Transportation Security Administration: TSA Executive Attrition Has Declined, but Better Information Is Needed on Reasons for Leaving and Executive Hiring Process
Published: 2009-10-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Transportation Security Executive Service (TSES) consists of executive-level staff serving in key agency positions just below political appointees. Committees of Congress have raise questions about the frequency of turnover within the TSES and have directed GAO to examine turnover among TSES staff. Accordingly, this report examines: (1) TSES attrition and how it compares with that of Senior Executive Service (SES) staff in other DHS components and cabinet-level departments, (2) the reasons TSES staff separated from TSA, and (3) TSA efforts to mange TSES attrition consistent with effective management practices. To answer these objectives, GAO analyzed data within the Office of Personnel Management's Central Personnel Data File, reviewed TSA human capital policies and procedures, and interviewed former TSES staff. The results of these interviews are not generalizable, but represent the views of about half the TSES staff who separated from fiscal years 2005 through 2008.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Separation data from fiscal years 2004 through 2008 show that attrition among TSA's TSES staff was consistently lower than the rate of attrition among all DHS SES staff and, through 2007, higher than SES attrition for all other cabinet-level departments. Separations among TSES staff peaked at 20 percent in fiscal years 2005, but declined each year thereafter, and resignations (as opposed to retirements, terminations, transfers to other cabinet level departments, or expirations of a term appointment) were the most frequent type of TSES separations over this period. In interviews with 46 former TSES staff, the majority (36 of 46) identified at least one adverse reason (that is, a reason related to dissatisfaction with some aspect of their experience at TSA) for leaving, as opposed to a nonadverse reason (such as leaving the agency for another professional opportunity). The two most frequently cited reasons for separation were dissatisfaction with the leadership style of the TSA administrator or those reporting directly to him (14 of 46) and to pursue another professional opportunity (14 of 46). To better address TSES attrition and manage executive resources, TSA has implemented measures consistent with effective human capital management practices and standards for internal control in the federal government. These measures include, among other things, reinstating an exit survey and establishing a process for hiring TSES staff that encompasses merit staffing requirements. However, TSA could improve upon these measures. For example, due to TSA officials' concerns about respondents' anonymity, TSA's new exit survey precludes TSES staff from identifying their position. Without such information, it will be difficult for TSA to identify reasons for attrition specific for TSES staff. Moreover, inconsistent with internal control standards, TSA did not document its adherence with at least one merit staffing procedure for 20 of 25 TSES hired in calendar year 2006 and 8 of 16 TSES hired in calendar year 2008. Although there are internal mechanisms that provide TSA officials reasonable assurance that merit staffing principles are followed, better documentation could also help TSA demonstrate to an independent third party, the Congress, and the public that its process for hiring TSES staff is fair and open.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the President  signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) into law on  November 19, 2001, establishing the Transportation Security  Administration (TSA) as the agency responsible for securing the nation’s  transportation systems, including civil aviation, highways, railroads, buses,  mass transit systems, ports, and pipelines. Immediately after its  formation, TSA began assembling a cadre of senior-level career staff to  help establish the new agency. These staff members became part of the  agency’s Transportation Security Executive Service (TSES), which— similar to the Senior Executive Service (SES) of other executive branch  agencies—is comprised of individuals selected for their executive  leadership experience and subject area expertise to serve in key agency  positions just below presidential appointees.
In June 2007, a report of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of  Representatives noted that TSA had frequent and sustained attrition within  its TSES ranks, resulting in a lack of historical knowledge about the  programs and policies of the agency. We have also reported that the  extensive loss of experienced workers can lead to critical gaps in an  agency’s leadership, skills, and institutional knowledge. Due to its  concern over TSA executive turnover, the Committee, in its report,  encouraged TSA to take appropriate measures to build a stable, senior  executive workforce so that when a change in political administration  occurs, the agency can continue operating throughout the transition  period without a diminution in transportation security oversight.  Subsequently, the explanatory statement accompanying the DHS  Appropriations Act, 2008, directed GAO to examine attrition—defined in  this report as any type of separation from service (e.g., resignation,  retirement, transfer)—among TSES staff since the agency’s formation.  Accordingly, this report addresses the following questions:  1.  What has been the attrition rate among TSES staff for fiscal years 2004  through 2008, and how does it compare to attrition among SES staff in  other DHS components and cabinet-level departments?   2.  What reasons did former TSES staff provide for leaving TSA, and how  do current TSA officials and industry stakeholders view the impact of  TSES attrition on TSA’s operations?  3.  To what extent are current TSA efforts to manage TSES attrition  consistent with effective human capital practices and standards for  internal control in the federal government?
To address the first objective, we obtained fiscal year 2004 through 2008  data from the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Central Personnel  Data File (CPDF) to determine the rate of attrition among TSES staff and  SES staff in other DHS components and cabinet-level departments. We  selected this time period because 2004 was the first full fiscal year during  which TSA was a part of DHS after transferring from the Department of  Transportation in March 2003, and 2008 was the most recently completed  fiscal year for which attrition data were available in CPDF. To calculate  attrition rates, we divided the total number of TSES who separated in a  given fiscal year by the average number of TSES employed by the agency  for that fiscal year. For these calculations, we included all separation  types—that is, the manner in which the TSES or SES staff member left the  agency or department, such as through resignation, transfer to another  cabinet-level department, retirement, termination, and expiration of a term  appointment. However, we did not include transfers from TSA to other  SES positions within DHS because this information was not readily  identifiable within CPDF data. We found CPDF data sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of this study. In addition to calculating the overall rate of  attrition for TSA, DHS, and cabinet-level departments, we also calculated  attrition rates for each separation type. To place TSA’s senior executive  attrition rate in context, we compared it to the overall DHS SES attrition  rate (excluding TSA) and the overall SES attrition rate for all other  cabinet-level departments (excluding DHS).
To obtain data on the reasons why former TSES chose to separate from  TSA, we conducted interviews with 46 TSES staff who left the agency  during fiscal years 2005 through 2008. To identify interviewees, we  obtained a list from TSA of all TSES staff who left the agency during fiscal  years 2005 through 2008—a total of 95 individuals. From this list, we  ultimately selected a nonprobability sample of 46 individuals for  interviews in order to achieve diversity among the following three  characteristics—fiscal year of separation (2005 through 2008), manner of  separation (resignations, retirements, etc.), and job location (headquarters  or field). To categorize the reasons why the 46 TSES staff separated, we  conducted a content analysis of their responses to our open-ended  interview question asking them to describe the reasons why they left the  agency. Although our sample did not allow us to generalize about the  reasons for all TSES separations from fiscal years 2005 through 2008, it did  provide us with the perspectives on why nearly half of these TSES staff  left TSA. To obtain information on the impact of TSES staff attrition on  agency operations, we conducted interviews with 22 TSA staff who were  direct reports to—that is, staff who were directly supervised by—at least  one of the TSES staff who separated from TSA during fiscal years 2005  through 2008, as well as 7 TSA officials who had supervised at least one of  these former TSES staff members. To obtain perspectives on how TSES  attrition may have impacted TSA’s ability to work with stakeholders, we  obtained information from seven industry associations representing  various transportation sectors that collaborate with TSA on transportation  security initiatives—three aviation, one surface, and three maritime  associations. We identified these associations based upon our existing  knowledge of contacts at various associations and by canvassing GAO’s  team of transportation security analysts for additional contacts. The  results of our interviews with direct reports, supervisors, and industry  stakeholders are not generalizable, but do provide a range of perspectives  on the impact of TSES attrition.
To gather information on the extent to which current TSA efforts to  manage TSES attrition are consistent with effective human capital  practices and internal control standards, we first reviewed past GAO  reports identifying effective human capital practices as well as the  standards for internal controls in the federal government. We also  reviewed applicable OPM regulations addressing merit staffing. We  conducted interviews with TSA human capital officials on efforts  underway and reviewed relevant documentation, such as TSA’s exit  interview protocols (past and planned), completed exit interviews with  separated staff, succession plans, and procedures for hiring TSES staff  which incorporate merit staffing requirements. We also reviewed all case  files containing documentation of the merit staffing procedures TSA  followed for the competitive selection of all individuals for career TSES  appointments from March 2006—when TSA established its hiring  process—through the end of calendar year 2006 and for all of calendar  year 2008.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 to October 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our objectives. Additional details on our scope and methodology  are included in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Human Capital Authorities and Flexibilities Available to TSA with Regard to Its Executive Staff
paragraphs: ATSA applied the personnel management system of the Federal Aviation  Administration (FAA) to TSA employees, and further authorized TSA to  make any modifications to the system it considered necessary.  Therefore, similar to FAA, TSA is exempt from many of the requirement s  imposed and enforced by OPM—the agency responsible for establishinghuman capital policies and regulations for the federal government—and,  thus, has more flexibility in managing its executive workforce than ma ny  other federal agencies. For example, compared to agencies operating  under OPM’s regulations, TSA is not limited in the number of permanent  TSES appointments and limited term TSES appointments it may make an the types of positions limited term TSES appointments may be used for.  Also, TSA has more discretion in granting recruitment, relocation, or  retention incentives to TSES staff than other agencies have for SES staff  (see table 1).
One benefit available to career-appointed SES in OPM-regulated agencies  is that once they are accepted into the SES of their agency, they can apply  for and obtain SES positions in other OPM-regulated executive branch  agencies without undergoing the merit staffing process. DHS and OPM  signed an agreement in February 2004 which also allows career-appointed  TSES staff the benefit of applying to SES positions without being subject  to the merit staffing process. Under the provisions of the agreement, TSA  must ensure that all TSES staff selected for their first career TSES  appointment (1) are hired using a process that encompasses merit staffing  principles and (2) undergo the ECQ-evaluation process. Consistent with  OPM regulations, a hiring process that encompasses federal merit  staffing requirements should include:    public notice of position availability,   identification of all minimally eligible candidates,   identification of position qualifications,   rating and ranking of all eligible candidates using position qualifications,    determination of the best qualified candidates (a “best qualified list”),    selection of a candidate for the position from among those best qualified,    certification of a candidate’s executive and technical qualifications.
TSES Positions within TSA  TSA has consistently employed more senior executives than any other  DHS component agency; however, as shown in table 2, from fiscal years  2005 through 2008, TSA went from being one of the DHS components with  the highest numbers of executive staff per nonexecutive staff, to one of  the components with the fewest executive staff per nonexecutive staff.  Specifically, out of eight DHS components, TSA had the third highest  number of executives per nonexecutive staff in 2005; however, by fiscal  year 2008, TSA had the third lowest number of executives per  nonexecutive staff. Compared with DHS overall, TSA had the same  number of executive per nonexecutive staff as DHS in 2005, but over the 4- year period, the number of TSA executive to nonexecutive staff declined,  while that of DHS increased. Moreover, the number of TSA executive staff  per nonexecutive staff was consistently lower than that of all cabinet-level  departments for fiscal years 2005 through 2008 (see table 2).
TSA has employed approximately equal numbers of TSES staff in both  headquarters and in the field, where its operational mission of securing the  nation’s transportation system is carried out (see table 3). TSES positions  in the field include federal security directors (FSDs) who are responsible  for implementing and overseeing security operations, including passenger  and baggage screening, at TSA-regulated airports; area directors, who  supervise and provide support and coordination of federal security  directors in the field; special agents in charge, who are part of the Federal  Air Marshal Service and generally located at airports to carry out  investigative activities; and senior field executives, who work with FSDs  and other federal, state, and local officials to manage operational  requirements across transportation modes. Headquarters executive  positions generally include officials responsible for managing TSA  divisions dedicated to internal agency operations, such as the Office of  Human Capital or the Office of Legislative Affairs, and external agency  operations, such as the Office of Security Operations and the Office of  Global Strategies.
section_title: TSES Attrition Has Declined Since 2005 and Has Consistently Been Lower than SES Attrition at Other DHS Components and, Until Recently, Above SES Attrition at Other Cabinet-level Departments
paragraphs: TSES attrition for fiscal years 2004 through 2008 was at its highest (20  percent) in fiscal year 2005, due to a surge in resignations for that fiscal  year. The rate of attrition among TSES staff for fiscal years 2004 through  2008 was consistently lower than the rate of attrition among all DHS SES,  but, until 2008, higher than the SES attrition rate for all other cabinet-level  departments. TSA human capital officials acknowledge that attrition  among TSES staff has been high in the past—which they attribute to the  frequent turnover in administrators the agency experienced from its  formation in fiscal year 2002 through mid-2005—and noted that since TSA  has had more stable leadership, attrition has declined.
subsections: section_title: TSES Attrition Peaked in Fiscal Year 2005, Primarily Due to Staff Resignations, and Has Since Declined
paragraphs: CPDF data for fiscal years 2004 through 2008 show that attrition among  TSES staff rose from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2005—peaking at 20  percent in fiscal year 2005—and has declined each year thereafter,  measuring 10 percent in 2008. Attrition includes separations due to  resignations, retirements, expiration of a limited term appointment,  terminations, or transfers to another cabinet-level department. The rate of  attrition among TSES headquarters staff was generally more than double  that of TSES staff in the field. Specifically, in fiscal years 2004, 2005, 2006,  and 2008, TSES attrition in headquarters was 26, 28, 28, and 14 percent  respectively, compared to TSES attrition in the field, which was 8, 13, 10,  and 6 percent respectively (see fig. 1).
With regard to the manner in which TSES separated (through resignation,  retirement, expiration of a limited term appointment, termination, or  transfer to another cabinet-level department), our analysis of CPDF data  shows that resignations were the most frequent type of TSES separation,  accounting for almost half of total separations over the 5-year period and  about two thirds of all separations during fiscal years 2005 and 2006 (see  table 4).  Also, over the 5-year period, transfers and retirements tied for  the second-most frequent type of TSES separation, while expiration of a  limited term appointment and “other” were the least common separation  types for TSES.
TSA human capital officials acknowledged that attrition among TSES staff  has been high at certain points in TSA’s history. They noted that frequent  turnover in administrators since TSA’s creation in 2002 through mid-2005  was the likely catalyst for much TSES attrition, and that once  Administrator Hawley, who served the longest term of any TSA  Administrator, was appointed, attrition among TSES staff declined.
section_title: Attrition among TSES Has Been Lower than that of All Other DHS SES, but Until Fiscal Year 2008, Higher than SES Attrition among Other Cabinet-level Departments
paragraphs: As shown in figure 2, the rate of attrition among TSES staff for fiscal years  2004 through 2008 was consistently lower than the rate of attrition among  all DHS SES. On the other hand, from fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the  TSES rate of attrition was higher than the overall SES attrition rate for all  other cabinet-level departments, but in 2008, the rate was slightly lower  than the rate for other cabinet-level departments.
When comparing attrition among types of separations, we found that TSA  had higher rates of executive resignations than DHS in 2005 and 2006; in  particular, the rate of TSES resignations in 2005 (13 percent) was almost  twice that of DHS SES (7 percent). TSA also had consistently higher rates  of executive resignations than other cabinet-level departments for fiscal  years 2004 through 2008 (see fig. 3). TSA human capital officials reiterated  that many of these resignations were likely influenced by frequent  turnover among TSA administrators, and that it is natural to expect that  some executive staff would choose to leave the agency after a change in  top agency leadership. They also explained that TSA’s high number of  resignations could, in part, reflect TSES staff who opted to resign in lieu of  being subject to disciplinary action or having a termination on their  permanent record.
Regarding other separation types, TSA’s TSES had lower rates of  retirements for fiscal years 2004 through 2008 than SES in DHS and all  cabinet-level departments. However, rates of transfers among TSES were  about the same as those among SES in DHS and cabinet-level  departments. For the same time period, TSA’s attrition rate for TSES  terminations and expiration of term appointments was 3 percent or less,  whereas the rate for DHS and all other cabinet-level departments was 1  percent or less.
section_title: Former TSES Staff We Interviewed Primarily Cited Adverse Reasons for Leaving TSA; Current TSA Employees and Other Stakeholders Expressed Varying Views on the Impact of These Separations
paragraphs: In interviews with 46 of 95 TSES who separated from TSA from fiscal  years 2005 through 2008, most reported adverse reasons for leaving the  agency—that is, a reason related to dissatisfaction with some aspect of  their TSA experience, as opposed to a nonadverse reason, such as to  spend more time with family or pursue another professional opportunity.  Perceptions regarding the impact of TSES separations on TSA operations  varied among TSA staff who directly reported to separated TSES staff  members, TSES supervisors, and stakeholder groups representing  industries that collaborate with TSA on security initiatives. Some of these  reported that TSES attrition had little or no impact on the agency’s ability  to implement transportation security initiatives, while others identified  negative effects on agency operations, such as a lack of program direction  and uncertainty and stress among employees.
subsections: section_title: TSES Staff We Interviewed Cited Nonadverse and Adverse Reasons for Leaving TSA
paragraphs: In addition to obtaining information on the manner by which TSES staff  separated from the agency, such as through resignation or retirement, we  also sought more detailed information on the factors that led staff  members to separate. For example, for TSES staff members who left the  agency through retirement, we sought information on any factors, beyond  basic eligibility, that compelled them to leave the agency. According to  TSA officials, one of the primary reasons for attrition among TSES has  been the large number of TSES term appointees employed by the agency,  who, by the very nature of their appointment, are expected to leave TSA,  generally within 3 years. However, as shown earlier in table 4, only 4 TSES  appointees separated from TSA due to the expiration of their  appointments for fiscal years 2004 through 2008, and TSA reported hiring a  total of 76 limited term appointees over this period. TSA human capital  officials later explained that when the time period for a limited term  appointments concludes, the reason for the staff member’s separation is  recorded on his or her personnel file as a type of “termination.” For this  reason, TSES on limited term appointments often leave the agency before  their terms expire in order to avoid having “termination” on their  personnel record, among other reasons. To better understand the reasons  for TSES separations, and the extent to which they may have been  influenced by TSES limited term appointments, we requested TSA exit  interview data that would provide more in-depth explanations as to why  the former TSES staff members left the agency. Since TSA had  documented exit interviews for only 5 of 95 TSES staff members who  separated from TSA from fiscal years 2005 through 2008, we interviewed  46 of these former TSES staff to better understand the reasons why they  left the agency. As stated previously, because we selected these  individuals based on a nonprobability sampling method, we cannot  generalize about the reasons for all TSES separations from fiscal years  2005 through 2008. However, these interviews provided us with  perspectives on why nearly half of these TSES staff left TSA.
Of the 46 former TSES staff members we interviewed, 33 cited more than  one reason for leaving TSA. Specifically, these individuals gave between  one and six reasons for separating, with an average of two reasons  identified per interviewee. Ten of 46 interviewees identified only  nonadverse reasons for leaving TSA, 24 identified only adverse reasons,  and 12 cited both adverse and nonadverse reasons. Nonadverse reasons  were those not related to dissatisfaction with TSA, such as leaving the  agency for another professional opportunity or to spend more time with  family. Adverse reasons were those related to dissatisfaction with some  aspect of the TSES staff member’s experience at TSA. As shown in table 5,  we identified three categories of nonadverse reasons and nine categories  of adverse reasons for why TSES staff left TSA. By discussing only the  perspectives of former TSES, we may not be presenting complete  information regarding the circumstances surrounding their separation  from TSA. However, as we agreed not to identify to TSA the identities of  respondents we spoke with, we did not obtain TSA’s viewpoint on these  separations because doing so would risk revealing the interviewee’s  identity.
section_title: Nonadverse Reasons Cited for Leaving TSA
paragraphs: Of the TSES staff we interviewed who reported leaving TSA for  nonadverse reasons, 14 of the 46 reported leaving for another professional  opportunity, such as a position in a security consulting firm. Seven of 46  reported separating from TSA because of personal reasons, such as the  desire to spend quality time with family, and 4 of the 46 TSES told us they  separated from the agency because they were employed on re-employed  annuitant waivers, which expired after 5 years.
section_title: Adverse Reasons Cited for Leaving TSA
paragraphs: Of the TSES staff we interviewed who reported leaving TSA for adverse  reasons, 14 of the 46 cited dissatisfaction with the leadership style of top  management as a reason they left the agency. These interviewees defined  top leadership as the TSA Administrator or those reporting directly to him,  such as Assistant Administrators. In addition to issues with management  style, 10 of the 14 responses focused specifically on top leadership’s  communication style and cited instances in which top management had  not communicated with other TSES staff and, in some cases, with lower- level staff. For example, one former FSD reported that new policies and  procedures were implemented by headquarters with little or no notice to  the field. He explained that in some cases, he learned that headquarters  had issued new policies or procedures when the media called to ask  questions about them. Another TSES interviewee reported that  communication occurred between the administrator and a core group, but  all other staff received only “bits and pieces of information.” Other  examples provided in this category were more general. For example, 3  interviewees reported they were compelled to leave the agency due to a  specific TSA Administrator’s more hierarchical management style.
Thirteen of the 46 former TSES staff we interviewed stated that some of  their colleagues lacked executive-level skills or were selected for positions  based on personal relationships with administrators or other TSES staff.  Specifically, 12 of the 13 interviewees in this category stated their  colleagues lacked the necessary qualifications for the position. For  example, one interviewee mentioned that an individual with a rail  background was put in charge of a TSA division that focused on aviation  policy. In addition, 6 of the 13 TSES staff in this category stated that many  in the TSES were hired based on personal relationships, as opposed to  executive qualifications. As discussed previously, unlike many other  federal agencies, TSA is not required to adhere to merit staffing principles  when hiring for limited term TSES positions. However, TSA has agreed to  adhere to merit staffing principles when hiring for career TSES positions  in accordance with the OPM-DHS interchange agreement. The former  TSES staff we interviewed did not always provide us with the names of  their colleagues whom they believed were not hired in accordance with  merit staffing principles. Additionally, documentation related to the hiring  of TSES staff who joined the agency prior to March 2006 was not generally  available. Therefore, we were not able to conduct an independent  assessment of whether the TSES in question should have been hired, and  subsequently were hired, in accordance with merit staffing principles.  However, later in this report, we discuss the extent to which TSA  documented its adherence to merit staffing principles when hiring for  TSES career positions in 2006 and 2008, such that an independent third  party could make this type of assessment in the future.
Thirteen of the 46 TSES staff we interviewed cited dissatisfaction with the  authority and responsibilities of their position as a reason for leaving.  Specifically, 7 TSES staff members reported being dissatisfied with the  limited authority associated with their position. For example, during a  period when contractors, as opposed to FSDs, were responsible for hiring  TSA airport employees, one former FSD explained that he arrived at the  interview site to observe the interview and testing process for the  transportation security officer candidates, but was not allowed to enter  the facility, even though he would be supervising many of the individuals  who were hired. The remaining 6 TSES reported that they were either  dissatisfied with the duties and responsibilities of their position, or they  became dissatisfied with their position after (1) they were reassigned to a  less desirable position or (2) they believed their position lost authority  over the course of their employment. For example, regarding the latter,  one former TSES staff member reported that after his division was  subsumed within another, he became dissatisfied with no longer having  the ability to report directly to the administrator or implement policies  across the agency, and subsequently left the agency.
Twelve of the 46 TSES staff we interviewed cited disagreement with top  leadership’s priorities or decisions as a reason for separation. Seven of the  12 TSES staff in this category disagreed with a specific management  decision. For example, one former TSES staff member reported leaving  the agency when top leadership decided to discontinue a process for  evaluating candidates for a certain TSA position, which the former TSES  staff member believed was critical to selecting appropriate individuals for  the position. The other 5 staff in this category questioned agency priorities.  For example, one TSES staff member believed that TSA focused on  aviation security at the expense of security for other modes of  transportation, while another commented that agency priorities had  shifted from a security focus to one that was centered on customer  service.
Eleven of the 46 TSES staff we interviewed reported that they were  frustrated with numerous agency reorganizations and frequent changes in  TSA administrators. For example, one TSES staff member reported that  during her tenure she experienced six physical office changes along with  multiple changes to duties and responsibilities, making it difficult to lead a  cohesive program in the division. We conducted an analysis of TSA  organization charts from calendar years 2002 through 2008, and found that  TSA underwent at least 10 reorganizations over this period. Furthermore,  the charts reflected 149 changes in the TSES staff in charge of TSA  divisions. Also, TSA was headed by several different administrators from  2002 through mid-2005—specifically, a total of 4 within its first 5 years of  existence. TSA human capital officials acknowledged that the many  reorganizations and changes in agency leadership the agency has  experienced since its formation have led to many TSES staff separations.
With regard to some of the remaining adverse reasons,    Nine of the 46 TSES staff told us they separated from the agency because  they believed that TSA executives and employees were treated in an  unprofessional or disrespectful manner. For example, one TSES staff  member reported that upon completion of a detail at another federal  agency, he returned to TSA and learned that his TSES position had been  backfilled without his knowledge.
Nine of the 46 TSES staff reported they were either terminated or  pressured to leave the agency. We reviewed TSA-provided data on  separations, and found that 3 of the 9 TSES in this category were actually  terminated. The 6 who were not terminated reported that they were  pressured to leave the agency. Specifically, 4 of the 6 reported that they  were forced out of the agency after being offered positions that TSA  leadership knew would be undesirable to them due to the location, duties,  or supervisor associated with the position. Finally, 2 of the 6 TSES  reported they were compelled to resign after being wrongly accused of  misconduct or poor performance.
Five of the 46 TSES staff we spoke with reported either insufficient or  inequitable pay as a reason for separating from the agency. In one case, a  TSES staff member told us that, unlike his peers, he did not receive any  bonuses or pay increases even though he was given excellent performance  reviews. TSA provided us with data on the total amount of bonuses  awarded to each TSES staff person employed with the agency during fiscal  years 2005 through 2008. Agency documentation reflects that these  bonuses were awarded to recognize performance. Of the 95 TSES who  separated during this 4-year period, 55 were awarded performance  bonuses, and the total amount of these awards ranged from $1,000 to  $44,000. Of 141 TSES who were employed with TSA during fiscal years  2005 through 2008, 92 were awarded performance bonuses, and the total  amount of these awards ranged from at least $4,800 to $85,000. Another  interviewee told us that he left TSA due, in part, to his perception that  TSES staff doing aviation security work were paid more than TSES staff  such as himself who worked in other nonaviation transportation modes.
section_title: TSA Employees and Stakeholders Held Varying Opinions on the Impact of TSES Attrition
paragraphs: While some attrition impacts agency operations negatively, such as the  loss of historical knowledge or expertise, the separation of other staff can  have a positive impact on agency operations—such as when an executive  is not meeting performance expectations. To identify the potential impact  of TSES separations on agency operations, we conducted interviews with  TSA staff who were direct reports to and immediate supervisors of TSES  staff members who left the agency. We also interviewed representatives of  seven transportation security associations. While we would not expect any  of these individuals to have a full understanding of the impact that TSES  attrition had on the agency, we believe that presenting the perspectives of  superiors and subordinates and external agency stakeholders enables us  to offer additional perspective on this issue.
We found that the direct reports, supervisors, and external stakeholders  had varying views regarding the impact that TSES attrition has had on  TSA. Specifically, of the 22 direct reports we interviewed, 13 stated that  TSES attrition had little or no impact on TSA’s programs and policies,  whereas 8 others cited negative effects, such as delays in the development  and implementation of agency programs. Two programs direct reports  identified as being negatively affected by TSES attrition were Secure  Flight and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)  programs. In addition, 12 of the direct reports stated that TSES attrition  had little or no impact on the functioning of their particular division,  although 10 cited negative effects such as a lack of communication  regarding the direction of the division and its goals; difficulties in building  relationships with ever-changing supervisors; and decreased morale.  Regarding our interviews with the 7 supervisors of TSES staff who since  left the agency, 6 reported that TSES attrition had little or no impact on  TSA’s programs and policies, but one stated that TSES separations caused  a lack of vision and direction for program development. Additionally, 4  supervisors did not believe that TSES attrition had negative impacts on the  functioning of a specific division, but 3 supervisors stated that TSES  attrition did have negative impacts, stating that separations cause  uncertainty and stress among employees, which negatively impacts  morale.
With regard to our interviews with seven industry associations  representing the various stakeholders affected by TSA programs and  policies (for example, airports, mass transit systems, and maritime  industries), four industry associations could not identify a negative impact  attributable to turnover among TSES staff. The remaining three  stakeholders reported delayed program implementation and a lack of  communication from TSA associated with TSES turnover.
TSA human capital officials noted that they were generally pleased that  many of the supervisors, direct reports, and stakeholders we interviewed  stated that the impact of TSES turnover on agency operations was  minimal. In particular, they interpreted this as evidence that their  succession planning efforts—to identify, develop, and select successors  who are the right people with the right skills for leadership and other key  positions—are working as intended, and minimizing the impact of  turnover on agency operations.
section_title: TSA Has Implemented Measures to Address TSES Attrition Consistent with Effective Human Capital Practices and Internal Controls, but Data on Exit Surveys and Hiring Decisions Could Be Improved
paragraphs: By affording separating TSES the opportunity to complete an exit survey,  TSA has taken steps to address attrition that are consistent with internal  control standards and effective human capital management practices.  Nevertheless, the current survey instrument does not allow TSES staff  leaving the agency to identify themselves as executive-level staff, hence  preventing the agency from isolating the responses of TSES staff and using  the data to address reasons for TSES attrition. In addition, the agency has  implemented other measures to improve overall management of its TSES  corps that are consistent with effective human capital management  practices and internal control standards, such as issuing an official  handbook that delineates human capital policies applying to the TSES,  implementing a succession plan, and incorporating merit-based staffing  requirements (which are intended to ensure fair and open competition for  positions) into its process for hiring executive staff. However, inconsistent  with internal control standards, TSA did not always clearly document its  implementation of merit staffing requirements.
subsections: section_title: TSA Has Taken Steps to Manage TSES Attrition by Affording Separating TSES Staff the Opportunity to Complete an Exit Survey and Decreasing Its Use of Limited Term Appointments, but Limited Exit Survey Data May Hinder Efforts
paragraphs: According to TSA officials, in January 2008, TSA began collecting data on  the reasons for TSES separation through an exit interview process, asking  questions specifically designed to capture the experiences of executive- level staff. The interview was administered by TSA human capital officials.  According to a TSA official, after we requested access to this information  in September 2008, TSA ceased conducting these exit interviews due to  concerns that the format would not provide for anonymity of former TSES  staff members’ responses. According to standards for internal control in  the federal government, as part of its human capital planning, management  should consider how best to retain valuable employees to ensure the  continuity of needed skills and abilities. Also, we have reported that  collecting and analyzing data on the reasons for attrition through exit  interviews is important for strategic workforce planning.  Such planning  entails developing and implementing long-term strategies for acquiring,  developing, and retaining employees, so that an agency has a workforce in  place capable of accomplishing its mission. In March 2009, TSA,  recognizing the importance of such a process to its management of TSES  resources, announced it was affording separating TSES staff the  opportunity to complete an exit survey. Specifically, TSA officials reported  that they would use the agency’s National Exit Survey instrument, which  has been in use for non-TSES staff since November 2005. We reviewed  the survey instrument, which consists of 21 questions (20 closed ended  and one open ended) concerning the staff member’s experience at TSA  and the specific reasons for separation, and found that it generally covered  all the reasons for separation identified by 46 separated TSES staff we  interviewed.
Although TSA’s National Exit Survey responses are submitted  anonymously (thereby allaying TSA’s concerns with the previous TSES  exit interview process), respondents are given the opportunity to identify  what position they held at TSA, such as “Transportation Security Officer  (TSO),” by selecting from a pre-set list of position titles. However, TSA  does not list “TSES” among the answer choices, which precludes TSES  staff who fill out the survey from identifying their position rank. TSA  officials explained that they do not allow TSES staff to self-identify  because, given the small number of TSES staff who leave the agency in a  given year, it may be possible to determine the identity of a particular  TSES respondent. However, according to TSA’s documented policy for  analyzing exit survey data, survey responses will not be analyzed by  position if the total number of respondents in that position is fewer than  five. We discussed this issue with TSA human capital officials and the TSA  officials stated that, in light of this policy, they may consider allowing  TSES staff members to identify themselves as such when filling out the  survey. Without the ability to isolate the responses of TSES staff from  those of other staff, it will be difficult for TSA to use the results of the exit  survey to identify reasons for attrition specific to TSES staff, thus  hindering TSA’s ability to use exit survey data to develop a strategy for  retaining talented TSES staff with specialized skills and knowledge, and  ensuring continuity among the agency’s leadership.
TSA has also sought to manage attrition among TSES by decreasing its use  of limited term TSES appointments. TSA officials believe that the agency’s  use of limited term appointments has contributed to higher attrition  among TSES staff. TSA’s Chief Human Capital Officer stated that during  the agency’s formation and transition to DHS, TSA made more liberal use  of limited term appointments, as it was necessary to quickly hire those  individuals with the executive and subject area expertise to establish the  agency. The official explained that as the agency has matured, and since it  now has a regular executive candidate development program, the agency  has hired fewer limited term appointments. TSA data on the number of  limited term TSES appointed (hired) per fiscal year from 2004 through  2008 show that the agency’s use of limited term appointments has  generally been decreasing, both in number and as a proportion of all new  TSES appointments. Specifically, the number of new limited term  appointments was highest in fiscal year 2004, representing over half of all  TSES appointments for that fiscal year; in fiscal year 2008, TSES made six  TSES limited term appointments, representing a sixth of all new  appointments for that fiscal year (see table 6).
section_title: TSA Has Taken Steps to Better Manage Its TSES Program, but Better Documentation Is Needed so that TSA Can Demonstrate Its Use of Merit-Based Staffing Procedures as Part of Its TSES Hiring Process
paragraphs: TSA has implemented a number of steps to help attract and retain TSES  staff. In November 2008, TSA issued a TSES handbook delineating human  capital policies and procedures applicable to TSES staff. Prior to this, a  comprehensive policy document did not exist. According to standards for  internal control in the federal government, management should establish  good human capital policies and practices for hiring, training, evaluating,  counseling, promoting, compensating, and disciplining personnel in order  to maintain an environment throughout the organization that sets a  positive and supportive attitude toward internal control and conscientious  management. Moreover, these policies and practices should be clearly  documented and readily available for examination.
TSA has had documented policies and procedures in place for such things  as reassignments, transfers, and terminations since December 2003, and  for the performance assessment of its TSES staff since July 2003.  However, in November 2008, TSA issued a more comprehensive  management directive delineating the agency’s human capital policies and  procedures for TSES that, in addition to the areas listed above, also covers  details to other agencies, reinstatements, compensation, work schedules,  leave, awards and recognition, disciplinary actions, and workforce  reductions.  TSA stated that its goal is to ensure that all current TSES  staff members are aware and have copies of the management directive.  The directive, along with TSA’s stated commitment to increasing TSES  access to this information, should help provide TSES staff with a more  accurate and complete understanding of the applicable human capital  management authorities, flexibilities, policies, and procedures.
TSA also developed a succession plan in 2006 to improve its overall human  capital management of TSES staff.  TSA’s succession planning efforts  provide for a more systematic assessment of position needs and staff  capabilities. Specifically, the plan targets 81 positions (both TSES and pay- band) and identifies the leadership and technical competencies required  for all. The program is designed to recruit talented TSA staff in lower- level positions as possible candidates for these positions and encourage  them to apply for entrance into a Senior Leadership Development Program  (SLDP) where, upon acceptance, program participants are to receive  special access to training and development experiences. Moreover,  program participants are to have their executive core qualifications  approved by OPM upon completion of the program, making them eligible  for noncompetitive placement into vacant TSES positions. We have  previously reported that succession planning can enable an agency to  remain aware of and be prepared for its current and future needs as an  organization, including having a workforce with the knowledge, skills, and  abilities needed for the agency to pursue its mission.
To better manage its TSES program, TSA also established in 2006 a hiring  process for TSES staff that incorporates merit staffing requirements;  however, TSA lacked documentation that would demonstrate whether  TSA is consistently following these requirements. Although TSA has more  human capital flexibilities with regard to hiring than most federal  agencies, the agency, on its own initiative, sought to incorporate various  merit staffing requirements into its hiring process. Merit staffing  requirements help to ensure that competition for executive positions is fair  and transparent, and that individuals with the necessary technical skills  and abilities are selected for positions—which was a concern for 13 of the  46 former TSES we interviewed. While TSA human capital officials  asserted that TSA has always hired qualified TSES staff in accordance with  merit staffing requirements, these officials also acknowledged that for  most of TSA’s existence, the agency did not have a documented process  for doing so. In January 2006, TSA established an Executive Resources  Council (ERC), which was chartered to advise the TSA Administrator and  Deputy Administrator on the recruitment, assessment, and selection of  executives, among other things. TSA’s ERC charter requires that merit  staffing be used when hiring for TSES positions by encompassing certain  merit staffing requirements into its procedures, namely public notice of  position availability; identification, rating, and ranking of eligible  candidates against position qualifications; determination of a list of best  qualified candidates with the final selection coming from among those best  qualified; and the agency’s certification of the final candidate’s  qualifications.
According to internal control standards, internal controls and other  significant events—which could include the hiring of TSES staff—need to  be clearly documented, and the documentation should be properly  managed and maintained. To determine the extent to which TSA  documented its implementation of the merit staffing procedures, we  reviewed case files for evidence that merit staffing procedures were  followed for the selection of 25 career TSES appointments for calendar  year 2006 (the year the TSES staffing process was established) and 16  TSES staff for calendar year 2008 (the most recent full calendar year for  which documentation was available). We could not review  documentation prior to this period because TSA explained that its hiring  decisions were not consistently documented prior to the establishment of  its ERC process in March 2006.
Based upon our review, we found that for 20 of the 25 career TSES who  were hired competitively in calendar year 2006 and for 8 of the 16 TSES  who were hired competitively in calendar year 2008, documentation  identifying how TSA implemented at least one of the merit staffing  procedures was either missing or unclear. For example, in our review of  one 2008 case file, we found that the person selected for the position had  not previously held a career executive-level position, but we did not find  documentation indicating on what basis the person had been rated and  ranked against other candidates applying for the position. Absent such  documentation, it is uncertain whether the appointment comported with  TSA’s hiring process. Moreover, OPM regulations establishing merit  staffing requirements, upon which TSA based its staffing process, provide  that agencies operating under merit staffing requirements must retain such  documentation for 2 years to permit reconstruction of merit staffing  actions. Table 7 identifies the specific merit staffing procedures required  by TSA’s hiring process for which documentation was either missing or  unclear.
TSA human capital officials told us that a lack of documentation within  case files does not necessarily indicate that merit staffing procedures were  not followed for a particular staffing decision. Specifically, TSA stated that  because the TSES staffing process consists of multiple levels of review,  including review by both the TSA and DHS Executive Resources Councils,  regardless of the lack of documentation, the agency has reasonable  assurance that merit staffing principles have been followed. While TSA  officials may believe that the agency has these assurances internally, by  ensuring that there is complete and consistent documentation of its TSES  staffing decisions, TSA can better demonstrate to an independent third  party, the Congress, and the public that the way in which it hires for TSES  positions is fair and open, that candidates are evaluated on the same basis,  that selection for the position is not based on political or other non-job  related factors, and that executives with the appropriate skills sets are  selected for positions.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Given the broad visibility of its mission to secure our nation’s  transportation system, it is important that TSA maintain a skilled  workforce led by well-qualified executives. As TSA prepares to bring on a  new administrator, it would be beneficial to address some of the  circumstances which led the former TSES staff members we interviewed  to separate. TSA has taken steps to address attrition among TSES staff and  to improve overall management of its TSES workforce. However, some  modifications to these efforts could be beneficial. For example, TSA’s  planned effort to conduct exit surveys of TSES staff—consistent with  human capital best practices—is intended to provide TSA with more  comprehensive data on the reasons why TSES staff decided to leave the  agency. However, the method by which TSA has chosen to collect these  data—anonymous surveys in which the separating TSES do not disclose  their level of employment—will not provide TSA reasons why TSES staff,  in particular, left the agency, thereby rendering the data less useful for  addressing TSES attrition. TSA has also implemented a process to hire  TSES staff, which incorporates procedures based upon merit staffing  requirements in order to ensure that candidates for career TSES  appointments are evaluated and hired on the basis of their skills and  abilities as opposed to personal relationships—which was a concern  among some former TSES staff we interviewed. By more consistently  documenting whether and how it has applied merit staffing procedures  when filling career TSES positions, TSA can better demonstrate that its  hiring of TSES is fair and merit-based, as intended.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To address attrition among TSES staff and improve management of TSES  resources, we recommend that the TSA Administrator take the following  two actions:    Ensure that the National Exit Survey, or any other exit survey instrument  TSA may adopt, can be used to distinguish between responses provided by  TSES staff and other staff, so that the agency can determine why TSES  staff, in particular, are separating from TSA.
Require that TSA officials involved in the staffing process for TSES staff  fully document how they applied each of the merit staffing principles  required by TSA when evaluating, qualifying, and selecting individuals to  fill career TSES positions.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: On October 7, 2009, we received written comments on the draft report,  which are reproduced in full in appendix IV. TSA concurred with our  recommendations and has taken action to implement them. In addition,  TSA, as well as OPM, provided technical comments on the draft report,  which we incorporated as appropriate.
With regard to our recommendation that TSA allow TSES staff to identify  themselves as such when filling out the National Exit Survey, TSA stated  that it has revised Question 27 of the National Exit Survey—”What is your  pay band?”—to include “TSES” as a response option. Regarding our  second recommendation that TSA fully document how it applied merit  staffing principles when evaluating, qualifying, and selecting individuals to  fill career TSES positions, TSA stated that it has established a checklist for  proper documentation and will conduct an internal audit of TSES  selection files on a quarterly basis.
While TSA agrees that it should document its adherence to merit staffing  principles, it raised a question about our analysis by stating that that we  regarded documentation of TSA’s certification of the candidate’s executive  and technical qualifications as deficient if there was not both a signed  letter from the selecting official and a signed Executive Resources Council  recommendation, even when contemporaneous records existed. However,  TSA’s statement is not accurate. To clarify, we considered documentation  of this merit staffing principle complete if there was both a signed letter  from the selecting official as well as a description of the candidate’s  executive and technical qualifications. Therefore, even if the signed ERC  recommendation was not present, if other contemporaneous records were  provided to us attesting to the candidate’s executive and technical  qualifications, we would have given TSA credit for this. We found that for  2006, of the 11 staffing folders that we determined had incomplete  documentation of TSA’s adherence to the agency certification principle, 4  were only missing the signed certification by the selecting official, 5 were  only missing the description of the candidate’s qualifications, and 2 of the  folders were missing both the signed letter from the selecting official as  well as a description of the candidate’s executive and technical  qualifications. The one folder we identified from 2008 as having  incomplete documentation of TSA’s certification of the candidate was  missing a description of the candidate’s qualifications. The absence of  critical documentation makes it difficult to support TSA’s statement that it  has implemented a rigorous process for executive resources management  consistent with effective human capital management practices and  standards for internal control.
TSA also stated that it was unable to respond to the reasons we reported  for why former TSES staff left the agency, because the responses were  anonymous. It is the case that we did not provide TSA with the names of  the former TSES staff with whom we spoke. However, we chose not to do  so because we believe that if the former TSES staff we interviewed knew  that we were going to share their names with TSA, they would have been  less candid and forthcoming in their responses. We would also like to note  that TSA would not have had to rely on the information we obtained from  former TSES staff regarding their reasons for leaving if TSA had  consistently been conducting exit interviews or exit surveys between 2005  and 2008, which is the period of time during which those we interviewed  left the agency.
We will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Acting Assistant Secretary for TSA. The report will  also be available at no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any further questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Most executive branch agencies—including most Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) agencies—have a Senior Executive Service  (SES), which is comprised of individuals selected for their executive  leadership experience and subject area expertise who serve in key agency  positions just below presidential appointees. However, due to its  exemption from many of the requirements imposed and enforced by the  Office of Personnel Management (OPM)—the agency responsible for  establishing human capital policies and regulations for the federal  government—the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA)  executives are part of the Transportation Security Executive Service  (TSES), which is distinct from the SES of other agencies. The explanatory  statement accompanying the DHS Appropriations Act, 2008, directed GAO  to “report on the history of senior executive service-level career turnover  since the formation of TSA.” Accordingly, we addressed the following  questions regarding TSA’s TSES staff:  1.  What has been the attrition rate among TSES staff for fiscal years 2004  through 2008, and how does it compare to attrition among SES staff in  other DHS components and cabinet-level departments?  2.  What reasons did former TSES staff provide for leaving TSA, and how  do current TSA officials and stakeholders view the impact of TSES  attrition on TSA’s operations?  3.  To what extent are current TSA efforts to manage TSES attrition  consistent with effective human capital practices and standards for  internal control in the federal government?
More details about the scope and methodology of our work to address  each of these principal questions are presented below.
subsections: section_title: Objective 1 - Attrition Rates for TSES Staff and SES Staff in DHS and Other Cabinet-level Departments
paragraphs: To calculate attrition for TSES staff and SES staff in DHS overall  (excluding TSA) as well as other cabinet-level departments, we analyzed  fiscal year 2004 through 2008 data from OPM’s Central Personnel Data File  (CPDF), a repository of selected human capital data for most Executive  Branch employees, including separations data. We selected this time  period because 2004 was the first full fiscal year during which TSA was a  part of DHS after transferring from the Department of Transportation in  March 2003, and thus a more meaningful starting point for comparing  TSES attrition to SES attrition at other federal agencies. Also, at the time  of our review, 2008 was the most recently completed fiscal year for which  attrition data were available in CPDF. The individuals who we classified as  senior executive staff who attrited, or separated, from their agencies were  those with CPDF codes that:  identified them as senior executive staff, specifically TSES, SES, or SES  equivalent staff and  indicated that they had separated from their agency of employment  through resignation, transfer to another cabinet-level department,  retirement, termination, expiration of term appointment, or “other”  separation type.
We did not include TSES or SES staff who made intradepartmental  transfers (such as transferring from TSA to U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP), which is another DHS agency) when calculating  attrition because these data were not readily available in CPDF.
We calculated the executive attrition rates (both SES and TSES) for each  fiscal year by dividing the total number of executive separations for a  given fiscal year by the average of (1) the number of senior executive staff  in the CPDF as of the last pay period of the fiscal year prior to the fiscal  year for which the attrition rate was calculated and (2) the number of  senior executive staff in CPDF as of the last pay period of the fiscal year in  which the attrition occurred. To place the TSA’s senior executive attrition  rate in context, we compared it to the overall DHS SES attrition rate  (excluding TSA) and the overall SES attrition rate for all other cabinet- level departments (excluding DHS). We did not calculate senior executive  attrition rates for individual component agencies within DHS (such as for  U.S. Secret Service) because the total number of senior executive staff for  most of these components for a given fiscal year was fewer than 50. We  generally do not to calculate rates or percentages when the total  population for any unit is less than 50. Given that we could not provide  rates for all DHS components, we decided not to compare TSES attrition  to SES attrition for individual DHS components; however we do provide  data on the number and type of executive separations for each DHS  component in appendix II.
For additional context, we compared the attrition rate for TSES staff who  worked in TSA headquarters to those who worked in field locations for  fiscal years 2004 through 2008. The CPDF does not identify whether a  TSES staff person is considered headquarters or field staff, but does  include codes that identify the physical location of each TSES position,  including the location of TSA’s headquarters building. As such, we  considered headquarters TSES staff to be all TSES staff assigned location  codes for TSA’s headquarters building. In addition, using CPDF location  codes, we identified all TSES staff working in the Washington D.C. area  (Washington, D.C., and nearby counties in Virginia and Maryland) who  were not assigned location codes for TSA headquarters, and asked TSA to  identify which of these individuals were considered headquarters staff. All  TSES staff not identified as headquarters staff were considered field staff.
We believe that the CPDF data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  this study. Regarding the CPDF, we have previously reported that  governmentwide data from the CPDF were 97 percent or more accurate.
section_title: Objective 2 - Reasons for TSES Separations from TSA and Stakeholder Views on the Impact of TSES Attrition on TSA Operations
paragraphs: To identify the reasons for TSES staff attrition, we selected a  nonprobability sample of 46 former TSES staff members to interview from  a TSA-provided list of 95 TSES staff members who separated from the  agency during fiscal years 2005 through 2008. TSA provided us with the  last-known contact information for each of these individuals. We searched  electronic databases, such as LexisNexis, or used Internet search engines  to obtain current contact information for these individuals if the  information TSA provided was outdated. We determined that the TSA- provided list of 95 former TSES staff was sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this study. To make this determination, we compared TSA  data on TSES staff separations with the number of TSES separations  identified in CPDF and found that both sources reported sufficiently  similar numbers of TSES staff separations per fiscal year.
We attempted to select former TSES staff based on a probability sample in  order to generalize about the reasons for TSES separation. Of the 46  interviewees, 31 were selected based upon a randomized list of the 95  separated TSES created to select a probability sample. We were unable to  obtain an acceptable response rate for our sample, thus we determined we  would continue interviewing until we had obtained responses from about  half of the 95 separated TSES staff. We selected the remaining 15  interviewees in our sample of 46 in such a way that the proportion of  interviewees with the following three characteristics—fiscal year of  separation (2005 through 2008), manner of separation (resignations,  retirements, etc.), and job location (headquarters or field)—would be  about the same as the proportion of the 95 TSES staff members who  separated during fiscal year 2005 through 2008 who had those  characteristics. For example, if one-third of the 95 former TSES staff TSA  identified left the agency in fiscal year 2005, then our goal was to ensure  that approximately one-third of the 46 former TSES we interviewed left in  2005. We were not always successful in obtaining interviews with staff  possessing some of the characteristics required to make our sample  population resemble the larger population; however, for most  characteristics, our sample of 46 generally had the same proportions as the  larger population of TSES (see table 8). To obtain our sample of 46 TSES,  we contacted a total of 70 of the 95 separated TSES, and of these 70, 24 did  not respond to our request for an interview. Specifically, 16 of these  nonresponses were from our attempt to select a probability sample. After  we began selecting TSES for interviews based on the three  characteristics—fiscal year of separation (2005 through 2008), manner of  separation (resignations, retirements, etc.), and job location (headquarters  or field)—we encountered an additional 8 nonresponses.
Since we determined which former TSES staff to interview based on a  nonprobability sample, we cannot generalize the interview results to all  TSES staff who separated from TSA from fiscal years 2005 through 2008.  However, these results provided us with an indication of the range of  reasons why nearly half of the TSES staff who separated from TSA during  this time period left the agency.
To ensure consistency in conducting our interviews with separated TSES  staff members, we developed a structured interview guide of 24 questions  that focused on senior-level executives’ reasons for separation and their  opinions on how TSA could better manage attrition. We conducted 3 of the  46 interviews in person at GAO headquarters and the remainder via  telephone. Our question on the reasons for separation was open-ended;  therefore, to analyze the responses to this question, we performed a  systematic content analysis. To do so, our team of analysts reviewed all  responses to this question, proposed various descriptive categories in  which TSES reasons for leaving TSA could be grouped based upon themes  that emerged from the interview responses, and ultimately reached  consensus on the 12 categories listed in table 9 below.
To determine which categories applied to a particular response provided  by the former TSES staff members we interviewed, two analysts  independently reviewed interview responses and assigned categories to  the data; there was no limit to the number of categories the analysts could  assign to each response. If the two analysts assigned the same categories,  we considered the reasons for separation agreed upon. If they determined  different categories applied, a third analyst reviewed the interview data  and independently assigned categories. If the third analyst assigned the  same category as one of the other reviewers, we considered the reason for  separation the agreed upon category. If all three analysts assigned  different categories, we coded the reason for separation as “unclassified.”  Of the 46 responses we received to our question regarding reasons why the  former TSES we interviewed separated from TSA, the initial two analysts  agreed upon the categories for 37 TSES staff members’ responses. For all 9  responses in which there was disagreement, a third analyst who reviewed  the data agreed with the category assigned by one of the other two other  analysts.
One of the general categories we established for why TSES separated from  TSA was dissatisfaction with numerous agency reorganizations. To  identify the number of reorganizations TSA experienced since its creation,  and the movement of TSES staff associated with these reorganizations, we  analyzed 10 organization charts provided to us by TSA covering calendar  years 2002 through 2008. These charts identified only high-level TSA  organizational divisions and the TSES staff member (usually an Assistant  Administrator) who headed each division. To identify movement of TSES  staff, we compared the charts in chronological order and counted the  number of changes in the TSES staff person heading the division from one  chart to the next. In conducting our analysis, we did not determine  whether changes in TSES staff from one chart to the next were directly  attributable to TSA’s reorganizations because we did not have the  resources to investigate the specific circumstances surrounding each of  the 149 changes.
Another of the general categories we established for why TSES staff  separated from TSA was dissatisfaction due to their perception of  receiving insufficient or inequitable pay. TSA provided us data on the total  amount of bonuses received by TSES staff employed with TSA during  fiscal years 2005 through 2008. We analyzed these data to identify the  number of TSES staff who received bonuses and the range of these  cumulative payments for staff who separated and for those who did not  separate during this period. For TSES staff who received, in addition to  bonuses, relocation, retention, and recruitment payments, TSA provided  us with a single sum for all these payments. For these TSES staff, we could  not identify the amount of the bonus from other payments made for  recruitment, retention, or relocation purposes. Thus, we excluded from  our analysis any individual receiving payments for recruitment, retention,  or relocation, in addition to bonuses. Specifically, we excluded data for 4  TSES staff who separated during fiscal years 2005 through 2008, and 34  TSES staff who were employed throughout the 4-year period. Although we  assessed TSA data on the number of TSES staff separations for fiscal years  2005 through 2008 and found them reliable, we were not able to assess the  reliability of the specific amounts of supplemental pay TSA reported giving  to TSES over this time period because some of these data were not  recorded within the CPDF for comparison. However, we confirmed with  TSA that the data provided were applicable to all TSES employed over the  fiscal year 2005 through 2008 time period.
To address the impact of TSES attrition, we interviewed supervisors of  separated TSES, employees who were direct reports to—that is,  employees who were directly supervised by—separated TSES staff, and  industry associations representing some of the various transportation  sectors (aviation, surface, and maritime) that collaborate with TSA on  transportation security initiatives. To conduct interviews with supervisors,  we asked TSA to identify TSES supervisors who were still with TSA and  who supervised any TSES who separated during fiscal years 2005 through  2008. TSA identified nine TSES staff still at the agency who had supervised  other TSES staff; we requested interviews with eight of these supervisors  and conducted seven interviews. We asked the supervisors to identify the  impact, if any, of the TSES separation(s) on 1) development or  implementation of TSA programs or initiatives and 2) external stakeholder  relations. Two analysts then performed a systematic content analysis to  determine if the responses to our interview questions portrayed a positive  impact, negative impact, or little to no impact. The analysts agreed in their  determinations for all seven interviews.
To identify direct reports for interviews, we asked the former TSES we  interviewed to provide us with names of employees who reported directly  to them when they were in TSES positions and who they believed were  still TSA employees; among the 25 former TSES staff who responded to  our inquiry, we were given names of 52 TSA employees who had reported  directly to these TSES staff during their tenure at TSA. Though this  selection method relied upon the recommendations of separated TSES  staff, we attempted to adjust for any bias the TSES staff may have had  when recommending these individuals by ensuring that the direct reports  we interviewed were evenly distributed across the following three  categories: 1) reported to TSES staff who left TSA for only nonadverse  reasons; 2) reported to TSES staff who left TSA for a combination of  nonadverse and adverse reasons; and 3) reported to TSES staff who left  TSA for adverse reasons only. We then selected 26 direct reports for  interviews from among the three groups. We were able to conduct a total  of 22 interviews: 5 from the nonadverse category; 4 from the  nonadverse/adverse category; and 13 from the adverse only category. We  conducted 9 of the 22 interviews in person at TSA headquarters with only  ourselves—and no other TSA employee—present in the room; we  conducted the remainder of direct report interviews via telephone, with a  TSA staff person online throughout the call. This staff person was the TSA  liaison, whose responsibility is to ensure that GAO receives access to  requested documentation and interviews for a given engagement. Though  the TSA liaison had no supervisory authority over the direct report staff  we interviewed, the presence of this individual during the phone call could  have inhibited the responses of the direct report interviewees we spoke  with via telephone. We asked the direct reports to describe the impact, if  any, of a TSES supervisor’s separation on their individual responsibilities  and the efforts underway in their particular division. We then performed a  systematic content analysis of their responses in the same manner as our  content analysis of separated TSES interviews. The two analysts reviewing  the direct report interviews agreed in their determinations for all 22  interviews.
Finally, to obtain perspectives from industry stakeholders, we interviewed  seven TSA transportation industry groups. We identified these industry  groups based on our experience in the field of transportation security and  by canvassing GAO analysts working in the area of transportation security  for other contacts. We requested interviews with 13 industry stakeholder  groups and either received written responses or obtained interviews with  7—specifically 3 aviation associations, 1 surface transportation  association; and 3 maritime transport associations. We asked the  stakeholders to identify whether they were aware of turnover among TSES  staff, how they knew turnover had occurred, and how it impacted a  specific policy or program they were working with TSA to implement. Two  analysts then performed a systematic content analysis on the responses,  and there was no disagreement between their determinations.
Although the direct report, supervisor, and industry stakeholder  interviews provided important perspectives on impact of executive  attrition, the results could not be generalized, and therefore, do not  represent the views of the entire population of each group.
section_title: Objective 3-The Extent to which TSA Efforts to Manage TSES Attrition and Improve Overall Management of Its TSES Workforce Are Consistent with Effective Human Capital Practices and Standards for Internal Control
paragraphs: To gather information on TSA efforts to address attrition, we interviewed  the Assistant Administrator and the Deputy Assistant Administrator of  TSA’s Human Capital Office to learn about the various initiatives they have  underway to address attrition and to improve management of their  executive resources. These officials identified several initiatives, which we  assessed, including a reinstated exit interview process, decreased use of  limited term appointments, and recent release of a comprehensive  handbook delineating TSES human capital policies, succession planning,  and the establishment of a merit-based staffing process.
To assess the exit survey process, we consulted prior GAO reports that  address the use of exit interview data in workforce planning. We  reviewed exit interviews TSA conducted under its previous process  (specifically, five interviews dating from January 2008 through September  2008), and examined TSA’s data collection tool for conducting these  interviews. We also reviewed the National Exit Survey instrument that  TSA is presently using to conduct exit interviews of TSES staff, and  conducted interviews with TSA human capital officials on the agency’s  plans for implementing this process.
To determine whether TSA has decreased its use of TSES limited term  appointments, we reviewed TSA-provided data on the number of limited  term appointments the agency made for fiscal years 2004 through 2008,  and reviewed CPDF data on the total number of TSES staff hired for fiscal  years 2004 through 2008. We were not able to determine the reliability of  these data because some TSA data on limited term appointments were not  recorded within CPDF.
To determine the extent to which TSA’s handbook for TSES human capital  policies and its succession plan were consistent with effective human  capital practices and internal control standards, we reviewed criteria in  prior GAO reports, as well as the standards for internal control in the  federal government. We reviewed TSA management directives for TSES  staff from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2008 (one of which is the  November 2008 handbook), as well as TSA’s succession plan (both the  2006 and 2008 versions). To identify the extent to which TSA has  implemented its succession plan, we also reviewed TSA data on the  number of staff who completed executive-level training identified within  its succession plan and spoke with human capital officials responsible for  compiling these data.
Finally, to determine the extent to which TSA has been following merit- based staffing requirements for hiring TSES staff, we first reviewed  documentation delineating TSA’s hiring process, specifically its Executive  Resource Council (ERC) charter. To determine the merit staffing  requirements TSA’s ERC process should encompass, we reviewed  applicable OPM regulations addressing merit staffing. We identified  seven merit staffing requirements that should have been reflected within  TSA’s hiring process, and therefore, within its documentation of hiring  decisions (see table 7). To ensure that the seven requirements we  identified were an appropriate standard for assessing TSA’s performance  of merit staffing, we reviewed OPM’s audit procedures for merit staffing  and found that OPM requires agencies operating under its jurisd iction to  document performance of these seven requirements. In addition, TSA  officials also confirmed that these were the key merit staffing  requirements they followed and agreed that these should be reflected  within documentation for TSES hiring decisions.
To determine whether TSA was documenting its performance of the seven  merit staffing requirements, we reviewed all case files for competitively  filled, career appointments to TSES positions for calendar years 2006 and  2008—a total of 41 case files. We reviewed case files for competitively  filled, career appointments specifically because TSA has committed to  using merit staffing for these hiring decisions; thus, we could expect to  find documentation of TSA’s performance of merit staffing procedures  within these files. We did not review case files from 2007, because we  were interested in comparing how TSA followed merit staffing  requirements when it initially established its ERC process in 2006, with  how it followed them more recently in 2008—the most recent full calendar  year when we undertook our review. After we provided the draft report to  DHS for comment on July 27, 2009, TSA officials informed us that the they  had additional documentation to demonstrate that the agency had adhered  to the merit staffing principle of agency certification of the candidate’s  executive and technical qualifications for more TSES career positions than  the number identified in our draft report. TSA provided this additional  documentation to us on September 4, 2009. Although this documentation  had not been kept in the files we reviewed, we assessed the additional  documentation and revised our report accordingly.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through October  2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Transportation Security Executive Service Staff Attrition Data
paragraphs: The following tables provide data for fiscal years 2004 through 2008 on the  number of senior executive staff who attrited—or separated—from the  Transportation Security Administration (TSA); other selected Department  of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies; and all cabinet-level departments,  excluding DHS. In this report, we define attrition as separation from an  agency by means of resignation, termination, retirement, expiration of  appointment, or transfer to another cabinet-level department. Senior  executive staff members in TSA are those individuals who are part of the  Transportation Security Executive Service (TSES), and senior executives  for other DHS agencies and cabinet-level departments are those  individuals who are part of the Senior Executive Service (SES) or who  hold SES-equivalent positions (for those agencies within cabinet-level  departments that, like TSA, do not have SES). The DHS agencies for which  we provide SES attrition data are those with operational missions, namely  the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Customs and  Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). We also provided SES  attrition data for “DHS Headquarters,” which includes all DHS executive  staff in positions serving departmentwide functions, such as those  involving financial or human capital management. We do not report rates  and percentages for populations under 50. Although the executive  populations of TSA and some DHS components for fiscal years 2004  through 2008 numbered more than 50 individuals (namely CBP, DHS  Headquarters, and Rest of DHS), most DHS components had less than 50  executives during this period. So that the presentation of our data would  be uniform, we chose to present the attrition data in tables 11, 13, 15, 17,  and 19 in total figures for all DHS components.
section_title: Appendix III: Transportation Security Administration National Exit Survey
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Kristy Brown (Assistant Director)  and Mona Blake (Analyst-in-Charge) managed this assignment. Maria  Soriano, Kim Perteet, and Janet Lee made significant contributions to the  work. Gregory Wilmoth, Catherine Hurley, and Christine San assisted with  design, methodology, and data analysis. Tom Lombardi and Jeff  McDermott provided legal support. Adam Vogt provided assistance with  report preparation.