Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force
Published: 2009-09-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, the Army has heavily used its reserve components--the Army National Guard and Army Reserve--for ongoing operations even though they were envisioned and resourced to be strategic reserves. A congressional commission, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Army have concluded the Army will need to continue to use its reserve components as an operational force. The transition will require changes to force structure as well as manning and equipping strategies that could cost billions of dollars. The 2009 Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to study this transition. This report provides additional information on (1) progress and challenges the Army faces, (2) to what extent the Army has estimated costs for the transition and included them in its projected spending plans, and (3) the effect of the operational role on the Guard's availability to state governors for domestic missions. GAO examined planning, policy, and budget documents, and relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code; and met with DOD, Army, reserve component, and state officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army is changing the organization and missions of some of its reserve units to provide more operational forces, and is increasing their personnel and equipment, but faces challenges in achieving the predictable and sustainable mobilization cycle envisioned for an operational force, primarily due to the high pace of operations. The Army is reorganizing its reserve units to match their active counterparts, is changing the missions of some units, has made plans to add over 9,000 personnel by 2013, and has requested almost $23 billion for reserve equipment since 2003. To guide the transition, DOD has established principles and policies, such as a 1-year limit on reserve mobilizations, and set a goal of providing reservists 5 years between mobilizations. However, heavy operational demands have meant that many reservists have had significantly less than 5 years between mobilizations. To make the most of the limited mobilization time available, DOD directed the services to provide sufficient resources to support reserve forces to be nearly ready to deploy before mobilization. In the past, reserve component forces often required significant time after mobilization to prepare individuals and units for deployment. However, the Army is continuing to need to improve readiness after mobilization by addressing medical and dental issues, or transferring personnel and equipment from nondeployed units to fill shortfalls. Until demand eases, it seems unlikely that the Army will be able to achieve the mobilization cycle it initially envisioned for the reserves. The Army developed initial cost estimates for transitioning its reserve components to an operational role, but has not budgeted for most of the costs it identified. A 2008 estimate identified costs of about $24 billion over a 6-year period from 2010 to 2015 to increase full-time support personnel, training days, recruiting and retention incentives, and installation support, among others. However, because the Army has not yet established the specific equipping, manning, and training levels required of an operational reserve, it is difficult to assess the estimate's validity. The Army established a task force to develop an implementation plan for the transition, and Army leadership is currently reviewing a draft plan and awaiting the results of other studies, such as a review of full-time support needs. However, pending the results of these studies and agreement on an implementation plan, the Army does not expect to budget for such costs until 2012. Best practices have shown that effective and efficient operations require detailed plans outlining major implementation tasks, metrics and timelines to measure success, and a comprehensive and realistic funding strategy. Until the Army finalizes an implementation plan and fully estimates the transition costs, and includes these costs in its projected spending plans, it will be difficult to assess the Army's progress in transitioning its reserve component to a sustainable operational force. The operational role has reduced the Guard's availability for domestic missions, but the effect on the states remains unclear because states mitigate shortfalls with mutual support agreements and requirements for some domestic missions remain undefined.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the demand for Army  forces has been high, and the Army has relied heavily upon its reserve  components—the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve—to meet  operational requirements. As of May 2009, about 475,000 members of the  Army’s reserve components had been activated for ongoing operations in  Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other missions worldwide, representing  the largest activation of reservists since the Korean War. The high pace of  operations has meant that the reserve components’ Cold War role has  evolved from a strategic reserve that would be used to supplement active  duty forces in the event of extended conflict to an operational force  characterized by ongoing rotational deployments.
As a strategic reserve, the reserve components were not maintained to be  immediately ready for deployment, and it was expected that they would  receive additional equipment, personnel, and training after they were  mobilized. However, as an operational force, reserve units need to build  and maintain readiness prior to mobilization to support recurring  deployments. Some capabilities that have been in especially high demand  for stability and counterinsurgency operations, such as civil affairs and  psychological operations, reside heavily in the reserve component,  creating an especially high pace of operations for reservists with these  skills. In 2006, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Quadrennial Defense  Review established that to use the reserve components as a viable  operational force, reservists and units must be more accessible and readily  deployable. In 2008, the congressionally chartered Commission on the  National Guard and Reserves found there was no reasonable alternative to  increased reliance on the reserve components given the current threats,  fiscal challenges, projected demand for forces, and the unique capabilities  resident in the reserves. In that same year, U.S. Army Forces Command  similarly concluded that using the reserve components as an operational  force was the Army’s best option for meeting its needs. According to the  Army, other options available including full mobilization, significantly  enlarging the active component, and maintaining or adapting the strategic  reserve were infeasible, impractical, or unsustainable. DOD has  acknowledged that the reserve component is now an integral part of the  operating force, in addition to its strategic reserve role, and the Army is  undertaking initiatives designed to enhance the capability of both active  and reserve forces and to provide a more predictable deployment  schedule.
Over the last few years, we have examined the effects of expanded  mission requirements on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve,  including their new operational roles in supporting both large-scale, long- duration overseas operations and emerging domestic requirements. In July  2005, we reported that, while the Army Reserve has provided ready forces  to support military operations since September 11, 2001, it was becoming  increasingly difficult to continue to provide these forces due to personnel  and equipment shortages. In October 2005, we reported that the high pace  of operations has also caused a strain on the Army National Guard’s  equipment inventories that could be used for domestic missions. In  September 2006, we testified before the congressionally chartered  Commission on National Guard and Reserves that equipment shortages  and personnel challenges have increased in the National Guard and Army  Reserve, which if left unattended may hamper the reserve components’  preparedness for future overseas and domestic missions. In January 2007,  we further reported that planning for the National Guard’s response to  large-scale, catastrophic events is not complete and that the National  Guard may not be prepared to respond as efficiently and effectively as  possible to domestic events. We have also previously reported that the  operational readiness of reserve forces has been hampered by long- standing problems with reservists’ medical and physical condition and that  DOD is unable to determine the extent to which the reserve force has  complied with routine examinations due to a lack of complete or reliable  data. A list of related GAO products is included at the end of this report.
The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2009 directed GAO to report on the use of the Army’s reserve  components as an operational reserve. Specifically, we were asked to  include in our report a description of current and programmed resources,  force structure, and any organizational challenges that the Army’s reserve  components may face serving as an operational reserve including  challenges related to force structure; manning; equipment availability,  maintenance, and logistics issues; and any conflicts with requirements  under Title 32 of the United States Code. We satisfied that mandate by  providing a briefing on our preliminary observations addressing these  issues to the congressional defense committees in June 2009. This report  provides additional information related to the questions addressed in  response to the mandate. Specifically, this report examines: (1) steps the  Army has taken and the challenges it faces in transitioning its reserve  force structure, manning, and equipping, and logistics strategies, (2) the  extent to which the Army has estimated costs required for the reserve  components’ transition to the operational role and included these in its  budget and Future Years Defense Program, and (3) the effect of the  National Guard’s federal operational role on its availability to state  governors for domestic missions.
To determine the extent to which the Army has modified the force  structure as well as the manning and equipping strategies of its reserve  components to meet the requirements of the operational role, and to  identify the challenges, if any, the Army faces in completing the transition,  we reviewed Army plans and policy documents, reports of the  Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, and DOD reports to  Congress on related initiatives and issues. We also reviewed program and  policy documents and interviewed officials with DOD, Army, National  Guard Bureau, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, U.S. Army Forces  Command, and First Army. Further, we incorporated information from  surveys of a nonprobability sample of 24 Army National Guard or Army  Reserve units, as well as follow-up interviews with officials from 15 of  these units. The surveys and interviews addressed a range of training,  equipment, and personnel issues. To evaluate the current and projected  resources for transitioning the reserve components to the operational role,  we reviewed current Army plans, policy and budget documents, DOD’s  fiscal year 2009 supplemental appropriations request, and DOD’s fiscal  year 2009 and 2010 budget requests. To determine the effect of the  National Guard’s federal operational role on its availability to state  governors for domestic missions, we reviewed relevant sections of Titles  10 and 32 of the United States Code and conducted interviews with the  National Guard Bureau and offices of the Adjutants General of four states  (Virginia, Missouri, Washington, and Florida). We selected states that had  a history of major disaster declarations and that also contained units that  are in demand for both overseas and domestic missions. We conducted  this performance audit from July 2008 through July 2009 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. The scope and methodology used in our review are  described in further detail in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2008, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard had about  197,000 and 360,400 soldiers, respectively, comprising 51 percent of the  total Army, which also includes the active component. The Army  organizes, trains, and equips its reserve components to perform assigned  missions. The Army Reserve is a federal force that is organized and trained  primarily to supply specialized combat support and combat service  support skills to combat forces. The Army National Guard is composed of  both combat forces and units that supply support skills, but in contrast to  the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard has dual federal and state  missions. When not called to active duty for a federal mission, Army  National Guard units remain under the command and control of the  governors, typically training for their federal mission or conducting state  missions. In addition, National Guard forces can be mobilized under Title  32 of the United States Code for certain federally funded, domestic  missions conducted under the command of the governors such as  providing security at the nation’s airports in the immediate aftermath of  the September 11 terrorist attacks and assisting the Gulf Coast in the  aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Both reserve components are composed  primarily of citizen soldiers who balance the demands of civilian careers  with part-time military service.
Reserve forces may be involuntarily called to active duty under three  mobilization authorities. As shown in table 1, the President may  involuntarily mobilize forces under two authorities with size and time  limitations. Full mobilization, which would authorize the mobilization of  forces for as long as they are needed, requires a declaration by Congress.
In September 2001, following President Bush’s declaration of a national  emergency resulting from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOD  issued mobilization guidance that, among other things, allowed the  services to mobilize reservists for up to 24 cumulative months under the  President’s partial mobilization authority. In January 2007, the Secretary of  Defense issued updated guidance on the utilization of the force that,  among other things, limits involuntary reserve component mobilizations to  no more than 1 year at a time.
During the Cold War, the Army’s reserve components principally operated  as a force in reserve, or strategic reserve, that would supplement active  forces in the event of extended conflict. Members of the reserves generally  served 39 days a year—1 weekend a month and an additional 2 weeks of  duty. In addition, the reserve components have a small number of full-time  personnel, Active Guard and Reserve personnel and military technicians,  that perform the necessary day-to-day tasks such as maintaining unit  equipment and planning training events that reserve units need to  accomplish in order to maintain readiness for their mission and be able to  deploy. The Army’s resourcing strategy for a strategic reserve provided  reserve units with varying levels of resources according to the priority  assigned to their federal warfighting missions. Most reserve component  units were provided with between 65 and 74 percent of their required  personnel and 65 to 79 percent of their required equipment. This approach  assumed that most reserve component forces would have a lengthy  mobilization period with enough time to fully man, equip, and train their  units after they were mobilized to attain the high level of operational  readiness necessary for deployment.
Since September 11, 2001, however, the demand for Army forces and  capabilities has been high, especially to support ongoing operations in Iraq  and Afghanistan. Recognizing that its forces were being stressed by the  demands of lengthy and repeated deployments, the Army has adopted a  new force-generation model intended to improve units’ readiness over  time as they move through phased training to prepare to be ready for a  potential deployment. This contrasts with the previous approach in which,  as a strategic reserve, units’ personnel and equipment levels were  maintained below warfighting readiness levels until they were mobilized.  Under the Army’s new model, the early phases of the cycle will entail  formation and staffing of the unit and beginning individual and collective  training, while later phases will concentrate on larger unit training. Figure  1 illustrates the planned movement of units through the reset, train/ready,  and available phases of the Army force-generation model.
Under the Army’s force-generation model as designed, reserve component  units would be available for deployment for 1 year with 5 years between  deployments. After returning home from a deployment, units remain in the  reset phase for a fixed 1-year period and focus on restoring personnel and  equipment readiness so that they can resume training for future missions.  Following the reset phase, units enter the train/ready phases in which they  progressively increase their training proficiency by completing individual  and collective training tasks. As designed in the force-generation model,  reserve component units remain in the train/ready phases for 4 years,  although the amount of time is not fixed and may be reduced to meet  operational demands. Upon completion of the train/ready phases, units  enter the available year in which they can be mobilized to meet specific  mission requirements. Under current DOD policy, involuntary reserve  component mobilizations are limited to no more than 1 year in length. The  force-generation process requires increasing resources for units to use in  training to gain higher levels of proficiency prior to mobilization. “The reserve components provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S.  defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles,  reserve components participate in a full range of missions according to their Services’  force-generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established  cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the  Services, Service members, their families and employers. In their strategic roles, reserve  component units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the  national defense strategy. As such, the reserve components provide strategic depth and are  available to transition to operational roles as needed.”
section_title: The Army Has Taken Steps to Adapt the Reserve Components, but It Faces Challenges in Achieving a Sustainable Mobilization Cycle and Meeting Premobilization Readiness Standards
paragraphs: The Army has made a number of changes to its force structure, as well as  to its manning and equipping strategies to better position its reserve  components for the operational role. However, given the current high pace  of operations, the Army has faced challenges in achieving sustainable  mobilization rates for its citizen soldiers and in readying personnel and  units before they are mobilized in order to maximize their availability to  operational commanders after deployment.
subsections: section_title: The Army Has Taken Steps to Modify the Reserve Components’ Force Structure for the Operational Role
paragraphs: The Army has made four force-structure changes to better position its  reserve components for the operational role.
First, the Army is undertaking a major reorganization—called the modular  force initiative—designed to make Army forces more flexible and  responsive by reorganizing combat and combat support forces from a  division-based force to smaller, more numerous, modular brigade  formations with significant support elements. In contrast to the Army’s  previous division-based force with many different types of unique forces,  the modular forces were designed to be standardized and interoperable so  forces could be more easily tailored to meet operational needs. Under the  modular reorganization, National Guard and Army Reserve units are to  have the same designs, organizational structures, and equipment as their  active component counterparts so that they can be operationally employed  in the same manner as active component units. The Army reported in its  2009 Campaign Plan that it has converted or begun converting 256 (84  percent) of the 303 planned brigade formations. However, the Army has  been focused on equipping and staffing units to support ongoing  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the equipment and personnel levels  in nondeployed units have been declining. Further, as previously reported,  the Army does not have a plan with clear milestones in place to guide  efforts to equip and staff units that have been converted to the modular  design, and the Army now anticipates that the converted modular units  will not be fully staffed and equipped until 2019—more than a decade  away. Furthermore, without adequate planning, the Army risks cost  growth and further timeline slippage in its efforts to transform to a more  modular and capable force.
The Army is changing the missions of some Army organizations and  retraining soldiers to produce more soldiers and units with high-demand  skills. For example, the Army is decreasing its supply of air defense,  armor, and field artillery capabilities in order to increase its supply of  special operations, civil affairs, and military police capabilities. The Army  began these rebalancing efforts in fiscal year 2003 after military operations  in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks generated high  demand for certain forces. Among those forces in high demand were  certain combat support and combat service support forces such as military  police and transportation units. These support forces, which are also  called enablers, reside heavily in the reserve components. The goals of  rebalancing included helping to ease stress on units and individuals with  high-demand skills and meeting the Army’s goal of executing the first 30  days of an operation without augmentation from the reserve component.  As part of the rebalancing plan, the Army National Guard is converting six  brigade combat teams into four maneuver enhancement brigades and two  battlefield surveillance brigades that will perform combat support roles.  As of February 2009, the Army reported that it had completed rebalancing  70,400 positions, about 50 percent of the approximately 142,300 positions  scheduled to be rebalanced by 2015 across the active and reserve  components.
The Army is also increasing personnel within the reserve components. In  January 2007, the Secretary of Defense announced an initiative to expand  the total Army by approximately 74,200 soldiers to better meet long-term  operational requirements, sustain the all-volunteer force, and build  towards a goal of 5 years between mobilizations for the reserve  components. This initiative is expected to add 8,200 soldiers to the Army  National Guard by 2010; 65,000 soldiers to the active component by fiscal  year 2010; and 1,000 soldiers to the Army Reserve by 2013. The Secretary  of Defense expects that with a larger force, individuals and units will, over  time, deploy less frequently and have longer times at home between  deployments. However, we have previously reported that the Army has not  developed a comprehensive funding plan for the expansion initiative and  that, lacking a complete and accurate plan, Congress and other decision  makers may not have the information they need to consider the long-term  costs and benefits associated with increasing Army personnel levels or  gauge the amount of funding that should be appropriated to implement the  initiative.
The Army eliminated some reserve force-structure positions that  previously had been intentionally unfilled, largely for budgetary reasons.  Specifically, the Army’s force-structure rebalancing, which began in fiscal  year 2003, and the modular transformation efforts that began in 2004  reduced the force structure allowances for the Army National Guard by 7  percent from 376,105 to 349,157 and Army Reserve by about 4 percent  from 213,324 to 205,028 between 2005 and 2009. Concurrently, the Army’s  Grow the Force plan increased the Army National Guard’s size by almost 2  percent from 352,700 soldiers in fiscal year 2007 to 358,200 by fiscal year  2010 and the Army Reserve’s size by 3 percent from 200,000 soldiers in  fiscal year 2007 to 206,000 by 2013. When the reserve components were  solely a strategic reserve, the Army routinely authorized units to be  assigned fewer personnel than would be required for their wartime  mission under the assumption that units could receive additional  personnel when mobilized. By reducing the number of units, the Army was  able to authorize the remaining units to be more fully manned.
DOD established a policy in 2008 to promote and support the management  of the reserve components as an operational force. The policy directed  the services to align reserve component force structures, to the extent  practicable, with established DOD goals for frequency and duration of  utilization for units and individuals. In addition, the policy instructs the  service Secretaries to manage their reserve components such that they  provide operational capabilities while also maintaining strategic depth to  meet U.S. military requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.  Further, the policy directs the Secretaries to ensure sufficient depth of  reserve component unit and individual capabilities to meet DOD’s  established force-utilization goals. Those goals include planning for  involuntary mobilizations of guard and reserve units such that they receive  5 years at home for every 1 year they are mobilized.
section_title: The Army Has Adapted Personnel Strategies for the Reserve Components’ Operational Role, but It Has Not Modified Requirements for Full- Time Support Staffing
paragraphs: The Army has adapted the strategies that it uses to staff its reserve  components for the operational role, which requires Army reserve  component units to achieve higher levels of personnel readiness and  maintain a more stable cadre of personnel than they did as part of a  strategic reserve. The Army has increased the number of personnel in  reserve component units, given units higher priority for personnel as they  near availability for deployment in the rotational cycle, established some  personnel readiness goals, and modified its recruiting and retention  strategies.
The operational role has several implications for how the Army staffs its  reserve component units. First, as an operational force, Army reserve  component units are now expected to be available to deploy for 1 year  with 5 years between deployments and more frequently when the Army  faces increased demand for forces by the combatant commanders. To  prepare for regular deployments, the Army now expects its reserve  component units to progressively increase their personnel readiness on a  cyclical basis as they near availability for deployment. The Army  determines a unit’s personnel readiness level by comparing the unit’s level  of available strength to the number of personnel required by the unit.  Available strength is the portion of the unit’s assigned strength that is  available for deployment to accomplish the unit’s assigned wartime  mission. To be available, these personnel must meet a number of  administrative, medical, and dental requirements and must meet their  individual qualifications. As an operational force, reserve component  units need to make efficient use of training time before deployment and  build a cohesive force needed to achieve collective training proficiency.
DOD’s policy that the service Secretaries program and execute resources  as required to support a “train-mobilize-deploy” model means that units  need to achieve high levels of personnel readiness and complete most of  their training requirements prior to mobilization. This approach to training  and mobilization contrasts with the strategic reserve’s “mobilize-train- deploy” approach in which units would be brought up to full personnel  strength and soldiers’ medical and dental issues would be addressed after  mobilization. To implement the train-mobilize-deploy model, the Army has  found that it needs to stabilize unit personnel by the time the unit is  alerted for deployment or as early as possible in the force-generation cycle  so that the unit can attain as much collective training proficiency as  possible prior to mobilization. This approach allows the unit to minimize  postmobilization training time and provide as much availability as possible  to theater commanders.
subsections: section_title: The Army Has Increased the Number of Personnel in Reserve Component Units
paragraphs: To staff reserve component units more fully, the Army has increased the  percentage of required personnel that are assigned to reserve component  units above strategic reserve levels and has established a long-range goal  of achieving full personnel strength throughout the force-generation cycle  for reserve components. As discussed previously, the Army decreased the  size of its reserve components’ force structures while also increasing their  end strength, which allowed remaining units to be more fully manned.  Also, the Army has modified its approach to assigning personnel to reserve  component units by giving units nearing deployment priority over other  units in the assignment of soldiers and establishing some personnel  readiness requirements for deploying units.
Despite these changes, the Army has not adopted any overarching,  uniform personnel readiness levels that units must achieve as they  progress through each phase of the force-generation cycle. The Army has  established some interim personnel readiness goals for units participating  in a “RESET pilot” program. However, the Army reported in its 2009  Campaign Plan that current high global demands for Army forces are  preventing units from achieving specific readiness levels as they progress  through the phases of the force-generation cycle. The Army plans to  evaluate units in the pilot program through 2010 and use this information  to identify lessons learned and determine what levels of personnel  readiness will be required of reserve component units as they progress  through the force-generation cycle.
section_title: The Reserve Components Have Established New Recruiting and Retention Initiatives
paragraphs: The reserve components have established several new initiatives to meet  the recruiting and retention goals of an operational force. Both  components have established incentives for current soldiers to recruit  others. The Army National Guard established the Guard Recruiting  Assistance Program in which every Army National Guard member can  function as a recruiter. The program provides a $2,000 monetary incentive  to Guard soldiers for every new person they recruit who begins basic  combat training. The Army Reserve’s Recruiting Assistance Program also  provides a $2,000 monetary incentive to soldiers for every new person they  recruit. Both components are also implementing targeted bonus programs  to increase retention for soldiers with high-demand occupational  specialties and for certain officer grades.
Other Army National Guard recruitment and retention efforts include  the Recruit Sustainment Program, which is designed to keep recruits  interested in the Army National Guard as well as increase their  preparedness while awaiting training, and  the Active First Program, which is a pilot initiative in which soldiers are  recruited to serve for an 8-year period which includes serving 3 years in  the active component and 5 years in the Army National Guard.
Additional Army Reserve recruitment and retention initiatives include    a conditional release policy designed to control the number of reservists  who leave the Army Reserve to enter the active Army, Army National  Guard, or other service components;    an education stabilization program which synchronizes new soldiers with  a unit in the appropriate phase of the force-generation cycle so that the  soldier can complete his/her college degree without the interruption of  mobilization; and    an employer partnership initiative in which soldiers are recruited to train  and serve in the Army Reserve for a particular occupational specialty and  work in a related occupation for one of the civilian employers that  participate in this initiative.
section_title: The Army Has Established Initiatives to Improve Reserve Component Personnel Readiness and Unit Stability
paragraphs: Further, the Army and its reserve components have begun several other  initiatives to improve personnel readiness and unit stability prior to  mobilization and improve the execution of the “train-mobilize-deploy”  model required by DOD for an operational force. Although these initiatives  are in various stages of implementation, and it is too early to assess their  effectiveness, some of the steps that the Army and its reserve components  have taken include the following:    The Army has established a goal of issuing alert orders to reserve  component units at least 12 months prior to their mobilization in order to  provide them enough time to attain required levels of ready personnel for  deployment. Army data show that the Army has increased the amount of  notice it provides to mobilizing Army National Guard units from an  average of 113 days in 2005 to 236 in 2008.
The Army Reserve began implementing the Army Selected Reserves  Dental Readiness System in 2008 to reduce the number of nondeployable  soldiers across the force by providing annual dental examinations and  dental treatment for all soldiers regardless of their alert or mobilization  status.
To reduce personnel attrition and increase unit stability prior to unit  mobilizations without the use of stop-loss,  the Army National Guard’s  Deployment Extension Stabilization Pay program, when implemented, will  make some soldiers eligible to receive up to $6,000 if they remain with  their unit through mobilization and 90 days following demobilization. The  initiative is scheduled to begin in September 2009. The Army Reserve is  considering a similar program.
To improve medical readiness across the reserve components, the Army  National Guard is pilot testing an initiative—the Select Medical Pre- Deployment Treatment Program—that will provide limited medical  treatment at no cost to eligible medically nondeployable soldiers in Army  National Guard and Army Reserve units alerted for deployment. If the  Army determines that the pilot is successful, it will consider expanding the  program across the reserve components.
section_title: The Army Has Not Established Full-Time Support Staffing Needs for the Operational Role
paragraphs: Although the shift to the “train-mobilize-deploy” model increases the  importance of the premobilization readiness tasks performed by full-time  support staff, the Army has not modified its full-time support staffing  requirements to reflect the needs of the operational role, and the reserve  component units face difficulties in performing key readiness tasks at  current staff levels. As of May 2009, the Army had not reevaluated the  reserve components’ requirement for the full-time staff that are needed to  perform key readiness tasks on a day-to-day basis in light of their new  operational role. With most members of the Army National Guard and  Army Reserve serving 2 days a month and 2 weeks out of the year, the  reserve components rely on a small number of full-time personnel to  perform the day-to-day tasks such as maintaining unit equipment and  planning training events that reserve units need to accomplish in order to  maintain readiness for their mission and be able to deploy. The Army  Reserve Forces Policy Committee, U.S. Army Forces Command, and the  Commission on National Guard and Reserves have reported that  insufficient full-time support levels place the operational force at risk.
The Army’s reserve components are not authorized the number of full-time  personnel needed to meet the requirements established for their strategic  role, and requirements for the operational role have not been determined.  For fiscal year 2010, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve required  about 119,000 full-time support positions but were only authorized 87,000  positions, or about 73 percent of the requirement. The current full-time  support requirement is based on a manpower study conducted in 1999  when the reserve components were still primarily a strategic reserve. In  subsequent years, the Army reviewed and adjusted the manpower analysis  but it did not conduct an analysis that incorporated the needs of an  operational reserve. The last review performed was completed in 2006,  prior to the issuance of the Secretary of Defense policy that limited  involuntary mobilizations to 1 year and before an increased emphasis was  placed on premobilization readiness. In 2007, the Army directed a study  designed, in part, to measure the readiness benefit to the Army of  increasing its reserve components’ full-time support. However, because of  data limitations, the Army could not quantify the effect of full-time support  on unit readiness. As a result, the Army initiated an additional study to  determine the link between full-time support levels and unit readiness  before including additional funding for full-time support in future budget  requests. Specifically, the Army has commissioned a study to assist it with  identifying the existing requirements for full-time support, determining  how the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have met these  requirements in the past, and developing analytical links between full-time  support and unit readiness. The Army does not plan to make any decision  on full-time support resource levels until after this study is completed in  September 2009.
Mobilization of certain full-time support staff with dual roles as full-time  support staff and deployable members of reserve units who perform key  logistics and maintenance tasks has also created maintenance and  readiness challenges for the Army’s reserve components. In the National  Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for 2009, DOD reported that the  average staffing of Army Reserve maintenance activities is at  approximately 60 percent of requirements, and currently about 25 percent  of the assigned staff is deployed. According to the report, mobilization of  Army National Guard full-time support staff has resulted in an overall  reduction of 71 percent of maintenance technician staffing during  mobilization. The Army National Guard often hires temporary technicians  to replace maintenance technicians who are mobilized. However, state  National Guards, on average, hire only one temporary technician for every  five maintenance technicians mobilized, due to the cost involved. To  mitigate the maintenance backlog, the Army Reserve continues to use  contractors, contracted maintenance support, and commercially available  services.
section_title: The Army Has Adapted Its Strategy for Equipping Deploying Reserve Units
paragraphs: The Army has adapted its strategy for equipping its reserve components  for the operational role by establishing a long-term equipping goal and,  until it reaches this goal, giving units priority for equipment as they near  their availability for deployment. Over the long term, the Army has  established a goal of equipping all reserve units with 100 percent of their  requirements by the end of fiscal year 2019. However, because the Army’s  need for equipment currently exceeds the available supply, and equipment  shortages are expected to continue for a number of years, the Army  prioritizes the distribution of equipment to units that are deployed and  preparing to deploy consistent with its force-generation model. In  addition, under the new “train-mobilize-deploy” model, reserve component  units are also expected to complete most of their training requirements  prior to mobilization so that they can provide as much time as possible to  theater commanders within the 12-month limit on involuntary  mobilizations. To accomplish these goals, the Army has established  interim policies and guidance for equipping reserve component units.  First, the Army intends for a unit to have 80 percent of its required  equipment 365 days after the unit returns from deployment. Second, the  Army has directed commanders to ensure that units report to the  mobilization station with 90 to 100 percent of their required equipment.
section_title: Given Current Operational Demands and Army Force- Sizing Decisions, Reserve Component Forces Face Challenges in Achieving the Secretary of Defense’s Goals for a Sustainable Mobilization Schedule and Premobilization Readiness
paragraphs: The Army faces challenges in limiting the frequency of mobilizations and  increasing both personnel and unit readiness given the high pace of  current operations.
subsections: section_title: The Army Faces Challenges in Achieving a Sustainable Mobilization Schedule
paragraphs: Despite changes to its force structure, manning, and equipping strategies,  at the current pace of operations, the Army’s reserve component force  structure does not allow the Army to reach the Secretary of Defense’s goal  of providing reservists 5 years demobilized for each year mobilized. As  figure 2 shows, the Army’s reserve components have experienced a  continued high level of mobilizations since 2001 in support of Operations  Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.
As of June 2009, more than 110,000 Army National Guard and Army  Reserve soldiers were mobilized in support of these operations. Due to  this high demand for forces, the Army has only been able to provide its  reserve component soldiers with less than 4 years at home between  mobilizations on average. For example, many capabilities such as civil  affairs, psychological operations, military police, transportation, and  adjutant general companies and detachments are in high demand, so units  with these skills are being mobilized much more frequently, sometimes  with less than 3 years between deployments. Although unit mobilization  frequency differs on a case-by-case basis, nearly all types of units are being  mobilized more frequently than the Secretary’s goal of no more than 1 year  mobilized every 5 years. For reserve component forces to be provided 5  years at home between mobilizations given the current force structure, the  total number of Army reserve component soldiers mobilized would have  to decline by about 54 percent of the soldiers mobilized as of June 2009 to  approximately 51,000 soldiers. As figure 3 below shows, the number of  reserve component soldiers that could be available for deployment  decreases as the required average amount of time between mobilizations  increases.
The Army’s current plans for its reserve component force structure would  provide soldiers about 4 years at home between mobilizations, which is  more than the current pace allows but less than the 5 year goal. According  to Army officials, the current high pace is not expected to be permanent  and the Army must balance mobilization frequency goals with the need to  meet current operational demands, maintain capabilities to perform the  full range of missions expected under the National Military Strategy, and  remain within the constraints of mobilization policies and force-size  limitations, as well as expected future budgets. The Army currently  projects that the high pace of operations will continue through fiscal ye 2013, but it does not project when the Army will be able to achieve the  Secretary’s goal of 5 years between deployments. As a result, the Army accepted the risk more frequent reserve mobilizations may pose to its  personnel recruitment and retention in order to be better positioned to  achieve its other goals.
section_title: Challenges Remain in Achieving Desired Levels of Personne Stability
paragraphs: Although officials report that the Army reserve component units are  meeting the Army’s required levels of ready personnel by the time that  they deploy, the reserve component units continue to have difficul achieving goals for personnel readiness and unit stability prior to  mobilization. As a result, the Army has had to continue to take steps to build readiness after mobilization. However, the Army has found that  addressing issues such as medical and dental problems after mobilization  may disrupt predeployment training and reduce the amount of time unit are able to be provided to theater commanders under current limits on  involuntary mobilizations. The Army has begun to implement additional  ness and unit stability but it is too  initiatives to improve personnel readi early to evaluate their effectiveness.
Reserve component units continue to have difficulty in achieving  personnel readiness and unit stability goals before they are mobilized  because of the number of soldiers who do not meet medical, dental individual training qualification requirements as well as personnel  attrition. A 2008 Army study of the pre- and postmobilization preparation  of five Army National Guard brigade combat teams that mobilized betw October 2007 and January 2008 found that none of the five units met  deployment standards for the levels of personnel with individua qualifications and medical readiness when they arrived at their  mobilization stations. The study also found that these units had  experienced significant attrition, with an average of 59 soldiers leaving  their units per month between the time they were alerted for mobi and 90 days before mobilization when th e Army’s stop-loss policy  prevented them from leaving the Army.  lization  As a result of the challenges faced in achieving desired personnel  readiness levels, the Army and its reserve components have had to  continue taking steps to improve individual and unit readiness late in the  force-generation cycle and after mobilization. Such steps include  addressing medical and dental issues and transferring personnel from  nondeployed to deploying units to fill shortages. For example, according  to Army mobilization officials, one unit that mobilized in September 2008  required the transfer of more than 900 soldiers, or 22 percent of the 4,122  required personnel, from other units within 2 weeks of its mobilization  date in order to fill shortages and man the unit to a deployable level.  Further, our surveys of and interviews with 24 recently deployed reserve  component units found that nearly all of those units had to receive  personnel transfers from outside their units to achieve the required  personnel levels for deployment. According to Army officials, such  transfers disrupt unit stability and cause personnel turbulence at a time  when the units are working to attain collective training proficiency in  preparation for deployment. Additionally, Army officials stated that  personnel transfers disrupt premobilization training plans when they  occur within the last 6 months prior to a unit’s mobilization date because  more training has to be done after mobilization, which reduces operational  availability to theater commanders. For these reasons, one of the chief  lessons learned reported in a 2008 Army study of pre- and postmobilization  is that early assignment of personnel and stabilization of deploying units is  necessary to make efficient use of training time and build a cohesive force  so that the units can efficiently achieve required levels of collective  training proficiency and provide as much operational availability as  possible to theater commanders.
section_title: The Army Faces Challenges Providing the Equipment Needed to Train Reserve Units for Ongoing Operations and Meeting Longer-Term Equipping Goals
paragraphs: Although the Army has taken steps in recent years to improve reserve  component equipment inventories, it faces challenges in equipping units  for training while supporting current high operational demands and, over  the long term, may face challenges in meeting its equipment goals amid  competing demands for resources. From 2003 to 2010, the Army requested  $22.7 billion in its annual appropriations to equip the Army National Guard  and Army Reserve. Despite this effort, the Army National Guard reported  in October 2008 that it had 76 percent of its required equipment with only  63 percent of the required items located within the United States and  available for training use. Similarly, the Army Reserve reported that it had  74 percent of its required equipment with only 67 percent of the required  items located within the United States.
The Army is finding it difficult to provide units access to the same  equipment for training that they will use overseas so they can attain  training proficiency before they deploy. The demand for some items, such  as mine resistant ambush protected vehicles and night vision equipment,  has increased across the Army as operations have continued, and  equipment requirements to support ongoing operations continue to evolve.  As previously reported, these evolving requirements have made it difficult  for the Army to communicate to deploying units what equipment will be  needed in-theater and has challenged the reserve components to identify  and transfer the right items. Moreover, the Army has directed reserve  component units returning from overseas deployments to leave in-theater  certain essential equipment items that are in short supply for use by  follow-on forces. While this equipping approach has helped meet  operational needs, it continues the cycle of reducing the pool of equipment  available to nondeployed forces for unplanned contingencies and for  training. We have previously reported that the continuing strategy of  transferring equipment to deploying forces hampers the ability of  nondeployed forces to train for future missions.
Furthermore, the transformation to the modular structure has also placed  demands on the Army’s equipment inventories because it requires modular  units to have modern equipment as well as increased quantities of some  items. Similarly, the initiative to expand the Army, which added six  brigade combat teams and additional modular support units to the overall  Army force structure, required equipment and placed additional demands  on the Army’s inventories.
A 2008 Army study of lessons learned from the deployment of five Army  National Guard Brigade Combat teams found that equipment shortages  adversely affected the deployment training of these units and increased  the amount of time required to obtain collective training proficiency. This  study noted that training on the equipment a unit will use in-theater is  essential to ensure tasks, conditions, and standards are met during  premobilization training. However, the Army has not been able to provide  some equipment to units to accomplish their training either prior to  mobilization or deployment.
During our interviews with reserve component units that had returned  from deployment within the past year, we found several instances where  units did not train with the same equipment before they deployed that they  used in theater. As a result, they had to accomplish this training in-theater,  effectively reducing their operational availability to theater commanders.  For example:    A National Guard transportation company did not have the opportunity to  train before mobilization with the armored trucks they drove in-theater.  According to unit officials, these models maneuver differently and drivers  need to practice driving the armored version. To accomplish this training,  soldiers trained with armored versions upon arrival in-theater.
A National Guard engineering battalion told us they did not have access to  the heavy equipment transporter or cranes used in-theater when it was  training at the mobilization station. Instead, soldiers trained with similar  equipment before they deployed and then trained on some of the  equipment upon arrival in-theater.
National Guard officials from an aviation battalion told us that they did not  have an opportunity to train on some equipment they used in-theater,  including global positioning systems, communications systems, and  intelligence systems. Instead, they trained on the equipment with the unit  they were relieving after they arrived in-theater.
An Army Reserve transportation company had to wait until it was in- theater to train on a pallet loading system.
Over the long term, the Army faces challenges in meeting its equipping  goals amid competing demands for resources. The National Guard and  Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2009 included estimates of the  resources required for the Army National Guard to achieve the 100 percent  equipping goal by 2019. The report estimated that the Army National  Guard will require an additional $6 billion each year from 2014 to 2019 to  achieve the 100 percent goal, not including the $36.8 billion included in the  Future Years Defense Program from 2005 to 2013 to purchase equipment.
In addition, this report estimated that the Army Reserve will need $1.6  billion each year over its 2009 to 2015 projected spending plan to reach its  equipping and modernization goals.
Despite the magnitude of the Army’s projected investment in its reserve  components, until operational demand eases, it seems unlikely that the  Army will be able to achieve DOD’s goal of a sustainable mobilization  cycle for its reserve forces or fully implement the train-mobilize-deploy  model. It is also not clear how long reserve component forces can sustain  the current high pace of operations without difficulties in recruiting and  retaining reserve component soldiers or compromising the viability of the  all-volunteer citizen soldier reserve components, which are an important  national resource critical for both domestic and overseas missions.
section_title: The Army Has Estimated and Budgeted for Some Costs to Transition Its Reserve Components to an Operational Force, but Has Not yet Finalized an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy
paragraphs: The Army has estimated and budgeted for some costs that relate to the  transition of its reserve components to an operational force, but the full  cost of the transition remains uncertain and could vary widely from the  initial estimates depending on Army decisions. The Army has decided to  include the majority of funding needed for this effort in its fiscal year 2012  to 2017 projected spending plans after costs are clarified by ongoing  studies. However, the Army has not yet completed an implementation plan  and funding strategy that fully describe the key tasks necessary for the  transition, establish timelines for implementation, and identify metrics to  measure progress.
subsections: section_title: Army Has Prepared Some Preliminary Cost Estimates for the Transition to an Operational Role, but Actual Costs Could Vary Widely Depending on Army Decisions
paragraphs: The Army has developed and updated a preliminary estimate of the costs  that are not already included in its budget and Future Years Defense  Program for the operational transition, but actual costs could vary widely  from the estimates depending on Army decisions, such as which cost  categories are essential for an operational reserve and the level of  resources that will be required. In response to initiatives established by the  Chief of Staff of the Army in April 2007, the Army formed a working group  to develop a concept plan to complete six critical transition tasks. These  tasks include (1) adapting pre- and postmobilization training; (2) adapting  forces that perform key functions such as training, equipping,  construction, and maintenance; (3) providing Army incentives to retain  citizen soldiers and support their families; (4) modifying reserve  component premobilization equipping strategies; (5) updating human  resource management processes; and (6) revising statutes, policies, and  processes.
As a part of this effort, the Army developed a preliminary cost estimate for  those transition tasks that were not already included in the Army’s budget  or program. The intent of the preliminary cost estimate was to determine  the magnitude of the additional costs required to complete the transition  in order to assess the feasibility of the effort and provide estimates that  Army leadership could use in developing its projected spending plans for  fiscal years 2010-2015. The working group estimated an incremental cost  of about $28 billion for fiscal years 2010-2015 for the transition. However,  the Army continued to examine the estimates for pre- and  postmobilization validation, training support, and installation support. As a  result of ongoing studies, the Army decided to report a cost range of  between $24.4 billion and $28.1 billion depending on implementation  decisions. Of that total, the primary cost driver was for increasing full-time  support, estimated at $12.8 billion over the period.
In 2009, the Army revised its estimates to incorporate updated  assumptions for some cost categories. Specifically, the estimates  increased costs for medical readiness to reflect expanding medical  treatment to reservists throughout the phases of the force-generation  cycle;    decreased costs for full-time support, which, according to Army officials,  will provide 80 percent of the strategic reserve requirement rather than  100 percent of the strategic reserve requirement;  increased costs for the Army Reserve homeland defense pilot program to  include the cost of incentives for high-priority units; and  increased premobilization training costs to incorporate updated cost  factors for items such as participation rates, pay and allowances, and  inflation.
At the time of this report, the Army had not completed updates for other  cost categories such as recruiting and retention, information technology,  predeployment training equipment, new equipment training, second- destination transportation, premobilization training, and community  services. The most recent Army estimates show a cost range from $12.7  billion to $27 billion over a 6-year period. Table 2 shows the cost  categories and the amounts the Army estimated in 2008, categories  updated in 2009, and a summary incorporating the most recent Army  estimates.
According to Army officials involved in cost estimating, the transition  costs could vary widely from the initial estimates for four key reasons.  First, the Army has not yet defined which cost categories are essential for  an operational reserve component, so costs could be added or removed  from the estimate. For example, the Army has not decided whether  activities recommended by the Commission on National Guard and  Reserves, such as providing housing allowance for activated reservists and  reimbursing certain reservists for travel, are essential for an operational  reserve and should be included as transition costs. Estimated costs for  implementing these recommendations were not included in the  preliminary estimate or the 2009 updates and, if included, could  significantly increase costs. The Army has estimated that providing  housing allowance for activated reservists could add from $170 million to  $400 million annually and reimbursing travel expenses for certain  reservists participating in individual training would add about $580 million  annually. The Army has not estimated costs to implement other  commission recommendations, such as the costs to increase the capacity  of training institutions and increase staff support to the Employer Support  of Guard and Reserves program. Second, the Army has not decided on  the level of resources that will be required in other cost categories. For  example, the Army has not established the specific personnel, training,  and equipment levels its reserve components will require in each phase of  the force-generation cycle. Third, several studies are underway to examine  the level of resources required for full-time support, medical and dental  benefits, and incentives changes for the operational role. If readiness  requirements, full-time support, medical and dental benefits, or incentives  are increased above current levels, costs for the transition to the  operational role could increase. Finally, neither estimate includes any  recurring or sustainment costs beyond 6 years; costs for incentives, policy,  or legislative changes required for the operational role; or costs for  implementing the human resource initiatives designed to increase  flexibility for reservists transitioning to and from active duty—referred to  as the “continuum of service initiatives”—that the Army has identified as  critical to the transition. Moreover, costs that the Army considered part  of other Army initiatives, such as increasing reserve component equipping  levels or expanding the Army, were not included.
section_title: The Army Plans to Include the Majority of Estimated Transition Costs in Its Fiscal Year 2012 to 2017 Projected Spending Plans, but It Has Not Finalized an Implementation Plan and a Funding Strategy for Achieving Its Goals
paragraphs: According to Army officials, The Fiscal Year 2010 President’s Budget  Request includes some funding that supports the reserves’ operational  role, but the Army plans to include the majority of funding for transition  costs in its fiscal year 2012-2017 projected spending plans after it obtains  more information on the resources needed to support the operational role.  Army officials identified $2.2 billion in The Fiscal Year 2010 President’s  Budget Request that the Army considers as supporting the transition to the  reserves’ operational role. Specifically, the fiscal year 2010 budget includes  $123 million for community services (family support); $34 million for  dental care to facilitate timely mobilization; $176 million for information  technology, secure internet, and bandwidth; and $1.9 billion for reserve  component recruiting and retention.
In addition, Army officials stated that $779 million of the funds requested  in DOD’s fiscal year 2009 supplemental request for overseas contingency  operations will also contribute to the transition to an operational force.  For example, Army officials identified funding requested for items such as  installing secure internet capability to reserve component units, temporary  full-time support staff, additional training days, and other costs as  contributing to the transition. However, it is not clear from Army  documents how much of the transition costs identified in the preliminary  cost estimates are included in the fiscal year 2009 supplemental or 2010  budget request.
Although, in an information paper provided to Congress in February 2008,  the Army stated that its fiscal years 2010 to 2015 projected spending plans  would capture the required capabilities to begin the formal transformation  of the reserve components to an operational force, the Army has decided  to defer including the majority of those resources until the fiscal years  2012 to 2017 projected spending plans. According to Army officials  involved in estimating transition costs, the Army needed more information  on the resources required for the reserve components to meet operational  readiness requirements, such as levels of medical support and full-time  support. Army officials noted that accurately estimating costs for the  transition is challenging because specific information about the levels of  personnel, equipment, training, and full-time support required of an  operational reserve component in each phase of the Army’s force- generation cycle has not been developed. Army officials have stated that  more specific metrics, such as the level of training proficiency required in  each phase of the cycle, would help them to develop a more refined cost  estimate for the transition.
In February 2008, the Army formed a temporary task force to develop a  comprehensive, coordinated implementation plan to transition the Army’s  reserve components from a strategic reserve to an operational force. At  the time of this report, the task force had developed a draft  implementation plan that identifies some of the key tasks, an approximate  10-year timeline to complete transition tasks and incorporate associated  costs into the base budget, and some measures of success. According to  Army officials, the Army is awaiting agreement on this plan, as well as the  results of several ongoing studies, before it incorporates any additional  transition costs into the fiscal year 2012 budget and program.
In the meantime, the Army continues to utilize its reserve components as  an operational force without a complete and approved implementation  plan that clearly defines what tasks and costs are essential to the  transition or a comprehensive funding strategy that identifies a timeline  and funding sources for key transition tasks. According to DOD’s directive  that governs managing the reserve components as an operational force, it  is DOD policy that the reserve components shall be resourced to meet  readiness requirements of federal missions and that resourcing plans shall  ensure visibility to track resources from budget formulation,  appropriation, and allocation through execution. Additionally, best  practices for strategic planning have shown that effective and efficient  operations require detailed plans outlining major implementation tasks,  defined metrics and timelines to measure progress, a comprehensive and  realistic funding strategy, and communication of key information to  decision makers. However, at the time of this report, the task force had  not yet identified specifics for key tasks such as adapting the training base  and institutional support functions, identifying measures of success for all  transition tasks—such as synchronizing training cycles, sustaining  volunteerism, and implementing human resource initiatives—and  developing a resourcing strategy. In addition, the draft implementation  plan does not explain how other Army initiatives, such as increasing the  Army’s end strength or transforming to the modular force contributes to  the overall goal of transitioning the reserve components to an operational  force.
According to Army officials, the task force is scheduled to disband in  September 2009, and it is not clear who will have responsibility for  managing the implementation of the transition to the operational role and  tracking progress over the long term. Without an approved  implementation plan that fully describes the key tasks necessary for the  transition, establishes timelines for implementation, and identifies metrics  to measure progress, it will be difficult for the Army to gauge whether it is  moving toward its goal of fully supporting the transition of the Army  National Guard and Army Reserve to operational roles. Furthermore,  Congress will continue to have only a partial view of the potentially  substantial cost and time required to complete the transition.
section_title: States Use Mutual Support Agreements to Mitigate Effects of National Guard Deployments, although Some Domestic Requirements Remain Undefined
paragraphs: The deployment of National Guard units as a federal operational force has  reduced their availability for domestic missions, but the effect on the  states remains unclear because states have mitigated shortfalls through  mutual support agreements and requirements for some domestic missions,  such as responding to large multistate events, remain undefined. In  general, National Guard members may only serve in one duty status at a  time. Unless they are activated under Title 10, Guard members remain  under command and control of the state governors in either state active  duty or Title 32 status. When National Guard members are activated for  federally controlled Title 10 duty, their Title 32 status generally stops and  then begins again when they are released from Title 10 active duty.
Under the Army’s force-generation model as designed, there is the  potential for units to be unavailable to state governors for 1 year with 5  years between federal mobilizations. However, according to Army and  state National Guard officials, the reality of the current operational  environment is that National Guard units deploy more frequently and are  unavailable to state governors for about 1 year every 3 years. For example,  Washington’s brigade combat team deployed in 2008 after 3-1/2 years at  home.
The effect of the operational role on the National Guard’s domestic  readiness remains unclear because states have taken steps to mitigate any  known shortfalls and, as we have previously reported, DOD, the  Department of Homeland Security, and the states have not defined  requirements, readiness standards, and measures for the National Guard’s  domestic missions that are likely to be conducted in Title 32 status. Since  National Guard units have begun deploying for their federal missions,  states have made plans to compensate for any shortfalls in availability of  their Guard forces either by relying on other capabilities and resources  within the state or by relying on assistance from other states obtained  through mutual support arrangements. National Guard officials from all of  the four states that we visited reported that they routinely coordinate with  other states and utilize mutual assistance agreements to ensure they can  respond effectively to domestic requirements when state forces are  deployed. For example, officials in Florida voiced a particular concern  because a brigade combat team of more than 3,400 people would be  deployed during the 2010 hurricane season. However, they noted that they  routinely coordinate with other southeastern states to ensure that forces  and capabilities that could be needed to respond to hurricanes are  available within the region, and they anticipated being able to respond  effectively. In addition, according to Washington National Guard officials,  while they have typically been able to assign domestic response missions  to units that are outside their deployment window, this becomes  increasingly difficult when a large percentage of the state’s forces are  mobilized. At the time of our visit, the state had almost 50 percent of its  forces mobilized. Similarly, Guard officials in Virginia told us that its  brigade combat team, comprising about 54 percent of the state’s National  Guard forces, will be deployed at the same time as the state’s aviation  battalion resulting in a large loss of forces and essential capabilities for  domestic response missions. To mitigate for this loss, Virginia National  Guard officials stated they rely on mutual support arrangements with  other states and cross training of the state’s soldiers. In addition, state  National Guard officials told us that they would have to rely on other  states to provide support in the event of a catastrophic disaster regardless  of the number of soldiers the state had mobilized for federal missions.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Army’s reserve components are likely to be used as an operational  force supporting regular overseas rotations for the foreseeable future, and  several studies and commissions have determined there is no viable  alternative to the Army’s continued reliance on reservists. Although the  Army has taken steps to modify its force structure and adapted its  personnel and equipping strategies for the operational role, heavy  operational demands have hampered the Army’s efforts to implement the  force-generation model as intended. For example, the Army has not  established firm readiness requirements for an operational reserve  component or fully incorporated the resources needed to support the  operational role into its budget and projected spending plan. Although the  Army continues to study key costs, incorporating the necessary resources  into its budget and projected spending plan is needed to effectively  implement the force-generation model and support the reserve  components in their new role. Adapting the Army’s institutions and  incorporating the resources needed to support the cyclical readiness of an  operational reserve component into its base budget will be a long-term  effort estimated to take more than 10 years to complete. The  implementation of these changes will span multiple administrations and  Congresses and require many billions of dollars and, therefore, needs  sound management controls to guide the effort and ensure success. The  Army currently plans to request the majority of funding to complete the  transition to an operational force in its fiscal year 2012-2017 budget;  however, it has not finalized a cost estimate or detailed implementation  plan that identifies what specific requirements have been and remain to be  filled. The lack of outcome-related metrics also hampers the Army’s ability  to measure its progress towards fully operationalizing its reserve  components and justifying the large expenditure of funds required to  implement the transition. Until the Army adopts an implementation plan  outlining its requirements for transitioning its reserve components to an  operational force, identifying progress made to date, and detailing  additional personnel and other resources required, DOD decision makers  and Congress will not be in a sound position to determine the total costs  to complete the transition and decide how to best allocate future funding.  Moreover, without effective management controls over these initiatives to  help measure progress and to accomplish effective and efficient  operations, the Army risks continued challenges in preparing ready units  and providing reservists a sustainable balance between military and  civilian careers, which, over time, could threaten the viability of the all- volunteer citizen soldier force.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army to take the following three actions:    Finalize an implementation plan for transitioning its reserve components  to the operational role that describes the key tasks necessary for the  transition, assigns responsibility for these tasks, defines metrics for  measuring success, and establishes timelines for full implementation.
Complete a cost estimate for the transition that, at a minimum, should    a clear definition of what costs the Army does and does not consider to be  related to the transition to an operational force;    estimates for key cost drivers; and  identification of any uncertainties in the estimates due to pending changes  to the reserve components’ force structure, personnel, training, and  equipping strategies or other decisions that may affect costs, and updates  to the plan as these decisions are made.  Include the costs of the transition in the Army’s budget and Future Years  Defense Program.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written  comments on a draft of this report. The department agreed with each of  our recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in  appendix II.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Secretary of the Army to finalize an implementation plan for  transitioning its reserve components to the operational role. In its  comments, it cited DOD Directive 1200.17 that directs the Secretaries of  the military departments to manage their respective reserve components  as an operational force such that they provide operational capabilities  while maintaining strategic depth. However, this directive does not  provide detailed direction on how the services should transition the  reserve forces, and we believe that a detailed plan is necessary to ensure  key tasks in managing the reserves as an operational force are completed.  DOD also drew a distinction between managing the reserve components as  an operational force and transitioning reserves to an operational force. In  this report, we defined transitioning reserves to an operational force as  implementing those steps necessary to adapt the Army’s institutions and  resources to support the cyclical readiness requirements and implement  the “train-mobilize-deploy” model. We believe that completing a detailed  implementation plan that describes key tasks necessary for the transition,  assigns responsibility for these tasks, defines metrics for measuring  success, and establishes time lines for full implementation is an essential  part of transitioning the reserve components to an operational force.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Secretary of the Army to complete a cost estimate for the  transition that includes a definition of costs, estimates for key cost drivers,  and areas of uncertainties, such as pending policy decisions, that may  affect costs. However, the department did not describe the steps it will  take to complete the estimate. We therefore believe the Secretary of  Defense should provide specific direction and guidance as outlined in our  recommendation.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Secretary of the Army to include the costs of the transition in  the Army’s budget and Future Years Defense Program. In its comments,  DOD noted its published guidance, Directive 1200.17, that resourcing plans  should ensure visibility to track resources from formulation,  appropriation, and allocation through execution. However, as discussed in  the report, the Army does not plan to include the majority of the estimated  costs for transitioning its reserve components to an operational role until  fiscal year 2012. Until the Army includes the resources required in its  future spending plans it will be hampered in its ability to transition its  reserve components to the operational role.
We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Should  you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, reviewed  documentation, and interviewed officials from the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense Comptroller, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the  Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters Department of the  Army, U.S. Army Forces Command, First Army, the National Guard  Bureau, the Army National Guard, the Office of the Chief of the Army  Reserve, the U.S. Army Reserve Command, RAND Corporation, and the  Institute for Defense Analysis. We also reviewed documentation and  interviewed officials from offices of National Guard Adjutants General in  four case-study states: Florida, Missouri, Virginia, and Washington. These  states were selected because they had a history of major disaster  declarations; are geographically dispersed across the United States; have a  brigade combat team presence or a Chemical, Biological, Radiological,  Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force  Package (CERFP) team (which are units that are dual-tasked with  domestic responsibilities) or both; face a range of homeland security risks;  and present a range of population sizes.
To identify the extent to which the Army has made progress but faces  challenges in modifying the force structure, manning, and equipping  strategies of its reserve components to meet the requirements of the  operational role, we reviewed prior GAO work, reports of the Commission  on the National Guard and Reserves, reports to Congress on related  initiatives and issues, current Army plans and policy documents, including  the Army Campaign Plan, Army Structure Memorandums, Army Forces  Command’s concept plan for Army Initiative 4 (transition the reserve  components to an operational force), Army Forces Command’s 4 + 1 Army  National Guard Brigade Combat Team Comprehensive Review, the  National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, DOD Directive 1200.17,  Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force, and  Headquarters Department of the Army Execution Order 150-18 Reserve  Component Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre- and Post-Mobilization  Training Strategy. We also reviewed Army data on actual and planned  modular unit restructuring, total force structure changes, and the expected  number of reserve component soldiers available each year at varying  mobilization rates under the currently planned rotational force structures  in order to assess changes made to the reserve components’ force  structure for the operational role. In addition, we reviewed Army National  Guard and Army Reserve force-structure allowances, personnel end  strength, and equipment on hand to assess the extent to which the Army  and reserve components have made changes to more fully man and equip  units for the operational role. Further, we incorporated information from  surveys of a nonprobability sample of 24 Army National Guard or Army  Reserve units, as well as follow-up interviews with officials from 15 of  these units. We selected units of different types and sizes that had  returned from deployments in the last 12 months. In addition, we chose  the proportion of Army National Guard and Reserve units for our sample  based on the proportion of mobilized forces from each of the components.  The surveys and interviews addressed a range of training, equipment, and  personnel issues. We supplemented this information by reviewing  documents and interviewing officials from DOD, Army, National Guard  Bureau, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, U.S. Army Forces  Command, and First Army to discuss planned and ongoing policy and  strategy changes for transitioning the reserve components to an  operational force. Further, we incorporated information from interviews  with officials from offices of National Guard Adjutants General in case- study states.
To determine the extent to which the Army has estimated costs for the  transition of the reserve components to an operational force and included  them in its current budget and Future Years Defense Program, we  reviewed DOD’s fiscal year 2009 supplemental appropriations request and  DOD’s fiscal year 2009 and 2010 budget requests. We also examined the  Army’s cost estimates for operationalizing the reserve components,  including Army Forces Command’s concept plan for Army Initiative 4  (AI4)—transitioning the reserve components to an operational force—and  a Center for Army Analysis cost-benefit analysis of the AI4 concept plan.  In addition, we interviewed officials from DOD, the Army, Army Forces  Command, the National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard, and the  Army Reserve in order to understand assumptions made in estimating the  cost for transforming the reserve components to an operational force, to  assess the extent to which those costs have been included in DOD’s  budget and Future Years Defense Program, and to identify whether the  Army has an implementation plan that includes the full cost of the  transition.
To determine the effect of the National Guard’s federal operational role on  its availability to state governors for domestic missions, we reviewed  relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code, and DOD directives  regarding management of the reserve components as an operational force  and National Guard homeland defense activities. We also conducted  interviews with the National Guard Bureau and offices of National Guard  Adjutants General in the four states chosen for our case study concerning  the possibility of conflicts between the states’ National Guard  requirements and Title 32 requirements related to the operational role of  the National Guard. Further, our review of prior GAO work, along with the  interviews with officials from the National Guard Bureau and case-study  states, allowed us to assess whether the requirements of the National  Guard’s operational role may affect the availability or readiness of  National Guard forces for domestic missions.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 through July 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant Director;  Melissa Blanco; Susan Ditto; Nicole Harms; Kevin Keith; Susan Mason,  Charles Perdue; John Smale, Jr.; Suzanne Wren; and Matthew Young made  key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach to Training and  Mobilizing Reserve Component Forces. GAO-09-720. Washington, D.C.:  July 17, 2009.
Military Personnel: Reserve Compensation Has Increased Significantly  and Is Likely to Rise Further as DOD and VA Prepare for the  Implementation of Enhanced Educational Benefits. GAO-09-726R.  Washington D.C.: July 6, 2009.
Military Personnel: Army Needs to Focus on Cost-Effective Use of  Financial Incentives and Quality Standards in Managing Force Growth.  GAO-09-256. Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2009.
Global War on Terrorism: Reported Obligations for the Department of  Defense. GAO-09-449R. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2009.
Military Training: Improvement Continues in DOD’s Reporting on  Sustainable Ranges, but Opportunities Exist to Improve Its Range  Assessments and Comprehensive Plan. GAO-09-128R. Washington, D.C.:  December 15, 2008.
Force Structure: The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to Equip and  Staff Modular Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Their Capabilities.  GAO-09-131. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2008.
Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil  Support Missions May Depend on DOD’s Implementation of the 2008  National Defense Authorization Act. GAO-08-311. Washington, D.C.: April  16, 2008.
Force Structure: Restructuring and Rebuilding the Army Will Cost  Billions of Dollars for Equipment but the Total Cost Is Uncertain.  GAO-08-669T. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2008.
Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions Needed  to Rebuild Readiness of U.S. Ground Forces. GAO-08-497T. Washington,  D.C.: February 14, 2008.
Force Structure: Need for Greater Transparency for the Army’s Grow the  Force Initiative Funding Plan. GAO-08-354R. Washington, D.C.: January  18, 2008.
Force Structure: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Oversee the  Army’s Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve  Accountability for Results. GAO-08-145. Washington, D.C.: December  2007.
Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps Cannot Be Assured That  Equipment Reset Strategies Will Sustain Equipment Availability While  Meeting Ongoing Operational Requirements. GAO-07-814. Washington,  D.C.: September 19, 2007.
Guard and Reserve Personnel: Fiscal, Security, and Human Capital  Challenges Should be Considered in Developing a Revised Business  Model for the Reserve Component. GAO-07-984. Washington, D.C.: June 20,  2007.
Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army’s  Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address Implementation  Challenges. GAO-07-936. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2007.
Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Establish a Strategy and Improve  Transparency over Reserve and National Guard Compensation to  Manage Significant Growth in Cost. GAO-07-828. Washington, D.C.: June  20, 2007.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic  Equipment Requirements and Readiness. GAO-07-60. Washington, D.C.:  January 26, 2007.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for  21st Century Challenges. GAO-06-1109T. Washington D.C.: September 21,  2006.
Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted  Personnel Recruitment and Retention Challenges. GAO-06-134.  Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2005.
Military Personnel: Top Management Attention Is Needed to Address  Long-standing Problems with Determining Medical and Physical  Fitness of the Reserve Force. GAO-06-105. Washington, D.C.: October 27,  2005.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and  Equipment Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, D.C.:  October 20, 2005.
Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard  Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force  Transformation Initiatives. GAO-06-111. Washington, D.C.: October 4,  2005.
Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Army Reserve  Personnel and Equipment Shortages. GAO-05-660. Washington, D.C.: July  12, 2005.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for  Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. GAO-05-21. Washington, D.C.:  November 10, 2004.
Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas  and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T.  Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2004.