Capitol Visitor Center: Schedule Delays Continue; Reassessment Underway
Published: 2005-09-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony discusses progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. Our remarks will focus on (1) the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) progress in managing the project's schedule since the Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch, Senate Committee on Appropriations' July 14 hearing on the project; (2) our estimate of a general time frame for completing the base project's construction and the preliminary results of our assessment of the risks associated with AOC's July 2005 schedule for the base project; and (3) the project's costs and funding, including the potential impact of scheduling issues on cost. However, we will not, as originally planned, provide specific estimated completion dates because AOC's contractors revised the schedule in August to reflect recent delays, but AOC has not yet evaluated the revised schedule. AOC believes that the time added to the schedule by its contractors is unreasonable. Until AOC completes its evaluation and we assess it, any estimates of specific completion dates are, in our view, tentative and preliminary. Similarly, we will wait until the schedule is stabilized to update our November 2004 estimate of the cost to complete the project. Currently, AOC and its consultant, McDonough Bolyard Peck (MBP), are still developing their cost-to-complete estimates.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In summary, although AOC and its construction contractors have continued to make progress since the Subcommittee's July 14 CVC hearing, several delays have occurred and more are expected. These delays could postpone the base project's completion significantly beyond September 15, 2006, the date targeted in AOC's July 2005 schedule. Although not yet fully reviewed and accepted by AOC, the schedule that AOC's contractors revised in August 2005 shows February 26, 2007, as the base project's completion date. According to our preliminary analysis of the project's July 2005 schedule, the base project is more likely to be completed sometime in the spring or summer of 2007 than by September 15, 2006. Unless the project's scope is changed or extraordinary actions are taken, the base project is likely to be completed later than September 15, 2006, for the reasons cited by the contractors and for other reasons, such as the optimistic durations estimated for a number of activities and the risks and uncertainties facing the project. AOC believes that the contractors added too much time to the schedule in August for activities not included in the schedule and that it can expedite the project by working concurrently rather than sequentially and by taking other actions. Additionally, we are concerned about actions that have been, or could be, proposed to accelerate work to meet the September 15, 2006, target date. The project's schedule also raises a number of management concerns, including the potential for delays caused by not allowing enough time to address potential problems or to complete critical activities. Fiscal year 2006 appropriations have provided sufficient funds to cover AOC's request for CVC construction funding as well as additional funds for some risks and uncertainties that may arise, such as costs associated with additional sequence 2 delays or unexpected conditions. Although sequence 2 delays have been occurring, the extent to which the government is responsible for their related costs is not clear at this time. Additional funding may be necessary if the government is responsible for significant delay-related costs or if significant changes are made to the project's design or scope or to address unexpected conditions. In addition, we and AOC identified some CVC construction activities that received duplicate funding. AOC has discussed this issue with the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We are pleased to be here today to assist the Subcommittee in monitoring  progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. Our remarks will  focus on (1) the Architect of the Capitol’s (AOC) progress in managing the  project’s schedule since the Subcommittee’s July 14 hearing on the  project; (2) our estimate of a general time frame for completing the base  project’s construction and the preliminary results of our assessment of the  risks associated with AOC’s July 2005 schedule for the base project; and  (3) the project’s costs and funding, including the potential impact of  scheduling issues on cost. However, we will not, as originally planned,  provide specific estimated completion dates because AOC’s contractors  revised the schedule in August to reflect recent delays, but AOC has not  yet evaluated the revised schedule. AOC believes that the time added to  the schedule by its contractors is unreasonable. Until AOC completes its  evaluation and we assess it, any estimates of specific completion dates  are, in our view, tentative and preliminary. Similarly, we will wait until the  schedule is stabilized to update our November 2004 estimate of the cost to  complete the project. Currently, AOC and its consultant, McDonough  Bolyard Peck (MBP), are still developing their cost-to-complete estimates.
Our remarks today are based on our review of schedules and financial  reports for the CVC project and related records maintained by AOC and its  construction management contractor, Gilbane Building Company; our  observations on the progress of work at the CVC construction site; and our  discussions with CVC project staff (including AOC, its major CVC  contractors, and representatives of MBP), AOC’s Chief Fire Marshal, and  officials responsible for managing the Capitol Power Plant. We also  reviewed applicable appropriations legislation. Appendix I provides more  detailed information on our assessment of the project’s schedule. We did  not perform an audit; rather, we performed our work to assist Congress in  conducting its oversight activities.
In summary, although AOC and its construction contractors have  continued to make progress since the Subcommittee’s July 14 CVC  hearing, several delays have occurred and more are expected. These  delays could postpone the base project’s completion significantly beyond  September 15, 2006, the date targeted in AOC’s July 2005 schedule.  Although not yet fully reviewed and accepted by AOC, the schedule that  AOC’s contractors revised in August 2005 shows February 26, 2007, as the  base project’s completion date. The contractors reported this revised date  largely because some key activities associated with the heating,  ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) and fire protection systems had  not been included in previous schedules and because delays were  occurring, both in constructing the utility tunnel and in completing interior  stonework.
According to our preliminary analysis of the project’s July 2005 schedule,  the base project is more likely to be completed sometime in the spring or  summer of 2007 than by September 15, 2006. Unless the project’s scope is  changed or extraordinary actions are taken, the base project is likely to be  completed later than September 15, 2006, for the reasons cited by the  contractors and for other reasons, such as the optimistic durations  estimated for a number of activities and the risks and uncertainties facing  the project. AOC believes that the contractors added too much time to the  schedule in August for activities not included in the schedule and that it  can expedite the project by working concurrently rather than sequentially  and by taking other actions. While AOC may not need all of the time added  for the missing activities, CVC project personnel believe that more time  will be needed than is currently scheduled for other activities, such as the  utility tunnel, interior finishes and stonework, and the East Front. Because  of the uncertainty surrounding the base project’s construction schedule,  we cannot estimate a specific completion date at this time. Additionally,  we are concerned about actions that have been, or could be, proposed to  accelerate work to meet the September 15, 2006, target date. While such  actions could expedite the project and save some costs, they could also  increase other costs or adversely affect the CVC facility’s quality,  functionality, or life safety provisions. The project’s schedule also raises a  number of management concerns, including the potential for delays  caused by not allowing enough time to address potential problems or to  complete critical activities. Since the Subcommittee’s July 14 hearing, we  have discussed several actions with AOC that we believe are needed to  address the CVC project’s schedule problems and our concerns. These  actions include    evaluating the project’s revised schedule, including the activity durations,  to ensure that adequate time is provided;   analyzing the impact of various factors on the schedule and the adequacy  of the resources scheduled to be applied to meet completion dates;   carefully considering the costs, benefits, and risks associated with  proposals to accelerate work or reduce its scope and ensuring that  appropriate management controls are in place to prevent or minimize the  possible adverse consequences of such actions, if taken;   proposing a CVC opening date that allows reasonable time between the  completion of construction and the facility’s opening to address problems  that may arise;   ensuring that delays and their causes are adequately determined and  documented on an ongoing basis; and   advising Congress of any plans for accelerating work or reducing its scope  so that Congress can be involved in such decisions.
AOC agreed with our suggestions.
Fiscal year 2006 appropriations have provided sufficient funds to cover  AOC’s request for CVC construction funding as well as additional funds for  some risks and uncertainties that may arise, such as costs associated with  additional sequence 2 delays or unexpected conditions. Although sequence  2 delays have been occurring, the extent to which the government is  responsible for their related costs is not clear at this time. Additional  funding may be necessary if the government is responsible for significant  delay-related costs or if significant changes are made to the project’s  design or scope or to address unexpected conditions. In addition, we and  AOC identified some CVC construction activities that received duplicate  funding. AOC has discussed this issue with the House and Senate  Appropriations Committees.
subsections: section_title: Work on the Project Is Progressing, but Delays Continue
paragraphs: AOC and its contractors have continued to make progress on the project  since the Subcommittee’s July 14 hearing. However, mostly because some  key activities associated with the HVAC and fire protection systems were  not included in earlier schedules and because delays occurred in installing  stonework and excavating the utility tunnel, the sequence 2 contractor’s  August schedule shows the expected completion date for the base project  as February 26, 2007. As discussed at the Subcommittee’s July 14 hearing,  AOC recognized some delays in its June 2005 schedule, which showed the  base project’s expected completion date as October 19, 2006. Although  AOC has not evaluated the contractor’s August schedule, it does not  believe that so much additional time will be needed. Furthermore, as  discussed in the next section, AOC maintains that work could be  accelerated to meet the September 15, 2006, target date.
section_title: Project’s Schedule, Including Possible Actions to Accelerate Work, Raises Management Concerns
paragraphs: According to our analysis of the CVC project’s schedule, the base project  is unlikely to be completed by the September 15, 2006, target date for  several reasons. AOC believes that it could take actions to complete the  project by then, but these actions could have negative as well as positive  consequences. These and other schedule-related issues raise a number of  management concerns. We have discussed actions with AOC officials that  we believe are necessary to address problems with the schedule and our  concerns. AOC generally agreed with our suggestions.
subsections: section_title: Base Project’s Construction Is Likely to Be Completed Later Than Scheduled for Several Reasons
paragraphs: For several reasons, we believe that the base project is more likely to be  completed sometime in the spring or summer of 2007 than by September  15, 2006:    As we have previously testified, AOC’s sequence 2 contractor, Manhattan  Construction Company, has continued to miss its planned dates for  completing activities that we and AOC are tracking to assist the  Subcommittee in measuring the project’s progress. For example, as of  September 8, the contractor had completed 7 of the 16 selected activities  scheduled for completion before today’s hearing (see app. II); however,  none of the 7 activities was completed on time. Unforeseen site  conditions, an equipment breakdown, delays in stone deliveries, and a  shortage of stone masons for the interior stonework were among the  reasons given for why the work was not completed on time. Our analysis  of the sequence 2 contractor’s production pace between November 2004  and July 2005 indicates that the base project’s construction is unlikely to  be finished by September 15, 2006, if the contractor continues at the same  pace or even accelerates the work somewhat. In fact, at the current or  even a slightly accelerated pace, the base project would be completed  several months after September 15, 2006. To finish the base project’s  construction by that date, our analysis shows that the sequence 2  contractor would have to recover 1 day for every 8 remaining days  between July 2005 and September 2006 and could incur no further delays.
We continue to believe that the durations scheduled for a number of  sequence 2 activities are unrealistic. According to CVC project team  managers and staff, several activities, such as constructing the utility  tunnel; testing the fire protection system; testing, balancing, and  commissioning the HVAC system; installing interior stonework; and  finishing work in some areas are not likely to be completed as indicated in  the July 2005 schedule. Some of these are among the activities whose  durations we identified as optimistic in early 2004 and that we and AOC’s  construction management contractor identified as contributing most to the  project’s schedule slippage in August 2005; these activities also served as  the basis for our March 2004 recommendation to AOC that it reassess its  activity durations to see that they are realistic and achievable at the  budgeted cost. Because AOC had not yet implemented this  recommendation and these activities were important to the project’s  completion, we suggested in our May 17 testimony before the  Subcommittee that AOC give priority attention to this recommendation.  AOC’s construction management contractor initiated such a review after  the May 17 hearing. Including more time in the schedule to complete these  activities could add many more weeks to the project’s schedule.
AOC’s more aggressive schedule management is identifying significant  omissions of activities and time from the sequence 2 schedule. AOC’s  approach, though very positive, is coming relatively late in the project. For  example, several detailed activities associated with testing, balancing, and  commissioning the CVC project’s HVAC and fire protection system were  added to the schedule in July and August, extending the schedule by  several months. AOC believes, and we agree, that some of this work may  be done concurrently, rather than sequentially as shown in the August  schedule, thereby saving some of the added time. However, until more  work is done to further develop this part of the schedule, it is unclear how  much time could be saved. Furthermore, the July schedule does not  appear to include time to address significant problems with the HVAC or  fire alarm systems should they occur during testing.
In August 2005, CVC project personnel identified several risks and  uncertainties facing the project that they believed could adversely affect  its schedule. Examples include additional unforeseen conditions in  constructing the utility and House Connector tunnels; additional delays in  stonework due to slippages in stone deliveries, shortages of stone masons,  or stop-work orders responding to complaints about noise from work in  the East Front; and problems in getting the HVAC and fire protection  systems to function properly, including a sophisticated air filtration system  that has not been used before on such a large scale. Providing for these  risks and uncertainties in the schedule could add another 60 to 90 days to  the completion date, on top of the additional time needed to perform  activities that were not included in the schedule or whose durations were  overly optimistic.
Over the last 2 months, AOC’s construction management contractor has  identified 8 critical activity paths that will extend the base project’s  completion date beyond September 15, 2006, if lost time cannot be  recovered or further delays cannot be prevented. These 8 activity paths are  in addition to 3 that were previously identified by AOC’s construction  management contractor. In addition, the amount of time that has to be  recovered to meet the September 15 target has increased significantly. The  activity paths include work on the utility tunnel and testing and balancing  the HVAC system; procuring and installing the control wiring for the air  handling units; testing the fire alarm system; millwork and casework in the  orientation theaters and atrium; and stonework in the East Front,  orientation theaters, and exhibit gallery. Having so many critical activity  paths complicates project management and makes on-time completion  more difficult.
section_title: Possible Actions to Accelerate Work Raise Concerns
paragraphs: AOC believes it can recover much of the lost time and mitigate remaining  risks and uncertainties through such actions as using temporary  equipment, adding workers, working longer hours, resequencing work, or  performing some work after the CVC facility opens. AOC said that it is also  developing a risk mitigation plan that should contain additional steps it  can take to address the risks and uncertainties facing the project. Various  AOC actions could expedite the project and save costs, but they could also  have less positive effects. For example, accelerating work on the utility  tunnel could save costs by preventing or reducing delays in several other  important activities whose progress depends on the tunnel’s completion.  Conversely, using temporary equipment or adding workers to overcome  delays could increase the project’s costs if the government is responsible  for the delays. Furthermore, (1) actions to accelerate the project may not  save time; (2) the time savings may be offset by other problems; or (3)  working additional hours, days, or shifts may adversely affect the quality  of the work or worker safety. In our opinion, decisions to accelerate work  must be carefully made, and if the work is accelerated, it must be tightly  managed.
Possible proposals from contractors to accelerate the project by changing  the scope of work or its quality could compromise the CVC facility’s life  safety system, the effective functioning of the facility’s HVAC system, the  functionality of the facility to meet its intended purposes, or the life-cycle  costs of materials. In August, project personnel raised such possibilities as  lessening the rigor of systems’ planned testing, opening the facility before  all planned testing is done, or opening the facility before completing all the  work identified by Capitol Preservation Commission representatives as  having to be completed for the facility to open. While such measures could  save time, we believe that the risks associated with these types of actions  need to be carefully considered before adoption and that management  controls need to be in place to preclude or minimize any adverse  consequences of such actions, if taken.
section_title: Project’s Schedule Presents Other Management Concerns
paragraphs: AOC’s schedule presents other management issues, including some that  we have discussed in earlier testimonies.
AOC tied the date for opening the CVC facility to the public to September  15, 2006, the date in the sequence 2 contract for completing the base  project’s construction. Joining these two milestones does not allow any  time for addressing unexpected problems in completing the construction  work or in preparing for operations. AOC has since proposed opening the  facility to the public on December 15, 2006, but the schedule does not yet  reflect this proposed revision. Specifically, on September 6, 2005, AOC  told Capitol Preservation Commission representatives that it was still  expecting the CVC base project to be substantially completed by  September 15, 2006, but it proposed to postpone the facility’s opening for 3  months to provide time to finish testing CVC systems, complete punch-list  work, and prepare for operating the facility. In our view, allowing some  time to address unexpected problems is prudent.
AOC’s and its contractors’ reassessment of activity durations in the August  schedule may not be sufficiently rigorous to identify all those that are  unrealistic. In reassessing the project’s schedule, the construction  management contractor found some durations to be reasonable that we  considered likely to be too optimistic. Recently, AOC’s sequence 2 and  construction management contractors reported that, according to their  reassessment, the durations for interior stonework were reasonable. We  previously found that these durations were optimistic, and CVC project  staff we interviewed in August likewise believed they were unrealistic.
We have previously expressed concerns about a lack of sufficient or timely  analysis and documentation of delays and their causes and determination  of responsibility for the delays, and we recommended that AOC perform  these functions more rigorously. We have not reassessed this area  recently. However, given the project’s uncertain schedule, we believe that  timely and rigorous analysis and documentation of delays and their causes  and determination of responsibility for them are critical. We plan to  reexamine this area again in the next few weeks.
The uncertainty associated with the project’s construction schedule  increases the importance of having a summary schedule that integrates the  completion of construction with preparations for opening the facility to  the public, as the Subcommittee has requested and we have  recommended. Without such a schedule, it is difficult to determine  whether all necessary activities have been identified and linked to provide  for a smooth opening or whether CVC operations staff will be hired at an  appropriate time. In early September, AOC gave a draft operations  schedule to its construction management contractor to integrate into the  construction schedule.
As we noted in our July 14 testimony, AOC could incur additional costs for  temporary work if it opens the CVC facility to the public before the  construction of the House and Senate expansion spaces is substantially  complete. As of last week, AOC’s contractors were still evaluating the  construction schedule for the expansion spaces, and it was not clear what  needs AOC would have for temporary work. The schedule, which we  received in early September, shows December 2006 as the date for  completing the construction of the expansion spaces. We have not yet  assessed the likelihood of the contractor’s meeting this date.
Finally, we are concerned about the capacity of the Capitol Power Plant  (CPP) to provide adequately for cooling, dehumidifying, and heating the  CVC facility during construction and when it opens to the public. Delays in  completing CPP’s ongoing West Refrigeration Plant Expansion Project, the  removal from service of two chillers because of refrigerant gas leaks, fire  damage to a steam boiler, management issues, and the absence of a CPP  director could potentially affect CPP’s ability to provide sufficient chilled  water and steam for the CVC facility and other congressional buildings.  These issues are discussed in greater detail in appendix III.
section_title: Actions Are Needed and Being Taken to Move the Project Forward and Address Concerns
paragraphs: Since the Subcommittee’s July 14 CVC hearing, we have discussed a  number of actions with AOC officials that we believe are necessary to  address problems with the project’s schedule and our concerns. AOC  generally agreed with our suggestions, and a discussion of them and AOC’s  responses follows.
By October 31, 2005, work with all relevant stakeholders to reassess the  entire project’s construction schedule, including the schedule for the  House and Senate expansion spaces, to ensure that all key activities are  included, their durations are realistic, their sequence and  interrelationships are appropriate, and sufficient resources are shown to  accomplish the work as scheduled. Specific activities that should be  reassessed include testing, balancing, and commissioning the HVAC and  filtration systems; testing the fire protection system; constructing the  utility tunnel; installing the East Front mechanical (HVAC) system;  installing interior stonework and completing finishing work (especially  plaster work); fabricating and delivering interior bronze doors; and fitting  out the gift shops. AOC agreed and has already asked its construction  management and sequence 2 contractors to reassess the August schedule.  AOC has also asked the sequence 2 contractor to show how it will recover  time lost through delays.
Carefully consider the costs, benefits, and risks associated with proposals  to change the project’s scope, modify the quality of materials, or  accelerate work, and ensure that appropriate management controls are in  place to prevent or minimize any adverse effects of such actions. AOC  agreed. It noted that the sequence 2 contractor had already begun to work  additional hours to recover lost time on the utility tunnel. AOC also noted  that its construction management contractor has an inspection process in  place to identify problems with quality and has recently enhanced its  efforts to oversee worker safety.
Propose a CVC opening date to Congress that allows a reasonable amount  of time between the completion of the base project’s construction and the  CVC facility’s opening to address any likely problems that are not provided  for in the construction schedule. The December 15, 2006, opening date  that AOC proposed earlier this month would provide about 90 days  between these milestones if AOC meets its September 15, 2006, target for  substantial completion. However, we continue to believe that AOC will  have difficulty meeting the September 15 target, and although the 90-day  period is a significant step in the right direction, an even longer period is  likely to be needed.
Give priority attention to effectively implementing our previous  recommendations that AOC (1) analyze and document delays and the  reasons and responsibility for them on an ongoing basis and analyze the  impact of scope changes and delays on the project’s schedule at least  monthly and (2) advise Congress of any additional costs it expects to incur  to accelerate work or perform temporary work to advance the CVC  facility’s opening so Congress can weigh the advantages and disadvantages  of such actions. AOC agreed.
section_title: Project Costs and Funding Provided as of September 2005
paragraphs: AOC is still updating its estimate of the cost to complete the CVC project,  including the base project and the House and Senate expansion spaces. As  a result, we have not yet had an opportunity to comprehensively update  our November 2004 estimate that the project’s estimated cost at  completion will likely be between $515.3 million without provision for  risks and uncertainties and $559 million with provision for risks and  uncertainties. Since November 2004, we have added about $10.3 million to  our $515.3 million estimate to account for additional CVC design and  construction work. (App. IV provides information on the project’s cost  estimates since the original 1999 estimate.) However, our current $525.6  million estimate does not include costs that AOC may incur for delays  beyond those delay costs included in our November 2004 estimate.  Estimating the government’s costs for delays that occurred after  November 2004 is difficult because it is unclear who ultimately will bear  responsibility for various delays. Furthermore, AOC’s new estimates may  cause us to make further revisions to our cost estimates.
To date, about $528 million has been provided for CVC construction. (See  app.V.) This amount does not include about $7.8 million that was made  available for either CVC construction or operations. In late August, we  and AOC found that duplicate funding had been provided for certain CVC  construction work. Specifically, about $800,000 was provided in two  separate funding sources for the same work. The House and Senate  Committees on Appropriations were notified of this situation and AOC’s  plan to address it. The funding that has been provided and that is  potentially available for CVC construction covers the current estimated  cost of the facility at completion and provides some funds for risks and  uncertainties. However, if AOC encounters significant additional costs for  delays or other changes, more funding may be needed.
Because of the potential for coordination problems with a project as large  and complex as CVC, we had recommended in July that AOC promptly  designate responsibility for integrating the planning and budgeting for CVC  construction and operations. In late August, AOC designated a CVC staff  member to oversee both CVC construction and operations funding. AOC  had also arranged for its operations planning consultant to develop an  operations preparation schedule and for its CVC project executive and  CVC construction management contractor to prepare an integrated  construction and operations schedule. AOC has received a draft  operations schedule and has given it to its construction management  contractor to integrate into the construction schedule. Pending the hiring  of an executive director for CVC, which AOC would like to occur by the  end of January 2006, the Architect of the Capitol said he expects his Chief  Administrative Officer, who is currently overseeing CVC operations  planning, to work closely with the CVC project executive to integrate CVC  construction and operations preparations.
Work and costs could also be duplicated in areas where the  responsibilities of AOC’s contractors overlap. For example, the contracts  or planned modification for both AOC’s CVC construction design  contractor and CVC operations contractor include work related to the gift  shop’s design and wayfinding signage. We discussed the potential for  duplication with AOC, and it agreed to work with its operations planning  contractor to clarify the contractor’s scope of work, eliminate any  duplication, and adjust the operations contract’s funding accordingly.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. We would be pleased to  answer any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact Bernard  Ungar at (202) 512-4232 or Terrell Dorn at (202) 512-6923. Other key  contributors to this testimony include Shirley Abel, Michael Armes,   John Craig, George Depaoli, Jr., Maria Edelstein, Elizabeth Eisenstadt,   Brett Fallavollita, Jeanette Franzel, Jackie Hamilton, Bradley James,   Scott Riback, and Kris Trueblood.
section_title: Appendix I: Risk Assessment Methodology
paragraphs: With the assistance of a contractor, Hulett & Associates, we assessed the  risks associated with the Architect of the Capitol’s (AOC) July 2005  schedule for the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project and used the results  of our assessment to estimate a time frame for completing the base CVC  project with and without identified risks and uncertainties. In August  2005, we and the contractor interviewed project managers and team  members from AOC and its major CVC contractors, a representative from  the Army Corps of Engineers, and AOC’s Chief Fire Marshal to determine  the risks they saw in completing the remaining work and the time they  considered necessary to finish the CVC project and open it to the public.  Using the project’s July 2005 summary schedule (the most recent schedule  available when we did our work), we asked the team members to estimate  how many workdays would be needed to complete the remaining work.  More specifically, for each summary-level activity that the members had a  role or expertise in, we asked them to develop three estimates of the  activity’s duration—the least, most likely, and longest time needed to  complete the activity. We planned to estimate the base project’s most  likely completion date without factoring in risks and uncertainties using  the most likely activity durations estimated by the team members. In  addition, using these three-point estimates and a simulation analysis to  calculate different combinations of the team’s estimates that factored in  identified risks and uncertainties, we planned to estimate completion  dates for the base project at various confidence levels.
In August 2005, AOC’s construction management and sequence 2  contractors were updating the July project schedule to integrate the  construction schedule for the House and Senate expansion spaces, reflect  recent progress and problems, and incorporate the results to date of their  reassessment of the time needed for testing, balancing, and commissioning  the heating, ventilation and air-conditioning, (HVAC) system and for fire  alarm testing. This reassessment was being done partly to implement a  recommendation we had made to AOC after assessing the project’s  schedule in early 2004 and finding that the scheduled durations for these  and other activities were optimistic. AOC’s construction management and  sequence 2 contractors found that key detailed activities associated with  the HVAC system had not been included in the schedule and that the  durations for a number of activities were not realistic. Taking all of these  factors into account, AOC’s contractors revised the project’s schedule in  August. AOC believes that the revised schedule, which shows the base  project’s completion date slipping by several months, allows too much  time for the identified problems. As a result of this problem and others we  brought to AOC’s attention, AOC has asked its contractors to reassess the  schedule. AOC’s construction management contractor believes that such a  reassessment could take up to 2 months. In our opinion, there are too  many uncertainties associated with the base project’s schedule to develop  reliable estimates of specific completion dates, with or without provisions  for risks and uncertainties.
section_title: Appendix II: Capitol Visitor Center Critical Construction Milestones, July-September 2005
subsections: section_title: Waterproof Working Slab Sta. 0:00-1:00
paragraphs: These activities are not critical. All other activities were critical in the April schedule or became critical  in subsequent schedules.
section_title: Appendix III: Issues Affecting the Capitol Power Plant’s Cooling and Heating Capacity
paragraphs: Several issues could affect the capacity of the Capitol Power Plant (CPP)  to provide sufficient chilled water and steam for the CVC facility and other  congressional buildings. CPP produces chilled water for cooling and  dehumidification and steam for heating Capitol Hill buildings.  To  accommodate the CVC facility and meet other needs, CPP has been  increasing its production capacity through the West Refrigeration Plant  Expansion Project. This project, which was scheduled for completion in  time to provide chilled water for the CVC facility during construction and  when it opened, has been delayed. In addition, problems with aging  equipment, fire damage, management weaknesses, and a leadership  vacancy could affect CPP’s ability to provide chilled water and steam.  More specifically:  In July, two chillers in CPP’s East Refrigeration Plant were taken out of  service because of a significant refrigerant gas leak. The refrigerant, whose  use is being phased out nationally, escaped into the surrounding  environment. Because of the chillers’ age and use of an outdated  refrigerant, AOC has determined that it would not be cost-effective to  repair the chillers. CPP’s chilled water production capacity will be further  reduced between December 1, 2005, and March 15, 2006, when the West  Refrigeration Plant is to be shut down to enable newly installed equipment  to be connected to the existing chilled water system. However, the  remainder of CPP’s East Refrigeration Plant is to remain operational  during this time, and AOC expects that the East Refrigeration Plant will  have sufficient capacity to meet the lower wintertime cooling demands.  Additionally, CPP representatives indicated that they could bring the West  Refrigeration Plant back online to provide additional cooling capacity in  an emergency. CPP is developing a cost estimate for this option.
In June, one of two CPP boilers that burn coal to generate steam was  damaged by fire. According to a CPP incident report, CPP operator errors  contributed to the incident and subsequent damage. Both boilers were  taken off-line for scheduled maintenance between July 1 and September  15, and CPP expects both boilers to be back online by September 30,  thereby enabling CPP to provide steam to CVC when it is needed.
Several management issues at CPP could further affect the expansion  plant’s and CPP’s operational readiness:    CPP has not yet developed a plan for staffing and operating the entire  plant after the West Refrigeration Plant becomes operational or contracted  for its current staff to receive adequate training to operate the West  Refrigeration Plant’s new, much more modern equipment.
CPP has not yet received a comprehensive commissioning plan from its  contractor.
A number of procurement issues associated with the plant expansion  project have arisen. We are reviewing these issues.
CPP has been without a director since May 2005, when the former director  resigned. CPP is important to the functioning of Congress, and strong  leadership is needed to oversee the completion of the expansion project  and the integration, commissioning, and operation of the new equipment,  as well as address the operational and management problems at the plant.  Filling the director position with an experienced manager who is also an  expert in the production of steam and chilled water is essential. AOC  recently initiated the recruitment process.
section_title: Appendix IV: Cost Growth for the CVC Project
subsections: section_title: Factors beyond or largely beyond AOC’s control
paragraphs: House and Senate expansion spaces  Air filtration system funded by Dep’t. of Defense (DOD)
Bid prices exceeding estimates, preconstruction costs exceeding budgeted costs,  unforeseen field conditions,   Other factors (costs associated with delays and design-to-budget overruns)
Project budget after increases (as of November 2004)
GAO-projected costs to complete after proposed scope changes (as of June 2005, excluding  risks and uncertainties)
Additional cost-to-complete items (as of August 2005)
Design of the Library of Congress tunnel (Funds from Capitol Preservation Fund)
GAO-projected costs to complete (as of August 2005, excluding risks and uncertainties)
Potential additional costs associated with risks and  uncertainties (as of November 2004)
Less: Risks and uncertainties GAO believes the project faced in  November 2004 [Congressional seals, orientation film, and backpack storage space ($4.2) +  US Capitol Police securitymonitoring ($3.0)]   (7.2)
Less: Additional cost-to-complete items (as of August 2005) (3.1)
The five additional scope items are the House connector tunnel, the East Front elevator extension,  the Library of Congress tunnel, temporary operations, and enhanced perimeter security.
section_title: Appendix V: Current Funding Provided to the CVC Project
paragraphs: Base project (as of November 2004)
US Capitol Police security monitoring   Current funding provided (as of June 2005)
Design of Library of Congress tunnel (funds from the Capitol Preservation Fund)
Construction-related funding provided in operations obligation plan:  Construction-related funding provided in operations  Current funding provided (as of August 2005)
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