Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain
Published: 2006-04-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: It has been over 3 years since the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assumed responsibility for passenger and baggage screening at commercial airports. This testimony focuses on the progress TSA is making in strengthening aspects of aviation security and the challenges that remain. Particularly, this testimony highlights (1) progress TSA has made, and challenges it faces, in managing a federalized security workforce--including federal security directors (FSD) and transportation security officers (TSO)--with operational responsibility for ensuring security of passengers and their baggage; and (2) actions TSA has taken, and the challenges it faces, to ensure appropriate regulatory oversight of other airport security activities.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: TSA has made progress in managing, deploying, and training a federalized aviation security workforce, including FSDs (the lead authority at U.S. airports) and TSOs (formerly known as screeners). FSDs have, for example, formed partnerships with key federal and private-sector stakeholders at airports engaged in security and operations. We reported, however, that the guidance on FSD authority is outdated and lacks clarity, particularly regarding security incidents when FSDs must coordinate with other stakeholders. Regarding TSOs, TSA has taken and has planned actions to strengthen the management and deployment of the TSO workforce. TSA has, for instance, developed a screening allocation model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports. However, FSDs have reported concerns that despite such a model, attracting, hiring, and retaining an adequate part-time TSO workforce remains a challenge. We have reported that, while TSA has expanded training opportunities for TSOs, insufficient TSO staffing and other problems hinder the ability of TSOs to take training. To evaluate TSO performance, TSA has collected performance data by conducting covert (undercover, unannounced) tests at passenger screening checkpoints. TSA has taken steps to strengthen key areas of aviation security for which it has regulatory and oversight responsibility, including domestic air cargo security, but faces challenges related to oversight and performance measurement. We reported in October 2005, for example, that while TSA had significantly increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections conducted, performance measures to determine to what extent air carriers and others are complying with air cargo security requirements had not been developed. Without such performance measures, and a systematic analysis of these results of air cargo security inspections, TSA's ability to target its workforce for future inspections, and fulfill oversight responsibilities, will be limited. Further, while TSA has incorporated elements of risk-based decision making into securing air cargo, its efforts are not yet complete. To address these and other issues, TSA officials stated that they plan to compile additional information on air cargo inspections to enhance their ability to conduct compliance inspections of air carriers using covert testing, and to require random inspection of air cargo.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the  management and deployment of federal employees charged with securing  U.S. commercial airports. After the terrorist attacks of 2001, securing the  nation’s aviation system—and ensuring that a federal workforce was in  place to carry out a wide range of aviation security responsibilities— became a key goal of the administration and the Congress. Among the  actions taken to address this need, the Aviation and Transportation  Security Act (ATSA) of 2001, which established the Transportation  Security Administration (TSA), charged the agency with, among other  things, overseeing security operations at the nation’s more than   400 commercial airports. In TSA, the federal workforce comprises, among  others, federal security directors (FSDs)—the ranking authority  responsible for leading and coordinating security activities at airports;  transportation security officers (TSO), formerly known as screeners; and  inspectors responsible for ensuring that air carriers, airport employees  and airport vendors comply with established security requirements.
My testimony today addresses two separate areas related to the  management and oversight of the federal airport security workforce:   (1) the progress TSA has made, and the challenges it faces, in managing a  federalized security workforce with operational responsibility for ensuring  security of passengers and their baggage, and (2) the actions TSA has  taken, and the challenges it faces, to ensure appropriate regulatory  oversight of other airport security activities.
My comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies  addressing the security of the U.S. commercial aviation system and our  ongoing work on TSA’s staffing standards for TSOs. We did our work in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Appendix I contains a list of related GAO products issued since September  11, 2001.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: TSA Operational Responsibilities for Passenger and Checked Baggage Security
paragraphs: Prior to the passage of ATSA, the screening of passengers and checked  baggage had been performed by private screening companies under  contract to the airlines. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was  responsible for ensuring compliance with screening regulations. With the  passage of ATSA and the transfer of aviation security responsibilities to  TSA, including passenger and checked baggage screening at airports, TSA  assigned FSDs—the top-ranking TSA authorities responsible for security  at the nation’s airports—to one or more commercial airports to oversee  security activities. TSA has approximately 157 FSD positions at  commercial airports nationwide to lead and coordinate TSA security  activities. Although an FSD is responsible for security at each commercial  airport, not every airport has an FSD dedicated solely to that airport. Most  category X airports have an FSD responsible for that airport alone, while  at other airports the FSD located at a hub airport has responsibility over  one or more spoke airports of the same or smaller size.
In addition to establishing TSA and giving it responsibility for passenger  and checked baggage screening operations, ATSA also set forth specific  enhancements to screening operations for TSA to implement, with  deadlines for completing many of them. These requirements include    assuming responsibility for screeners and screening operations at more  than 400 commercial airports by November 19, 2002;    establishing a basic screener training program composed of a minimum of  40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job training;    conducting an annual proficiency review of all screeners;    conducting operational testing of screeners;  requiring remedial training for any screener who fails an operational test;  and    screening all checked baggage for explosives using explosives detection  systems by December 31, 2002.
As mandated by ATSA, TSA hired and deployed a TSO workforce to  assume operational responsibility for conducting passenger and checked  baggage screening. Passenger screening is a process by which authorized  TSA personnel inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the  carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other  dangerous item onboard an aircraft or into a sterile area. TSOs must  inspect individuals for prohibited items at designated screening locations.  The four passenger screening functions are (1) X-ray screening of  property, (2) walk-through metal detector screening of individuals,   (3) hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and (4) physical  search of property and trace detection for explosives. Checked baggage  screening is a process by which authorized TSOs inspect checked baggage  to deter, detect, and prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive,  incendiary, or weapon onboard an aircraft. Checked baggage screening is  accomplished through the use of explosive detection systems (EDS) or  explosive trace detection (ETD) systems, and through the use of other  means, such as manual searches, canine teams, and positive passenger bag  match, when EDS and ETD systems are unavailable.
section_title: TSA Regulatory Responsibilities for Air Cargo and Airport Security
paragraphs: In addition to establishing requirements for passenger and checked  baggage screening, ATSA charged TSA with the responsibility for ensuring  the security of air cargo, including, among other things, establishing  security rules and regulations covering domestic and foreign passenger  carriers that transport cargo, domestic and foreign all-cargo carriers, and  domestic indirect air carriers—carriers that consolidate air cargo from  multiple shippers and deliver it to air carriers to be transported; and  overseeing implementation of air cargo security requirements by air  carriers and indirect air carriers through compliance inspections. In  general, TSA inspections are designed to ensure air carrier compliance  with air cargo security requirements, while air carrier inspections focus on  ensuring that cargo does not contain weapons, explosives, or stowaways.  TSA is responsible for inspecting 285 passenger and all-cargo air carriers  with about 2,800 cargo facilities nationwide, as well as 3,800 indirect air  carriers with about 10,000 domestic locations. In conducting inspections,  TSA inspectors review documentation, interview carrier personnel,  directly observe air cargo operations, or conduct tests to determine  whether air carriers and indirect air carriers are in compliance with air  cargo security requirements. In 2004, an estimated 23 billion pounds of air  cargo was transported within the United States, with about a quarter of  this amount transported on passenger aircraft. Recently, DHS reported  that most cargo on passenger aircraft is not physically inspected.
ATSA also granted TSA the responsibility for overseeing U.S. airport  operators’ efforts to maintain and improve the security of commercial  airport perimeters, access controls, and airport workers. While airport  operators, not TSA, retain direct day-to-day operational responsibilities for  these areas of security, ATSA directs TSA to improve the security of  airport perimeters and the access controls leading to secured airport  areas, as well as take measures to reduce the security risks posed by  airport workers. Each airport’s security program, which must be approved  by TSA, outlines the security policies, procedures, and systems the airport  intends to use in order to comply with TSA security requirements. FSDs  oversee the implementation of the security requirements at airports.
Of TSA’s 950 aviation security inspectors located at airports throughout  the United States, 750 are considered generalists who conduct a variety of  aviation security inspections, and 200 are dedicated to conducting air  cargo inspections. The FSD at each airport is responsible for determining  the scope and emphasis of the inspections, as well as discretion for how to  assign local inspection staff. TSA provides local airport FSDs and  inspectors with goals for the number of inspections to be conducted per  quarter.
section_title: TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen the Management and Performance of an Aviation Security Workforce, but Continues to Face Challenges
paragraphs: In recent years, TSA has taken numerous actions related to the  deployment, training, and performance of their aviation security  workforce. TSA has, for example, taken action to support the authority of  FSDs at airports, though additional clarification of their roles is needed.  TSA also has improved the management and deployment of its TSO  workforce with the use of a formal staffing model, though hiring and  deployment challenges remain. TSA has also strengthened TSO training,  and implemented various approaches to measuring TSO performance  related to passenger and baggage screening activities.
subsections: section_title: TSA Has Taken Action to Support FSDs, but Additional Clarification of Roles Is Needed to Support Stakeholder Coordination
paragraphs: In recent years, TSA has taken steps to ensure that FSDs, as the ranking  TSA authorities at airports, coordinated their security actions with various  airport stakeholders, and had sufficient authority to carry out their  responsibilities. In September 2005, we reported on the roles and  responsibilities of FSDs and other issues related to the position, including  the extent to which they formed and facilitated partnerships with airport  stakeholders. At that time, we reported that the FSDs and most  stakeholders at the seven airports we visited had developed partnerships  that were generally working well. TSA recognized that building and  maintaining partnerships with airport stakeholders was essential to FSDs’  success in addressing security as well as maintaining an appropriate level  of customer service. To that end, TSA established general guidance for  FSDs to follow in building stakeholder partnerships, but left it to the FSDs  to determine how best to achieve effective partnerships at their respective  airports. As a part of their security responsibilities, FSDs must coordinate  closely with airport stakeholders—airport and air carrier officials, local  law enforcement, and emergency response officials—to ensure that  airports are adequately protected and prepared in the event of a terrorist  attack. FSDs’ success in sustaining and ensuring the effectiveness of  aviation security efforts is dependent on their ability to develop and  maintain effective partnerships with these stakeholders. FSDs need to  partner with law enforcement stakeholders, for example, because they do  not have a law enforcement body of their own to respond to security  incidents. Partnerships can be of mutual benefit to FSDs and airport  stakeholders and can enhance customer service. For example, FSDs rely  on air carrier data on the number of passengers transiting through  checkpoints to appropriately schedule screeners, and air carriers rely on  the FSD to provide an efficient screening process to minimize wait times  for passengers.
At the airports we visited, FSDs and stakeholders cited several ways FSDs  maintained partnerships, including being accessible to their stakeholders  to help resolve problems and meeting with stakeholders to discuss how to  implement new security policies. In addition, a variety of communication  and coordination efforts were in place at the airports we visited, and many  of these efforts existed before TSA assigned FSDs to airports. Formal  mechanisms included security and general airport operations meetings,  incident debriefings, and training exercises to help ensure a coordinated  response in the event of a security incident.
We also found that in response to concerns over FSD authority in  responding to airport-specific security needs, in 2004, TSA made a number  of changes to better support and empower the FSD. These changes  included    establishing a local hiring initiative that vested more hiring authority with  the FSDs to address airport staffing needs,    providing flexibility to offer training locally to screeners,  increasing authority to address performance and conduct problems,  relocating five area director positions from the headquarters to the field in  conjunction with establishing a report group to provide operational  support and a communication link with headquarters, and    establishing a mentoring program for newly appointed FSDs or their  deputies.
Most of the 25 FSDs we interviewed generally viewed these changes  favorably. For example, most were satisfied with TSA’s new local hiring  process that provided more options for FSDs to be involved with hiring  screeners, and most said that the new process was better than the more  centralized hiring process it replaced. TSA officials concluded, among  other things, that TSO candidates selected at airports where the FSD and  staff were conducting the hiring process were more selective in accepting  offers—leading to lower attrition—because they had more knowledge of  what the job would entail than contractors did when they handled the  hiring process. In addition, most of the FSDs we interviewed also saw  value in the headquarters group TSA established to provide operational  support to the field and a communication link among headquarters, field- based area directors, and FSDs.
One area where we noted room for improvement at the FSD level was in  how the FSD’s authority has been defined. In September 2005, we reported  that TSA had developed guidance that describes the many roles and  responsibilities of FSDs, most of which is associated with securing  commercial airports from terrorist threats. However, while the guidance  clearly defined FSD roles and responsibilities, TSA’s primary document  outlining FSDs’ authority was outdated and lacked clarity regarding FSD  authority relative to that of other airport stakeholders with whom FSDs  must coordinate closely to help ensure the effectiveness of aviation  security efforts. The absence of a clear understanding of the authority of  the position had reportedly resulted in confusion during past security  incidents and had raised concerns among some stakeholders at both the  national and airport levels about possible ambiguity regarding FSDs’  authority during incidents. Accordingly, we recommended that steps be  taken to update TSA’s Delegation of Authority to FSDs to clearly reflect  the authority of FSDs relative to that of airport stakeholders during  security incidents and communicate the authority of the position, as  warranted, to the FSDs and all airport stakeholders. Such action would  benefit FSDs by further enabling them to communicate and share  consistent information about their authority with their staff and airport  stakeholders, including law enforcement agencies. In commenting on our  recommendation, DHS stated that a new restatement of the Delegation  Order had been drafted by a working group composed of FSDs from the  FSD Advisory Council and relevant stakeholders and is being internally  coordinated for comment and clearance.
section_title: TSA Has Taken Steps to Better Manage Its TSO Workforce, but Continues to Face Deployment Challenges
paragraphs: To accomplish its security mission, TSA needs a sufficient number of  passenger and checked baggage TSOs trained and certified in the latest  screening procedures and technology. We reported in February 2004 that  staffing shortages and TSA’s hiring process had hindered the ability of  some FSDs to provide sufficient resources to staff screening checkpoints  and oversee screening operations at their checkpoints without using  additional measures such as overtime. TSA has acknowledged that its  initial staffing efforts created imbalances in the screener workforce and  has since been taking steps to address these imbalances over the past   2 years, by, among other things, meeting a congressional requirement to  develop a staffing model for TSOs. Specifically, the Intelligence Reform  and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required TSA to develop and submit  to Congress standards for determining the aviation security staffing for all  airports at which screening is required. The act also directed GAO to  review these standards, which we are doing. These staffing standards are  to provide for necessary levels of airport security, while also ensuring that  security-related delays experienced by airline passengers are minimized.  In June 2005, TSA submitted its report on aviation security staffing  standards to Congress. Known as the Screening Allocation Model (SAM),  these standards are intended to provide an objective measure for  determining TSO airport staffing levels, while staying within the  congressionally mandated limit of 45,000 FTE screeners.
Whereas TSA’s prior staffing model was demand-driven based on flight  and passenger data, the SAM model analyzes not only demand data but  also data on the flow of passenger and baggage through the airport and the  availability of the workforce. In determining the appropriate TSO staffing  levels, the SAM first considers the workload demands unique to each  individual airport—including flight schedules, load factors and connecting  flights, and number of passenger bags. These demand inputs are then  processed against certain assumptions about the processing of passengers  and baggage—including expected passenger and baggage processing rates,  required staffing for passenger lanes and baggage equipment, and  equipment alarm rates. Using these and various other data, the SAM  determines the daily workforce requirements and calculates a work  schedule for each airport. The schedule identifies a recommended mix of  full-time and part-time staff and a total number of TSO full-time  equivalents (FTE) needed to staff the airport, consistent with a goal of   10 minutes maximum wait time for processing passengers and baggage.
For fiscal year 2006, the SAM model estimated a requirement of   42,170 TSO FTEs for all airports nationwide. In order to stay within a  43,000 TSO FTE budgetary limit for fiscal year 2006, TSA officials reduced  the number of FTEs allocated to airports to 42,056, a level that allowed it  to fund the 615 TSO FTEs in the National Screener Force—a force  composed of TSOs who provide screening support to all airports------and to  maintain a contingency of 329 TSO FTEs in reserve to meet unanticipated  demands, such as a new air carrier coming on line at an airport. As of  January 2006, there were 37,501 full-time TSOs and 5,782 part-time TSOs  on board nationwide, representing an annualized rate of 41,085 TSO FTEs.  According to TSA headquarters officials, the SAM can be adjusted to  account for the uniqueness of particular airport security checkpoints and  airline traffic patterns. Further, it is up to the FSDs to ensure that all of the  data elements and assumptions are accurate for their airports, and to bring  to TSA’s attention any factors that should be reviewed to determine if  changes to the SAM are appropriate. The President’s fiscal year 2007  budget requests a total of 45,121 FTEs under the Passenger and Baggage  TSO personnel compensation and benefits categories.
As part of our ongoing review of the SAM model, we have identified  several preliminary concerns about TSA’s efforts to address its staffing  imbalances and ensure appropriate coverage at airport passenger and  checked baggage screening checkpoints. At the five airports we visited,  FSD staff raised concerns about the SAM assumptions as they related to  their particular airports. Among other things, they noted that the  recommendation for 20 percent part-time TSO workforce—measured in  terms of FTEs—often could not be reached, the expected processing rates  for passenger and baggage screening were not being realized, non- passenger screening at large airports was higher than assumed, and the  number of TSO FTEs needed per checkpoint lane and per baggage  screening machine was not sufficient for peak periods. Regarding the SAM  assumption of a 20 percent part-time TSO FTE level across all airports,  FSD staff we visited stated that the 20 percent goal has been difficult to  achieve because of, among other things, economic conditions leading to  competition for part-time workers, remote airport locations coupled with  a lack of mass transit, TSO base pay that has not changed since fiscal year  2002, and part-time workers’ desire to convert to full-time status.  According to TSA headquarters officials, while the nationwide annual TSO  attrition rate is about 23 percent (compared to a rate of 14 percent  reported in February 2004), it is over 50 percent for part-time TSOs. TSA  has struggled with hiring part-time TSOs since it began actively recruiting  them in the summer of 2003. In February 2004, we reported that FSDs at  several of the airports we visited stated that they experienced difficulty in  attracting needed part-time TSOs, which they believed to be due to many  of the same factors, such as low pay and benefits, undesirable hours, the  location of their airport, the lack of accessible and affordable parking or  public transportation, and the high cost of living in the areas surrounding  some airports. These FSDs stated that very few full-time TSOs were  interested in converting to part-time status—a condition that still exists— and TSA officials stated that attrition rates for part-time TSOs were  considerably higher than those for full-time TSOs.
At two of the five airports we visited as part of our ongoing review of the  SAM model, FSD staff told us that they had not been able to hire up to  their authorized staffing levels. In February 2004, we reported that many of  the FSDs we interviewed expressed concern that TSA’s hiring process was  not responsive to their needs and hindered their ability to reach their  authorized staffing levels and adequately staff screening checkpoints.  Specifically, FSDs expressed concern with the lack of a continuous hiring  process to backfill screeners lost through attrition, and their lack of  authority to conduct hiring on an as-needed basis. We reported that TSA  was taking steps to make the hiring process more responsive to FSDs’  needs. Since then, TSA has provided FSDs with more input into the hiring  process in an effort to streamline the process and enable FSDs to more  quickly meet their staffing needs.
During our five airport visits, some FSD staff we interviewed also cited  another limitation of the SAM—specifically, that the model does not  account for screeners who are performing administrative or other duties.  The officials also noted that, because they are not authorized to hire a  sufficient number of mission support staff, TSOs are being routinely  used—in some cases full time—to carry out non-screening and  administrative duties, including supporting payroll, scheduling, uniform  supplies, legal support, logistics, and operations center activities. At the  five airports we visited in January and February 2006, out of a total of  2,572 TSO full time equivalents (FTE) on-board at those airports, roughly  136 FTEs (just over five percent) were being used for administrative  duties. FSD staff stated that some of these TSOs are being used on a part- time basis, while others are used on a full-time basis. The use of TSOs in  these support functions could adversely affect the ability of FSDs to  adequately staff their screening checkpoints.
To compensate for screener shortages and to enable operational flexibility  to respond to changes in risk and threat, in October 2003, TSA established  a National Screening Force (formerly known as the Mobile Screening  Force established in November 2002) to provide screening support to all  airports in times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under other special  circumstances that require a greater number of screeners than regularly  available to FSDs. In February 2004, we reported that the National  Screening Force consisted of over 700 full-time passenger and baggage  TSOs. TSA officials stated that while these screeners have a home airport  to which they are assigned, they travel to airports in need of screening  staff approximately 70 percent of the year.
TSA budgeted from appropriations received in fiscal year 2006 for   615 FTEs for the National Screening Force. The President’s fiscal year  2007 budget request includes $35 million for operational expenses of the  National Screening Force (not including salaries and benefits of force  members). According to the budget request, in fiscal year 2007, the  National Screening Force will generally be deployed only to those airports  experiencing significant staffing shortfalls associated with increased  seasonal traffic or when a special event, such as a Super Bowl or a large  national conference, occurs requiring an immediate influx of additional  TSO support. At one category X airport we recently visited, the FSD stated  that because of challenges in hiring and retaining TSOs for this airport, he  has had to rely on 59 members of the National Screening Force deployed  to his airport, and had been relying on this force since 2004. The  President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request states that TSA will continue to  review methods for reducing costs associated with this force, including  ensuring that each airport has a sufficient staffing program in place to  address short-term needs.
In the President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request, TSA identified several  additional initiatives under way to address the management of the TSO  workforce. These efforts include attempts to reduce attrition by creating a  performance-based pay system, and establishing retention incentives to  include performance bonuses, retention allowances, college credit  reimbursement and flexible staffing. TSA also reported efforts to enhance  opportunities for career advancement within the TSO job category,  reducing on-the-job injuries by reengineering baggage screening areas, and  deploying a national nurse care management program at 21 airports to  assist TSOs in returning to work in a shorter period of time.
section_title: TSA Has Strengthened TSO Training, but Faces Challenges in Delivering the Training
paragraphs: Since we reported on TSO training in September 2003, TSA has taken a  number of actions designed to strengthen training available to the TSO  workforce as part of its efforts to enhance the performance of TSOs. In  September 2003, we reported that TSA had not fully developed or  deployed a recurrent training program for passenger TSOs. At that time,  little training was available to TSOs once they completed their basic TSO  training. Since then, TSA has expanded training available to the TSO  workforce, such as introducing an Online Learning Center that makes self- guided courses available over TSA’s intranet and the Internet and  expanding training available to supervisory TSOs. TSA also established a  recurrent training requirement of 3 hours per week, averaged over a  quarter, and provided FSDs with additional tools to facilitate and enhance  TSO training, including at least one modular bomb set kit—containing  components of an improvised explosive device (IED)—and at least one  weapons training kit. TSA has also instituted a program called Threat in  the Spotlight that, based on intelligence TSA receives, provides screeners  with the latest in threat information regarding terrorist attempts to get  threat objects past screening checkpoints. Additionally, in December 2005,  TSA reported completing enhanced explosives detection training for over  18,000 TSOs. This training included both classroom and hands-on  experiences, and focused particularly on identifying X-ray images of IED  component parts, not just a completely assembled bomb. TSA plans for  the remaining TSO workforce to receive this training by June 2006 through  the Online Learning Center or other delivery methods. TSA also has  developed new training curriculums to support new screening approaches.  For example, TSA recently developed a training curriculum for TSOs in  behavior observation and analysis at the checkpoint to identify passengers  exhibiting behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or deception.
However, as we reported in May 2005, insufficient TSO staffing and a lack  of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to access the Online Learning  Center have made it difficult for all TSOs screeners at many airports to  receive required training and has limited TSO access to TSA training  tools. As previously discussed, TSA is taking steps to address the TSO  staffing challenges. However, it is too soon to determine whether TSA’s  efforts will address TSA’s ability to provide required training while  maintaining adequate coverage for screening operations. In terms of  access to the Online Learning Center, TSA plans to complete the  deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to airports during  fiscal year 2007. TSA established its Online Learning Center to provide  passenger and baggage screeners with online, high-speed access to  training courses. However, effective use of the Online Learning Center  requires high-speed Internet/intranet access, which TSA has not been able  to provide to all airports. In May 2005, we reported that as of October  2004, about 45 percent of the TSO workforce did not have high speed  Internet/intranet access to the Online Learning Center. The President’s  fiscal year 2007 budget request reports that approximately 220 of the more  than 400 airport and field locations have full information technology  infrastructure installation, to include high-speed network connectivity,  while the rest of the airports operate with dial-up access to TSA systems.  According to the budget request, TSA will use $120 million in fiscal year  2006 to deploy high-speed connectivity to all category X and I airports and  preliminary high-speed connectivity to all category II, III, and IV airports.  The budget request includes a request for a total of $90 million to support  this effort in fiscal year 2007, of which $54 million is needed to complete  the deployment of high-speed connectivity at category II, III, and IV  airports.
section_title: TSA Has Implemented Various Approaches to Measuring the Performance of TSOs Conducting Passenger and Baggage Security Screening Activities
paragraphs: TSA has strengthened its efforts to measure the performance of the  various components of the passenger and checked baggage screening  systems—people, processes, and technology—but results of covert testing  identified that weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to exist. In  November 2003, we reported on the need for TSA to strengthen its efforts  to measure the performance of its screening functions. At that time, TSA  had collected limited data on the effectiveness of its aviation security  initiatives, to include screening functions. Specifically, limited covert  (undercover, unannounced) testing had been performed, the TIP system  used to aid TSOs in identifying threat objects within baggage was not fully  operational at passenger screening checkpoints and was not available for  checked baggage screening systems, and TSA had not fully implemented a  congressionally mandated annual TSO proficiency review. Since then, TSA  has implemented and strengthened efforts to collect performance data in  each of these areas.
In the area of covert testing, TSA headquarters increased the amount of  passenger and checked baggage screening covert tests it performs and  recently changed its approach to covert testing to focus its resources on  catastrophic threats—threats that can take down an airplane or blow up  an airplane. TSA’s Office of Inspections (OI) (formerly the Office of  Internal Affairs and Program Review, or OIAPR) conducts unannounced  covert tests of TSOs to assess their ability to detect threat objects and to  adhere to TSA-approved procedures. These tests, in which undercover OI  inspectors attempt to pass threat objects through passenger screening  checkpoints and in checked baggage, are designed to measure  vulnerabilities in passenger and checked baggage screening systems and  to identify systematic problems affecting performance of TSOs in the areas  of training, procedures, and technology. OI, which began covert testing in  September 2002, conducted 836 tests in fiscal year 2003 and 2,369 tests in  fiscal year 2004 using its staff of 183 full-time-equivalents. In reporting its  covert testing results, OI makes recommendations to TSA leadership that  address deficiencies identified during testing and are intended to improve  screening effectiveness. As of December 2005, OI had issued 29 reports to  management on the results of its checkpoint and checked baggage covert  testing. In total, the reports include 19 distinct recommendations related to  passenger and checked baggage screening. Of these 19 recommendations,  11 relate to screener training. In September 2005, OI began implementing a  revamped testing process that included a more risk-based approach and  focused its resources on catastrophic threats. OI officials stated that they  will continue testing. However, TSA leadership is reviewing the results of  the revised testing, and final decisions regarding the structure, content,  and frequency of future tests have not yet been made.
Our analysis of TSA’s covert testing results for tests conducted between  September 2002 and September 2005 identified that overall, weaknesses  existed in the ability of screeners to detect threat objects on passengers, in  their carry-on bags, and in checked baggage. Covert testing results in this  analysis cannot be generalized either to the airports where the tests were  conducted or to airports nationwide.
In February 2004, TSA provided protocols to help FSDs conduct their own  covert testing of local airport passenger screening activities—a practice  that TSA had previously prohibited. Between May 2004 and April 2005,  FSDs conducted a total of 17,954 local covert tests at 350 airports; as of  February 2006, TSA reported that FSDs had conducted a total of 48,826  local covert tests. In February 2005, TSA released a general procedures  document for local covert testing at checked baggage screening locations.  Between March 2005 and September 2005, 1,370 local tests of EDS  screening were conducted at 71 airports. TSA headquarters officials stated  that a key challenge FSDs face in conducting local testing is the lack of  available federal staff to conduct the testing, particularly at smaller  airports. In May 2005, we reported that TSA officials stated that they had  not yet begun to use data from local covert testing to identify training and  performance needs because of difficulties in ensuring that local covert  testing is implemented consistently nationwide. TSA officials stated in  March 2006, that the data are available for FSDs to use to identify training  needs and levels of TSO performance.
Covert testing is one method TSA uses to measure the security  effectiveness of passenger and checked baggage screening procedures and  technologies in the operating environment in addition to other TSA  measures that assess the performance of passenger and checked baggage  TSOs. One other source of information on TSO performance in detecting  threat objects is the results from the TIP system. TIP is designed to test  passenger screeners’ detection capabilities by projecting threat images,  including images of guns, knives, and explosives, onto bags as they are  screened during actual operations. TSOs are responsible for identifying  the threat image and calling for the bag to be searched. Once prompted,  TIP identifies to the screener whether the threat is real and then records  the TSO’s performance in a database that could be analyzed for  performance trends. TIP threat detection results in conjunction with OI  covert test results and local testing are intended to assist TSA in  identifying specific training and performance improvement efforts.
In May 2005, we reported that in October 2003 TSA reactivated TIP as  planned with an expanded library of 2,400 images at all but one of the  more than 1,800 checkpoint lanes nationwide. In December 2005, TSA  reported that it has further expanded the image library to include  additional images of IEDs and IED components as part of its effort to  improve TSOs’ detection of explosives. Additionally, the President’s fiscal  year 2007 budget request states that TSA plans to maximize the training  benefits of the TIP system by tailoring TIP sessions to address individual  TSO weaknesses revealed in user performance data. For example, if a TSO  has particular difficulty identifying IEDs, the TIP would trigger the  projection of a higher proportion of simulated IEDs while that TSO was  operating the machine under standard circumstances.
Despite these improvements, TIP is not yet available for checked baggage  screening. In April 2004, we reported that TSA officials stated that they  were working to resolve technical challenges associated with using TIP for  checked baggage screening on explosives detection system (EDS)  machines and have started EDS TIP image development. However, in  December 2004, TSA officials stated that because of severe budget  reductions, TSA will be unable to begin implementing a TIP program for  checked baggage in fiscal year 2005. Officials did not specify when such a  program might begin.
Another measure of TSO performance is the results of annual  recertification testing. ATSA requires that each TSO receive an annual  proficiency review to ensure he or she continues to meet all qualifications  and standards required to perform the screening function. To meet this  requirement, TSA established a recertification program. The first  recertification program—which was conducted during the period October  2003 through March 2004—was composed of two assessment components,  one of TSOs’ performance and the other of TSOs’ knowledge and skills.  During the performance assessment component of the recertification  program, TSOs are rated on both organizational and individual goals, such  as maintaining the nation’s air security, vigilantly carrying out duties with  utmost attention to tasks that will prevent security threats, and  demonstrating the highest levels of courtesy to travelers to maximize their  levels of satisfaction with screening services. The knowledge and skills  assessment component consists of three modules: (1) knowledge of  standard operating procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3) practical  demonstration of skills.
Across all airports, TSOs performed well on the recertification testing for  the first 2 years the program was in place, with about 1 percent of TSOs  subject to recertification failing to complete this requirement. In both  years, TSOs faced the greatest difficulty on their first attempt to pass the  practical demonstration of skills module—a hands-on simulated work  sample used to evaluate a screener’s knowledge, skill, and ability when  performing specific screener tasks along with the ability to provide  customer service. According to TSA officials, at the completion of  recertification at an airport, TSA management has access to reports at  both the individual TSO and airport level, which identify the specific areas  that were missed during testing. National level reports are also available  that isolate areas that need improvement and can be targeted in basic and  recurrent training. In fiscal year 2004, TSA established a performance  measure for the recertification program.
During the first year of recertification testing, dual-function TSOs who  were actively working as both passenger and checked baggage TSOs were  required to take only the recertification test for passenger TSOs. They  were therefore not required to take the recertification testing modules  required for checked baggage, even though they worked in that capacity.  TSA’s second annual recertification testing, which began in October 2004,  included components for dual-function TSOs, but did not include an image  recognition module for checked baggage TSOs—which would include  dual-function screeners performing checked baggage screening. TSA  officials stated that a decision was made to not include an image  recognition module for checked baggage TSOs during this cycle because  not all checked baggage TSOs would have completed training on the  onscreen resolution protocol by the time recertification testing was  conducted at their airports. In October 2005, TSA released guidance for  screener recertification that included an image recognition module for  checked baggage and dual-function screeners trained in the onscreen  alarm resolution protocol.
In addition to enhancing its efforts to measure the performance of TSOs,  TSA also has developed two performance indexes to measure the  effectiveness of the passenger and checked baggage screening systems.  These indexes measure overall performance through a composite of  indicators and are derived by combining specific performance measures  relating to passenger and checked baggage screening, respectively. Such  measures can be useful in identifying shortfalls that might be addressed by  initiatives to enhance the workforce, such as providing special training.  Specifically, these indexes measure the effectiveness of the screening  systems through machine probability of detection and covert testing  results; efficiency through a calculation of dollars spent per passenger or  bag screened; and customer satisfaction through a national poll, customer  surveys, and customer complaints at both airports and TSA’s national call  center. We reported in May 2005 that the screening performance indexes  developed by TSA can be a useful analysis tool, but without targets for  each component of the index, TSA will have difficulty performing  meaningful analyses of the parts that make up the index. For example,  without performance targets for covert testing, TSA will not have  identified a desired level of performance related to screener detection of  threat objects. Performance targets for covert testing would enable TSA to  focus its improvement efforts on areas determined to be most critical, as  100 percent detection capability may not be attainable. In January 2005,  TSA officials stated that the agency planned to track the performance of  individual index components and establish performance targets against  which to measure these components. Since then, TSA has finalized targets  for the indexes, including targets for passenger and checked baggage  covert testing.
section_title: TSA Has Made Progress in Providing Regulatory Oversight of Airport and Air Carrier Security Activities, but it Could Better Target Workforce Resources
paragraphs: TSA has taken steps to strengthen oversight for key areas of aviation  security, including domestic air cargo security operations conducted by air  carriers, and airport perimeter security operations and access controls  carried out by airport operators. For air cargo, TSA has increased the  number of inspectors used to assess air carrier and indirect air carrier  compliance with security requirements, and has incorporated elements of  risk-based decision making to guide air cargo security needs. As of  October 2005, however, TSA had not developed performance measures to  determine to what extent air carriers and indirect air carriers are  complying with air cargo security requirements, limiting TSA’s ability to  effectively target its workforce for future inspections and fulfill its  oversight responsibilities. On airport premises, TSA had, at the time of our  2004 review, begun evaluating the security of airport perimeters and the  controls that limit access into secured airport areas, but had not  completed actions to ensure that all airport workers employed in these  areas were vetted prior to hiring and then trained.
subsections: section_title: Additional Action Needed to Strengthen TSA Inspections and Oversight of Domestic Air Cargo Security
paragraphs: We reported in October 2005 that TSA had significantly increased the  number of domestic air cargo inspections conducted of air carrier and  indirect air carrier compliance with security requirements. We noted,  however, that TSA had not developed performance measures to determine  to what extent air carriers and indirect air carriers were complying with  security requirements, and had not analyzed the results of inspections to  systematically target future inspections on those entities that pose a higher  security risk to the domestic air cargo system. Without these performance  measures and systematic analyses, TSA will be limited in its ability to  effectively target its workforce for future inspections and fulfill its  oversight responsibilities for this essential area of aviation security. We  also reported on other actions that TSA had taken to focus limited  resources on the most critical security needs.
Our analysis of TSA’s inspection records showed that between January 1,  2003, and January 31, 2005, TSA conducted 36,635 cargo inspections of air  carriers and indirect air carriers and found 4,343 violations. Although  TSA had compiled this information, the agency had not determined what  constitutes an acceptable level of performance or compared air carriers’  and indirect air carriers’ performance against this standard. Without  measures to determine an acceptable level of compliance with air cargo  security requirements, TSA cannot assess the performance of individual  air carriers or indirect air carriers against national performance averages  or goals that would allow TSA to target inspections and other actions on  those that fall below acceptable levels of compliance. According to TSA  officials, the agency was working on developing short-term and long-term  outcome measures for air cargo security, but they did not provide a  timetable for when this effort would be completed.
In addition, TSA had taken initial steps to compile information on the  results of its compliance inspections of air carriers and indirect air carriers  and identify the most frequent types of violations found. For example,  from January 1, 2003, to January 31, 2005, TSA identified violations  committed by air carriers and indirect air carriers involving  noncompliance with air cargo security requirements in several areas— such as cargo acceptance procedures, access control to cargo facilities,  and physical cargo inspections—that TSA had determined to be high-risk  because they would pose the greatest risk to the safety and security of air  cargo operations. TSA identified indirect air carriers’ failure to comply  with their own security programs as the area with the most violations,  which according to TSA officials is due, in part, to indirect air carriers’  unfamiliarity with air cargo security requirements. While TSA had  identified frequently occurring violations, it had not yet determined the  specific area of violation for a large number of inspections. In addition,  TSA could not identify how many of its 36,635 inspections covered each  air cargo security requirement. As a result, TSA could not determine the  compliance rate for each specific area inspected. Without complete  information on the specific air cargo security requirements that air carriers  and indirect air carriers violated, as well as the number of times each topic  area was inspected, TSA was limited in its ability to determine the  compliance rates for specific air cargo security requirements and  effectively target future inspections for air cargo security requirements  that were most frequently violated and the air carriers and indirect air  carriers that violate them. In June 2005, TSA officials informed us that in  the future they intended to compile information on the number of  instances in which specific air cargo security requirements were  inspected.
In addition, while TSA compiled information on the results of its  compliance inspections, the agency had not yet systematically analyzed  these results to target future inspections on security requirements and  entities that pose a higher risk. Analyzing inspection results would be  consistent with our internal control standards calling for comparisons of  data to identify relationships that could form the basis for corrective  actions, if necessary. TSA officials and the agency’s fiscal year 2005  annual domestic inspection and assessment plan identified the need for  such analyses. According to TSA officials, the agency had recently hired  one staff person to begin analyzing inspection data. In June 2005, TSA  officials also stated that the agency was working to revise its Performance  and Results Information System database to allow for more accurate  recording of inspection violations. However, the agency had not  systematically analyzed the results of its inspections to target future  inspections of those entities that pose an increased security risk. Without  an analysis of the results of its inspections, TSA had a limited basis to  determine how best to allocate its inspection resources.
Further, analyzing key program performance data and using the results of  this analysis to effectively allocate resources are consistent with elements  of a risk management approach. Specifically, analyzing the results of  compliance inspection data could help focus limited inspection resources  on those entities posing a higher security risk. Such targeting is important  because TSA may not have adequate resources to inspect all air carriers  and indirect air carriers on a regular basis. For example, as we reported in  October 2005, according to TSA inspection data for the period from  January 1, 2003, to January 31, 2005, compliance inspections identified a  greater incidence of violations by indirect air carriers than by air carriers.  In addition, the percentage of inspections of air carriers that did not  identify a violation of air cargo security requirements was significantly  higher than that for indirect air carriers. According to TSA officials, the  agency was taking steps to enhance its ability to conduct compliance  inspections of indirect air carriers.
To further target its inspections, TSA was conducting special emphasis  assessments, which include testing to identify air cargo security  weaknesses. On the basis of its review of compliance inspection results  for the period of January 2003 to January 2005, TSA identified 25 indirect  air carriers and 11 air carriers with a history of violations related to air  cargo security requirements. TSA officials stated that the agency began  conducting tests on these air carriers and indirect air carriers in April  2005. TSA officials stated that the agency planned to conduct additional  tests. However, TSA officials stated that the agency had not yet  determined how it will use the results of its testing program to help  interpret the results from its other compliance inspection efforts. TSA had  also not analyzed inspection results to identify additional targets for future  testing. Such analysis could include focusing compliance testing efforts on  air carriers and indirect air carriers with a history of air cargo security  violations related to high-risk areas.
TSA has made efforts to incorporate risk-based decision making into  securing air cargo, but has not conducted assessments of air cargo  vulnerabilities or critical assets (cargo facilities and aircraft)—two crucial  elements of a risk-based management approach without which TSA may  not be able to appropriately focus its resources on the most critical  security needs. TSA also completed an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in  November 2003 that outlined a threat-based risk management approach  and identified strategic objectives and priority actions for enhancing air  cargo security. Then, in November 2004, TSA issued a proposed air cargo  security rule to enhance and improve the security of air cargo  transportation. When finalized, TSA intends for this rule to implement  most of the objectives set forth in the strategic plan. TSA had also not  completed a methodology for assessing the vulnerability and criticality of  air cargo assets, or established a schedule for conducting such  assessments because of competing agency efforts to address other areas  of aviation security.
TSA had established a centralized Known Shipper database to streamline  the process by which shippers (individuals and businesses) are made  known to carriers with whom they conduct business. However, the  information on the universe of shippers was incomplete because shipper  participation was not mandatory and the data had not been thoroughly  reviewed. TSA estimated that the database represented less than a third of  the total population of known shippers. Further, TSA had not taken steps  to identify shippers who may pose a security threat, in part because TSA  had incomplete information on known shippers. TSA was attempting to  address this limitation by its November 2004 proposed air cargo security  rule which would make the Known Shipper database mandatory. This  would require air carriers and indirect air carriers to submit information  on their known shippers to TSA’s Known Shipper database. Finally, TSA  plans to take further steps to identify those shippers who may pose a  security risk.
In addition, TSA established a requirement for random inspection of air  cargo to address threats to the nation’s aviation transportation system and  to reflect the agency’s position that inspecting 100 percent of air cargo was  not technologically feasible and would be potentially disruptive to the flow  of air commerce. However, this requirement, which was revised in 2005 to  increase the percentage of inspections required, contained exemptions  based on the nature and size of cargo that may leave the air cargo system  vulnerable to terrorist attack. TSA’s plans for enhancing air cargo security  included implementing a system for targeting elevated risk cargo for  inspection. Although the agency acknowledged that the successful  development of this system was contingent upon having complete,  accurate, and current targeting information, the agency had not yet  completed efforts to ensure information that will be used by the system is  reliable.
Further, through its proposed air cargo security rule, TSA planned to  require air carriers and indirect air carriers to secure air cargo facilities,  screen all individual persons boarding all-cargo aircraft, and conduct  security checks on air cargo workers. In commenting on the proposed air  cargo security rule, industry stakeholders representing air carriers,  indirect air carriers and airport authorities stated that several of the  proposals, including those mentioned above, may be costly and difficult to  implement, and that TSA may have underestimated the costs associated  with implementing these proposed measures. Our analysis of TSA’s  estimate also suggested that it may have been an underestimate. TSA  stated that it plans to reassess its cost estimates before issuing its final air  cargo security rule.
In October 2005, we made several recommendations to assist TSA in  strengthening the security of the domestic air cargo transportation  system. These recommendations included (1) developing a methodology  and schedule for completing assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and  critical assets; (2) reexamining the rationale for existing air cargo  inspection exemptions; (3) developing measures to gauge air carrier and  indirect air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements;   (4) developing a plan for systematically analyzing and using the results of  air cargo compliance inspections to target future inspections and identify  system wide corrective actions; (5) assessing the effectiveness of  enforcement actions in ensuring air carrier and indirect air carrier  compliance with air cargo security requirements; (6) and ensuring that the  data to be used in the Freight Assessment System are complete, accurate,  and current. DHS agreed with our recommendations. We currently have an  ongoing review assessing the security of air cargo entering the United  States from foreign countries.
section_title: Further Steps May Be Needed to Strengthen TSA Oversight of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls
paragraphs: As discussed previously, domestic commercial airport authorities have  primary responsibility for securing airport perimeters and restricted areas,  whereas TSA conducts regulatory inspections to help ensure that airport  authorities are complying with TSA security requirements. We reported in  June 2004 on TSA’s efforts to strengthen the security of airport perimeters  (such as airfield fencing and access gates), the adequacy of controls  restricting unauthorized access to secured areas (such as building entry  ways leading to aircraft), and security measures pertaining to individuals  who work at airports. At the time of our review, we found TSA had begun  evaluating commercial airport security but needed a better approach for  assessing results. In addition, TSA required criminal history records  checks and security awareness training for most, but not all, the airport  workers called for in ATSA. Further, TSA did not require airport vendors  with direct access to the airfield and aircraft to develop security programs,  which would include security measures for vendor employees and  property, as required by ATSA.
TSA is responsible for, and, at the time of our 2004 review, had begun  evaluating the security of airport perimeters and the controls that limit  access into secured airport areas, but had not yet determined how the  results of these evaluations could be used to make improvements to the  nation’s airport system as a whole. Specifically, we found that TSA had  begun conducting regulatory compliance inspections, covert testing of  selected security procedures, and vulnerability assessments at selected  airports. These evaluations—though not yet completed at the time of our  report—identified perimeter and access control security concerns. For  example, TSA identified instances where airport operators failed to  comply with existing security requirements, including requirements  related to access control. In addition, TSA identified threats to perimeter  and access control security at each of the airports where vulnerability  assessments were conducted in 2003. TSA had plans to begin conducting  joint vulnerability assessments with the FBI but had not yet determined  how it would allocate existing resources between its own independent  airport assessments and the new joint assessments, or developed a  schedule for conducting future vulnerability assessments. In addition, TSA  had not yet determined how to use the results of its inspections in  conjunction with its efforts to conduct covert testing and vulnerability  assessments to enhance the overall security of the nation’s commercial  airport system.
In June 2004, we also reported that background checks were not required  for all airport workers. TSA requires most airport workers who perform  duties in secured and sterile areas to undergo a fingerprint-based criminal  history records check. TSA further requires airport operators to compare  applicants’ names against TSA’s aviation security watch lists. Once  workers undergo this review, they are granted access to airport areas in  which they perform duties. For example, those workers who have been  granted unescorted access to secured areas are authorized access to these  areas without undergoing physical screening for prohibited items (which  passengers undergo prior to boarding a flight). To meet TSA requirements,  airport operators transmit applicants’ fingerprints to a TSA contractor,  who in turn forwards the fingerprints to TSA, who submits them to the FBI  to be checked for criminal histories that could disqualify an applicant for  airport employment. In March 2006, that TSA contractor reported that its  background clearinghouse system had processed over 2 million criminal  history record checks of airport and airline employees. TSA also requires  that airport operators verify that applicants’ names do not appear on TSA’s  “no fly” and “selectee” watch lists to determine whether applicants are  eligible for employment.
According to TSA, by December 6, 2002, all airport workers who had  unescorted access to secured airport areas—approximately 900,000  individuals nationwide—had undergone a fingerprint-based criminal  history records check and verification that they did not appear on TSA’s  watch lists, as required by regulation. In late 2002, TSA required airport  operators to conduct fingerprint-based checks and watch list verifications  for an additional approximately 100,000 airport workers who perform  duties in sterile areas. As of April 2004, TSA said that airport operators had  completed all of these checks.
ATSA also mandates that TSA require airport operators and air carriers to  develop security awareness training programs for airport workers such as  ground crews, and gate, ticket, and curbside agents of air carriers.  However, while TSA requires such training for these airport workers if  they have unescorted access to secured areas, the agency did not require  training for airport workers who perform duties in sterile airport areas.  According to TSA, training requirements for these airport workers have  not been established because additional training would result in increased  costs for airport operators.
Further, TSA had not addressed the act’s provision that calls for the  agency to require that airport vendors with direct access to the airfield and  aircraft develop security programs to address security measures specific  to vendor employees (companies doing business in or with the airport).  TSA said that expanding requirements for background checks and security  awareness training for additional workers and establishing requirements  for vendor security programs would be costly to implement and would  require time-consuming rule-making efforts to assess potential impacts  and obtain and incorporate public comment on any proposed regulations.
In June 2004, we recommended, and DHS generally agreed, that TSA better  justify future decisions on how best to proceed with security evaluations  and implement additional measures to reduce the potential security risks  posed by airport workers. In July 2004, in response to our  recommendations, TSA made several improvements in these areas,  through the issuance of a series of security directives, including requiring  enhanced background checks and improved access controls for airport  employees who work in restricted airport areas.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Since its inception, TSA has achieved significant progress in deploying its  federal aviation security workforce to meet congressional mandates  related to establishing passenger and checked baggage screening  operations. With the initial congressional mandates now largely met, TSA  has turned its attention to more systematically deploying its TSO  workforce and assessing and enhancing its effectiveness in screening  passengers and checked baggage. TSA has developed a staffing model  intended to identify the necessary levels of TSOs to support airport  screening operations. However, given the challenges TSA faces in  determining appropriate staffing levels at airports, it is critical that TSA  carefully consider how it strategically hires, deploys and manages its TSO  workforce to help strengthen its passenger and checked baggage  screening programs. In addition, as threats and technology evolve, it is  vital that TSA continue to enhance training for the TSO workforce. Over  the past several years, TSA has strengthened its TSO training program in  an effort to ensure that TSOs have the knowledge and skills needed to  successfully perform their screening functions. However, without  addressing the challenges to delivering ongoing training, including  installing high-speed connectivity at airport training facilities, TSA may  have difficulty maintaining a screening workforce that possesses the  critical skills needed to perform at a desired level.
The importance of the nation’s air cargo security system and the limited  resources available to protect it underscore the need for a risk  management approach to prioritize security efforts so that a proper  balance between costs and security can be achieved. TSA has taken  important steps in establishing such a risk management approach, but  more work remains to be done to fully address the risks posed to air cargo  security, including assessments of systemwide vulnerabilities and critical  assets. Without such assessments, TSA is limited in its ability to focus its  resources on those air cargo vulnerabilities that represent the most critical  security needs. In addition, without performance measures to gauge air  carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with air cargo security  requirements and analyzing the results of its compliance inspections, TSA  cannot effectively focus its inspection resources on those entities posing  the greatest risk. In addition, TSA’s goal of developing a system to target  elevated risk cargo for inspection without impeding the flow of air  commerce will be difficult to achieve without ensuring that the  information used to target such cargo is complete, accurate, and current.  By addressing these areas, TSA would build a better basis for  strengthening air cargo security as it moves forward in implementing risk- based security initiatives.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at  this time.
section_title: Contact Information
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact at   Cathleen A. Berrick, (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this statement.
In addition to the contact named above, John Barkhamer, Amy Bernstein,  Kristy Brown, Philip Caramia, Kevin Copping, Glenn Davis,   Christine Fossett, Thomas Lombardi, Laina Poon, and Maria Strudwick  made key contributions to this testimony.
section_title: Appendix I: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely  Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s  Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from  Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.:  November 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air  Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2005.
Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority  of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.:  September 23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training  Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed.   GAO-05-781. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not  Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight  Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps  to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: July 22,  2005.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of  Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.:  July 13, 2005  Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement  Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.:  May 2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way,  but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05- 356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005  Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.  Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial  Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.:  February 23, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize  Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA’s Progress to Allow  Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services.  GAO-05-126. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but  Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term  Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of  Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728.  Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention Needed  to Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington, D.C.: May  28, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. GAO-04- 785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to  Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519.  Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility  to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T. Washington, D.C.:  April 22, 2004.
Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation  Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer- Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.:  March 17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the  Transportation Security Administration’s Efforts to Secure Aerial  Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System  Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington,  D.C.: February 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing  Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington,  D.C.: February 12, 2004.
The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a  Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development  Program. GAO-04-341R. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen  Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges  of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.  GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address  Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress  Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.:  September 24, 2003.
Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the  Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security  Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address  Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides  Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T.  Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover  Airports’ Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.:  February 25, 2003.
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a  Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: January 17,  2003.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and  DOT’s Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January 10,  2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the  Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and  Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22,  2002.
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has  Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27.  Washington, D.C.:  October 15, 2002.
Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses  Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces  Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.:  July 25, 2002.
Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial  Pilots. GAO-02-822R.  Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard  Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.:  September 25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for  Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:  September 21, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s  Efforts. GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve  Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.:  September 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in  Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
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