Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing, and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS's Efforts but Would Have Costs
Published: 2011-04-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: According to Pew Hispanic Center estimates, approximately 4 million to 5.5 million unauthorized immigrants in the United States entered the country legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission--referred to as overstays. As requested, GAO examined the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (1) takes action to address overstays and its reported results; and (2) identifies overstays and shares this information among its border security and immigration enforcement components. GAO reviewed relevant documents, such as standard operating procedures, DHS guidance, and overstay investigations data from fiscal years 2006 through 2010; interviewed officials from DHS components; and visited 6 DHS field offices and 12 ports of entry based on geographic dispersion, among other factors. The results of these visits are not generalizable, but provided insights into DHS operations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DHS takes actions to address a small portion of the estimated overstay population due to, among other things, competing priorities; however, these efforts could be enhanced by improved planning and performance management. Since fiscal year 2006, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the principle DHS component responsible for overstay enforcement, has allocated about 3 percent of its investigative work hours to overstay investigations and its Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU), which prioritizes and investigates possible overstays, has arrested approximately 8,100 overstays. ICE is considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal overstay enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) directorate, which has responsibility for apprehending and removing illegal aliens from the United States. However, ERO does not plan to assume this responsibility until ICE assesses the funding and resources doing so would require. ICE has not established a time frame for completing this assessment. By developing such a time frame and utilizing the assessment findings, as appropriate, ICE could strengthen its planning efforts and be better positioned to hold staff accountable for completing the assessment. In addition, CTCEU does not have mechanisms to assess program performance in accordance with leading performance management practices. By establishing such mechanisms, CTCEU could better ensure that managers have information to assist in making decisions for strengthening overstay enforcement efforts and assessing performance against CTCEU's goals. In the absence of a biometric entry and exit system, DHS uses various methods for identifying overstays, primarily biographic data, and sharing of overstay information; however, DHS faces challenges in collecting departure data and does not share information about all categories of suspected overstays among its components. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the DHS component charged with inspecting all people who enter the United States, does not provide a standard mechanism for nonimmigrants departing the United States through land ports of entry to remit their arrival and departure forms. These forms contain information, such as arrival and departure dates, used by DHS to identify overstays. CBP officials stated that establishing such a mechanism could help the agency increase its collection of departure data, but could also result in costs related to, for example, physical modifications to land ports of entry. If the benefits outweigh the costs, such a mechanism could help DHS obtain more complete and reliable departure data for identifying overstays. DHS also shares overstay information among its components through various mechanisms. For example, DHS creates electronic alerts for certain categories of overstays, such as those who overstay by more than 90 days, but does not create alerts for those who overstay by less than 90 days to focus efforts on more egregious overstay violators, as identified by CBP. Expanding the categories of overstays assigned an alert to the extent that benefits outweigh costs could improve the chance that these individuals are identified as overstays during subsequent encounters with federal officials, such as when they apply for readmission to the United States.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends, among other things, that DHS establish a time frame for completing overstay enforcement planning, performance measurement mechanisms, and, if benefits outweigh costs, a mechanism for collecting departure forms at land borders and alerts for additional categories of overstays. DHS concurred with our recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The most recent estimates from the Pew Hispanic Center approximated  that, in 2006, out of an unauthorized resident alien population of 11.5  million to 12 million in the United States, about 4 million to 5.5 million  were overstays. These are individuals who were admitted to the country  legally on a temporary basis—either with a visa, or in some cases, as a  visitor who was allowed to enter without a visa—but then overstayed their  authorized periods of admission. The overstay population is comprised of  individuals from various global regions, including Europe, South America,  Asia, and the Middle East. In February 2008, we reported that most  overstays are likely motivated by economic opportunities to stay in the  United States beyond their authorized periods of admission. Individuals  overstaying their authorized periods of admission could pose homeland  security concerns. For example, in some instances overstays have been  identified as terrorists or involved in terrorist-related activity, such as 5 of  the 19 September 11, 2001, hijackers. In addition, according to  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data, of approximately 400  individuals reported by the Department of Justice as convicted in the  United States as a result of international terrorism-related investigations  conducted from September 2001 through March 2010, approximately 36  were overstays.
DHS has primary responsibility for identifying and taking enforcement  action to address overstays, and several of its components and programs  contribute to these efforts. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is  tasked with, among other duties, inspecting all people applying for entry to  the United States to determine their admissibility to the country and  screening Visa Waiver Program (VWP) applicants to determine their  eligibility to travel to the United States under the program. U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the lead agency for  enforcing immigration law in the interior of the United States and is  primarily responsible for overstay enforcement. The United States Visitor  and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program (US-VISIT) within  DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate supports the  identification of nonimmigrant overstays. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration  Services (USCIS) is responsible for adjudicating applications and petitions  for immigration and citizenship benefits and the Office of Policy  Development is responsible for policy and oversight of the VWP. In  addition, the Department of State is responsible for issuing visas to foreign  nationals seeking admission to the United States.
In light of the potential homeland security risk posed by overstays, you  asked us to review DHS efforts to identify, address, and share information  on overstays. This report addresses the following questions:    To what extent do federal agencies take action against overstays, and what  have been the reported results?
To what extent does DHS identify and share information on overstays  among its components and with federal, state, and local agencies?
To determine the extent to which federal agencies take action against  overstays, we analyzed ICE documentation, such as policy manuals,  regarding its processes for identifying and investigating possible overstays  located within the United States. We obtained and analyzed data from ICE  on the investigations of its Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation  Unit (CTCEU), which is primarily responsible for overstay investigations,  from fiscal years 2004 through 2010 and ICE’s overstay investigative work  hours from fiscal years 2006 through 2010 to determine the extent to  which ICE has dedicated investigative resources to overstay  investigations. To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed  documentation on ICE’s data system internal controls and interviewed  knowledgeable agency officials about the source of the data and the  quality assurance steps performed to help ensure data reliability. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our  report. To evaluate ICE’s overstay enforcement efforts, we assessed the  extent to which CTCEU’s program practices adhered to standard practices  for program management and internal control standards. Furthermore,  we interviewed ICE officials from CTCEU and Enforcement and Remov al  Operations (ERO) headquarters, and conducted site visits to 6 of ICE’s 26  Special Agent in Charge field office locations—Seattle, Wash.; Los Angeles  and San Diego, Calif.; Miami, Fla.; New York, N.Y.; and Newark, N.J. We  selected these locations based on a mix of criteria, including the number  of completed overstays investigations, geographic location, and locations   Although the results from our interviews  near CBP ports of entry (POE). with officials at these locations cannot be generalized to officials at all  field offices, the site visits provided us with useful insights into the  experiences of ICE officials responsible for investigating overstays,  including their views on the processes ICE has established for conducting  these investigations. In addition, we obtained data and interviewed  officials from CBP and the State Department regarding their actions  against overstays attempting to obtain a new visa or gain admission to the  United States after having previously overstayed. In particular, we  analyzed data from CBP on the number of overstays it determined to be  inadmissible from fiscal years 2005 through 2010, and from the State  Department on the number of visas it refused due to prior overstay  violations from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. We assessed the reliability  of these data by interviewing officials familiar with the processes used to  collect, record, and analyze the data, and determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report.
To determine the extent to which DHS identifies and shares information  on overstays, we analyzed the processes DHS and its components,  particularly CTCEU and US-VISIT, use to evaluate suspected overstay  records and collect nonimmigrant arrival and departure information. We  compared DHS processes to internal control standards; analyzed US-VISIT  and CTCEU program documentation, such as guidance for evaluating  overstay records; and analyzed data on the number of overstay leads  identified and reviewed by US-VISIT from fiscal years 2005 through 2010  and by CTCEU from fiscal years 2004 through 2010. We assessed the  reliability of these data by interviewing US-VISIT and CTCEU officials who  were familiar with the data systems and by reviewing program  documentation and data systems’ internal control procedures, and we  determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  our report. Further, we interviewed officials from US-VISIT, CTCEU, and  the DHS Office of Immigration Statistics about the processes and systems  used to analyze arrival and departure information and other immigration  records for the purpose of identifying overstays. We also interviewed  officials at CBP Office of Field Operations headquarters and conducted  site visits to three land POEs, four sea POEs, and five air POEs to observe  and obtain officials’ views on the processes and systems used by CBP to  inspect passengers and collect nonimmigrant arrival and departure  information. We selected the POEs to visit based on their geographic  proximity to other types of POEs (i.e., land, sea, or air) and to include  POEs dispersed throughout the country, as well as their proximity to ICE  field offices we visited. Although we cannot generalize the information  obtained during the site visits to the experience of CBP officials at all  POEs, these visits provided us with useful insights into the processes CBP  uses to inspect travelers and collect nonimmigrant information at POEs, as  well as the mechanisms DHS uses to share information about overstays.  Additionally, to assess DHS’s efforts to share overstay information, we  interviewed officials from US-VISIT, ICE, and USCIS about their respective  roles in sharing overstay information with DHS components and other  federal, state, and local agencies, and also reviewed program  documentation about the information sharing activities administered by  these agencies.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2010 through April  2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more detailed discussion  of our scope and methodology is contained in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Process for Gaining Admission to the United States
paragraphs: Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a  temporary basis. From fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2010, the State  Department issued over 36 million nonimmigrant visas. Approximately 82  percent of these visas were issued to nonimmigrants for business travel,  pleasure, tourism, medical treatment, or for foreign and cultural exchange  student programs. In addition, from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year  2010, over 98 million visitors were admitted to the United States under the  VWP.
Generally, nonimmigrants wishing to visit the United States gain  permission to apply for admission to the country through one of two ways.
First, those eligible for the VWP apply online to establish eligibility to  travel under the VWP prior to departing for the United States. Second,  those not eligible for the VWP and not otherwise exempt from the visa  requirement must visit the U.S. consular office with jurisdiction over their  place of residence or, in certain circumstances, the area in which they are  physically present but not resident, to obtain a visa. Upon arriving at a  POE, nonimmigrants must undergo inspection by CBP officers, who  determine whether or not they may be admitted into the United States. A  CBP primary inspection officer first collects biographic and biometric  information from a nonimmigrant. If during this process the officer has  any concerns regarding the nonimmigrant’s admissibility to the United  States, the primary officer refers him or her for more in-depth, secondary  inspection. If CBP determines a nonimmigrant is admissible, he or she is  granted an authorized period of admission. In addition, visitors traveling  on nonimmigrant visas are issued a Form I-94, and visitors from the VWP  countries are issued a Form I-94W while in transit to or upon their arrival  to a United States POE. Each visitor is to give the top half of the form to  a CBP officer and to retain the bottom half, which should be collected  when the visitor departs the country to record their exit. See figure 1 for  the process by which nonimmigrants enter and exit the United States. a. b. c. d.
section_title: Definition and Regulatory Overview of Overstays
paragraphs: An overstay is a nonimmigrant who is legally admitted to the United States  for an authorized period but remains in the country illegally after that  period expired without obtaining an extension of stay or a change of  status or meeting other specific conditions, such as claiming asylum. In- country overstays refer to nonimmigrants who have exceeded their  authorized periods of admission and remain in the United States without  lawful status, while out-of-country overstays refer to individuals who have  departed the United States but who, on the basis of arrival and departure  information, stayed beyond their authorized periods of admission. As  shown in table 1, nonimmigrants who overstay generally fall into one of  three categories. The statute establishes consequences for nonimmigrant  visa holders, foreign students and exchange visitors, and nonimmigrants  admitted without a visa, such as VWP nonimmigrants, who overstay their  authorized periods of admission.
section_title: Comprehensive Biometric Entry and Exit System
paragraphs: The Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management  Improvement Act of 2000 required implementation of an integrated entry  and exit data system for foreign nationals. This act replaced in its  entirety a provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant  Responsibility Act of 1996 that had required an automated system to  record and then match the departure of every foreign national from the  United States to the individual’s arrival record. The Immigration and  Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act instead  required an electronic system that would provide access to and integrate  foreign national arrival and departure data that are authorized or required  to be created or collected under law and are in an electronic format in  certain databases, such as those used at POEs and consular offices. In  2002, DHS initiated the US-VISIT program to develop a comprehensive  entry and exit system to collect biometric data from aliens traveling  through United States POEs. In 2004, US-VISIT initiated the first step of  this program by collecting biometric data on aliens entering the United  States. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004  required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to  accelerate full implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit  data system that matches available information provided by foreign  nationals upon their arrival and departure from the United States. In  August 2007, we reported that while US-VISIT biometric entry capabilities  were operating at air, sea, and land POEs, exit capabilities were not, and  that DHS did not have a comprehensive plan or a complete schedule for  biometric exit implementation. In addition, we reported that DHS  continued to propose spending tens of millions of dollars on US-VISIT exit  projects that were not well-defined, planned, or justified on the basis of  costs, benefits, and risks. Since 2004, we have made numerous  recommendations to address US-VISIT weaknesses, including that DHS  ensure that US-VISIT expenditure plans fully disclose what system  capabilities and benefits are to be delivered, by when, and at what cost, as  well as how the program is being managed. DHS has reported taking  action to address them.
With regard to a biometric exit capability at land POEs, we reported in  December 2006 that US-VISIT officials concluded that, for various reasons,  a biometric US-VISIT exit capability could not be implemented without  incurring a major impact on land facilities. Specifically, we reported that  an interim nonbiometric technology test using radio frequency  identification to collect departure information at land POEs did not meet  the statutory requirement for a biometric exit capability and could not  ensure that visitors who entered the country were those who departed. In  December 2009, DHS initiated a land exit pilot to collect departure  information from temporary workers traveling through two Arizona land  POEs. Under this pilot, temporary workers who entered the United States  at these POEs were required to register their final departure by providing  biometric and biographic information at exit kiosks located at the POEs.  DHS plans to use the results of this pilot to help inform future decisions on  the pedestrian component of the long-term land exit component of a  comprehensive exit system.
With regard to air and sea POEs, in April 2008, DHS announced its  intention to implement biometric exit verification at air and sea POEs in a  Notice of Proposed Rule Making. Under this notice, commercial air and  sea carriers would be responsible for developing and deploying the  capability to collect biometric information from departing travelers and  transmit it to DHS. DHS received comments on the notice and has not yet  published a final rule. Subsequent to the rule making notice, on September  30, 2008, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing  Appropriations Act, 2009, was enacted, which directed DHS to test two  scenarios for an air exit solution. DHS conducted these pilots in 2009,  and we reported on them in August 2010. We concluded that the  limitations we identified with the pilots curtailed their ability to inform a  decision for a long-term air exit solution and pointed to the need for  additional sources of information on air exit’s operational impacts. We  recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security identify additional  sources of information beyond the pilots, such as comments from the  Notice of Proposed Rule Making, to inform an air exit solution decision.  DHS agreed with the recommendation and stated that the pilots it  conducted would not serve as the sole source of information to inform an  air exit solution decision.
section_title: Federal Agencies’ Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: DHS and its components and programs, including CBP, US-VISIT, ICE, and  USCIS are primarily responsible for taking action to identify and address  overstays, as shown in table 2. In addition, the State Department is  responsible for ensuring that the department’s visa issuances follow  guidelines related to overstays to ensure that individuals who have  overstayed and are ineligible for a visa do not receive one. State  Department’s responsibilities also include identifying and denying  nonimmigrant visas to potential intending immigrants—individuals who  intend to remain in the United States for an indefinite period.
Federal agencies use various databases to determine whether  nonimmigrants have overstayed their authorized periods of admission to  the United States. As shown in table 3, these databases provide  information on foreign nationals’ arrival to and departure from the United  States, foreign nationals’ applications to change status once in the United  States, and the status of foreign students.
section_title: Federal Agencies Take Actions against a Small Portion of the Estimated Overstay Population, but Strengthening Prioritization and Assessment of Overstay Efforts Could Improve Enforcement
paragraphs: ICE CTCEU is the primary federal entity responsible for taking  enforcement action to address in-country overstays, but it investigates and  arrests a small portion of the estimated in-country overstay population due  to, among other things, ICE’s competing priorities. While ICE reports  allocating a small percentage of its resources to overstay investigations  since fiscal year 2006, the agency has expressed an intention to augment  the resources it dedicates to overstay enforcement efforts moving forward.  Currently, CTCEU prioritizes in-country overstay leads based on various  factors that consider the potential risks overstays may pose to national  security and public safety, and field offices investigate those leads that  CTCEU identified as a priority. CTCEU has not yet established  mechanisms for assessing its performance in meeting program goals. In  addition to ICE’s overstay enforcement activities, State Department and  CBP also take action to prevent out-of-country overstays from returning to  the United States and to deny nonimmigrant visas to potential intending  immigrants.
subsections: section_title: ICE Investigates Few In- Country Overstays, but Its Efforts Could Benefit from Improved Planning and Performance Management
subsections: section_title: CTCEU Efforts Result in Enforcement Action against a Small Portion of the Estimated In-Country Overstay Population
paragraphs: ICE CTCEU is the primary federal entity responsible for taking  enforcement action to address in-country overstays, but it investigates and  arrests a small portion of the estimated in-country overstay population.  CTCEU identifies leads for overstay cases; takes steps to verify the  accuracy of the leads it identifies by, for example, checking leads against  multiple databases; and prioritizes leads to focus on those the unit  identifies as being most likely to pose a threat to national security or  public safety. CTCEU then requires field offices to initiate investigations  on all priority, high-risk leads it identifies. For example, in 2009 CTCEU  identified a suspected overstay from the United Kingdom who, intelligence  indicated, may have been a suspected terrorist. CTCEU referred this  overstay lead to a field office for investigation, which resulted in an arrest  of the suspected overstay in August 2010. According to CTCEU data, as of  October 2010, ICE field offices had closed about 34,700 overstay  investigations that CTCEU headquarters assigned to them from fiscal year  2004 through 2010. These cases resulted in approximately 8,100 arrests,  relative to a total estimated overstay population of 4 million to 5.5  million. Although the percentage of CTCEU overstay investigations that  resulted in arrest varied by the fiscal year in which they were initiated,  Homeland Security Investigations field offices arrested from 20 to 27  percent of nonimmigrant overstays who were subjects of those  investigations, as shown in figure 2.
In addition to overstay investigations that CTCEU headquarters assigns to  ICE field offices, the offices can open their own overstay investigations.  For example, CTCEU agents at all six field offices we visited stated that  their offices have initiated their own overstay investigations. Also, ICE  agents may encounter and arrest overstays during investigations they  conduct through ICE’s other investigative programs, such as worksite  enforcement. Because ICE codes these investigations differently in its  information systems, they are not included in the arrest data in figure 2.
CTCEU overstay investigations that do not lead to an arrest result in one  of three outcomes: (1) evidence is uncovered indicating that the suspected  overstay has departed the United States; (2) evidence is uncovered  indicating that the subject of the investigation is in-status (e.g., the subject  filed a timely application with USCIS to change his or her status and/or  extend his or her authorized period of admission in the United States); or  (3) CTCEU investigators exhaust all investigative leads and cannot locate  the suspected overstay. Of the approximately 34,700 overstay  investigations assigned by CTCEU headquarters that ICE field offices  closed from fiscal year 2004 through 2010, about 8,100 (or 23 percent)  resulted in arrest and about 26,700 (or 77 percent) resulted in one of these  three outcomes. Among these approximately 26,700 cases, 31 percent  resulted in a departure finding; 32 percent in an in-status finding; and 37  percent in all leads being exhausted, as presented in figure 3.
In-status (8,600)
ICE officials attribute the significant portion of overstay cases that result  in a departure finding, in-status finding, or with all leads being exhausted  generally to three issues: difficulties associated with locating suspected  overstays, data timeliness, and data completeness.
Difficulties locating suspected overstays. ICE agents reported locating  suspected overstays as challenging because the address ICE has on file for  a suspect may be outdated or inaccurate, and if ICE agents are unable to  locate the suspect after taking recommended investigative steps, they will  close the case with an all leads exhausted outcome. CTCEU agents in two  of the six offices we visited identified locating suspected overstays as the  most challenging aspect of conducting overstay investigations. They  explained that, although CTCEU headquarters only assigns investigations  to field offices if there is a last known address for the subject, the subject  may have moved to a new address or have never resided there in the first  place. For example, the address available to CTCEU agents may be the one  that the nonimmigrant provided on his or her Form I-94/I-94W when he or  she was admitted to the United States, and the nonimmigrant may have  subsequently moved. Prior to closing a case and reporting that all leads  have been exhausted, CTCEU recommends that agents perform several  steps to try to obtain additional leads for the case, including contacting  relatives or other known associates, searching Internet sites (e.g., Google  and Facebook), and contacting other law enforcement agencies. If an  agent performs such steps and still cannot identify a valid address for a  suspected overstay, the case will be closed with an outcome of all leads  exhausted. These cases are subsequently monitored by a system that  automatically queries various databases, such as Lexis-Nexis, on a weekly  basis for new information relating to the location of the suspected  overstay. If such information is identified, CTCEU will reopen the  investigation.
Data timeliness. With regard to data timeliness, new information may be  entered in DHS systems between the time CTCEU headquarters assigns an  investigation to a field office and the time that the office undertakes the  investigation that permits the field office to close the investigation.  CTCEU agents in four of the six field offices we visited told us that  additional data entered in this manner contributes to the frequency with  which they close cases with a departure or in-status finding. For example,  when a CTCEU headquarters analyst reviews an overstay lead, the analyst  is to check USCIS electronic information systems to see if the suspected  overstay has filed a benefit application with USCIS that places him or her  in-status. Although the suspected overstay may have done so, the  application may not yet appear in USCIS’s systems because the agency is  still processing it and has not posted its receipt. When a field office agent  opens an investigation, the first task the agent is to perform is to check  DHS information systems for any new information related to the suspected  overstay under investigation. If USCIS has subsequently posted that the  suspected overstay has a pending application in its systems, the field office  agent may see this information, determine that the suspected overstay  under investigation is in-status, and close the investigation with an in- status outcome.
Data completeness. Incomplete data in DHS systems contribute to  investigations resulting in departure findings when ICE field agents  uncover evidence that the subject of a CTCEU investigation departed even  though DHS systems contain no record of their departure. CTCEU agents  in four of the six offices we visited cited missing departure data as a cause  of cases resulting in a departure finding. For example, if the suspected  overstay under investigation exited the United States through a land POE  and did not submit an I-94/I-94W form to record his or her departure, there  will be no indication in DHS systems that the suspected overstay has left  the country, and CTCEU may open an investigation of the individual.  Through ensuing investigative efforts, such as attempting to contact the  suspected overstay by telephone or electronic mail, or asking Canadian  authorities to review their records to determine if the suspected overstay  entered Canada, CTCEU field agents may secure evidence that the  suspected overstay has departed the United States and close the  investigation accordingly.
In addition to CTCEU investigative efforts, other ICE programs within  ERO may take enforcement action against overstays, though none of these  programs solely or directly focus on overstay enforcement. For example, if  the ERO Criminal Alien Program identifies a criminal alien who poses a  threat to public safety and is also an overstay, the program may detain and  remove that criminal alien from the United States. Further, ERO’s National  Fugitive Operations Program may undertake efforts to locate a  nonimmigrant who was ordered removed based on various immigration  violations, including an overstay violation, but did not surrender for  removal. ERO cannot reliably quantify the results of its in-country overstay  enforcement efforts because in its case management system, ERO does  not separately track overstay cases. Rather, ERO’s cases are coded by the  section of law that the subject violated, and these sections apply to  violations that are broader than exclusively overstay violations. For  example, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) makes any alien who has failed to  maintain or comply with the conditions of his or her nonimmigrant status  deportable. In addition to overstay violations, this could include remaining  in the United States while no longer working as a foreign diplomat,  religious worker, or temporary agricultural worker, among other possible  violations. ERO officials told us that ERO plans to develop metrics for  tracking the results of its in-country overstay enforcement efforts, pending  the outcome of an ongoing internal ICE review of whether to shift more  overstay enforcement responsibilities to ERO in the future.
section_title: ICE Allocates a Small Percentage of Resources to Overstay Enforcement, but Plans to Augment Overstay Enforcement Resources
paragraphs: ICE has reported allocating a small percentage of its resources in terms of  investigative work hours to overstay investigations since fiscal year 2006,  but the agency has expressed an intention to augment the resources it  dedicates to overstay enforcement efforts moving forward. According to  DHS, ICE received approximately $1.7 billion in funding and about 8,000  full time equivalent positions in fiscal year 2010 for domestic  investigations, which include overstay investigations. From fiscal years  2006 through 2010, ICE reported devoting from 3.1 to 3.4 percent of its  total field office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations, as  shown in figure 4.
In addition to CTCEU investigative efforts, other ICE programs within  ERO may dedicate resources to overstay enforcement, such as ERO’s  Criminal Alien Program and National Fugitive Operations Program.  According to ERO officials, because overstay enforcement is not a specific  focus of any of ERO’s programs, ERO does not track the number of work  hours it dedicates to enforcement actions pertaining to overstays, but  intends to do so if it is assigned additional overstay enforcement  responsibilities as a result of ICE’s ongoing internal review.
ICE attributes the small percentage of investigative resources it reports  allocating to overstay enforcement efforts primarily to competing  enforcement priorities. According to the ICE Assistant Secretary, ICE has  resources to remove 400,000 aliens per year, or less than 4 percent of the  estimated removable alien population in the United States. In light of the  large number of immigration violators the agency is responsible for  addressing and its finite enforcement resources, in June 2010, the  Assistant Secretary stated that ICE must prioritize the use of its resources  to ensure that its efforts to remove aliens reflect the agency’s highest  priorities, namely nonimmigrants, including suspected overstays, who are  identified as high risk in terms of being most likely to pose a risk to  national security or public safety. In addition, the Assistant Secretary  stated that the level of resources ICE dedicates to overstay enforcement  efforts reflects the distribution of its resources among its competing  enforcement requirements. As a result, ICE dedicates its limited resources  to addressing overstays it identifies as most likely to pose a potential  threat to national security or public safety and does not generally allocate  resources to address suspected overstays that it assesses as non-criminal  and low risk.
ICE has indicated it may allocate more resources to overstay enforcement  efforts moving forward, and that it plans to focus primarily on suspected  overstays who ICE has identified as high risk or who have recently  overstayed their authorized periods of admission. For example, the ICE  Strategic Plan Fiscal Year 2010-2014 states that the agency plans to invest  more resources to identify and remove aliens soon after they overstay in  those fiscal years. Further, according to ICE’s Assistant Deputy Director,  ICE intends to put more resources towards identifying and removing  aliens who were admitted to the United States in the current fiscal year  and overstayed their authorized period of admission than aliens who  entered the country 10 years ago and overstayed. This official explained  that ICE prioritizes recent overstays in part because they have generally  established fewer ties in U.S. communities, and as a result, are more likely  to be eligible for removal under law. However, regardless of the length of  time a nonimmigrant has overstayed in the United States, ICE can take  enforcement action against the overstay, including in cases when ICE  encounters an overstay through other investigative programs or efforts,  according to this official. In addition, the Assistant Secretary of ICE stated  in March 2010 that it is imperative to expand the nation’s enforcement  efforts concerning overstays and other status violations, and ICE is  reviewing its policies, programs, and procedures concerning overstays.
According to senior ICE officials, as of January 2011, ICE is considering  expanding ERO’s overstay enforcement role by proposing the  development of teams of officers within ERO dedicated specifically to  enforcement action against civil (non-criminal) overstays and transferring  some or all CTCEU overstay programming from Homeland Security  Investigations to ERO. According to senior ERO officials, ICE senior  management is reviewing an ERO proposal to create 5 to 7 teams of about  16 officers each devoted exclusively to overstay enforcement. According  to ICE’s Assistant Deputy Director, ICE and DHS management concur with  this proposal and are considering requesting additional funds to support  these teams in a future budget request. According to ERO officials, these  teams would be located in the largest U.S. tourist destinations, such as  New York and Los Angeles, and would each be projected to close  approximately 600 cases per year. Although it is too early to tell what  impact, if any, ICE’s plans for allocating additional resources would have  on the results of its overstay enforcement activities, the creation of ERO  teams dedicated to taking enforcement action against overstays would  represent an expansion of ICE’s overstay enforcement efforts. In addition,  ERO officials told us that ICE is considering transferring at least part of  CTCEU’s efforts for addressing overstays from Homeland Security  Investigations to ERO, although no decision has been reached. According  to ICE’s Assistant Deputy Director, it is ICE’s intention for ERO to focus  on civil immigration enforcement and Homeland Security Investigations to  focus on taking enforcement actions to address criminal violators and  violators who pose a threat to national security; as overstaying is a civil  violation, civil overstay enforcement falls within ERO’s area of  responsibility.
As an intermediate step, in the summer of 2010, CTCEU began to provide  all overstay leads it identified as low risk in terms of posing a threat to  national security or public safety to the ERO Criminal Alien Program.  However, according to the Acting Unit Chief, the Criminal Alien Program  does not have sufficient resources to investigate these leads, and the  program is still in the process of determining how to most efficiently and  effectively utilize its resources to address civil, low-risk overstay violators.  According to senior ERO officials, although there has been discussion  within ICE about augmenting ERO resources for investigating overstays  through programs such as the Criminal Alien Program, no specific plans  for doing so have been established.
According to ERO officials, ERO does not plan to assume responsibility  for a portion of civil overstay enforcement until ICE assesses the funding  and resources that doing so would require. ERO officials stated that ERO  and Homeland Security Investigations have begun to assess these  requirements but have not established a time frame for completing this  assessment because ICE is considering transferring some overstay  programming from CTCEU to ERO concurrently with considering the  transfer of other Homeland Security Investigations functions to ERO.  Program management standards state that successful execution of any  program includes developing plans that include a time line for program  deliverables. By developing a time frame for completing a resource and  funding assessment and utilizing the assessment findings, as appropriate,  ICE would be better positioned to hold its staff accountable for  completion of efforts as management intended, thereby strengthening its  planning efforts for executing its overstay enforcement activities moving  forward.
section_title: CTCEU Considers Various Risk-Based Factors in Prioritizing Its Overstay Leads
paragraphs: CTCEU prioritizes investigation of in-country overstay leads based on the  perceived risk each lead is likely to pose to national security and public  safety as determined by threat analysis. CTCEU investigations focus on  suspected overstays it identifies as most likely to engage in activities that  may pose a threat to national security or public safety. In order to  prioritize investigation of overstay leads, CTCEU uses an automated  system to assign each overstay lead a priority ranking based on threat  intelligence information. The specific criteria CTCEU uses to rank the  priority level of leads are determined tri-annually based on current threat  information by the Compliance Enforcement Advisory Panel, an  interagency panel of intelligence experts assembled by ICE for the  purpose of determining these criteria. Although the threat-related criteria  identified by the Compliance Enforcement Advisory Panel and used by  CTCEU to prioritize overstay investigations are not publicly available, they  center on country of birth, age, and gender. For example, CTCEU may  assign all females within a specific age range who were born in a  particular country the same priority ranking. In addition, if other threat  information indicates that an individual or group of suspected overstays  that do not fit within the specific criteria determined by the Compliance  Enforcement Advisory Panel are high risk for engaging in activity that may  pose a threat to national security or public safety, CTCEU will assign them  as high priority for investigation. For example, upon receiving intelligence  indicating that a suspected VWP overstay who did not fit within CTCEU’s  priority criteria was wanted by Argentinean authorities for drug  smuggling, CTCEU prioritized the case for investigation. If a review by  CTCEU analysts indicates that there is sufficient information associated  with a priority lead (e.g., an address for the alien in question) to make it  viable for investigation, CTCEU assigns the lead to a field office for  mandatory investigation.
section_title: CTCEU Could Benefit from Establishing Mechanisms for Assessing Performance to Address Overstays
paragraphs: CTCEU has not yet established mechanisms for assessing its performance  in meeting program goals. We have previously reported that leading  organizations promote accountability by establishing results-oriented,  outcome goals and corresponding performance measures by which to  gauge progress. In addition, Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government and the Office of Management and Budget call for  agencies to have performance measures and indicators that are linked to  mission, goals, and objectives to allow for comparisons to be made among  different sets of data so that corrective actions can be taken if necessary.  Measuring performance allows organizations to track the progress they  are making toward their goals and gives managers critical information on  which to base decisions for improving their progress. According to DHS  training materials, information and data gathered from performance  measurement is in part to be used to plan for future resource allocations,  to better manage programs, and to communicate to stakeholders the value  the program is delivering.
Although CTCEU has established an output program goal and target and  tracks various performance measures, it does not have a mechanism in  place to assess the outcomes of its efforts, particularly the extent to which  the program is meeting its mission as it relates to overstays—to prevent  terrorists and other criminals from exploiting the nation’s immigration  system. CTCEU’s program goal is to prevent criminals and terrorists  from exploiting the immigration system by proactively developing cases  for investigation, and its performance target is to send 100 percent of  verified priority leads to field offices as cases. CTCEU also tracks a  variety of output measures, such as the number of cases completed and  their associated results (i.e., arrested, departed, in-status, or all leads  exhausted) and average hours spent to complete an investigation. While  CTCEU’s performance target permits it to assess an output internal to the  program—the percentage of verified priority leads it sends to field offices  for investigation—it does not provide program officials with a means to  assess the impact of the program in terms of preventing terrorists and  other criminals from exploiting the immigration system. According to  senior CTCEU officials, the unit measures its progress against an output  performance goal and target because the unit has not identified a means  by which to measure program outcomes. Specifically, the unit has not  identified any means to assess CTCEU’s progress in meeting its mission  other than to point out retroactively whether or not terrorists or criminals  have exploited the nation’s visa programs. If no status violators, including  overstays, attack the United States or otherwise compromise homeland  security, officials stated that they view this as an indication that the unit is  performing well. However, CTCEU cannot directly attribute the fact that  no overstays have attacked or compromised U.S. homeland security to its  overstay enforcement efforts, as various other factors could affect or  contribute to this outcome.
We and the Office of Management and Budget have acknowledged the  difficulty in developing outcome measures for programs that aim to deter  or prevent specific behaviors, and have reported that in such an instance  proxy measures—or indirect indicators—should be designed to assess the  effectiveness of program functions. CTCEU officials agreed that the use  of proxy measures with associated performance targets could better  enable the unit to gauge its performance in meeting its mission and to  measure the effectiveness of its overstay enforcement efforts. For  example, a proxy measure for CTCEU could be the number of cases  resulting in all leads exhausted per investigative hours worked, and the  target could be to have fewer than an established number of cases per  investigative hours worked result in this outcome. By undertaking efforts  to develop performance goals and targets for outcome-oriented  measures—or proxy measures if program outcomes cannot be captured— CTCEU could be positioned to track its performance in meeting its  mission. This performance information, in turn, could provide CTCEU  managers with information on which to base decisions for improving its  efforts and performance to prevent terrorists and other criminals from  exploiting the nation’s immigration system.
section_title: The State Department and CBP Have Taken Action to Prevent Ineligible Out-of- Country Overstays from Returning to the United States
paragraphs: In addition to ICE’s activities, the State Department and CBP have taken  action to prevent ineligible out-of-country overstays from returning to the  United States, and the State Department also has acted to deny  nonimmigrant visas to potential intending immigrants. In general, foreign  nationals who have departed the United States after having remained in  the country beyond their authorized periods of admission are ineligible to  return to the United States for 3 years if they overstayed by 181-364 days,  and 10 years if they overstayed by 365 or more days. The State Department  and CBP are responsible for, respectively, preventing ineligible violators  from obtaining a new visa or being admitted to the country at a POE.
According to State Department data, the department denied about 52,800  nonimmigrant visa applications and about 114,200 immigrant visa  applications from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2010 due, at least in  part, to applicants having previously been unlawfully present in the United  States for more than 180 days, according to statute. These numbers  equate to, on average, approximately 8,800 nonimmigrant visa refusals and  19,000 immigrant visa refusals per year from fiscal year 2005 through  2010. According to State Department officials, although a small portion of  these refusals refer to actions taken against people that illegally entered  the United States without inspection or unlawfully remained in the  country after having their status terminated, most of these visa refusals  were due to applicants having overstayed their authorized periods of  admission to the United States by more than 180 days. Similarly, CBP  reported that it refused admission to about 5,000 foreign nationals  applying for admission to the United States from fiscal year 2005 through  2010 (an average of about 830 per year) specifically due to the applicants’  previous status as unlawfully present in the United States for more than  180 days. The State Department may also deny applications for  nonimmigrant visas if there is reason to suspect that the applicants do not  intend to abide by the terms of the visas and are likely to remain in the  United States beyond their authorized periods of admission. In effect, by  denying intending immigrants nonimmigrant visas the State Department is  acting to prevent these nonimmigrants from having the opportunity to  overstay were they to be admitted to the United States. Although the  manner in which the State Department tracks nonimmigrant visa refusal  data does not allow it to isolate the number of refusals specifically  targeting intending immigrants, State Department officials reported that  this is a common reason for nonimmigrant visa applications to be refused.
section_title: More Reliable, Accessible Data Could Improve DHS’s Efforts to Identify and Share Information on Overstays
paragraphs: In the absence of a comprehensive biometric entry and exit system for  identifying overstays DHS relies on two components—US-VISIT and  CTCEU—to identify overstays primarily through analysis of biographic  information. However, DHS’s efforts to identify and report on overstays  are hindered by unreliable data. Further, DHS has established a variety of  mechanisms, such as overstay lookouts, or electronic alerts, to share  information pertaining to overstays with its components and with federal,  state, and local agencies that may encounter overstays as part of their law  enforcement or other activities. DHS creates lookouts for certain  categories of overstays, and expanding the categories of overstays  assigned these lookouts could help improve CBP’s ability to determine if  these nonimmigrants should be re-admitted to the United States.  Additionally, while CBP officers at POEs have reported facing challenges  in obtaining information from USCIS to help make admissibility decisions  regarding suspected overstays, USCIS has long-term plans to help address  these challenges.
subsections: section_title: Improved Data Reliability Could Strengthen DHS Processes to Identify Overstays
subsections: section_title: DHS Identifies Overstays Primarily Based on Biographic Entry and Exit Data
paragraphs: In the absence of a comprehensive biometric entry and exit system for  identifying and tracking overstays, US-VISIT and CTCEU primarily analyze  biographic entry and exit data collected at land, air, and sea POEs to  identify overstays. US-VISIT identifies both in-country and out-of-country  overstays by analyzing biographic data maintained in the Arrival and  Departure Information System—a database that contains information on  aliens’ entry, exit, and change of status—and electronically and manually  comparing Arrival and Departure Information System records to  information in other databases to find matches that demonstrate that a  nonimmigrant may have, for instance, departed the country or filed an  application to change status and thus is not an overstay (see figure 5). For  cases in which US-VISIT’s analysis shows that a nonimmigrant may be an  in-country overstay, DHS sends the lead to CTCEU for further analysis and  possible investigation. For cases in which US-VISIT’s analysis shows that a  nonimmigrant visa holder departed the United States—an out-of-country  overstay—but the departure was more than 90 days after the  nonimmigrant’s authorized period of admission expired, US-VISIT creates  a lookout that CBP officers at POEs and State Department officials at  overseas consulates can access to determine whether that nonimmigrant  is eligible for re-admission at POEs or can receive a new visa upon  application at a U.S. consulate. Appendix II provides more detailed  information on US-VISIT’s processes for analyzing in-country and out-of- country overstay leads.
In addition to US-VISIT’s process for identifying in-country and out-of- country overstays, CTCEU conducts its own analysis to identify in-country  overstays. Specifically, CTCEU analyzes (1) in-country visa overstay leads  provided by US-VISIT, (2) in-country VWP overstay leads provided by US- VISIT, (3) out-of-status students based on Student and Exchange Visitor  Information System data, and (4) overstay leads based on National  Security Entry-Exit Registration System data. CTCEU refers viable leads— that is, leads for which CTCEU can identify a last known address—to ICE  Homeland Security Investigations field offices for investigation, as shown  in figure 6. CTCEU analysts conduct automated and manual checks to  compare leads from the four sources against records in other databases  that contain information on, for example, nonimmigrants’ applications to  change status, to determine whether nonimmigrants have overstayed and  are likely still present in the United States. As shown in figure 6, the  majority of leads from fiscal years 2004 through 2010 were closed through  automated and manual checks, meaning that the nonimmigrants were  found to have departed the United States or were determined to be in  status. After the completion of manual checks, about 3 percent of leads  were considered to be priority with viable addresses and sent to ICE field  offices for investigation from fiscal years 2004 through 2010. Appendix II  provides more detailed information on CTCEU’s process for analyzing  overstay leads.
DHS’s efforts to identify and report on overstays are hindered by  unreliable data. Specifically, we identified four main challenges DHS faces  in identifying overstays: (1) incomplete collection of departure data at  POEs, (2) Student and Exchange Visitor Information System database  limitations, (3) lack of mechanisms for assessing the quality of leads that  CTCEU sends to the field offices for investigation, and (4) US-VISIT’s  backlog in analyzing potential overstay leads.
Unreliable Collection of Departure Data at POEs  Without a comprehensive biometric entry and exit system, DHS relies on  biographic information that nonimmigrants provide to CBP when entering  and exiting the United States, including information on I-94/I-94W arrival  and departure forms. CBP faces two challenges in collecting accurate and  complete biographic information from nonimmigrants departing the  United States through land POEs. First, CBP requires nonimmigrants  leaving the United States through land POEs to remit their I-94/I-94W  arrival and departure forms to record their exit if they do not plan to  return within 30 days. However, CBP does not inspect travelers exiting the  United States through land POEs, including collecting their biometric  information, and CBP does not have a consistent mechanism in place at  land POEs to provide nonimmigrants with the means to turn in these  forms. Nonimmigrants departing the United States through land POEs  turn in their I-94/I-94W forms on their own initiative. According to CBP  officials, at some POEs, CBP provides a box for nonimmigrants to drop off  their I-94/I-94W forms, while at other POEs departing nonimmigrants may  park their cars, enter the POE facility, and provide their forms to a CBP  officer. Remitting these forms represents the only method for recording  that nonimmigrants left the country if they exit via a land POE. If departing  nonimmigrants do not take the initiative to turn in their forms, DHS does  not have complete information that the nonimmigrants departed the  United States, hindering DHS’s efforts to determine whether those  nonimmigrants were overstays. Second, CBP faces challenges in ensuring  the accuracy of the I-94/I-94W forms that nonimmigrants submit when  departing through land POEs. In particular, at two of three land POEs we  visited, CBP officials told us that there have been instances in which an  individual other than the person listed on the I-94/I-94W form remitted the  form to CBP. In such a case, CBP cannot be sure whether the  nonimmigrant listed on the I-94/I-94W form actually departed the United  States, as someone else turned in his or her form. As a result of these  challenges, DHS faces difficulties in determining whether nonimmigrants  have actually departed the United States through land POEs and  identifying whether they overstayed their authorized periods of admission.
Internal control standards call for agencies to develop control activities to  help ensure that data are completely and accurately recorded. CBP  officials at two land POEs we visited stated that because of the  configuration of some land POEs—such as there being only one lane to  accommodate all automobile traffic exiting the United States— establishing a mechanism for collecting I-94/I-94W forms at these areas  could greatly impede the flow of traffic. The CBP Director for Traveler  Entry Programs stated that establishing a national policy for collecting I- 94/I-94W forms at land borders could yield benefits, including to help DHS  more reliably identify overstays, but would need to be weighed against  costs, such as determining the indirect cost for travelers to stop in line to  turn in I-94/I-94W forms and the potential impact on Canadian and  Mexican border crossing processes, which relate to CBP’s current border  crossing procedures. This official also noted that the submission of these  forms would not ensure the accuracy of the biographical information  collected from nonimmigrants departing through land POEs because  nonimmigrants could still fraudulently remit I-94/I-94W forms that belong  to others. From August 2005 to November 2006, CBP studied the feasibility  of using radio frequency technology to record biographic departure  information from I-94/I-94W forms at land POEs. Through tests of this  technology, CBP determined that it was too immature to meet the  requirements of a land exit solution. While CBP studied a technological  mechanism for recording biographic departure information at land POEs,  CBP officials stated that the agency has not studied the costs and benefits  of providing a mechanism for nonimmigrants departing the United States  at land POEs to turn in their forms, such as a drop box. In 2006, DHS  released a guide to help DHS components conduct cost-benefit analyses to  identify the superior financial solution among competing alternatives. This  guide identified cost-benefit analyses as a proven management tool for  managing costs and risks. By analyzing the costs and benefits of  developing a mechanism to provide nonimmigrants departing land POEs  with a way to turn in their I-94/I-94W forms, CBP could more effectively  determine if doing so presents a viable means for the agency to obtain  more complete departure information for identifying overstays for  possible investigation.
In addition to these challenges in collecting complete and accurate  departure information at land POEs, CBP has faced difficulties in ensuring  the accuracy of departure information collected from air and sea POEs.  Specifically, regulations require air and sea carriers to submit electronic  passenger departure manifests—containing, among other things, the  names and other identifying information of passengers—before the  airplane or vessel departs from the United States. The regulations also  specify that the carrier collecting the manifest information is responsible  for comparing the travel document presented by the passenger with the  travel document information it is transmitting to CBP to ensure that the  information is correct, the document appears to be valid for travel  purposes, and the passenger is the person to whom the document was  issued. However, carriers may elect to verify that a passenger matches  the travel document he or she presented at a check-in counter prior to the  individual entering the boarding area rather than doing so as passengers  board the airplanes or vessels, and CBP does not have a process to  perform this verification at boarding. CBP officials told us that, as a result,  the current system for verifying air and sea departures is vulnerable to  fraud. Specifically, a nonimmigrant could fraudulently make it appear as if  he or she departed when in fact the nonimmigrant has not because  another individual may have taken his or her place on the outbound plane  or vessel. For example, one nonimmigrant could present identification  when checking in to board a plane and to go through inspection at an  airport’s passenger checkpoint. However, once that nonimmigrant has  passed the airport’s security checkpoint, he or she could exchange a  boarding pass with someone else and not board the plane. That  nonimmigrant could then leave the airport and the other person could use  the boarding pass to board the plane, thereby making it appear as if the  nonimmigrant who did not board the plane departed the United States,  potentially posing a homeland security risk. CBP officials stated that they  could not estimate how often or if this scenario occurs, but stated that it is  a vulnerability. As a result, CBP may not have accurate information on  nonimmigrants departing through air and sea POEs, hindering DHS’s  efforts to reliably identify overstays.
In addition, we have previously reported on weaknesses in DHS processes  for collecting departure data, and how these weaknesses impact the  determination of overstay rates. The Implementing Recommendations of  the 9/11 Commission Act required that DHS certify that a system is in  place that can verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign  nationals who depart through U.S. airports in order for DHS to expand the  VWP. In September 2008, we reported that DHS’s methodology for  comparing arrivals and departures for the purpose of departure  verification would not inform overall or country-specific overstay rates  because DHS’s methodology did not begin with arrival records to  determine if those foreign nationals departed or remained in the United  States beyond their authorized periods of admission. Rather DHS’s  methodology started with departure records and matched them to arrival  records. As a result, DHS’s methodology counted overstays who left the  country, but did not identify overstays who have not departed the United  States and appear to have no intention of leaving. We recommended that  DHS explore cost-effective actions necessary to further improve, validate,  and test the reliability of overstay data. DHS reported that it is taking steps  to improve the accuracy and reliability of the overstay data, by efforts  such as continuing to audit carrier performance and work with airlines to  improve the accuracy and completeness of data collection.
In addition, to help address these issues with the accuracy and reliability  of departure data, DHS has tested biometric methods for positively  identifying passengers before they board airplanes. For example, CBP and  the Transportation Security Administration within DHS, conducted two  test pilots for collecting biometric information from nonimmigrants at two  airports in 2009. Under the CBP pilot, CBP officers collected biometric  exit data at departure gates at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport.  Under the Transportation Security Administration pilot, Transportation  Security Administration officials collected biometric exit data at security  checkpoints at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. DHS  issued an evaluation report on these pilots in October 2009 that, among  other findings, reported that the location of officers in the CBP pilot  provided a high level of confidence of departure, as all travelers  encountered the CBP process and then had to immediately board the  aircraft. As a result, they could neither circumvent the process to board  the aircraft nor attempt to remain in the United States without raising  immediate suspicion. In August 2010, we reported on this evaluation  report, noting that the pilot data provided insight into traveler impacts,  biometric capture procedures, traveler compliance, and staffing needs,  and would support further economic analysis for an air exit solution  decision, but that the scope and approach to the pilot tests restricted the  pilots’ ability to inform a decision for a long-term air exit solution. We  recommended that DHS identify additional sources for the operational  impacts of air exit not addressed in the pilots’ evaluation and incorporate  these sources into its air exit decision making and planning. DHS  concurred with this recommendation and stated that the pilots it  conducted would not serve as the sole source of information to inform its  decision making.
Limitations with the Student and Exchange Visitor Information  System Database  The Student and Exchange Visitor Information System database, which  maintains biographical and immigration status information on foreign  students and exchange visitors, has two gaps that hinder DHS efforts to  identify foreign students or exchange visitors who are out of status for  possible investigation. First, according to CTCEU officials, the Student  and Exchange Visitor Information System is not an account-based system,  meaning that it does not link all of a nonimmigrant’s records. For example,  a student’s activities—including applying to several schools, being  dismissed from a school, or transferring to another school—are not linked  together, making it difficult for ICE officials to determine a student’s  complete school enrollment history. Without this history, ICE officials  stated that they face challenges determining whether a student has  complied with the terms of his or her visa requirements, such as  requirements for foreign students to be continually enrolled in a school  while in the United States. Second, school officials are responsible for  inputting student status information into the Student and Exchange Visitor  Information System, and ICE officials stated that school officials may  record student biographical information incorrectly or incompletely. For  example, ICE officials told us that there have been instances of school  officials not inputting a graduation date for a student. In such a case, if the  student graduates and no longer meets the requirements for maintaining a  student visa status, ICE would not be aware that the student is actually out  of status. Further, according to ICE officials, school officials have inputted  student information fraudulently into the Student and Exchange Visitor  Information System. Specifically, officials from four of the six ICE field  offices we visited told us they had initiated student fraud cases, including  cases in which schools were knowingly reporting that students were  fulfilling their visa requirements, such as maintaining a full course load,  when students were not attending the school or only attending  intermittently. For example, in 2008 ICE agents from the Los Angeles field  office investigated and arrested an English language school operator who,  in exchange for cash payments, assisted nonimmigrants to fraudulently  obtain student visas and reported them as enrolled in his schools even  though they were not attending classes. ICE officials said that the agency  does not have the personnel and funding resources necessary to collect  and update biographical and educational information directly from the  more than 1 million nonimmigrant students, exchange visitors, and their  dependents in the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System  rather than relying on school officials at each institution to input this  information. As a result of these weaknesses, the Student Exchange and  Visitor Information System is vulnerable to fraud and data inaccuracies,  hindering ICE’s efforts to obtain accurate student status information,  identify students who may be overstays, and refer viable leads for further  investigation by ICE field offices.
According to ICE officials, DHS is developing an updated version of the  Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, which is expected to be  implemented by the end of fiscal year 2011. Among other improvements,  the updated version is to be an account-based system, allowing DHS to  better monitor student activity. Further, ICE officials have established a  new analysis unit within the CTCEU called the Student and Exchange  Visitor Information System Exploitation Section to help address these  vulnerabilities by, for example, analyzing Student and Exchange Visitor  Information System data and referring school fraud criminal investigation  leads to field offices. ICE officials said that because this section is new, it  is too early to tell what effect the new section will have on strengthening  efforts to identify student overstays and instances of school fraud.
Assessing the Quality of Overstay Leads  While CTCEU has a method for collecting and tracking overstay leads it  sends to the field offices for investigation, CTCEU lacks performance  measures for assessing the quality of overstay leads it provides to ICE field  offices. CTCEU officials stated that while it does not have performance  measures associated with its analyses or identification of overstay leads,  the unit developed an internal audit program for assessing its efforts.  Under this program, CTCEU supervisors check 1 percent of leads  reviewed by CTCEU analysts to determine whether analysts correctly  processed leads. Based on its audit program checks, CTCEU reported that  from November 2007 through April 2010, the unit found 12 material  errors—defined by CTCEU as leads that should have been identified as  viable for investigation but were not or conversely should have been  identified as not viable but were identified as viable—in analysts’ review  and identification of about 2,200 overstay leads. In addition, among the  2,200 overstay leads reviewed, the unit found about 1,700 nonmaterial  errors—defined as errors that did not impact whether or not a lead was  assigned to a field office for investigation, such as analysts not correctly  recording information included in the leads, like nonimmigrants’  identification numbers. This internal audit program can help CTCEU  determine the extent to which it is correctly identifying viable overstay  leads for investigation, and according to the audit program’s concept  document, is intended to help ensure that the CTCEU lead review process  functions effectively. However, this program does not help ICE assess the  extent to which the leads it identifies as viable for investigation ultimately  result in an enforcement outcome, such as arrests. From fiscal years 2004  through 2010, 23 percent of leads investigated by ICE field offices resulted  in arrests; the other 77 percent of leads resulted in a finding of departed,  in-status, or all leads exhausted. CTCEU officials stated that there are  various reasons that leads do not result in an arrest. For example, officials  said that databases used to verify leads may not have the most current  information, such as a petition for an immigration benefit. ICE officials  also stated that it can be difficult to locate overstays in cases when there is  not a last known address, as overstays can move to other locations.
Internal control standards require that agencies develop control activities  as an integral part of planning, implementing, reviewing, and  accountability for stewardship of government resources and achieving  effective results. Control activities can include, for example, establishing  and reviewing performance measures and indicators. While CTCEU does  not have such performance measures, US-VISIT—which performs a  similar function to CTCEU by providing overstay leads for investigation— has established an outcome measure based on the credibility rate of its  leads becoming investigative cases. Specifically, US-VISIT measures the  percentage of suspected overstay leads it forwards to CTCEU that are  currently in the United States and have overstayed their authorized  periods of admission, based on the information in the databases US-VISIT  checks at the time of its review of those leads. US-VISIT officials stated  they have found establishing this performance measure beneficial because  it provides them with information that is helpful for improving the quality  of its analyses to identify overstay leads. US-VISIT officials also stated that  the credibility rate is helpful for training its analysts in areas where  consistent errors were made, such as in reviewing refugee and asylee  benefits information. CTCEU collects data on the results of its overstay  investigations, such as the number of arrests resulting from leads sent to  field offices for investigation, but does not use this type of information to  assess the quality of its leads because it had not identified doing so as  necessary. By using data such as this to assess the quality of its leads  against performance measures and monitoring the results of those  measures, CTCEU could obtain information to adjust its approach in  identifying and assigning leads, thereby strengthening its overall overstay  investigative efforts.
Addressing US-VISIT’s Backlog of Potential Overstay Records  US-VISIT has a backlog of several hundred thousand unreviewed  nonpriority in-country overstay leads, which could impede US-VISIT’s  efforts to identify possible overstay leads for CTCEU to investigate. At the  end of fiscal year 2009, US-VISIT reported a total backlog of about 959,000  in-country overstay leads, and program officials attributed this backlog to  resource constraints and US-VISIT’s focus on reviewing leads that meet  ICE’s investigative priorities. The conference report accompanying the  fiscal year 2010 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act  noted congressional concerns regarding this backlog, stating that the  backlog in overstay records was troubling and represented a major  vulnerability. In response to this concern, DHS reprogrammed $5 million  from fiscal year 2009 to help address these backlogged leads, and US-VISIT  officials reported processing approximately 587,000 of the backlogged  leads in fiscal year 2010. However, as of January 2011, US-VISIT computer  systems identified having a backlog of 1.6 million potential overstay  records. According to US-VISIT officials, the 1.6 million potential overstay  records include prior nonpriority overstay leads that have not yet been  reviewed, nonpriority leads that continue to accrue on a daily basis, and  leads generated in error as a result of CBP system changes. Specifically,  CBP system changes resulted in multiple arrival or departure records  being inadvertently created for a single individual. US-VISIT officials  stated that they are currently in the process of addressing the impact of  these CBP system changes by working with CBP to prevent multiple  records from inadvertently being created in the Arrival and Departure  Information System, which can subsequently cause some overstay leads to  be generated in error. As of December 2010, US-VISIT was considering  ways to improve the efficiency of its current operations so that it can  process the remaining backlogged leads once its reprogrammed funds are  fully expended by, for example, increasing the required number of leads  contractors review. However, according to US-VISIT officials, as of  February 2011, the unit had spent $3.7 million of the $5 million in  reprogrammed funds and would not be able to prevent further backlogged  leads from accumulating without additional resources.
These four challenges—unreliable collection of departure data at POEs,  Student and Exchange Visitor Information System database limitations,  lack of mechanisms for assessing the quality of leads that CTCEU sends to  the field offices for investigation, and US-VISIT’s backlog in analyzing  potential overstay leads—hinder DHS’s efforts to identify possible  overstays in the United States for investigation by ICE. They also impede  DHS from annually reporting overstay estimates and overstay rates, as  required by statute. Specifically, by statute, DHS is required to submit an  annual report to Congress providing numerical estimates of the number of  aliens from each country in each nonimmigrant classification who  overstayed an authorized period of admission that expired during the  fiscal year prior to the year for which the report is made. DHS officials  stated that the department has not provided Congress annual overstay  estimates regularly since 1994 because officials do not have sufficient  confidence in the quality of the department’s overstay data—which is  maintained and generated by US-VISIT. As a result, DHS officials stated  that the department cannot reliably report overstay rates in accordance  with the statute. Further, by statute DHS is to determine a disqualification  rate for each country that participated in the VWP during the previous  fiscal year—that is the percentage of a VWP country’s nationals who  applied for admission under the program during the previous fiscal year  who were denied admission at the time of arrival (including those allowed  to withdraw their application for admission at the POE or violated the  terms of their admission, which would include overstaying the 90-day  period of admission. According to statute, if DHS determines that a VWP  country’s disqualification rate is between 2 and 3.5 percent, the country is  to be placed in probationary status for no more than two full fiscal years,  with termination as a program country to follow if the rate continues to be  2 percent or more. If DHS determines that the disqualification rate is 3.5  percent or more, the country’s designation as a VWP country is to be  terminated at the beginning of the second fiscal year following the fiscal  year in which the determination is made. Because DHS is not reporting  overstay rates for countries participating in the VWP, decision makers do  not have complete information for determining policy for probation or  removal of countries from the program. In September 2008, we  recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of Homeland  Security designate an office with responsibility for developing overstay  rate information for the purpose of monitoring countries’ compliance with  the statutory requirements of the VWP, and direct that office and other  DHS components to explore cost-effective actions to further improve the  reliability of overstay data. DHS stated that it was taking steps to  implement these recommendations through actions such as working with  airlines to improve the completeness of data collection.
section_title: Broadening the Scope of Electronic Lookouts in Federal Information Systems Could Enhance Overstay Information Sharing
subsections: section_title: DHS Uses Various Mechanisms and Alerts to Provide Overstay Information to Federal, State, and Local Agencies
paragraphs: DHS has established a variety of mechanisms to share immigration  information—including information pertaining to overstays—among its  component entities and with other federal, state, and local agencies. We  have previously reported on the importance of effectively sharing  information between different agencies and across levels of government,  and in 2008 DHS acknowledged that the department continued to face  barriers in this area. Responsibility for administering and enforcing the  nation’s immigration policies is divided between various components  within DHS and across the federal government, and state and local law  enforcement agencies can request immigration status information from  ICE on nonimmigrants they encounter, including whether those  nonimmigrants are overstays.
DHS has taken several steps to provide its component entities and other  federal agencies with information to identify and take enforcement action  on overstays. Whereas some of these mechanisms are designed  specifically to share overstay information, other mechanisms are broader  in scope but also communicate information that can be used to support  federal overstay identification and enforcement efforts. Table 4 provides  information about these information sharing activities.
With regard to the use of biometric and biographic lookouts, US-VISIT’s  efforts to share information about out-of-country overstays have  contributed to State Department and CBP actions to deny out-of-country  overstays new visas and prevent their return to the United States. In  particular, since fiscal year 2006, US-VISIT reported that the State  Department has refused 3,250 visa applications from applicants who had  overstay lookouts created by US-VISIT, and CBP has refused admission to  3,960 overstay violators applying for admission to the United States at  POEs who had US-VISIT overstay lookouts on their records.  Furthermore, as shown in figure 7, the number of applicants who had US- VISIT overstay lookouts on their records who were refused a visa or POE  admission has generally increased each fiscal year since 2006. US-VISIT  officials attributed this increase to the fact that the cumulative number of  lookouts is increasing as new lookouts are created, thus expanding the  population of overstays that could potentially be caught each year as a  result of overstay lookouts.
Electronic lookouts are one of the primary mechanisms DHS uses to share  information about out-of-country overstays, but the current scope of the  population to which these lookouts are assigned does not include certain  categories of overstays, such as those who overstay by less than 90 days.  We have previously reported on the importance of information sharing in a  variety of contexts, and internal control standards call for agencies to  communicate pertinent information to internal and external stakeholders  so that people can perform their duties efficiently. Similarly, DHS has  identified fostering information sharing as a core mission of the  department, and in 2007 the Secretary of DHS issued a memorandum  emphasizing that DHS personnel must have timely access to all relevant  information they need to perform their duties. Biometric and biographic  overstay lookouts immediately alert CBP’s primary inspection officers at  POEs—who generally have approximately 2 to 3 minutes to make  admissions decisions—of a nonimmigrant’s history as an overstay violator,  at which point the officer can refer the nonimmigrant to secondary  inspection for a more in-depth review of the alien’s record and  admissibility. Although CBP can, and does, identify overstays without  lookouts through other means during the inspection process—including  interviewing the subject and reviewing arrival and departure data in  information systems or in the subject’s passport—CBP officials stated that  overstay lookouts reduce the risk that overstays could be missed during  the inspection process. Furthermore, in its fiscal year 2011 budget request,  DHS credited the use of overstay lookouts as helping to increase the  number of adverse actions taken against overstays at POEs and overseas  consular offices. However, DHS does not create lookouts for the following  two categories of overstays: (1) temporary visitors who were admitted to  the United States using nonimmigrant business and pleasure visas and  subsequently overstayed by 90 days or less; and (2) suspected in-country  overstays who CTCEU deems not to be a priority for investigation in terms  of being most likely to pose a threat to national security or public safety.
US-VISIT is the primary entity responsible for creating biometric and  biographic lookouts for suspected out-of-country overstays who were  admitted to the United States using nonimmigrant business and pleasure  visas. According to US-VISIT officials, the decision to focus US-VISIT’s  efforts on nonimmigrants who overstayed their authorized period of  admission under these visas by greater than 90 days was reached in  accordance with its customers—CBP and the State Department—in 2006  in order to focus lookout creation on more egregious overstay violators.  Specifically, CBP officials stated that 90 days was selected as the threshold  for lookout creation based on the agency’s sense that nonimmigrants  suspected of overstaying by more than 90 days were more likely to  eventually be confirmed as overstays than nonimmigrants whose arrival  and departure records indicated they had overstayed by 90 days or less.
Consequently, US-VISIT does not review the records of, nor create  overstay lookouts for, nonimmigrants who were admitted to the country  using business and pleasure visas and subsequently overstayed by 90 days  or less. According to US-VISIT, a total of 570 nonimmigrant records fell  into this category of overstays in fiscal years 2007 through 2010 and were  not subject to review by US-VISIT for lookout creation. Although U.S. law  does not automatically bar aliens who overstayed their authorized period  of admission by 90 days or less from returning to the United States, their  ability to be admitted on a subsequent visit to the United States is up to the  discretion of CBP. As of January 2011, US-VISIT, CBP, and State  Department officials reported that there have been no discussions  between their agencies about revising the 90-day threshold for creating  overstay lookouts since the original decision to establish this parameter  was reached in 2006. According to US-VISIT officials, if the decision was  made to do so, reviewing new records from this particular category of out- of-country overstays would be expected to result in a small increase in the  number of overstay records US-VISIT would be responsible for reviewing  each day. For example, incorporating the fiscal year 2010 out-of-country  overstay records of 90 days or less from this nonimmigrant visa class  would have resulted in US-VISIT reviewing approximately one additional  overstay record each day.
In addition to this category of aliens who overstayed by 90 days or less  before departing, other categories of suspected in-country overstays also  do not have lookouts assigned to their records. Specifically, neither  CTCEU nor US-VISIT posts lookouts for nonimmigrants who are identified  as suspected in-country overstays but who CTCEU deems not to be a  priority for investigation in terms of being most likely to pose a threat to  national security or public safety. CTCEU forwards these nonpriority leads  to ERO, and according to CTCEU officials the decision not to create  lookouts for these suspected overstays stems from concerns about the  amount of resources and time that would be required to create and  maintain the lookouts, as well as to respond to inquiries about the  lookouts from other DHS components (e.g., CBP). Alternatively, US- VISIT officials reported that US-VISIT could potentially create lookouts for  the nonpriority overstay leads that it sends to CTCEU, many of which are  subsequently included in the leads forwarded to ERO. However, the  officials said that US-VISIT would need additional personnel in order to be  able to also create lookouts for these records. In the meantime, if the  subjects of the leads that CTCEU currently sends to ERO depart the  United States via an air or sea POE, their departure would be recorded in  the Arrival and Departure Information System and transmitted to US- VISIT, which would then be responsible for creating out-of-country  overstay lookouts for the aliens. Conversely, if any of these nonimmigrants  depart the country by land and do not turn in their I-94/I-94W form to  record their departure, US-VISIT would not receive their record from the  Arrival and Departure Information System as a potential new out-of- country overstay. As a result, if these nonimmigrants try to apply for a new  visa or for admission to the country in the future, they would not have  overstay lookouts on their records to help alert the State Department or  CBP officials about their previous violation. Nevertheless, it is still  possible that the State Department and CBP could determine that these  nonimmigrants had previously overstayed their authorized periods of  admission by, for example, conducting database searches before  determining whether to issue new visas or allow the nonimmigrants into  the United States.
CBP Office of Field Operations officials reported that having lookouts  created for out-of-country visa overstay violations of 90 days or less and  for in-country overstay leads that are sent to ERO could help CBP officers  more effectively identify these overstay violators during any future  attempts to gain admission to the United States. Similarly, officials from 9  of 12 POEs we visited reported that it would be beneficial to have lookouts  created for these categories of overstays, and officials from two of the  other POEs we visited stated that creating these lookouts could potentially  be beneficial depending on the extent to which they contain detailed  information about the factors that establish that the aliens are overstays.  Nevertheless, although the CBP Office of Field Operations officials we  spoke with expressed interest in having lookouts created for these  categories of overstays, they stated that any decision to create these  lookouts would also need to be weighed against potential costs that may  be involved. For example, in the case of lookouts for non-VWP overstays  of less than 90 days, there may be a risk that travelers could unnecessarily  be referred to secondary inspection only to have CBP discover that they  had a legitimate reason to overstay by a few days. Likewise, in the case of  in-country overstay leads that are sent to ERO, since these leads are not  manually reviewed by CTCEU, there is an increased likelihood that  lookouts based on these leads could be inaccurate, which could result in  travelers unnecessarily being referred to secondary inspection. State  Department officials we spoke with were unsure of the extent to which  creating lookouts for these categories of overstays could provide added  value to its visa adjudication process, and stated they would need to  communicate with DHS about the potential benefits and costs associated  with taking this step in order to determine if it would be beneficial.
Being aware that an alien has previously committed an overstay violation  is necessary if CBP is to accurately determine whether or not the violator  should be re-admitted to the United States. Creating lookouts for these  additional categories of overstays would help to alert CBP to these aliens’  overstay history, thereby better positioning the agency to accurately  identify these aliens as overstays and to incorporate this information into  future admissibility decisions involving these nonimmigrants. For  example, CBP officials at two POEs we visited stated that creating  lookouts for these two categories of overstays would provide another  layer of security in targeting overstays and would help to lessen the  burden on primary inspection officers attempting to identify overstays  seeking to gain admission to the country. Furthermore, to the extent these  expanded lookouts help CBP identify overstays encountered at POEs, the  lookouts could also help improve CBP’s ability to take enforcement action  against these overstays, including denying them the opportunity to be  admitted to the country and to overstay again. Additionally, officials from  three POEs we visited reported that including these overstays on US- VISIT’s biometric watch list would help CBP inspection officers positively  identify overstays regardless of any efforts taken by the aliens to conceal  their violations, such as through the use of fraudulent documents or  backdated passport stamps. Although CBP Office of Field Operations  officials told us that creating lookouts for these categories of overstays  would likely be beneficial and could help to reduce the risk that overstays  could be missed during inspections, they acknowledged that expanding  the scope of overstay lookouts in this manner could also produce  unintended costs, such as nonimmigrants being unnecessarily referred to  secondary inspection. According to these officials, CBP has not performed  an assessment to determine if the benefits of creating these new lookouts  would outweigh the potential costs, nor does the agency have plans to  conduct this type of assessment. Conducting such an assessment could  help CBP determine the benefits that could be gained from the creation of  lookouts for these categories of overstays relative to the costs, such as the  use of additional resources, which could result from creating the lookouts.
section_title: CBP Inspection Officers Face Challenges in Obtaining Information from USCIS to Address Overstays, but USCIS Has Long-Term Plans to Help Address These Challenges
paragraphs: USCIS provides immigration status information to federal agencies  responsible for identifying and addressing overstays, but CBP officials  from 9 of 12 POEs we visited reported facing challenges on some  occasions obtaining information from USCIS. The ability to access USCIS’s  information about pending or authorized changes to nonimmigrants’ status  or the length of their stay in the United States is particularly important to  agencies seeking to identify and address overstays, and can alter their  determination of whether an alien has committed an overstay violation.  For example, if USCIS approves a change of status or extension of stay for  a nonimmigrant, the alien may be authorized to remain in the country  beyond his or her original period of admission without qualifying as an  overstay. Likewise, nonimmigrants who have submitted a timely  application to change their status or extend their stay do not accrue  unlawful presence while their application is pending, and can be allowed  to remain in the United States beyond their original period of admission  until their case has been adjudicated by USCIS. As a result, even in  instances where an alien’s arrival and departure dates indicate that an  overstay violation has occurred, checking the alien’s record with USCIS  may show that the alien was authorized to remain in the United States  beyond his or her original period of admission.
Given the importance of this information for correctly identifying  overstays, being able to access timely, current, and accurate information  from USCIS about an alien’s immigration status and applications for  immigration benefits is important for federal agencies conducting overstay  enforcement activities. USCIS has identified ineffective information  sharing with its government partners as one of the agency’s challenges,  and has previously acknowledged that information it shares with other  agencies is sometimes difficult to obtain, incomplete, or not current. In  order to help share information with other agencies, USCIS has granted  several agencies—including CBP, ICE, the State Department, and officials  from US-VISIT—access to select USCIS databases to allow these agencies  to search for and view various immigration records, such as nonimmigrant  applications for extensions of stay or changes of status. In particular,  USCIS officials identified the Computer-Linked Application Information  Management System 3 and the Central Index System as the primary USCIS  databases containing information relevant to identifying overstays. Also,  in 2007 USCIS deployed the Person Centric Query Service, which helps to  streamline the process of searching for information in USCIS’s databases  by enabling users to search multiple databases with a single query.
However, officials we interviewed at CBP, ICE, and the State Department  reported overall mixed views about their ability to obtain information  from USCIS in order to make timely and accurate immigration status  determinations. Although officials from the State Department and the ICE  field offices we visited did not generally raise concerns about their ability  to obtain information from USCIS for the purpose of taking enforcement  action against overstays, CBP officials at some of the POEs we visited  reported experiencing challenges on some occasions with obtaining the  information they need from USCIS for the purpose of identifying overstays  encountered at POEs. In particular, officials at 9 of the 12 POEs described  challenges they have encountered in trying to search for and locate  records in USCIS’s databases, and officials at 5 of the 12 POEs described  instances where it has been challenging to contact USCIS directly for  assistance with questions about an alien’s immigration status or to obtain  information maintained in the alien’s A-File. According to CBP officials, in  instances where CBP officers are unable to obtain, or are otherwise  delayed in receiving the information they need from USCIS to determine  the admissibility of a suspected overstay, CBP officials may find it  necessary to defer the alien’s inspection or make an admission decision  based only on the information available to them at the time.
Despite USCIS having an electronic information sharing infrastructure in  place, several challenges prevent CBP officials from being able to obtain  all of the information they need from USCIS by searching its electronic  databases alone. In particular, USCIS’s operating processes are paper  based, which can result in some application and other case information  not being captured electronically, and thus not being available to officials  from other agencies searching USCIS’s databases. According to USCIS  officials we interviewed, the extent to which application information is  captured electronically in the agency’s databases varies between different  types of benefit applications. Whereas some forms contain a limited  number of fields that are not available to be viewed electronically, there  are other types of applications—such as Form I-290B, which is used to  appeal USCIS adjudication decisions—for which the entire application  form is not captured electronically and can only be viewed in hard copy.
Additionally, USCIS officials stated that the Computer-Linked Application  Information Management System 3 can be a difficult system for users from  outside of the agency to navigate, and they stated that in some cases  external users may not know how to effectively use the system to locate  information. For example, USCIS’s systems are event-based rather than  account-based, which, according to USCIS officials, can result in different  records about the same nonimmigrant (e.g., from multiple applications)  not being automatically linked together in USCIS’s databases.  Consequently, external officials may have to run several queries to  assemble all information for a nonimmigrant, and if any of the  nonimmigrant’s records are not located during this process the requesting  entity may not have access to all of the information needed to make an  accurate immigration enforcement decision. Although USCIS officials told  us that the introduction of the Person Centric Query Service in recent  years has helped to improve the ability of external users to search for  information in USCIS’s databases, USCIS does not consider this capability  to be a final solution to its information sharing challenges. Instead, in  order to address these and other challenges, in 2007 USCIS initiated a  project to transform its operating processes and data systems.
Among other things, the USCIS Transformation Program is designed to  help the agency move away from its current paper-based process to an  electronic environment, and it is expected to result in the development of  a new information system that will eventually replace the Computer- Linked Application Information Management System. USCIS plans to  begin implementing portions of the new information system in late 2011,  and estimates that full implementation of the Transformation Program will  be completed by fiscal year 2014. Although USCIS expects the  Transformation Program to improve its ability to share information with  other agencies, it is too early to tell what impact the program will have on  strengthening CBP’s ability to obtain information from USCIS regarding  nonimmigrants’ immigration status or applications for changes in status or  other benefits. We have ongoing work assessing USCIS’s transformation  efforts for the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate  Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and plan to  report on these efforts later this year.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Identifying and taking enforcement action to address the estimated 4  million to 5.5 million foreign visitors who are estimated to have entered  the United States legally but then overstayed is a daunting task. Given the  government’s finite resources for addressing overstays, competing  priorities, and the magnitude of the estimated overstay population, it is  particularly important that DHS overstay enforcement programs utilize  leading program management practices to plan and execute overstay  programs and effectively assess program results so that corrective actions  can be taken if necessary. By establishing a time frame for assessing the  funding and resources ERO would require to assume some responsibility  for enforcement of civil nonpriority overstay violators and utilizing  assessment findings, as appropriate, ICE could strengthen its planning  efforts for executing its overstay enforcement activities moving forward.  In addition, by establishing mechanisms to measure the outcomes of  programs intended to address overstays in accordance with leading  practices for performance management, CTCEU program managers could  have more specific information with which to make informed decisions as  to what program adjustments might be necessary, if any, to maximize  program effectiveness.
Identifying overstays is challenging, particularly given that, in the absence  of biometric departure data, DHS must rely on biographic information to  do so. As DHS’s ability to accurately identify overstays is largely  dependent on the quality of the alien arrival and departure data CBP  collects, it is important that CBP take steps to ensure these data are as  reliable as possible. By establishing a mechanism to collect biographic I- 94/I-94W exit documentation at land POEs to the extent that benefits  outweigh costs, CBP could better ensure the completeness of alien  departure data. Also, the reliability of leads sent to field offices is  important because ICE has limited resources to investigate a large  population of overstays. By developing and using performance measures  to assess the quality of overstay leads, CTCEU’s process for validating  leads could improve and commensurately focus ICE field office resources  on more promising overstay investigations. DHS’s ability to share  information between the many governmental entities involved in  administering the nation’s immigration laws also has an impact on the  effectiveness of its efforts to identify and take enforcement action against  overstays. Although the department has established various mechanisms  to share immigration information, expanding the scope of overstay  lookouts could improve CBP’s ability to identify overstays during the  inspection process, and by extension, better position it to take  enforcement action to address overstay violators attempting to re-enter  the United States.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ICE’s execution of overstay enforcement efforts; and improve  assessment of ICE programs that identify and address overstays so that  program adjustments can be made, if necessary; we recommend that the  Assistant Secretary of Immigration and Customs Enforcement take the  following three actions:    establish a target time frame for assessing the funding and resources ERO  would require in order to assume responsibility for civil overstay  enforcement and use the results of that assessment;    develop outcome-based performance measures—or proxy measures if  program outcomes cannot be captured—and associated targets on  CTCEU’s progress in preventing terrorists and other criminals from  exploiting the nation’s immigration system; and    develop a performance measure for assessing the quality of leads CTCEU  assigns to ICE field offices for investigations, using performance  information already collected by CTCEU.
To increase the completeness of exit information available for the purpose  of identifying overstays, we recommend that the Commissioner of  Customs and Border Protection analyze the costs and benefits of  developing a standard mechanism for collecting I-94/I-94W forms at land  POEs, and develop a standard mechanism to collect these forms, to the  extent that benefits outweigh the costs.
To improve information sharing in support of efforts to identify and take  enforcement action against overstays, we recommend that the Secretary of  Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border  Protection, the Under Secretary of the National Protection and Programs  Directorate, and the Assistant Secretary of Immigration and Customs  Enforcement to assess the costs and benefits of creating biometric and  biographic lookouts for (1) out-of-country overstays of 90 days or less who  entered the country using nonimmigrant business and pleasure visas, and  (2) in-country overstay leads sent to ERO, and create these lookouts, to  the extent that the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS and the State Department for  their review and comment. On April 11, 2011, we received written  comments on the draft report from DHS, which are reproduced in full in  appendix III. DHS concurred with our five recommendations and  described actions under way or planned to address them. DHS also  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
With regard to our first recommendation that ICE establish a target time  frame for assessing the funding and resources ERO would require in order  to assume responsibility for civil overstay enforcement and use the results  of that assessment, DHS stated that ICE is in the process of planning for  ERO to assume this responsibility. Specifically, DHS stated that ICE will  identify the resources needed to transition this responsibility to ERO as  part of the Fiscal Year 2013 Resource Allocation Plan. We believe that  setting a target time for completing funding and resource assessment  efforts would help ICE hold its staff accountable for completing these  efforts. With regard to our second recommendation that ICE develop  outcome-based performance measures or proxy measures and associated  targets for assessing CTCEU’s progress in preventing exploitation of the  nation’s immigration system, DHS stated that ICE plans to consult with  DHS’s national security partners to determine if proxy measures can be  implemented. Establishing performance measures or proxy measures  should help strengthen ICE’s overstay enforcement efforts and assessment  of ICE programs that identify and address overstays.
With regard to our third recommendation that ICE develop a performance  measure for assessing the quality of leads CTCEU assigns to ICE field  offices for investigations, DHS stated that, while the department  concurred with the recommendation, CTCEU disagreed with our  assessment that the metric it uses to assess the quality of overstay leads— a sampling of 1 percent of daily leads to correct deficient information and  determine if additional training is needed to correct repetitive errors—is  not sufficient to assess the quality of leads. CTCEU stated that one of the  challenges to developing a metric is that it has to rely on information from  other DHS components to formulate leads, and when that information  becomes more reliable and accurate, CTCEU’s leads should also become  more reliable. While we recognize that CTCEU relies on data from various  components to conduct its work and that the quality of its leads is  impacted by the quality of data it uses to formulate them, we continue to  believe that CTCEU could benefit from using information that it already  collects through its sampling process to assess the quality of its leads  against performance measures and monitoring the results of those  measures. Through such assessment and monitoring, we believe CTCEU  could obtain information to adjust its approach in identifying and  assigning leads, as needed, to strengthen its overall overstay enforcement  efforts.
To address our fourth recommendation, that CBP analyze the costs and  benefits of developing a standard mechanism for collecting I-94/I-94W  forms at land POEs, CBP proposed the completion of a cost effective  independent evaluation. CBP also noted that different operating  environments may render a standard mechanism for collecting I-94/I-94W  forms inefficient. We recognize that different operating environments can  effect the efficient collection of these forms, as we have reported, and  believe this would be an important consideration in such an evaluation.  Finally, DHS stated that in response to our fifth recommendation to assess  the costs and benefits of creating biometric and biographic lookouts for  out-of-country overstays of 90 days or less and in-country overstay leads  sent to ERO, that ICE, CBP, and the National Protection and Programs  Directorate will work together to assess the costs and benefits of creating  lookouts for these categories of overstays, and that the results of this  assessment will be used to determine the feasibility of additional program  costs.
The State Department did not have formal comments on our draft report,  but provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Secretaries of Homeland Security and State, selected congressional  committees, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8777, or StanaR@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which federal agencies take actions to address  overstays, we analyzed program documentation, collected data, and  interviewed officials from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  and its components, including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement  (ICE); U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services (USCIS); and the United States Visitor and  Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program(US-VISIT); and the State  Department. In particular, we analyzed ICE documentation, such as  standard operating procedures, memos, and guidance for investigations, to  determine the goals, programs, processes, and systems ICE has  established for the purpose of taking enforcement action against  suspected overstays located within the United States. We also interviewed  ICE officials from the Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit  (CTCEU) and Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) headquarters,  and conducted site visits to six ICE Homeland Security Investigations  Special Agent in Charge field offices (located in Seattle, Washington; Los  Angeles, California; San Diego, California; Miami, Florida; New York, New  York; and Newark, New Jersey). We selected these locations based on (1)  the range in the number of overstays investigations completed by the  offices from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2010; (2) the offices’  geographic location; and (3) the offices’ proximity to CBP ports of entry  (POE) we visited. While the information we obtained from officials at  these locations cannot be generalized across all 26 Special Agent in Charge  field offices, the visits provided us with the perspectives of ICE officials  responsible for conducting overstay investigations, including their views  on the processes ICE has established for conducting and overseeing these  investigations and any challenges they have faced in investigating overstay  cases. We also assessed the extent to which CTCEU’s program practices  were consistent with standard practices for program management and  GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.
Further, we obtained and analyzed data from ICE’s system for tracking  overstay leads on the results of CTCEU’s overstay investigations from  fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2010. In addition, we determined the  extent to which Homeland Security Investigations dedicates investigative  resources to overstay investigations by analyzing data on investigative  hours by case category for fiscal years 2006 through 2010. We assessed  the reliability of these data by (1) reviewing existing documentation and  documentation we collected on the controls in the systems and the  policies for ensuring data reliability; and (2) interviewing agency officials  who are familiar with the source of the data and internal controls built into  ICE’s systems, as well as the quality assurance steps performed after data  are entered into the systems. We determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report.
Moreover, we analyzed documentation, such as field office manuals and  program memos, regarding enforcement actions taken by CBP and the  State Department against out-of-country overstays attempting to be  admitted to the United States or apply for a new visa. We also interviewed  officials from the CBP Office of Field Operations and the State  Department Bureau of Consular Affairs to identify the types of actions  taken against overstays by these agencies and the circumstances in which  these actions occur. We analyzed data provided by CBP on POE  inadmissibilities, and the State Department on visa refusals, in order to  quantify the results of actions taken by each agency against overstays from  fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2010. We assessed the reliability of the  data provided by CBP and the State Department by interviewing agency  officials who are familiar with the data systems and the processes used to  collect, record, and analyze the data. We determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report.
To determine the extent to which DHS identifies overstays and shares  overstay information among its components and with federal, state, and  local agencies, we analyzed the processes DHS uses to (1) evaluate  suspected overstay records, (2) collect nonimmigrant arrival and  departure information, and (3) share information on overstays among its  component entities and with other federal, state, and local agencies. As  part of our effort to evaluate these processes, we compared the processes  established by DHS to criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government. Furthermore, we reviewed US-VISIT and CTCEU  program documentation—such as standard operating procedures and  guidelines for evaluating overstay records—and analyzed data on the  number of overstays identified and overstay leads processed by US-VISIT  from fiscal years 2005 through 2010 and by CTCEU from fiscal years 2004  through 2010. We assessed the reliability of the data provided by US-VISIT  and CTCEU by reviewing documentation on the data systems’ controls  and specifications, and interviewing US-VISIT and CTCEU officials who  are familiar with the data systems. We determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report.
Further, we interviewed officials from US-VISIT, CTCEU, and the DHS  Office of Immigration Statistics about the processes and systems used to  analyze nonimmigrant arrival and departure information and other  immigration records for the purpose of identifying overstays. We also  interviewed officials at CBP Office of Field Operations headquarters and  conducted site visits to three land POEs (located in Blaine, Washington;  San Ysidro, California; and Otay Mesa, California), four sea POEs (located  in Seattle, Washington; Los Angeles/Long Beach, California; Miami,  Florida; and Newark, New Jersey/New York, New York), and five air POEs  (located in Seattle, Washington; Los Angeles, California; Miami, Florida;  Newark, New Jersey; and New York, New York) in order to observe, and  obtain officials’ views on, the processes and systems used by CBP to  inspect passengers and collect nonimmigrant arrival and departure  information. We selected these locations based on (1) the presence of  multiple types of POEs (land, sea, or air) in close proximity to each other;  (2) the locations being geographically dispersed to include POEs on the  eastern and western coasts, as well as on the northern and southern land  borders; and (3) the locations being in close proximity to ICE Homeland  Security Investigations field offices we visited. Additionally, to assess  DHS’s efforts to share overstay information, we reviewed program  documentation from US-VISIT, ICE, and USCIS about applicable  information sharing activities and interviewed officials from different  agencies involved in sharing or receiving overstay information about the  results of these activities. In particular, we interviewed officials from US- VISIT, ICE, and USCIS to obtain the perspective of agencies responsible  for sharing overstay-related information. Likewise, we also interviewed  State Department officials from the Bureau of Consular Affairs and CBP  officials from the Office of Field Operations headquarters and at the POEs  we visited to obtain the view of agencies responsible for using the shared  information to take enforcement action against out-of-country overstays.  Although we cannot generalize the information obtained during the site  visits to the experience of CBP officials at all POEs, these visits provided  us with valuable perspectives on the mechanisms DHS uses to share  information about overstays and the processes CBP uses to inspect  travelers and collect nonimmigrant information at POEs.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2010 through April  2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Department of Homeland Security Identification of Overstays
paragraphs: The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology  Program (US-VISIT) is the primary Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) entity responsible for identifying visa and Visa Waiver Program  (VWP) nonimmigrant overstays. As of November 2010, US-VISIT had 42  government positions and 76 contractor positions responsible for  identifying nonimmigrant overstays based on nonimmigrants’ arrival and  departure information collected by DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) at ports of entry (POE) and contained in the Arrival and  Departure Information System database, a repository of biometric and  biographic information maintained by US-VISIT. Using this database, US- VISIT identifies both in-country and out-of-country overstays.
subsections: section_title: US-VISIT Identification of In-Country Overstays
paragraphs: To identify in-country overstays, US-VISIT first uses the Arrival and  Departure Information System to generate an automated report that  identifies nonimmigrants whose period of authorized admission has  elapsed but for whom there is no departure record in the Arrival and  Departure Information System. US-VISIT conducts automated and manual  searches of 13 databases for information indicating that any of the  remaining suspected overstays have left the country, have been granted an  adjustment of status, or have a legitimate reason for staying longer than  their authorized periods of admission (e.g., if the person has been granted  asylum status). All suspected overstay leads that do not have records  indicating that the suspected overstays have left the country or that  indicate that they otherwise may remain in the country due to, for  example, a change in status, are sent to the ICE Counterterrorism and  Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) for further verification. US-VISIT  cannot conclusively confirm that the leads it provides to ICE are overstays  because some information in the various databases it searches may be  incorrect, out-of-date, or missing. To positively identify overstays, ICE  must conduct further review and investigations.
As shown in table 5, from fiscal years 2005 through 2010, US-VISIT  analyzed over 5 million leads and sent over 79,000 leads to CTCEU for  further review.
section_title: US-VISIT Identification of Out-of-Country Overstays
paragraphs: To identify out-of-country overstays, US-VISIT conducts manual and  automated analyses similar to the processes for identifying in-country  overstays, as shown in figure 8.
Generally, the Arrival and Departure Information System identifies  potential out-of-country overstays and then US-VISIT analysts verify the  status of the suspected overstays through checking information in various  databases. If through this verification process an analyst determines that a  suspected overstay’s actual departure date exceeds his or her authorized  departure date by more than 90 days for nonimmigrant visa holders or by 7  or more days for nonimmigrants traveling under the VWP, the analyst  creates an electronic lookout on the nonimmigrant’s record to notify  federal officials that he or she previously overstayed. CBP officers use the  lookout to help determine whether the nonimmigrant is eligible for  readmission to the United States, and State Department consular officials  use this information to help determine whether the nonimmigrant is  eligible for a future visa. From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, US-VISIT  created lookouts for about 53,000 suspected of-out-country overstays.
section_title: CTCEU Identification of In-Country Overstay Leads
paragraphs: CTCEU is responsible for identifying and validating overstay leads to be  investigated by the ICE Homeland Security Investigations field offices. At  the beginning of fiscal year 2011, CTCEU had 50 contract analyst and 17  government, including supervisory, positions dedicated to identifying  leads. CTCEU conducts analysis subsequent to that performed by US- VISIT to identify additional in-country overstays and verify overstay leads  provided US-VISIT. Specifically, CTCEU analyzes (1) in-country visa  overstay leads provided by US-VISIT, (2) in-country VWP overstay leads  provided by US-VISIT, (3) out-of-status students identified in the Student  and Exchange Visitor Information System, and (4) overstay leads based on  data collected from the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System.  CTCEU analysts compare records from these four sources against records  in other databases that contain information on, for example,  nonimmigrants’ applications to change status, to determine whether  nonimmigrants have overstayed and are likely still present in the United  States. Specifically, CTCEU runs 28 different queries in 15 databases to  identify information pertaining to leads. These databases include the same  ones that US-VISIT reviews to identify any newly updated information as  well as additional databases. During this process, CTCEU removes records  of nonimmigrants that have either left the country or changed their status,  identifies nonpriority leads for processing by ICE Enforcement and  Removal Operations, and sends leads that do not have a viable address to  contractors to continually monitor for new address information. CTCEU  assigns overstay leads deemed to be valid and of high priority to ICE field  office agents within their geographical area of responsibility for  mandatory investigation.
From fiscal years 2004 through 2010, CTCEU processed over 1,373,000  leads and sent over 38,000 leads to field offices for investigation. Table 6  provides information related to the overstay leads that CTCEU has  processed from fiscal years 2004 through 2010.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Rebecca Gambler, Assistant  Director, and Taylor Matheson, analyst-in-charge, managed this  assignment. Jeremy Manion, Zane Seals, and Joshua Wiener made  significant contributions to this work. Amanda Miller assisted with design  and methodology, and Frances Cook provided legal support. Jessica Orr,  Robert Robinson, Debra Sebastian, Sylvia Bascope, Richard Eiserman,  Frederick Lyles, Katherine Trenholme, and Yee Wong assisted with report  preparation.