Counterterrorism: DOD Should Enhance Management of and Reporting on Its Global Train and Equip Program
Published: 2016-04-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The United States has undertaken several efforts, including DOD's Global Train and Equip program, to build the capacity of its foreign partners to counter terrorism. Funding allocated for this program totals $2.3 billion since 2009. DOD and State select projects from proposals that use a standard planning template. Once projects are approved by DOD with concurrence from State, DOD submits congressional notifications that summarize certain aspects of each project.
The fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision for GAO to review the Global Train and Equip Program. This report examines (1) the extent to which DOD considered and documented consideration of key security assistance elements for fiscal year 2015 project proposals, and (2) the results that have been reported on the achievement of project objectives since fiscal year 2009. GAO analyzed agency data and program documents, and interviewed DOD and State officials in Washington, D.C., and at selected combatant commands and embassies.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) officials consistently considered four key security assistance project planning elements for fiscal year 2015 Global Train and Equip project proposals. However, project proposals did not always adhere to federal internal control standards for clearly documenting three of those elements—absorptive capacity, project assessment, and sustainment plans. For example, DOD did not require project proposal packages to document information about the recipient unit's absorptive capacity. In addition, assessments of recipient unit baseline capabilities did not always include all information required by agency guidance to facilitate project assessment. Lastly, 13 of 54 project proposals did not include required estimates of annual sustainment costs. The sharp increase in funding for program activities in fiscal year 2015, as shown in the figure above, heightens the importance of documenting consideration of key planning elements to provide decision makers sufficient information about recipient units' ability to use and sustain assistance. Moreover, incomplete baseline assessments may limit DOD's ability to conduct project assessments to inform future funding decisions.
DOD reporting on Global Train and Equip project assessments has not met statutory deadlines but identifies some progress in building partner nation capabilities. Despite a legal requirement to complete and submit to Congress annual assessments within 90 days of the end of each fiscal year, DOD's fiscal year 2013, 2014, and 2015 assessment reports were submitted up to 21 months late. Untimely reporting may limit decision makers' ability to use assessments to inform future project selection and sustainment decisions. DOD's assessments—which cover 28 percent of funds allocated in fiscal years 2006 through 2013—indicate some progress in building capability to combat terrorism and conduct stability operations. They also identify factors that challenge the achievement of project objectives such as proposal design and interpretation and equipment delivery and procurement. For example, one country received sniper spotting scopes that were too tall for use in a prone position, exposing the spotter.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is making two recommendations to enhance DOD's documentation and management of the Global Train and Equip program and one to ensure timely completion of required assessment reporting to Congress. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, al-Shabaab,  Boko Haram, and al Qaeda and its affiliates threaten the national security  of the United States and its partners. The United States has long  recognized that the diversity and complexity of threats to our national  interest require a collaborative approach, both within the U.S. government  and among allies, partners, and multilateral organizations. A goal of U.S.  security assistance policy, as detailed in Presidential Policy Directive 23  on Security Sector Assistance (PPD 23) is to help partner nations build  sustainable capacity to address challenges such as transnational  threats. Programs to build foreign partner capacity can help partners  confront extremists before such threats require U.S. military intervention.
The United States has undertaken several efforts, including the  Department of Defense’s (DOD) Global Train and Equip program, to build  the capacity of its foreign partners to counter terrorism. Congress  originally authorized a temporary program in fiscal year 2006 and  permanently authorized the program in fiscal year 2015. Since 2009,  DOD has allocated about $2.3 billion through the program to train and  equip partner nation security forces in its efforts to counter terrorism and  support certain military and stability operations.
The fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) included  a provision for GAO to conduct biennial audits of programs conducted  pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2282 for the Global Train and Equip program.  This report examines (1) the extent to which DOD considered and  documented consideration of key security assistance planning elements  for fiscal year 2015 project proposals and (2) the results that have been  reported on the achievement of project objectives since fiscal year 2009.
To address these objectives, we analyzed program guidelines, project  proposal documents, congressional notifications, and fiscal year 2009  through 2015 funding data, including allocations, obligations, and  disbursements. We discussed the project proposal process and key  elements of project planning, documentation, and assessment with  officials from the Departments of State (State) and Defense, relevant  geographic combatant commands, and U.S. embassies in Kenya,  Jordan, and Latvia. We selected these countries based on factors such  as the amount of funds the countries have been allocated, the maturity of  projects, project assessment experience, and geographic distribution. To  assess the extent to which DOD considered and documented  consideration of key elements of security sector assistance for projects  DOD planned to implement in fiscal year 2015, we reviewed PPD 23,  which identified four key elements to be considered for security sector  assistance programs. To determine the extent to which DOD considered  these elements, we interviewed State and DOD officials who develop and  review proposals and reviewed congressional notifications developed  subsequent to agency approval to determine the extent to which those  documents include—and thus imply consideration of—information about  the four key planning elements. To determine the extent to which DOD  requested documentation about and fully documented consideration of  these elements, we analyzed the content of agency guidance and  agency-approved fiscal year 2015 project proposals for their inclusion. To  review the results that DOD has reported on the achievement of project  objectives since fiscal year 2009, we analyzed DOD’s assessment reports  from fiscal years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015. Specifically, we compared  original baseline recipient unit capability and performance levels  assessed at the time the projects were proposed with recipient unit  capability and performance levels assessed following the delivery of  program assistance. We also compared submission dates for each  assessment report to statutory deadlines and reviewed the assessment  reports to identify factors affecting the extent to which project objectives  were achieved. We assessed all data to be sufficiently reliable for the  purpose of this engagement by taking steps such as comparing funding  data to previously published information and interviewing cognizant  agency officials about funding data and project assessments. However,  we did not systematically validate the results included in DOD’s  assessment reports. For more detail on our scope and methodology, see  appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2015 to April 2016 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Evolution and Codification of the Global Train and Equip Authority to Build Foreign Partner Capacity
paragraphs: DOD has used the Global Train and Equip program (“the program”),  originally authorized under Section 1206 of the fiscal year 2006 NDAA  and amended several times thereafter, to build the capacity of foreign  military forces to conduct counterterrorism operations through the  provision of training, equipment, and small-scale military construction  activities. The fiscal year 2015 NDAA permanently authorized the  Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to  conduct programs to (1) build the capacity of a foreign country’s national  military forces to conduct counterterrorism operations or participate in or  support ongoing allied or coalition military or stability operations that  benefit the national security interests of the United States, (2) build the  capacity of a foreign country’s national maritime or border security forces  to conduct counterterrorism operations, and (3) build the capacity of a  foreign country’s national-level security forces that have among their  functional responsibilities a counterterrorism mission in order for such  forces to conduct counterterrorism operations.
section_title: U.S. Security Assistance Policy
paragraphs: Presidential Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance, published  in April 2013, was developed to strengthen the ability of the United States  to help allied and partner nations build their own security capacity. The  document identified principal goals of and guidelines for security sector  assistance that highlight the importance of including the following  elements in project design and execution:  identifying objectives that address partner nation needs; considering partner nation absorptive capacity; integrating assessment, monitoring, and evaluation to provide  policymakers, program managers, and implementers with information  and evidence necessary to make effective decisions and maximize  program outcomes; and anticipating sustainment needs.
DOD’s interagency process for developing and reviewing project  proposals, described in figure 1 below, incorporates these key elements.
section_title: Global Train and Equip Program Management and Project Planning
paragraphs: DOD’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special  Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) is responsible for providing  policy guidance and oversight of the Global Train and Equip program.  During the reporting period covered by this review, SO/LIC coordinated  with State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and other stakeholders in  an interagency process to solicit project proposals annually, in  accordance with guidelines and project proposal instructions that DOD  revises each year to reflect lessons learned, congressional concerns, and  other considerations. Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual framework of  this process, which included developing, reviewing, and selecting project  proposals; notifying Congress; implementing and delivering assistance;  and assessing project results. In practice, different elements of the  proposal development, review, selection, and notification process  occurred simultaneously as proposal submission and review occurred on  a rolling basis and agency-approved projects were notified to Congress in  multiple groups throughout each fiscal year.
DOD and State officials reviewed proposals—approved by the geographic  combatant command and ambassador or chief of mission—and selected  projects to recommend to the Secretaries of Defense and State.  Following approval by the Secretary of Defense, with concurrence from  the Secretary of State, DOD prepared and submitted congressional  notifications for each project it intended to fund through the program.  These notifications summarized project information such as objectives,  the absorptive capacity of the recipient unit, baseline capabilities of the  recipient unit, and arrangements for the project’s sustainment.  Congressional notifications were submitted for each project to the  appropriate congressional committees at least 15 days before initiation of  activities. According to DOD, project implementation did not begin  immediately following the 15-day notification period if additional time was  needed to provide congressional briefings and ensure that the  congressional committees agreed with proposed activities. Following  congressional notification, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency  assumed responsibility for overseeing the obligation of funds for training  and equipment procurement before the end of the relevant fiscal year,  while security assistance officers at U.S. embassies were responsible for  coordinating in-country project implementation. Finally, DOD planned to  conduct assessments of selected projects 6 to 18 months after the  delivery of major project components, to evaluate the extent to which U.S.  assistance had contributed to building recipient unit capabilities.
section_title: Funding for Global Train and Equip Projects
paragraphs: Allocations for activities to be implemented under the Global Train and  Equip authority increased from an average of about $275 million in fiscal  years 2009 through 2014 to $675 million in fiscal year 2015, as shown in  figure 2. Allocations for fiscal year 2015 significantly increased with the  creation of two funding transfer accounts: the Counterterrorism  Partnerships Fund (CTPF) and European Reassurance Initiative (ERI),  both of which were authorized to fund Global Train and Equip projects.  The CTPF is authorized to provide assistance to foreign security forces to  conduct, support, or facilitate counterterrorism and crisis response  activities, and to improve the capacity of the U.S. military to provide  enabling support to counterterrorism and crisis response activities  undertaken by foreign security forces. Congress appropriated $1.3 billion  and $1.1 billion for the CTPF in fiscal years 2015 and 2016, respectively.  ERI funds were appropriated, in part, to provide training, equipment,  logistical supplies, and other services to Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and  Lithuania. Funds were transferred from both the CTPF and ERI accounts  to be obligated for fiscal year 2015 projects.
As seen in figure 3, $272 million of the $675 million, or 40 percent, of  funding for fiscal year 2015 was allocated to projects for partner nations in  Africa. For more information regarding the distribution of fiscal year  2015 Global Train and Equip assistance, see appendix II.
As of the end of fiscal year 2015, DOD had no unobligated balances for  fiscal year 2009 through 2015 funds and had disbursed the majority of  funds obligated in fiscal years 2009 through 2012, as detailed in table 1.  DOD has disbursed 10 percent of the funds obligated in fiscal year 2015  and has until the end of fiscal year 2020 to complete disbursement of  those funds.
section_title: DOD and State Considered Four Key Security Assistance Elements While Planning Fiscal Year 2015 Projects but Consistently Documented Only One
paragraphs: DOD and State considered four key project planning elements called for  by Presidential Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance (PPD  23) for fiscal year 2015 Global Train and Equip projects, but did not  consistently document the consideration of those elements in proposal  packages. PPD 23 states that U.S. agencies should target security sector  assistance where it can be effective. To accomplish this goal, it identified  key project planning elements to consider, including (1) project objectives  that address partner nation needs, (2) partner nation absorptive capacity,  (3) project assessments, and (4) project sustainment. While officials  indicated that they considered each element, DOD consistently  documented consideration for only one of those elements: project  objectives. As seen in figure 4, documentation was incomplete for  absorptive capacity, project baseline assessments, and project  sustainment, despite officials’ indications that such factors were  consistently considered during proposal development.
subsections: section_title: DOD and State Considered Four Key Security Assistance Elements for Fiscal Year 2015 Projects
paragraphs: According to agency officials, DOD and State consistently considered four  key security assistance elements for all fiscal year 2015 project proposals  we reviewed. PPD 23 identified key project planning elements for the  United States to consider, including project objectives, absorptive  capacity, baseline assessments, and sustainment plans. SO/LIC officials  said that all four elements were discussed by program stakeholders,  including global combatant command and State officials, during the  proposal review process, prior to project approval by the Secretary of  Defense with concurrence from the Secretary of State. For example,  SO/LIC officials told us that absorptive capacity is consistently discussed  among stakeholders during the proposal review process. Specifically,  they noted that combatant command officials reported on the absorptive  capacity of the recipient units during the project review process but noted  that the SO/LIC policy oversight office lacked the resources to  independently confirm the information. Combatant command officials  confirmed that they consider elements such as absorptive capacity in  developing project proposal packages. For example, officials from the  U.S. European Command explained that absorptive capacity is one topic  that they address in planning discussions with host nation officials.
Officials from the U.S. Pacific Command noted that they have a well- established understanding of potential recipient unit absorptive capacity  based on the persistent relationship between partner nation officials and  U.S. officials imbedded with those units. Further, U.S. embassy officials  who help draft project proposals also noted they can inform the  consideration of potential recipient unit absorptive capacity, in part by  considering the historic ability of potential recipient units to absorb  previous assistance. DOD officials also told us that they consistently  considered sustainment for fiscal year 2015 projects and State officials  noted that they discuss project sustainment during proposal review and  sometimes identify additional potential sources of sustainment funds for  proposed projects. In addition, as a standard part of its proposal  development process, DOD includes 2 years of spare parts to enable  short-term sustainment, such as equipment maintenance, associated with  program assistance. For example, in April 2015, we reported that project  proposal templates since fiscal year 2011 indicated that each project  should contain spare parts for 2 years of maintenance, and that proposal  packages for fiscal year 2011 through 2014 projects for Yemen  consistently included such spare parts. In addition, officials from  SO/LIC, State, and DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency told us  that each project includes such short-term maintenance support.
Congressional notifications for agency-approved fiscal year 2015  projects, prepared subsequent to approval by the Secretary of Defense  and concurrence by the Secretary of State, included information related to  the four elements, as required, implying that those elements had been  considered. The fiscal year 2015 NDAA requires congressional  notifications for each project to include, among other requirements,  information about project objectives; absorptive capacity; a framework to  be used for project assessment; and arrangements, if any, for project  sustainment. Congressional notifications for 41 agency-approved fiscal  year 2015 projects were prepared following the passage of the fiscal year  2015 NDAA. Each of these 41 notifications included (1) information about  project objectives; (2) a similar statement, noting that the partner nation  “has been assessed as capable to absorb effectively and benefit from the  assistance proposed via this program;” (3) a description of the  assessment framework; and (4) a statement about arrangements for  sustainment, such as “while  might provide some  national funds to help sustain this capability, it is very likely that Foreign  Military Financing (FMF) will also be required to support future year  sustainment and training of this capability.”
section_title: Fiscal Year 2015 Project Proposals Consistently Documented Consideration of Only One of Four Key Elements
paragraphs: While DOD officials told us that they considered each of four key  elements highlighted in PPD 23, fiscal year 2015 Global Train and Equip  project proposal packages did not always document consideration of  baseline assessments and sustainment plans, and rarely did so for  absorptive capacity. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government states that internal control activities aimed at ensuring  effective use of resources should be clearly documented, and that  documentation should be readily available for examination. As noted in  table 2, DOD fiscal year 2015 project proposal packages requested  information about three of four key elements—project objectives, baseline  assessments, and sustainment plans. However, despite agency  guidance, such documentation was not always complete. Further, DOD  did not specifically request information about absorptive capacity.
DOD requested, and fiscal year 2015 project proposals consistently  documented, information about project objectives. DOD, in its fiscal year  2015 project proposal template, requested information related to project  objectives. Our review of fiscal year 2015 project proposals indicated that  they consistently included such information. For example, one proposal  stated that “his proposal will enhance the  ability to clear  and successfully navigate through routes that contain [improvised  explosive devices] laid by .” Another proposal stated that “his  program will allow the  to establish at least 3 defendable  forward operating bases and a mobile forward aircraft refueling point that  will have the capability to provide fuel, water, and sustainment of critical  supplies to patrols that are operating in the desolate parts of the country.”
subsections: section_title: Fiscal Year 2015 Project Proposals Rarely Documented Consideration of Absorptive Capacity
paragraphs: DOD did not request, and project proposals did not consistently include,  information about recipient units’ absorptive capacity. DOD’s fiscal year  2015 program guidance states that prior to proposal submission,  embassy security cooperation officers are to ensure that proposals are  appropriate for the partner nation’s absorptive capacity. However, DOD  did not request officials to document their consideration of the recipient  units’ absorptive capacity in fiscal year 2015 project proposal packages  that agency officials used to make project approval decisions. Although  the standard fiscal year 2015 project proposal template did not include a  field specifically requesting such information, our review indicated that 10  of the 54 fiscal year 2015 project proposals did include information about  the absorptive capacity of recipient units. For example, five proposals  drafted by U.S. Africa Command stated that the partner nation’s “ability to  absorb and sustain the training and equipment is well above average.” In  addition, four projects to be funded through the ERI account were  proposed using a template that had been modified to include a question  specifically about the absorptive capacity of recipient units. The tenth  proposal that included information about absorptive capacity did so in  planning for equipment delivery. SO/LIC officials said that they plan to put  additional focus on absorptive capacity during the proposal review  process for fiscal year 2016 projects. However, the fiscal year 2016  project proposal template did not request any specific information  regarding absorptive capacity, even though guidance for the program  states that SO/LIC is interested in the absorptive capacity of the partner  nation.
Without documentation of absorptive capacity considerations, decision  makers may not have sufficient information about recipient units’ ability to  integrate proposed assistance projects as they consider proposed  projects. For example, in documents supporting its fiscal year 2013 report  to Congress on its assessment of the results of selected projects, DOD  indicated that one partner nation recipient had a small armed force with  few resources that had limited capability to absorb additional foreign  military assistance. Despite having identified this challenge in an  assessment completed during fiscal year 2013, DOD approved projects  totaling more than $21 million for the same partner nation in fiscal years  2014 and 2015. DOD’s fiscal year 2015 project proposal package for this  partner nation did not document any assessment of the recipient unit’s  absorptive capacity.
section_title: Fiscal Year 2015 Baseline Assessments Inconsistently Included Requested Information
paragraphs: The project proposal packages submitted in response to DOD requests  almost always included baseline assessment documents; however, those  documents did not always include all information requested by DOD  guidance. DOD’s assessment framework is based on a dual-purpose  document that includes portions for assessing the recipient unit’s baseline  capabilities and its capabilities following project delivery and  implementation. DOD’s fiscal year 2015 program guidance states that a  baseline assessment of recipient unit capabilities should be completed  prior to submission of each proposal. While 51 of the 54 fiscal year 2015  project proposal packages included baseline assessments as required,  they did not consistently include all information requested by agency  guidance. DOD’s fiscal year 2015 guidance requests that geographic  combatant command officials complete the baseline assessment section  and the baseline portions of the project summary and certification  sections of that document when projects are proposed. Program office  officials said the baseline assessment section is the primary mechanism  to document the capabilities of the recipient unit and identifies what the  recipient unit is able to achieve at the time the project is proposed and  what it needs to improve its capabilities to meet its mission. The baseline  portion of the summary section provides an overview of the organizational  status of the partner nation before project implementation, and the  baseline assessment certification section requires the identification of the  people involved in the preparation of the baseline assessment and their  relevant experience. Thirty-four of the 51 baseline assessments we  reviewed included completed baseline assessment sections. Only six (or  12 percent) of the 51 baseline portions of the summary and certification  sections were complete. SO/LIC officials said they had not verified  completion of baseline assessments because the policy oversight office  was not staffed to provide this level of oversight. DOD officials said that  the policy oversight office had increased its staff and that they are  working to improve oversight of the baseline assessment process. The  baseline assessments are intended to be completed, submitted with  project proposals, and later used for project outcome assessments by  assessment teams, policy officials, embassy staff, and other  stakeholders. Incomplete assessments may affect DOD’s ability to design  appropriate capacity building projects and to assess project outcomes,  thus limiting information on program effectiveness that could help inform  future assistance decisions.
section_title: About One Quarter of Fiscal Year 2015 Project Proposal Packages Lacked Complete Documentation of Sustainment Plans
paragraphs: DOD’s fiscal year 2015 guidance requested information about planning  for project sustainment; however, some aspects of sustainment planning  are not consistently documented as requested by agency guidance. First,  DOD’s fiscal year 2015 program guidance instructed officials developing  proposals to provide context for any decisions to forego planning for the  sustainment of training or equipment to be provided and to identify, if  possible, the expected lifespan of the equipment if it will be used in a  combat setting. Only one fiscal year 2015 project proposal included  specific information about the applicability of project sustainment or the  expected lifespan of the equipment in question. Nevertheless, several  State and DOD officials told us that not all projects require or warrant  sustainment. For example, officials explained that some assistance, such  as ammunition, is expendable and does not require sustainment. Others  noted that some assistance was never intended to be sustained. For  instance, a project may have a discrete objective, such as enabling  partner nation security forces to deploy in support of the International  Security Assistance Force - Afghanistan. If the security forces had been  deployed, then the return on investment would have been realized and  long-term sustainment would be unnecessary. Officials explained that  there was no process to substantively analyze the value of long-term  project sustainment.
Second, the fiscal year 2015 project proposal template requests  information about (1) partner nation contributions, (2) partner nation  sustainment capability, and (3) estimates of annual sustainment costs.  The proposals we reviewed consistently included information regarding  the first two items: partner nation contributions and sustainment  capability. For example, 47 of 54 proposals indicated that the recipient  partner nation may be able to contribute national funds for project  sustainment, although State and DOD officials identified several reasons  why they do not have full confidence in sustainment plans predicated on  the availability of partner nation funds. With respect to the third category  of information requested in project proposals, only 37 of 54 proposals  included an estimate of annual sustainment costs as required. These 37  annual sustainment cost estimates ranged from $20,000 to sustain a $3  million project to develop the skills of a special operations force of a  European partner nation, to more than $5 million to sustain a project  building a counterterrorism company in an African partner nation. Four  additional proposals indicated that sustainment costs would be “minimal”  but did not include a specific estimate. The remaining 13 proposals did  not include sustainment cost estimates. As seen in figure 2 above, fiscal  year 2015 allocations for activities to be implemented under the authority  increased significantly over past years. Clearly documenting information  such as estimates of annual sustainment costs could help improve  decision makers’ ability to assess the sustainability of proposed projects  in making funding decisions. See appendix III for State and DOD views  on the availability of funds for long-term sustainment.
section_title: DOD Reporting on Project Assessments Has Not Met Statutory Deadlines but Indicates Some Progress in Building Foreign Partner Capacity
paragraphs: DOD reporting to Congress on the achievement of Global Train and  Equip project objectives has not met reporting deadlines, but those  reports—dating back to 2012—indicate that projects have made some  progress building partner capacity to combat terrorism and conduct  stability operations. The fiscal year 2013 assessment report was  submitted to Congress nearly 2 years after the required due date, the  fiscal year 2014 assessment report was submitted to Congress nearly 1  year later than required, and the fiscal year 2015 report was 1 month late.  DOD’s fiscal year 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 reports included  assessments of the recipient units of 61 of the 208 projects implemented  in fiscal years 2006 through 2013, which represents 28 percent of the $2  billion in assistance implemented in those fiscal years. These  assessments and supporting documents indicate that recipient units  generally experienced progress in building capabilities. They also  identified several factors—including proposal design, equipment  procurement, partner nation shortfalls, and workforce management—that  can affect the extent to which DOD is able to achieve project objectives.  Assessments, if completed in a timely manner, could help provide  valuable information to decision makers and policymakers as they seek to  choose new projects and address reported challenges.
subsections: section_title: Fiscal Year 2013, 2014, and 2015 Assessment Reports to Congress Were Late
paragraphs: DOD’s fiscal year 2013, 2014, and 2015 assessments reports were  submitted to Congress late. The fiscal year 2012 NDAA required DOD, no  later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year, to submit to Congress  a report including, in part, an assessment of the effectiveness of each  program in building the capacity of the foreign country to conduct  counterterrorism operations during the fiscal year covered by such report.  The fiscal year 2015 NDAA, enacted in December 2014, included a  similar requirement for DOD to submit a report to Congress no later than  90 days after the end of each fiscal year, from 2015 through 2020,  including an assessment of the effectiveness of the program in achieving  its intended purpose. This report is to summarize the findings of the  assessments of projects carried out under the program. DOD’s annual  reports for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014 described some  assessment activities and the relevant assessment framework but noted  that reporting on the results of assessment activities would be submitted  to Congress separately. As shown in table 3, DOD submitted its fiscal  year 2012 assessment report in accordance with required deadlines.  However, DOD submitted its fiscal year 2013 assessment report to  Congress in September 2015, 21 months later than required, and  submitted its fiscal year 2014 assessment report to Congress in  December 2015, 12 months later than required. DOD’s assessment  report for fiscal year 2015 was 1 month late.
DOD officials informed us that, although the assessment teams had  conducted the assessments during the associated fiscal year, DOD did  not submit those assessments to Congress on time because they did not  have sufficient resources to review and finalize them. According to DOD,  the assessment process is intended to enable the U.S. government to  make better decisions about project design and the types of projects that  promise the greatest return on investment, that accomplish  counterterrorism or stability operation missions, and that are likely to help  recipient partner nations achieve the intended standards of capability and  performance. Because the submissions to Congress were late, decision  makers lacked full and current information about the extent to which  projects achieved their objectives, which could have informed the  direction of assistance—for both new projects and sustainment of  previous efforts—in subsequent years. Further, program stakeholders  were not afforded the opportunity to use lessons learned documented in  those reports in designing related or similar projects. Officials from State  told us that they, too, might have used the information in the reports in  considering subsequent project proposals and during development of  Global Train and Equip and other security assistance efforts.
section_title: DOD Reporting on Assessed Projects Indicates Some Progress in Building Partner Capacity
paragraphs: DOD’s reporting on the achievement of project objectives indicates some  progress in enhancing recipient unit capabilities. As shown in figure 5,  DOD’s fiscal year 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 assessment reports  covered 61, or 29 percent, of the 208 projects implemented between  2006 and 2013. These 61 projects account for 28 percent of the $2  billion DOD allocated for this program in those years.
To conduct these assessments, DOD uses a standard framework for  evaluating the capabilities and performance of each recipient unit.  Baseline assessments, discussed earlier, rate the recipient unit’s level of  capability and performance before project implementation on a 5-point  scale on which 1 is defined as the ability to perform some basic tasks to  at least a low standard of performance and 5 is defined as the ability to  perform most of the advanced tasks for the unit’s missions and to operate  almost continuously throughout its assigned area of operations. Following  implementation, DOD conducts assessments using the same 5-point  scale to report on changes in the recipient unit’s level of capability and  performance. Comparing the change in a recipient unit’s capability and  performance rating between the baseline and post-implementation  assessments indicates the recipient unit’s positive, neutral, or negative  change since the provision of assistance. According to a DOD contractor  who leads the project assessments, these ratings do not solely represent  the effect of the provision of training and equipment on the recipient unit’s  capability and performance, as other factors may contribute to the change  in performance level. DOD implemented its Global Train and Equip  assessment framework in fiscal year 2012 and baseline assessments  became a requirement of project proposals in fiscal year 2013. Projects  proposed and implemented in earlier years were not required to have a  baseline assessment at the time of proposal. However, for the purpose of  assessing changes in recipient unit capacity, DOD established  hypothetical baseline ratings for some recipient units by inquiring about  those units’ capabilities prior to receipt of assistance.
Of the 61 projects assessed, 18 were for recipient units for which DOD  had not conducted or established a hypothetical assessment of baseline  capabilities. The remaining 43 projects, representing 21 percent of the  208 projects implemented in fiscal years 2006 through 2013, were for  recipient units for which DOD conducted both an assessment of baseline  capabilities and capabilities following project implementation. As shown in  figure 6, of these 43 projects, the recipient units of 35 were assessed as  having increased by at least one rating level—most often from level 1 to 2  or from level 2 to 3—following project implementation. For seven of those  35 projects, DOD reported that recipient unit capabilities increased by at  least two levels. For example, DOD’s fiscal year 2012 assessment report  noted that a project implemented in fiscal year 2010 intended to build  partner nation air force capacity to execute precision-guided strikes  against terrorist targets indicated that the recipient unit’s new capabilities  enabled strikes on a terrorist target that diminished terrorists’ capacity to  plan attacks. The remaining eight projects were directed to recipient units  assessed as having realized no change in capability. For example, one of  these four projects was intended to bolster a partner nation force’s ability  to enable sustained border security operations. At the time of the  assessment, the recipient unit was using assistance for pre-deployment  activities rather than to conduct envisioned border operations.
DOD’s assessment reports and supporting documents, as well as agency  officials we interviewed, also described some factors that can affect the  extent to which DOD is able to achieve Global Train and Equip project  objectives, including proposal design and interpretation, equipment  delivery and procurement, partner nation shortfalls, and workforce  management.
Proposal design and interpretation. Project proposal designs that  did not adequately capture recipient unit needs and capabilities  challenged the achievement of project objectives. For example,  DOD’s fiscal year 2013 assessment of a fiscal year 2011 project  indicated that the design of a light ballistic protection system for  partner nation helicopters did not take into consideration the location  of navigation lights and associated inspection and maintenance  procedures. The assessment suggested that communication and  design collaboration between the United States and the partner nation  could have identified and eliminated this issue. The assessment also  indicated that changes to the aircraft had to be certified by the original  equipment manufacturer per an agreement between the partner  nation and the Russian government. Since the changes had not been  approved by the Russian authorities, the aircraft were not permitted to  fly with troops. DOD’s assessment described this as a critical  shortcoming. In addition, DOD’s fiscal year 2013 assessment of a  fiscal year 2011 counterterrorism project indicated that several  elements were not well designed. For instance, some vehicles  provided were considered unsuitable for use in the terrain in which  they would be used and did not have an identified need or associated  concept of operations. As pictured in figure 7, this same assessment  reported that spotting scopes provided to enhance counterterrorism  capabilities were too tall for use in a prone position, exposing the  spotter.
Combatant command officials indicated that project proposals are at  times developed by individuals who lack subject matter expertise.  Unclear descriptions of desired capabilities in proposal documents  may make it difficult for project implementers and officials conducting  assessments to interpret the intent of the proposals. Further, DOD  officials indicated that because of institutionalized staff turnover in  U.S. embassies, the officials overseeing project implementation may  not have been responsible for project development and are less likely  to understand the capabilities of the intended recipient units or the  capability gaps that could be addressed by equipment and training.
Equipment delivery and procurement. Equipment delivery and  procurement challenges can make it difficult to achieve desired  capability-building objectives. For example, DOD’s fiscal year 2013  assessment report indicated that 7 of the 11 recipient units assessed  experienced equipment procurement and delivery issues. The  majority of projects provided to these recipients indicated  discrepancies between the number of items requested in  congressional notifications and the number of items delivered. For  instance, a fiscal year 2013 assessment of a fiscal year 2009 project  to equip the recipient unit to conduct counterterrorism operations in  urban settings reported that the unit received half the desired number  of body armor sets, one additional bulldozer, and 10 fewer night vision  rifle scopes than originally proposed. The report indicated that it was  unclear how the bulldozers were being employed in tactical  operations. In addition, incorrect equipment was delivered to some  partner nations. For example, one fiscal year 2013 project  assessment indicated that a recipient unit received left-hand drive  vehicles despite project plans for right-hand drive vehicles. Similarly, a  fiscal year 2012 assessment of a fiscal year 2009 project to bolster  the recipient unit’s aerial interdiction operations found that the  incorrect surveillance equipment was delivered to the recipient unit.  When the cockpit surveillance monitors were installed, the equipment  was in the pilot’s line of sight, rendering the equipment unusable per  original project design.
Partner nation shortfalls. Shortfalls of partner nations, including their  use of assistance for purposes other than those originally envisioned  and inability to maintain and sustain equipment, can negatively affect  the achievement of project objectives. For example, the fiscal year  2013 assessments and supporting documentation of fiscal year 2008  and 2009 projects to train and equip a partner nation counterterrorism  unit indicated that the recipient unit had not been assigned to conduct  counterterrorism operations as envisioned. In this instance, although  the recipient unit, at the time of congressional notification, was  intended to conduct urban counterterrorism operations, the  assessment team found that the recipient unit had subsequently been  assigned to execute urban internal defense operations. Nonetheless,  DOD’s assessment indicated that the recipient units were more  capable of conducting internal defense and counterterrorism  operations. In addition, DOD’s fiscal year 2012 assessment of a fiscal  year 2010 project to enhance maritime domain awareness found that  a recipient unit’s inability to maintain related equipment limited  operational performance. The recipient unit reportedly had difficulty  recruiting and training personnel to operate and maintain the  equipment, and also lacked spare parts. Similarly, DOD’s fiscal year  2012 assessment and supporting documentation of a fiscal year 2008  project intended to provide coastal radar surveillance noted that the  delivered equipment and training might have helped the recipient unit  earn a level 3 or 4 capability and performance rating, but maintenance  and sustainment issues reduced its rating to level 2—an increase of  only one level over its baseline assessment.
Workforce management. DOD officials indicated that workforce  challenges, particularly related to turnover and staffing levels, inhibit  effective project design, program implementation, and oversight. They  noted that workforce turnover within the policy oversight office was  systemic and that program oversight responsibilities historically entail  more work than available personnel can manage. DOD officials  indicated that they increased office staff by three permanent positions  in fiscal year 2015. According to SO/LIC officials, as of February  2016, the policy oversight office had six permanent employees—four  civilians and two military—who provide oversight of Global Train and  Equip and other DOD counterterrorism partnership program activities.  In addition, other non-permanent staff and temporary detailees are  sometimes assigned to help oversee the program’s key functions. In  addition, DOD officials indicated that, for several projects, the  associated embassy’s security cooperation office responsible for  implementing projects in-country had staffing limitations that affected  their ability to supervise project delivery and implementation, maintain  equipment delivery records, and gauge the recipient units’  implementation of the projects. Further, a U.S. Africa Command  official stated that combatant command and policy oversight office  staffing challenges inhibit effective proposal development,  implementation, oversight, and sustainment of projects.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Building partner capacity is a central focus of the U.S. counterterrorism  strategy, as underscored by the allocation of $675 million for Global Train  and Equip program activities in fiscal year 2015—a sharp increase  compared to the $275 million annual average in the preceding 6 years.  Although DOD has established a methodical interagency process to  develop and select security assistance project proposals that considers  key security sector assistance planning elements, it did not require  documentation of recipient unit absorptive capacity or fully document  support for consideration of other key elements in planning fiscal year  2015 projects. Fully documenting the basis of project approval decisions  could enhance transparency, provide additional assurance that resources  are efficiently allocated, and help to ensure the long-term benefits of  projects and careful use of scarce U.S. and partner nation resources. In  addition, DOD has not consistently fulfilled its congressional reporting  requirements for the program in a timely manner. DOD’s fiscal year 2013,  2014, and 2015 assessment reports were late. Without DOD’s timely  fulfillment of its assessment reporting requirements, Congress may not  have comprehensive and current information about past successes and  failures that could help ensure that U.S. resources are effectively used to  build partner capacity to combat terrorists.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve management of and reporting on the Global Train and Equip  program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following  three actions:  take steps to require that information about the absorptive capacity of recipient units be documented in project proposal packages, take steps to ensure that documentation requested in project proposal packages is complete, and take steps to develop a process for improving the timely completion and submission of required assessment reports to Congress.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD and State for comment. DOD  provided written comments concurring with all of our recommendations,  which we have reprinted in appendix IV. State had no comments.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretaries of Defense and State. In addition, the  report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-7331 or JohnsonCM@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense  Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015, requires GAO to conduct  biennial audits of such program or programs conducted or supported  pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2282 during the preceding 2 fiscal years as GAO  shall select, including in these reports (1) a description of the program(s),  (2) an assessment of the capacity of recipient countries to absorb  assistance, (3) an assessment of the arrangements, if any, for the  sustainment of the program(s), (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of  the program(s) in achieving their intended purpose, and (5) such other  matters as GAO considers appropriate. This report examines (1) the  extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) considered and  documented consideration of key security assistance planning elements  for fiscal year 2015 project proposals and (2) the results that have been  reported on the achievement of project objectives since fiscal year 2009.
We assessed funding data including allocations, obligations, and  disbursements for fiscal years 2009 through 2015. DOD provided data on  allocations, amounts reallocated, unobligated balances, unliquidated  obligations, and disbursements of funds for program activities. We  analyzed these data to determine the extent to which funds had been  disbursed. We assessed the reliability of these data by interviewing  cognizant agency officials and comparing the data with previously  published data, as well as verifying them with congressional notifications.  We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
To address these objectives, we analyzed program guidelines, project  proposal documents, and congressional notifications. We discussed  topics regarding the project proposal process and key elements of project  planning, project documentation, and project assessment with officials  from the Department of State (State) and DOD, geographic combatant  commands in whose areas of responsibility partner nations received fiscal  year 2015 assistance, and three selected U.S. embassies in Kenya,  Jordan, and Latvia. We selected these countries based on factors such  as the amount of funds the countries have been allocated, the maturity of  projects, project assessment experience, and geographic distribution.
To assess the extent to which DOD considered and documented  consideration of key elements of security sector assistance for projects it  planned to implement in fiscal year 2015, we analyzed agency documents  and interviewed agency officials. We reviewed Presidential Policy  Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance (PPD 23), which identified four  key elements to be considered for security sector assistance programs:  (1) project objectives that address partner needs, (2) the absorptive  capacity of the recipient unit, (3) the baseline capabilities of the recipient  unit, and (4) the arrangements for the sustainment of the project. To  determine the extent to which DOD considered these elements, we  interviewed State and DOD officials who develop and review proposals to  discuss (1) how they use information included in project proposal  packages to consider key planning elements and (2) other factors they  consider in developing and reviewing proposals that may not be  documented. Further, we reviewed congressional notifications SO/LIC  develops subsequent to agency approval to determine the extent to which  those documents include—and thus imply consideration of—information  about the four key planning elements. To determine the extent to which  DOD requested documentation about and fully documented consideration  of these elements, we analyzed the agency guidance and the content of  agency-approved fiscal year 2015 project proposals for their inclusion.  DOD’s fiscal year 2015 program guidance states each project proposal  package should include four documents: a completed standardized  project proposal, a baseline assessment of the capabilities of the recipient  unit, a proposed equipment list for the project, and a Chief of Mission  concurrence letter. DOD guidance also requires a country team  assessment for projects involving night vision devices or other sensitive  technology. Each project proposal package was independently reviewed  by two analysts for the inclusion of the four elements. The analysts  resolved any disagreements through discussion of the information used to  make their independent determinations. We ultimately reported on  information included in 54 fiscal year 2015 project proposal packages. We  excluded proposals for four fiscal year 2015 projects that redirected  assistance originally approved and procured for Yemen in previous fiscal  years but which could not be delivered because of political unrest.
With respect to our reporting on support for information about baseline  assessments, congressional notifications lay out a standardized  assessment framework to be used to assess the effects of projects. This  framework includes a baseline assessment that DOD requires to be  completed for inclusion in project proposal packages. DOD provided  baseline assessments for 51 of 54 fiscal year 2015 project proposals  notified to Congress. We analyzed these 51 baseline assessment  documents included in fiscal year 2015 project proposal packages against  DOD internal guidance to assess the completion of the required baseline  assessment sections.
We also analyzed congressional notifications for projects DOD planned to  implement in fiscal year 2015 to assess the extent to which they included  required information related to the four key planning elements and with  respect to requirements included in the fiscal year 2015 NDAA. Each  congressional notification was independently reviewed by two analysts for  the inclusion of eight required elements. The analysts resolved any  disagreements through discussion of the information used to make their  independent determinations. We ultimately reported on information  included in congressional notifications for 41 fiscal year 2015 projects that  were subject to the requirements in the fiscal year 2015 NDAA. For this  analysis, we did not include the congressional notifications for 4 projects  that redirected assistance originally approved and procured for Yemen in  previous fiscal years but which could not be delivered because political  unrest. Because these projects were planned in prior fiscal years, they  were subject to different legislative and agency guidance. We also did not  include 13 agency-approved project notifications to Congress submitted  before the December 2015 passage of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA  because these were not subject to the new requirements.
To assess the extent to which DOD has reported on the achievement of  project objectives since fiscal year 2009, we reviewed agency documents  and interviewed agency officials. In particular, we analyzed DOD’s four  annual project assessment reports and supporting documents from fiscal  years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 as well as the assessment framework  handbook. We analyzed DOD project implementation and funding data to  determine the number and value of implemented projects that DOD had  assessed between fiscal years 2006 and 2013. We also analyzed  submission dates for each assessment report against deadlines identified  in the fiscal year 2012 NDAA. Further, to examine the extent to which  DOD’s assessments and supporting documents reported progress in  building partner capacity, we compared original baseline recipient unit  capability and performance levels assessed at the time projects were  proposed with recipient unit capability levels assessed following the  delivery of program assistance. DOD uses a standard framework for  evaluating the capabilities and performance of each recipient unit. DOD  implemented its assessment framework for the Global Train and Equip  program in fiscal year 2012, and baseline assessments became a  requirement of project proposals in fiscal year 2013. Baseline  assessments rate the recipient unit’s level of capability and performance  before project implementation on a 5-point scale, with 1 defined as the  ability to perform some basic tasks to at least a low standard of  performance and 5 as the ability to perform most of the advanced tasks  for the unit’s missions and to operate almost continuously throughout its  assigned area of operations. Following implementation, project  assessments and supporting documents use the same framework to  report on changes in the recipient unit’s level of capability and  performance on the same 5-point scale. Projects proposed and  implemented in earlier years were not required to have a baseline  assessment at the time of proposal. However, for the purpose of  assessing changes in capacity, DOD established hypothetical baseline  ratings of some recipient units by inquiring about those units’ capabilities  prior to receipt of program assistance. Following implementation, project  assessments and supporting documents use the same framework to  report on changes in the recipient unit’s level of capability and  performance on the same 5-point scale. DOD’s fiscal year 2012, 2013,  2014, and 2015 reports included assessments of the recipient units of 61,  or 29 percent, of the 208 projects implemented in fiscal years 2006  through 2013. Of these 61 project assessments we reviewed, 43 were  directed to recipient units where DOD had conducted both an assessment  of recipient unit’s baseline capabilities and the recipient unit’s capabilities  following project implementation. Assessing the change in a recipient  unit’s capability and performance rating between the baseline and post- implementation assessments indicates the recipient unit’s positive,  neutral, or negative change since the provision of assistance. To  determine that the data included in DOD’s assessments were sufficiently  reliable for our purposes of reporting on those assessments, we met with  DOD and contracted officials responsible for conducting and reviewing  project assessments to gather information about their processes for  assessing recipient unit capabilities. We also reviewed the qualifications  and experience of the officials conducting the project assessments, which  included military experience that was relevant to the project and recipient  units being assessed. In addition, we reviewed DOD’s project  assessment guidance and their template for conducting project  assessments, which was consistently used in the assessments we  reviewed. Further, the preponderance of project assessments resulting in  modest increases in recipient unit capabilities lends credibility to the  assessment process. For example, our review of DOD’s project  assessments indicated that the majority of the recipient units’ capability  levels increased from level 1 to 2, or from level 2 to 3 following project  implementation. None of the recipient units’ capability levels were  assessed as having increased to level 5 following project implementation.  We did not conduct independent assessments to systematically validate  results included in DOD’s reports. We determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
In addition, we reviewed the assessment reports to identify factors  affecting the extent to which project objectives were achieved. We also  gathered information about key factors affecting the extent to which  project objectives were achieved from interviews with DOD officials  responsible for implementing the program, including officials from DOD’s  policy guidance and oversight office, Joint Staff, and geographic  combatant commands, and embassies in three selected countries, and  with officials at State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and Africa  Regional Bureau. We grouped the factors identified through our review of  DOD’s assessments and supporting documents, and conversations with  agency officials into four categories of key factors on which we reported:  (1) proposal design and interpretation, (2) equipment delivery and  procurement, (3) partner nation shortfalls, and (4) workforce  management.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2015 to April 2016 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Allocation of Funds for Fiscal Year 2015 Global Train and Equip Projects
subsections: section_title: Combatant command
section_title: U.S. Africa Command
section_title: U.S. European Command
section_title: Total
section_title: Appendix III: State and DOD Views on the Availability of Funds for Long-term Sustainment of Global Train and Equip Projects
paragraphs: DOD’s fiscal year 2015 Global Train and Equip project proposal template  did not request information about the sources of U.S. funds to be used for  long-term sustainment. Nonetheless, all 54 project proposals identified at  least one potential source of funds for sustainment purposes. The most  often cited sources of funds identified in those statements were partner  nation funds (47 of 54) and State’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF)  program (16 of 54). As we have previously reported, DOD’s fiscal year  2016 project proposal template requests information on the availability of  FMF and other available U.S. resources if a partner nation is unlikely to  cover the expected costs of maintenance. State and DOD officials  acknowledged that, regardless of the intentions documented in long-term  sustainment plans for fiscal year 2015 projects, partner nation and State  FMF funds—the two most commonly identified sources for long-term  project sustainment—may not be available in future years.
First, State and DOD officials identified several reasons why they do not  have full confidence in sustainment plans predicated on the availability of  partner nation funds. Officials explained that long-term sustainment plans  for projects were not always discussed with partner nation officials.  Projects are not guaranteed for funding until after proposals have been  submitted and approved. Sensitive to the potential challenges of raising  the expectations of partner nation counterparts, U.S. officials do not  always have direct discussions about long-term planning for projects that  might not come to fruition. In instances where long-term sustainment  planning is discussed with partner nation officials, partner nation behavior  may not conform to DOD and State’s plan. For example, embassy  officials explained that their partner nation counterparts may indicate  during planning discussions that they would sustain the equipment with  national resources but then use those resources for other purposes  because of unforeseen needs or changes in priorities. Furthermore, DOD  and State officials added that the economic conditions of some recipients  call into question the validity of long-term sustainment planning that relies  on partner nation funds. For example, officials from both State and DOD  noted that recipient partner nations in Africa (accounting for $272 million  of the $675 million allocated in fiscal year 2015) do not likely have  sufficient national funds available to sustain all approved projects.
Second, DOD and State officials acknowledge that FMF program  resources may not be sufficient to carry out plans for long-term project  sustainment. We have previously reported that FMF funds may not be  available as planned for the sustainment of some projects. Agency  officials noted that this longstanding concern has been compounded by  the additional Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund resources obligated for  the program in fiscal year 2015. Even if sufficient FMF funds are  available, U.S. officials were uncertain about the extent to which some  partner nations would use FMF resources for project sustainment. State  provides FMF assistance to certain partner nations as grants and loans  for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training.  State and DOD officials can work with partner nations to develop a  spending plan to include funding to sustain projects, but partner nations  could prioritize the use of FMF resources for other purposes.
Officials from DOD’s policy oversight office are aware of the sustainment  challenges that the program and recipient partner nations face. They  suggested that the ability to use funding made available for the program  to sustain projects implemented in previous fiscal years could help  address some such challenges. However, fiscal year 2012 congressional  committee report language accompanying that year’s NDAA notes that  resources authorized for the program are not intended to fund long-term  sustainment. DOD officials stated that they have drafted a legislative  proposal that could modify this restriction. According those officials, as of  February 2016, the proposal was undergoing interagency review in  advance of being officially conveyed to Congress for consideration.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331, or JohnsonCM@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Jason Bair (Assistant Director),  Kathryn Bolduc (Analyst-In-Charge), Mason Thorpe Calhoun, Christopher  Hayes, Lynn Cothern, Martin de Alteriis, and Ashley Alley made key  contributions to this report. Oziel Trevino also provided technical  assistance.