Environmental Satellites: Polar-orbiting Satellite Acquisition Faces Delays; Decisions Needed on Whether and How to Ensure Climate Data Continuity
Published: 2008-05-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is a triagency acquisition--managed by the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--that has experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program by reducing the number of satellites and sensors, increasing estimated costs to $12.5 billion, and delaying the first two satellites by 3 to 5 years. Among other objectives, GAO was asked to evaluate progress in restructuring the acquisition, assess the status of key program components and risks, and assess NASA's, NOAA's, and DOD's plans for obtaining the data originally planned to be collected by NPOESS sensors, but eliminated by the restructuring. To do so, GAO analyzed program and contractor data, attended program reviews, and interviewed agency officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The program office has completed most of the major activities associated with restructuring the NPOESS acquisition, but key activities remain to be completed. In the past year, the program redefined the program's deliverables, costs, and schedules, and renegotiated the NPOESS contract. However, agency executives have not yet finalized selected acquisition documents (including the tri-agency memorandum of agreement). Without the executive approval of key acquisition documents, the program lacks the underlying commitment needed to effectively manage a tri-agency program. Over the past year, the NPOESS program has continued to make progress in completing development activities, but key milestones have been delayed and multiple risks remain. Specifically, poor workmanship and testing delays caused an 8-month slip in the expected delivery of a technologically complex imaging sensor that is critical to weather and climate observations. This later delivery caused a corresponding 8-month delay in the expected launch date of a demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP). This demonstration satellite is intended to provide on-orbit experiences that can be used to reduce risks on NPOESS satellites and to provide interim weather and climate observations should predecessor weather and climate satellites begin to degrade or fail. Moving forward, risks remain in completing the testing of key sensors, integrating them on the NPP spacecraft, and ensuring sufficient system security. The program office is aware of these risks and is working to mitigate them, but continued problems could affect the program's overall schedule and cost. When the NPOESS restructuring decision removed four climate and space environment sensors from the program and reduced the functionality of four others, the program was directed to restore a limited version of one sensor and to restore the seven others if funded by entities outside the program office. NOAA, NASA, and DOD have taken preliminary steps to restore the capabilities of selected sensors by prioritizing the sensors, assessing options for restoring them, and making decisions to mitigate near-term data gaps by adding two sensors to the NPP satellite. However, the agencies have not yet developed plans to mitigate the loss of these and other sensors on a long-term basis. Until such a plan is developed, the agencies may lose windows of opportunity for selecting cost effective options or they may resort to an ad hoc approach to restoring these sensors. Almost 2 years have passed since key sensors were removed from the NPOESS program; further delays in establishing a plan could result in gaps in the continuity of climate and space environment data.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The planned National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite  System (NPOESS) program is expected to be a state-of-the-art,  environment-monitoring satellite system that will replace two existing  polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems. Polar-orbiting satellites  provide data and imagery that are used by weather forecasters,  climatologists, and the military to map and monitor changes in weather,  climate, the oceans, and the environment. The NPOESS program is  considered critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity  of data required for weather forecasting (including severe weather events  such as hurricanes) and global climate monitoring through the year 2026.
Three agencies share responsibility for the NPOESS acquisition: the  Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD)/United States  Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration  (NASA). These agencies established a tri-agency integrated program office  to manage the NPOESS program. In recent years, this program  experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties,  leading to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program. This decision  decreased the complexity of the program by reducing the number of  satellites and sensors, increased the estimated cost of the program to $12.5  billion, and delayed the launches of the first two satellites by 3 to 5 years.  The launch of a demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory  Project (NPP), was also delayed by about 3 years. NPP is expected to  reduce NPOESS risks by providing an early opportunity to work with the  sensors, ground systems, and data processing systems. It is also  envisioned to provide continuity of weather and climate data should  predecessor satellites degrade or fail. In addition, when the restructuring  decision removed four climate and space environment sensors from the  program and reduced the functionality of four others, the program was  directed to restore a limited version of one sensor and to restore the seven  others if sponsored and funded outside the program.
This report responds to your request that we (1) evaluate the NPOESS  program office’s progress in restructuring the acquisition, (2) assess the  status of key program components and risks, (3) identify how much notice  the program office would need if agency sponsors outside the program  choose to restore the eliminated or degraded sensors to the NPOESS  program, and (4) assess NASA’s, NOAA’s, and DOD’s plans for obtaining  the environmental data originally planned to be collected by NPOESS  sensors, but then eliminated by the restructuring.
To address our objectives, we reviewed program documentation including  the decision memo that restructured the program, status briefings,  milestone progress reports, and reports on program and agency plans for  restoring sensors to the NPOESS program. We analyzed earned value  management data obtained from the contractor to determine performance  against cost and schedule estimates. We also interviewed relevant agency  officials from NOAA, NASA, and DOD. In addition, this work builds on  reviews we have done on environmental satellites over the last several  years.
We conducted our work at the NPOESS Integrated Program Office  headquarters and at NOAA, NASA, and DOD facilities in the Washington,  D.C., metropolitan area. In addition, we conducted work at a contractor’s  facility in Boulder, Colorado, and at the Air Force Weather Agency in  Omaha, Nebraska, because of the importance of these sites to the planned  integration and operations of the NPP satellite. We conducted this  performance audit from June 2007 to April 2008 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Additional details on  our objectives, scope, and methodology are provided in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate operational  polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-orbiting  Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is managed by  NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), which  is managed by the Air Force. These satellites obtain environmental data  that are processed to provide graphical weather images and specialized  weather products. These satellite data are also the predominant input to  numerical weather prediction models, which are a primary tool for  forecasting weather 3 or more days in all advance—including forecasting  the path and intensity of hurricanes. The weather products and models are  used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so that  communities and emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate their  effects. Polar satellites also provide data used to monitor environmental  phenomena, such as ozone depletion and drought conditions, as well as  data sets that are used by researchers for a variety of studies such as  climate monitoring.
Unlike geostationary satellites, which maintain a fixed position relative to  the earth, polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the earth in an almost  north-south orbit, providing global coverage of conditions that affect the  weather and climate. Each satellite makes about 14 orbits a day. As the  earth rotates beneath it, each satellite views the entire earth’s surface  twice a day. Currently, there are two operational POES satellites and two  operational DMSP satellites that are positioned so that they can observe  the earth in early morning, midmorning, and early afternoon polar orbits.  Together, they ensure that, for any region of the earth, the data provided  to users are generally no more than 6 hours old. Figure 1 illustrates the  current operational polar satellite configuration. Besides the four  operational satellites, six older satellites are in orbit that still collect some  data and are available to provide limited backup to the operational  satellites should they degrade or fail. In the future, the Air Force plans to  continue to launch an additional DMSP satellite every few years; the last is  currently expected to launch in 2012. NOAA plans to launch the final  remaining POES satellite in 2009.
subsections: section_title: Polar Satellite Data and Products
paragraphs: Polar satellites gather a broad range of data that are transformed into a  variety of products. Satellite sensors observe different bands of radiation  wavelengths, called channels, which are used for remotely determining  information about the earth’s atmosphere, land surface, oceans, and the  space environment. When first received, satellite data are considered raw  data. To make them usable, the processing centers format the data so that  they are time-sequenced and include earth location and calibration  information. After formatting, these data are called raw data records. The  centers further process these raw data records into channel-specific data  sets, called sensor data records and temperature data records. These data  records are then used to derive weather and climate products called  environmental data records (EDR). EDRs include a wide range of  atmospheric products detailing cloud coverage, temperature, humidity,  and ozone distribution; land surface products showing snow cover,  vegetation, and land use; ocean products depicting sea surface  temperatures, sea ice, and wave height; and characterizations of the space  environment. Combinations of these data records (raw, sensor,  temperature, and environmental data records) are also used to derive  more sophisticated products, including outputs from numerical weather  models and assessments of climate trends. Figure 2 is a simplified  depiction of the various stages of satellite data processing, and figures 3  and 4 depict examples of EDR weather products. Specifically, figure 3  depicts a product used in weather forecasting, and figure 4 depicts a  product used in climate monitoring. Figure 5 depicts a derived product  that demonstrates how climate measurements can be aggregated over time  to identify long-term trends. In commenting on a draft of this report,  NOAA officials noted that while EDRs can be a valuable source of climate  data, the scientific community also needs climate data records. These  records require their own algorithms, data handling systems, and  calibration/validation in order to ensure consistency in processing and  reprocessing over years and decades.
section_title: NPOESS Overview
paragraphs: With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would  reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994  Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the  two satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of satisfying  both civilian and military requirements. The converged program,  NPOESS, is considered critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the  continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate  monitoring through the year 2026. To manage this program, DOD, NOAA,  and NASA formed the tri-agency Integrated Program Office, located within  NOAA.
Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain activities:  NOAA has overall program management responsibility for the converged  system and for satellite operations; DOD’s Air Force has the lead on the  acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for facilitating the  development and incorporation of new technologies into the converged  system. NOAA and DOD share the costs of funding NPOESS, while NASA  funds specific technology projects and studies. Figure 6 depicts the  organizations that make up the NPOESS program office and lists their  responsibilities.
The NPOESS program office is overseen by an executive committee that is  made up of the administrators of NOAA and NASA and the Undersecretary  of the Air Force.
NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated to  cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from its  inception in 1995 through 2018. The program is to provide satellite  development, satellite launch and operation, and ground-based satellite  data processing. These deliverables are grouped into four main categories:  (1) the space segment, which includes the satellites and sensors; (2) the  integrated data processing segment, which is the system for transforming  raw data into EDRs and is to be located at the four processing centers; (3)  the command, control, and communications segment, which includes the  equipment and services needed to support satellite operations; and (4) the  launch segment, which includes the launch vehicle services.
When the NPOESS engineering, manufacturing, and development contract  was awarded in August 2002, the cost estimate was adjusted to $7 billion.  Acquisition plans called for the procurement and launch of six satellites  over the life of the program, as well as the integration of 13 instruments— consisting of 10 environmental sensors and 3 subsystems. Together, the  sensors were to receive and transmit data on atmospheric, cloud cover,  environmental, climatic, oceanographic, and solar-geophysical  observations. The subsystems were to support nonenvironmental search  and rescue efforts, sensor survivability, and environmental data collection  activities. The program office considered 4 of the sensors to be critical  because they provide data for key weather products; these sensors are in  bold in table 1, which describes each of the expected NPOESS  instruments.
In addition, a demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory  Project (NPP), was planned to be launched several years before the first  NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk associated with launching  new sensor technologies and to ensure continuity of climate data with  NASA’s Earth Observing System satellites. NPP was to host three of the  four critical NPOESS sensors, as well as one other no critical sensor and  to provide the program office and the processing centers an early  opportunity to work with the sensors, ground control, and data processing  systems.
When the NPOESS development contract was awarded, the schedule for  launching the satellites was driven by a requirement that the satellites be  available to back up the final POES and DMSP satellites should anything  go wrong during the planned launches of these satellites. Early program  milestones included (1) launching NPP by May 2006, (2) having the first  NPOESS satellite available to back up the final POES satellite launch in  March 2008, and (3) having the second NPOESS satellite available to back  up the final DMSP satellite launch in October 2009. If the NPOESS  satellites were not needed to back up the final predecessor satellites, their  anticipated launch dates would have been April 2009 and June 2011,  respectively.
section_title: Continuing Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical Problems Led to a Decision to Restructure the NPOESS Program
paragraphs: Over several years, we reported that NPOESS had experienced continued  cost increases, schedule delays, and serious technical problems. By  November 2005, we estimated that the cost of the program had grown  from $7 billion to over $10 billion. In addition, the program was  experiencing major technical problems with the VIIRS sensor and  expected to delay the launch date of the first satellite by almost 2 years.  These issues ultimately required difficult decisions to be made about the  program’s direction and capabilities.
The Nunn-McCurdy law requires DOD to take specific actions when a  major defense acquisition program growth exceeds certain cost  thresholds. Key provisions of the law require the Secretary of Defense to  notify Congress when a major defense acquisition is expected to overrun  its baseline by 15 percent or more and to certify the program to Congress  when it is expected to overrun its baseline by 25 percent or more. In  November 2005, NPOESS exceeded the 25 percent threshold, and DOD  was required to certify the program. Certifying a program entails providing  a determination that (1) the program is essential to national security, (2)  there are no alternatives to the program that will provide equal or greater  military capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the program’s cost  are reasonable, and (4) the management structure for the program is  adequate to manage and control costs. DOD established tri-agency  teams—made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA experts—to work on each of  the four elements of the certification process.
In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner agencies)  certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to cost $12.5 billion  through 2026. This decision approved a cost increase of $4 billion over the  prior approved baseline cost and delayed the launch of NPP and the first 2  satellites by roughly 3 to 5 years. The new program also entailed reducing  the number of satellites to be produced and launched from 6 to 4, and  reducing the number of instruments on the satellites from 13 to 9— consisting of 7 environmental sensors and 2 subsystems. It also entailed  using NPOESS satellites in the early morning and afternoon orbits and  relying on European satellites for midmorning orbit data. Table 2  summarizes the major program changes made under the Nunn-McCurdy  certification decision.
The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision established new milestones for  the delivery of key program elements, including launching NPP by January  2010, launching the first NPOESS satellite (called C1) by January 2013,  and launching the second NPOESS satellite (called C2) by January 2016.  These revised milestones deviated from prior plans to have the first  NPOESS satellite available to back up the final POES satellite should  anything go wrong during that launch. Table 3 summarizes changes in key  program milestones over time.
Delaying the launch of the first NPOESS satellite meant that if the final  POES satellite fails on launch, satellite data users would need to rely on  the existing constellation of environmental satellites until NPP data  becomes available—almost 2 years later. Although NPP was not intended  to be an operational asset, NASA agreed to move NPP to a different orbit  so that its data would be available in the event of a premature failure of  the final POES satellite. If the health of the existing constellation of  satellites diminishes—or if NPP data is not available, timely, and reliable— there could be a gap in environmental satellite data.
In order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn-McCurdy certification  decision decreased the number of NPOESS sensors from 13 to 9 and  reduced the functionality of 4 sensors. Specifically, of the 13 original  sensors, 5 sensors remain unchanged (but 2 are on a reduced number of  satellites), 3 were replaced with older or less capable sensors, 1 was  modified to provide less functionality, and 4 were canceled. Table 4  delineates the changes made.
Table 5 shows the changes to NPOESS instruments, including the 4 critical  sensors identified in bold, and the planned configuration for NPP and the  four satellites of the NPOESS program, called C1, C2, C3, and C4. Program  officials acknowledged that this configuration could change if other  parties decided to develop the sensors that were canceled. However, they  stated that the planned configuration of the first satellite (C1) cannot  change without increasing the risk that the launch would be delayed.
The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of the  resulting weather and environmental products, called EDRs. In selecting  sensors for the restructured program during the Nunn-McCurdy process,  decision makers placed the highest priority on continuing current  operational weather capabilities and a lower priority on obtaining selected  environmental and climate measuring capabilities. As a result, the revised  NPOESS system has significantly less capability for providing global  climate measures than was originally planned. Specifically, the number of  EDRs was decreased from 55 to 39, of which 6 are of a reduced quality.  The 39 EDRs that remain include cloud base height, land surface  temperature, precipitation type and rate, and sea surface winds. The 16  EDRs that were removed include cloud particle size and distribution, sea  surface height, net solar radiation at the top of the atmosphere, and  products to depict the electric fields in the space environment. The 6  EDRs that are of a reduced quality include ozone profile, soil moisture,  and multiple products depicting energy in the space environment.
section_title: Prior Report Recommended Steps to Mitigate Program Risks
paragraphs: In April 2007, we reported that while the program office had made  progress in restructuring NPOESS since the June 2006 Nunn-McCurdy  certification decision, important tasks leading up to finalizing contract  changes remained to be completed. Specifically, the program had  established and implemented interim program plans guiding the  contractor’s work activities in 2006 and 2007 and had made progress on  drafting key acquisition documents, including the system engineering plan,  the test and evaluation master plan, and the memorandum of agreement  between the agencies. However, executive approval of those documents  was about 6 months late at that time—due in part to the complexity of  navigating three agencies’ approval processes.
We also reported that the program office had made progress in  establishing an effective management structure, but that plans to reassign  the Program Executive Officer would unnecessarily increase risks to an  already risky program. Additionally, we found that the program lacked a  process and plan for identifying and filling staffing shortages, which led to  delays in key activities such as cost estimating and contract revisions. We  reported that until this process is in place, the NPOESS program faced  increased risk of further delays.
To address these issues, we recommended that the appropriate agency  executives finalize key acquisition documents by the end of April 2007 in  order to allow the restructuring of the program to proceed. We also  recommended that NPOESS program officials develop and implement a  written process for identifying and addressing human capital needs and that  they establish a plan to immediately fill needed positions. In addition, to  reduce program risks, we recommended that DOD delay the reassignment of  the Program Executive Officer until all sensors were delivered to NPP.
The agencies’ response to these recommendations has been mixed. While  the program office is still working to complete selected acquisition  documents, program officials documented the program’s staffing process  and have made progress in filling selected budgeting and system  engineering vacancies. DOD, however, reassigned the Program Executive  Officer in July 2007. A new Program Executive Officer is now in place.
section_title: Earned Value Management Techniques Provide Insight on Program Cost and Schedule
paragraphs: To effectively oversee an acquisition, project managers need current  information on a contractor’s progress in meeting contract deliverables.  One method that can help project managers track this progress is earned  value management. This method, used by DOD for several decades,  compares the value of work accomplished during a given period with that  of the work expected in that period.
Differences from expectations are measured in both cost and schedule  variances. Cost variances compare the earned value of the completed  work with the actual cost of the work performed. For example, if a  contractor completed $5 million worth of work and the work actually cost  $6.7 million, there would be a -$1.7 million cost variance. Schedule  variances are also measured in dollars, but they compare the earned value  of the work completed with the value of work that was expected to be  completed. For example, if a contractor completed $5 million worth of  work at the end of the month but was budgeted to complete $10 million  worth of work, there would be a -$5 million schedule variance. Positive  variances indicate that activities are costing less or are completed ahead  of schedule. Negative variances indicate activities are costing more or are  falling behind schedule. These cost and schedule variances can then be  used in estimating the cost and time needed to complete the program.
section_title: Major Restructuring Activities Have Been Completed, but Key Activities Remain
paragraphs: The program office has completed major activities associated with  restructuring NPOESS, but key supporting activities remain—including  obtaining approval of key acquisition documents. Restructuring a major  acquisition program like NPOESS is a process that involves reassessing  and redefining the program’s deliverables, costs, and schedules, and  renegotiating the contract. The restructuring process also involves revising  important acquisition documents such as the tri-agency memorandum of  agreement, the acquisition strategy, the system engineering plan, the  integrated master schedule defining what needs to happen by when, and  the acquisition program baseline.
During the past year, the program redefined the program’s deliverables,  costs, and schedules, and renegotiated the NPOESS contract. To do so, the  program developed a new program plan and conducted an integrated  baseline review of the entire program, which validated that the new  deliverables, costs, and schedules were feasible. It also completed key  acquisition documents including the system engineering plan and the  integrated master schedule. The program and the prime contractor  renegotiated their agreement and signed a modified contract in July 2007.
However, key activities remain to be completed, including obtaining  executive approval of key acquisition documents. Specifically, even  though agency officials were expected to approve key acquisition  documents by September 2007, the appropriate executives have not yet  signed off on documents including the tri-agency memorandum of  agreement or the acquisition strategy report. They have also not signed off  on the acquisition program baseline, the fee management plan, the test and  evaluation master plan, and the two-orbit program plan (a plan for how to  use European satellite data with NPOESS). Appendix II provides more  information on the status of these documents.
Program officials stated that the program has been able to renegotiate the  contract and to proceed in developing sensors and systems without these  documents being signed because the documents have widespread  acceptance within the three agencies. They reported that the delays are  largely due to the complexity of obtaining approval from three agencies.  For example, program officials reported that an organization within DOD  suggested minor changes to the tri-agency memorandum of agreement  after months of coordination and after it had already been signed by both  the Secretary of Commerce and the Administrator of NASA. The program  office has now made the recommended changes and is re-initiating the  coordination process. In addition, NASA disagreed with the fee  management plan because it wanted to have an incentive associated with  the on-orbit performance of the NPP satellite. The program office is  currently trying to address NASA’s concerns, but stated that the current  plan is in effect for this fiscal year and any changes would have to wait  until fiscal year 2009. These disagreements further delay an already  delayed restructuring process. Without executive approval of key  acquisition documents, the program lacks the underlying commitment  necessary to effectively manage a tri-agency program. In our prior report,  we recommended that the appropriate executives immediately finalize key  acquisition documents. This recommendation remains open.
section_title: NPOESS Program Has Made Progress, but Key Milestones Have Been Delayed and Risks Remain
paragraphs: Over the last year, the NPOESS program has made progress by completing  planned development and testing activities on its ground and space  segments, but key milestones for delivering the VIIRS sensor and  launching NPP have been delayed by about 8 months. Moving forward,  risks remain in completing the testing of key sensors and integrating them  on the NPP spacecraft, in resolving interagency disagreements on the  appropriate level of system security, and in revising estimated costs for  satellite operations and support. The program office is aware of these risks  and is working to mitigate them, but continued problems could affect the  program’s overall schedule and cost. Given the tight time frames for  completing key sensors, integrating them on the NPP spacecraft, and  getting the ground-based data processing system developed, tested, and  deployed, it is important for the NPOESS Integrated Program Office, the  Program Executive Office, and the Executive Committee to continue to  provide close oversight of milestones and risks.
subsections: section_title: Ground Segment— Progress Has Been Made, but Important Work Remains to Be Done
paragraphs: Development of the ground segment—which includes the interface data  processing system, the ground stations that are to receive satellite data,  and the ground-based command, control, and communications system—is  under way and on track. For example, the Interface Data Processing  System has been installed at one of the two locations that are to receive  NPP data, and the command, control, and communications system passed  acceptance testing for use with NPP. However, important work in  developing the algorithms that translate satellite data into weather  products within the integrated data processing segment remains to be  completed. Table 6 describes each of the components of the ground  segment and identifies the program-provided risk level and status of each.
Using contractor-provided data, our analysis of the earned value data for  the ground segment indicates that cost and schedule performance were  generally on track between March 2007 and February 2008 (see fig. 7).  Between these dates, the contractor completed slightly more work than  planned on both the IDPS and command, control, and communications  components. In addition, the contractor finished slightly over budget for  the IDPS component and slightly under budget for the command, control,  and communications component. This caused cost and schedule variances  that were less than 1 percent off of expectations.
section_title: Space Segment—Progress Made, but One Sensor Has Been Delayed and Sensors Continue to Face Risks
paragraphs: Over the past year, the program made progress on the development of the  space segment, which includes the sensors and the spacecraft. Five  sensors are of critical importance because they are to be launched on the  NPP satellite. Initiating work on another sensor, the Microwave Imager  Sounder, is also important because this new sensor—which is to replace  the canceled Conical-scanned microwave imager/sounder sensor—will  need to be developed in time for the second NPOESS satellite launch.  Among other activities, the program has successfully completed ambient  testing of the VIIRS flight unit, structural vibration testing of the flight unit  of the Cross-track infrared sounder, risk reduction testing of the flight unit  of the Ozone mapper/profiler suite, and thermal testing of the NPP  spacecraft with three sensors on board. In addition, the program made  decisions on how to proceed with the Microwave imager sounder and  plans to contract with a government laboratory by the end of April 2008.
However, the program experienced problems on VIIRS, including poor  workmanship on selected subcomponents and delays in completing key  tests. These issues delayed VIIRS delivery to the NPP contractor by 8  months. This late delivery will in turn delay the NPP launch from late  September 2009 to early June 2010. This delay in NPP shortens the time  available for incorporating lessons learned from NPP while it is in orbit  into future NPOESS missions and could lead to gaps in the continuity of  climate and weather data if predecessor satellites fail prematurely. Also,  the Cross-track infrared sounder sensor experienced a cost overrun and  schedule delays as the contractor worked to recover from a structural  failure. The status and risk level of each of the components of the space  segment is described in table 7.
Our analysis of contractor-provided earned value data showed that the  NPOESS space segment has experienced negative cost and schedule  variances between March 2007 and February 2008 (see fig. 8). Specifically,  the contractor exceeded cost targets for the space segment by $15.1  million —which is 5.1 percent of the $298.2 million space segment budget  for that time period. Similarly, the contractor was unable to complete $2  million worth of work in the space segment—which is less than 1 percent  of the space segment budget for that time period.
section_title: Program Risks Remain; Continued Oversight Is Needed to Prevent Further Cost Increases and Schedule Delays
paragraphs: Moving forward, the program continues to face risks. Over the next 2  years, it will need to complete the development of the key sensors, test  them, integrate and test them on the NPP spacecraft, and test these  systems with the ground-based data processing systems. In addition, the  program faces two other issues that could affect its overall schedule and  cost. One is that there continues to be disagreement between NOAA and  DOD on the appropriate level of system security. To date, NPOESS has  been designed and developed to meet DOD’s standards for a mission  essential system, but NOAA officials believe that the system should be  built to meet more stringent standards. Implementing more stringent  standards could cause rework and retesting, and potentially affect the cost  and schedule of the system. Another issue is that program life cycle costs  could increase once a better estimate of the cost of operations and support  is known. The $12.5 billion estimated life cycle cost for NPOESS includes  a rough estimate of $1 billion for operations and support. Program officials  have identified the potential for this cost to grow as a moderate risk.
The NPOESS program office is working closely with the contractor and  subcontractors to resolve these program risks. To address sensor risks,  the program office and officials from NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center  commissioned an independent review team to assess the thoroughness  and adequacy of practices being used in the assembly, integration, and  testing of the VIIRS and CrIS instruments in preparation for the NPP  spacecraft. The team found that the contractors for both sensors had  sound test programs in place, but noted risks with VIIRS’s schedule and  with CrIS’s reliability and performance. The program office adjusted the  VIIRS testing schedule and is monitoring the CrIS testing results. In  addition, the program office recently instituted biweekly senior-level  management meetings to review progress on VIIRS’s development, and  program officials noted that both the prime contractor and the program  executive office will have senior officials onsite at the contractor’s facility  to provide extensive, day-to-day oversight of management activities to  assist in resolving issues.
To address the risk posed by changing security requirements late in the  system’s development, program officials commissioned a study to  determine the effect of more stringent standards on the system. This study  was completed by the end of March 2008, but has not yet been released. To  address the risk of cost growth due to poor estimates of operations and  support costs, DOD’s cost analysis group is currently refining this  estimate. A revised estimate is expected by June 2008.
The program office is aware of program risks and is working to mitigate  them, but continued problems could affect the program’s overall schedule  and cost. Given the tight time frames for completing key sensors,  integrating them on the NPP spacecraft, and getting the ground-based data  processing system developed, tested, and deployed, it is important for the  NPOESS program office, the Program Executive Office, and the Executive  Committee to continue to provide close oversight of milestones and risks.
section_title: Program Office Identified Preferred Timelines for Decisions on Restoring Sensors to NPOESS
paragraphs: When the Nunn-McCurdy restructuring agreement removed certain  sensors from NPOESS, the program was instructed to plan for the  reintegration of those sensors. Specifically, the certification decision  directed the program to build each NPOESS spacecraft with enough room  and power to accommodate the sensors that were removed from the  program and to fund the integration and testing of any sensors that are  later restored. Agency sponsors external to the program are responsible  for justifying and funding the sensor’s development, while the NPOESS  Executive Committee has the final decision on whether to include the  sensor on a specific satellite. Table 8 denotes sensors that were canceled  under the Nunn-McCurdy agreement, but could be restored to the different  satellites.
The NPOESS program office has requested that any entities that plan to  restore a sensor to an NPOESS satellite provide them 6 years’ notice. This  includes 4 years for the sensor to be developed and tested, and 2 years for  integration and testing on the spacecraft. Table 9 provides a listing of  dates based on current launch dates for each NPOESS satellite.
The program office developed its tentative timelines using historical data  for similar programs, but program officials reported that more or less time  might be required depending on the status of the sensor to be added. For  example, a sensor based on existing sensors may require less time, while a  more advanced sensor could require more time.
section_title: Agencies Have Undertaken Preliminary Steps to Restore Key Sensors, but Lack Timely Plans to Ensure Long-Term Data Continuity
paragraphs: NASA, NOAA, and DOD have taken preliminary steps to restore the  capabilities of selected climate and space weather sensors that were  degraded or removed from the NPOESS program by prioritizing the  sensors, assessing options for restoring them, and making decisions to  restore two sensors in order to mitigate near-term data gaps. However, the  agencies have not yet developed plans to mitigate the loss of these sensors  on a long-term basis. Best practices in strategic planning suggest that  agencies develop and implement long-term plans to guide their short-term  activities. Until such plans are developed, the agencies may lose their  windows of opportunity for selecting cost-effective options or they may  resort to an ad hoc approach to restoring these sensors. Lacking plans  almost 2 years after key sensors were removed from the NPOESS  program, the agencies face increased risk of gaps in the continuity of  climate and space environment data.
While NPOESS was originally envisioned to provide only weather  observations, this mission was later expanded to include long-term  continuity for key climate data. Maintaining the continuity of climate and  space data over decades is important to identify long-term environmental  cycles (such as the 11-year solar cycle and multiyear ocean cycles  including the El Niño effect) and their impacts, and to detect trends in  climate change and global warming. The Nunn-McCurdy restructuring  decision removed four sensors and degraded the functionality of four  other sensors that were to provide these data. DOD, NASA, and NOAA are  now responsible for determining what to restore, how to restore it, and the  means for doing so. This responsibility includes justifying the additional  funding needed to develop these sensors within their respective agencies’  investment decision processes. Best practices of leading organizations call  for defining a strategic plan to formalize priorities and plans for meeting  mission goals. Such a plan would include the agency’s long-term goals for  climate and space weather measurements, the short-term activities needed  to attain these goals, and the milestones and resources needed to support  the planned activities.
subsections: section_title: NASA, NOAA, and DOD Have Identified Priorities, Assessed Options, and Made Decisions to Restore Two Sensors
paragraphs: Since the June 2006 restructuring, NASA, NOAA, and DOD have taken  preliminary steps to restore sensor capabilities by determining priorities  for restoring sensor capabilities, assessing options for obtaining sensor  data over time, and making decisions to restore selected sensors.  Specifically, in August 2006, the NPOESS Senior User Advisory Group—a  group representing NASA, NOAA, and DOD system users—assessed the  impact of the canceled or degraded sensors and identified priorities for  restoring them. In January 2007, a NOAA and NASA working group on  climate sensors prioritized which of the sensors were most important to  restore for climate purposes and proposed possible solutions and  mitigation efforts. In addition, the National Research Council (NRC)  reported on the impact of the canceled sensors. Table 10 summarizes the  results of these studies.
In addition to prioritizing the sensors, NASA, NOAA, and DOD identified a  variety of options for obtaining key sensor data over the next two decades  and continue to seek other options. The agencies identified options  including adding sensors back to a later NPOESS satellite, adding sensors  to another planned satellite, and developing a new satellite to include  several of the sensors. Examples of options for several sensors are  provided in figure 9. In addition, in December 2007, NOAA released a  request for information to determine whether commercial providers could  include selected environmental sensors on their satellites.
In addition to prioritizing sensors and identifying options, over the last  year, NASA, NOAA, and DOD have taken steps to restore two sensors on a  near-term basis. Specifically, in April 2007, the NPOESS Executive  Committee decided to restore the limb component of the Ozone  mapper/profiler suite to the NPP satellite and, in January 2008, to add the  Clouds and the earth’s radiant energy system to NPP. These decisions are  expected to provide continuity for these sensors through approximately  2015. NASA officials noted that they also took steps to mitigate a potential  gap in total solar irradiance data by proposing to fund an additional 4  years of the SORCE mission (from 2008 to 2012).
section_title: Agencies Lack Plans to Ensure Long-Term Data Continuity
paragraphs: While NASA, NOAA, and DOD have taken preliminary steps to address the  climate and space sensors that were removed from the NPOESS program  almost 2 years ago, they do not yet have plans for restoring climate and  space environment data on a long-term basis. The Office of Science and  Technology Policy, an organization within the Executive Office of the  President, is currently working with NASA, NOAA, and DOD to sort  through the costs and benefits of the various options and to develop plans.  However, this effort has been under way for almost 2 years and officials  could not estimate when such plans would be completed.
Delays in developing a comprehensive strategy for ensuring climate and  space data continuity may result in the loss of selected options. For  example, NASA and NOAA estimated that they would need to make a  decision on whether to include a Total solar irradiance sensor on its  planned Landsat Data Continuity Mission by March 2008, and on whether  to build another satellite to obtain ocean altimeter data in 2008. Also, the  NPOESS program office estimated that if any sensors are to be restored to  an NPOESS satellite, it would need a decision about 6 years in advance of  the planned satellite launch. Specifically, for a sensor to be included on  the second NPOESS satellite, the sponsoring agency would need to  commit to do so by January 2010.
Without a timely decision on a plan for restoring satellite data on a long- term basis, NASA, NOAA, and DOD risk losing their windows of  opportunity on selected options and restoring sensors in an ad hoc  manner. Ultimately, the agencies risk a break in the continuity of climate  and space environment data. As national and international concerns about  climate change and global warming grow, these data are more important  than ever to try to understand long-term climate trends and impacts.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Over the past year, program officials have completed major activities  associated with restructuring the NPOESS program and have made  progress in developing and testing sensors, ground systems, and the NPP  spacecraft. However, agency executives have still not signed off on key  acquisition documents that were to be completed in September 2007, and  one critical sensor has experienced technical problems and schedule  delays that have led program officials to delay the NPP launch date by  about 8 months. Any delay in the NPP launch date shortens the time  available for incorporating lessons learned from NPP onto future NPOESS  missions and could also lead to gaps in critical climate and weather data.
When selected climate and space weather sensors were removed from the  NPOESS program during its restructuring, NASA, NOAA, and DOD became  responsible for determining what sensors to restore and how to restore  them. This responsibility includes justifying the additional funding needed  to develop these sensors within their respective agency’s investment  decision processes. In the 2 years since the restructuring, the agencies  have identified their priorities and assessed their options for restoring  sensor capabilities. In addition, the agencies made decisions to restore two  sensors to the NPP satellite in order to mitigate near-term data gaps.  However, the agencies lack plans for restoring sensor capabilities on a  long-term basis. Without a timely decision on a long-term plan for  restoring satellite data, the agencies risk a break in the continuity of  climate and space environment data. With the increased concern about  climate change and global warming, these data are more important than  ever to try to understand long-term climate trends and impacts.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order to bring closure to efforts that have been under way for years, we  are making recommendations to the Secretaries of Commerce and  Defense and to the Administrator of NASA to establish plans on whether  and how to restore the climate and space sensors removed from the  NPOESS program by June 2009, in cases where the sensors are warranted  and justified.
In addition, we are reemphasizing our prior recommendation that the  appropriate NASA, NOAA, and DOD executives immediately finalize key  acquisition documents.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary  of the Department of Commerce (see app. III), the Deputy Assistant  Secretary for Networks and Information Integration of the Department of  Defense (see app. IV), and the Associate Administrator for the Science  Mission Directorate of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration  (see app. V). In their comments, all three agencies concurred with our  recommendations. In addition, both the Department of Commerce and  NASA reiterated that they are working with their partner agencies to  finalize plans for restoring sensors to address the nation’s long-term needs  for continuity of climate measurements. Further, Commerce noted that  DOD and NASA executives need to weigh in to resolve issues at, or  immediately below, their levels in order to ensure prompt completion of  the key acquisition documents. NASA noted that difficulties in gaining  consensus across all three NPOESS agencies have delayed the signature of  key acquisition documents, and reported that they are committed to  moving these documents through the signature cycle once all of the issues  and concerns are resolved.
All three agencies also provided technical comments, which we have  incorporated in this report as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested  congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of  Defense, the Administrator of NASA, the Director of the Office of  Management and Budget, and other interested parties. In addition, this  report will be available at no charge on our Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major  contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the National Polar-orbiting Operational  Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program office’s progress in  restructuring the acquisition, (2) assess the status of key program  components and risks, (3) identify how much notice the program office  would need if agency sponsors outside the program choose to restore the  eliminated or degraded sensors to the NPOESS program, and (4) assess  plans of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),  the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and  Space Administration (NASA) for obtaining the environmental data  originally planned to be collected by NPOESS sensors, but then eliminated  under the restructuring.
To evaluate the NPOESS program office’s progress in restructuring the  acquisition program, we reviewed the program’s Nunn-McCurdy  certification decision memo, a later addendum to this decision, and  program documentation including copies of required documentation,  status briefings, and milestone progress reports. We also interviewed  program office officials and attended senior-level management program  review meetings to obtain information on the program’s acquisition  restructuring.
To evaluate the status of key program components and risks, we reviewed  program documentation associated with the program and its key  components. We analyzed briefings and monthly program management  documents to determine the status and risks of the program and key  program segments. We also analyzed earned value management data  obtained from the contractor to assess the contractor’s performance  against cost and schedule estimates. We obtained adequate assurance that  these agency-provided data had been tested and were sufficient for our  assessment purposes. We reviewed cost reports and program risk  management documents and interviewed program officials to determine  program and program segment risks that could negatively affect the  program’s ability to maintain the current schedule and cost estimates. We  also interviewed agency officials from NASA, NOAA, DOD, and the  NPOESS program office to determine the status and risks of the key  program segments. Finally, we observed senior-level management review  meetings to obtain information on the status of the NPOESS program.
To identify how much notice the program office would need if agency  sponsors outside the program choose to restore the eliminated or  degraded sensors to the NPOESS program, we reviewed the restoration  requirements in the program’s Nunn-McCurdy certification decision memo  and documentation related to the program’s planning efforts. We also  interviewed senior officials in the NPOESS program office and the  Program Executive Office to obtain information on program plans related  to sensor restoration, the historical basis for these time frames, and the  flexibility of these time frames for different sensor technologies.
To assess agency plans for obtaining the environmental data originally  planned to be collected by NPOESS sensors but then eliminated under the  restructuring, we reviewed reports and briefings produced by NASA,  NOAA, DOD, and the National Research Council on the impact of  eliminated sensors and priorities for restoring them. We also interviewed  agency officials from NASA, NOAA, and DOD, and sought and received  answers to questions from the Office of Science and Technology Policy  regarding decisions to restore two sensors to the NPOESS Preparatory  Project (NPP) satellite.
We primarily performed our work at the NPOESS Integrated Program  Office and at DOD, NASA, and NOAA offices in the Washington, D.C.,  metropolitan area. In addition, we conducted work at NOAA offices in  Suitland, Maryland, and at the Air Force Weather Agency in Omaha,  Nebraska, because these sites will be the first two sites to host the  NPOESS data processing system and to receive NPP data. We also  conducted audit work at the Boulder, Colorado, facility of the contractor  that is to integrate sensors on the NPP satellite. We conducted this  performance audit from June 2007 to April 2008 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Status of Key Acquisition Documents
paragraphs: Table 11 identifies the key NPOESS acquisition documents as well as their  original and revised due dates. Original due dates were specified in the  June 2006 restructuring decision memo. The revised due dates were  specified in an addendum to that memo, dated June 2007. Documents that  are in bold are overdue.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Commerce
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Colleen Phillips (Assistant  Director), Carol Cha, Neil Doherty, Nancy Glover, Kathleen S. Lovett, and  Kelly Shaw made key contributions to this report.