Environmental Satellites: Polar-orbiting Satellite Acquisition Faces Delays; Decisions Needed on Whether and How to Ensure Climate Data Continuity
Published: 2008-06-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is a tri-agency acquisition--managed by the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--which has experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program thereby decreasing its complexity, increasing its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying the first two satellites by 3 to 5 years. GAO was asked to summarize a report being released today that evaluates progress in restructuring the acquisition, assesses the status of key program components and risks, and assesses the agencies' plans for obtaining the data originally planned to be collected by NPOESS sensors, but eliminated by the restructuring.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The NPOESS program office has completed most of the major activities associated with restructuring the acquisition, but key activities remain to be completed. In the past year, the program redefined the program's deliverables, costs, and schedules, and renegotiated the NPOESS contract. However, agency executives have not yet finalized selected acquisition documents. Without executive approval, the program lacks the underlying commitment needed to effectively manage a tri-agency program. In addition, given that DOD has stated it would not release fiscal year 2009 funds to the NPOESS program if key acquisition documents are not completed by August 2008, delays in completing these documents could affect the program's funding and schedule. In the past year, the NPOESS program has made progress in completing development and testing activities associated with the spacecraft, sensors, and ground systems. However, key milestones have been delayed and multiple risks remain. Specifically, poor workmanship and testing delays caused an 8-month slip in the delivery of a complex imaging sensor called the Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite. This late delivery caused a corresponding 8-month delay in the expected launch date of the NPOESS Preparatory Project demonstration satellite, moving it from late September 2009 to early June 2010. Moving forward, risks remain in completing the testing of key sensors and integrating them on the spacecraft, resolving interagency disagreements about the appropriate level of system security, and revising outdated operations and support cost estimates--which program officials say could increase the lifecycle cost by about $1 billion. The program office is aware of these risks and is working to mitigate them, but these issues could affect the program's overall schedule and cost. When the NPOESS restructuring agreement removed four climate and space environment sensors from the program and degraded four others, it led NASA, NOAA, and DOD to reassess their priorities and options for obtaining climate and space environment data. Since the June 2006 restructuring decision, the three agencies have taken preliminary steps to restore the capabilities of selected climate and space weather sensors that were removed from the NPOESS program by prioritizing the sensors, assessing options for restoring them, and making decisions to mitigate near-term data continuity needs by restoring two sensors to the demonstration satellite and one sensor to the first NPOESS satellite. However, the agencies have not yet developed plans on whether and how to replace sensors on a long-term basis as no plans have been made for sensors or satellites after the first satellite of the program. Until such a plan is developed, the agencies may lose their windows of opportunity for selecting cost-effective options or they may resort to an ad hoc approach to restoring these sensors. Almost 2 years have passed since key sensors were removed from the NPOESS program; further delays in establishing a plan could result in gaps in the continuity of climate and space data.

section_title: Letter
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We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to  discuss our work on the $12.5 billion dollar National Polar-orbiting  Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program.  NPOESS is expected to be a state-of-the-art, environment- monitoring satellite system that will replace two existing polar- orbiting environmental satellite systems. Polar-orbiting satellites  provide data and imagery that are used by weather forecasters,  climatologists, and the military to map and monitor changes in  weather, climate, the oceans, and the environment. The NPOESS  program is considered critical to the United States’ ability to  maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting  (including severe weather events such as hurricanes) and global  climate monitoring through the year 2026.
Three agencies share responsibility for the NPOESS program: the  Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD)/United  States Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA). To manage the NPOESS program, these  agencies established a tri-agency integrated program office. In  recent years, the program has experienced escalating costs,  schedule delays, and technical difficulties, which led to a June 2006  decision to restructure it. This decision decreased the complexity of  the program by reducing the number of satellites and sensors,  increased the estimated cost of the program to $12.5 billion, and  delayed the launches of the first two satellites by 3 and 5 years,  respectively.
As requested, this statement summarizes our report being released  today that (1) evaluates the NPOESS program office’s progress in  restructuring the acquisition, (2) assesses the status of key program  components and risks, (3) and assesses NASA’s, NOAA’s, and DOD’s  plans for obtaining the environmental data originally planned to be  collected by NPOESS sensors, but then eliminated by the  restructuring.
In preparing this testimony, we relied on our work supporting the  accompanying report. That report contains a detailed overview of  our scope and methodology. In addition, we updated factual  information on sensors and due dates as warranted. All the work on  which this testimony is based was performed in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate  operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the  Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series— managed by NOAA—and the Defense Meteorological Satellite  Program (DMSP)—managed by the Air Force. These satellites  obtain environmental data that are processed to provide graphical  weather images and specialized weather products—including both  terrestrial and space weather. These satellite data are also the  predominant input to numerical weather prediction models, which  are a primary tool for forecasting weather 3 or more days in  advance—including forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes.  The weather products and models are used to predict the potential  impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency  managers can help prevent and mitigate their effects. Polar satellites  also provide data used to monitor environmental phenomena, such  as ozone depletion and drought conditions, as well as data sets that  are used by researchers for a variety of studies such as climate  monitoring.
subsections: section_title: NPOESS Overview
paragraphs: With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs  would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May  1994 Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to  converge the two satellite programs into a single satellite program  capable of satisfying both civilian and military requirements. The  converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United  States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather  forecasting and global climate monitoring through the year 2026. To  manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed the tri-agency  Integrated Program Office, located within NOAA.
Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain  activities: NOAA has overall program management responsibility for  the converged system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead  on the acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for  facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies  into the converged system. NOAA and DOD share the costs of  funding NPOESS, while NASA funds specific technology projects  and studies. The NPOESS program office is overseen by an  Executive Committee, which is made up of the Administrators of  NOAA and NASA and the Under Secretary of the Air Force.
NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated  to cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from  its inception in 1995 through 2018. The program is to provide  satellite development, satellite launch and operation, and ground- based satellite data processing. These deliverables are grouped into  four main categories: (1) the space segment, which includes the  satellites and sensors; (2) the integrated data processing segment,  which is the system for transforming raw data into environmental  data records (EDR) and is to be located at four data processing  centers; (3) the command, control, and communications segment,  which includes the equipment and services needed to support  satellite operations; and (4) the launch segment, which includes  launch vehicle services.
When the NPOESS engineering, manufacturing, and development  contract was awarded in August 2002, the cost estimate was  adjusted to $7 billion. Acquisition plans called for the procurement  and launch of six satellites over the life of the program, as well as  the integration of 13 instruments—consisting of 10 environmental  sensors and 3 subsystems. Together, the sensors were to receive  and transmit data on atmospheric, cloud cover, environmental,  climatic, oceanographic, and solar-geophysical observations. The  subsystems were to support non-environmental search and rescue  efforts, sensor survivability, and environmental data collection  activities. The program office considered 4 of the sensors to be  critical because they provide data for key weather products; these  sensors are in bold in table 1, which describes each of the expected  NPOESS instruments.
In addition, a demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS  Preparatory Project (NPP), was planned to be launched several  years before the first NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk  associated with launching new sensor technologies and to ensure  continuity of climate data with NASA’s Earth Observing System  satellites. NPP was to host three of the four critical NPOESS  sensors, as well as one other noncritical sensor and to provide the  program office and the processing centers an early opportunity to  work with the sensors, ground control, and data processing  systems.
When the NPOESS development contract was awarded, the  schedule for launching the satellites was driven by a requirement  that the satellites be available to back up the final POES and DMSP  satellites should anything go wrong during the planned launches of  these satellites. Early program milestones included (1) launching  NPP by May 2006, (2) having the first NPOESS satellite available to  back up the final POES satellite launch in March 2008, and (3)  having the second NPOESS satellite available to back up the final  DMSP satellite launch in October 2009. If the NPOESS satellites  were not needed to back up the final predecessor satellites, their  anticipated launch dates would have been April 2009 and June 2011,  respectively.
section_title: NPOESS Experienced Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical Problems That Led to Decision to Restructure the NPOESS Program
paragraphs: Over several years, we reported that NPOESS had experienced  continued cost increases, schedule delays, and serious technical  problems. By November 2005, we estimated that the cost of the  program had grown from $7 billion to over $10 billion. In addition,  the program was experiencing major technical problems with the  VIIRS sensor and expected to delay the launch date of the first  satellite by almost 2 years. These issues ultimately required difficult  decisions to be made about the program’s direction and capabilities.  The Nunn-McCurdy law requires DOD to take specific actions when  a major defense acquisition program cost growth exceeds certain  thresholds. The law requires the Secretary of Defense to notify  Congress when a major defense acquisition is expected to overrun  its current baseline by 15 percent or more and to certify the current  program to Congress when it is expected to overrun its baseline by  25 percent or more. In November 2005, NPOESS exceeded the 25  percent threshold, and DOD was required to certify the program.  Certifying a program entails providing a determination that (1) the  program is essential to national security, (2) there are no  alternatives to the program that will provide equal or greater  military capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the  program’s cost are reasonable, and (4) the management structure  for the program is adequate to manage and control costs. DOD  established tri-agency teams—made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA  experts—to work on each of the four elements of the certification  process.
In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner  agencies) certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to  cost $12.5 billion through 2026. This decision approved a cost  increase of $4 billion over the prior approved baseline cost and  delayed the launch of NPP and the first 2 satellites by roughly 3 to 5  years. The new program also entailed reducing the number of  satellites to be produced and launched from 6 to 4, and reducing the  number of instruments on the satellites from 13 to 9—consisting of 7  environmental sensors and 2 subsystems. It also entailed using  NPOESS satellites in the early morning and afternoon orbits and  relying on European satellites for midmorning orbit data. Table 2  summarizes the major program changes made under the Nunn- McCurdy certification decision.
The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision established new  milestones for the delivery of key program elements, including  launching NPP by January 2010, launching the first NPOESS satellite  by January 2013, and launching the second NPOESS satellite by  January 2016. These revised milestones deviated from prior plans to  have the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the final POES  satellite should anything go wrong during that launch.
Delaying the launch of the first NPOESS satellite meant that if the  final POES satellite fails on launch, satellite data users would need  to rely on the existing constellation of environmental satellites until  NPP data becomes available—almost 2 years later. Although NPP  was not intended to be an operational asset, NASA agreed to move  NPP to a different orbit so that its data would be available in the  event of a premature failure of the final POES satellite. If the health  of the existing constellation of satellites diminishes—or if NPP data  is not available, timely, and reliable—there could be a gap in  environmental satellite data.
In order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn-McCurdy  certification decision decreased the number of NPOESS sensors  from 13 to 9 and reduced the functionality of 4 sensors. Specifically,  of the 13 original sensors, 5 sensors remain unchanged (but 2 are on  a reduced number of satellites), 3 were replaced with older or less  capable sensors, 1 was modified to provide less functionality, and 4  were canceled. The certification decision also made allowances for  the reintegration of the cancelled sensors. Specifically, the program  was directed to build each NPOESS spacecraft with enough room  and power to accommodate the sensors that were removed from the  program and to fund the integration and testing of any sensors that  are later restored. Agency sponsors external to the program would  be responsible for justifying and funding the sensor’s development,  while the NPOESS Executive Committee would have the final  decision on whether to include the sensor on a specific satellite.   Table 3 identifies the changes to the NPOESS instruments.
The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of  the resulting weather and environmental products, called  environmental data records (EDR). In selecting sensors for the  restructured program during the Nunn-McCurdy process, decision  makers placed the highest priority on continuing current operational  weather capabilities and a lower priority on obtaining selected  environmental and climate measuring capabilities. As a result, the  revised NPOESS system has significantly less capability for  providing global climate measures than was originally planned.  Specifically, the number of EDRs was decreased from 55 to 39, of  which 6 are of a reduced quality. The 39 EDRs that remain include  cloud base height, land surface temperature, precipitation type and  rate, and sea surface winds. The 16 EDRs that were removed include  cloud particle size and distribution, sea surface height, net solar  radiation at the top of the atmosphere, and products to depict the  electric fields in the space environment. The 6 EDRs that are of a  reduced quality include ozone profile, soil moisture, and multiple  products depicting energy in the space environment.
section_title: Major Restructuring Activities Have Been Completed, but Key Remaining Activities Could Affect Funding and Schedule
paragraphs: The program office has completed major activities associated with  restructuring NPOESS, but key supporting activities remain— including obtaining approval of key acquisition documents—and  delays in completing these activities could affect the program’s  funding and schedule. Restructuring a major acquisition program  like NPOESS is a process that involves reassessing and redefining  the program’s deliverables, costs, and schedules, and renegotiating  the contract. The restructuring process also involves revising  important acquisition documents such as the tri-agency  memorandum of agreement, the acquisition strategy, the system  engineering plan, the integrated master schedule defining what  needs to happen by when, and the acquisition program baseline. In  April 2007, we reported that the key acquisition documents were  over six months late from their original September 2006 due date,  and we recommended that the appropriate executives immediately  finalize them. This recommendation has not yet been addressed  and agency officials subsequently extended the due dates of the  documents to September 2007.
During the past year, the program redefined the program’s  deliverables, costs, and schedules, and renegotiated the NPOESS  contract. To do so, the program developed a new program plan and  conducted an integrated baseline review of the entire program,  which validated that the new deliverables, costs, and schedules  were feasible. It also completed key acquisition documents  including the system engineering plan and the integrated master  schedule. The program and the prime contractor signed a modified  contract in July 2007.
However, key activities remain to be completed, including obtaining  executive approval of key acquisition documents. Specifically, even  though agency officials were expected to approve key acquisition  documents by September 2007, the appropriate executives have not  yet signed off on documents including the tri-agency memorandum  of agreement or the acquisition strategy report. They have also not  signed off on the acquisition program baseline, the fee management  plan, the test and evaluation master plan, and the two-orbit program  plan (a plan for how to use European satellite data with NPOESS).
Program officials stated that the program has been able to  renegotiate the contract and to proceed in developing sensors and  systems without these documents being signed because the  documents have widespread acceptance within the three agencies.  They reported that the delays are largely due to the complexity of  obtaining approval from three agencies. For example, program  officials reported that an organization within DOD suggested minor  changes to the tri-agency memorandum of agreement after months  of coordination and after it had already been signed by both the  Secretary of Commerce and the Administrator of NASA. Further,  after this issue was resolved, a senior official at DOD requested  another change to the document. The program office has now made  the recommended changes and is re-initiating the coordination  process.
More recently, in April 2008, DOD moved the due dates for all of the  acquisition documents other than the memorandum of agreement  and fee management plan from September 2007 to August 31, 2008.  (See appendix I for the history of the due dates and status of each  document). In addition, even though  DOD has had a role in delaying  these documents, the Department has stated it would not release  fiscal year 2009 funds to the program if these acquisition documents  are not completed by the new due date. Without executive approval  of key acquisition documents, the program lacks the underlying  commitment necessary to effectively manage a tri-agency program.  In addition, given DOD’s newest instructions, any further delays in  completing these acquisition documents could affect the program’s  funding and schedule.
section_title: Program Has Made Progress, but Key Milestones Have Been Delayed and Risks Remain
paragraphs: Over the last year, the NPOESS program has made progress by  completing planned development and testing activities on its ground  and space segments, but key milestones for delivering the VIIRS  sensor and launching NPP have been delayed by about 8 months.  Moving forward, risks remain in completing the testing of key  sensors and integrating them on the NPP spacecraft, in resolving  interagency disagreements on the appropriate level of system  security, and in revising estimated costs for satellite operations and  support. The program office is aware of these risks and is working  to mitigate them, but continued problems could affect the program’s  overall schedule and cost. Given the tight time frames for  completing key sensors, integrating them on the NPP spacecraft,  and getting the ground-based data processing system developed,  tested, and deployed, it is important for the NPOESS Integrated  Program Office, the Program Executive Office, and the Executive  Committee to continue to provide close oversight of milestones and  risks.
subsections: section_title: Ground Segment—Progress Made but Important Work Remains to Be Done
paragraphs: Development of the ground segment—which includes the interface  data processing system, the ground stations that are to receive  satellite data, and the ground-based command, control, and  communications system—is under way and on track. For example,  the Interface Data Processing System has been installed at one of  the two locations that are to receive NPP data, and the command,  control, and communications system passed acceptance testing for  use with NPP. However, important work in developing the  algorithms that translate satellite data into weather products within  the integrated data processing segment remains to be completed.  Table 4 describes each of the components of the ground segment  and identifies the program-provided risk level and status of each.
section_title: Space Segment—Progress Made, but One Sensor Was Delayed and Sensors Continue to Face Risks
paragraphs: Over the past year, the program made progress on the development  of the space segment, which includes the sensors and the  spacecraft. Five sensors are of critical importance because they are  to be launched on the NPP satellite. Initiating work on another  sensor, the Microwave Imager Sounder, is also important because  this new sensor—which is to replace the canceled Conical-scanned  microwave imager/sounder sensor—will need to be developed in  time for the second NPOESS satellite launch. Among other  activities, the program has successfully completed vibration testing  of the flight unit of the Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS), a major  pre-environmental testing review for the VIIRS instrument,  integration and risk reduction testing of the flight unit of the Ozone  mapper/profiler suite, and thermal testing of the NPP spacecraft  with three sensors on board. In addition, the program made  decisions on how to proceed with the Microwave imager sounder  and recently awarded a contract to a government laboratory for its  development.
However, the program experienced problems on VIIRS, including  poor workmanship on selected subcomponents and delays in  completing key tests. These issues delayed VIIRS delivery to the  NPP contractor by 8 months. This late delivery will in turn delay the  satellite’s launch from late September 2009 to early June 2010. This  delay shortens the time available for incorporating lessons learned  from NPP while it is in orbit into future NPOESS missions and could  lead to gaps in the continuity of climate and weather data if  predecessor satellites fail prematurely. Also, the CrIS sensor  experienced a cost overrun and schedule delays as the contractor  worked to recover from a structural failure and is currently several  weeks behind its schedule due to thermal vacuum testing taking  longer than planned. The status and risk level of each of the  components of the space segment is described in table 5.
section_title: Program Risks Remain; Continued Oversight Is Needed to Prevent Further Cost Increases and Schedule Delays
paragraphs: Moving forward, the program continues to face risks. Over the next  2 years, it will need to complete the development of the key sensors,  test them, integrate and test them on the NPP spacecraft, and test  these systems with the ground-based data processing systems. In  addition, the program faces two other issues that could affect its  overall schedule and cost. One is that there continues to be  disagreement between NOAA and DOD on the appropriate level of  system security. To date, NPOESS has been designed and developed  to meet DOD’s standards for a mission essential system, but NOAA  officials believe that the system should be built to meet more  stringent standards. Implementing more stringent standards could  cause rework and retesting, and potentially affect the cost and  schedule of the system. Another issue is that program life cycle  costs could increase once a better estimate of the cost of operations  and support is known. The $12.5 billion estimated life cycle cost for  NPOESS includes a rough estimate of $1 billion for operations and  support.
The NPOESS program office is working closely with the contractor  and subcontractors to resolve these program risks. To address  sensor risks, the program office and officials from NASA’s Goddard  Space Flight Center commissioned an independent review team to  assess the thoroughness and adequacy of practices being used in the  assembly, integration, and testing of the VIIRS and CrIS instruments  in preparation for the NPP spacecraft. The team found that the  contractors for both sensors had sound test programs in place, but  noted risks with VIIRS’s schedule and with CrIS’s reliability and  performance. The program office adjusted the VIIRS testing  schedule and is monitoring the CrIS testing results. In addition, the  program office recently instituted biweekly senior-level  management meetings to review progress on VIIRS’s development,  and program officials noted that both the prime contractor and the  program executive office will have senior officials onsite at the  contractor’s facility to provide extensive, day-to-day oversight of  management activities to assist in resolving issues.
To address the risk posed by changing security requirements late in  the system’s development, program officials commissioned a study  to determine the effect of more stringent standards on the system.  This study was completed in March 2008, but has not yet been  released. To address the risk of cost growth due to poor estimates of  operations and support costs, DOD’s cost analysis group is currently  refining this estimate. Program officials estimated that the program  costs could grow by about $1 billion, and expect to finalize revised  operations and support costs in July 2008.
The program office is aware of program risks and is working to  mitigate them, but these issues could affect the program’s overall  schedule and cost. Given the tight time frames for completing key  sensors, integrating them on the NPP spacecraft, and getting the  ground-based data processing system developed, tested, and  deployed, it is important for the NPOESS program office, the  Program Executive Office, and the Executive Committee to  continue to provide close oversight of milestones and risks.
section_title: Agencies Have Undertaken Preliminary Steps to Restore Key Sensors, but Lack Timely Plans to Ensure Long-Term Data Continuity
paragraphs: When the NPOESS restructuring agreement removed four climate  and space environment sensors from the program and degraded four  others, it led NASA, NOAA, and DOD to reassess their priorities and  options for obtaining climate and space environment data. Since the  June 2006 restructuring decision, the three agencies have taken  preliminary steps to restore the capabilities of selected climate and  space weather sensors that were degraded or removed from the  NPOESS program by prioritizing the sensors, assessing options for  restoring them, and making decisions to restore selected sensors in  order to mitigate near-term data gaps. However, the agencies have  not yet developed plans to mitigate the loss of these sensors on a  long-term basis. Best practices in strategic planning suggest that  agencies develop and implement long-term plans to guide their  short-term activities. Until such plans are developed, the agencies  may lose their windows of opportunity for selecting cost-effective  options or they may resort to an ad hoc approach to restoring these  sensors. Lacking plans almost 2 years after key sensors were  removed from the NPOESS program, the agencies face increased  risk of gaps in the continuity of climate and space environment data.
While NPOESS was originally envisioned to provide only weather  observations, this mission was later expanded to include long-term  continuity for key climate data. Maintaining the continuity of  climate and space data over decades is important to identify long- term environmental cycles (such as the 11-year solar cycle and  multiyear ocean cycles including the El Niño effect) and their  impacts, and to detect trends in climate change and global warming.  The Nunn-McCurdy restructuring decision removed four sensors  and degraded the functionality of four other sensors that were to  provide these data. DOD, NASA, and NOAA are now responsible for  determining what to restore, how to restore it, and the means for  doing so. This responsibility includes justifying the additional  funding needed to develop these sensors within their respective  agencies’ investment decision processes. Best practices of leading  organizations call for defining a strategic plan to formalize priorities  and plans for meeting mission goals. Such a plan would include the  agency’s long-term goals for climate and space weather  measurements, the short-term activities needed to attain these goals,  and the milestones and resources needed to support the planned  activities.
subsections: section_title: NASA, NOAA, and DOD Have Identified Priorities, Assessed Options, and Made Decisions to Restore Selected Sensors
paragraphs: Since the June 2006 restructuring, NASA, NOAA, and DOD have  taken preliminary steps to restore sensor capabilities by  determining priorities for restoring sensor capabilities, assessing  options for obtaining sensor data over time, and making decisions to  restore selected sensors. Specifically, in August 2006, the NPOESS  Senior User Advisory Group—a group representing NASA, NOAA,  and DOD system users—assessed the impact of the canceled or  degraded sensors and identified priorities for restoring them. In  January 2007, a NOAA and NASA working group on climate sensors  prioritized which of the sensors were most important to restore for  climate purposes and proposed possible solutions and mitigation  efforts. Two other groups— the National Research Council and a  NOAA-DOD working group—have also issued reports describing the  impact of the loss of climate and space environmental sensors,  respectively. Table 6 summarizes the results of these studies.
In addition to prioritizing the sensors, NASA, NOAA, and DOD  identified a variety of options for obtaining key sensor data over the  next two decades and continue to seek other options. The agencies  identified options including adding sensors back to a later NPOESS  satellite, adding sensors to another planned satellite, and developing  a new satellite to include several of the sensors. Examples of  options for several sensors are provided in figure 1. In addition, in  December 2007, NOAA released a request for information to  determine whether commercial providers could include selected  environmental sensors on their satellites.
In addition to prioritizing sensors and identifying options, over the  last year, NASA, NOAA, and DOD have taken steps to restore three  sensors on a near-term basis. Specifically, in April 2007, the NPOESS  Executive Committee decided to restore the limb component of the  Ozone mapper/profiler suite to the NPP satellite; in January 2008, to  add the Clouds and the earth’s radiant energy sensor to NPP; and in  May 2008 to add the Total solar irradiance sensor to the first  NPOESS satellite. These decisions are expected to provide  continuity for these sensors through approximately 2015. Table 7  shows the latest planned configuration of NPOESS satellites. NASA  officials noted that they also took steps to mitigate a potential gap in  total solar irradiance data by proposing to fund an additional 4 years  of the SORCE mission (from 2008 to 2012).
section_title: Agencies Lack Plans to Ensure Long-Term Data Continuity
paragraphs: While NASA, NOAA, and DOD have taken preliminary steps to  address the climate and space sensors that were removed from the  NPOESS program almost 2 years ago, they do not yet have plans for  restoring climate and space environment data on a long-term basis.  Specifically, there are as yet no firm plans for obtaining most of this  data after 2015. The Office of Science and Technology Policy, an  organization within the Executive Office of the President, is  currently working with NASA, NOAA, and DOD to sort through the  costs and benefits of the various options and to develop plans.  However, this effort has been under way for almost 2 years and  officials could not estimate when such plans would be completed.
Delays in developing a comprehensive strategy for ensuring climate  and space data continuity may result in the loss of selected options.  For example, NASA and NOAA estimated that they would need to  make a decision on whether to build another satellite to obtain  ocean altimeter data in 2008. Also, the NPOESS program office  estimated that if any sensors are to be restored to an NPOESS  satellite, it would need a decision about 6 years in advance of the  planned satellite launch. Specifically, for a sensor to be included on  the second NPOESS satellite, the sponsoring agency would need to  commit to do so by January 2010.
Without a timely decision on a plan for restoring satellite data on a  long-term basis, NASA, NOAA, and DOD risk losing their windows  of opportunity on selected options and restoring sensors in an ad  hoc manner. Ultimately, the agencies risk a break in the continuity  of climate and space environment data. As national and  international concerns about climate change and global warming  grow, these data are more important than ever to try to understand  long-term climate trends and impacts.
section_title: GAO Made Recommendations To Ensure That Future Climate Needs are Addressed and to Complete Restructuring Activities
paragraphs: Because of the importance of effectively managing the NPOESS  program to ensure that there are no gaps in the continuity of critical  weather, environmental, and climate observations, in our  accompanying report we made recommendations to the Secretaries  of Commerce and Defense and to the Administrator of NASA to  establish plans on whether and how to restore the climate and space  sensors removed from the NPOESS program by June 2009, in cases  where the sensors are warranted and justified. In their comments on  the report, all three agencies concurred with our recommendations.  In addition, both the Department of Commerce and NASA reiterated  that they are working with their partner agencies to finalize plans  for restoring sensors.
In addition, we also reemphasized a recommendation made in our  prior report that the appropriate NASA, NOAA, and DOD executives  immediately finalize key acquisition documents. All three agencies  also concurred with this recommendation. Further, Commerce  noted that DOD and NASA executives need to weigh in to resolve  issues at, or immediately below, their levels in order to ensure  prompt completion of the key acquisition documents. NASA noted  that difficulties in gaining consensus across all three NPOESS  agencies have delayed the signature of key acquisition documents,  and reported that they are committed to moving these documents  through the signature cycle once all of the issues and concerns are  resolved.
In summary, over the past year, program officials have completed  major activities associated with restructuring the NPOESS program  and have made progress in developing and testing sensors, ground  systems, and the NPP spacecraft. However, multiple risks remain.  Agency executives have still not signed off on key acquisition  documents that were originally to be completed in September 2006,  and now DOD is threatening to withhold funding if the documents  are not completed by August 2008—even though DOD has  contributed to the delays in completing these documents. Also, one  critical sensor has experienced technical problems and schedule  delays that have led program officials to delay the NPP launch date  by about 8 months. Any delay in the NPP launch date shortens the  time available for incorporating lessons learned from NPP onto  future NPOESS missions and could also lead to gaps in critical  climate and weather data. In addition, risks to the program remain  in resolving interagency disagreements on the appropriate level of  system security and in revising estimated costs for satellite  operations and support. The program office is aware of these risks  and is working to mitigate them, but continued problems could  affect the program’s overall schedule and cost.
When selected climate and space weather sensors were removed  from the NPOESS program during its restructuring, NASA, NOAA,  and DOD became responsible for determining what environmental  data to restore and how to restore them. This responsibility includes  justifying the additional funding needed to develop these sensors  within their respective agency’s investment decision processes. In  the 2 years since the restructuring, the agencies have identified their  priorities and assessed their options for restoring sensor  capabilities. In addition, the agencies made decisions to restore two  sensors to the NPP satellite and one to the first NPOESS satellite in  order to mitigate near-term data gaps. However, the agencies lack  plans for restoring sensor capabilities on a long-term basis. Without  a timely decision on a long-term plan for restoring satellite data, the  agencies risk a break in the continuity of climate and space  environment data. With the increased concern about climate change  and global warming, these data are more important than ever to try  to understand long-term climate trends and impacts.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to  answer any questions that you or members of the committee may  have at this time.
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony,  please cont act me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at  pownerd@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this testimony include  Colleen Phillips (Assistant Director), Kate Agatone, and Kathleen S.  Lovett.
section_title: Appendix I: Status of Key Acquisition Documents
paragraphs: Table 1 identifies the key NPOESS acquisition documents as well as  their original and revised due dates. Original due dates were  specified in the June 2006 restructuring decision memo. The revised  due dates were specified in an addendum to that memo, dated June  2007, and then revised again in another addendum, dated April 2008.  Documents that are in bold are overdue.