Depot Maintenance: Persistent Deficiencies Limit Accuracy and Usefulness of DOD's Funding Allocation Data Reported to Congress
Published: 2005-11-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Under 10 U.S.C. 2466, the military departments and defense agencies can use no more than 50 percent of annual depot maintenance funding for work performed by private-sector contractors. The Department of Defense (DOD) must submit a report to Congress annually on the division of depot maintenance funding between the public and private sectors during the preceding fiscal year and projected distribution for the current and ensuing fiscal years. As required, GAO reviewed the report submitted in April 2005 and is, with this report, submitting its views to Congress on whether (1) the military departments complied with the "50-50 requirement" for fiscal year 2004 and (2) the projections for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 represent reasonable estimates. Additionally, GAO is assessing whether the data currently provided in DOD's annual 50-50 report are useful to Congress in exercising its oversight role.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As in previous years, systemic weaknesses in DOD's financial systems and persistent deficiencies in 50-50 data reporting processes continue to prevent GAO from determining whether the military departments complied with the 50-50 requirement for public- and private-sector depot maintenance funding allocations for fiscal year 2004. Persistent deficiencies, such as inadequate management attention and review to ensure accurate and complete reporting, limited independent review and validation of data by audit services or other third parties, and inadequate training for those responsible for data gathering and reporting, continue to limit the quality of the 50-50 data submitted to Congress. GAO's previous reports over the last 7 years identified similar problems and recommended corrective actions, but DOD and the military services have failed to consistently implement corrective actions sufficient to resolve the deficiencies and alleviate data accuracy problems. The recurring nature of these problems indicates a management control weakness as defined under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act. Reported projections do not represent reasonable estimates of public- and private-sector depot maintenance funding allocations for fiscal years 2005 through 2006 because some data errors and omissions in DOD's prior-year report are carried into the projected years. It is difficult to project out-year data due to factors such as changing depot maintenance requirements, the ongoing consolidation of maintenance facilities, and the trend toward more contractor logistics support for new and existing weapon systems. Although DOD's current 50-50 report to Congress satisfies the annual mandate, it lacks additional detail that might be useful to Congress as it exercises its oversight role. The report currently submitted by DOD contains data that are aggregated at a high level and provides no analysis of changes from the prior years or long-term trends. The report also does not identify actual funding and workload distribution variances from year to year, nor explain the reasons behind them. Furthermore, it does not contain information as to the methodologies used to prepare the current and future year projections.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Under 10 U.S.C. § 2466, not more than 50 percent of annual depot  maintenance funding provided to the military departments and defense  agencies can be used for work accomplished by private-sector contractors.   Section 2466 also directs the Department of Defense (DOD) to submit a  report to Congress by April 1 of each year on the percentage distribution of  depot-level maintenance and repair funds between the public- and private- sectors for each military department and defense agency during the  preceding fiscal year and the projected distribution for the current and  ensuing fiscal years.  The Secretary of Defense may waive the 50 percent  limitation if he determines the waiver is necessary for national security, and  he submits notification of the waiver along with the reasons for the waiver  to Congress.  For fiscal year 2004, DOD issued the report on April 1, 2005.   All the services reported that their private sector depot maintenance  allocation fell below the 50 percent funding limitation for fiscal year 2004  and will remain below the 50 percent limitation for fiscal years 2005 and  2006.
Section 2466 also requires us to review DOD’s report to Congress and  evaluate whether DOD complied with the so-called 50-50 requirement.  This  is the eighth year that we have evaluated and reported on DOD’s annual 50- 50 report to Congress.  Specifically, this report discusses whether (1) the  military departments complied with the 50-50 requirement for public and  private sector depot maintenance funding allocations in fiscal year 2004  and (2) the projections for public- and private-sector depot maintenance  funding allocations in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 represent reasonable  estimates.  Additionally, we are providing our assessment concerning  whether the data currently provided by DOD in its annual 50-50 report are  useful to Congress in exercising its oversight role.
To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed DOD and service-specific  guidance for collecting and reporting 50-50 data, and analyzed the military  services’ procedures and internal management controls for validating  depot maintenance information included in the reported data and for  responding to the section 2466 requirements.  We assessed the reliability of  the reported depot maintenance workload funding allocations for fiscal  year 2004 for each of the military services.  To assess the reliability of  DOD’s data, we undertook a number of steps, including conducting  variance analyses and limited testing on reported funding allocations.   Based on the significance of funding variance from previous years and  other factors, we selected specific locations and weapons systems for more  in-depth reviews.  We conducted site visits, interviewed service officials  responsible for data collection, and reviewed the data for accuracy and  completeness.  For example, we verified reported obligations using the  source documents provided by service officials.  We also reviewed the  results of internal studies conducted by the service audit agencies or other  third parties, and reconciled areas of concern identified during prior years’  audits.  As discussed below, we found that the reported private- and public- sector allocation data are not reliable because of long-standing systemic weaknesses in DOD's financial systems and persistent deficiencies in 50- 50 data reporting processes.  Our analysis of projected allocations for fiscal  years 2005 and 2006 was limited because our initial audit efforts identified  significant recurring problems in these areas.  We conducted our review  from April 2005 through September 2005 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.  See appendix I for a more  detailed description of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In addition to the 50-50 requirement in 10 U.S.C. § 2466, the following  provisions directly affect the reporting of workload funding allocations to  the public and private sectors.
Section 2460 defines depot maintenance to include material  maintenance or repair requiring the overhauling, upgrading, or  rebuilding of parts, assemblies, or subassemblies and the testing and  reclamation of equipment, regardless of the source of funds or where  maintenance or repair is performed.  Depot maintenance also  encompasses software maintenance, interim contractor support, and contractor logistics support to the extent that work performed in these  categories is for depot maintenance.  The statute excludes from depot  maintenance the nuclear refueling of an aircraft carrier; the  procurement of major modifications or upgrades of weapon systems  that are designed to improve program performance; and the  procurement of parts for safety modifications, although the term does  include the installation of parts for safety modifications.
Section 2474 directs DOD to designate public depots as Centers of  Industrial and Technical Excellence and to improve their operations to serve as recognized leaders in their core competencies.   Section 342 of  the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Pub. L. No.  107-107, Dec. 28, 2001) amended this statute to exclude qualifying  public-private partnerships, referred to as private exempt, from the 50  percent funding limitation on contracting in section 2466.  Specifically,  section 342 provides that the funds expended for the performance of  depot-level maintenance by nonfederal government personnel located at  the Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence shall not be counted  when applying the 50 percent limitation if the personnel are provided  pursuant to a public-private partnership.  This exclusion initially applied  to depot maintenance funding for fiscal years 2002 through 2005.  The  exclusion later was extended to fiscal year 2006, and recently to fiscal  year 2009.
Section 2466 allows the Secretary of Defense to waive the 50 percent  limitation if he determines the waiver is necessary for national security.  The Secretary submits the notification of waiver together with the reasons  for the waiver to Congress.  Waivers were previously submitted for the Air  Force for fiscal years 2000 and 2001.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) issues guidance to the  military departments for reporting public-private workload funding  allocations.  The guidance is consistent with the definition of “depot-level  maintenance and repair” in 10 U.S.C. § 2460.  The military services have  also issued internal instructions to manage the data collection and  reporting process, tailored to their individual organizations and operating  environments.
subsections: section_title: Summary of Data in DOD’s 50-50 Report Submitted in April 2005
paragraphs: Figure 1 summarizes DOD’s April 2005 report to Congress on public- and  private-sector funding allocations for depot maintenance.  All three  departments reported that their private-sector depot maintenance  allocation fell below the 50 percent funding limitation for fiscal year 2004  and will remain below the 50 percent limitation for fiscal years 2005 and  2006.  The amounts shown are from DOD’s record of actual obligations  incurred for depot maintenance work in fiscal year 2004 and projected  obligations for fiscal years 2005 and 2006.  The percentages show the  department’s record of the relative allocations between the public and  private sectors and the exempted workload funding.
section_title: Limitations on Use of 50-50 Data as Reported by DOD
paragraphs: DOD’s 50-50 data, with our adjustments, only provide a rough  approximation of the allocation of depot maintenance funding between the  public and private sectors.  Our prior reports on depot maintenance  workload funding allocations have recognized systemic weaknesses in  DOD’s financial systems, operations, and internal controls that impede the  department’s ability to provide useful, reliable, and timely financial  information for day-to-day management and decision making.  In the  financial management systems area, DOD continues to struggle in its  efforts to implement systems to support managerial decision making.  To  date, none of the military services have passed the test of an independent  financial audit. Nonetheless, the data used to develop the 50-50 report are  the only data available and are accepted by DOD and used as input to  Congress for its congressional oversight.
section_title: Management Control Weaknesses Prevent Determination of Military Departments’ Compliance with 50-50 Requirement for Fiscal Year 2004
paragraphs: As in previous years, management control weaknesses in DOD’s financial  systems and persistent deficiencies in 50-50 data reporting processes  continue to prevent us from determining whether the military departments  complied with the 50-50 requirement for public- and private-sector depot  maintenance funding allocations for fiscal year 2004.  DOD’s April 1, 2005,  report to Congress contained data errors, omissions, and inconsistencies  due to persistent deficiencies, such as inadequate management attention  and review to ensure accurate and complete reporting, limited independent  review and validation of 50-50 data by audit services or other third parties,  and inadequate training for those responsible for data gathering and  reporting.  As a result, the data reported for the prior year cannot be relied  on to provide an accurate measure of the balance of funding between the  public and private sectors or to determine if the military departments  complied with the statutory limitation set by Congress for private-sector  depot-level maintenance funding allocations.  The recurring nature of these  deficiencies indicates a management control weakness in DOD’s 50-50 data  reporting processes significant enough to be reported in DOD’s annual  performance and accountability report.  This weakness has not been  disclosed in DOD’s annual accountability reports to Congress, even though  the issues have been identified in prior audits.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s April 2005 Report to Congress Contained Data Errors, Omissions, and Inconsistencies
paragraphs: DOD’s April 1, 2005, report to Congress contained errors, omissions, and  inconsistencies in the depot maintenance funding allocation data for fiscal  year 2004.  The net effects of correcting the data inaccuracies we identified  would increase the Army’s and Navy’s percentages of funding allocations  going to the private sector, causing both military departments to come very  close to the 50 percent private-sector limitation.  Although we also found  inaccuracies in the Air Force data, adjusting for them does not change the  funding allocation distribution percentages.  Table 1 summarizes the  amounts and effects of our adjustments to DOD’s reported depot funding  allocation data for fiscal year 2004.
Adjusting the Army’s data on the basis of the specific inaccuracies we  identified would reduce its total depot maintenance funding by  $347.1 million for fiscal year 2004.  The net effect of correcting for these  inaccuracies would increase the private-sector percentage allocation by  about 4.2 percentage points for an overall allocation of 49.2 percent.  (See  table 3 in app. II for a detailed breakout of these adjustments.)
The Army’s most significant data inaccuracies generally were due to  overreported public depot funding and underreported or unreported  private depot funding.  Adjustments to the Army’s reported public work  amounted to a $397 million decrease. The most significant of the errors in  public-sector depot maintenance reporting, $399.4 million, was due to a  transcription error.  The Army also overreported an additional $9.6 million  due to double-counting and $7.8 million for misclassifying private-sector  workload as public. Additionally, the Army underreported $18.4 million in  public-sector depot maintenance funding at the Aviation and Missile  Command and the Communications and Electronics Command and did not  report nearly $0.9 million in depot maintenance funding for the FOX  vehicle. Adjustments to the Army’s private sector workload resulted in a  net increase of $49.6 million mostly due to unreporting or underreporting.  The Army did not report private depot work for onetime repairs at a  nondepot aviation location in the amount of $20.7 million. The Army also  failed to report $2.2 million in private depot work at Anniston Army Depot  and $6.2 million in private depot work at a National Guard aviation  classification and repair depot. It also did not report $6.9 million in private  depot work for the Stryker vehicle and $5.9 million for the FOX vehicle.   For fiscal year 2004, the Army included amounts for its National  Maintenance Program, one of the two areas the Army previously  estimated made up the majority of its unreported depot-level maintenance  work performed at nondepot facilities; however, $5.7 million was  underreported because planned funding was reported instead of the  amounts actually obligated. Finally, the Army underreported $7.8 million  through a misclassification of private work as public work.
subsections: section_title: Department of the Navy
paragraphs: Adjusting the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ data on the basis of the specific  inaccuracies we identified would reduce their total depot maintenance  funding by $251.7 million for fiscal year 2004, the net effect of correcting  for these inaccuracies would increase the private-sector percentage  allocation by 2.4 percentage points for an overall allocation of 48.5 percent.   (See table 4 in app. II for a detailed breakout of these adjustments.)
The Navy’s most significant data inaccuracies generally were due to  unreported private depot funding and overreported public depot funding.   For example, as we reported in past years, the Navy did not report  $80.3 million in depot maintenance funding for work accomplished during  the nuclear refueling of aircraft carriers, citing the exclusion of nuclear  refueling from the 10 U.S.C. § 2460 definition of “depot maintenance.”  We  continue to believe that depot maintenance repairs not directly associated  with the task of nuclear refueling should be reported because these types  of repair actions are reported by other organizations and it is possible to  identify the funding for these tasks in Navy contracts and financial systems.   The Navy also, as in prior years, inconsistently reported on inactivation  activities related to the servicing and preservation of systems and  equipment prior to their placement in storage or on inactive status.   Specifically, the Navy did not report $14.4 million of private-sector  allocations for inactivation work on non-nuclear ships, even though it  reported private-sector funding for the inactivation for nuclear ships.  The  Navy contends that the work for nuclear ship inactivation is complex while  the work for non-nuclear ships is not.  We maintain that all such depot-level  work should be reported, since the statute and implementing guidance do  not make a distinction based on complexity.  Additionally, the Navy’s  public-sector depot maintenance allocation was overreported by  $357.6 million because of errors in reporting obligations for funds available  to be spent over multiple years.  Navy and OSD guidance requires that  commands only report the funds actually obligated in the fiscal year.  We  found that some Naval Sea Systems Command activities incorrectly  reported the funds available for obligation for depot maintenance in fiscal  year 2004 instead of the funds that were actually obligated.  As a result,  some of the amounts included in the Navy’s 50-50 report were not obligated  during fiscal year 2004.  Additionally, multiyear funds from a prior year  appropriation that were obligated in fiscal year 2004 were not, but should  have been, included.
Our review of the Marine Corps’ 2004 data found that it underreported the  public-sector total by about $1.3 million for maintenance work performed  at other military service depots.  In previous years, the Marine Corps’ error  rate was relatively high compared to that of the other services despite its  smaller depot maintenance program.  Based on our recommendation from  last year, the Marine Corps addressed a key contributor to its high error  rate by appointing a 50-50 focal point for the Marine Corps Systems  Command, the command responsible for acquiring and upgrading weapon  systems.  The focal point is responsible for preparing and submitting a  consolidated report for the command’s depot maintenance funding  allocation between the public and private sectors.
section_title: Department of the Air Force
paragraphs: Adjusting the Air Force’s data on the basis of the specific inaccuracies we  identified would increase its total depot maintenance funding by  $0.3 million but would not change the percentage allocation between the  public and private sectors.  (See table 5 in app. II for a detailed breakout of  these adjustments.)
Additionally, we were unable to verify some of the private depot  maintenance amounts reported because the Air Force had no supporting  data.  For example, we were unable to verify the total amount in private- sector workload funding allocation for air crew training devices used to  train active duty air crews.  According to the Air Force, all air crew training  devices are operated and maintained through contractor logistics support  contracts.  The depot maintenance portion for these contracts is computed  by taking a percentage of the cost incurred against a selected contract line  item or, in some instances, a percentage of the entire amount obligated for  the year.  DOD’s 50-50 guidance allows algorithms to be used when precise  determinations cannot be made; however, the line items included and the  percentages used are largely determined by the contractor, and the Air  Force lacks access to the data needed to validate the percentages used.
Additionally, the Air Force incorrectly reported amounts for depot  maintenance warranties in its fiscal year 2004 50-50 data.  The Air Force’s  guidance states that onetime obligations for warranties over extended  periods will be prorated for each year over the life of the warranty.   However, OSD guidance states that although warranty support that occurs  prior to initial operating capability shall not be reported as depot  maintenance and repair, warranty support that is contracted for prior to  initial operating capability but occurs after initial operating capability shall  be reported.  Also, the total warranty costs for depot maintenance and  repair services are to be reported in the year in which the obligation  occurs.  Therefore, consistent with OSD guidance, the Air Force should  have reported all amounts obligated for warranties for depot maintenance  repair that cover periods after initial operating capability in the year the  obligations were made.
Although we found the aforenoted inaccuracies, overall the Air Force’s  data had the least problems.  Additionally, the Air Force correctly included  contract administrative and oversight costs in its fiscal year 2004 data.  In  previous years, the Air Force adjusted its reported amounts for contract  administration and oversight costs, which decreased the amount of funding  for the private sector and increased funding for the public sector.  We  repeatedly reported that this adjustment was not consistent with 50-50  guidance, which states that costs should be associated with the end  product (i.e., the repaired item), and that the costs should be treated as  contracting expenses.
section_title: Persistent Deficiencies Continue to Limit Accuracy of Reported Data
paragraphs: Systemic weakness in DOD’s financial systems and persistent deficiencies,  such as inadequate management attention and review to ensure accurate  and complete reporting, limited independent review and validation of 50-50  data by audit agencies or other third parties, and inadequate training for  those responsible for data collection and reporting continue to limit the  accuracy of the 50-50 data provided to Congress.  For these reasons, the  reported data cannot be relied on to provide an accurate measure of the  balance of funding between the public and private sectors or to determine  whether the military departments complied with the 50 percent statutory  limitation set by Congress for private-sector depot-level maintenance.
Moreover, during the past 7 years, we have made 33 recommendations for  improving the depot maintenance reporting process for 50-50 purposes,  addressing both DOD and individual service reporting issues and concerns.  Of these recommendations 19 have been officially closed by GAO.  The 14  recommendations that remain open contain several recurring themes.   Table 2 summarizes the number of times these themes are mentioned in the  14 open recommendations as well as the number of times these themes  have been recommended throughout the course of the past 7 years of  reviewing DOD’s 50-50 depot maintenance report.
The problems in DOD’s 50-50 data reporting processes have not been  disclosed in DOD’s annual accountability reports to Congress, even though  the problems have been previously identified in prior audits, and in our  view result in more than a remote risk that significant misstatements will  not be prevented or detected.  As a result, managers or oversight officials’  decisions based on this reporting—to include workload or funding allocation decisions—may be adversely affected.  Title 31 U.S.C. § 3512(c)  requires that management controls be in place to reasonably ensure that  obligations and costs comply with the applicable law; all assets are  safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, and misappropriation of  assets; and revenues and expenditures are properly reported and  accounted for.  Management controls are the organization, policies, and  procedures that help managers achieve results and safeguard the integrity  of their programs.  Title 31 U.S.C. § 3512(c) also requires agency heads to  provide an annual statement of assurance on the effectiveness of the  management controls and to identify and report on material weaknesses.   As defined in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123,  Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control, December 21, 2004  (effective for Fiscal Year 2006), materiality for financial reporting is risk  of error or misstatement that could occur in a financial report that would  affect management’s or users’ decisions or conclusions based on such  report.  An official from OSD’s Materiel Readiness and Maintenance Policy,  the office responsible for submitting the 50-50 report to Congress each  year, told us they had never evaluated whether DOD’s 50-50 reporting  should be included in DOD’s annual accountability report.
subsections: section_title: Inadequate Management Attention and Review
paragraphs: One of the primary reasons for the recurring inaccuracies in the military  services’ 50-50 data was inadequate management attention and review to  ensure accurate and complete reporting.  Generally, we found that  personnel collecting the data at the various reporting centers or program  offices did not review or verify the data before submitting them up the  reporting chain to the service representative responsible for compiling and  forwarding the data to OSD.  Additionally, little documentation is provided  to the military service’s 50-50 data focal points or the reporting commands’  focal points to support the data included in the 50-50 report.  In prior  reports we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the military  services to provide more management review at all levels in DOD to ensure  accurate and complete reporting.  Despite these recommendations, the  services have limited policies and procedures for such management review.   For example, an Army official told us that no one checks the accuracy of  the data or performs a variance analysis with previously reported data.  Our  variance analysis of the Army’s fiscal year 2004 data compared with the  fiscal year 2003 data resulted in identifying nearly $400 million in  overreported public-sector workload funding allocations due to a  transcription error.  The same location reported only about $2.3 million the  previous fiscal year.  This error may have been identified and corrected if  the Army emphasized reviewing, analyzing, and questioning variances from  year to year.
As in previous years, we found that the Marine Corps officials responsible  for compiling and submitting the Marine Corps’ final report to OSD  performed no review to ensure the completeness or accuracy of the  reported data.  Moreover, during our review of the Navy’s U.S. Pacific Fleet,  we found the Southwest Regional Maintenance Facility did not maintain  documentation to support the amounts it reported.  It took the facility more  than a month to recreate a list of the transactions to support the $339.3 million in workload funding allocation data reported for fiscal year  2004.  Additionally, the Naval Audit Service could not verify the amount of  public-sector depot maintenance workload funding allocation for the Puget  Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility.  Moreover,  the Air Force often lacks access to the documentation needed to validate  the completeness or accuracy of the data associated with its contractor  logistics support/interim contractor support programs and the algorithms  used to determine the amount of depot maintenance for each contract.
section_title: Independent Review and Validation of Data Limited by Time and Scope
paragraphs: Although each of the military departments obtained some level of  independent review and validation of its 50-50 data, the reviews were  constrained by time and limited in scope.  Moreover, not all of the errors  were corrected prior to submission to Congress.  In prior reports we  repeatedly recommended that to further enhance 50-50 data accuracy, the  Secretary of Defense require the secretaries of the military departments to  direct the use of service audit agencies, or an agreed-upon alternate  method, for third-party review and validation of depot maintenance  workload funding allocation data and to ensure that auditor-identified  errors in the data are rectified before reports are submitted to Congress.   DOD guidance for this year’s 50-50 report directed the military departments  to implement this recommendation.
Concerning fiscal year 2004 depot maintenance allocation data, the Army  Audit Agency evaluated whether the Army implemented or planned to  implement selected recommendations made based on prior audits of depot- level maintenance workload allocation reporting, and whether the Army  accurately reported the status of implementation to the Office of the Army  Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.  The Army Audit Agency did not review  the accuracy of the 50-50 data submitted to Congress.  The Army hired a  consulting firm to review and validate its 50-50 data for fiscal year 2004.   The firm selected a statistical sample of the reported allocations to review.   However, due to time constraints, the Army did not correct several of the  errors identified by the consulting firm prior to submitting the report to  Congress.  Naval Audit Service identified errors in the Navy’s data, which  were corrected before the 50-50 report went to Congress.  However, the  Naval Audit Service’s review was limited to two activities, which accounted  for only 6 percent of the Navy’s reported depot maintenance funding for  fiscal year 2004.  Furthermore, although it did not review 100 percent of  transactions, the results and errors found during the review were  considered an indicator that similar errors might exist at the other eight  Navy reporting organizations.  Due to time constraints, the Naval Audit  Service did not attempt to determine the underlying cause for the errors  identified.  Air Force Audit Agency focused its review on contractor  logistics support/interim contractor support maintenance programs, an  area where problems in 50-50 reporting had been identified in the past.  The  contracts reviewed by the audit agency represented about three-fourths of  the contractor logistics support/interim contractor support programs.   Errors identified by the Air Force Audit Agency were corrected prior to  submitting the report to Congress.  Air Force officials acknowledge that  even with improvements, errors still occur and accurate reporting remains  an ongoing concern.  However, they do not believe additional errors that  may be found would threaten compliance with the 50-50 statute.
section_title: Inadequate Staff Training
paragraphs: Inadequate training for those responsible for collecting, aggregating, and  reporting 50-50 data continues to be a problem.  In two prior reports we  recommended that the Secretary of Defense require the secretaries of the  military departments to ensure that the 50-50 guidance is properly  disseminated and that staff are properly and promptly trained in the  application of the 50-50 guidance.  During our review we found that  although the reporting activities generally received the 50-50 data call  guidance, several reporting activities did not report 50-50 data accurately.   Additionally, we found that although the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force  provide some training, not all staff responsible for 50-50 reporting attended  this training.  According to a Navy official, no formal training on procedural  requirements or Navy guidance to develop and report the 50-50 data is  provided to the personnel responsible for compiling the data.  Rather, the  reporting activity coordinators are expected to provide guidance on  reporting requirements as questions arise from the reporting activities.   According to an Air Force official, program managers have not had  sufficient training to prepare and maintain documentation to ensure that  50-50 data are accurate.
section_title: Fiscal Year 2005 and 2006 Projections Do Not Represent Reasonable Estimates of Public- and Private- Sector Funding
paragraphs: DOD’s reported projections for fiscal years 2005 through 2006 do not  represent reasonable estimates of public- and private-sector depot  maintenance funding allocations.  The usefulness of the reported  projections to congressional and DOD decision makers is limited because  errors, omissions, and inconsistencies in DOD’s reported prior-year data  are carried into future years and because of the difficulty in projecting out- year data due to factors such as changing depot maintenance requirements,  consolidating maintenance facilities, and the trend toward more contractor  logistics support for new and existing weapon systems.  We reported these  shortcomings with the future years’ projections in the past.  While  limitations affect the usefulness of the data reported as a predictor of  funding allocations, the reported projection data show that all of the  military services are predicting a greater percentage of funds for the private  sector and less for the public sector.
Recurring errors, omissions, and inconsistencies similar to those we  identified for the fiscal year 2004 reported data could affect this trend, as  all of the services are moving closer to the threshold for private-sector  funding.  For example, while the Army projects that its private-sector depot  maintenance workload allocation will be around 46 percent, the magnitude  of the adjustments we made to the Army’s fiscal year 2004 data—increasing  the private-sector percentage by about 4.2 percentage points—when  carried forward, could cause the Army to exceed the 50-50 limitation.   Similarly, the Navy projects that its private-sector depot maintenance  workload allocation for fiscal year 2006 will be around 48 percent.  The  magnitude of the adjustments we made to the Navy’s fiscal year 2004  data—increasing the private-sector percentage by about 2.4 percentage  points—when carried forward, could cause the Navy to exceed the 50-50  limitation.
DOD has agreed that 50-50 data within 2 percentage points of exceeding the  50 percent threshold is a reasonable trigger for additional oversight and  management to ensure compliance with the 50 percent threshold.  Last  year, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct each military  department’s secretary, within 30 days of reporting 50-50 data indicating  that past, current, or budget year data are within 2 percentage points of  exceeding the 50 percent threshold, to submit a plan to OSD that identifies  actions the military department shall take to ensure continued compliance,  including the identification of decisions on candidate maintenance  workload sourcing that could be made to support remaining within the 50 percent threshold.  To date, none of the services have provided such  plans because their reported data did not indicate that such submissions  were necessary.
Additionally, increasing contractor maintenance support for military  operations and increasing the number of new weapon systems scheduled  to reach initial operational capability in fiscal year 2007 and beyond could  result in all the military departments exceeding the 50 percent threshold.   During our review, the Air Force provided evidence that it has integrated  50-50 reporting requirements into its source of repair decisions for new  weapon systems and major system modifications.
section_title: DOD’s Current 50-50 Report Satisfies the Annual Mandate but Could Provide More Useful Data and Analysis
paragraphs: Although DOD’s current 50-50 report to Congress satisfies the annual  mandate, it lacks additional detail that might be useful to Congress as it  exercises its oversight role.  For example, the report provides no analysis  of the data to show how the fiscal year 2004 funding allocations compared  to prior years’ figures.  Furthermore, the reported data are aggregated at  the service level.  The report also does not identify funding allocation  variances from year to year, nor explain the reasons behind them.   Additionally, the report does not contain analysis of long-term trends;  historical trend data must be calculated using previous 50-50 reports.  Finally, DOD’s 50-50 report to Congress does not contain information about  the methodologies used to prepare the current and future year projections  or the reasons for projected funding variances and changes in workload  distribution.
Because of the limited data provided in DOD’s 50-50 report, we have  developed these types of information as part of our mandated work over  the past 8 years to better meet Congress’s needs in exercising its oversight  role.  Our analysis of trend data shows that although reported depot  maintenance funding for fiscal year 2004 increased by about $700 million  over fiscal year 2003, only the Army’s total funding and private-sector  workload allocation increased significantly.  Compared to the other  services, the Army reported the largest increase in total funding (almost  $1.8 billion) and the largest jump in workload funding allocation to the  private sector.  With this increase, the Army’s reported private sector  allocation is on par with those of the other services.  The Navy shows the  biggest overall decrease in depot workload funding allocation (almost  $1.3 billion), and the Air Force shows little change. Figure 3 shows a  historical trend for private-sector reported allocations for fiscal years 1998  through 2004.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Year after year we continue to see the same persistent deficiencies in  DOD’s 50-50 report to Congress.  As a result, the reported 50-50 data cannot  be relied on to provide an accurate measure of the balance of funding  between the public and private sectors or to determine if the military  services exceeded the statutory limitations set by Congress for private- sector depot-level maintenance funding allocations.  By disclosing the  persistent deficiencies in the 50-50 reporting processes as a management  control weakness, along with planned corrective actions, in future  accountability reports, DOD will increase the level of management  attention and help focus improvement efforts so that the data provided to  Congress are accurate and complete.
The data DOD provides in its annual 50-50 report to Congress satisfy the  annual mandate but lack additional detail that may well be useful to  Congress as it exercises its oversight role.  Until DOD provides additional  information and analysis on changes in depot maintenance funding and  allocations, significant variances from the prior year’s report, and  methodologies used to estimate workload allocation projections for the  current and ensuing fiscal years in its annual 50-50 report, Congress will  continue to be hindered in its ability to exercise effective oversight.   Additionally, the extent of the percentage adjustments we find each year,  coupled with the persistent lack of progress by the Army and the Navy  toward improving their reporting processes and data quality, indicate that  DOD cannot afford to wait until the services reach the 50 percent limit  before formulating and providing a plan that identifies actions the military  departments will take to avoid exceeding the threshold for private-sector  funding.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the accuracy and reliability of depot maintenance funding  allocation data submitted to Congress and to provide congressional  decision makers with better information on funding allocations, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions.
We recommend that the Secretary, in future accountability reports, disclose  a management control weakness in DOD’s 50-50 data reporting processes  along with planned corrective actions to improve management control in  the following areas:  Management review, attention, and policies sufficient to ensure accurate  and complete 50-50 reporting.
Independent review and validation of 50-50 data by service audit  agencies or other third parties, with auditor-identified data inaccuracies  corrected prior to submission of the annual report to Congress.
Annual training on 50-50 policies and procedures for all individuals  participating in data gathering and reporting.
We also recommend that the Secretary enhance DOD’s annual 50-50 report  submitted to Congress.  This enhanced reporting should include the  following types of information:  Variance analyses that identify significant changes in depot maintenance  workload allocations from the prior year’s report and the reasons for  these variances.
Analysis of historical trends in depot maintenance workload allocations.
Explanation of the methodologies used to estimate workload allocation  projections for the current and ensuing fiscal years.
The military departments’ plans to ensure continued compliance with  the 50-50 requirement, including the identification of decisions on new  weapon systems maintenance workload sourcing that could be made to  support remaining within the 50 percent threshold.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: If Congress determines, for oversight purposes, that improvements are  needed in the reliability and usefulness of DOD’s annual report on depot  maintenance funding allocations, Congress should require the Secretary of  Defense to enhance its annual 50-50 report to Congress as stated in our  recommendations.  Specifically, this enhanced reporting should include  (1) variance analyses of significant changes in depot maintenance  workload allocations from the prior year’s report and the reasons for these  variances; (2) analysis of historical workload allocation trends;  (3) explanation of the methodologies used to estimate workload allocation  projections; and (4) plans to ensure continued compliance with the 50-50  requirement, including the identification of decisions on new weapon  systems maintenance workload sourcing that could be made to support  remaining within the 50 percent threshold.  Additionally, the enhanced  reporting should address the corrective actions DOD is taking to improve  the persistent deficiencies we have identified in DOD’s 50-50 data reporting  processes.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our  recommendations but did not indicate specific actions it would take  address the persistent deficiencies we identified in its 50-50 reporting  processes or to improve the usefulness of the information provided to  Congress.  DOD agreed there were errors in the 50-50 report and stated that  it is committed to providing accurate data in its annual report to Congress,  has made improvements in its reporting over the past several years, and  will continue to improve.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense, in future accountability reports, disclose a management control  weakness in DOD’s 50-50 data reporting processes along with planned  corrective actions to improve management control.  However, DOD did not  indicate that it would disclose its 50-50 data reporting processes as a  management control weakness in future accountability reports.  Instead,  DOD stated that it currently reports internal management control  weaknesses in its annual accountability reports.  The currently reported  weaknesses, however, are not specific to DOD’s 50-50 data reporting  processes, and we continue to believe that the recurring nature of the  deficiencies we have found in DOD’s 50-50 reporting processes indicates a  management control weakness significant enough to be reported  separately in DOD’s annual accountability reports.  Neither DOD nor the  military services have consistently implemented corrective actions  sufficient to resolve the deficiencies. As discussed in the report, during the  past 7 years we have made 33 recommendations for improving 50-50  reporting.  Of these recommendations, 19 have been officially closed by  GAO.  The 14 recommendations that remain open contain several recurring  themes, which include the need for increased management attention to  ensure accurate and complete 50-50 reporting, independent review, and  validation of data and annual training on 50-50 policies and procedures for  all individuals participating in data gathering and reporting.  Nevertheless,  in its comments DOD stated that systemic changes to the reporting process  have already been made in response to previous recommendations. DOD  noted that it instituted third-party review of data by service audit agencies  and corrected auditor-identified data inaccuracies prior to submission of  the annual report to Congress.  While we agree that DOD has made  improvements in its reporting processes over the past several years, our  work nevertheless has identified persistent deficiencies in these processes  that continue to prevent us from determining whether the military  departments complied with the 50-50 requirement. For example, as we  reported, although each of the military services obtained some level of  independent review and validation this year, the reviews were constrained  by time and limited in scope.  Moreover, not all of the errors were corrected  prior to submission to Congress.  Disclosing 50-50 reporting processes as a  management control weakness in future accountability reports could  increase DOD management emphasis on addressing the persistent  deficiencies that continue to limit the accuracy and usefulness of the depot  maintenance funding allocation data reported to Congress.
DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary  of Defense enhance DOD’s annual 50-50 report submitted to Congress.   However, DOD stated that producing the types of information suggested in  our recommendation would require a massive undertaking and may be of  limited value.  We disagree.  We have developed these types of information  as part of our annual mandated review of DOD’s 50-50 report, and the  information has been valuable in understanding and evaluating DOD’s  depot maintenance funding allocations.  For example, we compared fiscal  year 2004 reported allocations for specific programs and reporting centers  with fiscal year 2003 allocations, and followed up with the military services  to determine the reasons for significant differences.  The goal of this  recommendation is not to place an unnecessary burden on the department  but to provide additional information on depot maintenance funding that  would make the annual 50-50 report to Congress more informative and  useful as an oversight tool.  Furthermore, we believe that if DOD would  provide more detailed and analytical information to Congress, it would  place additional emphasis on assuring the accuracy of the data provided in  its annual 50-50 report.
Because it does not appear to us that DOD’s actions will address the  persistent deficiencies we identified in its 50-50 reporting processes or  improve the usefulness of the information provided to Congress, we have  added a matter for congressional consideration suggesting that Congress  require the Secretary of Defense to enhance the department’s annual 50-50  report as stated in our recommendations.
DOD also stated in its written comments that its 50-50 data quality has  improved, as shown by reductions in the Navy’s and the Air Force’s private- sector corrections.  DOD further noted that the Army’s one transcription  error accounted for 99.3 percent of its private sector corrections.  Our  report does not conclude that the department’s data quality has improved.   On the contrary, we state as in past years that DOD’s 50-50 data, with our  adjustments, provide only a rough approximation of the allocation of depot  maintenance funding between the public and private sectors.  We reported  that DOD’s April 1, 2005, report to Congress contained errors, omissions,  and inconsistencies that if corrected, would increase the Army’s and Navy’s  percentages of funding allocations going to the private sector.  Additionally,  we did not conduct a detailed review of all reported 50-50 data; therefore,  there may be additional errors, omissions, and inconsistencies that were  not identified during our review. We agree that the Army’s $399.4 million  transcription error was the single largest correction we identified.   However, this error involved a public-sector correction rather than a  private-sector correction as DOD stated.  We noted several other errors in  the Army’s data for both the public and private sectors, as shown in table 3  of this report. We continue to believe that adequate management attention  and review of 50-50 data to ensure accurate and complete reporting would  have helped identify the transcription error and other errors prior to  submitting the data to DOD and Congress.
DOD believes, based on guidance from the General Counsel’s office in the  Department of the Navy, that it has properly excluded depot maintenance  associated with nuclear carrier refueling and inactivation work performed  on non-nuclear ships.  We have disagreed in prior years with DOD’s  decision to exclude these types of depot maintenance repairs from its 50-50  reports.  As discussed in our report, we continue to believe that depot  maintenance repairs not directly associated with the task of refueling of  nuclear aircraft carriers should be included in DOD’s annual report to  Congress.  We also continue to believe that inactivation work performed on  non-nuclear ships should be included in DOD’s report.
DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,  and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director,  Office of Management and Budget.  We will make copies available to others  upon request.  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.  If you or your staff have any  questions on the matters discussed in this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report.  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the accuracy of the military services’ reporting of their depot  maintenance allocations and whether they met the 50-50 requirement for  fiscal year 2004, we analyzed each service’s procedures and internal  management controls for collecting and reporting its depot maintenance  allocations.  Certain programs, reporting centers, and maintenance  activities were identified for in-depth reviews.  In particular, we focused  on those reporting locations, programs, and issues that Department of  Defense (DOD) personnel and we identified as problem areas in current  and past reviews as well as those that had experienced significant funding  variances over time.  We did not conduct a detailed review of all reported  50-50 data; therefore there may be additional errors, omissions, and  inconsistencies that were not identified.
As part of these in-depth reviews, we conducted site visits to departmental  headquarters, major commands, selected maintenance activities, and  reporting centers; interviewed the service officials involved with the data  collection; and reviewed the data utilized for accuracy and completeness.   Our data verification efforts included examining summary records,  accounting reports, budget submissions, and contract documents.  We also  reviewed DOD, military service, and command-specific guidance for  collecting and aggregating 50-50 data.  We also compared this year’s  instructions with last year’s to identify any changes and additions and  reviewed service efforts to identify reporting sources and to distribute  guidance and tasks to develop and report the 50-50 data.
To determine what actions the services took to improve the quality of  reported 50-50 data and implementation of GAO’s prior year’s  recommendations, we reviewed the results of internal studies conducted  by the service audit agencies or other third parties, and reconciled areas of  concern identified during prior years’ audits.  Additionally, we reviewed  prior years’ recommendations to determine whether known problem areas  were being addressed and resolved.  We applied this knowledge to identify  additional areas for improving the reporting process and management  controls.  We examined the process used to compile the reports and the  data reported to determine that it was consistent and in compliance with  legislative requirements and to identify any errors, omissions, or  inconsistencies in the data reported.  We discussed with officials managing  and coordinating the reporting process their efforts to address known  problem areas and respond to recommendations by internal audit agencies  and GAO.
Our analysis of the data for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 was limited because  our audit efforts identified significant recurring problems in this area of the  report.  To determine whether DOD’s projected allocations for the current  fiscal year and ensuing fiscal year were reasonable, we performed certain  checks and tests, including variance analyses, to judge the consistency of  this information with data from prior years and with the future years’  budgeting and programming data used in DOD’s budget submissions and  reports to Congress.  We found repeated and significant changes, even  though the estimates were prepared only about 1 year apart.
We used the results of our analysis of fiscal year 2005 and 2006 projections  to further discuss with officials, and analyze the reasons behind, changes in  reported data and percentage allocations between the 2004 and 2005 50-50  reports submitted to Congress.  Our current and past work on this issue has  shown that DOD’s 50-50 data cannot be relied upon as a precise measure of  the allocation of depot maintenance funds between the public and private  sectors.  However, the mandate in 10 U.S.C. § 2466 requires (1) DOD to  report the data, which are the only data available and accepted and used  for DOD decision making and for congressional oversight, and (2) us to  submit our views on whether DOD has complied with the 50-50  requirement to Congress.  While DOD’s data cannot be relied upon to  provide a precise measure of the funding between the public and private  sectors, the data, along with our adjustments, provide a rough  approximation of the allocations and some trends that may be useful to  Congress in exercising its oversight role and to DOD officials in managing  the depot maintenance program.  Concerns about the accuracy and  completeness of the 50-50 data available were considered and incorporated  into our methodology and approach to reviewing the fiscal year 2004  report.  Along with the limitations on the 50-50 data available from DOD,  the constrained time frame for our review limited the extent to which our  analysis could be relied upon to identify all the errors, inconsistencies, and  omissions in DOD’s data.  We recognize that we have not been able to  comprehensively identify all of the errors and omissions in the 50-50 report  for fiscal year 2004.  However, we were able to conclude that the reported  depot maintenance workload funding allocations were not sufficiently  reliable for accurately determining whether the military departments  complied with the 50-50 requirement for fiscal year 2004.  As a result, we  developed recommendations for improving the 50-50 data collection,  verification, and reporting processes.
We interviewed officials, examined documents, and obtained data at the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air  Force headquarters in the Washington, D.C., area; Anniston Army Depot in  Anniston, Alabama; Army Materiel Command in Alexandria, Virginia;  National Guard Bureau Aviation Classification Repair Activity Depot in  Gulfport, Mississippi; Tank Automotive Command in Warren, Michigan;  Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, Maryland; Naval Sea  Systems Command in Washington, D.C.; Naval Inventory Control Point in  Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; U.S. Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk,  Virginia; Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance  Facility in Honolulu, Hawaii; U.S. Pacific Fleet Command in Honolulu,  Hawaii; Air Force Materiel Command in Dayton, Ohio; Ogden Air Logistics  Center in Ogden, Utah; Marine Corps Logistics Command in Albany,  Georgia; Marine Corps Logistics Command in Barstow, California; Marine  Corps Systems Command in Quantico, Virginia; Army, Naval, and Air Force  Audit Services; several public depots managed by the military departments’  materiel commands; and selected operating bases.  We conducted our  review from April 2005 through September 2005 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: GAO Adjustments for Inaccuracies Found in the Military Departments’ 50-50 Data for Fiscal Year 2004
paragraphs: Our review of the data supporting DOD’s 50-50 report identified errors,  omissions, and inconsistencies that if corrected, would revise the total  workload funding allocations and increase the private-sector allocations  for each of the military departments.  (See tables 3, 4, and 5.)
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report include Thomas Gosling, Assistant Director;  Claudia Dickey; Frank Smith; Andy Marek; Janine Prybyla; Oscar Mardis;  Jennifer Jebo; Bathsheba Everett; Michael Zola; Renee McElveen; and  Renee Brown.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Depot Maintenance: DOD Needs Plan to Ensure Compliance with Public-  and Private-Sector Funding Allocation. GAO-04-871. Washington, D.C.:  September 29, 2004.
Depot Maintenance: Army Needs Plan to Implement Depot Maintenance  Report’s Recommendations. GAO-04-220. Washington, D.C.: January 8,  2004.
Depot Maintenance: DOD’s 50-50 Reporting Should Be Streamlined. GAO- 03-1023. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2003.
Depot Maintenance: Key Unresolved Issues Affect the Army Depot  System's Viability. GAO-03-682. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2003.
Department of Defense: Status of Financial Management Weaknesses and  Progress Toward Reform. GAO-03-931T. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2003.
Depot Maintenance: Change in Reporting Practices and Requirements  Could Enhance Congressional Oversight. GAO-03-16. Washington D.C.:  October 18, 2002.
Depot Maintenance: Management Attention Needed to Further Improve  Workload Allocation Data. GAO-02-95. Washington, D.C.: November 9,  2001.
Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Overcome Capability Gaps in the  Public Depot System. GAO-02-105. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.
Defense Maintenance: Sustaining Readiness Support Capabilities  Requires a Comprehensive Plan. GAO-01-533T. Washington, D.C.:  March 23, 2001.
Depot Maintenance: Key Financial Issues for Consolidations at Pearl  Harbor and Elsewhere Are Still Unresolved. GAO-01-19. Washington, D.C.:  January 22, 2001.
Depot Maintenance: Action Needed to Avoid Exceeding Threshold on  Contract Workloads. GAO/NSIAD-00-193. Washington, D.C.: August 24,  2000.
Depot Maintenance: Air Force Waiver to 10 U.S.C. 2466. GAO/NSIAD-00- 152R. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2000.
Depot Maintenance: Air Force Faces Challenges in Managing to 50-50  Threshold. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-112. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2000.
Depot Maintenance: Future Year Estimates of Public and Private  Workloads Are Likely to Change. GAO/NSIAD-00-69. Washington, D.C.:  March 1, 2000.
Depot Maintenance: Army Report Provides Incomplete Assessment of  Depot-Type Capabilities. GAO/NSIAD-00-20. Washington, D.C.: October 15,  1999.
Depot Maintenance: Status of the Navy's Pearl Harbor Project.  GAO/NSIAD-99-199. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 1999.
Depot Maintenance: Workload Allocation Reporting Improved, but  Lingering Problems Remain. GAO/NSIAD-99-154. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 1999.
Navy Ship Maintenance: Allocation of Ship Maintenance Work in the  Norfolk, Virginia, Area. GAO/NSIAD-99-54. Washington, D.C.: February 24,  1999.
Defense Depot Maintenance: Public and Private Sector Workload  Distribution Reporting Can Be Further Improved. GAO/NSIAD-98-175.  Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1998.
Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD Shifting More Workload for New  Weapon Systems to the Private Sector. GAO/NSIAD-98-8. Washington, D.C.:  March 31, 1998.
Defense Depot Maintenance: Information on Public and Private Sector  Workload Allocations. GAO/NSIAD-98-41. Washington, D.C.: January 20,  1998.
Defense Depot Maintenance: Uncertainties and Challenges DOD Faces in  Restructuring Its Depot Maintenance Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-112.  Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1997. Also GAO/T-NSIAD-97-111. Washington,  D.C.: March 18, 1997.
Defense Depot Maintenance: More Comprehensive and Consistent  Workload Data Needed for Decisionmakers. GAO/NSIAD-96-166.  Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1996.
Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD’s Policy Report Leaves Future Role of  Depot System Uncertain. GAO/NSIAD-96-165. Washington, D.C.: May 21,  1996.
Defense Depot Maintenance: Privatization and the Debate over the  Public-Private Mix. GAO/T-NSIAD-96-148. Washington, D.C.: April 17,  1996. Also GAO/T-NSIAD-96-146. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 1996.
Depot Maintenance: Issues in Allocating Workload Between the Public  and Private Sectors. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-161. Washington, D.C.: April 12,  1994.