Homeland Defense: Continued Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations
Published: 2012-01-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In the 11 years since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has put forth extensive efforts to protect the nations aviation sector and airspace. These efforts include air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations, for which the Air Force provides personnel and fully fueled, fully armed aircraft sitting on constant alert at 18 sites across the United States. In 2009, GAO found shortcomings in the Department of Defenses (DOD) management of ASA operations, leading to a number of GAO recommendations. For this report, GAO examined the extent to which (1) the Air Force has implemented GAOs 2009 recommendations, (2) DOD has implemented a risk-based management approach for ASA operations, and (3) the Air Force has accurately identified expenditures for ASA operations. To do so, GAO analyzed relevant strategies, planning documents, guidance, and expenditure data; and interviewed North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Air Force, National Guard Bureau, and other DOD officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Air Force has not fully implemented the recommendations from GAOs 2009 report. With regard to GAOs recommendation that the military services should formally assign ASA duties to the units that consistently conduct them and ensure that the readiness of those units is fully assessed, the Air Force did so. However, the National Guard Bureau is considering reversing that action because it believes that the recommendation can be better addressed through the Air Forces standard deployment process. The Air Force has also not established a timetable to implement ASA as a steady-state mission; has not developed and implemented a plan to recapitalize the aging fighter aircraft that conduct ASA operations before the end of their service lives; and, when ASA units are deployed to support other ongoing operations, the Air Force continues to identify replacement units to perform the ASA mission on an ad hoc basis. All of the above were related to recommendations GAO made to the Air Force in its 2009 report. Separately, GAO found considerable confusion about the capabilities associated with ASA operations in part because, in September 2011, NORAD stopped using the term air sovereignty alert and created a new term, aerospace control alert (ACA), without clearly defining ACA or the missions that are now included within it.
DOD has taken a series of actions for ASA operations that are consistent with a risk-based management approach. However, several key actions have yet to be taken that would enable the department to better balance risk and costs. Risk-based management includes conducting routine risk assessments that evaluate threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality of assets, as recommended in GAOs 2009 report, and selecting between alternative courses of action to mitigate risk and make decisions about allocating resources. Although threats to the nations air sovereignty continue to emerge and evolve, GAO found that DOD is unable to measure the extent to which ASA helps to achieve the departments homeland-defense goal of securing the United States from direct attack because DOD has not established performance measures. NORAD has not conducted routine risk assessments of ASA operations. DOD has also yet to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for two of the three alternatives to current ASA operations that GAO evaluated. Adopting a more-rigorous risk-based management approachincluding balancing risk and costswould help policymakers within DOD and elsewhere more effectively allocate finite DOD resources.
Weak internal controls limit the ability of the Air Force and National Guard Bureau to accurately identify ASA expenditures. GAO analyzed the fiscal year 2010 expenditure information that the Air Force and National Guard Bureau submitted to Congress along with DODs fiscal year 2012 budget justification and found the reported expenditures of more than $246 million to be inaccurate. For example, GAO found that the Air Force overstated ASA flying-hour expenditures by at least $22 million and included expenditures related to national special-security events, which are not part of ASA operations. GAO found that the Air Forces ability to identify ASA expenditures is limited by unclear roles and responsibilities for programming and budgeting and a lack of guidance on defining and tracking ASA expenditures. These types of internal controls are important to ensuring basic accountability, maintaining funds control, and preventing fraud and abuse.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: Congress may wish to consider requiring the Air Force to fully implement GAOs 2009 recommendations. In addition, GAO recommends that DOD improve its risk management of ASA operations and improve the Air Forces ability to accurately identify ASA expenditures. DOD fully or partially agreed with all of GAOs recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government has  taken extensive efforts to protect the aviation sector and airspace over  the United States—including the establishment of restricted flight zones;  installation of hardened cockpit doors; enhanced screening of airline  passengers and baggage before flights; increased use of air marshals on  selected flights; the vigilance of civilian passengers and flight attendants  aboard commercial aircraft; and having fully fueled, fully armed jets ready  to scramble at any time in response to airborne threats. As a result of  these efforts, the Transportation Security Administration believes that a  hijacking scenario over the United States remains a possibility although it  is less likely to occur today. Other threats to the nation’s air sovereignty  continue to emerge and evolve. As a part of the federal government’s  overall efforts to protect U.S. airspace, the Department of Defense (DOD)  performs Operation Noble Eagle, which consists of several operations,  including the maintenance of fighter aircraft and trained personnel on alert  24 hours a day, 365 days a year, at 18 alert sites across the United  States. Since its inception in 2003, these efforts have been commonly  referred to as air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations. The ASA sites serve  to deter, respond to, and if necessary, defeat airborne threats over the  United States and Canada. In effect, these fighter jets can be the last line  of multiple layers of defense.
As a component of Operation Noble Eagle, ASA operations are  conducted by several DOD components under the command of North  American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) for the airspace over  North America, which includes Alaska and the continental United States,  and under the command of U.S. Pacific Command for the airspace over  the state of Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific. The Joint Chiefs of  Staff have directed the Air Force (among other components) to provide  support for ASA operations. Generally, Air National Guard aircraft and  personnel are used for alert, since the National Guard Bureau believes  that ASA operations are consistent with the Air National Guard’s  homeland mission. Both the Air Force’s Air Combat Command and the  National Guard Bureau believe that Air National Guard units can conduct  alert duty with less effect on overseas missions and at a lower cost than  active-duty Air Force units. Consequently, Air National Guard units are on  alert at 17 of the 18 ASA sites. In addition, units at all 18 ASA sites (i.e.,  both Air National Guard and active-duty personnel) are dual-tasked to  conduct both expeditionary missions, such as Operation Enduring  Freedom in Afghanistan, and ASA operations.
In January 2009, we issued a report that identified a number of   First, we found shortcomings in DOD’s management of ASA operations. that NORAD faced difficulty determining the appropriate levels and types  of units, personnel, and aircraft for ASA operations. We also found that,  after 8 years of operations, the Air Force had not yet established ASA as  a steady-state mission, which would include integrating ASA operations  into the Air Force’s planning, programming, and budgeting cycle. Partly  resulting from the absence of a steady-state mission, NORAD had only  partially assessed the readiness of units that consistently conduct ASA  operations to ensure that those units were organized, trained, and  equipped to perform ASA operations. In addition, we found that the Air  Force faced significant challenges replacing or extending the service life  of aging fighter aircraft, to the extent that, if aircraft were not replaced, 11  of the 18 ASA sites could be without aircraft by 2020. On the basis of  those findings, we identified a number of actions that DOD needed to take  to improve management of ASA operations. Specifically, we  recommended that DOD should conduct routine risk assessments as part  of a risk-based management approach, implement ASA as a steady-state  mission, and develop plans to address future challenges.
GAO and other federal agencies have long advocated the use of a risk- based management approach to enhance preparedness against potential  terrorist threats. Risk management is a systematic, analytical process to  determine the likelihood that a threat will harm physical assets or  individuals and then to identify actions to reduce risk and mitigate the  consequences of an attack. The principles of risk management  acknowledge that while risk generally cannot be eliminated, enhancing  protection from known or potential threats can serve to reduce risk. Key  elements of risk management include assessing threats, vulnerabilities,  and criticality of assets and selecting between alternative courses of  action to mitigate risk. As we have previously reported, risk management  can help policymakers make informed decisions, take actions, and  prioritize resource investments under conditions of uncertainty. For  additional information, see the Related GAO Products list at the end of  this report.
On the basis of your request that we review DOD’s actions on our  January 2009 recommendations, other issues associated with ASA  operations, and the Air Force’s ability to sustain those capabilities, this  report examines the extent to which (1) the Air Force has implemented  the recommendations made to the service in our 2009 report, (2) DOD  has implemented a risk-based management approach for ASA  operations—including our 2009 recommendation for routine risk  assessments—that balances risk with cost, and (3) the Air Force  accurately identified expenditures for its ASA operations. We are also  issuing a classified version of this report. That version includes a  classified appendix of our analysis of NORAD’s ASA basing model.
To determine the extent to which the Air Force has implemented the  recommendations from our 2009 report, we reviewed ASA-related  guidance, plans, and other documents from the Office of the Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security  Affairs, Air Force’s homeland defense office, Air Force’s Air Combat  Command, National Guard Bureau, and 3 of the 18 ASA units. We also  interviewed officials from these organizations. To determine the extent to  which DOD has adopted a risk-based management approach to balance  risk and costs for ASA operations, we evaluated documents and  interviewed officials from NORAD, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of  Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, the Air Force, and the  National Guard Bureau. On the basis of our analyses of these documents  and discussions, we compared actions that DOD has taken to three of the  five phases within GAO’s risk-based management framework. To  determine the extent to which the Air Force was able to accurately identify  ASA expenditures, we analyzed the fiscal year 2010 expenditure  information the Air Force included in ASA budget justification materials  provided to Congress in support of the fiscal year 2012 budget and  documented the steps taken to identify those expenditures through  interviews, e-mails, and related documentation. We also compared the  practices used by the Air Force to prepare the ASA budget justification  against best practices for producing cost estimates. To determine the  expenditures of each ASA site, we developed a survey that we sent out to  the Air National Guard and active-duty Air Force ASA units to gather  fiscal year 2009 and 2010 expenditures. We were provided information  from 18 of the 19 ASA sites that incurred expenditures for ASA  operations. Of the 18 sites that provided us information, 3 of the sites  provided us incomplete information.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2011 to January 2012  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional information on our  scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: ASA Operations
paragraphs: ASA operations consist of ground operations that take place before  fighter aircraft take off, including such activities as maintaining the fighter  aircraft. They also include those activities that may take place after a unit  receives an alert from NORAD, but before the aircraft are airborne. For  example, pilots and maintenance personnel may rush from their nearby  lodging facility to the alert aircraft facility, where maintenance personnel  conduct final preparations while the pilots sit in their aircraft awaiting  further instruction (battle station). Alternatively, pilots may taxi the aircraft  to the end of the runway and await further instruction (runway alert) or  take off in response to the alert (scramble).
Once aircraft take off, an Air National Guard pilot converts from Title 32  status under the command and control of the state governor to federal  Title 10 status under the command and control of NORAD.NORAD can increase personnel, aircraft, and the number of ASA sites  based on changes in the threat conditions.
section_title: Risk-Based Management Approach
paragraphs: GAO has previously reported that a risk-based management approach  helps policymakers make informed decisions and prioritize resource  investments. Risk management is a widely endorsed strategy for helping  decision makers allocate finite resources and take action under conditions  of uncertainty. We have previously recommended a five-phase risk-based  management approach as shown in figure 1.
The framework is dynamic and new information can be entered at any  phase. The framework can be used to inform agency officials and  decision makers of the basic components of a risk-based management  approach or can be used as a stand-alone guide. The risk-based  management approach, as outlined above is designed to be flexible in  that the approach may be applied at various organizational levels from a  department or a multiagency organization down to specific projects or  operations, such as ASA operations.
As we previously reported, because there is no one uniformly accepted  approach to risk management, terms and activities may differ across  applications. For example, the Department of Homeland Security’s 2009  National Infrastructure Protection Plan identifies a six-phase risk- management framework as shown in figure 2. The overall difference  between this framework and GAO’s is that the National Infrastructure  Protection Plan’s framework splits GAO’s risk-assessment phase into two  separate phases.
According to the 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the core  criteria for risk assessments include information needed to understand  and address each of the following components of risk—threat,  vulnerability, and consequence. Any approach that omits the substance of  the steps may result in resources that are not targeted to the highest  security needs. In addition, failing to monitor the implementation of  countermeasures, including those implemented by other agencies, may  result in a misallocation of resources. Similarly, failing to conduct routine  or periodic assessments of programs or operations could result in missed  opportunities to increase their efficiency and effectiveness.
DOD, itself, has identified risk management, in this context, as a process  of systematically identifying, assessing, and managing risks arising from  operational factors and making decisions that balance cost with mission  benefits. For example, DOD’s defense critical infrastructure program is a  risk-management program that seeks to ensure the availability of certain  identified assets critical to DOD missions. Activities include the  identification, assessment, and security enhancement of assets essential  for executing the National Military Strategy. The Defense Logistics  Agency similarly established its enterprise risk-management approach to  identify, assess, communicate, and manage risk in a cost-effective  manner.
section_title: The Air Force Has Not Fully Implemented the Recommendations from Our 2009 Report, and Mission Confusion Persists
paragraphs: The Air Force has fully implemented one recommendation from our 2009  report, but has not fully implemented the remaining four  recommendations. In addition, confusion over the definition and scope of  the mission perpetuates confusion about the capabilities and  expenditures associated with the mission.
subsections: section_title: Air Force Has Taken Partial Steps to Implement Recommendations
paragraphs: As of November 2011, the Air Force had fully implemented one of the five  recommendations from our 2009 report and taken partial steps to  implement the remaining four recommendations, as shown in figure 3  below. We made the following recommendations: (1) to formally assign  ASA duties to the appropriate units; (2) to implement ASA as a steady- state mission; (3) to establish a timetable for implementation of the  preceding recommendation; (4) to develop and implement a plan to  address any projected capability gaps; and (5) to develop and implement a  formal method to replace deploying units.
We continue to believe that the prior recommendations have merit and  that by not fully addressing the recommendations, DOD could leave the  long-term sustainability of ASA operations at risk. Since the 2009 report  was issued, some issues have arisen that might have been averted had  the Air Force implemented the recommendations. For example, since the  Air Force canceled the ASA program action directive that clearly identified  the service’s Air Combat Command as responsible for programming for  ASA operations, the National Guard Bureau assumed programming and  budgeting for its ASA sites to ensure that its units that were conducting  ASA operations were funded. This in turn has led to the National Guard  Bureau having to fund emergent expenses with funds that were  programmed for other purposes. For example, according to National  Guard Bureau officials, when an ASA site is undergoing certain  unplanned construction, the National Guard Bureau must fund the  transfer of ASA personnel and equipment to a separate base.
section_title: Undefined New Terminology Regarding ASA Operations Perpetuates Confusion about the Mission
paragraphs: Further complicating DOD’s management approach to ASA operations,  we found considerable confusion about the capabilities and expenditures  associated with ASA operations. In September 2011, NORAD stopped  using the term “air sovereignty alert” (ASA) and created a new term,  “aerospace control alert” (ACA) without clearly defining ACA or the  capabilities that are now included within it. When we asked NORAD  officials which capabilities are included under ACA, they told us that ACA  includes—but is not limited to—DOD’s traditional scope of ASA  operations (i.e., the dedicated fighter aircraft and personnel at 18 steady- state alert sites across the United States), as well as a more- comprehensive list of capabilities used in their aerospace control  mission. As figure 4 shows, according to NORAD, ACA capabilities  include air defense and air sovereignty operations personnel and  equipment at command and control centers at NORAD and elsewhere,  ground-based defense systems, air patrols, airborne radar, and air-to-air  refuelers—in addition to ASA fighters sitting on ground alert. However, Air  Force and National Guard Bureau officials told us that while they were  uncertain as to the definition of ACA, they believe the new term is  interchangeable with ASA (i.e., the dedicated fighter aircraft and personnel  at 18 steady-state alert sites across the United States).
While NORAD’s new terminology may better reflect its overall aerospace- control mission, without a clear definition of what capabilities and  expenditures are related to ACA—compared to ASA—Congress will lack  a complete picture of the funding and other resources needed for DOD to  conduct ASA operations (i.e., the dedicated fighter aircraft and personnel  at 18 steady-state alert sites across the United States). DOD is required  by law to submit a consolidated budget justification document annually  that includes all funding requirements for ASA operations. As will be  discussed in more detail later in this report, even before the change in  terminology, the Air Force and National Guard Bureau faced difficulties  providing Congress with complete and accurate information regarding  expenditures associated with ASA operations. During our review, officials  from NORAD, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, U.S. Pacific Command, the Air Force, and the National Guard  Bureau could not consistently define what capabilities and expenditures  should be considered part of ASA. Until DOD defines ACA; identifies the  specific capabilities that support it—including personnel and equipment;  and distinguishes the place of ASA within that mission for the purposes of  providing consistent information in response to their budget-justification  requirement, Congress, NORAD, and other entities within DOD could be  making important homeland security decisions based on inconsistent  information.
section_title: DOD Has Not Fully Implemented a Risk- Based Management Approach That Balances Risk and Costs for ASA Operations
paragraphs: DOD has taken a series of actions for ASA operations that are consistent  with a risk-based management approach; however, several key actions  have yet to be taken to fully implement a risk-based management  approach that would enable the department to better balance risk and  costs.
subsections: section_title: Risk Management Helps Balance Risk and Costs
paragraphs: According to our prior work, an ongoing risk-based management  approach is a best practice that enhances an organization’s decision  making, including determining operational requirements, and helps to  guide the use of limited resources. We have previously recommended a  five-phase approach to a risk-management framework, including:  strategic goals and objectives, risk assessment, evaluation of  alternatives, management selection, and implementation and monitoring.
Risk management is a widely endorsed strategy for decision makers to  allocate finite resources and take action under conditions of uncertainty.  For example, the 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan states that  its risk management framework integrates and coordinates strategies,  capabilities, and governance to enable risk-informed decision making  related to the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources. This  framework is applicable to threats such as natural disasters, manmade  safety hazards, and terrorism, although different information and  methodologies may be used to understand each.
section_title: DOD Has Established and Linked Its Homeland Defense Strategic Goal to Its ASA Objectives, but Has Not Established Performance Measures
paragraphs: DOD’s overarching homeland defense goal is to secure the United States  from direct attack, but DOD is unable to measure the extent to which ASA  operations help to achieve that goal. In its 2005 Strategy for Homeland  Defense and Civil Support, DOD linked homeland defense with several  objectives associated with ASA operations—including deterring,  detecting, and if necessary, defeating airborne threats. While these  actions are initial steps in the first phase of a risk-based management  approach, NORAD has not identified performance measures that could  identify the extent to which its ASA operations are progressing toward  DOD’s homeland defense goal and objectives. While U.S. Pacific  Command has established one type of performance measure identified in  Joint Chiefs of Staff doctrine on joint planning (measures of  effectiveness), the command has not established the other type of  performance measure (measures of performance). U.S. Pacific  Command officials also recognized that the command’s performance  measures may not be comprehensive since its single ASA site does not  deal with the same operational tempo as the other 17 ASA sites.  According to Joint Chiefs of Staff doctrine on planning, continuous  evaluation of operations against measures of performance and measures  of effectiveness to assess the component’s progress toward  accomplishing a task or achieving an objective is a key component of  DOD’s planning process. Measures of effectiveness are criteria used to  assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational  environment that are tied to measuring the attainment of an end state or  an objective, or creation of an effect. Measures of performance are  criteria to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task  accomplishment. To provide examples of performance measures that  could be applied to ASA operations, we created potential measures of  effectiveness and measures of performance after analyzing NORAD and  DOD planning documents and talking with NORAD and DOD officials,  including ASA units. Table 1 lists some of the potential measures we  developed. NORAD and DOD officials agreed that these examples could  be a viable start for a more comprehensive list of performance measures  to evaluate the effectiveness and performance of ASA operations.
Measuring the status of tasks, effects, and objectives becomes the basis  for reports to senior commanders and civilian leaders on the progress of  the operation. NORAD could then advise the President and the Secretary  of Defense accordingly and adjust operations as required. When we  discussed the lack of performance measures with DOD officials, they  acknowledged that such information would be helpful yet did not exist for  ASA operations.
DOD officials pointed out that NORAD evaluates each ASA unit generally  every 20 months. As we previously reported, NORAD’s unit assessments  evaluate the quality of alert aircraft, to include the overall condition of the  aircraft, and a unit’s ability to respond to different air sovereignty  scenarios. While these assessments evaluate the equipment and  operations of a single ASA unit against a planned scenario, the individual  assessments do not provide NORAD or DOD situational awareness of  actual ASA operations that occur every day (as opposed to planned  evaluations); do not allow either NORAD or DOD to identify trends across  ASA units; and do not provide NORAD or DOD criteria with which to  evaluate the effectiveness and performance of ASA operations against  DOD’s overall homeland-defense goal. Without ASA performance  measures, NORAD and DOD are limited in their ability to assess ASA  operations.
section_title: NORAD Has Not Conducted Routine Risk Assessments, and Its ASA Model Has Limitations
paragraphs: Although we have previously recommended that NORAD should conduct  routine risk assessments of ASA operations—the second phase of a  risk-based management approach—we found that it has not implemented  this recommendation. Specifically, our 2009 ASA report stated that by  undertaking routine risk assessments, NORAD could better evaluate the  extent to which previous threats have been mitigated by DOD or other  government agencies; better evaluate current and emerging threats to  determine which ones require the most urgent attention; and determine  operational requirements to address changing conditions. Moreover,  routine risk assessments could help NORAD evaluate alternatives to  current operations, especially in a resource-restricted environment.  Further, such assessments could enhance NORAD’s ability to determine  and apply the appropriate level and type of resources—including units,  personnel, and aircraft—to ASA operations.
Although NORAD has not conducted routine risk assessments, it took  steps toward implementing our 2009 recommendation by developing a  computer model to evaluate current ASA basing locations. However, we  found that the model had certain limitations that limit its ability to provide  NORAD commanders, DOD decision makers, and Congress risk-based  information. Specifically, it did not include a prioritized list of metropolitan  areas and critical infrastructure locations that NORAD should protect. The  2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan states that identifying and  prioritizing key assets to protect, such as metropolitan areas and critical  infrastructure, is a key component for risk management. According to  NORAD officials, the model omitted this information because DOD had  not issued additional guidance since the initial lists were distributed after  the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The model also did not  incorporate data that are associated with risk: threat, vulnerability, and  consequence because NORAD designed the model to assess the ability  of its aircraft to respond to a single type of threat regardless of its location  in the United States.
We also found some limitations with the assumptions and reliability of the  input data used by NORAD’s computer model. NORAD officials agreed  with our observations and agreed to take action to address them. Further,  we found that while NORAD officials regularly run queries using the  model, they do not generate reports documenting the results of their  analyses. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government recommends ongoing monitoring, in addition to separate  evaluations, to assess the quality of performance over time and ensure  that the findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved. A  report that documents the model’s analyses may allow analysts to  routinely identify trends over a period of time so that commanders could  determine the extent to which their operations are effective or to which a  threat might be evolving. We believe that NORAD’s computer model, if  properly designed, could sufficiently address our 2009 recommendation  to conduct routine risk assessments, as well as allow NORAD to assess  the specifics of detailed ASA scenarios. These areas of improvement are  consistent with DOD methodology used in other DOD risk-management  efforts, such as force protection and defense critical infrastructure, as well  as the U.S. Coast Guard’s and the Transportation Security  Administration’s risk-based efforts. Similarly, The National Strategy for the  Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets states that  responsible authorities using models and simulations can evaluate the  risk associated with particular vulnerabilities more accurately and  subsequently make more-informed protection decisions.conducting routine risk assessments or maintaining a risk-based  computer model that includes key components identified above, DOD will  be unable to identify and assess the level of risk that it is taking; evaluate  its ASA posture as the threat evolves or is mitigated by other U.S.  government efforts; and make risk-based decisions, especially in a  constrained fiscal environment. In addition, without documenting the  results of risk assessments or the analyses that are completed using data  from the computer model, DOD will be limited in its ability to identify  trends in threats, vulnerabilities, and potential consequence over time.
section_title: DOD Has Considered Costs and Benefits of One of Three Alternatives to ASA Operations
paragraphs: We identified three alternatives to DOD’s current ASA operations that the  department has considered since 2009, and DOD has analyzed costs and  benefits of these alternatives to varying extents. During this review, we  found that DOD has considered the following three alternatives to its  current ASA posture: establish a new ASA site to support the President  while in Chicago; acquire additional capabilities to address a perceived  threat; and modify the current number and location of ASA sites. Of these  three alternatives, we determined that DOD conducted a cost-benefit  analysis for one of the alternatives, but had not conducted a cost-benefit  analysis on the other two alternatives at the time of our review. According  to GAO’s risk-based management framework, weighing costs and  benefits is a critical component of risk management when choosing  among alternative security measures because it links the benefits of  alternatives to the costs associated with implementing and maintaining  them. The actions that DOD should take in the “risk-assessment” phase  should be the basis for identifying and considering alternatives. Capital  investments of federal expenditures generally require a cost-benefit or  cost-effectiveness approach.operations that DOD officials told us they had considered since 2009:   We analyzed the three alternatives to ASA
Establish a new ASA site to support the President while in Chicago.
DOD evaluated the possibility of establishing a new ASA site in the  Chicago metropolitan area to support the President’s visits to his  hometown. In evaluating this option, DOD identified several sites that  were considered and analyzed potential costs for each of these sites.  In addition, DOD analyzed the benefits, such as cost savings, and  drawbacks associated with the various sites and concluded that the  cost outweighed the benefit of an additional ASA site at this location.
Acquire capabilities to address a perceived threat. NORAD wants  DOD to acquire a number of capabilities for ASA operations to  address a capability gap that NORAD believes exists based on its  ASA computer model. While NORAD has identified some of the  potential costs associated with one of the new capabilities, it did not  include all of the costs associated with that capability; nor did it  include costs associated with other capabilities that could be acquired.  However, since NORAD requested these additional capabilities  through DOD’s Joint Capabilities Integration and Development  System process, a cost-benefit analysis is not scheduled to occur until  NORAD’s proposal has been assessed and approved as part of that  process.
Modify the number and location of ASA sites. In 2010, NORAD  analyzed its ASA basing strategy to identify whether it could change  the number and location of ASA sites without affecting its ability to  defend the homeland from aviation-related attack. NORAD’s analysis  determined that the probability of success of an attack increased as  the number of ASA sites decreased. The analysis also identified a  “point of diminishing returns” below which the number of ASA sites  could not be further reduced without assuming an unacceptable level  of risk. However, the analysis did not identify potential cost savings  that could result from eliminating a given number of sites. Should  NORAD, DOD, or Congress consider modifying the number and  location of ASA sites in the future, without an analysis that balances  both risk and costs, decision makers will be unable to make fully  informed decisions about whether the potential cost savings (or  increase) warrants the corresponding increase (or decrease) in risk.
We could not evaluate the extent to which DOD implemented the last two  phases—management selection, and implementation and monitoring— because (1) DOD had not fully implemented the first three phases of  GAO’s risk-based management framework, which are essential for the  last two phases, and (2) DOD was still in the managerial-selection phase  for the alternatives that we identified.
While we are encouraged that DOD has examined some alternatives to  its current ASA operations, adopting a more-rigorous risk-based  management approach—including balancing risk and costs—would help  decision makers within DOD and elsewhere more-effectively allocate  finite DOD resources.
section_title: Weak Internal Controls Limit the Ability of the Air Force and National Guard Bureau to Accurately Identify ASA Expenditures
paragraphs: Internal control weaknesses limit the Air Force’s ability to accurately  identify expenditures with regard to Air Force management of ASA  operations. Without accurate expenditure information, Congress,  NORAD, and DOD will not have an accurate basis for decision making  and realistic budget formulation.
subsections: section_title: Air Force and National Guard Bureau Officials Have Not Accurately Identified ASA Expenditures
paragraphs: We analyzed the fiscal year 2010 expenditure information the Air Force  and National Guard Bureau submitted to Congress and found that it did  not accurately identify all ASA expenditures.Force’s submission to Congress, more than $246 million was expended  on ASA operations in fiscal year 2010. While the Air Force included all of  the mandated funding requirements categories in its budget-justification   According to the Air  document, we found three areas in which the expenditures reported by  the Air Force were inaccurate.
First, we found that the Air Force overstated its ASA flying-hour  expenditures by at least $22 million. According to Air Force officials, they  mistakenly used a placeholder for the ASA flying-hour expenditure of  approximately $57.6 million, instead of using the actual flying-hour  expenditure data. During the course of our review, the Air Force provided  us with actual flying-hour data, which showed that the service expended  $35.6 million—38 percent less than reported.
Second, the ASA budget-justification document included expenditures  that were not associated with ASA operations. For example, it included  flying-hour and personnel expenditures related to non-ASA homeland- defense missions, such as air patrols protecting the President and  national special-security events. Hence, it is likely that the Air Force  further overstated its ASA flying-hour expenditures beyond the $22 million  discussed above.
Third, the budget justification document the Air Force provided to  Congress did not include some expenditures that are related to ASA.  While the budget justification included one military construction project for  a munitions storage unit at the Toledo, Ohio, ASA site, it did not include  any other expenditures associated with constructing, maintaining, and  upgrading ASA facilities in fiscal year 2010. For example, when asked if  the officials included the construction expenditures related to establishing  an ASA site at McEntire Joint National Guard Base, South Carolina, in  fiscal year 2010, such as constructing hangers for the alert fighter jets  and upgrading crew quarters, the officials stated that these expenditures  were not included in the ASA budget justification. However, we asked  budget officials at each site about ASA expenditures for fiscal year 2010  in a survey. According to their responses and additional information from  command officials, ASA sites as a whole spent at least $3.8 million in  facilities construction, maintenance, and equipment that was not included  in the budget justification.
When asked to identify the expenditures included in the budget  justification and the process by which the ASA expenditures were  compiled, the Air Force and National Guard Bureau could not answer  many of our questions regarding which detailed expenditures were  included under the expenditure totals listed in the budget justification.  Since the Air Force and National Guard Bureau were unable to accurately  identify the expenditures to conduct ASA operations, we conducted a  survey of all ASA sites in an effort to identify approximate expenditures  for fiscal year 2010. According to the information obtained from this  survey, the expenditures for each unit to conduct ASA operations during  fiscal year 2010 ranged from $2 million to $8 million, with the average site  expenditure being approximately $5 million.
In addition, Air Force and National Guard Bureau officials told us they did  not have documentation or guidance outlining how the ASA expenditures  were defined, identified, and compiled for the budget justification. DOD is  required by various statutes to improve its financial-management  processes, controls, and systems to ensure that complete, reliable,  consistent, and timely information is prepared and responsive to the  financial information needs of agency management and oversight  bodies. Additionally, GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government cite the importance of developing detailed internal-controls  policies, procedures, and practices to ensure basic accountability,  maintain funds control, and prevent fraud and abuse. Such efforts  should include clearly defined roles and responsibilities and accurate and  complete guidance on defining and tracking ASA expenditures. Without  adequate internal controls in place, the Air Force’s ability to accurately  identify ASA expenditures will be limited.
section_title: Unclear ASA Roles and Responsibilities Contributed to Weaknesses in the Identification of ASA Expenditures
paragraphs: The Air Force and National Guard Bureau lack clearly defined  programming and budgeting roles and responsibilities for ASA operations,  which in turn limited the Air Force’s ability to identify ASA expenditures.  We found that the Air Force and National Guard Bureau have not clearly  defined programming and budgeting roles and responsibilities since the  Air Force canceled its 2003 ASA program action directive in 2009. The  directive required the service’s Air Combat Command to program for ASA  operations. As a result, Air Combat Command programmed and  budgeted for ASA operations between 2003 and 2009. However, since  the directive was canceled and no additional guidance was issued, Air  Combat Command stopped programming, planning, and budgeting for  ASA operations at Air National Guard sites. National Guard Bureau  officials told us that they consequently assumed these responsibilities.  However, Bureau officials have questions about the bureau’s authority to  fund and conduct ASA operations in the manner in which they are  currently conducted. We have requested the Air Force’s official position  regarding whether the Air National Guard should be conducting this  mission under a Title 10 or Title 32 status. As of January 2012, the Air  Force had not responded to our inquiry. We also found other internal- control weaknesses, such as a lack of oversight of funds expended for  ASA operations. According to a National Guard Bureau internal-review  report, a lack of oversight and other internal-control weaknesses, such as  poor guidance, led to improper compensation at several ASA sites that  are operated by Air National Guard units. Without clearly defined roles  and responsibilities, questions about who is responsible for programming,  planning, and budgeting will remain; and the ability to accurately identify  ASA expenditures will be limited. In addition, the Air Force and National  Guard Bureau may remain vulnerable to improper use of limited  resources.
section_title: The Air Force and National Guard Bureau’s Lack of Guidance on Defining and Tracking ASA Expenditures Limited Its Ability to Accurately Identify ASA Expenditures
paragraphs: Air Force and National Guard Bureau financial-management officials told  us that they did not accurately capture the ASA expenditures because  they lacked guidance that defines ASA operations and the process to  track the associated expenditures. First, as mentioned previously in the  report, there is no agreed-upon definition of ASA operations among  NORAD and DOD components that contribute to ASA operations.  Consequently, the financial-management guidance does not clearly  define the expenditures that should be associated with ASA operations.  Instead, the guidance that is provided to the Air Force by the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) contains broad categories that  do not clearly state what specific expenditures should or should not be  included in the budget exhibit. For example, the guidance associated  with identifying ASA military-personnel expenditures states that Air Force  officials should provide military-personnel costs associated with the  military full-time equivalents supporting the ASA mission. Since the  guidance does not clearly identify the type or group of military personnel  who are associated with ASA, financial managers could respond to this  reporting requirement with a range of different personnel, such as  personnel that work at NORAD’s air-defense sectors and DOD’s refueling  units since they assist in ASA operations, but are not necessarily included  within the 18 alert sites.
Second, Air Force and National Guard Bureau financial-management  officials told us that they had not issued any guidance explaining the  process for tracking ASA expenditures at the local level. According to Air  Force guidance, financial managers and budget officers at all levels must  make sure that operating personnel are made aware of the importance of  properly identifying and capturing all costs associated with emergency  and special programs, like ASA, because only accurate cost data can  provide the documentation to meet reporting requirements. Guidance to  the local level on the process of tracking ASA expenditures would be  important because Air Force and National Guard Bureau officials told us  that they develop the ASA budget justification using the information that  the financial managers at the ASA sites enter into the service’s  accounting systems. While the National Guard Bureau’s annual financial- management guidance does not include any information on tracking ASA  expenditures, we found that it does contain specific financial- management guidance for a similar mission. Specifically, the Air National  Guard’s counterdrug mission is similar to the ASA mission in that they  both involve Guard personnel supporting a federal mission and have  specific accounting codes dedicated to tracking their expenditures. When  we asked about this disparity, National Guard Bureau financial- management officials acknowledged that there was not a good reason for  having not included more guidance about tracking ASA expenditures and  told us that the bureau would address this in the next version of the  guidance. However, a new version of the National Guard Bureau’s  financial-management guidance was subsequently issued and it did not  include guidance on tracking ASA expenditures. National Guard Bureau  financial-management officials stated that changes to the guidance will be  driven by a number of factors, including appropriations law, questions  from their comptrollers in the field, and our findings. Without clear  guidance on defining and tracking ASA expenditures, unit officials will be  unable to provide Air Force and National Guard Bureau officials accurate  and consistent ASA expenditure information.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government has  taken extensive efforts to protect the airspace over the United States,  aviation threat profiles have changed, and fiscal resources have become  more constrained. Nevertheless, NORAD and DOD have not fully  evaluated how to most-effectively manage ASA operations in this current  environment. Until the Air Force fully implements the recommendations  identified in our January 2009 report, including establishing ASA as a  steady-state mission by updating Air Force homeland-defense policy and  doctrine, concerns about the long-term sustainability of ASA operations  will remain. Additionally, until DOD defines ACA; identifies the specific  capabilities that support it, including personnel and equipment; and  distinguishes the place of ASA within that mission for the purposes of  meeting Congress’s budget-justification requirement, Congress, NORAD,  and other entities within DOD could be making important homeland- security decisions based on different definitions and a resulting variance  in understanding of what is required to accomplish that mission.
Further, in this environment, it is critical that DOD makes basing,  acquisition, and other decisions about ASA operations on the basis of  risk-management principles that balance risk and costs. These principles  include establishing performance measures; identifying and prioritizing  locations that should be protected; utilizing accurate, comprehensive, and  documented risk assessments; and conducting cost-benefit analyses for  alternatives. With a more-rigorous, risk-based management approach,  DOD and congressional decision makers would be in a better position to  effectively allocate resources. Finally, unless the Air Force addresses  internal-control weaknesses that limit its ability to identify ASA  expenditures, Congress, NORAD, and DOD will not have an accurate  basis for investment decision making and realistic budget formulation.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In order to ensure that the Air Force is taking action that addresses the  long-term sustainability of ASA operations, Congress may wish to  consider requiring the Secretary of the Air Force to fully implement the  remaining actions identified in our 2009 report within a time period that  Congress believes most prudent.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To address these issues, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  take the following seven actions.
In order that all DOD components may better understand the mission they  have been asked to perform, we recommend the Secretary of Defense  direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and  Americas’ Security Affairs, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to  clearly define ASA operations and its relationship to NORAD’s ACA  operations.
In order to implement a more-complete risk-based management approach  that balances risk and costs for ASA operations, we recommend the  Secretary of Defense take the following five actions:
Direct the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the U.S. element  of NORAD and U.S. Pacific Command, to develop performance  measures for ASA operations and then use these measures to  evaluate the mission and make adjustments, as warranted, on the  basis of the performance-measure results.
Direct the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland  Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, in coordination with the Joint  Chiefs of Staff, to issue updated guidance, which includes a prioritized  list of metropolitan areas and critical infrastructure that NORAD is  supposed to protect.
Direct the U.S. element of NORAD to update its ASA computer model  to address identified areas for improvement to include incorporating  the elements of risk—threat, vulnerability, and consequence.
Direct the U.S. element of NORAD to document the results of its risk  assessments so that NORAD and DOD can identify trends over time.  Identify the appropriate DOD entities that should conduct a  comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of NORAD’s ASA basing  strategy and then have those entities conduct such an analysis.
In order to accurately identify ASA expenditures and address other  internal control weaknesses, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of the  National Guard Bureau to issue guidance that defines ASA programmatic and budgeting roles and responsibilities; defines all expenditures that should be identified as ASA expenditures  in financial-management systems; and  identifies the proper procedures to track ASA expenditures in their  financial-management systems.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it concurred  with one of our recommendations and partially concurred with the other  six recommendations.  However, DOD did not consistently identify  specific actions that it would take to implement the recommendations and  it did not identify time frames for implementing the recommendations.  DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III.  The Department of  Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation also reviewed  a draft of this report but did not provide any comments.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to clearly define ASA  operations and its relationship to NORAD’s ACA operations and stated  that all organizations involved in the air sovereignty mission would use  standard terminology and that the new terminology would be reflected in  subsequent plans, execute orders, and DOD publications.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop  performance measures for ASA operations, but did not identify any  specific actions that it would take to implement the recommendation.  In  its comments, DOD stated that it recognizes the merit of, and routinely  employs performance measures that are incorporated into military service  training requirements. However, NORAD officials told us during our  review that the command had not developed any performance measures  for ASA operations. Consequently, we believe that the development and  use of ASA-related performance measures would improve DOD’s ability  to assess the overall effectiveness of its ASA operations and enhance the  performance measures to which DOD referred to in its comments.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that it issue updated  guidance, which includes a prioritized list of metropolitan areas and  critical infrastructure that NORAD is supposed to protect. DOD stated that  the current guidance on prioritized metropolitan areas and critical  infrastructure was produced by the National Security Staff and the criteria  used to produce it are still valid.  However, this guidance has not been  updated since shortly after September 11, 2001, and DOD has produced  other similar lists within the department that it uses in some contexts.  For  these reasons, we continue to believe that DOD should consider updating  existing guidance or developing new guidance concerning a prioritized list  of metropolitan areas and critical infrastructure locations. We anticipate  that NORAD and DOD could seek additional guidance from the National  Security Staff if they believe the Staff’s guidance needs to be reviewed or  updated. Such actions would better ensure that key national security  organizations have consistent and up to date expectations.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to direct the U.S.  element of NORAD to update its ASA computer model to address  identified areas for improvement to include incorporating the elements of  risk—threat, vulnerability, and consequence.  In its comments, DOD  stated that NORAD determines mission risk by evaluating its computer  model results (based on vulnerability, threat capability, and targets of  consequence) and comparing the results to intelligence assessments of  threat intent.  However, our analysis of the model found that it did not  incorporate threat, vulnerability, and consequence (or criticality) data  because NORAD designed the model to assess the ability of its aircraft to  respond to a single type of threat regardless of its location in the United  States.  DOD’s comments also stated that NORAD would explore  improvements to the ASA model in support of NORAD/NORTHCOM  decision making as targets and threats evolve and capabilities improve.   We continue to believe it appropriate that NORAD’s future improvements  to the model should include the three components that DOD has long- considered essential in risk assessments: threat, vulnerability, and  consequence (or criticality). Such actions would be consistent with DOD’s  other efforts to protect its people, property, and systems from attacks. We  also expect that future improvements to the model will include the specific  areas we identified in the classified version of this report.
DOD partially concurred with the recommendation to direct the U.S.  element of NORAD to document the results of its risk assessments so  that NORAD and DOD can identify trends over time.  In its response,  DOD identified several NORAD studies or assessments—including a  2009 Collateral Damage Study and the 2010 ASA Basing Study—that are  subject to trend analysis.  We believe that NORAD’s efforts to study or  analyze different aspects of its missions are positive actions. However,  while NORAD issued a one-time report to Congress in March 2011 that  identified the results of its 2010 ASA Basing Study, a one-time study is  not a trend analysis and the command has not documented the results of  its analyses of the ASA model since that time.  We continue to believe  that DOD should document over time the results of analyses stemming  from the ASA basing model itself. This would provide a valuable  reference of the model’s inputs and outputs over time and improve the  ability of current and future leaders to identify and address evolving  threats within U.S. airspace.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense should identify the appropriate DOD entities that should conduct  a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of NORAD’s ASA basing strategy  and then have those entities conduct such an analysis. The response  stated that multiple cost-benefit analyses have been conducted on  NORAD’s ASA basing strategy by NORAD, OSD Cost Assessment and  Program Evaluation, the Joint Staff, the Department of Air Force, and the  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and  Americas’ Security Affairs.  However, when we asked NORAD and DOD  officials, including some of those listed above, for the cost-benefit  analysis of its basing strategy (i.e. potential cost savings that could result  from eliminating a given number of sites), the officials told us that such an  assessment had not been completed.  Further, when we asked which  organization would be responsible for completing such studies, the  officials provided us conflicting views of whose responsibility it would be.  Nonetheless, DOD’s comments also recognize that such cost-benefit  analyses are critical for NORAD’s force posturing. As such, we believe  that NORAD and DOD’s ability to demonstrate its use of these cost- benefit analyses in future decision making efforts will help to ensure  effective mission capability consistent with the current fiscal environment.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to direct the Secretary  of the Air Force and the Director of the National Guard Bureau to issue  guidance that addresses internal control weaknesses that kept the Air  Force from providing accurate ASA expenditure information to Congress.  Such weaknesses included unclear roles and responsibilities; lack of  guidance that identified expenditures that should be identified as ASA  expenditures in financial-management systems; and proper procedures to  track ASA expenditures in their financial-management systems.  In its  response, DOD stated that it believes that programmatic and budgetary  roles are clearly understood and well defined in DOD’s planning,  programming, budgeting, and execution process. However,  the Air  Force’s inability to provide Congress an accurate reporting of resources  used for ASA operations indicates that internal control weaknesses exist  that have not been mitigated by DOD’s standard process. For example,  officials from the Air Force’s homeland defense office, the National Guard  Bureau, and the Air Force’s Combat Command could not provide us any  documentation of which organization is responsible for programming and  budgeting for ASA operations since the Air Force canceled its ASA  program action directive in 2009.
As a result of these weakness, the Air Force provided Congress  inaccurate information about its fiscal year 2010 ASA expenditures— ranging from overstating its flying hour costs by at least 38 percent to  understating its facilities construction, maintenance, and equipment  expenditures. DOD’s response did not indicate that it would issue  guidance to address these internal control weaknesses. Given the current  fiscal environment, DOD should identify and take specific actions  immediately to address our findings so that Congress, NORAD, and DOD  will have an accurate basis for decision making and realistic budget  formulation.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Commander of NORAD, the  Secretary of the Air Force, the Commissioner of Customs and Border  Protection, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the  Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, the  Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Director of OMB. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Air Force has implemented the  recommendations from our 2009 report, we interviewed officials from the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’  Security Affairs, the Air Force’s homeland-defense office, the Air Force’s  Air Combat Command, the National Guard Bureau, and three air  sovereignty alert (ASA) units. We gathered information about steps taken  related to the recommendations and obtained supporting documentation,  when possible. In those cases where the Air Force had taken action, we  asked the officials about the effect that the action had on their operations.  In those cases where the Air Force had not taken action, we asked the  officials to identify the rationale for lack of action and the plan that they  had in place—including time frames—to implement the  recommendations.
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  adopted a risk-based management approach to balance risk and costs for  ASA operations, we reviewed and analyzed applicable documentation  and interviewed relevant officials. Specifically, we reviewed prior GAO  reports that recommended organizations use a risk-based management  approach to manage risk and costs. We reviewed documents and  interviewed officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, the Air Force, and  the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to  determine the extent to which NORAD has followed a risk-based  management approach for ASA operations. We reviewed NORAD’s ASA  assessments and compared them to the elements required for a risk  assessment. We reviewed acquisition documentation to determine  whether the command considered the cost and benefits when considering  alternatives for ASA operations. During our discussions with officials, we  asked how and whether they measure the performance of ASA  operations and whether they consider cost for ASA operations. To help us  better understand whether DOD incorporates risk into ASA operations,  we reviewed documentation on how other agencies incorporate risk into  their missions. We then reviewed documentation on NORAD’s Operation  Noble Eagle Fighter Basing Location Model and analyzed the model’s  inputs and assumptions. We interviewed officials from NORAD on how it  operationalizes the model in support of ASA operations.
We defined ASA operations as the fully fueled, fully armed aircraft and trained personnel  on alert 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and the infrastructure, equipment, and supplies  required to maintain them at the 18 ASA sites across the United States.
section_title: Appendix II: Air Force’s Implementation of Our 2009 Recommendations as of November 2011
paragraphs: Recommendation  We recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the military services with  units that consistently conduct Air  Sovereignty Alert (ASA) operations to  formally assign ASA duties to these units  and then ensure that the readiness of  these units is fully assessed, to include  personnel, training, equipment, and ability  to respond to an alert.
Actions taken  Fully Implemented: The National Guard Bureau, in coordination with Air Combat  Command, initially implemented this recommendation by placing ASA operations on the  units’ secondary mission statements.does not believe that the Secretary of Defense has formally assigned ASA operations to  the Air National Guard units. As of November 2011, bureau officials told us that they were  taking action to remove the reference to ASA operations from these statements because  they now believe that they could better address the findings identified in the 2009 report  through the Air Force’s standard deployment process.  However, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) does not believe that  the National Guard Bureau should remove the reference to ASA operations from the  units’ secondary mission statements. NORAD officials told us that they do not support the  bureau’s position because NORAD experienced some challenges when it placed units  that do not normally sit alert on alert for the 10th anniversary of the September 11, 2001,  terrorist attacks. While our assessment gives the Air Force credit for having taken action,  we are also concerned that removing the reference to ASA operations from the units’  secondary mission statements could have adverse effects, such as the units not reporting  the extent to which they are able to conduct both their ASA operations and overseas  deployments in their appropriate readiness systems. It is too early to determine the  consequences of the bureau’s decision, although a bureau official acknowledged that the  problems we identified in our 2009 report could reoccur if this new approach with NORAD  was not fully implemented.
We recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Air  Force to implement ASA as a steady-state  mission according to NORAD, Department  of Defense (DOD), and Air Force guidance  by  (1) incorporating ASA operations within the  Air Force submissions for the 6-year  Future Years Defense Program;  (2) updating the Air Force homeland  defense policy, homeland operations  doctrine, and concept of operations to  incorporate and define the roles and  responsibilities for ASA operations; and  (3) updating and implementing the ASA  program action directive.
Partially Implemented: The Air Force has taken one of three steps to implement ASA as  a steady-state mission. Specifically:  (1) The National Guard Bureau has incorporated ASA operations in its fiscal year 2013  Future Years Defense Program.  (2) The Air Force had not updated any of the identified documents. Consequently, overall  roles and responsibilities remain undefined.  (3) Rather than updating and implementing the ASA program action directive, the Air  Force cancelled the program action directive. This leaves the Air Force and the National  Guard Bureau without clear roles and responsibilities for operational planning,  programming, and budgeting for ASA operations, which GAO has identified as an internal  control weakness.
We recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Air  Force to establish a timetable to implement  ASA as a steady-state mission [by taking  the actions identified in the preceding  recommendation].
Not Implemented: The Air Force has not established a timetable to implement ASA as a  steady-state mission.
Recommendation  We recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Air  Force to develop and implement a plan to  address any projected capability gaps in  ASA units due to the expected end of the  useful service lives of their F-15 and F-16  fighter aircraft.
Actions taken  Minimally Implemented: The Air Force has taken some action that could mitigate  potential challenges, if proactively managed, but has not developed a single plan to  manage the recapitalization of the aircraft that conduct ASA operations. Specifically, the  service has initiated efforts to test the effective service life of its remaining F-15 and F-16  fleets. In addition, the service has requested funding to update both platforms with radar  and communication equipment that will support ASA operations. The Air Force has also  identified the extent to which it could cover its alert sites if either the F-15 or F-16 fleet  were unavailable.  However, the potential grounding of ASA aircraft—such as the grounding of F-15s during  2007 and F-22s during 2011, the ongoing delays in the F-35 program, and the  unspecified fielding locations for the F-35 aircraft could pose challenges in the future.  Further, the Air Force could have challenges if the retirement of the current fleet of F-15s  and F-16s are not managed in a manner that considers the effect on ASA operations. For  example, if the Air Force were to decrease the number of older models of F-16s in the  inventory, this could affect ASA operations since these aircraft are flown by units that  conduct these operations. Also, if the Air Force retires the fleet of F-15s and F-16s with  the longest remaining effective service lives before those with shorter service lives, the  service could experience a shortage in fighter aircraft available for ASA operations before  the 5th-generation aircraft are available.
We recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Air  Force to develop and implement a formal  method to replace deploying units that still  provides unit commanders flexibility to  coordinate replacements.
Minimally Implemented: In response to this recommendation, DOD noted that it has a  global force-management system that it uses to formally manage its forces around the  world. However, the approach that DOD uses to backfill personnel and units for ASA  operations is still managed on an ad hoc basis.  NORAD and the Air Force have developed some planning documents, such as a plan for  backfilling ASA units on a large scale. For example, one of the planning documents  identifies potential units that could conduct ASA operations at bases that are equipped  with F-15s if those aircraft were grounded for a period of time as they were in 2008. In  addition, Air Combat Command and the National Guard Bureau developed a  memorandum of understanding that identifies a process by which Air National Guard  units will be scheduled to support non-ASA Operation Noble Eagle missions, such as  national special-security events, throughout the year, if called upon. The agreement  identifies a process by which Air National Guard units will be identified and scheduled to  support these missions, if called upon, and the time frame during which each unit will be  ready to support these missions. It also identifies Air Combat Command as the command  that will be responsible for providing funds to those units when called upon.  However, the Air Force has not developed similar Operation Noble Eagle planning  documents to replace ASA units that deploy to support overseas operations or units that  are taken off alert for a short period of time when they fail an alert force evaluation.  Consequently, the National Guard Bureau, in coordination with Air Combat Command,  must try to find personnel and equipment that are available to support these units. In  addition, since it is unclear who is responsible for funding these backfill efforts, the  National Guard Bureau must use funds that were programmed for other purposes to  cover these costs.
Fifth-generation aircraft, such as the F-22 and F-35, have stealth characteristics, fused sensor data,  and advanced radars.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made  significant contributions to this report: Davi M. D’Agostino, Director  (retired); Joseph Kirschbaum, Assistant Director; James D. Ashley;  Tommy Baril; Mark Braza; Susan C. Ditto; Brandon Jones; David F.  Keefer; Charles W. Perdue; Karen A. Richey; Jeff M. Tessin; Amie M.  Steele; Amanda G. Weldon; and Michael Willems.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air  Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace. GAO-09-184.  Washington, D.C.: January 27, 2009.
Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Address Management of Air  Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace. GAO-09-612T.  Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2009.
subsections: section_title: DOD Tactical Aircraft
paragraphs: Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Fighter Reports Generally Addressed  Congressional Mandates, but Reflected Dated Plans and Guidance, and  Limited Analyses. GAO-11-323R. Washington, D.C.: February 24, 2011  Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Ability to Meet Future Requirements Is Uncertain,  with Key Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment Decisions.  GAO-10-789. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2010.
section_title: Aviation Security
paragraphs: Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress, but Additional Efforts Are  Needed to Improve Security. GAO-11-938T. Washington, D.C.:  September 16, 2011.
Aviation Security: TSA’s Revised Cost Comparison Provides a More  Reasonable Basis for Comparing the Costs of Private-Sector and TSA  Screeners. GAO-11-375R. Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2011.
Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments and Stronger  Internal Controls Needed to Help Inform TSA Resource Allocation.  GAO-09-492. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2009.
section_title: Risk Management
paragraphs: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic,  Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness.  GAO-11-621. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2011.
Defense Management: Comprehensive Cost Information and Analysis of  Alternatives Needed to Assess Military Posture in Asia. GAO-11-316.  Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2011.
Defense Critical Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Improve the  Identification and Management of Electrical Power Risks and  Vulnerabilities to DOD Critical Assets. GAO-10-147. Washington, D.C.:  October 23, 2009.
Risk Management: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principles  in Homeland Security. GAO-08-904T. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2008.
Highlights of a Forum Convened by the Comptroller General of the United  States: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principles in  Homeland Security. GAO-08-627SP. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2008.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide  Federal Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7,  2007.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and  Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure.  GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
section_title: Financial Management
paragraphs: Department of Defense: Financial Management Improvement and Audit  Readiness Efforts Continue to Evolve. GAO-10-1059T. Washington, D.C.:  September 29, 2010.