Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency's Roles and Missions
Published: 2009-03-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: To more quickly field ballistic missile defenses, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been exempted from traditional Department of Defense (DOD) requirements development, acquisition, and oversight processes since its creation in 2002. Instead, MDA has unique roles and missions to develop and field weapon systems that address a variety of ballistic missile threats. To date, MDA has spent about $56 billion and plans to spend about $50 billion more through 2013 to develop an integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System. The system consists of a layered network of capabilities that includes defensive components such as sensors, radars, interceptors, and command and control. In reviews of DOD's approach to acquire, operate, and maintain ballistic missile defense systems, GAO has previously reported on several challenges that have stemmed from the broad flexibilities provided to MDA. This testimony summarizes the challenges facing DOD in acquiring and operating its ballistic missile defense systems and describes DOD's efforts to improve transparency and accountability. This statement is based primarily on previously issued GAO reports and testimonies. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed key officials to update past work and identify DOD and MDA efforts to address previous recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While MDA's exemption from traditional DOD processes allowed it to quickly develop and field an initial ballistic missile defense capability, this approach has led to several challenges. DOD now has an opportunity to better balance the flexibility inherent in MDA's unique roles with the need for effective management and oversight of ballistic missile defense programs. Furthermore, the start of a new administration and the appointment of a new MDA Director offer DOD the chance to more fully address the challenges identified in GAO's prior work. These include the following: (1) Incorporating Combatant Command Priorities: While DOD established a process in 2005 to address the combatant commands' needs for ballistic missile defense capabilities, GAO reported in 2008 that the process was evolving and had yet to overcome key limitations to its effectiveness, including the need for more effective methodologies to clearly identify and prioritize the combatant commands' needs. Additionally, when developing ballistic missile defenses, MDA lacked a departmentwide perspective on which of the commands' needs were most significant. (2) Establishing Adequate Baselines to Measure Progress: MDA's flexible acquisition approach has limited the ability for DOD and congressional decision makers to measure MDA's progress on cost, schedule, and testing. Specifically, as GAO reported in March 2009, MDA's baselines have been inadequate to measure progress and hold MDA accountable. However, GAO also reported that new MDA initiatives to improve baselines could help improve acquisition accountability. (3) Planning for Long-Term Operations and Support: DOD has taken initial steps to plan for ballistic missile defense support, but efforts to date are incomplete as difficulties in transitioning responsibilities from MDA to the services have complicated long-term planning. Additionally, although operation and support costs are typically 70 percent of a weapon system's life cycle costs, DOD has not required that full cost estimates for ballistic missile defense operations and support be developed and validated, and DOD's 6-year spending plan does not fully reflect these costs. DOD has recently taken some steps to improve transparency and accountability of ballistic missile defense programs, such as the creation of a Missile Defense Executive Board to provide top level oversight and a life cycle management process that established defensewide funding accounts. Although these are positive steps, they do not yet provide comprehensive information for acquisition oversight; and have not yet clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of MDA and the services, including how the defensewide account will be used to fund the ballistic missile defense program over the long term. As DOD seeks to improve transparency and accountability, sustained top leadership will be needed to build upon this recent progress.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the challenges facing the  Department of Defense (DOD) regarding its process for acquiring,  developing, and fielding ballistic missile defenses. Funded at $8 billion to  nearly $10 billion per year, the effort to develop and field ballistic missile  defenses is the largest research and development program in DOD. Since  its creation in 2002, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has expended  almost $56 billion to develop and field an initial ballistic missile defense  capability, and plans to spend about $50 billion more through 2013, while  being exempt from traditional DOD requirements development,  acquisition, and oversight processes. This exemption provided MDA with  flexibility to quickly develop and deliver an initial capability to defend the  United States, deployed U.S. forces, friends, and allies from the threats  posed by ballistic missiles. However, the new administration and Congress  are now reconsidering the approach with which DOD acquires, operates,  and maintains ballistic missile defense weapon systems. Such  reconsiderations are occurring against the backdrop of other efforts to  more broadly reform DOD’s traditional acquisition processes.
My remarks will discuss several key challenges that DOD has yet to  overcome as it has acquired ballistic missile defense capabilities outside  traditional DOD requirements and acquisition processes. Specifically, my  statement will address challenges in incorporating combatant command  priorities, providing information needed for acquisition accountability, and  planning for long-term operations and support, as well as describing the  department’s efforts to date to establish greater oversight. My statement is  based primarily on findings and recommendations from our previously  issued reports and testimonies in these areas. We also interviewed DOD  and MDA officials and reviewed documents to update our past work and  identify DOD and MDA efforts to address our previous recommendations.  A selected list of our previously issued reports and testimonies on these  issues is provided at the end of this statement. We conducted our work in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: MDA’s mission is to develop an integrated and layered Ballistic Missile  Defense System to defend the United States, its deployed forces, friends,  and allies against ballistic missile attacks. This mission requires complex  coordination and the integration of many and varied defensive  components—space-based sensors; ground- and sea-based surveillance  and tracking radars; advanced ground- and sea-based interceptors; and  battle management, command, control, and communications. Prior to  MDA’s establishment in 2002, the services, along with the support and  coordination of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, separately  managed the development and acquisition of ballistic missile defense  weapon systems as major defense acquisition programs.
In 2002, the President established ballistic missile defense as a national  priority and directed DOD to proceed with plans to develop and put in  place an initial capability beginning in 2004. To expedite the delivery of an  operationally capable Ballistic Missile Defense System, in 2002 the  Secretary of Defense re-chartered the Ballistic Missile Defense  Organization as MDA and directed MDA to manage all ballistic missile  defense systems then under development and transferred those systems  controlled by the military services to the agency. The systems transferred  from the services and the new systems whose development MDA initiates  are all considered to be “elements” of the Ballistic Missile Defense  System. The Secretary also directed MDA to manage the Ballistic Missile  Defense System as an evolutionary program, and to develop and field  increasingly effective ballistic missile defense capabilities. To do so, he  directed that systems developed by MDA would not be subject to DOD’s  traditional joint requirements determination and acquisition processes  until a mature ballistic missile defense capability had been developed and  was ready to be handed over to a military service for production and  operation.
MDA’s mission is to develop and field ballistic missile defenses against  threats posed by adversaries from all regions, at all ranges, and in all  phases of flight. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense and in order  to meet a presidential directive, the MDA began fielding in 2004 a limited  capability to defend the United States against long-range ballistic missile  attacks. This Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, which is intended  to protect the U.S. homeland against incoming long-range ballistic missiles  launched from Northeast Asia and the Middle East, was first made  operational in 2006. MDA has added to this limited capability since it was  first fielded by upgrading additional Air Force early warning radars,  developing and fielding land- and sea-based radars, and fielding an initial  capability for command and control, battle management, and  communications. Additionally, to provide sea-based defenses against  regional threats for deployed U.S. forces, friends, and allies, MDA has  upgraded software and radar systems on 18 Aegis destroyers and cruisers,  and delivered interceptors for use on these vessels, to defend against  short- and medium-range threats. Early in the next decade, MDA plans to  field an additional radar in the Czech Republic and ground-based  interceptors in Poland to defend Europe and North America from ballistic  missile threats originating in the Middle East. Over the long term, MDA  also is developing interceptor payloads that would be capable of defeating  more advanced threats—such as the use of multiple warheads or decoys— and “boost-phase” capabilities to enable DOD to shoot down ballistic  missiles shortly after liftoff.
To incorporate the views of the combatant commands—which is critical in  determining and prioritizing needed capabilities—the President made the  U.S. Strategic Command responsible in 2003 for advocating for desirable  missile defense characteristics and capabilities on behalf of all combatant  commands to MDA. To fulfill this responsibility, U.S. Strategic Command  and the MDA created the Warfighter Involvement Process in 2005. A key  output of this process is the Prioritized Capabilities List, which is intended  to specify how the combatant commands collectively prioritize the full  range of capabilities needed to perform ballistic missile defense missions.
To operate and support ballistic missile defense elements over the long  term, DOD plans to transition the responsibility for supporting ballistic  missile defense elements from MDA to the services. Transitioning involves  designating lead military service responsibilities for providing personnel,  force protection, operations and support, and for developing doctrine,  organization, and facilities requirements for its respective element. The  transition process may culminate in a transfer—which is the reassignment  of the MDA program office responsibilities to the lead service.
Oversight of MDA is executed by the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Because MDA is not subject to  DOD’s traditional joint requirements determination and acquisition  processes, DOD developed alternative oversight mechanisms. For  example, in 2007 the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Missile  Defense Executive Board, which is to provide the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, or Deputy Secretary of  Defense, as necessary, with a recommended ballistic missile defense  strategic program plan and feasible funding strategy for approval. In  September 2008, the Deputy Secretary of Defense also established a life  cycle management process for the Ballistic Missile Defense System. The  Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Board to use the process to  oversee the annual preparation of a required capabilities portfolio and  develop a program plan to meet the requirements with Research,  Development, Test, and Evaluation; procurement; operations and  maintenance; and military construction in defensewide accounts.
section_title: Key Management Challenges Have Not Been Fully Addressed
paragraphs: MDA’s exemption from traditional DOD processes allowed it the flexibility  to quickly develop and field an initial ballistic missile defense capability;  however, we have previously reported that DOD’s implementation of this  approach has resulted in several management challenges that have not  been fully addressed. These challenges include immature processes for  incorporating combatant command priorities, inadequate baselines to  measure progress, and incomplete planning for long-term operations and  support. With the start of a new administration and the appointment of a  new MDA Director, DOD now has an opportunity to better balance the  flexibility inherent in MDA’s unique roles and missions with the need for  effective management and oversight of ballistic missile defense programs,  and to more fully address the challenges that affect its ability to plan and  resource ballistic missile defenses.
subsections: section_title: Warfighter Involvement Process Has Helped MDA Address Some Combatant Command Capability Needs, but the Process Faces Limitations
paragraphs: DOD has taken some steps to address combatant command capability  needs through the Warfighter Involvement Process, but this process faces  key limitations to its effectiveness. For example, based on combatant  command inputs received through the Warfighter Involvement Process,  MDA initiated new programs in fiscal year 2008 to develop and deploy sea- based defenses against short-range missiles. However, when the Secretary  of Defense created MDA in 2002, the agency initially lacked a mechanism  for obtaining and considering the combatant commands’ priorities as it  developed ballistic missile defenses. The lack of such a mechanism made  it difficult for MDA and the combatant commands to be sure that MDA  was addressing the commands’ highest priority capability needs.
Although U.S. Strategic Command and MDA established the Warfighter  Involvement Process in 2005, we reported in July 2008 that this process is  still evolving and had not yet yielded a clear and effective approach for  MDA to follow when making investment decisions. Our report identified  several shortcomings that inhibited the process’ effectiveness. For  example:    U.S. Strategic Command’s and MDA’s roles and responsibilities for  implementing the process were not fully documented, which left the  combatant commands without an agreed-upon method for influencing  MDA investments and for holding MDA accountable. U.S. Strategic  Command has since issued guidance that documents how the process  operates, but this guidance is not binding on MDA and will require  updating as the process evolves. As of March 2009 MDA had drafted  but not yet issued similar guidance. As a result, the combatant  commands continue to lack both transparency into the agency’s  decision-making process and assurance that MDA will implement the  process in a manner that addresses their needs.
The process has not yet resulted in effective methodologies for the  combatant commands to clearly identify and consistently prioritize  their capability needs. For example, in preparing the 2007 Prioritized  Capabilities List—intended to give combatant commanders input into  development priorities—combatant commands used differing criteria  for assessing capabilities, and not all commands clearly distinguished  among their top priorities. As a result, the list did not provide MDA  with clear information about how to best address the combatant  commands’ needs. DOD agreed with our recommendation that          U.S. Strategic Command improve the methodologies for identifying  and prioritizing capabilities, but has not yet completed the 2009  Prioritized Capabilities List.
Senior civilian DOD leadership has not been involved in the Warfighter  Involvement Process to adjudicate potential differences among the  combatant commands’ priorities and provide perspective on how to  invest resources against priorities as the leadership would under  traditional DOD processes. Lacking such senior-level involvement,  MDA has not benefited from receiving a broader perspective on which  of the commands’ needs is the most significant. To address this  shortcoming, we recommended that senior civilian leadership review  the commands’ priorities before they are sent to MDA. DOD partially  agreed with our recommendation, but it did not clearly identify the  steps it would take to implement the recommendation.
A congressionally mandated independent review, released in August 2008,  of MDA’s roles, missions, and structure also identified the need to improve  the Warfighter Involvement Process. Although the independent review  found that the Warfighter Involvement Process provided a potential  mechanism for the combatant commands to influence Ballistic Missile  Defense System developments, the review made several recommendations  to make the process more effective. In particular, as our July 2008 report  recommended, the independent review recommended that DOD improve  the methodologies used to develop and prioritize the combatant  commands’ capability needs so that the Prioritized Capabilities List  provides more adequate guidance to MDA.
Since our July 2008 report was issued, U.S. Strategic Command has  responded to our recommendation that the combatant commands  compare their priorities with MDA’s long-term funding plans and provide  an assessment—called the Capability Assessment Report—to MDA.       U.S. Strategic Command expects the first assessment to be completed by  the end of April 2009. The assessment represents the combatant  commands’ official assessment of MDA’s response to the 2007 Prioritized  Capabilities List, and is also intended to provide a basis for MDA to make  capability trade-offs and programmatic adjustments to ensure acquisition  of the warfighters’ desired capabilities. U.S. Strategic Command provided  MDA with a preliminary overview of the assessment in June 2008 so that  MDA and the Missile Defense Executive Board could use the information  during the formulation of the fiscal year 2010 budget. However, until the  MDA’s fiscal year 2010 budget is presented to Congress, we are unable to  assess the extent to which the agency’s investments are reflective of the  commands’ priorities.
section_title: MDA’s Approach Limits Decision Makers’ Ability to Measure Progress on Cost, Schedule, and Testing, but New Initiatives Could Improve Acquisition Accountability
paragraphs: MDA’s approach to establishing baselines has limited the ability for DOD  and congressional decision makers to measure MDA’s progress on cost,  schedule, and testing; however, new DOD initiatives could help improve  acquisition accountability. Baselines are starting points that are used to  measure progress on cost, schedule, and testing. Tracking progress against  a baseline can signal when a program is diverting from its planned budget  and schedule. Overall, the Ballistic Missile Defense System does not have  baselines that are useful for oversight. Specifically, cost baselines have not  been established, test baselines remain relatively unstable, and production  and fielding are outpacing testing and modeling.
MDA has not yet established cost baselines that are useful to hold the  agency accountable for how it expends resources, but has indicated that it  is taking steps to do so. Baselined total costs and unit costs are  fundamental markers most programs use to measure performance.  However, MDA’s unique roles and missions exempted the agency from a  requirement to establish baselines for total or unit costs. As a result, in  March 2009 we reported for the sixth consecutive year that we were  unable to assess MDA’s actual costs against baseline costs. However, in  response to recommendations in our March 2009 report, MDA agreed to  provide total cost baselines for its block structure, which describes the  agency’s approach to acquiring and delivering new increments of ballistic  missile defense capabilities to the services and combatant commands for  operational use. While Block 1 capabilities (to defend the United States  from a limited, long-range North Korean attack) will not be baselined,  MDA has agreed to submit cost baselines for Block 2 capabilities (to  defend U.S. forces and allies from short- to medium-range threats in one  theater) and portions of Block 3 capabilities (to expand the defense of the  United States to include limited threats from Iran) as part of its submission  to the President’s fiscal year 2010 budget, expected in Spring 2009. MDA  also stated that it will submit total cost baselines for the rest of Block 3  and all of Block 5 capabilities (to expand the defense of U.S. forces and  allies) by the spring of 2010.
MDA also has made some progress with developing a schedule baseline  for its blocks and their associated capabilities, but has faced challenges in  meeting this baseline. MDA identifies its schedule baseline as the fiscal  year dates for early, partial, and full capability deliveries of hardware and  functionality for a block; as a result, schedule changes and their effects on  the Ballistic Missile Defense System’s development can be determined by  comparing the changes with the original schedule. However, by trying to  conform to the schedule baseline, production and fielding decisions have  outpaced testing and modeling. Specifically, MDA determines the  capability levels of individual elements through a formal declaration  process that is based on a combination of models, simulations, and ground  tests that are all anchored to flight test data. However, flight test  cancellations and delays have resulted in MDA revising and reducing the  basis it uses to declare when missile defense capabilities can be  considered for operational use. As a result, recent fielding decisions have  been made with a more limited understanding of system effectiveness than  planned.
MDA’s testing baselines also have not been effective for oversight, but a  new MDA initiative to review its testing program could lead to  improvements. In our March 2009 report, we found that MDA’s officially  approved test baseline, the Integrated Master Test Plan, changes  frequently, often because MDA has changed the substance of a test, the  timing of a test, or added new tests to the baseline. For example, based on  its September 2006 plan, MDA had expected the Ground-based Midcourse  Defense element to conduct seven interceptor flight tests from the start of  fiscal year 2007 through the first quarter of 2009. However, MDA was only  able to conduct two of these flight tests. As a result of these frequent  changes, we concluded that MDA’s test baseline is therefore not effective  for oversight. Recognizing the challenges to the testing program, in  February 2009, the Director, MDA testified before this Subcommittee that  the agency is undertaking a review of its program. This review, according  to MDA, will identify critical variables that have not been proven to date,  determine what test scenarios are needed to collect the relevant test data,  and develop an affordable and prioritized schedule of flight and ground  tests. If MDA’s review accomplishes its intended goals, then it could both  improve oversight and help close the gaps that exist between testing,  modeling, and simulation.
In our March 2009 report, we made several recommendations to MDA that  would improve its preparation of cost, schedule, and testing baselines,  which are needed to help decision makers in DOD and Congress to  exercise oversight of MDA’s acquisition approach. For example, in the  area of cost we recommended that MDA complete total cost baselines  before requesting additional funding for Blocks 2 and 3. Regarding  schedule baselines, we recommended that MDA synchronize the  development, manufacturing, and fielding schedules of Ballistic Missile  Defense System assets with the testing and validation schedules to ensure  that items are not fielded before their performance has been validated  through testing. In the testing area, we recommended that MDA reassess  its flight tests scheduled for the end of fiscal year 2009 to ensure that they  can be reasonably conducted. DOD generally concurred with all 11 of our  recommendations.
section_title: Planning for Long-Term Operations and Support Is Underway, But Efforts Are Incomplete
paragraphs: DOD has taken some initial steps to plan for long-term operations and  support of ballistic missile defense operations, but planning efforts to date  are incomplete because of difficulties in transitioning responsibilities from  MDA to the services and in establishing operation and support cost  estimates. Our prior work has shown that clear roles and responsibilities  can improve outcomes by identifying who is accountable for various  activities. However, in September 2008, we reported that DOD had not  identified clear roles and responsibilities among MDA and the services for  long-term support planning.
In our September 2008 report we recommended that DOD establish a  process for long-term support planning that adheres to key principles for  life cycle management. This includes establishing timelines for planning  that must be completed before each element is fielded, involving services  in support and transition planning and deciding when support  responsibilities will be transitioned to the services, specifying roles and  responsibilities for MDA and the services for life cycle management, and  identifying who is accountable for ensuring these actions are  accomplished. Since our September 2008 report was issued, DOD has  made some progress in planning for transition of some ballistic missile  defense elements. For example, in January 2009 MDA and the Army agreed  on the overarching terms and conditions for the transition and transfer of  elements from MDA to the Army, including Ground-based Midcourse  Defense, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, and the AN/TPY-2  Forward-based Radar. However, the agreement neither identifies when  these elements are expected to transfer to the Army, nor addresses the  specific details on how operations and support costs will be funded  following the transfer. Until DOD establishes a transition and transfer  process that adheres to key principles for life cycle management, DOD will  be unable to ensure that individual elements will be sustained in the long  term, and DOD’s long-term support planning will continue to face  challenges.
Moreover, DOD has established limited operation and support cost  estimates for ballistic missile defense elements, and the estimates that  have been developed are not transparent to DOD senior leadership and  congressional decision makers. DOD has not required that full cost  estimates for ballistic missile defense operations and support be  developed, validated, and reviewed. As a result, the Future Years Defense  Plan—DOD’s 6-year spending plan—does not fully reflect these costs.  Prior GAO work has shown that operations and support costs are typically  70 percent of a weapon’s life cycle costs. Specifically, our work found  that DOD has not addressed ballistic missile defense operation and  support costs in the following three ways:    First, in our September 2008 report, we found that MDA and the  services have jointly developed and agreed on cost estimates for only  two of the seven elements we examined. Joint cost estimates for the  other five elements are not yet complete and are likely to change over  time, perhaps significantly, because MDA and the services are still  determining key assumptions, such as how support will be provided— by contractor, the service, or a combination of the two—and where  some elements may be fielded and operated. These determinations will  affect military construction and operation and support costs, such as  maintenance, base operating support, and facilities.
Second, in September 2008 we found that DOD did not plan to  independently verify the operation and support cost estimates for all  the ballistic missile defense elements we reviewed. Independently  validated cost estimates are especially important to formulating budget  submissions because, historically, cost estimates created by weapon  system program offices are lower than those that are created  independently. In January 2009, MDA and the Army agreed in principle  that full, independently verified life cycle cost estimates may be among  the criteria for transferring elements to the Army. However, as of  February 2009, DOD had not developed plans to prepare these  estimates. Table 1 shows whether, as of February 2009, the joint  operation and support cost estimates have been completed, whether  the cost estimates have been independently verified, and the status of  the joint estimates.
Third, we reported in September 2008 that decision makers’ visibility  of ballistic missile defense operation and support costs was further  hindered because MDA and the services had agreed only on which  organization is responsible for funding operation and support costs  after fiscal year 2013 for two of the seven elements we reviewed— Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and Upgraded Early Warning Radar. It  is still unclear how DOD intends to fund long-term operations and  support costs. Although the MDA and Navy agreed in January 2009 on  how to fund operation and support costs for the Sea-Based X-Band  Radar through 2013, the agreement does not specify whether these  costs will be funded through the defensewide fund or through a  transfer of MDA’s appropriated funds to the Navy after that time.  Additionally, in February 2009 Army and Air Force officials told us that  the services had not reached agreements with MDA about how to fund  operation and support costs beyond 2013 for four of the seven  elements we reviewed. As a result of these limitations, DOD and the  services would face unknown financial obligations for supporting  ballistic missile defense fielding plans and that most of these costs  would not be reflected in DOD’s future years’ spending plan for fiscal  years 2010 through 2015.
To address these cost transparency challenges, we recommended that  DOD establish a requirement to estimate ballistic missile defense  operation and support costs, including detailing when credible estimates  are to be developed, updated, and reviewed, and requiring periodic  independent validation of operation and support costs for each element. In  its response to our recommendations, DOD stated that it has established a  new ballistic missile defense life cycle management process to oversee the  annual preparation of a required capabilities portfolio and a program plan  to meet those requirements through defensewide accounts. This process is  intended in part to provide decision makers with clear, credible, and  transparent cost information.
section_title: DOD Is Taking Actions to Establish Greater Oversight, but Obstacles Remain
paragraphs: DOD has recently taken some steps to improve oversight of the  development of the Ballistic Missile Defense System, such as the creation  of both the Missile Defense Executive Board and its life cycle management  process, but obstacles remain. For example, DOD’s actions do not yet  provide comprehensive information for acquisition oversight; and have not  yet clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of MDA and the services,  including how defensewide accounts will be used to fund the ballistic  missile defense program over the long term. Additionally, as DOD seeks to  improve transparency and accountability, sustained top leadership will be  needed to build upon this recent progress.
Establishment of a new Missile Defense Executive Board in 2007 has been  a step forward in improving transparency and accountability. The board is  chartered to review and make recommendations on MDA’s acquisition  strategy, plans, and funding. One step the board has taken to improve  transparency and accountability was its adoption of its life cycle  management process, a process designed to clarify the ballistic missile  defense roles of MDA, the services, combatant commands, and Office of  the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has directed MDA to take actions  based on Missile Defense Executive Board recommendations. For  example, the Under Secretary directed MDA to incorporate into its budget  proposal the interceptor inventory recommended by a Joint Staff study  and endorsed by the Missile Defense Executive Board.
Although the establishment of the Missile Defense Executive Board  represents progress, this new board does not yet provide comprehensive  acquisition oversight of the ballistic missile defense program. As we  reported in March 2009, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics plans to hold program reviews for several  Ballistic Missile Defense System elements to further increase acquisition  oversight of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. According to DOD  officials, these reviews are designed to provide comprehensive  information that will be used as the basis for Missile Defense Executive  Board recommendations for the Ballistic Missile Defense System business  case and baseline process—a process which, according to these officials,  is similar to the traditional Defense Acquisition Board process for  reviewing other major acquisition programs. However, it is unclear  whether the information provided to the Missile Defense Executive Board  will be comparable to that produced for other major acquisition program  reviews, as most of the information appears to be derived or presented by  MDA as opposed to independent sources as required for traditional major  defense acquisition programs.
Additionally, the Missile Defense Executive Board’s life cycle management  process is intended to facilitate more detailed agreements between MDA  and the services to clearly establish their respective roles and  responsibilities; however, these efforts are still in their early stages. For  example, although MDA is developing memorandums of agreement with  the services, the annexes that would lay out the specific responsibilities  for such things as planning, programming, budgeting, execution, and life  cycle management for each ballistic missile defense element have yet to be  completed. Further, the annexes are expected to provide details about the  how the services and MDA will work more closely together to manage the  elements through joint program offices. The MDA Director told us that  these new program offices would provide the services greater influence in  the design of ballistic missile defenses. We have previously reported that  early involvement by the services is important, because weapons design  influences long-term operations, support, and costs—responsibilities  likely borne by the services, not MDA.
A potential area of concern between MDA and services could be centered  around how DOD will use the defensewide accounts established in the life  cycle management process to fund the ballistic missile defense program  over the long term. The defensewide accounts are intended to pay for   ballistic missile defense costs other than those already agreed to be paid  by the services, including research and development, procurement, and  operations and support costs. In September 2008, we reported that the  Missile Defense Executive Board’s life cycle management process lacked  concrete details for implementation and was not well defined. In theory,  the defensewide accounts would allow all costs to be clearly identified and  would alleviate the pressure on the services’ budgets to fund operation  and support for ballistic missile defense programs. However, MDA and the  services have not yet determined the amount and duration of funding for  the individual ballistic missile defense elements that will come from the  defensewide accounts.
While DOD has recently been taking positive steps to improve  transparency and accountability for ballistic missile defense programs,  long-term success will require sustained involvement by top DOD  leadership. Leadership and oversight of missile defense has been sporadic  in the past. DOD had a senior-level group, called the Missile Defense  Support Group, dedicated to the oversight of MDA since the agency’s  founding that met many times initially; however, it did not meet after June  2005. This leadership vacuum was not filled until the Missile Defense  Executive Board was established 2 years later. The Missile Defense  Executive Board has a more robust charter than its predecessor, and an  additional strength of the board is that its chair, the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, used it as his primary  oversight tool over the last year.
In sum, whether or not DOD continues to manage missile defense outside  its customary acquisition processes, the management challenges we have  found in our work will need to be addressed. Sustained DOD leadership  will be required to ensure that the needs of combatant commands are  considered, that acquisition is adequately managed and overseen, and that  planning occurs for the long-term operations and support of these multi- billion dollar systems.
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my  prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions you or other  Members of the Subcommittee may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489, pendletonj@gao.gov   In addition to the contact named above, Marie A. Mak, Assistant Director;  David Best; Renee S. Brown; Tara Copp Connolly; Nicolaas C. Cornelisse;  Kasea L. Hamar; Ronald La Due Lake; Jennifer E. Neer; Kevin L. O’Neill,  Analyst in Charge; and Karen D. Thornton made key contributions to this  report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense  Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned.  GAO-09-338. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Charting a Course for Improved Missile Defense  Testing. GAO-09-403T. Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Sound Business Case Needed to Implement Missile  Defense Agency’s Targets Program. GAO-08-1113. Washington, D.C.:  September 26, 2008.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost  Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense.  GAO-08-1068. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for  Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities.  GAO-08-740. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but  Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. GAO-08-448. Washington, D.C.: March  14, 2008.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting  Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Element. GAO-07-430.  Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates  Results, but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. GAO-07-387. Washington,  D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning  and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense. GAO-06-473.  Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability  but Falls Short of Original Goal. GAO-06-327. Washington, D.C.: March 15,  2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for  Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System.  GAO-05-817. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in  2004. GAO-05-243. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and  Accountability. GAO-04-409. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing  Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. GAO-04-254.  Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2004.
Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for  Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. GAO-03-600. Washington, D.C.: August  21, 2003.
Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and  Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. GAO-03-597. Washington,  D.C.: May 23, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but  Risks Remain. GAO-03-441. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce  Risks in Developing Airborne Laser. GAO-02-631. Washington, D.C.: July  12, 2002.
Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early National  Missile Defense Flight Test. GAO-02-124. Washington, D.C.: February 28,  2002.
Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New  Patriot Missiles to Buy. GAO/NSIAD-00-153. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2000.
Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be  Revised to Reduce Risk. GAO/NSIAD-00-121. Washington, D.C.: May 31,  2000.
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