Explosives Detection Canines: TSA Has Enhanced Its Canine Program, but Opportunities May Exist to Reduce Costs
Published: 2016-03-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: TSA has implemented a multilayered system composed of people, processes, and technology to protect the nation's transportation systems. One of TSA's security layers is comprised of nearly 800 deployed explosives detection canine teams—a canine paired with a handler. These teams include PSC teams trained to detect explosives on passengers and conventional canines trained to detect explosives in objects, such as cargo.
In January 2013, GAO issued a report on TSA's explosives detection canine program. This testimony addresses the steps TSA has taken since 2013 to enhance its canine program and further opportunities to assess the program.
This statement is based on GAO's January 2013 report, a June 2014 testimony, and selected updates conducted in February 2016 on canine training and operations. The products cited in this statement provide detailed information on GAO's scope and methodology. For the selected updates, GAO reviewed the president's fiscal year 2017 budget request for TSA and interviewed TSA officials on changes made to NEDCTP since June 2014, the last time GAO reported on the program.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken steps to enhance its National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) since GAO's 2013 report, but further opportunities exist for TSA to assess its canine program and potentially reduce costs.
TSA Uses Data to Assess Canine Team Proficiency and Utilization: In January 2013, GAO reported that TSA needed to take actions to analyze NEDCTP data and ensure canine teams are effectively utilized. GAO recommended that TSA regularly analyze available data to identify program trends and areas that are working well and those in need of corrective action to guide program resources and activities. TSA concurred, and in June 2014, GAO reported that the agency had taken actions that address the recommendation. GAO subsequently closed the recommendation as implemented in August 2014. Since then, according to TSA officials, the agency has continued to enhance its canine program. For example, TSA reported that it requires canine teams to train on all explosives training aids they must be able to detect—any explosive used to test and train a canine—in all search areas (e.g., aircraft), every 45 days.
TSA has Deployed PSC Teams to the Highest-Risk Airports: GAO found in January 2013 that passenger screening canine (PSC) teams were not being deployed to the highest-risk airports as called for in TSA's 2012 Strategic Framework or utilized for passenger screening. GAO recommended that TSA coordinate with airport stakeholders to deploy future PSC teams to the highest-risk airports and ensure that deployed teams were utilized as intended. TSA concurred, and in June 2014, GAO reported that PSC teams had been deployed or allocated to the highest-risk airports. In January 2015, GAO closed the recommendation as implemented after TSA deployed all remaining PSC teams to the highest-risk airports and all teams were being utilized for passenger screening.
Opportunities May Exist for TSA to Reduce Canine Program Costs : GAO reported in 2013 that TSA began deploying PSC teams prior to determining their operational effectiveness and identifying where within the airport these teams would be most effectively utilized. GAO recommended that TSA take actions to comprehensively assess the effectiveness of PSCs. TSA concurred and has taken steps to determine the effectiveness of PSC teams and where in the airport to optimally deploy such teams. However, TSA did not compare the effectiveness of PSCs and conventional canines in detecting explosives odor on passengers to determine if the greater cost of training PSCs is warranted. In December 2014, TSA reported that it did not intend to do this assessment because of the liability of using conventional canines to screen persons when they had not been trained to do so. GAO closed the recommendation as not implemented, stating that conventional canines currently work in close proximity with people as they patrol airport terminals, including ticket counters and curbside areas. GAO continues to believe that opportunities may exist for TSA to reduce costs if conventional canines are found to be as effective at detecting explosives odor on passengers as PSCs.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is making no new recommendations in this statement.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our work on the Transportation  Security Administration’s (TSA) National Explosives Detection Canine  Team Program (NEDCTP). TSA, an agency within the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), is the primary federal agency responsible for  the security of the nation’s transportation systems. Since the terrorist  attacks of September 11, 2001, TSA has implemented a multilayered  system of security composed of people, processes, and technology to  protect transportation systems. One of TSA’s security layers is comprised  of nearly 800 deployed explosives detection canine teams—a canine  paired with a handler—aimed at deterring and detecting the use of  explosive devices in U.S. transportation systems.
Through NEDCTP, TSA trains, deploys, and certifies explosives detection  canine teams. The program began under the Federal Aviation  Administration (FAA) in 1972 as a partnership with state and local law  enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over airports by pairing state and  local law enforcement officer (LEO) handlers with conventional canines— canines trained to detect explosives in objects (e.g., baggage and  vehicles). In accordance with the Aviation and Transportation Security  Act, enacted in November 2001, TSA assumed from FAA primary  responsibility for civil aviation security and, as a result, the transfer of  FAA’s canine program to TSA was accomplished in March 2003. TSA  subsequently expanded the program beyond airports to other  transportation modes, including mass transit and maritime. In January  2008, TSA further expanded the program to include transportation  security inspector (TSI) canine teams responsible for screening air  cargo. In 2011, TSA again expanded the program by deploying TSI  handlers to airports with passenger screening canines (PSC)— conventional canines also trained to detect explosives being carried or  worn on a person. Furthermore, in 2015, TSA began training and  certifying all TSI air cargo teams as PSC teams. By the end of calendar  year 2016, TSA expects that all air cargo teams will be PSC certified,  providing the agency greater flexibility in how it can utilize its canine  teams.
My testimony today addresses the steps TSA has taken since 2013 to  enhance its canine program and further opportunities to assess the  program. This statement is based on our January 2013 report, June 2014  testimony, and includes selected updates on canine training and  operations. The products cited in this statement provide detailed  information on our scope and methodology. To conduct our selected  updates, we reviewed the president’s fiscal year 2017 budget request for  TSA and interviewed agency officials in February 2016 on changes made  to NEDCTP since June 2014. The work upon which this statement is  based was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: NEDCTP’s mission is to deter and detect the introduction of explosive  devices into U.S. transportation systems. As of February 2016, NEDCTP  has deployed 787 of the 997 canine teams for which it has funding  available in fiscal year 2016 across transportation systems. There are  four types of LEO canine teams: aviation, mass transit, maritime, and  multimodal; and two types of TSI canine teams: multimodal and PSC.  Table 1 shows the number of canine teams by type for which funding is  available, describes their roles and responsibilities, and costs per team to  TSA.
TSA’s start-up costs for LEO teams include the costs of training the  canine and handler, and providing the handler’s agency a stipend. The  annual costs to TSA for LEO teams reflect the amount of the stipend.  TSA’s start-up and annual costs for TSI canine teams are greater than  those for LEO teams, because TSI handlers are TSA employees and  therefore the costs include the handlers’ pay and benefits, service  vehicles, and cell phones, among other things. PSC teams come at an  increased cost to TSA compared with other TSI teams because of the  additional 2 weeks of training and costs associated with providing decoys  (i.e., persons pretending to be passengers who walk around the airport  with explosive training aids). In fiscal year 2016, approximately $121.7  million of amounts appropriated to TSA were available for its canine  program. For fiscal year 2017, TSA is requesting approximately $131.4  million, a $9.7 million increase compared to the prior fiscal year.  According to a TSA official, the increase is for projected pay increases  and 16 additional positions to support canine training and operations,  among other things.
Figure 1 shows LEO, TSI, and PSC teams performing searches in  different environments.
Conventional canines undergo 15 weeks of explosives detection training,  and PSCs 25 weeks, before being paired with a handler at TSA’s Canine  Training Center (CTC), located at Lackland Air Force Base. Conventional  canine handlers attend a 10-week training course, and PSC handlers  attend a 12-week training course. The 2 additional weeks are used to  train PSC teams in actual work environments. Canines are paired with a  LEO or TSI handler during their training course. After canine teams  complete this training, and obtain initial certification, they acclimate to  their home operating environment for a 30-day period. Upon completion  of the acclimation period, CTC conducts a 3-day operational transitional  assessment to ensure canine teams are not experiencing any  performance challenges in their home operating environment.
After initial certification, canine teams are evaluated on an annual basis to  maintain certification. During conventional explosives detection  evaluations, canine teams must demonstrate their ability to detect all the  explosive training aids the canines were trained to detect in five search  areas (e.g., aircraft). The five search areas are randomly selected  among all the possible types of search areas, but according to CTC,  include the area that is most relevant to the type of canine team. For  example, teams assigned to airports will be evaluated in areas such as  aircraft and cargo. Canine teams must find a certain percentage of the  explosive training aids to pass their annual conventional evaluation. In  addition, a specified number of nonproductive responses—when a canine  responds to a location where no explosives odor is present—are allowed.  After passing the conventional evaluation, PSC teams are required to  undergo an additional annual evaluation that includes detecting  explosives on a person, or being carried by a person. PSC teams are  tested in different locations within the sterile areas and passenger  screening checkpoints of an airport. A certain number of persons with  explosive training aids must be detected, and a specified number of  nonproductive responses are allowed for PSC certification.
section_title: TSA Has Taken Steps Since 2013 to Enhance Its Canine Program, but Further Opportunities May Exist to Assess the Program and Reduce Costs
paragraphs: TSA has taken steps to enhance NEDCTP since we issued our 2013  report. For example, TSA has used data, such as the results of covert  tests, to assess the proficiency and utilization of its canine teams.  However, further opportunities exist for TSA to assess its program related  to the use and cost of PSC teams.
subsections: section_title: TSA Uses Data to Assess Canine Team Proficiency and Utilization
paragraphs: In January 2013, we reported that TSA collected and used key canine  program data in its Canine Website System (CWS), a central  management database, but it could better analyze these data to identify  program trends. For example, we found that TSA did not analyze training  minute data over time (from month to month) and therefore was unable to  determine trends related to canine teams’ compliance with the  requirement to train 240 minutes each month. Similarly, TSA collected  monthly data on the amount of cargo TSI teams screened in accordance  with the agency’s requirement, but had not analyzed these data over time  to determine if, for example, changes were needed in the screening  requirement or the number of teams deployed. Table 2 highlights some of  the key data elements included in CWS at the time of our prior review.
In January 2013, we recommended that TSA regularly analyze available  data to identify program trends and areas that are working well and those  in need of corrective action to guide program resources and activities.  These analyses could include, but not be limited to, analyzing and  documenting trends in proficiency training minutes, canine utilization,  results of short notice assessments (covert tests) and final canine  responses, performance differences between LEO and TSI canine teams,  as well as an assessment of the optimum location and number of canine  teams that should be deployed to secure the U.S. transportation system.  TSA concurred with our recommendation, and in June 2014 we reported  on some of the steps it had taken to implement the recommendation.  Specifically, TSA monitored canine teams training minutes over time by  producing annual reports. For example, TSA analyzed canine teams’  compliance with the training requirement throughout fiscal year 2013 to  identify teams repeatedly not in compliance with the monthly requirement.  Field Canine Coordinators subsequently completed comprehensive  assessment reviews for their canine teams, which involved reporting on  the teams that did not meet the requirement. TSA also reinstated short  notice assessments in July 2013, since they had suspended them in May  2012. We reported that in the event a team fails a short notice  assessment, the Field Canine Coordinator completes a report that  includes an analysis of the team’s training records to identify an  explanation for the failure. According to TSA officials, in March 2014,  NEDCTP stood up a new office, known as the Performance Measurement  Section, to perform analyses of canine team data. Those actions, among  others, addressed the intent of our recommendation by positioning TSA to  identify program trends to better target resources and activities based on  what is working well and what may need corrective action. Therefore, we  closed the recommendation as implemented in August 2014.
Since we closed the recommendation, according to TSA officials, the  agency has continued to take steps to enhance its canine program. For  example, TSA eliminated the monthly 240-minute training requirement  and instead requires canine teams to train on all explosives training aids  they must be able to detect, in all search areas (e.g., aircraft), every 45  days. In April 2015, TSA also eliminated canine teams’ requirement to  screen a certain volume of air cargo. Instead, TSA requires TSI-led  canine teams to spend at least 40 percent of their time on utilization  activities, such as patrolling airport terminals and screening air cargo.  Canine teams can spend the rest of the time on administrative activities,  such as taking their canine to the veterinarian. Handlers record their daily  activities in a web-based system, which allow TSA to assess how the  canine teams are being used. According to TSA, utilization time increased  five percent in fiscal year 2015 since the requirement changed. In  February 2016, TSA officials told us that starting in fiscal year 2016, TSA  increased the number of short notice assessments required from two to  five per year for each state and local law enforcement agency that  participates in NEDCTP. According to a TSA official, the number was  increased since TSA believes such assessments are helpful in  determining the proficiency of canine teams. Furthermore, CTC placed 34  Regional Canine Training Instructors in the field to review canine teams’  training records and assist them in resolving any performance challenges,  such as challenges in detecting a particular explosive aid.
section_title: TSA has Deployed PSC Teams to the Highest-Risk Airports
paragraphs: We also reported in January 2013 that TSA’s 2012 Strategic Framework  called for the deployment of PSC teams based on risk; however, airport  stakeholder concerns about the appropriateness of TSA’s protocols for  resolving PSC team responses resulted in these teams not being  deployed to the highest-risk airports or utilized for passenger screening.  We recommended that TSA coordinate with airport stakeholders to  deploy future PSC teams to the highest-risk airports, and ensure that  deployed PSC teams are utilized as intended, consistent with the  agency’s statutory authority to provide for the screening of passengers  and their property. TSA concurred with our recommendation, and in June  2014, we reported that the PSC teams for which TSA had funding and not  already deployed to a specific airport at the time our 2013 report had  been deployed to or allocated to the highest-risk airports. We also  reported that, according to TSA officials, of all the airports where PSC  teams had been deployed, all but one airport had agreed to allow TSA to  conduct screening of individuals using PSC teams at passenger  screening checkpoint queues.
According to TSA, the agency was successful in deploying PSC teams to  airports where they were previously declined by aviation stakeholders for  various reasons. For example, TSA officials explained that stakeholders  have realized that PSCs are an effective means for detecting explosives  odor, and no checkpoints have closed because of a nonproductive  response. In January 2015, we closed the recommendation as  implemented after TSA deployed all remaining PSC teams (those which  had previously been allocated) to the highest-risk airports and all PSC  teams were being utilized for passenger screening. Since we closed the  recommendation, TSA has continued to allocate and deploy additional  PSC teams for which it has received funding to the highest-risk airports  based on its assessment of how high the risks are to particular airports. In  addition, from November 2015 to January 2016, TSA relocated PSC  teams located at 7 lower-risk airports to higher-risk airports. As a result,  TSA has PSC teams deployed at nearly all category X airports, which are  generally higher-risk airports. According to TSA officials, all category X  airports will have PSC teams by the end of calendar year 2016.
section_title: Further Opportunities May Exist for TSA to Assess Its Canine Program and Reduce Costs
paragraphs: In our January 2013 report, we found that TSA began deploying PSC  teams in April 2011 prior to determining the teams’ operational  effectiveness, and had not completed an assessment to determine where  within the airport PSC teams would be most effectively utilized. In June  2012, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and TSA  began conducting effectiveness assessments to help demonstrate the  effectiveness of PSC teams, but the assessment was not inclusive of all  areas of the airport (i.e., the sterile area, passenger screening checkpoint,  and public side of the airport). During the June 2012 assessment of  PSC teams’ effectiveness, TSA conducted one of the search exercises  used for the assessment with three conventional canine teams. Although  this assessment was not intended to be included as part of DHS S&T and  TSA’s formal assessment of PSC effectiveness, the results of this  assessment suggested, and TSA officials and DHS S&T’s Canine  Explosives Detection Project Manager agreed, that a systematic  assessment with both PSCs and conventional canines could provide TSA  with information to determine whether PSCs provide an enhanced  security benefit compared with conventional LEO aviation canine teams  that have already been deployed to airport terminals.
As a result, we recommended that TSA expand and complete testing, in  conjunction with DHS S&T, to assess the effectiveness of PSCs and  conventional canines in all airport areas deemed appropriate prior to  making additional PSC deployments to help (1) determine whether PSCs  are effective at screening passengers, and resource expenditures for  PSC training are warranted, and (2) inform decisions regarding the type  of canine team to deploy and where to optimally deploy such teams within  airports. TSA concurred, and we testified in June 2014 that through its  PSC Focused Training and Assessment Initiative—a two-cycle  assessment to establish airport-specific optimal working areas, assess  team performance, and train teams on best practices—TSA had  determined that PSC teams are effective and should be deployed at the  passenger checkpoint queue. Furthermore, in February 2014, TSA  launched a third PSC assessment cycle to increase the amount of time  canines can work and enhance their ability to detect explosives placed in  areas more challenging to detect. Since our June 2014 testimony, TSA  has continued to carry out the third assessment cycle. According to TSA  officials, as of February 2016, 68 PSC teams have undergone the  assessment. Additionally, TSA officials told us they began a fourth  assessment cycle in January 2016 to test PSC teams and all other canine  teams on threats identified through intelligence.
Although TSA has taken steps to determine whether PSC teams are  effective and where in the airport environment to optimally deploy such  teams, TSA has not compared the effectiveness of PSCs and  conventional canines in order to determine if the greater cost of training  canines in the passenger screening method is warranted. In June 2014,  we reported that TSA did not plan to include conventional canine teams in  PSC assessments because conventional canines have not been through  the process used with PSCs to assess their temperament and behavior  when working in proximity to people. We acknowledged TSA’s position  that half of deployed conventional canines are of a breed not accepted for  use in the PSC program, but noted that other conventional canines are  suitable breeds, and have been paired with LEO aviation handlers  working in proximity with people since they patrol airport terminals,  including ticket counters and curbside areas.
In December 2014, TSA reported that it did not intend to include  conventional canine teams in PSC assessments and cited concerns  about the liability of operating conventional canines in an unfamiliar  passenger screening environment. In January 2015, we closed the  recommendation as not implemented, reiterating that conventional  canines paired with LEO handlers work in close proximity with people  since, like PSCs, they also patrol airport terminals. Consistent with our  recommendation, we continue to believe that opportunities exist for TSA  to conduct an assessment to determine whether conventional canines are  as effective at detecting explosives odor on passengers when compared  to PSC teams working in specific areas, such as the passenger  checkpoint queue. If such an assessment were to indicate that  conventional canines are equally as effective at detecting explosives odor  on passengers as PSCs, then limiting proficiency training requirements of  PSCs to those that currently apply to conventional canine teams could  save TSA costs associated with maintaining PSC teams.
Also, as we reported in January 2013, TSA was considering providing  some PSCs to LEOs to work on the public side of the airport. Should TSA  determine that the additional investment for PSCs is warranted, it could  reduce the agency’s program costs if it deployed PSCs with LEO  handlers rather than TSI handlers. Specifically, TSA could save  approximately $100,000 per team each year, as a PSC team led by a  LEO handler would cost TSA about $54,000 annually (the amount of the  stipend), compared with about $154,000, the annual cost per TSI-led  PSC team (see table 1).
Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the  committee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  respond to any questions you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Jennifer Grover at  (202) 512-7141 or groverj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement  include Chris Ferencik (Assistant Director), Chuck Bausell, Lisa Canini,  Michele Fejfar, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Richard Hung, Brendan  Kretzschmar, Thomas Lombardi, and Ben Nelson. Key contributors for  the previous work that this testimony is based on are listed in those  products.
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