Military Pay: Gaps in Pay and Benefits Create Financial Hardships for Injured Army National Guard and Reserve Soldiers
Published: 2005-02-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In light of the recent mobilizations associated with the Global War on Terrorism, GAO was asked to determine if the Army's overall environment and controls provided reasonable assurance that soldiers who were injured or became ill in the line of duty were receiving the pay and other benefits to which they were entitled in an accurate and timely manner. This testimony outlines pay deficiencies in the key areas of (1) overall environment and management controls, (2) processes, and (3) systems. It also focuses on whether recent actions the Army has taken to address these problems will offer effective and lasting solutions.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Injured and ill reserve component soldiers--who are entitled to extend their active duty service to receive medical treatment--have been inappropriately removed from active duty status in the automated systems that control pay and access to medical care. The Army acknowledges the problem but does not know how many injured soldiers have been affected by it. GAO identified 38 reserve component soldiers who said they had experienced problems with the active duty medical extension order process and subsequently fell off their active duty orders. Of those, 24 experienced gaps in their pay and benefits due to delays in processing extended active duty orders. Many of the case study soldiers incurred severe, permanent injuries fighting for their country including loss of limb, hearing loss, and back injuries. Nonetheless, these soldiers had to navigate the convoluted and poorly defined process for extending active duty service. The Army's process for extending active duty orders for injured soldiers lacks an adequate control environment and management controls--including (1) clear and comprehensive guidance, (2) a system to provide visibility over injured soldiers, and (3) adequate training and education programs. The Army has also not established user-friendly processes--including clear approval criteria and adequate infrastructure and support services. Many Army locations have used ad hoc procedures to keep soldiers in pay status; however, these procedures often circumvent key internal controls and put the Army at risk of making improper and potentially fraudulent payments. Finally, the Army's nonintegrated systems, which require extensive errorprone manual data entry, further delay access to pay and benefits. The Army recently implemented the Medical Retention Processing (MRP) program, which takes the place of the previously existing process in most cases. MRP, which authorizes an automatic 179 days of pay and benefits, may resolve the timeliness of the front-end approval process. However, MRP has some of the same issues and may also result in overpayments to soldiers who are released early from their MRP orders. Out of 132 soldiers the Army identified as being released from active duty, 15 improperly received pay past their release date--totaling approximately $62,000.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Army’s procedures for  providing pay and related benefits, including medical benefits, to Army  National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers being treated for service- connected injuries or illness. Our related report released today details  weaknesses in the Army’s control environment, processes, and automated  systems needed to provide reasonable assurance that injured and ill  reserve component soldiers receive the pay and benefits to which they are  entitled without interruption.
In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Army National  Guard and Army Reserve mobilized and deployed soldiers in support of  Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom.  When mobilized for up to  2 years at a time, these soldiers performed search and destroy missions  against Taliban and al Qaeda members throughout Asia and Africa, fought  on the front lines in Afghanistan, and guarded al Qaeda prisoners held at  Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  Similarly, reserve component soldiers fought on  the front lines in Iraq and are now assisting in peacekeeping and  reconstruction operations in Iraq under Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Until  recently, reserve component soldiers who were mobilized in support of the  Global War on Terrorism and were injured or became ill were released from  active duty and demobilized when their mobilization orders expired, unless  the Army took steps, at the soldier’s request, to extend their active duty  service—commonly referred to as an active duty medical extension  (ADME).  During the course of our audit, the Army implemented the  Medical Retention Processing (MRP) program, which takes the place of  ADME for soldiers returning from operations in support of the Global War  on Terrorism but is a similar mechanism for providing pay and related  benefits to reserve component soldiers being treated for service-connected  injuries or illness.
Because the Army did not maintain reliable, centralized data on the  number, location, and disposition of mobilized reserve component soldiers  who had requested to extend their active duty service because they had  been injured or become ill in the line of duty, it was not possible to  statistically test controls or the impact control breakdowns had on soldiers  and their families. Instead, we relied on a case study and selected site visit  approach for this work—performing audit work at 10 Army installations  throughout the country, interviewing and obtaining relevant documentation  from officials at the Army Manpower Office at the Pentagon, all four of the  Army’s Regional Medical Commands (RMC) in the continental United  States, and the Army Human Resource Command (HRC) in Alexandria,  Virginia.  We also interviewed 38 reserve component soldiers who served in  the Global War on Terrorism and had experienced problems with the  ADME process at 4 military installations. Using Army pay and  administrative records, we corroborated information provided by soldiers  about disruptions in pay and benefits but were not always able to validate  other assertions made by injured soldiers about their experiences. Further  details on our scope and methodology and the results of the case studies  can be found in our related report.
Today, I will summarize the results of our work with respect to (1) the  problems experienced by selected injured or ill Army Reserve and National  Guard soldiers; (2) the weaknesses in the overall control environment and  management; (3) the lack of clear processes; (4) the lack of integrated pay,  personnel, and medical eligibility systems; and (5) our assessment of  whether the MRP program has resolved deficiencies associated with ADME  and will provide effective and lasting solutions.
subsections: section_title: Injured and Ill Reserve Component Soldiers Experience Gaps in Pay and Benefits, Creating Financial Hardships for Soldiers and Their Families
paragraphs: Poorly defined requirements and processes for extending injured and ill  reserve component soldiers on active duty have caused soldiers to be  inappropriately dropped from their active duty orders.  For some, this has  led to significant gaps in pay and health insurance, which has created  financial hardships for these soldiers and their families. Based on our  analysis of Army Manpower data during the period from February 1, 2004,  through April 7, 2004, almost 34 percent of the 867 soldiers who applied to  be extended on active duty orders fell off their orders before their  extension requests were granted.  This placed them at risk of being  removed from active duty status in the automated systems that control pay  and access to benefits, including medical care and access to the  Commissary and Post Exchange—which allows soldiers and their families  to purchase groceries and other goods at a discount.
While the Army Manpower Office began tracking the number of soldiers  who have applied for ADME and fell off their active duty orders during that  process, the Army does not keep track of the number of soldiers who have  lost pay or other benefits as a result.  Although, logically, a soldier who is  not on active duty orders would also not be paid, as discussed later, many  of the Army installations we visited had developed ad hoc procedures to  keep these soldiers in pay status even though they were not on official,  approved orders.  However, many of the ad hoc procedures used to keep  soldiers in pay status circumvented key internal controls in the Army  payroll system—exposing the Army to the risk of significant overpayment,  did not provide for medical and other benefits for the soldiers dependents,  and sometimes caused additional financial problems for the soldier.
Because the Army did not maintain any centralized data on the number,  location, and disposition of mobilized reserve component soldiers who had  requested ADME orders but had not yet received them, we were unable to  perform statistical sampling techniques that would allow us to estimate the  number of soldiers affected.  However, through our case study work, we  have documented the experiences of 10 soldiers who were mobilized to  active duty for military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the pay problems experienced by the 10  case study soldiers we interviewed and the resulting impact the disruptions  in pay and benefits had on the soldiers and their families.  According to the  soldiers we interviewed, many were living from paycheck to paycheck;  therefore, missing pay for even one pay period created a financial hardship  for these soldiers and their families. While the Army ultimately addressed  these soldiers’ problems, absent our efforts and consistent pressure from  the requesters of the report, it would likely have taken longer for the Army  to address these soldiers’ problems.  Further details on these case studies  are included in our related report.
section_title: The Army Lacks an Effective Control Environment and Management Controls
paragraphs: The Army has not provided (1) clear and comprehensive guidance needed  to develop effective processes to manage and treat injured and ill reserve  component soldiers, (2) an effective means of tracking the location and  disposition of injured and ill soldiers, and (3) adequate training and  education programs for Army officials and injured and ill soldiers trying to  navigate their way through the ADME process.
subsections: section_title: Clear and Complete Guidance Lacking
paragraphs: The Army’s implementing guidance related to the extension of active duty  orders is sometimes unclear or contradictory—creating confusion and  contributing to delays in processing ADME orders. For example, the  guidance states that the Army Manpower Office is responsible for  approving extensions beyond 179 days but does not say what organization  is responsible for approving extensions that are less than 179 days. In  practice, we found that all applications were submitted to Army Manpower  for approval regardless of the number of days requested.  At times, this  created a significant backlog at the Army Manpower Office and resulted in  processing delays. In addition, the Army’s implementing guidance does not  clearly define organizational responsibilities, how soldiers will be  identified as needing an extension, how ADME orders are to be distributed,  and to whom they are to be distributed. Finally, according to the guidance,  the personnel costs associated with soldiers on ADME orders should be  tracked as a base operating cost. However, we believe the cost of treating  injured and ill soldiers—including their pay and benefits—who fought in  operations supporting the Global War on Terrorism should be accounted  for as part of the contingency operation for which the soldier was originally  mobilized.  This would more accurately allocate the total cost of these  wartime operations.
section_title: The Army Lacks an Effective Means of Tracking the Location and Disposition of Injured and Ill Soldiers
paragraphs: As we have reported in the past, the Army’s visibility over mobilized  reserve component soldiers is jeopardized by stovepiped systems serving  active and reserve component personnel.  Therefore, the Army has had  difficulty determining which soldiers are mobilized and/or deployed, where  they are physically located, and when their active duty orders expire.  In  the absence of an integrated personnel system that provides visibility when  a soldier is transferred from one location to another, the Army has general  personnel regulations that are intended to provide some limited visibility  over the movement of soldiers.  However, when a soldier is on ADME  orders, the Army does not follow these or any other written procedures to  document the transfer of soldiers from one location to another—thereby  losing even the limited visibility that might otherwise be achievable.   Further, although the Army has a medical tracking system, the Medical  Operational Data System (MODS), that could be used to track the  whereabouts and status of injured and ill reserve component soldiers, we  found that, for the most part, the installations we visited did not use or  update that system.  Instead, each of the installations we visited had  developed its own stovepiped tracking system and databases.
Although MODS, if used and updated appropriately, could provide some  visibility over injured and ill active and reserve component soldiers— including soldiers who are on ADME orders—8 of the 10 installations we  visited did not routinely use MODS.  MODS is an Army Medical Department  (AMEDD) system that consolidates data from over 15 different major Army  and DOD databases. The information contained in MODS is accessible at all  Army Military Treatment Facilities (MTF) and is intended to help Army  medical personnel administer patient care.  For example, as soldiers are  approved for ADME orders, the Army Manpower Office enters data  indicating where the soldier is to receive treatment, to which unit he or she  will be attached, and when the soldier’s ADME orders will expire.    However, as discussed previously, the Army has not established written  standard operating procedures on the transfer and tracking of soldiers on  ADME orders. Therefore, the installations we visited were not routinely  looking to MODS to determine which soldiers were attached to them  through ADME orders.   When officials at one installation did access  MODS, the data in MODS indicated that the installation had at least 105  soldiers on ADME orders.  However, installation officials were only aware  of 55 soldiers who were on ADME orders.  According to installation  officials, the missing soldiers never reported for duty and the installation  had no idea that they were responsible for these soldiers.
section_title: The Army Lacks Adequate Training and Education Programs
paragraphs: The Army has not adequately trained or educated Army staff or reserve  component soldiers about ADME. The Army personnel responsible for  preparing and processing ADME applications at the 10 installations we  visited received no formal training on the ADME process. Instead, these  officials were expected to understand their responsibilities through on-the- job training.  However, the high turnover caused by the rotational nature of  military personnel, and especially reserve component personnel who make  up much of the garrison support units that are responsible for processing  ADME applications, limits the effectiveness of on-the-job training. Once  these soldiers have learned the intricacies of the ADME process, their  mobilization is over and their replacements must go through the same on- the-job learning process.  For example, 9 of the 10 medical hold units at the  locations we visited were staffed with reserve component soldiers.
In the absence of education programs based on sound policy and clear  guidance, soldiers have established their own informal methods—using  Internet chat rooms and word-of-mouth—to educate one another on the  ADME process.  Unfortunately, the information they receive from one  another is often inaccurate and instead of being helpful, further  complicates the process.  For example, one soldier was told by his unit  commander that he did not need to report to his new medical hold unit  after receiving his ADME order.  While this may have been welcome news  at the time, the soldier could have been considered absent without leave.   Instead, the soldier decided to follow his ADME order and reported to his  assigned case manager at the installation.
section_title: Lack of Clear Processes Contributed to Pay Gaps and Loss of Benefits
paragraphs: The Army lacks customer-friendly processes for injured and ill soldiers  who are trying to extend their active duty orders so that they can continue  to receive medical care.  Specifically, the Army lacks clear criteria for  approving ADME orders, which may require applicants to resubmit  paperwork multiple times before their application is approved.  This,  combined with inadequate infrastructure for efficiently addressing the  soldiers’ needs, has resulted in significant processing delays. Finally, while  most of the installations we reviewed took extraordinary steps to keep  soldiers in pay status, these steps often involved overriding required  internal controls in one or more systems.  In some cases, the stopgap  measures ultimately caused additional financial hardships for soldiers or  put the Army at risk of significantly overpaying soldiers in the long run.
subsections: section_title: The Army Lacks Criteria for Approving ADME Orders
paragraphs: Although the Army Manpower Office issued procedural guidance in July of  2000 for ADME and the Army Office of the Surgeon General issued a field  operating guide in early 2003, neither provides adequate criteria for what  constitutes a complete ADME application package. The procedural  guidance lists the documents that must be submitted before an ADME  application package is approved; however, the criteria for what information  is to be included in each document are not specified. In the absence of  clear criteria, officials at both Army Manpower and the installations we  visited blamed each other for the breakdowns and delays in the process.
For example, according to installation officials, the Army Manpower Office  will not accept ADME requests that contain documentation older than 30  days.  However, because it often took Army Manpower more than 30 days  to process ADME applications, the documentation for some applications  expired before approving officials had the opportunity to review it.   Consequently, applications were rejected and soldiers had to start the  process all over again.  Although officials at the Army Manpower Office  denied these assertions, the office did not have policies or procedures in  place to ensure that installations were notified regarding the status of  soldiers’ applications or clear criteria on the sufficiency of medical  documentation. For example, one soldier we interviewed at Fort Lewis had  to resubmit his ADME applications three times over a 3-month period— each time not knowing whether the package was received and contained  the appropriate information.   According to the soldier, weeks would go by  before someone from Fort Lewis was able to reach the Army Manpower  Office to determine the status of his application. He was told each time that  he needed more current or more detailed medical information.   Consequently, it took over 3 months to process his orders, during which  time he fell off his active duty orders and missed three pay periods totaling  nearly $4,000.
section_title: The Army Has Not Consistently Provided the Infrastructure Needed to Support Injured and Ill Soldiers
paragraphs: The Army has not consistently provided the infrastructure needed— including convenient support services—to accommodate the needs of  soldiers trying to navigate their way through the ADME process. This,  combined with the lack of clear guidance discussed previously and the high  turnover of the personnel who are responsible for helping injured and ill  solders through the ADME process, has resulted in injured and ill soldiers  carrying a disproportionate share of the burden for ensuring that they do  not fall off their active duty orders.  This has left many soldiers disgruntled  and feeling like they have had to fend for themselves.  For example, one  injured soldier we interviewed whose original mobilization orders expired  in January 2003 recalls making over 40 trips to various sites at Fort Bragg  during the month of January to complete his ADME application.
Over time, the Army has begun to make some progress in addressing its  infrastructure issues.  At the time of our visits, we found that some  installations had added new living space or upgraded existing space to  house returning soldiers.  For example, Walter Reed Army Hospital has  contracted for additional quarters off base for ambulatory soldiers to  alleviate the overcrowding pressure, and Fort Lewis had upgraded its  barracks to include, among other things, wheelchair accessible quarters.    Also, installations have been adding additional case managers to handle  their workload. Case managers are responsible for both active and reserve  component soldiers, including injured and ill active duty soldiers, reserve  component soldiers still on mobilization orders, reserve component  soldiers on ADME orders, and reserve component soldiers who have  inappropriately fallen off active duty orders.  As of June 2004, according to  the Army, it had 105 case managers, and maintained a soldier-to-case- manager-ratio of about 50-to-1 at 8 of the 10 locations we visited while  conducting fieldwork.   Finally, to the extent possible, several of the sites  we visited co-located administrative functions that soldiers would need— including command and control functions, case management, ADME  application packet preparation, and medical treatment.   They also made  sure that Army administrative staff, familiar with the paperwork  requirements, filled out all the required paperwork for the soldier.  Centralizing document preparation reduces the risk of miscommunication  between the soldier and unit officials, case managers, and medical staff.  It  also seemed to reduce the frustration that soldiers would feel when trying  to prepare unfamiliar documents in an unfamiliar environment.
section_title: Ad Hoc Procedures to Keep Soldiers in Pay Status Circumvented Key Internal Controls and Created Additional Problems for Soldiers
paragraphs: The financial hardships discussed previously that were experienced by  some soldiers would have been more widespread had individuals within  the Army not taken it upon themselves to develop ad hoc procedures to  keep these soldiers in pay status.  In fact, 7 of the 10 Army installations we  visited had created their own ad hoc procedures or workarounds to (1)  keep soldiers in pay status and (2) provide soldiers with access to medical  care when soldiers fell off active duty orders. In many cases, the  installations we visited made adjustments to a soldier’s pay records without  valid orders.  While effectively keeping a soldier in pay status, this work- around circumvented key internal controls—putting the Army at risk of  making improper and potentially fraudulent payments.  In addition,  because these soldiers are not on official active duty orders they are not  eligible to receive other benefits to which they are entitled, including health  coverage for their families.  One installation we visited issued official  orders locally to keep soldiers in pay status. However, in doing so, they  created a series of accounting problems that resulted in additional pay  problems for soldiers when the Army attempted to straighten out its  accounting.  Further details on these ad hoc procedures are included in our  related report.
section_title: Nonintegrated Systems Contribute to Processing Delays
paragraphs: Manual processes and nonintegrated order-writing, pay, personnel, and  medical eligibility systems also contribute to processing delays which  affect the Army’s ability to update these systems and ensure that soldiers  on ADME orders are paid in an accurate and timely manner. Overall, we  found that the current stovepiped, nonintegrated systems were labor- intensive and require extensive error-prone manual data entry and reentry.  Therefore, once Army Manpower approves a soldier’s ADME application  and the ADME order is issued, the ADME order does not automatically  update the systems that control a soldier’s access to pay and medical  benefits.   In addition, as discussed previously, the Army’s ADME guidance  does not address the distribution of ADME orders or clearly define who is  responsible for ensuring that the appropriate pay, personnel, and medical  eligibility systems are updated, so soldiers and their families receive the  pay and medical benefits to which they are entitled. As a result, ADME  orders were sent to multiple individuals at multiple locations before finally  reaching individuals who have the access and authority to update the pay  and benefits systems, which further delays processing.
As shown in figure 2, once Army Manpower officials approve a soldier’s  ADME application, they e-mail a memorandum to HRC-St. Louis  authorizing the ADME order.  The Army Personnel Center Orders and  Resource System (AORS), which is used to write the order, does not  directly interface nor automatically update the personnel, pay, or medical  eligibility systems.  Instead, once HRC-St. Louis cuts the ADME order it   e-mails a copy of the order to nine different individuals—four at the Army  Manpower Office, four at the National Guard Bureau (NGB) headquarters,  and one at HRC in Alexandria Virginia—none of which are responsible for  updating the pay, personnel, or medical eligibility systems.
As shown in figure 2, Army Manpower, upon receipt of ADME orders,  e-mails copies to the soldier, the medical hold unit to which the soldier is  attached, and the RMC.  Again, none of these organizations has access to  the pay, personnel, or medical eligibility systems.  Finally, NGB officials  e-mail copies of National Guard ADME orders to one of 54 state-level Army  National Guard personnel offices and HRC-Alexandria e-mails copies of  Reserve ADME orders to the Army Reserve’s regional personnel offices.   HRC-Alexandria also sends all Reserve orders to the medical hold unit at  Walter Reed.   When asked, the representative at HRC-Alexandria who  forwards the orders did not know why orders were sent to Walter Reed  when many of the soldiers on ADME orders were not attached or going to  be attached to Walter Reed. The medical hold unit at Walter Reed that  received the orders did not know why they were receiving them and told us  that they filed them.
At this point in the process, of the seven organizations that receive copies  of ADME orders, only two—the ANG personnel office and the Army  Reserve personnel office—use the information to initiate a pay or benefit- related transaction.   Specifically, the Guard and Reserve personnel offices  initiate a transaction that should ultimately update the Army’s medical  eligibility system, the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System  (DEERS).  To do this, the Army National Guard personnel office manually  inputs a new active duty order end date into the Army National Guard  personnel system, the Standard Installation Division Personnel Reporting  System (SIDPERS).  In turn, the data from SIDPERS are batch processed  into the Total Army Personnel Database-Guard (TAPDB-G), and then batch  processed to the Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System  (RCCPDS). The data from RCCPDS are then batch processed into  DEERS—updating the soldier’s active duty status and active duty order end  date. Once the new date is posted to DEERS, soldiers and family members  can get a new ID card at any DOD ID Card issuance facility. The Army  Reserve finance office initiates a similar transaction by entering a new  active duty order end date into the Regional Level Application System  (RLAS), which updates Total Army Personnel Database-Reserve (TAPDB- R), RCCPDS, and DEERS through the same batch process used by the  Guard.
As discussed previously, the Army does not have an integrated pay and  personnel system.  Therefore, information entered into the personnel  system (TAPDB) is not automatically updated in the Army’s pay system, the  Defense Joint Military Pay System-Reserve Component (DJMS-RC).
Instead, as shown in figure 2, after receiving a copy of the ADME orders  from Army Manpower, the medical hold unit and/or the soldier provide a  hard copy of the orders to their local finance office.  Using the Active Army  pay input system, the Defense Military Pay Office system (DMO),  installation finance office personnel update DJMS-RC.  Not only is this  process vulnerable to input errors, but it is time consuming and further  delays the pay and benefits to which the soldier is entitled.
section_title: The Army’s New Medical Retention Program Will Not Solve All the Problems Associated with ADME
paragraphs: The Army’s new MRP program, which went into effect May 1, 2004, and  takes the place of ADME for soldiers returning from operations in support  of the Global War on Terrorism, has resolved many of the front-end  processing delays experienced by soldiers applying for ADME by  simplifying the application process.  In addition, unlike ADME, the  personnel costs associated with soldiers on MRP orders are appropriately  linked to the contingency operation for which they served, and, therefore,  will more appropriately capture the costs related to the Global War on  Terrorism.  While the front-end approval process appears to be operating  more efficiently than the ADME approval process, due to the fact that the  first wave of 179-day MRP orders did not expire until October 27, 2004,  after we completed our work, we were unable to assess how effectively the  Army identified soldiers who required an additional 179 days of MRP and  whether those soldiers experienced pay problems or difficulty obtaining  new MRP orders.   In addition, the Army has no way of knowing whether all  soldiers who should be on MRP orders are actually applying and getting  into the system.  Further, MRP has not resolved the underlying  management control problems that plagued ADME, and, in some respects,  has worsened problems associated with the Army’s lack of visibility over  injured soldiers.  Finally, because the MRP program is designed such that  soldiers may be treated and released from active duty before their MRP  orders expire, weaknesses in the Army’s processes for updating its pay  system to reflect an early release date have resulted in overpayments to  soldiers.
According to Army officials at each of the 10 installations we visited, unlike  ADME, they have not experienced problems or delays in obtaining MRP  orders for soldiers in their units.   In fact some installation officials have  said that the process now takes 1 or 2 days instead of 1 or 2 months.   Because there is no mechanism in place to track application processing  times, we have no way of substantiating these assertions.  We are not aware  of any soldier complaints regarding the process, which were commonplace  with ADME.
The MRP application and approval process, which rests with   HRC-Alexandria instead of the Army Manpower Office, is a simplified  version of the ADME process.  As with ADME orders, the soldier must  request that this process be initiated and voluntarily request an extension  of active duty orders.  Both the MRP and ADME request packets include  the soldier’s request form, a physician’s statement, and a copy of the  soldier’s original mobilization orders.  However, with MRP, the physician’s  statement need only state that the soldier needs to be treated for a service- connected injury or illness and does not require detailed information about  the diagnosis, prognosis, and medical treatment plan as it does with ADME.   As discussed previously, assembling this documentation was one of the  primary reasons ADME orders were not processed in a timely manner.  In  addition, because all MRP orders are issued for 179 days, MRP has  alleviated some of the workload on officials who were processing AMDE  orders and who were helping soldiers prepare application packets by  eliminating the need for a soldier to reapply every 30, 60, or 90 days as was  the case with ADME.
While MRP has expedited the application process, MRP guidance, like that  of ADME, does not address how soldiers who require MRP will be  identified in a timely manner, how soldiers requiring an additional 179 days  of MRP will be identified in a timely manner, or how soldiers and Army  staff will be trained and educated about the new process. Further, because  the Army does not maintain reliable data on the current status and  disposition of injured soldiers, we could not test or determine whether all  soldiers who should be on MRP orders are actually applying and getting  into the system.   In addition, because MRP authorizes 179 days of pay and  benefits regardless of the severity of the injury, the Army faces a new  challenge—to ensure that soldiers are promptly released from active duty  or placed in a medical evaluation board process upon completion of  medical care or treatment in order to avoid needlessly retaining and paying  these soldiers for the full 179 days.  However, MRP guidance does not  address how the Army will provide reasonable assurance that upon  completion of medical care or treatment soldiers are promptly released  from active duty or placed in a medical evaluation board process.
MRP has also contributed to the Army’s difficulty maintaining visibility  over injured reserve component soldiers. Although the Army’s MRP  implementation guidance requires that installations provide a weekly  report to HRC-Alexandria that includes the name, rank, and component of  each soldier currently on MRP orders, according to HRC officials, they are  not consistently receiving these reports. Consequently, the Army cannot  say with certainty how many soldiers are currently on MRP orders, how  many have been returned to active duty, or how many soldiers have been  released from active duty before their 179-day MRP orders expired.   As  discussed previously, if the Army used and appropriately updated the  agency’s medical tracking system (MODS), the system could provide some  visibility over injured and ill active and reserve component soldiers— including soldiers on ADME or MRP orders.  However, the Army MRP  implementation guidance is silent on the use of MODS and does not define  responsibilities for updating the system.  According to officials at HRC- Alexandria, they do not update MODS or any other database when they  issue MRP orders.  They also acknowledged that the 1,800 soldiers  reflected as being on MRP orders in MODS, as of September 2004, was  probably understated given that, between May 2004 and September 2004,  HRC-Alexandria processed approximately 3,300 MRP orders.  Further, as  was the case with ADME, 8 of the 10 installations we visited did not  routinely use or update MODS but instead maintained their own local  tracking systems to monitor soldiers on MRP orders.
Not surprisingly, the Army does not know how many soldiers have been  released from active duty before their 179-day MRP orders had expired.   This is important because our previous work has shown that weaknesses in  the Army’s process for releasing soldiers from active duty and stopping the  related pay before their orders have expired—in this case before their 179  days is up—often resulted in overpayments to soldiers.   According to HRC- Alexandria officials, as of October 2004, a total of 51 soldiers had been  released from active duty before their 179-day MRP orders expired.   At the  same time, Fort Knox, one of the few installations that tracked these data,  reported it had released 81 soldiers from active duty who were previously  on MRP orders—none of whom were included in the list of 51 soldiers  provided by HRC-Alexandria.  Concerned that some of these soldiers may  have inappropriately continued to receive pay after they were released  from active duty, we verified each soldier’s pay status in DJMS-RC and  found that 15 soldiers were improperly paid past their release date— totaling approximately $62,000.
section_title: Actions to Improve the Accuracy, Timeliness, and Availability of Entitled Pay and Benefits
paragraphs: A complete and lasting solution to the pay problems and overall poor  treatment of injured soldiers that we identified will require that the Army  address the underlying problems associated with its all-around control  environment for managing and treating reserve component soldiers with  service-connected injuries or illnesses and deficiencies related to its  automated systems.   Accordingly, in our related report (GAO-05-125) we  made 20 recommendations to the Secretary of the Army for immediate  action to address weaknesses we identified including (1) establishing  comprehensive policies and procedures, (2) providing adequate  infrastructure and resources, and (3) making process improvements  to  compensate for inadequate, stovepiped systems.   We also made 2  recommendations, as part of longer term system improvement initiatives,  to integrate the Army’s order-writing, pay, personnel, and medical eligibility  systems.  In its written response to our recommendations, DOD briefly  described its completed, ongoing, and planned actions for each of our 22  recommendations.
section_title: Concluding Comments
paragraphs: The recent mobilization and deployment of Army National Guard and  Reserve soldiers in connection with the Global War on Terrorism is the  largest activation of reserve component troops since World War II.  As  such, in recent years, the Army’s ability to take care of these soldiers when  they are injured or ill has not been tested to the degree that it is being  tested now.  Unfortunately, the Army was not prepared for this challenge  and the brave soldiers fighting to defend our nation have paid the price.  The personal toll this has had on these soldiers and their families cannot be  readily measured.  But clearly, the hardships they have endured are  unacceptable given the substantial sacrifices they have made and the  injuries they have sustained.  While the Army’s new streamlined medical  retention application process has improved the front-end approval process,  it also has many of the same limitations as ADME.  To its credit, in response  to the recommendations included in our companion report, DOD has  outlined some actions already taken, others that are underway, and further  planned actions to address the weaknesses we identified.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony please contact Gregory D.  Kutz at (202) 512-9095 or kutzg@gao.gov.  Individuals making key  contributions to this testimony were Gary Bianchi, Francine DelVecchio,  Carmen Harris, Diane Handley, Jamie Haynes, Kristen Plungas, John Ryan,  Maria Storts, and Truc Vo.
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