Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks
Published: 2007-09-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Public Law 110-28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September 1, 2007, on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the Act, and the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. The benchmarks stem from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government in June 2006. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to report in July and September 2007 on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks, not whether the benchmarks have been met. To complete our work, we reviewed government documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies; the UN; and the government of Iraq. We also made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related audits we have completed since May 2003.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The January 2007 U.S. strategy seeks to provide the Iraqi government with the time and space needed to help Iraqi society reconcile. Our analysis of the 18 legislative, security and economic benchmarks shows that as of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces. The Iraqi government has met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected. The government also partially met one other benchmark to enact and implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008. Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. Specifically, a review committee has not completed work on important revisions to Iraq's constitution. Further, the government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, or militia disarmament. The Administration's July 2007 report cited progress in achieving some of these benchmarks but provided little information on what step in the legislative process each benchmark had reached. Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq's government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups. Five other benchmarks have not been met. The government has not eliminated militia control of local security, eliminated political intervention in military operations, ensured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army units capable of independent operations, or ensured that political authorities made no false accusations against security forces. It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased--a key security benchmark--since it is difficult to measure the perpetrator's intent and other measures of population security show differing trends. Finally, the Iraqi government has partially met the economic benchmark of allocating and spending $10 billion on reconstruction. Preliminary data indicates that about $1.5 billion of central ministry funds had been spent, as of July 15, 2007. As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it must balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with the military progress, homeland security, foreign policy, and other goals of the United States. Future administration reporting to assist the Congress would be enhanced with adoption of the recommendations we make in this report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Over the last 4 years, the United States has provided thousands of troops  and obligated nearly $370 billion to help achieve the strategic goal of  creating a democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself and be an ally  in the War on Terror. These troops have performed courageously under  dangerous and difficult circumstances. The U.S. Troop Readiness,  Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations  Act of 2007 (the Act) requires GAO to submit to Congress by September 1,  2007, an independent assessment of whether or not the government of  Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the Act, and the status of the  achievement of the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi government  actions needed to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the  security of the Iraqi population, provide essential services to the  population, and promote economic well-being. The benchmarks contained  in the Act were derived from benchmarks and commitments articulated by  the Iraqi government beginning in June 2006. (See appendix XIX for  information on the origin of these benchmarks.)
The January 2007 U.S. strategy, The New Way Forward in Iraq, is designed  to support the Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence and foster  conditions for national reconciliation. The U.S. strategy recognizes that  the levels of violence seen in 2006 undermined efforts to achieve political  reconciliation by fueling sectarian tensions, emboldening extremists, and  discrediting the Coalition and Iraqi government. Amid such violence, it  became increasingly difficult for Iraqi leaders to make the compromises  necessary to foster reconciliation through the passage of legislation aimed  at reintegrating former Ba’athists and sharing hydrocarbon revenues more  equitably, among other steps. Thus, the new strategy was aimed at  providing the Iraqi government with the time and space needed to help  address reconciliation among the various segments of Iraqi society.
As required by the Act, this report provides 1) an assessment of whether or  not the Iraqi government has met 18 key legislative, security, and  economic benchmarks, and, 2) provides information on the status of the  achievement of each benchmark. Among these 18 benchmarks, eight  address legislative actions, nine address security actions, and one is  economic-related. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to  report in July and September 2007 on the status of each benchmark, and to  provide an assessment on whether satisfactory progress is being made  toward meeting the benchmarks, not whether the benchmarks have been  met. In order to meet our statutory responsibilities in a manner consistent  with GAO’s core values, we decided to use “partially met” criteria for  selected benchmarks. See appendices I-XVIII for information on our  assessment and the status of the achievement of each benchmark, and  appendix XX for a comparison of GAO’s assessment with the  administration’s July 2007 initial benchmark assessment report. We are  also issuing a separate, classified report on selected benchmarks.
To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency documents and  interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the  Treasury; the Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate  commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence  Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These  officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General  David H. Petraeus, Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). We  also reviewed translated copies of Iraqi documents and met with officials  from the government of Iraq and its legislature. As part of this work, we  made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most recently from July  22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100  Iraq-related reports and testimonies that we have completed since May  2003. We provided drafts of the report to the relevant U.S. agencies for  review and comment. We received formal written comments from State  and Defense and technical comments from the Central Intelligence Agency  and National Intelligence Council which we incorporated as appropriate.  This letter and each appendix describe the detailed criteria we used in  making our assessments of the 18 benchmarks. As required by the  mandate, we made a determination of whether all 18 benchmarks had  been met. For 14 of the 18 benchmarks, we developed criteria for  assessing whether the benchmark was “partially met.” For the remaining 4  benchmarks, we determined that they should be judged as “met” or “not  met” because the nature of the individual benchmarks did not lend  themselves to a “partially met” assessment.
Although we analyzed classified data, including the August 2007 National  Intelligence Estimate for Iraq, this report only contains unclassified  information, as of August 30, 2007. We conducted our review in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Appendix XXI contains a detailed description of our scope and  methodology.
subsections: section_title: Legislative Benchmarks
paragraphs: Our analysis shows that the Iraqi government has met one of the eight  legislative benchmarks and partially met another. Specifically, the rights  of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected through  existing provisions in the Iraqi Constitution and Council of  Representatives’ by-laws; however, minorities among the Iraqi population  are vulnerable and their rights are often violated. In addition, the Iraqi  government partially met the benchmark to enact and implement  legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in October  2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008.
Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. The benchmark  requiring a review of the Iraqi Constitution has not been met. Fundamental  issues remain unresolved as part of the constitutional review process,  such as expanded powers for the presidency, the resolution of disputed  areas (such as Kirkuk), and power sharing between federal and regional  governments over issues such as distribution of oil revenue. In addition,  five other legislative benchmarks have not been met. Figure 1 highlights  the status of the legislative benchmarks requiring legislative enactment  and implementation.
As figure 1 shows, legislation on de-Ba’athification reform has been  drafted but has yet to be enacted. Hydrocarbon legislation is in the early  stages of legislative action; although three key components have been  drafted, none are under active consideration by the Council of  Representatives. Although the government of Iraq has established an  independent electoral commission and appointed commissioners, the  government has not implemented legislation to establish provincial  council authorities, provincial elections law, or a date for provincial  elections. No legislation on amnesty or militia disarmament is being  considered because the conditions for a successful program, particularly  the need for a secure environment, are not present, according to U.S. and  Iraqi officials.
Prospects for additional progress in enacting legislative benchmarks have  been complicated by the withdrawal of 15 of 37 members of the Iraqi  cabinet. According to an August 2007 U.S. interagency report, this boycott  ends any claim by the Shi’ite-dominated coalition to be a government of  national unity and further undermines Iraq’s already faltering program of  national reconciliation. In late August, Iraq’s senior Shi’a, and Sunni Arab  and Kurdish political leaders signed a Unity Accord signaling efforts to  foster greater national reconciliation. The Accord covered draft legislation  on de-Ba’athification reform and provincial powers laws, as well as setting  up a mechanism to release some Sunni detainees being held without  charges. However, these laws need to be passed by the Council of  Representatives. (See appendices I-VII, and XVI for further information on  these legislative benchmarks).
The Administration’s July 2007 report cited progress in achieving some of  these legislative benchmarks but provided little information on what step  in the legislative process each benchmark had reached. Future reporting  should provide this important detail, as we display in figure 1.
section_title: Security Benchmarks
paragraphs: Our analysis shows that the Iraqi government has met two of the nine  security benchmarks. Specifically, it has established political,  communications, economic, and services committees in support of the  Baghdad security plan and, with substantial coalition assistance, 32 of the  planned 34 Joint Security Stations across Baghdad. Of the remaining 7  benchmarks, the Iraqi government partially met 2 and did not meet five.  (see fig. 2)
The Iraqi government partially met the benchmark of providing three  trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations. Since  February 2007, the Iraqi government deployed nine Iraqi army battalions  equaling three brigades for 90-day rotations to support the Baghdad  Security Plan. The administration’s July 2007 report to Congress noted  problems in manning the Iraqi brigades, but stated that the three brigades  were operating in support of Baghdad operations. Our classified report  provides additional information on the readiness levels and performance  of these units, which supports our assessment of this benchmark.
The Iraqi government also partially met the benchmark of ensuring that  the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws  regardless of their sectarian or political affiliation. Even though the  Baghad Security Plan is aimed at eliminating safe havens, and U.S.  commanders report satisfaction with the coalition’s ability to target  extremist groups, opportunities for creating temporary safe havens exist  due to the political intervention of Iraqi government officials (see  discussion in appendix X) and the strong sectarian loyalties and militia  infiltration of security forces.
The Iraqi government has not met the benchmark to reduce sectarian  violence and eliminate militia control of local security.As discussed in  appendix XIII, militia control of local security forces remains a problem.  Several U.S. and UN reports have found that militias still retain significant  control or influence over local security in parts of Baghdad and other  areas of Iraq.
On trends in sectarian violence, we could not determine if sectarian  violence had declined since the start of the Baghdad Security Plan. The  administration’s July 2007 report stated that MNF-I trend data  demonstrated a decrease in sectarian violence since the start of the  Baghdad Security Plan in mid-February 2007. The report acknowledged  that precise measurements vary, and that it was too early to determine if  the decrease would be sustainable. Measuring sectarian violence is  difficult since the perpetrator’s intent is not always clearly known. Given  this difficulty, broader measures of population security should be used in  judging these trends. The number of attacks targeting civilians and  population displacement resulting from sectarian violence may serve as  additional indicators. For example, as displayed in figure 3, the average  number of daily attacks against civilians remained about the same over the  last six months. The decrease in total average daily attacks in July is  largely due to a decrease in attacks on coalition forces rather than  civilians.
While overall attacks declined in July compared to June, levels of violence  remain high. Enemy initiated attacks have increased around major  religious and political events, including Ramadan and elections. For 2007,  Ramadan is scheduled to begin in mid-September. Our classified report  provides further information on measurement issues and trends in  violence in Iraq obtained from other U.S. agencies. The unclassified  August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq reported that  Coalition forces, working with Iraqi forces, tribal elements, and some  Sunni insurgents, have reduced al Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI) capabilities and  restricted its freedom of movement. However, the NIE further noted that  the level of overall violence, including attacks on and casualties among  civilians remains high and AQI retains the ability to conduct high-profile  attacks.
For the remaining four unmet security benchmarks, we found that:    The Iraqi government has not always allowed Iraqi commanders to make  tactical and operational decisions without political intervention, resulting  in some operational decisions being based on sectarian interests.
The government had not always ensured that Iraqi security forces were  providing even-handed enforcement of the law, since U.S. reports have  cited continuing sectarian-based abuses on the part of Iraqi security  forces.
Instead of increasing, the number of Iraqi army units capable of  independent operations had decreased from March 2007 to July 2007.
Iraqi political authorities continue to undermine and make false  accusations against Iraqi security force personnel. According to U.S.  government officials, little has changed since the administration’s July  2007 report. (See appendices VIII-XV, and XVIII for further information on these  security benchmarks).
section_title: Economic Benchmark
paragraphs: The Iraqi government partially met the benchmark to allocate and spend  $10 billion because it allocated $10 billion in reconstruction funds when it  passed its 2007 budget in February, 2007. The New Way Forward in Iraq  cited Iraq’s inability to spend its own resources to rebuild critical  infrastructure and deliver essential services as an economic challenge to  Iraq’s self-reliance. Iraqi government funds represent an important source  of financing for rebuilding Iraq since the United States has obligated most  of the $40 billion provided to Iraq for reconstruction and stabilization  activities since 2003.
However, it is unclear whether the $10 billion allocated by the Iraqi  government will be spent by the end of Iraq’s fiscal year, December 31,  2007. Preliminary Ministry of Finance data reports that Iraq’s central  ministries spent about $1.5 billion, or 24 percent, of the approximately $6.5  billion in capital project funds allocated to them through July 15, 2007. The  remaining funds from the $10 billion were allocated to the provinces and  the Kurdish region. (See appendix XVII for further information on the  economic benchmark)
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did  not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. The Iraqi government has not fulfilled  commitments it first made in June 2006 to advance legislative, security,  and economic measures that would promote national reconciliation  among Iraq’s warring factions. Of particular concern is the lack of progress  on the constitutional review that could promote greater Sunni  participation in the national government and comprehensive hydrocarbon  legislation that would distribute Iraq’s vast oil wealth. Despite Iraqi leaders  recently signing a unity accord, the polarization of Iraq’s major sects and  ethnic groups and fighting among Shi’a factions diminishes the stability of  Iraq’s governing coalition and its potential to enact legislation needed for  sectarian reconciliation.
Reconciliation was also premised on a reduction in violence. While the  Baghdad security plan was intended to reduce sectarian violence,  measuring such violence may be difficult since the perpetrator’s intent is  not clearly known. Other measures of violence, such as the number of  enemy-initiated attacks, show that violence has remained high through  July 2007.
As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it must balance the  achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with the military progress,  homeland security, foreign policy and other goals of the United States.  Future administration reports on the benchmarks would be more useful to  the Congress if they clearly depicted the status of each legislative  benchmark, provided additional quantitative and qualitative information  on violence from all relevant U.S. agencies, and specified the performance  and loyalties of Iraqi security forces supporting coalition operations.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: In preparing future reports to Congress and to help increase transparency  on progress made toward achieving the benchmarks, we recommend that:  1.  The Secretary of State provide information to the President that clearly  specifies the status in drafting, enacting, and implementing Iraqi  legislation;  2.  The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other appropriate agencies,  provide information to the President on trends in sectarian violence  with appropriate caveats, as well as broader quantitative and  qualitative measures of population security, and  3.  The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other appropriate agencies,  provides additional information on the operational readiness of Iraqi  security forces supporting the Baghdad security plan, particularly  information on their loyalty and willingness to help secure Baghdad.
As discussed below, State and DOD concurred with these  recommendations.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and  Defense, the National Intelligence Council, and the Central Intelligence  Agency. The National Intelligence Council and the Central Intelligence  Agency provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.
The Department of State provided written comments, which are reprinted  in appendix XXII. State also provided us with technical comments and  suggested wording changes that we incorporated as appropriate. State  agreed with our recommendation to provide the President with additional  information on the specific status of key Iraqi legislation in preparing  future reports to Congress. State suggested that we note the standards we  used in assessing the 18 benchmarks differ from the administration’s  standards. The highlights page and introduction of our report discuss  these differing standards. State also suggested that we take into  consideration recent political developments in Iraq, such as the  communiqué released by Iraqi political leaders on August 26, 2007. We  added additional information to the report about this communiqué and  related developments.
The Department of Defense also provided written comments, which are  reprinted in appendix XXIII. DOD also provided us with technical  comments and suggested wording changes that we incorporated as  appropriate. Defense agreed with our recommendations to provide, in  concert with other relevant agencies, information to the President on  trends in sectarian violence with appropriate caveats, as well as broader  quantitative and qualitative measures of security. Defense also agreed to  provide the President with additional information on the operational  readiness of Iraqi security forces supporting the Baghdad security plan.
DOD also provided additional oral comments. DOD disagreed with our  conclusion in the draft report that trends in sectarian violence are unclear.  Further information on DOD’s views, and our response, are contained in  our classified report. However, the additional information that DOD  provided did not warrant a change in our assessment of “not met.” We  note that the unclassified August 2007 NIE stated that the overall violence  in Iraq, including attacks on and casualties among civilians, remains high,  Iraq’s major sectarian groups remain unreconciled, and levels of insurgent  and sectarian violence will remain high over the next six to twelve months.
DOD disagreed with our initial assessment of “not met” for the training  and readiness of the Iraqi brigades supporting operations in Baghdad and  provided additional information on this issue. While acknowledging that  some of these Iraqi units lacked personnel, fighting equipment, and  vehicles, the U.S. commander embedded with the units attested to their  fighting capabilities. Based on this additional information, and our  classified and unclassified information, we changed our rating from “not  met” to “partially met.”
DOD did not agree with our initial assessment that the benchmark related  to safe havens was not met. DOD provided additional information  describing MNF-I efforts to conduct targeted operations in Sadr City. For  example, from January to August 2007, Coalition forces and Iraqi security  forces conducted over eighty operations that span each sector of Sadr  City. However, due to sectarian influence and infiltration of Iraqi security  forces, and support from the local population, anti-coalition forces retain  the freedom to organize and conduct operations against coalition forces.  Based on this additional information, we changed this assessment to  “partially met.”
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate Members of Congress.  This report will also be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me on (202) 512- 5500 or Mr. Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International  Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8979. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are included in appendix  XXIV.
section_title: Appendix I: Benchmark 1 – Constitutional Review
paragraphs: Forming a constitutional review committee and completing the  constitutional review.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: Iraq’s Constitution was approved in a national referendum in October  2005, but did not resolve several contentious issues, such as claims over  disputed areas including oil-rich Kirkuk. Amending the Constitution is  critical to reaching national agreement on power sharing among Iraq’s  political blocs and furthering national reconciliation, according to Iraqi  leaders, U.S. officials, and the Iraq Study Group report.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Although the Iraqi legislature formed a Constitutional Review Committee  (CRC) in November 2006, the review process is not yet complete. First,  the review committee’s work is not finished. In a May 23, 2007 report, the  CRC recommended a package of constitutional amendments to the Iraq  Council of Representatives. However, the package did not resolve the  powers of the presidency; disputed territories, including Kirkuk; and the  relative powers of the regions versus the federal government. The CRC  received an extension until the end of August 2007 to help resolve the  outstanding issues, but, according to the chairman of the CRC, Iraq’s major  political groups need to reach agreement on these issues. Second, once  resolved, the Iraqi legislature must approve the package of amendments by  an absolute majority vote. Finally, if a package of amendments is  approved, the Iraqi people will need to vote on the amendments in a  referendum within 2 months after the legislature approves them.
subsections: section_title: Completion of the Constitutional Review First Requires Political Accommodation
paragraphs: To complete a package of necessary amendments to the Constitution,  Iraq’s major political groups need to reach agreement on the following  three contentious issues.
Power of the presidency. The Deputy Chairman of the CRC, a member of  the Sunni bloc, believes that the presidency should have greater power.  The Constitution gives the presidency such powers as accrediting  ambassadors. It also gives the presidency council the power to approve or  disapprove legislation in the current electoral term. However, the  legislature can adopt any disapproved legislation by a three-fifths majority  vote. In contrast, the prime minister, selected from the legislature’s largest  political bloc, is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, names the  ministers for each ministry, and directs the Council of Ministers. The  Council directs the work of all government ministries and departments,  develops their plans, and prepares the government budget. The high- ranking Sunni official said that giving the presidency more power could  allow for better power sharing among Iraq’s political groups.
Disputed areas, particularly Kirkuk. Article 140 of the Constitution  addresses the issue of disputed areas. It requires a census and a  referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed areas by December 31, 2007 to  determine the will of its citizens. According to the Kurdistan Regional  Government’s (KRG) prime minister, Kirkuk represents the Kurdish region  and must be returned to Kurdistan. Under the former regime’s policy of  Arabization—removing Kurdish families from Kirkuk and replacing them  with Arab families—areas of Kirkuk were given to other governorates,  according to a Kurdish committee. KRG officials want the referendum held  by the date specified in the Constitution. Other Iraqi legislators believe  that the Kirkuk referendum should be deferred because of the disputes  over the borders of Kirkuk and continuing displacement of people in the  area.
Power of the federal government versus regions. The CRC proposed  several amendments to the Constitution to clarify the powers of the  federal government and the shared powers with the regions, but has not  achieved compromise among major political factions on these  amendments. In particular, the CRC proposed amending Article 111 of the  Constitution to clearly state that the federal government shall collect oil  revenues and distribute them equally to all Iraqis in accordance with the  national budget law. According to the United Nations, this amendment  would provide the federal government exclusive authority for oil revenues.  In contrast, the existing constitutional framework is widely interpreted as  allowing regions to define how and whether they share locally generated  oil revenues. For this reason, the Kurdish bloc opposes the CRC-proposed  amendment.
section_title: Procedural and Logistical Challenges Confront Completion of the Review
paragraphs: If agreement is reached on a package of constitutional amendments, the  Iraqi legislature must vote on the package. The amendments will be  considered approved if an absolute majority of the legislature votes for the  package. One challenge is simply holding a vote.
Despite Iraqi leaders signing a unity accord, as of August 29, 2007, several  Iraqi parties were boycotting the government, including Iraq’s largest  Sunni bloc. Although the other parties in the legislature could form an  absolute majority to pass a package of amendments, it would defeat the  purpose of trying to reach a broad political accommodation.
If the legislature approves the constitutional amendments, the government  must hold a national referendum within 2 months of approval. According  to the United Nations, before a referendum can occur, the Iraq Electoral  Commission must develop a valid voting roster, educate the public about  the proposed amendments, print referendum ballots, and locate and staff  polling places. In a July 2007 report, the Iraq High Electoral Commission  stated that it faced challenges to developing a valid voting roster because  of the large movement of displaced persons—an estimated 800,000 since  February 2006.
section_title: Appendix II: Benchmark 2 – De-Ba’athification Reform
paragraphs: Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba’athification  reform.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 1 dissolved the Ba’athist  party, removed Ba’athist leaders and senior party members from  government, and banned them from future employment in the public  sector. The CPA further provided for investigation and removal of even  junior members of the party from upper-level management in government  ministries, universities, and hospitals. Most of Iraqi’s technocratic class  was pushed out of government due to de-Ba’athification and many Sunni  Arabs remain angry about policies to de-Ba’athify Iraqi society, according  to the Iraq Study Group report.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Although Iraqi leaders have drafted several pieces of legislation to reform  de-Ba’athification, none has sufficient support among Iraq’s political  factions to have a first reading in the Iraqi legislature, according to U.S.  officials. No consensus exists on reforming the current de-Ba’athification  policy and many Iraqis are concerned by the prospects of former Ba’athist  tormenters returning to power. However, according to an August 2007 U.S.  interagency report, Iraq’s senior Shi’a and Sunni Arab and Kurdish political  leaders signed a Unity Accord, including consensus on draft legislation on  de-Ba’thification reform. Such a law would need to be drafted, passed by  the Council of Representatives, and implemented.
According to U.S. officials, reforms to the law would more likely promote  reconciliation if the reforms target Ba’athists who had command  responsibility within the party or committed human rights violations or  other crimes. Removing individuals based purely on party membership  increases the chances that segments of the Iraqi public will see the system  as unfair, according to these officials. Draft legislation on de- Ba’athification reform, dated July 2007 before the Unity Accord, provides  for a special commission, a panel of judges to make decisions, and the  right to appeal the panel’s decisions. The draft legislation also specifies  that the commission will be dissolved 6 months after the law is passed.
section_title: Appendix III: Benchmark 3 – Hydrocarbon Legislation
paragraphs: Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable  distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without  regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and  implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of  Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi  citizens in an equitable manner.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: The importance of oil revenues for the Iraqi economy is widely recognized,  as is the need to create a new legal framework for the development and  management of the country’s oil sector. The oil sector accounts for over  half of Iraq’s gross domestic product and over 90 percent of its revenues.  The timely and equitable distribution of these revenues is essential to  Iraq’s ability to provide for its needs, including the reconstruction of a  unified Iraq.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: The government of Iraq has not enacted and implemented any of the four  separate yet interrelated pieces of legislation needed to ensure the  equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources. As of August 2007, the  Iraqi government had drafted three pieces of legislation: (1) hydrocarbon  framework legislation that establishes the structure, management, and  oversight for the oil sector; (2) revenue-sharing legislation; and (3)  legislation restructuring the Ministry of Oil. However, none of the  legislation is currently under consideration by Iraq’s parliament (Council  of Representatives). A fourth piece of legislation establishing the Iraq  National Oil Company (INOC) has not been drafted, according to State  officials.
Hydrocarbon framework legislation was approved by the Iraqi cabinet  (Council of Ministers) in February 2007, and sent to the Oil and Gas  Committee of Iraq’s parliament for review in July 2007. However, before  the legislation was submitted to the parliament, the Iraqi government  amended the draft to address substantive changes made by the Shura  council. According to State, the Shura council reviews draft legislation to  ensure constitutionality and to avoid contradictions with Iraq’s legal  system, including Islamic law. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)  did not agree to the council’s revisions. Accordingly, the Oil and Gas  Committee chairman is taking no legislative action until the Iraqi cabinet  and the KRG agree on a new draft, according to State. It is not clear if this  legislation will include annexes intended to allocate the control of  particular oil fields and exploration areas to either the central or regional  governments. According to the Iraqi government, the annexes remain  under consideration.
Revenue-sharing legislation is intended to ensure the equitable distribution  of Iraq’s financial resources, including oil and gas revenues. The central  government and the KRG agreed on draft revenue-sharing legislation in  June 2007. However, the Iraqi cabinet has not yet approved the legislation  and submitted it to Iraq’s parliament for consideration.
This draft legislation is linked to proposed amendments to the Iraqi  Constitution regarding the role of the federal government and regions and  the management of oil revenues. Under the existing Constitution, if there  is a contradiction between regional and national law with respect to a  matter outside the exclusive authority of the federal government, regional  law takes priority and regional powers have the right to amend the  application of the national legislation within that region. As oil revenue  sharing is not a power exclusively reserved for the federal government in  the existing Constitution, according to officials, regions may determine  how and whether they share locally generated oil revenues with the  remainder of Iraq, regardless of what is stated in the federal law. In  response, the Iraqi Constitutional Review Committee has proposed  amendments to the Constitution that would provide for the national  collection and distribution of oil revenues.
Legislation restructuring the Ministry of Oil has been drafted but has not  yet been submitted to the Council of Ministers, according to State.
Legislation establishing the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) is being  drafted, according to State.
section_title: Appendix IV: Benchmark 4 – Semi-Autonomous Regions
paragraphs: Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi- autonomous regions.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: Iraq’s Constitution requires the Council of Representatives to enact a law  that defines the executive procedures needed to form regions within 6  months of the date of its first session. Some Iraqi legislators believe that  the right to form regions, with authority similar to the Kurdistan region,  would help protect their rights.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: In October 2006, the Iraqi legislature passed a law establishing procedures  to form regions, but the law delays implementation for 18 months.  According to U.S. officials, this means that no steps to form regions, such  as holding provincial referendums, can be taken before April 2008.  According to State, this is in the best interests of Iraq as it will allow the  government to deal with some outstanding issues. The United Nations has  identified two issues that may impact implementation of this law—the  ongoing review of Iraq’s Constitution and the capacity of new regional  governments.
According to members of Iraq’s Constitutional Review Committee (CRC),  the law on procedures to form regions was delayed for 18 months to allow  the constitutional review process to be completed. Some of the proposed  amendments to the constitution would clarify the powers of the federal  government versus regions and governorates For example, according to  the United Nations, the CRC proposed amendments that would give  federal law priority over regional law with respect to water, customs,  ports, and oil and revenue sharing. Other proposed amendments would  give the federal government exclusive power over electricity generation,  railways, and pension funds. Moreover, the constitutional review could  also help resolve the status of disputed areas, which could impact regional  boundaries. Until the constitutional review is completed and the  constitutional referendum is held, residents in areas considering regional  formation may not have all the information they need to make decisions.
The capability of the regions to govern themselves will also impact  implementation of the law. Article 121 of the Constitution accords  significant executive, judicial, and management authorities to the regions.  The regions have responsibility for maintaining their internal security  forces, administering allocations from national revenues, and maintaining  representational offices in embassies and consuls. Moreover, the law on  formation of regions provides that once formed, the regions must  undertake to create elected provisional legislative councils. According to  the United Nations, this will require a substantial investment of resources  and significant management responsibility. GAO has reported on  significant shortages of competent personnel in national ministries  charged with delivering services to the Iraqi people; moreover, these  shortages are greater at the provincial level of government, according to  State and USAID officials. We have also reported that the poor security  situation and high levels of violence have contributed to the continued and  accelerating “brain drain” of professional Iraqis that would be needed to  manage the new regional administrations.
section_title: Appendix V: Benchmark 5 – Electoral Legislation
paragraphs: Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent  High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial  council authorities, and a date for provincial elections.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: When provincial elections were first held on January 2005, many Sunnis  boycotted the election, resulting in largely Shi’a and Kurd provincial  councils in provinces with majority Sunni populations. To redress the  under-representation of Sunnis in provincial councils, Iraq needs to hold  new provincial elections, but must first establish an electoral commission,  write provincial election laws, define provincial powers so voters know  the stakes, and set a date for elections.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Although the government of Iraq has enacted and implemented legislation  establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), it has not  enacted and implemented legislation establishing a provincial elections  law, provincial council authorities, or a date for provincial elections.
Although the government of Iraq has enacted and implemented legislation  to establish an IHEC, certain steps still remain in establishing the  commission. According to the U.S. government, the Council of  Representatives (COR) passed the IHEC Law on January 23, 2007, and  subsequently appointed the nine IHEC Commissioners, as required under  the law, in a process the UN deemed in compliance with international  standards. However, a provision in the IHEC law requires the COR to  nominate and the Board of Commissioners to appoint the directors of the  Governorate Electoral Offices in each province. Twelve of these positions  are vacant, but, according to State, the process of appointing the directors  is progressing. The law also requires the IHEC to establish and update a  voter registry in collaboration with the Governorate and Regional  Electoral Offices. However, before they can complete an update of the  voter registry (which was last updated in mid-2005), an election law must  be enacted that defines the residency and voter eligibility requirements.  Finally, the IHEC still needs a budget to fund its activities.
Iraq has not enacted and implemented legislation for provincial elections.  According to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the Prime Minster’s office is  drafting legislation governing provincial elections, including setting a date  for elections to occur. However, according to the Embassy, some key  political parties are hesitant to hold provincial elections due to concerns  that they will lose representation, potentially to more extreme parties.  Additionally, several parties are demanding that any election law ensure  that eligible refugees and internally displaced persons be allowed to vote.
Provincial powers legislation, which will define the authorities and  structures of local governments, has not been enacted and implemented.  According to the U.S. government, the draft legislation has been approved  and submitted to the Council of Representatives, where it has had two of  the three required readings. However, the U.S. government reported in  July 2007 that changes were being considered, particularly related to the  powers of the governor and the authority of the federal government at the  local level. The U.S. Embassy cited key issues with the draft, including that  it cedes most power to the provinces. The United Nations pointed out that  the draft fails to clarify the role of the governorate and that the draft law  does not deal adequately with the effective delivery of public goods and  services in the governorates. According to the U.S. Embassy, on July 8,  2007, the relevant COR committee presented a report outlining suggested  changes to the law, some of which the Embassy supported.
The government of Iraq has not set a date for provincial elections. The Iraq  Study Group emphasized the need for provincial elections at the earliest  possible date. The Embassy is urging the Iraqi government to take the  legislative and administrative action necessary to ensure timely and fair  elections. According to the U.S. Embassy, it is intensively engaged with the  Iraqi government and the COR at all levels to expedite legislation or  amendments to existing legislation that will allow provincial elections to  take place and secure funding for elections.
In comments on this appendix, State said that this benchmark should be  partially met since the Iraq High Electoral Commission has been  established and the benchmark calls only for its establishment. However,  the benchmark requires more than the establishment of the IHEC, and Iraq  has not enacted and implemented a provincial elections law, provincial  council authorities, or a date for provincial elections, as required by the  benchmark.
section_title: Appendix VI: Benchmark 6 – Amnesty Legislation
paragraphs: Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: Iraqi government officials believe that amnesty for insurgents and others  who have not committed terrorist acts is an important tool to promote  reconciliation and could help pacify insurgents. In addition, the Iraqi  government and coalition forces hold thousands of detainees, some of  whom could be eligible for an amnesty program when conditions are right.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: The Iraqi government has not drafted legislation on amnesty, according to  U.S. officials, and the conditions for a successful program are not present.  As figure 2 in the cover letter shows, many steps remain in the legislative  process, including drafting the legislation and obtaining approval in the  Iraqi cabinet and Council of Representatives. However, the government of  Iraq is not pressing for the development of amnesty legislation.
subsections: section_title: Little Progress Made in Considering Amnesty Legislation
paragraphs: Although amnesty was proposed as part of the Prime Minister’s national  reconciliation plan in June 2006, little progress has been made. The plan  called for issuing amnesty to prisoners not involved in crimes against  humanity or terrorist acts. At that time, the Iraqi government announced  that it would release 2,500 detainees; 2,500 prisoners were subsequently  released. According to U.S. officials in Baghdad, no large-scale releases  have been made since 2006, and there has been little discussion of  amnesty since then. However, the Prime Minister’s office and Iraq’s  Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Committee sponsored a  workshop on amnesty in May 2007. The workshop recommended that  amnesty should not proceed, but rather should result from national  reconciliation and that the government’s military has to be superior to  armed groups as a condition for offering amnesty.
The scope of an amnesty program is also an issue. The United Nations  takes the position that in considering the categories of perpetrators to be  included or excluded in amnesty, international law does not allow amnesty  to be granted to those who committed genocide, crimes against humanity,  or other serious violations of international humanitarian law. In addition,  Iraqi government officials have recommended that an amnesty program  consider all detained individuals held by Iraq and by coalition forces.  There are currently thousands of detainees, including over 24,000 held by  coalition forces. According to multinational force officials, there could be  considerably more detainees in the future as the Baghdad security plan  progresses. The Coalition’s Task Force 134 is building and expanding  prison facilities to accommodate additional detainees.
section_title: Appendix VII: Benchmark 7 – Militia Disarmament
paragraphs: Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia  disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are  accountable only to the central government and loyal to the  Constitution of Iraq.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: Militias contribute to the high levels of violence in Iraq, are responsible for  sectarian killings, fuel ongoing corruption, and have heavily infiltrated the  Iraqi army and national police.  Efforts to dissolve or bring militias under  control have been ongoing since 2004.  In March 2007, 77 percent of Iraqis  in a nationwide poll agreed that militias should be dissolved.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: The Iraqi government has not drafted legislation on disarming militias.  CPA Order 91, issued in 2004, prohibited armed forces and militias within  Iraq, except for those allowed under the Order. Multiple steps are needed  to enact and implement further legislation to disarm militias. More  importantly, according to U.S. officials, conditions are not right for a  traditional disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program  (DDR); accordingly, there is currently no momentum in the government of  Iraq for such a program. Thus, militias pose a severe challenge to stability  and reconciliation in Iraq.
subsections: section_title: Militias Pose a Challenge, but Little Progress Has Been Made in Demobilizing Them
paragraphs: Militias have contributed to the high levels of violence in Iraq. According  to the Defense Intelligence Agency Director, the Jayash al-Mahdi (the  militia associated with Muqtada al Sadr), often operates under the  protection or approval of Iraqi police to detain and kill suspected Sunni  insurgents and civilians. A June 2007 Defense Department report further  notes that many Jayash al-Mahdi fighters have left Baghdad as a result of  expanded coalition and Iraqi presence. They now engage in ethnic and  sectarian violence in northern and central Iraq and have increased conflict  with the Badr Organization in southern Iraq leading to a significant  increase in attacks against the coalition in Basrah. The June 2007 report  also states that Shi’a militia infiltration of the Ministry of Interior is a  problem. Militia influence impacts every component of the Ministry,  particularly in Baghdad and other key cities.
Despite the challenge the militias pose, little progress has been made to  disarm and demobilize them. Nine parties, with militias numbering an  estimated 100,000 fighters, agreed to a transition and reintegration process  in 2004. The Coalition Provisional Authority estimated that 90 percent of  these fighters would complete the transition and reintegration process by  January 2005. However, according to the administration’s July 15, 2007  report, no armed group has committed to disarm. Moreover, according to  U.S. officials in Baghdad, the Iraqi DDR commission has not developed a  plan for DDR and has not received funding for its work.
section_title: Conditions for Traditional DDR Do Not Exist
paragraphs: GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces,  GAO-07-612T) Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007); GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and  Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, (GAO-07-308SP) Washington,  D.C.: January 9, 2007; GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic,  Governance, and Security Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq, (GAO-06-217C)  Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2005. demobilization, but according to U.S. reports, some external groups are  not helpful. For example, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard provides  deadly arms and funding to Iraq’s militias and contributes to the ongoing  instability.
The Iraqi government provided $150 million for DDR in its 2007 budget  and the Congress has made available up to $156 million from the Iraq  Security Forces fund, to be used to assist the government of Iraq for this  purpose. However, Iraq has prepared no plan for DDR and has not made  progress in enacting legislation. Thus, it is uncertain whether such funding  is needed at this time.
section_title: Appendix VIII: Benchmark 8 – Baghdad Security Plan Committees
paragraphs: Establish supporting political, media, economic, and services  committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: The U.S. and Iraqi governments began the current Baghdad security plan  in mid-February 2007 to stem the violence in Baghdad and surrounding  areas. During the summer of 2006, MNF-I and the Iraqi security forces  implemented two other plans to secure Baghdad, but these operations  failed to reduce violence for a variety of reasons. Unlike the earlier  operations, the current Baghdad Security Plan encompasses political,  economic, and security activities that the Iraqi government needed to  coordinate at the national level.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: In February 2007, the Iraqi government created the Executive Steering  Committee (the executive committee) and six subcommittees to  coordinate political, economic and military activities and make decisions  in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. According to a Department of  State official, the executive committee’s major objective was to increase  the coordination and capacity of the Iraqi government to improve the  quality of life of Baghdad’s population as part of the Baghdad Security  Plan. Each of the subcommittees addresses one of six issues related to the  plan’s implementation: economics, services, political, communication,  popular mobilization, and security. The executive committee and  subcommittees meet on a weekly basis.
The committees consist of Iraqi and U.S. participants. The Iraqi Prime  Minister chairs the executive committee, while senior-level Iraqi ministry  officials chair the various subcommittees. For example, a deputy prime  minister chairs the economic subcommittee and the services  subcommittee. Representatives from the relevant Iraqi ministries serve on  each subcommittee. Two senior U.S. officials are observers to the  executive committee and attend its weekly meetings. A senior MNF-I or  U.S. embassy official is also assigned to each subcommittee. This official  provides advice on the subcommittees’ agendas and other support when  called upon.
According to a Department of State official, the executive committee and  subcommittees have worked to ensure that the Iraqi government provided  sufficient Iraqi forces to assist MNF-I in implementing the Baghdad  Security Plan. For example, when the Iraqi Army provided brigades that  were not at full strength, the executive committee and security  subcommittee identified forces from other parts of the country to move to  Baghdad. The committees also found ways to house and feed the Iraqi  troops supporting the security plan. In addition, the communication  subcommittee has helped publicize the security plan’s goals and the other  subcommittees’ efforts to get resources to Baghdad districts that have  been cleared of insurgents.
We did not assess the effectiveness of the executive committee or  subcommittees in providing overall coordination and supporting the  implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan. However, the  administration’s July 2007 report to Congress stated that the effectiveness  of each committee varied.
section_title: Appendix IX: Benchmark 9 – Iraqi Brigades
paragraphs: Provide three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad  operations.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: During the summer of 2006, a large number of Iraqi security forces refused  to deploy to Baghdad to conduct operations in support of the previous  Baghdad Security Plans. In January 2007, the President said that the Iraqi  government had agreed to resolve this problem under the current plan and  had committed three additional Iraqi brigades to support the new plan.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Since February 2007, the Iraqi government deployed nine Iraqi army  battalions equaling three brigades for 90-day rotations to support the  Baghdad Security Plan. In the July 2007 report, the administration stated  that the Iraqi government had difficulty deploying three additional army  brigades to Baghdad at sufficient strength. In commenting on our draft  report, DOD stated that current present for duty rates for deployed units is  75 percent of authorized strength.  However, the July 2007 administration  report stated that the government has deployed battalions from multiple  Iraqi Army divisions to provide the required three brigade-equivalent  forces to support the Baghdad security plan. After the initial deployment  of the required brigades, the Iraqi government began the rotation plan.  19  units have currently deployed in support of the Baghdad security plan.   Several of these units voluntarily extended, and others were rotated every  90 days in accordance with the plan.  In addition, all of the Iraqi units had  pre-deployment training to support operations in Baghdad. The  administration’s July 2007 report states that progress toward this  benchmark has been satisfactory, and the overall effect has been  satisfactory in that three brigades are operating in Baghdad.
However, in commenting on this report, DOD stated that performance of  the units currently supporting Baghdad operations has been varied. Some  units had performed exceptionally well, proven themselves and raised  their readiness ratings. Others had marked time and slowly regressed over  their 90-day deployment. Of the 19 Iraqi units that had supported  operations in Baghdad, 5 units had performed well while the remaining  had proven to be problematic for several reasons: lack of personnel, lack  of individual fighting equipment and lack of vehicles to conduct their  assigned missions. We obtained classified information that indicates other  problems with these Iraqi army units. Our classified briefing report  provides more information on this benchmark.
section_title: Appendix X: Benchmark 10 – Commander’s Authority
paragraphs: Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this  plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in  consultation with U.S commanders, without political intervention,  to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni  insurgents and Shi’ite militias.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: As stated in the President’s January 10, 2007, speech on the Baghdad  security plan, previous Baghdad security plans failed, in part, because Iraqi  political and sectarian interference prevented forces from taking action  against militias. According to the administration’s initial assessment, Iraq’s  Prime Minister stated that political or sectarian interference in the affairs  of the Iraqi security forces will not be tolerated, and actions have been  taken to address political intervention.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: In July 2007, the administration reported that the government of Iraq has  not made satisfactory progress toward providing Iraqi commanders with  all authorities to execute the Baghdad security plan and to make tactical  and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. commanders without  political intervention. The report noted that political intervention in the  conduct of some security operations continues even though new rules of  engagement for the Baghdad Operational Command have come into effect  and commanders have been given the authority to attack insurgents and  militias.
According to U.S. officials and other experts, sectarian and political  interference in the conduct of military operations continues. Tribal and  ethno-sectarian loyalties remain strong within many Iraqi military units,  hindering efforts to take actions against militias. These loyalties are often  the basis for relationships between key officers in units and higher-level  authorities who are not always in the direct chain of command. For  example, sectarian militias control many local police. Additionally, some  army units sent to Baghdad have mixed loyalties, and some have had ties  to Shi’a militias making it difficult to target Shi’a extremist networks.
Further, according to DOD, evidence exists of target lists emanating from  the Office of the Commander in Chief that bypassed operational  commanders and directed lower-level intelligence officers and  commanders to make arrests, primarily of Sunnis. In addition, sectarian  bias in the appointment of senior military and police commanders  continues, giving rise to suspicions that political considerations may drive  Iraqi commanders’ decisions about which operations to undertake or  support.
In commenting on this benchmark, DOD noted that all 9 of the brigade  commanders and 17 of the 27 national police battalion commanders have  been replaced for failure to command or enforce non-sectarian operations.
section_title: Appendix XI: Benchmark 11 – Iraqi Security Forces Enforcement of the Law
paragraphs: Ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed  enforcement of the law.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: During 2006, according to a Department of State human rights report, the  Iraqi security forces committed serious human rights violations in  Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. These actions added to the increasing  violence against the civilian population during 2006. In support of the  Baghdad security plan, the Iraqi Prime Minister pledged to provide even- handed enforcement of the law.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: According to U.S. reports, the government of Iraq has not ensured that the  Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law. In  May 2007, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom  reported that Iraq’s Shi’a-dominated government bears responsibility for  engaging in sectarian-based human rights violations, as well as tolerating  abuses committed by Shi’a militias with ties to political factions in the  governing coalition. According to the commission, the Iraqi government  through its security forces has committed arbitrary arrest, prolonged  detention without due process, targeted executions, and torture against  non-Shi’a Iraqis. In committing these abuses, the security forces target  Sunnis on the basis of their religious identity, as well as terrorists and  insurgents. and have committed such abuses as abductions, beatings, targeted killings,  intimidation, forced resettlement, murder, rape, and torture. According to  the commission’s report, relationships between these militias and leading  Shi’a factions within Iraq’s ministries and governing coalition indicate that  the Jayash al-Mahdi and Badr Organization are parastate actors operating  with impunity or even with governmental complicity.
In mid-August 2007, Department of State officials stated that the Iraqi  government and security forces continue to engage in sectarian-based  abuses. State’s March 2007 human rights report cited widely reported  incidents of unauthorized government agent involvement in extrajudicial  killings throughout the country. These incidents included Shi’a militia  members wearing police uniforms and driving police cars in carrying out  killings and kidnapping in the southern city of Basra. In addition, death  squads affiliated with the Ministry of Interior targeted Sunnis and  conducted kidnapping raids in Baghdad and its environs, largely with  impunity.
The administration’s July 2007 report stated that the Iraqi government and  many Iraqi security force units are still applying the law on a sectarian  basis when left on their own. The report attributed any progress made by  the security forces in enforcing the law more even-handedly to the  presence of coalition units and embedded training teams, rather than to  the Iraqi government.
section_title: Appendix XII: Benchmark 12 – Safe Havens
paragraphs: Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki  said ‘‘the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for  any outlaws, regardless of  sectarian or political affiliation.”
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: As stated in the President’s January 10, 2007, speech on the Baghdad  security plan, previous plans to secure Baghdad have failed, in part,  because political and sectarian interference and rules of engagement in  place for those plans prevented Iraqi and coalition forces from entering  neighborhoods that are safe havens to those fueling the sectarian violence.  On January 6, 2007, the Iraqi Prime Minister stated, “The Baghdad security  plan will not offer a safe shelter for outlaws regardless of their ethnic and  political affiliations, and we will punish anyone who hesitates to  implement orders because of his ethnic and political background.”
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Although the Iraqi government has allowed MNF-I to conduct operations  in all areas of Baghdad, temporary safe havens still exist due to strong  sectarian loyalties and militia infiltration of security forces. According to  State, terrorist safe havens are defined as ungoverned, under-governed, or  ill-governed areas of a country and non-physical areas where terrorists  that constitute a threat to U.S. national security interests are able to  organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in  relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will,  or both. maintain only one Joint Security Station on the border of Sadr City, with  none within the city itself (see fig. 4). In addition to Joint Security Stations,  MNF-I established about 30 coalition outposts throughout Baghdad,  including one on the border of Sadr City. temporary safe havens still exist in Baghdad, which supports a rating of  partially met. A June 2007 DOD report describes some of the conditions  that allow safe havens to exist. For example, the Shi’a militia continues to  function as the de facto government in Sadr City. Further, militia influence  impacts every component of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, particularly  in Baghdad and several other key cities, according to the DOD report.
Our classified briefing report provides more information on the existence  of safe havens.
section_title: Appendix XIII: Benchmark 13 – Sectarian Violence and Militia Control
paragraphs: Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating  militia control of local security.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: During 2006, according to State and UN reports, insurgents, death squads,  militias, and terrorists increased their attacks against civilians, largely on a  sectarian basis. In addition, the number of internally displaced persons in  Iraq sharply increased following the February 2006 bombing of the  Samarra mosque, primarily as a result of sectarian intimidation and  violence that forced many people from their homes. By the end of 2006,  according to the UN, many Baghdad neighborhoods had become divided  along Sunni and Shi’a lines and were increasingly controlled by armed  groups claiming to act as protectors and defenders of these areas. In  January 2007, the President announced that the United States would  increase force levels in Iraq to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to  reduce sectarian violence and bring security to Baghdad.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: While it is not clear if sectarian violence has been reduced, militia control  over security forces has not been eliminated and remains a serious  problem in Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. murders in determining trends in sectarian violence. The administration’s  July 2007 report concluded that the Iraqi government, with substantial  coalition assistance, had made satisfactory progress toward reducing  sectarian violence.  The report acknowledged that precise measurements  vary, and it was too early to determine if the decrease would be  sustainable.
GAO cannot determine whether sectarian violence in Iraq has been  reduced because measuring such violence requires understanding the  perpetrator’s intent, which may not be known. The number of attacks  targeting civilians and population displacement resulting from sectarian  violence may serve as additional indicators. For example, as displayed in  figure 5, the average number of daily attacks against civilians remained  about the same over the last six months. The decrease in total average  daily attacks in July is largely due to a decrease in attacks on coalition  forces rather than civilians. security will continue to improve modestly, but that levels of insurgent  and sectarian violence will remain high over the next 6 to 12 months.  Similarly, recent March and June 2007 United Nations reports state that  attacks against civilians persist and the continuing systematic, widespread  attacks against the civilian population in Iraq are tantamount to crimes  against humanity and violate the laws of war.
The violence in Iraq has resulted in a large number of Iraqis displaced from  their homes. A report by the Iraqi Red Crescent Organization found that  internally displaced persons increased from about 499,000 in February  2007 to about 1,128,000 in July 2007. The United Nations High  Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that an additional 1.8  million Iraqi citizens were displaced to nearby countries, primarily to  Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and Egypt. The UNHCR predicted that 40,000  to 50,000 people will continue to be displaced each month even if the  security plan succeeds in solving the displacement problem. Currently, the  number of displaced persons is increasing at an average of 80,000 to  100,000 each month, according to the Red Crescent.
The August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq stated that  population displacement resulting from sectarian violence continues,  imposing burdens on provincial governments and some neighboring states.  As the International Organization for Migration and the UN recently  reported, most of Iraq’s internally displaced persons are moving from  mixed areas to seek refuge in homogeneous areas, largely because of  direct threats or forcible displacement from their homes due to their  religious and sectarian identities. Where population displacements have  led to significant sectarian separation, according to the August 2007  National Intelligence Estimate, conflict levels have diminished to some  extent because warring communities find it more difficult to penetrate  communal enclaves.
Our classified report provides further information on trends associated  with violence in Iraq.
Militia control over local security forces – the second part of the  benchmark—has not been eliminated. Numerous U.S. and UN reports  have stated that militias still retain significant control or influence over  local security in parts of Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. For example, in  July 2007, the administration reported that militia presence is still strong  and will likely remain so until the security situation begins to stabilize. The  report stated that the Iraqi government has made unsatisfactory progress  towards eliminating militia control of local security, which continues to  negatively affect the public perception of the authority and fairness of the  Iraqi government. In addition, DOD’s June 2007 report to Congress called  militia influence of local police a significant problem and added that some  security forces remain prone to intimidation by, or collusion with, criminal  gangs. Further, the Department of State’s human rights report  characterized Iraqi police effectiveness as seriously compromised by  militias and sectarianism, with rampant corruption and a culture of  impunity. Finally, in March 2007, the United Nations reported cases of  possible collusion between armed militia and Iraqi security forces in raids  and security operations, as well as the failure of these security forces to  intervene and prevent kidnapping and murder and other crimes.
section_title: Appendix XIV: Benchmark 14 – Joint Security Stations
paragraphs: Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in  neighborhoods across Baghdad.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: Past Baghdad security plans failed, in part, because the coalition and Iraqi  forces did not hold neighborhoods after clearing them of insurgents. The  current Baghdad security plan and the related increase of U.S. and Iraqi  forces into Baghdad is intended to clear insurgents, militias, and organized  criminal gangs from neighborhoods; maintain a security presence in those  areas; and provide for follow-on assistance efforts. As part of this effort,  MNF-I and Iraqi security forces are establishing Joint Security Stations  across Baghdad to improve population protection by providing a  continuous presence in Baghdad’s neighborhoods.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: As of August 9, 2007, the Iraqi government, with substantial coalition  assistance, had established 32 of the 34 planned Joint Security Stations in  Baghdad (see fig. 6). This figure includes Joint Security Stations that had  achieved initial or full operational capability.
Joint Security Stations are staffed by Iraqi local police, national police, and  army personnel, as well as coalition forces. According to the  administration’s July 2007 report, the security stations are designed to  improve population protection by providing a 24-hour security presence in  Baghdad neighborhoods. They also allow greater oversight of Iraqi  security forces by U.S. military personnel.
section_title: Appendix XV: Benchmark 15 – Iraqi Security Forces Operating Independently
paragraphs: Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces’ units capable of  operating independently.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: In August 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved the Iraqi  military and began the process of rebuilding the Iraqi military and police.  Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to train and  equip about 350,000 Iraqi soldiers and police officers, in an effort to  develop Iraqi security forces, transfer security responsibilities to them and  the Iraqi government, and ultimately withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq. The  coalition began embedding transition teams with Iraqi security forces in  2005 to help develop their ability to conduct counterinsurgency  operations. These teams use the Operational Readiness Assessment  process to evaluate the readiness of Iraqi security force units to conduct  operations with or without coalition support.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: While the Iraqi security forces have grown in size and are increasingly  leading counterinsurgency operations, the number of Iraqi army units  operating independently decreased between March 2007 and July 2007.  According to the administration’s July 2007 report, an Iraqi unit can be  considered independent if it has achieved an Operational Readiness  Assessment rating of level 1, which means it is capable of planning,  executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations. operating independently, according to DOD reports. Sectarian and militia  influences further complicate the development of Iraqi forces. In June  2007, DOD reported that while coalition forces are the target of most  enemy attacks, Iraqi security forces and civilians account for the majority  of casualties, contributing to the decline in the readiness of some Iraqi  units. Attrition also has affected the Iraqi security forces. Annual attrition  is estimated to be between 15 and 18 percent for the Iraqi army and  between 20 and 22 percent for the police. In addition, according to a June  2007 report from DOD to Congress, only about 65 percent of authorized  Iraqi personnel are in the field at any given time due to a liberal leave  policy and absences without leave. To increase the number of soldiers on  hand for operations, the Iraqi government and MNF-I decided that they  will increase manning to 120 percent of authorization levels.
Due to Iraq’s immature logistics systems, many Iraqi military and police  units will continue to depend on MNF-I for key sustainment and logistics  support until December 2008. DOD reports that the Iraqi forces’ limited  capacity in these areas hinders their ability to assume missions from MNF- I and requires continued development in some key areas through the end  of 2008. For instance, DOD has set a December 2008 goal for the Iraqi  government to provide day-to-day items such as food, water, and  electricity to the Ministry of Defense’s National Depot. In addition, the  Ministry of Interior aims to become self sufficient in procuring and  managing repair parts by the end of 2008. with corruption and illegal activity, constrains progress in the  development of Ministry of Interior forces.
section_title: Appendix XVI: Benchmark 16 – Minority Party Rights
paragraphs: Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi  legislature are protected.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: Minority parties or groups had no rights under the former Ba’athist regime.  Ensuring the rights of minority parties was a key Iraqi goal to ensure broad  representation and fairness in the new Iraq.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: The rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected  through provisions in the Iraqi Constitution and the Council of  Representatives’ by-laws. However, in practice, the rights of minorities  throughout Iraq remain unprotected.
subsections: section_title: Rights of Minority Political Parties in the Legislature Are Protected
paragraphs: The Iraqi Constitution and the Council of Representatives’ by-laws include  provisions to ensure the full participation of minority political parties  within the Iraqi Council of Representatives. These provisions include:    Article 39 of Iraq’s Constitution, which guarantees the freedom to form  and join associations and political parties and also prohibits forcing any  person to join in any party, society, or political entity or to continue  membership in it.
Article 3 of the Council of Representatives by-laws, which guarantees the  freedom of expressions, opinions, and thoughts of all members of the  Council of Representatives. This guarantee is made regardless of a  representative’s party or political affiliation in a way that does not  contradict the provisions of the Constitution, including the freedom of  objective opposition, constructive criticism, and achieving cooperation  between the Council of Representatives and other constitutional  institutions.
According to Iraqi legislators from minority parties, their rights in the  legislature are protected and they are not physically intimidated. The  legislators also said that they have the right to speak before Parliament,  and to offer legislation even though they are often not consulted on  legislative issues. According to the U.S. government, the electoral  system—provincial proportional representation—that was used to elect  the current Council was chosen in 2005 to balance a number of factors,  including the ability of women and small minority parties to gain  representation. The Council of Representatives elected in December 2005  includes members from the Shi’a, Sunni, Kurdish, Turkmen, Chaldo- Assyrian Christian, and Yazidi communities.
section_title: Human Rights of Iraqi Minorities Across Iraq Remain Unprotected
paragraphs: Although the rights of minority parties are protected in the legislature,  widespread violence across Iraq has seriously compromised the  government’s ability to protect human rights. According to the United  Nations, attacks against religious and ethnic minorities continued  unabated in most areas of Iraq, prompting these communities to seek ways  to leave the country. The conflicts reportedly bear the mark of sectarian  polarization and “cleansing” in neighborhoods formerly comprised of  different religions. According to a non-governmental organization, all of  Iraq’s minority communities have suffered violations that include  destruction and defacement of religious buildings; mass murder of  congregations gathered in and around them; abduction, ransoming, and  murder of religious and civic leaders and individuals including children;  and forced conversion to Islam using tactics such as death threats, rape,  and forced marriage. their communities has a direct bearing on their work in the legislature,  their freedom of movement to and from the legislature, and their ability to  engage fully in Iraq political life.
section_title: Appendix XVII: Benchmark 17 – Allocating and Spending Iraqi Revenues
paragraphs: Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for  reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services on  an equitable basis.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: The President’s New Way Forward in Iraq identified Iraq’s inability to fully  spend its own resources to rebuild its infrastructure and deliver essential  services as a critical economic challenge to Iraq’s self-reliance. Iraqi  government funds are a necessary source of financing for Iraq’s rebuilding  effort, particularly since the United States has obligated most of the $40  billion it provided to Iraq for reconstruction since 2003. However, the  government of Iraq has had difficulty spending its resources on capital  projects. In 2006, the government spent only 22 percent of its non- provincial capital projects and reconstruction budget. Furthermore, in the  critical oil sector, which provides over 90 percent of Iraq’s revenues, the  government spent less than 3 percent of the $3.5 billion allocated for oil  reconstruction projects in 2006. In its 2007 budget, Iraq committed to  spending $10 billion on capital projects and reconstruction.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: according to U.S. and coalition officials. We are conducting a review of  U.S. efforts to help Iraq spend its budget and will issue a separate report at  a later date.
subsections: section_title: Iraq’s Ministries Have Increased Spending in 2007, but Are Unlikely to Spend a Large Share of their 2007 Capital Projects and Reconstruction Budgets
paragraphs: The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad reported that Iraqi government ministries  spent about $1.5 billion, or 24 percent, of the $6.25 billion allocated to their  capital projects and reconstruction budgets through July 15th, just over  half-way through the fiscal year. This level of spending already exceeds  the $1.4 billion spent in 2006. However, Iraqi ministries have less than 6  months left in the year to spend the remaining 76 percent of their budgets.  In its July 2007 report, the administration cited satisfactory progress with  this benchmark because the Ministry of Finance was releasing funds to  ministries and provinces. The U.S. Embassy reported that the Ministry of  Finance released 25 percent and 10 percent of 2007 capital project and  reconstruction budget funds to ministries and provinces, respectively, in  the first 5 months of the year. However, funding releases are not  expenditures and may not be a reliable indicator of future spending by  ministries and provinces. The administration’s report noted that capacity  constraints and security problems may affect Iraq’s ability to accelerate its  spending and procurement activities.
section_title: Ministry of Oil and Provinces Are Unlikely to Spend a Large Share of Their 2007 Capital Projects and Reconstruction Budgets
paragraphs: instead shifted them to its subsidiaries, such as the State Oil Marketing  Organization, which have responsibility for spending much of the Oil  Ministry’s capital projects and reconstruction budget. collected and reported by Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the provinces  had committed 44 percent of their 2007 allocation to contracts for capital  projects, as of July 15, 2007. However, it is not clear whether the value of  committed contracts is a reliable indicator of actual spending. Given the  capacity and security challenges currently facing Iraq, many committed  contracts may not be executed and, therefore, would not result in actual  expenditures. The Government of Iraq is undertaking a number of  initiatives, including budget execution training sessions, to help provincial  officials spend their capital budgets, according to U.S. officials.
section_title: Appendix XVIII: Benchmark 18 – False Accusations
paragraphs: Ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or  making false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security  Forces.
subsections: section_title: Issue
paragraphs: According to U.S. government reporting, qualified Iraqi officers may be  discouraged from operating in a professional, non-sectarian manner if  Iraq’s political authorities undermine or make false accusations against  members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Iraq’s political authorities continue to undermine and make false  accusations against members of the ISF. According to U.S. government  officials, little has changed since the U.S. Administration’s July 2007 Initial  Benchmark Assessment. Each month the U.S. government receives reports  alleging wrongdoing by ISF members considered by MNF-I to be non- sectarian in their approach to security. The U.S. assessment further stated  that in most cases the U.S. government was unable to determine the  validity of these allegations but believed them to be untrue. The  assessment concluded that these accusations undermine the  independence and non-sectarianism of the ISF and that the Iraqi  government does not adequately address the accusations. According to  MNF-I officials in Baghdad, some cases resulted in detention of military  officers, but the cases did not provide justification or specific charges  against the officers. Further information is classified. influential sectarian leaders linked to the security ministries. These actions  have reportedly led to the arrest and detention of several military officials.  According to U.S. officials, this tactic is primarily used against Sunni  Ministry of Defense officials and does not occur at the predominantly Shi’a  Ministry of Interior. The U.S. government also reported that some Sunni  politicians have made unsubstantiated claims against ISF officials.  Moreover, Iraqi government support for the ISF has been uneven. Some  members of the Council of Ministers and Council of Representatives have  publicly supported ISF leaders while behind the scenes they continue to  ignore sectarian activities, according to the U.S. government.
section_title: Appendix XIX: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks
paragraphs: ppendix XIX: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks  Appendix XIX: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks Iraq’s Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of political, security, and economic  benchmarks and an associated timeline in September 2006. These were reaffirmed by the  Presidency Council on October 16, 2006.
In December 2006, MNF-I and the government of Iraq agreed to establish joint security stations.
section_title: Appendix XX: Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration’s July 2007 Initial Benchmark Assessment Report
paragraphs: Forming  Contittionl Review Committee nd then completing the contittionl review.
Encting nd implementing legition on de-Ba’athifiction.
Encting nd implementing legition to ensure the equitable ditribution of hydrocon rerce of the people of Iraq  withot regrd to the ect or ethnicity of recipient, nd encting nd implementing legition to ensure tht the energy  rerce of Iraq enefit Sunni Arabs, Shi Arabs, Krd, nd other Iraqi citizen in n equitable mnner.
Encting nd implementing legition on procedre to form emi-autonomous region.
Encting nd implementing legition eablihing n Independent High Electorl Commission, provincil electionw,  provincil concil authoritie, nd te for provincil election.
Encting nd implementing legition ddressing mnety.
Encting nd implementing legition eablihing  trong militi disarmment progrm to ensure thsuch ecrity force  re ccontable only to the centrl government nd loyl to the Contittion of Iraq.
Eablihing supporting politicl, medi, economic, nd ervice committee in support of the Bghdecrity pln.
Providing three trined nd redy Iraqrigde to support Bghdd opertion.
Providing Iraqi commnder with ll authoritie to execte thi plnd to mke tcticnd opertionl deciion, in  consulttion with U.S. commnder, withot politicl intervention, to inclde the authority to psull extremi,  inclding Sunni insurgent nd Shiite militias.
Ensuring tht the IraqSecrity Force re providing even-hnded enforcement of the lw.
Ensuring tht, ccording to Preident Bush, Prime Miniter Mliki said ‘‘the Bghdecrity pln will not  provide  safe hven for ny otl, regrdless of  ectrin or politicffilition.’’ Redcing the level of ectrin violence in Iraq nd eliminting militi control of locecrity.
Eablihing ll of the plnned joint ecrity tion in neighorhood cross Bghdd.
Increasing the ner of Iraqecrity forces’ nitable of operting independently.
Ensuring tht the right of minority politicl prtie in the Iraqi legire re protected.
Allocting nd pending $10 illion in Iraqi reven for recontrction project, inclding delivery of  essentiervice, on n equitable bas.
Ensuring tht Iraq’s politicauthoritie re not ndermining or mking fccusation int  memer of the Iraqecrity force.
According to the U.S. State Department, conditions are not present for these benchmarks.
section_title: Appendix XXI: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq  Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007 (the Act) requires GAO to  submit to Congress by September 1, 2007, an independent assessment of  whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained  in the Act and the status of the achievement of the benchmarks. This  report (1) provides an assessment of whether or not the Iraqi government  has met 18 legislative, security, and economic benchmarks, and (2)  provides information on the status of the achievement of each benchmark.  These benchmarks address 8 legislative, 9 security and 1 economic-related  action.
To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency documents and  interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the  Treasury; the Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate  commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence  Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These  officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General  David H. Petraeus, Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). We  also reviewed translated copies of Iraqi documents and met with officials  from the government of Iraq and its legislature. As part of this work, we  made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, including a visit from  July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately  100 Iraq-related audits we have completed since May 2003. We provided  drafts of the report to the relevant U.S. agencies for review and comment,  which we incorporated as appropriate. Although we analyzed classified  data, this report only contains unclassified information, as of August 30,  2007. We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Legislative Benchmarks
paragraphs: political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected, we took a number of  actions. Specifically, we interviewed and reviewed documentation from  the Iraqi government, Iraqi legislators in Baghdad, UN, U.S. Institute for  Peace, IFES, the Independent High Electoral Commission, non- governmental organizations, and the Departments of Defense and State in  Washington, D.C. and Baghdad, Iraq. The documents reviewed included  the administration’s July 2007 initial benchmark assessment, the Iraqi  Constitution, draft laws related to each of the benchmarks, the  International Compact with Iraq 2007 Mid-Year Progress Report, and  UN analyses of the laws addressed by the benchmarks.
For our assessment of the status of the hydrocarbon legislation, we relied  on prior GAO reporting and updated information where appropriate. We  interviewed and reviewed documentation from the Iraqi government, UN,  U.S. Institute for Peace, and State Department in Washington, D.C. and  Baghdad, Iraq. We compared central government draft oil laws with the  Iraqi Constitution and the Kurdistan Regional Government Oil and Gas  law.
Additionally, to determine if the Iraqi government is ensuring that the  rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected, we  obtained and reviewed the Administration’s report on progress in Iraq, the  Iraqi constitution, and the Council of Representatives Bylaws. We  interviewed Iraqi legislators in Baghdad, Iraq, including the leader of the  Iraqi Minority Council. We also reviewed human rights reports from  nongovernmental organizations, the United Nations, and the U.S.  government to determine whether the rights of minorities throughout Iraq  are protected.
section_title: Security Benchmarks
paragraphs: intervention; (4) ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are providing even- handed law enforcement; (5) eliminating safe havens; (6) reducing the  level of sectarian violence and eliminating militia control of local security;  (7) establishing all planned joint security stations; (8) increasing the  number of security units capable of operating independently; and (9)  ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making  false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces, we took a  number of actions.
Specifically, we examined U.S. Department of State cables and other  documents that discussed the establishment of the supporting committees.  We reviewed classified and unclassified documents and reports showing  the Iraqi Army units that had deployed to Baghdad and analyzed the U.S.  Department of Defense Operational Readiness Assessments (ORA)  formerly known as Transitional Readiness Assessments, for these units. In  addition, we reviewed classified and unclassified assessments of the  authorities granted to unit commanders, the level of sectarian influence  and levels of militia infiltration of army and police units, and reports of  incidents where Iraqi officials interfered with the chain of command.
To understand the range of methodological issues associated with  measuring levels of sectarian violence, and to collect information related  to broader trends in population security, we interviewed officials from the  U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense in Washington, D.C.,  and Baghdad, Iraq; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Defense  Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Council; the United Nations;  and the International Organization for Migration in Washington, D.C.,  Baghdad, Iraq, and Amman, Jordan. We also met with these officials to  discuss the other benchmarks.
section_title: Economic Benchmark
paragraphs: Cooperation data on capital expenditures reported by Multinational Force- Iraq.
We also reviewed unofficial unreconciled data on capital budget execution  by the provinces in 2006 and 2007 collected by U.S. Provincial  Reconstruction Teams. We compared 2007 capital allocations to the  provinces with their populations to assess the equity of capital funding  allocations. We discussed the reliability of allocation and expenditure data  with U.S. Treasury officials and contractors advising the Ministry of  Finance. We also reviewed relevant reports by DOD and State, the Special  Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, World Bank, IMF, public  accountants and Iraqi government budget implementation documents. We  found that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of showing  trends in budget expenditures.
section_title: Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the State Department’s letter dated  August 30, 2007.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: devising a package of necessary amendments, the Iraqi legislature had  not voted on the package, and a referendum had not been held.  11. We added information to our already existing reference to the Kurdish  National Assembly legislation.  12. We revised this sentence.  13. Under our criteria, this benchmark was not met.  14. We revised the text to reflect State’s comments.  15. We revised the text to reflect State’s comments.  16. Our paragraph provides context for the committees’ work and the text  makes it clear that these actions were in the past so we retained our  original language.  17. See comment 6.  18. See comment 6.  19. See comment 5.   20. We revised the text.  21. See comment 6.
section_title: Appendix XXIII: Comments from the Department of Defense
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter dated August 30, 2007.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We have revised the text.  2.  We have revised the text.  3.  We have modified the sentence by adding not “always.”   4.  We have replaced this chart.  5.  We have qualified the sentence by adding “parts of .”  6.  We disagree with DOD’s comment.  The Iraq benchmark calls for  increasing the number of Iraqi security units capable of operating  independently.  A key impediment to Iraqi training and readiness,  particularly of the police, is sectarian and militia influence.  DOD’s  June 2007 report to Congress states that sectarian bias has constrained  the development of MOI forces.  7.  DOD commented that 71 percent of Iraqi authorized personnel are in  the field at any one time, compared to 65 percent, which we report.   We are retaining the 65 percent in our report because it is from a  published DOD source and we do not have further documentation on  the new figure.
section_title: Appendix XXIV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: Steve Lord, David Bruno, Howard Cott, Tim Fairbanks, Mattias Fenton,  Whitney Havens, Dorian Herring, Bruce Kutnick, Judy McCloskey, Tet  Miyabara, and Kathleen Monahan.
In addition, Robert Alarapon Ashley Alley, Monica Brym, Lessie M Burke- Johnson, Joe Carney, Miriam Carroll, Thomas Costa, Lynn Cothern, Debra  Chung, Joyee Dasgupta, Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Muriel Forster,  Patrick Hickey, Michael Jenkins, Sona Kalapura, Jeremy Latimer, Mary  Moutsos, Mimi Nguyen, Sidney Schwartz, Jena Sinkfield, Audrey Solis,  Cynthia Taylor, and Christina Werth provided technical assistance.