DOD'S Mobility Requirements: Value of Intratheater Lift Analyses Can Be Enhanced
Published: 1998-01-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) 1996 Intratheater Lift Analysis (ILA), focusing on whether: (1) the analysis and recommendations in the study were appropriately linked; (2) the study considered all options in meeting the requirements for various lift assets; and (3) improvements could be made to enhance the study's value as a decisionmaking tool.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO noted that: (1) the ILA does not adequately fulfill the congressional directive to determine lift requirements and develop an integrated plan to meet them; (2) the study contains recommendations that would cost billions of dollars to implement, but the study's analysis generally did not support these recommendations; (3) the disconnect between the analysis and recommendations is especially evident in the information regarding tactical wheeled vehicles and outsize airlift capability; (4) in addition, the study's analysis did not incorporate several assets that can contribute significantly to the intratheater lift mission; as a result, the study's requirements and solutions may be overstated; (5) the analysis did not consider: (a) commercial vehicles provided by host nation support (HNS); (b) the use of the current and planned fleet of outsize-capable intertheater airlifters such as the C-5 and C-17; and (c) the extent to which Army watercraft could reduce the need for alternative sources of lift; (6) furthermore, improvements could enhance the study's value to decisionmakers; (7) these improvements include requirements stated as a range rather than as absolute numbers and tradeoff assessments based on the cost and capability of the various lift assets; (8) a range would have better reflected the dynamic nature of intratheater requirements, and system tradeoff assessments would have provided choices based on cost and capability; and (9) the 1999 Mobility Requirements Study and updated ILA will afford DOD a good opportunity to address these issues and provide Congress with a basis for acquisition decisionmaking in future budget cycles.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: As requested, we are providing you with the results of our review of the Department of Defense’s 1996 Intratheater Lift Analysis. We reviewed the Department’s analysis to determine whether (1) the analysis and recommendations in the study were appropriately linked, (2) the study considered all options in meeting the requirements for various lift assets, and (3) improvements could be made to enhance the study’s value as a decision-making tool.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and the House National Security Committee; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others on request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
subsections: section_title: Introduction
paragraphs: In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to determine intertheater (from one theater of operations to another) and intratheater (within a theater of operations) mobility requirements for the armed forces and develop an integrated plan to meet those requirements. DOD assessed its intertheater requirements in the 1992 Mobility Requirements Study. This study was updated in 1995 based on the results of the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. According to Joint Staff officials, intratheater requirements were addressed in the July 1996 Intratheater Lift Analysis (ILA), which was DOD’s first published intratheater lift requirements study since the 1988 Worldwide Intratheater Mobility Study. The ILA was sponsored by the Joint Staff, with representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, military services, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Forces Korea, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. At the time of our review, the ILA had not been submitted to Congress.
Historically, DOD has focused on intertheater lift requirements because intratheater lift requirements are more difficult to establish. The time-phased force deployment data process, which sets out the mode and timing of transportation of each unit, typically concentrates on the intertheater leg of the deployment. Intratheater lift requirements depend more on the combat situation and the theater concept of operations, which may not be known until the start of hostilities and are always subject to change. Intertheater lift transports troops, equipment, and supplies from U.S. airfields and seaports or prepositioned locations to the airfields and seaports in the theater of operations. The intratheater lift phase transports the troops and equipment from these airfields and seaports to the tactical assembly areas and foxholes in the theater.  Figure 1.1 illustrates “fort-to-foxhole” deployment.
The Secretary of Defense’s 1997 Annual Report to the President and the Congress states that the mobility objectives identified in the updated 1995 Mobility Requirements Study and the 1996 ILA will guide future force structure and investment decisions. Officials from the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation said that the ILA is the official DOD study that the military services should use in developing their procurement plans for intratheater lift assets. The Army plans to spend about $1.7 billion through fiscal year 2003 to implement the ILA’s recommendations for tactical wheeled vehicles; if the airlift recommendations were implemented as well, another approximately $2.7 billion (fiscal year 1996 dollars) could be spent.
According to Joint Staff officials, a new Mobility Requirements Study is expected to be completed in 1999. That study is expected to incorporate the Quadrennial Defense Review scenarios and force structure, include an update to the ILA, and examine intertheater and intratheater lift requirements simultaneously rather than separately.
subsections: section_title: Modes of Intratheater Lift
paragraphs: Five alternate modes of transportation—airlift, highway, coastal waterway, rail, and pipeline—present several options for intratheater lift. The availability of these options depends on the combat situation and theater infrastructure. For example, if the 176 bridges and 11 tunnels between Pusan and Seoul, South Korea are damaged or destroyed or if the bridges cannot accommodate heavy tracked vehicles, such as main battle tanks, alternative modes of transportation must be arranged.
Airlift enables immediate positioning and delivery of unit equipment and sustainment, but it is costly and provides limited cargo capacity. The C-130 airlifter is the primary aircraft used for intratheater lift. Large intertheater airlifters, such as the C-17 and C-5, can also be used for intratheater lift if a larger payload capacity or the transport of outsize cargo—the largest items in the Army’s inventory—is needed and airfields can accommodate the aircraft.
Tactical wheeled vehicles are key to (1) moving units to assembly areas in the theater of operations in preparation for combat and (2) sustaining forces with supplies essential for successful operations. The tactical wheeled vehicles included in the ILA were the Heavy Equipment Transporter System (HETS), the Palletized Load System (PLS), 5,000- and 7,500-gallon fuel tankers, and 22.5- and 34-ton line haulers. The Army’s watercraft fleet consists of 245 craft that transport cargo and combat vehicles from ship to shore or to locations in the theater of operations via intracoastal waterways. The Logistics Support Vessel can accommodate  24 M1 main battle tanks and has the capacity to carry 2,000 tons. Rail, an important mode of transport in Korea, can alleviate some highway transportation requirements, according to the ILA. Appendix I shows some intratheater lift assets.
section_title: ILA Methodology
paragraphs: The war-fighting requirements on which the ILA was based were established in the updated 1995 Mobility Requirements Study. That study, which formed the basis for DOD’s current intertheater lift program, developed a requirement that would accomplish, with moderate risk, U.S. objectives established by the Joint Staff’s Tactical Warfare model (TACWAR) for a nearly simultaneous Korea and Southwest Asia scenario. The study assessed intertheater lift requirements to deliver combat and support forces to airfields and seaports in the two theaters of operations. The 1995 study, however, did not address the intratheater lift requirements needed to transport the units to their final destinations within the theaters.
The ILA, through the Scenario Unrestricted Mobility Model for Intratheater Simulation (SUMMITS), modeled the intratheater lift—including airlift, tactical wheeled vehicles, Army watercraft, and rail—needed to transport the troops and equipment from the airfields and seaports and prepositioning sites in the theater to destination air bases, staging areas, and tactical assembly areas. SUMMITS considers required delivery date, payload, rate of movement, loading and unloading times, and the available transportation assets and network capabilities; examines every feasible path from origin to destination; and selects the fastest path through the network, subject to user-defined mode selection rules. For example, the mode selection rules direct that airlift, which is more expensive than ground transportation, is to be used only if ground transportation would be late and airlift would result in an improvement of at least 24 hours.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Because its recommendations are intended to serve as the basis for proposed DOD acquisitions, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services requested that we report on the results of the 1996 ILA. Specifically, we determined whether (1) the analysis and recommendations in the study were appropriately linked, (2) the study considered all options in meeting the requirements for various lift assets, and (3) improvements could enhance the study’s value as a decision-making tool. To determine whether the ILA’s analysis and recommendations were appropriately linked, we reviewed the ILA, its Catalogues of Data and Assumptions, and other information supporting the study; theater command input to the ILA; Army and Air Force doctrine and procurement plans for tactical wheeled vehicles and airlifters; information on intratheater mobility in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and Operation Joint Endeavor; the 1997 and 1998 Air Mobility Master Plans; RAND’s 1997 Documented Briefing, “Should C-17s Be Used To Carry In-Theater Cargo During Major Deployments?”; and other relevant documents. We reviewed our prior reports on Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, PLS, HETS, and C-17. We visited the tactical wheeled vehicles training facility at Fort Eustis, Virginia. We discussed the ILA’s assumptions, analysis, and recommendations with officials from the following organizations:
Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.;
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements, Washington, D.C.;
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for Program Analysis and Evaluation, Washington, D.C.;
U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida;
U.S. Forces Korea;
U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii;
U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois;
Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;
Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia;
Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois;
Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;
Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia;
Army Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Virginia;
Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Requirements Management Office, Fort Eustis, Virginia; and
Boeing Corporation (formerly McDonnell Douglas Corporation), Rosslyn, Virginia.
To determine whether the ILA considered all options in meeting the requirements for various lift assets, including host nation support, the C-5, and Army watercraft, we reviewed the ILA and its supporting Catalogues of Data and Assumptions; DOD’s 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review; theater commands’ operation plans for Southwest Asia and Korea; DOD documents concerning host nation support in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm; the DOD Inspector General’s 1997 report on host nation support in Southwest Asia; the Air Mobility Command’s May 1997 Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report; Air Force and contractor documents concerning C-5 operations and capabilities; the Logistics Management Institute’s November 1996 report, “Joint Logistics Over The Shore Causeway Systems and Support;” the November 1996 Army Watercraft Master Plan; and other documents. We obtained information on the potential contribution of these lift assets from officials at the Joint Staff; theater commands; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for Program Analysis and Evaluation; the U.S. Transportation Command; Army Headquarters; the Army Training and Doctrine Command; the Army Combined Arms Support Command; the Air Combat Command; the Air Mobility Command; and Lockheed Martin Corporation, Crystal City, Virginia. We also toured the Army watercraft docked at Fort Eustis.
To determine whether improvements could enhance the study’s value as a decision-making tool, we reviewed the 1988 Worldwide Intratheater Mobility Study, 1992 Mobility Requirements Study, 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update, and the 1996 Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Strategic Mobility. We also reviewed the theater commands’ input into the ILA, information on tactical wheeled vehicle cost and capability from the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Requirements Management Office, and our prior reports on the 1992 and 1995 Mobility Requirements Studies. We obtained additional information from the Joint Staff; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for Program Analysis and Evaluation; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements; Air Force Headquarters; Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency; Air Combat Command; Air Mobility Command; Army Headquarters; and Army Combined Arms Support Command.
We did not assess the validity of the requirements or objectives identified in the fiscal year 2003 Total Army Analysis and did not independently verify the computer-generated data from the SUMMITS or TACWAR models. Our analysis focused on the decisions that were justified based on the output of these models. Our assessment of whether the outputs were properly used did not require a determination as to the accuracy of the models and the data they produce. We evaluated the links between the ILA’s recommendations and the requirements generated by the models.
We performed our review between September 1996 and November 1997 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: ILA Recommendations Are Not Based on the Study’s Analysis
paragraphs: The ILA contains several recommendations that are not based on requirements developed by the study’s analysis. In some cases, this disconnect appears to be the result of invalid assumptions. For example, assumptions about how the Army would use HETS were not consistent with Army doctrine. In other cases, the cause of the disconnect is unclear. Further, the recommendations for tactical wheeled vehicles supported the Army’s planned acquisition objectives, but the study’s analysis would have resulted in a different recommendation for most types of tactical wheeled vehicles (e.g., the PLS and the 34-ton line hauler). Finally, the ILA found that the current C-130 fleet is more than sufficient to meet airlift requirements but recommended that an additional squadron of C-17s, beyond the planned procurement of 120 aircraft, should be used for intratheater lift, particularly for outsize cargo. This recommendation is not supported by the analysis in the study.
subsections: section_title: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Recommendations Are Not Based on the Study’s Requirements
paragraphs: The tactical wheeled vehicle acquisition plan recommended by the ILA does not reflect the requirements determined by the study’s analysis. The ILA recommended that the Army continue with its tactical wheeled vehicle acquisition objectives based on the biennial Total Army Analysis for fiscal year 2003, even though the ILA requirements differed significantly from that analysis. The ILA recommended that shortfalls in some types of tactical wheeled vehicles be alleviated either by host nation support or tradeoffs with other types of excess vehicles. However, because the ILA requirements differ significantly from the Army’s acquisition objectives, the excesses asserted in the ILA may not actually exist. Further, the ILA did not consider tactical wheeled vehicle host nation support (the treatment of host nation support is discussed in ch. 3) or include a cost-effectiveness analysis of the tradeoffs among various types of vehicles. Table 2.1 shows the ILA requirements (number of companies) and recommendations for tactical wheeled vehicles. Appendix I shows the number of assets in each company.
subsections: section_title: HETS Assumptions Are Not Consistent With Army Doctrine
paragraphs: The ILA’s recommendation for the procurement of HETS is not consistent with the requirement identified in the study. The ILA requirement is for  4 HETS companies, but the recommendation supports the Army’s plan to buy 18 companies. The ILA did not model the use of HETS according to current Army doctrine and thus derived a much lower HETS requirement than the Army’s analysis. The ILA Catalogue of Data and Assumptions states that HETS were used to transport tracked vehicles only when the vehicles’ time to self-deploy would exceed the time required to load them on a HETS, transport them, and unload them. According to Army officials, however, under current Army doctrine, battle tanks do not self-deploy unless the distance to be traversed is 3 miles or less. This mission was added in 1991, before which time HETS only evacuated tanks from the battlefield. The Army’s objective of 18 HETS companies reflects the Army’s plan to procure enough HETS to relocate a heavy brigade and its support in a single lift. Another reason for ILA’s lower HETS requirement is that the study assumed a steady, even flow of heavy equipment arrivals by sea, with no surges as a result of weather or chance.
section_title: Fuel Tanker Requirements Are Not Accurate
paragraphs: The ILA identified a need for fewer 5,000-gallon fuel tankers than the Army plans to procure, but it recommended that the Army’s acquisition program be continued. The ILA acknowledges that its 5,000-gallon fuel tanker requirements are understated. According to Joint Staff and Army officials, one reason for the inaccuracy is that the ILA did not factor in fuel requirements for the tankers or the additional cargo line haulers that the analysis showed were needed to meet requirements. Another reason for the difference between the Army and ILA estimates is that the TACWAR battle on which the ILA was based was fought at a low-to-moderate intensity level. If the level of intensity had been higher, fuel requirements would have been greater.
section_title: PLS Recommendation Is Not Supported
paragraphs: The ILA’s recommendation to continue the Army’s plan to procure 32 PLS companies is not based on the ILA’s requirement of 16 companies. Rather than recommend a reduced number of PLS to reflect the requirements, the ILA recommended that the Army continue toward its acquisition objective and use the surplus PLS to help alleviate the 22.5-ton line hauler shortfalls. However, on the basis of a cost and operational effectiveness analysis, the cost-effectiveness of the PLS was determined only for an ammunition role. Further analysis has not been done to determine the cost-effectiveness of the PLS in a cargo-carrying role. One PLS costs about $391,000 (1996 dollars) compared with $158,000 (1996 dollars) for one 22.5-ton line hauler, according to an analysis by the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Requirements Management Office. Because alternative uses for the PLS have not been assessed for cost-effectiveness, the ILA’s recommendation for the PLS is premature and not supported by analysis.
section_title: Line Hauler Recommendations Are Not Consistent
paragraphs: The ILA identifies a minimum requirement for 54 22.5-ton line hauler companies but also supports the Army’s acquisition objective of 33 companies. The ILA states that excess PLS assets can help alleviate this shortfall. However, the PLS mission would have to be changed, and a cost-effectiveness analysis for such a change has not been done.
The ILA also identified a large shortfall in the 34-ton line haulers, but the Army believes enough of these assets are already in its inventory and therefore does not plan to procure any more. The ILA recommends 87 of these companies as an objective but supports the Army’s plan not to procure any additional trucks, stating that shortfalls can be offset with excess HETS assets, 7,500-gallon fuel tanker tractors (the same tractor used with the 34-ton line hauler), and host nation support. None of these options, however, were modeled.
section_title: Recommendation for Additional Airlift Is Not Supported
paragraphs: The number of C-130s in the fleet exceeds the number that the ILA identified as a requirement for the Korea and Southwest Asia scenarios.To determine the number of additional C-130s that would be needed worldwide for contingencies unrelated to these scenarios, the Joint Staff surveyed the theater commanders. Even with their additional requirement, the C-130 fleet still exceeds the number needed for intratheater lift. However, on the basis of analyses by the Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency, the ILA recommended using additional C-17s beyond the planned procurement of 120 (a squadron of 14, according to DOD officials) to augment the C-130s by providing outsize cargo capability. This recommendation has been supported by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Mobility (in a 1996 report) and by theater commanders. The Air Force analyses, however, do not support this recommendation because they only demonstrated that the C-17 could move cargo more quickly than the C-130 under certain circumstances. No intratheater requirement was established based on the C-17’s contribution to meeting TACWAR timelines, and the relative cost-effectiveness of the two aircraft was not taken into account.
The Air Force is not currently planning to acquire more than the planned 120 C-17s so that a squadron could be dedicated to an intratheater role. An Air Force document shows that no C-17s are allocated solely for intratheater lift but that the U.S. Transportation Command would continue to support the intratheater lift needs of war-fighting commanders, as demonstrated in Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia. RAND’s National Defense Research Institute evaluated intratheater concepts of operations for the planned C-17 fleet of 120 aircraft. In a 1997 Documented Briefing,RAND identified the advantages of using the C-17 in an intratheater role and concluded that about one squadron of C-17s could be used effectively in each of the two theaters of operation. These C-17s would be part of the planned procurement of 120 aircraft and would be based in the theater, unavailable to fly intertheater missions. RAND acknowledged that deploying these C-17s as intratheater assets would slow the flow of intertheater cargo, but stated that this effect would be offset by the improved intratheater deliveries afforded by the C-17. DOD officials commented that, during the halting phase, a delay in the strategic airlift flow may not be acceptable. RAND also determined that fewer C-17s would need to be dedicated to the theater if some C-17s arriving in the theater were delayed to perform intratheater missions and then re-entered the intertheater airlift flow. According to RAND, this concept could allow nondedicated C-17s to fly most of the missions that would otherwise require theater-assigned C-17s.
subsections: section_title: Further Analysis of Potential C-17 Role Is Warranted
paragraphs: In support of the ILA, the Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency used its own models, along with SUMMITS, to determine the number of C-130s needed to meet TACWAR requirements after the addition of a squadron of C-17s beyond the 120 planned aircraft. The analysis found that about 50 percent more cargo could be delivered with only two-thirds as many sorties. However, because the C-130 fleet was more than sufficient to deliver the ILA workload, the faster deliveries resulting from the addition of C-17s were not necessary to meet the TACWAR battle requirements.
The ILA also stated that, on the basis of its capability to deliver bulk cargo,every additional C-17 could replace three C-130s. However, the ratio of three C-130s to one C-17 does not take into account either cost or the reduced flexibility that would be provided to a theater commander who may need three C-130s for multiple deliveries rather than one C-17 for a single delivery.
Finally, dedicating a squadron of large airlifters, such as the C-17, for intratheater use could be an inefficient use of the asset. Intratheater missions typically involve small loads. In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, for example, the average C-130 load was only 3.2 tons per sortie, although the C-130 can carry 17 tons. During the three peaks in the airlift operation—August and September 1990 and February 1991—the average C-130 load was 3.5 tons per sortie, which is only 5 percent of the C-17’s 65-ton cargo-carrying capacity.
The Air Force stated that more analysis is needed before a definitive conclusion on the intratheater contribution of C-17s can be reached. The ILA notes that, due to SUMMITS’ limited ability to model airlift, C-17 and C-130 capability tradeoffs warrant further analysis. The Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency had planned to complete a more detailed study of C-17 and C-130 capability in September 1996, but, according to an Air Force official, that study has been delayed indefinitely.
section_title: Unit Relocation Analysis Used Questionable Assumptions and Was Not Tied to the TACWAR Requirement
paragraphs: The Air Force also performed an analysis of the advantages and necessity of the C-17 in theater airlift operations by identifying ways the C-17 could augment the C-130 in conducting specific unit relocations in the theater. This analysis was conducted outside of the SUMMITS and TACWAR models because the TACWAR battle plan does not relocate specific units once they have arrived at their target destinations. An ILA working group determined the units that should be relocated to specific airfields based on how the move could improve the theater commander’s tactical advantage. On the basis of these discussions, the Air Force modeled 11 different unit moves, including Patriot batteries, Multiple Launch Rocket System battalions, and the 101st Air Assault Division.
The Air Force analysis showed that, if a squadron of C-17s were dedicated to the theater, the selected units could be delivered to their destinations more rapidly than they could by the C-130. However, because the time frames in the analysis were not directly related to a specified requirement in the TACWAR battle plan, the benefit of the units’ earlier availability was not measured. For example, even if the analysis showed that a Patriot battery could reach its destination 3 days earlier on the C-17 than it would by other means, the analysis did not assess the effect of this unit’s move on the rest of the battle. In addition, the analysis did not assess the ripple effect of earlier delivery of the selected units on other units because the analysis was intended only to examine how the C-17 could speed the arrival of the 11 selected units.
Further, the C-17 unit relocation analysis assumed that the aircraft could land on 18 planned fields. However, according to the May 1997 Air Mobility Command Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report, only 9 of the 18 airfields have been surveyed for airlift operation suitability, and only 7 have been determined to be suitable for use by the C-17. The remaining two airfields have not been assessed for C-17 operations.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The ILA does not adequately fulfill congressional direction to develop intratheater lift requirements and establish an integrated plan to meet them because the study’s recommendations are not supported by the analysis. The ILA’s tactical wheeled vehicle recommendations, even though they support the Army’s acquisition objectives, are not consistent with the requirements identified in the ILA. In addition, some ILA assumptions are either not consistent with Army doctrine or are invalid for other reasons. These discrepancies call into question the basis for the study’s recommendations. Due to the inconsistencies between the ILA requirements and the Army’s acquisition objectives, for example, excess HETS and fuel tanker tractor assets may not actually exist. In addition, the ILA’s recommendation to use another squadron of C-17s, beyond the planned procurement of 120 aircraft, for intratheater lift is not based on sound analysis. The ILA did not establish a relationship between the use of the C-17 in a dedicated intratheater role and the rest of the battle, so the effect of the faster C-17 deliveries was not measured. Furthermore, even though the Air Force’s analysis assumed that the C-17 would be able to use all of the airfields identified by the ILA working group, there is no guarantee that they would be accessible to the C-17. The updated ILA, planned as part of the 1999 Mobility Requirements Study, will provide a good opportunity for DOD to reconsider the basis for intratheater lift requirements and ensure that they are linked appropriately to the study’s analysis.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the 1999 ILA update (1) link the study’s recommendations to its analysis and (2) include assumptions that consider current Army doctrine when acquisition plans are based on the doctrine.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: DOD concurred with our recommendations. DOD noted that, although study assumptions are generally based on military service doctrine, DOD must be free to analyze changes to that doctrine in the interest of enhancing joint capability. However, DOD did not agree with our finding that the ILA’s recommendations are not supported by the study’s analysis. DOD stated that the study used computationally derived data, along with additional analysis and military judgment, to develop its recommendations. DOD cites service acquisition programs, input from theater commanders, and substitution of one type of intratheater asset for another as examples of the additional analysis considered in developing the requirements and recommendations in the ILA. DOD points to the study’s recommendation to use excess HETS in place of 34-ton line haulers as being based on service acquisition programs and theater commander input.
The ILA does not link its requirements to its recommendations. Rather, its recommendations merely support the Army’s acquisition plans with no explanation of the disconnect between those plans and the study’s requirements. In discussing our draft report, agency officials acknowledged that the Joint Staff had difficulty linking the Army’s fiscal year 2003 acquisition program to the ILA requirements and that, for this reason, the study’s reliance on the acquisition program is not clearly explained. Furthermore, Joint Staff officials told us during our review that the decisions reached by ILA working groups concerning tradeoff assessments and the airlift tactical unit moves analysis were not documented. Without an explicit link in the ILA between the study’s requirements and recommendations, and without a means of reviewing the factors or additional analyses that led to the final recommendations in the study, we have no basis on which to concur that a link exists. Moreover, we question the reliability and independence of a DOD requirements study that bases its requirements and recommendations on service acquisition programs without examining the disconnects between those programs and the study’s own findings.
Concerning DOD’s example, the number of HETS identified as a requirement in the ILA is less than the number reflected in the study’s recommendation. According to theater commanders’ input to the study and our discussions with Army officials, the HETS is not an effective or economical substitute for 34-ton line haulers. We agree with DOD’s statement that service acquisition programs were used to support the study’s recommendations for HETS. It is this fact that leads us to conclude that the recommendations in the ILA were not based on the requirements identified by the study’s analysis, but rather were based on service acquisition programs that had already been established.
section_title: ILA Did Not Include the Potential Contribution of Some Lift Assets
paragraphs: The ILA did not incorporate the potential contribution of several lift assets that could assist in meeting intratheater lift requirements. Specifically, the ILA did not include (1) the potential contribution of host nation-provided tactical wheeled vehicles, (2) the ability of the C-5s currently in the inventory and the planned fleet of 120 C-17s to meet outsize intratheater airlift requirements as needed, and (3) the potential for Army watercraft to supplant tactical wheeled vehicle requirements. As a result, the study’s requirements and solutions may be overstated.
subsections: section_title: Host Nation Support Can Significantly Contribute to Intratheater Lift
paragraphs: Host nation support (HNS) is the civil or military assistance provided by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between the nations. In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, HNS included commercial cargo line haulers, fuel tankers, personnel transporters, and HETS. Of the 1,404 HETS used in the Persian Gulf conflict, 333 were provided by Saudi Arabia. DOD reported that support from host and other nations during the conflict was critical and that it gave the United States the flexibility to deploy substantial amounts of combat power early in the contingency—when the risks were the greatest—while reducing the amount of tactical wheeled vehicles that needed to be deployed from the United States.
The 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update, based on the same TACWAR battle as the ILA, assumed that HNS in Southwest Asia and Korea would include commercial cargo line haulers, fuel tankers, and HETS. However, the potential HNS tactical wheeled vehicle contribution to intratheater lift was not modeled in the ILA. Thus, ILA assumptions are inconsistent with the assumptions made in the updated 1995 Mobility Requirements Study. According to the ILA, HNS was not modeled because of a lack of signed agreements with some of the host nations. In addition, theater commanders wanted the ILA to model a worst case scenario without any HNS offsetting U.S. force structure. The ILA, however, notes repeatedly that HNS has the potential to reduce some of the reported lift shortfalls in several categories of tactical wheeled vehicles. HNS would also limit the amount of equipment required to be moved into the theater. Because it did not reflect HNS, the ILA depicted the worst case scenario as the only scenario for intratheater lift.
The theater commanders’ operation plans portray HNS as very important, if not critical, to the successful outcome of wars in Southwest Asia and Korea. Even the lack of formal HNS agreements in Southwest Asia does not limit the operation plans’ expectations of substantial HNS. The Southwest Asia operation plans assume that HNS will be available in either the amounts received during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm or in amounts negotiated and approved bilaterally between the host nations and the United States. The plans note that outsourcing logistical requirements within the theater of operations may completely preclude the need to deploy some logistical assets or units from the United States. The operation plans for a war in Korea state that U.S. Pacific Command forces can expect to receive significant wartime HNS from the Republic of Korea. The United States negotiated a wartime HNS agreement with the Republic of Korea in 1991. Cargo transportation was one of the components of this agreement, which also included medical, bulk fuel transport, maintenance, engineering, and ammunition support.
The key factors in making HNS successful are availability of the right numbers of assets when and where they would be needed and the commitment of host nation drivers and other equipment operators to perform their assigned missions. Members of the defense community, including the military services, theater commanders, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, are debating the extent to which HNS should offset U.S. force requirements. This debate is not likely to be resolved in the near future.
section_title: Intertheater Airlifters Can Help Meet Outsize Intratheater Requirements
paragraphs: The current intertheater airlift fleet includes the C-5 and C-17, which are capable of carrying outsize cargo. The C-5 Galaxy is the Air Mobility Command’s largest intertheater airlifter, with the capacity to carry 89 tons of cargo and 36 pallets, and the smaller C-17 is capable of carrying 65 tons of cargo and 18 pallets. Although the C-5 and C-17 are intertheater lift assets, they can also be used for intratheater lift if warranted, assuming that airfields can accommodate them. However, the ILA did not model the potential contribution of the C-5 and considered the planned 120 C-17s as an offset to the C-130 fleet only in Southwest Asia. Use of the existing airlift fleet for intratheater missions as needed could increase flexibility and decrease the need to procure additional outsize airlift capability. Although the C-5 and C-17 are primarily intertheater airlifters, the ability to divert them for intratheater missions is recognized in Air Force operational documents.
The Air Force has highlighted the C-17’s ability to deliver outsize cargo to small, austere airfields as a key factor in its dual role as an intertheater and intratheater airlifter. Small, austere airfields usually have a short runway and are limited in one or a combination of the following factors: taxiway systems, ramp space, security, materiel handling equipment, aircraft servicing, navigation aids, weather observing sensors, and communications. If delivering outsize cargo to small, austere airfields is necessary, the C-17 would likely be needed. However, if the airfields could accommodate the C-5, it could accomplish the mission. For example, the C-5 can quickly facilitate unit relocations. A Patriot battalion requires only 9 C-5 sorties compared with 15 sorties for the C-17.
Of the 67 airfields in the ILA, 46 have been surveyed by the Air Mobility Command and are listed in its Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report. Analysis of the 46 airfields common to the ILA and the Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report showed that 34 airfields, or 74 percent, are suitable for all types of airlifters, including the C-5. In Korea, the C-5 can use 70 percent of the airfields, and in Southwest Asia, the C-5 can use 77 percent of the airfields. Further, the number of airfields available to the C-5 would likely be higher during a contingency, since other airfields that have not been surveyed would be available at that time.
section_title: Potential Contribution of Army Watercraft Was Not Determined
paragraphs: Due to their cargo capacity and demonstrated multiple mission capability, Army watercraft could be used for intratheater transportation and could reduce the need for reliance on rail, tactical wheeled vehicles, and HNS. However, the ILA did not identify a requirement for Army watercraft and deferred a recommendation on these assets pending a planned study by the Logistics Management Institute. That study, issued in November 1996 (4 months after the ILA), found uncertainty among planners at the theater commands about the capability and availability of watercraft for intratheater operations. The Army has developed a long-range fleet management plan that includes an acquisition strategy to procure more watercraft, but the role and capability of watercraft to help meet intratheater requirements have not been addressed at the joint level.
At the end of fiscal year 1997, the Army had 245 watercraft in its fleet, according to an Army official. Some of these watercraft, such as the Logistics Support Vessel and the Landing Craft, Utility-2000 (LCU-2000), provide intratheater movement of equipment, cargo, and combat vehicles and transport cargo from ship to shore. The Logistics Support Vessel can self-deploy anywhere in the world to provide intratheater transport of large quantities of cargo, tracked and wheeled vehicles, and equipment. These vessels provided intratheater transport during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The LCU-2000 can perform tactical resupply missions to remote or underdeveloped coastlines and inland waterways. During Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, this vessel transported about 38,548 tons of equipment and supplies to fishing villages that had small piers or ramps.
Army watercraft employment is phased to meet the theater commanders’ requirements to offload combat and support forces during major regional contingencies. During the first 3 weeks of a conflict, Army watercraft operations would focus on port operations and offloading combat and support equipment from prepositioned ships and large strategic sealift ships. After the first 3 weeks, watercraft would continue port operations and begin to transition to sustainment operations, which include establishing intracoastal main supply routes and transporting equipment and cargo to forward areas in the theater. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, for example, watercraft delivered main battle tanks, ammunition, and other cargo to several locations on the Persian Gulf coast. Thus, although the port operations are the key mission for Army watercraft during the first part of a contingency, watercraft can contribute significantly to intratheater lift missions during later phases.
In several cases, the ILA demonstrated how Army watercraft could be used to offset reliance on rail, tactical wheeled vehicles, and HNS by repositioning forces in the theater of operations and moving tanks prepositioned on land to tactical assembly areas. However, the ILA did not recommend that these potential offsets be implemented, and the contribution of watercraft to intratheater lift was not reflected in the ILA’s recommendations for tactical wheeled vehicles as part of a tradeoff analysis.
The Logistics Management Institute study evaluated the role of watercraft for logistics-over-the-shore and intracoastal main supply route operations in the Korea and Southwest Asia scenarios. The study did not establish an intracoastal transportation requirement, however, because of a lack of data from theater commanders regarding the types and amounts of cargo and equipment that could be transported on watercraft. The study recommended that the Joint Staff provide theater command planners the analytical tools to match intratheater lift requirements with intracoastal transportation capability.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Because several potentially significant contributions to intratheater lift were not thoroughly considered in the study, the requirements in the ILA may be overstated. Given the experience of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the inclusion of HNS in the theater commanders’ operation plans, and the fact that the 1995 Mobility Requirements Study update assumed HNS would be available, it is unreasonable to exclude HNS from the analysis. A more flexible mobility study that reflected requirements with and without HNS would better assist decisionmakers in determining the effects of HNS on U.S. mobility requirements. U.S. Central Command officials agree, acknowledging that requirements stated with and without HNS would have added flexibility to the ILA. In addition, the C-5s and the planned fleet of C-17s could be considered as needed if an outsize intratheater airlift requirement is identified. Use of these airlifters would ensure that the potential contributions of DOD’s current assets are fully taken into account. Finally, Army watercraft has the potential to reduce reliance on tactical wheeled vehicles and HNS, but a requirement for these assets that reflects their intratheater role has yet to be defined. The potential contributions of tactical wheeled vehicle HNS, the current outsize-capable airlift fleet, and Army watercraft to meeting intratheater lift requirements warrant incorporation into the 1999 ILA update.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the 1999 updated ILA (1) consider HNS as a means of accomplishing intratheater lift and ensure that HNS assumptions are consistent with those in intertheater lift studies; (2) include the potential contribution of the C-5 airlifter and planned fleet of 120 C-17s; and (3) reflect the role, capability, and requirements for Army watercraft in an intratheater role, including an analysis of the extent to which these assets can alleviate identified shortfalls in tactical wheeled vehicles.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: DOD concurred with our recommendations and added that, as the potential intratheater role of the C-17 and C-5 are investigated, an analysis should be done to assess the impact on the warfight of taking these assets out of the intertheater airlift flow. We agree that such an analysis would be an important part of future studies that consider the use of these airlifters in an intratheater role.
section_title: Opportunities Exist to Improve Study’s Value as a Decision-Making Tool
paragraphs: Intratheater lift requirements depend on the course of the battle and theater infrastructure and thus are difficult to quantify. However, because the ILA requirements and solutions were stated as absolute numbers rather than ranges, the study does not reflect the dynamic and often unpredictable nature of intratheater lift requirements. In addition, the ILA did not include a cost-effectiveness analysis to assess tradeoffs between various lift alternatives. Such an assessment would provide decisionmakers with information needed to make investment decisions in a sensitive budget environment.
subsections: section_title: Lift Requirements Were Not Stated as Ranges
paragraphs: The 1995 updated Mobility Requirements Study determined lift requirements through an iterative modeling process that examined various war-fighting and mobility schemes. However, the ILA did not use an iterative modeling process to determine requirements, which precluded the ILA from stating lift asset requirements and solutions as ranges. Rather, the ILA stated the requirements and solutions as absolute numbers. Given the dependence of intratheater lift requirements on the course of the battle and the theater infrastructure, requirements stated as ranges would provide a more accurate depiction of the dynamic intratheater situation. It would also allow decisionmakers the flexibility to determine the type and quantity of lift assets needed to meet requirements while accounting for such factors as potential enemy actions to disrupt airfields and seaports, chemical or biological warfare, weather, HNS, and various threat scenarios.
DOD’s 1988 Worldwide Intratheater Mobility Study noted that intratheater mobility requirement statements are extremely dependent on the theater concept of operations. The study recommended that all intratheater mobility requirements be expressed as ranges when possible and that those requirements not expressed as ranges be understood as approximations. The 1996 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Mobility noted that the deployment phase most subject to disruption by the adversary is the intratheater movement of troops and equipment to their final destinations.
DOD officials said that the ILA could not express requirements as ranges because SUMMITS would have had to be rerun with a different input requirement. The officials told us that only one concept of operations was available—the TACWAR battle established for the 1995 updated Mobility Requirements Study. They stated that expressing the ILA requirements as ranges could have required amending the TACWAR battle timelines after the 1995 study had been completed and that this option was not seriously considered. The officials said, however, that SUMMITS and TACWAR are capable of interacting and that iterations can be modeled.
section_title: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Is Needed to Assess Tradeoffs Between Lift Assets
paragraphs: The 1995 updated Mobility Requirements Study, which is the basis for DOD’s procurement strategy for intertheater lift assets, included a cost-effectiveness analysis that assessed tradeoffs between various intertheater lift assets. The study developed a set of options consisting of possible additions to current airlift, sealift, and afloat prepositioning programs. Life-cycle cost estimates were developed for each option, and cost was a factor in the analysis leading to the final recommendations. However, a cost-effectiveness analysis that examined tradeoffs between the assets was not done to support the ILA recommendations. According to Joint Staff officials, limited tradeoff assessments were discussed as part of the ILA, but these assessments did not include cost and were not documented.
The ILA states that the study’s workloads for the 34- and 22.5-ton line haulers can be met by other means, such as excess HETS or PLS. However, tradeoff assessments were not made to determine whether these alternatives would be cost-effective uses of the HETS or PLS. The ILA identified a requirement for fewer HETS and PLS than the Army’s acquisition objectives for fiscal year 2003, but the study did not recommend that the Army procure fewer of these expensive assets. As of January 1996, each HETS cost $414,000 compared with $118,000 for the 34-ton line hauler, according to the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Requirements Management Office’s Catalog of U.S. Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicles. Army officials noted that the HETS would provide excess capacity in a line-haul role. In addition, even though a PLS company can carry 17 percent more cargo, it costs almost twice as much as the 22.5-ton line hauler. A PLS company costs $18.8 million (1996 dollars) compared with $9.5 million (1996 dollars) for a company of 22.5-ton line haulers, according to an analysis performed by the Requirements Management Office. DOD officials noted, however, that the PLS can self-load and unload containers, thereby requiring fewer personnel than the 22.5-ton line hauler.
In addition, a cost-effectiveness analysis was not conducted on the ILA’s proposed use of a squadron of 14 C-17s, beyond the planned procurement of 120 aircraft, for intratheater lift. Since the C-130 fleet is more than sufficient to meet requirements, according to the ILA, and outsize airlift capability exists with the planned procurement of C-17s and the current fleet of C-5s, it is important for a recommendation to procure additional C-17s beyond the currently planned 120 aircraft to be based on an analysis that includes cost-effectiveness as a criterion. In addition, a tradeoff assessment has not been conducted to consider the extent to which C-130s could be retired if additional C-17s were procured for intratheater lift.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The value of DOD’s future lift studies as decision-making tools can be strengthened if they state intratheater requirements and solutions as ranges rather than as absolute numbers to reflect the uncertainty associated with predicting lift requirements within the theater of operations. An iterative process resulting in requirements ranges may have shown, for example, that allied forces would not lose key objectives or incur additional casualties under a range of intratheater delivery schemes that required fewer lift assets to accomplish. Since the planned 1999 Mobility Requirements Study and ILA update are expected to be conducted simultaneously, concerns about changing the TACWAR battle by establishing a requirements range should be alleviated. Furthermore, if future mobility studies are to be the basis for the services’ acquisition plans, it would be prudent to determine the appropriate type and number of mobility assets to procure based on a tradeoff analysis of the capability and cost-effectiveness of different options. Tradeoff assessments of the lift alternatives considered in the study would provide decisionmakers the flexibility to take into account competing investment options within a constrained budget. The 1999 updated ILA will provide an opportunity to address these concerns so that decisionmakers can have a more substantive basis on which to determine DOD acquisition strategies.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the 1999 updated determine intratheater requirements and solutions as ranges to reflect their dependence on the combat situation and include a cost-effectiveness assessment of the alternatives considered in the study that examines tradeoffs among the lift assets to reflect capability, cost, and requirements.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: DOD concurred with our recommendation concerning requirements ranges. DOD stated that cost-effectiveness analysis would be accomplished if appropriate and that DOD has in place an acquisition process that considers cost-effectiveness when making programmatic decisions. DOD officials explained that detailed cost-effectiveness analyses would significantly expand the time frame and cost of mobility studies. Our recommendation is directed at system tradeoff analyses that would provide decisionmakers information on the relative costs and capabilities of systems in light of identified requirements. The ILA made programmatic recommendations that included, to an extent, tradeoffs among lift assets. We believe that cost-effectiveness should be a part of a requirements study that makes acquisition recommendations.
section_title: Intratheater Lift Assets
paragraphs: Airlifters, tactical wheeled vehicles, and watercraft are all used for intratheater lift. The following sections provide information these assets.
subsections: section_title: Airlifters
paragraphs: The C-130 Hercules is the Air Force’s primary intratheater airlifter. It can carry 6 pallets and 17 tons of cargo and accommodate 90 passengers. The C-17 Globemaster, being produced by the Boeing Corporation, can carry 18 pallets and 65 tons of cargo and accommodate 102 passengers. The C-5 Galaxy can be loaded with 36 pallets and can carry 89 tons of cargo and 73 passengers. Figures I.1 through I.3 show the C-130, C-17, and C-5 airlifters, respectively.
section_title: Tactical Wheeled Vehicles
paragraphs: The primary mission of the Heavy Equipment Transporter System is to (1) deliver main battle tanks to forward assembly areas fully fueled, armed, and ready for combat and (2) evacuate tanks from the battlefield. The tank’s crew rides in the cab of the system. The Palletized Load System consists of a truck, trailer, and removable cargo beds. It is used by artillery, ordnance, and transportation units to move ammunition to and from transfer points. The 7,500-gallon fuel tanker and the 34-ton line hauler use the same tractor and transport fuel and cargo, respectively, from ports to corps supply points, which are located farthest from the battle front. The 5,000-gallon fuel tanker and the 22.5-ton line hauler also use the same tractor and operate primarily in the division and brigade areas, which are closer to the battle front where roads are generally less developed. Table I.1 shows the number of tactical wheeled vehicles per company.
Figures I.4 through I.6 show the Heavy Equipment Transporter System, the Palletized Load System, and the 34-ton line hauler, respectively.
subsections: section_title: Army Watercraft
paragraphs: The Logistics Support Vessel has the capacity to carry 2,000 tons and accommodate 24 M1 main battle tanks or 25 20-foot containers (50 if they are double-stacked). Each Landing Craft, Utility-2000 has the capacity to carry 350 tons and accommodate 5 M1 main battle tanks or 12 20-foot containers (24 if double-stacked). Figures I.7 through I.9 show the Logistics Support Vessel and the Landing Craft, Utility-2000.
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section_title: Kansas City Field Office
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