Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions Needed to Rebuild Readiness of U.S. Ground Forces
Published: 2008-02-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: U.S. military forces, and ground forces in particular, have operated at a high pace since the attacks of September 11, 2001, including to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Between 2001 and July 2007, approximately 931,000 U.S. Army and Marine Corps servicemembers deployed for overseas military operations, including about 312,000 National Guard or Reserve members. To support ongoing military operations and related activities, Congress has appropriated billions of dollars since 2001, and through September 2007, the Department of Defense (DOD) has reported obligating about $492.2 billion to cover these expenses, of which a large portion are related to readiness. In addition, DOD's annual appropriation, now totaling about $480 billion for fiscal year 2008, includes funds to cover readiness needs. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the readiness implications of DOD's efforts to support ongoing operations; and (2) GAO's prior recommendations related to these issues, including specific actions that GAO believes would enhance DOD's ability to manage and improve readiness. This statement is based on reports and testimonies published from fiscal years 2003 through 2008. GAO's work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While DOD has overcome difficult challenges in maintaining a high pace of operations over the past 6 years and U.S. forces have gained considerable combat experience, our work has shown that extended operations in Iraq and elsewhere have had significant consequences for military readiness, particularly with regard to the Army and Marine Corps. To meet mission requirements specific to Iraq and Afghanistan, the department has taken steps to increase the availability of personnel and equipment for deploying units, and to refocus their training on assigned missions. For example, to maintain force levels in theater, DOD has increased the length of deployments and frequency of mobilizations, but it is unclear whether these adjustments will affect recruiting and retention. The Army and Marine Corps have also transferred equipment from nondeploying units and prepositioned stocks to support deploying units, affecting the availability of items for nondeployed units to meet other demands. In addition, they have refocused training such that units train extensively for counterinsurgency missions, with little time available to train for a fuller range of missions. Finally, DOD has adopted strategies, such as relying more on Navy and Air Force personnel and contractors to perform some tasks formerly handled by Army or Marine Corps personnel. If current operations continue at the present level of intensity, DOD could face difficulty in balancing these commitments with the need to rebuild and maintain readiness. Over the past several years, GAO has reported on a range of issues related to military readiness and made numerous recommendations to enhance DOD's ability to manage and improve readiness. Given the change in the security environment since September 11, 2001, and demands on U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, rebuilding readiness will be a long-term and complex effort. However, GAO believes DOD can take measures that will advance progress in both the short and long terms. A common theme is the need for DOD to take a more strategic decision-making approach to ensure programs and investments are based on plans with measurable goals, validated requirements, prioritized resource needs, and performance measures to gauge progress. Overall, GAO recommended that DOD develop a near-term plan for improving the readiness of ground forces that, among other things, establishes specific goals for improving unit readiness, prioritizes actions needed to achieve those goals, and outlines an investment strategy to clearly link resource needs and funding requests. GAO also made recommendations in several specific readiness-related areas, including that DOD develop equipping strategies to target shortages of items required to equip units preparing for deployment, and DOD adjust its training strategies to include a plan to support full-spectrum training. DOD agreed with some recommendations, but has yet to fully implement them. For others, particularly when GAO recommended that DOD develop more robust plans linked to resources, DOD believed its current efforts were sufficient. GAO continues to believe such plans are needed.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues related to military  readiness in light of the high pace of military operations since the attacks  of September 11, 2001, and, in particular, the significant demand on U.S.  forces to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the last  7 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has supported a wide range of  operations and activities in support of the administration’s strategy to  combat terrorism on a global basis, requiring many units and personnel to  deploy for multiple tours of duty, and in some cases to remain for  extended tours. As a result, the military now has a ground force that has  gained considerable experience and is battle-tested but also stressed by  the current pace of operations. As of July 2007, approximately 931,000 U.S.  Army and Marine Corps servicemembers had deployed for overseas  military operations since 2001, including about 312,000 National Guard or  Reserve members.
In the past several months, DOD’s senior leaders have publicly expressed  concerns about the high demands on U.S. forces and the impact on  military readiness, particularly for ground forces. While testifying last  week that our military is capable of responding to all threats to our vital  national interests, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed  concern about the toll of the current pace of operations. Congress, and  this committee in particular, has also voiced concerns and taken specific  actions to give greater attention to readiness, including establishing a  Defense Material Readiness Board to identify equipment and supply  shortfalls and solutions for addressing them, and requiring DOD to  develop a plan for rebuilding readiness. Further, it has also provided  unprecedented levels of taxpayer money in response to the department’s  funding requests, which have consistently emphasized the need for  resources to maintain readiness. More specifically, to support ongoing  military operations and related activities, Congress has appropriated  hundreds of billions of dollars since 2001, and through September 2007,  DOD has reported obligating about $492.2 billion to cover these expenses.  In addition, DOD also has received its annual appropriation, which totals  about $480 billion for fiscal year 2008.
As you requested, my testimony will focus on the impact of current  operations and the challenges DOD faces in rebuilding readiness,  particularly for ground forces. Specifically, I will address (1) the readiness  implications of DOD’s efforts to support ongoing operations; and 2) GAO’s  prior recommendations related to these issues, including specific actions  we believe would enhance DOD’s ability to manage and improve  readiness.
My statement is based on reports and testimonies published from fiscal  years 2003 through 2008. These reports are listed at the end of this  testimony and include reviews of mobilization policies, DOD’s equipping  and reset strategies, prepositioned equipment, military training, and the  use of contractors, as well as general reports on readiness and Iraq. We  conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Ongoing Operations Have Challenged DOD’s Ability to Sustain Readiness of Ground Forces, Particularly for Nondeployed Forces
paragraphs: To meet the challenges of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,  DOD has taken steps to increase the availability of personnel and  equipment for units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly with  regard to the Army and Marine Corps. Among other things, DOD has  adjusted rotation goals, and employed strategies such as to retrain units to  perform missions other than those they were designed to perform. It has  also transferred equipment from nondeployed units and prepositioned  stocks to support deployed units. The Army and Marine Corps have  refocused training to prepare deploying units for counterinsurgency  missions. DOD has also relied more on Navy and Air Force personnel and  contractors to help perform tasks normally handled by Army or Marine  Corps personnel. Using these measures, DOD has been able to continue to  support ongoing operations, but not without consequences for readiness.  In the short term, ground forces are limited in their ability to train for  other missions and nondeployed forces are experiencing shortages of  resources. The long-term implications of DOD’s actions, such as the  impact of increasing deployment times on recruiting and retention, are  unclear.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Adjusted Policies to Increase Availability of Personnel, but Long-Term Implications Are Unclear
paragraphs: For the past several years, DOD has continually rotated forces in and out  of Iraq and Afghanistan to maintain required force levels. While DOD’s  goals generally call for active component personnel to be deployed for 1 of  every 3 years and reserve component personnel involuntarily mobilized 1  of 6 years, many have been mobilized and deployed more frequently.  Additionally, ongoing operations have created particularly high demand  for certain ranks and occupational specialties. For example, officers and  senior noncommissioned officers are in particularly high demand due to  increased requirements within deployed headquarters organizations and  new requirements for transition teams, which train Iraqi and Afghan  forces. Several support force occupations such as engineering, civil affairs,  transportation, and military police have also been in high demand.
Since September 11, 2001, DOD has made a number of adjustments to its  personnel policies, including those related to length of service obligations,  length of deployments, frequency of reserve component mobilizations, and  the use of volunteers. While these measures have helped to increase the  availability of personnel in the short term, the long-term impacts of many  of these adjustments are uncertain. For example, the Army has  successively increased the length of deployments in Iraq—from 6 to 12 and  eventually to 15 months. Also, the services have, at various times, used  “stop-loss” policies, which prevent personnel from leaving the service, and  DOD has made changes to reserve component mobilization policies. In the  latter case, DOD modified its policy, which had previously limited the  cumulative amount of time that reserve component servicemembers could  be involuntarily called to active duty for the Global War on Terrorism.  Under DOD’s new policy, which went into effect in January 2007, there are  no cumulative limits on these involuntary mobilizations, but DOD has set  goals to limit the mobilizations to 12 months and to have 5 years between  these Global War on Terrorism involuntary mobilizations. DOD has also  stated that in the short term it will not be able to meet its goal for 5 years  between rotations. By making these adjustments, DOD has made  additional personnel available for deployment, thus helping to meet short- term mission requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, it is unclear  whether longer deployments or more frequent involuntary mobilizations  or other adjustments will affect recruiting and retention.
In the near term, the Army and Marine Corps have taken a number of steps  to meet operational requirements and mitigate the stress on their forces.  Such actions include deploying units from branches with lower  operational tempos in place of units from branches with higher  operational tempos after conducting some additional training for the units.  For example, after retraining units, the Army has used active component  field artillery units for convoy escort, security, and gun truck missions and  has used active and reserve component quartermaster units to provide  long-haul bulk fuel support in Iraq.
section_title: Equipment Shortages Affect Availability of Items for Nondeployed Units
paragraphs: As we have reported, ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan  combined with harsh combat and environmental conditions are inflicting  heavy wear and tear on equipment items that, in some cases, are more  than 20 years old. In response to the sustained operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan, the Army and Marine Corps developed programs to reset  (repair or replace) equipment to return damaged equipment to combat- ready status for current and future operations. We also have reported that  while the Army and Marine Corps continue to meet mission requirements  and report high readiness rates for deployed units, nondeployed units have  reported a decrease in reported readiness rates, in part due to equipment  shortages. Some units preparing for deployment have reported shortages  of equipment on hand as well as specific equipment item shortfalls that  affect their ability to carry out their missions. The Army Chief of Staff has  testified that the Army has had to take equipment from nondeployed units  in order to provide it to deployed units. The Marine Corps has also made  trade-offs between preparing units to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan and  other unit training. In addition, the Army National Guard and Army  Reserve have transferred large quantities of equipment to deploying units,  which has contributed to equipment shortages in nondeployed units. As a  result, state officials have expressed concerns about their National  Guard’s equipment that would be used for domestic requirements.
section_title: Services Have Adjusted Training to Focus Primarily on Counterinsurgency Tasks
paragraphs: To meet current mission requirements, the services, especially the Army  and the Marine Corps, have focused unit training on counterinsurgency  tasks. Given limitations in training time, and the current focus on  preparing for upcoming, scheduled deployments, nondeployed troops are  spending less training time on their core tasks than in the past. Our  analysis of Army unit training plans and discussions with training officials  indicate that unit commanders’ training plans have focused solely on  preparing for their unit’s assigned mission instead of moving progressively  from preparing for core missions to training for full-spectrum operations.  Since February 2004, all combat training rotations conducted at the Army’s  National Training Center have been mission rehearsal exercises to prepare  units for deployments, primarily to Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, units  are not necessarily developing and maintaining the skills for a fuller range  of missions. For instance, units do not receive full-spectrum operations  training such as combined arms maneuver and high-intensity combat. In  addition, the Army has changed the location of some training. According  to Army officials, the National Training Center has provided home station  mission rehearsal exercises at three Army installations, but these  exercises were less robust and on a smaller scale than those conducted at  the center. Army leaders have noted that the limited time between  deployments has prevented their units from completing the full-spectrum  training that the units were designed and organized to perform. The Chief  of Staff of the Army recently stated that units need 18 months between  deployments to be able to conduct their entire full-spectrum mission  training. While the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed  concerns about the impact of the current operational tempo on full- spectrum training during his testimony last week, he also noted that the  military is capable of responding to all threats to our vital national  interests.
section_title: Offloading of Prepositioned Equipment Could Affect DOD’s Ability to Meet Other Demands
paragraphs: The Army’s decision to remove equipment from its prepositioned ships  impacts its ability to fill equipment shortages in nondeployed units and  could impact DOD’s ability to meet other demands if new demands were  to cause requirements to rise above current levels to new peaks. The  Army’s decision to accelerate the creation of two additional brigade  combat teams by removing equipment from prepositioned ships in  December 2006 helps the Army to move toward its deployment rotation  goals. However, the lack of prepositioned equipment means that deploying  units will either have to deploy with their own equipment or wait for other  equipment to be assembled and transported to their deployment location.  Either of these options could slow deployment response times.
The most recent DOD end-to-end mobility analysis found that the mobility  system could continue to sustain the current (post 9/11) tempo of  operations with acceptable risk. The study found that when fully mobilized  and augmented by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and the Voluntary  Intermodal Sealift Agreement ships, the United States has sufficient  capability to support national objectives during a peak demand period  with acceptable risk. The study highlighted the need for DOD to continue  actions to reset and reconstitute prepositioned assets. However, some  prepositioned stocks have been depleted. Since portions of the Army’s  prepositioned equipment are no longer available, transportation  requirements may increase and risk levels may increase, which could  increase timelines for delivery of personnel and equipment.
section_title: DOD Is Also Relying on Other Services to Help Accomplish Some Missions Typically Handled by Ground Forces
paragraphs: Shortly after September 11, 2001, the Army’s pace of operations was  relatively low, and it was generally able to meet combatant commander  requirements with its cadre of active duty and reserve component  personnel. For example, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the  President, through the Secretary of Defense and the state governors, used  Army National Guard forces to fill security roles both at Air Force bases  and domestic civilian airports. Today, with the Army no longer able to  meet the deployment rotation goals for its active and National Guard and  Reserve forces due to the pace of overseas operations, DOD is increasingly  turning to the Navy and the Air Force to help meet requirements for skills  typically performed by ground forces.
The Navy and Air Force are filling many of these traditional Army ground  force requirements with personnel who possess similar skills to the Army  personnel they are replacing. According to Air Force and Navy testimony  before this committee in July 2007, some examples of the personnel with  similar skills included engineers, security forces, chaplains, and public  affairs, intelligence, medical, communications, logistics, and explosive  ordnance disposal personnel. The Navy and Air Force are also  contributing personnel to meet emerging requirements for transition teams  to train Iraqi and Afghan forces. Regardless of whether they are filling new  requirements or just operating in a different environment with familiar sets  of skills, Navy and Air Force personnel undergo additional training prior to  deploying for these nontraditional assignments. While we have not verified  the numbers, according to the July 2007 testimonies, the Air Force and  Navy deployments in support of nontraditional missions had grown  significantly since 2004 and at the time of the testimonies the Air Force  reported that it had approximately 6,000 personnel filling nontraditional  positions in the Central Command area of responsibility, while the Navy  reported that it had over 10,000 augmentees making significant  contributions to the Global War on Terror. Finally, the Air Force testimony  noted that many personnel who deployed for these nontraditional  missions came from stressed career fields—security force, transportation,  air traffic control, civil engineering, and explosive ordnance disposal—that  were not meeting DOD’s active force goal of limiting deployments to 1 in  every 3 years.
section_title: DOD’s Reliance on Contractors Has Reached Unprecedented Levels
paragraphs: The U.S. military has long used contractors to provide supplies and  services to deployed U.S. forces; however, the scale of contractor support  in Iraq is far greater than in previous military operations, such as  Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and in the Balkans. Moreover,  DOD’s reliance on contractors continues to grow. In December 2006, the  Army estimated that almost 60,000 contractor employees supported  ongoing military operations in Southwest Asia. In October 2007, DOD  estimated the number of DOD contractors in Iraq to be about 129,000. By  way of contrast, an estimated 9,200 contractor personnel supported  military operations in the 1991 Gulf War. In Iraq, contractors provide  deployed U.S. forces with an almost endless array of services and support,  including communication services; interpreters who accompany military  patrols; base operations support (e.g., food and housing); maintenance  services for both weapon systems and tactical and nontactical vehicles;  intelligence analysis; warehouse and supply operations; and security  services to protect installations, convoys, and DOD personnel. Factors that  have contributed to this increase include reductions in the size of the  military, an increase in the number of operations and missions  undertaken, a lack of organic military capabilities, and DOD’s use of  increasingly sophisticated weapons systems.
DOD has long recognized that contractors are necessary to successfully  meet current and future requirements. In 1990, DOD issued guidance that  requires DOD components to determine which contracts provide essential  services and gives commanders three options if they cannot obtain  reasonable assurance of continuation of essential services by a contractor:  they can obtain military, DOD civilian, or host-nation personnel to perform  services; they can prepare a contingency plan for obtaining essential  services; or they can accept the risk attendant with a disruption of services  during a crisis situation. While our 2003 report found that DOD has not  taken steps to implement the 1990 guidance, DOD officials informed us  that DOD has awarded a contract to deploy planners to the combatant  commands. According to the DOD officials, the planners will focus on the  contractor support portions of the operational plans, including  requirements for contractor services. In addition, the planners will  streamline the process through which the combatant commander can  request requirements definition, contingency contracting, or program  management support. DOD officials report that, as of February 7, 2008,  eight planners have been deployed. Without firm contingency plans in  place or a clear understanding of the potential consequences of not having  the essential service available, the risks associated with meeting future  requirements increase.
section_title: Actions Based on Transparency, Sound Plans, and Measurable Outcomes Are Needed to Guide DOD’s Efforts to Rebuild Readiness of Ground Forces
paragraphs: Given the change in the security environment since September 11, 2001,  and related increases in demands on our military forces as well as the  ongoing high level of commitment to ongoing operations, rebuilding  readiness of U.S. ground forces is a long-term prospect. In addition, the  department faces competing demands for resources given other broad- based initiatives to grow, modernize, and transform its forces, and  therefore will need to carefully validate needs and assess trade-offs. While  there are no quick fixes to these issues, we believe the department has  measures it can take that will advance progress in both the short and long  terms. Over the past several years, we have reported and testified on a  range of issues related to military readiness and made multiple  recommendations aimed at enhancing DOD’s ability to manage and  improve military readiness.
subsections: section_title: To Rebuild Readiness While Modernizing and Transforming Force Capabilities, DOD’s Plans Require a Substantial Commitment of Resources
paragraphs: DOD faces significant challenges in rebuilding readiness while it remains  engaged in ongoing operations. At the same time, it has undertaken  initiatives to increase the size of U.S. ground forces, and modernize and  transform force capabilities, particularly in the Army. Although the cost to  rebuild the U.S. ground forces is uncertain, it will likely require billions of  dollars and take years to complete. For example, once operations end, the  Army has estimated it will take $12 billion to $13 billion a year for at least  2 years to repair, replace, and rebuild its equipment used for operations in  Iraq. Similarly, the Marine Corps has estimated it will cost about $2 billion  to $3 billion to reset its equipment. Furthermore, current plans to grow,  modernize, and transform the force will require hundreds of billions of  dollars for the foreseeable future. Although the Army estimated in 2004  that it could largely equip and staff modular units by spending $52.5 billion  through fiscal year 2011, the Army now believes it will require additional  funding through fiscal year 2017 to fully equip its units. In addition, we  found that the Army’s $70 billion funding plan to increase its end strength  by over 74,200 lacks transparency and may be understated because some  costs were excluded and some factors are still evolving that could  potentially affect this funding plan. We have also reported that the costs of  the Army’s Future Combat System are likely to grow. While the Army has  only slightly changed its cost estimate of $160.7 billion since last year,  independent cost estimates put costs at between $203 billion and nearly  $234 billion. While our testimony today is focused on the readiness of the  Army and Marine Corps, we recognize that DOD is continuing to deal with  determining the requirements, size, and readiness of the Air Force and  Navy and that Congress is engaged with that debate. The Air Force for  example, is dealing with balancing the requirements and funding for  strategic and intratheater lift as well as its needs for aerial refueling  aircraft, tactical aircraft, and a new bomber fleet. The Navy is also  reviewing its requirements and plans to modernize its fleet. Meeting these  requirements will involve both new acquisitions as well upgrades to  existing fleets, which will cost billions of dollars.
section_title: Recommended Actions to Improve Strategic Decision Making and Address Specific Readiness Concerns
paragraphs: A common theme in our work has been the need for DOD to take a more  strategic approach to decision making that promotes transparency and  ensures that programs and investments are based on sound plans with  measurable goals, validated requirements, prioritized resource needs, and  performance measures to gauge progress against the established goals.  Due to the magnitude of current operational commitments and the  readiness concerns related to the ground forces, we believe decision  makers need to take a strategic approach in assessing current conditions  and determining how best to rebuild the readiness of the Army and Marine  Corps. As a result, in July 2007, we recommended that DOD develop near- term plans for improving the readiness of its active and reserve  component ground forces, and specify the number of ground force units  they plan to maintain at specific levels of readiness as well as the time  frames for achieving these goals. Because significant resources will be  needed to provide the personnel, equipment, and training necessary to  restore and maintain readiness, and because DOD is competing for  resources in an increasingly fiscally constrained environment, we also  recommended that the plans contain specific investment priorities,  prioritized actions that the services believe are needed to achieve the  plans’ readiness goals and time frames, and measures to gauge progress in  improving force readiness. Such plans would be helpful to guide decision  makers in considering difficult trade-offs when determining funding needs  and making resource decisions.
We have also recommended that DOD and the services take specific  actions in a number of areas I have discussed today. These  recommendations are contained in the products listed at the end of my  statement. In summary    The services need to collect and maintain comprehensive data on the  various strategies they use to meet personnel and unit requirements for  ongoing operations and determine the impact of these strategies on the  nondeployed force.
The Army needs to develop planning and funding estimates for staffing  and equipping the modular force as well as assess its modular force.
The Army needs to provide to Congress transparent information on its  plan to increase the force size, including data on the force structure to be  created by this initiative, implementation timelines, cost estimates, and a  funding plan.
DOD needs to identify mission essential services provided by contractors  and include them in planning, and also develop doctrine to help the  services manage contractors supporting deployed forces.
The Army needs to revise and adjust its training strategy to include a plan  to support full-spectrum training during extended operations, and clarify  the capacity needed to support the modular force.
DOD must develop a strategy and plans for managing near-term risks and  management challenges related to its prepositioning programs.
DOD must improve its methodology for analyzing mobility capabilities  requirements to include development of models and data, an explanation  of the impact of limitations on study results, and metrics in determining  capabilities.
DOD agreed with some recommendations, but has yet to fully implement  them. For others, particularly when we recommended that DOD develop  more robust plans linked to resources, DOD believed its current efforts  were sufficient. We continue to believe such plans are needed.
Given the challenges facing the department, we believe these actions will  enhance DOD’s ability to validate requirements, develop plans and funding  needs, identify investment priorities and trade-offs, and ultimately to  embark on a sustainable path to rebuild readiness and move forward with  plans to modernize and transform force capabilities. In the absence of a  strategic approach based on sound plans and measurable outcomes,  neither Congress nor the department can be assured that it will have the  information it needs to make informed investment decisions and to ensure  that it is maximizing the use of taxpayer dollars in both the short and long  terms.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my  statement. I would be pleased to respond to any question you or other  Members of the Committee or Subcommittee may have.
For questions regarding this testimony, please call Sharon L. Pickup at  (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and Other  Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Oversight and Management of  Contractors in Future Operations. GAO-08-436T. Washington, D.C.:  January 24, 2008.
Force Structure: Need for Greater Transparency for the Army’s Grow the  Force Initiative Funding Plan. GAO-08-354R. Washington, D.C.: January  18, 2008.
Force Structure: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Oversee the  Army’s Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve  Accountability for Results. GAO-08-145. Washington, D.C.: December 14,  2007.
Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps Cannot Be Assured That  Equipment Reset Strategies Will Sustain Equipment Availability While  Meeting Ongoing Operational Requirements. GAO-07-814. Washington,  D.C.: September 19, 2007.
Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army’s  Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address Implementation  Challenges. GAO-07-936. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2007.
Military Personnel: DOD Lacks Reliable Personnel Tempo Data and  Needs Quality Controls to Improve Data Accuracy. GAO-07-780.  Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future Combat  System. GAO-07-376. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Defense Logistics: Improved Oversight and Increased Coordination  Needed to Ensure Viability of the Army’s Prepositioning Strategy. GAO- 07-144. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2007.
Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Army’s  Implementation of Its Equipment Reset Strategies. GAO-07-439T.  Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2007.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic  Equipment Requirements and Readiness. GAO-07-60. Washington, D.C.:  January 26, 2007.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for  Congressional Oversight. GAO-07-308SP. Washington, D.C.: January 9,  2007.
Defense Transportation: Study Limitations Raise Questions about the  Adequacy and Completeness of the Mobility Capabilities Study and  Report. GAO-06-938. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2006.
Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on Equipment Reset  Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps. GAO-06-604T.  Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Defense Logistics: Better Management and Oversight of Prepositioning  Programs Needed to Reduce Risk and Improve Future Programs. GAO- 05-427. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force  Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues. GAO- 04-1031. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2004.
Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed  Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD’s Plans. GAO-03-695.  Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003.
Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of  Mobilizations for Reserve Forces. GAO-03-921. Washington, D.C.: August  21, 2003.
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