Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for New Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development
Published: 2007-04-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: As operations overseas continue, the Department of Defense (DOD) is experiencing a growing demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide valuable information in support of military operations. While the 2006 Quadrennial Review emphasized the need for the ISR community to improve the integration and management of ISR assets, DOD plans to make significant investments in ISR capabilities for the future. Congress has been interested in DOD's approach for managing and integrating existing assets while acquiring new systems. This testimony addresses preliminary observations based on GAO's ongoing work regarding (1) the status of DOD initiatives intended to improve the management and integration of ISR requirements and challenges DOD faces in implementing its initiatives, (2) DOD's approach to managing current ISR assets to support military operations, and (3) the status of selected ISR programs in development and the potential for synergies between them. GAO's ongoing work included document review, interviews with officials at relevant organizations, observations of some U.S. Central Command operations, and review of 12 airborne ISR development programs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD's first steps to formulate a strategy for improving the integration of future ISR requirements include developing an ISR Integration Roadmap and designating ISR as a test case for its joint capability portfolio management concept. DOD developed an ISR Roadmap that assessed current and planned ISR capabilities. Our preliminary work, however, has shown that the Roadmap does not (1) identify future requirements, (2) identify funding priorities, or (3) measure progress. DOD's second initiative to improve the integration of the services' ISR programs is assigning management of ISR issues as a test case of its joint capability portfolio management concept. The intent of the test case is to explore whether managing groups of ISR capabilities across DOD will enable interoperability of future capabilities and reduce redundancies and gaps. Although in its early stages, GAO identified challenges, such as the extent to which the services will adopt suggestions from portfolio managers. DOD's approach to managing its current ISR assets limits its ability to optimize its use of these assets. U. S. Strategic Command is charged with making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how best to allocate to combatant commanders theater-level assets used to support operational requirements. While it has visibility into the major ISR programs supporting theater-level requirements, it does not currently have visibility into all ISR assets. Also, the commander responsible for ongoing joint air operations does not currently have visibility over how tactical assets are being tasked. Nor do tactical units have visibility into how theater-level and ISR assets embedded in other units are being tasked. Further, DOD lacks metrics and feedback to evaluate its ISR missions. Without better visibility and performance evaluation, DOD does not have all the information it needs to validate the demand for ISR assets, to ensure it is maximizing the use of existing assets, and to acquire new systems that best support warfighting needs. Opportunities exist for different services to collaborate on the development of similar weapon systems as a means for creating a more efficient and affordable way of providing new capabilities to the warfighter. We have identified development programs where program managers and services are working together to gain these efficiencies and where less collaborative efforts could lead to more costly stovepiped solutions. Additionally, most of the 12 airborne ISR development programs that we reviewed had either cost growth or schedule delays. These problems resulted from not following a knowledge-based approach to weapon system development as provided for in Defense policy. In some cases, delay in delivering new systems to the warfighter led to unplanned investments to keep legacy systems relevant.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We appreciate the opportunity to discuss GAO’s work for this  Subcommittee on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) management and  acquisition of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets,  including unmanned aircraft systems. As you know, intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities are central to ongoing  military operations. Effective ISR can provide early warning of enemy  threats and precision targeting, as well as enable U.S. military forces to  increase effectiveness, coordination, and lethality. Battlefield commanders  rank the need for ISR systems and the information they produce as high on  their priority lists, a fact that is reflected in DOD’s planned investment in  ISR. The demand for ISR assets at every level of command is growing, and  DOD is making investments in a number of ISR systems, including  unmanned aircraft systems, manned platforms, and space-borne, maritime,  and terrestrial systems. Although the United States has significant ISR  capabilities, their effectiveness has been hampered by gaps in capabilities,  growing competition for assets, unavailability when needed, and systems  that do not fully complement one another. The 2001 and 2006 Quadrennial  Defense Reviews emphasized the increasingly important role intelligence  capabilities—including manned and unmanned airborne and space  capabilities—play in supporting military operations and acknowledged  that the ISR community as a whole must move toward a collaborative  enterprise to achieve more responsive support for civilian decision makers  and commanders engaged in planning and executing operations. The 2006  Quadrennial Defense Review also called for a shift from military service- focused acquisition systems and concepts of operation to a more joint  approach to acquiring and employing defense assets.  Further, as GAO has  emphasized, resources for investments in ISR capabilities are likely to be  constrained by the fiscal challenges of the federal budget.
Since we testified before this Subcommittee last year on one component  of DOD’s ISR enterprise—unmanned aircraft systems—demand for ISR  support has continued to grow, and DOD is planning to invest in new  systems with expanded and new capabilities. Meanwhile, growing out of  the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review’s recommendations, DOD has  undertaken a number of studies designed to determine future ISR  requirements and established a new organization to help integrate current  assets to improve its processes for supporting combat operations. In  addition, DOD has updated its ISR Integration Roadmap. Today, you asked  us to discuss our preliminary observations on DOD’s management of ISR  requirements, distribution of current assets, and planned acquisitions  based on ongoing work we are conducting for this Subcommittee.
Specifically, we will highlight (1) the status of DOD initiatives aimed at  improving the management and integration of ISR requirements and  challenges the department faces in implementing the initiatives, (2) DOD’s  approach to managing current ISR assets to support military operations,  and (3) the status of selected ISR programs in development and the  potential for synergies between them. We will be continuing our work on  the management of ISR requirements, the support of ISR assets for combat  operations, and the acquisition of ISR capabilities, and we plan to issue  reports based on this work later this year.
To understand the status of initiatives within DOD to improve the  management and integration of ISR requirements, we analyzed DOD’s ISR  Integration Roadmap and updates. We also reviewed documentation on  ISR requirements generation and validation that we obtained from DOD’s  Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System as well as previous  studies related to DOD’s management of ISR assets. In addition, we  discussed DOD’s ISR capabilities management initiatives and challenges  with senior officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence; the Joint Staff; the Battlespace Awareness Functional  Capabilities Board; the National Security Space Office; the Air Force; the  Army; the Navy; the U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Functional  Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance;  the U.S. Central Command; the U.S. Special Operations Command; and the  Defense Intelligence Agency.
To assess the effectiveness of DOD’s approach to managing current ISR  assets in support of ongoing combat operations, we interviewed officials  and reviewed documentation from the Unmanned Aircraft Systems  Planning Task Force within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Joint Staff; each of the  military services; U.S. Central Command and associated Army and Air  Force component commands; the Joint Functional Component Command  for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; and other  organizations. We also reviewed documentation and interviewed officials  at U.S. Central Command, Central Command Air Forces, and the  Combined Air Operations Center to better understand how ISR assets are  assigned to specific missions.  To understand how requests for ISR  support are generated and satisfied at the tactical level, we spoke with  units who recently returned from, or are currently supporting, ongoing  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as units within the services such  as the Marine Corps’ Tactical Fusion Center that are involved in  determining if tactical assets are available to satisfy those requests or if  the requests need to be forwarded for theater-level support.  To  understand DOD’s ongoing efforts to study its process for tasking ISR  assets, we reviewed documentation and interviewed an official from the  Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board.     Additionally, we discussed the use of unmanned aircraft systems in  military operations with U.S. Central Command officials and units who  recently returned or are currently supporting operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan.
To assess the status of selected ISR programs and the potential for  synergies between them, we obtained and analyzed programmatic and  budget documents for each of the systems we reviewed. We also discussed  the status of each program with officials at the program office level and  with officials from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition, we  discussed the potential for synergies among programs with officials from  the Joint Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
We conducted our ongoing work from June 2006 to April 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The term “intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,” or “ISR,”  encompasses multiple activities related to the planning and operation of  sensors and assets that collect, process, and disseminate data in support  of current and future military operations. Intelligence data can take many  forms, including optical, radar, or infrared images or electronic signals.  This data can come from a variety of sources, including surveillance and  reconnaissance systems ranging from satellites, to manned aircraft like the  U-2, unmanned aircraft systems like the Air Force’s Global Hawk and  Predator and the Army’s Hunter, to other ground, air, sea, or space-based  equipment, to human intelligence teams. DOD ISR activities support the  missions of the Department of Defense and the Director of National  Intelligence, as well as the missions of other government agencies. ISR  activities directly support current and future operations and military  forces rely on the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence in  the planning and conduct of their operations and activities.
Many defense organizations play a role in identifying ISR requirements,  managing current assets, and developing new capabilities. DOD  established the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to  coordinate policy and strategic oversight of defense intelligence, security,  and counterintelligence to meet combatant commander requirements.  Other defense intelligence agencies, such as the National Security Agency,  the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency have key roles in supporting defense and national  security missions.
Combatant commanders may identify their needs for ISR capabilities to  support their missions through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  For example, the U.S. Central Command is charged with identifying the  ISR capabilities required to support his theater of operations. Generally,  the individual military services or other DOD agencies are responsible for  managing the acquisition of new DOD ISR systems.
In 2003, DOD altered its unified command plan to give the U.S. Strategic  Command (USSTRATCOM) responsibility for planning, integrating, and  coordinating ISR in support of strategic and global operations. To execute  this responsibility, USSTRATCOM established the Joint Functional  Component Command-ISR in March 2005 and designated the Director of  the Defense Intelligence Agency as the commander. The Joint Functional  Component Command-ISR is charged with developing strategies for  distributing, or allocating, existing ISR assets among combatant  commanders and ensuring the integration and synchronization of DOD,  national, and allied ISR capabilities and collection efforts. In the case of  ongoing operations, the Joint Force Air Component Commander generally  tasks theater-level ISR assets made available for support of the Joint Force  Commander’s operational objectives.
Implemented in 2003, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development  System (JCIDS) is DOD’s principal process for identifying, assessing, and  prioritizing proposals to improve existing capabilities and develop new  capabilities. The JCIDS process is designed to facilitate coordination  among DOD components in assessing proposals for new capabilities to  ensure that they enable joint forces to meet the full range of military  operations and challenges. Under the JCIDS collaborative review process,  proposals for new intelligence capabilities that support DOD or national  intelligence requirements must be reviewed by the Joint Requirements  Oversight Council, which consists of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs  of Staff and a four-star officer designated by each of the military services.  Eight Functional Capabilities Boards assist the Joint Requirements  Oversight Council in evaluating proposals and making recommendations  on approval. The Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board  (BA/FCB) is responsible for reviewing proposals to develop and acquire  new ISR capabilities.
Under section 426 of title 10 of the U.S. Code, DOD is required to establish  an ISR Integration Council to serve as a forum for the services and the  defense intelligence agencies to discuss their ISR integration efforts in  order to ensure unity of effort and preclude unnecessary duplication of  effort. Led by the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, the council is  statutorily made up of senior intelligence officers from each of the armed  services and U.S. Special Operations Command, the directors of the  defense intelligence agencies, and the Joint Staff Director for Operations.  DOD is also required under section 426 to develop a comprehensive plan— known as the ISR Integration Roadmap—to guide the development and  integration of DOD ISR capabilities from 2004 through 2018. DOD  published the first iteration of the ISR Integration Roadmap in May 2005  and updated the Roadmap in January 2007. The details of the ISR  Integration Roadmap are classified, but the management issues and  initiatives it contains are not classified.
section_title: DOD Is Undertaking Important Initiatives, But the Extent to Which These Will Guide Future Investments to Achieve Better Integration of ISR Assets Is Not Clear
paragraphs: Over the past few years, DOD has taken some important steps to enable it  to take a department-wide view of ISR capabilities. These steps are  important in DOD’s efforts to formulate a strategy for meeting future ISR  requirements in a more integrated manner by considering how existing  and future assets will fit together to provide needed information to  support combatant commanders and national decision makers.  Specifically, DOD has developed and is updating a statutorily required ISR  Integration Roadmap that charts current programs and has begun testing  portfolio management principles to manage the requirements for future  ISR capabilities. However, these two initiatives are in the early stages of  implementation and have some limitations, and it is unclear whether these  initiatives will be enough to improve integration of DOD ISR assets and  guide DOD ISR investment decisions.
subsections: section_title: ISR Integration Roadmap
paragraphs: DOD’s ISR Integration Roadmap is a noteworthy step for DOD in  examining the ISR capabilities that DOD currently has available and in  development, although the Roadmap does not represent a comprehensive  vision for the ISR enterprise or define strategy to guide future investments.  First published in May 2005 in response to a statutory requirement and  updated in January 2007, DOD’s ISR Integration Roadmap comprises a  catalogue of detailed information on all the ISR assets being used and  developed across DOD, including ISR capabilities related to collection,  communication, exploitation, and analysis. DOD’s recent update took the  ISR Integration Roadmap a step farther than its 2005 version because it  incorporated information from the QDR and the National Intelligence  Strategy. For example, the updated version includes a list of the ISR- related QDR decisions aimed at achieving future joint force characteristics  and building on progress to date, such as increasing investment in  unmanned aircraft systems and balancing air- and space-borne ISR  capabilities. In addition, the recent ISR Integration Roadmap included  changes in funding and ISR program information driven by the fiscal year  2007 President’s Budget.
We believe that, given the vast scope of ISR capabilities, which operate in  a variety of mediums and encompass a range of intelligence disciplines,  the ISR Integration Roadmap represents a significant step toward  providing DOD leadership and the Congress with the information needed  to assess the strengths and weaknesses of current ISR capabilities.  However, while the Roadmap sets out some strategic goals objectives for  the defense ISR enterprise, such as recapitalizing ISR capabilities, it does  not yet constitute an enterprise-level architecture or represent an  investment strategy. The Roadmap does not clearly show how the ISR  systems—existing and future—will fit together in a vision for common  architecture to most efficiently meet priority ISR requirements or provide  a basis for making trade-offs among competing programs. Specifically, the  Roadmap does not (1) identify overall ISR requirements and how DOD  plans to achieve them, (2) identify funding priorities, and (3) establish  mechanisms to enforce an investment strategy or measure progress.  Moreover, the Roadmap does not clarify what requirements for future ISR  systems are already filled, or possibly saturated, identify the critical  capability gaps that need to be filled by future systems, or identify focus  areas for future requirements. For example, although the Roadmap sets  the objective of attaining global persistent surveillance, it has not yet  defined the requirements for persistent surveillance or how to use current  assets to attain it. We have previously testified on the need for better  planning for other ISR-related development programs. For example, DOD  has continued to request funding to support the services’ plans to develop  new unmanned aircraft system capabilities in the absence of overall plans  to guide development and investment decisions. DOD officials  acknowledged that the ISR Integration Roadmap has limitations and said  that these limitations will be addressed in future revisions. As the  department moves forward with its ISR Integration Roadmap, we believe it  could provide a basis for DOD to determine the mix of future capabilities  that provides the best value with regard to their place in an overarching  ISR architecture.
section_title: Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Management
paragraphs: DOD is attempting to better manage the requirements for future ISR  capabilities across DOD by applying a joint capability portfolio  management concept to ISR assets. In September 2006, the Deputy  Secretary of Defense decided to bring ISR systems across DOD together  into a capability portfolio as part of a test case for the joint capability  portfolio management concept. The capability portfolio containing these  ISR systems is known as the battlespace awareness capability portfolio,  and it is one of the four test cases for exploring this management concept.  The intent of the ISR portfolio management test case is to enable DOD to  develop and manage ISR capabilities across the entire department—rather  than by military service or individual program—and by doing so, to  improve the interoperability of future capabilities, minimize capability  redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness. The Under  Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the lead office for battlespace  awareness capability portfolio management. The ISR Integration Council  acts as the governance body for the ISR portfolio management effort. In  addition, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence works closely  with the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board, which is a  Joint Staff organization that provides analytic support for the Joint  Requirements Oversight Council’s discussions and decisions on ISR  capability needs, joint concepts, and programmatic issues.
Battlespace awareness capability managers reviewed and prioritized ISR  assets to inform budget development for the first time with the fiscal year  2008 budget, and the portfolio management concept is still being tested.  Therefore, it is too early to assess its effectiveness in integrating ISR  programs to meet future requirements. However, our preliminary work has  shown that the concept faces implementation challenges, among them  clarifying the responsibilities and authorities of the capability portfolio  managers in relation to the services in order to make trade-offs among  competing service priorities. For example, the ISR Integration Council  held discussions on service resource allocation decisions in an effort to  achieve consensus among the services, combatant commanders, and other  stakeholders. The Council proposed recommendations for rebalancing the  services’ investments in their respective ISR portfolios during the fiscal  year 2008 budget. However, the ISR Integration Council did not have the  authority to compel services to change their budget plans. According to  defense officials, there were some disagreements between the ISR  Integration Council’s recommendations and the services on funding levels  for ISR systems. These issues were elevated to the Deputy Secretary of  Defense for final decision. DOD leaders are monitoring the  implementation of the capability portfolio test cases to determine whether  portfolio managers should have the authority to direct changes to service  plans. However, without authority to direct the military services to adopt  any of its suggestions, it is unclear the extent to which the ISR Integration  Council can influence service plans.
The Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board is charged with  reviewing service proposals for new ISR capabilities and the Under  Secretary of Defense for Intelligence assists in this effort. The  documentation that the board reviews provides analysis of the capability  required and includes cost information related to the proposed approach  for generating the capability. However, it is not clear to what extent these  proposals are based on a comprehensive analysis that includes data on  cost/performance evaluations and consideration of national-level  capabilities.
Our preliminary work identified an example of the kind of data-driven  analysis of alternative investment strategies that we believe could be  useful to battlespace awareness capability portfolio managers for  analyzing competing ISR programs and developing an investment strategy  for the future. In 2004, the National Security Space Office completed a  limited architecture analysis of ISR assets using cost and performance  data. Specifically, the National Security Space Office analyzed how much  additional ISR capability would be provided by various ISR system mixes  for given levels of additional investment. The intent of the study was to  provide insight into the most efficient mix of current and planned ISR  systems. While the analysis was a useful demonstration of an approach to  inform decision makers, it had several limitations. For example, the  analysis did not include all national and tactical ISR systems, mainly  focusing on space and air. The analysis also assumed that the additional  infrastructure needed to support integration of information from  additional ISR systems would be available, while the costs associated with  such additional infrastructure, which are difficult to estimate, were not  included in the analysis. Further, the analysis was limited in that it only  considered ISR capabilities for levels of increased investment, not for  levels of decreased investment; thus, it did not consider what the most  efficient mix of ISR systems would be if limited resources forced decision  makers to decrease funding for ISR programs. Moreover, the analysis  represented a one-time effort and has not been repeated. Still, we believe  that, if expanded to be more comprehensive and integrated, this type of  data-driven analytical approach could inform decision makers on the  implications of various options for providing the most effective mix of ISR  capabilities that DOD can afford. Without an enterprise-level architecture  and an ongoing and comprehensive data-driven analysis of the most  efficient solutions, it is not clear to us how DOD can be assured that it is  developing and fielding the ISR capabilities that most efficiently and  effectively fill gaps and reduce redundancies.
section_title: Future GAO Work Will Continue to Focus on DOD’s Approach for Developing ISR Capabilities
paragraphs: While our preliminary work has focused on the new processes that DOD  has established to address what it has acknowledged are weaknesses in its  planning for integrated future capabilities, our future work will investigate  DOD’s processes for integrating requirements and developing an  investment strategy. Among the issues that we plan to address are the  extent to which:    DOD’s ISR Integration Roadmap, or other DOD initiatives, establish a  framework for developing an overarching joint ISR architecture and an  investment strategy;    DOD’s review processes enable it to identify gaps and redundancies in    DOD has considered comprehensive analyses of new ISR capabilities,  to include consideration of all available ISR assets and  cost/performance evaluations.
section_title: DOD Lacks Adequate Visibility and Metrics to Optimize ISR Assets
paragraphs: Given the substantial investment DOD is making in ISR assets and the  increasing demand for them, effective management of these assets has  become critical. Currently, DOD’s approach to allocation and tasking do  not provide full visibility for managing its current ISR assets. Although  DOD has established a process for allocating available ISR assets to the  combatant commanders to meet theater needs, including unmanned  aircraft systems, it does not have visibility over all ISR assets, which would  improve its ability to allocate assets. Additionally, DOD’s process for  tasking ISR assets does not currently allow for visibility at all levels into  how ISR assets are being used on a daily basis. Furthermore, DOD does  not have metrics and feedback for systematically measuring the  effectiveness of ISR missions.  Without better visibility and performance  evaluation, DOD does not have all the information it needs to validate the  demand for ISR assets, to ensure it is optimizing the use of existing assets,  and to acquire new systems that best support warfighting needs.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Approach to Allocating and Tasking ISR Does Not Consider All ISR Assets
paragraphs: DOD uses an annual process for allocating or distributing available ISR  assets to the combatant commanders to meet theater-level needs,  including unmanned aircraft systems. That process is managed by  USSTRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component Command-ISR (JFCC-ISR),  which is tasked with making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense  on how best to allocate ISR resources for theater use across the  combatant commands. Once ISR assets have been allocated, those assets  are available to the theater commanders to be assigned, or tasked, against  specific requests for ISR support, in support of ongoing operations.
JFCC-ISR’s ability to fulfill its mission of integrating DOD, national and  allied partner ISR capabilities to support the warfighter depends on the  extent to which it has awareness and visibility over all ISR assets including  DOD, national and allied. However, although the JFCC-ISR has been  assigned the mission of integrating national and DOD ISR capabilities, it  does not currently have visibility into all assets that could be brought to  bear to support combatant commanders’ needs. Currently, JFCC-ISR has  visibility into DOD ISR assets available to support theater-level  requirements, but does not have the same level of visibility into other ISR  assets such as national and allied. According to JFCC-ISR officials,  although they are working to develop better visibility over all ISR assets by  working with other defense and national intelligence agencies, they lack  full visibility into these ISR assets.  JFCC-ISR officials estimate it has 80-90  percent visibility into DOD ISR assets but does not have the same level of  visibility into other ISR assets available to support theater-level  requirements.  Without an approach to its allocation process that allows  visibility over all ISR capabilities and access to all relevant information, it  is not clear to us that the JFCC-ISR has the tools it needs in order to fulfill  its mission, in particular to leverage all available ISR assets and to  optimize the effectiveness of those assets.
Greater visibility of assets is also needed during ongoing operations to  improve DOD’s process for tasking, or assigning ISR assets to specific  missions. Specifically, greater visibility of assets is needed at the theater  level. The theater combatant commander’s Joint Force Air Component  Commander is responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring  joint air operations to focus the impact of air capabilities and for assuring  their effective and efficient use in achieving the combatant commander’s  objectives. However, while the Air Component Commander has visibility  into how all theater-level ISR assets, like the Air Force’s Predator, are  being used, it does not currently have visibility into how ISR assets,  embedded in and controlled by tactical units, such as the Army’s Hunter,  are being used on a daily basis. Greater visibility is also needed at the  tactical level to allow units a greater awareness of where other ISR assets,  including both theater-level and those assets embedded in other units, are  operating and what they are being used to do. Our preliminary work shows  that as a result of this lack of visibility, the potential exists for unnecessary  duplication, or multiple ISR aircraft to be tasked to operate in the same  area and against the same requirement.  However, some level of  duplication may be necessary when driven by system capabilities and  mission requirements.  Our work has also shown that by leveraging the  capabilities of different ISR assets using techniques such as cross-cueing,  the Air Component Commander has been able to use the different types of  capabilities brought by different theater-level manned and unmanned  assets to maximize the intelligence collected. For example, a manned Joint  Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance system could be  used to sense movement in an area and then an unmanned system such as  a Predator could be called in to collect imagery to confirm suspected  activity. With greater visibility at all levels into the tasking of all ISR assets,  including those tactical assets controlled by the military services, there is  an opportunity for DOD to gain greater synergies and optimize the use of  its ISR assets, reduce the potential for unnecessary duplicative taskings,  and determine whether additional perceived demand for these assets is  well-founded. This visibility would also allow tactical units, when  appropriate, to leverage other assets operating in their area to maximize  the information captured and avoid unnecessary duplicative taskings.   Without this visibility, DOD is not likely to optimize the capability offered  by these assets or achieve the joint approach to employing its ISR assets  called for in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
section_title: DOD Lacks Metrics and Feedback for Systematically Tracking the Effectiveness of Its ISR Missions
paragraphs: The growing demand for ISR assets is an indication of their value in  supporting combat forces, but DOD does not have sufficient metrics for  evaluating the effectiveness of ISR missions and is not getting consistent  feedback on whether the warfighters’ needs were met. For example, DOD  currently assesses its ISR missions with limited quantitative metrics such  as the number of targets planned versus the number collected against. We  recommended in a December 2005 report that DOD ensure its  performance measurement system measures how effectively unmanned  aircraft systems perform their missions, identify performance indicator  information that needs to be collected, and systematically collect  identified performance information. DOD officials acknowledged  shortcomings of its metrics, and DOD is developing qualitative as well as  quantitative ISR metrics, but progress has been limited and no milestones  have been established. Additionally, although DOD guidance calls for an  evaluation of how effective ISR support is in meeting the warfighters’  requirements, DOD officials acknowledge that this feedback is not  consistently occurring mainly because of the fast pace of operations in  theater. For example, while there is real-time communication among  unmanned aircraft system operators, requesters, and intelligence  personnel during an operation to ensure that the needed information is  captured, and agency officials indicate this communication is beneficial to  providing real-time feedback, there is little to no feedback after the  operation to determine whether the warfighters’ needs were met by the  ISR mission. Without developing metrics and systematically gathering  feedback that enables it to assess the extent to which ISR missions are  successful in supporting warfighter needs, DOD is not in a position to  validate the true demand for ISR assets, determine whether it is allocating  and tasking its ISR assets in the most effective manner, or acquire new  systems that best support warfighting needs.
section_title: ISR Development Programs Have Opportunities for Greater Synergies and Have Experienced Some Cost and Schedule Growth That Impact Legacy Systems
paragraphs: Without a comprehensive and integrated approach to managing current  ISR assets and balancing demands for the ISR capabilities required for the  future, some of DOD’s current ISR acquisitions are not benefiting from  collaboration among the services that could save time and money. Among  the ISR acquisition programs we reviewed, we found specific cases where  the military services’ successful collaboration resulted in savings of time  and resources. We also found cases where more collaboration is needed to  provide greater efficiencies in developing more affordable new systems to  close gaps in capabilities. Most of the 13 airborne ISR programs that we  reviewed have experienced some cost and/or schedule growth. One  program experienced significant cost growth and 9 programs have  experienced schedule delays that range from 2 months to 60 months.  These problems were caused largely by acquisition strategies that failed to  capture sufficient knowledge about the product technologies and design  before committing to the development or demonstration of a new system.  Resultant delays in the delivery of some new systems have required DOD  to make investments in legacy systems in order to keep them relevant and  operational until they can be replaced by new systems.
subsections: section_title: Opportunities Exist for Greater Collaboration across the Services’ ISR Programs
paragraphs: While the Office of Secretary of Defense has historically endorsed the  concept of joint acquisitions because of the potential synergies and  resultant benefits, the military services have not always embraced joint  acquisitions and often prefer separately managed programs to satisfy their  individual needs. As a result, opportunities to gain efficiencies through  common engineering, design, and manufacturing efforts are not presented  when a new acquisition program begins. However, we found the military  services sometimes initiate collaborative approaches on their own to  achieve some of the economies and efficiencies of a joint program. In one  case, we also found the services resisted seeking synergies that could  benefit both programs and lead to potential savings in development and  procurement costs. The following three examples illustrate programs that  are collaborating, have taken initial steps to begin collaborating, and have  resisted collaborating. The ultimate extent of collaboration as well as  outcomes of these programs still remains to be seen.
subsections: section_title: Successful Collaboration on Fire Scout
paragraphs: The Army began developing its Future Combat Systems—a family of  systems that included a vertical takeoff and landing unmanned aircraft  system called Fire Scout—in 2000. Program managers from the Army Fire  Scout contacted their counterparts in the Navy Fire Scout program to  share information and see if there could be any synergies between the two  programs. This was done on their own initiative as acquisition policy does  not require joint or collaborative programs. Army and Navy officials met  several times to discuss configuration, performance requirements, testing,  support, and other issues. Initially the requirements for the two systems  were quite different. The Army’s unmanned aircraft system had four  blades and a larger engine, while Navy’s system had three rotor blades and  a smaller engine. After discussions, the Navy decided to switch to the  Army’s configuration. The Army is buying common components, such as  the air vehicle and flight components, under the Navy contract.
An Army program management official estimated that the savings to the  Army in research and development alone would be about $200 million. As  both programs mature, the official believes additional synergies and  savings could be realized through contract price breaks on quantities and  shared test assets, such as air vehicles, support equipment, and test  components. Jointly acquiring common hardware under one contract will  also reduce procurement administrative lead time and permit common  design, tooling, and testing. Finally, future payload development such as  communications, sensors, and data links could be procured jointly.
section_title: Opportunity to Collaborate on Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS)
paragraphs: The Navy identified a mission need for a broad area maritime and littoral  ISR capability in 2000. Based on a 2002 analysis of alternatives, the Navy  decided to pursue a manned platform Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft  (MMA) with an unmanned adjunct, the BAMS. The Navy subsequently  performed an analysis of alternatives for the BAMS program, which  identified several potential alternatives; foremost among them was the  Global Hawk system. As a risk reduction effort, the Navy funded the  Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration program in 2003. Working through  the existing Air Force contract, the Navy procured two Global Hawk  unmanned aircraft and associated ground controls and equipment. The  demonstration program was expected to leverage the existing Global  Hawk system to develop tactics, training, and techniques for maritime  mission applications.
The BAMS program is at a critical juncture. It released a request for  proposals in February 2007 and plans to proceed with system development  and demonstration in October 2007. If the Global Hawk (or another  existing system like the Air Force Reaper) is selected, there are  opportunities for the Navy to work with the Air Force and take advantage  of its knowledge on the existing platform. By adopting the collaborative  techniques used by the Fire Scout officials, the Navy could leverage  knowledge early in the acquisition process and avoid or reduce costs for  design, new tooling, and manufacturing, and streamline contracting and  acquisition processes.
section_title: Collaboration Slow to Happen on Warrior and Predator
paragraphs: In contrast to the Fire Scout experience, the Air Force and Army  repeatedly resisted collaborating on their Predator and Warrior unmanned  aircraft programs. The Air Force’s Predator is a legacy program that has  been operational since 1995. Its persistent surveillance/full motion video  capability continues to be a valued asset to the warfighter. When the Army  began in 2001 to define requirements for the Warrior, a system similar to  the Predator, it did not explore potential synergies and efficiencies with  the Air Force program. Both the Air Force and the Joint Staff responsible  for reviewing Warrior’s requirements and acquisition documentation  raised concerns about duplication of an existing capability. Despite these  concerns, the Army did not perform an analysis of alternatives, citing the  urgent need of battlefield commanders for this capability. The Army  awarded a separate development contract to the same contractor  producing the Predator.
Responding to direction from the Quadrennial Defense Review and the  Secretary of Defense, the Army and Air Force agreed to consider  cooperating on the acquisition of the two systems in January 2006.  However, the effort has stalled because the services have different  concepts of operation and requirements. For example, the Army does not  agree with the Air Force’s requirement for rated pilots. The Air Force and  the Army are currently working to identify program synergies in a phased  approach. Initially, the Air Force will acquire two of the more modern  Warrior airframes and test them. Later, the services will compare their  requirements for ground control stations and automated takeoff and  landing. Finally, the Army and Air Force plan to compare concepts of  operation and training requirements for additional synergies. However, so  far the Army has coordinated the proposed approach through the Vice  Chief of Staff level, but the agreement has not yet been approved by the  Department of Army. The Air Force is still working to resolve comments  and concerns at lower organizational levels. If this stalls, these programs  could be more costly and redundant.
section_title: Some ISR Development Programs Have Experienced Problems That Have Led to Cost Growth, Delays, and Additional Investments in Legacy Systems
paragraphs: Nearly all of the 13 airborne ISR programs we reviewed have experienced  changes in cost or schedule. This can be attributed to a variety of causes.  Many programs began development without a solid business case or a  realistic acquisition strategy. As a result of the schedule delays in some  programs, the services will have to make investments in legacy systems to  keep them in the inventory longer than planned. These investments  represent opportunity costs that could have been used for other needs  within DOD.
subsections: section_title: Cost, Schedule, and Performance Status of Airborne ISR Programs
paragraphs: Programs must build a business case that provides demonstrated evidence  that (1) the warfighter need exists and that it can best be met with the  chosen concept, and (2) the concept can be developed and produced  within existing resources—technologies, design, funding, and time.  Establishing a business case calls for a realistic assessment of risks and  costs; doing otherwise undermines the intent of the business case and  invites failure. Once the business case is done, programs must develop a  realistic acquisition strategy, which requires having critical program  knowledge at key points in the acquisition. This includes knowledge about  technology maturity, system design, and manufacturing and production  processes. DOD’s acquisition policy endorses this knowledge-based  approach to acquisition. This policy includes strategies to reduce  technology, integration, design, manufacturing, and production risks.
Table 1 summarizes ISR programs that have encountered problems either  in development or as they prepared to begin the system development and  demonstration phase of an acquisition program.  Results of these  problems included cost and schedule growth, program restructuring,  cancellation, and unplanned investments in the legacy systems that were  being replaced.
Following are detailed examples of programs that failed to either develop  a good business case or an executable acquisition strategy and that had  problems. The outcome was that the services either had to or may have to  make additional investments in the legacy systems to keep them relevant  and in the operational inventory until the new system has completed  development and is fielded.
Aerial Common Sensor (ACS)
The Army’s termination of the ACS system development and  demonstration contract could have significant schedule, cost, and  performance impacts on three legacy systems in the ISR portfolio—the  Army’s Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) and Airborne Reconnaissance  Low (ARL), and the Navy’s EP-3. The Army and the Navy had planned a  phased approach to field the ACS and retire the legacy systems from the  inventory with a minimal investment in maintaining legacy systems. Delays  in ACS development will now require the Army and Navy to make  investments in the legacy systems at the same time that they develop new  replacement systems. In addition, any delay in either the development of  new systems or modification of legacy systems could result in an ISR  capability gap on the battlefield.
The GRCS and ARL were to be replaced by ACS beginning in fiscal  year 2009. Since the termination of the ACS development contract, the  ACS program has reverted to a predevelopment stage as the Army  restructures the program. ACS is scheduled to restart system  development and demonstration in 2009, 5 years later than the initial  development decision. Although the Army has not established a new  date for initial operating capacity, that date is also likely to slip by 5  years to fiscal year 2014. The cost to keep GRCS and ARL mission  equipment viable and the platforms airworthy is estimated to be $562  million between fiscal years 2008 and 2013. Without these  improvements, the systems will not remain capable against modern  threats which could result in a gap in ISR capabilities on the battlefield.  In addition, the airframes could not continue to fly during this time  frame without some structural modifications.
The Navy had planned to replace its EP-3 with ACS and begin fielding  the new system in fiscal year 2012. After the Army terminated the ACS  development contract, the Navy considered staying with the Army in its  development effort. However, according to Navy officials, the Chief of  Naval Operations directed the Navy to proceed with a separate  development effort, designated the EPX. The Navy now plans to  proceed with system development and demonstration in the fourth  quarter of fiscal year 2010. The Navy has not established a date to begin  fielding the new system, but that is not likely to take place before 2017.  This translates into a 5-year slip in retiring the oldest EP-3 systems and  will make modifications to those systems necessary so that they can  remain in the field until the Navy achieves full operating capacity for its  EPX. The Navy plans to invest $823 million between fiscal years 2008  and 2013 to modify the EP-3.
The Air Force plans to replace the U-2 with the Global Hawk but delays in  the Global Hawk program have contributed to the need to keep the U-2 in  the inventory longer than anticipated. In December 2005, the Air Force had  planned to begin retiring the U-2 in fiscal year 2007 and complete the  retirement by fiscal year 2012. Although the next configuration of the  Global Hawk (with limited signals intelligence capability) is scheduled for  delivery in fiscal year 2009, it will not have the same capability as the U-2.  The version of the Global Hawk that is planned to include a more robust  signals intelligence capability is scheduled to begin deliveries in 2012. The  Air Force is now developing a plan to fully retire the U-2s a year later in  2013 and at a slower rate than the 2005 plan. There are no funds in the  budget beyond fiscal year 2006 but the Air Force intends to fund projects  necessary to keep the U-2 capable.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy  to answer any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee may  have.
section_title: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For future questions about this statement, please contact Davi D’Agostino  at (202) 512-5431, Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619, or Michael Sullivan at  (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations  and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Other  individuals making key contributions to this statement include Margaret  Morgan, Patricia Lentini, Michael Hazard, Assistant Directors; Gabrielle A.  Carrington, Susan Tindall, Dayna Foster, Catherine H. Brown, Frank  Cristinzio, LaShawnda Lindsey, Elisha Matvay, Rae Ann Sapp, Michael  Aiken, and Grace Coleman.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Unmanned Aircraft Systems:  Improved Planning and Acquisition  Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges. GAO-06-610T.   Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition  Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges.  GAO-05-0395T.   Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2005.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Cost Increase Understated in  Nunn-McCurdy Report. GAO-06-222R. Washington, D.C.: December 15,  2005.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote  Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49.  Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Changes in E-10A Acquisition Strategy Needed  before Development Starts. GAO-05-273. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition  Strategy Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks, GAO-05-6. Washington,  D.C.: November 5, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Greater Use of Knowledge-Based Concepts Would  Reduce Risks in Developing New Signals Intelligence Aircraft, GAO-04- 939 Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004.
Force Structure:  Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD’s  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington. D.C.: March  17, 2004.
Signals Intelligence: DOD Should Consider Joint Replacement of Aging  Aircraft. GAO-02-401. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2002.
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