2010 Census: Census Bureau Continues to Make Progress in Mitigating Risks to a Successful Enumeration, but Still Faces Various Challenges
Published: 2009-10-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The decennial census is a constitutionally-mandated activity that produces data used to apportion congressional seats, redraw congressional districts, and help allocate billions of dollars in federal assistance. In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Census a high-risk area in part because of information technology (IT) shortcomings. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) has since strengthened its risk management efforts and made other improvements; however, in March 2009, GAO noted that a number of challenges and uncertainties remained. This testimony discusses the Bureau's readiness for 2010 and covers: (1) the delivery of key IT systems, (2) preliminary findings on the results of address canvassing and the lessons learned from that operation that can be applied to subsequent field operations, and (3) the Bureau's progress in improving its cost estimation abilities. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO work.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Bureau continues to make noteworthy gains in mitigating risks and in keeping the headcount on-track, but a number of challenges remain. Specifically, over the last few months, the Bureau has made important strides in improving oversight of testing key IT systems. For example, the Bureau named a testing officer to monitor the testing of census-taking activities. The Bureau has also made progress in system testing, but faces tight timeframes in finalizing the paper-based operations control system (PBOCS), which will be used to manage field operations. If any significant problems are identified during the testing phases of PBOCS, there will be little time, in most cases, to resolve the problems before the system needs to be deployed. Address canvassing, an operation where temporary workers known as listers go door-to-door to verify and update address data, finished ahead of schedule, but was over budget. Based on initial Bureau data, the preliminary figure on the actual cost of address canvassing is $88 million higher than the original estimate of $356 million, an overrun of 25 percent. A key reason for the overrun is that the Bureau did not update its cost estimates to reflect the changes to the address canvassing workload. Further, the Bureau did not follow its staffing strategy and hired too many listers. The Bureau's efforts to fingerprint employees, which was required as part of a criminal background check, did not proceed smoothly, in part because of training issues. As a result, over 35,000 temporary census workers--over a fifth of the address canvassing workforce--were hired despite the fact that their fingerprints could not be processed and they were not fully screened for employment eligibility. The Bureau is refining instruction manuals and taking other steps to improve the fingerprinting process for future operations. GAO is unable to verify the accuracy of the $14.7 billion estimated cost of the 2010 Census because key details and assumptions are unavailable. However, the Bureau is taking steps to improve its cost estimation process for 2020, including training its staff in cost estimation skills. While the Bureau has taken a number of actions to mitigate risk and its overall readiness for 2010 has improved, much work remains to be done. Many things can happen over the next few months, and keeping the entire enterprise on-plan will continue to be a daunting challenge fraught with risks. High levels of public participation, and continued Bureau and congressional attention to stewardship, performance, and accountability, will be key to a successful census.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to provide a progress report on the U.S.  Census Bureau’s (Bureau) implementation of the 2010 Census. As you  know, in March 2008, we designated the 2010 Census a high-risk area,  citing a number of long-standing and emerging challenges including (1)  weaknesses in the Bureau’s information technology (IT) acquisition and  contract management function; (2) problems with the performance of  handheld computers (HHC) that were designed in part for address  canvassing, a massive field operation where temporary census employees  go door-to-door to update the Bureau’s address list of around 140 million  housing units; and (3) uncertainty over the ultimate cost of the census— now estimated at around $14.7 billion.
Overarching all of these concerns was the lack of a full dress rehearsal,  which limited the Bureau’s ability to demonstrate critical enumeration  activities under near-census-like conditions, and the lack of time to  complete remaining work. By law, Census Day is April 1, 2010. As a result,  the design and execution of the decennial census proceed under a rigid  schedule; there are no timeouts, no do-overs, and no reset buttons.  Collectively, these issues raised questions about the Bureau’s readiness for  the 2010 Census.
This past March, exactly a year after we identified the decennial census as  a high-risk area, we appeared before this Subcommittee and testified that  the Bureau had made commendable progress in rolling out key  components of the census, making improvements to the HHCs, certain risk  management efforts, and various other activities. Nevertheless, a number  of operations and support systems still needed to be designed, planned,  and tested.
As requested, my remarks today will focus on the extent to which the  Bureau has improved its overall preparedness for the headcount, paying  particular attention to the steps the Bureau has taken since March 2009, to  mitigate risks and implement critical enumeration activities. The focus of  my discussion will be (1) the rollout of key IT systems, (2) our preliminary  findings on the results of address canvassing and the lessons learned from  that operation that can be applied to subsequent field operations, and (3)  the Bureau’s progress in improving its cost estimation abilities.
Lessons learned from 2010 will also be useful for informing the design of  the next decennial census. Rigorous planning and perhaps even a  fundamental re-examination of the census might be required because the  current approach to the national enumeration may no longer be financially  sustainable. Indeed, the cost of conducting the census has, on average,  doubled each decade since 1970 in constant 2010 dollars. If that rate of  cost escalation continues into 2020, the nation could be looking at a $30  billion census.
My testimony today is based on our ongoing and completed reviews of the  development, testing, and implementation of selected IT systems; our on- site observations of address canvassing this past spring; and our  examination of the Bureau’s efforts to improve its cost estimates.  Specifically, we analyzed key documents including plans, procedures, and  guidance for the selected activities, and interviewed cognizant Bureau  officials at headquarters and local census offices. In addition, during  address canvassing, we conducted 38 observations of address listers and  crew leaders as they went door-to-door and interviewed local census  office managers in 20 urban, suburban, and rural early local census offices  across the country. We anticipate issuing more comprehensive reports on  the results of this work in the near future.
On September 29, 2009, we provided the Bureau with a statement of facts  for ongoing audit work, and on October 1, 2009, the Bureau forwarded  written comments. The Bureau made some suggestions where additional  context or clarification was needed and, where appropriate, we made  those changes. We conducted our work in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we  plan and perform the audits to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to  provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives.
In summary, the Bureau continues to make noteworthy progress in  mitigating risks and keeping the decennial on track. Still, as the Bureau is  well aware, much work remains to be done, and a successful census  requires the near perfect alignment of a myriad of activities as well as a  high level of public cooperation, and even a small setback or misstep  could mushroom and potentially derail the Bureau’s efforts. More  specifically, over the last few months, the Bureau has made important  strides in improving oversight of testing key IT systems, strengthened  certain risk management activities, and generally completed address  canvassing ahead of schedule. Further, we are encouraged by the seating  of a new census director this past July (this position had been vacant for  several months), as well as by the experienced advisors he has put in place  to assist him, several of whom have experience from the 2000 Census.
That said, a number of challenges and uncertainties still need to be  addressed. For example, while the Bureau has made progress in testing  key decennial systems, critical testing activities need to be completed  before the systems will be ready to support the 2010 Census. Further, the  Bureau’s ability to develop accurate and reliable cost estimates for the  census remains a concern. For example, based on initial Bureau data, the  preliminary figure on the actual cost of address canvassing is $88 million  (25 percent) higher than the original estimate of $356 million. Moreover,  the Bureau’s efforts to fingerprint employees, which was required as part  of a criminal background check, did not proceed smoothly, and over  35,000 temporary census workers—over a fifth of the address canvassing  workforce—were hired despite the fact that their fingerprints could not be  processed, in part because many were illegible.
Overall, while there have been many positive developments in the last few  months, the 2010 Census remains a high risk area because of the amount  of work that still needs to be completed under a very tight time frame, as  well as for the inherent uncertainties in managing such a complex  enterprise, including the ultimate level of public participation. Public  engagement along with continued congressional and Bureau attention to  stewardship, performance, and accountability are key to a successful  census.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: As you know, Mr. Chairman, the decennial census is a constitutionally  mandated enterprise critical to our nation. Census data are used to  apportion seats and redraw Congressional districts, and to help allocate  over $400 billion in federal aid to state and local governments each year.
We added the 2010 Census to our list of high-risk areas in March 2008  because improvements were needed in the Bureau’s management of IT  systems, the reliability of the HHCs, and the quality of the Bureau’s cost  estimates. Compounding the risk was that the Bureau canceled a full dress  rehearsal of the census that was scheduled in 2008, in part, because of the  HHC’s performance problem, which included freeze-ups and unreliable  data transmissions. Although the Bureau had planned to use the HHCs to  collect data for both address canvassing and in going door to door  following up with nonrespondents, the Bureau ultimately decided to use  the HHCs for address canvassing and revert to collecting nonresponse  follow-up data using paper. As a result of this decision, the Bureau had to  redesign components of its field data collection system to accommodate  the new approach, thus introducing new risks.
Among other actions, in response to our findings and recommendations,  the Bureau strengthened its risk management efforts, including the  development of a high-risk improvement plan that described the Bureau’s  strategy for managing risk and key actions to address our concerns.
Still, in March 2009, in testimony before this Subcommittee, we continued  to question the Bureau’s readiness. Specifically, we noted that with little  more than a year remaining until Census Day, uncertainties surrounded  critical operations and support systems, and the Bureau lacked sufficient  policies, procedures, and trained staff to develop high-quality cost  estimates. Moving forward, we said that it will be essential for the Bureau  to develop plans for testing systems and procedures not included in the  dress rehearsal, and for Congress to monitor the Bureau’s progress.
section_title: The Bureau Has Made Progress on the Management and Testing of Key IT Systems, but Little Time Remains to Address Outstanding Issues
paragraphs: Since 2005, we have reported on weaknesses in the Bureau’s management  of its IT acquisitions, and issues continue concerning the Bureau’s IT  management and testing of key 2010 Census systems. In March 2009, we  reported and testified that while the Bureau took initial steps to enhance  its program-wide oversight of testing activities, those steps had not been  sufficient. Furthermore, while the Bureau had made progress in testing  key decennial systems, critical testing activities remained to be performed  before they would be ready to support the 2010 Census. At that time we  recommended that the Bureau improve its oversight of the completion of  testing activities for key systems.
In response to our findings and recommendations, the Bureau has taken  several steps to improve its management of IT for the 2010 Census. For  example, the Bureau named a Decennial Census Testing Officer whose  primary responsibilities include monitoring testing for decennial census  activities. In order to help improve the rigor and quality of test planning  and documentation, this official leads a bimonthly process to consolidate  and evaluate test planning and status across all key decennial census  operations, resulting in a decennial census testing overview document.
With respect to system testing, progress is being made, but much testing  remains to be completed as shown in the following table.
The Bureau has also made progress in end-to-end testing, but substantial  work remains to be completed. For example, the Bureau has completed  limited end-to-end tests for nonresponse follow-up and group-quarters  enumeration on the Paper-Based Operations Control System (PBOCS), a  work flow management system the Bureau developed late in the census  cycle when it moved from the HHCs to a paper-based approach to  nonresponse follow-up and other field operations. However, Bureau  officials stated that, although they were satisfied with the results of the  tests, significant additional testing will be needed. For example, several  critical issues were identified during these tests that will need to be  resolved and retested. In addition, the test was not designed to evaluate  the level of system performance needed while processing the estimated 48  million housing units that will be in the nonresponse-follow-up workload.  According to the Bureau, a performance test is being designed for the first  major release; however, detailed plans for this test have not yet been  completed. Finally, the test was performed with experienced census  employees, while the system will be used by newer, temporary employees.
Given the importance of IT systems to the decennial census, it is critical  that the Bureau ensure these systems are thoroughly tested. Bureau  officials have repeatedly stated that the limited amount of time remaining  will make completing all testing activities challenging.
subsections: section_title: The Bureau Needs to Prioritize Remaining Needs for Systems Used to Manage Field Data Collection
paragraphs: The Bureau faces significant challenges finalizing PBOCS. Most notably,  the Bureau needs to determine the remaining detailed requirements for the  system to be developed. As of early September 2009, the Bureau had  established high-level requirements for its PBOCS but had not yet finalized  the detailed requirements. High-level requirements describe in general  terms what functions the system will accomplish, such as producing  specific management reports on the progress of specific paper-based  operations or checking-out and checking-in groups of census forms for  shipping or processing. Detailed requirements describe more specifically  what needs to be done in order to accomplish such functions. For PBOCS,  such detailed requirements might include, for example, which data from  which data source should be printed where on a specific management  report. According to Bureau officials, in the absence of such specificity in  the requirements for the 2008 dress rehearsal, contract programmers with  little decennial census experience made erroneous assumptions about  which data to use when preparing some quality control reports. As a  result, quality assurance managers were unable to rely on the reports for  tracking progress.
In recognition of the serious implications that shortcomings in PBOCS  would have for the conduct of the 2010 Census and to see whether there  were additional steps that could be taken to mitigate the outstanding risks  to successful PBOCS development and testing, in June 2009, the Bureau  chartered an assessment of PBOCS, chaired by the Bureau’s chief  information officer (CIO). The assessment team reported initially in late  July 2009 and provided an update the following month. The review stated  that the PBOCS developers had made a strong effort to involve the system  stakeholders in the development process. However, the review also  identified several concerns with PBOCS development. For example, the  review found and we confirmed that the Bureau could improve its  requirements management for PBOCS. According to the CIO, the Bureau  has taken steps to address some of these findings, such as providing  additional resources for testing and development; however, resolving  problems found during testing before the systems need to be deployed will  be a challenge.
At the end of our review, the Bureau presented evidence of the steps it had  taken to document and prioritize requirements. We did not assess the  effectiveness of these steps. Until the Bureau completes the detailed  requirements for PBOCS, it will not have reasonable assurance that  PBOCS will meet the program’s needs. The Bureau is continuing to  examine how improvements will be made.
section_title: The Bureau Generally Completed Address Canvassing Ahead of Schedule But Went Over Budget
paragraphs: A successful census relies on an accurate list of all addresses where  people live in the country, because it identifies all households that are to  receive a census questionnaire and serves as a control mechanism for  following up with households that fail to respond. If the address list is  inaccurate, people can be missed, counted more than once, or included in  the wrong location.
Address canvassing is one of several procedures the Bureau uses to help  ensure an accurate address list and, because it is based on on-site  verification, it is particularly important for identifying the locations of  nontraditional or “hidden” housing units such as converted attics and  basements. Although these types of dwellings have always existed, the  large number of foreclosures the nation has recently experienced, as well  as the natural disasters that have hit the Gulf Coast and other regions,  have likely increased the number of people doubling-up, living in motels,  cars, tent cities, and other less conventional living arrangements. Such  individuals are at greater risk of being missed in the census.
The Bureau conducted address canvassing from March to July 2009.  During that time, about 135,000 address listers went door to door across  the country, comparing the housing units they saw on the ground to what  was listed in the database of their HHCs. Depending on what they  observed, listers could add, delete, or update the location of housing units.
Although the projected length of the field operation ranged from nine to  fourteen weeks, most early local census offices completed the effort in  less than 10 weeks. Moreover, the few areas that did not finish early were  delayed by unusual circumstances such as access issues created by  flooding. The completion rate is a remarkable accomplishment given the  HHC’s troubled history. The testing and improvements the Bureau made to  the reliability of the HHCs prior to the start of address canvassing,  including a final field test that was added to the Bureau’s preparations in  December 2008, played a key role in the pace of the operation, but other  factors, once address canvassing was launched, were important as well,  including the (1) prompt resolution of problems with the HHCs as they  occurred and (2) lower than expected employee turnover.
With respect to the prompt resolution of problems, although the December  2008 field test indicated that the more significant problems affecting the  HHCs had been resolved, various glitches continued to affect the HHCs in  the first month of the operation. For example, we were informed by listers  or crew leaders in 14 early local census offices that they had encountered  problems with transmissions, freeze-ups, and other problems. Moreover, in  10 early local census offices we visited, listers said they had problems  using the Global Positioning System function on their HHCs to precisely  locate housing units. When such problems occurred, listers called their  crew leaders and the Bureau’s help desk troubleshooted the problems.  When the issues were more systemic in nature, such as a software issue,  the Bureau was able to quickly fix them using software patches.
Moreover, to obtain an early warning of trouble, the Bureau monitored key  indicators of the performance of the HHCs such as the number of  successful and failed HHC transmissions. This approach proved useful as  Bureau quality control staff were alerted to the existence of a software  problem when they noticed that the devices were taking a long time to  close out completed assignment areas.
The Bureau also took steps to address procedural issues. For example, in  the course of our field observations, we noticed that in several locations  listers were not always adhering to training for identifying hidden housing  units. Specifically, listers were instructed to knock on every door and ask,  “Are there any additional places in this building where people live or could  live?” However, we found that listers did not always ask this question. On  April 28, 2009, we discussed this issue with senior Bureau officials. The  Bureau, in turn, transmitted a message to listers’ HHCs emphasizing the  importance of following training and querying residents if possible.
Lower than expected attrition rates and listers’ availability to work more  hours than expected also contributed to the Bureau’s ability to complete  the address canvassing operation ahead of schedule. For example, the  Bureau had planned for 25 percent of new hires to quit before, during, or  soon after training; however, the national average was 16 percent. Bureau  officials said that not having to replace listers with inexperienced staff  accelerated the pace of the operation. Additionally, the Bureau assumed  that employees would be available 18.5 hours a week. Instead, they  averaged 22.3 hours a week.
The Bureau’s address list at the start of address canvassing consisted of  141.8 million housing units. Listers added around 17 million addresses and  marked about 21 million for deletion because, for example, the address did  not have a structure. All told, listers identified about 4.5 million duplicate  addresses, 1.2 million nonresidential addresses, and about 690,000  addresses that were uninhabitable structures. Importantly, these  preliminary results represent actions taken during the production phase of  address canvassing and do not reflect actual changes made to the Bureau’s  master address list as the actions are first subject to a quality control  check and then processed by the Bureau’s Geography Division.
The preliminary analysis of addresses flagged for add and delete shows  that the results of the operation (prior to quality control) were generally  consistent with the results of address canvassing for the 2008 dress  rehearsal. Table 2 compares the add and delete actions for the two  operations.
subsections: section_title: Address Canvassing Costs Exceeded Budget Because of Unanticipated Workload and Hiring
paragraphs: According to the Bureau’s preliminary analysis, the estimated cost for  address canvassing field operations was $444 million, or $88 million (25  percent) more than its initial budget of $356 million. As shown in table 3,  according to the Bureau, the cost overruns were because of several  factors.
One such factor was that the address canvassing cost estimate was not  comprehensive, which resulted in a cost increase of $41 million. The  Bureau inadvertently excluded 11 million addresses identified in address  file updates from the initial address canvassing workload and fiscal year  2009 budget. Further, the additional 11 million addresses increased the  Bureau’s quality control workload, where the Bureau verifies certain  actions taken to correct the address list. Specifically, the Bureau failed to  anticipate the impact these addresses would have on the quality control  workload and therefore did not revise its cost estimate accordingly.  Moreover, under the Bureau’s procedures, addresses that failed quality  control would need to be recanvassed, but the Bureau’s cost model did not  account for the extra cost of recanvassing of any addresses. As a result,  the Bureau underestimated its quality control workload by 26 million  addresses which resulted in $34 million in additional costs, according to  the Bureau.
Bringing aboard more staff than was needed also contributed to the cost  overruns. For example, according to the Bureau’s preliminary analysis,  training additional staff accounted for about $7 million in additional costs.  Bureau officials attributed the additional training cost to inviting  additional candidates to initial training because of concerns that recruiting  and hiring staff would be problematic, even though (1) the Bureau’s  staffing goals already accounted for the possibility of high turnover and   (2) the additional employees were not included in the cost estimate or  budget.
The largest field operation will be nonresponse follow-up, when the  Bureau is to go door to door in an effort to collect data from households  that did not mail back their census questionnaire. Over 570,000  enumerators will need to be hired for that operation. To better manage the  risk of staffing difficulties while simultaneously controlling costs, several  potential lessons learned can be drawn from the Bureau’s experience  during address canvassing. For example, we found that the staffing  authorization and guidance provided to some local census managers were  unclear and did not specify that there was already a cushion in the hiring  goals for local census offices to account for potential turnover. Also,  basing the number of people invited to initial training on factors likely to  affect worker hiring and retention, such as the local employment rate,  could help the Bureau better manage costs.
According to Bureau officials, they are reviewing the results from address  canvassing to determine whether they need to revisit the staffing strategy  for nonresponse follow-up and have already made some changes. For  example, in recruiting candidates, when a local census office reaches 90  percent of its qualified applicant goal, it is to stop blanket recruiting and  instead focus its efforts on areas that need more help, such as tribal lands.  However, in hiring candidates, the officials pointed out that they are  cautious not to underestimate resource needs for nonresponse follow-up  based on address canvassing results because they face different  operational challenges in that operation than for address canvassing. For  example, for nonresponse follow-up, the Bureau needs to hire  enumerators who can work in the evenings when people are more likely to  be at home and who can effectively deal with reluctant respondents,  whereas with address canvassing, there was less interaction with  households and the operation could be completed during the day.
section_title: Address Canvassing Cost Overruns Are Symptomatic of Weaknesses with Cost Estimation Efforts
paragraphs: Problems with accurately estimating the cost of address canvassing are  indicative of long-standing weaknesses in the Bureau’s ability to develop  credible and accurate cost estimates for the 2010 Census. Accurate cost  estimates are essential to a successful census because they help ensure  that the Bureau has adequate funds and that Congress, the administration,  and the Bureau itself can have reliable information on which to base  decisions. However, in our past work, we noted that the Bureau’s estimate  lacked detailed documentation on data sources and significant  assumptions, and was not comprehensive because it did not include all  costs. Following best practices from our Cost Estimating and  Assessment Guide, such as defining necessary resources and tasks, could  have helped the Bureau recognize the need to update address canvassing  workload and other operational assumptions, resulting in a more reliable  cost estimate.
Given the Bureau’s past difficulties in developing credible and accurate  cost estimates, we are concerned about the reliability of the figures that  were used to support the 2010 budget, especially the costs of nonresponse  follow-up, which is estimated to cost $2.7 billion. We have discussed the  cost estimate for nonresponse follow-up with Bureau officials, and they  have said they are looking to see how foreclosures and vacant housing  units might affect the nonresponse follow-up workload. In addition,  Bureau officials said they will analyze address canvassing data and  determine if there are any implications for future operations.
Nevertheless, there still remains a great deal of uncertainty around the  final cost of the 2010 Census. In part, this is because of changes made to  the census design after April 2008, when the Bureau reverted to a paper- based data collection method for nonresponse follow-up in response to  the performance problems with the HHCs. The uncertainty also stems  from the fact that the assumptions used to develop the revised cost  estimate were not tested during the 2008 dress rehearsal. According to  budget documents, after the decision to return to a paper-based  nonresponse follow-up, the life cycle cost estimate increased by over $3  billion dollars.
Moving forward, it will be important for the Bureau to ensure the  reliability of the 2020 cost estimate, and the Bureau has already taken  several actions in that regard. For example, based on recommendations  from our June 2008 report, the Bureau plans to train its staff on cost  estimation skills, including conducting uncertainty analysis. In addition,  the Bureau is developing the Decennial Budget Integration Tool (DBiT),  which according to the Bureau, should consolidate budget information  and enable the Bureau to better document its cost estimates. Officials said  that DBiT is capturing actual fiscal year 2009 costs, which will be used to  estimate the life cycle cost for the 2020 census. However, officials also  said that DBiT needs further testing, and may not be fully used until the  2012 budget.
section_title: Bureau Needs to Improve Its Policies and Procedures for Fingerprinting Temporary Employees
paragraphs: To better screen its workforce of hundreds of thousands of temporary  census workers, the Bureau plans to fingerprint its temporary workforce  for the first time in the 2010 Census. In past censuses, temporary workers  were only subject to a name background check that was completed at the  time of recruitment. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is to  provide the results of a name background check when temporary workers  are first recruited. At the end of the workers’ first day of training, Bureau  employees who have received around 2 hours of fingerprinting instruction  are to capture two sets of ink fingerprint cards. The cards are then sent to  the Bureau’s National Processing Center in Jeffersonville, Indiana, to be  scanned and electronically submitted to the FBI. If the results show a  criminal record that makes an employee unsuitable for employment, the  Bureau is to either terminate the person immediately or place the  individual in nonworking status until the matter is resolved. If the first set  of prints are unclassifiable, the National Processing Center is to send the  FBI the second set of prints.
However, fingerprinting during address canvassing was problematic. Of  the over 162,000 employees hired for the operation, 22 percent—or  approximately 35,700 workers—had unclassifiable prints that the FBI  could not process. The FBI determined that the unclassifiable prints were  generally the result of errors that occurred when the prints were first  made. Factors affecting the quality of the prints included difficulty in first  learning how to effectively capture the prints and the adequacy of the  Bureau’s training. Further, the workspace and environment for taking  fingerprints was unpredictable, and factors such as the height of the  workspace on which the prints were taken could affect the legibility of the  prints.
Consistent with FBI guidance, the Bureau relied solely on the results of  the name background check for the nearly 36,000 employees with  unclassifiable prints. However, it is possible that more than 200 people  with unclassifiable prints had disqualifying criminal records but still  worked, and had contact with the public during address canvassing.  Indeed, of the prints that could be processed, fingerprint results identified  approximately 1,800 temporary workers (1.1 percent of total hires) with  criminal records that name check alone failed to identify. Of the 1,800  workers with criminal records, approximately 750 (42 percent) were  terminated or were further reviewed because the Bureau determined their  criminal records—which included crimes such as rape, manslaughter, and  child abuse—disqualified them from census employment.
Projecting these percentages to the 35,700 temporary employees with  unclassifiable prints, it is possible that more than 200 temporary census  employees might have had criminal records that would have made them  ineligible for census employment. Applying these same percentages to the  approximately 600,000 people the Bureau plans to fingerprint for  nonresponse follow-up, unless the problems with fingerprinting are  addressed, we estimate that approximately 785 employees with  unclassifiable prints could have disqualifying criminal records but still end  up working for the Bureau.
Aside from public safety concerns, there are cost issues as well. The FBI  charged the Bureau $17.25 per person for each background check,  whether or not the fingerprints were classifiable.
The Bureau stated that it has taken steps to improve image quality for  fingerprints captured in future operations by refining instruction manuals  and providing remediation training on proper procedures. In addition, the  Bureau is considering activating a feature on the National Processing  Center’s scanners that can check the legibility of the image and thus  prevent poor quality prints from reaching the FBI. These are steps in the  right direction. As a further contingency, it might also be important for the  Bureau to develop a policy for re-fingerprinting employees to the extent  that both cards cannot be read.
section_title: The Bureau Used Enhanced Training and Guidance for Canvassing Hurricane Affected Areas
paragraphs: The scale of the destruction in those areas affected Hurricanes Katrina,  Rita, and Ike made address canvassing in parts of Mississippi, Louisiana,  and Texas, especially challenging (see fig. 1). Hurricane Katrina alone  destroyed or made uninhabitable an estimated 300,000 homes.  Recognizing the difficulties associated with address canvassing in these  areas because of shifting and hidden populations and changes to the  housing stock, the Bureau, partly in response to recommendations made  in our June 2007 report, developed supplemental training materials for  natural disaster areas to help listers identify addresses where people are,  or may be, living when census questionnaires are distributed. For example,  the materials noted the various situations listers might encounter, such as  people living in trailers, homes marked for demolition, converted buses  and recreational vehicles, and nonresidential space such as storage areas  above restaurants. The training material also described the clues that  could alert listers to the presence of non-traditional places where people  are living and provided a script they should follow when interviewing  residents on the possible presence of hidden housing units.
Additional steps taken by the city of New Orleans also helped the Bureau  overcome the challenge of canvassing neighborhoods devastated by  Hurricane Katrina. As depicted in fig. 2 below, city officials replaced the  street signs even in abandoned neighborhoods. This assisted listers in  locating the blocks they were assigned to canvass and expedited the  canvassing process in these deserted blocks.
To further ensure a quality count in the hurricane affected areas, the  Bureau plans to hand-deliver an estimated 1.2 million questionnaires (and  simultaneously update the address list) to housing units in much of  southeast Louisiana and south Mississippi that appear inhabitable, even if  they do not appear on the address list updated by listers during address  canvassing. Finally, the Bureau stated that it must count people where  they are living on Census Day and emphasized that if a housing unit gets  rebuilt and people move back, then that is where those people will be  counted. However, if they are living someplace else, then they will be  counted where they are living on Census Day.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: The Bureau has made remarkable progress in improving its overall  readiness for 2010, with substantial strides being made in the management  of its IT systems and other areas. That said, as I noted throughout this  statement, considerable challenges and uncertainties lie ahead. While the  decennial is clearly back on track, many things can happen over the next  few months, and keeping the entire enterprise on plan continues to be a  daunting challenge fraught with risks.
Mr. Chairman and members of this Subcommittee, this concludes my  statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you might  have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts
paragraphs: If you have any questions on matters discussed in this statement, please  contact Robert N. Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2757 or by e-mail at  goldenkoffr@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this testimony include  Steven Berke, Virginia Chanley, Benjamin Crawford, Jeffrey DeMarco,  Dewi Djunaidy, Vijay D’Souza, Elizabeth Fan, Ronald Fecso, Amy Higgins,  Richard Hung, Kirsten Lauber, Jason Lee, Andrea Levine, Signora May, Ty  Mitchell, Naomi Mosser, Catherine Myrick, Lisa Pearson, David Powner,  David Reed, Jessica Thomsen, Jonathan Ticehurst, Shaunyce Wallace,  Timothy Wexler, and Katherine Wulff.
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