Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues
Published: 2008-04-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: It has been 5 years since the Department of Defense (DOD) established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland defense and civil support missions in the United States. Planning operations in the United States poses unique challenges for traditional military planning. GAO was asked to assess (1) the status of NORTHCOM's plans and the challenges it faces in planning and conducting operations, (2) the number, experience, and training of planning personnel, and (3) the extent to which NORTHCOM coordinates with other federal agencies. To do this, GAO reviewed available NORTHCOM plans, compared them to joint operational planning criteria, compared planning staff with those at other commands, and reviewed documentation and mechanisms for interagency coordination.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NORTHCOM has completed--or is in the process of revising--all of the major plans it is required to prepare for its homeland defense and civil support missions, but it faces a number of challenges in planning for and conducting these missions. NORTHCOM has completed its nine required plans. However, NORTHCOM does not know whether supporting plans that must be developed by other DOD organizations to assist NORTHCOM are complete because it has only recently begun to develop a process to track and assess these plans. NORTHCOM faces challenges in three key planning areas. First, NORTHCOM has difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities it may need in part because NORTHCOM does not have more detailed information from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the states on the specific requirements needed from the military in the event of a disaster. Second, NORTHCOM has few regularly allocated forces and few capabilities allocated to its plans. DOD could allocate forces to NORTHCOM and assign specific forces to the command's plans, but this would not guarantee that those forces would not have to be deployed elsewhere. However, it would provide DOD and the NORTHCOM commander with a better basis on which to assess the risk that the command would be unable to successfully execute one or more of its missions. Third, NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness of military units for its civil support mission because its plans do not specify mission tasks against which units can be assessed. NORTHCOM has undertaken mitigation efforts to address each challenge, and new national planning guidance may further assist NORTHCOM and DOD in addressing the challenges. Nevertheless, NORTHCOM and DOD can take additional actions to reduce the risk from these gaps and reduce the risk due to the overall uncertainty that stems from the nature of its mission. NORTHCOM has an adequate number of planning personnel, and the command is pursuing opportunities to expand the experience and training for staff needed to perform the command's planning function. NORTHCOM's planning staff is filled at over 96 percent of its authorized positions. NORTHCOM's military planning staff receives the same planning training and education as planners in other combatant commands. To draw upon experience in planning and conducting domestic operations, NORTHCOM has integrated National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard personnel into its headquarters staff. NORTHCOM has also developed a curriculum for required mission-related training courses. Although NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve coordination of its homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal agencies, it lacks formalized guidance and procedures--such as memorandums of understanding or charters--to help ensure that interagency coordination efforts or agreements that are reached can be fully relied on. This is important because responding to a major disaster in the United States--natural or man-made--is a shared responsibility of many government agencies with states often requiring federal assistance from DHS and DOD.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the  Department of Defense (DOD) recognized the need for a more integrated  military response to an attack on the homeland. In response, DOD  established the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in October 2002  to provide command and control of DOD homeland defense efforts and to  coordinate defense support of civil authorities. These two activities are  among DOD’s contribution to homeland security. The Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead federal agency for homeland  security, which is a national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the  United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize  the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. DOD contributes to  homeland security through its military missions overseas and homeland  defense and civil support operations. DOD is the lead federal agency for  homeland defense, which it defines as the protection of U.S. sovereignty,  territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against  external threats and aggression against the United States. This involves  strictly military actions, such as air defense. Civil support is DOD support  to US civil authorities—such as DHS or other agency—for domestic  emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities.
NORTHCOM differs from the other combatant commands—such as the  U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command—in that, in addition  to Canada and Mexico, its area of responsibility includes all 49 states on  the North American continent and the District of Columbia. This poses a  unique challenge for military planning and coordination in a U.S. domestic  context and with respect to 49 separate and individual state governments.  NORTHCOM also has to coordinate with numerous federal agencies that  also have a role in planning for and responding to a wide variety of  incidents in the homeland as reflected in the National Response  Framework.
Since NORTHCOM was established in October 2002, we have periodically  evaluated and reported on issues related to its ability to carry out its  missions. In our first report in July 2003, we reported that at the time it  was too early to assess the adequacy of NORTHCOM’s planning for  operations in the homeland but that there was a need for an assessment of  the DOD force structure necessary to conduct homeland defense and civil  support missions. Reports since then have consistently shown the need  for clearly defined roles and responsibilities among responder agencies,  the need for state and local involvement in the development of response  plans, and the need to ensure response capabilities are developed and  ready. Many of these issues were highlighted in 2005, when despite a  massive deployment of resources and support from both military and civil  agencies in response to Hurricane Katrina, confusion arose as to what  responsibilities the military had and what capabilities it would provide in  planning and responding to a catastrophic event.
Homeland defense and civil support operations are major responsibilities  of NORTHCOM. DOD is the lead federal agency for homeland defense  operations, and NORTHCOM is to command federal military forces  conducting homeland defense operations in the United States. For civil  support operations, although disaster preparedness and response is  primarily the responsibility of the civilian government and its agencies,  NORTHCOM must be prepared to assist when requested or when an  incident overwhelms local, state, tribal, and other federal authorities.  DOD is not the lead federal agency for civil support missions (unless  designated so by the President) and operates in support of civil authorities  only when directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense.  NORTHCOM would command only the federal military portion of such  operations and would do so in direct support of another federal agency,  such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
In planning for both homeland defense and civil support missions,  NORTHCOM relies on other DOD organizations and commands to prepare  plans that will support NORTHCOM in its missions. These organizations  include NORTHCOM’s subordinate commands, such as Joint Task Force  Alaska and Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region; component  commands, such as Army Forces North, Air Forces North, and Marine  Forces North; and supporting commands, such as Navy Fleet Forces  Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and DOD agencies such as the  Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency.  Following the joint planning process, NORTHCOM provides its  subordinate commands with planning guidance, such as types of incidents  to prepare for, and collectively these plans should help to facilitate an  adequate response to an incident in the homeland. Moreover, the joint  planning process calls for required capabilities to be identified and  allocated to ensure mission success and for the readiness of those units  providing the capabilities for assigned missions to be monitored.
As requested, this report addresses the extent to which NORTHCOM        (1) has prepared plans to conduct its homeland defense and civil support  missions and the challenges it faces in planning for and conducting these  operations, (2) has an adequate number of planning personnel with the  relevant experience and training to perform the planning function for the  command, and (3) coordinates the development of its plans and  operations with federal agencies and other organizations. We prepared a  separate report to address NORTHCOM’s coordination with the National  Guard Bureau (NGB) and the states.As agreed with your staff, we will  address matters related to NORTHCOM exercises and training as part of a  follow-on effort.
To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM has prepared plans to  execute its homeland defense and civil support missions, we reviewed  NORTHCOM’s available major plans and supporting plans, comparing  them to established DOD joint operational planning criteria for  completeness and adequacy. We also met with knowledgeable  NORTHCOM officials to discuss the status of each of the plans  NORTHCOM is required to prepare and the process by which the plans  were developed and assessed. Although we reviewed the assumptions,  constraints, and other portions of the plans for general adherence to  DOD’s joint operational planning criteria, we did not independently  validate those elements. Therefore, we did not attempt to determine the  extent to which NORTHCOM’s plans are executable. To assess the  challenges NORTHCOM faces in planning for and conducting homeland  defense and civil support operations, we developed a methodology  comparing a series of questions and topics for joint operational planning  to the information related to the plans themselves. The methodology was  based on DOD’s standards for joint operational planning for identifying  needed capabilities, allocating those capabilities to accomplish the  mission, monitoring the readiness of military units to meet the capability  requirements of their missions, and capturing and incorporating lessons  learned into planning. We used the results of this analysis and our  discussions with a broad range of DOD officials to determine what gaps, if  any, exist in NORTHCOM’s planning efforts stemming from these  challenges. Although we reviewed all of NORTHCOM’s plans according to  these criteria, we concentrated on the two primary homeland defense and  civil support plans. To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM’s  planning personnel have relevant and adequate training and experience,  we discussed staffing and training with a wide range of NORTHCOM and  DOD officials and compared information on planning personnel at  NORTHCOM with that of other combatant commands. We assessed the  reliability of these data and found them to be sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report. To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM  coordinates in planning for and conducting its missions, we reviewed the  documentation and mechanisms for coordination with organizations  outside NORTHCOM and interviewed officials from NORTHCOM’s  subordinate commands, DHS, the FEMA, and NGB. Additional information  on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
We conducted our review from May 2006 to April 2008 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. Appendix I contains further detail on our scope and  methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: As with other joint combatant commands, NORTHCOM’s organization  includes subordinate commands that report directly to NORTHCOM;  component commands, which are military service commands that assist  NORTHCOM operations; and other supporting commands and DOD  agencies. Each of these has a significant role in planning for NORTHCOM’s  missions. NORTHCOM planning efforts are guided by DOD policies and  procedures on joint planning that specify what should be included in the  plans as well as what organizations are required to submit plans in order  for the command to complete its planning process.
subsections: section_title: NORTHCOM Mission and Organization
paragraphs: NORTHCOM is the military command responsible for the planning,  organizing, and executing DOD’s homeland defense mission within its area  of responsibility—the continental United States (including Alaska) and  territorial waters—and civil support missions within the United States  (see fig. 1). Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. sovereignty,  territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against  external attacks and aggression. DOD is the lead federal agency for  homeland defense operations, such as air defense. Other federal agencies  would act in support of DOD in those circumstances. NORTHCOM’s  homeland defense mission incorporates air and space defense, land  defense, and maritime defense against external threats. One example of  how the homeland defense mission is conducted is Operation Noble Eagle,  the ongoing effort to protect against an air attack, such as those that  occurred on September 11, 2001.
NORTHCOM consists of a combatant command headquarters, a series of  smaller subordinate commands focused on particular missions or regions,  and component commands of the military services, which support  NORTHCOM’s planning and operations and command the land, maritime,  and air portions of a NORTHCOM joint operation. The NORTHCOM  Commander also commands the North American Aerospace Defense  Command (NORAD), a bi-national U.S. and Canadian organization charged  with air and maritime warning and airspace control. Figure 2 shows  NORTHCOM’s structure.
Civil support is DOD support to US civil authorities—such as DHS or other  agency—for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement  and other activities. DOD is not a lead federal agency for such missions  and thus operates in support of civil authorities only when directed to do  so by the President or the Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM would  command only the federal military portion of such operations and would  do so in direct support of another federal agency, such as FEMA.
Response to disasters or other catastrophic events in the United States is  guided by the National Response Framework, which involves a stepped  series of response, beginning with local authorities, state authorities, and  outside assistance from other states. Only when these capabilities are  exeeded would federal assistance become involved. It is at this point that  DOD may be asked to provide assistance. NORTHCOM would command  that DOD assistance. For civil support operations, there are three primary  situations in which DOD takes part in a federal response to a domestic  incident. Federal assistance, including assistance from DOD, can be  provided (1) at the direction of the President, (2) at the request of another  federal agency, such as DHs or FEMA, or (3) in response to a request from  local authorities when time is of the essence.
subsections: section_title: The Joint Operation Planning Process
paragraphs: Guidance for developing plans, such as NORTHCOM’s homeland defense  and civil support plans, is provided by DOD’s joint operation planning  process. This process establishes objectives, assesses threats, identifies  capabilities needed to achieve the objectives in a given environment, and  ensures that capabilities (and the military forces to deliver those  capabilities) are allocated to ensure mission success. Joint operation  planning and execution procedures also include assessing and monitoring  the readiness of those units providing the capabilities for the missions they  are assigned. Overall, the purpose of joint operation planning is to reduce  the risks inherent in military operations.
Joint operations plans themselves can take several forms, from the more  detailed to the more general. Examples of more detailed operations plans  include those prepared by several combatant commands for the kinds of  military operations dictated by a specific foreign threat or scenario, such  as the need to oppose a landward invasion of the territory of a U.S. ally by  a hostile nation. Such operations plans (OPLAN) are meant to cover  contingencies that are critical to U.S. national security and require detailed  planning in order to reduce risk to potential operations. These plans are  accompanied by detailed lists of military forces that would provide  required capabilities in order to execute the plan. Other plans are prepared  for less compelling but otherwise important national interest  contingencies and for unspecific threats (e.g., disaster relief, humanitarian  assistance, or peace operations fall under this category). These are  referred to as concept plans (CONPLAN) and are much more general in  nature but nonetheless are required to adhere to joint operational planning  standards. All of NORTHCOM’s plans are currently categorized as  CONPLANs.
Once a plan is drafted, it is reviewed several times by a number of DOD  stakeholders, primarily from the Joint Planning and Execution  Community, which consists of a broad range of military stakeholders, from  the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the military services, the  combatant commands, and the major DOD agencies. These stakeholders  provide input into all phases of planning, from mission analysis to the final  detailed plan.
In the last several years, DOD has begun to use what it refers to as an  adaptive planning process, whereby major plans are reviewed much more  often than in the past. All plans are now reviewed by DOD stakeholders  every 6 months.
section_title: NORTHCOM Planning Process for Homeland Defense and Civil Support
paragraphs: Part of NORTHCOM’s responsibility is to create plans to address its role in  various potential threats to the homeland, whether from potential enemy  attack or a natural disaster. Because the potential threats are so broad,  whether they involve terrorist attacks or potential natural disasters, the  plans NORTHCOM was required to develop by DOD usually take the form  of CONPLANs. Among the specific areas for which NORTHCOM prepares  plans are chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield  explosive (CBRNE) consequence management; pandemic influenza; and  nuclear accident response.
The specific contingencies for which NORTHCOM should plan are  directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM  follows several sets of strategies and guidance when planning for  homeland defense and civil support. Homeland defense planning follows  DOD guidance, such as the National Defense Strategy of the United States  of America, the Unified Command Plan, and Contingency Planning  Guidance. Civil support planning requires additional guidance. In addition  to the military guidance, because DOD is not the lead federal agency for  civil support missions involving domestic emergencies, natural disasters,  and similar events, it also follows the guidance prepared by the Homeland  Security Council and DHS in order to frame its civil support planning,  including the National Response Framework. To further guide planning  efforts for all hazards, the Homeland Security Council and DHS—along  with the federal interagency, and state and local homeland security  agencies—created the national planning scenarios. The scenarios provide  parameters for 15 highly plausible terrorist attack and natural disaster  situations, such as the detonation of a nuclear device by terrorists or a  major earthquake. The scenarios focus on the consequences that federal,  state, and local first responders will have to address and are intended to  illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic events for  which the nation needs to be prepared.
NORTHCOM prepares individual plans to cover its broad homeland  defense and civil support missions as well as subsets of those missions.  For example, while NORTHCOM has a major plan each for homeland  defense and civil support, it also has plans for air defense and for CBRNE  consequence management. NORTHCOM’s plans provide its subordinate,  component, and supporting commands and agencies with planning  guidance, such as types of incidents to prepare for and what kinds of plans  to prepare to support NORTHCOM’s plans.
section_title: NORTHCOM Has Completed Major Plans but Faces Considerable Challenges That Increase the Overall Risk to Its Ability to Execute Its Plans
paragraphs: NORTHCOM has completed—or is in the process of revising—all of its  major plans. However, NORTHCOM does not regularly track or assess the  required supporting plans from other DOD commands and agencies. This  heightens the risk that NORTHCOM cannot properly assess whether the  supporting organizations have adequately planned to assist the command  when an event takes place. Further, although NORTHCOM plans adhere to  military guidance in both content and structure, the command faces  additional challenges in such areas as (1) identifying required civil support  capabilities, (2) allocating capabilities (units, trained personnel, and  equipment) to meet potential requirements, and (3) monitoring the  readiness of forces delivering those capabilities. NORTHCOM and DOD  have some risk mitigation efforts under way in each of these areas that  partially address the challenges we found. However, it could take  additional steps to reduce the remaining level of risk to its ability to  effectively achieve its mission.
subsections: section_title: Major Plans Are Complete or Are Undergoing Revision
paragraphs: To date, NORTHCOM has completed nine major homeland defense and  civil support plans required by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and  DOD guidance, and is in the process of revising several of its plans in  accordance with the DOD requirement to review plans every 6 months for  potential revision, including its homeland defense plan. NORTHCOM  officials told us that they have placed priority on completing all of their  major plans over the last 2 years. In addition, NORTHCOM’s plans are now  undergoing review and consideration for major revision more often than  when the command was first established. Table 1 lists NORTHCOM’s  required major plans and the status of each with estimated completion and  revision dates where applicable.
NORTHCOM has also anticipated that DOD will require a 10th plan— Strategic Communications—and has fully drafted a plan in advance of this  guidance.
subsections: section_title: NORTHCOM Plans Adhere to Military Guidance
paragraphs: Although the majority of our review was focused on the two major  homeland defense and civil support plans, we also reviewed each of the  other plans and compared them to DOD’s established joint planning  standards for concept plans as well as NORTHCOM’s own concept of  operations for how it should plan for and conduct its missions. We found  that the plans met DOD’s standards for completeness in accordance with  DOD’s joint planning doctrine and adhered to NORTHCOM’s overall  concept of operations. For example, the plans include the required  concept, objectives, assumptions, and constraints sections that frame the  rest of the plan. We also reviewed the assumptions listed in the plans for  potential contradictions between one or more plans and found none. We  did not, however, independently validate the assumptions in the plans.  Some assumptions—such as assuming that adequate DOD forces would be  available to execute a plan—seemed broad and had the potential to affect  the entire plan if the assumption was proved invalid during a crisis.  However, NORTHCOM planning officials told us that some broad  assumptions are always necessary in order to even begin planning. They  said that once a plan needs to be executed, the assumptions are reviewed  again and the plan altered to account for an assumption that was  determined to be invalid. We also found that NORTHCOM’s civil support  plan adheres closely to the National Response Framework concept in that  NORTHCOM is to provide support for civil authorities upon request by a  lead federal agency.
section_title: NORTHCOM Plans Incorporate National Planning Scenarios
paragraphs: We also found that NORTHCOM’s plans incorporate 14 of the 15 national  planning scenarios developed by the Homeland Security Council in order  to guide federal agencies’ general planning and exercises. The one  scenario not incorporated into NORTHCOM’s plans is the cyber attack  planning scenario, which falls under U.S. Strategic Command’s area of  responsibility. Table 2 summarizes each of the 15 planning scenarios and  indicates where NORTHCOM planners have taken these scenarios into  consideration in their plans.
section_title: Limited Progress in Tracking and Reviewing Supporting Plans Increases Risk to the Planning Process
paragraphs: Because NORTHCOM officials have spent considerable time and effort in  completing or revising their major plans, they have not focused adequately  on the supporting plans that have been—or are to be—developed by other  organizations within DOD to assist NORTHCOM. Like all CONPLANs,  NORTHCOM’s plans require supporting plans from NORTHCOM’s  subordinate and component commands as well as other DOD agencies to  assist the responsible command—NORTHCOM—when an event occurs.  Because NORTHCOM’s major plans are less detailed and focused than the  operational plans of other combatant commands, these supporting plans  are critical for providing the operational level detail that is otherwise  lacking in the major plans. Supporting plans must also adhere to the same  joint doctrine standards as the broader plans and should contain  objectives, assumptions and constraints, and sections on such areas as  command and control, task organization, intelligence, and logistics.  Although there is no explicit DOD requirement that NORTHCOM  systematically review and track supporting plans, DOD guidance on joint  operation planning indicates that “in the absence of Joint Staff instructions  to the contrary, the supported commander will review and approve  supporting plans.” Regardless of whether there is an explicit requirement,  we believe it is prudent to perform these reviews to reduce the risk that  supporting agencies have not adequately planned to support NORTHCOM  when needed following a natural or man-made disaster.
The number of supporting plans required varies with the type of major  plan. For example, NORTHCOM’s homeland defense plan required  supporting plans from 25 commands and agencies, whereas the civil  support plan required supporting plans from only 6 commands and  agencies. Of the 6 supporting plans required by the civil support concept  plan, NORTHCOM officials had 4 in their possession when we reviewed  the plans at NORTHCOM headquarters. Similarly, of the 25 supporting  plans required by NORTHCOM’s homeland defense plan, NORTHCOM also  had only 3 at the time we reviewed plans. Some of the other 22  organizations expected to develop supporting plans for homeland defense  are the Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Intelligence  Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Defense Contract  Management Agency. With the exception of supporting plans by  NORTHCOM’s subordinate commands—such as Joint Task Force Alaska  and Joint Task Force Civil Support—and the component commands  whose plans they could provide copies of, NORTHCOM officials could not  report to us how many of the other supporting plans are completed. As we  report separately, NORTHCOM officials were uncertain about the status  and completeness of the supporting plans that the homeland defense  CONPLAN required NGB to coordinate with the states and forward to the  command.
We reviewed all the supporting plans NORTHCOM was able to locate for  the Homeland Defense, Defense Support to Civil Authorities, and CBRNE  Consequence Management plans, as well as several others we saw during  visits to other commands and DOD organizations. We found that in general  the supporting plans met the intent and objectives of the major strategic- level plans and had compatible assumptions. We did not, however, review  the supporting plans to the degree NORTHCOM officials would have to in  order to satisfy themselves that the plans meet the command’s needs, nor  did we independently validate the assumptions in the supporting plans.  NORTHCOM officials acknowledged that because they had devoted most  of their effort to completing and revising the major plans, until recently  they had not devoted enough attention to the supporting plans.  NORTHCOM officials told us that they are developing a process to track  the status of subordinate commands’ supporting plans. In fact, the officials  provided us an update on the status of these supporting plans. But this did  not include other DOD agencies, such as the Defense Threat Reduction  Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Defense Information Support  Agency, that are also supposed to be developing supporting plans for some  of NORTHCOM’s concept plans. Additionally, NORTHCOM officials told  us that they were planning to start reviewing supporting plans in a manner  similar to how DOD stakeholders review major plans. As long as this  approach encompasses all supporting plans, it could provide NORTHCOM  planning and operations officials with a much more detailed analysis of  the extent to which supporting plans meet their needs as well as help them  identify potential planning gaps. Without knowledge about the  completeness of supporting plans and the extent to which these plans  address NORTHCOM’s objectives, NORTHCOM officials face increased  uncertainty about the extent of planning and preparedness of other DOD  agencies if and when these agencies are called to respond.
section_title: NORTHCOM Has Difficulty Determining Required Capabilities for Its Civil Support Mission Because It Lacks Information on States
paragraphs: According to the strategic vision contained in NORTHCOM’s concept of  operations, NORTHCOM should facilitate the synchronization of national,  state, and local assets and capabilities to defend the nation and support  civilian authorities. One of the fundamental elements of operational  planning is determining the capabilities requirements for the mission to be  performed. Because NORTHCOM’s plans are broader CONPLANs rather  than more detailed OPLANs, they are not focused on specific scenarios  and discrete sets of required capabilities needed to accomplish objectives.  Without an understanding of the capabilities necessary for DOD to  conduct an operation, it is more difficult to plan in advance for the types,  numbers, and timing of capabilities (trained personnel and equipment) to  actually conduct an operation. For NORTHCOM’s homeland defense  mission, the required capabilities are based on an assessment of threats  and a number of factors that NORTHCOM and other DOD commands and  organizations assess. For NORTHCOM’s civil support mission, the  requirements the command faces are established by the needs of the  federal, state, and local agencies and organizations that DOD would be  supporting in an actual event.
Given the diverse environment that NORTHCOM is responsible for within  its area of responsibility, its civil support role varies by area, incident, and  other factors, which makes NORTHCOM’s ability to know its capability  requirements for any given civil support operation uncertain. Further,  NORTHCOM officials told us that they do not have access to enough detail  about from DHS or from the states in order to know what capabilities exist  at the state level and the extent to which there are capability gaps. DHS  has reported on the weaknesses in state and federal emergency plans both  in terms of the adequacy of the plans themselves and the lack of  information on required capabilities. As we report in a separate letter,  NORTHCOM has also not systematically reviewed state emergency plans  in order to obtain detailed information about the specific challenges it may  face in conducting homeland defense or civil support operations.  Coordination between NORTHCOM, DHS, NGB, and the states is therefore  important for emergency planning, particularly for civil support  operations.
NORTHCOM officials told us that understanding National Guard  capabilities is also problematic. For example, as we have reported, neither  DOD nor the states have fully determined the National Guard’s  requirements for civil support operations in the United States. The  National Guard serves as a critical portion of the response to a disaster,  whether in its normal role under the direct command of a state governor  or as part of a federal response once the President has made a  determination to federalize the Guard. In either case, uncertainty about the  National Guard’s civil support capabilities increases the risk to the  adequacy of NORTHCOM’s and DOD’s overall civil support planning effort.
In 2006, Congress required that DOD develop and maintain a database that  includes the types of emergency response capabilities DOD may be able to  provide in support of the National Response Framework’s emergency  support functions and the types of emergency response capabilities each  state’s National Guard may be able to provide in response to a domestic  natural or man-made disaster. DOD is also required to identify in this  database the specific units that are able to provide these capabilities.  Also, in 2006, Congress required FEMA to accelerate the completion of an  inventory of federal response capabilities and to develop a list of  organizations and functions within DOD that may be used to provide  support to civil authorities during natural or man-made disasters. FEMA  is still developing this list, and DOD is still developing the required  database. In January 2008, Congress required DOD to work with DHS to  determine the military-unique capabilities DOD needs to provide for civil  support operations and to prepare a plan to provide funds and resources  to maintain existing military-unique civil support capabilities or any  additional capabilities required for homeland defense and civil support  missions. In addition to descriptions of the emergency support functions,  the annexes to the previous National Response Plan—such as the  catastrophic incident annex—contain information about agency roles and  responsibilities as well as descriptions of capabilities. These annexes are  being revised as part of the new National Response Framework.
Until these efforts are completed and are coordinated with similar  information from the states, there remains a gap in knowledge about what  capabilities exist at all levels for responding to natural and man-made  disasters. This, in turn, limits NORTHCOM’s ability to fully identify the  civil support requirements for DOD forces.
NORTHCOM and DOD have taken some steps to mitigate the uncertainty  in civil support requirements. NORTHCOM officials reported to us that  through analyzing past disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, and potential  disasters—such as those represented by the national planning scenarios— they can reasonably determine the types of capabilities necessary to  support civil authorities. NORTHCOM officials said that this allows them  to anticipate the needs of states and local authorities in the event of a  disaster to some extent but that they can only “lean forward” so far  without infringing on the intent of the National Response Framework or  the prerogatives of the state governments. NORTHCOM and the Joint Staff  are also assessing NORTHCOM’s major plans (including Homeland  Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities) in order to determine  where the potential gaps in required capabilities may be and what specific  military capabilities are potentially required to address them. This may  better inform capabilities requirements and resource decisions.
NORTHCOM has also worked with FEMA and DOD officials to develop  prescripted mission assignments, which are descriptions of a set of  capabilities civil authorities might need from DOD in an emergency and  are written in such a way as to provide a common understanding of a  capability. NORTHCOM officials told us that the intent was to avoid  requests for specific DOD equipment that may or may not be suitable or  available to meet the request and to base requests on capabilities a  requesting agency needs that could potentially be addressed by a broader  range of DOD assets. For example, FEMA might request the capability to  move by air 40 metric tons rather than requesting a specific aircraft. This  enables DOD to apply a wide range of resources for solving a problem and  reduces confusion associated with varying requirements and terminology  across agencies. These mission assignments are designed to leverage  DOD’s areas of expertise and capabilities where civil agencies typically fall  short. Appendix II shows the 25 prescriptive mission assignments that  NORTHCOM and DOD have worked out with FEMA.
These mitigation efforts help reduce the uncertainty NORTHCOM faces in  determining requirements for civil support planning. But only a broader  effort by NORTHCOM, DOD, DHS, and the states to comprehensively  assess capabilities and capability gaps will help all stakeholders  understand the true extent of requirements in order to plan for natural and  man-made disasters in the United States.
section_title: Few Capabilities Are Allocated to Execute NORTHCOM’s Plans
paragraphs: One of the major challenges NORTHCOM faces in planning for and  conducting both homeland defense and civil support operations is  ensuring that it has adequate capabilities assigned to conduct those  missions as required. The major combatant commands, such as U.S.  European Command and U.S. Pacific Command, normally have forces  allocated to their operational control on a regular basis to meet their  general capabilities requirements and to perform other missions, such as  demonstrations of military presence in support of U.S. foreign policy  objectives. Further, the OPLANs prepared by combatant commands  normally have lists that detail which military units will respond to the plan,  if needed, and the timing of that deployment. DOD refers to this  information as time-phased force deployment data. The combination of  regularly assigned forces and force deployment lists associated with the  more detailed operations plans provides combatant commanders with a  reasonable level of assurance that sufficient forces will be available to  execute a plan if necessary and allows the commander to monitor the  readiness of the units assigned to the respective area of responsibility or  specific plan.
Since NORTHCOM was established in October 2002, DOD has routinely  considered the regular assignment of forces to the combatant commands  in what DOD refers to as a “Forces For Unified Commands” document.  However, despite the priority placed on homeland defense in the National  Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and other DOD strategic  guidance, DOD has only routinely assigned air defense and supporting  forces to NORTHCOM. A contributing factor may be that the pace and  scope of ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the  world has severely limited the number and types of units available to  respond to missions in the homeland. The assignment of forces to  combatant commands provides commanders with a means to know which  specific military forces are committed to that area of responsibility and,  conversely, allows commanders to perform risk assessments if those  forces must be committed elsewhere.
In addition to lacking regularly assigned forces, NORTHCOM officials told  us that their plans usually do not have lists that detail the military units  that will be used because the plans are meant to cover a less-specific and  broader range of threats, rather than specific scenarios. Only one  NORTHCOM plan—the CBRNE Consequence Management plan—had a  force deployment list at the time of our review of the plans. NORTHCOM  has since developed force deployment lists as part of the revised  homeland defense plan but not for the civil support plan. NORTHCOM  officials told us that they created the CBRNE consequence management  list in order to stress the importance of providing forces to the CBRNE  mission. The force deployment list lays out the capabilities for what DOD  calls the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF),  which is intended to be a series of separate units totaling roughly 15,000  personnel to provide initial response assistance to civil authorities in the  event of a major CBRNE incident in the country. We reported previously  on the lack of adequate training, equipment, and availability of active and  reserve chemical and biological units and the potential difficulty DOD  faced in meeting NORTHCOM’s CBRNE requirements. Despite being the  only set of capabilities dedicated to a NORTHCOM civil support plan, the  CCMRF has never been fully manned and equipped by DOD because many  of the units that would make up the force have been deployed to their  wartime missions or because of other availability or sourcing issues. DOD  and National Guard officials are currently negotiating a plan whereby  Guard units may provide the majority of CCMRF capabilities for a certain  period until the Active Army can resume responsibility. However, lack of  agreement between DOD and National Guard Bureau stakeholders on  sources of funding and command and control issues continues to delay the  effort.
While a force deployment list does not guarantee that the appropriate  units, trained personnel, and equipment will be available to execute a  military plan, such a list provides a known set of capabilities against which  to measure readiness and assess risk if all or part of the forces on the list  are unavailable. None of NORTHCOM’s other civil support plans have  force deployment lists, which limits NORTHCOM’s ability to know which  military units may respond to its homeland defense or civil support  missions if the need arises.
To help mitigate the uncertainties caused by the lack of forces being  assigned to execute NORTHCOM’s plans, NORTHCOM and DOD have  developed a series of standing “execute orders” in the homeland defense  and civil support areas. These orders identify the general types and  numbers of forces necessary to execute missions in such areas as air and  maritime homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. One  example is the domestic air defense order associated with Operation  Noble Eagle. Additionally, during periods of heightened specific threats,  such as the yearly hurricane season, NORTHCOM and the Joint Staff have  prepared temporary execute orders that detail more specific military  forces that can be called upon to meet an emerging NORTHCOM need to  support civil authorities. The execute orders serve as the gateway to the  “request for forces” process whereby NORTHCOM requests forces from  U.S. Joint Forces Command, through the Joint Staff, and Joint Forces  Command assigns specific military forces from the services to meet the  specific requirement, if possible. The orders also allow NORTHCOM to  place units on notice to prepare to deploy for a short time in advance of  their actual assignment to NORTHCOM.
According to Joint Forces Command and NORTHCOM officials, about  40,000 military personnel are associated with all of NORTHCOM’s execute  orders and the CBRNE Consequence Management plan. However, with the  exception of the dedicated homeland defense orders—such as Operation  Noble Eagle—the CCMRF deployment list and civil support execute  orders have very few units actually sourced to them. This means an  increased level of uncertainty about whether the appropriate number of  properly trained personnel and the correct equipment will be available  when a plan needs to be executed. NORTHCOM officials are concerned  about the high number of unsourced units and the corresponding level of  uncertainty about the availability of appropriate military forces to meet  their homeland defense and civil support needs. It should be noted,  however, that we found no instances where Joint Forces Command could  not meet NORTHCOM’s operational needs for an actual homeland defense  or civil support mission. Fortunately, NORTHCOM’s homeland defense  and civil support operations have mostly been manageable and not large- scale events. For example, in addition to Operation Noble Eagle, which  NORTHCOM carries out every day, the command conducts anticipated  and unanticipated operations in support of civil authorities, such as the  response to the Minneapolis bridge collapse and Hurricane Dean in August  2007 and in response to the California wildfires in October 2007.
NORTHCOM officials told us that the execute order process has provided  them some limited measure of assurance that adequate military forces will  be available for their homeland defense and civil support plans. However,  the absence of regularly assigned forces in NORTHCOM’s area of  responsibility and the lack of units specifically identified to execute  NORTHCOM’s plans may increase the level of risk to homeland defense or  civil support operations in terms of the availability of a sufficient number  of personnel with the appropriate level of training and equipment for  conducting the domestic mission.
section_title: NORTHCOM’s Ability to Monitor the Readiness of Forces to Respond to Civil Support Missions Is Hampered
paragraphs: NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness of individual military  units because in part, few requirements or units that may respond to a  request for civil support have been identified. In contrast, through its  planning process for homeland defense, NORTHCOM has determined the  forces it needs for this mission and, through the services, monitors the  readiness of these forces. DOD normally measures the readiness of  military units by (1) assigning them to conduct missions associated with  specific plans and (2) using lists of mission-essential tasks that correlate to  the actual mission they would perform. The degree to which units have the  numbers of trained personnel and the equipment necessary to accomplish  those mission-essential tasks serves as the overall measure of a unit’s  readiness.
According to NORTHCOM, Joint Forces Command, Joint Staff, and U.S.  Army Forces Command officials, DOD generally assumes that a unit  capable of performing its military mission is also capable of performing a  civil support mission, but this may not always be true. Neither  NORTHCOM nor the military services have developed mission-essential  tasks for civil support missions. We have reported on the mismatch  between assessments of readiness based solely on wartime missions and  the requirements of domestic civil support missions. Whereas homeland  defense missions in and around the United States would be similar to  traditional wartime missions, those same mission tasks do not necessarily  provide a complete picture of readiness for a domestic civil support  mission. As a result, DOD does not have a direct method to measure the  readiness of units for the civil support mission.
DOD officials told us that it is often possible for a unit to be considered  not ready for its wartime mission but be able to execute a civil support  mission. For example, a U.S. Army air defense unit whose surface-to-air  missile launchers are still overseas or undergoing depot repair is not  considered ready to conduct its wartime mission. However, to the extent  that personnel, trucks, and other equipment were still with the unit, it may  be ready to conduct a civil support mission, such as delivering supplies to  a disaster area. This is not captured in DOD’s readiness system. Further,  the lack of mission-essential tasks for the range of civil support missions  leads to a potential gap in DOD’s knowledge of whether sufficient trained  personnel and equipment are available. For example, NORTHCOM’s civil  disturbance plan assumes that nonlethal equipment and methods would be  necessary and that the forces required to conduct such operations have  been trained in nonlethal methods. But without a set of mission tasks  against which to measure unit readiness, there is no objective means of  determining if military units can meet these tasks.
Because at the time of our review only one of NORTHCOM’s major plans  has actual units assigned to it (CBRNE Consequence Management),  NORTHCOM officials were unable to monitor readiness of units that may  be asked to respond to other plans, even if there were specific civil  support-related mission tasks. We have work under way reviewing DOD’s  Readiness Reporting System, and we did not assess the accuracy of that  system as part of this review. However, we asked NORTHCOM officials to  show us the extent to which they could use DOD’s readiness systems to  monitor readiness for both its homeland defense and civil support  missions.
For the ability to respond to potential CBRNE attacks, NORTHCOM has  developed mission-essential tasks for the CCMRF. However, Joint Staff  and National Guard officials told us that they estimated that the wartime  military tasks of the units only met about 70 percent of the CCMRF’s total  mission, which further indicates the mismatch between wartime tasks a  unit may face in comparison to tasks it may face in a domestic, non- wartime environment. Joint Task Force Civil Support, NORTHCOM’s  subordinate command for CBRNE consequence management, routinely  uses the CCMRF’s mission-essential tasks, the existing DOD readiness  system, and direct interaction with Joint Forces Command and Army  officials to monitor the readiness of CCMRF forces on a routine basis.  Even with this effort, NORTHCOM and Joint Task Force Civil Support  officials told us that it is difficult to track readiness because, as we  indicated earlier, so few of the units are actually filled with the personnel  and equipment necessary. Nonetheless, the fact that the CBRNE forces  have mission tasks against which to measure readiness in the existing  system provides a level of knowledge about the overall state of readiness  to execute the CBRNE plan. This, in turn, provides the NORTHCOM  Commander and DOD with a clearer picture of the risk they face in that  area. Because no mission tasks exist for general civil support missions,  NORTHCOM and DOD face greater uncertainty about their ability to  execute these plans.
Mission-essential tasks are also critical guides for training military units  for their missions and for conducting and evaluating exercises.  NORTHCOM conducts two major exercises each year that include both  homeland defense and civil support elements. The command also  participates in other commands’ live exercises as well as tabletop  simulations of various homeland defense and civil support operations.  Further, NORTHCOM has a system for incorporating lessons learned from  training exercises into plans and future training exercises. The system has  a good structure for submitting and processing lessons, including multiple  layers of review to assess the validity of lessons and the assignment of  individuals with the responsibility of managing and addressing lessons.  NORTHCOM officials believe that the system is adequate, and they  continue to seek ways to improve the process. Ensuring that appropriate  mission-essential tasks are associated with each of the missions for which  NORTHCOM is responsible would further help NORTHCOM officials  evaluate exercises and actual operations and incorporate lessons learned  into future exercises and plan revisions. The command would also be in a  better position to conduct meaningful analysis to identify recurring  lessons and understand the causes of various systemic issues. This, in  turn, would allow NORTHCOM and DOD to identify those areas where  increased effort—and possibly resources—may be required.
To mitigate the uncertainties in readiness for civil support operations,  NORTHCOM has worked with Joint Forces Command and the military  services in advance of some potential incidents, such as hurricanes and  wildfires, to gain a better understanding of what units were likely to be  assigned, if necessary. This interaction has allowed NORTHCOM and other  DOD stakeholders to directly monitor the personnel and equipment status  of military units to determine if they would be prepared to adequately  respond to a civil support mission. For the remainder of NORTHCOM’s  potential civil support missions, NORTHCOM still lacks an objective  means to determine if the units that will be conducting civil support  operations in fact have the capabilities needed to fully conduct these  missions.
section_title: New National Planning Requirements May Help NORTHCOM Address Planning Challenges
paragraphs: In December 2007, the President issued an annex to the 2003 Homeland  Security Presidential Directive 8 that establishes a standard and  comprehensive approach to national planning for homeland security.  Included in the new instructions is a requirement that the federal  government more closely integrate federal, state, local, and tribal plans  with respect to capability assessments. This may further assist  NORTHCOM in more accurately determining its capability requirements  for civil support missions.
Among the new requirements was also a series of cascading plans at the  strategic, operational, and tactical levels. For example, all relevant federal  agencies are now required to prepare more detailed OPLANs with respect  to their specific homeland security missions. Thus far, NORTHCOM has  been required only to prepare less detailed CONPLANs. The definition for  OPLANs in the new guidance includes a requirement that such a plan  “identifies detailed resource, personnel and asset allocations.” This is  similar to the level of detail DOD requires in its OPLANs, including the  force deployment lists we discussed.
If these comprehensive national planning processes are pursued by DOD,  in coordination with DHS, NORTHCOM may be able to further address  some of the challenges and gaps we highlight.
section_title: NORTHCOM’s Planning Personnel Have Adequate Staff Level and Are Expanding Experience and Training
paragraphs: NORTHCOM has an adequate number of planning personnel, and the  command is pursuing opportunities to expand the experience and training  for staff needed to perform the command’s planning function. While the  unique characteristics associated with a domestic military command  present challenges, NORTHCOM officials address these circumstances by  integrating National Guard and Coast Guard personnel with NORTHCOM  staff. NORTHCOM, independently and with other organizations, is also  developing educational opportunities that address the challenges  associated with the interagency and state/federal environment that  planners face.
subsections: section_title: NORTHCOM Planning Positions Staffed at High Levels
paragraphs: We compared the numbers and general qualifications of NORTHCOM’s  planning staff with those of other combatant commands as a way of  gaining a rough understanding of what NORTHCOM’s staff looks like in  comparison to commands that have been established for a longer period of  time. NORTHCOM’s planning staff is assigned at over 96 percent of the  command’s authorized staffing level. These staff members include all  headquarters staff who have some form of planning function and not just  the staff of the plans directorates or those personnel with specific  designations as planners. As shown in table 3, with the exception of the  U.S. Central Command, NORTHCOM also has a greater number of staff it  considers to be planners and was staffed at a higher percentage of its  authorization than all other combatant commands responding to our  information requests.
We did not independently validate NORTHCOM’s requirements for  planning personnel. However, NORTHCOM officials said that they believe  they have an adequate number of planning personnel. Further,  NORTHCOM has been conducting an ongoing assessment of its overall  manpower needs and is evaluating the extent to which changes in  requirements for personnel may be needed.
NORTHCOM officials stated that partially because of the need to support  other operations, such as ongoing military operations overseas, the  command attempts to maximize the use of civilian staff in its workforce to  maintain continuity and consistency. Civilian staff provides an institutional  knowledge base and experience level that compliments the capabilities of  military officers who rotate through the command’s directorates. Over  one-half of the command’s planning staff is civilian or contractor  personnel. As shown in table 4, two other commands in our review, U.S.  Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command, also rely heavily on civilian  or contract personnel.
The military personnel who serve as NORTHCOM planners receive basic  planning-related training similar to that of planners in other combatant  commands. DOD and the services provide educational opportunities for  members of the U.S. Armed Forces, international officers, and federal  government civilians. These opportunities provide a broad body of  knowledge that enables students to develop expertise in the art and  science of war. Many of NORTHCOM’s military planners have completed  some of these courses. A number of these courses are also offered to  civilian planning personnel.
section_title: NORTHCOM’s Staff Includes National Guard and Coast Guard Personnel
paragraphs: To accomplish its homeland defense and civil support missions,  NORTHCOM must plan for and interact with other federal, state, and  territorial government agencies in addition to Canada and Mexico. The  need to plan for and conduct operations (1) within the United States and  (2) in support of other federal agencies, 49 state governments, and Canada  and Mexico presents a challenge to most planners who have functioned  solely in a military environment.
NORTHCOM has sought to address this challenge by integrating personnel  from the National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard into NORTHCOM’s  headquarters staff. These personnel have experience working in the state  environment and are incorporated into most, if not all, of the NORTHCOM  directorates that conduct some form of operational planning. Thirty-six  National Guard and 22 U.S. Coast Guard personnel are stationed at  NORTHCOM. These personnel provide command planners and operations  personnel with co-workers who have experience planning for and  conducting operations with other federal and state agencies.
In January 2008, Congress required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff to review the military and civilian positions, job descriptions, and  assignments at NORTHCOM. The goal is to determine the feasibility of  increasing the number of reserve component military personnel or civilian  staff with experience in homeland defense and civil support at  NORTHCOM.
section_title: NORTHCOM Has Efforts Under Way to Train DOD Planners for Domestic Operations
paragraphs: Having an adequate number of properly trained personnel to ensure that  missions are successfully planned is a decisive factor in the success of any  mission. NORTHCOM officials have been attempting to establish and  maintain a cadre of personnel in the active military with knowledge and  experience in NORTHCOM planning, homeland defense, civil support, and  interagency planning and coordination that go beyond the basic level  training the military provides in joint planning. These efforts extend from  the level of basic orientation training all the way to programs at the  graduate level.
NORTHCOM planners are required to complete an orientation course that  serves as a “crosswalk” between DOD’s homeland defense and civil  support plans and the plans of their agency partners. The orientation  course also provides students with a better understanding of DOD policy  regarding the protection of the homeland. DOD officials told us that  additional such planning courses are now offered at other DOD schools,  such as the Army’s Command and General Staff College and School of  Advanced Military Studies.
As recommended in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,  NORTHCOM has taken steps to create training programs and partner with  other agencies and private institutions. The goal is to develop educational  opportunities for interagency and state/federal environment planners to  inform them of other agencies’ homeland security responsibilities to  improve overall cooperation and coordination. For example, NORTHCOM  has developed a course for DOD and interagency personnel that focuses  on support to civil authorities. While the course does not directly address  the detailed aspects of planning, it provides an overview of DOD and other  agencies’ responsibility for homeland security. Officials from the Joint  Forces Staff College believe this is a valuable course and they are  considering requiring students to complete it before they can take certain  other courses at the college. In addition, NORTHCOM has developed a  training curriculum for each of its planning personnel. NORTHCOM  officials stated that each planner’s progress in completing the curriculum  is automatically tracked to ensure timely completion. Several of the  courses in the curriculum must be completed within specific time periods.
To further expand the educational opportunities for its own staff as well  as staff from agencies across the federal government, NORTHCOM has  also partnered with the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs to  develop the Center for Homeland Security, located on the campus of the  University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, which provides research and  educational capabilities to meet specific needs regarding protection of the  homeland. One of the accomplishments of the center is the creation of  several programs of study in homeland defense, including undergraduate  and graduate certificates in homeland security and homeland defense.  According to a senior official with the center, the four courses required for  the graduate certificate can also be applied toward a master of business  administration and a master of public affairs. The center, in cooperation  with several of its partners, including NORTHCOM, is also in the process  of developing other educational programs, such as a master of arts and a  doctoral program in homeland security.
According to NORTHCOM officials, a cooperative effort among the  University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, the Naval Postgraduate  School, and NORTHCOM helped found the Homeland Security/Defense  Education Consortium, which is a network of teaching and research  institutions focused on promoting education, research, and cooperation  related to and supporting the homeland security/defense mission. The  consortium conducts two symposia annually, one at NORTHCOM and a  second at a FEMA location. The Naval Postgraduate School also has a  master’s degree program through its Center for Homeland Defense and  Security. This program, designed in cooperation with FEMA, includes  strategy development, organizational, planning, and interagency  coordination aspects. NORTHCOM personnel have started to take  advantage of these programs on a case-by-case basis, but there are no  command requirements for NORTHCOM staff to attend any of these  courses or programs.
NORTHCOM’s efforts to provide additional training and education for its  staff should help the command expand its experience in planning and  conducting operations with partners at the international, federal, and state  levels. NORTHCOM officials have recognized the need for such education  opportunities at all levels for their own staff as well as for other military  and civilian personnel. At some point, NORTHCOM may be in a position to  require certain prerequisites in this area for military or civilian staff who  may be considered for assignment to the command.
section_title: NORTHCOM Has Taken Actions to Improve Interagency Coordination but Lacks a Formal Process to Ensure That Coordination Efforts Are Adopted
paragraphs: NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve the coordination of its  homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal  agencies. Such coordination is important for ensuring that proper planning  in advance of an attack or a natural disaster and that such operations  proceed as smoothly as possible if they need to be conducted. However,  NORTHCOM lacks formal guidance to coordinate its planning effort with  its agency partners. This results in uncertainty about which planning  coordination efforts are continued or agreed to by higher authorities and  an increased risk that interagency planning will not be done effectively.
subsections: section_title: NORTHCOM Has Taken Steps to Improve Coordination
paragraphs: We found several areas in which NORTHCOM has taken steps to improve  coordination with other agencies and organizations, many resulting from  the lessons learned following Hurricane Katrina. Coordination is important  not just for interagency planning but also to ensure that NORTHCOM and  its agency partners work together effectively when an incident actually  occurs. For example, NORTHCOM created an Interagency Coordination  Directorate in 2002 to assist in its collaboration efforts. Today, 40 agencies  and organizations are represented at NORTHCOM, including a senior  executive official from DHS as well as officials from FEMA, the Federal  Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The  directorate is designed to help build effective relationships by facilitating,  coordinating, and synchronizing information sharing across organizational  boundaries. NORTHCOM and U.S. Southern Command are the only  combatant commands with directorates dedicated solely to interagency  coordination. Table 5 shows the agencies currently represented at  NORTHCOM.
The presence of agency representatives provides a regular opportunity for  direct interaction between them and NORTHCOM staff. NORTHCOM and  other agency officials with whom we spoke agreed that this level of  regular contact is beneficial for coordinating plans in advance but also for  the more immediate needs of coordination when an event actually occurs.  Such agency representatives should therefore have the experience to  provide an effective link to their parent agencies and possess the  appropriate level of access to agency leadership in order to facilitate  interagency decision-making. When a major incident occurs, the agency  representatives, known as the Interagency Coordination Center, become a  direct adjunct to the NORTHCOM Commander’s battle staff, assisting the  command in its immediate crisis planning and providing a direct link to  their parent agencies.
The Interagency Directorate also administers NORAD-NORTHCOM’s Joint  Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), which is composed primarily of  the 40 resident agency representatives who are experts in interagency  planning and operations on the command’s staff. The JIACG’s role is to  coordinate with civilian federal agency partners to facilitate interagency  operational planning in contingency operations. All combatant commands  are establishing JIACGs. The JIACG supports day-to-day planning and  advises NORTHCOM planners regarding civilian agency operations,  capabilities, and limitations. Further, the JIACG provides the command  with day-to-day knowledge of the interagency situation and links directly  with agency partners at the command and in other locations when an  operation is necessary. The JIACG also conducts focused planning on  specific issues. For example, the group met with officials from the Centers  for Disease Control and Prevention and the Department of Health and  Human Services in August 2006 to coordinate federal efforts for  responding to a potential influenza pandemic. The JIACG also formed a  working group to integrate private sector capabilities and interests into  NORTHCOM plans and operations as appropriate. Specifically, the group’s  objectives were to determine how to provide NORTHCOM with private  sector information regarding facilities and operations, achieve  coordination and cooperation with the private sector, and gain and  maintain awareness of technological initiatives developed in the private  sector. The JIACG also formed working groups for law enforcement  issues, earthquakes, and prescripted mission assignments.
According to FEMA’s Director, one of the most important interagency  planning tools developed as a result of the lessons learned during  Hurricane Katrina is the prescripted mission assignments discussed  earlier. NORTHCOM collaborated with FEMA and other agencies to  identify the most likely tasks DOD would be asked to fulfill and drafted  generic mission assignments for those tasks in terms of capability  requirements rather than specific resources. Twenty-five prescripted  mission assignments are included in NORTHCOM’s standing Defense  Support for Civil Authorities Execute Order.
These mission assignments also include defense coordinating officers  (DCO) who are located in each of FEMA’s 10 regional offices (see fig. 3).  Officials from several agencies told us that locating the DCOs in the FEMA  regions and assigning greater emphasis to the DCOs’ missions has  enhanced interagency coordination, particularly with states. The DCOs are  senior military officers with joint experience and training on the National  Response Framework, defense support to civil authorities, and DHS’s  National Incident Management System. They are responsible for assisting  civil authorities, when requested by FEMA, by providing liaison support  and capabilities requirements validation. DCOs serve as single points of  contact for state, local, and other federal authorities that need DOD  support. DCOs work closely with federal, state, and local officials to  determine what unique DOD capabilities are necessary and can be used to  help mitigate the effects of a natural or man-made disaster. For example,  during the recent California wildfires, NORTHCOM’s subordinate  command, Army Forces North, deployed the Region IX DCO to support  the Joint Field Office in Pasadena, California, and assess and coordinate  defense support of civil authorities to FEMA. Based on the requirements  identified by state and federal officials in consultation with the DCO, DOD  and the National Guard deployed six aircraft equipped with the Modular  Airborne Firefighting System to California to assist in fighting the  wildfires.
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NORTHCOM has also improved interagency coordination through its  involvement in hurricane preparation with a wide range of state and  federal partners, including state adjutants general, FEMA, NGB, and state  and local emergency managers. NORTHCOM facilitates weekly hurricane  teleconferences throughout the hurricane season, which lasts from June to  November every year, to provide the opportunity for agencies to discuss  potential storms; resources available in the affected area as well as  through other sources, such as the Emergency Management Assistance  Compact (EMAC) or FEMA; and potential needs or unique capabilities  that DOD may be asked to provide. As a result of this frequent interaction,  NORTHCOM, DHS, and state officials believe the command has begun to  build more productive and effective relationships with the hurricane states  and participating agencies. For example, in anticipation of Hurricane Dean  being upgraded from a tropical storm in August 2007, at FEMA’s request  NORTHCOM deployed a DCO and supporting team to the Caribbean in  preparation for landfall. The DCO was prepared to coordinate requests for  military assistance and resources and provide direct support to federal,  state, and local agencies responding to the incident.
In addition to efforts to coordinate with federal agencies and  organizations, NORTHCOM recently began efforts to increase  coordination with private sector businesses and nongovernmental  organizations in planning for and responding to disasters to help  NORTHCOM better focus resources and ensure that efforts are not  duplicated. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, Wal-Mart was able to  deliver bottled water to some locations more quickly than federal agencies  could. Since many of NORTHCOM’s coordination efforts with  nongovernmental organizations are recent, it is too soon to determine how  successful they will be.
section_title: NORTHCOM Lacks Formal Procedures to Ensure That Integrated Planning Will Be Fully Adopted
paragraphs: Despite the steps that NORTHCOM has taken to improve federal  interagency coordination, we found that it lacks formalized procedures— such as memorandums of understanding or charters—to ensure that  agreements or arrangements made between the command and agency  representatives can be relied on for planning purposes. As we have  reported in the past, key practices that can enhance and sustain  interagency planning coordination efforts include—among others— establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies, agreeing on roles and  responsibilities, and identifying and addressing needs by leveraging  resources. We also reported that interagency coordination can be  enhanced by articulating agreements in formal documents, such as a  memorandum of understanding, interagency guidance, or interagency  planning document, signed by senior officials in the respective agencies.  DOD’s adaptive planning—that is, the joint capability to create and revise  plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require—includes  interagency coordination as a key part of the plan development process.  Further, the nature of NORTHCOM’s homeland defense and civil support  missions requires interagency coordination and support throughout all  levels of planning and operations. This is particularly important since so  many government agencies share the responsibility to ensure an effective  response to disasters such as Hurricane Katrina. It is therefore crucial that  DOD—through NORTHCOM—plan and coordinate thoroughly with all  relevant federal agencies.
NORTHCOM planners have achieved some success in coordinating  NORTHCOM’s homeland defense plan with an Incident Management  Planning Team (IMPT), an interagency team created by DHS to provide  contingency and crisis action incident management planning based on the  15 national planning scenarios. However, the planners told us that their  successful collaboration with the IMPT is largely because of the dedicated  personalities involved. For example, NORTHCOM planners have  informally instituted workshops and biweekly teleconferences with the  IMPT core and on-call groups to review NORTHCOM’s homeland defense  plan, as well as to discuss the overarching objectives of homeland defense  and security. NORTHCOM officials told us that the IMPT offers a unique  avenue of coordination direct to various agency partners and has helped to  break down institutional barriers by promoting more constructive  relationships between the agencies involved. However, without a formal  charter or memorandum of understanding that institutionalizes the  structure for integrated interagency planning, there is a risk that these  efforts to coordinate with agency partners will not continue when the  current planning staff move to their next assignments. Further, these and  other coordination efforts do not have mechanisms for obtaining parent  agency approval of agreements reached, and it is unclear what will be  done with the results of their efforts. Consequently, many otherwise  valuable interagency efforts may not be sufficiently supported by one or  more participating agencies, and key agency staff can be confused about  which coordination mechanisms serve a particular function.
As part of the new Homeland Security Presidential Directive annex on  national planning, DHS is required to coordinate with the heads of other  federal agencies and develop an integrated planning system. This planning  system is required to  1.  provide common processes for developing plans;  2.  serve to implement phase one of DHS’s Homeland Security  3. national planning doctrine and planning guidance, instruction, and  process to ensure consistent planning across the federal  government;    a mechanism that provides for concept development to identify and  analyze the mission and potential courses of action;    a description of the process that allows for plan refinement and  proper execution to reflect developments in risk, capabilities, or  policies, as well as to incorporate lessons learned from exercises  and actual events;    a description of the process that links regional, state, local, and  tribal plans, planning cycles, and processes and allows these plans  to inform the development of federal plans;    a process for fostering vertical and horizontal integration of federal,  state, local, and tribal plans that allows for state, local, and tribal  capability assessments to feed into federal plans; and    a guide for all-hazards planning, with comprehensive, practical  guidance and instruction on fundamental planning principles that  can be used at federal, state, local, and tribal levels to assist the  planning process.
Such an integrated planning system, if developed and institutionalized  across the federal government in coordination with state and local  governments, should further address the interagency coordination gaps we  identified.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: After being in operation for over 5 years, NORTHCOM has begun to  establish itself as a major combatant command and plan for its role in  leading homeland defense operations and assisting civil authorities in the  event of major disasters.
NORTHCOM has developed, refined, and is now revising a body of major  homeland defense and civil support plans. Nonetheless, NORTHCOM’s  limited progress in adequately tracking and assessing the supporting plans  necessary to carry out homeland defense and civil support operations  introduces increased risk in the planning process. The review process  NORTHCOM officials told us they are developing to track and assess  supporting plans from other commands and agencies should help them  close this gap, but only if their process is consistently applied and includes  supporting plans from all commands, organizations, and agencies required  to submit them. Further, the considerable challenges NORTHCOM faces in  planning for and conducting homeland defense and civil support missions  are exacerbated by decisions DOD and the command have made. DOD’s  decision not to assign regular forces to NORTHCOM, the decision not to  associate specific military capabilities and units with NORTHCOM’s plans,  and the decision not to develop mission-essential tasks for civil support  missions each introduce increased uncertainty into NORTHCOM’s  homeland defense and civil support planning efforts. When considering  their compounding effects together, the risk to NORTHCOM’s planning  effort are increased even further. To some degree, NORTHCOM will  always face challenges and risk in planning because it has to be prepared  for a wide variety of incidents that can range from a regional flood to a  catastrophic nuclear incident to a widespread terrorist attack. The  capabilities allocation and other planning challenges we discuss can be  further addressed, but there is no guarantee that this will compensate for  the scarcity of units and equipment because of the pace of ongoing  operations overseas. However, addressing the planning gaps we identified  would permit NORTHCOM and DOD a much more accurate understanding  of the risk associated with homeland defense and civil support operations  in the United States. Such risk mitigation efforts have recently been  required as part of the President’s and DHS’s national preparedness  guidance on national planning, and these requirements provide an  opportunity for DOD and NORTHCOM to address the gaps we identified.
NORTHCOM’s federal interagency coordination efforts have helped  address some of the uncertainty in the homeland defense and civil support  planning process and have improved NORTHCOM’s ability to coordinate  in the event of actual incidents. This is important because responding to a  major disaster in the United States—natural or man-made—is a shared  responsibility of many government agencies with states often requiring  federal assistance from DHS and DOD. Without clear guidance and  procedures on interagency roles and responsibilities across the federal  government and an understanding about which interagency planning  efforts or coordination mechanisms are authoritative, the multiple  interagency efforts that have been ongoing might not meet their potential  for integrating operational planning dealing with all threats to the  homeland, natural or man-made. If the integrated planning system required  by the President’s new homeland security guidance is developed and  institutionalized across the federal government in coordination with state  and local governments, it should further assist NORTHCOM and DOD in  addressing the interagency coordination gaps we identified.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help NORTHCOM reduce the level of risk to its homeland defense and  civil support planning efforts, in conjunction with the new national  planning requirements of the National Response Framework and the  national planning annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, we  are making three recommendations:    We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of  NORTHCOM to complete the process to track the status of all  supporting plans, coordinate the completion of those plans by other  commands and agencies, and assess the suitability of those plans to  meet the intent and objectives of NORTHCOM’s major plans.
Given the priority DOD places on homeland defense, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense assign forces to NORTHCOM—as is done  for other combatant commands—as well as require NORTHCOM to  develop dedicated time-phased force deployment data lists for each of  its major plans.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of  NORTHCOM, in consultation and coordination with the services, to  develop mission-essential tasks for its civil support plans. Individual  units required for these missions should be identified, and these  mission-essential tasks should be included as part of DOD’s readiness  assessment systems in order to permit consistent tracking of readiness  for specific elements of NORTHCOM’s plans.
To help NORTHCOM and DOD better integrate their operational planning  practices into the interagency and national preparedness structure, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the  Commander of NORTHCOM and other appropriate federal agencies,  develop clear guidance and procedures for interagency planning efforts,  including appropriate memorandums of understanding and charters for  interagency planning groups. This should be done in conjunction with the  integrated planning system required in the national planning annex to  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with the  intent of our recommendations and discussed steps it is taking and  planning to take to address these recommendations. DOD also provided  technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report where  appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that NORTHCOM complete the  process to track the status of supporting plans, coordinate the completion  of those plans by other commands and agencies, and assess the suitability  of those plans to meet the intent and objectives of NORTHCOM’s major  plans, DOD agreed with the need for these actions but stated that the  existing guidance we noted in our report already provides sufficient  direction. We agree that further formal guidance or direction may be  unnecessary as long as NORTHCOM consistently pursues its effort to  review supporting plans, including the supporting plans of all commands,  agencies, and organizations required to prepare such plans. For example,  some plans call for other DOD agencies and even non-DOD agencies to  prepare supporting plans. In these cases, while NORTHCOM may not have  the authority to compel compliance, it should nevertheless review these  supporting plans for adequacy.
In response to our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense assign  forces to NORTHCOM, DOD agreed that certain specialized forces, such as  those trained and equipped for CBRNE consequence management, should  be regularly assigned to NORTHCOM but said that it was not practical to  attempt to assign general purpose forces to meet all possible civil support  contingencies. DOD did not agree that all NORTHCOM plans should have  force deployment lists because it would not provide the level of readiness  tracking that we highlighted as being necessary in our report. We agree  that it is not practical to assign forces to NORTHCOM in an attempt to  cover all possible contingencies. Our concern was that the NORTHCOM  Commander should have a similar level of flexibility and day-to-day  readiness assurance that regularly assigned forces provide to other  combatant commanders. Assigning some specialized forces to  NORTHCOM would contribute to providing such flexibility and assurance.
DOD stated that it will work to develop civil support readiness metrics for  general purpose forces rather than prepare specific force deployment lists  for individual plans that were not already required to have them. We  believe this effort would help institutionalize the importance of DOD’s  domestic mission and provide NORTHCOM and other DOD authorities a  means of monitoring readiness to accomplish domestic missions.
With respect to our recommendation that DOD develop mission-essential  tasks for NORTHCOM’s civil support plans and identify the units required  for these missions, DOD agreed with our assessment that NORTHCOM  needs to track units’ readiness to complete civil support missions but said  that identifying units for all its civil support tasks would be impractical.  DOD reiterated its proposal to develop civil support-specific metrics  against which all general purpose forces could be measured. We believe  that developing such metrics would meet the intent of our  recommendation and would further institutionalize DOD’s domestic  mission throughout the force.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that clear guidance be developed  for interagency planning efforts. DOD stated that it had begun to  incorporate such direction in its major planning documents and would  continue to expand on this guidance in the future. We believe DOD’s  efforts as part of the Integrated Planning System and on its own, if pursued  consistently, should help better focus interagency planning to meet the  range of natural and man-made threats.
DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix III.
DHS also reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments,  which we have incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and other  interested parties. We will also make copies available to others on request.  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key staff members who contributed to this report are listed  in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)  has prepared plans to execute its homeland defense and civil support  missions, we reviewed NORTHCOM’s available major plans and  supporting plans, comparing them to established Department of Defense  (DOD) joint operational planning criteria for completeness and adequacy.  We also met with knowledgeable NORTHCOM officials to discuss the  status of each of the plans NORTHCOM is required to prepare and the  process whereby the plans were developed and assessed. We did not  independently validate the planning elements, such as the assumptions  NORTHCOM used. We therefore did not attempt to state the extent to  which the plans are executable. We compared the 15 national planning  scenarios with NORTHCOM’s plans and discussed the incorporation of the  scenarios within those plans with NORTHCOM officials. To assess the  challenges NORTHCOM faces in planning for and conducting homeland  defense and civil support, we developed a methodology based on DOD’s  standards for joint operational planning. Although we included all of  NORTHCOM’s plans in our review, we concentrated on the two primary  homeland defense and civil support plans as well as the Chemical,  Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Consequence  Management plan. The methodology involved a series of questions and  topics to determine the extent to which NORTHCOM and DOD have  considered the following as part of their planning for homeland defense  and civil support:    Allocation of military capabilities to meet identified capability    Readiness of forces (trained personnel and equipment) to meet the  missions for which they are assigned    Conduct of exercises and evaluation of lessons learned that can be fed  back into the planning process  We discussed this methodology with officials from the National Defense  University, NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, and the Joint Forces Staff College  to ensure that it was a reasonable approach to evaluating joint operational  planning.
We used the results of this analysis and our discussions with a broad range  of DOD officials to determine what gaps, if any, exist in NORTHCOM’s  planning efforts stemming from these challenges. We also reviewed the  structure of NORTHCOM’s lessons learned process and collected  information on the origin, analysis, and disposition of homeland defense  and civil support lessons. As part of this effort, we observed a major  exercise (Ardent Sentry/Northern Edge) in the Indianapolis area in May  2007. During our review, the NORTHCOM Inspector General’s Office was  conducting an assessment of the command’s lessons learned process,  including oversight mechanisms and internal controls. Therefore, we did  not conduct a deeper analysis of those elements.
To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM has adequate planning  personnel with the relevant experience and training to perform the  planning function for the command, we discussed personnel staffing and  training with officials from NORTHCOM headquarters, NORTHCOM  subordinate commands, and Joint Forces Staff College who were  knowledgeable of training courses available to planning personnel. We  discussed the extent to which NORTHCOM addresses planning challenges  unique to the command in its planning staff structure. In addition, we  compared basic information on planning personnel at NORTHCOM with  that of U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. European  Command, and U.S. Pacific Command in such areas as overall staffing  levels; numbers of military, civilian, and contractor personnel on staff; and  number of planning personnel who had received Joint Professional  Military Education credit. Since our intention was to look at all the staff  who have a direct relation to planning at the commands, and not just the  staff of the plans directorates, we left it up to the commands to define who  should be included. We did not validate the commands’ requirements for  specific numbers of planning personnel, and we did not independently  validate the personnel data we received from the combatant commands.  However, we assessed the data reliability measures the commands took to  gather and maintain the data and determined that the information  originated with the commands themselves and represented the best  available source. We did not obtain the data from other sources, such as  databases maintained by the military services’ personnel centers. We  found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM coordinates with federal  agencies and other organizations in planning for and conducting its  missions, we met with officials from NORTHCOM’s Interagency  Coordination Directorate; reviewed the documentation and mechanisms  for coordination with organizations outside NORTHCOM; and interviewed  officials from NORTHCOM’s subordinate commands, the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency  (FEMA), and the National Guard Bureau (NGB). We also surveyed the  adjutants general from the 48 contiguous states, Alaska, and the District of  Columbia and obtained information from NORTHCOM, DHS, and NGB on  NORTHCOM’s coordination with the states. We are reporting separately  on the results of that work.
In addressing our objectives, we reviewed plans and related documents,  obtained information, and interviewed officials at the following locations:    NORTHCOM Headquarters, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs,    Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia    The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.    The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.    Joint Task Force-Civil Support, Fort Monroe, Virginia    U.S. Army North, Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas    U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Georgia    U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Georgia    Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region, Fort McNair,  Washington, D.C.
Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia    NGB, Arlington, Virginia    DHS, Washington, D.C.    U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.    FEMA, Washington, D.C.
We conducted our review from May 2006 to April 2008 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: NORHTCOM’s 25 Prescripted Mission Assignments
paragraphs: Table 6 shows the 25 prescripted mission assignments that NORTHCOM  and FEMA officials coordinated in order to facilitate the process for  requesting DOD capabilities in the event of an emergency.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Lorelei St. James, Assistant  Director; Steven D. Boyles; Yecenia C. Camarillo; Angela S. Jacobs;     David F. Keefer; Joseph W. Kirschbaum; Joanne Landesman; Robert D.  Malpass; Lonnie J. McAllister; Erin S. Noel; Pamela Valentine; and Jena R.  Whitley made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern  Command’s Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau,  But Gaps Remain. GAO-08-252. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.
Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs’  Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs’ Impact  on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge. GAO-08-488T.  Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made in Implementation of  Management and Mission Functions, but More Work Remains.   GAO-08-457T. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.
Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Address Critical  Infrastructure Protection Challenges That Require Federal and Private  Sector Coordination. GAO-08-36. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2007.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to  Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion  Centers. GAO-07-1241T. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2007.
Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Clarify Federal Leadership  Roles and Improve Pandemic Planning. GAO-07-1257T. Washington, D.C.:  September 26, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation  of Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-1240T. Washington, D.C.:  September 18, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare  for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address  Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington,  D.C.:    July 31, 2007.
Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands’ Preparedness Efforts  Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk  Mitigation. GAO-07-696. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic  Equipment Requirements and Readiness. GAO-07-60. Washington, D.C.:  January 26, 2007.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to  Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated  National Priorities. GAO-07-143. Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for  21st Century Challenges. GAO-06-1109T. Washington, D.C.: September 21,  2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and  Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,  D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery  Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.:   July 31, 2006.
Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil  Support Teams’ Mission and Address Management Challenges.   GAO-06-498. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the  Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-808T.  Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the  Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643.  Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:  March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges  Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,  D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and  Equipment Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, D.C.:  October 20, 2005.
Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All- Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.:  July 11, 2005.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for  Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. GAO-05-21. Washington, D.C.:  November 10, 2004.
Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas  and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T.  Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2004.
Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally  Chartered Commissions. GAO-04-591. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for  Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related  Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.