Military Personnel: Reserve Components Need Guidance to Accurately and Consistently Account for Volunteers on Active Duty for Operational Support
Published: 2006-10-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress have expressed concern with the frequency and length of time that volunteer reservists serve on active duty. In fiscal year 2006, DOD nearly doubled its fiscal year 2005 estimate for the total maximum levels of reservists volunteering to be on active duty for operational support. Congress required GAO to review the reasons behind the increases and expressed an interest in understanding which reservists were being included or excluded from these numbers. In this report, GAO (1) identified the factors that led to the increase in DOD's requests for the maximum number of volunteer reserve personnel authorized to be on active duty for operational support since DOD's initial request in fiscal year 2005 and (2) assessed the extent to which the reserve components have consistently reported the number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity since 2005. In conducting this review, GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed DOD officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD's requested authorization levels for reserve personnel voluntarily on active duty for operational support grew substantially between fiscal years 2005 and 2006 for two reasons. First, when developing its fiscal year 2005 estimate, DOD used data reported annually that excluded some reservists serving in operational support capacities. Second, the definition of operational support was not included with the legislation and DOD did not distribute an official definition until 6 months after the fiscal year 2005 authorized levels were in place. Based on the published definition and greater outreach to personnel responsible for monitoring the number of volunteers for this type of active duty, most reserve components submitted higher estimates for maximum levels for fiscal year 2006. DOD submitted the same estimates in fiscal year 2007 as fiscal year 2006 because the number of volunteers did not change greatly. The reserve components have not been consistently identifying the number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity since this monthly reporting requirement was adopted in fiscal year 2005. The reserve components are inconsistently including certain categories of personnel in their reported numbers. For example, two of the six reserve components do not include personnel serving as voluntarily recalled retired reservists in their reported totals, even though this category is listed in DOD's definition of operational support. In addition, only three of the six components include reservists serving on extended active duty missions in their reported numbers. GAO also found that the Navy Reserve erroneously submitted cumulative amounts instead of the highest amount of volunteer reservists each month for 6 months, so that it appeared to exceed its maximum authorized level three times. DOD is implementing a change to its Defense Manpower and Data Center to systematically generate the highest count of reservists each month, but the effectiveness of this change depends on whether the components update and align their policies and systems to provide these data. DOD is in the process of developing an instruction and only four of the reserve components have updated or have plans to update their guidance to clarify and consistently define what categories to include when accounting for these operational support reservists. Without updating and aligning their guidance, inconsistencies and errors in the reported numbers of operational support reservists may continue.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the end of the Cold War, the reserve components have become an  integral part of military operations. As of May 2006, the Ready Reserve  comprised roughly 44 percent of the total military force. The Department  of Defense (DOD) has increasingly relied on both involuntarily mobilized  and volunteer reservists since the first Gulf War, as well as in a series of  military operations from 1994 through 2001 for contingencies in Haiti,  Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Kosovo. Following the terrorist attacks of  September 11, 2001, DOD has depended more heavily on the reserves for  overseas operations and homeland missions. The department and  Congress have expressed concern with the frequency and length of time  that volunteer reservists are mobilized or voluntarily serve on active duty,  which can lead to overuse of reservists and stress on the reserve force,  impairing the availability and ability of reservists to respond quickly to  contingency missions.
Prior to October 2004, the extent to which reservists could volunteer to  serve in military operations was restricted by legislation, which became  known as the 180-day rule. The rule stated that DOD must count in its  congressionally authorized, active duty, annual end strength levels any  reservist serving in an active duty role and performing special work for  longer than 180 days. As a result of the rule, DOD could use reservists to  perform mission-essential tasks for a limited period of time without  considering them as a permanent addition to the force. DOD officials  believed this rule limited volunteerism, service continuity, and their  flexibility in using volunteer reservists in a variety of missions. To work  around this rule, the services allowed reservists to volunteer multiple  times in succession as long as each active duty service tour lasted fewer  than 180 days. These actions resulted in volunteer reservists serving on  active duty for extended periods of time without being accounted for  under the active duty end strength numbers.
Enacted in October 2004, the Ronald Reagan National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA) included a mechanism to  provide oversight over the number of reservists volunteering to be on  active duty for operational support. The act eliminated the 180-day rule  and created a requirement for Congress to annually authorize the  maximum number of volunteer reserve personnel to be on active duty for  operational support purposes. The act did not define the term operational  support, but provided for the Secretary of Defense to define operational  support in a separately published regulation. The act also provided that a  reservist on active or full-time National Guard duty for a period greater  than 3 years or for a cumulative period of more than 3 years within the  past 4 years was to be counted against the active duty end strength  authorization. DOD then required the reserve components to report their  monthly highest numbers of these reservists in order to monitor that they  did not exceed their maximum authorized levels. In the NDAA for Fiscal  Year 2006, most of the reserve components had significantly increased  their estimates for the maximum number of reserves authorized to be on  active duty for operational support. The total authorization level nearly  doubled compared to the fiscal year 2005 authorization level. DOD’s fiscal  year 2007 requested authorization for volunteer reservists remained  consistent with the fiscal year 2006 maximum levels.
Congress required that we review the reasons behind the increases from  fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006, as well as the factors used to develop  the fiscal year 2007 levels. Congress also expressed an interest in  understanding which reservists were being included or excluded from the  number of reservists activated for operational support purposes. The  objectives of this report are to (1) identify the factors that led to the  increase in requests for the maximum number of volunteer reserve  personnel authorized to be on active duty for operational support since  fiscal year 2005 and (2) assess the extent to which the reserve components  have consistently reported the number of reservists serving in an  operational support capacity since 2005.
To identify the factors that led to the increase in the number of authorized  personnel, we reviewed policies, implementing guidance, and regulations,  analyzed key legislation, and interviewed Office of the Assistant Secretary  of Defense Reserve Affairs and reserve component officials to gain an  understanding of their roles and effectiveness in developing the  authorization levels for reservists on active duty for operational support.  To determine the reliability of the estimates for the maximum  authorization levels for the reserve components, we gathered reserve  component officials’ perspectives on their data systems in the collecting  and reporting of reserve numbers to DOD. To determine the extent to  which the reserve components have consistently reported the number of  reservists serving in an operational support capacity, we obtained  documentation and discussed with reserve officials the consistency in  application of the guidelines, including information on the structure of  reserve data systems and the process for collecting and recording the  numbers of reservists. The components and DOD also provided the  highest number of reservists each month as reported to DOD. We found  inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the data, based in part on definitional  problems of categories of reservists to be included in reported numbers,  generating data that we believe are not sufficiently reliable. As a result, we  make a recommendation for executive action to improve the accuracy and  consistency of information that is reported across the components. We  conducted our review from June 2006 through September 2006, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The  scope and methodology used in our review are described further in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Although reserve personnel have been used for contingency and  emergency operations through the involuntary “Presidential Reserve Call- up” and “Partial Mobilization” authorities, a significant number of reserve  personnel on active duty for these and other missions have been provided  on a voluntary basis. Agency officials stated that these volunteer  reservists’ roles could include filling in for an existing active duty mission  temporarily (such as an infantryman or pilot), providing needed special  skills (civil affairs or engineer), or participating in training exercises that  result in support to active duty missions. Legislation has evolved since  1980 to provide DOD with more flexibility in managing these volunteer  reservists.
The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act was passed in 1980 to  amend Title 10 of the U.S. Code. The act required that Congress annually  authorize total strength levels for each military service for active duty  personnel, with some exceptions. The act also established the 180-day rule  for reserve members serving on active duty for special work. Reserve  members on active duty who performed special work for 180 days or  fewer were excluded from being counted against active duty personnel  end-strengths.
Title 10 of the U.S. Code at Section 115, which governs personnel strengths  for the military, gave authority to the Secretary of Defense to vary active  duty and Selected Reserve end-strengths above the level authorized by  Congress. Prior to October 2004, the Secretary of Defense could increase  active duty end strength paid by active duty funds by up to 3 percent,  increase the end strength for active duty and National Guard paid by  reserve funds by up to 2 percent, and vary the end strength authorized for  the Selected Reserve by up to 2 percent.
On October 28, 2004, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 was enacted. The act  amended 10 U.S.C. § 115 by establishing an annual authorization  requirement for the maximum number of reserve personnel authorized to  be on active duty for operational support, thus creating a new accounting  category. It also added a provision that allows the Secretary of Defense to  increase the maximum strength authorized for certain reservists  voluntarily on active duty to perform operational support by up to 10  percent.
subsections: section_title: Authorization Levels Increased Due to Inaccurate Information and Lack of an Operational Support Definition
paragraphs: DOD’s estimates for the maximum number of volunteer reservists  authorized to be on active duty for operational support increased between  fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006 as a result of two key factors. First,  DOD developed its fiscal year 2005 estimates using inaccurate data from a  data source that could not distinguish volunteer reservists on active duty  for missions that would be considered operational support from other  reservists. Second, DOD did not formally define operational support prior  to establishment of its fiscal year 2005 maximum authorized levels and did  not release a definition of operational support until 6 months after the  maximum authorized levels were passed under the NDAA. DOD increased  its estimates for fiscal year 2006 after the reserve components reviewed  historical numbers of these reservists based on the published operational  support definition. For the fiscal year 2007 estimates, the reserve  components submitted the same maximum levels as fiscal year 2006  because there were no substantial increases or decreases in their  numbers, according to DOD officials.
section_title: DOD Based Its Initial Request on Data That Did Not Accurately Reflect the Number of Volunteer Reservists on Active Duty for Operational Support
paragraphs: One key factor that contributed to the increase in authorization levels  requested for fiscal year 2006 was that DOD’s initial request for fiscal year  2005 was not developed using data that accurately reflected the maximum  number of reservists on voluntary active duty for operational support. In  developing the estimate submitted for the fiscal year 2005 NDAA, DOD  used data that was provided by the reserve components for other  purposes. DOD derived its estimates from an annual data call where  reserve components provide information about reservists’ activities  throughout the year. These data identified reservists involved in such  missions as domestic emergencies, counter-drug activities, major  exercises, and mobilizations. According to a DOD official, they compiled  the estimates from various categories that represented what they  considered operational support. They automatically eliminated some  categories from their count, such as some counter-drug activities and  mobilizations, because they assumed that the reported data in these  categories only included involuntary active duty reservists.  DOD  informally provided the estimates to the reserve components for their  review, but had to submit the estimates before some reserve components  could respond.
After the authorized levels were approved by Congress in the fiscal year  2005 NDAA and communicated throughout the reserve components,  reserve officials with greater insight over the reservists serving in an  operational support role realized that the estimates did not reflect the  actual numbers of reservists serving in this capacity. Officials from the  reserve components informed DOD that the maximum numbers requested  were too low for force requirements. According to a DOD official, they  scrutinized their initial data review and found that the information  extracted from the data did not distinguish involuntarily activated  reservists from voluntarily activated reservists. Once they realized that the  data did not separate out voluntary and involuntary reservists, they  recognized that some of the data from categories that had been excluded,  such as mobilizations, should not have been completely excluded since it  contained some volunteers. DOD’s lack of formal coordination with the  reserve components and its reliance upon existing data that did not  specifically identify volunteer reservists on active duty for operational  support contributed to DOD submitting a low estimate for fiscal year 2005.
section_title: DOD Lacked a Definition of Operational Support Prior to its Fiscal Year 2005 Estimate
paragraphs: Another key factor that contributed to the increase in DOD’s fiscal year  2006 estimate for the maximum number of reservists authorized was that  DOD did not have a definition of operational support prior to its initial  estimate for fiscal year 2005. When the fiscal year 2005 NDAA was enacted  on October 28, 2004, the act did not provide a definition for operational  support to apply to the maximum authorization levels, but instead required  the Secretary of Defense to prescribe by regulation the meaning of the  term operational support.
After the fiscal year 2005 NDAA was enacted, DOD met with reserve  component officials in response to their concerns about the low  authorization levels and also to develop a definition for operational  support. In collaboration with the components, DOD established a  definition for operational support, and on April 26, 2005—approximately    6 months after the fiscal year 2005 authorization levels for reserve  personnel were made law—released the official definition with some  accounting and reporting guidelines. DOD defined operational support as:  active duty, other than mobilized active guard and reserve duty,  voluntarily performed by reservists; full-time duty, other than mobilized  active guard and reserve duty, voluntarily performed by National Guard  members; and active duty for training performed at the request of an  operational commander, or as the result of reimbursable funding. The  definition of operational support included  active duty for special work,  active duty and active duty for training performed as the result of  reimbursable funding,  funeral honors duty performed not in an inactive duty status,  voluntary active duty performed by recall reserve retirees not receiving  regular retired pay, and  active duty training performed as a result of a request of an operational  commander to provide support.
The guidelines created a requirement for components to report to DOD the  highest number of operational support reservists each month. Once the  definition for operational support was established, reserve component  officials that had direct responsibility for monitoring reserve personnel  end strength reviewed historical data from their internal systems on the  number of volunteer reservists serving in the areas included under the  definition. The components determined that the numbers that were in  fiscal year 2005 NDAA did not accurately reflect the number of reservists  performing operational support. Most of the reserve components then  submitted higher estimates for the maximum authorized levels in the fiscal  year 2006 NDAA. Table 1 shows that five out of six reserve components  provided larger maximum levels for fiscal year 2006, and the total  authorization level nearly doubled compared to the fiscal year 2005  authorization level.
section_title: Fiscal Year 2007 Estimates Match Fiscal Year 2006 Maximum Levels
paragraphs: For its fiscal year 2007 estimates, DOD submitted a request for the same  maximum levels as in fiscal year 2006. The reserve components reviewed  their historical data as they did for the fiscal year 2006 estimates and  updated them with data from fiscal year 2006. The reserve components  found that there were no substantial increases or decreases in their fiscal  year 2006 numbers that required changes in their estimated maximum  levels for fiscal year 2007.
section_title: Reserve Components Are Not Identifying Numbers of Active Duty Reservists for Operational Support Consistently across Components
paragraphs: The reserve components have not been consistently identifying the  number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity since this  requirement was adopted in fiscal year 2005. In its April 2005  memorandum that provided a definition for operational support, DOD  directed the components to report the highest number of volunteer  reservists serving in an operational support capacity each month so that  DOD could monitor the amounts to ensure that components did not  exceed the maximum levels authorized. On the basis of our analyses, we  found that the reserve components inconsistently include various  categories of personnel in their reported numbers because the  components have different interpretations about what is included under  DOD’s operational support definition and how it applies to their existing  categories. For example, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard  do not include voluntary active duty performed by recalled retired  reservists in their accounting amounts, even though this is one of the five  categories listed under DOD’s definition of operational support. According  to Army personnel, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard do not  include these reservists because they consider them active duty and  include them in their active duty end strength numbers. In addition, the  reserve components are inconsistent on whether they include volunteer  reservists serving on extended active duty in their reported operational  support numbers. The definition of operational support provided by DOD  does not specifically address extended active duty reservists. We found  that three of the six reserve components—Navy Reserve, Air Force  Reserve, and Army National Guard—include extended active duty  reservists in their reported operational support numbers, although the  Navy and Air Force define the length of service for extended active duty  reservists differently. The Navy Reserve defines them as voluntary recall  reservists on 2 to 5 year tours. The Air Force considers them to be  reservists volunteering to fill an existing, funded active duty position for 3  years or less. The Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air National  Guard do not include extended active duty reservists in their reported  operational support numbers because they are currently being accounted  for under active duty end-strengths.
In addition to these inconsistencies, we also found that one component’s  monthly reports of volunteer reservists serving on active duty for  operational support have not provided DOD with an accurate accounting  of the number of these individuals due to errors in the numbers reported.  We found that in each month from January through June 2006, the Navy  Reserve erroneously reported to DOD cumulative totals instead of the  highest number of reservists in each month. A Navy Reserve official stated  that they did not have complete access to personnel data during these  months because they had to relocate their personnel database after  Hurricane Katrina. As a result, the Navy Reserve appeared to exceed its  maximum authorized level for 3 months—in January, February, and June  2006. The Navy Reserve did not discover this error until late July 2006, at  which time they retroactively corrected the erroneously reported amounts.
To help address these inconsistencies and errors, the Defense Manpower  and Data Center (DMDC) is in the process of implementing a system  change that would allow DOD to have automated access to the number of  volunteer operational support reservists. We reported in September 2006  that DMDC can extract some reserve personnel data, such as a reservist’s  number of deployments and citizenship, but it could not provide data  specifically on volunteer status from all six reserve components.  According to a DMDC official, the proposed change would only provide  information from systems already aligned with DMDC that can distinguish  volunteer reservists for operational support. DMDC also does not have the  authority to direct the services to correct data errors and inconsistencies.
As of early October 2006, we found that each reserve component collected  its operational support numbers from accounting systems that did not  provide all this information to DMDC. For example, the Navy Reserve  obtained its reported numbers from the Navy Reserve Order Writing  System, which currently feeds into DMDC, but this system does not  distinguish the highest amount of volunteer reservists each month. The  Marine Corps Reserve’s systems can provide volunteer information to  DMDC, but it reported end of the month numbers, not the highest number  of reservists during the month. The Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and  Air National Guard each pull key data from external databases managed  by the Defense Finance and Accounting System, but the Army Reserve’s  database did not provide the monthly highest number of volunteers. The  Army National Guard compiles its number of volunteer reservists from its  own systems and the Army Human Resource Command, which do not  provide this information on volunteers. The DMDC official stated that the  effectiveness of the proposed change to automate reporting on volunteer  operational support reservists still depends on the components, which are  responsible for aligning their policies and systems to provide the  appropriate information according to changes in data reporting  requirements. As a result, we do not believe that this system change will  provide DOD with accurate information about the peak monthly number  of volunteer reservists serving in an operational support capacity, unless  the components align their policies and systems to conform to reporting  requirements.
We found that DOD and the reserve components have not updated and  aligned their guidance to clearly and consistently articulate and define  what categories of reservists to include in accounting for and reporting on  operational support levels. DOD released preliminary guidance in its April  2005 memorandum that defined the five categories of reservists that  comprise operational support; however, they have not yet updated their  instruction that governs the use of and accounting for reservists. DOD is in  the process of developing an instruction on accounting and reporting  procedures in the new DOD Instruction 1215.6, which it plans to officially  release in late October 2006. Even though DOD has not released its  updated instruction, the Army National Guard published updated guidance  based on DOD’s April 2005 memorandum that provides examples of  missions specific to the Army National Guard that are considered  operational support. Another three components—the Army Reserve, Air  Force Reserve, and Air National Guard—have plans in place to update  their guidance to reflect operational support reporting requirements. The  Department of the Army expects to release its updated guidance for the  Army Reserve within the year. The Air Force Reserve plans to update its  implementing regulations in March or April 2007 and, in the interim, has  issued a policy memorandum that applies operational support  requirements to its policies. The Air National Guard expects to update its  guidance in the near future, and has an interim policy that addresses  operational support similar to the Air Force Reserve. The two remaining  components—the Marine Corps Reserve and Navy Reserve—have not  updated their existing guidance to incorporate operational support  accounting and reporting and do not appear to have immediate plans to do  so until DOD releases new guidance. Until DOD and all of the reserve  components update and uniformly align their implementing guidance,  inconsistencies and errors in the reporting of the number of operational  support reservists may continue. As a result, DOD and the components  cannot ensure that they will not exceed the maximum authorized levels,  which may impair the ability of DOD and Congress to oversee the use of  volunteer reservists serving on active duty in an operational support  capacity.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: With DOD’s growing demand for reserve personnel to augment its active  duty forces to accomplish its missions overseas and at home, stress on the  reserve force is a significant issue. Reservists have been serving on  increasingly longer and more frequent tours of duty. However, reserve  personnel are a part-time force and DOD must take care in managing the  frequency with which it uses the reserves to complete its missions. It is  critical that DOD and Congress have oversight over DOD’s forces to  ensure that its citizen-soldiers are not overextended.
In eliminating the 180-day rule, Congress gave DOD flexibility in managing  its volunteer reservists to serve in a variety of missions, without limiting  volunteerism and continuity of service. However, the reserve components  continue to struggle with accurately and consistently identifying these  reservists each month. Updated guidance that clearly articulates what  should be included and excluded from this accounting would help the  components eliminate the inconsistent interpretations that currently exist.  Until DOD and all of the reserve components update their implementing  guidance in a uniform manner, inconsistencies and errors in the reporting  of the number may continue and DOD will be unable to ensure that  reported numbers are accurate and that maximum levels are not being  exceeded. Lack of an accurate accounting of the number of voluntary  reserve personnel serving in an operational support capacity defeats the  purpose for establishing the reporting requirement, which in turn hampers  DOD’s ability to manage its forces and to minimize lengthy activations and  stress on the reserve forces. This lack of visibility also limits Congress’s  oversight over the use, availability, and readiness of the reserve force to  ensure that its citizen-soldiers are not overextended.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that the components can report accurate and consistent  information about the number of reservists serving in an operational  support capacity, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the reserve  components to develop guidance to clarify and consistently define the  categories of operational support that should be included in the reported  numbers.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) provided written  comments on a draft of this report. The department concurred with the  recommendation. DOD stated that it will develop guidance that  specifically addresses what is to be included when accounting for  operational support. The department’s comments are reprinted in their  entirety in appendix II. In addition, the department provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking  Minority Members of the House and Senate Committees on Armed  Services. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Commandant  of the Marine Corps. We will also make copies available to others upon  request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Others making significant contributions to this  report are included in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the factors leading to the increase in the maximum number  of reserve personnel authorized to be on active duty for operational  support from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006, we reviewed and  analyzed the authorization levels for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, and the  requested authorization levels for fiscal year 2007. We also obtained  documentation of the highest number of reservists each month that is  reported to DOD and analyzed figures to identify any trends or patterns of  change. To determine what categories of reservists should be represented  by the numbers of reservists serving on operational support, we obtained  documentation on the definition of operational support given to the  components. We also interviewed DOD and reserve officials to gain an  understanding of their roles and effectiveness in implementing Sections  415 and 416 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal  Year 2005. We interviewed officials from DOD Reserve Affairs, Army  Reserve, Army National Guard, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard,  Navy Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve. To determine DOD’s authority  and role in management of the reservists under the NDAA, we reviewed  legislation and the history of relevant provisions of the law. To determine  the reliability of the estimates for the maximum authorization levels for  the reserve components, we gathered reserve component officials’  perspectives on their data systems in the collecting and reporting of  reserve strength to DOD.
To determine the extent to which the reserve components have  consistently reported the number of reservists serving in an operational  support capacity, we obtained DOD’s memorandums, implementing  guidance, and regulations. We obtained documentation from DOD and  reserve components to determine the categories included and excluded  from operational support. We interviewed DOD officials to determine its  definition for operational support, how DOD intended its implementing  guidelines to be applied, and to determine its interpretation of relevant  legislation. We also interviewed officials to determine the consistency in  application of the guidelines. From our interviews, we obtained  information on categories of reservists that were being excluded from  operational support. We reviewed and analyzed legislation to determine  what was required to be included in operational support. Officials also  provided information on the structure of their data systems and the  process for collecting and recording the numbers of reservists. The  components and DOD also provided the highest number of reservists each  month that was reported to DOD. Due to definitional problems of  categories of reservists to be included in reported numbers, we found  some inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the data, which produced data  that we believe are not sufficiently reliable. As a result, we make a  recommendation for executive action to improve the accuracy and  consistency of reported monthly information.
We conducted our review from June 2006 through September 2006, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Geraldine Beard, Renee Brown,  Tracy Burney, Pawnee Davis, Laura Durland, Meredith Georges, George  Poindexter, Terry Richardson, Gina Ruidera, and Karen Thornton made  significant contributions to the report.