Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed Plans for Its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Challenges Remain in Deploying Equipment
Published: 2012-07-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony discusses the efforts of the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to develop and deploy a global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA)an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United Statesand to provide an update on the deployment of radiation detection equipment at U.S. borders. Preventing terrorists from using nuclear or radiological material to carry out an attack in the United States is a top national priority. DNDO is charged with, among other things, enhancing and coordinating the nuclear detection efforts of federal, state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector to ensure a managed, coordinated response. Among other things, DNDO is required to coordinate with other federal agencies to develop an enhanced GNDA. It is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. While federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings, DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection strategies along other potential pathways in the architecture, including (1) land border areas between ports of entry into the United States, (2) international general aviation, and (3) small maritime craft, such as recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels.
Even before DNDOs inception in 2005, we were highlighting the need for a more comprehensive strategy for nuclear detection. In 2002, we reported on the need for a comprehensive plan for installing radiation detection equipment, such as radiation portal monitors, at all U.S. border crossings and ports of entry. In July 2008, we testified that DNDO had not developed an overarching strategic plan to guide the development of a more comprehensive GNDA, and we recommended that DHS coordinate with the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State to develop one. DHS agreed with our recommendation. In January 2009, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy to help ensure the success of initiatives aimed at closing vulnerabilities in the United States. We stated that this plan should focus on, among other things, establishing time frames and costs for the areas DNDO had identifiedland border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and small maritime craft. DHS did not comment on this recommendation but noted that it aligned with DNDOs past, present, and future actions. The status of these recommendations is discussed later in this testimony.
DHS has made meaningful progress in deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. border crossings and seaports; however, as deployed portal monitors begin to reach the end of their expected service lives, DHS will soon need to make decisions about whether to refurbish or replace them. DHS has also made progress in developing key planning documents to guide the GNDA. This testimony discusses: (1) DHSs efforts to complete the deployment of radiation detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the United States at ports of entry, (2) observations from our past work that may help DHS as it considers options for deploying new technologies to refurbish or replace existing portal monitors when they reach the end of their expected service lives, and (3) our assessment of the extent to which DHS has addressed our prior recommendations.
This testimony is primarily based on our prior work on federal efforts to detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials, issued from October 2002 through July 2011. We have updated our prior work in this testimony to reflect DHSs continuing efforts to deploy radiation detection equipment.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Over the past 10 years, DHS has made significant progress in deploying radiation detection equipment to scan for nuclear or radiological materials in nearly all trucks and containerized cargo coming into the United Stated through seaports and border crossings. However, challenges remain for the agency in developing a similar scanning capability for railcars entering this country from Canada and Mexico, as well as for international air cargo and international commercial aviation. As portal monitors approach the end of their expected service lives, observations from our past work may help DHS as it considers options to refurbish or replace such monitors. Among other things, we have previously reported that DHS should (1) test new equipment rigorously prior to acquisition and deployment, (2) obtain the full concurrence of the end user to ensure that new equipment meets operational needs, and (3) conduct a cost-benefit analysis to inform any acquisition decisions. In our past work on the GNDA, we recommended that DHS develop an overarching strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA, as well as a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy. DHS took action on these recommendations and, in December 2010, it issued the interagency GNDA strategic plan. We reported, in July 2011, that the GNDA strategic plan addressed several of the aspects of our prior recommendations but did not (1) identify funding necessary to achieve plan objectives or (2) employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify needed improvements. In April 2012, DHS issued its GNDA implementation plan, which addresses the remaining aspects of our recommendations by identifying funding dedicated to plan objectives and employing monitoring mechanisms to assess progress in meeting those objectives. However, in both the GNDA strategic plan and the implementation plan, it remains difficult to identify priorities from among various components of the domestic part of the GNDA.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the efforts of the Department of  Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)  to develop and deploy a global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA)— an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction  activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S.  border, and inside the United States—and to provide an update on the  deployment of radiation detection equipment at U.S. borders. Preventing  terrorists from using nuclear or radiological material to carry out an attack  in the United States is a top national priority. DNDO is charged with,  among other things, enhancing and coordinating the nuclear detection  efforts of federal, state, local, and tribal governments and the private   Among other things,  sector to ensure a managed, coordinated response.DNDO is required to coordinate with other federal agencies to develop an  enhanced GNDA. It is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and  deploying radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and  other federal agencies. While federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling  have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and  land border crossings, DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection  strategies along other potential pathways in the architecture, including (1)  land border areas between ports of entry into the United States, (2)  international general aviation, and (3) small maritime craft, such as  recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels.
GAO, Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment,  GAO-03-235T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2002). develop one. DHS agreed with our recommendation. In January 2009,  we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a  strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection  strategy to help ensure the success of initiatives aimed at closing  vulnerabilities in the United States.on, among other things, establishing time frames and costs for the areas  DNDO had identified—land border areas between ports of entry, aviation,  and small maritime craft. DHS did not comment on this recommendation  but noted that it aligned with DNDO’s past, present, and future actions.  The status of these recommendations is discussed later in this testimony.
We stated that this plan should focus  As we will discuss today, DHS has made meaningful progress in  deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. border crossings and  seaports; however, as deployed portal monitors begin to reach the end of  their expected service lives, DHS will soon need to make decisions about  whether to refurbish or replace them. DHS has also made progress in  developing key planning documents to guide the GNDA. This testimony  discusses: (1) DHS’s efforts to complete the deployment of radiation  detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the  United States at ports of entry, (2) observations from our past work that  may help DHS as it considers options for deploying new technologies to  refurbish or replace existing portal monitors when they reach the end of  their expected service lives, and (3) our assessment of the extent to  which DHS has addressed our prior recommendations.
This testimony is primarily based on our prior work on federal efforts to  detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials,  issued from October 2002 through July 2011. We have updated our prior  work in this testimony to reflect DHS’s continuing efforts to deploy  radiation detection equipment. To do so, we met with DHS, DNDO, and  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials and reviewed DHS  documents including the GNDA strategic plan, the 2011 GNDA Joint  Annual Interagency Review, and the GNDA implementation plan issued in  April 2012. As part of our update, we asked for, and DHS provided, a  classified briefing that compared the GNDA capabilities with the expected  capabilities of adversaries who may wish to smuggle nuclear material into  the United States. Details on the scope and methodology for our prior  reviews are available in our published reports. We conducted this work in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary, over the past 10 years, DHS has made significant progress  in deploying radiation detection equipment to scan for nuclear or  radiological materials in nearly all trucks and containerized cargo coming  into the United Stated through seaports and border crossings. However,  challenges remain for the agency in developing a similar scanning  capability for railcars entering this country from Canada and Mexico, as  well as for international air cargo and international commercial aviation.  As portal monitors approach the end of their expected service lives,  observations from our past work may help DHS as it considers options to  refurbish or replace such monitors. Among other things, we have  previously reported that DHS should (1) test new equipment rigorously  prior to acquisition and deployment, (2) obtain the full concurrence of the  end user to ensure that new equipment meets operational needs, and (3)  conduct a cost-benefit analysis to inform any acquisition decisions. In our  past work on the GNDA, we recommended that DHS develop an  overarching strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA, as well  as a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection  strategy. DHS took action on these recommendations and, in December  2010, it issued the interagency GNDA strategic plan. We reported, in  July 2011, that the GNDA strategic plan addressed several of the aspects  of our prior recommendations but did not (1) identify funding necessary to  achieve plan objectives or (2) employ monitoring mechanisms to  determine progress and identify needed improvements. In April 2012,  DHS issued its GNDA implementation plan, which addresses the  remaining aspects of our recommendations by identifying funding  dedicated to plan objectives and employing monitoring mechanisms to  assess progress in meeting those objectives. However, in both the GNDA  strategic plan and the implementation plan, it remains difficult to identify  priorities from among various components of the domestic part of the  GNDA.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at Land Borders and Major Seaports, but Challenges Remain
paragraphs: Over the past decade, DHS has made significant progress in deploying  radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo  and conveyances entering the United States through land and sea ports  of entry for nuclear and radiological materials, but it has made less  progress with other pathways. In 2010, we reported that DHS initially  planned to deploy more than 2,100 portal monitors to U.S. ports of entry.  Due to funding constraints and challenges in developing new  technologies, DHS is updating its portal monitor deployment plan by  reducing the number of portal monitors it planned to deploy and  increasing its reliance on portable systems. Specifically, according to  DHS officials, DHS has deployed about 1,465 of the approximately 1,537,  or 95 percent, of radiation portal monitors that it now plans to deploy; the  agency expects to complete this deployment by December 2014. As we  reported in 2011, since 2009, DHS has scanned nearly all of the  containerized cargo and conveyances entering the United States through  land borders and major seaports for nuclear and radiological materials.  However, as we reported in 2010 and 2011, DHS has made less progress  scanning: (1) railcars entering the United States from Canada and Mexico  and (2) international air cargo and commercial aviation aircraft,  passengers, and baggage.
As we reported in 2011, according to DHS officials, since November  2009, almost all nonrail land ports of entry have been equipped with one  or more radiation portal monitors. Of the about 1,465 portal monitors  deployed, as of July 2012, 917, or about 63 percent, have been deployed  along the northern and southern borders of the lower 48 states to all but a  few nonrail ports of entry. According to DHS officials, 100 percent of all  containerized cargo, conveyances, drivers, and passengers entering the  United States through commercial lanes at land borders are scanned for  radiation, as are more than 99 percent of all personally operated vehicles  (noncommercial passenger cars and light trucks), drivers, and  passengers.
According to DHS officials, the department scans nearly all containerized  cargo entering U.S. seaports for nuclear and radiological materials.  Specifically, of the about 1,465 portal monitors, DHS has deployed 453,  or about 31 percent, of radiation portal monitors to major American  seaports––including the largest seaports accounting for the majority of  cargo. However, some smaller seaports that receive cargo may not be  equipped with portal monitors. DHS officials told us they will know how  many more portal monitors will be deployed to these smaller seaports  when the agency completes its updated deployment plan in September  2012. Furthermore, in July 2012, these officials told us that, due to  increased cargo volume at some major seaports, additional portal  monitors may be needed to avoid delays in moving cargo through larger  ports. In such cases, DHS officials told us that they are considering cost- sharing arrangements with seaport operators, whereby DHS and seaport  operators would share the cost of additional portal monitor deployments.  Under such arrangements, DHS would continue to purchase, maintain,  and operate these additional portal monitors, but the seaport operators  would share in the cost of deploying them.
As we reported over the last 2 years, DHS has made limited progress  with regard to radiation scanning of the roughly 4,800 loaded railcars in  approximately 120 trains entering the United States each day from   Although, most  Canada and Mexico through 31 rail ports of entry.international rail crossings have radiography systems to scan the majority  of cargo, much of the scanning for nuclear and radiological materials that  takes place at these ports of entry is conducted with portable, handheld  radioactive isotope identification devices. This scanning is triggered  when, for example, anomalous readings are detected from imaging scans  of railcar contents. According to DHS officials, international rail traffic  represents one of the most difficult challenges for radiation detection  systems. Specifically, in June 2010, they told us that rail traffic poses  unique operational challenges due to the length of the trains (up to 2  miles), the distance required to stop moving trains, and the difficulties in  separating individual cars for further examination. Furthermore, DHS  officials told us that rail companies typically own the land where DHS  would need to establish stations for screening, and these companies  often resist doing things that might slow down rail traffic. Moreover, DHS  officials told us that an effective solution would require scanning of at  least some rail traffic on Mexican or Canadian soil, and they said that it  will take time to develop the close cooperation with officials in Mexico and  Canada necessary to do so. Accordingly, in 2010, DHS undertook an  International Rail Threat and Gap Study to determine the most promising  radiation detection approach. In July 2012, DHS officials said that the  agency is presently in the final stages of completing a second study  analyzing technological and operational options. DHS officials told us that  decisions about additional enhancement of radiation detection capabilities  at international rail ports of entry are pending the results of this analysis  and the department’s broader consideration of the needs and priorities of  the GNDA. The second study is due to be completed in September 2012,  according to DHS officials.
DHS has made less progress scanning air cargo and commercial aviation  for nuclear and radiological materials. As of July 2012, DHS was  scanning for nuclear and radiological materials at certain major  international airports in the United States using some portal monitors.  CBP also utilizes radioactive isotope identification devices and personal  radiation detectors to alert the agency to the presence of such materials.
DHS officials told us in June 2010 that they were studying options for  effectively deploying portal monitors to increase their capacity to scan for  nuclear and radiological materials in international air cargo conveyed on  commercial airlines. According to these DHS officials, their experience  scanning air cargo at a few major international airports in the United  States has led them to conclude that the deployment of radiation portal  monitors is not feasible at many locations due to the lack of natural choke  points, where scanning would take place. Furthermore, these officials  stated that scanning 100 percent of air cargo would be technically and  logistically challenging and would require significant investment in  equipment, staffing, and maintenance resources. Moreover, further DHS  analysis since June 2010 has shown that there are no procedural or  operational changes that can easily overcome the logistical and resource  challenges associated with airports. Until solutions to these challenges  can be found, DHS officials told us that the scanning for radioactive  materials that occurs at airports will continue to be conducted primarily  with handheld detectors where portal monitors are not deployed.
Similarly, DHS does not scan all commercial aviation aircraft, passengers,  or baggage for radioactive materials with portal monitors. However,  passengers are scanned for radioactive materials with radioactive isotope  identification devices when DHS is alerted to the presence of radiation by  CBP officers’ personal radiation detectors, and some baggage is scanned  by radiation portal monitors at selected overseas airports.
section_title: Observations from Our Past Work for DHS to Consider When Replacing Portal Monitors
paragraphs: As deployed portal monitors reach the end of their expected service lives,  observations from our past work may help DHS as it considers options for  deploying new technologies as to whether to refurbish or replace them.  DHS has been procuring portal monitors for about 10 years, and DHS  officials estimate that the expected service life of many of these portal  monitors is about 10 to 20 years. Their service lives can be extended by  refurbishing their key components but doing so also requires some  additional investment. In July 2012, DNDO and CBP officials told us they  are working on a portal monitor replacement strategy that is due to be  completed in 2013. As DHS considers options to refurbish existing  systems, or replace them with new systems, observations from our past  work may help the agency make the most informed decisions, mitigate  risks, and produce expected outcomes. Specifically, we believe it is  important that DHS consider the following:
Taking into account the overall priorities of the domestic side of the  GNDA before making investments or reinvestments in ports and  border crossings. Ports and border crossings have received most of  the investment of radiation detection technologies because these are  the areas through which a significant amount of cargo must pass, and  federal law requires certain scanning at seaports. However, as  discussed earlier, other pathways also pose risks. As we reported in  2011, any additional investment in radiation detection equipment  needs to be consistent with the highest priority needs of the domestic  side of the GNDA, including examining and balancing the needs and  risks of all smuggling pathways into the United States. In July 2012,  DHS officials told us they agreed that further investment in detecting  radiation in ports and border crossings needs to be consistent with the  overall needs of the GNDA.
Testing new equipment rigorously prior to acquisition and deployment.
One of the principal findings of our past work reviewing DNDO’s  efforts to develop and procure the advanced spectroscopic portal––a  more advanced radiation portal monitor––was that initial testing was  not rigorous enough. Once the testing became more rigorous, these  portals did not perform well enough to warrant deployment, and the  program was subsequently cancelled, after DNDO had spent more  than $280 million on development and testing costs. Consistent with  our past recommendations, any investment in new equipment should  include sufficient and rigorous testing to ensure that any new selected  equipment performs well enough to meet mission needs. DNDO  officials told us that DNDO is currently working on a collaborative  effort with the radiation detection agencies of the European Union to  test the capabilities of currently available radiation detection  equipment, including portal monitors, from multiple vendors. This  testing is part of the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program  and is not connected to any planned acquisition; instead, it will  provide performance information on a variety of radiation detection  equipment. According to DHS officials, the final report from this testing  is expected in 2013, and DNDO could use the results as part of its  basis for considering whether to replace currently deployed portal  monitors with other devices.
Obtaining full concurrence of the end user––CBP––to ensure that any  new equipment meets CBP’s operational needs. Our past work on the  advanced spectroscopic portal and DNDO efforts to develop a system  to use radiography to scan cargo for nuclear materials found that  DNDO did not fully understand (1) how CBP used existing radiation  detection equipment in a port environment or (2) the extent of the  space limitations in port environments.  Consistent with our past findings, decisions to rehabilitate or replace currently deployed portal  monitors need to be made with the full buy-in of CBP—particularly if  the decision involves new equipment or technologies. Obtaining early  buy-in from CBP will help ensure any new equipment is consistent  with CBP’s operational needs.
Conducting a cost-benefit analysis to inform acquisition decisions. A  key part of deciding whether to refurbish or replace currently deployed  portal monitors is conducting a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis  that can be used to compare the relative costs and expected benefits  of existing versus new equipment. Consistent with our past  recommendations in 2006 on portal monitors, such an analysis should  articulate what enhanced performance could be expected of new  equipment and whether this benefit is worth its cost.
section_title: DHS’s GNDA Strategic and Implementation Plans Address Our Past Recommendations but Do Not Yet Clearly Define Priorities
paragraphs: In our past work on the GNDA, we made recommendations about the  need for a strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA. Among  other things, in July 2008, we recommended that DHS develop an  overarching strategic plan for the GNDA that (1) clearly defines the  objectives to be accomplished, (2) identifies the roles and responsibilities  for meeting each objective, (3) identifies the funding necessary to achieve  those objectives, and (4) employs monitoring mechanisms to determine  programmatic progress and identify needed improvements. DHS agreed  with our recommendation. In January 2009, we recommended that DHS  develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear  detection strategy and that this plan focus on establishing time frames  and costs for addressing previously identified pathways within the  architecture—land border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and  small maritime vessels. DHS did not comment on this recommendation  but noted that it aligned with DNDO’s past, present, and future actions.
DHS has taken action on these recommendations. In December 2010,  DHS issued the interagency GNDA strategic plan and in April 2012, it  issued its GNDA implementation plan for domestic aspects of the GNDA.  As we reported in July 2011, the 2010 GNDA strategic plan addresses  several aspects of our prior recommendations—including defining  program objectives and assigning roles and responsibilities. However, it  did not (1) identify funding necessary to achieve plan objectives or (2)  establish monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify  needed improvements. DHS officials stated at that time that they intended  to include these aspects of our recommendations in an upcoming  implementation plan.
Our review of the April 2012 GNDA implementation plan found that DHS  had made progress in both identifying funding dedicated to plan  objectives and in employing monitoring mechanisms to assess progress  in meeting plan objectives. Furthermore, the plan has established specific  milestones for completing many of DHS’s activities—allowing a further  assessment of whether progress is being made according to plan time  frames. In our view, these actions address the intent of our 2008  recommendations to identify necessary funding and employ monitoring  mechanisms. The plan also discusses strategies for addressing  previously identified pathways in the domestic portion of the GNDA,  including timeframes and costs for key elements of DHS’ approach. While  these pathways remain an area of concern, the strategies discussed in  the plan address our 2009 recommendations and lay out an approach to  making nuclear smuggling through these pathways more difficult and thus  less likely to succeed. As DHS updates the implementation plan in the  future, providing additional details and discussion about how the strategy  will address the pathways in the domestic GNDA could better position  DHS to make decisions regarding resource allocations.
However, in both the GNDA strategic plan and the implementation plan, it  remains difficult to identify priorities from among various components of  the domestic part of the GNDA. As we reported in July 2011, one of the  key benefits of a strategic plan is that it is a comprehensive means of  establishing priorities and using these priorities to allocate resources so   In times of tight budgets,  that the greatest needs are being addressed.allocating resources to address the highest priorities becomes even more  important. Identifying priorities would help inform DHS’s decisions to  refurbish or replace portal monitors or invest in radiation detection  equipment for other potential pathways. DHS has done a comprehensive  analysis of GNDA capabilities and compared its capabilities with the  expected capabilities of adversaries who may wish to smuggle nuclear  material into the United States. This classified analysis provides data that  DHS could use as a basis to set priorities within the GNDA.
DHS officials told us they agreed that the implementation plan did not yet  articulate specific priorities for GNDA program areas with the greatest  need for development and resources and that the DHS classified analysis  of GNDA capabilities could help inform those priorities. These officials  told us the implementation plan was an iterative document that was  designed to be periodically updated and that future versions of the plan  would provide a greater discussion of priorities.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer  any questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this testimony, please contact David C. Maurer at  (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov or Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841  or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this  testimony. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include  Ned Woodward, Kiki Theodoropoulos, Kevin Tarmann, Alisa Beyninson,  and Alison O’Neill.
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