Federal Courthouses: Actions Needed to Enhance Capital Security Program and Improve Collaboration
Published: 2017-02-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The variety of civil and criminal cases tried in 400-plus federal courthouses can pose security risks. The CSP was started in 2012 and was designed to be a less costly alternative to building new federal courthouses by adding key security features to existing courthouses. Congress has provided $20 million in obligational authority for the program in each of the fiscal years that it has been funded.
GAO was asked to review physical security at federal courthouses. This report discusses (1) the extent to which federal stakeholders have identified security concerns; (2) how the CSP addresses courthouse security concerns; and (3) what actions federal agencies could take, if any, to improve courthouse security. GAO reviewed agency documents, AOUSC security scores, and interviewed officials from the Marshals Service, FPS, GSA, and AOUSC. GAO also visited eight courthouses to include six locations selected for CSP projects, and two that were considered but not selected. Although these site visits cannot be generalized to all CSP project locations or all federal courthouses, they provide insight into federal agencies' practices to secure courthouses.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Three federal agencies—the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), the U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service), and the Federal Protective Service (FPS)—collect information about security concerns at federal courthouses related to the agencies' respective missions. However, only AOUSC develops information that can be used to understand security concerns across the courthouse portfolio. In contrast, the Marshals Service and FPS collect information on security concerns on a building-by-building basis in varied ways, but the manner in which the information is collected prevents it from being used to understand portfolio-wide security concerns. This is inconsistent with GAO's risk management framework. Both agencies are taking steps to improve their information, but it is not clear whether these improvements will provide the portfolio-wide information stakeholders need to make risk-informed decisions.
The General Services Administration (GSA) has initiated 11 projects at 10 courthouse locations nationwide, as part of its Judiciary Capital Security Program (CSP); two projects have been completed. Local officials said that these projects have already improved or will improve security at the selected courthouses once completed. CSP improvements have been aimed at separating the paths of judges, prisoners, and the public, so that trial participants only meet in the courtroom. Transparency and collaboration issues have emerged among federal stakeholders as the program has been implemented. For example, not all key stakeholders GAO spoke to were clear on the eligibility of specific locations for CSP projects and varied in their views about how collaborative the process to select CSP projects has been. Although stakeholders have taken some steps to improve CSP transparency and collaboration as the program has evolved, some issues remain. Taking additional steps to improve documentation of decision-making and sharing this document with stakeholders could further enhance transparency and collaboration and better assure that all of the agencies and policy makers have the same understanding of how the program is supposed to work, that it is addressing the most urgent courthouse security needs, and that the expertise of all stakeholders is being used to ensure program efficiency.
GAO found that agencies could take additional actions to enhance security at federal courthouses by addressing a related GAO open recommendation, and establishing a formal mechanism such as a working group or forum to enhance coordination and information sharing. Specifically, in 2011, GAO recommended that the agencies update a 1997 memorandum of agreement to clarify their roles and responsibilities. This action has not been done although FPS has taken some steps to start the process. In addition, GAO found that GSA, AOUSC, the Marshals Service, and FPS had not routinely met to address courthouse security issues at a national level where decision-making authority exists. This lack of a formal meeting mechanism inhibits their ability to communicate regularly about their roles and responsibilities and share information about security concerns.
This is a public version of a law enforcement sensitive/limited official use report issued in October 2016.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that (1) the Marshals Service and FPS improve the courthouse security information they collect; (2) GSA and AOUSC improve the CSP's transparency and collaboration through better documentation; and (3) GSA establish a working group or other forum to enhance coordination. The agencies concurred with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Federal courthouses are critical to the U.S. judicial process and to  processing civil and criminal cases related to federal crimes such as  domestic and international terrorism and organized crime, extremist  groups, gangs, and drug trafficking. This environment can pose particular  security risks to the 400-plus federal courthouses nationwide, making the  physical security of courthouses essential. However, our prior work has  found that various attributes influence courthouse security and that older  or historic buildings may not be able to support, or may make it more  difficult to address security at those courthouses. The Consolidated  Appropriations Act, 2012 created the Judiciary Capital Security Program  (CSP) with $20 million in obligational authority. The program was  designed to improve physical security in buildings occupied by the  judiciary and the U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service) in lieu of  construction of new facilities.
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), an agency within  the judicial branch, implements the policies of the Judicial Conference of  the United States, including its security policies, and provides a range of  legislative, legal, financial, technology, management, administrative and  program support services for federal courts. Except for law enforcement  and related security functions the General Services Administration (GSA)  manages federal facilities, including courthouses, and is responsible for  operation, maintenance, and protection as outlined in the Homeland  Security Act of 2002. The Marshals Service, a component of the  Department of Justice (DOJ), protects federal judicial facilities and  personnel. The Federal Protective Service (FPS), a subcomponent of the  National Protection and Programs Directorate within the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), provides facility security assessments at  federal courthouses owned or leased by GSA. We have previously found  that these federal stakeholders have faced challenges in implementing  assigned responsibilities when addressing the demands of the complex  environment of courthouse security.
You asked us to review physical security concerns at federal courthouses  and federal stakeholders’ efforts to address these concerns. This report  addresses the following questions:
To what extent have federal stakeholders identified security concerns  across the portfolio of federal courthouses?
How has the CSP addressed courthouse security concerns and how,  if at all, can the program be improved?
What actions, if any, could federal agencies take to improve  courthouse security?
This report is a public version of a previously issued report identified by  DHS and DOJ as containing information designated as law enforcement  sensitive/limited official use, which must be protected from public  disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive information including  specific security concerns, the results of AOUSC’s security scores, and  the names and locations of courthouses we visited or whose information  we analyzed. The information provided in this report is more limited in  scope, as it excludes such sensitive information, but it addresses the  same questions that the law enforcement sensitive/limited official use  report does, and the overall methodology used for both reports is the  same.
To address these objectives, we reviewed agency documents including  capital-planning documents, security assessments, and other reports, and  interviewed AOUSC, Marshals Service, and FPS officials to determine  what information they collect, and to understand how they identify security  concerns. We did not independently determine what constitutes a  physical security concern; rather, we relied on these federal stakeholders  to determine physical security concerns as defined by their own  standards and guidance. As part of our review of these data, we  assessed federal stakeholders’ documentation and written responses  about data collection procedures and their views of the quality of the data.  We determined that AOUSC’s data were sufficiently reliable for our  purposes, and we analyzed the results of AOUSC’s data in 2016. We also  reviewed and analyzed federal stakeholders’ documentation on the CSP,  and interviewed relevant officials about methods used to select project  locations and collaborate with other federal stakeholders. We visited 6 of  the 10 federal courthouse facilities selected for a CSP project, which we  selected to cover CSP projects at various stages of implementation  (completed, under construction, and pre-construction), as well as two  locations considered for the CSP but not selected. During the site visits,  we toured the courthouses to observe security concerns and the ways  CSP projects have addressed or will address them. We interviewed local  officials from the Marshals Service, FPS, GSA, and local court officials to  obtain information about CSP implementation, as well as their views on  courthouse security concerns in general. Although information obtained  from these site visits cannot be generalized to all CSP project locations or  all federal courthouses, the site visits provided us with insights into  federal agencies’ practices to secure courthouses. We compared federal  stakeholders’ efforts to select projects and collaborate to criteria in our  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and the Office  of Management and Budget’s (OMB) directive on open government.  Further details on our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to February 2017,  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Security at federal courthouses is complex and involves multiple federal  stakeholders with different roles and responsibilities (see fig. 1).
A 1997 memorandum of agreement (MOA) between these entities  defines the roles and responsibilities for each of these stakeholders in  protecting federal courthouses and the federal framework for securing  courthouses. The MOA recognized areas in which stakeholders are to  coordinate their security efforts and established an informal collaboration  and oversight mechanism at the regional level.
The following federal stakeholders receive funding for court security  activities in different ways:
FPS is funded by the security fees it collects from agencies that  occupy GSA facilities for the security services FPS provides and  does not receive a direct appropriation.
The judiciary receives a court security appropriation. The amount for  fiscal year 2016 was approximately $538 million. AOUSC uses part  of this appropriation to pay for FPS fees and transfers part to the  Marshals Service for specific judiciary related costs or security  equipment.
In addition to the funds received from AOUSC, the Marshals Service  receives direct appropriations for construction in space controlled,  occupied, or used by the Marshals Service for prisoner holding and  related support (for example, vehicle sally ports and prisoner  elevators).
Instead of receiving direct appropriations, GSA administers the  Federal Buildings Fund, which is the primary source of funds for  operating federal space held under the custody and control of GSA  and the capital costs associated with the space. The Federal  Buildings Fund is funded primarily by income from rental charges  assessed to tenant agencies occupying GSA-held and -leased space  that approximate commercial rates for comparable space and  services. Congress exercises control over the Federal Buildings  Fund through the appropriations process that sets annual limits— called obligational authority—on how much of the fund can be  obligated for various activities. GSA, as an executive branch agency,  requests obligational authority from Congress as part of the annual  President’s Budget Request. GSA’s total obligational authority for  fiscal year 2016 was approximately $10.2 billion.
The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) addresses the quality and  effectiveness of physical security for federal facilities, including  courthouses. The ISC sets out the risk management process for federal  facilities in the ISC’s risk management standard. Pursuant to this  standard, FPS conducts facility security assessments, which consist of  identifying and assessing threats to, and vulnerabilities of, a facility as  well as identifying countermeasures (e.g., security equipment) best suited  to mitigate vulnerabilities at the facility. These assessments generally  focus on building systems and perimeter and entry issues.
The ISC risk management standard also lays out standards for  establishing facility security committees, which consist of a representative  from each of the tenant agencies in the facility, and which are responsible  for addressing security issues identified in the facility security assessment  and approving the implementation of recommended security  countermeasures. These standards include the following:  facility security committees are established when two or more federal  tenants with funding authority occupy a facility,  findings from the FPS facility security assessments are to be  presented at facility security committee meetings, and meeting minutes must document each vote to approve or disapprove  a recommended countermeasure, and if agenda decisions are  disapproved, the meeting minutes must document the chosen risk  management strategy.
As new threats to federal facilities have emerged, the federal government  has released additional directives related to the security of federal  facilities, including courthouses. For example:
The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical  Infrastructures and Key Assets. Following the attacks on  September 11, 2001, the White House developed this National  Strategy to ensure that initial efforts to protect key assets were  sustained over the long term. Courthouse security falls under the  National Strategy which outlines the guiding principles that  underpin national efforts to secure infrastructure and assets vital  to public health and safety, national security, governance,  economy, and public confidence.
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan. DHS developed this  plan to guide the national effort to manage risks to critical  infrastructure.
section_title: AOUSC Is Able to Identify Security Concerns across the Courthouse Portfolio, While the Marshals Service and FPS Are Able to Identify Concerns at the Individual Building Level
subsections: section_title: AOUSC Develops Portfolio-Wide Information About Security Concerns
paragraphs: Identifying security concerns at federal courthouses is critical to managing  the risk to those courthouses. We previously compiled a risk management  framework applicable to protecting federal facilities that defined risk  management in general as managing across a portfolio. We have also  issued other reports in recent years that discuss the importance of  understanding risk comprehensively (rather than only on an individual  building basis) in order to effectively protect federal facilities consistent  with that definition. AOUSC collects security information in a way that  provides a picture of portfolio-wide concerns and can be used to  comprehensively understand security concerns across the portfolio of  federal courthouses. AOUSC assesses and scores courthouses on the  security features of court operations, in accordance with the U.S. Courts  Design Guide as part of their long-range capital-planning process,  according to AOUSC officials. Through this process, AOUSC develops  security scores for courthouses that range from 0 to 100, with 100 being  an ideal courthouse that meets all assessed security factors, as  determined by the judiciary. These scores allow the judiciary to compare  security needs across courthouses and understand the relative security  deficiencies of one courthouse compared to others. AOUSC has three  categories to describe these security scores: below 60 is poor, 60–79 is  marginal to acceptable, and 80–100 is good.
AOUSC’s scores reflect different aspects of courthouse security, such as  whether the courthouse has separate pathways for judicial personnel,  prisoners, jury members, and the public; secured parking for judges;  vehicle sally ports for prisoner transport; an adequate number of  courtroom holding cells; and physical barriers to block unwarranted  vehicular access. While AOUSC’s security scores consider some aspects  of security on the perimeter and in space where prisoners are held,  detailed assessments of these aspects of security are the responsibility of  FPS and the Marshals Service, consistent with their missions.
section_title: Marshals Service and FPS Identify Building-Specific Security Concerns That Cannot Readily Be Tracked across the Portfolio of Courthouses
paragraphs: The Marshals Service and FPS also identify security concerns at  individual courthouse facilities, focused on their respective missions, but  unlike AOUSC, they do not currently collect this information in a way that  it can be readily compared across the portfolio of courthouses to gauge  the overall concerns with these buildings. As discussed below, the  Marshals Service identifies security concerns through two kinds of project  requests to address security concerns. The Marshals Service is taking  steps to improve the information it collects; however, these steps may not  enable it to understand concerns portfolio-wide as defined by our risk  management framework, because of the reasons discussed below.
Marshals Service officials told us that previously, they had no means  to prioritize among project requests to correct deficiencies in judicial  space, such as those in courtrooms. The Marshals Service is  piloting an initiative to create a means of prioritizing these requests  into three levels of priority. However, Marshals Service officials told us  that they still will not be able to compare similar concerns from one  courthouse to another once the improvements to the process are  made, because similar concerns would fall into the same priority level,  and the initiative does not have a method for prioritizing within the  same priority level.
For projects to correct deficiencies in Marshals Service space, such  as the areas used to move prisoners throughout the courthouse,  headquarters Marshals Service officials told us that they currently rely  on institutional knowledge to evaluate requests. Marshals Service  officials said that it can be difficult to determine which projects to fund  and not all officials would arrive at the same decisions, as there is  currently no standard process for reviewing project requests and  making funding decisions. To improve this process, the Marshals  Service is developing a decision matrix to document how decisions  are made, but officials said they were not sure if this process would  result in a way to compare projects as part of the portfolio of  courthouses, as they are still early in the process of developing the  matrix.
FPS conducts facility security assessments of individual buildings,  including courthouses. These assessments consist of identifying and  assessing threats to and vulnerabilities of a facility, for example, whether  security equipment is working properly. FPS shares these assessments  and recommendations for countermeasures with the building’s facility  security committee as part of the security services it provides to its  customer agencies, and the facility security committee votes on whether  to approve or disapprove suggested countermeasures.
Information on the status of FPS countermeasure recommendations— whether facility security committees have accepted, rejected, or not made  a decision—can provide insight into the level of risk tenant agencies  accept at a particular facility and enables risk-informed decisions. FPS  began tracking the facility security committee decisions at the individual  facility level in fiscal year 2015. Our prior work has found that the tool  FPS uses to conduct facility security assessments was not designed to  compare risks across federal facilities. FPS officials recognize the value  of being able to analyze countermeasures across courthouses and other  federal buildings. They said that this information would provide a greater  understanding of which countermeasures were consistently accepted or  rejected, which could help FPS make better recommendations for all  federal buildings, not just courthouses, in its facility security assessments.  For example, if FPS knew that a particular recommendation was  frequently rejected because it is cost prohibitive, FPS might look for  another less costly option to mitigate that deficiency, according to  officials.
FPS is also pursuing the capability to track the status of countermeasures  in an automated way as part of initial plans for a software upgrade for its  vulnerability assessment tool that allows FPS inspectors to review  recommended countermeasures, among other things. However, officials  were not certain when, or if, this capability will be ultimately included in  the upgrade. FPS officials said that absent the capability to track  countermeasure status in an automated way, obtaining information on  whether countermeasure recommendations are accepted or rejected  across all courthouses (or analyzing it by other variables) would be a  labor-intensive process because relevant data are not easy to retrieve  and would have to be done so manually. FPS officials said that there  might be other ways to obtain this capability, but so far, they have not  developed them. Further, FPS officials said that facility security  committees often do not report whether they are approving or  disapproving a countermeasure, even though the ISC standard calls for  approval or disapproval to be documented in the facility security  assessment. Tracking information on countermeasure implementation  across the portfolio could help hold facility security committees  accountable for their responsibilities under the ISC standard.
The improvements that both agencies are making to their information on  security concerns are promising but may not provide the portfolio-wide  information that decision makers need to make risk-informed decisions.  Portfolio-wide information could enhance the way that headquarters  Marshals Service officials make decisions when selecting security  projects, so that the selections address the most urgent needs and FPS  could be in a better position to understand the degree to which facility  security committees are accepting risk at federal facilities.
section_title: CSP Shows Potential for Enhancing Security at Federal Courthouses, but Greater Transparency and Collaboration Could Improve the Program
subsections: section_title: Officials at CSP Locations Cite Improvements in Security as a Result of the Program
paragraphs: Congress provided $20 million in obligational authority for the CSP in the  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 and also provided obligational  authority for the program for fiscal years 2013, 2015, and 2016, which  GSA has designated for 11 projects in 10 locations. The program, which  is funded from GSA’s Federal Buildings Fund, is intended to address  security deficiencies in existing buildings where physical renovations  (“brick and mortar solutions”) are viable, and to provide a vehicle for  addressing security deficiencies in a timely and less costly manner than  constructing a new courthouse. Program goals include: (a) utilizing  existing building assets and government resources cost-effectively; (b)  addressing security deficiencies which put the public and government  staff at risk; and (c) providing a low-cost alternative to high-cost capital  investments. Courts with adequate space to house judicial officers but  with poor physical security are eligible to participate because such courts  are unlikely to obtain a new courthouse in the foreseeable future. As of  March 2016, two projects had been completed, two were in construction,  four were in design, and three had not yet begun design, as shown in  Table 1.
CSP projects are designed to improve the separation of circulation in  accordance with the U.S. Courts Design Guide, which states that an  essential element of security design is the physical separation of the  public, judges, and prisoners into three separate paths of circulation so  that trial participants do not meet until they are in the courtroom during  formal court proceedings. AOUSC officials told us that having three  separate paths of circulation is important so that judges are protected  from being influenced or threatened by parties to court proceedings, their  families, or other members of the public when entering and circulating  through a courthouse. They also told us that criminal defendants pose a  security risk to co-defendants, witnesses, and the general public. Some of  the CSP improvements to address these separate paths of circulation  include:  Adding or enlarging sally ports: Some federal courthouses have no  vehicle sally port (or an inadequate one) for the Marshals Service to load  and unload prisoners.
Building secure parking for judges: Some federal courthouses do not  have a secure place for judges to park and enter the building.
Adding elevators for prisoners and/or judges: In some of the older  courthouses, the structure of the building and location of elevators may  not permit three separate paths of circulation.
Reconfiguring space to provide secure patterns of circulation: Some  federal courthouses cannot accommodate the three separate paths of  circulation without space reconfiguration.
While CSP projects may not address every security deficiency in a  building, officials at locations that have been selected for a CSP project  told us that the projects will provide (or have provided) significant  improvements to security at those locations. For example, a local GSA  official said that the security changes as a result of a completed CSP  project has created a “night and day” difference in the overall security of  the building as the parking and circulation issues have been addressed.  In addition, local Marshals Service officials said that when the CSP  project at their location is completed, it will address their highest security  priorities and improve security. AOUSC officials have re-evaluated their  security scores for the two projects that have been completed, and the  security scores have improved. At one location the security score  increased from 46.1 (poor) to 80.2 (good), and at the other, the score  increased from 58.9 (poor) to 68.2 (marginal to acceptable).
section_title: Selection Process for CSP Projects Has Evolved since Inception, with Some Improvements to Transparency and Collaboration
paragraphs: The process used to select potential CSP project locations has continued  to evolve since the program began in 2012, and as a result, transparency  and collaboration related to potential CSP project location selections and  program execution have improved. According to OMB’s directive on open  government, transparency promotes accountability and collaboration  improves the effectiveness of government by encouraging partnerships  and cooperation. Similarly, our prior work has recognized that leading  practices for capital-planning include that an agency’s project prioritization  process be transparent about how project rankings are determined,  among other things. In addition, our prior work also recognized that  collaboration is key to ensuring the efficient use of limited resources to  address issues that cut across more than one agency, and that  collaboration ensures that federal efforts draw on the expertise of the  involved agencies.
At the time of our review, two rounds of CSP project location selections  had been finished, and a third round was underway. With each round, the  transparency of selection evolved as more criteria were added for  selection and more people were involved in the selection process. More  specifically:
During the first round of selections, for fiscal year 2012 only,  according to AOUSC officials, AOUSC selected four project locations  using professional judgment informed by the expertise of GSA and the  Marshals Service to get them started quickly because a report and  spending plan on program implementation had to be submitted within  90 days of the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act,  2012. For example, one location was chosen because it had an  existing concept study that could be used as a basis for the project,  and another was prioritized, in part, because of a threat to a judge at  that location, according to AOUSC officials.
For the second round of project location selections, for projects  funded in fiscal years 2013 through 2017, criteria were developed for  selection following a two-step process. First, the judiciary developed a  preliminary list of project location candidates following a set of “Go/No  Go” factors. For example, only courthouse facilities that were federally  owned and had resident judges were eligible for selection. Second,  AOUSC conducted what it referred to as a “deep dive analysis” that  involved a number of factors. While this allowed greater insight into  how locations were selected, from our review of AOUSC documents,  we noted that there was still a lack of clarity about how some of these  factors would be measured. For example, one factor was “type of  caseload and proceedings” meaning that a “significant” number of  criminal proceedings are conducted in the facility, but it was not clear  how locations were evaluated on these criteria. As a result, for the  CSP projects selected in round two, we were unable to determine how  the criteria were used to prioritize project locations amongst each  other and why certain project locations were ultimately selected over  others because the decisions (such as why some were selected and  others were eliminated from contention) were not documented and it  was not clear how all criteria were defined and applied.
The process for the third round of potential CSP project location  selections (for projects 2018 and beyond) contained additional  improvements. AOUSC and federal stakeholders added refinements  to the existing two-step process and some additional steps after the  “Go/No Go” factors and “deep dive analysis” including: (a) a series of  internal judiciary review meetings that further narrowed the list of  candidates based on first-hand knowledge and observations; (b)  meetings between AOUSC, the Marshals Service, and GSA in March  2016 to narrow the remaining potential locations into three tiers based  on security scores as well as other factors; (c) reviews of the  feasibility of a project at the top eight locations, and (d) selecting four  of those locations for consideration. From our review of AOUSC  documents, we noted that this round of project location selections  provided important transparency improvements. For example, during  this round the CSP had a greater emphasis on buildings with poor  security scores—quantitative information that can be objectively  reviewed. In round three, only locations with poor security scores  (below 60) were considered for the program, and the Judiciary’s  Space and Facilities Committee approved four locations for a CSP  study in June 2016 that have security scores less than 30 (only 4 of  the 10 previous locations chosen for CSP projects had security scores  less than 30, see Table 1).
In addition to transparency improvements related to the selection  process, federal stakeholders have enhanced their collaboration during  CSP project execution. GSA officials said that they were not involved in  developing the scopes of work for the original four projects in fiscal year  2012 and the corresponding cost estimates for them. As a result, the  project concept studies did not consider GSA’s mechanical, engineering,  and plumbing standards, which are considered for concepts in other  capital projects. GSA officials said that this led to inaccurate estimates  and delays in the execution of some 2012 projects. For example, GSA  officials said that during one 2012 funded project, they were not consulted  on the concept and estimate, and that the estimate was under by about  30 percent, which they said is a significant deviation. After AOUSC  conferred with stakeholders on needed improvements in the second  round of CSP project selections (fiscal years 2013–2017), GSA officials  said that they began reviewing the cost estimates and providing  comments to AOUSC. Further, GSA officials said that AOUSC now seeks  their expertise on assumptions developed in the concept studies before  developing an estimate, which has minimized the amount of re-work  required at design.
section_title: Further Opportunities to Improve Transparency and Collaboration of the CSP
paragraphs: Although federal stakeholders have taken the aforementioned positive  steps to improve CSP, not all of the issues with transparency and  collaboration have been addressed, in particular:
Key stakeholders were not clear on the eligibility of particular locations  for a CSP project and how to suggest locations for consideration.  Marshals Service headquarters officials told us that they have asked  that certain court locations be considered for the CSP, but they have  been denied. For example, headquarters Marshals Service officials  told us that they requested that one particular federal courthouse be a  part of the CSP, specifically to add certain features to improve  circulation. This courthouse was not included as a potential CSP  project location, and the Marshals Service moved forward with the  design of the project. GSA officials told us that the judiciary developed  a process for identifying CSP projects and subsequent studies  resulted in a priority list of locations, and that this courthouse was not  put forth by the judiciary to be studied.
During the third round of project selections, that same courthouse was  one of four locations removed by the judiciary during the internal  judiciary meetings due to having Marshals Service-funded projects, or  joint projects, but no Marshals Service officials participated in this  discussion. Specifically, documentation from this internal meeting  showed that this courthouse was removed due to a Marshals Service  project that was already funded. However, local judicial, Marshals  Service, and GSA officials told us when we visited that a circulation  project was not planned for the location, and Marshals Service  officials provided a document that showed that the project has not yet  been funded, (project design has been funded). Although the judiciary  removed this courthouse from consideration for a project, Marshals  Service officials maintain that it could have been a CSP project.
There continues to be a lack of clarity about how key deep-dive  analysis factors were applied during the most recent round of project  selection. For example, one of these factors (as conceptualized in  round three) was the number of criminal defendants the courthouse  processed. But there is no description of what number of defendants  would be too low for a court to be considered further for a CSP  project, and the reasons that some locations were removed for a low  number of criminal defendants, while others with the same number  were put forward, were not clearly documented. For example  according to AOUSC documentation, a certain potential location was  removed as a candidate during the latest round of CSP selections  during internal judiciary meetings because it had zero criminal  defendants. However, other locations were put through to the next  round that also had zero criminal defendants.
Marshals Service officials also expressed a transparency concern  regarding CSP costs. Specifically, the additional costs they incur from  CSP projects are not considered during project selection. According to  Marshals Service officials, when the judiciary selects a CSP project,  the Marshals Service must find funding for any Marshals Service  security equipment needed to support the CSP projects. Marshals  Service officials said that in the first year of project selections (2012),  the corresponding Marshals Service costs were covered, but that  since then, GSA has told them that they would need to provide the  funding.
Key stakeholders hold varying views about how collaborative the  process to select CSP projects has been. AOUSC officials said they  believe that CSP selection process has been collaborative and that no  project was or is approved for CSP funding without the concurrence of  the Marshals Service and GSA. However, Marshals Service officials  said that they have not found the process of selecting projects to be  collaborative, but rather, from their point of view, the CSP projects are  selected by the judiciary based on its view of security concerns. GSA  officials said that they were not involved in project selection during the  first two rounds of CSP project selection, but that during the third  round of project selections, the process was more collaborative.  Similarly, FPS has generally not been included in the planning or  execution of CSP projects. FPS was only included in CSP planning  and implementation for one of six CSP project locations we visited,  where the local Marshals Service sought FPS’s expertise in  placement of security equipment. At these locations, CSP projects  may alter the perimeter of the building and could affect FPS’s  equipment. For example, local FPS officials in one location we visited  said that they did not know about the impending CSP project until we  notified them of our visit to tour the project site. They said they would  need new security equipment and that they could possibly add their  expertise to other aspects of the project early in the process to avert  unnecessary costs if they were consulted on this CSP project.  AOUSC officials told us that moving forward, FPS will be included in  the CSP.
As our prior work has shown, the interests of multiple—and often  competing—stakeholders may not align with the most efficient use of  government resources and can complicate decision making. Better  transparency about how projects are selected, could help to ensure that  the CSP is not subjected to competing stakeholder interests.  Furthermore, as we have also reported, effective collaboration can help  maximize performance and results, particularly for issues that cut across  more than one agency, as is the case with courthouse security. CSP  projects involve multiple stakeholders, and projects have multiple phases,  so it can be difficult to ensure that all stakeholders fully understand all  program procedures and are involved at the right time and to the right  degree throughout the life of the project. An internal control for efficient  and effective operations is to ensure that all transactions and other  significant events are clearly documented in a manner that allows the  documentation to be readily available for examination. With clearer  documentation of the process shared with all stakeholders, transparency  and collaboration could also be enhanced in the CSP. By developing  approaches to provide stakeholders information that clearly describes  how all selection criteria are to be applied, how to put forth a location for  consideration, what specific costs are eligible for funding within a project,  how collaboration is to occur during project selection and execution, and  when and how to include all relevant agencies in each phase of the  project, stakeholders could be better assured that they all have the same  understanding of how the program is supposed to work, that the program  is addressing the most urgent needs and that the expertise of all  government stakeholders is being used to help ensure that the program is  as efficient as possible.
section_title: Agencies Can Take Additional Actions to Address Previous Issues and Improve Coordination and Information Sharing
subsections: section_title: Previously Identified Issues Continue to Impair a Comprehensive Approach to Courthouse Security
paragraphs: We have previously reported on coordination issues facing the security of  courthouses. More specifically, in September 2011, we found that  federal stakeholders faced issues, among others, related to implementing  their roles and responsibilities, gathering and sharing comprehensive  security information, and participating in security committees. At that time,  we recommended that FPS and the Marshals Service, in conjunction with  the judiciary and GSA, jointly lead an effort to update a 1997 MOA that  outlines stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities. Implementation of this  recommendation was key to addressing the issues in our view. Since  then, FPS officials said that they took the initiative on updating the MOA,  working with each party individually and sharing iterative updates based  on comments. FPS officials said that they took the lead in this effort  because they wanted to address the recommendation and no other  agency was moving forward with it. However, despite these efforts, nearly  5 years after the recommendation, the updated MOA still has not been  signed. FPS officials told us that the MOA had been set aside at different  times since the recommendation was made, in part, due to staff turnover  at each agency that in some instances resulted in major revisions to the  draft that necessitated additional vetting. In addition, FPS officials said  that lengthy reviews and issues coordinating schedules have also  contributed to the delays.
During our visits to CSP project locations as a part of this review and  during discussions with AOUSC and local court officials, and  headquarters and local Marshals Service, GSA, and FPS officials, we  found that the issues we identified in September 2011 persist. More  specifically, these issues include those outlined below.
subsections: section_title: Effective Execution of Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: We found that the Marshals Service’s and FPS’s roles and responsibilities  have at times been fragmented. Some local FPS officials said that it can  be difficult to determine what entity has responsibility for security  equipment. For example, a local FPS official told us about a situation in  one courthouse, where some security equipment is monitored by FPS  and some is monitored by the Marshals Service. We found the same type  of situation in another location and officials were unsure how that  arrangement came to be. In addition, headquarters Marshals Service  officials told us that overall there is fragmentation between FPS and the  Marshals Service in ensuring that security equipment is operational. In  one location FPS local officials also said that duplicative security efforts—  such as when both the Marshals Service and have FPS have equipment  in the same building or part of the building—can create confusion.
We found that the level of coordination can be site-specific and  personality-driven which can make executing roles and responsibilities  difficult. For example, one local FPS official told us that FPS has a very  strong relationship with the local Marshals Service officials and judges  and are always included in court security meetings. However, at another  courthouse, an FPS inspector did not complete all sections in the 2014  facility security assessment, noting that an individual with the Marshals  Service would not answer all FPS questions during the interview and that  FPS could not be sure that all security equipment was working because  that individual would not permit the FPS inspector to conduct testing. FPS  and the Marshals Service both have new staff in those roles and officials  see the relationship improving; however, another facility security  assessment will not be completed until 2017.
Some local Marshals Service officials said that in certain locations, it is  difficult and time consuming for FPS to execute their role of repairing  equipment. For example, local Marshals Service officials at one location  we visited told us about a recent problem they encountered regarding  malfunctioning equipment at another location they serve. Initially, the  Marshals Service security contractor assessed that it needed a small,  inexpensive part, but the contractor could not fix it because the equipment  was owned by FPS. Marshals Service officials said that after 60 days and  reaching out through numerous calls and e-mails, FPS received the  internal approvals to fix the equipment.
section_title: Comprehensive Gathering and Sharing of Information on Security Concerns
paragraphs: We found that there continue to be issues associated with stakeholders  gathering comprehensive information on security concerns and sharing  the information gathered. As discussed earlier, the Marshals Service and  FPS have some information on security concerns for individual  courthouses, but cannot readily track the information across the portfolio  and address risks to courthouses associated with that analysis, based on  the way information is currently gathered. Further, information that  agencies already collect is not readily shared with the other agencies. For  example, AOUSC officials said that they have had difficulty getting facility  security assessments from FPS and have been told by some FPS  inspectors that AOUSC officials are not entitled to receive a copy of the  assessment, as they are not tenants in the building. Further, FPS officials  said that if AOUSC and the Marshals Service shared the information they  collect on security concerns with FPS, they could coordinate more with  those agencies, but FPS does not routinely have access to information  collected by these agencies.
Without sharing existing information on security concerns, federal  stakeholders do not have complete information to help them look for  strategic ways to achieve efficiencies and to address the risks to federal  courthouses more comprehensively. Further, if the agencies worked  together to gather and understand all of the available security information,  they could better understand what information is not collected at a  portfolio level, and work on a coordinated strategy to obtain needed  information efficiently. GSA officials told us that if more comprehensive  information was available and shared regarding deficiencies in  courthouses, federal agencies could develop joint acquisition strategies to  address widespread deficiencies more efficiently. For example, if FPS  develops the capability to track the status of countermeasure  recommendations across courthouses in an automated way, as  discussed earlier, and the results show that a particular countermeasure  is recommended often, but rarely accepted because is it cost-prohibitive,  federal agencies could leverage the buying power of the federal  government to drive down the cost of the countermeasure.
section_title: Accountability for Security at Individual Courthouses
paragraphs: Of the eight locations we visited, three did not have an active facility  security committee even though they have other federal tenants in the  building. In such buildings, a facility security committee is called for by the  ISC standard. Headquarters Marshals Service officials told us that in  their experience, facility security committee meetings, in reality, often do  not reflect the facility security committee provisions in the ISC standard  and that although addressing security needs ultimately falls upon the lead  tenant of each facility (the facility security committee chair), there are no  accountability mechanisms for ensuring these needs are addressed. FPS  officials also said that there is currently no compliance mechanism for the  ISC standard. Without attending these meetings, stakeholders involved in  courthouse security may be missing opportunities to share information  and coordinate so that security risks are better understood and  addressed. In 2013, we found that the ISC did not formally monitor  agencies’ compliance with ISC standards, but was planning an effort to  do so.
section_title: Federal Stakeholders Do Not Have an Effective Structure for Addressing Security Issues
paragraphs: We found that GSA, AOUSC, the Marshals Service, and FPS did not  routinely meet to address courthouse security problems at a national level  where decision-making authority exists. For example, more than four and  a half years passed before the four federal stakeholders met together in  May 2016 to discuss the MOA updates at a national level, although FPS  had been working on the update. A GSA official told us that when the four  stakeholders did meet, the meeting was very productive. FPS officials  said that though they considered assembling the larger group early on,  they elected to elicit comments and revisions on a draft to galvanize the  most substantive changes needed based on consultation with “key  representatives.” AOUSC officials told us that they did not know why they  had not met as a group prior to May 2016. In fact, Marshals Service and  AOUSC officials said that there was no working group or forum where the  four agencies could discuss issues relevant to courthouse security at the  national level where decision-making authority exits. In our previous work,  we identified interagency working groups as one of the collaboration  mechanisms used by agencies to coordinate activities.
National level coordination and cooperation in protecting critical  infrastructure is a key policy emphasis of the federal government. The  federal government has prioritized the protection of federal facilities  through directives to address the changing nature of threats to federal  facilities, including federal courthouses. Through these documents, the  federal government has consistently presented a common vision for  critical infrastructure protection: agencies involved in the security of  federal facilities should work together cooperatively to provide security to  our critical infrastructures in an efficient manner that maximizes the  federal government’s limited resources, for example:
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan notes the importance of  obtaining a shared vision with stakeholders with similar missions,  saying that “for the critical infrastructure community, leadership  involvement, open communication, and trusted relationships are  essential elements to partnership.”
The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical  Infrastructures and Key Assets states that protecting our critical  infrastructures and key assets calls for a transition to a national  cooperative approach across federal agencies.
However, the continuing issues related to cooperation that continue to  hinder effective courthouse security—in the areas of executing roles and  responsibilities, collecting and sharing information on security concerns,  and accountability for participating in coordination mechanisms like  security committee meetings—illustrate that more could be done to align  with the priorities that the federal government has established in these  documents. Also, the delays in updating the MOA further illustrate that the  cooperative approach described in the National Strategy has not been  fully developed. Without a more cooperative approach to securing  courthouses, such as through a working group or similar forum,  challenges across the portfolio of federal courthouses will likely persist.  The physical security of government assets is one of the most challenging  aspects of real property management. In fact, one of the reasons that  managing federal property is an area that we have designated as high  risk is due to the challenges involved with protecting federal facilities.  Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, except for law enforcement  and security related functions transferred to DHS, GSA has the  responsibility to protect buildings it holds or leases. In its role as a  steward of federal courthouses under its custody and control, and as part  of its related protection responsibilities, GSA is well positioned to  establish a working group or other forum of federal stakeholders to  improve cooperative efforts.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Securing our nation’s federal courthouses is complex and challenging and  four federal stakeholders have a significant role—the judiciary, through its  administrative arm, AOUSC; GSA; the Marshals Service; and FPS.  Addressing courthouse security concerns begins with good information  regarding the risks to each courthouse, but the federal government does  not have this comprehensive information. The only portfolio-wide  information that the federal government has is collected by AOUSC;  however, these scores are only part of the story because comprehensive  information related to security concerns identified by the Marshals Service  and FPS is not currently used portfolio-wide. While both agencies have  plans to enhance their processes, it is unclear whether these  improvements will lead to the ability to assess security concerns across  the portfolio of courthouses. With better portfolio-wide information from  the Marshals Service and FPS, decision makers can be better equipped  to make risk-informed decisions.
Addressing courthouse security concerns can be a costly undertaking,  especially in older courthouses that were not designed for modern day  security threats, particularly with regard to meeting current standards that  call for the separate circulation of judges, prisoners, and the public. The  CSP was designed to be a less costly alternative to building new federal  courthouses and provides a way to add key security features. Since 2012,  the CSP has demonstrated the potential to address security problems for  less than the cost of a new courthouse. Transparency and collaboration  have improved, showing that the CSP is generally moving in the right  direction, but some concerns remain. Stakeholders do not have the same  understanding about how the CSP program works at key stages,  including project selection, and on how collaboration will occur.
While the CSP has the potential to address security concerns at  courthouses that are selected for the program, issues persist related to  cooperation and information sharing that we have found in the past.  Creating greater cooperation—as the National Strategy suggests—to  address courthouse security concerns can help GSA, AOUSC, the  Marshals Service, and FPS to systemically identify risks, the resources  needed to address those risks, and investment priorities when managing  security at these facilities. This effort would involve all relevant  stakeholders working together, having quality information to work with,  and using it to manage risk and find efficiencies in their efforts. Without a  coordinating mechanism at the national level, however, the four agencies  are limited in their effectiveness in developing comprehensive  approaches for addressing challenges that affect courthouse security.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: We recommend that the Attorney General instruct the Director of the  Marshals Service to ensure that the improvements being made to the  Marshals Service’s information on the security concerns of individual  buildings allow the Marshals Service to understand the concerns  across the portfolio.
We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security instruct the  Director of FPS to ensure that the agency develops the capability to  track the status of recommended countermeasures across the  courthouse portfolio, either through FPS’s planned software  enhancement or other method.
We recommend that the Administrator of GSA and the Director of the  AOUSC, on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States, in  conjunction with the Marshals Service and FPS, improve CSP  documentation in order to improve transparency and collaboration in  the CSP program.
We recommend that the Administrator of GSA—in conjunction with  AOUSC, the Marshals Service, and FPS—establish a national-level  working group or similar forum, consisting of leadership designees  with decision-making authority, to meet regularly to address  courthouse security issues.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of law enforcement sensitive/limited official use  version of this report to the DOJ, DHS, GSA, and AOUSC for review and  comment. In addition, DOJ and DHS conducted sensitivity reviews of the  law enforcement sensitive/limited official use version of this report. As a  result of these reviews, this public version of the report omits sensitive  information including specific security concerns, the results of AOUSC’s  security scores, and the names and locations of courthouses we visited or  whose information we analyzed.
In response to our request for comments on the law enforcement  sensitive/limited official use version of this report, we received an e-mail  from DOJ’s Audit Liaison Specialist which stated that DOJ was not  providing written comments, but that DOJ agreed with our  recommendation to ensure that the improvements being made to the  Marshals Service information on the security concerns of individual  buildings allows the Marshals Service to understand the concerns across  the portfolio. After the law enforcement sensitive/limited official use  version was issued, the Marshals Service provided additional information  stating that it had several initiatives under way in response to this  recommendation, including an approach to real property management  that incorporates security, construction, and budget concerns across the  portfolio. In addition, DOJ stated that the Marshals Service will work with  AOUSC, FPS, and GSA to improve CSP documentation and will support  and participate in a national-level working group regarding courthouse  security issues. We have not yet evaluated this information to determine if  it will address our concerns and recommendation.
We also received written comments from DHS, GSA, and AOUSC, which  are reproduced in full in appendixes II, III, and IV, respectively. DHS  agreed with our recommendation to ensure that FPS develops the  capability to track the status of recommended countermeasures across  the portfolio. DHS noted that it appreciates our acknowledgement that  security at federal courthouses is complex and involves multiple federal  stakeholders with different roles and responsibilities. After the law  enforcement sensitive/limited official use version of this report was  issued, DHS provided additional information stating that it has included  cross-portfolio tracking of existing and recommended countermeasures  as part of a mission needs statement, with an acquisition decision to be  made in 2017. We have not yet evaluated this information to determine if  it will address our concerns and recommendation.
GSA agreed with our recommendations to improve CSP documentation  to improve transparency and collaboration and to establish a national- level working group or similar forum to meet regularly to address  courthouse security concerns. In the comments, GSA noted that it will  develop a comprehensive plan to address the recommendations and is  confident that this plan will satisfactorily remedy concerns this report  raises. After the law enforcement sensitive/limited official use version of  this report was issued, GSA provided additional information stating that it  plans to assist the judiciary in developing a statement of work for a CSP  handbook and subsequently work with the judiciary, USMS, and FPS to  develop the handbook. GSA also provided information stating that it plans  to finalize the Courts Security Memorandum of Agreement between  AOUSC, the Marshals Service, FPS, and GSA; and that it plans to  develop a courthouse security working group charter. We have not yet  evaluated this information to determine if it will address our concerns and  recommendations.
AOUSC agreed with our recommendation to improve CSP documentation  in order to improve transparency and collaboration and discussed steps  that AOUSC is already taking to address this recommendation. AOUSC  stated that it has started to compile and document all relevant  background, policy, and process information to provide a central resource  for all stakeholders to use. Further, AOUSC stated that it plans to develop  a handbook/guide for use by GSA, the Marshals Service, FPS, and other  stakeholders detailing key aspects of the CSP selection process. AOUSC  stated that this documentation will address our recommendation by  making documentation readily available for examination by all  stakeholders including descriptions of all selection criteria to be applied,  how projects are identified, specific costs eligible for funding, and how  collaboration will occur during project selection and execution. After the  law enforcement sensitive/limited official use version of this report was  issued, AOUSC provided additional information about actions it has taken  in response to this recommendation, including implementing of a  communications plan for all new CSP concept studies and ensuring that  all stakeholders are included in CSP concept, design, and construction  meetings. In addition, AOUSC stated that the judiciary is working with  GSA to jointly develop a CSP handbook, which they plan to complete by  the end of 2017. Further, AOUSC stated that all relevant stakeholders  were invited to participate in a meeting GSA held to develop a courthouse  security working group charter. We have not yet evaluated this  information to determine if it will address our concerns and  recommendation.
All four agencies provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.
We are sending copies to appropriate congressional committees, the  Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, Administrator of the  General Services Administration, and Director of the Administrative Office  of the U.S. Courts. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao.gov. GAO staff who made major  contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report focuses on physical security concerns in federal courthouses.  This report addresses the following questions:
To what extent have federal stakeholders identified security concerns  at federal courthouses?
How has the Judiciary Capital Security Program (CSP) addressed  courthouse security concerns and how, if at all, can the program be  improved?
What actions, if any, could federal agencies take to improve  courthouse security?
This report is a public version of a previously issued report identified by  the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice as  containing information designated as law enforcement sensitive/limited  official use, which must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore,  this report omits sensitive information including specific security concerns,  the results of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Court’s (AOUSC)  security scores, and the names and locations of courthouses we visited or  whose information we analyzed. The information provided in this report is  more limited in scope, as it excludes such sensitive information, but it  addresses the same questions that the law enforcement sensitive/limited  official use report does, and the overall methodology used for both reports  is the same.
To determine the physical security concerns identified by the AOUSC, the  U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service), and the Federal Protective  Service (FPS), we reviewed and analyzed documents from these federal  stakeholders, including capital-planning documents, security  assessments, information on physical security concerns, and other  reports, and interviewed AOUSC, Marshals Service, and FPS officials to  understand how they each identify security concerns and what data they  collect. We limited our scope to information collected by these federal  stakeholders, and we did not independently determine what constitutes a  physical security concern. Rather, we relied on these stakeholders to  determine physical security concerns as defined in their own standards  and guidance. As part of our review of these data, we assessed federal  stakeholders’ documentation and written responses about data collection  procedures and their views of the quality of the data. We analyzed  AOUSC’s March 2016 security scores, but we did not analyze the scores  of non-resident courthouses and bankruptcy-only courthouses due to  differences in security requirements of the different court operations and  facilities, differences that limit the comparability of security scores, leaving  267 courthouses for our analysis. We believe that AOUSC’s security  scores, developed as part of the judiciary’s long-range capital-planning  process, are sufficiently reliable for our purposes based on answers that  AOUSC provided to our questions on data reliability. We also reviewed  incident and threat data collected by the Marshals Service and FPS, but  based on our assessment, we do not believe these data were sufficiently  reliable for describing physical security concerns across courthouses. We  based this conclusion primarily on interviews with the Marshals Service  and FPS officials who both stated that there were significant limitations in  these data. We reviewed the methods of collecting information by these  federal stakeholders to determine whether it was used to understand  security concerns portfolio-wide as defined in our risk management  framework.
To understand how the CSP has or will address physical security  concerns, we visited eight courthouses, which we selected to cover six  CSP projects at various stages of implementation (completed, under  construction, and pre-construction) as well as two courthouses that were  considered but not selected. For each of the six site visit locations that  have had or will have a CSP project, we (1) toured the facility to observe  security concerns and how these concerns were (or will be) addressed in  a CSP project; (2) reviewed documentation including CSP concept plans,  security assessments and scores, and other reports indicating security  concerns; and (3) interviewed local officials from the General Services  Administration (GSA), Marshals Service, and FPS as well as local  judiciary officials, to obtain their views about physical security concerns  prior to the projects and how these concerns have or will be addressed by  the CSP, and about courthouse security concerns in general. We relied  on officials to bring security issues to our attention at the individual  courthouses we visited. While we visited six of the ten courthouses  selected for a CSP project as of fiscal year 2016, the information we  obtained from these site visits cannot be generalized across all CSP  locations. However, this information does provide useful examples about  a majority of CSP projects selected to date. We also selected two  courthouses that were considered but not chosen for the CSP and  appeared on AOUSC’s documentation of potential locations that was  used to selected projects from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2016. We  selected these particular locations because they could be combined with  our CSP site visits or were accessible to our field staff. As with the CSP  site visits, we toured the facility, reviewed documentation on security  concerns, and interviewed federal stakeholders, as discussed above.
To understand how federal stakeholders have selected CSP projects and  collaborated in planning and implementation efforts, we reviewed and  analyzed these stakeholders’ documentation on the CSP, including  project concepts and drawings, as well as AOUSC’s summaries of  selection criteria, summaries of an interagency summit to improve the  CSP, an agenda for an interagency meeting, and spreadsheets used to  select projects. We also interviewed relevant officials about methods used  to select project locations and collaborate with other stakeholders. We  incorporated written and testimonial information from all stakeholders, as  was appropriate and was relevant to the issues raised in our report. We  compared federal stakeholders’ efforts to select projects and collaborate  to criteria in our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government and the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB)  directive on open government.
To assess other actions federal stakeholders could take to address  courthouse security challenges, we examined relevant statutes,  memorandums of agreement, and federal stakeholders’ policies and  guidance pertaining to roles and responsibilities for physical security at  federal courthouses, as well as our prior work regarding courthouse  security, including GAO-11-857. Where they were available, we also  reviewed the meeting agendas and minutes of the facility security  committees for the courthouse locations we visited. We interviewed  headquarters and local officials from the GSA, Marshals Service, and  FPS and AOUSC officials and local judiciary officials to obtain their views  about efforts to address courthouse security challenges. We compared  federal stakeholders’ efforts to directives and authorities that have  established the federal government’s vision for critical infrastructure  protection, including the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of  Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, the National Infrastructure  Protection Plan.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to February 2017,  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the General Services Administration
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Lori Rectanus, (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, David Sausville (Assistant  Director), Amy Higgins (Analyst in Charge), Geoffrey Hamilton, John  Mingus, Kate Perl, Malika Rice, Amy Rosewarne, and Kelly Rubin made  key contributions to this report.