Environmental Satellite Acquisitions: Progress and Challenges
Published: 2007-07-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Environmental satellites provide data and imagery that are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and monitor changes in weather (including severe weather such as hurricanes), climate, the oceans, and the environment. Two current acquisitions are the $12.5 billion National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program--which is to replace two existing polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems--and the planned $7 billion Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R (GOES-R) program, which is to replace the current series of satellites due to reach end of their useful lives in approximately 2012. GAO was asked to summarize its past work on the progress and challenges facing these key environmental satellite acquisitions.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Both the NPOESS and GOES-R satellite acquisitions are costly, technically complex, and critically important to weather forecasting and climate monitoring. NPOESS was originally estimated to cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program, with its first satellite launch planned for April 2009. Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program thereby decreasing the program's complexity by reducing the number of sensors and satellites, increasing its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying the launches of the first two satellites to 2013 and 2016. Since that time, the program office has made progress in restructuring the satellite acquisition and establishing an effective management structure; however, important tasks remain to be done and significant risks remain. The GOES-R acquisition, originally estimated to cost $6.2 billion and scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012, is at a much earlier stage in its life cycle than NPOESS. In September 2006, GAO reported that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) had issued contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R system to three vendors and expected to award a contract to one of these vendors in August 2007 to develop the satellites. However, analyses of GOES-R cost--which in May 2006 was estimated to reach $11.4 billion--led the agency, in September 2006, to reduce the program's scope from four to two satellites and to discontinue one of the critical sensors. Program officials now report that they are reevaluating that decision and may further revise the scope and requirements of the program in coming months. GAO also reported that NOAA had taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite programs, but more remained to be done to ensure sound cost estimates and adequate system engineering capabilities. GAO currently has work under way to evaluate GOES-R risks and challenges.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to  discuss our work on two major operational environmental satellite  programs: the $12.5 billion National Polar-orbiting Operational  Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program and the planned  $7 billion Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R  (GOES-R) program.
Operational environmental satellites provide data and imagery that  are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to  map and monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the  environment. NPOESS—a tri-agency program managed by the  Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense/US Air Force,  and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—is  expected to be a state-of-the-art, environment monitoring satellite  system that will replace two existing polar-orbiting environmental  satellite systems. The GOES-R series, managed by NOAA with  assistance from NASA, is to replace the current series of satellites  which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in  approximately 2012. This new series is expected to mark the first  major technological advance in GOES instrumentation since 1994.  The NPOESS and GOES-R programs are considered critical to the  United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for  weather forecasting (including severe weather events such as  hurricanes) and global climate monitoring through the years 2026  and 2028 respectively.
At your request, we are summarizing the results of our previous  work on operational environmental satellite programs, including  NPOESS and the GOES-R program. In preparing this testimony, we  relied on the work supporting our prior reports. Those reports  contain detailed overviews of our scope and methodology. All of the  work on which this testimony is based was performed in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting operational  environmental satellites have been used by the United States to  provide meteorological data for weather observation, research, and  forecasting. NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite Data and  Information Service (NESDIS) is responsible for managing the  existing civilian geostationary and polar-orbiting satellite systems as  two separate programs, called the Geostationary Operational  Environmental Satellites and the Polar Operational Environmental  Satellites (POES), respectively. The Air Force is responsible for  operating a second polar-orbiting environmental satellite system— the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP).
Polar-orbiting environmental satellites obtain environmental data  that are processed to provide graphical weather images and  specialized weather products. These satellite data are also the  predominant input to numerical weather prediction models, which  are a primary tool for forecasting weather 3 or more days in  advance—including forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes.  The weather products and models are used to predict the potential  impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency  managers can help prevent and mitigate their effects. Polar satellites  also provide data used to monitor environmental phenomena, such  as ozone depletion and drought conditions, as well as data sets that  are used by researchers for a variety of studies such as climate  monitoring. Figure 1 illustrates the current operational polar  satellite configuration consisting of two POES and two DMSP  satellites.
Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the earth in a  relatively low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain a  constant view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in  space. NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is  primarily focused on the United States (see fig. 2). These satellites  are uniquely positioned to provide timely environmental data to  meteorologists and their audiences on the earth’s atmosphere, its  surface, cloud cover, and the space environment. They also observe  the development of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes and  severe thunderstorms, and track their movement and intensity to  reduce or avoid major losses of property and life. Furthermore, the  satellites’ ability to provide broad, continuously updated coverage of  atmospheric conditions over land and oceans is important to  NOAA’s weather forecasting operations.
subsections: section_title: Satellite Acquisition Programs Often Experience Technical Problems, Cost Overruns, and Schedule Delays
paragraphs: Satellite acquisition programs are often technically complex and  risky undertakings, and as a result, they often experience technical  problems, cost overruns, and schedule delays. We and others have  reported on a historical pattern of repeated missteps in the  procurement of major satellite systems, including NPOESS, the  GOES I-M series, the Air Force’s Space Based Infrared System High  Program (SBIRS-High), and the Air Force’s Advanced Extremely  High Frequency Satellite System (AEHF). Table 1 lists key problems  experienced with these programs. While each of the programs faced  multiple problems, all of them experienced insufficient maturity of  technologies, overly aggressive schedules, insufficient subcontract  management, and inadequate system engineering capabilities for  overseeing contractors.
section_title: NPOESS: Overview, Issues, and Prior GAO Recommendations
paragraphs: With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs  would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May  1994 Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to  converge the two satellite programs into a single satellite program  capable of satisfying both civilian and military requirements. The  converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United  States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather  forecasting and global climate monitoring through the year 2026. To  manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency  Integrated Program Office, located within NOAA.
Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain  activities: NOAA has overall program management responsibility for  the converged system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead  on the acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for  facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies  into the converged system. NOAA and DOD share the costs of  funding NPOESS, while NASA funds specific technology projects  and studies. The NPOESS program office is overseen by an  Executive Committee, which is made up of the Administrators of  NOAA and NASA and the Under Secretary of the Air Force.
NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated  to cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from  its inception in 1995 through 2018. The program was to provide  satellite development, satellite launch and operation, and ground- based satellite data processing. When the NPOESS engineering,  manufacturing, and development contract was awarded in August  2002, the estimated cost was $7 billion. Acquisition plans called for  the procurement and launch of six satellites over the life of the  program, as well as the integration of 13 instruments—consisting of  10 environmental sensors and 3 subsystems (see table 2).
In addition, a demonstration satellite (called the NPOESS  Preparatory Project or NPP) was planned to be launched several  years before the first NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk  associated with launching new sensor technologies and to ensure  continuity of climate data with NASA’s Earth Observing System  satellites.
NPOESS Experienced Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical Problems over Several Years  Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced continued cost  increases and schedule delays, requiring difficult decisions to be  made about the program’s direction and capabilities. In 2003, we  reported that changes in the NPOESS funding stream led the  program to develop a new program cost and schedule baseline.   After this new baseline was completed in 2004, we reported that the  program office increased the NPOESS cost estimate from about $7  billion to $8.1 billion, delaying key milestones, including the launch  of the first satellite, and extending the life of the program until 2020.  In mid-November 2005, we reported that NPOESS continued to  experience problems in the development of a key sensor, resulting  in schedule delays and anticipated cost increases. This was due in  part, to problems at multiple levels of management—including  subcontractor, contractor, program office, and executive leadership.  Recognizing that the budget for the program was no longer  executable, the NPOESS Executive Committee planned to make a  decision in December 2005 on the future direction of the program— what would be delivered, at what cost, and by when. This involved  deciding among options involving increased costs, delayed  schedules, and reduced functionality. We noted that continued  oversight, strong leadership, and timely decision making were more  critical than ever, and we urged the committee to make a decision  quickly so that the program could proceed.
However, we subsequently reported that, in late November 2005,  NPOESS cost growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold  that requires DOD to certify the program to Congress. This placed  any decision about the future direction of the program on hold until  the certification took place in June 2006. In the meantime, the  program office implemented an interim program plan for fiscal year  2006 to continue work on key sensors and other program elements  using fiscal year 2006 funding.
The Nunn-McCurdy law requires DOD to take specific actions when  a major defense acquisition program exceeds certain cost increase  thresholds. The law requires the Secretary of Defense to notify  Congress when a major defense acquisition is expected to overrun  its project baseline by 15 percent or more and to certify the program  to Congress when it is expected to overrun its baseline by 25  percent or more. In late November 2005, NPOESS exceeded the 25  percent threshold, and DOD was required to certify the program.  Certifying the program entailed providing a determination that (1)  the program is essential to national security, (2) there are no  alternatives to the program that will provide equal or greater  military capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the  program’s cost are reasonable, and (4) the management structure  for the program is adequate to manage and control costs. DOD  established tri-agency teams—made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA  experts—to work on each of the four elements of the certification  process.
In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner  agencies) certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to  cost $12.5 billion through 2026. This decision approved a cost  increase of $4 billion over the prior approved baseline cost and  delayed the launch of NPP and the first two satellites by roughly 3 to  5 years. The new program also entailed establishing a stronger  program management structure, reducing the number of satellites to  be produced and launched from 6 to 4, and reducing the number of  instruments on the satellites from 13 to 9—consisting of 7  environmental sensors and 2 subsystems. It also entailed using  NPOESS satellites in the early morning and afternoon orbits and  relying on European satellites for midmorning orbit data. Table 3  summarizes the major program changes made under the Nunn- McCurdy certification decision.
The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision established new  milestones for the delivery of key program elements, including  launching NPP by January 2010, launching the first NPOESS  satellite (called C1) by January 2013, and launching the second  NPOESS satellite (called C2) by January 2016. These revised  milestones deviated from prior plans to have the first NPOESS  satellite available to back up the final POES satellite should  anything go wrong during that launch.
Delaying the launch of the first NPOESS satellite means that if the  final POES satellite fails on launch, satellite data users would need  to rely on the existing constellation of environmental satellites until  NPP data becomes available—almost 2 years later. Although NPP  was not intended to be an operational asset, NASA agreed to move it  to a different orbit so that its data would be available in the event of  a premature failure of the final POES satellite. However, NPP will  not provide all of the operational capability planned for the NPOESS  spacecraft. If the health of the existing constellation of satellites  diminishes—or if NPP data is not available, timely, and reliable— then there could be a gap in environmental satellite data.
In order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn-McCurdy  certification decision decreased the number of NPOESS sensors  from 13 to 9 and reduced the functionality of 4 sensors. Specifically,  of the 13 original sensors, 5 sensors remain unchanged, 3 were  replaced with less capable sensors, 1 was modified to provide less  functionality, and 4 were cancelled. Table 4 shows the changes to  NPOESS sensors, including the 4 identified as critical sensors.
The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of  the resulting weather and environmental products, called  environmental data records or EDRs. In selecting sensors for the  restructured program, the agencies placed the highest priority on  continuing current operational weather capabilities and a lower  priority on obtaining selected environmental and climate measuring  capabilities. As a result, the revised NPOESS system has  significantly less capability for providing global climate measures  than was originally planned. Specifically, the number of EDRs was  decreased from 55 to 39, of which 6 are of a reduced quality. The 39  EDRs that remain include cloud base height, land surface  temperature, precipitation type and rate, and sea surface winds. The  16 EDRs that were removed include cloud particle size and  distribution, sea surface height, net solar radiation at the top of the  atmosphere, and products to depict the electric fields in the space  environment. The 6 EDRs that are of a reduced quality include  ozone profile, soil moisture, and multiple products depicting energy  in the space environment.
subsections: section_title: NPOESS Acquisition Restructuring Is Well Under Way, but Key Steps Remain To Be Completed
paragraphs: Since the June 2006 decision to revise the scope, cost, and schedule  of the NPOESS program, the program office has made progress in  restructuring the satellite acquisition; however, important tasks  remain to be done. Restructuring a major acquisition program like  NPOESS is a process that involves identifying time-critical and high- priority work and keeping this work moving forward, while  reassessing development priorities, interdependencies, deliverables,  risks, and costs. It also involves revising important acquisition  documents including the memorandum of agreement on the roles  and responsibilities of the three agencies, the acquisition strategy,  the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation master plan, the  integrated master schedule defining what needs to happen by when,  and the acquisition program baseline. Specifically, the Nunn- McCurdy certification decision required the Secretaries of Defense  and Commerce and the Administrator of NASA to sign a revised  memorandum of agreement by August 6, 2006. It also required that  the program office, Program Executive Officer, and the Executive  Committee revise and approve key acquisition documents including  the acquisition strategy and system engineering plan by September  1, 2006, in order to proceed with the restructuring. Once these are  completed, the program office can proceed to negotiate with its  prime contractor on a new program baseline defining what will be  delivered, by when, and at what cost.
The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the  acquisition. Specifically, the program office has established interim  program plans guiding the contractor’s work activities in 2006 and  2007 and has made progress in implementing these plans. The  program office and contractor also developed an integrated master  schedule for the remainder of the program—beyond fiscal year  2007. This integrated master schedule details the steps leading up to  launching NPP by September 2009, launching the first NPOESS  satellite in January 2013, and launching the second NPOESS satellite  in January 2016. Near-term steps include completing and testing the  VIIRS, CrIS, and OMPS sensors; integrating these sensors with the  NPP spacecraft and completing integration testing; completing the  data processing system and integrating it with the command,  control, and communications segment; and performing advanced  acceptance testing of the overall system of systems for NPP.
However, key steps remain for the acquisition restructuring to be  completed. Although the program office made progress in revising  key acquisition documents, including the system engineering plan,  the test and evaluation master plan, and the acquisition strategy  plan, it has not yet obtained the approval of the Secretaries of  Commerce and Defense and the Administrator of NASA on the  memorandum of agreement among the three agencies, nor has it  obtained the approval of the NPOESS Executive Committee on the  other key acquisition documents. As of June 2007, these approvals  are over 9 months past due. Agency officials noted that the  September 1, 2006, due date for the key acquisition documents was  not realistic given the complexity of coordinating documents among  three different agencies.
Finalizing these documents is critical to ensuring interagency  agreement and will allow the program office to move forward in  completing other activities related to restructuring the program.  These other activities include completing an integrated baseline  review with the contractor to reach agreement on the schedule and  work activities, and finalizing changes to the NPOESS development  and production contract. Program costs are also likely to be  adjusted during upcoming negotiations on contract changes—an  event that the Program Director expects to occur in July 2007.  Completion of these activities will allow the program office to lock  down a new acquisition baseline cost and schedule. Until key  acquisition documents are finalized and approved, the program  faces increased risk that it will not be able to complete important  restructuring activities in time to move forward in fiscal year 2008  with a new program baseline in place. This places the NPOESS  program at risk of continued delays and future cost increases.
section_title: Progress Has Been Made in Establishing an Effective NPOESS Management Structure, but Executive Turnover Increases Risks and Staffing Problems Remain
paragraphs: The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an  effective management structure, but—almost a year after this  structure was endorsed during the Nunn-McCurdy certification  process—the Integrated Program Office still faces staffing problems.
Over the past few years, we and others have raised concerns about  management problems at all levels of the NPOESS program,  including subcontractor and contractor management, program  office management, and executive-level management. Two  independent review teams also noted a shortage of skilled program  staff, including budget analysts and system engineers. Since that  time, the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an  effective management structure—including establishing a new  organizational framework with increased oversight by program  executives, instituting more frequent subcontractor, contractor, and  program reviews, and effectively managing risks and performance.  However, DOD’s plans for reassigning the Program Executive  Officer in the summer of 2007 increase the program’s risks.  Additionally, the program lacks a staffing process that clearly  identifies staffing needs, gaps, and plans for filling those gaps. As a  result, the program office has experienced delays in getting core  management activities under way and lacks the staff it needs to  execute day-to-day management activities.
NPOESS Program Has Made Progress in Establishing an Effective Management Structure and  Increasing Oversight Activities, but Executive Turnover Will Increase Program Risks  The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an  effective management structure and increasing the frequency and  intensity of its oversight activities. Over the past few years, we and  others have raised concerns about management problems at all  levels of management on the NPOESS program, including  subcontractor and contractor management, program office  management, and executive-level management. In response to  recommendations made by two different independent review teams,  the program office began exploring options in late 2005 and early  2006 for revising its management structure.
In November 2005, the Executive Committee established and filled a  Program Executive Officer position, senior to the NPOESS Program  Director, to streamline decision making and to provide oversight to  the program. This Program Executive Officer reports directly to the  Executive Committee. Subsequently, the Program Executive Officer  and the Program Director proposed a revised organizational  framework that realigned division managers within the Integrated  Program Office responsible for overseeing key elements of the  acquisition and increased staffing in key areas. In June 2006, the  Nunn-McCurdy certification decision approved this new  management structure and the Integrated Program Office  implemented it. Figure 3 provides an overview of the relationships  among the Integrated Program Office, the Program Executive  Office, and the Executive Committee, as well as key divisions within  the program office.
Operating under this new management structure, the program office  implemented more rigorous and frequent subcontractor, contractor,  and program reviews, improved visibility into risk management and  mitigation activities, and institutionalized the use of earned value  management techniques to monitor contractor performance. In  addition to these program office activities, the Program Executive  Officer implemented monthly program reviews and increased the  frequency of contacts with the Executive Committee. The Program  Executive Officer briefs the Executive Committee in monthly  letters, apprising committee members of the program’s status,  progress, risks, and earned value, and the Executive Committee now  meets on a quarterly basis—whereas in the recent past, we reported  that the Executive Committee had met only five times in 2 years.
Although the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an  effective management structure, this progress is currently at risk.  We recently reported that DOD space acquisitions are at increased  risk due in part to frequent turnover in leadership positions, and we  suggested that addressing this will require DOD to consider  matching officials’ tenure with the development or delivery of a  product. In March 2007, NPOESS program officials stated that DOD  is planning to reassign the recently appointed Program Executive  Officer in the summer 2007 as part of this executive’s natural career  progression. As of June 2007, the Program Executive Officer has  held this position for 19 months. Given that the program is currently  still being restructured, and that there are significant challenges in  being able to meet critical deadlines to ensure satellite data  continuity, such a move adds unnecessary risk to an already risky  program.
The NPOESS program office has filled key vacancies but lacks a  staffing process that identifies programwide staffing requirements  and plans for filling those needed positions. Sound human capital  management calls for establishing a process or plan for determining  staffing requirements, identifying any gaps in staffing, and planning  to fill critical staffing gaps. Program office staffing is especially  important for NPOESS, given the acknowledgment by multiple  independent review teams that staffing shortfalls contributed to past  problems. Specifically, these review teams noted shortages in the  number of system engineers needed to provide adequate oversight  of subcontractor and contractor engineering activities and in the  number of budget and cost analysts needed to assess contractor  cost and earned value reports. To rectify this situation, the June  2006 certification decision directed the Program Director to take  immediate actions to fill vacant positions at the program office with  the approval of the Program Executive Officer.
Since the June 2006 decision to revise NPOESS management  structure, the program office has filled multiple critical positions,  including a budget officer, a chief system engineer, an algorithm  division chief, and a contracts director. In addition, on an ad hoc  basis, individual division managers have assessed their needs and  initiated plans to hire staff for key positions. However, the program  office lacks a programwide process for identifying and filling all  needed positions. As a result, division managers often wait months  for critical positions to be filled. For example, in February 2006, the  NPOESS program estimated that it needed to hire up to 10 new  budget analysts. As of September 2006, none of these positions had  been filled. As of April 2007, program officials estimated that they  still needed to fill 5 budget analyst positions, 5 systems engineering  positions, and 10 technical manager positions. The majority of the  vacancies—4 of the 5 budget positions, 4 of the 5 systems  engineering positions, and 8 of the 10 technical manager positions— are to be provided by NOAA. NOAA officials noted that each of  these positions is in some stage of being filled—that is, recruitment  packages are being developed or reviewed, vacancies are being  advertised, or candidates are being interviewed, selected, and  approved.
The program office attributes its staffing delays to not having the  right personnel in place to facilitate this process, and it did not even  begin to develop a staffing process until November 2006. Program  officials noted that the tri-agency nature of the program adds  unusual layers of complexity to the hiring and administrative  functions because each agency has its own hiring and performance  management rules. In November 2006, the program office brought in  an administrative officer who took the lead in pulling together the  division managers’ individual assessments of needed staff and has  been working with the division managers to refine this list. This new  administrative officer plans to train division managers in how to  assess their needs and to hire needed staff, and to develop a process  by which evolving needs are identified and positions are filled.  However, there is as yet no date set for establishing this basic  programwide staffing process. As a result of the lack of a  programwide staffing process, there has been an extended delay in  determining what staff is needed and in bringing those staff on  board; this has resulted in delays in performing core activities, such  as establishing the program office’s cost estimate and bringing in  needed contracting expertise. Additionally, until a programwide  staffing process is in place, the program office risks not having the  staff it needs to execute day-to-day management activities.
In commenting on a draft of our report, Commerce stated that  NOAA implemented an accelerated hiring model. More recently, the  NPOESS program office reported that several critical positions were  filled in April and May 2007. However, we have not yet evaluated  NOAA’s accelerated hiring model and, as of June 2007, about 10 key  positions remained to be filled.
section_title: Major Program Segments Are Under Development, but Significant Risks Remain
paragraphs: Major segments of the NPOESS program—the space segment and  ground systems segment—are under development; however,  significant problems have occurred and risks remain. The program  office is aware of these risks and is working to mitigate them, but  continued problems could affect the program’s overall cost and  schedule. Given the tight time frames for completing key sensors,  integrating them on the NPP spacecraft, and developing, testing, and  deploying the ground-based data processing systems, it will be  important for the NPOESS Integrated Program Office, the Program  Executive Office, and the Executive Committee to continue to  provide close oversight of milestones and risks.
The space segment includes the sensors and the spacecraft. Four  sensors are of critical importance—VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS— because they are to be launched on the NPP satellite in September  2009. Initiating work on another sensor, the Microwave  imager/sounder, is also important because this new sensor— replacing the cancelled CMIS sensor—will need to be developed in  time for the second NPOESS satellite launch. Over the past year, the  program made progress on each of the sensors and the spacecraft.  However, two sensors, VIIRS and CrIS, have experienced major  problems. The status of each of the components of the space  segment is described in table 5.
Managing the risks associated with the development of VIIRS and  CrIS is of particular importance because these components are to be  demonstrated on the NPP satellite, currently scheduled for launch in  September 2009. Any delay in the NPP launch date could affect the  overall NPOESS program, because the success of the program  depends on the lessons learned in data processing and system  integration from the NPP satellite. Additionally, continued sensor  problems could lead to higher final program costs.
Development of the ground segment—which includes the interface  data processing system, the ground stations that are to receive  satellite data, and the ground-based command, control, and  communications system—is under way and on track. However,  important work pertaining to developing the algorithms that  translate satellite data into weather products within the integrated  data processing segment remains to be completed. Table 6 describes  each of the components of the ground segment and identifies the  status of each.
Managing the risks associated with the development of the IDPS  system is of particular importance because this system will be  needed to process NPP data.
section_title: Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Reduce Risk
paragraphs: Because of the importance of effectively managing the NPOESS  program to ensure that there are no gaps in the continuity of critical  weather and environmental observations, in our April 2007 report,  we made recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and  Commerce and to the Administrator of NASA to ensure that the  responsible executives within their respective organizations  approve key acquisition documents, including the memorandum of  agreement among the three agencies, the system engineering plan,  the test and evaluation master plan, and the acquisition strategy, as  quickly as possible but no later than April 30, 2007. We also  recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air Force to  delay reassigning the recently appointed Program Executive Officer  until all sensors have been delivered to the NPOESS Preparatory  Program; these deliveries are currently scheduled to occur by July  2008. We also made two additional recommendations to the  Secretary of Commerce to (1) develop and implement a written  process for identifying and addressing human capital needs and for  streamlining how the program handles the three different agencies’  administrative procedures and (2) establish a plan for immediately  filling needed positions.
In written comments, all three agencies agreed that it was important  to finalize key acquisition documents in a timely manner, and DOD  proposed extending the due dates for the documents to July 2, 2007.  DOD subsequently extended the due dates to September and  October 2007 and March 2008 in the case of the test and evaluation  master plan. Because the NPOESS program office intends to  complete contract negotiations in July 2007, we remain concerned  that any further delays in approving the documents could delay  contract negotiations and thus increase the risk to the program.
In addition, the Department of Commerce agreed with our  recommendation to develop and implement a written process for  identifying and addressing human capital needs and to streamline  how the program handles the three different agencies’  administrative procedures. The department also agreed with our  recommendation to plan to immediately fill open positions at the  NPOESS program office. Commerce noted that NOAA identified the  skill sets needed for the program and has implemented an  accelerated hiring model and schedule to fill all NOAA positions in  the NPOESS program. Commerce also noted that NOAA has made  NPOESS hiring a high priority and has documented a strategy— including milestones—to ensure that all NOAA positions are filled  by June 2007.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation to delay reassigning  the Program Executive Officer, noting that the NPOESS System  Program Director responsible for executing the acquisition program  would remain in place for 4 years. The Department of Commerce  also noted that the Program Executive Officer position is planned to  rotate between the Air Force and NOAA. Commerce also stated that  a selection would be made before the departure of the current  Program Executive Officer to provide an overlap period to allow for  knowledge transfer and ensure continuity. However, over the last  few years, we and others (including an independent review team  and the Commerce Inspector General) have reported that ineffective  executive-level oversight helped foster the NPOESS program’s cost  and schedule overruns. We remain concerned that reassigning the  Program Executive at a time when NPOESS is still facing critical  cost, schedule, and technical challenges will place the program at  further risk.
In addition, while it is important that the System Program Director  remain in place to ensure continuity in executing the acquisition,  this position does not ensure continuity in the functions of the  Program Executive Officer. The current Program Executive Officer  is experienced in providing oversight of the progress, issues, and  challenges facing NPOESS and coordinating with Executive  Committee members as well as the Defense acquisition authorities.  Additionally, while the Program Executive Officer position is  planned to rotate between agencies, the memorandum of agreement  documenting this arrangement is still in draft and should be flexible  enough to allow the current Program Executive Officer to remain  until critical risks have been addressed.
Further, while Commerce plans to allow a period of overlap  between the selection of a new Program Executive Officer and the  departure of the current one, time is running out. The current  Program Executive Officer is expected to depart in early July 2007,  and as of early July 2007, a successor has not yet been named.  NPOESS is an extremely complex acquisition, involving three  agencies, multiple contractors, and advanced technologies. There is  not sufficient time to transfer knowledge and develop the sound  professional working relationships that the new Program Executive  Officer will need to succeed in that role. Thus, we remain convinced  that given NPOESS current challenges, reassigning the current  Program Executive Officer at this time is not appropriate.
section_title: GOES-R: Overview, Issues, and Prior GAO Recommendations
paragraphs: To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several  satellites at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites  every few years (see table 7). To date, NOAA has procured three  series of GOES satellites and is planning to acquire a fourth series,  called GOES-R.
In 1970, NOAA initiated its original GOES program based on  experimental geostationary satellites developed by NASA. While  these satellites operated effectively for many years, they had  technical limitations. For example, this series of satellites was “spin- stabilized,” meaning that the satellites slowly spun while in orbit to  maintain a stable position with respect to the earth. As a result, the  satellite viewed the earth only about 5 percent of the time and had  to collect data very slowly, capturing one narrow band of data each  time its field-of-view swung past the earth. A complete set of  sounding data took 2 to 3 hours to collect.
In 1985, NOAA and NASA began to procure a new generation of  GOES, called the GOES I-M series, based on a set of requirements  developed by NOAA’s National Weather Service, NESDIS, and  NASA, among others. GOES I-M consisted of five satellites, GOES-8  through GOES-12, and was a significant improvement in technology  from the original GOES satellites. For example, GOES I-M was  “body-stabilized,” meaning that the satellite held a fixed position in  orbit relative to the earth, thereby allowing for continuous  meteorological observations. Instead of maintaining stability by  spinning, the satellite would preserve its fixed position by  continuously making small adjustments in the rotation of internal  momentum wheels or by firing small thrusters to compensate for  drift. These and other enhancements meant that the GOES I-M  satellites would be able to collect significantly better quality data  more quickly than the older series of satellites.
In 1998, NOAA began the procurement of satellites to follow GOES  I-M, called the GOES-N series. This series used existing technologies  for the instruments and added system upgrades, including an  improved power subsystem and enhanced satellite pointing  accuracy. Furthermore, the GOES-N satellites were designed to  operate longer than its predecessors. This series originally consisted  of four satellites, GOES-N through GOES-Q. However, the option for  the GOES-Q satellite was cancelled based on NOAA’s assessment  that it would not need the final satellite to continue weather  coverage. In particular, the agency found that the GOES satellites  already in operation were lasting longer than expected and that the  first satellite in the next series could be available to back up the last  of the GOES-N satellites. As noted earlier, the first GOES-N series  satellite—GOES-13—was launched in May 2006. The GOES-O and  GOES-P satellites are currently in production and are expected to be  launched in July 2008 and July 2011, respectively.
NOAA is currently planning to procure the next series of GOES  satellites, called the GOES-R series. NOAA is planning for the GOES- R program to improve on the technology of prior GOES series, both  in terms of system and instrument improvements. The system  improvements are expected to fulfill more demanding user  requirements and to provide more rapid information updates. Table  8 highlights key system-related improvements that GOES-R is  expected to make to the geostationary satellite program.
The instruments on the GOES-R series are expected to increase the  clarity and precision of the observed environmental data. Originally,  NOAA planned to acquire 5 different instruments. The program  office considered two of the instruments—the Advanced Baseline  Imager and the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite—to be the most  critical because they would provide data for key weather products.  Table 9 summarizes the originally planned instruments and their  expected capabilities.
After our report was issued, NOAA officials told us that the agency  decided to cancel its plans for the development of the Hyperspectral  Environmental Suite, but expected to explore options to ensure the  continuity of data provided by the current GOES series.  Additionally, NOAA reduced the number of satellites in the GOES-R  series from four to two satellites.
subsections: section_title: The GOES-R Series Procurement Activities Are Under Way, but System Requirements and Cost Estimates May Change
paragraphs: NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its  GOES-R system, which was initially estimated to cost $6.2 billion  and scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012. At  the time of our most recent review in September 2006, NOAA had  issued contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R  system to three vendors and expected to award a contract to one of  these vendors in August 2007 to develop the satellites. In addition, to  reduce the risks associated with developing new instruments, NOAA  issued contracts for the early development of two instruments and  for the preliminary designs of three other instruments.
However, analyses of the GOES-R program cost—which in May 2006  the program office estimated could reach $11.4 billion—led the  agency to consider reducing the scope of requirements for the  satellite series. In September 2006, NOAA officials reported that the  agency had made a decision to reduce the scope and complexity of  the GOES-R program by reducing the number of satellites from 4 to  2 and canceling a technically complex instrument—called the  Hyperspectral Environmental Suite. As of July 2007, agency officials  reported that they are considering further changes to the scope of  the program, which are likely to affect the overall program cost. We  have work under way to evaluate these changes.
section_title: Steps Taken to Reduce GOES-R Risk, More Work Remains
paragraphs: NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past  satellite programs, but more remains to be done. As outlined  previously, key lessons from these programs include the need to (1)  establish realistic cost and schedule estimates, (2) ensure sufficient  technical readiness of the system’s components prior to key  decisions, (3) provide sufficient management at government and  contractor levels, and (4) perform adequate senior executive  oversight to ensure mission success. NOAA established plans to  address these lessons by conducting independent cost estimates,  performing preliminary studies of key technologies, placing resident  government offices at key contractor locations, and establishing a  senior executive oversight committee. However, many steps remain  to fully address these lessons. Specifically, at the time of our review,  NOAA had not yet developed a process to evaluate and reconcile the  independent and government cost estimates. In addition, NOAA had  not yet determined how it will ensure that a sufficient level of  technical maturity will be achieved in time for an upcoming decision  milestone, nor had it determined the appropriate level of resources  it needs to adequately track and oversee the program using earned  value management. Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces  an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased  cost, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued  past procurements.
section_title: Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Reduce GOES-R Acquisition Risk
paragraphs: To improve NOAA’s ability to effectively manage the GOES-R  procurement, in our September 2006 report, we made  recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce to direct its NOAA  Program Management Council to establish a process for objectively  evaluating and reconciling the government and independent life  cycle cost estimates once the program requirements are finalized; to  establish a team of system engineering experts to perform a  comprehensive review of the Advanced Baseline Imager instrument  to determine the level of technical maturity achieved on the  instrument before moving the instrument into production; and to  seek assistance in determining the appropriate levels of resources  needed at the program office to adequately track and oversee the  contractor’s earned value management data. In written comments at  that time, the Department of Commerce agreed with our  recommendations and provided information on its plans to  implement our recommendations.
In summary, both the NPOESS and GOES-R programs are critical to  developing weather forecasts, issuing severe weather warnings for  events such as hurricanes, and maintaining continuity in  environmental and climate monitoring. Over the last several years,  the NPOESS program experienced cost, schedule, and technical  problems, but has now been restructured and is making progress.  Still, technical and programmatic risks remain. The GOES-R  program has incorporated lessons from other satellite acquisitions,  but still faces challenges in establishing the management  capabilities it needs and in determining the scope of the program.  We have work under way to evaluate the progress and risks of both  NPOESS and GOES-R in order to assist with congressional oversight  of these critical programs.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to  answer any questions that you or members of the committee may  have at this time.
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony,  please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at  pownerd@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this testimony include  Carol Cha, Kathleen S. Lovett, and Colleen Phillips (Assistant  Director).
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