Nuclear Safety: NRC's Oversight of Fire Protection at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Reactor Units Could Be Strengthened
Published: 2008-06-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: After a 1975 fire at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama threatened the unit's ability to shut down safely, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued prescriptive fire safety rules for commercial nuclear units. However, nuclear units with different designs and different ages have had difficulty meeting these rules and have sought exemptions to them. In 2004, NRC began to encourage the nation's 104 nuclear units to transition to a less prescriptive, risk-informed approach that will analyze the fire risks of individual nuclear units. GAO was asked to examine (1) the number and causes of fire incidents at nuclear units since 1995, (2) compliance with NRC fire safety regulations, and (3) the transition to the new approach. GAO visited 10 of the 65 nuclear sites nationwide, reviewed NRC reports and related documentation about fire events at nuclear units, and interviewed NRC and industry officials to examine compliance with existing fire protection rules and the transition to the new approach.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: According to NRC, all 125 fires at 54 of the nation's 65 nuclear sites from January 1995 through December 2007 were classified as being of limited safety significance. According to NRC, many of these fires were in areas that do not affect shutdown operations or occurred during refueling outages, when nuclear units are already shut down. NRC's characterization of the location, significance, and circumstances of those fire events was consistent with records GAO reviewed and statements of utility and industry officials GAO contacted. NRC has not resolved several long-standing issues that affect the nuclear industry's compliance with existing NRC fire regulations, and NRC lacks a comprehensive database on the status of compliance. These long-standing issues include (1) nuclear units' reliance on manual actions by unit workers to ensure fire safety (for example, a unit worker manually turns a valve to operate a water pump) rather than "passive" measures, such as fire barriers and automatic fire detection and suppression; (2) workers' use of "interim compensatory measures" (primarily fire watches) to ensure fire safety for extended periods of time, rather than making repairs; (3) uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of fire wraps used to protect electrical cables necessary for the safe shutdown of a nuclear unit; and (4) mitigating the impacts of short circuits that can cause simultaneous, or near-simultaneous, malfunctions of safety-related equipment (called "multiple spurious actuations") and hence complicate the safe shutdown of nuclear units. Compounding these issues is that NRC has no centralized database on the use of exemptions from regulations, manual actions, or compensatory measures used for long periods of time that would facilitate the study of compliance trends or help NRC's field inspectors in examining unit compliance. Primarily to simplify units' complex licensing, NRC is encouraging nuclear units to transition to a risk-informed approach. As of April 2008, some 46 units had stated they would adopt the new approach. However, the transition effort faces significant human capital, cost, and methodological challenges. According to NRC, as well as academics and the nuclear industry, a lack of people with fire modeling, risk assessment, and plant-specific expertise could slow the transition process. They also expressed concern about the potentially high costs of the new approach relative to uncertain benefits. For example, according to nuclear unit officials, the costs to perform the necessary fire analyses and risk assessments could be millions of dollars per unit. Units, they said, may also need to make costly new modifications as a result of these analyses.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: On March 22, 1975, a fire involving electrical cables at unit 1 of the three- unit Browns Ferry nuclear power plant in Alabama damaged numerous  safety systems and reduced unit operators’ ability to monitor the nuclear  unit. The fire raised awareness of the potential danger that fires pose to  the ability of the nation’s commercial nuclear units to safely shutdown.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which approves nuclear  units’ licenses to operate, responded by issuing numerous guidance  documents and in 1980 promulgating new fire safety regulations for  nuclear units. These regulations, commonly called Appendix R, are  intended to (1) prevent fires from starting; (2) rapidly detect, control, and  extinguish fires that do occur; and (3) protect a nuclear unit’s structures,  systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not  promptly extinguished will not prevent its safe shutdown.
NRC’s fire safety regulations for the nation’s commercial nuclear units  establish the design requirements in commercial nuclear reactor units for  mitigating the effects of a fire on the unit’s ability to shut down safely. As  of May 2008, 104 commercial nuclear units operated at 65 sites in 31 states,  with between one and three units located at each site. Among other things,  these prescriptive (or deterministic) regulations call for nuclear units to  have at least one redundant system of electric cables and equipment  available to safely shut down the unit free from fire damage. When two  such systems are in the same area of a nuclear unit, the regulations require  that they be separated (1) horizontally by at least 20 feet with automatic  fire suppression and detections systems and without intervening  combustibles or (2) by a fire barrier, such as a fire-proof wall or floor, or  by a material (fire wrap) that protects important cables. The fire barriers  must be able to withstand fire for at least 1 hour in areas with automatic  fire detection and suppression equipment, such as smoke detectors and  sprinklers, or at least 3 hours where such features are not present. NRC  required nuclear units that were operating prior to January 1, 1979, to  make necessary modifications, if possible, to meet NRC’s fire regulations  or request exemptions from the requirements. Units that NRC licensed  after that date incorporate the principles of NRC’s fire regulations as  conditions to their operating licenses.
Over the years, NRC approved exemptions or deviations from the fire  regulations for units that could not meet the regulations if these units  could otherwise demonstrate the ability to safely shut down. According to  NRC’s records, by 2001 NRC had granted over 900 exemptions for the  nation’s nuclear units. Many of these exemptions take the form of operator  manual actions, whereby nuclear unit staff manually activate or control  unit functions by hand outside of the unit’s control room, such as stopping  a pump that malfunctions during a fire and could impair a unit’s ability to  safely shut down. In addition, NRC allows nuclear units, in accordance  with their NRC-approved fire protection program, to institute interim  compensatory measures, which are temporary measures that units can  take without prior approval to compensate for equipment that needs to be  repaired or replaced. These interim compensatory measures often consist  of roving or continuously manned fire watches that occur while nuclear  units take corrective actions. Under NRC rules, the repairs or  replacements should take place as soon as practicable, thereby limiting  the time an interim compensatory measure is in effect. Many operator  manual actions or interim compensatory measures were instituted  because some fire wraps did not meet the requirements to withstand a fire  for 1 hour or 3 hours. In lieu of reliance on such a fire wrap, a unit might  opt to use a fire watch as an interim compensatory measure while repairs  are made.
In 2004, NRC issued a regulation that allowed the transition of nuclear  units from its existing, prescriptive fire safety regulations to a less  prescriptive, risk-informed, performance-based approach that complies  with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standard 805.  Under this approach, nuclear units can use tools, such as fire modeling  and risk analysis, to determine which areas of the unit are most at risk  from fire. According to NRC officials, these analyses could enable units to  focus their resources on addressing these higher-risk areas and reduce the  number of future exemptions in areas that are no longer considered to be  at high risk from fire. Reductions in exemptions would, thus, simplify the  units’ licenses.
Resolving any issues about the fire safety of nuclear units will be  important for assuring the public that nuclear power is safe. Providing  such assurances is especially significant given the scope of the nuclear  power industry’s plans for expanding the nation’s capacity to generate  electricity using nuclear reactors. According to the Nuclear Energy  Institute, which represents the nuclear power industry, as of April 2008,  electric utilities planned to build 29 new nuclear power units at 23 sites  nationwide. Currently, 104 nuclear units are operating in the nation, so the  planned expansion will be significant.
In this context, we were asked to examine (1) the number, reported safety  significance, and causes of fire incidents at U.S. nuclear units since 1995,  (2) commercial nuclear reactor units’ compliance with NRC’s fire  protection regulations, and (3) the status of the nuclear industry’s  implementation of the risk-informed approach to fire safety advocated by  NRC.
In conducting our work, we met with officials from NRC, industry, public  interest groups, and experts on fire safety and risk analysis in academia  and government. We also selected and visited 10 nuclear unit sites,  constituting a sample that is not generalizable to all nuclear units at all  nuclear unit sites. We selected sites based on covering each of NRC’s four  regional offices, varying levels of unit performance, different unit licensing  characteristics, and reactor types. At each site visit, we reviewed  documentation on fire events, use of operator manual actions and interim  compensatory measures, and analysis justifying decisions about whether  to transition to the risk-informed approach. In addition, we reviewed fire  event data from NRC and the industry for all fires in calendar years 1995  through 2007 to provide us with a reasonable time frame of data. Finally,  we reviewed relevant fire protection regulations and guidance from NRC  and industry.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 to June 2008  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 1971, the Atomic Energy Commission, NRC’s predecessor, promulgated  the first regulations for fire protection at commercial nuclear power units  in the United States. These regulations––referred to as General Design  Criterion 3––provided basic design requirements and broad performance  objectives for fire protection, but lacked implementation guidance or  assessment criteria. As such, NRC generally deemed a unit’s fire  protection program to be adequate if it complied with standards set by the  National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)––an international  organization that promotes fire prevention and safety––and received an  acceptable rating from a major fire insurance company. However, at that  time the fire safety requirements for commercial nuclear power units were  similar to those for conventional, fossil-fueled power units.
NRC and nuclear industry officials did not fully perceive that fires could  threaten a nuclear unit’s ability to safely shut down until 1975, when a  candle that a worker at Browns Ferry nuclear unit 1 was using to test for  air leaks in the reactor building ignited electrical cables. The resulting fire  burned for 7 hours and damaged more than 1,600 electrical cables, more  than 600 of which were important to unit safety. Nuclear unit workers  eventually used water to extinguish the fire, contrary to the existing  understanding of how to put out an electrical fire. The fire damaged  electrical power, control systems, and instrumentation cables and  impaired cooling systems for the reactor. During the fire, operators could  not monitor the unit normally.
NRC’s investigation of the Browns Ferry fire revealed deficiencies in the  design of fire protection features at nuclear units and in procedures for  responding to a fire, particularly regarding safety concerns that were  unique to nuclear units, such as the ability to protect redundant electrical  cables and equipment important for the safe shutdown of a reactor. In  response, NRC developed new guidance in 1976 that required units to take  steps to isolate and protect at least one system of electrical cables and  equipment to ensure a nuclear unit could be safely shut down in the event  of a fire. NRC worked with licensees throughout the late 1970s to help  them meet this guidance.
In November 1980, NRC published two new sets of regulations to  formalize the regulatory approach to fire safety. First, NRC required all  nuclear units to have a fire protection plan that satisfies General Design  Criteria 3 and that describes an overall fire protection program. Second,  NRC published Appendix R, which requires nuclear units operating prior  to January 1, 1979 (called “pre-1979 units”), to implement design  features—such as fire walls, fire wraps, and automatic fire detection and  suppression systems—to protect a redundant system of electrical cables  and equipment necessary to safely shut down a nuclear unit during a fire.  Among other things, Appendix R requires units operating prior to 1979 to  protect one set of cables and equipment necessary for safe shutdown  through one of the following means:1.  Separating the electrical cables and equipment necessary for safe  shutdown by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet from other  systems, with no combustibles or fire hazards between them. In  addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system (for  example, a sprinkler system) must be installed in the fire area.  2.  Protecting the electrical cables and equipment necessary for safe  shutdown by using a fire barrier able to withstand a 3-hour fire, as  conducted in a laboratory test (thereby receiving a 3-hour rating).  3.  Enclosing the cable and equipment necessary for safe shutdown by  using a fire barrier with a 1-hour rating and combining that with  automatic fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system.
If a nuclear unit’s fire protection systems do not satisfy those requirements  or if redundant systems required for safe shutdown could be damaged by  fire suppression activities, Appendix R requires the nuclear unit to  maintain an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its  associated circuits. Moreover, Appendix R requires all units to provide  emergency lighting in all areas needed for operating safe shutdown  equipment.
Nuclear units that began operating on or after January 1, 1979 (called  “post-1979 units”) must satisfy the broad requirements of General Design  Criteria 3 but are not subject to the requirements of Appendix R.
However, NRC has imposed or attached conditions similar to the  requirements of Appendix R to these units’ operating licenses.
When promulgating these regulations, NRC recognizes that strict  compliance for some older units would not significantly enhance the level  of fire safety. In those cases, NRC allows nuclear units licensed before  1979 to apply for an exemption to Appendix R. The exemption depends on  if the nuclear unit can demonstrate to NRC that existing or alternative fire  protection features provided safety equivalent to those imposed by the  regulations. Since 1981, NRC has issued approximately 900 unit-specific  exemptions to Appendix R. Nuclear units licensed after 1979 can apply for  “deviations” against their licensing conditions.
Many exemptions take the form of NRC-approved operator manual  actions, whereby nuclear unit staff manually activate or control unit  operations from outside the unit’s control room, such as manually  stopping a pump that malfunctions during a fire and could affect a unit’s  ability to safely shut down. NRC also allows nuclear units to institute, in  accordance with their NRC-approved fire protection program, “interim  compensatory measures”—temporary measures that units can take  without prior approval to compensate for equipment that needs to be  repaired or replaced. Interim compensatory measures often consist of  roving or continuously staffed fire watches that occur while nuclear units  take corrective actions.
In part to simplify the licensing of nuclear units that have many  exemptions, NRC recently began encouraging units to transition to a more  risk-informed approach to nuclear safety in general. In 2004, NRC  promulgated 10 C.F.R. 50.48(c), which allows––but does not require–– nuclear units to adopt a risk-informed approach to fire protection. The  risk-informed approach considers the probability of fires in conjunction  with a unit’s engineering analysis and operating experience. The NRC rule  allows licensees to voluntarily adopt and maintain a fire protection  program that meets criteria set forth by the NFPA’s fire protection  standard 805— which describes the risk-informed approach endorsed by  NRC—as an alternative to meeting the requirements or unit-specific fire- protection license conditions represented by Appendix R and related rules  and guidance. Nuclear units that choose to adopt the risk-informed  approach must submit a license amendment request to NRC asking NRC to  approve the unit’s adoption of the new risk-informed, regulatory  approach. NRC is overseeing a pilot program at two nuclear unit  locations and expects to release its evaluation report on these programs  by March 2009.
section_title: According to NRC, Recent Fires at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Units Have Had Limited Safety Significance
paragraphs: NRC officials told us that none of the 125 fires at 54 sites that nuclear unit  operators reported from January 1995 to December 2007 has posed  significant risk to a commercial unit’s ability to safely shut down. No fires  since the 1975 Browns Ferry fire have threatened a nuclear unit’s ability to  safely shut down. Most of the 125 fires occurred outside areas that are  considered important for safe shutdown of the unit or happened during  refueling outages when nuclear units were already shut down.
Nuclear units categorized 13 of the 125 reported fires as “alerts” under  NRC’s Emergency Action Level rating system, meaning that the reported  situation involved an actual or potential substantial degradation of unit  safety, but none of the fires actually threatened the safe shutdown of the  unit. NRC further characterizes alerts as providing early and prompt  notification of minor events that could lead to more serious consequences.  As shown in the table 1, the primary reported causes of these fires were  electrical fires.
Nuclear units classified the remaining 112 reported fires in categories that  do not imply a threat to safe shutdown. Specifically, 73 were characterized  as being “unusual events”––a category that is less safety-significant than  “alerts”––and 39 fires as being “non-emergencies.” No reported fire event  rose to the level of “site area emergency” or “general emergency”—the two  most severe ratings in the Emergency Action Level system.
As shown in table 2 below, about 41 percent of the 125 reported fires were  electrical fires, 14 percent were maintenance related, 7 percent were  caused by oil-based lubricants or insulation, and the remaining 38 percent  either had no reported causes or the causes were listed as “other,”  including brush fires, cafeteria grease fires, and lightning.
We also gathered information on fire events that had occurred at nuclear  unit sites we visited. NRC’s data on the location and circumstances  surrounding fire events was consistent with the statements of unit officials  whom we contacted at selected nuclear units. Although unit officials told  us that some recent fires necessitated the response of off-site fire  departments to supplement the units’ on-site firefighting capabilities, they  confirmed that none of the fires adversely affected the units’ ability to  safely shut down. Additionally, officials at two units told us that, although  fires affected the units’ auxiliary power supply, the events caused both  units to “trip”—an automatic power down as a precaution in emergencies.
section_title: NRC Has Not Resolved Long- standing Issues Affecting Industry’s Compliance with NRC’s Fire Regulations
paragraphs: NRC has not fully resolved several long-standing issues that affect the  commercial nuclear industry’s compliance with existing NRC fire  regulations. These issues include (1) nuclear units’ use of operator manual  actions; (2) nuclear units’ long-term use of interim compensatory  measures; (3) uncertainties regarding the effectiveness of fire wraps for  protecting electrical cables necessary for the safe shutdown of a nuclear  unit; and (4) the regulatory treatment of fire-induced multiple spurious  actuations of equipment that could prevent the safe shutdown of a nuclear  unit. Moreover, NRC lacks a central system of records that would enhance  its ability to oversee and address the use of operator manual actions and  extended interim compensatory measures, among other related issues.  According to an NRC Commissioner, the current “patchwork of  requirements” is characterized by too many exemptions, as well as by  unapproved or undocumented operator manual actions. He said the  current regulatory situation was not the ideal, transparent, or safest way to  deal with the issue of fire safety.
subsections: section_title: Many Nuclear Units Are Using Operator Manual Actions That May Not Comply with NRC’s Fire Regulations
paragraphs: NRC’s oversight of fire safety is complicated by nuclear units’ use of  operator manual actions that NRC has not explicitly approved. NRC’s  initial Appendix R regulations required that nuclear units protect at least  one redundant system—or “train”—of equipment and electrical cables  required for a unit’s safe shutdown through the use of fire protection  measures, such as 1-hour or 3-hour fire barriers, 20 feet of separation  between redundant systems, and automatic fire detection and suppression  systems. The regulations do not list operator manual actions as a means  of protecting a redundant system from fire. However, according to NRC  officials and NRC’s published guidance, units licensed before January 1979  can receive approval for a specific operator manual action by applying for  a formal exemption to the regulations. For example, unit officials at one  site told us they rely on 584 operator manual actions that are approved by  15 NRC exemptions for safe shutdown. (NRC allows units to submit  multiple operator manual actions under one exemption.) Units licensed  after January 1979 may use operator manual actions for fire protection if  these actions are permitted by the unit’s license and if the unit can  demonstrate that the actions will not adversely affect safe shutdown. NRC  and nuclear unit officials told us that units have been using operator  manual actions since Appendix R became effective in 1981. These officials  added that a majority of nuclear units that use operator manual actions  started using them beginning in the mid-1990s in response to the failure of  Thermo-Lag––a widely used fire wrap––to meet fire endurance testing.
A lack of clear understanding between NRC and industry over the  permissible use of operator manual actions in lieu of passive measures  emerged over the years. For example, officials at several of the sites we  visited produced documentation––some dating from the 1980s––showing  NRC’s documented approval of some, but not all, operator manual actions.  In some other cases, unit operators told us that NRC officials verbally  approved certain operator manual actions but did not document their  approval in writing. In some other instances, without explicit NRC  approval, unit officials applied operator manual actions that NRC had  previously approved for similar situations. NRC officials explained that  NRC inspectors may not have cited units for violations for these operator  manual actions because they believed the actions were safe; however,  NRC’s position is that these actions do not comply with NRC’s fire  regulations. Moreover, in fire inspections initiated in 2000 of nuclear units’  safe shutdown capabilities, NRC found that units were continuing to use  operator manual actions without exemptions in lieu of protecting safe  shutdown capabilities through the required passive measures. For  example, management officials for some nuclear units authorized staff to  manually turn a valve to operate a pump if it failed due to fire damage  rather than protecting the cables that operate the valve automatically. Unit  officials at one site stated that they rely on more than 20 operator manual  actions that must be implemented within 25 minutes for safe shutdown in  the event of a fire.
In March 2005 NRC published a proposal to revise Appendix R to allow  feasible and reliable operator manual actions if units maintained or  installed automatic fire detection and suppression systems. The agency  stated that this would reduce the regulatory burden by decreasing the  need for licensees to prepare exemption requests and the need for NRC to  review and approve them. However, industry officials stated, among  other things, that the requirement for suppression would be costly without  a clear safety enhancement and, therefore, would likely not reduce the  number of exemption requests. Officials at one unit told us that this  requirement, in conjunction with other NRC proposed rules, could cost as  much as $12 million at one unit, and they believe that the rule would have  caused the industry to submit a substantial number of exemption requests  to NRC. Due in part to these concerns, NRC withdrew the proposed rule in  March 2006.
NRC officials reaffirmed the agency’s position that nuclear units using  unapproved or undocumented operator manual actions are not in  compliance with regulations. In published guidance sent to all operating  nuclear units in 2006, NRC stated that this has been its position since  Appendix R became effective in 1981. The guidance further stated that  NRC has continued to communicate this position to licensees via various  public presentations, proposed rulemaking, and industry wide  communications.
In June 2006, NRC directed nuclear units to complete corrective actions  for these operator manual actions by March 2009, either by applying for  licensing exemptions for undocumented or unapproved operator manual  actions or by making design modifications to the unit to eliminate the need  for operator manual actions. Staff at most nuclear units we visited said  they would resolve this issue either by transitioning to the new risk- informed approach, or by applying to NRC for licensing exemptions  because making modifications would be resource-intensive. In March  2006, NRC also stated in the Federal Register that the regulations allow  licensees to use the risk-informed approach in lieu of seeking an  exemption or license amendment.
NRC officials told us that, at least for the short-term, they have no plans to  examine unapproved or undocumented operator manual actions for units  that have sought exemptions to determine if these units are compliant  with regulations. They said that NRC has already received exemption  requests for operator manual actions, and it expects about 25 units–– mostly units licensed before 1979 that do not intend to adopt the new risk- informed approach—to submit additional exemption requests by March  2009. They estimated that about half of the 58 units that have not decided  to transition to the risk-informed approach do not have compliance issues  regarding operator manual actions and, therefore, will not need to submit  related requests for exemptions. These officials anticipate that the  remaining units that are not transitioning to the risk-informed approach  will submit exemptions in the following two broad groups: (1) license  amendment requests that should be short and easy to process because the  technical review has already been completed, showing that the operator  manual actions in place do not degrade unit safety; and (2) exemption  requests that require more detailed review because the units have been  using unapproved operator manual actions.
section_title: NRC Has Not Yet Acted to Address Extended Use of Interim Compensatory Measures
paragraphs: Some nuclear units have used interim compensatory measures for  extended periods of time—in some cases, for years—rather than perform  the necessary repairs or procure the necessary replacements. As of April,  2008, NRC has no firm plans for resolving this problem. For example, at  one nuclear unit we visited, unit officials chose to use fire watches for  over 5 years instead of replacing faulty penetration seals covering  openings in structural fire barriers. Officials at several units told us that  they typically use fire watches with dedicated unit personnel as interim  compensatory measures whenever they have deficiencies in fire protection  features. NRC regional officials confirmed that most interim compensatory  measures are currently fire watches and that many of these were  implemented at nuclear units after tests during the 1980s and 1990s  determined that Thermo-Lag and, later, Hemyc fire wraps, used to protect  safe shutdown cables from fire damage, were deficient. According to a  statement released by an NRC commissioner in October 2007, interim  compensatory measures are not the most transparent or safest way to deal  with this issue. Moreover, NRC inspectors have reported weaknesses in  certain interim compensatory measures used at some units, including an  over reliance on 1-hour roving fire watches rather than making the  necessary repairs.
Although NRC regulations state that all deficiencies in fire protection  features must be promptly identified and corrected, they do not limit how  long units can rely on interim compensatory measures—such as hourly  fire watches—before taking corrective actions or include a provision to  compel licensees to take corrective actions. In the early 1990s, NRC issued  guidance addressing the timeliness of corrective actions, stating that the  agency expected units to promptly complete all corrective actions in a  timely manner commensurate with safety and thus eliminate reliance on  the interim compensatory measures. In 1997, NRC issued additional  guidance, stating that if a nuclear unit does not resolve a corrective action  at the first available opportunity or does not appropriately justify a longer  completion schedule, the agency would conclude that corrective action  has not been timely and would consider taking enforcement action. NRC’s  current guidance for its inspectors states that a unit may implement  interim compensatory measures until final corrective action is completed  and reliance on an interim compensatory measure for operability should  be an important consideration in establishing the time frame for  completing the corrective action. This guidance further states that  conditions calling for interim compensatory measures to restore  operability should be resolved quickly because such conditions indicate a  greater degree of degradation or nonconformance than conditions that do  not rely on interim compensatory measures. For example, the guidance  states that NRC expects interim compensatory measures that substitute an  operator manual action for automatic safety-related functions to be  resolved expeditiously. Officials from several different units that we  visited confirmed that NRC has not implemented a standard timeframe for  when corrective actions must be made regarding safe shutdown  deficiencies.
NRC officials further state that interim compensatory measures could  remain in place at some units until they fully transition to the risk- informed approach to fire protection. They stated that this was because  many of the interim compensatory measures are in place for Appendix R  issues that are not risk significant, and nuclear units will be able to  eliminate them after they implement the risk-informed approach.
section_title: NRC Has Not Resolved Uncertainty Regarding the Effectiveness of Fire Wraps
paragraphs: NRC has not resolved uncertainty regarding fire wraps used at some  nuclear units for protecting cables critical for safe shutdown. NRC’s  regulations state that fire wraps protecting shutdown-related systems must  have a fire rating of either 1 or 3 hours. NRC guidance further states that  licensees should evaluate fire wrap testing results and related data to  ensure it applies to the conditions under which they intend to install the  fire wraps. If all possible configurations cannot be tested, an engineering  analysis must be performed to demonstrate that cables would be protected  adequately during and after exposure to fire. NRC officials told us that the  agency prefers passive fire protection, such as fire barriers—including fire  wraps—because such protection is more reliable than other forms of fire  protection, for example, human actions for fire protection.
Following the 1975 fire at Browns Ferry, manufacturers of fire wraps  performed or sponsored fire endurance tests to establish that their fire  wraps met either the 1-hour or 3-hour rating period required by NRC  regulations. However, NRC became concerned about fire wraps in the late  1980s when Thermo-Lag—a fire wrap material commonly used in units at  the time—failed performance tests to meet its intended 1-hour and 3-hour  ratings, even though it had originally passed the manufacturer’s fire  qualification testing. In 1992, NRC’s Inspector General found that NRC and  nuclear licensees had accepted qualification test results for Thermo-Lag  that were later determined to be falsified. From 1991 to 1995, NRC issued a  series of information notices on performance test failures and installation  deficiencies related to Thermo-Lag fire wrap systems. As a result, in the  early 1990s, NRC issued several generic communications informing  industry of the test results and requested that licensees implement  appropriate interim compensatory measures and develop plans to resolve  any noncompliance. One such communication included the expectation  that licensees would review other fire wrap materials and systems and  consider actions to avoid problems similar to those identified with  Thermo-Lag.
Deficiencies emerged in other fire wrap materials starting in the early  1990s, and NRC suggested that industry conduct additional testing. It took  NRC over 10 years to initiate and complete its program of large-scale  testing of Hemyc—another commonly used fire wrap—and then direct  units to take corrective actions after small-scale test results first indicated  that Hemyc might not be suitable as a 1-hour fire wrap. In 1993, NRC  conducted pilot-scale fire tests on several fire wrap materials, but because  the tests were simplified and small-scale models were used, NRC applied  test results for screening purposes only. These tests involved various fire  wraps assembled in different configurations. The test results indicated  unacceptable performance in approximately one-third of the assemblies  tested, and NRC reported that the results for Hemyc were inconclusive,  although NRC’s Inspector General recently reported that Hemyc had failed  this testing. In 1999 and 2000, several NRC inspection findings raised  concerns about the performance of Hemyc and MT—another fire wrap— including: (1) whether test acceptance criteria for insurance purposes is  valid for fire barrier endurance tests and (2) the performance of fire wraps  when those wraps are used in untested configurations. In 2001, NRC  initiated testing for typical Hemyc and MT installations used in units in the  United States, and the test results indicated that the Hemyc configuration  did not pass the 1-hour criteria and that the MT configuration did not pass  the 3-hour criteria. In 2005, NRC held a public meeting with licensees to  discuss these test results and how to achieve compliance.
In 2006, NRC published guidance stating that fire wraps installed in  configurations that are not capable of providing the designed level of  protection are considered nonconforming installations and that licensees  that use Hemyc and MT—previously accepted fire wraps—may not be  conforming with their licenses. This guidance further stated that if  licensees identify nonconforming conditions, they may take the following  corrective actions: (1) replace the failed fire wraps with an appropriately  rated fire wrap material, (2) upgrade the failed fire barrier to a rated  barrier, (3) reroute cables or instrumentation lines through another fire  area, or (4) voluntarily transition to the risk-informed approach to fire  protection.
According to NRC’s Inspector General, during testimony before Congress  in 1993 on the deficiencies of Thermo-Lag, the then-NRC Chairman  committed NRC to assess all fire wraps to determine what would be  needed in order to meet NRC requirements. The testimony also contained  an attachment of an NRC task force that made the following two  recommendations: (1) NRC should sponsor new tests to evaluate the fire  endurance characteristics of other fire wraps and (2) NRC should review  the original fire qualification test reports from fire wrap manufacturers.
Although NRC maintains that it has satisfied this commitment, the NRC  Inspector General reported in January 2008 that the agency had yet to  complete these assessments. NRC officials told us that licensees are  required to conduct endurance tests on fire wraps used at nuclear units;  however, the NRC Inspector General noted that, to date, no test has been  conducted certifying Hemyc as a 1- or 3- hour fire wrap. Licensees’  proposed resolutions for this problem ranged from making replacements  with another fire wrap material to requesting license exemptions. In  addition, although NRC advised licensees that corrective actions  associated with Hemyc and MT are subject to future inspection, the  Inspector General noted that NRC has not yet scheduled or budgeted for  inspections of licensees’ proposed resolutions. The Inspector General’s  report indicated that several different fire wraps failing endurance tests  are still installed at units across the country, but NRC does not maintain  current records of these installations. Until issues regarding the  effectiveness of fire wraps are resolved, utilities may not be able to use the  wraps to their potential and instead rely on other measures, including  operator manual actions.
section_title: NRC Has Not Yet Acted to Resolve How to Protect against Multiple Spurious Actuations That Could Affect a Nuclear Unit’s Ability to Safely Shut Down
paragraphs: NRC has not finalized guidance on how nuclear units should protect  against short-circuits that could cause safety-related equipment to start or  malfunction spuriously (instances called spurious actuations). In the early  1980s, NRC issued guidance clarifying the requirements in its regulations  for safeguarding against spurious actuations that could adversely affect a  nuclear unit’s ability to safely shut down. However, NRC approved  planning for spurious actuations occurring only one at a time or in  isolation. In the late 1990s, nuclear units identified problems related to  multiple spurious actuations occurring simultaneously. Due to uncertainty  over this issue, in 1998 NRC exempted units from enforcement actions  related to spurious actuations, and in 2000 the agency temporarily  suspended the electrical circuit analysis portion of its fire inspections at  nuclear units. Cable fire testing performed by industry in 2001  demonstrated that multiple spurious actuations occurring simultaneously  or in rapid succession without sufficient time to mitigate the consequences  may have a relatively high probability of occurring under certain  circumstances, including fire damage.
Following the 2001 testing, NRC notified units that it expects them to plan  for protecting electrical systems against failures due to fire damage,  including multiple spurious actuations in both safety-related systems and  associated nonsafety systems. NRC resumed electrical inspections in  2005 and proposed that licensees review their fire protection programs to  confirm compliance with NRC’s stated regulatory position on this issue  and report their findings in writing. The proposal suggested that  noncompliant units could come into compliance by (1) reperforming their  circuit analyses and making necessary design modifications, (2)  performing a risk-informed evaluation, or (3) adopting the overall risk- informed approach to fire protection advocated by NRC. In 2006, however,  NRC decided not to issue the proposal, stating that further thought and  care can be taken to ensure the resolution of this issue has a technically  sound and traceable regulatory footprint that would provide permanent  closure.
The nuclear industry has issued statements disagreeing with NRC’s  proposed regulatory approach for multiple spurious actuations. Industry  officials noted that NRC approved licenses for many units that require  operators to plan for spurious actuations from a fire event that occur one  at a time or in isolation and that NRC’s current approach amounts to a  new regulatory position on this issue. Furthermore, the industry asserts  that units only need to plan for protecting against spurious actuations  occurring one at a time or in isolation because, in industry’s view, multiple  spurious actuations occurring are highly improbable and should not be  considered in safety analyses. Industry officials told us that the 2001 test  results were generated under worst-case scenarios, which operating  experience has shown may not represent actual conditions at nuclear  units. These officials further told us that NRC’s requirements are  impossible to achieve.
In December 2007, the nuclear industry proposed an approach for  evaluating the effects on circuits from two or more spurious actuations  occurring simultaneously, but NRC had not officially commented on the  proposal as of May 2008. NRC has stated that draft versions of the  proposal it has reviewed do not achieve regulatory compliance. As of May  2008, despite numerous meetings and communications with industry, NRC  has not endorsed guidance or developed a timeline for resolving  disagreements with industry about how to plan for multiple spurious  actuations of safety-related equipment due to fire damage. However, NRC  officials told us they have recently developed a closure plan for this issue  that they intend to propose to NRC’s Commissioners for approval in June  2008. NRC officials told us that after this plan is approved, their planned  next steps are to determine (1) the analysis tools, such as probabilistic risk  assessments or fire models, that units can use to analyze multiple spurious  actuations; and (2) a time frame for ending its ongoing exemption of units  from enforcement actions related to spurious actuations.
section_title: NRC Lacks a Comprehensive Database to Track Nuclear Units’ Use of Operator Manual Actions, Interim Compensatory Measures, and Exemptions
paragraphs: NRC has no comprehensive database of the operator manual actions or interim  compensatory measures implemented at nuclear units since its regulations  were first promulgated in 1981, in addition to the hundreds of related licensing  exemptions. NRC does not require units to report operator manual actions  upon which they rely for safe shutdown. Although NRC reports operator  manual actions in the inspection reports it generates through its triennial fire  inspections, it does not track these operator manual actions industrywide nor  does it compile them on a unit by unit basis. NRC does not maintain a central  database of interim compensatory measures being used in place of permanent  fire protection features at units for any duration of time. In addition, NRC  regional officials told us that triennial fire inspectors do not typically track the  status of interim compensatory measures used for fire protection or which  units are using them. However, units record maintenance-related issues in their  corrective action programs, including those issues requiring the  implementation of interim compensatory measures. As a result, data are  available to track interim compensatory measures that last for any period of  time as well as to analyze their safety significance. NRC resident inspectors told  us that they review these corrective action programs on a daily basis and that  they are always aware of the interim compensatory measures in place at their  units. They reported that this information is sometimes reviewed by NRC  regional offices but rarely by headquarters officials.
NRC officials explained that the agency tracked the use of exemptions— including some operator manual actions—through 2001 but then stopped  because the number of exemptions requested by units decreased. This  information is available, in part, electronically through its public  documents system and partly in microfiche format. These officials  explained that part of the agency’s inspection process is to test if licensees  have copies of their license exemptions and, thus, are familiar with their  own licensing basis. Inspectors have the ability to confirm an exemption,  but once the inspectors are in the field, they often rely on the licensee’s  documentation. According to these officials, NRC has no central  repository for all the exemptions for a unit, but agency inspectors can  easily validate a licensee’s exemption documentation by looking it up in  their public documents system. They said that they conduct the triennial  inspections over 2 weeks at the unit because they realize licensees may  not be able to locate documentation immediately. They notify licensees  what documents they need during the first week onsite so the licensees  can have time to prepare them for NRC’s return trip. NRC regional officials  told us that it is difficult to inspect fire safety due to the complicated  licensing basis and inability to track documents.
An NRC commissioner told us that nuclear power units have adopted many  different fire safety practices with undocumented approval status. The  commissioner further stated that NRC does not have good documentation of  which units are using interim compensatory measures or operator manual  actions for fire protection and that it needs a centralized database to track  these issues. The commissioner stated the lack of a centralized database does  not necessarily indicate that safety has been compromised.
However, without a database that contains information about the  existence, length, nature, and safety significance of interim compensatory  measures, operator manual actions, and exemptions in general, NRC may  not have a way to easily track which units have had significant numbers of  extended interim compensatory measures and possibly unapproved  operator manual actions. Moreover, the database could help NRC make  informed decisions about how to resolve these long-standing issues. Also,  the database could help NRC inspectors more easily determine whether  specific operator manual actions or extended interim compensatory  measures have, in fact, been approved through exemptions.
section_title: To Date, 46 Nuclear Unit Operators Have Announced They Will Adopt a New Risk- Informed Approach to Fire Safety, but the Transition Effort Faces Challenges
paragraphs: Officials at 46 nuclear units have announced their intention to adopt the  risk-informed approach to fire safety. Officials from NRC, industry, and  units we visited that plan to adopt the risk-informed approach stated that  they expect the new approach will make units safer by reducing reliance  on unreliable operator manual actions and help identify areas of the unit  where multiple spurious actuations could occur. Academic and industry  experts believe that the risk-informed approach could provide safety  benefits, but they stated that NRC must address inherent complexities and  unknowns related to the development of probabilistic risk assessments  used in the risk-informed approach. Furthermore, the shortage of skilled  personnel and concerns about the potential cost of conducting risk  analyses could slow the transition process and limit the number of units  that ultimately make the transition to the new approach.
subsections: section_title: Nuclear Units Adopting the Risk-Informed Approach Expect It to Improve Safety
paragraphs: As of May 2008, 46 nuclear units at 29 sites have announced that they will  transition to the risk-informed approach endorsed by NRC (see fig. 1). To  facilitate the transition process for the large number of units that will  change to the new approach within the next 5 years, NRC is overseeing a  pilot program involving three nuclear units at the Oconee Nuclear Power  Plant in South Carolina and one unit at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power  Plant in North Carolina, and NRC expects to release its evaluation of these  units’ license amendment requests supporting their transition to the risk- informed approach by March 2009. At that point, 22 nuclear units will have  submitted their license amendment requests for NRC’s review, followed by  other units in a staggered fashion.
NRC and transitioning unit officials we spoke with expected that  transitioning to the new approach could simplify nuclear units’ licensing  bases by reducing the number of future exemptions significantly at each  unit. Furthermore, officials from each of the 12 units we contacted that  plan to adopt the approach said that one of the main reasons for their  transition is to reduce the number of exemptions, including those  involving operator manual actions, that are required to ensure safe  shutdown capability under NRC’s existing regulations. Specifically, these  officials told us that they expected that conducting fire modeling and  probabilistic risk assessments—aspects of the risk-informed approach— would allow the nuclear units to demonstrate that fire protection features  in an area with shutdown-related systems would be acceptable based on  the expected fire risk in that area. According to some of these officials,  under these circumstances units would no longer need to use  exemptions—including those involving operator manual actions—to  demonstrate compliance with the regulations. Officials at 10 of the units  we visited stated that, as a result, the approach could eliminate the need  for some operator manual actions. For example, officials at one site that  contained two nuclear units expected that by transitioning to the new risk- informed approach, the units could eliminate the need for over 1,200  operator manual actions currently in place. Other unit officials conceded  that the outcomes of probabilistic risk assessments may demonstrate the  need for new operator manual actions that are currently not required  under the current regulations. These officials added that any new actions  or other safety features could be applied only to those areas subject to fire  risk, rather than to the entire facility, thereby allowing units to maximize  resources.
According to nuclear unit officials, adopting the risk-informed approach  could also help resolve concerns about multiple spurious actuations that  could occur as a result of fire events. Officials from six units we visited  told us that conducting the probabilistic risk assessments would allow  them to identify where multiple spurious actuations are most likely to  occur and which circuit systems would be most likely affected. These  officials told us that limiting circuit analyses to the most critical areas  would make such analyses feasible. NRC has repeatedly promoted the  transition to the new risk informed approach as a way for nuclear units to  address the multiple spurious actuation issue.
section_title: Industry and Academic Experts Expressed Concern about Probabilistic Risk Assessments That Would Be Used under the Risk- Informed Approach
paragraphs: According to industry officials and academic experts we consulted, the  results of a probabilistic risk assessment used in the risk-informed  approach could help units direct safety resources to areas where risk from  accidents could be minimized or where the risk of damage to the core or a  unit’s safe shutdown capability is highest; however, officials also noted  that the absence of significant fire events since the 1975 Browns Ferry fire  limits the relevant data on fire events at nuclear units. Specifically, these  experts noted the following:    Probabilistic risk assessments require large amounts of data; therefore the  small number of fires since the Browns Ferry fire and the subsequent lack  of real-world data may increase the amount of uncertainty in the analysis.
Probabilistic risk assessments are limited by the range of scenarios that  practitioners include in the analysis. If a scenario is not examined, its risks  cannot be considered and mitigated.
The role of human performance and error in a fire scenario—especially  those scenarios involving operator manual actions—is difficult to model.
Finally, these parties stated that probabilistic risk assessments in general  are difficult for a regulator to review and are not as enforceable as a  prescriptive approach, in which compliance with specific requirements  can be inspected and enforced.
section_title: NRC and Industry Face a Possible Shortage in Personnel with Skills Relevant to the Risk- Informed Approach
paragraphs: Numerous NRC, industry, and academic officials we spoke with expressed  concern that the transition to the new risk-informed approach could be  delayed by a limited number of personnel with the necessary skills and  training to design, review, and inspect against probabilistic risk  assessments. Several nuclear unit officials told us that the pool of fire  protection engineers with expertise in these areas is already heavily  burdened with developing probabilistic risk assessments for the pilot  program units and other units, including the 38 units that had already  begun transitioning as of October 2007.
Academic experts, consultants, and industry officials told us that the  current shortage of skilled personnel is due to (1) an increased demand for  individuals with critical skills under the risk-informed approach and (2) a  shortage of academic programs specializing in fire protection engineering.  According to these experts and officials, the current number of individuals  skilled in conducting probabilistic risk assessments is insufficient to  handle the increased work expected to be generated by the transition to a  risk-informed approach. NRC officials we spoke with expressed concern  that the nuclear industry has not trained or developed sufficient personnel  with needed fire protection skills. These officials also told us that they  expect that, as demand for work increases, more engineering students will  choose to go into the fire protection field. However, to date, only one  university has undergraduate and graduate programs in the fire protection  engineering field, and the ability to produce graduates is limited. Other  officials we spoke with noted that engineers in other fields can be trained  in fire protection but that this training takes a significant amount of time.
Academic experts and industry officials stated that without additional  skilled personnel, units would not be able to perform all of the necessary  activities, especially probabilistic risk assessments, within the 3-year  enforcement discretion “window” that NRC has granted each transition  unit as an incentive to adopt the new approach. Most nuclear units that  responded to an industry survey on this issue indicated that they expected  that they will need NRC to extend the discretion deadline for each unit.  Delays in individual units’ transition processes could create a significant  backlog in the entire transition process.
NRC also faces an aging workforce and the likelihood that it will be  competing with industry for engineers with skills in the fire protection  area. As we reported in January 2007, the agency as a whole faces  significant human capital challenges, in part because approximately 33  percent of its workforce will be eligible to retire in 2010. To address this  issue, we reported that NRC identified several critical skill gaps that it  must address, such as civil engineering and operator licensing. In relation  to needed skill areas, the agency has taken steps, including supporting key  university programs, to attract greater numbers of students into mission- critical skills areas and to offer scholarships to those studying in these  fields. In relation to fire protection, and probabilistic risk assessments in  particular, NRC officials told us that they expect to address future  resource needs through the use of a multiyear budget and by contracting  with the Department of Energy’s National Laboratories to help manage the  process. Further, these officials stated that part of the purpose of the pilot  program is to help them determine future resource needs for the transition  to the risk-informed approach, and, as a result, they do not intend to  finalize resource planning until the pilot programs are complete. A number  of experts in the engineering field, including academics and fire engineers,  stated that it will be difficult for NRC to compete with industry over the  projected numbers of graduates in this field over the next few years. Also,  NRC’s total workload, in addition to fire protection, is expected to  increase as nuclear unit operators submit license applications to build new  units, extend the lives of existing units, or increase the generating capacity  of existing units. For example, NRC staff are currently reviewing license  applications for units at six sites and have recently announced that  operators have submitted licenses for two additional units at a seventh  site. The agency expects to review or receive 12 more applications during  2008.
section_title: Operators of 58 Nuclear Units Have Not Announced Whether They Will Transition to the New Approach, in Part Due to Concerns about NRC’s Risk-Assessment Guidance and Pilot Program Timetable
paragraphs: To date 58 of the nation’s 104 nuclear units have not announced whether  they will adopt the risk-informed approach. NRC and industry officials  stated that they expected that newer units and units with relatively few  exemptions from existing regulations would be less likely to transition to  the new approach, while those with older licenses and extensive  exemptions would make the transition. However, to date, 25 units licensed  prior to 1979 have yet to announce whether they will make the transition.  Officials from nontransitioning units we visited told us that concerns over  NRC’s guidance and time table have been key reasons why they have not  yet announced their intent to transition.
According to industry and nuclear unit officials we spoke with, the costs  associated with conducting fire probabilistic risk assessments for the units  may be too high to justify transitioning to the new approach. For example,  some officials told us that performing the necessary analysis of circuits  and fire area features in support of the probabilistic risk assessment could  cost millions of dollars without substantially improving fire safety. These  officials noted that both pilot sites currently expect to spend  approximately $5 million to $10 million each in transition costs, including  circuit analysis. Some of these officials also noted that updating  probabilistic risk assessments—which units are required to do every 3  years or whenever any significant changes are made to a unit—would  require units to dedicate staff to this effort on a long term or permanent  basis.
Officials at transition and nontransition units stated that NRC’s guidance  for developing fire models that support probabilistic risk assessments is  overly conservative. In effect, these models require engineers to assume  that fires will result in massive damage, burn for significant periods of  time, and require greater response and mitigation efforts than less  conservative models. As such, these officials stated that the fire models  provided by NRC guidance would not provide an accurate assessment of  risk at a given unit. Furthermore, these officials stated that unit  modifications required by the risk analysis could cost more than seeking  exemptions from NRC. Some of these officials stated that they expect NRC  to revise the probabilistic risk assessment guidance to facilitate the  transition process in the future. NRC officials told us that nuclear units  have the option to develop and conduct their own fire models rather than  follow NRC’s guidance. Furthermore, in its initial review of one of the pilot  unit’s probabilistic risk assessments, NRC agreed with industry that  models used in the development of the probabilistic risk assessment  contained some overly conservative aspects and recommended that the  unit conduct additional analysis to address this. However, nuclear unit  officials expressed concern that the costs of developing site-specific fire  models, a process that includes numerous iterations, could be prohibitive.
Nuclear industry officials identified another area of concern in the current  transition schedule, in which 22 units are expected to submit their license  amendment requests for the risk-informed approach before NRC finishes  assessing the license amendment requests for the pilot program units in  March 2009. Although NRC has established a steering committee and a  frequently asked question process to disseminate information learned in the  ongoing pilot programs to other transition units, a number of nuclear unit  officials expressed concern about beginning the transition process before the  transition pilot programs are complete and lessons learned from the pilot  programs are available. For example, an official at one of the pilot sites noted  that the success of the pilot program probably will not be known until after  the first triennial safety inspection conducted by NRC, which will occur after  March 2009. The transition project manager for two nonpilot transition units  expressed his opinion that, due to uncertainties regarding the work units  must perform in order to comply with the risk-informed standard, no unit  should commit itself to transitioning to the new approach until 2 years after  the completion of the pilot programs.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: NRC’s ability to regulate fire safety at nuclear power units has been adversely  affected by several long-standing issues. To its credit, NRC has required that  nuclear units come into compliance with requirements related to the use of  unapproved operator manual actions by March 2009. However, NRC has not  effectively resolved the long-term use of interim compensatory measures or  the possibility of multiple spurious actuations. Especially critical, in our  opinion, is the need for NRC to test and resolve the effectiveness of fire wraps  at nuclear units, because units have instituted many manual actions and  compensatory measures in response to fire wraps that were found lacking in  effectiveness in various tests. Compounding these issues, NRC has no central  database of exemptions, operator manual actions, and extended interim  compensatory measures. Such a system would allow it to track trends in  compliance, devise solutions to compliance issues, and help provide  important information to NRC’s inspection activities.
Unless NRC deals effectively with these issues, units will likely continue to  postpone making necessary repairs and replacements, choosing instead to  rely on unapproved or undocumented manual actions as well as  compensatory measures that, in some cases, continue for years. According  to NRC, nuclear fire safety can be considered to be degraded when  reliance on passive measures is supplanted by manual actions or  compensatory measures. By taking prompt action to address the  unapproved use of operator manual actions, long-term use of interim  compensatory measures, the effectiveness of fire wraps, and multiple  spurious actuations, NRC would provide greater assurance to the public  that nuclear units are operated in a way that promotes fire safety. Despite  the transition of 46 units to a new risk-informed approach, for which the  implementation timeframes are uncertain, the majority of the nation’s  nuclear units will remain under the existing regulatory approach, and the  long-standing issues will continue to apply directly to them.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To address long-standing issues that have affected NRC’s regulation of fire  safety at the nation’s commercial nuclear power units, we recommend that  the NRC Commissioners direct NRC staff to take the following four actions:    Develop a central database for tracking the status of exemptions,  compensatory measures, and manual actions in place nationwide and at  individual commercial nuclear units.
Address safety concerns related to extended use of interim compensatory    defining how long an interim compensatory measure can be used and  identifying the interim compensatory measures in place at nuclear  units that exceed that threshold,    assessing the safety significance of such extended compensatory  measures and defining how long a safety-significant interim  compensatory measure can be used before NRC requires the unit  operator to make the necessary repairs or replacements or request an  exemption or deviation from its fire safety requirements, and,    developing a plan and deadlines for units to resolve those  compensatory measures.
Address long-standing concerns about the effectiveness of fire wraps at  commercial nuclear units by analyzing the effectiveness of existing fire  wraps and undertaking efforts to ensure that the fire endurance tests have  been conducted to qualify fire wraps as NRC-approved 1- or 3-hour fire  barriers.
Address long-standing concerns by ensuring that nuclear units are able to  safeguard against multiple spurious actuations by committing to a specific  date for developing guidelines that units should meet to prevent multiple  spurious actuations.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Commissioners of the Nuclear  Regulatory Commission for their review and comment. In commenting on  a draft of this report, NRC found that it was accurate, complete, and  handled sensitive information appropriately and stated that it intends to  give GAO’s findings and conclusions serious consideration. However, in its  response, NRC did not provide comments on our recommendations. NRC’s  comments are reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Commissioners of the Nuclear  Regulatory Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Office of  the Inspector General, and interested congressional committees. We will  also make copies available to others on request. In addition, this report  will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine the number, causes, and reported safety significance of fire  incidents at nuclear reactor units since 1995, we analyzed Nuclear  Regulatory Commission (NRC) data on fires occurring at operating  commercial nuclear reactor units from January, 1995, to December, 2007.  NRC requires units to report fire events meeting certain criteria, including  fires lasting longer than 15 minutes or those threatening safety. To assess  the reliability of the data, we (1) interviewed NRC officials about the steps  they take to ensure the accuracy of the data; (2) confirmed details about  selected fire events, NRC inspection findings, and local emergency  responders with unit management officials and NRC resident inspectors  during site visits to nuclear power units; (3) reviewed NRC inspection  reports related to fire protection; and (4) checked the data for obvious  errors. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report.
To examine what is known about nuclear reactor units’ compliance with  NRC’s deterministic fire protection regulations, we reviewed the relevant  fire protection regulations and guidance from NRC and industry. We also  met with and reviewed documents provided by officials from NRC,  industry, academia, and public interest groups. In particular, we  interviewed officials from NRC’s Fire Protection Branch, Office of  Enforcement, four regional offices, Office of the Inspector General, and  Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. In addition, we interviewed  officials from the Nuclear Energy Institute, National Fire Protection  Association, nuclear industry consultants, and nuclear insurance  companies. We conducted site visits to nuclear power units, where we met  with unit management officials and NRC resident inspectors. During these  site visits, we discussed and received documentation on the use of  operator manual actions, interim compensatory measures, and fire wraps,  and we obtained views on multiple spurious actuations and their impact  on safe shutdown. We also reviewed and discussed each unit’s corrective  action plan. Finally, we observed multiple NRC public meetings and  various collaborations with industry concerning issues related to  compliance with NRC’s deterministic fire protection regulations.
To examine the status of the nuclear industry’s implementation of the risk- informed approach to fire safety advocated by NRC, we met with and  reviewed documents provided by officials from NRC, industry, and public  interest groups, as well as academic officials with research experience in  fire safety and risk analysis. In particular, we interviewed officials from  NRC’s Fire Protection Branch, Office of Enforcement, four regional  offices, Office of the Inspector General, and Advisory Committee on  Reactor Safeguards. We also interviewed officials from the Nuclear Energy  Institute, National Fire Protection Association, nuclear industry  consultants, and nuclear insurance companies. We conducted site visits to  nuclear power units, where we met with unit management officials and  NRC resident inspectors. During these site visits, we discussed and  received documentation on the risk-informed approach to fire safety,  including resource planning and analysis justifying decisions on whether  or not to transition to NFPA-805. We also observed multiple NRC public  meetings and collaborations with industry concerning issues related to the  risk-informed approach to fire safety. Finally, we reviewed relevant fire  protection regulations and guidance from NRC and industry.
In addressing each of our three objectives, we conducted visits to sites  containing one or more commercial nuclear reactor units. These visits  allowed us to obtain in-depth knowledge about fire protection at each site.  We selected a nonprobability sample of sites to visit because certain  factors—including custom designs that differ according to each nuclear  unit, hundreds of licensing exemptions and deviations in place at units  nationwide, and the geographic dispersal of units units across 31 states— complicate collecting data and reporting generalizations about the entire  population of units. We chose 10 sites (totaling 20 operating nuclear  reactor units out of a national total of 104 operating nuclear units) that  provided coverage of each of NRC’s four regional offices and that  represented varying levels of unit fire safety performance, unit licensing  characteristics, reactor types, and NRC oversight. At the time of our visits,  5 of the 10 sites we visited (totaling 10 of the 20 nuclear reactor units we  visited) had notified NRC that they intend to transition to the new risk- informed approach to fire safety. Over the course of our work, we visited  the following sites: (1) D.C. Cook (2 units), located near Benton Harbor,  Michigan; (2) Diablo Canyon (2 units), located near San Luis Obispo,  California; (3) Dresden (2 units), located near Morris, Illinois; (4) Indian  Point (2 units), located near New York, New York; (5) La Salle (2 units),  located near Ottawa, Illinois; (6) Nine Mile Point (2 units), located near  Oswego, New York; (7) Oconee (3 units), located near Greenville, South  Carolina; (8) San Onofre (2 units), located near San Clemente, California;  (9) Shearon Harris (1 unit), located near Raleigh, North Carolina; and (10)  Vogtle (2 units), located near Augusta, Georgia.
We selected the nonprobability sample from the entire population of  commercial nuclear power units currently operating in the United States.  In order to capture variations that could play a role in how these units  address fire safety, we designed our site visit selection criteria to represent  the following: (1) geographic diversity; (2) units licensed to operate before  and after 1979; (3) sites choosing to remain under the deterministic  regulations and those transitioning to the risk-informed approach; (4)  pressurized and boiling water reactor types; (5) a variety of safety  problems in which inspection findings or performance indicators of higher  risk significance (white, yellow, or red) were issued; (6) units that have  been subjected to at least some level of increased oversight since regular  fire inspections were initiated in 2000; and (7) sites with various numbers  of fires reportable to NRC since 1995. We received feedback on our  selection criteria from nuclear insurance company officials, nuclear  industry consultants, NRC officials, and academic officials with research  experience in fire safety and risk analysis. We interviewed NRC resident  inspectors and unit management officials at each site to learn about the  fire protection program at the site. We also observed fire protection  features at each site, including safe-shutdown equipment and areas of the  units where operator manual actions, interim compensatory measures, and  fire wraps are used for fire safety. Finally, we observed part of an NRC  triennial fire inspection at one site.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 to June 2008  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Ernie Hazera (Assistant Director),  Cindy Gilbert, Chad M. Gorman, Mehrzad Nadji, Omari Norman, Alison  O’Neill, Steve Rossman, and Jena Sinkfield made key contributions to this  report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Nuclear Energy: NRC Has Made Progress in Implementing Its Reactor  Oversight and Licensing Processes but Continues to Face Challenges.  GAO-08-114T. Washington, D.C.: October 3, 2007.
Nuclear Energy: NRC’s Workforce and Processes for New Reactor  Licensing are Generally in Place, but Uncertainties Remain as Industry  Begins to Submit Applications. GAO-07-1129. Washington, D.C.:  September 21, 2007.
Human Capital: Retirements and Anticipated New Reactor Applications  Will Challenge NRC’s Workforce. GAO-07-105. Washington, D.C.: January  17, 2007.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Nuclear Power Plant  Safety Has Improved, but Refinements Are Needed. GAO-06-1029.  Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2006.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Preliminary Observations on Its  Process to Oversee the Safe Operation of Nuclear Power Plants.   GAO-06-888T. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2006.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Preliminary Observations on Its  Oversight to Ensure the Safe Operation of Nuclear Power Plants.   GAO-06-886T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Challenges Facing NRC in Effectively  Carrying Out Its Mission. GAO-05-754T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Nuclear Regulation: Challenges Confronting NRC in a Changing  Regulatory Environment. GAO-01-707T. Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2001.
Major Management Challenges and Performance Risks: Nuclear  Regulatory Commission. GAO-01-259. Washington, D.C.: January 2001.
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