Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Need for Improved Oversight Persists
Published: 2008-09-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures the pension benefits of 44 million private sector workers and retirees in over 30,000 employer-sponsored pension plans. In July 2007, GAO reported that PBGC's governance structure needed improvements, and asked Congress to consider expanding the board of directors to include additional members. GAO also recommended that the board develop policies and mechanisms consistent with corporate governance practices, and develop formal guidelines to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the board chair, members, their representatives, and the director. On the basis of that work, this report addresses (1) the steps PBGC has taken to improve policy direction and oversight and (2) how Congress applies oversight to PBGC and what other oversight mechanisms exist for government corporations. GAO reviewed PBGC's new corporate bylaws and the structure and reporting requirements of selected government corporations. GAO also interviewed PBGC and Department of Labor officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Although PBGC's board has strengthened the corporation's governing bylaws, the three-member board of directors is still limited in its ability to provide policy direction and oversight to PBGC. In implementing our earlier recommendation, the board revised the corporation's bylaws to more clearly define the roles and responsibilities of PBGC's board members, representatives, director, and senior management. PBGC also contracted with a consulting firm to provide a background report to assist the board in its review of alternative corporate governance structures, including restructuring the board of directors as GAO suggested in 2007. However, because of its small size, the board has not been able to develop procedures and mechanisms to monitor PBGC's operations, such as standing committees, which are mechanisms used by other government corporations. PBGC may also be exposed to challenges as the board, its representatives, and the director will likely change with the upcoming presidential transition in January 2009. While PBGC management has experienced a partial leadership change in recent years and provides operational and financial information to those newly appointed, PBGC Inspector General and GAO reports have recently identified additional financial and operational challenges facing the corporation. This additional information could help the new board members better understand the vulnerabilities and challenges facing the corporation. PBGC is subject to routine congressional oversight, but certain other government corporations have other types of reporting requirements in place--such as congressional notifications and reporting protocols for their advisory committees--to ensure effective communication exist between the corporations and Congress. Congressional oversight of PBGC in recent years has ranged from formal committee hearings to investigations and studies conducted by its congressional support agencies. For example, since 2002, PBGC officials have testified 19 times before several different committees on issues such as the status of its financial condition. Further, GAO, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Congressional Research Service have issued a variety of reports and testimonies on PBGC financial and operational matters. However, PBGC does not have reporting requirements applied to other government corporations for providing additional information to Congress. For example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Commodity Credit Corporation are required to notify Congress prior to conducting certain financial transactions. The advisory committee of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation formally reports to its board of directors, while the Export-Import Bank of the United States' advisory committee formally reports to its board and Congress each year on matters related to their respective organizations. In addition, the advisory boards of other government entities with retirement-related responsibilities--such as the Social Security Administration, the Railroad Retirement Board, and the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board--provide reports to their overseeing bodies.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures the pension  benefits of 44 million private sector workers and retirees in over 30,000  employer-sponsored pension plans. Since its creation in 1974, PBGC’s  assets have increased significantly, making its financial portfolio one of  the largest of any federal government corporation. PBGC holds  approximately $68 billion in assets and approximately $82 billion in  liabilities from underfunded plans—many of which were terminated in the  past decade. As a result, PBGC has an accumulated deficit that currently  stands at about $14 billion. Recognizing the effect PBGC’s financial  condition could have on the federal budget, in 2003, we placed PBGC’s  largest insurance program on GAO’s High Risk list; a list composed of  federal programs that need attention and transformation. PBGC’s  insurance program remains on the list today.
PBGC is governed by a three-member board of directors consisting of the  Secretaries of the Treasury, Labor, and Commerce, who are responsible  for providing policy direction and oversight of PBGC. In July 2007, we  reported that the board structure was not sufficient in size to include the  expertise or diverse set of interests needed to provide policy direction and  oversight of PBGC. Consequently, we asked Congress to consider  restructuring the corporation’s board of directors by appointing additional  members with diverse backgrounds who possess knowledge and expertise  useful to PBGC’s responsibilities. We also recommended that the board  develop policies and mechanisms consistent with corporate governance  practices and develop formal guidelines to articulate the roles and  responsibilities of the board chair, members, their representatives, and the  director. You asked us to update the progress PBGC has made in  improving its governance structure to provide policy direction and  oversight since our report. Specifically, this report addresses (1) the steps  PBGC has taken to improve its policy direction and oversight and (2) how  Congress applies oversight to PBGC and what other oversight mechanisms  exist for government corporations.
To identify the steps PBGC has taken to improve its governance structure,  we updated our prior work, collecting and reviewing documents related to  PBGC’s bylaws, which were published in May 2008. We also reviewed  reports on PBGC’s organizational structure. To identify how Congress has  recently exercised oversight of PBGC, we reviewed congressional hearings  from 2002 to the present related to PBGC matters, examined the work of  the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, and  PBGC’s Office of Inspector General, and reviewed PBGC’s congressional  reporting requirements. To identify oversight mechanisms that exist at  other government corporations, we collected information on the federal  government corporations we identified for our July 2007 review that have  similar missions or designations to those of PBGC. Moreover, we reviewed  government agencies with retirement-related responsibilities to determine  what additional mechanisms may exist. We also met with officials from  PBGC and the Department of Labor.
We conducted this performance audit between June 2008 and September  2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I discusses our scope  and methodology in further detail.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974  (ERISA) to protect the interests of participants and beneficiaries of private  sector employee benefit plans.  Before the enactment of ERISA, few rules  governed the funding of defined benefit pension plans, and participants  had no guarantee that they would receive promised benefits. ERISA  established PBGC to insure private sector plan participants’ benefits and  to encourage the continuation and maintenance of private sector defined  benefit pension plans by providing timely and uninterrupted payment of  pension benefits.
PBGC is a wholly owned government corporation—that is, the federal  government does not share ownership interests with nonfederal entities,  and PBGC is subject to requirements under the Government Corporation  Control Act of 1945, as amended, such as annual budgets, audits, and  management reports. According to public administration experts, a  government corporation is appropriate for the administration of  government programs that are    predominately of a business nature,    produce revenue and are potentially self-sustaining,  involve a large number of business-type transaction with the public,  and  require greater budget flexibility than a government department or  agency.
The United States government is not liable for any obligation or liability  incurred by PBGC. The corporation is funded through insurance  premiums from employers that sponsor insured pension plans, as well as  assets from terminated pension plans and investment income.
PBGC insures certain private sector defined benefit plans through its  single-employer and multiemployer insurance programs. Through its  single-employer insurance program, PBGC paid nearly $4.1 billion in  benefits to 622,000 participants and beneficiaries across the United States  in fiscal year 2006 (see fig. 1). The geographic breakdown of PBGC-insured  participants largely matches the overall population. Appendix II includes  information on PBGC’s single-employer plans by each U.S. state and  territory, as shown in figure 1.
PBGC is governed by a board of directors that consists of the Secretaries  of the Treasury, Labor, and Commerce, with the Secretary of Labor  serving as chair of the board. Prior to the passage of the Pension  Protection Act of 2006, ERISA provided the Secretary of Labor with  responsibility for administering PBGC’s operations, personnel, and budget.  The Secretary has historically delegated the responsibility for  administering PBGC to an executive director. The Pension Protection Act  replaced the chair of the board as PBGC’s administrator with a Senate- confirmed director. The corporation is also aided by a seven-member  Advisory Committee appointed by the President to represent the interest  of labor, employees, and the general public. This committee has an  advisory role, but has no statutory authority to set PBGC policy or conduct  formal oversight. PBGC also has an Office of Inspector General that  reports to the board through the chair. With 22 staff, the Office of  Inspector General generally conducts audits, inspections, and  investigations of PBGC’s programs and operations in order to promote  program administration effectiveness and deter waste, fraud, and abuse of  PBGC resources.
section_title: Revised Bylaws Improve Policy Direction and Oversight, but Board Structure Continues to Limit Attention and Oversight
paragraphs: PBGC’s board has taken steps to improve its governance structure by  revising the corporation’s bylaws. PBGC also contracted with a consulting  firm to assist the board in its review of alternative corporate governance  structures. However, the board consists of three cabinet secretaries, a fact  that limits their ability to provide policy direction and oversight. PBGC  may also face additional challenges as the board members, their  representatives, and director will all likely change with the upcoming  presidential transition, thus limiting the corporation’s institutional  knowledge.
subsections: section_title: PBGC Has Taken Steps to Address Concerns
paragraphs: PBGC has taken steps to improve its policy direction and oversight  through the revision of its bylaws. In our July 2007 report, we  recommended PBGC’s board of directors establish formal guidelines that  articulate the authorities of the board, the Department of Labor, other  board members, and their respective representatives. As part of its May  2008 bylaw revision, the board of directors more clearly defined the roles  and responsibilities of its members, representatives, and director. For  example, the new bylaws state that the board is responsible for  establishing and overseeing the policies of the corporation. The new  bylaws explicitly outline the board’s responsibilities, which include  approval of policy matters significantly affecting the pension insurance  program or its stakeholders; approval of the corporation’s investment  policy; and review of certain management and Inspector General reports.  In addition, the new bylaws explicitly define the role and responsibilities  of the director and the corporation’s senior officer positions. See appendix  III to view PBGC’s new bylaws.
Our July 2007 report also asked Congress to consider restructuring the  board of directors to appoint additional members of diverse backgrounds  who possess knowledge and expertise useful to PBGC’s responsibilities  and can provide the attention needed for strong corporate oversight. In  response to these findings, PBGC contracted with a consulting firm to  review governance models and provide a background report to assist the  board in its review of alternative corporate governance structures. The  consulting firm’s final report describes the advantages and disadvantages  of the corporate board structures and governance practices of other  government corporations and select private sector companies, and  concludes that there are several viable alternatives for PBGC’s governance  structure and practices.
section_title: Board’s Limited Ability to Provide Policy Direction and Oversight Persists
paragraphs: Our July 2007 report found that PBGC’s board has limited time and  resources to provide policy direction and oversight and has not  established procedures and mechanisms to monitor PBGC operations.  Although board members have met more frequently since 2003, the three  cabinet secretaries who compose the board have numerous other  responsibilities. Because of their responsibilities and the small size of the  board, it is difficult for the board to establish and manage oversight  mechanisms, such as the use of standing committees—which are common  mechanisms used by both government and private corporate boards.  According to board officials, the board representatives, assisted by their  staff, undertake some of the oversight functions that could be conducted  by standing committees. Other government corporations, such as the  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Overseas Private  Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the National Railroad Passenger  Corporation (Amtrak), have established standing committees to conduct  certain oversight functions. For example, FDIC’s board of directors  established standing committees, such as the Case Review Committee and  the Audit Committee, to conduct certain oversight functions.
Instead, PBGC’s board continues to rely on the Inspector General and  PBGC’s management oversight committees to ensure that PBGC is  operating effectively. However, our prior work found that while the  board requires the Inspector General to brief it at its semiannual meetings,  there were no formal protocols requiring the Inspector General to  routinely meet with the board or its representatives and staff.  Consequently, when the board and its representatives likely change, it is  unclear whether the board would be aware of this informal protocol.  Further, we reported that the board relies on PBGC’s executive  committees and working groups for monitoring and reviewing PBGC’s  operations. However, these committees and working groups are neither  independent of the PBGC director nor required to formally report all  matters to the board.
PBGC may also be exposed to challenges as the board, its representatives,  and director will likely change with the upcoming presidential transition in  January 2009, thus limiting institutional knowledge of the challenges  facing the corporation. As we noted in 2007, because PBGC’s board is  composed of cabinet secretaries, PBGC board members, their  representatives, and the director typically change with each  administration. Other government corporations’ authorizing statutes— such as OPIC’s—have established board structures with staggered terms  for their directors, possibly avoiding gaps in their organization’s  institutional knowledge. PBGC management has experienced partial  leadership transitions in recent years, and in anticipation of the  forthcoming complete leadership change, PBGC is developing additional  materials to include in its official transition package for newly appointed  officials. This new information includes information on standards of  ethical conduct, appointments, compensation levels, and information on  presidential transitions. While PBGC typically provides newly appointed  members, representatives, and directors with information on its  operations and financial position, PBGC’s Office of Inspector General and  our work recently identified additional financial and operational  challenges facing the corporation. This additional information could help  the new board members and their representatives better understand the  vulnerabilities and challenges facing the corporation.
section_title: Congress Has Overseen PBGC in Several Ways, but Some Other Government Corporations Have Additional Reporting Requirements
paragraphs: Congressional oversight of PBGC in recent years has ranged from formal  congressional hearings to the use of its support agencies, such as GAO, the  Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Congressional Research  Service (CRS). However, unlike some other government corporations,  PBGC does not have certain reporting requirements for providing  additional information to Congress. In general, our prior work has shown  that congressional oversight is designed to fulfill a number of purposes,  including but not limited to ensuring executive compliance with legislative  intent; improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and economy of  government operations; evaluating program performance; and conducting  investigations.
subsections: section_title: Congress Has Overseen PBGC in a Variety of Ways
paragraphs: Since 2002, PBGC officials have testified 19 times before various  congressional committees—mostly on broad issues related to the status of  the private sector defined benefit pension policy and its effect on PBGC  (see table 1). For example, in 2005, the PBGC director testified before the  House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’s Subcommittee  on Aviation regarding pension challenges facing the airline industry. The  director’s testimony discussed the possible effects such defaults would  have on the defined benefit pension industry and the financial position of  the corporation. Congress also recently began exercising oversight of  PBGC through the confirmation process of PBGC’s director. With the  passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, PBGC’s director now must  be confirmed by the Senate. During the confirmation hearing conducted  in 2007, members expressed concerns about key defined benefit pension  policy issues and PBGC’s financial condition, as well as sought the  nominee’s thoughts on addressing weaknesses in PBGC’s governance  structure, such as the concerns we raised about the corporate governance  practices.
Beyond formal congressional hearings, PBGC staff told us that they  frequently discuss pension policy matters with congressional staff. In  addition, PBGC must annually submit reports to Congress on its prior  fiscal year’s financial and operational matters, which include information  on PBGC’s financial statements, internal controls, and compliance with  certain laws and regulations. For example, the Pension Protection Act of  2006 requires that PBGC provide a comparison of the average return on  investment earned with respect to asset investments by the corporation,  which PBGC includes in its annual report.
Through its support agencies—GAO, the Congressional Budget Office, and  the Congressional Research Service—Congress has also provided  oversight and reviewed PBGC. Specifically, Congress has asked GAO to  conduct assessments of policy, management, and the financial condition  of PBGC. For example, we conducted more than 10 reviews of PBGC over  the past 5 years, including assessments related to PBGC’s 2005 corporate  reorganization and weaknesses in its governance structure, human capital  management, and contracting practices. Our work also raised concerns  about PBGC’s financial condition and the state of the defined benefit  industry. In addition, CBO has published nine specific reports on PBGC  since 2005.  For example, in April 2008, CBO reported that PBGC’s  investment policy is likely to produce higher returns over the long run, but  noted the new strategy increases the risk that PBGC will not have  sufficient assets to cover retirees’ benefit payments when the economy  and financial markets are weak. Further, CRS has published eight studies  related to PBGC since 2006. Appendix IV includes a list of selected GAO,  CBO, and CRS reports and testimonies related to PBGC.
section_title: Some Government Corporations Have Additional Congressional Reporting Requirements
paragraphs: Some government corporations have additional reporting requirements for  notifying Congress of significant actions. The Millennium Challenge  Corporation is required to formally notify the appropriate congressional  committees 15 days prior to the allocation or transfer of funds related to  the corporation’s activities. The Commodity Credit Corporation is subject  to a similar requirement, which obliges the Secretary of Agriculture to  alert the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate  and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives prior to  making adjustments to a certain price support program. The Overseas  Private Investment Corporation is required to submit a detailed report to  the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on  Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives at least 60 days prior to  issuing, among other things, political risk insurance for losses due to  business interruption for the first time. These examples demonstrate how  Congress has required additional reporting requirements for certain  activities conducted by government corporations. While PBGC generally  has no requirements to formally notify Congress prior to taking significant  financial or operational actions, PBGC officials said that they informally  notify Congress prior to certain policy shifts. For example, in fiscal year  2008, PBGC officials met with congressional staff before modifying the  investment policy to decrease the corporation’s fixed-income asset  investments. In addition to its annual reporting requirements, PBGC is  required to report proposals for certain premium rate revisions, including  reasons for such revisions, to specific congressional committees; however,  these premium rate revisions are not considered effective until 30 days  after enactment of a law approving them.
Like other government corporations, PBGC has an advisory committee.  PBGC’s advisory committee is charged with advising the corporation on its  policies and procedures related to the corporation’s appointment of  trustees in termination proceedings, investments of monies, whether  terminated plans should be liquidated immediately or continued in  operation, and any other matters the corporation may request. Unlike  PBGC’s advisory committee, the advisory boards or committees of other  government corporations—such as the Export-Import Bank and FDIC— are subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act and some submit  formal reports to their board chair and directors (see table 2). In contrast,  PBGC’s advisory committee is not subject to the Federal Advisory  Committee Act. According to PBGC officials, the corporation is exempt  because of the proprietary nature of its work. PBGC’s advisory committee  typically reports only to the director, although representatives of PBGC’s  board members frequently attend advisory committee meetings and  officials said that the committee can submit concerns to the board if it  believes it is warranted.
Beyond reporting to the chairman of its board, the Export-Import Bank’s  advisory committee is also required to submit an annual report to  Congress on the extent to which the Export-Import Bank is providing  competitive financing to expand U.S. exports, along with suggestions for  improvements. In addition to government corporations, some government  agencies with retirement-related responsibilities—such as the Social  Security Administration (SSA), the Railroad Retirement Board, and the  Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board—have advisory committees  as part of their governance structures, which annually report to their  respective overseeing bodies. For example, when Congress established  SSA as a separate and distinct agency from the Department of Health and  Human Services, it also established an independent seven-member  bipartisan Advisory Board to advise the President, Congress, and the  commissioner of Social Security on respective policy issues.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: With more than 44 million Americans insured by PBGC, it is essential that  the corporation is soundly governed and efficiently managed to guarantee  that retirement income will be available to all those covered. Despite  PBGC’s efforts to improve its bylaws, the three-member board of directors  is still one of the smallest and least diverse of any government  corporation. Other government corporations’ governance structures  include oversight mechanisms, such as standing committees, and  additional reporting requirements to conduct certain oversight functions  and assist their boards of directors. While PBGC’s board should be  restructured, additional reporting requirements, like some government  corporations have, may not be appropriate for PBGC given the proprietary  nature of its financial work; thus, any reporting changes would need to be  carefully considered.
The limitations of the board structure will become even more apparent in  the coming months as the board, its representatives, and the corporation’s  director will likely be replaced with a new presidential administration.  Because board members and their representatives serve by virtue of their  positions in the federal government, there is no assurance that these  individuals will have the needed expertise to understand the corporation’s  business or financial vulnerabilities. Without adequate information and  preparation, this transition could limit not only the progress made by the  current board, its representatives, and director, but may also curtail the  corporation’s ability to insure and deliver retirement benefits to millions of  Americans that rely on the corporation.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that recently identified management and financial challenges  facing PBGC are shared with those newly appointed, we recommend that  PBGC provide Office of Inspector General and GAO reports on the  corporation’s financial and management challenges to the newly  appointed board members, board representatives, and director so that  they can take appropriate action as needed.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We obtained written comments on a draft report from PBGC’s director,  which are reproduced in appendix V. In addition, the Departments of the  Treasury, Labor, and Commerce provided joint technical comments, which  were incorporated into the report where appropriate.
In response to our draft report, the PBGC director stated that PBGC  prepares substantial in-depth briefing materials on its operational issues  for incoming administrations. The director agreed with our  recommendation, stating that PBGC will ensure that the transition  materials provided to those newly appointed will also include pertinent  PBGC Office of Inspector General and GAO reports. Further, the director  stated that PBGC will continue to work in concert with the board to  provide oversight information necessary to address the important issues  that they confront in providing pension security to Americans.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of the Treasury,  Labor, and Commerce, as well as the PBGC director and other interested  parties. We will also make copies available to others on request. If you or  your staff has any questions concerning this report, please contact me on  (202) 512-7215 or bovbjergb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify the steps that the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation  (PBGC) has taken to improve its governance structure, we reviewed our  work issued in July 2007, as well as collected and reviewed documents  related to PBGC’s bylaws, which were last published in May 2008. We  reviewed reports on PBGC’s organizational structure and financial  condition. We also identified provisions of the Employee Retirement and  Income Security Act of 1974, the Pension Protection Act of 2006, and  chapter 91 of the U.S. Code, which is commonly known as the Government  Corporation Control Act (GCCA), that outline the authority of PBGC’s  board of directors as well as the administrative responsibilities of PBGC’s  director. To understand the board of directors’, their representatives’, and  PBGC’s director’s role, we reviewed documentation related to the board  members’ activities to identify what types of actions the board members  had considered and taken.
To determine how Congress exercises oversight of PBGC, we identified  the number of times PBGC officials testified before Congress since 2002,  and reviewed the issues discussed at each formal hearing. Further, we  reviewed the work of the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional  Research Service, PBGC’s Office of Inspector General, and our work on  PBGC’s financial and management challenges. To determine the oversight  mechanisms and reporting requirements that exist at other government  corporations, we collected information on select federal government  corporations that we identified in our July 2007 work, which are listed  under the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, as amended, and  have similar missions or designations to those of PBGC. We reviewed  information on the following government corporations:    Commodity Credit Corporation,    Export-Import Bank of the United States,    Federal Crop Insurance Corporation,    Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,    Federal Financing Bank,    Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR),    Financing Corporation,    Government National Mortgage Association,    Millennium Challenge Corporation,    National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)    Overseas Private Investment Corporation,    Resolution Funding Corporation,    Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation,    Tennessee Valley Authority, and    United States Postal Service.
We also reviewed government agencies with retirement-related  responsibilities to determine what other oversight mechanisms may exist;  the agencies include the Social Security Administration, the Railroad  Retirement Board, and the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board.  Moreover, we met with officials from PBGC and the Department of Labor.
section_title: Appendix II: Selected PBGC Single-Employer Plan Pension Data by State
subsections: section_title: Claims 1975-2006
section_title: Appendix III: Bylaws of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, May 23, 2008
section_title: Appendix IV: List of Selected Reports and Testimonies Related to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
paragraphs: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Some Steps Have Been Taken to  Improve Contracting, but a More Strategic Approach Is Needed.   GAO-08-871. Washington, D.C.: August 2008.
PBGC Assets: Implementation of New Investment Policy Will Need  Stronger Board Oversight. GAO-08-667. Washington, D.C.: July 2008.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: A More Strategic Approach  Could Improve Human Capital Management. GAO-08-624. Washington,  D.C.: June 2008.
High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.:   January 2007.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Governance Structure Needs  Improvements to Ensure Policy Direction and Oversight. GAO-07-808.  Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007.
PBGC’s Legal Support: Improvement Needed to Eliminate Confusion  and Ensure Provision of Consistent Advice. GAO-07-757R. Washington,  D.C.: May 18, 2007.
Private Pensions: Questions Concerning the Pension Benefit Guaranty  Corporation’s Practices Regarding Single-Employer Probable Claims.  GAO-05-991R. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2005.
Private Pensions: The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and Long- Term Budgetary Challenges. GAO-05-772T. Washington, D.C.:   June 9, 2005.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Single-Employer Pension  Insurance Program Faces Significant Long-Term Risks. GAO-04-90.  Washington, D.C.: October 2003.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Single-Employer Insurance  Program: Long-Term Vulnerabilities Warrant ‘High Risk’ Designation.  GAO-03-1050SP. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2003.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Statutory Limitation on  Administrative Expenses Does Not Provide Meaningful Control.   GAO-03-301. Washington, D.C.: February 2003.
GAO Forum on Governance and Accountability: Challenges to Restore  Public Confidence in U.S. Corporate Governance and Accountability  Systems. GAO-03-419SP. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
A Review of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s New  Investment Strategy. April 24, 2008.
Effect of H.R. 2830 on the Net Economic Costs of the Pension Benefit  Guaranty Corporation. December 29, 2005.
The effect on the 10-year net costs to the Pension Benefit Guaranty  Corporation (PBGC) of enacting S. 1783, the Pension Security and  Transparency Act of 2005. October 11, 2005.
A Guide to Understanding the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  September 2005.
The Risk Exposure of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  September 2005.
Testimony on Multiemployer Pension Plans. June 28, 2005.
Testimony on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Financial  Condition, Potential Risks, and Policy Options. June 15, 2005.
Testimony on Estimating the Costs of the Pension Benefit Guaranty  Corporation. June 9, 2005.
Testimony on Defined-Benefit Pension Plans: Current Problems and  Future Challenges, June 7, 2005.
Baird Webel. Insurance Guaranty Funds. RL32175. February 27, 2008.
John J. Topoleski. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: A Fact Sheet.  95-118. January 29, 2008.
Patrick Purcell. Summary of the Pension Protection Act of 2006.  RL33703. May 1, 2007.
William Klunk. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and the  Federal Budget. RS22650. April 24, 2007.
William Klunk. The Financial Health of the Pension Benefit Guaranty  Corporation (PBGC). RL33937. March 23, 2007.
Jennifer Staman and Erika Lunder. The Pension Benefit Guaranty  Corporation and Single-Employer Plan Terminations. RS22624. March  14, 2007.
Jennifer Staman and Erika Lunder. Pension Protection Act of 2006:  Summary of the PBGC Guarantee and Related Provisions. RS22513.  December 20, 2006.
Neela K. Ranade and Paul J. Graney. Defined Benefit Pension Reform for  Single-Employer Plans. RL32991. January 26, 2006.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Pension Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Benefit Guaranty Corporation Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: The following team members made key contributions to this report:   Blake Ainsworth, Assistant Director; Jason Holsclaw, Analyst-in-Charge;  Susannah Compton; William King; Matthew Lee; Charlie Willson; and   Craig Winslow.