Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: Poor Planning Has Complicated DOE's Plutonium Consolidation Efforts
Published: 2005-10-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Plutonium is very hazardous to human health and the environment and requires extensive security because of its potential use in a nuclear weapon. The Department of Energy (DOE) stores about 50 metric tons of plutonium that is no longer needed by the United States for nuclear weapons. Some of this plutonium is in the form of contaminated metal, oxides, solutions, and residues remaining from the nuclear weapons production process. To improve security and reduce storage costs, DOE plans to establish enough storage capacity at its Savannah River Site (SRS) in the event it decides to consolidate its plutonium there until it can be permanently disposed of. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which DOE can consolidate this plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS's capacity to monitor plutonium storage containers.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As GAO reported in July 2005, DOE cannot yet consolidate its surplus plutonium at SRS for several reasons. First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium into a form for permanent disposition, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a plan, DOE cannot ship additional plutonium to SRS. Second, SRS cannot receive all of the plutonium from DOE's Hanford Site because it is not in a form SRS planned to store. Specifically, about 20 percent of Hanford's plutonium is in the form of 12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods, which Hanford had planned to ship intact to SRS as part of its efforts to cleanup and demolish its closed nuclear facilities. However, SRS's storage plan assumed Hanford would package all of its plutonium in DOE's standard storage containers. Until a permanent disposition plan is developed, more plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS and DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that consolidation could offer. In particular, continued storage at Hanford will cost approximately $85 million more annually because of increasing security requirements and will threaten that site's achievement of the milestones in its accelerated cleanup plan. In addition, DOE lacks the necessary capability to fully monitor the condition of the plutonium to ensure continued safe storage. The facility at SRS that DOE plans to use to store plutonium lacks adequate safety systems to conduct monitoring of storage containers. Without a monitoring capability, DOE faces increased risks of an accidental plutonium release that could harm workers, the public, and the environment. DOE had planned to construct a monitoring capability in another building at SRS that already had safety systems needed to work with plutonium. However, this building would not have had sufficient security to conduct all of the required monitoring activities. In addition, this building also has other serious safety problems. Faced with these challenges, DOE announced in April 2005 that it would have SRS's storage facility upgraded to conduct plutonium monitoring.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the Department of  Energy’s (DOE) efforts to consolidate surplus plutonium. My testimony  today is based on our report issued in July 2005, entitled Securing U.S.  Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to Take Action to Safely Consolidate  Plutonium (GAO-05-665).
DOE stores about 50 metric tons of plutonium that is no longer needed by  the United States for nuclear weapons. Some of this plutonium is in the  form of contaminated metal, oxides, solutions, and residues remaining  from the nuclear weapons production process. When the United States  stopped producing nuclear weapons in 1989, it had plutonium inventories  located in numerous DOE facilities throughout the United States,  including the Hanford Site in Washington, the Rocky Flats Environmental  Technology Site in Colorado, the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New  Mexico, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, and  the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. DOE recognizes that  consolidation could reduce costs and improve security for stored  plutonium. Although DOE has not made a final decision to consolidate, it  has proceeded with plans to establish enough storage capacity at SRS in  the event it decides to consolidate its plutonium at SRS until it can be  processed into a form for permanent disposition and disposed of in a  geological repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.
Plutonium is very hazardous to human health and the environment.  Inhaling a few micrograms creates a long-term risk of lung, liver, and bone  cancer and inhaling larger doses can cause immediate lung injuries and  death. In certain forms, plutonium can spontaneously combust in the  presence of oxygen at temperatures above room temperature. Because of  these hazards, plutonium must be stabilized and packaged appropriately to  minimize the risk of accidental release. In addition, facilities storing  plutonium must be properly equipped with safety systems that prevent it  from escaping into the surrounding air, land, or water in the event a  storage container is breached.
In 2003, DOE issued a technical standard for plutonium storage that it  believes will allow it to safely store plutonium for a minimum of 50 years.  DOE is nearing completion of a multiyear effort to stabilize and package  plutonium at its sites across the United States into 5-inch-wide, 10-inch- long storage containers. Under DOE’s standard, once the plutonium is  safely packaged, DOE must periodically monitor the storage containers for  changes in the plutonium’s condition, particularly any pressurization or  corrosion of the containers. Such monitoring includes annually x-raying a  sample of storage containers to evaluate potential pressurization. Storage  containers may also be cut open to evaluate the plutonium inside and the  container itself for potential corrosion. An effective monitoring program is  intended to detect damaged storage containers or inadequately stabilized  plutonium and will help ensure the continued safe storage of the material.
In addition to plutonium’s health and environmental hazards, DOE has  long recognized that a successful terrorist attack on a site containing  plutonium could have devastating consequences for the site and its  surrounding communities. Therefore, plutonium requires extensive  security because of its potential use in a nuclear weapon; to create an  improvised nuclear device; and to create a so-called “dirty bomb,” in which  conventional explosives are used to disperse radioactive material. For  many years, a key component of DOE security has been the development  of the design basis threat, a classified document that identifies the  potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. Since September 11,  2001, the size of the potential threat has increased significantly and DOE is  facing challenges in improving its security measures to respond to the  increased threat.
Our July 2005 report examined (1) the extent to which DOE can  consolidate its plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS’s capacity to monitor  plutonium storage containers. We reviewed plutonium storage,  monitoring, and security plans and reports prepared by DOE’s Office of  Environmental Management, DOE’s Office of Security and Safety  Performance Assurance, and National Nuclear Security Administration;  DOE’s operating contractor for SRS (Westinghouse Savannah River  Company); and DOE’s security contractor for SRS (Wackenhut Services,  Inc.). In addition, we reviewed studies on plutonium storage at SRS and  interviewed officials with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, an  independent federal agency established by the Congress in 1988 to oversee  the safety of DOE’s nuclear weapons complex. The work on our report  was conducted from June 2004 through June 2005 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary, DOE cannot consolidate all of its plutonium at SRS. DOE has  not yet completed a plan to process the plutonium into a form for  permanent disposition, as required by the National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a plan, DOE cannot ship additional  plutonium to SRS. In addition, DOE’s plutonium consolidation efforts have  been hindered because DOE relied upon its individual sites to  independently develop plans to achieve their own goals instead of  developing an integrated consolidation plan. Specifically, Hanford was  preparing to ship plutonium to SRS as part of its efforts to accelerate the  cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear facilities. About one-fifth of  Hanford’s plutonium is in the form of 12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods.  Because disassembling the fuel rods would delay cleanup activities,  Hanford’s accelerated cleanup plan calls for shipping these rods intact to  SRS inside special shipping containers. However, SRS’s storage plan  assumed Hanford would disassemble the fuel rods and package the  plutonium in DOE’s standard storage containers. Despite these  inconsistencies, DOE approved both Hanford’s accelerated cleanup plan  and SRS’s plutonium storage plans. Although SRS’s plutonium storage  facility has sufficient space to store the fuel rods, several steps are  necessary before DOE would be able to ship the fuel rods to SRS,  including obtaining Department of Transportation certified shipping  containers for the fuel rods. However, until DOE develops a plan to  process the plutonium for permanent disposition, additional plutonium  cannot be shipped to SRS and DOE will not achieve the cost savings and  security improvements that plutonium consolidation could offer. In  particular, continued plutonium storage at Hanford will cost  approximately $85 million more annually because of increasing security  requirements and will threaten that site’s achievement of the milestones in  its accelerated cleanup plan.
In addition, DOE currently lacks the capability at SRS to fully monitor the  plutonium storage containers as required by DOE’s storage standard.  According to the Safety Board, the facility at SRS that DOE plans to use to  store the plutonium—Building 105-K—is not equipped to conduct the  needed monitoring of storage containers. In fact, because Building 105-K  lacks adequate fire protection, ventilation, and filtration, DOE’s standard  storage containers cannot be removed from their outer packaging—35- gallon steel drums used to ship the containers to SRS. Without a  monitoring capability that would detect whether the stored plutonium is  becoming unstable and damaging the storage containers, DOE faces  increased risks of an accidental plutonium release at SRS that could harm  workers, the public, and the environment. Because Building 105-K lacks  the capability to monitor stored plutonium, DOE had planned to construct  a monitoring capability in another building at SRS—Building 235-F—that  already had the ventilation and filtration systems needed to work with  plutonium. However, following changes in 2004 to DOE’s design basis  threat, Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to conduct all  of the monitoring activities required by DOE’s storage standard. In  addition, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has reported that,  like Building 105-K storage facility, Building 235-F lacks adequate fire  protection as well as having other serious safety concerns. Given these  challenges, DOE announced in April 2005 that it would have Building 105- K upgraded to allow storage and monitoring activities to be centralized in  one facility.
In our report, we made two recommendations to ensure that DOE  develops a comprehensive strategy for plutonium consolidation, storage,  and disposition and that its facilities cleanup plans are consistent with this  strategy. DOE generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that  its recently created Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation  Coordination Committee will develop a strategic plan for the consolidation  and disposition of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Since our  report was issued in July 2005, DOE’s committee has been continuing with  its work developing the strategic plan.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: To address the problems associated with unstable forms of plutonium and  inadequate packaging for long-term storage, DOE established a standard  for the safe storage of plutonium for a minimum of 50 years that sets  plutonium stabilization and packaging requirements. Stabilization is  achieved by heating the material to remove moisture that could lead to a  buildup of pressure, which would increase the risk of rupturing a  container. Plutonium storage containers designed to meet the standard  consist of an inner and outer container, each welded shut. The inner  container is designed so that it can be monitored for a buildup of pressure  using analytical techniques, such as radiography, that do not damage the  container. Containers must also be resistant to fire, leakage, and  corrosion.
Plutonium stabilization and packaging are completed at Rocky Flats,  Hanford, and SRS, and SRS has already received nearly 1,900 containers  from Rocky Flats. Stabilization and packaging are still ongoing at  Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories. Once  stabilization and packaging are completed, DOE estimates that it will have  nearly 5,700 plutonium storage containers stored at locations across the  United States that could eventually be shipped to SRS.
SRS’s plutonium storage plans originally called for the construction of a  state-of-the-art Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility that would have  provided long-term storage and monitoring of standard plutonium  containers in a secure environment. DOE changed its storage plans and  cancelled the project in 2001 because it expected to store the plutonium  for only a few years until a facility to process the plutonium for permanent  disposition was available. Instead of building a new facility, DOE decided  to use two existing buildings at SRS for plutonium storage and monitoring  operations: Building 105-K and Building 235-F. Building 105-K was  originally a nuclear reactor built in the early 1950s and produced  plutonium and tritium until 1988. The reactor was then placed in a cold  standby condition until its complete shutdown in 1996. The major reactor  components were removed and the facility is now primarily used to store  plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Building 235-F was also  constructed in the 1950s and was used until the mid-1980s to produce  plutonium heat sources that were used to power space probes for the  National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of  Defense. The building is currently used to store plutonium.
After the design basis threat was changed in October 2004, SRS was forced  once again to reevaluate its storage plans. Because the new design basis  threat substantially increased the potential threat that SRS must defend  against, Building 105-K and Building 235-F would need extensive and  expensive upgrades to comply with the new requirements. SRS estimated  the total cost of this additional security at over $300 million. SRS further  estimated that it could save more than $120 million by not using Building  235-F for storage and therefore decided in April 2005 to consolidate  plutonium storage in Building 105-K.
section_title: DOE Cannot Currently Consolidate Its Plutonium at SRS
paragraphs: DOE cannot consolidate its excess plutonium at SRS for several reasons.  First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium into a form  for permanent disposition, as required by the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. DOE proposed two facilities at  SRS to process its surplus plutonium into a form for permanent  disposition: a mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility to convert plutonium  into fuel rods for use in nuclear power plants and a plutonium  immobilization plant where plutonium would be mixed with ceramics, the  mixture placed in large canisters, and the canisters then filled with high- level radioactive waste. The canisters would then be permanently  disposed of at Yucca Mountain. In 2002, citing budgetary constraints, DOE  cancelled the plutonium immobilization plant, eliminating the pathway to  process its most heavily contaminated plutonium into a form suitable for  permanent disposition. Section 3155 of the act provides that if DOE  decides not to construct either of two proposed plutonium disposition  facilities at SRS, DOE is prohibited from shipping plutonium to SRS until a  plan to process the material for permanent disposition is developed and  submitted to the Congress. To date, DOE has not developed a disposition  plan for the plutonium that would have been processed in the  immobilization plant. In its fiscal year 2006 budget, DOE requested $10  million to initiate conceptual design of a facility that would process this  plutonium. However, it is uncertain when this design work would be  completed and a plan prepared.
Second, even if a plan to process this plutonium for permanent disposition  had been developed and DOE were able to ship the plutonium, SRS would  still be unable to accommodate some of Hanford’s plutonium because  Hanford’s accelerated cleanup plans and SRS’s storage plans are  inconsistent with one another. DOE approved both plans even though  Hanford’s accelerated cleanup plan called for shipping some of its  plutonium to SRS in a form that SRS had not planned on storing.
Hanford stores nearly one-fifth of its plutonium in the form of 12-foot-long  nuclear fuel rods, with the remainder in about 2,300 DOE standard 5-inch- wide, 10-inch-long storage containers. The fuel rods were to be used in  Hanford’s Fast Flux Test Facility reactor. The reactor has been closed, and  the fuel rods were never used. Hanford’s plutonium is currently being  stored at the site’s Plutonium Finishing Plant—the storage containers in  vaults and the nuclear fuel rods in large casks inside a fenced area.  Hanford was preparing to ship plutonium to SRS as part of its efforts to  accelerate the cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear facilities.  Although Hanford’s original cleanup plan called for demolishing the  Plutonium Finishing Plant by 2038, the plan was modified in 2002 to  accelerate the site’s cleanup. Hanford’s accelerated cleanup plan that was  approved by DOE’s Office of Environmental Management now calls for  shipping the storage containers and nuclear fuel rods to SRS by the end of  fiscal year 2006 so that Hanford can demolish the Plutonium Finishing  Plant by the end of fiscal year 2008. To meet the new deadline, Hanford  planned to ship the fuel rods intact to SRS.
Nevertheless, SRS’s July 2004 plutonium storage plan stated that Hanford  would cut the fuel rods and package the plutonium in approximately 1,000  DOE standard storage containers before shipping the material to SRS.  Although Building 105-K has space to store the fuel rods intact, several  steps would be necessary before DOE could ship the fuel rods from  Hanford to SRS. First, there is currently no Department of Transportation- certified shipping container that could be used to package and ship the  fuel rods. In addition, SRS would be required, among other things, to  prepare the appropriate analyses and documentation under the National  Environmental Policy Act and update Building 105-K’s safety  documentation to include storage of the fuel rods. Wherever the fuel rods  are stored, they would have to be disassembled before processing the  plutonium for permanent disposition. Hanford and SRS currently lack the  capability to disassemble the fuel rods, but DOE plans to study  establishing that capability at SRS as part of its conceptual design of a  facility to process the plutonium for disposition.
The challenges DOE faces storing its plutonium stem from the  department’s failure to adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. DOE  has not developed a complexwide, comprehensive strategy for plutonium  consolidation and disposition that accounts for each of its facilities’  requirements and capabilities. Until DOE is able to develop a permanent  disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS, and DOE  will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that  plutonium consolidation could offer. According to DOE officials, the  impact of continued storage at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore will  be relatively minor because both laboratories had already planned to  maintain plutonium storage facilities for other laboratory missions.  However, according to Hanford officials, continued storage at Hanford  could cost approximately $85 million more annually because of increasing  security requirements and will threaten the achievement of the goals in the  site’s accelerated cleanup plan. Specifically, maintaining storage vaults at  Hanford’s Plutonium Finishing Plant will prevent the site from  demolishing the plant as scheduled by September 2008.
section_title: DOE Cannot Currently Fully Monitor the Condition of Stored Plutonium
paragraphs: Under DOE’s plutonium storage standard, storage containers must be  periodically monitored to ensure continued safe storage. Without a  monitoring capability that can detect whether storage containers are at  risk of rupturing, there is an increased risk of an accidental plutonium  release that could harm workers, the public, and the environment.  Monitoring activities must occur in a facility that, among other things, is  equipped to confine accidentally released plutonium through effective  ventilation and appropriate filters. In addition, the facility must have a fire  protection system to protect storage containers and prevent their contents  from being released in a major fire.
According to the Safety Board, Building 105-K is not currently equipped  with adequate ventilation or fire protection. Specifically, SRS removed the  High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters that were used in the  building’s ventilation system when it was a nuclear reactor. Such filters  could prevent plutonium from escaping the building in the event of a  release from the storage containers. In addition, Building 105-K lacks  automatic fire detection or suppression systems. As a result, plutonium  storage containers cannot safely be removed from inside the outer  packaging used to ship the containers to SRS. The outer package—a 35- gallon steel drum—is used to ship a single storage container and is  designed to resist damage during transportation and handling. The outer  package confines the plutonium in the event the storage container inside is  breached. In addition, the outer package provides an additional layer of  protection from fire for the storage container inside.
Because monitoring requires x-raying individual storage containers and, in  some cases, puncturing and cutting storage containers to analyze the  condition of the container and the plutonium within, the storage  containers must be removed from their outer packaging. SRS plans to  establish a capability to restabilize the plutonium by heating it in a  specialized furnace in the event monitoring determines that the stored  plutonium is becoming unstable (i.e., increasing the risk of rupturing a  storage container). The restablized plutonium would then be packaged  into new storage containers. The only facility at SRS currently capable of  restabilizing and repackaging the plutonium has closed in preparation for  decommissioning.
Because Building 105-K does not have the capability to monitor storage  containers, DOE had planned to install monitoring equipment in Building  235-F at SRS. Building 235-F was chosen primarily because it was already  equipped with filtered ventilation systems appropriate to handling  plutonium—multiple and redundant air supply and exhaust fan systems  that use HEPA filters. Exhaust from the ventilation system is further  filtered through a sand filter before entering the outside atmosphere.
Currently, Building 235-F is limited to removing storage containers from  their outer packaging and x-raying the containers to evaluate potential  pressurization. Although DOE has installed equipment in Building 235-F  that can puncture the storage container to relieve pressure, Building 235-F  currently lacks the capability to conduct destructive examinations.  Destructive examinations consist of cutting containers open to take  samples of and analyze the gases inside and examining the containers  themselves for indications of corrosion. In addition, destructive  examination allows plutonium inside the container to be analyzed to  detect any changes in the plutonium’s condition. Building 235-F also  currently lacks the capability to restabilize and repackage plutonium.
In addition, Building 235-F faced several other challenges that would have  affected its ability to monitor plutonium. Because of changes in the design  basis threat, Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to store  Category I quantities of plutonium. SRS officials estimate that 972 storage  containers contain Category I quantities of plutonium metal. Although  these storage containers are at relatively low risk for rupture, SRS would  have been unable to remove those containers from Building 105-K to  monitor their condition. According to SRS officials, security measures  could have been established in Building 235-F if a safety issue had arisen  that required opening a Category I container.
Furthermore, the Safety Board identified a number of serious safety  concerns with Building 235-F. Specifically, the Safety Board reported the  following:    The building lacks fire suppression systems, and many areas of the  building lack fire detection and alarm systems.
The building’s nuclear criticality accident alarm system has been removed.
A nuclear criticality accident occurs when enough fissile material, such as  plutonium, is brought together to cause a sustained nuclear chain reaction.  The immediate result of a nuclear criticality accident is the production of  an uncontrolled and unpredictable radiation source that can be lethal to  people who are nearby.
A number of the building’s safety systems depend upon electrical cables  that are approximately 50 years old and have exceeded their estimated life.  When electrical cables age, they become brittle and may crack, increasing  the potential for failure.
SRS has discovered two areas in the soil near the building that could  present a hazard in the event of an earthquake.
The building’s ventilation system still contains plutonium from its previous  mission of producing plutonium heat sources to power space probes. This  highly radioactive plutonium could be released, for example, during a fire  or earthquake and could pose a hazard to workers in the building.
Once again, DOE’s monitoring challenges demonstrate its failure to  adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. Instead of a comprehensive  strategy that assessed the monitoring capabilities needed to meet its  storage standard, DOE’s plans went from constructing a state-of-the-art  storage and monitoring facility to using a building that the Safety Board  had significant concerns with. Moreover, DOE’s plans have subsequently  changed again. In April 2005, after spending over $15 million to begin  modifications to Building 235-F, DOE announced that it would only use  the building to monitor plutonium temporarily. Now, DOE plans to install  the necessary safety systems and monitoring equipment in Building 105-K,  a 50-year-old building that was not designed for such functions. This  decision underscores that DOE’s lack of careful planning has forced SRS  to focus on what can be done with existing facilities, eliminating options  that could have been both more cost-effective and safer than current  plans.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may  have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Gene Aloise at  (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Sherry McDonald, Assistant Director; and Ryan T. Coles  made key contributions to this testimony.
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