Military Training: Actions Needed to Further Improve the Consistency of Combat Skills Training Provided to Army and Marine Corps Support Forces
Published: 2010-04-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In conventional warfare, support forces such as military police, engineers, and medical personnel normally operate behind the front lines of a battlefield. But in Iraq and Afghanistan--both in U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of responsibility--there is no clear distinction between front lines and rear areas, and support forces are sometimes exposed to hostile fire without help from combat arms units. The House report to the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010 directed GAO to report on combat skills training for support forces. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) Army and Marine Corps support forces are completing required combat skills training; (2) the services and CENTCOM have information to validate completion of required training; and (3) the services have used lessons learned to adjust combat skills training for support forces. To do so, GAO analyzed current training requirements, documentation of training completion, and lessons learned guidance; observed support force training; and interviewed headquarters officials, trainers, and trainees between August 2009 and February 2010.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Army and Marine Corps support forces undergo significant combat skills training, but additional actions could help clarify CENTCOM's training requirements, ensure the services fully incorporate those requirements into their training requirements, and improve the consistency of training that is being conducted. CENTCOM has issued a list of training tasks to be completed, in addition to the services' training requirements, before deploying to its area of operations. However, there is confusion over which forces the CENTCOM requirements apply to, the conditions under which the tasks are to be trained, and the standards for successfully completing the training. As a result, interpretations of the requirements vary and some trainees receive detailed, hands-on training for a particular task while others simply observe a demonstration of the task. In addition, while the Army and Marine Corps are training their forces on most of CENTCOM's required tasks, servicemembers are not being trained on some required tasks prior to deploying. While units collect information on the completion of training tasks, additional actions would help higher level decision-makers assess the readiness of deploying units and servicemembers. Currently, both CENTCOM and the services lack complete information on the extent to which Army and Marine Corps support forces are completing required combat skills training. The Army has recently designated the Digital Training Management System as its system of record for tracking the completion of required training, but guidance concerning system implementation is unclear and the system lacks some needed capabilities. As a result, support forces are not fully utilizing the system, and are inconsistently tracking completion of individual and unit training using paper records, stand-alone spreadsheets, and other automated systems. The Marine Corps also uses inconsistent approaches to document training completion. Furthermore, as GAO reported in May 2008, CENTCOM does not have a clearly defined waiver process to provide visibility over the extent to which personnel are deploying to its area of operations without having completed its required training tasks. As a result, CENTCOM and the services have limited visibility over the extent to which servicemembers have or have not completed all required training. While trainers at Army and Marine Corps training sites have applied lessons learned information and made significant changes to the combat skills training they provide support forces, the changes to training have varied across sites. Army and Marine Corps doctrine requires the collection of after action reports, the primary formal vehicle for collecting lessons learned. Lessons are also shared informally, such as through communication between deployed forces and units training to replace them. While the services have these formal and informal means to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned information, trainers at the various training sites are not consistently sharing information about the changes they have made to their training programs. As a result, servicemembers are trained inconsistently and units that are deploying for similar missions sometimes receive different types and amounts of training.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 2001, the Army and Marine Corps have deployed a large number of  support forces to U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) area of  responsibility to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Support  forces reside in both the active and reserve components and include the  following:    Army support forces consist of: combat support units that provide fire  support and operational assistance to combat elements and include  military police, combat engineers, and military intelligence soldiers,  and combat service support units that provide essential capabilities,  functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain operating forces  including soldiers who provide transportation, medical, and  quartermaster support.
Marine Corps support forces, known as Logistics Combat Elements,  represent one of the four elements of a deploying Marine Corps Air  Ground Task Force and perform tasks such as medical, supply,  engineer, and transportation.
In conventional warfare conditions, support forces would normally  operate in rear areas away from the front lines of a battlefield. However,  the current combat environments in Iraq and Afghanistan have  demonstrated that there are no clear distinctions between the front lines  and rear support areas, and support forces are, therefore, at times exposed  to hostile fire without support from combat arms units.
The House Armed Services Committee report to the Fiscal Year 2010  National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to report on a number  of military readiness issues, including the adequacy of combat skills  training provided to support forces. We have previously reported on  combat skills training for Air Force and Navy forces, and will report  separately on other issues called for in the House report. This report  specifically assesses the extent to which (1) Army and Marine Corps  support forces are completing required combat skills training; (2) the  services and Central Command have information to validate the  completion of required combat skills training; and (3) the Army and  Marine Corps have applied lessons learned from operational experiences  to adjust combat skills training for support forces.
To assess the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps support forces  are completing required combat skills training, between August 2009 and  February 2010, we reviewed U.S. Central Command, Army, and Marine  Corps training requirements and guidance, and we interviewed combatant  command and service officials to discuss these documents. We also  observed support force training, interviewed Army and Marine Corps  trainers, and active and reserve component units participating in  predeployment training, and analyzed information from training sites.  Specifically, we conducted discussions with trainers and members of four  Army active component, five Army Reserve, and one Army National Guard  support units and three active component Marine Corps combat logistics  battalions. These units were either conducting training or stationed at  some of the services’ largest training facilities—Fort Hood, Fort Dix, Camp  Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Twentynine Palms. To assess the extent to  which the services and Central Command have information to validate the  completion of required combat skills training, we reviewed joint and  service guidance to determine the requirements for documenting the  completion or waiving of training requirements. We also interviewed  combatant command and service headquarters and training command  officials as well as members of the previously listed Army and Marine  Corps units and reviewed service documentation concerning the extent to  which servicemembers were completing required training. To assess the  extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have applied lessons learned  information to adjust combat skills training for support forces, we  evaluated service policies on the collection and dissemination of this  information. At the sites we visited, we also interviewed training command  officials, trainers, unit officials in charge of developing training plans, and  liaisons from the service lessons learned centers. Additionally, we  discussed the collection and dissemination of lessons learned information  with officials from the service lessons learned centers and we reviewed a  nongeneralizable sample of formal lessons learned reports they had  published.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 through February  2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our  scope and methodology are in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The services and combatant commands both have responsibilities for  ensuring servicemembers are trained to carry out their assigned missions.  As a result, both the services and combatant commands have developed  specific training requirements.
subsections: section_title: CENTCOM and Service Responsibilities
paragraphs: Combatant commanders and service secretaries both have responsibilities  related to ensuring the preparedness of forces that are assigned to the  combatant commands. Under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, the commander of  a combatant command is directly responsible for the preparedness of the  command to carry out its assigned missions. In addition, according to Title  10 of the U.S. Code, each service secretary is responsible for training their  forces to fulfill the current and future operational requirements of the  combatant commands.  In addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense  has issued guidance for managing and developing training for  servicemembers. Specifically, DOD issued a directive, which stated the  services are responsible for developing service training, doctrine,  procedures, tactics, and techniques, and another that required that training  resemble the conditions of actual operations and be responsive to the  needs of the combatant commanders.
section_title: Unit Commanders’ Responsibilities
paragraphs: According to Joint Publication 1, unit commanders are responsible for the  training and readiness of their units. Army and Marine Corps guidance  also assigns unit commanders responsibility for certifying that their units  have completed all required training and are prepared to deploy.  Specifically, Army Regulation 350-1 states that unit commanders are  responsible for the training proficiency of their unit and, when required,  for certifying that training has been conducted to standard and within  prescribed time periods. In addition, a Department of the Army  Executive Order states that, for the reserve component, unit commanders,  in concert with service component commands, certify completion of  training and the service component command—the Army National Guar or U.S. Army Reserve—validates units for deployment. Administrative Message 740/07 states that coordination of predep training is the responsibility of the unit commander and all questions  concerning the training should be vetted through the commander or  his  operations element. Further, unit commanders validate that their units  are certified for deployment, doing so through a certification message that documents the extent to which deploying Marines have successfully  completed predeployment training.
Headquarters, Department of the Army Executive Order 150-08, Reserve Component  Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre- and Post-Mobilization Training Strategy (March  2008).
Marine Corps Order 3502.6, Marine Corps Force Generation Process (Jan. 26, 2010).
section_title: CENTCOM Training Requirements
paragraphs: Combatant commanders have wide-reaching authority over assigned  forces. In this capacity, CENTCOM has established baseline theater entry  requirements that include training tasks that all individuals must complete  before deploying to the CENTCOM area of operations. Specifically, these  CENTCOM training requirements include minimum training tasks for both  units and individuals. Required individual tasks include, but are not limited  to, basic marksmanship and weapons qualification, high-mobility  multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) and mine resistant ambush  protected (MRAP) vehicle egress assistance training, non-lethal weapons  usage, first aid, counter-improvised explosive device training, and a  number of briefings including rules of engagement.
section_title: Service Training Requirements
paragraphs: The services have established combat training requirements that their  servicemembers must complete at various points throughout their careers.  During initial entry training, recruits are trained on service tasks and skills,  including basic military tactics, weapons training, and marksmanship. In  addition, the services have annual training requirements that are focused  on tasks such as crew-served weapons training, reacting to chemical and  biological attacks, and offensive and defensive tactics. Prior to deploying  overseas, servicemembers must also complete a set of service directed  predeployment training requirements. These predeployment requirements  incorporate the combatant commander’s requirements for the area where  the forces will be deployed. U.S. Army Forces Command and the  Commandant of the Marine Corps have both issued training requirements  for forces deploying to the CENTCOM area of operations or in support of  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These documents also require that  units complete a final collective event prior to deployment to demonstrate  proficiency in collective tasks.
section_title: Collection and Dissemination of Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Lessons learned are defined as results from an evaluation or observation  of an implemented corrective action that produced an improved  performance or increased capability. The primary vehicle for formally  collecting and disseminating lessons learned information is the after  action report. Army and Marine Corps guidance require that units submit  after action reports to the services’ respective lessons learned centers.  Army Regulation 11-33 established its Army Lessons Learned Program to  create an information sharing culture and a system for collecting,  analyzing, disseminating, integrating, and archiving new concepts, tactics,  techniques, and procedures. The regulation further assigned the Center for  Army Lessons Learned (CALL) primary responsibility for the Army  Lessons Learned Program. The Marine Corps established its Marine Corps  Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) to provide a relevant, responsive  source of institutional knowledge that facilitates rapid adaptation of  lessons into the operating forces and supporting establishments.
The Army and Marine Corps have both formal and informal approaches to  collect and disseminate lessons learned information. Their formal  approaches often rely on a wide network of MCCLL and CALL liaison  officers at training centers and in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the centers  also publish relevant information on their Web sites to make it widely  available. The informal networks based on personal relationships between  unit commanders, trainers, or individual soldiers and marines have also  facilitated the sharing of lessons learned information.
section_title: Prior GAO Work
paragraphs: GAO has previously reported on combat skills training provided to  nonstandard forces. In May 2008, we reported that the Air Force and  Navy waived CENTCOM established training requirements without  consistently coordinating with the command, so CENTCOM lacked full  visibility over the extent to which all of its forces were meeting training  requirements. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, in  conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop and  issue a policy to guide the training and use of nonstandard forces, to  include training waiver responsibilities and procedures. DOD agreed with  our recommendation, stating that it had work underway to ensure that the  necessary guidance was in place for effective training of nonstandard  forces. However, as of February 2010, it had not issued such guidance.
section_title: Army and Marine Corps Support Forces Receive Significant Combat Skills Training, but May Not Consistently Complete All Required Tasks
paragraphs: Although Army and Marine Corps support forces undergo significant  training, they may not consistently or successfully complete all required  training tasks prior to deploying. Both CENTCOM and the services have  issued predeployment training requirements. However, some of  CENTCOM’s training requirements lack associated conditions and  standards, and confusion exists over which forces the requirements apply  to. In addition, the Army and Marine Corps have not included certain  CENTCOM required tasks in their predeployment training requirements,  and unit commanders can certify their units for deployment even if all the  required individual and collective training tasks have not been successfully  completed.
subsections: section_title: Army and Marine Corps Support Forces Receive Significant Combat Skills Training
paragraphs: The services provide combat skills training to their servicemembers,  including support forces, at various points throughout their careers.  During initial entry training, recruits are trained on service tasks and skills,  including basic military tactics, weapons training, and marksmanship. In  addition, servicemembers participate in annual training that is focused on  tasks such as crew-served weapons training, reacting to chemical and  biological attacks, and offensive and defensive tactics. Soldiers and  marines also participate in combat skills training prior to deploying for any  overseas operations. As a result, the predeployment combat skills training  that support unit personnel receive should be viewed as a significant piece  of their training to operate in an asymmetric environment, but not as their  only training to operate in that environment.
section_title: Some of CENTCOM’s Training Requirements Do Not Clearly Define Conditions and Standards, and Confusion Exists over to Whom the Requirements Apply
paragraphs: CENTCOM has issued a list of training tasks that all individuals assigned  to its area of responsibility, including support unit personnel, must  complete before deploying in support of ongoing operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan. While the CENTCOM training requirements outline tasks that  must be trained, the command does not always clearly define the  conditions and standards to which all of the tasks should be trained. Task  conditions identify all equipment, tools, materials, references, job aids,  and supporting personnel required to perform the task, while standards  indicate the basis for judging effectiveness of task performance. For some  training tasks, CENTCOM includes specific guidance. For example,  weapons qualification requirements include a detailed discussion of when  the qualification must take place, equipment that must be worn, and range  distances.
For some training tasks, however, CENTCOM does not provide any  conditions or standards. For example, as noted above, CENTCOM requires  that all deploying forces complete HMMWV rollover training, but it does  not specify how the training should be conducted. Consequently, service  training has varied within and among the Army and Marine Corps. At one  Marine Corps site, training officials explained that HMMWV rollover  training could be completed in less than a half hour. On the other hand,  trainers at one Army training site noted that their HMMWV rollover  training consisted of a full day of training that included a classroom  overview and hands-on practice in a simulator with both day and night  scenarios, pyrotechnics to simulate improvised explosive devices, and the  incorporation of casualty evacuation procedures.
For other training tasks, the CENTCOM requirements contain only general  guidance on training conditions. For example, for some tasks such as first  aid and improvised explosive device training, CENTCOM requires that  classroom training be followed up with practical application during field  training that mimics the harsh, chaotic, and stressful conditions  servicemembers encounter in the CENTCOM area of operations. However,  the requirements do not identify the materials or training aides to be used  in conducting the training and they do not indicate the standard for  successfully completing the training. While service officials acknowledged  that, as outlined in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, it is their responsibility to  train servicemembers, they stated that CENTCOM’s list of minimum  theater entry training tasks was unclear, which resulted in varying service  interpretations of the tasks.
Furthermore, CENTCOM training requirements are communicated to the  services in a document that also outlines training requirements for joint  sourced forces. Service officials have expressed confusion over these  training requirements and the extent to which they apply to all forces  given that the tasks are listed in a document that focuses primarily on unit  training requirements for joint sourced forces. Service officials reported  that changes to training requirements have also added to the confusion  over training requirements and priorities. While the latest set of  CENTCOM requirements contained in the joint sourced forces document  was issued on May 7, 2009, ground commanders have issued several  requirements since then. For example, in January 2010, the Commander,  U.S. Forces- Afghanistan, issued an order that contained additional  training requirements for all forces deploying to Afghanistan. However,  CENTCOM officials said that these Afghanistan-specific requirements had  not yet been validated. When CENTCOM validates new requirements it  promulgates them in several different ways, including in updates to the  training requirements contained in the joint sourced forces document, in  individual request for forces, or by CENTCOM messages.
section_title: The Services Are Providing Training on Most of CENTCOM’s Required Tasks, but Have Not Included Certain Tasks
paragraphs: While the Army and Marine Corps have provided most of the CENTCOM  required training, in some cases, they have not provided training on the  specific tasks called for by CENTCOM. For example, neither service has  provided MRAP vehicle rollover training to all of their support forces.  MRAP vehicle rollover training has been identified as a key combat skill  for deploying forces. MRAP vehicles have much larger profiles and  weights than the vehicles they replaced in theater, and as a result, pose a  greater risk of tip or rollover when negotiating slopes, trenches, ditches,  and other obstacles. Further, rollover risks are higher in Afghanistan due  to uneven terrain and sub-par road conditions.
A November 2009 DOD study on MRAP vehicle rollovers noted that since  2007, 178 MRAP vehicle mishaps involved some type of rollover that  resulted in a total of 215 injuries and 11 fatalities. The study  recommended more practice on rollover drills, and CENTCOM has  required this training for all deploying forces. According to Marine Corps  officials, the Marine Corps is prioritizing MRAP vehicle rollover training,  and current Marine Corps guidance requires this training only for marines  expected to utilize MRAP vehicles. However, use of these vehicles in  theater has been increasing, and officials at I Marine Expeditionary Force  explained that they are trying to train deploying forces to meet the MRAP  vehicle rollover training requirement. A rollover trainer was originally  scheduled to arrive at their training area in February 2010, but the delivery  has been delayed and there is currently not a projected delivery date.
Army officials explained that they have attempted to meet the CENTCOM  requirement, but that a lack of MRAP rollover trainers at the Army’s  training bases in the United States has prevented them from fully training  all forces on this task prior to deployment. In the meantime, some support  forces are getting required training after they deploy, but Army officials  were unable to confirm whether all forces were getting the required  training.
Moreover, neither the Army nor the Marine Corps have provided non- lethal weapons training to all deploying support forces. CENTCOM  requires that all individuals deploying to its area of responsibility complete  training in non-lethal weapons usage, planning, and understanding of non- lethal weapons capability sets. DOD reported in December 2009 that  operational experience dictates the need for forces to be trained in non- lethal weapons and that current operations have highlighted the  imperative for the discriminate use of force to minimize civilian casualties  and the integral role that non-lethal weapons capabilities provide in  achieving that objective. In that report, DOD noted that non-lethal  weapons training has been mandated by CENTCOM for all deploying  forces and that non-lethal weapons training must be further integrated into  service training. Further, GAO has previously reported that DOD needed to  provide clearer weapons employment guidance for non-lethal weapons  and incorporate this guidance into training curricula. Due to the  confusion over what forces CENTCOM’s joint sourced training  requirements apply to, Marine Corps officials explained that they do not  believe the non-lethal weapons training requirement applies to them and  do not require this training. The Army requires non-lethal weapons training  only for combat arms units. Army officials explained that they do not have  sufficient resources to train all deploying forces, including support forces,  on non-lethal weapons, but have not sought formal waivers for this task.
section_title: Unit Commanders Can Certify Units for Deployment without Successfully Completing All Tasks in Their Final Collective Training Event
paragraphs: According to Joint Publication 1, unit commanders are responsible to their  respective Service Chiefs for the training and readiness of their unit.  Service guidance emphasizes this responsibility, assigning unit  commanders’ responsibility for the coordination and completion of  predeployment training and validating that servicemembers are certified  for deployment. Before forces deploy, Army and Marine Corps guidance  requires that units complete a final collective training event. These  events can vary based on unit type, assigned mission, and the theater of  operations and provide an opportunity for the unit to demonstrate  proficiency in collective tasks.
While service guidance requires that units undergo a final collective  training event, the guidance does not specifically require that units  successfully complete the training before commanders can certify their  units for deployment. Army and Marine Corps officials explained that if a  support unit does not demonstrate combat skills proficiency during the  final event, when and where remediation is to occur is left to the  discretion of the individual unit commander and can be completed in  theater after deploying. For example, a Marine Corps combat logistics  battalion that deployed in January 2010 was assessed fully trained in its  logistics mission, but not proficient in basic warrior tasks during its final  collective training event at Exercise Mojave Viper. Specifically, the unit  was not proficient in fifteen of sixteen warrior tasks including reacting to  ambush, escalation of force, individual continuing actions, and casualty  evacuation procedures. The Marine Corps logistics training officer who  conducts the final unit after action reviews for combat logistics battalions  explained that poor ratings on basic warrior skills were not uncommon for  support units during their final collective training event. While the unit  conducted remedial training on casualty evacuation procedures prior to  deployment, it did not conduct remedial training in other areas, since the  unit had 15 days to complete both required training that they were unable  to accomplish prior to Exercise Mojave Viper and remedial training, and  the unit deployed on time. Service officials explained that it is the  responsibility of unit commanders to exercise judgment in assessing  whether the unit has the collective skills needed to accomplish its mission.  However, without visibility over the completion of remediation, Army and  Marine Corps support forces may not successfully complete all CENTCOM  or service required training tasks prior to deploying.
section_title: CENTCOM and the Services Lack Complete Information on Servicemembers’ Completion of Required Combat Skills Training
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps take steps to document the completion of  required combat skills training tasks, but face inconsistencies in the way  the services track completion of training. While the Army has a service- wide system of record for tracking the completion of training  requirements, the system is not being fully utilized. Furthermore, the  Marine Corps lacks a service-wide system for tracking the completion of  training requirements. Instead, both services rely on paper rosters and  stand-alone spreadsheets and databases to track training completion. In  addition, even though CENTCOM requires that all forces deploying to its  area of responsibility complete a set of required training tasks, the  command lacks a clearly defined process for waiving individual training  requirements if they cannot be met.
subsections: section_title: Unit Commanders Lack Full Visibility over Completion of Required Training Tasks Due to Inconsistent Service Tracking Systems
paragraphs: According to Joint Publication 1, unit commanders are responsible to their  respective Service Chiefs for the training and readiness of their units.  Service guidance emphasizes this responsibility, assigning unit  commanders’ responsibility for coordinating and completing  predeployment training and validating that servicemembers are ready for  deployment. Higher level decision-makers, including the higher  headquarters elements of the units in training, are then responsible for  validating the unit commanders’ assessments. The Army and Marine Corps  take slightly different approaches to validating units for deployment,  particularly as it applies to the Army’s reserve component. While the Army  and Marine Corps active components rely heavily on unit commanders to  validate units and higher headquarter elements, such as brigade and  division commanders for the Army’s active component and the Marine  Logistics Groups and Marine Expeditionary Forces for the Marine Corps,  to validate the commander’s assessment, the Army’s reserve component  relies heavily on a validation board that convenes at the completion of a  unit’s training at a mobilization training center. However, according to  Army officials, in the end, the final decision is largely based on individual  unit commanders’ assessments of the readiness of their units.
While the Army issued guidance requiring tracking of training completion  through a servicewide system, the system has not been fully utilized. In  December 2009, the Army updated a training regulation and required that  all individual and collective training tasks be documented for soldiers  through the Digital Training Management System (DTMS) in order to  better standardize training. Army units were required to report  completion of certain requirements, such as suicide prevention classes and  the Army physical fitness test tasks, in DTMS prior to the revision of this  regulation. However, the revised regulation designates DTMS as the only  authorized automated system for managing unit training and requires units  to track each individual soldier’s completion of all required training tasks,  to include all predeployment individual and collective training. The  regulation was effective as of January 18, 2010, and states that DTMS will  be able to provide units with the ability to plan, resource, and manage unit  and individual training. However, as of February 2010, the system was not  fully operational, and while active component units were able to enter all  of their data into DTMS, reserve component units were not yet able to do  so because of a lack of interfaces among existing tracking systems and  DTMS. The Army has not yet developed a detailed schedule with  milestones and resource requirements for fully developing the capability  for reserve component units to input data. Neither has it established  milestones for active and reserve component units to enter data into the  system. Furthermore, the guidance does not assign responsibility for  ensuring compliance and does not make it clear whether previously  completed training needs to be entered into the system or only training  that is completed after the January 18, 2010, implementation date.
The Army’s active and reserve components have both begun using DTMS,  but DTMS is not being fully or consistently used by either component. U.S.  Army Forces Command officials reported that the capabilities of DTMS  are fully operational among the active component, but that units have not  consistently used the system. During our discussions with commanders  from four active component battalions in February 2010, we found that the  system, while operational, was not being fully utilized. We noted that the  battalions used DTMS to different degrees. Specifically, two commanders  said that their battalions relied on DTMS to track training schedules and  some tasks, such as weapons qualification and physical fitness, but they  said that their battalions did not track completion of all required tasks  down to the individual soldier level. The other two battalion commanders  noted that they did not use DTMS to track completion of any training  tasks. Overall, none of the four battalions used DTMS the way the Army  intended it to be used, but emphasized interest in incorporating the system  into how they track training. First Army officials reported that DTMS is  not fully operational among the reserve component. Army officials  reported that not all of the individual systems the reserve component used  to track completion of training were interchangeable with DTMS, and as  such, the system was not fully operational. Moreover, in our discussions  with unit commanders from five Army Reserve units and one National  Guard unit in November 2009, we noted that the system was not being  utilized. In fact, none of those commanders were familiar with DTMS  despite the fact that the Army had required the entry of suicide prevention  classes and the Army physical fitness test tasks into DTMS by September  2009.
Instead of using DTMS, Army support units rely on tools such as paper  rosters and stand-alone spreadsheets and databases to track completion of  individual and unit training, and the tools used are not consistent among  units and commands. For the reserve component, First Army has  established an Excel spreadsheet, referred to as the Commander’s  Training Tool, to track completion of individual training tasks. According  to officials, the tool, intended to serve as an “in-lieu-of” system until DTMS  reached full operational capability, is used as a model for tracking systems  at the individual mobilization training centers. Specifically, officials at one  mobilization training center told us that they had developed an  individualized tracking system based on the Commander’s Training Tool,  but had tailored the system to meet the needs of the individual command.  Within the active component, unit commanders we spoke with noted that  they also rely on tools such as paper rosters and stand-alone spreadsheets  and databases to track completion of individual and unit training at the  battalion level and below, providing regular status updates to the brigade  and division commanders. Reliance on various inconsistent tracking  mechanisms instead of the servicewide DTMS limits the visibility unit  commanders have over completion of required training tasks.
The Marine Corps also uses inconsistent approaches to track completion  of required training and relies instead on paper rosters and stand-alone  spreadsheets for tracking. Specifically, 2nd Marine Logistics Group  officials said that individual units are responsible for tracking completion  of individual training and that this tracking is completed through large  Excel spreadsheets, but that the information is regularly reviewed by the  Marine Logistics Group. A commander from a support unit within the 2nd  Marine Logistics Group noted that training was tracked and reviewed  using Excel spreadsheets. Further, the unit’s operations officer noted that  within the battalion, individual training is tracked at the company level,  and once a week, the information is provided to the battalion operations  officer, who then briefs the battalion commander on overall percentages  of marines who have completed the required tasks.
We also spoke with officials from the 1st Marine Logistics Group who  noted that the individual units are responsible for tracking the completion  of both individual and unit training requirements. While the 1st Marine  Logistics Group provides units with a summary level spreadsheet to report  the status of the unit training, the individual units are responsible for  tracking the completion of individual training and the Marine Logistics  Group does not track the completion of individual training. Officials from  the 1st Marine Logistics Group noted that unit operations officers have  visibility over individuals and their respective training, and this  information is rolled up and provided at a high level to the Commanding  Officer.
A commander of a support unit we spoke with noted that his unit used the  Excel spreadsheet provided by the 1st Marine Logistics Group to track  completion of individual training requirements, with individual tracking  being done at the company level. Further, sometimes when marines  transfer among units, documentation of completed training tasks is not  provided to the receiving unit. For example, a support battalion operations  officer we spoke with noted that the battalion received many marines  throughout the deployment process, but some marines arrived without  documentation of the training they had previously completed. In the  absence of a consistent approach to track completion of training tasks, the  Marine Corps relies on inconsistent tracking mechanisms among  individual units and commands. These inconsistent tools limit the visibility  unit commanders have over completion of required training tasks,  particularly when marines are transferred from one unit to another for  deployment purposes.
section_title: CENTCOM Lacks a Process for Waiving Training Requirements, Limiting the Command’s Visibility over Whether Forces Are Completing Required Training
paragraphs: While CENTCOM has issued a consolidated list of minimum theater entry  requirements for all individuals deploying to its area of responsibility, it  has not issued overarching waiver guidance or established a formal  process for waiving each of these requirements (e.g., basic marksmanship  and weapons qualification, law of land warfare, and HMMWV and MRAP  vehicle egress assistance training) in circumstances where the  requirements are not going to be met. However, CENTCOM officials  provided an example of a case where waiver requirements for one specific  task were outlined. In September 2007, the command issued a message  requiring HMMWV egress assistance training for all forces deploying to its  area of responsibility. This requirements message included steps the  services needed to take to waive the requirement in the event that the  training could not be completed by 100 percent of the deploying personnel  before deployment. However, a similar waiver process is not outlined for  other required CENTCOM tasks.
Officials from both the Army and Marine Corps noted that there are  instances where servicemembers are not completing all of the required  training. Specifically, when we spoke to unit commanders and unit  training officers, we were told that some personnel were not meeting these  individual training requirements and that units were not requesting formal  waivers from CENTCOM or communicating this information to  CENTCOM. For example, an operations officer from a Marine Corps’  combat logistics battalion reported that some of the unit’s deploying  marines would not complete their required individual training tasks, such  as the CENTCOM-required MRAP vehicle egress training. Moreover, the  commander of an active component Army support battalion noted that in  validating his unit for deployment, he did not focus on completion of  individual tasks, instead assessing the unit’s ability to complete tasks  collectively. As such, the unit commander’s decision was not based on  whether all individuals completed all of the required individual training  tasks. There is no clearly defined process for waiving these training  requirements, and there is no clear or established method for the services  to report to CENTCOM that some servicemembers are not completing  CENTCOM’s required training. As a result, CENTCOM cannot determine if  additional training is required following arrival in theater.
In May 2008, we reported that the Air Force and Navy implemented  procedures for waiving CENTCOM-required training without fully  coordinating with the CENTCOM headquarters office responsible for  developing the training requirements. Specifically, we reported that Navy  nonstandard forces that completed Navy combat skills training more than  90 days prior to their deployment would normally have to update their  training by repeating the course, but that they could waive this  requirement if they completed relevant combat skills training that  significantly exceeded what they would have received in the Navy course.  We further reported that the Air Force granted waivers for combat skills  training on a case-by-case basis. At the time, CENTCOM officials noted  that the services had not consistently coordinated these waiver policies  with their command. Therefore, CENTCOM did not have full visibility over  the extent to which its assigned forces had met its established training  requirements. At the time, we recommended that the Office of the  Secretary of Defense develop a policy to guide the training and use of  nonstandard forces, and the policy include training waiver responsibilities  and procedures. In February 2010, an official from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense reported that they planned to issue a revised policy  on non-standard forces by the end of the year, and that the revised  guidance would address the issue of granting waivers. Furthermore,  during our review, we learned that CENTCOM’s lack of visibility applies to  a larger population of forces than just the Air Force and Navy nonstandard  forces, instead applying to all forces deploying to the CENTCOM area of  responsibility.
section_title: The Army and Marine Corps Have Made Significant Changes to Combat Skills Training as a Result of Lessons Learned, but Information Concerning These Changes Is Not Being Consistently Shared
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps have made significant changes to their  combat skills training for support forces as a result of lessons learned, but  the services have not uniformly applied lessons learned. Both the Army  and Marine Corps require the collection of lessons learned information,  and each service relies on formal and informal collection methods to  obtain relevant information. While it can take time to incorporate lessons  learned into service doctrine, service training facilities are often able to  utilize lessons learned to adjust their training almost immediately.  However, training facilities do not consistently share information obtained  as a result of lessons learned or share changes made to training as a result  of lessons learned among other facilities, resulting in servicemembers  being trained inconsistently. As such, support forces have been deploying  for similar missions with different training.
subsections: section_title: The Army and Marine Corps Have Incorporated Changes from Lessons Learned into Training and Deployment Preparation
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps collect lessons learned information through  both formal and informal processes, and they have made significant  changes to their training and deployment preparations as a result of this  information. Army and Marine Corps doctrine require the formal  collection of lessons learned and designate after action reports as the  primary vehicle for this formal collecting of lessons learned information.  Trainers and units noted that they prepare after action reports at several  different times including after final collective training exercises and during  and after deployment. Depending on the complexity of the deficiency that  is addressed in an after action report and the resources required to  address the deficiency, it can sometimes take considerable time to see  actions that result from formal after action reports. However, after action  reports have resulted in changes to the way the services train and deploy  their forces, as the following examples illustrate.
In July 2009, the Marine Corps officially established and began training  Female Engagement Teams, small detachments of female marines  whose goal was to engage Afghan women. The concept of a Female  Engagement Team was first introduced in February 2009 as part of a  special operations mission in Afghanistan. An after action report  emphasizing the need for forces to be organized and trained to engage  Afghan women was submitted in response to an incident in May 2009,  in which the enemy escaped dressed as women because male Marines  were not allowed to engage Afghan women. As a result, the Marine  Corps expanded the use of the Female Engagement Team concept,  developing an actual program and implementing a training plan. In  December 2009, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan released a memorandum that  emphasized the need for increased training and use of Female  Engagement Teams. Prior to that time, the use of Female Engagement  Teams was primarily a Marine Corps effort. However, the  memorandum stated that all services should create these teams, and  since the memorandum was issued, officials noted that the Army has  begun to assess how it can best meet the needs in theater for these  teams with its available personnel.  In November 2009, the 1st Marine Logistics Group established and  conducted a new predeployment training course for support forces that  focused on combat logistics patrols. The course was developed in  response to at least two different units’ after action reports, one  submitted by a unit returning from Afghanistan and another submitted  by a unit undergoing final predeployment training, which highlighted  the need for leaders of support units to receive additional training and  experience with combat patrols. The redeploying unit’s after action  report identified shortcomings in how support units conducting convoy  missions outside of forward operating bases were trained, and the unit  undergoing final training’s after action report identified deficiencies in  the amount of time spent on training. The new 5-day course—the  Combat Logistics Patrol Leaders Course—focuses on providing  support units with the skills they need to conduct combat logistics  patrols, which require support forces to leave protected areas where  they can become the target for enemies, as opposed to simply convoy  missions conducted inside protected forward operating bases.
The services also rely on lessons collected through informal means when  adjusting predeployment training. Informal collection methods include  obtaining feedback from units currently deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan  through informal discussions, observations made by trainers or deploying  unit leaders during brief visits to theater, and informal conversations  among personnel within service commands and training organizations.  Army and Marine Corps officials stated that there is regular  communication between personnel who are deployed in theater and the  personnel who are preparing to deploy to replace them. Furthermore, they  said that the deployed personnel often provide vital information regarding  the current conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which the deploying unit  commander and trainers can use to make immediate adjustments to  training. Much like changes made as a result of formal lessons learned, the  informal collections have also resulted in changes to the way the services  train and deploy their forces, as the following examples illustrate.
An Army installation established an Individual Replacement Training  program to provide individual replacement soldiers with the combat  skills needed to join their parent units in theater. Army officials noted  that approximately 2 years ago, certain units were tasked to train these  individual replacements on a 4- to 5-month rotating basis. However, the  units that conducted the training were unable to keep pace with the  flow of individual replacements because of their high pace of  operations. Based on feedback obtained from the units and  observations by unit leadership, Army civilians were assigned  responsibility for the training, which resulted in the Individual  Replacement Training program. As of 2009, the Individual Replacement  Training program trained approximately 3,400 soldiers, and combat  skills have been trained more consistently.
Since improvised explosive devices are commonly used against military  forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, training regarding the defeat of these  devices is a CENTCOM predeployment training requirement and was  cited as a key focus at the training facilities we visited. Officials we  spoke with explained that improvised explosive devices pose a serious  threat to military forces because the types of devices the enemies use  constantly change. While training facilities have incorporated the most  recent improvised explosive device defeat tactics into their training  based on information provided by the Joint Improvised Explosive  Device Defeat Organization, they also obtain and immediately  incorporate the tactics provided informally by individuals in theater.
section_title: The Services Would Benefit from Sharing Changes Made as a Result of Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Trainers at the sites we visited told us that they had made adjustments to  training based on both informal and formal lessons learned information  that they had received. However, they also told us that they did not  consistently share information about the adjustments they had made with  other sites that were training forces on the same tasks, and even in cases  where the information was shared, there were still some differences in the  training that was being provided to deploying support forces. For example:    One site significantly enhanced its HMMWV rollover training based on  informal feedback. Specifically, the training was enhanced to include  hands-on practice in a simulator with both day and night and land and  water scenarios, as well as an emphasis on new vehicle features, such  as the dual release seatbelts, when exiting the vehicle in an emergency.  While trainers from this site provided information about these  enhancements to some of their counterparts at other training facilities,  HMMWV rollover training varies significantly from site to site. At one of  the sites we visited, HMMWV rollover training consisted simply of a  short demonstration.
At one training site we visited, trainers were teaching Army Reserve  support forces who had not been mobilized specific tactics for entering  and clearing buildings, while other trainers at the same site were  teaching soldiers who had been mobilized different tactics for the same  task. Officials we spoke with stated that these differences in tactics are  a result of a lack of sharing of information among trainers. Specifically,  the First Army trainers who were training soldiers after mobilization  were not consistently sharing information with U.S. Army Reserve  trainers who were training soldiers prior to mobilization. Since one of  the primary purposes for conducting repetitive training is to develop an  intuitive response to certain circumstances, repetitive training that  employs different tactics may not be as effective as repetitive training  that uses consistent tactics.
Although officials at the training facilities we visited note that they have  made efforts to share some of the information obtained and subsequent  changes made as a result of lessons learned with their counterparts at  other training facilities, the sharing has been inconsistent. According to a  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, organizations  participating in the joint lessons learned program are to coordinate  activities and collaboratively exchange observations, findings, and  recommendations to the maximum extent possible. While the services  have formal and informal means to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned  information, trainers at the various training sites are not consistently  sharing information about the changes they have made to their training  programs. As a result, servicemembers are trained inconsistently and units  that are deploying for similar missions sometimes receive different types  and amounts of training.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: U.S. forces deployed to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility, including  support forces, are operating in an environment that lacks clear  distinctions between the front lines and rear support areas. As a result,  support units such as military police, engineers, and medical personnel  may be exposed to hostile fire and other battlefield conditions. The Army,  Marine Corps, and CENTCOM continue to emphasize the importance of  training and have identified specific tasks to be accomplished as part of  predeployment training that they believe will better prepare forces to  operate in the current operational environment. While forces clearly  undergo significant training, clarifying CENTCOM’s training requirements,  including more clearly defining the specific tasks to be completed by  different types of forces and the conditions and standards for the content  of training, would enhance the service’s ability to ensure that forces are  consistently trained on required tasks. Furthermore, in order to make  informed decisions on deploying forces and assigning missions once  deployed, the services and CENTCOM need information on the extent of  training completed by forces prior to deployment. Inconsistencies in  existing approaches for documenting the completion of training and the  lack of a formal process for granting waivers to training and  communicating waiver decisions hamper the services and CENTCOM in  their ability to get a clear picture of which units or individuals have been  fully trained for certain missions and whether any capability gaps might  exist upon the forces’ arrival in theater. Last, the services are making  significant adjustments in training regimens based on captured lessons  learned from actual operational experiences. However, additional efforts  to share information on these adjustments among and within training  facilities would provide greater assurance that the training is consistent.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: To improve the consistency of training, we recommend that the Secretary  of Defense:    direct the commander, U.S. Central Command to:    clarify which of the command’s mandatory training requirements  apply to all forces deploying to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility  and which requirements apply only to joint sourced forces, and  clearly communicate this information to the services.    clearly outline the conditions under which CENTCOM’s mandatory  training requirements are to be accomplished and the standards to  which the tasks should be trained.    direct the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine  include all of CENTCOM’s minimum training requirements in their  service training requirements.
To improve commanders’ visibility over the extent to which support forces  are completing required combat skills training, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to fully implement  the service’s system of record for tracking training completion—the  Digital Training Management System by (1) developing a schedule for fully  implementing the system, including the work to be performed and the  resources to be used, and (2) including the actual start and completion  dates of work activities performed so that the impact of deviations on  future work can be proactively addressed. We further recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to  establish and fully implement consistent approaches for documenting the  completion or waiving of combat skills training requirements. We are also  broadening our prior recommendation on waiver oversight and  recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the commander, U.S.  Central Command, to establish a formal process for waiving training  requirements for all deploying forces, not just nonstandard forces, and to  communicate this process to the services.
To maintain training consistency as training evolves in response to  ongoing operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to  develop a method for consistently sharing information concerning changes  that are made to training programs in response to formal or informal  lessons learned.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially  concurred with our recommendations. Specifically, DOD concurred with  our six recommendations related to the definition, completion, and waiver  of training requirements, and sharing information on changes to training  based on lessons learned. DOD stated that it has inserted draft language  into its 2010 update to the “Guidance for the Development of the Force”  and its draft DOD Instruction 1322.mm entitled “Implementing DOD  Training” to address our recommendations.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to fully implement the Digital  Training Management System (DTMS)—the service’s system of record for  tracking training completion—by (1) developing a schedule for fully  implementing the system, including the work to be performed and the  resources to be used, and (2) including the actual start and completion  dates of work activities performed so that the impact of deviations on  future work can be proactively addressed. In its comments, DOD stated  that the Army’s training management system of record has been directed  to be implemented and that in order to fully leverage this capability, it will  take time, training and resources to extend the system to the entire  organization. Instead of stipulating DTMS, DOD requested that GAO  address (in our recommendation) more generally the Army’s training  management system of record. We recognize that it will take time for the  Army to fully implement the system, but also note that it has not set a  specific schedule, with key elements, such as work to be performed,  resources needed, and milestones for start and completion of activities,  which we believe will add discipline to the process, help guide its efforts,  and help the Army to plan for any schedule deviations. We recognize that  the Army continues to refine DTMS and that changes could occur.  However, at this point in time, Army guidance specifically characterizes  DTMS as the Army’s training management system of record; therefore, we  do not agree that our recommendation should be adjusted.
Furthermore, DOD stated that some findings in the draft report are  partially accurate, but that a number of points of information and  clarification related to DTMS provided by the Department of the Army do  not appear in the findings. For example, DOD noted that ongoing efforts  by the Army designed to improve DTMS will expand existing functionality  and interfaces to enhance and broaden operational use of the application  by Army units. It noted the Army has a review process that, among other  things, monitors progress of DTMS implementation and allows for the  establishment and approval of priorities for developing interfaces with  other existing legacy systems and manual processes. In addition, DOD  stated that the report cites that DTMS is not fully operational because all  interfaces are not completed to the satisfaction of a subordinate  organization, which, in DOD’s view, does not drive the level of program  functionality or define the point in time when the system is fully  operational. DOD noted that the inclusion of updated interfaces enables  data input from other sources and that the basic functionality of DTMS is  in place, operational, and available for use by units across the Army. DOD  also noted some Army units are still using spreadsheets and/ or legacy  systems to track individual training rather than DTMS, but that this is a  function of compliance, not operational capability or the availability of  system interfaces. It further stated that the Army is currently working to  institute methods to improve compliance as outlined in AR 350-1, the  Army’s regulation that guides training.
We recognize that the basic functionality of DTMS exists and that the  Army is continuing to take steps to implement DTMS, improve the  interfaces between DTMS and legacy systems and processes, and improve  overall compliance with the requirement for units to report in DTMS.  However, our work suggests that it is not only a lack of compliance  preventing full utilization of the system, but also a lack of awareness  among all of the operational units that DTMS even exists. For example,  within the reserve component, some unit commanders we interviewed  were unfamiliar with DTMS or that they were required, by Army guidance,  to use the system to report training completion. Further, while we  recognize interfaces exist, our work shows they are not fully mature to the  point where they are compatible with existing tracking systems, thereby  limiting the ability of the reserve component to fully use DTMS as  intended.
DOD further noted that the report infers that DTMS could or should be the  source for CENTCOM and the Army to certify and/ or validate unit training  for deployments, but due to it not being fully utilized, the completion of  combat skills training could be in question. DOD explained that DTMS is a  training management system, and it is the responsibility of Commanders  and Army Service Component Commands to certify and validate units. As  stated in our report, we recognize that commanders and the service  component commands are responsible for the certification and validation  of units for deployment. However, in order to be more fully informed  about the training and readiness status of units before making decisions  about deployments, those making these decisions need visibility over the  completion of the combatant command and service pre-deployment  training requirements. Currently, DTMS does not provide unit  commanders or service component commands with this type of visibility,  and therefore, these individuals and commands must rely on the tracking  mechanisms we outlined in this report when certifying and validating  units, and these tracking mechanisms are not always complete or  consistent.  The full text of DOD’s written comments is reprinted in  appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which Army and Marine Corps support forces are  completing required combat skills training, we reviewed combatant  commander and service individual and unit predeployment training  requirements, including CENTCOM’s Theater Entry Requirements, the U.S.  Army Forces Command’s Predeployment Training Guidance for Follow-on  Forces Deploying In Support of Southwest Asia, and Marine Corps Order  3502.6, Marine Corps Force Generation Process. To determine if the  services were fully addressing the CENTCOM minimum requirements, we  compared the CENTCOM minimum training requirements to the Army and  Marine Corps minimum requirements, making linkages where possible and  obtaining service explanations when linkages did not appear to exist. We  also reviewed policy documents on service training, such as the services’  common skills manuals and training programs of instruction. Additionally,  we interviewed and analyzed information from officials responsible for  developing and implementing training requirements at CENTCOM,  Department of the Army Training Directorate, U.S. Army Forces  Command, First Army, U.S. Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve  Command, Marine Corps Training and Education Command, and Marine  Forces Command. Lastly, we observed support force training at four of the  Army and Marine Corps’ largest training facilities— Fort Dix, Camp  Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Base. At  the training sites, we interviewed and collected various training-related  documents from Army and Marine Corps active and reserve component  units participating in predeployment training as well as training command  officials on the implementation of service training guidance. We also  obtained information from Army active component support forces  stationed at Fort Hood.
To assess the extent to which the services and Central Command have  information to validate the completion of required combat skills training,  we reviewed Army and Marine Corps policies on training, including Army  Regulation 350-1, which outlines requirements for servicewide tracking  through the Digital Training Management System, and Marine Corps Order  3502.6, Marine Corps Force Generation Process. We also coordinated with  the U.S. Army Audit Agency regarding their ongoing efforts in reviewing  the Digital Training Management System. We interviewed service  headquarters officials to discuss the processes the services use to track  completion of training requirements. We reviewed Joint Publication 1, and  other joint and service policies that document the role and responsibilities  of unit commanders in tracking and reporting completion of training  requirements. We interviewed Department of the Army Training  Directorate, Marine Corps Training and Education Command, U.S. Army  Forces Command, Marine Forces Command, First Army, and U.S. Army  Reserve Command officials and reviewed documents from these  commands, which are involved in the process of tracking the completion  of combat skills training. Additionally, we interviewed an Army training  command and the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Marine Corps Logistics Groups to  discuss the processes used to track completion of training requirements at  the unit level. We reviewed the means these organizations use to  document the extent to which servicemembers were completing required  training—paper records, automated spreadsheets, and databases. We  further interviewed thirteen unit commanders of units preparing to deploy  or returning from deployment to identify individual processes being used  to track completion of training requirements. Lastly, we interviewed and  obtained information from officials representing CENTCOM, Army and  Marine Corps headquarters, and the Army and Marine Corps force  providers and training commands to discuss the processes the services use  to waive service and combatant command training requirements. We also  reviewed past related GAO reports regarding the tracking and waiving of  training requirements.
To assess the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have applied  lessons learned from operational experiences to adjust combat skills  training for support forces, we reviewed service policies on the collection  and dissemination of lessons learned, specifically Army Regulation 11-33  for the Army Lessons Learned Program and Marine Corps Order 3504.1 for  the Marine Corps Lessons Learned Program and the Marine Corps Center  for Lessons Learned. These policies, which establish the services’ lessons  learned centers, also require the collection of after action reports. Further,  we reviewed joint guidance to determine whether requirements existed for  the training facilities and services to collaborate and share lessons learned  information. We interviewed and obtained information on the collection  and implementation of lessons learned from officials representing the  Center for Army Lessons Learned and the Marine Corps Center for  Lessons Learned. We also interviewed lessons learned liaisons, training  command officials, trainers, and officials responsible for developing unit  training plans at five of the Army and Marine Corps’ largest training sites— Fort Hood, Fort Dix, Camp Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Twentynine  Palms. While interviewing officials from the lessons learned centers and  the training facilities, discussions included: the use of various lessons  learned to alter and improve predeployment training; the types of products  the centers create and distribute; and the extent to which trainers shared  the information among training sites. Based on these discussions with  lessons learned officials, we identified and reviewed a nongeneralizable  sample of the formal lessons learned reports and handbooks that applied  specifically to training for support forces. We also reviewed past related  GAO and DOD reports regarding lessons learned.
To gain insight on support forces’ perspectives on completion of  combatant command and service combat skills training requirements, we  conducted discussions with five Army Reserve and one Army National  Guard support units—military intelligence, movement control, combat  camera, medical, and human resources—located at the combined pre- and  post-mobilization training center Fort Dix, New Jersey, and three active  component Marine Corps combat logistics battalions from the two Marine  Corps Divisions located in the continental United States that were  preparing to deploy to either Iraq or Afghanistan, as well as four of Fort  Hood’s active component Army support battalions that have recently  returned from deployment. To conduct these discussion sessions, we  traveled to one Army installation and three Marine Corps installations in  the continental United States from August 2009 through December 2009  and conducted telephone discussions with representatives from one active  duty Army installation in February 2010. In selecting units to speak with,  we asked the service headquarters and force providers to identify all  support units that would be in pre-mobilization or predeployment training  during the time frame of our visit. The basic criteria used in selecting these  units was that they were an Army or Marine Corps support unit  participating in pre-mobilization or predeployment training and preparing  to deploy to or recently redeployed from either Iraq or Afghanistan. Thus,  our selection was limited since the time frame was so narrow. Once units  were identified, we spoke with the unit command elements and senior  enlisted servicemembers from nine support units that were available at the  individual sites we visited. Overall, we spoke with Army and Marine Corps  support units preparing to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan, and within  these units, some servicemembers who had previously deployed to Iraq or  Afghanistan. We also spoke with four available active component Army  support unit representatives who had recently returned from Iraq. Topics  of discussion during the sessions included development and  implementation of unit training plans, verification of training completion,  and equipment and manning challenges that impact training. We also  administered a short questionnaire to participants in the senior enlisted  discussion sessions to obtain their feedback on the combat skills training  their unit received. Comments provided during the discussion groups, as  well as on the questionnaire, cannot be projected across the entire military  community because the participants were not selected using a  generalizable probability sampling methodology. To validate information  we heard in the discussion groups, we interviewed the unit’s higher  headquarters, where available, as well as officials from the training  commands and service headquarters and force providers.
Table 1 outlines all of the organizations we interviewed during the course  of our review.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 through February  2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov.
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Michael Ferren (Assistant Director), Susan Ditto, Lonnie McAllister,  Terry Richardson, Michael Silver, Christopher Watson, Natasha Wilder,  Erik Wilkins-McKee, and Kristy Williams.