Environmental Contamination: Lessons Learned from the Cleanup of Formerly Used Defense and Military Munitions Sites
Published: 2009-06-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP), the Department of Defense (DOD) has charged the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) with cleaning up 4,700 formerly used defense sites (FUDS) and active sites that were under its jurisdiction when they were initially contaminated. The 661-acre Spring Valley site in Washington, D.C is one such site. Like many other FUDS, the U.S. Army used the Spring Valley site during World War I for research and testing of chemical agents, equipment, and munitions. Most of the site is now privately owned and includes private residences, a hospital, and several commercial properties. The primary threats at the site are buried munitions, elevated arsenic in site soils, and laboratory waste; perchlorate was also found onsite. This testimony discusses GAO's past work relating to remediation efforts at FUDS and military munitions sites to provide context for issues at Spring Valley. Specifically, it addresses: (1) the impact that shortcomings in information and guidance can have on decision-making; (2) the impact that incomplete data can have on cost estimates and schedules; (3) how funding for a particular site may be influenced by overall program goals; and (4) how better coordination can increase public confidence in cleanups and facilitate effective decision-making. GAO has made several prior recommendations that address these issues, with which, in most cases, the agency concurred.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO's past work has found significant shortcomings in the Corps' use of available information and guidance for making decisions relating to cleanup of FUDS. For example, in 2002, GAO found that the Army determined that there was no evidence of large-scale burials of hazards remaining at Spring Valley before it had received all technical input. This experience is not unique. In a 2002 national study, GAO reported that the Corps did not have a sound basis for determining that about 1,468 of 3,840 FUDS properties--38 percent--did not need further study or cleanup action. GAO attributed these shortcomings to limitations in the Corps guidance that did not specify what documents or level of detail the agency should obtain to identify potential hazards at FUDS or how to assess the presence of potential hazards. GAO's past work has also shown that incomplete data on site conditions and emerging contaminants can interfere with the development of accurate cost and schedule estimates. At Spring Valley, the Corps' estimates of cleanup costs increased by about six fold, from about $21 million to about $124 million from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2001. As assumptions about site conditions changed and new hazards were discovered, the estimates continued to rise and currently stand at about $174 million. Again, these problems are not unique. In 2004, GAO evaluated DOD's cleanup of sites with military munitions and found several similar weaknesses in preliminary cost estimates for numerous sites across the country. GAO's past work has shown that funding available for specific sites may be influenced by overall program goals and other priorities. Spring Valley has received priority funding due to its proximity to a major metropolitan area and high visibility; however, GAO's past work shows that this is usually not the case with most FUDS sites. Over the past 10 years DOD has invested nearly $42 billion in its environmental programs, but it typically requests and receives a relatively smaller amount of funding for environmental restoration activities at FUDS sites compared to funding available for active sites. GAO's past work has found that better coordination and communication with regulators and property owners can increase public confidence and facilitate effective decision-making for contaminated sites. With regard to Spring Valley, GAO reported in 2002 that the Corps, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the District of Columbia had made progress because they had adopted a partnership approach to cleanup decisions. However, this kind of cooperation and coordination does not always occur nationwide. For example, in 2003, GAO reported that the Corps only informed states of upcoming work and requested input from them about half of the time. Similarly, GAO found that the Corps did not always communicate with property owners about the decisions it makes regarding contamination at FUDS sites and more often than not did not inform property owners about how to contact the Corps in the event that further hazardous substances were identified at the site.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s work relating to the  Department of Defense’s (DOD) remediation efforts at Formerly Used  Defense sites (FUDS) and sites with military munitions around the  country, which we believe will provide context for the issues faced by the  Spring Valley site, in Washington D.C. Spring Valley is one of 4,700  FUDS—properties that DOD owned or controlled and transferred to  private parties or other government entities prior to October 1986. Under  the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP), DOD is required  to identify, investigate, and clean up environmental contamination and  other hazards at both active sites and FUDS that were under its  jurisdiction when they were initially contaminated. The FUDS inventory  includes sites with a variety of cleanup needs. These properties may  contain hazardous, toxic, and radioactive wastes in the soil and water or in  containers such as underground storage tanks. Other hazards, including  unexploded ordnance and unsafe buildings may also be present. As you  know, such hazards can contribute to deaths and serious illness or pose a  threat to the environment.
The Spring Valley site was originally known as the American University  Experiment Station, and covers approximately 661 acres in the northwest  section of Washington, D.C. Like many other FUDS, the U.S. Army used  the Spring Valley site during World War I for research and testing of  chemical agents, equipment, and munitions. After World War I, the  majority of the site was returned to private ownership and developed for  residential and other uses, becoming the Spring Valley neighborhood. The  site now includes American University, about 1,200 private residences,  Sibley Hospital, numerous embassy properties, and several commercial  properties. During the 1950s and again in the 1980s, American University  and others raised concerns about buried munitions in the Spring Valley  neighborhood. An Army investigation concluded in 1986 that no large  burials of ordnance remained on the site; however, in 1993, the site  received a FUDS designation after a contractor unearthed buried military  ordnance while digging a utility trench. Investigations of the site  expanded, and in 1996, the Army again concluded there were no remaining  large ordnance areas; however, follow-on work found additional large- scale hazards, including more than 600 pieces of ordnance, arsenic  contaminated soil, and lab waste. More recently, perchlorate, an emerging  contaminant––a term for chemicals or materials lacking a federal  regulatory standard, with a potential threat to health or the environment–– was also found on the site. Perchlorate is known to cause health problems  in certain populations.  The estimated total cost for completing the project  was $173.7 million in fiscal year 2007, according to the latest Defense  Environmental Program Annual Report to Congress.
Although GAO last reviewed the progress of the Spring Valley Cleanup in  2002, since that time we have conducted a number of reviews relating to  the management and cleanup challenges that DOD faces when addressing  contamination at FUDS and other sites with military munitions across the  country. We also currently have two ongoing reviews related to FUDS— one addressing the management of FUDS broadly and one specifically  addressing the munitions cleanup program—the latter study was  mandated by the fiscal year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act.  These reports are expected for release in fiscal year 2010.
My testimony is based on this body of work and will address four main  themes and lessons learned that we believe provide context for assessing  the progress made at the Spring Valley site. The four themes that my  statement addresses include: (1) the impacts that shortcomings in the use  of available information and guidance can have on decision-making; (2)  the impacts that incomplete data on site conditions and emerging  contaminants can have on the development of accurate cost estimates and  schedules; (3) how funding available for a particular site may be  influenced by overall program goals and other priorities; and (4) how  better coordination with regulators and property owners can increase  public confidence in cleanups and facilitate effective decision-making.
We conducted our work in accordance with GAO’s Quality Assurance  Framework, which requires that we plan and perform each engagement to  obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to meet our stated objectives  and to discuss any limitations in our work. We believe that the information  and data obtained, and the analyses conducted, provided a reasonable  basis for the findings and conclusions in these reports.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Under the DERP, DOD is authorized to identify, investigate and clean up  environmental contamination and other hazards at FUDS as well as active  installations. To that end, DOD has established restoration goals and  identified over 31,000 sites that are eligible for cleanup, including more  than 21,000 sites on active installations, more than 5,000 sites on  installations identified for Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), and  4,700 FUDS. The DERP was established by section 211 of the Superfund  Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) which amended the  Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act  (CERCLA) of 1980. Under the DERP, DOD’s activities addressing  hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants are required to be  carried out consistent with section 120 of CERCLA. DOD delegated its  authority for administering the cleanup of FUDS to the Army, which in  turn delegated its execution to the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps).  Funding for cleanup activities comes from the Environmental Restoration  and BRAC accounts. The Environmental Restoration account funds  cleanup at active sites and FUDS properties and, of the $1.4 billion  obligated in fiscal year 2007, FUDS property obligations totaled $116.5  million for addressing hazardous substances and $102.9 million for  munitions response.
To be eligible for FUDS cleanup, a property must have been owned by,  leased to, possessed by, or otherwise controlled by DOD during the  activities that led to the presence of hazards. These hazards may include  unsafe buildings, structures, or debris, such as weakened load-bearing  walls; hazardous, toxic, and radioactive substances, which includes  contaminants such as arsenic, certain paints, some solvents, and  petroleum; containerized hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste, such as  transformers and aboveground or underground storage tanks that contain  petroleum, solvents, or other chemicals which have been released into the  environment; and ordnance and explosive materials, such as military  munitions and chemical warfare agents. To determine if a property is  eligible for cleanup under the FUDS program, the Corps conducts a  preliminary assessment of eligibility to determine whether the property  was ever owned or controlled by DOD and if hazards caused by DOD’s use  may be present. If the Corps determines that the property was owned or  controlled by DOD but does not find evidence of any hazards caused by  DOD, it designates the property as “no DOD action indicated” (NDAI). If  however, the Corps determines that a DOD-caused hazard may be present,  the Corps begins to further study and/or clean up the hazard, consistent  with CERCLA. The CERCLA process generally includes the following  phases: preliminary assessment, site inspection, remedial  investigation/feasibility study, remedial design/remedial action, and long- term monitoring.
To address the release of hazardous substances, pollutants, or  contaminants resulting from past practices that pose environmental health  and safety risks on both active sites and FUDS, DOD established the  Installation Restoration Program (IRP) in 1985 under the DERP. In fiscal  year 2007, the Corps had 2,612 FUDS in the IRP. Performance metrics and  comprehensive goals have been developed by DOD to assess progress  toward the agency’s IRP goals. These goals include progress in reaching a  CERCLA cleanup phase at the site level, progress toward achieving a  “remedy in place” or “response complete” status at the installation level,  and progress in achieving overall relative-risk reduction. Specific targets  are included in DOD’s annual report to Congress.
To better focus its munitions cleanup activities on both active sites and  FUDS, DOD established the Military Munitions Response Program  (MMRP) in September 2001, as part of the DERP, specifically to address  potential explosive and environmental hazards associated with munitions.  The objectives of the program include compiling a comprehensive  inventory of military munitions sites, establishing a prioritization protocol  for sequencing work at these sites, and establishing program goals and  performance measures to evaluate progress. In December 2001, shortly  after DOD established the program, the Congress passed the National  Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002, which, among other things,  required DOD to develop an initial inventory of defense sites, other than  military ranges still in operation, that are known or suspected to contain  military munitions by May 31, 2003, and to provide annual updates  thereafter. DOD provides these updates as part of its annual report to  Congress on Defense environmental programs; in its 2007 report DOD had  identified 3,537 sites suspected or known to have munitions  contamination, an increase of 221 sites from fiscal year 2006. Table 1  provides a summary of DOD performance goals for MMRP and IRP.
subsections: section_title: The Spring Valley Site
paragraphs: The principal government entities involved in the Spring Valley cleanup  include the Corps, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the  District of Columbia. The Corps has led the effort of identifying,  investigating, and cleaning up contamination at the site, whereas EPA  primarily consulted with and provided technical assistance to the Corps  and the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia’s Department of  Health has monitored the cleanup’s status and adequacy, conducting such  actions as, according to the Department, assessing the human health risks  associated with any exposure to remaining hazards at Spring Valley.  Additionally, advisory entities were created to further facilitate decision- making on technical topics.
In 2002, we reported that cleanup progress included the identification and  removal of a large number of hazards, including buried ordnance,  chemical warfare agents in glass containers, and arsenic-contaminated  soil. By April 2002 the Corps had identified and removed 5,623 cubic  yards of arsenic-contaminated soil from 3 properties and removed 667  pieces of ordnance-- 25 of which were chemical munitions-- and 101  bottles of chemicals. A March 2009 project overview report by the Corps  indicated that, in 2004, the Corps excavated 474 drums of soil and  recovered more than 800 items, such as construction debris, ordnance  scrap, and laboratory glassware and ceramic pieces. The report also  indicated that, by 2006, the Corps removed 5,500 cubic yards of soil, 117  munitions debris items, 6 intact munitions items, and 31 intact containers in addition, the excavation, backfilling, and restoration of the debris field  that contained these materials was completed.
We reported in 2002 that the primary health risks that influenced cleanup  activities were (1) the possibility of injury or death from exploding or  leaking ordnance and containers of chemical warfare agents; and (2)  potential long-term health problems, such as cancers and other health  conditions, from exposure to arsenic-contaminated soil. A study by the  Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for Toxic Substances  and Disease Registry found no evidence of significant exposure to arsenic  in the individuals tested in 2002. In 2003, the Corps discovered perchlorate  in groundwater at the site, and installed at least 38 monitoring wells for  sampling. Sampling results identified elevated levels of perchlorate in the  project area.  Further investigation is underway with more wells and  sampling planned in 2009. In April 2002, the Army estimated that the  remaining cleanup activities at Spring Valley would take 5 years to  complete. Total costs for the project were estimated at $145.9 million in  fiscal year 2002; by fiscal year 2007, the estimated total costs increased to  $173.7 million.  Figure 1 presents information on the annual cost to  complete and annual amounts spent to date from 2003 to the present at  the Spring Valley site.
section_title: Shortcomings in the Use of Available Information and Guidance Can Lead to Poor Decision-making
paragraphs: When we reviewed the Spring Valley cleanup in 2002, we found that the  Army determined that there was no evidence of large–scale burials of  hazards remaining at Spring Valley before it received all technical input.  For example, while the Army’s Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency  reviewed work done by American University and documentation from  additional sources, it also contracted with EPA’s Environmental  Photographic Interpretation Center to review available aerial photographs  of the site taken during the World War I era. However, the photographs  were not received or reviewed prior to 1993, according to EPA officials.  Despite never having received technical input from EPA on the aerial  photographs, in 1986 the Army concluded that if any materials were buried  in the vicinity of the university, the amounts were probably limited to  small quantities and no further action was needed. However, as we now  know, subsequent investigations by the Army discovered additional  ordnance in large burial pits and widespread arsenic-contaminated soil.
The experience at Spring Valley is by no means a unique occurrence. Our  review of other FUDS nationwide found significant shortcomings in the  Corps’ use of available information and guidance for making decisions  relating to cleanup of contamination at these sites. For example, in 2002,  we reported that the Corps did not have a sound basis for determining that  about 1,468 of 3,840 FUDS properties––38 percent––did not need further  study or cleanup action. Specifically, we found    No evidence that the Corps reviewed or obtained information that would  allow it to identify all the potential hazards at these properties or that it  took sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential hazards.
That for about 74 percent of all NDAI properties, the site assessment files  were incomplete—i.e., the files lacked information such as site maps or  photos that would show facilities, such as ammunition storage facilities,  that could indicate the presence of hazards (e.g. unexploded ordnance).
That for about 60 percent of all NDAI properties the Corps may not have  contacted all the current owners to obtain information about potential  hazards present on the site.
The Corps appeared to have overlooked or dismissed information in its  possession that indicated hazards might be present. For example, at a  nearly 1,900 acre site previously used as an airfield by both the Army and  the Navy, the file included a map showing bomb and fuse storage units on  the site that would suggest the possible presence of ordnance-related  hazards; however, we found no evidence that the Corps searched for such  hazards.
The files contained no evidence that the Corps took sufficient steps to  assess the presence of potential hazards. For example, although Corps  guidance calls for a site visit to look for signs of potential hazards, we  estimated that the Corps did not conduct the required site visit for 686 or  about 18 percent of all NDAI properties.
We found that these problems occurred in part because the Corps’  guidance did not specify (1) what documents or level of detail the agency  should obtain when looking for information on the prior uses of and the  facilities located at FUDS properties to identify potential hazards or (2)  how to assess the presence of potential hazards. For example, some Corps  district staff stated that there was no guidance showing the types of hazard  normally found at certain types of facilities. We concluded that, since  many properties may have not been properly assessed, the Corps did not  know the number of additional properties that may require cleanup, the  hazards that were present at those properties, the risk associated with  these hazards, the length of time needed for cleanup, or the cost to clean  up the properties.
To address these problems, we recommended that the Corps develop  more specific guidelines and procedures for identifying and assessing  potential hazards at FUDS and to use them to review NDAI files and  determine which properties should be reassessed. DOD told us that it has  implemented this recommendation; however, according to one major  association of state regulators, problems persist in how the Corps makes  NDAI determinations in many cases. In 2008, the association published a  fact sheet indicating, among other things, that the evidence collected is not  adequate for making determinations. We will be reviewing some aspects  of this decision making process as part of our ongoing work on FUDS and  MMRP.
section_title: Incomplete Data on Site Conditions and Emerging Contaminants Can Interfere With the Development of Accurate Cost Estimates and Schedules
paragraphs: At Spring Valley, the Corps’ estimate of the cost to complete cleanup of the  site increased by about six fold––from about $21 million to about $124  million––from fiscal year 1997 through 2001. Factors such as the future  discovery of hazards made it inherently challenging for the Corps to  estimate the costs for completing cleanup activities at the site. Future  estimates of the cost to complete cleanup of the site also depend on  assumptions about how many properties require the removal of arsenic- contaminated soil and how many properties need to be surveyed and  excavated to remove possible buried hazards. As these assumptions have  changed, the cost to cleanup Spring Valley has continued to rise where the  most recent estimate for fiscal year 2007 is $173.7 million.
The challenges of estimating the costs of the Spring Valley cleanup are  common to many FUDS, and our past work has shown that incomplete  data on site conditions and emerging contaminants can interfere with the  development of accurate cost and schedule estimates. For example, in  2004, we evaluated DOD’s MMRP program and found several weaknesses  in preliminary cost estimates for numerous sites. We found that a variety  of factors, including the modeling tool used to compile cost estimates,  contributed to these weaknesses. Specifically, when detailed, site-specific  information was not available for all sites, we found that DOD used  estimates, including assumptions about the amount of acreage known or  suspected of containing military munitions when preparing its cost  projections. As a result, the cost estimates varied widely during the life of  some cleanup projects. For example, the Corps confirmed the presence of  unexploded ordnance at Camp Maxey in Texas, and in 2000, estimated  cleanup costs at $45 million. In its fiscal year 2002 annual report, DOD  reported that the estimated total cost had tripled and grown to $130  million, and then in June 2003, the estimate decreased to about $73  million––still 62 percent more than the original cost estimate. The main  factors behind these shifting cost estimates, according to the project  manager, were changes in the acreage requiring underground removal of  ordnance and changes in the amount of ordnance found.
To address the challenges of estimating costs, schedules, and other  aspects of munitions response, we made a number of recommendations  related to various elements of DOD’s comprehensive plan for identifying,  assessing and cleaning up military munitions at potentially contaminated  sites.  In its response to our 2004 report and recommendations, DOD said  that it was working on developing better cost estimates, and that the  Corps would designate 84 percent of its environmental restoration budget  in fiscal year 2007 for investigations and cleanup actions. According to  DOD, this funding would help the Corps gather more site specific  information, which in turn could be used for better determining the  expected cost to complete cleanup at FUDS.
We found that these concerns are also not limited to just FUDS but also  affect operational ranges as well. When we reviewed the development of  DOD’s cost estimates for addressing potential liabilities associated with  unexploded ordnance, discarded military munitions, and munitions  constituents on operational ranges, we found that DOD’s cost estimates  for cleanup were questionable because the estimates were based on  inconsistent data and invalidated assumptions.
The presence of newly identified contaminants at sites needing cleanup  further complicates DOD’s efforts to develop reliable cost estimates. In  2004, we found that DOD does not have a comprehensive policy requiring  sampling or cleanup of the more than 200 chemical contaminants  associated with military munitions on operational ranges. Of these 200  contaminants, 20 are of great concern to DOD due to their widespread use  and potential environmental impact—including perchlorate. According to  our 2005 report, perchlorate has been found in the drinking water,  groundwater, surface water, or soil in 35 states, the District of Columbia  (including the Spring Valley site), and 2 commonwealths of the United  States. In its 2007 Annual Report to Congress, DOD indicated that new  requirements to address emerging contaminants like perchlorate will drive  its investments in cleanup, and require modifications in plans and  programs, and adjustments to total cleanup and cost to complete  estimates. However, there is limited information on the potential costs of  addressing these emerging contaminants and how their cleanup may affect  overall site cleanup schedules. This is partly because none of these  munitions constituents are currently regulated by a federal drinking water  standard under the Safe Drinking Water Act, although perchlorate, for  example, is the subject of a federal interim health advisory and several  state drinking water standards. Our 2004 report recommended that DOD  provide specific funding for comprehensive sampling for perchlorate at  sites where no sampling had been conducted; although DOD disagreed at  the time, it recently took action to sample hundreds of locations  nationwide.
section_title: Funding Available for a Particular Site May Be Influenced by Overall Program Goals and Other Priorities
paragraphs: Spring Valley has received priority funding due to its proximity to the  nation’s capitol and high visibility; however, our past work shows that this  is not the case with most FUDS. Over the past 10 years DOD has invested  nearly $42 billion in its environmental programs, which include  compliance, restoration, natural resources conservation, and pollution  prevention activities. In fiscal year 2007, DOD obligated approximately $4  billion for environmental activities, but only $1.4 billion of this total was  utilized for DERP environmental restoration activities at active  installations and FUDS. Of this amount, $1.2 billion funded cleanup of  hazardous substances, pollutants and contaminants from past DOD  activities through the Installation Restoration Program (IRP) and $215.8  million funded activities to address unexploded ordnance, discarded  military munitions and munitions constituents through the Military  Munitions Response Program (MMRP).  Figure 2 shows expenditures  through fiscal year 2007, DOD’s estimated costs to complete, and the fiscal  year 2007 obligations for the IRP and MMRP at active sites and FUDS.
DOD requests separate funding amounts for active sites and FUDS cleanup  programs based on specific DERP restoration goals and the total number  of sites in each program’s inventory. Goals are set separately for the IRP  and MMRP; target dates for cleanup of high priority sites are different for  these programs. Furthermore, while DOD has established Department- wide goals, each service has its own goals, which may differ, and  determines the allocation of funds between IRP and MMRP. Specifically,  for the IRP, the DOD goal is to have a remedy in place or response  complete for all active sites and FUDS by fiscal year 2020. However, DOD  has requested much greater budgets for active sites than for FUDS. For  example, DOD requested $257.8 million for FUDS or only one-fifth of the  amount requested for active sites for fiscal year 2009. Similarly, obligations  in fiscal year 2007 totaled $969.8 million for active sites, whereas FUDS  obligations only totaled $219.4 million. According to the most recent  annual report to Congress, DOD does not expect to complete the IRP goal  for FUDS until fiscal year 2060. DOD is aiming to complete cleanup of IRP  sites much earlier than MMRP sites, even if higher-risk MMRP sites have  not yet been addressed.
For MMRP, DOD’s first goal was to complete preliminary assessments for  FUDS as well as active sites, by the end of fiscal year 2007. DOD reported  that it has reached this goal for 96 percent of MMRP sites. However, it is  not clear if this percentage includes sites recently added to the site  inventory. DOD also has an MMRP goal of completing all site inspections  by the end of fiscal year 2010, but has not yet set a goal for achieving  remedy in place or response complete. Our ongoing reviews of the FUDS  and MMRP programs will include more in-depth analyses of the  prioritization processes used by DOD for active sites and FUDS.
section_title: Better Coordination and Communication with Regulators and Property Owners Can Increase Public Confidence and Facilitate Effective Decision-making
paragraphs: In our 2002 report on Spring Valley, we reported that the Corps, EPA and  the District of Columbia had made progress on site cleanup by adopting a  partnership approach for making cleanup decisions. Importantly, they  established a systematic means of communicating information to, and  receiving input from, the residents of Spring Valley and other interested  members of the public. While the entities did not agree on all cleanup  decisions, officials of all three entities—the Corps, the District of  Columbia, and EPA—stated that the partnership had been working  effectively. However, we have found that this kind of cooperation and  coordination does not always occur at other sites nationwide. For  example:  In 2003, we conducted a survey to determine how the Corps coordinates  with state regulators during the assessment and cleanup of FUDS. We  found that the Corps did not involve the states consistently, and that EPA  had little involvement in the cleanup of most FUDS. We found that the  Corps informed states of upcoming work at hazardous waste projects 53  percent of the time and requested states’ input and participation 50  percent of the time. We reported that federal and state regulators believed  that better coordination with the Corps regarding cleanup at FUDS would  increase public confidence in the cleanups and improve their  effectiveness.
Some state regulators told us that inadequate Corps coordination has  made it more difficult for them to carry out their regulatory  responsibilities at FUDS properties and that, because of their lack of  involvement, they have frequently questioned Corps cleanup decisions at  FUDS. Conversely, when Corps coordination has occurred, states have  been more likely to agree with Corps decisions. Several states also told us  that they would like to see EPA become more involved in the cleanup  process, for example, by participating in preliminary assessments of  eligibility or providing states with funds to review Corps work. EPA also  believed that a better-coordinated effort among all parties would improve  the effectiveness of cleanup at FUDS and increase public confidence in the  actions taken at these sites, but emphasized it did not expect its  involvement to be consistent across all phases of work; rather, that it  would increase its involvement at a site when conditions warranted—for  example, if there were “imminent and substantial endangerment” or if it  had concerns about the appropriateness of the cleanup.
We also found that EPA and DOD disagreed on EPA’s role in the FUDS  program. Although EPA is the primary regulator for the FUDS that are on  the National Priorities List, the states are typically the primary regulatory  agency involved for all other FUDS. EPA told us that its role at some of  these unlisted FUDS should be greater because it believes it can help  improve the effectiveness of the cleanups and increase public confidence  in the program. DOD and some states disagreed with this position because  they do not believe there is a need for additional EPA oversight of DOD’s  work at unlisted FUDS properties where the state is the lead regulator. We  concluded in 2003 that the lack of a good working relationship between  two federal cleanup agencies may hamper efforts to properly assess  properties for cleanup and may, in some cases, result in some duplication  of effort.
We also concluded in this 2003 report that a factor behind the historical  lack of consistency in the Corps coordination with regulators could be that  DOD and Corps guidance does not offer specific requirements that  describe exactly how the Corps should involve regulators. To address  these shortcomings, we recommended that DOD and the Corps develop  clear and specific guidance that explicitly includes, among other things,  what coordination should take place during preliminary assessments of  eligibility on projects involving ordnance and explosive waste. We also  recommended that DOD and the Corps assess recent efforts to improve  coordination at the national as well as district level and promote wider  distribution of best practices; and work with EPA to clarify their  respective roles in the cleanup of former defense sites that are not on the  National Priorities List. DOD, representing the Corps and DOD, generally  agreed with our recommendations and has since implemented additional  changes to improve its coordination with regulators, including revising its  guidance to include step-by-step procedures for regulatory coordination at  each phase of FUDS cleanup. However, we have not reassessed DOD’s  efforts or reviewed its coordination efforts since our 2003 report.
In addition to better coordination with regulators, our past work has  shown that the Corps frequently did not notify property owners of its  determinations that the properties did not need further action, as called  for in its guidance, or instruct the owners to contact the Corps if evidence  of DOD-caused hazards was found later. In 2002, we estimated that the  Corps failed to notify current owners of its determinations for about 72  percent of the properties that the Corps determined did not need further  study or cleanup action. Even when the Corps notified the owners of its  determinations, we estimated that for 91 percent of these properties it did  not instruct the owners to contact the Corps if evidence of potential  hazards was found later. In some cases, several years elapsed before the  Corps notified owners of its determinations. We concluded that this lack  of communication with property owners hindered the Corps’ ability to  reconsider, when appropriate, its determinations that no further study or  cleanup action was necessary.
As a result of our findings, we recommended that the Corps consistently  implement procedures to ensure that owners are notified of NDAI  determinations and its policy of reconsidering its determinations if  evidence of DOD-caused hazards is found later. DOD has implemented this  recommendation although we have not reviewed its implementation.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, as we move forward on the cleanup of the  Spring Valley site, we believe that the lessons learned from DOD’s national  environmental cleanup programs provides valuable insights that could  guide decision-making and also inform the oversight process. The  experience at the national level tells us that while not all the information  that DOD needs is always available, it is imperative that the information  that is available should be duly considered when developing cleanup plans  and estimates. Moreover, involving regulators and property owners can  also better ensure that DOD has the best information on which to make its  decisions. Finally, it is important to recognize that emerging and  unexpected situations can cause significant changes in both cost and time  schedules and this could have funding implications as well for specific  cleanup sites.
This concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to respond to any  questions from you or other Members of the Subcommittee.
section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. For further  information about this testimony, please contact Anu Mittal at (202) 512- 3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Key contributors to this testimony were Diane  Raynes, Elizabeth Beardsley, Alison O’Neill, Justin Mausel, and Amanda  Leisoo.
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