Army Corps of Engineers: Organizational Realignment Could Enhance Effectiveness, but Several Challenges Would Have to Be Overcome
Published: 2010-09-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The U.S. Army Corp of Engineers' (Corps) civil works mission has grown over the years, while its three-tiered headquarters, division, and district structure has remained the same since it was created in 1893. GAO was asked to examine for the Civil Works Program (1) over time, how the Corps has realigned its organization to take into account its changing mission, budget, staffing, and workload; (2) the challenges that the Corps has faced in realigning its organization; and (3) areas where officials and stakeholders believe changes to organizational alignment, if any, could enhance the Corps' civil works mission. Organizational alignment refers to, among other things, changes in structure, roles and responsibilities, and technical and policy guidance. GAO completed a historical and legislative review of the Corps' mission and past realignment efforts, reviewed budget, staffing, and workload data, and interviewed current and former officials and stakeholders.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since 1893, the Corps has had mixed results in modifying its organizational alignment in response to its changing mission, budget, staffing, and workload, but the fundamental structure has remained the same. For example, the Corps has added capacity and staff in response to its expanding mission, which now includes nine functional areas. Additionally, from 1994 to 2003, the Corps experienced static funding levels and responded by launching an effort that realigned the agency roles, functions, and processes to improve the efficiency of the Civil Works Program. In contrast to these efforts, other past proposals for realignment have not been implemented. For example, in 1992, the Corps proposed reducing the number of district offices in response to a diminished workload and budget. However, Congress did not support the closing of any districts, and therefore, this, as well as other similar proposals, have not been implemented. The Corps has faced and will likely continue to face three challenges to any realignment effort: (1) inability to gain congressional support, (2) limitations of its funding structure, and (3) the autonomous culture of its districts. Most current and former officials told GAO that past attempts to realign district offices have failed because of a lack of congressional support. They said that the perceived risk of service reductions and job losses has and will continue to generate congressional resistance to such realignment efforts. In addition, they said the Corps' annual incremental project-based appropriations and cost-sharing requirements create an impediment to realignment. For example, funding projects in increments hinders project efficiency by increasing costs and timelines. Finally, they said the autonomous culture of the districts has created a culture where they are reluctant to share resources and workload. This has impeded the Corps' efforts to realign its work and resources more efficiently. Although many officials and stakeholders that GAO spoke with generally agreed that the Corps' structure is appropriate because it allows each level to focus on client and stakeholder needs at that level, some said that the current workload did not justify 38 districts. Officials and stakeholders also identified three areas where changes could result in enhanced effectiveness. First, they identified the need to redefine and clarify roles and responsibilities within the three levels so that Corps staff and managers are clear about the extent of their responsibilities. Second, there are opportunities to make better use of the Corps' Centers of Expertise, which were created to consolidate key skills and knowledge and improve the effectiveness of the overall Civil Works Program. Areas in which the centers could be improved include better information on the types of services available and qualifications of the experts in the centers. Finally, the majority of division and district commanders we interviewed said that the Corps' technical guidance is outdated and needs to be revised. Some of this technical guidance is between 10 and 15 years out of date and may result in divisions and districts executing projects differently. To improve the effectiveness of the Corps, GAO recommends, among other things, that the Department of Defense direct the Corps to review and revise as necessary the roles and responsibilities of component levels of the organization, and determine the extent to which the agency's technical guidance needs to be updated. The Department of Defense generally agreed with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) is the federal agency  responsible for, among other things, domestic civil works projects. In  recent years the Corps has come under criticism from Members of  Congress, stakeholders, and the public about the effectiveness of its Civil  Works Program, including the length of time it takes to complete projects  and the Corps’ increasing backlog of congressionally authorized projects.
The Corps has a history dating back to the founding of the country. When  the Continental Congress organized the Continental Army in 1775, it  provided for a Chief Engineer to design and construct military batteries  and fortifications. In 1802, the U.S. Congress authorized the establishment  of the Corps and founded the U.S. Military Academy at West Point as an  engineering school—the first in the nation—under the supervision of the  Corps. The Corps started out as a small group, and in 1812 consisted of 17  officers and 19 enlisted men. The Corps’ civil works mission was  established in 1824, when Congress passed the General Survey Act,  authorizing the President to use the Corps to survey road and canal routes  “of national importance, in a commercial or military point of view.” Soon  after, Congress appropriated $75,000 to the Corps for improving the  navigation of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. As the nation grew, the  Corps was given additional civil works responsibilities.
In general, the Corps receives “no-year” appropriations through the Energy  and Water Development Appropriations Act—that is, there are no time  limits on when the funds may be obligated or expended, and the funds  remain available for their original purposes until expended. Projects are  typically funded incrementally and often over many years. Since fiscal year  2006, the Corps has received appropriations of over $5 billion per year for  its Civil Works Program. Currently, the Corps, through the Civil Works  Program, employs approximately 25,000 civilian personnel and 650  military personnel and covers hundreds of civil works projects  nationwide. The program comprises nine major functional areas, or  business lines, which include not only navigation and flood risk  management, but also a regulatory program, water supply, hydropower,  recreation, environment, emergency management, and support for others.  Since the late nineteenth century, the Corps has been structured into three  tiers—headquarters, divisions, and districts.
Given your interest in the Corps’ Civil Works Program and the long- standing history of the Corps’ organizational structure, you requested that  we examine the Corps’ organizational alignment. For purposes of this  report, organizational alignment refers to integration of various  organizational components (headquarters, divisions, and districts), the  roles and responsibilities of these components, or the funding and staff  resources that are available to support the Corps’ civil works mission.  Specifically, our objectives were to examine (1) how, over time, the Corps  has modified its organizational alignment to take into account its changing  mission, budget, staffing, and workload; (2) the challenges the Corps has  faced in realigning its organization and the extent to which these or other  challenges are still relevant; and (3) what changes to the Corps’  organizational alignment, if any, do officials and stakeholders believe  could enhance the effectiveness of the civil works mission.
To examine how the Corps has modified its organizational alignment to  take into account its changing mission, budget, staffing, and workload, we  analyzed data on appropriations and obligations, full-time equivalent  (FTE) data, and project number and expenditures for the Civil Works  Program. We also did a historical and legislative analysis of how the Corps’  mission and organizational alignment has evolved over time using Corps  historical documents and congressional committee and conference  reports, and other congressional documents. We compiled appropriations  and obligations data from the Budget of the United States Government for  each of the Corps’ civil works funding accounts for fiscal years 1980, 1990,  and 2000 through 2009. We received and compiled FTE data from the  Corps at the district level for fiscal years 2000 through 2009; division level  for fiscal years 2000 through 2009; and Corps-wide for fiscal years 1980,  1990, and 2000 through 2009. According to Corps headquarters officials,  reliable district-level FTE data were available for fiscal years 2000 through  2009, reliable division-level data were available back to 1990, and reliable  Corps-wide data were available back to fiscal year 1980. We obtained the  number of construction and operations and maintenance (O&M) projects  for each district from cost and financial statements found in the Annual  Report for Civil Works Activities for 1980, 1990, and 2000 through 2008.  The construction account includes construction and major rehabilitation  projects related to navigation, flood control, water supply, hydroelectric  power, and environmental restoration. The O&M account focuses on  preserving, operating, and maintaining river and harbor projects that have  already been constructed. We restricted this analysis to construction and  O&M projects because not all districts included information in the annual  reports on the number of project investigations they conducted during the  fiscal year. We also calculated expenditures on construction and O&M  projects for each district in fiscal years 1980, 1990, and 2000 through 2008  based on data from the Corps.
To examine the challenges the Corps has faced and may continue to face  in realigning its organization, the opportunities for realignment that may  exist, and past efforts to realign the Corps, we conducted semistructured  interviews with the current and five former Chiefs of Engineers; the  current and four former Assistant Secretaries of the Army for Civil Works;  one former Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works; seven  current and six former senior Corps officials; officials from the eight  domestic civil works divisions; officials from a nonprobability sample of  10 of the 38 domestic civil works districts; and seven stakeholders,  including three academics and four interest groups. We selected districts  based on geographical representation and to ensure the inclusion of small,  medium, and large districts. We conducted 50 interviews and performed a  content analysis of these interviews to identify common themes. For the  purposes of reporting our results, we used the following categories to  quantify responses of officials and stakeholders: “some” refers to  responses from two to five individuals, “several” refers to responses from  six to eight individuals, “many” refers to responses from nine or more  individuals, and “majority” refers to responses from over half of an  interview group. In addition, to determine the challenges the Corps has  faced in past realignment efforts, we also conducted a review of historical  Corps documents, congressional hearings, and other reports on Corps  realignment efforts. Appendix I contains a more detailed discussion of our  scope and methodology, and appendix II contains a list of former Corps  officials we interviewed.
We conducted this performance audit between August 2009 and August  2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objective.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Corps is the world’s largest public engineering, design, and  construction management agency. Located within the Department of  Defense (DOD), the Corps has both military and civilian responsibilities.  The Military Program provides engineering, construction, and  environmental management services to DOD, other U.S. government  agencies, and foreign governments. Under its Civil Works Program, at the  direction of Congress, the Corps plans, constructs, operates, and  maintains a wide range of water resources projects. The Corps’ Civil  Works Program is organized into three tiers: a national headquarters in  Washington, D.C., eight regional divisions, and 38 local district offices (see  fig. 1). In fiscal year 2010, the Civil Works Program employed  approximately 25,000 civilian personnel in numerous occupational  classifications, including civil engineers, biologists, economists, architects,  lock operators, mechanics, and foresters.
Corps headquarters primarily develops policies and plans the future  direction of the organization. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil  Works, appointed by the President, establishes the policy direction for the  Civil Works Program. The Chief of Engineers, a military officer, is  responsible for execution of the civil works and military missions. The  Chief of Engineers delegates day-to-day leadership and management of the  Civil Works Program to the Deputy Commanding General for Civil and  Emergency Operations, who is a general officer, and the Director of Civil  Works, who is a civilian employee.
The primary role of the Corps’ eight civil works divisions, which were  established generally according to watershed boundaries, is to coordinate  their districts’ civil works projects. Each division office is headed by a  division commander, who is a military officer. The role of the 38 civil  works districts is to plan and execute projects. Each district office is  headed by a district commander, who is also a military officer. Each  district office performs the following seven functions that are relevant to  executing its projects: (1) planning, (2) engineering, (3) construction, (4)  operations, (5) program and project management, (6) resource  management, and (7) regulatory functions. Furthermore, district offices  are responsible for coordinating with project stakeholders such as state  and local partners.
The Civil Works Program operates 50 Centers of Expertise and seven  research laboratories, which assist Corps division and district offices in  the planning, design, and technical review of civil works projects. The  Centers of Expertise are designated individuals or organizations—located  either in district offices, division offices, or research laboratories—with  capability or expertise in a specialized area. The Corps designates  employees at various levels within the organization to oversee, manage,  and coordinate the centers. The Corps established the centers to  consolidate expertise, improve consistency, reduce redundancy, and  enhance institutional knowledge, among other things. The Corps’ seven  research laboratories support DOD and other agencies in military and  civilian projects. For example, the Coastal and Hydraulics Laboratory  performs ocean, estuarine, riverine, and watershed regional scale systems  analyses research support work for the Corps and the DOD Task Force in  support of the Ocean Commission.
The Centers of Expertise program is comprised of 10 mandatory centers  and 40 nonmandatory centers. The Corps requires that district and division  offices consult the mandatory Centers of Expertise that are relevant to  their projects during project planning, formulation, or execution. For  example, if a district is implementing a hydropower project, it must  consult the Hydropower Analysis Center, a mandatory Center of  Expertise, on project analysis or economic benefit evaluations. The set of  40 nonmandatory centers are known collectively as a Directory of  Expertise, and their use is discretionary. Divisions and districts may seek  out the expertise of the centers in the directory as needed. The Centers of  Expertise, both mandatory and nonmandatory, are typically funded out of  project budgets, and according to the Corps, collectively these centers  have unique and unparalleled expertise that is critical to the functions of  district and division offices.
The conference reports accompanying the annual Energy and Water  Development Appropriations Acts generally lists individual projects and  specific allocations of funding for each project. Through this report, the  appropriations committees essentially outline their priorities for the  Corps’ water resource projects. Congress directs funds for many  individual projects in increments over the course of several years. For  example, a construction project to reduce flood damage in the Greenbrier  River Basin of West Virginia has an estimated total cost of $158 million.  The conference reports directed $1.5 million to this project in fiscal year  2009 and $1.4 million in fiscal year 2010. Additional funding for this project  will be contingent upon future congressional appropriations.
In fiscal year 2010, funding for civil works projects included annual  appropriations of over $5.4 billion through the Energy and Water  Development Appropriations Act. The Energy and Water Development  Appropriations Act provides funds for nine appropriation accounts, which  support eight of the Civil Works Program’s nine major business lines.  In  addition to the funding received through annual appropriations acts, the  Corps received supplemental appropriations in 6 of the past 8 fiscal years.  Also, as outlined in the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of  1986, the Corps typically receives funds, particularly for construction  projects, from each project’s local sponsor, which may be a state, tribal,  county, or local agency or government. The degree of cost sharing  required varies by, among other things, project purpose.
section_title: The Corps Has Had Mixed Results in Modifying Its Organizational Alignment in Response to Changes in Its Mission, Budget, Staffing, and Workload
paragraphs: The Corps has faced significant changes in its mission, budget, staffing,  and workload over the last several decades. As a result, the Corps has had  mixed results in modifying certain aspects of its organizational alignment,  such as the roles, responsibilities, and resources of its components in  response to these changes. While the agency’s fundamental structure has  remained the same since 1893, it has made efforts to realign its  organization within its three-tiered structure—some of which have been  implemented, but others were not.
subsections: section_title: Changes in the Corps’ Mission, Appropriations, Staffing, and Workload
paragraphs: The Corps’ civil works mission started with navigation responsibilities in  1824 when Congress passed the General Survey Act, which authorized the  President to use the Corps to survey road and canal routes of commercial  or military importance. Since that time, the Corps’ civil works mission has  expanded to include the following additional responsibilities: flood risk  management, regulatory program, water supply, hydropower, recreation,  environment, emergency management, and support for others (see fig. 2).  Appendix III contains a more detailed timeline of key events and  legislation related to the Corps’ civil works mission.
Over time, the Corps has also seen fluctuations in its appropriations and  obligations, staffing levels, and workload. For example, although the  Corps had relatively stable appropriations and obligations for fiscal years  2000 through 2004, subsequent years have shown more variability in  funding (see fig. 3 and fig. 4). In recent years, some of this variability is a  result of supplemental funding that has been provided to the Corps for  expenses related to the consequences of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in  2005. According to a senior Corps budget official, funding has also been  directed to expenses related to the consequences of hurricanes Gustav and  Ike (both 2008 hurricanes), as well as the 2008 Midwest floods. In fiscal  year 2009, the agency received supplemental funding of about $5.8 billion  for hurricane protection in Louisiana; and the Corps received $4.6 billion  in fiscal year 2009 through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
At the same time, Corps-wide allocations for staff, measured in FTEs, has  declined from over 28,000 in 1980 to fewer than 22,000 in 2009 (see fig. 5).  However, the extent of the decline in FTEs has also varied by divisions  and districts, and some offices have seen a slight increase in FTEs. For  example, from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2009, FTEs in the North  Atlantic Division reduced by over 24 percent from 2,417 FTEs to 1,822  FTEs, while FTEs in the Northwestern Division reduced by about 7  percent from 3,840 FTEs to 3,557 during the same time period (see table  1). Similarly, while FTEs in the Seattle District increased by about 5  percent, from 539 FTEs in fiscal year 2000 to 567 FTEs in fiscal year 2009,  FTEs in the Honolulu District reduced by about 57 percent, from 130 in  fiscal year 2000 to 56 in fiscal year 2009.
This variability has also been seen in the divisions’ and districts’ workload.  For instance, between fiscal years 2000 and 2009, the Pacific Ocean  Division’s construction and O&M project expenditures have ranged from a  low of $18,756,845 to a high of $73,960,902, while the Mississippi Valley  Division ranged from a low of $882,822,221 to a high of $957,991,516 (see  table 2). Similarly, in some districts like Seattle, construction and O&M  project expenditures have ranged from a low of $62,716,478 to a high of  $78,650,927, while Honolulu’s has ranged from a low of $2,583,263 to a  high of $13,884,393. Appendix IV contains detailed information on the  Corps’ budget, staffing, and workload for each of the 38 districts.
section_title: Past Efforts to Realign the Corps’ Organizational Structure
paragraphs: The Corps’ three-tiered structure—headquarters, divisions, and districts— has remained the same since 1893. However, in some instances, the  number of divisions and districts and the roles and responsibilities have  changed in response to changes in the agency’s mission, workload,  funding mechanisms, staffing levels, and budget. Some past efforts to  realign the agency include the following:    Expanding mission. The Corps has realigned as a result of its expanding  mission. For example, in 1824 the Corps’ primary mission was navigation,  but as the Corps’ mission expanded and as a result of the increased  responsibility given to the Corps, it realigned into eight divisions largely  based on watershed boundaries. Also, because of its expanding mission,  the Corps realigned its district offices in the 1970s by, for example, hiring  environmental specialists. This came, in part, in response to the National  Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which requires federal agencies to  consider the environmental impacts of proposed major federal actions that  significantly affect the environment.
Specific workload needs. In the past, the Corps has established temporary  district offices to handle the work of a single large project. For example, in  1942, the Corps formed its Manhattan Engineer District to oversee and  provide technical expertise for the planning and construction of facilities  related to atomic research. The district remained open until the end of  World War II. Similarly, in 1972, the Corps established the Susquehanna  Engineer District to complete work related to the extensive damage  caused by Hurricane Agnes in New York and Pennsylvania. The  Susquehanna Engineer District was only open for 4 months.
Changes in funding mechanisms. In the 1980s, the Corps implemented a  realignment in response to its changing funding mechanisms. Specifically,  the 1986 WRDA generally required the Corps to obtain cost-share  agreements with local sponsors to share the federal burden of Corps  projects. In response, the Corps expanded its district roles and  responsibilities and implemented a project management process in 1989 to  improve relationships with nonfederal partners and improve project costs  and timelines. This new process assigned a project manager at the district  level to each Corps project to work with project sponsors on a day-to-day  basis and manage the progress of the project.
Changes in staffing levels. The Corps has also implemented some  realignments in response to changes in staffing—which have been reduced  by over 22 percent over the past two decades. For example, the Federal  Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994 required the President to reduce the  number of FTEs in federal agencies, with the Corps’ Civil Works Program  assigned to reduce by 3,401. In response, in 1995 the Corps realigned  division roles and responsibilities and the structure of the agency.  Specifically, it regionalized human resource functions, transferred finance  and accounting functions to a single location, and eliminated technical and  policy review functions at the division level. In addition, in response to the  reduced FTEs, in 1997 the Corps reduced the number of division offices  from 11 to 8.
Static budget. In 2003, the Corps implemented a realignment, in part, in  response to its relatively static budget. Specifically, from 1994 to 2003, the  Corps experienced a period of static administrative funding levels. In  response to this situation, the Corps launched an organizational initiative  in 2003—called USACE 2012—to realign the roles, functions, and  processes of the three tiers with the goal of improving the efficiency of the  Civil Works Program. For example, USACE 2012 created regional business  centers at the division level to coordinate the activities of the districts  within a region to ensure they shared resources and technical expertise,  and improved project management and delivery. As part of their  responsibilities, the regional business centers assign work to each of the  districts according to each district’s capabilities and available staff.  USACE 2012 also created regional integration teams at the headquarters  level to resolve regional issues. Regional integration teams provide a single  point of contact for regional business centers to resolve concerns and  issues that must be dealt with at the headquarters level.
section_title: Some Realignment Attempts Have Not Been Implemented
paragraphs: In the past, other attempts for organizational realignment of the Corps  have been considered but not implemented for a variety of reasons. For  example, in 1949, 1971, 1978, and the early 2000s, various members of the  executive branch proposed to transfer the Corps’ civil works functions to  other federal agencies, but these proposals did not result in any changes.  In 1949, the Hoover Commission recommended the transfer of all water  resource functions of the federal government, including those of the  Corps, to the Department of the Interior. Similarly, in 1971, President  Nixon proposed a new Department of Natural Resources to bring together  natural resources responsibilities scattered throughout the federal  government, and President Carter made a similar proposal in 1978. More  recently, former Corps officials we spoke with said that during his tenure,  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had considered whether the Civil Works  Program should be taken out of DOD and given to another agency.
The Corps has also undertaken some past attempts to make its  organizational structure more efficient by reducing the number of district  offices. However, these attempts faced stiff resistance and were not  implemented. For example, in 1989, the Senate Committee on  Appropriations recognized the need for the Corps to examine every  available opportunity to increase its efficiency and effectiveness and  directed the Chief of Engineers to initiate a conceptual study of potential  field organization structures. As a result of this study, the Corps proposed  a reduction in the number of district offices in the contiguous United  States from 35 to 22 and a reduction in the number of division offices from  10 to 6, in response to the diminished workload and budget of the agency.  In order to accomplish this realignment, the Corps chose to submit the  plan as part of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.  However, in an amendment to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment  Act of 1990, Congress specifically excluded the Corps’ Civil Works  Program from downsizing. Shortly after, in the fiscal year 1993 annual  appropriation, Congress included funds to further a more efficient  headquarters and division office structure but prohibited the Corps from  closing any district offices as part of that reorganization plan. As a result  of this study, the Corps proposed consolidating and downsizing division  offices, reducing the number from 11 to 6, and removing technical and  policy review functions from the division level. The proposal also added  another district, for a total of 36, but consolidated planning and  engineering functions in 15 districts. Congress did not approve this  proposal, and it was not implemented.
section_title: The Corps Has Faced and Will Likely Continue to Face Challenges If It Undertakes Organizational Realignment in the Future
paragraphs: Inability to obtain congressional support has been and will continue to be  the primary challenge to any organizational realignment, according to the  officials and stakeholders we interviewed, as well as our analysis of  records of past realignment attempts. Current and former Corps officials  and other stakeholders also identified two additional challenges that could  impede any realignment attempts. These include the Corps’ funding  structure and the autonomous culture of its districts.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Support Is the Primary Challenge to Realignment
paragraphs: Lack of support for the Corps realignment efforts by Members of  Congress, as well as local officials and their constituents in the potentially  affected divisions or districts, has been one of the challenges most often  noted by current and former Corps officials and other stakeholders that  we interviewed. According to former officials, the Corps districts have  historically enjoyed a close relationship with their elected representatives  in Congress. As a result, any closure of a district office as part of a  realignment proposal is likely to meet strong opposition from elected  officials because of congressional concerns, including (1) the perception  that the district’s needs will not be adequately served if the office is closed  and (2) the potential loss of jobs in the district. For example, according to  a former Chief of Engineers, in response to a past realignment effort, he  received calls from congressional delegations upset because he was  proposing to take jobs away from their district. According to another  senior Corps official, in 1997, the Corps was able to reduce the number of  division offices from 11 to the 8 that it currently has, rather than reduce  the number of district offices, because the divisions have a smaller number  of employees than district offices. Therefore, reducing the number of  division offices would result in fewer job losses in a congressional district,  thus reducing the congressional concern.
Similarly, historical records indicate that past realignment efforts to  reduce the number of Corps districts and divisions were unsuccessful or  were delayed because of significant opposition from Members of  Congress. For example, as mentioned earlier, in 1991 the Corps attempted  to close 13 districts and four divisions using the BRAC process, which was  intended to provide a fair process for the timely closure and realignment  of military installations inside the United States. However, in response to  concerns among Members of Congress, the Secretary of Defense decided  against including the Corps’ reorganization plan in the 1991 list of BRAC  base closures. Four of the five former Chiefs of Engineers we interviewed  provided examples of opposition from Members of Congress to past  realignment efforts that included the closure or reorganization of districts.  For example, one former Chief of Engineers said that a realignment  proposal was delayed because Members of Congress were concerned  about which division their Corps district would be incorporated into. A  former senior Corps official faced a similar situation as a district engineer  when he wanted to move a facility from his district to another district  where the facility was better able to perform its work. However, the  congressional Member representing the district opposed the move and,  according to this former senior official, prevented it from happening.  Several officials we interviewed told us that the inability to obtain  congressional support for any Corps realignment efforts that include  closing districts and divisions will continue to be a factor in the  foreseeable future.
section_title: The Corps’ Funding Structure Creates Challenges to Organizational Realignment
paragraphs: Unlike many other federal agencies that have budgets established for  broad program activities, most Corps civil works funds are appropriated  for specific projects and require nonfederal sponsors to share project  costs. Current and former Corps officials and other stakeholders we  interviewed said that these requirements have led to inefficiencies and  project delays that are difficult to overcome and hinder attempts at  organizational realignment. Specifically, they identified the following  challenges created by the Corps’ funding structure:  Incremental funding reduces efficiency and increases costs. According  to an academic stakeholder we interviewed, organizations need stable  funding and a predictable workload to be efficient, but the Corps has  neither. This sentiment was echoed by many former and current Corps  officials who said that funding projects in increments hinders the Corps’  ability to be efficient. For example, they said that incremental funding  sometimes forces the Corps to stop projects because they do not have  sufficient funding to complete the next stage of the project. This can cause  project delays and the costs of projects to escalate. For example,  according to a division commander, “What used to be $1 million will be $3  million by the time you get around to spending the money.” Another  current senior official said, “his is one of the reasons that a civil works  project takes 20 years to execute, instead of 3 if we were fully funded from  the start.” Our previous work has demonstrated that incremental funding  can result in project delays and cost increases. For example, our work  looking at hurricane protection projects in southeastern Louisiana found  that taking an incremental approach that was based on funding and  direction provided through specific appropriations had increased the  overall cost to the federal government.
Cost-sharing requirements can delay projects and cause costs to  escalate. According to the current Chief of Engineers, the Corps  sometimes has to delay work on a project while local sponsors raise their  portion of a civil works project’s cost. For example, according to a  division commander, recently some local sponsors have been unable to  raise their portion of the funding due to the economic downturn, resulting  in some projects having to be idled. Conversely, at times the local sponsor  has been able to fund its portion of the project, but the Corps has not,  according to some Corps officials that we spoke with. In such cases, the  sponsor may have to raise more money as the price of the project  increases due to delays, which they said can also be frustrating to the local  sponsors.
The Corps’ funding structure makes watershed planning difficult. The  Corps’ organizational structure is built around the nation’s watersheds.
Many current and former Corps officials and stakeholders that we spoke  with said the Corps should plan projects based on feasibility studies  conducted at the watershed level, but that the existing funding process,  according to these officials and stakeholders, prevents them from doing  so. Specifically, funding is directed for studies that are intended to lead to  individual district-based projects, not for watershed-level studies. For  example, according to a senior Corps official, Corps division and district  boundaries are generally based on watersheds, but districts must complete  individual project budgets that do not take into consideration the needs of  the nation. In addition, feasibility studies—a necessary step leading up to  every project—generally require cost sharing from local sponsors, and  thus a watershed-level feasibility study would typically require multiple  sponsors. However, some officials said that sponsors may be reluctant to  fund such a study because it will not necessarily result in a project in their  district. Many former and current Corps officials supported a watershed  approach to civil works project planning and development, but recognized  the difficulties in the current funding structure to conduct them.
section_title: The Culture in District Offices Has Inhibited Recent Realignment Efforts
paragraphs: The culture of the Corps district offices was cited by the majority of  current and former officials as a challenge to realignment efforts. Because  Corps districts receive project-based funding, they have an incentive to  acquire and retain control over projects, according to some officials, and  this has led to an autonomous culture in which some districts are reluctant  to share resources. In particular, these officials said this is because a  district’s workload determines the amount of personnel it can employ, so  some district officials believe that sharing work could lead to layoffs or  reductions in force.
Several former Corps officials cited examples of how this culture is an  impediment to organizational realignment and may lead districts to resist  sharing work with other districts. For example, one former Assistant  Secretary of the Army for Civil Works said that there was tension among  districts about sharing work, and there is nostalgia for the “full-service”  district—a district that could carry out all aspects of a project. According  to this Assistant Secretary, “It sets up a functional barrier to sharing work  across districts.” Another former senior Corps official said that districts’  resistance to sharing work was compounded by the belief that other  districts do not understand local needs, problems, and conditions, and  therefore the local district must execute its own projects. Yet another  former senior Corps official said that collaboration is difficult because the  congressional boundaries and funding process force districts to only think  locally. Some current Corps officials cited similar examples. For example,  a district commander told us that his district once had excess capacity to  perform work, yet a neighboring district contracted out their excess work  instead of sharing it with his. Similarly, a division commander confirmed  that some districts use contractors instead of using other Corps  capabilities. Additionally, some division commanders told us that district  commanders may hesitate to share work because the commander loses  control of the tasks that are shared but is still responsible for completing  the project.
As a result of this culture, the Corps has also been slow to implement  aspects of USACE 2012, its most recent realignment effort, according to  some Corps officials we spoke with. USACE 2012 is intended, in part, to  promote the sharing of work by the districts within each division, thereby  providing a steadier workload for each district and more stability for the  workforce. However, two former Chiefs of Engineers said that districts  were used to being in control of the resources within their boundaries, and  it was a big cultural shift for the districts to give up some of their control.  Furthermore, USACE 2012 was undertaken, in part, because the funding  the Corps was receiving at that time was not enough to support an  organizational structure with 38 full-service districts. According to the  current Chief of Engineers, while he recognizes that some of the districts  would rather be independent and “full-service,” the reality is that this level  of effort cannot be sustained in each district.
section_title: Officials and Stakeholders Agree That the Corps’ Three- Tiered Structure Is Appropriate, but Some Changes to Alignment Could Enhance Its Effectiveness
paragraphs: While many current and former Corps officials and stakeholders generally  agreed that the Corps’ three-tiered structure was appropriate to meet its  mission, some believe that the number of districts could be reduced as  part of a comprehensive organizational realignment. In addition, these  officials and stakeholders identified opportunities to clarify roles and  responsibilities, enhance expertise and policy guidance, as well as modify  the Corps’ funding structure that could lead to improved effectiveness  without resorting to a complete realignment.
subsections: section_title: The Corps’ Structure Is Appropriate, but the Number of Districts Could Be Reduced
paragraphs: Many current and former Corps officials and stakeholders agreed that the  Corps’ three-tiered structure was appropriate to accomplish the agency’s  civil works mission. Specifically, according to the officials and  stakeholders we spoke with, the Corps’ three-tiered structure allows each  tier to focus on the client and stakeholder needs at that level. For example,  according to some current Corps officials, including the Chief of  Engineers, the division level provides supervision for districts that  headquarters alone would not be able to provide. Some former and current  Corps officials also told us the district level is important because it  provides a presence in the local community. For example, one former  senior Corps official said that “having people  at the local level is  a strength of the Corps because it brings local understanding,  relationships, contacts, and an appreciation for local problems.” However,  some interview participants told us that the Corps was not well structured.  For example, one current senior Corps official said it takes too much of an  investment to sustain 38 districts and eight divisions.
Although many favored the three-tiered structure, some former and  current officials and stakeholders said that the Corps could consolidate  some of its districts—including some of the smaller districts that do not  have sufficient work. However, these officials and stakeholders also  recognized that any kind of realignment plan that reduces the number of  districts would require congressional support and could not be  accomplished by the Corps alone. Some officials and stakeholders  suggested that Congress would have to consider establishing a process  similar to the BRAC process to facilitate congressional approval of a  reduction in the number of districts. According to one former official, a  BRAC-like process to close a district would involve choosing districts to  close based on objective criteria. However, as mentioned earlier, past  attempts to include district closures as part of the BRAC process were not  successful.
section_title: Corps Officials and Stakeholders Said That Roles and Responsibilities Could Be Clarified or Modified to Improve the Corps’ Effectiveness
paragraphs: Several current Corps officials identified the need to redefine and clarify  the roles and responsibilities within the Corps’ three-tiered structure to  help improve its effectiveness. In particular, the roles and responsibilities  of division and district commanders need to be clarified, according to  some division commanders. For example, one division commander new to  the Corps said that he was unsure where he could locate specific guidance  to accomplish tasks necessary for his role. Another division commander  said that although new district commanders receive an orientation course,  a capstone document for commanders would be helpful, as would a  published doctrine that explains the roles and responsibilities for each  level within the Corps. Some division and district commanders said that  while USACE 2012 was the Corps’ overall foundational doctrine, it needed  more details to be helpful to commanders in understanding their roles and  responsibilities. Our past work shows that clearly defined roles and  responsibilities are necessary for an organization to be most effective.
Many current division and district commanders also said that the Corps  should clarify the roles and responsibilities of its Communities of Practice  (CoP). The Corps created CoPs to build, maintain, and provide expertise  and capability and develop best practices, and considers them a central  part of the USACE 2012 realignment. For example, the environmental CoP  develops and delivers solutions and provides advice on technical  management, design, and execution of a full range of sustainability,  cleanup, and environmental protection activities. However, some current  division and district commanders said that the CoPs’ roles and  responsibilities need to be clarified because some CoP members were  taking actions that were not consistent with their level of responsibility.  For example, one commander said that CoPs members were generating  policies that had resource implications, which is a responsibility of  commanders—not the CoPs. Another commander said that a CoP ordered  a job description in his division to be revised without his consent.  However, according to this official, CoPs are not in the chain of command  and are therefore not allowed to give orders on personnel-related matters.  One division commander said that this confusion was a result of a failure  within the agency to understand the difference between a CoP, which is a  forum to exchange best practices, and a functional board, which focuses  on specific disciplines.
Many current and former Corps officials and stakeholders also identified  opportunities to alter roles and responsibilities within the project review  process. For example, according to some officials we spoke with, Corps  projects receive multiple reviews at the headquarters, division, and district  levels, as well as an external review, without regard to project size. In  1995, the Corps began implementation of a realignment plan that removed  review functions from the divisions. According to a former Assistant  Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, a previous effort to streamline the  review process by removing division-level reviews further slowed the  process because headquarters did not have the capacity to handle more  review responsibilities. In 2003, USACE 2012 established a concurrent  project review process. The goal of this was for all levels of the  organization to provide input early in the project planning process rather  than waiting until later on to identify problems, which can result in time- consuming repetition of the planning process. However, according to  some current Corps officials that we spoke with, the Corps has not fully  embraced this concept. For example, one division commander said the  agency still performs two levels of review because headquarters is  concerned that policy will not be applied consistently across the agency.  Similarly, all four of the interest groups we interviewed told us that the  Corps’ review process was slow. For example, one group said that the  multiple reviews between the various Corps levels is time-consuming.
Many current Corps officials identified two specific areas that need to be  addressed to enhance the review process: (1) re-examine the roles and  responsibilities within the three tiers and (2) reassess the criteria that  dictate the level of review a project receives. With regard to the first area,  the role of the division in the review process was questioned by some  officials we spoke with. For example, according to a deputy district  commander, divisions should only be doing an administrative review to  make sure planning documents are complete for headquarters review.  Similarly, a district commander suggested transferring all review functions  from the division to headquarters because the division review did not add  value to project plans. Another area identified by current officials where  roles and responsibilities need to be clarified, was that review bodies at  the headquarters level need to be integrated earlier into the project review  process. These officials said that it is time-consuming to fix a project  plan if flaws are discovered during the final review because they must then  be sent back through the review process. With regard to the second area  of concern, current Corps officials cited the opportunity to revise criteria  that determine the level of review a project receives. Some district  commanders told us that currently small projects are required to receive  the same level and number of reviews as large projects, and this is  inefficient and costly. For example, a district commander told us that a $5  billion hurricane project receives the same level of review as a $1 million  ecosystem restoration project. He and others said that, instead, the level of  risk should determine the level of review.
section_title: Corps Officials Suggested Changes to Better Utilize Expertise to Improve Effectiveness
paragraphs: Many current and former Corps officials, including the current Chief of  Engineers, said that the Corps’ Centers of Expertise were useful because  they help to optimize the use of specialized expertise, but they noted  opportunities to make better use of the centers. First, some former and  current officials agreed that the centers need a stable source of funding to  remain viable. Centers are typically funded by performing work for  districts and being reimbursed from a district’s project funds. According to  these officials, districts may be reluctant to use the centers because they  take resources away from their civil works projects. For example, this  leads to centers being under-funded and asking for work from others,  according to a former senior Corps official. In order to ensure better  utilization of the centers, some former and current officials suggested  centrally funding the centers. For example, two officials suggested fully  funding the centers from the Corps’ general expense account, which  currently funds headquarters and divisions.
Second, several current Corps officials told us that districts and divisions  need more information about the centers, including information on their  capabilities and their roles and responsibilities. For example, some of the  officials we interviewed said that they needed more information on the  differences between mandatory centers and directories of expertise.  During our interviews, one district commander was unable to distinguish  between the two, and another was unaware of the centers altogether. In  addition, other officials said there was not enough information on the  mandatory Centers of Expertise. For example, one division commander  said that while it may be mandatory to send work to a center, it is  generally unclear that districts must do so, and he believed that the  centers are not being used consistently across the agency. Another  division commander said centers could better publicize themselves with  brochures and outreach to other divisions and districts. Some officials also  said the centers should provide more information on how long it will take  for projects to receive services, so that districts can better manage their  projects’ timelines.
Third, several current and former Corps officials suggested that more  information should be available on the certification and training that the  experts at the centers receive, so that the centers can assure district  offices that they have the qualified staff necessary to do the job. For  example, one division commander said that, in the case of one of his own  centers, he was not sure it had the level of expertise that he would want or  that he would recommend its services to other commanders. In addition, a  current deputy district commander said certain centers have bad  reputations, so he would not send work to them without assurance that  they had quality staff. In this regard, he suggested the centers should have  some kind of requirements or certification for experts to demonstrate that  they are qualified in their area of expertise. Other current and former  officials also said that the centers vary in the quality of work they provide  to districts and that the level of expertise needed to be standardized.
Although many current and former Corps officials and other stakeholders  said that the best way to maintain expertise was to keep it concentrated in  the centers, others disagreed. For example, one former Chief of Engineers  said that it is difficult for a subject matter expert within a district to  maintain expertise if they only work on a subject occasionally, whereas in  a center they can work on it regularly. Furthermore, an academic expert  that we spoke with said that grouping experts together allows them to  interact, creating a collective expertise that as a whole exceeds the sum of  the parts. In contrast, some current and former officials questioned the  usefulness of the centers and said that the Corps could better use  expertise if it were kept in the districts. For example, one former Chief of  Engineers said national centers may not know the local area as well as the  district and that districts may be able to purchase expertise in their own  area, such as at a local university. This was echoed by a current division  commander who said that experts from the centers may not understand  the local projects, politics, or environment as well as district experts.
section_title: Current and Former Officials Identified the Need for Updated Guidance to Improve the Corps’ Effectiveness
paragraphs: In addition to identifying ways of improving the use of expertise, the  majority of current division and district commanders we interviewed, as  well as a former senior Corps official, said that the Corps’ technical  guidance is outdated and needs to be revised. According to some Corps  division and district commanders, on average Corps technical guidance is  between 10 and 15 years out of date, and some guidance dates back to the  1970s. According to a former senior Corps official, this means that each  division and district may be executing projects differently because they  lack current guidance. This has also resulted in confusion for Corps  project managers and has led local sponsors to question the feasibility of  constructing projects without current guidance, according to a Corps  district official. Some Corps officials told us that historically, the Corps  had been noted by industry officials and around the world as the place to  go to get technical guidance. Now, according to one Corps official, the  Corps has to go to the industry for such information, and another official  told us that the New Orleans District is using manuals from other nations  for some of its work because their technical guidance is more advanced  than the Corps’. Furthermore, the current Assistant Secretary of the Army  for Civil Works agreed that technical guidance is outdated and added that  the Corps is behind in issuing implementation guidance on many  requirements of WRDA 2007. The Assistant Secretary also said that the  Corps has limited resources dedicated to address such updates.
section_title: Modifying the Corps’ Funding Structure Can Improve Its Effectiveness According to Officials and Stakeholders
paragraphs: Current and former Corps officials, including the current and former  Assistant Secretaries of the Army for Civil Works, and stakeholders that  we interviewed identified opportunities to change how the Corps is funded  to better enable it to execute its mission. First, several officials suggested  providing a steadier stream of funding, such as full funding for projects or  funding them in multiyear increments. As mentioned previously, the Corps  receives “no-year” funding and Congress currently funds projects in 1-year  increments, which, according to these officials may delay or increase the  costs of projects. One current Corps official told us that the fully funded  projects authorized in response to Hurricane Katrina gave the Corps an  opportunity to involve contractors earlier in the building process, which  has allowed the Corps to be more timely and efficient in carrying out these  projects. A former Assistant Secretary suggested funding civil works  projects in multiyear increments, as the Corps’ military construction  projects are now funded. According to a division commander, this would  provide a predictable funding stream that would allow the Corps to  execute civil works projects in more a timely manner.
Second, several former and current officials and stakeholders suggested  that Congress fund civil works projects that take into account an entire  watershed, which they said would better address the nation’s water  resources. As previously mentioned, funding is currently provided for  specific projects at the district level, and the needs of the whole region or  watershed are not taken into account. One stakeholder said, “he Corps  does not often receive funds for watershed studies because Congress  wants to appropriate funds that benefit their own local districts rather  than the whole watershed.” Some current and former officials and  stakeholders advocated that Congress dedicate a stream of funding for  watershed programs, then let the Corps decide how best to use the funds.  However, some of these officials and stakeholders acknowledged that  changes to how the Corps is funded would be difficult in a fiscally  constrained budget environment and would require changes in  congressional authorizations and a significant increase in appropriations,  which they recognize is highly unlikely.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Since 1824, the Corps has been responsible for civil works projects of  national importance, and its mission has expanded over time to include  such responsibilities as navigation, emergency response, and  environmental restoration. Organizational alignment of the Corps is  crucial because it establishes the framework within which the Corps’ large  workforce can most effectively and efficiently carry out these diverse and  important missions. In this regard, clearly defined roles and  responsibilities are necessary for management to exercise control over an  organization. However, the Corps does not have clear guidance on the  roles of division and district commanders, and as a result, some Corps  staff indicated that commanders and CoPs are confused about the scope  of their responsibilities. Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities,  Corps officials are left to determine, on their own, what their job requires,  which increases the risk that they might complete tasks inconsistently. In  addition, the alignment of the Centers of Expertise within the Corps’  organization is important if the Corps is to optimize the use of specialized  expertise, eliminate redundancy, and increase standardization across the  agency. However, without a stable source of funding, lack of information  on how the centers are to be used, and without adequate assurance that  the centers have the appropriate quality of experts, it is unlikely that the  districts will use them in a systematic fashion. Moreover, up-to-date  technical guidance is crucial to the Corps’ civil works mission, since it  helps determine how the Corps executes projects. However, much of the  Corps’ technical guidance is outdated and needs to be revised and the  Corps has limited resources available to complete this task. As a result,  districts may not be following the best available practices because they  lack current guidance. Finally, even though the Corps receives “no-year”  funding, a more stable funding approach could improve the overall  efficiency and effectiveness of the Civil Works Program.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the effectiveness of the Corps’ Civil Works Program, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief of Engineers  and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take the  following four actions:    Review and revise as necessary the roles and responsibilities of each  component level of the organization and ensure that they are clearly  articulated in agency guidance;  re-evaluate the Centers of Expertise and develop a process to help ensure  that they are consistently used across the agency;    determine the extent to which the agency’s technical guidance needs to be  updated, create a schedule for completing these updates, and if additional  funding is needed to accomplish these updates, provide this information to  Congress; and    work with Congress to develop a more stable project funding approach  that facilitates project implementation and that provides more efficient  and effective use of funds.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense for review  and comment. The department generally agreed with the  recommendations in our report. Specifically, the department concurred  with our recommendation that the Corps re-evaluate the Centers of  Expertise and develop a process to help ensure that they are consistently  used across the agency. The department agreed that the Centers of  Expertise need to be periodically reviewed and that the agency should  improve its guidance and information on the types of services available  and qualifications of the experts in the Centers. The department partially  concurred with our other three recommendations. Specifically, with  regard to our recommendation that the Corps review and revise as  necessary the roles and responsibilities of each component level of the  organization and ensure that they are clearly articulated in agency  guidance, the department believes that the roles and responsibilities of  each component are appropriate, but agreed to work to increase the  understanding of the roles of the components, both within and outside of  the organization. The department also agreed that confusion exists about  the roles and responsibilities of the Communities of Practice, particularly  with regard to reviewing decision documents, and will review and clarify  as necessary all existing guidance, corporate governance documents, and  other publications.
In addition, the department also partially concurred with our  recommendation that the Corps determine the extent to which the  agency’s technical guidance needs to be updated, create a schedule for  completing these updates, and if additional funding is needed to  accomplish these updates, provide this information to Congress. The  department stated that development and maintenance of technical  guidance is identified by technical experts within the Corps; however,  budget decisions regarding this development and maintenance must be  made within the framework of all of the needs and priorities of the Civil  Works Program. The department also noted that it is not appropriate for  the agency to inform Congress of requirements for funding beyond those  included in the President’s budget, unless that information is specifically  requested by Congress. While we believe that it is important to recognize  individual agency needs within the framework of all of its priorities when  making budget decisions for the Civil Works Program, we continue to  believe that, if additional funding is needed to accomplish these updates,  that information should be provided to Congress.
Finally, the department partially concurred with our recommendation that  the Corps work with Congress to develop a more stable project funding  approach that facilitates project implementation and a more efficient and  effective use of funds. The department agreed and believes the  administration and Congress are generally aware that many studies and  some projects are not funded for the most efficient execution. The  department stated that the Corps will continue to promote efficient  funding during the budget process, but will support budget decisions made  by the administration. While we acknowledge that there are constraints to  the budgeting and appropriation of funds for the efficient execution of  projects, we continue to believe that the Corps should work with Congress  to develop a more stable project funding approach that would allow for a  more efficient and effective use of funds and execution of projects in a  more timely manner.
A copy of the department’s letter commenting on the draft report is  reprinted in appendix V.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief  of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers, and other interested parties. In addition, this report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We were asked to examine (1) how, over time, the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers (Corps) has modified its organizational alignment to take into  account its changing mission, budget, staffing, and workload; (2) the  challenges the Corps has faced in realigning its organization and the extent  to which these or other challenges are still relevant; and (3) what changes  to the Corps’ organizational alignment, if any, do officials and stakeholders  believe could enhance the effectiveness of the civil works mission.
To examine the Corps’ changing civil works mission over time, we  conducted a review of the legislative history of the Corps’ civil works  mission. We also conducted a review of historical Corps literature, studies,  and congressional hearings and committee reports. To examine the Corps’  civil works budget, we obtained appropriations and obligations data from  the Budget of the United States Government, by the nine appropriations  funding accounts, for the following fiscal years: 1980, 1990, and annually  between 2000 and 2009. We chose these years because data were  electronically available and the appropriations funding accounts remained  relatively constant over those years. To examine the changes over time for  the staffing of the Civil Works Program, we obtained full-time equivalent  (FTE) data, by district for fiscal years 2000 through 2009, from the Corps  based on data from the Corps of Engineers Financial Management System.  We also obtained FTE allocations by division for fiscal years 2000 through  2009 and Corps-wide FTE allocations for fiscal years 1980, 1990, and  annually between 2000 and 2009. According to the Corps, Corps-wide  staffing data were found for prior fiscal years; however, it was unknown  how these data were collected and counted and therefore they were  deemed not reliable. Additionally, FTE data pertain only to Corps civilian  employees, because, according to the Corps, military personnel are  considered to be on duty all day, every day and, therefore, the Corps does  not track the time they spend on civil works projects. To examine the  Corps’ changing workload, we obtained the number of construction and  operations and maintenance (O&M) projects each district listed in its cost  and financial statements included in the Corps’ Annual Report on Civil  Works Activities for fiscal years 1980, 1990, and annually between 2000  and 2008. According to the Corps, the districts only report construction  and O&M projects in this table. We also obtained project expenditure data  for construction and O&M projects for fiscal years 1980, 1990, and  annually between 2000 and 2008. These were the only years the Corps was  able to supply us with project expenditure data, so we also restricted our  analysis of the number of projects to those years.
To determine how the Corps has modified its organizational alignment  throughout its history, we reviewed Corps documentation, congressional  hearings, and committee reports related to past realignment efforts. We  also spoke with former and current Corps officials and stakeholders about  efforts that they were involved with or had knowledge of. Based on the  documentation and testimonial evidence, and to the extent possible, we  linked these efforts with changes in the Corps’ mission, budget, staffing,  and workload.
To determine the challenges the Corps has faced and would face in  modifying its organizational alignment, and the changes to organizational  alignment needed to enhance its effectiveness, we conducted  semistructured interviews with the current and five former Chiefs of  Engineers; the current and four former Assistant Secretaries of the Army  for Civil Works; one former Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for  Civil Works; seven current and six former senior Corps officials; officials  from the eight domestic civil works divisions; officials from a  nonprobability sample of 10 of the 38 domestic civil works districts; and  seven stakeholders, including three academics and four interest groups.  During these interviews, we discussed whether the Corps was aligned to  accomplish its mission, opportunities to realign roles and responsibilities  of the three-tiers, advantages and disadvantages to the number and  location of districts and divisions, opportunities to realign expertise and  the sharing of best practices, realignment of and challenges associated  with the way in which the Corps is funded, and challenges associated with  past and any future realignment of the Corps’ Civil Works Program.
The semistructured interviews were transcribed and coded to identify the  challenges to modifying the Corps’ alignment and changes in alignment  that would enhance effectiveness. The coding was based upon themes in  the interviews and was verified by a second reviewer. For the purposes of  reporting our results, we used the following categories to quantify  responses of officials and stakeholders: “some” refers to responses from  two to five individuals, “several” refers to responses from six to eight  individuals, “many” refers to responses from nine or more individuals, and  “majority” refers to responses from over half of an interview group.
We attempted to contact all Chiefs of Engineers and Assistant Secretaries  of the Army for Civil Works that were in office in 1988 or later. One former  Chief of Engineers declined our interview, one former Assistant Secretary  is deceased, and another was unavailable to speak with us. We identified  other former senior Corps officials, interest groups, and two of the three  academic stakeholders using a snowball sampling technique, in which we  selected interviewees after two of our previous interviewees had  mentioned them as important contacts. Finally, we spoke with one of the  academic stakeholders based upon previous GAO work on organizational  alignment. Additionally, academic stakeholders had to meet the following  criteria: (1) the academics’ recognition in the professional or academic  community and (2) relevance of his or her published work or research to  organizational alignment.
To choose the nonprobability sample of districts, we gathered 2009 civil  works FTE data from the Corps and divided it into three categories: (1)  large districts with more than 800 FTEs; (2) medium districts with 400 to  799 FTEs, and; (3) small districts with 399 or fewer FTEs. We sorted all  districts by their FTE size category and chose three districts in each of the  FTE size categories, ensuring that at least one district from each of the  eight domestic civil works divisions was chosen. We then plotted these  nine districts on a map of the Corps districts and divisions, and based on  the geographical spread of those nine districts, chose an additional district  from an area that was not geographically represented.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 through August  2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Former Corps Officials GAO Interviewed
paragraphs: This appendix includes former senior-level Corps officials that we spoke  to, including former Assistant Secretaries of the Army for Civil Works,  former Chiefs of Engineers, and former senior-level officials.
subsections: section_title: Former Assistant Secretaries of the Army for Civil Works
section_title: Former Chiefs of Engineers
section_title: Other Former Senior-Level Corps Officials
section_title: Appendix III: Timeline of Select Laws and Events Related to the Civil Works Mission
paragraphs: This appendix includes legislation and events that have led to the current  responsibilities of the Corps under its civil works mission. Legislation and  events are listed by the Corps’ nine business lines. While many of these  laws and events affected more than one of the Corps’ nine responsibilities,  we have grouped the laws and events discussed in this appendix under  nine headings describing the responsibilities for illustrative purposes.
subsections: section_title: Navigation
paragraphs: April 30, 1824, General Survey Act of 1824: This act outlined the  initial definition of the Corps’ civil works mission. The act authorized the  President to employ “two or more skilful civil engineers, such as officers  of the corps of engineers” to survey road and canal routes that facilitated  national commercial, military, or postal service activities.
May 24, 1824, Navigation Act: This act appropriated funds ($75,000) for  improvement of inland waterways navigation (removal of sand bars in the  Ohio River and removal of snags in the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers).
May 20, 1826, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1826: This act authorized  both surveys and construction projects within the same act (a practice  continued to today).
January 21, 1927, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1927: This act gave  congressional authorization for the Corps to conduct surveys to devise the  most comprehensive and effective strategy for improving navigation on  navigable streams and their tributaries, and the most efficient  development of flood control, potential water power, and irrigation needs.
section_title: Flood Risk Management (Flood and Storm Damage Reduction)
paragraphs: September 30, 1850: Congress commissioned the first planning study  from the Corps to determine the best way to control flooding on the lower  Mississippi River.
June 28, 1879, Establishment of Mississippi River Commission:  Federal flood control activity took form with the establishment of the  Mississippi River Commission, a seven-member organization including  three members from the Corps. The commission was responsible for  directing and completing surveys of the lower Mississippi River and taking  into consideration plans to prevent destructive flooding.
March 1, 1917, Flood Control Act of 1917: This is act established the  Corps’ flood damage reduction role and gave authority for federal  construction of flood control improvements beyond the Mississippi Valley.  It also notably prescribed that all plans for flood control should include a  comprehensive study of the relevant watershed and report on potential  other uses for the project, such as water power, navigation improvements,  and “such other uses as may be properly related to or coordinated with the  project.”
January 21, 1927, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1927: This act gave  congressional authorization for the Corps to conduct surveys to devise the  most comprehensive and effective strategy for improving navigation on  navigable streams and their tributaries and the most efficient development  of flood control, potential water power, and irrigation needs.
May 15, 1928, Flood Control Act of 1928: This act authorized the  Corps’ Mississippi River and Tributaries Project.
June 22, 1936, Flood Control Act of 1936: This act declared flood  control as a “proper activity” of the federal government and established  the Corps as the agency responsible for flood control throughout the  nation, in cooperation with the Bureau of Reclamation. The act also  effectively required submission of all Corps flood control projects to a  cost-benefit test (the federal government should only sponsor projects  where the benefit of a project exceeds its cost).
August 18, 1941, Flood Control Act of 1941: This act rescinded  certain local contribution requirements for reservoir construction,  spurring their construction.
July 14, 1960, Flood Control Act of 1960: Section 206 of this act  authorizes floodplain management studies. The Corps begins its Flood  Plain Management Services Program in response to this act.
March 7, 1974, Water Resources Development Act of 1974: This was  the first Water Resources Development Act. Prior to 1974, Corps projects  were authorized and funded through Rivers and Harbors and Flood  Control Acts.
section_title: Regulatory Program
paragraphs: September 19, 1890 and March 3, 1899, Rivers and Harbors Act of  1890 and 1899: The acts prohibit unauthorized obstructions in navigable  waterways and authorizes the Secretary of the Army to remove wrecks or  other obstructions from navigable waterways and to issue permits for  construction, excavation, or disposition of materials in, over, or under  navigable waters. Provisions of the 1899 act superseded the provisions of  the 1890 act.
October 18, 1972, Federal Water Pollution Control Act  Amendments of 1972: This act amended the Federal Water Pollution  Control Act (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act), adding  section 404. Section 404 authorizes the Corps to issue permits for  discharging dredged or fill materials into “the waters of the U.S.”
October 23, 1972, Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries  Act of 1972: Authorizes the Corps to issue permits for the transportation  of dredged materials for the purpose of dumping in the ocean.
section_title: Hydropower
paragraphs: March 3, 1909, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1909: This act authorized  the Corps to report data concerning the development and utilization of  hydroelectric power in project plans.
March 3, 1925, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1925: This was one of  earliest acts (together with 1909 Rivers and Harbors Act, above) that  called for a multipurpose approach to water resources development. It  authorized the Corps and the Federal Power Commission to conduct  survey cost estimates of navigable streams and tributaries “whereon  power development appears feasible and practicable.”
section_title: Recreation
paragraphs: December 22, 1944, Flood Control Act of 1944: This act gave the  Corps a recreation role that was added as part of flood control projects at  Corps reservoirs.
October 23, 1962, River and Harbor Act of 1962: This act expanded  the Corps’ recreation role by authorizing the agency to build recreational  facilities as part of all water resource development projects.
July 9, 1965, The Federal Water Project Recreation Act of 1965:  This act provided for development of recreational opportunities at federal  water resources projects.
section_title: Emergency Management
paragraphs: May 11, 1882: In the winter of 1882, floods on the Mississippi forced  thousands of people from their homes. The Army Quartermaster  Department had relief supplies for the refugees, but they were unable to  deliver them. Congress authorized the Corps of Engineers to use their  engineer vessels to dispense supplies and rescue victims along the river.
December 10, 1896: In Circular #18, the Chief of Engineers, by authority  of the Secretary of the Army, gave Army Engineers standing authority to  use or loan government equipment to save life and property in cases of  sudden emergency without prior headquarters approval.
August 18, 1941, Flood Control Act of 1941: Section 5 of this act  authorized the Secretary of War to allot up to $1 million per year to be  used for rescue work or repair or maintenance of damaged or threatened  flood control works.
May 17, 1950, The Flood Control Act of 1950 (Title II of the River  and Harbor Act of 1950): Section 210 of this act further amended the  1941 Flood Control Act to increase the annual authorized funding level  (for rescue work and repair, restoration, or maintenance of damaged or  threatened flood control projects) from $2 to $15 million, and authorized  the Secretary of the Army to allot funds from other flood control  appropriations for immediate works until appropriations are made.
Sept. 30, 1950, Disaster Relief Act of 1950: The act authorizes the  President to direct any federal agency to assist states and local  governments to alleviate suffering and damage caused by major disasters.
June 28, 1955, Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies Act of 1955:  This act amended section 5 of the 1941 Flood Control Act giving the Corps  its emergency management mission. The act directed the Corps to spend  funds in emergency preparation and in rescue operations. This led to the  establishment of the Corps’ Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies  Program.
May 22, 1974, Disaster Relief Act of 1974: This act authorizes the  President to establish a program of disaster preparedness that utilizes  services of all appropriate agencies.
November 23, 1988, Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and  Emergency Assistance Act: The Stafford Act authorizes federal agencies  to provide assistance during certain emergencies, expanding the Corps’  disaster preparedness role. The act, as subsequently amended, authorizes  agencies, including the Corps, to support the Federal Emergency  Management Agency in carrying out the Federal Response Plan (now the  National Response Plan) to provide coordinated disaster relief and  recovery operations.
section_title: Water Supply and Storage
paragraphs: 1850s to 1860s: The Corps developed and continues to maintain  permanent water supply systems to the District of Columbia and  Georgetown (today known as the Washington Aqueduct division of the  Corps’ Baltimore District).
July 3, 1958, Water Supply Act of 1958: This act gave the Corps the  authority to include water storage in new and existing reservoir projects  for municipal and industrial uses.
section_title: Environmental Restoration and Protection
paragraphs: September 19, 1890 and March 3, 1899, Rivers and Harbors Act of  1890 and 1899: The 1890 act, later superseded by provisions of the 1899  act, prohibits unauthorized obstructionsin navigable waterways and  authorizes the Corps to permit certain activities. It lays the foundation of  the Corps’ environmental mission to protect, restore, and manage the  environment through the regulation of dredging and the dumping of  dredged materials given in the 1972 Clean Water Act.
August 12, 1958, Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act: This act  authorized the Secretary of the Interior to coordinate with federal  agencies concerning wildlife, stating that “wildlife conservation shall  receive equal consideration and be coordinated with other features of  water-resource development programs through the effectual and  harmonious planning, development, maintenance, and coordination of  wildlife conservation and rehabilitation.”  1966: U.S. Army Chief of Staff assigns the Corps supervision over all  engineering responsibilities related to the Army’s growing environmental  protection and pollution reduction in the construction and operation of  the Army’s military activities.
January 1, 1970, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969  (NEPA): This act requires federal agencies to include in every  recommendation or report on a major federal action that significantly  affects the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement on the  environmental impact on, any unavoidable adverse environmental effects  of, and alternatives to the proposed action, among other things.
October 18, 1972, Federal Water Pollution Control Act  Amendments of 1972: This act amended the Federal Water Pollution  Control Act (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act), adding  section 404. Section 404 authorizes the Corps to issue permits for  discharging of dredged or fill materials into “the waters of the U.S.”
November 17, 1986, Water Resources Development Act of 1986:  This act further expanded the Corps’ environmental role to include  enhancing and restoring natural resources at certain new and existing  projects.
November 28, 1990, Water Resources Development Act of 1990:  This act mandates that environmental protection be included as one of the  Corps’ primary missions.
October 13, 1997, Energy and Water Resources Appropriations Act  of 1998: Congress for the first time directs funding for the Formerly  Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) to the Corps. The  Corps is to conduct cleanup activities of early atomic energy program sites  under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and  Liability Act and National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution  Contingency Plan. The FUSRAP Program was started in the 1970s under  the predecessor to the Department of Energy.
section_title: Support for Others
paragraphs: March 4, 1915, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1915: Section 4 of this act  authorizes the Secretary of the Army to receive contributions from private  parties on expenditures of public funds in connection with authorized  river and harbor improvements.
September 4, 1961, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: This act  established the United States Agency for International Development  (USAID). Also, Section 607 provided for the furnishing of services and  commodities to foreign countries on a reimbursable basis.
October 27, 1965, River and Harbor Act of 1965: This act authorized  the Chief of Engineers, under supervision of the Secretary of the Army, to  accept orders from federal departments and agencies for work or services  and to perform all or any part of such work by contract. This provision  was later repealed and re-enacted as an amendment to the codification of  Title 10 of the United States Code at 10 U.S.C. § 3036(d). This work  includes flood control, the improvement of rivers and harbors, research,  and support to private engineering and construction firms competing for,  or performing, work outside the United States. The Support for Others  program (now named the Interagency and International Services program)  engages the Corps in reimbursable work that is determined to be in  America’s best interests.
October 16, 1968, Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968:  Provides authority for federal agencies to provide specialized or technical  services to state and local governments. This section was later repealed  and re-enacted as an amendment to the codification of Title 31 of the  United States Code at 31 U.S.C. 6506.
section_title: Appendix IV: Army Corps of Engineers’ Budget, Staffing, and Workload
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, key contributors to this report  included Vondalee R. Hunt (Assistant Director), Kevin Bray, Jennifer  Bryant, Kirsten Lauber, Justin L. Monroe, Anne Rhodes-Kline, Holly Sasso,  and Ben Shouse.