Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audit Approach and Findings
Published: 2007-01-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: GAO provided a strategic overview of GAO's work related to securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding Iraq. In our statement today, as requested, GAO highlighted (1) GAO's scope, authority, and coordination; (2) some of the insights stemming from our work in Iraq; and (3) the rigorous quality assurance framework that GAO uses to ensure relevant, reliable, and consistent results in all of our work. This testimony is based upon extensive work spanning several years. Since 2003, we have issued 67 Iraq-related reports and testimonies. For example, GAO sent a report to the Congress last week on a range of key issues for congressional oversight of efforts to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Iraq. Although many of our sources are classified, we strive to report information to the Congress in a public format to promote greater transparency and accountability of U.S. government policies, programs, and activities. As provided for in our congressional protocols, most of our work in Iraq has been performed under my authority to conduct evaluations on my own initiative since it is a matter of broad interest to the entire Congress and numerous committees in both chambers. Our work also helped inform the deliberations of the Iraq Study Group; the Comptroller General personally briefed this group on the results of our Iraq work in June 2006. GAO also provided significant additional information to the Iraq Study Group for its use.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO and the Inspectors General (IG) of individual departments and agencies have different roles and responsibilities. GAO's broad audit authority allows us to support Congress through strategic analyses of issues that cut across multiple federal agencies and sources of funding. Our work spans the security, political, and economic prongs of the U.S. national strategy in Iraq. The broad, cross-cutting nature of this work helps minimize the possibility of overlap and duplication by any individual Inspector General. Based on our work, we have made some unique contributions to Congress. Our past and ongoing work has focused on the U.S. strategy and costs of operating in Iraq, training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, governance issues, the readiness of U.S. military forces, and acquisition outcomes. Some highlights from our work follow. Our analysis of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq recommended that the National Security Council improve the strategy by articulating clearer roles and responsibilities, specifying future contributions, and identifying current costs and future resources. In our examination of the cost of U.S. military operations abroad, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense improve the transparency and reliability of Department of Defense's (DOD) Global War on Terror (GWOT) obligation data. We also recommended that DOD build more funding into the baseline budget once an operation reaches a known level of effort and costs are more predictable. In assessing the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, we found that overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated despite increases in the numbers of trained and equipped security forces. A complete assessment of Iraqi security forces' capabilities is dependent on DOD providing GAO with the readiness levels of each Iraqi unit. We found that DOD faces significant challenges in maintaining U.S. military readiness for overseas and homeland missions and in sustaining rotational deployments of duty, especially if the duration and intensity of current operations continue at the present pace. In assessing the impact of ongoing military operations in Iraq on military equipment, we found that the Army and the Marine Corps have initiated programs to reset (repair or replace) equipment and are likely to incur large expenditures in the future. In reviewing efforts to secure munitions sites and provide force protection, we recommended that DOD conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment of unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq and incorporate storage site security into strategic planning efforts. In assessing acquisition outcomes, we found that DOD often entered into contract arrangements with unclear requirements, which posed additional risks to the government. DOD also lacked the capacity to provide sufficient numbers of contracting, logistics, and other personnel, thereby hindering oversight efforts. In April 2005, an international peer review team gave our quality assurance system a clean opinion--only the second time a national audit institution has received such a rating from a multinational team. Thus, the Congress and the American people can have confidence that GAO's work is independent, objective, and reliable.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to provide a strategic overview of GAO’s  work related to securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding Iraq. In my statement  today, as requested, I will highlight (1) GAO’s scope, authority, and  coordination; (2) some of the insights stemming from our work in Iraq;  and (3) the rigorous quality assurance framework that GAO uses to ensure  relevant, reliable, and consistent results in all of our work.
My statement today is based upon extensive work spanning several years.  Since 2003, we have issued 67 Iraq-related reports and testimonies. For  example, I sent a report to the Congress last week on a range of key issues  for congressional oversight of efforts to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Iraq.  Although many of our sources are classified, we strive to report  information to the Congress in a public format to promote greater  transparency and accountability of U.S. government policies, programs,  and activities. As provided for in our congressional protocols, most of our  work in Iraq has been performed under my authority to conduct  evaluations on my own initiative since it is a matter of broad interest to the  entire Congress and numerous committees in both chambers. Our work  also helped inform the deliberations of the Iraq Study Group; I personally  briefed this group on the results of our Iraq work in June 2006. We also  provided significant additional information to the Iraq Study Group for its  use.
The work supporting this statement is based on our analysis of agency  plans and documents and discussions with relevant senior officials from  the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy, State, and the Treasury; the  U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the Army Corps of  Engineers; the multinational force; the Defense Intelligence Agency; and  the Central Intelligence Agency. We conducted our reviews in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: GAO’s Work in Iraq Is Broad and Coordinated with Other Audit Authorities
paragraphs: While the IGs are designed to focus primarily on exposing fraud, waste,  and abuse in individual federal agency programs, GAO’s broad audit  authority allows us to support Congress through strategic analyses of  issues that cut across multiple federal agencies and sources of funding.  Although the IGs report to the heads of their respective departments and  make periodic reports to Congress, GAO reports directly to Congress on a  continuous basis. GAO consults regularly with its oversight committees  and relevant committees of jurisdiction regarding key issues of national  importance, such as U.S. fiscal solvency, emergency preparedness, DOD  transformation, global competitiveness, and emerging health care and  other challenges for the 21st century.
The Congress established the GAO in 1921 to investigate all matters  relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds.  Since then, Congress has expanded GAO’s statutory authorities and  frequently calls upon it to examine federal programs and their  performance, conduct financial and management audits, perform policy  analysis, provide legal opinions, adjudicate bid protests, and conduct  investigations. In 2006, the GAO issued more than 1,000 audit products and  produced a $105 return for each dollar invested in the agency.
GAO has developed substantial expertise on security and reconstruction  issues, as well as having long-term relationships with State, Defense, and  USAID. Our work spans several decades and includes evaluations of U.S.  military and diplomatic programs and activities, including those during  and following contingency operations in Vietnam, the Persian Gulf  (Operations Desert Shield and Storm), Bosnia, and Afghanistan.
We also have many years of expertise in evaluating U.S. efforts to help  stabilize regions or countries; we have, for example, monitored U.S.  assistance programs in Asia, Central America, and Africa. The depth and  breadth of our work and the expertise we have built has helped facilitate  our ability to quickly gather facts and provide insights to the Congress as  events unfold, such as the conflict in Iraq. Our current work draws on our  past work and regular site visits to Iraq and the surrounding region, such  as Jordan and Kuwait. Furthermore, we plan to establish a presence in  Iraq beginning in March 2007 to provide additional oversight of issues  deemed important to Congress. Our plans, however, are subject to  adequate fiscal 2007 funding of GAO by the Congress.
Our work in Iraq spans the three prongs of the U.S. national strategy in  Iraq—security, political, and economic. The broad, cross-cutting nature of  our work helps minimize the possibility of overlap and duplication by  individual IGs. We and other accountability organizations take steps to  coordinate our oversight with others to avoid duplication and leverage our  resources. In that regard, the ability of the Special Inspector General for  Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) to provide in-country oversight of specific  projects and reconstruction challenges has enabled us to focus our work  on more strategic and cross-cutting national, sector, and interagency  issues.
The expansion of SIGIR’s authority underscores the need for close  coordination. We coordinate our work in Iraq through various forums,  including the Iraq Inspectors General Council (IIGC) and regular  discussions with the IG community. Established by what is now SIGIR,  IIGC provides a forum for discussion and collaboration among the IG and  staff at the many agencies involved in Iraq reconstruction activities. Our  work is coordinated through regular one-on-one meetings with SIGIR,  DOD, State, and USAID. We also coordinate our work with other  accountability organizations, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s  (FBI) public corruption unit.
section_title: Key Findings and Recommendations from GAO’s Work in Iraq
paragraphs: Let me highlight some of the key findings and recommendations we have  made as a result of our continuing work in Iraq.
subsections: section_title: Assessment of the November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and the U.S. Military Campaign Plan
paragraphs: In November 2005, the National Security Council issued the National  Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President’s strategy for  achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. The U.S.  goals included establishing a peaceful, stable, and secure Iraq. Our July  2006 report assessed the extent to which the NSVI and its supporting  documents addressed the six characteristics of an effective national  strategy. While we reported that the NSVI was an improvement over  previous U.S. planning efforts for stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq, we  concluded that the strategy fell short in at least three key areas. First, it  only partially identified the agencies responsible for implementing key  aspects of the strategy. Second, it did not fully address how the United  States will integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international  community, and it did not detail Iraq’s anticipated contribution to its  future needs. Third, it only partially identified the current and future costs  of U.S. involvement in Iraq, including maintaining U.S. military operations,  building Iraqi government capacity, and rebuilding critical infrastructure.
We recommended that the NSC improve the current strategy by  articulating clear roles and responsibilities, specifying future  contributions, and identifying current costs and future resources. In  addition, our report urged the United States, Iraq, and the international  community to (1) enhance support capabilities of the Iraqi security forces,  (2) improve the capabilities of the national and provincial governments,  and (3) develop a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy. In our view,  congressional review of the President’s 2007 plan for Iraq should consider  whether it addresses the key elements of a sound national strategy  identified in our July 2006 report.
In October 2005, we issued a classified report on the military’s campaign  plan for Iraq. In that report, we discussed the military’s counterinsurgency  plan for Iraq and the conditions and phases in the plan. The report  contained a recommendation to link economic, governance, and security  indicators to conditions for stabilizing Iraq. Congress acted on our  recommendation in the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act and  required DOD to report on progress toward meeting the conditions  referred to in GAO’s report. We have supplemented this work with a series  of classified briefings to the Congress on changes to the campaign plan  and U.S. efforts to train and equip Iraqi security forces and protect  weapons caches throughout Iraq. We will continue to provide Congress  these classified briefings.
section_title: Limited Transparency on the Costs of the Global War on Terror
paragraphs: Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $495 billion to U.S. agencies  for military and diplomatic efforts in support of the global war on  terrorism; the majority of this amount has gone to stabilize and rebuild  Iraq. Efforts in Iraq involve various activities such as combating  insurgents, conducting civil affairs, building capacity, reconstructing  infrastructure, and training Iraqi military forces. To date, the United States  has reported substantial costs for Iraq and can expect to incur significant  costs in the foreseeable future, requiring decision-makers to consider  difficult trade-offs as the nation faces an increasing number of long-range  fiscal challenges. Funding for these efforts has been provided through  annual appropriations, as well as supplemental appropriations that are  outside the annual budget process. In our view, moving more funding into  baseline budgets, particularly for DOD, would enable decision-makers to  better weigh priorities and assess trade-offs.
As of September 30, 2006, DOD had reported costs of about $257.5 billion  for military operations in Iraq. In addition, as of October 2006, about $29  billion had been obligated for Iraqi reconstruction and stabilization efforts.  However, problems with the processes for recording and reporting GWOT  costs raise concerns that these data may not accurately reflect the true  dollar value of war-related costs.
U.S. military and diplomatic commitments in Iraq will continue for the  foreseeable future and are likely to involve hundreds of billions of  additional dollars. The magnitude of future costs will depend on several  direct and indirect variables and, in some cases, decisions that have not  been made. DOD’s future costs will likely be affected by the pace and  duration of operations, the types of facilities needed to support troops  overseas, redeployment plans, and the amount of military equipment to be  repaired or replaced. Although reducing the number of troops would  appear to lower costs, we have seen from previous operations in the  Balkans and Kosovo that costs could rise—if, for example, increased  numbers of contractors replace military personnel. With activities likely to  continue into the foreseeable future, decision-makers will have to  carefully weigh priorities and make difficult decisions when budgeting for  future costs.
Over the years, we have made a series of recommendations to the  Secretary of Defense intended to improve the transparency and reliability  of DOD’s GWOT obligation data, including recommendations that DOD (1)  revise the cost-reporting guidance so that large amounts of reported  obligations are not shown in “miscellaneous” categories, and (2) take steps  to ensure that reported GWOT obligations are reliable. We also have  recommended that DOD build more funding into the baseline budget once  an operation reaches a known level of effort and costs are more  predictable. In response, the department has implemented many of our  previous recommendations.
section_title: Progress in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraq Has Not Led to Improved Security Conditions
paragraphs: Overall security conditions in Iraq continued to deteriorate in 2006 and  have grown more complex despite recent progress in transferring security  responsibilities to Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi government. The  number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces has increased from  about 174,000 in July 2005 to about 323,000 in December 2006, at the same  time as more Iraqi army units have taken the lead for counterinsurgency  operations in specific geographic areas. Despite this progress, attacks on  coalition forces, Iraqi security forces, and civilians have all increased,  reaching record highs in October 2006. Because of the poor security in  Iraq, the United States could not draw down U.S. force levels in Iraq as  planned in 2004 and 2006, and U.S. forces have continued to conduct  combat operations in urban areas, especially Baghdad.
Transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces and  provincial governments is a critical part of the U.S. government’s strategy  in Iraq and key to allowing a drawdown of U.S. forces. Since 2003, the  United States has provided about $15.4 billion to train, equip, and sustain  Iraqi security forces and law enforcement. However, it is unclear whether  U.S. expenditures and efforts are having their intended effect in  developing capable forces and whether additional resources are needed. A  key measure of the capabilities of Iraqi forces is the Transition Readiness  Assessment (TRA) reports prepared by coalition advisors embedded in  Iraqi units. These reports serve as the basis for the Multinational Force- Iraq (MNF-I) determination of when a unit is capable of leading  counterinsurgency operations and can assume security responsibilities for  a specific area.
The TRA reports provide the coalition commander’s professional  judgment on an Iraqi unit’s capabilities and are based on ratings in  personnel, command and control, equipment, sustainment and logistics,  training, and leadership. To conduct future work on this issue, GAO has  made multiple requests for full access to the unit-level TRA reports over  the last year. However, DOD has not yet complied with our requests. This  serves to seriously and inappropriately limit congressional oversight over  the progress achieved toward a critical U.S. objective.
section_title: DOD May be Unable to Ensure that U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces
paragraphs: Since 2003, the United States has provided about $15.4 billion for Iraqi  security forces and law enforcement. According to Multinational Security  Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) records, MNF-I has issued about  480,000 weapons, 30,000 vehicles, and 1.65 million pieces of gear  (uniforms, body armor, helmets, and footwear), among other items, to the  Iraqi security forces as of October 2006.
Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional  security assistance programs, which, according to DOD officials, provided  DOD with a large degree of flexibility in managing the program. Since the  funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the  accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs did not  necessarily apply, according to DOD officials. It is currently unclear what  accountability measures, if any, DOD has chosen to apply to the train-and- equip program for Iraq, as DOD officials have expressed differing opinions  on this matter. As part of our ongoing work, we have asked DOD to clarify  what accountability measures it has chosen to apply to the program.
While it is unclear which regulations DOD has chosen to apply, beginning  in early 2004, MNF-I established requirements to control and account for  equipment provided to the Iraqi security forces by issuing orders that  outlined procedures for its subordinate commands. These included  obtaining signed records for equipment received by Iraqi units or  individuals and recording weapons serial numbers. Although MNF-I took  initial steps to establish property accountability procedures, limitations  such as the initial lack of a fully operational equipment distribution  network, staffing weaknesses, and the operational demands of equipping  the Iraqi forces during war hindered its ability to fully execute critical  tasks outlined in the property accountability orders. Since late 2005,  MNSTC-I has taken additional steps to improve its property accountability  procedures, including establishing property books for equipment issued  to Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces. According to  MNSTC-I officials, MNSTC-I also recovered existing documentation for  equipment previously issued to Iraqi forces. However, according to our  preliminary analysis, DOD and MNF-I may not be able to account for Iraqi  security forces’ receipt of about 90,000 rifles and about 80,000 pistols that  were reported as issued before early October 2005. Thus, DOD and MNF-I  may be unable to ensure that Iraqi military forces and police received all of  the equipment that the coalition procured or obtained for them.
In our ongoing review, we will continue to assess MNF-I records for Iraqi  equipment distributed to Iraqi forces. We plan on issuing a final report on  these and related intelligence matters by March 2007. Our work focuses on  the accountability requirements for the transportation and distribution of  U.S.-funded equipment and did not review any requirements relevant to  the procurement of this equipment.
section_title: Challenges in Improving Governance and Spending Budgeted Capital Project Funds
paragraphs: The U.S. government faces significant challenges in improving the  capabilities of Iraq’s central and provincial governments so that they can  provide security and deliver services to the Iraqi people. According to  State, the Iraqi capacity for self-governance was decimated after nearly 30  years of autocratic rule. In addition, Iraq lacked competent existing Iraqi  governmental organizations. Since 2003, the United States has provided  the Iraqis with a variety of training and technical assistance to improve  their capacity to govern. As of December 2006, we identified more than 50  capacity development efforts led by at least six U.S. agencies. However, it  is unclear how these efforts are addressing core needs and Iraqi priorities  in the absence of an integrated U.S. plan.
Iraq also faces difficulties in spending budgeted funds for capital goods  and projects in the security, oil, and electricity sectors. When the Iraqi  government assumed control over its finances in 2004, it became  responsible for determining how more than $25 billion annually in  government revenues would be collected and spent to rebuild the country  and operate the government. However, unclear budgeting and  procurement rules have affected Iraq’s efforts to spend capital budgets  effectively and efficiently. Since most of the U.S. reconstruction funds  provided between fiscal years 2003 and 2006 have been obligated,  unexpended Iraqi funds represent an important source of additional  financing. Iraq had more than $6 billion in unspent capital project funds as  of August 2006. For example, Iraq’s Oil Ministry spent only $4 million of  $3.6 billion in budgeted funds to repair Iraq’s dilapidated oil infrastructure.
The inability to spend this money raises serious questions for the  government, which has to demonstrate to citizens who are skeptical that it  can improve basic services and make a difference in their daily lives. The  U.S. government has launched a series of initiatives in conjunction with  other donors to address this issue and improve ministry budget execution.
section_title: Impact of the War on U.S. Military Readiness
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, U.S. military forces have experienced a high  pace of operations to support homeland security missions, Operation  Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and various combat and  counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. These operations have required  many units and personnel to deploy for multiple tours of duty and, in some  cases, to remain for extended tours. DOD faces significant challenges in  maintaining readiness for overseas and homeland missions and sustaining  rotational deployments of duty, especially if the duration and intensity of  current operations continue at the present pace.
Ongoing military operations in Iraq are inflicting heavy wear and tear on  military equipment. Some equipment items used by U.S. forces are more  than 20 years old, and harsh combat and environmental conditions over  time have further exacerbated equipment condition problems. The Army  and the Marine Corps have initiated programs to reset (repair or replace)  equipment and are likely to incur large expenditures in the future. We are  currently assessing these programs, including the extent to which the  military services are tracking reset costs and the extent to which their  reset plans maintain unit equipment readiness while meeting ongoing  operational requirements.
section_title: Problems in Securing Munitions Sites and Providing Force Protection
paragraphs: U.S. ground forces in Iraq have come under frequent and deadly attacks  from insurgents using weapons such as improvised explosive devices  (IED), mortars, and rocket launchers. IEDs, in particular, have emerged as  the number one threat against U.S. forces. Because of the overwhelming  size and number of conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq, combined  with prewar planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, there were an  insufficient number of U.S. and coalition troops on the ground to prevent  the widespread looting of those sites. The human, strategic, and financial  costs of the failure to provide sufficient troops on the ground have been  high, since IEDs made from looted explosives have caused about half of all  U.S. combat fatalities and casualties in Iraq and have killed hundreds of  Iraqis. In addition, unsecured conventional munitions sites have helped  sustain insurgent groups and threatened the achievement of the Operation  Iraqi Freedom’s (OIF) strategic goal of creating a stable Iraqi nation.
DOD’s actions to date have primarily focused on countering IEDs and not  on the security of conventional munitions storage sites as a strategic  planning and priority-setting consideration for future operations. Although  good first steps, these actions do not address what we believe is a critical  OIF lesson learned: If not secured during initial combat operations, an  adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites can represent an  asymmetric threat to U.S. forces that remain in country.
In December 2006, we recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Staff  conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured  conventional munitions in Iraq and incorporate conventional munitions  storage site security as a strategic planning factor into all levels of  planning policy and guidance. DOD partially concurred with our  recommendations.
Efforts to protect U.S. ground forces with increased body and truck armor  have been characterized by shortages and delays, which have reduced  operational capabilities and forced combat commanders to accept  additional risk in completing their missions. We are currently reviewing  force protection measures, including body armor, for current operations,  as well as the organization and management of the Joint IED Defeat to  counter the IED threat.
In prior reports, we recommended that the process for identifying and  funding urgent wartime requirements be improved and that funding  decisions be based on risk and an assessment of the highest priority  requirements. More recently, we have recommended actions to ensure that  the services make informed and coordinated decisions about materiel  solutions developed and procured to address common urgent wartime  requirements. DOD generally agreed with these recommendations.
section_title: Improving DOD Acquisition Outcomes
paragraphs: DOD has relied extensively on contractors to undertake major  reconstruction projects and provide logistical support to its troops in Iraq.  Despite making significant investments through reconstruction and  logistics support contracts, this investment has not always resulted in the  desired outcomes. Many reconstruction projects have fallen short of  expectations, and DOD has yet to resolve long-standing challenges in its  management and oversight of contractors in deployed locations. These  challenges often reflect shortcomings in DOD’s capacity to manage  contractor efforts, including having sufficiently focused leadership,  guidance, a match between requirements and resources, sound acquisition  approaches, and an adequate number of trained contracting and oversight  personnel.
The challenges encountered in Iraq are emblematic of the systemic issues  that DOD faces. In fact, GAO designated DOD’s contract management  activities as a high-risk area more than a decade ago and have reported on  DOD’s long-standing problems with its management and oversight of  support contractors since 1997. For example, because information on the  number of contractor employees and the services they provide is not  aggregated within DOD or its components, DOD cannot develop a  complete picture of the extent to which it relies on contractors to support  its operations. DOD recently established an office to address contractor  support issues, but the office’s specific roles and responsibilities are still  being defined.
In assessing acquisition outcomes government-wide over many years, we  have applied a framework of sound acquisition practices that recognizes  that a prerequisite to having good outcomes is to match well-defined  requirements and available resources. Shifts in priorities and funding  invariably have a cascading effect on individual contracts. Further, to  produce desired outcomes with available funding and within required time  frames, DOD and its contractors need to clearly understand DOD’s  objectives and needs and how they translate into the contract’s terms and  conditions; they need to know the goods or services required, the level of  performance or quality desired, the schedule, and the cost. When such  requirements were not clear, DOD often entered into contract  arrangements that posed additional risks. Managing risks when  requirements are in flux requires effective oversight, but DOD lacked the  capacity to provide sufficient numbers of contracting, logistics, and other  personnel, thereby hindering oversight efforts. With a considerable  amount of DOD’s planned construction work remaining and the need for  continued logistical support for deployed forces, it is essential to improve  DOD’s capacity to manage its contractors if the department is to increase  its return on its investment.
section_title: GAO’s Quality Assurance Framework
paragraphs: GAO’s value to the Congress and the American people rests on its ability  to demonstrate professional, independent, objective, relevant, and reliable  work. To achieve this outcome, we set high standards for ourselves in the  conduct of our work. Our core values of accountability, integrity, and  reliability describe the nature of our work and, most importantly, the  character of our people. In all matters, GAO takes a professional,  objective, and nonpartisan approach to its work. GAO’s quality assurance  framework is designed to ensure adherence to these principles.
The framework is designed around people, processes, and technology and  applies to all GAO work conducted under generally accepted government  auditing standards. GAO has a multidisciplinary staff of approximately  3,200 accountants, health experts, engineers, lawyers, national security  specialists, environmental specialists, economists, historians, social  scientists, actuaries, and statisticians. GAO leverages this knowledge by  staffing engagements with teams proficient in a number of areas. For  example, engagement teams comprise a mix of staff supported by experts  in technical disciplines, such as data collection and survey methods,  statistics, econometric modeling, information technology, and the law. To  add additional value and mitigate risk, GAO has a forensic audits and  special investigations team to expose government fraud, waste, and abuse.
A key process in our quality assurance framework is providing responsible  officials of audited agencies with the opportunity to review and comment  on our draft reports. This policy is one of the most effective ways to  ensure that a report is fair, complete, and constructive.
In April 2005, an international peer review team gave our quality assurance  system a clean opinion—only the second time a national audit institution  has received such a rating from a multinational team. Thus, the Congress  and the American people can have confidence that GAO’s work is  independent, objective, and reliable. The team, under the auspices of the  Global Working Group of national audit institutions, examined all aspects  of GAO’s quality assurance framework. The team found several global  “better practices” at GAO that go beyond what is required by government  auditing standards. These practices included its strategic planning process,  which ensures that GAO focus on the most significant issues facing the  country, serious management challenges, and the programs most at risk.
The team identified other noteworthy practices:    GAO’s audit risk assessment process, which determines the level of  product review and executive involvement throughout the audit  engagement.
GAO’s agency protocols, which provide clearly defined and transparent  policies and practices on how GAO will interact with audited agencies.
GAO’s use of experts and specialists to provide multidisciplinary audit  teams with advice and assistance on methodological and technical  issues—vastly expanding GAO’s capacity to apply innovative approaches  to the analysis of complex situations.
As an organization in constant pursuit of improvement, we benefited from  the peer reviewers’ recognition of our quality control procedures as global  “better practices” as well as their suggestions on how to strengthen  guidance and streamline procedures.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Our work highlights the critical challenges that the United States and its  allies face in the ongoing struggle to help the Iraqis stabilize, secure, and  rebuild their country. Forthright answers to the oversight questions we  posed in our report of January 9, 2007, are needed from the U.S. agencies  responsible for executing the President’s strategy. Congress and the  American people need complete and transparent information on the  progress made toward achieving U.S. security, economic, and diplomatic  goals in Iraq to reasonably judge our past efforts and determine future  directions. For future work, GAO will continue to provide this committee  and Congress with independent analysis and evaluations and coordinate  our efforts with the accountability community to ensure appropriate  oversight of federal programs and spending.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or other members may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please call Joseph A. Christoff at  (202) 512-8979. Other key contributors to this statement were Nanette  Barton, Donna Byers, David Bruno, Dan Cain, Lynn Cothern, Tim  DiNapoli, Mike Ferren, Rich Geiger, Tom Gosling, Whitney Havens, Lisa  Helmer, Patrick Hickey, Henry L. Hinton Jr., John Hutton, Steve Lord, Judy  McCloskey, Tet Miyabara, Mary Moutsos, Ken Patton, Sharon Pickup,  Jason Pogacnik, Jim Reynolds, Donna Rogers, and William Solis.
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