Nuclear Regulatory Commission: NRC Needs to Do More to Ensure that Power Plants Are Effectively Controlling Spent Nuclear Fuel
Published: 2005-04-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Spent nuclear fuel--the used fuel periodically removed from reactors in nuclear power plants--is too inefficient to power a nuclear reaction, but is intensely radioactive and continues to generate heat for thousands of years. Potential health and safety implications make the control of spent nuclear fuel of great importance. The discovery, in 2004, that spent fuel rods were missing at the Vermont Yankee plant in Vermont generated public concern and questions about the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) regulation and oversight of this material. GAO reviewed (1) plants' performance in controlling and accounting for their spent nuclear fuel, (2) the effectiveness of NRC's regulations and oversight of the plants' performance, and (3) NRC's actions to respond to plants' problems controlling their spent fuel.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Nuclear power plants' performance in controlling and accounting for their spent fuel has been uneven. Most recently, three plants--Vermont Yankee and Humboldt Bay (California) in 2004 and Millstone (Connecticut) in 2000--have reported missing spent fuel. Earlier, several other plants also had missing or unaccounted for spent fuel rods or rod fragments. NRC regulations require plants to maintain accurate records of their spent nuclear fuel and to conduct a physical inventory of the material at least once a year. The regulations, however, do not specify how physical inventories are to be done. As a result, plants differ in the regulations' implementation. For example, physical inventories at plants varied from a comprehensive verification of the spent fuel to an office review of the records and paperwork for consistency. Additionally, NRC regulations do not specify how individual fuel rods or segments are to be tracked. As a result, plants employ various methods for storing and accounting for this material. Further, NRC stopped inspecting plants' material control and accounting programs in 1988. According to NRC officials, there was no indication that inspections of these programs were needed until the event at Millstone. NRC is collecting information on plants' spent fuel programs to decide if it needs to revise its regulations and/or oversight. In addition to reviewing specific instances of missing fuel, NRC has had its inspectors collect basic information on all facilities' programs. It has also contracted with the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee to review NRC's material control and accounting programs for nuclear material, including spent fuel. It further plans to request information from plant sites and visit over a dozen of them for more detailed inspection. These more detailed inspections may not be completed until late 2005, over 5 years after the instance at Millstone that initiated NRC's efforts. However, we believe NRC has already collected considerable information indicating problems or weaknesses in plants' material control and accounting programs for spent fuel.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Spent nuclear fuel—the used fuel periodically removed from reactors in  nuclear power plants—is one of the most hazardous materials made by  humans. Without protective shielding, the fuel’s intense radiation can kill a  person within minutes if directly exposed to it or cause cancer in those  exposed to smaller doses. The nation’s 103 operating nuclear power plants,  which generate about 20 percent of U.S. electricity, annually produce over  2,000 metric tons of spent fuel. Absent a national repository, these  materials must be stored on site. Given the potential harm to human health  and the environment, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires  licensees or operators of commercial nuclear power plants to strictly  control and account for their spent fuel. However, several recent  discoveries of missing or unaccounted-for spent fuel have raised concerns  about nuclear power plants’ control over these materials and NRC’s  oversight. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, heightened these  concerns by raising questions about whether these highly radioactive  materials could be diverted or stolen and used maliciously.
A commercial nuclear power plant’s reactor is fueled by small ceramic  pellets of uranium, roughly the size of the tip of one’s little finger. These  pellets are placed end-to-end inside hollow metal tubes (made today of  zirconium alloy), which are then gas pressurized and welded closed. The  filled metal tubes are called fuel rods or pins. Rods are grouped together  into fuel assemblies (also known as fuel bundles), typically about 5 to 10  inches square and 12 to 14 feet long, and placed in the reactor core.  Depending on the type of reactor, an assembly consists of 36 to 289 rods and the core contains from 150 to 800 assemblies. An assembly can weigh  over half a ton. About every 12 to 18 months, the reactor must shut down  for refueling. During this time, about one-fourth to one-third of the fuel  assemblies are removed from the reactor core and replaced with new fuel  assemblies. Removed assemblies are those that have become too  inefficient to power the nuclear reaction (but which have become intensely  radioactive and will continue to generate some amount of heat for tens of  thousands of years).
When removed from the reactor, spent fuel assemblies are placed in racks  in a spent fuel pool. Spent fuel pools are typically 40-foot deep, steel-lined,  concrete vaults filled with water. Water is a natural barrier to radiation, and  it allows the fuel to cool as it becomes less radioactive. Over the course of  years, the spent fuel within the pools has been typically moved or  rearranged to accommodate more spent fuel while maintaining safety. At  some nuclear power sites, spent fuel has also been transferred to dry  storage casks to await permanent disposition at a national repository for  spent fuel, such as the deep underground repository planned at Yucca  Mountain, Nevada. Spent fuel is typically cooled for 5 years before it can be  moved to dry storage casks, which are extremely large and heavy  containers made of steel or steel surrounded by additional concrete that  can hold from 7 to 68 fuel assemblies. However, the majority of spent fuel  at nuclear power plants remains within spent fuel pools. In addition, at a  number of nuclear power plants, fuel assemblies have been disassembled  or reconstituted due to damaged or leaking fuel rods or for inspection and  testing purposes. Disassembly or reconstitution is a delicate process  involving heavy machinery. These individual fuel rods and, if broken, rod  fragments are also stored in the spent fuel pool, either placed at the bottom  or in special containers, repackaged, or in some cases, put back into the  parent spent fuel assembly.
This report discusses (1) nuclear power plants’ performance in controlling  and accounting for their spent nuclear fuel, (2) the effectiveness of NRC’s  regulations and oversight of nuclear power plants’ performance in  controlling and accounting for spent nuclear fuel, and (3) actions that NRC  is taking in response to licensees’ spent fuel control and accounting  difficulties. In the context of this report, control and accounting for spent  nuclear fuel refers to plants’ tracking of and record-keeping for the  movement and storage of their spent nuclear fuel. We did not assess plants’  safety procedures for the handling or storage of spent fuel or plant security  and the vulnerability of spent fuel to theft or terrorist attacks.
To assess nuclear power plants’ performance in controlling and accounting  for their spent nuclear fuel, we reviewed and analyzed relevant documents,  including NRC and nuclear power plant licensees’ event reports, NRC  studies and investigations of missing fuel rods, and other related  documents. We also interviewed NRC and nuclear power plants officials.  To assess NRC’s material control and accounting requirements for spent  fuel stored at nuclear power sites, we reviewed and analyzed relevant  regulations, NRC orders and policies, and interviewed NRC and industry  officials to identify the key NRC requirements and how they are  implemented. To determine how NRC performs oversight of nuclear power  plant material control and accounting activities, we reviewed NRC  inspection policies, instructions, and reports; analyzed relevant Inspector  General reports and internal NRC analyses and studies; interviewed  appropriate NRC program and regional officials; and conducted an e-mail  survey of all NRC lead/senior inspectors located on site at plants about  inspection practices, management controls, and suggestions for  improvements, if viewed necessary. To determine the status of NRC actions  and plans in response to licensees’ spent fuel control and accounting  problems, we reviewed internal NRC memoranda, instructions, and reports  and interviewed appropriate program officials.
A more detailed description of our scope and methodology is presented in  appendix I. More detailed results of our survey of NRC resident inspectors  is presented in appendix II. We performed our work between July 2004 and  February 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: NRC is an independent agency established by the Energy Reorganization  Act of 1974 to regulate civilian uses of nuclear materials. It is responsible  for ensuring that those who use radioactive material—in generating  electricity, for experiments at universities, and for other uses such as in  construction and medicine—do so in a manner that protects the public, the  environment, and workers. NRC has issued licenses to the 103 operating  nuclear power plants and the 7 facilities that produce fuel for these plants.  In addition, NRC, or the 33 states that have agreements with NRC, regulates  about 22,000 other entities that use nuclear materials. For example, in the  medical field, nuclear material licensees annually perform millions of  diagnostic and therapeutic procedures using radioactive material.
NRC is headed by a five-member commission appointed by the President  and confirmed by the Senate. The President designates one commissioner  as Chairman and official spokesperson. NRC has over 3,000 employees who  work in its headquarters office in Rockville, Maryland, and its four regional  offices. NRC is financed primarily by fees it imposes on commercial users  of the nuclear material that it regulates. For fiscal year 2005, NRC’s  appropriated budget of $669 million included approximately $540 million  financed by these fees.
NRC regulates the nation’s commercial nuclear power plants by  establishing requirements for plant owners and operators to follow in the  design, construction, and operation of nuclear reactors. NRC also licenses  the reactors and the people who operate them. To ensure that nuclear  reactors are operated within their licensing requirements and technical  specifications, NRC oversees them by inspecting activities at the plants and  assessing plant performance. NRC’s inspections consist of both baseline  inspections and supplemental inspections to assess particular licensee  programs or issues that arise at a particular power plant. Inspections may  also occur in response to a specific operational problem or event that has  occurred at a plant. NRC maintains from two to three inspectors at every  operating nuclear power site in the United States and supplements the  inspections conducted by these resident inspectors with inspections  conducted by staff from headquarters and/or its regional offices. Generally,  inspectors verify that the plant’s operator qualifications and operations,  engineering, maintenance, fuel handling, security, emergency  preparedness, and environmental and radiation protection programs are  adequate and comply with NRC requirements. An important part of NRC’s  regulatory strategy is that licensees have programs that include monitoring,  maintenance, and inspection to ensure safe operations.
In addition to the construction and operation of commercial nuclear power  plants, NRC regulates the storage, transportation (together with the  Department of Transportation), and disposal of spent fuel. Although  nuclear power licensees ship a small amount of spent fuel off site for  storage and some fuel is stored in dry casks on site, most spent fuel is taken  from the reactor and moved directly to the nuclear power site’s spent fuel  pool.
Spent fuel pools are constructed according to NRC requirements, typically  with 4- to 6-foot thick steel-lined concrete walls and floors. Pools are  typically 30 to 60 feet long, 20 to 40 feet wide, and 40 feet deep. The  location of these pools is dependent on the type of reactor. Essentially, all  commercial nuclear power reactors in the United States are one of two  types, either a boiling water reactor or a pressurized water reactor.For  most boiling water reactors, the pools are located close to the reactors,  several stories above ground. For pressurized water reactors, the pools are  located in structures outside the reactor building, on the ground or partially  embedded in the ground. Regardless of reactor type, these pools are  required by NRC to be constructed to protect the public against radiation  exposure, even after a natural disaster, such as an earthquake. The water in  the pool is constantly cooled and circulated, and the fuel assemblies are  generally 20 feet below the surface of the water.
In 1982, under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the Congress directed the  Department of Energy (DOE) to construct an underground repository for  the disposal of spent fuel and other high-level radioactive waste. The  Congress amended the act in 1987 and required DOE to only consider  Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as a potential site for the repository. In 2002, the  President recommended to the Congress, and the Congress approved,  Yucca Mountain as a suitable site for the development of a permanent high- level waste repository. For a variety of reasons, DOE is unlikely to open the  repository in 2010 as planned.
Lacking a long-term disposal option now, some nuclear utilities must move  a portion of their spent fuel into dry storage or face shutting down their  plants because their spent fuel pools are reaching capacity. The majority of  dry storage facilities are located on site but licensed at a different time  from the power plant. These facilities are known as independent spent fuel  storage installations, or ISFSIs. Once dry storage is approved by NRC,  spent fuel is loaded into dry storage casks, which are steel containers  surrounded by additional steel, concrete, or other material meant to  provide radiation shielding, and are backfilled with inert gas. The full casks  are welded or bolted shut and placed either horizontally or vertically in  concrete vaults or on a concrete pad, depending on the design. Dry storage  casks are very large. According to NRC, a vertical cask may be 20 feet tall  and 9 feet in diameter and could weigh 125 tons fully loaded. Once in place,  the fuel is cooled by air. NRC requires these storage systems to be capable  of protecting against radiation exposure and surviving natural disasters.  Because the move to dry storage is time consuming and expensive, utilities  are, wherever possible, modifying wet pool storage capacity so they can  store larger quantities of spent fuel in these pools.
To ensure that all spent fuel is accounted for and that unauthorized acts  such as theft or diversion are detected, NRC regulations require each  licensee to (1) establish, maintain, and follow written procedures that are  sufficient to enable the licensee to control and account for the material in  storage; (2) conduct a physical inventory of the spent fuel; and (3) maintain  records of receipt as well as records on the inventory (including location),  disposal, and transfer of the material. The physical inventory is required to  be performed at intervals not to exceed 12 months. Compliance with these  requirements is a condition of each plant’s operating license.
There is a high public perception and fear that spent nuclear fuel, if lost or  stolen, could be used maliciously. According to NRC, the control of spent  fuel is of great importance because of the potential health and safety  implications. However, NRC stated that the very high radiation level of  spent fuel makes its theft difficult, dangerous, and very unlikely. NRC also  explained that individual spent fuel rods contain only a very small amount  of nuclear material, making it unlikely that stolen rods could be used to  manufacture a weapon. Theft of many rods would be necessary to acquire  enough material to manufacture a weapon. To expose a large number of  people to the harmful effects of radiation, the spent fuel would have to be  released from its protective containers and dispersed over a wide or  densely populated area. Unlike many other hazardous materials, spent fuel  is neither explosive nor volatile. Putting the material in a dispersible form  would be a difficult and dangerous task involving extensive preparation  using special equipment and radiation shielding. In the event of a dispersal,  the most significant health effects would involve persons who inhaled very  small particles. Such particles would be absorbed into the body and  possibly remain there for many years.
According to NRC officials, protective systems at nuclear power reactors  are designed using the concept of “defense in depth.” The officials pointed  out that it is very unlikely that pieces of spent fuel could be out in the  public domain because power reactors have layers of protection and  controls to detect and prevent spent fuel from leaving the spent fuel pool.  Material control and accounting is one of these layers. Physical security,  another layer, relies on measures such as portal radiation monitors, fences,  guards, locks, and limited access. Additional layers relate to safety. For  example, reactors store spent fuel under at least 20 feet of water because of  the heat and radiation. If an item of spent fuel is raised out of the spent fuel  pool, extremely sensitive detectors in the pool area alarm. The officials said  that NRC requires licensees to respond to these alarms and keep records of  them. All parties agree that it is very important to fully account for this  material.
section_title: Nuclear Power Plants Have Had Unaccounted-For Spent Nuclear Fuel
paragraphs: Three nuclear power plants have recently reported the discovery of missing  or unaccounted-for spent nuclear fuel to NRC. These plants were the  Millstone Nuclear Power Station in Connecticut in 2000, the Vermont  Yankee plant in Vermont in 2004, and the Humboldt Bay Power Plant in  California in 2004. NRC’s actions in response to the missing or  unaccounted-for spent fuel at Millstone led directly to identifying the  problems at Vermont Yankee and help identify the problems at Humboldt  Bay. In all three cases, the missing or unaccounted-for spent fuel was in  loose fuel rods or segments of fuel rods that had been removed from the  fuel assemblies. Other plants have also identified possible instances of lost  or unaccounted-for spent fuel.
subsections: section_title: Millstone
paragraphs: At Millstone, two nuclear fuel rods were discovered to be missing when, in  November 2000, the licensee, Northeast Utilities, was involved in a records  reconciliation and verification effort to support preparations to move spent  fuel into dry cask storage. The location of the two full-length fuel rods was  not properly reflected in special nuclear material records. The licensee  reported that in 1972, a fuel assembly was disassembled after it was  removed from the reactor during a shutdown. In 1974 when the fuel  assembly was reassembled, two rods that were damaged were not placed  back into the assembly. Instead, they were placed in a container for  individual rods and stored in the spent fuel pool. Records dated 1979 and  1980 show the individual fuel rods in the container in the spent fuel pool.  However, spent fuel pool map records after 1980 do not show either the  fuel rods or the container. Records do not indicate what happened to these  rods. The licensee’s investigations of the loss centered on the significant  spent fuel pool activities that occurred between 1980 and 1992, which  potentially related to the missing fuel rods. These activities included two  re-racks, which modified the racks to accommodate more fuel assemblies,  and several shipments to facilities licensed to receive irradiated nonfuel  components. The unaccounted-for material from Millstone was never  found; the licensee concluded that the rods were shipped to a low-level  waste disposal facility in Barnwell, South Carolina. NRC undertook a  special inspection to review the licensee’s efforts to locate the missing fuel  rods and in February 2002 agreed with the licensee that the two missing  rods were most likely shipped to the Barnwell facility. In June 2002, NRC  took enforcement action against the licensee and fined the licensee  $288,000 for failure to adequately account for the special nuclear material  contained in the two fuel rods and for failure to report missing material to  NRC in a timely manner.
section_title: Vermont Yankee
paragraphs: Spent fuel at Vermont Yankee was discovered missing in April 2004, as the  NRC resident inspectors at the plant conducted an inspection required by  NRC headquarters in response to the lost spent fuel rods at Millstone. The  resident inspectors found that although the licensee had been performing  an annual physical inventory of the spent fuel pool, the inventory did not  verify that two fuel rod segments contained in a special container stored on  the bottom of the pool were still present in the container. In responding to  the NRC senior resident inspector’s questions, the licensee determined that  two spent fuel rod pieces, the product of a 1979 fuel reconstitution to  replace corroded fuel rods that had failed, were not in the storage location  identified in the inventory records. The two fuel rod pieces were  approximately one-half inch in diameter by approximately 9 inches and  17.75 inches in length.
The Vermont Yankee licensee formed an investigation team to search for  the fuel rod pieces. According to the licensee, the investigation included  inspecting the spent fuel pool, reviewing documents, interviewing past and  present Vermont Yankee employees, and interviewing contractors that had  been associated with spent fuel pool activities and radioactive waste  operations at Vermont Yankee. In July 2004, after identifying an aluminum  cylinder in the spent fuel pool as potentially containing the two fuel rod  pieces, the licensee opened and inspected the cylinder, which in fact  contained the two fuel rod pieces. The licensee concluded that the root  causes of this event were that (1) the special nuclear material account  devices used in inventorying the material had not been properly maintained  and (2) the plant’s special nuclear material inventory and accountability  procedures did not provide guidance for controlling pieces of special  nuclear material as they do for whole fuel assemblies. According to a  licensee representative, it cost the licensee several million dollars to locate  the spent fuel rod pieces and review the plant’s material control and  accounting procedures and activities to determine the root causes of this  incident. The licensee representative also told us that the plant has already  taken or is in the process of taking various corrective actions. For example,  the plant has revised its material control and accounting procedures to  reflect the findings of the root cause analysis.
NRC conducted a special inspection to review the results of the licensee’s  investigation at Vermont Yankee, assess the licensee’s determination of the  root cause, determine whether the licensee and its predecessor were in  compliance with applicable regulations, and identify which findings or  observations may have implications for other nuclear power plants. The  inspection was performed from April through August 2004, and a report  was issued to the licensee in December 2004. NRC inspectors concluded  that the licensee and its predecessor did not keep adequate special nuclear  material inventory records of the two spent fuel rod pieces, did not follow  the licensee’s written procedures when the two spent fuel rod pieces were  moved to a fuel storage container, and did not conduct adequate periodic  physical inventories of the two spent fuel rod pieces. NRC inspectors also  concluded that because the two spent fuel rod pieces remained in the  Vermont Yankee spent fuel pool the entire time the apparent violation  existed, no actual safety consequence resulted from this apparent violation.  Nevertheless, NRC considered the apparent violation a potentially  significant failure of the licensee’s material control and accounting  program. Enforcement action against the licensee for its apparent violation  of material control and accounting regulations is currently under review by  NRC management. A decision is expected sometime in 2005.
section_title: Humboldt Bay
paragraphs: In July 2004, Humboldt Bay officials reported to NRC that in the process of  reviewing records and verifying the contents of the spent fuel pool in  preparation for dry storage operations, the licensee identified a  discrepancy in plant records that questioned the location of three 18-inch  fuel rod segments removed from a single spent fuel rod. A plant record  from 1968 indicated that the three fuel rod segments were stored in the  spent fuel pool in a small container. However, licensee spent fuel shipment  records indicated that the entire fuel assembly, including the rod segments,  had been sent off site for reprocessing in 1969. The licensee notified NRC  of the record discrepancy in the records and the apparent loss of  accountability records for the special nuclear material. The licensee  implemented a program to search the spent fuel pool for the fuel rod  segments, review additional plant records, and interview plant personnel  who were on site during the 1968 to 1969 time period.
In November 2004, NRC officials initiated a special inspection that included  a review of the licensee material control and accounting procedures.  According to an NRC official, current material control and accounting  procedures appear to be adequate, but there were some problems with past  accounting practices. The licensee has completed its physical search of the  spent fuel pool and other areas of the plant for the three rod segments and  has not conclusively identified the missing three 18-inch segments. The  licensee is continuing its review of plant records as well as interviewing  plant personnel who may have knowledge of the whereabouts of the three  fuel rod segments. The licensee issued an interim report of its search  results and evaluations at the end of February 2005. NRC plans to issue an  interim inspection report after reviewing the licensee interim report. A final  inspection report will not be issued until the licensee completes its  investigation, currently expected in May 2005.
section_title: Other Facilities
paragraphs: Another example of an inaccurately accounted-for fuel rod occurred at a  plant that is being decommissioned. The material from its spent fuel pool is  being moved to dry cask storage. In 1974, a failed fuel assembly was being  disassembled because it was leaking. A fuel rod from this assembly was  found to be completely broken in two. The broken rod was supposed to  have been put in a fuel rod storage basket in the spent fuel pool. In 1997, an  attempt was made to verify the presence of the 16-inch fuel rod segment  before the basket was placed into a dry storage cask. The attempt failed,  and because the basket was too tall, it was not placed into the dry storage  cask at that time. In October 2001, because of the case of the lost fuel rods  at Millstone, the licensee decided to again inspect the basket to verify the  presence of the fuel rod segment. While the licensee successfully examined  the basket, it did not find the fuel rod segment. The licensee undertook a  complete review of the site’s spent fuel records and concluded that the  accounting failure resulted from (1) the poor visual clarity in the spent fuel  pool at the time the fuel rod fragment was being placed in the basket and  (2) inadequate care by the operators performing the task. The licensee also  concluded that the fuel rod segment did not contain any fuel pellets  because when the fuel rod broke, the pellets were ejected into the reactor  cooling system and ultimately ground into powder. In January 2002, when  NRC regional inspectors performed a special inspection at the plant  concerning this issue, the inspectors did not take issue with the licensee’s  conclusions concerning the missing fuel rod. However, they did find that— since the same procedures were being used at the other operating plants on  site—the licensee should examine the fuel assembly and fuel rod storage  baskets at these locations to determine that the fuel rods that are supposed  to be in them are actually present. In February 2004, NRC inspectors  reported that the licensee had inspected the baskets and determined that  the existing inventory sheets were correct. NRC closed this matter.
NRC is also aware of additional instances of lost or unaccounted-for spent  fuel. In 1990, a nuclear power plant shipped one more spent fuel rod than  planned. The licensee discovered the discrepancy in 1991, then notified  NRC and corrected its records. On several occasions, licensees reported  “lost” or “missing” spent fuel, but, according to NRC, in each case, the spent  fuel was actually known to be contained within the facility, either in the  reactor coolant system, the spent fuel pool, or a refueling pathway.
The potential exists for missing or unaccounted-for spent fuel rods to be  discovered at additional plants. NRC’s inspections at plants in response to  the Millstone incident revealed that many nuclear power sites (a site may  consist of more than one plant) had removed spent fuel rods from fuel  assemblies or had reconstituted fuel assemblies. In performing these  inspections, NRC inspectors were to obtain from the licensee a list of all  irradiated or spent fuel rods that have been removed from their parent  assembly. Using the current fuel pool map, the inspectors were to identify  the presumed location of the separated rods. Then, by observing from the  edge of the pool, the inspector was to answer whether there were rods in  all of the locations on the map identified as containing separate rods. At  some of these sites, this was not possible. Some containers where rods  were presumably stored were closed or their contents were not visible.  Even when containers were not closed, some contents were unverifiable  because of poor water clarity and lighting and container design. According  to NRC officials, the agency has preliminarily chosen these sites for further  inspection.
section_title: NRC Regulations and Oversight Activities Are Insufficient to Ensure Control of All Spent Fuel
paragraphs: Although NRC requires nuclear power plants to maintain an accurate  record of their spent fuel and its location, agency regulations do not specify  how licensees are to conduct physical inventories of this material nor how  they are to control and account for loose or separated spent fuel rods and  fragments. In addition, NRC oversight does not include routine monitoring  of plants’ compliance with its material control and accounting regulations.
subsections: section_title: NRC Regulations to Control and Account for Special Nuclear Materials Have Several Shortcomings
paragraphs: Under NRC regulations, reactor licensees are required to maintain and  follow written procedures sufficiently to enable them to control and  account for their special nuclear material. They are to keep records  showing the receipt, inventory (including location), disposal, and transfer  of all special nuclear material. Each record of receipt, acquisition, or  physical inventory of special nuclear material must be retained as long as  the licensee has possession of the material and for 3 years following any  transfer of such material. Physical inventories of special nuclear material  must be performed at least annually. However, NRC guidance for material  control and accounting of spent nuclear fuel does not characterize what  constitutes a physical inventory nor how to conduct one.
NRC regulations define physical inventory as the means to determine on a  measured basis the quantity of special nuclear material on hand at a given  time. The regulations also state that the methods of physical inventory and  associated measurements will vary depending on the material being  inventoried and the processes involved. As a result, licensees implement  the physical inventory requirement in different ways. NRC resident  inspectors found that inventories may include anything from comparing a  map with the assembly racks in the spent fuel pool to performing a  comprehensive identification of fuel assemblies according to their serial  numbers. For example, at one site, the NRC resident inspector reported  that the annual inventory is performed in a “piece counting” manner and  does not specifically verify the bundle serial number and fuel pool location.  At another site, the NRC resident inspector reported that the annual  inventory is only conducted for special nuclear material that has been  moved since the last audit. Further, according to an NRC program official,  no definition of physical inventory is provided in NRC’s regulatory  guidance for spent fuel because the concept of physical inventory is a  simple “first course in accounting” term. That is, a physical identification of  items for the purpose of determining the number of items physically on  hand and for comparison with a “book” record, which is the listing of items  according to the accounting records. This NRC official also stated that it’s  what large retailers do at least once a year, it’s a well-understood concept,  and it has never been thought to require clarification until now. An NRC  resident inspector at still another site told us that the annual physical  inventory was an office paperwork review to ensure that all the “i’s were  dotted and t’s were crossed” from past material movements and transfers.  The resident inspector added that the licensee had never actually opened  its storage container to visually verify the accuracy of the paperwork. In  responding to our survey, several resident inspectors suggested that if  licensees sealed their containers—for example, with tamper-safe sealing— the containers would not have to be opened during the physical inventory.  According to NRC officials, verification of items in spent fuel pools is  difficult and time consuming, raises concerns about radiation exposure,  and can be costly.
Additionally, although NRC regulations state that licensees are to control  and account for all special nuclear material, the regulations do not  specifically require licensees to track individual fuel rods or fragments that  may be stored in their spent fuel pools. Further, individual rods, fragments,  or other controlled special nuclear material may or may not be specifically  accounted for in licensees’ inventories. As a result, licensees employed  various methods of storing and accounting for this material. For example,  according to an NRC resident inspector, at one plant the spent fuel rods are  in a closed container in a designated area of the spent fuel pool. According  to the licensee’s procedures, the canister is opened every 6 years and the  presence of the correct number of rods is verified. At another plant, the  licensee told the resident inspector that it was not sure how many fuel rod  fragments are in two storage baskets or how the fragments might be  divided up between the baskets. In responding to our survey, several NRC  resident inspectors described current practices and offered suggestions for  best practices for storing and controlling loose rods and segments. Several  respondents described placing loose spent fuel in “dummy” or “skeleton”  fuel assemblies, which are empty of fuel, or only in specially designed and  approved containers placed in designated cells and racks in the spent fuel  pool. In addition, one resident inspector suggested that given that fuel rod  breaks are often the result of reconstitution, a best practice would be for  the reconstitution of fuel assemblies to be done off site.
Licensees of nuclear power plants also control and account for their  inventories of spent fuel to help meet requirements relating to U.S. treaty  obligations for the control of nuclear material. NRC regulations require  power reactor licensees to submit a Nuclear Material Transaction Report to  the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System every time their  facilities receive or transfer special nuclear material or make corrections to  their material balances. At least once a year, licensees must also submit to  the system material balance reports concerning special nuclear material  received, produced, possessed, transferred, consumed, disposed of, or lost,  and inventory composition reports. This system, which is managed by the  DOE and partially supported by NRC, is operated by a DOE contractor.  Because reporting to the system is done in the amount or weight of the  nuclear material, such as plutonium, rather than the number of items of  spent fuel, nuclear power plant licensees use complex computer programs  to provide estimates of the amount of special nuclear material that these  items contain. According to plant officials we spoke with, their sites send  their annual inventory information to their corporate headquarters to be  calculated and reported to the Nuclear Materials Management and  Safeguards System contractor.
section_title: NRC Does Not Monitor Plants’ Compliance with Its Material Control and Accounting Regulations
paragraphs: Since 1988, NRC inspections of power reactor licensees’ compliance with  material control and accounting requirements have been done on an  exception-only basis—that is, if a particular problem or incident was  reported by the licensee or identified by NRC that warranted investigating.  Since 1988, NRC has not routinely monitored licensee compliance with  material control and accounting regulations or verified that licensees’  inventories are complete and accurate.
In 1984, NRC’s overall inspection program for monitoring nuclear power  plants’ compliance with their licenses had three parts: (1) a minimum  program to be completed at all operating nuclear facilities without  exception, (2) a basic program to be completed at all operating facilities,  but under some circumstances parts did not have to be completed because  of extraordinary demands on limited inspection resources, and (3) a  supplemental program of additional inspections to be done on the basis of  an assessed need or problems at a facility. According to NRC, the basic  program included material control and accounting inspections to be  conducted once every 3 years. In 1988, according to NRC officials, this  requirement for the periodic inspections of material control and accounting was discontinued. Officials said that although there is no written  documentation available, these inspections were discontinued because  spent fuel stored in spent fuel pools was considered to be “self protecting;”  that is, the fuel bundles are heavy, highly radioactive, and contained in 40- foot deep pools of water. Spent fuel was viewed as a low-risk danger to  public health and the environment and a low priority for use of NRC’s  resources.
NRC substantially revised its nuclear reactor oversight process in 2000, but  did not reinstitute routine material control and accounting inspections.  According to NRC, the new process—called the Reactor Oversight  Process—uses more objective, timely, and safety-significant criteria in  assessing nuclear plant performance. NRC stated that the revised program  includes baseline inspections common to all nuclear plants and focuses on  activities and systems that are risk significant—that is, those activities and  systems that have a potential to trigger an accident, increase the  consequences of an accident, or mitigate the effects of an accident. The  Reactor Oversight Process also allows for inspections beyond the baseline  program if there are operational problems or events that NRC believes  require greater scrutiny. Material control and accounting fall under this  criteria. When the new process was being developed, NRC officials  continued to believe that the material in spent fuel pools was self  protecting and that it was appropriate to perform material control and  accounting inspections on an exception-only basis. NRC officials told us  that there were no indications prior to the discovery of missing fuel rods at  Millstone that routine inspections were needed.
According to NRC officials, a few Reactor Oversight Process inspections  can indirectly involve NRC inspections of licensees’ material control and  accounting programs. One of these inspections is of licensee operations  during refueling of the reactor. This inspection includes verifying that the  location of fuel assemblies is being tracked and that discharged fuel  assemblies are placed in permissible locations in the spent fuel pool. To  perform such an inspection, NRC inspectors observe the movement of a  sample of fuel bundles between the reactor core and the spent fuel pool.  NRC officials told us that material control and accounting problems with  spent fuel may also be reviewed under plant status inspections. These  inspections involve a number of activities surrounding NRC resident  inspectors’ efforts to be aware of emergent plant issues, potential adverse  trends, equipment problems, and other ongoing activities that may impact  the plant’s safety risks. These efforts include control room walkdowns,  attending licensee meetings, and weekly plant tours. Inspectors generally  would not learn of material control and accounting problems during one of  these inspectors unless the licensee was aware of them and raised them  during meetings with the inspectors. In addition, a few NRC resident  inspectors that we surveyed mentioned some review of spent fuel records  during the loading of dry storage fuel casks.
section_title: NRC Is Studying Spent Fuel Control and Accounting Problems but Has Yet to Revise Its Regulations or Oversight Policies
paragraphs: In light of the missing or unaccounted-for spent fuel at Millstone and  subsequently at other locations, NRC has various activities under way to  assess the need to revise its regulations and oversight of spent fuel. While  final completion dates for these efforts have not been set, it will likely be  late in 2005 before all of them will be completed. This date would be over 5  years after the spent fuel rods were first found missing at Millstone in 2000.  We believe that after the more recent instances of missing spent fuel at  Vermont Yankee and Humboldt Bay, the 2003 NRC Office of the Inspector  General report outlining weaknesses in NRC’s oversight of special nuclear  materials (including spent fuel), and information collected during its  ongoing efforts, NRC has considerable information that suggests the need  to address nuclear power plants’ material control and accounting  problems, including compliance with NRC regulations. According to NRC  officials, they plan to submit the results of these activities to the NRC  Commissioners in the spring of 2005. The Commissioners will decide what,  if any, actions will be taken in response to the findings.
subsections: section_title: NRC Is Using a Multifaceted, Phased Approach to Assess the Need to Revise Its Regulations and Oversight
paragraphs: NRC has three principal activities under way to assess the need to revise its  regulations and oversight of spent fuel. These are (1) a three-phase project  under which NRC inspectors are collecting information on the status of  material control and accounting programs at individual plants; (2) a  comprehensive program review of NRC material control and accounting  programs for special nuclear materials, including spent fuel, through the  contract with DOE’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory; and (3) a bulletin  issued on February 11, 2005, to nuclear power plant licensees requesting  information concerning their compliance with NRC material control and  accounting regulations.
In November 2003, NRC issued a temporary instruction (TI) to its  inspection manual. NRC’s overall objective in issuing the TI was to gather  site-specific information on nuclear power plants’ material control and  accounting programs to determine if the issues affecting the missing spent  fuel rods at Millstone were present at other power plants. More specifically,  NRC wanted to obtain enough information to determine if  material control and accounting guidance for nuclear power plants  should be modified to reduce the possibility of a licensee losing spent  fuel rods in the future;  licensees can account for all spent fuel, including any rods that have  been separated from their parent assembly; and  all items of spent fuel listed in the spent fuel inventory, including rods  that have been separated from their parent assembly, can be located in  the spent fuel pool.
The TI also called for obtaining site-specific data for the purposes of  improving the plants’ material control and accounting programs. According  to the TI, several inspection activities were aimed at identifying conditions  for future program improvement rather than inspections for compliance  with regulatory requirements.
NRC is carrying out the TI in three phases. Phases I and II have been  completed. In phase I, NRC regional and/or resident inspectors determined  if nuclear power plant licensees had ever removed irradiated (spent) fuel  rods from an assembly or had reconstituted fuel assemblies. For licensees  that had removed rods or reconstituted assemblies, phase II was  conducted. During phase II, inspectors used inspections and interviews to  fill out a questionnaire about the licensees’ material control and accounting  programs. Among the questions were the following:  Does the licensee have a program that tracks individual fuel rods from  the point of removal from a fuel assembly to where they are stored in  the spent fuel pool and to their final destination?
Are there rods in all of the locations identified on the spent fuel map (or  equivalent) as containing separated rods? (The inspectors were  instructed to obtain from licensees a list of all spent fuel rods that had  been removed from their parent assembly and, to the extent possible,  answer this question by observing from the edge of the spent fuel pool.  If the rods were stored in a closed container, they were to report this  under the “Comments” section of the questionnaire.)
Does the licensee have written material control and accounting  procedures approved by licensee management?
Does the licensee have written procedures for the movement of  individual spent fuel rods within the spent fuel pool?
Does the licensee have procedures for performing oversight of all spent  fuel pool operations?
Does the licensee have records documenting spent fuel pool operations  conducted by contractors or fuel vendors?
Does the licensee perform an annual physical inventory of the spent fuel  pool that includes resolution of all discrepancies?
The TI did not specify an approach to answering the questions but instead  allowed the resident inspectors to use their best judgment and experience.  Our survey of NRC’s senior resident inspectors identified some differences  in what the inspectors did to answer the phase II questions. The inspectors  generally interviewed licensee staff and reviewed licensees’ records and  written procedures. For the most part, they also used the licensee’s map to  verify materials in the spent fuel pool. About half used visual tools such as  binoculars or underwater cameras to verify materials in the spent fuel pool.  About one-fifth observed licensee activities.
Phase III, which has not begun, is to expand on the questions in phase II  with more detailed inspection and review of site documentation to verify  that procedures or controls are implemented and that they are adequate.  For a sample of sites, including those for which “no” was answered to any  of the phase II questions, personnel with material control and accounting  expertise, rather than the regional and on-site inspectors, are to carry out  the activities.
The TI called for phases I and II to be completed within 6 months (by May  2004) and phase III within 18 months (by May 2005). Phases I and II were  carried out from January 2004 to May 2004. The phase I review at 70 sites— all 103 operating nuclear power plants at 65 sites (a site may contain more  than one nuclear power plant), decommissioning plants at 4 sites, and 1  wet storage facility—identified 65 sites that had removed irradiated fuel  rods from an assembly or had reconstituted fuel assemblies. Phase II was  conducted for these sites. On the basis of the phase II results, NRC officials  determined that at least 19 sites were candidates for more detailed phase  III review because NRC inspectors identified that the site had two or more  programmatic issues. As of February 2005, NRC officials told us that they  are in the planning stages for phase III inspections. Because the TI expires  2 years after its November 2003 issuance, if the phase III inspection were to  be performed before this, it would be late 2005 before the project would be  completed.
In September 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade  Center and the Pentagon, the Chairman of NRC directed the staff to  undertake a comprehensive review of all the agency’s safeguards and  security programs. NRC contracted with the Oak Ridge National  Laboratory in August 2003 to review NRC’s material control and accounting  programs for special nuclear materials at all NRC licensees. This contract,  which according to an NRC official was for about $500,000, was part of a  broader NRC effort. The Oak Ridge laboratory, which was chosen because  of its expertise in material control and accounting, began the work under  the contract in September 2003. Its four principal tasks were to (1) review  NRC’s current material control and accounting requirements, (2) discuss  material control and accounting with current and former employees  involved in these activities, (3) visit selected facilities representing  different types of special nuclear material licensees to explore current  material control and accounting requirements and inspection practices at  each site, and (4) develop a report that offers Oak Ridge’s views on NRC’s  material control and accounting requirements across the range of NRC- licensed facilities, discusses any concerns or deficiencies with the current  regulations and inspection practices, and provides specific  recommendations for programmatic changes. Oak Ridge submitted its  report in August 2004 and concluded its work with a management briefing  in October 2004. NRC is currently reviewing the report. According to NRC  officials, the staff will complete its review of the report and consider the  results of its review, as well as additional recommendations from the staff,  in developing a paper to the NRC Commissioners. The paper is due to the  Commissioners by spring 2005.
In February 2005, NRC issued a bulletin to holders of operating licenses for  nuclear power plants, decommissioning nuclear power plants storing spent  fuel in a pool, and wet spent fuel storage sites. The bulletin, which requests  information about procedural controls and inventories, responds to issues  involving accounting and control of spent (and other irradiated) nuclear  fuel, which were first identified at Millstone and then at Vermont Yankee  and Humboldt Bay. The purpose of the bulletin is to gather specific  information from the licensees about the status of control and accounting  of special nuclear material at power reactors and other facilities with wet  storage of irradiated fuel. NRC officials told us that results from the  bulletin will contribute to assessing the need to revise the current NRC  material control and accounting regulations and inspection program. The  results from the bulletin will also determine where phase III inspections  will be conducted.
section_title: NRC Has Considerable Information Indicating Problems with the Control and Accounting for Spent Fuel
paragraphs: The data collected by NRC inspectors during phases I and II of the TI  identified material control and accounting problems or shortcomings. Of  the sites that had removed fuel rods from their parent assemblies or had  reconstituted fuel assemblies, the inspectors reported that some sites did  not appear to be in compliance with all of NRC’s material control and  accounting requirements or otherwise had questionable material control  and accounting practices involving procedures, physical inventory,  accounting records, or tracking and control.
Additionally, in May 2003, NRC’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG)  issued its report, Audit of NRC’s Regulatory Oversight of Special Nuclear  Materials. In its report, the OIG concluded that NRC’s oversight did not  provide adequate assurance that all licensees properly control and account  for special nuclear material. The OIG found that NRC performed limited  inspections of licensees’ material control and accounting activities and  could not assure the reliability of the tracking system for special nuclear  material. It stated that NRC managers believed that most spent fuel is self- protecting from a health and safety point of view and that the risk of  undetected loss, theft, or diversion of special nuclear material at power  reactors is low. Therefore, according to the OIG, NRC trusts power reactor  licensees to implement their material control and accounting activities  effectively. The OIG further concluded that without adequate routine  inspections of these activities, NRC cannot reasonably ensure that  licensees are controlling and fully accounting for special nuclear material.  The OIG recommended, among other things, that NRC conduct periodic  inspections to verify that licensees comply with material control and  accounting requirements, including, but not limited to, visual inspection of  licensees’ special nuclear material inventories and validation of report  information.
In its October 2003 response to the OIG recommendation, NRC said that its  staff planned to perform a review of the agency’s material control and  accounting program (which it did by commissioning the Oak Ridge study)  as part of a comprehensive review of the agency’s safeguards and security  program. NRC added that based on the results of the program review, the  staff will determine what changes need to be made to the inspection  program. According to NRC’s response, any decision to change the  inspection program would be made during fiscal year 2005, following  completion of the program review. In February 2004, the OIG responded by  stating that delaying any decision to make changes to the material control  and accounting inspection program until fiscal year 2005 was untimely and  did not reflect the importance of ensuring licensee’s compliance with  material control and accounting requirements. In March 2004, NRC replied  that the staff considered the program review to be vital to developing and  documenting the regulatory basis for subsequent permanent revisions to  the inspection program. An NRC official told us that once the Oak Ridge  study has been completed and its findings and recommendations have been  addressed, the OIG’s recommendation can be closed. The staff currently  anticipates that it will develop specific recommendations and submit them  to the NRC Commissioners during the spring of 2005.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The effectiveness of nuclear power plants’ efforts to control and account  for their spent fuel is uneven. A number of plants have experienced  instances of missing or unaccounted-for spent fuel, and NRC has identified  weaknesses in the material control and accounting programs at various  other plants. Contributing to this unevenness is the fact that NRC  regulations do not specifically require plants to control and account for  loose rods or segments of rods. Although loose spent fuel rods do not  appear to have been a concern when NRC developed its regulations, recent  information collected by NRC indicates that most plants have removed  rods from their fuel assemblies or reconstituted fuel assemblies. NRC data  further indicate that plants are treating loose rods and segments differently  under their material control and accounting programs. The absence of  specific guidance in NRC regulations for how licensees should conduct  physical inventories has also resulted in unevenness in licensees’  compliance with these important requirements.
Loose spent fuel rods and rod segments also were not an issue when NRC  stopped inspecting licensees’ compliance with material control and  accounting regulations. Spent fuel was generally viewed in terms of fuel  assemblies, which NRC considered to be, in effect, self-protecting because  of their high radioactivity and large size and weight. However, individual  rods, and especially rod segments, are also highly radioactive and are much  smaller and lighter than fuel assemblies. This issue was first raised in 2000,  with the loss of spent fuel rods at Millstone. The occurrences of missing or  unaccounted-for spent fuel rods and the unevenness in licensees’  compliance with material control and accounting requirements highlight  the need for more effective oversight of these programs. In the aftermath of  terrorist attacks on the United States, material control and accounting of  spent nuclear fuel has become more important. Material control and  accounting requirements are of great importance because of the potential  health and safety consequences of failing to effectively account for and  control spent nuclear fuel. While NRC’s multifaceted and phased approach  to these issues may have been appropriate in the initial context of a single  incident at Millstone, waiting longer to make a decision on changes in the  agency’s regulations and oversight is—as the OIG stated in February  2004—not timely and does not fully reflect the importance of ensuring that  licensees comply with control and accounting requirements for spent fuel.  We believe that NRC has sufficient information about problems with  material control and accounting at nuclear power plants to proceed with  revising NRC’s regulations and oversight.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the effectiveness of nuclear reactor licensees’ material control  and accounting programs for spent nuclear fuel, we recommend that the  NRC Commissioners take action, in a timely manner, on the following two  items:  Establish specific requirements for the control and accounting of loose  spent fuel rods and rod segments and nuclear reactor licensees’ conduct  of their physical inventories.
Develop and implement appropriate inspection procedures to verify  compliance and assess the effectiveness of licensees’ material control  and accounting programs for spent fuel.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to NRC for review and comment. In its  written comments (see app. III), NRC generally agreed with the report’s  conclusions and stated that, overall, the report is well written and  balanced. Regarding our recommendation that NRC establish specific  requirements for the control and accounting of loose spent fuel rods and  rod segments and nuclear reactor licensees’ conduct of their physical  inventories, NRC stated that it will develop guidance concerning control  and accounting of rods and pieces of spent nuclear fuel and the conduct of  physical inventories. According to NRC, its current regulations are clear  that licensees are required to keep complete records of and conduct annual  physical inventories of all special nuclear material, but the implementation  guidance does need to be enhanced. Regarding our recommendation that  NRC develop and implement appropriate inspection procedures to verify  compliance and assess the effectiveness of licensees’ material control and  accounting programs for spent fuel, NRC said that it plans to revise its  existing procedures for inspecting material control and accounting for  spent nuclear fuel to include instruction on inspecting control and  accounting of rods and pieces.
In addition to comments directly relating to our recommendations, NRC  offered a number of comments concerning the report’s context. For  example, NRC said that its development and issuance of its temporary  instruction was postponed by the need to devote NRC’s limited resources  to areas requiring more immediate attention, especially the comprehensive  security and radiological protection activities conducted after the  September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. NRC also said that the report needs  to provide balance by giving credit to NRC for making prioritized decisions  based on a variety of factors, including, but not limited to, risk of  malevolent action, attractiveness of the material for potential malevolent  activities, other controls, and available personnel resources. According to  NRC, there is no reason to conclude that any of the missing fuel segments  were removed for any malevolent purpose. NRC further stated that the  report does not make sufficiently clear that the problems at Vermont  Yankee were identified as a direct result of NRC’s implementation of its  temporary instruction and that implementation of the temporary  instruction also helped identify the problems at Humboldt Bay. We believe  that our report provides sufficient context for the issues relating to the  instances of unaccounted-for spent nuclear fuel. It also devotes  considerable attention to describing NRC’s actions in response to those  instances, including efforts already under way when we began our review.  We have added language to the report to emphasize that NRC’s actions in  response to the Millstone incident led directly to identifying the problems  at Vermont Yankee and helped identify the problems at Humboldt Bay.  While we also agree that there is no evidence that any of the missing fuel  segments were removed for malevolent purposes, we note that it is still not  certain what happened to the missing spent fuel at Millstone and Humboldt  Bay.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the  date of its issuance. At that time, we will send copies of this report to  interested congressional committees, the Chairman of NRC, and other  interested parties. We will make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please call me at  (202) 512-3841 or contact me at Wellsj@gao.gov. Key contributors to this  report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess nuclear power plants’ performance in controlling and accounting  for their spent nuclear fuel, we reviewed and analyzed relevant documents,  including Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and nuclear power plant  licensees’ event inquiry reports and NRC studies and investigations of  missing spent fuel rods. We also interviewed NRC and nuclear power plant  officials and conducted two site visits to nuclear power plants. In the  context of this report, control and accounting for spent nuclear fuel refers  to plants’ tracking of and recordkeeping for the movement and storage of  their spent nuclear fuel. We did not assess plant safety procedures for  handling or storage of spent fuel or plant security and the vulnerability of  spent fuel to theft or terrorist attacks.
To assess NRC’s material control and accounting requirements for spent  fuel stored at nuclear power sites, we reviewed and analyzed relevant  legislation, regulations, and NRC orders and policies and we interviewed  NRC and industry officials to identify the key NRC requirements and how  they are implemented.
To determine how NRC performs oversight of nuclear power plants’  material control and accounting activities, we reviewed NRC inspection  policies, instructions, and reports; analyzed relevant NRC Inspector  General reports and internal NRC analyses and studies; and interviewed  appropriate NRC program and regional officials. To determine the status of  NRC’s actions and plans in response to licensees’ spent fuel control and  accounting problems, we reviewed internal NRC memorandums,  instructions, and reports and interviewed appropriate program officials.
To further explore how NRC performs oversight of control and accounting  activities for spent fuel at nuclear power plants, we conducted an e-mail  survey of all NRC lead/senior inspectors located on site at the plants about  NRC inspection practices, management controls, and the inspectors’  suggestions for improvements, if viewed necessary. There are no sampling  errors because this was not a sample survey; rather, we sent and received a  response from every lead/senior inspector at every site.
Nonetheless, the practical difficulties in developing and administering any  survey may introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors.  For example, difficulties may arise in how a particular question is  interpreted or from differences in experiences and information available to  respondents when answering a question. We took steps in the development  of the survey, its administration, and the data editing to minimize these  nonsampling errors. We conducted three pretests of the survey instrument.
The first pretest was with two inspectors at one location by telephone; the  second and third pretests were with expert NRC officials, both by  telephone. We modified the survey instrument to reflect questions,  comments, and concerns received during the pretests. The instrument was  also internally reviewed by one of our survey methodologists. In addition,  we edited all completed surveys for consistency and contacted NRC  inspectors to clarify responses whenever necessary. While our survey  responses reflect the opinions of NRC resident inspectors, to ensure the  reliability that our survey data was accurate and complete and that  spreadsheet calculations were correct, 100 percent of the data entry and all  formulas were internally and independently checked and verified.
Through discussions with appropriate NRC officials, we determined in the  course of developing our survey that although there are 103 plants  currently in operation in the United States, some reactors are colocated on  a total of 65 sites. Because only one of the two or three inspectors assigned  to each site is designated as the lead NRC authority, we sent our survey to  that person. Therefore, we sent our survey to a total of 65 senior/lead NRC  inspectors. We expected that given their experience, the lead/senior  inspector would obtain additional views and input from the other resident  inspectors if they felt it was needed. For example, this additional input  would be important if the other inspectors performed the requirements of  the temporary instruction for inspection of material control and accounting  at nuclear power sites, or if the senior resident was newer to and,  therefore, less familiar with the practices and history of the material  control and accounting program at the site. We received 67 responses to  our survey. In one case, we received a response from the senior inspector  and an additional resident inspector at the same site. We kept only the  senior inspector’s response in our analysis and deleted the other response  from that site. In the second instance where we received two responses  from one site, special circumstances at that site provided for two senior  resident inspectors, but one of those inspectors is primarily responsible for  the recovery effort of one of the units at that site. We excluded that  inspector’s response from our analysis, retaining only the response from  the senior inspector with the more general role. This left us with 65  responses for a 100 percent response rate. The detailed results of our  survey of NRC resident inspectors are presented in appendix II.
We performed our work primarily in Washington, D.C., between July 2004  and February 2005, in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
section_title: Summary Results of GAO Survey of NRC Senior/Lead Resident Inspectors
paragraphs: Overall, we received 65 responses to our survey.  Our detailed scope and  methodology (Appendix 1) contains particulars regarding the development and  administration of the survey.   Not all of the respondents answered all questions.   This may have been a result of either the respondent’s choice or they may have been  instructed to skip a question according to their previous response.  Throughout this  appendix, we will note the number of respondents answering each question by  noting “n=number of respondents to this question”.
The Vermont congressional delegation, along with a member from a nearby  Massachusetts district, has asked the U. S.  Government Accountability Office to  review the NRC’s oversight of licensees’ material control and accounting program for  spent nuclear fuel at commercial nuclear power plants.
As part of our review, we have met with NRC officials in headquarters and at the  regional level.  We have spent a day touring a nuclear power plant, discussing and  reviewing licensee procedures.  With this survey, we are gathering information on  resident inspectors’ activities and views related to this issue. We are distributing the  following survey to all NRC senior resident inspectors.
Your contribution to our efforts is gratefully appreciated.  The information you  provide will assist us in responding to Congressional interest on this important issue.
Please complete and return this survey by November 24, 2004  Simply reply to this email by selecting "Reply to Sender (include message)" and then  type in your responses by the return date.  Although we are sending this to senior  resident inspectors, please feel free to include other resident inspectors at your site  in developing your answers.  If you do include other inspectors, please provide the  contact information of all inspectors contributing to the survey in Question 1.
If you have any questions about this survey or have problems submitting your  response, please contact Melissa A. Roye by phone at (202) 512-6426 or by email at  RoyeM@gao.gov. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~BEGIN SURVEY~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  1.  In case we would like to clarify any of your responses, please provide the  following information for ALL persons involved in submitting information requested  in this survey (please copy and paste fields for Respondent 3+, if necessary):  Respondent 1 (n=65)  Name: Title: Phone number:    Site Name/Location:    Months at current site: Months as SRI or RI at any site: Months at NRC: Respondent 2 Name: Title: Phone number:    Site Name/Location:    Months at current site: Months as SRI or RI at any site: Months at NRC: Material Control and Accounting Related Activities: 2.  What did you do to execute the requirements of “Spent Fuel Material Control and  Accounting at Nuclear Power Plants,” Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/154?    Please mark all that apply.  (n=65)
Interviews   Records review   Review of licensee's written procedures   Observation of licensee activities  Verification of materials in the spent fuel pool using a map   Verification of materials in the spent fuel pool using visual aides such as  binoculars or underwater cameras   Only Phase I of the TI was completed at this site   At this site, the TI was conducted by someone else.  Name of Inspector(s):           22 provided a name and some also included an explanation.   Other?  Please explain: 10 provided explanation.  3.  Do you routinely inspect or verify the licensee’s material control and accounting  program policies, records, or procedures for spent nuclear fuel?  (n=65)   Yes. Please elaborate below, if you wish.   No. Please elaborate below, if you wish.   Don’t know (Please go to question 4).
Page 2 Elaboration:  Overall, 42 respondents provided an elaboration.     Of that 42, 23 responded yes and 19 responded no.   4.  Do you engage in inspection activities under the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP)  that indirectly involve material control and accounting for spent fuel?  (n=65)   Yes. Please elaborate below, if you wish.   No. Please elaborate below, if you wish.   Don’t know (Please go to question 5)
Elaboration: Overall, 53 respondents provided an elaboration.
Of that 53, 49 responded yes and 4 responded no.  5.  Do you engage in additional oversight activities (beyond the requirements of the  ROP) that aid you in assessing the licensee’s abilities for material control and  accounting of spent fuel?  (n=65)   Yes. Please elaborate below, if you wish.   No. Please elaborate below, if you wish.   Don’t know (Please go to question 6)
Elaboration: Overall, 23 respondents provided an elaboration.
Of that 23, 13 responded yes and 10 responded no.  6.  Do you think that the NRC should be doing more with regard to the oversight of  material control and accounting for spent fuel?  (n=65)   Yes. Please elaborate below, if you wish, and then go to question 7.   No. Please elaborate below, if you wish, and then go to question 8.   Don’t know (Please go to question 8)
Elaboration:  Overall, 38 respondents provided an elaboration.
Of that 38, 20 responded yes, 12 responded no, and 6 responded that  they did not know.  7.  Would you need more training to perform oversight of the licensee’s material  control and accounting program?  (n=26)   Yes. Please elaborate below, if you wish.  No. Please elaborate below, if you wish.  Don’t know (Please go to question 8)
Elaboration: Overall, 13 respondents provided an elaboration.  Of that 13, 5 responded yes and 8 responded no.  In addition, there were 23 respondents who should have skipped this  question based on their previous response but chose to answer it  anyway.  Of that 23, 8 also provided us with further elaboration; 3  responded yes, 3 responded no, and 2 responded that they did not  know.
Page 3 8.  With regard to the material control and accounting of spent fuel, do you have any  best practices or lessons learned to share?  For example, the transferring of fuel  pellets from broken pins into new pins, the insertion of pins into skeleton assemblies,  or any recordkeeping improvements.  (n=65)   Yes. Please elaborate below, if you wish, and then go to question 9.   No. Please elaborate below, if you wish, and then go to question 10.   Don’t know (Please go to question 10)
Elaboration: Overall, 17 respondents provided an elaboration.     Of that 17, 14 responded yes and 3 responded no.   9.  Please indicate if these best practices or policies: (n=12; respondents could check  all that could apply)   Are in place at your current site.  Please elaborate below, if you wish.  Were learned or practiced elsewhere.  Please elaborate below, if you wish.  Are just something you believe can improve procedures and the oversight  process.
Please elaborate, if you wish:  3 respondents provided elaboration.  Of those three, all  described practices or policies in place at their current site and one respondent  stated that it is something they believe can improve procedures and the oversight  process.
Other.    Please explain:  One respondent provided an explanation to discuss a  best practice or policy.   10.  Please share with us any additional comments: (n=16)  16 respondents provided an elaboration.
Thank you for your participation.
section_title: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individuals named above, Ilene Pollack and Melissa A.  Roye made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report  were John W. Delicath, Doreen Feldman, Judy K. Pagano, Keith A. Rhodes,  and Barbara Timmerman.