Information Sharing: DHS Has Demonstrated Leadership and Progress, but Additional Actions Could Help Sustain and Strengthen Efforts
Published: 2012-09-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Recent planned and attempted acts of terrorism on U.S. soil underscore the importance of the need to ensure that terrorism-related information is shared with stakeholders across all levels of government in an effective and timely manner. DHS, through its Office of Intelligence and Analysis, has responsibility for sharing this information and has established an information-sharing vision for 2015which includes ensuring that the right information gets to the right people at the right time. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which DHS (1) has made progress in achieving its information-sharing mission, and (2) tracks and assesses information-sharing improvements. GAO analyzed relevant DHS documents, such as strategic planning documents and those related to DHSs governance structure, among others, and interviewed DHS officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress in achieving its information-sharing mission, but could take additional steps to improve its efforts. Specifically, DHS has demonstrated leadership commitment by establishing a governance board to serve as the decision-making body for DHS information-sharing issues. The board has enhanced collaboration among DHS components and identified a list of key information-sharing initiatives. The board has also developed and documented a process to prioritize some of the initiatives for additional oversight and support. However, because DHS has not revised its policies and guidance to include processes for identifying information-sharing gaps and the results; analyzing root causes of those gaps; and identifying, assessing, and mitigating risks of removing incomplete initiatives from its list, it does not have an institutional record that would help it replicate and sustain those information-sharing efforts. Overall, DHSs key information-sharing initiatives have progressed, and most have met interim milestones. However, progress has slowed for half of the 18 key initiatives, in part because of funding constraints. For example, 5 of DHSs top 8 priority information-sharing initiatives currently face funding shortfalls. The board has not been able to secure additional funds for these initiatives because they ultimately compete for funding within the budgets of individual components, but DHS officials noted that the boards involvement has kept some initiatives from experiencing funding cuts. DHS is also developing plans that will be important in managing its information-sharing efforts, such as a revised strategy for information sharing and a related implementation plan.
DHS has taken steps to track its information-sharing efforts, but has not yet fully assessed how they have improved sharing. Specifically, DHS is tracking the implementation progress of key information-sharing initiatives, but the department does not maintain completion dates and does not fully assess the impact initiatives are having on sharing. Determining and documenting initiative completion dates and how initiatives affect sharing, where feasible, would help the board better track progress in implementing the initiatives and make any necessary course corrections if completion dates are delayed. Further, DHS has begun to assess the extent to which its technology programs, systems, and initiativeswhich include the key information-sharing initiativeshave implemented critical information-sharing capabilities, such as secure user access authorization. However, DHS has not yet determined the specific capabilities each particular program must implement for DHS to conclude that it has improved information sharing enough to achieve its information-sharing vision for 2015. Establishing the level of capabilities programs must implement could help DHS prioritize programs, and track and assess progress toward its vision. In addition, DHS is in the process of implementing customer feedback measures on the usefulness of information provided and has taken steps to assess customers information needs. DHS has not yet developed measures that determine the impact of its information-sharing efforts on homeland security, but plans to develop ways to assess information-sharing results toward achieving its 2015 vision. DHSs time frames for completing this effort are to be included in forthcoming plans currently being developed.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DHS revise its policies and guidance to include processes for identifying information-sharing gaps, analyzing root causes of those gaps, and identifying, assessing, and mitigating risks of removing incomplete initiatives from its list; better track and assess the progress of key information-sharing initiatives; and establish the level of capabilities programs must implement to meet its vision for 2015. DHS agreed with these recommendations and identified actions taken or planned to implement them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Recent planned and attempted acts of terrorism on U.S. soil underscore  the importance of ensuring that terrorism-related information is shared  with stakeholders across all levels of government, the private sector, and  foreign countries in an effective and timely manner. Consistent with the  Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007  (9/11 Commission Act) and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism  Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act), among other statutes,  the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has responsibility for  sharing terrorism-related information with federal, state, local, tribal,  territorial, international, and private sector partners. DHS is also one of  five key agencies tasked with responsibilities related to establishing the  Information Sharing Environment (ISE)—a statutorily mandated  governmentwide approach to facilitate the sharing of terrorism-related  information.
We have designated terrorism-related information sharing as high risk  because the government faces formidable challenges in analyzing and  disseminating this information in a timely, accurate, and useful manner. Our work on this high-risk area has primarily focused on the government’s  efforts to implement the ISE. As part of the ISE, DHS has been working to  improve its sharing of terrorism-related information. In a September 2010  letter to DHS, we identified steps that the department could take to  improve its sharing, which, among other things, included the development  of a strategy for how DHS will achieve its information-sharing mission,  demonstration of the existence of a clear governance structure for  information sharing, and demonstration that DHS is making progress in  providing terrorism-related information to its customers. DHS in turn  identified related actions it was taking and provided us periodic updates  on its progress, which are discussed later in this report. In response to  your request, this report addresses the extent to which DHS (1) has made  progress since 2010 in achieving its information-sharing mission, and  what related challenges exist, if any, and (2) tracks and assesses  information-sharing improvements.
DHS has made recent efforts to also improve the safeguarding of information—in  response to the release of classified and diplomatic documents by the website Wikileaks  in 2010—but this was outside the scope of our review and therefore is not addressed in  this report.
Government and criteria that we use in assessing high-risk issues. We  also reviewed DHS’s efforts related to its Segment Architecture against  our prior report and federal guidance on defining architecture content.
To address the second objective, we analyzed documentation and  examples of DHS’s mechanisms for tracking and assessing the progress  and results from its information-sharing efforts, including documentation  and data on DHS’s performance measures for customer feedback and  customer information needs, among other areas, for fiscal years 2011  and 2012. We assessed the reliability of these data by, for example,  analyzing performance measurement documentation, and determined  that they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We also  interviewed program officials within I&A and from DHS’s Office of the  CIO. In addition, we obtained information from customers of DHS’s  information sharing, including 10 of 77 fusion centers, where states and  major urban areas collaborate with federal agencies to improve  information sharing; 1 of 7 DHS operational components who participate  in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, ICE; and 2 of DHS’s 16 intelligence  community customers, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence  (ODNI) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). We selected fusion centers based on, among other things, geographic dispersion and  variation in risk based on the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 25 Cities  Project. We selected ICE, ODNI, and the FBI because they are key  customers of DHS’s intelligence products or partner with I&A to create  these products. ICE is a DHS component that shares terrorism-related  information and leads two of DHS’s key information-sharing initiatives.  ODNI and the FBI are federal agencies that have key roles in analyzing  terrorism threats to the United States and jointly issue products with DHS.  The FBI also has the primary role in carrying out investigations within the  United States of threats to national security. Because we selected a  nonprobability sample of customers to contact, the information we  obtained from these customers may not be generalized to all customers  nationwide, but it provided us with a general understanding of the  perspectives about DHS’s information sharing held by different customer  types nationwide. We assessed DHS’s efforts for tracking and assessing  information-sharing improvements against criteria for practices in program  management.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 through  September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details  on our scope and methodology are contained in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Overview of DHS Roles and Responsibilities and the Information Sharing Environment
paragraphs: Figure 1 shows DHS’s homeland security and information-sharing visions,  missions, and goal.
I&A is the lead DHS component with responsibilities for sharing terrorism- related information with all levels of government and the private sector.  I&A performs a variety of functions related to information sharing,  including gathering customer information needs, developing and  distributing intelligence reports, and gathering customer feedback on the  information I&A provides. I&A, along with the Office of the CIO, also has a  key role in the overall governance structure DHS has created to manage  information sharing throughout the department, which is discussed more  fully later in this report. I&A is headed by the Under Secretary for  Intelligence and Analysis who has responsibilities for, among other things,  providing homeland security intelligence and information to the Secretary  of Homeland Security; other federal officials and agencies, such as  members of the intelligence community; Members of Congress;  departmental component agencies; and the department’s state, local,  tribal, territorial, and private sector partners, such as fusion centers. In  addition to I&A, multiple other DHS components—such as ICE, U.S.  Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Transportation Security  Administration (TSA)—share information within and outside DHS on  threats more specific to their mission areas, such as travel information.  Among other things, these agencies develop and distribute intelligence  reports about these areas to customers, such as the intelligence  community.
DHS is one of five key agencies responsible for establishing the ISE.  Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform Act, as amended by the 9/11  Commission Act, requires the President to take action to facilitate the  sharing of terrorism-related information through the creation of the ISE.In April 2005, the President designated a Program Manager—within the  Office of the Director of National Intelligence—to, among other things,  plan for, oversee implementation of, and manage the ISE. In July 2011,  we recommended that in defining a road map for the ISE, the Program  Manager ensure that relevant initiatives individual agencies were  implementing are leveraged across the government, among other  things.recommendations and has actions under way to address them. DHS  noted that the department remained committed to continuing its work with  the Program Manager and relevant stakeholders to further define and  implement a fully functioning ISE.
The Program Manager generally agreed with our  DHS’s Office of the CIO is responsible for the department’s information  technology management and is developing the department’s enterprise  architecture (EA), which is designed to establish an agencywide road  map to achieve its mission. An EA can be viewed as a reference or  “blueprint” for guiding an organization’s transition to its future environment  that includes maximizing information sharing within and across  organizational boundaries. Along with I&A, the Office of the CIO is  responsible for overseeing this transition.
section_title: Federal Statutes and Strategies Governing Information Sharing
paragraphs: integrate the information and standardize the format of the terrorism- related products of the department’s intelligence components.
In October 2007, the President issued the National Strategy for  Information Sharing, which identifies the federal government’s  information-sharing responsibilities. The strategy calls for authorities at all  levels of government to work together to obtain a common understanding  of the information needed to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist  attacks. On the basis of the National Strategy, DHS developed a strategy  in 2008 to direct the department’s information-sharing efforts and is  drafting a Fiscal Year 2012-2017 DHS Information Sharing and  Safeguarding Strategy. DHS plans to finalize and release this new  strategy after the Executive Office of the President issues a new National  Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding, and DHS then plans  to release an implementation plan that is to describe in more detail how  the department will implement its strategy along with related milestones. DHS’s new strategy is intended to update the 2008 strategy to reflect the  department’s growing and increasingly complex mission and include  information safeguarding—in response to the release of classified and  diplomatic documents by the website Wikileaks in 2010—as well as  information sharing.
section_title: DHS Has Made Progress in Advancing Key Information- Sharing Initiatives, but Additional Steps Could Help Sustain Such Efforts
paragraphs: DHS has established a decision-making body—the Information Sharing  and Safeguarding Governance Board (the board)—that demonstrates  senior executive-level commitment to improving information sharing. The  board has identified information-sharing gaps and developed a list of key  initiatives to help address those gaps, but additional steps could help  DHS sustain these efforts. Board and department attention has helped  achieve progress on many of the key initiatives, but funding challenges  have slowed some efforts. DHS has also made progress in developing  and implementing DHS’s Information Sharing Segment Architecture, but  has not yet fully developed this architecture. The board plans to update  the DHS Information Sharing Strategy and develop a related  implementation plan, which will be important in managing information- sharing efforts.
As of early September 2012, the new National Strategy for Information Sharing and  Safeguarding had not been released.
subsections: section_title: The Governance Board Demonstrates Leadership Commitment to Improving Information Sharing
paragraphs: The Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board serves as  DHS’s senior executive-level decision-making body for information- sharing issues. According to the board’s charter, DHS established the  board in 2007 to serve as the “arbiter of data access denials or delays  that cannot be resolved at the component level” and to work with DHS  operational components to monitor their information management  processes and ensure respect for legal protections. In the aftermath of  the release of classified and diplomatic documents by the website  Wikileaks, in 2011 DHS revised the board’s charter to reflect its  responsibility to govern both information sharing and safeguarding and  expanded the board’s membership to incorporate components with  information-safeguarding responsibilities. The board includes senior  executive-level representation from almost every DHS component, as  shown in figure 2.
The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis serves as the board’s  chair. According to DHS officials, as the DHS representative to the  interagency policy committee for information sharing, the Under Secretary  brings knowledge of governmentwide information-sharing efforts. The  DHS Chief Information Officer serves as the board’s vice chair, also  bringing knowledge as the authority over DHS’s technology-related  information-sharing projects. Board minutes show that senior-level  officials attend the board’s quarterly meetings, demonstrating DHS  leadership commitment to the board’s work. The board is responsible for  approving the department’s information-sharing and -safeguarding vision  and strategy, establishing information-sharing goals and priorities, and  overseeing implementation across DHS components. According to DHS  officials, the board periodically reports its results to the Secretary of  Homeland Security. The Information Sharing Coordinating Council serves  as an advisory body to the board and supports it by recommending  policies and procedures for information sharing, preparing for board  meetings, and helping to track information-sharing initiatives.
The board has advanced DHS information sharing in several ways. First,  the board has raised visibility—that is, has increased awareness of— information-sharing initiatives. Both the Office of the CIO and ICE officials  noted that visibility improves stakeholder coordination across initiatives  and facilitates access to high-level officials who can help initiatives  overcome roadblocks. For example, ICE officials said that the board has  increased the visibility of LEISI—DHS’s main initiative for sharing law  enforcement information with state and local partners—and that other  DHS components are now more likely to coordinate with LEISI in their law  enforcement information-sharing activities. An official from the Office of  the CIO also noted that the board provides information-sharing initiatives  with organizational support at higher levels across DHS, which can  remove roadblocks within or across components. For example, the official  noted that one information-sharing initiative—the Homeland Security  Information Network (HSIN), which DHS uses to share information with  federal, state, and local partners—cannot succeed without this visibility  and now has better stakeholder coordination than ever before.
Second, according to DHS officials, the board has helped to reduce  redundancies across DHS components. For example, through board  activities, members recognized that DHS components were  independently developing over 20 systems to collect, share, and display  the information that components and other stakeholders need to plan for  and respond to threats and hazards, known as Common Operating  Picture systems. The board worked with the components involved to  examine each component’s Common Operating Picture systems and  identify opportunities for cooperation, thereby reducing redundancies and  saving funds.
In February 2012, the board also established an Information Sharing  Environment Coordination Activity—with staff from I&A and the Office of  the CIO—to facilitate decision making related to DHS’s Information  Sharing Segment Architecture transition plans. The group’s  responsibilities include developing recommendations and advising on  policy development, resource allocation, acquisition management, and  program management processes. In addition, the group is responsible for  assessing whether departmental investments in new and existing  technology programs include critical information-sharing capabilities, and  whether investments present opportunities to deploy capabilities as  enterprise services, such as computer-to-computer mechanisms to  deliver information between systems. We discuss this group’s role in  several information-sharing efforts later in this report. Because the group  is relatively new, it was too early for us to determine its impact. DHS’s  actions to establish an information-sharing governance structure and  related activities demonstrate DHS leadership’s commitment to improving  information sharing.
section_title: DHS Has Identified Key Information-Sharing Initiatives to Fill Gaps, but Additional Steps Could Help Sustain this Process
subsections: section_title: Key Information-Sharing Initiatives
paragraphs: DHS has identified a list of initiatives that it determined are key to  advancing information sharing within the department and with its  customers, which DHS refers to as its Information Sharing Roadmap.  According to DHS officials, to develop this list, the board hosted a series  of meetings from April 2010 through December 2011 with relevant  components in each of its five mission areas. According to I&A officials,  these meetings included in-depth conversations with DHS and  component executives about their information-sharing activities and gaps,  and presentations from subject matter experts on these issues. The board  selected a list of 22 initiatives that it determined represented DHS’s  greatest opportunities to improve information sharing. Some of these  initiatives were information-sharing programs that components were  already implementing as part of their mission activities, while others were  new projects designed to address specific information-sharing gaps.  According to DHS officials, the process of identifying departmental  information-sharing gaps evolved progressively over the course of 2  years as the board continually sought to improve its methods.
According to DHS officials, in July 2011, the board’s chair requested that  board members prioritize the list of initiatives and select a smaller and  more manageable list to receive additional support in the DHS budget  process. Using a weighted scoring and voting system, each board  member selected 5 top-priority initiatives based on four criteria: cross- departmental impact, linkage to mission areas, enterprisewide  information-sharing enabler, and level of DHS component support. After  compiling these rankings across members, the board determined that 8  initiatives were clustered near the top of the list and established these  initiatives as its priority efforts, as shown in table 1.
To improve the process it used to select the priority initiatives, DHS  formed the Criteria Working Group in 2011. According to the working  group’s briefing materials, the group developed new criteria for selecting  priority initiatives—such as mission criticality and feasibility—that it will  use in future prioritization efforts and a new process for integrating  component input on which initiatives to choose as priorities.
According to DHS officials, the board also recognized the need to  periodically add and remove initiatives from the broader list of key  information-sharing initiatives and developed and documented processes  to do so. Therefore, in December 2011, the board elected to begin  reviewing the list of initiatives on a semiannual basis, evaluating the  initiatives for continued relevancy and considering newly emerging  requirements. According to I&A officials, the board could remove an  initiative from the list because (1) the initiative has “graduated”—that is, it  has achieved all of its information-sharing goals or (2) the initiative has  languished because components have not provided needed funding or  DHS did not have a lead component to manage the initiative. These latter  initiatives would be removed from the list and set aside for potential  reevaluation if a component agrees to lead the initiative at a later date. In  May 2012, DHS issued the Information Sharing and Safeguarding  Roadmap Implementation Guide to document and describe goals and  elements of the list of key initiatives and provide guidance for  development, management, and oversight of the list.
In 2012, the board added 5 new initiatives to the list in order to reflect the  board’s new emphasis on information safeguarding. consolidated 3 initiatives into a single initiative, split 1 initiative into 2  separate initiatives, and removed 3 from the list because, according to  I&A officials, they were better handled by other entities and no longer  required board involvement. As of September 2012, DHS had 18 key  information-sharing initiatives and 5 safeguarding initiatives on its list of  key initiatives.
DHS’s efforts to identify information-sharing gaps and select initiatives to  address them have advanced information-sharing efforts, but additional  steps could help DHS sustain these efforts. First, DHS has not  documented its process for identifying information-sharing gaps in each of  its mission areas or the list of gaps it identified. Documenting this process  and its results could help DHS replicate and sustain this process in the  future. Federal internal control standards require agencies to clearly   DHS officials noted the board did not  document significant activities. document the process because its efforts were in early stages and the  process was revised as the board learned from experience. Processes for  selecting key information-sharing initiatives are documented in DHS’s  Roadmap Implementation Guide—the department’s policies and  procedures for managing key initiatives. However, because DHS’s  assessment of gaps drives the selection of key information-sharing  initiatives, documenting the process for identifying gaps and the results of  that process in the Roadmap Implementation Guide or other related  policies and procedures would provide DHS with an institutional record to  better replicate, and therefore sustain, a key step in its efforts to improve  information sharing.
DHS’s five safeguarding priorities in the 2012 list of initiatives are Address the Insider  Threat, Improve Access Control, Improve Enterprise Audit, Reduce Removable Media  Use, and Reduce User Anonymity.
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
Second, DHS did not analyze the root causes of information-sharing gaps  to ensure that its key initiatives target the correct problems. According to  DHS officials, DHS did not do this because the root causes of DHS’s  information-sharing problems—such as challenges in incorporating  diverse agencies into a single department—are well known and have  been discussed at high levels within the executive branch, in the context  of the formation of DHS, in the 9/11 Commission Report, and through  subsequently enacted laws. These broad, overarching issues help  inform DHS’s efforts to improve information sharing, but documenting and  implementing a process for analyzing the specific causes of DHS’s  information-sharing gaps within each mission area would help DHS  ensure that it invests in the correct information-sharing solutions. For  example, diagnosing whether specific gaps are caused by DHS’s own  funding decisions and constraints, by its organizational structure, or by  technological limitations would allow DHS to better choose appropriate  solutions. Furthermore, our work on high-risk programs has shown that  analyzing root causes of program gaps or limitations can help in  designing effective solutions to reduce risks.
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. managed by another entity within the department, which mitigated the risk  of removal. Nevertheless, as we describe in the following section, funding  and other constraints may require DHS to remove items from the list in  the future, and establishing and documenting processes for potential  future use could help guide these decisions. DHS officials stated that  such processes could improve information-sharing efforts. By establishing  and documenting processes for identifying and assessing the risks of  removing an incomplete initiative from its list and working to mitigate that  risk, DHS could be better positioned to identify the effects that removal  may have on its information-sharing efforts and sustain these efforts.
section_title: DHS Has Advanced Key Information-Sharing Initiatives, but Progress Has Slowed for Half of Them in Part because of Funding Constraints
paragraphs: Since DHS developed its list of key information-sharing initiatives, many  of those initiatives have proceeded and met interim program milestones.  As of June 2012, 15 of the 18 key information-sharing initiatives met at  least one interim milestone, and DHS fully completed 1 initiative— developing a training course designed to improve and increase sharing of  terrorism information by promoting a culture of awareness. However, as  shown in figure 3, progress has slowed or stopped for 10 of the 18 key  information-sharing initiatives presented to the board in June 2012.
Funding constraints are a primary reason why progress has slowed or  stopped for some initiatives. For example, among the 8 priority  information-sharing initiatives, 5 faced risks as of June 2012 because of  lack of funding, and DHS has had to delay or scale back at least 4 of  them. More specifically, according to ICE documents, LEISI has met  milestones related to several activities—including developing a strategic  plan, implementing a performance metrics tracking system, and  expanding information sharing with federal, state, and local partners—but  inadequate funding threatens the ability of ICE to further expand the  LEISI user base and share additional data, among other things. Also,  DHS’s top information-sharing priority (CHISE)—an initiative to develop  an integrated, searchable index to consolidate and streamline access to  intelligence, law enforcement, and other information across DHS—has  not been fully funded, but efforts to explore possible funding options  continue, according to DHS officials. The officials noted that CHISE is  intended to streamline access to terrorism-related information and help  analysts synthesize this information. The officials added that until CHISE  is developed, analysts will continue to separately access numerous data  sets from across the department, which requires a larger number of  analysts, is more time consuming, and may result in missing connections  among data in different data sets.
According to I&A officials, for the fiscal year 2012 budget, the board made  a concerted effort to advocate for additional funding to support priority  initiatives and emphasize information sharing during the DHS planning  and budgeting process. According to I&A officials, the board was not able  to obtain increased funding for the initiatives but plans to continue its  efforts. The officials noted that the board does not have budget authority  within the department, and therefore does not have the authority or  resources to fund the priority initiatives. They explained that under the  DHS budget process, the initiatives are considered integral to, and not  separate from, an agency’s fundamental mission activities and are funded  through the DHS components responsible for each initiative. Thus,  according to the officials, in a constrained budget environment,  components are faced with difficult decisions in deciding whether to fund  mission activities or information-sharing activities. However, DHS officials  stated that the board’s involvement has kept some of these initiatives  from experiencing funding cuts. In addition, as we reported in July 2012,  the board serves as the portfolio governance board for information  sharing, which provides guidance and investment recommendations for  future year planning, programming, and budgeting. According to DHS  officials, as the department’s information technology governance process  matures, the board will have a more formal role and processes for  affecting funding decisions.
Moving forward, DHS plans to collect and publish data on the annual and  long-term funding the department budgets and spends on its information- sharing and -safeguarding programs and activities. According to DHS  officials, the ability for the department to generate reliable cost estimates  for these sharing and safeguarding programs and activities will lower the  risk to the public and minimize overruns, missed deadlines, and  performance shortfalls. The officials added that cost estimates will also  allow decision makers to prioritize future investments and demonstrate a  continued commitment to support the capability and capacity of DHS  components to share and safeguard information. These cost estimates  could also allow us to determine the extent to which DHS has the  capacity to implement its plans. We will continue to monitor DHS’s  implementation of these plans and its ability to address funding shortfalls  for key initiatives, particularly in a challenging budget environment.
section_title: DHS Has Made Important Progress, but Has Yet to Fully Implement Its Information-Sharing Architecture
paragraphs: DHS has developed architecture guidance to support the implementation  of its target DHS information sharing environment. Specifically, in May  2009, DHS published version 2.1 of its Information Sharing Segment  Architecture. In July 2011, we reported that the Segment Architecture did  not include key architecture content, such as a transition plan for moving  to the target DHS information sharing environment and a conceptual  solution architecture that provides an integrated view of proposed  systems and services.in addressing the missing architecture content. For example, in January  2012, DHS updated its Segment Architecture to include a transition plan  that provides a conceptual road map to implement the key capabilities  needed to achieve the target DHS information sharing environment.
In response, DHS has made important progress  DHS has also taken actions to identify and define its key business and  information requirements, an initial important step in building an effective  architecture to determine technology solutions it will need to achieve its  information-sharing goals. According to guidance issued by the Program  Manager for the ISE, agencies should create an inventory of assets to  effectively share terrorism-related information. According to the  executive director of the DHS Information Sharing Environment Office,  DHS has completed an inventory of the data assets (e.g., databases  containing terrorism-related information) that each of the components  across the department owns, such as border-crossing records. More  specifically, DHS has cataloged more than 800 data assets across the  department and identified the basic information available in each asset.  Also according to the executive director, the Information Sharing  Environment Coordination Activity will then determine with what other  stakeholders DHS needs to share these data assets. DHS has  determined that 80 of the data assets contain information with potential  value in counterterrorism efforts. Of those 80, DHS identified the top 20  most valuable data assets and included them in the CHISE initiative,  which is to organize these data assets into searchable indices to facilitate  fast information retrieval. Since 2008, we have reported on the  importance of agencies taking an inventory of what information they own  as the first step to then determining who needs to have this information  and how agencies will share it with key partners. DHS’s inventory efforts  should help it to more systematically determine where it has gaps in  sharing or additional opportunities to use the information it owns to  protect the homeland.
DHS has also developed a conceptual solution architecture, which,  according to the guidance issued by the Program Manager for the ISE, is  to provide an integrated view of the combined systems, services, and  technology for the target ISE, as well as the interfaces between them.  This conceptual solution architecture provides an integrated view of  systems, such as Homeland Secure Data Network, and services, such  as Enterprise Service Bus message services, which allow information to  flow among disparate applications across multiple hardware and software  platforms. This is important since it defines specific technology resources  for implementing DHS’s information sharing environment. In addition,  DHS officials stated the department is using its shared space to share  terrorism-related information with other agencies. For example, the  officials stated DHS plans to use its Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR)  shared space to share SAR data with the Department of Justice.
The ISE Terrorist Watchlist mission business process is a component of the  identification and screening mission process and encompasses the receiving and sharing  of reported information and the nomination, export, screening, encounter, redress, and  updates to the Terrorist Screening Database. The FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center  maintains this database of known or suspected terrorists, which is used during security- related and other screening processes.
Program Manager for the ISE issues a national-level standard that  describes business context and information exchanges for AWN.  According to the Deputy Program Manager for the ISE, the Office of the  Program Manager plans to work with DHS and other agencies on the  development of standard information exchanges for AWN in fiscal year  2013. The alignment of DHS data assets with the ISE mission business  processes is important because it would support better discovery and  sharing of relevant terrorism-related information.
In addition, while DHS has developed a conceptual solution architecture,  it has not yet determined how well its current systems and technology  environment support target business and information requirements.  According to guidance from the Program Manager for the ISE, ISE  agencies should assess the systems and technology environment for  alignment with business and information requirements. According to DHS  officials, from April through July 2012, the DHS Information Sharing  Environment Coordination Activity conducted an initial baseline  assessment of major programs to determine whether current systems and  technologies can satisfy target architecture requirements, such as  business and data requirements. Also according to DHS, it will review  other segment architectures (e.g., screening) being developed to assess  alignment with information-sharing capabilities described in the  information-sharing architecture. By taking these actions, DHS could  achieve cost avoidance and cost savings in implementing the DHS  information sharing environment.
section_title: Upcoming Information Sharing Strategy and Implementation Plan Will Be Important in Managing Information-Sharing Efforts
paragraphs: DHS’s activities to assess gaps, select initiatives, and ensure that  information-sharing programs have the capabilities needed to promote  sharing are in the early development and implementation phases. As a  result, DHS is taking steps to institutionalize some of its policies and  practices, including developing key strategies and plans, that will be  important in planning and managing its information-sharing efforts. In our  September 2010 letter to DHS, we stated that DHS should develop a  strategy and commensurate plans to achieve its information-sharing  mission, among other things. According to DHS officials, the department  is taking steps to update and develop other strategies and related plans in  addition to its list of key information-sharing initiatives that could address  steps we have identified for DHS to take in information sharing. For  example, as discussed earlier in this report, DHS is working to update the  DHS Information Sharing Strategy, in part to be consistent with  governmentwide efforts to update the related National Strategy. DHS  officials stated that they expect to issue the updated strategy after the  National Strategy is released, although the date of this latter action is  uncertain. In deliberating on the updates, DHS is working to ensure that  the DHS strategy outlines its information-sharing vision and mission, and  addresses important components, such as goals and objectives on  sharing and safeguarding information, methods it plans to achieve key  outcomes as well as manage any potential risks, and steps it plans to  take to ensure efforts receive the resources they need. Subsequent to  releasing its strategy, DHS plans to release the Information Sharing and  Safeguarding Implementation Plan within 90 days that is to describe in  more detail how DHS will implement its strategy and include related  milestones for the efforts described in the plan. We will continue to  monitor implementation of these strategies and plans for taking corrective  actions to improve information sharing.
section_title: DHS Has Taken Steps to Track Information- Sharing Efforts, but Has Not Yet Fully Assessed How They Have Improved Sharing
paragraphs: DHS is tracking the progress key information-sharing initiatives are  making toward interim milestones but the department generally does not  track when the initiatives will be completed, so as to make course  corrections if completion dates are delayed, or assess what impact they  are having on achieving needed sharing. DHS also has taken several  steps to implement the information-sharing capabilities it needs to share  information but has not yet defined the level of capabilities that initiatives  and other programs must have in place to help it achieve the  department’s information-sharing vision. Customer feedback can help  assess information sharing by indicating how useful customers find the  products DHS disseminates; DHS has taken steps to survey its  customers to determine their satisfaction as well as assess their needs.  DHS has not yet developed measures that determine the impact of  sharing on its homeland security efforts, but plans to develop more  meaningful ways to assess information-sharing results and progress  toward achieving its vision.
subsections: section_title: DHS Is Tracking Progress of Key Initiatives but Does Not Track Completion Dates or Assess Impacts on Information Sharing
paragraphs: Our work has shown that being able to track the progress of initiatives  that address program barriers as well as assess the effectiveness of  initiatives, or the results they achieve, can help agencies minimize the  risks in key programs such as information sharing. DHS is tracking the  implementation progress of key information-sharing initiatives, but the  department does not track how close the initiatives are to completion and  could better assess how the initiatives are improving information sharing  or helping DHS achieve its 2015 vision, which includes ensuring that the  right information gets to the right people at the right time.
DHS has developed a tool to track implementation of key information- sharing initiatives, referred to as Roadmap Quad Charts, but it does not  include information on how close the initiatives are to completion.  According to I&A documents, the purpose of the charts is to report an  initiative’s implementation progress to the board. Components are  responsible for providing the information tracked in the charts and  submitting monthly updates to I&A. The tool contains an overall health  indicator, key milestones, risks, and other data, as shown in figure 4.
The left quadrants of the chart define interim activities and milestones,  and track progress toward both. Components categorize the health of  each initiative as having no impediments (green), or that its progress has  slowed (yellow) or stopped (red). The right quadrants contain narrative  information, including issues facing the initiative—such as inadequate  funding or technological or legal difficulties encountered—and risks to  progress, such as the impact of an initiative’s inability to meet time  frames.
The board reviews the Quad Charts on a quarterly basis to track and  oversee progress, and can question components on the initiatives and the  status of milestones. For example, one initiative (Common Operating  Picture/User-Defined Operating Picture Integrated Project Team)  experienced challenges in setting milestones, which was reflected in its  chart. Subsequently, the board pushed the relevant components to set  more aggressive milestones, and, as a result, DHS expects to begin  transitioning components from over 20 different common operating  pictures to about 5 common operating pictures in March 2013, which,  according to DHS officials, is earlier than would have been possible  without the board’s involvement. When the transition has been  completed, DHS will have streamlined the applications that collect, share,  and display the information components need to plan for and respond to  threats and hazards, which will increase efficiencies, according to DHS  officials.
The Quad Charts track progress that initiatives are making toward interim  activities and milestones, but do not include information regarding  completion dates or what difference the initiatives are making in  improving information sharing. For example, a LEISI program official said  that LEISI identifies milestones for the charts that can be accomplished  each year, but the LEISI chart does not show how much closer that year’s  targets will advance the initiative toward completing its information- sharing functions. Including completion dates in the charts could help the  board better understand the overall progress initiatives made, make more  informed decisions on which initiatives it will advocate should receive  additional funding, and generally provide better oversight by holding  components accountable for these completion dates. In addition, the  charts do not provide information on how effective initiatives have been.  For example, the charts do not provide a sense of any improvements in  how ICE shares law enforcement information with key stakeholders as a  result of implementing LEISI, such as how many more data sets are  available to share or the increase in the number of users with access to  these data sets. Including such information in the Quad Chart could help  the board assess how initiatives improve DHS information sharing,  including the impact of any risks identified in the chart. According to DHS  officials, the lower left quadrant of the chart is intended to show longer- term activities and milestones leading toward completion, but our review  shows that 15 of the 18 initiatives did not have completion milestones as  of June 2012. DHS officials stated that it will not be possible to identify  completion dates for some initiatives, such as for CHISE, because they  are in the early planning stages and responsible components cannot yet  estimate their completion. Moreover, other initiatives, such as the  Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, are secretarial  priorities that DHS will not remove from the list of key initiatives because  they are ongoing initiatives with no date for completion.
DHS officials recognize they need to better track the progress of key  initiatives and assess how they affect sharing with customers, but related  efforts are just beginning and DHS did not have further details on what  changes they will make. Program management practices note the  importance of establishing a timeline for program milestones and  deliverables, including when a program is complete, which helps lay the  groundwork for the program and position it for successful execution.  These practices also note that it is important to track intermediate and  final results of a program as well as the benefits a program delivers,  which helps ensure the organization will realize and sustain the benefits  from its investment. We recognize that completion dates cannot be  provided in each case. However, determining and documenting initiative  completion dates and assessing how initiatives affect sharing, where  feasible, would help the board better track progress in implementing the  initiatives, make any necessary course corrections if completion dates are  delayed, and demonstrate how initiatives enhance information sharing  and homeland security.
section_title: DHS Is Assessing Technology and Fusion Center Capabilities Needed to Share Information, but Could Better Determine How Technology Capabilities Are Helping Achieve 2015 Vision
paragraphs: In addition to identifying and tracking key information-sharing initiatives it  needs to implement, DHS has also taken several steps to assess the  capabilities that programs need so that key partners can access and  share information the department owns. First, DHS has begun to assess  the extent to which its technology programs have implemented critical  information-sharing capabilities. DHS officials stated that from April  through July 2012, the Information Sharing Environment Coordination  Activity conducted initial baseline assessments of approximately 160  technology programs, systems, and initiatives—which include the key  information-sharing initiatives—to determine the extent to which they  have critical information-sharing capabilities in place. Capabilities include,  for example, ways to determine that a user who is trying to access DHS  information is authorized to access it and the ability to subsequently audit  or track who has accessed this information. DHS officials noted that the  Office of the CIO and board plan to track the progress that individual  information-sharing programs and initiatives achieve in implementing  these capabilities, as applicable, and develop a mechanism to provide  DHS better visibility over the capabilities that programs have implemented  and still need to implement. DHS officials stated that they plan to  introduce this capability-tracking mechanism in early 2013.
DHS’s planned capability-tracking mechanism may not include an  important step to help DHS determine its progress toward its 2015  information-sharing vision. The Information Sharing Segment Architecture  Transition Plan discusses major milestones and time frames for  implementing the critical capabilities in order for DHS to achieve its  information-sharing vision by 2015. However, this plan does not detail— and DHS officials said that they have not determined—the specific  capabilities each particular program must implement for DHS to conclude  that it has improved information sharing enough to achieve the 2015  information-sharing vision. For example, the transition plan notes that  DHS is to have begun developing the framework for establishing how to  authorize user access by the end of fiscal year 2012, but it does not  include which programs this capability is relevant for, and how many of  them must implement this capability for DHS to be able to conclude that it  has made meaningful progress in that capability by 2015. DHS officials  recognize the importance of measuring progress toward the 2015 vision,  but the department’s efforts to define critical capabilities are new and it  has not yet taken this step. Including this step in the department’s efforts  to develop its capability-tracking mechanism would help DHS better  understand which programs to prioritize to improve information sharing.
Our past work and the experience of leading organizations have  demonstrated that measuring performance allows organizations to track  progress they are making toward intended results—including goals,  objectives, and targets they expect to achieve—and gives managers  critical information on which to base decisions for improving their  programs. The Information Sharing Environment Coordination Activity  charter also notes that this group is to provide the board with the ability to  prioritize and oversee steps DHS is taking to achieve its information- sharing vision. Determining the specific capabilities certain programs  must implement in order for DHS to achieve its 2015 vision and  subsequently tracking annual progress could help DHS prioritize  programs and track and assess progress toward ensuring that the right  information is getting to the right people at the right time to meet their  homeland security responsibilities.
Second, in addition to tracking the capabilities of its own programs, DHS,  in conjunction with the Department of Justice, is collecting information on  the extent to which fusion centers are putting in place certain capabilities  that the two agencies and other federal interagency partners have  determined are critical for ensuring these centers can effectively operate  in a national information-sharing network. States and major urban areas  originally created fusion centers to provide information about threats  within the centers’ jurisdictions. The federal government, particularly  through DHS, has been leveraging such centers to further disseminate  federal information on threats and to collect information on threats and  pass it on to federal agencies, among other things. I&A collaborated with  the fusion center directors and their interagency partners to design and  implement the 2011 Fusion Center Assessment, which is to help DHS  track the progress of fusion centers in achieving key capabilities. These  include the capability to receive, analyze, and further disseminate  information on terrorist threats and crimes that can be precursors to  terrorism. DHS completed its initial assessment in October 2011 and  issued a report on its results in June 2012. The assessment found that  overall capability scores for the 72 fusion centers that participated ranged  from 29 to 97 out of 100, with an average score of 77. The report stated  that the national network is a long-term investment and made  recommendations on how DHS and its federal interagency partners can  help fusion centers fill gaps over the next 4 years. DHS officials said that  they will look at trends in individual fusion center scores to identify what  capability gaps exist across the National Network of Fusion Centers and  work with centers to focus any federal resources they receive on filling  these gaps. DHS plans to monitor the improvements that centers make  over time in filling capability gaps as an indicator of the effectiveness of  fusion centers.
Information-sharing and access agreements are vehicles used by DHS to exchange,  receive, and share information from external (non-DHS) parties. outcomes of executing these agreements. Specifically, DHS plans to  assess customer satisfaction of the recipients of multiple data sets  received through these agreements beginning in October 2012.
section_title: Customer Feedback Can Provide Perspectives on the Usefulness of Information Shared
paragraphs: DHS’s key initiatives and capabilities should help to increase the  department’s ability to make components’ information available to  important customers, and to disseminate components’ products and  reports created for these customers. However, determining whether the  right people have the right information at the right time requires obtaining  views from customers about the accuracy, usefulness, and timeliness of  information provided and shared. DHS components are in the process of  implementing customer feedback mechanisms that should help to provide  customers’ perspectives of how well DHS is meeting its 2015 vision.
DHS has taken steps to survey customers to measure how satisfied they  are with the information and intelligence products that DHS components  disseminate, such as homeland security assessments and homeland  information notes. measures that help to gauge the usefulness of the information provided.  DHS recognizes that there is a potential for bias in survey results, but  DHS is taking steps to obtain feedback in additional ways, such as  meeting with its customers to assess their needs, as a means to improve  intelligence products.
Homeland security assessments provide in-depth analysis based on detailed research.  Homeland security notes provide information or analysis on a recent or current event or  development of interest to DHS customers. components are following suit. Component surveys include a common  question that asks customers to rate satisfaction on a five-point scale— very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied,  somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied—and DHS customer  satisfaction performance measures report the percentage of intelligence  products rated somewhat satisfied or very satisfied. DHS plans to  aggregate survey results on this question from across the DHS  Intelligence Enterprise components, use the data as a gauge on how the  information provided contributed to success in achieving goals for  missions areas—such as preventing terrorist attacks—and publish the  results in the department’s Annual Performance Report as performance  measures, beginning in 2013. For example, TSA disseminated about  11,000 incident reports that pertain to preventing terrorist attacks during  the first two quarters of 2012 and received about 5,800 responses. Over  the same time period, I&A distributed 41 reports pertaining to preventing  terrorist attacks and received over 700 responses.that customers who responded to the surveys said that they were  generally satisfied with the reports they reviewed during that time frame.  I&A data for fiscal year 2011 also show that customers said they were  generally satisfied with products disseminated that year. These customer  feedback mechanisms should help to provide customers’ perspectives of  how well DHS is meeting its 2015 vision.
However, I&A recognizes that the survey results may not be  representative of the entire population of customers that received those  products because customers voluntarily choose whether or not to provide  feedback. In internal documents and external reports on customer  feedback, such as the I&A annual report to Congress, I&A cautions  readers that survey results are subject to bias that prevents the  organization from drawing conclusions about the entire I&A customer  population.customer read a product in order to take the survey—meaning that the  feedback of those who read the product and chose to provide feedback  may not be representative of those customers that decided not to read an  I&A product. Given this potential for bias in I&A data, any performance  measures drawn from that data will carry that bias, providing DHS,  Congress, and taxpayers with a potentially incomplete account of  progress made in improving information sharing. According to DHS  officials, because of technological limitations in tracking the dissemination  of products, I&A does not know the number of recipients or readers of  each product, which prevents I&A from knowing the full impact of this  bias.
For example, a bias is created by the requirement that a  I&A has taken a number of steps to obtain feedback in other ways and  help ensure it provides customers with the right information at the right  time. For example, according to I&A officials, I&A has initiated a core  customer study designed to establish a common definition of core  customers, allowing I&A to identify and directly survey representative  samples of customers from across each segment on their satisfaction  with I&A’s intelligence support. However, the study is in the beginning  phases; thus I&A has not yet established a completion date and it is too  early to evaluate the results. In addition, I&A has established a Customer  Feedback Working Group to analyze feedback-related issues and devise  ways to improve products. For example, on the basis of feedback that I&A  products did not contain enough relevant local content, the group has  begun a project to improve the regional content in intelligence products,  according to I&A officials. Further, I&A conducts targeted surveys on  high-interest topical issues to assess its performance on sharing  terrorism-related intelligence and information.
Our discussions with various DHS customers indicate varying levels of  satisfaction with terrorism-related information from DHS and its  components, including I&A and TSA. According to DHS officials, the  department has prioritized its customers, and the department funds  information-sharing initiatives according to these priorities. This, in turn,  can affect how relevant some of the customers find DHS and its  components’ information to their mission. For example, fusion centers are  higher-priority customers than customers in the intelligence community,  such as the FBI, according to the I&A Strategic Plan. As a result, DHS  officials stated that the department focuses more of its funding and  initiatives on fusion centers. We interviewed senior officials from 10 state  and major urban area fusion centers, ICE, ODNI, and the FBI. We  supplemented our discussions with additional information, such as the  results of a 2012 fusion center survey about counterterrorism intelligence  and our prior survey on TSA customers. The results of our analysis are  summarized below.
Fusion centers: Directors and other senior officials in 8 of 10 fusion  centers we spoke with generally found I&A information to be useful. For example, officials at 1 fusion center reported that I&A products  keep officials up to date on national and global terrorism trends that  may have an impact on their region. In addition, officials at another  fusion center stated that reports, such as the Joint Intelligence  Briefing from DHS and the FBI on the 10th anniversary of 9/11, and  special assessments of security at sporting events, have helped the  fusion center provide guidance to state and local law enforcement.  Further, in response to an I&A report on radicalization of prison  inmates, 1 fusion center’s detectives met with corrections department  staff to enhance their awareness of prison radicalization and held  trainings on suspicious activities and radicalization indicators.  Moreover, officials at this center noted that the timely dissemination of  reports has improved, that reports are more specific to regional needs  than in the past, and that I&A has responded to fusion center  feedback. However, officials at 2 other fusion centers we met with  stated that I&A information was not always timely. These officials  reported that sometimes, I&A information is already available through  media outlets or other information sources. According to one official,  although this practice can be considered a method to verify the recent  news media information, the volume of information tends to flood the  network and can lead to reduced attention being paid to I&A  products. In addition, officials at 2 fusion centers we met with reported  that I&A distributes too many reports that are not specific to their  region. Further, results from a 2012 Homeland Security Policy  Institute survey that asked fusion center staff to order their most  important sources of information suggest that DHS may have  opportunities to better meet customer needs. On the basis of the  fusion center officials who responded—which, according to survey  authors come from traditional law enforcement backgrounds that may  influence their rankings—DHS ranked sixth after sources such as law  enforcement and Joint Terrorism Task Forces. Other sources, such as  the National Counterterrorism Center and other fusion centers, ranked  lower than DHS.
TSA customers: We previously reported on the extent to which TSA  customers are satisfied with the security-related information products  they receive and found that they were generally satisfied.  Specifically, TSA has developed a series of products to share  security-related information with transportation stakeholders, such as  annual modal threat assessments that provide an overview of threats  to each transportation mode—including aviation, rail, and highway— and related infrastructure. Fifty-seven percent of the customers we  surveyed (155 of 275 who answered this question) indicated that they  were satisfied with the products they receive.
ICE: ICE directors and analysts in the Homeland Security Intelligence  Office did not comment on the information contained in I&A reports,  but noted that they were generally dissatisfied with I&A reports  primarily because they found it difficult to determine which reports are  most relevant to their needs. For example, the officials stated that I&A  is not proactive in informing ICE about the products it completes and  would find useful. ICE officials stated that connectivity and access to  I&A products have improved since 2010, but the ease of finding these  products and understanding what is relevant to ICE remains  problematic.
ODNI: ODNI officials stated that they were generally satisfied with the  department’s responsiveness to information needs and that  collaboration with DHS has improved since 2010. For example, if  circumstances necessitate ODNI obtaining passenger manifest data,  DHS provides such information more quickly than in the past. In  addition, ODNI has successfully used DHS data to counter potential  terrorist threats. For example, by cross-checking refugee application  data from DHS with other data, ODNI has facilitated numerous arrests  and removed over 500 people who posed a potential threat from the  refugee stream prior to their arrival in the United States. However,  ODNI officials stated that some DHS intelligence reports are not  timely enough for their needs. Further, DHS’s finished intelligence  products are generally not as valuable to the intelligence community  because they are generally written for state and local customers.
FBI: Two FBI headquarters divisions responsible for sharing terrorism- related information reported on their satisfaction with information from  DHS. Specifically, officials from one of the two FBI divisions reported  that, overall, the division was neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with I&A  information, and officials from the other division reported their division  was somewhat satisfied. These same officials also reported that they  were very satisfied with the information received from CBP, ICE, and  TSA. For example, the FBI officials reported that its Counterterrorism  Division and ICE have enhanced the consistency with which  information is shared and have worked toward a transparent and  coordinated effort for developing, sharing, and distributing terrorism- related information. The FBI reported that DHS intelligence products  are generally not produced for the FBI’s use specifically, and that the  FBI collaborates with DHS to develop reports on a variety of topics,  such as potential terrorist attacks.
DHS also monitors the extent to which I&A finished intelligence products  address issues that state, local, and tribal customers deemed as most  critical to their needs, which could increase customer satisfaction with  products. Customers articulate their critical needs based on 10 threat- based categories, such as Terrorism and Illicit Drug Operations. I&A  tags its intelligence products and information reports with relevant  “standing information needs” prior to distribution, which enables I&A to  monitor the extent to which I&A is distributing products and reports that  match customers’ needs. The 2011 annual performance report shows  that I&A determined that 85 percent of finished intelligence products were  directly responsive to its state, local, and tribal customers’ information  needs, which met the performance target for this measure. I&A data show  that the department reached similar conclusions during the first two  quarters of 2012. According to DHS officials, additional components are  beginning to tag their information reports and intelligence products with  relevant standing information needs, which will enable DHS to assess  departmentwide contributions to addressing crucial customer needs.
I&A also provides customers with information based on specific requests  and collects data on the extent to which I&A is timely in its responses and  customers are satisfied with those responses. Customer satisfaction is  based on three factors: quality of communication, the accuracy of the  information provided, and satisfaction with the process. Specifically,  customers request certain information from I&A—such as background  information for a person of interest—and I&A officials are to respond to  that request by an agreed-upon time frame. The 2011 annual performance report shows that I&A answered 85 percent of requests  within the time frame I&A and the customer agreed upon to the  customer’s satisfaction. Since I&A is currently updating this measure to  include other DHS entities, 2012 is a baseline year that the department  plans to use to evaluate the extent to which timeliness and satisfaction of  information requests are improving over time. Therefore, this measure  should help DHS determine to what extent customers are getting the right  information at the right time.
section_title: Carrying Through on Plans to Develop More Meaningful Ways to Assess the Impacts of Information-Sharing Efforts Will Be Important
paragraphs: DHS has plans that could help it better assess the impact of the  department’s information sharing on homeland security. After DHS  releases its new Information Sharing and Safeguarding Strategy, the  department plans to develop and implement a new DHS sharing and  safeguarding performance management program that is to include the  development of performance measures that determine the outcomes its  information sharing is to achieve. Our work has shown that DHS is  evolving from utilizing process measures that are relatively easy to  implement—for example, counting the number of issued reports—to more  meaningful measures that determine customer satisfaction with the  usefulness of the information provided. Demonstrating results is a  standard practice in performance measurement. DHS continues to  recognize that it must develop measures that demonstrate the results of  its efforts, and department officials noted that such measures will be a  crucial part of the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Implementation  Plan the department is to develop. Specifically, the department’s draft  planning documents note that the board is to develop information-sharing  outcome measures to determine whether federal and nonfederal  customers receive DHS information that is timely, accurate, trusted, and  useful; meets their needs; and contributes to securing the homeland. For  example, DHS could enhance its customer satisfaction performance  measures by asking customers what difference the product they reviewed  made on their ability to ensure a safe and secure homeland. The board is  also to develop measures that assess the impact of information sharing  on preventing terrorism and enhancing security, as well as other  missions. Further, the board is to develop measures that assess the  degree of budget and outcome alignment, and calculate the cost of  achieving information-sharing outcomes and target levels of  performance.
We will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts to assess the results and impact  of its sharing efforts. Our work has shown that having the ability to  monitor progress and demonstrate results helps to lower the risks posed  from implementing programs critical to the nation, such as the sharing of  information on terrorist threats. Executing its plans to develop better  measures should help DHS assess the progress in sharing information  and monitor the extent to which the department is achieving its 2015  vision to provide the right information to the right people at the right time.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Ensuring that terrorism-related information is shared in an efficient  manner with stakeholders across all levels of government, the private  sector, and foreign countries is a challenging and critical task. DHS has  demonstrated a strong commitment to advance information-sharing  efforts; its key information-sharing initiatives have made progress, and  most have met interim milestones. The department has also taken steps  to track its information-sharing efforts and developed information-sharing  performance measures that monitor the effectiveness of some  information-sharing efforts. However, additional steps could help DHS  sustain these efforts. For example, in its Roadmap Implementation Guide  or other policies and procedures, documenting processes for identifying  information-sharing gaps and the results; documenting and implementing  a process for analyzing the root causes of those gaps; and establishing  and documenting a process for potential future use for identifying,  assessing, and mitigating the risk of removing an incomplete initiative  from the list would provide DHS with an institutional record to better  replicate, and therefore sustain, its information-sharing efforts. Moreover,  defining the milestones that initiatives must achieve in order to be  considered complete and determining what difference the initiatives are  making in information sharing could help the board better track progress  in implementing the initiatives, make any necessary course corrections,  and make future investment decisions. Further, determining the specific  capabilities certain programs must implement in order for DHS to achieve  its 2015 vision and subsequently tracking annual progress toward  achieving these capabilities could help DHS prioritize programs and  investments, and track and assess progress toward meeting homeland  security responsibilities.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the  following five actions.
To address information-sharing gaps and risks, direct the Information  Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board to, in either its  Roadmap Implementation Guide or other related policies and  procedures, document its processes for identifying information-sharing gaps document and implement a process for analyzing the root causes  of those gaps; and establish and document processes for identifying and assessing  risks of removing initiatives from the list, as well as determining  whether other initiatives or alternative solutions are needed to  mitigate any significant risks related to the relevant information- sharing gap.
To improve DHS’s ability to track and assess key information-sharing  initiatives, direct the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance  Board to incorporate into the board’s existing tracking process  milestones with time frames that initiatives must achieve to be  considered complete, where feasible, and information to show the  impact initiatives are having on information sharing, and direct the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance  Board and the Office of the CIO to include in the mechanism the  board is developing to track programs’ achievement of key  capabilities the specific capabilities certain programs must  implement in order to achieve the department’s 2015 information- sharing vision.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS, ODNI, and the FBI on August  14, 2012, for review and comment. On September 5, 2012, DHS provided  written comments, which are reprinted in appendix II. In commenting on  the report, DHS stated that it concurred with all five recommendations  and identified actions taken or planned to implement them.
DHS concurred with the first recommendation, to direct the Information  Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board to document its processes  for identifying information-sharing gaps and the results. DHS stated that  the department, through the board, has recently initiated an effort to draft  a DHS-wide Information Sharing and Safeguarding Implementation Plan.  The implementation plan is to ensure that DHS’s sharing and  safeguarding activities align with the forthcoming Fiscal Year 2012–2017  DHS Information Sharing and Safeguarding Strategy. DHS stated that the  templates that the department will use to develop the implementation plan  will identify information-sharing and -safeguarding gaps and the  anticipated results. DHS also plans to update its Roadmap  Implementation Guide to provide the department with an institutional  record to better replicate, and therefore sustain, ongoing and future  implementation efforts to improve information-sharing and -safeguarding.  DHS also concurred with the second recommendation, to direct the  Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board to document  and implement a process for analyzing the root causes of those gaps.  DHS stated that the templates that the department will use to develop the  implementation plan will identify the specific root causes of information- sharing and -safeguarding gaps for the initiatives contained in the  implementation plan. DHS also plans to update its Roadmap  Implementation Guide to document the processes by which it identifies  the root causes of the gaps. DHS stated that this effort will better ensure  that the department invests in the correct information-sharing solutions  and effectively reduces risks. DHS concurred with the third  recommendation, to direct the Information Sharing and Safeguarding  Governance Board to establish and document processes for identifying  and assessing risks of removing initiatives from the list, as well as  determining whether other initiatives or alternative solutions are needed  to mitigate any significant risks related to the relevant information-sharing  gap. DHS stated that it plans to establish and document such processes,  and also plans to update its Roadmap Implementation Guide to document  the processes by which it identifies and assesses risks. DHS stated that  preliminary planning to address this recommendation has begun.
DHS concurred with the fourth recommendation, to direct the Information  Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board to incorporate into the  board’s existing tracking process milestones with time frames that  initiatives must achieve to be considered complete, where feasible, and  information to show the impact initiatives are having on information  sharing. DHS stated that the board will incorporate the recommended  changes into its tracking process, and that preliminary planning to  address this recommendation has begun. DHS also concurred with the  fifth recommendation, to direct the Information Sharing and Safeguarding  Governance Board and the Office of the CIO to include in the mechanism  the board is developing to track programs’ achievement of key  capabilities the specific capabilities certain programs must implement in  order to achieve the department’s 2015 information-sharing vision. DHS  stated that the board and the Office of the CIO will include the  recommended changes in the mechanism, and stated that preliminary  planning to address this recommendation has begun.
If fully implemented, DHS’s planned efforts will address the intent of the  five recommendations.
DHS and the FBI also provided us with technical comments, which we  considered and incorporated in the report where appropriate. ODNI did  not have comments on the draft report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, and  appropriate congressional committees. This report is also available at no  charge on GAO’s web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512- 6510 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Staff acknowledgments are provided in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our reporting objectives were to review the extent to which the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (1) has made progress since  2010 in achieving its information-sharing mission, and what related  challenges exist, if any, and (2) tracks and assesses information-sharing  improvements. To determine the extent to which DHS has made  progress in achieving its information-sharing mission, we analyzed  relevant strategic planning documents, such as DHS’s January 2011  Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management, the DHS Information  Sharing Strategy, the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing, and  the Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) Strategic Plan 2011-2018. In  addition, to determine the extent of DHS leadership’s demonstrated  commitment to information sharing, we analyzed documents related to  DHS’s governance structure for information sharing, including charters  that are current as of September 2012 and meeting minutes for relevant  governing bodies from January 2011 through April 2012.
To determine the extent to which DHS has developed information-sharing  plans and identified key efforts, we analyzed documents related to DHS’s  plans and initiatives for sharing, such as DHS’s list of key information- sharing initiatives, and analyzed documents from one initiative—the Law  Enforcement Information Sharing Initiative (LEISI)—which is led by DHS’s  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). We selected this  initiative as an example case study of DHS’s actions related to  information-sharing initiatives because it is a priority initiative and an  established program. To determine the extent to which DHS’s other key information-sharing initiatives have made progress, we analyzed DHS  documents tracking those initiatives. To determine the extent to which  DHS has the resources needed to achieve its information-sharing  mission, we analyzed documents related to DHS’s budget, including the  DHS fiscal year 2013 Budget in Brief, and the funding status of key  information-sharing initiatives. To determine the extent to which DHS has  the technology needed for information sharing, we analyzed documents  related to DHS’s technology framework for information sharing, such as  the Information Sharing Segment Architecture Transition Plan, among  other things.
In addition, we interviewed program officials within DHS’s I&A to obtain  information on the department’s information-sharing mission, goals,  programs, activities, and funding; the Segment Architecture; efforts to  improve terrorism-related information sharing; and related challenges. We  interviewed ICE officials about LEISI’s progress and their experiences  working with I&A on improving DHS’s information sharing. To determine  the progress DHS has made on the technology framework for information  sharing and on the funding of information-sharing programs, we  interviewed officials from DHS’s Office of the Chief Information Officer  (CIO). We assessed DHS’s plans and efforts against Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government and criteria that we use in  assessing high-risk issues. We also reviewed DHS’s efforts related to its  Segment Architecture against our prior report and federal guidance on  defining architecture content.
To determine the extent to which DHS tracks and assesses information- sharing improvements, we analyzed relevant strategic planning  documents, such as the I&A Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2011-2018 and  the February 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR).  Furthermore, to determine how DHS tracks progress and results in its  information-sharing initiatives, we analyzed documentation and examples  of DHS’s tracking mechanisms for its information-sharing efforts. We  analyzed documentation and data on DHS’s performance measures for  fiscal years 2011 and 2012 to determine the extent to which DHS is  monitoring the effectiveness of information sharing. We also used these  DHS performance measurement data to determine if DHS could  demonstrate progress in information sharing by analyzing data for  customer feedback and customer information needs, among other areas.  To assess the reliability of the data obtained from DHS, we analyzed  performance measurement documentation and interviewed officials  knowledgeable about the controls over the integrity of the data. On the  basis of our assessments, we determined that the performance  measurement data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report. In addition, we interviewed program officials within I&A and from  DHS’s Office of the CIO on I&A’s and DHS’s progress in sharing  terrorism-related information, and on mechanisms they use to monitor  effectiveness.
To supplement the steps we took to assess how DHS tracks and  assesses information-sharing improvements, we also obtained  information from various customers of DHS’s information sharing on the  usefulness of I&A and other DHS components’ products. Specifically, we  obtained information from 10 of 77 fusion center customers, 1 of 7 DHS  operational components who participate in the DHS Intelligence  Enterprise, and 2 of DHS’s 16 intelligence community customers. We  interviewed or received written input from directors and other senior  officials from 10 fusion centers—where states and major urban areas  collaborate with federal agencies to improve information sharing— including the President of the National Fusion Center Association. The  national network of fusion centers is the hub of much of the two-way  intelligence and information flow between the federal government and  state, local, tribal and territorial partners, making fusion centers key  customers of I&A’s intelligence reports. Because we selected a  nonprobability sample of fusion centers to contact, the information we  obtained from these locations may not be generalized to all fusion centers  nationwide. However, because we selected these centers based on,  among other things, geographic dispersion and variation in risk based on  the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 25 Cities Project, the information we  gathered from these locations provided us with an understanding of  similarities and differences in fusion centers’ satisfaction with DHS’s  information sharing across different centers. We interviewed ICE officials  from the Homeland Security Investigations and Intelligence office and  officials from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI)  National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Further, we received written  input from two headquarters divisions of the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI) that are responsible for sharing terrorism-related  information. We selected ICE, ODNI, and the FBI because they are key  customers of DHS’s intelligence products or partner with I&A to create  these products. ICE is a DHS component that shares terrorism-related  information and leads two of DHS’s key information-sharing initiatives.  ODNI and the FBI are federal agencies that have key roles in analyzing  terrorism threats to the United States and jointly issue products with DHS.  The FBI also has the primary role in carrying out investigations within the  United States of threats to national security. The views of ICE, ODNI, and  the FBI are not generalizable to all of DHS’s federal customers, but they  provided us with a general understanding of the perspectives about  DHS’s information sharing held by different customer types nationwide.  To supplement these views, we reviewed our prior work on DHS  customer satisfaction and analyzed a report from a survey on information  sharing conducted by the George Washington University Homeland  Security Policy Institute and discussed the report with a representative  who conducted the survey. In January and February 2012, the institute  administered a 78 question self-completion survey to individuals working  in 72 state and major urban area fusion centers, and 71 individuals  voluntarily took the survey. On average, 48 to 49 individuals answered  each question. Our analysis included reviewing the methodology and  assumptions of the study, and discussing the study’s scope and  conclusions with the George Washington University Homeland Security  Policy Institute. As a result of our review and analysis, we determined  that the study and its results were appropriate for use in our report. We  assessed DHS’s mechanisms to track and assess information-sharing  improvements against criteria for practices in program management.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 through  September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, David A. Powner (Director), Eric  Erdman (Assistant Director), Anh Le (Assistant Director), Paul A. Hobart,  Karl W. Seifert, Rebecca Kuhlmann Taylor, and Ashley D. Vaughan made  significant contributions to the report. Also contributing to this report were  Virginia A. Chanley, Tracy J. Harris, Eric D. Hauswirth, Kevin J. Heinz,  Lisa Humphrey, Jeff R. Jensen, Justine C. Lazaro, Thomas Lombardi,  Jan B. Montgomery, Jessica S. Orr, Anthony K. Pordes, and William M.  Reinsberg.