Coast Guard: Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Faced in Developing and Implementing a Common Operational Picture
Published: 2013-07-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: To facilitate its mission effectiveness through greater maritime situational awareness, the Coast Guard developed its COP--a map-based information system shared among its commands. The COP displays vessels, information about those vessels, and the environment surrounding them on interactive digital maps. COP information is shared via computer networks throughout the Coast Guard to assist with operational decisions. COP-related systems include systems that can be used to access, or provide information to, the COP.
This statement summarizes GAO's work on (1) the Coast Guard's progress in increasing the availability of data sources and COP information to users and (2) the challenges the Coast Guard has experienced in developing and implementing COP-related systems. This statement is based on GAO's prior work issued from July 2011 through April 2013 on various Coast Guard acquisition and implementation efforts related to the COP, along with selected updates conducted in July 2013. To conduct the selected updates, GAO obtained documentation on the Coast Guard's reported status in developing COP-related acquisition planning documents.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Coast Guard, a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has made progress in developing its Common Operational Picture (COP) by increasing the information in the COP and increasing user access to this information. The Coast Guard has made progress by adding internal and external data sources that allow for better understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could affect the United States. The COP has made information from these sources available to more COP users and decision makers throughout the Coast Guard. For example, in 2006, the ability to track the location of Coast Guard assets, including small boats and cutters, was added to the COP. This capability--also known as blue force tracking--allows COP users to locate Coast Guard vessels in real time and establish which vessels are in the best position to respond to mission needs. In addition to adding information to the COP, the Coast Guard has also made the information contained in the COP available on more computers and on more systems, which, in turn, has increased the number of users with access to the COP.
The Coast Guard has also experienced challenges in developing and implementing COP-related systems and meeting the COP's goals for implementing systems to display and share COP information. These challenges have affected the Coast Guard's deployment of recent COP technology acquisitions and are related to such things as the inability to share information as intended and systems not meeting intended objectives. For example, in July 2011, GAO reported that the Coast Guard had not met its goal of building a single, fully interoperable Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance program (C4ISR) system--a $2.5 billion project intended to enable the sharing of COP and other data among its new offshore vessels and aircraft. Specifically, GAO noted that the Coast Guard: (1) repeatedly changed its strategy for achieving the goal of the C4ISR system and (2) that not all vessels and aircraft were operating the same C4ISR system, or even at the same classification level and hence could not directly exchange data with one another as intended. GAO found similar challenges with other Coast Guard COP-related systems not meeting intended objectives. For example, in February 2012, GAO reported that the intended information-sharing capabilities of the Coast Guard's WatchKeeper software--a major part of the $74 million Interagency Operations Center project designed to gather data to help port partner agencies collaborate in the conduct of operations and share information, among other things--met few port agency partner needs, in part because the agency failed to determine these needs when developing the system. Further, in April 2013, GAO reported that, among other things, the Coast Guard experienced challenges when it deployed its Enterprise Geographic Information System (EGIS), a tool for viewing COP information that did not meet user needs. The challenges Coast Guard personnel experienced with EGIS included system slowness and displays of inaccurate information.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO has made recommendations in prior work to enhance the Coast Guard's development and implementation of its COP-related systems. DHS generally concurred with the recommendations and has reported actions under way to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the status of the Coast Guard’s  progress in developing a Common Operational Picture (COP), and the  challenges the agency has faced in managing this effort. As you know,  maritime domain awareness (MDA)—which involves the effective  understanding of anything in the maritime environment that could impact  the security, safety, economy or environment of the United States—is  critical to the Coast Guard’s mission efforts. According to the Coast  Guard, MDA played a key role in 2011 as it interdicted over 100 tons of  narcotics, intercepted over 2,400 alien migrants, detained over 190  suspected smugglers, boarded over 100 foreign vessels to suppress  illegal fishing, and rescued over 3,800 persons.
To enhance its situational awareness, the Coast Guard operates within a  complex information-sharing network with its maritime partners.  Specifically, as the lead agency in the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) for maintaining and improving MDA efforts, the Coast Guard works  with its partners to facilitate the sharing and dissemination of a wide array  of information and intelligence to secure the nation’s maritime  transportation system against potential threats. The level of information  sharing among these partners is largely dependent on the information  source and classification level. For example, the Coast Guard works  directly with the Navy as a major part of its defense readiness mission.  However, since the Navy’s command and control system operates at the  classified level, the Coast Guard must also be able to share information at  the classified level. Similarly, because many of its mission-related  interagency activities are with other federal, state, and local government  agencies, as well as the private sector, the Coast Guard must also be  able to communicate and share information at the unclassified level. As a  result, the Coast Guard operates in both the classified and unclassified  environment.
To facilitate this information sharing for mission effectiveness and  situational awareness with all of its partners, in 1998 the Coast Guard  began developing its COP—an interactive map-based information system  that can be shared among Coast Guard commands—that displays  vessels and information about those vessels and the environment  surrounding them. In general, the Coast Guard’s COP can be described  as an information display that provides the position and additional  information on vessel and aircraft contacts (called tracks) to the Coast  Guard and other decision makers. The Coast Guard’s concept for the  COP includes a complex interplay of data, assets, technology, and  multiple organizations at multiple security levels helping to populate and  share information within the COP. The COP can be a stand-alone  presentation or part of mission-oriented Geographic Information System  (GIS) displays that are linked to information sources. COP-related  systems include systems that can be used to access, or provide  information, to the COP.
My statement today is based on our prior work issued from July 2011  through April 2013 on the Coast Guard’s implementation of COP-related  systems, and the challenges the Coast Guard has encountered in  acquiring and implementing these systems, including selected updates  conducted in July 2013 related to the Coast Guard’s acquisition strategy  of COP-related systems. This statement discusses (1) the Coast Guard’s  progress in increasing data sources and the availability of COP  information to users and (2) the challenges the Coast Guard has  experienced in developing and implementing COP-related systems. For  our previous reports we analyzed Coast Guard documentation, such as  pertinent provisions of the Coast Guard’s Common Operational Picture  Concept of Operations, and interviewed Coast Guard officials, including  headquarters officials responsible for managing the COP’s development  and requirements and field personnel who use the COP. More detailed  information on our scope and methodology appears in our published  work. For the selected updates, we obtained documentation on the  Coast Guard’s reported status in developing acquisition planning and  technical documents for COP-related systems. All of our work was  conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: According to the Coast Guard, the COP became operational in 2003 and  is comprised of four elements:
Track data feeds: The primary information included in the Coast  Guard’s COP is vessel and aircraft position information—or tracks— and descriptive information about the vessels, their cargo, and crew.  Track information may be obtained from a variety of sources  depending on the type of track. For example, the COP includes track  information or position reports of Coast Guard and port partner  vessels.
Information data sources: The information data sources provide  supplementary information on the vessel tracks to help COP users  and operational commanders determine why a track might be  important. The COP includes data from multiple information sources  that originate from the Coast Guard as well as from other government  agencies and civilian sources.
Command and control systems: These systems collect, fuse,  disseminate, and store information for the COP. Since the COP  became operational in 2003, the Coast Guard has provided COP  users with various systems that have allowed them to view,  manipulate and enhance their use of the COP. These systems have  included the Global Command and Control System (GCCS),  Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC), and Hawkeye. In  addition to the technology needed to view the COP, the Coast Guard  has also developed technology to further enhance the information  within the COP and its use to improve mission effectiveness. This has  occurred in part through its former Deepwater Command, Control,  Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and  Reconnaissance (C4ISR) program system improvements.
COP management procedures: These procedures address the  development and the use of the COP. This would include, for  example, the Concept of Operations document, which identifies the  basic components, use, and exchange of information included in the  COP and the requirements document, which identifies the essential  capabilities and associated requirements needed to make the COP  function. These procedures also include other documents such as  standard operating procedures on how the Coast Guard uses the  COP, agreements with others using the COP on how information is to  be shared or exchanged, and rules for how data are correlated and  how vessels are flagged as threats or friends.
Figure 1 depicts the Coast Guard’s vision of the COP with Coast Guard  internal and external users.
section_title: The Coast Guard Has Made Progress in Adding Data Sources and the Availability of COP Information to Users
paragraphs: In April 2013, we reported that since the COP became operational in  2003, the Coast Guard has made progress in adding useful data sources  and in increasing the number of users with access to the COP. In  general, the COP has added internal and external data sources and types  of vessel-tracking information that enhance COP users’ knowledge of the  maritime domain. Vessel tracking information had been available  previously to Coast Guard field units located in ports through a Vessel  Tracking Service—that is, a service that provides active monitoring and  navigational advice for vessels in confined and busy waterways to help  facilitate maritime safety. However, adding it to the COP provided a  broader base of situational awareness for Coast Guard operational  commanders. For example, before automatic identification system (AIS)  vessel-tracking information was added to the COP, only Coast Guard  units specifically responsible for vessel-tracking, were able to easily track  large commercial vessels’ positions, speeds, courses, and destinations.  According to Coast Guard personnel, after AIS data were added to the  COP in 2003, any Coast Guard unit could access such information to  improve strategic and tactical decision making. In 2006, the ability to track  the location of Coast Guard assets, including small boats and cutters,  was also added to the COP. This capability—also known as blue force  tracking—allows COP users to locate Coast Guard vessels in real time  and establish which vessels are in the best position to respond to mission  needs. Similarly, blue force tracking allows the Coast Guard to  differentiate its own vessels from commercial or unfriendly vessels.
Another enhancement to the information available in the COP was  provided through the updating of certain equipment on Coast Guard  assets that enabled them to collect and transmit data. Specifically, the  Coast Guard made some data collection and sharing improvements,  including the installation of commercial satellite communications  equipment and AIS receivers, onboard its older cutters. This added  capability made the COP information more robust by allowing Coast  Guard vessels at sea to receive, through AIS receivers, position reports  from large commercial vessels and then transmit this information to land  units where it would be entered into the COP. This equipment upgrade on  older Coast Guard cutters added information into the COP that is  generally not available through other means.
According to Coast Guard officials, in addition to adding information to the  COP, the Coast Guard has also made the information contained in the  COP available on more computers and on more systems, which, in turn,  has increased the number of users with access to the COP. One of the  key steps toward increasing the number of users with COP access  occurred in 2004 with the implementation of C2PC, which made both the  classified and unclassified COP available to additional Coast Guard  personnel. According to Coast Guard officials, the advent of C2PC  allowed access to the COP from any Coast Guard computer connected to  the Coast Guard data network. Prior to C2PC, Coast Guard personnel  had access to the COP through Coast Guard GCCS workstations.
section_title: The Coast Guard Has Experienced Challenges in Developing and Implementing COP- related Systems
paragraphs: We previously reported that the Coast Guard has experienced challenges  with COP-related technology acquisitions that resulted from the Coast  Guard not following its own information technology acquisition guidance  and processes. These challenges included poor usability and the inability  to share information as intended, and ultimately resulted in the Coast  Guard not meeting its goals for multiple COP-related systems. For  example, four COP-related systems have been affected by the Coast  Guard not closely following its acquisition processes.
C4ISR project. The C4ISR project was designed to allow the Coast  Guard’s newly acquired offshore vessels and aircraft to both add  information to the COP using their own sensors as well as view  information contained within the COP, thereby allowing these assets to  become both producers and consumers of COP information. However,  in July 2011, we reported that the Coast Guard had not met its goal of  building the $2.5 billion C4ISR system. Specifically, we reported that the  Coast Guard had repeatedly changed its strategy for achieving C4ISR’s  goal of building a single fully interoperable command, control, intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance system across the Coast Guard’s new  vessels and aircraft. Further, we found that not all aircraft and vessels  were operating the same C4ISR system, or even at the same  classification level, and hence could not directly exchange data with each  other. For example, an aircraft operating with a classified system had  difficulty sharing information with others operating on unclassified  systems during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill incident. In addition, we  reported at that time that the Coast Guard may shift away from a full data- sharing capability and instead use a system where shore-based  command centers serve as conduits between assets while also entering  data from assets into the COP. This approach could increase the time it  takes for COP information, for example, gathered by a vessel operating  with a classified system to be shared with an aircraft operating with an  unclassified system. Because aircraft and vessels are important  contributors to and users of COP information, a limited capability to  quickly and fully share COP data could affect their mission effectiveness.  We concluded that given these uncertainties, the Coast Guard did not  have a clear vision of the C4ISR required to meet its missions.
We also reported in July 2011 that the Coast Guard was managing the  C4ISR program without key acquisition documents. At that time, the  Coast Guard lacked an acquisition program baseline that reflected the  planned program, a credible life-cycle cost estimate, and an operational  requirements document for the entire C4ISR acquisition project.  According to Coast Guard information technology officials, the abundance  of software baselines could increase the overall instability of the C4ISR  system and complexity of the data sharing among assets. We  recommended, and the Coast Guard concurred, that it should determine  whether the system-of-systems concept for C4ISR is still the planned  vision for the program, and if not, ensure that the new vision is  comprehensively detailed in the project documentation. In response to  our recommendation, the Coast Guard reported in 2012 that it was still  supporting the system-of-systems approach, and was developing needed  documentation. We will continue to assess the C4ISR program through  our ongoing work on Coast Guard recapitalization efforts.
Development of WatchKeeper. Another mechanism that was expected  to increase access to COP information was the DHS Interagency  Operations Center (IOC) program, which was delegated to the Coast  Guard for development. This $74 million program began providing COP  information to Coast Guard agency partners in 2010 using WatchKeeper  software. The IOCs were originally designed to gather data from sensors  and port partner sources to provide situational awareness to Coast Guard  sector personnel and to Coast Guard partners in state and local law  enforcement and port operations, among others. Specifically,  WatchKeeper was designed to provide Coast Guard personnel and port  partners with access to the same unclassified GIS data, thereby  improving collaboration between them and leveraging their respective  capabilities in responding to cases. For example, in responding to a  distress call, access to WatchKeeper information would allow both the  Coast Guard unit and its local port partners to know the location of all  possible response vessels, so they could allocate resources and develop  search patterns that made the best use of each responding vessel.
In February 2012, we reported that the Coast Guard had increased  access to its WatchKeeper software by allowing access to the system for  Coast Guard port partners. However, the Coast Guard had limited  success in improving information sharing between the Coast Guard and  local port partners and did not follow its established guidance during the  development of WatchKeeper—a major component of the $74 million  Interagency Operations Center acquisition project. By not following its  guidance, the Coast Guard failed to determine the needs of its users,  define acquisition requirements, or determine cost and schedule  information. Specifically, prior to the initial deployment of WatchKeeper,  the Coast Guard had made limited efforts to determine port partner needs  for the system. For example, we found that Coast Guard officials had  some high level discussions, primarily with other DHS partners, but that  port partner involvement in the development of WatchKeeper  requirements was primarily limited to Customs and Border Protection  because WatchKeeper had grown out of a system designed for screening  commercial vessel arrivals—a Customs and Border Protection mission.  However, according to the Interagency Operations Process Report:  Mapping Process to Requirements for Interagency Operations Centers,  the Coast Guard identified many port partners as critical to IOCs,  including other federal agencies (e.g., the Federal Bureau of  Investigation) and state and local agencies.
We also determined that because few port partners’ needs were met with  WatchKeeper, use of the system by port partners was limited.  Specifically, of the 233 port partners who had access to WatchKeeper for  any part of September 2011 (the most recent month for which data were  available at the time of our report), about 18 percent had ever logged onto  the system and about 3 percent had logged on more than five times.  Additionally, we reported that without implementing a documented  process to obtain and incorporate port partner feedback into the  development of future WatchKeeper requirements, the Coast Guard was  at risk of deploying a system that lacked needed capabilities, which would  continue to limit the ability of port partners to share information and  coordinate in the maritime environment. We concluded, in part, that the  weak management of the IOC acquisition project increased the program’s  exposure to risk. In particular, fundamental requirements-development  and management practices had not been employed; costs were unclear;  and the project’s schedule, which was to guide program execution and  promote accountability, had not been reliably derived. Moreover, we  reported that with stronger program management, the Coast Guard could  reduce the risk that it would have a system that did not meet Coast Guard  and port partner user needs and expectations. As a result, we  recommended, and the Coast Guard concurred, that it collect data to  determine the extent to which (1) sectors are providing port partners with  WatchKeeper access and (2) port partners are using WatchKeeper; then  develop, document, and implement a process to obtain and incorporate  port-partner input into the development of future WatchKeeper  requirements; and define, document, and prioritize WatchKeeper  requirements. As of April 2013, we had not received any reports of  progress on these recommendations from the Coast Guard.
Coast Guard Enterprise Geographic Information System (EGIS). In  April 2013, we also reported that Coast Guard personnel we interviewed  who use EGIS--an important component, along with its associated viewer,  for accessing COP information—stated that they had experienced  numerous challenges with the system after it was implemented in 2009.  Our site visits to area, district, and sector command centers in six Coast  Guard field locations, and discussions with headquarters personnel,  identified numerous examples of user concerns about EGIS.  Specifically, the Coast Guard personnel we interviewed who used EGIS  stated that it was slow, did not always display accurate and timely  information, or degraded the performance of their computer  workstations—making EGIS’s performance generally unsatisfactory to  them. For example, personnel from one district we visited reported losing  critical time when attempting to determine a boater’s position on a map  display because of EGIS’s slow performance. Similarly, personnel at  three of the five districts we visited described how EGIS sometimes  displayed inaccurate or delayed vessel location information, including, for  example, displaying a vessel track indicating a 25-foot Coast Guard boat  was located off the coast of Greenland—a location where no such vessel  had ever been. Personnel we met with in two districts did not use EGIS at  all to display COP information because doing so caused other  applications to crash.
In addition to user-identified challenges, we reported in April 2013 that  Coast Guard information technology (IT) officials told us they had  experienced challenges largely related to insufficient computational power  on some Coast Guard work stations, a lack of training for users and  system installers, and inadequate testing of EGIS software before  installation. For example, according to Coast Guard IT officials, Coast  Guard computers are replaced on a regular schedule, but not all at once,  and EGIS’s viewer places a high demand on the graphics capabilities of  computers. They added that this demand was beyond the capability of the  older Coast Guard computers used in some locations. Moreover, Coast  Guard IT management made EGIS available to all potential users without  performing the tests needed to determine if capability challenges would  ensue. In regard to training, Coast Guard officials told us that they had  developed online internal training for EGIS, and classroom training was  also available from the software supplier. However, Coast Guard IT  officials stated that they did not inform users that this training was  available. This left the users with learning how to use EGIS on the job.  Similarly, the installers of EGIS software were not trained properly, and  many cases of incomplete installation were later discovered. These  incomplete installations significantly degraded the capabilities of EGIS.  Finally, the Coast Guard did not pre-test the demands of EGIS on Coast  Guard systems in real world conditions, according to Coast Guard  officials. Tests conducted later, after users commented on their problems  using EGIS, demonstrated the limitations of the Coast Guard network in  handling EGIS. According to Coast Guard officials, some of these  challenges may have been avoided if they had followed established  acquisition processes for IT development. If these problems had been  averted, users may have had greater satisfaction and the system may  have been better utilized for Coast Guard mission needs.
Poor communication by, and among, Coast Guard IT officials led to  additional management challenges during efforts to implement a  simplified EGIS technology called EGIS Silverlight. According to Coast  Guard officials, the Coast Guard implemented EGIS Silverlight to give  users access to EGIS data without the analysis tools that had been tied to  technical challenges with the existing EGIS software. Coast Guard  personnel from the Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) stated  that EGIS Silverlight was available to users in 2010; however, none of the  Coast Guard personnel we spoke with at the field units we visited  mentioned awareness of or use of this alternative EGIS option when  asked about what systems they used to access the COP. According to  CIO personnel, it was the responsibility of the system sponsor’s office to  notify users about the availability of EGIS Silverlight. However, personnel  from the sponsor’s office stated that they were unaware that EGIS  Silverlight had been deployed and thus had not taken steps to notify field  personnel of this new application that could have helped to address EGIS  performance problems. These Coast Guard officials were unable to  explain how this communication breakdown had occurred.
Coast Guard One View (CG1V). In April 2013, we reported that the  Coast Guard had not followed its own information technology  development guidance when developing its new COP viewer, known as  Coast Guard One View, or CG1V. The Coast Guard reported that it  began development of CG1V in April 2010 to provide users with a single  interface for viewing GIS information, including the COP, and to align the  Coast Guard’s viewer with DHS’s new GIS viewer. However, in 2012,  during its initial development of CG1V, the agency did not follow its  System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) guidance which requires  documents to be completed during specific phases of product  development. Specifically, 9 months after CG1V had entered into the  SDLC the Coast Guard either had not created certain required documents  or had created them outside of the sequence prescribed by the SDLC.  For example, the SDLC-required tailoring plan is supposed to provide a  clear and concise listing of SDLC process requirements throughout the  entire system lifecycle, and facilitate the documentation of calculated  deviations from standard SDLC activities, products, roles, and  responsibilities from the outset of the project. Though the SDLC clearly  states that the tailoring plan is a key first step in the SDLC, for CG1V it  was not written until after documents required in the second phase were  completed. Coast Guard officials stated that this late completion of the  tailoring plan occurred because the Coast Guard’s Chief Information  Officer had allowed the project to start in the second phase of the SDLC  because they believed CG1V was a proven concept. However, without  key phase one documents, the Coast Guard may have prematurely  selected CG1V as a solution without reviewing other viable alternatives to  meet its vision, and may have dedicated resources to CG1V without  knowing project costs. In October 2012, Coast Guard officials  acknowledged the importance of following the SDLC process and stated  their intent to complete the SDLC-required documents. Clarifying the  application of the SDLC to new technology development would better  position the Coast Guard to maximize the usefulness of the COP. In our  April 2013 report, we recommended that the Commandant of the Coast  Guard direct the Coast Guard Chief Information Officer to issue guidance  clarifying the application of the SDLC for the development of future  projects. The Coast Guard concurred with the recommendation and  reported that it planned to mitigate the risks of potential implementation  challenges of future technology developments for the COP by issuing  proper guidance and clarifying procedures regarding the applicability of  the SDLC. The Coast Guard estimated that it would implement this  recommendation by the end of fiscal year 2013.
Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy  to respond to any questions.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Stephen L. Caldwell at  (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement  include Dawn Hoff (Assistant Director), Jonathan Bachman, Jason  Berman, Laurier Fish, Bintou Njie, Jessica Orr, Lerone Reid, and  Katherine Trimble.
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