Human Trafficking: A Strategic Framework Could Help Enhance the Interagency Collaboration Needed to Effectively Combat Trafficking Crimes
Published: 2007-07-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Human trafficking is a transnational crime whose victims include men, women, and children and may involve violations of labor, immigration, antislavery, and other criminal laws. To ensure punishment of traffickers and protection of victims, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), which is subject to reauthorization in 2007. The Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS) lead federal investigations and prosecutions of trafficking crimes. As requested, this report discusses (1) key activities federal agencies have undertaken to combat human trafficking crimes, (2) federal efforts to coordinate investigations and prosecutions of these crimes, and (3) how the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) supported federally funded state and local human trafficking task forces. GAO reviewed strategies, reports, and other agency documents; analyzed trafficking data; and interviewed agency officials and task force members.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since the enactment of the TVPA in 2000, federal agencies have (1) investigated allegations of trafficking crimes, leading to 139 prosecutions;(2) provided training and implemented state and local initiatives to support investigations and prosecutions; and (3) established organizational structures, agency-level goals, plans, or strategies. For example, agencies have trained new and current personnel on investigating and prosecuting trafficking in persons crimes through their agency training academies and centers, provided Web-based training, and developed and disseminated guidance on case pursuance. Agencies have also sponsored outreach and training to state and local law enforcement, nongovernmental organizations, and the general public through a toll-free complaint line, newsletters, national conferences, and model legislation. Finally, some agencies have established special units or plans for carrying out their antitrafficking duties. Federal agencies have coordinated across agencies on investigations and prosecutions of trafficking crimes on a case-by-case basis, determined by individual case needs, and established relationships among law enforcement officials across agencies. For example, several federal agencies worked together to resolve a landmark trafficking case involving over 250 victims. However, DOJ and DHS officials have identified the need to advance and expand U.S. efforts to combat trafficking through more collaborative and proactive strategies to identify trafficking victims. Prior GAO work on interagency collaboration has shown that a strategic framework that includes, among other things, a common outcome, mutually reinforcing strategies, and compatible polices and procedures to operate across agency boundaries can help enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies dealing with issues that are national in scope and cross agency jurisdictions. To support U.S. efforts to investigate trafficking in persons, BJA has awarded grants of up to $450,000 to establish 42 state and local human trafficking law enforcement task forces. BJA has funded the development of a train-the-trainer curriculum and a national conference on human trafficking and taken further steps to respond to task force technical assistance needs. Nevertheless, task force members from the seven task forces we contacted and DOJ officials identified continued and additional assistance needs. BJA does not have a technical assistance plan for its human trafficking task force grant program. Prior GAO work has shown the need for agencies that administer grants or funding to state and local entities to implement a plan to focus technical assistance on areas of greatest need. BJA officials said they were preparing a plan to provide additional and proactive technical assistance to the task forces, but as of June 2007 had not received the necessary approvals.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Human trafficking is a transnational crime whose victims include men,  women, and children and may involve violations of labor, immigration,  antislavery, and other criminal laws. Victims of trafficking are bought,  sold, sometimes transported across national boundaries, and forced to  work in legal or illegal situations, including the sex industry, sweatshops,  domestic service, and agriculture, among others. What usually  distinguishes trafficking from crimes such as alien smuggling or other  labor law violations is the trafficker’s use of force, fraud, or coercion to  compel these victims into, or hold them in, the employment situation.  Despite international acknowledgment of the trafficking problem as a  human rights violation, estimates of the number of victims remain  questionable because of methodological weaknesses, gaps in data, and  numerical discrepancies. Since the mid-1990s, the United States has  played a leading role in putting trafficking in persons on the international  community’s agenda and pursued trafficking crimes within the United  States. By 2000, various U.S. policymakers had determined that existing  U.S. statutes scattered enforcement authority across the government and  did not adequately protect trafficking victims, deter trafficking, and bring  traffickers to justice.
As a result, in October 2000, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims  Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) to ensure just and effective punishment of  traffickers and protection of victims. Among other things, the TVPA made  it illegal to obtain or maintain persons for commercial sexual activity,  using force, fraud, or coercion for those 18 or over (but proof of force,  fraud, or coercion is not required for those under 18), and to use certain  kinds of force or coercion to provide or obtain persons for any labor or  services (e.g., work in farms, factories, and households). The act also  updated and supplemented existing involuntary servitude statutes used to  prosecute trafficking crimes, enhanced the penalties for trafficking crimes,  and provided a range of new protections and assistance for victims of  trafficking. Congress reauthorized the act in 2003 and 2005, and it is  subject to reauthorization in 2007.
Nevertheless, pursuing trafficking in persons crimes continues to present  special challenges to federal investigators and prosecutors. Since the  primary eyewitness to and evidence of the crime is typically the trafficking  victim, the first step in pursuing these crimes is usually to identify victims.  Yet these victims are often hidden from view, employed in legal or illegal  enterprises, do not view themselves as victims, or are considered to be  criminals or accessories to crimes (e.g., prostitutes or smuggled aliens)  subject to incarceration or deportation. A nongovernmental organization,  average citizens, or even state and local law enforcement working in the  community may be the first point of contact for a trafficking victim, rather  than federal law enforcement.
Moreover, trafficking in persons cases are difficult to pursue because they  are multifaceted, complex, and resource intensive. Federal agencies have  to determine whether those identified as potential victims have in fact  been trafficked and then secure their cooperation in order to pursue the  investigation and prosecution of the traffickers. Victims may be reluctant  to testify because of trauma, fear, loyalty to the trafficker, or distrust of  law enforcement. Moreover, a single case may involve one or hundreds of  victims, requiring housing, food, and other services from federal agencies;  diverse offenses, such as violent crime, labor exploitation, sex crimes,  alien smuggling, organized crime, and financial crimes; and collection of  significant evidence from overseas.
Accordingly, investigating and prosecuting trafficking crimes requires  collaboration among multiple components of the Departments of Justice  (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS) with responsibilities for investigating  and prosecuting trafficking crimes. Identifying trafficking and victims can  also involve collaboration between DOJ and DHS agencies and  components of the Departments of Labor (DOL) and State (DOS) that may  uncover information relevant to the pursuit of trafficking crimes in the  course of carrying out their missions. Collaboration is also needed  between federal agencies and state and local law enforcement and  nongovernmental organizations. Recognizing the need to leverage these  resources to identify victims and support federal efforts to pursue  traffickers, DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), working with the  Office for Victims of Crime (OVC), implemented a competitive grant  program in 2004 to fund human trafficking law enforcement task forces  composed of state and local law enforcement agencies, field offices of  federal agencies, and victim and social service organizations with the  support of the local U.S. Attorney. As of fiscal year 2006, BJA had funded  42 task forces across the country.
As requested, to ascertain the status of U.S. efforts to investigate and  prosecute trafficking crimes, this report discusses (1) key activities federal  agencies have undertaken to combat trafficking in persons crimes, (2)  federal efforts to coordinate investigations and prosecutions of trafficking  in persons crimes and whether these efforts might be enhanced, and (3)  how BJA supported federally funded state and local human trafficking  task forces and whether these efforts might be improved. This review is  part of a larger body of work we have conducted on U.S. efforts to combat  trafficking in persons, here and abroad. A companion report that examines  U.S. and multilateral efforts to combat human trafficking overseas was  also issued today.
To determine key activities federal agencies have undertaken to combat  trafficking in persons crimes, we reviewed agency reports describing these  activities and strategies and memorandums applicable to federal efforts to  address these crimes. We interviewed officials from DOJ, including the  Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Civil Rights Division/Criminal  Section (CRT/CS), Criminal Division/Child Exploitation and Obscenity  Section (CEOS), and the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys; DHS U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services (CIS); DOL’s Wage and Hour Division; DOS’s Bureau  of Diplomatic Security and Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in  Persons; and the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC). From  the FBI, ICE, CRT/CS, and CEOS, we obtained and analyzed relevant data  on the cases investigated and prosecuted, including numbers of cases,  defendants charged, and convictions, as well as, where possible, estimates  of the resources used to do so. We discussed the sources of these data  with federal agency officials to determine that these data were sufficiently  reliable to show trends in agencies’ activities undertaken to investigate  and prosecute trafficking crimes.
To determine what efforts federal agencies have undertaken to coordinate  investigations and prosecutions of trafficking in persons crimes and  whether these efforts might be enhanced, we reviewed pertinent  documents, such as agency reports, strategies, and memorandums to field  offices, which described or directed agency and interagency coordination  on trafficking activities. We interviewed officials from DOJ headquarters,  including FBI, CRT/CS, CEOS, and the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys;  ICE and CIS; DOL’s Wage and Hour Division; DOS’s Bureau of Diplomatic  Security and Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons; and  HSTC. We also interviewed field personnel from FBI, ICE, DOL, and  selected U.S. Attorney’s Offices. In addition, we used relevant GAO reports  on enhancing interagency collaboration as criteria.
To assess how BJA has supported federally funded state and local human  trafficking task forces and whether these efforts might be improved, we  analyzed relevant documents and grant reports from BJA, including grant  solicitations, performance reports, and Web site information; met with  BJA, OVC, and CRT/CS officials to discuss the documents and technical  assistance to the task forces; made site visits to three task forces; and  conducted telephone interviews with key participants from four other task  forces. The task forces contacted were judgmentally selected based on the  length of time funded (fiscal year 2004); different levels of success, based  on BJA performance measures (e.g., number of identified potential  trafficking victims); and focus (e.g., trafficking for labor, sex, or both). We  interviewed key task force participants (e.g., Assistant U.S. Attorneys,  local and federal law enforcement, and representatives of  nongovernmental organizations) from the seven task forces. Although this  approach does not allow for generalizing, it provided additional  information on steps federal agencies took to support state and local  human trafficking task forces. In addition, we reviewed relevant GAO  reports on federal agencies’ administration of grants or funding to state  and local entities.
We conducted our work from June 2006 through June 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I  presents more details about the scope and methodology of our work.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 to combat  trafficking in persons. As the centerpiece for U.S. antitrafficking efforts,  the TVPA advanced a three-pronged victim-centered approach— prevention of trafficking, protection and assistance for victims of  trafficking, and prosecution and punishment of traffickers. Among its  provisions, the TVPA addressed identified gaps in existing law and  enhanced the tools available to pursue these crimes. Specifically, the act  criminalized the obtaining or maintaining of persons for commercial  sexual activity, using force, fraud, or coercion for those 18 or over (but not  for those under 18), and to use certain kinds of force or coercion to  provide or obtain persons for any labor or services (e.g., work in farms,  factories, and households). It also included nonviolent coercion and  threats of harm to third persons in federal involuntary servitude laws;  made attempted trafficking crimes punishable; criminalized the holding of  actual or purported identity documents in the course of committing, or  with the intent to commit, any trafficking crime; and increased the  maximum penalty for slavery and involuntary servitude offenses from 10  to 20 years or to a life sentence if the offense involved factors like death,  kidnapping, or aggravated sexual abuse. In addition, the TVPA required  restitution for victims of trafficking and forfeiture of traffickers’ assets and  provided legal status and special benefits to aliens certified as trafficking  victims in the United States who are willing to assist law enforcement  efforts against traffickers. (App. II identifies specific statutory provisions  relevant to investigating and prosecuting trafficking in persons crimes.)
Responsibilities for pursuing trafficking crimes fall to multiple federal  agencies, including the FBI and ICE, which investigate these crimes;  CRT/CS, CEOS, and U.S. Attorney’s Offices, which prosecute traffickers;  and other agencies within DHS and DOJ and components of DOL and DOS  that support U.S. efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking in  persons. Figure 1 depicts these key agencies and their respective  responsibilities related to the investigation and prosecution of trafficking  in persons crimes.
In addition, to coordinate the implementation of the TVPA, the act  directed the President to establish an Interagency Task Force to Monitor  and Combat Trafficking in Persons and authorized the Secretary of State  to create the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons to  provide assistance to the task force. In February 2002, the President issued  an executive order creating this cabinet-level task force and then in  December issued National Security Presidential Directive 22, which  identified trafficking in persons as an important national security issue  and directed federal agencies to strengthen their collective efforts,  capabilities, and coordination to support the goal of abolishing human  trafficking. Subsequently, the 2003 TVPA reauthorization statutorily  established the Senior Policy Operating Group (SPOG) to address  interagency policy, program, and planning issues regarding the TVPA’s  implementation. In addition, HSTC, which is staffed by detailees from  DHS, DOJ, DOS, and the intelligence community, among other places,  collects and disseminates intelligence information to build a  comprehensive picture of human trafficking.
Pursuing trafficking investigations and prosecutions also needs the  support of state and local law enforcement, who may be in the best  position to find trafficking victims because of their familiarity with their  respective jurisdictions, and nongovernmental organizations, from whom  victims may more readily seek assistance. To leverage these resources to  support federal efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons,  DOJ designed, developed, and instituted a task force approach that it  presented during the first National Training Conference on Human  Trafficking: Rescuing Women and Children from Slavery, held in Tampa,  Florida, in July 2004. DOJ invited 21 teams of 20 federal, state, and local  law enforcement and nongovernmental service providers from  communities that it believed to have potential trafficking problems to  attend the conference. After the conference, the teams were expected to  work together on human trafficking in their respective communities. To  implement the approach, BJA, the DOJ component responsible for  supporting local, state, and tribal efforts to achieve safer communities,  developed and implemented a human trafficking law enforcement task  force competitive grant program. These grants were to be awarded to state  or local police agencies that work with the local U.S. Attorney’s Office,  federal law enforcement entities, and nongovernmental organizations that  may come into contact with victims of trafficking. In addition, in spring  2003, the FBI’s Crimes Against Children Unit, DOJ’s Child Exploitation and  Obscenity Section, and the National Center for Missing and Exploited  Children launched the Innocence Lost National Initiative in 14 U.S. cities  where the FBI field offices had identified a high incidence of trafficking of  U.S. children for commercial sex.
As trafficking in persons is a transnational crime, federal agencies may  need to obtain information and assistance directly from individual foreign  governments and through international law enforcement organizations in  order to investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons cases in the  United States. Multilateral and extradition treaties provide the authority  for U.S. investigative and prosecutorial agencies to request information  and assistance on criminal cases, including trafficking in persons, from  approximately 175 individual foreign governments. Working through ICE  and FBI personnel stationed at U.S. embassies, U.S. investigative and  prosecutorial agencies have obtained a broad spectrum of assistance from  individual foreign governments and with such assistance have successfully  prosecuted traffickers. This assistance has included obtaining  documentary evidence and corroborating witness testimony, protecting  U.S. trafficking victims’ family members in a foreign country,  apprehending fugitive traffickers, and extraditing defendants. In addition,  U.S. agencies may obtain information through the International Criminal  Police Organization, Interpol, which serves as a conduit for a cooperative  exchange of information on criminal activities from its 186 member  countries.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Undertaken Key Activities to Combat Trafficking in Persons Crimes
paragraphs: Subsequent to the enactment of the TVPA, federal agencies reported 139  prosecutions and hundreds of investigations of trafficking for  commercial sex or labor as of June 2007. To support federal efforts to  identify victims and investigate and prosecute these crimes, agencies (1)  provided training to agency personnel to raise awareness and increase the  skills needed to identify victims and pursue trafficking investigations and  prosecutions, (2) carried out outreach and training to raise public  awareness of and skills in identifying trafficking victims, and (3) engaged  state and local knowledge and resources by funding state and local  trafficking in persons task forces and developing and disseminating a  model state law. In addition, to address their responsibilities related to  trafficking in persons crimes, some agencies have established special  units, agency-level goals, or plans or strategies. Federal investigative and  prosecutorial agencies have generally drawn from existing resources to  carry out these efforts (app. III provides information on resources).
subsections: section_title: Federal Agencies Reported a General Increase in Investigations and Prosecutions of Trafficking in Persons Beginning in Fiscal Year 2001
paragraphs: With the enhanced tools available to federal investigators and prosecutors  as a result of the enactment of the TVPA, federal agencies reported a  general increase in the number of prosecutions and investigations of  trafficking in persons crimes. These data are an indicator of the level of  agency effort in pursuit of these crimes, since fiscal year 2001, although  they are limited by a number of factors. Trafficking crimes and their  victims are hidden and not readily identifiable. Traffickers may be charged  or convicted of other than trafficking crimes (e.g., kidnapping,  immigration violations, or money laundering) for strategic or technical  reasons. Also, limitations of agency data systems, which are primarily case  management systems, may not allow for the extraction of trafficking data  per se. In addition, availability of individual agencies’ data may be limited  by factors pertinent to that agency; for example, ICE was only established  in 2003. Moreover, agency data are not comparable across agencies nor  can data on investigations be linked to data on prosecutions. As a result of  these limitations, however, the actual number of investigations and  prosecutions that have led to the incapacitation of traffickers may be  greater than the numbers that have been reported by federal agencies.
CRT/CS reported 139 prosecutions from fiscal year 2001 to June 14, 2007,  as compared with 19 cases for fiscal years 1995 to 2000. These cases  included 39 defined by CRT/CS as labor trafficking and 100 as trafficking  for commercial sexual activity. According to CRT/CS officials, the number  of prosecutions varies in any given year, because of differences in the  complexity of the cases. (See app. IV for illustrations of the complexity of  cases.). FBI and ICE provided data on numbers of trafficking cases  opened. The FBI’s Civil Rights Unit reported opening a total of 751  trafficking in persons cases between fiscal year 2001 and April 5, 2007.  However, these data do not include investigations involving trafficking  that are classified as other types of crime, for example, alien smuggling  cases that also involve trafficking in persons. ICE reported opening a total  of 899 trafficking in persons cases, for fiscal year 2005 through May 31,  2007. Both FBI and ICE data may include cases involving investigations  handled jointly by the two agencies. In addition, as part of the Innocence  Lost National Initiative, the FBI’s Crimes Against Children Unit reported  327 cases opened on trafficking of U.S. children for commercial sex  between fiscal year 2004 and June 5, 2007. Appendix III presents additional  data related to trafficking in persons investigations and prosecutions;  including arrests; indictments; convictions; and restitution to the victims,  as required under the TVPA, where appropriate.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Undertaken Training, Outreach, and State and Local Initiatives to Support Federal Efforts to Investigate and Prosecute Trafficking Crimes
paragraphs: National Security Presidential Directive 22 directed federal departments  and agencies to ensure that all appropriate offices within their jurisdiction  were fully trained to carry out their specific responsibilities to combat  trafficking, including interagency cooperation and coordination on the  investigation and prosecution of trafficking. FBI, ICE, CRT/CS, CEOS, and  DOL all reported taking steps to ensure that their personnel received  appropriate training, using a variety of means to do so, including the  following:  training for new agents through the ICE and FBI training academies;    a Web-based training module, which is available to ICE agents through  ICE’s intranet;    guidance to ICE domestic and international field offices about  conducting outreach, training, and coalition building;  training conference sessions by the FBI Civil Rights Unit and  information on trafficking in the FBI’s civil rights reference guide for  FBI agents;  training of U.S. Attorneys and other prosecutors on trafficking in  persons and trafficking of U.S. children for commercial sex, at the  National Advocacy Center;    guidance to all U.S. Attorneys’ Offices about prosecuting under the  TVPA, a tool kit for prosecutors, and a law guide, developed by  CRT/CS;  training for victim-witness coordinators, who are the federal  government’s liaisons to victims of federal crimes, and updating the  Attorney General’s victim/witness guidelines to include trafficking in  persons;    a nationwide televised human trafficking training initiative on the  Justice Television Network (JTN), initiated by CRT/CS in 2006 and  continuing in 2007, transmitted from the National Advocacy Center to  all 94 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. These offices and BJA-funded state and  local human trafficking task forces hosted members of the law  enforcement and nongovernmental organization communities to view  these programs; and    a week-long seminar on investigating and prosecuting cases involving  child sex trafficking, developed by CEOS, FBI, and the National Center  for Missing and Exploited Children for the joint training of state and  federal law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and social service  providers in targeted cities. This seminar is given multiple times each  year.
In addition, to help identify victims of trafficking and support federal  efforts to pursue trafficking investigations, agencies have used a variety of  means to extend outreach and training to state and local law enforcement,  nongovernmental organizations, and the general public. ICE developed  laminated wallet-size cards, in five languages, identifying the differences  between human smuggling and human trafficking as well as red flag  indicators for human trafficking and also developed a police roll  call/muster DVD describing human trafficking. CRT/CS publishes a  newsletter on trafficking, available on the DOJ Web site, and in  collaboration with other federal agencies and DOJ components, prepared  and published the Report on Activities to Combat Trafficking: Fiscal  Years 2001-2005. DOJ’s Office of Legal Policy prepares the Attorney  General’s annual report to Congress on U.S. efforts to combat trafficking,  as required by the TVPA of 2003, and the annual assessment of those  efforts. DOJ also established, and subsequently permanently funded, a toll- free Trafficking in Persons and Worker Exploitation Complaint Line in  February 2000 to provide a means for victims, witnesses, and others to  report potential trafficking matters to law enforcement, get information,  and obtain referrals to services in their area. In 2004 and 2006, federal  agencies sponsored and participated in national conferences on human  trafficking in Tampa, Florida, and New Orleans, Louisiana, respectively.  In 2006, CRT/CS, with the Attorney General, produced the film Give Us  Freedom: Liberty and Justice for Victims of Modern Day Slavery.
To further U.S. investigations and prosecutions of trafficking in persons  crimes, federal agencies have also fostered antitrafficking efforts at the  state and local levels. For example, federal agencies have sought to engage  state and local law enforcement and nongovernmental organizations by  funding the establishment of state and local trafficking in persons task  forces that bring together local law enforcement, federal law enforcement,  a U.S. Attorney, and nongovernmental victim service providers. In  addition, to expand antitrafficking law enforcement authority and promote  a uniform national legal strategy to combat human trafficking, DOJ  developed a model state law, available on the DOJ Web site. According to  DOJ, at the time of its initial dissemination in 2004, 4 states—Texas,  Florida, Missouri, and Washington—had laws against trafficking in  persons. As of June 2007, 31 states had enacted antitrafficking in persons  legislation.
section_title: Individual Federal Agencies Have Established Special Units, Agency-level Goals, or Plans or Strategies to Address Trafficking in Persons Responsibilities
paragraphs: National Security Presidential Directive 22 directed all federal agencies to  develop and promulgate plans to implement the directive by March 2003.  Plans for DOJ, DHS, DOL, and DOS enumerate activities relevant to the  investigation and prosecution of trafficking in persons. Additionally, some  agencies have undertaken various steps to address their respective  responsibilities related to the investigation and prosecution of trafficking  in persons, including establishing special units that focus on trafficking in  persons, agency-level goals, or plans or strategies. In doing so, each of  these agencies has defined its responsibilities for pursuing trafficking  crimes in accordance with its broader agency mission.
Both ICE and CRT/CS have established specialized units focused on  trafficking in persons. The ICE Office of Investigations’ Human Smuggling  and Trafficking Unit, consisting of a unit chief, with a staff consisting of  program managers who oversee programmatic and operational issues  globally, and victim witness coordinators, oversees ICE’s efforts to  identify criminal smuggling and trafficking organizations, prioritizes  investigations based on risk factors, coordinates field office investigations  into those targeted organizations, and coordinates victim assistance  through approximately 300 of ICE’s collateral-duty victim witness  coordinators. On January 31, 2007, the Attorney General and the  Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division announced the  formation of a special Human Trafficking Prosecution (HTP) Unit within  CRT/CS. According to CRT/CS officials, the unit is to continue to play a  role in coordinating intra-DOJ and interagency trafficking efforts (e.g.,  with ICE); develop new strategies to increase human trafficking  investigations and prosecutions throughout the nation; enhance DOJ’s  investigations and prosecutions of trafficking crimes by pursuing cases  that are multijurisdictional or involve financial crimes; and also continue  to engage in training, technical assistance, and outreach initiatives to  federal, state, and local law enforcement and nongovernmental  organizations.
The primary investigative agencies for trafficking in persons have laid out  goals and activities for combating this crime. The top goal of ICE’s  trafficking in persons efforts—to disrupt and dismantle criminal  organizations involved in trafficking, including intelligence gathering on  these organizations—is aligned with DHS strategic goals of assessing  vulnerabilities and mitigating threats to the homeland. In addition, ICE’s  trafficking goals of seizing assets of criminal organizations and rescuing  and protecting victims of trafficking follow ICE’s top goal. The FBI’s  Strategic Plan 2004-2009 identifies investigations of trafficking in persons  crimes as a rising priority under its responsibility to enforce civil rights  protections. In addition, the FBI Civil Rights Unit specifies the  strengthening of its intelligence base on trafficking activity as a top  priority among its programmatic goals and emphasizes coordination with  other law enforcement entities and partnerships with nongovernmental  organizations in pursuing trafficking investigations.
Furthermore, both ICE and FBI have disseminated guidance on handling  trafficking cases to their agents in the field. In December 2006, the ICE  Director of Investigations disseminated to Special Agents in Charge  (SACs) and ICE personnel assigned to U.S. embassies the ICE Office of  Investigations’ new strategy document for combating trafficking in  persons, entitled ICE Trafficking In Persons Strategy, or ICE TIPS. ICE  TIPS emphasizes outreach and education on ICE’s role in trafficking  investigations and ability to issue Continued Presence, a mechanism for  authorizing victims without legal immigration status to remain in the  United States; collaborations with other law enforcement entities and  nongovernmental service providers, including task force participation; and  performance evaluation to focus and refine ICE’s efforts. In May 2007,  additional guidance from the ICE Office of Investigations and the ICE  Office of International Affairs was sent to SACs and ICE personnel  assigned to U.S. embassies overseas. The guidance provided direction on  outreach, training, coordination, and coalition building and mandated  periodic reporting of efforts to ICE headquarters. The FBI’s guidance is  contained in its Civil Rights Program Reference Guide, the fiscal year Civil  Rights Program Plan, and memorandums to the field. The fiscal year 2007  Civil Rights Program Plan provides information similar to that contained  in ICE TIPS and encourages working partnerships with other law  enforcement entities and nongovernmental service providers, including  providing training to these groups.
As the lead prosecutorial agency for trafficking in persons, CRT/CS  identified three levels of strategic planning for its trafficking efforts. DOJ’s  Strategic Plan (Fiscal Years 2003-2008) lays out broad goals and  performance measures. Specifically, CRT/CS’s efforts on trafficking in  persons fall under goal two—enforce federal laws and represent the rights  and interests of the American people, strategic objective 2.4—to uphold  the civil and constitutional rights of all Americans and protect vulnerable  members of society. According to the strategy, the Civil Rights Division  intends to protect new immigrants to America by, among other things,  vigorously prosecuting those who exploit their vulnerability through  trafficking in persons, including increasing efforts to combat the criminal  trafficking of children and other vulnerable victims, through more  intensified efforts and interagency coordination. To achieve DOJ’s  strategic goals and objectives, CRT/CS’s fiscal year 2007 internal priorities  document lays out activities to be undertaken in three areas— investigation and prosecution; outreach and training; and policy  development, including intergovernmental coordination. In addition, DOJ  communicates direction and guidance on handling trafficking in persons  cases through internal DOJ memorandums between CRT/CS and U.S.  Attorneys, including guidance to U.S. Attorneys on how to prosecute  trafficking cases, memorandums between CRT/CS and the FBI, and  memorandums between DOJ and other federal agencies.
In addition, DOL’s Wage and Hour Division has an internal plan that  addresses its role in federal interagency trafficking efforts. The plan  presents current goals and measures for the division’s involvement with  human trafficking task forces in investigations, as appropriate with its  mission, and in assisting trafficking victims in securing restitution, as well  as long-term goals and measures for increasing these efforts.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Coordinated on Individual Trafficking Cases, but a Strategic Framework Could Help Further and Sustain Interagency Collaboration
paragraphs: Recognizing that investigating and prosecuting trafficking cases can be  complex and multifaceted activities, federal agencies have taken steps to  coordinate their efforts to leverage the expertise and resources required to  resolve these crimes. Coordination of investigations and prosecutions has  usually occurred as determined by the needs of the individual cases and  personal relationships established between law enforcement officials  across agencies. However, DOJ and DHS officials acknowledged the need  to expand the scope of their efforts to investigate and prosecute  trafficking crimes by, for example, undertaking proactive measures to  identify trafficking victims and multijurisdictional and international  trafficking in persons investigations and prosecutions. Pursuing such  efforts requires more strategic collaboration among agencies, since no one  agency can carry out these efforts alone. Our prior work has shown that a  strategic framework that would include, at a minimum, a common  outcome and mutually reinforcing strategies; agreed-on roles and  responsibilities; and compatible polices, procedures, and other means to  operate across agency boundaries can help agencies enhance and expand  collaboration on issues that are national in scope and cross agency  jurisdictions. However, the mechanisms that are currently in place to  facilitate interagency cooperation on human trafficking do not address the  greater collaboration needed for the expanded level of effort to investigate  and prosecute trafficking crimes. Establishing such a strategic framework  to investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons crimes, as developed by  federal agencies to address the unique challenges posed by these crimes,  could help federal agencies enhance and sustain the collaboration needed  to expand their efforts to combat trafficking crimes.
subsections: section_title: Federal Agencies Have Coordinated Trafficking Efforts on a Case-by-Case Basis
paragraphs: According to DOJ and DHS officials, in practice, agency coordination of  investigations and prosecutions of trafficking in persons has occurred on a  case-by-case basis. CRT/CS, CEOS, ICE, and FBI officials acknowledged  that investigating and prosecuting trafficking in persons crimes made it  necessary for federal agencies to work with one another and with state  and local law enforcement, who were often the first ones to discover  possible evidence of trafficking, and with nongovernmental organizations  that provided assistance to the victims. Federal officials emphasized that  they knew whom to call; for example, the victim-witness coordinators in  ICE and CRT/CS know each other; ICE and FBI investigators knew the  names of prosecutors in CRT/CS.
ICE and FBI officials explained that they sometimes worked joint  investigations or investigated different aspects of a case. For example, in  one case, while ICE agents rescued the victims in one location, the FBI  was investigating related brothel operations in other cities. Through their  detailees to the HSTC, ICE and FBI may determine whether the two  agencies may be working on a related case. Agents in the field may also  contact their counterparts at other agencies to ascertain whether they are  working on a similar case. DOL Wage and Hour Division officials told us  that if they identified a potential trafficking situation, they would notify  the FBI and the respective U.S. Attorney and the FBI might take over  responsibility for the case, as DOL’s Wage and Hour Division does not  carry out criminal investigations related to trafficking in persons. In  addition, victim witness coordinators across DOJ and DHS are in regular  contact with each other to ensure victim care and services from the point  of victim identification through investigation and prosecution.
Investigative and prosecutorial agencies also work with nongovernmental  agencies. For example, ICE officials said that they shared information with  nongovernmental organization interviewers who helped the investigators  determine which potential trafficking victims were actual victims and  which were “victim enforcers” who were swept up in the raid but worked  for the traffickers. CRT/CS and U.S. Attorney’s Offices prosecute the cases  developed by the investigative agencies. In addition, under the auspices of  the Innocence Lost National Initiative, FBI investigators from its Crimes  Against Children Unit, the National Center for Missing and Exploited  Children, and CEOS prosecutors have joined forces with state and local  law enforcement through the establishment of formal or ad hoc task  forces in 23 cities across the country, as a grassroots operation to work on  cases of trafficking of U.S. children for commercial sex.
Two noteworthy trafficking cases illustrate the breadth and diversity of  coordination and cooperation that occurs in pursuit of these crimes. For  example, the prosecution of Kil Soo Lee brought together FBI  investigators, DOL investigators from the Wage and Hour Division and the  Occupational and Safety and Health Administration, CRT/CS prosecutors,  and some nongovernmental organizations and resulted in the largest  trafficking case brought to date. In a separate case, Gerardo Flores  Carreto and Josue Flores Carreto were each sentenced to 50 years in  prison in a case involving coordination among ICE, DOJ, international  nongovernmental organizations, as well as the Mexican government. (See  app. IV.)
In addition to interacting as needs emerge, officials told us that various  law enforcement procedures and protocols are in place to foster  coordination. Upon initiating a trafficking in persons investigation, ICE  and the FBI notify the local U.S. Attorney to determine if enough evidence  exists to pursue a federal trafficking in persons prosecution. Moreover,  U.S. Attorneys are required to report civil rights cases, including  trafficking in persons cases, to CRT/CS, which then determines whether to  accept the U.S. Attorney’s staffing recommendation. In addition, DHS,  DOJ, and the Department of Health and Human Services signed a  memorandum of understanding that lays out the basic responsibilities and  functions of the departments as they relate to the certification of victims’  eligibility for certain federal benefits.
Federal agencies have also developed tools to facilitate interagency  coordination and even coordination with state and local law enforcement  and nongovernmental organizations in trafficking cases, usually on a case- by-case basis. According to DOJ and DHS officials, training is provided to  these stakeholders prior to raids; operations manuals are prepared both  for law enforcement and victim-witness coordinators.
section_title: A Strategic Framework Could Be Important to Implementing Expanded Approaches to Combating Trafficking
paragraphs: Although federal agencies have successfully coordinated on a case-by-case  basis to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, officials described  their approach to trafficking investigations and prosecutions as usually  being reactive and acknowledged the need for additional proactive  approaches to enhance interagency efforts to investigate and prosecute  trafficking crimes. DOJ and DHS senior officials identified the need to  expand the scope of efforts, including taking proactive measures to  identify trafficking victims (e.g., expanding outreach to additional law  enforcement agencies and nongovernmental organizations) and pursuing  multijurisdictional and international trafficking in persons investigations  and prosecutions. These efforts require more strategic collaboration  among agencies, since no one agency has the authority to carry out these  efforts alone. However, the current coordinating mechanisms and National  Security Presidential Directive 22 do not address the greater collaboration  needed for this level of expanded effort, and individual agency plans only  address individual agency efforts—none of which is linked to a common  governmentwide outcome to address the investigation and prosecution of  trafficking crimes. Additionally, differing perceptions among agencies  exist on leadership and roles and responsibilities surrounding some of  these expanded efforts.
As our previous work has shown, a strategic framework that includes  agencies working together toward a common outcome with mutually  reinforcing strategies, agreed-on roles and responsibilities, and compatible  policies and procedures can help enhance and sustain collaboration  among federal agencies dealing with issues, such as trafficking in persons,  that are national in scope and cross agency jurisdictions. In light of the  unique challenges posed by trafficking in persons investigations and  prosecutions, we acknowledge that a framework to address the  investigation and prosecution of trafficking crimes needs to be flexible  and incorporate different types of collaborative mechanisms. The agencies  involved would determine the specifics of the elements enumerated above,  any additional elements to be included in the framework, and the  structures for developing and implementing such a framework.
subsections: section_title: Federal Agencies Identified Need for Expanded Approaches
paragraphs: DOJ and DHS officials acknowledged the need to expand the scope of U.S.  efforts to combat trafficking crimes by developing proactive approaches to  identify trafficking victims (e.g., expanding outreach to non-law  enforcement agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and other law  enforcement agencies), pursuing multijurisdictional and even international  trafficking in persons investigations and prosecutions, and establishing  mechanisms for consistent communications and information sharing  among agencies.
Because trafficking victims are hidden and difficult to find, but are also the  primary source of evidence of trafficking crimes, agency officials  underscored the need to develop proactive approaches to identify  trafficking victims in order to increase investigations and prosecutions.  While current efforts to pursue trafficking crimes have drawn on the  support of other federal agencies that do not have specific law  enforcement functions or have benefited from the collaboration between  law enforcement and nongovernmental organizations, officials expressed  the desire to expand these efforts. For example, CRT/CS officials told us  that they would like to prosecute more labor trafficking cases, but these  situations were difficult to identify. While CRT/CS has worked with DOL’s  Wage and Hour Division on trafficking cases, such as the Kil Soo Lee  prosecution, they hoped to work with DOL to proactively identify potential  trafficking situations, possibly during Wage and Hour’s self-initiated  investigations of low-wage work sites. However, DOL officials said that to  do so, the agencies would need to develop an approach that included  regional planning and further training of DOL’s program managers.  This  level of collaboration and planning could benefit from mutually reinforcing  strategies or a joint strategy to identify additional victims of labor  trafficking.
In addition, the main goal of ICE’s outreach efforts to state and local law  enforcement, nongovernmental organizations, and foreign partners is  identifying victims. While there are several jurisdictions across the country  that are currently combating trafficking crimes in their communities, DOJ  and DHS officials recognized the need to expand their outreach and  training efforts to other law enforcement and non-law enforcement  entities to identify victims and increase the number of investigations and  prosecutions.  Currently, coordination among agencies on training and  outreach is largely episodic. However, developing collaborative outreach  and training strategies to incorporate state and local law enforcement,  nongovernmental organizations, and foreign partners, among others, could  allow agencies to expand their efforts while making the best use of  agencies’ resources.
DOJ officials also told us that they hoped to expand federal antitrafficking  efforts by pursuing multijurisdictional and international investigations and  prosecutions. For example, CRT/CS officials told us that they were striving  to enhance investigations and prosecutions of significant trafficking in  persons and slavery cases, such as multijurisdictional cases and those  involving financial crimes. To do so, CRT/CS has engaged in training  activities for federal prosecutors across the country to institutionalize  ways to combat trafficking and allow CRT/CS attorneys to focus on  multijurisdictional cases. However, CRT/CS has also been actively  involved in the training of investigators, task forces, and foreign officials,  as well as carrying out their responsibilities to prosecute trafficking cases.  Folding CRT/CS’s training and outreach efforts into a broader and more  collaborative training and outreach strategy could disperse responsibility  for training to other federal partners who are also engaging in training and  outreach efforts.
The DOJ officials identified the need to establish mechanisms for  consistent communication and information sharing. While FBI officials  said that case-by-case coordination between some field offices on  individual trafficking cases was good, they said that there was also a lack  of consistency in information sharing and communication among field  offices. DOJ officials also cited the need to maintain information in a  central repository to enhance tracking of the movements of traffickers and  victims. For example, CEOS identified the lack of such a repository of  information on trafficking and an institutionalized policy on information  sharing as factors that can inhibit trafficking investigations. Working  collaboratively with counterparts in the field and across agencies at the  national level to establish mechanisms for consistent communication and  information sharing could be incorporated into a strategic framework.   Additionally, FBI and ICE officials pointed to the need to pursue  information about trafficking organizations back to their country of origin  and identify trafficking patterns in order to enhance efforts to dismantle  trafficking organizations. However, HSTC officials told us that the  intelligence community is not collecting as much information on  trafficking as it is on other issues, such as human smuggling. HSTC  officials also said that if HSTC could increase its analytical capability, it  would be able to expand its current collection and dissemination of  intelligence information on trafficking to develop more products and in so  doing provide a more valuable resource to law enforcement and the  intelligence community, among others. CRT/CS officials told us they are  working with the FBI to obtain information that would help identify  trafficking networks. With intelligence information from traditional  intelligence sources being limited, agencies could work toward achieving  their goal of tracking trafficking patterns and dismantling trafficking  organizations by establishing collaborative practices to obtain needed  information to support proactive investigations of trafficking crimes.
section_title: Expanded Approaches Can Be Linked to a Common Outcome with Mutually Reinforcing Strategies
paragraphs: A strategic framework could promote a collaborative effort to define and  articulate a common federal outcome for investigations and prosecutions  of trafficking crimes. Agencies have identified agency-level goals and  proactive approaches to expand their current efforts to combat trafficking  crimes, but none of these approaches is linked to a governmentwide  outcome defined by the key federal agencies that investigate and  prosecute trafficking crimes.  Our previous work on effective interagency  collaboration has demonstrated that having a clearly defined  governmentwide outcome could help align specific goals across agencies.
While National Security Presidential Directive 22 instructed federal  agencies to develop and promulgate plans to implement the directive,  agencies primarily developed lists of activities that indicated individual  agency efforts, and the plans, taken together, did not cut across agency  boundaries and lead toward a common governmentwide outcome. As we  have illustrated in our work related to national strategies to combat  terrorism, a governmentwide outcome could hinge on an ideal “end-state”  followed by a logical hierarchy of major goals, subordinate objectives, and  specific activities to achieve results. Gathering intelligence on traffickers,  dismantling trafficking rings, increasing prosecutions, and rescuing  victims can be activities linked to broader objectives to achieve a common  outcome for investigations and prosecutions of trafficking crimes, but at  this time, agencies have not collectively articulated what that outcome  might be. The scope of U.S. governmentwide efforts to investigate and  prosecute trafficking crimes can be linked to a common outcome to  provide an accountability framework.
Our prior work has shown that without a clearly defined outcome, it may  be difficult to overcome significant differences in agency missions,  cultures, and established ways of doing business. For example, pursuing  trafficking investigations and prosecutions involves collaboration between  law enforcement and nongovernmental organizations that typically do not  work together. Identifying a unified federal outcome for investigations and  prosecutions of trafficking crimes could help align the goals and sustain  the support of these agencies and organizations, thereby enhancing  investigations and prosecutions.
Our work has shown that after identifying a common outcome,  collaborating agencies need to establish strategies that work in concert  with those of their partners or are joint in nature. Such strategies help in  aligning the partner agencies’ activities, core processes, and resources to  accomplish the common outcome. Some individual agencies have  developed their own strategies to combat trafficking and implement the  proactive approaches to expand current activities, but strategies have not  been linked to a common governmentwide outcome for investigations and  prosecutions of trafficking crimes. Since no single agency is undertaking  these initiatives alone, mutually reinforcing strategies could help agencies  better align their activities and resources to accomplish a common  outcome.
section_title: Roles and Responsibilities Can Be Clearly Defined through a Strategic Framework
paragraphs: As federal agencies expand their approaches to investigating and  prosecuting trafficking crimes, a strategic framework could assist in  clarifying respective roles and responsibilities.  Such a framework could  be important to ensure that agencies understand who will do what and  help to reconcile differing perceptions of leadership that exist among the  agencies on combating trafficking crimes.
Our prior work has shown that generally agencies can enhance their  collaboration by working together to define and agree on their respective  roles and responsibilities, including how the collaborative effort will be  led. Nonetheless, existing interagency collaborative mechanisms are not  positioned to support the greater collaboration needed to coordinate  expanded U.S. efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons.  The Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking, the  SPOG, and SPOG working groups facilitate governmentwide policy on  human trafficking.  However, operational coordination on investigations  and prosecutions of trafficking in persons rests with criminal justice  personnel and currently occurs on a case-by-case basis. HSTC is an  information clearinghouse and facilitates information sharing among  investigative and prosecutorial agencies working on trafficking. HSTC is  also available to assist agencies to avoid duplication of efforts by querying  an array of participating agency databases to determine if more than one  agency has an ongoing interest or open investigation on a specific target.  The Trafficking in Persons and Worker Exploitation Task Force was  involved in both policy and operations, but at the time of our review, DOL  told us it understood that the task force was no longer functioning, and  CRT/CS officials said they were in the process of reinvigorating DOJ’s  relationship with DOL on this issue.
Furthermore, developing a strategic framework could help reconcile  differing perceptions of who is in charge in coordinating antitrafficking  investigations and prosecutions. Specifically, CRT/CS and investigative  agencies perceived the interagency leadership role in pursuing trafficking  crimes differently. CRT/CS officials told us that its newly formed Human  Trafficking Prosecution Unit was positioned to take the leadership role in  coordinating trafficking efforts across the federal agencies because  investigative agencies historically work with CRT/CS prosecutors to  complete cases. While FBI officials acknowledged CRT/CS as the leader  on trafficking in persons, they also said that leadership needs to cut across  agencies, since no one agency carries out trafficking cases alone. ICE  officials said that agencies are all equal partners in the effort to combat  trafficking and that while CRT/CS may take the lead on prosecutions, the  investigative agencies each take the lead on their own investigations, or  work jointly on joint investigations, until they are handed to prosecutors.  ICE officials also did not perceive the need for leadership beyond the  SPOG for U.S. policy on trafficking, but acknowledged that the SPOG did  not have oversight for investigations and prosecutions because of law  enforcement sensitive matters. ICE officials suggested that should a  problem with investigations and prosecutions arise, the SPOG could  create a subcommittee to deal with these issues.  However, according to  DOJ officials, because investigative and prosecutorial agencies are  governed at the operational level by confidentiality rules (e.g., grand jury  secrecy) and limitations on sharing law enforcement sensitive information,  the SPOG or its working groups were not appropriate vehicles for leading  collaborative operational efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking in  persons.  Since no one agency will be able to accomplish the steps  identified to further U.S. efforts to combat trafficking on its own,  collaboration among agencies will need to go beyond the current case-by- case coordination and views on leadership.
section_title: Establishing Compatible Policies, Procedures, and Other Means to Operate across Agency Boundaries
paragraphs: Our prior work has shown that a strategic framework could also foster  efforts to devise compatible standards, policies, procedures, and  information systems that will be used in collaborative efforts for a range of  topics across federal agencies. As agencies move forward in their efforts  to expand current activities to investigate and prosecute trafficking  crimes, such as tracking trafficking cases or addressing the limitations  posed on current coordinating mechanisms, agencies could work jointly  and consult with other stakeholders to determine what information on  trafficking could be collected and shared as policies and procedures for  developing information systems are being planned and created.  Additionally, agencies working together to establish policies and  procedures to provide guidance on how to achieve maximum coordination  and cooperation across agencies to investigate and prosecute trafficking  crimes, including the exchange of information, would address current  inconsistencies that exist among the field offices of federal investigators.
section_title: BJA Has Helped Support Federally Funded State and Local Human Trafficking Law Enforcement Task Forces, but Lacks a Plan to Identify and Focus Technical Assistance Needs
paragraphs: To help coordinate U.S. efforts to identify trafficking victims, get needed  services to victims of trafficking, and investigate and prosecute trafficking  in persons crimes in communities across the country, BJA established a  program to fund state and local law enforcement human trafficking task  forces. Each task force was to develop a strategy to raise public  awareness, identify more victims, and establish protocols among  government agencies and service providers and to meet related  performance measures. Since 2004, BJA has awarded grants of up to  $450,000 for a 3-year period to each of 42 task forces. BJA reported using  its general funds to support some technical assistance to the task forces  (e.g., sponsoring the development of a train-the-trainer curriculum on  human trafficking and funding a national conference) and taking further  steps to help respond to task force technical assistance needs. However,  task force members we contacted and DOJ officials pointed to continued  and additional technical assistance needs. BJA does not have a technical  assistance plan for its human trafficking grant program. Our previous  work has shown the need for agencies that administer grants or funding to  state and local entities to implement a plan that focuses technical  assistance and training efforts on areas of greatest need. BJA officials told  us that they recognized the need for a technical assistance plan for its  human trafficking initiative and had begun to prepare a plan to provide  additional and proactive technical assistance to the task forces.
subsections: section_title: BJA Funds State and Local Law Enforcement Human Trafficking Task Forces to Support Investigations and Prosecutions of Trafficking Crimes
paragraphs: In 2004, BJA established a program to fund state and local law  enforcement human trafficking task forces to help support U.S. efforts to  identify trafficking victims and investigate and prosecute trafficking in  persons crimes in communities across the country. Working with OVC,  which was already providing assistance to victim service providers serving  trafficking victims, BJA solicited applications from state and local law  enforcement for fiscal year 2004, and then again for fiscal years 2005 and  2006. Each task force was to develop a strategy that included the  following: (1) a memorandum of agreement outlining the respective roles  and responsibilities of the participating agencies and ensuring  coordination and involvement of the local U.S. Attorney; (2) training  materials for first responding officers and investigators, including written  protocols and resource manuals to enhance coordination and  information/resource sharing among law enforcement and victim service  providers to identify and assist human trafficking victims; (3) distinct  protocols for resource referral and service provisions for U.S. versus alien  victims of human trafficking; and (4) definition of the role of law  enforcement and service provider partners in training others in the  community. The task forces were to meet specific program goals and  performance measures focused on identification of and assistance to  victims, training of law enforcement in the identification of victims, public  awareness and outreach, and identification and collaboration with  community stakeholders. Grantees were required to collect and report  data on performance measures, including the number of potential and  assisted trafficking victims; DHS applications made to obtain trafficking  victims’ benefits; law enforcement personnel and others trained;  presentations given to law enforcement and the general public; service  providers, community support groups, and community education groups  identified; and memorandums of agreement signed.
Under its human trafficking task force initiative, BJA has funded a total of  42 law enforcement task forces on human trafficking—22 in fiscal year  2004 and 10 in each of fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Each task force grant  award was for up to $450,000 for a period of 3 years. BJA reported  awarding a total of $17,324,182 to the 42 task forces. The core membership  of each task force includes federal, state, and local law enforcement; the  U.S. Attorney’s Office; and nongovernmental organizations. However, the  task forces vary, as evidenced by those we contacted, with respect to  which federal agencies participate—FBI, ICE, DOL, or others; the number  of state or local law enforcement agencies involved—a single or multiple  police departments and sheriff’s offices; and the number of  nongovernmental groups. As shown in figure 3, the 42 task forces are  located in 25 states, two territories, and the District of Columbia.
section_title: BJA Has Provided Some Technical Assistance to the Task Forces
paragraphs: To support its grant programs, BJA can provide technical assistance to any  justice-related state, tribal, or local agency or organization through on-site  and off-site technical assistance; peer-to-peer information exchange and  mentoring; publication drafting and dissemination; information sharing;  aid with developing conferences, workshops, and training events; and  curriculum development. According to BJA officials, technical assistance  is available to human trafficking task forces, but BJA did not receive any  specific funds to support its technical assistance to the human trafficking  law enforcement task forces. BJA reported using $1,433,000 of its general  funds to finance the development of a train-the-trainer curriculum on  human trafficking, deliver training sessions using the curriculum, and fund  the national conference on human trafficking held in New Orleans in  October 2006.
The train-the-trainer curriculum, prepared by the Institute for  Intergovernmental Research to promote law enforcement awareness of  human trafficking in the United States, was completed in October 2004.  The curriculum included CD-ROMs with PowerPoint slides, instructor  notes, and lists of additional resources. It addressed the following topics:  introduction to human trafficking; legal overview; investigative  considerations, including investigative techniques for trafficking cases; the  roles of victim service providers in trafficking cases; immigration issues;  interagency cooperation; and engaging the community. The curriculum  was used to train trainers, including task force members, at BJA- sponsored train-the-trainer sessions held in California, Florida, and Illinois  between November and April 2005, and a Human Trafficking Conference  in Houston, Texas, in February 2005. According to BJA, some task force  members attended the sessions and all 22 task forces funded at that time  were represented at the Houston conference. The trainers were to use the  curriculum to train law enforcement in their respective communities.
BJA worked with other DOJ components, DHS, and DOL, among others, to  put on the national trafficking conference in New Orleans. The plenary  and breakout sessions provided information on various aspects to  trafficking—investigative strategies, victims services, and interviewing  witnesses, among others. According to DOJ officials, sessions were  specifically held for the task forces in addition to the public conference  program. During these sessions, task force participants discussed such  issues as collaboration and reporting progress using BJA’s performance  measures.
In addition, BJA reported further steps taken to respond to the technical  assistance needs of the task forces. According to BJA officials, task force  grantees could request technical assistance by submitting the form found  on the BJA Web site.  BJA also reported if the data submitted by a task  force in its semiannual report indicated the existence of performance  problems, BJA would make routine calls to the particular task force to  help resolve the issues or obtain additional information so that BJA could  work with CRT/CS, OVC, or the appropriate U.S. Attorney’s Office on  these matters. Also, having recognized that some task forces were  experiencing difficulties in collecting and reporting data on its  performance measures (e.g., identifying the number of trafficking victims),  BJA sponsored a special session on this topic during the New Orleans  conference. According to BJA officials, after the conference it distributed  to the task forces the materials used during the session. Furthermore,  between 2006 and 2007, BJA, sometimes working in conjunction with OVC,  conducted site visits to 8 of the 42 task forces. The site visits provided the  opportunity for BJA to identify challenges task forces were having, such as  developing or implementing training for law enforcement, that might be  addressed through training or technical assistance. In addition, CRT/CS  reported that, in coordination with BJA, its attorneys had provided  technical assistance and training to all but 8 of the task forces.
section_title: Task Force Technical Assistance Needs Were Identified
paragraphs: DOJ officials and task force members we interviewed identified continuing  and additional task force technical assistance and training needs. BJA said  that it was aware of this need from weekly phone conversations with task  force members; site visits to task force jurisdictions; and conversations  with U.S. Attorneys, CRT/CS, and OVC. Continuing and additional  technical assistance needs identified by DOJ officials and task forces we  contacted included (1) substantive training about trafficking crimes and  trafficking victims and (2) technical assistance and training to help task  forces develop the components in their strategies required under their  grants.
DOJ officials and members of task forces we contacted suggested a range  of training on substantive topics related to human trafficking. They  acknowledged that there would always be a need for basic training on  trafficking issues, as new task forces were formed, existing task forces  reached out to new participants, and individuals participating in the task  forces changed over time. In addition, to enhance the capacity of the task  forces to support investigations and prosecutions of trafficking crimes,  they identified the need for advanced training on such topics as seizing  and forfeiting traffickers’ assets, techniques to facilitate law enforcement  and nongovernmental organizations working together to interview  trafficking victims, and techniques for interviewing child victims of sex  trafficking. To expand their ability to identify more trafficking victims,  DOJ officials and some task forces we contacted pointed to the need for  training of other agency personnel, such as other law enforcement,  hospital workers, and social services personnel, who in the course of their  jobs might come into contact with trafficking victims. They also indicated  that it was sometimes necessary to tailor training and technical assistance  to specific populations. For example, training could be focused on  potentially vulnerable populations within the community where a task  force was located (e.g., farm labor, restaurant workers, domestic service  workers, alien victims, and U.S. children trafficked for commercial sex) or  trafficking populations that have typically been more difficult to find,  specifically victims of labor trafficking.
By requiring each task force grantee to lay out a strategy to raise public  awareness of trafficking, identify more victims, and establish protocols  among government agencies and service providers, BJA demonstrated its  awareness of the need for the task forces to have a mechanism to  coordinate activities and operations in order to achieve program goals.  Task force members we interviewed provided examples of the challenges  they had confronted in addressing the various elements of their task force  strategy. For example, some task force members said that after 2 years of  BJA funding they were still trying to iron out protocols covering roles and  responsibilities; experiencing tensions among key players on the task  force, including nongovernmental organizations; or relying on informal  contacts based on who knew whom or pre-established relationships  among task force members (e.g., local law enforcement and FBI) rather  than on positions or protocols. Members from one task force we  interviewed even held different opinions regarding its protocols. The task  force leader attributed the task force’s success to its informal protocols.  By contrast, another task force member told us that the protocols, which  had not been developed in consultation with task force members, were  merely guidelines and led to victims falling through the cracks because of  the lack of standard services. Examples of types of possible technical  assistance needs suggested by the task forces we contacted included (1)  ways to improve communication and sharing information/intelligence  between and among entities, including e-mail lists, a secure Web site, and  training bulletins; (2) standardized protocols that outline roles and  responsibilities of each member agency, which the task forces can adapt  for their own jurisdictions; (3) help in strategizing; (4) regional and  national meetings that bring smaller groups of task forces together; (5)  interpreters/cultural assistance; and (6) safe and secure housing for  victims.
section_title: Technical Assistance Plan Could Enhance BJA’s Support to Human Trafficking Task Forces
paragraphs: BJA does not have a technical assistance plan for its human trafficking  grant program. Our previous work on federal agencies’ administration of  grants or funding to state and local entities has shown the need for  agencies that administer grants or funding to state and local entities to  implement a plan that focuses technical assistance efforts on areas of  greatest need. BJA told us that it was developing a plan to provide  additional and proactive technical assistance to the task forces. It said the  plan would address developing BJA’s capability to provide technical  assistance as needed, identifying model task force leaders who could  provide some technical assistance to other task forces, and establishing a  means to ensure communication among the task forces. Officials said that  they were working with OVC to develop an approach that would meet the  needs of BJA and OVC human trafficking grantees. However, BJA reported  that the development and review of the plan had been delayed pending  final decisions on DOJ’s funding for fiscal year 2007.
As part of its plan, BJA might address outreach needs to ensure that task  forces are aware of BJA’s capacity to provide or facilitate the obtaining of  technical assistance and training. DOJ and DHS officials emphasized the  importance of the task forces to the overall U.S. effort to investigate and  prosecute trafficking in persons. Working within communities, task force  members are usually best situated to identify trafficking victims and  crimes. Representatives of some of the task forces we contacted were not  aware of BJA’s capacity to respond to technical assistance needs.  Accordingly, identifying steps needed to disseminate information on the  types of assistance and training available is a necessary component of a  technical assistance plan for these task forces.
Also, BJA might incorporate into its plan a systematic assessment of its  performance measures for the task forces. BJA reported that it collated  and analyzed the performance data it received, would make routine calls  to the particular task force to help resolve the performance issues, or  obtain additional information to assist a task force in addressing a  problem. However, systematically assessing task force reports on BJA  performance measures could help BJA to identify common problem areas  in collecting and reporting performance data. It could also provide BJA  with the means to determine which measures might need to be modified or  how BJA might enhance its measures to enable it to assess the impact of  task force efforts. Such an approach should help BJA to facilitate the task  forces’ meeting the program’s overall goals and objectives of identifying  victims and supporting investigations and prosecutions.
In addition, through its technical assistance plan, BJA might identify steps  to obtain information from the task forces on areas for continuous  improvement. This information could be used to determine common and  emerging technical assistance or training needs, approaches for meeting  those needs, and how best to provide that assistance. As part of its plan,  BJA could also develop other means and mechanisms for providing  technical assistance to the task forces effectively and efficiently. For  example, as suggested by some of the task force members we contacted, a  secure Web site could provide a means for task forces to share best  practices, readily obtain samples of protocols or other documents, or ask  for peer-to-peer assistance from other task forces. BJA could also use the  Web site to disseminate information to the task forces.
BJA’s plan might also include a component for assessing the quality of its  technical assistance. To ensure that the technical assistance and training  provided to the task forces meet their needs, BJA might request  information from the task forces on technical assistance and training  provided to them, including evaluations of that assistance. Such  information could help BJA demonstrate what it has done to support the  task forces and the effectiveness of those efforts in meeting task force  needs. This information could also be used to ascertain necessary  modifications of or changes to technical assistance to better meet task  force needs.
To facilitate BJA’s technical assistance to the task forces, the plan might  identify available technical assistance and training resources from a  variety of sources. BJA could then match a particular task force’s needs  with technical assistance and training that might be provided by other  federal agencies, such as CRT/CS, or other task forces. While such training  and technical assistance are currently provided on a case-by-case basis,  within the context of a plan, BJA could more systematically galvanize  these resources, incorporate them into its overall approach to meeting the  task forces’ needs, and assess their impact on task force efforts.  Information on task force training needs could also be used to help BJA,  working with other federal agencies, to plan the content and format of the  legislatively mandated 2007 and 2008 national trafficking conferences so  that it meets the range of training and technical assistance needs for  experienced task forces as well as new task forces.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Federal agencies have made strides in several areas to combat trafficking  crimes and to coordinate their efforts on a case-by-case basis. This  approach has generally led to an increase in the number of investigations  and prosecutions since the passage of the TVPA in 2000.  However, as  agencies look ahead to broadening their efforts while still maintaining  coordination on individual cases, strategic planning will be necessary to  ensure agency resources are being expended with the greatest return on  investment. Defining a common governmentwide outcome for  investigations and prosecutions of trafficking crimes, reconciling roles and  responsibilities, and ensuring consistent communication and information  sharing are vital to the investigation and prosecution of trafficking crimes.  Yet no such outcome has been collaboratively defined by the agencies,  perceptions of leadership differ among agencies, and policies are not in  place to ensure consistent communication and information sharing.  Furthermore, to sustain a coordinated victim-centered approach to  combating trafficking, agencies must continue to educate and engage their  own personnel, as well as supporting partners in the effort to combat this  crime, such as state and local law enforcement, nongovernmental  organizations, non-law enforcement agencies, and citizens. As our prior  work on multi-agency collaboration has shown, a strategic framework that  includes elements such as defining a common outcome, establishing  mutually reinforcing or joint strategies, and agreeing on roles and  responsibilities, among others, is particularly useful in addressing  problems that are national in scope and involve multiple agencies with  varying jurisdictions. Such an approach allows for the necessary flexibility  and incorporation of different types of collaborative mechanisms to  address the complexities of and unique challenges posed by such  problems. Working in a more strategic fashion, agencies could build on  their current cooperative relationships to establish a strategic focal point,  ensure consistency of communication and partnerships, and sustain and  expand a coordinated effort to investigate and prosecute trafficking in  persons crimes.
BJA’s competitive grant program has funded state and local law  enforcement human trafficking task forces to support U.S. efforts to  identify trafficking victims and investigate and prosecute trafficking  crimes. Given its mission to support state and local law enforcement, BJA  has provided some training and technical assistance to the human  trafficking task forces, sometimes through coordinated efforts with other  agencies. However, the task forces we interviewed identified challenges  they faced in implementing BJA’s strategic planning requirements and  carrying out their responsibilities, especially in identifying potential  victims and establishing partnerships with key players. Our previous work  on federal agencies’ administration of grants or funding to state and local  entities shows the importance of implementing a technical assistance plan  that focuses the training and technical assistance efforts by agencies that  administer grant funding. In the absence of such a plan, BJA may find it  difficult to target technical assistance to the task forces most in need and  ensure that task forces receive the technical assistance needed to meet the  strategic planning requirements and performance measures outlined in the  human trafficking task force grant solicitation. Implementing such a plan  will help BJA focus its efforts, enabling BJA to better ensure that its efforts  meet the needs of the task forces, achieve the objectives of the program,  enhance collaboration across levels of government and between  government and nongovernmental entities, and ultimately support U.S.  efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that the U.S. government maximizes its ability to enforce  laws governing trafficking in persons, we recommend that the Attorney  General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the  Secretaries of Labor, State, and other agency heads deemed appropriate,  develop and implement a strategic framework to coordinate U.S. efforts to  investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons. At a minimum this  framework should   a.  define and articulate a common outcome;   b.  establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies;   c.  agree on roles and responsibilities; and   d.  establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to  operate across agency boundaries.
To better support the federally funded state and local human trafficking  task forces, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the Director  of the Bureau of Justice Assistance to develop and implement a plan to  help focus technical assistance on areas of greatest need.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney  General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and  the Secretary of Labor. DOJ and DHS provided written comments, which  are summarized below and included in their entirety in appendixes V and  VI, respectively. In addition, these agencies and DOS and DOL provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
DOJ agreed with the contents of the report. Regarding our  recommendation to the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland  Security to develop a strategic framework to coordinate U.S. efforts to  investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, DOJ acknowledged that  continued and increased collaboration could further efforts to investigate  and prosecute trafficking in persons crimes. DOJ further noted that it is  already pursuing a variety of such methods, including establishing the  Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit and holding collaborative meetings  and training sessions with its partners. As a result, DOJ proposed that the  report identify the need for continued collaboration but not mandate one  particular collaborative model.
It was not our intent to prescribe a particular structure or collaborative  model. We recognize that because of the unique challenges posed by  trafficking in persons investigations and prosecutions, the proposed  framework needs to be flexible. Our previous work has shown that the  four elements outlined in our recommendation—a common outcome;  mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; agreed-on roles and  responsibilities; and compatible polices, procedures, and other means to  operate across agency boundaries—are key to an effective strategic  framework. However, the specifics of each of these elements, additional  elements to be included in a strategic framework for the investigation and  prosecution of trafficking crimes, and the structures for developing and  implementing this framework would be determined by the agencies  involved. In response to DOJ’s comments, we have included language in  our report that reinforces the need for flexibility in developing and  implementing a strategic framework for investigations and prosecutions of  trafficking in persons.
Commenting on our recommendation that the Attorney General call on the  Director of BJA to develop and implement a plan to help focus technical  assistance to the human trafficking task forces, DOJ stated that to address  the areas of task force technical assistance needs raised in our report, BJA  and OVC planned to collaboratively develop and lead a facilitated working  group, including representatives from these agencies, ICE, HSTC, DOL,  and other DOJ components, by October 1, 2007. The working group is to  provide input into BJA’s collaborative outreach and improve training and  technical assistance strategies to address issues raised in the report. DOJ  enumerated the elements that its training and technical assistance plan  was expected to include, such as a strategy for informing task force  members, on a continuous basis, of the availability of training and  technical assistance resources; a systematic assessment of performance  measures; and methods to assess the quality of training and technical  assistance.
DHS generally agreed with the contents of the report. Specifically, DHS  said that the report reflected an overall understanding of the complexities  of the antitrafficking response; ICE’s efforts in leading investigations,  conducting outreach, and responding to trafficking victims; and properly  characterized ICE’s compliance with National Security Presidental  Directive 22. In response to the report’s discussion of interagency  coordination and strategizing, DHS noted that ICE regularly conducted  strategic planning with its partners, particularly in the field; worked with  federally funded state and local trafficking task forces; and contributed to  annual trafficking reports prepared by DOJ. Moreover, DHS maintained  that interagency coordination through the SPOG ensured that trafficking  policies and guidelines were carried out, and therefore ICE believed that a  governmentwide framework or strategy was not needed.
Our report acknowledged that the SPOG and its working groups help to  facilitate coordination of governmentwide policy on human trafficking.  However, the focus of our work was U.S. efforts to investigate and  prosecute trafficking in persons crimes, the coordination of which rests  with criminal justice personnel, primarily DHS and DOJ. Given DOJ and  DHS senior officials’ acknowledgment of the need to expand the scope of  U.S. efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons and our  finding that existing mechanisms and individual agency plans did not  address the interagency collaboration needed to support this expanded  level of effort, we recommended the development of a strategic  framework for coordinating U.S. efforts to investigate and prosecute  trafficking cases.
Commenting on this recommendation, DHS said that ICE would support  such a framework if certain considerations were taken into account. For  example, DHS noted that mutual goal setting might be possible so long as  the goals contained objectives that specifically addressed unique agency  capabilities in combating trafficking. DHS also noted that any framework  would also need to recognize that agencies’ roles in a particular case  would vary by available resources, local priorities, and the nature of the  case and investigation. Agency resources for policy efforts and initiating  any recommendations that arose from the framework would also be  critical. GAO would expect that in developing and implementing such a  framework for investigations and prosecutions of trafficking crimes, the  agencies involved would determine how to address varying authorities,  respective resources, and other relevant factors.
We will send copies of this report to the Attorney General, the Secretary of  Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Labor, and  interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available  to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no  charge on GAO’s Web Site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me on (202) 512-2757 or goldenkoffr@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report.  Major contributors to this report are listed in  appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To ascertain the status of U.S. efforts to investigate and prosecute  trafficking crimes, this report discusses (1) key activities federal agencies  have undertaken to combat trafficking in persons crimes, (2) federal  efforts to coordinate on investigations and prosecutions of trafficking in  persons crimes and whether these efforts might be enhanced, and (3) how  the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) supported federally funded state  and local human trafficking task forces and whether these efforts might be  improved. This review is part of a larger body of work that you requested  on U.S. efforts to combat trafficking in persons, here and abroad.
To determine key activities federal agencies have undertaken to combat  trafficking in persons crimes, we reviewed pertinent documents and  interviewed officials from the Department of Justice (DOJ), including the  Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Civil Rights Division/Criminal  Section (CRT/CS), Criminal Division/Child Exploitation and Obscenity  Section (CEOS), and the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys; the  Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; the  Department of Labor’s (DOL) Wage and Hour Division; the Department of  State’s (DOS) Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Office to Monitor and  Combat Trafficking in Persons; and the Human Smuggling and Trafficking  Center (HSTC). We obtained and analyzed written responses to questions  we provided, departmentwide strategic planning documents, agency plans,  strategies, and memorandums and guidance on efforts to combat human  trafficking. We obtained examples of training materials used to train  investigative agents and to conduct outreach and attended the national  human trafficking conference in New Orleans in October 2006. From the  FBI, ICE, CRT/CS, and CEOS, we obtained and analyzed relevant data on  the cases investigated and prosecuted, including numbers of cases,  defendants charged, and convictions, as well as, where possible, estimates  of the resources used to do so. We discussed the sources of these data  with federal agency officials to determine that these data were sufficiently  reliable to show trends in agencies’ activities undertaken to investigate  and prosecute trafficking crimes. We did not seek data prior to the passage  of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act in 2000 for investigative agencies  since the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security  transferred some human trafficking investigative duties from DOJ’s legacy  Immigration and Naturalization Service to DHS’s Immigration and  Customs Enforcement.
To determine what efforts federal agencies have undertaken to coordinate  investigations and prosecutions of trafficking in persons crimes and  whether these efforts might be enhanced, we reviewed pertinent  documents, such as agency reports, strategies, and memorandums to field  offices. We interviewed officials from DOJ headquarters, including FBI,  CRT/CS, CEOS, and the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys; DHS’s ICE  and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; DOL’s Wage and Hour  Division; DOS’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Office to Monitor and  Combat Trafficking in Persons; and the HSTC. We gathered and analyzed  information from selected field personnel representing the FBI, ICE, and  local U.S. Attorney’s Offices. To ascertain how efforts to combat  trafficking might be enhanced and identify applicable criteria to be used in  our analysis, we consulted our prior work on agency collaboration,  international crime, terrorism, organized crime, and the illegal importation  of prescription and illegal drugs. We also interviewed agency officials to  identify challenges they face in the investigating and prosecuting of  trafficking crimes and to identify what elements may enhance their efforts.
To assess how BJA has supported federally funded state and local human  trafficking task forces and whether these efforts might be enhanced, we  obtained and analyzed relevant documents from BJA, including task force  grant proposals, grant reports written by program managers, performance  measurement data, and information from its Web site. We interviewed  BJA, Office for Victims of Crime (OVC), and CRT/CS officials on the origin  of the task forces, when task forces were funded, and the types of  assistance provided to the task forces. We also interviewed field personnel  from the FBI, ICE, and DOL to determine what federal supports had been  given to the task forces we selected for either site visits or telephone  interviews. We developed case studies of seven task forces to provide us  with in-depth knowledge about how the task forces are functioning, how  they are working together, and what supports and technical assistance  they have been provided. Gathering information for the case studies  included site visits to task forces in Collier County, Florida; Los Angeles,  California; and Washington, D.C.; and telephone interviews with key  participants from task forces in Houston, Texas; Hawaii; and Nassau and  Suffolk Counties in New York.
In selecting the 7 task forces we contacted, we limited our selection to the  longest-running task forces (i.e., the 22 founded in fiscal year 2004)—those  that had had an opportunity to be established. From this group, we tried to  include task forces located in various U.S. geographic regions, and with a  primary focus on either sex trafficking, labor trafficking, or both sex and  labor. To ensure that we included task forces of varying performance  levels, we asked officials from BJA and CRT/CS for recommendations on  task forces that were performing well. In addition to these  recommendations, we also used BJA performance measures such as  number of victims found and the number of continued presence visas  provided to make our selections. As a part of our site visits or through  telephone interviews, we interviewed the task force leader, the Assistant  U.S. Attorney (who may or may not the leader), the primary local law  enforcement contact, the dominant nongovernmental organization  participant, and FBI and ICE representatives on the task force. BJA was  not able to provide us with a list of task force participants, but a  nongovernmental organization, Polaris Project, affiliated with the  Washington, D.C., human trafficking task force, had networked with all the  BJA-funded task forces at the federally sponsored human trafficking  conference in New Orleans in October 2006, and provided us with a list  identifying the “key players.” From this list, we developed our list of  interviewees based on our inclusion criteria. The FBI and ICE participant  names were provided to us through the liaisons in each agency. Overall,  through site visits and telephone interviews we interviewed a total of 50  task force members. We interviewed 13 Assistant U.S. Attorneys, 7 local  law enforcement, 6 FBI participants, 5 ICE agents, 1 DOL participant, 13  nongovernmental organization participants, and 3 task force leaders from  an Attorney General’s office. In addition, we interviewed a U.S. Attorney,  who had recently set up a human trafficking task force, to obtain his  perspective on challenges faced in putting a task force into operation. This  approach does not allow for generalizing. In addition, we reviewed  relevant GAO reports on federal agencies’ administration of grants or  funding to state and local entities.
We conducted our work from June 2006 through June 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Statutory Provisions Used to Investigate and Prosecute Trafficking Crimes
paragraphs: During the 1990s, the United States began to take steps to address  trafficking in persons at home and abroad. DOJ prosecuted trafficking  cases under several federal criminal statutes, including the involuntary  servitude statutes, the Mann Act, and labor laws on workplace conditions  and compensation. However, various U.S. policymakers determined that  existing U.S. statutes did not take into account some characteristics of  contemporary trafficking in persons and, therefore, did not adequately  protect trafficking victims, deter trafficking, and bring traffickers to  justice. These statutes did not always treat trafficked persons as victims.  Involuntary servitude was restricted to cases of physical abuse—force,  threats of force, or threats of legal coercion, as opposed to the  psychological coercion often used by today’s traffickers. While the  modern concept of trafficking in persons focused on compelled service,  under the Mann Act trafficking was perceived as interstate transportation  for prostitution. Moreover, these statutes scattered enforcement authority  across the government and resulted in different case outcomes, depending  on the charges brought or which agency learned of the allegations of  abuse.
The TVPA addressed limitations in existing law that made it difficult to  prosecute traffickers, as well as adding new crimes and enhancing the  penalties. Federal agencies continue to rely on a number of statutes to  prosecute traffickers and halt their operations. Table 1 lays out the  primary statutes that support the investigation and prosecution of  trafficking in persons crimes.
Traffickers may also be charged with other offenses. Examples of these  statutes are shown in table 2.
section_title: Appendix III: Federal Efforts to Investigate and Prosecute Trafficking in Persons and Data on Resources
paragraphs: This appendix provides additional data on federal agencies’ efforts to  investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons crimes. It also presents  available information on federal agency resources used to support these  efforts.
subsections: section_title: Federal Agencies Report Prosecutions and Investigations of Trafficking in Persons since fiscal year 2001
paragraphs: The FBI, ICE, and CRT/CS reported data on the investigations,  prosecutions, indictments, and arrests related to trafficking crimes since  the passing of the TVPA. These data are a general indicator of the level of  agency effort on trafficking in persons, although they are limited by a  number of factors. Because trafficking in persons is a hidden crime and  victims are hesitant to come forward, it is difficult to estimate the extent  of trafficking in persons crimes. Moreover, because prosecutors may  charge traffickers with other crimes (e.g., kidnapping, the Mann Act,  immigration violations, or money laundering) for strategic or tactical  reasons, data on the number of trafficking in persons investigations and  prosecutions do not provide a complete picture of the number of  traffickers who have been thwarted. The data systems agencies use are  primarily case management systems, which may not be able to extract  trafficking data if trafficking was not listed as a charge. Additionally, if an  investigation on smuggling later reveals a trafficking violation, some data  systems will continue to store investigative data under the smuggling  classification.
The complexity of the investigations and the limitations of data systems  make providing data on human trafficking a labor-intensive effort for  agencies. Therefore, these data are not comparable across the agencies  and it is not possible to associate arrest and indictment data with a  particular case because of differences in agency data systems. Moreover,  agency officials noted that investigations do not always lead to  prosecutions, because situations that appear to be trafficking may prove to  be alien smuggling or prostitution accompanied by abuse and, therefore,  do not meet the criteria to be prosecuted as trafficking cases. In addition,  ICE officials said that in situations involving children, the agency’s priority  was to rescue the victim whether or not the investigation led to the  prosecution of the trafficker.
Since fiscal year 2001, CRT/CS has reported an overall increase in the  number of prosecutions for cases involving sex and labor trafficking, as  defined by CRT/CS, based on the facts of the case. Table 3 shows the  increase in number of prosecutions after the implementation of the TVPA  in 2001, compared to those in the years leading up to the law’s passage.  CRT/CS officials noted that the number of defendants in each case varied,  as well as the number of victims, and the complexity of the case (app. IV  provides summaries of several cases to illustrate this variation.).
The data since fiscal year 2001 related to investigations of trafficking in  persons provided by the FBI and ICE is shown in tables 4 and 5, and also  shows a general increase. As with the prosecutions of human trafficking  cases, variation in numbers from year to year may be due to the  complexity of a case. For example, factors such as a case with many  victims, multiple defendants, a long period of victimization, and multiple  jurisdictions from which to collect evidence may affect how many cases  are able to be investigated from year to year.
Additionally, FBI’s Crimes Against Children Unit reported data on cases of  trafficking of U.S. children for commercial sex from its Innocence Lost  National Initiative, as shown in table 6.
DOL’s Wage and Hour Division reported participating in four cases  involving criminal or potentially criminal allegations of trafficking in  persons, which were concluded in fiscal year 2007. The division reported  seven cases currently under investigation; seven cases at some stage of  litigation or case development by the FBI, Assistant U.S. Attorney, or  others; and one additional case in which it will be providing technical  assistance following direct law enforcement action. According to the  division, its involvement may have been as a result of a referral from  another agency (e.g., FBI, Assistant U.S. Attorney, or local law  enforcement), a referral from an advocacy organization, or a situation in  which the division was the initial investigating agency. In addition to  participation in cases involving violations of the trafficking statutes, the  division has also assisted other law enforcement agencies in developing  investigations or prosecutions of criminal violations of other statutes and  may pursue criminal penalties under its own statutes. For example,  according to CRT/CS, DOL has been involved in the calculation of back  wages and overtime pay for victims, as in United States v. Calimlim.  According to DOL, it provided technical advisory assistance to the  prosecuting U.S. Attorney, furnishing sample back wage computations that  would have been due had the victim fallen under the provisions of the Fair  Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and had the case events occurred within the  FLSA statute of limitations. In the subsequent prosecution, CRT/CS  successfully secured a $940,000 restitution order.
section_title: Resource Commitments of Federal Investigative and Prosecutorial Agencies to Meet Their Responsibilities for Pursuing Trafficking in Persons Crimes
paragraphs: To implement their respective plans and carry out activities related to the  investigation and prosecution of trafficking in persons, agencies have  generally drawn from existing resources. Therefore, according to DHS and  DOJ officials, resource information may not be distinguishable from other  activities and is generally an estimate.  Information is also not consistent  across agencies.
Although the 2005 TVPA amendments authorized appropriations of  $18,000,000 in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 to ICE and $15,000,000 in fiscal  year 2006 to the FBI for trafficking investigations, these amendments were  enacted after fiscal year 2006 had already begun and the amounts were not  appropriated. ICE reported 53 full-time equivalents for fiscal year 2005, 68  in fiscal year 2006, and 32 through the first half of fiscal year 2007 for  trafficking activities. In midyear 2003, ICE received $3.7 million in  supplemental funding, which mostly funded law enforcement operations  to enforce the TVPA and domestic and overseas training activities. FBI  officials told us they had not received a separate appropriation specifically  for trafficking in persons. The FBI Civil Rights Unit reported as of April  2007, 141 Special Agents are allocated to its Civil Rights Program  throughout 56 field offices. One Unit Chief, six Supervisory Special Agents,  and eight support staff are assigned to headquarters. For fiscal year 2006,  approximately 24 percent of these resources were directed toward human  trafficking matters.
In fiscal year 2006, the FBI’s Crimes Against Children Unit received  $500,000 from the Assets Forfeiture fund to support task forces and  working groups investigating trafficking of U.S. children for commercial  sex. The funds were used for overtime pay for state and local officers,  equipment, and training. Additionally, to support the Innocence Lost  National Initiative, the FBI received 16 positions (10 agents and 6 analysts)  in fiscal year 2005, and 10 agent positions in fiscal year 2006. The FBI said  it requested 30 investigative, clerical, and analytical personnel to support  the Crimes Against Children program initiatives for fiscal year 2008,  including combating trafficking of U.S. children for commercial sex.
In addition, the conference agreement for the fiscal year 2007 DHS  appropriation designated $1 million to ICE for its contribution to the  Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC). HSTC officials said  although these funds were not designated specifically for trafficking in  persons, they would assist HSTC’s trafficking efforts. Furthermore,  because ICE was the only agency with funds specifically designated for  HSTC, it would henceforth take on the responsibility for up-front  administrative expenses at HSTC, for which other agencies, including DOS  and DOJ, would then reimburse ICE.
CRT/CS also reported that it had not received funds specifically  designated for human trafficking prosecutions, but provided us with  estimates of the numbers of positions, attorneys, and full-time equivalents  for trafficking in persons. CRT/CS further noted that the actual number of  positions is very difficult to track, because, as is true for all enforcement  areas within the Criminal Section, most attorneys do not work exclusively  on trafficking in persons, but carry other criminal enforcement cases as  well. CRT/CS training, outreach, and technical assistance on trafficking in  persons have also been provided from its operating funds. However,  CRT/CS developed and provided us with estimates of various types of  resources it used to address trafficking in persons, as presented in table 7.
DOJ’s fiscal year 2008 budget submission included a request for a CRT/CS  program increase of $1,713,000, 13 agent/attorney positions, and 7 full-time  equivalents for its trafficking efforts.
According to CEOS, prosecuting sex trafficking and sex tourism cases can  be enormously resource intensive, especially if foreign victims or  investigators will be needed to testify at trial. As trafficking crimes were  not a line item in the appropriation legislation, CEOS could not provide  actual data on the resources used to prosecute these crimes. However,  CEOS estimated that it has devoted approximately 15 to 25 percent of its  attorney time to trafficking crimes since 2003. FBI and CEOS officials  noted the lack of facilities for these victims, who need special treatment.
The TVPA authorized the Attorney General to make grants to develop,  expand, or strengthen victim service programs for victims of trafficking.  DOJ received approximately $10 million per year in fiscal years 2002  through 2006 for victim services programs for victims of trafficking, as  authorized by section 107(b)(2) of the TVPA. In fiscal year 2002, OVC  awarded these funds to nonprofit, nongovernmental victim services  providers to develop, expand, or strengthen services for victims of  trafficking. According to DOJ officials, in fiscal year 2003, DOJ decided to  use a portion of these funds to award BJA task forces grants on trafficking  with the goal of expanding services for victims by identifying more victims  and connecting them with needed services. In subsequent fiscal years,  both OVC and BJA awarded grants with these funds.
In addition, FBI, ICE, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, and CRT/CS  have emergency funds that may be used to provide immediate services to  victims when services cannot be provided through other programs that  support trafficking victims. According to OVC, the agencies coordinate  these efforts through it to ensure that any use of emergency funds is  appropriate, maximizes the use of trafficking appropriation dollars when  they are available, and occurs when no other funds are available.
section_title: Appendix IV: Summary Case Studies
paragraphs: The following case studies illustrate several of the characteristics of  human trafficking described in this report, including (1) the diverse  purposes for which people are trafficked and the circumstances in which  they work, both legally and illegally; (2) the variation in the number of  victims; (3) case complexity; and (4) coordination among law enforcement  and nongovernmental organizations in caring for the victims and  prosecuting the perpetrators.
subsections: section_title: United States v. Kil Soo Lee
paragraphs: United States v. Kil Soo Lee—the largest trafficking prosecution before a  federal court—resulted from an investigation involving five languages,  several countries and states, and numerous federal agencies and  nongovernmental organizations. Between September 1998 and December  2000, Lee recruited 250 skilled garment workers—mostly young women  who had paid $5,000 and $8,000 recruitment fees—from China and  Vietnam, locating his garment factory, named Daewoosa Samoa, in  American Samoa to use the “Made in America” label and avoid drawing  attention to his operation. The workers believed the fees to be legitimate  payment in exchange for new jobs possibly leading to a better life. Instead,  they lived, ate, and slept in barracks on the factory compound, surrounded  by fences that remained locked and guarded during working hours. Lee  and his associates seized passports—threatening the workers with  deportation, bankruptcy, severe financial hardship to family members  back home, and false arrest—and withheld food and pay.
In March 1999, workers asked to be paid for several months’ labor. Kil Soo  Lee refused to pay them, and when the workers protested, he locked them  inside of the Daewoosa compound and refused to provide them with food.  Several workers climbed over the fence at night and contacted local  residents to complain and seek food. Upon finding out that workers had  left the compound, Kil Soo Lee notified the American Samoan police that  the workers were causing a disturbance and had the police arrest three of  the female workers who tried to leave the company grounds. The workers  were unable to speak English or Samoan, and thus were unable to  communicate the true version of events to the police. Attempting to  communicate with the outside world, another worker threw a handwritten  note from the window of the company car after visiting jailed coworkers.  This note was found and passed on to the U.S. Department of Labor,  which investigated allegations that Kil Soo Lee had withheld the workers’  pay. Because of the investigation, DOL required Lee to make restitution to  the affected employees. Following additional complaints and allegations  that Lee was requiring workers to kick back the back wage payments, DOL  again investigated. The garment manufacturers for which Lee was  producing goods provided the back wage restitution for the underpaid  employees in this second investigation.
In November 2000, workers protested again by slowing production. On  Lee’s direction, guards entered the factory and conducted a mass beating  of the Vietnamese, inflicting severe injuries on several. Local police  investigated the uprising but dismissed the case, believing the guards’  accounts that the Vietnamese workers had attacked the Samoans. The  Occupational Safety and Health Administration of DOL then arrived to  conduct inspections of the Daewoosa facility from November to February  2001, citing violations of workplace safety noted from earlier  investigations concluded in June 1999. In March 2001, FBI agents and  CRT/CS prosecutors traveled to American Samoa to investigate. They  conducted interviews, surveyed the factory, and seized records,  computers, and other evidence. Kil Soo Lee was then arrested on March  23, 2001. He and four other defendants were indicted in August of that year  on 22 charges of subjecting workers to involuntary servitude. The trial  began in October 2002 and lasted 4 months.
During prosecution, the nature of the crime and the cultural and linguistic  backgrounds of the workers posed challenges for the Civil Rights Division.  Attorneys had to prove that the workers—now witnesses in the trial— were victims rather than simply violators of labor and immigration laws.  Lee had already had some of them deported, while others scattered to 20  states around the country after being given temporary immigration status  to testify. During the pretrial preparations and the trial, more than 200  victims had to be housed and fed, while the sick and injured required  medical care. Because the victims had limited or no English facility  (languages spoken included Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, and Samoan),  interpreters had to be provided. Agents and attorneys also had to gain the  victims’ trust, overcoming their fears of law enforcement and authority,  which Kil Soo Lee and the other defendants had earlier exploited. Finally,  the victims needed to be assured that no harm would come from the  proceedings either to them or their families back home and that they had  done nothing to draw shame or fear of exposure upon themselves.
In August 2001, two of the American Samoan guards entered guilty pleas  to participating in the conspiracy to violate the civil rights of the garment  workers and were later sentenced to 70 and 51 months in prison. Two  codefendants were acquitted on all charges. In February 2002, Kil Soo Lee  was convicted of conspiracy to violate the civil rights of the workers, 11  counts of involuntary servitude, 1 count of extortion, and 1 count of  money laundering. Lee, who was in his mid-50s, was sentenced in June  2005 to 40 years in prison, which at that time was the highest sentence  handed down in a trafficking/slavery case that did not result in death, and  ordered to pay restitution of $1,826,087.94.
On April 16, 2002, the High Court of American Samoa in a separate  consolidated civil case also ordered Daewoosa Samoa, Ltd. to pay $3.5  million in back wages to the workers.
section_title: United States v. Carreto
paragraphs: The Carreto case came to the U.S. government’s attention on a tip from  Mexican authorities that a victim was believed to have been held and  forced into prostitution. An investigation led agents to locations where a  number of young women and their traffickers were arrested. The  defendants were members or associates of an extended family whose  principal business was reaping the profits from compelling young Mexican  women into prostitution through force, fraud, and coercion. The  defendants, who often lured the women into romantic relationships, used  deception, psychological manipulation, and false promises, along with  physical beatings and rapes, to overcome the will of the victims, compel  them into prostitution, and force them to turn over virtually all the  proceeds to the defendants.
During the investigation of this case, ICE and DOJ coordinated with  international nongovernmental organizations, the Mexican government,  and Mexican attorneys to remove the victims’ children from the custody of  the Carreto family, thereby removing one of the last means of control the  Carreto family had exerted over the victims. The investigation revealed  extensive sex trafficking activity between Mexico and the United States,  prompting initiatives to coordinate multijurisdictional, multi-agency  investigations.
On November 16, 2004, a federal grand jury returned a 27-count  superseding indictment charging Josue Flores Carreto, Gerardo Flores  Carreto, Daniel Perez Alonso, Eliu Carreto Fernandez, Consuelo Carreto  Valencia, and Maria de los Angeles Velasquez Reyes with victimizing nine  young Mexican women. The indictment charged the six defendants with  counts of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, sex trafficking, attempted  sex trafficking, forced labor, violation of the Mann Act, conspiracy to  import aliens for immoral purpose, and alien smuggling. Two additional  defendants, Edith Mosquera de Flores and Eloy Carreto Reyes were  charged separately by complaint.
On April 5, 2005, on the morning trial in this case was to begin, Gerardo  Flores Carreto, Josue Flores Carreto, and Daniel Perez Alonso pled guilty  to all charges in the 27-count indictment. On April 27, 2006, Gerardo Flores  Carreto and Josue Flores Carreto were each sentenced to 50 years in  prison. Daniel Perez Alonso was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Edith  Flores had previously been sentenced to 16 months. On June 1, 2006, Eliu  Carreto Fernandez was sentenced to 80 months in prison. Eloy Carreto  Reyes is still pending sentencing.
On January 19, 2007, the Mexican government extradited defendant  Consuelo Carreto Valencia to the United States, along with 14 other  criminal defendants, in an extradition that Attorney General Gonzales  lauded as unprecedented in its scope and importance. Consuelo Carreto  Valencia, the mother of two of the lead defendants, is charged with  conspiring with the other defendants to compel the victims into forced  prostitution. An additional defendant, Maria de los Angeles Reyes, remains  in Mexico, where she has previously been arrested on related charges.  CRT/CS is seeking her extradition.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Justice
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Robert N. Goldenkoff (202) 512-2757.
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Glenn G. Davis, Barbara A.  Stolz, Susanna R. Kuebler, Richard Ascarate, Kelly Bradley, Erin Claussen,  Frances Cook, Stuart Kaufman, and Elizabeth Curda made significant  contributions to the report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Human Trafficking: Better Data, Strategy, and Reporting Needed to  Enhance U.S. Anti-Trafficking Efforts Abroad, GAO-06-825 (Washington,  D.C.: July 18, 2006)
Human Trafficking: Monitoring and Evaluation of International  Projects Are Limited, but Experts Suggest Improvements, GAO-07-1034  (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2007)
Results-oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and  Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington,  D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005)
International Crime Control: Sustained Executive-Level Coordination of  Federal Response Needed, GAO-01-629 (Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001)
Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in  National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington,  D.C.: February 3, 2004)
Organized Crime: Issues Concerning Strike Forces, GAO/GGD-89-67  (Washington, D.C.: April 11, 1989)
Prescription Drugs: Strategic Framework Would Promote Accountability  and Enhance Efforts to Enforce the Prohibitions on Personal  Importation, GAO-05-372 (Washington, D.C.: September 8, 2005)
Community Services Block Grant Program: HHS Should Improve  Oversight by Focusing Monitoring and Assistance Efforts on Areas of  High Risk, GAO-06-627 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006)