Public Housing: Information on Receiverships at Public Housing Authorities
Published: 2003-02-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: About 3,000 public housing authorities--state, county, and municipal agencies--develop and manage low-income housing in cooperation with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Since 1979, 15 housing authorities have been placed in the hands of receivers' outside parties designated to manage the authorities during a specific period of time, usually several years. GAO was asked to identify the circumstances that led to receiverships, any differences in the way they operate and in their results, and the factors that have influenced the termination of receiverships.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Receiverships at housing authorities have generally resulted from long-standing, severe, and persistent management problems that led to deterioration of the housing stock. Under an administrative receivership, HUD appoints either a contractor or a HUD employee to take over the housing authority's management. Because receiverships generally involve the complete takeover of a housing authority's management and operations, HUD views receiverships as a last resort when other interventions such as technical assistance or sanctions have failed. HUD has made these decisions on a case-by-case basis. In four cases, decisions to appoint receivers were made by courts. These judicial receiverships stemmed from lawsuits filed against housing authorities because of poor living conditions in public housing. Administrative and judicial receiverships have operated similarly, and all of the receivers have had the same authority to make necessary changes. The specific corrective actions receivers have taken depended on the problems at the individual housing authority. Most receivers have found it necessary to oversee the complete reorganization of the housing authority's management and operations, develop and enforce policies and procedures, and improve physical conditions. In some cases, receivers have had to desegregate public housing to address fair housing violations. Whether under administrative or judicial receivers, nearly all of the 15 authorities showed improvement during their years of receivership. The four housing authorities under judicial receiverships generally have continued to demonstrate strong performance; for example, performance scores have improved and have generally remained high. While housing authorities under administrative receiverships have also made improvements, some still demonstrated a significant problem with housing units in very poor physical condition. According to HUD officials, HUD ends administrative receiverships when it is clear not only that conditions at the housing authority have improved but also that the authority's management can sustain the improvements. The decisions to end judicial receiverships are made by judges. To date, four administrative and two judicial receiverships have been terminated.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: About 3,000 public housing authorities—state, county, and municipal  agencies—develop and manage low-income housing in cooperation with  the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD provides  funding—nearly $7 billion annually—and has contracts with these  authorities that require them to maintain decent, safe, and sanitary  properties and manage programs according to HUD’s regulations and  requirements. Despite expenditures of this magnitude, many public  housing properties have been unsafe and unsanitary for several decades.  Some have violated fair housing requirements by maintaining segregated  public housing. HUD provides technical assistance to authorities with such  problems, and also can impose sanctions such as removing housing  authority officials to help prompt corrective actions. HUD may also place a  housing authority under administrative receivership—taking over the  authority’s management and operations.
Based on information from HUD, since 1979, 15 housing authorities have  been placed in the hands of receivers—HUD officials or outside parties  designated to manage the authorities during a specific period of time,  usually several years. HUD initiated 11 of these receiverships, while 4 were  initiated by courts, generally in response to lawsuits from residents of  public housing. Whether HUD-initiated (administrative) or ordered by a  court (judicial), receiverships have had the same goal: to correct the  problems at the housing authority and improve the residents’ standard of  living.
As agreed with your office, this report provides information about  receiverships at public housing authorities, specifically addressing the  following questions:  What circumstances led HUD to place public housing authorities under  administrative receiverships and judges to order judicial receiverships?
What are the differences, if any, in the way administrative and judicial  receiverships have operated and in the kinds of actions receivers have  taken?
What are the differences, if any, in the results achieved with  administrative and judicial receiverships?
What factors have influenced the decision to terminate some  receiverships?
To address the objectives, we interviewed HUD headquarters and field  staff, housing authority officials, and the receivers themselves; reviewed  public housing laws, policies and procedures; and reviewed documents  concerning the impact of the receiverships on the housing authorities. For  8 of the authorities, we obtained and analyzed HUD’s performance scores  during the periods before and after receivers were appointed; these scores  were unavailable for the other 7 authorities because their receivership  predated HUD’s scoring system or for other reasons. While we report  changes in HUD’s scores for these authorities, the small number of  receiverships of each type preclude using the scores to statistically identify  possible distinctions between administrative and judicial receiverships.  Further, we did not explore other factors that might have contributed to  changes in scores. We performed our work from February 2002 through  December 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Details about our methodology are in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Under the Housing Act of 1937, as amended, Congress created the federal  public housing program to help communities provide housing for low- income families. Congress annually appropriates funds for the program and  HUD allocates them to public housing authorities (PHA). PHAs are  typically created under state law, and a locally appointed board of  commissioners approves their decisions. HUD and the PHAs have an  annual contributions contract—a written contract under which HUD  agrees to make payments to the PHA and the PHA agrees to administer the  housing program in accordance with HUD regulations and requirements.  HUD provides the housing authorities with several types of assistance  including  operating subsidies to cover the difference between rent payments and   capital funds to improve the physical condition of properties and  upgrade the management and operation of existing public housing  developments; and   HOPE VI grants, on a competitive basis, to revitalize severely distressed  public housing. These grants fund the capital costs of improvements  such as major rehabilitation and new construction, the demolition of  severely distressed public housing, and community and support services  for residents.
In fiscal year 2000, HUD began implementing the Public Housing  Assessment System (PHAS) to improve the department’s ability to measure  PHAs’ performance. From 1991 until 2001, HUD had used the Public  Housing Management Assessment Program (PHMAP) to evaluate public  housing authorities. Both systems measure the same basic elements, but  the earlier system is based on self-certified information from the housing  authorities and does not include an independent physical inspection or  input from the public housing residents—both integral parts of the new  assessment system. The new system has three major indicators as follows:  The physical inspection indicator determines whether the housing  authority is providing decent, safe, and sanitary housing to its residents.
The financial condition indicator determines whether the PHA has  sufficient financial resources and is capable of effectively managing  those resources.
The management operations indicator measures PHAs’ management  performance.
Finally, a survey measures residents’ satisfaction with their living  conditions. While this performance system has not yet been fully  implemented, we concluded in our March 2002 report that it has the  potential to provide a more reliable basis for evaluating housing  authorities’ performance than the previous system.
If a housing authority receives an overall score of less than 60 percent  under the Public Housing Assessment System, or a score of less than 60  percent of the available points under more than one of the three major  indicators (physical, financial, and managerial), it is designated as a  “troubled” PHA. HUD assigns a recovery team to each troubled PHA and  develops a plan to remedy the problems. Initially, HUD may offer technical  assistance and training to a troubled authority. HUD may also sanction an  authority, for example, by withholding funding. In some cases, HUD has  entered into special agreements with PHAs that allow them flexibility in  addressing unusual challenges. For example, at the Chicago Housing  Authority, HUD waived some of its regulations for 10 years and allowed the  authority to consolidate its capital and operating funds into a single block  grant. The housing authority was thus able to undertake a large-scale  redevelopment project to replace or redevelop most of its public housing.
Finally, HUD may place a housing authority under an administrative  receivership. The department has the authority to take possession of all or  part of the PHAs operation and management. Generally, the receiver  replaces the top management of the housing authority and dissolves the  board of commissioners—the body that approves housing authority  management decisions. Typically, HUD will assign one of its employees or  hire a contractor to act as the board while the housing authority is under  receivership. HUD will then develop a plan for improvement based on what  needs to be done at the housing authority. Since 1985, HUD has placed 11  housing authorities under administrative receivership; these are listed in  table 1. Additionally, judges have placed 4 housing authorities under  judicial receivership since 1979; these are in table 2.
The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 requires that  HUD place poorly performing housing authorities under receivership if  they are not able to substantially improve their performance—that is, to  improve their scores under the new assessment system to 60—within 2  years.   The act directs HUD to take over all or part of the operations of  PHAs with fewer than 1,250 units or to seek a court-appointed receiver. For  PHAs with 1,250 or more units, HUD must seek a court-appointed receiver.  However, HUD is still making adjustments to the new scoring system and  has not fully implemented it. Thus, no PHAs have been placed in  receivership on the basis of their performance scores alone.
The following tables show the status of housing authorities under  receivership as of December 2002. The tables show the primary problems  that prompted the housing authorities placement under receivers,  according to HUD and housing authority data. However, most of the  housing authorities were placed in receivership for several reasons, and  some degree of management difficulty underlies the reasons for all of the  receiverships.
section_title: Receiverships at Housing Authorities Have Resulted from Severe, Long-standing Problems
paragraphs: The problems that compel HUD and the courts to place public housing  authorities in receivership are serious physical, financial, and managerial  deficiencies that violate agreements between HUD and the authority and  that have persisted despite repeated interventions. The courts have  imposed all four judicial receiverships to date in response to lawsuits that  also involve the poor condition of public housing properties. (Appendixes  II and III, respectively, discuss the details of these administrative and  judicial receiverships.)
subsections: section_title: HUD Uses Receiverships When Other Approaches Have Been Unsuccessful
paragraphs: The PHAs that HUD has placed under receivership have generally had  severe management problems resulting in poorly maintained housing.    These problems violate the agreements between the PHAs and HUD, which  require that public housing be maintained according to HUD’s standards— decent, safe, and sanitary. HUD has placed housing authorities under  receivership after long-standing and severe problems that have not  responded to other HUD interventions, such as training or sanctions. HUD  has also taken over PHAs that were violating fair housing requirements by  maintaining segregated public housing developments, where the  segregation could not be addressed by other means.
Management difficulties are typically the cause of persistent problems at  PHAs, according to HUD and housing authority officials. Managers may  lack experience or may refuse to comply with HUD’s requirements. For  example, HUD determined that the St. James Parish Housing Authority in  Louisiana could not fulfill its mission because of ineffective management.  According to HUD officials, the public housing units at St. James were in  deplorable condition and were deteriorating “at an alarming rate.”   HUD  also cited high turnover rates among managers and insufficient training as  the reasons the Housing Authority of New Orleans was unable to manage  its maintenance and modernization programs. Eight of the 11  administrative receiverships involved PHAs that had problems with the  physical condition of their units. For example, the Camden Housing  Authority, the Housing Authority of New Orleans, the St. James Parish  Housing Authority, and the Wellston Housing Authority were not  completing routine maintenance on their public housing units before going  into receivership. At the Chicago Housing Authority, most of the public  housing had been poorly designed, was old, and was deteriorating.
At three PHAs, HUD took control of the management and operations  primarily to address racial segregation in the public housing developments.  HUD placed the Beaumont, Lafayette, and Orange County Housing  Authorities under receivership in order to desegregate the public housing  developments. At the Beaumont and the Orange County housing  authorities, HUD is under court order (Young v. Martinez) to take actions  to facilitate desegregation. When the PHAs failed to desegregate the  developments, HUD decided to place both under receivership. HUD took  over the Lafayette Housing Authority because the management was  maintaining its public housing waiting lists based on race, ensuring that its  developments were segregated.
In one case, HUD assumed control of a single program without placing the  entire housing authority in receivership. According to HUD officials, the  Puerto Rico Public Housing Administration lacked the capacity to manage  its HOPE VI program. HUD hired a contractor to help manage the projects  and provide technical assistance, but the housing authority was not  properly overseeing the program. A report issued by HUD’s Inspector  General in March of 2001 reported a total breakdown of the housing  authority’s ability to administer its HOPE VI project. According to the  report, the authority lacked effective management and accounting controls  over its federal funds and did not effectively monitor the activities of the  contracted project manager. HUD officials told us that the situation has  improved, and that the program will be returned to the Puerto Rico  Housing Administration in the near future.
section_title: Lawsuits over Poor Living Conditions Prompted Judicial Receiverships
paragraphs: To date, all judicial receiverships at PHAs have resulted from lawsuits filed  by residents and have involved the very poor physical condition of public  housing units. All four of the housing authorities under judicial  receivership had similar histories of problems. Besides the poor condition  of the occupied public housing units, the housing authorities had high  vacancy rates because units had been deemed uninhabitable. As a result,  those on waiting lists for public housing could not obtain housing, the  neighborhoods surrounding the empty units deteriorated, and crime near  the abandoned housing rose. According to HUD and PHA officials, poor  management, corruption, and local political interference were the  underlying causes of the problems at these housing authorities.
When residents in Kansas City, Missouri, filed suit against the housing  authority, the judge ordered the PHA to rehabilitate or repair all housing  developments in poor condition. When it failed to comply with the order,  the judge ordered the PHA into receivership and named a receiver to  oversee the redevelopment of public housing in the city. In Boston,  according to a PHA official and the former receiver, the housing authority  had lost control of its public housing developments before it went into  receivership. Criminals controlled the developments, the PHA had stopped  trying to maintain occupied units, and it failed to board up vacant units.  Finally, residents filed suit, and the judge ordered the receivership. At the  Chester Housing Authority, the judge made the decision to place the PHA in  receivership after touring the developments and witnessing the poor living  conditions and the drug dealing that went on in front of them, according to  the attorney for the case. At the District of Columbia Housing Authority, the  judge ordered the PHA into receivership after 2 years of investigating and  detailing the poor condition of the public housing developments.
section_title: Administrative and Judicial Receiverships Have Operated Similarly, but Specific Remedies Have Varied
paragraphs: Administrative and judicial receiverships have operated similarly in that  they usually both involve the complete takeover of a PHA’s management  and operations or of an entire program within a PHA. Both types of  receivers have the same authority to implement any necessary changes to  improve the PHA’s performance. However, the remedies receivers apply  vary, largely because the situations that result in receiverships differ. The  nature and extent of the problems determine the kinds of goals that are set  and the way they are addressed.
subsections: section_title: Both Administrative and Judicial Receiverships Involve the Complete Takeover of a PHA’s Management and Operations
paragraphs: Once a PHA goes into receivership, the receiver has the authority to take  full control of management and operations. The PHA’s management  relinquishes control of the housing authority to the receiver, and the locally  elected board of commissioners is dissolved. In most cases, the receiver  replaces the top management positions at the housing authority and  institutes new policies and procedures to affect improvements. For  example, when the Housing Authority of Kansas City entered a judicial  receivership, the receiver brought staff from his consulting firm to fill top  management positions. The receiver and his staff rewrote personnel  standards, personnel policies, and procurement policies in order to restore  the PHA’s accountability. Similarly, under an administrative receivership at  the St. James Parish Housing Authority, the receiver hired a new executive  director, established a system of financial controls, developed new  personnel policies, and put in place new maintenance guidelines for the  public housing developments. At the Housing Authority of New Orleans,  HUD and the City of New Orleans initially agreed to a partial or “quasi”  receivership in 1996. It replaced the board of commissioners with a  contractor and appointed an executive monitor to oversee the PHA’s  management and operations. When the housing authority had shown little  improvement after several years, HUD imposed a full administrative  receivership in January 2002 with a HUD employee as the receiver.
Although the legal authority of the administrative and judicial receiverships  are the same, court-appointed receivers may be better able to effectively  use their authority according to officials of several housing authorities and  public housing experts that we spoke with. According to these officials, the  court-appointed receivers are more insulated from local politics and better  able to make necessary changes at the housing authority.
section_title: Receivers’ Actions Respond to Specific Problems
paragraphs: Actions imposed by receivers to remedy problems at a PHA respond to the  specific problems that need to be addressed. In all of the judicial  receiverships and several of the administrative receiverships, the receiver  has taken action to redevelop or rebuild a substantial portion of the public  housing developments. Following are the examples of actions to remedy  specific problems:  At the Housing Authority of Kansas City, the receiver had every public  housing unit either rebuilt or rehabilitated because of the poor condition  of the housing stock.
Similarly, at the Chicago Housing Authority, the receiver tore down  some of the deteriorated and poorly designed housing developments.
At the three PHAs where racial segregation was the problem, the  receivers implemented plans to desegregate the public housing  developments. At the Beaumont and Orange County Housing  Authorities, for instance, HUD-appointed receivers provided incentives  such as moving expenses to persuade public housing residents to move.
Receivers may also take other actions to prevent future problems in  addition to responding to short-term needs. Examples of actions to prevent  future problems are as follows:  At the Boston Housing Authority, the receiver permanently disbanded  the board of commissioners because it had been a source of some of the  PHA’s original problems—the board was not conducive to effective  management. According to the receiver and housing authority officials,  the members of the board did not have the necessary skills or political  independence to make the right decisions for the housing authority.  Currently, the top official for the Boston Housing Authority reports  directly to the Mayor.
At the District of Columbia Housing Authority, the receiver facilitated  the restructuring of the housing authority so that it would become a  separate entity rather than a department of the city. This restructuring  allowed the PHA’s management more control over its operations and  budget.
section_title: Both Administrative and Judicial Receiverships Have Shown Improvement
paragraphs: According to HUD’s assessed performance scores and/or other evidence,  nearly all of the 15 authorities showed improvement during their years of  receivership whether under administrative or judicial receivers. While the  numbers are too small to statistically identify differences between judicial  and administrative receiverships, we found that this pattern of  improvement was consistent for the 4 housing authorities under judicial  receiverships. Performance scores under judicial receiverships have  generally remained high. In contrast, some housing authorities under  administrative receiverships still demonstrate problems such as housing  units in poor physical condition and high turnover among managers. In  reviewing the 5 authorities under administrative receivership for which a  sufficient number of HUD’s assessed performance scores were available,  we also noted that the 2 largest housing authorities showed more  improvement than the 3 small and medium-sized authorities in the initial  years of receivership; however, the small and medium-sized housing  authorities improved their scores more over the long run.
subsections: section_title: PHAs Have Made Progress under Receivership
paragraphs: Most housing authorities under receivership demonstrated some type of  progress, regardless of the initial problems. Almost all the authorities that  were placed under receivership because of severe physical problems with  their public housing units improved the physical condition of their units.  For example, the Camden Housing Authority, the District of Columbia  Housing Authority, the Wellston Housing Authority, and the Housing  Authority of Kansas City all had problems with the physical condition of  their units prior to being placed in receivership. Throughout their  receiverships, all of these housing authorities improved the physical  condition of their units through extensive rehabilitation and modernization  efforts.
The three housing authorities (Beaumont, Orange County, and Lafayette)  that were placed in receivership because of racial segregation also showed  overall improvement, based on their performance scores. While HUD’s  performance scores do not have a component that captures the progress  made in desegregating developments, they do indicate that, in recent years,  these housing authorities generally made progress in improving the  management of the agency and the physical condition of the housing stock.  The Lafayette Housing Authority was in troubled status when it was taken  over by HUD in 1995 but managed to receive performance scores that were  high enough under the receivership to remove that designation.
Overall, HUD’s assessed performance scores show a pattern of  improvement at housing authorities placed in receivership. The eight  housing authorities for which a sufficient number of performance scores  were available showed a median increase in their overall performance  score of about 27 percent after 2 years of receivership and about 41 percent  after 3 years of receivership. The last scores for PHAs—the last available  score for PHAs currently under receivership and the score for the final year  for PHAs that are out of receivership—showed a median increase of about  67 percent (see fig. 1).
Although the number of available performance scores was not sufficient  for the above analysis, the scores that were available for an additional 4  housing authorities also showed a general pattern of improvement. The  Beaumont, Camden, East St. Louis, and the Springfield Housing Authorities  showed some improvement in their performance scores during  receivership.
section_title: Improvements Have Been Consistent at Authorities under Judicial Receiverships
paragraphs: All of the four housing authorities that have been or are currently under  judicial receivership (Boston, District of Columbia, Kansas City, and  Chester) have generally shown consistent improvements. Following are  examples of improvements at these authorities:  At the Housing Authority of Kansas City, Missouri, several units were  either rehabbed or redeveloped during the receivership, and new  procurement and personnel policies were instituted. By the late 1990s,  the housing authority was consistently achieving lower crime rates,  higher rent collections, and a higher occupancy rate.
The District of Columbia Housing Authority demolished several vacant  public housing units and extensively modernized others in order to  improve the physical condition of its developments. According to a  senior housing authority official, every unit that needed work was  rehabilitated or modernized. Financial management systems were also  put in place during the receivership, which allowed the housing  authority better access to funding.
The housing stock at the Chester Housing Authority also improved  during receivership. The PHA has conducted revitalization work on  several developments and has been able to decentralize all operations  and implement agencywide standard operating procedures.
Further, all of these authorities continue to progress. Turnover among  managers has decreased, and performance scores have been high.
In contrast, while housing authorities under administrative receiverships  have also made improvements, some are still experiencing problems. For  example, the public housing units at the Housing Authority of New Orleans,  Louisiana, are still in very poor physical condition. Additionally, according  to HUD officials, the housing authority still has significant management  problems that have led to further HUD involvement in the receivership.
While the numbers are too small to statistically identify differences  between judicial and administrative receiverships, we noted that HUD’s  assessed performance scores for the housing authorities under judicial  receivership showed a generally consistent pattern of improvement. The  data for the eight authorities for which a sufficient number of performance  scores were available are shown in table 3.
section_title: Improvements Varied by Housing Authority Size
paragraphs: While again the numbers of housing authorities are too small to statistically  make distinctions, we also noted that among the five administrative  receiverships for which a sufficient number of performance scores were  available, the 3 small and medium-sized housing authorities experienced  higher increases in performance scores, over longer timelines, than the 2  very large housing authorities. The scores for these authorities are shown  in table 4.
Most of the small and medium-sized PHAs that have been placed in  administrative receivership have had less severe physical problems than  the large and very large housing authorities. For example, the three PHAs  that HUD placed in receivership because of racial segregation can be  classified as small or medium-sized. The receiverships at these three PHAs  have focused primarily on ensuring that the segregation patterns end. For  the most part, these housing authorities do not have the severe physical  deterioration of their housing stock that large PHAs such as Chicago have.  While other small and medium-sized PHAs under administrative  receivership have had some physical problems with their public housing  units, management, or both, the scale of the issues has been limited by the  housing authority’s size.
In contrast, large and very large housing authorities have often had  significant physical and management problems that have required  substantial work. The housing authorities of New Orleans, Chicago, and  Camden have all had substandard housing units, high turnover rates for top  managers, and weak internal controls. These PHAs have had to undertake  major rehabilitation of public housing developments and initiate changes in  personnel, procurement, and other policies in order to correct the  deficiencies that led to receivership. In some cases, the improvements have  not been sustained. For example, some public housing developments in  both New Orleans and Chicago are still in poor physical condition.
section_title: Criteria for Ending Receiverships Vary
paragraphs: No set guidelines exist for ending either administrative or judicial  receiverships because both are handled on a case-by-case basis.  Receiverships that have been terminated have ranged from as little as one  and a half years (Springfield and San Francisco) to approximately 11 years  (Boston). To date, most of the current receiverships have lasted  approximately 5 to 9 years. Of the receiverships included in our review,  only 4 administrative and 2 judicial receiverships have been terminated.
HUD’s regulations, past or current, do not prescribe when HUD returns a  PHA to local control once it’s under an administrative receivership. The  criteria HUD uses to make this decision vary depending on the problems  that led to receivership and the severity of those problems. Judges make  the determination to end judicial receiverships on the basis of a PHA’s  progress in satisfying the initial goals set for the receivership. The judge’s  criteria have varied depending on the level of improvement that is deemed  necessary to overcome the problems that led to the receivership.
subsections: section_title: HUD’s Termination Decisions Consider Severity of Problems
paragraphs: To date, HUD has terminated four receiverships—the Chicago Housing  Authority, the Lafayette Housing Authority, the San Francisco Housing  Authority, and the Springfield Housing Authority. The Chicago Housing  Authority was in receivership for approximately 4 years as HUD privatized  some functions, developed plans to improve maintenance and security  operations, and began to rebuild and rehabilitate the housing stock. Once  HUD completed these improvements and removed the PHA from troubled  status, HUD began discussions with the Mayor for the return of the housing  authority to local control. The receivership ended in May 1999. While the  housing authority has continued to have some problems with its housing  stock since 1999, it has sustained enough of the improvements that were  made under the receivership and, thus, has avoided further intervention in  its public housing program. In addition, HUD has entered into agreements  with the authority that will lead to a complete physical transformation of its  public housing developments within 10 years.
At the Lafayette Housing Authority, HUD decided not to terminate the  receivership until all concerns about racial segregation had been  addressed. The PHA was taken over as a result of severe management  problems—the management was purposely segregating public housing  developments by race, according to HUD officials. It was also in troubled  status when it went into receivership, with an overall performance score of  25.69 percent for fiscal year 1995. It was removed from troubled status in  1998 after receiving a performance score of 83.73 percent for fiscal year  1997. However, HUD kept the authority in receivership because of racial  segregation issues and did not end the receivership until the PHA enacted  policies to bring the housing authority in full compliance with fair housing  requirements. Once these policies were in place and HUD determined that  the PHA could sustain the improvements, HUD terminated the  receivership. The PHA was officially turned back over to local control on  September 17, 2002.
At the San Francisco Housing Authority, HUD decided to terminate the  receivership after the Mayor appointed a new board and strategies had  been initiated to turn the PHA around. HUD had taken over the PHA in  March 1996 at the Mayor’s request, after he had fired the executive director  and commissioners. HUD sent a recovery team of HUD officials,  consultants, and employees from other housing agencies to assess the  PHA’s operations and develop strategies to deal with the problems. The  acting HUD Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing assumed the  role of the board of commissioners. HUD also contracted to fill several key  management positions to continue the recovery efforts and once the Mayor  had appointed a new board member, HUD decided to turn the housing  authority back over to local control. The housing authority was officially  handed over to the new board in September 1997.
The Springfield Housing Authority (SHA) voluntarily transferred  operational control to HUD in 1996. The housing authority was in troubled  status and HUD agreed to monitor the SHA after it signed a Memorandum  of Agreement (MOA) that was designed to correct the housing authority’s  deficiencies. A HUD official assumed the role of the board of  commissioners throughout the receivership. Under the MOA, the SHA had  made progress on several fronts, including quality of physical work and  budget controls. In September 1997, the housing authority was removed  from troubled status and HUD decided to transfer the SHA back to local  control. The short receivership ended that month when the SHA board of  commissioners passed a resolution accepting control of the housing  authority.
section_title: Judges Have Terminated Receiverships That Met Their Goals
paragraphs: Thus far, judges have terminated two of the four judicial receiverships—the  Boston Housing Authority and the District of Columbia Housing Authority.  The receiverships ended when the judges determined that the housing  authorities had met specific criteria or made substantial improvements at  the PHAs. The Boston Housing Authority was initially placed in  receivership in 1979 after residents filed a lawsuit against the housing  authority alleging uninhabitable living conditions in the city’s public  housing developments. In general, the PHA had problems carrying out  basic functions of a housing authority. According to the receiver and a BHA  official, the housing authority also had problems controlling crime in its  public housing developments. The judge decided to return the PHA to local  control after the housing authority improved the conditions that had led to  receivership. Additionally, according to the receiver, he and the judge  wanted the board of directors permanently disbanded and an effective  manager appointed. After the authority accomplished these measures, the  judge agreed to release the PHA from the receiver’s control and give the  agency back to the city, with the Mayor acting as the receiver and the court  maintaining supervision of the housing authority. The court’s active  supervision of the PHA ended in 1990. According to the current  Administrator of the Boston Housing Authority, the PHA has been able to  maintain the governance structure and some of the improvements made  under the receivership. The housing authority has achieved strong  performance scores the last couple of years, and according to HUD  officials, this is reflective of the progress that the PHA has made.
The District of Columbia Housing Authority was placed under a judicial  receivership because of poor living conditions and failure to make vacant  units available for residents. For these reasons, a lawsuit was filed against  the housing authority, and the presiding judge placed the PHA in  receivership. The judge’s criteria for ending the receivership were  performance scores of 70 or higher for 2 consecutive years of assessment.  The PHA was able to meet this requirement after extensive rehabilitation  and modernization work on its public housing units and the reshaping of its  administrative and financial management systems. The receivership ended  in September 2000, and the PHA currently operates as an independent  agency in cooperation with the D.C. government.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to HUD for its comment and review. We  received comments from the Director, Field Operations Staff, and the  Director, Troubled Agency Recovery Operations, who generally concurred  with the content of this report. HUD commented that further analysis  should be conducted on the differences between judicial and  administrative receiverships, because it believes that judicial receiverships  are more costly than administrative receiverships. In addition, HUD  provided technical comments, which we incorporated in this report as  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority  Member, Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs; the  Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation,  Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; the Chairman  and Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Financial Services;  the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Housing  and Community Opportunity, House Committee on Financial Services. We  will send copies to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and  the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We also will send  copies to other interested parties, and we will make copies available to  others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge  on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please contact me at (202) 512- 8678 if you or your staff have any questions about this report. Key  contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We gathered information on 15 public housing authorities (PHA) that have  been under receivership. We excluded one receivership that HUD initiated  after we began our study (Shelby County Housing Authority). We  interviewed PHA officials, HUD officials who either were involved with a  receivership or are now helping to monitor a PHA, and when we could, the  receivers for the PHAs.
To identify the circumstances that led the Department of Housing and  Urban Development (HUD) or the courts to impose receiverships, we  reviewed HUD’s guidance and policies regarding receiverships. In addition,  we gathered information and obtained documents on the events and  conditions at the PHAs that preceded each receivership. We also  interviewed several housing authority officials, officials from industry  groups, lawyers that handled the lawsuits resulting in receiverships, and  HUD officials that had been involved in receiverships.
To identify potential differences in the way administrative and judicial  receiverships operate, we interviewed officials involved with  administrative receiverships and officials involved with judicial  receiverships, including several receivers. In addition, we reviewed  documentation on the actions receivers took to address the problems at the  PHAs. We examined the impact of these actions on the PHAs.
To identify the conditions that lead to the termination of receiverships, we  examined relevant documentation from HUD and the receivers and  interviewed officials who were directly involved with a termination. In  order to assess the performance of PHAs under receivership, we obtained  all the performance scores from both the old and new scoring systems that  were available for the 15 PHAs we reviewed. The data covered fiscal years  1991 (when performance assessments first began) through 2001 (the latest  year for which scores were available). Performance scores were not  available for all housing authorities for some years. The Boston and East St.  Louis Housing Authorities were placed under receivership several years  before HUD began assessing PHAs. The San Francisco and Camden  Housing Authorities did not have an assessment score for the year that  each housing authority was placed under receivership. Other receiverships  began recently or lasted less than 2 years and, consequently, the housing  authorities had very few performance scores. The Beaumont Housing  Authority receivership and St. James Parish Housing Authority  receivership began in 2000 and 2001, respectively. The Springfield Housing  Authority receivership lasted less than 2 years. Where possible, we  examined changes in performance scores for these seven housing  authorities while they were under receivership.
For eight PHAs that had performance scores at the time the receivership  began and whose receiverships lasted at least 2 years, we conducted  further analysis on the changes in performance scores that occurred during  the receivership. We used the score for the fiscal year that a housing  authority went into receivership as the beginning of receivership score. We  used the 2- and 3-year intervals so that the assessments would reflect the  effects of the receivers’ actions as fully as possible. We used the final score  for terminated receiverships in order to show the progress made during the  entire receivership. For housing authorities still under receivership, we  used the last available score to show as much of the progress made as  possible. In either case, this score was the score for the fiscal year that the  housing authority was last assessed while under receivership.
We used HUD’s criteria to determine the size of PHAs. These criteria are  based on the number of public housing units in a housing authority’s stock,  as follows:   Very large, more than 6,599 units;  Large, 1,250 units to 6,599 units;  Medium, 500 units to 1,249 units;  Small, 100 units to 499 units; and  Very small, less than 100 units.
We conducted our work from February 2002 through December 2002 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Administrative Receiverships
subsections: section_title: Beaumont Housing Authority (TX)
paragraphs: The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) took over the  public housing authority (PHA) in 2000 because of racial segregation in the  public housing developments. The Beaumont Housing Authority is one of  several housing authorities in East Texas bound by the Young v. Martinez,  Final Judgment and Decree, which makes HUD responsible for addressing  racial segregation in public housing developments. When the Beaumont  Housing Authority failed to take the necessary steps to desegregate its  public housing, HUD assumed control of the PHA’s management and  operations. Initially, HUD removed all the managers and the board of  commissioners and hired a contractor to evaluate the problems and  develop a work plan for improvement. A HUD staff person is currently the  Acting Executive Director, and another HUD staff person has replaced the  board of commissioners.
According to HUD officials, the problems at the Beaumont Housing  Authority have effectively been remedied. The developments have been  desegregated, and HUD believes that the current management is capable of  operating the housing properly. HUD officials are currently preparing to  end the receivership and to turn back the housing authority to local  control. The Acting Executive Director is currently interviewing candidates  for the position of Executive Director, and HUD has asked the Mayor of  Beaumont to appoint an advisory committee that will become the board of  commissioners once HUD ends the receivership.
section_title: Camden Housing Authority (NJ)
paragraphs: HUD took over the Camden Housing Authority in 1997 with the  concurrence of the mayor of Camden. The PHA had a long history of  problems. It was unable to provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing; had  poor internal controls; was not complying with federal regulations; and  political influence was interfering with its ability to improve, according to  HUD officials.
HUD hired consultants to manage the housing authority and designated a  HUD official to act as the board of commissioners. After assessing the  conditions at the PHA, the consultants instituted initiatives to clean and  repair the housing projects, improve management’s relationship with the  residents, and improve the PHA’s organizational structure. Longer-term  improvement efforts focused on modernizing the properties and improving  property management, maintenance, financial management,  administration, security, resident initiatives, and strategic planning.   The  housing authority now has an executive director in charge, but a HUD  official continues to oversee management and operations. Although the  Camden Housing Authority is performing well, HUD is not returning it to  local control at this time because of the instability of City of Camden,  which the state of New Jersey has recently placed under receivership.
section_title: Chicago Housing Authority (IL)
paragraphs: The Chicago Housing Authority has had a long history of management  problems and distressed housing conditions. HUD had designated the PHA  as “troubled” as far back as 1979, when the department first began to focus  on poorly performing PHAs. The Chicago PHA had weak internal controls,  fiscal problems, and frequent turnover among its top management. In  addition, the PHA’s housing was some of the worst in the country—old,  deteriorating, and poorly designed for the climate.
In 1995, HUD took control of the PHA’s management and operations and  put HUD employees in charge. HUD reorganized the PHA’s management,  privatized some functions, developed plans to improve maintenance and  security, and began to rebuild and rehabilitate the housing stock. HUD  returned the housing authority to local control by 1999 after the PHA had  improved its performance scores enough for HUD to lift its “troubled”  designation. According to HUD officials, however, even though the Chicago  PHA was no longer technically troubled, it still was not completely “fixed”  because many of its housing developments were still in poor condition.  However, after HUD returned the housing authority to local control it  agreed to a grant of $1.5 billion over 10 years so the PHA could carry out a  transformation plan that calls for demolishing 18,000 public housing units  and rehabilitating or redeveloping another 25,000.
section_title: East St. Louis Housing Authority (IL)
paragraphs: HUD took control of the East St. Louis Housing Authority in 1985.  According to HUD officials, the PHA was mismanaged, routine  maintenance was not being completed on the public housing units,  modernization funds were being improperly used, and housing authority  officials had been indicted for crimes that included larceny and  embezzlement. Additionally, the city was in political chaos, contributing to  the problems at the PHA, according to HUD officials.
HUD hired a contractor to manage the PHA and implement needed  changes. The contractor reorganized the staff, rewrote all policies, and  created a merit-based personnel system. In addition, it rehabilitated or  repaired about one-third of the public housing units and established a  maintenance program to keep the units in compliance with HUD’s  standards. Currently, the PHA is performing well. An executive director  runs the management and operations, and a full board of commissioners is  in place. However, according to HUD officials, the PHA will remain under  receivership—they do not believe the city is in a condition to operate the  housing authority because of its financial problems.   HUD officials  responsible for monitoring the East St. Louis PHA believe that if they  return it to local control now, it would not sustain the improvements that  have been made under the receivership.
section_title: Lafayette Housing Authority (LA)
paragraphs: HUD took over the Lafayette Housing Authority in 1995 as a result of severe  management problems and racial segregation in the public housing  developments. The PHA was placing families in public housing  developments based on their race rather than on their place on the waiting  list. HUD disbanded the PHA’s board of commissioners and hired a new  Executive Director. HUD staff also developed new policies and procedures  for placing families in public housing and provided the technical assistance  needed to bring the authority back into compliance with fair housing  requirements. HUD returned the Lafayette PHA to local control in 2002.
section_title: Housing Authority of New Orleans (LA)
paragraphs: The Housing Authority of New Orleans had a long history of management  problems, and its public housing has long been in very poor condition. In  1996, HUD entered into a “cooperative endeavor agreement” with the city  of New Orleans in order to correct problems at the PHA. Under this  agreement, HUD dissolved the PHA’s board of commissioners and chose a  HUD representative as Executive Monitor to oversee the authority’s  progress in implementing improvements. The improvement plan focused  mainly on rehabilitating and redeveloping the deteriorating public housing  stock.
In 2002, after the PHA had made little progress, HUD took control of the  PHA’s management and operations. A team of HUD officials is now in  complete control of the management of the housing authority. According to  HUD officials involved in the receivership, they are working on reallocating  staff resources, reorganizing the PHA’s structure, and cutting back on  unnecessary expenditures. They have procurement, management, and  financial problems yet to address.   According to HUD officials, they are  also making progress toward improving the condition of the housing stock  through several new construction and rehabilitation projects.
section_title: Orange County Housing Authority (TX)
paragraphs: HUD took over the Orange County Housing Authority in 1993 because of  the management’s failure to desegregate its public housing. As it is with the  Beaumont Housing Authority, HUD is responsible for facilitating  desegregation of Orange County public housing under Young v. Martinez,  Final Judgment and Decree. A HUD staff person currently serves as the  board of commissioners, and HUD has contracted with the Executive  Director of a neighboring PHA to manage the day-to-day operations. HUD  staff involved with the receivership told us that they had succeeded in  desegregating public housing developments in three of the PHA’s four  communities. HUD staff felt that they had done as much as they could to  desegregate the public housing developments and attempted to place the  PHA under local control. However, local officials refused, according to  HUD. As a result, HUD now plans to dismantle the housing authority.  Public housing developments in two of the communities will be sold,  although the units will remain as affordable housing. The developments in  the remaining two communities will be transferred to another PHA.
section_title: St. James Parish Housing Authority (LA)
paragraphs: HUD took over the St. James Parish Housing Authority in 2001 after the  authority had been in troubled status for almost 8 years. The PHA was  poorly managed, was not completing routine maintenance on its public  housing units, and was not boarding up vacant units. It had been under the  supervision of HUD’s Office of Troubled Agency Recovery since 1997 and  began receiving assistance from HUD’s Troubled Agency Recovery Center  (TARC) in 1998.    The PHA improved after receiving TARC assistance, but  it continued to have problems—for example, it did not keep financial  records and much of its housing stock was in disrepair—violating the  provisions of its Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with HUD.
HUD hired a consulting firm to run the management and operations of the  PHA and to act as the board of commissioners. According to TARC  officials, the consulting firm established financial controls, put in place  new policies and procedures (including new personnel policies), and  provided extensive training to staff at the facility. According to HUD  officials, the PHA is currently doing well. The staff are now completing  routine maintenance and following the consulting firm’s policies and  procedures. The housing authority now has an Executive Director, and  HUD is training members of an advisory board that will become the board  of commissioners once HUD returns the PHA to local control.
section_title: San Francisco Housing Authority (CA)
paragraphs: HUD took over the San Francisco Housing Authority in 1996 after the  Mayor of San Francisco requested HUD’s assistance. The PHA had  managerial problems, high crime at its public housing developments, and  problems with the physical condition of the units. HUD sent a team of  consultants, HUD officials, and employees of other PHAs to act as  managers and correct the problems. A HUD official functioned as the board  of commissioners. HUD’s recovery efforts included implementing new  policies and procedures and reorganizing the PHA.   HUD returned the PHA  to local control in 1997. Several years after the PHA was returned to local  control, it developed financial difficulties and sought the assistance of  HUD’s TARC. The TARC continues to monitor and provide assistance the  San Francisco Housing Authority.
section_title: Springfield Housing Authority (IL)
paragraphs: The Springfield Housing Authority voluntarily transferred operational  control to HUD in 1996. The PHA was in “troubled” status, and its  deficiencies were not being corrected. The board of commissioners  resigned, and a HUD official assumed its role.
In September 1996, the housing authority signed an MOA that was aimed at  addressing the PHA’s problems. Under the MOA, the PHA was able to make  some changes, including improving its contract administration,  modernizing its budget controls, raising the quality of construction work,  and improving the physical condition of the housing stock. By September  1997, the PHA had improved enough to be removed from troubled status  and returned to local control.
section_title: Wellston Housing Authority (MO)
paragraphs: HUD took over the Wellston Housing Authority in 1996 after a series of  problems and 3 years of poor performance scores. The PHA had severe  management and financial problems, as well as problems with the physical  condition of its housing units. HUD initially had staff from its local area  office act as the board of commissioners and executed an agreement with a  nearby PHA to oversee the day-to-day management and operations.  According to officials of the managing PHA, the Wellston Housing  Authority was in a state of chaos. They found severe physical deficiencies  in the public housing units, rents had not been collected, and there were no  records to determine who lived in the public housing or whether residents  were qualified to live there. According to HUD officials, the management of  the housing authority prior to receivership was dysfunctional.
According to officials responsible for operating the housing authority at the  beginning of the receivership, they had to recreate all of the management  and information systems and inspect all the units to determine  maintenance needs. They had to reverify all the residents’ incomes and  determine whether or not residents had been paying rent. The management  team completed a physical needs assessment of the units to determine the  health and safety violations that needed to be addressed and routine  repairs that were required. After the initial problems were resolved, the  HUD Office of Troubled Agency Recovery in Cleveland took over the  oversight of the PHA and hired an Executive Director to run the day-to-day  operations. HUD also hired a contractor to act as the board. The contractor  is currently training members of an advisory board that will eventually act  as the board of commissioners once HUD returns the PHA to local control.  According to HUD and housing authority officials, the public housing units  are now in good condition and the housing authority is operating properly.
section_title: Judicial Receiverships
subsections: section_title: Boston Housing Authority
paragraphs: The Boston Housing Authority was initially placed in receivership on  July 25, 1979, after tenants filed a class-action lawsuit in 1975 claiming  unsafe and unsanitary living conditions at the public housing authority’s  (PHA) developments. The court’s decision was affirmed on February 4,  1980. The next day the court appointed a receiver to take any and all  actions needed to bring conditions in the housing units into compliance  with the state’s sanitary code and all other laws regulating the conditions  and habitability of housing. The court gave the receiver all the powers that  a housing authority’s board of commissioners or executive director could  exercise. The board of commissioners, which had contributed to the PHA’s  management problems, was disbanded and a new management structure  was later put in place. The court would closely oversee the receivership’s  progress through weekly meetings, written reports, and hearings.
During the receivership, the housing authority undertook several  improvements, including stabilizing and fully redeveloping several  developments, rehabilitating vacant and dilapidated buildings, making  extensive capital commitments, and overhauling maintenance systems. The  redevelopment efforts resulted in the complete redesign and rehabilitation  of several large developments and the conversion of one into a privately  owned, mixed-income development. By 1984, the PHA had made enough  progress to end the tenure of the initial receiver. Boston’s Mayor assumed  the powers of the receiver and appointed an administrator to exercise  those powers. The new team continued the efforts of the past receiver,  particularly working to reduce vacancies by rehabilitating empty units.  These efforts substantially reduced the number of vacancies. The PHA also  developed initiatives in operational areas such as security, tenant selection,  and litigation.
The receivership terminated in September 1990 with the judge noting that  supervision was no longer necessary because of the extensive  improvements the PHA had made during the 1980s. According to  Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) officials, the  Boston Housing Authority is currently performing well and has received  high performance scores in the last few years.
section_title: Chester Housing Authority
paragraphs: The Chester Housing Authority (Pennsylvania) was placed in receivership  in August 1994 based on a class-action lawsuit filed in 1990. The lawsuit  claimed that HUD had permitted and approved the de facto demolition of  units in public housing developments by allowing them to deteriorate. At  the time, the PHA was not repairing and renting its vacant units, and HUD  was already overseeing the PHA after declaring it in violation of its contract  in 1991. According to the lawyer for the plaintiffs, the judge agreed with the  plaintiffs, finding that HUD had in effect constructively demolished the  PHA’s units by allowing them to deteriorate. The receiver was charged with  reorganizing the PHA, redeveloping and rebuilding the crumbling and  unsanitary units, and helping to create mixed-income communities in the  developments and neighborhoods.
Throughout the receivership, the PHA has improved on several fronts. It  embarked on a revitalization effort that has culminated in the award of two  HOPE VI grants to rebuild two of the most dilapidated developments. It has  made progress in demolishing units and building new ones to replace them  at other developments. According to PHA officials, it has also formed its  own police force to provide better security at the developments. On the  management side, the PHA has converted to an asset-management  structure by decentralizing all operations and converting to site-based  accounting and maintenance, and moving staff from centralized offices to  specific developments. Each site now has its own waiting list for tenants  and its own inventory, and all leasing functions occur at the sites. The PHA  has been reorganized and has implemented new standard operating  procedures for each department that have been approved by HUD and the  court.
The PHA’s performance scores have been high for the last 2 years but the  housing authority remains under receivership. According to PHA officials,  the main concern about ending the receivership is the ability of local  authorities to manage it. The City of Chester has faced significant decline  and was designated as a distressed municipality in the past. PHA and local  HUD officials believe that since the court is concerned about ending the  receivership, in all likelihood, some type of monitoring will continue once  the receivership ends.
section_title: Housing Authority of Kansas City
paragraphs: The Housing Authority of Kansas City (Missouri) went into receivership  after a lawsuit alleging uninhabitable conditions and fair housing violations  in public housing developments. According to the attorney who filed the  lawsuit in 1989, the living conditions in the developments were very poor  and vacancies so high that the situation was tantamount to demolishing the  units. On November 25, 1991, a Consent Decree was entered into that was  aimed at improving the PHA, but the PHA repeatedly violated it. In July  1993, a U.S. District Court judge placed the PHA in receivership and in  September 1994 appointed a receiver.
Since the appointment of the receiver, the PHA has focused on rebuilding  distressed communities and improving the quality of the housing stock.  The housing authority has modernized several developments and received  HOPE VI grants that it has used to completely redevelop some dilapidated  developments and scattered-site units. It has also made other  improvements, installing community gardens, playgrounds, and new curbs  and gutters. On the management side, the PHA has implemented new  procurement and personnel policies. According to the receiver, the  receivership team reorganized the PHA and created standards for planning  and development, construction, and development management.   Finally,  the PHA has taken steps during the receivership to promote self-sufficiency  among residents.
Overall, the PHA has lowered crime rates, raised rent collections, and  increased occupancy rates during the receivership. In addition, it now  serves almost twice the number of households as it did in September 1994.  Currently, the housing authority is in the final stage of receivership. In  September 2002, the local board of commissioners was reconstituted. The  receiver is now a Special Master, with oversight responsibilities for both  the board and the PHA.
section_title: District of Columbia Housing Authority
paragraphs: The District of Columbia Housing Authority was placed in receivership in  May 1995 after tenants filed a lawsuit in 1993. The lawsuit focused on two  claims: first, that the PHA had constructively demolished public housing  units by failing to maintain and allocate them to those on a waiting list, and,  second, that the PHA had violated its contract with HUD by failing to  maintain its units in decent, safe, and sanitary condition. Additionally,  public housing was under the Mayor’s control prior to the receivership and  during that time, turnover of management was high. According to a study  done on the receivership, the agencies operating public housing went  through 13 different directors between 1979 and 1995. After negotiations on  the receivership, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, HUD, and the  plaintiffs’ counsel entered into a written agreement that allowed the  receiver virtually unlimited powers to manage the agency; the presiding  judge would have oversight responsibility.
When the receivership began, the housing authority had a number of  problems. According to PHA officials, the developments were  deteriorating, and many units were in poor physical condition.  Management systems either worked inadequately or not at all. To address  these problems, during the first year, the receiver focused on establishing  the administrative and financial management systems necessary to proceed  with needed improvements in the housing stock and the agency itself. The  next step was a redevelopment strategy aimed at improving physical  conditions by reducing density, integrating design features that would deter  criminal activity, and substantially improving architecture, in part by  incorporating architectural characteristics of surrounding communities.  These efforts included three HOPE VI revitalization projects, three HOPE  VI demolition projects, and four home ownership projects. Additionally, the  housing authority created an Occupied Unit Rehabilitation Program to  complete all deferred maintenance. The plan called for installing new  flooring, kitchen appliances, and bathroom fixtures and making other  repairs to units. The PHA also rehabilitated several vacant units that  needed extensive rehabilitation. Finally, it decentralized its administrative  structure in an effort to increase responsiveness and accountability.
The receivership produced improvements in the consistency of operations  within the agency, reduced the number of vacant units, and improved the  physical condition of the PHA’s housing stock. The District of Columbia  Housing Authority Act of 1999, which was enacted in February 2000,  allowed the PHA to become independent and maintain control over  personnel, financial, and procurement matters while working with the  government of the District of Columbia. The receivership ended in  September 2000, after the PHA met the judge’s criteria for terminating the  receivership by receiving a performance score of 70 or higher for 2  consecutive years of annual HUD assessments.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those individuals named above, Emily Chalmers, Jacqueline  Garza, Curtis Groves, Tarek Mahmassani, and John McGrail made major  contributions to this report.
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