Electronic Warfare: Option of Upgrading Additional EA-6Bs Could Reduce Risk in Development of EA-18G
Published: 2006-04-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The EA-6B has conducted airborne electronic attack for all services since 1996. In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) completed an analysis of alternatives for the EA-6B that concluded the inventory would be insufficient to meet the DOD's needs beyond 2009. Since then, the services have embarked on separate acquisition efforts to develop airborne electronic attack assets. In 2003, the Navy started development of the EA-18G aircraft to replace the EA-6B. This report was done under the Comptroller General's authority and assesses if (1) DOD's 2002 conclusion that the EA-6B inventory would be insufficient beyond 2009 remains valid for assessing the Navy's future needs, and (2) the acquisition approach used to develop the EA-18G is knowledge-based and might mitigate future risks.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: EA-6B aircraft will be able to meet the Navy's suppression of enemy air defense needs through at least 2017 and the needs of the Marine Corps through 2025--as long as sufficient numbers of the aircraft are outfitted with upgraded electronics suites. The conclusion that the EA-6B inventory would be insufficient past 2009 was not based on the Navy's requirement for 90 aircraft, but on an inventory requirement of 108 aircraft that would meet the needs of all services. The decision to move to a system of systems using multiple aircraft types means the Navy will no longer be required to support all of DOD's electronic attack requirements. However, insufficient quantities of upgraded jamming systems means that the majority of the EA-6B fleet is equipped with the older jamming system that is limited in its ability to conduct numerous critical functions. If the Navy is required to support all services, given the recent Air Force proposal to terminate its EB-52 standoff jammer program, additional EA-6Bs may require the Improved Capability (ICAP) III upgrade. The risk of cost growth and schedule delays in the EA-18G program is increasing because the program is not following a knowledge-based approach to acquisition. None of its five critical technologies were fully mature as the system development phase began, and that is still the case today. Of particular concern is the ALQ-218 receiver, placed in the harsh wingtip environment on the EA-18G and not the more benign setting of the EA-6B's tail, for which it was developed. While the EA-18G's design appears stable, and almost all its design drawings are complete, that may change once the aircraft is flight-tested. Production of the EA-18G is also risky: One-third of the total buy will be procured as low-rate initial production aircraft based on limited demonstrated functionality.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In conducting military operations, U.S. aircraft are often at great risk from  enemy air defenses, such as surface-to-air missiles (SAM). The services  use specialized aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade  enemy air defense systems through either electronic warfare or physical  attack. These aircraft use electronic warfare jammers, which disrupt  enemy radar and communications to temporarily suppress enemy air  defenses. Other specialized aircraft use antiradiation missiles that home in  on radars used by surface-to-air missiles or antiaircraft artillery systems to  degrade or destroy them. Because specialized aircraft protect aircraft of  all services in hostile airspace, the suppression mission necessarily  crosses individual service lines.
Over the past decade, we have issued several reports calling attention to  the possibility that our nation’s ability to counter such defenses is being  degraded. In 1996, for example, we reported that the Department of  Defense (DOD) had decided to eliminate the F-4G and EF-111 suppression  aircraft without first fielding comparable replacements. Because no  replacements were available, the Navy’s EA-6B aircraft became DOD’s  only standoff radar jammer aircraft, providing suppression support for all  services. In January 2001, we called attention to the acknowledged gap  between the services’ suppression capabilities and their needs. The gap  was a consequence of the increasing modernization of enemy air defenses  that had outpaced DOD’s effort to improve its suppression capabilities. At  that time, DOD stated that the analysis of alternatives (AoA) for airborne  electronic attack (AEA) would provide a basis for its future strategy and  lead to a balanced set of acquisition programs for the services. Urgency to  complete such an analysis of alternatives was motivated by a projected  shortfall of the EA-6B inventory, primarily caused by attrition, and the  increasing cost of operating such aging aircraft. The study found that the  EA-6B aircraft inventory was declining faster than had been projected and  concluded that it would be insufficient to meet DOD’s needs beyond 2009.  In November 2002 we recommended that a comprehensive strategy was  needed to remedy the situation. Since then, the military services have  embarked on separate acquisition efforts to develop a future AEA system  of systems (SoS) for DOD. In 2003 the Navy started development of the  EA-18G aircraft to replace the EA-6B as its contribution to the DOD AEA  SoS.
We examined the analysis of alternatives and planned acquisition efforts to  determine (1) whether the key conclusion that the projected inventory of  EA-6Bs would be insufficient beyond 2009 for all services remains valid for  projecting the Navy’s future needs and (2) whether the acquisition  management approach to developing the Navy’s airborne electronic attack  core component, the EA-18G, is knowledge-based and can help mitigate  future risks.  We conducted this work under the Comptroller General’s  authority and are addressing the report to you because of your  committees’ jurisdiction on these issues.
To address these objectives, we reviewed the 2002 analysis of alternatives;  pertinent DOD, service, and contractor documents addressing the status of  the EA-6B inventory; plans for maintaining them; status of EA-6B  suppression capabilities; testing conducted for the EA-6B Improved  Capability (ICAP) III program; the AEA system of systems; gaps in the  AEA; and potential solutions for AEA. We interviewed officials from the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Strategic Command (Offutt, Nebraska);  Commander Electronic Attack Pacific Fleet (Whidbey Island); and officials  responsible for requirements and programs for the Air Force, Navy, and  Marine Corps. We interviewed personnel responsible for ICAP III  electronic warfare testing at the Office of the Director, Operational Test  and Evaluation (Washington, D.C.); Commander of Operational Test and  Evaluation Navy (Norfolk, Virginia); and VX-9 personnel responsible for  ICAP III testing at China Lake, California. We discussed airborne  electronic attack issues and EA-18G development and production with  contractor personnel at Boeing Corporation in St. Louis, Missouri and El  Segundo, California. We discussed software matters with officials at China  Lake and Point Mugu, California. We met with pilots at Patuxent River  Naval Air Station; China Lake, California; Whidbey Island Naval Air  Station, Washington; Fallon Naval Air Station, Nevada; and Boeing  Corporation to discuss pilot workload issues, the nature of the threat,  ICAP III testing, and tactics developed for AEA. As with our past work on  the EA-18G development effort conducted under our annual assessment of  selected major defense acquisition programs, we focused our work to  determining whether the program was following a knowledge-based  acquisition approach. We met with Navy EA-18G program officials  currently involved with the development effort to document the maturity  status of the aircraft’s critical technologies, and the status of its design  effort and plans for producing the aircraft. We performed our review from  May 2005 through March 2006 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The four-seat EA-6B Prowler aircraft conducts missions for all services.  The AEA mission is focused on protecting U.S. aircraft and ground forces  by disabling enemy electronic capabilities. The EA-6B performs this  mission with a complement of electronic receivers and jammers, referred  to as its electronic suite, which are located on the aircraft structure and in  external pods attached to its wings. A development effort is currently  under way to replace the EA-6B with a two-seater electronic attack variant  of the F/A-18F, designated the EA-18G Growler.
The EA-6B joined the Navy’s fleet in January 1971. The EA-6Bs’s initial  deployment was in 1972 over the skies of Southeast Asia. Since the early  1990s, use of the EA-6B has steadily increased. In 1991 the aircraft was  used in Operation Desert Storm and in support of Iraqi “no-fly” zones  instituted after that war. In 1995, the EA-6B was selected to become the  sole tactical radar support jammer for all services after the Air Force  decided to retire its fleet of EF-111 aircraft. This decision resulted in  increased use of the EA-6B. Since 1995 the Prowler force has provided  AEA capability during numerous joint and allied operations against both  traditional and nontraditional threats. It was used to provide support for  Operation Allied Force in Kosovo and for peacekeeping operations over  Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, and is currently being used against  traditional and nontraditional target sets in support of ground forces.  These capabilities continue to be demonstrated in the Global War on  Terrorism, in which EA-6B operations in Afghanistan and Iraq protect  coalition forces and disrupt critical communications links.
There have been several upgrades to the EA-6B’s electronic suite since it  was initially fielded to address increased threats faced by U.S. forces. The  standard version, fielded in 1971, was quickly replaced in 1973 with the  expanded capability EA-6B, which augmented the electronic  countermeasure coverage of the aircraft. In 1977, the Improved Capability  version entered service, and was followed by a more sophisticated ICAP II  version, first deployed in 1984. The EA-6B/ICAP II featured updated  receivers, displays, and software to cover a wider range of known  surveillance and surface-to-air missile radars. As a result of heavy use and  the limited inventory of the EA-6B, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that  the inventory of EA-6Bs be managed as low-density/high-demand (LD/HD)  assets. Low-density/high demand assets are force elements consisting of  major platforms, weapon systems, or personnel that possess unique  mission capabilities and are in continual high demand to support  worldwide joint military operations. In 1998 an ICAP III upgrade was  initiated to address capability gaps against threats from mobile surface-to- air missile systems. In addition, concerns surfaced about an anticipated  decline in the EA-6B inventory because of structural fatigue issues. As a  result, an AEA analysis-of-alternative was started in 1999 to find a  replacement for the EA-6B. At that time it was anticipated that the EA-6B  would remain in the inventory until at least 2015.
Plans, as recently as December 2001, were to upgrade all 123 EA-6B  aircraft in the inventory to the ICAP III configuration. The ICAP III  provides rapid emitter detection, identification, geolocation, selective  reactive jamming, and full azimuth coverage. Also, ICAP III-equipped EA- 6Bs will have the ability to integrate multiple EA-6Bs to match any threat  density, and to control other manned or unmanned assets. The upgrade is  needed to address capability gaps in the ICAP II electronic suite presently  installed in EA-6B aircraft. The EA-6B ICAP III production line is currently  scheduled to shut down after the fiscal year 2006 buy.
The AoA report, published in 2002, concluded that an EA-6B replacement  would be needed in 2009 to meet the services needs. The AoA further  concluded that two components are needed to provide a complete AEA  solution that is able to meet DOD’s collective needs. These two  components are a recoverable “core” component and an expendable  “stand-in” component.
The AEA AoA report identified 27 platform combinations that were  capable of delivering jamming support. The study concluded that the final  AEA solution must address both anticipated short-term platform  shortfalls, as well as how best to implement the follow-on capability based  on the menu of alternatives developed by the AoA. In addition, the study  concluded that before a service can begin a formal acquisition program,  the discussion should consider, among other things, whether one service  will provide all DOD core component capability, and whether the AEA  core component will reside on a single platform.
Subsequent to the AoA report, the Navy and the Air Force each decided to  develop their own unique aircraft from the 27 platform combinations  identified in the AoA to perform the core component of AEA, as shown in  figure 2. The Navy opted to develop the EA-18G Growler, a derivative of  the F/A-18F, as its core component. The Air Force decided to develop an  electronic attack variant of the B-52, designated the EB-52 SOJ (Standoff  Jammer), to function as its core component of the AoA solution and an  unmanned combat air vehicle and an unmanned decoy as the expendable  stand-in components of its AEA AoA solution. The Marine Corps opted to  continue using the EA-6B with the ICAP III electronic suite in anticipation  of an electronic variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) being developed  as a replacement for its EA-6Bs. The combination of these service AEA  solutions is shown below in the DOD AEA system of systems.
F/A-18 E/F, F-22, JSF AESA Kinematic Range  of Known SAMs As a result of these changes the services have updated a memorandum of  agreement that would allow Navy expeditionary EA-6B squadrons to be  decommissioned between fiscal years 2009 and 2012, to be replaced by  U.S. Air Force electronic attack capability. The Navy’s aircraft would be  dedicated to providing carrier-based AEA support to the Navy. The Navy  determined that an inventory of 90 aircraft would be needed to support the  Navy’s core component requirement. In 2001 it was projected that an  inventory of 108 EA-6Bs would be needed if the Navy were to continue to  provide AEA mission support to all the services.
In February 2006, DOD proposed to terminate two major components of  the system of systems: the B-52 Standoff Jammer system and the Joint  Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS). The goal of the B-52 SOJ  program was to provide long-range jamming of sophisticated enemy air  defense radars and communications networks, using high-powered  jamming equipment. The Air Force believes that a standoff jamming  capability is still required, and it is investigating the solution options,  platform numbers, and mix to deliver this capability. As part of the  cancellation of the B-52 SOJ, the Air Force is investigating other solution  options and platforms to provide the standoff capability, including  examining how the B-52 SOJ cancellation affects Navy plans to retire the  expeditionary squadrons of EA-6Bs. The goal of the J-UCAS program is to  demonstrate the technical feasibility and operational value of a networked  system of high-performance and weaponized unmanned air vehicles.
section_title: Changes in Operational Concept and Upgrades Extend Operational Viability of the EA-6B, but Quantities Are Insufficient to Meet Identified Requirements
paragraphs: The conclusion of the May 2002 AoA report that the EA-6B inventory  would be insufficient past 2009 was not based on the Navy’s requirement  for 90 aircraft, but on an inventory requirement of 108 aircraft that would  meet the needs of all services. The decision to move to a system of  systems using multiple aircraft types means the Navy will no longer be  required to support all of DOD’s electronic attack requirements. As a  result, EA-6B aircraft will be able to meet the Navy’s suppression of enemy  air defense needs through at least 2017 and the needs of the Marine Corps  through 2025 as long as sufficient numbers of the aircraft are outfitted  with ICAP III electronics suites. If the Navy is required to support all  services, given the recent Air Force proposal to terminate the EB-52  standoff jammer program, additional EA-6Bs may require the ICAP III  upgrade.
According to program officials, the EA-6B ICAP III electronic suite  upgrade was determined to be operationally effective and suitable in 2005  and has proven to be significantly better than the ICAP II electronic suite  that is currently in use on all but a few EA-6Bs. However, while the EA-6B  inventory decline has been postponed, the planned number of aircraft that  would receive the ICAP III electronic suite upgrade has been significantly  reduced, leaving most EA-6Bs with a shortfall in electronic attack  capability against some current and future threats. Production of the EA- 6B ICAP III upgrade is scheduled to end after the 2006 buy.
subsections: section_title: System of Systems Decision Reduces the Inventory Requirement for the Navy
paragraphs: Program officials said that DOD’s 2002 decision to move to a system of  systems concept has reduced the inventory requirement for the Navy from  108 aircraft to 90 aircraft. The Navy determined that an inventory of 90  aircraft would be needed to support Navy’s core component requirement.  An inventory of 108 EA-6Bs would be needed if the Navy were to continue  to provide electronic attack mission support to all the services. The  memorandum of agreement between the services, in which the EA-6B has  been the sole provider of electronic attack since 1996, allows the Navy  expeditionary squadrons to be decommissioned between fiscal year 2009  and 2012 and replaced by the U.S. Air Force’s EB-52 standoff jammer.  However, the Air Force has recently canceled the EB-52 jammer.
As shown in figure 3, the EA-6B inventory levels are now expected to be  sufficient to meet the Navy’s requirement for 90 aircraft through at least  2017 and the Marine Corps requirement for 31 aircraft through 2025.  Procurement and replacement of 114 wing center sections for the EA-6B,  begun in 1998, have been made on 94 aircraft and are ongoing. A few  aircraft have received more than one wing center replacement because of  heavy use. As a result, program officials identified the fatigue life of the  fuselage as the determining factor in projected inventory levels. The  official estimated life analysis of the EA-6B was conducted between 1984  and 1988. The aircraft used in that analysis had 1,873 actual flight hours  when the test began, and program management believes that factor was  not considered in determining the current fuselage life limit. Program  management has asked that updated fatigue life charts be developed based  on this information. Program management predicts that this will result in  an increase in fuselage life to 14,000 hours, as shown in the solid line in  figure 3. In addition, according to program officials extended inventory life  can be obtained by procuring 32 additional EA-6B wing center sections at  an estimated cost of $170 million. This would result in an inventory of over  90 EA-6Bs through 2019. This projected inventory is represented by the  dashed line in figure 3. However, according to program officials, Northrop  Grumman Corporation will wrap up wing center section production late  this summer, and any new wing center section production would have to  be placed on order this year to avoid additional startup and production  break costs.
section_title: Electronic Suite Upgrade Is More Capable, but Quantities Are Insufficient to Meet Requirements
paragraphs: While the inventory of EA-6Bs is now projected to meet the Navy’s  inventory needs through 2017, most of that inventory will be less able to  address some current and future threats than recently anticipated.  According to program documents, the ICAP II tactical jamming system,  currently installed on most EA-6B aircraft, is limited in its ability to  conduct numerous critical functions. Its receivers and integrated  connectivity are limiting factors in the ICAP II’s ability to detect, locate,  and react to threat systems. Threat systems have become more  sophisticated and incorporate advanced technology, severely limiting  current ICAP II equipped EA-6Bs’ receivers’ ability to detect and identify  threats. The ICAP III upgrade, at an estimated cost of $11.7 million per  aircraft for the last four upgrades, provides selective reactive jamming  capability; accurate emitter geolocation; full azimuth coverage; and a  flexible command and control warfare core system that can integrate and  coordinate multiple EA-6Bs to match any threat density, as well as the  ability to integrate and control other manned or unmanned command and  control warfare assets. Program officials project that a lower unit cost  could be achieved if higher quantities are procured.
Recent operational test and evaluation (OPEVAL) results for the EA-6B  equipped with the ICAP III electronic suite have determined it to be  operationally effective and suitable. Since these results, Navy operations  and training units have flown and observed two EA-6B squadrons  upgraded with ICAP III and found the upgrade to be significantly more  capable than EA-6B aircraft equipped with the ICAP II electronic suite.  According to Navy users who flew the EA-6B with ICAP III during a recent  training detachment, the ICAP III system demonstrated a 30 percent  increase in jamming effectiveness over the ICAP II. More data on the  superior performance of ICAP III relative to the ICAP II system will  become available as results from its first deployment, which just recently  occurred, develop.
Although the ICAP III-equipped EA-6Bs have been found to be significantly  more capable, the numbers of aircraft that are funded to receive the ICAP  III upgrade has been reduced compared with earlier DOD intentions to  fully upgrade all EA-6Bs. Currently 14 EA-6B aircraft have been funded to  receive the ICAP III upgrade, because of funding reductions, development  test results, and the decision in 2003 to replace the EA-6B with the EA- 18G.
According to Navy and Marine Corps requirements officials, fitting only 14  EA-6Bs with ICAP III is not sufficient to allow for the transition to the EA- 18G without leaving them with an airborne electronic attack capability  shortfall against some current and future threats. They believe that  between 21 (to meet the Navy requirement) and 31 (to meet the Marine  Corps requirement) EA-6Bs should be fitted with ICAP III to address this  shortfall. However, an analysis provided by the EA-6B program office  concluded that 44 ICAP III aircraft would be needed to meet both Navy  and Marine Corps requirements. We have not validated the number of  aircraft Navy and Marine Corps officials identified as needed. Because of  recent decisions affecting Air Force electronic attack near-term  capabilities, additional EA-6Bs may be needed if the Navy is tasked to  support the electronic attack requirements of all services beyond 2010.  However, increasing the number of EA-6Bs with ICAP III will not be an  option if ICAP III production ends in 2006 as currently planned.
section_title: EA-18G Program at Risk of Cost and Schedule Growth because It Is Not Following a Knowledge-Based Approach
paragraphs: The EA-18G development schedule is aggressive according to program  officials and the DOD Director of Operational Test and Evaluation’s 2005  annual report. While the program is currently on cost and schedule  according to program officials, our analysis shows that the program is not  fully following the knowledge-based approach inherent in best practices  and DOD’s acquisition guidance, thus increasing the risk of cost growth  and schedule delays. In addition, we have found that most research and  development cost growth is reported after a program has passed the  critical design review--the acquisition phase the EA-18G recently entered.  Over the last several years, we have undertaken a body of work examining  weapon system acquisition in terms of lessons learned from best system  development practices. Successful programs attain high levels of  knowledge in three aspects of a new product or weapon: technology,  design, and production. If a program is not attaining high levels of  knowledge, it incurs increased risk of problems, with attendant cost  growth and schedule delays. The EA-18G airborne electronic attack  program entered system development with immature technologies, and  some of these technologies are still not mature. Also, while most of the  design drawings are complete, it is possible that redesign may be needed  in the future as the technologies mature. In addition, the Navy plans to  procure a large percentage of the total EA-18G aircraft during low-rate  initial production based on limited knowledge of the aircraft’s ability to  perform the electronic attack mission. This could result in the need to  retrofit already produced EA-18G aircraft, shown in mock-up form in  figure 4, a possibility that the Navy is already anticipating.
subsections: section_title: EA-18G Program Has Entered the Acquisition Phase Where Most Cost Growth is Reported
paragraphs: According to program officials, the EA-18G program is currently on cost  and schedule. While it held its critical design review in April 2005, it is now  in the phase where most research and development cost growth is  recognized and reported. We recently reviewed the development cost  experience of 29 programs that have completed their product development  cycle--the time between the start of development and the start of  production. We found a significant portion of the recognized total  development cost increases of these programs took place after they were  approximately halfway into their product development cycle. These  increases typically occurred after the time of the design review of the  programs. The programs experienced a cumulative increase in  development costs of 28.3 percent throughout their product development.  Approximately 8.5 percent of the total development cost growth occurred  up until the time of the average critical design review. The remaining 19.7  percent occurred after the average critical design review.
section_title: Potential for Cost Growth and Redesign Because of Technological Immaturity
paragraphs: Our work shows that the demonstration of technology maturity by the  start of system development phase is a key indicator of achieving a match  between program resources (knowledge, time, and money) and customer  requirements. We recently reported that the cost effect of proceeding into  product development without mature technologies can be dramatic.  Research, development, and test and evaluation costs for programs that  started development with mature technologies increased by an average of  4.8 percent, while those that began with immature technologies increased  by an average 34.9 percent.
In December 2003, after a truncated concept exploration phase, the EA- 18G was approved to enter system development, in order to achieve a 2009  initial operational capability date directed by the Chief of Naval  Operations. Prior to entering system development, the program office  assessed the readiness of the EA-18G’s technologies and concluded that   the system was not developing or advancing any new technologies and  that only proven systems with minor modifications using mature  technologies would be utilized. In addition, program officials stated that  the EA-18G development benefited from the maturity of the F-18F  platform and the airborne electronic attack suite currently flown on the  EA-6B.
Our assessment of the technology maturity of the EA-18G, however, differs  from that offered by program officials. Over the last few years, we have  reported on the system’s progress in our annual assessment of selected  major defense acquisition programs. We have reported that at the start of  system development none of the program’s five critical technologies were  fully mature, and as recently as our March 2005 report this had not  changed. While they are similar to the mature technologies found on the  EA-6B and the F/A-18F, integrating those technologies on the EA-18G  involves form and fit challenges. Three of the critical technologies--the  ALQ-99 jamming pods, the F/A-18F aircraft, and the tactical terminal  system--are approaching full maturity; two other technologies—the  communications countermeasure set and the ALQ-218 receiver--are less  mature.
The Communications Countermeasures Set (CCS) provides  communications detection and processing to the EA-18G. Among other  things, it is used to degrade the effectiveness of the communications  components that make up enemy integrated air defense systems. The  existing set used on legacy EA-6Bs is out of production, and a replacement  system is needed for use in the EA-18G. The new one is to be composed of  new components, and it will function in a new environment. We believe  that putting the CCS into the space constraints of the EA-18G platform  may be a challenge and thus should be considered a technology risk to the  program.
The EA-6Bs fitted with ICAP III have a new technologically mature  receiver, the ALQ-218, which is housed in the large space on the aircraft’s  vertical tail. The ALQ-218 receiver for the EA-18G, however, is being split  and redesigned so it can be integrated into the aircraft’s smaller wingtip  pods. The wingtip environment is also known to be harsh, with noise and  vibration that are known to be particularly severe and can degrade the  reliability of receiver components. Isolators will be used in an attempt to  lower the vibration levels. Since the ALQ-218 antenna elements will be  subject to flexing of the wing that could reduce system performance,  accelerometers will be placed in the wingtip pods to measure relative  movement between the wingtips so that accurate threat locations can be  made. In addition, many subcomponents also include new and modified  parts, so the receiver’s performance and delivery schedule are being  tracked as risks to the program. Furthermore, the unique ALQ-218 wingtip  covers, or radomes, have recently surfaced as potentially problematic.  There are technical risks with the radome’s electrical characteristics and  environmental specifications--especially its ability to withstand hail strike  requirements. The radome is being tracked as a high risk to the program  because it may not meet a performance requirement. Flight tests on the  EA-18G to measure the impact of noise and vibration on completed  components will not start until February 2007. The performance of the  ALQ-218 radome will not be known until flight tests that demonstrate its  capability are conducted later this year. The maturity of the full ALQ-218  will not be fully known until the EA-18G aircraft completes flight tests  with these components during developmental testing scheduled to start in  April 2008.
The design of the EA-18G appears stable because almost all of its design  drawings are complete. However, the order in which knowledge is built  throughout product development is important to delivering products on  time and within costs. Our past work has shown that knowledge gaps have  a cumulative effect. For example, design stability cannot be attained if key  technologies are not mature. Until all the EA-18G critical technologies  demonstrate maturity, the potential for design changes remains. While the  program held its system-level critical design review in April 2005, flight  tests will be needed to verify the loads and environment used for some of  these designs and determine the maturity of the critical technologies.
section_title: Production Decision Based on Limited Demonstrated Functionality, and Initial Capability Provided Will Be Less than That of EA- 6B ICAP III
paragraphs: The EA-18G production decision scheduled for April 2007 will be based on  limited demonstrated functionality. The initial capability demonstrated in  support of the production decision will be less than that of the ICAP III on  the EA-6B. Four EA-18G aircraft will be built to conduct operational tests  during the system development and demonstration test phase. The Navy  plans to procure an additional one-third, or 30, of the EA-18G aircraft  during low-rate initial production (LRIP), at an estimated cost of $2,297.1  million for the two low-rate initial production lots in fiscal year 2007 and  fiscal year 2008. This low-rate initial production quantity is significantly  higher than the recommended DOD acquisition target of 10 percent. The  program does not plan to demonstrate through flight tests a fully  functional production representative prototype until testing in April and  May of 2008. In addition, program plans call for procuring 56 EA-18G full-  rate production (FRP) aircraft to achieve the procurement objective of 90  aircraft. As a result, full funding for 56 of the 90 EA-18G aircraft and 34 of  the 56 airborne electronic attack suites will be committed prior to the  completion of operational testing and evaluation. This creates a risk,  acknowledged by the program office, that redesign and retrofitting may be  needed, since it will not be known how effective and suitable the EA-18G  will be or what changes are required until after those tests are completed.
The EA-18G requirements are to meet, and in some cases exceed, those of  the EA-6B ICAP III, adding an air-to-air intercept capability and the ability  to communicate while jamming. However, according to program  documents the first operational test, scheduled to be completed in  February 2007, 2 months before the low-rate initial production decision,  will demonstrate a much more limited capability, primarily the ability to  radiate a simple, single-source jamming assignment and the ability to  receive, identify, and display limited simple emitters. Test results  demonstrating full ICAP III equivalent capabilities will not be available  until the operational evaluation scheduled to be completed in January  2009, 3 months before the projected full-rate production decision, when  the third and final software release will be available for testing.
The test plan is driven by software development, and the EA-18G software  will be available for testing in three releases, or builds. Software is on the  critical path to program completion and will provide the functionality that  is available for testing before each production decision. While the program  officials responsible for managing the software appear to be tracking all  major cost, schedule, and quality markers, software development is still  considered a moderate risk. Problems or delays in the initial software  releases could affect the start of the operational evaluation. Even before  that, the current software development schedule will not allow the  program to demonstrate that the EA-18G system can fully function until  after the program office has committed to producing all 30 of the low-rate  initial production aircraft. Under the current schedule, operational testing  of the final software release needed to demonstrate the desired  functionality of EA-18G aircraft will not be completed until January 2009 –  3 months before the projected full-rate production decision.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Should the Air Force decisions to terminate its EB-52 jammer and Joint- Unmanned Combat Air System programs stand, the airborne electronic  attack framework that arose after the 2002 analysis of alternatives will not  materialize as planned. These decisions and the emergence of irregular  threats place an added burden on the Navy’s EA-6B and EA-18G airborne  electronic attack assets and may result in an even larger gap in DOD’s  capability.
A reduction in plans to upgrade Navy EA-6B with ICAP III electronic suites  creates a transition shortfall in capability until the EA-18G becomes  operational. Potential delays in the EA-18G development and testing effort  would only aggravate this shortfall. The EA-18G development schedule is  based on a premise--EA-6B inventory will not be sufficient beyond 2009-- that is no longer valid for assessing the Navy’s future needs. The inventory  of EA-6B aircraft is now projected to be sufficient to meet Navy and  Marine Corps needs for another decade or longer. In addition, the  compressed and aggressive schedule, a direction given to the program  office, does not allow decision makers to benefit from the demonstration  of knowledge at critical junctures, a proven mitigator of risk.
The availability of EA-6B aircraft allows DOD to consider an alternative to  its current strategy. After determining how it will fulfill the warfighter’s  needs and address capability shortfalls, DOD could outfit additional EA-6B  aircraft with upgraded ICAP III electronic suites. This option is made  possible by the successful integration of the ICAP III electronic suite with  the EA-6B aircraft and structural improvements. However, this would  necessitate not closing production of these electronic suites in 2006, as  presently planned.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To mitigate the effects accruing from the shortfall in upgraded EA-6B  aircraft, the risk of delay in the development of the EA-18G, and the  proposed cancellation of the EB-52 jammer and the Joint-Unmanned  Combat Air System, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the  following two actions:    Determine the number of EA-6Bs equipped with ICAP III electronic  suites necessary to deal with the existing and near-term capability  gaps.
Consider procuring this necessary number of ICAP III upgrades. If  DOD implements the option, we recommend that the department    continue the EA-6B ICAP III production line after the fiscal year  2006 buy, and  restructure its EA-18G low-rate initial production plans so that  procurement of the aircraft occurs after the aircraft has  demonstrated full functionality.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The  comments appear in appendix II.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense determine the necessary number of EA-6Bs equipped with ICAP  III electronic suites to deal with the existing and near-term capability gap.  DOD agreed that the Navy’s airborne electronic attack inventory needs  review and has directed a study of department wide airborne electronic  attack forces to be issued on September 15, 2006. However, it is unclear  from DOD’s response if the department's review will specifically identify,  as we recommended, the necessary number of ICAP III-equipped EA-6Bs  needed to address the existing and near-term capability gap. In light of the  end of planned ICAP III production this year, DOD needs to identify this  specific number, as it is a necessary prerequisite to our second  recommendation.
DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary  of Defense consider procuring the determined number of ICAP III  upgrades and that if DOD takes this option, the department (1) continue  ICAP III production and (2) restructure the EA-18G low-rate initial  production plans so that the procurement of the aircraft occurs after the  aircraft has demonstrated full functionality. Regarding the first part of our  recommendation, DOD agreed that it should consider procuring the  required ICAP III upgrades, as determined by the ongoing airborne  electronic attack review, but stated that it is premature to make a decision  until the ICAP III inventory levels are determined. We agree that such  determination is a prerequisite and have so stated in our first  recommendation. However, that determination needs to be completed  before the ICAP III production line ends in fiscal year 2006. With regard to  the second part of our recommendation, DOD stated that the current EA- 18G low-rate initial production plan provides the best balance of risk and  cost to expeditiously meet warfighters’ needs. We remain concerned that  producing EA-18G aircraft before testing demonstrates that the design is  mature unnecessarily increases the likelihood of design changes that will  lead to cost growth, schedule delays, and performance problems. In the  past, Congress has raised concerns about the costly outcomes of highly  concurrent development and production efforts that are not "flying before  buying."  Starting production before flight tests demonstrate the full ICAP  III equivalent capability works as intended places the $2,297.1 million low- rate initial production investment at significant risk. The procurement of  additional ICAP-III-equipped EA-6Bs would allow the time to properly test  the EA-18G before making a production decision and reduce the risk of  costly retrofitting of the initially produced EA-18Gs.  Therefore, we  continue to believe that our recommendation should be implemented.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force, and  Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of  Management and Budget. We will provide copies to others on request. This  report will also be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or any of your staff have any questions on matters discussed in  this report, please contact me on (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our  offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Principal contributors to this report were David  Best Assistant Director, Jerry Clark, Robert Ackley, Michael Aiken, Judy  Lasley, Chris Miller, and Robert Swierczek.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine if the key conclusion reached in the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) May 2002 airborne electronic attack (AEA) analysis of  alternatives (AoA)--the projected inventory of EA-6Bs would be  insufficient beyond 2009--is still valid, we interviewed officials in the  Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Strategic Command (Offutt,  Nebraska); the Commander Electronic Attack, Pacific Fleet (Whidbey  Island); and officials responsible for Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps  AEA requirements. We interviewed personnel responsible for Improved  Capability (ICAP) III electronic warfare testing at the Office of the  Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (Washington, D.C.);  Commander of Operational Test and Evaluation Navy (Norfolk, Virginia);  and VX-9 personnel responsible for ICAP III testing at China Lake,  California. In addition to the reviewing 2002 AEA AoA, we reviewed  pertinent DOD, service, and contractor documents addressing the status of  the EA-6Bs inventory, plans for maintaining the status of EA-6B  suppression capabilities, testing conducted for the EA-6B ICAP III  program, the AEA system of systems, gaps in the AEA, and potential  solutions for AEA.
To determine whether the acquisition management approach to the Navy’s  airborne electronic attack core component, the EA-18G, is knowledge- based and can help forestall future risks, we reviewed pertinent DOD,  service, and contractor documents addressing the status of the EA-18G  development effort. We discussed airborne electronic attack issues and  EA-18G development and production with contractor personnel at Boeing  Corporation in St. Louis, Missouri and El Segundo, California. We  discussed software matters with officials at China Lake and Point Mugu,  California. We met with pilots at Patuxent River Naval Air Station, China  Lake, Whidbey Island Naval Air Station, Fallon Naval Air Station, and  Boeing Corporation to discuss pilot workload issues given the transition to  the two-seat EA-18G from the four-seat EA-6B. As with our past work on  the EA-18G development effort conducted under our annual assessment of  selected major defense acquisition programs, we focused our work to  determining whether the program was following a knowledge-based  acquisition approach. We met with Navy EA-18G program officials  currently involved with the development effort to document the maturity  status of the aircraft’s critical technologies, the status of its design effort,  and plans for producing the aircraft.
We performed our review from May 2005 through March 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.  GAO-06-391. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.
Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Identify and Address Gaps and  Potential Risks in Program Strategies and Funding Priorities for  Selected Equipment. GAO-06-141. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon  Programs. GAO-05-301. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices,  But More Controls Are Needed. GAO-04-53. Washington, D.C.:   November 10, 2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to  Improve DOD's Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions.   GAO-04-393.  Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2004.
Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for  Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses. GAO-03-51. Washington, D.C.:  November 25, 2002.
Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Suppressing  Enemy Air Defenses. GAO-01-28. Washington, D.C.: January 3, 2001.
Contingency Operations: Providing Critical Capabilities Poses  Challenges. GAO/NSIAD-00-164. Washington, D.C.:  July 6, 2000.
Combat Air Power: Joint Assessment of Air Superiority Can Be  Improved. GAO/NSIAD-97-77. Washington, D.C.:  February 26, 1997.
Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air  Defenses May Be Too Low. GAO/NSIAD-96-128. Washington, D.C.:   April 10, 1996.
Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making  Program and Budget Decisions. GAO/NSIAD-96-177. Washington, D.C.:   September 20, 1996.