Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and Performance Goals
Published: 2004-05-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the National Capital Region (NCR), comprising jurisdictions including the District of Columbia and surrounding jurisdictions in Maryland and Virginia, has been recognized as a significant potential target for terrorism. GAO was asked to report on (1) what federal funds have been allocated to NCR jurisdictions for emergency preparedness; (2) what challenges exist within NCR to organizing and implementing efficient and effective regional preparedness programs; (3) what gaps, if any, remain in the emergency preparedness of NCR; and (4) what has been the role of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in NCR to date.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, grant programs administered by the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and Justice awarded about $340 million to eight NCR jurisdictions to enhance emergency preparedness. Of this total, the Office for National Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC) targeted all of the $60.5 million Urban Area Security Initiative funds for projects designed to benefit NCR as a whole. However, there was no coordinated regionwide plan for spending the remaining funds (about $279.5 million). Local jurisdictions determined the spending priorities for these funds and reported using them for emergency communications and personal protective equipment and other purchases. NCR faces several challenges in organizing and implementing efficient and effective regional preparedness programs, including the lack of a coordinated strategic plan for enhancing NCR preparedness, performance standards, and a reliable, central source of data on funds available and the purposes for which they were spent. Without these basic elements, it is difficult to assess first responder capacities, identify first responder funding priorities for NCR, and evaluate the effectiveness of the use of federal funds in enhancing first responder capacities and preparedness in a way that maximizes their effectiveness in improving homeland security.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Washington, D.C., area,  known as the National Capital Region (NCR), has been recognized as a  high-threat area for terrorism. The complexity of the region, composed of  jurisdictions including the nation’s capital and surrounding areas in the  states of Maryland and Virginia, and a range of potential targets, presents  significant challenges to coordinating and developing effective homeland  security programs. In recognition of the region’s status as a significant  potential target, a substantial amount of federal funding was provided to  NCR in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to enhance the region’s ability to  prepare for and respond to emergencies, including terrorist attacks.  Federal funding has also been provided to other high-threat urban areas  around the nation, and at your request, our work in NCR will be followed  by a review of coordination practices in several other urban regions  around the nation.
In 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established to  consolidate the resources of 22 federal agencies for dealing in a  multifaceted and comprehensive manner with domestic preparedness,  including coordinating with other levels of government, planning  programs, and assessing their effectiveness. These responsibilities include  oversight of the grant-making process to promote effective domestic  preparedness programs. Appropriations to DHS and agencies in the  Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services for domestic  preparedness programs for state and local governments totaled nearly  $13.9 billion in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. These grants include funding to  NCR, which received special focus with the creation of the Office for  National Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC) in statute as part of the  new department. ONCRC was established to oversee and coordinate  federal programs for, and relationships with, state, local, and regional  authorities. ONCRC’s statutory responsibilities also include assessing  needs, providing information and support, and facilitating access to  federal domestic preparedness grants and related programs. To assist in  accomplishing its mission, ONCRC developed a governance structure to  receive input from state and local authorities through a Senior Policy  Group composed of representatives designated by the Governors of  Maryland and Virginia and the Mayor of the District of Columbia.
You asked us to examine preparedness efforts in NCR, with an emphasis  on the use of funds, what has been done recently to better position the  area to address potential threats, and what continuing problems exist in  organizing and implementing efficient regional programs. This report  addresses the following questions:    What federal funds have been allocated to local jurisdictions in the NCR  for emergency preparedness, for what specific purposes, and from what  sources?
What challenges exist within NCR to organizing and implementing  efficient and effective regional preparedness programs?
What gaps, if any, remain in the emergency preparedness of NCR?
What has been DHS’s role to date in enhancing the preparedness of NCR  through such actions as coordinating the use of federal emergency  preparedness grants, assessing preparedness, providing guidance,  targeting funds to enhance preparedness, and monitoring the use of those  funds?
To respond to the questions, we met with and obtained documentation on  grant awards and spending plans from officials of DHS, the Metropolitan  Washington Council of Governments, ONCRC Senior Policy Group, state  emergency management agencies, and first responder officials from NCR  jurisdictions. We identified 25 emergency preparedness programs that  provided funding to NCR, and we selected 16 of them for our detailed  review. These 16 grants were selected to cover a range of programs  including the largest funding sources; grants provided for general  purposes, such as equipment and training; and grants provided for specific  purposes, such as fire prevention and bioterrorism. We collected and  analyzed grant data from federal, state, and local sources. We also  reviewed relevant reports, studies, and guidelines on homeland security  and domestic preparedness. We conducted our review from June   2003 through February 2004 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. See appendix I for more details on our  scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, there has been broad acknowledgment by the  federal government, state and local governments, and a range of  independent research organizations of the need for a coordinated  intergovernmental approach to allocating the nation’s resources to  address the threat of terrorism and improve our security. This coordinated  approach includes developing national guidelines and standards and  monitoring and assessing preparedness against those standards to  effectively manage risk. The National Strategy for Homeland Security  (National Strategy), released in 2002 following the proposal for DHS,  emphasized a shared national responsibility for security involving close  cooperation among all levels of government and acknowledged the  complexity of developing a coordinated approach within our federal  system of government and among a broad range of organizations and  institutions involved in homeland security. The national strategy  highlighted the challenge of developing complementary systems that avoid  unintended duplication and increase collaboration and coordination so  that public and private resources are better aligned for homeland security.  The national strategy established a framework for this approach by  identifying critical mission areas with intergovernmental initiatives in each  area. For example, the strategy identified such initiatives as modifying  federal grant requirements and consolidating funding sources to state and  local governments. The strategy further recognized the importance of  assessing the capability of state and local governments, developing plans,  and establishing standards and performance measures to achieve national  preparedness goals.
Recent reports by independent research organizations have highlighted  the same issues of the need for intergovernmental coordination, planning,  and assessment. For example, the fifth annual report of the Advisory Panel  to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving  Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Gilmore Commission) also emphasizes  the importance of a comprehensive, collaborative approach to improve the  nation’s preparedness. The report states that there is a need for a  coordinated system for the development, delivery, and administration of  programs that engage a broad range of stakeholders. The Gilmore  Commission notes that preparedness for combating terrorism requires  measurable demonstrated capacity by communities, states, and the private  sector to respond to threats with well-planned, well-coordinated, and  effective efforts by all participants. The Gilmore Commission recommends  a comprehensive process for establishing training and exercise standards  for responders that includes state and local response organizations on an  ongoing basis. The National Academy of Public Administration’s recent  panel report also notes the importance of coordinated and integrated  efforts at all levels of government and in the private sector to develop a  national approach to homeland security. Regarding assessment, the report  recommends establishing national standards in selected areas and  developing impact and outcome measures for those standards.
The creation of DHS was an initial step toward reorganizing the federal  government to respond to some of the intergovernmental challenges  identified in the national strategy.  The reorganization consolidated   22 agencies with responsibility for domestic preparedness functions to,  among other things, enhance the ability of the nation’s police, fire, and  other first responders to respond to terrorism and other emergencies  through grants. Many aspects of DHS’s success depend on its maintaining  and enhancing working relationships within the intergovernmental system  as the department relies on state and local governments to accomplish its  mission. The Homeland Security Act contains provisions intended to  foster coordination among levels of government, such as the creation of  the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and ONCRC.
The Homeland Security Act established ONCRC within DHS to oversee  and coordinate federal programs for, and relationships with, state, local,  and regional authorities in the National Capital Region. Pursuant to the  act, ONCRC’s responsibilities include    coordinating the activities of DHS relating to NCR, including cooperating  with the Office for State and Local Government Coordination;   assessing and advocating for resources needed by state, local, and regional  authorities in NCR to implement efforts to secure the homeland;   providing state, local, and regional authorities in NCR with regular  information, research, and technical support to assist the efforts of state,  local, and regional authorities in NCR in securing the homeland;   developing a process for receiving meaningful input from state, local, and  regional authorities and the private sector in NCR to assist in the  development of the federal government’s homeland security plans and  activities;   coordinating with federal agencies in NCR on terrorism preparedness to  ensure adequate planning, information sharing, training, and execution of  the federal role in domestic preparedness activities;   coordinating with federal, state, and regional agencies and the private  sector in NCR on terrorism preparedness to ensure adequate planning,  information sharing, training, and execution of domestic preparedness  activities among these agencies and entities; and   serving as a liaison between the federal government and state, local, and  regional authorities, and private sector entities in NCR to facilitate access  to federal grants and other programs.
The act also requires ONCRC to submit an annual report to Congress that  includes  the identification of resources required to fully implement homeland  security efforts in NCR,   an assessment of the progress made by NCR in implementing homeland  security efforts in NCR, and recommendations to Congress regarding the additional resources needed  to fully implement homeland security efforts in NCR.
The first ONCRC Director served from March to November 2003, and the  Secretary of DHS appointed a new Director on April 30, 2004. The ONCRC  has a small staff including full-time and contract employees and staff on  detail to the office.
NCR is a complex multijurisdictional area comprising the District of  Columbia and surrounding counties and cities in the states of Maryland  and Virginia and is home to the federal government, many national  landmarks, and military installations. Coordination within this region  presents the challenge of working with eight NCR jurisdictions that vary in  size, political organization, and experience with managing emergencies.  The largest municipality in the region is the District of Columbia, with a  population of about 572,000. However, the region also includes large  counties, such as Montgomery County, Maryland, with a total population  of about 873,000, incorporating 19 municipalities, and Fairfax County,  Virginia, the most populous jurisdiction (about 984,000), which is  composed of nine districts. NCR also includes smaller jurisdictions, such  as Loudoun County and the City of Alexandria, each with a population  below 200,000. The region has significant experience with emergencies,  including natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and blizzards,  and terrorist incidents such as the attacks of September 11, and  subsequent events, and the sniper incidents of the fall of 2002. For more  details on the characteristics of the individual jurisdictions, see table 1.
section_title: Multiple Grants Support a Wide Variety of Uses, Including Equipment, Training and Exercises, Planning, and Bioterrorism Preparedness
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, Congress provided billions of dollars in  grants to state and local governments to enhance the ability of the nation’s  first responders to prevent and respond to terrorism events. We reviewed  16 of the funding sources available for use by first responders and  emergency managers that were targeted for improving preparedness for  terrorism and other emergencies. In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, these grant  programs, administered by DHS, Health and Human Services (HHS), and  Justice awarded about $340 million to the District of Columbia, Maryland,  Virginia, and state and local emergency management, law enforcement,  fire departments, and other emergency response agencies in NCR.   Table 2 shows the individual grant awards to the jurisdictions. The funding  sources we reviewed include a range of grants that can be used for broad  purposes, such as ODP’s State Homeland Security Grant Program and the  Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Emergency Management  Performance Grant, as well as more targeted grants for specific disciplines  such as FEMA’s Assistance to Firefighters Grant and HHS’s Bioterrorism  Preparedness Grants.
While some of these grants are targeted to different recipients, many of  them can be used to fund similar projects and purposes. For example,  there are multiple grants that can be used to fund equipment, training, and  exercises. We have previously reported the fragmented delivery of federal  assistance can complicate coordination and integration of services and  planning at state and local levels. Multiple fragmented grant programs can  create a confusing and administratively burdensome process for state and  local officials seeking to use federal resources for homeland security  needs. In addition, many of these grant programs have separate  administrative requirements such as applications and different funding  and reporting requirements.
In fiscal year 2004, in an effort to reduce the multiplicity of separate  funding sources and to allow greater flexibility in the use of grants, several  ODP State and Local Domestic Preparedness grants, which were targeted  for separate purposes such as equipment, training, and exercises, were  consolidated into a single funding source and renamed the State  Homeland Security Grant Program. In addition, four FEMA grants (Citizen  Corps, Community Emergency Response Teams, Emergency Operations  Centers, and State and Local All-Hazards Emergency Operations Planning)  now have a joint application process; the same program office at FEMA  administers these grants. Overall, NCR jurisdictions used the 16 funding  sources we reviewed to address a wide variety of emergency preparedness  activities such as (1) purchasing equipment and supplies; (2) training first  responders; (3) planning, conducting, and evaluating exercises;   (4) planning and administration; and (5) providing technical assistance.  Table 3 shows the eligible uses for each of the 16 grants.
subsections: section_title: Two Largest Funding Sources Supported a Range of Efforts
paragraphs: Of the $340 million awarded for the 16 funding sources, the two largest  funding sources—which collectively provided about $290.5 million   (85 percent) in federal funding to NCR—were the Fiscal Year 2002  Department of Defense (DOD) Emergency Supplemental Appropriation  and the Fiscal Year 2003 Urban Area Security Initiative. Both of these  sources fund a range of purposes and activities such as equipment  purchases, including communications systems; training and exercises;  technical assistance; and planning.
The Fiscal Year 2002 DOD Emergency Supplemental Appropriation, which  was provided in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, provided  approximately $230 million to enhance emergency preparedness.  Individual NCR jurisdictions independently decided how to use these  dollars and used them to fund a wide array of purchases to support first  responders and emergency management agencies. Our review of the  budgets for this appropriation submitted by NCR jurisdictions showed that  many of these grant funds were budgeted for communications equipment  and other equipment and supplies. Table 4 provides examples of major  projects funded by each jurisdiction with these funds.
section_title: UASI Targets Regionwide Preparedness Needs
paragraphs: In 2003, DHS announced a new source of funding targeted to large urban  areas under UASI to enhance the ability of metropolitan areas to prepare  for and respond to threats or incidents of terrorism. This initiative  included a total of $60.5 million to NCR, which was one of seven  metropolitan areas included in the initial round of funding. The cities  were chosen by applying a formula based on a combination of factors,  including population density, critical infrastructure, and  threat/vulnerability assessment. UASI’s strategy for NCR includes plans to  fund 21 individual lines of effort for the region in the areas of planning,  training, exercises, and equipment. In addition, funds are provided for  administration and planning and to reimburse localities for changing levels  of homeland security threat alerts. Table 5 summarizes the planned use of  the UASI funds.
section_title: Challenges to Effective Grants Management Include Lack of Standards, Planning, and Data
paragraphs: Effectively managing first responder federal grant funds requires the  ability to measure progress and provide accountability for the use of  public funds. As with other major policy areas, demonstrating the results  of homeland security efforts includes developing and implementing  strategies, establishing baselines, developing and implementing  performance goals and data quality standards, collecting reliable data,  analyzing the data, assessing the results, and taking action based on the  results. This strategic approach to homeland security includes identifying  threats and managing risks, aligning resources to address them, and  assessing progress in preparing for those threats and risks. Without a NCR  baseline on emergency preparedness, a plan for prioritizing expenditures  and assessing their benefits, and reliable information on funds available  and spent on first responder needs in NCR, it is difficult for ONCRC to  fulfill its statutory responsibility to oversee and coordinate federal  programs and domestic preparedness initiatives for state, local, and  regional authorities in NCR.
Regarding first responders, the purpose of these efforts is to be able to  address three basic, but difficult, questions: “For what types of threats and  emergencies should first responders be prepared?” “What is required— coordination, equipment, training, etc.—to be prepared for these threats  and emergencies?” “How do first responders know that they have met  their preparedness goals?”
NCR is an example of the difficulties of answering the second and third  questions in particular. ONCRC and its jurisdictions face three interrelated  challenges that limit their ability to jointly manage federal funds in a way  that demonstrates increased first responder capacities and preparedness  while minimizing inefficiency and unnecessary duplication of  expenditures. First and most fundamental are the lack of preparedness  standards and a baseline assessment of existing NCR-wide first responder  capacities that is linked to those standards.
subsections: section_title: Performance Goals for First Responders Needed to Assess Spending Benefits
paragraphs: As in other areas of the nation generally, NCR does not have a set of  accepted benchmarks (best practices) and performance goals that could  be used to identify desired goals and determine whether first responders  have the ability to respond to threats and emergencies with well-planned,  well-coordinated, and effective efforts that involve police, fire, emergency  medical, public health, and other personnel from multiple jurisdictions.  The Gilmore Commission’s most recent report noted that there is a  continuing problem of a lack of clear guidance from the federal level about  the definition and objectives of preparedness, a process to implement  those objectives, and how states and localities will be evaluated in meeting  those objectives. The report states the need for a coordinated system for  the development, delivery, and administration of programs that engages a  broad range of stakeholders.
Over the past few years, some state and local officials and independent  research organizations have expressed an interest in some type of  performance standards or goals that could be used as guidelines for  measuring the quality and level of first responder preparedness, including  key gaps. However, in discussing “standards” for first responders, it is  useful to distinguish between three different types of measures that are  often lumped together in the discussion of standards.
Functional standards generally set up to measure such things as  functionality, quantity, weight, and extent and in the context of first  responders generally apply to equipment. Examples include the number of  gallons of water per minute that a fire truck can deliver or the ability of a  biohazard suit to filter out specific pathogens, such as anthrax.
Benchmarks are products, services, or work processes that are generally  recognized as representing best practices for the purposes of  organizational improvement. An example might be joint training of fire and  police for biohazard response—a means of achieving a specific  performance goal for responding to biohazard threats and incidents.
Performance goals are measurable objectives against which actual  achievement may be compared. An example might be the number of  persons per hour who could be decontaminated after a chemical attack.  Realistic training exercises could then be used to test the ability to meet  that objective.
Homeland security standards should include both functional standards  and performance goals. In February 2004, DHS adopted its first set of  functional standards for protective equipment. The eight standards,  previously developed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and  Health (NIOSH) and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), are  intended to provide minimum requirements for equipment. These  standards include NIOSH standards for three main categories of chemical,  biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) respiratory protection  equipment and five NFPA standards for protective suits and clothing to be  used in responding to chemical, biological, and radiological attacks.
Performance and readiness standards are more complicated and difficult  to develop than functional standards. In a large, diverse nation, not all  regions of the nation require exactly the same level of preparedness  because, for example, not all areas of the nation face the same types and  levels of risks and, thus, first responder challenges. For example, first  responder performance goals and needs are likely to be different in New  York City and Hudson, New York. Thus, different levels of performance  goals may be needed for different types and levels of risk.
Recently, the administration has focused more attention on the  development of homeland security standards, including the more difficult  performance goals or standards. For example, DHS’s recently issued  strategic plan makes reference to establishing, implementing, and  evaluating capabilities through a system of national standards. Homeland  Security Presidential Directive 8 (December 2003) requires the  development of a national preparedness goal to include readiness metrics  and a system for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness by the fiscal  year 2006 budget submission.
section_title: Coordinated NCR-wide Plan Needed to Guide First Responder Spending
paragraphs: The lack of benchmarks and performance goals may contribute to  difficulties in meeting the second challenge in NCR—developing a  coordinated regionwide plan for determining how to spend federal funds  received and assess the benefit of that spending. A strategic plan for the  use of homeland security funds—whether in NCR or elsewhere—should  be based on established priorities, goals, and measures and align spending  plans with those priorities and goals. At the time of our review, such a  strategic plan had yet to be developed. Although ONCRC had developed a  regional spending plan for the UASI grants, this plan was not part of a  broader coordinated plan for spending federal grant funds and developing  first responder capacity and preparedness in NCR. The former ONCRC  Director said that ONCRC and the Senior Policy Group could have a  greater role in overseeing the use of other homeland security funds in the  future.
section_title: Consistent Data on Funding and Spending Needed to Establish Accountability
paragraphs: There is no established process or means for regularly and reliably  collecting and reporting data on the amount of federal funds available to  first responders in each of NCR’s eight jurisdictions, the planned and  actual use of those funds, and the criteria used to determine how the funds  would be spent. Reliable data are needed to establish accountability,  analyze gaps, and assess progress toward meeting established  performance goals. Credible data should also be used to develop and  revise plans and to set goals during the planning process. Were these data  available, the lack of standards against which to evaluate the data would  make it difficult to assess gaps.
It should be noted that the fragmented nature of the multiple federal  grants available to first responders—some awarded to states, some to  localities, some directly to first responder agencies—may make it more  difficult to collect and maintain regionwide data on the grant funds  received and the use of those funds in NCR. Our previous work suggests  that this fragmentation in federal grants may reinforce state and local  fragmentation and can also make it more difficult to coordinate and use  those multiple sources of funds to achieve specific objectives.
section_title: DHS Efforts to Assess First Responder Needs Did Not Include Feedback to NCR Jurisdictions
paragraphs: NCR jurisdictions completed the Office for Domestic Preparedness State  Homeland Security Assessment (ODP assessment) in the summer of   2003. At the time of our review, NCR jurisdictions said that they had not  received any feedback from ODP or ONCRC on the review of those  assessments. Preparedness expectations should be established based on  likely threat and risk scenarios and an analysis of the gap between current  and needed capabilities based on national guidelines. In keeping with the  requirement of the Homeland Security Act that DHS conduct an  assessment of threats and state and local response capabilities, risks, and  needs with regard to terrorist incidents, DHS developed the ODP State  Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program.  The ODP  assessment was aligned with the six critical mission areas in the National  Strategy for Homeland Security, and generally followed the structure of a  risk management approach. The assessment used the same scenarios for  all jurisdictions nationwide, allowing ODP to compare different  jurisdictions using the same set of facts and assumptions. Of course, the  scenarios used may not be equally applicable to all jurisdictions  nationwide.
The assessment collected data in three major areas: risk, capability, and  needs related to terrorism prevention. The risk assessment portion  includes threat and vulnerability assessments. The capability assessment  includes discipline-specific tasks for weapons of mass destruction (WMD)  events. The needs assessment portion covers five functional areas of  planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises. Supporting  materials and worksheets on a threat profile, capability to respond to  specific WMD, an equipment inventory, and training needs are provided to  assist local jurisdictions in completing the assessment.
A feedback loop is a key part of a risk management process. It involves  evaluating the assessment results to inform decision making and establish  priorities; it is not clear how the results of the assessment were used to  complete this process for NCR. ONCRC did not present any formal  analysis of the gap in capabilities identified by the assessment, and several  NCR jurisdictions said they did not receive any feedback on the results of  the assessment for their individual jurisdictions. The former ONCRC  Director said that the results of the assessment for each of the NCR  jurisdictions were combined to establish priorities and develop the  strategy for the use of the UASI funds, but he did not provide any  information on how the individual assessments were combined or the  methodology used to analyze the assessment results. While the former  Director said the results of the assessment were used to develop the plan  for the use of the UASI funds within NCR, he said that they were not  applied beyond that one funding source to establish priorities for the use  of other federal grants.
section_title: Some Regional Planning Efforts Exist but Do Not Include Coordination for Funding
paragraphs: While the NCR jurisdictions had emergency coordination practices and  procedures, such as mutual aid agreements, in place long before  September 11,2001, the terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax events  in NCR highlighted the need for better coordination and communication  within the region. As a result, WashCOG developed a regional emergency  coordination plan (RECP) to facilitate coordination and communication  for regional incidents or emergencies. While this new plan and the related  procedures represent efforts to improve coordination, more  comprehensive planning would include a coordinated regional approach  for the use of federal homeland security funds.
NCR is one of the first regions in the country to prepare a regional  emergency coordination plan. The plan is intended to provide structure  through which the NCR jurisdictions can collaborate on planning,  communication, information sharing, and coordination activities before,  during, and after a regional emergency. RECP, which is based on FEMA’s  Federal Response Plan, identifies 15 specific regional emergency support  functions, including transportation, hazardous materials, and law  enforcement. The Regional Incident Communication and Coordination  System (RICCS), which is included in the WashCOG plan, provides a  system for WashCOG members, the state of Maryland, the Commonwealth  of Virginia, the federal government, public agencies, and others to  collaborate in planning, communicating, sharing information, and  coordinating activities before, during, and after a regional incident or  emergency. RICCS relies on multiple means of communication, including  conference calling, secure Web sites, and wireless communications. The  system has been used on several occasions to notify local officials of such  events as a demonstration in downtown Washington, D.C., and the  October 2002 sniper incidents. For example, RICCS allowed regional  school systems to coordinate with one another regarding closure policies  during the sniper events.
section_title: Planning and Budgeting of Federal Grant Funds Is Not Coordinated among the NCR Jurisdictions
paragraphs: Our work in NCR found that no regional coordination methods have been  developed for planning for the use of 15 of the 16 funding sources we  reviewed. While the region has experience with working together for  regional emergency preparedness and response, NCR officials told us that  they have not worked together to develop plans and coordinate  expenditures for the use of federal funds. Most NCR jurisdictions did not  have a formal overall plan for the use of these funds within their individual  jurisdictions. In addition, while the grant recipients are required to report  to the administering federal agencies on each individual grant, DHS and  ONCRC have not implemented a process to collect and analyze the  information reported for NCR as a whole. The one exception to this lack  of coordination is UASI, for which ONCRC developed a regional plan for  the use of the funds. Internal control standards support developing  documentation, such as plans, to assist in controlling management  operations and making decisions. Without this type of documentation, it  is difficult for ONCRC to monitor the overall use of funds within NCR and  to evaluate their effectiveness and plan for future use of grant funds. While  some NCR and ONCRC officials said that there was a need for DHS and  the NCR jurisdictions to establish controls over how emergency  preparedness grant funds are used in the region, they did not indicate any  plans to do so.
Within NCR, planning for the use of federal emergency and homeland  security grant funds is generally informal and is done separately by each of  the NCR jurisdictions. Most of the jurisdictions told us that they have  undocumented or informal plans for the uses of the federal grant monies  for emergency preparedness activities. Only two jurisdictions have formal  written plans that indicate how the jurisdiction would use its federal  homeland security grants. NCR states and local jurisdictions had various  budgets for uses of emergency preparedness grant funds they received  from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2003. However, they did not  coordinate with one another in defining their emergency preparedness  needs, in developing their budgets, or in using the federal grant funds to  avoid unnecessary duplication of equipment and other resources within  the region. In general, budgeting for the use of federal emergency  preparedness grants was done on a grant-by-grant basis within each  jurisdiction and is largely based on requests from first responder and  emergency management officials. Budgets indicate how the individual  jurisdictions intend to spend funds from a specific grant but do not  indicate whether those budgets are based on any strategic plan or set of  priorities.
One Maryland county developed an overall plan for the use of federal  homeland security and emergency preparedness grants. The July 1,   2003, homeland security strategy outlined the priorities for the county in  using federal emergency preparedness grant funds.  However, it did not  specify grants or amounts for each of the initiatives. The priorities for such  funding were focused on equipping and training its first responders;  conducting exercises and drills for its government employees; training  other essential and critical government workers, as well as the citizens and  residents of the county; working vigorously to implement  recommendations from its Homeland Security Task Force; and solidifying  the county’s relationships with other federal, state, and regional homeland  security entities.
While officials from other NCR jurisdictions do not have a formal plan,  some have established a process for reviewing proposals for the use of the  homeland security grants. For example, one Northern Virginia jurisdiction  recently adopted a planning process in which its Emergency Management  Coordination Committee, composed of the county’s senior management  team, solicits budget proposals from first responder and emergency  management agencies for potential grant funds. This committee then  makes funding recommendations based upon a review of these proposals  and their funding priorities for the county. Officials from other  jurisdictions described similar processes for developing budget proposals,  but they have not developed longer-term or comprehensive strategic plans.
To determine how the NCR jurisdictions used the funds, we reviewed the  use of funds of the Fiscal Year 2002 Department of Defense Supplemental  Appropriation, which was the largest source of funding for the period of  our review. Each NCR jurisdiction used those funds to buy emergency  equipment for first responders.  However, officials said they did not  coordinate on planning for these expenditures with the other NCR  jurisdictions. For example, five of the eight NCR jurisdictions planned to  either purchase or upgrade their command vehicles. One of the  jurisdictions allocated $310,000 for a police command bus and $350,000 for  a fire and rescue command bus; a neighboring jurisdiction allocated  $350,000 for a mobile command unit for its fire department; another  jurisdiction allocated $500,000 for a police command vehicle replacement;  a nearby jurisdiction allocated $149,000 to upgrade its incident command  vehicle; and its neighboring jurisdiction allocated $200,000 to modify and  upgrade its mobile command van. In another example, four nearby  jurisdictions allocated grant funds on hazardous response vehicles or  hazardous materials supplies that reflected costs of $155,289 for one  jurisdiction’s rapid hazmat unit, $355,000 for a neighboring jurisdiction’s  hazardous materials response vehicle, $550,000 for a jurisdiction’s fire and  rescue hazmat unit vehicle, and $115,246 for a jurisdiction’s hazardous  materials supplies. While such purchases might not be duplicative,  discussions among neighboring jurisdictions could have facilitated a plan  and determined whether these purchases were necessary or whether the  equipment purchased could be shared among the jurisdictions, thereby  freeing up grant dollars for other needed, equipment to create greater  combined capacity within the region. Maximizing the use of resources  entails avoiding unnecessary duplication wherever possible. This requires  some discussion and general agreement on priorities, roles, and  responsibilities among the jurisdictions. Some NCR and ONCRC officials  said they believed the NCR jurisdictions could plan better to share  resources and work to prevent redundancy while avoiding gaps in  inventory.
section_title: Data on Grants to NCR Jurisdictions Were Not Consistently Available
paragraphs: During our review, NCR jurisdictions and federal grantor agencies could  not consistently provide data on the 16 grants and funding sources within  the scope of our study, such as award amounts, budgets, and financial  records. The individual jurisdictions and ONCRC did not have systems in  place to identify and account for all federal grants that can be used to  enhance domestic preparedness in NCR and elsewhere. The lack of  consistently available budget data for all emergency preparedness and  homeland security grants limits the ability to analyze and assess the  impact of federal funding and to make management decisions to ensure  the effective use of federal grant dollars.
section_title: No Central Source Exists for Data on Emergency Preparedness Grants and Information Varies by Jurisdiction
paragraphs: There is no central source within each jurisdiction or at the federal level to  identify all of the emergency preparedness grants that have been allocated  to NCR. At the local level, such information is needed to meet legislative  and regulatory reporting requirements for federal grant expenditures of  $300,000 or more. In addition, each grant has specific reporting  requirements, such as quarterly financial status reports, semiannual  program progress reports, and related performance information to comply  with the Government Performance and Results Act (P.L. 103-62).  Moreover, federal grant financial system guidelines require that federal  agencies implement systems that include complete, accurate, and prompt  generation and maintenance of financial records and transactions. Those  federal system requirements also require timely and efficient access to  complete and accurate information, without extraneous material, to  internal and external parties that require that information. We asked  ONCRC, the Virginia and Maryland emergency management agencies, and  the eight NCR jurisdictions for data on the emergency preparedness grants  allocated in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. ONCRC could not provide a  complete list of grants allocated to the NCR as a whole, and the state  emergency management agencies did not provide complete lists of grants  for NCR jurisdictions within their respective states. For example, the  Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) provided data on the  federal grants for Montgomery and Prince George’s counties that were  allocated through the state. MEMA is not required to oversee grants not  allocated through the state and, therefore, it did not provide grant data on  all of the federal grants provided to the two counties. Similarly, the  Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) did not provide  data on all of the grants to the jurisdictions in Virginia. We compiled grant  data for the NCR jurisdictions by combining information received from the  NCR jurisdictions and the state emergency management agencies. This  involved contacting several different budget officials at the NCR  jurisdictions and at the state level.
The availability of emergency preparedness grant data at the local level  also varied by NCR jurisdiction, and complete data were not readily  available. After repeated requests for the grant awards, budgets, and plans  over a period of 7 months, NCR jurisdictions or the State emergency  management agencies provided us with the grant amounts awarded to  them during fiscal years 2002 and 2003. Some jurisdictions provided  documentation on amounts awarded, but did not provide supporting  budget detail for individual grants to substantiate the amounts awarded.  Regarding budgets, we obtained a range of information from the NCR  jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions provided budget documentation on all the  federal grants that were allocated to them; others provided budget  documentation on some of their grants; and two did not provide any grant  budget documentation. This lack of supporting documentation indicates a  lack of financial controls that should be in place to provide accurate and  timely data on federal grants.
Guidance on financial management practices notes that to effectively  evaluate government programs and spending, Congress and other decision  makers must have timely, accurate, and reliable financial information on  program cost and performance. Moreover, the Comptroller General’s  standards for internal control state that “program managers need both  operational and financial data to determine whether they are meeting their  agencies’ strategic and annual performance plans and meeting their goals  for accountability for effective and efficient use of resources.” These  standards stress the importance of this information to make operating  decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources and that  “pertinent information is identified, captured, and distributed to the right  people in sufficient detail, in the right form, and at the appropriate time to  enable them to carry out their duties and responsibilities efficiently and  effectively.” Having this information could help NCR officials make  informed decisions about the use of grant funds in a timely manner.
section_title: Assessing the Remaining Gaps in NCR is Difficult without Guidance, Reliable Data, or Analysis
paragraphs: Without national standards, guidance on likely scenarios for which to be  prepared, plans, and reliable data, NCR officials assess their gaps in  preparedness based on their own judgment. The lack of standards and  consistently available data makes it difficult for the NCR officials to use  the results of DHS’s ODP assessment to identify the most critical gaps in  capacities and to verify the results of the assessment and establish a  baseline that could then be used to develop plans to address outstanding  needs. Consequently, it is difficult for us or ONCRC to determine what  gaps, if any, remain in the emergency response capacities and  preparedness within the NCR. Each jurisdiction provided us with  information on their perceived gaps and specific needs for improving  emergency preparedness.  However, there is no consistent method for  identifying these gaps among jurisdictions within NCR. Some officials  from NCR jurisdictions said that in the absence of a set of national  standards, they use the standards and accreditation guidelines for  disciplines such as police, fire, hazardous materials, and emergency  management in assessing their individual needs. While these standards  may provide some general guidance, some NCR officials said that they  need more specific guidance from DHS, including information about  threats, guidance on how to set priorities, and standards. Some of the  jurisdictions reported that they have conducted their own assessments of  need based on their knowledge of threat and risk. Officials from other  jurisdictions said they have used FEMA’s Local Capability Assessment for  Readiness or the hazardous materials assessment to identify areas for  improvement.
Several jurisdictions told us that they identify remaining gaps based on  requests from emergency responder agencies. Other jurisdictions said that  they have established emergency management councils or task forces to  review their preparedness needs and begin to develop a more strategic  plan for funding those needs. Officials of most NCR jurisdictions  commonly identified the need for more comprehensive and redundant  communications systems and upgraded emergency operations centers.  Some officials of NCR jurisdictions also expressed an interest in training  exercises for the region as a whole to practice joint response among the  Maryland and Virginia jurisdictions and the District of Columbia.
section_title: DHS and ONCRC Appear to Have Had a Limited Role in Promoting Regional Coordination in NCR
paragraphs: DHS and ONCRC appear to have played a limited role in fostering a  coordinated approach to the use of federal domestic preparedness funds  in NCR. According to the former ONCRC Director, ONCRC has focused its  initial coordination efforts on the development of a strategy for the use of  the UASI funds of $60.5 million in NCR. However, ONCRC efforts to date  have not addressed about $279.5 million in other federal domestic  preparedness funding that we reviewed. According to officials from one  NCR jurisdiction, they would like additional support and guidance from  DHS on setting priorities for the use of federal funds.
subsections: section_title: ONCRC Has Focused on Planning for UASI Funding
paragraphs: One of ONCRC’s primary responsibilities is to oversee and coordinate  federal programs and domestic preparedness initiatives for state, local,  and regional authorities in NCR and to cooperate with and integrate the   efforts of elected officials of NCR. ONCRC established a governance  structure to receive input from state and local authorities through a Senior  Policy Group composed of representatives designated by the Governors of  Maryland and Virginia and the Mayor of Washington, D.C. The Senior  Policy Group developed the UASI strategy to fund a range of projects that  would enhance regional capabilities to improve preparedness and reduce  the vulnerability of NCR to terrorist attacks. (See table 5.)  According to  ONCRC’s former Director, the strategy for UASI was an attempt to force a  new paradigm, by developing a regional plan for the use of the funds, with  input from outside organizations in addition to representatives from the  local jurisdictions. The plan for the $60.5 million allocated funds for  projects, including planning, training, equipment, and exercises to benefit  the region as a whole, as opposed to allocating funds to meet the  individual needs of each NCR jurisdiction separately. The former Director  said that funding allocations to these regional projects were based on a  summary of the results of the assessment that was completed by each  NCR jurisdiction.
section_title: NCR Jurisdictions Expressed Mixed Views on ONCRC’s Effectiveness
paragraphs: Officials from NCR state and local jurisdictions expressed mixed opinions  on the effectiveness of ONCRC. Officials from a Virginia jurisdiction  expressed a need for more guidance on how to set priorities and allocate  federal domestic preparedness funding. District of Columbia officials said  ONCRC has done a good job of coordination and has been very supportive,  given its small staff and the newness of the office. Some noted that  ONCRC’s role is still evolving. For example, some officials in one  jurisdiction said that ONCRC’s long-term mission has not yet been  finalized and ONCRC is still in the process of establishing its role within  NCR. The officials believe that ONCRC has significant potential for leading  and coordinating homeland security efforts in the region. They  recommended that ONCRC become a routine part of regional governance  and provide guidance to local governments, focus resources, and enhance  the ability of localities to work together to implement homeland security  strategies. The officials noted that ONCRC’s efforts were motivated  primarily by the leadership of the Director and had not become routine.
We discussed NCR officials’ views with the former ONCRC Director. He  acknowledged that ONCRC’s initial efforts to coordinate the use of federal  grant funds in NCR concentrated on implementing UASI. He said that  UASI presented an improvement over previous funding allocations in NCR  by allocating funds on a regional basis—rather than jurisdictional  perceptions—that considered the results of an assessment of NCR  preparedness levels and requirements. The Director said that ONCRC  could consider coordinating for other federal programs in addition to  UASI, but he did not indicate any concrete plans to do so.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The nation’s ongoing vulnerability to terrorist attacks after September   11, 2001, is magnified in NCR because it is the location of critical  government infrastructure, national and international institutions, and  significant landmarks. In addition to NCR, there are several other high- threat urban areas that share similar vulnerabilities, and improving  homeland security is a concern for the entire nation. The challenges faced  in NCR a lack of performance standards; baseline information on  preparedness and threat and risk scenarios, plans based on those tools,  and reliable data to report on the status of initiativesare fundamental  obstacles in achieving desired levels of preparedness. Furthermore, NCR’s  complex structure requires working with individual political jurisdictions  with varying experience in managing homeland security funds and  responding to emergencies. This adds to the challenge of developing and  implementing a coordinated plan for enhancing first responder capacity.
Effective regional and local management of the large amounts of available  homeland security funding is an important element in improving our  national preparedness. However, it is difficult for regional coordinators  and local jurisdictions to avoid duplication and inefficiency in the  procurement of goods and services without a knowledge of all the grants  that can be leveraged to fight the terror threat; without centralized,  standard records to account for the use of those grants; and without a  coordinated regional plan for using those funds. It is also difficult to target  funding in a way that ensures it is used for goods and services that  enhance preparedness and response without current threat information or  scenarios and standards that reflect performance goals for preparedness  and response. The approach taken in planning for the use of the UASI  funds, with its emphasis on regional allocations, is a step toward improved  coordination that could provide a more rational and effective method for  enhancing emergency preparedness within NCR. In addition, DHS’s  recently released strategic plan and the endorsement of standards for  equipment represent steps toward addressing some of the challenges  noted in this report. However, more needs to be done to develop plans,  monitor the use of funds, and assess against goals and standards to  evaluate progress toward improved homeland security.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that emergency preparedness grants and associated funds  are managed in a way that maximizes their effectiveness, we recommend  that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security take the  following three actions in order to fulfill the department’s statutory  responsibilities in the NCR:    work with the NCR jurisdictions to develop a coordinated strategic plan to  establish goals and priorities for enhancing first responder capacities that  can be used to guide the use of federal emergency preparedness funds;   monitor the plan’s implementation to ensure that funds are used in a way  that promotes effective expenditures that are not unnecessarily  duplicative; and identify and address gaps in emergency preparedness and evaluate the  effectiveness of expenditures in meeting those needs by adapting  standards and preparedness guidelines based on likely scenarios for NCR  and conducting assessments based on them.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: On April 29, 2004, we provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of  DHS and to ONCRC’s Senior Policy Group for comment. On May 19,   2004, we received comments from DHS’s GAO/OIG Liaison and the Senior  Policy Group that are reprinted in appendix III and IV, respectively.
DHS and the Senior Policy Group generally agreed with our  recommendations but also stated that NCR jurisdictions had worked  cooperatively together to identify opportunities for synergies and lay a  foundation for meeting the challenges noted in the report. DHS and the  Senior Policy Group also agreed that there is a need to continue to  improve preparedness by developing more specific and improved  preparedness standards, clearer performance goals, and an improved  method for tracking regional initiatives.  In addition, DHS identified the  following concerns:   DHS stated that the report demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding  regarding homeland security grant programs in NCR and the oversight role  and responsibilities of ONCRC. DHS stated that GAO fails to distinguish  between funds provided to specific jurisdictions for local priorities and  enhancements and funds intended to address regional needs. We disagree.  The responsibilities of ONCRC are outlined in the Homeland Security Act  and on page 8 of this report. These include activities such as coordinating  with federal, state, and regional agencies and the private sector to ensure  adequate planning and execution of domestic preparedness activities  among these agencies and entities, and assessing and advocating for  resources that state, local, and regional authorities in the NCR need to  implement efforts to secure the homeland. The responsibilities further  require an annual report to Congress that identifies resources required to  implement homeland security efforts in NCR, assesses progress made in  implementing these efforts, and makes recommendations regarding  additional resources needed. In order to fulfill this mandate, ONCRC  needs information on how all grant monies have been used, not just those  designated specifically for regional purposes, information on how those  expenditures have enhanced first responder capacity in the region, and an  ability to coordinate all federal domestic preparedness funding sources to  NCR.
DHS noted that our report recognizes the importance of  a coordinated  regionwide plan for establishing first responder goals, needs, and priorities  and assessing the benefits of all expenditures to enhance first responder  capabilities, and our review found that no such coordination methods have  been developed. DHS stated that this task is accomplished by the formal  NCR Review and Recommendation Process, adopted on February 4, 2004,  which ensures coordination of resources among all jurisdictions within  NCR.  DHS provided us information on this process at our exit conference  on April 15, 2004. DHS explained that the Review and Recommendation  Process was developed for the UASI program, and ONCRC and NCR  officials are in the process of extending it to additional federal programs.   While this process could be used to facilitate the development of a  regional plan in the future, the process has not included a review of how  federal grants have already been used or the development of a coordinated  regional plan for establishing needs and priorities and assessing benefits  of all federal domestic preparedness programs.
Finally, the comments noted a correction to our draft regarding the  establishment of the Senior Policy Group, and we have revised the report  accordingly.
As agreed with your office, unless you release this report earlier, we will  not distribute it until 30 days from the date of this letter.  At that time, we  will send copies to relevant congressional committees and subcommittees,  to the Secretary of Homeland Security, to members of the NCR Senior  Policy Group, and to other interested parties.  We will also make copies  available to others upon request.  In addition, the report will be available  at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report or wish to discuss it further,  please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or Patricia A. Dalton, Director,   (202) 512-6737. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We met with and obtained documentation from officials of the Department  of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency  (FEMA), and the Office for Domestic Preparedness; the Metropolitan  Washington Council of Governments (WashCOG); the homeland security  advisers and officials from the emergency management agencies for the  District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia; and first responder officials  from the National Capital Region (NCR) jurisdictions, including the  District of Columbia; the city of Alexandria; and the counties of Arlington,  Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William in Virginia; and Montgomery and  Prince Georges counties in Maryland.
To determine what federal funds have been provided to local jurisdictions   for emergency preparedness, for what specific purposes, and from what  sources, we met with officials from the DHS’s Office for National Capital  Region Coordination (ONCRC), ONCRC’s Senior Policy Group, Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), homeland security advisers for  the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, and first responders from  eight jurisdictions within NCR—the District of Columbia; the city of  Alexandria; and Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, Prince William, Montgomery,  and Prince George’s counties. We identified 25 emergency preparedness  programs that provided funding to NCR, and we selected 16 for our  detailed review. These 16 programs were selected to cover a range of  programs, including the largest funding sources; grants provided for  general purposes such as equipment and training; and grants provided for  specific purposes, such as fire prevention and bioterrorism. We obtained  and reviewed the emergency preparedness grant data for the period of  October 2001 through September 30, 2003, including grant awards,  budgets, and detailed plans for purchases, such as equipment and supplies,  communications, and training and exercises. To the extent possible, we  independently verified the data we received on funds available and the  planned and actual use of those funds by comparing federal, state, and  local data sources. Our review revealed the lack of consistent data  reported by the jurisdictions in the region and the lack of a central source  for such data. For example, NCR state and local jurisdictions vary in their  ability to provide budget information on the emergency preparedness and  homeland security grants they received. Also, DHS and ONCRC do not  have systems in place to account for all federal homeland security and  emergency preparedness grants covering their respective jurisdictions.
To determine the regional coordination practices and remaining  challenges to implementing regional preparedness programs in NCR, we  met with officials from WashCOG, DHS, Virginia, Maryland, and local NCR  jurisdictions. Oral and documentary evidence obtained from these officials  has provided us with an overall perspective on the status of coordination  for homeland security within the region and remaining challenges to  implementing effective homeland security measures in NCR. We also  talked with officials about regional programs that have been successfully  implemented in NCR.
To determine the gaps that exist in emergency preparedness in NCR, we  obtained oral and documentary information from officials of the  Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments; DHS; the District of  Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia emergency management agencies;  homeland security advisers; and local first responders. Our discussions  with these officials provide their views of the state of preparedness in  NCR. We also obtained information from these officials regarding their  plans to address those emergency preparedness gaps. In addition, we  reviewed relevant reports, studies, and guidelines to provide context for  assessing preparedness. However, there are no uniform standards or  criteria by which to measure gaps, and self-reported information from  local jurisdictions may not be objective.
To determine DHS’s role in enhancing the preparedness of NCR through  coordinating the use of federal emergency preparedness grants, assessing  preparedness, providing guidance, targeting funds to enhance  preparedness, and monitoring the use of those funds, we met with DHS, as  well as with state homeland security advisers, state emergency  management officials, and local first responders. We obtained and  analyzed verbal and documentary evidence on the ODP assessment  completed by the NCR jurisdictions, and how that assessment was used,  as well as other actions DHS had taken to facilitate homeland security  coordination within NCR.
Finally, we contacted the District of Columbia Auditor, the Maryland  Office of Legislative Audits, and the Virginia Joint Legislative Audit and  Review Commission to inform them of our review and determine if the  agencies had related past or ongoing work. None of the agencies had  conducted or planned to conduct reviews of emergency preparedness or  homeland security in the NCR.
We conducted our review from June 2003 to February 2004 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: NCR Jurisdictions’ Arrangements to Respond to Public Safety Emergencies
paragraphs: NCR jurisdictions over the years have implemented various mechanisms  to ensure planned and coordinated interjurisdictional approaches to the  activities of first responders and other public safety professionals. These  efforts involve the activities of regional planning and coordinating bodies,  such as the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments  (WashCOG), the regional metropolitan planning organization, and mutual  assistance agreements between the first responders of neighboring NCR  jurisdictions.
subsections: section_title: Regional Bodies Facilitate Coordination Efforts in Other Areas
paragraphs: Planning and coordinating bodies have existed in NCR for many years.  WashCOG is a regional entity that includes all the jurisdictions within the  region. Other planning and coordinating organizations exist in both  Maryland and Virginia.
WashCOG is a nonprofit association representing local governments in the  District of Columbia, suburban Maryland, and Northern Virginia. Founded  in 1957, WashCOG is supported by financial contributions from its   19 participating local governments, federal and state grants and contracts,  and donations from foundations and the private sector. WashCOG’s  members are the governing officials from local NCR governments, plus  area delegation members from Maryland and Virginia legislatures, the U. S.  Senate, and the House of Representatives. According to WashCOG, the  council provides a focus for action and develops regional responses to  such issues as the environment, affordable housing, economic  development, health and family concerns, human services, population  growth, public safety, and transportation. The full membership, acting  through its board of directors, sets WashCOG policies. The National  Capital Region Preparedness Council is an advisory body that makes  policy recommendations to the board of directors and makes procedural  and other recommendations to various regional agencies with emergency  preparedness responsibilities or operational response authority. The  council also oversees the regional emergency coordination plan.
Other regional coordinating bodies exist in the National Capital Region,  including the Northern Virginia Regional Commission (NVRC), the  Maryland Terrorism Forum, and the Maryland Emergency Management  Assistance Compact. NVRC is one of the 21 planning district commissions  in Virginia. A 42-member board of commissioners composed of elected  officials and citizen representatives all appointed by 14 member localities  establishes NVRC’s programs and policies. The commission is supported  by annual contributions from its member local governments, by  appropriations of the Virginia General Assembly, and by grants from  federal and state governments and private foundations. According to a  NVRC official, the commission established an emergency management  council to coordinate programs, funding issues, and equipment needs. The  emergency management council is composed of local chief administrative  officers, fire chiefs, police chiefs, and public works managers.
In 1998, the Governor of Maryland established the Maryland Terrorism  Forum to prepare the state to respond to acts of terrorism, especially  those involving weapons of mass destruction. The forum also serves as the  key means of integrating all services within federal, state, and local  entities as well as key private organizations. The forum’s executive  committee, composed of agency directors and cabinet members, provides  policy guidance and recommendations to the steering committee; which  addresses policy concerns. According to Maryland Emergency  Management Agency (MEMA) officials, the forum’s first focus was on  planning in terms of equipment interoperability; evacuation planning; and  commonality of standards, procedures, and vocabulary. The forum is in  the process of hiring a full-time planner for preparedness assessment and  strategic planning for the region.
section_title: Mutual Aid Agreements Are in Place within NCR
paragraphs: The terrorist attacks in New York City and on the Pentagon on September  11, 2001, security preparations during the World Bank demonstrations, and  the sniper incidents in the summer and fall of 2002 highlighted the need for  enhanced mutual cooperation and aid in responding to emergencies.  Several NCR jurisdiction public safety officials told us that mutual aid  agreements have worked well and are examples of regional programs that  have been successfully implemented in NCR. Mutual aid agreements  provide a structure for assistance and for sharing resources among  jurisdictions in preparing for and responding to emergencies and disasters.  Because individual jurisdictions may not have all the resources they need  to acquire equipment and respond to all types of emergencies and  disasters, these agreements allow for resources to be regionally  distributed and quickly deployed. These agreements provide opportunities  for state and local governments to share services, personnel, supplies, and  equipment. Mutual aid agreements can be both formal and informal and  provide cooperative planning, training, and exercises in preparation for  emergencies and disasters.
For over 40 years, jurisdictions in the National Capital Region have been  supporting one another through mutual aid agreements. According to a  WashCOG official, the agency has brokered and facilitated most of these  agreements and acts as an informal secretariat for mutual aid issues.
According to WashCOG, there are currently 21 mutual aid agreements in  force among one or more of the 18 member jurisdictions, covering one or  more issues. These can be as broad as a police services support agreement  among 12 jurisdictions and as restricted as a two-party agreement relating  to control over the Woodrow Wilson Bridge. In September 2001, for  example, WashCOG member jurisdictions developed planning guidance  for health system response to a bioterrorism event in NCR. The purpose of  this guidance is to strengthen the health care response systems allowing  them to, among other things, improve early recognition and provide mass  care. According to WashCOG, the planning guidance was developed  through the cooperative effort of more than 225 individuals representing  key government and private elements with NCR that would likely be  involved should such an event occur.
The Maryland Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a mutual  aid compact established to help Maryland’s local jurisdictions support one  another with their resources during emergencies and disasters and  facilitate efficient operational procedures. The compact establishes  partnerships among local jurisdictions so that resources can be requested  and provided in response to emergencies and disasters. In addition to  helping local governments and their emergency response agencies develop  risk management decisions, the compact provides a framework that will  increase accessibility for maximum compensation in federally declared  disasters. The compact, established by legislation in June 2002, is modeled  after the Emergency Management Assistance Compact with 48 states and  two U.S. territories participating in interstate mutual aid.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the National Capital Region’s Senior Policy Group
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those mentioned above, Ernie Hazera and Amelia Shachoy  (Strategic Issues) and Wendy Johnson, Jack Bagnulo, David Brown,   R. Rochelle Burns (Homeland Security and Justice) made key  contributions to this report.