Army Networks: Size and Scope of Modernization Investment Merit Increased Oversight
Published: 2013-01-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: For nearly 20 years, the Army has had limited success in developing an information network--sensors, software, and radios--to give soldiers the exact information they need, when they need it, in any environment. Such a network is expected to improve situational awareness and decision making in combat. Under its network modernization strategy, the Army is implementing a new agile process intended to leverage industry technology solutions. The Army estimates that it will require about $3.8 billion in fiscal 2013. As requested, this report addresses the extent to which (1) the Army's network strategy and agile process addresses cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness; and (2) the Army's strategy faces other risks and challenges. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed key documents, observed testing activities, and interviewed acquisition officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army has taken a number of steps to begin executing its network strategy and agile process, including establishing a baseline network architecture for Army communications. The Army's agile process involves seven phases and three decision points to allow officials to quickly evaluate emerging networking technologies to determine if they address capability gaps and can be deployed to the field. However, the network strategy is still evolving and the Army has not yet executed one full cycle of the agile process. The Army's strategy addresses some aspects of cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness, but as implementation is still under way, data for assessing progress are not available at this time. Nevertheless, the Army is beginning to spend billions of dollars netting together dozens of disparate systems to form a network that is intended to enhance warfighter effectiveness and survivability. Specifically, the Army has identified that over $3 billion will be needed each year on an indefinite basis for investments in networking capabilities, potentially making it one of the Army's most costly investments. To help determine that technologies meet prescribed levels of technical maturity, the Army has established a laboratory-based screening process for evaluating technologies, and those that show promise move to evaluations in a realistic environment with soldiers and testers. To help provide security and information assurance, the Army is working with contractors and the National Security Agency to obtain appropriate certifications prior to fielding new networking technologies. Furthermore, the Army is attempting to align the procurement and fielding of networking systems with the relatively fixed schedules for equipping and training units before they are deployed. The challenge will be to ensure that the equipment being sent to the field has been thoroughly demonstrated and that fielding decisions are not made solely to accommodate deployment cycles.
The overall scope and cost of the Armys new network strategy, as well as other factors unique to the strategy, present significant risks and challenges and deserve high-level oversight attention by both the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD). For example, the Army wants to field smaller quantities with greater frequency to be able to take advantage of new and improved capabilities as they become available, thus avoiding long-term procurements of outdated technology and potentially helping to realize savings in development, testing, and maintenance costs. However, the Army is still weighing funding and contracting options that would allow it to accomplish this goal while adhering to established acquisition and budget processes that may require long lead time to acquire these technologies. DOD guidance calls for measuring actual contributions of information technology portfolios, which includes the Army network, against established outcome-based performance measures to determine improved capability and allow for adjustments in the mix of portfolio investments. Senior DOD officials provided extensive input on the soundness of individual network components and the schedule for fielding equipment and have offered that future evaluations in an operational environment present a good opportunity to evaluate the overall performance of the network. However, the Army and DOD have not yet fully defined quantifiable network performance measures or plans to periodically review and evaluate the actual effectiveness of new Army network capabilities. Inadequate oversight of the portfolio could put the investment at risk. Finally, budget justification and other planning materials for network equipmentover 50 research and development and procurement budget elementsare not organized to provide insight into the budget for and affordability of the entire network. Given the magnitude and financial commitment envisioned, a consolidated reporting and budgeting framework could yield more consistency and clarity in the justifications for Army network initiatives and facilitate congressional oversight.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: To help ensure adequate oversight, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) define quantifiable outcome-based performance metrics for network equipment; (2) develop a plan for future network evaluations to determine if those measures have been met; and (3) evaluate fielded network performance and make recommendations for adjustments, as necessary. GAO also recommends that the Secretary of Defense consolidate Army tactical network budget elements and justifications into a single area of the Army budget submittal. DOD generally concurred with these recommendations and stated that it has initiated actions to address several of the challenges identified in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: For nearly two decades, the Army has had various initiatives under way to  improve situational awareness and enhance the decision making of  soldiers and commanders through the increased use of information  technology. While these initiatives resulted in some capability  advancements in the Army’s network capabilities, they fell far short of  their objectives, resulting in what the Army believes is a loosely  coordinated set of disparate sensors, applications, and services as  opposed to a networked system of weapons and other equipment. The  Army is now implementing a new agile process, through which it will seek  to leverage industry solutions with less systems development by the Army  in modernizing its tactical network to give soldiers the exact information  they need, when they need it, in any environment. Under this process, the  Army plans to field smaller quantities more frequently, allowing it to  procure and field new and improved capabilities as they become  available. Army officials believe this would allow the Army to avoid long- term procurements of outdated technology and potentially help realize  savings in development, testing, and maintenance costs. Army leadership  has identified the network as the service’s number one modernization  priority and estimates that it will require $3.8 billion in fiscal 2013 funding  for its network initiatives.
Because of the network’s importance, the ambitious nature of the current  network modernization strategy, and the department’s track record with  system acquisitions over the past decade, you asked us to examine  various elements of the new process the Army is using to acquire network  capabilities. As agreed with committee staff, we will address issues  related to the acquisition process, evaluation of new and current network  capabilities, and current plans to purchase radios and other  communications equipment in phases. In this first report, we address (1)  the extent to which the Army’s network modernization strategy and agile  process addresses cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness;  and (2) other risks and challenges facing implementation of the Army’s  network strategy and agile process.
To conduct this work, we reviewed the Army’s approach to modernizing  network equipment and evaluated it against DOD policies and best  practices. We observed testing, visited laboratory facilities, interviewed  acquisition and test officials, and analyzed key documentation. A detailed  description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2012 to January  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Over the last two decades, the Army began transforming its warfighting  capabilities to more effectively counter a broad and complex set of  potential threats with smaller, adaptable, more agile and deployable  brigade combat teams. The Army wanted the force components— soldiers, platforms, weapons, and sensors—to be “net-centric,” that is,  closely linked and able to operate seamlessly together. The Army took  initial steps toward transformation through its Digitization program in the  1990s by installing computers, software, and interfaces to  communications systems on Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and  other vehicles in selected units that enable both in-theater and higher  commands to share battlefield data with lower-level units.
About 10 years ago, the Army envisioned the Future Combat System as  the culminating stage in the Army’s ongoing transformation to a lighter,  more agile and capable force. Future Combat System was a large and  complex development effort to provide a networked family of weapons  and other systems for the future force. Ultimately, the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) issued  an acquisition decision memorandum that canceled the Future Combat  System development effort. Subsequently, the Army established the  Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team program to demonstrate, among  other things, improved network technology and sensors that had been  part of the Future Combat System. However, faced with disappointing test  results and high costs, DOD directed the Army to cease these  developmental efforts, eventually canceling the program in February  2011.
Over the last decade, most network improvements fielded by the Army  were focused on supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and were  expensive and time consuming. The Army’s development and fielding  efforts for network technologies were not well synchronized. Funding and  timelines for network-related programs were rarely, if ever, aligned.  Capabilities were fielded piecemeal and integration with existing  technology was largely the responsibility of the user. Current battle  command network components were developed to address a range of  capabilities and have resulted in what the Army believes is a loosely  coordinated set of disparate sensors, applications, services, and transport  (i.e., the means of moving information). The decade of conflict also  provided the Army with a set of “lessons learned” that have shaped the  adoption of the new approach intended to accelerate the introduction of  advanced information technology capabilities to the warfighter, especially  those engaged at the tactical edge (i.e., the forward battle lines). In  December 2011, Army leaders finalized the Network-enabled Mission  Command Initial Capabilities Document, which serves as a foundational  document in support of Army Network Modernization and describes the  essential network capabilities required. We have included a listing of the  essential network capabilities in appendix II. These capabilities support  an Army mission command capability defined by a coherent network of  command posts, aerial and ground platforms, manned and unmanned  sensors, and dismounted soldiers that are linked by an integrated suite of  mission command systems and connected by a robust transport layer  capable of delivering voice, data, imagery, and video to the tactical edge.  The Initial Capabilities Document also defined scores of capability gaps  that exist with current Army networks. We have included a listing of the  highest priority capability gaps in appendix III.
The Army’s network modernization strategy focuses on addressing four  factors that Army leaders believe are at the root of the Army’s network  challenges: a lack of common technical standards, unsynchronized acquisition timelines, no visibility at the enterprise (top) level, and  test and acquisition processes that they believe result in the fielding of  outdated technology.
In response, the Army has fundamentally changed the way it develops,  evaluates, tests, and delivers networked capability to its operating forces.  The Army is shelving its inadequate, disjointed process in favor of an  approach it calls capability set management.
Under capability set management, the Army evaluates the current  operational environment and then designs a suite of systems and  equipment, a “capability set,” to answer the projected requirements of a 1- year period. Instead of developing an ultimate capability and buying  enough to cover the entire force, the Army plans to buy only what is  needed for units preparing to deploy. Every year, the Army will integrate  the next capability set, which will reflect any changes or advances in  technology realized since the last set was fielded. The Army is using this  approach to manage network capabilities as a cohesive portfolio and  synchronize all supporting activities. The Army numbers these sets to  coincide with its upcoming training and fielding schedule to give units  ample time to (1) integrate the new capabilities and (2) train with the  systems before deploying to theater. For example, network capabilities  being ready for fielding in 2013 are labeled capability set 13.
In support of capability sets, the Army has formulated an agile process  that will rely heavily on industry to fill those networking capability gaps  using nondevelopmental items or commercial-off-the-shelf options,  meaning the Army will do less system development. The Army’s agile  process involves seven phases and three decision points intended to  identify proposed solutions that can be evaluated for feasibility to address  an identified need and can be deployed to the field. This approach is also  designed to help the Army cull out network system candidates that either  may not be an appropriate solution or may not be technically ready for  evaluation. Figure 1 illustrates the agile process. The Army believes this  process will allow for both large- and small-scale industry involvement  that could lead to increased competition and lower costs.
To implement this agile process, the Army sends out sources sought  notices to attract proposed solutions to identified network capability gaps  and evaluates each of the proposed solutions at decision points after key  phases.which systems will proceed further into the process. The Army screens  systems again during a laboratory validation in Phase II. The Army  notifies contractors as to whether their systems will be allowed to  advance to the evaluation phase, where candidate systems are integrated  with existing network capabilities and tested with a full Army brigade. If  the system performs well at the evaluation, the Army decides whether or  not to buy and field it.
The Army initially screens proposals at Phase I to determine  Equipped with every vehicle platform currently in the Army inventory, the  2nd brigade, 1st armored division assigned to Brigade Modernization  Command leads phases III to V of the process and is responsible for  executing the Network Integration Evaluations (NIE), which are held semi- annually and typically last for approximately 6 weeks. The NIEs are designed to replicate current real-world conditions and include systems  already fielded to the operational theater. Soldiers, combat developers,  training developers, materiel developers, and engineers participate in  each event, providing feedback as the evaluation progresses. NIEs  provide a venue for operational testing of formal acquisition programs and  for demonstrating government and industry provided systems under  evaluation in an operational environment. Army leaders use information  from NIEs to inform decisions on what to send to the field. With this large- scale and centralized testing process, the Army intends to validate new  technology as it becomes available; select the best candidates for quick  insertion into operational units; and refine tactics, techniques, and  procedures very quickly to eventually relieve or reduce the integration  burden of new equipment on operational forces.
The standard operating procedure for the agile approach states that it is  not a substitute for existing DOD acquisition policy. Rather, the agile  process applies only to the testing, assessment, and evaluation during  NIE events and does not address any subsequent development or  procurement actions. Nevertheless, the standard operating procedures  state that changes to DOD policy may be considered as the Army  develops additional guidance for broader implementation of the agile  process. Further, the Army believes this agile process addresses a  portion of the information technology reform called for in Section 804 of  the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, in which  Congress directed DOD to formulate a new approach for acquiring  information technology systems. In the meantime, the Army expects to  comply with procurement aspects of DOD acquisition policy when it  decides to buy systems that proceed through the agile process.
section_title: Army Moving Ahead but Its Network Strategy Is Still Evolving
paragraphs: The Army has begun a number of initiatives intended to define a desired  baseline network, enhance the ability of industry to develop networking  systems, and streamline the acquisition of those systems. In particular,  the Army is implementing a new overall network strategy and agile  process, but details are still evolving. Through these initiatives, the Army  has developed preliminary plans to address the areas of cost, technology  maturity, security, and readiness. However, the ongoing implementation  of the agile process makes it difficult to assess potential effectiveness of  the Army’s preliminary plans, and additional data to inform such an  assessment will likely not be available until after the Army begins fielding  new network capabilities. The Army has identified near-term funding  needs for network investments and established a process for screening  proposed networking capabilities before they are tested. The Army also  recognized the need to protect the network and its content and is working  with the National Security Agency and vendors to ensure systems are  certified for integration into the network. The Army is also attempting to  align network capability fielding with its relatively fixed schedule for  deploying forces to ensure soldiers are trained with new equipment prior  to deployment.
subsections: section_title: Army Executing Network Strategy and Implementing Agile Process
paragraphs: The Army is beginning to execute its network strategy and implement its  agile process. However, the network strategy is still evolving,  implementation has only recently started, and the Army has not yet  executed one full cycle of the agile process. While the Army indicated that  systems evaluated at the NIE in fiscal year 2012 and to be fielded in  capability set 13 completed the entire agile process, some of those  systems were not evaluated in the laboratory. A full cycle would include  going through all phases of the process. The Army is using the agile  process to quickly evaluate emerging networking capabilities. At this  point, it is unclear what impact some of these actions will have on network  modernization. The following examples detail steps the Army has taken to  implement the new approach.
Since 2011, the Army has solicited proposals from both industry  sources and existing programs of record to address recognized  capability gaps. Industry participation in the agile process generally,  and in the NIEs specifically, is critical to the success of the Army  network modernization strategy. Under the agile process, the Army  has decided to buy only one system from industry after having  evaluated more than 100. While the Army anticipates contracting, as  appropriate, for solutions to fill capability gaps, industry is making a  sizable investment to take part in an NIE, and it remains to be seen if  industry will continue to participate in this strategy over the longer  term while purchases to date have been minimal.
The Army is learning lessons from the use of the agile process. For  instance, the Army issued an initial sources sought notice for the  second NIE in fiscal year 2012—NIE 12.2. Army officials stated that  some of the gaps were too broad, which resulted in too many  responses that were not targeted to the specific gap the Army was  hoping to fill. Consequently, the Army issued a second, more targeted  sources sought notice for NIE 12.2 that resulted in fewer submissions,  yet they were better targeted to the specific gaps.
After the fiscal year 2012 NIEs, the Army established a baseline  network architecture, which is essentially the logical and structural  design of the Army’s network and includes capabilities such as on- the-move communications, battle command, and position location.  This baseline architecture incorporates both programs of record and  commercial technologies. This architecture provides the foundation  upon which the Army will add future networking capabilities. The Army  now has an expanded network design that will inform network  investment decisions; enable the development of tactics, techniques,  and procedures; and serve as the next baseline for future  development efforts. Army and DOD planning documents include  notional enhancements to the baseline architecture, which implement  a number of design considerations that are intended to reduce  capability gaps and mitigate risks while enhancing the capability of the  brigade combat teams. The Army is utilizing its new agile process to  evaluate systems that could fill identified capability gaps, enhance  networking, and thus add to the network architecture over time.
The Army has screened and evaluated government and industry  proposals in various ways and recently implemented a laboratory  screening process, from which it accepted and subsequently  forwarded many candidate solutions for evaluation at an upcoming  NIE. The Army has conducted four NIEs to date and is implementing  lessons learned from those events to improve future evaluations. For  instance, past NIEs included systems that were immature and simply  not technically ready for the evaluation. The Army believes that its  enhanced screening efforts will identify systems that are not  technically ready for the events.
The Army is already procuring many of the systems planned for its  first capability set and additional procurements are pending. Based on  testing and evaluations during prior NIEs, the Army determined the  content of capability set 13 and began procuring this equipment this  past October. All but one of the capability set 13 systems was  developed through a program of record. In many cases, funding had  already been identified for these systems. In other cases, the Army  had to find additional funding for some equipment through  reprogramming. Soldiers at Fort Drum, New York and Fort Polk,  Louisiana are receiving capability set 13 equipment and have begun  training in preparation for deployment later this year. While a detailed  description of capability set 14 systems is not yet available, they will  likely include many systems from capability set 13, plus potentially  other capabilities tested at recent NIEs.
section_title: Army Network Strategy Expected to Be Very Costly Over the Long Term
paragraphs: Because the Army’s network modernization effort is a portfolio and not a  single acquisition program, the Army has not been required to compile an  estimate of the total costs to develop and field its tactical network across  the entire Army force structure. However, those costs will be substantial— at an estimated $3 billion annually, this level of effort could total in excess  of $60 billion over a 20-year period. For fiscal year 2013, the Army plans  to invest about $3.8 billion in its network-enabled mission command  portfolio—about $1 billion in research and development and $2.8 billion in  procurement (see table 1).
Those investments are intended for communications transport,  applications, and network services capabilities. Funding for  communications transport equipment such as radios and Warfighter  Information Network-Tactical makes up a significant portion of network  funding.
The Army estimates a need for this level of funding to continue  indefinitely. In planning documents, the Army assumes that its spending  within the mission command portfolio—at least out to the 2030s—will be  about $3 billion annually for procurement plus about $0.5 billion to $1.0  billion for research and development. That level of spending would fund  the fielding of full capability sets to four brigade combat teams per year  and basic network capabilities to other operational forces to ensure  interoperability. The Army would continue to roll out capability sets to  initially cover all operating forces through the late 2020s and additional  upgraded capabilities are expected after that. In 2013, the expected level  of funding is greater than that provided to all but one of the nine Army  equipment portfolios.
As the Army prepared to buy and field the first network capability set in  fiscal year 2013, it did not have funds to complete certain tasks. In June  2012, it requested a total of $139.4 million in reprogrammed funds from  other accounts to cover unplanned costs, including vehicle modifications  to enable network integration ($59.4 million); procurement of various  radios and ancillary equipment ($51.3 million); and procurement of a  variety of equipment for tactical operations centers ($28.7 million). Army  officials have told us that funding for these costs in fiscal year 2014 and  beyond will be accounted for in future Army budgets.
As the Army gets actual cost data on procuring and fielding improved  network capabilities, it will be in a better position to estimate future costs.
section_title: Army Laboratory Expected to Validate Technologies in Relevant Environment, but Effectiveness Uncertain
paragraphs: Acquisition best practices and DOD policy both emphasize the need for  the use of mature technologies in acquisition programs. Our prior work  has found technology readiness levels to be a valuable decision-making  tool because they can presage the likely consequences of incorporating a  technology at a given level of maturity into a product’s development. To  date, all the sources sought notices issued as part of the agile process  have required proposed network solutions to have achieved technology  readiness level 6, which means a high-fidelity prototype demonstrated in  a relevant environment, in order to be considered for filling a capability  gap. Appendix IV contains a complete listing and description of  technology readiness levels. The Army has established a screening  process to validate the contractors’ assertions regarding technology  maturity. Army officials believe this validation process will improve upon  multiple critiques of previous NIE activities by soldiers and testers,  including the burdensome number of systems being evaluated, perceived  military utility of systems, and overall performance of the network  architecture.
Army officials have multiple opportunities to reject a proposed capability  based on technical maturity and other factors. Interested vendors are  instructed to submit a detailed white-paper description of their proposed  solutions and those solutions are evaluated on a variety of factors,  including technical maturity, compatibility with the Army’s network  architecture, demonstration in a relevant environment, and ability to meet  schedule and provide field support for testing. Successful candidate  systems will then proceed to laboratory-based testing to determine,  among other things, whether the system is mature enough to be fielded  and supported, whether the system performs as intended, and whether it  fits into the network architecture. Successful laboratory-based validation  results in selected government and industry systems proceeding to the  NIE.
NIE 13.1, which the Army conducted in the fall of 2012, was the first NIE  for which all systems have been subjected to the entirety of the agile  process, including the various laboratory exercises. Army officials believe  the rigor they have built into the agile process will filter out many systems  that are not quite ready for the NIEs, thus reducing the soldier burden and  improving the scores for individual systems and the overall network.  However, the real success of this approach can only be determined by  NIE results—particularly whether systems perform as advertised, how  well they integrate with the network, and the level of military utility  determined by soldiers and operational testers. The Army received  preliminary results from NIE 13.1 in December 2012.
section_title: Army Plans to Address Information Assurance and Security Issues during Network Integration Evaluations
paragraphs: The Army defines information assurance as the protection of systems and  information in storage, processing, or transit from unauthorized access or  modification; denial of service to unauthorized users; or the provision of  service to authorized users. It also includes those measures necessary to  detect, document, and counter such threats, as well as measures that  protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their  availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.  This includes providing for restoration of information systems by  incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.
The Army collaborates with the National Security Agency to ensure that  information assurance issues are addressed early in the NIE process.  Vendors understand that they need to secure certification from the  National Security Agency, and the Army has a customer service advocate  to help in this regard. To implement the certification process, vendors  complete a product summary questionnaire, detailed proposal, and  security evaluation, which eventually lead to a security certification from  the National Security Agency. Vendors must also get certification from  DOD for communications-security-related equipment. For over-the-air  transmissions of communications-security-related items, the NIE requires  the National Security Agency to issue an over-the-air or interim-approval- to-operate that sets the parameters of how and where the testing can be  performed on the system. After the NIE, programs of record will work with  the National Security Agency to make sure any devices that have not  completed National Security Agency certification complete the tasks  before systems are fielded.
One of the specific objectives for NIE 12.2 was to assess and evaluate  network vulnerabilities. According to Director, Operational Test and  Evaluation officials, the Army continues to improve threat operations  during NIEs. NIE 12.2 was the first NIE in which threat information  operations—for example, when a mock opposition force uses electronic  warfare tactics such as jamming and network intrusion to try and disrupt  Army network operations—were fully integrated into the threat  commander’s allowable tactics. Director, Operational Test and Evaluation  officials also noted that an aggressive, adaptive threat that is intent on  winning the battle is an essential component of good operational testing  and that the Army should continue to ensure that future NIEs contain a  robust threat force to include threat information warfare capabilities.
section_title: Army Plans to Synchronize Integration of New Technology with Deployment of Forces
paragraphs: To achieve its tactical network objectives, the Army is changing the way it  delivers capability to its operating forces. Previous Army efforts to  develop and field network technologies were seldom coordinated.  Program funding, developmental timelines, and testing for network- related programs were rarely, if ever, aligned. Network capabilities were  fielded piecemeal and frequently for only one element of the operational  force, such as at the company, battalion, or brigade level versus an entire  brigade combat team. In the past, the Army has sent network systems to  operational units already in theater, leaving soldiers to figure out how to  use them, resulting in frustrated soldiers and ineffectively utilized  systems—all of which had negative effects on unit readiness.
The Army is shelving this approach in favor of capability set management,  where it treats tactical network capability as a cohesive portfolio. After  evaluating its current operational environment, identifying capability gaps,  and designing a suite of systems and equipment to address these gaps,  the Army will procure any elements of the set not already in the Army  inventory and distribute them throughout a combat formation, from the  brigade command post, to the commander on-the-move, to the  dismounted soldier. Capability set management also diverges from the  past practice of conducting limited user tests of individual systems. The  Army plans to test the entire capability set to assess its collective  functionality and interoperability, each component’s individual  performance and compliance with architectural standards, and whether  the set works with technology already in use and can accommodate the  rapid pace of emerging technologies.
The Army plans to integrate fielding of the capability set with the Army’s  Force Generation process that prepares forces for deployment through  three force pools: Reset, Train/Ready, and Available (See figure 2).
Through capability set management, the Army will align program funding  and timelines so that operational units—brigade combat teams and other  operating units—receive an integrated network capability set prior to or  during the train/ready phase of the Army’s Force Generation cycle. The  Army expects to buy and integrate the elements of capability set 13 with  the existing Army network and later field it to eight brigade combat teams  and other operating units. Capability sets will go only to those units in the  Army’s Force Generation queue available for deployment and will be  fielded during the train/ready phase so that operational units are prepared  when they land in theater. Additionally, rather than committing to  purchasing any given system or capability in quantities sufficient to outfit  the entire force at once, the Army will procure only what is needed by  units entering the deployment pool.
The NIE conducted from late May to early June of 2012 included the  systems for capability set 13, which is composed of vehicles, network  components, and associated equipment and software that are intended to  deliver an integrated voice and data capability throughout the Brigade  Combat Team. This capability set, illustrated in table 2, will field a  foundational network baseline, which is based on the integration of  available satellite-based communications and land radios, upon which  future capability sets will build.
Fielding for capability set 13 started at the beginning of fiscal year 2013,  to align with the Army’s deployment cycle. This equipment will provide a  baseline network solution until the Army’s intended networking radio  hardware and waveforms are ready for fielding. The Army’s deployment  cycle is schedule driven in that the operating units are expected to arrive  at their destination in a ready and trained status at predetermined times.  However, the technical maturity and integration of network capabilities  may not always occur as expected. In the future, the challenge for the  Army will be to ensure that the network equipment to be sent to operating  units has been thoroughly demonstrated and integrated in advance, that  fielding decisions are not made solely to accommodate the deployment  schedule, and that the process is delivering mature and militarily useful  capabilities.
section_title: Army’s Network Modernization Strategy and Agile Process Face Other Risks and Challenges
paragraphs: The Army’s network strategy and agile process face several other risks  and challenges as implementation continues. For instance, the Army is  still weighing different funding approaches and contracting strategies to  enable rapid production of capabilities. The Army is challenged with (1)  the inability of some current force vehicles to accommodate new  networking capabilities, (2) encouraging both industry and existing  programs to implement new computing technologies and standards that  will shape future development efforts, and (3) continuing other initiatives  aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness of the network. The  network strategy also presents oversight challenges in that the Army has  not yet (1) fully defined performance metrics that would allow decision  makers to gauge progress in the portfolio and make informed investment  decisions and (2) created a consolidated reporting and budgeting  framework for the network portfolio.
subsections: section_title: Army Considering a Variety of Options For Funding and Procuring New Network Capabilities
paragraphs: As part of the agile process, Army officials are testing and evaluating  systems presented at the NIEs for forthcoming capability sets at a rapid  pace. They are also striving to identify funding methods and contracting  strategies that allow rapid procurement and fielding of these systems, yet  are consistent with established acquisition regulations. The processes for  procuring systems that are already part of a program of record are  understood. Those programs go through various acquisition steps that  include developing a requirement, developing and procuring systems to  meet the requirement, and identifying funds to procure those systems  through the traditional budgeting process. However, the processes for  buying systems that are not already established programs is less clear  due to the fact that items to be bought are not yet known and it can take 2  years to complete the budget cycle.
The Army has identified a number of possible funding scenarios for  systems under evaluation that are chosen for procurement after an NIE.  One option would be to reprogram unobligated funds from other  programs. Another option available is to procure initial quantities of  chosen systems from a $25 million procurement fund the Army worked  into the fiscal year 2013 budget, and obtain follow-on procurements  through the traditional budgeting process. However, the Army seems to  realize that the reprogramming option may not be available in all cases  and that the $25 million procurement fund may not be sufficient.  According to Army officials, a third option would be to allow continued  development of the proposed capability to proceed in conjunction with  similar efforts to develop new technologies under DOD’s science and  technology line of effort. In any event, the Army may face challenges  given the long lead time for getting items in the budget (up to 2 years),  and items the Army wants to buy may not be known at the time the  budget is prepared.
Finally, the Army is looking at various contracting strategies available  under existing acquisition regulations to enable it to rapidly procure a  capability. If the capability originated from a program of record,  procurement would proceed according to the program’s acquisition  strategy. However, if the capability is not linked to a program of record or  if multiple contractors could provide a comparable system, the Army will  most likely look to competitively procure the capability, which could be  time consuming. If the capability in question is available under a General  Services Administration schedule, the Army could proceed to order off the  schedule. However, the Army noted that acquiring such a capability  without adequate evaluation and testing adds risk that it will not work  properly in a combat environment.
The Army is still formulating plans for funding and procuring networking  equipment in capability sets planned for combat brigades in fiscal years  2014 and beyond. Planning documents we reviewed reflect uncertainty  about the source of future funding over the next 2 years, noting that  funding strategies could require reprogramming above thresholds  allowable at the DOD’s discretion, which would require congressional  approval. For fiscal years 2016 and beyond, capability sets could be  included in the fiscal years 2015-2019 planning budget and future budget  submittals.
section_title: Army Addressing Size, Weight, Power, and Cooling Challenges of Heavy Forces
paragraphs: A number of the Army’s current fleet of combat and tactical vehicles—the  Abrams, Bradley, and Paladin—have reached or exceeded their size,  weight, power, and cooling limit. The Army is managing upgrades to  these vehicles based on technical advances, cost benefit analyses, and  alignment with vehicle modernization opportunities. These vehicles will  receive moderate capability improvements, or interim solutions, until  modernized vehicles are available to receive full network capabilities.  Operational needs and changes to combat vehicle modernization plans  have led the Army to focus on initially fielding its new network capabilities  to infantry and Stryker brigades.
The integration and fielding of network capabilities to the heavy brigades  cannot occur until the heavy combat vehicles are network-ready. The  Abrams and Bradley upgrades are expected to begin production in fiscal  year 2017 and the Paladin upgrade program started developmental  testing in May 2011 with its first production delivery scheduled for June  2015. According to the Army, the Stryker, particularly the Double V-Hull  variant, has proven protection and size, weight, and power capacities to  accept some of the capability set 13 network-related equipment. Under  the capability set management process, the Army will complete some  initial Stryker Brigade Combat Team network modernization two years  faster than originally planned. The Army is also developing a new ground  combat vehicle and a joint light tactical vehicle. The challenge for the  Army will be to align new network technologies with the upgraded and  newly procured vehicles in a cost effective and efficient manner.
section_title: Army Focusing on Having Industry and Programs of Record Implement Common Operating Environment
paragraphs: A key component of the Army’s tactical network development strategy is  to establish technical standards to guide the computing environment. The  Army has defined and begun to implement a set of computing  technologies and standards to which the network, all applications, and all  network systems must comply. The Army believes this Common  Operating Environment (COE) will reduce development time, lower costs,  improve interoperability, and ease system maintenance. The value of  having a COE is that industry will know in advance the standards to which  it must build solutions, cutting acquisition timelines and, possibly, cost.  The COE is expected to reduce the complexities of configuration, support,  and training, making integration of new capabilities with existing  technology much easier and faster.
The COE, which includes the current network architecture, is intended to  reduce duplication and redundancy. For example, rather than asking for  proposals to provide a new network capability that complies with various  standards and interfaces, the Army would specify that the new capability  should assume that certain capabilities already reside within the network.
One of the key issues stemming from this initiative is how and when to  get current programs of record, which number in the hundreds, to fully  implement the COE. The initial implementation of this convergence has  already begun and the Army’s goal is to ensure full implementation by all  programs in 5 years. The Army has already acknowledged some  challenges it will face in getting current programs of record to fully  implement the COE, including
Securing funding—COE convergence is an unfunded requirement at
Managing up front and transition costs, which are expected to be high;
Aligning implementation to lessen potential for disruption to schedule  and cost of Army acquisition programs;
Aligning requirements and acquisition processes; and
Revising current testing methodologies to help facilitate the desired  pace of technological change.
Technical standardization is necessary to speed development and fielding  of new capabilities. The COE provides industry the parameters within  which Army technology (hardware and applications) must fit. The Army  also mandated a single mode for transmission of information, regardless  of format; text, voice, video, signal, or other type of data. That mode of  transmission—which is called “everything over Internet protocol”—brings  the Army in line with commercial-sector norms and expands the  possibility of using commercial-off-the-shelf, or near-commercial-off-the- shelf solutions, especially for hardware, such as radios. Pre-existing  standards and nonproprietary Internet protocol and waveforms will enable  industry to develop products more quickly than previously possible. In  addition, technology built to common standards will make the testing  process simpler, and integration with existing systems and software,  including those of U.S. allies, much easier and faster. However, a  drawback to the “everything over Internet protocol” policy is that such a  policy makes Army networks more vulnerable to widely-proliferating,  Internet-based attacks.
If implemented properly, COE could facilitate improved efficiency for the  Army’s network development effort including lower costs, lower risks, and  improved performance. However, COE implementation also represents a  potential bottleneck or chokepoint if the challenges discussed above are  not addressed in an effective and timely manner by the Army.
section_title: Army Is Pursuing Other Network Initiatives to Improve Efficiency and Effectiveness
paragraphs: Over the next several years, to improve efficiency and effectiveness, the  Army plans to pursue a number of network improvement initiatives such  as consolidating several separate sensor networks; consolidating a  number of network planning, monitoring, and other tools; moving toward a  single set of network tools; and improving the efficiency of command  posts because commanders need a converged voice, data, imagery, and  video transport system capability that is reliable and secure in a cyber  and electronic warfare environment. The Army has also started an  initiative to identify and manage the costs—including operating and  support costs—of the Army tactical network. Each of these initiatives  could be challenging in that it is expected to impact multiple components  of the emerging network at the same time that the Army is proceeding  with integration and fielding.
The Army has identified benefits of taking several existing but  separate sensor networks and consolidating their capabilities for  improved efficiency and effectiveness. These networks have separate  operation centers and employ many different satellites. As a result,  according to the Army, there is inefficient network utilization and  limited operational utility. The goal is to consolidate to far fewer  operational centers and to employ fewer satellites. Among other  benefits, the consolidation is expected to provide more  responsiveness, agility, and quality of service. This initiative will begin  soon and initial parts of the consolidation will be demonstrated in NIE  13.2.
The Army has identified a need to consolidate various network  planning, monitoring, and other tools for better efficiency and  effectiveness. Currently, network operations tools such as network  planning, monitoring, and loading devices reside in many individual  network systems and each are used independently. The consolidation  initiative will move toward the use of a single set of network tools that  can deal with issues throughout the network. According to the Army,  the potential benefits include more network visibility and reduced cost  and complexity. As the Army identifies opportunities to use common  tools, officials will adjust the network architecture. The Army plans to  evaluate the converged tools at forthcoming NIEs.
Another Army initiative involves the integration of existing and new  elements of command posts, which are made up of many different  systems and subsystems. Currently, most of the command post  elements are not integrated, resulting in inefficiencies for the network  as a whole. This initiative is to incrementally integrate the current  command post systems and other systems demonstrated at NIEs. As  a part of that demonstration, the command post architecture will be  examined closely and standardization implemented wherever  possible. The Army will also develop new command post operational  procedures as well as training materials and processes. As it moves  forward, the Army plans to evaluate the updated command posts at  the NIEs.
The initiative, called Resourcing the Portfolio, is to identify and  manage the costs of the Army network enterprise in various ways.  During the recent capability portfolio review, the Army looked at the  operating and support requirements and funding for the various  mission command systems and found that the projected annual costs  would be far beyond the current expected funding levels. Those  additional costs, coupled with the expected costs of future NIEs,  capability set fielding, and the other new initiatives would have to be  appropriately addressed in the fiscal years 2014-2018 budget  planning deliberations. At the same time, the Army wants to find ways  to reduce the operating and support costs of the various systems that  are already in the current network as well as those expected to be  introduced in coming years.
section_title: Information and Insights from NIEs and Consolidated Budgeting Could Benefit DOD and Congressional Oversight
paragraphs: In February 2011, USD(AT&L) designated the Army Tactical Network as  a special interest portfolio consisting of a set of acquisitions. As part of  this special designation, the USD(AT&L) directed the Army to provide a  comprehensive network acquisition strategy to ensure the alignment,  adaptation, and synchronization of acquisition efforts, including network  integration and testing. The USD(AT&L) directed the Overarching  Integrated Product Team Chair for Network to provide periodic portfolio  reviews. According to USD(AT&L) officials, the Chair for Network  conducted an initial review in 2011 of the Army’s proposed network  architecture and its strategy for acquiring, integrating, and fielding the  network. In that review and subsequent collaboration with the Army, the  USD(AT&L) officials and staff have (1) provided extensive technical input  on the soundness of individual network components and whether they are  in synch with the rest of the capability set and the existing network as a  whole, and (2) reviewed the acquisition schedules of all the network  programs of record within the capability set to ensure that they are  properly aligned. Also, USD(AT&L) officials and staff have provided input  as part of acquisition milestone reviews for major programs that are a part  of the Army network.
DOD has also issued guidance for the measurement of outcomes from IT  investment portfolios, which would include the network portfolio. DOD’s  directive, issued in 2005, calls for responsible authorities to “measure  actual contributions of the portfolio against established outcome-based  performance measures to determine improved capability as well as to  support adjustments to the mix of portfolio investments, as necessary.”
The Army and DOD consider the fielding of capability set 13 as the initial  output from the Army’s network modernization portfolio but have yet to  fully define outcome-based performance measures to evaluate the actual  contributions of the capability set. The Army and USD(AT&L) officials  point to a set of design considerations that drove the definition of  capability set 13 as appropriate sources for outcome-based performance  measures. Those design considerations include (1) robust network  connectivity from the command post down to the soldier; (2) access to  unclassified, classified, and coalition networks; and (3) planning,  configuration, and monitoring of the network.
Subsequently, the expectation is that capability set 13 and the entire  Army network will be evaluated at future NIEs. Optimally, based on those  evaluations, the Army and USD(AT&L) would have the necessary  information to determine how capability set 13—as fielded in operational  units—has actually affected (1) overall network performance, (2) identified  capability gaps, and (3) essential network capabilities. That could provide  a basis to determine if any adjustments need to be made to future  capability sets. However, it is not yet clear whether and how the NIE can  provide the necessary data and insights on the performance of the  network as a whole. To date, the NIEs have been focused primarily on  the operational testing of selected major acquisition programs and the  operational evaluation of emerging network capabilities. While  USD(AT&L); Army; and Director, Operational Test and Evaluation officials  offer that the NIEs present a good opportunity to evaluate the overall  performance of the network, they concede that they have not designed  the NIEs to fully focus on that task.
Although the Army is managing its network modernization initiatives as a  portfolio, the individual programs and initiatives are spread out over a  variety of research and development and procurement accounts. Budget  justification and other planning materials for these individual programs  and initiatives focus mostly on planned activities to move the individual  system along in the development effort and little on how that system may  relate to the network as a whole. For the fiscal year 2013 request, the  network portfolio was made up of over 50 research and development and  procurement budget elements. At present, these materials do not provide  insight into the budgets and activities for the tactical network capability  sets as a whole, which could stymie oversight of the Army network  development and fielding by congressional committees. A consolidated  reporting and budgeting framework for all of the programs that are part of  the tactical network portfolio could yield more consistency and clarity in  the justifications for Army network initiatives as well as facilitate oversight  of the strategy’s affordability.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Given less-than-successful past efforts to modernize its information  network, the Army is making a good faith effort to take a more realistic,  lower-risk strategy to getting the capability it desires. Specifically,  leveraging private sector innovation to quickly and incrementally deliver  technology has advantages over the Army trying to define and develop an  ultimate long-term solution. Yet, this strategy is only in its initial stages  and there are a number of implementation challenges that lie ahead.  Looking ahead, although the Army network strategy is more modest from  a technology standpoint, it is still a huge transformational effort that will  affect all aspects of Army operations. The size and scope of the Army’s  modernization investment deserves high-level oversight attention by both  the Army and DOD. Effective oversight can reduce risk and improve  outcomes.
Regarding implementation, DOD and the Army collaborated extensively  on the technical design of capability set 13 and the Army has proceeded  with the procurement and fielding of those capabilities. To facilitate  oversight of the latter phase, it is important for the Army and DOD to  assess the actual contributions of the initial capability set to be fielded in  fiscal year 2013 and use the results to inform future investments.  Establishing outcome-based performance measures will allow the Army  and DOD to assess progress of network development and fielding and be  in a position to determine the cost-effectiveness of their investments in  capability set 13. It will also be important for the Army to assess the cost  effectiveness of individual initiatives before and during implementation.
The Army and DOD are expecting a lot from future NIEs in terms of  providing information and insights on the capability sets and the Army  network as a whole; however, these officials have yet to put a plan in  place to make this a reality. Finally, as the NIE process begins to provide  the needed information and insights, DOD oversight would be enhanced  by an Office of the Secretary of Defense-level review of the actual  effectiveness and suitability of capability set 13. Such a review should  consider how capability set 13 actually affected overall network  performance, capability gaps, and essential network capabilities. This  level of review would be part of the intended periodic reviews and be  more targeted than the initial review conducted in 2011 and could help to  ensure that available resources are managed effectively.
It is important for the Army to take the steps necessary to ensure that the  technologies it procures are fully mature and ready for integration and  fielding; immature technology delivered faster still puts the Army at risk for  less than optimum results. Considering nondevelopmental items or  commercial-off-the-shelf options has the potential benefit of substantially  lower development time and cost. However, those options may not be  available to address all of the capability gaps, and some development  investments may be needed over time. Also, given the realities of the  federal budgeting process and the time commitments associated with full  and open competition, it may not be possible to procure all emerging  technologies immediately. However, if the Army can find a way to procure  and field new technologies within 2 to 3 years, that is still considerably  better than a typical development effort that in the past has taken a  decade or longer. Industry participation may be a lynchpin to the  continued availability of cutting edge network capabilities, but to date,  Army procurement of new network technologies from other than programs  of record has been very limited. The Army/industry relationship will have  to be carefully monitored and nurtured—that should be a priority for both  DOD and the Army.
Regarding oversight, the Army’s network investment is a dispersed  portfolio of efforts funded in a number of places in the budget. While  network modernization is not defined as a major acquisition program, it is  a substantial level-of-effort investment that will encompass on the order of  $3 billion a year indefinitely. The magnitude and duration of the financial  commitment command attention regarding the affordability of the strategy.  Increased congressional and DOD oversight of the Army network portfolio  would benefit from an integrated budget encompassing the Army tactical  network elements.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: In order to enhance oversight of Army network initiatives by the Army,  DOD, and Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Army to define an appropriate set of quantifiable outcome-based performance  measures to evaluate the actual contributions of capability set 13 and  future components under the network portfolio, and develop and implement a plan for future NIEs to provide the  necessary information and insights to determine if those performance  measures have been met.
As additional information is provided, we recommend that the Secretary  of Defense identify an oversight body to determine how capability set 13—as fielded in operational units—has  actually impacted overall network performance, capability gaps, and  essential network capabilities and make recommendations for  adjustments, as may be necessary, and determine how well the Army is rapidly fielding mature and militarily  useful network capabilities to its operating forces and maintaining  robust industry participation in the process.
To facilitate congressional oversight of the overall affordability of this  important Army initiative, we also recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to consolidate tactical network  budget elements and justifications into a single area of the Army budget  submittal.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. Of the five  recommendations, DOD concurred with two and partially concurred with  the three other recommendations. DOD’s comments appear in appendix  V. DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated  as appropriate in the report.
DOD concurred with our recommendations that the Army (1) define an  appropriate set of quantifiable outcome-based performance measures to  evaluate the actual contributions of capability set 13 and future  components under the network portfolio and (2) develop and implement a  plan for future Network Integration Evaluations (NIEs) to provide the  necessary information and insights to determine if those performance  measures have been met. However, DOD noted that the complexity of  NIEs will change in the future and that those changes will result in  outcome-based performance measures changing accordingly. DOD also  noted that the Army, as well as other military departments and several  major components, are working collaboratively to define the architecture  and standards for a Joint Information Environment, which will help focus  DOD engineering efforts on five specific operational capabilities, including  network normalization and single security architecture. DOD further noted  that it is defining metrics and associated minimum values for each  capability and that the Army’s network modernization strategy and NIEs  will need to conform to the Joint Information Environment architecture and  standards. The development of Joint Information Environment  architecture and standards will be noteworthy to the extent that they  enhance oversight, reduce risk, and improve outcomes. Regarding our  recommendation to develop a plan to use future NIEs to provide  information and insights into how well performance metrics have been  met, DOD noted that NIEs are not static events and that plans will evolve  over time. We recognize the dynamic nature of the NIEs and agree  adjustments to the plan will be necessary and we will monitor the Army’s  progress in developing and implementing its plan in our continuing review  of the Army’s tactical network strategy.
DOD partially concurred with our two recommendations regarding an  oversight role for the Overarching Integrated Product Team Chair for  Network to determine (1) how capability set 13 has actually impacted  overall network performance, capability gaps, and essential network  capabilities; and (2) how well the Army is rapidly fielding mature and  military useful network capabilities to its operating forces and maintaining  robust industry participation in the process. While noting that the specific  integrated product team we referenced no longer exists, DOD agreed that  an Office of the Secretary of Defense-level oversight body needs to be  identified and chartered to review the Army system-of-systems NIEs.  Such a body would provide oversight of the NIEs and inform the  acquisition and budget processes. In response to DOD comments, we  have modified our recommendation to reflect the need for an Office of the  Secretary of Defense-level oversight body instead of the Overarching  Product Team Chair for Network that no longer exists. DOD also agreed  to work with the Army to maintain industry support and participation in the  agile process. Because the Army is moving out to field capabilities, we  believe that the oversight body needs to be established expeditiously in  order to evaluate in near real time the results of NIE 13.1 and the initial  fielding of capability set 13.
Finally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to consolidate  network budget elements and justifications into a single area of the Army  budget. DOD stated that this recommendation was too broad and unclear,  noting that the complete Army Network Portfolio is broader than the  tactical segment addressed in our report. We agreed to clarify and narrow  the recommendation to consolidate “tactical” network budget elements  and justifications into a single area of the Army budget. DOD notes that  the Army has already consolidated many elements of the network in its  Mission Command portfolio and is developing a structure to align all  network assets. The purpose of the recommendation is to facilitate  congressional oversight; therefore, we support actions by the Army to  increase clarity and visibility to improve congressional oversight of the  Army’s tactical and other network initiatives.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and  other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  Belva M. Martin at (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to (1) examine the extent to which the Army’s agile  process addresses cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness;  and (2) identify other risks and challenges facing implementation of the  Army’s agile process and networking in general.
To examine the extent to which the Army’s agile process addresses cost,  technology maturity, security, and readiness, we interviewed officials from  the Army’s System of Systems Integration Directorate; the Army Training  and Doctrine Command; the Army’s Program Executive Office for  Command, Control, Communications—Tactical; the Army’s Program  Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors;  Communications—Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering  Center; Army G-8; and the Army Test and Evaluation Command. We also  interviewed officials from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Developmental Test and Evaluation; the Director, Operational Test and  Evaluation; and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. We analyzed the Army’s  emerging agile process and evaluated it against acquisition best  practices, and we toured lab facilities to understand how the Army is  validating and selecting technologies for network evaluations. We  reviewed Army programmatic documentation to understand cost  projections for testing and procuring network equipment under the new  approach and we analyzed current and prior budget documentation in  order to evaluate how the Army would resource this approach. We also  analyzed the Army’s emerging plans for ensuring networking hardware  receives proper security certifications and reviewed the Army’s  assessments of recent testing for information assurance and network  protection. Finally, we reviewed the Army’s agile process to identify the  fielding strategy for equipping units with emerging networking capabilities.
To identify other risks and challenges, we compared the Army’s agile  process and overall networking strategy against established policies for  managing a portfolio of capabilities. We reviewed Army decisions to defer  network improvements to certain legacy platforms due to acknowledged  size, weight, and power limitations. We attended test events and an  industry day and spoke with contractor officials about their experiences  with the agile process. We also interviewed Army officials to identify other  networking challenges the Army is addressing concurrent with  implementation of the agile process.
We discussed the issues presented in this report with officials from the  Army and the Secretary of Defense and made several changes as a  result.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2012 to January  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Army Mission Command Essential Capabilities
paragraphs: Appendix II: Army Mission Command Essential  Capabilities Description  A converged voice, data, imagery, and video transport layer consisting of line-of-sight and  beyond line-of-sight means that are reliable, protected, layered, secure, and defended in a  cyberspace and electronic warfare environment.
Efficient and dynamic allocation of transport resources to maximize mission command  application and service performance in all conditions and through all phases of operations.
Enable all elements of the force to operate on the same map and support real-time  coordination and collaboration.
Enable the receipt and dissemination of essential information from dismounted soldier to all  higher echelon command posts.
Sharing of ideas and situational awareness within the tactical, operational, and/or strategic  community of interest.
Collaboratively create, change, distribute and rehearse mission orders (voice, written, and  graphical) between command posts, platforms, dismounted leaders, and soldiers.
Maintain situational awareness and communications while away from the command post  and moving on the ground or in the air.
Continuously gather, track, and fuse logistic and intelligence and operational information to  support tactical decision making and continuous assessments.
section_title: Appendix III: Highest Priority Army Network Capability Gaps and Descriptions
paragraphs: Appendix III: Highest Priority Army Network  Capability Gaps and Descriptions Description  Commanders and leaders engaged at the tactical edge have very little capability to combine  local information/intelligence, position location information, processed sensor data and  intelligence, and higher-level environmental information together to define contextual  significance/implications and inform understanding, decisions, and actions.
Commanders and leaders engaged in full spectrum operations require the capability to  access, filter, share, display, and collaborate on fused operations and intelligence  information, while operating away from their command post, in air or ground platforms, and  while dismounted at the tactical edge.
Building a Common Operating Picture  Commanders and leaders…have limited capability to access, select, integrate, display and  share relevant information (geospatially rectified and time stamped) from multiple sources.
Commanders and leaders engaged in full spectrum operations have limited capability to  digitally integrate JIIM partners during planning and execution.
section_title: Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels
paragraphs: Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) are measures pioneered by the  National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and adopted by  the Department of Defense (DOD) to determine whether technologies  were sufficiently mature to be incorporated into a weapon system. Our  prior work has found TRLs to be a valuable decision-making tool because  they can presage the likely consequences of incorporating a technology  at a given level of maturity into a product development. The maturity level  of a technology can range from paper studies (TRL 1), to prototypes that  can be tested in a realistic environment (TRL 7), to an actual system that  has proven itself in mission operations (TRL 9). According to DOD  acquisition policy, a technology should have been demonstrated in a  relevant environment or, preferably, in an operational environment (TRL  7) to be considered mature enough to use for product development. Best  practices of leading commercial firms and successful DOD programs  have shown that critical technologies should be mature to at least a TRL  7 before the start of product development.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, William R. Graveline, Assistant  Director; William C. Allbritton; Marcus C. Ferguson; Kristine Hassinger;  Sean Seales; Robert S. Swierczek; and Paul Williams made key  contributions to this report.