Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Address Some Challenges Faced by State and Local Fusion Centers
Published: 2008-04-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, state and local governments formed fusion centers, collaborative efforts to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity. Recognizing that the centers are a critical mechanism for sharing information, the federal government--including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has primary responsibility for governmentwide information sharing--is taking steps to partner with fusion centers. This testimony focuses on (1) the characteristics of fusion centers as of September 2007 and (2) federal efforts to help alleviate challenges centers identified. This testimony is based on GAO's October 2007 report on 58 fusion centers and related federal efforts to support them as well as updated information GAO obtained in March 2008 by reviewing plans describing selected federal efforts and attending the second annual national fusion center conference.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Almost all states and several local governments have established or are in the process of establishing fusion centers that vary in their characteristics. Centers were generally established to address gaps in information sharing, and the majority of the centers GAO contacted had adopted broad missions that could include both counterterrorism and law enforcement-related information. While law enforcement entities, such as state police, are the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the centers GAO contacted, the centers varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies. The majority of the operational fusion centers GAO contacted had federal personnel, including from DHS or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), assigned to them as of September 2007. DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address challenges fusion center officials identified. DHS and DOJ have provided many fusion centers access to their information systems, but fusion center officials cited challenges accessing and managing multiple information systems. Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for state and local personnel and set timeliness goals for granting clearances. However, officials cited challenges obtaining and using clearances. DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have also taken steps to develop guidance and provide technical assistance to fusion centers, for instance, by issuing guidelines for establishing and operating centers. However, officials at 21 centers cited challenges with the availability of training for mission-specific issues. DHS and DOJ have continued providing a technical assistance program for fusion centers and disseminated a baseline capabilities draft in March 2008 that outlines minimum operational standards for fusion centers. While this support and guidance is promising, it is too soon to determine the extent to which it will address challenges identified by officials contacted. Finally, officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers contacted reported facing challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 centers reported challenges with funding, some of which affected these centers' sustainability. To support fusion centers, both DHS and the FBI have assigned, and continue to assign, personnel to the centers. To help address funding issues, DHS has provided funding for fusion-center related activities. The National Strategy for Information Sharing, issued in October 2007 by the President, states that the federal government will support the establishment of fusion centers and help sustain them through grant funding, technical assistance, and training. However, some fusion center officials raised concerns about how specifically the federal government was planning to assist state and local governments to sustain fusion centers as it works to incorporate fusion centers into the ISE and to implement the strategy.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing on fusion  centers. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, most states and several  local governments have established fusion centers to address gaps in  homeland security and law enforcement information sharing by the federal  government and to provide a conduit of this information within the state.  While fusion centers vary, reflecting differences in state and local needs,  the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007  (9/11 Commission Act) defines a fusion center as a “collaborative effort of  two or more federal, state, local, or tribal government agencies that  combine resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing  the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and  respond to criminal or terrorist activity.”
With information-sharing weaknesses recognized as a major contributing  factor in the nation’s lack of preparedness for the September 11 attacks, a  number of information-sharing initiatives were mandated in the  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence  Reform Act). For example, the Intelligence Reform Act, as amended in  August 2007 by the 9/11 Commission Act, requires the President to take  action to facilitate the sharing of terrorism-related information by  establishing an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) to combine  policies, procedures, and technologies that link people, systems, and  information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities  and the private sector. To oversee development and implementation of  the ISE, the act also required the President to appoint a program manager,  which the President did in April 2005.
The Program Manager for the ISE (PM-ISE), the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are taking steps to  partner with fusion centers as part of the information sharing  environment. In November 2006, the PM-ISE issued a plan for  implementing the ISE that incorporated presidentially approved  recommendations for federal, state, local, and private-sector information  sharing. The implementation plan acknowledges that the collaboration  between fusion centers and with the federal government marks a  tremendous increase in the nation’s overall analytic capacity that can be  used to combat terrorism, and it identifies the creation of an integrated  nationwide network of fusion centers as a way to promote two-way  information sharing with the federal government. Under the plan, DHS and  DOJ are to assume responsibility for technical assistance and training to  support fusion centers. Both DHS and DOJ have established program  offices to oversee their relationships with fusion centers. In October 2007,  the President issued the first National Strategy for Information Sharing:  Success and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related Information  Sharing (National Strategy), which further highlights the importance of  state and local fusion centers as valuable information-sharing resources to  be incorporated into the national information sharing framework.
In addition, the 9/11 Commission Act contains several provisions related to  fusion centers. For example, in accordance with the act, DHS established  a fusion center program office. This office is responsible for providing  operational and intelligence advice and assistance to fusion centers,  facilitating coordination and information flow between fusion centers and  DHS, and deploying DHS personnel to fusion centers. In addition, the act  requires that the Secretary of DHS, in consultation with the Attorney  General, establish guidelines for fusion centers that include standards  related to privacy policies and training.
My testimony today discusses (1) the characteristics of state and local  fusion centers as of September 2007 and (2) the extent to which efforts  under way by the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ are helping to address some of  the challenges identified by fusion centers. My statement is based on   (1) the results of our October 2007 report that discusses the status and  characteristics of 58 state and local fusion centers as well as federal  efforts underway to help address challenges the centers identified; and   (2) updated information we obtained in March 2008 about selected federal  efforts to support fusion centers.  To obtain updated information, we  reviewed plans and documents describing these federal efforts and  attended the second annual national fusion center conference. We  conducted this work according to generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Most States and Several Local Jurisdictions Have or Are Planning Fusion Centers That Vary in Their Characteristics
paragraphs: Almost all states and several local governments have established or are in  the process of establishing a fusion center. Specifically, officials in 43 of  the 58 fusion centers we contacted described their centers as operational,  and officials in 15 centers considered their centers to be in the planning or  early stages of development as of September 2007. Officials cited a variety  of reasons why their state or local area established a fusion center. To  improve information sharing—related to homeland security, terrorism,  and law enforcement—among federal, state, and local entities and to  prevent terrorism or threats after the attacks of September 11 were the  most frequently cited reasons for establishing a fusion center. Several  officials cited the need to enhance information sharing within their own  jurisdictions across disciplines as the reason why they established a  center. While 9 centers opened in the couple of years after the attacks of  September 11, 2001, 34 of the 43 operational centers have opened since  January 2004 as shown in figure 1.
Consistent with the 9/11 Commission Act’s definition of a fusion center  and the purpose of a fusion center, as defined in the Fusion Center  Guidelines, officials in 41 of the 43 operational centers we contacted said  that their scopes of operations focused on more than just  counterterrorism. For instance, officials in 22 of these centers described  their centers’ scope as all crimes or all crimes and counterterrorism, and  officials in 19 operational centers said that their scopes of operations  included all-hazards information (such as related to public health and  safety or emergency response). Further, 23 of the 36 operational fusion  centers that provided us mission statements had missions that involved  collecting, analyzing, and disseminating criminal as well as terrorism- related information. Eleven other fusion centers had missions that  involved enhancing, supporting, or coordinating information and  intelligence dissemination to both law enforcement and homeland security  agencies. Officials told us that adopting a broader focus helped provide  information about all threats because of the link of many crimes to  terrorist activity and also increased the centers’ sustainability, for  instance, by including additional stakeholders. Indeed, the National  Strategy highlights the importance of the centers fostering a culture that  recognizes the importance of fusing “all crimes with national security  implications” and “all hazards” information, which often involves  identifying criminal activity and other information that might be a  precursor to a terrorist plot.
Law enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of  investigation, were the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the  operational centers we contacted. The centers varied in their staff sizes  and partnerships with other agencies, ranging from fewer than 5  employees to over 80. In addition to a variety of state and local law  enforcement agencies, some centers included personnel detailed from  emergency management, fire, corrections, or transportation partners. As  of September 2007, at least 34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we  contacted reported that they had personnel from at least one federal  agency assigned to their centers. For example, DHS had deployed full-time  intelligence officers to 17 of the 43 operational fusion centers we  contacted and was in the process of staffing 8 additional centers. About  three quarters of the operational centers we contacted reported that the  FBI had assigned personnel, including intelligence analysts and special  agents, to their centers. Additionally, 12 of the operational centers we  contacted were colocated in an FBI field office or with an FBI task force,  such as a Joint Terrorism Task Force or a Field Intelligence Group.  Further, 19 of the operational centers reported that they had other DHS or  DOJ components represented in their centers, such as personnel from  Customs and Border Protection; Immigration and Customs Enforcement;  Transportation Security Administration; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and  Firearms; or Drug Enforcement Administration.
Many fusion centers reported having access to DHS’s and DOJ’s  unclassified networks or systems, such as the Homeland Security  Information Network (HSIN) and Law Enforcement Online (LEO),  containing, among other things, terrorism-related information. For  example, as of September 2007, 40 of the 43 operational centers reported  they had access to HSIN, and 39 reported having access to LEO. In  addition, 16 of the 43 centers said they had or were in the process of  obtaining access to DHS’s classified network of secret-level homeland  security data, and 23 reported they had or were in the process of obtaining  access to the FBI’s classified systems containing, among other things,  secret-level investigative case files.
Thus far, products disseminated and services provided also varied. Fusion  centers reported that they issued a variety of products, such as daily and  weekly bulletins on general criminal or intelligence information and  assessments that, in general, provided in-depth reporting on an emerging  threat, group, or crime.
section_title: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help Address Some Reported Challenges
paragraphs: Fusion center officials identified challenges in establishing and operating  their centers in several areas, such as accessing and managing multiple  information systems, obtaining and using security clearances, finding  sufficient guidance and training, obtaining and retaining personnel, and  obtaining funding. DHS and DOJ, recognizing the importance of fusion  centers in information sharing, have efforts under way that begin to  address many of these challenges.
subsections: section_title: DHS, DOJ, and PM-ISE Have Some Actions Under Way to Address Fusion Center Challenges with Accessing and Managing Information Systems
paragraphs: Fusion center officials reported challenges accessing and managing  multiple information systems. In October 2007, we reported that DHS and  the FBI had provided many operational fusion centers access to their  primary unclassified information systems (HSIN and LEO) and had  outlined plans to provide access to their primary classified networks to  state and local centers that had federal personnel at the center. However,  officials at 31 of the 58 centers we contacted reported challenges obtaining  access to federal information systems or networks. For instance, officials  in some centers cited challenges with DHS and the FBI not providing  fusion center personnel with direct access to their classified systems.  Fusion center personnel in these centers had to rely on federal personnel  who were assigned to the center or other state personnel assigned to FBI  task forces to access these systems, obtain the relevant information, and  share it with them. Further, officials in 12 fusion centers reported  challenges meeting system security requirements or establishing the  technical capabilities necessary to access information systems, and DHS  and the FBI had taken some steps to address these challenges.  For  example, we reported that DHS reviews the fusion centers’ security status  and assesses its adequacy in light of its intention to deploy personnel and  information systems to the center. In March 2008, the DHS Under  Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis stated that DHS planned to deploy  its secret-level homeland security data network to 41 fusion centers by the  end of fiscal year 2008.
While officials in many fusion centers cited challenges obtaining access to  systems, primarily classified ones, officials in 30 of the 58 fusion centers  we contacted reported that the heavy volume of information or the  existence of multiple systems with often redundant information was a  challenge to manage. Officials in 18 fusion centers said that they had  difficulty with what they perceived to be the high volume of information  their center receives, variously describing the flow of information as  “overwhelming,” “information overload,” and “excessive.” For example,  officials described how center personnel must sort through the large  amount of information, much of which is not relevant to the center, to find  information that is useful or important to them. In addition, officials in 18  fusion centers found the lack of integration among these multiple,  competing, or duplicative information systems challenging, or said they  wanted a single mechanism or system through which to receive or send  information.
In October 2007, we reported that officials from the PM-ISE’s office were  collaborating with other agencies, including DHS and DOJ, to identify  potential opportunities to streamline system access and improve the  quality and flow of information. For example, PM-ISE officials reported  that these entities had completed a review of the most commonly used  systems, such as HSIN, LEO, and the Regional Information Sharing  Systems, that included an examination of users’ needs to identify  potential areas to streamline system access. In October 2007, we also  reported that such a review was in accordance with recommendations that  fusion centers made during the first annual national fusion center  conference in March 2007 and with what several officials we contacted  told us. Specifically, officials in 23 of the 58 fusion centers told us that  DHS and DOJ, to facilitate implementation of a national network of fusion  centers, should reduce the number of existing systems or develop a  unified platform or mechanism for information sharing with fusion  centers. In addition, the PM-ISE, along with DHS, DOJ, and other federal  agencies, are taking steps to improve the quality and flow of information  through the establishment of an Interagency Threat Assessment and  Coordination Group (ITACG), which was made a statutorily mandated  body by the 9/11 Commission Act. This group, which is to include state,  local, and tribal representatives detailed to work with the National  Counterterrorism Center, is to provide advice, counsel, and subject-matter  expertise to the intelligence community about the types of terrorism- related information needed by state, local, and tribal governments and  how these entities use that terrorism-related information to fulfill their  counterterrorism responsibilities. In doing so, the PM-ISE reported that  the ITACG is to enable the timely production by the National  Counterterrorism Center of clear, relevant, and federally coordinated  terrorism-related information products intended for dissemination to state,  local, and tribal officials.  In October 2007, we reported that PM-ISE  officials indicated that the ITACG had achieved an initial operational  capability. As of March 2008, four state and local law enforcement  representatives had been detailed to the ITACG to provide a nonfederal  perspective to the intelligence community in its situational and threat  reporting and intelligence products, by, for example, requesting changes to  report language to better address state and local needs. According to one  of the representatives, these changes have involved requesting that  specific tactical information be included in reports or that, where possible,  the security classification of a report be lowered so that it could be  disseminated more broadly to state and local officials.  While these efforts  to improve the quality and flow of information to state and local users are  promising, it is too soon to determine the extent to which they will  address the challenges in accessing and managing information reported to  us by fusion center officials.
section_title: DHS and the FBI Provide Clearances to Fusion Center Officials, but Officials Cited Some Challenges with Obtaining and Using Clearances
paragraphs: Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for numerous  state and local personnel in order to access classified information and  have set goals to reduce the length of time it takes to obtain a security  clearance. For example, DHS set a goal of 90 days to complete a Secret  clearance, and the FBI set a goal of 45 to 60 days to complete a Secret  clearance and 6 to 9 months to complete a Top Secret clearance. DHS and  the FBI have also provided centers with information about the security  clearance process and time frames, stating that processing time for  individual security clearances can vary, depending on complexity.  However, obtaining and using security clearances represented a challenge  for many of the fusion centers (44 of 58) we contacted. For instance,  officials at 32 of the centers cited difficulties with the length of time it  takes to receive a security clearance from DHS or the FBI.  However, some  fusion center officials acknowledged that that the length of time to  conduct the required background checks was necessary to ensure that  clearances were only given to individuals who meet the requirements.
In October 2007, we also reported that while law and executive order  provide that a security clearance granted by one government agency  should generally be accepted by other agencies, officials in 19 of the  centers we contacted encountered difficulties with federal agencies,  particularly DHS and the FBI, accepting each others’ clearances. This  reported lack of reciprocity could hinder the centers’ ability to access  facilities, computer systems, and information from multiple agencies. DHS  and DOJ officials said that they were not aware of fusion centers  encountering recent challenges with reciprocity of security clearances.  However, they said that there were complications in the clearance process  because, for example, multiple federal agencies carry out their own  processes and grant clearances without central coordination.
section_title: DHS and DOJ Continue to Provide Guidance, Technical Assistance, and Training to Fusion Centers
paragraphs: DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE continue to provide fusion centers with  guidance, technical assistance, and training to help address their  challenges in these areas. In October 2007, we reported that DHS and DOJ  had, in August 2006, issued jointly developed Fusion Center Guidelines  that outline 18 recommended elements for establishing and operating  fusion centers. Intended to help ensure that fusion centers were set up and  operated consistently, they cover elements such as ensuring appropriate  security measures are in place for facility, data, and personnel. Officials in  many (48 of 58) of the fusion centers we contacted said that they found the  guidelines generally good and useful, however others said they were not  specific enough to address their challenges. In addition, officials at 19  fusion centers said that they lacked guidance on specific information- sharing policies and procedures, such as privacy and civil liberties issues.  Furthermore, officials at 21 of the centers we contacted said that the  availability of adequate training for mission-related issues, such as training  on intelligence analysis, was a challenge. Officials in 11 centers, most of  which were operational centers that had been in existence for more than 2  years, expressed a need for the federal government to establish standards  for training fusion center analysts. This could help ensure that analysts are  trained in a similar way nationwide, thereby facilitating communication  amongst fusion center analysts.
DHS and DOJ provide a technical assistance service program for fusion  centers, which, among other services, includes assistance developing a  comprehensive privacy and civil liberties policy, and have ongoing efforts  to provide training to fusion centers. Additionally, along with the PM-ISE  and others, DHS and DOJ have sponsored regional and national  conferences, including the second annual national fusion center  conference in March 2008, which was designed to support fusion centers  in building capabilities and understanding their roles and responsibilities  as described in the National Strategy. In addition, DHS and DOJ, in  collaboration with others, disseminated in March 2008 a draft baseline  capabilities document.  Building on the Fusion Center Guidelines, the  document outlines baseline capabilities and steps that fusion centers  could take to ensure compliance in 12 topic areas, including management  and governance, security, intelligence analysis and production, and  intelligence and information dissemination.  The document states that  when a fusion center achieves all of these standards, it is considered to  have the standards, structures, and tools in place to support the gathering,  analysis, and dissemination of terrorism, homeland security, and law  enforcement information. Such a baseline level of capability is critical to  establishing a national, integrated network of fusion centers, according to  the National Strategy. DHS and DOJ solicited the feedback of state and  local officials on this document at the national fusion center conference— the results of which have yet to be compiled and released.
section_title: Fusion Center Officials Cited Challenges with Personnel and Funding; DHS and the FBI Are Helping to Address These Issues to Some Extent
paragraphs: Many fusion center officials we contacted reported challenges related to  obtaining personnel (43 of 58) and obtaining and maintaining funding  when establishing and operating their centers (54 of 58)—challenges that  some of these officials also said affected their centers’ sustainability. For  example, officials in 37 centers said they encountered challenges with  federal, state, or local agencies not being able to detail personnel to their  fusion center, particularly in the face of resource constraints. Fusion  centers rely on such details as a means of staffing the centers and  enhancing information sharing with other state and local agencies.
Furthermore, officials in 20 of the centers we contacted said that they  faced challenges finding, attracting, and retaining qualified personnel. For  instance, one official said that it was challenging to find personnel with the  expertise to understand the concept behind the development of the center  and to use the tools to build the center. While many of these reported  challenges were attributed to difficulties at the state and local level, we  reported that DHS and the FBI had ongoing efforts to assign personnel to  support centers and facilitate information sharing. Both DHS and the FBI  have continued to support fusion centers by deploying personnel,  consistent with the 9/11 Commission Act. As of March 2008, DHS had  deployed 23 officers to fusion centers and has plans to place officers in as  many as 35 centers by the end of fiscal year 2008, and the FBI had assigned  about 200 personnel to 44 fusion centers, according to DHS and FBI  officials respectively.
In terms of funding, officials encountered challenges obtaining both  federal and state funding. Specifically, officials in 35 of the 58 centers  encountered challenges with the complexity of the federal grant process,  uncertainty as to whether they would receive federal funds, or declining  federal funding, and officials from 28 of the 58 centers reported having  difficulty obtaining state or local funding. They said that these issues  created confusion for their centers over the steps needed to secure federal  funds, made it difficult to plan for the future, and created concerns about  the fusion centers’ abilities to sustain their capabilities for the long term.  Fusion center officials also identified challenges with restrictions on the  use of federal grant funds, unclear and changing grant guidance, and a lack  of understanding of how federal funding decisions are made. For  example, officials in 21 fusion centers said that obtaining adequate funding  for personnel was difficult, and officials in 17 fusion centers found federal  time limits on the use of grant funds for personnel challenging.
In October 2007, we reported that DHS had provided grant funding for  fusion-related activities and had made some changes to ease the grant  process and adjust some of the restrictions on the timing and use of grant  funds. For example, DHS expanded grant funding in fiscal year 2006 in the  area of allowable costs for information sharing and collaborative efforts.  Funds could be used by states to develop and enhance fusion centers,  particularly by hiring contract or government employees as intelligence  analysts; purchasing information-technology equipment; or hiring  consultants to develop and enhance fusion centers. However, we also  reported that, despite this funding, fusion center officials were concerned  about the extent of federal support they could expect over the long term,  especially in relation to the role of their state or local jurisdictions. Given  that at the time, federal plans or guidance did not articulate the long-term  role the federal government expected to play in fusion centers, we  recommended, and the PM-ISE and DHS concurred, that the federal  government determine and articulate its long-term fusion center role and  whether it expects to provide resources to help ensure their sustainability.  Further, we stated that particular emphasis should be placed on how best  to sustain those fusion center functions that support a national  information-sharing capability as critical nodes of the ISE.
In promoting that fusion centers achieve a baseline level of capability, the  National Strategy states that the federal government will support the  establishment of fusion centers and help sustain them through grant  funding, technical assistance, and training to achieve such a baseline level  of capability. The strategy outlines specific roles and responsibilities for  federal, state, local, and tribal authorities in five areas that are related to  the establishment and continued operations of fusion centers and for  establishing a national integrated network of centers. It notes that these  roles and responsibilities were developed in partnership with state and  local officials and represent a collective view. While the strategy  acknowledges that fusion centers are owned and managed by state and  local governments, it identifies the objective is to assist state and local  governments in the establishment and sustained operation of these  centers. However, some fusion center officials raised concerns at the  national fusion center conference about how specifically the federal  government was planning to assist state and local governments to sustain  fusion centers.  For example, whether federal funding for fusion centers  would continue to be available through DHS’s homeland security grant  program or whether in the future there would be fusion-center specific  funding has yet to be determined. In addition, some officials raised  questions about limits on federal funding for personnel. For example,  according to the fiscal year 2008 homeland security grant program  guidance, costs associated with hiring new intelligence analysts are still  allowable for 2 years. After which, the states and urban areas will be  responsible for supporting the sustainment costs of those intelligence  analysts (as well as providing a budget plan for doing so) after the 2-year  federal funding period is over. In our October 2007 report, we reported on  challenges that officials found with federal time limits on the use of grant  funds for personnel. In particular, some of these officials expressed  concerns about maintaining their personnel levels, and one official told us  that the 2-year limit on the use of DHS grant funds for personnel made  retaining personnel challenging because state and local agencies may lack  the resources to continue funding the position, which could hinder the  center’s ability to continue to operate. In discussing the implementation of  the National Strategy at the fusion center conference, a Homeland Security  Council official stated that the question of federal versus state and local  roles in sustaining fusion centers is a very difficult question and one that is  not yet resolved but is ongoing.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, fusion centers are operating or are being  established in almost all states and several local jurisdictions. Although  fusion centers were primarily established to meet or enhance information  sharing within a state or local area, they have become a critical component  of the federal government’s plans as it works to improve information  sharing in accordance with law and policy. Indeed, the National Strategy  recognizes fusion centers as vital assets to information sharing and critical  in the creation of an integrated national network to promote two-way  sharing of terrorism-related information. Given the federal interest in  fusion centers and the centers’ interest in supporting such a national  network, it is important that the federal government continue to provide  fusion centers with added value as an incentive to facilitate such a  network. In October 2007 we reported that DHS’s and DOJ’s efforts to  assist fusion centers, such as providing access to information systems,  security clearances, guidance and technical assistance, personnel, and  funding, had begun to address a number of the challenges fusion center  directors identified to us. Several of those efforts are continuing and  evolving, including the establishment of ITACG to improve the quality of  information provided to state and local users and the release of baseline  capabilities for the operation of fusion centers. These efforts are  promising; however, it is too soon to determine the extent to which they  will address all of the challenges reported to us by fusion center officials.  It is also important for fusion center management to understand the  federal government’s role with respect to these centers since this affects  state and local governments’ support to centers. In this regard, we  recommended in our October 2007 report that the federal government  define and articulate its long-term fusion center role. The National  Strategy clearly articulates a vision for the federal government’s role in  supporting centers—that is by helping to sustain centers through grant  funding, technical assistance, and training. However, fusion center  officials raised some concerns about sustainability of funding and  personnel as the federal government continues work to incorporate fusion  centers into the information sharing environment and implement the  National Strategy.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at  this time.
section_title: Contact Information
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Eileen Larence  at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at larencee@gao.gov. Individuals making key  contributions to this testimony include Mary Catherine Hult, Tom  Lombardi, and Jeffrey Niblack.
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