Combating Wildlife Trafficking: Agencies Are Taking a Range of Actions, but the Task Force Lacks Performance Targets for Assessing Progress
Published: 2016-09-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:
Africa’s iconic elephants and rhinos face extinction
The illegal trade in wildlife is worth an estimated $7 billion to $23 billion annually—and is pushing some animals to the brink of extinction.
To help combat wildlife trafficking and the transnational and other criminal groups profiting from it, President Obama established a federal task force in 2013. While the task force has helped address trafficking by assisting local law enforcement and supporting conservation efforts, it is difficult to gauge its progress.
We recommend that the task force develop specific performance targets to assess progress and identify areas for improvement.

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Illegal trade in wildlife—wildlife trafficking—continues to push some protected and endangered animal species to the brink of extinction, according to the Department of State. Wildlife trafficking undermines conservation efforts, can fuel corruption, and destabilizes local communities that depend on wildlife for biodiversity and ecotourism revenues. This trade is estimated to be worth $7 billion to $23 billion annually. In 2013, President Obama issued an executive order that established the interagency Task Force charged with developing a strategy to guide U.S. efforts on this issue.
GAO was asked to review U.S. government efforts to combat wildlife trafficking. This report focuses on wildlife trafficking in Africa, particularly of large animals, and examines, among other things, (1) what is known about the security implications of wildlife trafficking and its consequences, (2) actions Task Force agencies are taking to combat wildlife trafficking, and (3) the extent to which the Task Force assesses its progress. GAO analyzed agency documents and met with U.S. and host country officials in Washington, D.C.; Kenya; South Africa; and Tanzania.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While criminal elements of all kinds, including some terrorist entities and rogue security personnel, engage in poaching and transporting ivory and rhino horn across Africa, transnational organized criminals are the driving force behind wildlife trafficking, according to reports GAO reviewed and agency officials GAO spoke with in the United States and Africa. Wildlife trafficking can contribute to instability and violence and harm people as well as animals. According to reports, about 1,000 rangers were killed from 2004 to 2014. Wildlife trafficking in Africa particularly affects large animals, with populations of elephants and rhinos diminishing at a rate that puts them at risk of extinction.
Agencies of the interagency Task Force leading U.S. efforts to combat wildlife trafficking are taking a range of conservation and capacity-building actions. The Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service, for example, provides law enforcement assistance and supports global conservation efforts. The Department of State contributes to law enforcement capacity building and diplomatic efforts, while the Department of Justice prosecutes criminals and conducts legal training to improve partner-country capacity. Further, the U.S. Agency for International Development works to build community and national- level enforcement capacity and supports various approaches to combat wildlife trafficking. Several other agencies also contribute expertise or resources to support various activities outlined in the Task Force's National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking Implementation Plan .
The Task Force provides some information about progress, but it lacks performance targets, making effectiveness difficult to determine at the strategic level. A fundamental element in an organization's efforts to manage for results is its ability to set specific targets that reflect strategic goals. Task Force officials identified a range of reasons why they do not have targets, including dependence on global partners, the long time periods needed to document results, and limited data availability. However, Task Force agencies have provided performance targets for other efforts that face similar challenges. Without targets, it is unclear whether the Task Force's performance is meeting expectations, making it difficult to gauge progress and to ensure that resources are being utilized most effectively in their efforts against wildlife trafficking.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Secretaries of State and the Interior and the Attorney General of the United States, as co-chairs, jointly work with the Task Force to develop performance targets related to the National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking Implementation Plan . Agencies agreed with GAO's recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: According to the Department of State (State), wildlife trafficking is a  multibillion-dollar transnational criminal activity that is both a conservation  issue and a security threat. Conservative estimates place it among the  top-ranked illicit types of trade. Wildlife trafficking undermines  conservation efforts, can fuel corruption, and destabilizes communities  that depend on wildlife for biodiversity and ecotourism revenues.  Poaching and the illegal trade in wildlife—both of which are part of wildlife  trafficking—continue to push some protected and endangered species to  the brink of extinction. Wildlife trafficking is fueled by unchecked demand  for exotic pets, culinary delicacies, and traditional medicines. The capture  and slaughter of animals is devastating wild populations of elephants,  rhinoceroses, tigers, pangolins, turtles, exotic birds, and many other  species.
In 2013, President Obama issued an executive order that established an  interagency Task Force and charged it with developing a strategy to  guide U.S. efforts to combat wildlife trafficking. The Presidential Task  Force on Wildlife Trafficking (Task Force) is co-chaired by the  Departments of the Interior (DOI), Justice (DOJ), and State, and the  White House released the Task Force’s National Strategy for Combating  Wildlife Trafficking (the Strategy) in February 2014. The Strategy  establishes guiding principles and priorities for U.S. efforts to stem illegal  trade in wildlife. In February 2015, the Task Force released the National  Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking Implementation Plan  (Implementation Plan), which identifies specific objectives and steps  supported by programs overseen by Task Force agencies.
You asked us to review U.S. efforts aimed at combating wildlife trafficking  (CWT). This report focuses on wildlife trafficking in Africa, particularly of  large animals, and supply side activities, which include poaching,  transport, and export of wildlife and wildlife parts. We examined (1) what  is known about the security implications of wildlife trafficking and its  consequences; (2) actions Task Force agencies are taking to combat  wildlife trafficking; (3) State and U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID) monitoring and evaluation of CWT efforts in select  countries; and (4) the extent to which the Task Force assesses its  progress.
To obtain information for background and context, we reviewed  information related to rhinoceros and elephant products and poaching.  We also examined data on the flow of illegal ivory and seizures. We did  not assess the reliability of these data.
To address our objectives, we analyzed agency documentation, met with  Task Force agency officials and nongovernmental wildlife trafficking  experts in Washington, D.C., and conducted fieldwork in Kenya, South  Africa, and Tanzania. We selected these countries using a combination of  criteria: (1) Since fiscal year 2013, each country has received at least $1  million annually in U.S. government funding for efforts related to CWT; (2)  CWT activities are underway in each country and are expected to make  significant impact; and (3) each country has the presence of at least two  U.S. government agencies conducting CWT work. This sample is not  generalizable to all the countries in which the United States has CWT- related programs. While in each country in Africa, we interviewed officials  who served on each embassy’s CWT working group, which generally  included officials from State, USAID, and the Departments of Defense,  Homeland Security, the Interior, and Justice. We also interviewed host  government officials, implementing partner representatives, park  authorities, and community members.
To examine monitoring efforts in these countries, we worked with State  and USAID to identify one program in each country based on the criterion  that the program must have CWT-related activities. Agency officials  identified a total of four programs that met that criterion, and we assessed  the monitoring documentation for those four programs. We identified nine  widely accepted monitoring elements and reviewed the documentation  the agencies provided for each program to determine whether it  addressed each principle—generally, partially, or not at all. We cannot  generalize from this sample of programs in these selected countries to  the universe of all CWT programs in all countries.
To examine evaluation efforts, we identified CWT-related programs in the  three selected countries that had available evaluation reports. In total, we  reviewed the evaluation reports for six USAID-supported programs. State  was not able to identify any CWT-related programs with an available  evaluation report in any of the three countries. To assess the degree to  which these evaluations were conducted in adherence to select  evaluation standards, we used criteria identified in prior GAO work. We  then identified the goals and objectives of each evaluation report to  determine the extent to which the evaluations addressed CWT goals.
To address the extent to which the Task Force assesses its progress, we  analyzed relevant documentation and information, including the National  Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking Implementation Plan and the  2015 Annual Progress Assessment. In addition, we reviewed  documentation on results management and spoke with Task Force  officials. Using prior GAO work, we established that a fundamental  element in an organization’s efforts to manage for results is its ability to  set performance goals with specific targets and time frames that reflect  strategic goals and to measure progress toward its performance goals as  part of its strategic planning efforts. In addition, according to Standards  for Internal Control in the Federal Government, managers need to  compare actual performance against planned or expected results and to  analyze significant differences. Using these criteria, we analyzed the  extent to which the Task Force assessed its progress. Appendix II  provides a detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2015 to September  2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Wildlife Trafficking Is a Multibillion-Dollar Illegal Trade and Threatens Iconic Species
paragraphs: According to a 2014 United Nations Environment Programme report, the  illegal trade in wildlife has been estimated by different sources to be worth  between $7 billion and $23 billion annually. The report also indicates that  poached African elephant ivory, just one of many wildlife products, may  represent an end-user street value in Asia of an estimated $165 million to  $188 million per year. According to a 2012 joint report by the World  Wildlife Fund, a conservation organization, and Dalberg, a strategic  consulting firm, the price of rhino horn had reached approximately  $27,000 per pound—which, at that time, was twice the value of gold and  platinum and more valuable on the black market than diamonds and  cocaine.
Wildlife trafficking threatens iconic species, including elephants and  rhinos in Africa. According to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS),  before 1900, black rhinos lived throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa,  but from 1970 to 1992, rhino populations declined 96 percent. More  recently, from 2007 to 2015 in South Africa, poachers killed 5,061 rhinos,  according to the government of South Africa (see fig. 1). Currently, an  estimated 25,000 rhinos remain on the continent, according to FWS.
According to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered  Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the number of elephants killed  each year has reached levels deemed unsustainable. The illicit ivory  trade has grown by more than three times since 1998, and elephants are  being killed faster than they can reproduce. From 2002 to 2011, the total  population of forest elephants decreased by an estimated 62 percent  across central Africa. According to FWS, from 2010 to 2012, an estimated  100,000 elephants were killed for their ivory, an average of approximately  1 every 15 minutes. The agency also reported that poaching continues at  an alarming rate and is at its highest level in decades. Specifically, it  reported that the current rate of decline is unsustainable and puts the  African elephant at risk of extinction. Elephants are under threat even in  areas that were once thought to be safe havens. During our fieldwork in  Africa, we observed an elephant that had been shot and died in a  protected area of northern Kenya, illustrating the nature of the challenge.
section_title: Africa and Supply-Side Wildlife Trafficking Activities
paragraphs: According to the Strategy, while the United States is among the world’s  major end markets for wildlife trafficking in general, Africa has become  one of the largest sources of animal and plant species to supply criminal  networks trading to Asia. As one nongovernmental organization (NGO)  reported, wildlife products illegally leave the African continent by air or by  sea through increasingly sophisticated routes and concealment methods.  In Asia, increased demand for ivory and rhino horn stems from a rapidly  expanding wealthy class that views these commodities as luxury goods  that enhance social status, as reported in the Strategy.
The flow of ivory illustrates the Africa-Asia nexus. According to a report by  an NGO that works with U.S. government agencies on CWT, the primary  axis for the illicit ivory trade is from Africa to East Asia, through the  international container shipping system. The majority of shipments exit  Kenya and Tanzania bound for China, Thailand, and Vietnam. Significant  ivory seizures occur in Malaysia and Singapore due to their role as  transshipment hubs. A 2016 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime  (UNODC) report indicates that over 70 percent of the ivory seized from  2009 to 2013 was found in large shipments of raw ivory. Figure 3 shows  sources and destinations of ivory seizures, based on seizure data from  the UNODC, with arrows representing repeated indications of a source- destination pairing.
section_title: Brief History of U.S. Task Force, Strategy, and Other CWT Efforts
paragraphs: In 2013, President Obama issued an executive order that established the  Task Force and charged it with developing a strategy to guide U.S. efforts  on CWT. Figure 4 outlines selected U.S. government CWT actions from  2013 to 2016. In February 2014, the White House released the Strategy,  which lays out guiding principles and strategic priorities for U.S. efforts to  stem illegal trade in wildlife. In February 2015, the Task Force released  the Implementation Plan for the Strategy, which identifies a range of  objectives and agency roles. For each objective, the Implementation Plan  designates one or more lead and participating agencies, departments, or  offices. One objective, for example, is to achieve a near-total U.S. ban on  trade in elephant ivory and rhino horn. The lead agency designated for  this objective is DOI, working through FWS; the participating agencies are  DOJ, the Department of Commerce through its National Oceanic and  Atmospheric Administration, the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS), and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. The  Implementation Plan identifies a total of 24 objectives categorized under  three strategic priorities:
Strengthen Enforcement;
Reduce Demand for Illegally Traded Wildlife; and
Build International Cooperation, Commitment, and Public-Private  Partnerships.
In June 2015, FWS, in coordination with wildlife and conservation  partners from government, NGOs, and the private sector, hosted its  second major ivory crush event to educate consumers and to send a  message to ivory traffickers that the United States will not tolerate this  illegal trade. One ton of ivory seized during an FWS undercover  operation, plus other ivory from the New York State Department of  Environmental Conservation and the Association of Zoos and Aquariums,  was crushed in Times Square, New York City. In June 2016, FWS  finalized a rule that, according to FWS, established a near-total ban on  the domestic commercial trade of African elephant ivory. The rule  prohibits the import and export of African elephant ivory, with limited  exceptions. In March 2016, the Task Force issued an Annual Progress  Assessment (APA), which describes accomplishments related to the  Implementation Plan. In addition, Congress is considering multiple CWT  legislative proposals. For example, in November 2015 and September  2016, the House and Senate, respectively, passed legislation which aims,  among other things, to support global antipoaching efforts, strengthen the  capacity of partner countries to counter wildlife trafficking, and designate  major wildlife-trafficking countries.
section_title: Agency Spending on Combating Wildlife Trafficking Is Difficult to Determine
paragraphs: From fiscal year 2014 to 2016, Congress directed that not less than $180  million be made available to combat wildlife trafficking (see fig. 5).
While annual appropriations acts directed that a minimum amount be  made available to combat the transnational threat of wildlife poaching and  trafficking in each fiscal year from 2014 to 2016, determining how much  agencies have obligated to CWT efforts is challenging. According to  agency officials, this is due in part to the inherently interdisciplinary nature  of CWT, which involves development conservation, domestic  conservation, local law enforcement, combating transnational crime, and  demand reduction. According to USAID, extrapolating the CWT  component of obligations is not possible in accounting terms, but  programs that include CWT goals and funding are managed to achieve  intended CWT objectives. However, some agencies have attempted to  make informed estimates of CWT funding, based on a specific USAID- State definition, and have identified CWT as a key issue in their budget  justifications. Agency officials also told us that they use different  methodologies to identify CWT funding because CWT activities often are  part of programs that have multiple goals, and funding stems from  different authorizations.
section_title: Transnational Organized Criminals Drive Wildlife Trafficking, Contributing to Violence and Instability
subsections: section_title: Transnational Organized Criminals and Networks Drive Wildlife Trafficking
paragraphs: While criminal elements of all kinds, including some terrorist entities and  rogue security personnel, are involved in poaching and transporting ivory  and rhino horn across Africa, transnational organized criminals and  networks are the driving force behind wildlife trafficking, according to  reports we reviewed and agency officials we spoke with in the United  States and Africa. A 2016 UNODC report states that wildlife trafficking is  increasingly recognized as a specialized area for transnational organized  criminals and a significant threat to many animal species. A report by an  NGO that works with U.S. government agencies on CWT analyzed the  flow of ivory and found that a relatively narrow logistics and distribution  chain suggests collusion of transnational criminal organizations. In  addition, a representative of the U.S. Intelligence Community and other  agency officials in Washington, D.C., indicated that organized criminal  groups that have the scale and sophistication to conduct illicit trade  internationally are the main actors responsible for moving large volumes  of wildlife products across the world. Agency officials we spoke with in  Africa also told us that because such criminal organizations have global  links and the desire to earn money by any means, they play the major  role in wildlife trafficking. As of July 2016, State’s Transnational  Organized Crime Rewards Program, which authorizes rewards for certain  information regarding members of significant transnational criminal  organizations, identified the Xaysavang Network as an international  wildlife-trafficking syndicate that facilitates the killing of elephants, rhinos,  and other protected species for products such as ivory and rhino horn.
section_title: Officials and Reports Provide Mixed Views on Terrorist Group Involvement in Wildlife Trafficking
paragraphs: Agency officials we spoke with expressed varying perspectives on the  degree of terrorist group involvement in wildlife trafficking. Reporting from  NGOs is also mixed. Agency officials told us that the differences in views  may be due to a range of reasons, including a lack of a common definition  for and usage of the term “terrorist group,” lack of reliable evidence, and  the tendency for different types of criminal activities to blend together.
State applies a specific definition to designate Foreign Terrorist  Organizations (FTO), criteria for which include that the organization must  be a foreign organization, must engage in terrorist activity or retain the  capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism, and must  threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the  United States. State has designated the following, among others, as  FTOs: al Qaeda, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab, and Boko  Haram. A senior State official publicly testified that al-Shabaab is directly  or indirectly (through taxation of goods moving through areas they  control) involved in wildlife trafficking. NGOs also reported that al- Shabaab has been actively buying and selling ivory as a means of  funding their militant operations. However, another report from an NGO  found flaws with the al-Shabaab–ivory nexus. In addition, some State  and other agency officials we spoke with suggested that evidence linking  FTOs to wildlife trafficking is generally inconclusive, due in part to lack of  specific, reliable evidence.
According to State, Janjaweed and the Lord’s Resistance Army are not  FTOs, but agency officials told us these organizations are commonly  referred to as terrorist groups. The Lord’s Resistance Army, an armed  group that operates in several countries of central Africa, uses proceeds  from elephant poaching to support its illicit activities, according to agency  officials. Various reports from U.S. agencies and NGOs also implicate  Janjaweed, a group of Sudanese Arab militias, as active in wildlife  trafficking.
The 2016 UNODC report suggests that, in general, it is difficult to see  how African terrorist groups are making large sums of money by poaching  elephants for ivory in areas they control. Agency officials told us that  terrorist groups would engage in wildlife trafficking if it presented a  practical opportunity to generate revenue, and they said that some are so  engaged, but exactly where and to what extent is difficult to determine.  Moreover, activities of criminal elements blend together, a condition  referred to as “convergence” in law enforcement. Criminal organizations  can exploit the same weaknesses—corrupt institutions, porous borders,  unstable regions—to overlap and blur linkages to their illicit undertakings,  including wildlife trafficking. This, combined with the fact that illegal  activity by nature is clandestine, makes it difficult to determine the extent  to which terrorist groups are involved in wildlife trafficking, according to  agency officials.
section_title: Wildlife Trafficking Contributes to Instability and Violence
paragraphs: Wildlife trafficking contributes to instability and violence, with corruption  playing a major role, according to reports we reviewed and agency  officials we spoke with in the United States and Africa. A 2013 report from  the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) found that  systemic corruption enables the illicit ivory and rhino horn trade and that  the trade exacerbates corruption by making high-value illegal products  available to influential individuals along the supply chain, from rangers to  customs officers, police, and the military. By inducing widespread  movement of armed poachers and traffickers, ivory and rhino horn trade  also exacerbates border insecurity, particularly across porous borders,  according to the ODNI report. As an example of this kind of condition,  U.S. agency and South African officials in Kruger National Park, a key  rhino-poaching ground, told us that poachers from Mozambique cross the  South African border to hunt for wildlife and that deadly gun battles occur  on an ongoing basis. In addition, according to international organization  and NGO reports, an estimated 1,000 rangers were killed worldwide over  the decade from 2004 to 2014, which on average means that 1 ranger  died every 4 days during that period. On our visit to northern Kenya, we  met with an antipoaching ranger patrol unit (see fig. 6). The commander  told us that a team member was recently killed in the line of duty,  demonstrating the risk that rangers face on the job every day. In addition,  a high-level official in South Africa told us that a shoot-out involving  poachers recently occurred in downtown Pretoria, the capital, indicating  that wildlife trafficking-related violence can affect urban areas as well as  remote parks.
Wildlife trafficking also has adverse national and local-level economic  impacts. The 2013 ODNI report found that the illicit trade in ivory and  rhino horn arguably weakens macroeconomic and fiscal stability, deters  investment, contributes to income inequality, and hinders growth at all  levels of an economy. Tourism revenues are particularly threatened by  unchecked poaching, according to the report. Agency officials in Africa  told us that wildlife tourism provides a significant source of income. Local  communities in particular suffer when poaching occurs, because, among  other things, it reduces already limited economic opportunities. For  example, some of the villagers we spoke with in northern Kenya told us  they had at one time been poachers but then became antipoaching  rangers, because they saw first-hand that poaching produced a range of  adverse impacts on their communities, reducing revenue from tourism  while upsetting the delicate ecosystem balance and risking violent conflict  with authorities or other poachers.
section_title: U.S. Task Force Agencies Are Taking a Range of Actions to Combat Wildlife Trafficking
paragraphs: The Task Force is co-chaired by DOI, DOJ, and State, and the  Implementation Plan designates approximately 16 agencies,  departments, or offices to play a role in taking action to combat wildlife  trafficking. For the purposes of this report, we focused on the co-chair  agencies and USAID, which is one of the agencies most heavily involved  in CWT. Within DOI, FWS is responsible for conservation and  management of biological resources, and it acts as the implementing  organization for CWT efforts. State, responsible for managing U.S.  foreign affairs, contributes to CWT-related diplomacy and law  enforcement capacity-building activities. DOJ’s role in CWT involves  prosecuting criminals and conducting judicial and prosecutorial training  with partner nations. Under its development mission, USAID works with  local communities and at the national level to conserve wildlife in Africa  and around the world.
subsections: section_title: FWS Provides Law Enforcement Assistance and Supports Species Conservation Efforts
paragraphs: Through grants and other means, FWS provides law enforcement  assistance and supports conservation efforts that contribute to addressing  wildlife trafficking. The Implementation Plan gives FWS a lead or  participating role in each of the 24 objectives, making it the co-chair  agency with the most responsibility for conducting CWT work. According  to FWS officials, in fiscal year 2015, FWS awarded funding to 141 wildlife  trafficking-related projects through its International Affairs Program,  obligating approximately $20 million worldwide. This included $9.6 million  of USAID funds for the Central Africa Regional Program for the  Environment program, implemented by FWS and their partners; $7.2  million from FWS regional and species funds; and $2.6 million to counter  wildlife trafficking in Southeast Asia, implemented by FWS through an  interagency agreement with State.
In addition, in the summer of 2015, FWS placed two law enforcement  attachés in Africa to help build capacity in 16 partner nations. One attaché  is based in Botswana and another in Tanzania, but their responsibilities  are regional. The attaché in Botswana covers southern Africa and is  responsible for nine countries: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique,  Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The attaché in  Tanzania is responsible for seven countries: the Democratic Republic of  the Congo, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and  Uganda. The attachés provide countertrafficking expertise to embassy  staff and work with host government officials to build law enforcement  capacity. Their role may involve training foreign counterparts in  conducting wildlife-focused criminal investigations, providing support for  digital evidence collection and technical investigative equipment, or  contributing directly to casework or criminal investigations of wildlife  traffickers. FWS officials we spoke with in the field stated that the  placement of personnel in-country has made a positive impact.  Previously, for example, FWS would have had to rely on nonagency  sources of information or send officials abroad temporarily to conduct  work, and it could not be as active or involved in CWT efforts in Africa.  Now, FWS is able to conduct or facilitate investigations on its own and  can establish personal relationships with counterparts, significantly  enhancing cooperation.
FWS also manages species-specific conservation grant programs for  elephants and rhinos and Africa regional grants that include CWT efforts.  For example, a fiscal year 2015 grant aims to generate local support for  the protection of elephants in and around Ruaha National Park, Tanzania,  by conducting education and outreach programs in villages and operating  a program for local residents to meet with park officials (see fig. 7).
FWS also plays a role in the agency’s CWT efforts through DOI’s  International Technical Assistance Program (ITAP). In East Africa, USAID  supports ITAP’s work in priority areas, including wildlife law enforcement,  CITES implementation, and information sharing. ITAP also collaborates  with other organizations such as the U.S. Geological Survey, National  Park Service, and Bureau of Land Management, in conducting field work  on an as-needed and temporary basis to supplement efforts of the FWS  attachés. For example, in 2016, after conducting assessments with  funding from USAID, ITAP produced a Five Year Strategic Plan and Year  One Work Plans for Tanzania and Uganda that will guide ITAP’s work in  the region.
section_title: State Contributes to CWT- Related Diplomacy and Law Enforcement Capacity Building
paragraphs: State contributes to CWT-related diplomacy through public outreach and  support of international organizations and also contributes to law  enforcement capacity building by, for example, providing training and  equipment to park rangers. According to State officials, State supports  organizations that address wildlife trafficking, such as the International  Consortium to Combat Wildlife Crime, which includes the CITES  Secretariat, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL),  UNODC, the World Bank, and the World Customs Organization. The  consortium aims to strengthen wildlife law enforcement effectiveness  through intelligence-led interdiction and advanced investigative methods.
State also has conducted public outreach efforts in countries such as  Kenya and Tanzania to raise awareness. For example, in Kenya, the U.S.  ambassador participated in a gathering with Kenyan officials on World  Wildlife Day in March 2016 and announced more than $4.1 million in new  U.S. government assistance to support wildlife conservation and  community development. As another example, in January 2015 in  Tanzania, the U.S. ambassador met with game scouts—local villagers  who help rangers and communities mitigate poaching by conducting  patrols and alerting authorities—during a USAID-supported media tour in  the Selous Game Reserve.
With regard to law enforcement capacity building, since 2013 State’s  Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has  awarded more than $6 million in bilateral CWT grants for work in Kenya  and South Africa in addition to funding for regional programs. For  example, in Kenya, INL awarded a grant to the Northern Rangelands  Trust (NRT), a U.S. government-supported community conservation  organization, to build a more effective ranger force that includes  advanced classroom and field-based training and equipment. Through  specialized and refresher training of mobile community policing teams,  the grant aims to increase coverage of elephant range areas and  strengthen ranger capacity in arresting poachers and dealers, recovering  firearms and trophies, and ensuring the rangers’ own safety.
In South Africa, INL provided approximately $1.3 million in grants during  2014 and 2015 to support the Endangered Wildlife Trust, which operates  around Kruger National Park, a threatened rhino habitat (see fig. 8).
Among other things, the trust’s INL-funded activities support local law  enforcement capacity building, including an all-female antipoaching unit  called the “Black Mambas” (see fig. 9). According to a trust  representative, this group conducts antipoaching patrols, aided by  smartphone technology that enables them to identify animals or potential  issues in real time. While they carry no weapons, the Black Mambas  patrol range areas, alerting authorities if they find poachers’ camps or  anything suspicious. Black Mamba members told us that they patrol the  perimeter, looking for the tracks of poachers and disturbances in fencing  such as cut wires or other indications of possible intrusion. In addition,  they said they trek through the interior to look for signs of poacher camps,  poached animals, or snares used to catch bushmeat. According to a  representative of the Endangered Wildlife Trust, these patrols have been  effective because bushmeat poaching is down 78 percent since 2013.
section_title: DOJ Prosecutes Criminals and Conducts Training
paragraphs: DOJ’s role in CWT, which is coordinated and led by the Environment and  Natural Resources Division, involves prosecuting criminals and  conducting prosecutor and foreign judicial training. For example,  Operation Crash—a rhino horn and ivory-smuggling investigation led by  FWS and prosecuted by DOJ—resulted in charges being brought in U.S.  courts against nearly 40 individuals or businesses. As of September  2016, Operation Crash had led to at least 30 convictions, prison terms as  long as 70 months, and forfeitures and restitutions as high as $4.5 million.  According to DOJ officials, DOJ also regularly prosecutes individuals and  businesses involved in the illegal importation of ivory into the United  States, including, in recent years, prosecutions involving the smuggling of  raw ivory, worked ivory carvings, and ivory inlayed items such as pool  cues.
In addition, with funding from State and assistance from USAID, DOJ is  implementing a series of regional capacity-building workshops on wildlife  trafficking for judges and prosecutors in Africa. The first workshop of the  series took place in Livingstone, Zambia, in October 2015 for 32 judges  and prosecutors from six southern African nations (Angola, Botswana,  Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zambia). The second took place in  Accra, Ghana, in June 2016 for 36 judges and prosecutors from five  western African nations (Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo,  and Togo). The workshops provided training by subject matter experts  from UNODC, antitrafficking NGOs, and other U.S. government agencies.  Topics covered by the training included evidentiary and prosecutorial  issues unique to wildlife-trafficking cases, as well as sessions on money  laundering, asset tracing, and corruption issues.
section_title: USAID Works to Build Community and National- Level Enforcement Capacity to Conserve Wildlife
paragraphs: USAID combats wildlife trafficking by working with communities to help  them conserve wildlife, particularly in Africa. USAID also works at the  national level and with rangers and law enforcement personnel  throughout the supply chain to strengthen capacity. In June 2015, USAID  committed to starting more than 35 new CWT projects in 15 countries.  Initiatives that address the supply side of wildlife trafficking include,  among others, support for the Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool  (SMART), a free software tool that enables village scouts and rangers to  instantly capture GPS and observational data in the field, enhancing  conservation efforts. According to USAID, for many years, rangers have  collected monitoring data on paper that had to be sifted through to find  relevant information, limiting its usefulness for planning and analysis. With  SMART, rangers can digitally record and analyze information on poaching  encounters, areas patrolled, and wildlife sightings to make protected area  management more effective and efficient. For example, USAID has  equipped and trained more than 400 rangers in the Democratic Republic  of the Congo and Republic of the Congo on the use of GPS units, hand- held computers for data collection, and SMART. As a result, according to  the Task Force’s 2015 APA, SMART patrols are now providing credible,  actionable data on wildlife presence and threats, which park managers  use to deploy ranger teams to high-intensity poaching areas. According to  this assessment, as of March 2016, more strategic patrols and other  measures across eight landscapes in the two countries resulted in the  destruction of nearly 1,800 snares and traps, the confiscation of 2,800  firearms, the arrest of 416 poachers, and numerous seizures of elephant  tusks and other wildlife products.
In the countries we visited, USAID officials told us that USAID takes a  holistic approach to CWT at the national and community level, with efforts  aimed at improving livelihoods, governance, and security. Project sites  we visited faced common issues, including poverty and conflict, which  provide fertile conditions for poaching. USAID aims to address these root  causes in parallel with CWT efforts by focusing on improving equity,  transparency, and livelihoods in local communities. For example, to  incentivize villagers who live in and around range areas to protect wildlife,  USAID works to establish programs that increase revenue generated  from wildlife tourism and safaris. The community is then to share the  income and use it to meet public demand for health care, education, and  other critical needs. The following are illustrative examples from our  fieldwork.
In Kenya, USAID has provided assistance to the NRT for years,  according to a USAID official, and in September 2015 signed an  agreement worth approximately $20 million over 5 years that aims to  reduce wildlife trafficking as one of five key goals. According to USAID  officials and NRT representatives, the trust has contributed to bringing  peace, stability, and reduced poaching in regions of northern Kenya.  For example, according to NRT representatives, the rate of illegal  killing of elephants declined from 81 percent in 2012 to 46 percent in  2014. USAID and NRT representatives told us that while the area  protected by the trust is vast and poaching remains an ongoing  concern, the overall success of its CWT effort has been driven by a  combination of supportive donors, strong security capabilities, and  governance mechanisms that communities perceive to be fair,  equitable, and transparent. As a result, they said that communities  realize the benefits of tourism and receive revenue from wildlife and  therefore are motivated to protect it.
In South Africa, USAID supports the Resilience in the Limpopo Basin  Program, a $14.5 million effort started in 2012 aimed at improving the  transboundary management of an area that spreads over parts of  South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. Almost half of  the area is within South Africa, which relies heavily on the basin to  support agriculture, industry, and tourism. Protected areas across the  basin, including Kruger National Park, exhibit a unique biodiversity  and are home to several vulnerable species for which poaching is a  key threat. One of the program’s three primary objectives is to  conserve biodiversity and sustainably manage high-priority  ecosystems. According to USAID and implementing partner officials,  one activity with that aim involves improving the livelihoods of villagers  who live around Kruger National Park by increasing income  opportunities from wildlife, thus strengthening the incentive for them to  protect wildlife. For example, they said that USAID helped villagers  work with park authorities to clarify agreements on how to share  revenue generated from wildlife in the area, ultimately resulting in  more transparency and increased income for the villagers.
In Tanzania, USAID supports Promoting Tanzania’s Environment,  Conservation, and Tourism, a $14.5 million 5-year project that aims to  enhance the country’s capacity to combat wildlife poaching and  trafficking as one of its focal areas. Started in April 2015, the project  aims to improve the abilities of park, customs, and judiciary authorities  by, for example, training customs officials on the detection of wildlife  products. In addition, in September 2015, USAID launched the  Endangered Ecosystem of Northern Tanzania (EENT) Project, which,  according to USAID, plans to provide $12.4 million over 5 years to  support and secure the long-term conservation and resilience of more  than 6 million acres of wildlife habitat. One of EENT’s four strategic  goals is to improve wildlife protection and land and habitat  management. EENT implementing partners emphasized the  importance of an integrated and holistic approach and told us that  they are working with communities to improve livelihoods, develop  conservation incentives, and build capacity. According to  representatives of these implementing partners, one activity that has  made a positive impact is strengthening security, particularly through  the use of canine patrols, which significantly enhance detection and  tracking capabilities (see fig. 10). We observed an exercise  demonstrating that properly trained dogs can follow a scent in the field  and quickly and accurately lead rangers to the source. According to  the implementing partner representatives, the addition of canine units  has enabled rangers to find, identify, and arrest poachers who  otherwise would have escaped detection.
section_title: Other Agencies Also Contribute to CWT
paragraphs: In addition to the co-chair agencies and USAID, more than a dozen other  federal agencies, departments, or offices contribute to CWT efforts.  Department of Defense (DOD) officials, for example, told us that DOD  plays a role in CWT through its capacity-building efforts. For example,  DOD has provided training to partner nations’ enforcement agencies in  various skills and tactics, including those involved in countering public  corruption, running basic criminal investigations, and conducting border  patrols to counter illicit trafficking. Specifically, in March 2015, DOD  personnel, with State Africa Bureau funding, delivered antipoaching  training in weapons-handling procedures, combat marksmanship,  patrolling, offensive tactics, land navigation, and mounted operations for  more than 40 Tanzanian rangers in the Selous Game Reserve. In  addition, in Gabon, DOD trained Gabonese park rangers in infantry  tactics to enhance their capacity to thwart trafficking in ivory and other  wildlife products. DOD officials told us that they are continuing to  explore ways in which DOD can help address wildlife trafficking,  particularly in Africa.
DHS officials told us that, like DOD, DHS contributes to CWT through  capacity building, providing training to partner nations, and working  alongside foreign counterparts to support CWT investigations and  enforcement initiatives. For example, in March 2016, DHS’s Customs and  Border Protection provided, with funding from USAID and DOD, elephant  ivory- and narcotics-sniffing canine units and trained handlers for the air  and sea ports in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. We met with Tanzanian port  officials who indicated that having dogs on site would improve their ability  to detect smuggled wildlife products in shipping containers. Also, in 2015,  according to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland  Security Investigations officials, the attaché in Pretoria supported the  South African Police Service on covert operations involving a proposed  sale of a drug that is often used to immobilize elephants, rhinos, and  other large mammals. They said that the operations led to the arrest of  five wildlife poaching conspirators, some with links to transnational  organized criminals, and the seizure of items used in the proposed killing  of a rhino.
For its part in CWT, Department of the Treasury (Treasury) officials told  us that the department analyzes available information and, if applicable,  exercises U.S. sanctions authorities against individuals and entities that  engage in wildlife trafficking. For example, in March 2016, Treasury  designated the Lord’s Resistance Army as subject to Executive Order  13667, which blocks any and all transactions involving the U.S. property  of persons contributing to the conflict in the Central African Republic. In  making this designation, Treasury noted that the Lord’s Resistance Army  had engaged in illicit diamonds trade, elephant poaching, and ivory  trafficking for revenue. In addition, Treasury represents the United States  as an observer to the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money  Laundering Group and, as a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money  Laundering, two of nine Financial Action Task Force-style regional bodies  that uphold international standards on anti-money laundering and  countering terrorism financing. Treasury officials told us that due to  mission priorities, limited staff resources are dedicated to CWT issues,  although the Implementation Plan designates Treasury as the lead or a  participating agency in 8 of the 24 objectives. However, if a significant  amount of relevant information emerges on wildlife trafficking, Treasury  officials said they could take immediate action.
section_title: State and USAID Generally Monitor the CWT Programs We Reviewed in Accordance with Widely Accepted Standards; Both Agencies Have Yet to Conduct CWT- Specific Evaluations
subsections: section_title: State and USAID Generally Follow Monitoring Standards for the Four CWT-Related Programs We Reviewed
paragraphs: We found that State and USAID generally follow selected elements of  widely accepted monitoring standards for CWT-related programs in the  countries we visited—Kenya, South Africa, and Tanzania. As shown in  table 1, we reviewed documentation for one State program and one  USAID program in Kenya, a State program in South Africa, and a USAID  program in Tanzania.
For the State programs in Kenya and South Africa and the USAID  programs in Kenya and Tanzania, we assessed the agencies’  documentation related to monitoring against selected key elements of  widely accepted monitoring standards that we determined can be applied  to foreign assistance programs. We identified the widely accepted  monitoring standards through a review of Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government; the Government Performance and Results Act  (GPRA) Modernization Act of 2010; and Uniform Administrative  Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal  Awards.
Table 2 summarizes our overall assessment of the select CWT programs’  monitoring activities. Appendix I provides greater detail on our selection  and analysis of these programs.
For the four programs we reviewed, we found that State and USAID  generally follow the nine key elements of widely accepted monitoring  standards listed in table 2, with some exceptions. Both agencies’  programs fully implement procedures to periodically collect and analyze  data on performance indicators, define roles and responsibilities of  personnel responsible for monitoring, and submit periodic and annual  reports. Fully adhering to these three elements of widely accepted  monitoring standards helps enable the agencies to promote data-driven  analysis and regular reporting of results, which could help identify any  needed course corrections in a timely manner.
We found that the USAID program in Kenya partially implements the  element of ensuring appropriate qualifications for staff conducting  monitoring, while the State programs in Kenya and South Africa and the  USAID program in Tanzania fully implement this element. Implementing  this element helps to ensure that staff have the expertise to exercise  sound judgment in overseeing the programs.
We also found that all four programs at least partially implement the  element of creating a monitoring plan and at least partially implement the  element of identifying funding sources for monitoring; USAID’s program in  Tanzania was the only one of the four that fully implemented both these  elements of the monitoring standards. Three of the four programs partially  created a monitoring plan or partially identified funding sources for  monitoring, based on documentation we received. For example,  documentation for the two programs that partially created monitoring  plans provided some detail on how performance would be monitored  through activities such as establishing time lines and tracking  performance indicators; however, the documentation contained little or no  information on how responsible parties within the agencies, such as a  grants officer or grants officer representative, would ensure a systematic  review of monitoring efforts. In addition, we found that both of State’s  programs only partially identify funding sources, because program  documentation lacked funding information specific to monitoring activities.
As table 2 (above) shows, the results of our analysis for the remaining  three elements of monitoring standards were mixed. Only USAID’s  program in Tanzania fully implemented all three by (1) implementing data  quality assurance procedures on performance indicators, (2) validating  the implementing partner’s performance through site visits and other  activities, and (3) considering monitoring information in making  management decisions. Conducting data quality procedures helps  provide assurance that the likelihood of significant errors or  incompleteness is minimal and that the data can be used for their  intended purposes. Site visits, along with other methods of verification,  can help address or avoid problems that programs sometimes  experience, such as delays in program start-up, untimely submission of  progress or financial reports, or allegations of misuse of funds. In Kenya,  each agency’s program only partially implemented this element. For  example, State’s program in that country provided reports of telephone  audits but no additional documentation such as photographs or other  evidence to support validation of program implementation. Considering  performance information in making management decisions facilitates  program improvement by providing data-based evidence for making  adjustments.
USAID’s Toolkit for Periodically Collecting  and Analyzing Data on Performance  Indicators   USAID created an impact measurement  toolkit in 2015 to be a primary resource to  improve action and accountability in USAID’s  efforts to combat wildlife crime at the  programmatic level. According to a USAID  official, the Promoting Tanzania’s  Environment, Conservation, and Tourism  (PROTECT) program was the first to apply the  toolkit in designing its monitoring and  evaluation plan, which includes baseline  values and targets for each indicator and a  time line for specific monitoring and evaluation  activities. A representative of PROTECT told  us that the monitoring and evaluation plan will  be revised each year to preserve flexibility.  For example, one revision already made was  to reduce the number of performance  indicators originally proposed in the program’s  monitoring and evaluation plan to improve  program results.
Agencies are taking steps to measure progress. One example is the CWT  toolkit, which USAID created in 2015 (see sidebar). USAID officials  stated that they hope the toolkit serves as a resource for other Task  Force agencies as well. According to State officials, through efforts such  as the toolkit, Task Force agencies will continue to strengthen the  monitoring and evaluation sections of their programs as the agencies  continue to improve efforts of combating wildlife trafficking and lessons  learned from ongoing programs.
section_title: State and USAID Have Not Yet Evaluated CWT- Specific Programs
paragraphs: While State and USAID monitor CWT programs to some degree in the  countries we selected for this review, the agencies have not yet  conducted CWT-specific evaluations in those countries. Both State and  USAID officials told us that it is too early to conduct such evaluations,  given that appropriations for CWT-specific activities only began in fiscal  year 2014 and no CWT-specific programs in the three countries we  focused on had been completed yet. Officials also indicated that they plan  to conduct evaluations of major CWT-specific activities when these are  completed. At our request, however, USAID identified a total of six  programs it had recently supported in Kenya, South Africa, and Tanzania  that had some element of CWT-related activity as well as a final  evaluation report available to assess (see table 3). State was not able to  identify any CWT-related programs with an available evaluation report.
We found that of the six evaluation reports we reviewed, none included  CWT-related efforts as a primary goal or objective of the evaluation.  Generally, we found that the six evaluated broader conservation goals of  each program without focusing on specific CWT-related activities.  However, some of the evaluation reports provide limited CWT  information. For example, the evaluation report for the Scaling-Up  Conservation and Livelihoods Efforts in Northern Tanzania Project  indicated that the project had accomplished its goal to continue building  capacity for an antipoaching unit in two of its wildlife management areas.  This specific output was tied to the program’s broader goal to deliver  transformational conservation and economic impact. Another example is  the Africa Biodiversity Collaborative Group, a coalition of U.S.-based  international conservation organizations that operate field programs in  Africa. The evaluation report stated that the group had been highly  effective in creating new conservation partnerships, some of which led to  faith leaders uniting against illegal wildlife trade. The Spatial Monitoring  and Reporting Tool for law enforcement was cited as an example  showing how one of the program’s innovative conservation practices had  been more widely adopted in Africa as a result of the group’s  collaborative work, which helped to ensure that wildlife patrols were  carried out.
section_title: CWT Task Force Lacks Performance Targets, Making Effectiveness Difficult to Determine
paragraphs: While the interagency Task Force, co-chaired by State, DOI, and DOJ,  provides some information about progress, it lacks performance targets,  making effectiveness difficult to determine at the strategic level. The  Implementation Plan and the 2015 Annual Progress Assessment (APA)  describe objectives, metrics, and accomplishments. Under three strategic  priorities, the Implementation Plan identifies 24 objectives and ways to  measure progress for each. For example, one objective is to develop and  broadly disseminate cost‐effective analytical tools and technological  solutions to support wildlife trafficking investigations and prosecutions.  The plan outlines two ways to measure progress for this objective: new inspection and interdiction technologies developed and applied,  and  forensic tools, capacity, and networks developed.
In reporting on progress related to this objective, the APA states that  USAID launched the Wildlife Crime Tech Challenge to generate new  science and technology solutions for detecting transit routes,  strengthening forensic evidence, reducing consumer demand, and  tackling corruption along the supply chain. According to the  announcement of winners, one awardee in South Africa developed a  product that enables the tracing of rhino horn through individualized DNA  profiling, thus providing a means of linking a sample of trafficked product  back to a specific crime. Such information describes accomplishments  that relate to objectives, but the Task Force does not provide targets, in  the APA or elsewhere, that would enable comparison of actual  performance against planned results.
As we have previously reported, a fundamental element in an  organization’s efforts to manage for results is its ability to set performance  goals with specific targets and time frames that reflect strategic goals and  to measure progress toward its performance goals as part of its strategic  planning efforts. Such performance measurement allows organizations  to track progress in achieving their goals and gives managers crucial  information to identify gaps in program performance and to plan any  needed improvements. In addition, according to Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government, managers need to compare actual  performance against planned or expected results and to analyze  significant differences. Furthermore, internal control helps managers  achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public resources.  Having targets would allow the Task Force to more fully demonstrate the  commitment articulated in its Implementation Plan: to continually evaluate  progress, both by assessing the extent to which the Task Force is able to  achieve the specific objectives identified in the plan and by looking more  broadly at the effectiveness of those objectives toward achieving strategic  priorities and the ultimate goal of ending wildlife trafficking.
The Task Force identified a range of reasons why it does not have  targets, including that many potential indicators are metrics with limited or uneven  results cannot be attributed solely to U.S. government actions and are  dependent on continued combined global effort;  results often require years to document accurately;  availability of data from the key developing countries; and  reporting against metrics could downplay the contributions of other  stakeholders, divert resources, and either risk oversimplification or  confuse audiences with complicated explanations of the limitations of  quantitative targets.
We have highlighted strategies in our past work that agencies can use  when faced with the challenge of having limited control over external  factors that can affect a program’s outcomes. These strategies include  selecting a mix of outcome goals over which the agency has varying  levels of control; using data on external factors to statistically adjust for  their effect on the desired outcome; and disaggregating goals for distinct  target populations for which the agency has different expectations.  Additionally, to help interpret the results of performance measures, we  have also emphasized in our past work the importance of communicating  adequate contextual information, such as factors inside or outside the  agency’s control that might affect performance.
In addition, Task Force agencies have provided performance targets for  efforts facing similar challenges to measuring and reporting results. For  example, the performance and accountability reports of State, USAID,  DOI, and DOJ all provide targets for diplomatic, development, legal, and  conservation-related activities that are complex and difficult to measure.  Despite challenges associated with measuring progress against climate  change, State and USAID provide quantitative targets for measuring  results in their FY 2015 Joint Summary of Performance and Financial  Information. In its 2016/17 Annual Performance Plan & 2015 Report,  DOI identifies a target for status of international species. DOJ’s FY 2015  Annual Performance Report and FY 2017 Annual Performance Plan  provides a target for protecting Americans from terrorism and other  threats to national security—a complex, global challenge. In addition, a  separate presidential task force, responsible for addressing species  conservation of pollinators, identified a target that encompasses, among  other things, international partners, long time periods, and factors outside  the control of the U.S. government.
Developing targets for CWT may not require significant resources or  complicated analysis. For example, regarding the aforementioned  objective to disseminate cost‐effective analytic tools and technological  solutions, targets may include the following:
Develop and apply x number of new inspection and interdiction  technologies by z year.
Develop w number of forensic tools, x level of capacity, and y  networks by z year.
Providing some basis for comparison would enable the Task Force to  better understand the extent to which its accomplishments are meeting  expectations.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Wildlife trafficking, worth at least $7 billion annually, continues to push  some protected and endangered animal species to the brink of extinction.  Furthermore, wildlife trafficking can fuel corruption and criminal activity,  leads to loss of both human and animal lives, and destabilizes  communities that depend on wildlife for biodiversity and ecotourism  revenue. Task Force agencies are helping combat wildlife trafficking  through a variety of efforts; however, at the strategic level, the Task Force  has not identified performance targets.
Without such targets, it is unclear whether the Task Force’s  accomplishments are meeting expectations, making it difficult to gauge  progress and to ensure effective stewardship of public resources. For  example, do those accomplishments represent a satisfactory level of  performance, given the level of investment and expected results, or  should resources be adjusted? Without targets, agencies risk reporting  their progress merely as an annual description of successes and  accomplishments. While important, these accomplishments alone do not  provide accountability because they do not link back to targets, and there  is no basis for comparison between actual and intended results. In  addition, over time, such descriptions may lack continuity. It would be  difficult to compare progress from year to year, if the Task Force reports  different types of successes and accomplishments each cycle.
To maximize resources available to address this problem, it is critical that  the agencies involved continually assess the efficiency and effectiveness  of their efforts so as to ensure that the most effective Task Force efforts  are supported. By establishing targets, the Task Force would be able to  generate and communicate more meaningful performance information  that would help them identify performance shortfalls and the best options  for making improvements in their efforts against wildlife trafficking.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To provide a basis for comparing actual results with intended results that  can generate more meaningful performance information, we recommend  that the Secretaries of the Interior and State and the Attorney General of  the United States should jointly work with the Task Force to develop  performance targets related to the National Strategy for Combating  Wildlife Trafficking Implementation Plan.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the  Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, the Interior, Justice, State,  the Treasury, and USAID. The Departments of the Interior, Justice, and  State, and USAID agreed with our recommendation. Written responses  from Department of the Interior, Department of State, and USAID are  reproduced in appendixes II, III, and IV. All agencies provided us with  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and to the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, the  Interior, State, and the Treasury; the Attorney General of the United  States; the Administrator of USAID; and other interested parties. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8612, or gianopoulosk@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and of Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report focuses on the efforts of the Presidential Task Force on  Wildlife Trafficking (Task Force) to combat wildlife trafficking of large  animals in Africa and supply side activities, which include poaching,  transport, and export of wildlife and wildlife parts. The report examines  (1) what is known about the security implications of wildlife trafficking and  its consequences; (2) actions Task Force agencies are taking to combat  wildlife trafficking; (3) Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID) monitoring and evaluation efforts in  select countries; and (4) the extent to which the Task Force assesses its  progress.
To obtain information for background and context, we reviewed  information related to rhinoceros and elephant products and poaching  from both U.S. and foreign government sources as well as from  international organizations. We also examined the flow of illegal ivory and  seizure data. We did not assess the reliability of these data.
To address our objectives, we met with Task Force agency officials and  nongovernmental wildlife trafficking experts recommended by agency  officials and other nongovernmental wildlife trafficking experts in  Washington, D.C., and conducted fieldwork in Kenya, South Africa, and  Tanzania. We selected these countries using a combination of criteria: (1)  Since fiscal year 2013, each country has received at least $1 million  annually in U.S. government funding for efforts related to combating  wildlife trafficking (CWT); (2) CWT activities are underway in each country  and are expected to make a significant impact; and (3) each country has  the presence of at least two U.S. government agencies conducting CWT  work. This sample is not generalizable to all the countries in which the  United States has CWT-related programs. While in each country in Africa,  we interviewed officials who served on each embassy’s CWT working  group, which generally included officials from State, USAID, and the  Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, the Interior, and Justice.  The Department of the Treasury did not have an attaché in any of the  three countries we visited. We also interviewed representatives from host  governments responsible for the management of natural resources and  parks; nongovernmental organizations involved in implementing U.S.  government programs related to conservation, law enforcement, and  other CWT objectives; and community members that live in or around  protected areas that are directly impacted by wildlife trafficking.
To examine what is known about wildlife trafficking and its consequences,  particularly security implications, we reviewed more than 15 relevant  reports and other information from U.S. agencies and international and  nongovernmental organizations. We selected these reports and  information from organizations that had produced wildlife trafficking  analysis, that had worked with the U.S. government on CWT activities, or  that had been recommended to us by officials or experts. We also  interviewed representatives from these organizations in the United States  and in Africa.
To address actions Task Force agencies are taking to combat wildlife  trafficking, we reviewed relevant documentation and information,  including agency and implementing partner documentation of CWT- related projects, programs, and grants. We also interviewed agency  officials in Washington, D.C., and in Africa. During our fieldwork, we  visited project sites and met with host government officials, implementing  partner representatives, park authorities, security units, and community  members.
To address CWT monitoring and evaluation efforts, we selected State  and USAID programs in the three countries we visited that were at or  near completion or that were started in fiscal year 2013. Our analysis is  not generalizable and applies only to the selected programs in selected  countries.
To examine monitoring efforts in these countries, we worked with State  and USAID to identify one program in each country based on the criterion  that the program must have CWT-related activities. State officials  reported that State had no CWT-funded programs in Tanzania, and  USAID officials reported that USAID had no CWT-funded programs in  South Africa. As a result, we assessed monitoring documentation for a  total of four programs, which included award agreements and  modifications, performance management plans, monitoring and  evaluation plans, quarterly monitoring reports, and annual funding data.  We identified widely accepted monitoring principles, determined  commonalities among the principles, and considered the life-cycle of the  project from planning to the utilization of monitoring information. Using  these criteria, we identified nine elements and asked agencies for  documentation that demonstrated that their monitoring practices reflected  these elements. We reviewed the documentation the agencies provided  for each program to determine whether it addressed each element— generally, partially, or not at all. For each program, an analyst was  instructed to (1) answer whether an element was addressed by entering  “yes,” “partial,” or “no”; and (2) summarize or cite relevant information or a  source from the monitoring documents. A methodologist then reviewed  the information and determined whether there was sufficient support to  answer if an element was met “generally” (which was “yes”), “partially,” or  “no.” In those instances where the analyst and methodologist interpreted  the information differently, they met to discuss their differences and reach  consensus. In instances when the initial documentation provided did not  indicate that the agencies generally or partially met an element for a  program, we informed the agencies and asked for any additional  documentation that might be available. We cannot generalize from this  sample of programs in these selected countries to the universe of all  CWT programs in all countries.
To examine evaluation efforts, we identified CWT-related programs in the  three selected countries that had available evaluation reports. In total, we  reviewed six programs, all of which are USAID supported. State was not  able to identify any CWT-related programs with an available evaluation  report in any of the three countries. We reviewed the evaluation reports  available for each identified USAID program. To assess the degree to  which these evaluations were conducted in adherence to select  evaluation standards, we used criteria identified in prior GAO work. We  then identified the goals and objectives of each evaluation report to  determine the extent to which the evaluations addressed CWT goals.
To address the extent to which the Task Force assesses its progress, we  analyzed relevant documentation and information, including the National  Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking Implementation Plan and the  2015 Annual Progress Assessment. In addition, we reviewed  documentation on results management and spoke with Task Force  officials. Using prior GAO work, we established that a fundamental  element in an organization’s efforts to manage for results is its ability to  set performance goals with specific targets and time frames that reflect  strategic goals and to measure progress toward its performance goals as  part of its strategic planning efforts. In addition, according to Standards  for Internal Control in the Federal Government, managers need to  compare actual performance against planned or expected results and to  analyze significant differences. Using these criteria, we analyzed the  extent to which the Task Force assessed its progress.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2015 to September  2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of the Interior
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Kimberly M. Gianopoulos, (202) 512-8612, or gianopoulosk@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Judith Williams (Assistant  Director), Marc Castellano, David Dayton, Martin De Alteriis, Mark  Dowling, Shakira O’Neil, and Oziel Trevino made key contributions to this  report.