Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed to Further Mitigate Security Risks
Published: 2007-01-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Five years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, GAO is taking stock of key efforts by the President, Congress, federal agencies, and the 9/11 Commission to strengthen or enhance critical layers of defense in aviation and border security that were directly exploited by the 19 terrorist hijackers. Specifically, the report discusses how: (1) commercial aviation security has been enhanced; (2) visa-related policies and programs have evolved to help screen out potential terrorists; (3) federal border security initiatives have evolved to reduce the likelihood of terrorists entering the country through legal checkpoints; and (4) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other agencies are addressing several major post-9/11 strategic challenges. The report reflects conclusions and recommendations from a body of work issued before and after 9/11 by GAO, the Inspectors General of DHS, State, and Justice, the 9/11 Commission, and others. It is not a comprehensive assessment of all federal initiatives taken or planned in response to 9/11. GAO is not making any new recommendations at this time since over 75 prior recommendations on aviation security, the Visa Waiver Program, and U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), among others, are in the process of being implemented. Continued monitoring by GAO will determine whether further recommendations are warranted.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While the nation cannot expect to eliminate all risks of terrorist attack upon commercial aviation, agencies have made progress since 9/11 to reduce aviation-related vulnerabilities and enhance the layers of defense directly exploited by the terrorist hijackers. In general, these efforts have resulted in better airline passenger screening procedures designed to identify and prevent known or suspected terrorists, weapons, and explosives from being allowed onto aircraft. Nevertheless, the nation's commercial aviation system remains a highly visible target for terrorism, as evidenced by recent alleged efforts to bring liquid explosives aboard aircraft. DHS and others need to follow through on outstanding congressional requirements and recommendations by GAO and others to enhance security and coordination of passengers and checked baggage, and improve screening procedures for domestic flights, among other needed improvements. GAO's work indicates that the government has strengthened the nonimmigrant visa process as an antiterrorism tool. New measures added rigor to the process by expanding the name-check system used to screen applicants, requiring in-person interviews for nearly all applicants, and revamping consular officials' training to focus on counterterrorism. Nevertheless, the immigrant visa process may pose potential security risks and we are reviewing this issue. To enhance security and screening at legal checkpoints (air, land, and sea ports) at the nation's borders, agencies are using technology to verify foreign travelers' identities and detect fraudulent travel documents such as passports. However, DHS needs to better manage risks posed by the Visa Waiver Program, whereby travelers from 27 countries need not obtain visas for U.S. travel. For example, GAO recommended that DHS require visa-waiver countries to provide information on lost or stolen passports that terrorists could use to gain entry. We also recommended that DHS provide more information to Congress on how it plans to fully implement US-VISIT--a system for tracking the entry, exit, and length of stay of foreign travelers. While much attention has been focused on mitigating the specific risks of 9/11, other critical assets ranging from passenger rail stations to power plants are also at risk of terrorist attack. Deciding how to address these risks--setting priorities, making trade-offs, allocating resources, and assessing social and economic costs--is essential. Thus, it remains vitally important for DHS to continue to develop and implement a risk-based framework to help target where and how the nation's resources should be invested to strengthen security. The government also faces strategic challenges that potentially affect oversight and execution of new and ongoing homeland security initiatives, and GAO has deemed three challenges in particular--information sharing, risk management, and transforming DHS as a department--as areas needing urgent attention. DHS and the Department of State reviewed a draft of this report and both agencies generally agreed with the information. Both agencies provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, significantly altered the  nation’s views on how to secure and protect the people, borders, and  assets of the United States, and dramatically highlighted the need to take  immediate actions to reduce the likelihood of future attacks of this  magnitude taking place on U.S. soil. With the benefit of hindsight, it is  apparent that on 9/11, several areas in particular—the U.S. commercial  aviation system, the federal government’s approach to compiling and  managing terrorist watch lists, the nonimmigrant visa process, and  mechanisms for screening and recording foreign travelers entering and  exiting the United States—were all shown to be vulnerable to exploitation  by terrorists intent on gaining entry to the country and wreaking havoc.  Clearly, federal action was needed to address these and other weaknesses  in our defenses. The federal government simply was not prepared for, and  did not anticipate, the ways in which the security measures in place prior  to 9/11 would be defeated. As the National Commission on Terrorist  Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) noted in its 2004  report, none of the security measures adopted by the U.S. government  prior to the attacks disturbed or even delayed the progress of the al Qaeda  plot.
In the 5 years since 19 hijackers commandeered four commercial aircraft  and succeeded in destroying the World Trade Center, damaging the  Pentagon, and killing almost 3,000 people, Congress and the  administration have taken a number of actions to realign homeland  security policies, priorities, and resources to help ensure that the 9/11  scenario could never be repeated. To this end, our government has in part  reorganized by combining vital federal security, immigration, and  investigative capabilities within a new Department of Homeland Security  (DHS). Parallel efforts also were undertaken to transform the intelligence  community in order to provide better information on, and analysis of,  terrorist threats—information that could have serious implications for  aviation, the visa process, and the border screening and inspection  processes undertaken as part of border security.
Since 9/11, Congress and the administration, including many federal  agencies, have increasingly sought to take a longer-term view of homeland  security, recognizing, among other things, that a variety of transportation  and border security initiatives are needed, such as improving the  mechanisms for screening foreign travelers before they enter the country  legally by air, land, or sea ports, and tracking their entry and exit. More  recent efforts by terrorists to disrupt society—notably, the alleged attempt  by terrorists to bring liquid explosives on board aircraft bound for the  United States and terrorist attacks on passenger rail systems in Madrid  and London—have further highlighted the need for effective information  sharing, proactive planning, and effective risk analysis, in order to identify  and mitigate risks to people, national assets, and economic sectors and  prioritize resources to address them.
In recognition of the fifth anniversary of the 2001 terrorist attacks, you  expressed interest in taking stock of some of the efforts by Congress, the  administration, and many federal agencies—in concert with state and local  governments and the private sector—to identify the nation’s security  vulnerabilities in key areas and find ways to mitigate them to the fullest  extent possible. You asked us to draw upon the growing body of work by  us and the Inspectors General that examine many of the key laws, policies,  and practices related to homeland security in the post-9/11 period to  assess how these security policies and procedures have evolved in  response to the actions of the terrorists. While we recognize that it will  never be possible to anticipate or mitigate every potential security threat,  or to close every gap in our defenses, it is nonetheless important to  acknowledge the critical work that has been done to make the country  safer—and, looking ahead, to discuss how the government intends to  identify, manage, and mitigate risks to domestic security in general, while  continuing to protect privacy and the flow of people and commerce. It is  also important to review security efforts made to date, in light of Congress’  interest in revisiting the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission,  including those addressing aviation and border security challenges, as well  as challenges related to sharing homeland security information. The  information contained in this report is derived from a security sensitive  report that we issued in December 2006 on progress made to address  vulnerabilities exposed by 9/11.  That report contained detailed  information on specific security vulnerabilities.
This report does not undertake a comprehensive assessment of all federal  initiatives taken or planned in response to 9/11. Rather, we focus on the  progress the nation has made in strengthening or enhancing the critical  layers of defense that either were penetrated by the terrorist hijackers of  9/11, or which our work or that of the Inspectors General shows are  vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. This critical layered system of defense  identifies points of vulnerability wherever they exist, and turns them into  targets of opportunity for interdiction. These layers provide a series of  independent, overlapping and reinforcing redundancies—domestically, for  example, at airports as well as land and sea ports of entry, or outside the  country, at consular offices—designed to raise the odds that terrorist  activity can be identified and intercepted. This report focuses primarily on  three main layers of defense—aviation security, visa security, and border  security—and to the extent that our body of work allows, this report also  addresses the role that information sharing has played in keeping federal  officials and key stakeholders informed as these layers of defense are  strengthened.
In particular, this report discusses the following: (1) In what ways has the  security of the nation’s commercial aviation system been enhanced since  9/11 to reduce the likelihood that terrorists may carry out new attacks  using aircraft? (2) How have visa-related policies and programs evolved  since 9/11 to help screen out potential terrorists seeking entry into the  United States? (3) How have federal border security efforts evolved since  9/11 to reduce the likelihood that terrorists could enter the United States  through legal checkpoints? (4) What are the major strategic challenges  facing Congress, DHS, and other federal agencies as the post-9/11 era  progresses and decisions are made about prioritizing efforts and allocating  finite resources to further enhance homeland security?
The overall scope of our review reflects the national layers of defense in  place on 9/11, which the terrorists exploited, and other areas with  recognized vulnerabilities and security weaknesses where federal actions  have been taken and for which we have a body of work. Specifically, the  scope of our work encompassed an extensive review of work published by  us and others on the conditions leading up to and the actions taken after  9/11 by Congress and federal departments—the departments of Homeland  Security, State, and Justice—which now have primary responsibility for  establishing and maintaining key layers of national defense (aviation, the  visa process, and our borders) exploited by the 9/11 hijackers. To perform  our analyses for all the research questions, we reviewed the findings,  conclusions, and recommendations from GAO reports, testimonies, and  other issued products on security policies and procedures prior to and  after 9/11. This review included GAO’s work on aviation security, the visa  issuance process, and border security initiatives, as well as information on  the development and consolidation of federal terrorist watch lists and how  this and other sensitive information has been shared among federal  agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, and appropriate  state and local personnel, such as law enforcement agencies and private  air carriers. We also analyzed our preliminary results from ongoing work  related to homeland security that was being conducted at the time of this  review (i.e., work that we had under way but had not yet issued) on  international aviation passenger prescreening, the U.S. Visitor and  Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) border security  program, and more. In addition to GAO’s work, we analyzed reports and  testimonies issued after 9/11 by the Inspectors General for the  departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security and the findings of  reports and testimonies issued by the 9/11 Commission.
We reviewed key legislation enacted after 9/11, including (but not limited  to) the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the Homeland Security  Act of 2002, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act   of 2002, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of  2004; presidential directives, including (but not limited to) Homeland  Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6) on terrorist identification,  screening, and tracking and HSPD-7 on critical infrastructure protection  responsibilities; and executive orders. In addition to our documentary  analysis, we interviewed senior officials at the departments of State and  Homeland Security to obtain current information on progress made to  implement selected recommendations we had made, and other actions  under way by the departments at the time of our review to enhance  security in the areas we were addressing—aviation, visa, and border  security.
We recognize that there are significant factors that contributed to the  terrorists’ ability to complete their acts that Congress and the  administration have been addressing since 9/11, which we do not discuss  in depth in this report. These include vulnerabilities in available  intelligence, terrorist financing mechanisms, and the domestic  counterterrorism infrastructure in place to address threats within U.S.  borders, among others. Nor does our review reflect activities or initiatives  not directly related either to strengthening homeland security or to the  9/11 response; thus our review excludes consideration of initiatives aimed  at facilitating travel convenience, such as “trusted traveler” programs and  implementation of a redress process to remedy the problem associated  with passengers misidentified on terrorist watch lists. See appendix III for  a list of products issued by GAO and the office of Inspectors General  within the departments of Homeland Security, State, and Justice related to  the events of 9/11 and homeland security; many of these products are  referred to in this report.
Our work was conducted from September 2005 through October 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Overview of Key Legislation Enacted After 9/11 Related to Aviation and Border Security
paragraphs: After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress and the President  enacted several new laws intended to address many of the vulnerabilities  exploited by the terrorists by strengthening layers of defense related to  aviation and border security. A summary of key legislative efforts follows.
To strengthen transportation security, the Aviation and Transportation  Security Act (ATSA) was signed into law on November 19, 2001, with the  primary goal of strengthening the security of the nation’s aviation system.  To this end, ATSA created the Transportation Security Administration  (TSA) as an agency within the Department of Transportation (DOT) with  responsibility for securing all modes of transportation, including aviation.  ATSA included numerous requirements with deadlines for TSA to  implement that were designed to strengthen the various aviation layers of  defense. For example, ATSA required TSA to create a federal workforce to  assume the job of conducting passenger and checked baggage screening  from air carriers at commercial airports. The act also gave TSA regulatory  authority over all transportation modes.
After ATSA was enacted, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 consolidated  most federal agencies charged with providing homeland security,  including securing our nation’s borders, into the newly formed  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was created to improve,  among other things, coordination, communication, and information  sharing among the multiple federal agencies responsible for protecting the  homeland.
Legislation also was enacted to enhance various aspects of border  security. The Homeland Security Act, for example, generally grants DHS  exclusive authority to issue regulations on, administer, and enforce the  Immigration and Nationality Act and all other immigration and nationality  laws relating to the functions of U.S. consular officers in connection with  the granting or denial of visas. The Homeland Security Act authorized  DHS, among other things, to assign employees to U.S. embassies and  consulates to provide expert advice and training to consular officers  regarding specific threats related to the visa process.
New legislation also was enacted that contained provisions affecting a  major border security initiative that had begun prior to 9/11—a system for  integrating data on the entry and exit of certain foreign nationals into and  out of the United States, now known as US-VISIT (U.S. Visitor and  Immigrant Status Indicator Technology). In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act  provided that, in developing this integrated entry and exit data system, the  Attorney General (now Secretary of Homeland Security) and Secretary of  State were to focus particularly on the utilization of biometric technology  (such as digital fingerprints) and the development of tamper-resistant  documents readable at ports of entry (either a land, air, or sea border  crossing associated with inspection and admission of certain foreign  nationals). It also required that the system be able to interface with law  enforcement databases for use by federal law enforcement to identify and  detain individuals who pose a threat to the national security of the United  States. In addition, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform  Act of 2002 required that, in developing the integrated entry and exit data  system for ports of entry, the Attorney General (now Secretary of  Homeland Security) and Secretary of State implement, fund, and use the  technology standard that was required to be developed under the USA  PATRIOT Act at U.S. ports of entry and at consular posts abroad. The act  also required the establishment of a database containing the arrival and  departure data from machine-readable visas, passports, and other travel  and entry documents possessed by aliens and the interoperability of all  security databases relevant to making determinations of admissibility  under section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. (For additional  information on legislative requirements related to US-VISIT, see   GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Faces Strategic, Technological, and  Operational Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-248 [Washington,  D.C.: December 2006]).
In December 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act  of 2004 was enacted, containing provisions designed to address many of  the transportation and border security vulnerabilities identified, and  recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission. It included provisions  designed to strengthen aviation security, information sharing, visa  issuance, border security, and other areas. For example, the act mandated  that TSA develop a passenger prescreening system that would compare  passenger information for domestic flights to government watch list  information, a function that was at the time, and still is, being performed  by air carriers. The act also required the development of risk-based  priorities across all transportation modes and a strategic plan describing  roles and missions related to transportation security for encouraging  private sector cooperation and participation in the implementation of such  a plan. In addition, the act required DHS to develop and submit to  Congress a plan for full implementation of US-VISIT as an automated  biometric entry and exit data system and required the collection of  biometric exit data for all individuals required to provide biometric entry  data.
section_title: Overview of Key Presidential Policy Directives Issued After 9/11 Related to Aviation and Border Security
paragraphs: In an effort to increase homeland security following the terrorist attacks  on the United States, President Bush issued the National Strategy for  Homeland Security in July 2002. The strategy sets forth overall objectives  to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s  vulnerability to terrorism, minimize the damage and assist in the recovery  from attacks that may occur. The strategy is organized into six critical  mission areas, including (for purposes of this report) one on border and  transportation security. For this mission area, in particular, the strategy  specified several objectives, including ensuring the integrity of our borders  and preventing the entry of unwanted persons into our country. To  accomplish this, the strategy provides for, among other things, reform of  immigration services, large-scale modernization of border crossings, and  consolidation of federal watch lists. It also acknowledges that  accomplishing these goals will require overhauling the border security  process.
The President has also issued 16 homeland security presidential directives  (HSPD), in addition to the strategy that was issued in 2002, providing  additional guidance related to the mission areas outlined in the National  Strategy. For example, HSPD-6 sets forth policy related to the  consolidation of the government’s approach to terrorism screening and  provides for the appropriate and lawful use of terrorist information in  screening processes. HSPD-11 builds upon this directive by setting forth  the nation’s policy with regard to comprehensive terrorist-related  screening procedures through detecting, identifying, tracking, and  interdicting people and cargo that pose a threat to homeland security,  among other things. Additionally, HSPD-7 establishes a national policy for  federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize critical  infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist  attacks. (For additional information on the National Strategy for  Homeland Security and related presidential directives, see GAO,  Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges  Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO-05-33  ).
section_title: Overview of Key Federal Security-Related Roles and Responsibilities in Post- 9/11 Era
paragraphs: The federal departments with primary security-related responsibilities for  aviation and border security after 9/11—the frontline departments  providing key layers of defense—which are included in this report are  shown in figure 1.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, became the impetus for  change in both the way in which airline passengers are screened and the  entities responsible for conducting the screening. With the passage of  ATSA, TSA assumed responsibility for civil aviation security from the  Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and for passenger and baggage  screening from the air carriers. As part of this responsibility, TSA  oversees security operations at the nation’s more than 400 commercial  airports, including passenger and checked baggage screening operations.  One of the most significant changes mandated by ATSA was the shift from  the use of private-sector screeners to perform airport screening operations  to the use of federal screeners. Prior to ATSA, passenger and checked  baggage screening had been performed by private screening companies  under contract to airlines. ATSA required TSA to create a federal  workforce to assume the job of conducting passenger and checked  baggage screening at commercial airports. The federal workforce was in  place, as required, by November 2002. While TSA took over responsibility  for passenger checkpoint and baggage screening, air carriers have  continued to conduct passenger prescreening (the process of checking  passengers’ names against federal watch list data at the time after an  airline reservation is made). As noted above, the Intelligence Reform and  Terrorism Prevention Act requires that TSA take over this responsibility  from air carriers.
In addition to establishing requirements for passenger and checked  baggage screening, ATSA charged TSA with the responsibility for ensuring  the security of air cargo. TSA’s responsibilities include, among other  things, establishing security rules and regulations covering domestic and  foreign passenger carriers that transport cargo, domestic and foreign all- cargo carriers, and domestic indirect air carriers—carriers that  consolidate air cargo from multiple shippers and deliver it to air carriers to  be transported; and overseeing implementation of air cargo security  requirements by air carriers and indirect air carriers through compliance  inspections. In general, TSA inspections are designed to ensure air carrier  compliance with air cargo security requirements, while air carrier  inspections focus on ensuring that cargo does not contain weapons,  explosives, or stowaways.
ATSA also granted TSA the responsibility for overseeing U.S. airport  operators’ efforts to maintain and improve the security of airport  perimeters, the adequacy of controls restricting unauthorized access to  secured areas, and security measures pertaining to individuals who work  at airports. While airport operators, not TSA, have direct day-to-day  operational responsibilities for these areas of security, ATSA directs TSA  to improve the security of airport perimeters and the access controls  leading to secured airport areas, as well as take measures to reduce the  security risks posed by airport workers.
subsections: section_title: Border Security: State Department and DHS’s Customs and Border Protection Have Primary Responsibility for Visa Management and Border Inspection
paragraphs: Our nation’s current border security process is intended to control the  entry and exit of foreign nationals seeking to enter or remain in the United  States as well as prevent hazardous cargo or materials from being  transported into the country. The primary federal agencies involved in this  effort are the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs and DHS’s  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE).
Managing and Administering the Visa Process  The first layer of border security begins at the State Department’s overseas  consular posts, where State’s consular officers are to adjudicate visa  applications for foreign nationals who wish to enter the United States. In  deciding to approve or deny a visa, consular officers are on the front line  of defense in protecting the United States against potential terrorists and  others whose entry would likely be harmful to U.S. national interests.  Consular officers must balance this security responsibility against the  need to facilitate legitimate travel. The process for determining who will  be issued or refused a visa contains several steps, including  documentation reviews, in-person interviews, collection of biometrics  (fingerprints), and cross-referencing an applicant’s name against a name- check database that includes the names of visa applicants to identify  terrorists and other aliens who are potentially ineligible for visas based on  criminal histories or other reasons specified by federal statute. In addition,  State provides guidance, in consultation with DHS, to consular officers  regarding visa policies and procedures and has the lead role with respect  to foreign policy-related visa issues. While State manages the visa process,  DHS is responsible for establishing visa policy, reviewing implementation  of the policy, and providing additional direction. In addition, DHS had  designated ICE to oversee efforts to review applications and provide  expert advice and training to consular officers regarding specific threats  related to the visa process at certain overseas posts.
Border Screening and Inspection Processes for Ports of Entry  CBP is responsible for conducting immigration and customs inspections  for aliens entering the United States at official border crossings (air, land,  and sea ports of entry). CBP enforces immigration laws by screening and  inspecting international travelers who enter the country through ports of  entry. As part of this process, CBP officers verify travelers’ identities  through inspection of travel documents, screen travelers against terrorist  watch lists, and scan or enter passport data into databases to verify  travelers’ identities. CBP also is responsible for conducting customs- related inspections of cargo at ports of entry and for ensuring that all  goods entering the United States do so legally. In addition, CBP conducts  prescreening of passengers on international flights bound for or departing  from the United States. Specifically, CBP reviews biographical data and  passport numbers provided by air carriers and conducts queries against  terrorist watch lists and law enforcement and immigration databases to  determine whether any passengers are to be referred to secondary  inspection (whereby passengers are selected for more in-depth review of  their identity and documentation) prior to the arrival of the aircraft at a  U.S. port of entry.
section_title: Federal Use of the Terrorist Watch List to Enhance Aviation and Border Security
paragraphs: The consolidated terrorist watch list is an important tool used by federal  agencies to help secure our nation’s borders. This list provides decision  makers with information about individuals who are known or suspected  terrorists, so that these individuals can either be prevented from entering  the country, apprehended while in the country, or apprehended as they  attempt to exit the country. After 9/11, various government watch lists  were consolidated into one watch list, which is maintained by the FBI’s  Terrorist Screening Center (an entity that has been operational since  December 2003 under the administration of the FBI). The consolidated  watch list maintained by the center is the U.S. government’s master  repository for all known and suspected international and domestic  terrorist records used for watch list-related screening. The consolidated  watch list is an important homeland security tool used by federal frontline  screening agencies, including the departments of State, Justice, and  Homeland Security. Based upon agency-specific policies and criteria,  relevant portions of the consolidated watch list can be used in a wide  range of security-related screening procedures. For instance, air carriers  and CBP use subsets of the consolidated watch list to prescreen  passengers; State Department consular officers use the information in the  visa application process; CBP officers use watch list data as part of the  visitor inspection process at ports of entry, and state and local law  enforcement officers use watch list data to screen apprehended  individuals during traffic stops and for other purposes.
section_title: Assessing and Managing Homeland Security Risks Using a Risk Management Approach
paragraphs: In recent years, we, along with Congress (most recently through the  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004); the executive  branch (e.g., in presidential directives); and the 9/11 Commission have  required or advocated that federal agencies with homeland security  responsibilities utilize a risk management approach to help ensure that  finite national resources are dedicated to assets or activities considered to  have the highest security priority. We have concluded that without a risk  management approach, there is limited assurance that programs designed  to combat terrorism are properly prioritized and focused. Thus, risk  management, as applied in the homeland security context, can help to  more effectively and efficiently prepare defenses against acts of terrorism  and other threats. A risk management approach entails a continuous  process of managing risk through a series of actions, including setting  strategic goals and objectives, performing risk assessments, evaluating  alternative actions to reduce identified risks by preventing or mitigating  their impact, selecting actions to undertake by management, and  implementing and monitoring those actions.
section_title: Stronger Layered Defenses for Aviation Security in Place, Though We Reported More Needs to Be Done to Enhance Passenger Screening Operations and Security of Other Transportation Modes
paragraphs: TSA and other agencies have taken steps to strengthen the various layers  of commercial aviation defense—including passenger prescreening  (conducted after a reservation is made), passenger checkpoint screening  (conducted once passengers are at the airport and proceeding to the gate  with any carry-on bags), and in-flight security—that were exploited by the  hijackers on 9/11. Many of the vulnerabilities related to these areas have  been addressed through new legislation passed by Congress and policies  and procedures taken by various federal agencies, though opportunities  exist for additional improvements. For example, passengers selected for  additional screening after they make their airline reservations receive  greater scrutiny prior to boarding, but we have reported that more work is  needed to help ensure the process for identifying passengers who are  selected results in accurate identification, and TSA has yet to take full  responsibility for this process, as mandated. In other areas, passenger  checkpoint screening procedures and technologies have been enhanced to  aid in detecting prohibited items, and security measures for preparing or  responding to in-flight on-board threats, and coordinating responses from  the ground, have been strengthened. In addition, other layers of defense in  our aviation system have been strengthened, such as checked baggage and  air cargo screening, though challenges remain. In baggage screening, for  example, while TSA now screens 100 percent of checked baggage using  explosive detection systems, enhancing the effectiveness of current  baggage screening technologies—and finding the most cost-effective  approaches for deploying baggage screening systems to detect  explosives—remains challenging. Finally, because we cannot afford to  protect everything against all threats in the post-9/11 era, choices must be  made about targeting security priorities. Thus, great care needs to be  taken to assign available resources to address the greatest risks, along  with selecting those strategies that make the most efficient and effective  use of resources—within aviation as well as among other transportation  security modes, such as passenger rail and maritime industries. TSA and  other federal agencies have begun focusing on identifying and prioritizing  security needs in these and other areas using a risk-based approach to  guide security-related decision making. In addition, efforts are under way  to enhance cooperation with domestic and international partners on a  broad array of security concerns.
subsections: section_title: While Many of the Aviation Vulnerabilities of 9/11 Have Been Addressed, TSA and Other Agencies Continue Efforts to Further Strengthen Aviation Security
paragraphs: At the time of the 9/11 attacks, federal and airline industry rules for  commercial airline travel reflected a system that sought to balance  security concerns with the need to facilitate consumer travel and manage  growing demand. The events of that day revealed many ways in which  more stringent security measures were needed for a commercial aviation  system that was evidently vulnerable to terrorism. In particular, the  nation’s layered system of defense for aviation—including passenger  prescreening, passenger checkpoint screening, and in-flight security  measures—were not designed to stop the terrorist hijackers from boarding  and taking control of the aircraft. A review of aviation security conditions  in place prior to 9/11, and the many federal actions taken since then to  mitigate the known vulnerabilities, suggest that we have come a long way  toward making air travel safer. That said, our work, and that of others, has  identified additional actions that are needed to resolve strategic and  operational barriers to further enhance the layers of defense for the  nation’s aviation system.
subsections: section_title: Domestic Airline Passenger Prescreening Procedures Have Been Enhanced but We Have Reported That More Work Is Needed to Help Ensure Accuracy in Matching Passengers’ Identities against Terrorist Watch Lists
paragraphs: The prescreening of passengers—the process of identifying passengers  who may pose a security risk before they board an aircraft—is an  important first layer of defense that is intended to help officials focus  security efforts on those passengers representing the greatest potential  threat. At the time of the attacks, the passenger prescreening process was  made up of two components performed by air carriers in conjunction with  FAA: (1) a process to compare passenger names with names on a  government-supplied terrorist watch list (i.e., the identity-matching  process); and (2) a computer-assisted prescreening system that was used  to select passengers requiring additional scrutiny. With respect to the first  of these passenger prescreening components, after passengers made their  airline reservations, the air carriers used the information passengers had  provided (such as name and address) to check them against a no-fly list—a  government watch list of persons who were considered by the FBI to be a  direct threat to U.S. civil aviation, and which was distributed to the U.S. air  carriers by FAA. None of the 19 hijackers who purchased their airline  tickets for the four 9/11 flights in a short period at the end of August 2001  using credit cards, debit cards, or cash, was on the no-fly list. This list  contained the names of just 12 terrorist suspects; the information for the  no-fly list came from one source, the FBI. Other government lists in place  at the time contained the names of many thousands of known and  suspected terrorists—but were not used to prescreen airline passengers.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the federal government  recognized that effective prescreening of airline passengers largely  depended on obtaining accurate, reliable, and timely information on  potential terrorists and gave priority attention to, among other things,  developing more comprehensive and consolidated terrorist watch lists. In  response, in part, to recommendations by us, government watch lists  were subsequently consolidated into a terrorist screening database—also  known as the consolidated watch list—maintained by the FBI’s Terrorist  Screening Center. The consolidated watch list maintained by the center is  the U.S. government’s master repository for all known and suspected  international and domestic terrorist records used for watch list-related  screening. This watch list database contains records from several sources,  including the FBI’s list of terrorist organizations and information from the  intelligence community on the identity of any known terrorists with  international ties. For aviation security purposes, a portion of this  consolidated watch list is exported by the Terrorist Screening Center and  incorporated into TSA’s no-fly and selectee lists. (While according to  TSA, persons on the no-fly list should be precluded from boarding an  aircraft bound for, or departing from, the United States, any person on the  selectee list is to receive additional screening before being allowed to  board.) TSA provides updated lists to air carriers for use in prescreening  passengers and provides assistance to air carriers in determining whether  passengers are a match with persons on the lists. As of June 2006, the  number of records in the consolidated watch list that had been extracted  for the no-fly and selectee lists had been increased significantly (up from  12 records available on 9/11).
With respect to the second component of passenger prescreening, a  computer-assisted prescreening system was in place on 9/11, in which data  related to a passenger’s reservation and travel itinerary were compared by  the air carriers against behavioral characteristics used to identify  passengers who appeared to pose a higher than normal risk, and who  therefore would be selected for additional security attention prior to their  flights. While nine of the 9/11 terrorists were selected for additional  scrutiny by the air carriers’ computer-assisted prescreening process, there  was little consequence to their selection because, at the time, selection  only entailed having one’s checked baggage screened for explosives or  held off the airplane until one had boarded; it was not geared toward  identifying the weapons and tactics used by the hijackers. The  consequences of selection reflected the view that non-suicide bombing  was the most substantial risk to domestic aircraft and were designed to  identify individuals who might try to bomb a passenger jet using methods  similar to those employed in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over  Lockerbie, Scotland, in which a bomb was placed in checked luggage.
After the passage of ATSA in November 2001, which created TSA as the  agency responsible for ensuring the security of aviation and other  transportation modes, TSA took over responsibility for the secondary  screening process from the air carriers. TSA subsequently changed the  consequences for passengers selected by the prescreening process.  Currently, passengers who are selected for secondary prescreening either  because they are on TSA’s selectee list or because they are selected by an  air carrier’s computer-assisted passenger prescreening system now receive  more comprehensive secondary screening. Specifically, all these selectees  not only receive greater passenger-checked baggage screening than  nonselectees, as was the case at the time of terrorist attacks, but also  receive additional physical screening, such as a hand-search of their  luggage and a more thorough physical inspection of their person at the  checkpoint.
All of these efforts have helped to transform the prescreening process into  a more robust layer of defense than existed prior to 9/11. Nevertheless, the  federal government still faces challenges related to improving the identity- matching portion of the prescreening process to help ensure that known  or suspected terrorists are identified before they can board aircraft. For  example, while the process of developing and maintaining terrorist watch  lists to be used in the identity-matching process requires continuous effort,  and no watch list can ever promise to contain a match for every potential  traveler, ensuring the quality of watch list data nevertheless remains a key  challenge. Concerns have been raised about the overall quality of the  consolidated watch list—in particular, that the quality of data in the watch  lists varies, and that the underlying accuracy of the data in the  consolidated watch list has not been fully determined. The Department of  Justice Inspector General reported in June 2005 that the Terrorist  Screening Center could not ensure the information in the consolidated  watch list database maintained by the center was complete and accurate.  For example, the database did not contain names that should be included  in watch lists, according to the Inspector General, and it contained  inaccurate information about some persons who were on the lists.  According to the Inspector General’s report, the Terrorist Screening  Center is working on completing a record-by-record quality assurance  review of the watch lists to ensure that each record contains the required  data to improve watch list quality. In addition, screening center officials  have recently stated that all records on the no-fly list are being re-vetted  using newly developed no-fly list inclusion guidance to determine if each  individual truly belongs on the list. We have work under way addressing  the law enforcement response agencies take when an individual on the  watch list is encountered.
A second challenge that affects the accuracy of the current identity- matching process relates to the nature of the information available to air  carriers and the procedures used to match passenger identities against the  no-fly and selectee lists that are part of the consolidated terrorist watch  list. Although air carriers are required to compare the information supplied  by passengers against the names that appear on the no-fly and selectee  lists, there is no uniform identity matching process or common software  that all air carriers are required to use to conduct their identity matching  procedures. In addition, the technical sophistication of air carrier identity  matching techniques also varies. Some identity matching technologies  might correctly discriminate between “John Smith” and “John Smythe”  when comparing these names against the consolidated terrorist watch list,  while others may not. Different identity matching results can lead to a  passenger being boarded on one carrier’s flight while being denied  boarding on another air carrier’s flight, including a connecting flight.  Although we did not assess the relative accuracy of the various name- matching procedures used to prescreen passengers, inconsistency in these  procedures can be problematic for passengers and creates security  concerns.
A third challenge relates to concerns about the disclosure of watch list  information outside the federal government. Sharing of watch list data  with air carriers, or organizations with whom they contract, creates an  opportunity for watch lists to be viewed by parties who may use this  information in ways that are detrimental to U.S. interests. For example, if a  terrorist group could view the no-fly and selectee lists they would learn  which—if any—of their operatives would be able to travel on commercial  aircraft to or from the United States unhampered. In addition, the 9/11  Commission stated that there are security concerns with sharing U.S.  government watch lists with private firms and foreign countries.
In an effort to address these security challenges, the commission  recommended that TSA take over the domestic watch list identify- matching process from air carriers, and in December 2004, Congress  required that the responsibility for the domestic watch list identity- matching process be assumed by TSA. While shifting control over the  watch list identity-matching process from the airline industry to the  federal government should help address some of the limitations of the  current process, for over 3 years, TSA has faced significant challenges in  developing and implementing a new and more reliable identity-matching  process, and has not yet taken this function over from air carriers. TSA’s  Secure Flight program—which is to perform the functions associated  with determining whether passengers on domestic flights are on  government watch lists—is intended to remedy some of the problems in  the current identity-matching process. For example, unlike the current  system that operates as part of each air carrier’s reservation system,  Secure Flight would be operated by TSA—and TSA, rather than the air  carriers, would be responsible for matching passengers’ names against the  no-fly and selectee information maintained in the consolidated watch list  (this information is currently transmitted to air carriers) as well as  information from other watch lists. This approach would, among other  benefits, eliminate the need to distribute terrorist watch list information  outside the federal government as part of passenger prescreening. In  addition, Secure Flight is intended to address the problem related to the  lack of standard procedures among air carriers for obtaining passenger- supplied data by defining what type of passenger information is required.  Secure Flight also plans, among other things, to use research analysts to  resolve discrepancies in the matching of passenger data to data contained  in the database.
However, we have reported that, taken as a whole, the development of  Secure Flight has not been effectively managed—has not, in fact, been  implemented—and is at risk of failure. We have reported on multiple  occasions that the Secure Flight program has not met key milestones, or  finalized its goals, objectives, and requirements and have recommended  that TSA take numerous steps to help to develop the program. For  example, to help manage risk associated with Secure Flight’s continued  development and implementation, we recommended in March 2005 that  TSA finalize the system requirements and develop detailed test plans to  help ensure that all Secure Flight system functionality is properly tested  and evaluated. We also recommended that TSA develop a plan for  establishing connectivity among the air carriers, CBP, and TSA to help  ensure the secure, effective, and timely transmission of data for use in  Secure Flight operations. In early 2006, TSA suspended development of  Secure Flight and initiated a reassessment, or rebaselining, of the program,  to be completed before moving forward. Our work reviewing air carriers’  current processes has identified two air carriers that are enhancing their  identity-matching systems, since it remains unclear when TSA will take  over the passenger identity-matching function through Secure Flight.  However, any improvements made to the accuracy of an individual air  carrier’s identity-matching system will not apply system-wide and could  further exacerbate differences that currently exist among the various air  carriers’ systems. These differences may result in varying levels of  effectiveness in the matching of passenger names against the terrorist  watch list. At Congress’s request, we are continuing to monitor TSA’s  progress to develop Secure Flight. (See app. III for a list of GAO products  related to domestic passenger prescreening, including Secure Flight.)
section_title: CBP Faces Challenges Obtaining Data Needed To Prescreen Travelers on International Flights before Takeoff
paragraphs: The ongoing security concerns about prescreening for domestic flights,  including disclosure of watch list information outside the government and  the quality of information used for the identity-matching process, also  pertain to international flights departing from or traveling to the United  States. As with domestic passenger prescreening, air carriers conduct an  initial match of passenger names against terrorist watch lists—the no-fly  and selectee lists—before international flights depart to or from the U.S.  using information that passengers supply when they make their  reservations. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—the DHS agency  responsible for international passenger prescreening—supplements the  identity-matching conducted by air carriers by comparing more reliable  passenger information collected from passports against the terrorist watch  lists and other government databases for international flights. (This  information is considered more reliable because passport data is not self- reported.) However, the current process does not require the U.S.  government’s identity-matching procedures be completed prior to the  departure of international flights traveling to or from the United States.  As a result, passengers thought to be a risk to commercial aviation have  successfully boarded flights. For example, in calendar year 2005, a number  of passengers previously identified by the U.S. government as direct  threats to the security of commercial aviation boarded international flights  traveling to or from the United States, according to agency incident  reports. In seven cases, the resulting risk was deemed high enough to  divert the flight from its intended U.S. destination, resulting in costs to the  air carriers, delays for passengers, and government intervention. While  none of the flights resulted in an attempted hijacking or other security  incidents, these flights nevertheless illustrate a continuing vulnerability  that high-risk passengers could potentially board international flights and  attempt to blow up these aircraft or take control in order to use them as  weapons against U.S. interests at home or abroad.
To address this vulnerability, as part of the Intelligence Reform and  Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Congress mandated that DHS issue a  proposed plan by February 15, 2005, for completing the U.S. government’s  identity-matching process before the departure of international flights.  While CBP did not meet this deadline, the agency issued a proposed rule  that would eliminate the preliminary screening conducted by air carriers  and replace it instead with a process where air carriers select one of two  options for transmitting this information earlier to CBP. One option allows  air carriers to transmit passport information as each individual passenger  checks in. Under this option, CBP would analyze the information against  terrorist watch lists, make an immediate (or “real-time”) decision about  whether the passenger can board the aircraft, and convey this information  electronically to the air carrier. Under this approach air carriers could  admit passengers for flights up to 15 minutes before departure. The second  option allows air carriers to provide all passengers’ passport information  (in a bulk data transmission) to CBP for verification at least 60 minutes  before a flight’s departure. Under either option, the government would  retain control of the watch lists, resolving this additional security concern.
Regardless of which proposed option air carriers choose to pursue, many  of CBP’s efforts to improve the international prescreening process are still  largely in development, and the agency faces several challenges in  implementing its proposed solutions. One challenge, in particular,  concerns stakeholder coordination. CBP must rely on a variety of  stakeholders to provide input or to implement aspects of the prescreening  process, including air carriers, industry associations, foreign governments,  and other agencies within and outside DHS. One coordination challenge  involves aligning international aviation passenger prescreening with TSA’s  development of its Secure Flight program for prescreening passengers on  domestic flights. Ensuring that this coordination effort aligns with Secure  Flight is important to air carriers, since passengers may have both a  domestic and an international part to their itinerary. If these prescreening  processes are not coordinated, passengers may be found to be high-risk on  one flight and not high-risk on another flight, resulting in air carrier  confusion and a potential security hazard. We have recently recommended  that DHS take additional steps and make key policy and technical  decisions (in order to determine, for example, the data and identity- matching technologies that will be used) that are necessary to more fully  coordinate CBP’s international prescreening program with TSA’s  prospective domestic prescreening program, Secure Flight. (See app. III  for a list of GAO products related to domestic and international passenger  prescreening.)
section_title: GAO Concluding Observations—Passenger Prescreening
paragraphs: While passenger prescreening represents a more secure layer of defense  today than it did on 9/11, there is still a need for DHS, TSA, and CBP to  follow through on congressional requirements and recommendations we  have made to improve the process. Specifically, TSA must still comply  with a congressional requirement for transferring responsibility for the  passenger identity-matching process from air carriers to TSA for domestic  flights. In addition, we made a recommendation in November 2006, which  DHS has taken under consideration, aimed at helping the agency to  enhance coordination between CBP’s international prescreening program  and TSA’s prospective domestic prescreening program, Secure Flight.  Such efforts are necessary to help ensure that the prescreening process— as a first layer of aviation defense—is accurate and effective in identifying  potential terrorists who should be denied boarding or receive additional  screening, and in ensuring that watch list data are not at risk of disclosure  to those wishing to do harm to U.S. interests.
section_title: Passenger Checkpoint Screening Threat Detection Capabilities Have Been Strengthened and Efforts to Further Enhance Screener Training, Screening Procedures, and Related Technologies Are Under Way
paragraphs: The layer of aviation security most visible to the general public, as well as  to terrorists, is the physical screening of passengers and their carry-on  bags at airport checkpoints, known as passenger checkpoint screening.  The passenger checkpoint screening process involves the inspection of  passengers and their carry-on bags to deter and prevent the carriage of any  unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item on  board an aircraft. Checkpoint screening is a critical component of aviation  security—and one that has long been subject to security vulnerabilities.  Passenger checkpoint screening is comprised of three elements: (1) the  people responsible for conducting the screening of airline passengers and  their carry-on items; (2) the procedures that must be followed to conduct  screening; and (3) the technology used in the screening process. TSA has  made progress in implementing security-related measures in all these  areas, but there are additional opportunities to further enhance aviation  security through the people, processes, and technologies involved in  passenger checkpoint screening.
Prior to the passage of ATSA, the screening of passengers had been  performed by private screening companies under contract to the air  carriers. The FAA was responsible for ensuring compliance with screening  regulations. As we reported in 2000, since 1978, the FAA and the airline  industry have continued to face challenges in improving the effectiveness  of airport checkpoint screeners, and we reported that screeners were not  detecting dangerous objects, including loaded firearms and, in tests  conducted by FAA, simulated explosive devices. We attributed screening  detection problems primarily to high turnover rates among screeners,  among other things. By the time the terrorist attacks occurred, the FAA  was already 2 years behind in issuing a regulation in response to a  congressional mandate requiring the companies that employ checkpoint  screeners to improve their testing and training through a certification  program.
As the 9/11 Commission report testified, the terrorist hijackers, having  escaped watch-list detection during the prescreening process, had to beat  only one layer of security—the security checkpoint process—in order to  proceed with their plan. The Commission concluded that at the time of the  attacks, while walk-through metal detectors and X-ray machines were in  use to stop prohibited items, many potentially deadly and dangerous  items—such as the box-cutters carried by the hijackers—did not set off  metal detectors or were hard to distinguish in an X-ray machine.  Moreover, FAA regulations and guidance did not explicitly prohibit knives  with blades under 4 inches long. And the standards for what constituted a  deadly or dangerous weapon were “somewhat vague,” the commission  found, and were left up to the discretion of air carriers and their screening  contractors. Moreover, secondary screening—whereby passengers coming  through the checkpoint with carry-on bags are selected for additional  screening—took place, by and large, only when passengers triggered metal  detectors. Even when such trigger events occurred, passengers often were  cleared to board. For example, of the 5 hijackers who boarded planes at  Washington Dulles International Airport on 9/11, three set off metal  detectors; they (and one carry-on bag as well) were hand-wanded, the bag  swiped for explosive trace detection, and then they were cleared to board.
TSA Has Made Progress in Training and Evaluating a Federalized  Workforce for Screening Airline Passengers  After 9/11 and as a result of ATSA, TSA assumed responsibility for  screeners and screening operations at more than 400 commercial airports,  established a basic screener training program, and has conducted annual  proficiency reviews and operational testing of screeners, now known as  transportation security officers (TSO). TSA has taken numerous steps to  develop and evaluate its screening personnel by, among other things,  expanding training beyond the basic training requirement through a self- guided on-line learning center, and by providing additional training on  threat information, explosives detection, and new screening approaches.  While these efforts and others taken by the agency have helped TSA to  develop and evaluate appropriate workforce skills, we have recommended  that TSA take additional steps to ensure that this training is delivered. For  example, at some airports we have visited, TSOs encountered difficulty  accessing and completing recurrent (refresher) training because of  technological and staffing constraints. In May 2005, TSA stated that it had  a plan for deploying high speed Internet connections at airports. The  President's 2007 budget request reported that approximately 220 of the  nation's 400 commercial airport and field locations have full information  technology infrastructure installation. (See app. III for a list of GAO  products related to screener workforce issues.)
Passenger Checkpoint Screening Procedures Have Been Enhanced  to Improve Security and Procedures Are Regularly Modified to  Reflect Current Conditions  In addition to TSA’s efforts to train and deploy a federal screener  workforce, steps also have been taken to strengthen checkpoint screening  polices and procedures to enhance security. One of the most important  differences of the current checkpoint screening system compared to the  system in place on 9/11 is the additional physical screening that certain  passengers selected by the prescreening process, as discussed earlier,  must undergo at the checkpoint. In addition, certain screening procedures  performed by TSOs, or other authorized TSA personnel, are now  mandatory for all passengers. Prior to entering the sterile area of an  airport—the area within the terminal where passengers wait to board  departing aircraft—all passengers must be screened by a walk-through  metal detector and their carry-on items must be X-rayed. Passengers  whose carry-on baggage alarms the x-ray machine, passengers who alarm  the walk-through metal detectors, or passengers who are selected by the  air carriers’ passenger prescreening system, all receive additional  screening. These passengers may be screened by hand-wand or pat-down  or have their carry-on items screened for explosive traces or physically  searched. Figure 2 shows the functions performed as part of passenger  checkpoint screening.
Because history has shown that terrorists will adapt their tactics and  techniques in an attempt to bypass increased security procedures, and are  capable of developing increasingly sophisticated measures in an attempt  to avoid detection, TSA leadership has emphasized the need to continually  test or implement new screening procedures to further enhance security in  response to changing conditions. We have ongoing work on how TSA  modifies and implements passenger checkpoint screening procedures and  plan to issue a report in February 2007. Last year, we testified that TSA  security-related proposed changes to checkpoint screening procedures are  based on risk-based factors, including previous terrorist incidents, threat  information, vulnerabilities of the screening system, as well as operational  experience and stakeholder concerns.
Recommended modifications to passenger checkpoint screening  procedures are also generated based on covert testing conducted by TSA  officials and the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). Covert tests are  designed to assess vulnerabilities in the checkpoint screening system to  specific threats, such as vulnerability to the various methods by which  terrorists may try to conceal handguns, knives, and improvised explosive  devices (IED). We have ongoing work evaluating TSA’s covert testing  efforts and expect to report our results later this year.
TSA Is Exploring New Technologies to Enhance Detection of  Explosives and Other Threats  The ever changing terrorist threat also necessitates continued research  and development of new technologies and the fielding of these  technologies to strengthen aviation security. The President’s fiscal year  2007 budget request notes that emerging checkpoint technology may  enhance the detection of prohibited items, especially firearms and  explosives, on passengers. Furthermore, the DHS OIG has reported that  significant improvements in screener performance may not be possible  without greater use of new technology, and has encouraged TSA to  expedite its technology testing programs and give priority to technologies  that will enable screeners to better detect both weapons and explosives.  TSA has recently put increased focus on the threats posed by IEDs and is  investing in technology for this purpose. For example, since the  September 11 attacks, 94 explosive-detection-trace portal machines have  been installed at 37 airports. (These machines detect vapors and residues  of explosives, including IEDs.) In addition, as of May 2006, TSA had  conducted, or planned to conduct, evaluations of nine new types of  passenger screening technology, including, for example, technology that  would screen bottles for liquid explosives. It is important that TSA  continue to invest in and develop technologies for detecting explosives  This is especially important in light of the alleged August 2006 plot to  detonate liquid explosives on board multiple commercial aircraft bound  for the United States from the United Kingdom. We are currently  evaluating DHS’s and TSA’s progress in planning for, managing, and  deploying research and development programs in support of airport  checkpoint screening operations. We expect to report our results later this  year. (See app. III for a list of GAO products related to passenger  checkpoint screening.)
section_title: GAO Concluding Observations—Passenger Checkpoint Screening
paragraphs: As with passenger prescreening, the checkpoint screening system in place  today is far more robust, reflects more rigorous screening requirements,  and deploys better trained staff, than in the years leading up to the  terrorist attacks. In its list of recommended actions that the government  should take to protect against and prepare for future terrorist attacks, the  9/11 Commission suggested that improving checkpoint screening should  be a priority. TSA has largely accomplished this goal, though as with all  aspects of aviation security, efforts to further enhance and strengthen  procedures are ongoing. For example, new and emerging technologies for  detecting threat objects are likely to help enhance the checkpoint  screening process.
section_title: In-flight Security Measures in Preparing For or Responding To On-board Threats, and Coordinating Responses from the Ground, Have Been Strengthened
paragraphs: Security protocols and policies for preparing for or responding to threats  that occur on board flights already in progress, and coordinating  responses to such security events from the ground, have changed  significantly since 9/11. With respect to on-board security measures, the  airline cabin and flight crews on duty on 9/11 were neither trained for nor  prepared to deal with the events that unfolded once the hijackers were on  board. Though in-flight security was regarded as a layer of defense in the  commercial aviation system, FAA’s security training guidelines at the time  did not contemplate suicide hijackers, with aircraft used as guided  missiles, as a likely scenario. Flight crews had been taught to cooperate,  rather than resist, during an emergency. As with the prescreening and  checkpoint screening processes, the ability of the hijackers to manipulate  flight crews and penetrate the captain’s cockpit revealed serious  weaknesses of in-flight security.
In-flight security has since been strengthened in several ways to help  mitigate the likelihood of terrorists being able take over an aircraft. For  example, TSA established the Federal Flight Deck Officer program in 2002.  The program trains eligible flight crew members in the use of force to  defend against an act of criminal violence or air piracy. These flight deck  officers are deputized as federal law enforcement officers, and may  transport and carry a TSA-issued firearm, in a manner approved by TSA. In  addition, FAA directed air carriers to harden their cockpit doors and  Congress expanded the decades-old Federal Air Marshal Service by  mandating in ATSA the deployment of air marshals, on board all high- security risk flights. Before 9/11, there were 33 air marshals altogether;  now there are thousands. A key aspect of air marshals’ operating  procedures is the discreet (semicovert) movement through airports as  they check in for their flight, transit screening checkpoints, and board the  aircraft.
TSA has also taken steps to ensure that flight and cabin crew members— among the last lines of defense—are prepared to handle potential threat  conditions on board commercial aircraft. The revised guidance and  standards TSA developed for air carriers to follow in developing and  delivering their flight and cabin crew member security training is a  positive step forward in strengthening the security on board commercial  aircraft. This training includes, among other things, teaching crew  members how to search a cabin for explosive devices. Congress also  mandated TSA to implement an advanced voluntary crew member self- defense training program for flight and cabin crew members; this training  is ongoing.
With respect to coordinating responses to on-board threats from the  ground, the events of 9/11 revealed the importance of prompt interagency  communication to allow for a unified, coordinated response to airborne  threats. Once an in-flight security threat is identified, rapid and effective  information sharing among agencies on the ground is critical to ensure  that each agency can respond according to its mission and that the  security threat is handled in the safe manner. The 9/11 Commission Report  stated that a weakness in aviation security exploited by the terrorists  included a lack of protocols and capabilities in executing a coordinated  FAA and military response to multiple hijackings and suicidal hijackers.
According to the commission, the response on 9/11 of the Department of  Defense’s North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which  is responsible for securing U.S. airspace, was hindered in part by lack of  real-time communications with FAA and defense and intelligence  agencies. For instance, a shootdown authorization was not communicated  to the NORAD air defense sector until 28 minutes after United 93 had  crashed in Pennsylvania. Moreover, the commission noted, planes did not  know where to go or what targets they were to intercept. And once the  shootdown order was given, it was not communicated to the pilots.
To address the communications and coordination problems that were  highlighted by 9/11, many federal agencies, including the FAA, DOD, and  TSA, have taken action. For example, the FAA—which is responsible for  managing aircraft traffic entering into or operating in U.S. airspace— established an unclassified teleconference system, called the Domestic  Events Network, designed to gather and disseminate information for all  types of security threats. The network is monitored by approximately 60  users from a variety of federal agencies as well as state and local entities.  This network was originally established as a conference call on the  morning of 9/11 to coordinate the federal response to the hijacked aircraft  and it has remained in existence since then, serving as a basis for  interagency cooperation. Any Domestic Events Network user can  broadcast information, allowing other agencies on the Network to  communicate and monitor a situation in real-time. According to FAA  officials, domestic air carriers have recently been given the capability to  link into the Domestic Events Network, allowing for the air carrier to  provide real-time situational updates as they are received from the flight  crew onboard the aircraft in question without relying on an intermediary  party. Another important interagency communications tool is the Defense  Red Switch Network which is a secure, classified network administered by  the DOD that allows multiple agencies to discuss intelligence information  over a secure line.
In addition, TSA has established the Transportation Security Operations  Center (TSOC), a national center that operates around the clock and  coordinates the multi-agency response to in-flight security threats. Air  carriers are required to report to TSOC all incidents and suspicious  activity that could affect the security of U.S. civil aviation, including any  incidents of interference with a flight crew, specific or non-specific bomb  threats, and any correspondence received by an aircraft operator that  could indicate a potential threat to civil aviation. We have ongoing work  analyzing the processes that federal agencies follow to identify, assess,  and respond to in-flight security threats and the extent to which  interagency coordination problems occurred, if at all, and the steps  agencies took to address identified problems. The results of this work,  which will be issued in early 2007, will be classified. (See app. III for a list  of GAO products related to in-flight security.)
section_title: GAO Concluding Observations—In-flight Security and Ground-Based Response Efforts
paragraphs: Several actions taken in the months after 9/11—notably, hardened cockpit  doors, better emergency response training for airborne flight crews, and  the presence of federal air marshals on certain flights—have helped to  ensure that aircraft are both physically safer and better protected from the  actions of on-board hijackers or terrorists. Federal actions also have been  taken in response to the communications and coordination failures that  occurred on 9/11 in order to enhance coordinated responses to onboard  security threats from the ground. Our ongoing work will discuss, among  other things, the process federal agencies follow to identify, assess, and  respond to security threats, and the challenges, if any, that have arisen in  agencies’ coordination efforts and steps taken to deal with them.
section_title: Areas of Aviation System Not Exploited by 9/11 Terrorists Also Have Been Strengthened, though Implementation and Resource Challenges Remain
paragraphs: Two aspects of commercial aviation that were not directly implicated in  the 9/11 scenario—checked baggage screening and air cargo screening— are nonetheless recognized as important components of a layered system  of aviation defense. Congress and TSA have taken steps to enhance the  security of both in the years since 9/11, though resource and technology  challenges remain. The infrastructure of commercial airport properties,  which can pose risks to security by enabling criminals or terrorists to  penetrate sensitive areas (such as boarding areas or baggage facilities),  also has received congressional and federal attention. In addition,  Congress and federal agencies have taken actions to enhance security in  the noncommercial aviation sector, specifically, at the nation’s general  aviation airports—small airports that are home to flight training schools as  well as privately owned aircraft.
subsections: section_title: TSA Has Installed Baggage Screening Explosive Detection Equipment at Most Airports and Has Begun to Identify Costs, Benefits, and Technologies for Further Optimizing Baggage Screening
paragraphs: With respect to checked baggage screening, at the time of the attacks,  there was no federal requirement to screen all checked baggage on  domestic flights. In some cases, air carriers screened checked baggage on  commercial flights for bulk quantities of explosives using X-ray screening  equipment similar to that used for medical CAT scans. As the  Congressional Research Service reported a month after the attacks, the  availability and cost of baggage screening X-ray equipment, along with the  time it took to screen a bag, did not permit its use in all airports, on all  flights at airports where it was used, or even on all bags on any given  flight. In addition, passengers selected by the passenger prescreening  process for additional pre-flight scrutiny were either to have their checked  bags scanned for explosives or held until they boarded the aircraft. As  noted earlier, 5 of the 8 hijackers selected by the passenger prescreening  system in place on 9/11 had their checked bags held prior to boarding and  three had their bags scanned for explosives.
After the attacks, Congress, through ATSA, mandated that all checked  baggage at commercial airports be screened using explosive detection  systems. TSA has worked to overcome equipment challenges, and other  challenges, in order to fulfill this mandate, and now reports having the  capability to screen 100 percent of checked baggage using two types of  screening equipment—explosive detection systems (EDS), which use   X-rays to scan bags for explosives, and explosive trace detection systems  (ETD), in which bags are swabbed to test for chemical traces of  explosives. TSA considers screening with EDS to be superior to screening  with ETD because EDS machines process more bags per hour and  automatically detect explosives without direct human involvement. As of  June 2006, in order to screen all checked baggage for explosives at over  400 airports, TSA had procured and installed about 1,600 EDS and   7,200 ETD machines.
TSA has begun shifting its focus away from placing these systems  primarily in airport lobbies, as had been done initially, because of  problems that arose from this configuration. For instance, TSA’s  placement of stand-alone EDS and ETD machines in airport lobbies  resulted in passenger crowding, which presented unsafe conditions and  may have added security risks for passengers and airport workers. TSA  has begun to focus instead on systematically deploying the configuration  of baggage screening equipment that is considered by TSA to be the most  efficient, least labor-intensive, and most cost-effective at many airports— in-line EDS. These systems are integrated with airports’ baggage conveyor  and sorting systems (see fig. 3 for an illustration of the checked-baggage  screening system using an in-line EDS machine). TSA has also developed  smaller and less expensive stand-alone EDS equipment that may be  effective at smaller airports or closer to airline check-in counters.
A TSA cost-benefit analysis of in-line EDS machines being installed at nine   airports conducted in May 2004 showed that they could yield significant  savings for the federal government and achieve other benefits—including  reduced screener staffing requirements and increased baggage throughput  (the rate at which bags are processed). Specifically, TSA estimated that in- line baggage screening systems at these nine airports could save the  federal government about $1 billion over 7 years.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 mandated  and the conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2005 DHS  Appropriations Act directed TSA to, among other things, develop a  comprehensive plan for expediting the installation of in-line explosive  detection systems. To assist TSA in planning for the optimal deployment of  checked baggage screening systems, we recommended in March 2005 that  TSA systematically evaluate baggage screening needs at airports, including  the costs and benefits of installing in-line EDS systems at airports that did  not yet have such systems installed. We suggested that such planning  should include analyzing which airports should receive federal support for  in-line EDS systems based on cost savings that could be achieved from  more effective and efficient baggage screening operations and on other  factors, including enhanced security. And we recommended that TSA  identify and prioritize the airports where the benefits of replacing stand- alone baggage screening systems with in-line systems are likely to exceed  the costs of the systems, or where the systems are needed to address  security risks or related factors.
In February 2006, in response to our recommendation and a legislative  requirement to submit a schedule for expediting the installation and use of  in-line systems and replacement of ETD equipment with EDS machines,  TSA provided to Congress its strategic planning framework for its checked  baggage screening program. This framework introduced a strategy  intended to increase efficiency through deploying EDS to as many airports  as practicable, lowering lifecycle costs for the program, minimizing  impacts to TSA and airport/airline operations, and providing a flexible  security infrastructure for accommodating growing airline traffic and  potential new threats. The framework is an initial step toward: (1) finding  the ideal mix of higher-performance and lower-cost alternative screening  solutions for the 250 airports with the highest checked baggage volumes,  and (2) funding prioritization schedules by airport, by identifying the top  25 airports that should first receive federal funding for projects related to  the installation of EDS based on quantitative modeling of security and  economic factors, and other factors.
In addition, partly in response to other recommendations we made, TSA is  collaborating with airport operators, air carriers, and other key  stakeholders to identify funding and cost sharing strategies (in order to  determine how to allocate investments in baggage equipment between the  federal government and air carriers) and is focusing its research and  development efforts on the next generation of EDS technology. For  airports where in-line systems may not be economically justified because  of high investment costs, we suggested that a cost-effectiveness analysis  be used to determine the benefits of additional stand-alone EDS machines  to screen checked baggage in place of the more labor-intensive ETD  machines. According to TSA, the agency is conducting an analysis of the  airports that rely heavily on ETD machines and determined if they would  benefit from also having stand-alone EDS equipment. (See app. III for a list  of GAO products related to checked baggage screening.)
section_title: TSA Has Strengthened Oversight and Inspection of Air Cargo but We Have Reported That More Work Is Needed to Ensure Shippers Comply with Security Requirements and Address Potential Resource Challenges
paragraphs: In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the security of cargo carried  on both passenger and all-cargo aircraft became a growing concern both  to the public and to members of Congress. Since the attacks, several  instances of human stowaways in the cargo holds of all-cargo aircraft have  further heightened the concern over air cargo security by revealing  vulnerabilities that could potentially threaten the entire air transportation  system.
TSA has the responsibility for ensuring the security of air cargo, including,  among other things, establishing security rules and regulations covering  domestic and foreign passenger carriers that transport cargo, domestic  and foreign all-cargo carriers, and domestic indirect air carriers  (companies that consolidate air cargo from multiple shippers and deliver it  to air carriers to be transported); and has responsibility for overseeing  implementation of air cargo security requirements by air carriers and  indirect air carriers through compliance inspections. In general, TSA  inspections are designed to ensure that air carriers comply with air cargo  security requirements, while air carrier inspections focus on ensuring that  cargo does not contain weapons, explosives, or stowaways (see fig. 4).
Because safeguarding the nation’s air cargo transportation system is a  shared public and private sector responsibility, air carriers are generally  responsible for meeting TSA’s air cargo security requirements, including  how employees are to handle and physically inspect cargo.
As we reported in October 2005, TSA has implemented a variety of actions  intended to strengthen oversight for domestic air cargo security  operations conducted by air carriers. For air cargo, TSA has increased  the number of dedicated air cargo inspectors used to assess air carrier and  indirect air carrier compliance with security requirements, issued a  regulation in May 2006 to enhance and improve the security of air cargo  transportation, and has taken other actions. However, our work identified  factors that may limit the effectiveness of these measures. For example:    TSA has primarily relied on its Known Shipper program (allowing  individuals or businesses with established histories to ship cargo on  passenger carriers) to ensure that cargo transported on passenger air  carriers is screened in accordance with ATSA, and that unknown  shipments are not placed on passenger aircraft. However, at the time of  our review, we reported that the Known Shipper program had  weaknesses and may not provide adequate assurance that shippers are  trustworthy and that air cargo transported on passenger air carriers  was secure. For example, the information in TSA’s database on known  shippers was incomplete because participation was voluntary, and the  information in the database may not have been reliable. TSA has  addressed this issue through its May 2006 regulation on air cargo  security requirements, making it mandatory for air carriers and indirect  air carriers to provide information to this database by requiring them to  submit data on their known shippers.
TSA established a requirement for random inspection of air cargo  reflecting the agency’s position that inspecting 100 percent of air cargo  was not technologically feasible and would be potentially disruptive to  the flow of air commerce. However, this requirement contained  exemptions based on the nature and size of cargo that may leave the air  cargo system vulnerable to terrorist attack. We recommended in 2005  that TSA reexamine the rationale for existing air cargo inspection  exemptions, determine whether such exemptions leave the air cargo  system unacceptably vulnerable to terrorist attack, and make any  needed adjustments to the exemptions. In September 2006, TSA revised  the criteria for exemptions for cargo transported within or from the  United States on passenger aircraft. TSA is reviewing the remaining  inspection exemptions to determine whether or not they pose an  unacceptable vulnerability to the air cargo transportation system.
TSA conducts audits of air carriers and indirect air carriers to ensure  that they are complying with existing air cargo security requirements.  But TSA has not developed performance measures to determine to  what extent air carriers and others are complying with air cargo  security requirements. Without performance measures to gauge air  carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with air cargo security  requirements, TSA cannot effectively focus its inspection resources on  those entities posing the greatest risk. In addition, without measures to  determine an acceptable level of compliance with air cargo security  requirements, TSA cannot assess the performance of individual air  carriers or indirect air carriers against national performance averages  or goals that would allow TSA to target inspections and other actions  on those that fall below acceptable levels of compliance. We  recommended that TSA assess the effectiveness of enforcement  actions, including the use of civil penalties, in ensuring air carrier and  indirect air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements. We  also recommended that TSA develop measures to gauge air carrier and  indirect air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements to  assess and address potential security weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
TSA had not analyzed the results of air cargo security inspections to  systematically target future inspections on those entities that pose a  higher security risk to the domestic air cargo system, or assessed the  effectiveness of its enforcement actions in ensuring air carrier  compliance with air cargo security requirements. Such targeting is  important because TSA may not have adequate resources to inspect all  air carriers and indirect air carriers on a regular basis. We  recommended that TSA develop a plan for systematically analyzing the  results of air cargo compliance inspections and use the results to target  future inspections and identify systemwide corrective actions.  According to TSA officials, the agency has been working on developing  short-term and long-term outcome measures for air cargo security and  has begun to analyze inspection results to target future inspections.
Finally, with respect to TSA’s regulation on air cargo security  requirements, in May 2006, TSA estimated that implementing all the  provisions in the regulation (including actions already ongoing, such as  requiring air carriers to randomly inspect a percentage of air cargo) will  cost approximately $2 billion over a 10-year period (2005-2014). Before the  regulation was finalized, industry stakeholders representing air carriers  and airport authorities had stated that several of the provisions, such as  securing air cargo facilities, screening all individual persons boarding all- cargo aircraft, and conducting security checks on air cargo workers,  would be costly to implement.
We have not assessed how this regulation, or its costs, may affect TSA or  stakeholders. Nor have we undertaken additional work to determine the  extent to which TSA’s subsequent actions have addressed the weaknesses  identified above and our related recommendations. In our work, we  concluded that while the cost of enhancing air cargo security can be  significant, the potential costs of a terrorist attack, in terms of both the  loss of life and property and long-term economic impacts, would also be  significant although difficult to predict and quantify. TSA’s regulation also  covers inbound air cargo security requirements (for cargo originating  outside the United States). We currently have an ongoing review assessing  the security of inbound air cargo, including the regulation’s relevant  requirements, and expect to issue this work early this year.
section_title: Security of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Other Secure Areas Are Being Addressed
paragraphs: Like most other aspects of the aviation system, the security of commercial  airport facilities also came under heightened scrutiny after 9/11. Congress  included provisions in ATSA to address this aspect of airport security. In  particular, ATSA granted TSA the authority to oversee U.S. airport  operators’ efforts to maintain and improve the security of airport  perimeters (such as airfield fencing and access gates), the adequacy of  controls restricting unauthorized access to secured areas (such as building  entry ways leading to aircraft), and security measures pertaining to  individuals who work at airports. Apart from ongoing concerns about the  potential for terrorists to gain access to these areas, in 2004, concerns also  were raised about security breaches and other illegal activities, such as  drug smuggling, taking place at some airports. These events highlighted  the importance of strengthening security in these areas. Taken as a whole,  airport perimeter security and related areas, along with passenger and  baggage screening, comprise key elements of the aviation security  environment at commercial airports.
We reported in 2004 that TSA had begun evaluating commercial airport  security by conducting compliance inspections, among other things, but  needed a better approach for assessing how the results of these efforts  would be used to make improvements to the entire commercial airport  system. We also reported that TSA had helped some airport operators to  enhance perimeter and access control security by providing funds for  security equipment, such as electronic surveillance systems. However,  TSA had not, at the time of our review, set priorities for these and other  efforts or determined how they were to be funded. We also found that  while TSA had taken some steps to reduce the potential security risks  posed by airport workers, the agency did not require fingerprint-based  criminal history checks for all workers, as ATSA required. To help ensure  that TSA is able to articulate and justify future decisions on how best to  proceed with security evaluations, fund and implement security  improvements (including new security technologies), and implement  additional measures to reduce the potential security risks posed by airport  workers, we recommended that TSA develop a plan for Congress  describing how it would meet the applicable requirements of ATSA.
Since our report was issued, TSA made several improvements in these  areas, through the issuance of a series of security directives that required  enhanced background checks and improved access controls for airport  employees who work in restricted airport areas. We have new work  planned in this area that will, among other things, examine TSA’s further  progress in meeting ATSA requirements for reducing the potential security  risks posed by airport workers, such as requiring fingerprint-based  criminal history checks and security awareness training for all airport  workers. We have also recently issued work examining progress toward  establishing the Transportation Workers Identification Credential (TWIC)  Program. TWIC is intended to establish a uniform identification  credential for 6 million workers who require unescorted physical or cyber  access to secured areas of transportation facilities, including airports.  While TWIC was initially intended to meet an ATSA recommendation that  TSA consider using biometric access control systems to verify the identity  of individuals who seek to enter a secure airport, as of September 2006,  TSA had determined that TWIC would be implemented first for workers  requiring unescorted access to secure areas at commercial seaports and  that there were no immediate plans to implement the program in the  airport environment.
section_title: Federal Regulations Issued After 9/11 Requiring Background Checks for Airline Pilots, and Other Measures, Have Enhanced Security at General Aviation Airports
paragraphs: General aviation, as distinguished from commercial aviation, encompasses  a wide variety of activities, aircraft types, and airports. Federal  intelligence agencies have reported in the past that terrorists have  considered using general aviation aircraft for terrorist acts—and that the  9/11 terrorists learned to fly at flight schools based at general aviation  airports in Florida, Arizona, and Minnesota. We have noted in our work  that the extent of general aviation’s vulnerability to terrorist attack is  difficult to determine. Nevertheless, as we reported in November 2004,  TSA and the FAA have taken steps to address security risks to general  aviation through regulation and guidance. For example, TSA has  promulgated regulations requiring background checks of foreign  candidates for U.S. flight training schools and has issued security  guidelines for general aviation airports. Prior to the September 11 attacks,  FAA did not require background checks of anyone seeking a pilot’s  license. Other measures taken to enhance general aviation security since  then include actions by nonfederal general aviation stakeholders who have  partnered with the federal government and have individually taken steps  to enhance general aviation security. For example, industry associations  developed best practices and recommendations for securing general  aviation, and have worked with TSA to develop other security initiatives.
While these actions represent progress toward enhancing general aviation  security, at the time we reported on these efforts, TSA continued to face  challenges. Although TSA has issued a limited assessment of threats  associated with general aviation, a systematic assessment of threats to, or  vulnerabilities of general aviation to determine how to better prepare  against terrorist threats, had not been conducted at the time of our  November 2004 review because the assessments were considered costly  and impractical to conduct at the nearly 19,000 general aviation airports.  We recommended that TSA develop and implement a plan to identify  threats and vulnerabilities and include, among other things, estimates of  funding requirements. Should TSA establish new security requirements for  general aviation airports, competing funding needs could challenge the  ability of general aviation airport operators to meet these requirements.  General aviation airports have received some federal funding for  implementing security upgrades since September 11, but have funded most  security enhancements on their own. General aviation stakeholders we  contacted expressed concern that they may not be able to pay for any  future security requirements that TSA may establish. In addition, TSA and  FAA are unlikely to be able to allocate significant levels of funding for  general aviation security enhancements, given competing priorities of  commercial aviation and other modes of transportation. (We made no  recommendations related to funding challenges.) We have not undertaken  additional work to determine the extent to which subsequent actions  taken by DHS or TSA have enhanced general aviation security or have  addressed our recommendations.
section_title: GAO Concluding Observations—Enhancing Security of Layers of Aviation Defense Not Implicated on 9/11
paragraphs: TSA’s efforts to address aspects of aviation security other than those  directly implicated in the 9/11 attacks have been mixed. On the one hand,  TSA has made significant progress in an area where it has direct  operational authority—enhancing detection of threat objects in  passengers’ checked baggage. Thanks to the increased use of technology  (explosive detection systems), today’s checked baggage undergoes far  more scrutiny than before the terrorist attacks. In other areas of aviation,  however, where TSA has regulatory and oversight responsibility, but does  not take the operational lead, our past work indicates that TSA faced  challenges. With respect to air cargo, for example, TSA has implemented a  variety of actions intended to strengthen oversight for domestic air cargo  security operations conducted by air carriers, including increasing the  number of inspectors used to assess air carriers’ compliance with air cargo  security requirements, but opportunities exist to better ensure that this  compliance process is working. Because we do not have recent work on  progress made to enhance the security at general aviation airports, we  cannot comment further on the extent of progress made in this area. Our  ongoing work on airport perimeter security and access controls will allow  us to provide an updated assessment of progress later in 2007.
section_title: Congress and Federal Agencies Are Addressing Security Needs of Transportation Modes in the Post-9/11 Era through Legislation, Risk Management, and Enhanced Cooperation with Domestic and International Partners
paragraphs: In the aftermath of the attacks on 9/11, Congress and the administration  focused their energies first on shoring up our national layers of defense— particularly in the aviation sector, which had proven to be vulnerable to  terrorist attacks. As of November 2006, TSA had substantially  implemented the major aviation security mandates issued by Congress  following the 9/11 attacks, particularly those ATSA mandates designed to  address specific vulnerabilities exploited by the terrorists, such as the  requirement to deploy federal personnel to screen passengers and baggage  at airports. Congress, the 9/11 Commission, federal agencies, and we have  recognized the need to develop strategies and take actions to protect  against and prepare for terrorist attacks on critical parts of our  transportation system other than aviation, which also are considered  vulnerable to attack. These areas include passenger rail and the maritime  industry—both considered vital components of the U.S. economy. In  addition, other modes of transportation also remain vulnerable to attack,  such as the nation’s highway infrastructure and commercial vehicles.
subsections: section_title: Multiple Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Passenger Rail Security
paragraphs: The passenger rail sector is one critical area of transportation where a  number of federal departments and their component agencies have begun  taking actions to enhance security. The U.S. passenger rail sector is a vital  component of the nation’s transportation infrastructure, with subway and  commuter rail systems, among others, carrying more than 11 million  passengers each week day. Characteristics of some passenger rail  systems—high ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance,  and location (e.g., large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)—make  them attractive targets for terrorists because of the potential for mass  casualties and economic damage and disruption. Indeed, public  transportation in general, and passenger rail in particular have continued  to be attractive targets for terrorist attack as evidenced by the March 2004  terrorist bomb attacks on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain in which   191 people were killed and 600 injured, and the July 2005 bomb attacks on  the London’s subway system, which resulted in over 50 fatalities and more  than 700 injuries.
Prior to the creation of TSA in 2002, the Federal Transit Administration  (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) were the primary  federal agencies involved in passenger rail security matters, and both  undertook numerous initiatives both before and after 9/11 to enhance  security. For example, FTA conducted security readiness assessments of  rail transit systems, sponsored security training, and developed security  guidance for transit agencies. FRA has assisted commuter railroads and  Amtrak in developing security plans, conducted security inspections of  commuter railroads, and researched various security technologies, among  other things. Since taking over as the lead federal agency responsible for  transportation security, TSA has also taken a number of actions intended  to enhance passenger rail security. For example, in response to the  commuter rail attacks in Madrid, and federal intelligence on potential  threats against U.S. passenger rail systems, TSA issued security directives  for rail operators in May 2004. The directives required rail operators to  implement a number of general security measures, such as conducting  frequent inspections of stations, terminals, and other assets, or utilizing  canine explosive detection teams, if available. The issuance of these  directives was an effort to take swift action in response to a current threat.  However, as we reported in September 2005, because these directives  were issued with limited input and review by rail industry and federal  stakeholders, they may not provide the industry with baseline security  standards based on industry best practices. Furthermore, no permanent  rail security standards had been promulgated and clear guidance for rail  operators was lacking. To ensure that future rail security directives are  enforceable, transparent, and feasible, we recommended that TSA  collaborate with the Department of Transportation and the passenger rail  industry to develop rail security standards that reflect industry best  practices and that can be measured, monitored, and enforced. Among  other actions taken, TSA has also tested emergency rail security  technologies for screening passenger baggage and has enlarged its  national explosives detection canine program to train and place canine  teams in the nation’s mass transit and commuter rail systems. (See app. III  for information on GAO products related to passenger rail security.)
section_title: TSA Has Identified the Nation’s Highway Infrastructure and Commercial Vehicles as Vulnerable to Terrorist Attack
paragraphs: In addition to the U.S. passenger rail system, concerns have been raised  about the nation’s highway infrastructure, which facilitates transportation  for a vast network of interstate and intrastate trucking companies and  others. Vehicles and highway infrastructure play an essential role in the  movement of goods, services, and people, yet more work needs to be done  to assess or address vulnerabilities to acts of terrorism that may exist in  these systems. Surface transportation provides terrorists with thousands  of points from which to attack and easy escape routes, potentially causing  significant loss of life and economic harm. Indeed, threat information and  TSA assessments have identified that specific components of the  commercial vehicle sector are potential targets—and are vulnerable—to  terrorist attacks. Among other targets, attackers can target bridges,  tunnels, and trucks, including using hazardous material trucks as  weapons. Further, the diversity of the trucking industry poses additional  challenges in effectively integrating security in both large, complex  trucking operations and smaller owner/operator businesses. We have work  under way to analyze federal efforts to strengthen the security of  commercial vehicles, including vehicles carrying hazardous materials, and  how federal agencies coordinate their efforts to secure the commercial  vehicle sector. We expect to report on this work later this year.
section_title: Federal Agencies and Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Identify and Reduce Vulnerabilities and Enhance Security at Seaports
paragraphs: The maritime sector is another critical area of transportation where a  number of federal agencies and local stakeholders have taken many  actions to secure seaports. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the  nation’s 361 seaports have been increasingly viewed as potential targets  for future terrorist attacks. These ports are vulnerable because they are  sprawling, interwoven with complex transportation networks, close to  crowded metropolitan areas, and are easily accessible. Ports contain a  number of specific facilities that could be targeted by terrorists, including  military vessels and bases, cruise ships, passenger ferries, terminals, locks  and dams, factories, office buildings, power plants, refineries, sports  complexes, and other critical infrastructure. The large cargo volumes  passing through seaports, such as containers destined for further shipment  by other modes of transportation such as rail or truck, also represent a  potential conduit for terrorists to smuggle weapons of mass destruction or  other dangerous materials into the United States. The potential  consequences of the risks created by these vulnerabilities are significant  as the nation’s economy relies on an expeditious flow of goods through  seaports. Although no port-related terrorist attacks have occurred in the  United States, terrorists overseas have demonstrated their ability to access  and destroy infrastructure, assets, and lives in and around seaports. A  successful attack on a seaport could result in a dramatic slowdown in the  supply system, with consequences in the billions of dollars.
Much was set in motion to address these risks in the wake of the 9/11  terrorist attacks. We have reported that a number of actions have been  taken or are under way to address seaport security by a diverse mix of  agencies and seaport stakeholders. Federal agencies, such as the Coast  Guard, CBP, and TSA, have been tasked with responsibilities and  functions intended to make seaports more secure, such as monitoring  vessel traffic or inspecting cargo and containers, and procuring new assets  such as aircraft and cutters to conduct patrols and respond to threats. In  addition to these federal agencies, seaport stakeholders in the private  sector and at the state and local levels of government have taken actions  to enhance the security of seaports, such as conducting security  assessments of infrastructure and vessels operated within the seaports  and developing security plans to protect against a terrorist attack. The  actions taken by these agencies and stakeholders are primarily aimed at  three types of protections: (1) identifying and reducing vulnerabilities of  the facilities, infrastructure, and vessels operating in seaports; (2) securing  the cargo and commerce flowing through seaports; and (3) developing  greater maritime domain awareness through enhanced intelligence,  information-sharing capabilities, and assets and technologies.
Our work indicated that assessments of potential targets have been  completed at 55 of the nation’s most economically and militarily strategic  seaports, and more than 9,000 vessels and over 3,000 facilities have  developed security plans that have been reviewed by the Coast Guard.  New assets are budgeted and are coming on line, including new Coast  Guard boats and cutters and communication systems. Finally, new  information-sharing networks and command structures have been created  to allow more coordinated responses and increased awareness of  activities going on in the maritime domain. Some of these efforts have  been completed and others are ongoing; overall, the amount of effort has  been considerable. (Federal efforts to secure container cargo crossing U.S.  borders by land or sea are discussed later in this report.) (See app. III for  information on our products related to maritime security.)
section_title: TSA and Other Agencies Have Begun Using a Risk- Management Approach to Identify and Prioritize Transportation Security Needs and Investments
paragraphs: Even with all the actions taken since 9/11 by Congress and federal  agencies to strengthen our transportation-related layers of defense, we  have reported that it seems improbable that all risk can be eliminated, or  that any security framework can successfully anticipate and thwart every  type of potential terrorist threat that highly motivated, well skilled, and  adequately funded terrorist groups could devise. This is not to suggest that  security efforts do not matter—they clearly do. However, it is important to  keep in mind that total security cannot be bought no matter how much is  spent on it. We cannot afford to protect everything against all threats— choices must be made about security priorities. Thus, great care needs to  be taken to assign available resources to address the greatest risks, along  with selecting those strategies that make the most efficient and effective  use of resources.
One approach we have advocated to help ensure that resources are  assigned and appropriate strategies are selected to address the greatest  risks is through risk management—that is, defining and reducing risk. To  help federal decision makers determine how to best allocate limited  resources, we have advocated, the National Commission on Terrorist  Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) has recommended,  and the subsequent Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of  2004 requires that a risk management approach be employed to guide  security decision making. We have concluded that without a risk  management approach, there is limited assurance that programs designed  to combat terrorism are properly prioritized and focused. A risk  management approach is a systematic process for analyzing threats and  vulnerabilities, together with the criticality (that is, the relative  importance) of the assets involved. This process consists of a series of  analytical and managerial steps, basically sequential, that can be used to  assess vulnerabilities, determine the criticality (that is, the relative  importance) of the assets being considered, determine the threats to the  assets, and assess alternatives for reducing the risks. Once these are  assessed and identified, actions to improve security and reduce the risks  can be chosen from the alternatives for implementation. To be effective,  this process must be repeated when threats or conditions change to  incorporate any new information to adjust and revise the assessments and  actions.
In July 2005, in announcing his proposal for the reorganization of DHS, the  Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security declared that as a core  principle of the reorganization, the department must base its work on  priorities driven by risk. DHS has also taken steps to implement a risk- based approach to assessing risks in various transportation modes. For  example, TSA completed an air cargo strategic plan 3 years ago that  outlined a threat-based, risk management approach to secure the air cargo  system by, among other things, targeting elevated risk cargo for  inspection. TSA also completed an updated cargo threat assessment in  April 2005. However, we reported in November 2005 that TSA had not yet  established a methodology and schedule for completing assessments of air  cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets—two crucial elements of a risk- based management approach without which TSA may not be able to  appropriately focus its resources on the most critical security needs. We  recommended that TSA, among other things, complete its assessments of  air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets. (TSA has not provided any  documentation to indicate that either the methodology or the schedule has  since been completed.) By not yet fully evaluating the risks posed by  terrorists to the air cargo transportation system through assessments of  systemwide vulnerabilities and critical assets, including analyzing  information on air cargo security breaches, TSA is limited in its ability to  focus its resources on those air cargo vulnerabilities that represent the  most critical security needs and assure Congress that existing funds are  being spent in the most efficient and effective manner.
With respect to passenger rail, DHS’s Office of Grants and Training (OGT)  has developed and implemented a risk assessment methodology that it has  used to complete risk assessments at rail facilities around the country. As  we reported in September 2005, rail operators we interviewed stated that  OGT’s risk management approach has helped them to allocate and  prioritize resources to protect their systems. OGT has provided over   $320 million in grants to rail transit agencies for certain security activities  since fiscal year 2003. OGT has also leveraged its grant-making authority  to promote risk-based funding decisions for passenger rail by requiring, for  example, that operators complete a risk assessment to be eligible for a  transit security grant. TSA has also recently begun to conduct risk  assessments of the rail sector as part of a broader effort to assess risk to  all transportation modes, but has not completed these efforts or  determined how to analyze and characterize risks that are identified. Until  these efforts are completed, TSA will not be able to prioritize passenger  rail assets based on risk and help guide investment decisions about  protecting them. We recommended in 2005 that TSA establish a plan and  time line for completing its methodology for conducting risk assessments  and evaluate whether the risk assessments used by OGT should be  leveraged to facilitate the completion of risk assessments for rail and other  transportation modes.
Progress also has been made to analyze risks to other transportation  sectors. For example, with respect to seaports, Coast Guard has been  using a port security risk assessment tool for determining the risk  associated with specific attack scenarios against key infrastructure or  vessels in local ports. Under this approach, seaport infrastructure that is  determined to be both a critical asset and a likely and vulnerable target  would be a high priority for security enhancements or funding. In general,  we have reported that the most progress has been made on fundamental  steps, such as conducting risk assessments of individual assets, and that  the least amount of progress has been made on developing ways to  translate this information into comparisons and priorities across ports or  across infrastructure sectors.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Recognized the Need to Enhance Cooperation with Domestic and International Stakeholders in Order to Strengthen Transportation Security
paragraphs: Federal agencies with transportation security responsibilities should not  expect to develop or implement enhanced security goals and standards for  transportation without participation and input from other federal partners,  as well as key state, local, private-sector, and international stakeholders.  These stakeholders include, for example, federal transportation modal  administrations such as FTA and FRA, local governments, air carriers and  airports, rail and seaport operators, private industry trade associations,  and foreign governments. It is important that all these stakeholders be  involved, as applicable and appropriate, in coordinating security-related  priorities and activities, and reviewing and sharing best practices on  security-related programs and policies as a means of developing common  security frameworks. Such efforts are important in part because we are  increasingly interdependent when it comes to addressing security gaps.  For example, we place Federal Air Marshals on international flights, and  we match information from passengers on international flights bound for  the United States against terrorist watch lists. This interdependence  requires close coordination and opportunities to harmonize security  standards and practices with critical stakeholders, such as foreign  governments.
Federal partnerships with various domestic stakeholders are under way  throughout the transportation sector. In aviation, for example, TSA has  been developing partnerships with private air carriers to conduct  passenger prescreening, but continues to face challenges both identifying  and supporting the roles it expects air carriers to play in the prescreening  process, especially with regard to Secure Flight. In making  recommendations to TSA on passenger prescreening, we have emphasized  the need for TSA to continue to strengthen federal partnerships, and its  partnerships with air carriers, in order to coordinate passenger screening  programs, such as Secure Flight. For passenger rail, as mentioned  previously, we have also recommended that TSA collaborate with the  Department of Transportation and private industry rail operators on  developing security standards that reflect industry best practices. In  response, TSA is taking action to strengthen its partnerships with these  stakeholders and is currently working with the American Public  Transportation Association on developing passenger rail security  standards based upon best practices.
Establishing federal partnerships with foreign governments and industry  associations tackling similar transportation security challenges can  provide important strategic opportunities to learn about security practices  and programs that have worked elsewhere. As European Union countries  and others throughout the world become more focused on aviation and  transportation security, and with the establishment of international  aviation security standards, TSA officials have acknowledged the  importance of coordinating and collaborating with foreign countries on  security matters. We have ongoing work examining TSA’s efforts to  coordinate with foreign governments on aviation security and expect to  report on our results in the first quarter of 2007.
In our work on passenger rail security, we identified some practices that  are utilized abroad that U.S. rail operators or the federal government had  not studied in terms of the feasibility, costs, and benefits. For example,  covert testing to determine whether security personnel comply with  established security standards, which has been conducted at rail stations  in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, is one approach TSA and rail  industry stakeholders could consider. We recommended, among other  things, that TSA evaluate the potential benefits and applicability—as risk  analyses warrant and as opportunities permit—of implementing covert  testing processes and other security practices that were not currently in  use in the United States at the time our September 2005 report. In  response, TSA, through DHS, stated that it had been working with foreign  counterparts on rail and transit security issues in order to share and glean  best practices and intended to continue to do so.
section_title: GAO Concluding Observations—Enhancing Security of Other Transportation Modes
paragraphs: It is understandable that in the months and years following the 9/11  attacks, Congress and federal departments focused primarily on meeting  the aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA and, in general,  addressing the aviation-related vulnerabilities exploited by the terrorists.  Over time, recognizing the threats and vulnerabilities facing other  transportation modes, TSA and other agencies have begun to address  other transportation security needs that were not the focal point of 9/11,  including passenger rail, the maritime sector, and surface transportation  modes. In these areas, TSA and other agencies have begun to identify and  set priorities, based on risk and other factors, in order to allocate finite  resources to enhance protection of the nation’s passenger rail systems,  seaports, highways, and other critical transportation assets. Agencies have  made some progress but have a long way to go toward working with  domestic and international partners to identify critical transportation  assets, develop strategies for protecting them, and use a risk-based  approach to prioritize and allocate resources across competing  transportation security requirements.
section_title: Measures to Improve Visa Applicant Screening, Consular Counterterrorism Training, and Fraud Detection Have Strengthened the Visa Process as an Antiterrorism Tool
paragraphs: The visa process is a first layer of border security to prevent terrorists or  criminals from gaining entry into the United States. Citizens of other  countries seeking to enter the country temporarily for business and other  reasons generally must apply for and obtain a visa. Before 9/11, U.S. visa  operations focused primarily on illegal immigration concerns; after the  attacks, greater emphasis was placed on using the visa process as a  counterterrorism tool. Congress, DHS, and State have taken numerous  actions to help strengthen the visa process by, among other things,  expanding the name-check system used to screen applicants (including  portions of the consolidated watch list), requiring in-person interviews for  nearly all applicants, revamping consular training to focus on  counterterrorism, and augmenting staff at consular posts. Steps also have  been taken to help detect and prevent visa fraud. In addition, State and  DHS officials have acknowledged that immigrant visa processes—whereby  immigrants seeking permanent residency in the United States must obtain  a certain type of visa—may warrant further review because these visa  types could also pose potential security risks.
subsections: section_title: Visa Process Prior to 9/11 Did Not Focus on Counterterrorism
paragraphs: Citizens of other countries seeking to enter the United States temporarily  for business and other reasons generally must apply for and obtain a U.S.  travel document, called a visa, at U.S. embassies or consulates abroad  before arriving at U.S. ports of entry. The main steps required to obtain a  visa are generally the same before and after 9/11: visa applicants must  submit an application to a consulate or embassy; consular officials review  the applicant’s documentation; the applicant’s information is checked  against a name-check system maintained by State; officials then issue, or  decline to issue, a visa, which the applicant may then present to CBP  officials (formerly Immigration and Naturalization Service inspectors) for  inspection prior to entering the United States.
While the general visa process has remained intact, the focus before 9/11  was primarily on screening applicants to determine whether they intended  to work or reside illegally in the United States, though screening for  terrorists was also part of this process. The 9/11 Commission staff  reported that no U.S. agency at the time of the attacks thought of the visa  process as an antiterrorism tool, and noted that consular officers were not  trained to screen for terrorists. Overseas consular posts, which  administer the visa process, were encouraged to promote international  travel, and were given substantial discretion in determining the level of  scrutiny applied to visa applications. For example, posts had latitude to  routinely waive in-person interviews as part of their overall visa applicant  screening process. In making decisions about who should receive a visa,  consular officials relied on a State Department name-check database that  incorporated information from many agencies on individuals who had  been refused visas in the past, had other immigration violations, and had  raised terrorism concerns. This name-check database was the primary  basis for identifying potential terrorists and other ineligible applicants.
With these policies and State’s name-check system in place, the   19 hijackers exploited this process and were able to obtain visas. (See app.  I for details on the hijackers’ visa applications and a time line of visas  issued to hijackers during this period.) Specifically, the hijackers were  issued a total of 23 visas at five different consular posts from April 1997  through June 2001 (multiple visas were issued over this period, for  different stays). These visas were issued based on the belief that the  applicants were “good cases,” that is, they were not perceived as security  risks and were thought likely to return to their country at the end of their  allotted time in the United States. For citizens of either Saudi Arabia or  United Arab Emirates, for example, post policies were to consider all of  these citizens as “good cases” for visas. Thus, it was policy for consular  officers in these countries to issue visas to most Saudi and Emirati  applicants without interviewing them unless their names showed up in the  name-check database or they had indicated on their applications that they  had a criminal history. In addition, consular managers at these posts said  that the posts had accepted applications from Saudi and Emirati nationals  that weren’t completely filled out and lacked supporting documentation.
As it turned out, 17 of the 19 hijackers were citizens of either Saudi Arabia  or United Arab Emirates. None of the visa applications for which we were  able to obtain documentation was completely filled out and consular  officers granted visas to all but 2 of the 15 hijackers for whom records  were available, without conducting an interview. Moreover, while consular  officers who issued visas to the hijackers followed established procedures  for checking to see if these individuals were included in the name-check  database when they applied for visas, the database did not contain  information on any of them. While the intelligence community notified  State a few weeks prior to 9/11 that it had identified two of them as  possible terrorists who should not receive visas, the visas had already  been issued—and although they were subsequently revoked, by that time  the hijackers had entered the country.
section_title: New Visa-Related Policies and Programs Have Been Implemented to Enhance Visa Security, Improve Applicant Screening, Prevent Fraud, and More
paragraphs: As we reported in September 2005, State, DHS, and other agencies have  taken many steps since the 9/11 attacks to strengthen the visa process as  an antiterrorism tool. For example, the consular name-check database  has been expanded—the information in this database now draws upon a  subset of the Terrorist Screening Center’s consolidated watch list as well  as other information. Specifically, State, in cooperation with other federal  agencies, has increased the amount of information available to consular  officers in the name-check database by fivefold—from 48,000 records in  September 2001 to approximately 260,000 records in June 2005. An  additional 8 million records on criminal history from the FBI also are now  available for the name-check process. In addition, under the leadership of  the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, our work shows that  consular officers are receiving clear guidance on the importance of  security as the first priority of the visa process. Our observations of  consular sections at eight posts in 2005 confirmed, for instance, that  consular officers overseas regard security as their top priority, while also  recognizing the importance of facilitating legitimate travel to the United  States.
subsections: section_title: New Operating Procedures and Requirements Strengthen the Visa Issuance Process
paragraphs: Many new policies have been introduced, and existing policies revised,  both to strengthen the visa process as a terrorist screening tool and to  build in more structure for posts that have traditionally had discretionary  latitude in handling visa matters. One key policy change, mandated in the  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and which we  had previously recommended, requires that consular posts conduct in- person interviews with most applicants for nonimmigrant visas with  certain exceptions. Generally, applicants between the ages of 14 and   79 must submit to an in-person interview though under certain  circumstances such interviews can be waived. To ensure that these and  other new policies for strengthening the visa process as an antiterrorism  tool would be understood and implemented by all consular officers at all  posts, State, in consultation with DHS, has issued more than 80 new  standard operating procedures related to security and other matters. For  example, State has issued procedures implementing the legislative  provision that places restrictions on the issuance of nonimmigrant visas to  persons coming from countries that sponsor terrorism. Another new  procedure informs consular offices about fingerprint requirements for visa  applicants.
State has also established management controls to ensure that visa  applications are processed in a consistent manner at each post, in part to  reinforce security-related policies and procedures. For example, the  department created Consular Management Assistance Teams to conduct  management reviews and field visits of consular sections worldwide,  providing guidance to posts on standard operating procedures. Over 90 of  these reviews have been conducted, in which the teams evaluate  operations and make recommendations to mitigate a range of potential  vulnerabilities they identify in their visits.
In addition, as a means of adding a layer of security review prior to issuing  new visas, DHS has, as directed by Congress, assigned visa security  officers in Saudi Arabia to review all visa applications prior to adjudication  by State’s consular officers, and to provide expert advice and training to  consular officers on visa security at selected U.S. embassies and  consulates. This effort, known as the Visa Security Program, is being  expanded to other posts. According to State’s consular officers, the deputy  chief of mission, and DHS officials in Saudi Arabia, the visa security  officers deployed in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, strengthen visa  security because of their law enforcement and immigration experience, as  well as their ability to access and use information from law enforcement  databases not immediately available, by law, to consular officers. Based on  recommendations we made in 2005, DHS has developed performance data  to assess the results of this program at each post.
section_title: Consular Training on Counterterrorism and Security Supports State Department Efforts to Use Visa Application Process as Antiterrorism Tool
paragraphs: Consular officers’ training has been revamped and expanded to emphasize  counterterrorism. For example, the basic consular training course has  been lengthened from 26 days to 31 days to provide added emphasis on  visa security, counterterrorism awareness, and interviewing techniques.  And last year, State initiated training to enhance interviewing techniques,  specifically designed to help consular officers spot inconsistencies in a  visa applicant’s story or in the applicant’s demeanor; such observations  may form a sufficient basis for denying a visa. State Department officials  believe this training is important to help consular officers determine,  during the interview period, whether applicants whose documents do not  indicate any terrorist ties show signs of deception.
section_title: Visa Fraud-prevention Measures Implemented to Complement Other Counter- Terrorism Efforts
paragraphs: To complement efforts taken to implement new guidance, policies and  procedures, and management controls, State also has taken actions to  address the potential for visa fraud at consular posts. As the 9/11  Commission staff noted, 2 of the 19 terrorist hijackers used passports that  had been manipulated in a fraudulent manner to obtain visas needed to  enter the country. State has since deployed 25 visa fraud investigators to  U.S. embassies and consulates and developed ways for consular officers in  the field to learn about fraud prevention including, for example, an on-line  discussion group, comprised of more than 500 members, where  information on, and lessons learned from, prior fraud cases may be  shared. Training on fraud prevention also has been bolstered. For  example, State expanded fraud prevention course offerings for managers  from 2 to 10 times annually; DHS’s ICE provides training to State’s fraud  prevention managers; and ICE’s Forensic Document Laboratory provides  training on forensic documentation and analysis to combat travel and  identity document fraud.
Acting on a recommendation we made in 2005 on fraud prevention, State’s  Vulnerability Assessment Unit has begun to conduct more in-depth  analyses of the visa information that is collected as a means of detecting  patterns and trends that may indicate the potential for fraud and  determining whether additional investigation may be needed. Using data- mining techniques (searching large volumes of data for patterns), this unit  can, for example, use its internal databases to trigger alerts when specific  keywords or activities arise, such as visas issued to individuals associated  with certain organizations with terrorist ties, or sudden increases in visas  issued to individuals residing in countries where they are not citizens. This  proactive analysis may result in investigations and further mitigates  potential fraud risks in the visa process.
In addition, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004  required State in coordination with DHS to conduct a survey of each  diplomatic and consular post to assess the extent to which fraudulent  documents are presented by visa applicants. The act mandates that State  in coordination with DHS identify the posts experiencing the greatest  frequency of fraudulent documents being presented by visa applicants and  place in those posts at least one full-time antifraud specialist. The  presence of full-time fraud officers at high-fraud posts is particularly  important given that entry-level officers may serve as fraud prevention  managers on a part-time basis, in addition to their other responsibilities.  According to State officials, as of July 2006, State had completed its review  of fraud levels at posts, and is continuing to refine its methodology for  determining which posts have the highest levels of fraud in the visa  process.
section_title: State Is Addressing Consular Staffing and Language- Proficiency Challenges
paragraphs: In addition to implementing new policies, procedures, and antifraud  measures, State also has taken some steps to address staffing and  language proficiency issues at consular posts. Though State added  hundreds of Foreign Service consular positions after 9/11, and an  additional 150 consular officer positions have been authorized annually  from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2009, State has reported that a  staffing shortage at consular posts persists, and we have reported on  multiple occasions that State has a shortage of mid-level, supervisory,  consular officers at key overseas posts, and that the department has not  assessed its overall consular staffing needs. Staff shortages have also led  to extensive wait times for visa interview appointments at some posts. We  are currently reviewing this issue and expect to report on our findings  early this year. Moreover, in our earlier work, we found that not all  consular officers were proficient in languages at their posts in order to  hold interviews with visa applicants. To remedy a shortage of consular  officers able to speak critical languages, State has made efforts to focus  recruitment of consular officers to include more who are proficient in  languages it deems critical. (See app. III for a list of our products related to  the visa process.)
section_title: Potential Security Risks of Visa Programs for Immigrants Seeking Permanent Residency Status Warrant Review
paragraphs: While State and other agencies have enhanced and strengthened policies  and procedures for screening applicants for nonimmigrant visas, State and  DHS have acknowledged that the visa process for immigrants seeking to  reside in the United States on a permanent basis may warrant further  review because these visa types could also pose potential security risks.  Immigrant visas are issued on the basis of certain family relationships or  types of employment, refugee status, or other circumstances adjudicated  by officials at several federal agencies, including the departments of  Homeland Security, Labor, and Justice. We have recently begun a review  to identify the security risks associated with various immigrant visa  programs, and plan to issue a report later this year.
One immigrant visa program singled out by the State OIG 3 years ago as  potentially risky was the Diversity Visa program, established by Congress  in 1995. It authorizes the issuance of up to 50,000 immigrant visas annually  to persons from countries that are underrepresented among the 400,000 to  500,000 immigrants coming to the United States each year, and who qualify  for a visa on the basis of their education level and/or work experience.  This program is commonly referred to as the visa lottery because  “winners” are selected through a computer-generated random drawing.  The applicants who receive a visa under this program are authorized to  live and work permanently in the United States. The State OIG reported as  a concern in 2003 that the Diversity Visa program did not generally  prohibit the issuance of visas to aliens from countries that sponsor  terrorism. (The nonimmigrant visa process, by contrast, places restrictions  on the issuance of visas to persons from countries sponsoring terrorism.)  Steps have since been taken by the State Department to address this  concern. In 2005, the OIG reported that revised consular procedures and  heightened awareness generally provided greater safeguards against  terrorists entering through the Diversity Visa process than in the past. For  example, the OIG noted that consular officers interview all Diversity Visa  winners and check applicants’ police and medical records. In addition, all  immigrant visa applicants (as well as nonimmigrant applicants) are  required to be fingerprinted; the fingerprint system helps to identify  fraudulent applicants using false names. Despite these actions, the OIG  continues to believe that the program still poses significant risks to  national security from hostile intelligence officers, criminals, and terrorists  attempting to use the program for entry into the United States as  permanent residents. We are also reviewing the potential security risks of  the Diversity Visa program as part of our ongoing review of immigrant visa  programs.
subsections: section_title: GAO Concluding Observations—Visa Process
paragraphs: The range of actions that State and DHS have undertaken to strengthen the  nonimmigrant visa process as an antiterrorism tool—in part in response to  our past recommendations---have, when considered altogether, gone a  long way toward reducing the likelihood that terrorists can obtain the  visas needed to enter the United States and wreak havoc. While it is  generally acknowledged that the visa process can never be entirely  failsafe—and that it will never be possible to entirely eliminate the risk of  terrorists obtaining nonimmigrant visas issued by the United States  government—the federal government has done a creditable job overall of  strengthening the visa process as a first line of defense. Separate concerns  have been raised about potential risks associated with certain immigrant  visa programs, and we have initiated a review to identify and analyze these  potential security risks.
section_title: Efforts to Screen and Verify Travelers and Detect Fraudulent Travel Documents Have Enhanced Border Security, but We Have Reported More Work Is Needed to Ensure That Risks Posed by Certain Travelers and Cargo Are Mitigated
paragraphs: The processes for screening and inspecting travelers arriving at the  nation’s air, land, and sea ports represent a key layer of border security  defense. Many measures have been put in place to enhance security in  these and related areas, but policies and programs can still be  strengthened. For example, the Visa Waiver Program, which enables  travelers from certain countries to seek entry into the United States  without visas, carries inherent security, law enforcement, and illegal  immigration risks because, among other things, visa waiver travelers are  not subject to the same degree of screening as those travelers required to  obtain visas. In addition, the potential misuse of lost or stolen passports  from visa waiver countries is a serious security problem that terrorists and  others can potentially exploit. Since 9/11, in response to congressional  requirements, DHS has begun taking steps designed to mitigate the risks  posed by visa waiver travelers; however, we have reported that additional  actions are needed to further mitigate the risks posed by the use of  fraudulent identity documentation, including actions to ensure that foreign  governments report information on lost or stolen passports. Separately, a  border security initiative designed to verify travelers’ identities—  US-VISIT—has helped to process and authenticate travelers seeking entry  (or reentry) to the country. A key goal of US-VISIT—tracking those who  overstay their authorized stay—cannot be fully implemented, however,  because, among other things, the exit portion of the initiative has not been  developed. Steps also have been taken by various federal agencies to  enhance detection of hazardous cargo shipped over land and to identify  oceangoing cargo containers that also may contain hazardous materials or  weapons, but more work is needed in both areas.
subsections: section_title: The Government Faces Challenges in Assessing and Mitigating the Inherent Security Risks of the Visa Waiver Program
paragraphs: While significant progress has been made to ensure that terrorists do not  obtain visas as a prelude to gaining entry to the United States, visa holders  are by no means the only foreign travelers coming to the United States.  Under the Visa Waiver Program, millions of travelers seek entry into the  United States each year without visas. The Visa Waiver Program is  intended to facilitate international travel and commerce, and ease  consular workload at overseas posts, by enabling citizens of   27 participating countries to travel to the United States for tourism or  business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a nonimmigrant visa  from U.S. embassies and consulates. (See app. II for a map of Visa Waiver  Program member countries.) While the Visa Waiver Program provides  many benefits to the United States, there are inherent security, law  enforcement, and illegal immigration risks in the program because some  foreign citizens may exploit the program to enter the United States. In  particular, visa waiver travelers are not subject to the same degree of  screening as those travelers who must first obtain a visa before arriving in  the United States. Furthermore, lost and stolen passports from visa waiver  countries could be used by terrorists, criminals, and immigration law  violators to gain entry into the United States. While DHS established a unit  in 2004 to oversee the program and conduct mandated assessments of  program risks, we reported in July 2006 that the assessment process has  weaknesses and the unit was unable to effectively monitor risks on a  continuing basis because of insufficient resources. Furthermore, while  DHS has taken some actions to mitigate program risks, the department has  faced difficulties in further mitigating the risks of the program, particularly  regarding lost and stolen passports—a key vulnerability.
subsections: section_title: Visa Waiver Travelers and Visa Applicants Face Different Levels of Screening, by Design
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2005, nearly 16 million travelers entered the United States  under the Visa Waiver Program, and visa waiver travelers have  represented roughly one-half of all nonimmigrant admissions to the United  States in recent years. The program is beneficial, according to federal  officials, because it facilitates international travel for millions of foreign  citizens seeking to visit the United States each year, provides reciprocal  visa-free travel for Americans visiting visa waiver member countries, and  creates substantial economic benefits for the United States. Moreover, the  program allows State to allocate its limited resources to visa-issuing posts  in countries with higher-risk applicant pools.
By design, visa waiver travelers are not subject to the same degree of  screening as those travelers who must first obtain a visa before arriving in  the United States. Travelers who must apply for visas receive two levels of  screening as they are first screened by consular officers overseas and then  by CBP officers before entering the country. However, visa waiver  travelers are first screened in person by a CBP inspector upon arrival at a  U.S. port of entry.
For all travelers, CBP primary officers observe the applicant, examine that  person’s passport, collect the applicant’s fingerprints as part of the U.S.  Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program (US-VISIT),  and check the person’s name against automated databases and watch lists,  which contain information regarding the admissibility of aliens, including  known terrorists, criminals, and immigration law violators. However,  according to the DHS Office of Inspector General, CBP’s primary border  officers are disadvantaged when screening visa waiver travelers because  they may not know the alien’s language or local fraud trends in the alien’s  home country, nor have the time to conduct an extensive interview. In  contrast, non-visa waiver travelers, who must obtain a visa from a U.S.  embassy or consulate, undergo an interview by consular officials overseas,  who conduct a rigorous screening process when deciding to approve or  deny a visa. Moreover, consular officers have more time to interview  applicants and examine the authenticity of their passports, and may speak  the visa applicant’s native language, according to consular officials. Fig. 5  provides a comparison of the process for visa waiver travelers and visa  applicants.
section_title: DHS Has Taken Steps to Enhance Oversight of Visa Waiver Program Countries’ Participation but There Are Weaknesses in Program Oversight
paragraphs: The Visa Waiver Program, while valuable, can pose risks to U.S. security,  law enforcement, and immigration interests because some foreign citizens  may try to exploit the program to enter the United States. Indeed,  convicted 9/11 terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui and “shoe-bomber” Richard  Reid both boarded flights to the United States with passports issued by  Visa Waiver Program countries. Moreover, as we have reported,  inadmissible travelers who need visas to enter the United States may  attempt to acquire a passport from a Visa Waiver Program country to avoid  the additional scrutiny that takes place in non-visa waiver countries. Since  the terrorist attacks, the government has taken several actions intended to  enhance the security of the Visa Waiver Program by improving program  management, oversight, and efforts to assess and mitigate program risks,  among other things. For example, shortly after 9/11, Congress required  DHS to increase the frequency of mandated assessments to determine the  effect of each country’s continued participation in the Visa Waiver  Program on U.S. security, law enforcement, and immigration interests,  from once every 5 years to once every 2 years (biennially). These  assessments are important because they enable the United States to  analyze individual participating countries’ border controls, security over  passports and national identity documents, and other matters relevant to  law enforcement, immigration, and national security. In April 2004, the  DHS OIG reported that a lack of funding, training and other issues left  DHS unable to comply with the congressionally mandated biennial country  assessments. In response to the OIG’s findings, DHS established a Visa  Waiver Program Oversight Unit to oversee Visa Waiver Program activities  and monitor countries’ adherence to the program’s statutory requirements  to help ensure that the United States is protected from those who wish to  do it harm or violate its laws, including immigration laws. Actions taken by  this unit include completing comprehensive assessments for 25 of the   27 visa waiver countries (with the remaining two under way); identifying  risks through these assessments, which were brought to the attention of  host country governments for five countries; working with countries  seeking to join the program; and briefing foreign government  representatives from participating countries on issues of interest and  concern such as new passport requirements for visa waiver travelers.
While the move to a biennial review process and establishment of the Visa  Waiver Program Oversight Unit represents a good first step to better  assess the inherent risks of the program, our recent work indicates that  DHS could improve its administration of this effort and raises concerns  about the agency’s ability to effectively monitor the law enforcement and  security risks due to staffing and resource constraints. For example, in our  July 2006 report, we identified several problems with DHS’s first biennially  based review cycle conducted in 2004, including the lack of clear criteria  when assessing each country’s participation in the program to determine  at what point security concerns in a particular country would trigger  discussions with foreign governments to resolve them. Moreover, DHS did  not issue the mandated summary report to Congress in a timely manner,  describing the findings from its 25 country assessments. DHS, State, and  Justice officials acknowledged that the report—consisting of a six-page  summary lacking detailed descriptions of the law enforcement and  security risks identified during the review process and which was  delivered more than a year after the site visits were made—took too long  to complete. As a result of this lengthy process, the final report delivered  to Congress did not necessarily reflect the current law enforcement and  security risks posed by each country, and did not capture recent  developments. For example, the large-scale theft of blank passports in a  visa waiver country that took place while the report was being processed  was not reflected in the country’s report. Thus, there were missed  opportunities to report timely information to Congress. In our July 2006  report, we recommended that DHS finalize clear, consistent, and  transparent protocols for biennial country assessments and provide these  protocols to stakeholders at relevant agencies at headquarters and  overseas. These protocols should provide time lines for the entire  assessment process, including the role of a site visit, an explanation of the  clearance process, and deadlines for completion. In addition, we  recommended to Congress that it establish a biennial deadline by which  DHS must complete its assessments and report to Congress. In its formal  comments to our report, DHS did not appear to support the establishment  of a deadline. Instead, DHS suggested that Congress require continuous  and ongoing evaluations of the risks of each country’s program.
With respect to staffing and resources to carry out these assessment  efforts and other program oversight responsibilities, we reported that DHS  cannot effectively monitor the law enforcement and security risks posed  by 27 visa waiver countries on a consistent, ongoing basis because it has  not provided the oversight unit with adequate staffing and funding  resources. Without adequate resources, the unit may be unable to monitor  and assess participating countries’ compliance with the program. We  recommended that additional resources be provided to strengthen the  program oversight unit’s monitoring activities. Until this is achieved,  staffing and resource constraints may hamper the effectiveness of the Visa  Waiver Program and could jeopardize U.S. security interests. DHS has  stated that it expects the administration to seek resources appropriate for  the oversight unit’s tasks.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Begun to Address Security Risks Arising from Lost or Stolen Passports, but We Have Reported That Additional Actions are Needed to Further Mitigate These Risks
paragraphs: In addition to efforts to improve administration and oversight and assess  the overall risks of the Visa Waiver Program, federal actions also have  been taken to mitigate one specific risk: the potential misuse of lost or  stolen passports. DHS intelligence analysts, law enforcement officials, and  forensic document experts all acknowledge that the greatest security  problem posed by the program is the potential exploitation by terrorists,  immigration law violators, and other criminals of a country’s lost or stolen  passports—whether they’ve been issued (used) or are blank (unused).  Lost and stolen passports from visa waiver countries are highly prized  among those travelers seeking to conceal their true identities or  nationalities. In 2004, the DHS OIG reported that aliens applying for  admission to the United States using lost or stolen passports had little  reason to fear being caught. DHS has acknowledged that an undetermined  number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the United States using a  stolen or lost passport from a visa waiver country, and, in fact, passports  from Visa Waiver Program countries have been used illegally by travelers  attempting to enter the United States. For example, in a 6-month period in  2005, DHS confiscated 298 fraudulent or altered passports at U.S. ports of  entry, which had been issued by visa waiver countries. Visa waiver  countries that do not consistently report the losses or thefts of their  citizens’ passports, or of blank passports, put the United States at greater  risk of allowing inadmissible travelers to enter the county.
DHS has begun taking steps intended to help mitigate the risks related to  lost and stolen passports. For example, in 2004, the DHS OIG reported that  a lack of training hampered CBP border inspectors’ ability to detect  passport fraud among visa waiver travelers and recommended that CBP  officers receive additional training in fraudulent document detection. In  response, DHS has doubled the time devoted to fraudulent document  detection training for new officers from 1 day to 2 days, and provides  additional courses for officers throughout their assignments at ports of  entry.
Nevertheless, training officials said that fraudulent and counterfeit  passports are extremely difficult to detect, even for the most experienced  border officers. Congress and DHS have taken additional actions designed  to mitigate this risk. For example, all passports issued to visa waiver  travelers between October 26, 2005 and October 25, 2006, must contain a  digital photograph printed in the document, and DHS is enforcing this  requirement. For example, when Italy and France failed to meet the  deadline for issuing new passports encoded with digital photographs, DHS  began requiring citizens with noncompliant passports to obtain a visa  before visiting the United States. In addition, passports issued to visa  waiver travelers after October 25, 2006, must be electronic (e-passports).  E-passports aim to enhance the security of travel documents, making it  more difficult for imposters or inadmissible aliens to misuse the passport  to gain entry into the United States. Travelers with passports issued after  the deadlines that do not meet these requirements are required to obtain a  visa from a U.S. embassy or consulate overseas before departing for the  United States. On October 26, 2006, DHS announced that 24 of the 27 Visa  Waiver Program countries had met the deadline to begin issuing   e-passports.
While e-passports may help officers to identify fraudulent and counterfeit  passports, because many passports issued from a visa waiver country  before the October 2006 deadline are not electronic—and remain valid for  years to come—it remains imperative that lost and stolen passports from  visa waiver countries be reported to the United States on a timely basis. In  2002, Congress made the timely reporting of stolen blank passports, in  particular, a condition for continued participation in the program and  required that a country must be terminated from the Visa Waiver Program  if the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State jointly  determine that this information was not reported on a timely basis.  According to DHS, detecting stolen blank passports at U.S. ports of entry  is extremely difficult and some thefts of blank passports have not been  reported to the United States until years after the fact. For example, in  2004, a visa waiver country reported to the United States the theft of  nearly 300 blank passports more than 9 years after the theft occurred. DHS  and State have chosen not to terminate from the program countries that  failed to report these incidents. DHS officials told us that the inherent  political, economic, and diplomatic implications associated with removing  a country from the Visa Waiver Program make it difficult to enforce the  statutory requirement. Nevertheless, recognizing the importance of timely  reporting of this information, DHS has taken steps to address this issue.  For example, in 2004, during its assessment of Germany’s participation in  the Visa Waiver Program, DHS determined that several thousand blank  German temporary passports had been lost or stolen, and that Germany  had not reported some of this information to the United States. In  response, after a series of diplomatic discussions, temporary passport  holders from Germany were no longer allowed to travel to the United  States without a visa. In addition, because lost or stolen issued passports  can be altered, DHS issued guidance in 2005 to visa waiver countries  requiring that they certify their intent to report lost or stolen passport data  on issued passports. Some visa waiver countries do not provide this  information to the United States, due in part to concerns over the privacy  of their citizens’ biographical information.
While we acknowledge the complexities and challenges of enforcing the  statutory requirement and collecting information on both blank and issued  stolen and lost passports aside, our recent work has identified areas where  DHS could do more to help ensure that countries report this information— and do so in a timely manner. For example, as of June 2006, DHS had not  yet issued guidance or standard operating procedures on what information  must be shared, with whom, and within what time frame. In July 2006, we  recommended that DHS require all visa waiver countries to provide the  United States with nonbiographical data from lost or stolen issued  passports, as well as from blank passports, and develop and communicate  clear standard operating procedures for the reporting of these data,  including a definition of timely reporting and a designee to receive the  information.
In a separate effort to mitigate risks from lost and stolen passports, the  U.S. government announced in 2005 its intention to require visa waiver  countries to certify their intent to report information on lost and stolen  blank and issued passports to the International Criminal Police  Organization (Interpol)—the world’s largest international police  organization. State reported to Congress in 2005 that it had instructed all  U.S. embassies and consulates to take every opportunity to persuade host  governments to share this data with Interpol. Interpol already has a  database of lost and stolen travel documents to which its member  countries may contribute on a voluntary basis. As of June 2006, this  database contained more than 11 million records of lost and stolen  passports. However, the way visa member countries and the United States  interact with and utilize the Interpol database system could be improved.  While most of the 27 visa waiver countries use and contribute to Interpol’s  database, 4 do not. Moreover, some countries that do contribute do not do  so on a regular basis, according to Interpol officials. In addition, Interpol’s  data on lost and stolen travel documents are not automatically accessible  to U.S. border officers at primary inspection—which is one reason why it  is not an effective border screening tool, according to DHS, State, and  Justice officials. According to the Secretary General of Interpol, until DHS  can automatically query Interpol’s data, the United States will not have an  effective screening tool for checking passports. However, DHS has not yet  finalized a plan to acquire this systematic access to Interpol’s data. We  recently recommended that DHS require all visa waiver countries to  provide Interpol with nonbiographical data from lost or stolen issued or  blank passports, and implement a plan to make Interpol’s database  automatically available during primary inspection at U.S. ports of entry.
section_title: GAO Concluding Observations—Visa Waiver Program
paragraphs: The Visa Waiver Program aims to facilitate international travel for millions  of people each year and promote the effective use of government  resources. Effective oversight of the program entails balancing these  benefits against the program’s potential risks. To find this balance, as we  have reported, the U.S. government needs to fully identify the  vulnerabilities posed by visa waiver travelers, and be in a position to  mitigate them. However, we found weaknesses in the process by which  the U.S. government assesses these risks, and DHS’s Visa Waiver Program  oversight unit is not able to manage the program with its current resource  levels. While actions are under way to address these issues, they have not  all been resolved. Specifically, in response to our recommendation that  additional resources be provided to strengthen the program oversight  unit’s monitoring activities, DHS stated that it expected the administration  to seek resources appropriate for the unit’s tasks. Until this is achieved, as  we have reported, staffing and resource constraints may hamper the  effectiveness of the Visa Waiver Program and could jeopardize U.S.  security interests. Moreover, DHS has not communicated clear reporting  requirements for lost and stolen passports—a key risk—nor can it  automatically access all stolen passport information when it is most  needed—namely, at the primary inspection point at U.S. points of entry.  We recently recommended that DHS require all visa waiver countries  provide the United States and Interpol with nonbiographical data from lost  or stolen issued passports, as well as from blank passports, and implement  a plan to make Interpol’s lost and stolen passport database automatically  available during the primary inspection process at U.S. ports of entry. DHS  is in the process of implementing these recommendations. Finding ways to  address these and other challenges, including those related to program  staffing and managing the visa waiver country review process, are  especially important, given that, while it does not appear there will be any  expansion of the Visa Waiver Program in the short term, many countries  are actively seeking admission into the program, and the President has  announced his support for the program’s expansion.
section_title: US-VISIT Border Security Initiative Helps to Process and Authenticate Travelers Entering the Country, but Identifying Overstays and Detecting Fraudulent Travel Documents Remain Challenges
paragraphs: Over the last decade, the United States has, at the direction of Congress,  been developing a border security initiative intended to serve as a  comprehensive system for recording the entry and exit of most foreign  travelers. Prior to 9/11, this system, now known as US-VISIT, was the  responsibility of the INS and focused primarily on trying to ensure that  nonimmigrant travelers (including those from visa waiver countries) who  arrived at U.S. ports of entry (POE) did not overstay their authorized  visitation periods in order to work illegally in the country. Our work in the  years leading up to the 9/11 attacks, and work by the Justice Department  OIG, found weaknesses in overstay processes, in part because the INS did  not collect and maintain records that would enable officials to identify all  of the foreign nationals who either left the country or who remained past  the expiration date of their authorized stay. US-VISIT was initially  conceived as one means of addressing this problem. After the terrorist  attacks, while immigration enforcement remained an important priority,  the ability to track overstays through an entry/exit border inspection  system, and to authenticate the identity of travelers arriving at ports of  entry, took on added importance, given that three of the six terrorist pilots  had managed to remain in the U.S. after their visas had expired. In prior  reports on US-VISIT, we have identified numerous challenges that DHS  faces in delivering program capabilities and benefits on time and within  budget. We have reported, for example, that the US-VISIT program is a  risky endeavor, in part because it is large, complex, and potentially costly.  (See app. III for a list of our products related to overstay tracking and   US-VISIT.)
US-VISIT is designed to use biographic information (e.g., name,  nationality, and date of birth) and biometric information (e.g., digital  fingerprint scans) to verify the identity of those covered by the program,  which is being rolled out over a 5-year period, from 2002 to 2007. The  program applies to certain visitors whether they hold a nonimmigrant visa,  or are traveling from a country that has a visa waiver agreement with the  United States under the Visa Waiver Program. Foreign nationals subject to  US-VISIT who intend to enter the country encounter different inspection  processes at different types of ports of entry (POEs) depending on their  mode of travel. Foreign nationals subject to US-VISIT who enter the  United States at an air or sea POE are to be processed, for purposes of   US-VISIT, in the primary inspection area upon arrival. Generally, these  visitors are subject to prescreening before they arrive via passenger  manifests, which are forwarded to CBP by commercial air or sea carrier in  advance of arrival. By contrast, foreign nationals intending to enter the  United States at a land POE are generally not subject to prescreening  because they arrive in private vehicles or on foot and there is no manifest  to record their pending arrival. Thus, when foreign nationals subject to   US-VISIT arrive at a land POE, they are directed by CBP officers from the  primary inspection area to the secondary inspection area for further  processing.
As we have recently reported, DHS has deployed an entry capability for  US-VISIT at over 300 air, sea, and land POEs, including 154 land ports  along the northern and southwestern borders where hundreds of millions  of legitimate border crossings take place annually. Biographic and  biometric information, including digital fingerprint scans and digital  photographs, are used at these ports to verify the identity of visitors. With  respect to land ports specifically (the subject of our most recent US-VISIT  work), CBP officials at 21 land POE sites we visited where US-VISIT entry  capability had been deployed reported that the program had enhanced  their ability to verify travelers’ identities, among other things. However,  many land POE facilities, which are small and aging, face ongoing  operational challenges, including space constraints and traffic congestion,  as they continue to operate the entry capability of US-VISIT while also  processing other travelers entering the United States. Moreover,  Congress’s goal for US-VISIT—to record entry, reentry, and exit—has not  been fully achieved because a biometric exit capability has not been  developed or deployed. According to DHS officials, implementing a  biometrically-based exit program like that used to record those entering or  re-entering the country is potentially costly (an estimated $3 billion),  would require new infrastructure, and would produce major traffic  congestion because travelers would have to stop their vehicles upon exit  to be processed—an option officials consider unacceptable. Officials  stated that they expect a viable technology for developing a biometric exit  capability for US-VISIT that would not require travelers to stop at a facility  will become available within the next 5 to 10 years. Without some type of  biometric exit capability, however, the government cannot provide  certainty that the person exiting the country is the person who entered— and thus cannot determine which visitors have remained in the U.S. past  the expiration date of their authorized stay. In November 2006, we  recommended, among other things, that DHS finalize a mandated report to  Congress describing how a comprehensive biometrically based entry and  exit system would work and how an interim nonbiometric exit solution— one is currently being tested—is to be developed or deployed. DHS  agreed with our recommendation.
While the goal of US-VISIT is in part to ensure that lawful travelers enter  and exit the country using valid identity documents, the program is not  intended to verify the identities of all travelers. In particular, U.S. citizens,  lawful permanent residents, and most Canadian and Mexican citizens are  exempt from being processed under US-VISIT upon entering and exiting  the country. It is still possible for travelers such as these to use fraudulent  documents as a basis for entering the country. For example, U.S. citizens  and citizens of Canada and Bermuda are not generally required to present  a passport when they enter the United States via land ports of entry.  Instead, as we have reported, they may use other forms of identifying  documentation, such as a driver’s license or birth certificates, which can  be easily counterfeited and used by terrorists to travel into and out of the  country. In 2003, 2004, and again in 2006 our undercover investigators  were able to successfully enter the United States from Canada and Mexico  using fictitious names and counterfeit driver’s licenses and birth  certificates.
CBP officials have acknowledged that its officers are not able to identify  all forms of counterfeit documentation of identity and citizenship  presented at land ports of entry and the agency fully supports a new  statutory initiative designed to address this vulnerability. This requires  DHS and State to develop and implement a plan by no later than June 2009  whereby U.S. citizens and foreign nationals of Canada, Bermuda, and  Mexico must present a passport or other document or combination of  documents deemed sufficient to show identity and citizenship to enter or  reenter the United States; such documentation is not currently needed by  many of these travelers. While this effort, known as the Western  Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), may address concerns about  counterfeit documents, it still faces hurdles. For example, key decisions  have yet to be made about what documents other than a passport would  be acceptable when U.S. and Canadian citizens enter or return to the  United States via land ports of entry—a decision critical to making  decisions about how DHS is to inspect individuals entering the country.  Nor has DHS decided what types of security features should be utilized to  protect personal information contained in travel documents that may be  required, such as an alternative type of passport containing an electronic  tag encoded with information to identify each traveler. DHS also has not  determined whether, or how, WHTI border inspection processes would fit  strategically or operationally with other current and emerging border  security initiatives.
The emergence of fraud-prevention efforts such as WHTI pose additional  challenges for DHS’s oversight of US-VISIT. For example, DHS has not yet  determined how US-VISIT is to align with emerging land border security  initiatives and mandates like WHTI, and thus cannot ensure that these  programs work in harmony to meet mission goals and operate cost  effectively. As we reported 3 years ago, agency programs need to properly  fit within a common strategic context governing key aspects of program  operations, such as what functions are to be performed and rules and  standards governing the use of technology. Although a strategic plan  defining an overall immigration and border management strategy has been  drafted, DHS has not approved it, raising questions about DHS’s overall  strategy for effectively integrating border security programs and systems  at land POEs. Until decisions about WHTI and other initiatives are made, it  remains unclear how US-VISIT will be integrated with emerging border  security initiatives, if at all—raising the possibility that CBP would be  faced with managing differing technology platforms and border inspection  processes at each land POE. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work in concert  with other border security and homeland security initiatives could help  Congress, DHS, and others better understand what resources and tools are  needed to ensure their success. We recommended in November 2006 that  DHS direct the US-VISIT Program Director to finalize in its required report  to Congress (as noted earlier) a description of how DHS plans to align   US-VISIT with other emerging land border security initiatives. DHS agreed  with our recommendation. We have ongoing work looking at many aspects  of US-VISIT.
subsections: section_title: GAO Concluding Observations—US-VISIT
paragraphs: Developing and deploying complex technology that records the entry and  exit of millions of visitors to the United States, verifies their identities to  mitigate the likelihood that terrorists or criminals can enter or exit at will,  and tracks persons who remain in the country longer than authorized is a  worthy goal in our nation’s effort to enhance border security in a post-9/11  era. But doing so also poses significant challenges; foremost among them  is striking a reasonable balance between US-VISIT’s goals of providing  security to U.S. citizens and visitors while facilitating legitimate trade and  travel. DHS has made considerable progress making the entry portion of  the US-VISIT program at land ports of entry operational, and border  officials have clearly expressed the benefits that US-VISIT technology and  biometric identification tools have afforded them. With respect to DHS’s  effort to create an exit verification capability, developing and deploying  this capability for US-VISIT at land POEs has posed a set of challenges that  are distinct from those associated with entry. US-VISIT has not determined  whether it can achieve, in a realistic time frame, or at an acceptable cost,  the legislatively mandated capability to record the exit of travelers at land  POEs using biometric technology. Finally, DHS has not articulated how  US-VISIT fits strategically and operationally with other land-border  security initiatives, such as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and  Secure Border Initiative. As we have recently reported, without knowing  how US-VISIT is to be integrated within the larger strategic context  governing DHS operations, DHS faces substantial risk that US-VISIT will  not align or operate with other initiatives at land POEs and thus not cost- effectively meet mission needs. We recently recommended that DHS  finalize a mandated report to Congress on US-VISIT that would include a  description of how a comprehensive biometrically based entry and exit  system would work and how DHS plans to align US-VISIT with other  emerging land border security initiatives. DHS agreed with these  recommendations.
section_title: DHS Has Made Progress in Detecting Hazardous Materials and Cargo at Ports of Entry, but Security Challenges Remain
paragraphs: In addition to the challenges posed by travelers at U.S. ports of entry,  various types of cargo also pose security challenges. Preventing  radioactive material from being smuggled into the United States—perhaps  to be used by terrorists in a nuclear weapon or in a radiological dispersal  device (a so-called dirty bomb)—has become a key national security  objective. DHS is responsible for providing radiation detection capabilities  at U.S. ports of entry and implementing programs to combat nuclear  smuggling. The departments of Energy, Defense, and State, are also  implementing programs to combat nuclear smuggling in other countries by  providing radiation detection equipment and training to foreign border  security personnel. Our work in this area suggests that while the nation  may always be vulnerable to some extent to this type of threat, DHS has  improved its use of radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry  and is coordinating with other agencies to conduct radiation detection  programs. DHS has, for example, improved in its use of radiation detection  equipment and in following the agency’s inspection procedures  implemented since 2003.
We have nevertheless identified potential weaknesses in procedures for  ensuring both that radioactive material is being obtained and used  legitimately in the United States and that appropriate documentation, such  as bills of lading, are provided when this material is transported across our  borders. For example, we have conducted covert testing to determine  whether it was possible to make several purchases of small quantities of  radioactive material and used counterfeit documents to cross the border  even if radiation monitors detected the radioactive sources we carried.  Our purchase of the radioactive substance was not challenged because  suppliers are not required to determine whether a buyer has a legitimate  use for the material. Nor are purchasers required to produce a document  from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission when making purchases of small  quantities. During our testing, the radiation monitors properly signaled the  presence of radioactive material when our two teams conducted  simultaneous border crossings and the vehicles were inspected. However,  our investigators were able to enter the United States with the material  because they used counterfeit documents. Specifically, the investigators  were able to successfully represent themselves as employees of a fictitious  company and present a counterfeit bill of lading and a counterfeit Nuclear  Regulatory Commission document during inspections. CBP officers never  questioned the authenticity of our investigators’ counterfeit documents. In  response to our work, officials with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission  told us that they are aware of the potential problems with counterfeit  documentation and are working to resolve these issues.
In other work, we have identified other potential weaknesses related to  the regulation and inspection of radioactive materials being shipped to the  United States. We found, for example, that while radiological materials  being transported into the United States are generally required to have a  Nuclear Regulatory Commission license, regulations do not require that  the license accompany the shipment. Further, CBP officers do not have  access to data that could be used to verify that shippers have acquired the  necessary documentation. And CBP inspection procedures do not require  officers to open containers and inspect them after an initial alarm is  triggered, although under some circumstances, doing so could improve  security. DHS has sponsored research, development, and testing activities  to address the inherent limitations of currently fielded detection  equipment. However, much work remains to achieve consistently better  detection capabilities. We have recently recommended to DHS and CBP  that, among other things, CBP’s inspection procedures be revised to  include physically opening cargo containers in certain circumstances  where external inspections prove inconclusive and that federal officials  find ways to authenticate licenses that accompany radiological shipments.  DHS agreed with our recommendations and has committed to  implementing them. (See app. III for a list of our products related to  hazardous materials crossing our borders.)
In addition to the hazards posed by certain types of land-based cargo,  government officials recognize that terrorism also poses risks to  oceangoing cargo traveling to and from commercial U.S. seaports. Ocean  cargo containers play a vital role in the movement of cargo between global  trading partners. In 2004 alone, nearly 9 million ocean cargo containers  arrived and were offloaded at U.S. seaports. Responding to heightened  concern about national security since 9/11, several U.S. government  agencies have focused efforts on preventing terrorists from smuggling  weapons of mass destruction in cargo containers from overseas locations  to attack the United States and disrupt international trade. To help address  its responsibility to ensure the security of this cargo, CBP has in place a  program known as the Container Security Initiative. The program aims to  target and inspect high-risk cargo shipments at foreign seaports before  they leave for destinations in the United States. Under the program,  foreign governments agree to allow CBP personnel to be stationed at  foreign seaports to use intelligence and risk assessments to target  shipments to identify those at risk of containing weapons of mass  destruction or other terrorist contraband. As of February 2005 (the date of  our most recent work), the Container Security Initiative program was  operational at 34 foreign seaports, with plans to expand to an additional   11 ports by the end of fiscal year 2005. We have advocated in recent  testimony that CBP’s targeting system should, among other things, take  steps to assess the risks posed by oceangoing cargo. (See app. III for a list  of our products related to other cargo security initiatives.)
subsections: section_title: GAO Concluding Observations—Border Security
paragraphs: Whether the security challenge facing federal authorities at ports of entry  involves persons or cargo, the job of securing the nation’s borders is  daunting. The task involves the oversight and management of nearly   7,500 miles of land borders with Canada and Mexico, and hundreds of  legal ports of entry through which millions of travelers are inspected  annually. After 9/11, the government took immediate steps to tackle some  of the major border-related vulnerabilities and challenges that we and  others had identified, such as those related to passport and document  fraud and tracking overstays. While it may never be possible to ensure that  all terrorists, criminals, or those violating immigration laws are prevented  from entering the country, DHS and other agencies must remain vigilant in  developing and implementing programs and policies designed to reduce  breaches in our borders and ensure that hazardous cargoes are  interdicted.
section_title: Federal Government Must Address Strategic Challenges of Sharing Terrorism- Related Information, Managing Risk, and Structuring DHS to Meet Its Mission
paragraphs: Five years after 9/11 and in the wake of new terrorist threats and tactics,  Congress, DHS, and other federal agencies face an array of strategic  challenges that potentially affect the ability of each to effectively oversee  or execute the ambitious goals and programs that are under way or  planned to enhance homeland security. U.S. leaders and policy makers  continue to face the need to choose an appropriate course of action going  forward—setting priorities, allocating resources, and assessing the social  and economic costs of the measures that may be taken governmentwide to  further strengthen domestic security. Balancing the trade-offs inherent in  these choices—and aligning policies to support them—will not be easy,  but is nonetheless essential. Accomplishing this critical task will be further  challenged by (1) the federal government’s continued struggle to share  information needed to combat terrorism across federal departments and   with state and local governments; (2) having to implement a system that  assesses the relative risks reduced by investing scarce dollars among  varied and competing security alternatives; and (3) a DHS that continues  to struggle in becoming a fully integrated and effectively functioning  organization that is prepared and positioned to successfully protect the  homeland from future terrorist threats.
subsections: section_title: Efforts to Share Critical Information on Terrorism Have Improved Since 9/11, but a Governmentwide Framework for Information Sharing Has Still Not Been Implemented
paragraphs: There are numerous challenges that cut across branches of the federal  government that must be addressed broadly and in a coordinated fashion  at the highest levels. One of the most important and conspicuous of these  cross-cutting challenges involves the sharing of information related to  terrorism. The former vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission identified the  inability of federal agencies to effectively share information about  suspected terrorists and their activities as the government’s single greatest  failure in the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks. As discussed earlier in this report,  FAA’s no-fly list only contained 12 names of potential terrorists on 9/11  because information collected by other agencies, such as the CIA and FBI  about terrorist suspects was not shared with FAA at the time. According to  the 9/11 report, this undistributed information would have helped identify  some of the terrorists, but such information was shared only on a need-to- know rather than a need-to-share basis. The commission recommended,  among other things, that terrorism-related information contained in  agency databases should be shared across agency lines. Because of the  significance of this issue, we designated information sharing for homeland  security as a governmentwide high-risk area in 2005.
Responding to the lessons of 9/11, Congress and federal departments have  taken steps to improve information sharing across the federal government  and in conjunction with state and local governments and law enforcement  agencies, as well, but these efforts are not without challenges. The FBI has  increased its field Joint Terrorism Task Forces, bringing together  personnel from all levels of government in their counterterrorism  missions. DHS implemented the homeland security information network  to share homeland security information with states, localities, and the  private sector. States and localities are creating their own information  “fusion” centers, some with FBI and DHS support, to provide state and  local leaders with information on threats to their communities, a topic on  which we have ongoing work. And DHS has implemented a program to  encourage the private sector to provide information on the vulnerabilities  and security in place at critical infrastructure assets, such as nuclear and  chemical facilities by guaranteeing to protect that information from public  disclosure. But, the DHS Inspector General found that users of the  homeland security information network were confused and frustrated  with this system, in part because the system does not provide them with  useful situational awareness and classified information and as a result  users do not regularly use the system; how well fusion centers will be  integrated into the federal information sharing efforts remains to be seen.  And DHS has still not won all of the private sector’s trust that the agency  can adequately protect and effectively use the information that sector  provides. These challenges will require longer-term actions to resolve.
These challenges also require policies, procedures, and plans that  integrate these individual initiatives and establish a clear, governmentwide  framework for sharing terrorism-related information. But as we reported  in March 2006, the nation still has not implemented the governmentwide  policies and processes that the 9/11 commission recommended and that  Congress mandated. Responsibility for creating these policies has shifted  over time—from the White House to the Office of Management and  Budget, to the Department of Homeland Security, and then to the Office of  the Director of National Intelligence. Nevertheless, the Intelligence Reform  and Terrorism Prevention Act required that action be taken to facilitate  the sharing of terrorism information by establishing an “information  sharing environment” that would combine policies, procedures, and  technologies that link people, systems, and information among all  appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector.
One purpose of this information sharing environment is to represent a  partnership between all levels of government, the private sector, and our  foreign partners. While this environment was to be established by  December 2006, program managers told us that a 3-year road map is to be  released in November 2006. According to these officials, the plan will  define key tasks and milestones for developing the information sharing  environment, including identifying barriers and ways to resolve them, as  GAO recommended. Completing the information sharing environment is a  complex task that will take multiple years and long-term administration  and congressional support and oversight, and will pose cultural,  operational, and technical challenges that will require a collaborated  response.
section_title: Developing and Implementing a Risk- Based Framework to Balance Trade-offs between Security and Other Priorities Remains a Critical Strategic Federal Challenge
paragraphs: Addressing the diffuse nature of terrorist threats—and protecting the vast  array of assets and infrastructure potentially vulnerable to attack— requires trade-offs that balance security needs with competing priorities  for limited resources. Shortly after 9/11, new federal policies sought to  acknowledge the importance of determining these trade-offs. For example,  as reflected in the National Strategy for Homeland Security of 2002, the  United States is to “carefully weigh the benefit of each homeland security  endeavor and only allocate resources where the benefit of reducing risk is  worth the amount of additional cost.” The strategy recognizes that the  need for homeland security is not tied solely to the current terrorist threat  but to enduring vulnerability from a range of potential threats that could  include weapons of mass destruction and bioterrorism. In addition,  Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7, issued in December 2003,  charged DHS with integrating the use of risk management into homeland  security activities related to the protection of critical infrastructure. The  directive called for the department to develop policies, guidelines, criteria,  and metrics for this effort.
Federal officials are also well aware of the need for taking a risk-based  approach to allocating scarce resources for homeland security. The  Secretary of DHS testified in June 2005 on the need for managing risk by  developing plans and allocating resources in a way that balances security  and freedom. He noted the importance of assessing the full spectrum of  threats and vulnerabilities, conducting risk assessments, setting realistic  priorities, and guiding decisions about how to best organize to prevent,  respond to, and recover from an attack.
In our January 2005 report on high-risk areas in the federal government,  we noted the importance of completing comprehensive national threat and  risk assessments—and noted risk management as an emerging area. At  that time, we noted that DHS was in the early stages of adopting a risk- based strategic framework for making important resource decisions  involving billions of dollars annually. In part, this is because the process is  difficult and complex; requires comprehensive information on risks and  vulnerabilities; and employs sophisticated assessment methodologies. The  process also requires careful trade-offs that balance security concerns  with economic interests and other competing interests. DHS, with a fiscal  year 2007 budget of about $35 billion, has begun allocating grants based on  risk criteria, and has begun risk assessments at individual infrastructure  facilities. But, it has not completed all of the necessary risk assessments  mandated by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to set priorities to help  focus its resources where most needed. In addition, when applying risk  management to critical infrastructure protection, DHS’s risk management  framework, which requires the support of a comprehensive, national  inventory of critical infrastructure assets that DHS refers to as the  National Asset Database, remains incomplete. And, according to the DHS  OIG, the agency is still identifying and collecting critical infrastructure  data for this tool and this database is not yet comprehensive enough to  support the management and resource allocation decisionmaking needed  to meet the requirements of HSPD-7.
Nonetheless, agencies are making progress in using risk as a basis for  decision making. We found, for example, that the Coast Guard had made  the greatest progress among three DHS agencies we reviewed in  conducting risk assessments—that is, evaluating individual threats, the  degree of vulnerability to attack, and the consequences of a successful  attack. Also, we found that TSA has begun to assess risks within other  transportation modes, such as rail in an effort to begin allocating scarce  resources toward the greatest risks and vulnerabilities. Nevertheless,  DHS is still faced with the formidable task of developing a more formal  and disciplined approach to risk management, and answering questions  such as what is an acceptable level of risk to guide homeland security  strategies and investments and what criteria should be used to target  federal funding for homeland security to maximize results and mitigate  risks within available resource levels. Doing so will not be easy. However,  as we noted in our analysis of homeland security challenges for the 21st  century, defining an acceptable, achievable level of risk, within  constrained budgets is imperative to addressing current and future  threats.
In the longer term, progress in implementing a risk-based approach will  rest heavily on how well DHS coordinates homeland security risk  management efforts with other federal departments, as well as state, local,  and private-sector partners that oversee or operate critical infrastructure  and assets. Currently, our work shows that while various risk assessment  approaches are being used within DHS, they are neither consistent nor  comparable—that is, there is no common basis, or framework, used to  evaluate risk assessments within sectors (such as transportation) or  across sectors (such as transportation, energy, and agriculture). DHS faces  challenges related to establishing uniform assessment policies,  approaches, guidelines, and methodologies so that a common risk  framework can be developed and implemented within and across sectors.  Overall, DHS has much more to do to effectively manage risk as part of its  homeland security responsibilities within current and expected resource  levels.
section_title: DHS Faces Challenges in Managing Its Organizational Transformation
paragraphs: DHS faces significant management and organizational transformation  challenges as it works to protect the nation from terrorism and  simultaneously establish itself. It must continue to integrate approximately  180,000 employees from 22 originating agencies, consolidate multiple  management systems and processes, and transform into a more effective  organization with robust planning, management, and operations. For these  reasons, in January 2005, we continued to designate the implementation  and transformation of the department as high risk. DHS’s Inspector  General also reported, in December 2004, that integrating DHS’s many  separate components into a single effective, efficient and economical  department remains one of its biggest challenges. Failure to effectively  address these management challenges could have serious consequences  for our national security.
This task of transforming 22 agencies—several with major management  challenges—into one department with the critical, core mission of  protecting the country against another terrorist attack has presented many  challenges to the Department’s managers and employees. While DHS has  made progress, it still has much to do to establish a cohesive, efficient and  effective organization. Successful transformations of large organizations,  even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations and pressure for  immediate results than DHS, can take from 5 to 7 years to take hold on a  sustainable basis. For DHS to successfully address its daunting  management challenges and transform itself into a more effective  organization, we have stated that it needs to take the following actions: develop a department wide implementation and transformation strategy  that adopts risk management and strategic management principles and  establishes key milestones and performance measures; improve management systems including financial systems, information  management, human capital, and acquisitions; and implement corrective actions to address programmatic and partnering  challenges.
The DHS OIG, in its report on the major management challenges facing  DHS, identified consolidating the department’s components as a challenge,  but noted that the 2005 departmental restructuring has resulted in changes  to the DHS organizational structure that refocused it on risk and  consequence management and further involved its partners in other  federal agencies, state and local governments, and private sector  organizations. However, the IG concluded that much more remains to be  done.
subsections: section_title: GAO Concluding Observations—Strategic Challenges
paragraphs: After spending billions of dollars on people, policies, procedures, and  technology to improve security, we have improved preparedness  compared to the time of the attacks, but much more needs to be done as  terrorists change tactics and introduce new vulnerabilities. Consequently,  we must remain ever vigilant. Today, we are more alert to the possibility of  threats. DHS is engaged in a number of individual efforts and initiatives as  it works to implement its vision of an integrated, unified department. The  momentum generated by the attacks of 9/11 to create a successful  homeland security function could be lost if DHS does not continue to  work quickly to put in place key merger and transformation practices that  would enable it to be more effective in taking a comprehensive and  sustained approach to its management integration. Moreover, it remains  vitally important for DHS to continue to develop and implement a risk- based framework to help target where the nation’s resources should be  invested to strengthen security, and determine how these investments  should be directed—toward people, processes, or technology. And we  must continue to improve the sharing of terrorism-related information  across organizational and intergovernmental cultures and “stovepipes.”  Finally, Congress continues to play an important role in overseeing the  nation's homeland security efforts, and has asked GAO to assist in this  oversight. Our work, the work of the Inspectors General, and the work of  other accountability organizations has helped identify where Congress can  provide solutions and enhance our homeland security investments.
We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security,  the Secretary of the Department of State, and interested congressional  committees. We will make copies available to others upon request.  In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at  larencee@gao.gov or (202) 512-8777. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Visas Issued to the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Hijackers
paragraphs: The 19 hijackers who participated in the September 11 terrorist attacks  received a total of 23 visas at five different consular posts from April 1997  through June 2001 (see fig. 6). Fifteen of them were citizens of Saudi  Arabia. They obtained their visas in their home country, at the U.S.  consulate in Jeddah (11 hijackers) and the U.S. embassy in Riyadh   (4 hijackers). Two others, citizens of the United Arab Emirates, also  received their visas in their home country, at the U.S. embassy in Abu  Dhabi and at the U.S. consulate in Dubai. The remaining 2 hijackers  obtained their visas at the U.S. embassy in Berlin. They were considered  third-country national applicants because they were not German citizens:  one was a citizen of Egypt, the other of Lebanon. Of the 19 hijackers,   18 received visas for temporary visits for business and pleasure, and   1 received 2 student visas. These visas allowed the holders to enter the  United State multiple times during the visas’ validity period, subject to the  approval of the immigration officer at the port of entry. Of the 23 issued  visas, 4 were valid for a period of 1 year; 15 were valid for 2 years; 2 for   5 years; and 2 for 10 years.
section_title: Appendix II: Map of Visa Waiver Program Countries
section_title: Appendix III: Related GAO and Inspectors General Products
subsections: section_title: Transportation Security
subsections: section_title: Aviation Security
subsections: section_title: Passenger Prescreening and Checkpoint Screening
paragraphs: Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International Passenger  Prescreening are Under Way, but Planning and Implementation Issues  Remain. GAO-07-55SU. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2006.
Transportation Security Administration’s Office of Intelligence:  Responses to Post Hearing Questions on Secure Flight. GAO-06-1051R.  Washington D.C.: August 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the  Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program.   GAO-06-864T. Washington D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked  Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington,  D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made  Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring  Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T.  Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely  Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s  Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not  Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight  Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps  to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.:   July 22, 2005.
Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement  Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.:  May 2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way,  but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed.   GAO-05-356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Follow-Up Audit of Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures at  Domestic Airports (Unclassified Summary). Department of Homeland  Security Office of Inspector General, OIG-05-16. Washington, D.C.: March  2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial  Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.:   Feb. 23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer- Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.:  March 17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System  Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington,  D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing  Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington,  D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress  Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.:   Sept. 24, 2003.
section_title: In-Flight Security
paragraphs: Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better  Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in  Deploying Less-than-Lethal Weapons. GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.:   May 26, 2006.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from  Improved Planning and Controls, GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.:   Nov. 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training  Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed.   GAO-05-781. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges  of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.  GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial  Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
section_title: Checked Baggage Screening
paragraphs: Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening  Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D.C.:   July 28, 2006.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding  Uncertainties Remain. GAO-06-875T. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006  Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of  Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.:  July 13, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.  Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
section_title: Air Cargo
paragraphs: Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air  Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air  Cargo Security. GAO-05-446SU. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods   and DOT’s Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.:   Jan. 10, 2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the  Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002.
section_title: Perimeter Security, Access Controls, and General Aviation
paragraphs: Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted  Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed. GAO-05-928T.  Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2005.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but  Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term  Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of  Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728.  Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies.   GAO-04-785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to  Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519.  Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the  Transportation Security Administration’s Efforts to Secure Aerial  Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004.
The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a  Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development  Program. GAO-04-341R. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004.
section_title: Other Aviation Security
paragraphs: Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority  of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.:  Sept. 23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation  Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen  Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address  Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003.
Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the  Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003.
Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover  Airports’ Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.:  Feb. 25, 2003.
Aviation Security Costs, Transportation Security Agency. Department of  Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, CC-003-066. Washington,  D.C.: Feb 5, 2003.
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has  Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.:   Oct. 15, 2002.
Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses  Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2, 2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces  Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.:  July 25, 2002.
Challenges Facing TSA in Implementing the Aviation and  Transportation Security Act. Department of Homeland Security Office of  Inspector General, CC-2002-88. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 23, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard  Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.:   Sept. 25, 2001.
Actions Needed to Improve Aviation Security. Department of Homeland  Security Office of Inspector General, CC-2001-313. Washington, D.C.: Sept.  25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for  Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:  Sept. 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve  Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.:   Sept. 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in  Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001.
Aviation Security in the United States. Department of Homeland Security  Office of Inspector General, CC-2001-308. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001.
section_title: Surface and Maritime Security
paragraphs: Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA’s State  Safety Oversight Program. GAO-06-821. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006.
Maritime Security: Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving.   GAO-06-933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated  Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing  Management Challenges and New Risks. GAO-06-580. Washington, D.C.:  May 31, 2006.
Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and  Risk Can Help Guide Security Efforts. GAO-06-557T. Washington, D.C.:  March 29, 2006.
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to  Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-06-181T. Washington, D.C.:  Oct. 20, 2005.
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to  Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-05-851. Washington, D.C.:  Sept. 9, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, But Implementation and  Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information  Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention.  GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.
Information Technology: Customs Automated Commercial Environment  Program Progressing, but Need for Management Improvements  Continues. GAO-05-267. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective  Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.: Sept.  30, 2004.
Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address  Security Challenges. GAO-03-263. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2002.
section_title: General Transportation Security
paragraphs: Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges Before  Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Program.   GAO-06-982. Washington, D.C.: September 2006.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize  Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2005.
Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching and  Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management.   GAO-04-890. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security  Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address  Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides  Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T.  Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a  Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2003.
section_title: Border Security
subsections: section_title: Visa Process and Visa Waiver Program
paragraphs: Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks  of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-1090T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7,  2006.
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks  of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-854. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.
Process for Admitting Additional Countries into the Visa Waiver  Program. GAO-06-835R. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.
Border Security: More Emphasis on State’s Consular Safeguards   Could Mitigate Visa Malfeasance Risks. GAO-06-115. Washington, D.C.:  Oct. 6, 2005.
Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit From  Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing. GAO-05-859.  Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2005.
Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of  Department of Homeland Security’s Visa Security Program. GAO-05-801.  Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005.
Border Security: Reassessment of Consular Security Resource  Requirements Could Help Address Visa Delays. GAO-06-542T.  Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2005.
Border Security: Streamlined Visas Mantis Program Has Lowered  Burden on Foreign Science Students and Scholars, but Further  Refinements Needed. GAO-05-198. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 18, 2005.
Implementation of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status  Indicator Technology Program at Land Border Ports of Entry.  Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, OIG-05-11.  Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2005.
A Review of the Use of Stolen Passports from Visa Waiver Countries to  Enter the United States. Department of Homeland Security Office of  Inspector General, OIG-05-07. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2004.
Border Security: State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on  Schedule, but Guidance Is Lagging. GAO-04-1001. Washington, D.C.:   Sept. 9, 2004.
An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the  Homeland Security Act of 2002. Department of Homeland Security Office  of Inspector General, OIG-04-33. Washington, D.C.: August 2004.
Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in  the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-04-795. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2004.
An Evaluation of the Security Implications of the Visa Waiver Program.  Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, OIG-04-26.  Washington, D.C.: April 2004.
Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to  Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars. GAO-04-371.  Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2004.
Border Security: New Policies and Increased Interagency Coordination  Needed to Improve Visa Process. GAO-03-1013T. Washington, D.C.: July  15, 2003.
Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in  the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-03-798. Washington, D.C.: June 18,  2003.
Review of Nonimmigrant Visa Policy and Procedures, memorandum  report. Department of State Office of Inspector General, ISP-I-03-26.  Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2002.
Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program.  GAO-03-38. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002.
Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an  Antiterrorism Tool. GAO-03-132NI. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002.
section_title: US-VISIT and Other Border Security Issues
paragraphs: Border Security: US-VISIT Faces Strategic, Technological, and  Operational Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-248. Washington,  D.C.: Dec. 06, 2006.
Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the  United States. GAO-06-976T. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2006.
Information Technology: Immigration and Customs Enforcement Is  Beginning to Address Infrastructure Modernization Program  Weaknesses but Key Improvements Still Needed. GAO-06-823.  Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006.
Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for Visitor and  Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened. GAO-06-404.  Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006.
Observations on Efforts to Implement Western Hemisphere Travel  Initiative on the U.S. Border with Canada. GAO-06-741. Washington,  D.C.: May 25, 2006.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of  Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T.  Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported Radioactive  Sources Across Our Nation’s Borders at Selected Locations.   GAO-06-545R. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying  Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns  Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and  Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation  Detection Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.:  March 14, 2006.
Homeland Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating,  but Management Improvements Are Still Needed. GAO-06-318T.  Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2006.
Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced  Scrutiny With Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GAO-05-404.  Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2005.
US-VISIT System Security Management Needs Strengthening (Redacted).   Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General. OIG-06-16.  Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2005.
Information Technology: Management Improvements Needed on  Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Infrastructure Modernization  Program. GAO-05-805. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005.
Review of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Compliance  Enforcement Unit. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector  General, OIG-05-50. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2005.
Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and  Marine Assets. GAO-05-543. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 2005.
Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved.  GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment  Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection  Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain  on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program.  GAO-05-202. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2005.
Implementation of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status  Indicator Technology Program at Land Border Ports of Entry.  Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, OIG-05-11.  Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2005.
Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in Transforming  Immigration Programs. GAO-05-81. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2004.
Immigration Enforcement: DHS Has Incorporated Immigration  Enforcement Objectives and Is Addressing Future Planning  Requirements. GAO-05-66. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2004.
Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a  Layered Defense. GAO-04-82. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004.
Homeland Security: First Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status  Program Operating, but Improvements Needed. GAO-04-586. Washington,  D.C.: May 11, 2004.
Security: Counterfeit Identification Raises Homeland Security  Concerns. GAO-04-133T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2003.
Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation  Security Program Needs to Be Addressed. GAO-03-1083. Washington, D.C.:  Sept. 19, 2003.
Security: Counterfeit Identification and Identification Fraud Raise  Security Concerns. GAO-03-1147T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003.
Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the  Inspections Process. GAO-03-1084R. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 18, 2003.
Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the Country from Certain Western  Hemisphere Countries Not Detected. GAO-03-713T. Washington, D.C.: May  13, 2003.
Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States. GAO-03-438T.  Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003.
Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security.   GAO-03-174. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002.
section_title: Watch List and Information Sharing
paragraphs: Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating Government and  Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors’ Characteristics. GAO-07-39.   Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2006.
Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects  on the Public. GAO-06-1031. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Leadership Needed to Enhance  Cybersecurity. GAO-06-1087T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2006.
Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More  Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical  Infrastructure Information. GAO-06-383. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2006.
Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish  Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but  Unclassified Information. GAO-06-385. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2006.
Review of the Terrorist Screening Center. Department of Homeland  Security Office of Inspector General, Audit Report 05-27. Washington,  D.C.: June 2005.
DHS Challenges in Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information.  Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, OIG-04-31.  Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2004.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Improving Information Sharing with  Infrastructure Sectors. GAO-04-780. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2004.
Homeland Security: Communication Protocols and Risk  Communication Principles Can Assist in Refining the Advisory System.  GAO-04-682. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004  Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to be  Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington, D.C.: August 27, 2003  Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated  to Promote Better Integration and Sharing. GAO-03-322. Washington,  D.C.: April 15, 2003.
section_title: Homeland Security, Risk Management, and High Risk List
paragraphs: GAO’s High Risk Program. GAO-06-497T. Washington, D.C.: March 15,  2006.
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database. Department of  Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, OIG-06-40. Washington,  D.C.: June 10, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and  Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical  Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005.
Major Management Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland  Security. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,  OIG-06-14. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2005.
Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training  Important for Successful Transformation. GAO-05-888. Washington, D.C:  Sept. 23, 2005.
Strategic Budgeting: Risk Management Principles Can Help DHS  Allocate Resources to Highest Priorities. GAO-05-824T. Washington, D.C.:  June 29, 2005.
Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland Security  Management Challenges. GAO-05-573T. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005.
Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and Sustained  Approach Needed to Achieve Management Integration. GAO-05-139.  Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.  21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal  Government. GAO-05-325SP. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2005.
Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges  Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security. GAO-05-33.  Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005.  9/11 Commission Report: Reorganization, Transformation, and  Information Sharing. GAO-04-1033T. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 3, 2004.
Status of Key Recommendations GAO Has Made to DHS and Its Legacy  Agencies. GAO-04-865R. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2004.
Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally  Chartered Commissions and GAO. GAO-04-591. Washington, D.C.: March  31, 2004.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of State.  GAO-03-107. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2003.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Efforts.  GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2001.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, key contributors to the report  include Katie Bernet, Amy Bernstein, Cathleen Berrick, John Brummet,  Sally Gilley, David Hooper, Kirk Kiester, Sarah Lynch, Octavia Parks,  Susan Quinlan, Brian Sklar, Richard Stana, and Maria Strudwick.