Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability
Published: 2003-06-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: After the events of September 11, 2001 led to the defeat of the Taliban, the United States and the international community developed an assistance program to support Afghanistan's new government and its people. Key components of this effort include food and agricultural assistance. GAO was asked to assess (1) the impact, management, and support of food assistance to Afghanistan and (2) the impact and management of agricultural assistance to Afghanistan, as well as obstacles to achieving food security and political stability.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The emergency food assistance that the United States and the international community provided from January 1999 through December 2002 helped avert famine by supplying millions of beneficiaries with about 1.6 million tons of food. However, the inadequacy of the international community's financial and in-kind support of the World Food Program's (WFP) appeal for assistance disrupted the provision of food assistance throughout 2002. Because of a lack of resources, WFP reduced the amount of food rations provided to returning refugees from 150 kilograms to 50 kilograms. Meanwhile, as a result of the statutory requirement that U.S. agencies providing food assistance purchase U.S.-origin commodities and ship them on U.S.-flag vessels, assistance costs and delivery times were higher by $35 million and 120 days, respectively, than if the United States had provided WFP with cash or regionally produced commodities. Had the U.S. assistance been purchased regionally, an additional 685,000 people could have been fed for 1 year. The livelihood of 85 percent of Afghanistan's approximately 26 million people depends on agriculture. Over 50 percent of the gross domestic product and 80 percent of export earnings have historically come from agriculture. Over the 4-year period, because of continued conflict and drought, the international community provided primarily short-term agricultural assistance such as tools and seed. As a result, the assistance did not significantly contribute to the reconstruction of the agricultural sector. In 2002, agricultural assistance was not adequately coordinated with the Afghan government; a new coordination mechanism was established in December 2002, but it is too early to determine its effectiveness. As a result of the weak coordination, the Afghan government and the international community have not developed a joint strategy to direct the overall agricultural rehabilitation effort. Meanwhile, inadequate assistance funding, continuing terrorist attacks, warlords' control of much of the country, and the growth of opium production threaten the recovery of the agricultural sector and the U.S. goals of food security and political stability in Afghanistan.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Afghanistan is a country devastated by 23 years of war and destructive  domestic policies and more than 4 years of drought. The livelihood of 85  percent of Afghanistan’s approximately 26 million inhabitants depends on  agriculture, yet the food and agricultural sector has been severely  damaged. Since 1978, the country has required international food aid to  help meet the shortfall between food supply and demand. Since 1999, the  United States has been the largest donor of food and agricultural assistance  to Afghanistan. The U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan is to create a stable  Afghan society that is not a threat to itself or others and is not a base for  terrorism; U.S. food and agricultural assistance to Afghanistan is intended  not only to provide emergency relief but also to help achieve this long-term  goal. The United States has provided short-term, emergency food  assistance to feed Afghanistan’s vulnerable populations, as well as longer- term agricultural development assistance to help Afghanistan improve its  food security and political stability. The majority of U.S. assistance has  been given through the U.S. Agency for International Development  (USAID) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the United  Nations (UN) World Food Program (WFP) and the UN Food and  Agriculture Organization (FAO), as well as nongovernmental organizations.
Nongovernmental organizations and contractors distribute most of the  assistance provided through the UN organizations in Afghanistan.
Because of concerns about the United States’ and UN’s ability to deliver  assistance in such a complex environment, and recognizing the  interrelationship of short-term emergency food assistance and longer-term  agricultural assistance, you asked that we examine the food and  agricultural assistance provided to date. We assessed, for 1999–2002, (1)  the impact, management, and U.S. and international support of short-term,  emergency food assistance to Afghanistan and (2) the impact and  management of long-term, agricultural development assistance to  Afghanistan, as well as obstacles to achieving food security and political  stability.
To address these issues, we collected and analyzed information from the  U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and State; the U.S. Agency for  International Development; the UN World Food Program, Food and  Agriculture Organization, and Development Program; the World Bank; the  Asian Development Bank; and the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture and  Animal Husbandry and Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources. This  effort included an analysis of the cost data for U.S. food assistance  provided through these agencies and organizations. In addition, we  contacted 14 nongovernmental organizations, responsible for delivering  WFP and FAO assistance in Afghanistan, to obtain their views on a range of  issues including the management of donated commodities and  coordination. Finally, we traveled to Afghanistan to examine the WFP’s  operations in country. Our presence in Afghanistan was limited due to  security precautions imposed by the Department of State. While in  Afghanistan, we spoke with officials from U.S., UN, and nongovernmental  organizations and the Afghan government. (For further details of the scope  and methodology of our study, see app. I.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Afghanistan is a mountainous, arid, land-locked Central Asian country with  limited natural resources. At 647,500 square kilometers, it is slightly smaller  than the state of Texas. Afghanistan is bordered by Pakistan to the east and  south; Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China to the north; and  Iran to the west (see fig. 1). Its population, currently estimated at 26 million, is ethnically diverse, largely rural, and mostly uneducated. Life  expectancy in Afghanistan is among the lowest in the world, with some of  the highest rates of infant and child mortality.
Political conflicts have ravaged Afghanistan for years, limiting  development within the country. Conflict broke out in 1978 when a  communist-backed coup led to a change in government. One year later, the  Soviet Union began its occupation of Afghanistan, initiating more than two  decades of conflict. Over the course of the 10-year occupation, various  countries, including the United States, backed Afghan resistance efforts.  The protracted conflict led to the flight of a large number of refugees into  Pakistan and Iran. In 1989, the Soviet forces withdrew, and in 1992, the  communist regime fell to the Afghan resistance. Unrest continued,  however, fueled by factions and warlords fighting for control.
The Taliban movement emerged in the mid 1990s, and by 1998 it controlled  approximately 90 percent of the country. Although it provided some  political stability, the Taliban regime did not make significant  improvements to the country’s food security. Furthermore, the Taliban’s  continuing war with the Northern Alliance and the Taliban’s destructive  policies, highlighted in its treatment of women, further impeded aid and  development. Coalition forces removed the regime in late 2001, responding  to its protection of al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States. In  December 2001, an international summit in Bonn, Germany, established a  framework for the new Afghan government, known as the Bonn  Agreement.
Agriculture is essential to Afghanistan. Despite the fact that only 11.5  percent (7.5 million hectares) of Afghanistan’s total area is cultivable, 85  percent of the population depends on agriculture for its livelihood, and 80  percent of export earnings and more than 50 percent of the gross domestic  product have historically come from agriculture. However, Afghanistan’s  agricultural sector continues to suffer from the effects of prolonged  drought, war, and neglect. It lacks high-quality seed, draft animals, and  fertilizer, as well as adequate veterinary services, modern technology,  advanced farming methods, and a credit system for farmers. Further,  Afghanistan’s Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry and its Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources lack the infrastructure and  resources to assist farmers.
Because Afghanistan experiences limited rainfall, its agricultural sector is  highly dependent on irrigation—85 percent of its agricultural products  derives from irrigated areas. Thus, the conservation and efficient use of  water is the foundation of the agricultural sector. The severe drought that  has gripped the country since 1998 has resulted in drastic decreases in  domestic production of livestock and agricultural supplies including seed,  fertilizer, and feed (see fig. 2). Several earthquakes and the worst locust  infestation in 30 years exacerbated this crisis in 2002. Without adequate  supplies and repairs to irrigation systems, even if the drought breaks,  farmers will be unable to produce the food that the country needs to feed  itself.
Since 1965, the WFP has been the major provider of food assistance to  Afghanistan. Partnering with nongovernmental organizations, it delivers  assistance through emergency operations that provide short-term relief to  populations affected by a specific crisis such as war or drought. It also  conducts protracted relief and recovery operations designed to shift  assistance toward longer-term reconstruction efforts. Because of its policy  to target assistance at specific populations, WFP does not attempt to  provide food for all of the vulnerable people within a country or affected  area. Instead, it focuses on specific vulnerable populations such as  internally displaced people or widows (see fig. 3). Further, it does not try to  meet all of the daily requirements of the targeted populations. WFP’s 2002  emergency operation in Afghanistan targeted internally displaced people,  people affected by drought, and children, among others. The assistance  programs designed to assist these populations provide between 46 and 79  percent, or 970 to 1671 kilocalories, of the recommended minimum daily  requirement of 2100 kilocalories. WFP assumes that beneficiaries will  obtain the remainder of their food through subsistence farming or the  market.
FAO has provided much of the agricultural assistance to Afghanistan.  FAO has been involved in agricultural development and natural resource  management in Afghanistan for more than 50 years. FAO was founded in  1945 with a mandate to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, to  improve agricultural productivity, and to better the condition of rural  populations. Today, FAO is one of the largest specialized agencies in the UN  system and the lead agency for agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and rural  development. An intergovernmental organization, FAO has 183 member  countries plus one member organization, the European Community. FAO  has traditionally carried out reconstruction efforts in relatively stable  environments. Although FAO is increasingly implementing its programs in  unstable postconflict situations such as Afghanistan, the agency and its  staff are still adjusting to operating in such environments. FAO's regular  program budget provides funding for the organization's normative work  and, to a limited extent, for advice to member states on policy and planning  in the agricultural sector. FAO's regular budget can also fund limited  technical assistance projects through its Technical Cooperation Program.  Apart from this, extrabudgetary resources, through trust funds provided by  donors or other funding arrangements, fund all emergency and  development assistance provided by FAO. Thus, extrabudgetary resources  fund FAO’s field program, the major part of its assistance to member  countries.
section_title: U.S. and International Food Assistance Had Significant Impact and Was Well Managed, but Donor Support Was Problematic
paragraphs: The emergency food assistance provided to Afghanistan by the United  States and the international community from January 1999 through  December 2002 benefited millions and was well managed, but donor  support was inadequate. WFP delivered food to millions of people in each  of the 4 years, helping avert widespread famine. In addition, WFP managed  the distribution of U.S. and international food assistance effectively,  overcoming significant obstacles and using its logistics system and a  variety of monitoring mechanisms to ensure that food reached the intended  beneficiaries. However, inadequate and untimely donor support in 2002  disrupted some WFP assistance efforts and could cause further disruptions  in 2003. Further, WFP could have provided assistance to an additional  685,000 people and reduced its delivery times if the United States had  donated cash or regionally purchased commodities instead of shipping  U.S.-produced commodities. Additionally, if the United States had donated  the $50.9 million that it spent on approximately 2.5 million daily rations air- dropped by the Department of Defense, WFP could have purchased enough  regionally produced commodities to provide food assistance for an  estimated 1.0 million people for a year.
subsections: section_title: Food Assistance Had Important Impact
paragraphs: The emergency food assistance that the United States and other bilateral  donors provided in Afghanistan through WFP from 1999 through 2002 met a  portion of the food needs of millions of vulnerable Afghans. Over the 4-year  period, WFP delivered approximately 1.6 million metric tons of food that  helped avert famine and stabilize the Afghan people, both in Afghanistan  and in refugee camps in neighboring countries. The food assistance also  furthered the country’s reconstruction through projects, among others, that  exchanged food for work. WFP delivered the assistance as part of seven  protracted relief–recovery and emergency operations (see table 1). The  types of operations and their duration and objectives varied in response to  changing conditions within Afghanistan. These objectives included, but  were not limited to, providing relief to the most severely affected  populations in Afghanistan and Afghan refugees in neighboring countries  and preventing mass movements of populations.
WFP implemented a number of different types of food assistance projects,  including free food distribution; institutional feeding programs; bakeries;  food-for-work, -seed, -education, -training, and -asset-creation projects; and  projects targeted at refugees, internally displaced people, and civil  servants. (See app. II for a list and description of WFP’s projects.) Food-for- work and food-for-asset-creation projects provided essential food  assistance to the most vulnerable members of Afghanistan’s population  while enabling the beneficiaries to help rehabilitate local infrastructure and  rebuild productive assets such as roads and schools. Between July and  September 2002, these projects employed 1 million laborers per month,  paying them in food commodities.
U.S. food assistance to Afghanistan, provided by USAID and USDA,  accounted for approximately 68 percent of the cash contributions and 67  percent of the commodities delivered by WFP from 1999 through 2002 (see  table 1). The U.S. provides cash to WFP to cover transportation and  administrative costs associated with its in-kind contributions of  commodities. USAID’s authority to donate to WFP operations derives  from Title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of  1954 (P.L. 480). Title II authorizes the agency to donate agricultural  commodities to meet international emergency relief requirements and  carry out nonemergency feeding programs overseas. USDA also provides  surplus commodities to WFP under section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act  of 1949. U.S. contributions consisted of in-kind donations of commodities  such as white wheat and cash donations to cover the cost of transporting  the commodities from the United States to Afghanistan.
section_title: Food Assistance Distribution Was Well Managed
paragraphs: WFP managed the distribution of U.S. and international food assistance to  Afghanistan effectively despite significant obstacles, including harsh  weather and a lack of infrastructure to deliver food to beneficiaries. To  accomplish this, WFP appointed a special envoy to direct operations and  employed a dedicated staff of local nationals. It also used various  monitoring and reporting mechanisms to track the delivery of food.
subsections: section_title: WFP’s Management Overcame Many Obstacles
paragraphs: In distributing the food assistance, WFP faced significant obstacles related  to political and security disturbances in Afghanistan as well as physical and  environmental conditions. These obstacles included limited mobility due to  continued fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance and  coalition forces; religious edicts issued by the Taliban limiting the  employment of women by international organizations; difficult transport  routes created by geography, climate, and lack of infrastructure (see fig. 4);  and attempts by Afghan trucking cartels to dramatically increase trucking  fees. To overcome these obstacles, WFP negotiated with the Taliban to  allow the movement of food to areas occupied by the Northern Alliance; it  also threatened to cancel certain projects unless women were allowed to  continue to work for WFP. Further, WFP found ways to deliver food to  remote areas, including airlifting food and hiring donkeys (see fig. 5). In  addition, it purchased trucks to supplement a fleet of contracted trucks.  Using these trucks as leverage against the Afghan trucking cartel, WFP  forced the cartel to negotiate when the cartel attempted to dramatically  increase transport fees.
WFP created the position of Special Envoy of the Executive Director for  the Afghan Region to lead and direct all WFP operations in Afghanistan and  neighboring countries during the winter of 2001–2002, when it was believed  that the combination of winter weather and conflict would increase the  need for food assistance. WFP was thus able to consolidate the control of  all resources in the region, streamline its operations, and accelerate the  movement of assistance. WFP points to the creation of the position as one  of the main reasons it was able to move record amounts of food into  Afghanistan from November 2001 through January 2002. In December 2001  alone, WFP delivered 116,000 metric tons of food, the single largest  monthly food delivery within a complex emergency operation in WFP’s  history.
WFP also credits its quick response to its national staff and the Afghan  truck drivers it contracted. WFP employed approximately 400 full-time  national staff during 1999–2002. These staff established and operated an  extensive logistics system and continued operations throughout  Afghanistan, including areas that international staff could not reach owing  to security concerns, and during periods when international staff were  evacuated from the country. The truckers who moved the food around the  country continued working even during the harshest weather and in areas  that were unsafe because of ongoing fighting and banditry.
section_title: WFP Monitoring Shows Effective Distribution and Negligible Losses
paragraphs: WFP uses a number of real-time monitoring mechanisms to track the  distribution of commodities in Afghanistan, and the data we reviewed  suggested that food distributions have been effective and losses minimal.  (For a description of WFP’s monitoring procedures, see app. III.)   During  our visits to project and warehouse sites in Afghanistan, we observed  orderly and efficient storage, handling, and distribution of food  assistance. WFP’s internal auditor reviewed WFP Afghanistan’s  monitoring operations in August of 2002 and found no material  weaknesses. USAID has also conducted periodic monitoring of WFP  activities without finding any major flaws in WFP’s operations. In addition,  most of the implementing partners we contacted were familiar with WFP  reporting requirements. However, 10 of the 14 implementing partners we  contacted commented unfavorably on WFP’s project monitoring efforts,  stating that monitoring visits were too infrequent. Finally, WFP’s loss  reporting data indicated that only 0.4 percent of the commodities was lost  owing to theft, spoilage, mishandling, or other causes.
section_title: Inadequate International Support Disrupted Food Assistance; U.S. Contributions Costly and Slow
paragraphs: Inadequate and untimely donor support disrupted WFP’s food assistance  efforts in 2002 and could disrupt efforts in 2003; in addition, U.S. assistance  to Afghanistan, both through WFP and the Department of Defense, was  costly. In 2002, interruptions in support forced WFP to delay payments of  food, curtail the implementation of new projects, and reduce the level of  rations provided to repatriating refugees. WFP expressed concern that  donor support in 2003 may be similarly affected, as a growing number of  international emergencies and budgetary constraints could reduce the total  funding available for food assistance to Afghanistan. In addition, WFP  could have delivered more food and reduced delivery times if the United  States had provided either cash or regionally purchased commodities  instead of shipping U.S.-produced commodities and airdropping  humanitarian daily rations.
subsections: section_title: Limited International Donor Support Disrupted Food Assistance in 2002, Could Disrupt Efforts in 2003
paragraphs: Obtaining donor support for the emergency food assistance operation for  the April 2002 through December 2002 period was difficult owing to the  donor community’s inadequate response to WFP’s appeal for contributions.  WFP made its initial appeal in February 2002 for the operation and it made  subsequent appeals for donor support throughout the operation. The  operation was designed to benefit 9,885,000 Afghans over a 9-month period,  through the provision of 543,837 metric tons of food at a cost of over $295  million. It was also intended to allow WFP to begin to shift from  emergency to recovery operations with particular emphasis on education,  health, and the agricultural sector. When the operation began in April 2002,  WFP’s Kabul office warned that it might have to stop or slow projects if  donors did not provide more support. At that time, WFP had received only  $63.9 million, or 22 percent of the required resources. The United States  provided most of this funding. (See app. IV for a list of donors and their  contributions for the operation.) From April through June—the preharvest  period when Afghan food supplies are traditionally at their lowest point— WFP was able to meet only 51 percent of the planned requirement for  assistance. WFP’s actual deliveries were, on average, 33 percent below  actual requirements for the 10-month period April 2002–January 2003.  Figure 6 illustrates the gaps in the operation’s resources for the 10-month  period.
Lack of timely donor contributions and an increase in the number of  returning refugees forced WFP and its implementing partner, the UN High  Commissioner for Refugees, to reduce from 150 to 50 kilograms the rations  provided to help returning refugees and internally displaced persons  reestablish themselves in their places of origin. The rations are intended to  enable these groups to sustain themselves long enough to reestablish their  lives; reducing the rations may have compromised efforts to stabilize  population movements within Afghanistan. The lack of donor support also  forced WFP and its implementing partners to delay for up to 10 weeks, in  some cases, the compensation promised to Afghans who participated in the  food-for-work and food-for-asset-creation projects, resulting in a loss of  credibility in the eyes of the Afghans and nongovernmental organizations.  Similarly, because of resource shortages, WFP had to delay for up to 8  weeks in-kind payments of food in its civil service support program,  intended to help the new government establish itself, and it never received  enough contributions to provide civil servants with the allocation of tea  they were to be given as part of their support package. In addition, WFP  was forced to reduce the number of new projects it initiated, thus limiting  the level of reconstruction efforts it completed.
In January 2003, WFP expressed concern that the problems it encountered  with donor support in 2002 could recur in 2003. Despite the expansion of  agricultural production in 2002 because of increased rainfall, 6 million  Afghans will require food assistance in 2003. Although the United States  was the largest donor of food assistance to Afghanistan in 2002, the U.S.  contribution may be smaller in 2003 than in previous years owing to  reduced surpluses of commodities, higher commodity prices, and  competing crises in Africa, North Korea, and Iraq. The UN forecasts  Afghan cereal production for July 2002 through June 2003 at 3.59 million  metric tons, a cereal import requirement of 1.38 million metric tons, and  Afghan commercial food imports at 911,000 metric tons. Thus, an estimated  total deficit of 469,000 metric tons remains to be covered in the 12-month  period by international food assistance.
section_title: U.S. Food Assistance Contributions Were Costly and Inefficient
paragraphs: The U.S.-produced commodities and humanitarian daily rations provided  by the United States to Afghanistan resulted in lower volumes of food than  if the United States had provided regionally purchased commodities or  cash donations. If it had provided WFP with cash or commodities from  countries in the Central Asia region, the United States could have  eliminated ocean freight costs. We estimated that the savings in freight  costs would have enabled WFP to provide food assistance to  approximately 685,000 additional people for 1 year. In addition, we  estimated that if the United States had donated cash or regionally  purchased commodities instead of air-dropping rations, WFP could have  provided food assistance for another 1.0 million people for a year.
U.S.-Produced Commodities Raised Costs and Slowed Delivery Most of the food assistance that the United States donated to Afghanistan  in 1999–2002 was provided through WFP as in-kind donations of U.S.  agricultural products as well as cash to cover shipping and freight costs.  Since the commodities were purchased in the United States, much of the  cost of the assistance represented shipping and freight costs rather than  the price of the commodities. Figure 7 provides a breakdown of the costs  associated with U.S. food assistance to Afghanistan from 1999 through  2002. (See app. V for additional cost data.)
We estimated that if the United States had provided cash or regionally  purchased commodities instead of U.S.-produced commodities in 2002,  WFP could have purchased approximately 103,000 additional metric tons  of commodities and saved 120 days in delivery time. WFP officials in Rome  and Cairo stated that cash was greatly preferable to in-kind donations  because it allows for flexibility and for local and regional purchases. Other  contributors to WFP efforts in Afghanistan have provided cash, allowing  WFP to make the purchases it deemed most expedient, including  purchases from Central Asian countries that produced large surpluses in  2002. Ninety-three percent of the commodities WFP purchased for the  emergency operation that began in April 2002 (157,128 metric tons) were  from Kazakhstan and Pakistan. WFP also stated that it could have saved  approximately 120 days in delivery time if it had received U.S.  contributions in cash that it could have used for regional purchases.
Although the commodity costs and some of the freight costs for regional  purchases are lower, the largest portion of the savings from regional  purchases comes from eliminating ocean freight costs. In 2002, USDA spent  $5.6 million on ocean freight, or 31 percent of the value of the aid it  provided to Afghanistan. USAID spent $29.4 million on ocean freight, or  18.3 percent of the value of the aid it provided to Afghanistan. Overall,  USDA and USAID spent approximately $35.0 million on ocean freight and  commissions, or 19.6 percent of the total value ($178,068,786) of the food  aid they provided through WFP to Afghanistan. Had this money been spent  on regional purchases instead of on ocean freight, it could have paid for  103,000 additional metric tons of commodities, or enough to provide food  assistance for approximately 685,000 people for 1 year. However, the laws  governing the main food assistance programs under which most of the U.S.  assistance was provided to Afghanistan through WFP do not provide for  USAID and USDA to purchase food assistance commodities regionally or  provide cash to WFP to make regional purchases. All of the assistance must  be provided in the form of U.S. commodities, and 75 percent of the  commodities by weight must be shipped on U.S.-flag vessels. According to  USDA, this requirement referred to as “cargo preference” accounts for 9  percent of the cost of U.S. food assistance shipments worldwide. In this  case, it accounted for approximately $16 million of the $35 million in ocean  freight. In prior reports we reported that the most significant impact of the  cargo preference requirement on U.S. food assistance programs is the  additional costs incurred. Using U.S.-flag vessels reduces funds available  for purchasing commodities, thus the amount of food delivered to  vulnerable populations is decreased. In its 2002 annual assessment of  management performance, the Office of Management and Budget  concluded that U.S. food assistance programs would be more cost effective  and flexible if the requirement to ship U.S. food assistance on U.S.-flag  vessels was eliminated. In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA  stated that consideration should be given to waiving cargo preference  requirements in specific food aid situations.
In February 2003, the President announced a new humanitarian $200  million Famine Fund. Use of the fund will be subject to presidential  decision and will draw upon the broad disaster assistance authorities in the  Foreign Assistance Act. According to USAID, these authorities allow the  U.S. government to purchase commodities overseas to meet emergency  food assistance needs. However, this authority does not extend to the  United States’ fiscal year 2003 $2.6 billion food assistance programs under  existing food assistance legislation.
Humanitarian Daily Rations Were Expensive and Inefficient The U.S. Department of Defense’s humanitarian daily ration program was a  largely ineffective and expensive component of the U.S. food assistance  effort. The program was initiated to alleviate suffering and convey that the  United States was waging war against the Taliban, not the Afghan people.  However, the program’s public relations and military impact have not been  formally evaluated. Airdrops of the humanitarian daily rations were  intended to disperse the packets over a wide area, avoiding the dangers of  heavy pallet drops or having concentrations of food fall into the hands of a  few. On October 8, 2001, U.S. Air Force C-17s began dropping rations on  various areas within Afghanistan. Drops averaged 35,000 packets per night  (two planeloads) and ended on December 21, 2001. In 198 missions over 74  days, the Air Force dropped 2,489,880 rations (see fig. 8).
According to WFP, one of the major problems with the ration program was  the lack of any assessment to identify the needs of the target populations or  their locations. WFP representatives were part of the coordination team  located at Central Command in late 2001 when the airdrops were made.  These representatives provided the Defense Department with general  information on drought-affected areas but were not asked to provide  information on specific areas to target. According to Department of  Defense officials, the drop areas were selected based on consultations with  USAID staff familiar with the situation in Afghanistan.
Defense officials told us that the rations are an expensive and inefficient  means of delivering food assistance and were designed to relieve  temporary food shortages resulting from manmade or natural disasters— not, as in Afghanistan, to feed a large number of people affected by a long- term food shortage. Defense officials responsible for the ration program  stated that the humanitarian, public relations, and military impact of the  effort in Afghanistan had not been evaluated. According to these officials,  anecdotal reports from Special Forces soldiers indicated that vulnerable  populations did receive the food and that the rations helped to generate  goodwill among the Afghan people. However, reports from  nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan indicated that often the  rations went to the healthiest, since they were able to access the drop zone  most quickly, and were hoarded by a few rather than distributed among the  population.
The cost of the rations was $4.25 per unit, or $10,581,990 for the  approximately 2.5 million dropped. The total cost of the program was  $50,897,769, or $20.44 per daily ration. Delivery cost is estimated at $16.19  per unit, based on the difference in the ration cost and the department’s  total expenditure. The rations accounted for only 2,835 metric tons out of  the total of 365,170 metric tons, or .78 percent of the total weight of food  aid delivered in fiscal year 2002. However, the cost of the rations equals  28.6 percent of the $178,068,786 that USAID and USDA spent on emergency  assistance to Afghanistan from October 2001 through September 2002. If  the United States had bought traditional food assistance commodities  regionally instead of dropping the 2,835 metric tons of rations, it could have  purchased approximately 118,000 metric tons of food, enough to provide  food assistance to 1.0 million people for 1 year.
section_title: Agricultural Assistance Has Had Limited Impact and Lacks Coordination, and Major Obstacles Jeopardize Food Security and Political Stability
paragraphs: The U.S. and international community’s agricultural reconstruction efforts  in Afghanistan have had limited impact, coordination of the assistance has  been fragmented, and significant obstacles jeopardize Afghanistan’s long- term food security and political stability. Because of drought and adverse  political conditions, agricultural assistance provided by the international  community has not measurably improved Afghanistan’s long-term food  security. In 2002, collective efforts to coordinate reconstruction assistance,  especially with the Afghan government, were ineffectual and, as a result, no  single operational strategy has been developed to manage and integrate  international agricultural assistance projects. Finally, the inadequacy of  proposed agricultural assistance, and the increase in domestic terrorism,  warlords’ control of much of the country, and opium production all present  obstacles to the international community’s goal of achieving food security  and political stability in Afghanistan.
subsections: section_title: Impact of Agricultural Assistance Limited by Drought and Political Factors
paragraphs: For most of the period 1999–2002, because of war and drought, FAO,  bilateral donors, and more than 50 nongovernmental organizations in  Afghanistan focused resources primarily on short-term, humanitarian  relief; consequently, the impact of this effort on the agricultural sector’s  long-term rehabilitation was limited. The assistance was provided in an  effort to increase short-term food security and decrease Afghanistan’s  dependence on emergency food assistance. During most of the 4-year  period, FAO provided $28 million in assistance to Afghanistan partly under  the UN Development Program’s (UNDP) Poverty Eradication and  Community Empowerment program and partly as donor-funded response  to the drought. The poverty eradication program ended in 2002, but FAO  continues its projects in Afghanistan. FAO’s short-term activities focus on  efforts to enable war- and drought-affected populations to resume food  production activities. These activities include providing agricultural inputs  such as tools, seed, and fertilizer; controlling locusts; and making repairs to  small-scale irrigation systems (see fig. 9). Its longer-term activities include,  among other things, the establishment of veterinary clinics, assistance in  the production of high-quality seed through 5,000 contracted Afghan  farmers, and horticulture development. From 1999 to 2002, bilateral efforts  focused on the distribution of agricultural inputs and the repair of irrigation  systems. USAID activities currently include developing a market-based  distribution system for agricultural inputs as well as distributing high- quality seed. As of March 2002, at least 50 of the approximately 400  national and international nongovernmental organizations working in  Afghanistan were involved in agriculture-related assistance, including  providing agricultural inputs, farmer training, microcredit, and the  construction of wells.
For most of the 4-year period, the rise of the Taliban, the continuing  conflict with the Northern Alliance, and the ongoing drought prevented the  international community from shifting from short-term relief projects to  longer-term agricultural rehabilitation projects and reversed earlier  advancements in agricultural production. For example, by 1997, agriculture  in some areas had returned to prewar levels, and Afghanistan as a whole  had reached 70 percent self-sufficiency in the production of cereals. At the  time, assistance agencies were planning to implement longer-term  assistance activities but were unable to do so owing to drought and  conflict. These same factors resulted in decreases in cereal production and  livestock herds of 48 percent and 60 percent, respectively, from 1998  through 2001. In 2002, a number of longer-term agricultural rehabilitation  efforts were started, including efforts by USAID to reestablish agricultural  input and product markets. However, these efforts have not been  evaluated, and it is too early to determine their sustainability after donor  assistance ends or their long-term impact.
section_title: Weak Assistance Coordination in 2002 Hindered Afghan Government’s Involvement and Development of Operational Strategy
paragraphs: International assistance, including agricultural assistance, was not well  coordinated in 2002, and, as a result, the Afghan government was not  substantively integrated into the agricultural recovery effort and lacks an  effective operational strategy. In December 2002, the Afghan government  and the international community instituted a new mechanism, the  Consultative Group, to improve coordination. However, the Consultative  Group is similar in purpose and structure to a mechanism used earlier in  2002, the Implementation Group, and does not surmount the obstacles that  prevented the Implementation Group’s success. Because of the lack of  coordination, the Afghan government and the international community  have not developed a single operational strategy to direct the agricultural  rehabilitation effort; instead, all of the major assistance organizations have  independent strategies. Although documents prepared by the Afghan  government and others to manage assistance efforts contain some of the  components of an effective operational strategy, these components have  not been combined in a coherent strategy. The lack of an operational  strategy hinders efforts to integrate projects, focus resources, empower  Afghan government ministries, and make the international community  more accountable.
section_title: Assistance Coordination Was Weak in 2002
paragraphs: Despite efforts to synchronize multiple donors’ initiatives in a complex and  changing environment, coordination of international assistance in general,  and agricultural assistance in particular, was weak in 2002. According to  the UN, assistance coordination refers to a recipient government’s  integration of donor assistance into national development goals and  strategies. From the beginning of the assistance effort in 2002, donors were  urged to defer responsibility for assistance coordination to the Afghan  government as stipulated in the Bonn Agreement. According to the UN,  coordination rests with the Afghan government, efforts by the aid  community should reinforce national authorities, and the international  community should operate, and relate to the Afghan government, in a  coherent manner rather than through a series of disparate relationships.
The Security Council resolution that established the UN Assistance Mission  in Afghanistan goes further; it states that reconstruction assistance should  be provided through the Afghan government and urges the international  community to coordinate closely with the government.
In April 2002, the Afghan government attempted to exert leadership over  the highly fragmented reconstruction process. To accomplish this task, the  government published its National Development Framework. The  framework provides a vision for a reconstructed Afghanistan and broadly  establishes national goals and policy directions. The framework is not  intended to serve as a detailed operational plan with specific objectives and  tasks that must be pursued to accomplish national goals. Also, in 2002, the  Afghan government established a government-led coordination  mechanism, the Implementation Group (see app. VI for detailed  descriptions and a comparison of the coordinating mechanisms). The  intent of the Implementation Group was to bring coherence to the  international community’s independent efforts and broad political  objectives, such as ensuring Afghanistan does not become a harbor for  terrorists. The mechanism’s structure was based on the National  Development Framework. Individual coordination groups, led by Afghan  ministers and composed of assistance organizations, were established for  each of the 12 programs contained in the framework.
The Implementation Group mechanism proved to be largely ineffective.  Officials from the Afghan government, the UN, the Department of State,  and USAID, as well as a number of nongovernmental bodies, expressed  concern over the lack of meaningful and effective coordination of  assistance in Afghanistan in 2002. For example, a high-ranking WFP official  in Afghanistan said that coordination efforts since September 11, 2002, paid  only “lip-service” to collaboration, integration, and consensus. In August  2002, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Rural Reconstruction and  Development, Irrigation, and Agriculture stated that the donor community’s  effort to coordinate with the government was poor to nonexistent. A  USAID official characterized the coordination of reconstruction in 2002 as  an “ugly evolution” and “the most complex post-conflict management  system” he had ever seen.
The ineffectiveness of the Implementation Group mechanism resulted from  its inability to overcome several impediments. First, each bilateral,  multilateral, and nongovernmental assistance agency has its own mandate,  established by implementing legislation or charter, and sources of funding,  and each agency pursues development efforts in Afghanistan  independently. Second, the international community asserts that the  Afghan government lacks the capacity and resources to effectively assume  the role of coordinator and, hence, these responsibilities cannot be  delegated to the government. Third, no single entity within the  international community has the authority and mandate to direct the  efforts of the myriad bilateral, multilateral, and nongovernmental  organizations providing agricultural assistance to Afghanistan. Finally,  efforts to coordinate agricultural assistance were further complicated  because the Ministries of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Rehabilitation and  Rural Development share responsibility for agriculture development.
subsections: section_title: Efforts to Improve Coordination Have Been Implemented
paragraphs: In December 2002, the Afghan government instituted a new coordination  system, the Consultative Group mechanism. The overall objective of the  Consultative Group in Afghanistan is to increase the effectiveness and  efficiency of assistance coordination in support of goals and objectives  contained in the National Development Framework. According to the  Afghan government, the program-level consultative groups established  under this mechanism provide a means by which the government can  engage donors, UN agencies, and nongovernmental organizations to  promote specific national programs and objectives presented in the  government’s National Development Framework and the projects  articulated in the Afghan National Development Budget. According to  advisors to the Afghan government, the Consultative Group mechanism  provides a real opportunity for donors to provide focused support for  policy development, project preparation, implementation, monitoring, and  evaluation.
The Consultative Group mechanism in Afghanistan evolved out of the  Implementation Group and is similar in its National Development  Framework–based hierarchal structure, the role of the Afghan government,  the membership and leadership of sector specific groups, and stated goals  (see app. VI). One difference between the Implementation and Consultative  Group mechanisms is that, since the establishment of the latter, the Afghan  government has asked donor government and assistance organizations to  categorize their assistance projects under the subprograms in the National  Development Framework and to direct funding toward the projects in the  Afghan National Development Budget.
Despite the effort to develop a more effective coordination mechanism, the  Consultative Group mechanism has not surmounted the conditions that  prevented the Implementation Group from effectively coordinating  assistance. For example, in 2003, donor governments and assistance  agencies have continued to develop their own strategies, as well as fund  and implement projects outside the Afghan government’s national budget.  In addition, agricultural assistance is divided up among several  consultative groups including the groups for natural resources  management and livelihoods. Further, unlike food assistance where donors  primarily use one agency, WFP, for channeling resources, donors continue  to use a variety of channels for their agriculture assistance. Although the  Afghan government asserts that it is assuming a greater level of leadership  over the coordination effort, as of May 2003, we could not determine  whether the new coordination mechanism would be more successful than  earlier efforts.
section_title: Lack of Coordination Prevented Development of Operational Strategy
paragraphs: Because of the inadequate coordination of agricultural assistance, the  Afghan government and the international community have not developed  an operational agricultural sector strategy. Each assistance agency has  published its own development strategy that addresses agriculture and  numerous other sectors. The Consultative Group mechanism and the  National Development Framework, as well as other documents prepared  by the Afghan government and others to manage assistance efforts, contain  some of the components of an effective operational strategy, such as  measurable goals and impediments to their achievement. However, these  components have not been incorporated in a single strategy. Without an  integrated operational strategy, jointly developed by the Afghan  government and the international community, the Afghan government lacks  a mechanism to manage the agricultural rehabilitation effort, focus limited  resources, assert its leadership, and hold the international donor  community accountable.
Assistance Agencies Have Developed Separate Strategies No donor has taken the lead in the agricultural sector; consequently,  multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental organizations, including the  UN, FAO, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, USAID, and  others, have prepared individual strategies that address, to varying degrees,  agricultural reconstruction and food security. However, these strategies  lack measurable national goals for the sector and have not been developed  jointly with the Afghan government. For example, in August 2002, the  Minister of Agriculture stated, “The ministry does not know the priorities of  the international community for the agricultural sector, how much money  will be spent, and where the projects will be implemented.” FAO claimed  that the Ministry of Agriculture had endorsed FAO’s agricultural  rehabilitation strategy. However, no letter of agreement or memorandum of  understanding between the FAO and the ministry documents the  acceptance of the strategy. The Minister of Agriculture told us, in  December 2002, that the ministry had not endorsed FAO’s latest strategy.  Further, the Ministry of Agriculture presented a list of more than 100  prioritized rehabilitation projects to the international community. As of late  December 2002, the international community had not responded regarding  the ministry’s proposed projects.
Components of an Operational Strategy Have Not Been Integrated  into a Single Document Although Consultative Group mechanism–related documents, the Afghan  National Development Framework, and other documents prepared by the  Afghan government and others to manage assistance efforts contain some  of the components of an effective operational strategy, these components  have not been incorporated in a single strategy. For an operational  agricultural strategy to be effective, all relevant stakeholders must  participate in its formulation. In this case, stakeholders include the Afghan  Ministries of Agriculture and Irrigation and key nongovernmental,  multilateral, and bilateral development organizations. Further, such  strategies must establish measurable goals, set specific time frames,  determine resource levels, and delineate responsibilities. For example, in  Afghanistan, one such goal might be to increase the percentage of irrigated  land by 25 percent by 2004 through the implementation of $100 million in  FAO-led irrigation projects in specific provinces. In addition, an operational  strategy should identify external factors that could significantly affect the  achievement of goals and include a schedule for future program  evaluations. Stakeholders should implement the strategy through projects  that support the measurable goals of the strategy and broader policy  objectives, such as those contained in the Afghan Government’s National  Development Framework (see fig. 10).
The Implementation Group and its successor, the Consultative Group, as  well as the National Development Framework and other documents,  contain some of the essential elements of an operational strategy. These  elements include the involvement of key stakeholders, the development of  some measurable objectives, and the identification of external factors that  could affect the achievement of goals. However, since the National  Development Framework is a general national strategy and not a detailed  operational strategy, it is sufficiently broad that any assistance to the  agricultural sector could be considered supportive of the framework, even  if the assistance were not well targeted or made no significant impact. In  addition, the various elements of an effective operational strategy that are  contained in the National Development Framework and other documents  have not been effectively applied, nor has a single agricultural sector  strategy incorporating all of these elements been developed.
The UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan’s management plan endorses  the formulation of joint strategies for reconstruction. In late December  2002, Afghanistan’s Minister of Agriculture told us that he would welcome  the development of a joint Afghan–international agricultural sector strategy  containing clear objectives, measurable goals, concrete funding levels, and  clearly delineated responsibilities. In January 2003, FAO’s Assistant  Director-General of Technical Cooperation stated that FAO would welcome  the opportunity to assist the Ministry of Agriculture in preparing a strategy.  The Consultative Group mechanism could serve as a vehicle to support the  development of such a strategy. In March 2003, Afghan government  advisors told us that consultative groups could develop strategies based on  the subprograms contained in the National Development Framework and  National Development Budget. Proposals for the development of strategies  pertaining to natural resources management, including agriculture, have  been drafted, and support for these proposals is being sought from the  international community.
Lack of Operational Agricultural Sector Strategy Limits Integration  and Oversight  The lack of an operational agricultural sector strategy hinders efforts to  integrate disparate projects, focus limited assistance resources, place  Afghan government ministries in a leadership role, and make the  international community more accountable to the Afghan government. In  its October 2002 National Development Budget, the Afghan government  cited the lack of a strategic framework for the natural resources  management sector, including agriculture, as an impediment to  rehabilitation. Absent an operational strategy, the Afghan government lacks  a mechanism to   integrate disparate projects into an effective agricultural rehabilitation   manage finite resources so as to ensure the greatest return on   guide the efforts of the international community and assert the Afghan  government’s leadership in agricultural reconstruction.
Finally, an operational agricultural sector strategy that includes measurable  goals and the means to assess progress against those goals could increase  accountability. Because no comprehensive integrated strategy exists, the  Afghan government lacks the means to hold the international assistance  community accountable for implementing the agricultural sector  reconstruction effort and achieving measurable results.
section_title: Limited Funding and Security Problems Present Obstacles to Food Security and Political Stability
paragraphs: Major obstacles to the goal of a food-secure and politically stable Afghan  state include inadequate assistance funding, as well as a volatile security  situation, long-standing power struggles among warlords, and the rapid  increase in opium production. Donor support has not met Afghanistan’s  recovery and reconstruction needs, and future funding levels for  agricultural assistance may be inadequate to achieve the goal of food  security and political stability, primarily because assistance levels are  based on what the international community is willing to provide rather than  on Afghanistan’s needs. Meanwhile, the continued deterioration of the  security situation, exacerbated by a rising incidence of terrorism, the  resurgence of warlords, and near-record levels of opium production, are  impeding reconstruction and threaten to destabilize the nascent Afghan  government.
subsections: section_title: International Assistance May Be Insufficient to Meet Needs
paragraphs: Total assistance levels, including those for agricultural reconstruction,  proposed at the Tokyo donors’ conference in January 2002 do not provide  Afghanistan with enough assistance to meet its estimated needs. The  preliminary needs assessment prepared for the January 2002 donor’s  conference in Tokyo estimated that, in addition to humanitarian assistance  such as food and shelter assistance, between $11.4 and $18.1 billion over 10  years would be needed to reconstruct Afghanistan (see table 2). Others  have estimated that much more is required. For example, the Afghan  government estimated that it would need $15 billion for reconstruction  from 2003 through 2007.
In January 2002, donors pledged $5.2 billion for the reconstruction of  Afghanistan for 2002–2006, or slightly more than half of the base-case  estimate for 5 years. For the period January 2002–March 2003, the donors  pledged $2.1 billion (see app. VII for donor pledges and donations). As of  March 2003, approximately 88 percent of the 2002 grant funding had been  disbursed. However, only 27 percent, or $499 million, was spent on major  reconstruction projects such as roads and bridges, which are essential for  the export of Afghan agricultural commodities and the import of foreign  agricultural supplies. Despite the importance that the United States and the  international community attach to the Afghan reconstruction effort,  Afghanistan is receiving less assistance than was provided for other recent  postconflict, complex emergencies. For example, per capita assistance  levels have ranged from $193 in Rwanda to $326 in Bosnia, compared with  $57 for Afghanistan. Given that the livelihood of 22 million Afghans  depends on agriculture, we estimated that if all of the assistance had been  provided only to people engaged in agriculture, each person would have  received $67 annually or about 18 cents per day for their daily subsistence  and agriculture production efforts in 2002. If Afghanistan were to receive  per capita aid consistent with the average amounts provided for other  recent postconflict reconstruction efforts, in 2002 it would have received  $6 billion in international assistance, and from 2002 to 2006 it would  receive $30 billion, or nearly three times the base-case estimate.
section_title: Funding May Be Inadequate to Rehabilitate Agricultural Sector
paragraphs: The funding proposed by donors for food security–related issues is limited  and may be insufficient to achieve the long-term goals of the Afghan  government and the international community. Despite the Afghan  government’s estimated annual need of $500 million for agricultural  rehabilitation, agricultural assistance for Afghanistan in 2003 may total  approximately $230 million. Afghanistan’s President has emphasized that  the goal of food security and political stability is the Afghan government’s  overarching priority, and the United States and other donor governments  recognize the strong link between stability and food security. According to  the U.S. Department of State, reconstruction is an integral part of the  campaign against terrorism: the U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan is to create  a stable Afghan society that is not a threat to itself or others and is not a  base for terrorism. Because the agricultural sector forms the core of the  Afghan economy, the pace of the sector’s recovery will largely determine  the rate of overall economic recovery. Sustained investment in the  agricultural sector, particularly the rehabilitation, upgrading, and  maintenance of the nation’s irrigation infrastructure, is essential for the  recovery of the Afghan economy and the country’s long-term food  security. Despite improvements in agricultural production in 2002, owing  primarily to increased precipitation, the fundamental weakness of  Afghanistan’s agricultural infrastructure continues to threaten overall  recovery efforts.
The Ministry of Agriculture estimates that it needs $5 billion over 10 years  to complete 117 key projects and other efforts important for the recovery  of the sector. Despite these costs, the 2003 Afghan development budget for  natural resource management, including agriculture, is only $155 million.  Since the budget is funded almost entirely by the donor community, the  budget reflects what the government expects to receive from the  international community, not the Afghan government’s actual need. Afghan  government budget estimates indicate that the natural resources  management budget will increase to $298 million in 2004 and $432 million  in 2005. International donors have budgeted approximately $230 million for  agriculture-related assistance in 2003. USAID considers adequate funding a  prerequisite for the success of the assistance effort and plans to spend  approximately $50 million on agriculture in 2003 and similar amounts in  2004 and 2005. USAID funding covers 32 percent of the Afghan  government’s 2003 natural resources management program budget of $155  million but only 10 percent of the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture’s  estimated annual needs of $500 million.
section_title: Increased Terrorism, Warlords, and Opium Production Are Major Obstacles to Food Security and Political Stability
paragraphs: The goal of a stable Afghan state is threatened by the rise in domestic  terrorism, long-standing rivalries among warlords, and the rapid increase in  opium production. In March 2002, in a report to the UN Security Council,  the UN Secretary General stated that security will remain the essential  requirement for the protection of the peace process in Afghanistan. One  year later, in a report to the council, he stated that “security remains the  most serious challenge facing the peace process in Afghanistan.” Others in  the international community, including USAID, consider security as a  prerequisite for the implementation of reconstruction efforts. In 2002 and  early 2003, the deteriorating security situation was marked by terrorist  attacks against the Afghan government, the Afghan people, and the  international community. These incidents have forced the international  community to periodically suspend agricultural assistance activities,  disrupting the agricultural recovery effort.
Meanwhile, clashes between the warlords’ private armies continue to  destabilize the country and reduce the Afghan government’s ability to fund  agricultural reconstruction. The warlords foster an illegitimate economy  fueled by smuggling of arms, drugs, and other goods. They also illegally  withhold hundreds of millions of dollars in customs duties collected at  border points in the regions they control, depriving the central government  of revenues needed to fund the country’s agricultural reconstruction. The  warlords control private armies of tens of thousands of armed men. Across  Afghanistan, approximately 700,000 Afghan men are armed, and half of  these are combat trained. USAID considers the demobilization and  integration of these armed men a prerequisite for the success of the  international recovery effort. Currently, the unemployment rate in  Afghanistan is estimated at 50 percent. Without a revitalization of the  agricultural sector—the engine of the Afghan economy and the main  source of employment—it is likely that these men will remain in the employ  of the warlords.
Another destabilizing force that affects agriculture is the illicit international  trade in Afghan opiates. The drug trade was the primary income source of  the Taliban and continues to provide income for terrorists and warlords.  On January 17, 2002, the President of Afghanistan issued a decree stating  that the existence of an opium-based economy was a matter of national  security and should be fought by all means. During the 1990s, Afghanistan  became the world’s leading opium producer accounting for approximately  70 percent of opium production worldwide. Despite being a central focus  of a number of international donors engaged in Afghanistan, opium poppy  eradication efforts implemented by the Afghan government and the  international community in 2002 failed. In July 2002, one of Afghanistan’s  vice presidents and leader of the Afghan government’s poppy eradication  campaign, Haji Qadir, was assassinated. In October 2002, the UN Office for  Drug Control and Crime Prevention estimated that, in 2002, Afghan farmers  produced 3,400 metric tons of opium. This level of production equals or  exceeds levels achieved in 9 of the last 10 years. Total 2002 revenue from  opium production totaled $1.2 billion, an amount equivalent to 70 percent  of total assistance to Afghanistan pledged for 2002, or nearly 220 percent  more than the Afghan government’s 2003 operating budget.
The UN Drug Control Program also estimated that the average poppy  farmer earned $4,000 dollars from growing poppies in 2002. Owing to  continuing drought, a poor agricultural marketing structure, and  widespread poverty, farmers have turned to poppy cultivation to avoid  destitution. Since the fall of the Taliban, irrigated acreage dedicated to  wheat production has fallen by 10 percent, supplanted by opium poppies.  In addition, it is estimated that 30 to 50 percent of Afghans are involved in  opium cultivation. Many of the farmers continue to grow opium poppies  because they lack the seed and fertilizer needed to grow alternative crops  that generate revenues comparable to those from opium.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The establishment of a new government in Afghanistan has provided the  Afghan people, the international community, and the United States an  opportunity to rebuild Afghanistan and create a stable country that is  neither a threat to itself or its neighbors nor a harbor for terrorists. In 2002,  U.S. and international food assistance averted famine, assisted the return  of refugees, and helped to implement reconstruction efforts. However, U.S.  food assistance and cargo shipping legislation limited the United States’  flexibility in responding quickly to the emergency and providing support to  WFP; the legislation does not provide for purchasing commodities  regionally or donating cash to the UN for procuring commodities and  requires that U.S. commodities be shipped on U.S. flag vessels.  Consequently, the costs of food assistance were higher and delivery times  were greater, fewer commodities were purchased, and a smaller number of  people received food assistance. In addition, a lack of timely and adequate  overall donor support disrupted WFP’s food assistance efforts. Meanwhile,  in 2003, six million people will require food assistance in Afghanistan.
Because the economy remains overwhelmingly agricultural, the pace of  recovery in the agricultural sector will largely determine the rate of  Afghanistan’s overall recovery. Food assistance alone cannot provide food  security; Afghanistan’s agricultural sector must be rehabilitated.  Environmental and political problems have limited the impact of the  international community’s agricultural assistance efforts. In addition, in  2002, the assistance efforts were not coordinated with each other or with  the Afghan government. A new coordination mechanism established in  December 2002 is largely similar to earlier mechanisms, and it is too recent  for us to determine its effectiveness. Further, whereas U.S. and UN  agencies, bilateral donors, and nongovernmental organizations have  drafted numerous overlapping recovery strategies, no single Afghan  government–supported strategy is directed toward the effort to rehabilitate  the sector. Meanwhile, funding for the agricultural assistance effort is  insufficient and the nascent Afghan government is plagued with problems  stemming from domestic terrorism, the resurgence of warlords, and near- record levels of opium production. These obstacles threaten the recovery  of the agricultural sector and the U.S. goals of achieving food security and  political stability in Afghanistan.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: To increase the United States’ ability to respond quickly to complex  emergencies involving U.S. national security interests, such as that in  Afghanistan, Congress may wish to consider amending the Agricultural  Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-480), as amended,  to provide the flexibility, in such emergencies, to purchase commodities  outside the United States when necessary and provide cash to assistance  agencies for the procurement of non-U.S.-produced commodities. In  addition, Congress may wish to amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as  amended, to allow waiver of cargo preference requirements in emergencies  involving national security. These amendments would enable the United  States to reduce assistance costs and speed the delivery of assistance, thus  better supporting U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To increase the effectiveness of the agricultural assistance effort in  Afghanistan, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the  Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development work  through the Consultative Group mechanism to develop a comprehensive  international–Afghan operational strategy for the rehabilitation of the  agricultural sector. The strategy should (1) contain measurable goals and  specific time frames and resource levels, (2) delineate responsibilities, (3)  identify external factors that could significantly affect the achievement of  goals, and (4) include a schedule for program evaluations that assess  progress against the strategy’s goals.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to WFP, Department of State, USDA,  USAID, and Department of Defense and received written comments from  each agency (see app. VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII respectively). We also received  technical comments from USDA, the Departments of Defense and State,  USAID, FAO, and the World Bank, and incorporated information as  appropriate.
Department of State, USDA, and USAID all commented on our matter for  congressional consideration related to amending food assistance  legislation. WFP supported our suggestion that Congress consider  amending the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954  to allow the provision of non-U.S. commodities when such action supports  U.S. national security. However, State, USDA, and USAID did not support  the recommendation. Specifically, although State accepted our evidence  that purchasing commodities from the United States is not the most cost- effective method of providing assistance, it believes that further study of  potential variables, such as regional customs fees, taxes, and trucking  costs, that may negate cost-benefit savings is needed before the act is  amended. USAID stated that an amendment is not necessary because other  authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act allow the provision of cash,  and the proposed $200 million Famine Fund announced by the President in  February 2003 would also increase the flexibility of U.S. assistance  programs. USDA stated that the flexibility to quickly respond to  humanitarian crises can be achieved through means, such as amending  cargo shipping legislation, that would not adversely affect the provision of  U.S. commodities. Specifically, USDA suggested adding a national security  waiver to the U.S. regulations that govern how U.S. assistance is  transported to eliminate the requirement to use U.S. flag vessels in certain  circumstances.
We do not disagree that under broad disaster assistance legislation U.S.  agencies may provide cash or purchase food aid commodities outside the  United States. However, we maintain that amending the Agricultural Trade  Development and Assistance Act of 1954 to allow the provision of cash or  food commodities outside the United States will greatly improve U.S.  flexibility in responding to crises that affect U.S. national security and  foreign policy interests. The act is the principal authority for providing food  assistance in emergency situations. In both 2002 and 2003 over $2 billion in  food assistance, the preponderant amount of this type of assistance, was  dispersed under this authority. Amending the act will provide the United  States with more flexibility to respond rapidly and at lower cost to events  that affect U.S. national security; this is particularly important given the  number and magnitude of crises requiring food assistance and decreasing  surpluses of U.S. commodities. We also agree with USDA that the cargo  preference requirement adds additional cost to food assistance and should  be waived in specific situations, and we have adjusted the matter for  congressional consideration contained in the report on this issue.
In its comments, USDA stated that the report did not provide enough  evidence about the existence of surpluses in 2002 in the Central Asia  region. It also stated that if the U.S. had procured greater levels of  commodities with the savings accrued by purchasing regional versus U.S. - origin commodities, the additional commodities would have over burdened  WFP’s logistics system while generating only “marginal savings in time and  money.”
We have added additional information on the 7.6 million metric ton 2002  grain surplus in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. We disagree with USDA’s  assertions that additional regionally procured commodities would have  taxed WFP’s logistics system and brought only marginal gains. In  December 2002, while fighting between coalition forces, the Northern  Alliance, and the Taliban was still occurring, and winter weather was  complicating food deliveries, WFP delivered 116,000 metric tons of food to  Afghan beneficiaries, in the single largest movement of food by WFP in a 1- month period. According to WFP, its Afghanistan logistics system was  capable of routinely moving more than 50,000 metric tons of food per  month. Further, we disagree with USDA’s statement that the potential  savings in cost and time by purchasing commodities regionally are  marginal. Savings from the elimination of ocean freight costs could have  fed 685,000 people for 1 year, and commodities purchased regionally are  delivered to beneficiaries within weeks of being purchased, compared with  the 4 months that it can take for commodities purchased in the United  States.
WFP, the Department of State, USDA, and USAID all agreed with the  report’s conclusion and recommendation pertaining to assistance  coordination and the need to develop a joint international-Afghan  agricultural rehabilitation strategy. WFP pointed out that although the  international assistance effort may have been aided by better coordination  in 2002, the overall level of assistance might have been too small in 2002 to  have any long-term impact on the agricultural sector. Although USAID  agreed with our recommendation, it stated it did not want to lead the  strategy development effort. We believe that USAID should take an active  and aggressive role in the development of a joint international–Afghan  government strategy, because the United States is the largest donor to  Afghanistan, agriculture rehabilitation is the focus of USAID’s assistance  effort in Afghanistan, and the achievement of U.S. goals in Afghanistan is  tightly linked to the rehabilitation of the country’s agricultural sector.  According to USAID’s assistance strategy for Afghanistan, restoring food  security is USAID’s highest priority.
Finally, the Department of Defense focused its comments on the report’s  discussion of the humanitarian daily ration program. Specifically, the  Department of Defense stated that (1) the report incorrectly characterized  the ration program as a food assistance program, (2) informal evaluations  of the program indicated that the program alleviated hunger and generated  goodwill from the Afghan people toward U.S. soldiers, and (3) although the  funds used to purchase rations could have been used to purchase bulk  food, the bulk food could not have been delivered to remote areas. The  report discusses both the food assistance and nonfood assistance aspects  of the rations program, and we have added information on page 30 about  the goodwill generated by the rations to the report. Finally, as discussed on  page 20 of the report, bulk food could have been delivered to remote areas  during the period of time (October-December 2001) when the ration  program was implemented. During the month of December 2001, WFP  delivered 116,000 metric tons of food to Afghanistan, a level of food  assistance that exceeds any 1-month total for any emergency operation in  WFP’s history.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Richard J. Durbin,  Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government  Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia,  Committee on Governmental Affairs, and to the Honorable Frank R. Wolf,  Chairman, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary,  Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. We also will  make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4347. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are  listed in appendix XIII.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine the management, cost, and sufficiency of U.S. and international  food assistance since 1999, we reviewed documents obtained from the  World Food Program (WFP) and the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID). Specifically, we reviewed program documentation  for recent emergency and special operations; WFP Afghanistan Country  Office quarterly and annual reports; WFP’s Emergency Field Operations  Manual and Food Aid in Emergencies Redbook; country office monitoring  guidelines; Afghanistan area office strategies; memorandums of  understanding and letters of agreement signed by WFP and United Nations  (UN) agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the Afghan  government; and monitoring reports prepared by USAID staff.
In addition, we analyzed project monitoring and loss data to determine the  frequency of monitoring visits, the experience and education level of  monitors, and the level of commodities lost versus those delivered. We did  not verify the statistical data provided by WFP. We also reviewed donor  resource contribution data for recent emergency and special operations.  We contacted by e-mail, or spoke with, 14 Afghan and international  nongovernmental organizations to obtain their views on the delivery of  assistance, WFP monitoring and reporting, and overall assistance  coordination issues. We interviewed WFP management and staff at WFP  headquarters in Rome, Italy; at the Regional Bureau for the Mediterranean,  Middle East, and Central Asia, in Cairo, Egypt; at the Country Office in  Kabul, Afghanistan; and at the Area Office in Hirat, Afghanistan. We also  interviewed USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U.S.  Department of State staff in Washington, D.C., and Kabul; U.S. Department  of Defense Staff in Washington; the International Security Afghanistan  Force, UN Development Program (UNDP), and UN Assistance Mission in  Afghanistan (UNAMA) staff in Kabul; and UN High Commissioner for  Refugees staff in Kabul and Hirat. Finally, we visited WFP project sites and  warehouses in Kabul and Hirat. The number of sites visited was limited  because of constraints placed on our movement within Afghanistan by the  U.S. Embassy because of security considerations.
We also examined cost data provided by USDA and USAID. The data  included commodity costs; total ocean freight charges; inland freight;  internal transport, storage, and handling charges; and administrative  support costs. We used the data to calculate two additional expenses, per  USDA statements about the composition of costs and additional costs that  are not stated on the data sheets. First, the "freight forwarder" fees  represent 2.5 percent of the total cost of ocean freight. Thus, ocean freight  charges were divided between freight forwarder fees (total freight minus  total freight divided by 1.025) and actual freight costs (total freight minus  freight forwarder fees). This was true for both USDA and USAID  assistance. In the final analysis, the freight forwarder fee was included in  the ocean freight cost because it is an expense that would not have been  incurred if ocean shipping had not been used. Second, with each donation  to WFP, USDA provides an administrative support grant at the rate of 7.5  percent of the total value of the donated commodities. We calculated these  data accordingly.
We checked all USAID and USDA data for validity, where possible to the  level of individual shipment. We cross-checked USAID data with USDA  data. (USAID typically provided only estimated costs for commodities for  the period 1999–2002. Because USDA conducts almost all commodity  purchases for USAID, USAID estimates the commodity costs at the time it  places its order with USDA, based on the current market cost. However,  because USDA provided actual costs for USAID purchases in 1999, 2000,  and 2001, the USAID commodity costs we cited for 2002 are based on  USAID's estimate.) We then compared the cost of the U.S.-purchased  commodities with the cost of commodities purchased in the Central Asia  region to determine whether any savings could have been realized by  purchasing commodities regionally versus buying U.S. commodities.  Finally, using the level of rations that WFP provides to returning refugees,  12.5 kilograms per month, we calculated the amount of food assistance that  the United States could have purchased and the number of people that  could have received food assistance if it had purchased commodities in the  Central Asia region.
Further, we examined the costs associated with the Department of  Defense’s Afghan humanitarian daily ration program, implemented from  October 2001 through December 2001. Using the level of rations that WFP  provides to returning refugees, 12.5 kilograms per month, we calculated the  amount of food assistance that the United States could have purchased and  the number of people that could have received food assistance if it had  purchased commodities in the Central Asia region.
In addition, we reviewed relevant food assistance legislation including the  Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-480) to  determine whether provisions in the law allowed the U.S. government to  purchase commodities outside the United States or provide cash transfers  to assistance agencies for the provision of commodities from sources other  than U.S. suppliers.
To assess U.S. and international agricultural assistance, coordination,  strategies, and funding intended to help Afghanistan maintain stability and  achieve long-term food security, we reviewed documentation provided by  FAO, UNDP, and UNAMA; the World Bank; the Asian Development Bank;  USAID; and the Afghan Ministries of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry,  and Irrigation and Water Resources. We reviewed information pertaining to  past and current coordination mechanisms in the Afghan government’s  National Development Framework and National Development Budget. We  examined the structure and content of the assistance strategies published  by FAO, UNDP, UNAMA, the European Commission, the World Bank, Asian  Development Bank, and USAID, and we examined the proposed funding  levels contained in each strategy. Using the criteria contained in the U.S.  Government Performance and Results Act, we examined the strategies to  determine whether each contained the basic elements of an operational  strategy articulated in the act. Further, we examined the overall assistance  funding requirements contained in the January 2002 UNDP, World Bank,  and Asian Development Bank Comprehensive Needs Assessment, which  served as a guideline for international donor contributions for Afghanistan.  We interpolated the funding projection data to construct annual aid flows,  so that the cumulative totals were equal to those contained in the  assessment. Assuming that the first year of data referred to 2002, we  applied the U.S. gross domestic product deflator to convert the assumed  current dollar figures into constant 2003 dollars.
Further, we examined security reports produced by the Department of  Defense and the UN, as well as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime report on  opium production in Afghanistan, to determine the impact of warlords and  opium production on food security and political stability. In addition, we  discussed U.S. and international agricultural assistance efforts and food  security issues with officials from USAID in Washington and Kabul; FAO in  Rome and Kabul; UNDP and the Afghan Ministries of Communication,  Foreign Affairs, Interior, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and  Irrigation and Water Resources in Kabul; and the Afghan Ministry of  Agriculture in Kabul and Washington.
We conducted our review from April 2002 through May 2003 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: World Food Program Projects in Afghanistan, 2002
paragraphs: Free food is delivered to the most vulnerable populations.
Malnourished children, pregnant and nursing mothers, and people undergoing  treatment for tuberculosis and leprosy are provided with a blended mix of either milled  corn and soy or wheat and soy, in addition to sugar and oil, through feeding centers,  hospitals, clinics, and orphanages.
Returning refugees, internally displaced persons, and people involved in the poppy  industry, among others, reconstruct and rehabilitate irrigation canals, roads, and other  infrastructure. The program provides wages in the form of food and tools.
Men and women of the community decide which families should receive food. Able- bodied households contribute their labor to construct or rehabilitate an asset, such as  an irrigation canal, that benefits the entire community. Those who cannot contribute  labor also receive food, and they benefit from the community asset.
Food is distributed to students in school to encourage families to send their children to  school. To encourage families to support the education of females, additional food is  provided to female students. Food is also provided to teachers to supplement their low  salaries.
Food is provided to women who participate in informal education activities including  technical skills and literacy training.
Food is exchanged for improved seed grown by contract farmers. The seed is then sold  to other farmers.
Daily rations of bread are provided to more than 250,000 people. Women operate 41 of  the 100 bakeries.
Approximately 270,000 civil servants were provided with pulses and oil to supplement  their salaries and help the Afghan government reestablish itself.
Food assistance is provided as part of a resettlement package to help people  reestablish themselves in their home areas or chosen community.
section_title: Description of WFP Food Assistance Monitoring Mechanisms
paragraphs: The World Food Program uses a number of mechanisms to minimize losses  and ensure that its commodities are well managed. The mechanisms  include real-time automated tracking, periodic monitoring visits to project  sites, required periodic reports from implementing partners, and end-of- project evaluations. The program’s global automated tracking system, the  Commodity Movement and Progress Analysis System, is intended to record  and report all commodity movement, loss, and damage. Each WFP  suboffice in Afghanistan has access to the system and employs a clerk  dedicated to managing it. The system produces a number of reports,  including stock, damage, and loss reports.
WFP guidelines state that monitoring and reporting are essential parts of  effective project management in the field, and it is WFP’s policy not to  support any project that cannot be monitored. Monitoring activities are  intended to assess the status of projects by comparing the actual  implementation of activities to the project’s work plan. The responsibility  for monitoring projects rests with the program’s country office in Kabul  and five Afghan suboffices located in other cities. Each office employs  between 6 and 24 local Afghan project monitors, and WFP has 22 program  staff in Afghanistan who also monitor projects, in addition to their other  duties. WFP’s Afghan country office has developed monitoring guidelines  for its monitors and monitoring checklists for each type of activity (e.g.,  food-for-work, food-for-seed, food-for-asset-creation, food-for-education).
According to WFP, monitoring visits include an examination of project  inputs, current operations, outputs, and immediate effects. Specific  monitoring activities include an examination of food stocks held by  implementing partners. The monitors spot-check the weight of randomly  selected bags in storage and compare the total stock held with WFP stock  balance reports. The monitors also survey local markets to determine  whether any WFP food is being resold rather than used by beneficiaries.  Projects are monitored on a periodic basis. WFP tries to visit each project  when it starts, during its implementation, and when it is completed. The  WFP data that we examined indicated that, on average, 2.4 monitoring  visits were conducted on all projects implemented between April 2002 and  November 2002 in Afghanistan.
In addition to requiring the project monitoring visits, WFP requires its  implementing partners to report on the status of projects on a monthly  basis. WFP project proposals and the letters of agreement signed by WFP  and its implementing partners stipulate that monthly and end-of-project  reports must be submitted to WFP. The end-of-project reports include an  assessment of the achievement of project objectives and a breakdown of  budget expenditures.
section_title: Donor Contributions to World Food Program Emergency Operation 10155 as of May 12, 2003
section_title: Cost Data for U.S. Food Assistance to Afghanistan Provided to the UN World Food Program, Fiscal Years 1999–2002
section_title: International Donor Assistance Coordination Mechanisms in Afghanistan
paragraphs: Between 1998 and 2003, as circumstances in Afghanistan changed, the  coordination processes utilized by the international community and the  Afghan government evolved (see table 3 and figure 11). Beginning in 1998,  the international community employed a strategy of Principled Common  Programming among United Nations agency, nongovernmental, and  bilateral donor programs. The international community’s aim was to  establish priorities and projects based on agreed upon goals and principles  that would form the UN’s annual consolidated appeal for assistance. To  implement Principled Common Programming, a number of coordination  mechanisms were established, including the Afghan Programming Body.  The programming body consisted of the Afghan Support Group, 15 UN  Representatives, and 15 nongovernmental organizations and was  responsible for making policy recommendations on issues of common  concern, supporting the UN’s annual consolidated appeal for donor  assistance, and promoting coordination of assistance efforts. The Taliban  government had no role in the programming body. The programming body  was supported by a secretariat; working level operations were conducted  by a standing committee and thematic groups responsible for analyzing  needs, developing strategies and policies, and setting assistance priorities  within their thematic areas (e.g., the provision of basic social services). The  Afghan Programming Body and its standing committee were incorporated  into the Implementation Group/Program Group process established in  2002. Table 3 describes the Afghan assistance coordination mechanisms in  place in 2002.
In December 2002, the Afghan government instituted the Consultative  Group coordination process in Afghanistan. The process evolved out of the  previous Implementation/Program group processes. (Table 4 compares the  two processes.) The Consultative Group process retains the same basic  hierarchical structure that was established under the Implementation  Group process. For example, the new process includes 12 groups, each  lead by an Afghan government minister, organized around the 12 programs  contained in the Afghan government’s National Development Framework.  In addition to the 12 groups, 2 consultative groups covering national  security programs (i.e., the national army and police); and 3 national  working groups on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration;  counternarcotics; and demining were established. Further, 5 advisory  groups were also established to ensure that cross-cutting issues, such as  human rights, are mainstreamed effectively in the work of the 12  consultative groups and reflected in the policy framework and budget.
Each consultative group will assist in policy management, as well as  monitoring the implementation of activities envisaged under the Afghan  government’s national budget. The groups will assist in preparing the  budget, provide a forum for general policy dialogue, monitor the  implementation of the budget, report on indicators of progress for each  development program, and elaborate detailed national programs. The  groups, with assistance from the standing committee, will also focus on  monitoring performance against benchmarks established by each group.  Each lead ministry will select a focal point, or secretariat, organization  from among donors and UN agencies. Each year, in March, the Afghanistan  Development Forum, or national consultative group meeting, will be held  to discuss the budget for the next fiscal year, review national priorities, and  assess progress. At that time, the consultative groups will report to the  Consultative Group Standing Committee.
section_title: Major Donors’ Pledges and Contributions as of December 31, 2002 (as reported by the U.S. Department of State)
paragraphs: 3 years Russia did not pledge at Tokyo – Russian assistance has been primarily in-kind donations.
section_title: Comments from the World Food Program
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the letter from the United Nations  World Food Program dated June 2, 2003.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. Although changes in the coordination mechanism utilized in  Afghanistan were introduced in 2003, the Afghan government and the  international community still lack a common, jointly developed  strategy for rehabilitating the agricultural sector. We believe that such a  strategy, including measurable goals and a means to evaluate progress  toward achieving the goals, is needed to focus limited resources and  hold the international community accountable for the assistance it  delivers.
section_title: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the letter from the Department of  State dated June 3, 2003.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) currently  purchases limited amounts of regional food commodities in an effort to  respond quickly to humanitarian emergencies. Commodities purchased  in the United States by U.S. agencies must travel the same logistics  networks as commodities purchased regionally. For example, U.S.  commodities destined for Afghanistan in 2002 were shipped from the  United States to the Pakistani port at Karachi and moved to their final  destination via roads in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Commodities  purchased in Pakistan followed the same transit routes. Hence, the  overland shipping costs, such as for trucking, were the same for U.S.  origin commodities and Pakistani commodities. Further, regional cash  purchases of food would be made by U.S. government officials or World  Food Program (WFP) officials, the same officials that currently handle  hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance funds and millions of  metric tons of commodities; we are not suggesting that cash be  provided to local governments. Any purchases would be subject to U.S.  and UN accountability procedures, as such purchases are currently;  increasing the amount of commodities purchased locally would not by  itself create an opportunity for corruption.
section_title: Comments from the United States Agency for International Development
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the letter from the United States  Agency for International Development dated June 6, 2003.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: strategy recognizes the importance of agriculture sector rehabilitation  to the achievement of the U.S. policy goals in Afghanistan, including a  politically stable state that is not a harbor for terrorists. 4. We agree that other authorities allow USAID to provide cash or  purchase assistance commodities outside the United States. However,  we believe that amending the Agricultural Trade Development and  Assistance Act of 1954 to allow the provision of cash or food  commodities outside the United States will greatly improve U.S.  flexibility in responding to crises affecting U.S. national security and  foreign policy interests. The act is the principal authority for providing  food assistance in emergency and nonemergency situations. Amending  the act will provide a permanent provision in this authority allowing the  United States to respond rapidly and in a cost-effective manner to  events that affect U.S. national security.
USAID cites the recently proposed $200 million Famine Fund as  providing the flexibility that the United States needs to address  humanitarian crises. However, the fund proposal indicates that the fund  will target dire unforeseen circumstances related to famine; thus, the  fund does not appear to be designed to respond to nonfamine crises  involving large amounts of food aid or national security. The fund  amounts to less than 10 percent of the $2.2 billion and $2.6 billion  appropriated for U.S. food aid in 2002 and 2003, respectively, a period  marked by an increasing number of humanitarian food crises—for  example, in Afghanistan, southern Africa, and North Korea—that did  not entail famine but that did, in some cases, affect U.S. national  security. The Famine Fund is inadequate to respond to the increasing  number and size of such crises. Meanwhile, the availability of  commodities in the United States for food assistance has declined in  2003. Therefore, the need to procure commodities overseas in close  proximity to affected countries has become more critical while also  being more cost effective.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Agriculture
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the letter from the Department of  Agriculture dated June 10, 2003.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. Although other legislation allows for the provision of cash or assistance  commodities from non-U.S. sources, we believe that amending the  Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 to allow  the provision of cash or food commodities outside the United States  will greatly improve U.S. flexibility in responding to crises that affect  U.S. national security interests. The act is the principal authority for  providing food assistance in emergency and nonemergency situations.  Amending the act will provide a permanent provision in this authority  allowing the United States to respond rapidly and in a cost effective  manner to events that affect U.S. national security.
In addition, although the proposed $200 million Famine Fund may  provide some additional flexibility for responding to humanitarian  crises, the fund proposal indicates that the fund will target dire  unforeseen circumstances related to famine. Thus, the fund does not  appear to be designed to respond to nonfamine crises involving large  amounts of food aid or national security. The fund amounts to less than  10 percent of the $2.2 billion and $2.6 billion appropriated for U.S. food  aid in 2002 and 2003, respectively, a period marked by an increasing  number of humanitarian food crises—for example, in Afghanistan,  southern Africa, and North Korea—that did not entail famine but that  did, in some cases, affect U.S. national security.  2. We agree with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) that the  cargo preference requirement adds additional cost to food assistance  and should be waived in specific situations, and we have adjusted the  matter for congressional consideration to reflect this. As stated in the  report, 19.6 percent of total food assistance costs in fiscal year 2002  were for ocean freight. These costs were incurred because of the  requirement that assistance commodities must be purchased in the  United States, and 75 percent of the purchased commodities by weight  must be shipped on U.S.-flagged carriers. In previous reports, we  analyzed the costs of cargo preference requirements on food assistance  and demonstrated the negative impact of these costs on U.S. food aid  programs. it had used the savings realized through the purchase of regional  commodities versus U.S. commodities to procure additional  commodities. Further, WFP has commodity quality control standards  and would not purchase commodities with donor funds that were  objectionable to the donor providing the funds. Finally, much of the  wheat that was purchased in the United States was shipped in bulk to  ports in Pakistan where it was bagged for final distribution in bags  clearly marked “USA.” Wheat purchased regionally with U.S. funds was  packaged in Pakistan in the same type of bags. Thus, any regional  purchases could be packaged in appropriately marked bags in the  country of origin or at a bagging facility in a transit country. WFP uses  this practice in other regions, such as southern Africa. 6. WFP made regional purchases during late 2001, but it also made  regional purchases during 2002. As stated in the report, the amount of  food available for food assistance in 2003 is less than in 2002, while the  need for food aid continues to grow around the world, most notably in  southern Africa. In addition, even if the U.S. grain infrastructure system  is able to respond to ongoing demands for food aid, purchasing U.S.  origin commodities and shipping the commodities via expensive ocean  freight is not the most cost effective or quickest means either of  supplying food to hungry people or of achieving U.S. national security  and foreign policy objectives, such as stability in Afghanistan. 7. We agree that the donor community faced challenges in engaging the  Afghan government in 2002. We believe that the mechanisms currently  in place, including the Consultative Group coordination mechanism,  provide an environment where the international community and the  Afghan government can engage in a joint strategy development effort. 8. The report’s description of Afghanistan’s agriculture sector is based on  discussions with and documents obtained from FAO, Asian  Development Bank, USAID, and Afghan government officials. We have  adjusted the language in the report in response to USDA’s comments.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the letter from the Department of  Defense dated June 10, 2003.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. The report discusses both food assistance and nonfood assistance  aspects of the Humanitarian Daily Ration program. On page 30 of the  report, we state that the HDR program was initiated to alleviate  suffering and convey that the United States waged war against the  Taliban, not the Afghan people. Also, the HDR program is included with  the U.S. Agency for International Development’s humanitarian  programs in U.S. government tallies of total humanitarian assistance  provided to Afghanistan. 2. Department of Defense officials responsible for the administration of  the HDR program stated that no formal evaluation of the HDR program  in Afghanistan has been conducted. In the report, we cite the informal  reporting that provided the Department of Defense with some  information about how the program was received by the Afghan people.  We have added information about the goodwill that the HDRs  generated according to the informal reports cited by the Department of  Defense in its comments on the draft report. 3. The report describes how HDRs are designed to be used—to relieve  temporary food shortages resulting from manmade or natural  disasters—not, as in Afghanistan, to feed a large number of people  affected by a long-term food shortage. Further, as discussed in the  report, the World Food Program (WFP) has worked in Afghanistan for  many years, and during that period it developed an extensive logistics  system for delivering food throughout the country. Even during the rule  of the Taliban, WFP was able to deliver food to remote areas including  those controlled by the Northern Alliance. During the month of  December 2001, while Department of Defense was delivering HDRs,  WFP delivered 116,000 metric tons of food to Afghanistan, a level of  food assistance that exceeds any 1-month total for any emergency  operation in WFP’s history. As stated in the report, WFP’s logistics  system was capable of delivering commodities to remote populations  both by air or by donkey if necessary.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individuals named above, Jeffery T. Goebel, Paul Hodges,  and Reid L. Lowe made key contributions to this report.
section_title: GAO’s Mission
paragraphs: The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of  Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities  and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government  for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal  programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other  assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding  decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of  accountability, integrity, and reliability.
section_title: Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
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subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Public Affairs