Warfighter Support: DOD Needs Strategic Outcome-Related Goals and Visibility over Its Counter-IED Efforts
Published: 2012-02-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Over $18 billion has been appropriated to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to address the improvised explosive device (IED) threat, and there is widespread consensus that this threat will continue to be influential in future conflicts. DOD established the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in 2006 to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions in support of the combatant commanders and their respective joint task forces efforts to defeat IEDs. This report, one in a series on JIEDDOs management and operations, addresses the extent to which DOD (1) has provided a comprehensive counter-IED strategic plan including measurable objectives that determine the effectiveness of efforts across DOD to combat IEDs, and (2) has identified counter-IED initiatives and activities, and coordinated these efforts. To address these objectives GAO reviewed counter-IED efforts from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, reviewed and analyzed relevant strategic-planning documents, collected and reviewed data identifying DOD counter-IED efforts, and met with DOD and service officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As the responsible DOD agency for leading, advocating, and coordinating all DOD efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices (IED) the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was directed to develop DODs counter-IED strategic plan in February 2006 under DOD Directive 2000.19E. As previously recommended by GAO, JIEDDO has made several attempts to develop such a plan, but its strategic-planning actions have not followed leading strategic-management practices or have since been discontinued. For example, JIEDDOs 2007 strategic plan did not contain a means of measuring its performance outcomesa leading strategic-management practice. In addition, JIEDDOs 20092010 strategic plan contained performance measures, but JIEDDO discontinued using these measures because it later determined that the measures were not relevant to the organizations goals. Although DOD tasked JIEDDO to develop its counter-IED strategic plan, DOD has not translated DODs counter-IED general mission objective of eliminating IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence into actionable goals and objectives. JIEDDO issued a new counter-IED strategic plan in January 2012; however, the new plan does not apply to all other counter-IED efforts departmentwide, only to those managed by JIEDDO. Consequently, JIEDDOs new strategic plan alone will not provide the means necessary for determining the effectiveness of all counter-IED efforts across DOD. Further, as JIEDDO implements its plan, it will continue to face difficulty measuring effectiveness until DOD establishes and provides results-oriented goals to accompany its general mission objective. Without actionable goals and objectives established by DOD, JIEDDO and other DOD components cannot tie individual performance measures to DODs desired outcomes. As a result, DOD and external stakeholders will be left without a comprehensive, data-driven assessment as to whether their counter-IED efforts are achieving DODs mission and will not be informed about the overall effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts or use of resources as they relate to DODs mission.
DOD has not fully identified its counter-IED initiatives and activities, and as a result is not able to effectively coordinate these efforts across DOD. In attempting to develop a comprehensive database, as previously recommended by GAO, JIEDDO has used at least three systems to collect and record complete information on DODs counter-IED efforts but discontinued each of them for reasons including lack of timeliness, comprehensiveness, or cost. For example, beginning in 2009, JIEDDO pursued Technology Matrix as a possible counter-IED database for all efforts within the DOD. However, JIEDDO discontinued support for Technology Matrix as a database since DOD did not require all relevant organizations to provide information to JIEDDO, and therefore it was not comprehensive. Without an automated means for comprehensively capturing data on all counter-IED efforts, the military services may be unaware of potential overlap, duplication, or fragmentation. For example, GAO identified six systems that DOD components developed to emit energy to neutralize IEDs, and DOD spent about $104 million collectively on these efforts, which could be duplicative because the military services did not collaborate on these efforts. Given the lack of a DOD-wide counter-IED database, other efforts may be overlapping.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends four actions for DOD to develop a comprehensive strategic plan with strategic outcome-related goals and a complete listing of counter-IED efforts to maximize its resources. DOD concurred with one of the recommendations but did not concur with three. GAO continues to believe that its recommendations are warranted as discussed in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Through fiscal year 2011, Congress has appropriated over $18 billion to  the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to  address the improvised explosive device (IED) threat. In addition, other  Department of Defense (DOD) components, including the military  services, have spent billions of dollars from their own funds developing  counter-IED capabilities. For example, the Mine Resistant Ambush  Protected (MRAP) Task Force, which leads DOD’s efforts to produce and  field MRAP vehicles to protect troops against IEDs and other threats,  received over $40 billion from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. The IED  threat continues to be a major concern in Afghanistan in addition to other  areas throughout the globe, with over 500 IED events per month  worldwide outside of Southwest Asia, according to JIEDDO. There is  widespread consensus that this threat will not go away and that IEDs will  continue to be a weapon of strategic influence in future conflicts. In  fighting the IED threat, both JIEDDO and the services have taken steps to  reduce IED incidents and casualties. For example, during 2010, JIEDDO  initiated 49 major efforts, which according to JIEDDO, made significant  contributions toward defeating the IED threat.
Prior to the establishment of JIEDDO in 2006, no single entity was  responsible for coordinating the DOD’s counter-IED efforts. DOD  established JIEDDO and directed it to lead, advocate, and coordinate all  DOD actions in support of the combatant commanders and their  respective joint task forces’ efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic  influence. DOD’s directive mandates that JIEDDO’s director serve as the  DOD point of coordination for initiatives across the full range of efforts  necessary to defeat the IED threat, integrate all counter-IED solutions  throughout DOD, and coordinate with other DOD components for ongoing  midterm research and development initiatives and long-term science and  technology efforts, among other duties. A primary role for JIEDDO is to  provide funding and assistance to rapidly develop, acquire, and field  counter-IED solutions.
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 110-477, at 1003-04 (2007) (conference report accompanying  the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008); S. Rep. No. 109-292, at  239-40 (2006) (report of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, accompanying the  Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2007). a report in October 2009, in which we noted that despite the creation of  JIEDDO, many of the organizations engaged in the counter-IED effort  prior to JIEDDO continued to develop, maintain, and expand their own  counter-IED capabilities. In July 2010, we reported that JIEDDO did not  have metrics that inform DOD about the effect of the agency’s efforts on  combating IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence. Accordingly, you  requested that we assess the progress DOD and JIEDDO have made  with regard to counter-IED strategic planning and achieving  comprehensive visibility over DOD-wide counter-IED activities.  Specifically, this review addresses the extent to which (1) DOD has  provided a comprehensive counter-IED strategic plan including results- oriented strategic goals and performance metrics to determine the  effectiveness of efforts across DOD to combat IEDs, and (2) DOD has  identified counter-IED initiatives and activities, and coordinated these  efforts.
To address these objectives, we considered DOD counter-IED efforts  from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. To analyze the extent to which DOD  has provided a comprehensive counter-IED strategic plan including  strategic results-oriented goals and metrics that determine the  effectiveness of efforts across DOD to combat IEDs, we reviewed DOD’s  counter-IED strategic-planning documents that we gathered from JIEDDO  as well as the Combatant Commands. In addition, we also interviewed  JIEDDO officials involved in strategic planning and assessment to learn  about the implementation of the actions detailed in some of the  documents. From these documents and interviews, we identified several  triggering actions that either provided the impetus for, or resulted in,  strategic management efforts. We compared these actions against  leading strategic management practices and principles demonstrated by  successful results-oriented organizationstheir fulfillment of these leading practices. To determine the extent to  which DOD has identified counter-IED initiatives and activities, and  coordinated these efforts, we reviewed JIEDDO databases on counter- IED efforts and interviewed DOD, Service, and JIEDDO officials to  determine the degree of comprehensive awareness regarding DOD’s  counter-IED efforts.   and rated each according to  We conducted this performance audit between June 2010 and February  2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I  contains additional details of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Created by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in January 2006, JIEDDO is  responsible for leading, advocating, and coordinating all DOD actions in  support of the combatant commanders’ and their respective joint task  forces’ efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. Prior  DOD efforts to defeat IEDs included various process teams and task  forces. For example, DOD established the Joint IED Defeat Task Force in  June 2005 for which the Army provided primary administrative support.  This task force replaced the Army IED Task Force, the Joint IED Task  Force, and the Under Secretary of Defense, Force Protection Working  Group. To focus all of DOD’s efforts and minimize duplication, DOD  published a new counter-IED policy in February 2006 through DOD  Directive 2000.19E, which changed the name of the Joint IED Defeat  Task Force to JIEDDO and established it as a joint entity and jointly  staffed organization within DOD, reporting directly to the Deputy  Secretary of Defense. The directive states that JIEDDO shall “focus”  (i.e., lead, advocate, and coordinate) all DOD actions in support of the  Combatant Commanders’ and their respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts  to defeat IEDs as “weapons of strategic influence.”
GAO, Defense Management: More Transparency Needed over the Financial and  Human Capital Operations of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization,  GAO-08-342 (Washington D.C.: Mar. 6, 2008). controls. DOD and JIEDDO agreed with our recommendations and have  taken actions in response.
section_title: DOD Has Not Provided a Results- Oriented Strategic Plan to Manage Its Counter-IED Efforts
paragraphs: Beginning in February 2006, JIEDDO has been responsible for  developing DOD’s IED defeat strategic plan for countering the IED  threat, but its strategic-planning actions have not followed leading  strategic management practices, or have since been discontinued. In  March 2007, we found that JIEDDO had not developed a strategic plan  and as a result could not assess whether it was making the right  investment decisions or whether it had effectively organized itself to meet  its mission. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense require the  Director of JIEDDO, in developing DOD’s IED defeat strategic plan, to  clearly articulate JIEDDO’s mission and specify goals, objectives, and  measures of effectiveness. JIEDDO fully concurred with our  recommendations and was working to complete a strategic plan when we  issued this report, and in September 2007, JIEDDO completed its DOD- wide counter-IED strategic plan. However, JIEDDO’s 2007 strategic plan  did not contain a means of measuring its performance outcomes, which is  a leading strategic management practice. Subsequent JIEDDO strategic-  planning efforts also did not follow leading strategic management  practices or have been discontinued. For example, JIEDDO’s 2009–2010  strategic plan contained performance measures, but JIEDDO  discontinued using these measures because they determined that the  data from these measures were not relevant to the organization’s goals.  We have previously reported that good strategic planning helps  organizations (1) make the key decisions that will drive their actions, (2)  measure the effectiveness of their actions to achieve intended results,  and (3) if not achieving intended results, have the data to determine  modifications needed to achieve intended results—all attributes of a plan  that helps maximize organizational resources. Many of JIEDDO’s plans  contained output measures such as the percentage of initiatives for which  JIEDDO completes operational assessments or the percentage of  counter-IED initiatives that were adopted by one of the Military Services.  While collecting outputs is an important initial step in measuring progress,  they do not provide information about progress toward achieving  JIEDDO’s mission as outcome measures would.
Since 2006, JIEDDO has made several attempts to develop a counter- IED strategic plan including its 2007 and 2009–2010 strategic plans,  which in the case of the 2007 plan, included elements for guiding DOD  subordinate organizations and the military services involved with counter- IEDs in developing their own counter-IED planning. However, those plans  did not have outcome-related goals specific enough for JIEDDO and  these organizations to be able to develop enduring measures of  effectiveness that inform DOD whether its counter-IED mission is being  met. As shown in figure 1, we identified 17 key actions or triggering  events applicable to DOD that were to either produce counter-IED  strategic plans for the department or further develop the strategic plans.  However, the 17 actions have either been discontinued or did not satisfy  key strategic-management-planning practices, including developing  results-oriented strategic goals, performance measures, and the  adjustment of plans or intended actions based on the results of these  measures. For some of the 17 actions and events, we found that while  JIEDDO had made efforts to satisfy leading strategic management  practices, these efforts fell short of developing results-oriented goals and  performance measures that link with DOD’s counter-IED mission. We  assessed some efforts as partially fulfilling strategic management  practices because developing output measures is a step toward  developing outcome measures, and measuring individual initiatives  contributes toward the overall counter-IED effort. However, JIEDDO has  not expanded its assessments beyond these individual efforts and  determined how these efforts, overall, help to achieve DOD’s counter-IED  mission.
In early January 2012, JIEDDO issued its counter-IED strategic plan for  2012–2016, which established five principal goals for JIEDDO with three  to six supporting objectives for each goal. This plan did not specify what  actions JIEDDO planned to take to achieve these goals. On January 19,  2012, JIEDDO augmented its strategic plan by issuing an annex detailing  numerous actions to achieve these objectives, and establishing 230  separate metrics that JIEDDO expects will provide the means of  assessing its progress. In addition, JIEDDO is planning to begin, in March  2012, quarterly internal reviews to assess progress and make  adjustments to its counter-IED efforts accordingly. Such action has not  been a step JIEDDO has included in its past efforts. We see good  potential in JIEDDO’s strategic plan; however, because the portion of the  plan relevant to our recommendations was issued on January 19, 2012— shortly before issuance of this report—we did not evaluate the plan and  have not therefore assessed the extent to which this new plan will follow  leading strategic management practices and provide results-oriented  strategic goals and sufficient performance metrics for JIEDDO. Further,  according to JIEDDO officials, the strategic plan applies only to counter- IED efforts managed by JIEDDO and does not apply to all other counter- IED efforts departmentwide. Consequently, successful implementation of  JIEDDO’s strategic plan alone will not provide the means necessary for  determining the effectiveness of all counter-IED efforts across DOD.  According to JIEDDO officials, DOD will produce a departmentwide  counter-IED strategic plan in the future, but there is no specified timeline  for issuance of this plan.
As JIEDDO moves forward to implement its counter-IED strategic plan,  and DOD develops a departmentwide counter-IED strategic plan, DOD  will continue to face difficulty in developing measures of effectiveness, if it  does not have results-oriented strategic goals to accompany DOD’s  general counter-IED mission statement. The department has identified  eliminating IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence as the overarching  mission of its counter-IED programs, but has not translated this mission  into actionable goals and objectives. Without actionable goals and  objectives established by DOD, JIEDDO, and other DOD components  cannot tie individual performance measures to DOD’s desired outcomes.  As a result, DOD and external stakeholders are left without a  comprehensive, data-driven assessment as to whether DOD’s counter- IED efforts are achieving DOD’s mission. Furthermore, without a means  to measure the success of JIEDDO’s efforts in achieving DOD’s counter- IED mission, JIEDDO’s basis for determining how to invest its resources  among its three lines of organizational effort—to attack the network,  defeat the device, and train the force—is limited. While JIEDDO has  established procedures to assess counter-IED gaps and prioritize and  manage its requirements and individual investments—including  coordinating and collaborating with various DOD entities—to rapidly  pursue these critical lines of effort, JIEDDO and DOD are not informed  about the overall effectiveness of their counter-IED efforts and use of  resources as they relate to DOD’s mission.
Lastly, JIEDDO has not had a completed, fully developed strategic plan  until recently, with long-term strategic goals that informed incoming  directors about which actions have taken place and which must be  continued in order to maintain continuous progress toward achieving  long-term goals. Having such a strategic plan would have benefitted  JIEDDO leadership as JIEDDO’s directors changed four times over the 6  years JIEDDO has existed (see fig. 1). Without this framework, new  strategic-planning efforts have been initiated under each of these  directors to improve the organization and manage counter-IED support—  efforts that contributed in varying degrees to strategic management but,  as discussed above, were not implemented or were discontinued in many  instances. Now that JIEDDO has completed its strategic plan, it should  work to ensure that implementation helps provide continuity for the  organization as JIEDDO leadership changes in the future.
section_title: DOD Has Some Visibility over Counter-IED Initiatives but Does Not Have a Comprehensive Listing of All DOD Counter-IED Initiatives
paragraphs: A provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 repealed  certain quarterly reporting requirements. See Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1062(d)(5) (2011).  However, reporting requirements for other information related to counter IED efforts may  remain. comprehensive list of counter-IED efforts that would provide a better  basis for determining key efforts to report to Congress.
Technology Matrix Database: In 2009, DOD developed this database  through JIEDDO in response to our recommendation to establish a  comprehensive counter-IED database, expending a total of  $225,000. JIEDDO requested sponsorship from DOD Deputy  Director for Research and Engineering to make this database an  official repository of DOD technology information for counter-IED  efforts, and require full participation of all DOD entities. However, the  database was not fully developed in its concept, structure, and  procedures. Thus, the Research and Engineering officials did not  require all organizations involved in developing counter-IED solutions  to use this database until these shortcomings were addressed.  Without this requirement from Research and Engineering, JIEDDO  concluded that the database could not provide comprehensive  counter-IED information as intended, and JIEDDO discontinued using  this database for this purpose in early 2010 and looked to other  ongoing alternatives to provide this capability.
Tripwire Analytical Capability (TAC): JIEDDO acquired and further  developed this system in 2009 for intelligence querying purposes but  also explored this system for possible use in collecting comprehensive  data on DOD’s counter-IED initiatives managed by the military  services and other DOD agencies outside of JIEDDO, automatically  through programmed computer interfaces. JIEDDO considered using  this data to populate a JIEDDO counter-IED database. However,  according to JIEDDO officials, JIEDDO subsequently determined that  less expensive commercially available alternatives were available and  discontinued its exploration of TAC in May 2011 for collecting DOD  counter-IED data. At the time JIEDDO ceased considering TAC for  use in collecting data on DOD’s counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO had  not expended any additional funds on TAC specifically for this  purpose.
JIEDDO is currently developing a new JIEDDO-wide information  technology architecture and plans to develop a database for counter-IED  efforts across DOD as part of this new architecture. This effort is in the  conceptualization stage, and JIEDDO officials do not anticipate  completion before the end of fiscal year 2012. Further JIEDDO does not  have an implementation plan that includes a detailed timeline with  milestones, a key management practice, to help track its progress in  achieving this goal.
JIEDDO’s expenditure tracking system, does not differentiate between expenditures it  makes that constitute overhead and infrastructure and expenditures it makes that JIEDDO  considers to be separate, stand alone counter-IED initiatives. initiatives, and therefore, when JIEDDO began implementation of this  process in May 2011, it had to review one by one its 887 funds tracking  system numbers to separate its stand-alone counter-IED initiatives from  overhead. JIEDDO completed this review June 17, 2011, and concluded  that 223, or approximately 25 percent, of JIEDDO’s 887 expenditure-  tracking-system control numbers were currently active stand-alone  counter-IED initiatives. While this list could provide JIEDDO and  external stakeholders with a comprehensive inventory of active JIEDDO- funded counter-IED initiatives, it is incomplete because it does not identify  or separate out inactive stand-alone counter-IED initiatives from  administrative overhead expenditures. According to JIEDDO officials,  JIEDDO could produce a comprehensive list of its counter-IED initiatives  in a matter of 2 to 4 days, but had not done so as of December 15, 2011.  Further, if JIEDDO did produce such a list, it would represent one point in  time and would not provide a comprehensive DOD-wide database of  counter-IED efforts because it would not include counter-IED efforts  funded and managed by other DOD components independently of  JIEDDO.
GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save  Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue GAO-11-318SP (Washington D.C.: Mar. 1, 2011). available on the six initiatives are classified, the efforts exhibit a range  of different approaches regarding physical size, weight, and cost, and  data show that the various DOD components involved have spent  about $104 million collectively on these efforts to date. However,  given the lack of a DOD-wide counter-IED database, there could be  more directed energy efforts that we have not identified. Moreover,  concerns regarding the fragmentation and duplication in DOD’s  directed energy counter-IED efforts have risen to the highest levels  within the warfighter community. Specifically, the commander of U.S.  Central Command, in August 2011, conveyed concern regarding  issues including apparent “duplicity of  effort” in directed  energy technology with organizations (in DOD) working different  solutions. The correspondence called for coordination and  cooperation by DOD on its directed energy efforts to develop a  directed energy system that works in theater as quickly as possible  given that the development has been under way since 2008. In  response, in August 2011, JIEDDO, as DOD’s coordinating agency for  these efforts, developed a plan and, in September 2011, brought  various service program offices together to develop a solution as soon  as possible. According to JIEDDO officials, the six systems will  continue in development through fiscal year 2012, at which point,  JIEDDO will determine which of the systems best satisfies U.S.  Central Command’s requirement. While this new approach may  eliminate future unnecessary duplication of effort, earlier coordination  and better visibility could have prevented duplication that may have  occurred up to this point. According to JIEDDO officials, the level of  concern expressed and the fact that the concern was expressed in  writing resulted in JIEDDO being able to secure the cooperation  needed by the various organizations working different directed energy  solutions to coordinate in this instance. However, this is a unique  occurrence because, according to JIEDDO officials, JIEDDO does not  have the authority to direct—i.e., compel— various DOD  organizations that may be working on overlapping technologies or  efforts to reach consensus regarding selection among competing  alternatives. Therefore, JIEDDO has not always been successful in  securing the cooperation of the services to coordinate on counter-IED  efforts.
Radio Frequency Jamming Systems: The Army and Navy continue to  pursue separate developments of counter-IED jamming systems,  which provide a limited radius of protection to prevent IEDs from being  triggered by an enemy’s radio signals. In 2007, DOD established the  Navy as single manager and executive agent for ground-based  jamming. Under DOD Directive 5101.14, military services may  conduct ground-based jammer research and development to satisfy  military service-unique requirements if the requirements are  coordinated before initiation with the DOD’s single manager for  jammers and, for any system or system modifications resulting from  such efforts, operational technical characteristics and logistics plans  are approved by the single manager. The Navy has developed a  standard technology and system for ground-based jamming called  JCREW I1B1, which DOD has designated as the ground-based  jamming program for the entire Department. However, the Army has  continued to develop its own ground-based jamming system called  Duke. According to Navy officials, in 2010, the Army continued to  develop new technology for insertion into its Duke system—expected  to cost about $1.062 billion when completed and installed—without  notifying and coordinating with the Navy as DOD’s single manager for  ground-based jammer technology. According to Army officials, the  Army is pursuing development of its own system because it intends to  expand the use of this technology for purposes other than countering  IEDs such as jamming enemy command, control, and communication  systems. However, according to Navy officials, the CREW system’s  technology has the flexibility and capacity to expand and provide the  same additional functions as the Army plans for its Duke system.  Moreover, according to Navy officials, the Navy’s system is further  along in its development. Because the Navy and Army are pursuing  separate jamming systems, it is not clear if DOD is taking the most  cost-effective approach. While, according to JIEDDO officials, the  Office of Secretary of Defense was considering how to resolve this  issue, a decision had not been made before this report was  completed. Regardless of the final outcome however, a more  coordinated approach early in the process when initiating programs of  this magnitude could prevent unnecessary duplication in costs and  effort.
Electronic Data Collection Systems: According to JIEDDO officials,  JIEDDO has funded the development and support of approximately  70 electronic data collection and analysis tools that overlap to some  degree because they include capabilities to collect, analyze, and store  data to help the warfighter combat the IED threat. Although JIEDDO  recently reported that it could not verify total funding for its information  technology investments, GAO determined through a review of DOD  financial records that DOD has expended at least $184 million  collectively on information technology development for its data  collection and analysis tools. According to JIEDDO officials, JIEDDO  is aware of the redundancy within these electronic tools. In April 2011,  the JIEDDO Deputy Director for Information Management raised the  issue of redundancy in JIEDDO’s information technology systems  including its counter-IED data collection and analysis systems and  tools. Consequently, since April 2011, JIEDDO has worked to  eliminate overlapping information-technology capabilities where  feasible including among the approximately 70 analytical tools  JIEDDO has funded and developed for use in countering IED  networks. For example, on July 1, 2011, JIEDDO discontinued  funding for one of these initiatives—Tripwire Analytical Capability  (TAC)—citing as reasons TAC’s limited purpose, high cost, and  duplicative capabilities. However, in making the decision to  discontinue TAC yet continue operating the other data collection and  analysis tools, JIEDDO had not compared and quantified all of the  potential options to streamline or consolidate these tools to create a  single collective system that includes extracting data on counter-IED  efforts across DOD. As a result, JIEDDO cannot be certain it is  pursuing the most advantageous approach for collecting, analyzing,  storing, and using available data for combating the IED threat.  Further, although JIEDDO has discontinued funding TAC, the  Defense Intelligence Agency is continuing to develop the tool for its  own use, resulting in the potential for DOD-wide duplication between  TAC and JIEDDO’s other data collection and analysis tools.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Six years after DOD established JIEDDO as its coordinating agency to  lead, advocate, and coordinate responses to the IED threat across the  department, DOD continues to lack comprehensive visibility of its counter- IED expenditures and investments, including those from JIEDDO, the  military services, and relevant DOD agencies. The absence of a strategic  plan with outcome-oriented goals and visibility over DOD’s counter-IED  efforts are recurring themes that we have identified in prior reports as  affecting JIEDDO’s ability to manage DOD’s efforts effectively and  efficiently. JIEDDO has demonstrated progress in addressing previously  raised issues—by developing a formal, more rigorous internal control  system, and in issuing a 2012–2016 strategic plan for the management of  JIEDDO’s counter-IED efforts—but these actions have not fully  addressed the issues we have raised in this report. Specifically, DOD has  not implemented adequate actions to (1) provide a comprehensive plan to  ensure that all DOD counter-IED efforts are strategically managed in  order to achieve its goal to defeat IEDs as a weapon of strategic  influence, and (2) comprehensively list all DOD-wide counter-IED  initiatives in a database that provides internal and external parties with  visibility into the department’s counter-IED efforts. Without a  comprehensive plan and listing of its counter-IED initiatives, DOD  continues to risk fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in its counter-IED  efforts, such as those identified in this report, as well as lack the ability to  prioritize projects within future budget levels. Given the limited  applicability of JIEDDO’s recently issued strategic plan and the limited  progress JIEDDO has made in implementing our prior recommendation  regarding developing a comprehensive listing of DOD-wide efforts, it is  critical that DOD places greater focus and emphasis on the actions it  takes in addressing these issues. As the nation addresses fiscal  challenges, and DOD is directed to identify efficiencies, it will need to  reduce and eliminate unnecessary duplicative counter-IED initiatives. We  therefore reiterate our prior recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the military services to work with JIEDDO to develop a  database for all DOD’s counter-IED initiatives.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In addition to the prior recommendation reiterated above that remains  open, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy  Secretary of Defense, who is responsible for direction and control of  JIEDDO, to take the following four actions:
Define outcome-related strategic goals associated with DOD’s  counter-IED mission to enable the development of measures of  effectiveness that will help to determine progress of DOD’s counter- IED efforts.
Assess JIEDDO’s recently completed strategic plan and its  implementation to ensure that it incorporates outcome-related strategic goals,  includes sufficient measures of effectiveness to gauge progress,  and uses the data collected from these metrics to adjust its counter- IED efforts, as needed.
Develop an implementation plan for the establishment of DOD’s  counter- IED database including a detailed timeline with milestones to  help achieve this goal.
Develop a process to use DOD’s counter-IED database once it is  established to identify and compare all counter-IED initiatives and  activities, to enable program monitoring, and reduce any duplication,  overlap, and fragmentation among counter-IED initiatives.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the  third of our four recommendations—to develop an implementation plan for  the establishment of DOD’s counter-IED database—and did not concur  with the other three. DOD’s written comments are included in appendix II.  DOD also provided technical comments that we have incorporated into  this report where appropriate.
In disagreeing with our first recommendation for the Deputy Secretary of  Defense to define outcome-related strategic goals associated with DOD’s  counter-IED mission to enable the development of measures of  effectiveness that will help to determine progress of DOD’s counter-IED  efforts, the department stated that the JIEDDO Director has accomplished  this task by issuing its 2012–2016 counter-IED strategic plan in January  2012. While we agree that the recent issuance of JIEDDO’s plan is a  positive development, it does not fully address our recommendation  because the plan does not apply to all counter-IED efforts  departmentwide. According to JIEDDO officials, the plan applies to the  management of JIEDDO counter-IED efforts only and has not been  adopted as DOD’s strategic plan for managing all of its counter-IED  expenditures and investments from the military services and relevant  DOD agencies. Therefore, JIEDDO’s strategic goals do not satisfy the  need for the Deputy Secretary of Defense to define outcome-related  strategic goals for the department taken as a whole, and we believe our  recommendation remains valid.
In disagreeing with our second recommendation for the Deputy Secretary  of Defense to document and assess JIEDDO’s strategic plan to ensure  that it incorporates outcome-related strategic goals, includes sufficient  measures of effectiveness to gauge progress, and uses the data collected  from these metrics to adjust its counter-IED efforts, as needed, the  department stated that JIEDDO has established outcome-related  strategic goals and measures of effectiveness in its January 2012  strategic plan and related implementation plan. DOD further stated that in  March 2012 JIEDDO will begin quarterly internal reviews to assess  progress against its goals and make adjustments to its counter-IED  efforts. Completion of JIEDDO’s strategic plan is a positive step; however,  because the portion of the plan relevant to our prior recommendations— the annex containing measures of effectiveness, timelines, and goals— was issued on January 19, 2012, we were unable to evaluate the plan  before issuance of this report and therefore cannot comment on its  adequacy relative to our recommendations. However, JIEDDO’s  numerous prior strategic-planning actions have not followed leading  strategic management practices, or have been discontinued. Therefore,  JIEDDO’s recently completed counter-IED strategic plan and plans for  internal quarterly reviews alone do not negate the need for the Deputy  Secretary of Defense to assess the adequacy of JIEDDO’s strategic plan  and its implementation, and we believe our recommendation remains  valid. However, we modified the language in our recommendation to  reflect the fact that JIEDDO has now recently issued a strategic plan and  to clarify that the remaining action needed by the Deputy Secretary of  Defense is to assess its adequacy and implementation.
In concurring with our third recommendation for the Deputy Secretary of  Defense to develop an implementation plan for the establishment of  DOD’s counter- IED database, DOD stated that DOD Directive 2000.19E  is currently being revised to create a requirement for Combatant  Commands, military services, and DOD agencies to report counter-IED  initiatives to JIEDDO. According to DOD, this step will enable JIEDDO to  develop a database for all DOD counter-IED initiatives. We agree that  establishing this requirement should help JIEDDO’s counter-IED  database development; however, according to JIEDDO officials, DOD  Directive 2000.19E has been under revision for 2 years without DOD  issuing a new directive. Therefore, it is critical that DOD complete this  task as soon as possible to enable JIEDDO to develop its planned  counter-IED database as described in DOD’s comments.
In disagreeing with our fourth recommendation for the Deputy Secretary  of Defense to develop a means to identify and reduce any duplication,  overlap, and fragmentation among counter-IED initiatives, DOD stated  that it had existing processes and organizations including JIEDDO and its  Senior Integration Group to facilitate coordination and collaboration with  the military services and across DOD, which would address this  recommendation. We agree that existing DOD processes such as  JIEDDO’s Capabilities Development Process and DOD’s Senior  Integration Group prioritization process can be helpful in coordinating  DOD’s counter-IED efforts. However, the effectiveness of DOD’s existing  coordination and collaboration processes has been limited given that  these processes did not prevent the issues of potential duplication we  identified in this report. For example, in the case of DOD’s directed  energy counter-IED efforts where DOD has collectively expended $104  million, the processes cited by DOD in its response did not identify and  resolve the fragmentation and potential duplication present in these  efforts. As a result, the commander of U.S. Central Command, as  mentioned previously, protested in writing to DOD officials about potential  duplication of efforts. Without an adequate process to use DOD’s counter- IED database, once it is developed, DOD will continue to lack assurance  that it is identifying and addressing instances of potential duplication  before making significant investments. In finalizing our report, we  modified the wording of our recommendation to clarify our intent that DOD  establish a process (rather than a means) to use its counter-IED  database once it is established.
In addition to comments on our recommendations, DOD questioned the  accuracy of our statements regarding the soundness of JIEDDO’s  prioritization and resource allocation determinations. Specifically, DOD  stated that our report was inaccurate in stating that JIEDDO does not  have a sound basis to determine how to invest DOD’s resources among  the lines of operation: attack the network, defeat the device, and train the  force. DOD further stated that JIEDDO has established procedures to  assess counter-IED gaps and prioritize requirements in coordination with  warfighting commanders and that JIEDDO coordinates counter-IED  initiatives with numerous DOD offices, which DOD concluded ensures  warfighting priorities, effectiveness of fielded counter-IED efforts, and cost  reasonableness are addressed and evaluated. DOD also asserted that  JIEDDO’s existing programming and prioritization processes align  JIEDDO’s investment resources with Combatant Commander priorities.  We recognize that JIEDDO has resource allocation and prioritization  processes in place and have modified the language of this report to  acknowledge these processes where applicable. However, we maintain  our position that JIEDDO’s basis for determination of resource allocations  and prioritizations is limited because DOD has not been able to identify all  of its counter-IED efforts, as stated above, and lacks actionable goals and  objectives needed to tie JIEDDO’s and the Department’s performance  measures to outcomes that would assess its counter-IED efforts.  Therefore, DOD does not have full assurance that its investments are  achieving its strategic goal in the counter-IED fight.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional  committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, this report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at  (404) 679-1808 or at russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We considered counter-IED strategic planning efforts from February 2006  through 2012. To analyze the extent to which DOD has provided a  comprehensive counter-IED strategic plan including strategic results- oriented goals and metrics that determine the effectiveness of efforts  across DOD to combat IEDs, we collected and reviewed DOD’s counter- IED strategic-planning documents from JIEDDO. We also reviewed prior  GAO reports and work papers involving strategic planning and  management, both for JIEDDO and for the government in general. We  used these GAO reports to identify leading strategic management  practices derived from leading strategic management principles  demonstrated by successful results-oriented organizations for use as  evaluation criteria in this review. In addition, we interviewed JIEDDO  officials involved in strategic planning and assessment to learn about the  implementation of the actions detailed in the counter-IED strategic  planning documents collected. Furthermore, we attended a counter-IED  conference sponsored by JIEDDO in March 2011 that focused on a key  element of strategic planning and management—measuring outcomes  and performance—to observe and collect additional information relevant  to DOD’s counter-IED strategic management. From the documents  collected and interviews conducted, we identified several triggering  actions that either provided the impetus for, or resulted in, counter-IED  strategic management efforts in JIEDDO or elsewhere in DOD. We  compared these actions against leading strategic management criteria  described above and rated each according to its fulfillment of these  leading practices.
We considered counter-IED efforts from fiscal years 2006 through 2011  managed by DOD components with involvement in counter-IED efforts:  JIEDDO, military services, combatant commands, and defense agencies.  To determine the extent to which DOD has identified counter-IED  initiatives and activities, and coordinated these efforts, we reviewed  JIEDDO databases on counter-IED efforts and interviewed OSD, military  service and JIEDDO officials to discuss the availability of data about  additional counter-IED efforts/initiatives. Through our interactions with  JIEDDO officials, we determined that the best, most comprehensive  repository of counter-IED information that currently existed was the  Technology Matrix. We analyzed the Technology Matrix to obtain a list of  persons, for each organization, who had entered information regarding  counter-IED efforts into the database. Additionally, we reviewed and  analyzed prior GAO counter-IED work to obtain relevant contact  information, obtained current contact information of relevant organizations  through our Inspector General liaison, and reviewed and analyzed other  external sources of information, which contained relevant organizations.
We interviewed OSD, Service, and JIEDDO officials to discuss and  determine awareness of DOD’s counter-IED efforts. To determine the  effects of the absence of a comprehensive DOD listing of counter-IED  initiatives within the department, we assessed whether DOD components  continue to independently pursue counter-IED efforts that may be  redundant or overlapping. We updated counter-IED initiatives case  studies that we previously reported as having redundancy of effort and  developed additional case studies of overlapping counter-IED efforts  within DOD. We purposefully selected the additional case studies based  on information in interviews with DOD officials or in data or  documentation collected during this review that evidenced similar  capabilities and objectives among two or more counter-IED efforts. In  each case study, we compared the overlapping counter-IED efforts to  determine and describe the degree of redundancy and potential  duplication among the efforts for each case study given overlap of the  capabilities and functions of these systems.
section_title: Appendix II: Supplemental Table to Figure 1
paragraphs: The following table identifies 17 key actions or triggering events  applicable to DOD that were to either produce counter-IED strategic plans  for the department or further develop the strategic plans. This table is  similar to figure 1 but shows the interactive text without needing the  interactive computer capability.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Grace Coleman, Rajiv D’Cruz, Emily Norman, Michael  Shaughnessy, Rebecca Shea, Michael Silver, Amie Steele, William M.  Solis, John Strong, and Tristan T.To.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs,  Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-11-318SP. Washington  D.C.: March 1, 2011.
Warfighter Support: DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes Need a More  Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation.  GAO-11-273. Washington D.C.: March 1, 2011.
Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve the Joint Improvised  Explosive Device Defeat Organization’s System of Internal Control.   GAO-10-660. Washington D.C.: July 1, 2010.
Warfighter Support: Improvements to DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes  Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts to Meet Critical  Warfighter Needs. GAO-10-460. Washington D.C.: April 30, 2010.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Comprehensive Planning and a Results- Oriented Training Strategy Are Needed to Support Growing Inventories.  GAO-10-331. Washington D.C.: March 26, 2010.
Warfighter Support: Challenges Confronting DOD’s Ability to Coordinate  and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Efforts.  GAO-10-186T. Washington D.C.: October 29, 2009.
Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and  Coordination of DOD’s Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts.  GAO-10-95. Washington D.C.: October 29, 2009.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve  Management and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter  Needs. GAO-09-175. Washington D.C.: November 14, 2008.
Defense Management: More Transparency Needed over the Financial  and Human Capital Operations of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device  Defeat Organization. GAO-08-342. Washington D.C.: March 6, 2008.
Defense Business Transformation: Achieving Success Requires a Chief  Management Officer to Provide Focus and Sustained Leadership.  GAO-07-1072. Washington D.C.: September 5, 2007.
Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and  Organizational Transformations. GAO-03-669. Washington D.C.: July 2,  2003.
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a  Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington D.C.: January 17,  2003.
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons  Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal  Agencies. GAO-03-293SP. Washington D.C.: November 14, 2002.
Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance  and Results Act. GGD-96-118. Washington, D.C.: June 1, 1996.