Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Major Management Issues Facing DOD's Development and Fielding Efforts
Published: 2004-03-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been under development since the 1980s. UAVs were used in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003 to observe, track, target, and strike enemy forces. These successes have heightened interest in UAVs within the Department of Defense (DOD). Congress has been particularly interested in DOD's approach to managing the growing number of UAV programs. GAO was asked to summarize (1) the results of its most current report on DOD's approach to developing and fielding UAVs1 and the extent to which the approach provides reasonable assurance that its investment will lead to effective integration of UAVs into the force structure, and (2) the major management issues GAO has identified in prior reports on UAV research and development.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO's most recent report points out that while DOD has taken some positive steps, its approach to UAV planning still does not provide reasonable assurance that the significant Congressional investment in UAVs will result in their effective integration into the force structure. In 2001, DOD established the joint UAV Planning Task Force in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to promote a common vision for UAV-related efforts and to establish interoperability standards. To communicate its vision and promote UAV interoperability, the task force issued the 2002 UAV Roadmap. While the Roadmap provides some strategic guidance for the development of UAV technology, neither the Roadmap nor other documents represent a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that the services and other DOD agencies focus development efforts on systems that complement each other, will perform the range of priority missions needed, and avoid duplication. Moreover, the Task Force has only advisory authority and, as such, cannot compel the services to adopt its suggestions. GAO's prior work supports the need for effective oversight of individual UAV programs at the departmental level. UAVs have suffered from requirements growth, risky acquisition strategies, and uncertain funding support within the services. Some programs have been terminated. Success has been achieved as a result of top-level intervention and innovative acquisition approaches. For example, in 2003, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had to intervene to keep the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle program viable. As UAV programs grow in the future, they will face challenges in the form of increased funding competition, greater demand for capabilities, and spectrum and airspace limitations. Moreover, UAVs are no longer an additional "nice-to-have" capability; they are becoming essential to the services' ability to conduct modern warfare. Meeting these challenges will require continued strong leadership, building on the UAV Roadmap and Planning Task Force as GAO has recommended.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the  major management issues that we identified in our current and prior work  on the research, development, and fielding of the latest generation of  unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) by the Department of Defense (DOD).  The current generation of UAVs has been under development for defense  applications since the 1980s, and as DOD continues to transform the way  in which it conducts military operations, UAVs are becoming a vital part of  the force structure.
For our statement today, you asked us to discuss the results of our most  recent report to the subcommittee, which is being released today. In this  report, we summarized recent UAV costs and funding, and analyzed DOD’s  approach to developing and fielding UAVs to see to what extent the  approach provides reasonable assurance that UAV programs will be  efficiently integrated into the force structure. You also asked that we  summarize the major management issues we have identified in prior  reports on UAV programs, including our 2003 report on the unmanned  combat aerial vehicle.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD defines a UAV as a powered aerial vehicle that does not carry a  human operator; can be land-, air-, or ship-launched; uses aerodynamic  forces to provide lift; can be autonomously or remotely piloted; can be  expendable or recoverable; and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload.  Generally, UAVs consist of the aerial vehicle; a flight control station;  information and retrieval or processing stations; and, sometimes, wheeled  land vehicles that carry launch and recovery platforms.
UAVs have been used in a variety of forms and for a variety of missions for  many years. After the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 spy plane in 1960,  certain UAVs were developed to monitor Soviet and Chinese nuclear  testing. Israel used UAVs to locate Syrian radars and was able to destroy  the Syrian air defense system in Lebanon in 1982. The United States has  used UAVs in the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Operation Enduring Freedom,  and Operation Iraqi Freedom for intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance missions and to attack a vehicle carrying suspected  terrorists in Yemen in 2002. The United States is also considering using  UAVs to assist with border security for homeland security or homeland  defense.
The current generation of UAVs has been under development for defense  applications since the 1980s. UAVs won considerable acceptance during  military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003, respectively.  They were used in these operations to observe, track, target, and in some  cases strike enemy forces. These and similar successes have heightened  interest in UAVs within DOD and the services. In fact, by 2010, DOD plans  to have at least 14 different UAVs in the force structure to perform a  variety of missions. Moreover, in the fiscal year 2001 National Defense  Authorization Act, Congress established the goal that one-third of the Air  Force’s deep-strike capability be provided by UAVs by 2010.
The overall management of UAV programs has gone full circle. In 1989 the  DOD Director of Defense Research and Engineering set up the UAV Joint  Project Office as a single DOD organization with management  responsibility for UAV programs. With the Navy as the Executive Agency,  within 4 years the Joint Project Office came under criticism for a lack of  progress. Replacing the office in 1993, DOD created the Defense Airborne  Reconnaissance Office as the primary management oversight and  coordination office for all departmentwide manned and unmanned  reconnaissance. In 1998, however, this office also came under criticism for  its management approach and slow progress in fielding UAVs. In that same  year, this office was dissolved and UAV program development and  acquisition management was given to the services, while the Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and  Intelligence was assigned to provide oversight for the Secretary of  Defense.
section_title: GAO’s New Report Calls for Improved Strategic Planning
paragraphs: Our report being issued today (Force Structure: Improved Strategic  Planning Can Enhance DOD’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO- 04-342, Mar. 17, 2004) analyzes recent funding trends for UAVs and makes  recommendations to strengthen DOD’s strategic planning and  management approach for UAVs.
subsections: section_title: UAV Funding Has Increased
paragraphs: During the past 5 fiscal years, Congress provided funding for UAV  development and procurement that exceeds the amounts requested by  DOD, and to date the services have obligated about 99 percent of these  funds. To promote the rapid employment of UAVs, Congress appropriated  nearly $2.7 billion to develop and acquire UAVs from fiscal year 1999  through fiscal year 2003, compared with the $2.3 billion requested by DOD.  The majority of the funds—$1.8 billion (67 percent)—have been for UAV  research, development, test, and evaluation. Figure 1 displays the trends in  research, development, test, and evaluation and procurement funding from  fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003.
Over these 5 years, only three systems—the Air Force’s Predator and  Global Hawk, and the Army’s Shadow—have matured to the point that  they required procurement funding, amounting to about $880 million by  fiscal year 2003 and another estimated $938 million needed by fiscal year  2005.
Because Congress has appropriated more funds than requested, the  services are able to acquire systems at a greater rate than planned. For  example, in fiscal year 2003, the Air Force requested $23 million to buy 7  Predator UAVs, but Congress provided over $131 million, enough to buy 29  Predators. The Air Force had obligated 71 percent of the Predator’s fiscal  year 2003 funding during its first program year.
The Hunter, Predator, Pioneer, and Shadow are among the UAV systems  currently being used, and therefore we determined the level of DOD’s  operations and maintenance spending from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal  year 2003 for these systems. Operations and maintenance funding has  steadily increased over that period from about $56.6 million for three of  the systems to $155.2 million in 2003 for all four. These increases are the  result of a larger inventory of existing systems and the introduction of new  systems. Figure 2 displays the operations and maintenance spending for  these UAV systems for fiscal years 1999 to 2003.
section_title: Progress Made, but Challenges Remain in UAV Planning
paragraphs: DOD has taken certain positive steps to improve the management of the  UAV program by establishing a program focal point in the joint UAV  Planning Task Force and trying to communicate a common vision for UAV  development, the UAV Roadmap. While the creation of the Task Force and  the UAV Roadmap are important steps to improve the management of the  program, they are not enough to reasonably assure that DOD is developing  and fielding UAVs efficiently. The Task Force’s authority is generally  limited to program review and advice, but is insufficient to enforce  program direction. Moreover, the UAV Roadmap does not constitute a  comprehensive strategic plan for developing and integrating UAVs into  force structure.
subsections: section_title: Some Positive Steps Have Been Taken to Improve Program Management
paragraphs: Since 2000, DOD has taken several positive steps to improve the  management of the UAV program. In October 2001, the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics created the joint UAV  Planning Task Force as the joint advocate for developing and fielding  UAVs. The Task Force is the focal point to coordinate UAV efforts  throughout DOD, helping to create a common vision for future UAV- related activities and to establish interoperability standards. For example,  the Task Force is charged with developing and coordinating detailed UAV  development plans, recommending priorities for development and  procurement efforts, and providing the services and defense agencies with  implementing guidance for common UAV programs.
The development of the 2002 Roadmap has been the Task Force’s primary  product to communicate its vision and promote interoperability. The  Roadmap is designed to guide U.S. military planning for UAV development  through 2027, and describes current programs, identifies potential  missions, and provides guidance on developing emerging technologies.  The Roadmap is also intended to assist DOD decision makers to build a  long-range strategy for UAV development and acquisition in such future  planning efforts as the Quadrennial Defense Review or other planning  efforts.
section_title: The Joint UAV Planning Task Force Has Limited Authority
paragraphs: The joint UAV Planning Task Force’s authority is generally limited to  program review and advice, but is insufficient to enforce program  direction. The Task Force Director testified before the House Armed  Services Committee in March 2003 that the Task Force does not have  program directive authority, but provides the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with advice and recommended  actions. Without such authority, according to the Director, the Task Force  seeks to influence services’ programs by making recommendations to  them or proposing recommended program changes for consideration by  the Under Secretary. According to defense officials, the Task Force has  attempted to influence the joint direction of service UAV efforts in a  variety of ways, such as reviewing services’ budget proposals, conducting  periodic program reviews, and participating in various UAV-related task  teams and has had some successes, as shown below:    The Task Force has encouraged the Navy to initially consider an  existing UAV (Global Hawk) rather than develop a unique UAV for its  Broad Area Marine Surveillance mission.
The Task Force has worked with the Army’s tactical UAV program to  encourage it to consider using the Navy’s Fire Scout as an initial  platform for the Future Combat System class IV UAV.
The Task Force convinced the Air Force to continue with the  Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle program last year when the Air  Force wanted to terminate it, and the Task Force ultimately helped the  then-separate Air Force and Navy programs merge into a joint program.
The Task Force convinced the Navy not to terminate the Fire Scout  rotary wing UAV program as planned.
However, the Task Force cannot compel the services to adopt any of its  suggestions and consequently has not always succeeding in influencing  service actions. For example, according to DOD officials, no significant  progress has been made in achieving better interoperability among the  services in UAV platform and sensor coordination, although efforts are  continuing in this vein.
section_title: DOD Has No Comprehensive Strategic Plan
paragraphs: Neither the Roadmap nor other DOD guidance documents represent a  comprehensive strategy to guide the development and fielding of UAVs  that complement each other, perform the range of missions needed, and  avoid duplication. DOD officials acknowledged that the Office of the  Secretary of Defense has not issued any guidance that establishes an  overall strategy for UAVs in DOD. While high-level DOD strategic-planning  documents—such as the National Military Strategy, the Joint Vision 2020,  and the Defense Planning Guidance—provide some general  encouragement to pursue transformational technologies, including the  development of UAVs, these documents do not provide any specific  guidance on developing and integrating UAVs into the force structure.
At the same time, while the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has  reviewed several UAVs and issued guidance for some systems, neither the  Joint Staff nor the council has issued any guidance that would establish a  strategic plan or overarching architecture for DOD’s current and future  UAVs. In June 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the  Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System to provide a top- down capability-based process. Under the system, five boards have been  chartered, each representing a major warfighting capability area as  follows: (1) command and control, (2) force application, (3) battle space  awareness, (4) force protection, and (5) focused logistics. Each board has  representatives from the services, the combatant commanders, and certain  major functions of the Under Secretary of Defense. Each board is tasked  with developing a list of capabilities needed to conduct joint operations in  its respective functional areas. The transformation of these capabilities is  expected, and the boards are likely to identify specific capabilities that can  be met by UAVs. Nonetheless, according to Joint Staff officials, these  initiatives will not result in an overarching architecture for UAVs.  However, the identification of capabilities that can be met by UAVs is  expected to help enhance the understanding of DOD’s overall requirement  for UAV capabilities.
Moreover, according to officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,  the UAV Roadmap was not intended to provide an overarching  architecture for UAVs. The Roadmap does state that it is intended to assist  DOD decision makers in building a long-range strategy for UAV  development and acquisition in such future planning efforts as the  Quadrennial Defense Review. Nonetheless, the Roadmap represents a  start on a strategic plan because it incorporates some of the key  components of strategic planning, as shown below:  Long-term goals—The Roadmap states its overall purpose and  what it hopes to encourage the services to attain. The Roadmap  refers to the Defense Planning Guidance’s intent for UAVs as a  capability and indicates that the guidance encourages the rapid  advancement of this capability. At the same time, it does not  clearly state DOD’s overall or long-term goals for its UAV efforts.  Similarly, while it states that it wants to provide the services with  clear direction, it does not clearly identify DOD’s vision for its UAV  force structure through 2027.
Approaches to obtain long-term goals—The Roadmap’s  “Approach” section provides a strategy for developing the  Roadmap and meeting its goal. This approach primarily deals with  identifying requirements and linking them to needed UAV payload  capabilities, such as sensors and associated communication links.  The approach then ties these requirements to forecasted trends in  developing technologies as a means to try to develop a realistic  assessment of the state of the technology in the future and the  extent to which this technology will be sufficient to meet identified  requirements. At the same time, however, the Roadmap does not  provide a clear description of a strategy for defining how to  develop and integrate UAVs into the future force structure. For  example, the Roadmap does not attempt to establish UAV  development or fielding priorities, nor does it identify the most  urgent mission-capability requirements. Moreover, without the  sufficient identification of priorities, the Roadmap cannot link  these priorities to current or developing UAV programs and  technology.
Performance goals—The Roadmap established 49 specific  performance goals for a variety of tasks. Some of these goals are  aimed at fielding transformational capabilities without specifying  the missions to be supported. Others are to establish joint  standards and control costs. Nonetheless, of the 49 goals, only 1  deals directly with developing and fielding a specific category of  UAV platform to meet a priority mission-capability requirement— the suppression of enemy air defenses or strike electronic attack.  The remaining goals, such as developing heavy-fuel aviation  engines suitable for UAVs, are predominantly associated with  developing UAV or related technologies as well as UAV-related  standards and policies to promote more efficient and effective joint  UAV operations. However, the Roadmap does not establish overall  UAV program goals.
Performance indicators—Some of the 49 goals have  performance indicators that could be used to evaluate progress,  while others do not. Furthermore, the Roadmap does not establish  indicators that readily assess how well the program will meet the  priority mission capabilities.
As the services and defense agencies pursue separate UAV programs, they  risk developing systems with duplicate capabilities, potentially higher  operating costs, and increased interoperability challenges. The House  Appropriations Committee was concerned that without comprehensive  planning and review, there is no clear path toward developing a UAV force  structure. Thus, the committee directed that each service update or create  a UAV roadmap. These roadmaps were to address the services’ plans for  the development of future UAVs and how current UAVs are being  employed. Officials from each of the services indicated that their UAV  roadmap was developed to primarily address their individual service’s  requirements and operational concepts. However, in their views, such  guidance as the Joint Vision 2020, National Military Strategy, and Defense  Planning Guidance did not constitute strategic plans for UAVs to guide the  development of their individual service’s UAV roadmap. These officials  further stated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2002 UAV  Roadmap provided some useful guidance, but was not used to guide the  development of the service’s UAV roadmaps. Moreover, they did not view  the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Roadmap as either a DOD-wide  strategic plan or an overarching architecture for integrating UAVs into the  force structure. According to service officials developing the service-level  UAV roadmaps, there was little collaboration with other services’ UAV  efforts.
As we have described for you today, DOD has an opportunity to enhance  its strategic planning to improve the management of UAV development  and fielding. In the report released to you today, we make two  recommendations to assist DOD to enhance its management control over  the UAV program. We recommend that DOD establish a strategic plan or  set of plans based on mission requirements to guide UAV development and  fielding. We also recommend that DOD designate the joint UAV Planning  Task Force or another appropriate organization to oversee the  implementation of a UAV strategic plan. In responding to our report, DOD  stated that it partially concurred with the first recommendation but  preferred to address UAV planning through the Joint Capabilities  Integration and Development System process. DOD disagreed with the  second recommendation saying that it did not need to provide an  organization within the department with more authority because it  believes that the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and  Technology already has sufficient authority to achieve DOD’s UAV goals.
Our report states clearly that we continue to support both  recommendations. We believe that the growth in the number and cost of  UAV programs, and their importance to military capabilities, will need  more formalized oversight by DOD.
section_title: Oversight Challenge Is Framed by Experiences of the Past and Demands of the Future
paragraphs: Our reviews of system development efforts over the last several decades  show that the road to fielding operational UAVs has not been easy.  Success has been achieved as a result of intervention by leadership and  the use of innovative processes. Even when put on a sound footing, these  programs have continued to face new challenges. In the future, UAVs will  be growing in number, sophistication, and significance, but will also have  to compete for increasingly scarce funds, electromagnetic frequency  spectrum, and airspace.
subsections: section_title: Lessons From Past Experience
paragraphs: Since the mid 1970s, we have reviewed many individual DOD UAV  development efforts. A list of our reports is attached in the section  entitled “Related GAO Products.” Our previous work has highlighted  problems that addressed congressional efforts to bring the development  process under control and subsequently led to the termination or redesign  and retrofit of a number of these development efforts.
In 1988 we reported on a variety of management challenges related to UAV  development. At that time, congressional committees had expressed  concern about duplication in the services’ UAV programs, which ran  counter to the committees’ wishes that DOD acquire UAVs to meet  common service needs. In 1988, we noted that DOD was to provide, at  minimum, a UAV master plan that (1) harmonized service requirements,  (2) utilized commonality to the maximum extent possible, and (3) made  trade-offs between manned and unmanned vehicles in order to provide  future cost savings. After budget deliberations for fiscal year 1988,  Congress eliminated separate service accounts for individual UAV  programs and consolidated that funding into a single Defense Agencies  account. This in turn led to the formation of DOD’s UAV Joint Projects  Office, which promoted joint UAV efforts that would prevent unnecessary  duplication. This effort was led by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance  Office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which has since been  disbanded.
Our analysis of DOD’s 1988 UAV master plan identified a number of  weaknesses: (1) it did not eliminate duplication, (2) it continued to permit  the proliferation of single-service programs, (3) it did not adequately  consider cost savings potential from manned and unmanned aircraft trade- offs, and (4) it did not adequately emphasize the importance of common  payloads among different UAV platforms.
In testimony presented in April 1997, we recognized the strong support  that Congress had provided for DOD’s UAV acquisition efforts and how it  had encouraged the department to spur related cooperation between the  services. We noted that problems with UAV development continued and  were leading to cost, schedule, and performance deficiencies; continued  duplication of UAV capabilities; and even program cancellations in many  instances. In 1997, only one UAV—the Pioneer—had been fielded.
subsections: section_title: Factors That Limit UAV Development
paragraphs: Since 1997, we have continued to evaluate the department’s UAV  development efforts, including plans to develop a lethal variant of UAVs  called unmanned combat air vehicles. Our reviews over the last 27 years  have revealed several reasons why UAV efforts have not been successful,  including requirements that outstrip technology, overly ambitious  schedules, and difficulties integrating UAV components and UAV testing.  We have also found that UAV system acquisitions processes were not  protected from what is known as “requirements creep.” These  requirements changes increase development and procurement costs  significantly. For example:    The Aquila was started in 1979 with a straightforward mission to  provide small, propeller-driven UAVs to give group commanders real- time battlefield information about enemy forces beyond ground  observers’ line of sight. Requirements creep increased complexity and  development and anticipated procurement costs significantly. For  example, in 1982 a requirement for night vision capability was added  which increased development costs due to the additional payloads and  air vehicles needed to meet the new requirement. During operational  tests, the Aquila successfully fulfilled all requirements in only 7 of 105  flights.
When the Air Force’s Global Hawk reconnaissance UAV was started in  1994, it was expected to have an average unit flyaway price of $10  million. Changes in the aircraft’s range and endurance objectives  required the contractor to modify the wings and other structural parts,  and by 1999 its cost had increased by almost 50 percent. In our April  2000 report, we concluded that the cost of air vehicles to be produced  could increase still further, because the Air Force had not finalized its  design requirements. In 2002, the Global Hawk program adopted a  higher-risk strategy that calls for both a larger, more advanced aircraft  and an accelerated delivery schedule.
In June 2003 we reported that the original requirements for the Air  Force’s unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) program posed  significant, but manageable challenges to build an air vehicle that is  affordable throughout its life cycle, highly survivable, and lethal.  Subsequently, however, the Air Force added requirements—adding a  mission and increasing flying range. This action widened the gap  between requirements and resources and increased the challenge for  the development program.
Aside from the air vehicle, other ground and airborne systems are also  needed for the UAV to be complete. DOD’s practice of buying systems  before successful completion of testing has repeatedly led to defective  systems that were terminated, redesigned, or retrofitted to achieve  satisfactory performance. Our reviews have shown that, before production  begins, DOD needs to test to ensure that all key parts of the UAV system  can work successfully together, and that it can be operated and  maintained affordably throughout its lifecycle.
In March 1999, we examined the Medium Range UAV, which began in  1989 as a joint effort of the Navy and Air Force. The Air Force was to  design and build the sensor payload, including cameras, a videotape  recorder, and a communications data link that would send back the  imagery from the UAV. The Navy was to design and build the air  vehicle. Splitting and then integrating these development efforts  became problematic. The Air Force ran into major payload  development difficulties, which impacted payload development costs.  As a result of the difficulties, the payload program fell behind schedule,  developmental tests on a surrogate manned aircraft were  unsuccessful, and the payload was too big to fit in the space the Navy  had allotted inside the aircraft. In 1993, the program was terminated.
In 1999, the Army began low-rate initial production of four Shadow  systems at the same time that it began the engineering and  manufacturing development phase. In February 2001, the Army sought  to revise its acquisition strategy to procure four additional Shadow  systems before conducting operational tests. We recommended in a  2000 report that the Army not buy these four additional systems until  after operational testing is completed. In our opinion, only operational  testing of the system in a realistic environment can show whether the  overall system would meet the Army’s operational needs. Subsequently,  we reported that problems encountered during early tests forced the  program to delay completion of operational testing by one year. The  results of operational tests revealed that the Shadow was not  operationally suitable, survivable, and may not be affordable.
section_title: Factors That Lead to UAV Success
paragraphs: Our body of UAV work also made several observations about factors that  contribute to success, including the use of innovative approaches and  high-level interventions by individuals and organizations. In August 1999,  we concluded that DOD’s use of Advanced Concept Technology  Demonstration projects improved UAV acquisitions because it focused on  maturing technology and proving military utility before committing to a  UAV. We found that DOD’s Advanced Concept Technology  Demonstration approach was consistent with the practices that we  typically characterize as leading commercial development efforts.  Predator UAV used a 30-month Advanced Concept Technology  Demonstration approach and prototypes were deployed in Bosnia in 1995  and 1996 as part of the demonstration. Performance data gathered there  convinced military users that Predator was worth acquiring.
High-level individuals intervened to set resource constraints and  encouraged evolutionary acquisition strategies on the Air Force’s Global  Hawk, the Army’s Shadow UAV, and the Joint Unmanned Combat Air  System programs.
In the initial Shadow program, the Army’s top military acquisition  executive reached an agreement with his counterpart in the  requirements community that limited the program to “must have”  capabilities and restrained resources such as cost. This resulted in the  need to make trade-offs—so the Army lowered the performance  requirement for the imagery sensor so that existing technology could  be used.
In the Global Hawk program, the Under Secretary of Defense  (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) became personally involved  and insisted that the program take an evolutionary approach,  developing and fielding different versions of increasingly capable  UAVs. He also placed cost constraints on the initial version, which  enabled more advanced imagery sensor capabilities to be deferred for  later versions of the UAV.
In our report on the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle program, we  reported on Air Force plans to have initial deliveries of a lethal-strike- capable aircraft by 2011. The Air Force had abandoned the Unmanned  Combat Air Vehicle initial low-risk approach to development, and  increased requirements and accelerated its program schedule shortly  before it was to shift to the product development stage. As previously  reported, it took intervention by the Office of the Secretary of Defense  to resolve requirements and funding challenges and maintain strong  oversight over the program. The Task Force also was instrumental in  getting the funding restored to the program, creating a joint effort  between the Air Force and Navy, and accelerating the Navy’s version.  Their strong oversight and intervention might have saved the program,  which is now known as the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System  program.
section_title: Future Challenges in Oversight of UAVs
paragraphs: Over the next decade, DOD plans show that UAV investments will  increase, greater numbers will be fielded, and these systems will play more  significant roles than in the past. In addition to overcoming the problems  and pressures that have impaired past programs, managers of future UAV  programs will face increasing competition for money, electromagnetic  frequency spectrum bandwidth, and airspace.
By 2010, DOD plans to invest $11 billion in UAV acquisitions, quadrupling  the number of systems in its inventory today. As UAV programs vie for  increased funding, they will have to compete against very large programs,  such as the F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. If the costs of acquisition  programs continue to exceed what has been set aside in the budget,  competition will intensify and funding could be jeopardized.
Initially, UAVs were seen as complementary systems that augmented  capabilities the warfighter already had. They were, in a sense, “another  pair of eyes.” We are already seeing the evolution of UAVs into more  significant roles, for which they provide primary capability. For example,  the Global Hawk is being seen as replacing the U-2 reconnaissance  aircraft, and the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle may eventually perform  electronic warfare missions that the EA-6 Prowler aircraft performs today.  UAVs are figuring prominently in plans to transform the military into a  more strategically responsive force. UAVs are expected to be an integral  part of this information-based force. For example, UAVs may serve as  relay nodes in the Future Combat System’s command and control  network. As UAVs perform increasingly significant roles, their payloads  and designs will likely become more sophisticated.
UAVs depend on the available space in the electromagnetic frequency  spectrum to send and receive signals. Such signals are essential to UAV  control, communications, and imagery. As the number of UAVs grows, the  systems will have to compete for more room on the spectrum. Spectrum  resources are scarce and facing increased demands from sources other  than UAVs. Because of the changing nature of warfighting, more and more  military systems are coming to depend on the spectrum to guide precision  weapons and obtain information superiority. Recently, because of  advances in commercial technology, a competition for scarce frequency  spectrum has developed between government and nongovernment users.
Moreover, as the growing number of UAV systems become available for  military units and civilian agencies, such as the Department of Homeland  Security, their operation will also need to be integrated into the national  airspace system. Currently, the Federal Aviation Administration requires  detailed coordination and approval of UAV flights in the national airspace  system. The Federal Aviation Administration and DOD are working on  how to better integrate military UAVs within the national air space system.  In the future, UAVs are going to be used for homeland security, and their  acceptance into civil airspace may be difficult to accomplish until  significant work is accomplished in the areas  of reliability, regulation,  communications, and collision avoidance.
section_title: Concluding Remarks
paragraphs: Recent operations are convincing military commanders that UAVs are of  real value to the warfighter. That success on the battlefield is leading to  more and more demand for UAVs and innovative ways of using them,  creating pressures such as a greater need for interoperability of systems  and competition for limited resources like money, electromagnetic  frequency spectrum, and airspace. The UAVs that are successful today  survived an environment characterized by a number of canceled programs,  risky strategies, uncoordinated efforts, and uncertain funding. It took  additional measures for them to succeed, not the least of which was strong  management intervention. In recent years, DOD has taken positive steps to  better manage the development of UAVs by creating the joint UAV  Planning Task Force and the UAV Roadmap. The question is whether  these steps will be sufficient to make the most out of current and future  investments in UAVs. We believe that DOD should build on these good  steps so that it will be in a better position to provide stewardship over  these investments. Taking these steps will give Congress confidence that  its investments’ in the technology will produce optimum capabilities  desired of UAVs.  -     -     -     -     -  Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy  to answer any questions that you or Members of the subcommittee may  have.
For future questions about this statement, please contact Mr. Curtin at  (202) 512-4914, Mr. Francis at (202) 512-2811, or Brian J. Lepore at (202)  512-4523. Individuals making key contributions to this statement include  Fred S. Harrison, Lawrence E. Dixon, James K. Mahaffey, James A.  Driggins, Jerry W. Clark, Jose Ramos, Jr., R.K. Wild, Bob Swierczek, and  Kenneth E. Patton.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD’s  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington, D.C.: March  17, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed for Controls on Exports of  Cruise Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-493T.  Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed to Better Control Technology  Exports for Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-175.  Washington, D.C.: January 23, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to  the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program’s Success. GAO-03-598.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Questionable Basis for Revisions to Shadow  200 Acquisition Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-00-204. Washington, D.C.:  September 26, 2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced  Concept Technology Demonstration. GAO/NSIAD-00-78. Washington, D.C.:  April 25, 2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Demonstration Approach Has  Improved Project Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-33. Washington, D.C.: August  30, 1999.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress toward Meeting High Altitude  Endurance Aircraft Price Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-29. Washington, D.C.:  December 15, 1998.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Outrider Demonstrations Will Be Inadequate  to Justify Further Production. GAO/NSIAD-97-153. Washington, D.C.:  September 23, 1997.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Acquisition Efforts. GAO/ T-NSIAD- 97-138. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1997.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System Is Not Appropriate for Navy  Fleet Use. GAO/NSIAD-96-2. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1995.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Performance of Short Range System Still in  Question. GAO/NSIAD-94-65. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 1993.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: More Testing Needed Before Production of  Short Range System. GAO/NSIAD-92-311. Washington, D.C.: September 4,  1992.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium Range System Components Do Not  Fit. GAO/NSIAD-91-2. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1991.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Realistic Testing Needed Before Production  of Short Range System. GAO/NSIAD-90-234. Washington, D.C.: September  28, 1990.
Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  Master Plan. GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 1988.
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