Defense Acquisitions: CH-53K Helicopter Program Has Addressed Early Difficulties and Adopted Strategies to Address Future Risks
Published: 2011-04-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The United States Marine Corps is facing a critical shortage of heavy-lift aircraft. In addition, current weapon systems are heavier than their predecessors, further challenging the Marine Corps's current CH-53E heavy-lift helicopters. To address the emerging heavy-lift requirements, the Marine Corps initiated the CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement program, which has experienced significant cost increase and schedule delays since entering development in 2005. This report (1) determines how the CH-53K's estimates of cost, schedule, and quantity have changed since the program began development and the impact of these changes and (2) determines how the CH-53K's current acquisition strategy will meet current program targets as well as the warfighter's needs. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed the program's budget, schedules, acquisition reports, and other documents and interviewed officials from the program office, the prime contractor's office, the Marine Corps, the Defense Contract Management Agency, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The CH-53K helicopter mission is to provide combat assault transport of heavy weapons, equipment, and supplies from sea to support Marine Corps operations ashore. Since the program began development in December 2005, its total cost estimate has grown by almost $6.8 billion, from nearly $18.8 billion to over $25.5 billion as a result of a Marine Corps-directed quantity increase from 156 to 200 aircraft and schedule delays. The majority of the program's total cost growth is due to added quantities. Development cost growth and schedule delays resulted from beginning development before determining how to achieve requirements within program constraints, with miscommunication between the program office and prime contractor about systems engineering tasks and with late staffing by both the program office and the contractor. The program has also deferred three performance capabilities and relaxed two maintenance-based technical performance metrics in an effort to defer cost. Delivery of the CH-53K to the warfighter is currently scheduled for 2018--a delay of almost 3 years. The CH-53K program has made progress addressing the difficulties it faced early in system development. It held a successful critical design review in July 2010 and has adopted mitigation strategies to address future program risk. The program's new strategy, as outlined in the President's fiscal year 2012 budget, lengthens the development schedule, increases development funding, and delays the production decision. However, adjustments made to the budget submitted to Congress reduce the program's fiscal year 2012 development funding by $30.5 million (and by a total of $94.6 million between fiscal years 2010 and 2015). According to information contained in the budget, this reduction would result in additional schedule delays to the program of approximately 7 months and a net increase of $69 million to the total development cost estimate. The CH-53K program's new acquisition strategy addresses previous programmatic issues that led to early development cost growth and schedule delays.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United States Marine Corps is facing a critical shortage in the number  of Marine expeditionary heavy-lift aircraft, currently its CH-53E  helicopters. Although all available decommissioned CH-53E helicopters  have been overhauled for use, according to program officials, currently  deployed CH-53E aircraft are flying at three times their planned utilization  rate. In addition, current weapon systems are heavier than their  predecessors, further challenging the Marine Corps’s current CH-53E  heavy-lift helicopters. To address the emerging heavy-lift requirements, the  Marine Corps initiated the CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement program. The  total program is expected to cost significantly more than originally  planned and deployment has been significantly delayed. As a result, you  asked GAO to (1) determine how the CH-53K’s estimates of cost, schedule,  and quantity changed since the program began development and the  overall impact of these changes and (2) determine how the CH-53K’s  current acquisition strategy will meet current program targets as well as  the warfighter’s needs.
To determine how the CH-53K’s estimates of cost, schedule, and quantity  have changed since the program began development, we received  briefings from program and contractor officials and reviewed budget  documents, annual Selected Acquisition Reports, monthly status reports,  performance indicators, and other data. To identify the CH-53K’s current  acquisition strategy and determine how this strategy will meet current  program targets as well as the warfighter’s needs, we reviewed the  program’s original and current acquisition schedules and test plans. We  analyzed the current retirement schedules of the legacy CH-53E fleet and  discussed the impact of these retirements on the Marine Corps’s heavy-lift  requirement with appropriate officials. We interviewed officials with the  CH-53K program office; Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky), the  prime contractor; the United States Marine Corps; the Defense Contract  Management Agency; and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  We conducted this performance audit from February 2010 through March  2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more detailed  description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The CH-53K helicopter mission is to provide combat assault transport of  heavy weapons, equipment, and supplies from sea to support Marine  Corps operations ashore. The CH-53K is a new-build design evolution of  the existing CH-53E and is expected to maintain the same shipboard  footprint, while providing significant lift, reliability, maintainability, and  cost-of-ownership improvements. Its major improvements include  upgraded engines, redesigned gearboxes, composite rotor blades and rotor  system improvements, fly-by-wire flight controls, a fully integrated glass  cockpit, improved cargo handling and capacity, and survivability and force  protection enhancements. It is expected to be able to transport external  loads totaling 27,000 pounds over a range of 110 nautical miles under high- hot conditions without refueling and to fulfill land- and sea-based heavy- lift requirements.
Sikorsky was awarded a sole-source contract to develop the CH-53K  helicopter because, according to the program office, as the developer of  the CH-53E, it is the only known qualified source with the ability to design,  develop, and produce the required CH-53 variant. The program entered the  system development and demonstration phase of the acquisition process  in December 2005 and a $3 billion development contract was awarded to  Sikorsky in April 2006. Beginning in 2006, the program experienced  schedule delays that resulted in cost increases to the development  contract. As a result of the schedule delays and cost growth, in 2009 the  program office reported a cost and schedule deviation to its original cost  and acquisition program baselines to OSD. However, these increases were  not significant enough to incur what is commonly referred to as a Nunn- McCurdy breach.
In July 2010, the CH-53K program completed what it deemed a successful  critical design review (CDR), signaling that it had a stable design and  could begin building developmental test aircraft. The program began  building the first of five developmental test aircraft in early 2011, plans to  make a decision to enter low-rate initial production (LRIP) in 2015, and  plans to achieve an initial operational capability (IOC) in 2018.
section_title: CH-53K Cost Growth, Schedule Delays, and Deferred Capabilities Will Affect Delivery to the Warfighter
paragraphs: Primarily because of decisions to increase the number of aircraft and  other issues, the CH-53K program has experienced approximately $6.8  billion in cost growth and a nearly 3-year delay from original schedule  estimates for delivery of IOC. The program started development before  determining how to achieve requirements within program constraints,  which led to cost growth and schedule delays and resulted in the program  delaying its preliminary design review to September 2008, nearly 3 years  after development start. In addition, the program received permission to  defer three performance capabilities and relax two technical metrics  associated with operating and support costs—which we believe are sound  acquisition decisions—and will deliver the initial capability to the  warfighter in 2018, almost 3 years later than originally planned. In the end,  delayed delivery will require the Marine Corps to rely longer on legacy  aircraft that are more costly to operate and maintain, less reliable, and less  capable of performing the same mission.
The CH-53K program’s estimates of cost, schedule, and quantity have  significantly grown since development started in December 2005. The  Marine Corps now plans to buy a total of 200 CH-53K helicopters for an  estimated $25.5 billion, a 36 percent increase over its original estimates.  The majority of this increase is due to added quantities. The program’s  schedule delays have increased the development cost estimate by over  $1.7 billion, or more than 39 percent. In 2008, the Marine Corps directed  the program to increase its total quantity estimate from 156 to 200 aircraft  to support an increase in strength from 174,000 to 202,000 Marines. In  February 2011, the Secretary of Defense testified that the number of  Marine Corps troops may decrease by up to 20,000 Marines beginning in  fiscal year 2015. The Marine Corps has assessed the required quantity of  aircraft and determined that the requirement for 200 aircraft remains valid  despite the proposed manpower decrease. Primarily as a result of the  aircraft quantity increase, the program’s procurement cost estimate has  also increased by over $5 billion, or 35 percent, from nearly $14.4 billion to  over $19.4 billion. The program’s average procurement unit cost has  increased 4.8 percent. In addition, the program’s schedule delays have  delayed its ability to achieve IOC until 2018, nearly 3 years later than  originally planned. Table 1 compares the program’s original baseline  estimates of cost, quantity, and major schedule events to current program  estimates.
subsections: section_title: CH-53K Program Started Development Before Determining How to Achieve Requirements and with Late Staffing
paragraphs: The program started development before determining how to achieve  requirements within program constraints, which led to cost growth and  schedule delays. The CH-53K program originally scheduled its preliminary  design review for June 2007, a year and a half after the program began  development, and later delayed it to September 2008, nearly 3 years after  development start. We have reported that performing systems engineering  reviews—including a system requirements review, system functional  review, and preliminary design review—before a program is initiated and a  business case is set is critical to ensuring that a program’s requirements  are defined and feasible and that the design can meet those requirements  within cost, schedule, and other system constraints.
Problems with systems engineering began immediately within the program  because the program and Sikorsky disagreed on what systems engineering  tasks needed to be accomplished. As a result, the bulk of the program’s  systems engineering problems related to derived requirements. According  to an OSD official, the contractor did not account for total design  workload, technical reviews, and development efforts. For example, the  program experienced problems defining software specifications for its  Avionics Management System. While Marine Corps officials commented  that requirements are often difficult to define early in the engineering  process and changes are expected during design maturation, they noted  that in this case the use of a firm fixed-price contract with the  subcontractor made it difficult to facilitate changes. As a result,  completing this task took longer than the program had estimated and the  program’s CDR was delayed. In another example, the program has a  requirement that the CH-53K be transportable by C-5 aircraft. As with the  CH-53E, because of its size, the CH-53K’s rotor and main gearbox will be  removed from the aircraft’s body in order to fit within the height  requirements of a C-5. The program office interpreted this as requiring that  each CH-53K be shipped in its entirety on a single C-5 aircraft, including  the removed rotor and gearbox. However, the contractor interpreted the  requirement differently and proposed shipping all rotors and main  gearboxes in another C-5 separate from the CH-53K body. Program  officials did not accept this interpretation of the requirement and required  the contractor to propose a solution in which each CH-53K aircraft would  be shipped and arrive in its entirety in a single C-5 aircraft. Marine Corps  officials commented that even though this requirement was interpreted  differently, it was identified early in the systems engineering process and  addressed.
The program office and contractor underestimated the time it would take  to hire its workforce, and delays in awarding subcontracts made it difficult  for the program to complete design tasks and maintain its schedule.  According to an OSD official, while the program officially began  development in December 2005, the development contract was not  awarded until 4 months later—in April 2006—delaying development start.  According to program officials, budget-driven hiring restrictions for  government personnel, which included ceilings on the number of  government personnel who could be assigned to the program management  office, affected the program’s ability to hire its workforce at the time the  program was initiated. Similarly, program officials told us that the  contractor underestimated the amount of time required to locate, recruit,  train, and assign qualified personnel to the program. The contractor was  also late in awarding contracts to its major subcontractors. To mitigate the  risk of production cost growth, the contractor established long-term  production agreements with its subcontractors. According to program  officials, in these agreements subcontractors committed in advance to  pricing arrangements for the production of parts and spares. While the  contractor used this strategy to reduce program risk, it resulted in a delay  and the major subcontracts were awarded later than needed to maintain  the program’s initially planned schedule.
section_title: CH-53K Program Has Deferred Performance Capabilities and Relaxed Technical Metrics Associated with Operating and Support Costs
paragraphs: In 2010, the CH-53K program received approval from the Joint  Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to defer three performance  capabilities that make up a portion of the Net-Ready key performance  parameter, and from the Marine Corps to relax two maintenance-based  technical performance metrics—both of which we believe are sound  acquisition decisions. The Department of Defense’s (DOD) decision to  defer three performance capabilities was based on consultation among  JROC, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Chief of Naval Operations staff,  and the program office in 2008, which prompted the CH-53K program  office to review the program’s requirements and identify potential areas in  which to decrease costs. As part of that review, the program office  identified several areas where costs could be deferred without decreasing  capability, including three communications-related performance  capabilities—Link-16, Variable Message Format, and Mode V software— that constituted part of the Net-Ready key performance parameter.  Program officials estimated that this will result in over $100 million in cost  deferral. Program officials explained that these software capabilities were  not removed from the program’s road map, but rather have been deferred  until after IOC. Originally, the program’s Operational Requirements  Document called for all three capabilities to be fully integrated in fiscal  year 2015. However, one of the capabilities must now be fully integrated  no later than 6 months after IOC, which is currently scheduled to occur in  2018, and the other two capabilities must be fully integrated within 2 years  of IOC. Program officials stated that deferment of these capabilities will  not affect aircraft interoperability.
Two technical performance metrics were changed because, according to  program officials, meeting the original maintenance-based technical  performance requirements for Mean Time To Repair and Mean Corrective  Maintenance Time for Operational Mission Failures was not cost  effective. For example, the CH-53K’s rotor blades are designed to have a  two-piece design featuring a removable tip. However, the curing time to  adhere the blade tip to the blade was driving up the time it would take to  remove and replace the blade tip. The contractor proposed meeting the  original requirement by moving to a one-piece blade; however, this would  increase the program’s operating and support costs by approximately $99  per flight hour and increase the logistical footprint of the helicopter. As a  result, the program sought and received approval to relax the performance  metric associated with replacing the blade tip instead of investing the  financial resources necessary to obtain the original metrics or moving to a  one-piece blade.
section_title: Delayed Delivery of the CH-53K Requires Longer Reliance on Costly and Less Reliable Legacy Aircraft
paragraphs: Because of a nearly 3-year delay in initial delivery of the CH-53K, program  officials estimated that it will cost approximately $927 million more to  continue to maintain the CH-53E legacy system. Initial delivery of the CH- 53K to the warfighter is currently scheduled for 2018, a delay of almost 3  years that will require the Marine Corps to rely on legacy aircraft that are  less reliable, more costly to operate and maintain, and less capable of  performing the same mission. This delay, coupled with an increased  demand for the CH-53E in foreign theaters, led the Marine Corps to pull all  available assets from retirement for either reentry into service or to be  used for spare parts. Continued reliance on the CH-53E will be costly, as it  is one of the most expensive helicopters to maintain in the Marine Corps’s  fleet. For example, the drive train of the CH-53E costs approximately  $3,000 per flight hour to maintain. In contrast, the program estimates that  the drive train for the CH-53K—its largest dynamic system—will cost only  $1,000 per flight hour to maintain. In addition, the CH-53K is expected to  have improved reliability and maintainability over the CH-53E legacy  system. For example, the CH-53K’s engine has 60 percent fewer parts than  that of the CH-53E, which the program office believes will result in a more  reliable engine that is easier and less costly to maintain. In addition, the  CH-53K incorporates an aluminum gearbox casing, which will decrease  the need for replacement resulting from corrosion.
Delayed delivery of the CH-53K will also affect the ability of the Marine  Corps to carry out future missions that cannot be performed by the CH- 53E. For example, the CH-53E can carry 15,000 pounds internally  compared to 30,000 pounds for the CH-53K. While the CH-53K is expected  to carry up to 27,000 pounds externally for 110 nautical miles at 91.5°F at  an altitude of 3,000 feet—a Navy operational requirement for high-hot  conditions—the CH-53E can only carry just over 8,000 pounds under the  same conditions. The increased lift capability of the CH-53K during these  conditions may enable it to carry the current and incoming inventory of  up-armored vehicles, which are much heavier than their less-armored  predecessors. For example, the up-armoring of wheeled military vehicles,  such as the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle, and the  introduction of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle have resulted in a military  inventory with weights that are beyond the weight limits of the CH-53E.  According to program officials, without the addition of the CH-53K, the  Marine Corps will soon no longer be able to carry and deliver the military’s  new inventory of wheeled vehicles in high-hot conditions. Figure 1  compares the capabilities and characteristics of the CH-53E and CH-53K.
The combination of the increase in the quantity of heavy-lift helicopters  required to support Marine troop levels and the delayed delivery of the  CH-53K to the warfighter has created a requirement gap for heavy-lift  helicopters of nearly 50 helicopters (nearly 25 percent) over the next 7  years and represents an operational risk to the warfighter. However, the  Marine Corps stated that it is accepting significant risk with the heavy-lift  shortfall and will continue to operate under this gap until the CH-53K  becomes available. Figure 2, which shows the required aircraft quantities,  the current CH-53 series helicopter force structure, and planned CH-53K  production, illustrates the operational risk.
section_title: CH-53K Program Has Made Progress and Adopted Strategies to Address Future Risk
paragraphs: The CH-53K program has made progress addressing the difficulties it faced  early in system development. The program held CDR in July 2010,  demonstrating that it has the potential to move forward successfully. The  program has also adopted mitigation strategies to address future program  risk. The program’s new strategy, as outlined in the President’s fiscal year  2012 budget, lengthens the development schedule, increases development  funding, and delays the production decision by 1 year. However, while the  program’s new acquisition strategy increases development time to mitigate  risk, some testing and production activities remain concurrent, which  could result in costly retrofits if problems are discovered during testing.
subsections: section_title: CH-53K Program Has Made Progress Addressing Earlier Difficulties
paragraphs: The CH-53K program has taken several steps to address some of the  shortfalls that the program experienced early in development. For  example, the program has addressed its cost growth by revising its cost  estimate to align with the current schedule. The program’s 2011 budget  request fully funded the development program to its revised estimate. The  program addressed its early staffing issues by increasing staffing levels  beginning in January 2009 and maintained those levels through completion  of CDR. In addition, the program delayed technical reviews until it was  prepared to move forward, thereby becoming more of an event-driven  rather than a schedule-driven program. An event-driven approach enables  developers to be reasonably certain that their products are more likely to  meet established cost, schedule, and performance baselines. For instance,  the program delayed CDR—a vehicle for making the determination that a  product’s design is stable and capable of meeting its performance  requirements—until all subsystem design reviews were held and more  than 90 percent of engineering designs had been released.
In July 2010, the program completed system integration—a period when  individual components of a system are brought together—culminating  with the program’s CDR. With completion of CDR, the program has  demonstrated that the CH-53K design is stable—an indication that it is  appropriate to proceed into fabrication, demonstration, and testing and  that it is expected that the program can meet stated performance  requirements within cost and schedule. At the time CDR was held, the  program had released 93 percent of its engineering drawings, exceeding  the best practice standard for the completion of system integration.  According to best practices, a high percentage of design drawings—at  least 90 percent—should be completed and released to manufacturing at  CDR. Additionally, the program office stated that all 29 major subsystem  design reviews were held prior to the start of CDR, and that coded  software delivery was ahead of schedule. In the end, the Technical Review  Board, the approving authority for CDR, determined that the program was  ready to transition to system demonstration—a period when the system as  a whole demonstrates its reliability as well as its ability to work in the  intended environment—and identified seven action items, none of which  were determined by the program office to be critical.
section_title: CH-53K Program Has Taken Steps to Address Future Risk
paragraphs: The program has also adopted several mitigation strategies to address  future program risk. The program has established weight improvement  plans to address risks associated with any potential weight increases and  has been able to locate areas where weight reductions can be made. For  example, the program worked with the subcontractor responsible for  designing and manufacturing the floor of the CH-53K to find areas to  reduce weight. The program has also created several working groups to  reduce risk to the overall capabilities of the CH-53K. For example, the  Capabilities Integrated Product Team, which meets on a monthly basis,  was developed to focus on risk relating to the program’s requirements.  This team comprises officials from the program office; Headquarters U.S.  Marine Corps; Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Chief of  Naval Operations staff; the Navy’s Commander, Operational Test and  Evaluation Force, staff; the operational testing squadron; and the  developmental testing squadron. Its members work with the program  office to identify, clarify, and resolve mission-related issues and program  requirements. In addition, the program holds integrating design reviews  every 6 months, freezing the working design in order to hold a system-level  review and manage design risk.
section_title: Future CH-53K Program Risk Remains
paragraphs: The CH-53K program’s schedule contains overlap, or concurrency,  between testing and production. The stated rationale for concurrency is to  introduce systems in a timelier manner or to fulfill an urgent need, to  avoid technology obsolescence, to maintain an efficient industrial  development/production workforce, or a combination of these. While  some concurrency may be beneficial to efficiently transition from  development to production, there is also risk in concurrency. Any changes  in design and manufacturing that require modifications to delivered  aircraft or to tooling and manufacturing processes would result in  increased costs and delays in getting capabilities to the warfighter. In the  past, we have reported a number of examples of the adverse consequences  of concurrent testing and delivery of systems and how concurrency can  place significant investment at risk and increases the chances that costly  design changes will surface during later testing.
The CH-53K program’s original schedule contained concurrency between  testing and aircraft production. In 2009, reflecting the early difficulties  experienced in development, the CH-53K program revised its cost and  schedule estimates. This revised schedule would have reduced the  program’s level of concurrency. For example, while the original program  schedule called for developmental testing to be ongoing during the  production of all three lots of LRIP, the schedule resulting from the 2009  adjustments called for developmental testing to be ongoing during the first  two lots of LRIP. However, the program had concerns that this schedule’s  allowance of approximately 2 years between final delivery of  developmental test aircraft and the beginning of LRIP would create a  production gap that could be costly. As a result, the program office was  considering accelerating procurement funds in an effort to begin  production 1 year earlier than planned and minimize breaks in production.  This consideration was negated, however, as a result of a funding cut that  the program sustained in the process of formulating the President’s fiscal  year 2012 budget.
In February 2011, the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget was released and  outlined changes to the program’s budget and schedule. According to a  program official, the program’s requested budget was reduced by  approximately $30.5 million in fiscal year 2012 (and a total of $94.6 million  between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2015)—funds to be applied to  other DOD priorities. The President’s budget reports that while the CH- 53K program was fully funded to the OSD Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation Office estimate in the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget, the  funding adjustments made to the program in the President’s fiscal year  2012 budget would result in a net increase of $69 million to the  development cost estimate and a schedule delay of approximately 7  months. The new schedule results in later delivery of developmental test  aircraft and delays some testing. As a result, according to program  officials, the production gap issue has been addressed. Another result,  though, is that the program’s new schedule maintains a level of  concurrency similar to that of the original schedule. Program officials have  conceded that concurrency exists within their program, but state that this  concurrency will reduce the operational risk of further delaying IOC. In  commenting on the risks of concurrency, Marine Corps officials noted that  the time allotted prior to the start of production and the small quantity of  LRIP planned reduces the risks of costly retrofits resulting from issues  identified during developmental test. Figure 3 compares the CH-53K  program’s original and new schedules.
LRIP Lot 1 (6)
LRIP Lot 2 (9)
LRIP Lot  (14)
Fll rte prodction (FRP) Lot 4-9 (127)
LRIP Lot 1 (6)
LRIP Lot 2 (9)
LRIP Lot  (14)
FRP (171)
As the CH-53K program moves forward, it is important that further cost  growth and schedule delays are mitigated. The CH-53K program’s new  acquisition strategy addresses previous programmatic issues that led to  early development cost growth and schedule delays.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: DOD provided technical comments on the information in this report,  which GAO incorporated as appropriate, but declined to provide  additional comments.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the  Secretary of the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the  Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The report also is  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Staff members who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine how the CH-53K’s estimates of cost, schedule, and quantity  have changed since the program began development, we received  briefings by program and contractor officials and reviewed budget  documents, annual Selected Acquisition Reports, monthly status reports,  performance indicators, and other data. We compared reported progress  with the program of record and previous years’ data, identified changes in  cost and schedule, and obtained officials’ reasons for these changes. We  interviewed officials from the CH-53K program and the Department of  Defense (DOD) to obtain their views on progress, ongoing concerns, and  actions taken to address them.
To identify the CH-53K’s current acquisition strategy and determine how  this strategy will meet current program targets as well as the warfighter’s  needs, we reviewed the program’s acquisition schedule and other program  documents, such as Selected Acquisition Reports and test plans. We  analyzed the retirement schedule of the legacy CH-53E fleet and discussed  the impact of these retirements on the Marine Corps’s heavy-lift  requirement with appropriate officials. To identify the CH-53K program’s  current acquisition strategy and to determine how the program plans to  meet its new targets and still meet the needs of the warfighter, we  obtained from the program—through program documents—the program’s  revised acquisition plans.
In performing our work, we obtained documents, data, and other  information and met with CH-53K program officials at Patuxent River,  Maryland, and the prime contractor, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, at  Stratford, Connecticut. We met with officials from Headquarters Marine  Corps, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Office of the  Secretary of Defense’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office at  the Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia. We interviewed officials from the Office  of Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,  Office of Developmental Testing and Evaluation, in Arlington, Virginia. We  also met with officials from the Defense Contract Management Agency  who were responsible for the CH-53K program at Stratford, Connecticut.  We drew on prior GAO work related to acquisition best practices and  reviewed analyses and assessments done by DOD.
To assess the reliability of DOD’s cost, schedule, and performance data for  the CH-53K program, we talked with knowledgeable agency officials about  the processes and practices used to generate the data. We determined that  the data we used were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2010 through March  2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, the following staff members made  key contributions to this report: Bruce Thomas, Assistant Director; Noah  Bleicher; Marvin Bonner; Laura Greifner; Laura Jezewski; and Robert  Miller.