Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Competition for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts
Published: 2006-10-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2003, Congress has appropriated more than $20 billion through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) to support Iraq rebuilding efforts. The majority of these efforts are being carried out through contracts awarded by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). When awarding IRRF-funded contracts for $5 million or more noncompetitively, agencies are required by statute to provide notification and justification to Congress. In June 2004, GAO found that agencies generally complied with laws and regulations governing competition to award new contracts, but did not always comply with competition requirements when issuing task orders under existing contracts. As mandated by Congress, this report (1) describes the extent of competition in Iraq reconstruction contracts awarded by DOD, USAID, and State since October 1, 2003, based on available data, and (2) assesses whether these agencies followed applicable documentation and congressional notification requirements regarding competition for 51 judgmentally selected Iraq reconstruction contract actions. In written comments, State and USAID concurred with the report findings. DOD provided a technical comment.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While no single, comprehensive system currently tracks governmentwide Iraq reconstruction contract data, available data showed that from October 1, 2003, through March 31, 2006, DOD, USAID, and State collectively awarded the majority of Iraq reconstruction contracts competitively. Based on competition information we obtained on $10 billion of the total $11.6 billion in IRRF obligations by these agencies during the period of our review, we found that about $9.1 billion--or 91 percent--was for competitively awarded contracts. While our ability to obtain complete competition data for all DOD Iraq reconstruction contract actions was limited because not all DOD components consistently tracked or fully reported this information, we obtained information on approximately $7 billion, or 82 percent, of DOD's total Iraq reconstruction contract obligations, and of this, we found that competition occurred for nearly all of the obligations. Additionally, based on complete data for the period of our review we found that USAID competitively awarded contract actions for 99 percent of its obligations, while State awarded contract actions competitively for only 10 percent of its obligations. GAO reviewed the files for 51 contract actions totaling $1.55 billion--22 of which were awarded noncompetitively and 29 of which were awarded competitively--almost all of which contained proper documentation. One contract file--for a noncompetitively awarded task order issued by State--did not contain justifications or other required documentation. DOD was also unable to provide documentation for 4 of the competitively awarded contract actions. Of the 22 noncompeted contract actions in GAO's review, State should have notified Congress of 2 actions awarded using other than full and open competition in accordance with notification requirements but did not. State officials told GAO that they have taken steps to address the problem. GAO did not identify any DOD or USAID contract actions within the sample that required notification.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 2003, Congress has appropriated more than $20 billion through the  Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) to support Iraq rebuilding  efforts, such as repairing oil facilities, increasing electricity capacity, and  restoring water treatment plants. The majority of these efforts are being  carried out by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and  the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) through contracts  with private sector companies. Widespread congressional interest in  ensuring competition when awarding contracts for Iraq has been evident  since the war in Iraq began. Specifically, in the fiscal year 2004  supplemental appropriation for Iraq, concerns about competition in Iraq  reconstruction contracting led Congress to require that notification and  justification be sent to multiple congressional committees when other than  full and open competition is used to award contracts for $5 million or  more.
In June 2004, GAO reported on contract award procedures for contracts  and task orders to help rebuild Iraq in fiscal year 2003. That report found  agencies generally complied with applicable laws and regulations  governing competition to award new reconstruction contracts. However,  the report also identified several instances in which task orders issued  under existing contracts did not comply with applicable competition  requirements. Appendix III describes actions taken in response to  recommendations made in that report.
The fiscal year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act conference report  required that GAO update its 2004 report on competition in Iraq  reconstruction contracting. In response, this report (1) describes the  extent of competition in Iraq reconstruction contracts awarded by DOD,  USAID, and State since October 1, 2003, based on available data, and (2)  assesses whether these agencies followed applicable documentation and  congressional notification requirements regarding competition for  selected Iraq reconstruction contract actions.
To address these objectives, we focused our review on three agencies, the  Departments of Defense and State and USAID. These three agencies are  responsible for 98 percent of the total obligations made with IRRF. For  the first objective, we obtained data from DOD, USAID, and State on IRRF- funded reconstruction contract actions, including contracts awarded, task  orders issued, and applicable modifications, from October 1, 2003, through  March 31, 2006, with obligations of $1 million or more. For the second  objective, we judgmentally selected 51 contract actions—22 indicated as  noncompeted and 29 indicated as competed—to determine compliance  with competition documentation and congressional notification  requirements as prescribed in statute, regulations, and other guidance. Our  findings regarding documentation and notification are specific to these  selected contract actions and are not projectable to the agencies’ total  contract action universe.
We also reviewed statutory requirements, the Federal Acquisition  Regulation (FAR) and applicable agency supplements, and agency policies  and procedures related to competition in contracting. We interviewed  contracting officers and other procurement officials and reviewed  contract files in Washington, D.C.; Virginia; and Iraq. We did not evaluate  the acquisition strategy used to award the contract actions, whether  justifications for issuing awards noncompetitively were adequate, or  whether task orders were within the scope of the underlying contract.  While GAO and other audit agencies have identified problems in contract  implementation and administration, we did not address these issues within  our review. Appendix I contains the details of our scope and methodology.  We conducted our review from April 2006 through August 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The United States, along with its coalition partners and various  international organizations and donors, has embarked on a significant  effort to rebuild Iraq following multiple wars and years of neglect. In April  2003, Congress passed the Emergency Wartime Supplemental  Appropriations Act, which created the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction  Fund and appropriated approximately $2.48 billion for reconstruction  activities. These funds—referred to as IRRF I—were to be used by USAID,  State, DOD, Treasury, and Health and Human Services for a broad range of  humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. In November 2003, Congress  enacted an additional emergency supplemental appropriations act, which  provided approximately $18.4 billion for reconstruction activities in Iraq.  This appropriation—referred to as IRRF II—focused on security and  infrastructure, and the funding was allocated across multiple sectors.  Additionally, the November 2003 act required that full and open  competition be used to enter into contracts using IRRF funds unless the  use of an authorized statutory exception was properly documented and  approved, and the specified congressional committees notified. As of  August 29, 2006, about 94 percent, or approximately $20 billion, of all IRRF  funds had been obligated by all agencies.
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) generally requires that  federal contracts be awarded on the basis of full and open competition.  This process is intended to permit the government to rely on competitive  market forces to obtain needed goods and services at fair and reasonable  prices. However, the law and implementing regulations recognize that  there may be circumstances under which full and open competition would  be impracticable, such as when contracts need to be awarded quickly to  respond to urgent needs or when there is only one source for the required  product or service. In such cases, agencies are given authority by law to  award contracts without providing for full and open competition (e.g.,  using limited competition or on a sole-source basis), provided that the  proposed approach is appropriately justified, approved, and documented.  Additionally, regarding task orders issued under an existing contract, the  competition law does not require competition beyond that obtained for the  initial contract award, provided the task order does not increase the scope  of the work, period of performance, or maximum value of the contract  under which the order is issued.
section_title: Vast Majority of Reported Contract Obligations Were for Competitive Awards
paragraphs: While no single, comprehensive system currently tracks governmentwide  Iraq reconstruction contract data, we obtained competition information on  $10 billion of the total $11.6 billion in obligations for Iraq reconstruction  contracts collectively awarded by DOD, USAID, and State from October 1,  2003, through March 31, 2006, and found that about $9.1 billion, or 91  percent, of the obligations was for competitive awards. We obtained  information on approximately $7 billion of the $8.55 billion DOD obligated  and found that competition occurred for nearly all of the obligations. Both  USAID and State provided information on all of their IRRF obligations  made during the period of our review. However, where USAID information  showed that almost all of its Iraq reconstruction contract obligations were  for competitive awards, State information showed that few of its contract  action obligations were for competitive awards. Figure 1 shows a  breakdown of the three agencies’ competed and noncompeted contract  actions based on available data.
subsections: section_title: Most DOD Obligations Were for Competitively Awarded Contract Actions
paragraphs: Based on available data, we found that the majority of DOD’s IRRF  contract obligations incurred during the period we reviewed were for  competitive awards. Competition information was available for  approximately 82 percent of DOD’s total $8.55 billion in Iraq  reconstruction contract obligations. Of this, we found that DOD  competitively awarded about $6.83 billion, and noncompetitively awarded  about $189 million. Most of the DOD offices we spoke with reported that,  when possible, contract actions were competed.
JCC-I/A—the office performing the majority of Iraq contracting for the  DOD offices we reviewed—and its predecessor organizations, including  the Project and Contracting Office and Program Management Office,  obligated $3.82 billion, of which $3.81 billion was obligated for competitive  awards. Additionally, the other DOD offices we reviewed, including the  Army Corps of Engineers’ Gulf Region Division and Transatlantic  Programs Center; the Army’s TACOM Life Cycle Management Command;  and the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence obligated  approximately $2.25 billion, and of these obligations, approximately $2.08  billion were for competitive awards and $177 million for noncompetitive  awards. Furthermore, the Army Corps of Engineers’ Southwestern  Division competitively awarded two contracts to rebuild Iraqi oil  infrastructure with obligations totaling $941 million.
Complete information on DOD’s contract actions and competition type for  the period of our review was not available, in part because not all offices  consistently tracked or reported this information. Currently, DOD is  transitioning its contract-writing systems to interface with the Federal  Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG). Until this  transition is completed, the majority of DOD components are expected to  use DD Form 350s to report contract actions. However, we found that  while the DD 350 system tracks competition information by contract, not  all offices report their contracts to the system. For example, the JCC-I/A  and its predecessor organizations did not fully input detailed, individual  contract action information into DOD-wide systems including DD 350,  which would provide information on competition. Furthermore, according  to JCC-I/A officials, JCC-I/A did not track competition information until  after May 2005. Consequently, we relied on multiple sources in order to  obtain competition information for the DOD components within our  review.
section_title: Almost All USAID Contract Obligations Were for Competitive Awards
paragraphs: USAID provided competition information for 100 percent of the $2.27  billion in IRRF contract obligations that the agency reported incurring  between October 1, 2003, and March 31, 2006. These data indicated that  USAID competitively awarded contract actions for about $2.25 billion, or  99 percent, of the approximately $2.27 billion it obligated; approximately  $20.4 million, or about 1 percent, of these obligations were  noncompetitively awarded. Agency contracting staff reported that USAID  has pursued competition with very few exceptions when awarding  contracts and issuing task orders for Iraq reconstruction.
During our contract file review, we identified three instances in which the  competition information provided by USAID was inaccurate. In two cases,  USAID reported contracts as being awarded competitively when they were  actually awarded under limited competition. In the third case, USAID  reported a contract as “not competed,” when it was actually awarded  competitively. In each of these instances, we used corrected competition  information for our analysis.
section_title: Only Small Percentage of State Contract Obligations Were for Competitive Awards
paragraphs: State obligated the smallest portion of IRRF funding among the three  agencies, however, it incurred most if its obligations for noncompetitive  awards. State provided competition information for 100 percent of the  $762 million in IRRF contract obligations that the agency reported  incurring between October 1, 2003, and March 31, 2006. These data  indicated that State incurred obligations of approximately $73 million in  competitive awards, or approximately 10 percent, of the approximate $762  million it obligated for IRRF contract actions; approximately $688 million,  or about 90 percent, of these obligations were incurred under  noncompetitive awards. In several of these cases, State cited urgency as  the reason for awarding the contract actions noncompetitively.  Specifically, justifications in two of the contract files we reviewed cited  FAR § 6.302-2, unusual and compelling urgency, as the basis for using  other than full and open competitive procedures. Additionally, one task  order we reviewed was an unauthorized commitment that had to be  ratified by State. The ratification amounted to the issuance of a  noncompetitive task order to the contractor.
During our contract file review, we identified three instances in which the  competition information provided by State was inaccurate. In two of these  cases, we found that contracts that were reported as awarded  competitively were actually awarded noncompetitively. In the third case,  State misclassified the competition type reported for a contract that was  awarded competitively. In each of these instances, we used corrected  competition information for our analysis.
section_title: Agencies Generally Provided Necessary Documentation but Did Not Always Comply with Congressional Notification Requirements
paragraphs: We reviewed 51 contract actions totaling $1.55 billion—35 at DOD, 11 at  USAID, and 5 at State. We found that the agencies generally followed the  FAR and the applicable agency supplements regarding documentation  requirements for contract actions but did not always comply with  congressional notification requirements. Of the 51 contract actions that we  reviewed, 22 were awarded noncompetitively, while 29 were awarded  competitively.  Only 1 of the 22 noncompetitive contract action files did  not contain justifications or other documentation as required in the FAR  or agency supplements. Of the 29 competed contract actions, DOD was  unable to provide documentation that competition had occurred, such as  evidence of bidders or price negotiation memos, in 4 cases. Additionally,  of the 22 noncompeted contract actions, State should have notified  Congress of 2 actions it awarded using other than full and open  competition in accordance with the notification requirements. While State  failed to provide the required notifications, State officials told us that they  have taken steps to address the problem for future awards. Within our  sample, we did not find any additional instances where DOD, USAID, and  State should have notified Congress of a noncompeted award but did not.
subsections: section_title: Contract Action Files Generally Contained Required Documentation
paragraphs: Of the 35 DOD IRRF contract actions we reviewed, 15 were indicated as  noncompeted and 20 indicated as competed. The files for the 15  noncompeted contract actions contained documentation required by the  FAR, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement and the Army  Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. Of the 15 noncompeted  actions, 4 were sole source contract awards; 4 were awarded using limited  competition; 3 were noncompeted task orders under a multiple award  IDIQ contract; 3 were sole source awards under the 8(a) program; and 1  was an out of scope modification. Based on our review, all of the contract  actions that were awarded non-competitively had justification and  approval documentation citing the reason for either limiting competition  or using a sole source award when required. For example, JCC-I/A  partially terminated an IDIQ contract used to rebuild hospitals in Iraq. In  order to complete the remaining work, JCC-I/A awarded a series of sole  source contracts to the remaining Iraqi subcontractors to complete the  work. In another example, the Project and Contracting Office awarded a  series of contracts using limited competition to pave roads in 13  governorates in Iraq, citing unusual and compelling urgent circumstances  due to security concerns and limited manpower to evaluate all  submissions from Iraqi firms. For the 20 competed DOD contract actions,  16 files included documentation that competition occurred, such as  evidence of bidders or price negotiation memos when required. However,  DOD was unable to provide supporting evidence for the remaining 4  contract actions that were indicated as competed.
Of the 11 USAID contract actions we reviewed, 3 were indicated as  noncompeted and 8 indicated as competed. The files for all 3  noncompeted actions included the documentation required by the FAR  and the Agency for International Development Acquisition Regulation  (AIDAR) regarding competition. Two of these contracts were awarded  under limited competition—one for catering services and one for armored  vehicles—providing an opportunity for multiple vendors to submit bids.  For both of these contracts, USAID used a blanket waiver authority  provided by the USAID Administrator pursuant to section 706.302- 70(b)(3)(ii) of the AIDAR. This waiver was originally signed in January of  2003, later renewed in June 2004, and again in August 2005, and the agency  is currently working on a 2006 version. The third noncompeted action was  a modification extending the performance period and increasing the total  award amount for a contract for facility security. The files for the 8  competed USAID contract actions included documentation that  competition occurred, such as evidence of bidders or price negotiation  memos.
Finally, of the 5 State contract actions we reviewed, 4 were indicated as  noncompeted and 1 indicated as competed. Of the 4 noncompeted actions,  2 were single-award contracts for protective services, and 2 were task  orders for police and guard services off of 1 IDIQ contract. The files for  the 2 single-award contracts and one of the task orders included all of the  documentation required by the FAR and the Department of State  Acquisition Regulation (DOSAR) regarding competition. However, the file  for one of the task orders for construction of a police training facility did  not include documentation regarding the basis for using an exception to  the fair opportunity process, as required in FAR § 16.505. The file for the  1 competed contract action included documentation that competition  occurred, such as evidence of bidders or price negotiation memos.
section_title: State Did Not Always Provide Required Congressional Notifications
paragraphs: Of the 22 noncompeted contract actions in our review, State should have  notified Congress of 2 actions it awarded using other than full and open  competition in accordance with the congressional notification requirement  in section 2202 of Public Law 108-106 but did not.
State failed to notify Congress when awarding 2 letter contracts for  personal protective services noncompetitively. State indicated that the  department failed to comply with the notification requirement in these two  cases because the Office of Acquisitions Management, which is  responsible for awarding and administering contracts at State, was not  notified that IRRF funds were applied to these contracts by the relevant  program office. State officials told us they have coordinated with program  office staff to ensure that they communicate funding types to contracting  staff in the future.  We did not identify any USAID or DOD contract actions  within our sample that required congressional notification.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We requested comments from DOD, USAID, and State on a draft of this  report. DOD provided only one technical comment, which was  incorporated into the report. USAID reviewed the report and found it to be  factually correct.  State acknowledged our findings and provided  additional information regarding steps taken to address the section 2202  reporting requirement. Comments from State and USAID appear in  appendixes IV and V.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and  State; the Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development; and  the Commanding General and Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers. We will make copies available to others on request. In addition,  this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report.  If you have any questions about  this report, please contact me at (202)-512-4841.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: The fiscal year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act conference report  required that GAO update its 2004 report on the extent of competition for  Iraq reconstruction contracts. In response, we focused our review on  reconstruction contract actions funded solely with the Iraq Relief and  Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). IRRF represents the largest amount of U.S.  appropriated funds for reconstruction purposes. Other sources of U.S.  funding for Iraq military, reconstruction, and stabilization efforts that are  not included in our review are the Iraq Security Forces Fund, the  Commander’s Emergency Response Program, and the Commander’s  Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Program. Additionally, the  congressional notification requirement in section 2202 of Public Law 108- 106 that was included in our review applies only to contract awards  funded with IRRF.
We included the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the  U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as these agencies are  responsible for 98 percent of the total obligations made with IRRF through  June 2006. Additionally, within DOD, we used the Corps of Engineers  Financial Management System (CEFMS) data to select individual  components to include in our review that were responsible for the  majority of IRRF II contracting during the time period of our review. The  components we selected included the Joint Contracting Command- Iraq/Afghanistan, Army Corps of Engineers’ Gulf Region Division and  Transatlantic Programs Center, Army’s TACOM Life Cycle Management  Command, and the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence.
To determine the approximate number of reconstruction contract actions,  the types of actions, the funding sources, and the competition type of such  actions, we found that no single source of information contained suitable  amounts of both contracting actions issued using IRRF monies and  competition information. Therefore, to obtain DOD data, CEFMS was  selected as the basis for DOD’s IRRF contract universe due to the fact that  it is the payment system for most of the major offices performing DOD  contracting and presented the most complete contract action list. Using  CEFMS, we identified DOD components based on the Department of  Defense Activity Address Code, and selected offices to include in our  review based on total obligations under IRRF II. Since CEFMS does not  capture competition information, however, we attempted to cross- reference contracts found in CEFMS with DOD’s DD Form 350 Individual  Contracting Action Report database. However, at the time of our review,  we found that DD 350 did not include fiscal year 2006 data and not all DOD  components fully reported contract actions to DD 350. As a result, we  contacted the individual DOD components selected for inclusion in our  review and requested competition information for the offices’ contracting  actions funded with IRRF monies.
To obtain IRRF-funded contract actions from USAID and State, we relied  on agency-provided data, since the Federal Procurement Data System- Next Generation (FPDS-NG) did not contain any of USAID’s contracting  actions at the time we began our review. Although State’s contracting  actions were contained within FPDS-NG, the system did not indicate  which actions were funded using IRRF money and other criteria needed  for our review.
We judgmentally selected 51 contract actions for further review to  determine compliance with documentation requirements as prescribed in  statutes, regulations, and other guidance, such as justification and  approval documentation for noncompeted actions, and synopses of  proposed contract actions, price negotiation memos, and evidence of  bidder’s lists for competed actions. To determine the applicable  documentation requirements and policies governing competition when  awarding contract actions, we reviewed the requirements of the  Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 and the Federal Acquisition  Regulation, and additional agency regulations including the Defense  Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Army Federal Acquisitions  Regulation Supplement, Agency for International Development Acquisition  Regulation, Department of State Acquisition Regulation, and other  guidance. The contract actions were selected based on the following  criteria:  reconstruction contract actions funded with IRRF monies;    actions awarded from October 1, 2003, through March 31, 2006;    current obligations of $1 million or more;   represented both competed and noncompeted actions;    selected more actions from DOD than USAID and State based on  volume of contract actions obtained;  included a variety of contracts, task orders, and modifications; and  included a variety of goods and services provided.
Our findings regarding documentation are specific to these selected  contract actions and are not projectable to the agencies’ total contract  action universe. Of the 51 contract actions selected, 22 were indicated as  awarded noncompetitively and 29 were indicated as awarded  competitively. We included competitively awarded actions in our review to  verify the accuracy of reported actions and confirm evidence of  competition. In the few cases noted where actions were incorrectly  reported as competed or noncompeted by USAID and State, we corrected  the errors as appropriate for use in our analysis. Given that our actions to  corroborate the data contained within agency systems or provided by the  agencies identified only a few errors, which we corrected, we believe the  data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
To determine whether agencies complied with the congressional  notification requirement contained in section 2202 of Public Law 108-106,  we reviewed agency contract data within our selected contract actions to  identify instances where the reporting requirement would apply and  followed up with officials where appropriate.
In order to review and understand the contract files selected, we  interviewed DOD, USAID, and State contracting officers and other  procurement officials in Washington, D.C.; Virginia; and Iraq. Where  possible, we obtained electronic documentation from agency officials.  Appendix II lists the Iraq reconstruction contract actions we reviewed.
We conducted our work between April 2006 and August 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Iraq Reconstruction Contract Actions and Obligations Reviewed
subsections: section_title: U.S. Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence
paragraphs: Names of Iraqi firms not listed.
section_title: Appendix III: Actions Taken in Response to GAO-04-605, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management Challenges
subsections: section_title: GAO recommendations from GAO-04-605 Iraq reconstruction contracting
paragraphs: To ensure that task orders issued to rebuild Iraq comply with  applicable requirements, and to maximize incentives for the  contractors to ensure effective cost control, the Secretary of  the Army should review the out-of-scope task orders for Iraqi  media and subject matter experts issued by the Defense  Contracting Command-Washington (DCC-W) and take any  necessary remedial actions.
DCC-W agreed with the GAO findings concerning out-of-scope work  for the orders awarded to SAIC for the Iraqi Media Network and the  subject matter experts. Contracting officers ordering the out-of-scope  work have been made aware that their actions were improper. DCC- W has instituted agencywide training in a number of topics, including  the need to carefully review the scope of work of a contract to  determine what may be legitimately ordered from that contract. This  training will be periodically repeated. In addition, its postaward  reviews will include an assessment of whether requiring work is within  the scope of the basic contract.
GAO and DOD consider this recommendation closed.
To ensure that task orders issued to rebuild Iraq comply with  applicable requirements, and to maximize incentives for the  contractors to ensure effective cost control, the Secretary of  the Army should ensure that any future task orders under the  Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract for  Iraq reconstruction activities are within the scope of that  contract.
According to DOD, the Procuring Contracting Officer for the LOGCAP  contract reviews each proposed scope of work that will result in a  task order and makes a determination whether the action is within the  scope of the contract and obtains appropriate legal advice as  necessary.
GAO and DOD consider this recommendation closed.
To ensure that task orders issued to rebuild Iraq comply with  applicable requirements, and to maximize incentives for the  contractors to ensure effective cost control, the Secretary of  the Army should address and resolve all outstanding issues in  connection with the pending Justifications and Approvals for  the contracts and related task orders used by the Army Corps  of Engineers to restore Iraq’s electricity infrastructure.
As of June 2006, the justifications and approvals were being  processed for Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,  Logistics and Technology, approval.
GAO considers this recommendation open, though Defense  Procurement and Acquisition Policy has indicated that this  recommendation will be closed in the near term.
To ensure that task orders issued to rebuild Iraq comply with  applicable requirements, and to maximize incentives for the  contractors to ensure effective cost control, the Secretary of  the Army should direct the Commanding General, Army Field  Support Command, and the Commanding General and Chief  of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to definitize  outstanding contracts and task orders as soon as possible.
DOD has definitized, or reached agreement on key terms and  conditions for, all of the six contract actions identified in our June  2004 report. We noted in our March 2005 report entitled, High-Level  DOD Coordination is Needed to Further Improve the Management of  the Army’s LOGCAP Contract (GAO-05-328), that the Army had  made improvements in definitizing task orders issued under the  LOGCAP contract.
GAO and DOD consider this recommendation closed.
To improve the delivery of acquisition support in future  operations, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the  Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development,  should evaluate the lessons learned in Iraq and develop a  strategy for ensuring that adequate acquisition staff and other  resources can be made available in a timely manner.
In November 2005, DOD issued directive 3000.05, Military Support  for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations,  which, in part, required that DOD ensure proper oversight of contracts  in stability operations and ensure U.S. commanders deployed in  foreign countries are able to secure contract support rapidly. DOD is  also working on developing joint contingency contracting policy and  doctrine and assessing DOD’s contract administration services  capability for theater support contracts. The estimated completion  data of the ongoing actions is fall 2006.
GAO considers this recommendation open.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Major contributors to this report were John Neumann, Daniel Chen, Kate  France, Julia Kennon, John Krump, Art James, Shannon Simpson, Karen  Sloan, Adam Vodraska, and Aaron Young.