Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to Implement and Assess Infrastructure and Technology
Published: 2015-05-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DHS has employed a variety of technology, infrastructure, and other assets to help secure the border. For example, in January 2011, CBP developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, which includes seven acquisition programs related to fixed and mobile surveillance systems, agent-portable devices, and ground sensors. CBP has also deployed tactical infrastructure--fencing, roads, and lights--and tactical communications (radio systems) and uses air and marine assets to secure the border. In recent years, GAO has reported on a variety of DHS border security programs and operations.
This statement addresses some of the key issues and recommendations GAO has made in the following areas: (1) DHS's efforts to implement the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and deploy tactical infrastructure, (2) CBP's and ICE's efforts to modernize radio systems, and (3) OAM mix and placement of assets. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from September 2009 through April 2015, along with selected updates conducted in April and May 2015 to obtain information from DHS on actions it has taken to address prior GAO recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO reported in March 2014 that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), had made progress in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan), but that CBP could strengthen its management and assessment of the Plan's programs. Specifically, GAO reported that CBP's schedules and life-cycle cost estimates for the Plan and its three highest-cost programs met some but not all best practices and recommended that CBP ensure that its schedules and estimates more fully address best practices, such as validating its cost estimates with independent estimates. CBP concurred and is taking steps toward addressing GAO's recommendations, such as planning to update cost estimates by the end of calendar year 2015. Further, in March 2014, GAO reported that while CBP had identified mission benefits of technologies to be deployed under the Plan, such as improved situational awareness, the agency had not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies, as GAO recommended. In April 2015, GAO reported that CBP had identified a set of potential key attributes for performance metrics for deployed technologies and CBP officials stated that by the end of fiscal year 2015, baselines for each performance measure will be developed and the agency will begin using the data to evaluate the contributions of specific technology assets.
In March 2015, GAO reported that DHS, CBP, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had taken steps to upgrade tactical communications equipment and infrastructure, such as completing full modernization projects in four of the nine southwest border sectors, but could benefit by developing performance and program plans. Since rolling out upgrades--which include replacing and updating equipment and expanding infrastructure--CBP had not established an ongoing performance monitoring plan to determine whether the systems were working as intended. CBP agreed to develop such a plan, as GAO recommended, and is working to complete the plan by the end of 2015. Further, GAO reported in March 2015 that ICE did not have a program plan to manage its portfolio of modernization projects. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation to develop a plan and stated that ICE will develop a program to facilitate, coordinate, and maintain ICE's radio systems, and document resource needs, define program goals, and establish performance measures by January 2016.
In March 2012, GAO reported that the Office of Air and Marine (OAM) within CBP could benefit from reassessing its mix and placement of assets to better address mission needs and threats. GAO reported that OAM should clearly document the linkage of deployment decisions to mission needs and threat and its analysis and assessments used to support its decisions on the mix and placement of assets. GAO also reported that OAM could consider how border technology deployment will affect customer requirements for OAM assets. GAO recommended that CBP reassess the mix and placement of OAM's assets to include mission requirements, among other things. CBP concurred, and after May 2013, OAM began a realignment of personnel, aircraft, and vessels from the northern border to the southern border based on its evaluation of the utilization and efficiency of current assets and available funding to accomplish the transfers. In April 2015, OAM officials stated that they are working to provide GAO with the data and analysis used to support the realignment of assets.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: In its prior work, GAO made recommendations to DHS to strengthen its management of plans and programs, tactical communications, and mix and placement of OAM assets. DHS generally agreed and plans to address the recommendations. Consequently, GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) efforts to acquire and deploy various assets to secure  U.S. borders. In the years since DHS’s inception, increased activity  across the nation’s borders has led to an increase of agency resources.  For instance, at the end of fiscal year 2004, the first full year DHS existed  as an agency, it had about 10,500 agents assigned to patrol the U.S. land  borders and about 17,600 officers inspecting travelers at air, land, and  sea ports of entry (POE). At the end of fiscal year 2014, approximately  21,000 agents were assigned to patrol the U.S. land borders and more  than 22,000 officers were assigned to air, land, and sea POEs.
In addition to this increase in personnel, DHS has employed a variety of  technology, infrastructure, and other assets to assist with its efforts to  secure the border. For example, in November 2005, DHS announced the  launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program, which was  responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system  using technology, known as the Secure Border Initiative Network  (SBInet), and tactical infrastructure—fencing, roads, and lighting—along  the southwest border to deter smugglers and aliens attempting to illegally  cross the border. In January 2011, in response to internal and external  assessments that identified concerns regarding the performance, cost,  and schedule for implementing the systems, the Secretary of Homeland  Security announced the cancellation of further procurements of SBInet  systems. After the cancellation of SBInet, CBP developed the Arizona  Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan), in January 2011, which  includes a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras to help provide security  for the remainder of the Arizona border. Moreover, DHS has continued to  deploy other tactical infrastructure along the southwest border.
DHS is also utilizing surveillance technology, tactical communications  (TACCOM) systems, and other assets to assist its efforts to more  effectively and efficiently secure the border. For instance, CBP and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents and officers  responsible for securing the southwest border depend on land-mobile  radio systems (radio systems) for secure, reliable, and timely exchanges  of critical information to effectively carry out their mission, especially in  remote areas along the southwest border. Further, CBP components,  including the Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol), also rely on the  support of Office of Air and Marine (OAM) aircraft, vessels, and crew to  help enforce border security. Within CBP, OAM operates a fleet of air and  marine assets in support of federal border security efforts.
Over the years, we have reported on the progress and challenges DHS  faces in implementing its border security efforts. My statement discusses  our key findings in the following areas:
DHS’s effort to implement the Arizona Border Surveillance  Technology Plan and deploy tactical infrastructure,
CBP’s and ICE’ s efforts to modernize radio systems, and
OAM mix and placement of assets.
This statement is based on related reports and testimonies we issued  from 2009 through 2015 that examined DHS efforts to secure the U.S.  border (see Related GAO Products at the end of this statement). It also  includes selected updates we conducted in April and May 2015 on DHS’s  efforts to address our previous recommendations. Our reports and  testimonies incorporated information we obtained and analyzed from  officials from various DHS components and state and local law  enforcement agencies. More detailed information about our scope and  methodology can be found in our reports and testimonies. For the  updates, we collected information from DHS on actions it has taken to  address findings and recommendations made in prior reports on which  this statement is based. We conducted all of this work in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: CBP Has Taken Steps to Strengthen the Management of and Assess the Effectiveness of Its Border Surveillance Technologies and Fencing, but Additional Actions Are Needed
subsections: section_title: CBP Plans to Update Program Schedules and Life-Cycle Cost Estimates, but Has Not Yet Provided Complete Information to Reflect It Is Following Best Practices
paragraphs: In March 2014 and April 2015, we reported that CBP had made progress  in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology  Plan, but that CBP could take additional action to strengthen its  management of the Plan and the Plan’s various programs. The Plan’s  seven acquisition programs include fixed and mobile surveillance  systems, agent portable devices, and ground sensors. Its three-highest  cost programs which represent 97 percent of the Plan’s estimated cost  are the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT), Remote Video Surveillance System  (RVSS), and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC).
In March 2014, we found that CBP had a schedule for each of the Plan’s  seven programs, and that four of the programs would not meet their  originally planned completion dates. We also found that some of the  programs had experienced delays relative to their baseline schedules, as  of March 2013. More recently, in our April 2015 assessment of DHS’s  major acquisitions programs, we reported on the status of the IFT  program in particular, noting that from March 2012 to September 2014,  the program’s initial operational capability date had slipped from the end  of September 2013 to the end of September 2015. CBP officials said that  this slip occurred because the program released its request for proposals  behind schedule, and then received more proposals than anticipated. The  subsequent bid protest extended the slip. CBP officials said these delays  contributed to the IFT’s full operational capability slip, but funding  shortfalls are the major contributor to the delay. Originally, full operational  capability was scheduled to occur by September 2015, but as of  December 2014, it was scheduled for March 2022. The IFT program  anticipated it would receive less than half the fiscal year 2015 funding it  needed to remain on track, and it anticipated its funding plan would be  reduced further in the future. As a result of this expected funding  shortage, the program anticipated it would be able to deliver 24 of 52  planned IFT units, with the funding through 2020, and that it planned to  deploy the IFT units to three of the six original Border Patrol Station areas  of responsibility. Furthermore, the Chief of the Border Patrol had informed  the program that 12 of the 28 remaining IFT units systems are not needed  given changing threats.
Further, with regard to schedules, scheduling best practices are  summarized into four characteristics of reliable schedules— comprehensive, well constructed, credible, and controlled (i.e., schedules  are periodically updated and progress is monitored). We assessed  CBP’s schedules as of March 2013 for the three highest-cost programs  and found in March 2014 that schedules for two of the programs at least  partially met each characteristic (i.e., satisfied about half of the criterion),  and the schedule for the other program at least minimally met each  characteristic (i.e., satisfied a small portion of the criterion). For example,  the schedule for the IFT program partially met the characteristic of being  credible in that CBP had performed a schedule risk analysis for the  program, but the risk analysis was not based on any connection between  risks and specific activities. For the MSC program, the schedule minimally  met the characteristic of being controlled in that it did not have valid  baseline dates for activities or milestones by which CBP could track  progress. We recommended that CBP ensure that scheduling best  practices are applied to the IFT, RVSS, and MSC schedules. DHS  concurred with the recommendation and stated that CBP planned to  ensure that scheduling best practices would be applied as far as practical  when updating the three programs’ schedules. In May 2015, CBP  provided us a summary of its completed and planned milestones for the  IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs. However, CBP has not provided us with  a complete program schedule for the IFT, RVSS, and MSC, and,  therefore, we cannot determine the extent to which the agency has  followed best practices when updating the respective schedules.
In March 2014, we also found that CBP had not developed an Integrated  Master Schedule for the Plan in accordance with best practices. Rather,  CBP had used separate schedules for each program to manage  implementation of the Plan, as CBP officials stated that the Plan contains  individual acquisition programs rather than integrated programs.  However, collectively these programs are intended to provide CBP with a  combination of surveillance capabilities to be used along the Arizona  border with Mexico, and resources are shared among the programs.  According to scheduling best practices, an Integrated Master Schedule is  a critical management tool for complex systems that involve a number of  different projects, such as the Plan, to allow managers to monitor all work  activities, how long activities will take, and how the activities are related to  one another. We concluded that developing and maintaining an  integrated master schedule for the Plan could help provide CBP a  comprehensive view of the Plan and help CBP better understand how  schedule changes in each individual program could affect implementation  of the overall plan. We recommended that CBP develop an integrated  master schedule for the Plan. CBP did not concur with this  recommendation and maintained that an integrated master schedule for  the Plan in one file undermines the DHS-approved implementation  strategy for the individual programs making up the Plan, and that the  implementation of this recommendation would essentially create a large,  aggregated program, and effectively create an aggregated “system of  systems.” DHS further stated that a key element of the Plan has been the  disaggregation of technology procurements. However, as we noted in the  report, collectively these programs are intended to provide CBP with a  combination of surveillance capabilities to be used along the Arizona  border with Mexico. Moreover, while the programs themselves may be  independent of one another, the Plan’s resources are being shared  among the programs. We continue to believe that developing an  integrated master schedule for the Plan is needed. Developing and  maintaining an integrated master schedule for the Plan could allow CBP  insight into current or programmed allocation of resources for all  programs as opposed to attempting to resolve any resource constraints  for each program individually.
In addition, in March 2014, we reported that the life-cycle cost estimates  for the Plan reflected some, but not all, best practices. Cost-estimating  best practices are summarized into four characteristics—well  documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible. Our analysis of  CBP’s estimate for the Plan and estimates completed at the time of our  review for the two highest-cost programs—the IFT and RVSS programs— showed that these estimates at least partially met three of these  characteristics: well documented, comprehensive, and accurate. In terms  of being credible, these estimates had not been verified with independent  cost estimates in accordance with best practices. We concluded that  ensuring that scheduling best practices were applied to the programs’  schedules and verifying life-cycle cost estimates with independent  estimates could help better ensure the reliability of the schedules and  estimates, and we recommended that CBP verify the life-cycle cost  estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs with independent cost  estimates and reconcile any differences. DHS concurred with this  recommendation, but stated that at this point it does not believe that there  would be a benefit in expending funds to obtain independent cost  estimates and that if the costs realized to date continue to hold, there may  be no requirement or value added in conducting full-blown updates with  independent cost estimates. We recognize the need to balance the cost  and time to verify the life-cycle cost estimates with the benefits to be  gained from verification with independent cost estimates. However, we  continue to believe that independently verifying the life-cycle cost  estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs and reconciling any  differences, consistent with best practices, could help CBP better ensure  the reliability of the estimates. As of May 2015, CBP officials stated that  the agency plans to update the life-cycle cost estimates for the three of its  highest-cost programs under the Plan, including IFT and RVSS, by the  end of calendar year 2015.
section_title: CBP Has Made Progress toward Assessing Performance of Surveillance Technologies and Fencing, but Has Not Yet Fully Applied Performance Metrics or Assessed the Contributions of its Technologies
paragraphs: We reported in March 2014 that CBP identified the mission benefits of its  surveillance technologies, as we recommended in November 2011. More  specifically, CBP had identified mission benefits of surveillance  technologies to be deployed under the Plan, such as improved situational  awareness and agent safety. However, we also reported that the agency  had not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all  surveillance technology to be deployed as part of the Plan, as we  recommended in November 2011. As of May 2015, CBP had identified a  set of potential key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies  to be deployed under the Plan; however, CBP officials stated that this set  of measures was under review as the agency continues to refine the  measures to better inform the nature of the contributions and impacts of  surveillance technology on its border security mission. While CBP has  yet to apply these measures, CBP established a time line for developing  performance measures for each technology. CBP officials stated that by  the end of fiscal year 2015, baselines for each performance measure will  be developed, at which time the agency plans to begin using the data to  evaluate the individual and collective contributions of specific technology  assets deployed under the Plan. Moreover, CBP plans to establish a tool  by the end of fiscal year 2016 that explains the qualitative and  quantitative impacts of technology and tactical infrastructure on situational  awareness in specific areas of the border environment. While these are  positive steps, until CBP completes its efforts to fully develop and apply  key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed  under the Plan, it will not be able to fully assess its progress in  implementing the Plan and determine when mission benefits have been  fully realized.
Moreover, in March 2014, we found that CBP does not capture complete  data on the contributions of these technologies, which in combination with  other relevant performance metrics or indicators could be used to better  determine the contributions of CBP’s surveillance technologies and inform  resource allocation decisions. Although CBP has a field within its  Enforcement Integrated Database for maintaining data on whether  technological assets, such as SBInet surveillance towers, and  nontechnological assets, such as canine teams, assisted or contributed to  the apprehension of illegal entrants and seizure of drugs and other  contraband, according to CBP officials, Border Patrol agents were not  required to record these data. This limited CBP’s ability to collect, track,  and analyze available data on asset assists to help monitor the  contribution of surveillance technologies, including its SBInet system, to  Border Patrol apprehensions and seizures and inform resource allocation  decisions. We recommended that CBP require data on asset assists to be  recorded and tracked within its database and that once these data were  required to be recorded and tracked, analyze available data on  apprehensions and technological assists, in combination with other  relevant performance metrics or indicators, as appropriate, to determine  the contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP’s border security  efforts. CBP concurred with our recommendations and has taken steps to  address it. In June 2014, in response to our recommendation, CBP  issued guidance informing Border Patrol agents that the asset assist data  field within its database was now a mandatory data field. Agents are  required to enter any assisting surveillance technology or other  equipment before proceeding. While this is a positive step, to fully  address our recommendations, CBP needs to analyze data on  apprehensions and seizures, in combination with other relevant  performance metrics, to determine the contribution of surveillance  technologies to its border security mission.
In addition, with regard to fencing and tactical infrastructure, CBP  reported that from fiscal year 2005 through May 2015, the total miles of  vehicle and pedestrian fencing along 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico border  increased from approximately 120 miles to 652 miles. With the completion of the new fencing and other tactical infrastructure, DHS is  now responsible for maintaining this infrastructure including repairing  breached sections of fencing which cost the department at least $7.2  million in 2010, as reported by CBP. Moreover, we have previously  reported on CBP’s efforts to assess the impact of fencing and tactical  infrastructure on border security. Specifically, in our May 2010 and  September 2009 reports, we found that CBP had not accounted for the  impact of its investment in border fencing and infrastructure on border  security. CBP had reported an increase in control of southwest border  miles, but could not account separately for the impact of the border  fencing and other infrastructure. In September 2009, we recommended  that CBP determine the contribution of border fencing and other  infrastructure to border security. DHS concurred with our  recommendation, and in response, CBP contracted with the Homeland  Security Studies and Analysis Institute to conduct an analysis of the  impact of tactical infrastructure on border security.
section_title: DHS Components Have Taken Steps to Address Radio Interoperability Challenges, but Could Better Manage These Efforts
subsections: section_title: DHS Components Have Taken Steps to Upgrade Tactical Communications Equipment and Infrastructure, but Could Benefit by Developing Performance and Program Plans
paragraphs: To effectively carry out their respective border security missions, CBP  and ICE agents and officers require interoperable communications—the  capability of different electronic communications systems to readily  connect with one another to enable timely communications—with one  another and with state and local agencies, as we reported in March  2015. In 2008, DHS components, including CBP and ICE, initiated  individual TACCOM modernization programs to upgrade radio systems  that were past expected service life to improve the performance of these  systems and to help achieve interoperability across federal, state, and  local agencies that are responsible for securing the border. In March  2015, we reported that from 2009 through 2013, CBP completed full  modernization projects in 4 of the 9 sectors that constitute the southwest  border. In these 4 sectors, Yuma, Tucson, Rio Grande Valley, and El  Paso, CBP has (1) upgraded outdated analog tactical communications  equipment and infrastructure to digital systems and (2) expanded  coverage and provided capacity enhancements by procuring additional  equipment and building out new tower sites in areas where CBP agents  operate that were not previously covered with existing infrastructure.
In 2009, CBP also revised its modernization approach for all remaining  sectors, halting the addition of any new tower sites, and adding a project  known as Digital in Place (DIP) as a capstone to this program. The scope  of the DIP project entails one-for-one replacements of analog systems  with digital systems and does not provide additional coverage or capacity  enhancements. CBP plans to implement DIP in the remaining 5 sectors  along the southwest border that did not receive full modernization  upgrades. As of May 2015, DIP projects had been completed in 3 of the 5  sectors along the southwest border—Big Bend, Laredo, and Del Rio— and were under way in other locations across the nation.CBP, because DIP does not include new site build-outs, among other  things, this approach will greatly reduce the costs associated with the full  modernization approach and is expected to be completed in a relatively  shorter time period.
GAO-15-201. information could help CBP better identify any challenges with use of the  system and assess system performance. For example, although CBP  collects information on radio system availability and maintenance, CBP  officials stated that they have not used this information to assess overall  system performance to determine the extent to which upgraded radio  systems are meeting user needs or to identify areas in need of corrective  action. According to CBP officials, the agency had not yet analyzed  available data to determine the extent to which upgraded radio systems  are meeting user needs or to identify areas in need of corrective action  because complete operational data have not been collected for all sites to  which radio systems were deployed and because these data are  maintained across different repositories that are not currently linked  together. CBP officials recognized the need to collect sufficient data to  monitor radio system performance and at the time of our report, stated  that the agency was taking steps to address this need by collecting data  in recently modernized sites. They further stated that once the data had  been collected, the agency planned to consolidate these data in a central  repository.
Moreover, in March 2015 we found that most of the groups of CBP radio  users we met with reported experiencing challenges relating to  operational performance. For example, 7 of the 10 groups of CBP radio  users we met with in the Tucson, Rio Grande Valley, and El Paso sectors  stated that coverage gaps continued to affect their ability to communicate,  even after the upgrades were completed. Specifically, 2 groups stated  that coverage in some areas seemed to be worse after the upgrades  were completed, 4 groups stated that coverage gaps had been reduced  but continued to exist after the upgrades, and 1 group stated that while  coverage had improved in some areas, the group did not receive the  coverage enhancements it expected to receive, especially in critical  areas. We recommended in March 2015 that CBP develop a plan to  monitor the performance of its deployed radio systems. DHS concurred  with this recommendation and stated that it will work to complete a CBP  Land Mobile Radio System Performance Monitoring Plan by December  31, 2015.
We also found in March 2015 that ICE does not have complete  information to effectively manage its TACCOM modernization program.
Specifically, we reported that ICE has 58 completed, ongoing, or planned  projects under its TACCOM modernization program and has taken some  actions to modernize its TACCOM radio systems, including along the  southwest border. Specifically, according to ICE officials, the agency has  replaced individual analog TACCOM radios and equipment with digital  systems across all 26 ICE regions, including the southwest border  regions. In addition, while ICE has completed full modernization  projects—which entail expanding coverage and capacity by building new  sites—in other regions across the United States, it had not developed  plans to modernize any southwest border regions. Instead, to meet the  needs of ICE radio users in the southwest border regions, ICE officials  stated that the agency’s strategy focused on leveraging other agency  infrastructure in areas where ICE does not have infrastructure until  funding is approved to initiate modernization projects in these regions.  For example, in Yuma and Tucson, ICE officials stated that the agency  primarily uses CBP’s radio system.
Further, we found that while ICE has developed some documentation for  the individual projects, such as individual project plans, and provided us  with an integrated master schedule for the 58 ongoing, planned, and  completed projects, the agency had not documented an overall plan to  manage its TACCOM modernization program and provide oversight  across all projects. For example, ICE officials were unable to provide  documentation that all TACCOM equipment had been upgraded to digital  systems. Additionally, our interviews with groups of ICE radio users  showed that agency efforts to upgrade its TACCOM technology— including leveraging other agency infrastructure in areas where ICE does  not have infrastructure—may not be supporting ICE radio user needs  along the southwest border. For example, 2 of the 3 groups of ICE radio  users we met with in Tucson, Rio Grande Valley, and El Paso that  operate on CBP land-mobile radio networks stated that coverage was  worse after the upgrades or did not meet ICE radio user needs because  the new system did not provide the capabilities the agency promised to  deliver. The third group stated that CBP’s modernization project upgrades  enhanced coverage in a limited capacity but created new challenges for  ICE because of the increase in communication traffic. Specifically, ICE  radio users in this location stated that since they are using CBP channels,  Border Patrol has priority of use, so when there is too much traffic on a  channel, ICE radio users are unable to access the channel or get kicked  off the system and hear a busy signal when attempting to use their radios.  All 4 groups of ICE radio users we met with stated that operability and  interoperability challenges frequently compromised their investigations  and resulted in unacceptable risks to officer safety.
We reported that ICE officials agreed that ICE radio user coverage needs  had not been met in the southwest border areas and at the time of our  report stated that the agency was taking steps to assess radio user needs  in these locations. Specifically, ICE officials stated that they were  soliciting information from radio users on their operational needs and  briefing ICE management to inform future decisions about ICE coverage  and funding needs. However, at that time ICE officials also stated that  there were no plans for creating a program plan to guide and document  these efforts. We recommended that ICE develop a program plan to  ensure that the agency establishes the appropriate documentation of  resource needs, program goals, and measures to monitor the  performance of its deployed radio systems. DHS concurred with this  recommendation. In response to our recommendation, DHS stated that  ICE’s Office of the Chief Information Officer will develop a program to  facilitate, coordinate, and maintain ICE’s deployed radio systems, and will  ensure that the agency establishes the proper documentation of resource  needs, defines program goals, and establishes measures to monitor  performance by January 31, 2016.
section_title: Additional Efforts Are Needed to Ensure That CBP and ICE Agents and Officers Receive Necessary Training
paragraphs: We also concluded in March 2015 that CBP and ICE could do more to  ensure the agencies are meeting the training needs of all CBP and ICE  radio users. We reported that CBP provided training to its agents and  officers on upgraded radio systems in each southwest border location that  received upgrades. However, 8 of 14 CBP radio user groups we met with  suggested that radio users be provided with additional radio training to  enhance their proficiency in using radio systems. Further, we found that  CBP does not know how many radio users are in need of training. We  recommended in March 2015 that CBP (1) develop and implement a plan  to address any skills gaps for CBP agents and officers related to  understanding the new digital radio systems and interagency radio use  protocols, and (2) develop a mechanism to verify that all Border Patrol  and Office of Field Operations radio users receive radio training. DHS  concurred with these recommendations and estimated a completion date  of March 31, 2016.
We also found that ICE provided training on the upgraded radio systems  in one location, but 3 of the 4 ICE radio user groups we met with in field  locations stated that additional training would help address challenges  experienced by radio users. Further, ICE officials stated that they did not  track the training that the agency provided. We recommended in March  2015 that ICE (1) develop and implement a plan to address any skills  gaps for ICE agents related to understanding the new digital radio  systems and interagency radio use protocols, and (2) develop a  mechanism to verify that all ICE radio users receive radio training. DHS  concurred with these recommendations. In response to these  recommendations, DHS stated that ICE will propose an increase in  training for new agents and will develop a mechanism to verify that all ICE  radio users receive radio training by March 31, 2016.
section_title: OAM Could Benefit from Reassessing Its Mix and Placement of Assets to Better Address Mission Needs and Threats
paragraphs: Our March 2012 report on OAM assets highlighted several areas the  agency could address to better ensure the mix and placement of assets is  effective and efficient.  These areas included: (1) documentation clearly  linking deployment decisions to mission needs and threats, (2)  documentation on the assessments and analysis used to support  decisions on the mix and placement of assets, and (3) consideration of  how deployment of border technology will affect customer requirements  for air and marine assets across locations.
Specifically, our March 2012 report found that OAM had not documented  significant events, such as its analyses to support its asset mix and  placement across locations, and as a result, lacked a record to help  demonstrate that its decisions to allocate assets were the most effective  ones in fulfilling customer needs and addressing threats, among other  things. While OAM’s Fiscal Year 2010 Aircraft Deployment Plan stated  that OAM deployed aircraft and maritime vessels to ensure its forces  were positioned to best meet the needs of CBP field commanders and  respond to the latest intelligence on emerging threats, OAM did not have  documentation that clearly linked the deployment decisions in the plan to  mission needs or threats. We also found that OAM did not provide higher  rates of support to locations Border Patrol identified as high priority, a fact  that indicated that a reassessment of OAM’s resource mix and placement  could help ensure that it meets mission needs, addresses threats, and  mitigates risk. OAM officials stated that while they deployed a majority of  assets to high-priority sectors, budgetary constraints, other national  priorities, and the need to maintain presence across border locations  limited overall increases in assets or the amount of assets they could  redeploy from lower-priority sectors. While we recognized OAM’s  resource constraints, the agency did not have documentation of analyses  assessing the impact of these constraints and whether actions could be  taken to improve the mix and placement of assets within them. Thus, the  extent to which the deployment of OAM assets and personnel, including  those assigned to the southwest border, most effectively utilized OAM’s  constrained assets to meet mission needs and address threats was  unclear.
We also found in March 2012 that OAM did not document assessments  and analyses to support the agency’s decisions on the mix and placement  of assets. DHS’s 2005 aviation management directive requires operating  entities to use their aircraft in the most cost-effective way to meet  requirements. Although OAM officials stated that it factored cost- effectiveness considerations, such as efforts to move similar types of  aircraft to the same locations to help reduce maintenance and training  costs into its deployment decisions, OAM did not have documentation of  analyses it performed to make these decisions. OAM headquarters  officials stated that they made deployment decisions during formal  discussions and ongoing meetings in close collaboration with Border  Patrol, and considered a range of factors such as operational capability,  mission priorities, and threats. OAM officials said that while they generally  documented final decisions affecting the mix and placement of assets,  they did not document assessments and analyses to support these  decisions.
In addition, we reported that CBP and DHS had ongoing interagency  efforts under way to increase air and marine domain awareness across  U.S. borders through deployment of technology that may decrease  Border Patrol’s use of OAM assets for air and marine domain awareness.  However, at the time of our review, OAM was not planning to assess how  technology capabilities could affect the mix and placement of air and  marine assets until the technology has been deployed. Specifically, we  concluded that Border Patrol, CBP, and DHS had strategic and  technological initiatives under way that would likely affect customer  requirements for air and marine support and the mix and placement of  assets across locations. CBP and DHS also had ongoing interagency  efforts under way to increase air and marine domain awareness across  U.S. borders through deployment of technology that may decrease  Border Patrol’s use of OAM assets for air and marine domain awareness.  OAM officials stated that they would consider how technology capabilities  affect the mix and placement of air and marine assets once such  technology has been deployed.
To address the findings of our March 2012 report, we recommended that  CBP, to the extent that benefits outweigh the costs, reassess the mix and  placement of OAM’s air and marine assets to include mission  requirements, performance results, and anticipated CBP strategic and  technological changes. DHS concurred with this recommendation and  responded that it planned to address some of these actions as part of the  Fiscal Year 2012-2013 Aircraft Deployment Plan. In September 2014,  CBP provided this Plan, approved in May 2012, and updated information  on its subsequent efforts to address this recommendation, including a  description of actions taken to reassess the mix and placement of OAM’s  assets. In particular, CBP noted that in late 2012, it initiated some actions  based on its analysis of CBP data and assessment of OAM statistical  information, such as the priority for flight hours by location based on  Border Patrol and OAM data on arrests; apprehensions; and seizures of  cocaine, marijuana, currency, weapons, vehicles, aircraft, and vessels.  According to OAM, after consulting with DHS and CBP officials and  approval from the DHS Secretary in May 2013, the office began a  realignment of personnel, aircraft, and vessels from the northern border to  the southern border based on its evaluation of the utilization and  efficiency of current assets and available funding to accomplish the  transfers. CBP’s actions are a positive step to more effectively allocating  scarce assets. As of April 2015, OAM officials said that they were in the  process of providing GAO with the data and analysis used to support this  realignment of assets in order to fully document implementation of the  recommendation.
Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and members of the  committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to  answer any questions you may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact Rebecca  Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. In addition, contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key  contributions to this statement included Kirk Kiester (Assistant Director),  as well as Carissa Bryant, Adam Gomez, Yvette Gutierrez, Jon Najmi,  Meg Ullengren, and Michelle Woods. Other contributors to the work on  which this statement is based included Cindy Ayers, Jeanette Espinola,  and Nancy Kawahara.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal  Actions Needed to Improve Accountability. GAO-15-171SP. Washington,  D.C.: April 22, 2015.  2015 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation,  Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits.  GAO-15-404SP. (Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2015).
Border Security: Additional Efforts Needed to Address Persistent  Challenges in Achieving Radio Interoperability. GAO-15-201.  Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2015.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed  to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-411T.  Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed  to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-368.  (Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2014).
Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS Implementation and  Assessment Efforts. GAO-13-653T. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2013.
Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S.  Borders. GAO-13-414T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2013.
GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules.  GAO-12-120G (exposure draft). Washington, D.C.: May 2012.
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of  DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. GAO-12-518. Washington, D.C.: March 30,  2012.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing,  Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan.   GAO-12-106R. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and  Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. (Washington, D.C.:  November 4, 2011).
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the  Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-896.  (Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009).
GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for  Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. GAO-09-3SP.  (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).
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