Broadcasting to Cuba: Actions Are Needed to Improve Strategy and Operations
Published: 2009-01-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: For more than two decades, the U.S. government has been broadcasting to Cuba to break the Cuban government's information blockade and promote democracy in Cuba. Over this period, questions have been raised regarding the quality and effectiveness of these broadcasts. GAO was asked to examine (1) the Office of Cuba Broadcasting's (OCB) broadcasting approach and what is known about its audience; (2) how the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)--which oversees U.S. government broadcasting--and OCB ensure compliance with journalistic principles; (3) steps taken to ensure adherence to domestic and international broadcasting laws, agreements, and standards; and (4) steps BBG and OCB have taken to address management challenges. GAO analyzed documentation related to strategic planning, audience research, oversight, and operations and interviewed officials from BBG, BBG's International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), OCB, State, and other agencies.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: OCB broadcasts Radio and TV Marti through multiple transmission methodsthat face varying levels of jamming by the Cuban government. While there are no nationally representative data and some surveys of recent Cuban emigres suggest a larger audience, the best available research suggests that Radio and TV Marti's audience is small. Specifically, less than 2 percent of respondents to telephone surveys since 2003 reported tuning in to Radio or TV Marti during the past week. Despite the importance of audience research, we found minimal sharing of such research among available sources. Because of limitations in the audience research data, decisionmakers lack basic information to help assess the relative success or return on investment from each of OCB's transmission methods. BBG's IBB--which directly oversees OCB--has established an annual program review process that serves as the main mechanism for assessing OCB's compliance with journalistic standards. While IBB officials report that the quality of OCB programming has improved in recent years, IBB reviews since 2003 have recommended improving adherence to certain journalistic standards, particularly in the areas of balance and objectivity. IBB's process provides useful feedback, but we found weaknesses such as limited training and operational guidance for staff conducting the reviews. OCB and IBB have taken steps to ensure that U.S. broadcasting adheres to relevant laws and standards, but some concerns remain. To comply with U.S. law, they have taken steps to minimize the domestic dissemination of OCB programming; however, OCB broadcasts reach U.S. audiences in several ways, such as through the Internet. In addition, a commercial TV station contracted to broadcast OCB programming showed some inappropriate advertisements during OCB programs. Furthermore, an international body found that OCB's TV broadcasts cause harmful interference to Cuban broadcasts, but the U.S. government has not taken steps to address this issue. Despite some efforts by BBG and OCB, oversight entities have identified problems such as poor communication by OCB management and low employee morale. For example, OCB lacks formal mechanisms for communicating with or obtaining information from employees.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United States has been broadcasting to Cuba for more than two  The United States has been broadcasting to Cuba for more than two  decades via Radio Martí (and subsequently TV Martí) to “break the  decades via Radio Martí (and subsequently TV Martí) to “break the  information blockade” and promote freedom and democracy in Cuba. U.S.  information blockade” and promote freedom and democracy in Cuba. U.S.  broadcasting to Cuba is performed by the Office of Cuba Broadcasting  broadcasting to Cuba is performed by the Office of Cuba Broadcasting  (OCB), which is a U.S. government entity overseen by the Broadcasting  (OCB), which is a U.S. government entity overseen by the Broadcasting  Board of Governors (BBG). OCB operates Radio and TV Martí, which  Board of Governors (BBG). OCB operates Radio and TV Martí, which  broadcast news, commentary, and entertainment programming to Cuba 24  broadcast news, commentary, and entertainment programming to Cuba 24  hours per day. From the inception of these broadcasting efforts, various  hours per day. From the inception of these broadcasting efforts, various  questions have been raised regarding their purpose, quality, and  questions have been raised regarding their purpose, quality, and  effectiveness. In light of the more than $500 million that has been spent  effectiveness. In light of the more than $500 million that has been spent  over the years on broadcasting to Cuba and OCB’s $34 million annual  over the years on broadcasting to Cuba and OCB’s $34 million annual  budget, you asked us to review a variety of issues related to the  budget, you asked us to review a variety of issues related to the  effectiveness of OCB management and broadcasts.  effectiveness of OCB management and broadcasts.
In response, this report examines (1) OCB’s approach for broadcasting  In response, this report examines (1) OCB’s approach for broadcasting  and what is known about the size of its audience in Cuba; (2) how BBG— and what is known about the size of its audience in Cuba; (2) how BBG— which oversees OCB—and OCB ensure compliance with journalistic  which oversees OCB—and OCB ensure compliance with journalistic  principles; (3) steps taken to ensure that U.S. broadcasting to Cuba  principles; (3) steps taken to ensure that U.S. broadcasting to Cuba  adheres to domestic and international broadcasting laws, agreements, and  adheres to domestic and international broadcasting laws, agreements, and  standards; and (4) management and oversight challenges, and the steps  standards; and (4) management and oversight challenges, and the steps  that BBG and OCB have taken to address those challenges.  that BBG and OCB have taken to address those challenges.
To address these objectives, we analyzed documentation and interviewed  To address these objectives, we analyzed documentation and interviewed  officials from a variety of U.S. government agencies, including OCB, BBG,  officials from a variety of U.S. government agencies, including OCB, BBG,  and the Department of State (State). To analyze OCB’s approach to  and the Department of State (State). To analyze OCB’s approach to  broadcasting to Cuba and what is known about its audience size in Cuba,  broadcasting to Cuba and what is known about its audience size in Cuba,  we reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from BBG and OCB  we reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from BBG and OCB  and other relevant agencies, including State and the U.S. Agency for  and other relevant agencies, including State and the U.S. Agency for  International Development and interviewed contractors responsible for  International Development and interviewed contractors responsible for  maintenance of OCB transmissions and audience research. To identify the  maintenance of OCB transmissions and audience research. To identify the  available information regarding the size of OCB’s audience, we analyzed  available information regarding the size of OCB’s audience, we analyzed  International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB) and OCB audience research from  2003 through 2008, including telephone surveys, focus group studies, and  anecdotal reports of reception. We determined that these data were  sufficiently reliable for the purpose of characterizing the size of Radio and  TV Martí’s audience in very broad terms for the populations the surveys  reached. To review how BBG and OCB ensure compliance with  journalistic principles, we analyzed documentation and interviewed  officials from BBG’s IBB, which is responsible for reviews of program  quality, and interviewed officials from BBG and OCB. To understand the  steps taken to adhere to domestic and international broadcasting laws,  agreements, and standards, we interviewed officials from State and the  Federal Communications Commission (FCC), reviewed documentation  regarding complaints and decisions from the International  Telecommunication Union (ITU), and reviewed relevant U.S. laws and  legislative histories. To describe how BBG and OCB have addressed  management and oversight challenges, we reviewed prior audit reports by  the State Office of Inspector General (OIG); interviewed BBG, IBB, and  OCB officials; and reviewed documentation related to previous  management challenges and responses. Appendix I provides a more  detailed discussion of our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2008 to January 2009, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 1983, Congress passed the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act to provide  the people of Cuba, through Radio Martí, with information they would not  ordinarily receive due to the censorship practices of the Cuban  government. Subsequently, in 1990, Congress authorized U.S. television  broadcasting to Cuba. The objectives of Radio and TV Martí are to   (1) support the right of the Cuban people to seek, receive, and impart  information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers;   (2) be effective in furthering the open communication of information and  ideas through the use of radio and television broadcasting to Cuba;   (3) serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of accurate,  objective, and comprehensive news; and (4) provide news, commentary,  and other information about events in Cuba and elsewhere to promote the  cause of freedom in Cuba.
OCB is a federal entity and is a part of BBG, which is an independent  federal agency responsible for overseeing all U.S. government-sponsored,  nonmilitary, international broadcasting programs. In addition to OCB,  BBG also oversees the operations of IBB, which in turn oversees Voice of  America (VOA). BBG also provides funding and oversight to three  independent grantees: Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc.; Radio  Free Europe/Radio Liberty; and Radio Free Asia (see table 1).
In October 2003, the President established the Commission for Assistance  to a Free Cuba (CAFC) to identify measures to help bring about an end to  the Castro government and support U.S. programs that could assist in an  ensuing transition. This commission published two interagency policy  frameworks—the 2004 and 2006 Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba  reports—which identify measures to (1) empower Cuban civil society,   (2) break the Cuban government’s information blockade, (3) deny  resources to the Cuban dictatorship, (4) illuminate the reality of Castro’s  Cuba, (5) encourage international efforts to support Cuban civil society,  and (6) undermine the regime’s “succession strategy.” The CAFC reports  make recommendations in a variety of areas, including measures to  intensify efforts to break the Cuban government’s information blockade,  such as utilizing new methods to broadcast TV Martí. These reports also  indicate that Radio and TV Martí are vehicles for facilitating the transition  to democracy in Cuba, supporting Cuban democratic opposition, and  empowering Cuban civil society. In addition, State and OCB officials  indicate that Radio and TV Martí will be important platforms for providing  information to Cubans during any future government transition.
OCB’s role is to provide Cuba with the Spanish-language programming  that one could access in an open society, including news and  entertainment. In 2004, Radio Martí changed its programming from  entertainment and news to an all-news format, and currently broadcasts  news and information programming 6 days a week, 24 hours per day, and 1  day per week for 18 hours. Radio Martí’s daily programming consists of 70  percent live news broadcasts, and 30 percent recorded programming with  the ability to go live as needed. TV Martí broadcasts news (including two  live newscasts), sports and entertainment, and special programming.
OCB has 167 authorized direct-hire positions and approximately 120 talent  contractors. OCB’s fiscal year 2008 budget was approximately $34 million,  including about $18 million for salaries, $7 million for general operating  expenses, and almost $9 million for transmissions. Figure 1 shows a  breakdown of OCB’s budget.
section_title: OCB Broadcasts to Cuba through Multiple Methods, but the Best Available Research Suggests That Radio and TV Martí’s Audience Size Is Small
paragraphs: OCB broadcasts Radio and TV Martí to Cuba through multiple  transmission delivery methods to overcome the Cuban government’s  jamming of certain signals, with a recent focus on providing more of its  resources for TV transmissions. Due to the U.S. government’s lack of  access to Cuba, OCB has difficulty in obtaining nationally representative  data on its audience size. The best available research (from IBB telephone  surveys) indicates that Radio and TV Martí’s audience size is small, due in  part to signal jamming by the Cuban government. IBB and OCB have  made some efforts to gain information on the extent and impact of  jamming; however, they still lack data on the number, type, and  effectiveness of the jammers. In addition, Radio and TV Martí broadcasts  face the challenge of competition from domestic and international media,  which OCB could do more to address. Furthermore, coordination with  other relevant U.S. agencies to share audience research to Cuba is  minimal. Finally, OCB has conducted some strategic planning exercises,  but lacks a strategic plan that BBG has approved.
subsections: section_title: OCB Broadcasts Radio and TV Martí through Multiple Transmission Delivery Methods, with a Recent Focus on TV Transmissions
paragraphs: OCB broadcasts Radio and TV Martí through multiple transmission  delivery methods in an effort to overcome the Cuban government’s  attempt to block, or jam, these broadcasts, thereby preventing them from  reaching a Cuban audience. OCB broadcasts radio through shortwave, AM,  two subchannels on Hispasat satellite television, and the Internet. Figure  2 shows the cost, broadcast schedule, and projected coverage (in the  absence of Cuban jamming or counter-broadcasting) of Radio Martí.
OCB broadcasts TV Martí through satellite television (Hispasat and  DirecTV), an over-the-air transmission via an airplane (AeroMartí), and the  Internet. Figure 3 shows the cost, broadcast schedule, and projected  coverage (in the absence of Cuban jamming) of TV Martí.
Over the past 3 years, OCB added more transmission delivery methods and  devoted more resources for TV Martí than for Radio Martí (see fig. 4). The  2004 and 2006 CAFC reports recommended that OCB explore additional  transmission methods, including the use of airborne platforms and satellite  television, to further efforts to break the information blockade in Cuba. In  October 2006, OCB launched AeroMartí, which consists of two Gulfstream  propeller airplanes that OCB leases to broadcast television signals to  Cuba. In December 2006, IBB leased airtime on TV Azteca, a commercial  television station in Miami that is carried on the DirecTV satellite.
Due in large part to the launch of AeroMartí, most of OCB’s budget for  transmission costs is spent on TV Martí. In fiscal year 2008, OCB spent  over $6 million on AeroMartí, which includes about $5 million for fuel,  operation, and maintenance of the airplanes and about $1 million to equip  one airplane with the ability to broadcast on channel 13. Additional OCB  resources were focused on TV Martí transmissions because BBG and OCB  felt there were more opportunities to expand the size of the audience of  TV Martí than that of Radio Martí. Prior to its use of AeroMartí, OCB  transmitted TV Martí through an aerostat (blimp) in the Florida Keys. The  aerostat was destroyed by a hurricane in 2005. BBG, IBB, and OCB  officials believe that AeroMartí is more effective than the aerostat due to  its technological capabilities. In December 2006, IBB began leasing 1 hour  of airtime from 12:00 midnight to 1:00 a.m. on weeknights on a commercial  AM radio station in Miami (Radio Mambi), at a cost of about $183,000 for a  6-month period. However, due to budget constraints, IBB canceled its  contract with this station in February 2008.
In addition to investing in new transmission methods for TV Martí, OCB  has taken steps to improve the production quality of its television  programming. For example, instead of broadcasting taped newscasts, in  October 2006, OCB began airing a live news broadcast at 6:00 p.m., with  updates at 10:00 p.m. According to IBB officials, the production quality of  TV Martí programming has also improved through OCB’s use of more  original programming, well-designed graphics, and upgraded sets.
In anticipation of greater Internet availability and use in Cuba, OCB’s  Director said that OCB is beginning to focus more attention on improving  its Web site. For example, OCB officials said they are in the process of  redesigning OCB’s Web site and have trained staff on digital journalism.  However, Cubans’ ownership of personal computers is limited, and the  Cuban government tightly restricts Internet access to Cubans. According  to OCB officials, some Cubans access OCB’s Web site using foreign  Internet service providers, and, as a result, OCB is unable to determine the  number of hits on its Web site that originate from Cuba.
section_title: Significant Challenges Exist to Conducting Valid Audience Research; Available Data Provide Little Information for Assessing Relative Success of Different Transmission Methods
paragraphs: BBG; IBB; OCB; and U.S. Interests Section, Havana (USINT) officials  emphasized that they face significant challenges in conducting valid  audience research due to the closed nature of Cuban society. For example,  U.S. government officials stationed in Havana are prohibited by the Cuban  government from traveling outside of Havana. Also, IBB researchers  believe that the Cuban government would not permit U.S. government- funded organizations to conduct audience research on Radio and TV Martí  in Cuba. According to State, it is difficult to travel to Cuba for the purpose  of conducting audience research. In addition, the Department of the  Treasury (Treasury) prohibits BBG from conducting in-person audience  research surveys in Cuba. BBG also notes that the threat of Cuban  government surveillance and reprisals for interviewers and respondents  raise concerns, such as respondents’ willingness to answer sensitive  questions frankly.
Despite these limitations, IBB, OCB, and USINT conduct a variety of  research efforts to obtain information on Radio and TV Martí’s audience  size, characteristics, reaction to programming, and preferences. To  measure audience size, IBB periodically commissions international  telephone surveys. IBB also periodically commissions monitoring panels  and focus groups in Miami with recent Cuban arrivals to the United States  to solicit their feedback on the content and production quality of OCB  programming and to obtain information about their radio and television  use, preferences, and experiences in Cuba. OCB contracts with a local  Miami market research firm that conducts monitoring panels once a  month and conducts surveys twice a year to solicit recent Cuban arrivals’  feedback on the quality of TV Martí programming and to obtain  information about their media habits and perceptions of Radio and TV  Martí programming. In addition, USINT has occasionally administered  informal surveys of Cubans visiting USINT, which asked, among other  things, whether visitors listened to and watched Radio and TV Martí.
BBG, IBB, and OCB officials indicated that research on Radio and TV  Martí’s audience size faces significant limitations, such as none of these  data are representative of the entire Cuban population. IBB’s telephone  surveys are IBB’s only random data collection effort in Cuba, but these  data might not be representative of Cubans’ media habits for two main  reasons: (1) Only adults in homes with published telephone numbers are  surveyed, and, according to BBG documents, approximately 17 percent of  Cuban adults live in households with published telephone numbers; and  (2) BBG and OCB officials noted that, because individuals in Cuba are  discouraged or prohibited by their government from listening to and  watching U.S. international broadcasts, they might be fearful of  responding to media surveys and disclosing their media habits, and thus  actual audience size might be larger than survey results.
The various research efforts that IBB, OCB, and USINT have undertaken  provide decisionmakers with limited information to help assess the  relative success or return on investment from U.S. broadcasting to Cuba.  For example, at a strategic level, documents produced as a part of BBG’s  annual Language Service Review process contain data on the cost per  listener. However, we found that although documents from the 2004 and  2005 Language Service Reviews of OCB included such data, documents  from the 2006, 2007, and 2008 Language Service Reviews of OCB listed this  information as “not available.” This is because the news and programming  operations and budgets for Radio and TV Martí were merged in fiscal year  2005, thus making it impossible to separate the budgets (and, therefore,  the cost per listener) for Radio and TV Martí.
In addition, the research efforts provide decisionmakers with limited  information on the relative return on investment from each of the  individual transmission methods OCB uses. For example, the IBB  telephone surveys do not include questions on the transmission method— such as shortwave or medium-wave radio, satellite television, AeroMartí,  or the Internet—that respondents used to listen to or watch Radio and TV  Martí. As a result, it is impossible to determine from the telephone surveys  whether TV Martí’s audience is due to AeroMartí (which costs about $5.0  million annually) or the DirecTV transmission (which costs about $0.5  million annually).
Furthermore, other officials have suggested that the current methods used  to broadcast to Cuba may not be the most cost-effective way to reach a  Cuban audience. For example, a USINT official stated that the most  successful distribution of TV Martí has been via DVD (rather than satellite  or over-the-air AeroMartí broadcasts) and suggested that there could be  avenues for others to increase the distribution of DVDs throughout Cuban  society.
section_title: No Nationally Representative Data on OCB’s Audience Exists, but the Best Available Audience Research Suggests That Radio and TV Martí’s Audience Size Is Small
paragraphs: Despite the lack of reliable nationally representative data, BBG has  determined that telephone surveys conducted from outside Cuba are  among the best available and most cost-effective methods of estimating  audience size for Radio and TV Martí. These surveys indicate that Radio  and TV Martí’s audience size is small. Regarding radio broadcasting, less  than 2 percent of respondents to IBB’s telephone surveys in 2003, 2005,  and 2006 said they listened to Radio Martí during the past week. In 2008,  less than 1 percent of respondents said they listened to Radio Martí during  the past week. Regarding television broadcasting, IBB audience research  indicates that TV Martí’s audience size is small. All of IBB’s telephone  surveys since 2003 show that less than 1 percent of respondents said they  watched TV Martí during the past week. Notably, results from the 2006 and  2008 telephone surveys show no increase in reported TV Martí viewership  following the launch of AeroMartí and DirecTV broadcasting in 2006.
Similarly, very few participants in IBB-commissioned focus groups said  that they had seen TV Martí in Cuba.
Despite the small number of Cubans who reported listening to or viewing  Radio or TV Martí in IBB telephone surveys, OCB officials told us that  other information suggests that Radio and TV Martí have a larger audience  in Cuba. For example, a 2007 survey that OCB commissioned, intended to  obtain information on programming preferences and media habits, also  contained data on Radio and TV Martí’s audience size. While the survey  was not intended to measure listening rates or project audience size, this  nonrandom survey of 382 Cubans who had recently arrived in the United  States found that 45 percent of respondents reported listening to Radio  Martí and that 21 percent reported watching TV Martí within the last 6  months before leaving Cuba. However, these results may not represent the  actual size of Radio and TV Martí’s audience because (1) according to BBG  officials, higher viewing and listening rates are expected among recent  arrivals and (2) the demographic characteristics of the respondents to  this survey did not reflect the Cuban population in all aspects.
In addition, OCB receives anecdotal information about its audience. BBG’s  Executive Director said that, in the case of a closed society, such  anecdotal and testimonial reports of reception are evidence that a  broadcast has a significant audience. (See fig. 5 for an example of reported  reception of TV Martí via AeroMartí in Cuba.) As an illustration, OCB  reported that Radio Martí’s coverage of Hurricane Ike, which struck Cuba  in September 2008, was widely heard in Cuba, with callers from all over  Cuba providing updated information on the situation to OCB. We also  reviewed letters and records of telephone calls from Cubans to OCB.  Following our observation that it does not track this information  systematically, OCB began doing so in August 2008.
section_title: OCB Broadcasts Face Jamming, but OCB Lacks Comprehensive, Reliable Data on the Extent of Jamming
paragraphs: The Cuban government jams Radio Martí’s shortwave signals and  interferes with Radio Martí’s AM signals by counter-broadcasting at a  higher power level on the same frequency. OCB tries to overcome jamming  of its shortwave signals by broadcasting on three different frequencies per  hour until 12:00 midnight and on two different frequencies per hour from  12:00 midnight to 6:00 a.m., while also changing its shortwave frequencies  several times throughout the day. To overcome Cuban government  counter-broadcasting of its AM broadcasts, OCB increases signal power  during daylight hours. According to OCB, the Cuban government’s  counter-broadcasting is largely effective in and around Havana and several  other large cities, but probably has little impact outside these areas.  Recently arrived Cubans who participated in IBB-commissioned focus  groups reported that signal jamming and counter-broadcasting by the  Cuban government made it difficult for them to listen to Radio Martí.
The Cuban government also jams TV Martí’s signals from AeroMartí.  According to OCB engineers, the jamming attempts to disrupt the signal  reaching televisions in Cuba (rather than at the transmitter). OCB  engineers said that because AeroMartí’s signal is transmitted from a high- altitude, constantly moving platform, they believe jamming is less  effective, but this has not been confirmed. A February 2008 OCB  assessment of Cuban jamming states that “Cuba would need many  thousands of additional jammers to totally block TV Martí.” However,  according to IBB’s research contractor, none of the 533 respondents to  IBB’s 2008 telephone survey living in Havana reported watching TV Martí  broadcasts during the past 12 months. In addition, recently arrived  Cubans who participated in IBB-commissioned focus groups reported that  signal jamming of TV Martí’s over-the-air broadcast via AeroMartí made it  difficult for them to view TV Martí. USINT officials also said that Cuban  government jamming of AeroMartí prevented them from viewing over-the- air TV Martí broadcasts.
In recent years, IBB and OCB have attempted to better understand and  quantify the extent of Cuban jamming and its impact on the technical  reception of Radio and TV Martí broadcasts. Despite their efforts, IBB and  OCB still lack reliable data on the number, location, type, and  effectiveness of Cuban jamming equipment. As a result, it is unclear how  much of the radio and television signals can be heard and seen in Cuba.  For example, OCB recently asked AeroMartí’s contractor to study  AeroMartí’s capabilities and effectiveness in the presence and absence of  jamming. The contractor developed a model and estimated that  AeroMartí’s broadcasts had a potential viewing audience of about 40  percent of the Cuban population in the absence of jamming and at least 20  percent of the population in the presence of Cuban jamming. This  estimate, however, assumed that the Cuban government uses four  jammers in fixed locations in the Havana area. OCB’s Director of  Engineering said that the assumption that Cuba has four fixed jammers is  based on observations made in the 1990s by a USINT public affairs officer  and defecting Cuban jamming technicians. Given the dated nature of the  assumption, the estimates regarding AeroMartí’s potential viewing  audience might be unreliable, and, therefore, the validity of the study’s  conclusions is uncertain. The contractor’s study also does not address or  account for other potential variables, including jamming outside of the  Havana area or the effect of mobile jammers on AeroMartí broadcasts. In  addition, according to OCB officials, Hurricane Ike may have reduced  Cuba’s jamming capabilities.
In addition, IBB Office of Engineering officials said that they have  provided equipment to monitor the quality of Radio and TV Martí’s  technical reception in Cuba. According to an IBB Office of Engineering  official, these systems are not yet operational due to technical problems  and other State priorities. Once operational, the equipment will provide  IBB (and others, through a public Web site) with access to the Radio and  TV Martí signal received in Cuba. IBB will be able to listen to and view  OCB broadcasts and analyze when, how often, and to what extent  broadcasts are jammed or interfered with. Officials noted that a major  limitation of the systems is that they would only provide data on the  quality of technical reception in at the location where the equipment is  operating.
section_title: Radio and TV Martí Broadcasts Face Competition; OCB Could Do More to Address Challenges Posed by Its Competitors in the Cuban Media Environment
paragraphs: OCB’s Director emphasized that the competitive media environment in  Cuba is a key challenge for OCB in attracting and maintaining an audience  for Radio and TV Martí. To identify what Cuban media are reporting and to  understand the situation in Cuba, OCB staff monitor Cuban government  broadcasts. In addition, IBB and OCB surveys and focus groups provide  some information regarding competing stations. Recent IBB- commissioned telephone surveys indicate that Radio and TV Martí  broadcasts face competition from Cuban and international broadcasters.  For example, about 60 to 70 percent of respondents in the 2006 telephone  survey reported listening to three national Cuban radio stations during the  past week. IBB and OCB senior officials said that Cuban radio attracts  listeners because of its high-quality music programming. The 2006  telephone survey results indicate that Radio Martí and Radio Exterior de  España (Spain’s foreign radio) have the largest audience among  international radio broadcasters to Cuba, with similar past week  listenership rates of about 1 percent.
In recent years, over 90 percent of telephone survey respondents said they  watched Cuba’s national television broadcasts during the past week. IBB  and OCB officials said that the quality of Cuban television programming  has recently improved and includes popular U.S. programming (such as  The Sopranos and Grey’s Anatomy). Telephone surveys indicate that TV  Martí has a smaller audience than other international television  broadcasts. For example, about 30 percent of respondents in 2005 and  2006 said they watched CNN during the past week. Telemundo’s and  Univision’s (which are broadcast only on satellite television) past week  viewership rates in 2006 were about 3 percent, while TV Martí’s was less  than 1 percent. According to IBB research, international radio and  television broadcasts, including VOA broadcasts to Cuba, are not jammed  at all or not as heavily jammed as Radio and TV Martí.
While OCB and IBB have gathered information relating to OCB’s  competitors, OCB has not compiled comprehensive information regarding  the number, nature, and quality of other radio and television programming  available to Cuban listeners and viewers. We have previously reported on  how assessments of broadcasting competitors can be used in the strategic  planning process to improve operations. For example, we reported that  the Middle East Broadcasting Networks conducts ongoing assessments of  its competitors and uses this information to make adjustments to its  programming. IBB officials said that IBB does not have the resources to  catalog all of the different types of programming available to Cubans.
section_title: BBG Coordinates with Other Agencies Regarding U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, but Coordination of Audience Research Is Minimal
paragraphs: BBG staff are responsible for coordinating with other agencies—such as  State and the U.S. Agency for International Development—that are  involved in efforts to provide uncensored information to Cuba. However,  BBG coordination with other, relevant U.S. agencies regarding audience  research is minimal. The 2006 CAFC report recommended the  establishment of quarterly meetings of the appropriate U.S. government  agencies to coordinate strategy on broadcasting and communications to  Cuba. BBG officials reported that they have participated in significant  coordination activities regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba. For example,  BBG’s Executive Director reported attending seven high-level interagency  meetings on Cuba in 2008. However, such coordination has not  consistently occurred on a quarterly basis and does not address  operational challenges, such as the lack of audience research data or data  on Cuba’s jamming capabilities. We found several examples of ways in  which additional coordination could have enhanced OCB’s understanding  of its Cuban audience. For example:    OCB and the U.S. Agency for International Development and State  grantees do not regularly share relevant audience research with each  other. For example, State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and  Labor provides a $700,000 grant to a nongovernmental organization near  Miami that also broadcasts radio programming to Cuba 7 days per week.  While OCB and the nongovernmental organization have shared some  program content and coordinated with some of the same independent  journalists in Cuba, OCB was unaware of a significant amount of audience  research that it has gathered. For example, the director of this  nongovernmental organization reported that in 2007 it made international  telephone calls to 35,000 Cubans to obtain information about their media  preferences. The director said his organization would be willing to share  the audience research with OCB. BBG and IBB officials were unaware of  this organization’s broadcasting efforts or its audience research activities.
OCB and USINT conduct separate audience research activities and do not  always share relevant research data with one another. For example,  USINT recently administered a survey that included data on Radio and TV  Martí’s audience reach; however, OCB was unaware of these data.
section_title: OCB Has Conducted Strategic Planning Exercises, but Lacks an Approved Strategic Plan
paragraphs: Despite several significant changes in OCB’s operations, such as additional  transmission methods, OCB lacks a formal strategic plan approved by  BBG to guide such decision making. Strategic planning, including the  development of a strategic plan, is a good management practice for all  organizations. A strategic plan serves the purposes of articulating the  fundamental mission of an organization and laying out the long-term goals  for implementing that mission, including the resources needed to achieve  those goals. We have reported that organizations should make  management decisions in the context of a strategic plan, with clearly  articulated goals and objectives that identify resource issues and internal  and external threats, or challenges, that could impede the organization  from efficiently and effectively accomplishing its objectives. Additionally,  Office of Management and Budget guidance suggests that strategies state  the organization’s long-term goals and objectives; define approaches or  strategies to achieve goals and objectives; and identify the various  resources needed and the key factors, risks, or challenges that could  significantly affect the achievement of the strategic goals.
A June 2007 State OIG inspection of OCB recommended that OCB prepare  a long-term strategic plan, including contingency planning for a time when  uncensored broadcasts are allowed in Cuba. This recommendation has not  yet been fully implemented. OCB developed a draft strategic plan with  assistance from BBG staff and submitted its draft strategic plan to BBG in  July 2007. BBG management said the plan that OCB submitted was more  of a crisis broadcasting plan than a strategic plan, and asked OCB to  resubmit a strategic plan that was not predicated on Fidel Castro’s death,  but rather laid out a longer-term vision for OCB operations. At the end of  2007, BBG approved and made publicly available its BBG-wide strategic  plan for 2008-2013. According to BBG staff, the Board of Governors then  directed BBG staff to work with BBG’s broadcast entities to ensure that  their individual strategic plans were in line with BBG’s strategic plan. OCB  subsequently resubmitted its strategic plan to IBB for review and approval.  IBB management is currently reviewing the plan. In October 2008, an IBB  official and a BBG official suggested that it might take an additional 3 to 6  months for the board to review and approve OCB’s draft strategic plan.  Without a formal, approved strategic plan, BBG and OCB lack an agreed- upon approach to guide such decision making regarding OCB funding and  operations.
section_title: IBB Identified Problems with OCB’s Adherence to Journalistic Standards That OCB Has Not Fully Addressed, but IBB’s Process Could Be Improved
paragraphs: IBB’s annual program review process is the main mechanism used to  assess Radio and TV Martí broadcasts’ compliance with VOA journalistic  standards. IBB’s analyses and external reviews of broadcast content  frequently identified problems with the broadcasts’ adherence to  journalistic standards such as balance and objectivity. IBB has  consistently made recommendations to OCB to improve its adherence to  certain aspects of journalistic standards; however, OCB has not ensured  the full implementation of IBB program review recommendations. While  this process provides some useful information, we identified several  weaknesses in the process.
subsections: section_title: IBB’s Program Review Process Is the Primary Mechanism for Assessing Whether OCB Broadcasts Comply with Journalistic Standards
paragraphs: The Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act and the TV Broadcasting to Cuba Act  require Radio Martí and TV Martí, respectively, to adhere to VOA  journalistic standards to ensure that their programming is accurate,  objective, and balanced and presents a variety of views. VOA journalistic  standards are set out in the VOA Charter and the VOA Programming  Handbook.
In addition to the VOA Charter, OCB has its own set of editorial guidelines  that establish OCB’s policy on radio and television broadcasts to Cuba,  and that are intended to assist broadcast personnel in making day-to-day  editorial decisions. The editorial guidelines provide guidance on how to  ensure balance, proper sourcing, and proper tone in broadcasts. The  guidelines also discuss several proscribed actions in broadcasts, such as  the insertion of personal opinion, use of broad generalizations, reporting  of unsubstantiated information, and incitement to revolt or other violence.
The main mechanism for assessing broadcasts’ compliance with  journalistic standards is IBB’s program review process, which is designed  to improve the content and production value of programming and ensure  quality control. IBB officials told us that this is intended to be an iterative  process for identifying areas for improvement focused on continuous  improvement from year to year, with the broadcast entity having primary  responsibility for making such improvements. IBB’s Office of Performance  Review is responsible for managing the program review process. It  conducts annual reviews of VOA’s 45 language services and OCB’s Radio  and TV Martí broadcasts. Office of Performance Review program analysts  and external reviewers assess the content and production quality against  a standard set of criteria. IBB program analysts write reviews assessing  broadcast content and production quality. IBB program review  coordinators and OCB management then discuss these inputs at a program  review meeting at OCB. Within 2 weeks after the program review meeting,  IBB’s Office of Performance Review staff directs the formulation of an  action plan with suggestions and recommendations for improvement for  OCB. The action items are intended to be the result of consensus between  IBB and OCB. There is a 3-month follow-up period after the program  review meeting during which IBB Office of Performance Review program  analysts monitor OCB’s implementation of the action plan. IBB and OCB  then hold a follow-up meeting to discuss OCB’s implementation of the  action plan. IBB also assigns performance scores (on a scale of 0 to 4) for  each of the individual content and production criterion. The scores from  IBB’s content and production reviews are then combined with the scores  assigned by external experts and monitoring panels of people from the  target audience to develop an overall performance score.
section_title: IBB’s Annual Reviews Identified Problems with Broadcasts’ Adherence to Certain Journalistic Standards
paragraphs: While IBB officials report that the quality of OCB programming has  improved in recent years, IBB’s internal as well as external reviews  identified problems with OCB broadcasts’ adherence to certain  journalistic standards, particularly in the area of balance and objectivity.  IBB program analysts’ reviews from 2003 through 2008 repeatedly cite  several, specific problems with the broadcasts, such as the presentation of  individual views as news, editorializing, and the use of inappropriate  guests whose viewpoints represented a narrow segment of opinion. IBB  reviews of Radio and TV Martí’s content identified other problems,  including    placement of unsubstantiated reports coming from Cuba with news stories  that had been verified by at least two reputable sources; the use of offensive and incendiary language in broadcasts, which is  explicitly prohibited by OCB’s editorial guidelines; and    a lack of timeliness in news and current affairs reporting.
External reviews of Radio and TV Martí’s broadcast content also identified  problems regarding the broadcast’s adherence to certain journalistic  standards, particularly balance and objectivity. For example, the results of  IBB monitoring panels from 2003 through 2007 showed that the majority (9  of 13) of expert control listeners and viewers, as well as approximately  one-third (16 of 49) of recent Cuban arrival panelists, expressed concerns  about the broadcasts’ balance and objectivity. In addition, an OCB- commissioned survey of recent Cuban arrivals in 2007 showed that 38  percent felt that TV Martí programming was “objective,” and 13 percent  felt the programming was “biased.” Furthermore, 29 percent of  respondents believed that Radio Martí’s news was “objective,” and 18  percent felt the news broadcasts were “exaggerated.”
To help improve adherence to journalistic standards, in 2007, the Director  of OCB issued a memorandum to managers requiring them to certify that  they have provided employees and contractors with a copy of both OCB’s  editorial guidelines and the VOA Charter. OCB has also taken recent steps  to improve training for OCB employees that could, over time, address  concerns regarding adherence to journalistic standards. For example, OCB  has selected a staff person to serve as a training coordinator and  established a designated space for training classes. However, BBG’s  Manual of Administration establishes additional responsibilities for  providing training that OCB has not yet fulfilled. For example, while the  manual requires managers to review employees’ training needs annually,  OCB officials reported that they have made no recent efforts to identify  staff training needs. Although there has been recent training related to  writing for the Internet, over the past 5 years, OCB has provided little  training to its broadcasting staff on how to comply with journalistic  standards. OCB management has acknowledged the importance of training  staff, but stated that budget limitations in recent years have precluded  such training.
section_title: OCB Has Not Ensured Implementation of Some Program Review Recommendations
paragraphs: Action plans that IBB program review coordinators and OCB management  have developed consistently recommended that OCB address problems  regarding its adherence to certain journalistic standards; however, OCB  has not ensured the implementation of some IBB program review  recommendations. For example, IBB action plans from 2003 through 2008  recommended that OCB    separate news from opinion in broadcasts,    ensure balanced and comprehensive selection of viewpoints,    avoid sweeping generalizations and editorializing,    use guests who are informed on program topics, and    separate unsubstantiated reports from Cuba from newscasts.
Senior officials in IBB’s Office of Performance Review said that OCB  management is to decide how to handle the recommendations, and noted  that the current OCB management has been more responsive to IBB  program review recommendations than previous OCB management. In  response to a recommendation by the State OIG regarding the lack of  implementation of some program review recommendations, BBG agreed  to develop a process to help ensure additional oversight of the  implementation of such recommendations. Specifically, BBG agreed that  the Office of Performance Review should make quarterly reports to the  Deputy Director of IBB regarding the most significant outstanding action  items.
OCB senior managers acknowledged that IBB’s action plans make some of  the same recommendations from year to year, and that OCB has not  implemented all of the IBB recommendations. For example, OCB senior  officials acknowledged that, on occasion, newscasters insert their  opinions into newscasts, but said that this is difficult to prevent during live  newscasts. We observed that, in cases in which OCB management agreed  with IBB program review recommendations, OCB attempted to address  specific examples of noncompliance cited in IBB’s report, but did not  address the broader factors underlying its lack of adherence to journalistic  standards. An OCB senior official also said that OCB does not implement  certain program review recommendations when it disagrees with IBB over  the substance of the criticism.
section_title: IBB’s Reviews Provide Useful Information, but Have Several Weaknesses
paragraphs: We observed the meetings held between IBB and OCB officials to discuss  the results of IBB’s reviews of Radio and TV Martí in June and September  2008, and found that this process provides useful information for OCB  regarding the content and production quality of its broadcasts. For  example, we observed that during the September 2008 Radio Martí  program review meeting, IBB analysts provided several specific examples  of poor sound quality, editorializing, and long monologues, each of which  OCB management agreed to address with relevant staff. We also found  that IBB program analysts present constructive recommendations for  improvement in these and other areas. However, our analysis of 5 years  worth of IBB’s qualitative reviews of Radio and TV Martí’s content  identified several weaknesses in the reviews:  IBB content reviews of Radio and TV Martí did not clearly indicate  whether the broadcasts are in full compliance with journalistic standards  or the extent of compliance. These reviews frequently identified problems  with the broadcasts’ adherence to certain journalistic standards, but did  not attempt to indicate the severity or frequency of an identified problem  with the broadcasts. When discussing a particular journalistic standard,  IBB reviews sometimes cited both positive and negative examples, making  it difficult to determine the reviews’ overall assessment. We also noted  many instances in which the reviews did not make any overall conclusion  regarding the broadcasts’ adherence to a particular journalistic standard.
IBB’s qualitative reviews of the broadcasts’ content sometimes did not  clearly support the quantitative score that IBB’s analysts assigned to the  broadcasts for a particular journalistic standard. In some cases, IBB’s  content review criticized OCB adherence to a particular journalistic  standard, but provided a relatively positive quantitative score. For  example, in a recent IBB review of TV Martí’s content, the review cited  one negative observation regarding the broadcast’s relevance to the  audience; however, the reviewer assigned TV Martí with a high score  under the “relevance to audience” content criterion. In other cases, IBB’s  content reviews contained both positive and negative observations, but  provided a relatively negative score.
IBB’s content reviews lack consistency in the ways that they are  conducted and reported. For example, while the qualitative reviews state  the general time period of the review, they did not specify the number of  hours that the reviewer spent listening to or viewing programming or  clearly indicate the programs that were listened to or viewed. Moreover,  the time period varied greatly from about 1 week to 1 year. The lack of  consistency in the reviews from year to year makes it difficult to  systematically assess Radio and TV Martí’s content and production quality  across years. BBG officials stated that the reviews are not intended for  systematic comparison across years, but to evaluate program quality at a  particular point in time, based on a subjectively selected sample of  programming chosen by the program analyst.
While IBB’s Office of Performance Review has guidance describing the  purpose and steps in the program review process, there is no specific  operational guidance for analysts explaining how to conduct content and  production reviews. For example, IBB does not provide analysts with any  guidance to help them determine how to assign a specific quantitative  score on the basis of their observations of programming. BBG and IBB  officials said they refer IBB analysts to the BBG’s strategic plan and OCB’s  editorial guidelines for guidance. Moreover, while program analysts  receive training regarding language, regional expertise, and technical  production, they have received limited training regarding skills, such as  program evaluation, to assist them in conducting program reviews. The  Director of IBB’s Office of Performance Review said that program analysts  could benefit from additional training in these areas to further enhance the  quality of program reviews, but the IBB training budget is limited and  priority is given to broadcasters.
section_title: Steps Taken to Ensure U.S. Broadcasting to Cuba Adheres to Domestic and International Broadcasting Standards, but Some Concerns Remain
paragraphs: U.S. law generally prohibits the domestic dissemination of public  diplomacy information intended for foreign audiences. Some domestic  dissemination of OCB programming is authorized by law, and IBB and  OCB have taken a variety of steps to minimize U.S. audiences’ access to  such material. However, both Radio and TV Martí broadcasts reach U.S.  audiences in several ways. In addition, some commercials shown by a  Miami television station contracted to air TV Martí programming were not  consistent with IBB guidance. Furthermore, the Cuban government has  complained that U.S. broadcasting to Cuba violates international  broadcasting standards, and the international body that serves as a forum  for such disputes—the ITU—has found that U.S. television broadcasts (but  not radio broadcasts) cause harmful interference with Cuban broadcasts.  State indicated that no action has been taken in response to the ITU’s  determinations that U.S. broadcasts cause harmful interference. Officials  from State indicated that the ITU’s determinations were based on  information provided solely by the Cuban government and that the United  States has not independently verified that the broadcasting is causing  harmful interference.
subsections: section_title: OCB Takes Steps to Adhere to Legal Ban on the Domestic Distribution of Public Diplomacy Material, but Some Permitted Domestic Dissemination Occurs
paragraphs: Since 1948, U.S. law has prohibited the domestic dissemination of public  diplomacy material intended for foreign audiences. In enacting the  legislation, Congress intended, among other things, to prevent the U.S.  government from engaging in domestic propaganda. However, legislation  authorizing U.S. radio and television broadcasting to Cuba permits  domestic dissemination of such broadcasts under certain circumstances.  The Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act directs that radio broadcasting to  Cuba utilize broadcasting facilities located in Marathon, Florida, and the  1180 AM frequency, which is available to U.S. listeners. Moreover, if the  broadcasts on the 1180 AM frequency are jammed by the Cuban  government, the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act authorizes the leasing of  time on other commercial or noncommercial educational AM band radio  stations. Since these broadcasts originate from U.S. territory, they would  be available to a domestic audience. The Television Broadcasting to Cuba  Act permits some domestic dissemination of U.S. government  information prepared for dissemination abroad, as long as the  dissemination is “inadvertent.” While the term “inadvertent” is not defined,  the statute’s legislative history indicates that under certain circumstances,  some domestic reception would be unavoidable and, therefore, permitted,  as long as transmission signals would not be intentionally or deliberately  targeted to domestic audiences.
OCB has taken a variety of steps to minimize the domestic dissemination  of U.S. broadcasting to Cuba. For example, the three radio antennas used  for OCB’s radio broadcasting on the 1180 AM frequency from Marathon  are arrayed in a line so that the signal is directed toward Cuba and away  from the United States. In addition, in deciding which local Miami  television station to contract with to place TV Martí programming on  DirecTV, IBB officials told us that they evaluated the geographic coverage  of each station’s broadcasting, with a view toward minimizing domestic  dissemination.
Despite efforts to minimize domestic dissemination, U.S. broadcasting to  Cuba can be accessed domestically through several means. Both the  shortwave and AM radio broadcasts can be heard in parts of Florida. In  addition, TV Martí programming on TV Azteca can be seen in Miami by  those with local cable or DirecTV subscriptions. Furthermore, streaming  video from TV Martí and audio from Radio Martí can be retrieved from  OCB’s Web site.
section_title: Some Commercials Aired during TV Martí Programming on TV Azteca Were Inconsistent with IBB Practice
paragraphs: BBG lacks a formal, written policy for determining whether commercials  aired during or after BBG broadcasts are appropriate. However, IBB’s  standard practice is to include standard language relating to the inclusion  of advertisements during BBG (TV Martí, in this case) broadcasts in their  contracts with other broadcasters. That standard language explicitly  prohibits “political advertising immediately before, after, or during the  BBG provided programming.” Other than political advertisements, no  other content is explicitly prohibited.
In December 2006, IBB contracted with a Miami-based television station,  TV Azteca, to broadcast two nightly TV Martí newscasts. The contract  provided TV Martí with two 26-minute windows of airtime that would be  broadcast locally in Miami and be viewable in Cuba to those who  subscribe to DirecTV and purchase the local Miami programming package.  The remaining 4 minutes of the half hour are used by TV Azteca to air  commercials. The following concerns have been raised regarding these  commercials:    First, some critics believe that the mere existence of these commercials is  inappropriate. They believe that, as a U.S. government-funded broadcast,  there should be no advertisements for commercial products or services.  However, we found, consistent with BBG’s legal assessment, that no U.S.  law, regulation, or BBG policy or practice prohibits the airing of  advertisements during TV Martí broadcasts.
Second, some OCB employees complained that the content of some  commercials shown during the TV Martí programming is inappropriate.  For example, they reported viewing political advertisements and  commercials for a 1-900 phone sex service during TV Martí programming  on TV Azteca. We subsequently confirmed that advertisements for a U.S.  presidential candidate aired in September 2008. We also viewed an  advertisement for a “Love Calculator,” which aired in April 2008.
The contract with TV Azteca did not include the standard language  prohibiting political advertising during TV Martí broadcasts. A BBG official  suggested that this error could have occurred as a result of staff turnover  in the final phase of the negotiation and drafting of the contract. As we  have previously reported, this contract was awarded with limited  involvement of contracting officials. According to BBG, OCB requested, in  October 2008, that TV Azteca air the TV Martí broadcasts for 26  consecutive minutes and that any advertisements be shown after the TV  Martí programming. BBG’s Acting General Counsel indicated that the  contract would be modified to reflect this change.
After informing BBG staff of our findings related to the content of some  commercials aired during TV Martí programming on TV Azteca, BBG  officials acknowledged that the airing of political advertisements is  inappropriate. In October 2008, BBG requested that TV Azteca stop airing  political advertisements during TV Martí programming. In response, TV  Azteca agreed to cease airing political advertisements during TV Martí  programming.
section_title: International Body Finds That Some U.S. Broadcasting to Cuba Violates International Broadcasting Regulations
paragraphs: According to State records, since 2003, the Cuban government has filed  more than 300 specific complaints that U.S. broadcasting to Cuba violates  international broadcasting regulations. The ITU, which is the leading  United Nations organization for information and communication  technologies, develops these regulations. The Cuban government has  consistently objected to U.S. television broadcasts to Cuba. The FCC has  authorized OCB to broadcast on television channels 13 and 20. Cuba  alleges that this U.S. broadcasting causes harmful interference to its own  broadcasting on television channels 13 and 20, which it has registered with  the ITU. In 2004 and 2006, the ITU determined that U.S. broadcasting on  channels 13 and 20, respectively, was causing harmful interference and  encouraged the United States and Cuba to cooperate and find a solution  for solving the harmful interference.
State indicated that no action has been taken in response to the ITU’s  determinations that U.S. broadcasts cause harmful interference. Officials  from State indicated that the ITU’s determinations were based on  information provided solely by the Cuban government, and that the United  States has not independently verified that the broadcasting is causing  harmful interference. The Cuban government also has complained to the  ITU about U.S. radio broadcasts to Cuba. Recently, Cuba has filed  complaints regarding U.S. broadcasting on the 530 AM frequency.  However, the ITU determined in December 2004 that since Cuba has not  registered a station on that AM frequency, it cannot complain about  harmful interference on that frequency.
The Cuban government has further argued that U.S. broadcasting from an  airborne platform violates ITU regulations. Following Cuban complaints,  at the ITU World Radiocommunication Conference in November 2007, a  report was adopted that stated that broadcasting from an aircraft for the  purpose of transmitting solely to the territory of another country without  its permission was not in conformity with ITU regulations. The U.S.  government disassociated from that statement in the report as not  accurately representing the ITU Radio Regulations and reiterated its policy  of broadcasting information to the Cuban people.
section_title: Despite Some BBG and OCB Efforts, Oversight and Management Challenges Persist
paragraphs: Several groups, including BBG, IBB, and the State OIG, provide oversight  of OCB operations. Oversight efforts by these various groups have  identified three categories of concerns in recent years: poor  communication by OCB management, low employee morale, and  allegations of fraud and abuse. In responding to recent audit reports, BBG  and OCB have taken steps to address nearly all of the audit  recommendations.
subsections: section_title: Several Groups Perform Oversight of OCB
paragraphs: Several groups perform oversight of OCB operations. BBG and its staff  perform oversight in multiple ways. BBG holds a monthly meeting at  which the head of each broadcast entity (including the Director of OCB)  updates the BBG Governors on the key efforts of their entity. BBG also  conducts a statutorily mandated annual review of the effectiveness of its  broadcasts. According to BBG staff, this process (called Language Service  Review) is a comparative review designed to evaluate the need for adding  or deleting language services and strategically allocating funds to the  language services on the basis of priority and impact. To facilitate this  process, BBG staff prepare summary data and narrative for each language  service, covering such issues as audience reach, budget, and program  quality rating. BBG staff also oversee OCB through unscheduled but  regular communication on various issues, such as budget and finances.
IBB’s efforts to oversee OCB take three main forms. First, OCB  participates in a daily editorial meeting with VOA and IBB staff to discuss  what news stories each entity will be covering that day. According to IBB’s  Deputy Director, participation in such meetings can help coordinate  entities’ coverage of stories and ensure that each entity is covering all of  the relevant news events. Second, as we have previously discussed, IBB  performs annual program reviews of Radio and TV Martí. According to  IBB’s Deputy Director, the program review process is intended to provide  quality control by objectively evaluating OCB’s broadcasting services once  a year and recommending improvements in their broadcasting. Third, IBB  participates in and oversees OCB’s handling of strategic issues, such as  using an aircraft to broadcast TV Martí programming.
The State OIG has performed three reviews of OCB since 1999. These  reviews have covered a variety of issues—including strategic planning,  security, audience research, and contracting—and have resulted in  multiple recommendations for improvement. In addition to the inspections  and audits focused on OCB operations, the State OIG has also conducted  reviews of BBG and IBB operations that affect OCB. For example, in May  2006, the State OIG issued a report related to IBB’s Office of Performance  Review, which conducts the annual program review process for OCB and  VOA. In addition, in July 2007, the State OIG released the results of its  inspection of USINT, which sometimes assists U.S. broadcasting to Cuba.
In addition, OCB employees have multiple outlets to raise concerns  regarding management and personnel issues. OCB employees can seek  assistance from their employee union to address concerns regarding  working conditions. The union has two stewards who work at OCB  headquarters in Miami. OCB employees can also raise concerns about  equal employment opportunity issues with IBB’s Office of Civil Rights.  Two OCB employees serve as liaisons between OCB employees and the  Office of Civil Rights by receiving and working to address employee  concerns. IBB’s Office of Human Resources also has a full-time staff  person at OCB who, in addition to other administrative responsibilities,  receives employee complaints regarding mismanagement.
BBG, IBB, and OCB staffs have mixed views regarding whether OCB’s  location in Miami inhibits effective oversight of OCB operations. BBG and  IBB management reported that OCB’s location does not inhibit their  efforts to oversee it. They noted that they are in regular contact with OCB  management by telephone and e-mail. They also noted that the monthly  BBG board meetings (one of which is held in Miami each year) provide  sufficient personal contact with OCB management. Some OCB employees,  however, expressed concern regarding what they perceive as a lack of  oversight or involvement by BBG and IBB. One employee commented that  OCB seemed to be “out of sight and out of the minds” of BBG and IBB.  Other OCB employees suggested that more regular visits by BBG or IBB  staff to OCB would enhance their understanding of OCB’s operations and  management.
section_title: Oversight Efforts Have Raised Concerns Regarding Communication, Morale, and Fraud and Abuse
paragraphs: In recent years, three categories of problems have been raised regularly  regarding OCB operations. First, some OCB employees reported poor  communication from senior OCB management. Prior GAO work has  shown the benefits of maintaining continuous dialogue between  management and employees to share information and address workplace  issues. However, in responding to the Office of Personnel Management’s  2007 annual employee survey, more than half of OCB employees  responding disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that they  are satisfied with the information they received from management on what  is going on in the organization. Several OCB employees expressed  concern to us specifically regarding the lack of any formal systems for  disseminating information from management to staff or for staff to provide  input into management decisions. They expressed frustration with the lack  of regular staff meetings and absence of an employee newsletter to  improve communication. However, despite an informal recommendation  from the State OIG, OCB management has not established any formal or  regular mechanisms for communicating with staff, such as regular staff  meetings or newsletters. In response, OCB senior management noted that  there are frequent meetings between the OCB Director and senior  managers to discuss various issues, but that it is the responsibility of  managers to brief their staff on current issues and hold regular staff  meetings.
Second, employee morale has been a concern at OCB. For example, a  majority of OCB employees responding to the Office of Personnel  Management’s 2007 annual employee survey either disagreed or strongly  disagreed with the statement that they are satisfied with their involvement  in decisions that affect their work. Our interviews with some employees  in Miami also confirmed that employee morale is a concern.
Relating to the issue of employee morale, BBG management and OCB  employees expressed differing views regarding the current director’s  management of OCB. BBG and IBB management praised his leadership  style and told us that he has made numerous improvements in OCB’s  organization and broadcast quality. In 2007, the State OIG praised the  director as a “hands-on manager and an assertive, inspiring leader.” At  the same time, the State OIG acknowledged that his management style has  intimidated some employees. Similarly, we spoke with some OCB  employees who view him as a “micromanager” with excessive involvement  in the editorial content of OCB programming.
Third, a variety of allegations regarding fraud and abuse have been raised.  For example, according to BBG officials, they referred one case of  suspected fraud to the State OIG. As a result, in 2007, an OCB employee  was sentenced to serve 27 months in prison and required to pay a  monetary fine for taking kickbacks from a production company doing  business with OCB. Other allegations, however, have not been  substantiated. From November 2007 through May 2008, our Office of  Forensic Audits and Special Investigations interviewed former and current  employees alleging mismanagement at OCB. Employee allegations  included, among other things, time and attendance abuse, improper hiring  practices, contracting improprieties, and excessive travel by OCB  managers. Our investigators requested documentation from employees  that would support their allegations. Although investigators received some  documentation, it was insufficient to pursue further investigation.  Therefore, while investigators found some indications of mismanagement,  much of the evidence was anecdotal or hearsay and did not provide a  sufficient basis to continue the investigation.
Data from BBG’s Office of Civil Rights show that the number of  complaints that OCB employees have filed recently averages fewer than 3  per year. Staff from the Office of Civil Rights suggested that this  represents an improvement from previous time periods when a larger  number of complaints were filed, and attributed this improvement to the  management style of the current OCB Director. Since 2003, the Office of  Civil Rights has received 15 formal complaints from OCB employees. The  most frequently cited reasons for complaints were reprisal and  discrimination on the basis of gender or national origin. According to the  Director of the Office of Civil Rights, a few cases were settled and  managers prevailed in the remainder of the 12 cases that have been  completed. In placing these most recent complaints in context, staff from  the Office of Civil Rights indicated the following:    A small number of OCB employees accounts for a majority of the  complaints. Since 2003, 4 employees have been responsible for 9 of the 15  complaints filed by OCB employees.
The number of equal employment opportunity complaints filed by OCB  employees was substantially higher during the tenure of other OCB  Directors.
In their experience, other BBG broadcast entities have more frequent  equal employment opportunity complaints than OCB.
However, some OCB employees told us that the current outlets for  expressing concerns are ineffective. For example, an OCB employee union  representative indicated that in numerous cases, OCB management has  ignored or insufficiently addressed union members’ concerns. In addition,  some employees expressed fear of reprisal by managers if they raise  concerns.
section_title: BBG and OCB Have Taken Steps to Address Nearly All Recent Audit Recommendations
paragraphs: As we have previously discussed, external auditors have conducted  several reviews in recent years related to U.S. broadcasting to Cuba. Those  reviews have led to numerous recommendations for improvement to BBG,  IBB, and OCB. Most notably, in its 2003 and 2007 inspection reports of  OCB, the State OIG made 20 formal recommendations to improve OCB  operations. These recommendations addressed a variety of issues related  to OCB operations, including audience research, contracting, adherence to  journalistic standards, and strategic planning. Of those, the State OIG  considers 17 of the recommendations to be implemented. OCB officials  indicated that other recommendations related to physical security at OCB  headquarters will also be addressed soon.
IBB staff are responsible for tracking the status of ongoing and completed  audits related to all BBG entities and providing monthly reports to ensure  that IBB management and BBG staff are aware of such ongoing activities.  According to BBG officials, this is performed mainly to ensure that BBG  staff are aware of auditors’ ongoing inquiries. IBB staff maintain a paper  file for each audit, and, if a report is published and contains  recommendations, the file would maintain the report and any follow-up  documentation related to compliance. BBG officials stated that they are  developing a database that can be used to easily access information  regarding the compliance status of various audit recommendations. Once  this is completed, the database will contain information that can be used  by BBG staff and the Board of Governors to perform their oversight  responsibilities.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Broadcasting to Cuba has been an important part of U.S. foreign policy  toward Cuba for more than two decades. Despite OCB’s recent efforts to  broadcast Radio and TV Martí using additional transmission methods at a  significant cost, the best available research indicates that OCB’s audience  size is small. However, OCB believes that these results do not reflect the  true size of its audience in Cuba, citing the challenges to conducting valid  audience research in Cuba and anecdotal reports it receives from Cubans.  With a new President and Congress, the United States has a fresh  opportunity to reassess the purpose and effectiveness of U.S. radio and  television broadcasting to Cuba. To assist decisionmakers in formulating  the U.S. broadcasting strategy and making funding decisions, BBG and  OCB need to ensure that they have articulated a clear strategy and  assembled data to help decisionmakers assess the effectiveness and return  on investment of OCB’s various transmission methods.
In addition to the need for a clear strategy to guide current and future  policy direction, which OCB and BBG are developing, it is important to  have systems and processes in place to enable the efficient and effective  operation of OCB. To help ensure that U.S. broadcasting to Cuba is  informed by all available audience research, it is important to enhance  coordination among U.S. agencies and grantees that perform such  research. Additionally, to better ensure that U.S. broadcasting to Cuba is in  compliance with journalistic standards, the lack of training for OCB staff  needs to be addressed and guidance and training for IBB program analysts  who conduct reviews of OCB’s adherence to journalistic standards should  be enhanced. Furthermore, to improve morale within the organization,  OCB management should take steps to address persistent concerns with  its communication and interaction with OCB staff. Finally, to avoid the  diminution of the reputation of U.S. government-funded broadcasting, it is  important that advertisements containing inappropriate material are not  shown during OCB broadcasts.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To assist decisionmakers and improve OCB’s strategy, we recommend that  the Broadcasting Board of Governors take the following two steps:    Conduct an analysis of the relative success and return on investment of  broadcasting to Cuba, showing the cost, nature of the audience, and  challenges—such as jamming and competition—related to each of OCB’s  transmission methods. The analysis should also include comprehensive  information regarding the media environment in Cuba to better  understand the extent to which OCB broadcasts are attractive to Cubans.
Coordinate the sharing of information among U.S. agencies and grantees  regarding audience research relating to Radio and TV Martí.
To improve OCB operations, we recommend that Broadcasting Board of  Governors take the following four actions:   Direct IBB to enhance guidance and training for analysts performing  program reviews.
Direct OCB to provide training to OCB staff regarding journalistic  standards.
Direct IBB to develop guidance and take steps to ensure that political and  other inappropriate advertisements are not shown during OCB broadcasts.
Direct OCB to establish formal mechanisms for disseminating information  to and obtaining views from employees to help improve communication  and morale.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Broadcasting Board of Governors  and the Department of State. Their technical comments are included in  this report as appropriate. In addition, BBG provided formal comments,  which are reprinted in appendix II.
BBG indicated that it is in general agreement with all of the  recommendations and will move to implement them, to the degree  practicable. BBG also suggested that the draft report at times did not fully  reflect the difficulties in broadcasting to a closed society or in evaluating  the reach of broadcasts to a closed society. We believe the report  addresses both issues appropriately. Regarding the difficulties in  broadcasting to a closed society, the report has separate sections (in  which BBG, IBB, and OCB officials are frequently cited) that discuss the  challenges posed by Cuban government jamming and competitors in the  Cuban media environment. Regarding the difficulties in evaluating the  reach of broadcasts to Cuba, the report clearly acknowledges that  significant challenges exist to conducting valid audience research in Cuba.  For example, the report discusses the prohibition on conducting in-person  audience research in Cuba and the lack of nationally representative data  from telephone surveys. BBG also suggested that the draft report’s  discussion of a lack of a strategic plan was somewhat misleading. While  the report acknowledges coordination has occurred on some strategic  issues, OCB’s draft strategic plan (which was first presented in July 2007)  has yet to be approved. We believe an approved strategic plan would be  particularly valuable to decisionmakers as the new Congress and  Administration seeks to formulate the U.S. broadcasting strategy and  make funding decisions.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested  congressional committees, the Secretary of State, and the Broadcasting  Board of Governors. In addition, this report will be available at no charge  on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4128 or FordJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who contributed to this report are listed in  appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine the Office of Cuba Broadcasting’s (OCB) approach for  broadcasting to Cuba and what is known about the size of its audience, we  reviewed and analyzed strategic, programmatic, budget, and audience  research documents from the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG),  International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), OCB, and Department of State  (State). To describe OCB’s approach, we reviewed BBG’s strategic plan for  2008-2013 and OCB’s draft strategic plan and interviewed officials at BBG,  IBB, and OCB regarding strategic planning exercises. To analyze OCB’s  approach for broadcasting to Cuba, we reviewed relevant  documentation—including OCB and IBB data on the cost, broadcast  schedule, geographic coverage, and effectiveness of Radio and TV Martí’s  various transmission methods—and interviewed OCB and IBB officials.  We also visited some of the sites from where OCB broadcasts Radio and  TV Martí, including OCB’s medium-wave radio station in Marathon,  Florida, and AeroMartí’s station in Key West, Florida, and interviewed  OCB staff and contractors based at those locations. To describe the  makeup of OCB’s budget, we obtained OCB data regarding its fiscal year  2008 budget. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for  the purpose of identifying the main categories and general budget levels  for each category. To identify the available information regarding the size  of OCB’s audience, we analyzed IBB and OCB audience research from  2003 through 2008, including telephone surveys, focus group studies, and  anecdotal reports of reception. To assess the reliability of these data, we  interviewed BBG, IBB, and OCB officials, as well as IBB and OCB  audience research contractors, regarding the methodology for collecting  the data. We also observed an OCB-commissioned monitoring panel and a  Radio Martí program review meeting with IBB and OCB officials to review  and analyze the results of audience research. In addition, we analyzed IBB  documents explaining the methodology for conducting various audience  research efforts. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable  for the purpose of characterizing the size of Radio and TV Martí’s audience  in very broad terms for the populations the surveys reached. However, the  fall in reported audience size in the 2008 IBB telephone survey does raise  some questions about the accuracy of that survey. To analyze the impact  of Cuban government jamming on OCB’s broadcasts, we reviewed OCB  documents—including an assessment of Cuban jamming capabilities and a  study conducted by AeroMartí’s primary contractor on the airplane’s  capabilities—and interviewed IBB and OCB engineers and AeroMartí’s  contractor. To analyze the effect of competition on OCB broadcasts, we  reviewed IBB telephone surveys and interviewed OCB and IBB officials.  To assess the extent of interagency coordination, we reviewed relevant  documentation, including the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba  reports, and interviewed BBG, OCB, U.S. Agency for International  Development, and State officials.
To review how BBG and OCB ensure compliance with journalistic  principles, we reviewed documentation on journalistic standards,  including Voice of America’s (VOA) Charter and OCB’s editorial  guidelines, as well as IBB’s qualitative and quantitative assessments of  Radio and TV Martí’s broadcast content. To understand IBB’s process for  assessing OCB broadcast content, we observed a June 2008 TV Martí  follow-up meeting and a September 2008 Radio Martí program review  meeting and interviewed BBG, IBB, and OCB officials. To assess OCB  compliance with journalistic standards, we analyzed IBB program review  documentation from 2003 to 2008, including IBB’s qualitative reviews of  OCB’s broadcast content, IBB’s content and production performance  scores for OCB and VOA broadcasts, and IBB actions plans. We also  interviewed IBB officials responsible for overseeing the performance  review process and the IBB program analyst who performed the reviews  of Radio and TV Martí. To assess the quality of IBB reviews of OCB  broadcast content, we systematically analyzed IBB reviews of Radio and  TV Martí broadcast content from 2003 to 2008. For each review, we  determined whether and to what extent the review report identified  information, such as the scope of the review, overall judgments regarding  compliance with journalistic standards, and the frequency or severity of  problems cited. In addition, we reviewed the results of prior audit work  regarding the program review process. To identify the amount of training  on journalistic standards offered to OCB employees, we reviewed OCB  training records and interviewed OCB staff.
To describe the efforts taken to ensure that U.S. broadcasting to Cuba  complies with relevant domestic and international broadcasting standards,  we reviewed legislation authorizing U.S. radio and television broadcasting  to Cuba and legislation prohibiting domestic dissemination of public  diplomacy information intended for foreign audiences. We also  interviewed BBG officials regarding the steps taken to minimize domestic  dissemination of Radio and TV Martí programming. In addition, we  interviewed a representative of TV Azteca and obtained documents related  to political advertisements and commercials aired during September 2008.  Furthermore, we interviewed and obtained video clips from OCB  employees regarding commercials aired by TV Azteca during TV Martí  broadcasts. We also reviewed documents from the U.S. government,  Cuban government, and International Telecommunication Union (ITU)  regarding U.S. broadcasting to Cuba’s adherence to ITU regulations.  Finally, we interviewed officials from State and the Federal  Communications Commission about the history of U.S.-Cuban disputes  regarding international broadcasting and the current U.S. position  regarding broadcasting to Cuba.
To identify oversight and management challenges related to OCB and  analyze the efforts undertaken to address those challenges, we reviewed  prior audit reports by GAO and the State Office of Inspector General. We  also interviewed BBG staff and reviewed BBG documentation regarding  the steps taken to implement prior audit recommendations. Additionally,  we analyzed BBG data regarding official complaints by OCB employees  since 2003 to describe the nature of the complaints. Furthermore, we  interviewed BBG, IBB, and OCB officials regarding oversight and  management challenges and the steps taken to address those challenges.  Finally, we interviewed OCB staff regarding current and historical  management and oversight challenges.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2008 to January 2009, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Broadcasting Board of Governors
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, John Brummet (Assistant  Director), Jason Bair, Emily Gupta, Natalie Sirois, Etana Finkler, Martin de  Alteriis, Ernie Jackson, and Adrienne Spahr made key contributions to this  report. Joseph Carney, John Hutton, Timothy DiNapoli, Katherine Trimble,  Justin Jaynes, Leigh Ann Nally, Bruce Causseaux, Gary Bianchi, Ryan  Geach, Madhav Panwar, R. Gifford Howland, Jennifer Young, Charlotte  Moore, Armetha Liles, and Colleen Miller also provided assistance.