Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns Drive Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved
Published: 2007-04-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) most visible layer of commercial aviation security is the screening of airline passengers at airport checkpoints, where travelers and their carry-on items are screened for explosives and other dangerous items by transportation security officers (TSO). Several revisions made to checkpoint screening procedures have been scrutinized and questioned by the traveling public and Congress in recent years. For this review, GAO evaluated (1) TSA's decisions to modify passenger screening procedures between April 2005 and December 2005 and in response to the alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot, and (2) how TSA monitored TSO compliance with passenger screening procedures. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed TSA documents, interviewed TSA officials and aviation security experts, and visited 25 airports of varying sizes and locations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Between April 2005 and December 2005, proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint screening standard operating procedures (SOP) were made for a variety of reasons, and while a majority of the proposed modifications--48 of 92--were ultimately implemented at airports, TSA's methods for evaluating and documenting them could be improved. SOP modifications were proposed based on the professional judgment of TSA senior-level officials and program-level staff. TSA considered the daily experiences of airport staff, complaints and concerns raised by the traveling public, and analysis of risks to the aviation system when proposing SOP modifications. TSA also made efforts to balance the impact on security, efficiency, and customer service when deciding which proposed modifications to implement, as in the case of the SOP changes made in response to the alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot. In some cases, TSA tested proposed modifications at selected airports to help determine whether the changes would achieve their intended purpose. However, TSA's data collection and analyses could be improved to help TSA determine whether proposed procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their intended purpose. For example, TSA officials decided to allow passengers to carry small scissors and tools onto aircraft based on their review of threat information, which indicated that these items do not pose a high risk to the aviation system. However, TSA did not conduct the necessary analysis of data it collected to assess whether this screening change would free up TSOs to focus on screening for high-risk threats, as intended. TSA officials acknowledged the importance of evaluating whether proposed screening procedures would achieve their intended purpose, but cited difficulties in doing so, including time pressures to implement needed security measures quickly. Finally, TSA's documentation on proposed modifications to screening procedures was not complete. TSA documented the basis--that is, the information, experience, or event that encouraged TSA officials to propose the modifications--for 72 of the 92 proposed modifications. In addition, TSA documented the reasoning behind its decisions for half (26 of 44) of the proposed modifications that were not implemented. Without more complete documentation, TSA may not be able to justify key modifications to passenger screening procedures to Congress and the traveling public. TSA monitors TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening procedures through its performance accountability and standards system and through covert testing. Compliance assessments include quarterly observations of TSOs' ability to perform particular screening functions in the operating environment, quarterly quizzes to assess TSOs' knowledge of procedures, and an annual knowledge and skills assessment. TSA uses covert tests to evaluate, in part, the extent to which TSOs' noncompliance with procedures affects their ability to detect simulated threat items hidden in accessible property or concealed on a person. TSA airport officials have experienced resource challenges in implementing these compliance monitoring methods. TSA headquarters officials stated that they are taking steps to address these challenges.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives  onboard multiple commercial aircraft bound for the United States from  the United Kingdom has highlighted the continued importance of securing  the commercial aviation system. The Transportation Security  Administration (TSA) is responsible for, among other things, securing the  nation’s commercial aviation system while also facilitating the movement  of passengers. To protect this system after the September 11, 2001,  terrorist attacks, TSA implemented a multilayered system of security—the  most publicly visible layer being the physical screening of passengers and  their carry-on bags at airport screening checkpoints, which all passengers  must pass through prior to entering an airport’s sterile area, the area  within the terminal that provides passengers access to boarding aircraft.
The passenger checkpoint screening system is composed of three  elements: (1) the people responsible for conducting the screening of  airline passengers and their carry-on items—Transportation Security  Officers (TSO) (formerly known as screeners), (2) the procedures TSOs  are to follow to conduct screening, and (3) the technology used in the  screening process. Collectively, these elements help to determine the  effectiveness and efficiency of passenger checkpoint screening. TSA has  made efforts to enhance each of the three elements of the passenger  checkpoint screening system.
Since its inception, TSA has issued 25 versions of the passenger  checkpoint screening standard operating procedures (SOP), to include  new screening procedures as well as changes to existing screening  procedures. Several of these revisions have been criticized and scrutinized  by the traveling public and Congress. For example, in September 2004,  TSA modified its passenger screening procedures in response to the  August 2004 midair explosions of two Russian airliners, believed to have  been caused by Chechen women who concealed explosive devices under  their clothing. Specifically, the revision entailed a more invasive technique  for patting down the torso area of passengers. According to TSA officials,  in response to complaints raised by airline passengers and TSA’s review of  additional threat information, TSA further modified the pat-down  procedure in December 2004 to entail a more targeted, less intrusive pat- down procedure. In December 2005, TSA allowed passengers to carry  small scissors and small tools onto aircraft, resulting in concern by some  industry representatives that allowing sharp objects onto planes would put  flight crew at risk of attack. This procedural change also resulted in the  TSA Assistant Secretary being asked to testify before Congress on the  agency’s rationale for allowing passengers to carry small scissors and  small tools onto planes and a legislative mandate for us to assess the  impact of the prohibited items list change on public safety and screening  operations.
In light of the potential impact of changes to passenger checkpoint  screening procedures, you asked that we assess TSA’s process for  determining whether and how screening procedures should be modified,  to include the creation of new screening procedures and changes to  existing screening procedures. Specifically, this report addresses the  following questions: (1) How and on what basis did TSA modify passenger  screening procedures and what factors guided the decisions to do so?   (2) How does TSA determine whether TSOs are complying with the  standard procedures for screening passengers and their carry-on items?   In March 2007, we issued a report that contained sensitive security  information regarding TSA’s passenger checkpoint screening procedures,  including the factors TSA considered when modifying passenger screening  procedures and TSA’s efforts to monitor TSO compliance with standard  passenger screening procedures. This report provides the results of our  March 2007 report with sensitive security information removed.
To obtain information on the process used to modify passenger  checkpoint screening procedures, we reviewed and analyzed available  TSA documentation on proposed procedure modifications that were  considered between April 2005 and December 2005, as well as threat  assessments and operational studies that supported SOP modifications.  We also reviewed and analyzed similar documentation for proposed  modifications considered between August 2006 and November 2006 in  response to the alleged terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard  multiple aircraft en route from the United Kingdom to the United States.  We included modifications to passenger checkpoint screening procedures  related to this particular event because they provided the most recent  information available of TSA’s approach to modifying screening  procedures in response to an immediate perceived threat to civil aviation.  To assess TSO compliance with standard operating procedures, our work  also involved a review of available documentation, including guidance,  checklists, and other evaluation tools used by TSA. In addition, we met  with TSA headquarters officials who were involved in the process of  determining whether proposed changes to passenger checkpoint screening  procedures should be implemented, and who were responsible for  overseeing efforts to monitor TSO compliance with screening procedures.  We also visited or conducted phone interviews with staff at 25 airports,  which we selected based on variation in size, geographic location, and  level of performance on compliance-related assessments. At each airport,  we interviewed Federal Security Directors (FSD), members of their  management teams, and TSOs with passenger screening responsibilities.  Information from these interviews cannot be generalized to all airports  nationwide. Two of the airports we visited were also participants in TSA’s  Screening Partnership Program. We also met with officials from the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology  Directorate as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to discuss  the methodology and results of their liquid explosives tests, which were  used to support TSA’s decisions to modify the SOP in September 2006. We  also interviewed five experts in the field of aviation security to obtain their  perspectives on TSA’s approach for deciding whether to implement  proposed checkpoint screening procedures. We compared TSA’s  approach for implementing and revising passenger checkpoint screening  procedures, and for monitoring TSO compliance, with the Comptroller  General’s standards for internal control in the federal government and  with risk management guidance. We assessed the reliability of the data we  acquired from TSA regarding TSO compliance and found the data to be  sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We conducted our work from March 2005 through January 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. More  details about the scope and methodology of our work are presented in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Passenger Checkpoint Screening System
paragraphs: Passenger screening is a process by which personnel authorized by TSA  inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of any  unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item  onboard an aircraft or into a sterile area. Passenger screening personnel  must inspect individuals for prohibited items at designated screening  locations. As shown in figure 1, the four passenger screening functions  are    X-ray screening of property,    walk-through metal detector screening of individuals,    hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and    physical search of property and trace detection for explosives.
Typically, passengers are only subjected to X-ray screening of their carry- on items and screening by the walk-through metal detector. Passengers  whose carry-on baggage alarms the X-ray machine, who alarm the walk- through metal detector, or who are designated as selectees—that is,  passengers selected by the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening  System (CAPPS) or other TSA-approved processes to receive additional  screening—are screened by hand-wand or pat-down and have their carry- on items screened for explosives traces or physically searched.
The passenger checkpoint screening system is composed of three  elements: the people responsible for conducting the screening of airline  passengers and their carry-on items—TSOs, the technology used during  the screening process, and the procedures TSOs are to follow to conduct  screening. Collectively, these elements help to determine the effectiveness  and efficiency of passenger checkpoint screening.
subsections: section_title: Transportation Security Officers
paragraphs: TSOs screen all passengers and their carry-on baggage prior to allowing  passengers access to their departure gates. There are several positions  within TSA that perform and directly supervise passenger screening  functions. Figure 2 provides a description of these positions.
In May 2005, we reported on TSA’s efforts to train TSOs and to measure  and enhance TSO performance. We found that TSA had initiated a  number of actions designed to enhance passenger TSO, checked baggage  TSO, and supervisory TSO training. However, at some airports TSOs  encountered difficulty accessing and completing recurrent (refresher)  training because of technological and staffing constraints. We also found  that TSA lacked adequate internal controls to provide reasonable  assurance that TSOs were receiving legislatively mandated basic and  remedial training, and to monitor the status of its recurrent training  program. Further, we reported that TSA had implemented and  strengthened efforts to collect TSO performance data as part of its overall  effort to enhance TSO performance. We recommended that TSA develop a  plan for completing the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet  connectivity to all TSA airport training facilities, and establish appropriate  responsibilities and other internal controls for monitoring and  documenting TSO compliance with training requirements. DHS generally  concurred with our recommendations and stated that TSA has taken steps  to implement them.
section_title: Screening Technology
paragraphs: There are typically four types of technology used to screen airline  passengers and their carry-on baggage at the checkpoint:    walk-through metal detectors,    X-ray machines,    hand-held metal detectors, and    explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment.
The President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request noted that emerging  checkpoint technology will enhance the detection of prohibited items,  especially firearms and explosives, on passengers. As of December 2006,  TSA plans to conduct operational tests of three types of passenger  screening technologies within the next year. TSA has conducted other  tests in the past; for example, during fiscal year 2005, TSA operationally  tested document scanners, which use explosive trace detection technology  to detect explosives residue on passengers’ boarding passes or  identification cards. TSA decided not to expand the use of the document  scanner, in part because of the extent to which explosives traces had to be  sampled manually. TSA also plans to begin operational tests of technology  that would screen bottles for liquid explosives. We are currently evaluating  the Department of Homeland Security’s and TSA’s progress in planning  for, managing, and deploying research and development programs in  support of airport checkpoint screening operations. We expect to report  our results in August 2007.
section_title: Standard Operating Procedures
paragraphs: TSA has developed checkpoint screening standard operating procedures,  which are the focus of this report, that establish the process and standards  by which TSOs are to screen passengers and their carry-on items at  screening checkpoints. Between April 2005 and December 2005, based on  available documentation, TSA deliberated 189 proposed changes to  passenger checkpoint screening SOPs, 92 of which were intended to  modify the way in which passengers and their carry-on items are  screened. TSA issued six versions of the passenger checkpoint screening  SOPs during this period.
TSA modified passenger checkpoint screening SOPs to enhance the  traveling public’s perception of the screening process, improve the  efficiency of the screening process, and enhance the detection of  prohibited items and suspicious persons. As shown in table 1, 48 of the   92 proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint screening SOPs were  implemented, and the types of modifications made or proposed generally  fell into one of three categories—customer satisfaction, screening  efficiency, and security.
section_title: TSA Considered Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns when Modifying Passenger Screening Procedures, but Could Improve Its Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed Procedures
paragraphs: TSA used various processes between April 2005 and December 2005 to  modify passenger checkpoint screening SOPs, and a variety of factors  guided TSA’s decisions to modify SOPs. TSA’s processes for modifying  SOPs generally involved TSA staff recommending proposed modifications,  reviewing and commenting on proposed modifications, and TSA senior  leadership making final decisions as to whether proposed modifications  should be implemented. During our 9-month review period, TSA officials  considered 92 proposed modifications to the way in which passengers and  their carry-on items were screened, and 48 were implemented. TSA  officials proposed SOP modifications based on risk factors (threat and  vulnerability information), day-to-day experiences of airport staff, and  concerns and complaints raised by passengers. TSA then made efforts to  balance security, efficiency, and customer service when deciding which  proposed SOP modifications to implement. Consistent with our prior work  that has shown the importance of data collection and analyses to support  agency decision making, TSA conducted data collection and analysis for  certain proposed SOP modifications that were tested before they were  implemented at all airports. Nevertheless, we found that TSA could  improve its data collection and analysis to assist the agency in determining  whether the proposed procedures would enhance detection or free up  TSO resources, when intended. In addition, TSA did not maintain complete  documentation of proposed SOP modifications; therefore, we could not  fully assess the basis for proposed SOP modifications or the reasons why  certain proposed modifications were not implemented. TSA officials  acknowledged that it is beneficial to maintain documentation on the  reasoning behind decisions to implement or reject SOP modifications  deemed significant.
subsections: section_title: TSA’s Processes for Modifying SOPs Were Driven by Input from TSA Field and Headquarters Staff
paragraphs: Proposed SOP modifications were submitted and reviewed under two  processes during our 9-month review period, and for each process, TSA  senior leadership made the final decision as to whether the proposed  modifications would be implemented. One of the processes TSA used to  modify passenger checkpoint screening SOPs involved TSA field staff or  headquarters officials, and, to a lesser extent, TSA senior leadership,  suggesting ways in which passenger checkpoint screening SOPs could be  modified. These suggestions were submitted through various mechanisms,  including electronic mail and an SOP panel review conducted by TSA  airport personnel. (These methods are described in more detail in app. II.)  Eighty-two of the 92 proposed modifications were considered under this  process.
If TSA officials determined, based on their professional judgment, that the  recommended SOP modifications—whether from headquarters or the  field—merited further consideration, or if a specific modification was  proposed by TSA senior leadership, the following chain of events  occurred:    First, the procedures branch of the Office of Security Operations  drafted SOP language for each of the proposed modifications.    Second, the draft language for each proposed modification was  disseminated to representatives of various TSA divisions for review,  and the language was revised as needed.
Third, TSA officials tested proposed modifications in the airport  operating environment if they found it necessary to:    assess the security impact of the proposed modification,    evaluate the impact of the modification on the amount of time  taken for passengers to clear the checkpoint,    measure the impact of the proposed modification on passengers  and industry partners, or    determine training needs created by the proposed modification.
Fourth, the revised SOP language for proposed modifications was  sent to the heads of several TSA divisions for comment.
Fifth, considering the comments of the TSA division heads, the head  of the Office of Security Operations or other TSA senior leadership  made the final decision as to whether proposed modifications  would be implemented.
Another process for modifying passenger checkpoint screening SOPs  during our 9-month review period was carried out by TSA’s Explosives  Detection Improvement Task Force. The task force was established in  October 2005 by the TSA Assistant Secretary to respond to the threat of  improvised explosive devices (IED) being carried through the checkpoint.  The goal of the task force was to apply a risk-based approach to screening  passengers and their baggage in order to enhance TSA’s ability to detect  IEDs. The task force developed 13 of the 92 proposed SOP modifications  that were considered by TSA between April 2005 and December 2005.  The task force solicited and incorporated feedback from representatives  of various TSA divisions on these proposed modifications and presented  them to TSA senior leadership for review and approval. TSA senior  leadership decided that 8 of the 13 proposed modifications should be  operationally tested—that is, temporarily implemented in the airport  environment for the purposes of data collection and evaluation—to better  inform decisions regarding whether the proposed modifications should be  implemented. Following the testing of these proposed modifications in the  airport environment, TSA senior leadership decided to implement 7 of the   8 operationally tested changes. (The task force’s approach to testing  these procedures is discussed in more detail below.) Following our   9-month period of review, the changes that TSA made to its passenger  checkpoint screening SOPs in response to the alleged August 2006 liquid  explosives terror plot were decided upon by DHS and TSA senior  leadership, with some input from TSA field staff, aviation industry  representatives, and officials from other federal agencies.
section_title: Risk Factors, Day-to-Day Experiences, and Customer Concerns Were the Basis for Proposed SOP Modifications
paragraphs: Based on available documentation, risk factors (i.e., threats to  commercial aviation and vulnerability to those threats), day-to-day  experiences of airport staff, and complaints and concerns raised by  passengers were the basis for TSA staff and officials proposing  modifications to passenger checkpoint screening SOPs.
Fourteen of the 92 procedure modifications recommended by TSA staff  and officials were based on reported or perceived threats to commercial  aviation, and existing vulnerabilities to those threats. For example, the  Explosives Detection Improvement Task Force proposed SOP  modifications based on threat reports developed by TSA’s Intelligence and  Analysis division. Specifically, in an August 2005 civil aviation threat  assessment, the division reported that terrorists are likely to seek novel  ways to evade U.S. airport security screening. Subsequently, the task  force proposed that the pat-down procedure performed on passengers  selected for additional screening be revised to include not only the torso  area, which is what the previous pat-down procedure entailed, but  additional areas of the body such as the legs. The August 2005 threat  assessment also stated that terrorists may attempt to carry separate  components of an IED through the checkpoint, then assemble the  components while onboard the aircraft. To address this threat, the task  force proposed a new procedure to enhance TSOs’ ability to search for  components of improvised explosive devices. According to TSA officials,  threat reports have also indicated that terrorists rely on the routine nature  of security measures in order to plan their attacks. To address this threat,  the task force proposed a procedure that incorporated unpredictability  into the screening process by requiring designated TSOs to randomly  select passengers to receive additional search procedures. Following our  9-month review period, TSA continued to use threat information as the  basis for proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint screening SOPs.  In August 2006, TSA proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint  screening SOPs after receiving threat information regarding an alleged  terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard multiple aircraft en  route from the United Kingdom to the United States. Regarding  vulnerabilities to reported threats, based on the results of TSA’s own  covert tests (undercover, unannounced tests), TSA’s Office of Inspection  recommended SOP modifications to enhance the detection of explosives  at the passenger screening checkpoint.
TSA officials also proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint  screening SOPs based on their professional judgment regarding perceived  threats to aviation security. For example, an FSD recommended changes  to the screening of funeral urns based on a perceived threat. In some  cases, proposed SOP modifications appeared to reflect threat information  analyzed by TSA officials. For example, TSOs are provided with Threat in  the Spotlight, a weekly report that identifies new threats to commercial  aviation, examples of innovative ways in which passengers may conceal  prohibited items, and pictures of items that may not appear to be  prohibited items but actually are. TSOs are also provided relevant threat  information during briefings that take place before and after their shifts.   In addition, FSDs are provided classified intelligence summaries on a daily  and weekly basis, as well as monthly reports of suspicious incidents that  occurred at airports nationwide. TSA’s consideration of threat and  vulnerability—through analysis of current documentation and by  exercising professional judgment—is consistent with a risk-based  decision-making approach. As we have reported previously, and DHS and  TSA have advocated, a risk-based approach, as applied in the homeland  security context, can help to more effectively and efficiently prepare  defenses against acts of terrorism and other threats.
TSA headquarters and field staff also based proposed SOP modifications— specifically, 36 of the 92 proposed modifications—on experience in the  airport environment. For example, TSA headquarters officials conduct  reviews at airports to identify best practices and deficiencies in the  checkpoint screening process. During one of these reviews, headquarters  officials observed that TSOs were not fully complying with the pat-down  procedure. After discussions with TSOs, TSA headquarters officials  determined that the way in which TSOs were conducting the procedure  was more effective. In addition, TSA senior leadership, after learning that  small airports had staffing challenges that precluded them from ensuring  that passengers are patted down by TSOs of the same gender, proposed  that opposite-gender pat-down screening be allowed at small airports.
Passenger complaints and concerns shared with TSA also served as a basis  for proposed modifications during our 9-month review period. Specifically,  of the 92 proposed SOP modifications considered during this period, TSA  staff and officials recommended 29 modifications based on complaints and  concerns raised by passengers. For example, TSA headquarters staff  recommended allowing passengers to hold their hair while being screened  by the Explosives Trace Portal, after receiving complaints from  passengers about eye injuries from hair blowing in their eyes and hair  being caught in the doors of the portal.
section_title: TSA Balanced Security, Efficiency, and Customer Service when Deciding whether to Implement Proposed SOP Modifications
paragraphs: When deciding whether to implement proposed SOP modifications, TSA  officials also made efforts to balance the impact of proposed modifications  on security, efficiency, and customer service. TSA’s consideration of  these factors reflects the agency’s mission to protect transportation  systems while also ensuring the free movement of people and commerce.  As previously discussed, TSA sought to improve the security of the  commercial aviation system by modifying the SOP for conducting the   pat-down search. (TSA identified the modified pat-down procedure as the  “bulk-item” pat-down.) When deciding whether to implement the proposed  modification, TSA officials considered not only the impact that the bulk- item pat-down procedure would have on security, but also the impact that  the procedure would have on screening efficiency and customer service.  For example, TSA officials determined that the bulk-item pat-down  procedure would not significantly affect efficiency because it would only  add a few seconds to the screening process. Following our 9-month review  period, TSA continued to make efforts to balance security, efficiency, and  customer service when deciding whether to implement proposed SOP  modifications, as illustrated by TSA senior leadership’s deliberation on  proposed SOP modifications in response to the alleged August 2006 liquid  explosives terrorist plot. TSA modified the passenger checkpoint  screening SOP four times between August 2006 and November 2006 in an  effort to defend against the threat of terrorists’ use of liquid explosives  onboard commercial aircraft. While the basis for these modifications was  to mitigate risk, as shown in table 2, TSA senior leadership considered  several other factors when deciding whether to implement the  modifications.
As TSA senior leadership obtained more information about the particular  threat posed by the liquid explosives through tests conducted by DHS’s  Science and Technology Directorate and FBI, TSA relaxed the restrictions  to allow passengers to carry liquids, gels, and aerosols onboard aircraft in  3-fluid-ounce bottles—and as of November 2006, 3.4-fluid-ounce bottles— that would easily fit in a quart-sized, clear plastic, zip-top bag. TSA senior  leadership identified both benefits and drawbacks to this SOP  modification, but determined that the balance of security, efficiency, and  customer service that would result from these SOP changes was  appropriate. As shown in table 2, TSA officials recognize that there are  security drawbacks—or vulnerabilities—associated with allowing  passengers to carry even small amounts of liquids and gels onboard  aircraft. For example, two or more terrorists could combine small  amounts of liquid explosives after they pass through the checkpoint to  generate an amount large enough to possibly cause catastrophic damage  to an aircraft. However, TSA officials stated that doing so would be  logistically challenging given the physical harm that the specific explosives  could cause to the person handling them, and that suspicion among  travelers, law enforcement officials, and airport employees would likely be  raised if an individual was seen combining the liquid contents of small  containers stored in two or more quart-sized plastic bags. TSA officials  stated that at the time of the modifications to the liquid, gels, and aerosols  screening procedures, there was consensus among explosives detection  experts, both domestically and abroad, regarding TSA’s assumptions about  how the explosives could be used and the damage they could cause to an  aircraft. TSA officials also stated that after reviewing the intelligence  information related to the alleged August 2006 London terror plot— particularly with regard to the capability and intent of the terrorists—TSA  determined that allowing small amounts of liquids, gels, and aerosols  onboard aircraft posed an acceptable level of risk to the commercial  aviation system. Moreover, TSA officials acknowledged that there are  vulnerabilities with allowing passengers to carry liquids that are exempted  from the 3.4-fluid-ounce limit—such as baby formula and medication— onboard aircraft.
TSA officials stated that the enhancements TSA is making to the various  other layers of aviation security will help address the security  vulnerabilities identified above. For example, TSA has increased  explosives detection canine patrols, deployed Federal Air Marshals on  additional international flights, increased random screening of passengers  at boarding gates, and increased random screening of airport and TSA  employees who pass through the checkpoint. TSA also plans to expand  implementation of its Screening Passengers by Observation Technique  (SPOT) to additional airports. SPOT involves specially trained TSOs  observing the behavior of passengers and resolving any suspicious  behavior through casual conversation with passengers and referring  suspicious passengers to selectee screening. TSA intends for SPOT to  provide a flexible, adaptable, risk-based layer of security that can be  deployed to detect potentially high-risk passengers based on certain  behavioral cues.
section_title: TSA’s Analysis of the Impact of Certain Proposed Screening Changes on Security and TSO Resources Could Be Strengthened
paragraphs: While professional judgment regarding risk factors, experience in the  operating environment, and customer feedback have guided many of the  decisions TSA leadership made about which screening procedures to  implement, TSA also sought to use empirical data as a basis for evaluating  the impact some screening changes could have on security and TSO  resources. The TSA Assistant Secretary stated in December 2005 that TSA  sought to make decisions about screening changes based on data and  metrics—a practice he said TSA would continue. The use of data and  metrics to inform TSA’s decision making regarding implementing  proposed screening procedures is consistent with our prior work that has  shown the importance of data collection and analyses to support agency  decision making. Between October 2005 and January 2006, TSA’s  Explosives Detection Improvement Task Force sought to collect data as  part of an effort to test the impact of seven proposed procedures at  selected airports, as noted earlier. These seven proposed procedures  were selected because officials believed they would have a significant  impact on how TSOs perform daily screening functions, TSO training, and  customer acceptability. According to TSA’s chief of security operations,  the purpose of testing these procedures in the airport environment was to  ensure that TSA was “on the right path” in implementing them. These  particular procedures were considered by senior TSA officials as  especially important for enhancing the detection of explosives and for  deterring terrorists from attempting to carry out an attack. According to  TSA, some of the proposed procedures could also free up TSOs so that  they could spend more time on procedures for detecting explosives and  less time on procedures associated with low security risks, such as  identifying small scissors in carry-on bags. The seven proposed  procedures tested by the task force reflect both new procedures and  modifications to existing procedures, as shown in table 3.
Our analysis of TSA’s data collection and data analysis for the seven  procedures that were operationally tested identified several problems that  affected TSA’s ability to determine whether these procedures, as designed  and implemented by TSA, would have the intended effect—to enhance the  detection of explosives during the passenger screening process or to free  up resources so that explosives detection procedures could be  implemented. Although the deterrence of persons intending to do harm is  also an intended effect of some proposed SOP modifications, TSA officials  said that it is difficult to assess the extent to which implementation of  proposed procedures would deter terrorists. The Office of Management  and Budget has also acknowledged the difficulty in measuring deterrence,  particularly for procedures intended to prevent acts of terrorism. While we  agree that measuring deterrence is difficult, opportunities exist for TSA to  strengthen its analyses to help provide information on whether the  proposed procedures would enhance detection or free up TSO resources,  when intended.
Screening Passengers by Observation Technique. TSA officials stated  that SPOT is intended to both deter terrorists and identify suspicious  persons who intend to cause harm while on an aircraft. While we  recognize that it is difficult to assess the extent to which terrorists are  deterred by the presence of designated TSOs conducting behavioral  observations at the checkpoint, we believe that there is an opportunity to  assess whether SPOT contributes to enhancing TSA’s ability to detect  suspicious persons that may intend to cause harm on an aircraft. One  factor that may serve as an indicator that a person intends to do harm on  an aircraft is whether that individual is carrying a prohibited item. TSA  collected and assessed data at 14 airports for various time periods on the  number of prohibited items found on passengers who were targeted under  SPOT and referred to secondary screening or law enforcement officials.  However, these data collection efforts, alone, did not enable TSA to  determine whether the detection of prohibited items would be enhanced if  SPOT were implemented because TSA had no means of comparing  whether persons targeted by SPOT were more likely to carry prohibited  items than persons not targeted by SPOT. To obtain this information, the  task force would have had to collect data on the number of passengers not  targeted by SPOT that had prohibited items on them. This information  could be used to determine whether a greater percentage of passengers  targeted under SPOT are found to have prohibited items than those  passengers who are not targeted by SPOT, which could serve as one  indicator of the extent to which SPOT would contribute to the detection of  passengers intending to cause harm on an aircraft.
Although it has not yet done so, it may be possible for TSA to evaluate the  impact of SPOT on identifying passengers carrying prohibited items. There  is precedent in other federal agencies for evaluating the security benefits  of similar procedures. For instance, U.S. Customs and Border Protection  (CBP) within DHS developed the Compliance Examination (COMPEX)  system to evaluate the effectiveness of its procedures for selecting  international airline passengers for secondary screening. Specifically,  COMPEX compares the percentage of targeted passengers on which  prohibited items are found to the percentage of randomly selected  passengers on which prohibited items are found. The premise is that  targeting is considered to be effective if a greater percentage of targeted  passengers are found to possess prohibited items than the percentage of  randomly selected passengers, and the difference between the two  percentages is statistically significant. CBP officials told us in May 2006  that they continue to use COMPEX to assess the effectiveness of their  targeting of international airline passengers. When asked about using a  method such as COMPEX to assess SPOT, TSA officials stated that CBP  and TSA are seeking to identify different types of threats through their  targeting programs. CBP, through its targeting efforts, is attempting to  identify passengers with contraband and unauthorized aliens, whereas  TSA, through SPOT, is attempting to identify potential high-risk  passengers. Additionally, in commenting on a draft of this report, DHS  stated that, according to TSA, the possession of a prohibited item is not a  good measure of SPOT effectiveness because an individual may not intend  to use a prohibited item to cause harm or hijack an aircraft. While it may  be possible for a terrorist to cause harm or hijack an aircraft without using  a prohibited item, as in the case of the September 11 terrorist attacks,  other terrorist incidents and threat information identify that terrorists who  carried out or planned to carry out an attack on a commercial aircraft  intended to do so by using prohibited items, including explosives and  weapons. Therefore, we continue to believe that comparing the percentage  of individuals targeted and not targeted under SPOT on which prohibited  items are found could be one of several potential indicators of the  effectiveness of SPOT. Such a measure may be most useful with regard to  the prohibited items that could be used to bring down or hijack an aircraft.  TSA officials stated that the agency agrees in principle that measuring  SPOT effectiveness, if possible, may provide valuable insights.
Unpredictable Screening Process, Bulk-Item Pat-Down Search, and  IED Component Search. We found that the task force also could have  strengthened its efforts to evaluate the security impact of other proposed  procedures—specifically, USP, the bulk-item pat-down search, and the  IED component search. For all three of these procedures, the task force  did not collect any data during the operational testing that would help  determine whether they would enhance detection capability. TSA officials  told us that they did not collect these data because they had a limited  amount of time to test the procedures because they had to make SOP  modifications quickly as part of the agency’s efforts to focus on higher  threats, such as explosives, and the TSA Assistant Secretary’s goal of  implementing the SOP modifications before the 2005 Thanksgiving holiday  travel season. Nevertheless, TSA officials acknowledged the importance of  evaluating whether proposed screening procedures, including USP and the  bulk-item pat-down, would enhance detection capability. TSA officials  stated that covert testing has been used to assess TSOs’ ability to detect  prohibited items, but covert testing was not implemented during  operational testing of proposed procedures. Office of Inspection officials  questioned whether covert testing could be used to test, exclusively, the  security benefit of proposed procedures, because TSO proficiency and the  capability of screening technology also factor into whether threat objects  are detected during covert tests. Four of the five aviation security experts  we interviewed acknowledged this limitation but stated that covert testing  is the best way to assess the effectiveness of passenger checkpoint  screening. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS stated that,  according to TSA, USP is intended to disrupt terrorists’ planning of an  attack by introducing unpredictability into the passenger checkpoint  screening process, and tools such as covert testing could not be used to  measure the effectiveness of USP to this end. While we agree that covert  testing may not be a useful tool to assess the impact USP has on disrupting  terrorists’ plans and deterring terrorists from attempting to carry out an  attack, we continue to believe that covert testing could have been used to  assess whether USP would have helped to enhance detection capability  during the passenger screening process, which TSA officials stated was  another intended result of USP.
Although TSA did not collect data on the security impact of the USP and  bulk-item pat-down procedures, the task force did collect data on the  impact these procedures had on screening efficiency—the time required to  perform procedures—and on the reaction of TSOs, FSDs, and passengers  to the proposed procedures. These data indicated that the USP procedure  took less time, on average, for TSOs to conduct than the procedure it  replaced (the random continuous selectee screening process); the revised  pat-down procedure took TSOs about 25 seconds to conduct; and that  passengers generally did not complain about the way in which both  procedures were conducted.
With respect to operational testing of the IED component search  procedure, TSA was unable to collect any data during the testing period  because no IEDs were detected by TSOs at the airports where the testing  took place. As with the USP and bulk-item pat-down procedures, TSA  could have conducted covert tests during the operational testing period to  gather simulated data for the IED search procedure, in the absence of  actual data.
Selectee Screening Changes and Threat Area Search. Recognizing  that some of the proposed procedures intended to enhance detection  would require additional TSO resources, TSA implemented several  measures aimed collectively at freeing up TSOs’ time so that they could  focus on conducting more procedures associated with higher threats— identifying explosives and suspicious persons. For example, TSA modified  the selectee screening procedure and the procedure for searching carry-on  items—the threat area search—in order to reduce screening time. During  an informal pilot of these proposed procedures at 3 airports in November  2005, TSA determined that the proposed selectee screening procedure  would reduce search time of each selectee passenger, on average, by  about 1.17 minutes at these airports. TSA also determined through this  study that the proposed threat area search, on average, took 1.83 minutes  to conduct at the participating airports, as compared to the existing target  object search that took, on average, 1.89 minutes, and the existing whole  bag search that took, on average, 2.37 minutes.
Prohibited Items List Changes. Another measure TSA implemented to  free up TSO resources to focus on higher threats involved changes to the  list of items prohibited onboard aircraft. According to TSA, TSOs were  spending a disproportionate amount of TSA’s limited screening resources  searching for small scissors and small tools, even though, based on threat  information and TSA officials’ professional judgment, such items no longer  posed a significant security risk given the multiple layers of aviation  security. TSA officials surmised that by not having to spend time and  resources physically searching passengers’ bags for low-threat items, such  as small scissors and tools, TSOs could focus their efforts on  implementing more effective and robust screening procedures that can be  targeted at screening for explosives.
To test its assumption that a disproportionate amount of TSO resources  was being spent searching for small scissors and tools, TSA collected  information from several sources. First, TSA reviewed data maintained in  TSA’s Performance Management Information System (PMIS), which  showed that during the third and fourth quarters of fiscal year 2005   (a 6-month period), TSOs confiscated a total of about 1.8 million sharp  objects other than knives or box cutters. These sharp objects constituted  19 percent of all prohibited items confiscated at the checkpoint. Second,  based on information provided by FSDs, TSOs, and other screening  experts, TSA determined that scissors constituted a large majority of the  total number of sharp objects found at passenger screening checkpoints.  Third, TSA headquarters officials searched through confiscated items bins  at 4 airports and found that most of the scissors that were confiscated had  blades less than 4 inches in length. Based on these collective efforts, TSA  concluded that a significant number of items found at the checkpoint were  low-threat, easily identified items, such as small scissors and tools, and  that a disproportionate amount of time was spent searching for these  items—time that could have been spent searching for high-threat items,  such as explosives. TSA also concluded that because TSOs can generally  easily identify scissors, if small scissors were no longer on the prohibited  items list, TSOs could avoid conducting time-consuming physical bag  searches to locate and remove these items.
While we commend TSA’s efforts to supplement professional judgment  with data and metrics in its decision to modify passenger checkpoint  screening procedures, TSA did not conduct the necessary analysis of the  data collected to determine the extent to which the removal of small  scissors and tools from the prohibited items list could free up TSO  resources. Specifically, TSA did not analyze the data on sharp objects  confiscated at the checkpoint along with other relevant factors, such as  the amount of time taken to search for scissors and the number of TSOs at  the checkpoint conducting these searches, to determine the extent to  which TSO resources could actually be freed up. Based on our analysis of  TSA’s data for the 6-month period, where we considered these other  relevant factors, we determined that TSOs spent, on average, less than   1 percent of their time—about 1 minute per day over the 6-month period— searching for the approximately 1.8 million sharp objects, other than  knives and box cutters, that were found at passenger screening  checkpoints between April 2005 and September 2005. If the average  amount of time TSOs spent searching for sharp objects per day over a   6-month period was less than 1 minute per TSO, and sharp objects  constituted just 19 percent of all prohibited items confiscated at  checkpoints over this period, then it may not be accurate to assume that  no longer requiring TSOs to search for small scissors and tools would  significantly contribute to TSA’s efforts to free up TSO resources that  could be used to implement other security measures.
To further support its assertion that significant TSO resources would be  freed up as a result of removing small scissors and tools from the list of  prohibited items, TSA officials cited the results of an informal study  conducted in October 2005—which was intended to provide a general idea  of the types of prohibited items TSOs were finding as a result of their  searches and how long various types of searches were taking TSOs to  conduct. Specifically, according to the study conducted at 9 airports over a  14-day period, TSA determined that 24 percent of items found during  carry-on bag searches were scissors. However, based on data regarding  the number of bags searched, removing scissors may not significantly  contribute to TSA’s efforts to free up TSO resources.
TSA conducted additional informal studies 30, 60, and 90 days after the  prohibited items list change went into effect to determine whether the  change had resulted in reductions in the percentage of carry-on bags that  were searched and overall screening time. However, we identified  limitations in TSA’s methodology for conducting these studies. In  February 2007, a TSA official stated that some FSDs interviewed several  TSOs after the prohibited items list change went into effect, and these  TSOs reported that the change did save screening time. However, TSA  could not identify how many TSOs were interviewed, at which airports the  TSOs were located, and how the TSOs were selected for the interview; nor  did TSA document the results of these interviews. TSA also did not use  random selection or representative sampling when determining which  TSOs should be interviewed. Therefore, the interview results cannot be  generalized.
TSA officials acknowledged that they could have made some  improvements in the various analyses they conducted on the prohibited  items list change. However, they stated that they had to make SOP  modifications quickly as part of the agency’s efforts to focus on higher  threats, such as explosives, and the TSA Assistant Secretary’s goal of  implementing the SOP modifications before the 2005 Thanksgiving holiday  travel season. Additionally, officials stated that they continue to view their  decision to remove small scissors and tools from the prohibited items list  as sound, particularly because they believe small scissors and tools do not  pose a significant threat to aviation security. TSA officials also stated that  they believe the prohibited items list change would free up resources  based on various sources of information, including the professional  judgment of TSA airport staff, and their analysis of PMIS data on  prohibited items confiscated at checkpoints. The TSA Assistant Secretary  told us that even if TSA determined that the proposed SOP modifications  would not free up existing TSO resources to conduct explosives detection  procedures, he would have implemented the modifications anyway  considering the added security benefit of the explosives detection  procedures. Additionally, a TSA headquarters official responsible for  airport security operations stated that to help strengthen the agency’s  analysis of future proposed SOP changes, the agency plans to provide the  Explosives Detection Improvement Task Force with the necessary  resources to help improve its data collection and analysis.
An additional measure intended to free up TSO resources involved  changes to CAPPS rules. TSA’s assumption is that these changes could  allow TSOs who were normally assigned to selectee screening duties to be  reassigned to new procedures, such as USP, which may require new  screening positions. (Both USP and SPOT require TSO positions: USP  requires one screening position for every two screening lanes, while SPOT  typically uses more than one screening position per ticket checker at the  checkpoint.)
According to FSDs we interviewed, the changes made to the prohibited  items list and the CAPPS rules had not freed up existing TSO resources, as  intended. Specifically, as of August 2006, 13 of 19 FSDs we interviewed at  airports that tested USP or SPOT said that TSO resources were not freed  up as a result of these changes. In addition, 9 of the 19 FSDs said that in  order to operationally test USP or SPOT, TSOs had to work overtime,  switch from other functions (such as checked baggage screening), or a  screening lane had to be closed. TSA’s Explosives Detection Improvement  Task Force reported that nearly all of the FSDs at airports participating in  operational testing of USP believed that the procedure had security value,  though the task force also reported that 1 FSD dropped out of the  operational testing program for USP due to insufficient staffing resources  and another could only implement the procedure during off-peak travel  periods. Additionally, most of the FSDs we interviewed stated that the  changes to the prohibited items list and CAPPS rules did not free up TSOs,  as intended, to better enable TSOs to take required explosives detection  training. Specifically, as of August 2006, of the 19 FSDs we interviewed at  airports that implemented USP and SPOT, 13 said that they did not  experience more time to conduct explosives training as a result of changes  to the prohibited items list and CAPPS rules. Three of the 13 FSDs said  that they used overtime to enable TSOs to take the explosives training. As  previously stated, the TSA Assistant Secretary stated that even if existing  TSO resources are not freed up to conduct explosives detection  procedures, longer lines and wait times at airport checkpoints are an  acceptable consequence, considering their added security benefit. With  regard to explosives training, he stated that it is acceptable for FSDs to use  overtime or other methods to ensure that all TSOs participated in the  required explosives detection training. He further noted that even if one  screening change does not free up TSO resources, all of the changes  intended to accomplish this—when taken together—should ultimately  help to redirect TSO resources to where they are most needed.
TSA’s efforts to add data and metrics to its tool kit for evaluating the  impact of screener changes are a good way to supplement the use of  professional judgment and input from other experts and sources in making  decisions about modifying screening procedures. However, TSA’s methods  for data collection and analysis could be improved. We recognize the  challenges TSA faces in evaluating the effectiveness of proposed  procedures, particularly when faced with time pressures to implement  procedures. However, by attempting to evaluate the potential impact of  screening changes on security and resource availability, TSA could help  support its decision making on how best to allocate limited TSO resources  and ensure that the ability to detect explosives and other high-threat  objects during the passenger screening process is enhanced.
section_title: Documentation of the Reasoning behind Proposed SOP Modifications Was Incomplete
paragraphs: While we were able to assess TSA’s reasoning behind certain proposed  SOP modifications considered during our review period, our analysis was  limited because TSA did not maintain complete documentation of  proposed SOP modifications. Documentation of the reasoning behind  decisions to implement or reject proposed modifications was maintained  in various formats, including spreadsheets developed by TSA officials,  internal electronic mail discussions among TSA officials, internal  memorandums, briefing slides, and reports generated based on the results  of operational testing. TSA did improve its documentation of the proposed  SOP modifications that were considered during the latter part of our   9-month review period. Specifically, the documentation for the SOP  modifications proposed under the Explosives Detection Improvement  Task Force provided more details regarding the basis of the proposed  modifications and the reasoning behind decisions to implement or reject  the proposed modifications.
Of the 92 proposed SOP modifications considered during our 9-month  review period that TSA documented, TSA provided the basis for 72. More  specifically, TSA documented the basis—that is, the information,  experience, or event that encouraged TSA officials to propose an SOP  modification—for 35 of the 48 that were implemented and for 37 of the   44 that were not implemented. However, TSA only documented the  reasoning behind TSA senior leadership’s decisions to implement or not  implement proposed SOP modifications for 43 of 92 proposed  modifications. According to TSA officials, documentation that explains the  basis for recommending proposed modifications can also be used to  explain TSA’s reasoning behind its decisions to implement proposed  modifications. However, the basis on which an SOP modification was  proposed cannot always be used to explain TSA senior leadership’s  decisions not to implement a proposed modification. In these cases,  additional documentation would be needed to understand TSA’s decision  making. However, TSA only documented the reasoning behind its  decisions for about half (26 of 44) of the proposed modifications that were  not implemented. TSA officials told us that they did not intend to  document all SOP modifications that were proposed during our review  period. Officials stated that, in some cases, the reasoning behind TSA’s  decision to implement or not implement a proposed SOP modification is  obvious and documentation is not needed. TSA officials acknowledged  that it is beneficial to maintain documentation on the reasoning behind  decisions to implement or reject proposed SOP modifications deemed  significant, particularly given the organizational restructuring and staff  turnover within TSA. However, TSA officials could not identify which of  the 92 proposed SOP modifications they consider to be significant because  they do not categorize proposed modifications in this way.
Our standards for governmental internal controls and associated guidance  suggest that agencies should document key decisions in a way that is  complete and accurate, and that allows decisions to be traced from  initiation, through processing, to after completion. These standards  further state that documentation of key decisions should be readily  available for review. Without documenting this type of information, TSA  cannot always justify significant modifications to passenger checkpoint  screening procedures to internal or external stakeholders, including  Congress and the traveling public. In addition, considering the ongoing  personnel changes, without sufficient documentation, future decision  makers in TSA may not know on what basis the agency historically made  decisions to develop new or revise existing screening procedures.
Following our 9-month review period, TSA continued to make efforts to  improve documentation of agency decision making, as evidenced by  decisions regarding the August 2006 and September 2006 SOP  modifications related to the screening of liquids and gels. For example,  TSA senior leadership evaluated the actions taken by the agency between  August 7 and August 13, 2006, in response to the alleged liquid explosives  terrorist plot, in order to identify lessons learned and improve the agency’s  reaction to future security incidents. As a result of this evaluation, as  shown in table 4, TSA made several observations and recommendations  for improving documentation of agency decision making when considering  modifications to screening procedures.
Documentation of TSA’s decisions regarding the September 26, 2006,  modifications to the liquid screening procedures showed that TSA had  begun implementing the recommendations in table 4. TSA’s  documentation identified the various proposed liquid screening  procedures that were considered by TSA, the benefits and drawbacks of  each proposal, and the rationale behind TSA’s final decision regarding  which proposal to implement. The documentation also tracked the timing  of TSA’s deliberations of each of the proposed liquid screening  procedures. However, the documentation of TSA’s decisions was not  always presented in a standard format, nor was the origin and use of  supporting documentation always identified. TSA officials acknowledged  that documentation of the September 2006 SOP modifications could have  been improved and stated that efforts to improve documentation, through  implementation of the recommendations in table 4, will continue to be a  high priority.
section_title: TSA Has Several Methods in Place to Monitor TSO Compliance with Passenger Checkpoint Screening SOPs
subsections: section_title: A New Performance Accountability System Helps TSA Monitor TSO Compliance with SOPs
paragraphs: TSA implemented a performance accountability system in part to  strengthen its monitoring of TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint  screening SOPs. Specifically, in April 2006, TSA implemented the  Performance Accountability and Standards System (PASS) to assess the  performance of all TSA employees, including TSOs. According to TSA  officials, PASS was developed in response to our 2003 report that  recommended that TSA establish a performance management system that  makes meaningful distinctions in employee performance, and in response  to input from TSA airport staff on how to improve passenger and checked  baggage screening measures. With regard to TSOs, PASS is not intended  solely to measure TSO compliance with SOPs. Rather, PASS will be used  by TSA to assess agency personnel at all levels on various competencies,  including training and development, readiness for duty, management  skills, and technical proficiency.
There are three elements of the TSO technical proficiency component of  PASS that are intended to measure TSO compliance with passenger  checkpoint screening procedures: (1) quarterly observations conducted by  FSD management staff of TSOs’ ability to perform particular screening  functions in the operational environment, such as pat-down searches and  use of the hand-held metal detector, to ensure they are complying with  checkpoint screening SOPs; (2) quarterly quizzes given to TSOs to assess  their knowledge of the SOPs; and (3) an annual, multipart knowledge and  skills assessment. While the first two elements are newly developed, the  third element—the knowledge and skills assessment—is part of the annual  TSO recertification program that is required by the Aviation and  Transportation Security Act (ATSA) and has been in place since October  2003. Collectively, these three elements of PASS are intended to provide a  systematic method for monitoring whether TSOs are screening passengers  and their carry-on items according to SOPs. TSA’s implementation of PASS  is consistent with our internal control standards, which state that agencies  should ensure that policies and procedures are applied properly.
The first component of PASS (quarterly observations) is conducted by  screening supervisors or screening managers, using a standard checklist  developed by TSA headquarters, with input from TSA airport staff. There  is one checklist used for each screening function, and TSOs are evaluated  on one screening function per quarter. For example, the hand-held metal  detector skills observation checklist includes 37 tasks to be observed,  such as whether the TSO conducted a pat-down search to resolve any  suspect areas. The second component of PASS (quarterly quizzes) consists  of multiple-choice questions on the standard operating procedures. For  example, one of the questions on the PASS quiz is “What is the correct  place to start an HHMD outline  on an  individual: (a) top of the head, (b) top of the feet, or (c) top of the  shoulder?”
The third component of PASS is the annual knowledge and skills  assessment, a component of the annual recertification program that  evaluates the technical proficiency of TSOs. This assessment is composed  of three modules: (1) knowledge of standard operating procedures,   (2) recognition of threat objects on an X-ray image, and (3) demonstration  of screening functions. According to TSA officials, while recertification  testing is not a direct measure of operational compliance with passenger  checkpoint screening SOPs, recertification testing, particularly module 1  and module 3, is an indicator of whether TSOs are capable of complying  with SOPs. TSA officials stated that if a TSO does not have knowledge of  SOPs and if the TSO cannot demonstrate basic screening functions as  outlined in the SOPs, then the TSO will likely not be able to comply with  SOPs when performing in the operating environment. Table 5 provides a  summary of each of these modules.
FSDs we interviewed reported that they have faced resource challenges in  implementing PASS. Specifically, as of July 2006, 9 of 24 FSDs we  interviewed said they experienced difficulties in implementing PASS due  to lack of available staff to conduct the compliance-related evaluations.  TSA officials stated that they have automated many of the data-entry  functions of PASS to relieve the field of the burden of manually entering  this information into the PASS online system. For example, all scores  related to the quarterly quiz and skill observation components are  automatically uploaded, and PASS is linked to TSA’s online learning center  database to eliminate the need to manually enter TSOs’ learning history. In  addition, the TSA Assistant Secretary said that FSDs were given the option  of delaying implementation of PASS if they were experiencing resource  challenges.
section_title: TSA Uses Local and National Covert Testing, in Part, to Assess TSO Compliance with SOPs
paragraphs: TSA also conducts local and national covert tests, which are used to  evaluate, in part, the extent to which noncompliance with the SOPs affects  TSOs’ ability to detect simulated threat items hidden in accessible  property or concealed on a person. TSA first issued guidance on its local  covert testing program—known as Screener Training Exercises and  Assessments (STEA)—in February 2004. STEA testing is conducted by  FSD staff at airports, who determine the frequency at which STEA tests  are conducted as well as which type of STEA tests are conducted.  According to the STEA results reported by TSA between March 2004 and  February 2006, TSOs’ noncompliance with the SOP accounted for some  of the STEA test failures. TSOs’ lack of proficiency in skills or  procedures, which may affect TSOs’ ability to comply with procedures,  was also cited as the reason for some of the STEA test failures. TSOs who  fail STEA tests are required to take remedial training to help them address  the reasons for their failure.
FSDs we interviewed reported that they have faced resource challenges in  conducting STEA tests. Specifically, even though all 24 FSDs we  interviewed as of July 2006 said that they have conducted STEA tests,   10 of these FSDs said that the lack of available staff made it difficult to  conduct these tests. When asked how they planned to address FSDs’  concerns regarding a lack of available staff to complete STEA tests, TSA  headquarters officials told us that they are considering resource  alternatives for implementing the STEA program, but could not provide us  with the specific details of these plans. Until the resource limitations that  have restricted TSA’s use of its compliance monitoring tools have been  fully addressed, TSA may not have assurance that TSOs are screening  passengers according to the SOP.
As previously discussed, TSA’s Office of Inspection initiated its national  covert testing program in September 2002. National covert tests are  conducted by TSA headquarters-based inspectors who carry simulated  threat objects hidden in accessible property or concealed on their person  through airport checkpoints, and in cases where TSOs fail to detect threat  objects, the inspectors identify the reasons for failure. During September  2005, TSA implemented a revised covert testing program to focus more on  catastrophic threats—threats that can bring down or destroy an aircraft.  According to Office of Inspection officials, TSOs may fail to detect threat  objects during covert testing for various reasons, including limitations in  screening technology, lack of training, limitations in the procedures TSOs  must follow to conduct passenger and bag searches, and TSOs’  noncompliance with screening checkpoint SOPs. Office of Inspection  officials also said that one test could be failed due to multiple factors, and  that it is difficult to determine the extent to which any one factor  contributed to the failure. TSOs who fail national covert tests, like those  who fail STEA tests, are also required to take remedial training to help  them address the reasons for failure.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives  onboard multiple U.S.-bound aircraft highlighted the need for TSA to  continuously reassess and revise, when deemed appropriate, existing  passenger checkpoint screening procedures to address threats against the  commercial aviation system. In doing so, TSA faces the challenge of  securing the aviation system while facilitating the free movement of  people. Passenger screening procedures are only one element that affects  the effectiveness and efficiency of the passenger checkpoint screening  system. Securing the passenger checkpoint screening system also involves  the TSOs who are responsible for conducting the screening of airline  passengers and their carry-on items, and the technology used to screen  passengers and their carry-on items.
We believe that TSA has implemented a reasonable approach to modifying  passenger checkpoint screening procedures through its consideration of  risk factors (threat and vulnerability information), day-to-day experience  of TSA airport staff, and complaints and concerns raised by passengers  and by making efforts to balance security, efficiency, and customer  service. We are also encouraged by TSA’s efforts to conduct operational  testing and use data and metrics to support its decisions to modify  screening procedures. We acknowledge the difficulties in assessing the  impact of proposed screening procedures, particularly with regard to the  extent to which proposed procedures would deter terrorists from  attempting to carry out an attack onboard a commercial aircraft. However,  there are existing methods, such as covert testing and CBP’s COMPEX—a  method that evaluates the effectiveness of CBP’s procedures for selecting  international airline passengers for secondary screening—that could be  used by TSA to assess whether proposed screening procedures enhance  detection capability. It is also important for TSA to fully assess available  data to determine the extent to which TSO resources would be freed up to  perform higher-priority procedures, when this is the intended effect.  Without collecting the necessary data or conducting the necessary analysis  that would enable the agency to assess whether proposed SOP  modifications would have the intended effect, it may be difficult for TSA to  determine how best to improve TSOs’ ability to detect explosives and  other high-threat items and to allocate limited TSO resources. With such  data and analysis, TSA would be in a better position to justify its SOP  modifications and to have a better understanding of how the changes  affect TSO resources. Additionally, because TSA did not always document  the basis on which SOP modifications were proposed or the reasoning  behind decisions to implement or not implement proposed modifications,  TSA may not be able to justify SOP modifications to Congress and the  traveling public. While we are encouraged that TSA’s documentation of its  decisions regarding the SOP modifications made in response to the alleged  August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot was improved compared to  earlier documentation, it is important for TSA to continue to work to  strengthen its documentation efforts. Such improvements would enable  TSA officials responsible for making SOP decisions in the future to  understand how significant SOP decisions were made historically—  a particular concern considering the restructuring and staff turnover  experienced by TSA.
As shown by TSA’s covert testing results, the effectiveness of passenger  checkpoint screening relies, in part, on TSOs’ compliance with screening  procedures. We are, therefore, encouraged by TSA’s efforts to strengthen  its monitoring of TSO compliance with passenger screening procedures.  We believe that TSA has implemented a reasonable process for monitoring  TSO compliance and that this effort should assist TSA in providing  reasonable assurance that TSOs are screening passengers and their   carry-on items according to screening procedures. Given the resource  challenges FSDs identified in implementing the various methods for  monitoring TSO compliance, it will be important for TSA to take steps,  such as automating PASS data entry functions, to address such challenges.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help strengthen TSA’s evaluation of proposed modifications to  passenger checkpoint screening SOPs and TSA’s ability to justify its  decisions to implement or not implement proposed SOP modifications, in  the March 2007 report that contained sensitive security information, we  recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the  Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for TSA to take the following  two actions:    when operationally testing proposed SOP modifications, develop sound  evaluation methods, when possible, that can be used to assist TSA in  determining whether proposed procedures would achieve their  intended result, such as enhancing TSA’s ability to detect prohibited  items and suspicious persons and freeing up existing TSO resources  that could be used to implement proposed procedures, and  for future proposed SOP modifications that TSA senior leadership  determines are significant, generate and maintain documentation to  include, at minimum, the source, intended purpose, and reasoning  behind decisions to implement or not implement proposed  modifications.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: On March 6, 2007, we received written comments on the draft report,  which are reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS generally concurred  with our recommendations and outlined actions TSA plans to take to  implement the recommendations.
DHS stated that it appreciates GAO’s conclusion that TSA has  implemented a reasonable approach to modifying passenger checkpoint  screening procedures through its assessment of risk factors, the expertise  of TSA employees, and input from the traveling public and other  stakeholders, as well as TSA’s efforts to balance security, operational  efficiency, and customer service while evaluating proposed changes.
With regard to our recommendation to develop sound evaluation methods,  when possible, to help determine whether proposed SOP modifications  would achieve their intended result, DHS stated that TSA plans to make  better use of generally accepted research design principles and techniques  when operationally testing proposed SOP modifications. For example,  TSA will consider using random selection, representative sampling, and  control groups in order to isolate the impact of proposed SOP  modifications from the impact of other variables. DHS also stated that  TSA’s Office of Security Operations is working with subject matter experts  to ensure that operational tests are well designed and executed, and  produce results that are scientifically valid and reliable. As discussed in  this report, employing sound evaluation methods for operationally testing  proposed SOP modifications will enable TSA to have better assurance that  new passenger checkpoint screening procedures will achieve their  intended purpose, which may include improved allocation of limited TSO  resources and enhancing detection of explosives and other high-threat  objects during the passenger screening process. However, DHS stated, and  we agree, that the need to make immediate SOP modifications in response  to imminent terrorist threats may preclude operational testing of some  proposed modifications.
Concerning our recommendation regarding improved documentation of  proposed SOP modifications, DHS stated that TSA intends to document  the source, intent, and reasoning behind decisions to implement or reject  proposed SOP modifications that TSA senior leadership deems significant.  Documenting this type of information will enable TSA to justify significant  modifications to passenger checkpoint screening procedures to internal  and external stakeholders, including Congress and the traveling public. In  addition, considering the ongoing personnel changes TSA has  experienced, such documentation should enable future decision makers in  TSA to understand on what basis the agency historically made decisions to  develop new or revise existing screening procedures.
In addition to commenting on our recommendations, DHS provided  comments on some of our findings, which we considered and incorporated  in the report where appropriate. One of DHS’s comments pertained to  TSA’s evaluation of the prohibited items list change. Specifically, while  TSA agrees that the agency could have conducted a more  methodologically sound evaluation of the impact of the prohibited items  list change, TSA disagrees with our assessment that the prohibited items  list change may not have significantly contributed to TSA’s efforts to free  up TSO resources to focus on detection of high-threat items, such as  explosives. As we identified in this report, based on interviews with FSDs,  airport visits to determine the types of items confiscated at checkpoints,  and a study to determine the amount of time taken to conduct bag  searches and the number of sharp objects collected as a result of these  searches, TSA concluded that the prohibited items list change would free  up TSO resources. DHS also stated that interviews with TSOs following  the prohibited items list change confirmed that the change had freed up  TSO resources. However, based on our analysis of the data TSA collected  both prior to and following the prohibited items list change, we continue  to believe that TSA did not conduct the necessary analysis to determine  the extent to which the removal of small scissors and tools from the  prohibited items list would free up TSA resources.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 21 days from the  date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of the report to the  Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the TSA Assistant  Secretary, and interested congressional committees as appropriate. We  will also make copies available to others on request.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) process for  modifying passenger checkpoint screening procedures and how TSA  monitors compliance with these procedures, we addressed the following  questions: (1) How and on what basis did TSA modify passenger screening  procedures and what factors guided the decisions to do so? (2) How does  TSA determine whether TSOs are complying with the standard procedures  for screening passengers and their carry-on items?
To address how TSA modified passenger screening procedures and what  factors guided the decisions to do so, we obtained and analyzed  documentation of proposed standard operating procedures (SOP) changes  considered between April 2005 and September 2005, as well as threat  assessments and operational studies that supported SOP modifications.  The documentation included a list of proposed changes considered, as  well as the source, the intended purpose, and in some cases the basis for  recommending the SOP modification—that is, the information,  experience, or event that encouraged TSA officials to propose the  modifications—and the reasoning behind decisions to implement or reject  proposed SOP modifications. We also obtained documentation of the  proposed SOP changes considered by TSA’s Explosives Detection  Improvement Task Force, which was the deliberating body for proposed  changes that were considered between October 2005 and December 2005.  We also reviewed and analyzed similar documentation for proposed SOP  modifications considered between August 2006 and November 2006 in  response to the alleged terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard  multiple aircraft en route from the United Kingdom to the United States.  We included modifications to passenger checkpoint screening procedures  related to this particular event because they provided the most recent  information available of TSA’s approach to modifying screening  procedures in response to an immediate perceived threat to civil aviation.  The documentation included notes from internal meetings, slides for  internal and external briefings on proposed SOP modifications, data on  customer complaints and screening efficiency, and the results of liquid  explosives testing conducted by the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate and the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI). We also obtained each revision of the passenger  checkpoint screening SOP that was generated between April 2005 and  December 2005 and August 2006 and November 2006, as well as  accompanying documentation that highlighted all of the changes made in  each revision. In addition, we met with TSA headquarters officials who  were involved in the process for determining whether proposed passenger  checkpoint screening procedures should be implemented. We also met  with officials in the DHS Science and Technology Directorate as well as  the FBI to discuss the methodology and results of their liquid explosives  tests, which were used to support TSA’s decisions to modify the SOP in  September 2006. We also met with TSA Office of Inspection and DHS  Office of Inspector General staff to discuss their covert testing at  passenger checkpoints and the recommended changes to the passenger  checkpoint screening SOP that were generated based on testing results.  We also obtained and analyzed data and information collected by TSA on  the proposed procedures that were evaluated in the operational  environment. In addition, we met or conducted phone interviews with  Federal Security Directors (FSD) and their management staff, including  Assistant FSDs and Screening Managers, and Transportation Security  Officers (TSO) with passenger screening responsibilities, at 25 commercial  airports to gain their perspectives on TSA’s approach to revising the  passenger checkpoint screening SOP. We also met with officials from four  aviation associations—the American Association of Airport Executives,  Airports Council International, the Air Transport Association, and the  Regional Airline Association—to gain their perspectives on this objective.  Finally, we met with five aviation security experts to obtain their views on  methods for assessing the impact of proposed passenger checkpoint  screening procedures. We selected these experts based on their depth of  experience in the field of aviation security, employment history, and their  recognition in the aviation security community. However, the views of  these experts may not necessarily represent the general view of other  experts in the field of aviation security. We compared TSA’s approach to  revising its passenger checkpoint screening SOP with the Comptroller  General’s standards for internal control in the federal government and  risk management guidance.
To address how TSA determines whether TSOs are complying with the  standard procedures for screening passengers and their carry-on items, we  obtained documentation of compliance-related initiatives, including  guidance, checklists, and SOP quizzes used to assess TSO compliance  under the Performance Accountability and Standards System (PASS), and  guidance provided to FSDs for developing local compliance audit  programs. We also obtained the fiscal year 2005 recertification and  Screener Training Exercises and Assessments (STEA) test results, which  were used, in part, to assess TSO compliance with and knowledge of the  passenger checkpoint screening SOP. In addition, we reviewed the results  of covert testing conducted by TSA’s Office of Inspection, which were also  used, in part, to assess TSO compliance with the passenger checkpoint  screening SOP. We assessed the reliability of the compliance-related data  we received from TSA, and found the data to be sufficiently reliable for  our purposes. In addition, we interviewed TSA headquarters officials who  were responsible for overseeing efforts to monitor TSO compliance with  standard operating procedures. This included officials in the Office of  Security Operations, Office of Human Capital, and the Office of  Operational Process and Technology. Our audit work also included visits  to or phone conferences with 25 airports, where we interviewed FSDs,  members of their management teams, and Transportation Security  Officers with passenger screening responsibilities. However, the  perspectives of these FSDs and their staff cannot be generalized across all  airports. In July 2006, we submitted two sets of follow-up questions to FSD  staff, related to their experiences with implementing PASS and STEA tests.  We also obtained documentation of local compliance audit programs from  the FSD staff at several of these airports. We compared TSA’s approach  for monitoring TSO compliance with the Comptroller General’s standards  for internal control in the federal government.
As previously mentioned, we conducted site visits and/or phone interviews  at 25 airports (8 category X airports, 7 category I airports, 4 category II  airports, 4 category III airports, and 2 category IV airports) to discuss  issues related to TSA’s approach to revising the passenger checkpoint  screening SOP, and the agency’s approach to monitoring TSO compliance  with the SOP. We visited 7 of these airports during the design phase of   our study. These airports were selected based on variations in size and  geographic location, and whether they were operationally testing any  proposed passenger checkpoint screening procedures or passenger  screening technology. We also selected 2 airports that participated in the  Screening Partnership Program.
After visiting the 7 airports during the design phase of our review, we  selected an additional 15 airports to visit based on variations in size,  geographic distribution, and performance on compliance-related  assessments. Specifically, we obtained and analyzed fiscal year 2005  Screener Training Exercise and Assessments results and fiscal year 2005  recertification testing results to identify airports across a range of STEA  and recertification scores. Additionally, we visited 3 additional airports  that operationally tested the proposed Unpredictable Screening Process  (USP) and the Screening Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT)  procedure.
In July 2006, we received from 19 FSDs answers to follow-up questions on  their experiences with implementing pilot testing of SPOT or USP. This  included 14 FSDs that were not part of our initial rounds of interviews.  Nine of these 14 FSDs were from airports that participated in SPOT pilots.  The remaining 5 of 14 FSDs that were not part of our initial rounds of  interviews were from airports that were participants in USP pilots.
We conducted our work from March 2005 through March 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Sources of SOP Changes
paragraphs: Of the 92 proposed screening changes considered by TSA between April  2005 and December 2005, 63 were submitted by TSA field staff, including  Federal Security Directors and Transportation Security Officers. Thirty  proposed screening changes were submitted by TSA headquarters  officials. Last, TSA senior leadership, such as the TSA Assistant Secretary,  recommended 5 of the 92 proposed screening changes considered during  this time period. One SOP modification was also proposed through a  congressional inquiry. TSA’s solicitation of input from both field and  headquarters officials regarding changes to the passenger checkpoint  screening SOP was consistent with internal control standards, which  suggest that there be mechanisms in place for employees to recommend  improvements in operations.
The FSDs with whom we met most frequently identified periodic  conference calls with the Assistant Secretary, the SOP Question and  Answer mailbox, or electronic mail to Security Operations officials as the  mechanisms by which they recommended changes to the SOP. The TSOs  with whom we met identified their chain of command and the SOP  Question and Answer mailbox as the primary mechanisms by which they  submitted suggestions for new or revised procedures. According to TSA  officials, the SOP mailbox entails FSDs and their staff, including TSOs,  submitting suggestions, questions, or comments to TSA’s Security  Operations division via electronic mail, either directly or through their  supervisors. Submissions are then compiled and reviewed by a single  Security Operations official, who generates responses to the questions that  have clear answers. However, for submissions for which the appropriate  response is not obvious or for submissions that include a suggestion to  revise the SOP, this official forwards the submissions to other Security  Operations officials for further deliberation. SOP mailbox responses are  provided to all TSA airport officials. If TSA headquarters revised a  screening procedure based on a mailbox submission, the revision is noted  in the mailbox response.
Thirty of the screening changes considered by TSA between April 2005 and  December 2005 were proposed by TSA headquarters officials, including  Security Operations officials, who are responsible for overseeing  implementation of checkpoint screening. According to Security  Operations officials, they recommended changes to checkpoint screening  procedures based on communications with TSA field officials and airport  optimization reviews. Security Operations officials conduct optimization  reviews to identify best practices and deficiencies in the checkpoint  screening and checked baggage screening processes. As part of these  reviews, Security Operations officials may also assess screening efficiency  and whether TSOs are implementing screening procedures correctly.
Other TSA headquarters divisions also suggested changes to passenger  checkpoint screening procedures. For example, the Office of Law  Enforcement recommended that there be an alternative screening  procedure for law enforcement officials who are escorting prisoners or  protectees. Previously, all armed law enforcement officers were required  to sign a logbook at the screening checkpoint, prior to entering the sterile  area of the airport. The officials in the Office of Passengers with  Disabilities also recommended changes to checkpoint screening  procedures. For example, in the interest of disabled passengers, they  suggested that TSOs be required to refasten all wheelchair straps and  buckles undone during the screening process.
Last, TSA senior leadership suggested 5 of the 92 procedural changes  considered by TSA between April 2005 and December 2005. TSA senior  leadership also proposed a procedure that would allow TSOs to conduct  the pat-down procedure on passengers of the opposite gender at airports  with a disproportionate ratio of male and female TSOs.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Maria Strudwick, Assistant  Director; David Alexander; Christopher W. Backley; Amy Bernstein;   Kristy Brown; Yvette Gutierrez-Thomas; Katherine N. Haeberle;   Robert D. Herring; Richard Hung; Christopher Jones, Stanley Kostyla; and  Laina Poon made key contributions to this report.
section_title: GAO Related Products
paragraphs: Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for  Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be  Systematically Reassessed. GAO-07-299. Washington, D.C.: February   28, 2007 Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key  Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains. GAO-07-448T.  Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007.
Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the  Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed  to Further Mitigate Security Risks. GAO-07-375. Washington, D.C.:  January 24, 2007.
Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening  Procedures Could Be Strengthened GAO-06-869. Washington, D.C.:   July 28, 2006.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, but Funding  Uncertainties Remain GAO-06-875T. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006.
Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the  Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program.   GAO-06-864T. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better  Management Controls Needed if Air Carriers Resume Interest in  Deploying Less-than-Lethal Weapons. GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.:   May 26, 2006.
Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked  Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington,  D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made  Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring  Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T.  Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private- Sector Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains. GAO-06-166.  Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely  Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s  Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from  Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.:  November 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air  Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2005.
Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority  of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.:  September 23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training  Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed.   GAO-05-781. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not  Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information during Secure Flight  Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps  to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.:   July 22, 2005.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of  Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.:  July 13, 2005.
Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement  Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.:  May 2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way,  but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed.   GAO-05-356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.  Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial  Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.:  February 23, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize  Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA’s Progress to Allow  Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services.   GAO-05-126. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but  Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term  Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of  Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728.  Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention Needed  to Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington, D.C.:   May 28, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies.   GAO-04-785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to  Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519.  Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility  to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T. Washington, D.C.:  April 22, 2004.
Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation  Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer- Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington,  D.C.: March 17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the  Transportation Security Administration’s Efforts to Secure Aerial  Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System  Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington,  D.C.: February 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing  Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington,  D.C.: February 12, 2004.
The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a  Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development  Program. GAO-04-341R. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen  Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges  of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.  GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address  Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress  Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.:  September 24, 2003.
Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, and the  Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security  Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address  Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides  Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T.  Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover  Airports’ Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.:  February 25, 2003.
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to   Build a Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.:   January 17, 2003.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods   and DOT’s Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.:   January 10, 2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the  Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and  Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November   22, 2002.
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has  Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.:  October 15, 2002.
Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses  Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces  Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.:  July 25, 2002.
Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial  Pilots. GAO-02-822R.  Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard  Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.:  September 25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for  Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:  September 21, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s  Efforts. GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve  Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.:  September 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in  Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
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