U.S. Public Diplomacy: Strategic Planning Efforts Have Improved, but Agencies Face Significant Implementation Challenges
Published: 2007-04-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, polling data have generally shown that anti-Americanism has spread and deepened around the world, and several groups have concluded that this trend may have harmed U.S. interests in significant ways. U.S. public diplomacy activities undertaken by the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which totaled almost $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2006, are designed to counter such sentiments. Based on our prior reports, this testimony addresses (1) the negative consequences various groups have associated with rising anti-American sentiments; (2) strategic planning, coordination, and performance measurement issues affecting U.S. public diplomacy efforts; and (3) key challenges that hamper agency activities.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Numerous experts, policymakers, and business leaders have identified various potential negative consequences of growing anti-Americanism. According to these sources, anti-Americanism may have a negative impact on American economic interests, the ability of the United States to pursue its foreign policy and military goals, and the security of Americans worldwide. Our reports and testimonies have highlighted the lack of a governmentwide communication strategy, as well as the need for an integrated State Department strategy, enhanced performance indicators for State and the BBG, and improvements in the BBG's audience research methodology. We also reported in March 2007 that U.S. foreign assistance activities were not being consistently publicized and branded, and we recommended that State help develop governmentwide guidance for marking and publicizing these efforts. State has responded to our recommendations and has taken actions to develop a more strategic approach and measure the effectiveness of its programs. Likewise, the BBG has adapted its strategic plan to include additional performance indicators and is beginning to address our recommendations to adopt management improvements at its Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN). Nevertheless, State and the BBG continue to face challenges in implementing public diplomacy and international broadcasting. State has shortages in staffing and language capabilities, and security issues continue to hamper overseas public diplomacy efforts. For example, in 2006 we reported that State continued to experience significant foreign language proficiency shortfalls, particularly at posts in the Muslim world. The BBG faces challenges in managing a disparate collection of broadcasters. Also, MBN faces several managerial challenges involving program review, internal control, and training.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s work on U.S. public  diplomacy efforts. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,  polling data have generally shown that anti-Americanism has spread and  intensified around the world and many groups have concluded that this  trend may have harmed U.S. national security and business interests in  significant ways. U.S. public diplomacy activities designed to counter such  negative sentiments are largely divided between the State Department and  the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). In the past 4 years, we have  issued a series of reports on these agencies’ public diplomacy efforts (see  enclosure). At the request of the ranking minority member of the Senate  Committee on Foreign Relations, we are currently reviewing how research  is used to inform and direct U.S. government efforts to communicate with  foreign audiences. We plan to issue a final report this summer.
The key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and  influence overseas audiences. State’s Under Secretary for Public  Diplomacy and Public Affairs oversees an annual budget of nearly $800  million, which funds the activities of program bureaus in Washington and  the activities of nearly 700 public diplomacy officers located at more than  260 posts around the world and domestically. Program efforts include  academic and professional exchanges, English language teaching,  information programs, and news management activities. The BBG, as the  overseer of U.S. international broadcasting efforts, aims to support U.S.  public diplomacy objectives by broadcasting fair and accurate  information, while maintaining its journalistic independence as a news  organization. The BBG manages a budget of nearly $650 million that funds  multiple discrete broadcast entities that broadcast in 57 foreign languages  to 125 media markets around the world.
Mr. Chairman, you asked us to discuss key findings from the reports we  have issued over the past several years, particularly regarding our  government’s public diplomacy strategy and the challenges faced in  implementing these activities in the field. Today, I will talk about (1) the  negative consequences various groups have associated with rising anti- American sentiments; (2) strategic planning, coordination, and  performance measurement issues affecting U.S. public diplomacy efforts;  and (3) the key challenges that hamper agency efforts.
As part of our reviews of public diplomacy, we have met with officials  from the Department of State, the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Broadcasting  Board of Governors. We have also observed U.S. public diplomacy efforts  in a range of countries including Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and Pakistan;  conducted a worldwide poll of public diplomacy officials in 2003 and more  limited surveys of field activity in recent reviews; and have met with public  diplomacy counterparts in the United Kingdom and Germany. Finally, we  convened roundtables of key agency staff and experts on public relations  and the Muslim world to obtain their key insights and recommendations  for improvement. The work used to support this testimony was conducted  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and  influence overseas audiences. Public diplomacy is carried out through a  wide range of programs that employ person-to-person contacts; print,  broadcast, and electronic media; and other means. Traditionally, the State  Department’s efforts have focused on foreign elites—current and future  overseas opinion leaders, agenda setters, and decision makers. However,  the dramatic growth in global mass communications and other trends have  forced a rethinking of this approach, and State has begun to consider  techniques for communicating with broader foreign audiences. Since the  terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, State has expanded its public  diplomacy efforts globally, focusing particularly on countries in the  Muslim world considered to be of strategic importance in the war on  terror. In May 2006, we reported that this trend continued with funding  increases of 25 percent for the Near East and 39 percent for South Asia  from 2004 to 2006.
The BBG supports U.S. public diplomacy’s key objectives by broadcasting  news and information about the United States and world affairs and  serving as a model of how a free press should operate. The BBG manages  and oversees the Voice of America (VOA), Radio/TV Marti, Radio Free  Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio Farda, Radio Sawa, and the  Alhurra TV Network.
As shown in figure 1, State and the BBG spent close to $1.5 billion on  public diplomacy programs in fiscal year 2006.
section_title: Widespread Concern Exists about the Impact of Anti- American Sentiment
paragraphs: As others have previously reported, in recent years anti-American  sentiment has spread and intensified around the world. For example, the  Pew Global Attitudes Project has found that the decline in favorable  opinion of the United States is a worldwide trend. For instance, favorable  attitudes toward the United States in Indonesia declined from 75 percent  in 2000 to 30 percent in 2006 and from 52 percent to 12 percent over the  same time period in Turkey. While individual opinion polls may reflect a  snapshot in time, consistently negative polls may reflect the development  of more deeply seated sentiments about the United States.
Numerous experts, expert groups, policymakers, and business leaders  have expressed concerns that anti-Americanism may harm U.S. interests in  various ways. In its 2004 report on strategic communication, the Defense  Science Board states that “damaging consequences for other elements of  U.S. soft power are tactical manifestations of a pervasive atmosphere of  hostility.” Similarly, the Council on Foreign Relations has claimed that the  loss of goodwill and trust from publics around the world has had a  negative impact on U.S. security and foreign policy. Anti-American  sentiments may negatively affect American economic interests, U.S.  foreign policy and military operations, and the security of Americans.
subsections: section_title: Anti-Americanism May Have Negative Effects on U.S. Economic Interests Around the World
paragraphs: According to Business for Diplomatic Action, anti-Americanism can hurt  U.S. businesses by causing boycotts of American products, a backlash  against American brands, increased security costs for U.S. companies,  higher foreign opposition to U.S. trade policies, and a decrease in the  U.S.’s ability to attract the world’s best talent to join the American  workforce. Additionally, a report from the Princeton-based Working  Group on Anti-Americanism generally echoes the possibility that anti- Americanism may harm U.S. business interests in these same areas.
Further, as reported by the Travel Business Roundtable during previous  hearings before this subcommittee, the U.S. travel industry has reported  significant declines in the U.S. market share of the worldwide travel  market and a decline in overseas visitors to the United States since 9/11.  Further, the State Department’s 2003 report on Patterns of Global  Terrorism recorded 67 attacks on American business facilities and 7  business casualties. In 2006, the Overseas Security Advisory Council noted  that more threats against the private sector occurred in 2006 than in 2004  or 2005 in most of the industries it reports on. Finally, the Working Group  on Anti-Americanism also indicated that threats to American private  property and personnel working overseas have become constant in some  regions, especially the Middle East, and have resulted in significantly  increased security costs.
section_title: Anti-Americanism May Limit Ability to Pursue U.S. Foreign Policy
paragraphs: According to the Defense Science Board, the Brookings Institution, and  others, anti-Americanism around the world may reduce the U.S.’s ability to  pursue its foreign policy goals, including efforts to foster diplomatic  relationships with other foreign leaders and to garner support for the  global war on terror. For instance, in October 2003, the Advisory Group on  Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World reported that “hostility  toward the U.S. makes achieving our policy goals far more difficult.”  Specifically, according to a paper from the Working Group on Anti- Americanism, foreign leaders may seek to leverage anti-American  sentiment in pursuit of their own political goals, which may then limit their  future support for U.S. foreign policy. As these leaders achieve personal  political successes based on their opposition to the United States, they  may then be less likely to support U.S. foreign policy going forward.
Further, the 9/11 Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, and  others have reported on the possibility that anti-Americanism may also  serve as a barrier to success in the global war on terror and related U.S.  military operations. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission report of July 2004  stated that perceptions of the United States’ foreign policies as anti-Arab,  anti-Muslim, and pro-Israel have contributed to the rise in extremist  rhetoric against the United States. Further, the Council on Foreign  Relations has argued that increasing hostility toward America in Muslim  countries facilitates recruitment and support for extremism and terror.
section_title: Anti-Americanism May Be Linked to Decreased Security of Americans Around the World
paragraphs: The Council on Foreign Relations also has identified potential  consequences of anti-Americanism on the security of individual  Americans, noting that Americans now face an increased risk of direct  attack from individuals and small groups that wield increasingly more  destructive power. According to State’s Country Reports on Terrorism for  2005, 56 private U.S. citizens were killed as a result of terrorism incidents  in 2005. The Working Group on Anti-Americanism suggests that there is  some correlation between anti-Americanism and violence against  Americans in the greater Middle East but notes that the relationship is  complex. For example, they note that while increased anti-Americanism in  Europe or Jordan has not led to violence against Americans or U.S.  interests in those areas, it does seem to play a role in fueling such violence  in Iraq. Other factors, such as the visibility of Americans overseas,  particularly in Iraq; the role of the media in supporting anti-Americanism;  and the absence of economic security may also contribute to this violence.
While all of the topics discussed here represent areas in which anti- Americanism may have negative consequences, the empirical evidence to  support direct relationships is limited. As such, we cannot confirm any  causal relationships between negative foreign public opinion and specific  negative outcomes regarding U.S. interests. Despite the fact that we  cannot draw a direct causal link between anti-Americanism and specific  outcomes in these areas, it is clear that growing negative foreign public  opinion does not help the United States achieve its economic, foreign  policy, and security goals, and therefore U.S. public diplomacy efforts,  which seek to counter anti-Americanism sentiment, have a critical role to  play in supporting U.S. interests throughout the world.
section_title: Strategic Planning, Coordination, and Performance Measurement Remain Areas of Concern
paragraphs: Over the past 4 years, we have identified and made recommendations to  State and the BBG on a number of issues related to a general lack of  strategic planning, inadequate coordination of agency efforts, and  problems with measuring performance and results. Among other things,  we have recommended that (1) communication strategies be developed to  coordinate and focus the efforts of key government agencies and the  private sector, (2) the State Department develop a strategic plan to  integrate its diverse efforts, (3) posts adopt strategic communication best  practices, and (4) meaningful performance goals and indicators be  established by both State and the BBG. Currently, the U.S. government  lacks an interagency public diplomacy strategy; however, such a plan has  been drafted and will be released shortly. While the department has  articulated a strategic framework to direct its efforts, comprehensive  guidance on how to implement this strategic framework has not yet been  developed. In addition, posts generally do not pursue a campaign-style  approach to communications that incorporates best practices endorsed by  GAO and others. State has begun to take credible steps towards instituting  more systematic performance measurement practices, consistent with  recommendations GAO and others have made. Finally, although the BBG  has added audience size as a key performance measure within its strategic  plan, our latest review of MBN’s operations call into question the potential  value of this measure due to various methodological concerns.
subsections: section_title: Government Lacks an Interagency Public Diplomacy Strategy
paragraphs: In 2003, we reported that the United States lacked a governmentwide,  interagency public diplomacy strategy, defining the messages and means  for communication efforts abroad. We reported since then that the  administration has made a number of unsuccessful attempts to develop  such a strategy. The lack of such a strategy complicates the task of  conveying consistent messages and therefore increases the risk of making  damaging communication mistakes. State officials have said that it also  diminishes the efficiency and effectiveness of governmentwide public  diplomacy efforts, while several reports have concluded that a strategy is  needed to synchronize agencies’ target audience assessments, messages,  and capabilities.
On April 8, 2006, the President established a new Policy Coordination  Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications. This  committee, led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public  Affairs, intends to better coordinate interagency activities, including the  development of an interagency public diplomacy strategy. We have been  told this strategy is still under development and will be issued soon.
The U.S. government also lacks a governmentwide strategy and  meaningful methods to ensure that recipients of U.S. foreign assistance are  consistently aware that the aid comes from the United States. In March  2007, we reported that most agencies involved in foreign assistance  activities had established some marking and publicity requirements in  their policies, regulations, and guidelines, and used various methods to  mark and publicize their activities. However, we identified some  challenges to marking and publicizing U.S. foreign assistance, including  the lack of a strategy for assessing the impact of marking and publicity  efforts on public awareness and the lack of governmentwide guidance for  marking and publicizing U.S. foreign aid. To better ensure that recipients  of U.S. foreign assistance are aware that the aid is provided by the United  States and its taxpayers, we recommended that State, in consultation with  other U.S. government agencies, (1) develop a strategy to better assess the  impact of marking and publicity programs on public awareness and (2)  establish interagency agreements for marking and publicizing all U.S.  foreign assistance.  State indicated that the interagency public diplomacy  strategy will address assessment of marking and publicity programs and  will include governmentwide marking and publicity guidance.
subsections: section_title: Private Sector Engagement Strategy Not Yet Developed
paragraphs: In 2005, we noted that State’s efforts to engage the private sector in pursuit  of common public diplomacy objectives had met with mixed success and  recommended that the Secretary develop a strategy to guide these efforts.  Since then, State has established an Office of Private Sector Outreach, is  partnering with individuals and the private sector on various projects, and  hosted a Private Sector Summit on Public Diplomacy in January 2007.  However, State has not yet developed a comprehensive strategy to guide  the Department’s efforts to engage the private sector.
section_title: State Has Established a Public Diplomacy Strategic Framework but Lacks Implementing Guidance
paragraphs: In 2005, the Under Secretary established a strategic framework for U.S.  public diplomacy efforts, which includes three priority goals: (1) offer  foreign publics a vision of hope and opportunity rooted in the U.S.’s most  basic values; (2) isolate and marginalize extremists; and (3) promote  understanding regarding shared values and common interests between  Americans and peoples of different countries, cultures, and faiths. The  Under Secretary noted that she intends to achieve these goals using five  tactics—engagement, exchanges, education, empowerment, and  evaluation—and by using various public diplomacy programs and other  means, including coordinating outreach efforts with the private sector.  This framework partially responds to our 2003 recommendation that State  should develop and disseminate a strategy to integrate its public  diplomacy efforts and direct them toward achieving common objectives.  State has not yet developed written guidance that provides details on how  these five tactics will be used to implement the Under Secretary’s priority  goals. However, it should be noted that the Under Secretary has issued  limited guidance regarding the goal of countering extremism to 18 posts  selected to participate in a pilot initiative focusing on this objective.
section_title: Posts Lack a Campaign- Style Approach to Communications
paragraphs: We have recommended that State, where appropriate, adopt strategic  communication best practices (which we refer to as the “campaign-style  approach”) and develop country-specific communication plans that  incorporate the key steps embodied in this approach. As shown in figure 2,  these steps include defining the core message, identifying and segmenting  target audiences, developing detailed communication strategies and  tactics, and using research and evaluation to inform and re-direct efforts  as needed. As noted in our May 2006 report, our review of public  diplomacy operations in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt in 2006 found that  this approach and corresponding communication plans were absent.  Rather, post public diplomacy efforts constituted an ad hoc collection of  activities designed to support such broad goals as promoting mutual  understanding.
In a recent development, 18 posts participating in the department’s pilot  countries initiative have developed country-level plans focusing on the  countering extremism goal. These plans were developed on the basis of a  template issued by the Under Secretary that requires each post to provide  a list of supporting objectives, a description of the media environment,  identification of key target audiences, and a list of supporting programs  and activities. We reviewed most of the plans submitted in response to this  guidance. Although useful as a high-level planning exercise, these plans do  not adhere to the campaign-style approach, which requires a level of rigor  and detail that normally exceeds the three- to four-page plans produced by  posts in pilot countries. The plans omit basic elements, such as specific  core messages and themes or any substantive evidence that proposed  communication programs were driven by detailed audience research—one  of the key principles embodied in the campaign-style approach. In the  absence of such research, programs may lack important information about  appropriate target audiences and credible messages and messengers.
section_title: State Is Making a Concerted Effort to Better Measure Program Performance and Impact
paragraphs: Based on prior reports by GAO and others, the department has begun to  institute a more concerted effort to measure the impact of its programs  and activities. The department created (1) the Office of Policy, Planning,  and Resources within the office of the Under Secretary; (2) the Public  Diplomacy Evaluation Council to share best practices; and (3) a unified  Public Diplomacy Evaluation Office. The Department established an  expanded evaluation schedule that is designed to cover all major public  diplomacy programs. The department also has called on program  managers to analyze and define their key inputs, activities, outputs,  outcomes, and impact to help identify meaningful performance goals and  indicators. Finally, the department recently launched a pilot public  diplomacy performance measurement data collection project that is  designed to collect, document, and quantify reliable annual and long-term  outcome performance measures to support government reporting  requirements.
section_title: BBG Has Strategy for International Broadcasting, but Audience Data May be Misleading
paragraphs: In 2001, the BBG introduced a market-based approach to international  broadcasting that sought to “marry the mission to the market.” This  approach was designed to generate large listening audiences in priority  markets that the BBG believes it must reach to effectively meet its  mission. Implementing this strategy has focused on markets relevant to  the war on terrorism, in particular in the Middle East through such key  initiatives as Radio Sawa and the Alhurra TV network. The Board’s vision  is to create a flexible, multimedia, research-driven U.S. international  broadcasting system.
We found that the BBG’s strategic plan to implement its new approach did  not include a single goal or related program objective designed to gauge  progress toward increasing audience size, even though its strategy focuses  on the need to reach large audiences in priority markets. The BBG  subsequently created a single strategic goal to focus on the key objective  of maximizing impact in priority areas of interest to the United States and  made audience size a key performance measure. However, in our August  2006 review of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, we found that  methodological concerns call into question the potential accuracy of this  key performance measure with regard to Radio Sawa’s listening rates and  Alhurra’s viewing rates. Specifically, we found that weaknesses in the  BBG’s audience surveys create uncertainty over whether some of Radio  Sawa’s or Alhurra’s performance targets for audience size have been met.  We recommended that the BBG improve its audience research methods,  including identifying significant methodological limitations. The BBG  accepted our recommendation and has informed us that it is currently  considering how it will do so.
section_title: A Number of Internal and External Challenges Hamper U.S. Public Diplomacy Activities
paragraphs: Public diplomacy efforts in the field face several other challenges.  Beginning with our September 2003 report on State’s public diplomacy  efforts, post officials have consistently cited several key challenges,  including a general lack of staff, insufficient administrative support, and  inadequate language training. Furthermore, public diplomacy officers  struggle to balance security with public access and outreach to local  populations. Finally, the BBG’s disparate organizational structure has been  viewed as a key management challenge that significantly complicates its  efforts to focus and direct U.S. international broadcasting efforts.
subsections: section_title: Insufficient Staff and Lack of Staff Time Hinders Public Diplomacy Activities
paragraphs: Although several recent reports on public diplomacy have recommended  an increase in U.S. public diplomacy program spending, several embassy  officials stated that, with current staffing levels, they do not have the  capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. According to State, the  Department had 887 established public diplomacy positions (overseas and  domestic) as of March 31, 2007, but 199, or roughly 22 percent, were  vacant. Compounding this challenge is the loss of public diplomacy  officers to temporary duty in Iraq, which, according to one State official,  has drawn down field officers even further. Staffing shortages may also  limit the amount of training public diplomacy officers receive. State is  repositioning several public diplomacy officers as part of its  transformational diplomacy initiative. However, this effort represents  shifting existing public diplomacy officers and does not increase the  overall number of officers, which we have noted were generally the same  in fiscal years 2004 and 2006.
In addition, public diplomacy officers at posts are burdened with  administrative tasks, and thus have less time to conduct public diplomacy  outreach activities than they did previously. One senior State official said  that administrative duties, such as budget, personnel, and internal  reporting, compete with officers’ public diplomacy responsibilities.  Another official in Egypt stated that she rarely had enough time to  strategize, plan, or evaluate her programs. These statements echo  comments we heard during overseas fieldwork and in a survey for our  2003 report. In that survey, officers stated that, although they manage to  attend public outreach and other functions within their host country  capitals, it was particularly difficult to find time to travel outside the  capitals to interact with other communities. This challenge is compounded  at posts with short tours of duty, including many tours in the Muslim  world, as officials stated that it is difficult to establish the type of close  working relationships essential to effective public diplomacy work when  they are in country for only a short time. In our May 2006 report, we  reported that the average length of tour at posts in the Muslim world is  about 22 percent shorter than tour lengths elsewhere. Noting the  prevalence of 1-year tours in the Muslim world, a senior official at State  said that public affairs officers who have shorter tours tend to produce  less effective work than officers with longer tours.
To address these challenges, we recommended in 2003 that the Secretary  of State designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs  sections to reduce the administrative burden. Officials at State said that  the Management bureau is currently considering options for reducing the  administrative burden on posts, including the development of centralized  administrative capabilities offshore.
section_title: Language Deficiencies Continue, Especially in the Muslim World
paragraphs: In August 2006, GAO reported that the State Department continued to  experience significant foreign language proficiency shortfalls in countries  around the world. Our May 2006 report noted this problem was  particularly acute at posts in the Muslim world where Arabic—classified  as a “superhard” language by State—predominates. In countries with  significant Muslim populations, we reported that 30 percent of language- designated public diplomacy positions were filled by officers without the  requisite proficiency in those languages, compared with 24 percent  elsewhere. In Arabic language posts, about 36 percent of language- designated public diplomacy positions were filled by staff unable to speak  Arabic at the designated level. In addition, State officials said that there  are even fewer officers who are willing or able to speak on television or  engage in public debate in Arabic. The information officer in Cairo stated  that his office does not have enough Arabic speakers to engage the  Egyptian media effectively. Figure 3 shows the percentage of public  diplomacy positions in the Muslim world staffed by officers meeting  language requirements.
State has begun to address these language deficiencies by increasing its  overall amount of language training and providing supplemental training  for more difficult languages at overseas locations. State has also made  efforts to ensure that its public diplomacy staff receive appropriate  language training. For example, State’s Foreign Service Institute recently  offered a week of intensive media training for language-qualified officers  that provided guidance on how to communicate with Arabic-speaking  audiences.
section_title: Embassies Must Balance Security and Public Outreach
paragraphs: Security concerns have limited embassy outreach efforts and public  access, forcing public diplomacy officers to strike a balance between  safety and mission. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11,  2001, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, “Safety is one of our top  priorities…but it can’t be at the expense of the mission.” In our May 2006  reported we noted that security concerns are particularly elevated in  countries with significant Muslim populations, where the threat level for  terrorism is rated as “critical” or “high” in 80 percent of posts.
Security and budgetary concerns have led to the closure of publicly  accessible facilities around the world, such as American Centers and  Libraries. In Pakistan, for example, all American Centers have closed for  security reasons; the last facility, in Islamabad, closed in February 2005.  These same concerns have prevented establishing a U.S. presence  elsewhere. As a result, embassies have had to find other venues for public  diplomacy programs, and some activities have been moved onto embassy  compounds, where precautions designed to improve security have had the  ancillary effect of sending the message that the United States is  unapproachable and distrustful, according to State officials. Concrete  barriers and armed escorts contribute to this perception, as do  requirements restricting visitors’ use of cell phones and pagers within the  embassy. According to one official in Pakistan, visitors to the embassy’s  reference library have declined to as few as one per day because many  visitors feel humiliated by the embassy’s rigorous security procedures.
Other public diplomacy programs have had to limit their publicity to  reduce the risk of becoming a target. A recent joint USAID-State report  concluded that “security concerns often require a ‘low profile’ approach  during events, programs or other situations, which, in happier times,  would have been able to generate considerable good will for the United  States.” This constraint is particularly acute in Pakistan, where the  embassy has had to reduce certain speaker and exchange programs.
State has responded to security concerns and the loss of publicly  accessible facilities through a variety of initiatives, including American  Corners, which are centers that provide information about the United  States, hosted in local institutions and staffed by local employees.  According to State data, there are currently 365 American Corners  throughout the world, including more than 200 in the Muslim world, with  another 31 planned (more than 20 of which will be in the Muslim world).  However, two of the posts we visited in October 2005 were having  difficulty finding hosts for American Corners, as local institutions fear  becoming terrorist targets.
section_title: Disparate Structure and Management Concerns Challenge the Broadcasting Board of Governors
paragraphs: The Broadcasting Board of Governors has its own set of public diplomacy  challenges, including trying to gain large audiences in priority markets  while dealing with a disparate organizational structure that contains  multiple discrete broadcasters (see fig. 4). As noted in the BBG’s strategic  plan, “the diversity of the BBG—diverse organizations with different  missions, different frameworks, and different constituencies—makes it a  challenge to bring all the separate parts together in a more effective  whole.” As we reported in July 2003, the Board hoped to address this key  challenge through two primary means. First, it planned to treat the  component parts of U.S. international broadcasting as a single system with  the Board in the position of actively managing resources across broadcast  entities to achieve common broadcast goals. Second, it intended to realign  the BBG’s organizational structure to reinforce the Board’s role as CEO  with a host of responsibilities, including taking the lead role in shaping the  BBG’s overall strategic direction, setting expectations and standards, and  creating the context for innovation and change.
In addition, in 2006, we found that MBN, which received $79 million in  funding in fiscal year 2006, faces several managerial and editorial  challenges that may hinder the organization’s efforts to expand in their  highly competitive market. While MBN has taken steps to improve its  process of program review and evaluation, it has not yet implemented our  recommendations to improve its system of internal control or develop a  comprehensive staff training plan.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may  have at this time.
section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jess T. Ford at  (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to  this statement include Audrey Solis, Assistant Director; Michael ten Kate;  Eve Weisberg; Kate France Smiles; and Joe Carney.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Foreign Assistance: Actions Needed to Better Assess the Impact of  Agencies’ Marking and Publicizing Efforts. GAO-07-277. Washington,  D.C.: Mar. 12, 2007.
U.S. International Broadcasting: Management of Middle East  Broadcasting Services Could Be Improved. GAO-06-762. Washington,  D.C.: Aug. 4, 2006.
Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist  Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps. GAO-06-894. Washington, D.C.: Aug.  4, 2006.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim  Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant  Challenges. GAO-06-535. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2006.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts Lack Certain  Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges. GAO-06-707T.  Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2006.
International Affairs: Information on U.S. Agencies’ Efforts to Address  Islamic Extremism. GAO-05-852. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2005.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by  the Lack of a National Communication Strategy. GAO-05-323.  Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2005.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and Broadcasting Board of  Governors Expand Post- 9/11 Efforts but Challenges Remain. GAO-04- 1061T.  Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2004.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and the Broadcasting Board of  Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant  Challenges. GAO-04-435T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 2004.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces  Significant Challenges. GAO-03-951. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2003.
U.S. International Broadcasting: New Strategic Approach Focuses on  Reaching Large Audiences but Lacks Measurable Program Objectives.  GAO-03-772. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further  permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or  other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to  reproduce this material separately.