Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks
Published: 2004-11-05T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Global Hawk offers significant military capabilities to capture and quickly transmit high-quality images of targets and terrain, day or night, and in adverse weather--without risk to an onboard pilot. Global Hawk first flew in the late 1990s as a demonstrator and supported recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2001, the Air Force began an acquisition program to develop and produce improved Global Hawks. In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) restructured and accelerated the program to include a new, larger and more capable air vehicle. GAO was asked to review the program and discuss (1) the restructuring's effect on the Air Force's ability to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter and (2) whether its current business case and management approach is knowledge-based and can help forestall future risks.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The restructuring of the Global Hawk program impacts the acquisition program in multiple ways. More and accelerated funding: Funding, which previously spanned 20 years, now is compressed in about half the time. The restructured plan requires $6.3 billion through fiscal year 2012; the original plan would have needed $3.4 billion by that time. The budget request is now three times higher for some years. Immature technologies: Several critical technologies needed to provide the advanced capabilities are immature and will not be tested on the new air vehicle until late in the program, after which most of the air vehicles will already have been bought. New requirements, new costs: DOD's desire to add additional Global Hawk capabilities tripled development costs. The program acquisition unit cost increased 44 percent since program start, yet fewer vehicles are to be produced than originally planned. Challenges, trade-offs, and delays: The addition of new capabilities has led to space, weight, and power constraints for the advanced Global Hawk model. These limitations may result in deferring some capabilities. Some key events and activities--many related to testing issues--have been delayed. Global Hawk's highly concurrent development and production strategy is risky and runs counter in important ways to a knowledge-based approach and to DOD's acquisition guidance. The restructuring caused gaps in product knowledge, increasing the likelihood of unsuccessful cost, schedule, quality, and performance outcomes. Because the restructured program is dramatically different from the initial plan for the basic model, the business case now seems out of sync with the realities of the acquisition program.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Air Force’s Global Hawk is a high-flying unmanned aerial vehicle that  can capture detailed images of targets as well as wide swaths of terrain and  transmit those images on a near real-time basis to battlefield commanders  and intelligence centers. With an ability to see through clouds, sandstorms,  and other inclement weather conditions day or night and to fly for more  than a day, Global Hawk can significantly improve the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) ability to gather intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance information about potential adversaries without risking an  onboard pilot. An early model performed well in the ongoing global war on  terrorism, and the Secretary of Defense identified Global Hawk as having  the potential to transform military operations. The Air Force began the  acquisition program in 2001. With total program cost estimated at  $6.3 billion, Global Hawk is currently DOD’s most expensive unmanned  aerial vehicle. The Navy is considering Global Hawk for a maritime  surveillance mission, and other federal agencies, several foreign countries,  and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have all expressed an interest in  this aircraft system.
In 2002, DOD restructured the program, accelerating development and  production, and, more importantly, changing the design significantly to a  new, larger, heavier, and more capable air vehicle to handle both imagery  and signals intelligence missions. Given Global Hawk’s overall importance  to DOD, you asked us to review the program. This report discusses (1) the  restructuring’s effect on the Air Force’s ability to deliver new capabilities to  the warfighter in terms of funding, acquisition strategy, cost, and other  related issues and (2) whether the current business case and management  approach is knowledge-based and can help forestall future risks.
To determine the effects of restructuring on the Global Hawk program’s  cost, schedule, and performance goals, we reviewed the original  acquisition strategy, two major restructurings, and the current acquisition  strategy. We assessed changes to funding, annual budget requests, the  number of vehicles to be procured, vehicle capabilities, and program cycles  for developing, testing, and procuring Global Hawk. To evaluate the  program’s likelihood of meeting its objectives, we compared the current  acquisition strategy with criteria established in DOD’s acquisition policy  and with best practices and experiences of leading commercial firms and  successful government acquisitions. This methodology, which we call a  knowledge-based approach, enabled us to evaluate whether the program  achieved product knowledge at the right times in terms of technology,  design, and production maturity. We identified gaps in product knowledge,  reasons for those gaps, and risks associated with inadequate knowledge.  We performed our review from February 2004 to September 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. More  details about our methodology are in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle system is designed to support  warfighting and peacekeeping missions by providing decision makers with  up-to-date information about potential adversaries’ locations, resources,  and personnel. Operators on the ground can change Global Hawk’s  navigation and direct the onboard sensors to survey a geographic area the  size of Illinois within a 24-hour cycle. As a high-altitude, long-endurance  aircraft, Global Hawk was originally designed to reach an altitude of  65,000 feet and fly for up to 35 hours.
Global Hawk began in 1994 as an acquisition concept technology  demonstration program, managed first by the Defense Advanced Research  Projects Agency and, since 1998, by the Air Force. Seven demonstrator  aircraft were eventually produced; three have since been destroyed in  mishaps. The demonstrator models logged several thousand-flight hours  and effectively supported combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The system passed a military usefulness assessment, completed several  demonstrations and other tests, and DOD judged it a success. However,  testing identified that significant improvements in reliability, sensor  performance, and communications were needed before producing  operationally effective and suitable systems.
In March 2001, DOD approved the Global Hawk for a combined start of  system development and low-rate initial production of six air vehicles  based on the successful demonstrations and operational deployments of  demonstrator aircraft. The Air Force planned to slowly develop more  advanced capabilities and acquire 63 air vehicles. This model, now called  the RQ-4A, is shown in figure 1.
In March 2002, DOD restructured the acquisition strategy to include a  second Global Hawk model, the RQ-4B. The new strategy includes 51 air  vehicles, 10 ground stations, multiple intelligence sensors, support  equipment, and facilities at a cost of $6.3 billion. Of the 51 air vehicles  to be purchased, 7 are RQ-4As and 44 are RQ-4Bs. Separately, the Navy is  procuring 2 RQ-4As and a ground station for about $300 million (including  development costs) to evaluate the vehicles’ potential for the Broad Area  Maritime Surveillance Program. In December 2002, DOD restructured  the program again. Instead of buying all RQ-4Bs with multiple  intelligence capability, the RQ-4Bs will now have a mix of multimission and  single-mission capabilities. The two restructurings also increased low-rate  initial production quantities to 19 (recently increased to 20) air vehicles:  7 RQ-4As and 12 (now 13) RQ-4Bs.
subsections: section_title: Differences between the Two Global Hawk Models
paragraphs: The RQ-4A and the RQ-4B differ significantly. The new RQ-4B model is  intended to have 50 percent greater payload capacity, a longer fuselage and  longer wing span and will be heavier than the A model. DOD considered  these changes necessary to carry new advanced sensor payloads and to  provide multi-intelligence capabilities on a single RQ-4B. Even though the  RQ-4B is bigger and heavier, it will use the same engine as the RQ-4A.  Table 1 shows the key differences in the two models.
In addition to the differences shown in table 1, the RQ-4B includes new  requirements for advanced sensors payloads, enhancements to  communications and ground stations, a new multiplatform common data  link, and an open systems architecture. The new design will use more  advanced technologies (such as lithium batteries and electric brakes), will  require a larger power-generating capability, and will incorporate new  landing gears that fold into the wing. Also, the design changes require new  manufacturing processes and investments in new production tooling—the  factory equipment and manufacturing items used to build large quantities  of major weapon systems, such as Global Hawk.
section_title: Restructured Global Hawk Program Attempts to Do More in Less Time
paragraphs: Global Hawk’s restructuring has impacted the acquisition program in a  number of significant ways: the time span for funding has been compressed  into roughly half the time and the overall funding amount has increased;  concurrent development and production is causing the Air Force to invest  in almost half the total fleet of the new and improved Global Hawk vehicle  before a production model has proven that it will work as intended; and  development costs have tripled because of the need to develop a new and  improved vehicle. In addition, the program has deferred some capabilities  and incurred delays that could affect the Air Force’s ability to deliver  Global Hawk to the warfighter.
subsections: section_title: Annual Funding Needs Are Higher under Restructured Program
paragraphs: The restructured program requires greater up-front investment, a faster  ramp-up in funding, and a larger total budget. The development period was  extended from 7 years to 12 years, and development funding increased  significantly to develop the RQ-4B and to integrate advanced sensor and  communication technologies. Procurement is now concentrated into  11 years instead of the 20 years of relatively level procurement set out in  the original plan. The restructuring triples Global Hawk’s budgetary  requirements in some years. Figure 2 illustrates the restructuring’s  compression of the program and impact on annual funding requirements.
Compared with the original plan, the restructured plan has much higher  annual funding requirements, placing more budgeted funds at risk of not  being fully funded when competing for the defense dollar. In their  respective peak years of budget requirements, the original plan would have  required $353 million (fiscal year 2010), while the restructured plan expects  to request $781 million (fiscal year 2007). The upcoming fiscal year 2006  requirement is currently about $750 million, three times higher than the  original plan for that same fiscal year. Cumulatively, the restructured plan  requires $6.3 billion to be completed in fiscal year 2012, whereas the  original plan would only have needed $3.4 billion by that year.
section_title: Restructured Program Increased Concurrency between Development and Production
paragraphs: Significant concurrency now exists between development and production  that covers the period from fiscal years 2004 to 2010. The Air Force now  plans to invest in almost half of the total RQ-4B fleet before a production  model is flight-tested and operational evaluations are completed to show  that the air vehicle design works as required. Full-rate production will  begin before the airborne signals intelligence and multiplatform radar  complete development and are flight-tested to prove the integrated system  will work as intended. The primary reason for building the RQ-4B model  was to integrate and carry the advanced sensors to provide added  capability to the warfighter. Additionally, schedule delays have already  occurred in the restructured plan that will continue to add pressure in  the program.
Collectively, the actions to restructure the program have materially  changed the underpinnings in the original business case decision  developed to justify the start of system development and low-rate  production. The business case should provide sufficient evidence that  resources are available to meet warfighter needs. This case would include  technology and design demonstrations that added confidence that the  integrated product can be developed within time and money constraints.  The original plan was to first acquire basic RQ-4A systems very similar to  the demonstrators and then slowly and incrementally develop and acquire  systems with more advanced sensor capabilities while using the same air  vehicle. This strategy incorporated an evolutionary approach in that a basic  capability was to be produced in a first block of aircraft and a second, more  advanced block was to be acquired once the new technologies were  mature. Each block had separate decision points and testing plans and  significant risk was removed from the program because the demonstrators  had been built, tested, and extensively flown (and later used successfully in  actual combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq). While testing showed it  needed some improvements, the RQ-4A was significantly more mature and  proven than the RQ-4B model to begin production.
Figure 3 illustrates the significantly greater concurrency of development  and production activities resulting from the program’s restructuring  compared with the original plan. Historically, programs with high degrees  of concurrency are at greater risk of cost, schedule, and performance  problems than programs with less overlap of development and production.  The original acquisition strategy planned to complete most development  testing prior to beginning production, thereby taking advantage of product  knowledge. The restructured program added the new RQ-4B model,  substantially increased low-rate production quantities, and established  highly concurrent development and production cycles to acquire and test  several different RQ-4B configurations over the life of the program. The Air  Force plans to invest in 20 RQ-4Bs before completion of initial operational  test and evaluation. The reason for designing a larger and heavier Global  Hawk was to satisfy warfighter needs for the new advanced sensors.  However, integration and operational testing of the advanced sensors on  the fully configured air vehicle are not scheduled to be completed and  reported on until fiscal year 2009 for the advanced signal intelligence  sensor and fiscal year 2011 for the multiplatform radar. By this time, the  entire RQ-4B fleet will already be produced or on order.
section_title: Restructured Program Added Requirements and Increased Costs
paragraphs: Global Hawk’s development cost estimates have increased almost  threefold, from $906.2 million in March 2001 to about $2.6 billion in  March 2004, mostly due to the requirement for the new RQ-4B’s inclusion in  the program. Total program costs have continued to increase, including an  increase of $466 million since March 2003. The program acquisition unit  cost increased 44 percent since program start, from $85.6 million to  $123.2 million. Increasing costs for Global Hawk raises affordability issues  and questions about employing the vehicle in medium- and high-threat  environments because of its high replacement costs and limited numbers.  Total procurement cost estimates decreased from program start due to  the cut in quantities from 63 to 51 and inflation savings resulting from  compressing the program and cutting 9 years of future procurement  activities. Table 2 shows how costs have changed since March 2001  in millions of then-year dollars.
The following factors caused the Global Hawk program’s cost estimates to  change between 2001 and 2004:  March 2001 cost estimate: Based on the original acquisition strategy  to slowly and incrementally develop and acquire improved versions of  the demonstrator model. The RQ-4B model was not yet part of the  acquisition strategy.
March 2002 cost estimate: Reflects changes for the first restructuring  of the program, which introduced the RQ-4B. Development costs  increased significantly because of plans to quickly build advanced  capabilities into the RQ-4B. While the quantity of air vehicles—the  RQ-4A and RQ-4B models—and ground stations decreased because of  revised user requirements, total procurement costs increased because  of the higher cost for the RQ-4Bs and the plan at that time to equip all  the larger platforms with multi-intelligence mission capabilities.
March 2003 cost estimate: Reflects a second restructuring for  affordability reasons. In December 2002, DOD officials decided to  switch from all multimission capabilities to a mix of multimission  and single-mission RQ-4Bs. This switch lowered procurement costs by  decreasing the required number of sensors.
March 2004 cost estimate: Between March 2003 and March 2004,  total program cost increased by $466 million, and officials added  another 18 months to the development program to accomplish  requirements deferred from prior years and to accommodate new  requirements. Development costs increased to cover the extended  schedule and additional requirements. Procurement costs increased  primarily because of higher costs for structural components and for  labor to build the RQ-4B.
section_title: Restructured Program Has Created Other New Challenges
paragraphs: Space, weight, and power constraints of the RQ-4B limit what capabilities  can be included now or added in the future. Some capabilities have already  been eliminated or deferred to later years. For example, the warfighter  wanted a defensive subsystem for Global Hawk, but development has been  delayed and may be dropped because of weight limitations in the air  vehicle, already at or near capacity with some of the new advanced sensor  payloads. Also, the RQ-4B configured with the airborne signals intelligence  payload is projected to have no capacity for future growth because this  payload weighs more than allocated in the design of the air vehicle.
Other development tasks have similarly been delayed or pushed out  beyond the budget years, including efforts related to demonstrating that  Global Hawk can operate in areas with extreme temperatures.
The Air Force’s overall acquisition approach to add new technologies  whenever they are deemed ready was designed to allow flexibility in  responding to changes in priorities and new requirements. However,  Global Hawk’s vehicle limitations and changing requirements have  increased development challenges. For example, despite the space, weight,  and power limitations of the RQ-4B, Air Force officials stated that Global  Hawk users and other DOD officials continue to identify potential future  technologies and capabilities for possible incorporation into Global Hawk.  Absent major downsizing of the advanced sensors or other payloads, the  Air Force will need to consider dedicating the RQ-4B to an increasing  number of single and specific—rather than multi-intelligence—missions, if  the goal is to utilize new and unproven emerging technologies not currently  part of the Global Hawk plan.
section_title: Delays in Key Events Since Restructuring Can Impact Delivery of New Capability
paragraphs: The new schedule for some key events and activities has slipped because  of programmatic, budget, or external issues. Air Force and contractor  officials say that a significant contributor to schedule delays was the  episodic deployment of Global Hawk’s earlier model in Afghanistan and  Iraq. The Global Hawk system—including considerable numbers of Air  Force and contractor personnel, ground stations, and supporting  equipment—has been used to support combat operations and is subject to  future deployment orders.
Some examples of program events that have been delayed and others  whose future schedules have slipped include:  government acceptance of the second RQ-4A production aircraft due to  quality and performance problems identified during tests;  delivery of the equipment and support needed to begin initial operations  at the Global Hawk’s home base, Beale Air Force Base in California;  the operational assessment of the RQ-4A;  completion of the first phase of combined developmental and  operational testing of Global Hawk;  acquisition of production tooling, establishing manufacturing processes,  and delivering parts needed for production;  delivery schedules projected for RQ-4B air vehicles; and  the expected start of initial operational test and evaluation to support  the full-rate production decision.
Delays and deficiencies in scheduled development testing could  compromise upcoming decisions in the program. According to test officials  in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the first of five phases of Global  Hawk’s combined development and operational testing is not as robust as  originally planned and is taking significantly longer than expected. As of  July 2004, only about 10 percent of the required flight test points had been  completed and nearly 70 percent of the remaining test points were either  on hold or not fully defined. The approved test plan required this testing to  be completed by September 2004, but testing officials do not expect it to be  completed until March 2005. Test delays are occurring due to late delivery  of key subsystems, lack of resources, deployments in support of the global  war on terrorism, other program priorities, and unexpected testing  problems. Test officials told us that the lack of quality test data is  hampering their ability to provide meaningful oversight.
The results from this first phase of development testing were to be used in  the operational assessment of the first two production RQ-4A aircraft  starting in September 2004 to assess the Global Hawk’s mission readiness  and suitability. Because of phase one delays, the start of the assessment has  slipped until at least March 2005. Test officials believe further delays are  likely because of other higher priorities, including the start-up activities at  Beale Air Force Base. At this time, a firm date for the testing has not been  scheduled and the unapproved test plan still lacks the necessary details to  ensure effective testing. Test officials believe the operational assessment is  in jeopardy of being cancelled or cut back in order to start the dedicated  initial operational test and evaluation on time. The officials say that  eliminating the operational assessment, or reducing its scope, would add  risk to the program. Entering the next phase involves testing the new,  larger RQ-4B aircraft and advanced sensor payloads, and, without having  the assurances the production aircraft are mission-ready, additional tests  will likely be required.
section_title: Global Hawk Program’s Current Management Approach Sets Stage for Additional Risks
paragraphs: In attempting to get advanced capabilities to the warfighter sooner, the  Air Force’s restructured acquisition strategy for the Global Hawk program  does not fully follow best practices and DOD acquisition guidance for an  evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition process. DOD recently rewrote  its acquisition policy specifically to encourage acquisitions to develop and  deliver increased capability to the warfighter incrementally (or on an  evolutionary basis), only when appropriate knowledge concerning  technology, design, and manufacturing has been attained. Compared with  the original strategy, the new Global Hawk acquisition strategy has yielded  less product knowledge in each of these areas, thereby raising the  likelihood of future negative impacts on cost, schedule, and performance.  Air Force and contractor officials acknowledge that—with its highly  compressed and concurrent schedule—the program is risky and presents  major management challenges. The Air Force has established management  controls and processes intended to mitigate risks; however, without a  disciplined process to capture and base investment decisions on key  technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge, the controls are less  robust and the risks remain high.
subsections: section_title: Restructured Acquisition Strategy Does Not Fully Capture Product Knowledge at Key Decision Points
paragraphs: By approving the start of system development and low-rate production at  the same time, Global Hawk’s restructured acquisition strategy skipped the  critical decision points that require the capture of key product knowledge  used to inform decisions to move forward in an acquisition program.  Skipping the necessary steps to capture technology, design, and  manufacturing knowledge has added risk to the program. The Air Force  would have captured more knowledge under the original March 2001  strategy, which more closely followed the knowledge-based approach.  At that time, the plan was to acquire basic air vehicles and ground systems  very similar to the demonstrators that had already been built, extensively  flown, and (later) used in combat. The Air Force then planned to upgrade  sensor and performance capabilities for the next production lot as the  technologies matured while retaining the same airframe. Since the decision  to start the program, additional information and experience have closed  some of the gaps, but a substantial lack of knowledge continues to add risk  to the RQ-4B acquisition.
GAO has a body of work focused on best practices in product development  and weapon systems acquisition. We have found that when program  managers capture key product knowledge at three critical knowledge  points during a major acquisition, the probability of meeting expected  performance within cost and schedule objectives increases. Each of the  points builds on previously attained knowledge. The acquired knowledge is  used to identify and reduce any risks before moving a weapon system to  the next stage of development. This approach to developing new  products—commercial and defense—has been shown over time to  continually produce successful outcomes in terms of cost, schedule,  and performance.
In recent years, DOD revised its acquisition policy to embrace an  evolutionary and knowledge-based approach, which we believe provides a  sound framework for the acquisition of major weapon systems. This policy  covers most of DOD’s major acquisition programs. As noted in our  November 2003 report, this revised policy is a step in the right direction.  The acquisition policy states that program managers shall provide  knowledge about the key aspects of the system at key decision points in the  acquisition process and an evolutionary or incremental development  approach should be used to establish a more manageable environment for  attaining and applying knowledge. The customer may not get the ultimate  capability right away, but the initial product is available sooner and at a  lower cost. The policy adopts the essence of the following points from the  knowledge-based approach:  Knowledge point 1: Should occur when the acquisition program is  scheduled to start, when the customer’s requirements are clearly  defined, and resources—proven technology, engineering capability,  time, and money—exist to satisfy them. This match should support the  business case for starting system development and demonstration.  Technology should be mature before starting a program, and, therefore,  the technology development phase of an acquisition should be separate  from the system development phase.
Knowledge point 2: Should occur at the design readiness review,  about halfway through the system development phase, when the  product’s design is determined to be capable of meeting product  requirements—the design is stable and ready to begin initial  manufacturing of prototypes.
Knowledge point 3: Should occur when managers commit to starting  production, when information is available to determine that a reliable  product can be produced repeatedly within established cost, schedule,  and manufacturing quality targets.
Figure 4 shows a generalized depiction of DOD’s acquisition policy, where  DOD’s key milestones are anchored along a typical program’s acquisition  path and where the three knowledge points from the knowledge-based  approach fit along this path. Also shown in figure 4 is how the Global Hawk  program overlaps technology and system development and begins  production before the necessary knowledge is achieved.
Global Hawk’s new strategy approved initial production of the improved  RQ-4B well in advance of completing technology maturation and approved  developing and integrating the vehicle’s design with the various sensor  payloads desired by the warfighter. Furthermore, low-rate production was  approved without ensuring the quality and reliability of manufacturing  processes. This approach added significant risk in that sensor technologies  and final design may not meet the space, weight, and power limitations of  the RQ-4B, which is in low-rate production, and may not satisfy the  warfighter’s requirements. By not closing knowledge gaps in the integrated  product design (air vehicle, sensor payloads, and data links) needed to  meet requirements, there is increased risk that sensor development  schedules may need to be extended to achieve form, fit, and function for an  integrated Global Hawk system. Otherwise, the program office may have to  go back to the warfighter and further negotiate requirements. Table 3  compares the product knowledge available to support key decision points  under the original plan in March 2001 with the knowledge obtained at the  start of RQ-4B production in July 2004. A black dot indicates product  knowledge meets best practice standards from knowledge-based approach.
The table shows that the level of product knowledge approached best  practice standards when the decision was made in March 2001 to start  system development and low-rate production of the RQ-4A. The program’s  restructurings in 2002, however, created substantial gaps in technology,  design, and manufacturing knowledge that have not yet been closed by the  start of RQ-4B production. Lack of product knowledge increases risks of  poor cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. Appendix III includes a  more detailed discussion of knowledge gaps at each knowledge point.  Following are brief examples of knowledge gaps as they relate to each of  the three critical knowledge points.
Technology maturity: Using best practices, at the start of system  development, a program’s critical technologies should be in the form, fit,  and function needed for the intended product and should be demonstrated  in a realistic environment. The RQ-4B development program is struggling to  meet these criteria for several of its most critical technologies. Nearly  2 years after development began, the technologies required for the RQ-4B  to perform its operational mission including enhanced imaging sensors,  signals intelligence, multiplatform radar, and open system architecture are  immature, basically at a functional rather than form or fit configuration.  For example, the airborne signals intelligence payload and multiplatform  radar technology insertion program are still in development under separate  Air Force programs. These subsystems are key to providing the advanced  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities for which the  RQ-4B is being developed. At the time of our review, neither of these  technologies had been demonstrated in an operational environment using a  system prototype. Air Force officials expect them to be mature by the time  they begin buying sensors to incorporate them into the Global Hawk  production line in fiscal years 2008 and 2009. However, by this time most of  the air vehicles will have already been bought. Also, operational testing to  evaluate performance in a realistic operating environment is not scheduled  until late fiscal year 2008 for the signals intelligence sensor and late 2010  for the radar. Nevertheless, the Air Force continues to build the RQ-4B  platform lacking solid assurance that these critical subsystems will work  as planned.
Design maturity: The program had completed 75 percent of RQ-4B model  drawings by the design readiness review in comparison with the 90 percent  completion standard for best practices. While the Air Force anticipated the  design and experience on the RQ-4A would add assurances and speed  efforts to mature the new RQ-4B design, the two vehicles ultimately had  only about 10 percent commonality. While drawings completed were  approaching best practice standards, the Air Force did not build a  prototype of the RQ-4B design to demonstrate a stable design.  Demonstration of the design is a key factor in ensuring a stable design.  The Air Force had not established a reliability growth goal or plan and had  not identified critical manufacturing processes, both essential to the next  phase of production and needed to ensure quality and cost targets can  be met.
Production maturity: Officials have started to identify the critical  manufacturing processes for the RQ-4B but do not intend to collect and use  statistical process control data to ensure the manufacturing could deliver  quality products. The new RQ-4B requires new manufacturing processes  because of major differences from the RQ-4A. In addition, Officials from  the program office, the prime contractor, and the Defense Contract  Management Agency continue to identify problems and concerns about the  performance and quality of work by several key subcontractors, including  those producing the wing, the advanced sensor suite, and the vertical tail  and aft fuselage parts. This latter subcontractor is new to large-scale  manufacturing using advanced composite materials and has experienced  significant start-up and quality problems. According to best practices, the  subcontractor’s critical processes must be demonstrated to ensure good  quality and limit rework. The prime contractor and DOD sent special teams  of advisors to help develop the firm’s manufacturing processes and to train  employees. Creating another gap in production maturity, a fully integrated  system representative prototype was not tested before starting production  and will not have been demonstrated before full-rate production, scheduled  in 2007. By then, 45 percent of the RQ-4B planned quantities will be  under contract.
section_title: Joint Efforts Will Help Manage Risk in the Global Hawk Program
paragraphs: Air Force and contractor officials agree that the restructured program  significantly increased program and technical risks. They acknowledge that  the use of the approach to insert technology periodically affects all aspects  of the program, making it more challenging to manage functional areas,  including logistics support, contracting, program integration, and testing.  To better manage the risks and challenges created by this acquisition  approach and environment, the Global Hawk management team provided  the following as examples of actions they are taking  better teaming practices between the government and contractor to  manage the program at all levels;  better controls for the release of funds on both development and   allocation of higher amounts of management reserve funding during   use of a “buy to budget” concept that limits activity in the program to a  ceiling amount of funds planned for the total program; and  use of a risk management database to focus the attention of  management on the most critical risks facing the program.
These are all management practices that can be used to manage any  product development program and will likely identify and help manage  risks in the Global Hawk program. Nevertheless, using a knowledge-based  approach that captures critical knowledge at key junctures in a program  has been shown time and again in both commercial and defense acquisition  programs to consistently produce successful outcomes—cost, schedule,  quality, and performance.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In March 2001, DOD approved the start of development and production for  Global Hawk on the basis of a business case that matched requirements  with resources—technologies, engineering capabilities, time, and funding.  The first increment of Global Hawk was based on mature technologies and  a design proven to meet the warfighter’s need through actual combat use of  the technology demonstrator. The plan included a reasonable funding  profile and embraced a knowledge-based acquisition strategy that  completed development before entering production. The plan included  future improvements to the baseline capability as technologies and funding  became available. By December 2002, the Air Force had dramatically  changed the Global Hawk’s acquisition plan and the knowledge-based  foundation for the earlier decision to proceed into development and  production. This change created large gaps between Global Hawk’s  requirements and the resources available to meet them. The new plan  required a new, larger, and heavier air vehicle with only 10 percent  commonality with the previous proven design; increased development  time; and accelerated production time, creating significant concurrency  between development and production. To accommodate the changes, the  plan calls for twice the annual funding amounts in peak years over the old  plan. Overall, the new plan has increased risks significantly. Subsequent  reviews by DOD have acknowledged the changes in the program have  increased uncertainty. The new design has not been demonstrated to work  using a prototype model; technologies to support the advanced sensor  payloads that drove the need for a new Global Hawk design are still  immature; and the Air Force will be requesting about $750 million in  funding next year for the program. Yet, the Air Force has awarded a  contract to start the production of the new, larger Global Hawk B model  with the hope that simulations and analysis will be sufficient to allow  decision makers to manage risk. The history of DOD managed programs  suggests otherwise.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To decrease risks of poor outcomes and to increase the chances of  delivering required warfighter capabilities with the funds available, we are  making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to take the following  two actions  direct the Air Force to revisit the decision to begin concurrent  development and production of the Global Hawk B design and direct the  Air Force to create and present a new business case that defines the  warfighter’s needs that can be accommodated given current available  resources of technology, engineering capability, time, and money, and  delay further procurement of the Global Hawk B, other than units  needed for testing, until a new business case is completed that reduces  risk and justifies further investments based on a knowledge-based  acquisition strategy.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The  comments appear in appendix II. DOD stated that it did not concur with  our two recommendations. Separately, DOD provided one technical  comment that we incorporated in this report to more accurately  characterize the issue of affordability and use of Global Hawks in threat  conditions.
Regarding our first recommendation on completing a new business case to  justify and guide concurrent development and production of the RQ-4B  model, DOD stated its belief that the Global Hawk’s acquisition strategy  balances acquisition risks with the department’s demands to rapidly field  new capabilities to the warfighter, thereby obviating the need for a new  business case. Furthermore, by following what officials call an  evolutionary development process, DOD said it is providing  transformational warfighting capabilities to ongoing military operations  without disrupting Global Hawk’s current development and production  activities. DOD said it is effectively managing risk with the help of regular  oversight meetings and by requiring monthly and quarterly activity reports.
We continue to believe that a new business case is needed to support  further investments and to improve oversight by Congress and DOD  decision makers. The program today is much different than the one  supported by the original business case. The Air Force started with an  advanced concept technology demonstration program that proved the  capability of a smaller and lighter Global Hawk air vehicle. Use of this  vehicle on numerous occasions in actual combat situations has saved lives,  according to Air Force and contractor officials. However, this is not the  vehicle that the Air Force now plans to produce. Instead, the Air Force  dramatically changed the acquisition strategy for the Global Hawk program  and is not gaining some key knowledge before production. The Air Force  plans to concurrently design and produce a new Global Hawk air vehicle  that is significantly larger and heavier than the earlier version used in  combat. The larger air vehicle is intended to accommodate new, heavier,  and larger sensors that will not be available until the 2008 to 2009 time  frame. In implementing the restructured strategy, the Air Force is not fully  following a knowledge-based approach for developing the RQ-4B Global  Hawk as called for by best practices and DOD’s new defense acquisition  guidance. The new guidance clearly states that knowledge reduces risks,  and we agree.
While the Air Force believes it can manage the risk of a concurrent  development and production program by holding regular meetings with  acquisition executives and by issuing management reports, DOD’s own  experience has shown this to be risky and a factor that led DOD to change  its acquisition policy to a knowledge-based approach. History has shown  concurrency usually delays the delivery of a needed capability and results  in higher costs. From March 2003 to March 2004, estimated program costs  have increased by $466 million, and the sensors and the new air vehicle are  still being developed. Stepping back from this rush to produce the new air  vehicle and establishing a new business case designed to capture key  product knowledge before costly investments in production would better  inform DOD decision makers and Congress about what is feasible with  available technology and dollar resources to meet warfighter needs and to  better assess the extent and/or severity of program acquisition risks.
Regarding our second recommendation to delay further procurement of the  RQ-4B (other than units needed for testing) until a new knowledge-based  and risk-reducing business case is prepared, DOD stated that its current  acquisition strategy effectively manages risk and fosters the rapid delivery  of needed capabilities to the warfighter. DOD said we overstated risks from  RQ-4B development, design changes, and insertion of advanced sensor  capabilities. DOD further stated that our recommendation would result in a  production break with serious cost and schedule complications and that  GAO’s sequential knowledge-based approach does not consider real-world  events, such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack in the United States  or issues related to North Korea and Iraq.
We believe the risks in the Global Hawk program are real and continue to  support delaying the near-term procurement of air vehicles not needed for  testing. We think this is a prudent way for the program to gain knowledge  before significantly increased resource investments and to reduce risks  until a new air vehicle integrated with the advanced signals intelligence  payload and the multiplatform radar can be demonstrated through testing  to meet warfighter requirements. Our report notes that operational testing  of the air vehicle’s performance and suitability will not take place until  almost half the fleet is already purchased and that integration and testing of  the advanced sensors will not occur until late in the program after the full- rate production decision is made and most systems are bought. DOD’s  comments appear to decouple the air vehicle from the advanced sensors by  stating that, if a sensor diverges from its current plan, alternate future  payloads could fill the RQ-4B’s greater payload capacity. However, the need  for designing a new larger air vehicle was predicated on its ability to carry  these specific sensors to meet the warfighter’s requirements. Therefore, we  believe that knowledge based on a demonstration of the integrated  capability is key to supporting production and delivery of the product  within estimated cost and schedule. Additionally, the new Global Hawk  program strategy requires significantly greater amounts of funding earlier,  putting that investment at risk should changes occur as development and  testing is completed.
Regarding a potential break in production, our analysis indicates that a  break is neither impending nor certain if our recommendation were  adopted. We are not recommending that DOD stop production or reduce  the total quantity but rather a near-term delay in procuring the portion of  annual buys for air vehicles not needed for testing. Funds currently on  contract and approved appropriations for fiscal year 2005 would continue  production on the Air Force’s planned schedule through mid-fiscal  year 2007 at least. Only then would a production break or slowdown  happen, and only if the Air Force has not yet prepared a business case to  justify its investments beyond that point based on demonstrated product  knowledge of the new air vehicle. If the current acquisition strategy and  financial plan are feasible and appropriate, the Air Force would be able to  prepare and justify a comprehensive business plan for the RQ-4B well in  advance of a potential break.
DOD indicated that our knowledge-based acquisition approach was  untimely and not adaptive to fast-changing world events. When we  developed the knowledge-based approach, our high priority was to focus  on better ways to deliver capability to the warfighter more quickly through  incremental, or evolutionary, development. Our approach is based on a  careful study of historical DOD acquisition programs and the best efforts in  the private sector. Our prior work shows that proceeding without requisite  knowledge ultimately costs programs more money and takes longer to  complete than those adopting a more rigorous and comprehensive strategy  basing investment decisions on key product knowledge—technology,  design, and production maturity levels. DOD agreed with our findings and  changed its acquisition guidance to reflect a knowledge-based approach.  We note in this report that the original Global Hawks were produced  through a successful demonstration program that effectively and quickly  provided the warfighter with transformational intelligence, surveillance,  and reconnaissance capabilities. Defense Contract Management Agency  reports, contract cost reports, corporate briefings, design drawing changes,  new tooling and new production processes, and the evident need for Air  Force and prime contractor task teams to be extensively deployed to  subcontractor facilities, all indicate that the RQ-4B program entails higher  degrees of risk, greater management challenges, and significant changes  from production of the RQ-4A and earlier demonstrators.
We believe that our recommendation to delay further procurement of the  RQ-4B until a new knowledge-based and risk-reducing business case is  prepared prudently balances real-world internal investment risks with  military demands from real-world external events. The Air Force could  have continued to deliver the capability of the Global Hawk that was the  direct outgrowth of the demonstration program while allowing the sensor  and radar technology time to mature before investing in a new larger and  more risky Global Hawk program. This would have allowed continued  delivery of the enhanced RQ-4A capability to the warfighter while  minimizing the impacts of design changes that come out of normal  development and testing and that grow more costly as a product enters the  production environment. The heavy cost of design changes after  production is underway could impact DOD’s ability to respond to other  warfighter needs in the post-9/11 world.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its  issue date. At that time, we will send copies to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, the  Secretary of the Navy, and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.  In addition, the report will be available on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4163 or Michael J. Hazard at (937) 258-7917.  Other staff making key contributions to this report were Lily J. Chin,  Bruce D. Fairbairn, Steven M. Hunter, Matthew B. Lea, Charlie Shivers,  and Adam Vodraska.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the effects of Global Hawk’s restructuring on cost, schedule,  and performance goals, we compared the original acquisition strategy,  two major revisions, and the current acquisition strategy as implemented.  We identified changes in cost, quantity, fleet composition, and sensor  capability mixes as well as overall consequences of restructuring on total  funding requirements, annual budget requests, and program cycles for  developing, testing, and producing the Global Hawk. We reviewed  management plans, cost reports, contract files, progress briefings, and risk  data to identify program execution efforts and results to date. We identified  cost changes, schedule delays, and performance issues.
To evaluate whether the current acquisition approach can help forestall  risks, we applied GAO’s methodology for assessing risks in major weapon  systems. This methodology is derived from the best practices and  experiences of leading commercial firms and successful defense  acquisition programs. We reviewed program office and prime contractor  organizations, processes, and management actions. We extracted and  evaluated program and technical risks maintained in a risk database used  by the program office and contractor to identify major risks and the steps  taken to mitigate risks. We compared the program office’s plans and results  to date against best practice standards in achieving product knowledge in  terms of technology, design, and production maturity information and in  applying knowledge to support major program decisions. We identified  gaps in product knowledge, reasons contributing to those gaps, and the  elevated risks expected as a consequence of inadequate product  knowledge. We further analyzed original and current acquisition  approaches to demonstrate the high concurrency of development,  production, and testing and the elevated risks imposed as a result.
In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed officials  from the Global Hawk System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force  Base, Ohio; 452nd Flight Test Squadron, Air Force Flight Test Center, and  Detachment 5, Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, Edwards  Air Force Base, CA; Defense Contract Management Agency, San Diego and  Palmdale, CA; Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems, Rancho Bernardo  and Palmdale, CA; and offices of the Director, Operational Test and  Evaluation, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Planning Office, which are part  of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in Washington, D.C.
We conducted our work from February to September 2004 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Knowledge Gaps at Critical Knowledge Points
subsections: section_title: Technology Maturity Gap— Knowledge Point 1
paragraphs: Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system  development is a particularly important best practice. This means that the  critical technologies needed to meet essential product requirements are in  the form, fit, and function needed for the intended product and have been  demonstrated to work in their intended environment. The RQ-4B  development program is struggling to meet these criteria for several of its  most critical technologies. More than 2 years after development began, the  technologies required for the RQ-4B to perform its operational mission  including enhanced imaging sensors, signals intelligence, multiplatform  radar, and open system architecture are immature, basically at a functional  rather than form or fit configuration. Nevertheless, the Air Force continues  to build the RQ-4B platform, lacking solid assurance that these critical  subsystems will work as planned.
In particular, the airborne signals intelligence payload and multiplatform  radar technology insertion program are still in development under separate  Air Force programs and will be purchased by the Global Hawk program as  government furnished equipment. These subsystems are key to providing  the advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities for  which the RQ-4B is being developed. At the time of our review, neither of  these technologies had been demonstrated in an operational environment  using a system prototype. Air Force officials characterized their current  stages of development as laboratory settings demonstrating basic  performance, technical feasibility, and functionality but not form or fit  (size, weight, materials, etc.). Technology maturity of the sensors is critical  because the basic design of the RQ-4B has been completed and allocates  limited space, weight, and power for the new capability. If the new sensors  cannot be developed within these constraints, some performance  trade-offs—such as reduced frequency coverage—are likely. The airborne  signals intelligence payload currently exceeds the weight allocated for its  integration into the RQ-4B, while the multiplatform radar uses most of the  vehicle’s available power-generation capability.
Officials expect them to be mature by the time they begin buying sensors to  incorporate them into the Global Hawk production line in fiscal years 2008  and 2009. However, by this time most of the air vehicles will have already  been bought; additional time and money might be needed to fix or retrofit  any remaining differences. Also, operational testing to evaluate  performance in a realistic operating environment is not scheduled until late  fiscal year 2008 for the signals intelligence sensor and late 2010 for the  radar. Any changes or delays in these programs would likely impact Global  Hawk cost, schedule, and/or performance.
section_title: Design Maturity Gap— Knowledge Point 2
paragraphs: Seventy-five percent of engineering drawings were released at the  Global Hawk design readiness review that triggered the start of RQ-4B  manufacturing and assembly. This figure is 15 percent less than the best  practices’ standard of 90 percent. The Air Force and contractor had  anticipated being able to use much of the design work and production  experience on the RQ-4A to prove the design and decrease the time and  extent of engineering work on the RQ-4B. However, officials found out that  the two models had much less in common than anticipated. About  90 percent of the airframe had to be redesigned—only 10 percent was  common to both models. Therefore, relying on the experience of the RQ-4A  increased the risk of poor program outcomes because the RQ-4B is  substantially heavier; incorporates a new wing, fuselage, and vertical tail;  has a 50 percent greater payload capacity to carry advanced sensors still in  development; and requires new production tooling, new materials, and  changed manufacturing processes.
The Air Force also did not build an RQ-4B prototype—a best practice to  demonstrate design stability—before awarding a contract to start  production. An analysis of the development contract performance, as of  May 2004, shows that development and integration efforts needed to  finalize the design and prepare the RQ-4B for production is behind  schedule and over cost. The planned work efforts were just over one-half  completed, but two-thirds of the budget allocated for these efforts was  expended. Defense Contract Management Agency analysts cited cost  growth in labor and materials and problems in finalizing and releasing  design drawings as causes for the problems.
Neither the original nor the current plan established comprehensive  reliability targets and growth curves. Reliability growth is the result of an  iterative design, build, test, analyze, and fix process. Improvements in  reliability of a product’s design can be measured by tracking reliability  metrics and comparing the product’s actual reliability with the growth plan  and, ultimately, to the overall goal. Although both models are in production,  the Air Force did not establish reliability growth programs to measure how  reliability is improving and to uncover design problems so fixes could be  incorporated before the design was frozen and before committing to  production.
section_title: Production Maturity Gap— Knowledge Point 3
paragraphs: Officials have started to identify the critical manufacturing processes for  the RQ-4B but do not intend to collect and use statistical process control  data to ensure that the manufacturing could deliver quality products within  best practices quality standards and that the end product meets the design  and specifications. The officials’ assessments of the program continue to  identify significant concerns about the quality, performance, and timeliness  of the work of several subcontractors. For example, the subcontractor  building the vertical tail and main parts of the fuselage is new to large-scale  manufacture using advanced composite materials. The firm experienced  significant start-up problems and the prime contractor and DOD sent  special teams of advisors to help develop the firm’s manufacturing  processes and to train employees. The subcontractor’s critical processes  must be demonstrated to ensure good quality and limit rework. Officials  have identified similar concerns with the subcontractors building the wing  and imaging sensor.
The Air Force started producing the A and B models without first  demonstrating that the systems would meet reliability goals. Reliability is a  function of the specific elements of a product’s design and making changes  after production begins is costly and inefficient. Best practices for system  development require reliability to be demonstrated by the start of  production. The RQ-4A is a production version of the demonstrators with  few changes. Testing of the demonstrators identified a need to evaluate  reliability under a stressful operating tempo. Air Force officials told us that  reliability improvements on the RQ-4A were constrained, as were  demonstrations of reliability. The RQ-4B design has incorporated  improvements in such areas as flight control actuators, mission computers,  avionics, and structures that officials expect will fix some of the identified  problems and improve reliability, but these have not been demonstrated.
Finally, the Air Force did not acquire and test a fully integrated system  representative prototype before committing to production. The contract  for the first three units was awarded and work began in late fiscal year  2004. Budget plans call for procuring 13 RQ-4Bs in low-rate production  through the fiscal year 2006. The Air Force has also programmed advance  procurement funds in fiscal year 2006 for 7 more, meaning that the  government will have made investments in 20 RQ-4Bs—45 percent of the  entire RQ-4B fleet—before the basic air vehicle is flight tested and before  evaluations are made leading to the full-rate production decision,  scheduled in fiscal year 2007. The Air Force also plans to enter full-rate  production without complete testing to demonstrate that a fully integrated  system—with advanced sensors and data links—will work as intended, is  reliable, and can be produced within cost, schedule, and quality targets.  Initial operational test and evaluation will only test the RQ-4B air vehicle  with its basic imagery intelligence payloads. Complete operational testing  and incorporation of the advanced signals intelligence payload and the  multiplatform radar capabilities—the reasons for acquiring the larger  model in the first place—will not occur until later in the program, after the  full-rate decision is made.
In the absence of specific product knowledge required by best practices  and DOD acquisition guidance, the Air Force and its contractor are  depending on the operational experience of the demonstrators, lab  modeling and simulation efforts, and production of the RQ-4A to help  “close the gaps” and provide some assurance on the RQ-4B design maturity,  its reliability, and its producibility within cost, schedule, and quality targets.  Although the demonstrator program had notable successes, testing  identified significant improvements were needed before producing  operationally effective and suitable air vehicles. Areas needing  improvement included reliability under a stressful operating tempo,  performance of sensors, mission planning, and communications bandwidth  burden. We also note that the RQ-4A is a production version of the  demonstrators with few changes and that government acceptance of the  second production RQ-4A was delayed due to deficiencies, including flight  problems. Moreover, as previously discussed, the RQ-4B is significantly  different than the RQ-4A and requires investing in new tooling and changed  manufacturing processes. These factors contribute to increased risks of  poor cost, schedule, and performance outcomes due to incomplete product  knowledge.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs.   GAO-04-248. Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD’s  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington, D.C.:  March 17, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Revised Policy Emphasizes Best  Practices, but More Controls Are Needed. GAO-04-53. Washington, D.C.:  November 10, 2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key  to the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program’s Success. GAO-03-598.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce  Weapon Systems’ Total Ownership Costs. GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.:  February 11, 2003.
Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge  Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.:  July 15, 2002.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best  Practices. GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to  Better Weapons System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.:  March 8, 2001 Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better  Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington D.C.:  July 31, 2000.
Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon  System Decisions. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced  Concept Technology Demonstration. GAO/NSIAD-00-78. Washington, D.C.:  April 25, 2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Demonstration Approach Has  Improved Project Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-33. Washington, D.C.:  August 16, 1999.
Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon  System Program Implement Best Practices. GAO/NSIAD-99-206.  Washington, D.C.: August 16,1999.
Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development  Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-162.  Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999.
Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program  Outcomes. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999.
Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible.   GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1998.
Best Practices: DOD Can Help Suppliers Contribute More to Weapon  System Programs. GAO/NSIAD-98-87. Washington, D.C. March 17, 1998.
Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires  Changes in DOD’s Environment. GAO/NSIAD-98-56. Washington, D.C.:  February 24, 1998.
Major Acquisitions: Significant Changes Underway in DOD’s Earned  Value Management Process. GAO/NSIAD-97-108. Washington, D.C.:  May 5, 1997.
Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer  Improvements for DOD. GAO/NSIAD-96-162. Washington, D.C.:  August 26,1996.
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