Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Address Management of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace
Published: 2009-04-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony discusses GAO's recently issued report on the North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD) and the Department of Defense's (DOD) air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations. According to the National Strategy for Aviation Security, issued in March 2007, and officials from U.S. intelligence agencies with whom we met, air attacks are still a threat to the United States and its people. To address this threat, NORAD and DOD have fully fueled, fully armed aircraft and trained personnel on alert 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, at 18 ASA sites across the United States. Of the 18 sites, 16 are maintained by Air National Guard (ANG) units and 2 are maintained by active duty Air Force units. If warranted, NORAD can increase personnel, aircraft, and the number of ASA sites based on changes in threat conditions. The Air Force provides NORAD with personnel and equipment, including F-15 and F-16 aircraft, for these operations. ASA units are tasked to conduct and train for both expeditionary missions (e.g., military operations in Iraq) and ASA operations. This testimony will discuss whether (1) NORAD routinely conducts risk assessments to determine the appropriate operational requirements; (2) the Air Force has implemented ASA operations as a steady-state mission, which would require programming funding and measuring readiness, in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance; and (3) the Air Force has developed a plan to address the recapitalization challenges to sustaining ASA operations for the future.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Although NORAD had performed some risk assessments in response to individual DOD leadership inquiries about ASA operations, it had not done routine risk assessments as part of a risk-based management approach to determine ASA operational requirements. Moreover, NORAD has not conducted similar assessments since 2006. Although its units are conducting ASA operations, the Air Force had not implemented these operations as a steady-state mission in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force directives and guidance. For example, in response to a December 2002 NORAD declaration of a steady-state air defense mission, the Air Force issued a directive assigning specific functions and responsibilities to support the mission. According to the directive, the Air Force was to take 140 actions to implement ASA as a steady-state mission. NORAD partially assessed readiness through inspections; however, the Air Force, which as the force provider is responsible for measuring readiness for its missions by evaluating personnel, training, and the quantity and quality of equipment needed, has not done so for ASA operations. Air Force officials said they do not perform such assessments because the service has not formally assigned the mission to the units. Specifically, the Air Force issues mission Designed Operational Capability statements that identify the unit's mission(s) and related requirements (e.g., type anumber of personnel). Because the Air Force did not implement ASA operations as a steady-state mission in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance, at the time of our review ASA units were experiencing a number of difficulties that challenged their ability to perform both their expeditionary missions and ASA operations. The unit commanders we interviewed identified funding, personnel, and dual tasking of responsibilities as the top three factors affecting ASA operations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here before you this morning to discuss GAO’s recently  issued report on the North American Aerospace Defense Command’s  (NORAD) and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) air sovereignty alert  (ASA) operations. According to the National Strategy for Aviation  Security, issued in March 2007, and officials from U.S. intelligence  agencies with whom we met, air attacks are still a threat to the United  States and its people. To address this threat, NORAD and DOD have fully  fueled, fully armed aircraft and trained personnel on alert 24 hours a day,  365 days a year, at 18 ASA sites across the United States, as shown in  appendix I. Of the 18 sites, 16 are maintained by Air National Guard (ANG)  units and 2 are maintained by active duty Air Force units. If warranted,  NORAD can increase personnel, aircraft, and the number of ASA sites  based on changes in threat conditions. The Air Force provides NORAD  with personnel and equipment, including F-15 and F-16 aircraft, for these  operations. ASA units are tasked to conduct and train for both  expeditionary missions (e.g., military operations in Iraq) and ASA  operations.
ASA operations consist of ground operations that take place before fighter  aircraft take off, such as maintaining the fighter aircraft. They also include  those activities that take place after a unit receives an alert from NORAD  but before the aircraft are airborne. Once aircraft take off, “alert”  operations end and the operation becomes a homeland defense air mission  under Operation NOBLE EAGLE. For example, aircraft and personnel  from three ASA units—Duluth, Minnesota; Madison, Wisconsin; and New  Orleans, Louisiana—responded to the April 6, 2009, cross-border incident  in which a stolen Cessna aircraft entered into U.S. airspace from Canada  without approval. When the transition occurs from ground operations to  airborne operations, an ANG pilot converts from Title 32 status under the  command and control of the state governor to federal Title 10 status,  because they are performing a federal mission under the command and  control of NORAD. Active duty units are always in a Title 10 status, but  command and control of pilots and aircraft conducting ASA operations  passes from the local commander to NORAD when performing air defense  operations.
My testimony today, which is based on our January 2009 report on ASA  operations, will discuss whether (1) NORAD routinely conducts risk  assessments to determine the appropriate operational requirements; (2)  the Air Force has implemented ASA operations as a steady-state mission,  which would require programming funding and measuring readiness, in  accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance; and (3) the Air  Force has developed a plan to address the recapitalization challenges to  sustaining ASA operations for the future. I will conclude with some  observations regarding our recommendations and DOD’s response to our  recommendations.
Our work on that report was conducted in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards from April 2008 to January 2009.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Our work included  reviews of pertinent documents and structured interviews of the  commanders of the 20 alert units at all 18 sites performing ASA operations.  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. For this testimony,  we also followed up with DOD offices on the status of our  recommendations.
subsections: section_title: NORAD Had Assessed ASA Operational Requirements but Not on a Routine Basis as Part of a Risk-Based Management Approach
paragraphs: Although NORAD had performed some risk assessments in response to  individual DOD leadership inquiries about ASA operations, it had not done  routine risk assessments as part of a risk-based management approach to  determine ASA operational requirements. Moreover, NORAD has not  conducted similar assessments since 2006. For example, NORAD had  completed three assessments that we determined could be part of a risk- based management approach. NORAD completed the first of these  assessments after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, when it  worked with other federal agencies and determined, based on  vulnerabilities and criticality, which sites should be protected by ASA  operations. NORAD conducted two other assessments, in 2005 and 2006,  primarily in response to the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment  Commission process and efforts to cut costs for Operation NOBLE  EAGLE. On both of these occasions, NORAD conducted a cost evaluation,  considering aviation security improvements—such as secured cockpits  and enhanced passenger screening—that were made by the  Transportation Security Administration since 2001. At the time of our  review, DOD had not required NORAD to manage ASA operations using a  risk management approach, which includes routine risk assessments. By  performing routine risk assessments, NORAD could better evaluate the  extent to which previous threats have been mitigated by DOD or other  government agencies, better evaluate current and emerging threats to  determine which ones require the most urgent attention, and determine  operational requirements to address changing conditions. Routine risk  assessments could also help NORAD determine the appropriate level and  type of resources, including units, personnel, and aircraft for ASA  operations, especially in a resource-restricted environment. Furthermore,  during the course of our review, Air Force and ANG officials  acknowledged the benefits of performing risk assessments on a routine  basis for determining operational requirements for ASA operations.
section_title: The Air Force Had Not Implemented ASA Operations as a Steady-State Mission in Accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force Directives and Guidance
paragraphs: Although its units are conducting ASA operations, the Air Force had not  implemented these operations as a steady-state mission in accordance  with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force directives and guidance. For example,  in response to a December 2002 NORAD declaration of a steady-state air  defense mission, the Air Force issued a directive assigning specific  functions and responsibilities to support the mission. According to the  directive, the Air Force was to take 140 actions to implement ASA as a  steady-state mission. For example, the directive required the Air Force  Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to ensure that ASA active personnel  requirements were included in the Air Force submission to the Future  Years Defense Program. The directive also required Air Force major  commands to develop the capability to report on the readiness of ASA  activities in DOD’s readiness system, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for  Personnel to work with the appropriate officials to limit adverse effects on  the careers of personnel affected by the steady-state mission. However,  the Air Force had not implemented ASA operations as a steady-state  mission. For example, although the Office of the Secretary of Defense  directed the Air Force to program ASA operations across the 6 years of its  Future Years Defense Program submission, the Air Force decided to  program ASA operations in 2-year increments.
According to headquarters Air Force officials, the Air Force did not  implement ASA operations as a steady-state mission because (1) it has  focused on other priorities, such as overseas military operations, and (2) it  believed that ASA operational requirements, such as number of sites,  might be decreased to pre-September 11, 2001, levels at some point in the  future. As a result, the readiness of the units conducting ASA operations  was not being fully assessed, and commanders of ASA units reported they  were experiencing difficulties pertaining to a variety of factors, such as  personnel and funding, which challenged their ability to perform both their  expeditionary missions and ASA operations.
subsections: section_title: Readiness of ASA Units Was Not Fully Assessed by the Air Force
paragraphs: NORAD partially assessed readiness through inspections; however, the Air  Force, which as the force provider is responsible for measuring readiness  for its missions by evaluating personnel, training, and the quantity and  quality of equipment needed, has not done so for ASA operations. Air  Force officials said they do not perform such assessments because the  service has not formally assigned the mission to the units. Specifically,  the Air Force issues mission Designed Operational Capability statements  that identify the unit’s mission(s) and related requirements (e.g., type a  However, the Air Force has not identified ASA  number of personnel). operations as a mission in the operational capability statements of those  units that conduct ASA operations on a daily basis. Unit commanders told  us during our structured interviews that they did not evaluate and report  the personnel, training, or quantity and quality of equipment to perform  ASA operations because they had not been assigned the mission in their  operational capability statements. As a result, the Air Force did not have  complete information to assess readiness, and DOD and Congress lacked  visibility of costs and other important information to inform decisions for  these homeland defense operations.
section_title: Temporary Status of ASA Operations Creates Difficulties for Units and Hampers Cost Visibility
paragraphs: Because the Air Force did not implement ASA operations as a steady-state  mission in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance, at the  time of our review ASA units were experiencing a number of difficulties  that challenged their ability to perform both their expeditionary missions  and ASA operations. The unit commanders we interviewed identified  funding, personnel, and dual tasking of responsibilities as the top three  factors affecting ASA operations. For example, during our structured  interviews, officials from 17 of the 20 units stated that personnel issues  were a moderate or great concern and that recruiting, retention, and  promotion limitations were the primary issues arising from the current  practice of programming for ASA operations in 2-year increments.  Commanders at the ASA sites that we visited told us that they had lost  some of their most experienced personnel due to job instability caused by  the manner in which ASA operations are programmed. Similarly,  commanders at 17 of the 20 units stated that the Air Force treats ASA  operations as a temporary mission and has not provided sufficient  resources. Thirteen of the 20 units reported that dual tasking—training  and conducting for their expeditionary mission and for ASA operations— was a moderate or great concern and that the Air Force was not  adequately equipping units to conduct both missions. Headquarters Air  Force and National Guard Bureau/Air National Guard (NGB/ANG) officials  acknowledged the units’ difficulties in conducting ASA operations. Figure  1 depicts units’ responses regarding difficulties they have experienced in  conducting ASA operations.
Because the Air Force has not programmed for ASA operations in its  Future Years Defense Program submissions, the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, NORAD, and Congress lack visibility into the costs of these  operations.  This program is one of the principal tools used to inform  DOD senior leaders and Congress about resources planned to support  various programs, and reflects DOD decisions regarding allocation of  federal resources. Implementing ASA operations as a steady-state mission  may help to mitigate the challenges associated with ASA operations, as  well as provide Congress and DOD leaders cost visibility into ASA  operations, which support DOD’s high-priority homeland defense mission.
section_title: The Air Force Had Not Developed a Plan to Address Fighter Aircraft Challenges for Units Conducting Both ASA Operations and Expeditionary Missions
paragraphs: Of the 18 ASA sites, 13 sites are currently equipped with F-16s, which,  according to ANG estimates, will reach the end of their useful service lives  between fiscal years 2015 and 2020. Five sites have F-15s, which were  grounded for 3 months in late 2007 and early 2008 after an F-15 broke  apart during a normal flying operation in November 2007. According to Air  Force and ANG officials, the F-15s’ useful service lives could end earlier  than the expected time frame of 2025 if the aircraft are used increasingly  for overseas deployments or other missions. Depending on when the F-16s  reach the end of their useful service lives and on the availability of next- generation F-22 and F-35 fighter aircraft, a gap in the number of available  aircraft may affect units performing ASA operations. Figure 2 shows the  projected number of current ASA sites with and without viable aircraft to  conduct ASA operations through 2032. As the figure reflects, unless the  Air Force modifies its current fielding schedules or extends the service  lives of its F-15s and F-16s to the extent that this option is possible, it will  lack viable aircraft to conduct ASA operations at some of the 18 current  ASA sites after fiscal year 2015. The figure also shows that 2 of the current  ASA sites will not be equipped with viable aircraft and thus will be unable  to conduct ASA operations even after the Air Force fields all of its  currently planned F-22s and F-35s in fiscal year 2031. This figure is based  on our analysis of documentation on the expected service lives of the F- 15s and F-16s and the Air Force’s fielding schedules for the F-22s and F- 35s at the time of our review, and represents one possible scenario.
The House report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2008 directed the Secretary of the Air Force, in  consultation with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the  Secretary of Homeland Security, to conduct a study on the feasibility and  desirability of equipping certain ASA units with F-35s. The Air Force  study, which was submitted to Congress in December 2008, states that,  although the F-35’s capabilities make it a desirable platform to conduct air  defense operations, a number of factors—such as fiscal, operational, and  environmental considerations—will affect where F-35s are based.  Consequently, it is unclear whether or when the current ASA sites will  receive F-35 aircraft. For the purpose of our analysis, however, we  assumed that the Air Force would provide the F-35s to ANG sites  conducting ASA operations. Our March 2009 reports about the F-35  acquisition program have also questioned the reliability of its production  schedule and cost estimates.  For example, we reported that despite the  program’s continued manufacturing problems and the infancy of the flight  test program, DOD officials wanted to accelerate F-35 production from 485  to 654 aircraft over a 6-year time frame from fiscal years 2010 through  2015. On April 6, 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced that DOD  intends to increase F-35 production to 513 aircraft across the 5-year  defense plan. We continue to believe DOD’s increased production  approach is overly optimistic.
During our review, we discussed some options with Air Force and ANG  officials that could reduce the potential gap between retired aging aircraft  and the replacements needed to conduct ASA operations, but these  options are not without challenges. The options we discussed included the  following:    Replace the F-16s with either F-22s or F-35s, both of which the Air Force is  acquiring. However, according to the F-22 and F-35 fielding schedules at  the time of our review, only 1 of the 12 units—Shaw Air Force Base, South  Carolina—will receive the new aircraft before its fleet of F-16s reaches the  end of its useful service life.
Replace the F-16s with F-15 models from the current inventory. However,  F-15s, like F-16s, are beginning to reach the end of their useful service  lives for reasons including structural problems and accelerated use for  overseas deployments and other missions.
Extend the service life of the F-15 and F-16 aircraft. However, at the time  of our review, the Air Force had not determined the extent to which such  actions were viable.
Until the Air Force plans accordingly, the extent to which replacement  aircraft will be available to conduct ASA operations and mitigate this  fighter shortage is unclear. Given the importance of the capability to deter,  detect, and destroy airborne threats to the United States, it is important  that the Air Force address current and future requirements of the ASA  mission to ensure its long-term sustainability.
section_title: GAO’s Prior Recommendations and DOD’s Response
paragraphs: In our January 2009 report, we recommended that DOD take a number of  actions to address the issues that we identified during our review. In  summary, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct    The Commander of the U.S. command element of NORAD to routinely  conduct risk assessments to determine ASA requirements, including the  appropriate numbers of ASA sites, personnel, and aircraft to support ASA  operations.
The military services with units that consistently conduct ASA operations  to formally assign ASA duties to these units and then ensure that the  readiness of these units is fully assessed, to include personnel, training,  equipment, and ability to respond to an alert.
The Secretary of the Air Force to establish a timetable and implement ASA  operations as a steady-state mission, to include:    updating and implementing the ASA program action directive;    updating Air Force guidance to incorporate and define the roles and  responsibilities for ASA operations; and  incorporating the ASA mission within the Air Force submissions for  the 6-year Future Years Defense Program.
The Secretary of the Air Force to develop and implement a plan to address  any projected capability gaps in ASA units due to the expected end of the  useful service lives of their F-15s and F-16s.
In its written comments on our report, DOD fully or partially concurred  with all of our recommendations. However, based on DOD’s written  response, it is unclear the extent to which DOD will implement these  recommendations. For example, DOD partially concurred with our  recommendation to employ a risk-based management approach, which  would include routine risk assessments to determine ASA requirements.
However, DOD stated that sufficient guidance and a long-standing risk- based process currently guide its decisions on ASA operations and,  therefore, it does not plan on taking any further action.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my  prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions that you  may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Davi M.  D’Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. In addition, contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key  contributions to this testimony are Lorelei St. James and Marc Schwartz  (Assistant Directors), Tommy Baril, Grace Coleman, Greg Marchand, Terry  Richardson, Bethann Ritter, Kenneth Cooper, and Jane Ervin. In addition,  Victoria DeLeon and John Trubey made significant contributions to the  January 2009 report that supported this testimony.
section_title: Appendix I: Locations of the 18 ASA Sites in the United States as of October 2008
paragraphs: The Vermont ANG unit at Burlington International Airport is conducting ASA operations until the  Massachusetts ANG unit at Barnes Air National Guard Station assumes responsibility for ASA  operations in fiscal year 2010.
A detachment from the Vermont ANG conducts ASA operations at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia;  the South Dakota ANG unit from Sioux Falls is assisting with ASA operations at this site until the  Massachusetts ANG assumes responsibility for the New England ASA operations in fiscal year 2010.
ASA operations at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida are conducted by a detachment from the  Jacksonville, Florida ANG unit.
ASA operations at Ellington Field, Texas are conducted by a detachment from the Tulsa, Oklahoma  ANG unit.
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