Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions
Published: 2002-11-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The September 11th attacks affected the scope of activities of many federal agencies, including the Coast Guard. Homeland security, a long-standing but relatively small part of the Coast Guard's duties, took center stage. Still, the Coast Guard remains responsible for many other missions, such as helping stem the flow of drugs and illegal migration, protecting important fishing grounds, and responding to marine pollution. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard's current efforts and future plans for balancing resource levels among its many missions.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As the Coast Guard adjusts to its new post-September 11th environment, it will likely take several years to determine how best to balance carrying out nonsecurity missions alongside new security responsibilities. In recent months the Coast Guard has increased its level of effort in nonsecurity activities such as drug interdiction and fisheries patrols, but some of these activities remain below earlier levels. For example, patrol boats formerly used for drug interdiction are still being used for harbor security patrols. Substantial increases in nonsecurity activities are also unlikely in the near future, because the mission-related initiatives proposed in the fiscal year 2003 budget are directed primarily at security missions. Most notably, most of the proposed 1,330 new staff would replace reserve staff activated after September 11th. The Coast Guard has not yet developed a strategy for showing, even in general terms, the levels of effort it plans for its various missions in future years. Understandably, the Coast Guard's attention has been focused on assimilating added security responsibilities. However, developing a more comprehensive strategy is now important, as a way to inform the Congress about the extent to which the Coast Guard's use of its resources--cutters, boats, aircraft, and personnel--will allow it to continue meeting its many responsibilities. Also important is designing a way to keep the Congress informed about its progress in achieving this balance. The Coast Guard has considerable data from which to develop progress reports, but this information is currently in disparate forms and documents.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks affected the scope of  activities for many federal agencies. This is especially true of the United  States Coast Guard. The attacks prompted the nation to evaluate its  vulnerabilities to terrorism, and this evaluation has focused considerable  attention on the nation’s vast and sprawling network of ports and  waterways. Ports and waterways are particularly vulnerable because they  are both a potential target for a terrorist attack and an avenue for tools of  destruction to make their way into the country. While homeland security  has long been one of the Coast Guard’s missions, the agency has spent the  past decade focusing on other major national objectives, such as the  nation’s attempts to reduce the flow of drugs, monitor and protect  important fishing grounds, and respond effectively to marine pollution.   September 11th drastically changed the nation’s priorities, but it did so by  adding to the Coast Guard’s many responsibilities rather than by replacing  responsibilities that were already in place.
The impact of these changes on the Coast Guard, and consideration of how  to manage them, have been a matter of intense congressional attention. For  example, proposals to move the Coast Guard from its current  organizational home within the Department of Transportation (DOT) to a  new Department of Homeland Security have generated questions about the  Coast Guard’s ability to meet its new security responsibilities while still  dealing with its other more traditional roles. You asked us to examine how  the Coast Guard’s various missions have fared since September 11th. As  agreed with your staff, we focused our work on the following four  questions:    What nonsecurity missions were most affected by the September 11th  terrorist attacks, and what are the most recent levels of effort for these  missions?
To what extent would proposed funding for new initiatives in the  President’s fiscal year 2003 budget request allow the Coast Guard to  increase levels of effort for nonsecurity missions, while addressing  increased security responsibilities?
Are there operational efficiencies that the Coast Guard can consider as a  way to help accomplish all of its missions in 2003 and beyond?
What framework would help the Congress monitor levels of effort and  results attained for all Coast Guard missions?
To answer these questions, we conducted such activities as reviewing  Coast Guard documents and records and visiting Coast Guard installations  to determine how activities were being affected. We conducted our work at  Coast Guard headquarters and at five of the Coast Guard’s nine districts.  The districts we visited spanned three coasts—East, West, and Gulf. Our  work, which was conducted from December 2001 through October 2002,  was done in accordance with generally accepted governmental auditing  standards. A detailed description of our scope and methodology appears in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Coast Guard, a Department of Transportation agency, is involved in  seven main mission or program areas: (1) enforcement of maritime laws  and treaties; (2) search and rescue; (3) aids to navigation; (4) marine  environmental protection; (5) marine safety and security (including  homeland security); (6) defense readiness; and (7) ice operations. The  Coast Guard has two major commands that are responsible for the overall  mission performance in the Pacific and Atlantic areas. These commands  are further organized into a total of nine districts, which in turn are  organized into a number of groups, marine safety offices, and air stations.  Groups provide more localized command and control of field units, such as  small boat stations, and patrol boats. Marine safety offices are located at  coastal ports and on inland waterways, and they are responsible for the  overall safety and security of maritime activities and for environmental  protection in their geographic areas. To accomplish these varying missions  and responsibilities, the Coast Guard operates a variety of equipment (see  table 1), including high- and medium-endurance cutters, patrol boats, and  aircraft.
A federal agency that is also part of the armed services, the Coast Guard  has both military and civilian positions. At the end of fiscal year 2001, the  agency had over 41,000 total full-time positions—about 36,100 military and  about 5,700 civilians. The Coast Guard also has about 8,000 reservists who  support the national military strategy and provide additional operational  support and surge capacity during emergencies, such as natural disasters.  Also, about 35,000 volunteer auxiliary personnel assist in a wide range of  activities, ranging from search and rescue to boating safety education.
Added homeland security requirements pose a challenge to the Coast  Guard as it works to balance all of its missions. While maritime homeland  security is not necessarily a new mission, the Coast Guard’s level of effort  in this mission prior to September 11th had been minimal when compared  with most of its other missions.  The events of September 11th caused the  Coast Guard to direct efforts increasingly into this area, highlighted by the  Coast Guard’s establishing a new program area: Ports, Waterways, and  Coastal Security. Additionally, legislation now under consideration by both  houses of Congress would mandate that the Coast Guard take on even  greater homeland security responsibilities. For example, some of the  additional responsibilities the Coast Guard would be required to perform if  the legislation passes include conducting port vulnerability assessments,  establishing local port security committees, assessing antiterrorism  measures at foreign ports, conducting antiterrorism drills, and maintaining  harbor patrols.
section_title: Expanded Security Activities Primarily Affected Law Enforcement and Marine Safety Missions
paragraphs: Taken together, the available data and additional information provided by  Coast Guard field personnel about levels of effort indicate that activities in  two nonsecurity missions—law enforcement and marine safety—were the  most affected by the Coast Guard’s shift of resources to security functions  after September 11th. For law enforcement, data show that the Coast  Guard shifted the use of multiple-mission resources like cutters and patrol  boats to security efforts immediately after September 11th. Specifically, the  data show a sharp decline in the number of hours these resources spent in  law enforcement after September 11th, followed by a return to more  traditional levels, though the results vary by type of resource and continue  to be affected when the Coast Guard must respond to heightened security  levels. For marine safety, which is largely carried out without using these  resources, there are no similar data for making comparisons in the levels of  effort. However, during our visits at individual Coast Guard sites, we were  provided many examples showing that as of mid-2002, expanded security  responsibilities were still affecting levels of effort for both missions.  Resource levels in two other nonsecurity missions—aids to navigation and  search and rescue—were also temporarily affected by September 11th, but  according to Coast Guard personnel, overall effects on mission  performance from these changes were minimal.
subsections: section_title: Initial Effect of September 11th on Resource Deployment Was Substantial
paragraphs: For the Coast Guard, the events of September 11th produced a dramatic  shift in resources used for certain missions. The Coast Guard responded  quickly to the attacks with a number of significant steps to ensure that the  nation’s ports remained open and operating. The Coast Guard relocated  vessels, aircraft, and personnel—especially those associated with law  enforcement—to enhance security activities. For example, nearly all  cutters that were conducting offshore patrols for drug, immigration, and  fisheries law enforcement were recalled and repositioned at entrances to  such ports as Boston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and San Francisco.  Smaller patrol boats and motor lifeboats, which had been used for search  and rescue, fisheries patrols, and other nonsecurity functions, were used to  conduct security patrols within port facilities, becoming the port’s “cop on  the beat,” according to Coast Guard officials.
This change can be seen in the mission hours logged by multiple-mission  resources. The Coast Guard does not have an agencywide measure, such as  a mission-by-mission breakdown of how all employees spend their time,  that would provide a comprehensive picture of how nonsecurity missions  were affected throughout the entire organization.  The best quantitative  picture of how missions were affected can be obtained from data about  how the Coast Guard’s multi-mission resources, such as cutters, boats, and  aircraft, were used before and after September 11th. These resources are  used in a variety of nonsecurity missions, and they figured heavily in the  Coast Guard’s homeland security response.
The resource-hour data show a large rise in homeland security activity and  a drop in several other missions, especially law enforcement. Overall, the  data for all types of resources (cutters and patrol boats, other boats, and  aircraft) showed that homeland security activities accounted for 2 percent  of total hours during the quarter prior to September 11th (April–June 2001).  For the quarter in which September 11th occurred (July–September), the  figure for homeland security rose to nearly 16 percent, and in the  subsequent quarter it more than doubled, to 37 percent. Law enforcement  was the nonsecurity mission most affected as a consequence of this rapid  rise in homeland security activities, according to Coast Guard personnel.  Law enforcement accounted for 28 percent of all mission hours from April  through June 2001, 26 percent from July through September, and 15 percent  from October through December.  Total law enforcement resource hours  for the various types of resources declined from about 67,000 from April  through June 2001 to about 39,000 from October through December. Here  are resource-by-resource breakdowns:  For Coast Guard high- and medium-endurance cutters, the months  immediately before and after September 11th showed a dramatic shift  toward security-related activities and away from law enforcement.  Typically, 73 to 88 percent of these cutters’ resource hours have been  spent on law enforcement activities, compared with less than 3 percent  on homeland security. In the second quarter of fiscal year 2001  (January–March 2001), for example, they logged about 25,700 resource  hours in law enforcement activities, compared with less than 1,000  hours in security-related activities and about 4,600 hours in all other  missions, including such activities as search and rescue and marine  environmental protection. In the quarter immediately after September  11th (October–December 2001), law enforcement activities dropped to  about 13,400 hours, or about 47 percent of their total resources hours;  efforts devoted to security-related activities increased to more than  11,000 hours, and other missions were at about 3,800 hours.
For the Coast Guard’s 82-, 87-, and 110-foot patrol boats, the shift was  even greater.  Prior to September 11th, these boats were used mainly for  law enforcement and search and rescue activities in offshore waters,  with law enforcement activities generally accounting for 68 percent or  more of their resource hours and homeland security missions for less  than 5 percent. In the quarter immediately after September 11th  (October–December 2001), security-related hours increased to the point  that they greatly exceeded the number of hours spent on law  enforcement activities (about 20,500 hours for security versus about  12,000 hours for law enforcement).
These and other changes put a strain on some resources. Local  commanders reported that to meet new security requirements while still  being able to meet other essential missions, such as search and rescue  activities, they have had to operate small boats at 20 to 50 percent above  normal levels. They reported that hours for patrol boats also increased, and  that some personnel were working 60 to 100 hours a week.
Although Coast Guard officials indicated that marine safety activities were  also heavily affected by the need to shift personnel to security activities,  the Coast Guard does not have data capturing the extent of this shift. To a  much greater extent than for law enforcement, marine safety activities are  carried out in ways other than using multiple-mission resources. For  example, personnel at marine safety offices are extensively involved in  conducting inspections of ships in port, examining facilities, and carrying  out a variety of other shoreside activities. The Coast Guard’s current  information systems do not capture the time devoted to these activities.  Officials at Coast Guard districts and local offices told us that they had to  curtail marine safety activities related to recreational boating safety, fishing  boat safety, pollution drills, and other activities.  However, since these  activities are not captured in terms of the level of resources expended on  them, we were unable to quantify the overall extent to which these  reductions occurred or the impact they had.
section_title: Nonsecurity Activities Have Increased, but Missions Are Still Affected
paragraphs: Since the initial response immediately following September 11th, levels of  effort for nonsecurity missions in general—and for law enforcement in  particular—have risen.   During the first 6 months of 2002, the level of  resource hours provided for law enforcement activities rose to the point  that by July–September 2002, total resource hours were above 62,000—or  within about 5,000 of the level of April–June 2001. The degree to which this  occurred varied from resource to resource. For medium- and high- endurance cutters, for example, the amount of time spent on security- related activities dropped substantially in the January–March 2002 and  April–June 2002 quarters, while the amount of time spent on law  enforcement activities began to approach levels that existed in January– March 2001, and before. (See fig. 1.)  During the April–June 2002 quarter,  high- and medium-endurance cutters logged over 27,000 hours for law  enforcement missions, compared with about 1,100 hours for security  missions. This is in marked contrast to the quarter immediately following  September 11th, when hours for the two types of missions were about the  same. However, security hours rose sharply again in the July–September  2002 quarter. According to Coast Guard officials, this increase came in  response to the Office of Homeland Security’s raising the national threat  level from “elevated” to “high” risk. During this period, which lasted from  September 10 until September 24, the Coast Guard reassigned its resources  to respond to the increased threat condition. Such shifts show that even  relatively short periods of increased security activity can affect other  missions.
The pattern was similar, but not as pronounced, for 82-, 87-, and 110-foot  patrol boats. (See fig 2.)  Compared with hours for high- and  medium-endurance cutters, patrol boat hours continue to show a more lasting effect for expanded security requirements. Immediately after  September 11th, hours logged by these boats on security activities  outstripped law enforcement hours. By the April–June 2002 quarter, the  number of hours devoted to law enforcement activities had once again  increased so that it was more than twice the number spent on security  activities. However, for the July–September 2002 quarter, patrol boat hours  for security purposes nearly doubled in response to the heightened threat  condition, and hours spent on other missions declined as a result.
Changes in resource hours provide a useful indicator of the overall level of  effort for most missions, but these data alone do not tell the entire story.  There are limitations in using the data, and these limitations make quarter- to-quarter comparisons difficult and potentially misleading. For example,  as we pointed out earlier, the data do not include the activities of about  one-fourth of the Coast Guard, particularly the personnel assigned to the  Coast Guard’s 43 marine safety offices spread throughout the country.  Many of these personnel were and continue to be assigned to security  functions, according to Coast Guard officials. In addition, the resource  hour data do not reflect a working environment in which all fluctuations in  hours over time can be readily attributed to the events of September 11th.  For example, mission hours can be affected by seasonal fluctuations, such  as the need for more fisheries patrols during the fishing season and the  need for more buoy servicing because of weather damage, especially  during hurricane season. Similarly, fluctuations can result from changes in  budget levels, as they were in the months immediately preceding  September 11th. During this period, in response to pending budget cuts, the  Coast Guard pulled a number of cutters and aircraft out of service, some  temporarily and others permanently. Finally, the Coast Guard’s operating  tempo increased sharply after September 11th, and the higher levels of  resource activity, while feasible temporarily, may not be sustainable in the  longer term because resources are being used far beyond their normal  limits.
To determine whether the situation at specific locations was different from  the trends shown in the overall data, we visited a number of Coast Guard  facilities on the East, West, and Gulf coasts. Officials at individual Coast  Guard districts and offices identified many examples of law enforcement  and marine safety activities that, as of mid-2002, were still less than existed  before September 11th. The type and extent of these examples varied from  location to location, depending on the particular Coast Guard  responsibilities in that location. For example, districts with large industrial  ports receiving additional security attention after September 11th reported  having to shift the most resources to security missions. The following are  examples, from the five Coast Guard districts we visited, of how the  districts said they were faring in returning resources to nonsecurity  missions by June 2002:    In the First District, officials said that they reassigned patrol boats  from security to nonsecurity missions because the number of security patrols was reduced from 48 from October through December 2001 to  18 from April through June 2002.  These reassignments allowed the  district to increase such activities as fishing boat boardings, which had  been reduced to 38 during the October–December 2001 period,  compared with 300 in the same quarter the year before. Still, they said  the capacity to conduct dockside safety inspections of commercial  fishing boats had been cut in half from pre-September 11th levels.  District officials also said that the increased hours of operation brought  on by the security operations created $400,000 in unforeseen  maintenance expenditures.
Fifth District officials said that they once again use three 110-foot  patrol boats for law enforcement patrols. However, because the  district’s 87-foot patrol boats are still involved with homeland security  activities, they said that law enforcement operations conducted by  patrol boats will likely remain about 40 to 50 percent lower than they  were before September 11th. Officials said that this reduction in law  enforcement operations would likely continue for several years. At one  of the district’s local marine safety offices we visited (Hampton Roads,  Virginia), officials said that they eliminated or reduced activities in such  areas as planning and outreach, pollution planning exercises, and  selected safety inspections of foreign vessels.
Eighth District officials said that all missions have seen significant  resource reductions except for homeland security, search and rescue,  and aids to navigation. For example, during fiscal year 2002, the district  boarded 1,020 U.S. fishing vessels, compared with 2,701 boardings for  fiscal year 2001. At one of the local offices we visited  (Houston/Galveston), officials reported that the requirement for  providing cruise ship security had a major impact on personnel  allocations. Local marine safety unit officials said that they currently  assign at least six marine safety personnel for terminal security sweeps,  sea marshal operations, and tugboat and bunker barge security  monitoring; they also dedicate both an aircraft and patrol boats for  cruise ship escort duty. They said that an expected increase in cruise  ship activity would add to this workload.
In the Eleventh District,officials said that they were not sending a 110- foot patrol boat to southern California and northern Mexico to conduct  counter-drug patrols. Prior to September 11th they had done so, but  since the terrorist attacks this boat has remained within the district’s  area of responsibility to conduct security-related activities. Besides  reductions in counter-drug patrols, district staff indicated that other  missions were being affected by increased security requirements. For  example, in San Francisco, officials said that they used patrol and small  boats to conduct harbor patrols and enforce established security zones.  The group commander said that since the terrorist attacks he has had to  eliminate a number of nonsecurity missions for these boats, including  fishing vessel–safety inspections and fisheries-  and other living marine  resources–enforcement operations.
In the Thirteenth District, officials said that they had resumed some  ready cutter patrols, which were suspended between September 2001  and April 2002. Nonetheless, the district is continuing to use one of its  patrol boats for homeland security patrols on inshore waters and along  the border. This precludes using this boat for its former duty in fisheries  enforcement patrols, since these patrols are normally conducted on  offshore waters.
These examples of local officials’ difficulties in returning nonsecurity  missions to earlier levels reflect a central issue that Coast Guard officials  have pointed out: a number of their activities are dependent on cutters,  patrol boats, and aircraft that are used to meet a variety of missions. If a  cutter or patrol boat is assigned to conduct security patrols because this  mission is judged to be a higher priority, it is less available to perform other  types of missions. Coast Guard officials said that multiple-mission  resources may be involved in simultaneous missions, such as a cutter’s  engaging in both fisheries enforcement and marine environmental  protection tasks while at sea. However, particularly when these resources  are engaged in close-in security work, they said the resources are less  available to multitask in this way or less effective in doing so.
section_title: Effects on Other Nonsecurity Missions Were Not as Great
paragraphs: While other nonsecurity missions besides law enforcement and marine  safety were affected by the increased emphasis on homeland security, the  available data and our discussions with Coast Guard officials indicate that  by comparison, other missions were affected to a much lesser degree than  law enforcement and marine safety. For example:   Although search and rescue resources were used to perform homeland  security functions, doing so did not materially affect the Coast Guard’s  ability to respond to search and rescue missions, according to Coast  Guard officials. Although search and rescue boats were initially  redeployed for harbor security patrols, they said that any potential  impact of doing so was tempered by normal changes in workload in the  season when the attacks occurred. Search and rescue hours normally  tend to follow a cyclical pattern, with heavier demand in the April- through-September period, and lower demand in October through  March. They said that because the attacks occurred at the beginning of  the low-demand season, resources could be redeployed with little or no  effect on the mission. Coast Guard officials also emphasized that search  and rescue is a primary mission that will always receive priority.  Operational data we reviewed showed that the drop in search and  rescue hours after September 11th mirrored the normal annual cycle,  and that since that time, the quarterly fluctuations have continued as  they have done historically.
For aids to navigation, the data showed a drop in cutter resource hours  after September 11th, when, according to Coast Guard officials, some  boats that normally operate as buoy tenders were used for security  purposes instead. However, this drop was not as great as it had been for  law enforcement and was relatively short-lived. By the April–June 2002  quarter, the number of cutter resource hours spent on aids to navigation  had returned to traditional levels. Coast Guard officials said that  resources for aids to navigation were among the first to be returned to  their former missions.
section_title: Funding Increases Proposed in Fiscal Year 2003 Budget May Not Have a Major Effect on Nonsecurity Missions
paragraphs: Most of the proposed funding increase for new mission-related initiatives in  the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2003 budget request is directed at security  activities and, according to Coast Guard officials, would likely have a  limited impact on nonsecurity missions. The $213 million proposed for new  operational initiatives would be directed primarily toward new, permanent,  security-related personnel positions and new security patrol boats. The  Coast Guard is still working out plans for how these additional personnel  would be used and where they would be assigned, but, according to Coast  Guard personnel in the units we visited, it is unlikely that the additional  personnel would allow units to shift substantial resources to nonsecurity  missions. Many of the proposed new positions would replace  reservists  activated on a temporary basis after September 11th. To the degree that the  proposed positions would replace temporarily activated reservists, they  would not result in a net addition of staff.
subsections: section_title: Proposed Spending for New Initiatives Is Focused on Expanded Security Role
paragraphs: The administration’s fiscal year 2003 budget request for the Coast Guard  includes a total of $213 million for new mission-related initiatives. Of this  amount, $188 million (88 percent) is proposed for security-related  purposes, such as increased patrols and vessel boardings; the remaining  $25 million is for enhanced staffing of search and rescue operations, and  for vessel traffic information system improvements. One of the main  objectives of the security-related initiatives is to provide permanent staff  following the Coast Guard’s initial staffing buildup after September 11th,  which was accomplished largely by temporarily activating reservists. While  there is variation among the districts, many of the proposed positions  would be permanent slots that would replace the positions filled by  reservists. In all, the Coast Guard plans to hire almost 2,200 new personnel  by the end of fiscal year 2003. Of these positions, 870 were authorized in the  supplemental appropriation approved for fiscal year 2002, and 1,330 are  proposed in the fiscal year 2003 budget request. The Coast Guard expects  nearly 90 percent of these 2,200 new positions to be assigned to security- related functions. (See table 2.)  Coast Guard officials expect that at least  80 percent of the personnel will be assigned to field units (area commands,  districts, marine safety offices, marine safety units, air stations, or small  boat stations).
In addition to the increased numbers of permanent positions, the Coast  Guard plans to buy 80 homeland security response boats and 4 87-foot  coastal patrol boats. While both types of boats are multi-mission capable,  officials stated that these new boats are intended mainly for use in  homeland security missions.
section_title: Ability to Shift Resources to Nonsecurity Missions May Be Limited
paragraphs: The additional personnel and assets included in the fiscal year 2003 budget  request may allow field units to free up some resources for nonsecurity  missions, but for several reasons, the flexibility to do so appears limited.  One reason is that many of the new positions would replace reservists  activated at field locations since September 11th, thereby providing these  units only the resources necessary to maintain operations at current levels.  The Coast Guard can use reservists for up to 2 years, but from a practical  standpoint, the agency typically uses them in large numbers only for surge  capability during emergencies. Moreover, having permanent personnel is  more cost effective and provides long-term workforce stability, according  to Coast Guard officials. Our interviews with district staff indicated that  this would be the case to a greater degree in some locations than in others.  Coast Guard staff in some districts told us that new personnel would  largely replace currently activated reservists, and therefore would do little  more than allow them to maintain the status quo. Some districts also  reported that because of the large number of reservists called to active  duty, there would not be enough new active duty personnel to replace  reservists on a one-to-one basis. As a result, the new authorized personnel  strength would not match the current personnel numbers at some  locations, and the impact would actually be a reduction in resources  allocated to lower-priority missions.
The second reason why the flexibility to shift additional resources to  nonsecurity missions may be limited is that the Coast Guard plans to assign  a number of the new positions to security units that would provide only  limited replacement of any existing activity. Nearly 430 personnel, or 20  percent of all new personnel, are expected to be assigned to six maritime safety and security teams. Currently, the Coast Guard has four such  teams—in Seattle; San Pedro, California; Houston/Galveston, Texas; and  Hampton Roads, Virginia—and there are plans for two additional teams in  Jacksonville, Florida, and New York City. Our conversations with Coast  Guard officials indicated that there are still many unresolved issues  concerning how these teams will be used. District and headquarters  officials believed that these teams help meet certain security requirements,  but individual teams will have to learn how best to use these assets.
The third reason for limited flexibility is the time that will probably elapse  before many of the people in these new positions could be in place or ready  to make optimum contributions. Time lags normally occur from when a  position is authorized to when a person is assigned to fill it. Both  headquarters and district officials have reported that they do not expect  some personnel to start filling headquarters and field positions for at least 6  months, or maybe even longer. In addition, once a number of these  positions are filled, the effectiveness of the persons in them could be  decreased by what some Coast Guard personnel refer to as “juniorocity”— that is, persons at a lower rank or pay grade (in the case of civilians) filling  positions that call for higher-level candidates. Coast Guard officials said  that this could potentially occur, and if it does, these people may need  additional supervision from senior personnel.
The Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2003 allocation of cutter and patrol boat  resource hours provides further indication that nonsecurity missions  would not be greatly increased, because the resource hours allocation is  relatively the same as it was for fiscal year 2002. The Coast Guard sets this  allocation for all law enforcement program areas in its annual operational  and maritime safety mission planning guidance. This guidance shows that  for fiscal year 2003, the overall number of cutter hours for those activities  is to rise by about 5,700, a 2 percent increase from the previous year, with  each of the law enforcement areas seeing small changes from the prior  year. The planning guidance data support the conclusion that even with  new security boats funded in the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the Coast  Guard would not be able to redeploy cutters to nonsecurity missions.  According to the guidance, continued shifting of small boats and 87-foot  patrol boats to port security activities will leave gaps in inshore fisheries  enforcement.
section_title: Opportunities for Increased Operational Efficiency Could Help Meet Mission Responsibilities
paragraphs: A number of opportunities for improving operational efficiency are  potentially available to help the Coast Guard accomplish its various  missions. In recent years, we and others have studied Coast Guard  operations and made recommendations for more efficient operations, and  a number of these recommendations have merit in this new operating  environment. In addition, the Coast Guard has attempted, through local  port organizations, to develop ways to partner more effectively with local,  state, and federal agencies, as well as with public and private entities.  Individual ports have made notable—but isolated—accomplishments in  this regard. Although some mechanisms are in place to help ports share  information about these projects, these mechanisms are not working  effectively.
subsections: section_title: Previous Recommendations for Improving Operations Still Have Merit
paragraphs: Over the past decade, we and other outside organizations, along with the  Coast Guard itself, have studied Coast Guard operations to determine  where greater efficiencies might be found. We consolidated many of these  recommendations to improve Coast Guard operations in reports issued in  1997 and 1999. As part of previous initiatives aimed at operating more  efficiently, the Coast Guard has used many such recommendations,  undertaking such steps as reducing administrative staff, consolidating  offices, and streamlining operations. However, a number of past  recommendations that were not adopted still have relevance. For example:    Dockside fisheries enforcement by the National Marine Fisheries  Service. Past studies found that the Coast Guard had opportunity to  replace some of its at-sea boardings for domestic fishing vessels with  dockside enforcement by the National Marine Fisheries Service (an  agency of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) and  by state agencies. Whether this same opportunity still exists in the  current environment is unknown, but it represents a possible way to  leverage resources and minimize any overlap that may be occurring. A  closer look at potential efficiencies seems particularly warranted given  the increasingly complex nature of the Coast Guard’s work in fisheries  enforcement. For example, fishing regulations in the New England  fisheries have evolved to include 18 fisheries management plans  involving more than 40 marine species.
Privatizing vessel traffic service systems in more ports. Vessel traffic  service systems, which are responsible for controlling harbor traffic  operations in a number of the nation’s ports, are operated  predominantly by Coast Guard personnel. However, two systems— Delaware Bay and Los Angeles/Long Beach—are either privately  operated or operated jointly with the Coast Guard, and past studies have  recommended that the Coast Guard examine the possibility of  privatizing at least some additional systems. At Los Angeles/Long Beach,  for example, the system uses Coast Guard and Marine Exchange  personnel to monitor traffic and provide mariners with information.  The state of California reimburses the Coast Guard’s personnel costs,  using fees paid by vessel owners using the system.
section_title: Leveraging Resources through Partnerships Provides Mission Efficiencies to the Coast Guard
paragraphs: One area that has come to the forefront since September 11th, given the  expanded duties that the Coast Guard and other port stakeholders have  assumed, is the agency’s potential ability to partner with other port  stakeholders to help accomplish the varied security and nonsecurity goals  involved in port operations. These stakeholders include state and local  agencies as well as private-sector interests. As we visited Coast Guard  locations, we noted many examples in which cooperative arrangements  had been used to accomplish these varied goals successfully. Table 3  provides examples of some of the partnerships we found.
The Coast Guard has recognized possibilities for greater efficiencies  through partnering and is beginning to implement better guidance and  procedures in this area. In May 2002, the Commandant stated that the Coast  Guard intended to build strategic partnerships to enhance its mission  outcomes, bring clarity to mission planning and execution, and leverage the  capabilities of Coast Guard forces. Likewise, the Coast Guard’s strategic  plan declares partnering to be a guiding principle for decisionmaking. To  help local Coast Guard officials promote these efforts, headquarters has  issued general guidance to aid in the development of harbor safety  committees. Although there are other cooperative arrangements in ports,  including area committees and port security committees, the Coast Guard  has focused on harbor safety committees or their equivalents because it  believes that such committees, composed of  facility operators and port  users, are often the only local bodies available to meet and discuss mutual  safety, mobility, and environmental protection issues.
Harbor safety committees, established largely on an ad hoc basis by the  Coast Guard or other entities over the years, differ widely in their  membership and structure. These differences, in part, reflect the  differences that exist from port to port. The Coast Guard guidance is  intended to increase harmonization between committees without imposing  a mandated structure for them. The guidance illustrates the attributes of  particularly successful committees and focuses on overall organizational  structure, committee membership, and areas for potential action. The  guidance also points out that tools are available to assist committees in  their work, particularly the Coast Guard’s National Harbor Safety  Committee Web site. Coast Guard officials told us that some recently  formed committees were established using the guidance, and that some  existing committees have made changes to come into closer alignment with  the guidance.
section_title: Effectiveness of Some Partnerships Is Hampered by Limited Scope of Activity and Lack of Information Sharing
paragraphs: Although the Coast Guard recognizes the potential offered by partnering  and has provided guidance toward this end, current efforts are limited by  two main problems. The first is related to the variations between harbor  safety committees:  some are much narrower in scope and activity than  others. The second is related to the lack of effective sharing of information  among harbor safety committees.
The makeup of harbor safety committees, which varies somewhat from  port to port, can sometimes affect their ability to tackle new projects. The  actions the Coast Guard can undertake often reflect the extent of the  individual committee’s interests. Some committees have broad  representation among various stakeholder groups. For example, the  committee in Puget Sound has included a broad mix of shipping industry  groups, labor organizations, port representatives, environmental agencies,  and state representatives. Consensus efforts of this committee resulted in  new state regulations about the dumping of ballast water, for example. By  contrast, in Philadelphia, when the Coast Guard attempted to carry out a  safety assessment with the cooperation of the local harbor safety  committee, the stakeholders perceived the assessment effort as  threatening the competitiveness of the port and decided not to cooperate.  Coast Guard officials attributed this lack of interest to the makeup of the  committee, which did not have representation beyond industry  representatives.
More effective information-sharing is another way the Coast Guard could  better leverage its resources. There currently is no effective way for  stakeholder groups in the more than 100 locations where such committees  exist to share information with each other about successful projects or  about best practices that contribute to these successes. Our discussions  with Coast Guard and port officials indicated that information between  committees tends to be exchanged sporadically, by word of mouth or  happenstance. There currently is no national harbor safety association or  other umbrella group that can share information, although a few  committees have recently expressed interest in forming an association.  Likewise, no formal process exists for sharing best practices and  information within the Coast Guard. Numerous Coast Guard personnel  noted that personal relationships and the rotation of personnel currently  are the best tools available for information-sharing about the operation of  other ports.
In the absence of a mechanism or process for effectively sharing  information, communication within the Coast Guard and among its  partners could be facilitated by greater use of the Coast Guard’s National  Harbor Safety Committee Web site, which is currently underutilized. When  we checked in September 2002, it had just five examples of best  practices—three from Puget Sound, one from the National Oceanic and  Atmospheric Administration, and one from the Coast Guard. By contrast,  during our field visits we were told about examples of good partnerships in  each of the ports we visited.
section_title: Framework for Monitoring Levels of Effort and Results Has Two Main Components
paragraphs: The Congress has expressed great interest in monitoring the Coast Guard’s  mission resource levels, especially for nonsecurity missions. In particular,  legislation currently under consideration for establishing a Department of  Homeland Security includes a requirement for the Coast Guard to report  regularly on the status of its nonsecurity missions. We think our experience  in reviewing such information may be helpful in establishing a meaningful  framework for keeping the Congress informed. In this instance, such a  framework would involve two main components. The first component is a  strategy that identifies, at least in general terms, the planned levels of effort  for these various missions in future years and a time frame for achieving  these planned levels. The second component is adequate information for  assessing progress. This information has to capture not only how much the  Coast Guard is spending on these missions but also what these  expenditures produce, both in the level of service provided and the results  achieved. Much of the necessary information may already exist, but not in a  report that specifically responds to the Congress’s interest in nonsecurity  missions.
subsections: section_title: First Component: Establishing Planned Resource Levels and a Time Frame for Achieving These Levels
paragraphs: In the Coast Guard’s substantial transformation following September 11th,  it is understandable that the agency’s primary planning focus has been on  incorporating its expanded security mission. The agency has not yet  developed a plan for how it intends to balance these various missions over  the longer term. For its multiple-mission resources such as cutters and  aircraft, the Coast Guard has established fiscal year 2003 resource levels  for its various missions, but there is no indication that these levels  represent planned levels for future years.
Specifying the proposed resource levels for these missions, as well as  establishing a strategy for achieving them, is an important first step in the  Coast Guard’s communication with the Congress and other decisionmakers  about what it intends to accomplish with its additional resources. This  information is critical; without it, neither the Coast Guard nor the Congress  knows what level of activities and services are to be expected. Operating  without such knowledge for an extended period of time places  decisionmakers in the position of being asked to decide on funding levels  without knowing what this funding is likely to produce.
section_title: Second Component: Adequate Information for Assessing Progress
paragraphs: Once resource levels are set, it is important to be able to assess progress in  achieving those levels. An effective reporting mechanism needs a variety of  measures and a way to set these measures in context. Although the Coast  Guard may already be collecting this information, it currently does not  exist in a useful format.
subsections: section_title: Measures That Address Both Efforts and Accomplishments
paragraphs: Program measures are most useful when, taken together, they can provide  a picture of both the resources being applied to a mission (inputs) and the  results of applying these resources (outputs and outcomes). Input  measures include such things as the amount of money spent on a mission  or the number of persons assigned to the mission. (See table 4 for other  examples.)  Output measures, such as the number of patrols or inspections  conducted, describe what is being provided with these resources. Outcome  measures go further than output measures, in that they address the extent  to which program goals are accomplished. Together, these different  measures allow decisionmakers to answer questions about how many  resources are being applied, how the application of these resources  translates into specific activities, and what these activities are producing.
Having all three types of measures is important, because exclusive  dependence on any one type has built-in limitations. For example, a rising  level of expenditures (an input measure) does not necessarily equate to  higher levels of effort (outputs). Instead, it may be a reflection only of  rising personnel costs or increased capital expenditures. Similarly,  although a rising level of outputs (such as increased numbers of patrols)  may appear desirable, they tell only a limited story on their own. Increased  outputs may simply represent inefficiencies—more effort is expended, but  with little or no increase in the desired outcome. Including outcome  measures is particularly important because they provide a “so what” tool to  help assess whether the level of effort is justified and whether it needs to  be modified in some way.
The Coast Guard currently has a variety of all three types of measures. (See  table 5 for examples.)  Many of these measures are already reported in  some context or another. In particular, the Coast Guard currently collects  and reports a variety of outcome data to comply with the Government  Performance and Results Act (GPRA). Under GPRA, DOT is required to  establish annual performance plans that contain annual goals and  measures to assess progress in reaching these goals, which are linked to  their long-term strategic goals. The Coast Guard’s current performance  plan also contains some discussion of how security-related priorities are  affecting performance targets for other missions in fiscal years 2002 and  2003. The plan notes five areas that have been negatively impacted by  increased security requirements—drug interdiction, foreign fishing vessel  interdiction, fisheries protection, military readiness, and support for  military operations. For example, the Coast Guard does not expect to reach  its fiscal year 2002 cocaine seizure rate goal, because drug interdiction  resources have been diverted to port security missions.
To give context to these various types of measures, it may be necessary to  report other explanatory information. Such information might be needed to  explain changes in the way an agency is doing business, or special  circumstances that had an impact on the agency’s goals or missions. This  information is of two main types:  External factors, such as environmental or demographic characteristics,  that are outside of an organization’s control. Declines in fish stocks, for  example, can be affected by many things beyond the management of the  fishery, such as climate or actions by other nations.
Internal factors, such as staffing patterns, patrol routes, or any other  significant developments that the agency has control over. Such  information is important because data from the measures themselves— particularly input and output measures—may, in isolation, tell only part  of the story. For example, the Coast Guard’s marine safety office in New  Orleans recently curtailed some of its safety-related foreign flag–vessel  inspections because of reduced staff levels. Any measure related to the  number of inspections made by Coast Guard personnel would thus  likely show a decline and lead to a conclusion that the Coast Guard had  significantly curtailed its safety oversight. However, the Coast Guard  decided in this instance to rely on Coast Guard-approved maritime  classification societies for these safety inspections. This additional  information would be needed to put the data in proper context.
section_title: No Current Report Usefully Provides This Information
paragraphs: Although much potentially useful information exists for explaining and  analyzing the Coast Guard’s levels of effort in nonsecurity missions, no  current report assimilates this information and sets it in the context of  organizational or program developments related to accomplishing  nonsecurity missions. The Coast Guard’s annual performance plan, while  acknowledging in several places that nonsecurity performance targets are  likely to be negatively affected by ongoing security efforts, has a relatively  limited amount of data, is not intended as a report on increasing resource  levels for nonsecurity missions, and does not have the level of detail that  may be desired on this issue.
Assembling a meaningful report calls for a mix of input, output, and  outcome measures and a complementary explanation of what difficulties  the Coast Guard is facing, what externalities have affected the outcome,  and what plans the Coast Guard is making either to bring more resources to  bear or to find ways to leverage resources or otherwise operate more  efficiently. A meaningful report could potentially use many different  measures. In concept, the best set of measures would be one that allowed  both the Coast Guard and the Congress, to the degree possible, to link  resources and activities with results—for example, linking the number and  types of fisheries patrols with the recovery of fish stocks, or the level of  drug enforcement patrols with the level of success in preventing drugs  from entering the country.
It is important for the Coast Guard to work with the Congress in defining  what information should be provided, because some information is readily  available while other information is not. For example, under current  information systems, it is much easier to determine, on a mission-by- mission basis, how personnel aboard ships and aircraft spend their time  than it is to create a similar mission-by-mission picture of how time is spent in headquarters and program offices. The value of developing additional  measures that are not already in place needs to be weighed against the  possible cost. We did not undertake a detailed evaluation of the Coast  Guard’s information systems to determine the full range of information  these systems might be able to supply. It may be that, if the Congress  decides that certain additional measures are important for reporting  purposes, Coast Guard information specialists can assemble the data with  relative ease. However, if the systems do not already collect the  information, considerable work may be needed, and there may be little  historical information to provide a benchmark for current data.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Coast Guard’s adjustment to its new post–September 11th    environment is still largely in process. Sorting out how traditional missions  will be fully carried out alongside new security responsibilities will likely  take several years. The Congress has expressed strong interest in  monitoring the activity levels for these missions, particularly those  nonsecurity missions that saw a reduction in activities after September  11th. The Coast Guard acknowledges that for the foreseeable future,  absorbing new security activities will continue to affect activity levels for  some of these other missions. After September 11th, the Coast Guard’s  attention understandably turned to assimilating added security  responsibilities, and beyond its short-term plans for fiscal year 2003 it has  not indicated the levels of effort its various missions are likely to receive.  However, given the degree of congressional concern, it is important for the  Coast Guard to develop a framework that will keep the Congress apprised  of what is happening. It is also important for the Coast Guard to develop  and share with the Congress a longer-term strategy that identifies, at least  in general terms, the levels of effort the Coast Guard projects for its various  missions, along with a time frame for achieving these planned levels.  Because the Coast Guard must adjust to rapid changes in its multi-mission  environment, these levels are likely to remain fluid and therefore in need of  revision as necessary, but the direction they set is nonetheless important.  Without this sense of direction, decisionmakers are less able to make  spending and other decisions with a clear understanding of how the Coast  Guard intends to balance its missions.
It is also important for the Coast Guard to provide decisionmakers with  information about progress in achieving the intended balance among  missions. The Coast Guard currently collects and disseminates a wide  variety of information about its nonsecurity missions and activities, but this  information is in disparate forms and documents. To make such  information more useful for the Congress, a better synthesis is needed. In  short, existing information must be analyzed in the context of the Coast  Guard’s efforts to address all of its missions as effectively and efficiently as  possible. In doing so, information regarding agreed-upon performance  measures also needs to be developed and provided to congressional  decisionmakers.  The absence of such information limits their ability to  assess current efforts and decide if changes should be made.
In meeting the challenges involved with its various missions, it is also  important for the Coast Guard to carefully consider and implement, where  appropriate, ways of operating more efficiently and effectively. Many past  suggestions for more efficient operation still appear relevant. These would  include looking for ways to share monitoring duties with other agencies,  eliminating possible duplication of effort, and conducting joint operations  or projects with state and local partners. The Coast Guard’s recent efforts  to expand partnerships with other maritime stakeholders at individual  ports offer promising examples of greater leveraging of existing resources.  However, the processes for sharing information between ports are limited,  diminishing the potential for replicating a port’s successes in other  locations.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: To provide the Congress with a useful framework for reviewing and  monitoring Coast Guard activities, we recommend that the Secretary of  Transportation direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to:  Develop a longer-term strategy that outlines how the Coast Guard sees  its resources—cutters, boats, aircraft, and personnel—being distributed  across its various missions, as well as a time frame for achieving this  desired balance among missions.
Work with the Congress to develop and implement a useful reporting  format that provides a full range of input, output, and outcome  measures, as well as a means to keep the Congress apprised of ongoing  developments that have an effect on nonsecurity missions.
To improve operational efficiencies and help leverage resources, we also  recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Commandant to  reexamine past recommendations for operational efficiencies and, in  particular, to develop an effective way to systematically share information  on successful partnership efforts.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation and  the Coast Guard for their review and comment. Coast Guard officials  provided a number of comments and clarifications, which we incorporated  to ensure the accuracy of our report. The Coast Guard did not respond in  writing to our recommendations, but, in oral comments, Coast Guard  officials expressed a concern that our recommendation about developing a  longer-term strategy would involve disclosing budgetary information well  in advance of approval by DOT and Office of Management and Budget  officials in the normal budget process. We have modified the wording of the  recommendation to help clarify that it is meant to identify, in more general  terms, how the Coast Guard envisions distributing its resources to meet its  many missions.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 7 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of the report to the Honorable  Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary of Transportation, and Admiral Thomas H.  Collins, Commandant of the Coast Guard. We also will make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at  no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at  heckerj@gao.gov or (202) 512-2834, or Randall Williamson at  willamsonr@gao.gov or (206) 287-4860. GAO contacts and  acknowledgments are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Coast Guard has restored its  nonsecurity missions following the September 11th terrorist attacks, we  reviewed the Coast Guard’s Abstract of Operations. This data, reported by  crews of cutters, boats, and aircraft, represents the hours that these  resources spent in each of the Coast Guard’s mission areas. We reviewed  this data to identify how resources were utilized across missions both  before and after September 11th. In addition, we also spoke with officials at  Coast Guard Headquarters and at the Atlantic Area and Pacific Area  commands in Portsmouth, Virginia, and Alameda, California, respectively,  regarding restoration of nonsecurity missions. To obtain information on  how the restoration varied around the country, we visited Coast Guard  district offices and operational units in Alameda, Boston, New Orleans,  Portsmouth, and Seattle, as well as personnel at operational commands  under these district commands.
To assess the impact of the fiscal year 2003 budget request on nonsecurity  operations, we reviewed the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2002 budget and  supplemental appropriations, as well as their fiscal year 2003 budget  request. In addition, we interviewed Coast Guard officials within the Coast  Guard’s Office of Programs, the Human Resource Directorate, Operations  Directorate, and the Marine Safety Directorate to identify where budget  increases would be spent and the impact of the budget increase. To discuss  the impact of the increase in the budget request, we interviewed staff at  Coast Guard Headquarters, area commands, and district offices. In  addition, we also reviewed Coast Guard planning documents to determine  the extent of changes in planned resource allocations for fiscal year 2003.
To identify types of operational efficiencies the Coast Guard should  consider to help restore nonsecurity missions, we reviewed previous GAO  and Department of Transportation Inspector General reports. In addition,  we discussed options for operational efficiencies and for the development  of partnerships at district offices we visited, as well as at local Coast Guard  offices under these districts’ commands. We also reviewed Coast Guard  guidance for Harbor Safety Committees and Marine Transportation System  issues.
To identify a framework that would help the Coast Guard report on  progress toward restoring nonsecurity missions, we reviewed previous  GAO work on performance management and developing performance  measures. We reviewed the Coast Guard’s current strategic documents and  discussed these reports with staff in the Coast Guard’s Office of Programs  to determine the extent to which existing data collection activities could  support a reporting framework.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, David Hooper, Christopher M. Jones,  Molly C. Laster, Sara Moessbauer, Tim Schindler, and Stan Stenersen made  key contributions to this report.
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