Bureau of Prisons: Information on Efforts and Potential Options to Save Costs
Published: 2014-09-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: BOP is responsible for the custody and care of 216,000 federal inmates—an almost 9-fold increase since 1980. At the same time, BOP appropriations increased more than 20-fold. DOJ states that the costs of the growing population are BOP's greatest challenge. BOP's population size is driven by several factors, such as law enforcement policies and sentencing laws.
GAO was asked to review BOP's opportunities to save costs. This report (1) describes BOP's major costs and actions to achieve savings, (2) assesses the extent to which BOP has mechanisms to identify additional efficiencies, and (3) describes potential changes within and outside of BOP's authority that might reduce costs.
GAO analyzed BOP financial data for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, reviewed but did not test its internal control system and processes for achieving efficiencies, and interviewed BOP officials. On the basis of sentencing reform options identified by experts and actions by the Attorney General, GAO developed a list of policy options that could reduce BOP's population. GAO gathered views on their potential effects from entities and 4 states selected for their criminal justice expertise. The views are not generalizable, but provide insights.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Correctional services—which includes salaries and benefits for correctional officers—is the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) largest operational cost, and BOP has undertaken a number of initiatives to reduce costs. Specifically, on the basis of GAO's analysis of BOP's fiscal year 2013 obligations of approximately $6.6 billion, BOP obligated the largest share—about $3.9 billion, or 59 percent—for personnel compensation and benefits. Further, BOP has undertaken a number of initiatives, such as renegotiated contracts, to achieve cost savings of about $61 million over the last 3 years.
BOP has designed internal processes to identify opportunities for additional cost efficiencies, but could improve the monitoring of corrective actions to achieve them. For example, BOP focuses on cost efficiency and innovation in its strategic plan and has developed mechanisms for staff to share information on best practices and cost savings efforts. BOP also employs an internal control system with processes, such as program reviews, that allows it to identify opportunities for cost efficiencies. However, when program reviews repeatedly cited frequent deficiencies or significant findings that could increase costs—such as insufficient contract monitoring—responsible BOP Central Office divisions did not provide specifics or documentation for how they always monitor the effectiveness of corrective actions to prevent the same deficiency or issue from reoccurring. Establishing a mechanism for relevant Central Office divisions to consistently monitor the progress of bureau-wide corrective actions in the presence of repeated frequent deficiencies or significant findings could help BOP better ensure that it is resolving such deficiencies or issues promptly and, ultimately, operating more efficiently.
BOP's current authorities to reduce inmate sentence length result in limited cost savings, but potential actions outside of its authority could have a greater impact on costs. GAO has reported previously on BOP authorities to reduce inmate sentences, and thus its costs, in detail, and found that inmate eligibility for certain programs and lack of capacity affect BOP's use of them. For example, greater use of programs such as Compassionate Release for terminally ill inmates could reduce sentences, but cost savings relative to BOP's budget would be small—about $651,000 in 2013. Additional opportunities outside of BOP's authority, including those requiring legislative or executive action, such as options to reduce sentence length, could reduce BOP's population, and thus potentially significantly reduce its costs. For example, an option to reduce sentences of incarcerated drug offenders by an average of 44 percent could save about $4.1 billion. Potential savings could be even higher if the changes sufficiently reduced the inmate population to allow BOP to reduce its staff or close facilities. Expert entities GAO consulted reported that all of the options GAO reviewed also have advantages and disadvantages unrelated to costs that should be taken into consideration, such as potential effects on public safety if released inmates reoffend. GAO is not taking a position on any of these options, but presents information on estimated cost savings and experts' views of advantages and disadvantages for such options to inform policymakers as they weigh whether and how to address rising costs at BOP.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that BOP establish a mechanism to consistently monitor if bureau-wide corrective actions address repeated deficiencies and findings. DOJ concurred.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The inmate population at the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Federal  Bureau of Prisons (BOP)—the primary cost driver of BOP’s budget—has  increased almost 9-fold since the early 1980s—from about 25,000 in  fiscal year 1980 to about 216,000 as of July 2014. Given these population  increases, and inflation, BOP’s appropriations have increased more than  20-fold during the same time period—from $330 million in fiscal year  1980, about 14 percent of DOJ’s total budget that year, to almost $7  billion requested for fiscal year 2015, or about one-quarter of DOJ’s  requested fiscal year 2015 budget. According to the DOJ Inspector  General, the rising costs for BOP threaten the department’s ability to fulfill  its mission in other areas, including maintaining national security,  enforcing criminal law, and defending civil rights. Moreover, DOJ projects  that BOP costs will increase if the federal prison population grows through  2019 as forecast by DOJ in its Fiscal Year 2015 Performance Budget  Congressional Submission for the Federal Prison System.
BOP’s mission is to confine federal offenders in safe and secure prisons  and community-based facilities, and to provide work and other self- improvement opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law-abiding  citizens. Additionally, one of BOP’s strategic goals is to continually strive  toward improvements in its effective use of resources and its efficient  delivery of services. As of June 2014, BOP operates 120 prison  institutions nationwide, as well as paying for and monitoring 14 prisons  and, as of July 2014, 200 residential reentry centers (RRC) (halfway  houses)—operated by private contractors. According to officials, BOP’s  biggest challenge is managing the increasing federal inmate population,  and related responsibilities, within budgeted levels.
We have previously reported that the size of the federal prison population  is a function of many factors, including the nation’s crime levels, federal  sentencing laws, and law enforcement policies, all of which are beyond  the control of BOP. In addition, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984  abolished parole for federal offenders, and subsequent legislation  established mandatory minimum sentences for many federal offenses,  facts that limit the authority BOP has to affect the size of the prison  population or the length of prison sentences. BOP has discretionary  authorities, or flexibilities, to reduce a federal prisoner’s period of  incarceration through programs such as the Residential Drug Abuse  Treatment Program (RDAP). BOP also has statutory authority to award  “good conduct time” credit toward reducing an inmate’s sentence up to 54  days per year of sentence served, if the inmate has displayed exemplary  compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations. To help alleviate  costs associated with an increasing inmate population and inflation, as  noted in its fiscal year 2015 Performance Budget Congressional  submission, BOP continues to streamline operations and increase  efficiency in order to operate as efficiently and effectively as possible.
Additionally, actions involving policy changes outside of BOP’s authority  could reduce BOP’s inmate population and therefore its costs. These  include potential legislative actions by Congress, executive orders by the  President, policy changes implemented by the Attorney General, or  changes in federal sentencing guidelines by the U.S. Sentencing  Commission (USSC).
The Attorney General’s August 2013 Smart on Crime Initiative is an  example of a policy change that will affect the size of the BOP population.  The Attorney General issued a memorandum to the U.S. Attorneys and  Assistant Attorneys for the Criminal Division instructing prosecutors to  decline to charge the quantity necessary to trigger a mandatory minimum  sentence for certain defendants in cases involving the applicability of drug  law mandatory minimum sentences based on drug type and quantity.
Growth in the federal inmate population and its effects on BOP’s budget  are a matter of continuing congressional interest. You asked us to review  the transparency of BOP’s budget justification and opportunities for BOP  to realize operational efficiencies. In December 2013 we reported that by  providing additional funding data to Congress in its budget justification,  BOP could clarify what it proposes to spend on specific categories and   We recommended that the Attorney General consult with  subcategories.congressional decision makers on providing additional BOP funding detail  in future budget justifications, and in conjunction with BOP, take action as  appropriate. DOJ concurred with this recommendation and is taking  action to implement it. This report responds to the latter part of your  request by further describing BOP’s major costs and the actions it has  taken to identify and implement cost efficiency opportunities and reduce  costs. Specifically, this report addresses the following questions:  1.  What are the major costs for BOP operations, and what actions has  BOP taken to implement cost savings?  2.  To what extent does BOP have mechanisms to identify opportunities  for cost efficiencies and to take corrective actions that may improve  cost efficiency?  3.  What potential changes, both within and outside of BOP’s authority,  could lead to cost reductions or improved efficiencies in BOP  operations, and what might be the potential impact of these changes?
To address the first question, we obtained historical obligation data from  BOP’s Financial Management Information System for fiscal years 2009- 2013—a 5-year time frame to provide us with an adequate understanding  of trends in BOP obligation levels—to identify the major costs incurred by  BOP for its Salaries and Expenses account, which generally represents   We have assessed the reliability of these  98 percent of BOP’s budget.data and determined them to be reliable for the purposes of this report.  This assessment included performing checks on the data received and  interviewing officials responsible for compiling and maintaining these  data. We also collected data (e.g., cost savings estimates prepared by  BOP) and documentation, such as memos and concept papers approved  by executive staff from fiscal years 2009 through 2013; through review of  these data and documents and interviews with relevant agency officials,  we determined that these data are also reliable for the purposes of this  report. In addition, we interviewed Central Office-, regional-, and  institutional-level officials to identify to the extent possible all existing cost  efficiency and savings initiatives adopted by BOP and their impact on its  overall budget.
To address the second question, we reviewed the processes and tools at  BOP during the same time period (fiscal years 2009-2013) that are used  to identify, implement, and promote cost-efficiency and savings initiatives  throughout its institutions, such as executive staff meetings and a catalog  compiling cost-savings initiatives. With respect to identifying additional  opportunities to realize cost efficiencies or reduce costs, using our  financial analysis as context, we analyzed elements of BOP’s internal  control system related to the control objective of achieving operational  efficiencies and interviewed relevant officials to assess whether BOP has  designed a management structure and processes to routinely assess its  administrative and operational activities for possible corrective action.  Specifically, we reviewed BOP’s mechanisms and processes leading to  its internal review of operational and administrative functions, including its  process for taking corrective action related to high-cost areas, and  compared these characteristics with those called for in Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government.
To address the third question, on potential policy changes both within and  outside BOP’s authority that could lead to BOP cost savings, we collected  and reviewed analysis and documentation from DOJ, BOP, the USSC,  and entities that we selected for their expertise in criminal justice issues,  and, in particular, potential changes to federal sentencing policies, and to  ensure that a wide range of views on the advantages and disadvantages  of these potential changes.the universe of expert entities in the criminal justice field and therefore  may not represent all views on this topic; however, their views provide  insights. We obtained data from BOP for 2013 and 2014 on the impact on  BOP’s population and costs resulting from changes within BOP’s  authority. We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing  documentation and interviewing knowledgeable officials, and determined  the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
These entities may not be representative of  Further, on the basis of our assessment of proposals put forward by  several sources, including the Attorney General, expert entities, states  with experience with criminal justice reform, and advocacy entities with a  range of views on criminal justice reform, we identified eight options  outside of BOP’s authority that could reduce the size of the inmate  population. GAO is not taking a position on any of these options, but  presents information on estimated cost savings and experts’ views of  advantages and disadvantages for such options to inform policymakers  as they weigh whether and how to address rising costs at BOP.
For each of these eight options, we asked the USSC to estimate the  impact on the size of the BOP inmate population and, using the USSC  estimates, we then calculated cost savings or cost avoidance that could  result from implementing a given option.objectives, we determined that based on the expertise of the USSC, the  evidence obtained from the USSC provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions.
In addition, we asked the 14 expert entities to comment on the options  with regard to their view of the advantages or disadvantages of  implementation of the eight options. We also asked 4 states to comment  on the potential options for change. One of the 4 was Texas, which had  the largest number of incarcerated offenders in the nation (as of 2012)  and which was identified as a model for changes in state criminal justice  systems by the Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI), a public-private  partnership of DOJ and the Pew Charitable Trusts, to provide technical  assistance and financial support for system-wide criminal justice reform  efforts. 1 year’s experience in implementing JRI programs; of these 8, we chose  the 3 that had the largest annual corrections budgets as of the year in  which JRI started in those states. We received acknowledgement of  receipt from 17 of the 18 entities (the 14 expert entities and 4 states) to  which we sent the letter.
Texas was identified as a model for criminal justice system reforms in a joint January  2014 DOJ-Urban Institute report assessing the JRI initiative. See: Urban Institute- Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Assistance, Justice Reinvestment Initiative State  Assessment Report (Washington, D.C.: January 2014). assessment of options, which provides a list of the proposals that were  used to develop the selected options.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 to September 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: BOP’s Cost-Accounting Methods
paragraphs: BOP uses a network of cost centers—individual accounting units in which  costs can be segregated—to obligate, account for, and manage various  costs. Managers of each cost center are provided with information to  control and manage costs within their area of responsibility. Cost centers  can be structured along different dimensions, such as organizational  units, operating processes, and activities.centers include Correctional Services, Inside Medical Services, and Food  Services at each institution.
For example, BOP cost  BOP also tracks its obligations and expenditures by budget object and  subobject classification. Object classes are categories used in budget  preparation to classify obligations by the items or services purchased by  the federal government (e.g., personnel compensation, contractual  services). Within these object classes, the Department of Justice has  assigned subobject class codes that further define the nature of services  or articles obligated and provide DOJ with a detail of expended funds. For  example, under the personnel compensation object class, BOP has  defined subobject class codes for items such as compensation for full- time, permanent appointment employees; overtime; and holiday pay.  Object and subobject classes are used for direct tracking of specific items  on which funds are being spent (e.g., salaries, supplies, pharmaceuticals,  etc.) and are used across all cost centers.
section_title: BOP Organizational Structure
paragraphs: To carry out its responsibility for the custody and care of federal  offenders, as of June 2014, BOP houses inmates across six geographic  regions in 120 federal institutions, 14 privately operated secure contract  facilities, home detention, and as of July 2014, 200 residential reentry  centers. These federal institutions and other facilities are managed and overseen through the following offices:
Central Office. The Central Office, which serves as BOP’s  headquarters, consists of nine divisions that provide oversight of  major BOP program areas and operations, such as correctional  programs and health services, as well as the National Institute of  Corrections. BOP’s Program Review Division, which leads BOP’s process for conducting internal reviews of each program or operation  at each BOP institution, is among these nine divisions.
Grand Prairie Office Complex. This complex, located in Grand  Prairie, Texas, was created to consolidate various processes into one  location. It consists of three components: human resource services,  designation and sentence computation, and field acquisitions  exceeding $100,000.
Regional offices. BOP has six regional offices, each led by a  regional director, covering the Mid-Atlantic, North Central, Northeast,  South Central, Southeast, and Western regions of the United States.  These offices provide oversight, technical assistance, and training to  the BOP facilities located within each region.
Residential Reentry Management field offices. BOP has 25 field  offices that administer contracts for community-based programs and  serve as liaisons with various federal, state, and local groups within  their judicial districts. Staff at these offices also monitor residential  reentry centers (RRCs), which provide offenders with community- based services to assist with their reentry needs.
BOP generally houses sentenced inmates in its long-term institutions.  Male long-term institutions include four security level designations–– minimum, low, medium, and high––and female institutions include three  security designations––minimum, low, and high. The security-level  designation of a facility depends on the level of security and staff  supervision that the institution is able to provide, such as the presence of  security towers; perimeter barriers; the type of inmate housing, including  dormitory, cubicle, or cell-type housing; and inmate-to-staff ratio.  Additionally, BOP designates some of its institutions as administrative  institutions, which house male and female inmates and specifically serve  inmates awaiting trial, or those with intensive medical or mental health  conditions, regardless of the level of supervision these inmates require.
section_title: The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and Federal Sentencing Guidelines
paragraphs: Prior to passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, federal judges  generally had broad discretion in sentencing. Most criminal statutes  provided only broad maximum terms of imprisonment. Federal law  outlined the maximum sentence, federal judges imposed a sentence  within a statutory range, and the federal parole official eventually  determined the actual duration of incarceration. The Sentencing Reform  Act of 1984 changed the federal sentencing structure. The act was  effective for offenses committed on or after November 1, 1987. The act  abolished parole for federal offenders sentenced after its effective date,  and subsequent legislation established mandatory minimum sentences  for many federal offenses.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 also established the independent  USSC within the judicial branch and charged it with, among other things,  developing federal sentencing guidelines. USSC establishes sentencing  policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system that provide  certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding  unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar  criminal records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct  while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences  when warranted. To foster this goal, the guidelines specify sentencing  guideline ranges—a range of time (in months) that offenders should serve  given the nature of their offense and other factors—but also permit  sentences to depart upward or downward from guideline ranges because  of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In 2005, the Supreme Court  found the Sentencing Guidelines, which had previously been binding for  federal judges to follow in sentencing criminal defendants, to be advisory  in nature. Regardless of the guidelines’ advisory nature, judges are still  required to calculate properly and consider the Sentencing Guidelines  and other sentencing goals.
In applying the USSC’s guidance, federal district judges are to determine  the appropriate sentencing guideline range for an offender based on  various factors related to (1) the offense and (2) the offender. The offense  is assigned an offense level; drug offenses are based on several factors,  such as the quantity and type of drug involved and whether the offense  involved violence.
The offender is also assigned a criminal history category based on the  number of criminal history points. USSC sentencing guidelines assign  criminal history points based on a defendant’s criminal record:
A single point is assigned for every other federal or state prior  sentence of conviction, subject to certain exceptions.
Two or more points are assigned for every prior sentence of  imprisonment or juvenile confinement of 60 days or more or for  offenses committed while the defendant was in prison; was an  escaped prisoner; or was on probation, parole, or supervised release;
Three points are assigned if an offender has been previously  sentenced or is being sentenced to a prison term of 13 months or  more.
Taken in combination, the offense level and criminal history category  correlate with a sentencing guideline range, expressed in months. For  certain types of offenses, including certain drug and weapons offenses,  statutorily specified mandatory minimum sentences supplant the lower  end of the otherwise applicable guidelines range. While federal law  generally requires a sentencing judge to impose a minimum sentence of  imprisonment following conviction for any of a number of federal offenses,  there are two statutorily provided exceptions. One—the substantial  assistance exception—is available upon motion of the government, and  allows the court to impose a sentence below the level established by  statute as a minimum to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the  investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an  offense. The other, commonly referred to as the safety valve, was  created by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994  and is available for certain types of defendants for certain drug offenses  that carry minimum sentences.
section_title: Correctional Services Is BOP’s Largest Operational Cost, and BOP Has Initiated a Number of Efforts to Reduce Costs
subsections: section_title: BOP’s Correctional Services, Private Prison Contracts, Medical Care, and Food Services Account for the Majority of Its Costs, with the Largest Share of Spending on Personnel
paragraphs: During fiscal year 2013, BOP obligated approximately $6.6 billion for all  its programs and operations. According to our analysis of BOP’s fiscal  year 2013 obligations by cost center, correctional services, privately  operated secure contract facilities, medical care, and food services  represent the majority (approximately $3.56 billion, or 54 percent) of  BOP’s expenses, as illustrated in figure 1. See appendix III for a breakout  of cost trends in these and other key cost centers over the last 5 fiscal  years.
Figure 2 provides further information on the key cost centers represented  above.
Within its cost centers, the majority of costs across the bureau are  payment of staff salaries and benefits. Detailed data on these expenses  are tracked using budget object and subobject classifications. These  budget classifications are used consistently across all cost centers and  represent items or services actually purchased by BOP. Figure 3 shows  the budget object classifications that accounted for BOP’s total fiscal year  2013 obligations.
As figure 3 shows, personnel compensation and benefits (retirement  contributions, health insurance benefits, etc.) account for approximately  59 percent of BOP’s overall obligations. Moreover, BOP’s personnel costs  are actually higher than 59 percent because compensation for other staff  employed on a contractual basis is included in the “other contractual  services” object class. This object class consists of privately operated  prison expenses, outside medical services, and other items—as well as  contract staff—and accounts for nearly 26 percent of fiscal year 2013  obligations. See appendix IV for more detailed data on object and  subobject class obligations from fiscal years 2009 through 2013.
section_title: BOP Has Identified and Implemented Various Cost Savings Efforts
paragraphs: BOP’s Director, in an April 2014 statement before Congress, highlighted  BOP’s commitment to stewardship of financial resources by seeking cost  avoidance and greater efficiencies throughout the bureau.accordance with this focus, BOP has embarked on a number of initiatives  in recent years that have resulted in actual or projected cost savings. Key  initiatives for which BOP has estimated cost savings over the last 3 fiscal  years are listed in table 1.
These efforts reflect a focus on the part of both BOP management and  staff to identify and implement cost savings initiatives, on both a large and  a small scale. BOP-developed estimates of savings from these efforts  total about $61 million, which is just under 1 percent of total obligations  for fiscal year 2013. BOP officials stated that since such a large  component of BOP’s costs is related to paying salaries and benefits  necessary to manage its inmate population, their ability to recognize cost  savings beyond those efforts presented here is fairly limited.
In addition, BOP is in varying stages of taking additional actions such as  converting inmate case files from paper to electronic records that may  reduce costs—for which it has not determined or provided savings  estimates—that can be found in appendix V. According to BOP officials,  they may undertake such initiatives in order to operate more efficiently,  and these initiatives may also result in immediate cost savings. However,  the officials said that they do not always develop cost savings estimates  for initiatives whose primary purpose is to improve efficiency, rather than  achieve cost savings.
section_title: BOP Has Designed Internal Processes to Identify Opportunities for Additional Cost Efficiencies, but Could Improve the Monitoring of Corrective Actions
subsections: section_title: BOP Has Designed Mechanisms to Identify Opportunities for Cost Efficiencies
paragraphs: BOP has various mechanisms to identify opportunities for cost  efficiencies, including the following:
Strategic Plan. BOP’s Strategic Plan helps guide its efforts in fulfilling  its mission and achieving strategic goals. As one strategic goal, BOP  states that it will manage its operations and resources in an effective  manner that encourages innovation, and that it “continually strives  toward improvements in its effective use of resources and its efficient  delivery of services.” Further, BOP has developed a strategic  objective focused on cost efficiency and innovation, stating that it will  continue to focus on reducing costs using efficient and cost-effective  methods to perform tasks. According to the Strategic Plan, it will  accomplish this through, in part, “continued emphasis on financial  planning, analyzing workload and staffing requirements, using  consolidated and shared services, increasing the use of technology,  and refining the processes of the BOP.” In support of this strategic  objective, BOP requires that institutions and regions submit to Central  Office established local best practices or cost savings measures that  can be shared and replicated at other institutions.
Cost Efficiencies and Innovations Catalog. This product is a  compendium of institution-level efficiency efforts and innovations that  serves as a reference for other institutions. The catalog is a result of  efforts to identify cost efficiencies as stated in BOP’s Strategic Plan.  To compile this catalog, BOP’s Central Office surveys institutions  twice a year regarding new or ongoing efforts that they consider to be  local best practices in achieving cost efficiencies. After compiling the  catalog, BOP distributes it bureau-wide, including to program  managers at all institutions. Some examples of cost-efficiency efforts  identified and shared throughout BOP via this catalog include efforts  in recycling material and food waste, water and energy conservation,  use of video conferencing, and inmate training and education.  Institutional officials we spoke with reported that they were aware of  and reviewed this catalog. BOP institution-level staff estimated that  the catalog issued in March 2013 contained items saving tens of  millions of dollars in expenses.
Best practices internal site. In April 2007, BOP implemented an  internal information-sharing site designed to facilitate bureau-wide  communication of efforts that have resulted in cost efficiencies to  bureau staff or inmates. This reference tool includes links to cost  reduction initiatives, energy conservation efforts, and other items that  have been reviewed and vetted by subject matter experts as having  demonstrated their value to BOP. The website includes institution-led  efforts such as battery-recycling operations and improved efficiencies  to water-heating systems.
General staff/program area meetings. Officials at BOP’s Central  Office, regional offices, and selected institutions with whom we spoke  all cited frequent communication between and among program  officials and executive staff regarding items such as general  operations, budget and cost levels, staffing levels and use of  overtime, health care topics, and other items. These officials  frequently cited the quarterly executive staff meeting, which includes  assistant directors from Central Office and the six regional directors,  as a key meeting for these discussions. At these meetings, among  other things, officials present and discuss position papers that lay out  information on initiatives that may have the potential for cost savings.  For instance, at one meeting, the participants discussed a paper  describing ongoing efforts to convert BOP’s Inmate Case Files from a  paper-based system to an electronic system, ultimately saving staff  resources.
Internal control. Internal control is an integral component of an  organization’s management that is to provide reasonable assurance  that objectives are achieved, including the efficiency of operations.  We focused our review on BOP’s internal control objective related to  achieving operational efficiencies. Given this, we reviewed the  elements of BOP’s internal control system that specifically provide  BOP with opportunities to identify cost efficiencies, and found that  BOP’s internal control processes align with Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government. Table 2 provides examples and  descriptions of BOP’s specific internal control processes, organized  by internal control standard, that allow it to identify opportunities for  cost efficiencies. We did not independently test BOP’s internal  controls to determine whether they mitigate all possible risks and are  operating as intended.
section_title: BOP’s Internal Control System Helps Identify Opportunities to Achieve Efficiencies, but Lacks a Mechanism to Consistently Monitor Bureau-wide Corrective Actions
paragraphs: We found that BOP’s internal control system is designed to identify  additional opportunities for cost efficiencies, but BOP did not provide  specifics or documentation on a mechanism to consistently monitor  bureau-wide corrective actions. Program reviews—which document the  results of the Program Review Division’s (PRD) internal reviews of  programs and operations at each BOP institution—collectively cited  repeated frequent control deficiencies and significant findings over  multiple time periods that present inefficiencies or could increase costs.  However, for these repeated issues, BOP did not provide specifics or  documentation for how its corrective actions were always monitored  consistently to ensure that the actions addressed the issues bureau- wide. Specifically, we reviewed BOP’s quarterly program review  summaries—which compile each quarter’s internal review results and  highlight frequent deficiencies and significant findings—for the years  2009-2013 to identify significant findings as well as the most frequent  internal control deficiencies reported with respect to opportunities to  achieve cost efficiencies in the highest-cost areas identified above.  According to our review of these 20 quarterly summaries, frequent  deficiencies or significant findings were repeatedly reported in three high- cost areas—time and attendance (14 of 20 quarters), food services (8 of  20 quarters), and RRC contract administration (6 of 20 quarters).
BOP has processes to identify and share information about these  frequent and significant deficiencies. In particular, PRD disseminates its  quarterly program review summaries to all BOP institutions and the other  Central Office divisions to make them aware of these deficiencies. For  instance, we found that officials from the Central Office Divisions with  oversight over the repeated frequent deficiencies and significant findings  that we analyzed—the Human Resource Management Division (HRMD),  Health Services Division (HSD), and Reentry Services Division (RSD)— were aware of them.
Moreover, one of the divisions, HRMD, formulated a corrective action  plan and has systematically taken steps to address and monitor progress  toward resolving reported deficiencies and findings related to time and  attendance that were identified at multiple institutions across multiple time  periods. For instance, BOP’s program reviews identified control issues  related to time and attendance in 14 of the 20 quarters from 2009 through  2013, such as inaccurate time and attendance records and the lack of  appropriate documentation to support payment. These reported issues  could lead to payment errors, such as incorrectly compensating staff for  overtime. HRMD officials reported that, as a result of these issues, they  implemented policy changes, such as developing mandatory training and  requiring that each human resource office audit a representative sample  of its time and attendance files annually. Further, BOP is currently  transitioning to a web-based time and attendance reporting system, which  includes information technology controls. Such information technology  controls establish segregation of duties (e.g., the staff approving reported  work hours is supervisory and different from the staff reporting the hours  worked) and the retention of electronic records in compliance with rules  and regulations, which officials report could help address the deficiencies.  To consistently monitor progress toward resolving these issues bureau- wide, BOP’s Central Office has conducted a number of audits of time and  attendance records and reports that error rates in record accuracy have  declined from about 5 percent in 2010 to less than 2 percent in 2014.
The other two Central Office divisions with oversight over the repeated  frequent deficiencies and significant findings that we analyzed—HSD and  RSD—have taken actions at the national level to attempt to address  some of the deficiencies. However, they did not provide specifics or  documentation for how the divisions would monitor progress toward  correcting them. With respect to HSD, BOP’s internal reviews identified  findings related to the administration and management of resources in its  Food Services Program (constituting $408 million, or 6 percent, of BOP’s  obligations in fiscal year 2013) in 8 of the 20 quarters from 2009 through  2013, such as incomplete inventories; not properly reporting lost,  damaged, or stolen property; or failures to adjust inventory records  referenced when formulating and submitting an institution’s budget. At the  national level, BOP is providing training on the use of the Food Services  Program’s information system that includes a quarterly inventory control  function, and has formed support teams to provide assistance to  institutions identified as having deficient programs. For the staff  performing inventory control at the local level (e.g., warehouse staff), the  division is requesting that they attend national training or a similar training  program. However, HSD did not provide specifics or documentation for  establishing a mechanism that would allow it to monitor whether the  actions taken have produced needed improvements within Food Services  comprehensively across institutions.
With respect to RSD, BOP’s internal review identified findings related to  RRC contract oversight and monitoring (RRC contracts constituting $296  million, or 4 percent, of BOP’s obligations in fiscal year 2013) in 6 of 20  quarters from 2009 through 2013, such as monitoring reports not being  completed on a timely basis and inaccurate payments being made to  contractors. These reported issues could result in failing to address  contractor performance or overpayments. In July 2013, Residential  Reentry Management (RRM) offices nationwide were consolidated under  the direct management of the Residential Reentry Management Branch  (RRMB). Previously, the RRM field offices were under the operational  control of the six BOP regional offices. According to BOP, this  reorganization has allowed BOP to implement and monitor consistent  practices throughout the Residential Reentry offices. BOP also reported  that, as a result of these findings, management teams within the  Residential Reentry Management Branch provide guidance to individual  field offices that require corrective actions. Additionally, they have  scheduled a national-level training session in September 2014 to address  repeated frequent deficiencies, share best practices in contract  monitoring, and promote consistency and effective oversight of RRCs.  Similar to Food Services, however, RSD did not provide specifics or  documentation for establishing a mechanism that would allow it to monitor  whether the actions taken have produced needed improvements with the  Residential Reentry Program comprehensively across RRC contracts.
Internal control standards state that monitoring of internal controls should  include policies and procedures for ensuring that the findings of audits  and other reviews are promptly resolved. In particular, managers are to  promptly evaluate findings from audits and other reviews, including those  showing deficiencies and recommendations reported by auditors who  evaluate agencies’ operations; determine proper actions in response to  findings and recommendations from audits and reviews; and complete,  within established time frames, all actions that correct or otherwise  resolve the matters brought to management’s attention. According to the  standards, the resolution is completed only after action that corrects  identified deficiencies, produces improvements, or demonstrates the  findings and recommendations do not warrant management action.
For deficiencies and other findings associated with a particular institution,  BOP has a mechanism to monitor corrective actions at the individual  institution to help ensure that the deficiencies and findings do not reoccur  at that specific location. Specifically, according to BOP, the responsible  official of the entity reviewed (most often the warden of the institution) is  responsible for developing and implementing the corrective action, and  PRD monitors that specific institution’s progress in implementing the  corrective action. However, with respect to frequent deficiencies and  significant findings across a number of institutions repeatedly reported  over time, BOP did not provide specifics or documentation for  establishing a mechanism to consistently monitor bureau-wide corrective  actions to determine whether they are achieving desired results and  helping to prevent similar deficiencies from occurring at different  institutions over time. We found that in at least one instance in which  deficiencies were repeatedly found across a number of institutions— HRMD’s process for resolving deficiencies associated with time and  attendance—a Central Office division did successfully take steps to  consistently monitor the deficiencies bureau-wide. Specifically, for the  repeated frequent deficiencies and significant findings associated with  time and attendance, we found that HRMD’s process for implementing  and monitoring its corrective actions has resulted in fewer errors and  stronger internal controls related to record retention and segregation of  duties, which could reduce the risk of erroneous payments, thereby  providing BOP with greater assurance that it is operating more efficiently  with regard to its staff costs across its many institutions.
However, despite the repeated nature and recency of findings within the  Food Services and Residential Reentry Programs, the relevant Central  Office divisions did not provide specifics or documentation for how they  have monitored their corrective actions to assess their progress toward  addressing these findings across BOP institutions. As a result, BOP does  not have reasonable assurance that actions taken are preventing certain  frequent and significant findings from reoccurring at other institutions,  thus hindering BOP’s ability to achieve cost efficiencies in these two high- cost areas—accounting for spending of $408 million and $296.1 million in  fiscal year 2013, respectively. By establishing a mechanism for relevant  Central Office divisions to consistently monitor bureau-wide corrective  actions and assess their progress in the presence of repeated frequent  deficiencies or significant findings reported across multiple institutions,  BOP could be better assured that it is resolving such deficiencies  promptly and, ultimately, operating more efficiently. Further, although  repeated frequent deficiencies and significant findings related to  operational effectiveness and compliance-related issues were outside the  scope of our review, such a mechanism would also better position BOP to  resolve repeated deficiencies and significant findings in these areas.
section_title: Authorities within BOP’s Control to Reduce Costs Are Limited; Options outside of BOP’s Authority Could Have a Larger Impact on Costs
subsections: section_title: BOP’s Current Authority to Reduce Inmate Sentences Results in Limited Cost Savings Relative to Its Overall Budget
paragraphs: See 18 U.S.C. § 4102. reduce the length of the inmate’s sentence, based on inmate “good  conduct time (GCT);” determine the eligibility of an offender for participation in a substance  abuse program (which may result in a sentence reduction of up to 1  year); and  transfer an inmate out of prison to serve the remainder of his or her  sentence in a residential reentry center or in home detention.
Table 3 describes key statutory provisions in which BOP has a role in  reducing a federal prisoner’s period of incarceration in a BOP institution.
Of these authorities, two—IPTP and Compassionate Release—are  programs that can result in a direct reduction of BOP’s population and  thus cost savings. The number of inmates released through these two  programs annually is small, however, as are the estimated savings. For  example, the estimated 2013 cost savings from these programs were  about $2.6 million and $651,000, respectively, or about 0.04 and about  0.01 percent of BOP’s total fiscal year 2013 appropriations of $6.44  billion.
IPTP. As of June 28, 2014, BOP had about 54,000 foreign nationals in  its custody. However, eligibility criteria constrain the number who can  be transferred. Specifically, inmates must voluntarily request a  transfer to their home countries to serve out the remainder of their  sentences, the United States must have a treaty with the home  country permitting repatriation, eligibility for transfer must be  confirmed by BOP, the transfer request must be approved by DOJ’s  Office of Enforcement Operations, and the home country must agree  to receive the prisoner. Further, while the United States has treaties  with 94 foreign countries to permit IPTP transfers, the DOJ Inspector  General (IG) reported that, as of 2010, about 22 percent of the foreign  nationals in BOP come from countries with which there is no transfer  agreement. In addition, as of late June 2014, almost 37,400 (17.3  percent) of all BOP inmates were Mexican nationals (or about 70  percent of all BOP foreign nationals). However, since 2001, Mexico  has restricted eligibility for transfer from the United States, according  to a 2011 DOJ IG report.
In fiscal year 2013, DOJ approved 245 transfers out of BOP custody,  representing less than 0.5 percent of BOP’s foreign national population.  Through these transfers, BOP estimates that it avoided costs of  approximately $2.6 million in fiscal year 2013, or about 0.04 percent of  BOP’s fiscal year 2013 $6.44 billion appropriation.
Compassionate Release. We have previously reported on BOP’s  discretionary authority to request compassionate release for certain  offenders—termed “reduction in sentence” by BOP—and found that  BOP used this authority infrequently because of, among other things,  BOP’s eligibility criteria. Specifically, compassionate release of an  inmate historically has been limited by BOP to terminally ill patients  with an incurable disease and short life expectancy or to those who  are elderly with a profoundly debilitating medical condition. In April  2013, the DOJ IG reported that the existing BOP compassionate  release program had been poorly managed and implemented  inconsistently, likely resulting in eligible inmates not being considered  for release and in terminally ill inmates dying before their requests  were decided. No cost savings estimate could be provided for earlier  releases because, according to the IG report, BOP did not maintain  cost data associated with the custody of inmates eligible for  consideration under the program, and BOP had not conducted any  analysis of cost savings achieved by releasing such inmates.
DOJ issued a revised program statement with less restrictive criteria for  compassionate release in August 2013. The revisions included making  terminally ill inmates with a life expectancy of up to 18 months eligible for  consideration instead of maintaining the previous 12-month limit.
According to BOP data, total releases under compassionate release  increased from 29 inmates in calendar year 2011 to 39 in calendar year  2012, and to 61 in calendar year 2013 (including 11 released under the  expanded criteria). An additional 2 had been released as of July 2014  under expanded nonmedical criteria. However, as a percentage of BOP’s  population and costs, the number of affected inmates and savings  remains small given the numerous factors involved in determining  eligibility. Inmates released under compassionate release in calendar  year 2013 represented about 0.03 percent of the total BOP inmate  population, and estimated savings from the releases amounted to about  $651,000, or about 0.01 percent of BOP’s fiscal year 2013 $6.44 billion  appropriation.
Funding and eligibility constraints also limit BOP’s use of RDAP and  RRCs to affect costs related to the number of inmates in BOP custody.  Some cost savings can result from inmates being able to reduce their  sentences as a result of successfully completing the RDAP program;  however, both RDAP and RRCs are types of rehabilitation programs  intended to reduce recidivism rather than serving as cost-saving  mechanisms. professional staff and resources, increasing the number of offender  participants in either would require additional funding that could offset  potential cost savings.
RDAP participation is limited to prisoners with a verifiable substance use disorder within  the 12 months prior to their arrest. They must also voluntarily apply for participation and  be approved by BOP for the program. RRCs are run by private contractors and cost more  than minimum security institutions, and about the same as low- or medium-security BOP  prisons on an annual basis per offender. We reported daily costs per prisoner previously  in GAO-12-320 as follows: $70.79 for RRCs, $57.55 for minimum security, $69.53 for low  security, and $71.91 for medium security. average participant reduced his or her sentence by about 10 months  in fiscal year 2013.
As we have also previously concluded, increasing RDAP participation  would cost more than the potential savings from reducing sentences by  relatively small amounts. For example, if every eligible RDAP participant  who completed the program in fiscal year 2011 had received his or her  maximum sentence reduction, BOP would have been responsible for  15,729 fewer months of inmate incarceration, yielding an estimated cost  savings of about $13.2 million. However, the fiscal year 2012 request for  an additional $15 million to permit more offenders to enter RDAP “on  time” and thereby to increase their allowable sentence reductions would  not have been enough to achieve the full 12-month potential reduction,  meaning that expanding RDAP would have cost at least $1.8 million more  than it would have saved. Similarly, according to DOJ, BOP received an  increase of $15 million in RDAP funding in fiscal year 2014 and this  funding will, by fiscal year 2016, increase the average sentence reduction  for RDAP participants from 10 months in fiscal year 2013 to an estimated  11.5 months. BOP reported that reaching the full potential 12-month  sentence reduction for all participants in fiscal year 2013 would have  resulted in about $11 million in cost avoidance savings, but it did not  provide a calculation of the cost of providing additional spaces and staff to  permit the full sentence reduction for all participants.
These cost savings estimates do not take into account potential long-term  savings to society from reducing substance abuse and recidivism among  released inmates. While RDAP may contribute to achieving such savings,  expanding it above current levels requires an up-front cost that exceeds  its potential cost savings for BOP in the short term.
RRCs. According to BOP, RRCs, or halfway houses, provide  programs that are intended to help inmates rebuild their ties to the  community and to thereby reduce the likelihood that they will  recidivate. Run by private contractors, RRCs provide programs that  help offenders find employment, and coordinate the provision of  services to address substance abuse, medical, and mental health  care with appropriate community providers. We have previously found  that the use of RRCs is constrained by both eligibility criteria and  funding. For example, inmates with detainers (other crimes for which  they were charged but were not yet sentenced), with sentences of 6  months or less, or who are in civil commitment status are all ineligible  for RRC placement. In addition, BOP officials stated that objections  from local communities to halfway houses in residential  neighborhoods have hindered expanding the RRC program, even  when funds were available.
We have previously found that not all inmates are eligible to be sent to an  RRC prior to their release from prison, and that for those who are eligible,  some spend only a portion of the full 12 months’ allowable time in an  RRC because of a lack of bed space and because of eligibility criteria. According to BOP, an increase in the number of offenders getting the full  12 months’ allowable time would necessitate additional bed space, which  would require both additional funding and additional RRC contracts. For  example, in fiscal year 2013, BOP reported that it had 9,455 RRC beds  available nationwide, but would have required about 30,000 beds to  provide the maximum allowable 12 months in RRCs to all participants, or  an addition of more than 20,500 beds above its current capacity. As noted  above, and as we have previously reported, BOP officials explained that  such an expansion could be challenged by local zoning restrictions and  the unwillingness of many communities to accept nearby RRCs.  Moreover, if such an expansion were to take place, BOP would need  additional funding to pay for the new RRC bed space. For fiscal year  2013, BOP reports that the average daily cost per offender in an RRC  was about $73, or $26,645 per year. This means that an increase of the  more than 20,500 beds that would be required to achieve the allowable  12 months for all participants (at current program levels) would cost about  $546 million annually.but would require a substantial funding increase, equal to almost 8  percent of BOP’s entire $6.9 billion fiscal year 2015 budget request.
section_title: Potential Actions outside of BOP’s Authority Could Reduce Prison Populations and Costs, and Experts Say There Are Advantages and Disadvantages to These Options
paragraphs: We examined cost-saving options that are outside BOP’s authority and  that are widely discussed among criminal justice policy experts, the  USSC, and DOJ, such as instructing federal prosecutors to decline to  charge certain defendants in certain drug cases in such a manner as to  trigger mandatory minimum prison sentences, reducing the lengths of  sentences specified by federal guidelines for drug offenders, or applying  the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactively in order to  provide sentences for cocaine base (“crack”) offenders that are less   Toward  disparate from those applied for possession of powder cocaine.this end, we reviewed selected reports and analyses from entities chosen  for their expertise in criminal justice issues, and had discussions with  officials from DOJ, BOP, and the USSC. See appendix VI for more  information on the entities we selected. Through this review, we identified  eight options outside BOP’s authority that could reduce the size of the  inmate population. These involve potential legislative actions by  Congress, executive orders by the President, policy changes  implemented by the Attorney General, or changes in sentencing  guidelines that could be promulgated by the USSC. For each of these  options, we asked the USSC to calculate the estimated impact on the size  of BOP’s population and the potential savings that could result from  implementation of each.  See appendix VII for the USSC analyses of  these options. For the purposes of our analysis, we determined that the  USSC is an authoritative source for conducting such analysis; it has  conducted similar analyses in recent years and published one on its   For each option, the time frame (number of  website on July 25, 2014.years) over which the option would take effect may vary, as well as the  number and type of offenders who would be eligible for a changed  sentence under the option. In general, the majority of the impact of most  options was estimated by the USSC to occur within 5 or 6 years of  implementation. However, the options are not all directly comparable;  some would have a greater impact more quickly than would others,  depending on the option and the number of potentially eligible offenders.  For options that apply only prospectively (that is, only to future  offenders)—such as the Attorney General’s August 2013 memorandum to  U.S. Attorneys—the potential impact is typically less than for options that  would apply to larger numbers of currently incarcerated offenders.
On the basis of analyses the USSC conducted of the potential results  from implementing each of the eight options, which provided estimates of  bed year savings, we then calculated the potential cost savings.  Implementation of the options could range from about $8.7 million to  almost $4.1 billion, with the potential savings varying based on the option  implemented and the duration of the option. Cost savings or cost  avoidance savings were calculated using BOP’s fiscal year 2014  estimated average annual marginal cost of approximately $11,000.  Marginal costs covers such things as security, food, medical care,  clothing, unit management, education, records, and maintenance  associated with additional inmates entering existing BOP facilities. BOP  officials stated that calculating cost savings using marginal cost was more  appropriate than using per capita costs because BOP is about 36 percent  overcrowded system-wide, and therefore BOP would have to reduce its  existing population by that percentage (equal to about 78,000 offenders in  July 2014) to eliminate overcrowding system-wide. Until that number is  reached, BOP officials stated, they would not be closing existing prisons  and therefore would expect savings only in marginal costs versus  average per capita costs to be realized. However, the use of marginal  cost in calculating savings does not take into account the possibility that  reductions in BOP population could permit BOP to reduce the numbers of  offenders sufficiently to reduce staff, close some existing facilities, or  avoid opening additional ones that would otherwise have been required. If  the options achieved population reductions resulting in reductions in fixed  costs, such as reducing staff or closing existing prisons, calculating cost  savings using average annual per capita costs—$29,291 in fiscal year  2013, according to BOP—would be appropriate. Three of the options  could result in an estimated 78,000 or more offenders being eligible for  release or eligible for sentence reductions over five years, which could  greatly reduce or eliminate current overcrowding based on BOP’s  estimate within the same 5 years. Given the size of these potential  reductions in sentence lengths and the number of eligible offenders, we  calculated per capita cost savings for three of these options, based on the  USSC estimates for saved bed years. We did not calculate per capita  savings for a fourth option—changing the way that BOP calculates the  amount of “good conduct” time that offenders earn for each year served— because although the number of eligible inmates would be almost  180,000, the reduction in sentence for each inmate would be small in  contrast to the other three options and would occur over 30 or more  years. Therefore, this option may be less likely to allow BOP to reduce  staffing levels or close facilities.
It is important to emphasize cost savings is one of many considerations.  In particular, these options may have additional effects, such as on public  safety. The expert entities we contacted identified potential advantages  and disadvantages they believe could result from the implementation of  each option, such as making sentences more commensurate with the  crime or releasing inmates who may reoffend.
We are not taking a position on any of these options. We present the  information we obtained from the USSC and the expert entities to inform  policymakers as they weigh whether and how to address costs at BOP.  Specifically, in table 4, we summarize each option we presented to the  USSC, expert entities, and the four states selected because of their  experience with criminal justice sentencing initiatives. For each option, we  show the USSC estimate of the number of BOP offenders who would  likely be eligible for release or for a reduced sentence (leading to release)  as a result of implementation. The table also shows the USSC estimates,  if available, of the bed year savings that would result from implementation  of each option, and our calculation of the cost savings that would result.In addition, we summarize the comments from the responding states and  the expert entities with regard to potential advantages and disadvantages  that could result from implementing these options.
As the Attorney General has noted, without action to reduce the current  size of BOP’s population, and projected future growth, BOP will continue  to require an ever greater share of DOJ’s budget, having increased from  about 14 percent of that budget in 1980 to nearly 25 percent in the fiscal  year 2015 request. As table 4 shows, a number of options outside of  BOP’s current authority exist by which the sentence lengths of  prospective and incarcerated offenders could be reduced (producing bed  year savings), as well as the number of offenders to be incarcerated,  such as under the Attorney General’s August 2013 Smart on Crime  direction (option 3). Hence, BOP’s costs could be reduced, but the range  of potential savings from these options is great. As illustrated in table 4,  actual savings are greater for options that apply to current offenders  compared with those that apply only prospectively. For example,  retroactively reducing drug sentences by about 44 percent (option 1)  would have the greatest estimated cost savings: $4.1 billion using  marginal cost savings, or $11.626 billion if per capita savings were to  occur. Other options would have a lesser impact, such as avoiding  charging future low-level, nonviolent drug offenders with charges that  result in mandatory minimum sentences, which could be a savings of $8.7  million in marginal costs over 5 years (option 3). However, as discussed  earlier, cost savings is one of many considerations in weighing which, if  any, option could be adopted. Equally important is consideration of the  advantages and disadvantages associated with each option.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: According to BOP officials, BOP’s biggest challenges are managing the  continually increasing federal inmate population while providing for  inmates’ care and safety, as well as the safety of BOP staff and  surrounding communities, within budgeted levels. BOP has made  improvements in its effective use of resources a strategic goal. Toward  that end, BOP has implemented mechanisms that allow it to identify  opportunities for cost savings, such as an internal website through which  BOP staff can view cost efficiency efforts being implemented across BOP,  and undertaken cost-savings efforts, such as in energy conservation.  However, establishing a mechanism for relevant Central Office divisions  to consistently monitor bureau-wide corrective actions and assess their  progress in the presence of repeated frequent or significant findings could  help BOP better ensure that it is resolving such deficiencies promptly and,  ultimately, operating more efficiently.
BOP’s inmate population is its primary cost driver; however, BOP’s ability  to reduce its population, and thus its costs, are limited. Potential changes  outside of BOP’s authority could substantially reduce both BOP’s  population and its costs. Expert entities and states from which we  obtained views reported that there are potential trade-offs to  implementing these options. Some expert entities observed that release  of offenders poses the risk of recidivism and that reductions in sentence  length could reduce prosecutors’ leverage in extracting information from  low-level criminals that is used to prosecute higher-level ones. At the  same time, other expert entities reported potential advantages to these  options, such as making sentence lengths more commensurate with the  crime committed. These experts’ analyses of the possible savings and the  potential advantages and disadvantages, beyond cost savings, of these  options may be useful for policymakers to consider as they weigh whether  and how to address BOP’s population and, ultimately, its costs.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enable BOP to promptly address repeated frequent deficiencies and  other significant findings it identifies through its program reviews in areas  of high cost across multiple institutions, we recommend that the Director  of the Bureau of Prisons establish a mechanism for relevant Central  Office divisions to consistently monitor bureau-wide corrective actions.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We requested comments on a draft of this report from DOJ. In an email  received September 17, 2014, the DOJ liaison stated that DOJ concurred  with our recommendation. The Department did not provide official written  comments to include in our report, but did provide written technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The U.S. Sentencing  Commission also provided written technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to selected congressional  committees, the Attorney General, the Director of BOP, and other  interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any further questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix VIII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: We addressed the following questions as part of this review:  1)  What are the major costs for Bureau of Prisons (BOP) operations, and  what actions has BOP taken to implement cost savings?  2)  To what extent does BOP have mechanisms to identify opportunities  for cost efficiencies and to take corrective actions that may improve  cost efficiency?  3)  What potential changes, both within and outside of BOP’s authority,  could lead to cost reductions or improved efficiencies in BOP  operations, and what might be the potential impact of these changes?
To address the first question, we obtained historical obligation data from  BOP’s Financial Management Information System for fiscal years 2009- 2013—a 5-year time frame to provide us with an adequate understanding  of trends in BOP obligation levels—to identify the major costs incurred by  BOP for its Salaries and Expenses account, which generally represents  98 percent of BOP’s budget. We have assessed the reliability of these  data and determined them to be reliable for the purposes of this report.  This assessment included performing checks on the data received and  interviewing officials responsible for compiling and maintaining these  data. We also collected data (e.g., cost savings estimates prepared by  BOP) and documentation, such as memos and concept papers approved  by executive staff from fiscal years 2009 through 2013; through review of  these data and documents and interviews with relevant agency officials,  we determined that these data are also reliable for the purposes of this  report. In addition, we interviewed Central Office-, regional-, and  institutional-level officials to identify to the extent possible all existing cost  efficiency and savings initiatives adopted by BOP and their impact on its  overall budget.
To address the second question, we reviewed the processes and tools at  BOP during the same time period (fiscal years 2009-2013) that identify,  implement, and promote cost-efficiency and savings initiatives throughout  its institutions, such as executive staff meetings and a catalog compiling  cost-savings initiatives. With respect to identifying additional opportunities  to realize cost efficiencies or reduce costs, using our financial analysis as  context, we analyzed elements of BOP’s internal control system related to  the control objective of achieving operational efficiencies and interviewed  relevant officials to assess whether BOP has a management structure  and processes to routinely assess its administrative and operational  activities for possible corrective action. Specifically, we reviewed BOP’s  mechanisms and processes leading to its internal review of operational  and administrative functions, including its process for taking corrective  action, related to high-cost areas and compared these characteristics with  those called for in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government.
To address the third question, on potential policy changes both within and  outside BOP’s authority that could lead to BOP cost savings, we collected  analysis and documentation from the Department of Justice (DOJ), BOP,  the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC), and entities selected for their  expertise in criminal justice issues, and, in particular, potential changes to  federal sentencing policies.several means, including (1) asking officials at both the USSC and the  Urban Institute who have previously worked on analyses and reports  relevant to prison population data and criminal justice to identify entities  they considered as expert in the field of sentencing reform and criminal  justice, (2) conducting a literature search to identify publications issued by  some of the entities on sentencing reform or corrections, and (3)  identifying entities with known expertise and authoritativeness (e.g., the  ABA) in the criminal justice field through literature searches. These  entities may not be representative of the universe of expert entities in the  criminal justice field and therefore may not represent all views on this  topic; however, their views provide insights. We obtained data from   We identified these expert entities through  calendar year 2011 through July 2014 from BOP on the impact on BOP’s  population and costs resulting from changes implemented by BOP to  broaden the criteria for compassionate release of offenders, as well as  analyses from the USSC on the estimated impact of the memorandum  accompanying the Attorney General’s August 2013 DOJ Smart on Crime  initiative that instructed prosecutors to decline to charge certain  defendants in certain types of drug cases in such a manner as to trigger  mandatory minimum sentences. For data on efforts taken under BOP’s  authority, we assessed the reliability by reviewing documentation and  interviewing knowledgeable officials; we determined the data to be  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. For data on the impact  of policy changes outside BOP’s authority, we obtained analyses from the  USSC. According to our audit objectives, we determined based on its  expertise that the evidence obtained from the USSC provides a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions.
We reviewed sentencing reform options identified by the expert entities,  as well as analyses of these options from these entities. We identified  these entities on the basis of their demonstrated expertise as well as to  ensure that a wide range of views on the advantages or disadvantages of  potential changes to existing sentencing guidelines was covered. GAO is  not taking a position on any of these options, but presents information on  estimated cost savings and experts’ views of advantages and  disadvantages for such options to inform policymakers as they weigh  whether and how to address rising costs at BOP.
On the basis of the options we identified, we compiled a list of seven  sentencing guideline and related changes that were being widely  considered and discussed among expert entities at the time we began our  review and during the course of the review. We also included one change  resulting from a memorandum issued by the Attorney General in August  2013 to U.S. Attorneys instructing them to decline to charge certain  defendants in certain types of drug cases in such a manner as to trigger  mandatory minimum sentences. These selected options were based on  our assessment of proposals put forward by several sources, including  the Attorney General, expert entities, states with experience with criminal  justice reform, and advocacy entities with a range of views on criminal  justice reform. See appendix II for the letter sent to expert entities asking  for their assessment of options, which provides a list of the proposals that  were used to develop the selected options. During the course of our  review, two of these options were approved by the USSC, with the  amendment to the sentencing guidelines forwarded to Congress. This  amendment will become effective on November 1, 2014, unless Congress  acts to modify or disapprove the amendment. The two options approved  are closely related—the first, approved by the USSC on April 10, 2014,  reduces the sentences for future (federal) drug offenders, such that there  would be an approximately 18 percent reduction in the average length of  such sentences compared with sentences under current guidelines. The  second was approved on July 18, 2014, by USSC, and applies the  reduction retroactively—that is, to currently incarcerated drug offenders.  After the USSC July 18 vote to make the drug sentence reductions  retroactive (if eligibility criteria are met), the Attorney General issued a  statement that, at his direction, BOP will begin notifying federal inmates of  the opportunity to apply for a reduction in sentence immediately. Unless  Congress modifies or disapproves the amendment to the sentencing  guidelines submitted by the USSC, beginning November 1, 2014, eligible  offenders can ask courts to reduce their sentences. Offenders whose  requests are granted by the courts can be released no earlier than  November 1, 2015, under the USSC provision. For the purposes of this  report, we refer to these two changes by the USSC, and the Attorney  General’s August 2013 directive to U.S. Attorneys, and to the other  options collectively as eight options.
For each of these eight options, we asked the USSC to estimate the  impact on the size of the BOP inmate population. The USSC calculates  such impact in bed years; 1 bed year is defined by the USSC as 12  months of prison time (e.g., one offender in prison for 1 year, or three  offenders in prison for 4 months each, and so forth). Using the USSC bed  years’ savings estimates, we then calculated cost savings or cost  avoidance that could result from implementing a given option. analyses of these eight options are reproduced in appendix VII.
We calculated savings that would result from reductions in BOP population or cost  avoidance savings resulting from increases below what would otherwise occur if an option  was not implemented, by multiplying bed years saved by the annual marginal cost for a  prisoner. BOP defines marginal costs as the cost of adding one offender for 1 year; these  cover food, medical, clothing, and utilities. For fiscal year 2014, the average annual  marginal cost per offender is about $11,000. For some options that could result in reduced  sentences and earlier releases of about 78,000 or more offenders, we also calculated per  capita savings, as such population reductions that could allow BOP to reduce its staff or  close facilities.
In addition, we asked the 14 expert entities to comment on the options  with regard to their view of the advantages or disadvantages of  implementation of the eight options. We also identified 4 states (Texas,  Louisiana, Ohio, and North Carolina) that have had at least 1 year’s  experience in implementing state-level sentencing and criminal justice  changes similar to the ones being discussed for federal offenders, and  asked them to comment on the potential options for change. We  selected Louisiana, Ohio, and North Carolina also because they are  participants in the joint DOJ-Pew Charitable Trust Justice Reinvestment  Initiative (JRI), which funds implementation of changes to state  sentencing and criminal justice policies intended to reduce prison  populations and recidivism, and these states were also the largest in  terms of annual spending on corrections among the JRI states with at  least 1 year’s experience in implementing JRI-related initiatives. We  selected Texas because, as of 2012, it had both the largest state prison  population in the United States and was cited by the Urban Institute as an  early leader in criminal justice reform initiatives that DOJ used as a model  for the Justice Reinvestment Initiative program. We received responses  from 17 of the 18 entities (the 14 expert entities and 4 states) to which we  sent the letter.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 to September 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our   findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Letter Sent to Select States and Expert Entities
paragraphs: The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), the investigative arm  of the U.S. Congress, is carrying out a research engagement (GAO job  #441173) on ways in which the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) can  achieve cost efficiencies. As part of this work, we will be listing select  options that would require action by entities other than BOP—such as  changes enacted by Congress and the President that could affect the size  of the BOP prison population, or changes in sentencing guidelines that  could be promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC) and  possibly also applied retroactively. These options include proposals  identified by a number of experts or included in pending legislation that  would likely help reduce costs at BOP. We are writing you to ask for your  comments or observations on these select options.
These options are based on an assessment of varying proposals put  forward by several sources:
Proposals and guidance from the U.S. Attorney General on  sentencing reform, including changes to charging procedures ordered  in August 2013 as part of the DOJ Smart on Crime Initiative to avoid  incarceration of low-level, non-violent drug offenders.
Potential cost-saving changes or concepts identified by expert  entities, including the USSC; the Pew Charitable Trusts; the Urban  Institute; the Heritage Foundation; the Vera Institute of Justice; the  Council of State Governments/Justice Center; and the American Bar  Association, some of which are also included in pending legislation.
The experiences of various states in recent years with criminal justice  reform, often intended to reduce prison populations and recidivism,  including Texas and 17 states involved in the DOJ Justice  Reinvestment Initiative (JRI) and as reported on in the January 2014  joint DOJ-Urban Institute report, Justice Reinvestment Initiative State  Assessment Report.
Comments and analyses by several expert/advocacy entities with a  range of views on criminal justice reform including the National  Association of Assistant United States Attorneys; the National  Association of Former United States Attorneys; the Brennan Center  for Justice at New York University School of Law; Families Against  Mandatory Minimums; and Right on Crime: A project of the Texas  Public Policy Foundation in cooperation with Justice Fellowship.
Based on common policy themes assessed or reported by the  aforementioned sources, the options listed below are grouped into three  broad categories (in most cases, there are several related proposals or  concepts that have been put forth by various expert entities or experts):  1)  Sentencing Reform—Proposals to Reduce Length of Mandatory  2)  Enhancement of “Good Conduct Time” reduction-in-sentence through  good behavior by inmates and/or through participation in programs  intended to reduce recidivism, enhance post-release employment  chances, and/or reduce substance abuse; and  3)  Proposals to expand the safety valve for offenders. A “safety valve” is  a statutory exception to mandatory minimum sentencing laws that  authorizes a judge to sentence a person below a mandatory minimum  term if certain conditions are met. The current federal sentencing  guidelines provide for a reduced sentence for persons who meet the  current federal safety valve criteria (which apply only to drug  trafficking cases) even in cases where a mandatory minimum penalty  would not otherwise apply.
subsections: section_title: Instructions
paragraphs: For each option, we would like to ask you to briefly identify any potential  “advantage” or “disadvantage”, based on your organization’s expertise or,  for states, based on your experience in implementing some version of  them (we recognize these vary considerably in detail). For example, an  “advantage” for most of these proposals is sometimes stated to be to  reduce overcrowding of prisons, or to reduce the waiting list for anti- recidivism educational or substance abuse programs. Alternatively, a  “disadvantage” for some of these, as identified by some experts, is that a  certain percentage of those released may commit crimes again and that,  therefore, early release (v. serving the full sentence) may put someone  back into society who may become a recidivist earlier than would  otherwise have occurred.
GAO will generally present only the aggregate results of the responses to  these questions in our report to Congress. Although in some cases  individual responses may be discussed, the report will not include any  information that could be used to identify individual respondents.  Identifying information will not be released outside of GAO, unless  compelled by law or pursuant to a Congressional request. See 31 U.S.C.  §716.
Please start by saving the document as a Microsoft Word file to a hard  drive before completing it, as your comments will otherwise not be saved.  There are comment boxes below each of the options. Please type your  responses in the space provided, which will expand automatically to  accommodate your comments.
Group 1: Proposals to Reduce Length of Mandatory Sentences  Option A: Reduce the length of mandatory minimum sentences for drug- related offenses –for example, reduce the mandatory minimum sentences  in drug trafficking cases from 20 years to 10 years; 10 years to 5 years;  and 5 years to 2 years.   ❏  Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough  Information to Comment   Option B: Make the amendments to drug mandatory minimum penalties  of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactive to those offenders currently  incarcerated for crack cocaine-related offenses.  ❏  Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough  Information to Comment   Option C: Avoid charging low-level non-violent drug offenders with a  charge which results in a mandatory sentence.  ❏  Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough  Information to Comment   Option D: Amend sentencing guidelines for all drug offenders—for  example, reduce such sentences by a given percentage below current  lengths (e.g., by 20 percent; by 10 percent).  ❏  Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough  Information to Comment   Option E: Apply the amendments to sentencing guidelines in Option D to  both new drug offenders and retroactively to incarcerated drug offenders.   ❏  Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough  Information to Comment   Group 2: Proposals to Reduce Sentence Time Based on Good  Conduct and/or Participation in Anti-Recidivism and Substance  Abuse Programs  Option F: Increase good time credits for good conduct and/or participation  in anti-recidivism programs, including substance abuse programs.   ❏  Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough  Information to Comment   Group 3: Proposals to Expand the Safety Valve for Drug and/or  Other Offenders  Overview: The “safety valve” was created by the Violent Crime Control  and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which directed that lower-level  defendants sentenced for certain drug offenses who meet specified  criteria will not be subject to mandatory minimum penalties. Accordingly,  only defendants sentenced after the guideline amendment’s November 1,  1995 effective date who satisfy the safety valve requirements are eligible  for the reduced term of imprisonment.
Option G: Expand the current “safety valve” for drug offenders to make it  available to offenders with more than one prior minor offense up to a  certain limit (for instance, up to three criminal history points.)   ❏  Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough  Information to Comment   Option H: Expand the safety valve as described in Option G to include  both drug offenders and other non-violent offenders (this would not apply  to any sex offenders).  ❏  Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough  Additional Comments or Suggested Options  Finally, in the box below, please make any other comments or  suggestions you may have, especially with regard to whether there are  any other options for making cost effective changes to criminal justice  rules or processes that you wish to bring to our attention.
Additional Comments or Observations: Other Options to Consider  This completes the requested assessment of potential options we are  considering. Thank you for your time in providing your input on these  options with regard to the federal criminal justice system.
section_title: Appendix III: Data on the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) Largest Cost Centers
paragraphs: Table 5 presents annual obligations data for fiscal years 2009 through  2013 for BOP’s 20 largest cost centers during fiscal year 2013.
section_title: Appendix IV: Data on the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) Largest Subobject Class Expenses
paragraphs: Table 6 presents annual obligations data for fiscal years 2009 through  2013 for BOP’s 20 largest subobject classes in fiscal year 2013.  Compensation for full-time permanent staff has consistently been the  greatest area of expense; personnel compensation and benefits account  for most of the subobject classes listed below.
section_title: Appendix V: Additional Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) Efforts to Achieve Cost Savings and Efficiencies
paragraphs: In addition to efforts discussed earlier, BOP also reports pursuing the  following initiatives that could provide current and future cost savings,  shown in Table 7.
section_title: Appendix VI: Expert Entities Providing Input on Prison Population Reduction Options
paragraphs: The expert sources that provided us with analysis or information on  sentencing issues are listed in table 8.
section_title: Appendix VII: Analyses of Options Provided by the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC)
paragraphs: Appendix VII:  Analyses of Options Provided  by the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC)
This appendix reproduces the methodology and analyses prepared by the  U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC) in developing estimates of the  impact on the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inmate population of eight  options for cost saving that are outside BOP’s authority and that are  widely discussed among criminal justice policy experts and entities. GAO  identified these eight options based on our assessment of proposals put  forward by several sources, including the Attorney General, expert  entities, states with experience with criminal justice reform, and advocacy  entities with a range of views on criminal justice reform. GAO is not taking  a position on any of these options, but presents information on them to  inform policymakers as they weigh whether and how to address rising  costs at BOP. The USSC estimates on the inmate population are reported  in the full report.
For options 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, the USSC prepared a written analysis  describing its estimate of the impact of changes specified by the option.   For options 3 and 4, the USSC provided tables showing estimated  impact. A description of the option analyzed by the USSC and further  information relevant to specific analyses are included with each analysis  or table below.
subsections: section_title: 1. USSC analysis of option 1: Reduce the length of mandatory minimum sentences for incarcerated drug offenders.
section_title: Under this option, the sentences of certain incarcerated drug offenders convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum sentence would be reduced by an average of about 44 percent—for example, from 10 years to 5 years and from 5 years to 2 years. Incarcerated offenders who have completed their recalculated sentence (i.e., if the time served exceeded the new sentence length) would be released.
paragraphs: ONE COLUMBUS CIRCLE,  N.E.
subsections: section_title: Dear Mr. Tumin:
paragraphs: The Government Accountability Office has asked the U.S.  Sentencing  Commission to assist it in connection with its engagement (number 441173).  We  understand that through this engagement the GAO is examining ways in which the  operating costs of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BoP) can be reduced.  As we have  previously discussed with you and your colleagues, the Commission has agreed to  analyze on GAO's behalf several policy options which could reduce the overall size of  the prison population that the BoP administers.  Specifically, our analyses of these policy  options will consider the effect on the federal prison population if the policies were  implemented in such a way that the options would apply to inmates currently incarcerated  in the BoP system.
In this memorandum, we provide to you another of these estimates.  Here we  provide our estimate of the impact on the federal prison population if the current statutory  mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses of 5,  10 and 20 years were reduced to 2,  5,  and 10 years, respectively, and the courts were authorized to resentence all federal  offenders convicted of an drug offense carrying one of these mandatory minimum  penalties under a sentencing framework that incorporated the new minimum penalties.
As we discuss more fully below, we estimate that 78,106 offenders who are  incarcerated and would still be in prison as of October 1, 2014 would be eligible for a  sentence reduction.  The average reduction in sentence for these offenders would be 57  months (44.2 percent).  The estimated total savings to the BoP from such a policy change  applied retroactively would be 370,985 bed years.
I.
The Policy Option We Considered  One of the policy options that we have agreed to examine on behalf of the GAO is  the impact of a policy change in current law whereby the current statutory mandatory  minimum penalties for drug offenses of 5,  10 and 20 yeru:s were reduced t  2  5  and  10  years, respectively (the "Policy Option").!  As part of o lIT analysis  we have assumed that  the courts would be authorized (most likely by statute2 )  to  resentence aU  federal offenders  convicted of a drug offense carrying one of these mandatory minimum penalties under a  sentencing framework that incorporated the new minimum penalties.
II.
Applying the Policy Option to offenders in the custody of the BoP, we estimate  that there are 78,106 offenders who would be incarcerated on October 1,2014 who would  be eligible for a reduction in their current sentence if the Policy Option were to be  retroactively applied.  Ifthe courts were to grant each of these offenders the full reduction  in their sentence we estimate that the total savings to the BoP would be 370,985 bed  years.3  Table 1 provides information on some ofthe demographic characteristic ofthe  offenders eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to the Policy Option.  Table 2  provides an estimate of the number of offenders who would be released each year if the  Policy Option was applied retroactively compared to the number of offenders who will be  released each year pursuant to their current sentence.  As can be seen on this table, if the  Policy Option were fully retroactive on October 1,2014, more than 24,600 offenders  would be eligible for immediate release.  Within the first year of the effective date of the  Policy Option, another 8,221  offenders would be eligible for release above the number  who will be released under their current sentence.  Table 3 provides information on  selected sentencing guideline characteristics and the criminal history category of these  offenders.
I  See,  e.g., 21  U.S.C. §§  841 (b), 960(b) (2006) (establishing five-, ten-, and twenty-year minimum penalties  in  certain drug cases).
Another approach would be for the President to reduce the sentence for all offenders eligible for such a  change using his clemency powers.  See U.S. CONST.,  art. II,  § 2, cl. 2.
A "bed year"  is the cost to the BoP of incarcerating one inmate for one year.  For example, one inmate  who serves five years of imprisonment accounts for five bed years. would not be realized in any single year but is the cumulative savings realized over  several years.
III.
How We Conducted This Analvsis  A.
The methodology for this analysis is based on the Commission's Prison Impact  Model, which has been in use in some form since the guidelines were first developed.  This model is used to estimate the impact of proposed statutory and guideline  amendments on newly sentenced offenders and to project the future impact those  amendments will have on bed space in the BoP.  For this analysis, those offenders who  appear to be eligible to receive a reduced sentence were hypothetically "resentenced"  with the computer program as ifthe proposed policy change had been in effect in the year  in which they were sentenced.  A new release date for each offender also was calculated  in order to determine when the offender would be eligible for release if he or she were  provided the full reduction in sentence provided by the proposed policy change.
B.
The Offender Population We Studied  The Bureau of Prisons provided the Commission with a datafile of inmates who  were in the custody of the BoP on Jan 25,2014.  That file contained approximately  189,000 offenders.  Approximately 184,000 of these offenders were sentenced between  fiscal year 1992 and fiscal 2013.USSC staff was able to match 171,765 of these  offenders to Commission records.  Of these,  138,894 were estimated to remain  incarcerated on October 1,2014.
In order to approximate the group of offenders who will be sentenced in fiscal  year 2014, the Commission used the FY2013 datafile and moved all sentence dates  forward by one year.  Staff then determined which of these offenders would be  incarcerated on October 1,2014.  This process added another 40,178 offenders into the  analysis.  Between the two groups, the Commission's analysis included data on 179,072  offenders.
C.
In performing our analysis, we have been required to make some assumptions (set  forth below) concerning the decisions that Congress and the courts (or the President)  would make in determining whether, and to what extent, to reduce the sentences of  offenders eligible to receive a modification of sentence pursuant to the Policy Option  discussed above.  These assumptions may not hold in every case.  1.
Specifically, we have assumed that Congress would authorize the courts (or the  President would issue an order) to reduce the sentences of offenders incarcerated on or  after a specific date (discussed below) in a manner consistent with the Guidelines Manual  and bound only by any mandatory minimum penalties that might apply in current law or  as modified through the Policy Option being discussed.  We also assumed that the  Commission would make no further changes to the Guidelines Manual in light of the  Policy Option, so that the provisions of the 2013  Guidelines Manual would apply in these  cases.  Finally, we assumed that the effective date of any such Policy Option would be  October 1,2014.  Therefore, only offenders incarcerated as of that date would be eligible  to seek a reduction in sentence pursuant to the Policy Option discussed in the  memorandum.  2.
The policy we analyzed would have the effect of lowering the current statutory  mandatory minimum penalties in drug cases from 5,  10, and 20 years to 2,5, and 10  years  respectively.  In fiscal year 2010, approximately 66 percent of all drug offenders  were convicted of an  offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty.s  Of those,  approximately 46 percent remain subject to the penalty at the time of sentencing. Some  offenders receive relief from the effect of any such penalty by providing substantial  assistance to the government in the investigation or prosecution of another offender. Others receive relief from such a penalty through the statutory "safety valve" provision  which authorizes courts to sentence drug offenders without regard to any mandatory  minimum penalty provided the offender meets several criteria desirned to  identify low level, non-violent offenders with little or no prior criminal history.  Some offenders are  eligible for both provisions.
In our analysis, we provide a full reduction for all offenders who remained subject  to a mandatory minimum penalty at the time of sentencing.  That is, we reduce sentences  by 60 percent for all offenders convicted of a 5-year mandatory minimum who remained  subject to that mandatory minimum at sentencing.  Similarly, we reduce sentences by 50  percent for all offenders convicted of a 1 O-year or a 20-year mandatory minimum penalty  and who remained subject to that penalty at sentencing.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES  IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL  JUSTICE SYSTEM  154 (2011).
See  18 U.S.c. § 3553(f); USSG  §5K3.1.
Drug offenders who receive relief from a mandatory minimum penalty by  providing substantial assistance to the government have sentences that are, in general, 46  percent below the arplicable guideline minimum sentence,9 which often is the mandatory  minimum penalty. Drug offenders who receive relief from a mandatory minimum  penalty through the statutory safety valve provision have sentences that are, in general,  39 percent below the applicable guideline minimum sentence. The extent of these  reductions fluctuates somewhat each year.  Because these offenders benefitted from  substantial reductions in their sentence at the time of the original sentence, we have  assumed that any benefit to them from the Policy Option would not be as great as it  would be for those offenders who remained subject to a mandatory minimum penalty at  sentencing.  Therefore, for this analysis, we made additional assumptions for these  offenders, as follows:  -- offenders who were convicted of a drug offense carrying a 5-year mandatory  minimum penalty, but who were not subject to any mandatory penalty at sentencing due  to relief through substantial assistance or the safety valve would receive a further  reduction of 30 percent under the Policy Option (i.e., 50% of the 60% reduction that  offenders received if they remained subject to that mandatory minimum penalty at  sentencing);  -- offenders who were convicted of a drug offense carrying a 10-year or 20-year  mandatory minimum penalty, but who were not subject to any mandatory penalty at  sentencing due to relief through substantial assistance or the safety valve would receive a  further reduction of25 percent under the Policy Option (i.e., 50% of the 50% reduction  that offenders received if they remained subject to either ofthose mandatory minimum  penalties at sentencing).
This analysis does not assume any change in sentence for offenders who were not  convicted of a drug offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty.  It is possible, of  course, that Congress (of the President) might authorize a reduction in sentence for drug  offenders currently incarcerated but who were not convicted of an offense carrying a  mandatory minimum penalty.  Any such reduction would likely be tied to a change in the  Guidelines Manual that incorporated the Policy Option.  We are unable to model any  change to the sentencing guidelines from a statutory enactment of the Policy Option, and  so have excluded from this analysis any consideration of a change in sentence for drug  offenders who were not convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty.
See 2013  Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, Table 30 (2014).
See USSG §5G 1.1  (which provides that the minimum guideline sentence may not be lower than any  mandatory minimum penalty).
II See 2013  Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, Table 30A (2014). the Bureau of Prisons, and offenders would serve the lesser of the newly calculated  sentence or their life expectancies.
If you have any questions about our analysis, please do not hesitate to contact the  Commission.  We continue to work to analyze the other policy options that we discussed  with you and your colleagues.  We will provide our analyses of these options as they are  completed.
While  Black  Hispanic  Other  Total  14,773  27,512  34,096  1,590  77,971  19.0%  35.3%  43.7%  2.0%  100.0%  74.1%  25.9%  100.0%  92.5%  7.5%  100.0%  (as of October 1, 2014) 'The analysis involves a total of78,106 cases in which the offender was identified as eligible to seek a sentence reduction if  the drug mandatory minimum changes were made retroactive.  Cases missing infonnation for  any  specific analysis are excluded irom that analysis.
Total percentages may not add to  exactly 100% due to rounding.
SOURCE:  U.S. Sentencing Couunission,  1992 - 2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - USSCFY13 and projected 2014 Datafile. 'Of the 78,106 offenders who appear to be eligible for relief if the Polcy Option was applied  retroactivly, Commission records contained sufficient infonnatioll to perfonn  perfonTI this analysis for 78, I 02 offenders.
I  .he analysis involves a total of78,106 cases in which the offender was identified as eligible to seek a sentence reduction if  the drug mandatory minimum changes were made retroactive.  Cases missing infonl1ation tor any  specific analysis are excluded from that analysis.  ~The average base offense level was excluded from this analysis due to missing guideline relevant statutory information  lrom the new sentence.
Total percentages may not add to  exactly 100% due to rounding.
SOURCE:  U.S.  Sentencing Conunission,  1992 - 2012 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - USSCFY13 and projected 2014 Datafile.
section_title: 2. USSC analysis of option 2: Retroactively apply the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) of 2010 reductions in drug mandatory minimum penalties to offenders currently incarcerated for crack cocaine-related offenses.
section_title: This option would retroactively apply to eligible incarcerated offenders the reductions in mandatory minimum penalties for crack cocaine-related offenses that are provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, which did not apply to offenders already sentenced under the original penalty guidelines.
paragraphs: ONE COLUMBUS CIRCLE,  N.E.
subsections: section_title: Dear Mr. Tumin:
paragraphs: The Government Accountability Office has asked the U.S.  Sentencing  Commission to assist it in connection with its engagement (number 441173).  We  understand that through this engagement the GAO is examining ways in which the  operating costs of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BoP) can be reduced.  As we have  previously discussed with you and your colleagues, the Commission has agreed to  provide to the GAO the results of our analyses of several policy options which could  reduce the overall size of the prison population that the BoP administers.  Specifically,  our analyses of these policy options will consider the effect on the federal prison  population if the policies were implemented in such a way that the options would apply  to inmates currently incarcerated in the BoP system.
In this memorandum, we provide to you the first of these estimates.  Here we  provide our estimate of the impact on the federal prison population if the provisions of  the Fair Sentencing Act of2010 I.
Statutory Changes in the FSA and the Conforming Guideline Amendment  A.
Statutory Changes in the FSA  The FSA changed the quantities of crack cocaine that trigger the five- and ten year statutory mandatory minimum penalties.  As a consequence, first-time trafficking  offenses involving less than 28 grams of crack cocaine are subject to a statutory penalty  range of zero to 20 years of imprisonment.  First-time trafficking offenses involving  between 28  and 280 grams of crack cocaine are subject to a statutory penalty range of  five to 40 years of imprisonment.A first-time trafficking offense involving 280 or more  grams of crack cocaine is subject to a statutory penalty range of 10 years to life  imprisonment. The FSA did not make any of the statutory changes retroactive.  Therefore, offenders sentenced before the effecti ve date of the FSA continue to be  subject to the mandatory minimum penalties in effect on the date of sentencing.
B.
Temporary and Permanent Amendments to the Guidelines Manual in  Response to the FSA  On October 15,2010, the Commission promulgated a temporary, emergency  amendment to the guidelines that implemented the emergency directive in section 8 of  the FSA.(In this memorandum, the several modifications to the drug guidelines promulgated in  response to the FSA are referred to collectively as the "FSA Guideline Amendment.")
USSG, 2011  Supp. to App.  C,  Amendment 748 (effective Nov.  1,2010).
FSA Guideline Amendment added both new mitigating and aggravating provisions to  USSG §2D 1.1 for offenses involving drugs, regardless of drug type.  Part C of the FSA  Guideline Amendment eliminated a provision in the guidelines under which an offender  who possessed more than 5 grams of crack cocaine was sentenced under the drug  trafficking guideline.
C.
Retroactive Application of the FSA Guideline Amendment  The Commission voted to authorize courts to retroactively arply Parts A and C of  the FSA Guideline Amendment to offenders currently incarcerated.  Pursuant to  18  U.S.C.  § 3582(c)(2), courts were then authorized to reduce the sentences of those  offenders consistent with the amended sentencing guidelines.  To date, the courts have  reduced the sentences of more than 7,500 offenders pursuant to retroactive application of  the FSA Guideline Amendment. In more than 5,000 other cases, the courts have denied  relief to offenders seeking a reduction in sentence under the FSA Guideline Amendment.  The courts found that the offender was not eligible for any sentence reduction in more  than 3,700 of those cases.  For example, in 1,458 cases, the court found that the offender  was ineligible because the applicable mandatory minimum penalty controlled the  sentence and prevented the court from reducing the sentence.
In more than 1,045 other cases, the offender was found ineligible because the  Career Offender guideline (USSG §4B1.1), and not the drug trafficking guideline (USSG  §2D 1.1), determined the guideline range at sentencing.  As discussed above, the  mandatory minimum penalties applicable to offenders sentenced prior to the FSA were  unchanged by the act.  The Career Offender guideline is linked to statutory maximum  penalties which, in drug cases, are also linked to statutory mandatory minimum penalties.  Because neither the FSA nor the FSA Guideline Amendments had the effect of lowering  the Career Offender guideline, the provisions of 18 U.S.C.  § 3582(c)(2) allowing courts  to reduce the sentences of incarcerated offenders when their sentencing guideline is  lowered do not apply to offenders whose guideline range is determined under that  proVISIOn.
Finally, in some additional cases, the offender received only a partial reduction in  sentence under the FSA Guideline Amendment.  This was because a mandatory  minimum penalty prevented the court from lowering the sentence to a point within the  amended guideline range.
The base offense level for some quantities of crack cocaine in the Drug Quantity Table did not change as  a  result of the FSA Guideline Amendment.  Also, offenses involving quantities of less than 500 mg of crack  cocaine were unaffected by the amendment and remained assigned to BOL 12.
USSG, 2011  Supp. to App.  C,  Amendment 759 (effective Nov.  1,2011).
B.
In performing our analysis, we have been required to make some assumptions (set  forth below) concerning the decisions that Congress and the courts would make in  determining whether, and to what extent, to reduce the sentences of offenders eligible to  receive a modification of sentence pursuant to the FSA if it were retroactively applied.  These assumptions may not hold in every case.
Specifically, we have assumed that Congress would authorize the courts by statute  to reduce the sentences of offenders in accordance with the Guidelines Manual in effect  on a specific date and bound only by the mandatory minimum penalties as they were  amended by the FSA.  We also assumed that the Commission would make no further  changes to the Guidelines Manual regarding crack cocaine offenses in response to  Congress' action, so that the provisions ofthe 2012 Guidelines Manual would apply in  these cases. Finally, we assumed that the effective date of any such statutory change  would be no earlier than January 1,2014.
Additional assumptions we have made for this analysis are as follows:  (1) offenders sentenced within the applicable guideline range when they were first  sentenced would be sentenced at the same point in the range under the Guidelines  Manual in effect on January 1,2014;  (2) offenders sentenced outside the applicable guideline range when they were  first sentenced would be sentenced to a new position outside the guideline range under  the Guidelines Manual in effect on January 1,2014 that is the same proportional distance  above or below the amended guideline range as their original sentence was from the  guideline range in effect at the original sentencing;  (3) offenders for whom the new estimated sentence is below the applicable  mandatory minimum (all cases in this analysis have five grams triggering a five-year  mandatory minimum or 50 grams triggering a 10-year mandatory minimum), and where  no safety valve or substantial assistance reduction was applied when the offender was  originally sentenced, would be sentenced at the new applicable mandatory minimum;  (4) offenders classified as Career Offenders would be sentenced pursuant to the  Career Offender provision of the guidelines in accordance with the statutory maximums  as amended by the FSA.  (5) the "mitigating role cap" on the base offense level of the guidelines would be  applied, if appropriate, based upon the new base offense level;  (6) offenders originally receiving relief from a mandatory minimum penalty by  operation of the safety valve provision would continue to receive relief but, if the  applicable statutory minimum is at least five years, the offense level determined after  applying Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three (Adjustments) of the guidelines  would not be less than level  17 (pursuant to USSG §5CI.2(b»;  (7) for offenders with an original combined offense level (after application of  Chapters Two and Three) of level  16 or greater but having a new combined offense level  below level  16, the applicable reduction for Acceptance of Responsibility would be  reduced from three levels to two levels in accordance with that guideline provision;  (8) the sentence for each offender would be reduced based on the maximum good  conduct credit allowed by the Bureau of Prisons; and  (9) offenders would serve the lesser ofthe newly calculated sentence or their life  expectancies.
C.
Limitation as to Application of New Mitigating Provisions of the FSA  As discussed above, Part B of the FSA Guideline Amendment added both new  mitigating and aggravating provisions to USSG §2DI.I for offenses involving drugs,  regardless of drug type.  The Commission did not vote to allow those provisions to be  applied retroactively.  We are unable to assess the extent to which the courts might apply  these new mitigating provisions were the FSA to be applied retroactively as those  provisions involve the consideration of facts that are not readily available in the  sentencing documents provided to the Commission in all cases.  To the extent that the  courts might consider these provisions in resentencing offenders when applying the FSA  retroactively, the sentences for some offenders could be reduced below the point  determined in our estimate, which would accelerate the release of those offenders from  incarceration.
D.
For some of these offenders, the guideline range that applied at sentencing was derived from either the  Career Offender (USSG §4B 1.1) or Armed Career Criminal (USSG §4B 1.4) provision.  However, for the  purpose of this analysis these offenders are considered to have been sentenced under the drug trafficking  guideline as the court is required to calculate a guideline range for them under USSG §2D 1.1  as well. in the offense, and 3) having sufficient infonnation for analysis by the Commission's  prison and sentencing impact model.
The Commission's retroactivity analysis determined that of these 19,154  offenders,  10,325 would not experience a change in their sentence if the FSA were fully  retroactive.  These offenders were excluded from the analysis.  The majority of the  offenders (n = 9,741) were excluded because they would not experience the proposed  statutory change - either because no statutory mandatory minimum penalty applied in  their cases or the offender already was sentenced below the FSA mandatory minimum  thresholds. IS  Another 362 offenders were sentenced under the Career Offender provision  and, despite a change to their drug statutory minimum penalty, their guideline range  under the Career Offender provision did not change.  In another 191  cases, the current  sentence is greater than both the guideline minimum and the FSA statutory minimum,  therefore no change in their sentence would result.  A small number of offenders (n=30)  were excluded because their guideline range was detennined under the Armed Career  Criminal provision, which would be unaffected by the retroactive application of the FSA.  Lastly, one offender had a base offense level of38, the top of the Drug Quantity Table,  and the quantity of drugs involved in that case continued to place the offender at that  level, so therefore no change in his or her guideline range would occur.
After these offenders were excluded, there remained 8,829 offenders who were  projected to be incarcerated on January 1,2014 and who appeared eligible to seek a  reduced sentence if the provisions of the FSA were to be made retroactive as described  above.
If you have any questions about our analysis please do not hesitate to contact the  Commission.  We continue to work to analyze the other policy options that we discussed  with you and your colleagues.  We will provide our analyses ofthese options as they are  completed.
Because many of the offenders currently incarcerated in the BoP for crack offenses were sentenced after  August 3, 2010, the mandatory minimum penalty provisions applied by the courts in  most of those cases  were the lower penalties provided by the FSA.  Some courts did continue to apply the pre-FSA minimum  penalties to offenders sentenced after August 3,2010 but who committed their crime prior to that date.  However, the Supreme Court's opinion in Dorsey clarified that this practice was in error.
IOfthe 8,829 offenders who appear to be eligible for relief if the Fair Sentencing Act  of 201 0 were retroactive, Conunission records contained sufficient information to  perform this analysis for 8,468 offenders.
SOURCE:  U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1992 - 2012 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - USSCFYI2.
section_title: 3. USSC table with data for impact of option 3: Instruct U.S. Attorneys to decline to charge certain defendants in certain types of drug cases in such a manner as to trigger mandatory minimum sentences.
section_title: For option 3, the USSC provided a table composed of six subtables that show the USSC’s analysis of the estimated impact of the changes discussed in option 3. According to the USSC, the total number of offenders estimated to be affected annually by option 3 can be found in line 1, column 2, of the first table (i.e., 620). For the first 5 years’ estimated impact, we multiplied 620 by 5. According to the USSC, the bed years saved over the first 5 years of implementation can be found by adding the numbers shown in the first line of the third table, which total 788.
paragraphs: Total Cases are those with a particular sentencing factor being analyzed.
Total Cases are those with a particular sentencing factor being analyzed.
4. USSC table with data for impact of option 4: Amend USSC  sentencing guidelines for future drug offenders, reducing them two  levels below current guidelines.
This option reduces the potential sentences for all future drug offenders by  two levels below current guidelines, resulting in a roughly 18 percent  reduction of sentence length below current lengths. It was approved by the  USSC and forwarded to Congress on April 30, 2014; it will apply to future  eligible drug offenders effective November 1, 2014, in connection with  option 5 (see next option) unless amended or rejected by Congress.
For option 4, the USSC provided a table composed of 2 subtables; the  overall table is labeled “Table 5” by the USSC and shows the USSC  estimate of the changes discussed in option 4. According to the USSC, the  number of offenders estimated to be affected annually by the option  (17,457) can be found in line 1 of the first table. Some other data in the two  subtables were updated as a result of USSC actions that made option 4  retroactive (i.e., option 5), but which also delayed implementation of  retroactivity until November 1, 2015, unless amended or rejected by  Congress.
subsections: section_title: 1st Year
section_title: 1st Year After Effective Date
section_title: 5. USSC analysis of option 5: Apply the amendments to sentencing guidelines in option 4 also to incarcerated drug offenders—that is, to both new drug offenders and retroactively to incarcerated drug offenders.
section_title: This analysis (which also includes information relevant to option 4, to which it is closely related) was posted to the USSC website on July 25, 2014. (http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/retroactivity-analyses-and- data-reports/retroactivity-analyses-and-data-reports)
subsections: section_title: Office of Research and Data
paragraphs: SUBJECT:  Summary of Key Data Regarding Retroactive Application of the  I.
On April 30, 2014, the United States Sentencing Commission submitted to Congress an  amendment to the federal sentencing guidelines that would revise the guidelines applicable to  drug trafficking offenses by changing how the base offense levels in the drug quantity tables in  sections 2D 1.1  and 2D 1.11  of the Guidelines Manual!  incorporate the statutory mandatory  minimum penalties for drug trafficking offenses (Amendment 782).2  Specifically, the  amendment would reduce by two levels the offense levels assigned to the quantities that trigger  the statutory mandatory minimum penalties, resulting in corresponding guideline ranges that  include the mandatory minimum penalties, and make conforming changes to section 2D2.11.  On  July  18, the Commission voted to give retroactive effect to Amendment 782 beginning on the  effective date of the amendment, which will be November 1, 2014, unless Congress acts to  modify or disapprove the amendment.
U.S. SENTENCfNG COMMISSION,  GUIDELfNES MANUAL  §2D 1.1 (Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting or  Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses); Attempt or Conspiracy) (2013)  (hereinafter USSG); USSG §2D 1.11  (Unlawfully Distributing, Importing, Exporting or Possessing a Listed  Chemical; Attempt or Conspiracy).
References in this memorandum to the "2014 drug guidelines amendment," "the amendment," or any  similar  references mean the amendment the Commission submitted to Congress on April 30, 2014, that would modify the  drug quantity tables in USSG §§2Dl.1 and 201.11.
As part of the Commission's decision to retroactively apply Amendment 782, it required  that no offender may be released pursuant to the retroactive application of the amendment until  November 1, 2015 or later.  This memorandum provides information concerning the effect of  this limitation.
II.
FURTHER ANALYSES OF THE IMPACT OF RETROACTIVE APPLICATION  OF THE 2014 DRUG GUIDELINES AMENDMENT  A.
Summary of Data on the Eligible Offenders  ORD previously estimated that 51,141  offenders sentenced between October 1,  1991  and  October 31,2014,3 would be eligible to seek a reduction in their current sentence if the  Commission were to make the 2014 drug guidelines amendment retroactive. Of this group,  there are 46,376 offenders who would not be released under their current sentence until on or  after November 1,2015, and so could benefit from the Commission's decision to retroactively  apply Amendment 782.
The current average sentence for the 46,376 offenders who could benefit under  retroactive application of the amendment is  133 months.  Applying the amendment retroactively  to these offenders the new average sentence would be 108 months.  This is a difference of 25  months, which represents an 18.8 percent reduction in the sentence.  The number of bed years  saved by this reduction is 79,740 bed years, which would be realized by the Bureau of Prisons  over a period of years, of course.
The most common drug types involved in these cases are methamphetamine (28.8%),  powder cocaine (27.8%), crack cocaine (19.3%), marijuana (11.6%), heroin (7.6%), and other  drugs (5.0%).  Attached to this memorandum is a summary of selected offender characteristics  about these offenders as well as information about their criminal history.
B.  Summary of Data on the Projected Release Dates of the Eligible Offenders  We estimate that on November 1,2015 there would be 7,953  offenders eligible for  immediate release.  Another 8,550 offenders would be released during the year that begins on  November 1, 2015  and ends on October 31, 2016.  That is, a total of 16,503 offenders will be  released during the first year in which offenders may be released pursuant to retroactive  application of the amendment.  If the Commission had not authorized the amendment to be  applied retroactively, we estimate that 7,609 offenders would still have been released during that  year, as their current terms of incarceration expired.  Attached to this memorandum is a table that  provides additional information concerning the release years of these offenders and the districts  in which they were sentenced.
The analysis was limited to data from fiscal year 1992 and later because the Commission's data collection efforts  prior to fiscal year 1992 were not as complete as in later years.
Selected Characteristics of Eligible Offenders  Retroactive Application of Amendment 782 With  Release On or After November 1, 2015  (FY1992 through FY2015)
November 1, 2015  within  1 yf  within 2 yr  within  3 yr  within 4 yr  within 5 yr  more than 5 yr  Total  The analysis involves a total of 46,376 cases, however, cases missing infonnation for any specific analysis are excluded fi'om  that analysis.  Total percentages may not add to exactly 100% due to rounding.  * A total of 16,503  offenders are estimated to be elgible for release during the first year in which offenders may be released under  retroactive application of the amendment.  This is 8,894 more than will be released upon expiration of their current sentence.
SOURCE:  U.S.  Sentencing Commission,  1992  - 2005 Datatlles, USSCFY92 - USSCFY13.
Possible Release Timing for Retroactive Eligible Offenders bv OistJict  (FY1992 through FY2015) f:ligible ror Relensr  1:':ligiblc  ro.· Release  t:ligible  for  H.clease  10.8  18.1  14.9  17.7  9.1  16 . .1  17.0  7.2  12.1  11.3  17.9  22.6  17.6  22. 1  16.7  11.6  22.6  25.2  11.8  12.2  5.0  I::!.l  21.7  27.5  1).0  11.1  1S.:!
21.0  22.1  18.::! )
12.6  20.1  23 .1  14.1  10.0  8.4  9.7  11 .6  30.5  21 .8  21.1  28.0  '"  For example, in  (he District ofCc,llumbia. 62  offenders are eligible for  relea~e between Novennber I. 2015  aIld OL1.ober 31,2016.
Possible Release Timing for Retroactive Eligible Offenders by District  (FY1992 through FY2015)
E1it:iblc (or Releasc  ~:tigibl(.' (or Release  in  Si ..  or Mo~  in  YearT",·o  %  IS.)
1::!.2.
21 .1  13. 1  14.8  13. 1  :!l.8  51::!
3::!
16.:!  21 .::!
7:!
2)
Possible Release Timing for Retroactive Eligible Offenders by District  (FY1992 through FY2015)
Guam  Hawaii  Idaho  Montana  Nevada  Northern Mariana Lslands  Oregon  2)
Possible Release Timing for Retroactive Eligible Offenders bv District  (FY1992 through FY2015)
EJigih1c  (or Relc3!11l'  ~. ~.
38:::! ~3 ,.
15. 7  13.0  10.8  Of the 46.376 offenders  idcnriti~d :lS eligible  [-Or  relief under the amendment, Ct)lrunisi:iion records  containcd :\lIllieicnt inftxm:l1ion to pcrtllml  d,is anal)'sis  ft)C  4S,~SO l,rrcnders.
E.,tiU~1ttJ n:1/:;;a.\(. dALd de1.::rmined using lht:  Commission's prison and sentencing impact mood which !If)Prie,, f1~ l;."U&ldinc.' cltangl";'. to ulT~tc:d t,(ta:n&r!\:wld rc~ 11)(':<. olT~ in a propMi('lrcl munncr.  Undc'~ rno&~ .ffct'tl:d oni"td~I'S:  I J receive a 11(:\ ... · otlcnse level;  2) haw (~W scnl~nc:ing rang~ dcu:rm~d (d$ipg ,h;: r.lng~s from  the  Scnlc~--il\g  r~bt. .\).J~ ~aI to the:  s:tr'l'lC rel:t.tJ"c  position wilhin  (<W  ~fdcl ,hc- \NigitW 1;U'idclinc mn~ (c.g., an ofTl:odt:r curn:mly sentenced at the lTlic.\p<.)im  ~)r\hc ~wjgJntlllukh:afk.' f·:J~ ... ~thcn "i\1 b.! scntenced foJd\\:  mi~po;r\l ,,(the ~\\ ~uich;tim; r.mg.~); lind 4) rcceive  stalUl(\r:' aJld  l:,"Uideiine trwnps wben applic~lnk.  Other assumplil\flS incoI"(K\rntcd  into the mood include:  [) t\ft~rw:ier.-; eflfll  lt~ maximum  allowable good-time (clirrently 54 days  per Yelr served H'f  imposed sentences gre!lter  than one year but  not life ilTlp"isonlTII:l)t): aoo 2) ollerders sene the  Ics~'fofA) the  ,~ll!llCe im,>O!.Cd  les ...  the:  maximum aUmvnble gO<'lCi  cooduct time, or B}lhcir ... 'Slimal<:d rernniniog life C:<pc<::tallCY.  ~dupoi'l an nduary  table ino.lrporating age. (!lee. :md sex,  SOURCE:  US  Sl!'nt'L'ncing Commis5kHl.  1992  - ~013 Dalt=1ll1es.  USSCFY92 -lJSSCFY13.
section_title: 6. USSC analysis of option 6: Increase good time credits for good conduct time (GCT).
section_title: Under this option, a credit for GCT would be awarded to current offenders using a formula that would result in 54 days’ credit per year of sentence, rather than the current BOP interpretation that limits the GCT credit to 47 days per served sentence year. This would result in eligible inmates serving 85 percent of their sentences, rather than the higher 87 percent average resulting from BOP’s current interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b).
paragraphs: ONE COLUMBUS CIRCLE,  N.E.
subsections: section_title: Dear Mr. Tumin:
paragraphs: The Government Accountability Office has asked the U.S.  Sentencing  Commission to assist it in connection with its engagement (number 441173).  We  understand that through this engagement the GAO is examining ways in which the  operating costs of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BoP) can be reduced.  As we have  previously discussed with you and your colleagues, the Commission has agreed to  analyze on GAO's behalf several policy options which could reduce the overall size of  the prison population that the BoP administers.  Specifically, our analyses of these policy  options will consider the effect on the federal prison population if the policies were  implemented in such a way that the options would apply to inmates currently incarcerated  in the BoP system.
In this memorandum, we provide to you another of these estimates.  Here we  provide our estimate of the impact on the federal prison population if the current method  of determining "good time credit" were to be changed so that offenders could earn up to  54 days per year for good conduct and the BoP would be authorized to  apply that  expanded credit to all offenders currently incarcerated.
As we discuss more fully below, we estimate that 179,265 offenders who are  incarcerated and would still be in prison on October 1,2014 would be eligible to receive  additional good conduct credit under such a policy change.  The average increase in good  conduct credit for these offenders would be 2.3  months (2.2%).  The estimated total  savings to the BoP from such a policy change applied retroactively would be 34,359 bed  years.  1.
The Policy Option We Considered  Under current law, I  a prisoner who is serving a term of imprison of more than one  year may receive credit to the service of a sentence if they behave satisfactorily while  incarcerated.  Section 3 624(b) of title  18 provides:  A prisoner may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner's  sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year  of the prisoner's term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first  year of the term .... redit for the last year or portion of a year of the  term of imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the last six  weeks of the sentence.
The goal of this provision is, in essence, that offenders serve at least 85  percent of the  sentence imposed.  The BoP currently uses a formula to  determine good conduct credit  that results in a maximum of 47 days of credit being given for each year of incarceration  served.  The difference between the BoP approach and the 54 days described in the  statute occurs because ofthe BoP's interpretation of when the good conduct credit is  accrued (following the service of each year) and how the credit is to be applied to the  partial year remaining at the end of an offender's sentence.
An alternate method of calculating the good conduct credit could be to simply  award 54 days of credit for each year of sentence imposed at the beginning of the  sentence.  Although the BoP's current interpretation of the statute has been upheld by the  Supreme Court,3 the Department of Justice has proposed to Congress that it amend the  governing statute so as to allow the BoP to award up to 54 days per year.
You have asked us to consider a change to the statute whereby the calculation of  the good conduct credit is changed to authorize 54 days per year to be awarded (the  "Policy Option").
II.
Barber v.  Thomas, 560 U.S. _  (2010).
section_title: imposed if the Policy Option were to be retroactively applied. If the BoP were to grant each ofthese offenders the full good time credit of the Policy Option we estimate that the total savings to the BoP would be 34,359 bed years.
paragraphs: Table 1 provides information on some of the demographic characteristic ofthe  offenders eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to the Policy Option.  Table 2  provides an estimate of the number of offenders who would be released each year if the  Policy Option was applied retroactively compared to the number of offenders who will be  released each year pursuant to their current sentence.  As can be seen on this table, if the  Policy Option were fully retroactive on October 1,2014, there would be 819 offenders  eligible for immediate release.  Within the first year of the effective date of the Policy  Option, another 25,918 offenders would be eligible for release.  In total, the number of  offenders eligible for release under the Policy Option in the first year is 2,878 more than  the number who will be released under their current sentence.  Table 3 provides  information on selected sentencing guideline characteristics and the criminal history  category of these offenders.
For the 179,265 offenders who would be eligible to receive additional good  conduct credit under the Policy Option, the current average time served is  103.3 months.  If the BoP were to award the maximum good time credit under the Policy Option, the  projected average time served would be 101.0 months, a reduction of2.3 months (or  2.2%).  Based on this reduction, the estimated total savings to the BoP from the  retroactive application of the Policy Option would be 34,359 bed years.  This savings  would not be realized in any single year but is the cumulative savings realized over  several years.
III.
How We Conducted This Analysis  A.
The methodology for this analysis is based on the Commission's Prison Impact  Model, which has been in use in some form since the guidelines were first developed.  This model is used to estimate the impact of proposed statutory and guideline  amendments on newly sentenced offenders and to project the future impact those  amendments will have on bed space in the BoP.  For this analysis, those offenders who  appear to be eligible to receive a reduced sentence were hypothetically "resentenced"  with the computer program as if the proposed policy change had been in effect in the year  in which they were sentenced.  A new release date for each offender also was calculated  in order to determine when the offender would be eligible for release if he or she were  provided the full reduction in sentence provided by the proposed policy change.
B.
The Offender Population We Studied  The Bureau of Prisons provided the Commission with a datafile of inmates who  were in the custody of the BoP on Jan 25,2014.  That file contained approximately  189,000 offenders.  Approximately 184,000 of these offenders were sentenced between  fiscal year 1992 and fiscal 2013. USSC staffwas able to match 171,765 of these  offenders to Commission records.  Of these,  138,894 were estimated to remain  incarcerated on October 1,2014.
In order to approximate the group of offenders who will be sentenced in fiscal  year 2014, the Commission used the FY2013 datafile and moved all sentence dates  forward by one year.  Staffthen determined which of these offenders would be  incarcerated on October 1,2014.  This process added another 40,178 offenders into the  analysis.  Between the two groups, the Commission's analysis included data on 179,072  offenders.
C.
In performing our analysis, we have been required to make some assumptions (set  forth below) concerning the decisions that Congress and the courts would make in  determining whether, and to what extent, to reduce the sentences of offenders eligible to  receive a modification of sentence pursuant to the Policy Option discussed above.  These  assumptions may not hold in every case.  1.
Specifically, we have assumed that Congress would amend the provisions of 18  U.S.c. § 3624(b) in such a way that the BoP would award a maximum of good conduct  credit of 54 days per year of sentence imposed.  We have also assumed that Congress  would authorize the statutory change to be applied retroactively to offenders incarcerated  in the BoP.  2.
We have assumed that the sentence for each offender would be reduced based on  the maximum good conduct credit allowed under the Policy Option.  This assumption  may not hold for every offender, as some offenders lose a portion or all of their earned  good conduct credit as a sanction for unacceptable behavior.  As a result, our estimate of  the impact of the Policy Options may be overbroad, but not to an extent we can  determine.  We have also assumed that offenders would serve the lesser ofthe newly  calculated sentence or their life expectancies.
If you have any questions about this analysis, or any of our prior analyses that we  have provided to the GAO, please do not hesitate to contact the Commission.  This  analysis completes the list of analyses we have agreed to provide to you.  We hope that  the information the Commission has provided has been useful to the GAO in its work.
section_title: Demographic Characteristics of Eligible Offenders
paragraphs: (FY1992 through FY2014)
White  Black  Hispanic  Other  Total  47,363  58,531  67,051  6,045  178,990  26.5%  32.7%  37.5%  3.4%  100.0%  74.3%  25.7%  100.0%  92.9%  7.1%  100.0%  (as of November 1,2014) (at sentencing)
The analysis involves a total of 179,265 cases, however, cases missing information for any specific analysis are  excluded from  that analysis.
Total percentages may not add to exactly 100% due to rounding.
SOURCE:  U.S . Sentencing Commission,  1992 - 2013  Datafiles, USSCFY92 - USSCFYI3 .
Projected Y car of Release for Retroactive Eligible Offenders  (FY1992 through FY2014)
Of the  179,265 offenders who appear to be eligible to benefit under the Policy Option,  Commission records contained sufficient information to perform this analysis for  179,265 offenders.
SOURCE:  U.S.  Sentencing Commission,  1992 - 2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - USSCFYI3.
Guideline Sentencing Characteristics, Crimina] History, and  Position Relative to the Guideline Range of Eligible Offenders  (FY1992 through FY2014)
The analysis involves a total of 179,265  cases,  however, cases missing information for any specific  analysis are excluded from that analysis.
Total percentages may not add to exactly  100% due to  rounding.
SOURCE:  U.S.  Sentencing Commission,  1992 - 2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - USSCFYI3 .
section_title: 7. USSC analysis of option 7: Make the current “safety valve” available to any drug offender with no offenses that receive 3 points under the criminal history point system.
section_title: Federal law generally requires a sentencing judge to impose a minimum sentence of imprisonment following conviction for any number of federal offenses; however, there are two statutorily provided exceptions. One of these exceptions, commonly referred to as the “safety valve,” was created by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, and is available for certain types of defendants for certain offenses that carry minimum sentences. Under this option, the current statutory requirements for eligibility for safety valve relief in drug cases involving a mandatory minimum penalty would be expanded to cover incarcerated offenders with any number of criminal history points, provided that the offender does not have a conviction for which the sentence imposed was a 3-point offense under USSC sentencing guidelines. Under USSC sentencing guidelines, 3 criminal history points are assigned if an offender has been previously sentenced or is being sentenced to a prison term of 13 months or more.
paragraphs: ONE COLUMBUS CIRCLE,  N.E.
subsections: section_title: Dear Mr. Tumin:
paragraphs: The Government Accountability Office has asked the U.S.  Sentencing  Commission to assist it in connection with its engagement (number 441173).  We  understand that through this engagement the GAO is examining ways in which the  operating costs of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BoP) can be reduced.  As we have  previously discussed with you and your colleagues, the Commission has agreed to  analyze on GAO's behalf several policy options which could reduce the overall size of  the prison popUlation that the BoP administers.  Specifically, our analyses of these policy  options will consider the effect on the federal prison population if the policies were  implemented in such a way that the options would apply to inmates currently incarcerated  in the BoP system.
In this memorandum, we provide to you another of these estimates.  Here we  provide our estimate of the impact on the federal prison population if the current statutory  requirements for eligibility for "safety valve" relief in drug cases involving a mandatory  minimum penalty! were to be expanded.  Specifically, you have asked us to consider a  change to current law whereby offenders with any criminal history not involving a  conviction for which the sentence imposed exceeded  13  months would be eligible for  such relief and the courts would be authorized to resentence all federal offenders  convicted of a drug offense in a manner consistent with the revised statute.
I  18 U.S.c. § 3553(f); see also USSG §5C1.2. sentence reduction.  The average reduction in sentence for these offenders would be  18  months (19.1  percent).  The estimated total savings to the BoP from such a policy change  applied retroactively would be  15,889 bed years.  1.
The Policy Option We Considered  One of the policy options that we have agreed to examine on behalf of the GAO is  the impact of a policy change in current law whereby the current statutory requirements  for eligibility for "safety valve" relief from the application of mandatory minimum  penalties in drug cases would be expanded.  That provision currently requires courts to  sentence offenders who have been convicted of a drug offense carrying a mandatory  minimum penalty without regard for that penalty when all of several criteria are met. of the offender.  Currently,  offenders are eligible for safety valve relief only if they have been assessed no more than  one criminal history point under the sentencing guidelines.You have asked us to  consider a change to the statute whereby offenders would be eligible for safety valve  relief regardless of their criminal history score provided that none of their criminal  history involves a conviction for which the sentence imposed exceeded one year and one  month,5  and further provided they meet the remaining safety valve criteria (the "Policy  Option").
II.
Offenders convicted of an  offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded one year and one month are  assessed three points under the sentencing guidelines.  See USSG §4A 1.1 (a).  Therefore, this Policy Option  would expand safety valve relief to any offender who did not have any conviction that was assigned three  points under the criminal history provisions ofthe guidelines.
A "bed year" is the cost to the BoP of incarcerating one inmate for one year.  For example, one inmate  who serves five years of imprisonment accounts for five  bed years. provides an estimate of the number of offenders who would be released each year if the  Policy Option was applied retroactively compared to the number of offenders who will be  released each year pursuant to their current sentence.  As can be seen on this table, if the  Policy Option were fully retroactive on October 1,2014, more than 1,123 offenders  would be eligible for immediate release.  Within the first year of the effective date of the  Policy Option, another 865 offenders would be eligible for release above the number who  will be released under their current sentence.  Table 3 provides information on selected  sentencing guideline characteristics and the criminal history category of these offenders.
For the  11,949 offenders who would be eligible to receive a sentence reduction  under the Policy Option, the current average sentence is 94 months.  If the courts were to  grant the full reduction possible in each case, the projected new average sentence for  these offenders would be 76 months, a reduction of 18 months (or 19.1  percent).  Based  on this reduction, the estimated total savings to the BoP from the retroactive application  of the Policy Option would be  15,889 bed years.  This savings would not be realized in  any single year but is the cumulative savings realized over several years.
III.
How We Conducted This Analysis  A.
The methodology for this analysis is based on the Commission's Prison Impact  Model, which has been in use in some form since the guidelines were first developed.  This model is used to estimate the impact of proposed statutory and guideline  amendments on newly sentenced offenders and to project the future impact those  amendments will have on bed space in the BoP.  For this analysis, those offenders who  appear to be eligible to receive a reduced sentence were hypothetically "resentenced"  with the computer program as if the proposed policy change had been in effect in the year  in which they were sentenced.  A new release date for each offender also was calculated  in order to determine when the offender would be eligible for release if he or she were  provided the full reduction in sentence provided by the proposed policy change.
B.
The Offender Population We Studied  The Bureau of Prisons provided the Commission with a datafile of inmates who  were in the custody of the BoP on Jan 25,2014.  That file contained approximately  189,000 offenders.  Approximately 184,000 of these offenders were sentenced between  fiscal year 1992 and fiscal 2013. USSC staff was able to match 171,765 of these  offenders to Commission records.  Of these,  138,894 were estimated to remain  incarcerated on October 1,2014.
In order to approximate the group of offenders who will be sentenced in fiscal  year 2014, the Commission used the FY2013 datafile and moved all sentence dates  forward by one year.  Staff then determined which of these offenders would be  incarcerated on October 1,2014.  This process added another 40,178 offenders into the  analysis.  Between the two groups, the Commission's analysis included data on 179,072  offenders.
C.
In performing our analysis, we have been required to make some assumptions (set  forth below) concerning the decisions that Congress and the courts would make in  determining whether, and to what extent, to reduce the sentences of offenders eligible to  receive a modification of sentence pursuant to the Policy Option discussed above.  These  assumptions may not hold in every case.  1.
Specifically, we have assumed that Congress would amend the provisions of 18  U.S.C.  § 3553(f)(1) to the effect that "the defendant does not have a criminal history  score, as determined under the sentencing guidelines, that includes points added for any  conviction for which the sentence imposed exceeded one year and one month."  We have  further assumed that the Commission would amend USSG §5C1.3 to conform it to the  provisions of the amended statutory safety valve provisionbut make no further changes  to the Guidelines Manual, so that the remaining provisions of the 2013  Guidelines  Manual would apply in these cases.  Further, we have assumed that Congress would  authorize the statutory change to be applied retroactively to offenders incarcerated in the  BoP and that the Commission would amend USSG §IBl.I0 to authorize courts to apply  the amendment to USSG §5Cl.3 retroactively to those offenders on some specific date. We also assumed that the courts would resentence offenders in a manner that is consistent  with the amended Guidelines Manual. Finally, we assumed that the effective date of  any such Policy Option would be October 1,2014.  Therefore, only offenders  incarcerated as of that date would be eligible to seek a reduction in sentence pursuant to  the Policy Option discussed in this memorandum.  2.
In fiscal year 2010  approximately 66 percent of all drug offenders were convicted  of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty. Of those  approximately 46  percent remain subject to the penalty at the time  f sentencing. S  me offenders receive  relief from the effect of any such penalty by providing substantial assistance to the  government in the investigation or prosecution of another offender. Others receive  relief from such a penalty through the statutory "safety valve" provision. Some  offenders are eligible for both provisions.
Under the sentencing guidelines, drug offenders who meet the requirements of the  statutory safety valve provision, which is incorporated into the guidelines at USSG  SCI.3, are entitled to a two-level reduction in offense level. This provision applies  regardless of whether the offender was convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory  minimum penalty.  That is, for offenders who are convicted of an offense carrying a  mandatory minimum penalty, eligibility for the safety valve provides two benefits:  1)  statutory relief from application of the mandatory minimum penalty, and 2) a two-level  reduction in the offense level calculated under the sentencing guidelines.  For drug  offenders who were not convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty,  eligibility for safety valve relief also results in the two-level reduction in offense level.  For the analysis described in this memorandum, we have assumed that this structure  would be unchanged, so that all drug offenders could benefit from the Policy Option if  they meet the revised safety valve criteria and regardless of whether a mandatory  minimum penalty had ever applied in the case.
Additional assumptions we have made for this analysis are that the sentence for  each offender would be reduced based on the maximum good conduct credit allowed by  the Bureau of Prisons, and offenders would serve the lesser of the newly calculated  sentence or their life expectancies.
II See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES  IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL  JuSTICE SYSTEM  154 (2011).
If you have any questions about our analysis, please do not hesitate to contact the  Commission.  We continue to work to analyze the other policy options that we discussed  with you and your colleagues.  We will provide our analyses of these options as they are  completed.
Demographic Characteristics of Drug Offenders  Potentially Eligible for Retroactive Expanded Safety Valve (No 3-Point Events) 'The analysis involves a total  of 11,949 cases  in  which the offender was  identified as  eligible to seek a sentence reduction if  the  drug mandatory minimum changes were made  retroactive.  Cases missing information for any specific analysis are  Total percentages may not add to exactly  100% due to rounding.
SOURCE:  U.S.  Sentencing Commission,  1992 - 2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - USSCFYI3  and projected 2014 Datafile.
Estimated Projected Year of Release for Drug Offenders  l>otentially Eligible for Retroactive Expansion of Safety Valve eN 0  3-Point Events) 'Of the  11 ,949 offenders who appear to be eligible for relief if the Poley Option was applied retroactively,  Commission records contained sufficient information to perform this analysis for  11 ,917 offenders.
Guideline Sentencing ChaTactel"istics and Criminal History of  Drug Offenders Potentially Eligible for Retroactive Expanded Safety Valve (No 3-Point Events)
IThe  analysis  involves a total of 11,949 cases  in  which the offender was  identified as  eligible to seek a sentence reduction  if the expanded safety valve changes were made retroactive.  Cases missing information for  any specific analysis are  Total  percentages may not add to exactly 100% due to rounding.
SOURCE:  U.S.  Sentencing Commission,  1992 - 2013  Datafiles,  USSCFY92 - USSCFY13  and projected 2014 Datafile.
8. USSC analysis of option 8: Expand the safety valve as described in  option 7 to include both non-violent drug offenders and any  nonviolent offenders provided that they do not have a 3-point offense.
Under this option, the current statutory requirements for eligibility for "safety  valve" relief in drug cases involving a mandatory minimum penalty would  be expanded to cover both drug offenders and other non-violent (non-drug)  offenders. No offender could have a conviction for which the sentence  imposed was a 3-point offense under USSC sentencing guidelines.
ONE COLUMBUS CIRCLE,  N.E.
section_title: Dear Mr. Tumin:
paragraphs: The Government Accountability Office has asked the U.S.  Sentencing  Commission to assist it in connection with its engagement (number 441173).  We  understand that through this engagement the GAO is examining ways in which the  operating costs of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BoP) can be reduced.  As we have  previously discussed with you and your colleagues, the Commission has agreed to  analyze on GAO's behalf several policy options which could reduce the overall size of  the prison population that the BoP administers.  Specifically, our analyses of these policy  options will consider the effect on the federal prison population if the policies were  implemented in such a way that the options would apply to  inmates currently incarcerated  in the BoP system.
In this memorandum, we provide to you another of these estimates.  Here we  provide our estimate of the impact on the federal prison population if the current statutory  requirements for eligibility for "safety valve" relief in drug cases involving a mandatory  minimum penalty)  were to be expanded to all offenders regardless of the type of offense  committed, subject to some limitations.  Specifically, you have asked us to consider a  change to current law whereby any non-violent offender would be eligible for safety  valve relief regardless of the offender's criminal history, provided that the offender had  not been convicted of any offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13  months,  and the courts would be authorized to resentence those offenders in a manner consistent  with the revised statute.
As we discuss more fully below, we estimate that 38,930 offenders who are  incarcerated and would still be in prison as of October 1, 2014 would be eligible for a  I  18  U.S.c.  § 3553(f); see also USSG  §5CI.2.  sentence reduction under such a policy change.  The average reduction in sentence for  these offenders would be 15 months (20.5%).  The estimated total savings to the BoP  from such a policy change applied retroactively would be 40,552 bed years.  1.
The Policy Option We Considered  One of the policy options that we have agreed to examine on behalf of the GAO is  the impact of a policy change in current law whereby the current statutory requirements  for eligibility for "safety valve" relief from the application of mandatory minimum  penalties in drug cases would be expanded.  That provision currently requires courts to  sentence offenders who have been convicted of a drug offense carrying a mandatory  minimum penalty without regard for that penalty when all of several criteria are met. One of those criteria involves the criminal history scoreof the offender.  Currently,  offenders are eligible for safety valve relief only if they have been assessed no more than  one criminal history point under the sentencing guidelines.
You have asked us to consider a change to the statute whereby the safety valve  would be available to all offenders, not just those committing drug offenses, provided  that they offender was not a violent offender.  You also asked us to consider a further  change to the statute so that any such non-violent offender would be eligible regardless of  their criminal history score, provided that none of their criminal history involves a  conviction for which the sentence imposed exceeded one year and one month,and  further provided they meet the remaining safety valve criteria (the "Policy Option").
II.
A "bed year" is the cost to the BoP of incarcerating one inmate for one year.  For example, one inmate  who serves five years of imprisonment accounts for five  bed years.
2  provides an estimate of the number of offenders who would be released each year if the  Policy Option was applied retroactively compared to the number of offenders who will be  released each year pursuant to their current sentence.  As can be seen on this table, if the  Policy Option were fully retroactive on October 1, 2014, more than 5,623 offenders  would be eligible for immediate release.  Within the first year of the effective date of the  Policy Option, another 12,067 offenders would be eligible for release.  In total, the  number of offenders eligible for release under the Policy Option in the first year is 6,321  more than the number who will be released under their current sentence.  Table 3  provides information on selected sentencing guideline characteristics and the criminal  history category of these offenders.
For the 38,931  offenders who would be eligible to receive a sentence reduction  under the Policy Option, the current average sentence is 73  months.  If the courts were to  grant the full reduction possible in each case, the projected new average sentence for  these offenders would be 58 months, a reduction of 15  months (or 20.5%).  Based on this  reduction, the estimated total savings to the BoP from the retroactive application of the  Policy Option would be 40,552 bed years.  This savings would not be realized in any  single year but is the cumulative savings realized over several years.
III.
How We Conducted This Analysis  A.
The methodology for this analysis is based on the Commission's Prison Impact  Model, which has been in use in some form since the guidelines were first developed.  This model is used to estimate the impact of proposed statutory and guideline  amendments on newly sentenced offenders and to project the future impact those  amendments will have on bed space in the BoP.  For this analysis, those offenders who  appear to be eligible to receive a reduced sentence were hypothetically "resentenced"  with the computer program as if the proposed policy change had been in effect in the year  in which they were sentenced.  A new release date for each offender also was calculated  in order to determine when the offender would be eligible for release if he or she were  provided the full reduction in sentence provided by the proposed policy change.
B.
The Offender Population We Studied  The Bureau of Prisons provided the Commission with a datafile of inmates who  were in the custody of the BoP on Jan 25,2014.  That file contained approximately  189,000 offenders.  Approximately 184,000 of these offenders were sentenced between  fiscal year 1992 and fiscal 2013. USSC staff was able to match 171,765 of these  offenders to Commission records.  Of these,  138,894 were estimated to remain  incarcerated on October 1,2014.
In order to approximate the group of offenders who will be sentenced in fiscal  year 2014, the Commission used the FY2013 datafile and moved all sentence dates  forward by one year.  Staff then determined which of these offenders would be  incarcerated on October 1,2014.  This process added another 40,178 offenders into the  analysis.  Between the two groups, the Commission's analysis included data on 179,072  offenders.
C.
In performing our analysis, we have been required to make some assumptions (set  forth below) concerning the decisions that Congress and the courts would make in  determining whether, and to what extent, to reduce the sentences of offenders eligible to  receive a modification of sentence pursuant to the Policy Option discussed above.  These  assumptions may not hold in every case.  1.
Specifically, we have assumed that Congress would amend the provisions of 18  U.S.C.  § 3553(f) to provide that the subsection would apply at sentencing in any case in  which the offender was not convicted of a violent offense and had not used violence in  the commission ofthe offense.  We have also assumed that Congress would amend 18  U.S.C.  § 3553(f)(1) to expand eligibility under that section to  any federal offender to the  extent that:  "the defendant does not have a criminal history score, as determined under  the sentencing guidelines, that includes points added for any conviction for which the  sentence imposed exceeded one year and one month."  We have further assumed that the Commission would amend USSG §5C1.3 to  conform it to the provisions of the amended statutory safety valve provisionbut make no  further changes to the Guidelines Manual, so that the remaining provisions of the 2013  Guidelines Manual would apply in these cases.  Further, we have assumed that Congress  would authorize the statutory change to be applied retroactively to offenders incarcerated  in the BoP and that the Commission would amend USSG §IBl.I0 to authorize courts to  apply the amendment to USSG §5C1.3 retroactively to those offenders on some specific  date. We also assumed that the courts would resentence offenders in a manner that is  consistent with the amended Guidelines Manual. Finally, we assumed that the effective  date of any such Policy Option would be October 1, 2014.  Therefore, only offenders  incarcerated as of that date would be eligible to seek a reduction in sentence pursuant to  the Policy Option discussed in this memorandum.  2.
In fiscal year 2010, approximately 66 percent of all drug offenders were convicted  of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty. I I  Of those, approximately 46  percent remain subject to the penalty at the time of sentencing. Others receive  relief from such a penalty through the statutory "safety valve" provision. Some  offenders are eligible for both provisions.
Under the sentencing guidelines, drug offenders who meet the requirements of the  statutory safety valve provision, which is incorporated into the guidelines at USSG  5Cl.3, are entitled to a two-level reduction in offense level. the guideline applied in the case was from Part A of Chapter 2 of the Guidelines  Manual (which involves crimes against the person);  the guideline applied was USSG §2B2.1  (burglary of a residence);  the guideline applied was USSG §2B3.1  (robbery);  the guideline applied was USSG §2B3.2 (extortion by force or threat of injury);  the guideline applied was USSG §2Dl.9 (placing dangerous devices to protect  the guideline applied was from  Subpart 1 of Part E of Chapter 2 (racketeering);  the guideline applied was from Subpart 1 of Part G of Chapter 2 (promoting  commercial sex acts or other prohibited sexual conduct);  the guideline applied was from Subpart 2 of Part G of Chapter 2 and the conduct  involved the production of child pornography;  the guideline applied was USSG §2H4.1  (peonage, slave trade);  the guideline applied was from Part K of Chapter 2 (firearms);  the guideline applied was from Subparts  1,2,3,5, or 6 of Part M of Chapter 2  (treason, sabotage, espionage, and cases involving nuclear, biological and chemical  weapons and materials);  the guideline applied was USSG §2Nl.l (tampering with consumer products with  risk of death);  the guideline applied was USSG §2P 1.3  (prison riot);  the guideline applied was USSG §2Q 1.1  (knowing endangerment from  the guideline applied was USSG §2Ql.4 (tampering with public water system); or  the guideline applied was USSG §2X6.1  (use of a minor in a crime of violence).
Additional assumptions we have made for this analysis are that the sentence for  each offender would be reduced based on the maximum good conduct credit allowed by  the Bureau of Prisons, and offenders would serve the lesser of the newly calculated  sentence or their life expectancies.
If you have any questions about our analysis, please do not hesitate to contact the  Commission.  We continue to work to analyze the other policy options that we discussed  with you and your colleagues.  We will provide our analyses of these options as they are  completed.
section_title: Demographic Characteristics of Eligible Offenders
paragraphs: (FY1992 through FY2014)
45.4%  2.6%  100.0%  66.1%  33.9%  100.0%  (as of November 1,2014) (at sentencing)
The analysis involves a total of38,931 cases, however, cases missing information for any specific analysis are  excluded from that analysis.
Total percentages may not add to exactly 100% due to rounding.
SOURCE:  U.S. Sentencing Commission,  1992 - 2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - USSCFY13.
Projected Year of Release for Retroactive Eligible Offenders  (FY1992 through FY2014)
Of the 38,931  offenders who appear to  be eligible for relief under the amendment, Commission  records contained sufficient information to perform this analysis for 38,930 offenders.
SOURCE:  U.S. Sentencing Commission,  1992 - 2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - USSCFY13.
Guideline Sentencing Characteristics, Criminal History, and  Position Relative to the Guideline Range of Eligible Offenders  (FY1992 through FY2014)
The analysis involves a total of 38,931  cases, however, cases missing information for any specific  analysis are excluded from  that analysis.
Total percentages may not add to exactly  100% due to  rounding.
SOURCE:  U.S . Sentencing Commission,  1992 - 2013  Datafiles, USSCFY92 - USSCFYI3 .
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: David C. Maurer, (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Jill Verret (Assistant Director),  Pedro Almoguera, Billy Commons, Adam Couvillion, Michele Fejfar, Eric  Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Linda Miller, Michael Tropauer, and Jonathan R.  Tumin made key contributions to this report.