Missile Defense: Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and Improving Accountability
Published: 2014-04-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In order to meet its mission, MDA is developing a diverse group of BMDS components including (1) land-, sea-, and space-based sensors; (2) interceptors; and (3) a battle management system. These systems can be integrated in different ways to provide protection in various regions of the world. Since its inception in 2002, MDA has been given flexibility in executing the development and fielding of the ballistic missile defense system. This statement addresses recent MDA progress and the challenges it faces with its acquisition management. It is based on GAO's March and April 2014 reports and prior reports on missile defense.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense's (DOD) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) made progress in its goals to improve acquisition management, and accountability and transparency. The agency gained important knowledge for its Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) by successfully conducting several important tests, including the first missile defense system-level operational flight test. Additionally, key programs successfully conducted developmental flight tests that demonstrated key capabilities and modifications made to resolve prior issues. MDA also made some improvements to transparency and accountability. For example, MDA improved the management of its acquisition-related efforts to deploy a missile defense system in Europe and MDA continued to improve the clarity of its resource and schedule baselines, which are reported to Congress for oversight.
Although some progress has been made, MDA acquisitions are still high risk, due to inherent technical and integration challenges, tight timeframes, strategies that overlap development and production activities, and incomplete management tools. More specifically:
MDA faces challenges stemming from higher-risk acquisition strategies that overlap production activities with development activities. While some concurrency is understandable, committing to production and fielding before development is complete often results in performance shortfalls, unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, and test problems. GAO found that the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense SM-3 Block IB and Ground-based Midcourse Defense programs, which have already produced some of their assets before completing testing, discovered issues during testing that have affected or continue to affect production.
Testing continues to fall short of goals. For example, the first ever system-level operational flight test failed to demonstrate true integration. MDA also combined, delayed, and deleted some tests, and eliminated test objectives in other tests. These challenges reduced the knowledge they had planned to obtain in order to understand the capabilities and limitations of the BMDS.
MDA has not yet fully developed or implemented a complete management strategy for synchronizing its efforts to deploy missile defense in Europe. As a result, it remains unclear how different European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) efforts are aligned together and what constitutes success in delivering capabilities in Europe.
Issues with the content and presentation of resource and schedule baselines continue to limit their usefulness as management tools. For the fourth year, GAO has found that MDA's cost estimates are unreliable for some BMDS elements and do not include certain costs for military services which may significantly understate total costs. Recently, Congress took steps to require that improvements be made to MDA's cost estimates, so GAO did not make any new cost recommendations. MDA's schedule baselines continue to be presented in a way that makes it difficult to assess progress. For instance, MDA's schedule baselines identify numerous events, but provide little information on the events and why they are important.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: In April 2014, GAO recommended that MDA verify any changes needed for the SM-3 Block IB missile through flight testing before approving full production; retest the fielded GMD interceptor to demonstrate performance and the effectiveness of changes; and take actions to improve the clarity of its schedule baselines. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation on the SM-3, stating that MDA will verify the efficacy of any modifications by testing and that the production decision will be vetted through the DOD process. DOD did not agree with the recommendation on GMD, stating that the decision to flight test the interceptor will be made by the Director, MDA, based on the judgment of other stakeholders. GAO previously made recommendations on EPAA and testing. DOD generally concurred with them. GAO continues to believe all recommendations are valid.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the acquisition progress  achieved and challenges that remain for the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Since 2002, MDA has been  charged with developing and fielding the Ballistic Missile Defense System  (BMDS), which is expected to be capable of defending the United States,  deployed troops, friends, and allies against ballistic missiles of all ranges  and in all phases of flight. It has spent over $98 billion to develop and  deploy a diverse collection of land-, sea-, and space-based assets, and  has requested an additional $38 billion for fiscal years 2014 through 2018  to continue its efforts. Since its inception, MDA has been operating in an  environment of tight time frames for delivering capabilities—first with a  presidential directive in 2002 to field a limited capability by 2004 and then  with a presidential announcement in 2009 to deploy U.S. missile defense  in Europe. Looking forward, it will also have to operate in an environment  of budgetary constraints, which necessitate tough trade-off decisions. As  a result, MDA will require additional steps to reduce acquisition risk to  ensure it provides warfighters with systems whose performance and  capability is understood, and which are delivered on time and on budget.
This year, we continue to report that missile defense acquisitions are high  risk. MDA has made tangible progress in increasing the complexity and  sophistication of missile defense tests, enhancing plans and processes  for deploying U.S. missile defense in Europe, and increasing the  completeness and clarity of cost and schedule reporting to the Congress.  However, two key programs face challenges stemming from higher –risk  acquisition strategies that overlap production activities and development  activities; testing overall continues to provide less knowledge than initially  planned and considerably more improvements are needed in both  reporting to the Congress and in planning for deployment of missile  defense in Europe. Many of the challenges MDA faces are tied to the  technical and integration risks that are inherent in the capabilities MDA is  seeking to deliver, while others are tied to tight time frames placed on  MDA as well as changing demands. Nevertheless, MDA still has  opportunities to take steps to reduce acquisition risk, increase  transparency, and enhance oversight. MDA’s new Director is focused on  doing so, though it may take time for his efforts to affect the MDA’s broad  portfolio of acquisitions, particularly older programs that began without  sound foundations for success.
Since 2002, we have been mandated to prepare annual assessments of  MDA’s progress toward its acquisition goals. Our report in response to  this mandate was issued on Tuesday, April 1, 2014. This testimony  highlights the findings from that report as well as relevant findings from  other recent related reports. To assess MDA’s progress and related  challenges, we examined the acquisition accomplishments of individual  missile defense programs and supporting efforts that MDA is currently  developing and fielding. We conducted this work in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives. Additional information on our scope and  methodology is available in our issued reports.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: MDA’s BMDS is being designed to counter ballistic missiles of all  ranges—short, medium, intermediate, and intercontinental. Because  ballistic missiles have different ranges, speeds, sizes, and performance  characteristics, MDA is developing multiple systems that, when  integrated, provide multiple opportunities to destroy ballistic missiles in  flight for the strategic defense of the United States and regional defense  of its deployed forces and allies. The BMDS architecture includes space- based sensors, ground- and sea-based radars, ground- and sea-based  interceptor missiles, and a command and control, battle management,  and communications system to provide the warfighter with the necessary  communication links to the sensors and interceptor missiles.
Table 1 provides a brief description of some of the BMDS systems, which  MDA refers to as elements, and programs included in this year’s  assessment. More details can be found in our report.
When MDA was established in 2002, the Secretary of Defense granted it  exceptional flexibility to set requirements and manage the acquisition of  the BMDS in order to quickly deliver protection against ballistic missiles.  This decision enabled MDA to rapidly deliver assets, but we have  reported that it has come at the expense of transparency and  accountability. Examples of key problems we have cited in reports in  recent years and which continue to affect MDA’s acquisitions are  highlighted below.
MDA’s highly concurrent acquisition approach has led to significant  cost growth, schedule delays, and in some cases, performance  shortfalls. Concurrency is broadly defined as the overlap between  technology development and product development or between  product development and production. While some concurrency is  understandable, committing to product development before  requirements are understood and technologies are mature or  committing to production and fielding before development is complete  is a high-risk strategy that often results in performance shortfalls,  unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, and test problems. At  the very least, a highly concurrent strategy forces decision makers to  make key decisions without adequate information about the weapon’s  demonstrated operational effectiveness, reliability, and readiness for  production. According to MDA officials, they have taken some steps  to identify and track concurrency in their programs. However, high  levels of concurrency adopted earlier for some programs persist  today.
Testing disruptions have reduced the knowledge planned to be  available to inform acquisition decisions and understand performance.  For example, flight test failures disrupted MDA’s acquisitions of  several components and forced MDA to suspend or slow production  of three out of four interceptors, including the GMD interceptor and the  Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3 Block IB (SM-3 Bock IB). In the  Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) case, because MDA moved  forward years ago with CE-I and CE-II interceptor production before  completing its flight testing program, test failures have exacerbated  disruptions to the program. Specifically, because the program has  delivered approximately three-fourths of the interceptors for fielding, it  faces difficult and costly decisions on how it will implement corrections  from prior test failures. Additionally, after fielding these assets, the  program has had to add tests that were previously not planned, in  order to assess the extent to which prior issues were resolved. It also  had to delay tests that were needed to understand the system’s  capabilities and limitations.
MDA has been challenged to meet some of its goals for the European  Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). During the past several years,  MDA has been responding to a mandate from the President to  develop and deploy new missile defense systems in Europe. This  four-phase effort was designed to rely on increasingly capable  missiles, sensors, and command and control systems to defend  Europe and the United States. Each successive phase is expected to  defend larger areas against more numerous and more capable threat  missiles. DOD delivered the first phase, for short and medium range  defense of Europe, in December 2011, and has been making  progress in developing some systems to support future phases.  However, in March 2013, the Secretary of Defense canceled two  programs, planned for the fourth phase, thus eliminating the fourth  phase, which was intended to provide additional layer for defense of  the United States against intercontinental ballistic missiles. The  cancelations were driven in part by affordability concerns, schedule  delays and technical risks associated with these programs. Our  previous work found similar issues with other EPAA efforts. We also  found that MDA has lacked a comprehensive management approach  to synchronize key EPAA activities.
Finally, MDA’s acquisition baseline reporting has provided limited  insight into the cost and schedule progress of the BMDS. Due to the  acquisition flexibilities it has been granted, BMDS’s entrance into  DOD’s acquisition process is deferred, and laws and policies that  generally require major defense acquisition programs to take certain  steps at certain phases in the acquisition process will not apply until  the program enters this process. For example, major defense  acquisition programs are generally required to document key  performance, cost, and schedule goals in an acquisition baseline at  certain phases in the acquisition process; because BMDS has not  progressed through threshold phases of the DOD acquisition process,  this requirement is not yet applicable. To improve the transparency  and accountability of BMDS development efforts, Congress has  enacted legislation requiring MDA to establish some baselines. MDA  reported baselines for several BMDS programs to Congress for the  first time in its June 2010 BMDS Accountability Report (BAR).  Specifically, MDA’s baselines, including resource and schedule  baselines, are reported in the BAR and are updated annually. Since  2011, although progress has been made to improve the reporting, we  have found issues affecting the usefulness of MDA’s acquisition  baselines for oversight due to (1) a lack of clarity, consistency, and  completeness; (2) a lack of high-quality supporting cost estimates and  schedules; and (3) instability in the content of the baselines.
Our work has recommended a number of actions that can be taken to  address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended  that DOD reduce concurrency and more closely follow knowledge based  acquisition practices. We also made recommendations designed to  reduce testing risk, and to improve schedule and cost reporting. DOD has  generally concurred with our recommendations, and has undertaken  some actions to reduce acquisition risk, and improve accountability and  transparency.
section_title: MDA Made Progress on Testing and Further Improved Some Management Practices
paragraphs: This year we found that MDA gained important knowledge about the  BMDS system-level performance and individual elements by successfully  executing several flight tests. We also found that MDA further improved  some of its acquisition practices for managing the European Phased  Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and improved the clarity of its resource and  schedule baselines.
subsections: section_title: Progress: MDA Demonstrates BMDS Capability Through Testing
paragraphs: In April 2014, we reported that MDA made progress in demonstrating the  systems’ capabilities by conducting the first system-level operational flight  test in September 2013. This is a significant achievement because it is  the first time that MDA conducted an operational flight test that involved  multiple elements working simultaneously. The test involved warfighters  from several combatant commands, and according to independent testing  officials, recreated a potentially realistic scenario. During this test, MDA  launched two medium-range ballistic missile targets, including its newly  developed air-launched extended-medium range ballistic missile  (eMRBM). Both the Aegis SM-3 Block IA and THAAD successfully  intercepted their targets, demonstrating progress towards achieving an  integrated BMDS. In addition, the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB and GMD  programs successfully conducted developmental flight tests in 2013 that  demonstrated key capabilities and modifications made to resolve prior  issues. Specifically, the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB intercepted all targets  in its last three flight tests. GMD also successfully conducted a non- intercept flight test of its CE-II interceptor, demonstrating the performance  of a guidance component that MDA redesigned in response to a  December 2010 flight test failure.
section_title: Progress: EPAA Acquisition Management Improves
paragraphs: We also found that DOD improved the acquisition management of  EPAA. In our first report on the subject in 2010, we assessed progress  of EPAA acquisition planning against six key acquisition principles that  synchronize acquisition activities and ensure accountability.that DOD has established testing and acquisition plans for technology   We found  development and engineering, and had begun work on identifying key  stakeholders. This year, we found improvements in these areas. For  example, DOD completed identifying EPAA stakeholders and in 2012  issued a directive updating the warfighter role in testing and capability  acceptance.
Lastly, in April 2014, we found that MDA continued to improve the clarity  of its resource and schedule baselines, which are reported to Congress in  its annual acquisition report called the BAR. In its 2013 BAR, MDA  continued to incorporate useful changes it made last year, and took some  additional actions to improve the completeness and clarity of the BAR  baselines by:  identifying the date of the initial baseline and, if applicable, the date  when the initial baseline was most recently revised; explaining most of the significant cost and schedule changes from the  current baseline estimates against both the estimates reported in the  prior year’s BAR and the latest initial baseline; and making the baselines easier to read by removing cluttered formatting  such as strikethroughs and highlights that made some of the events  listed in past BARs unreadable.
section_title: MDA Continues to Face Testing and Acquisition Challenges
paragraphs: Although MDA has taken some steps to improve its acquisitions, the  agency continues to face several challenges that we have found in  previous reviews. Specifically, it faces challenges stemming from high- risk acquisition practices, as well as challenges in BMDS testing,  managing the development of EPAA capabilities, and reporting resource  and schedule baselines that support oversight. Until MDA addresses  these challenges, the agency and decision makers may not obtain the  information needed to assess the capabilities of the BMDS or make  informed acquisition and investment decisions.
subsections: section_title: Challenge: Implementing Higher Risk Acquisition Programs
paragraphs: While MDA has gained important insights through testing and taken some  steps to improve management and increase transparency, it still faces  challenges stemming from higher-risk acquisition strategies that overlap  production activities with development activities. While some concurrency  is understandable, committing to production and fielding before  development is complete often results in performance shortfalls,  unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, and test problems. It can  also create pressure to keep producing to avoid work stoppages. Our  April 2014 report found that Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB and GMD, which  have already produced some of their assets before completing testing,  discovered issues during testing that could affect or have affected  production. Although both programs demonstrated progress in resolving  previous issues, some of which stemmed from their concurrent  acquisition strategies, testing revealed new issues. Specifically:
An interceptor failure during a September 2013 test of Aegis BMD  SM-3 Block IB means that a key component, common to the deployed  SM-3 Block IA, may need to be redesigned and flight tested. While the  failure review is not yet complete, if a redesign is necessary,  interceptors that were already produced may require retrofits. MDA  continues to procure new SM-3 Block IBs while it investigates the  cause of the failure.
A GMD CE-I interceptor failure in a July 2013 flight means that MDA  did not demonstrate the interceptor could perform under more  challenging conditions than previously tested, further delaying  knowledge of the interceptors performance capability. Additionally, the  failure precluded confirmation that previous design changes improved  performance, and delayed the upcoming test needed to resume  production of CE-II interceptors. According to program officials, the  failure review is not complete, but the failure could have been caused  by a component common to both the CE-I and CE-II interceptors. It is  still unclear what, if any, corrective action will be needed. The GMD  program has had many years of significant and costly disruptions  caused by production getting well ahead of testing and then  discovering issues during testing. Consequently, even though some  assets have already been produced, MDA has had to add tests that  were previously not planned and delay tests that are necessary to  understand the system’s capabilities and limitations. Additionally,  since it has delivered approximately three-fourths of its interceptors,  MDA faces difficult and costly decisions on how it will implement  corrections from prior test failures. As a result of these development  challenges, the GMD program will likely continue to experience  delays, disruptions, and cost growth.
We made recommendations to address the ongoing issues with both  systems in our April 2014 report. First, we recommended that the  Secretary of Defense direct MDA’s Director to flight test any modifications  that may be required to the Aegis SM-3 Block IB, before the Under  Secretary of Defense, Acquisitions, Technology, & Logistics approves full  production allowing the program to manufacture the remaining  interceptors. Second, we also recommended testing the fielded GMD CE- I interceptor in order to complete the original purpose of the failed test to  (1) demonstrate the CE-I’s effectiveness against a longer range threat in  more challenging conditions, and (2) confirm the effectiveness of previous  upgrades as well as (3) confirm any new modifications to address the  failure work as intended. DOD partially concurred with the  recommendation on the Aegis SM-3 Block IB, stating that MDA will verify  the efficacy of any modifications by testing and that the full production  decision will be vetted through the DOD process. DOD did not agree with  the recommendation on GMD, stating that the decision to flight test the  interceptor will be made by the Director, MDA, based on the judgment of  other stakeholders.
section_title: Challenge: Gaining Expected Knowledge From Testing
paragraphs: In this year’s reports, we found that testing has provided less knowledge  than initially planned.experienced testing shortfalls, including failures of Aegis and GMD  interceptors I mentioned above. The agency also combined, delayed, and  deleted some tests, and eliminated test objectives in others. These  changes reduced the knowledge expected to be available to understand  the capabilities and limitations of the BMDS. Examples of key testing  problems we cited in this year’s reports are:   While MDA accomplished some testing goals, it
Operational Integration—Although the September 2013 operational  flight test demonstrated layered defense between Aegis BMD and  THAAD, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation concluded that  the test did not achieve true integration. Specifically there were  system network issues, interoperability limitations, and component  failures. For example, the test uncovered several issues with  communication networks that are needed for interoperability between  the elements. Interoperability is important because it can improve  missile defense effectiveness and mitigate some limitations of the  systems working alone.
Test plan revisions continue to reduce the knowledge planned to be  available to understand BMDS performance and inform acquisition  decisions. In our March 2014 and April 2014 reports, we found that  MDA combined, delayed, and deleted some tests, and eliminated test  objectives in others. For example, MDA had to make some  adjustments to its September 2013 operational flight test, reducing the  number of targets from five to two and removing the participation of  more mature elements. The agency also reduced the number of  ground tests, which are used to assess performance and  interoperability. While MDA added other ground tests to mitigate some  effects of this reduction, they are smaller in scope and may not  provide the same amount of data about how the systems work  together.
Previously GAO has made recommendations to improve MDA’s ability to  gather expected knowledge from testing. For example, we recommended  that MDA add non-intercept tests for new targets and ensure that its test  plan can absorb unforeseen events, like failures, in order to minimize  disruptions to the test schedule. We also recommended that MDA  synchronize its testing with development and delivery schedules for its   MDA generally concurred with our recommendations, but has  assets.not fully implemented them.
section_title: Challenge: Managing Development and Deployment of U.S. Missile Defense in Europe
paragraphs: In March 2014, we found that while MDA made further improvements to  the way it manages EPAA, it has yet to develop or implement a complete   Specifically, MDA  management strategy for synchronizing these efforts.has not established an integrated schedule and has yet to completely  define EPAA requirements. As a result, it remains unclear how different  EPAA efforts are aligned together and what constitutes success in  delivering EPAA capabilities. Considering that defensive capability  planned for EPAA increasingly depends on integrated performance of the  participating systems, an acquisition approach that identifies and  synchronizes all needed activities becomes increasingly important. While  flexibility is a hallmark of the EPAA policy, it also increases the risk of  delivering less capability than expected without demonstrating the actual  performance of what is delivered.
In fact, our March 2014 report found concurrency, fragmentation of  development activities, and delays for some originally planned  capabilities. For example, we found that some systems may be delivered  later than originally anticipated for integration activities. This reduces the  time to discover and correct issues. We also found schedule delays that  reduced both the capability MDA plans to deliver and the understanding  of how that capability will perform. For example, although MDA delivered  the first set of capability in December 2011, an upgrade originally planned  for 2014, is now expected in 2015. Additionally, we found that MDA split  the delivery of capability it initially planned to deliver in 2015 into two  segments. It now plans to deliver what it calls “basic” or “core” capability  in 2015 and the remainder in 2017. Similarly, MDA also realigned its  plans for the capability it initially planned for 2018 into two segments— designating a subset of originally planned capability to be delivered in  2018, with the remainder in 2020 or later. Finally, MDA postponed its  plans to conduct a formal system-level end-to-end assessment of EPAA  capabilities because of concerns with data reliability associated with such  tests. MDA is currently making investments to develop the tools it needs  to improve the reliability of their system-level assessments, but they are  expected to be ready after two-thirds of EPAA capabilities have been  delivered.
We have previously made recommendations to improve management of  EPAA, which are highlighted in this year’s report. Although DOD  generally concurred with these recommendations, it has not yet fully  implemented them.
section_title: Challenge: Reporting Resource and Schedule Baselines that Support Oversight
paragraphs: Although we found in March 2014 that MDA took some additional steps to  improve the clarity of its resource and schedule baselines, this was the  fourth year that we have found MDA’s resource baselines are not  sufficiently reliable to support oversight. Additionally, issues with the  content and presentation of the schedule baselines continue to limit the  usefulness of the information for decision makers. According to agency  officials, MDA is taking steps to improve the reliability of their resource  baselines, however, until MDA completes these efforts, its baselines will  not be useful for decision makers to gauge progress.
Since MDA first reported baselines in June 2010, we have found that the  underlying information supporting its resource baselines does not meet  best practice standards for high-quality cost estimates. baselines reported in its 2013 BAR remain unreliable because the agency  is still in the process of improving the quality of the cost estimates that  support its baselines. For example,
MDA has not fully implemented its cost estimating handbook. In  April 2013, we reported that, in June 2012, MDA completed an  internal Cost Estimating Handbook, largely based on GAO’s Cost  Estimating and Assessment Guide which, if implemented, could help  address nearly all the shortfalls we identified. According to MDA  officials, the agency is still in the process of applying that handbook to  its cost estimates and therefore revised estimates for BMDS elements  included in the 2013 BAR were not ready for our review.
MDA has not obtained independent cost estimates of the  reported baselines. Officials from DOD’s Office of the Director for  Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation told us that although they  examined costs for some BMDS elements over the last two years,  they have not completed a formal independent cost estimate for a  BMDS element since 2010.
GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.:  March 2009).
MDA’s cost estimates reported in the 2013 BAR do not include  operation and support costs funded by individual military  services. In April 2013, we found that MDA was not reporting the  operation and support costs borne by other military services and  concluded that as a result MDA’s reported costs may significantly  understate the full costs for some BMDS elements. We recommended  MDA include these costs in its resource baselines reported in the  BAR.full costs of DOD programs, but the department stated that the BAR  should only include content for which MDA is responsible. However,  limiting the baseline reporting to only MDA costs precludes decision  makers from having insight into all the costs associated with MDA’s  weapons systems. We continue to believe that reporting these costs  would aid both departmental and congressional decision makers as  they make difficult choices of where to invest limited resources.DOD  does not currently report the full costs for MDA’s missile defense  acquisitions.
DOD agreed that decision makers should have insight into the  In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Congress  took steps to address concerns over MDA’s cost estimates. As a result,  we did not make any new recommendations regarding cost this year.  However, we plan to continue to monitor MDA’s progress because  establishing high-quality cost estimates that are accurate, credible, and  complete is fundamental to creating realistic resource baselines.
In April 2014, we also found that assessing MDA’s progress in achieving  its schedule goals is difficult because MDA’s 2013 schedule baselines are  not presented in a way that allows decision makers to understand or  easily monitor progress.identify numerous events, but provide little information on the events and  why they are important. In addition, MDA’s schedule baselines do not  present any comparisons of event dates. Because MDA’s schedule  baselines only present current event dates, decision makers do not have  the ability to see if and how these dates have changed.
For instance, MDA’s schedule baselines  We recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the MDA Director  to improve the content of the schedule baselines by highlighting critical  events, explaining what these events entail and why they are important,  and by presenting information in a format that allows identification of  changes from the previous BAR as well as from the initial baseline. DOD  concurred with our recommendation.
This concludes my statement, I am happy to answer any questions you  have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For future questions about this statement, please contact me at (202)  512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to the work this  statement is based on include David B. Best and Patricia Lentini,  Assistant Directors; Susan C. Ditto; Aryn Ehlow; Wiktor Niewiadomski;  John H. Pendleton; Karen Richey; Brian T. Smith; Jennifer Spence;  Steven Stern; Robert Swierczek; Jay Tallon; Brian Tittle; and Hai V. Tran;  Alyssa Weir; and Gwyneth B. Woolwine.
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