Defense Infrastructure: DOD Should Improve Reporting and Communication on Its Corrosion Prevention and Control Activities
Published: 2013-05-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: According to DOD, corrosion can significantly affect the cost of facility maintenance and the expected service life of DOD facilities. While corrosion is not always highly visible, it can lead to structural failure, loss of capital investment, and environmental damage. In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed DODs corrosion prevention and control program for facilities and infrastructure. In this report, GAO assessed the extent that DOD (1) met reporting requirements, (2) maintained accurate return-on-investment data in its records, and (3) fully informed relevant officials of its corrosion-control efforts. GAO reviewed DOD policies and plans, met with corrosion-control officials, and visited and interviewed officials at 32 installations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has invested more than $68 million in 80 projects in fiscal years 2005 through 2010 to demonstrate new technology addressing infrastructure-related corrosion, but project managers have not submitted all required reports on the results of these efforts to the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office (Corrosion Office). The DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan requires project managers to submit a final report when a project is complete, and submit a follow-on report within two years after the military department implements the technology. As of November 2012, GAO found that project managers had not submitted final reports for 50 of the 80 projects (63 percent) funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2010. Also, project managers had not submitted follow-on reports for 15 of the 41 projects (37 percent) funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2007. GAO found that the Corrosion Offices tracking system lacks key information to help ensure that project managers meet reporting requirements. Furthermore, the Corrosion Office is not fully exercising its authority to identify and implement options or incentives to address funding and other reasons given for not meeting reporting milestones. Also, GAO found inconsistency among the military departments Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives (Corrosion Executives) in holding project managers accountable for submitting the required reports. Without effective actions to ensure timely submission of final and follow-on reports, decision makers may be unaware of potentially useful technologies to address corrosion.
The Corrosion Office maintains records on its infrastructure-related corrosion projects, including initial and reassessed return-on-investment estimates, for internal and external reporting, such as in DODs annual budget report to Congress. GAO found that the Corrosion Offices records showed updates to the initial estimates for the proposed projects, but the office has not consistently updated its records to show the reassessed estimates included in the follow-on reports. Specifically, GAO found that the Corrosion Office did not update data in its records for 5 of 25 projects (20 percent) with completed follow-on reports. Federal internal control standards require agencies to use internal controls to provide assurance that they have reliable financial and other reports for internal and external use. Without accurate and timely data, Congress and DOD managers may not have reliable information on the estimated return on investment as they oversee corrosion projects.
DODs Corrosion Executives use mechanisms, such as briefings and site visits, to collect and disseminate information on corrosion-control activities in their departments; however, GAO found that slightly more than half of public works officials interviewed at 32 installations were unaware of DODs corrosion-related offices and resources. Under federal statute, Corrosion Executives are tasked with coordinating corrosion activities in their departments. GAO found that many relevant service officials interviewed did not receive key corrosion-control information because their Corrosion Executives do not have targeted communication strategies and accompanying action plans. Without a strategy and action plan, managers of facilities and infrastructure may not have access to all available information on efficient methods for corrosion prevention and control.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends five actions to improve DODs project reporting and tracking, the accuracy of its return-on-investment data, and its communication with stakeholders on corrosion-control activities for facilities and other infrastructure. DOD partially concurred with three recommendations and did not agree with two. DOD plans to implement a web-based tracking tool to improve data timeliness and standardization, among other actions. GAO continues to believe that its recommendations to improve project reporting are warranted, that the Corrosion Office should use its existing authorities to identify and implement other incentives for project managers to meet reporting milestones and that DOD should revise its guidance so that Corrosion Executives would assist with the oversight of project reporting.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 2013 the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that the estimated  cost of corrosion was about $20.8 billion annually to prevent and mitigate  corrosion of all of its assets, including military equipment, weapons, and  facilities and other infrastructure. While the vast majority of these costs  are related to corrosion issues on military equipment and weapons, the  cost of corrosion at DOD facilities and other infrastructure was estimated  to be about $1.9 billion annually. The vast size of DOD’s real-estate  portfolio of more than 555,000 facilities—including barracks,  commissaries, data centers, office buildings, laboratories, maintenance  depots, storage tanks, and piers—and linear structures, such as  pipelines, roads, and runways, on more than 28-million acres provides  additional challenges for DOD in preventing and repairing damage from  corrosion of its infrastructure. Corrosion is defined in Section 2228 of  Title 10 of the United States Code as the deterioration of a material or its  properties due to a reaction of that material with its chemical  environment.lead to structural failure, loss of capital investment, and environmental  damage.
The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required the  Secretary of Defense to designate an officer, employee, board, or committee as the  individual or office with this responsibility. See Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 1067 (2002)  (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2228). The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2008 amended this requirement by designating the Director of Corrosion Policy and  Oversight as the official with these responsibilities. See Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 371 (2008)  (amending 10 U.S.C.§ 2228). strategy, and including the returns on investmenttechnology demonstration projects.
In 2008, section 903 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 required the Departments of Army,  Navy and Air Force to each designate a Corrosion Control and Prevention  Executive (hereafter referred to as Corrosion Executive) to be the senior  official in each military department with responsibility for coordinating  department-level corrosion prevention and control program activities. Section 903, among other things, assigned responsibility to the three  Corrosion Executives for (1) coordinating department-level corrosion  prevention and control activities (including budget programming) with the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, the program executive officers of the  military departments, and relevant major subordinate commands of each  military department; (2) ensuring that corrosion prevention and control is  maintained in each department’s policy and guidance, including military  infrastructure design, construction, and maintenance; (3) identifying the  funding levels necessary for accomplishing certain corrosion-related  priorities in each department, and (4) submitting an annual report to the  Secretary of Defense with recommendations pertaining to the corrosion  prevention and control program of each department. Section 903 also  designated each military department’s Corrosion Executive as that  department’s principal point of contact with the Director of the Corrosion  Office.
The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L.  No.110-417, § 903 (2008). corrosion, and the Corrosion Office has required military departments’  project managers to submit periodic reports on the status and outcomes  of these projects.
We have examined DOD’s corrosion issues for a number of years and  this is our first report focusing on DOD’s corrosion-control activities for  DOD facilities and other infrastructure, including projects to demonstrate  new technology that can prevent or mitigate corrosion. In response to  your request, GAO reviewed DOD’s corrosion prevention and mitigation  program for facilities and other infrastructure. This report addresses  (1) the extent to which the military services have met DOD requirements  to submit reports on corrosion technology demonstration projects; (2) the  extent to which the return-on-investment data submitted by the military  departments is accurately reflected in records maintained by the  Corrosion Office; and (3) the extent to which DOD’s corrosion-control  officials have fully informed relevant officials within each department  about efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion of facilities and other  infrastructure. We also provide information on the results of the Corrosion  Office-sponsored cost-of-corrosion studies of DOD facilities and other  infrastructure (see app. I).
To address our first objective, we obtained project information on 80  infrastructure-related corrosion projects proposed by the military  departments and approved for funding by the Corrosion Office for fiscal  years 2005 through 2010. We reviewed project documentation—project plans, bimonthly or quarterly status reports, final project reports, and  project follow-on reports—to determine if reports were submitted and the  data met the Corrosion Office’s reporting requirements. To assess the  reliability of the data, we met with Corrosion Office officials to identify the  process by which DOD generated and tracked project data, and we  reviewed the documents for any missing data, outliers, or other errors.  If the military departments did not provide the required information, we  interviewed the Corrosion Executives and the military departments’  research and development officials (project managers)—who were the  principal authors and points of contact for the facilities and other  infrastructure projects—to determine their rationale for not completing the  required reports. According to the DOD Corrosion Prevention and  Mitigation Strategic Plan, a final report must be submitted when each  demonstration project is completed. According to Corrosion Office  officials, each demonstration project typically is completed within two  years after the receipt of funding. For the purposes of our work in  reviewing projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2010, we  considered a final report to be submitted if the Corrosion Office had a  copy of the report in its records system. We did not consider the  timeliness of the submitted reports. Additionally, the DOD strategic plan  requires that follow-on reports be submitted for completed projects within  two years after the projects have been completed and transitioned to use  within the military departments According to Corrosion Office officials, the  transition period to implement the demonstrated technology in a military  department can be up to one year. As a result, for follow-on reports, we  could assess only the projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2007  (41 of the 80 projects). For completed projects, we documented the initial  return-on-investment estimates shown in the project plans and the  resulting change, if any, shown in the follow-on reports. We determined  that the project reporting data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  determining the extent to which the military departments met the  Corrosion Office’s reporting requirements, but we did not determine the  timeliness of the reports or assess elements of reports.
The DOD strategic plan uses the phrase “return-on-investment validation”  to describe how project managers recompute the return-on-investment  estimate included in a project’s follow-on report. This recomputation is  based on revised cost data after the project has been completed and the  new technology has been transitioned to the services’ use and tracked for  two years. We are using the terms “reassessment” or “reassessed” rather  than “validation” or “validated” because they more closely describe the  process that the project managers are to use to review and update, if  necessary, the assumptions used to recompute the initial return-on- investment estimate. Additionally, Corrosion Office officials told us that  they are planning to use the term “reassessment” in the revised DOD  strategic plan. The reassessment is not an update based on actual results  of the cost savings achieved by the project.
To address our second objective, for all 105 infrastructure-related  corrosion projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2012, we  compared the return-on-investment estimates found in the project plans  with the return-on-investment estimates maintained in the Corrosion  Office’s records to determine if any inconsistencies existed in the data.  When we found inconsistencies between the return-on-investment  estimates in the project plans and the Corrosion Office’s records, we  asked the Corrosion Office to explain the inconsistencies and provide  additional information to help reconcile the differences in the estimates.  Further, we compared the return-on-investment estimates maintained in  the Corrosion Office’s records for projects funded in fiscal years 2005  through 2007 with the return-on-investment estimates contained in the  military departments’ follow-on reports to check for any differences  between the two sets of records.
To address our third objective, we reviewed related guidance, documents,  policies, and procedures regarding the management of DOD’s corrosion  prevention and mitigation program. We interviewed officials at various  levels within DOD—Corrosion Office officials, Corrosion Executives, the  military services’ installation management commands, and facility and  infrastructure managers within the services’ civil engineering and public  works components—to discuss their corrosion prevention and control  efforts, including challenges and successes in implementing new  corrosion technologies. We selected a nonprobability sample of  32 installations; conducted site visits with 6 of these 32 military  installations and completed semistructured interviews via conference  calls with the other 26 military installations to collect information and  views from facility and infrastructure management officials about their  corrosion management efforts. In selecting the 32 installations for our  nonprobability sample, we limited the installations for selection to those  active-duty installations with at least 25 buildings owned by the federal  government and ensured a range of locations were selected from each of  the four military services and across the geographic regions of the United  States. Our selection criteria also included the selection of installations  with different environmental conditions, some joint bases, and  installations that participated in the Corrosion Office’s corrosion  technologies demonstration projects. The purpose of our semistructured  interviews was to understand how the installation officials (1) use policies,  plans, and procedures to identify and address corrosion; (2) address  corrosion prevention and mitigation; (3) determine their maintenance and  sustainment priorities; and (4) receive and disseminate information on  relevant corrosion topics. We determined that the data used to select  the installations included in our review were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of selecting our nonprobability sample. We provide more details  about installation selection methodology and data-collection efforts in our  scope and methodology section in appendix II.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to May 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Strategic Planning and Guidance for Corrosion Prevention and Control
paragraphs: DOD submitted the first version of its long-term corrosion strategy to  Congress in December 2003. DOD developed this long-term strategy in  response to direction in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2003. In November 2004, DOD revised its long-term  corrosion strategy and issued its DOD Corrosion Prevention and  Mitigation Strategic Plan. DOD strives to update its strategic plan  periodically, most recently in February 2011, and officials stated the next  update in planned for 2013. The purpose of DOD’s strategic plan is to  articulate policies, strategies, objectives and plans that will ensure an  effective, standardized, affordable DOD-wide approach to prevent, detect  and treat corrosion and its effects on military equipment and  infrastructure.
In January 2008, the department first issued DOD Instruction 5000.67,  Prevention and Mitigation of Corrosion on DOD Military Equipment and  Infrastructure, which was canceled and reissued with the same title in  February 2010.policy, assign responsibilities, and provide guidance for the establishment  and management of programs to prevent or mitigate corrosion of DOD’s  military equipment and infrastructure. This instruction describes legislative  requirements and assigns the Corrosion Executives responsibility for  certain corrosion prevention and control activities in their respective  military departments. It requires the Corrosion Executives to submit  information on proposed corrosion projects to the Corrosion Office with  coordination through the proper military department’s chain of command,  as well as to develop support, and provide the rationale for resources to  initiate and sustain effective corrosion prevention and mitigation programs  in each military department.
section_title: Corrosion Office Operations
paragraphs: According to statute and DOD guidance, the Director of the Corrosion  Office is responsible for the prevention and mitigation of corrosion of DOD  equipment and infrastructure. The Director’s duties include developing  and recommending policy guidance on corrosion control, reviewing the  corrosion-control programs and funding levels proposed by the Secretary  of each military department during DOD’s internal annual budget review,  and submitting recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding  those programs and proposed funding levels. In addition, the Director of  the Corrosion Office periodically holds meetings with the DOD Corrosion  Board of Directors and serves as the lead on the Corrosion Prevention  and Control Integrated Product Team. The Corrosion Prevention and  Control Integrated Product Team includes representatives from the  military departments, the Joint Staff, and other stakeholders who help  accomplish the various corrosion-control goals and objectives. This team  also includes the seven Working Integrated Product Teams which  implement corrosion prevention and control activities. These seven  product teams are organized to address the following areas: corrosion  policy, processes, procedures and oversight; metrics, impact, and  sustainment; specifications, standards, and qualification process; training  and certification; communications and outreach; science and technology;  and facilities. Appendix A of the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation  Strategic Plan contains action plans for each product team, including  policies, objectives, strategies, planned actions and results to date.
To accomplish its oversight and coordination responsibilities, the  Corrosion Office has ongoing efforts to improve the awareness,  prevention and mitigation of corrosion of military equipment and  infrastructure, including (1) hosting triannual corrosion forums;  (2) conducting cost-of-corrosion studies; (3) operating two corrosion  websites; (4) publishing an electronic newsletter; (5) working with industry  and academia to develop training courses and new corrosion  technologies; and (6) providing funding for corrosion-control  demonstration projects proposed and implemented by the military  departments. According to the Corrosion Office, these corrosion activities  enhance and institutionalize the corrosion prevention and mitigation  program within DOD.
To receive funding from the Corrosion Office, the military departments  submit project plans for their proposed projects that are evaluated by a  panel of experts assembled by the Director of the Corrosion Office. The  Corrosion Office generally funds up to $500,000 per project, and the  military departments generally pledge matching funding for each project  that they propose. The level of funding by each military department and  the estimated return on investment are two of the criteria used to evaluate  the proposed projects. Appendix D of the DOD Corrosion Prevention and  Mitigation Strategic Plan includes instructions for submitting project plans,  along with instructions for submission of final and follow-on reports. For  the project selection process, the military departments submit preliminary  project proposals in the fall and final project proposals in the spring, and  the Corrosion Office considers the final proposals for funding. Projects  that meet the Corrosion Office’s criteria for funding are announced at the  end of the fiscal year. Figure 1 provides additional details of the project  selection process for a given fiscal year.
As part of the project selection process, DOD’s strategic plan states that  the estimated return on investment, among other things, must be  documented for each proposed project. The total cost for each project is  based on both the funding requested from the Corrosion Office and the  funding provided by the military departments. DOD records reflect varying  estimated returns on investment and savings for each proposed project  submitted by the military departments. According to the Corrosion Office,  a senior official within each military department reviews the proposed  projects, including the estimated return on investment, before the project  plans are submitted to the Corrosion Office. Section 2228 of Title 10 of  the United States Code requires the Secretary of Defense to include the  expected return on investment that would be achieved by implementing  the department’s long-term strategy for corrosion, including available  validated data on return on investment for completed corrosion projects  and activities, in his annual corrosion-control budget report to Congress.
section_title: Reporting Requirements
paragraphs: DOD’s strategic plan stipulates three reporting requirements for approved  projects. According to Corrosion Office officials, the project managers  typically are responsible for completing the reporting requirements. The  requirements are to: (1) provide bimonthly or quarterly project updates  until the project is completed, (2) submit a final report as soon as each  project is completed, and (3) submit a follow-on report within two years  after a project is completed and the technology has transitioned to use  within the military department.
Figure 2 provides a breakout of the number of projects that have reached  various reporting milestones as of November 2012. There were  105 infrastructure-related corrosion projects funded from fiscal years  2005 through 2012, in which
41 projects had reached the milestone for submitting final and follow- on reports, including return-on-investment reassessments;
39 projects had reached only the milestone for submitting final
25 projects were not yet complete, thus they have not reached the  milestone for submitting final or follow-on reports.
In September 2012, we reported that the Corrosion Office performs an  analysis to determine the average return-on-investment estimates for  projects that it cites in its annual corrosion-control budget report to  Congress. Additionally, we reported that the Corrosion Office did not  use the most up-to-date data for the projects’ returns on investment or  provide support for the projects’ average return on investment that was  cited in its fiscal year 2013 corrosion-control budget report to Congress.  We recommended that DOD provide an explanation of its return-on- investment methodology and analysis, including the initial and, to the  extent available, the reassessed return-on-investment estimates.  However, DOD did not agree with our recommendation. In its written  comments, DOD generally restated the methodology in its strategic plan,  which the military departments use to estimate the projected return on  investment of each project. DOD did not provide any additional reasons  why it did not use current return-on-investment estimates in its report to  Congress. Additionally, in our December 2010 review, we recommended  that DOD update applicable guidance, such as Instruction 5000.67, to  further define the responsibilities of the Corrosion Executives to include  more specific oversight and review of corrosion project plans before and  during the selection process. However, DOD did not agree with our  recommendation and stated that DOD-level policy documents are high- level documents that delineate responsibilities to carry out the policy and  that specific implementing guidance is provided through separate  documentation. Further, in some of our earlier work, we reported that the  secretaries of the military departments did not have procedures and  milestones to hold major commands and program offices accountable for  achieving strategic goals to address corrosion regarding facilities and  weapons systems. DOD agreed with our recommendations to define  and incorporate measurable, outcome-oriented objectives and  performance measures into its long-term corrosion mitigation strategy that  show progress toward achieving results. Additionally, in May 2013 GAO  issued a separate report assessing DOD’s and the military departments’  strategic plans. All the related GAO products are listed at the end of this  report.
section_title: DOD Has Not Ensured the Submission of All Reports on the Results of Its Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Projects
paragraphs: DOD has not ensured that all final and follow-on reports on the results of  its infrastructure-related corrosion projects were submitted as required by  its strategic plan. As of November 2012, our review found that project  managers had not submitted the required final reports for 50 of the 80  projects (over 60 percent) funded from fiscal years 2005 through 2010.  Also, for 41 of the 80 projects that were funded from 2005 through 2007,  we found that the project managers had not submitted the required follow- on reports for more than a third of the projects (15 of the 41 projects).  DOD’s Corrosion Office, the military departments’ Corrosion Executives,  and the military departments’ project managers cited various reasons for  not meeting reporting milestones. DOD’s Corrosion Office has not  effectively used its existing authority to hold project management offices  accountable for submitting required reports at prescribed milestones and  the office lacks an effective method for tracking reports submitted by the  project managers. Moreover, DOD has not provided clear guidance to the  military departments’ Corrosion Executives on their responsibilities and  authorities for assisting the Corrosion Office in holding their project  management offices accountable for submitting reports for their  infrastructure-related corrosion projects.
subsections: section_title: Project Managers Have Not Submitted Many Final and Follow-On Reports
paragraphs: DOD has invested more than $68 million in 80 infrastructure-related  corrosion projects funded from fiscal years 2005 through 2010, but project  managers have not submitted all of the required reports on whether the  corrosion-control technologies are effective. DOD’s strategic planstates that project plans should include a milestone schedule for  reporting, including quarterly status reports, final reports and follow-on  reports. According to Corrosion Office officials, if a project is approved, a  quarterly status report is required starting the first week of the fiscal  quarter after the contract award and every three months thereafter until  the final report is submitted. Also, DOD’s strategic plan requires a final  report at project completion, and requires a follow-on report two years  after project completion and transition to use within the military  departments. According to Corrosion Office officials, these reports  provide valuable information on the results of corrosion projects and in  planning future projects.
Corrosion Office officials stated that project managers must submit final  reports at project completion, which is typically within two years after the  receipt of the funding of each project. As stipulated in DOD’s strategic  plan, final reports should include certain content, such as an executive  summary, lessons learned, recommendations, and conclusions. However,  we found that 50 of the 80 required final reports (63 percent) for projects  funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2010 had not been submitted. Table 1  shows the status of final reports submitted by each service for  infrastructure-related projects.
DOD’s strategic plan also requires that follow-on reports be submitted  within two years after a project is completed and transitioned to use in the  military department. According to Corrosion Office officials, this transition  period includes up to one year to implement the technology in a military  department. Corrosion Office officials also told us that they expected the  follow-on reports to be submitted within five years of a project’s initial  funding. Therefore, follow-on reports for 41 completed projects funded in  fiscal years 2005 through 2007 were due on or before the end of fiscal  year 2012. We found that project managers had not submitted 15 of the  41 required follow-on reports (37 percent). DOD’s strategic plan states  that the follow-on reports should include an assessment of the following  areas: project documentation, project assumptions, responses to mission  requirements, performance expectations, and a comparison between the  initial return-on-investment estimate included in the project plan with the  new estimate. Table 2 shows the status of follow-on reports submitted by  each service. In Appendix III of this report, we provide details of the  returns on investment for all follow-on reports that were submitted.
According to officials in the Corrosion Office, final and follow-on reports  are used to assess the effectiveness of the corrosion projects and  determine if continued implementation of the technology is useful. As  Corrosion Office officials review project managers’ final reports, they  stated that they focus on any lessons learned, technical findings,  conclusions and recommendations, and whether the results from the  report should trigger follow-on investigations of specific technology and a  review for broader applications of the technology. Officials stated that  they review follow-on reports to assure that necessary implementation  actions have been taken and to review changes in the return-on- investment estimates.
section_title: Corrosion Office and Military Departments Cited Various Reasons for Project Managers Not Submitting Reports
paragraphs: The military departments and Corrosion Office provided various reasons  to explain why project managers did not complete and submit mandatory  final and follow-on reports within expected timeframes. For example,  officials at the Army Engineering Research Development Center,  Construction Engineering Research Laboratory—who are the project  managers for Army infrastructure projects—stated that funding  challenges, problems with contractor performance, and personnel issues  contributed to delays in completing the final reports, but acknowledged  that it was their responsibility to reduce their longstanding backlog.  Additionally, according to the Navy’s Corrosion Executive, officials of the  Naval Facilities Engineering Command (Engineering Support Center)— who are the project managers for Navy infrastructure projects—did not  have sufficient funding to complete and submit all required reports.  Finally, according to a Corrosion Office official, the final report for the one  Air Force fiscal year 2005 project was not submitted because the project  manager did not complete it before retiring.
Additionally, Corrosion Office officials cited other reasons that a project  manager may be late in completing the required reports, such as lengthy  coordination processes and the lack of priority that military departments’  officials place on completing required reports. The officials stated that  they expect the military departments’ project managers to complete final  reports within two years after receipt of funds, and it is the military  departments’ responsibility to plan so that funding is available to complete  all required reports. To assist the military departments with their  responsibility, the Corrosion Office in fiscal year 2011 offered personnel  and funding resources to the military departments to conduct the return- on-investment reassessments needed to complete follow-on reports.  According to the Corrosion Office, only the Navy accepted the funds to  complete all but one return-on-investment reassessment. According to an  official in the Army Corrosion Executive’s office, he informed the project  managers about the additional funding, but no one accepted the offer. We  found at least four fiscal year 2006 projects where Army project managers  did not use the available funding to complete and submit the required  reports. Officials from the Army’s project management office told us that  the project managers did not accept the additional funding to complete  the 2006 projects because they had some work performance issues with  the contractor assigned to complete the return-on-investment  reassessments. In April 2012, these officials told us that follow-on reports  for three projects were written but have not been submitted to the  Corrosion Office, and the remaining follow-on report was still under  development. As of November 2012, we found that these reports, which  were due by the end of fiscal year 2011, still had not been submitted to  the Corrosion Office. Further, the Air Force did not complete the follow-on  report for its one corrosion project funded in fiscal year 2005. According  to Corrosion Office officials, they did not require the Air Force to complete  the follow-on report for this project because the demonstration was  successful and the technology was implemented elsewhere within DOD.
section_title: Corrosion Office’s Tracking System Does Not Ensure That Project Managers Submit Required Reports
paragraphs: Corrosion Office officials told us that they track each corrosion project’s  progress and review submitted final and follow-on reports for findings and  broad application of corrosion-prevention techniques and approaches,  including changes in the project’s initial and reassessed return-on- investment estimates. However, the Corrosion Office’s tracking system is  limited and does not record the reason for late reporting or set new  reporting deadlines. According to Section 2228 of Title 10 of the United  States Code, the Secretary of Defense is required to report specific  information including the expected return on investment that would be  achieved by implementing the department’s long-term strategy for  corrosion, including available validated data on return on investment for  completed corrosion projects and activities, in his annual corrosion- control budget report to Congress. The Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government require federal managers to establish internal  control activities, such as controls over information processing,  segregation of duties, and accurate and timely recording of transactions  and events—including pertinent information to determine whether they  are meeting their goals—to help ensure that management’s directives are  carried out and managers achieve desired results through effective  stewardship of public resources.
Specifically, the Corrosion Office employs a contractor to maintain  electronic records about all corrosion projects. Corrosion Office officials  stated that project managers submit copies of their reports to the  Corrosion Office and to the respective Corrosion Executive. On a monthly  basis, the contractor checks each project’s records to determine if the  project managers have submitted the required reports. If a project  manager has not submitted a required report, the contractor notifies the  Corrosion Office and that office contacts the relevant project manager  and that manager’s Corrosion Executive. At that point, a Corrosion Office  official encourages project managers to submit the report as soon as  possible, but the Corrosion Office does not record a reason for late  reporting and does not set a new reporting deadline. Also, the Corrosion  Office officials stated that they elevate discussions about late filers in the  three forums held each year that include meetings between Corrosion  Office officials and Corrosion Executives. However, the Corrosion Office’s  tracking system does not require that the project managers include  certain information, such as stating reasons for missing a reporting  deadline and identifying a revised deadline for submitting their reports.  Additionally, the format developed by the Corrosion Office for completing  the follow-on reports does not include a data field that would document  when the project managers submitted their follow-on reports to the office.  By not adopting an enhanced tracking system that includes revised  deadlines, among other things, the Corrosion Office is unable to  effectively monitor whether project managers are working toward new  timeframes to complete overdue reports. Without effective tracking, the  Corrosion Office will allow a number of project managers to continue the  practice of not submitting the required reports and project managers will  not fully inform decision makers of the latest outcomes of the corrosion- control projects.
section_title: Corrosion Office Uses Routine Communication Methods to Encourage Project Management Offices to Submit Required Reports, but Has Not Employed Other Options
paragraphs: Section 2228 of Title 10 of the United States Code requires the Secretary  of Defense to develop and implement a long-term corrosion strategy that  should include, among other things, implementation of programs to  ensure a focused and coordinated approach to collect, review, validate,  and distribute information on proven corrosion prevention methods and  products. In response to this requirement, the Corrosion Office oversees  corrosion projects and uses routine communication methods and follow- up to encourage the project management offices to submit the required  reports, but the office is not employing other options that would hold  project management offices accountable for reporting milestones. For  example, Corrosion Office officials stated that they have initiated  telephone conversations and e-mails to project managers to reemphasize  reporting requirements and have had limited success in obtaining some of  the outstanding reports. However, there are other options beyond routine  communications that the Corrosion Office could take to make project  managers accountable for submitting timely reports, such as using  funding incentives or changing evaluation criteria for project selection.  Corrosion Office officials told us that they considered holding back  funding for future projects from project management organizations that  missed reporting deadlines, but they chose not to implement this action  because it could delay progress in addressing corrosion control within the  department. Although the Corrosion Office in 2011 offered the military  departments additional funding to complete and submit follow-on reports,  Corrosion Office officials stated that they would not set aside a portion of  its annual funds in the future to assist project management offices in the  completion of outstanding reports due to uncertainty in annual funding.
Further, a senior Corrosion Office official stated that the office has  considered but not adopted criteria for new projects that would include a  project management office’s past reporting performance as an indicator  for assessing corrosion project plans. DOD’s strategic plan refers to  factors that are used by the evaluation panel to assess project plans and  determine which to approve and fund. The evaluation factors, among  other things, include whether the proposed project can be completed  within a two-year timeframe, the risk associated with the project, and the  estimated return on investment. The senior Corrosion Office official told  us that the office has considered including a factor that would assess a  project management office’s history of reporting performance as a  criterion for deciding whether to approve and fund the office’s future  projects; however, the office decided not to do so. The official stated that  a successful project is one that reduces the impact of corrosion on  weapon systems and/or infrastructure, and a project’s report in and of  itself does not contribute to the success of the project. However, late  submissions of reports could delay communication of project outcomes as  planners are considering funding new projects, as well as limit key  information that should be included in the annual corrosion-control budget  report to Congress. The Corrosion Office has not implemented other  options to better ensure that project managers consistently submit  required reports. Internal control standards emphasize the importance of  performance-based management to ensure program effectiveness,  efficiency, and good stewardship of government resources. Without using  its existing authorities for oversight and coordination to identify and  implement possible options or incentives for addressing the various  funding, personnel, or other reasons cited by project management offices  for not meeting reporting milestones, the Corrosion Office may be missing  opportunities to effectively reduce the number of outstanding reports,  enforce requirements, and ensure that the valuable information in past  projects is known and appropriately documented.
section_title: Corrosion Executives Have Not Taken Consistent Actions to Ensure Timely Submission of Required Reports
paragraphs: The three military departments’ Corrosion Executives work with project  managers for the infrastructure-related corrosion projects to ensure that  the reporting requirements are being met; however, they have not taken  effective actions to ensure that all project managers submit their required  reports on a timely basis. DOD Instruction 5000.67 describes  responsibilities for Corrosion Executives, such as being the principal  points of contact for each military department to the Director of the  Corrosion Office, developing, supporting, and providing the rationale for  resources for initiating and sustaining effective corrosion prevention and  control in the department, evaluating the effectiveness of each  department’s program, and establishing a process to collect information  on the results of corrosion prevention and control activities.
While DOD’s strategic plan and other guidance—such as its corrosion  instruction—identify the Corrosion Executives’ overall role in the  management of each military department’s corrosion prevention and  control program, the Corrosion Executives do not have clearly defined  roles for holding their project managers accountable for submitting  required reports. During our discussions with the military departments’  Corrosion Executives, we found that each executive varied in describing  the extent of his work with corrosion project managers to ensure that the  required reports are completed. For example, officials within the office of  the Army’s Corrosion Executive told us that they are involved in all  aspects of the corrosion demonstration project and receive updates and  reports from the Army’s project managers. Also, these officials stated that  they are in the process of developing additional policy on facilities and  other infrastructure to improve the corrosion project process and provide  an Army funding mechanism to cover costs of reporting after expiration of  initial project funding. However, for the infrastructure-related corrosion  projects, the other two military departments have not been as involved as  the Army in ensuring that project managers submit required reports. For  example, the Air Force’s Corrosion Executive stated that he coordinates  with the Corrosion Office to track outstanding reports and can task the  project managers to complete the required reports by going through the  appropriate chain of command. Also, the Navy’s Corrosion Executive told  us that he maintains a level of awareness on the status of projects’  reports, but does not play an active role in the submission of project  reports because project managers have the responsibility to submit  reports to the Corrosion Office.
DOD’s strategic plan and instruction assign specific responsibilities to the  Corrosion Executives; however, these documents do not clearly define a  role for the Corrosion Executives in ensuring that all project managers  submit mandatory reports. Without clearly defined responsibilities for the  Corrosion Executives to help ensure required reporting, the Corrosion  Executives may not take a leading role in holding project managers  accountable for completing and submitting mandatory reports. If a  number of project managers continue to be late in completing mandatory  reports, decision makers are unlikely to be fully informed about whether  implemented projects used effective technology to address corrosion  issues and whether this technology could have broader uses throughout  the military departments’ installations.
section_title: Corrosion Office Has Not Updated All Records to Accurately Reflect the Return- On-Investment Estimates in the Military Departments’ Follow-On Reports
paragraphs: The Corrosion Office maintains data for its infrastructure-related corrosion  projects, but the office has not updated all of its records to accurately  reflect the return-on-investment estimates that are provided in the military  departments’ follow-on reports. The data maintained by the Corrosion  Office includes the financial investments provided by the Corrosion Office  and the military departments, the estimated savings expected, and the  calculated return-on-investment estimates for all of the military  departments’ funded and unfunded corrosion projects. Additionally, for  each project, the Corrosion Office maintains data on whether the project  managers have completed and submitted the required follow-on report  and the value of the reassessed return-on-investment estimate in that  follow-on report. The follow-on report shows, among other things, a  comparison of the new estimate and the initial return-on-investment  estimate included in the project plan. According to Corrosion Office  officials, the data contained in its records system are used for reporting  purposes, both internally and externally, such as the stated estimated  returns on investment that are summarized in DOD’s annual corrosion  budget report to Congress. According to Standards for Internal Control in   agencies should use internal controls that  the Federal Government,provide a reasonable assurance that the agencies have effective and  efficient operations, and have reliable financial reports and other reports  for internal and external use. Further, this guidance requires, in part,  controls over information processing, and accurate and timely recording  of transactions and events, to help ensure that management’s directives  are carried out and managers achieve desired results through effective  stewardship of public resources.
During our review, we found differences between the initial return-on- investment estimates included in project plans and the initial estimates in  the Corrosion Office’s records for 44 of the 105 projects (42 percent). The  Corrosion Office provided reasons for correcting data. Specifically,  according to the Corrosion Office officials, there were two main reasons  for these differences:(1) funding-level changes between the estimate  included in initial project plan and funding provided when the project was  approved; and (2) incorrect computations of the estimated returns on  investment by the project managers that required the Corrosion Office to  recalculate the estimate to ensure consistency and accuracy. However,  when comparing the reassessed return-on-investment estimates included  in the projects’ follow-on reports with the reassessed estimates in the  Corrosion Office’s records, we found that the Corrosion Office had not  updated all of its records with the return-on-investment estimates from the  follow-on reports. Specifically, we found that for 5 of 25 projects  (20 percent) funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2007, the Corrosion  Office had not updated its records to reflect the reassessed return-on- investment estimates included in the projects’ follow-on reports. The  return-on-investment estimates for these 5 projects were from outdated  sources, such as project plans and final reports. Specifically, the return- on-investment estimates for 3 Army projects were taken from final reports  that had been submitted to the Corrosion Office in June 2007. Also, the  return-on-investment estimates for one Army and one Navy project were  from the project plans that had been submitted to the Corrosion Office in  June 2004 and October 2004, respectively. Table 3 identifies the  5 projects funded in 2005 that had discrepancies in data.
While the Corrosion Office has created records to track the estimated  returns on investment of infrastructure-related corrosion projects, we  found that the office has not adopted a best practice to maintain reliable  data with accurate and timely information throughout its records. The  Corrosion Office may use this return-on-investment data in its reporting,  both internally and externally, such as in DOD’s annual corrosion budget  report to Congress. Additionally, in September 2012, we reported that the  Corrosion Office did not use current data for the projects’ returns on  investment or provide support for the projects’ average return on  investment. Without accurate and timely return-on-investment estimates  maintained in the Corrosion Office’s records for corrosion projects,  Congress and DOD corrosion-control managers may not have sufficient  and reliable information about returns on investment for their oversight of  completed projects.
section_title: Corrosion Executives Have Mechanisms to Disseminate Information, but Have Not Ensured That All Relevant Service Officials Receive Key Corrosion-Control Information
subsections: section_title: Corrosion Executives Use Various Mechanisms to Collect and Share Corrosion-Control Information
paragraphs: All the military departments’ Corrosion Executives use mechanisms— such as product team meetings, briefings, conferences, and site visits—  to collect and disseminate information on infrastructure-related corrosion  activities within their departments. Additionally, the Corrosion Executives  host information sessions during the triannual DOD corrosion forums to  discuss their corrosion-related issues. However, in our interviews with  installation officials who were involved with corrosion work, slightly more  than half of the officials were unaware of DOD’s Corrosion Office, their  respective Corrosion Executive, or the training, information, and other  resources available through the related offices. According to the Duncan  Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section  903, the Corrosion Executive at each military department is, among  other things, responsible for coordinating corrosion prevention and control  activities with the military department and the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, the program executive officers, and relevant major subordinate  commands. Additionally, DOD Instruction 5000.67 directs each Corrosion  Executive, in coordination with the proper chain of command, to establish  and maintain a process to collect information on the results of corrosion- control activities for infrastructure within its department. Further, the DOD  Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan includes a  communications goal to fully inform all levels of DOD about all aspects of  corrosion work and states that the rapid and reliable exchange of  information is the core of DOD’s new corrosion-control culture. Also,  each military department developed documents for corrosion control and  prevention that acknowledged the importance of communication on  corrosion control. Likewise, internal controls have shown that  organizations benefit from communicating timely information to  management and others to help them achieve their responsibilities.
During this review, we found that the military departments’ Corrosion  Executives use various mechanisms to collect and disseminate corrosion- related information within each department’s chain of command.  Additionally, we learned that the Corrosion Executives have encountered  challenges in ensuring that information about their infrastructure-related  corrosion-control initiatives reaches all relevant service-level officials.  Specifically, each military department identified the following mechanisms  and challenges:  Army—In the 2012 U.S. Army Corrosion Prevention and Control  Strategic Plan, the department established an Army Corrosion Board and  an Army Corrosion Integrated Product Team to address corrosion issues.  According to officials in the Corrosion Executive’s office, the board has  held its first organizational meeting and the integrated product team  meets as needed, often virtually. Additionally, the officials explained that  they communicate key information on corrosion of Army facilities and  other infrastructure through the relevant Army offices in the chain of  command for installations, using data calls. However, one Corrosion  Executive official stated that the Army does not have a formal process to  communicate directly to officials in the field about lessons learned or best  practices for addressing corrosion of facilities and other infrastructure.  The Army’s strategic plan includes the goal to address poor  communication and outreach that may hinder corrosion-control solutions  from being implemented in the field.
Navy—The Navy’s Annual Report on Corrosion for Fiscal Year 2011  states that a concerted awareness program is one of the cornerstones of  improving communications about corrosion control and prevention within  the Department of the Navy, which includes the United States Navy and  the United States Marine Corps. The Corrosion Executive chairs the  department’s Corrosion Cross-Functional Team, an internal group of  subject matter experts and relevant command officials, to serve as the  primary method for coordinating within the department. Additionally, the  Navy’s Corrosion Executive noted that he works within the department’s  applicable chain of command for corrosion issues for facilities and other  infrastructure. Further, the Corrosion Executive stated that the office  communicated its roles and responsibilities through information provided  in regular department communications, such as bulletins, briefings and  conferences; and also through site visits and assessments. However, he  noted that the frequency of opportunities for conferences and site visits  will be limited in the future due to budget constraints. The Navy’s strategic  plan for corrosion notes that it will continue to use communications as a  tool in its corrosion-control efforts.
Air Force—In the May 2012 Air Force Enterprise Corrosion Prevention  and Control Strategic Plan, the department acknowledged that facilities  and other infrastructure organizations have not been integrated into the  department’s corrosion program. In its strategic plan, the Air Force  highlighted the need to establish lines of communication, structures, and  process to ensure that facilities incorporate appropriate corrosion control  throughout each life cycle. Also, the Corrosion Executive stated that the  department in June 2012 created a Corrosion Control and Prevention  Working Group in which he serves as the lead and meets regularly with  the working group members from the Air Force’s major commands and  relevant components. According to the Corrosion Executive, the means  for disseminating and collecting information from the department’s  installations are the service organizations within the chain of command for  the affected facilities and other infrastructure. He also stated that the  service’s training curriculum will incorporate important information as  needed.
section_title: All Relevant Officials Have Not Received Key Corrosion-Control Information
paragraphs: During our review, managers and other public works officials at 16 of 31  installations stated that they were not familiar with the Corrosion Office.Officials also told us that their installations could benefit from the  additional information on corrosion control and prevention offered by  these offices. However, Corrosion Executives stated in interviews that  they disseminate corrosion information through each department’s chain  of command. In response to our questions, installation officials provided  views in the following areas:
Awareness of corrosion offices—In response to our questions of  officials who are responsible for installation maintenance and would  be involved in corrosion-control activities, officials at 16 of 31  installations stated that prior to our work they were not aware of the  Corrosion Office or the relevant military department’s Corrosion  Executive.  In addition, officials at 24 of 29 installations stated they  had not contacted the Corrosion Office about their corrosion work in  the last three years.that they had not contacted the respective Corrosion Executive during  the same period. However, officials at 23 of 29 installations stated that  they had contacted their services’ installation management command  or major commands about corrosion work in the last three years.
At least four officials qualified their responses to this question by stating that other  officials might be more knowledgeable about specific documents due to the nature of their  positions.
Interest in additional information—Many installation officials stated  interest in receiving additional information about corrosion resources.  For example, more than half of the interviewed officials (17 of 31)  stated that the Corrosion Office or the relevant military department’s  Corrosion Executive could provide more communications and  enhance awareness about corrosion issues or corrosion-related  resources. An identical number of officials stated that DOD’s and the  military departments’ corrosion-control offices could support  corrosion-related training as a useful resource for installations.  Specifically, an Army installation official noted that it would be  beneficial for the military services and DOD to disseminate  information about the Corrosion Office and the military departments’  Corrosion Executives, including their roles and responsibilities, and  the assistance they can provide.
Other suggestions—Officials at installations noted other suggestions  for exchanging information about installations, such as: holding  regular forums and highlighting opportunities for contact with  counterparts at other installations, having a centralized source for  accessing corrosion-related information, disseminating case studies  or best practices relevant to DOD, enhanced use of existing service- issued newsletters, and planning conferences or communities of  practice. In addition, five respondents suggested providing important  corrosion-related information to the service headquarters, regional  command, or management commands for distribution to the  installations.
Additionally, in interviews at the services’ installation management  commands, we found officials who stated similar concerns about  communications. Officials from installation management commands  stated that they had little contact with Corrosion Executives. For example,  during our interview with one Air Force major command, a command  official stated that the most recent information he had about the Air  Force’s Corrosion Executive was from 2008. Another major command’s  response did not include the Corrosion Executive as an organization it  interacts with on corrosion issues. Similarly, officials at three different  locations—the Commander of Navy Installations Command, the Marine  Corps Installation Command, and the Army’s Installation Management  Command Headquarters—stated that they had limited or no interaction  on infrastructure issues with the Corrosion Office and their respective  Corrosion Executive.like to receive information on training by the Corrosion Office regarding  corrosion of infrastructure, and that the best channel for the information  would be through the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management,  an office that works with the Army’s Corrosion Executive.
In addition, the Army official stated that he would  In evaluating communications for corrosion issues for facilities and other  infrastructure, we found that all relevant service officials do not receive  key information because the military departments’ Corrosion Executives  do not have a targeted communication strategy for their military  department and an accompanying action plan to ensure frequent  communications between Corrosion Executives and all service officials  involved in corrosion activities for facilities and other infrastructure. The  military departments mention communication in their strategic plans, but  they do not have specific steps for communicating corrosion-control  information for facilities and other infrastructure at every level. Our prior  work on federal organizations identified key practices and implementation  steps for establishing a communication strategy to create shared  expectations and report related progress. communication strategy and accompanying action plan, the Corrosion  Executives cannot ensure that service managers of facilities and other  infrastructure will have access to all information and resources available  for dealing with corrosion and are aware of the most effective and efficient  methods for corrosion control.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and  Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). submitted when due. In fact, the Corrosion Office has not adopted  methods to enhance tracking, such as recording the reasons for missed  reporting deadlines, new reporting deadlines, and the submission dates  for follow-on reports. Further, although the Corrosion Office encourages  project managers to complete outstanding reports, it has not exercised its  existing oversight and coordination authorities to identify and implement  possible options or incentives for addressing the various funding,  personnel, or other reasons cited by project management offices for not  meeting reporting milestones. Also, DOD’s strategic plan and other  guidance do not clearly define a role for the military departments’  Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives (Corrosion Executives),  who could assist the Corrosion Office, in holding the military departments’  project management offices accountable for submitting infrastructure- related reports in accordance with DOD’s strategic plan. Without effective  actions to ensure timely submission of reports, decision makers may be  unaware of potentially useful technologies to address corrosion.  Moreover, the Corrosion Office is not always updating its records to  ensure accurate information is maintained on reassessed return-on- investment estimates for infrastructure-related corrosion projects. Without  accurate return-on-investment estimates for corrosion projects, Congress  and DOD corrosion-control managers may not have sufficient information  about returns on investment for their oversight of completed projects.
Finally, slightly more than half of the installation officials (16 of 31  officials) whom we interviewed were unaware of DOD’s Corrosion Office,  their respective Corrosion Executive, or the training, information, and  other resources available through the related offices. Without a targeted  communication strategy and accompanying action plan, the military  departments’ Corrosion Executives cannot ensure that managers of  facilities and other infrastructure will have access to all information and  resources available for dealing with corrosion and are aware of the most  effective and efficient methods for corrosion control.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making five recommendations to improve DOD’s corrosion  prevention and control program:  To improve accountability for reporting the results of corrosion-control  demonstration projects affecting DOD infrastructure, we recommend that  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics direct the Director of the Office of Corrosion Policy and  Oversight to take steps to enhance reporting and project tracking, such as  noting the reasons why project management offices missed a reporting  deadline and including any revised reporting deadlines for final and  follow-on reports.
To improve the military departments’ submission of completed reports for  infrastructure-related corrosion-control demonstration projects at  prescribed milestones, we recommend that the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics direct the Director of  the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to use the office’s existing  authority to identify and implement possible options or incentives for  addressing the various funding, personnel, and other reasons cited by  project management offices for not meeting reporting milestones.
Further, to provide greater assurance that the military departments will  meet reporting milestones for future projects, we recommend that the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics— in coordination with the Director of the Office of Corrosion Policy and  Oversight—revise corrosion-related guidance to clearly define a role for  the military departments’ Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives to  assist the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight in holding their  departments’ project management offices accountable for submitting  infrastructure-related reports in accordance with the DOD Corrosion  Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan.
To ensure that Congress, DOD and officials of the military departments’  infrastructure-related corrosion activities have the most complete and up- to-date information, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics direct the Director of the Office  of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to take actions to ensure that its  records reflect complete, timely, and accurate data of the projects’ return- on-investment estimates.
To ensure that all relevant infrastructure officials receive pertinent  corrosion information, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Army,  Navy, and Air Force departments direct their assistant secretaries  responsible for acquisitions, technology and logistics to require the  military departments’ Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives—in  coordination with their installation management commands and in  consultation with the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight—to  develop a targeted communication strategy and an accompanying action  plan for their departments to ensure the timely flow of key information to  all relevant service officials, particularly to officials at the installation level,  about corrosion-control activities and initiatives, such as training  opportunities and outcomes of the infrastructure-related corrosion  projects.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written  comments, reprinted in appendix IV, DOD partially concurred with three of  our recommendations and did not agree with two recommendations.
DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation to take steps to  enhance the tracking and reporting of its infrastructure-related corrosion  projects. In its comments, DOD stated that it is developing a web-based  tracking tool for the Corrosion Office, Corrosion Executives, and project  managers to input and extract project-related data, and DOD expects the  change to result in increased timeliness and standardization of project  data to include revised reporting deadlines for final and follow-on reports.  While this system may address our recommendation, DOD did not state  when the new system would be available for use. In response to our  fourth recommendation that DOD take action to ensure that its records  reflect complete, timely and accurate data on the projects’ return on  investment, DOD partially concurred with the recommendation and stated  that this new web-based system would provide data including return-on- investment estimates, and would be accessible to other parties, including  the Corrosion Office, Corrosion Executives and project managers.
DOD did not agree with our second recommendation that the Corrosion  Office use its existing authority to identify and implement possible options  or incentives for addressing the various funding, personnel, and other  reasons cited by project management offices for not meeting reporting  milestones. In its written comments, DOD disagreed with our  recommendation, but did not state what actions it would take to improve  submission of completed reports from the military services that DOD’s  strategic plan requires for infrastructure-related corrosion projects. DOD  stated that prior positive incentives to complete project reports were  largely ineffective. However, as our report states, there are examples of  military departments responding to incentives, such as the Navy  completing 11 of 12 return-on-investment reassessments after the  Corrosion Office provided funding as an incentive. The reassessments  are the main focus of follow-on reports. Also, DOD stated that its project  management offices occasionally miss reporting milestones and generally  have done an excellent job of meeting their reporting obligations.  However, as our report clearly shows, the project management offices  had not submitted 50 of the 80 required final reports (63 percent) and had  not submitted 15 of the 41 required follow-on reports (37 percent) to the  Corrosion Office. Without timely submission of reports, decision makers  may be unaware of potentially useful technologies to address corrosion.
We continue to believe that the Corrosion Office could use its existing  authorities to identify and implement other incentives or methods to  address reasons that project management offices cite for not meeting  reporting milestones.
DOD did not agree to our third recommendation to revise guidance to  clearly define the role of Corrosion Executives to assist the Corrosion  Office in holding departments’ project management offices accountable  for submitting reports in accordance with DOD’s strategic plan. DOD  stated that further guidance is not necessary as the requirements are  clearly stated in the strategic plan. DOD also stated that Corrosion  Executives are given the freedom to manage their programs in the most  efficient and effective manner. However, DOD’s strategic plan and  guidance do not define a role for the Corrosion Executives in assisting the  Corrosion Office in the project reporting process. Our recommendation  was intended to fortify the role of Corrosion Executives in ensuring that  project management offices within the Corrosion Executives’ respective  military departments submit project reports as required in the strategic  plan. We continue to believe that the Corrosion Executives could provide  the additional management oversight necessary to strengthen corrosion  project reporting.
DOD partially concurred with our last recommendation that the  Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force direct the relevant assistant  secretaries to require the military departments’ Corrosion Executives—in  coordination with their installation management commands and in  consultation with the Corrosion Office—to develop a targeted  communication strategy and an action plan for their departments to  ensure the timely flow of key information to all relevant service officials  about corrosion-control activities and initiatives, such as training  opportunities and outcomes of infrastructure-related corrosion projects.  DOD commented that information flow to installations follows the chain of  command to ensure that appropriate individuals receive information  necessary for successful mission completion. The department further  stated that the Corrosion Office would ensure that training information  and project outcomes would be available to all relevant officials via  publication in appropriate media; also, DOD stated that during the next  review cycle the Corrosion Office would evaluate the military department  corrosion prevention and control strategic plans to determine if they  adequately address the flow of information. However, we continue to  believe that each military department should have a targeted  communication strategy, developed in consultation with the Corrosion  Office and coordinated with the installation management commands  within the military departments, and that strategy should go beyond the  publication of information in appropriate media and provide specific steps  for communicating corrosion-control information to all relevant service  corrosion officials. Such a strategy is important because, as our report  states, we found that all corrosion officials within each military  department, particularly at the installation level, were not receiving  relevant corrosion prevention and control information. Also, we continue  to believe that without a targeted communication strategy and action plan,  Corrosion Executives cannot ensure that service managers of facilities  and other infrastructure will have access to all information and resources  for dealing with corrosion and are aware of the most effective and efficient  methods for corrosion control.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees and to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army,  the Navy, and the Air Force; Director of the DOD Office of Corrosion  Policy and Oversight, and the Director of the Office of Management and  Budget. In addition, this letter will be made available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-7968 or mctiguej@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this letter. GAO staff who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: DOD Studies on the Cost of Corrosion for Facilities and Other Infrastructure
paragraphs: DOD’s Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight (Corrosion Office)  sponsors a series of studies to assess the cost of corrosion throughout  the department, including three studies—two completed and one  ongoing—to determine how much money DOD spends on corrosion  activities for its facilities and other infrastructure. These studies are  conducted by LMI using a method approved by the Corrosion Office’s  Corrosion Prevention and Control Integrated Product Team. According to  LMI, its estimation methodology includes construction costs and actual  maintenance expenditures for sustainment, restoration, and  modernization that are known or can be identified, and focuses on  tangible, direct material and labor costs as well as some indirect costs,  such as research and development and training. In its studies, LMI noted  that although corrosion maintenance costs are a subset of sustainment,  restoration, and modernization costs, the tools and analysis methods  used by planners to estimate sustainment, restoration, and modernization  requirements do not specifically identify corrosion.
In its first report in May 2007, LMI determined that spending on corrosion  prevention and control for DOD facilities and other infrastructure for fiscal  year 2005 was $1.8 billion.  In its second report in July 2010 report, LMI  found that spending on corrosion at DOD facilities and other infrastructure  decreased from $1.8 billion to $1.6 billion between fiscal years 2005 and  2007, and then increased to $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2008. In its 2010  report, LMI reported that spending on corrosion as a percent of spending  on maintenance dropped from 15.1 percent in fiscal year 2005 to  10.7 percent in fiscal year 2007 and increased to 11.7 percent in fiscal  year 2008.
Further, in its 2010 report, LMI reported that DOD spent more on  corrosion-related maintenance for facilities and other infrastructure than it  did on corrosion work related to military construction. Specifically, LMI  reported that spending on corrosion for maintenance is three to four times  higher than corrosion spending associated with construction, even though  overall construction expenditures were nearly double that of overall  maintenance expenditures. LMI provided two main reasons for this  occurrence: (1) corrosion is rarely identified as a justification for the  construction of a new facility; and (2) if estimated construction costs need  to be reduced to obtain funding of the project, measures to prevent  corrosion are among the first costs to be removed from the estimated  costs. Additionally, LMI reported that DOD spent almost twice as much on  corrective measures to address corrosion ($1,263 million) as it did on  preventive measures to avoid corrosion ($640 million).
LMI’s 2010 report shows installations’ estimated expenditures in eight  categories of corrective and preventive maintenance for facilities and  other infrastructure. Table 4 shows information from that 2010 report  about the estimated expenditures for facilities and other infrastructure by  maintenance category for fiscal year 2008.
In August 2012, LMI began its third study of the cost of corrosion at DOD  facilities and other infrastructure to analyze corrosion-related spending for  fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011. For this report, the LMI official  told us that the methodology for classifying the environmental conditions  of the installations that are included in their cost-of-corrosion studies  would be the major difference between the 2012 assessment and the  prior reports. LMI also acknowledged that there are some challenges and  limitations to the methodology and data used in its analysis. These  challenges and limitations include, but are not limited to: (1) limited quality  controls in the services’ facilities and other infrastructure work order data  in which approximately 25 percent of the records obtained from the  military services’ maintenance systems could not be used due to missing  key data elements that could not be recreated; (2) the lack of tracking and  maintaining of asset availability data for facilities and other infrastructure;  and (3) the three-year period between the cost of corrosion studies, which  means there will be a significant period before data can be updated.
section_title: Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address our first objective to determine the extent that project  managers submitted required reports to the DOD Office of Corrosion  Policy and Oversight (hereafter referred to as Corrosion Office), we  reviewed the February 2011 DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation  Strategic Plan and used the reporting milestones outlined in the plan to  identify types of reports required for each project. We obtained project  information for the 80 infrastructure-related corrosion demonstration  projects funded by the Corrosion Office for fiscal years 2005 through  2010. We requested and reviewed the project documentation— project  plans, bimonthly or quarterly reports, final reports and follow-on reports— to determine if the data and related reports met the Corrosion Office’s  reporting requirements. We reviewed the corrosion project documentation  for these projects for missing data, outliers, or other errors, and  documented where we found incomplete data and computation errors.  For the purposes of our work in reviewing projects funded in fiscal years  2005 through 2010, we considered a final report to be submitted as  required if the Corrosion Office had a copy of the report in its records  system. We did not consider the timeliness of the submitted reports.  Additionally, for follow-on reports, we could assess only the projects  funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2007 (41 of the 80 projects) because  the DOD strategic plan’s milestone requires that follow-on reports be  submitted for completed projects within two years after the projects have  been completed and transitioned to use within the military departments.  For completed projects, we documented the initial return-on-investment  estimates shown in the project plans and the resulting change, if any,  shown in the follow-on reports. We determined that the project reporting  data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining the extent to  which the military departments met the Corrosion Office’s reporting  requirements, but we did not determine the timeliness of the report or  assess elements of the actual report.
After identifying the projects that required further review because the  project managers had not completed and submitted the required reports,  we interviewed and obtained documentation from the Corrosion Office,  the military departments’ Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives  (hereafter referred to as Corrosion Executives) and the respective project  managers to determine why the required reports were not submitted at  the prescribed deadlines. Also, we determined what actions, if any, they  planned to take to complete the reports. Specifically, to complete this  task, we met with corrosion-control officials from the following  organizations: the Corrosion Office, Army Corrosion Executive, Navy  Corrosion Executive, Air Force Corrosion Executive, Army Engineering  Research Development Center, Construction Engineering Research  Laboratory, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (Engineering Support  Center), Office of the Air Force Logistics, Installations and Mission  Support, and the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency. We also  reviewed prior GAO work on DOD’s corrosion prevention and control  program.
To address our second objective to assess the extent to which the return- on-investment data submitted by the military departments is accurately  reflected in records maintained by the Corrosion Office, for the  105 infrastructure-related corrosion demonstration projects funded from  fiscal years 2005 through 2012, we reviewed the return-on-investment  estimates found in the project plans and the return-on-investment  estimates maintained in the Corrosion Office’s records. We then  compared the data from these two sources to determine if any differences  existed in the estimated return on investment. Upon completion of this  comparison, we provided a list of projects with discrepancies in the  estimated return on investment to the Corrosion Office and asked the  officials to explain why the inconsistencies existed and requested that  they provide additional information to reconcile the differences in the two  estimates. Further, we compared the return-on-investment estimates  maintained in the Corrosion Office’s records for projects funded in fiscal  years 2005 through 2007 with the return-on-investment estimates  contained in the military departments’ follow-on reports to check for any  differences between the two sets of records.
To address our third objective to assess the extent to which DOD’s  corrosion-control officials have fully informed all relevant officials within  each department about efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion of  facilities and other infrastructure, we reviewed relevant legislation and  guidance, DOD policies and publications, and the DOD and the military  departments’ strategic plans to obtain information on the management of  DOD’s corrosion prevention and control program. In addition, we  interviewed officials at all levels within DOD—Corrosion Office officials,  Corrosion Executives, the military services’ management commands for  installations, and facility and infrastructure managers within the  services—to discuss their corrosion prevention and control efforts,  including challenges and successes in implementing new corrosion  technologies. We interviewed officials across each of the military services  and reviewed relevant service documentation to gather information about  corrosion prevention and control programs within the services. We spoke  with each military department’s designated Corrosion Executive as well  as officials in the Corrosion Executives’ offices to discuss corrosion  control and prevention activities for facilities and other infrastructure  across the departments. We also interviewed officials from the installation  management commands of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, including  the Office of the Army Chief of Staff for Installations Management, the  U.S. Army Installations Management Command, the Commander of Navy  Installations Command, and the U. S. Marine Corps Installations  Command. We also interviewed officials within the civil engineering or  facilities branches at two Air Force major commands—Air Mobility  Command and Air Combat Command. We reviewed relevant service  documentation, including each military department’s strategic plan for  corrosion control and prevention, to identify efforts related to facilities and  other infrastructure. During our review, we also met with the manager of a  Defense Logistics Agency program for cathodic protection and corrosion  control of submerged or underground steel structures. Other defense  agencies were not evaluated as part of our work.
We used data obtained from Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of  Defense for Installations and Environment to identify all DOD facilities and  other infrastructure by military service and geographic location. Using a  nonprobability sample, we limited the installations for selection to those  active-duty installations with at least 25 buildings owned by the federal  government and ensured that a range of locations were selected from  each of the four military services and across geographic regions of the  United States. From the 390 installations that met these criteria, we   some joint  selected installations with different environmental conditions,military installations, and installations that did or did not participate in the  Corrosion Office’s corrosion-technology demonstration projects. We  determined that the data used to select the installations for our review  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of selecting our nonprobability  sample.
From April to October 2012, we conducted semistructured interviews with  management officials of facilities and other infrastructure from 32 DOD  installations to gather information and views about their corrosion control  and management efforts.  Figure 3 identifies the 32 selected installations  where GAO interviewed officials for this review. The purpose of the  semistructured interviews was to understand how the installation officials  (1) use policies, plans, and procedures to identify and address corrosion;  (2) address corrosion prevention and mitigation; (3) determine their  maintenance and sustainment priorities; and (4) receive and disseminate  information on relevant corrosion topics. We visited and interviewed   and conducted audio  officials at 6 of the 32 military installations,conference calls with officials at 26 of the 32 military installations.  Although our findings from the interviews of officials of the 32 installations  are not generalizable to the entire universe of installations, we feel our  findings provide a range of issues related to corrosion that are  experienced at installations.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to May 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Returns on Investment for DOD’s Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Technology Demonstration Projects
paragraphs: As defined by DOD for its corrosion technology demonstration projects,  the estimated return on investment is the ratio of the present value of  benefits to the present value of the project’s total cost. In our December  2010 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), in  coordination with the Corrosion Executives, develop and implement a  plan to ensure that return-on-investment reassessments are completed  as scheduled.information on the timeframe and source of funding required to complete  the return-on-investment reassessments. DOD concurred with our  recommendation and stated that plans were underway to address this  requirement. As of July 2012, DOD had not developed or implemented a  formal plan that addresses this requirement.
Specifically, we recommended that this plan include  During our review, we found that the Corrosion Office required project  managers of 41 projects to submit follow-on reports, and reports were  completed and submitted for 25 of the 41 projects funded for fiscal years  2005 through 2007. Of the 25 follow-on reports, 23 contained return-on- investment estimates. We found that although follow-on reports were  completed and submitted for the remaining 2 projects, return-on- investment estimates were not calculated for the projects because the  respective Army and Navy reports noted that such a calculation was not  required. For the 23 projects that have completed and submitted the  required follow-on reports, Table 5 provides the military departments’  return-on-investment estimates included in the original project plans and  the resulting change, if any, included in the follow-on reports. We did not  review the military departments’ calculations or their methods for  estimating the cost and benefits of the estimated returns on investment.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact name above, the following staff members made  key contributions to this report: Mark J. Wielgoszynski, Assistant Director;  Rebekah Boone; Randolfo DeLeon; Jacqueline McColl; Charles Perdue;  Carol Petersen; Richard Powelson; Terry Richardson; Amie Steele and  Michael Willems.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Management: Additional Information Needed to Improve Military  Departments’ Corrosion Prevention Strategies. GAO-13-379.  Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2013.
Defense Management: The Department of Defense’s Annual Corrosion  Budget Report Does Not Include Some Required Information.  GAO-12-823R. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2012.
Defense Management: The Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2012  Corrosion Prevention and Control Budget Request. GAO-11-490R.  Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2011.
Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs,  Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-11-318SP.  Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2011.
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Monitor and Assess Corrective  Actions Resulting from Its Corrosion Study of the F-35 Joint Strike  Fighter. GAO-11-171R. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2010.
Defense Management: DOD Has a Rigorous Process to Select Corrosion  Prevention Projects, but Would Benefit from Clearer Guidance and  Validation of Returns on Investment. GAO-11-84. Washington, D.C.:  December 8, 2010.
Defense Management: Observations on Department of Defense and  Military Service Fiscal Year 2011 Requirements for Corrosion Prevention  and Control. GAO-10-608R. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.
Defense Management: Observations on the Department of Defense’s  Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request for Corrosion Prevention and Control.  GAO-10-607R. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.
Defense Management: Observations on DOD’s Fiscal Year 2010 Budget  Request for Corrosion Prevention and Control. GAO-09-732R.  Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2009.
Defense Management: Observations on DOD’s Analysis of Options for  Improving Corrosion Prevention and Control through Earlier Planning in  the Requirements and Acquisition Processes. GAO-09-694R.  Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2009.
Defense Management: Observations on DOD’s FY 2009 Budget Request  for Corrosion Prevention and Control. GAO-08-663R. Washington, D.C.:  April 15, 2008.
Defense Management: High-Level Leadership Commitment and Actions  Are Needed to Address Corrosion Issues. GAO-07-618. Washington,  D.C.: April 30, 2007.
Defense Management: Additional Measures to Reduce Corrosion of  Prepositioned Military Assets Could Achieve Cost Savings. GAO-06-709.  Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Defense Management: Opportunities Exist to Improve Implementation of  DOD’s Long-Term Corrosion Strategy. GAO-04-640. Washington, D.C.:  June 23, 2004.
Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and  Increase Readiness. GAO-03-753. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic  Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities.  GAO-03-274. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2003.