Information Security: IRS Needs to Further Enhance Controls over Taxpayer and Financial Data
Published: 2016-04-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In collecting taxes, processing returns, and providing taxpayer service, IRS relies extensively on computerized information systems. Accordingly, it is critical that sensitive taxpayer and other data are protected. Recent data breaches at IRS highlight the vulnerability of taxpayer information. In addition, identity theft refund fraud is an evolving threat that occurs when a thief files a fraudulent tax return using a legitimate taxpayer's identity and claims a refund.
Since 1997, GAO has designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area, and in 2015 it expanded this area to include the protection of personally identifiable information. GAO also added identity theft refund fraud to its high-risk area on the enforcement of tax laws.
This statement discusses (1) IRS's information security controls over tax processing and financial systems and (2) roles that federal agencies with government-wide information security responsibilities play in providing guidance and oversight to agencies. This statement is based on previously published GAO work and a review of federal guidance.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In March 2016 GAO reported that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had instituted numerous controls over key financial and tax processing systems; however, it had not always effectively implemented safeguards intended to properly restrict access to systems and information. In particular, while IRS had improved some of its access controls, weaknesses remained with identifying and authenticating users, authorizing users' level of rights and privileges, encrypting sensitive data, auditing and monitoring network activity, and physically securing its computing resources. These weaknesses were due in part to IRS's inconsistent implementation of its agency-wide security program, including not fully implementing GAO recommendations. The table below shows the status of prior and new GAO recommendations as of the end of its fiscal year (FY) 2015 audit of IRS's information security. GAO concluded that these weaknesses collectively constituted a significant deficiency for the purposes of financial reporting for fiscal year 2015. Until they are effectively mitigated, taxpayer and financial data will continue to be exposed to unnecessary risk.
The importance of protecting taxpayer information is further highlighted by the billions of dollars that have been lost to identity theft refund fraud, which continues to be an evolving threat. While IRS has taken steps to address this issue, as GAO reported in January 2015 it has yet to assess the costs, benefits, and risks of methods for improving the authentication of taxpayers' identity.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provide government-wide guidance and oversight for federal information security. These agencies have taken a number of actions to carry out these responsibilities. For example:
OMB has prescribed security policies, including direction on ensuring that online services provided by agencies are secure and protect privacy.
NIST has developed standards and guidelines for implementing security controls, including those for authenticating users during online transactions.
DHS has issued a directive requiring departments and agencies to mitigate critical vulnerabilities on their Internet-facing systems. It also assists agencies in monitoring their networks for malicious traffic.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: In addition to 49 prior recommendations that had not been implemented, GAO made 45 new recommendations to IRS in March 2016 to further improve its information security controls and program. GAO also recommended that IRS assess costs, benefits, and risks of taxpayer authentication options.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to testify at today’s timely hearing on  information security at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). As taxpayers  file their returns for 2015, it is especially important that IRS ensure that  adequate protections are in place to secure the sensitive information  entrusted to the agency by members of the public.
The federal government faces an evolving array of cyber-based threats to  its systems and data. Reported incidents and data breaches at federal  agencies, including IRS, have affected millions of people through the  compromise of sensitive personal information and underscore the  continuing and urgent need for effective information security. We initially  designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk  area in 1997, and in 2003 we expanded this area to include computerized  systems supporting the nation’s critical infrastructure. In 2015 we added  the protection of personally identifiable information (PII) that is collected,  maintained, and shared by both federal and nonfederal entities.
In carrying out its mission to collect taxes, process tax returns, and  enforce U.S. tax laws, IRS relies extensively on computerized systems  and on information security controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity,  and availability of sensitive personal and financial information for each  U.S. taxpayer.
As requested, my statement today will discuss (1) information security  controls over tax processing and financial systems at IRS and (2) roles  that federal agencies with government-wide information security  responsibilities play in providing guidance and oversight to executive  branch agencies. In preparing this statement, we relied on previously  published work on IRS and government-wide information security. We  also reviewed relevant federal laws and information security-related  guidance issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The GAO reports  cited in this statement each contain a detailed description of the scope of  the work on which they are based and the methodologies used to carry it  out.
All the work on which this statement is based was conducted in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform audits to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: As technology has advanced, the federal government has become  increasingly dependent on computerized information systems to carry out  operations and process, maintain, and report essential information.  Federal agencies rely on such systems to process, maintain, and report  large volumes of sensitive data, such as personal information.
Ineffective protection of these systems and information can impair  delivery of vital services and result in  loss or theft of computer resources, assets, and funds;  inappropriate access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of  sensitive information, such as PII; undermining of agency missions due to embarrassing incidents that  erode the public’s confidence in government; damage to networks and equipment; and high costs for remediation.
Recognizing the importance of these issues, federal law includes  requirements intended to improve the protection of government  information and systems. These laws include the Federal Information  Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014, which among other things,  requires the head of each agency to provide information security  protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm resulting  from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or  destruction of the agency’s information or information systems.
More specifically, federal agencies are to develop, document, and  implement an agency-wide information security program to provide  security for the information and information systems that support the  operations of the agency, including those provided or managed by  another agency, a contractor, or other organization on behalf of the  agency. In addition, the head of each agency is responsible for, among  other things, ensuring that senior agency officials carry out their  information security responsibilities and that all personnel are held  accountable for complying with the agency-wide information security  program.
The act also assigned OMB and the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) oversight responsibilities to assist agencies in effectively  implementing information security protections. In addition, NIST is  responsible for developing standards and guidelines that include  minimum information security requirements.
subsections: section_title: IRS Relies on Information Technology Systems to Carry out Its Role as Tax Collector for the United States
paragraphs: IRS’s mission is to provide America’s taxpayers top-quality service by  helping them to understand and meet their tax responsibilities and to  enforce the law with integrity and fairness to all. In carrying out its  mission, IRS relies extensively on computerized information systems,  which it must effectively secure to protect sensitive financial and taxpayer  data for the collection of taxes, processing of tax returns, and  enforcement of federal tax laws.
During fiscal year 2015, IRS collected more than $3.3 trillion; processed  more than 243 million tax returns and other forms; and issued more than  $403 billion in tax refunds.
IRS employs about 90,000 people in its Washington, D.C., headquarters  and at more than 550 offices in all 50 states, U.S. territories, and some  U.S. embassies and consulates. To manage its data and information, the  agency operates two enterprise computing centers. It also collects and  maintains a significant amount of personal and financial information on  each U.S. taxpayer. Protecting this sensitive information is essential to  protecting taxpayers’ privacy and preventing financial loss and damages  that could result from identity theft and other financial crimes. Further, the  size and complexity of the IRS add unique operational challenges.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has overall responsibility for  ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information  and systems that support the agency and its operations. Within IRS, the  senior agency official responsible for information security is the Associate  CIO, who heads the IRS Information Technology Cybersecurity  organization.
section_title: Cyber Threats Facing Federal Systems Continue to Evolve
paragraphs: Risks to cyber-based assets can originate from unintentional or  intentional threats. Unintentional threats can be caused by natural  disasters, defective computer or network equipment, software coding  errors, and the actions of careless or poorly trained employees.  Intentional threats include targeted and untargeted attacks from criminal  groups, hackers, disgruntled employees, foreign nations engaged in  espionage and information warfare, and terrorists. These adversaries  vary in terms of their capabilities, willingness to act, and motives.
These threat sources make use of various techniques—or exploits—that  may adversely affect federal information, computers, software, networks,  and operations. These exploits are carried out through various conduits,  including websites, e-mails, wireless and cellular communications,  Internet protocols, portable media, and social media. Further, adversaries  can leverage common computer software programs as a means by which  to deliver a threat by embedding exploits within software files that can be  activated when a user opens a file within its corresponding program.
The number of information security incidents affecting systems supporting  the federal government is increasing. Specifically, the number of incidents  reported by federal agencies to the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness  Team (US-CERT) increased from 5,503 in fiscal year 2006 to 67,168 in  fiscal year 2014, an increase of 1,121 percent. This upward trend  continues. According to OMB, agencies reported 77,183 incidents in fiscal  year 2015. Similarly, the number of incidents involving PII reported by  federal agencies has more than doubled in recent years, from 10,481 in  2009 to 27,624 in 2014.
Moreover, for fiscal year 2015, OMB reported that federal agencies spent  about $13.1 billion on cybersecurity, and agencies budgeted about $14  billion for cybersecurity for fiscal year 2016. This amount may increase  significantly, as the president’s fiscal year 2017 budget proposes  investing over $19 billion in resources for cybersecurity.
Cyber incidents can adversely affect national security, damage public  health and safety, and compromise sensitive information. Regarding IRS  specifically, two recent incidents illustrate the impact on taxpayer and  other sensitive information:  In June 2015, the Commissioner of the IRS testified that unauthorized  third parties had gained access to taxpayer information from its Get  Transcript application. According to officials, criminals used taxpayer- specific data acquired from non-agency sources to gain unauthorized  access to information on approximately 100,000 tax accounts. These  data included Social Security information, dates of birth, and street  addresses. In an August 2015 update, IRS reported this number to be  about 114,000, and reported that an additional 220,000 accounts had  been inappropriately accessed. In a February 2016 update, the  agency reported that an additional 390,000 accounts had been  accessed. Thus, about 724,000 accounts were reportedly affected.  The online Get Transcript service has been unavailable since May  2015.
In March 2016, IRS stated that as part of its ongoing security review, it  had temporarily suspended the Identity Protection Personal  Identification Number (IP PIN) service on IRS.gov. The IP PIN is a  single-use identification number provided to taxpayers who are victims  of identity theft (IDT) to help prevent future IDT refund fraud. The  service on IRS’s website allowed taxpayers to retrieve their IP PINs  online by passing IRS’s authentication checks. These checks confirm  taxpayer identity by asking for personal, financial, and tax-related  information. The IRS stated that it was conducting further review of  the IP PIN service and is looking at further strengthening the security  features. As of April 7, the online service was still suspended.
section_title: Although IRS Has Made Improvements, Information Security Weaknesses Continue to Place Taxpayer and Financial Data at Risk
paragraphs: As we reported in March 2016, IRS has implemented numerous  protections over key financial and tax processing systems; however, it  had not always effectively implemented access and other controls,  including elements of its information security program.
Access controls are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized  access to computing resources, programs, information, and facilities.  They include identification and authentication, authorization,  cryptography, audit and monitoring, and physical security, among others.  In our most recent review we determined that IRS had improved access  controls, but some weaknesses remain.
Identifying and authenticating users—such as through user  account-password combinations—provides the basis for establishing  accountability and controlling access to a system. IRS established  policies for identification and authentication, including requiring  multifactor authentication for local and network access accounts and  establishing password complexity and expiration requirements. It also  improved identification and authentication controls by, for example,  expanding the use of an automated mechanism to centrally manage,  apply, and verify password requirements. However, weaknesses in  identification and authentication controls remained. For example, the  agency used easily guessable passwords on servers supporting key  systems. In addition, while IRS continued to expand the use of two- factor access to its network, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax  Administration reported that IRS had not fully implemented unique  user identification and authentication or remote electronic  authentication that complies with federal requirements.
Authorization controls limit what actions users are able to perform  after being allowed into a system and should be based on the concept  of “least privilege,” granting users the least amount of rights and  privileges necessary to perform their duties. While IRS established  policies for authorizing access to its systems, it continued to permit  excessive access in some cases. For example, users were granted  rights and permissions in excess of what they needed to perform their  duties, including for an application used to process electronic tax  payment information and a database on a human resources system.
Cryptography controls protect sensitive data and computer  programs by rendering data unintelligible to unauthorized users and  protecting the integrity of transmitted or stored data. IRS policies  require the use of encryption, and the agency continued to expand its  use of encryption to protect sensitive data. However, key systems we  reviewed had not been configured to encrypt sensitive user  authentication data.
Audit and monitoring is the regular collection, review, and analysis  of events on systems and networks in order to detect, respond to, and  investigate unusual activity. IRS established policies and procedures  for auditing and monitoring its systems and continued to enhance its  capability by, for example, implementing an automated mechanism to  log user activity on its access request and approval system. But it had  not established logging for two key applications used to support the  transfer of financial data and access and manage taxpayer accounts;  nor was the agency consistently maintaining key system and  application audit plans.
Physical security controls, such as physical access cards, limit  access to an organization’s overall facility and areas housing sensitive  IT components. IRS established policies for physically protecting its  computer resources and physical security controls at its enterprise  computer centers, such as a dedicated guard force at each of its  computer centers. However, the agency had yet to address  weaknesses in its review of access lists for both employees and  visitors to sensitive areas.
IRS also had weaknesses in configuration management controls, which  are intended to prevent unauthorized changes to information system  resources (e.g., software and hardware) and provide assurance that  systems are configured and operating securely. Specifically, while IRS  developed policies for managing the configuration of its IT systems and  improved some configuration management controls, it did not, for  example, ensure security patch updates were applied in a timely manner  to databases supporting two key systems we reviewed, including a patch  that had been available since August 2012.
To its credit, IRS had established contingency plans for the systems we  reviewed, which help ensure that when unexpected events occur critical  operations can continue without interruption or can be promptly resumed,  and that information resources are protected. Specifically, IRS had  established policies for developing contingency plans for its information  systems and for testing those plans, as well as for implementing and  enforcing backup procedures. Moreover, the agency had documented  and tested contingency plans for its systems and improved continuity of  operations controls for several systems.
Nevertheless, the control weaknesses can be attributed in part to IRS’s  inconsistent implementation of elements of its agency-wide information  security program. The agency established a comprehensive framework  for its program, including assessing risk for its systems, developing  system security plans, and providing employees with security awareness  and specialized training. However, IRS had not updated key mainframe  policies and procedures to address issues such as comprehensively  auditing and monitoring access.
In addition, the agency had not fully mitigated previously identified  deficiencies or ensured that its corrective actions were effective. During  our most recent review, IRS told us it had completed corrective actions for  28 of our prior recommendations; however, we determined that 9 of these  had not been effectively implemented.
The collective effect of the deficiencies in information security from prior  years that continued to exist in fiscal year 2015, along with the new  deficiencies we identified, are serious enough to merit the attention of  those charged with governance of IRS and therefore represented a  significant deficiency in IRS’s internal control over financial reporting  systems as of September 30, 2015.
subsections: section_title: Implementing GAO Recommendations Can Help IRS Better Protect Sensitive Taxpayer and Financial Data
paragraphs: To assist IRS in fully implementing its agency-wide information security  program, we made two new recommendations to more effectively  implement security-related policies and plans. In addition, to assist IRS in  strengthening security controls over the financial and tax processing  systems we reviewed, we made 43 technical recommendations in a  separate report with limited distribution to address 26 new weaknesses in  access controls and configuration management.
Implementing these recommendations—in addition to the 49 outstanding  recommendations from previous audits—will help IRS improve its controls  for identifying and authenticating users, limiting users’ access to the  minimum necessary to perform their job-related functions, protecting  sensitive data when they are stored or in transit, auditing and monitoring  system activities, and physically securing its IT facilities and resources.
Table 1 below provides the number of our prior recommendations to IRS  that were not implemented at the beginning of our fiscal year 2015 audit,  how many were resolved by the end of the audit, new recommendations,  and the total number of outstanding recommendations at the conclusion  of the audit.
In commenting on drafts of the reports presenting the results of our fiscal  year 2015 audit, the IRS Commissioner stated that while the agency  agreed with our new recommendations, it will review them to ensure that  its actions include sustainable fixes that implement appropriate security  controls balanced against IT and human capital resource limitations.
We have also previously reported that IRS can take steps to improve its  response to data breaches involving the inappropriate disclosure—or  potential disclosure—of personally identifiable information. Specifically, in  December 2013 we reported on the extent to which data breach policies  at eight agencies, including IRS, adhered to requirements and guidance  set forth by OMB and NIST. While the agencies in our review generally  had policies and procedures in place that reflected the major elements of  an effective data breach response program, implementation of these  policies and procedures was not consistent.
With respect to IRS, we determined that its policies and procedures  generally reflected key practices, although the agency did not require  considering the number of affected individuals as a factor when  determining if affected individuals should be notified of a suspected  breach. In addition, IRS did not document lessons learned from periodic  analyses of its breach response efforts. We recommended that IRS  correct these weaknesses, but the agency has yet to fully address them.
section_title: IRS Faces Challenges in Addressing Identity Theft Refund Fraud
paragraphs: The importance of protecting taxpayer information is further highlighted by  the billions of dollars that have been lost to IDT refund fraud, which  continues to be an evolving threat. IDT refund fraud occurs when a  refund-seeking fraudster obtains an individual’s Social Security number,  date of birth, or other PII and uses it to file a fraudulent tax return seeking  a refund. This crime burdens legitimate taxpayers because authenticating  their identities is likely to delay the processing of their tax returns and  refunds. Moreover, the victim’s PII can potentially be used to commit  other crimes. Given current and emerging risks, in 2015 we expanded our  high-risk area on the enforcement of tax laws to include IRS’s efforts to  address IDT refund fraud.
IRS develops estimates of the extent of IDT refund fraud to help direct its  efforts to identify and prevent the crime. While its estimates have inherent  uncertainty, IRS estimated that it prevented or recovered $22.5 billion in  fraudulent IDT refunds in filing season 2014. However, it also estimated  that it paid $3.1 billion in fraudulent IDT refunds.
IRS has taken steps to address IDT refund fraud; however, it remains a  persistent and evolving threat. For example in its fiscal year 2014-2017  strategic plan, IRS increased resources dedicated to combating IDT and  other types of refund fraud. In 2015, IRS reported allocating more than  4,000 full-time equivalent staff and spending $470 million on refund fraud  and IDT activities. In addition, IRS received an additional $290 million for  fiscal year 2016 to improve customer service, IDT identification and  prevention, and cybersecurity efforts.
The agency has also taken actions to improve customer service related to  IDT fraud by, for example, providing an increased level of service to  taxpayers calling its identity theft toll-free phone line. In addition, IRS has  worked with tax preparation professionals, states, and financial  institutions to better detect and prevent IDT fraud.
These efforts notwithstanding, fraudsters continue to adapt their schemes  to identify weaknesses in IDT defense, such as by gaining access to  taxpayers’ tax return transcripts through IRS’s online Get Transcript  service. According to IRS officials, this allows fraudsters to create  historically consistent returns that are hard to distinguish from one filed by  a legitimate taxpayer.
These continuing challenges highlight the need for additional actions by  IRS. As we have reported, there are steps IRS can take to, among other  things, better authenticate the identity of taxpayers before issuing  refunds. In January 2015 we reported that IRS’s authentication tools have  limitations. For example, individuals could obtain an e-file PIN by  providing their name, Social Security number, date of birth, address, and  filing status for IRS’s e-file PIN application. Identity thieves can easily find  this information, allowing them to bypass some, if not all, of IRS’s  automatic checks. After filing an IDT return using an e-file PIN, the  fraudster could file a fraudulent return through IRS’s normal return  processing. Accordingly, we recommended that IRS assess the costs,  benefits, and risks of its authentication options.
In November 2015, IRS officials told us that the agency had developed  guidance for its Identity Assurance Office to assess costs, benefits, and  risk of authentication tools. In February 2016, officials told us that this  office plans to complete a strategic plan for taxpayer authentication  across the agency in September 2016. Until it completes these steps, IRS  will lack key information to make decisions about whether and how much  to invest in authentication options.
section_title: Agencies with Government-Wide Responsibilities Play a Key Role in Guiding and Overseeing Federal Information Security
paragraphs: Under FISMA, the Director of OMB is responsible for developing and  overseeing the implementation of policies, principles, standards, and  guidelines on information security in federal agencies, except with regard  to national security and certain other systems. The director is also  responsible for coordinating the development of standards and guidelines  by NIST.
For its part, NIST is responsible under FISMA for developing security  standards and guidelines for agencies that include standards for  categorizing information and information systems according to ranges of  impact levels, minimum security requirements for information and  information systems in risk categories, guidelines for detection and  handling of information security incidents, and guidelines for identifying an  information system as a national security system.
Accordingly, OMB and NIST have prescribed policies, standards, and  guidelines that are intended to assist federal agencies with identifying and  providing information security protections commensurate with the risk and  magnitude of harm resulting from the unauthorized access, use,  disclosure, alteration, and destruction of information and information  systems, including those systems operated by a contractor or others on  behalf of the agency. These include the following:
OMB M-14-03, Enhancing the Security of Federal Information and  Information Systems, which provides agencies with direction for  managing information security risk on a continuous basis, including  requirements for establishing information security continuous  monitoring programs.
NIST, Federal Information Processing Standard 199, Standards for  Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information  Systems, requires agencies to categorize their information systems as  low-impact, moderate-impact, or high-impact for the security  objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
NIST Federal Information Processing Standard 200, Minimum  Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information  Systems, specifies minimum security requirements for federal agency  information and information systems and a risk-based process for  selecting the security controls necessary to satisfy these  requirements.
NIST Special Publication 800-53, Security and Privacy Controls for  Federal Information Systems and Organizations, provides a catalog of  security and privacy controls for federal information systems and  organizations and a process for selecting controls.
OMB and NIST also have provided guidance to agencies on procedures  for authenticating users to federal systems and websites, including the  following:
OMB M-15-13, Policy to Require Secure Connections across Federal  Websites and Web Services, which requires all publicly accessible  federal websites and web services to provide service through a  secure connection.
OMB M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies,  which addresses federal government services accomplished using the  Internet, instead of on paper, and calls for identity verification or  authentication to make sure that online government services are  secure and protect privacy. This guidance established four levels of  identity assurance for electronic transactions requiring authentication.  Each level describes the agency’s degree of certainty that a user has  presented an identifier that refers to his or her identity:
Level 1: little or no confidence in the asserted identity’s validity.
Level 2: some confidence in the asserted identity’s validity.
Level 3: high confidence in the asserted identity’s validity.
Level 4: very high confidence in the asserted identity’s validity.
NIST Special Publication 800-63-2, Electronic Authentication  Guideline, provides technical guidelines for federal agencies  implementing electronic authentication and covers remote  authentication of users (such as employees, contractors, or private  individuals) interacting with government IT systems over open  networks. Specifically, it provides technical requirements for agencies  to use in selecting technology to achieve specified levels of e- authentication assurance, as defined by OMB and illustrated by the  following examples:
Level 1: Identity proofing is not required. Successful  authentication occurs when an individual proves through the  means of authentication that he or she possesses and controls the  token. The cryptographic methods used at this level may still  allow someone with malicious intent to intercept the transmission  of a password through eavesdropping and crack it using a  dictionary attack (i.e., guessing a password through trial-and-error  using a dictionary).
Level 2: Requires single-factor remote authentication, using one of  three factors—something you know (e.g., a password), something  you have (e.g., an identification badge), or something you are  (e.g., a fingerprint). Identity proofing requirements are introduced,  requiring presentation of identifying materials or information.  Approved cryptographic methods would not allow the type of  eavesdropping attack that is possible at Level 1.
Level 3: Requires multi-factor remote authentication, requiring at  least two authentication factors. An individual proves possession  of a physical or software token in combination with some  memorized knowledge. Approved cryptographic methods should  be strong enough to protect against impersonation of the verifying  entity.
Level 4: Is intended to provide the highest practical remote  network authentication assurance, requiring the proof of  possession of a key through a cryptographic protocol. At this level  in-person identity proofing is required. It is otherwise similar to  Level 3, except with stronger cryptographic methods in place.
subsections: section_title: OMB and DHS Are Responsible for Oversight of Operational Aspects of Federal Cybersecurity
paragraphs: Federal law also gives OMB and DHS responsibility and authority for  oversight of operational aspects of federal information security. In  particular, the OMB Director is charged with overseeing and enforcing  agency compliance with information security requirements by taking  certain actions authorized by relevant federal law (discussed in more  detail below), and OMB has developed various mechanisms to carry out  its oversight function.
Budgetary authority: Federal law gives OMB the power of  enforcement and accountability related to evaluating agencies’  management of their information resources, which includes ensuring  that information security policies, procedures, and practices are  adequate. In particular, in enforcing accountability, OMB is  empowered to recommend reductions or increases in an agency’s  budget and restrict the availability of funds for information resources,  among other things.
OMB Cyber Unit: In fiscal year 2015, OMB established the OMB  Cyber and National Security Unit (OMB Cyber) within the Office of the  Federal Chief Information Officer. This unit is responsible for  strengthening federal cybersecurity through oversight of agency and  government-wide programs, issuing and implementing policies to  address emerging IT security risks, and oversight of government-wide  response to major incidents and vulnerabilities.
CyberStat Reviews: OMB has also established the “CyberStat  Review” process, which involves evidence-based meetings led by  OMB to ensure agencies are accountable for their cybersecurity  posture, while assisting them in developing targeted, tactical actions  to deliver results.
FISMA reporting: As required by FISMA, OMB reports annually to  Congress on the effectiveness of information security policies and  practices at executive branch agencies during the preceding year and  a summary of evaluations conducted by agency inspectors general.
Regarding DHS, the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of  2014 codified its responsibility for certain operational aspects of federal  agency cybersecurity. In particular, DHS is responsible for administering, in consultation with OMB, the implementation of  agency information security policies and practices for information  systems (other than national security systems, Department of  Defense, and the intelligence community’s “debilitating impact”  systems); developing, issuing, and overseeing the implementation of binding  operational directives to agencies on matters such as incident  reporting, contents of agency’s annual reports, and other operational  requirements; and operating the federal information security incident center (the U.S  Computer Emergency Readiness Team or US-CERT), deploying  technology to continuously diagnose and mitigate threats, compiling  and analyzing data, and developing and conducting targeted  operational evaluations, including threat and vulnerability  assessments of systems.
In May 2015 DHS issued its first directive, which required all departments  and agencies to review and mitigate all critical vulnerabilities on their  Internet-facing systems. DHS identifies these vulnerabilities using  scanning tools and reports the results to agencies on a weekly basis.  Agencies are then required to mitigate the DHS-identified vulnerabilities  within 30 days of the report, or provide a justification to DHS outlining  barriers, planned steps for resolution, and a time frame for mitigation.
DHS has also supplied agencies with tools and technologies to assist in  protecting against cyber threats and vulnerabilities. For example:
Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program: Since fiscal year  2013, DHS has provided agencies the opportunity to use a suite of  tools and capabilities to identify cybersecurity risks on an ongoing  basis, prioritize these risks based on potential impacts, and enable  cybersecurity personnel to mitigate the most significant problems first.
National Cybersecurity Protection System: NCPS is an integrated  system-of-systems intended to deliver a range of capabilities for  intrusion detection, intrusion prevention, analytics, and information  sharing. When deployed on an agency’s connection to the Internet,  the system monitors inbound and outbound traffic for malicious  activity.
In summary, while IRS has made progress in implementing information  security controls, it needs to continue to address weaknesses in access  controls and configuration management and consistently implement all  elements of its information security program. The risks IRS is exposed to  have been illustrated by recent incidents involving public-facing  applications, highlighting the importance of securing systems that contain  sensitive taxpayer and financial data. In addition, fully implementing key  elements of a breach response program will help ensure that when  breaches of sensitive data do occur, their impact on affected individuals  will be minimized. IRS also needs to assess the costs, benefits, and risks  of alternatives for better authenticating taxpayers who access its systems.  Finally, strengthening the security posture of IRS—and other agencies— also depends on the key roles played by OMB, NIST, and DHS in  providing oversight and guidance from a government-wide perspective,  such as that related to improving authentication.
Chairwoman Comstock, Ranking Member Lipinski, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer  any questions you have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you have any questions regarding this statement, please contact  Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov, Nancy  Kingsbury at (202) 512-2928 or kingsburyn@gao.gov, or James R.  McTigue, Jr. at (202) 512-9110 or mctiguej@gao.gov. Other key  contributors to this statement include Jeffrey Knott, Larry Crosland, John  de Ferrari, and Neil A. Pinney (assistant directors); Dawn E. Bidne; Mark  Canter; James Cook, Shannon J. Finnegan; Lee McCracken; Justin Palk;  J. Daniel Paulk; Monica Perez-Nelson; David Plocher; Erin Saunders  Rath; and Daniel Swartz.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.