Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry
Published: 2007-11-05T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for keeping terrorists and other dangerous people from entering the country while also facilitating the cross-border movement of millions of travelers. CBP carries out this responsibility at 326 air, sea, and land ports of entry. In response to a congressional request, GAO examined CBP traveler inspection efforts, the progress made and the challenges that remain in staffing and training at ports of entry, and the progress CBP has made in developing strategic plans and performance measures for its traveler inspection program. This is a public version of a For Official Use Only report GAO issued on October 5, 2007. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed and analyzed CBP data and documents related to inspections, staffing, and training, interviewed managers and officers, observed inspections at eight major air and land ports of entry, and tested inspection controls at eight small land ports of entry. Information the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deemed sensitive has been redacted.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: CBP has had some success in identifying inadmissible aliens and other violators, but weaknesses in its operations increase the potential that terrorists and inadmissible travelers could enter the country. In fiscal year 2006, CBP turned away over 200,000 inadmissible aliens and interdicted other violators. Although CBP's goal is to interdict all violators, CBP estimated that several thousand inadmissible aliens and other violators entered the country though ports of entry in fiscal year 2006. Weaknesses in 2006 inspection procedures, such as not verifying the nationality and admissibility of each traveler, contribute to failed inspections. Although CBP took actions to address these weaknesses, subsequent follow up work conducted by GAO months after CBP's actions found that weaknesses such as those described above still existed. In July 2007, CBP issued detailed procedures for conducting inspections including requiring field office managers to assess compliance with these procedures. However, CBP has not established an internal control to ensure field office managers share their assessments with CBP headquarters to help ensure that the new procedures are consistently implemented across all ports of entry and reduce the risk of failed traveler inspections. CBP developed a staffing model that estimates it needs up to several thousand more staff. Field office managers said that staffing shortages affected their ability to carry out anti-terrorism programs and created other vulnerabilities in the inspections process. CBP recognizes that officer attrition has impaired its ability to attain budgeted staffing levels and is in the process of developing a strategy to help curb attrition. CBP has made progress in developing training programs, yet it does not measure the extent to which it provides training to all who need it and whether new officers demonstrate proficiency in required skills. CPB issued a strategic plan for operations at its ports of entry and has collected performance data that can be used to measure its progress in achieving its strategic goals. However, current performance measures do not gauge CBP effectiveness in apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators, a key strategic goal.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—a major component within  the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—is the lead federal agency  in charge of inspecting travelers seeking to enter the United States at air,  land, and sea ports of entry.CBP officers, who number about 17,600 at  these ports of entry, play a critical role in carrying out this responsibility.  Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, their role has involved  increased emphasis on countering threats posed by terrorists and others  attempting to enter the country with fraudulent or altered travel  documents. Intelligence officials believe that the United States will face a  persistent and evolving terrorist threat and that the terrorist group al  Qaeda will intensify its efforts to put operatives here. There is also a  growing concern that terrorists with no criminal record may use legitimate  travel documents when they attempt to enter the country through ports of  entry.
In addition to its homeland security responsibilities, CBP is responsible for  preventing inadmissible aliens, criminals, and inadmissible goods from  entering the country. Doing so is a difficult task given the high volume of  travelers and goods that enter the country. For example, officers  frequently carry out their responsibilities with little time to make decisions  about admitting individuals into the country because they also face  pressure to facilitate the cross-border movement of millions of legitimate  travelers and billions of dollars in international trade.
When CBP was created in March 2003, it represented a merger of  components from three departments—the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S.  Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Animal and Plant Health  Inspection Service. As part of the merger, CBP moved forward with an  approach that was to allow a CBP officer, with the proper cross-training,  to carry out homeland security as well as traditional customs and  immigration responsibilities. For example, former customs inspectors  would be trained and work on tasks traditionally done by immigration  inspectors and vice versa. The CBP officer would also be capable of  referring agricultural violations to agricultural specialists. By training  officers from legacy agencies to perform both the customs and  immigration functions, CBP aimed to have a well-trained and well- integrated workforce to carry out the range of the agency’s missions.
In July 2003, we reported on vulnerabilities and inefficiencies in traveler  inspections. Given the critical role that CBP plays in homeland security,  you asked us to review the progress CBP has made in strengthening its  ability to inspect travelers arriving at the nation’s international airports  and land borders.  In response, on October 5, 2007, we issued a For  Official Use Only report that addressed the following questions:    What success and challenges has CBP had in interdicting inadmissible  aliens and other violators at its ports of entry?
What progress has CBP made in improving staffing and training at its  ports of entry and how successful has it been in carrying out these  workforce programs?
What progress and problems has CBP encountered in setting goals and  performance measures for its traveler inspection program?
As our October 2007 report contained information that DHS considered  law enforcement sensitive, this version of the report omits sensitive  information about CBP’s traveler inspection efforts, including information  on the techniques used to carry out inspections, data on the number of  inadmissible aliens and other violators that enter the country each year,  and data on staffing at ports of entry.  In addition, at DHS’s request, we  have redacted the specific locations that we visited.
The overall methodology used for our initial report is relevant to this  version of the report since the information in this product is derived from  our first report.  To address the questions above, we analyzed information  and data on CBP’s traveler inspections, staffing, and training at ports of  entry. We reviewed CBP policies and procedures for the traveler  inspection program as well as other documents related to traveler  inspection efforts. We interviewed CBP officials on the status of CBP  efforts to develop a staffing model, train staff, carry out traveler  inspections, and develop performance measures. For information that  would provide an overall picture of CBP’s efforts, we reviewed and  analyzed several nationwide databases, including data on staffing, training,  attrition, resource requests from CBP’s 20 field offices  and one pre- clearance headquarters office, and apprehension of inadmissible aliens  and other violators at major airp and land ports of entry. We assessed the  reliability of CBP’s data from CBP’s random selection program of travelers  and staffing and training data by, among other things, meeting with  knowledgeable officials about these data, reviewing relevant  documentation, and performing electronic testing. We concluded that data  from CBP databases, with the exception of the data on training as we  discuss later in our report, were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  our review. Although we discussed the staffing model and its results with  CBP officials responsible for the model, validating the model and its  results was outside the scope of our review.
To supplement our analyses of CBP’s nationwide data, we visited eight  ports of entry. While we cannot generalize our work from our visits to all  ports of entry, we chose these ports of entry to provide examples of  operations at air and land ports of entry. At each site, we held discussion  groups with CBP officers and met with management to discuss, among  other things, staffing and training programs. In addition, GAO investigators  visited other ports of entry to test the traveler inspection process.  Although we cannot generalize our investigator’s work at these locations  to all ports of entry, we selected these ports of entry to provide examples  of traveler inspections.  Our investigators did their work in accordance  with quality standards for investigations as set forth by the President’s  Council on Integrity and Efficiency. Unless we specify that the work was  done by our investigators, all referrals to our visits to ports of entry pertain  to the eight ports of entry cited above. In addition, we analyzed the 2004  and 2006 Office of Personnel Management Federal Human Capital Surveys  of staff at 36 federal agencies, including the results from CBP, that dealt  with the views of federal employees on training and staffing in the  workplace. We reviewed standards for internal control in the federal  government and compared the standards for information and  communications and monitoring with CBP’s policies and procedures for  traveler inspections. Finally, we reviewed prior GAO reports on best  practices for developing strategic plans and performance measures and  compared the best practices with CBP’s plans and measures for its  operations at its ports of entry. See appendix I for further explanation of  our scope and methodology. We did our work in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards from August 2006  through September 2007.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: CBP is the lead federal agency charged with keeping terrorists, criminals,  and inadmissible aliens out of the country while facilitating the flow of  legitimate travel and commerce at the nation’s borders. CBP has three  main components that have border security responsibilities. First, CBP’s  Office of Field Operations is responsible for processing the flow of people  and goods that enter the country through air, land, and sea ports of entry  where CBP officers inspect travelers and goods to determine whether they  may be legally admitted into the country. Second, CBP’s Border Patrol  works to prevent the illegal entry of persons and contraband into the  United States between the ports of entry. The Border Patrol is responsible  for controlling nearly 7,000 miles of the nation’s land borders between  ports of entry and 95,000 miles of maritime border in partnership with the  United States Coast Guard. Third, CBP’s Office of Air and Marine helps to  protect the nation’s critical infrastructure through the coordinated use of  an integrated force of air and marine resources and provides mission  support to the other CBP components. For fiscal year 2007, CBP had a $9.3  billion budget, of which $2.5 billion was for border security and trade  facilitation at ports of entry.
In carrying out its responsibilities, CBP operates 326 official ports of entry,  composed of airports, seaports, and designated land ports of entry along  the northern and southern borders. Ports of entry vary considerably in  size and volume, including diverse locations such as major airports like  New York’s John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport, and the busiest  land crossing in the United States at San Ysidro, California, which  processes over 17 million vehicles a year (see fig. 1); small ports in remote  rural locations along the Canadian border that process only a few  thousand vehicles every year; and seaports like the Port of Miami where  cruise ships transport more than 3 million travelers into and out of the  country each year. Most ports of entry are land border crossings located  along the northern border with Canada or the southern border with  Mexico. The four largest land border ports of entry by traveler volume  are at San Ysidro, Calexico, and Otay Mesa in California, and the Bridge of  Americas in El Paso, Texas. In total, these four ports process about 27  percent of all travelers who enter the country by land.
CBP annually processes over 400 million passenger and pedestrian  entries, 20 million containers, and 130 million conveyances through  ports of entry. In fiscal year 2005, the most recent year for which traveler  data are available by mode of entry, land border crossings were by far the  busiest for processing people, with about three out of four entries into the  country occurring through a land port of entry (see fig. 2).
subsections: section_title: Process for Inspecting Travelers Differs between Air and Land Ports of Entry
paragraphs: The process for inspecting travelers at airports is significantly different  than the process at land ports of entry. Prior to departure from foreign  airports, airline carriers electronically submit passenger manifest  information to CBP. CBP officers cross-check passengers against a wide  range of law enforcement databases before travelers enter the country.  Upon arrival in the United States, international airline passengers are first  subject to immigration inspections that check visas, passports, and  biometric data (see fig. 3). Generally, international passengers arriving by  air must present a U.S. passport, permanent resident card, foreign  passport, or a foreign passport containing a visa issued by the Department  of State. CBP officers may also inspect the luggage of travelers.
CBP faces a much greater challenge to identify and screen individuals at  land ports of entry, in part because of the lack of advance traveler  information and the high volume of traffic at many locations. Unlike  travelers who enter the country at airports, travelers entering through land  ports of entry can arrive at virtually any time and may present thousands  of different forms of documentation, ranging from oral declarations of U.S.  or Canadian citizenship, driver’s licenses, birth certificates, passports,  visas, permanent resident cards, or U.S. military identity cards. Travelers  entering the country by bus or rail must provide documentation and may  be subject to further inspection. CBP has implemented measures to help  provide advance information on passengers arriving at land ports of entry,  including trusted traveler programs that register frequent, low-risk  travelers for expedited entry, and license plate readers that match license  plate numbers against law enforcement databases.
section_title: Traveler Inspection Policies and Procedures Call for Establishing Citizenship and Admissibility
paragraphs: The Immigration and Nationality Act, implementing regulations, and  CBP policies and procedures for traveler inspection at all ports of entry  require officers to establish, at a minimum, the nationality of individuals  and whether they are eligible to enter the country. The first requirement is  for the CBP officer to determine if the person is a U.S. citizen or an alien,  and if an alien, establish whether the person meets the criteria for  admission into the country. Current documentation requirements for entry  into the country vary depending on the nationality of the traveler and the  mode of entry. For example, U.S. citizens arriving at land ports of entry  currently may seek to establish citizenship to a CBP officer through an  oral declaration of citizenship. In general, nonimmigrant aliens arriving at  land and air ports of entry must present a valid, unexpired passport as well  as, depending on country of origin and intended length of stay in the  United States, a valid, unexpired visa issued by a U.S. embassy or  consulate for entry into the country. As most travelers attempting to enter  the country through ports of entry have a legal basis for doing so, a  streamlined screening procedure referred to as a primary inspection is  used to process those individuals who can be readily identified as  admissible. Persons whose admissibility cannot be readily determined and  persons selected as part of a random selection process are subjected to a  more detailed review called a secondary inspection. This involves a closer  inspection of travel documents and possessions, additional questioning by  CBP officers, and cross references through multiple law enforcement  databases to verify the traveler’s identity, background, purpose for  entering the country, and other corroborating information. At the end of  this process, the individual may be admitted, refused entry and returned to  the country of origin, or detained while admissibility is subject to further  review.
section_title: Transforming the Role of CBP Officers Is a Work in Progress
paragraphs: As part of the original reorganization plan for border security, DHS found  that having border security and inspections performed by three separate  legacy agencies with different priorities, conflicting policies, and varying  leadership structures had led to inconsistent inspections and gaps in the  sharing of information between these agencies. As part of its actions to  address these concerns, in March 2003, DHS created CBP by merging  employees from the three legacy agencies previously responsible for  border security. Among other considerations, DHS formed CBP to  establish a unified command structure that was intended to reduce  duplication of efforts while improving the sharing of information. For  operations at ports of entry, in September 2003 CBP issued its plan for  consolidating the inspection functions formerly performed by separate  inspectors from the three legacy agencies. The plan, referred to as “One  Face at the Border,” called for unifying and integrating the legacy  inspectors into two new positions—a CBP officer and a CBP agricultural  specialist. The new CBP officer would serve as the frontline officer  responsible for carrying out the priority anti-terrorism mission as well as  the traditional customs and immigration inspection functions, while also  identifying and referring goods in need of a more extensive agricultural  inspection to the agricultural specialist. CBP anticipated that having a  well-trained and well-integrated workforce that could carry out the  complete range of inspection functions involving the processing of  individuals and goods would allow it to utilize its inspection resources  more effectively and enable it to better target potentially high-risk  travelers. Together, CBP envisioned the result to be more effective  inspections and enhanced security at ports of entry while also accelerating  the processing of legitimate trade and travel.
While it has been about 4 years since the formation of DHS and CBP, our  prior work on mergers and acquisitions found that it generally takes 5 to 7  years to successfully complete such a transformation. For example, GAO  designated DHS’s overall transformation as a high-risk area in 2003 based  on three factors. First, DHS faced a formidable task in implementing a  transformation process that would effectively combine 22 disparate  agencies with an estimated 170,000 employees into one department.  Second, many of these agencies were facing their own challenges in  management areas such as strategic human capital, information  technology, and financial management; thus, DHS inherited a host of  operational and management challenges from the beginning. Third, DHS’s  national security mission is critically important and failure to effectively  address its management challenges and program risks could have serious  consequences for national security as well as have major economic  impacts. CBP, as part of DHS, faces many similar challenges in its efforts  to unify three agencies into one and in transforming the role of its officers.  For example, with over 40,000 employees, CBP represented the largest  merger of people and functions within DHS. Additionally, our prior work  on the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S. Customs  Service, two of the primary agencies involved in the merger, showed that  these agencies experienced many management challenges before their  merger into CBP. Finally, like DHS, CBP’ has a primary mission of  preventing terrorist attacks that is critical to national security.
section_title: CBP Has Had Some Success in Interdicting Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators, but It Still Needs to Overcome Weaknesses in Its Traveler Inspections and Physical Infrastructure
paragraphs: CBP has had some success in identifying inadmissible aliens and other  violators. In fiscal year 2006, CBP successfully caught tens of thousands of  violators and it made security improvements at its ports of entry, such as  installing new cargo inspection technology. Nevertheless, the agency faces  major challenges in overcoming weaknesses in both traveler inspections  and physical infrastructure. In regards to traveler inspections, at our  request, CBP officials showed us a videotape that identified numerous  examples of officers not establishing the nationality of individuals and  their eligibility for entering the country as required by law. CBP took  action in the summer of 2006 to address the problems by holding high- level management meetings and delivering training on traveler inspections  to its officers. However, we later found that CBP’s initial set of corrective  actions did not always address the problems and we found similar  problems as those on the videotape. CBP issued new policies and  procedures to overcome these inspection weaknesses at its land ports of  entry including requiring field office directors to conduct assessments to  ensure compliance with these new inspection procedures. However, the  policies and procedures do not require that field office directors share  their assessment results with CBP headquarters management, which may  hinder its ability to use the information to overcome weaknesses in  traveler inspections and to identify best practices that may occur during  implementation of its new policies and procedures. CBP faces a challenge  in addressing physical infrastructure weaknesses at land ports of entry in a  timely way because some ports are owned by other governmental or  private entities, potentially adding to the time needed to agree on  infrastructure changes and put them in place.
subsections: section_title: CBP Has Had Some Success Identifying Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators
paragraphs: CBP has identified and interdicted thousands of potentially dangerous  people and significant amounts of illegal goods at ports of entry.  According to CBP, in fiscal year 2006, CBP officers arrested more than  23,000 suspected criminals, denied entry to over 200,000 inadmissible  aliens, seized more than 644,000 pounds of illegal drugs, intercepted  nearly 1.7 million prohibited agricultural items, and seized over $155  million in illegal commercial merchandise, such as counterfeit footwear  and handbags. CBP officers also intercepted 40,362 fraudulent documents  used in attempts to enter the country illegally in fiscal year 2006. Over half  (21,292) of the fraudulent documents intercepted by CBP involved the  alteration or improper use of travel documents issued by the U.S  Department of State. About 80 percent of these documents involved  impostors—that is, people using authentic, unaltered documents that had  been validly issued to another person. The remaining 20 percent attempted  to enter with fraudulent documents that were altered in some way, such as  a fake or altered U.S. visa, or were entirely counterfeit.
CBP’s success in identifying inadmissible aliens and other violators has  been enhanced by several new initiatives and programs that aim to further  improve security at ports of entry. They include the following:    New cargo inspection technology.  According to CBP, it has  installed nonintrusive inspection technologies at ports of entry that  enable officers to rapidly inspect vehicles and truck containers for  inadmissible aliens and other violators, nuclear or radiological  weapons, or other contraband (see fig. 4). Other nonintrusive  technologies, such as radiation detectors, allow CBP to inspect  containerized truck and sea cargo without having to perform a time- intensive manual search or other intrusive examinations of the  contents.
Additional requirements for screening passengers. To improve its  ability to target high-risk individuals that are on international flights  bound for the United States, CBP in fiscal year 2007, issued a ruling  that requires airlines provide passenger manifest information prior to  departure. These data are critical in screening passengers against  watch lists and other databases and identifying potentially dangerous  individuals attempting to enter the United States.
CBP also expanded the entry capability of the U.S. Visitor and  Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to a total  of 116 airports, 15 seaports, and 154 land ports of entry. Through this  program, CBP is able to collect, maintain, and share data, including  biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, on selected foreign  nationals entering the United States to verify their identities as they  Inspection  Equipment  arrive at air, sea, and land ports of entry. CBP also uses these data to  screen persons against watch lists and other law enforcement  databases to determine their eligibility to enter the country.
Prescreening programs for low-risk travelers. As part of CBP  efforts to facilitate legitimate trade and travel, CBP has implemented  several initiatives to increase enrollment in its trusted traveler  programs, such as the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid  Inspection (SENTRI) program on the southern border and the NEXUS  program on the northern border. These programs allow registered  border residents and frequent cross-border travelers identified as low- risk individuals access to dedicated lanes and expedited processing  with minimal inspection (see fig. 5). Participants undergo a thorough  background check, a fingerprint law enforcement check, and a  personal interview with a CBP officer. Enrollment in these two  programs totaled nearly 260,000 members in fiscal year 2007. In  addition, as part of an initiative among the United States, Canada, and  Mexico, CBP operates a trusted traveler program called the Free and  Secure Trade (FAST) program, for truck companies involved in  transporting cargo through land ports of entry. Participants in FAST  have access to dedicated lanes as well as reduced number of  examinations. In 2006, CBP certified 124 new commercial partners and  approved over 8,000 new drivers to participate in the program, bringing  total FAST enrollment to 84,000 participants.
Automated license plate and document readers. CBP has also  increased deployment of automated license plate and document  readers at land ports of entry. License plate readers automatically read  front and rear license plates of vehicles as they enter the primary  inspection area, with the data simultaneously queried against CBP and  law enforcement databases (see fig. 6). In addition, CBP has installed  document readers that electronically read documents, such as  passports or border crossing cards, that allow CBP officers to  automatically query law enforcement databases. With these readers in  place, CBP officers spend less time manually inputting information,  thereby reducing inspection times, improving the accuracy of the  collected information, and affording the officers the ability to interact  more with vehicle occupants.
section_title: Improvements Notwithstanding, CBP Acknowledges that It Did Not Apprehend All Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators
paragraphs: While CBP has had some success in interdicting inadmissible aliens and  other violators, CBP acknowledges that it did not apprehend all  inadmissible aliens and other violators who sought to enter the country at  air and land ports of entry.  CBP’s estimates of how many inadmissible  aliens and other violators evade detection are based on a sample of  travelers who arrive at land and air ports of entry. This program, called  Compliance Examination (COMPEX), randomly selects travelers entering  the country for more detailed inspections. CBP carries out this program  at air and land ports of entry.  At land ports, CBP randomly selects  vehicles and conducts more detailed inspections of the vehicles and  possessions of the traveler. At airports, CBP supervisors randomly select  travelers. In both cases, the program is designed to select travelers who  would not normally be referred to a secondary inspection and would  therefore be allowed to enter the country. On the basis of the extent to  which violations are found in the in-depth inspections, CBP estimates the  total number of inadmissible aliens and other violators who seek to enter  the country at locations where COMPEX is carried out. CBP then  calculates an apprehension rate by comparing the number of violators it  actually apprehends with the estimated number of violators that attempted  entry.  Using COMPEX, CBP estimates that several thousand inadmissible  aliens and other violators entered the country through air and land ports  of entry in fiscal year 2006.
section_title: Weaknesses in How Well Inspection Procedures Were Followed Increased the Potential of Illegal Entry
paragraphs: Weaknesses in how well inspection procedures were followed increased  the potential that inadmissible aliens and other violators successfully  entered the country. In the summer of 2006, CBP reviewed hundreds of  hours of video from 150 large and small land ports of entry and determined  that while CBP officers carried out thorough traveler inspections in many  instances, they also identified numerous examples where officers did not  comply with inspection requirements, according to CBP officials. At our  request, CBP officials showed us a 15-minute video that CBP had prepared  that documented noncompliance with inspection requirements. The  following were examples of weaknesses that were on the video:  In one instance, officers waved vehicles into the United States without  stopping the vehicle or interviewing the driver or its passengers as  required. In another instance, motorcycles passed through inspection  lanes without stopping and making any contact with an officer. In a  third instance, during “lane switches” when CBP officers were relieved  of their duty and replaced by other officers, officers waved traffic  through the lane while the officer logged into the computer. The proper  procedure is for traffic to be stopped until the officer is logged into the  system and is available to perform proper inspections.
In another instance, while the CBP officer was reviewing information  on his computer screen, he waved pedestrians through the lane without  looking at them, making verbal contact, or inspecting travel  documents. In another instance, travelers would simply hold up their  identification cards and officers would view them without stepping out  of the booth before waving the vehicle through. In these cases, the  officers did not appear to make verbal contact with the passengers and  did not interview any passengers sitting in the back seat of the vehicle.  As a final example, officers did not board recreational vehicles to  determine whether additional traveler inspections should be carried  out.
Without checking the identity, citizenship, and admissibility of travelers,  there is an increased potential that dangerous people and inadmissible  goods may enter the country and cause harm to American citizens and the  economy. According to CBP interviews with apprehended alien smugglers,  alien smuggling organizations have been aware of weaknesses in CBP’s  inspection procedures and they have trained operatives to take advantage  of these weaknesses. This awareness heightens the potential that failed  inspections will occur at ports of entry when such procedural weaknesses  exist.
According to CBP senior management, the factors that may have  contributed to these weaknesses included the following:    Failure to engage, lack of focus, and complacency. According to  CBP senior management, emphasis is not being placed on all missions,  and there is a failure by some of its officers to recognize the threat  associated with dangerous people and goods entering the country.
Insufficient staffing. According to CBP senior management, they are  unable to staff ports of entry to sufficiently accommodate the  workload. Lack of sufficient staff contributes to officers working  double shifts, sometimes resulting in fatigue that can affect decisions.
Lack of supervisory presence in primary inspections. CBP senior  management noted that lack of supervisory presence at primary  inspection booths can contribute to less than optimal inspections.
Lack of training. CBP senior management acknowledged that, in  some cases, periodic and on-the-job training is not being delivered.
subsections: section_title: CBP Is Taking Action to Address Inspection Weaknesses, but Challenges Remain
paragraphs: CBP has taken action to address weaknesses in its inspection procedures  by renewing its emphasis on the need to improve inspections at ports of  entry and by revising traveler inspection policies and procedures. In July  2006, CBP headquarters showed field office directors the 15-minute  videotape that documented the type of noncompliant inspections that  were taking place at land ports of entry. CBP management emphasized the  importance of thorough inspection procedures at all ports of entry,  including airports and seaports, by requesting field office directors to  review current procedures and identify best practices for more thorough  inspections. As requested by the Assistant Commissioner of Field  Operations, the field office directors conducted a series of meetings with  senior port management to review and evaluate their ports’ performance,  make corrections where necessary, and identify best practices when  inspecting travelers. Through efforts such as these, CBP managers  identified best practices that included (1) increased supervisory presence  in primary inspection areas; (2) detailing specific steps that should be  conducted during primary inspections, such as interviewing travelers and  conducting thorough document review (e.g., handling and inspecting  documents); and (3) personal visits to ports of entry by directors and  managers.
CBP also revised its policies and procedures for traveler inspections at  land ports of entry to deal with weaknesses that were identified. In July  2007, CBP issued new policies and procedures for inspecting travelers at  land ports of entry, including pedestrians and those who enter by vehicle.  Among other things, the policies and procedures call on officers to obtain  photo identification for all travelers in a vehicle and match the traveler  with the photograph. In doing so, the CBP officer is required to obtain a  declaration of citizenship, either in the form of travel documents, such as  passports, or in the case of a U.S. citizen or Canadian citizen, an oral  statement. To the extent possible, officers are required to query law  enforcement databases for all travelers in a vehicle. The new policies  identify roles and responsibilities of CBP officials at ports of entry,  including directors of field offices, port directors, supervisory CBP  officers, as well as CBP officers. In the near future, CBP officials are also  planning to issue new policies and procedures for processing cargo at land  borders and for inspecting travelers who enter the country at airports and  seaports.
However, issuing new policies and procedures alone does not ensure they  will be carried out. For example, after CBP headquarters issued directives,  held musters, and issued memorandums to field office and port managers  that emphasized the importance of carrying out improved traveler  inspections in July 2006, many of the same weaknesses they attempted to  deal with continued to exist at ports of entry we visited. In October 2006  and January 2007, or as much as 5 months after managers informed  officers of the need to carry out traveler inspections in a more rigorous  way by interviewing travelers and examining their travel documents, our  investigators identified weaknesses in traveler inspections that were  similar to those identified in CBP’s 15-minute video.  At several ports of  entry, our investigators found that a CBP officer was not staffing the booth  when they arrived for inspection.  At other locations, CBP officers did not  ask for travel documents from our investigators. For example, at one port,  when our investigators arrived at the port of entry, one of them called over  to three officers who were seated at desks behind a counter about ten feet  away.  One of the officers asked our investigator if he was a U.S. citizen  and the investigator said “yes.”  The CBP officers did not get up from their  desks to ask for any identification, asked no other question, and allowed  our investigator to enter the country. At another port of entry, a CBP  officer was not present at the primary inspection booth when our  investigator arrived for inspection and he had to wait approximately 3 to 4  minutes before an officer arrived.
While CBP’s new policies and procedures are a step in the right direction,  ensuring their proper implementation will be key to overcoming  weaknesses in traveler inspections. An effective internal control  environment is a key method to help agency managers achieve program  objectives and enhance their ability to address identified weaknesses. CBP  is taking positive steps to implement some control requirements. For  example, one of the standards for internal control in the federal  government involves monitoring to assess the quality of performance over  time. To monitor how traveler inspections are conducted at ports of entry,  CBP headquarters has developed a program to covertly test the integrity of  existing security measures at ports of entry, including the work carried out  by CBP officers. In addition, CBP headquarters officials are called on to  conduct compliance reviews. Last, CBP’s new policies and procedures on  traveler inspections call on field office directors to ensure compliance  with the new inspection procedures at all ports of entry by conducting  audits and assessments. Internal control standards state that information  should be communicated to management to enable it to carry out its  program responsibilities. However, CBP does not require that field offices  share the results of their audits and assessments with CBP headquarters  management. Without obtaining and receiving the results of field office  audits and assessments, CBP management may be hindered in its ability to  efficiently use the information to overcome weaknesses in traveler  inspections and identify best practices that may occur during  implementation of its new policies and procedures.
Querying all travelers arriving at land ports of entry against CBP law  enforcement databases represents a major challenge for CBP. As  discussed earlier in this report, CBP’s new policies and procedures require  officers, to the extent feasible, to query travel documents of all travelers  who arrive at primary inspection at land ports of entry. In contrast, CBP  officers at airports generally handle and query documents of all travelers.  Taking the time to enter information into CBP’s law enforcement database  for the several hundred million travelers arriving at primary inspection  could hinder CBP’s ability to facilitate the movement of legitimate travel  and commerce.
DHS’s planned Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, when implemented  at land ports of entry, may allow CBP to query more travelers against law  enforcement databases and could improve CBP’s ability to identify  inadmissible aliens and other violators without harming commerce and  travel. The initiative generally requires travelers to have a passport or  passport-like document to enter the United States from Canada, Mexico,  and other countries in the western hemisphere that is machine-readable  and therefore can be more quickly and accurately checked against CBP’s  law enforcement database than currently acceptable documents. CBP has  already implemented the initiative at air ports of entry, but has yet to do so  at land ports of entry. When the initiative is implemented at land ports of  entry, CBP officers may be able to query more documents because DHS  estimates that processing a traveler at primary inspection will be reduced  by 15 to 25 seconds because all travelers will have documents that will be  machine readable.
section_title: Problems with Physical Infrastructure Increase the Risk That Vehicles Could Bypass Land Ports of Entry
paragraphs: CBP’s effectiveness at securing the nation’s borders depends not only on  the quality of traveler inspections, but also on the degree to which physical  infrastructure is in place to reduce the risk that inadmissible aliens and  other violators could bypass inspection points and enter the country.  During our site visits, we identified weaknesses in physical infrastructure  at some land ports of entry.
subsections: section_title: Making Changes to Address Physical Infrastructure Weaknesses at Land Ports of Entry Can Be Challenging
paragraphs: CBP has developed a process to identify and prioritize capital  infrastructure needs at land ports of entry. One component of this  planning process is called the Strategic Resource Assessment—an  assessment that identifies capital needs at ports of entry by evaluating  existing facility conditions, predicting future workload trends, performing  space capacity analyses, and estimating costs for the recommended  options. CBP’s Office of Finance has compiled resource assessments for  163 land crossings and has prioritized the ports with the greatest need.  On  the basis of the assessments, CBP estimates that the cost of making capital  improvements at land crossings totals about $4 billion. In addition, the  assessments identify a planning process to ensure that funding is allocated  in a systematic and objective manner.
While CBP has made progress in identifying its capital needs, making  infrastructure changes to address the problems is not always easy,  according to CBP officials responsible for infrastructure improvements.  For example, these senior CBP officials noted that they do not have the  discretion to make infrastructure improvements on their own, such as  installing barriers and bollards, when they do not own the property and  therefore need to coordinate their efforts with other entities, such as  private bridge commissions or state highway departments. For capital  improvements at ports of entry, such as building new vehicle lanes or  secondary inspection facilities, the CBP officials said the lead time for  making such improvements was long. For example, according to these  CBP officials, for the 96 ports of entry that are owned by the General  Services Administration (GSA), GSA approves and prioritizes capital  improvement projects. The process of submitting a request for an  infrastructure improvement and completion of the project is  approximately 7 years from start to finish, according to a GSA official. For  the 23 ports of entry that are privately owned and leased by GSA, CBP  officials noted that coordinating with privately owned companies on  infrastructure improvements is a difficult process because the private  owner’s interest in facilitating commerce must be balanced with CBP’s  interest in national security. According to CBP officials, the degree to  which improvements will be made at land ports of entry and how long it  will take depend on available funding and the results of discussions with  various stakeholders, such as GSA and private port owners. Each year,  depending upon funding availability, CBP submits its proposed capital  improvement projects based upon the prioritized list it has developed. As  of September 2007, CBP had infrastructure projects related to 20 different  ports of entry in various stages of development, according to a CBP  official.
section_title: Progress Being Made, but Challenges Still Exist in CBP Officer Staffing and Training
paragraphs: CBP has taken action to improve staffing and training at ports of entry by  assessing staffing needs, adding staff, and developing an extensive training  program, but it faces challenges in hiring and retaining staff and providing  required training. To address staffing, CBP developed a staffing model to  identify the resources needed at the nation’s ports of entry. While CBP has  had a net increase of about 1,000 more staff since 2005, the results of the  staffing model indicate that CBP may need additional officers at ports. Not  having sufficient staff contributes to morale problems, fatigue, and safety  issues for officers. It also makes it difficult for ports of entry to fully carry  out anti-terrorism and other traveler inspection programs. The problems  are exacerbated by difficulties in retaining experienced staff. Regarding  training, CBP has made progress in developing 37 training modules for  CBP officers and a national on-the-job training program for new officers.  While it has delivered training to thousands of CBP officers, CBP faces  challenges in (1) delivering the required training modules to those who  need it and (2) providing on-the-job training to new CBP officers  consistent with national program guidance. When staff do not receive  required training or are not trained consistently with program guidance, it  limits knowledge building and increases the risk that needed expertise is  not developed. Senior CBP headquarters officials also stated that the lack  of training and training that is inconsistently delivered may increase the  risk that terrorists, inadmissible travelers, and illicit goods could be  admitted into the country.
subsections: section_title: Staffing Shortfalls and Retention Problems Exist at Ports of Entry
paragraphs: Congressional concern about CBP’s ability to link resources to its mission  led Congress to call on CBP to develop resource allocation models. In  responding to language in the conference report for the fiscal year 2007  DHS appropriations and the SAFE Port Act of 2006, CBP developed a  staffing model for its land, air, and sea ports of entry. The conference  report directed CBP to develop the staffing model in a way that would  align officer resources with threats, vulnerabilities, and workload. This  directive stemmed, in part, from concern about CBP’s ability to effectively  manage its growing workload, minimize wait times, and ensure that CBP  officers receive adequate training in all relevant inspection functions. The  staffing model is designed to determine the optimum number of CBP  officers that each port of entry needs in order to accomplish its mission  responsibilities. According to CBP staff involved in developing the staffing  model, it is primarily driven by traveler volume and inspection processing  times. The staffing model also incorporates assumptions for training, anti- terrorism activities, and staffing for special equipment, such as radiation  portal monitors. According to CBP officials, the model’s assumptions will  be recalculated each fiscal year in order to account for changes caused by  new requirements, procedures, or changes in workload. For example,  when the new inspection requirements come into effect under the Western  Hemisphere Travel Initiative, CBP can adjust the processing times in the  staffing model, which may result in changes in the number of staff  needed, according to CBP officials. CBP plans to use the staffing model  to help management decide on the number of staff needed and where they  should be deployed.
In July 2007, CBP provided us with the results for the staffing model.  The  model’s results showed that CBP would need up to several thousand  additional CBP officers and agricultural specialists at its ports of entry.  In  addition, the staffing model showed the relative need among different CBP  locations.  CBP has determined that data from the staffing model are law  enforcement sensitive.  Therefore, we are not providing more detailed data  and information from the model in this report.
The staffing model was not finalized in time to prepare CBP’s fiscal year  2008 budget request. CBP officials told us that they plan to use the results  of the staffing model to determine which locations are to receive  additional staffing in fiscal year 2008, should Congress approve their  request for additional positions.
subsections: section_title: CBP Cites Insufficient Staffing as an Impediment to Traveler Inspection Efforts
paragraphs: Before the staffing model was finalized, CBP used other data to determine  staffing needs and provide an indication of the degree to which insufficient  staffing affects operations at ports of entry. CBP’s 20 field offices and its  pre-clearance headquarters office requested additional officers through  quarterly resource assessment reports that quantified perceived staffing  needs and provided justifications for the request. CBP used the quarterly  resource assessment reports to help determine the number of officers to  allocate to each office, but the majority of the requests went unfilled due,  in part, to budget constraints. In January 2007, 19 of CBP’s 21 offices  identified a need for additional officers to accomplish their anti-terrorism  responsibilities through special operations and anti-terrorism teams;  operate new equipment, such as radiation portal monitors and non- intrusive inspection technologies, both of which are relatively new  additions to CBP’s mission responsibilities; and to deal with increased  workload from increased traveler volume and the expansion of primary  inspection lanes and other facilities.
Managers, supervisors, and officers at seven of the eight ports of entry that  we visited provided examples of how insufficient staffing affects their  ability to carry out primary and secondary inspections:  Anti-terrorism and other traveler inspection programs are not fully  carried out. CBP uses a “layered” enforcement approach when it inspects  travelers.  In implementing this approach, port officials told us that when  possible, they perform enforcement operations that include anti-terrorism  teams and canine inspections (see fig. 7).  While considered discretionary,  according to CBP officials, these inspections can result in significant  numbers of seizures and adverse actions and, thus, are a key tool in  traveler inspection efforts. For example, one port conducted a 30-day pilot  project during which it focused its efforts on such operations.   During this  time, CBP officers said they apprehended 96 criminals, inadmissible aliens,  and other violators who were in line for primary inspection.
Double shifts can result in officer fatigue. Due to staffing shortages, ports  of entry rely on overtime to accomplish their inspection responsibilities.  Officers at six of the eight ports of entry we visited indicated that officer  fatigue caused by excessive overtime negatively affected inspections at  their ports of entry. On occasion, officers said they are called upon to  work 16-hour shifts, spending long stints in the primary passenger  processing lanes in order to keep lanes open, in part to minimize traveler  wait times.  Further evidence of fatigue came from officers who said that  CBP officers call in sick due to exhaustion, in part to avoid mandatory  overtime, which in turn exacerbates the staffing challenges faced by the  ports.
section_title: CBP Faces Challenges in Retaining Officers
paragraphs: CBP’s onboard staffing level is below its budgeted level, partly due to  attrition.  According to CBP officials at headquarters and the ports of  entry we visited, the gap between the budgeted staffing level and the  number of officers onboard is attributable in part to high attrition, with  ports of entry losing officers faster than they can hire replacements.  Through March 2007, CBP data show that, on average, 52 CBP officers left  the agency each 2-week pay period in fiscal year 2007, up from 34 officers  in fiscal year 2005. Port managers at five locations indicated that the rising  attrition consistently keeps their ports of entry below the budgeted  staffing level because of the lengthy amount of time—up to a year—that it  can take to hire and train a new officer. On a case-by-case basis, CBP has  allowed five field offices to hire above their budgeted staffing levels in  order to account for the expected attrition before the next hiring cycle.  For example, one field office was allowed to hire over its budgeted staffing  level by 100 staff in anticipation of expected officer attrition. However, the  use of this option is limited and port managers stated that attrition still  outpaces hiring at such locations.
Numerous reasons exist for officer attrition. As with other federal  agencies, officer retirements are taking a toll on the agency’s workforce. In  the next 4 years, over 3,700 CBP officers, or about 20 percent of CBP’s  authorized level of 18,530 officers, will become eligible for retirement. In  addition, according to CBP officials, CBP officers are leaving the agency to  take positions at other DHS components and other federal agencies to  obtain law enforcement officer benefits not authorized to them at CBP. In  fiscal year 2006, about 24 percent of the officers leaving CBP, or about 339  officers, left for a position in another DHS component. Further, extensive  overtime, poor officer morale, and the high cost of living in certain areas  were frequently cited by employees who left as reasons for attrition. Our  analysis of responses by nonsupervisory CBP staff to the 2006 OPM  Federal Human Capital Survey corroborated that they have concerns  about efforts to develop staff and agency leadership that could contribute  to low morale and attrition. See appendix II for a more complete analysis  of responses by nonsupervisory employees to OPM’s Federal Human  Capital Survey.
CBP recognizes that attrition of officers is adversely affecting its  operations and that it must reassess aspects of its human capital approach  if it is to hire and retain a high-performing, motivated workforce. CBP  officials told us that CBP is considering a number actions including  establishing personnel incentive programs, such as a tuition  reimbursement program. In addition, the Office of Field Operations plans  to work with CBP’s Office of Human Resources Management to develop  and distribute a personnel satisfaction survey to obtain employee  feedback so that leadership can better address the needs of its workforce.  CBP has also revised the exit survey it gives to employees prior to their  leaving the agency to better assess their reasons for leaving and to help  CBP identify where it is losing employees. CBP plans to analyze data from  OPM’s Human Capital Survey, the employee satisfaction and exit surveys,  and attrition data to help identify what specific actions CBP may need to  take to curb attrition. CBP plans to develop some initial retention  strategies by December 2008 and by September 2009 develop approaches  to retain staff based on areas of concern identified in the employee exit  survey.
section_title: Major Cross-Training Program Developed, but Ports of Entry We Visited Faced Challenges in Delivering Required Training
paragraphs: Starting in 2003, CBP began developing a series of 37 training modules  aimed at improving the skills of and to cross-train CBP officers in carrying  out inspections at ports of entry. CBP recognized the importance of  training in transforming the role of its officers, and has made officer  training a focus of the agency. CBP initiated a multiyear cross-training  program effort to equip new and legacy officers with the tools necessary to  perform primary immigration and customs inspections, and sufficient  knowledge to identify agricultural threats in need of further examination  by the agricultural specialists. For example, through a combination of  computer-based “fundamentals” courses followed by classroom and on- the-job training, a former customs inspector would take training that  prepared him or her to conduct secondary inspections related to possible  immigration violations. At airports, former customs officers might receive  instruction so that they could better conduct traveler inspections. Legacy  immigration officers in air and land ports of entry would be trained so that  they could work in inspecting baggage or vehicles, respectively. The  program involved developing training modules on such topics as anti- terrorism and detecting fraudulent documents. Through its efforts, CBP  has cross-trained thousands of officers since 2004. For example, CBP has  trained about 12,000 staff in the anti-terrorism module.
In August 2007, CBP officials involved in developing the training program  at ports of entry told us that CBP is in the process of changing its cross- training program. The officials told us that they hope to update existing  cross-training materials and align them with recent changes in policies and  procedures. Further, the officials said that the new program will be geared  toward delivering training that provides specific expertise in immigration  or customs-related inspection activities to new officers or CBP officers  transferring to a different job function. According to these officials, they  will begin implementing the program in January 2008.
subsections: section_title: Mission Demands Cited as Reason for Challenges in Delivering Cross-Training
paragraphs: While CBP has made progress in developing training modules and in  training its officers, CBP managers at seven of the eight ports of entry we  visited said they had experienced difficulty in providing their officers with  required training in a timely manner because staffing challenges force the  ports to choose between performing port operations and providing  training. In these instances, port of entry managers told us that training is  often sacrificed. One port of entry director stated, “the port is thinking out  of the box just to do basic functions  cannot even begin to focus on  training.” Managers at this port of entry also indicated that training  courses are scheduled and then canceled because of staffing concerns. At   two other ports of entry we visited, managers indicated that staffing  challenges cause the ports of entry to use overtime to fill positions  temporarily vacated by officers who participate in training. For example,  to provide its officers with four basic cross-training courses, including a  course in processing immigration cases, management at one port  estimated they would need nearly $4 million in overtime—a condition that  would make the port go over its budget for overtime and add to the  problems we discussed earlier caused by excessive overtime.
We also identified examples where ports of entry we visited did not  consistently provide cross-training courses in the manner expected by  CBP headquarters. For example, headquarters informed field offices that  course content may not be shortened. However, according to a CBP  official at one location, his port of entry trained officers to work in the  immigration secondary area by pushing officers through a compressed 5- day version of the course rather than the 9-day version developed by  headquarters. At another port, new officers we spoke with had not taken  the immigration course after working for 3 years, even though CBP  guidance states that new officers should take the course during their  second year at the port. Challenges in providing training are not new. We  have previously reported that staffing shortages have affected training  efforts at ports of entry even before CBP was created in March 2003.
section_title: Insufficient Cross-Training Creates Vulnerabilities in Traveler Inspections
paragraphs: Managers and supervisors at six of eight ports of entry we visited told us  that vulnerabilities in traveler inspections occurred when officers did not  receive cross-training before rotating to new inspection areas. Although  CBP’s training policy calls for no officer to be placed in an area without  receiving the proper cross-training module, officers and supervisors at  ports of entry we visited told us that officers are placed in situations for  which they had not been trained. While we cannot determine the degree to  which this is happening in other ports of entry cross the country, we  identified several examples where this policy is not being followed at the  ports of entry we visited. For example, legacy customs officers at one port  of entry reported feeling ill prepared when called upon to inspect  passengers because they had not received the requisite training. One  supervisor at this port of entry stated that he had “no confidence” that the  officers he supervised could process the casework for a marijuana seizure  correctly in order to successfully prosecute the violator because they had  not received training. Supervisors at another port of entry told us that they  were rotated to areas in which they had not received training. With  responsibility over admissibility decisions, these supervisors were  concerned that they could not answer questions from their subordinates  or make necessary determinations beyond their area of expertise. As a  result of not being trained, officers at this port stated that they relied  heavily on senior officers from legacy agencies. The officers also told us  that these senior officers have been leaving the agency. CBP managers in  headquarters recognize that insufficient training can lead to a higher risk  of failed inspections. In a presentation that was given to all field office  directors, CBP headquarters officials stated that untrained officers  increase the risk that terrorists, inadmissible travelers, and illicit goods  could enter the country.
section_title: Data for Measuring Progress in Providing Cross-Training Are Not Available
paragraphs: CBP is attempting to capture information that better reflects whether  training requirements are being met. In November 2006, CBP’s field offices  submitted their revised training plans indicating how many additional  officers needed to be cross-trained over the next several years. However,  CBP officials told us that they do not track specifically which officers need  to take a particular training module, nor do they track whether those  officers have received the needed training. Without data on which CBP  officers need which particular cross-training modules and whether they  have received the training, CBP does not know the extent that its officers  have received the necessary cross-training and are not in a position to  measure progress toward achieving its cross-training program goals.
Standards for internal control in the federal government provide a  framework for agencies to achieve effective and efficient operations and  ultimately to improve accountability. One of the standards involves having  good controls in place to ensure that management’s directives are carried  out. To do so, the standards call on agencies to compare actual  performance to planned or expected results throughout the organization  and to analyze significant differences. Having reliable data to measure the  degree to which training has been delivered to those who are required to  receive it would help meet this standard and put CBP management in a  position to better gauge the results of its cross-training program.
section_title: On-the-Job Training Program for New CBP Officers Faces Implementation Challenges at Ports of Entry We Visited
paragraphs: In addition to developing cross-training modules for its officers, CBP also  has an on-the-job training program for new officers once they arrive at a  port of entry. In a July 2003 report on inspections at land border ports of  entry, we recommended that CBP develop and implement a field training  program for new officers before they independently conduct inspections.  In response to this recommendation, CBP issued guidance for on-the-job  training of new CBP officers. According to the guidance, new officers  should receive up to 12 and 14 weeks of on-the-job training at land and air  ports of entry, respectively. The guidance provides an outline of the type  of experiences that a port of entry needs to provide to an officer as part of  the on-the-job training program, such as reviewing emergency port of  entry procedures and computer systems used in primary inspections.
However, at seven of the eight ports of entry we visited officials told us  that they had difficulty in providing on-the-job training in compliance with  the guidance. For example:    Management at one land port of entry stated that it could not provide  12 weeks of on-the-job training to its new officers because of workload,  budget, and staffing challenges, but indicated that it tried to provide 6  weeks of on-the-job training. CBP officers at another port of entry told  us that the length of their on-the-job training varied from 2 weeks to 6  weeks and they told us that they needed more on-the-job training  before inspecting travelers on their own.
CBP’s on-the-job training guidance recommends, but does not require,  new officers receive 3 weeks of the training under close supervision of  a coach or field training officer in order to receive direct guidance and  feedback in their performance. However, officials at seven of the ports  of entry we visited said that their port of entry had difficulty providing  new officers with field training officers.  For example, at two ports of  entry, experienced officers were unwilling to take on the extra  responsibility of training new officers, according to CBP officials at  these locations.
subsections: section_title: Weaknesses in On-the-Job Training Can Reduce the Effectiveness of Traveler Inspections
paragraphs: Vulnerabilities in traveler inspections are created when new officers do  not receive required training. For example, new officers who received as  little as 2 weeks of on-the-job training rather than the recommended 12  weeks told us that they needed more training before inspecting travelers.  In our July 2003 report, we reported that discrepancies in on-the-job  training decrease the effectiveness of traveler inspections at ports of entry  when little or no on-the-job training is given to new officers. For example,  we found that the ports that graded their officers as being the least  prepared to carry out traveler inspections were among the ports that  provided the least amount of on-the-job training.
section_title: Opportunities for Strengthening CBP’s On-the- Job Training Program for New CBP Officers
paragraphs: In addition to new CBP officers not receiving on-the-job training  consistent with CBP’s national program guidance, the training program  lacks certain elements that may be limiting CBP’s ability to effectively  train new officers. Internal control standards related to management of  human capital state that management should ensure that the organization  has a workforce that has the required skills necessary to achieve  organizational goals. While CBP’s on-the-job training guidance requires  supervisors to document the tasks officers have performed while in the  on-the-job training program, the guidance does not require that officers  perform certain tasks to develop needed skills nor does it call on officers  to demonstrate proficiency in specific job tasks.
The U.S. Border Patrol, an office within CBP, developed a field training  program that contains mechanisms to help ensure new Border Patrol  agents obtain the needed skills to do their job and demonstrate proficiency  in those skills. For example, the Border Patrol identified 32 different  specific skills, knowledge, and behavior traits intrinsic to Border Patrol  operations, such as processing an expedited removal case, that agents  must perform over the 12-week training period. If the new agent cannot  gain experience in a specific task, the training officer must arrange for the  new agent to conduct a practical exercise. The program requires that  agents be evaluated in all 32 areas and be provided weekly feedback on  those areas covered in training during the week. Agents are required to  demonstrate competency in performing the 32 skills. In addition, training  officers are required to write specific comments on performance that is  rated as significantly deficient or exceptional.
We discussed the utility of the Border Patrol’s on-the-job training program  with CBP officials. CBP officials told us that they are planning to revise  CBP’s on-the-job field training program for new CBP officers to make it a  more robust program.  They stated that they would review the Border  Patrol’s field training program to identify best practices that they might  incorporate into CBP’s on-the-job training program for new CBP officers.
section_title: Results from OPM’s 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey Show that NonSupervisory CBP Staff Are Concerned about Training
paragraphs: Similar to the issues discussed above, our analysis of OPM’s 2006 Federal  Human Capital Survey shows that CBP staff expressed concern about  training. Our analysis shows that less than half of nonsupervisory CBP  staff were satisfied with how CBP assesses their training needs (43  percent), the extent to which supervisors support employee development  (43 percent), and the degree to which supervisors provide constructive  feedback on how to improve (42 percent). In responding to these three  questions, a significantly lower percentage of nonsupervisory staff at CBP  was satisfied with their training experiences than nonsupervisory staff in  other federal agencies.
section_title: CBP Has Developed Strategic Goals for Its Traveler Inspection Program, but Challenges Remain in Formalizing Related Performance Measures
subsections: section_title: Strategic Plan Establishes Goals and Objectives for Traveler Inspection Program
paragraphs: CBP has developed strategic goals for its traveler inspection program, but  it faces challenges in formalizing a set of performance measures that track  what progress it is making toward achieving these goals. In September  2006, CBP’s Office of Field Operations issued its 5-year strategic plan  called Securing America’s Borders at Ports of Entry, which defines CBP’s  national strategy for securing America’s borders, specifically at ports of  entry for fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011. Building on the key  themes in DHS’s and other CBP strategic plans and applying them  specifically to ports of entry, the plan outlines the Office of Field  Operation’s vision on establishing secure ports of entry where potential  threats are deterred; threats and inadmissible people, goods, and  conveyances are intercepted; legitimate trade and travel are facilitated;  and operations and outcomes are consistent across locations and modes  of transportation. The plan outlines five strategic goals. They are (1)  expanding advance knowledge—increasing and improving the information  and analysis CBP has about people, goods, and conveyances before they  arrive at the ports of entry; (2) modernizing the inspection process to  ensure that all people and goods are inspected appropriately; (3) ensuring  a flexible enforcement focus to improve CBP’s effectiveness in assessing,  detecting, and predicting threats; (4) strengthening physical security at the  ports of entry to maintain a secure environment for officers to perform  inspections; and (5) building organizational partnerships, maintaining a  skilled workforce, and utilizing emerging technologies to achieve CBP’s  mission.
section_title: Reported Performance Measures for Traveler Inspection Program Do Not Assess CBP’s Effectiveness at Apprehending Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators
paragraphs: Although one of CBP’s main goals is to intercept inadmissible aliens and  other violators, CBP’s reported performance measure does not address  this goal. In its fiscal year 2006 Performance and Accountability Report,  CBP reported on the degree to which travelers who arrive at the port of  entry are in compliance with immigration, agricultural, and other laws,  rules, and regulations as a way to gauge the success of its traveler  inspection efforts. Using data from its COMPEX program, CBP uses a  measure—called the compliance rate—which showed that in fiscal year  2006 about 99 percent of travelers who seek to enter the United States  through 19 major airports and by vehicle at 25 major land ports were in  compliance with laws, rules, and regulations.
We have reported that linking performance to strategic goals and  objectives and publicly reporting this information are important so that  Congress and agency management have better information about agency  performance and help to ensure accountability. CBP’s current  performance measure, the compliance rate, shows the extent to which  travelers arriving at ports of entry meet the legal requirements for entering  the country. CBP does not use data that measure the extent to which it is  intercepting inadmissible aliens and other violators, one of CBP’s key  strategic objectives. As discussed earlier in our report, CBP calculates a  measure known as the apprehension rate as part of its COMPEX program,  which provides an estimate of the agency’s effectiveness in apprehending  travelers seeking to enter the country illegally or in violation of other laws.  The COMPEX program was originally developed by the former U.S.  Customs Service to comply with the Government Performance and Results  Act, which requires federal agencies to develop outcome-based  performance goals and measures, when possible, as a way to assess the  effectiveness and efficiency of their programs.
During the course of our review, we discussed with CBP officials the  potential of using the apprehension rate as one way of measuring the  effectiveness of CBP interdiction efforts. In June 2007, CBP officials told  us that CBP was in the process of selecting performance measures for  fiscal year 2008 and a decision had not yet been made on whether to  include the apprehension rate or some other similar outcome-based  measure.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Effective inspection of the millions of travelers entering the country each  year is critical to the security of the United States. As CBP matures as an  organization, having effective inspection procedures, retaining its officer  corps, and developing the necessary skills in its officer corps are essential  given the critical role that CBP plays in national security. Although CBP  developed new inspection procedures that require CBP field office  directors to monitor and assess compliance with the new procedures, a  key internal control requiring field office directors to communicate with  CBP management the results of their monitoring and assessment efforts is  not in place. As a result, CBP management may not get information that  would identify weaknesses in the traveler inspections process that need to  be addressed. The initial set of actions that CBP has taken for dealing with  challenges in training at ports of entry is a positive start, but it has not  established a mechanism to know whether officers who need specific  cross-training have received it and whether new CBP officers have  experience in the necessary job tasks and are proficient in them. This  means that some officers may be called on to perform certain inspection  tasks without having the knowledge and skills to do them.
It is also important to have performance measures in place to permit  agency management to gauge progress in achieving program goals and, if  not, to take corrective action. In regard to traveler inspections, CBP is  missing an important performance measure that shows what results are  achieved in apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators. CBP has  apprehension rate data that could be used to develop such a performance  measure. Having performance measures related to the effectiveness of  CBP interdiction efforts would help inform Congress and agency  management of improvements resulting from changes in CBP’s traveler  inspection program and what gaps in coverage, if any, remain.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To mitigate the risk of failed traveler inspections at ports of entry, we  recommended in our October 5, 2007 report that the Secretary of  Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border  Protection to take the following four actions:  implement internal controls to help ensure that field office directors  communicate to agency management the results of their monitoring  and assessment efforts so that agencywide results can be analyzed and  necessary actions taken to ensure that new traveler inspection  procedures are carried out in a consistent way across all ports of entry;    develop data on cross-training programs that measure whether the  individuals who require training are receiving it so that agency  management is in a better position to measure progress toward  achieving training goals;  incorporate into CBP’s procedures for its on-the-job training program  (1) specific tasks that CBP officers must experience during on-the-job  training and (2) requirements for measuring officer proficiency in  performing those tasks; and   formalize a performance measure for the traveler inspection program  that identifies CBP’s effectiveness in apprehending inadmissible aliens  and other violators.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of the For Official Use Only version of this report to  DHS for comment. In commenting on our draft report, DHS, including  CBP, agreed with our recommendations.  Specifically, DHS stated that  CBP is taking action or has taken action to address each recommendation.
For example, DHS stated that CBP will develop a measurement validation  tool to help confirm that officers have received the necessary cross- training courses before they are assigned to a different work environment.   In addition, CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) will evaluate how the  Border Patrol is implementing its on-the-job training program and analyze  its compatibility to OFO.  If effectively implemented, these actions should  help address the intent of our recommendations.
CBP took issue with an example we used in our draft report describing a  situation where two GAO investigators who tested the traveler inspection  process at land port of entry were not asked for any identification.  We  stated that as our investigators attempted to enter at the port, the CBP  officer—who was seated behind a desk about 10 feet away—only asked  our investigators if they were U.S. citizens and the investigators said “yes.”   DHS stated that under current statute and regulation, a person claiming to  be a United States citizen arriving at a port of entry is not required to  provide identity documents as long as the subject can establish, to the  satisfaction of the inspecting officer, citizenship.  DHS stated that because  CBP officers were satisfied with the citizenship of the two investigators at  the time of inspection, identity documents were not required.
We agree that an identity document is not required for U.S. citizens at land  ports of entry.  However, this example is meant to convey that some  inspections were not meeting the intent of CBP’s July 2006 management  guidance calling for more thorough inspections through traveler  interviews and document review.  Asking a traveler one question about  citizenship when seated at a desk about 10 feet away does not seem to be  consistent with the more thorough inspections called for in CBP’s  management guidance.  We modified our report to include additional  information on this episode.
DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the  For Official Use Only version of this report as appropriate.  Appendix III  contains written comments from DHS.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and  interested congressional committees.  We will also make copies available  to others on request.  In addition, this report will be available at no charge  on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at stanar@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report addresses the progress the U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) has made and the remaining challenges it faces in  conducting traveler inspections, staffing, and training at ports of entry.  Specifically, we answered the following questions: (1) What success and  challenges has CBP had in interdicting inadmissible aliens and other  violators at its ports of entry? (2) What progress has CBP made in  improving staffing and training at its ports of entry and how successful has  it been in carrying out these workforce programs? (3) What progress and  problems CBP has encountered in setting goals and performance  measures for its traveler inspection program?
On October 5, 2007, we issued a report that answered the above questions,  but it contained information that DHS considered law enforcement  sensitive.  This version of the report omits sensitive information about  CBP’s traveler inspection efforts, including information on the techniques  used to carry out inspections, data on the number of inadmissible aliens  and other violators that enter the country each year, and data on staffing at  ports of entry.  In addition, at DHS’s request, we have redacted the specific  locations that we visited.
The overall methodology used for our initial report is relevant to this  version of the report since the information in this product is derived from  our first report.  Specifically, we, performed our work at the Department  of Homeland Security’s (DHS) CBP offices, based in Washington, D.C. We  also conducted work at 8 ports of entry—three airports and five land  crossings.  While we cannot generalize our work from our visits to all  ports of entry, we chose these ports of entry to provide examples of  operations at ports of entry.  At each location, we held group sessions with  CBP officers and supervisors. We also interviewed port management and  staff involved in training. In addition, our investigators conducted  vulnerability assessments of inspection procedures at 8 additional ports of  entry. Our investigators conducted covert operations to evaluate screening  procedures at small ports of entry.  Although we cannot generalize our  investigators‘ work at these locations to all ports of entry, we selected  these ports of entry to provide examples of traveler inspections at small  ports of entry. Our investigators did their work in accordance with quality  standards for investigations as set forth by the President’s Council on  Integrity and Efficiency. In assessing the adequacy of internal controls, we  used the criteria in GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government, GAO/AIMD 00-21.3.1, dated November 1999.  These  standards, issued pursuant to the requirements of the Federal Managers'  Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA), provide the overall framework for  establishing and maintaining internal control in the federal government.   Also pursuant to FMFIA, the Office of Management and Budget issued  Circular A-123, revised December 21, 2004, to provide the specific  requirements for assessing the reporting on internal controls.  Internal  control standards and the definition of internal control in Circular A-123  are based on the GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government.
To determine what success and challenges CBP has had in interdicting  inadmissible aliens and other violators at its ports of entry, we interviewed  CBP headquarters officials, such as officials from the Offices of Field  Operations, Policy and Planning, Finance, and Training and Development.  We obtained and analyzed available DHS documents on traveler  inspections, more specifically on COMPEX data (a compliance  measurement to determine an overall estimated rate of compliance for  travelers), and port infrastructure assessments. For example, we  examined COMPEX data that estimate the total number of inadmissible  aliens and other violators that seek to enter the country, and compared  their compliance and apprehension rates. We assessed the reliability of the  COMPEX data by (1) talking with knowledgeable officials about how  COMPEX inspections are conducted, documented, and how the  apprehension rate estimates are generated; (2) reviewing relevant  documentation; and (3) replicating the calculations for the apprehension  rates that were provided in the COMPEX reports. We determined the  COMPEX estimates were sufficiently reliable for illustrating apprehension  rates for the ports of entry the COMPEX program covers. Additionally, we  also analyzed CBP’s Strategic Resource Assessment, an evaluation and  planning tool designed to identify a port’s infrastructure needs and  operational impact on traveler inspections. We also evaluated the CBP  Inspector’s Field Manual to determine inspections-related requirements.  During our eight site visits, we met with and interviewed field office  directors and senior port management staff. During our interviews, we (1)  discussed CBP’s success in interdicting inadmissible aliens and other  violators and the vulnerabilities in the inspections procedures and  concerns related to physical infrastructure and (2) obtained available  documentation regarding traveler-related inspections policies and  procedures. At each port of entry we visited, we observed both primary  and secondary screening procedures and conducted discussion group  sessions with officers and supervisors. At each port of entry we visited, we  obtained a list of CBP officers scheduled to work during our site visit and  from that list we randomly selected officers and supervisors to participate  in our sessions at six of the eight ports we visited. We organized the  discussion groups by whether they were from legacy organizations or  became CBP officers after the merger. At two ports of entry, local  management selected officers who would attend the discussion groups  and interviews. The group discussions covered a variety of discussion  topics, particularly officers’ perceptions and experiences with the “One  Face at the Border” initiative and associated challenges in conducting  inspections at ports of entry. Over 200 CBP officers participated in our  discussion group sessions. In addition to the discussion groups, we also  conducted meetings (usually groups of two to four) with CBP chiefs, line  supervisors, and specialists (e.g., officers assigned to the intelligence or  canine units). These meetings were designed to collect perceptions from  CBP middle management and specialists. Additionally, we reviewed a  videotape prepared by CBP that documented noncompliance with  inspection requirements.  Finally, we reviewed CBP’s new policies and  procedures for traveler inspections at land ports of entry.
To examine what progress CBP has made in improving staffing and  training at its ports of entry and how successful has it been in carrying out  these workforce programs, we interviewed CBP headquarters officials,  including those from the Offices of Field Operations, Policy and Planning,  Human Resource Management, and Training and Development. We  obtained and analyzed available CBP reports on staffing and training data.  For example, we analyzed staffing data from CBP’s Quarterly Resource  Assessment, an allocation tool used by field offices to identify the port’s  need for additional resources (e.g., request for additional officers). We  also collected and analyzed data from CBP’s National Training Plan, a  comprehensive guide that documents recommended training guidelines  for CBP officers. At each major port we visited, we met with field office  directors and senior port management. During our meetings we discussed  staffing and training challenges that affected port operations. Follow-up  meetings with CBP headquarters officials resulted in receiving staffing  numbers from the Quarterly Resource Assessment—an assessment tool  used by CBP to identify field office needs and resources—that  documented field offices’ request for additional officers. We reviewed  headquarters guidance on the on-the-job training program, then met with  field office directors and training coordinators. We assessed the reliability  of the staffing data by (1) talking with knowledgeable officials about  staffing resources, (2) reviewing relevant documentation, and (3)  comparing budgeted staffing numbers to officers currently onboard.  Although CBP provided us with the results of the staffing model and not  the model itself, we reviewed the model with knowledgeable officials,  including the assumptions that were used to produce the estimated  staffing needs. We understand that the staffing requirements the model  produces will vary depending on the assumptions used and we present the  key assumptions in the text of our report. Although we discussed the  staffing model and its results with CBP officials responsible for the model,  validating the model and its results was outside the scope of our review.   During the course of our review, we analyzed November 2006 training data  from ports of entry that showed the number of officers that had taken  cross-training modules as well as the number of officers that local port  management had identified as still needing to take a certain module.  However, when we compared July 2007 training data with the November  2006 data from ports of entry, we identified inconsistencies with the data.  For example, the July 2007 data showed that 120 fewer officers had taken  training in a module when compared with the November 2006 data.  Because of inconsistencies such as these, we did not use these data in our  report. We also reviewed the Border Patrol’s on-the-job training program  to identify best practices. Finally, we assessed nonsupervisory CBP  employees’ perceptions of the effectiveness of CBP’s workforce  management in areas such as job satisfaction, performance evaluation,  providing employees sufficient resources to do their jobs, and meeting  training needs by analyzing results from the 2004 and 2006 Office of  Personnel Management’s (OPM) Federal Human Capital Survey.  In  addition, we discussed CBP’s training program with officers during  discussion groups at the eight ports of entry we visited.  To get a  perspective on how these results ranked against other federal agencies, we  compared the results of our analysis for nonsupervisory CBP employees  with responses from nonsupervisory staff in the other DHS component  agencies as well as the responses from the other 36 federal agencies  included in the survey.
To examine what progress CBP has made in setting goals and performance  measures for its traveler inspection program, we interviewed and  corresponded with officials in CBP’s Offices of Field Operations, Policy  and Planning, and Human Resources Management. In addition, to identify  CBP’s strategic goals and performance measures for inspecting travelers,  we reviewed agency documents such as CBP’s Strategic Plan for 2005 to  2010, CBP Performance and Accountability Reports for fiscal years 2005  and 2006, and OFO’s strategic plan, Securing America’s Borders at Ports of  Entry (FY 2007- 2011).
We conducted our work from August 2006 through September 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: CBP’s Strengths and Challenges, According to OPM Surveys
paragraphs: To gain a broader view of CBP nonsupervisory staff perspectives on  workforce issues, we analyzed results from the 2004 and 2006 OPM  Federal Human Capital Survey of 36 federal departments or agencies.  OPM’s survey represents responses from over 220,000 federal employees,  including staff from DHS and CBP. The survey has 73 questions designed  to gauge employees’ perceptions about how effectively agencies manage  their workforce in the following categories: Personal Work Experiences;  Recruitment, Development and Retention; Performance Culture;  Leadership; Learning (Knowledge Management); Job Satisfaction; and  Satisfaction with Benefits. The following presents our analysis of  responses from nonsupervisory CBP staff to questions from OPM’s 2004  and 2006 surveys.
subsections: section_title: CBP Receives High Marks in Some Areas, but Staff Generally Expressed Low Satisfaction with Their Work Environment
paragraphs: Estimates based on responses by CBP nonsupervisory staff to OPM’s 2006  survey show that weaknesses in the work environment generally  outweighed the strengths. Our analysis of the survey data showed that  CBP nonsupervisory staff identified strengths in 12 of the 73 survey  questions. For example, we estimate that a high percentage of CBP staff  (1) view their work as important, (2) use information technology to  perform work, (3) like the kind of work they do, and (4) understand how  their work relates to the agency’s mission. (See table 1 for the top 10  items.)
Our analysis also showed that CBP nonsupervisory staff identified  weaknesses in 22 of 73 areas. (See table 2 for the bottom 10 items.)
When compared with the 2004 survey results, the survey results for 2006  showed that the only area where CBP demonstrated significant progress  for non-supervisory staff was increasing employees’ electronic access to  learning materials at their desks (an estimated 24 percent improvement  from 2004 to 2006). For 19 of 71 items, we estimate that scores for  nonsupervisory CBP staff declined by a statistically significant degree.  Some of the items where CBP faces greater challenges today than it did in  2004 include (1) having worthwhile discussions with supervisors about  performance (an estimated 9.4 percent fewer positive responses in 2006  compared with 2004); (2) rating the overall quality of work done by their  unit (6.9 percent fewer); and (3) people I work with cooperate to get the  job done (6.2 percent fewer).
section_title: CBP Results Generally Mirror Those of DHS, but CBP Has Shown Little or No Improvement in Its Work Environment Since 2004
paragraphs: The estimates for nonsupervisory staff within CBP generally mirror those  for the rest of DHS employees. Estimates based on responses from  nonsupervisory CBP staff were about the same as those based on the rest  of DHS on 47 of the 73 survey items. CBP scored higher on four items,  including having a reasonable workload and electronic access to training.  CBP was below DHS on the remaining 22 items, including work  environment issues such as the quality of work done by the workgroup,  feedback from supervisors, and having enough information to do the job  well.
Placing the results of our analysis in context with how DHS compared  with the other 36 departments or agencies involved in OPM’s survey  provides a baseline along which to examine a department or agency’s  results. For 2006, DHS ranked at or near the bottom of four main  categories measured by the survey. DHS ranked 35th on leadership and  knowledge management, 36th on having a results-oriented performance  culture, 33rd on talent management, and 36th on job satisfaction. To put  the situation at CBP in this context, CBP’s survey results rank the agency  10th out of the 13 DHS subcomponents, which would suggest that CBP  similarly ranks at or near the bottom in these categories when compared  to other federal agencies.
section_title: Quality of CBP’s Work Environment for Nonsupervisory Employees Is Generally Lower than at Other Federal Agencies
paragraphs: For 2006, nonsupervisory CBP staff scored the work environment as lower  than elsewhere in the federal government on 61 of the survey’s 73  questions. For example, when we compared CBP with other federal  agencies, we estimated that a significantly smaller percentage of CBP  nonsupervisory staff said (1) supervisors or team leaders in their work  unit support employee development, (2) their work unit recruits people  with the right skills, and (3) they are given an opportunity to improve their  skills. In contrast, there were no items where CBP staff scored the work  environment as significantly better.
When viewed in more detail, our analysis of OPM’s survey data shows that  CBP faces challenges in staffing and training its personnel, especially  when CBP is compared to other federal agencies. For staffing, we estimate  that CBP staff gave low marks to CBP for (1) the adequacy of sufficient  resources to get the job done and (2) their work unit being able to recruit  people with the right skills. With respect to training, less than half of CBP’s  staff were reportedly satisfied with (1) the quality of the training received,  (2) CBP’s assessment of their training needs, and (3) supervisory support  for employee development (see table 3).
CBP acknowledges that it needs to improve its workforce management,  particularly focusing on raising employees’ perceptions of CBP leadership,  enhancing training and career development, and attitudes toward the  performance culture at CBP. CBP has formulated a business plan that  outlines a variety of corrective actions and initiatives it will take to achieve  results in each of these areas. From a strategic standpoint, CBP will  establish a Human Capital Advisory Board, composed of senior field  leadership from the major CBP offices, that will serve as the central  contact point for all program offices, advise and assist with implementing  the initiatives outlined in the business plan, and asses the potential for  forming an Employee Action Team Advisory Board. To facilitate  communication with CBP employees about management actions, the plan  sets forth a variety of potential actions, such as creating a Web site on the  CBP intranet where CBP supervisors and employees can review the  current workforce issues being addressed or results from actions taken,  adding a link to CBP’s Web site where the public can access information to  learn how CBP is addressing the survey results, and holding town hall  meetings at key locations with the Commissioner and other high-level  management. To better define the scope of the workforce issues and  problems identified through the Federal Human Capital Survey, CBP also  plans to conduct employee focus groups as well as administer the survey  internally to a larger, more representative sample of CBP employees.
Following an in-depth analysis of the results of these actions, CBP will  update the business plan in the first quarter of 2008.
As part of its leadership initiative, CBP is exploring options to improve  employee perceptions of managers’ job performance, establish better  communication of management’s goals and priorities, and encourage  managers to build more trust and confidence with their employees. To  accomplish these goals, CBP plans to create a leadership development  checklist to make sure supervisors are addressing critical areas identified  through the employee focus groups, and intends to increase the marketing  of its recently implemented training course for incumbent supervisors as  well as continue the development of training for supervisors newly  promoted into management positions. These courses cover integrity,  communication, conflict management, and holding effective roundtable  discussions. Within the performance culture initiative, CBP wants to find  better ways of recognizing employees’ performance that will improve their  perceptions about the fairness of CBP’s performance recognition while  also supporting a balance between work and family life, which employees  also rated poorly. CBP’s plan includes, among other things, a call for  improving the channels of communication used to inform supervisors and  managers about the type and scope of discretionary performance awards  they have at their disposal to issue throughout the year. It also suggests  encouraging management at all levels of CBP to have more frequent  employee recognition events, to publish award recipients and best  practices, and to make awards management a component of performance  standards for supervisory personnel. Finally, within the talent  management initiative, the plan calls for Human Resources to complete its  competency, skills, and needs assessment by the third quarter of fiscal  year 2007, and for the Office of Training and Development to implement an  automated development and career path system that will guide employees  in their career development by providing occupational “road maps” and  recommending training based on the occupations they intend to pursue.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777 or StanaR@gao.gov.
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact listed above, Michael Dino, Assistant Director;  Neil Asaba; Frances Cook; Josh Diosomito; Kasea Hamar; Michael  Meleady; Christopher Leach; Ron La Due Lake; and Stan Stenersen made  key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas Enhanced, but  More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use. GAO-07-1006.  Washington D.C.: July 31, 2007.
Homeland Security: Prospects for Biometric US-VISIT Exit Capability  Remain Unclear. GAO-07-1044T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2007.
Border Patrol: Costs and Challenges Related to Training New Agents.  GAO-07-997T. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2007.
Homeland Security: Information on Training New Border Patrol Agents.  GAO-07-540R. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Homeland Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Operational,  Technological, and Management Challenges. GAO-07-632T. Washington,  D.C.: March 20, 2007.
Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Planning and Management  Improvements Needed to Control Risks. GAO-07-504T. Washington, D.C.:  February 27, 2007.
Homeland Security: US-VISIT Has Not Fully Met Expectations and  Longstanding Program Management Challenges Need to Be Addressed.  GAO-07-499T. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2007.
Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better  Support Oversight and Accountability. GAO-07-309. Washington, D.C.:  February 15, 2007.
Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and  Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Adequately Defined and  Justified. GAO-07-278. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007.
Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and  Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-378T.  Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2007.
Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and  Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-248.  Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.
Department of Homeland Security and Department of State: Documents  Required for Travelers Departing from or Arriving in the United States  at Air Ports-of-Entry From within the Western Hemisphere.   GAO-07-250R. Washington, DC: December 6, 2006.
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks  of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-1090T. Washington, D.C.: September  7, 2006.
Illegal Immigration: Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995;  Border Patrol’s Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated.  GAO-06-770. Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2006.
Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the  United States. GAO-06-976T. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2006.
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks  of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-854. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.
Process for Admitting Additional Countries into the Visa Waiver  Program. GAO-06-835R. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.
Intellectual Property: Initial Observations on the STOP Initiative and  U.S. Border Efforts to Reduce Piracy. GAO-06-1004T. Washington, D.C.:  July 26, 2006.
Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources across  Our Nation’s Borders at Two Locations. GAO-06-940T. Washington, D.C.:  July 7, 2006.
Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources across  Our Nation’s Borders at Two Locations. GAO-06-939T. Washington, D.C.:  July 5, 2006.
Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions  in the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs  Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection. GAO-06-751R.  Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006.
Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for Visitor and  Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened. GAO-06-404.  Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006.
Observations on Efforts to Implement the Western Hemisphere Travel  Initiative on the U.S. Border with Canada. GAO-06-741R. Washington,  D.C.: May 25, 2006.
Homeland Security: Management and Coordination Problems Increase  the Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Disease.   GAO-06-644. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2006.
Border Security: Reassessment of Consular Resource Requirements  Could Help Address Visa Delays. GAO-06-542T. Washington, D.C.:   April 4, 2006.
Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources across  Our Nation’s Borders at Two Locations. GAO-06-583T. Washington, D.C.:  March 28, 2006.
Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported Radioactive  Sources across Our Nation’s Borders at Selected Locations.   GAO-06-545R. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS’s  Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources. GAO-06-462T. Washington,  D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying  Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns  Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and  Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation  Detection Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.:  March 14, 2006.
Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border  Surveillance Technology Program. GAO-06-295. Washington, D.C.:  February 22, 2006.
Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key  Border Security Program Need to Be Implemented. GAO-06-296.  Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2006.
Homeland Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating,  but Management Improvements Are Still Needed. GAO-06-318T.  Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2006.
Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training  Important for Successful Transformation. GAO-05-888. Washington, D.C.:  September 23, 2005.
Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from  Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing. GAO-05-859.  Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2005.
Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and  Marine Assets. GAO-05-543. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 2005.
Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of  Department of Homeland Security’s Visa Security Program. GAO-05-801.  Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005.
Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest  Differences in Sector Performance. GAO-05-435. Washington, D.C.: July  22, 2005.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection  Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T.  Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Homeland Security: Performance of Foreign Student and Exchange  Visitor Information System Continues to Improve, but Issues Remain.  GAO-05-440T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain  on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program.  GAO-05-202. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.
Border Security: Streamlined Visas Mantis Program Has Lowered  Burden on Foreign Science Students and Scholars, but Further  Refinements Needed. GAO-05-198. Washington, D.C.: February 18, 2005.
Border Security: Joint, Coordinated Actions by State and DHS Needed to  Guide Biometric Visas and Related Programs. GAO-04-1080T.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2004.
Border Security: State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on  Schedule, but Guidance Is Lagging. GAO-04-1001. Washington, D.C.:  September 9, 2004.
Border Security: Consular Identification Cards Accepted within United  States, but Consistent Federal Guidance Needed. GAO-04-881.  Washington, D.C.: August 24, 2004.
Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in  the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-04-795. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2004.
Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in  the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-04-899T. Washington, D.C.: July 13,  2004.
Border Security: Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their Strategies  and Operations on Federal Lands. GAO-04-590. Washington, D.C.: June  16, 2004.
Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a  Layered Defense. GAO-04-82. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004.
Homeland Security: First Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status  Program Operating, but Improvements Needed. GAO-04-586. Washington,  D.C.: May 11, 2004.
Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation  Security Program Need to Be Addressed. GAO-04-569T. Washington, D.C.:  March 18, 2004.
Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to  Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars. GAO-04-443T.  Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2004.
Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to  Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars. GAO-04-371.  Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2004.
Homeland Security: Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered  Defense. GAO-04-170T. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2003.
Security: Counterfeit Identification Raises Homeland Security  Concerns. GAO-04-133T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2003.
Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation  Security Program Need to Be Addressed. GAO-03-1083. Washington, D.C.:  September 19, 2003.
Security: Counterfeit Identification and Identification Fraud Raise  Security Concerns. GAO-03-1147T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the  Inspections Process. GAO-03-1084R. Washington, D.C.: August 18, 2003.
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center: Capacity Planning and  Management Oversight Need Improvement. GAO-03-736. Washington,  D.C.: July 24, 2003.
Border Security: New Policies and Increased Interagency Coordination  Needed to Improve Visa Process. GAO-03-1013T. Washington, D.C.: July  15, 2003.
Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the  Inspections Process, GAO-03-782. Washington, D.C.: July 2003.
Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in  the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-03-908T. Washington, D.C.: June 18,  2003.
Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in  the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-03-798. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003.
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland  Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation  Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.
Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States from Certain  Western Hemisphere Countries Not Detected. GAO-03-713T.   Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2003.
Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated  to Promote Better Integration and Sharing. GAO-03-322.   Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2003.
Border Security: Challenges in Implementing Border Technology.   GAO-03-546T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003.