Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Allocation of Assets and Determine Workforce Requirements
Published: 2016-05-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard has been charged with expanded missions. Further, constrained budgets in recent years have underscored the importance of strategically allocating its assets and personnel to meet these missions.
GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard's resource allocation process. This report addresses the extent to which the Coast Guard: (1) employs an effective process to strategically allocate assets to meet its missions, and (2) has determined workforce requirements and addressed identified personnel needs.
GAO reviewed Coast Guard planning and workforce requirements documents and asset performance data for fiscal years 2010 through 2015. GAO also discussed the planning process and personnel needs with Coast Guard officials at headquarters; as well as at the two Area and nine District Commands.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Coast Guard developed and uses the Standard Operational Planning Process to annually allocate asset (aircraft and vessels) resource hours to field units for meeting missions, but the headquarters' Strategic Planning Directions used in this process do not provide field units with strategic, realistic goals. Rather, headquarters' Strategic Planning Directions allocate maximum resource hour capacities for each asset—such as 700 hours per Jayhawk helicopter per year. As shown below, these asset allocations have consistently exceeded actual asset resource hours used by field units. By better incorporating data on assets' actual use that field units provide to Coast Guard headquarters—such as Operational Performance Assessment Reports —to inform asset allocation goals in its Strategic Planning Directions, the Coast Guard would better ensure that it effectively communicates strategic intent to its field units and makes more informed asset allocation decisions that are aligned with its strategic goals.
The Coast Guard has developed management tools, such as manpower requirements analyses, to help it determine workforce requirements and help align its personnel with its missions. However, a Coast Guard official responsible for these analyses stated that the Coast Guard cannot meet the demand for these analyses because it does not have sufficient staff and a system to help analyze and prioritize the manpower requirements analyses that need to be completed. Without a systematic process for prioritizing the most important manpower requirements analyses to complete, consistent with leading program management practices, the Coast Guard does not have reasonable assurance that the highest priority missions are fully supported with the appropriate number of staff possessing the requisite mix of skills and abilities.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is making three recommendations to the Coast Guard, including to incorporate field unit input to inform its allocation decisions and to develop a systematic process that prioritizes the most critical manpower requirements analyses to complete. DHS concurred with the recommendations and stated it is taking actions, such as including field unit input into its planning process and prioritizing manpower requirements analyses of unstudied units, as resources permit.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security, is the  principal federal agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and  environmental stewardship. Following the terrorist attacks of September  11, 2001, the Coast Guard has been charged with expanded security- related mission responsibilities. Further, major natural disasters, such as  Hurricane Katrina, provided the Coast Guard with lessons learned  regarding the importance of strategically allocating resources (primarily  assets and personnel) across its units. The impact of balancing a broad  array of Coast Guard missions and the nationwide need for mission-ready  Coast Guard units, in conjunction with constrained budgets in recent  years, have underscored the need for the Coast Guard to ensure it can  effectively allocate assets and personnel to meet its mission  responsibilities.
From 2006 to 2008, the Coast Guard began a series of actions, such as  developing a planning process and management tools, to better  determine resource needs and align resources accordingly across its  mission responsibilities. The Coast Guard continues to face decisions  about how to best allocate and use its resources to meet its mission  responsibilities. Given the importance of the Coast Guard’s missions— such as search and rescue and drug interdiction—you asked that we  review the status of the Coast Guard’s efforts to allocate resources  across its statutory missions. This report addresses:  the extent to which the Coast Guard employs an effective process to  strategically allocate assets to meet its mission responsibilities, and  the extent to which the Coast Guard has determined its workforce  requirements and addressed identified personnel needs.
To address the first objective, we analyzed Coast Guard documents  related to its annual planning process for allocating assets (mainly aircraft  and vessels) to meet its mission responsibilities. The documents included  policies and guidance regarding how this process is to operate, as well as  documents used to inform and communicate the asset allocations  throughout the Coast Guard’s command structure, such as Planning  Assessments for fiscal years 2010 through 2017, a 2014 risk assessment,  strategies from 2013 through 2014, planned asset resource hour  allocations by field units and missions, and reports of asset hours used by  field units for each fiscal year. Using these documents, we analyzed  resource hour data, planned and used, beginning in fiscal year 2010— when the Coast Guard began collecting these data in a standardized  manner—through fiscal year 2015—the last full fiscal year for which data  were available. Further, we analyzed trends in asset resource hour  allocations from fiscal year 2010 through 2016—the latest year planning  documents were available. To conduct these analyses, in consultation  with Coast Guard headquarters and field unit officials, we compiled data  on asset types—such as aircraft, cutters and boats—and calculated the  percent difference between the asset hours planned and the asset hours  used for each fiscal year. To assess the reliability of these data, we  analyzed documents, such as reporting guidance, and interviewed  cognizant Coast Guard headquarters and field unit officials regarding how  these data are collected and used. We determined that these data were  sufficiently reliable to provide a general indication of asset resource hours  planned and used. We also assessed the Coast Guard’s internal controls  related to collecting and documenting quality information and assessing  risks and compared them against criteria in Standards for Internal Control  in the Federal Government.
We interviewed officials that are responsible for helping plan and  implement the resource allocation process at Coast Guard headquarters,  the Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands, and at all nine of the Coast  Guard’s districts. In our interviews with Coast Guard district officials, we  used a standard set of questions to obtain information about district  perspectives on the resource allocation process. We made site visits to  the Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands, as well as a district and sector  in close proximity to each Area Command, to obtain a general  understanding of how resource decisions are determined and  implemented at these three command levels. Although the sectors we  visited were not generalizable to all sectors, they provided insights into  how sectors allocate and deploy assets to meet mission responsibilities.  We also reviewed prior GAO reports on the Coast Guard’s resource  allocation process and its acquisitions.
To address the second objective, we analyzed Coast Guard documents  related to management tools it has developed and used to determine its  workforce requirements and identify personnel needs; including guidance  and analyses related to developing manpower requirements, a model  used to determine sector staffing needs, and strategies that set out the  Coast Guard’s stated human capital priorities and principles. As with the  first objective, we interviewed cognizant officials at Coast Guard  headquarters, the Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands, and all nine of  the Coast Guard’s districts. Headquarters officials interviewed were  responsible for the development of manpower requirements and  overseeing implementation of the staffing model for Coast Guard units.  The Area command and district officials we interviewed were responsible  for implementing and managing personnel changes on behalf of their  units. We also reviewed prior GAO reports on workforce planning and  Coast Guard personnel problems. Finally, we reviewed documents and  information on these management tools and compared them against  leading practices identified in the Program Management Institute’s (PMI)  Standard for Program Management.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2014 to May 2016 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: The Coast Guard’s Structure, Resources, and Missions
subsections: section_title: Coast Guard’s Organizational Structure
paragraphs: The Coast Guard employs a multi-level organizational structure, as  shown in figure 1.
The Coast Guard provides commanders at each level the authority and  discretion to conduct operations within their operational areas. Command  and control begins at Coast Guard headquarters, which is responsible for  developing national strategies and policies for operations. However,  Coast Guard headquarters does not exercise direct operational control of  assets. Rather, the Commandant apportions this control to the two Area  commanders. The two Area commanders—one for the Atlantic Area  Command and one for the Pacific Area Command—are responsible for  translating policy into operational objectives through theater plans for  Coast Guard missions. The Coast Guard has nine districts that report to  the Area Commands. District commanders are responsible for regional  operations and they assume tactical control of allocated resources to  execute operations and missions within their areas of responsibility. The  nine Coast Guard districts are supported by 37 sectors. Sector  commanders are responsible for local operations within each district.  Sector commanders assume tactical control of allocated resources to  execute operations and missions within their areas of responsibility. Each  of the Coast Guard Area commands, districts, and sectors is responsible  for managing its assets and accomplishing missions within its geographic  area of responsibility and for the purposes of this report are referred to as  field units.
section_title: Coast Guard Assets and Personnel
paragraphs: The Coast Guard uses a variety of assets to conduct its mission  responsibilities. The Coast Guard’s assets consist of aircraft and vessels.  The Coast Guard operates two types of aircraft—fixed wing (airplanes)  and rotary wing (helicopters). Fixed wing aircraft operate from Air Stations  and airports, whereas rotary wing aircraft operate from Air Stations, flight- deck equipped cutters, or other locations that could support flight  operations. Similarly, the Coast Guard operates two types of vessels— cutters and boats. A cutter is any vessel 65 feet in length or greater,  having adequate accommodations for crew to live on board. Larger  cutters (major cutters), over 179 feet in length, are generally under the  control of Area Commands and cutters 175 feet or less in length come  under control of District Commands. In contrast, all vessels less than 65  feet in length are classified as boats and usually operate near shore and  on inland waterways. As of the end of fiscal year 2015, the Coast Guard’s  assets included 61 fixed wing aircraft, 142 rotary wing aircraft, 40 major  cutters, 205 cutters, and 1,750 boats. For a more detailed listing of these  Coast Guard’s assets, see appendix I.
To crew its aircraft and vessels and to plan, manage, and carry out its  mission responsibilities, the Coast Guard relies on a staff of active duty,  reserve duty, and civilian personnel. As of the end of fiscal year 2015, the  Coast Guard had 54,425 employees—39,116 active duty (6,566 officers,  1,728 Chief Warrant Officers, and 30,822 enlisted) personnel; 7,109  reservists; and 8,200 civilians.
section_title: Coast Guard Strategic Commitments
paragraphs: Strategic commitments are annual, up-front commitments of resources  made at the headquarters level and are deemed by the Coast Guard as  critical to the implementation of national, Department of Homeland  Security, and Commandant strategic priorities. Among other things,  strategic commitments specify the amount of time certain types of Coast  Guard assets are to be operating in support of these activities, and these  resource allocations serve as minimum levels of activity that field unit  commanders are expected to provide. An example of a strategic  commitment is supporting counter drug missions in the Western  Caribbean and Eastern Pacific in coordination with other federal law  enforcement or Department of Defense agencies. Strategic commitments  represent the Coast Guard’s highest priorities, so the Coast Guard  allocates resources to these activities before it allocates the remaining  resources to meet other field units’ missions.
section_title: Coast Guard Missions
paragraphs: The Coast Guard is responsible for 11 statutory missions, which are  divided into non-homeland security and homeland security missions, as  shown in table 2. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires that the  authorities, functions, and capabilities of the Coast Guard to perform its  missions be maintained intact and without significant reduction, except as  specified in subsequent acts. It also prohibits the Secretary of  Homeland Security from reducing “substantially or significantly…the  missions of the Coast Guard or the Coast Guard’s capability to perform  those missions.”
Each fiscal year, the Coast Guard allocates resource hours to its field  units for carrying out its 11 statutory missions based on the number and  type of assets in those units at that time. During fiscal years 2010 through  2016, some missions were allocated more asset resource hours than  others, as shown in figure 2. For example, for fiscal year 2016, the two  missions with the highest allocation of asset resource hours were ports,  waterways, and coastal security and aids to navigation. Conversely, the  two missions with the lowest allocation of asset resource hours during  that year were other law enforcement and marine environmental  protection.
section_title: Past Concerns about the Coast Guard’s Alignment of Resources to Meet Mission Needs
paragraphs: In prior reports and testimonies, we have raised concerns about the  Coast Guard’s difficulties in clearly and systematically allocating  resources to accomplish its diverse missions. For example, in March  2004, we found that although the Coast Guard used a variety of mission  performance measures, it did not have a systematic approach that would  allow it to understand the linkage between resources expended and  performance results achieved.  We recommended, among other things,  that the Coast Guard proceed with initiatives to account more completely  for resources expended. In response, the Coast Guard developed the  Mission Cost Model, which was to accurately capture the costs of  mission-direct activities and the allocation of mission-support costs as  they are incurred. We also previously reported that although the Coast  Guard reports summary financial data by homeland security and non- homeland security missions to the Office of Management and Budget, as  a multi-mission agency, the Coast Guard can be conducting multiple  missions simultaneously. As a result, we stated that it is difficult to  accurately determine the level of resources dedicated to each mission.
section_title: The Coast Guard’s Process for Aligning Assets to Meet Mission Needs
paragraphs: Recognizing the difficulty of determining resource needs in a multi- mission agency, the Coast Guard developed a process to help it better  allocate its assets in line with its strategic commitments and statutory  mission responsibilities. Specifically, since being implemented in fiscal  year 2008, the Coast Guard has used the Standard Operational Planning  Process (SOPP) for annually developing and communicating strategic  commitments and allocating resource hours, by asset type (i.e., types of  aircraft, cutters, and boats), throughout its chain of command for meeting  mission needs. The SOPP is to provide guidance and direction, while  preserving some autonomy for field unit commanders to conduct  operations, as events require.
As shown in Figure 3, as part of the SOPP, Coast Guard headquarters  issues an annual Strategic Planning Direction, which is to be the primary  mechanism for allocating resources and providing strategic direction to  operational commanders at the Area, District, and Sector levels. To  determine and plan for how assets are to be allocated, Coast Guard  headquarters are to rely on mission priorities, data on historical and  current-year mission performance, and operational and intelligence  assessments. As part of the planning process, field commands are  allocated resource hours by asset type to be used for meeting strategic  commitments and executing the 11 statutory missions. The Strategic  Planning Direction is annually disseminated to the two Area Commands  that are then to disseminate their own Operational Planning Directions  through their command levels, with each District command developing its  own plan to cover its area of responsibility. The Area commanders  develop a plan known as the Area Operational Planning Direction and  District commanders develop a district level Operational Planning  Direction. After assets are deployed, staff at the field units are to enter the  assets’ actual resource hours used, by mission, into data systems. The  asset resource hour data are consolidated on a quarterly basis as part of  Operational Performance Assessment Reports. The historical and  current-year operational data from these reports, as well as Planning  Assessments, are to be communicated back to Coast Guard  headquarters as part of the information to be used to develop the  Strategic Planning Direction for the following year.
section_title: Coast Guard Management Tools for Aligning Personnel to Meet Mission Needs
paragraphs: The Coast Guard has also developed management tools to help it align  its personnel with its missions. In particular, the Coast Guard has  developed the Manpower Requirements Determination (MRD) system  and the Sector Staffing Model (SSM) to facilitate management decisions  on personnel requirements (see table 3).
section_title: Coast Guard’s Data Systems Used to Record Its Mission Activities
paragraphs: The Coast Guard collects and reports the number of hours its assets— aircraft, cutters, and boats—spend conducting missions. Coast Guard  field unit personnel are to record asset resource hours used to  accomplish a mission(s), by mission category (such as domestic ice  breaking or marine environmental protection operations), into one of two  operational reporting databases. The Asset Logistics Maintenance  Information System (ALMIS) and the Abstract of Operations System  (AOPS) capture asset resource hour data to support mission  responsibilities. According to Coast Guard instructions, field units are to  record at least one type of activity, such as one of the Coast Guard’s 11  statutory missions, within 24 hours after an asset is deployed. Staff at the  relevant field units are to review and certify that the data entered are  accurate. After the data have been entered, the Coast Guard Business  Intelligence system is used to extract and combine resource and  performance data each quarter to create Operational Performance  Assessment Reports. Data on resource hours used by field units’ assets  are included in these reports and are part of the feedback component of  the SOPP whereby field units report data on asset usage to Coast Guard  headquarters on a quarterly basis.
section_title: The Coast Guard’s Process for Allocating Assets Has Limitations that Constrain Its Strategic Effectiveness
subsections: section_title: Coast Guard Headquarters’ Strategic Planning Directions Reflect Asset Performance Capacities Rather Than Achievable Goals
paragraphs: Coast Guard headquarters does not provide field units with strategic,  realistic goals for allocating assets, by mission. Rather, headquarters’  allocations of assets in the Strategic Planning Directions that we reviewed  for fiscal years 2010 through 2016 were based on assets’ maximum  performance capacities. For example, the Strategic Planning Directions  allocated each Hercules fixed wing aircraft (HC-130H) 800 hours per  year, each Jayhawk helicopter (MH-60T) 700 hours per year, and each  210-foot or 270-foot medium endurance cutter (WMEC) 3,330 hours per  year, irrespective of the condition, age, or availability of these assets. As  a result, as shown in figure 4, the asset resource hours allocated in the  Strategic Planning Directions have consistently exceeded the asset  resource hours actually used by Coast Guard field units during fiscal  years 2010 through 2015. For example, in fiscal year 2015, the Strategic  Planning Direction allocated a total of 1,075,015 resource hours for field  unit assets whereas the actual asset resource hours used was 804,048  hours, or about 75 percent of the allocated hours for that year.
Coast Guard field unit officials we spoke with and Coast Guard planning  documents we reviewed indicate that the Coast Guard is not able to  achieve the resource allocation capacities set by the headquarters’  Strategic Planning Directions for several reasons, including asset  condition and unscheduled maintenance. The field unit officials told us  they provide Coast Guard headquarters with information on their assets’  availabilities through Operational Planning Directions, Operational  Performance Assessment Reports, and Planning Assessments. For  example, in its Planning Assessment for fiscal years 2015-2016, an Area  Command noted that one of its classes of cutters was 50 years old and  the cutters were hampered by mechanical failures requiring emergency  dry dock repairs resulting in reduced availability to carry out their missions  during the year. In another example, an Area Command stated in its fiscal  year 2015 Operational Planning Direction that based on historical use, it  planned for 575 hours per vessel for one type of cutter instead of the 825  hours performance capacity, as specified in the Strategic Planning  Direction. Further, district officials we interviewed told us that they do not  expect to use all of the boat asset resource hours allocated to their units  because they do not have sufficient crews available, or needed  maintenance prevents them from operating the boats at their capacity  resource hours.
Our analyses of Coast Guard resource hour data across asset types for  fiscal years 2011 through 2015 show that actual asset use differed by  asset type, but overall fell below asset resource hour projected capacities,  as shown in figure 5. During this time period, the percent difference  between resource hour capacities and actual resource hours used for  rotary-wing aircraft were relatively close—for example, about 7 percent  fewer hours were used than allocated for fiscal year 2015. In contrast, the  percent difference between boat resource hour capacities and actual boat  resource hours used during fiscal years 2011 through 2015 were more  sizable—for example, about 35 percent fewer hours were used than  allocated for fiscal year 2015.
Our review of Coast Guard planning documents and discussions with field  unit officials also show that Operational Planning Directions developed by  field unit commands can differ from headquarters’ Strategic Planning  Directions. For example, officials from one district told us that based on  their analyses, they determined that their district could realistically use  only about two-thirds of the performance capacity hours for boats  allocated for one mission. Specifically, in fiscal year 2013, for the ports,  waterways, and coastal security mission, the district’s Operational  Planning Direction included 8,126 hours, or 63 percent, of the 13,000  hours allocated in headquarters’ Strategic Planning Direction, as shown in  figure 6. The district officials stated that allocating 13,000 hours (total  assets’ capacity) was not practical based on their analysis of the boat  station locations and events requiring protection, among other things.
District officials we met with told us that actual asset use for other  missions was similarly below performance capacities, such as cutters that  used about 75 percent of the capacity hours for the aids to navigation  mission. These officials stated that the differences did not reflect an  underutilization of their assets; rather, they considered the boat stations  to be appropriately staffed with sufficient numbers of boats to meet  mission demands. Thus, the capacity resource hours allocated to the  district’s various missions through the SOPP do not align with the  district’s actual asset resource hours used—as reported in the  Operational Performance Assessment Reports.
Because actual asset use has consistently fallen below asset  performance capacities, headquarters’ Strategic Planning Directions have  steadily overstated the amount of asset resource hours available to  achieve the Coast Guard’s strategic commitments and missions, and  there is not a direct alignment between the Coast Guard’s strategic goals  and its prospects for achieving those goals. As a result, the headquarters’  strategic intent is not effectively communicated to field units when  allocating asset resource hours. According to a Coast Guard  Commandant Instruction, the SOPP is to effectively translate strategic  intent to mission execution by, for example, issuing guidance and  direction; setting performance targets; allocating resources; and providing  effective feedback, including operational status and desired outputs.  The Coast Guard Instruction also states that the intent of the Operational  Performance Assessment Reports is for operational commanders to  inform pertinent stakeholders about their resource utilization and mission  performance, identify operational gaps, and provide a forecast of  operational requirements for the next 4 quarters. In addition to the Coast  Guard Commandant Instruction, Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government states that for an agency to run and control its  operations, it must have relevant, reliable, and timely communications  relating to internal, as well as external events. Moreover, agencies  should use quality information to achieve objectives and address related  risks. Quality information should be appropriate, current, complete,  accurate, accessible, and timely. Agency management can then use this  information to make informed decisions and evaluate performance in  achieving key objectives and addressing risks. Further, agencies should  internally communicate the necessary, quality information to achieve the  agency’s objectives.
Coast Guard headquarters officials told us that they use assets’ maximum  performance capacities as a basis for asset allocations in the Strategic  Planning Directions because (1) they do not have the necessary  information and methods to realistically predict the operational availability  of all assets, and (2) they need to identify assets’ maximum performance  capacities available to field units in the event of needed surge operations  or to respond to emergency situations.
With regard to asset operational availability, the Coast Guard is in the  process of implementing the Coast Guard Logistics Information  Management System (CG-LIMS), which is intended to improve  information on assets’ operational availability by consolidating its legacy  logistics systems into one system, and providing timely and accurate  information on the location, movement, and operational status of assets,  among other things. According to Coast Guard officials, CG-LIMS could  provide more centralized and systematic information on the operational  availability of the assets, such as when assets are scheduled to be in  maintenance during the year. For example, beginning in fiscal year 2017,  one major cutter—a National Security Cutter—is expected to be out of  commission for about 1 year for needed structural enhancements. An  official from a Coast Guard Area Command stated that the Area  Command has planned for the reduction in available resource hours for  this cutter, but it would be useful to have more systematic information on  operational availability across all assets. In December 2014, CG-LIMS  began consolidating data on one aircraft type and the system is to expand  to support all Coast Guard aircraft and some of its boats by the end of  2018. Coast Guard officials noted, though, that a decision has not yet  been made to expand CG-LIMS to consolidate the logistics systems of  other assets, such as cutters. The officials said that if the Coast Guard  makes a determination to include all of its assets into the new CG-LIMS  system, it should provide more systematic and centralized operational  data across all assets.
With regard to the use of asset capacities, we do not disagree that  information on assets’ performance capacities can help inform decisions  regarding surge operations or emergency situations. However, in addition  to asset capacities, information on assets’ actual performance in the  Strategic Planning Directions would more effectively communicate the  Coast Guard’s strategic intent and more closely align asset allocations to  the field units’ actual use of the assets in carrying out their various  missions. For example, as stated earlier, one district had sufficient  numbers of assets to meet demands in one mission while about 25  percent under capacity hours. Coast Guard officials stated that although  they consider Operational Performance Assessment Report data when  determining the number of asset resource hours to allocate among the  missions in the annual Strategic Planning Directions, they do not reduce  the estimates of total asset capacity and align actual resource hour use  accordingly.
Until the Coast Guard implements CG-LIMS or another system for asset  allocation, using current and accessible information from field units, such  as Operational Performance Assessment Reports and Planning  Assessments, to inform asset hour allocations in the annual Strategic  Planning Directions—in addition to the asset performance capacities  currently used—will better ensure that the Coast Guard is effectively  communicating strategic intent to its field units, realistically identifying any  operational limitations of its assets, and making more informed asset  resource hour allocation decisions that are aligned with its strategic goals.  Further, without this alignment, Coast Guard headquarters does not know  the extent to which field units are effectively and meaningfully carrying out  the intent of the Strategic Planning Directions, and field units do not have  the benefit of headquarters’ strategic direction in terms of the actual use  of their assets in carrying out missions.
section_title: The Coast Guard is Taking Steps to Improve Data Quality for Resource Hours Used to Support Each Mission
paragraphs: Coast Guard field officials we met with told us that total asset resource  hours recorded in Operational Performance Assessment Reports are  accurate, but noted that data on asset resource hours used to support  each mission may not be accurate. As stated earlier, Coast Guard  guidance states that units should report at least one primary employment  category, such as one of the 11 statutory missions, for the time an asset  is deployed. The officials told us that data on resource hours, by mission,  for all assets may not be accurate because the Coast Guard does not  have a systematic way for field units to (1) record time spent on more  than one mission during an asset’s deployment or (2) consistently  account for time assets spend in transit to designated operational areas.  For example, officials from six of the nine Coast Guard districts we  interviewed told us that they generally record one mission per asset  deployment, even though each asset’s crew may have performed two or  more missions during a deployment. Officials from the remaining three  districts told us that if their assets’ crews perform more than one mission  per deployment, the crews generally apportion the number of hours spent  on each mission performed. Thus, for example, if a cutter is deployed on  a ports, waterways, and coastal security mission and is diverted to an  emergency search and rescue mission, the cutter’s crew would record the  hours spent on each respective mission. The officials noted, though,  that this may not be a consistent practice across all units.
In September 2013, the Coast Guard began drafting guidance for field  units to capture assets’ transit times in order to better account for both the  direct and indirect costs of conducting missions. Area and district officials  we met with told us that it is important to accurately capture the time an  asset is in transit because, for example, it can sometimes take a number  of days for a cutter to transit to an operational area to conduct its mission  because of vast geographic areas of responsibility. As of February 2016,  Coast Guard officials informed us that the Coast Guard was investigating  potential solutions to enhance the current software and information  technology systems’ capabilities, but did not have an estimated date for  finalizing the guidance.
The Coast Guard has acknowledged these data limitations and Coast  Guard officials stated that the resource hour data were accurate enough  for operational planning purposes. Further, the Coast Guard officials  stated that the Coast Guard was in the process of determining how best  to account for time spent by assets on multiple missions and in transit in  order to obtain more accurate and complete data on the time assets  spend conducting each of its missions. For example, in April 2014, the  Coast Guard issued instructions to its field units to provide definitions,  policies, and processes for reporting their operational activities and also  established a council to coordinate changes among the various  operational reporting systems used by different field units. These are  positive steps and should help the Coast Guard address limitations that  currently hinder its ability to accurately capture assets’ operational data.
section_title: The Coast Guard Is Taking Steps to Track How Increased Strategic Commitments Affect Resource Hours Available for Other Missions
paragraphs: In the headquarters’ Strategic Planning Directions, according to Coast  Guard headquarters’ officials, the allocations of certain assets’ hours in  support of strategic commitments has grown from fiscal year 2010 to  fiscal year 2016, including commitments in support of the Coast Guard’s  Western Hemisphere Strategy issued in September 2014 and the  Department of Homeland Security’s Southern Borders and Approaches  Campaign Plan issued in January 2015. These strategic commitments  of assets are made at the headquarters level and, as stated earlier, are  deemed critical to the implementation of national, Department of  Homeland Security, and the Commandant’s strategic priorities.  Headquarters and field unit officials we met with told us that it has  become increasingly difficult to fulfill these growing strategic commitments  when asset performance levels have generally remained the same or  declined in recent years. For example, one Area Command stated that its  ability to meet the strategic commitments and other priority missions was  severely strained because of concerns over the reliability of some cutters  in its fleet that are 50 years old and operating beyond their useful service  lives. Area command officials stated that after meeting these priority  missions, it has been challenging to respond to threats within their areas  of responsibility with the remaining asset resource hours. Further, the  Coast Guard Commandant testified before a congressional subcommittee  in February 2015 that the Coast Guard’s mission demands continue to  grow and evolve and that given the age and condition of some of its  legacy assets, the success of future missions relies on the continued  recapitalization of Coast Guard aircraft, cutters, boats, and  infrastructure.
To address these challenges, the Coast Guard is taking steps to provide  more transparency regarding asset resource hours needed to support  strategic commitments and the remaining resource hours available to field  unit commanders. For example starting in fiscal year 2015, the Coast  Guard began using a new data field to track the time assets spent  supporting its Arctic strategy. Moving forward, these efforts will continue  to be important if current trends continue—that is, actual asset  performance levels remaining the same or declining and strategic  commitments and other mission needs increasing.
section_title: The Coast Guard Does Not Document the Extent to Which Risk Assessments Affect Asset Allocation Decisions
paragraphs: The Coast Guard does not maintain documentation on the extent to which  risk factors have affected the allocation of resource hours to missions  through its Strategic Planning Directions. For example, Coast Guard  officials told us that the Coast Guard conducts a National Maritime  Security Risk Assessment every 2 years to inform its asset allocations;  however, the Coast Guard does not document how these risk  assessments have affected asset allocation decisions across its  missions. Further, these officials told us that they consider this risk  assessment, as well as other information, such as intelligence reports, to  establish planning priorities across its 11 statutory missions in the  Strategic Planning Directions. The officials added that changes made to  Strategic Planning Directions’ resource allocations, by mission, are  discussed in verbal briefings but are not formally documented.  Specifically, Coast Guard officials stated that the National Maritime  Security Risk Assessment informs allocations for 7 of the 11 statutory  missions. For the remaining 4 missions, the Coast Guard relies on other  factors—such as historic use of asset resource hours by mission and field  unit Planning Assessments—to inform allocations for those 4 missions.
Written statements provided to us by the Coast Guard indicate that all  projections and changes to resource hours, such as changes made to  allocations among missions in the Strategic Planning Directions, are to be  documented throughout the planning process. In addition, SOPP  guidance states that risk-informed methods and processes are to be  incorporated to support establishing planning priorities across missions,  performance targets, and force apportionment to better understand and  articulate the impacts of shifting resources from one mission to another.  Further, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state  that agencies should identify, analyze, and respond to changes and  related risks that may impact internal control systems as part of its risk  assessment process; and create and maintain documentation to provide  evidence of the execution of these control activities. Coast Guard  officials told us that while they have identified, analyzed, and incorporated  risk factors as part of the SOPP, it is not their practice to maintain  documentation on the extent to which risk factors have affected resource  allocation decisions. Without documenting how risk factors have informed  the asset allocation decisions, the Coast Guard lacks a record to help  ensure that its decisions are transparent and the most effective ones for  fulfilling its missions given existing risks.
section_title: The Coast Guard Has Made Progress in Determining Workforce Needs, but Lacks Priorities for Remaining Workforce Requirements
subsections: section_title: The Coast Guard Has Made Progress in Determining Workforce Requirements, but Does Not Have a Plan to Prioritize Remaining Work
paragraphs: As stated earlier, a manpower requirements analysis (MRA) is to turn  documented mission requirements into manpower requirements, which a  unit can use to compare against actual personnel assigned. As shown  in table 4, for its 134 unit types, the Coast Guard has completed 9 MRAs  along with the accompanying manpower requirements determinations  (MRD); as well as an additional 42 MRAs, as of December 2015.  According to Coast Guard officials, unit types can represent an asset,  such as the National Security Cutter, or an office, such as the Office of  Civilian Human Resources.
In June 2015, Coast Guard officials told us that based on current staffing  levels, they estimate it could take 10 years to complete baseline MRAs for  all Coast Guard units and were working on a strategy to prioritize and  complete them. Further, these officials said that they cannot meet the  demand for MRAs in a timely manner and that the units that can fund a  contractor to conduct an MRA are the ones that are most likely to be  completed. As of February 2016, the Coast Guard had not made  progress on this strategy or established a process for prioritizing the MRA  workload.
Coast Guard guidance states that the MRA sponsor—such as the heads  of the 134 unit types mentioned above—are to use the data provided in  MRAs and decide if the personnel requirements recommended by the  MRAs are feasible in the context of the program’s overall strategies,  goals, and objectives. Coast Guard MRA guidance states that the Coast  Guard should seek efficient staff, overhead, and support organizations  with a goal of ensuring that high priority mission activities are fully  supported. Further, the Coast Guard’s January 2016 Human Capital  Strategy states that when an adjustment to personnel strength or  competencies is necessary, the MRD process is the primary tool to be  used by planners to define the human capital required to accomplish the  mission. The Standard for Program Management calls for agencies to  engage in (1) resource planning to determine which resources are  needed and when they are needed to successfully implement the  program, and (2) resource prioritization to allow the program manager to  prioritize critical resources that are not available in abundance and to  optimize their use across all program components.
A Coast Guard official in charge of MRAs and MRDs told us in December  2015 that the Coast Guard has not issued the strategy because it does  not have sufficient resources. In particular, the official noted that the  Coast Guard does not have enough staff and lacks a system to store  analyses from previously completed MRAs—such as standard workweek  calculations for different personnel—that could help analyze the MRA  workload and facilitate better risk management decision making. Because  the Coast Guard does not have a systematic process that allows it to  prioritize critical resources and to optimize their use across all program  components, it faces risks in its ability to identify and prioritize the most  important MRAs to complete and does not have reasonable assurance  that the high priority mission activities are fully supported with the  appropriate number of staff possessing the requisite mix of skills and  abilities.
section_title: Most Staffing Changes Identified in the Sector Staffing Model Are to Be Implemented by the End of 2017
paragraphs: In 2012, the Coast Guard implemented what it called the Sector Staffing  Model (SSM) to redistribute and balance existing personnel across its  sectors, based on its analyses of the sectors’ workloads from about 2009  through 2012. Coast Guard officials told us that, given overall limited  resources, the sectors were staffed at lower staffing levels than were  identified in the SSM. Officials we interviewed at the two Area Commands  and nine districts stated that they thought that implementing the SSM was  an important step in analyzing sector workload and balancing personnel  across the sectors to meet workload demands. In total, the SSM involved  the redistribution of about 1,400 positions, including about 1,280 active  duty and 122 civilian personnel. Coast Guard officials told us that  beginning in 2014, active duty positions identified in the SSM began to be  redistributed through normal active duty transfer cycles and the officials  noted that they expected all active duty position redistributions to be  completed by the end of 2017. As of the end of 2015, 1,167 of the 1,280  active duty positions and 57 of the 122 civilian positions identified in the  SSM had been redistributed.
According to business rules the Coast Guard established for  implementing the SSM, changes to civilian positions identified by the  SSM did not require mandatory transfers or positions to be vacated in  order to minimize disruption to the civilian workforce. This has resulted in  staffing challenges for some field units. Officials we spoke with at seven  of the nine districts stated that they faced staffing challenges because  targeted civilian positions could not be redistributed until the civilians  voluntarily transfer to a different position or retire. For example, officials  from one district told us that one of its sectors was waiting for a civilian  specialist to help manage hazardous materials, but they could not fill the  position until a targeted civilian position was vacated. Further, officials at  another district told us that one of its sectors was waiting for a civilian port  security specialist, but the sector could not fill this position until a civilian  administrative position was vacated in another sector. Because the  business rules state that changes to civilian positions were not  mandatory, it could be a number of years before some civilian positions  are vacated, if the civilians in those positions have no desire to move to a  different position and have years to work before they retire.
Coast Guard headquarters officials told us they recognized that staffing  gaps would remain in some civilian positions after SSM implementation,  but noted they were waiting for the normal active duty transfer cycles to  be completed by the end of 2017 before considering any updates to the  SSM. Further, the officials said they were cognizant of the difficulties that  some field units are facing since some needed civilian positions have not  been filled or some unneeded civilian positions have not been vacated as  identified in the SSM. These officials noted, though, that SSM business  rules state that field units can request headquarters’ consideration of staff  reprogramming proposals to make changes to their existing staff to align  with the SSM and that they have been working to rectify these staffing  imbalances and accommodate staffing changes as field units make staff  reprogramming requests.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Given the declining availability of its aging assets and the constrained  budgets in recent years to replace legacy assets, together with growing  strategic commitments, the Coast Guard will continue to face critical  decisions about how to best allocate its limited assets to meet its  mandated mission responsibilities. The Coast Guard uses the Standard  Operational Planning Process (SOPP) to allocate asset resource hours to  its field units for meeting their missions, but this planning process  allocates maximum asset resource hour capacities and does not also  include more realistic operational targets. However, by incorporating data  that field units provide to Coast Guard headquarters on assets’  performance—such as Operational Performance Assessment Reports  and Planning Assessments—to inform asset hour allocations in  headquarters’ annual Strategic Planning Directions, the Coast Guard  would be better positioned to ensure it is identifying any operational  limitations of its assets, making more informed asset resource hour  allocation decisions, and more effectively communicating strategic intent  to its field units.
The Coast Guard does not maintain documentation on the extent to which  risk factors have affected the allocation of asset resource hours to  missions through its annual Strategic Planning Directions. Without such  documentation, the Coast Guard lacks transparency and a record to help  ensure that its asset allocation decisions are the most effective ones for  fulfilling its missions given existing risks.
The Coast Guard has developed management tools, such as manpower  requirements determinations, to help it strategically align its personnel  with its missions, but Coast Guard officials state they cannot meet the  demand for these analyses and have not established a process to  prioritize them because they do not have sufficient staff and lack a system  to help analyze the MRA workload. Because the Coast Guard does not  have a systematic process for identifying and prioritizing the most  important manpower requirements analyses to complete, it does not have  reasonable assurance that the highest priority missions are fully  supported with the appropriate number of staff possessing the requisite  mix of skills and abilities.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the  following three actions:
To improve the strategic allocation of assets, the Coast Guard should  incorporate field unit input, such as information on assets’ actual  performance from Operational Performance Assessment Reports and  Planning Assessments, to inform more realistic asset allocation  decisions—in addition to asset performance capacities currently  used—in the annual Strategic Planning Directions to more effectively  communicate strategic intent to field units.
To improve transparency in allocating its limited resources, and to  help ensure that its resource allocation decisions are the most  effective ones for fulfilling its missions given existing risks, the Coast  Guard should document how the risk assessments conducted were  used to inform and support its annual asset allocation decisions.
To ensure that high priority mission activities are fully supported with  the appropriate number of staff possessing the requisite mix of skills  and abilities, the Coast Guard should develop a systematic process  that prioritizes manpower requirements analyses for units that are the  most critical for achieving mission needs.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In April 2016, we requested comments on a draft of this report from the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Coast Guard. Both DHS  and the Coast Guard provided technical comments, which we have  incorporated into the report, as appropriate. In addition to its technical  comments, DHS provided an official letter for inclusion in the report,  which can be seen in appendix II. With regard to the first two  recommendations, the Coast Guard stated that it was taking actions, such  as incorporating field unit input contained in Operational Performance  Assessment Reports and Planning Assessments, and documenting how  risk assessments conducted were used to inform its annual asset  allocation and program direction to field units. If implemented as  described in the fiscal year 2017 Strategic Planning Direction to be issued  by October 2016, this would meet the intent of these recommendations.  Further, with regard to the third recommendation, the Department stated  that the Coast Guard would be prioritizing manpower requirements  analyses of unstudied units and incorporating all available manpower  data into future personnel decisions, as resources permit, by October  2016. If implemented as described, this would meet the intent of the  recommendation.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of  Homeland Security and the Commandant of the Coast Guard. In addition,  the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at  http:www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-7141 or groverj@gao.gov. Contact Points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Coast Guard Assets as of the End of Fiscal Year 2015
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact above, Christopher Conrad, Assistant Director;  Nancy Kawahara, Analyst in Charge; Dominick Dale; Michele Fejfar; Holly  Halifax; Eric Hauswirth; Carol Henn; Bonnie Ho; Tracey King; Ying Long;  Alexandra Squitieri; and John Yee all made key contributions to this  report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Coast Guard Acquisitions: Enhanced Oversight of Testing Could Benefit  National Security Cutter Program and Future DHS Acquisitions,   GAO-16-314T. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2016.
National Security Cutter: Enhanced Oversight Needed to Ensure  Problems Discovered during Testing and Operations Are Addressed,  GAO-16-148. Washington, D.C: January 12, 2016.
Coast Guard: Timely Actions Needed to Address Risks in Using  Rotational Crews, GAO-15-195. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2015.
Coast Guard Acquisitions: Better Information on Performance and  Funding Needed to Address Shortfalls, GAO-14-450. Washington, D.C.:  June 5, 2014.
Coast Guard: Clarifying the Application of Guidance for Common  Operational Picture Development Would Strengthen Program,   GAO-13-321. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2013.
Coast Guard: Portfolio Management Approach Needed to Improve Major  Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-12-918. Washington, D.C.: September 20,  2012.
Coast Guard: Legacy Vessels’ Declining Conditions Reinforce Need for  More Realistic Operational Targets, GAO-12-741. Washington, D.C.: July  31, 2012 .
Homeland Security: Observations on the Coast Guard’s and the  Department of Homeland Security’s Fleet Studies, GAO-12-751R.  Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2012.
Coast Guard: Action Needed As Approved Deepwater Program Remains  Unachievable, GAO-11-743. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011.
Coast Guard: Observations on Acquisition Management and Efforts to  Reassess the Deepwater Program, GAO-11-535T. Washington, D.C.:  Apr. 13, 2011.
Coast Guard: Deepwater Requirements, Quantities, and Cost Require  Revalidation to Reflect Knowledge Gained, GAO-10-790. Washington,  D.C.: July 27, 2010.
Coast Guard: Service Has Taken Steps to Address Historic Personnel  Problems, but It Is too Soon to Assess the Impact of These Efforts.   GAO-10-268R. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2010.
Coast Guard: Better Logistics Planning Needed to Aid Operational  Decisions Related to the Deployment of the National Security Cutter and  Its Support Assets, GAO-09-497. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2009.
Coast Guard: As Deepwater Systems Integrator, Coast Guard Is  Reassessing Costs and Capabilities but Lags in Applying Its Disciplined  Acquisition Approach, GAO-09-682. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2009.
Coast Guard: Observations on Changes to Management and Oversight of  the Deepwater Program, GAO-09-462T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24,  2009.