Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force Identification Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements for High-Demand Support Forces
Published: 2006-09-05T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the war on terrorism has dominated the global security environment. Ongoing overseas operations and heavy reliance on reservists have raised concerns about how the Department of Defense (DOD) will continue to meet its requirements using an all-volunteer force. The Army, in particular, has faced continuing demand for large numbers of forces, especially for forces with support skills. GAO was mandated to examine the extent of DOD's reliance on personnel with high-demand skills and its efforts to reduce or eliminate reliance on these personnel. Accordingly, GAO assessed (1) the combat support and combat service support skills that are in high demand and the extent to which DOD officials have visibility over personnel who are available for future deployment and (2) the extent to which DOD has conducted a comprehensive, data-driven analysis of alternatives for providing needed skills.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required large numbers of ground forces, creating particularly high demand for certain combat support and combat service support skills, such as military police and civil affairs. After determining which requirements can be met with contractor personnel, DOD then determines how to meet requirements for military personnel. DOD officials charged with identifying forces have not had full visibility over the pool of skilled personnel available for future deployments. For some skills, the combatant commander's operational requirements have exceeded the initial supply of readily available trained military forces. DOD has met demands for these skills through strategies such as reassigning or retraining personnel. However, many of the skilled personnel in high demand are reservists whose involuntary active duty is limited under the current partial mobilization authority and DOD and Army policy. To meet requirements, officials charged with identifying personnel for future rotations developed an inefficient, labor-intensive process to gather information needed for decision making because integrated, comprehensive personnel data were not readily available. DOD is taking steps to develop comprehensive data that identify personnel according to deployment histories and skills; however, until DOD systematically integrates such data into its process for identifying forces, it will continue to make important decisions about personnel for future rotations based upon limited information and lack the analytical bases for requesting changes in or exceptions to deployment policies. Although DOD has developed several strategies to meet the combatant commander's requirements for previous rotations, it has not undertaken comprehensive, data-driven analysis of options that would make more personnel available for future rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A key reason why DOD has not conducted comprehensive analyses of options is that its process for identifying forces focuses on one rotation at a time and does not take a long-term view of potential requirements. Prior GAO work has shown that reliable data about current and future workforce requirements are essential for effective strategic planning, as is the data-driven analysis of the number of personnel and the skill mix needed to support key competencies. With data that link deployment dates and skills, DOD could assess options, including using more personnel with support skills from the Army and other services, transferring more positions to high-demand areas, and changing deployment lengths. Each of these options has both advantages and disadvantages. However, without a comprehensive analysis of the options and their related advantages and disadvantages, DOD will be challenged to plan effectively for future requirements and to meet recruiting goals. Additionally, without linking data and options, the services may have difficulty deploying all reservists once before other reservists are required to deploy for a second time, which is a key DOD goal. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense and Congress will not have complete information with which to make decisions about the size and composition of the force, mobilization policies, and other issues.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Global War on  Terrorism has required large numbers of active duty and reserve military  personnel to deploy for overseas missions, including ongoing operations in  Afghanistan and Iraq. The Department of Defense (DOD) now faces the  unprecedented challenge of sustaining large-scale, ongoing operations  with an all-volunteer military force. As operations have evolved from  combat to counterinsurgency operations, the dynamic operational  conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it more difficult for DOD to  anticipate the number of forces and the specific skills needed in the future.  Thus far, operations have continued to require large numbers of ground  forces. The combatant commander of U.S. Central Command is  responsible for the area of operations that includes Iraq and Afghanistan.  The commanders, Joint Forces Command and Special Operations  Command, are charged with identifying the forces that can be deployed to  meet the combatant commander’s requirement considering global risks.  While DOD has contracted with private companies for a significant  number of support activities, Army forces—particularly those with combat  support and combat service support skills, such as military police and  civil affairs, which reside heavily in its reserve components—continue to  be in high demand. The high pace of operations and heavy reliance on  reserve forces along with recruiting challenges raise concerns about  whether the U.S. military will be able to continue to meet operational  requirements in the future.
DOD has identified the need to transform into a more flexible and  responsive force by divesting itself of structure and forces from the Cold  War era and reorganizing its forces to meet new threats. The 2006  Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which outlines the defense program  for the future, recognizes that the department needs to rebalance military  skills between and within the active and reserve components and that the  reserve components need to be more accessible and ready to meet a range  of overseas and domestic missions. The report did not provide details on  how it will accomplish this. Further, as we have previously reported, the  department faces challenges in transforming forces for the future, such as  meeting increased requirements for high-demand skills. For example, we  have reported on problems in DOD’s mobilization and demobilization of  reservists as well as the issues raised by continuing demands for reserve  personnel to deploy. As we reported in July 2005, the number of Army  Reserve personnel that can be deployed under current mobilization  authorities and deployment policies is declining and many personnel have  been moved among units to tailor forces and fill shortages in those units.
Further, we have reported that DOD lacks data that would give it visibility  over the health status of reserve members. We also reported that while  DOD intends to move military positions to high-demand skills over time to  provide more capability, the degree to which this initiative will make more  military personnel available for operational missions is uncertain.  Moreover, in November 2005 we reported that the services were facing  difficulty recruiting and retaining enlisted personnel and that certain  occupational specialties have been consistently over- or underfilled.
The House of Representatives report accompanying the   Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2005 directed GAO to examine the extent of DOD’s reliance on personnel  with high-demand skills and its efforts to reduce or eliminate reliance on  these personnel. This report is an unclassified version of a classified  report.  The classified report contains additional details comparing  operational requirements to the Army’s supply of trained personnel  available to deploy and examining DOD’s strategies to meet the  requirements for skilled forces. Accordingly, this report assesses (1) the  combat support and combat service support skills that are in high demand  for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the extent to which DOD has  visibility over personnel available for future deployment and (2) the extent  to which the department has conducted a comprehensive, data-driven  analysis of its alternatives to continue meeting requirements for high- demand forces. We concentrated our analysis on the Army’s combat  support and combat service support skills because of the continuing high  demand for those forces and examined DOD’s process to identify forces  for rotations, referred to as “sourcing.”
To assess the key skills in high demand, we collected and analyzed data  provided by the U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Joint Staff, and the   U.S. Special Operations Command and examined how requirements from  U.S. Central Command have been met for military operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan. In addition, we observed Department of the Army and Joint  Staff conferences to understand how the department made decisions when  identifying support forces for these operations. To assess what forces  remain available to meet future requirements, we examined documents  provided by the Joint Staff, the U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Army, and  the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and we discussed with  responsible officials the challenges they face in identifying forces for  deployment. To assess the extent to which DOD has analyzed alternatives  that will allow it to continue to meet requirements for support forces, we  reviewed our work on human capital management, identified and  examined DOD’s initiatives to assess alternatives, and held discussions  with officials responsible for identifying forces. We performed our review  from February 2005 through June 2006 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. We determined that the data  used were sufficiently reliable for our objectives and in the context in  which the data are presented. Further information on our scope and  methodology appears in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, DOD  has launched two major overseas military operations related to the Global  War on Terrorism: Operation Enduring Freedom, which includes ongoing  military operations in Afghanistan and certain other countries, and  Operation Iraqi Freedom, which includes ongoing military operations in  Iraq. In both cases, operations quickly evolved from major combat  operations into ongoing counterinsurgency and stability operations, which  have continued to require large numbers of forces, ranging from about  138,000 personnel to about 160,000 personnel from 2004 to the present.  These operations have required large numbers of forces with support  skills, such as military police and civil affairs. While some of these skills  have been in high demand across the Army, some skills, such as civil  affairs, reside heavily in the Army’s reserve components and sometimes in  small numbers of critical personnel.
Reserve forces may be called to active duty under a number of authorities.  As shown in table 1, two authorities enable the President to involuntarily  mobilize forces, but with size and time limitations. Full mobilization,  which would enable the mobilization of forces for as long as they are  needed, requires a declaration by Congress.
On September 14, 2001, President Bush declared that a national emergency  existed as a result of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York  and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and he invoked the partial  mobilization authority. As table 1 shows, this authority restricts the  duration of reservists’ active duty to 24 consecutive months. OSD  implements the activation of reservists for Iraq and Afghanistan under this  partial mobilization authority. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Reserve Affairs, who reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness, is responsible for providing policy, programs,  and guidance for the mobilization and demobilization of the reserve  components.
On September 20, 2001, OSD issued mobilization guidance that among  other things directed the services as a matter of policy to specify in initial  orders to reserve members that the period of active duty service would not  exceed 12 months. However, the guidance allowed the service secretaries  to extend orders for an additional 12 months or to remobilize reserve  component members as long as an individual member’s cumulative service  did not exceed 24 months.
The services implement the authority and guidance according to their  policies and practices. To meet the continuing demand for ground forces,  in 2004 the Army extended the time that reservists must be deployed for  missions related to Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring  Freedom. DOD’s and the Army’s current guidance states the goal that  soldiers should serve 12 months with their “boots-on-the-ground” in the  theater of operations, not including the time spent in mobilization and  demobilization activities, which could add several more months to the  time a reserve member spends on active duty. Further, senior DOD  officials state that under DOD policy, a reservist may not be involuntarily  deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan more than once.
Since September 11, 2001, there have been several rotations of troops to  support Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Currently, DOD refers to troop rotations based on troop deployment dates,  although deployments overlap calendar years. For example, the rotation of  troops that deployed or are scheduled to serve from calendar years 2004  through 2006 is known as the 04-06 rotation. The 05-07 rotation is  composed of troops expected to deploy and serve from 2005 through 2007.  DOD recently identified troops to deploy to either theater from 2006  through 2008 in the 06-08 rotation. DOD recently has started planning for  the 07-09 rotation to identify forces for deployments from calendar years  2007 through 2009.
subsections: section_title: Identifying Forces for Ongoing Operations
paragraphs: In response to the new security environment, in May 2005 the Secretary of  Defense approved a new integrated force assignment, apportionment, and  allocation process, known as Global Force Management. The new process  is designed to identify capabilities or forces to conduct operational  missions. The Secretary tasked the Joint Forces Command with  responsibility for developing global, joint sourcing solutions for  conventional forces in support of combatant commander requirements. A  Global Force Management Board, composed of general officer/flag officer- level representatives from the combatant commands, the services, the  Joint Staff, and OSD, guides the process by reviewing emerging force  management issues and making risk management recommendations to the  Secretary of Defense.
Under the Global Force Management process, combatant commanders  determine the capabilities they will need to support ongoing operations,  including identifying the numbers of personnel and specific skills required  to generate the capabilities. In generating their operational plans, the  combatant commanders consider whether private contractors or civilians  rather than military forces could provide any of the desired capabilities.  For missions that require military forces, the combatant commanders  request the forces needed to provide the military capabilities from the  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, who reviews and validates the  requirements. When the requirements are validated, the Chairman sends  the requirements for conventional forces to the Commander, Joint Forces  Command, and to the Commander, Special Operations Command, for  special operations forces such as civil affairs and psychological  operations. The commanders, Joint Forces Command and Special  Operations Command, are responsible for identifying the forces that can  be deployed to meet the requirement considering global risks. The Army  Forces Command, which reports to the Joint Forces Command, is charged  with identifying the Army units and personnel that can be deployed to  meet the requirements of the combatant commanders. The Army Special  Operations Command, which reports to the Special Operations Command,  is charged with identifying Army units and personnel to be deployed to  support combatant commanders’ requirements. The Secretary of Defense  reviews the commanders’ force sourcing recommendations and approves  or disapproves them.
section_title: Army Combat Support and Combat Service Support Skills Are in Increasingly Short Supply, and Data on Skilled Individuals Available for Future Deployments Are Not Integrated into the Sourcing Process
paragraphs: Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have created continuing high  demand for certain combat support and combat service support skills,  including military police, engineering, and civil affairs, and officials  charged with sourcing future rotations have a limited view of what  personnel remain available for future rotations. While dynamic operational  requirements complicate force-planning efforts, the department will be  increasingly challenged to identify forces for future rotations from a  diminishing supply of readily available personnel under current  deployment policies. The supply of personnel already trained in high- demand skills and eligible to deploy has decreased as operations have  continued because many personnel with these skills are reservists whose  deployments and duration of involuntary active duty service under the  partial mobilization authority are limited by DOD and Army policy. A  primary strategy used to meet requirements has been to identify personnel  from other Army skills or from other services that can be reassigned or  retrained with high-demand skills. However, DOD officials charged with  identifying forces for future rotations have not had a source of readily  available, comprehensive personnel data on deployment histories and  skills across the services. Lacking such information, DOD officials  developed a labor-intensive process involving a series of conferences with  service representatives, the Joint Staff, and the Joint Forces Command  where officials identify actions the services can take to meet the  combatant commander’s requirements. DOD is taking steps to consolidate  personnel, deployment, and skill data to support force management  decisions through a new defense readiness reporting system. Until DOD  systematically integrates such data into its process for identifying forces, it  will continue to use an inefficient process and make important decisions  about how to meet the combatant commander’s requirements based on  limited information. Further, without complete, reliable, and accessible  data that provide greater visibility over its available forces, DOD will lack  analytical bases for requesting changes in or exceptions to current  deployment policies when needed.
subsections: section_title: As the Supply of Available, Trained Personnel for Some High-Demand Combat Support and Combat Service Support Skills Has Decreased, DOD Has Relied Increasingly on Reassigning and Retraining Personnel to Meet Requirements
paragraphs: As operations have evolved from combat to counterinsurgency operations,  requirements for forces with some high-demand skills—especially combat  support and combat service support skills—have initially exceeded the  number of Army personnel trained and available to deploy. As a result,  DOD has relied increasingly on reassigning and retraining personnel to  meet combatant commander requirements. The skills where requirements  have initially exceeded the number of trained personnel include  transportation, engineering, military police, quartermaster, military  intelligence, civil affairs, signal corps, medical, and psychological  operations. Many of these high-demand skills reside primarily in the  Army’s reserve component. Reservists serving in Afghanistan and Iraq  have been activated under a partial mobilization authority that enables the  secretary of a military department, in a time of national emergency  declared by the President or when otherwise authorized by law, to  involuntarily mobilize reservists for up to 24 consecutive months. DOD  policy implementing the mobilization authority states that any soldier who  has served 24 cumulative months during current operations is ineligible  for any further activation unless the reservist volunteers for additional  duty. Further, DOD’s policy is that no reservist should be involuntarily  deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan more than once, according to senior  DOD officials. Consequently, as operations continue and the number of  reservists who have already deployed increases, it is likely to become  increasingly difficult for DOD to identify reserve personnel skilled in high- demand areas who are eligible to deploy.
One of the primary strategies DOD has used to meet requirements for  some high-demand skills has been to reassign and retrain Army or other  service personnel. The percentage of requirements that have been filled  by reassigned or retrained Army personnel to some high-demand skills has  increased as operations have continued. In addition, the combatant  commander’s requirements for Army skills increasingly have been met by  retraining personnel from the other services under Army doctrine. The  strategy of reassigning and retraining available personnel from other  services to fill combat support and combat service support requirements  supports the department’s goal of deploying all reservists at least once  before any are involuntarily activated for a second time. This will likely  continue to be a primary strategy for providing high-demand forces as  operations continue and the pool of skilled personnel who have not  deployed continues to diminish. However, DOD officials charged with  identifying the personnel who could be reassigned or retrained to meet  requirements were challenged because they did not have information that  linked data on personnel who remained eligible to deploy and their skills  across the services.
section_title: DOD’s Process for Identifying Forces Is Labor Intensive, and Officials Charged with Identifying Forces Have Not Integrated Comprehensive Data into DOD’s Sourcing Process
paragraphs: Officials charged with identifying forces for future rotations did not  integrate comprehensive data that would allow them to efficiently identify  what skilled personnel are available to be deployed because such data  were not readily available when the department began a rotational force  deployment schedule. Until the need to sustain large numbers of forces for  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over a long period emerged, DOD  officials did not anticipate the need for detailed information on individuals  to support a rotational force schedule on a long-term basis. While officials  ultimately identified forces to meet the combatant commander’s  operational requirements, our review of the force identification process  showed that the data used were not comprehensive and did not give  officials charged with identifying forces a complete picture of what forces  remained available across the services to meet the requirements.
DOD officials involved with the process of identifying forces stated that  supporting the rotational force schedule has not permitted them the time  or resources to consolidate the services’ personnel data. In the absence of  such data in the early stages of the ongoing operations, DOD officials  developed a labor-intensive process that involves conferences on service  and interservice joint levels where officials discuss various strategies to  assign forces because they do not have data that would provide visibility  over available forces. For example, while the Army Reserve and National  Guard had data that identified available units, the data did not provide  complete information on how many individuals remained deployable or  had the required skills. Through a series of conferences, officials discussed  what personnel remained available for future deployments based on data  they gathered from various sources. While DOD is taking steps to link  information about personnel and deployment history in its new defense  readiness reporting system that could be helpful in making decisions  about forces for future rotations, these data have not yet been integrated  with DOD’s sourcing process.
The Joint Staff and the services participated in conferences to identify  forces for the 04-06 rotation in 2004 when identifying skilled personnel  available for deployment became more difficult because of previous  deployments, and the Army recognized the need to identify forces as early  as possible so that they could be retrained in high-demand skills. The  process, managed by the Joint Forces Command, has evolved over time as  operations have continued and now involves months of conferences held  at the service level and across the department where representatives of  the services, the Joint Forces Command, the combatant commander, and  others discuss strategies for meeting requirements.
To meet the requirements for which the Army could not initially identify  available and trained forces, the Joint Forces Command formed working  groups composed of representatives from the services and Joint Forces  Command, among others, to identify personnel from any of the other  services who could be reassigned and retrained according to Army  doctrine. The work of the joint functional working groups culminated in  another conference, called the Final Progress Review, hosted by the Joint  Staff at the Pentagon. During the executive sessions of the Final Progress  Review, senior military leaders made decisions as to how the services,  including the Army, would fill the remaining requirements.
The process has enabled the department to fill requirements, but  efficiency was lost because these officials did not have data that linked  personnel skills and deployment availability so that trained forces  remaining available under current policies could be readily identified. As a  result, conference participants had to defer decisions until they could  obtain more complete data. Moreover, the process does not provide  assurance that forces identified are the most appropriate match  considering both current requirements and future readiness. Moreover, it  does not provide an ability to make future projections about whether DOD  will be able to meet future requirements or will need to consider other  alternatives. While DOD has begun compiling data through its new  readiness reporting system that links information about personnel  according to deployment history and skill set to provide better visibility of  available forces, and such data were available beginning in August 2005,  this information has not been integrated into the existing sourcing  process.
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)  has taken steps to develop a new defense readiness reporting system, the  Defense Readiness Reporting System, that will link data on personnel  availability and skills, according to a senior agency official. The system,  which consolidates data from multiple sources, such as the services and  the department’s manpower data center, is in the early stages of  implementation and validation. When fully implemented and validated, the  Defense Readiness Reporting System could provide the integrated data  that sourcing officials need. However, the information has not yet been  integrated into the sourcing process to identify the most appropriate  forces to meet current requirements from all the services considering their  other missions. In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD said  that although integrated personnel data were not available during the  entire 06-08 sourcing process, this system could now provide data and  analytical support for identifying forces for future rotations. DOD said that  Joint Forces Command and Special Operations Command officials  responsible for identifying forces should use the system to assist in  identifying available personnel in the future. Until DOD systematically  integrates such data into its process for identifying forces, it will continue  to use an inefficient process and make important decisions about how to  meet the combatant commander’s requirements based on limited  information. Further, without complete, reliable, and accessible data that  provide greater visibility over its available forces, DOD will lack analytical  bases for requesting changes in or exceptions to current deployment  policies when needed.
section_title: DOD Has Not Conducted a Comprehensive, Data- Driven Analysis of Options to Enhance the Availability of Personnel with High- Demand Skills for Future Rotations
paragraphs: Although DOD found ways to meet the combatant commander’s  requirements for high-demand skills through the 06-08 rotation, it has not  undertaken a comprehensive analysis of options to support future  rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan should they continue for a number of  years. DOD has not undertaken a comprehensive analysis because its  process for identifying forces was created to meet the specific combatant  commander’s requirements for the next rotation cycle. Our previous work  has shown that in the face of a changing environment, such as that of  evolving military operations, valid and reliable data on the number of  employees required are critical to prevent shortfalls that threaten the  ability of an organization to efficiently and effectively perform its  mission. However, without a comprehensive assessment of the most  efficient and effective way to prepare for future rotations, including  comprehensive analyses of various options, DOD will not be able to  demonstrate a convincing business case for maintaining or changing its  strategies, such as retraining personnel and seeking volunteers, for  meeting a combatant commander’s requirements.
subsections: section_title: The Joint Staff’s Limited Analyses of Options for the 07-09 Rotation Quantified Shortfalls by Units in Some High-Demand Skills
paragraphs: In summer 2005, the Secretary of Defense asked the Director, Joint Staff,  for a briefing on future force structure challenges for the next 2 to 3 years,  although the Secretary did not specify how the review was to be  conducted. In response to the Secretary’s request, in fall 2005, the Joint  Staff conducted a study, known as Elaborate Crossbow V, with the  objectives of predicting shortfalls of skilled personnel for the 07-09  rotation, recommending options to make personnel available for  rotations, and identifying risks that demonstrated the difficulties officials  face in identifying forces for future rotations, among other objectives.  However, the study was limited to units within selected high-demand  combat support and combat service support skills for operations in Iraq  and Afghanistan. In the 2005 assessment, Joint Staff and DOD officials  assumed that the combat commander’s requirements for support skills for  the 07-09 rotation would be the same as the requirements for the 06-08  rotation, and they compared these requirements to estimates of available  units.
Joint Staff officials were charged with developing models that would  assess the number of units that could be made available by using several  options, including requesting a new partial mobilization authority and  allowing redeployment of reserve personnel with residual time under  current mobilization authority. Joint Staff officials requested detailed  information from the Joint Forces Command and Special Operations  Command on (1) the total inventory of units in the force structure, (2) the  units’ arrival and departure dates from theater, (3) the number of days in  theater for the last rotation for individuals in the units, (4) the amount of  time individuals spent at home stations, and (5) the remaining time  available under the partial mobilization authority for reservists. The Joint  Staff officials planned to use the data in the models to determine if  changing the underlying assumptions associated with an option would  make more units available.
When detailed data were available, Joint Staff officials were able to use  their models to test how changing policies would affect the availability of  units; however, detailed data were only available for civil affairs units. The  fact that an official from the Special Operations Command had accurate  and specific information on the civil affairs specialists’ dates of  deployments and time remaining under the mobilization authority enabled  the Joint Staff officials to test how changing policies would change the  availability of units to meet the estimated requirement. For example, the  analysis showed that if DOD allowed the redeployment of reserve  personnel with remaining time under partial mobilization authority, more  Army reserve civil affairs companies would become available. However,  according to a Joint Staff official who assisted in developing the models,  the Joint Staff could not conduct a thorough analysis of other units with  skills in high demand because it did not have key data. While the Joint  Staff’s limited review is a first step, it does not represent systematic  analyses of options for continuing to support operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan beyond the 06-08 rotation.
section_title: Human Capital Best Practices Rely on Data- Driven Analyses to Guide Decision Making
paragraphs: Our prior work has shown that valid and reliable data about the number of  employees an agency requires are critical if the agency is to spotlight areas  for attention before crises develop, such as human capital shortfalls that  threaten an agency’s ability to economically, efficiently, and effectively  perform its missions. We have designated human capital management as  a governmentwide high-risk area in which acquiring and developing a staff  whose size and skills meet agency needs is a particular challenge. To meet  this challenge, federal managers need to direct considerable time, energy,  and targeted investments toward managing human capital strategically,  focusing on developing long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and  retaining a workforce that is clearly linked to achieving the agency’s  mission and goals.
The processes that an agency uses to manage its workforce can vary, but  our prior work has shown that data-driven decision making is one of the  critical factors in successful strategic workforce management. High- performing organizations routinely use current, valid, and reliable data to  inform decisions about current and future workforce needs, including data  on the appropriate number of employees, key competencies, and skills  mix needed for mission accomplishment and appropriate deployment of  staff across the organizations. In addition, high-performing organizations  also stay alert to emerging mission demands and remain open to  reevaluating their human capital practices. The change in the Army’s  missions from combat to counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan represented a new environment, which provided DOD with  the opportunity to reevaluate the mix of personnel and skills and its  deployment policies to determine whether they are consistent with  strategic objectives.
section_title: Several Options Exist to Increase the Army’s and Other Services’ Supply of Combat Support and Combat Service Support Skills
paragraphs: The United States is in its fifth year of fighting the Global War on  Terrorism, and the operations associated with the war, particularly in Iraq  and Afghanistan, may continue. DOD planners are beginning to identify  forces for the 07-09 rotation. Based on our review of DOD’s deployment  policies and our prior work, we identified several options that DOD could  assess to increase the supply of high-demand skills to support future  rotations. Each of the proposed options involves both advantages and  disadvantages, and some options could be implemented in conjunction  with others. Moreover, some options might be more appropriate for  certain skill sets than others. However, without key data and analyses,  such as the amount of time remaining under the partial mobilization  authority for each reservist, decision makers will have difficulty weighing  which option(s) would best achieve DOD’s overall goals of supplying  trained and available forces to meet the combatant commander’s  requirements while considering risks, future readiness, and recruiting and  retention. Based on its challenges in providing personnel with high- demand skills in previous rotations, DOD will be faced with difficult  choices on how to make personnel in high-demand skills available for  future rotations. Options that could increase the supply of combat support  and combat service support skills for future rotations include the  following:    Retraining personnel within the Army and other services in high- demand skills. DOD could consider requiring the Army to reassign and  retrain more of its personnel as well as relying on the Air Force, the Navy,  and the Marine Corps to reassign and retrain available personnel for high- demand Army skills. As discussed previously, the Joint Forces Command  has identified significant numbers of Army and other service personnel  that the Army could retrain for some high-demand skills. As of February  2006, the Joint Staff estimated that over 200,000 reservists from all the  services’ reserve components could be potentially available for  deployment under current policies and might be retrained for high-demand  skills, and the services are attempting to verify the actual availability of  reservists. However it is unclear how many reservists can be reassigned  and retrained to meet Army requirements for skills and rank. OSD officials  said the department would consider waiving deployment policies for  targeted high-demand skill personnel only when the services can provide a  strong business case for the waiver. Instead, the department intends to  rely on retraining personnel and seeking volunteers to meet future  requirements. Joint Staff officials are currently seeking from the services  more detailed data on potentially available personnel, such as their skills  and whether they can be assigned and trained for deployment. A key  advantage of this option is that Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps  personnel who have not deployed already have some military skills and  experience, such as an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of  their senior leaders and knowledge of military roles and missions that  could be useful in supporting ongoing operations. In some cases,  experienced personnel from the other services may have specialized skills  that are similar to the Army skills in high demand; therefore, they would  need less training than newly recruited Army personnel. A disadvantage to  this option would be that the other service personnel would not be  available to perform missions in their respective services. Further,  members of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps could potentially miss  training and other opportunities to enhance their careers in their parent  services. Moreover, recruiting and retention could be hindered because  potential recruits or experienced personnel may not want to retrain for  missions and skills other than those they originally planned to perform.
Adjusting force structure through increasing the number of Army  positions in combat support and combat service support by further  transferring positions from low-demand skills to high-demand  areas. Another option focuses on shifting positions in low-demand skills  to high-demand skills, either temporarily or permanently. The Army plans  to transfer some low-demand positions to high-demand skills, such as  military police. In addition, DOD plans to expand psychological operations  and civil affairs units by 3,700 personnel as a result of Operation Iraqi  Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, according to the 2006  Quadrennial Defense Review Report. However, according to a senior  Army official, the Army is facing challenges in meeting its current planned  time frames for reassigning positions because providing forces to meet the  rotational requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan has created delays in  planned transfers of skills and modular force transformations may require  permanent changes in the numbers and types of skills needed. The  advantage of creating more units with high-demand skills is that  continuing operational requirements could be met with more available,  trained personnel. Further, if more units with the combat support and  combat service support skills that are in high demand were in the active  component, DOD would not face the restrictions that apply to reserve  personnel. A major disadvantage to using this option is that the Army  could encounter further delays in providing personnel with high-demand  skills because, according to some service officials, limitations in the  availability of training facilities, courses, and instructors may reduce the  numbers of personnel who can be retrained in the short term. Many of  the Army’s skills in high demand reside primarily in the Army’s reserve  component. Therefore, if DOD’s deployment policies remain unchanged,  the Army will continue to face limitations on its use of reservists.
Changing the number of days that active duty and reserve Army  personnel may be in theater for a deployment. OSD could consider  changing the duration of deployment for Army reservists or active duty  personnel in theater, known as “boots-on-the-ground,” from the current 12  months. Current departmental guidance states that Army personnel can  serve no more than 12 months within the U.S. Central Command’s theater  of operations, not including the time spent in mobilization and  demobilization activities. However, because mobilization and  demobilization activities require about 3 months prior to deployment and 3  months after deployment, reservists deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan  typically serve about 18 months on active duty. Under DOD’s policy, the  Army may use reserve members for a total of 24 cumulative months.  Therefore, by the time reservists are deactivated after 18 months of  mobilization, they have only 6 months of deployment eligibility remaining  under DOD’s policy—not enough to remobilize and redeploy for another  yearlong overseas assignment. If the amount of “boots-on-the-ground” time  was lengthened, from the current 12 months to 18 months, the Army could  more fully use reserve personnel under the partial mobilization authority.  A key advantage of this option would be that a longer deployment period  would permit forces to be in theater longer and provide more force  stability and continuity, but individuals could be adversely affected by  longer tours of duty. In addition, a slower rotational pace would provide  force planners, such as the Army Forces Command, more time to identify  available personnel and decide which personnel will best meet  requirements for the next rotation. However, lengthening “boots-on-the- ground” time could have negative consequences for individuals. If  reservists were away from their civilian careers and families for longer  time frames, individual morale could erode, and DOD could face  challenges in recruiting and retaining skilled personnel.
Alternatively, the Army could shorten the “boots-on-the-ground” time and  involuntarily activate reservists to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan more  than once. If deployments were shortened, Army reservists would not be  separated from their civilian careers for long periods, and recruiting and  retention challenges could lessen. However, a major disadvantage to  shortening the Army’s deployment lengths to, for example, 6 months is  that the Army would have to mobilize and demobilize more personnel in a  given period. According to Army and Army Forces Command officials, if  reservists’ deployments were shortened without change to the “one  deployment only” policy, the Army would face critical personnel shortages  in many skill areas. Any shortages of available reserve personnel would  likely have to be filled with active duty personnel, increasing stress on the  active force. Further, less time at home for active forces could disrupt  training and lower readiness for future missions.
Allowing redeployment of reserve personnel with time remaining  under DOD’s 24 cumulative month deployment policy. DOD’s policy  is that personnel should not be deployed for more than 24 cumulative  months under the partial mobilization authority or involuntarily deployed  overseas a second time, irrespective of the number of months served.  However, if OSD allowed the redeployment of reserve personnel the  services could more fully use reservists’ 24 months of involuntary active  duty. The major advantage to this option is that the Army would have  access to reservists trained in high-demand skills. Further, changing the  redeployment policy could enable the Army to decrease its reliance on  retraining its personnel or other service personnel to meet the combatant  commander’s requirements. If the Army collected detailed data about the  number of days a reservist served in theater and the remaining time  available under the partial mobilization authority, it could compile a  comprehensive list of reservists who could possibly deploy again and  identify the time frames that they would be available. However, as  discussed in the previous sections of the report, DOD and the Army do not  have detailed data about personnel across the services readily available. A  major disadvantage of this option would be that DOD would involuntarily  activate large numbers of reserve personnel for multiple deployments.  Multiple deployments could disrupt a reservist’s civilian career and  decrease his or her willingness to remain in the military. Another  disadvantage of redeploying reservists would be that some reservists  could be deployed more than once in 6 years, which differs from the  Army’s plan under its force rotation model. The Army’s force rotation  planning model is designed to provide reservists more predictability in  deployment eligibility.
Increasing the Army’s active duty end strength. Congress authorizes  annually the number of personnel that each service may have at the end of  a given fiscal year. This number is known as authorized end strength. In  the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Congress  increased the fiscal year 2006 end strength of the Army by 10,000—from  502,400 to 512,400. Congress also authorized additional authority for  increases of up to 20,000 active Army personnel for fiscal years 2007  through 2009 to support ongoing missions and to achieve transformation.  However, current Army plans project a decrease in personnel to 482,400  active duty forces by fiscal year 2011. The primary advantage of increasing  the Army’s end strength and funding associated positions would be that  the Army could provide more active duty personnel to meet operational  requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan, to accommodate the requirements  for the modular force, and to help meet the Army’s rotational force  planning goal of having active personnel deployed for no more than 1 out  of every 3 years. Budgetary concerns could be a major drawback to this  option. Decision makers would have to weigh the increased cost of  permanently increasing the Army’s end strength. According to Army  personnel and budget officials, in fiscal year 2005, the estimated cost to  compensate, retain, and train each Army servicemember was over  $100,000 annually. Further, recruiting personnel to meet the higher end  strength levels may be difficult because of the uncertainty of how long  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan may continue and whether new recruits  could be targeted to high-demand skills. Additionally, the Army would  require time to organize, train, and equip additional units to be ready to  deploy for overseas operations.
Using more personnel from the Individual Ready Reserve. Members  of the Army’s Individual Ready Reserve, which is composed of about  112,700 members, include individuals who were previously trained during  periods of active service but who have not completed their service  obligations, individuals who have completed their service obligations and  voluntarily retain their reserve status, and personnel who have not  completed basic training. Most of these members are not assigned to an  organized unit, do not attend weekend or annual training, and do not  receive pay unless they are called to active duty. Members assigned to the  Individual Ready Reserve are subject to recall, if needed, and serve a  maximum of 24 months. As of September 2005, of the total Army  Individual Ready Reserve population of 112,700, about 5,200 personnel had  been mobilized. An advantage of this option is that it could provide the  Army with access to personnel who already have some military  experience. These reservists could be retrained in their active duty skills  or retrained in different skills. A significant drawback to this option would  be the time needed to identify, locate, and contact members of the  Individual Ready Reserve because, as we have reported previously, the  services lack vital contact information. Further, based on the Army’s  recent experience when these reservists were recalled, exemptions and  delays were encountered that could limit the services’ ability to use these  personnel in significant numbers.
Identifying forces for future rotations is likely to become more difficult for  DOD without comprehensive analyses of options for meeting potential  future requirements. Without complete and accurate data that link  deployment information and skill areas for military personnel to assist in  developing and assessing the options, the department will continue to  have limited information with which to make decisions about how to fill  the combatant commander’s requirements. Further, without a systematic  evaluation of options, the current difficulties in providing personnel with  the needed skills could worsen and requirements could go unfilled. As the  Joint Staff’s limited analyses of options showed, having complete and  accurate data enables planners to clearly identify how alternative options  would affect their ability to efficiently identify forces. Additionally,  without linking data to options, the services may have difficultly deploying  all reservists at least once before other reservists are required to deploy  for a second time, which is a key goal of officials in OSD. If DOD had data- driven analyses of options to increase available skilled personnel, DOD  leaders would have a better basis for considering policy changes and  congressional decision makers would have more complete information  with which to carry out their oversight responsibilities with regard to the  size and composition of the force, mobilization policies, and other issues.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Although DOD has accommodated the continuing high demands for  combat support and combat service support skills, primarily through  retraining and reassigning personnel, the pool of available, trained, and  deployable reservists is diminishing rapidly and could leave the  department with significant challenges to identifying personnel for future  rotations. Until DOD’s planners and senior decision makers integrate in  the sourcing process comprehensive, reliable data that link personnel by  skills and deployment histories, they will have to continue to use an  inefficient and time-consuming process to determine which personnel to  deploy. Moreover, DOD will be limited in its ability to assess whether it  can meet future requirements and to consider a range of alternatives for  meeting requirements for skills that are in high demand. If DOD had better  visibility over the personnel who are available to deploy and their skills,  officials could reduce the amount of time they spend in identifying  personnel for rotations, provide assurance that personnel identified are  appropriately matched considering both the requirements and future  readiness, and better manage the risks associated with moving personnel  from other skills and missions to support future operations.
In addition, without an integrated assessment that uses data to examine  alternative courses of action, DOD planners and senior leaders will not be  well positioned to make informed decisions on how to meet the  requirements of future rotations, particularly if rotations continue at  roughly the same level for the next few years. To meet requirements for  future rotations, the department intends to continue its strategy of  reassigning any eligible personnel the services can identify until all  reservists from all services have been deployed at least once. However,  there are additional options that DOD could consider that might increase  the supply of personnel for high-demand skills for future rotations,  although each option could have negative effects as well as positive ones.  Data-driven analysis of options could help DOD senior leaders make  difficult decisions to balance the advantages and disadvantages for each  option and to apply the best-suited option to meet the varying  requirements for the range of high-demand skills. Until DOD  comprehensively assesses these options using detailed data linked to  individual skills and deployment histories, DOD officials cannot weigh  what options would be most advantageous to the combatant commander  and whether potential negative effects on readiness for future operations  would be minimized.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To facilitate DOD’s decision making to meet the demands associated with  the Global War on Terrorism and to increase the availability of skilled  personnel, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following  two actions:  Integrate comprehensive data that identify active and reserve personnel  according to deployment history and skill set, including personnel who are  available to deploy, with DOD’s sourcing process before identifying  combat support and combat service support personnel for the next  rotation to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Conduct comprehensive, data-driven analyses of options for meeting  potential requirements for future missions to Iraq and Afghanistan. Such  analyses should include an assessment of options, such as using more  personnel with support skills from the Army and other services;  transferring more positions to high-demand areas; changing deployment  lengths; and increasing Army end strength, which would increase the  availability of personnel in high-demand skills.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness) provided written  comments on a draft of the classified version of this unclassified report.  The department agreed with our recommendations and cited actions it is  taking to implement them. The department’s comments are reprinted in  appendix II. In addition, the department provided technical comments,  which we incorporated as appropriate. In its comments, DOD expressed  concerns that our report (1) does not fully reflect the complicated task of  providing forces for dynamic operational requirements and (2) subtly  suggests that DOD’s flexibility in meeting operational requirements is a  sign of failed force management practices. It also stated that its use of the  total force, not just the Army, enabled it to meet all combatant  commanders’ requirements to date. In addition, the department stated that  our recommendations should more explicitly recognize and support the  use of the newly developed Defense Readiness Reporting System. It stated  that the total force visibility our recommendations call for exists in that  system and that the Joint Forces Command and the Special Operations  Command should use the detailed, individual-level information in that  system to support their sourcing processes.
We agree that the process developed to identify forces is very complex.  Our report described the process for identifying forces for Army combat  support and combat service support requirements. Moreover, our report  discussed how DOD has met the demands and how officials used multiple  strategies and relied on the total force to meet requirements for high- demand skills. The report does not make a judgment about the  appropriateness of the outcomes of the sourcing process. Rather, the  report demonstrates that the lack of data complicated the force  identification process, and that force planners did not have visibility over  detailed information on personnel or how current sourcing decisions  would affect the readiness of the force. However, we have modified our  report to reflect that DOD’s effort to integrate personnel deployment and  skill data and readiness information in the new Defense Readiness  Reporting System represents a positive step toward providing the visibility  over personnel and deployment histories that would be useful to force  planners. Although this system has not yet been used to support the  sourcing process, when it reaches full operational capability at the end of  fiscal year 2007 and DOD has completed data validation, it could be a  means to provide visibility over detailed information on personnel to  improve the sourcing process, thereby fulfilling our recommendation. We  have not modified our recommendation to require that DOD use the  Defense Readiness Reporting System in its sourcing process because it is  still in development.
With respect to our second recommendation that DOD conduct  comprehensive, data-driven analyses of options for meeting continuing  operational requirements, DOD agreed that all options should be  considered and said it is conducting a variety of data-driven analyses to  develop clearer options aimed at better positioning forces to meet current  and future operational requirements. We believe that the department’s  approach will satisfy the intent of our recommendation if the department  bases its assessments on data that provide decision makers complete  information on the options and related risks.
We are sending copies to other appropriate congressional committees and  the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies available to other  interested parties upon request. In addition, the report is available at no  charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at   (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the combat support and combat service support skills that are in  high demand for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we collected U.S.  Joint Forces Command and U.S. Special Operations Command data  showing how U.S. Central Command’s requirements were met for two  rotations—calendar years 05-07 and calendar years 06-08. Using the data,  we compared the number of requirements from U.S. Central Command to  the number of requirements that the Army could meet and determined  whether and to what extent combat support and combat service support  skills initially experienced shortages for the 05-07 and 06-08 rotations. To  identify what strategies the Department of Defense (DOD) took to identify  forces in cases where demand exceeded the initial supply, we examined  the decisions made by officials at the U.S. Joint Forces Command and the  U.S. Special Operations Command as documented in their data. We also  compared the U.S. Central Command’s documents, which identified the  specific capabilities and deployment time frames, to the U.S. Joint Forces  Command and U.S. Special Operations Command data to identify specific  instances where the Army reassigned and retrained its personnel or where  personnel from the other services were reassigned and retrained to  perform Army requirements. We also reviewed the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s  analyses of the U.S. Central Command’s requirement and the actions taken  by DOD to meet the requirements for the 04-06, 05-07, and 06-08 rotations.  Since the U.S. Joint Forces Command did not have complete data on how  the department identified forces for the 04-06 rotation, we attributed the  04-06 sourcing results to the Joint Staff. We met with an official in the  Joint Staff Directorate for Operations to discuss our analysis comparing  the combatant commander’s requirements for the 05-07 rotation to DOD’s  05-07 sourcing decisions to ensure our methodology was comparable to  the Joint Staff official’s analysis. We also discussed our methodology of  analyzing the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s data for the 05-07 and 06-08  rotations with officials in the command’s Joint Deployment Operations  Division. To assess the reliability of the 05-07 and 06-08 rotation data, we  reviewed existing information about the data and the systems that  produced them, interviewed officials knowledgeable about the data, and  performed limited electronic testing. When we found missing information  or discrepancies in the key data elements, we discussed the reasons for  the missing information and data discrepancies with officials in the Joint  Deployment Operations Division, U.S. Joint Forces Command. We  determined that the 05-07 and 06-08 rotation data were sufficiently reliable  for our purposes.
In addition, to assess the extent to which DOD has visibility over what  forces remain available to meet future requirements, we collected and  examined the Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and Department of  the Army briefings that document the decisions reached to identify the  combat support and combat service support forces identified for the 05-07  and 06-08 rotations and held discussions with officials responsible for  identifying forces at DOD organizations. We also examined DOD  documents that contained information on deployment policies and the  partial mobilization authority to understand how they affect the  availability of active military personnel and reservists for future  deployments. We discussed the implications of DOD’s deployment policies  and the status of identifying forces for rotations by obtaining testimonial  evidence from officials responsible for managing these efforts at DOD  organizations, including, but not limited to, the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (Readiness,  Programming and Assessment), the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate for  Operations, the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Deployment Operations  Division, the U.S. Special Operations Command Operations Support  Group, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Deputy Chief of Staff  for Plans, the U.S. Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for  Operations and Plans, and the U.S. Army Forces Command Plans Division.  Because it did not fall within the scope of our review, we did not assess  how the forces were trained or will be trained and equipped or the effects  on recruitment and retention as a result of continuing operational needs.  We also observed the Department of the Army’s conference in April 2005  and the U.S. Joint Forces Command/Joint Chiefs of Staff conference in  August 2005 to understand the process used by department officials to  identify combat support and combat service support for the 06-08 rotation.  As part of this effort, we observed working group meetings that were  organized by combat support and combat service support skills to  understand how department officials discussed and developed approaches  to meet the combatant commander’s requirements. At these conferences,  we held discussions with officials to fully understand the challenges they  face with using the available data to identify personnel.
To determine what percentage of combat support and combat service  support skills reside in the Army’s active and reserve components, we  collected skill set data from the Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  for Operations and calculated the percentage of positions assigned to  several support skills for each of the Army’s components in fiscal years  2005 and 2011. In addition, we analyzed transcripts of public briefings and  congressional testimony presented by DOD officials. To assess the  reliability of the fiscal year 2005 and the projected fiscal year 2011 data on  the composition of the Army’s active and reserve components by skills, we  reviewed existing information about the data and the systems that  produced them, interviewed officials knowledgeable about the data, and  compared our analysis to the Army’s published analysis. We determined  that the Army’s data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our  objectives.
To assess the extent to which DOD has conducted a comprehensive, data- driven analysis of its alternatives to continue meeting requirements for  high-demand forces, we met with officials in the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (Readiness,  Programming and Assessment), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Army’s  Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, and the U.S.  Joint Forces Command Joint Deployment Operations Division to  determine whether the department had plans to conduct assessments. We  held further discussions with officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff  Directorate for Force Assessment to gain an understanding of the  departmentwide study led by the Joint Staff. Further, we examined the  Joint Staff’s briefing documents to increase our understanding of the  process used to conduct the study, the data and assumptions used during  the study, and the results of the study. We discussed the status and  implications of the study with officials who participated in the Joint Staff- led study, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness (Readiness, Programming and Assessment) and officials from  the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Deployment Operations Division.
To identify other options that DOD should consider to increase the  availability of personnel with high-demand skills, we examined DOD  documents containing information on deployment policies and the partial  mobilization authority, held discussions with knowledgeable officials  about mobilization authority and deployment rules, reviewed recently  issued reports from think tanks related to providing forces for rotations,  and reviewed our prior audit work related to end strength and initiatives  to make more efficient use of military personnel. We identified criteria for  examining force levels through our reports on strategic human capital  management. Further, we reviewed our prior audit work related to  recruiting and retention to enhance our understanding of the factors that  affect the military services’ ability to attract and retain personnel. Our  work was conducted in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area; Norfolk,  Virginia; Atlanta, Georgia; and Tampa, Florida. We performed our work  from February 2005 through June 2006 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  An objective of the report was to identify high-demand skills, and as  part of that assessment, we observed and reviewed DOD’s force  identification process to meet operational requirements for Iraq and  Afghanistan, including DOD’s current policies and plans. The report  describes in detail the structures developed to identify forces and  identifies and assesses major analytical tools used during the process.  Our report also acknowledges that the department met the combatant  commander’s requirements for the 04-06, 05-07, and 06-08 rotations.  However, we believe that the force identification process could  become more efficient if DOD officials charged with identifying forces  relied on comprehensive data to inform decision making.  2.  We agree with the department that dynamic operational conditions in  Iraq and Afghanistan have made it more difficult for the department to  anticipate the number of forces and the specific skills needed in the  future, and we have added text on pages 1 and 8 to more fully reflect  this challenge.
DOD stated that as a result of the dynamic operational conditions, the  Joint Forces Command—the DOD agent charged with filling  combatant commanders’ force requirements—used a variety of  strategies, such as reassigning and retraining personnel to new skill  areas (both within the Army and across service lines), capitalizing on  joint solutions in like skill areas. According to DOD’s comments, in  every case, these forces have deployed only after having been fully  certified as prepared for their theater missions and have performed  admirably. Our report extensively described the process for identifying  forces for Army combat support and combat service support  requirements and illustrated in detail how DOD officials used multiple  strategies to meet requirements for high-demand skills. Assessing the  appropriateness of sourcing outcomes and how the forces were  trained were outside the scope of this review.  3.  Our review focused on the Army because of the high-demand skills  that were found predominantly in the Army, such as military police and  civil affairs. We disagree that our report implies that DOD’s flexibility  in meeting uncertain operational requirements is a sign of failed force  management. We point out, however, that as rotations to Iraq and  Afghanistan have continued to require large numbers of ground forces,  data demonstrate that the number of available, trained Army personnel  has declined. According to DOD officials, strategies to meet combatant  commander requirements, such as reassigning and retraining  personnel, present their own challenges, such as costs for new  training. Further, while our draft report recognizes the overall Global  Force Management process, it focuses on the part of that process that  identifies deployable personnel and develops strategies to meet the  combatant commander’s force requirements using available personnel.  4.  We believe that the Defense Readiness Reporting System could be a  mechanism to provide force planners the visibility they need when it is  fully operational. We have updated our report to reflect the status of  the system; however, we did not assess the data reliability of that  system.  5.  We do not make a recommendation as to what system DOD could use  to supply force planners with the data they need for visibility over  personnel skills and deployment histories. If the department decides to  use the Defense Readiness Reporting System, it should be integrated  into the force identification process.  6.  See the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant  Director; Deborah Colantonio; Susan Ditto; Nicole Harms; Whitney  Havens; Catherine Humphries; James Lawson; David Marroni; Kevin  O’Neill; Masha Pastuhov-Pastein; Jason Porter; and Rebecca Shea made  major contributions to this report.