Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Additional Action Needed to Incorporate Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs
Published: 2006-09-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) plans to procure the next generation of geostationary operational environmental satellites, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R series (GOES-R). This new series is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting through the year 2028. GAO was asked to summarize and update its report previously issued to the Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards--Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, GAO-06-993 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). This report (1) determines the status of and plans for the GOES-R series procurement, and (2) identifies and evaluates the actions that the program management team is taking to ensure that past problems experienced in procuring other satellite programs are not repeated.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: At the time of our review, NOAA was nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its GOES-R system--which was estimated to cost $6.2 billion and scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012. It expected to award a contract in August 2007 to develop this system. However, recent analyses of the GOES-R program cost--which in May 2006 the program office estimated could reach $11.4 billion--have led the agency to consider reducing the scope of requirements for the satellite series. Since our report was issued, NOAA officials told GAO that the agency has made a decision to reduce the scope of the program to a minimum of two satellites and to reduce the complexity of the program by canceling a technically complex instrument. NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite programs, but more remains to be done. Prior satellite programs--including a prior GOES series, a polar-orbiting environmental satellite series, and various military satellite programs--often experienced technical challenges, cost overruns, and schedule delays. Key lessons from these programs include the need to (1) establish realistic cost and schedule estimates, (2) ensure sufficient technical readiness of the system's components prior to key decisions, (3) provide sufficient management at government and contractor levels, and (4) perform adequate senior executive oversight to ensure mission success. NOAA has established plans to address these lessons by conducting independent cost estimates, performing preliminary studies of key technologies, placing resident government offices at key contractor locations, and establishing a senior executive oversight committee. However, many steps remain to fully address these lessons. Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued past procurements.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on  the planned Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R  (GOES-R) program. The GOES-R series is to replace the current  series of satellites which will likely begin to reach the end of their  useful lives in approximately 2012. This new series is expected to  mark the first major technological advance in GOES  instrumentation since 1994. It is also considered critical to the  United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for  weather forecasting through the year 2028.
As requested, our testimony summarizes and updates a report we  previously issued to your subcommittee that (1) determines the  status of and plans for the GOES-R series procurement, and (2)  identifies and evaluates the actions that the program management  team is taking to ensure that past problems experienced in  procuring other satellite programs are not repeated. In preparing  for this testimony, we relied on our work supporting the  accompanying report. That report contains a detailed overview of  our scope and methodology. All the work on which this testimony is  based was performed in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting environmental  satellites have been used by the United States to provide  meteorological data for weather observation, research, and  forecasting. NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite Data and  Information Service (NESDIS) is responsible for managing the  civilian geostationary and polar-orbiting satellite systems as two  separate programs, called GOES and the Polar Operational  Environmental Satellites, respectively.
Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the earth in a  relatively low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain a  constant view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in  space. NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is  primarily focused on the United States (see fig. 1). These satellites  are uniquely positioned to provide timely environmental data to  meteorologists and their audiences on the earth’s atmosphere, its  surface, cloud cover, and the space environment. They also observe  the development of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes and  severe thunderstorms, and track their movement and intensity to  reduce or avoid major losses of property and life. Furthermore, the  satellites’ ability to provide broad, continuously updated coverage of  atmospheric conditions over land and oceans is important to  NOAA’s weather forecasting operations.
To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several  satellites at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites  every few years (see table 1).
Three satellites—GOES-11, GOES-12, and GOES-13—are currently  in orbit. Both GOES-11 and GOES-12 are operational satellites, while  GOES-13 is in an on-orbit storage mode. It is a backup for the other  two satellites should they experience any degradation in service.  The others in the series, GOES-O and GOES-P, are planned for  launch over the next few years. NOAA is also planning a future  generation of satellites, known as the GOES-R series, which are  planned for launch beginning in 2012.
Each of the operational geostationary satellites continuously  transmits raw environmental data to NOAA ground stations. The  data are processed at these ground stations and transmitted back to  the satellite for broadcast to primary weather services both in the  United States and around the world, including the global research  community. Raw and processed data are also distributed to users  via ground stations through other communication channels, such as  dedicated private communication lines and the Internet. Figure 2  depicts a generic data relay pattern from the geostationary satellites  to the ground stations and commercial terminals.
subsections: section_title: GOES-R Program—An Overview
paragraphs: NOAA is planning for the GOES-R program to improve on the  technology of prior GOES series, in terms of both system and  instrument improvements. The system improvements are expected  to fulfill more demanding user requirements and to provide more  rapid information updates. Table 2 highlights key system-related  improvements GOES-R is expected to make to the geostationary  satellite program.
The instruments on the GOES-R series are expected to increase the  clarity and precision of the observed environmental data. NOAA  plans to acquire five different types of instruments. The program  office considered two of the instruments—the Advanced Baseline  Imager and the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite—to be most  critical because they would provide data for key weather products.  Table 3 summarizes the originally planned instruments and their  expected capabilities.
The program management structure for the GOES-R program differs  from past GOES programs. Prior to the GOES-R series, NOAA was  responsible for program funding, procurement of the ground  elements, and on-orbit operation of the satellites, while NASA was  responsible for the procurement of the spacecraft, instruments, and  launch services. NOAA officials stated that this approach limited the  agency’s insight and management involvement in the procurement  of major elements of the system.
Alternatively, under the GOES-R management structure, NOAA has  responsibility for the procurement and operation of the overall  system—including spacecraft, instruments, and launch services.  NASA is responsible for the procurement of the individual  instruments until they are transferred to the overall GOES-R system  contractor for completion and integration onto the spacecraft.  Additionally, to take advantage of NASA’s acquisition experience  and technical expertise, NOAA located the GOES-R program office  at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. It also designated key  program management positions to be filled with NASA personnel.  These positions include the deputy system program director role for  advanced instrument and technology infusion, the project manager  for the flight portion of the system, and the deputy project manager  for the ground and operations portion of the system. NOAA officials  explained that they changed the management structure for the  GOES-R program in order to streamline oversight and fiduciary  responsibilities, but that they still plan to rely on NASA’s expertise  in space system acquisitions.
section_title: Satellite Programs Often Experience Technical Problems, Cost Overruns, and Schedule Delays
paragraphs: Satellite programs are often technically complex and risky  undertakings, and as a result, they often experience technical  problems, cost overruns, and schedule delays. We and others have  reported on a historical pattern of repeated missteps in the  procurement of major satellite systems, including the National  Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System  (NPOESS), the GOES I-M series, the Space Based Infrared System  High Program (SBIRS-High), and the Advanced Extremely High  Frequency Satellite System (AEHF). Table 4 lists key problems  experienced with these programs.
section_title: GOES-R Procurement Activities Are Under Way, but System Requirements and Cost Estimates Are Changing
paragraphs: At the time of our review, NOAA was nearing the end of the  preliminary design phase on its GOES-R program and planned to  award a contract for the system’s development in August 2007.  However, because of concerns with potential cost growth, NOAA’s  plans for the GOES-R procurement are changing. To date, NOAA has  issued contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R  system to three vendors and expects to award a contract to one of  these vendors to develop the system. In addition, to reduce the risks  associated with developing new instruments, NASA has issued  contracts for the early development of two instruments and for the  preliminary designs of three other instruments. The agency plans to  award these contracts and then turn them over to the contractor  responsible for the overall GOES-R program. However, this  approach is under review and NOAA may wait until the instruments  are fully developed before turning them over to the system  contractor. Table 5 provides a summary of the status of contracts  for the GOES-R program.
According to program documentation provided to the Office of  Management and Budget in 2005, the official life cycle cost estimate  for GOES-R was approximately $6.2 billion (see table 6). However,  program officials reported that this estimate was over 2 years old  and under review.
At the time of our review, NOAA was planning to launch the first  GOES-R series satellite in September 2012. The development of the  schedule for launching the satellites was driven by a requirement  that the satellites be available to back up the last remaining GOES  satellites (GOES-O and GOES-P) should anything go wrong during  the planned launches of these satellites. Table 7 provides a summary  of the planned launch schedule for the originally planned GOES-R  series.
However, NOAA’s plans for the GOES-R procurement are changing  because of concerns with potential cost growth. Given its  experiences with cost growth on the NPOESS acquisition, NOAA  asked program officials to recalculate the total cost of the estimated  $6.2 billion GOES-R program. In May 2006, program officials  estimated that the life cycle cost could reach $11.4 billion. The  agency then requested that the program identify options for  reducing the scope of requirements for the satellite series. Program  officials reported that there were over 10 viable options under  consideration, including options for removing one or more of the  planned instruments. The program office also reevaluated its  planned acquisition schedule based on the potential program  options. Specifically, program officials stated that if there was a  decision to make a major change in system requirements, they  would likely extend the preliminary design phase, delay the decision  to proceed into the development and production phase, and delay  the contract award date. At the time of our review, NOAA officials  estimated that a decision on the future scope and direction of the  program could be made by the end of September 2006.
subsections: section_title: Recent NOAA Decision on the Direction and Scope of the GOES-R Program
paragraphs: In mid-September 2006, NOAA officials reported that a decision on  the future scope and direction of GOES-R had been made—and  involved a reduction in the number of satellites and in planned  program capabilities, a revised life cycle cost estimate, and the delay  of key programmatic milestones. Specifically, NOAA reduced the  minimum number of satellites to two. In addition, plans for  developing the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite—which was  once considered a critical instrument by the agency—were  cancelled. Instead, the program office is exploring options that will  ensure continuity of sounding data currently provided by the current  GOES series. NOAA officials reported that the cost of the  restructured program is not known, but some anticipate it will be  close to the original program estimate of $6.2 billion. The contract  award for the GOES-R system has been pushed out to May 2008.  Finally, the planned launch date of the first satellite in the GOES-R  series has been delayed until December 2014.
section_title: The GOES-R Program Office Has Taken Steps to Address Past Lessons Learned, but Significant Actions Remain
paragraphs: NOAA has taken steps to apply lessons learned from problems  encountered on other satellite programs to the GOES-R  procurement. Key lessons include (1) establishing realistic cost and  schedule estimates, (2) ensuring sufficient technical readiness of the  system’s components prior to key decisions, (3) providing sufficient  management at government and contractor levels, and  (4) performing adequate senior executive oversight to ensure  mission success. NOAA has established plans designed to mitigate  the problems faced in past acquisitions; however, many activities  remain to fully address these lessons. Until it completes these  activities, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program  will repeat the increased cost, schedule delays, and performance  shortfalls that have plagued past procurements.
subsections: section_title: Efforts to Improve Reliability of Cost and Schedule Estimates are Under Way, but Key Steps Remain in Reconciling Cost Estimates
paragraphs: We and others have reported that space system acquisitions are  strongly biased to produce unrealistically low cost and schedule  estimates in the acquisition process. Our past work on military  space acquisitions has indicated that during program formulation,  the competition to win funding is intense and has led program  sponsors to minimize their program cost estimates. NOAA programs  face similar unrealistic estimates. For example, the total  development cost of the GOES I-M acquisition was over three times  greater than planned, escalating from $640 million to $2 billion.  Additionally, the delivery of the first satellite was delayed by 5 years.
NOAA has several efforts under way to improve the reliability of its  cost and schedule estimates for the GOES-R program. NOAA’s Chief  Financial Officer has contracted with a cost-estimating firm to  complete an independent cost estimate, while the GOES-R program  office has hired a support contractor to assist with its internal  program cost estimating. The program office is re-assessing its  estimates based on preliminary information from the three vendors  contracted to develop preliminary designs for the overall GOES-R  system. Once the program office and independent cost estimates are  completed, program officials intend to compare them and to  develop a revised programmatic cost estimate that will be used in its  decision on whether to proceed into system development and  production. In addition, NOAA has planned for an independent  review team—consisting of former senior industry and government  space acquisition experts—to provide an assessment of the program  office and independent cost estimates for this decision milestone.  To improve its schedule reliability, the program office is currently  conducting a schedule risk analysis in order to estimate the amount  of adequate reserve funds and schedule margin needed to deal with  unexpected problems and setbacks. Finally, the NOAA Observing  System Council submitted a prioritized list of GOES-R system  requirements to the Commerce Undersecretary for approval. This  list is expected to allow the program office to act quickly in deleting  lower priority requirements in the event of severe technical  challenges or shifting funding streams.
While NOAA acknowledges the need to establish realistic cost and  schedule estimates, several hurdles remain. As discussed earlier, the  agency was considering—during the time of our review—reducing  the requirements for the GOES-R program to mitigate the increased  cost estimates for the program. Prior to this decision, the agency’s  efforts to establish realistic cost estimates could not be fully  effective in addressing this lesson. In addition, NOAA suspended the  work being performed by its independent cost estimator. Now that  the program scope and direction is being further defined, it will be  important for the agency to restart this work. Further, the agency  has not yet developed a process to evaluate and reconcile the  independent and program office cost estimates once final program  decisions are made. Without this process, the agency may lack the  objectivity necessary to counter the optimism of program sponsors  and is more likely to move forward with an unreliable estimate.  Until it completes this activity, NOAA faces an increased risk that  the GOES-R program will repeat the cost increases and schedule  delays that have plagued past procurements.
section_title: Preliminary Studies Are Under Way, but Steps Remain in Determining Components’ Technical Maturity
paragraphs: Space programs often experience unforeseen technical problems in  the development of critical components as a result of having  insufficient knowledge of the components and their supporting  technologies prior to key decision points. One key decision point is  when an agency decides on whether the component is sufficiently  ready to proceed from a preliminary study phase into a development  phase; this decision point results in the award of the development  contract. Another key decision point occurs during the development  phase when an agency decides whether the component is ready to  proceed from design into production (also called the critical design  review). Without sufficient technical readiness at these milestones,  agencies could proceed into development contracts on components  that are not well understood and enter into the production phase of  development with technologies that are not yet mature.
In 1997, NOAA began preliminary studies on technologies that could  be used on the GOES-R instruments. These studies target existing  technologies and assessed how they could be expanded for GOES-R.  The program office is also conducting detailed trade-off studies on  the integrated system to improve its ability to make decisions that  balance performance, affordability, risk, and schedule. For instance,  the program office is analyzing the potential architectures for the  GOES-R constellation of satellites—the quantity and configuration  of satellites, including how the instruments will be distributed over  these satellites. These studies are expected to allow for a more  mature definition of the system specifications.
NOAA has also developed plans to have an independent review team  assess project status on an annual basis once the overall system  contract has been awarded. In particular, this team will review  technical, programmatic, and management areas; identify any  outstanding risks; and recommend corrective actions. This measure  is designed to ensure that sufficient technical readiness has been  reached prior to the critical design review milestone. The program  office’s ongoing studies and plans are expected to provide greater  insight into the technical requirements for key system components  and to mitigate the risk of unforeseen problems in later acquisition  phases.
However, the progress currently being made on a key instrument  currently under development—the Advanced Baseline Imager—has  experienced technical problems and could be an indication of more  problems to come in the future. These problems relate to, among  other things, the design complexity of the instrument’s detectors  and electronics. As a result, the contractor is experiencing negative  cost and schedule performance trends. As of May 2006, the  contractor incurred a total cost overrun of almost $6 million with  the instrument’s development only 28 percent complete. In addition,  from June 2005 to May 2006, it was unable to complete  approximately $3.3 million worth of work. Unless risk mitigation  actions are aggressively pursued to reverse these trends, we project  the cost overrun at completion to be about $23 million.
While NOAA expects to make a decision on whether to move the  instrument into production (a milestone called the critical design  review) in January 2007, the contractor’s current performance raises  questions as to whether the instrument designs will be sufficiently  mature by that time. Further, the agency does not have a process to  validate the level of technical maturity achieved on this instrument  or to determine whether the contractor has implemented sound  management and process engineering to ensure that the appropriate  level of technical readiness can be achieved prior to the decision  milestone. Until it does so, NOAA risks making a poor decision  based on inaccurate or insufficient information—which could lead  to unforeseen technical problems in the development of this  instrument.
section_title: Efforts to Strengthen Government and Contractor Management are Under Way, but Significant Work on Program Controls Remain
paragraphs: In the past, we have reported on poor performance in the  management of satellite acquisitions. The key drivers of poor  management included inadequate systems engineering and earned  value management capabilities, unsuitable allocation of contract  award fees, inadequate levels of management reserve, and  inefficient decision-making and reporting structure within the  program office.
NOAA has taken numerous steps to restructure its management  approach on the GOES-R procurement in an effort to improve  performance and to avoid past mistakes. These steps include:
The program office revised its staffing profile to provide for  government staff to be located on-site at prime contractor  and key subcontractor locations.
The program office plans to increase the number of resident  systems engineers from 31 to 54 to provide adequate  government oversight of the contractor’s system engineering,  including verification and validation of engineering designs at  key decision points (such as the critical design review  milestone).
The program office has better defined the role and  responsibilities of the program scientist, the individual who is  expected to maintain an independent voice with regard to  scientific matters and advise the program manager on related  technical issues and risks.
The program office also intends to add three resident  specialists in earned value management to monitor  contractor cost and schedule performance.
NOAA has work under way to develop the GOES-R contract  award fee structure and the award fee review board that is  consistent with our recent findings, the Commerce Inspector  General’s findings, and other best practices, such as  designating a non-program executive as the fee-determining  official to ensure objectivity in the allocation of award fees.
NOAA and NASA have implemented a more integrated  management approach that is designed to draw on NASA’s  expertise in satellite acquisitions and increase NOAA’s  involvement on all major components of the acquisition.
The program office reported that it intended to establish a  management reserve of 25 percent consistent with the  recommendations of the Defense Science Board Report on  Acquisition of National Security Space Programs.
While these steps should provide more robust government oversight  and independent analysis capabilities, more work remains to be  done to fully address this lesson. Specifically, the program office has  not determined the appropriate level of resources it needs to  adequately track and oversee the program and the planned addition  of three earned value management specialists may not be enough as  acquisition activities increase. By contrast, after its recent problems  and in response to the independent review team findings, NPOESS  program officials plan to add 10 program staff dedicated to earned  value, cost, and schedule analysis. An insufficient level of  established capabilities in earned value management places the  GOES-R program office at risk of making poor decisions based on  inaccurate and potentially misleading information. Finally, while  NOAA officials believe that assuming sole responsibility for the  acquisition of GOES-R will improve their ability to manage the  program effectively, this change also elevates NOAA’s risk for  mission success. Specifically, NOAA is taking on its first major  system acquisition and an increased risk due to its lack of  experience. Until it fully addresses the lesson of ensuring an  appropriate level of resources to oversee its contractor, NOAA faces  an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the  management and contractor performance shortfalls that have  plagued past procurements.
section_title: NOAA Has Established a Senior Executive Committee to Perform Oversight Role
paragraphs: We and others have reported on NOAA’s significant deficiencies in  its senior executive oversight of NPOESS. The lack of timely  decisions and regular involvement of senior executive management  was a critical factor in the program’s rapid cost and schedule  growth.
NOAA formed its program management council in response to the  lack of adequate senior executive oversight on NPOESS. In  particular, this council is expected to provide regular reviews and  assessments of selected NOAA programs and projects—the first of  which is the GOES-R program. The council is headed by the NOAA  Deputy Undersecretary and includes senior officials from  Commerce and NASA. The council is expected to hold meetings to  discuss GOES-R program status on a monthly basis and to approve  the program’s entry into subsequent acquisition phases at key  decision milestones—including contract award and critical design  reviews, among others. Since its establishment in January 2006, the  council has met regularly and has established a mechanism for  tracking action items to closure.
The establishment of the NOAA Program Management Council is a  positive action that should support the agency’s senior-level  governance of the GOES-R program. In moving forward, it is  important that this council continue to meet on a regular basis and  exercise diligence in questioning the data presented to it and making  difficult decisions. In particular, it will be essential that the results  of all preliminary studies and independent assessments on technical  maturity of the system and its components be reviewed by this  council so that an informed decision can be made about the level of  technical complexity it is taking on when proceeding past these key  decision milestones. In light of the recent uncertainty regarding the  future scope and cost of the GOES-R program, the council’s  governance will be critical in making those difficult decisions in a  timely manner.
section_title: Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Improve NOAA’s Efforts to Implement Lessons Learned
paragraphs: To improve NOAA’s ability to effectively manage the GOES-R  procurement, in our accompanying report, we recommended that  the Secretary direct its NOAA Program Management Council to take  the following three actions:
Once the scope of the program has been finalized, establish a  process for objectively evaluating and reconciling the  government and independent life cycle cost estimates.
Perform a comprehensive review of the Advanced Baseline  Imager, using system engineering experts, to determine the  level of technical maturity achieved on the instrument, to  assess whether the contractor has implemented sound  management and process engineering, and to assert that the  technology is sufficiently mature before moving the  instrument into production.
Seek assistance from an independent review team to  determine the appropriate level of resources needed at the  program office to adequately track and oversee the  contractor’s earned value management. Among other things,  the program office should be able to perform a  comprehensive integrated baseline review after system  development contract award, provide surveillance of  contractor earned value management systems, and perform  project scheduling analyses and cost estimates.
In written comments, Commerce agreed with our recommendations  and provided information on its plans to implement our  recommendations. In particular, Commerce intends to establish a  process for evaluating and reconciling the various cost estimates  and to analyze this process and the results with an independent  review team comprised of recognized satellite acquisition experts.  The agency is also planning to have this independent review team  provide assessments of the Advanced Baseline Imager’s technical  maturity and the adequacy of the program management’s staffing  plans.
In summary, the procurement of the next series of geostationary  environmental satellites—called the GOES-R series—is at a critical  juncture. Recent concerns about the potential for cost growth on the  GOES-R procurement have led the agency to reduce the scope of  requirements for the satellite series. According to NOAA officials,  the current plans call for acquiring 2 satellites and moving away  from a technically complex new instrument in favor of existing  technologies. While reducing the technical complexity of the system  prior to contract award and defining an affordable program are  sound business practices, it will be important for NOAA to balance  these actions with the agencies’ long term need for improving  geostationary satellites over time.
While NOAA is positioning itself to improve the acquisition of this  system by incorporating the lessons learned from other satellite  procurements including the need to establish realistic cost  estimates, ensure sufficient government and contractor  management, and obtain effective executive oversight, further steps  remain to fully address selected lessons and thereby mitigate  program risks. Specifically, NOAA has not yet developed a process  to evaluate and reconcile the independent and government cost  estimates. In addition, NOAA has not yet determined how it will  ensure that a sufficient level of technical maturity will be achieved  in time for an upcoming decision milestone or determined the  appropriate level of resources it needs to adequately track and  oversee the program using earned value management. Moreover,  problems that are frequently experienced on major satellite  acquisitions, including insufficient technical maturity, overly  aggressive schedules, inadequate systems engineering capabilities,  and insufficient management reserve will need to be closely  monitored throughout this critical acquisition’s life cycle. To  NOAA’s credit, it has begun to develop plans for implementing our  recommendations. These plans include, among other things,  establishing a process to evaluate and reconcile the various cost  estimates and obtaining assessments from an independent review  team on the technical maturity of a key instrument in development  and the adequacy of the program management’s staffing plans.  However, until it addresses these lessons, NOAA faces an increased  risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost,  schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued past  procurements.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to  answer any questions that you or members of the committee may  have at this time.
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony,  please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at  pownerd@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this testimony include  Carol Cha, Neil Doherty, Nancy Glover, Kush Malhotra, Colleen  Phillips, and Karen Richey.
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