U.S. Asylum System: Agencies Have Taken Actions to Help Ensure Quality in the Asylum Adjudication Process, but Challenges Remain
Published: 2008-09-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Each year, tens of thousands of noncitizens apply in the United States for asylum, which provides refuge to those who have been persecuted or fear persecution. Asylum officers (AO) in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and immigration judges (IJ) in the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) assess applicants' credibility and eligibility. GAO was asked to evaluate aspects of the asylum system. This report addresses the extent to which quality assurance mechanisms have been designed to ensure adjudications' integrity, how key factors affect AOs' adjudications, and what key factors affect IJs' adjudications. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed agency documents, policies, and procedures; surveyed all AOs, supervisory AOs, and IJs; and visited three of the eight Asylum Offices. These offices varied in size and percentage of cases granted asylum. Results of these visits provided additional information but were not projectable.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: USCIS and EOIR have designed quality assurance mechanisms to help ensure the integrity of asylum adjudications, but some can be improved. While 75 percent of AO survey respondents reported that basic training prepared them at least moderately well to adjudicate cases, they also reported that despite weekly training, they needed additional training to help them detect fraud, conduct security checks, and assess the credibility of asylum seekers. The Asylum Division does not consistently solicit AOs' and supervisory AOs' input on a range of their training needs. Without this, the Asylum Division lacks key information for making training decisions. The Asylum Division has designed a quality review framework to ensure the quality and consistency of asylum decisions. Although supervisors review all cases and headquarters reviews certain cases, other local quality assurance reviews rarely took place in three of the eight Asylum Offices primarily due to competing priorities. By fully implementing its quality review framework, the Asylum Division would better identify deficiencies, examine their root causes, and take action. The majority of IJ survey respondents reported that training enhanced their ability to adjudicate asylum cases, although the majority also reported having additional training needs. EOIR expanded its training program in 2006, particularly for newly hired IJs, and annually solicits IJs' views on their training needs. Asylum officers reported challenges in identifying fraud and assessing applicants' credibility, as well as time constraints, as key factors affecting their adjudications. The majority of AO survey respondents reported it moderately or very difficult to identify various types of fraud, despite mechanisms designed to help identify fraud and assess credibility. Further, assistance from other federal entities to AOs in assessing the authenticity of asylum claims has been hindered in part by resource limitations and competing priorities. With respect to time constraints, 65 percent of AOs and 73 percent of supervisory AOs reported that AOs have insufficient time to thoroughly adjudicate cases--that is, in a manner consistent with procedures and training--while management's views were mixed. The Asylum Division set a productivity standard equating to 4 hours per case in 1999 without empirical data. Without empirical data on the time it takes to thoroughly adjudicate a case, the Asylum Division is not best positioned to know if its productivity standard reflects the time AOs need for thorough adjudications. Verifying fraud, assessing credibility, and time constraints are also key factors affecting IJs' adjudications. IJ survey respondents cited verifying fraud (88 percent) and assessing credibility (81 percent) as a moderately or very challenging aspect of asylum adjudications. Responding to 2006 Attorney General reforms, EOIR implemented a program to which IJs can refer instances of suspected fraud and receive information to aid in fraud detection. Eighty-two percent of IJs reported time limitations as moderately or very challenging aspects of their adjudications. EOIR has detailed IJs to courts with high caseloads and plans to hire additional staff, but it is too soon to know the extent to which additional staff will alleviate IJs' time challenges.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Each year, tens of thousands of individuals representing over 100  nationalities apply for asylum in the United States. U.S. immigration law  provides that noncitizens who are in this country—regardless of whether  they entered legally or illegally—may be granted humanitarian protection  in the form of asylum if they demonstrate that they cannot return to their  home country because they have a well-founded fear of persecution.   Federal adjudicators—asylum officers in the U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services (USCIS) within the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) and immigration judges in the Executive Office for  Immigration Review (EOIR) within the Department of Justice (DOJ)— assess whether asylum applicants’ claims are legitimate and meet the  eligibility criteria for asylum.
Asylum decisions can carry serious consequences. Granting asylum to an  applicant with a genuine claim provides protection from being returned to  a country where the individual’s freedom or life could be threatened. On  the other hand, granting asylum to an individual with a fraudulent claim  jeopardizes the integrity of the asylum system by enabling the individual to  remain in the United States, apply for certain benefits such as a Social  Security card, and pursue a path to citizenship. In the worst case scenario,  this could pose a threat to our national security or public safety. The 1993  bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1993 killings of CIA employees,  and a plot to bomb New York landmarks were all undertaken by  individuals who had applied for asylum. Although none of these  individuals was granted asylum, the attacks of September 11, 2001, have  heightened fears that terrorists might enter the United States with false  documents, file fraudulent asylum claims, and become embedded in the  U.S. population.
The very nature of the asylum system puts adjudicators in the position of  trying to make quality decisions with imperfect information. Asylum law  states that testimonial information alone can be sufficient for asylum  applicants to meet the burden of proof for establishing asylum eligibility,  in part because applicants may not be able to present documents if they  fled their country of persecution without them, came from countries  where documentary evidence was not available, or fled with fraudulent  documents to hide their true identity. As such, adjudicators must make  decisions at times without documentation to support or refute an  applicant’s claim. Furthermore, economic incentives for a better life in the  United States can make it attractive for aliens to fraudulently apply for  asylum status and, according to some academic journals and policy  reports, fraudulent asylum claims are easy to make and difficult to detect.  Together, these factors create a challenging environment in which  adjudicators must attempt to reach the best decisions they can.
You requested that we review aspects of the asylum system. This report  addresses the following questions:    To what extent have quality assurance mechanisms been designed within  the U.S. asylum system to ensure the integrity of the adjudication process?
How do key factors affect asylum officers’ adjudication of asylum cases?    What key factors affect immigration judges’ adjudication of asylum cases?
To address the first two questions, we reviewed applicable laws,  regulations, and agency documents, including asylum adjudication policies  and procedures, asylum officer training materials, and fraud referral data.  We compared USCIS and EOIR quality-assurance mechanisms with  criteria in GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.  We also reviewed governmental and nongovernmental reports and  academic journals on asylum issues. In addition, we surveyed all 256  asylum officers and all 56 supervisory asylum officers who were on board  as of September 30, 2006, to obtain their views on quality assurance  mechanisms and factors that affect asylum officers’ ability to adjudicate  asylum cases. We obtained a 74 percent and 77 percent response rate,  respectively, from the asylum officers and supervisors. (See app. I and  app. II, respectively, for the surveys we sent to asylum officers and  supervisory asylum officers and their aggregate responses.) To gain a  better understanding of asylum adjudications, we visited three USCIS  Asylum Offices—Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York. The views  we obtained at these three offices may not be generalized to all eight  Asylum Offices. However, because we selected these offices based on  their diversity in size (based on the number of asylum officers and cases  adjudicated), variation in the percentage of cases granted asylum, and  disparate geographic location, they provided us with an overview and  perspective of the asylum process as well as potential challenges facing  asylum officers. At these offices, we conducted semistructured interviews  with Asylum Office Directors and Deputy Directors, quality assurance and  training coordinators, Fraud Detection and National Security immigration  officers, and selected asylum officers and supervisory asylum officers; and  observed interviews that asylum officers conducted with asylum  applicants. In addition, we interviewed the asylum officer representative  to the American Federation of Government Employees. We also  interviewed the Directors of the other five Asylum Offices as well as  headquarters officials from USCIS’s Asylum Division and Office of Fraud  Detection and National Security. To further our understanding of federal  efforts to address fraud in the asylum system, we attended the Asylum  Division’s December 2007 Fraud Prevention Conference. Finally, we  interviewed DHS officials in the U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement’s (ICE) Forensic Document Laboratory regarding document  verification and Identity and Benefit Fraud Branch regarding asylum  investigations. We interviewed officials in the Department of State (State)  regarding their role in providing information that may help adjudicators  distinguish between genuine and fraudulent asylum claims.
To address the third question and further examine the first question in the  context of the immigration courts, we surveyed all 207 immigration judges  who were on board as of September 30, 2006, and obtained a 77 percent  response rate. (See app. III for the survey we sent to immigration judges  and their aggregate responses.) We reviewed EOIR documents and  reports, including Statistical Yearbooks and the Immigration Judge  Benchbook. We reviewed the Attorney General’s 2006 reforms directed to  the immigration courts and information from EOIR regarding its  implementation of the reforms. We also interviewed EOIR headquarters  officials. To further our understanding of factors affecting immigration  judges’ asylum adjudications, we interviewed representatives of the  National Association of Immigration Judges. We also observed court  proceedings at the Los Angeles immigration court, which included  hearings on asylum cases, to enhance our understanding of the role of  immigration judges. To obtain an additional perspective on factors that  affect asylum adjudicators—both asylum officers and immigration  judges—we interviewed ICE Assistant Chief Counsels (also known as ICE  trial attorneys) associated with immigration courts in Los Angeles and San  Francisco, California, and New York City, New York.
To provide additional information, we also reviewed Asylum Division as  well as immigration judge caseload data for fiscal years 2002 through 2007.  To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed existing information  about the data systems, analyzed the data for obvious errors in accuracy  or completeness, and compared the data to other published reports. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for presenting overall  trends in caseload.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2005 through  September 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix IV  contains more details about our survey and site-visit methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Asylum, a form of humanitarian protection, is an immigration benefit that  enables certain noncitizens to remain in the United States and apply for  lawful permanent residence. Asylum provides refuge for certain  individuals who have been persecuted in the past or fear persecution on  the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social  group, or political opinion.
Congress and the executive branch have acted to strengthen the U.S.  asylum system against the possibility of asylum fraud and limit its  vulnerability to terrorists using it as a vehicle for remaining in the United  States. For example, in the mid-1990s, the Asylum Division implemented  major reforms which, among other things, decoupled employment  authorization from asylum requests to discourage applicants with  fraudulent asylum claims from applying for asylum solely to obtain a work  authorization, and established a goal of completing asylum adjudications  within 180 days. To account for such circumstances, the Asylum Division  established a national goal to complete 75 percent of the cases that are  interviewed at local Asylum Offices and referred to the immigration courts  within 60 days of the application date; EOIR established a goal that 90  percent of all asylum cases be completed within 180 days from the  application date. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant  Responsibility Act of 1996 generally codified some of these reforms into  law and required administrative adjudication of asylum applications, not  including administrative appeals, within 180 days, absent exceptional  circumstances. It also incorporated certain security provisions, including  a requirement that the identity of all asylum applicants be checked against  certain records or databases maintained by the federal government to  determine if an applicant is ineligible to apply for or be granted asylum.
More recently, the REAL ID Act of 2005 codified existing DOJ precedent  that (1) the burden is on the applicant to establish past persecution or a  well-founded fear of persecution and (2) asylum adjudicators have the  discretion to require documentary support for asylum claims.  Specifically, if an adjudicator determines that the applicant should provide  evidence to corroborate otherwise credible testimony, such evidence is to  be provided unless the applicant does not have and cannot reasonably  obtain the evidence. The act also laid out the criteria to be considered in  making a credibility determination, stating that adjudicators must consider  the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors. An adjudicator  may base a credibility determination on inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or  falsehoods without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or  falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, as long as it is relevant  to the evaluation in light of the totality of the circumstances. It also  clarified the wording of the terrorist-related grounds of ineligibility for a  grant.
Responsibility for the U.S. Asylum System is shared between USCIS in  DHS and EOIR in DOJ, with asylum officers and immigration judges  adjudicating asylum cases as well as other types of cases. In addition to  asylum cases, the Asylum Division’s and EOIR’s caseloads also include  certain applications for relief under section 203 of the Nicaraguan  Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) and credible and  reasonable fear cases. NACARA cases involve certain individuals from  Guatemala and El Salvador and former Soviet Bloc countries who can  have their removal cancelled. Credible fear cases involve individuals  subject to expedited removal who express an intention to apply for asylum  or state that they have a fear of persecution or torture. Reasonable fear  cases involve individuals subject to administrative removal or reinstated  orders of removal who have expressed a fear of persecution or torture if  removed. In addition to these cases, immigration judges also hear other  types of immigration cases.
The Asylum Division and its eight Asylum Offices—Arlington, Chicago,  Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Newark, and San Francisco— reside within USCIS. Asylum officers are assigned to these eight offices  and periodically travel to other locations to conduct interviews when  applicants live outside the general geographic area of these offices. In  fiscal year 2008, the Asylum Division received about $61 million all from  USCIS fee-based funding, although no fee is charged to apply for asylum.  Within EOIR, immigration judges are positioned organizationally under the  Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, which is responsible for 54  administrative immigration courts. The Board of Immigration Appeals  (BIA) also resides within EOIR and is responsible for hearing appeals of  immigration judges’ asylum decisions, among other kinds of appeals. In  fiscal year 2008, EOIR received about $238 million to fund all of its  activities.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has a Nonadversarial Adjudication Process
paragraphs: DHS’s asylum adjudication process involves affirmative asylum claims— that is, claims that are made at the initiative of the alien who is in the  country either legally or illegally and filed directly with USCIS. The  affirmative asylum process is nonadversarial in that no government official  argues in opposition to the asylum applicant, and the asylum officer is to  be a neutral decision maker. Figure 1 provides an overview of the steps  typically involved in DHS’s asylum process. For more detailed information  on the asylum process, see appendix V.
The Asylum Division’s Affirmative Asylum Procedures Manual and basic  training materials for asylum officers identify the various tasks asylum  officers are to perform in adjudicating an asylum case. Asylum officers are  required to conduct an asylum interview, prior to which they must, among  other things, review the applicant’s file and check databases to (1)  determine who is included on the application, (2) determine when the  applicant claims to have entered the United States and when he or she  filed the asylum application, (3) become familiar with the applicant’s  background and claim, and (4) identify issues to cover during the  interview. In addition, if the asylum officer is unfamiliar with country  conditions relevant to the applicant’s claim, the officer should research  conditions in that country. During the interview, in addition to hearing the  applicant’s testimony, the asylum officer must also explain the process,  verify basic and biographical information provided on his or her  application, and place the applicant, the applicant’s interpreter, and the  interpreter monitor under oath. After the interview, the asylum officer  must update the Refugees, Asylum, and Parole System (RAPS); write a  decision that includes a legal analysis and in most cases citations to  country conditions; and prepare a decision letter. In making a decision, an  asylum officer must make a determination of the credibility of the  applicant and consider if any false submission of information is relevant to  the claim. On average, asylum officers have about 4 hours to complete  these tasks for each case. The 4-hour average is based on the productivity  standard that requires management to assign asylum officers work  equivalent to 18 asylum cases in a 2-week period and allows for 4 hours of  training each week. In addition, the Asylum Division generally requires  that asylum officers submit their written decisions to their supervisor  within 4 days of conducting an applicant interview.
Affirmative asylum applicants are almost never detained while their  asylum application is pending. Applicants are free to live in the United  States pending the completion of their asylum processing. DHS’s  affirmative asylum process can result in asylum officers making one of the  following decisions regarding the applicant and qualifying dependents:   Grant of asylum. The asylum officer grants asylum when he or she  determines that the applicant is eligible for asylum. The asylees can  remain in the United States indefinitely unless their asylum is  terminated. Asylees are eligible for certain benefits, such as an  Employment Authorization Document, an unrestricted Social Security  card, and medical and employment assistance. Within 2 years of being  granted asylum, asylees can petition for a spouse or child who was not  included in the original grant of asylum to also obtain asylum. In  addition, they may also apply for lawful permanent residency 1 year  after being granted asylum and, ultimately, United States citizenship.
Recommended approval of asylum. The asylum officer issues a  recommended approval of asylum when he or she determines that the  applicant is eligible for asylum, but USCIS has not received the results  of a mandatory FBI name check. The decision to change a  recommended approval to an asylum grant is contingent on a favorable  result from background, identity, and security checks (referred to  throughout this report as identity and security checks). An applicant  who receives a recommended approval may apply for an Employment  Authorization Document, but not for other benefits.
Referral to immigration court. The asylum officer makes a referral to  the immigration court when the applicant is in the United States  illegally and the officer determines that the applicant is ineligible for  asylum. The asylum officer prepares a Notice to Appear before an  immigration judge. A referral is not a denial of asylum; rather the  applicant and any of the applicant’s dependents also in the United  States illegally are placed in removal proceedings where an  immigration judge reviews the asylum case de novo.
Denial of asylum. The asylum officer denies asylum when the  applicant is in the United States legally and the officer determines that  the applicant is ineligible for asylum. The asylum officer prepares a  Notice of Intent to Deny, and the applicant is given 16 days to rebut the  finding. If the applicant submits a rebuttal, the asylum officer reviews  it and then approves or denies the claim. If the applicant does not  rebut the finding or the rebuttal fails to overcome the grounds for  denial, the applicant is denied asylum but may stay in the United States  as long as the applicant remains in legal status.
Not all cases result in an asylum decision. For example, USCIS  administratively closes a case if the applicant withdraws his or her asylum  application. From fiscal years 2002 through 2007, the asylum grant rate for  affirmative asylum applications ranged from 30 percent to 36 percent for  asylum cases that resulted in a decision.
From fiscal years 2002 through 2007, the Asylum Division received about  400,000 new or re-opened asylum, NACARA, and credible and reasonable  fear cases and completed approximately 750,000 cases. During this same  period, authorized staffing levels for asylum officers ranged from a high of  332 officers in 2004 to a low of 291 officers in 2007. See appendix VI for  more information on the Asylum Division’s caseload and staffing levels.
section_title: DOJ Has an Adversarial Adjudication Process
paragraphs: In contrast to DHS’s process, DOJ’s asylum adjudication process is  adversarial in that individuals appear in removal proceedings before EOIR  immigration judges to defend themselves against removal from the United  States. Immigration judges hear both affirmative asylum claims that have  been referred to them by an asylum officer as well as defensive asylum  claims. A defensive claim is made by an alien who first requests asylum  while in removal proceedings. An alien making a defensive claim may have  been placed in removal proceedings after having been stopped at the  border without proper documentation, identified as present in the United  States illegally, or identified as deportable on one or more grounds, such  as certain kinds of criminal convictions. Applicants who filed for asylum  affirmatively with USCIS, but were referred to an immigration court and  placed in removal proceedings, continue to be considered “affirmative”  asylum applicants. Affirmative and defensive claims follow the same  procedures in removal proceedings.
During immigration court proceedings, immigration judges hear witness  testimony and cross-examinations and review evidence. ICE Assistant  Chief Counsels, also known as ICE trial attorneys, represent DHS in these  proceedings. ICE trial attorneys are also responsible for ensuring identity  and security checks are completed. An applicant in immigration  proceedings may be represented by an attorney of his or her choosing at  no cost to the government. Figure 2 provides an overview of the steps  typically involved in EOIR’s asylum process. For more detailed  information on the asylum process, see appendix V. (within 180 day)
EOIR’s asylum adjudication process can result in immigration judges  making one of the following decisions regarding the applicant and  qualifying dependents:  Grant of asylum. The immigration judge grants asylum when he or she  determines that the applicant is eligible for asylum. The asylees can  remain in the United States indefinitely, unless DOJ terminates asylum.  A grant of asylum from an immigration judge confers the same benefits  on an asylee as a grant of asylum from an asylum officer, which are  discussed earlier in this report.
Denial of asylum. The immigration judge denies asylum when he or  she determines that the applicant is ineligible for asylum and may  order the applicant to be removed from the United States unless the  immigration judge grants the applicant another form of relief from  removal.
EOIR may also close a case without making a decision for such reasons as  a request to move a case from one court to another or the applicant  withdrawing or abandoning his or her application for asylum. From fiscal  years 2002 through 2005, the asylum grant rate in the immigration courts  remained fairly consistent at around 37 percent, and increased to 45  percent in 2006 and 46 percent in 2007.
From fiscal years 2002 through 2007, the immigration courts received  about 1.9 million newly filed or reopened immigration cases, and  completed about the same number of cases. During this same time, the  number of authorized immigration judges increased from 216 in fiscal year  2002 to 251 in fiscal year 2007. See appendix VI for more detailed  information on EOIR’s caseload and staffing.
section_title: The Asylum Division and EOIR Have Designed Quality Assurance Mechanisms to Help Ensure the Integrity of Asylum Adjudications, but Some Can Be Improved
paragraphs: To help ensure quality in adjudications, the Asylum Division has designed  training programs and quality reviews and EOIR has designed training  programs, but some can be improved. The Asylum Division has designed a  framework for training asylum officers and their supervisors. However,  despite general satisfaction with the initial training that officers receive,  many asylum officers and supervisors agreed that asylum officers needed  additional training in a number of areas—such as identifying fraud,  conducting identity and security checks, and assessing credibility—to  improve their ability to carry out their responsibilities. Also, 88 percent of  asylum officers expressed the view that observing skilled interviewers  would help improve their interviewing skills, yet 53 percent of asylum  officers reported they had not had the opportunity to do so. Furthermore,  the Asylum Division does not have a framework in place to solicit asylum  officers’ or supervisors’ views on training needs in a structured and  consistent manner. The Asylum Division has designed a framework for  quality reviews, including those conducted by supervisors and other local  and headquarters personnel. Although supervisors review all asylum  officer decisions and headquarters personnel review certain cases, other  quality reviews had not occurred in three of the eight Asylum Offices. With  respect to EOIR, although the majority of immigration judges reported the  training they received enhanced their ability to adjudicate asylum cases,  the majority reported needing additional training in several areas,  including identifying fraud. EOIR expanded its training program primarily  for new immigration judges in 2006 and annually solicits input from  immigration judges on their training needs. According to EOIR, BIA  reviews of appealed cases provide another means of quality assurance.
subsections: section_title: Asylum Officers and Supervisors Receive Training, but Most Reported Having Additional Training Needs
paragraphs: The Asylum Division provides training to asylum officers and supervisory  asylum officers (i.e., centralized training) and directs local Asylum Offices  to provide weekly training (i.e., decentralized training), but most asylum  officers and supervisors who responded to our survey reported that better  or more training was needed, particularly in the area of fraud, to improve  asylum officers’ ability to adjudicate asylum cases. The mix of centralized  and decentralized training that officers receive reflects elements of a  strategic approach to training that we have described in previous work.  Centralized training consists of a 5-week Asylum Officer Basic Training  Course (AOBTC) that addresses most facets of the asylum adjudication  process and is usually offered about twice each year at the Federal Law  Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) to recently hired asylum officers.  To adjudicate asylum claims, asylum officers must either complete this  training program or be certified at their respective Asylum Office. In  addition, a 5-week basic training course on immigration law for USCIS  adjudications officers and asylum officers is generally provided at FLETC  or another USCIS facility within an asylum officer’s first year. The Asylum  Division also periodically offers a 2-week supervisory training program in  Washington, D.C., for supervisory asylum officers and Asylum Office  Directors and Deputy Directors that concentrates primarily on advanced  asylum law issues and the review of asylum officer decisions. Additionally,  USCIS said that the Asylum Division created a new management  position—a Chief of Training—to take actions to improve the training of  asylum officers. The first Chief of Training came on board on August 31,  2008.
Most asylum officers and supervisory asylum officers who responded to  our survey reported that the centralized training they received generally  prepared them for their roles. Specifically, 75 percent of asylum officers  reported that AOBTC prepared them moderately or very well to adjudicate  asylum cases, a positive view of AOBTC that held regardless of their  length of experience as asylum officers. However, more than 75 percent of  asylum officers also believed that AOBTC needed improvement to better  prepare them to identify possible fraud and conduct identity and security  checks. Among the 26 supervisory asylum officers who had attended the  supervisory training program prior to completing our survey, 14 said that,  overall, the training prepared them moderately or very well to review  asylum officer decisions. Nevertheless, 13 of those who had attended the  training reported that the supervisory training program needed to be  improved to help them better provide feedback on asylum officer written  decisions, while 12 reported improvements were needed to help them  better understand and contribute to the Asylum Division’s efforts to  combat asylum fraud and 12 reported improvements were needed to help  them better analyze credibility.
In addition to the centralized training programs, the Asylum Division  requires that asylum officers and supervisory asylum officers participate in  ongoing decentralized training at local Asylum Offices, where local Quality  Assurance and Training Coordinators (QA/T) are responsible for  developing training to meet the needs of each office. Asylum Offices are to  allocate 4 hours each week for formal or informal training to asylum  officers and their supervisors. The training can range from classroom  instruction by the local QA/T to individual study time that officers can use  for such learning activities as staying current with case law, researching  conditions around the world affecting asylees and refugees, and reading  new procedures issued by headquarters. Although QA/Ts, in consultation  with local office management, have significant discretion in deciding what  training to provide, officials from the Training, Research, and Quality  Branch said they review each office’s quarterly training reports to  ascertain what training has been provided and is planned. In addition, the  Asylum Division provides training materials to all the offices to ensure a  national, consistent training approach when warranted. For example, after  the REAL ID Act was passed, the Asylum Division distributed explanatory  PowerPoint presentations and descriptions of the statutory changes.
Notwithstanding the training asylum officers and supervisors receive,  most identified areas in which they said they needed additional training on  fraud-related topics as well as other areas. As figure 3 shows, at least 75  percent of asylum officers or 75 percent of supervisory asylum officers  who responded to our survey identified 15 specific topics (from about 25  training topics about which we inquired) as areas in which asylum officers  needed more training to improve their ability to adjudicate asylum claims.  Furthermore, supervisory asylum officers consistently viewed asylum  officers’ need for additional training as greater than asylum officers’  perceptions of their own needs. We do not know why, in some instances,  there were sizable differences between asylum officers’ and supervisors’  views of asylum officers’ training needs. However, supervisors have a  broader perspective since multiple asylum officers report to them.
The training topics identified were in areas related to fraud, identity and  security checks, interviewing and assessing credibility, relevant statutes,  time management, and the Asylum Virtual Library—the Asylum Division’s  online library.
Fraud-detection training. USCIS’s Strategic Plan calls for training  adjudications staff, which includes asylum officers, to proactively identify  fraud when considering applications for immigration benefits. However,  77 percent of asylum officers who responded to our survey reported that  AOBTC’s training needed to be improved with respect to identifying  possible fraud. Asylum Division officials told us that despite a number of  improvements, they also saw fraud-detection training as one of the areas  that requires further refinement in the AOBTC curriculum but had not  updated AOBTC’s written lesson plan on fraud since 2002 because (1)  USCIS’s fraud-prevention program had been evolving since its creation of  its Office of Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) in 2004 and  placement of FDNS immigration officers (FDNS-IO) at Asylum Offices and  (2) revising other lesson plans, such as those related to national security  issues, had taken priority. However, they explained that despite not having  updated the written lesson plan, fraud-prevention training at AOBTC had  undergone significant changes since 2002 and continues to undergo  change. For example, since 2002, the Asylum Division added training  sessions at AOBTC on the role of FDNS-IOs in Asylum Offices, a workshop  on how to make fraud referrals, a “hands on” session on identifying  features of fraudulent documents, and a fraud-prevention computer lab  session emphasizing the electronic resources available to asylum officers.  According to Asylum Division officials, since 2006, AOBTC has dedicated 6  or more hours to fraud-detection training. Although the Asylum Division  has made changes to improve fraud-detection training at AOBTC, our 2007  survey found that 70 percent (19 of 27) of new asylum officer respondents  (who would have attended AOBTC since 2006) reported that fraud  detection-training at AOBTC needed to be improved to better prepare  them to identify fraud. Those with longer tenure (who would have  attended AOBTC prior to 2006) also held this view. Eighty-one percent (79  of 98) of respondents who attended AOBTC and had been asylum officers  for at least 1 year but less than 10 years, and 94 percent (30 of 32) of those  who attended AOBTC and had been asylum officers for 10 years or more,  reported that AOBTC fraud-detection training needed improvement.
Asylum officers’ views that more fraud-related training was needed to  improve their ability to adjudicate asylum claims extended beyond the  AOBTC curriculum to the ongoing training sessions that take place at their  respective Asylum Offices. Overall, at least 75 percent of both asylum  officer and supervisory asylum officer survey respondents reported that  asylum officers needed additional training on identifying fraudulent  documents, current trends in fraud, and identifying fraud in the claim. In  addition, the majority of asylum officers and supervisors reported, overall,  that asylum officers also needed additional training on identifying preparer  fraud (i.e., fraud perpetrated by an individual who prepared the applicant’s  application), attorney fraud (i.e., fraud perpetrated by an attorney  representing the applicant), and interpreter fraud (i.e., fraud perpetrated  by an individual who translates during the applicant’s interview). These  results were generally consistent across Asylum Offices—that is, at least  half of the supervisors in all eight Asylum Offices reported that asylum  officers needed additional training in these fraud-related topics, and the  majority of asylum officers reported this need in seven of the eight offices.
According to Asylum Division officials, since 2006, the Asylum Division  has required that each Asylum Office have at least two of their staff  trained by ICE’s Forensic Document Laboratory (FDL). These staff attend  a 3-day training that focuses on methods for detecting fraudulent features  in documents as well as security features in genuine documents. Staff who  have completed this training are responsible for training other asylum  officers and serving as in-house resources on document issues. According  to Asylum Division officials, as of June 2008, the Asylum Division had 34  staff who received this FDL training.
Identity and security checks. Checking asylum applicants’ identity  against appropriate records and databases is required by asylum law and  Asylum Division procedures and is a tool to help determine whether  certain applicants may be ineligible for asylum protection. The results of  required checks may uncover, for example, that an applicant may be  barred due to national security concerns. Despite their importance to the  integrity of the asylum process, 63 percent of asylum officers and 85  percent of supervisory asylum officers (34 of 40) who responded to our  survey reported that asylum officers moderately or greatly needed  additional training on conducting identity and security checks.
AOBTC provides a general exposure to the topic of databases and identity  and security checks, and, according to 76 percent of asylum officer  respondents, this was an area that needed to be improved at AOBTC to  better prepare them to make asylum decisions. The latest AOBTC  Validation Study, which was completed in 2003, noted that completing  identity and security checks was among the critical tasks asylum officers  perform and recommended that asylum officers receive basic orientation  to this task at AOBTC, followed by on-the-job training at their local  Asylum Office. Officials from the Asylum Division’s Training, Research,  and Quality Branch explained that new asylum officers should receive  local training on databases because the databases asylum officers are  required to check are not all accessible at AOBTC. Further, the expertise  for teaching how to conduct and interpret the results of identity and  security checks resides among staff at local Asylum Offices.
Most asylum officers who responded to our survey reported that they  understood the information in the databases they check, yet the majority  of asylum officer and supervisor respondents said that asylum officers still  needed more training on identity and security checks. Eighty-eight percent  of asylum officer respondents reported that they moderately or greatly  understood the type of information contained in the various databases or  systems they check as well as the results they receive. Nevertheless, 68  percent of asylum officers thought additional training was moderately or  greatly needed at their local offices on interpreting the results of identity  and security checks—a view held by 88 percent of supervisors (35 of 40).  Sixty-three percent of asylum officer respondents thought more training  was moderately or greatly needed locally on conducting these checks—a  view held by 85 percent of supervisors (34 of 40). This view was fairly  consistent across all eight Asylum Offices—that is, at least half of the  supervisors reported this training need for asylum officers in all eight  Asylum Offices, while the majority of asylum officers reported this need in  seven of the eight offices. In providing survey comments, one asylum  officer expressed the opinion that training is needed on how to read the  results from all the identity and security checks because, although officers  do these checks as required, they do not know what to do if they get a hit  that indicates that the applicant may be a national security or public safety  threat. In an effort to keep asylum officers informed of policies and  procedures for conducting checks, the Asylum Division issued an Identity  and Security Checks Procedures Manual in 2005 and has updated it three  times between March 2007 and May 2008.
Interviewing and assessing credibility. Assessing credibility involves a  determination of whether all of the evidence indicates that the applicant’s  testimony is credible. An asylum officer may find the applicant to be  credible if he or she determines, upon considering the totality of the  circumstances and all relevant factors, that an applicant’s testimony is  consistent, detailed, and plausible. The ability to elicit information through  applicant interviews is a critical component of an asylum officer’s ability  to distinguish between genuine and fraudulent claims. Internal control  standards for the federal government state that agencies should, among  other things, ensure that management identifies skills personnel need to  perform jobs and provide the needed training to staff.
Responses from asylum officers and supervisors to several survey  questions pointed to the need for additional training or learning  opportunities to improve asylum officers’ interviewing skills, including  assessing credibility. Sixty-four percent of asylum officers who responded  to our survey reported a moderate or great need for more training on  assessing credibility. To a much greater extent, supervisors, who are  required to observe one interview each month conducted by each asylum  officer they supervise, thought that asylum officers needed more  interview-related training. Furthermore, 95 percent of supervisor  respondents (38 of 40) reported that asylum officers moderately or greatly  needed additional training in assessing credibility—more than in any of  the 27 training areas about which we inquired—to improve their ability to  adjudicate asylum claims. Eighty-eight percent of supervisors (35 of 40)  reported that asylum officers needed more training in overall interviewing  skills and 83 percent of supervisors (33 of 40) thought asylum officers  needed more training on eliciting sufficient information during interviews.  According to a supervisory asylum officer with local anti-fraud  responsibilities, interviewing is the only realistic basis for fraud deterrence  and new officers should be informed from the start that if they cannot  develop sophisticated fraud-sensitive interviewing skills, they will not be  able to make meaningful adjudications.
According to 88 percent of asylum officers who responded to our survey,  having the opportunity to observe interviews conducted by skilled  interviewers would be a moderate to very useful way to improve officers’  interviewing skills, yet 53 percent reported not having had the opportunity  to do so. Of those asylum officers who said observing skilled interviewers  would be useful, 98 percent reported this would be moderately or very  useful during their first year on the job and many thought this would be of  value beyond their first year, as shown in table 1. Standards for internal  control in the federal government state that federal agencies should ensure  that management provides needed training to staff. Providing additional  opportunities to observe skilled interviewers would help asylum officers  refine their interview techniques to elicit information to use in assessing  credibility, determining eligibility, and distinguishing between genuine and  fraudulent claims.
Relevant statutes (the REAL ID Act and U.S. asylum law). Given  that writing a legal analysis is part of every asylum decision they make,  asylum officers must know how to read and interpret precedent decisions  and stay current with case law. The REAL ID Act of 2005 made changes  that apply to asylum adjudications of applications filed on or after May 11,  2005. In addition to developing AOBTC lesson plans, the Asylum Division  developed training materials on the REAL ID Act and required that all  Asylum Offices provide local training no later than May 30, 2006.  Nevertheless, when we conducted our surveys in March through May 2007,  68 percent of asylum officers and 90 percent of supervisory asylum  officers (36 of 40) who responded reported that asylum officers had a  moderate or great need for additional training on how to apply the REAL  ID Act in adjudicating asylum decisions. Further, 44 percent of asylum  officers and 78 percent of supervisory asylum officers (31 of 40) who  responded to our survey indicated that asylum officers had a moderate or  great need for additional training on U.S. asylum law, in general—for  example, on case law and statutory and regulatory changes.
Time management. Fifty-seven percent of asylum officer respondents  and 85 percent of supervisory asylum officer respondents (34 of 40)  reported that asylum officers had a moderate or great need for additional  training on time management. An Asylum Office Deputy Director  explained that without good time management skills, asylum officers can  easily fall behind on their workload and it can be impossible to catch up.  Later in this report we will discuss, in depth, how time constraints  challenge asylum officers and how this affects their adjudications.
Using the Asylum Virtual Library. The Asylum Virtual Library is an  online collection of documents produced and collected by the Asylum  Division and Asylum Offices. Documents in the online library are  organized into folders and include case law, country-conditions  information, decision-writing templates, forms, policies and procedures,  statistics, and training materials. Asylum Office personnel can find  information by browsing through the folders or by conducting searches.  Forty-four percent of asylum officers and 75 percent of supervisors (30 of  40) who responded to our survey reported that asylum officers had a  moderate or great need for additional training on using the Asylum Virtual  Library.
section_title: Asylum Division Does Not Solicit Officers’ Views on Training in a Structured and Consistent Manner
paragraphs: Although our surveys of asylum officers and supervisors revealed some  widely held views about asylum officers’ and supervisors’ training needs,  the Asylum Division does not have a framework in place for soliciting  asylum officers’ and supervisors’ views on their training needs in a  structured and consistent manner. Obtaining information in this manner  would improve headquarters’ and Asylum Offices’ knowledge of asylum  officers’ and supervisory asylum officers’ ongoing training needs and the  ability to use training to meet those needs. We have previously reported  that a best human-capital practice among effective organizations is to  survey or interview agency employees to obtain their views on training  programs that might be needed and systematically consider and act on  employees’ suggestions for improving or developing training, when  appropriate. The Asylum Division requests general written feedback from  new asylum officers on the training they received at AOBTC. In addition,  all eight Asylum Office Directors stated that their offices had used ad hoc  methods to obtain input from officers on unmet training needs, such as  asking for feedback at training sessions or periodically e-mailing officers  for training suggestions. However, these methods varied among offices  and were not done in a consistent manner using a structured approach to  collect the information.
Nevertheless, 63 percent of the asylum officers who responded to our  survey said their Asylum Office had not solicited their views on what  training should be offered locally. Responses varied by Asylum Office. In  four of the eight offices, between half and three-fourths of the asylum  officers said their views had been solicited; but in the remaining four  offices, no more than 15 percent said their views had been solicited.  Training, Research, and Quality Branch officials said that, at the national  level, they rely on Asylum Office Directors for feedback on whether they  are meeting officers’ needs and also request information on asylum officer  training needs and activities during monthly conference calls with local  QA/Ts.
section_title: The Asylum Division Designed a Framework for Quality Reviews, but Local Quality Assurance Reviews Do Not Always Occur
paragraphs: The Asylum Division has designed a three-tiered framework for  conducting quality reviews in Asylum Offices and headquarters to help  ensure the quality and consistency of asylum decisions, but local quality  assurance reviews—one of the three tiers—do not always occur.  According to the Asylum Division, a “particularly high level” of quality is  demanded in asylum decisions to protect the integrity of the legal  immigration process and to avoid potentially serious consequences that  could result if an applicant is harmed after being wrongfully returned to  his or her home country or if an applicant who poses a threat to the United  States is wrongfully permitted to stay. As such, it has designed a quality  review framework that includes supervisory review, local QA/T review,  and headquarters quality review. Together, these reviews are intended,  among other things, to help ensure quality and consistency as well as  identify deficiencies that might be addressed through training. This  framework is in keeping with internal control standards for the federal  government, which state that agencies should assure that ongoing  monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations.
Supervisory review. The Asylum Division requires a supervisory asylum  officer to sign off on every asylum decision to indicate that it is supported  by law and that procedures are properly followed. Supervisory review is  intended to assure quality and provide consistency in decision making— not to ensure the supervisor agrees with the specific decision the asylum  officer reached. Asylum Office Directors generally agreed that the 100  percent supervisory review requirement was important for reasons that  included the complexity of asylum adjudications. One Asylum Office  Director characterized the requirement as the key to the Asylum Division’s  success. The majority of the 171 asylum officers and 40 supervisory  asylum officers who responded to our survey considered these reviews as  moderately or very effective in ensuring compliance with procedures (72  percent and 90 percent, respectively) and improving the quality of  decisions (53 percent and 83 percent, respectively). Further, 37 percent of  asylum officers and 73 percent of supervisors reported that the  supervisory review promoted consistency in decision making.
Local quality-assurance review. The Asylum Division created the QA/T  position in each Asylum Office to, among other things, review a sample of  asylum decisions for quality and consistency and observe asylum officer  interviews to assess interview techniques. According to the Chief of the  Training, Research, and Quality Branch, QA/T reviews are similar to  supervisory reviews in that both assess the legal sufficiency of decisions.  In addition, QA/Ts are in a position to take a broader view by looking for  consistency across each Asylum Office and identifying office training  needs that may surface from their quality reviews. The 1997 QA/T position  description outlined quality assurance review responsibilities in addition  to training responsibilities as including (1) reviewing a representative  sample of written decisions for quality, consistency, and timeliness with an  emphasis on identifying patterns of inconsistency, faulty legal analysis,  trends, misuse of country-conditions information, or procedural or  technical errors; (2) reviewing sensitive cases before they are forwarded  to Asylum Division headquarters for review (see the following section on  headquarters quality review for more on these sensitive cases); and (3)  observing interviews conducted by asylum officers to identify strengths  and weaknesses in interviewing techniques. It further stated that QA/T  responsibilities included developing weekly training sessions that address,  among other things, the interviewing and adjudication deficiencies noted  during quality assurance reviews. Thus, by having responsibility for  reviewing asylum officers’ decisions and observing interviews, as well as  providing training, it was intended that the QA/T would be in a position to  ensure any observed deficiencies could be addressed through training and  brought to local management’s attention.
In 1998, the Asylum Division also communicated that quality assurance  responsibilities should occupy the greatest portion of a QA/Ts’ time, in  contrast to the time they are to spend on their other responsibilities,  including training. It further communicated that a proper role for the QA/T  is to help the Asylum Office Director monitor the quality assurance of each  supervisory asylum officer. According to the Chief of the Training,  Research, and Quality Branch, QA/Ts are to look for ways to improve the  quality of each office’s adjudications and identify training needs.  Furthermore, the Chief stated that each office is to develop its own QA/T  performance work plan and decide how many cases a QA/T should review  for quality, including how to select cases for review.
As a result of the discretion given to Asylum Offices, expectations for  QA/T reviews of a sample of decisions varied among Asylum Offices. QA/T  performance work plans either included the expectation that QA/Ts  evaluate the quality and consistency of written decisions, or note  procedural or technical errors and deficiencies. QA/T reviews of a sample  of decisions were routinely conducted in five of the eight offices,  according to Asylum Office Directors and QA/Ts. For example, we were  told that in one office, QA/Ts randomly reviewed 2 to 3 decisions each  week; in another office, the QA/T randomly reviewed 12 cases each week;  and in a third office, the QA/T reviewed all decisions that had been  reviewed by a supervisor on 1 day every 2 weeks, focusing on a particular  aspect of the decision. According to two QA/Ts, the deficiencies they most  frequently identified involved asylum officers’ credibility assessments. For  example, one explained that asylum officers were not being sufficiently  rigorous in pursuing applicants’ credibility. Although both QA/Ts said their  reviews usually revealed minor deficiencies, one noted that egregious  problems did occasionally surface, such as a decision that is not consistent  with the latest case law. In three offices QA/T reviews were not being done  routinely. In two of these offices, competing work demands reportedly  precluded QA/Ts from performing quality reviews or limited their  frequency. For example, in one office, the QA/T was expected to evaluate  an average of five or more decisions each week for quality and consistency  to receive the highest rating in the related performance element. However,  the Director of that office indicated the QA/T had been unable to meet that  expectation because of the time demands of other responsibilities  involving reviewing sensitive cases and training-related tasks. The Asylum  Office Director of the third office told us in August 2007 of plans for that  office to establish a process for the QA/T to randomly review two to four  decisions each week. Although this Director informed us in August 2008  that the QA/T had begun conducting these reviews, the Director stated the  position had become vacant during the past year and thus local quality  assurance reviews were not taking place. In addition, in six of the eight  offices, including two that we visited, performance work plans included  local expectations that QA/Ts observe and evaluate asylum officer  interviews. However, in all three offices we visited, the QA/Ts told us  they did not observe or evaluate asylum officer interviews, or did so only  on occasion, because of other work demands. Therefore, the Asylum  Division’s quality review framework was not being fully implemented in all  the offices. Implementing the quality review framework would better  position the Asylum Division to examine the root causes of deficiencies  and take corrective action, such as addressing deficiencies through  training.
A recent study of asylum adjudications by Georgetown University  researchers found that there was considerable variability among  individual adjudicators in Asylum Offices as well as in the immigration  courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Asylum Office Directors generally  agreed that grant rates can legitimately vary among officers in one office  as well as across offices. Nevertheless, four either expressed concern  about inconsistencies that result from differences among some asylum  officers or supervisory asylum officers in their office or said that  headquarters should be doing more to improve the consistency of asylum  decisions or review the quality of work. According to the Asylum  Division’s Deputy Chief, headquarters does not monitor asylum officers’  grant rates or decision patterns, which would provide some information  regarding consistency in asylum decisions, in part because it does not  want to suggest that there is a particular grant rate that is correct or  desirable. Further, we asked six Asylum Office Directors if they monitored  the grant rates of asylum officers in their offices and five said they did not.  The Asylum Division is considering developing a training course for QA/Ts  and creating a new senior asylum officer position that, among other things,  would have the authority to assess the consistency of supervisory  decisions.
Headquarters quality review. To help ensure consistency in novel or  complex areas of the law, the Asylum Division reviews all asylum cases  categorized as “sensitive” before an asylum decision is issued. Local  Asylum Offices are required to submit certain categories, established by  headquarters, of sensitive cases to the Asylum Division’s Training,  Research, and Quality Branch in headquarters for quality review. Sensitive  cases include, for example, those involving issues related to national  security, applicants involved in persecutor or human rights violations,  diplomats or other high-level government or military officials or family  members, and principal applicants who are under 18 years of age.
In fiscal year 2007, Asylum Offices sent the Asylum Division 384 of these  sensitive asylum cases for review, of which 28 percent were designated as  national security cases. National security cases include cases in which the  applicant may be a persecutor, terrorist, or risk to the security of the  United States. In the previous fiscal year, Asylum Offices sent 263 such  cases to the Asylum Division for review, of which 41 percent were  considered national security cases. Asylum Division data indicate that, in  fiscal year 2007, headquarters concurred with 86 percent of the decisions  asylum officers made and, in fiscal year 2006, it concurred with 83 percent  of asylum officers’ decisions. The data further indicate that when the  Asylum Division did not concur, it generally required that the applicant be  interviewed again or the written decision be modified, and that the  decision then be resubmitted to headquarters for further review.
section_title: Majority of Immigration Judges Reported Needing Additional Training; EOIR Expanded Training for New Immigration Judges and Solicited Input on Training Needs
paragraphs: Although the majority of immigration judges reported that EOIR’s training  for newly hired immigration judges and annual training enhanced their  ability to adjudicate asylum cases, the majority reported needing  additional training in several areas, including identifying fraud. EOIR  expanded its training program primarily for new immigration judges in  2006 and annually solicits input from immigration judges on their training  needs.
Since 1997, EOIR has sent newly hired immigration judges to a week-long  training at the National Judicial College, which includes courses on  immigration court procedures, immigration law, ethics, caseload  management, and stress management. The training is delivered in a  workshop format and incorporates lecture instruction, small-group  exercises, and court-hearing demonstrations. Of the 67 immigration judges  who came on board since 1997 and responded to our question about this  training, 66 percent reported that the National Judicial College moderately  or greatly enhanced their ability to adjudicate asylum cases.
In addition to the new immigration judge training program, EOIR also  holds an annual conference for all immigration judges. This conference is  generally a week-long training that includes lectures and presentations.  During the 2007 conference, topics covered included immigration law and  procedure, ethics, religious freedom, disparities in asylum adjudications  and forensic analysis. Eighty percent of immigration judges who  responded to our survey reported that attending the annual conference in  person either moderately or greatly enhanced their ability to adjudicate  asylum cases. Although immigration judges generally attend this  conference in person, the in-person conference was canceled in fiscal  years 2003 through 2005 and again in 2008 because of budget constraints.  In its place, a virtual conference was held in fiscal years 2004 and 2005,  and included recorded presentations in place of the in-person conference.  EOIR officials told us that because of budget constraints, a virtual  conference was also offered in August 2008. The virtual conference  included interactive computer-based training addressing asylum issues  before the courts and a multimedia presentation that emphasizes the  importance and effect of immigration judge asylum decisions. Fifteen  percent of immigration judges reported that a virtual conference  moderately or greatly enhanced their ability to adjudicate asylum cases.
Although the majority of immigration judges who responded to our survey  reported that EOIR’s new hire training and in-person annual conference  enhanced their ability to adjudicate asylum cases, as shown in figure 4, the  majority of immigration judges also reported needing additional training in  certain areas. Seventy-six percent reported moderately or greatly needing  additional continuing education on asylum issues, 74 percent reported that  additional training on identifying fraud was moderately or greatly needed,  59 percent reported additional training on assessing credibility was  moderately or greatly needed, and 55 percent reported that additional  training on U.S. asylum law was moderately or greatly needed to enhance  their ability to adjudicate asylum cases. National Association of  Immigration Judges (NAIJ) representatives we interviewed, who also  serve as immigration judges, stated that immigration judges could benefit  if time were allotted each week for self-study and they received more  training on assessing credibility.
Beyond these specific training topics, immigration judges who responded  to our survey also identified the need for other professional development  opportunities to enhance their ability to adjudicate asylum cases. For  example, 75 percent of immigration judges reported that informal  meetings with other immigration judges were moderately or greatly  needed. NAIJ representatives stated that EOIR’s training program lacks  opportunities for immigration judges to meet and communicate with other  immigration judges in their same circuit and that a circuit-specific regional  conference, offered quarterly, would address this need. Other forms of  training that many immigration judge survey respondents thought were  moderately or greatly needed included opportunities to be detailed to the  BIA (62 percent) and attending intergovernmental agency conferences (55  percent). With respect to opportunities for immigration judges to be  detailed to the BIA, according to EOIR, two immigration judges were  serving on the BIA as of August 2007.
EOIR implemented several changes to its training program in response to  reforms directed by the Attorney General in 2006 and in alignment with  EOIR’s 2005–2010 Strategic Plan to prioritize training for EOIR  adjudicators, which was issued in 2004. In September 2006, EOIR  expanded its training for newly hired immigration judges by requiring an  additional week of courses. It also extended the time newly hired  immigration judges observed hearings from 1 week to 4 weeks. These  changes were implemented after most of the immigration judges in our  survey population would have received new hire training. Sixty-three  percent of those responding to our survey reported that observing  hearings conducted by other immigration judges moderately or greatly  enhanced their ability to adjudicate asylum cases.
EOIR also recognizes that new developments in immigration law  necessitate that immigration judges receive timely, current, circuit-specific  legal updates. As such, it distributes case summaries on a weekly basis  and, in response to reforms directed by the Attorney General in 2006,  launched a monthly publication that provides a more in-depth analysis of  legal issues, case law, and statutory and regulatory developments.  According to EOIR, although it has neither the time nor the funds to  expand immigration judges’ opportunities to interact with each other  outside their court locations, it thinks it would be of immense value.  Lacking the opportunity in fiscal year 2008 for such interactions through  an immigration judge conference and having received feedback that  immigration judges would like to observe another immigration judge,  EOIR is structuring opportunities for peer court observation to take place  within each immigration judge’s court.
EOIR’s 2005–2010 Strategic Plan calls for EOIR to annually identify  training needs for all immigration court staff and, as such, EOIR uses a  structured questionnaire to solicit immigration judges’ training needs at  both the new immigration judge training and the immigration judges’  annual training conference.  According to EOIR, it receives continuous  training recommendations from immigration judges in the field, NAIJ, the  Immigration Judges Advisory Committee, and new immigration judges’  training faculty. Further, Assistant Chief Immigration Judges may observe  immigration court proceedings to determine whether immigration judges  need additional training. However, according to EOIR, budget cuts  resulted in reductions in spending in fiscal year 2008, including canceling  planned conferences and curtailing training.
section_title: BIA Reviews Immigration Judge Decisions That Are Appealed
paragraphs: According to EOIR, another means of providing quality assurance resides  in its formal appeals board, the BIA. The BIA is the highest administrative  body for immigration issues and is responsible for applying immigration  and nationality laws uniformly throughout the United States. Unlike  asylum officers’ decisions, all of which are reviewed by supervisors, the  BIA reviews decisions when DHS or the asylum applicant appeals a  decision. In addition, according to EOIR, when a decision is appealed to  the BIA, a transcript of the decision is sent to the immigration judge’s  Assistant Chief Immigration Judge who may review any or all of the  transcribed decisions for quality assurance. Overall, 10 percent of all  immigration judges’ decisions, which include asylum decisions, were  appealed to the BIA in fiscal year 2007.
section_title: Challenges in Assessing the Authenticity of Claims and Time Constraints Are Key Factors Affecting Asylum Officers’ Adjudications
paragraphs: Asylum officers reported difficulties in assessing the authenticity of  asylum claims, despite mechanisms USCIS designed to help asylum  officers assess claims, and also reported time constraints in adjudicating  cases. Mechanisms USCIS designed included, for example, identity and  security checks and fraud prevention teams. Federal entities outside  USCIS’s Asylum Division and FDNS also have a role in combating fraud  and confirming the validity of claims, but their ability to provide assistance  to asylum officers has been hindered due to a lack of resources, competing  priorities and, in some cases, confidentiality requirements intended to  protect asylum applicants and their families. In addition, asylum officers  and supervisors reported that asylum officers do not have sufficient time  to adjudicate cases in a manner consistent with their procedures manual  and training, although management’s views were mixed. Furthermore, the  Asylum Division established the productivity standard for asylum officers  without the benefit of empirical data.
subsections: section_title: Asylum Officers Reported Difficulties Assessing the Authenticity of Claims Despite USCIS Mechanisms and Assistance from Other Federal Agencies
subsections: section_title: Asylum Officers Reported Facing Challenges Assessing the Authenticity of Claims
paragraphs: Asylum officers face challenges in assessing the authenticity of claims— that is, identifying fraud and assessing credibility. The very nature of the  asylum system, which does not require applicants to submit  documentation to support their claim, presents a challenge. Furthermore,  economic incentives and benefits that accompany asylum can make the  system a target of fraud. Abuse of the asylum system by particular groups  has been reported in the past. For example, in 1999, a large-scale federal  investigation began that resulted in the prosecution and conviction in 2005  of 23 individuals, including immigration brokers and consultants who  aided thousands of Indonesian immigrants living in the United States in  fraudulently applying for government benefits, including asylum. In a  2006 document prepared by FDNS staff at a USCIS service center, a  particular nationality was identified as using fraudulent documents for the  purpose of applying for asylum and establishing residency in the United  States. According to the report, “the issues identified . . . constitute  widespread abuse of the asylum system” by applicants from that country.
In responding to our survey, many asylum officers reported difficulties  carrying out their fraud-related responsibilities and, as discussed earlier in  this report, many reported needing more or better fraud-related training.  According to the Asylum Division, asylum officers must consider whether  fraud exists in the applicant’s claim, identity documents, or other  documents provided to support the claim. Asylum applicants’ use of a  fraudulent document does not necessarily constitute fraud in their overall  claim. Even after identifying fraud, asylum officers must determine if the  fraud was made knowingly to obtain an immigration benefit for which the  applicant was not entitled. As shown in figure 5, asylum officers who  responded to our survey most frequently (73 percent) identified document  fraud as moderately or very difficult for them to identify. In September  2007, we reported that the ease with which individuals can obtain genuine  identity documents for an assumed identity creates a vulnerability that  terrorists can exploit to enter the United States with legal status.
The figure also shows that about half of asylum officer survey respondents  identified attorney fraud (53 percent) and identity fraud (49 percent) as  moderately or very difficult for them to identify. According to Asylum  Division data for fiscal year 2007, 38 percent of the applicants brought an  attorney with them to their asylum interview; in fiscal year 2006, 30  percent did so. An unscrupulous attorney might prepare false asylum  applications, including supporting affidavits and documents, which may be  difficult to identify. For example, in February 2008, an attorney was  indicted for preparing fraudulent asylum applications that included false  documents with forged notary stamps and signatures. With respect to  identity fraud, asylum officers we interviewed explained that the identity  of an applicant is sometimes hard to determine and applicants may falsely  claim to be from one country where persecution is known to occur, yet  really be from another country in that region.
In addition to identifying fraud, assessing credibility poses a challenge to  asylum officers in making asylum decisions. As previously discussed in  this report, asylum officers must make a credibility assessment regarding  every applicant they interview. As shown in figure 6, the majority of  asylum officers who responded to our survey reported significant  challenges to assessing credibility in about half or more of the cases they  adjudicated in the past year, including insufficient time to prepare and  conduct research prior to the interview (73 percent), insufficient time to  conduct the interview (63 percent), the lack of information regarding  document validity (61 percent), the lack of overseas information on  applicants (59 percent), and the lack of documents provided by applicants  (54 percent). According to the Asylum Division, given the preponderance  of evidence standard, it is possible to have reasonable doubts about  whether applicants meet the definition of a refugee and still correctly find  that applicants met their burden of establishing that their claim is true.
Supervisory asylum officers also reported difficulties in carrying out their  fraud-related responsibilities. Supervisors are responsible for identifying  possible fraud trends as they review asylum cases from multiple asylum  officers and can identify patterns individual asylum officers may not  observe. Nevertheless, in responding to our survey, 54 percent of  supervisors (21 of 39) reported it moderately or very difficult to identify  emerging trends in fraud in the time they have available.
While asylum fraud presents a challenge to officers, its full extent is not  known and is being systematically assessed for the first time. In March  2005, FDNS undertook an Asylum Benefit Fraud Assessment because,  according to FDNS, asylum was a benefit program historically considered  to be one of USCIS’s most fraud-prone or high-risk programs and reliable  and comprehensive information about the types and prevalence of fraud in  asylum applications was not available. The assessment randomly sampled  239 affirmative asylum applications filed during a 6-month period in 2005  that were either issued a final decision or placed on hold. FDNS  Immigration Officers (FDNS-IO) were required to conduct a series of  identity and security checks, some of which were mandatory at the time of  adjudication, as well as additional checks and research. The FDNS-IOs  also requested overseas document verification when they believed  relevant information that would substantiate a fraud finding could be  obtained. However, according to FDNS officials, as of July 2008, FDNS had  not received a response on almost half of the 72 documents it sent  overseas for verification. Other factors can also make it difficult to assess  the full extent of asylum fraud. As FDNS officials explained, an asylee’s  petition for overseas relatives to join the asylee in the United States—a  process that can take years—can reveal that the stories of persecution an  asylee presented when applying for asylum are not always consistent with  information later provided by his or her relatives. The Director of Fraud  Prevention Programs in State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs confirmed that  the petition process has uncovered information that clearly demonstrated  that the principal applicant’s asylum claim was fraudulent, including cases  where personnel reached this conclusion after interviewing relatives or  conducting investigations. As of July 2008, FDNS had not finalized the  Asylum Benefit Fraud Assessment and had not decided whether to do so  without information from approximately 10 asylum termination interviews  to be completed as a result of information obtained during the Asylum  Benefit Fraud Assessment.
section_title: USCIS Designed Mechanisms to Help Asylum Officers Assess the Authenticity of Claims
paragraphs: In April 2005, the Asylum Division conducted a review of past cases in  which asylum applicants had alleged ties with terrorists or engaged in  terrorist activity, although ties may not have been known at the time of  adjudication. As a result, it identified vulnerabilities to terrorism in the  U.S. asylum system and found that many of the vulnerabilities it identified  were resolved with the 1995 asylum reforms. However, the report also  identified vulnerabilities that remained postreform, including the lack of  checks to identify individuals, the possibility of an applicant’s interpreter  perpetrating fraud, and vulnerabilities outside of its control. According to  information the Asylum Division provided, it has since taken steps to  address vulnerabilities within its control. Some of these, and other  mechanisms it has designed, can help asylum officers identify fraud and  assess credibility—specifically, identity and security check requirements,  fraud prevention teams with anti-fraud responsibilities, monitoring  applicants’ interpreters during asylum interviews, and tracking preparers  suspected of fraud. However, because the extent of asylum fraud and how  it has changed over time is not known, it is difficult to assess the effect of  these measures on the identification of fraud. Furthermore, it is difficult to  know the extent to which any of these measures have deterred fraud.
Identity and security checks. Security check requirements have  increased, particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, and  asylum staff at all levels viewed them as helping ensure the integrity of  asylum decisions. Asylum officers are required to ensure multiple identity  and security checks are conducted to confirm an applicant’s identity,  identify applicants who pose a national security or public safety risk, and  resolve certain eligibility issues. Asylum officers must confirm that all  checks are initiated prior to issuing a decision and obtain cleared results  of checks before issuing a grant of asylum.
Some identity and security checks are automatically initiated immediately  after an applicant files an asylum application at the USCIS Service  Center; however, many are initiated and completed during the  adjudication process. According to Asylum Office Directors, in six of the  eight Asylum Offices, asylum officers conduct the required identity and  security checks for the cases they adjudicate. In the remaining two offices,  asylum officers are designated, on a rotational basis, to conduct identity  and security checks for all asylum officers in the office; however, each  asylum officer must still review the results of these checks for each case  he or she is assigned. Each supervisor must confirm that documentation of  the security checks is accurately completed in accordance with the  decision being issued before signing off on the decision.
The Asylum Division has worked with other federal entities to provide  asylum officers with access to databases to conduct identity and security  checks and expanded and implemented new identity and security check  requirements on existing checks. Some of these checks are required for all  USCIS adjudications; others are required only in an asylum adjudication.  Since that time, the Asylum Division has required asylum officers to check  the following databases:  Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS). IBIS is a multi-agency  database aimed at improving border enforcement and facilitating  inspections of applicants for admission into the United States by  identifying threats to national security or public safety. The database  interfaces with another system that includes law enforcement data,  including information on immigration law violators, individuals with a  criminal history or who are subject to criminal investigations, or suspected  terrorists.
U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT). In  2004, the Asylum Division and the Department of Homeland Security’s US- VISIT office worked together to develop a mechanism to provide asylum  officers with access to the US-VISIT database through a web-based  interface tool, US-VISIT SIT. US-VISIT collects, maintains, and shares  biometric and other information on certain foreign nationals entering and  exiting the United States. This tool allows asylum officers to ensure that  the applicant is not identified by US-VISIT as a national security or public  safety threat and that the applicant who appears for the interview is the  same individual who appeared earlier for fingerprinting.
State’s Consular Consolidated Database (CCD). The Asylum Division  worked with State to provide asylum officers with access to information in  the CCD, which contains records about visa applications. The database  may contain biometric data and copies of information an applicant  presented to a State Consular Officer when applying for the visa. Such  data may be valuable to asylum officers in providing information about the  identity, previous travel history, method of entry into the United States, or  background of an asylum applicant.
The Asylum Division has also made several changes expanding the  requirements for several existing identity and security checks, including  the following:    Since February 2003, asylum officers have been required to check the  name of every asylum applicant against the Deportable Alien Control  System (DACS) prior to adjudicating an asylum case in addition to when  the asylum application was filed. DACS contains records of individuals  who have been detained by ICE or placed in removal proceedings. Prior to  2003, asylum officers completed this check when the asylum application  was filed and repeated the check only for cases resulting in a grant of  asylum.
Since November 2006, asylum officers have been required to verify that  every asylum applicant aged 14 to 75 has been fingerprinted prior to the  asylum interview in addition to obtaining fingerprint results prior to  issuing a grant of asylum. This gives the asylum officer the opportunity to  review any available information associated with the applicant’s  fingerprint records prior to or at the time of the interview. The asylum  officer must reschedule the interview if an applicant has failed to be  fingerprinted in advance. Prior to this change, the requirement called only  for asylum officers to obtain fingerprint results in cases that resulted in a  grant of asylum.
When an asylum application is filed, RAPS automatically requests an FBI  name check for every applicant aged 14 to 79. Since 2002, asylum officers  have been required to obtain the results of the FBI name check before  granting asylum. Prior to 2002, this check was initiated at the time an  applicant filed an asylum application, but obtaining a result was not  necessary before issuing a grant. Since 2005, RAPS has automatically  initiated FBI name checks on aliases, maiden names, and alternate dates  of birth.
Seventy-eight percent of asylum officers who responded to our survey  reported that, overall, they found that identity and security checks were  moderately or very useful in identifying or providing information on  individuals who pose a risk to national security or public safety. Moreover,  as figure 7 shows, the majority found each of the required identity and  security checks to be moderately or very useful. However, as noted by an  asylum officer we interviewed, applicants who enter the United States  without inspection or who use a false identity are less likely to be  identified by these checks.
According to the Asylum Division, checking applicants in the US-VISIT  system had significantly mitigated existing vulnerabilities in the program  by locking in an applicant’s identity through fingerprint and photograph at  the earliest point possible in the application process and searching against  other biometric databases to confirm an applicant’s identity and identify  potential derogatory information. The Asylum Division further noted that,  while the US-VISIT system is vast, it is not an exhaustive warehouse of  biometric prints obtained by all U.S. government agencies or by other  governments. According to an Asylum Office Director, between  fingerprints, FBI name checks, IBIS, US-VISIT, and CCD, it would be  reasonable to expect that a national security risk would be identified if  such information were contained in one of the security databases.
In addition, 72 percent of asylum officers who responded to our survey  reported that, overall, they found identity and security checks to be  moderately or very useful in providing information regarding an  applicant’s eligibility for asylum. At least half of the respondents found  each of the required checks to be useful for this purpose, as shown in  figure 8.
Fraud-prevention teams. Asylum Offices have fraud-prevention teams  comprised of at least one FDNS immigration officer (FDNS-IO) and one  Fraud Prevention Coordinator (FPC) who are tasked with anti-fraud  responsibilities. USCIS assigned responsibilities to FDNS-IOs at Asylum  Offices that included tracking fraud patterns for FDNS, apprising Asylum  Offices of fraud trends, resolving national security “hits,” addressing fraud- related leads provided by asylum officers, liaising with law enforcement  entities, and referring cases of suspected fraud to ICE. FDNS-IOs are  precluded from performing routine functions associated with the  adjudication process, such as the resolution of non-national-security- related background checks or the review of suspect documents. The work  of FDNS-IOs is directed by local Asylum Office management and by FDNS  headquarters. As of July 2008, a total of 14 FDNS-IOs were located in  Asylum Offices and, according to Asylum Division staff, additional  positions may be authorized in the future. In addition, each Asylum Office  has at least one FPC, usually a supervisory asylum officer with additional  fraud-related responsibilities as a collateral duty. Duties vary and are  directed by local office management. FPCs may work closely with FDNS- IOs but, in contrast to FDNS-IOs, FPCs have a direct role in supporting  asylum officers in their adjudication decisions. According to an official in  the Asylum Division’s Operations Branch, FPCs may also review fraud  referrals that asylum officers make to the FDNS-IOs to ensure quality and  determine fraud trends.
The specific tasks performed by anti-fraud staff and who performs them  varied across offices. For example, either a FDNS-IO or a FPC might  prescreen applications for fraud indicators, coordinate requests for  document verification or overseas information, track interpreters or  preparers suspected of fraud, communicate fraud trends to asylum  officers, review national security “hits,” participate in or communicate  with interagency task forces, or provide fraud-related training to office  staff.
Interpreter monitors. In an effort to combat the Asylum Division’s  concern regarding fraud and quality of interpretation among some of the  interpreters that non-English speaking applicants are required to bring to  their interview, the Asylum Division began phasing in the use of  contracted telephonic interpreter monitors in the first half of 2006.  According to the Asylum Division’s 2003 report on its interpreter  monitoring pilot program, investigations revealed that interpreters were  engaging in fraudulent behavior, such as altering asylum applicants’  testimony and coaching applicants during interviews. In May 2006, the  Asylum Division reported that the interpreter monitoring contractor had  been unable to accommodate 11 to 13 percent of requests for interpreter  monitors in March and April 2006, and thus did not meet its goal to provide  monitors 90 percent of the time. The interpreter monitoring program was  intended as an interim step in combating interpreter fraud and ensuring  accurate interpretation in the interview. USCIS plans to issue a rule that  would require the Asylum Division to provide professional interpreters.  According to Asylum Division officials, the Asylum Division has prepared  a request for a multiple-award contract for interpreter services and  expects to have the contract in place by the end of September 2008. As  such, it would curtail its approach of monitoring applicants’ interpreters.
Nevertheless, asylum staff indicated that interpreter monitors have  improved the interviewing process and helped combat fraud. After an  initial assessment of the interim project in May 2006, the Asylum Division  concluded that monitors were successful in assisting asylum officers in  obtaining information from applicants and deterring fraudulent  interpreters, although the deterrent effect could not be quantified. Asylum  officers who responded to our survey also viewed interpreter monitoring  as successful in combating interpreter fraud and helping genuine refugees  communicate their claim. Specifically, 87 percent indicated that  interpreter monitors were very or moderately useful in deterring  interpreters from intentionally misinterpreting, while 55 percent reported  that it is very or moderately easy to identify interpreter fraud when  interpreter monitors are used. Eighty-two percent reported that interpreter  monitors were very or moderately useful in helping genuine refugees  clearly communicate their claim and avoid misunderstandings due to poor  interpretation.
Tracking preparers. To help identify applications completed by  suspicious fraudulent preparers, in July 2007, the Asylum Division began  systematically tracking information on the preparer of each asylum  application. The Asylum Division noted the difficulties of addressing fraud  perpetrated by preparers—that is, individuals who assist asylum  applicants with the completion of their asylum applications. Preparers of  fraudulent claims have been known to produce applications containing,  for example, false claims of persecution and coach applicants on how to  exploit the sympathies of asylum officers. The Asylum Division issued  guidance in July 2007 that introduced new procedures to collect preparer  information and instructed asylum officers to verify that USCIS Service  Centers entered preparer information into RAPS. The guidance instructs  asylum officers to gather information during the interview regarding the  circumstances under which the application was prepared, including who  prepared the application. According to the Asylum Division’s Deputy Chief  at the time of our review, the division anticipates this effort will allow the  collection and analysis of data on preparers and could help identify  applications prepared by preparers determined to be fraudulent.
Other planned initiatives. The Asylum Division is also considering  various other anti-fraud efforts that are in various stages of planning and  have been highlighted as key initiatives for fiscal year 2008. These plans  include working with the Department of Defense to develop a systematic  way of processing fingerprints for asylum seekers through Department of  Defense systems, using software to scan applications to identify common  text and data, and furthering the exchange of information with Canada and  other countries. With respect to exchanging information with Canada, for  example, USCIS is exploring the feasibility of systematically exchanging  with Canada information submitted by asylum seekers.
section_title: Assistance from Other Federal Entities That Could Help Asylum Officers Assess the Authenticity of Claims Is Not Always Available
paragraphs: Federal entities outside the Asylum Division and FDNS also have a role in  combating fraud and confirming the validity of claims, but their assistance  to asylum officers has been hindered by a lack of resources, competing  priorities, and—in some cases—confidentiality requirements intended to  protect asylum applicants and their families.
ICE’s Forensic Document Laboratory (FDL). Although the majority of  asylum officers who responded to our survey reported it was difficult for  them to identify fraudulent documents, the ability of the federal  government’s forensic crime laboratory dedicated to detecting fraudulent  documents to assist asylum officers has been hindered by competing  priorities and a lack of exemplar documents—an authentic travel or  identity document FDL uses to make comparisons in forensic  examinations. Due to resource limitations, FDL prioritizes cases so that  those in which the individual is detained receive highest priority and  requests from asylum officers—those involving individuals with no set  court date—are among those receiving the lowest priority. According to  FDL data for fiscal year 2007, when FDL responded to requests from  Asylum Offices and other entities with the same relative priority, it took an  average of 122 days, with response times ranging from 1 to 487 days.  Because the Asylum Division recognizes it is unlikely that FDL will  respond to a document examination request before an adjudication  decision must be made given asylum processing time requirements,  asylum officers are instructed to submit documents to FDL if they or their  supervisor believe that the analysis may change the outcome of the  decision.
In addition, according to FDL’s Unit Chief, FDL often does not have the  kinds of documents asylum seekers often submit to asylum officers to  support their claims, such as overseas birth certificates, marriage  certificates, or medical records. Recognizing that FDL’s ability to verify  certain types of documents is hindered by its lack of relevant exemplars,  the Asylum Division requires each Asylum Office to have at least two FDL- trained staff to provide training to other officers, as discussed earlier in  this report. In addition to assisting officers in identifying fraudulent  documents, these staff are to advise officers on whether FDL is likely to  have an exemplar for the document they want verified.
State and USCIS overseas offices. State and USCIS overseas offices  can play an important role in helping asylum officers distinguish between  genuine and fraudulent claims by providing overseas information on  asylum applicants and their claims. According to USCIS officials we  interviewed, overseas investigations may be one of the best methods of  verifying the facts alleged by applicants. A FDNS official further explained  that far more fraud could be uncovered if more work were conducted  overseas, and this is especially true for asylum cases. State and USCIS may  be able to provide information on a particular asylum case by verifying or  obtaining overseas documents, such as medical or employment records,  by providing an assessment of the accuracy an applicant’s assertion about  country conditions or the applicant’s situation, or by engaging in  investigations.
In our surveys we asked asylum officers and supervisory asylum officers  about the usefulness of obtaining overseas medical and employment  records, or verification of such records. Eighty-two percent of asylum  officers and 90 percent of supervisory asylum officers (36 of 40) who  responded thought that these records or verification of these records  would be moderately or very useful in adjudicating cases. Several  respondents explained that overseas information can help them verify  accounts of medical treatment, encounters with police or military forces,  or political affiliation that relate to an applicant’s claim. Furthermore,  about half the asylum officers indicated they needed, but did not have  such information (53 percent for medical records; 49 percent for  employment records) in about half or more of the cases they adjudicated  in the past year. Preliminary results of the Asylum Benefit Fraud  Assessment further suggest the value of obtaining overseas information on  asylum applications. USCIS reported preliminary data in January 2007 that  indicated they received an overseas response for 13 requests for document  verification, of which 9 were found to support a finding that the asylum  claim was fraudulent. USCIS’s Refugee, Asylum, and International  Operations Directorate, of which the Asylum Division is a component,  proposed creating 54 new positions in fiscal year 2008, including positions  in several overseas posts to be focused on fraud detection and national  security. The fiscal year 2008 plan requires approval from State for the  overseas positions. As of July 2008, State had approved most of them.  According to the Asylum Division’s Acting Deputy Chief, the increased  capacity may enable increased assistance to asylum officers, although it is  too early to determine to what degree.
Despite adjudicators’ views that overseas information can be useful,  overseas offices’ ability to respond to asylum officers’ requests for  assistance has been hindered due to competing priorities, resource  constraints, and challenges associated with respecting the confidentiality  of asylum applicants to avoid placing them or their relatives at a greater  risk of harm. Recognizing demands on overseas resources, the Asylum  Division instructs asylum officers to limit overseas requests to those cases  where such information is essential to making a final asylum  determination. According to State procedures, in answering requests for  specific information on asylum cases, it generally gives priority to requests  from immigration courts over requests from asylum officers, although it  also gives priority to requests from Asylum Division headquarters  regarding sensitive cases. A Deputy Director within State explained that  requests from immigration courts are given higher priority because  individuals appearing before an immigration judge face the possibility of  deportation. Confidentiality requirements designed to protect applicants’  safety can further constrain obtaining overseas information because  making such inquiries of agencies of foreign governments can put asylum  applicants or their families at risk by releasing information to the public or  alleged persecutors.
These limitations notwithstanding, USCIS and State have worked together  to improve asylum officers’ access to information regarding asylum  applicants’ visa applications. Since May 2006, asylum officers have had  access to State’s CCD. Because not all information included on the visa  application is captured in CCD, the Asylum Division issued procedures in  March 2007 on how asylum officers can request full visa application  information from State if such additional information is material to the  applicant’s claim and can influence the adjudication decision. These  procedures were disseminated close to the time we conducted our  surveys. Ninety-one percent of asylum officers and 93 percent of  supervisory asylum officers (37 of 40) who responded thought that having  the entire visa application in addition to what is available in CCD would be  moderately or very useful in adjudicating cases. Fifty-five percent of  asylum officers said they needed, but did not have, the entire visa  application in about half or more of the cases they adjudicated in the past  year.
The process for requesting overseas information on asylum applicants,  other than visa applications, varies among Asylum Offices, and USCIS and  State have been working on improving procedures for making these  requests. According to Asylum Division officials, asylum officers are to  consult their supervisors when they desire overseas assistance. However,  the process for initiating requests for overseas information—that is,  whether requests are made through FDNS or Asylum personnel—varies  among Asylum Offices. Seventy-four percent of asylum officers and 43  percent of supervisors (16 of 37) said they did not understand or had no  more than a slight understanding of the process their office used for  requesting overseas verification services. In June 2008, the Asylum  Division’s Acting Deputy Chief told us that USCIS and State were in the  process of developing procedures that streamline the current process for  requesting overseas assistance. According to an Operations Branch  official, once the procedures are updated, the Asylum Division plans to  provide training on the new procedures.
ICE’s Office of Investigations. USCIS and ICE have an agreement that  USCIS will refer articulated suspicions of fraud to ICE, which will make a  decision whether to accept or decline a case for investigation within 60  days. If ICE declines a case or does not respond within that time, the  FDNS-IO is responsible for taking further action. According to the Chief  of FDNS, ICE declines about two-thirds of FDNS’s requests for  investigation. FDNS data showed that of the 58 requests that FDNS-IOs at  Asylum Offices sent to ICE for investigation during fiscal year 2007, ICE  had declined 33, accepted 12, and had not made a decision to accept or  decline 13 requests as of July 2008. According to the Acting Chief of ICE’s  Identity and Benefit Fraud Unit, ICE data showed that in fiscal year 2007,  ICE opened 128 asylum fraud investigations, 70 of which were based on  USCIS referrals. ICE investigations of asylum fraud can result from fraud  referrals made by confidential informants, federal and local law  enforcement personnel, as well as USCIS personnel. USCIS referrals can  include those from asylum officers, FDNS-IOs, or district examiners.  However, officials from the Identity and Benefit Fraud Unit explained it is  difficult for ICE to identify the exact number of asylum fraud  investigations because of the way a case may be recorded. Cases involving  asylum fraud often involve other types of fraud, such as identity or  marriage fraud, and may be recorded under a category relating to other  fraud found in the investigation. Furthermore, a single conviction may  involve an individual who was associated with numerous sham asylum  applications.
According to ICE officials, resource constraints preclude ICE from  investigating all fraud referrals. Asylum fraud is difficult to investigate and  resource-intensive because asylum claims often lack supporting evidence  to facilitate investigations, according to the Acting Chief of ICE’s Identity  and Benefit Fraud Unit. These investigations can take several years to  complete. According to ICE, its investigations of asylum fraud most often  target larger-scale conspiracies, and individual applicants are given a  lower priority. ICE also gives asylum cases special attention when asylum  applicants from certain countries might pose a threat to national security.
Asylum Division personnel and Asylum Office fraud staff view ICE  investigations of asylum fraud as a critical component in combating  asylum fraud and, along with prosecutions, the best way to deter it. At one  Asylum Office we visited, the Director stated that she believed prior local  ICE activity had deterred fraudulent asylum applications. Furthermore, 42  percent of 107 asylum officers and 45 percent of 33 supervisory asylum  officers who provided survey comments regarding what can be done to  deter or cut down on asylum fraud shared views that actions such as  investigating, prosecuting, or assigning penalties are needed to help deter  fraud. In March 2006, we reported that taking appropriate and consistent  actions against immigration benefit violators is an important element of  fraud control and deterrence.
Representatives from these and other federal entities outside USCIS  participated in the Asylum Division’s Fraud Prevention Conference in  December 2007, where conference leaders acknowledged that combating  fraud requires both intra- and intergovernmental efforts. They further  stressed the importance of finding administrative solutions to fraud, as  prosecutions of asylum fraud are infrequent. The conference provided a  forum for fraud detection and prevention personnel, investigators,  attorneys, and personnel from USCIS, ICE, DOJ, and State to share  information on current fraud trends, including specifics on suspected  preparers who assisted, recruited, and sometimes duped clients to make  fraudulent claims; methods used to make fraudulent claims; and indicators  used to detect fraud.
section_title: Asylum Officers Report Time Constraints Affect Adjudications; Adjudication Requirements Have Increased While the Productivity Standard Is Unchanged
subsections: section_title: Asylum Officers and Supervisors Report Asylum Officers Have Insufficient Time to Thoroughly Adjudicate Cases, but Management Views Are Mixed
paragraphs: The majority of asylum officers and supervisory asylum officers who  responded to our survey reported that the 4 hours, on average, they have  to complete an asylum case is insufficient to be thorough—that is, to  complete the case in a manner consistent with their procedures manual  and training—although views among managers varied. The 4-hour average  is based on the productivity standard, which requires management to  assign asylum officers work equivalent to 18 asylum cases in a 2-week  period, allowing for 4 hours of training each week. The productivity  standard is one of the elements in the asylum officers’ performance work  plan that is used to rate an asylum officer’s performance. As table 2 shows,  28 percent of asylum officers and 28 percent of supervisory asylum  officers (11 of 40) reported that asylum officers need about 4 hours or less  to complete an asylum case. However, 65 percent of asylum officers and  73 percent of supervisors (29 of 40) reported that asylum officers needed  more than the standard 4 hours to complete a case.
Many asylum officer survey respondents indicated time constraints  hindered their ability to thoroughly adjudicate cases. For example, of 138  respondents who provided narrative comments explaining how they  manage their caseload when they have insufficient time, 39 percent wrote  that they rush through their work or cut back on doing country-condition  research, interviewing, completing identity and security checks, or writing  the assessment. Moreover, 43 percent of asylum officers reported that,  during the past year, productivity standards hindered their ability to  properly adjudicate in about half or more of their cases.
Asylum Officers are taught at AOBTC that they must work under time  constraints and develop interviewing skills that will enable them to gather  all the information they need. However, they are also informed of the  danger in rushing through an interview, which could lead the asylum  officer to incorrectly assess credibility. In conducting interviews with  asylum officers, we asked 12 officers how much time they spend  conducting an asylum interview. Eleven of the 12 asylum officers said that,  of the 4 hours they generally have available for a case, they typically spend  between 1 and 2 hours conducting the applicant interview. Nearly 30  percent of asylum officers reported that they were able to elicit sufficient  information in asylum interviews to properly evaluate the claim no more  than about half of the time. Further, 92 percent reported that having more  time to probe in an interview would moderately or greatly help them elicit  better information during the asylum applicant interview to properly  evaluate the claim, including assessing the applicant’s eligibility and  credibility. The same percentage reported that having more time to  prepare for and conduct research prior to an interview would moderately  or greatly help them elicit better information during the asylum applicant  interview to properly evaluate the claim, including assessing the  applicant’s eligibility and credibility.
In addition, when asked what would help them better identify fraud,  asylum officer survey respondents who provided comments most  frequently said that having more time would help them better identify  fraud, with about 40 percent of the 98 respondents making such  comments. For example, an asylum officer explained that although more  tools to detect fraud are always useful, they are of little or no use if asylum  officers are not given either time or correct training to use such tools.  Another asylum officer stated that attorneys and preparers know that  asylum officers do not have time to check into the claim and, thus, the  “system is perpetuating fraud by not giving  time to  concentrate on the adjudication.” Sixty-four percent of supervisors (25 of  39) who responded to our survey indicated that asylum officers were not  always completing a fraud referral sheet when they should in at least some  of the cases they reviewed. Of the 111 asylum officer survey respondents  who explained what prevented them from referring suspected fraud cases  to their FDNS-IO, about half attributed this to time limitations.
One of USCIS’s strategic goals is to combat fraud and, in 2007, the Asylum  Division included measures for combating fraud in its performance work  plan for supervisory asylum officers; however, it has not explicitly  included measures for combating fraud in its performance work plan for  asylum officers. Several asylum officers who provided comments to our  survey explained that a disincentive exists to take the time to make a fraud  referral when they suspect fraud. According to one asylum officer, there is  no reason to make a fraud referral because the performance work plan  does not reward it and it takes a lot of extra time. In October 2007, in  response to a DHS Office of Inspector General recommendation, USCIS  stated it plans to ensure that adjudicators’ performance work plans  include a measure for fraud detection—a recommendation that USCIS  concurred with and plans to address. We reported in March 2003 that  organizations should align individual performance expectations with  organizational goals to improve performance by helping personnel  connect their daily activities and organizational goals and encourage them  to achieve these goals. As such, we agree with the Office of the Inspector  General’s recommendation. Asylum Division officials told us in July 2008  that they had begun discussing this recommendation with USCIS and were  looking to USCIS to take the lead on addressing the issue.
Although most asylum officers and supervisors reported that asylum  officers needed more time to thoroughly adjudicate asylum cases,  management views were mixed. Five of the eight Asylum Office Directors  said that they believed that the 4 hours asylum officers are given to  complete a case was not reasonable, while three considered it to be  reasonable. One Asylum Office Director elaborated that asylum officers do  not struggle to complete cases within 4 hours, in part because the majority  of the asylum cases adjudicated in that office are older cases that are  usually easier to adjudicate. This Director explained that older cases may  be easier if country conditions have changed so dramatically over time  that the asylum claim can no longer be sustained, or if they were filed  before asylum reform solely for the purpose of obtaining employment  authorization. In the latter case, often the asylum claim is easily  determined to be unsupported. The Asylum Division recognizes that  asylum officers must work under time constraints and that the tasks and  time involved in completing a particular case may increase due to factors  such as a complicated story that takes additional time to fully elicit or  several dependents being listed on an application. Nevertheless, the Chief  of the Asylum Division said that the 4-hour average was sufficient and was  not convinced that more time would lead to increased adjudication quality.  Also, asylum officer performance work plan guidance states that under  extenuating circumstances, supervisors can allow asylum officers to take  more than the 4 days they typically have to provide their written decision  to their supervisor.
section_title: Adjudication Requirements Have Increased, While the Productivity Standard, Which Was Established Without Empirical Data, Has Remained the Same
paragraphs: Since 1999, asylum adjudication requirements have increased while the  productivity standard, which was established without empirical data, has  remained unchanged. As previously discussed in this report, since  September 11, 2001, the Asylum Division added requirements for asylum  officers to check additional identity and security databases and increased  the procedural requirements regarding when to conduct certain checks.  The Asylum Division estimates that 10 percent of asylum officers’ time  would be needed to conduct security checks and, in 2004, began including  this in making staffing projections. We discussed this projection with five  of the eight Asylum Office Directors we interviewed. Three of the five  Asylum Office Directors estimated that asylum officers spent 10 percent of  their time conducting security checks, and two stated that asylum officers  spent more than 10 percent of their time conducting these checks.  According to one of these Directors, 30 minutes of the 4 hours asylum  officers generally have to complete a case is needed to conduct identity  and security checks, and a QA/T explained that if the results of an identity  and security check identify a potential concern, resolving that concern can  add an hour to the adjudication process. In addition, beginning in 2007,  asylum officers have been required to confirm that Service Center staff  entered preparer information in RAPS and question the applicant if no  information was entered, as well as contact, swear in, and document  contact with interpreter monitors. Furthermore, all of the eight Asylum  Office Directors we interviewed commented that, over time, asylum cases  have become more complex or that requirements for completing cases  have increased. According to one Asylum Office Director, while tools have  been provided to deal with the increased complexity of fraud in asylum  applications, the asylum officers have not been given more time to use  these tools.
Although the overall caseload of the Asylum Division has steadily declined  from about 450,000 cases in 2002 to 83,000 cases in 2007, this has not  translated into asylum officers having more time to adjudicate asylum  cases. If local management is not able to assign asylum officers 18 asylum  cases per 2-week period, it assigns asylum officers other Asylum Division  work that is equivalent to 18 asylum cases to compensate for fewer asylum  cases. Given the other work assigned, asylum officers continue to have an  average of 4 hours under the productivity standard to complete each  asylum case assigned. According to six of the eight Asylum Office  Directors, asylum officers in their offices are generally being assigned  work that equates to 18 asylum cases—that is, they are assigned asylum  interviews in combination with other work. To compensate for being  assigned fewer than the 18 asylum cases, asylum officers adjudicated  nonasylum cases (i.e., credible fear, reasonable fear, and NACARA cases)  and performed additional work such as administrative closures and  research projects. Because of the decline in overall caseload, the Asylum  Division plans to take on new responsibilities for asylum officers that are  similar to their current work, such as adjudicating Refugee/Asylum  Relative Petitions. The adjudication of these petitions will be modeled on  the current asylum adjudication process, requiring interviews and checks  against US-VISIT, in addition to the other mandatory identity and security  checks. The division also increased the number of asylum officers  assigned to overseas details from about 12 officers in 2007 to 40 officers in  2008.
According to the Asylum Division Chief, the productivity standard was  established in 1999 as the result of discussions with the asylum officers’  union and management’s judgment. The Asylum Division had not  conducted a time study or gathered empirical data. At that time, the  productivity standard was reduced from 24 cases to 18 cases in a 2-week  period. Asylum Division training materials explain that the productivity  standard helps the Asylum Division achieve its mission of protecting  refugees, while meeting quality and timeliness goals. Further, if the  productivity standard is set too low, the Asylum Division would not have a  reasonable ability to keep pace with new receipts given the staff available,  whereas if it is set too high, the quality of adjudications would likely  suffer. Asylum Division officials further explained that setting the  productivity standard too low could result in adjudication delays that  might encourage spurious filings of asylum applications for the purpose of  obtaining employment authorizations. In May 2003, we reported that time  studies, in general, have the substantial benefit of providing quantitative  information that can be used to create objective and defensible measures  of workload and can account for time differences in completing work that  can vary in complexity. However, such studies do place some burden on  personnel during data collection and involve other costs as well. Without  empirical data on which to base the asylum officer’s productivity standard,  the Asylum Division is not in the position to know whether asylum officers  have sufficient time to conduct thorough asylum adjudications.
section_title: Key Factors Affecting Immigration Judge Adjudications Are Similar to Those Identified by Asylum Officers
paragraphs: Immigration judges’ responses to our survey indicated that key factors  affecting their adjudications were similar to those that asylum officers  identified. As shown in figure 9, of the 11 aspects of adjudicating asylum  cases we inquired about in our survey, immigration judge survey  respondents most frequently cited verifying fraud (88 percent) as a  moderately or very challenging aspect of adjudicating asylum cases. The  vast majority also reported time limitations (82 percent) and assessing  credibility (81 percent) as moderately or very challenging.
subsections: section_title: Immigration Judges Reported Challenges in Identifying Fraud and Assessing Credibility
paragraphs: Most immigration judges who responded to our survey identified fraud  and assessing credibility as significant challenges in adjudicating asylum  cases. In assessing an applicant’s eligibility for asylum, immigration judges  consider adverse factors, including the use of fraud to gain admittance to  the United States and inconsistent statements made by the asylum  applicant. As an immigration judge respondent explained, “it is very easy  to suspect fraud, but as in all civil cases, fraud is one of the most difficult  things to actually prove. Unless the DHS . . . can prove fraud by a  preponderance of the evidence, or a respondent admits facts constituting  fraud, the suspicion of fraud will remain just that.”
Of the various types of fraud that we inquired about in our survey, the  majority of immigration judges who responded reported that all the types  of fraud were moderately or very difficult to identify, with attorney fraud  (66 percent) and identity fraud (66 percent) most frequently reported as  difficult to identify, as shown in figure 10.
Of the various types of fraud that we inquired about in our survey, the  majority of immigration judges reported that all the types of fraud  presented a challenge in at least some of the cases that they adjudicated  over the last year. For example, as shown in figure 11, in at least some of  the cases they adjudicated over the past year, 94 percent of immigration  judges reported that suspected fraud in the claim presented a challenge,  and 93 percent reported that suspected document fraud presented a  challenge.
Most immigration judges who responded to our survey also reported  assessing credibility as a challenging aspect of adjudicating asylum cases.  In each decision, an immigration judge must include a detailed credibility  finding. Eighty-one percent of immigration judges reported that assessing  credibility was a moderately or very challenging aspect of adjudicating  asylum cases and an area in which they needed additional training.   Further, 48 percent of immigration judges cited assessing credibility as  one of their top three greatest challenges in adjudicating asylum cases. In  addition, a NAIJ representative stated that assessing credibility is very  difficult and that immigration judges would be better able to explore  issues relevant to credibility if they had more time in court to review  testimony and evidence.
The majority of immigration judges who responded to our survey reported  impediments to assessing credibility in about half or more of the cases  they adjudicated over the past year, including a lack of documentary  evidence (70 percent), lack of other overseas information on applicants  (61 percent), and lack of document verification from overseas (56  percent), as shown in figure 12. An immigration judge survey respondent  shared the view that because of a high level of fraud and abuse in asylum  cases and in the process, any case-specific evidence the ICE trial attorneys  could present to prove or disprove an asylum applicant’s case would be  extremely useful in trying to reach a fair and just result for the parties.  Although lack of overseas information was reportedly an impediment to  immigration judges’ ability to assess credibility, according to EOIR, it is  the role of the ICE trial attorney or the asylum applicant to gather  information from overseas agencies and verify the authenticity of  documents.
In response to reforms directed by the Attorney General in 2006, EOIR  designed the Fraud and Abuse Program that established a formal  procedure for immigration judges, BIA members, and other EOIR staff to  report suspected instances of immigration fraud or abuse. Prior to the  implementation of this new program, immigration judges reported  suspected fraud on an ad hoc basis primarily through management  channels or EOIR’s Attorney Discipline Program.
The goals of the Fraud and Abuse Program include    protecting the integrity of proceedings before EOIR;  referring, where appropriate, information to either law enforcement or a  disciplinary authority;    encouraging and supporting investigations and prosecutions; and    providing immigration judges, BIA members, and other EOIR staff with  source materials to aid in screening for fraudulent activity.
According to EOIR, the program improves immigration judges’ ability to  identify fraud by providing examples of prevalent forms of fraud and  abuse and suggestions for the screening of boilerplate claims and common  addresses. The program issues a monthly newsletter conveying such  information and has also established a Web site.
EOIR provided some training on the Fraud and Abuse Program. Although  the majority of immigration judges who responded to our survey reported  being somewhat or not at all familiar with EOIR’s new Fraud and Abuse  Program, EOIR was in the process of informing immigration judges of this  program when we conducted our survey during May through July 2007. As  of July 2008, the manager of the program had conducted presentations at  26 immigration courts and at the annual immigration judge conference. A  NAIJ representative stated that the Fraud and Abuse Program presentation  that immigration judges received during the annual immigration judge  conference was useful, but because the program was new, NAIJ had not  received feedback from immigration judges indicating their use of the  program.
According to EOIR, the Fraud and Abuse program is tracking all incoming  referrals. As of July 2008, the program had received 132 referrals, including  referrals of suspected asylum fraud and document fraud. Twenty-six of the  132 referrals were made by immigration judges. Patterns in referrals will  be used to alert EOIR staff and other entities to fraud schemes. According  to EOIR, as the Fraud and Abuse Program is relatively new, it remains  flexible to respond to agency needs. The program has surveyed staff who  attended the presentations at immigration courts about additional services  they would like from the program and, according to EOIR officials,  solicited immigration judges’ input in July 2008 to develop ideas for  additional training, among other things. EOIR officials stated that the  Fraud and Abuse Program Manager has developed internal benchmarks of  performance to assess the program, such as responding to all referrals  within 5 days and reviewing inactive cases every 60 days.
section_title: Immigration Judges Reported Facing Time Constraints and EOIR Has Taken Some Steps to Address This Challenge
paragraphs: Most immigration judges who responded to our survey reported time  constraints as a challenge in adjudicating asylum cases, and EOIR has  taken some steps to mitigate these challenges. Specifically, 82 percent of  immigration judges who responded to our survey reported that time  limitations were moderately or very challenging in adjudicating asylum  cases and 77 percent reported that managing caseload was moderately or  very challenging. The fact that the growth in the number of onboard  immigration judges has not kept pace with overall growth in caseload and  case completions, which include asylum cases, may contribute to this  challenge. While, from fiscal years 2002 through 2007, the number of  onboard immigration judges increased by 2 (from 214 to 216 immigration  judges), caseload, which includes newly filed and reopened cases and  cases pending from prior years, rose 14 percent from about 442,000 to  about 506,000 and completions rose 20 percent from about 274,000 to  about 328,000. The average caseload per onboard immigration judge rose  13 percent from 2,067 cases in fiscal year 2002 to 2,343 cases in fiscal year  2007.
According to a NAIJ representative, time constraints can have an effect on  the quality of decisions. The representative further explained that if a case  needs to be delayed or rescheduled, it may be rescheduled as much as a  full year later because of the volume of cases on an immigration judge’s  schedule. According to EOIR, both an immigration judge’s overall caseload  and the way the immigration judge manages that caseload affect the  pressures the immigration judge experiences on the bench. A heavy  caseload may limit an immigration judge’s ability to manage comfortably.
Nearly all immigration judge survey respondents also reported needing  more than the 4 hours off the bench that is provided for them to handle  administrative matters. Fifty-two percent reported that they need more  than 8 hours per week for administrative tasks and 45 percent said they  need about 5 to 8 hours. Sixty-nine percent reported that they did not use  their administrative time as intended about half the time; instead, they  used that time to hear cases.
According to EOIR, EOIR monitors the caseload of each immigration court  to identify courts that have been unable to meet their established goals for  timely case adjudication and provides assistance to help those courts meet  these goals. In 2006, we reported that EOIR helped courts address growing  caseloads by detailing immigration judges, using technology, transferring  responsibility for hearing locations, and establishing new courts. EOIR  informed us in 2007 that it continues to employ these mechanisms. In 2007,  when we surveyed immigration judges, 57 percent reported that having a  visiting immigration judge detailed to their court somewhat or greatly  helped their ability to manage their caseload, and 40 percent reported  having immigration judges from other courts hear cases via  videoconference somewhat or greatly helped their ability to manage their  caseload.
In addition, because of the volume of cases that immigration judges  handle, EOIR advises immigration judges to issue oral decisions  immediately after hearing a case, deeming it generally to be the most  efficient way to complete cases. However, 71 percent of immigration  judges who responded to our survey reported that rendering an oral  decision immediately after a hearing was moderately or very challenging.  According to a NAIJ representative, oral decisions are difficult because  immigration judges are trying to balance multiple tasks at once during a  hearing—listening carefully to the testimony, asking follow-up questions,  and applying case law correctly. Having time to reflect after listening to  testimony, and having time to prepare a written decision would result in  better decisions. However, according to EOIR, rendering oral decisions  following a hearing allows both sides to hear the decision while the  evidence is fresh in their minds and then make an informed choice  whether to appeal the decision. Furthermore, immigration judges who  reserve decisions for later quickly develop a backlog.
According to EOIR, issues resulting from heavy caseloads are best  addressed by increasing the number of immigration judges and staff  available. To help immigration judges better manage their caseload, EOIR  requested funding to hire 240 additional staff for immigration courts.  According to EOIR, in developing its request, it considered budget  guidance and the number of positions it could reasonably expect to fill in a  given year. One hundred and twenty new positions were requested and  funded in fiscal year 2007, 20 of which were immigration judge positions.  Although EOIR requested funding for the remaining 120 positions in fiscal  year 2008, it did not receive its full budget request. As a result, EOIR  abolished its plans to hire an additional 120 positions in fiscal year 2008,  including 20 immigration judge positions. Prior to the hiring of additional  staff, most immigration judges who responded to our survey reported that  having additional law clerks (98 percent), additional immigration judges  (84 percent), and additional administrative court staff (77 percent) would  moderately or greatly improve their ability to carry out their  responsibilities. According to EOIR, as of May 2008, it was in the process  of hiring approximately 38 immigration judges, comprised of newly  authorized positions and replacements for attrition. Until all authorized  immigration court staff are on board, it is too soon to determine the extent  to which increased staffing will affect immigration judges’ ability to  manage their caseload.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Adjudicating asylum cases is a challenging undertaking because asylum  officers do not always have the means to determine which claims are  authentic and which are fraudulent. USCIS has taken steps to instill quality  and strengthen the integrity of the asylum decision-making process.  However, asylum officers still face adjudication challenges, including  asylum fraud, lack of information from entities outside USCIS that could  help assess the authenticity of claims, and increased responsibilities  without additional time to carry them out. With potentially serious  consequences for asylum applicants if they are incorrectly denied asylum  and for the United States if criminals or terrorists are granted asylum,  asylum officers must make the best decision they can within the  constraints that are placed on them.
The mechanisms USCIS designed to promote quality and integrity in  decision making can be better utilized to decrease the risk that incorrect  asylum decisions are made. Eliciting information through applicant  interviews is a challenging and critical component of an asylum officer’s  ability to distinguish between genuine and fraudulent claims. By  supplementing existing training with additional opportunities for asylum  officers to observe skilled interviewers, the Asylum Division could  improve asylum officers’ ability to elicit needed information during an  applicant interview to help distinguish between a genuine and fraudulent  claim. In addition, by developing a framework to solicit asylum officers’  and supervisors’ views of their training needs in a structured and  consistent manner, the Asylum Division would help ensure that  headquarters and Asylum Offices have more complete information from  which to make training decisions. Furthermore, by more fully  implementing its quality review framework, the Asylum Division would be  in a better position to identify deficiencies in the quality of asylum  decisions asylum officers make, identify the root causes of such  deficiencies, and take appropriate action, such as focusing training  opportunities.
Insufficient time for asylum officers to adjudicate cases can undermine the  efficacy of the tools that asylum officers do have, as well as USCIS’s goals  to ensure quality and combat fraud. We recognize that conducting an  empirical study of the time asylum officers need to complete a thorough  adjudication, including conducting increased security checks and referring  instances of suspected fraud when appropriate, would involve some  expenditure of resources. However, doing so would better position the  Asylum Division to know whether it is providing asylum officers with the  time needed to do their job in accordance with their procedures manual  and training. More recent tools, such as additional identity and security  check information and the placement of FDNS immigration officers in  Asylum Offices can be valuable, but only if asylum officers have the time  to fully utilize them.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the integrity of the asylum adjudication process, we  recommend that the Chief of the Asylum Division take the following five  actions:    explore ways to provide additional opportunities for asylum officers to    develop a framework for soliciting information in a structured and  consistent manner on asylum officers’ and supervisors’ respective training  needs, including, at a minimum, training needs discussed in this report;    ensure that the information collected on training needs is used to provide  training to asylum officers and supervisory asylum officers at the offices  where the information shows it is needed or nationally, when training  needs are common;    develop a plan to more fully implement the quality review framework— and complement existing supervisory and headquarters reviews—to  include, among other things, how to ensure that in each Asylum Office a  sample of decisions of asylum officers are reviewed for quality and  consistency and interviews conducted by asylum officers are observed;  and    develop a cost-effective way to collect empirical data on the time it takes  asylum officers to thoroughly complete the steps in the adjudication  process and revise productivity standards, if warranted.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We requested comments on a draft of this report from DHS, DOJ, and  State. The departments did not provide official written comments to  include in our report. However, in e-mails received September 12, 2008,  the DHS and USCIS liaisons stated that DHS concurred with our  recommendations. DHS and EOIR provided written technical comments,  which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General,  and the Secretary of State. We will also provide copies to others on  request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. For further  information about this report, please contact Richard M. Stana, Director,  Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-8777 or at  stanar@gao.gov. GAO staff members who were major contributors to this  report are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Survey of Asylum Officers
paragraphs: We sent our Web-based survey to all asylum officers who were in their  position at the end of fiscal year 2006. We received 189 responses from  asylum officers, resulting in a 74 percent response rate. To ensure survey  respondents had recent knowledge about the issues our survey explored,  18 of the 189 respondents were directed to not complete the rest of survey  because their responses to our initial questions indicated their primary  responsibilities did not include adjudicating asylum cases or they had  adjudicated no, or almost no, asylum cases over the past year. Although  171 asylum officers completed the survey, the number answering any  particular question may be lower, depending on how many chose to  answer any given question. In addition, for certain questions, respondents  were instructed to skip particular questions based on their responses to  previous questions. Each question includes the number of asylum officers  responding to it.
Our survey was comprised of closed- and open-ended questions. In this  appendix, we include all the survey questions and aggregate results of  responses to the closed-ended questions; we do not provide information  on responses provided to the open-ended questions. For a more detailed  discussion of our survey methodology see appendix IV.
subsections: section_title: Survey Methodology
paragraphs: To corroborate information and pursue issues we identified during our  research on the U.S. Asylum System and our interviews with agency  officials, we developed and deployed three different Web-based surveys to  (1) asylum officers, (2) supervisory asylum officers, and (3) immigration  judges. We asked asylum officers about their views on areas including  training, conducting identity and security checks, interviewing and  assessing credibility, assessing fraud, country-condition information,  workload, and decision making. We asked supervisory asylum officers  about their views on areas including their own responsibilities and training  as well as asylum officers’ responsibilities and training. We asked  immigration judges about their views on areas including professional  development, credibility and fraud in asylum cases, rendering an asylum  decision, and caseload.
subsections: section_title: Survey Development
paragraphs: GAO social science survey specialists along with GAO staff knowledgeable  about asylum adjudications developed the three survey instruments. We  sent drafts of the asylum officer survey and supervisory asylum officer  survey to Asylum Division officials for preliminary reviews to ensure that  our questions were clear and unambiguous, used clear terminology and  appropriate response options, and that the survey was comprehensive and  unbiased. We sent a draft of the survey of immigration judges to Executive  Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) officials and Assistant Chief  Immigration Judges for the same purpose. We also asked for and received  comments from the asylum officer representative to the American  Federation of Government Employees on the draft asylum officer survey  and representatives from the National Association of Immigration Judges  (NAIJ) on the draft immigration judge survey. We considered comments  and suggestions from all parties and made revisions where we thought  they were warranted.
We conducted pretests of the three surveys to ensure that the questions  were clear and concise, and refined the instruments based on feedback we  received. We pretested the asylum officer survey with eight asylum  officers with a range of experience levels in five different Asylum Offices.  We conducted these pretests using a combination of in-person, telephone,  and Web-based approaches. We conducted pretests of the supervisory  asylum officer survey with three supervisors with varying levels of  experience in three different Asylum Offices; all were conducted by  telephone and one used a Web-based approach. We conducted pretests of  the immigration judge survey by telephone with three immigration judges  in three different immigration courts.
section_title: Identification of Survey Respondents
paragraphs: To develop mailing lists for the asylum officer and supervisory asylum  officer surveys, we obtained from the Asylum Division the name, Asylum  Office, and e-mail address of every onboard asylum officer and supervisor  along with the date each officer began his or her position. Similarly, to  develop a mailing list for the immigration judge survey, we obtained from  EOIR the name, immigration court, and e-mail address of every onboard  immigration judge along with the date each immigration judge began his or  her position. We excluded from this list Assistant Chief Immigration  Judges because we provided them with the opportunity to review a survey  draft and provide comments. To ensure that we solicited information only  from those who had some basic level of experience on which to draw, we  sent surveys only to individuals who had been in their position for at least  approximately 6 months—that is, they were on board as of September 30,  2006, the end of fiscal year 2006. Two hundred fifty-six asylum officers, 56  supervisory asylum officers, and 207 immigration judges met the criterion.
section_title: Survey-Distribution Timeframes and Response Rates
paragraphs: Asylum officer survey. We announced our upcoming Web-based survey  of asylum officers on March 1, 2007, and e-mailed asylum officers a cover  letter and link to the survey on March 5. The Chief of the Asylum Division  also informed Asylum Office staff of our survey efforts and encouraged  asylum officers to participate, noting that participation was voluntary, and  directed Asylum Office management to provide all asylum officers with 2  hours of administrative time during which they could elect to complete the  survey. During the period from March 5 through April 30 (the final  deadline for completing the survey), we e-mailed reminder notices five  times to asylum officers who had not responded, encouraging them to  participate. On April 24, we followed up by telephone with 17 asylum  officers—all those who had begun, but had not finished, the survey. We  received 189 responses from asylum officers, resulting in a 74 percent  response rate. Of the 189 respondents, 171 said that, over the past year,  their primary responsibilities included adjudicating asylum cases and that  they had adjudicated at least some affirmative asylum cases, which was  the focus of our review. The remaining 18 asylum officers who said their  primary responsibilities did not include adjudicating asylum cases or they  had not adjudicated at least some asylum cases over the past year were  directed to not complete the rest of survey.
Supervisory asylum officer survey. With respect to the Web-based  survey of supervisory asylum officers, we announced the survey on March  12, 2007, and e-mailed supervisory asylum officers a cover letter and link  to the survey on March 14. As with the asylum officer survey, the Chief of  the Asylum Division also informed Asylum Office staff of our survey  efforts and encouraged supervisors to participate, noting that participation  was voluntary, and directed Asylum Office management to provide all  supervisors with 2 hours of administrative time during which they could  elect to complete the survey. During the period from March 12 through  May 6 (the final deadline for completing the survey), we e-mailed reminder  notices four times to supervisory asylum officers who had not responded,  encouraging them to participate.
On April 24, we followed up by telephone with 3 supervisory asylum  officers—all those who had begun, but had not finished, the survey. We  received 43 responses from supervisory asylum officers, resulting in a 77  percent response rate. Of the 43 respondents, 40 said that they had  reviewed at least some affirmative asylum decisions over the past year.  The remaining 3 supervisory asylum officers who said they reviewed no or  almost no asylum cases over the past year were directed to not complete  the rest of the survey. Percentages for data from relatively small  populations, such as supervisor asylum officers, may convey a level of  precision that can be misleading because they can change greatly with  minor changes in the data. Thus, in reporting supervisory asylum officers’  survey responses throughout this report, we generally identified the  number in addition to the percentage of supervisory asylum officers who  responded to a question in a particular way.
Immigration judge survey. We announced our upcoming Web-based  survey of immigration judges on May 25, 2007, and e-mailed a cover letter  and link to the survey on May 30. The President of NAIJ encouraged  immigration judges to participate. During the period from May 30 through  July 29 (the final deadline for completing the survey), we e-mailed  reminder notices five times to immigration judges who had not responded,  encouraging them to participate. From July 12 through July 16, 2007, we  followed up by telephone with the 65 immigration judges who had not  completed the survey. We surveyed all 207 immigration judges who were  on board as of September 30, 2006, and received 160 responses for a 77  percent response rate. Of the 160 respondents, 159 said that they had  heard at least some asylum cases over the past year. The one immigration  judge who had not adjudicated any asylum cases over the past year was  directed to not complete the rest of the survey.
section_title: Survey Analysis
paragraphs: In analyzing the three surveys, we computed descriptive statistics on the  closed-ended survey responses and conducted a systematic content  analysis on selected open-ended survey responses. (See app. I, app. II, and  app. III, respectively, for aggregate responses to the asylum officer,  supervisory asylum officer, and immigration judge survey).
To analyze the content of responses of asylum officers and supervisors to  particular open-ended questions, two staff members independently  reviewed all the responses and identified preliminary response categories,  and then mutually agreed on response categories. They subsequently  reviewed responses, again, and independently placed them into  appropriate categories. Any discrepancies were discussed and resolved,  with a third team member being consulted when needed.
Because these were not sample surveys, but rather a census of all the  relevant groups, there are no sampling errors. However, the practical  difficulties of conducting any surveys may introduce nonsampling errors.  For example, differences in how a particular question was interpreted or  the sources of information available to respondents can introduce  unwanted variability into the survey results. We included steps in both the  data-collection and data-analysis stages for the purposes of minimizing  such nonsampling errors. As indicated above, social science survey  specialists designed the draft questionnaires in close collaboration with  GAO subject matter experts, and drafts were reviewed for accuracy by  agency officials. Versions of the questionnaire were pretested with several  members of each of the populations. Since this was a Web-based survey,  respondents entered their answers directly into the electronic  questionnaire, eliminating the need to key data into a database, minimizing  error. We examined the survey results and performed computer analyses  to identify inconsistencies and other indications of error. A second,  independent analyst checked the accuracy of all computer analyses.
section_title: Site Visits
paragraphs: To gain a better understanding of asylum adjudications, we visited three of  the Asylum Division’s eight Asylum Offices—Los Angeles, San Francisco,  and New York. The views we obtained at these three offices may not be  generalized to all eight Asylum Offices. However, since we selected these  offices based on their diversity in size (based on the number of asylum  officers and cases adjudicated), percentage of cases granted asylum, and  geographic location, they provided us with an overview and perspective of  the asylum process as well as potential challenges facing asylum officers.  At each of the three offices, we conducted semistructured interviews with  the Asylum Office Director and Deputy Director, a Quality Assurance and  Training Coordinator, and the Fraud Detection and National Security  Immigration Officer; and at two of the three offices, we interviewed the  Fraud Prevention Coordinator. In addition, we interviewed a total of 14  asylum officers and 5 supervisory asylum officers among the three offices.  At one office, we asked the Director to identify 2 asylum officers and 1  supervisory asylum officer for us to interview. At the other two offices, we  selected asylum officers and supervisors using a random sampling  approach that we stratified based on experience levels. The composition  of each office in terms of number and experience levels of officers and  staff availability affected who we were able to interview. Between these  two offices, we interviewed 12 asylum officers (5 officers with more than 8  years of experience who we categorized as “very experienced,” 4 officers  with between 2 and 8 years of experience who we categorized as  “experienced,” and 3 officers with less than 2 years of experience who we  categorized as “less experienced”). At each of these 2 offices, we  interviewed 1 “very experienced” and 1 “experienced” supervisory asylum  officer. Between the 2 offices, we also observed a total of 14 interviews  that asylum officers conducted with asylum applicants. In addition, we  observed a local training session at each of these 2 offices.
To obtain an additional perspective on factors that may affect asylum  officers’ and immigration judges’ adjudication of asylum cases, we  interviewed U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Assistant  Chief Counsels (also known as ICE trial attorneys) associated with  immigration courts in Los Angeles and San Francisco, California, and New  York City, New York who were identified by an ICE Deputy Chief Counsel  as having experience with asylum cases. As the government’s  representative in removal proceedings, ICE trial attorneys see asylum  cases that come before the immigration court. In Los Angeles and San  Francisco, we met with a Deputy Chief Counsel and a total of three ICE  trial attorneys; in New York City, we met with four ICE trial attorneys. To  further our understanding of factors affecting immigration judges’ asylum  adjudications, we visited the Los Angeles immigration court where we  interviewed four immigration judges and observed court proceedings,  which included initial and merit hearings on asylum cases.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2005 through  September 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix V: Asylum Adjudication Process
subsections: section_title: Asylum Adjudication Process within DHS
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) affirmative asylum process  generally consists of several steps. The alien initiates the process by filing  an asylum application at a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  (USCIS) Service Center, where the case is entered into the Refugees,  Asylum, and Parole System and some background, identity, and security  checks are automatically initiated. Service Center personnel send  automatically generated notices to the applicants, requiring them to  appear for biometrics collection, including fingerprints, at a USCIS  Application Support Center prior to the asylum interview. Service Center  personnel send the applicant’s file to the Asylum Office that has  jurisdiction over the applicant’s place of residence. Within 21 days of  filing, the Asylum Office sends an automatically generated interview notice  to the applicant. The Asylum Office is allocated at least 15 days to  complete the adjudication after conducting the interview. Generally, cases  are randomly assigned to asylum officers who are required by law to  conduct interviews with applicants within 45 days of the application filing  date in the absence of exceptional circumstances. The purpose of the  interview is to verify the applicant’s identity, establish the applicant’s  alienage, evaluate the applicant’s credibility, and determine whether the  applicant is eligible for asylum. Applicants are permitted, but not required,  to bring their own attorney or accredited representative to the interview. If  the applicant is not fluent in English, the applicant is required to bring an  interpreter to the asylum interview. Within 4 days of the interview, the  asylum officer is to prepare the written decision and submit it to a  supervisory asylum officer. The supervisor is to review the decision to  ensure the asylum officer’s decision is supported by law and that  procedures are properly followed. The supervisor either signs or returns it  to the asylum officer for correction. Applicants interviewed at Asylum  Offices are required to return to the asylum office 2 weeks after the  interview and within 60 days of filing the asylum application to receive the  asylum decision.
section_title: Asylum Adjudication Process within DOJ
paragraphs: Within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Executive Office for  Immigration Review’s (EOIR) asylum process generally consists of the  following steps. The applicant is to appear before an immigration judge for  an initial hearing, during which the immigration judge is to, among other  things, (a) ensure that the applicant understands the contents of the  Notice to Appear, (b) provide the applicant information on available free  of charge or low-cost legal representation in the area, and (c) schedule a  subsequent date to hear the merits of the asylum claim. At that time, the  immigration judge also hears the pleadings of the U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement (ICE) trial attorney and the applicant. Prior to the  merits hearing, the ICE trial attorney, and the applicant or the applicant’s  representative must submit applications, exhibits, motions, a witness list,  and criminal history to the immigration court, if applicable. The ICE trial  attorney and the applicant, or the applicant’s representative, may also  submit prehearing briefs or statements for the immigration judge to review  in advance of the hearing to narrow the legal issues. In some cases  attorneys, or the immigration judge, may request a prehearing conference  for reasons including narrowing the issues or exchanging information. A  merits hearing is then held, during which the applicant (or the applicant’s  representative) and an ICE trial attorney present the case before the  immigration judge by generally making opening statements, presenting  witnesses and evidence to the immigration judge, cross-examining, and  making closing statements. The immigration judge may participate in the  questioning of the applicant or other witnesses. At the end of the hearing,  the immigration judge is to issue a decision that includes the facts that  were found to be true, an accurate statement of the law, factors that were  considered, and the weight that was given to the evidence presented  (including the credibility of witnesses). If the applicant or ICE disagrees  with the immigration judge’s decision, either party may appeal it to EOIR’s  Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) within 30 days. If the BIA ruling is  adverse to the applicant, the applicant generally may file a petition for  review in the U.S. Court of Appeals.
section_title: Appendix VI: Asylum Division and EOIR Caseload and Staffing Information
subsections: section_title: Asylum Division Caseload and Staffing Levels
paragraphs: During fiscal years 2002 through 2007, the Asylum Division received  391,763 new cases, of which 63 percent consisted of asylum receipts—that  is, new or reopened asylum applications. As shown in figure 13, asylum  officers’ annual caseload declined during this period, and completions  declined from fiscal year 2005 through 2007.
During this same period, authorized staffing for asylum officers ranged  from a high of 332 officers in 2004 to a low of 291 officers in 2007, as  shown in table 3, although not all asylum officers were considered  available to conduct adjudications. The Asylum Division projects the  number of “available asylum officers” by subtracting from authorized  levels the number of staff designated to conduct overseas refugee  adjudications and security screening and the number it projects will be  unavailable due to activities such as training and leave. During fiscal years  2002 through 2007, the Asylum Division reported available asylum officers  ranged from a high of 232 in 2003 to a low of 199 in 2005. It reported 163  officers would be available in 2008. The Asylum Division may detail  asylum officers from one office to another to assist offices with high  caseloads.
section_title: EOIR Immigration Court Caseload and Staffing Levels
paragraphs: Immigration court receipts—that is, newly filed and reopened cases—  totaled about 1.9 million cases during fiscal years 2002 through 2007, of  which 22 percent were asylum, and the rest were other types of  immigration cases. From fiscal years 2002 through fiscal year 2005,  immigration judges’ caseload, which includes receipts and all cases still  pending from the prior years, increased annually, but began to decline in  fiscal year 2006 (see fig. 14). Completions increased annually from fiscal  years 2002 through 2006, and declined in 2007. According to the Executive  Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), immigration caseload is expected  to increase by a minimum of 25,000 additional cases by 2008 as a result of  current and planned DHS initiatives, such as the addition of detention  facilities and beds and enhanced anti-smuggling programs.
As shown in table 4, from fiscal years 2002 through fiscal year 2007, the  number of authorized immigration judges increased from 216 in fiscal year  2002 to 251 in fiscal year 2007, with the most significant increase occurring  in fiscal year 2007. At the same time, the number of immigration judges  who were on board remained fairly constant, except for an increase in  fiscal year 2006.
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Evi Rezmovic, Assistant Director,  and Lori Weiss, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. Tracey Cross,  Foster Kerrison, Maria Mercado, Catherine Kim, Yvette Gutierrez-Thomas,  Jason Campbell, and Alana Miller made significant contributions to the  work. Michele Fejfar, Elizabeth Wood, and Carolyn Boyce assisted with  design, methodology, and data analysis. Lara Kaskie and Richard Ascarate  provided assistance in report preparation, Frances Cook provided legal  support, Tom Jessor provided expertise on immigration court issues, and  Karen Burke and Etana Finkler developed the report’s graphics.