Disaster Resilience: Actions Are Underway, but Federal Fiscal Exposure Highlights the Need for Continued Attention to Longstanding Challenges
Published: 2014-05-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Multiple factors including increased disaster declarations, climate change effects, and insufficient premiums under the National Flood Insurance Program increase federal fiscal exposure to severe weather events. Managing fiscal exposure from climate change and the National Flood Insurance Program are both on GAO's High Risk list. GAO has previously reported that building resilience to protect against future damage is one strategy to help limit fiscal exposure. However, in prior reports GAO also identified multiple challenges to doing so. Responsibility for actions that enhance resilience rests largely outside the federal government, so nonfederal entities also play a key role.
This testimony discusses (1) resilience-building challenges GAO has previously identified; (2) federal efforts to facilitate resilience-building as part of Hurricane Sandy recovery; and (3) examples of nonfederal efforts to incentivize resilience building. This testimony is based on previous GAO reports issued from 1998 through 2014 related to hazard mitigation, climate change, flood insurance, and preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work for this committee on federal resilience efforts related to the Sandy recovery. For the ongoing work, GAO reviewed documents such as the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy and a 2012 National Academies Study on building resilience. GAO also interviewed officials from FEMA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO has identified various challenges to resilience building—actions to help prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adapt to adverse events including those caused by extreme weather. These include challenges for communities in balancing hazard mitigation investments with economic development goals, challenges for individuals in understanding and acting to limit their personal risk, and broad challenges with the clarity of information to inform risk decision making. GAO's work over more than 30 years demonstrates that these are longstanding policy issues, without easy solutions. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) May 2013 release of a National Mitigation Framework and establishment of a group to help coordinate interagency and intergovernmental mitigation efforts offers one avenue for leadership on these issues.
In ongoing work on federal resilience efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, GAO identified three high-level actions that demonstrated an intensified federal focus on incorporating resilience-building into the recovery.
The President issued an executive order to coordinate the recovery effort and created a task force that issued 69 recommendations aimed at improving recovery from Sandy and future disasters—including recommendations designed to facilitate resilient rebuilding.
Congress appropriated about $50 billion in supplemental funds for multiple recovery efforts, including at least five federal programs that help support resilience-building efforts. One of these, FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), is the only federal program designed specifically to promote mitigation against future losses in the wake of a disaster; while, another, the Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program made more than $4 billion available for transit resilience projects.
The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 provided additional responsibilities and authorities related to FEMA's mitigation and recovery efforts. In response, FEMA has undertaken efforts to make HMGP easier for states to use—for example by streamlining application procedures. The act also provided additional authorities for FEMA to fund hazard mitigation with other disaster relief funds and required FEMA to provide recommendations for a national strategy on reducing the cost of future disasters to Congress, which FEMA finalized in September 2013.
For the purposes of this statement GAO reviewed studies that discuss resilience building and climate change adaptation and identified examples efforts at the state and local levels that illustrate a variety of nonfederal initiatives that may drive communities to build resilience. For example, a nonprofit group is creating report cards to assess the resilience of a building to earthquakes and plans to extend these efforts to wind and flood risk. In some localities public-private partnerships have helped promote efforts to buy properties that were at risk from repeat losses.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today about disaster  mitigation and resilience, especially given the $50 billion in federal dollars  recently appropriated for recovery from Hurricane Sandy.
The term resilience refers to the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb,  recover from, and more successfully adapt to actual or potential adverse  events. Hazard mitigation and climate adaptation are strategies to  promote resilience to extreme weather events, among other things. The  term mitigation, in this context, describes the capabilities necessary to  reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact of disasters;  while, climate change adaptation is specific to such adjustments made in  response to actual or expected climate change. These resilience-building  strategies include efforts to protect critical infrastructure and reduce  specific vulnerabilities—by for example, increasing the capacity of storm  water systems and raising river or coastal dikes.
As we reported in 2012, from fiscal years 2004 through 2011, the Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) obligated over $80 billion in  federal assistance for disasters, and the growing number of major  disaster declarations had contributed to increasing federal disaster  assistance expenditures. Moreover, the United States Global Change  Research Program has reported that the impacts and costliness of  weather disasters—resulting from floods, drought, and other events such  as hurricanes—will increase in significance as what are considered “rare”  events become more common and intense due to climate change. In  addition, less acute effects of changes in the climate, such as sea level  rise, could also result in significant long-term effects on people and  property. In 2013, we added managing fiscal exposure due to climate  change to our High Risk list, in part, because of concerns about these  increasing costs.
We also designated the National Flood Insurance Program—a key  component of the federal government’s efforts to limit the financial impact  of floods—as a high risk area and included it on our High Risk list in  March 2006. The program faces challenges with long-term  sustainability—as of December 2013, FEMA’s debt from flood insurance  payments totaled about $24 billion—and FEMA had not repaid any  principal on the loan since 2010—which compounds fiscal exposure  arising from severe weather events.
We and others have recommended building resilience—by taking actions  to mitigate vulnerabilities to the effects of severe weather and to adapt to  effects of climate change—as one strategy to help to limit the nation’s  fiscal exposure. However, we have previously identified a variety of  challenges associated with such resilience-building efforts.
In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy devastated the Eastern seaboard and  resulted in tens of billions of dollars damage from the Mid-Atlantic to the  Northeast. At the same time, an executive order and legislation in the  wake of the devastation signaled an increased focus from both the  President and Congress on building resilience into recovery efforts.
We currently have ongoing work for this committee evaluating select  federal efforts to facilitate resilience planning and activities as part of the  Sandy recovery effort, which we plan to issue later this year. My  statement today is based on previously published and ongoing work and  it discusses select (1) resilience-building challenges we have previously  identified; (2) federal efforts to facilitate resilience-building as part of the  Sandy recovery; and (3) examples of nonfederal efforts to incentivize  resilience building.
This statement is based on reports we issued from January 1998 to  August 2007 on hazard mitigation and resilience-building activities and  ongoing work for this committee evaluating federal efforts to facilitate  resilience planning and activities as part of the Sandy recovery efforts.  Specifically, to describe resilience building challenges we have previously  identified, we consulted our prior reports and testimonies (see Related  GAO Products at the end of this statement). For our prior work, among  other things, we reviewed key federal documents and efforts such as  previous congressional reports and publications from the federal agencies  involved in mitigation activities, analyzed information collected from  relevant agencies and officials, and visited locations with comprehensive  mitigation programs. Further details on the scope and methodology of our  previously issued reports are available within each of the published  products. For our ongoing work on federal mitigation efforts, we reviewed  documents such as the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy and  FEMA’s report on recommendations for a national strategy to reduce the  costs of future disasters, and studies on nonfederal resilience-building  efforts, and we interviewed federal officials at FEMA and the Department  of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). We shared a copy of the  new information in this statement with Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) officials.
The work upon which this testimony is based was and is being conducted  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Longstanding Challenges Inhibit Efforts to Promote Resilience
paragraphs: Challenges we identified with disaster resilience as long ago as 1980  have persisted and were reflected in our work on disaster mitigation in  2007, as well as recent studies such as a 2012 National Academies  National Research Council (NRC) study on disaster resilience.
subsections: section_title: State and Local Governments May Have Concerns about Competing Priorities for Economic Development and Resilience Building
paragraphs: We testified in January 1998 that, for a number of reasons, state and  local governments may be reluctant to invest in resilience-building  efforts. For example, leaders may be concerned that hazard mitigation  activities will detract from economic development goals and may perceive  that mitigation is costly and involves solutions that are overly technical  and complex.
In our work on hazard mitigation issued in August 2007, we found that  these issues persisted. We reported that hazard mitigation goals and  local economic interests often conflict, and the resulting tension can often  have a profound effect on mitigation efforts. For example, we reported  that community goals such as building housing and promoting economic  development may be higher priorities than formulating mitigation  regulations that may include restrictive development regulations and more  stringent building codes. In particular, local government officials we  contacted as part of that work commented that developers often want to  increase growth in hazard-prone areas (e.g., along the coast or in  floodplains) to support economic development. These areas are often  desirable for residences and businesses, and such development  increases local tax revenues but is generally in conflict with mitigation  goals.
In 2012, the National Academies National Research Council (NRC)  issued a report on disaster resilience, noting that understanding,  managing, and reducing disaster risks provide a foundation for building  resilience to disasters. Risk management—both personal and  collective—is important in the resilience context because the perceptions  of and choices about risk shape how individuals, groups, and public- and  private-sector organizations behave, how they respond during and after a  disaster event, and how they plan for future disasters. However, the  National Academies report described a variety of challenges that affect  risk management. As with our 1998 and 2007 work, one of the key  challenges the NRC reported for state and local governments was  reluctance to limit economic development with resilience measures.
section_title: Individuals May Lack Incentives and Understanding of Risk When Deciding Whether to Invest in Resilience- Building Efforts
paragraphs: We testified in January 1998 that individuals may also lack incentives to  take resilience-building measures. We noted that increasing the  awareness of the hazards associated with living in a certain area or  previous experience with disasters do not necessarily persuade  individuals to take preventive measures against future disasters.  Residents of hazard-prone areas tend to treat the possibility of a  disaster’s occurrence as sufficiently low to permit them to ignore the  consequences.
We have also reported that the availability of federal assistance may  inhibit actions to mitigate disaster losses. As long ago as 1980, we  reported that individuals may not act to protect themselves from the  effects of severe weather if they believe the federal government will  eventually help pay for their losses. The 1993 National Performance  Review also found that the availability of post-disaster federal funds may  reduce incentives for mitigation. Moreover, FEMA’s 1993 review of the  National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program concluded that at the  state level there is “the expectation that federal disaster assistance will  address the problem after the event. Concerns about individuals’ ability  to appropriately evaluate risk and take action to protect themselves  continued in our August 2007 work when we reported that individuals  often have a misperception that natural hazard events will not occur in  their community and are not interested in learning of the likelihood of an  event occurring. Likewise, the 2012 NRC report on disaster resilience  identified the key risk management challenge for homeowners and  businesses in hazard-prone areas is the fact that they may be unaware of  or underestimate the hazards that they face.
section_title: Information Required to Support Risk Decision Making is Imprecise, Incomplete, and Complex
paragraphs: In January 1998, we described three sets of issues that complicate  assessing the cost-effectiveness of actions to build resilience. At the  same time, we testified that a lack of comprehensive, reliable data to  make decisions about cost-benefit tradeoffs may also inhibit local  governments from deciding to invest in hazard mitigation activities. First,  we noted that by definition, natural hazard mitigation reduces the loss of  life and property below the levels that could be expected without  mitigation, but it is impossible to measure what loss would have been  incurred without mitigation. Second, the dispersion of mitigation funds and  responsibilities across various agencies makes it difficult to determine the  collective benefit of federal efforts. Finally, we noted that federal savings  depend on the frequency of future disasters and the extent to which the  federal government will bear the resulting losses, which is unknown.
Moreover, in 2007 we reported that limited public awareness may also be  a result of the complexity of the information that is needed for individuals  to understand their hazard risks. We concluded that for local decision  makers to develop mitigation strategies for their communities they need  appropriate and easily understandable information about the probability of  natural hazards and that efforts to improve public awareness and  education are long-term and require sustained effort. Similarly, in our  February 2014 testimony on limiting fiscal exposure from and increasing  resilience to climate change, we noted that local decision makers need  expert assistance translating climate change information into something  that is locally relevant. The 2012 NRC study identified understanding how  to share scientific information with broad audiences as one of the key  challenges for resilience researchers.
The challenges we identified in prior work—competing priorities for state  and local governments, imperfect individual risk decision making, and  imprecise, incomplete, and complex information about both risk and  benefits—are difficult issues that are likely to persist. These issues are  longstanding and difficult policy issues. Indeed, the increasing number of  federal disaster declarations and the growing role of the federal  government in funding post disaster relief and recovery efforts may serve  to exacerbate some of the inherent challenges. We are encouraged that  DHS finalized the National Mitigation Framework in 2013 to coordinate  interagency and intergovernmental efforts and that the framework  established a Mitigation Framework Leadership Group to coordinate  mitigation efforts of relevant local, state, tribal, and federal organizations.  The framework and the group create an avenue for interagency and  intergovernmental leadership to pursue solutions to these difficult policy  issues. As part of our ongoing work, we plan to evaluate the status of the  Mitigation Framework Leadership Group and the actions taken to date to  apply the National Mitigation Framework in the context of recovery from  Hurricane Sandy.
section_title: Federal Response to Hurricane Sandy Demonstrated Increased Focus on Mitigation and Resilience-Building
paragraphs: In ongoing work on federal resilience efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane  Sandy, we identified three high-level actions that demonstrated an  intensified federal focus on incorporating resilience-building into the  recovery.
subsections: section_title: The President’s Executive Order on Sandy Rebuilding Charged Federal Agencies with Facilitating Resilience
paragraphs: In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, President Obama signed Executive  Order 13632 on December 7, 2012. The Executive Order created the  Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, chaired by the HUD Secretary  and consisting of more than 23 federal agencies and offices. Among other  things, the executive order charged the task force to work with partners in  the affected region to understand existing and future risks and  vulnerabilities from extreme weather events; identify resources and  authorities that strengthen community and regional resilience during  recovery; and plan for the rebuilding of critical infrastructure in a manner  that increases community and regional resilience. The order also charged  the task force with helping to identify and remove obstacles to resilient  rebuilding and promoting long-term sustainability of communities and  ecosystems.
In August 2013, the Sandy Rebuilding Task Force issued the Hurricane  Sandy Rebuilding Strategy, which contained 69 recommendations to  various federal agencies and their nonfederal partners aimed at improving  recovery from both Hurricane Sandy and future disasters. Among these  69 recommendations are many that take into account the President’s  charge to facilitate planning and actions to build resilience in the Sandy- affected region. Introducing the strategy, the task force chair  acknowledged how critical it was that efforts to rebuild for the future make  communities more resilient to emerging challenges such as rising sea  levels, extreme heat, and more frequent and intense storms.
The task force report notes that many of the recommendations have been  adopted and describes actions underway to implement them as part of  the Hurricane Sandy recovery effort. Key examples of long-term resilient  rebuilding initiatives to address future risks to extreme weather events  include the Rebuild by Design effort and the New York Rising Community  Reconstruction Program. In June 2013, HUD and its partners launched  the Rebuild by Design competition to challenge communities to develop  solutions to address structural and environmental vulnerabilities exposed  by Hurricane Sandy. Of the 148 applicants, HUD selected 10 to move  forward. The selected teams then worked with local stakeholders to  tailor their projects to the communities and hosted over 50 community  workshops to educate the communities on their proposals and the theme  of resilience. On April 3, 2014, the final proposals were exhibited and  evaluated by an expert jury. Winning design solutions may be awarded  disaster recovery grants from HUD and other public and private partners.  Some resilience aspects of the designs include elevating streets and  adding breakwater systems.
The New York Rising Community Reconstruction Program is another  mitigation program that provides over $650 million for additional  rebuilding and revitalization planning and implementation assistance to  Sandy-affected communities. As of May 2014, six regions of New York  composed of 102 localities and 50 New York Rising communities created  plans that assessed storm damage and current risk, identified community  needs and opportunities, and developed recovery and resilient strategies.  Each locality is eligible for $3 million to $25 million from HUD and other  public and private partners. According to the State of New York, as of  May 2014, multiple projects had been awarded funding.
As part of our ongoing work on resilience-building as part of the Hurricane  Sandy recovery, we are identifying recommendations from the task force  report that particularly support resilient rebuilding and assessing the  actions taken to date to implement them. We plan to issue a report on  these issues later this year.
section_title: Congress Appropriated Funds to Key Federal Programs that Can Help Support Resilient Rebuilding
paragraphs: In January 2013, Congress passed and the President signed the Disaster  Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (Sandy Supplemental), which  appropriated about $50 billion in funding to support recovery. The  Sandy Supplemental appropriated funds—primarily for programs and  activities associated with recovery from Hurricane Sandy— to nineteen  federal agencies. Among the nineteen agencies, four—DHS, HUD, the  Department of Transportation (DOT), and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers  (USACE)—received amounts that represent over 92 percent of the total  with appropriations ranging from $5 billion to $15 billion. These four  agencies administer five programs that play a key role in helping to  promote resilience-building as part of recovery: (1) FEMA’s Hazard  Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), (2) FEMA’s Public Assistance  Program (PA), (3) HUD’s Community Development Block Grant-Disaster  Recovery (CDBG-DR) Program, (4) DOT’s Federal Transit Administration  (FTA) Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program, and (5)  USACE’s Flood Risk Management Program. See table 1 for a description  of these programs and how they help to support resilience-building  efforts.
As part of our ongoing work we plan to focus on efforts within FEMA’s  HMGP and PA and HUD’s CDBG-DR to facilitate and support community  and regional resilience efforts as part of recovery from Hurricane Sandy.  We are evaluating federal actions, gathering perspectives from key state  officials, and studying at least one large-scale PA project that involves  resilience-building activates.
section_title: Legislation to Improve Recovery Activities Also Focuses on Resilient Rebuilding
paragraphs: The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA) was enacted as  part of the Sandy Supplemental. The law authorizes several significant  changes to the way FEMA may deliver federal disaster assistance. FEMA  is tracking its implementation of 17 provisions of the act, of which are  aimed at mitigating future damage. Specifically:
Public Assistance Work Alternative Procedures. This section  authorizes FEMA to implement alternative procedures for  administration of the PA program with the aim of providing greater  flexibility and less administrative burden by basing grants on fixed  estimates. Among the provisions in this section of SRIA is one that  would allow use of all or part of the excess grant funds awarded for  the repair, restoration, and replacement of damaged facilities for cost  effective activities that mitigate the risk of future damage, hardship, or  suffering from a major disaster.
Changes to HMGP. SRIA authorized three key changes to HMGP.
First, it authorizes FEMA to expedite implementation of the program.  FEMA has issued guidance for streamlining the program and is  planning actions to continue to refine the changes and measure their  effectiveness. Second, SRIA allows FEMA to provide up to 25 percent  of the estimated costs for eligible hazard mitigation measures to a  state or tribal grantee before eligible costs are incurred. As part of the  revised, streamlined HMGP guidance, FEMA has informed states of  this provision. Third, SRIA allows FEMA to waive notice and comment  rulemaking procedures for HMGP Administration by States and  authorizes FEMA to carry out the program as a pilot. FEMA is  currently carrying out a pilot program and issued a notice in the  Federal Register in March 2014 seeking comments from the public to  help inform the development of this new method of program  delivery. To develop the program, FEMA is exploring the extent to  which its determinations regarding cost-effectiveness, technical  feasibility and engineering, and final eligibility and funding can be  made at the state level.
National Strategy to Reduce Costs on Future Disasters. SRIA  required FEMA to make recommendations for the development of a  national strategy to reduce costs on future disasters. In September  2013 FEMA issued the required report, recommending that the  following elements be considered in the development of a national  strategy: 1) engage in a whole community dialogue and build upon  public-private partnerships, 2) enhance data-driven decisions, 3) align  incentives promoting disaster cost reduction and resilience, 4) enable  resilient recovery, and 5) support disaster risk reduction nationally.
section_title: Nonfederal Groups Have a Variety of Initiatives to Help Incentivize Resilience Building
paragraphs: As we have previously reported, most responsibility and authority for  resilience activities rests largely outside the federal government;  therefore, nonfederal incentives are also a critical piece of the overall  strategy to reduce future losses.  The federal government, by providing  incentives through programs like the five discussed earlier in this  statement, can help to promote and facilitate mitigation before and after  disasters. However, ultimately, nonfederal entities inside and outside the  government make the decisions that lead (or do not lead) to resilience  activities. Several examples of mitigation efforts at the state and local  levels help illustrate the variety of ways that incentives help drive  communities to be more resilient—with a range of activities from shoring  up building codes to facilitating buyouts of repetitive loss properties.
As part of our ongoing work, we are reviewing studies about efforts to  build resilience to extreme weather events and climate change. For the  purposes of this statement, we selected illustrative examples from those  studies to describe a range of nonfederal efforts to incentivize mitigation.
The 2012 NRC report discussed earlier in this statement included several  examples of earthquake mitigation efforts in California.
In California, zones of potential landslide, liquefaction, or fault rupture  hazard have been mapped by the California Geological Survey as  “special study zones” according to provisions in the California Alquist- Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act of 1972. If a property is in one of  these special study zones, the buyers must sign a form indicating that  they have been made aware of this potential hazard and recognize  that additional inspections and work may be required if they choose to  modify the property in the future.
The U.S. Resiliency Council, a nonprofit organization based in  California, is working on creating building “report cards” to provide  technically defensible metrics to evaluate and communicate the  resilience of individual buildings. The initial focus is on seismic risk,  and officials plan to extend their efforts to creating metrics for  resilience to catastrophic wind and flood risk. Transparency and  required disclosure of these individual building resilience ratings can  benefit building users, owners, and lenders by increasing the value of  well designed or properly retrofitted properties.
The Property Transfer Tax Program in Berkeley, California has  provided funds for seismically retrofitting a number of properties in the  city. In 1992, voters approved an additional 0.5 percent transfer tax on  top of the existing 1 percent tax on all real estate transactions, with  the tax paid equally by buyer and seller. This portion of the transfer  tax is available for voluntary seismic upgrades to residential property.  Residential property owners have up to 1 year to complete the  seismic retrofit (or lose the funds). Since many homes sell for  $750,000 to $1 million or more in Berkeley, this amounted to $3,750- 5,000 in “free funds” and can cover homeowner upgrades such as  brick chimney bracing or anchoring water heaters. This incentive  program has an 80 to-90 percent participation rate. Along with other  measures, this program has led to more than 60 percent of the  residences in Berkeley becoming more resistant to earthquakes.
Similarly, the Columbia Center for Climate Change Law of Columbia Law  School issued a report in 2013 that included examples of flood mitigation  efforts in North Dakota and Iowa.
In 1996, 83 percent of the homes in Grand Forks, ND were damaged  when the Red River reached 54 feet and topped the city dikes. Using  CDBG funding, the City of Grand Forks purchased 802 lots, moved  salvageable homes, and destroyed the remainder to create a green  space. The city also partnered with a private development company to  finance the construction of 180 new homes in an underdeveloped  area of Grand Forks to help relocate some of the people who had lost  their homes in the flooding and subsequent buy-out program.  In 1993, the Iowa River flooded, and overtopped existing levees. The  US Army Corps of Engineers planned to rebuild and repair the  levees—but a working group of state and federal agencies determined  that the best solution would be to buy all the homes in the levee  district so that it could be statutorily dissolved and the city would no  longer have to support the infrastructure in the area. The buyout  program developed a novel land-transfer system and engaged  government agencies and non-profit organizations to execute it. The  non-profit organization’s role was instrumental because landowners  were hesitant to sell their property to the government, but were  comfortable selling it to the non-profit. The non-profit used a formula  to set the land price, which contributed to the success of the buyout  because purchasers didn’t have to negotiate prices with each  individual landowner and it removed the incentive for landowners to  hold out for a better price.
Chairman Begich, Ranking Member Paul, and members of the  subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy  to respond to any questions you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony,  please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this statement. Christopher Keisling, Assistant  Director; and Katherine Davis, Dorian Dunbar, Melissa Duong, Kathryn  Godfrey, Tracey King, Amanda Miller, and Linda Miller, made  contributions to this testimony. In addition, Martha Chow, Steve Cohen,  Stanley Czerwinski, Roshni Davé, Peter Del Toro, Chris Forys, Daniel  Garcia-Diaz, Alfredo Gomez, Michael Hix, Karen Jarzynka-Hernandez, Jill  Naamane, Brenda Rabinowitz, Joe Thompson, Lisa Van Arsdale, Pat  Ward, David Wise, and Steve Westley also made contributions based on  published and related work.
section_title: GAO Related Products
paragraphs: Extreme Weather Events: Limiting Federal Fiscal Exposure and  Increasing the Nation’s Resilience. GAO-14-364T. Washington, D.C.:  February 12, 2014.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-13-283. Washington, D.C.: February  14, 2013.
Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to Assess a  Jurisdiction’s Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own.  GAO-12-838. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2012.
Natural Hazard Mitigation: Various Mitigation Efforts Exist, but Federal  Efforts Do Not Provide a Comprehensive Strategic Framework.  GAO-07-403. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2007.
High Risk Series: GAO’s High-Risk Program. GAO-06-497T. Washington,  D.C.: March 15, 2006.
Disaster Assistance: Information on the Cost-Effectiveness of Hazard  Mitigation Projects. GAO/T-RCED-99-106. Washington, D.C.: March 4,  1999.
Disaster Assistance: Information on Federal Disaster Mitigation Efforts.  GAO/T-RCED-98-67. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 1998.
Disaster Assistance: Information on Expenditures and Proposals to  Improve Effectiveness and Reduce Future Costs. GAO/T-RCED-95-140.  Washington, D.C.: March 16, 1995.
Federal Disaster Assistance: What Should the Policy Be? PAD-80-39.  Washington, D.C.: June 16, 1980.
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