Defense Infrastructure: Opportunity to Improve the Timeliness of Future Overseas Planning Reports and Factors Affecting the Master Planning Effort for the Military Buildup on Guam
Published: 2008-09-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) continues its efforts to reduce the number of troops permanently stationed overseas and consolidate overseas bases. The Senate and conference reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD to develop and GAO to monitor DOD's overseas master plans and to provide annual assessments. The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to review DOD's master planning effort for Guam as part of these annual reviews. This report examines (1) the changes and challenges described in the fiscal year 2009 master plans, the extent the plans address GAO's prior recommendations, and the plans' timeliness and (2) the status of DOD's master planning efforts for the proposed buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam. GAO reviewed the plans and other relevant documents, and visited three overseas combatant commands, various installations, and Guam organizations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While the fiscal year 2009 master plans generally reflect recent changes in U.S. overseas basing strategies and the challenges DOD faces as well as address GAO's prior recommendations, DOD provided Congress the plans in May 2008, well after the February budget submission when the Senate and conference reports require DOD to issue the plans. This year's plans contain information on current overseas basing strategies and infrastructure requirements and the challenges that DOD faces implementing the plans. The plans also generally address GAO's recommendations except that the U.S. Pacific Command plan does not provide an update of the Air Force's training challenges in South Korea, despite GAO's prior recommendation that it should describe the challenges and their potential effects on infrastructure and funding requirements. DOD officials said that since last year the South Korean government and the U.S. Air Force have taken several steps to address these training challenges. According to DOD officials, efforts to incorporate last-minute changes in basing plans and projects and the lengthy review and approval process have contributed to the fiscal year 2009 plans' lateness. While the congressional requirement for the overseas master plans expired with the fiscal year 2009 plans, DOD said that it intends to provide Congress annual updates of its global defense posture through 2014 and that these updates would replace the master plans as DOD's overseas planning report to Congress. Since DOD will continue to provide annually updated global defense posture reports, it has an opportunity to reexamine its timeline for producing future reports earlier to provide Congress with time for review. DOD has developed a basic framework for the military buildup on Guam but has not issued the congressionally required master plan that was initially due in December 2006, and which Congress later extended to September 2008. The Joint Guam Program Office, which is planning and managing the proposed military buildup, is coordinating the multi-service development of a working-level plan for DOD that is to be submitted to Congress by the 2008 deadline. However, this is a onetime requirement, and DOD officials said that the plan will be a snapshot of the status of the planning process and will not be considered a comprehensive master plan for several reasons. First, while the required environmental impact statement and the resulting record of decision will influence many key decisions about the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam, these documents are not expected to be completed until January 2010. Also, officials of the Joint Guam Program Office said that they expect to complete a comprehensive master plan within 90 days after these required documents are finalized. Second, plans for the detailed force composition of units relocating to Guam, associated facility requirements, and implications for other services' realignments on Guam continue to be refined. Third, additional time is needed to fully address the challenges related to funding uncertainties, operational requirements, and Guam's economic and infrastructure requirements. However, without a comprehensive master plan, Congress may have limited data on requirements on which to make informed appropriation decisions and to carry out its oversight responsibilities.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In its ongoing global realignment of U.S. forces and installations, the  Department of Defense (DOD) plans to reduce the number of troops  permanently stationed overseas and consolidate overseas bases.  Realigning the U.S. overseas posture involves closing obsolete and  redundant bases, constructing new facilities costing billions of dollars, and  ensuring that other needed infrastructure is in place to support realigned  forces and missions. For example, the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review  Initiative established a framework for U.S. force structure in Japan that  relocates U.S. military units from Japan to other areas, including Guam. As  a part of this initiative, DOD tentatively plans to move about 8,000 Marines  and their estimated 9,000 dependents from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by  2014.
The Senate report and subsequent conference report accompanying the  fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD to  prepare detailed, comprehensive master plans to ensure that  infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in each overseas  regional command’s area of responsibility reflected DOD’s global  realignment of U.S. forces and installations. The Senate report also  directed us to provide assessment reports on these master plans each year  to the congressional defense committees. Subsequently, the conference  report accompanying the 2004 military construction appropriation bill also  directed the department to prepare comprehensive master plans with  yearly updates through fiscal year 2009. In July 2006, the Senate report  accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military construction appropriation bill  directed DOD to submit a master plan for the military buildup in Guam by  December 29, 2006. This deadline was later extended to September 15,  2008. The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military  construction appropriation bill also directed us to review DOD’s master  planning effort for Guam as part of our annual review of the overseas  master plans. DOD considers the master plan for Guam as separate from  the overseas master plans because Guam is a U.S. territory.
This is our fifth report responding to the requirements contained in the  fiscal year 2004 Senate military construction appropriation bill report and  our second report responding to the reporting requirements on the Guam  military buildup contained in the fiscal year 2007 Senate military  construction appropriation bill report. This report examines (1) the  changes and challenges described in this year’s overseas master plans, the  extent to which they address our prior recommendations, and the plans’  timeliness and (2) the status of DOD’s master planning efforts for the  proposed buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam. This  report is our final report to fulfill the congressional mandates, which  expired with DOD’s May 2008 fiscal year 2009 report.
In conducting our work, we visited three overseas regional combatant  commands—U.S. Pacific Command, including U.S. Forces Korea and U.S.  Forces Japan; U.S. European Command; and U.S. Central Command. We  observed selected installation and military construction projects and  interviewed command officials to understand the challenges the  commands face in implementing the master plans. After DOD issued its  fiscal year 2009 plans, we reviewed them to determine how they had  changed since last year, how they address the challenges to their  implementation, and to what extent they addressed the congressional  reporting requirements and responded to our prior recommendations. We  assessed whether the fiscal year 2009 plans were in compliance with the  Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) most recent guidance on  overseas master plans. We generally concluded that the master plans  addressed the congressional reporting requirements if the plans included  details on base categories (i.e., military population on main operating  bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations), host  nation funding levels, facility requirements and costs, environmental  remediation issues, and other challenges affecting implementation of the  plans. To identify the challenges and determine the status of planning  efforts for the proposed buildup on Guam, we met with the Governor of  Guam, the Guam Delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, and  officials from U.S. Pacific Command, Marine Forces Pacific, Third Marine  Expeditionary Force, the Navy Joint Guam Program Office, the Guam  legislature, the Mayors’ Council of Guam, and various Guam community  groups. At these meetings, we discussed the challenges to the military  buildup, the planning framework for the military buildup, the schedule and  development of the Guam master plan, and the status of the environmental  impact study required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.  We visited Naval Base Guam; Andersen Air Force Base, Guam; and  potential Marine Corps basing locations to directly observe existing  installations and future military construction sites. We also analyzed  available reports and documents that described ongoing and proposed  military activities and the challenges that may affect DOD’s development  and implementation of a master plan for the proposed military buildup on  Guam.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 through  August 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for more  information on our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation that has been  described as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces  overseas since the end of the Korean War. The realignment is to improve  the U.S. military’s flexibility to address conventional and terrorist threats  worldwide. As part of this restructuring, DOD created new bases in  Central Asia and Eastern Europe, downsized the U.S. presence in  Germany, and realigned forces in South Korea and Japan.
In 2004, the United States and Japan began a series of sustained security  consultations aimed at strengthening the U.S.-Japan security alliance to  better address the rapidly changing global security environment. The  resulting U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative established a  framework for the future of the U.S. force structure in Japan and is to  facilitate a continuing presence for U.S. forces in the Pacific theater by  relocating units to other areas, including Guam. As a result of this and  other DOD realignments planned on Guam, the total military and related  infrastructure buildup is estimated to increase Guam’s current population  of 171,000 by an estimated 25,000 active duty military personnel and  dependents. The population could swell further because these estimates  do not include DOD civilians, contractors, or transient personnel from a  Navy aircraft carrier that is planned to conduct periodic visits to Guam in  the future. The total cost of all services’ realignments on Guam is  estimated to be more than $13 billion, although additional costs are  anticipated for other DOD activities and the local Guam community.  Realignment costs for the Marine Corps move from Okinawa are to be  shared by the United States and Japan.
subsections: section_title: Overseas Master Plans
paragraphs: DOD uses military construction appropriations to plan, design, construct,  alter, and improve military facilities worldwide. The military construction  budget submission for fiscal year 2009 includes approximately   $24.4 billion for military construction and family housing, of which nearly  $1.1 billion (4.7 percent) is designated for specific overseas locations.  Most of these funds are to enhance and support enduring installations,  rather than for new or emerging requirements outside existing basing  structures.
In 2003, the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed concern about  the use of military construction budget authority for projects at bases that  may become obsolete because of force realignments. Consequently, in  Senate Report 108-82, the Senate Appropriations Committee directed DOD  to prepare detailed, comprehensive master plans for the changing  infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of its overseas  regional commands. According to the Senate report, at a minimum, the  plans were to identify precise facility requirements, the status of  properties being returned to host nations, funding requirements, and the  respective cost-sharing responsibilities of the United States and the host  nations. The Senate report also directed DOD to provide a report to  congressional defense committees on the plans’ status and implementation  with each yearly military construction budget request. The Senate report  directed us to provide the congressional defense committees an annual  assessment of the plans. Subsequently, the conference report  accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill  directed that DOD update its overseas master plans annually through fiscal  year 2009.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics  responded to these congressional reporting requirements and assigned the  overseas regional combatant commands responsibility for preparing  comprehensive master plans for their respective areas of responsibility.  U.S. Pacific Command is responsible for DOD activities in East Asia and  South Asia; U.S. European Command is responsible for DOD activities in  Eastern and Western Europe; and U.S. Central Command is responsible  for DOD activities in the Middle East and Central Asia. In February 2007,  the President directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a new  geographic combatant command to consolidate the responsibility for DOD  activities in Africa that have been shared by U.S. Pacific Command, U.S.  European Command, and U.S. Central Command (see fig. 1). U.S. Africa  Command was officially established on October 1, 2007, with a goal to  reach full operational capability as a separate, independent geographic  combatant command by September 30, 2008. DOD officials said that U.S.  Africa Command will issue a plan for its area of responsibility next year.
section_title: Master Planning Effort for Guam
paragraphs: In 2004, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and the Japanese  Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for Defense began a series  of sustained security consultations aimed at strengthening the U.S.-Japan  security alliance and addressing the changing global security environment.  The resulting U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative established a  framework for the future of the U.S. force structure in Japan designed to  reduce the U.S. military’s burden on Japanese communities and create a  continuing presence for U.S. forces in the Pacific theater. The initiative’s  goal of moving about 8,000 Marines and 9,000 dependents from Okinawa  to Guam by 2014 is one of several current proposals to build up military  forces and infrastructure on Guam. In addition to the initiative, the Navy  plans to enhance its infrastructure, logistics capabilities, and waterfront  facilities to support transient nuclear aircraft carriers, combat logistics  force ships, submarines, surface combatants, and high-speed transport  ships at the Naval Base Guam. The Air Force plans to develop a global  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance strike hub at Andersen Air  Force Base in Guam by hosting various types of aircraft, such as fighters,  bombers, tankers, and Global Hawk systems, on a permanent and  rotational basis. The Army plans to place a ballistic missile defense task  force on Guam.
U.S. Pacific Command was responsible for the initial planning for the  movement of forces to Guam. In August 2006, OSD directed the Navy to  establish the Joint Guam Program Office to facilitate, manage, and execute  requirements associated with the rebasing of U.S. assets from Okinawa,  Japan, to Guam. Specifically, the office was tasked to lead the coordinated  planning efforts of all of DOD’s components and other stakeholders to  consolidate, optimize, and integrate the existing military infrastructure on  Guam. In addition, the office is to integrate the operational support  requirements; develop, program, and synchronize the services’ respective  realignment budgets; oversee military construction; and coordinate  government and business activities. The office is also expected to work  closely with Congress, U.S. agencies, the government of Guam, and the  government of Japan to manage this effort and develop a master plan.
As initiatives for expanding the U.S. military presence on Guam began to  emerge, the Senate Appropriations Committee noted the ambitiousness of  the military construction program and the need for a well-developed  master plan to efficiently use the available land and infrastructure. The  Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military construction  appropriation bill directed DOD to submit a master plan for the military  buildup in Guam by December 29, 2006. The Senate report also directed  us to review DOD’s master planning effort for Guam as part of our annual  review of DOD’s overseas master plans. The conference report  accompanying the fiscal year 2008 military construction appropriation bill  extended the due date for the Guam master plan to September 15, 2008.
section_title: Prior Reviews of the Overseas Master Plans and the Master Planning Effort for Guam
paragraphs: We previously reported that while DOD’s overseas master plans generally  exceeded the reporting requirements established by Congress,  opportunities existed for the plans to provide more complete, clear, and  consistent information and to present a more definitive picture of future  requirements. In our 2007 report on DOD’s overseas master plans, we  suggested that Congress consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to  ensure that the overseas master plans include information on residual  value compensation and training limitations for U.S. Pacific Command,  which are discussed later in this report. We also suggested that Congress  consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to report periodically to the  defense committees on the status of the department’s planning efforts for  Guam to help ensure the best application of federal funds and leveraging  of options for supporting the military buildup until DOD finalizes a  comprehensive master plan. In our May 2008 testimony on the Guam  military buildup master planning effort, we reported that while DOD had  established a framework for the military buildup on Guam, many key  decisions remain and both DOD and the government of Guam faced  significant challenges. We also reported that Guam’s efforts to address  infrastructure challenges caused by the buildup were in their initial stages  and that existing uncertainties contributed to the difficulties in developing  precise plans.
section_title: Overseas Master Plans Generally Reflect Changes, Challenges, and Our Prior Recommendations, but Could Be More Timely
paragraphs: The fiscal year 2009 master plans generally reflect recent changes in the  U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements and current  challenges that DOD faces in implementation. The plans also reflect DOD’s  responses to the recommendations we made in our previous reports  except that the U.S. Pacific Command plan does not provide the status of  the Air Force’s training challenges in South Korea, despite our prior  recommendation that it should describe the challenges and their potential  effects on infrastructure and funding requirements. DOD officials said that  since last year South Korea and the U.S. Air Force have taken steps to  address these training challenges. In addition, DOD has submitted the  plans to Congress several months after the annual budget submissions  even though the Senate and conference reports accompanying the fiscal  year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD to provide  updates of the master plans with its military construction budget  submissions. Without timely access to the plans, the congressional defense  committees may not have the information needed at the appropriate time  to prepare the annual defense and military construction legislation and to  carry out their oversight responsibilities.
subsections: section_title: Plans Update the Evolution of Overseas Basing Strategies and Requirements
paragraphs: The fiscal year 2009 master plans incorporated recent changes associated  with the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing strategies and  requirements. Generally, major force structure realignments that were  discussed in the fiscal year 2009 master plans had already been mentioned  last year. However, for fiscal year 2009, several changes identified in the  overseas master plans included updated information involving realignment  initiatives in South Korea and Japan, DOD’s efforts to establish missile  defense sites in the Czech Republic and Poland, and the ongoing  development of U.S. Africa Command.
The U.S. Pacific Command plan discussed the progress of realignment  initiatives, which will relocate military personnel and facilities in Japan  and South Korea. Specifically, the command reported that the U.S.-Japan  Defense Policy Review Initiative has served as an effective framework to  manage alliance transformation and realignments in Japan and that  planning and execution efforts are ongoing to achieve one of the largest  changes in recent history to U.S. force posture in the Pacific. Also, as part  of the initiative, the command described the importance of relocating  8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam and of consolidating the remaining  U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa to reduce the impact on local  communities. It also included information on U.S. Forces Japan’s efforts to  return to the government of Japan U.S. facilities and more than 14,000  acres of land on Japan and Okinawa. Also, U.S. Pacific Command updated  the status of the U.S.-South Korea Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan  Relocation Plan, including its efforts to reduce major U.S. installations  from 41 to 10 (76 percent) in South Korea. The command also provided  information regarding almost 3,000 acres of land acquisitions, including  the expansion of Army Garrison Humphreys (formerly known as Camp  Humphreys) and other sites.
The U.S. European Command plan updated the network of forward  operating sites and cooperative security locations in Eastern Europe. For  example, the plan provided details on the mission, planned capabilities,  equipment and aircraft, population, and facility requirements for Novo  Selo Training Area in Bulgaria and Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base in  Romania. It also described recent efforts to proceed with formal  negotiations with the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic on  establishing missile defense sites and facility requirements to support this  effort. For example, it identified over $284 million in facility requirements  to support the ballistic missile defense program in the Czech Republic.  U.S. European Command also explained the establishment of U.S. Africa  Command and that its future mission is to conduct military-to-military  programs, military-sponsored activities, and other operations.
The U.S. Central Command plan reflected a long-term planning vision for  the development of required infrastructure in the region to achieve its  missions. The command also reported a need for an increase in both U.S.  military construction and host nation support funding. For example, the  command identified a goal of $1.7 billion in host nation funding, which it  considered reasonable since the infrastructure may also be used by the  host nation. Also, the command’s plan provides detailed descriptions of  each forward operating site by providing information on its mission (such  as providing logistical support), the units it could host, and its role in the  region (such as supporting the war against terrorism or strengthening  capabilities for rapid and flexible response in the Central Asian states), as  well as identifying the requirements for equipment and facilities at the site.
section_title: Plans Generally Reflect Challenges
paragraphs: This year’s master plans discuss a number of challenges, such as  uncertainties with host nation relations and environmental concerns,  which DOD faces in the implementation of the plans. They also provide  more detailed descriptions of these challenges than prior years’ plans.
subsections: section_title: This Year’s Plans Provided More Complete Descriptions of Host Nation Relations
paragraphs: All of the regional commands describe to varying degrees the status of  recent negotiations and agreements with host nations in their fiscal year  2009 master plans. In our review of the overseas master plans in 2005, we  found that none of the commands fully explained the (1) status of or (2)  challenges to finalizing host nation agreements and recommended that the  commands briefly explain the status of negotiations with host nations to  provide more complete and clearer plans. These agreements depend  largely on the political environment and economic conditions in host  nations and can affect the extent of host nation support—access to  facilities or funding—to U.S. forces. Accordingly, the resulting agreements  may increase or decrease U.S.-funded costs for future infrastructure  changes. For example, this year:    The U.S. Pacific Command plan updates information on the results of the  U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative. The plan describes the  planned arrival of the USS George Washington, a nuclear aircraft carrier,  at Naval Base Yokosuka to replace the USS Kitty Hawk, a conventional  aircraft carrier. The plan also describes how the funding for the Japanese  Facilities Improvement Program, historically the source of major  construction on U.S. facilities in Japan, has been decreasing. For example,  the command noted that the funding for this program has decreased from  an estimated $1 billion in 1993 to $242 million. U.S. Forces Japan  anticipates that the government of Japan will continue to reduce these  funds because of Japan’s commitment to provide several other forms of  host nation support (i.e., utilities and Japanese labor force) and funding  for the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative under which the  Marine Corps forces are moving from Okinawa to Guam. Several DOD  officials believe that these financial commitments and other constraints  may result in U.S. facilities in Japan receiving less host nation support,  which in turn would require more financial support from the U.S.  government than in the past. In addition, the U.S. Pacific Command plan  provided details on current realignment efforts regarding the delayed  move from Yongsan Army Garrison in Seoul to Army Garrison Humphreys  south of Seoul. Originally expected to be completed by December 2008,  the plan stated that the move may not be completed until 2012. According  to the plan, early challenges with land procurement and bilateral funding  negotiations have now been overcome and the relocation is moving  forward. The plan also recognized that any future constraints on host  nation funding or U.S. military construction funds could further delay the  Yongsan Relocation Plan.
The U.S. European Command plan provided a status of ongoing  realignments in Europe. It also described the rationale for the  realignments and listed the facilities returned to the host nations.  Specifically, the plan provided information on efforts to return  installations in Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Turkey, and  several classified locations in Europe. It further reported that while  supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. Army Europe returned  nearly 20,000 soldiers and their families, including parts of the 1st Infantry  Division, back to the United States. U.S. Army Europe has also prepared  three military communities in Wuerzburg, Hanau, and Dermstadt for  return to the government of Germany. Also, the plan discussed the  relocation of U.S. Army Europe headquarters from Heidelberg to  Wiesbaden, Germany, to become the 7th Army deployable headquarters by  fiscal year 2012. The plan also discussed the Army’s efforts to keep U.S.  Army Garrison Baumholder as an enduring base because without it the  five other Army main operating bases (i.e., Grafenwoehr/Vilseck/Hohenfels  complex, Stuttgart, Ansbach, Kaiserslautern, and Wiesbaden) in Germany  would be filled beyond capacity. It also explained how U.S. European  Command’s transformation depends on host nation negotiations, political- military considerations, base realignment and closure in the United States,  and fiscal limitations.
The U.S. Central Command plan discussed efforts to solicit contributions  from host nations and to obtain the coordination and support that are  needed from DOD, the Department of State, and host nations. It discussed  the challenges of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the  command’s intention to sustain long-term access to locations across its  area of responsibility. The plan described how ongoing operations in Iraq  and Afghanistan have increased the basing footprint by using contingency  construction funding, although the command expects to work with DOD  and Congress to transition from using contingency funding to support its  sites. For the future, the command will focus on transitioning from current  contingency operations to developing plans for more a fixed posture, in  terms of forces and infrastructure.
section_title: Most of This Year’s Plans Provided Descriptions of Environmental Challenges
paragraphs: Most of the commands addressed the extent of their environmental  challenges in this year’s master plans. In contrast, during our review of the  overseas master plans in 2005, none of the commands identified  environmental remediation and restoration issues. This year, U.S. Pacific  Command provided information on the removal of underground storage  tanks with host nation funding on U.S. installations in various locations in  South Korea. Also, U.S. Forces Korea identified one base that was closed  for which environmental information had been exchanged; however, the  command was still in the process of returning the base to the government  of South Korea. This year, U.S. European Command included information  on the progress of the environmental cleanup of contaminated sites at  Rhein Main Air Base, Germany. The command identified that some sites  had been cleaned, others needed further investigation, but all  investigations are expected to be completed at the earliest by the end of  2012. Because there were no environmental issues in the command’s area  of responsibility, according to a command official, U.S. Central Command  did not report any environmental issues.
section_title: Overseas Master Plans Generally Address Our Prior Recommendations
paragraphs: Over the years, OSD has modified its guidance for preparing the overseas  master plans in an effort to address our prior recommendations related to  the following topics:    Facility requirements and costs. This year, all of the regional  commands identified their precise facility requirements and costs for fiscal  years 2009 through 2014, and reported estimated facility sustainment and  recapitalization costs for fiscal year 2009.
Base categories. This year, all of the commands categorized their  installations into applicable base categories of main operating base,  forward operating site, and cooperative security location, which provided  users a clearer picture of the infrastructure plans and requirements at  these sites. The commands also supplemented the information on base  categories with detailed data on the installations’ capabilities, overall  mission, population, and types of equipment and facilities located at each  site.
End state date. This year, all of the commands identified a common  strategic end state date, which identifies the last fiscal year of the  construction time frame and thus provides users a more complete and  clearer basis for tracking progress in meeting the command infrastructure  objectives for their areas of responsibility.
Host nation funding levels. This year, all of the commands reported  host nation funding levels at the project level for fiscal year 2009 and at the  aggregate level for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, which provided users a  better basis to determine the extent to which U.S. funding is needed for  facility requirements.
Effects of other defense activities. This year, all of the commands  described the effects of other defense activities on implementation of their  master plans. For example, both U.S. European Command and U.S.  Central Command described how the development of U.S. Africa  Command would affect their commands and the increased need to  coordinate efforts in the future.
Until this year, the overseas master plans have not discussed residual  value even though we have recommended that they should. In response to  this recommendation, OSD and command officials stated that residual  value could not be readily predicted and therefore should not be assumed  in the master plans. These officials also reported that residual value is  based on the reuse of property being turned over to the host nation, which  is limited for most categories of military facilities and is often reduced by  actual or anticipated environmental remediation costs. However, we have  always maintained that since these issues vary by host nation and may not  be clear to all users of the plans, OSD should require commands, at a  minimum, to explain the issues with obtaining residual value in each host  nation and report the implications for U.S. funding requirements. This  year, U.S. European Command described the difficult and lengthy process  to return and negotiate the value of facilities to address our prior  recommendation. The command noted that attempting to forecast  residual value would not be prudent fiscal planning because of the  uncertainties in receiving residual value, such as the negotiated price to be  paid. After we received the U.S. European Command plan, command  officials provided data showing that the U.S. government has received  approximately $656 million in residual value and payment-in-kind  compensation since 1989. Payment-in-kind projects include installation of  water, sewer, electrical, and communication lines, and quality of life  projects, such as dormitories and neighborhood renovations.
subsections: section_title: No Recognition of the Training Challenges in South Korea
paragraphs: While the overseas master plans have continued to evolve and have  provided more comprehensive data every year since fiscal year 2006, the  U.S. Pacific Command master plan does not describe the challenges the  command faces in addressing the U.S. Air Force’s training limitations in  South Korea even though we have recommended that it should describe  the challenges and their potential effects on infrastructure and funding  requirements. While DOD officials indicated that the Air Force’s training  conditions have improved on the Korean peninsula, this information was  not provided in the U.S. Pacific Command’s plan.
For several years, the government of South Korea has attempted to  relocate the Koon-Ni training range, which had served as the primary air- to-ground range for the Seventh Air Force. The air and ground range  management of the Koon-Ni training range was transferred to the  government of South Korea, which closed the range in August 2005. While  there is an agreement with the government of South Korea to enable U.S.  forces to train at other ranges, according to senior Air Force and U.S.  Forces Korea officials, the other ranges do not provide electronic scoring  capabilities necessary to meet the Air Force’s air-to-surface training  requirements and there is difficulty in obtaining access to these ranges. In  technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD officials said that the  South Korean government has increased the U.S. Air Force’s access to air- to-ground training ranges and improved one training site. DOD also noted  that newly agreed upon airspace management practices are expected to  facilitate more training opportunities for U.S. Air Force pilots in South  Korea. However, U.S. Pacific Command did not discuss the progress made  in addressing these training challenges in its fiscal year 2009 overseas  master plan.
Though it omits the training challenges and progress in South Korea, the  U.S. Pacific Command plan provides details on the training limitations in  Japan. The plan discussed training limitations on carrier landing practice  and the need for aircraft from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to train at Iwo  Jima, Japan, which is considered a hardship due to the extra distance the  aircraft need to fly to Iwo Jima. Currently, the United States and  government of Japan are reviewing options that would provide the Naval  Air Facility Atsugi access to closer training ranges. The plan also discusses  how noise and land use sensitivities and maneuver area limitations in  Okinawa require U.S. forces to deploy to other Pacific locations to  supplement their training. It also describes efforts by U.S. Forces Japan  and the government of Japan to engage in bilateral discussions to address  these training shortfalls and explore solutions.
section_title: Overseas Master Plans Generally Have Been Submitted to Congress Late
paragraphs: DOD has recently submitted the overseas master plans to Congress several  months after the annual budget submissions even though the Senate and  conference reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military  construction appropriation bill directed DOD to provide updates of the  master plans with each yearly military construction budget submission.
Recently, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2009 military  construction appropriations bill expressed concern about DOD’s frequent  failure to comply with deadlines for submitting congressionally mandated  reports. According to the Senate report, many of these mandated reports  are planning documents, intended to demonstrate that DOD is adequately  coordinating its many ongoing initiatives, such as the Global Defense  Posture moves and the Grow the Force initiative. The Senate report  further noted that these mandated reports are necessary to ensure proper  congressional oversight and to inform congressional decisions related to  DOD’s budget requests.
Congressional staff members have stressed to us the importance of DOD  providing the defense committees the overseas master plans at the same  time as the annual budget submission. The President generally submits the  administration’s budget submissions in February of each year. However,  DOD provided the defense committees the fiscal year 2007 plans on April  27 and the fiscal year 2008 plans on March 28. This year, DOD submitted  the plans to Congress in mid-May, 3 months after the fiscal 2009 military  construction budget submission was provided to Congress. According to  DOD officials, OSD’s most recent efforts to incorporate last-minute  changes in basing plans and projects contributed to providing Congress  the plans months after the military construction budget submission. In  addition, overseas command officials commented that the lengthy review  and approval process among the commands and OSD has contributed to  the plans’ lateness.
In comments on a draft of this report, DOD said that it intends to replace  the overseas master plans with annual updates of its global defense  posture as the department’s overseas planning report to Congress.  Because of continued concern over the possibility of changes to the global  defense posture, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2009  military construction appropriation bill extended the requirement for DOD  to provide annually updated reports on the status of its global basing  initiative to the Committees on Appropriations of both Houses of  Congress. These global basing reports are to be submitted with the  administration’s budget submissions each year through fiscal year 2014  and should include, at a minimum, an overview of the current overseas  basing strategy and an explanation of any changes to the strategy; the  status of host nation negotiations; the cost to date of implementing the  military construction elements of the strategy; an updated estimate of the  cost to complete the construction program; and an updated timeline for  implementing the strategy. The Senate report further noted that the timely  filing of these reports is essential to the ability of the committee to  exercise its oversight responsibilities, and it is therefore important that  DOD adhere to the schedule and provide these reports at the same time as  the annual budget submission. Since the department will continue to  report on its overseas planning to Congress, DOD has an opportunity to  reexamine its timeline for producing these reports and provide them to  Congress with the administration’s annual budget submission to provide  Congress with adequate time for review. Without access to these reports  on a timely basis, congressional committees may not have the information  needed at the appropriate time to prepare the annual defense and military  construction legislation and to carry out oversight responsibilities of  DOD’s global realignment of U.S. forces and installations overseas.
section_title: DOD Has Established a Framework for Military Buildup on Guam but Has Yet to Develop the Congressionally Required Master Plan
paragraphs: DOD has established various planning and implementation documents that  serve as a framework to guide the military realignment and buildup on  Guam. However, the department has not issued a comprehensive master  plan for the buildup that was initially due in December 2006, which  Congress later extended to September 2008. While the Joint Guam  Program Office is coordinating the development of a working-level plan  for DOD that is to be submitted to Congress by the 2008 deadline, this is a  onetime requirement, and DOD officials said that this plan will be a  snapshot of the status of the planning process at the time of its completion  and will not be considered a comprehensive master plan for several  reasons. First, the results of the environmental impact statement and  resulting record of decision on the proposed military buildup, which are  expected to be completed by January 2010, will influence many key  decisions about the military infrastructure development on Guam. Also,  Joint Guam Program Office officials estimate that the office could  complete a comprehensive master plan for Guam within 90 days once  these documents are completed. Second, plans for the detailed force  composition of units relocating to Guam, associated facility requirements,  and implications for other services’ realignments on Guam continue to be  refined. Third, additional time is needed to fully address the challenges  related to funding uncertainties, operational requirements, and Guam’s  economic and infrastructure requirements.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Established a Framework for Military Realignment and Buildup
paragraphs: DOD has established various planning and implementation documents that  serve as a framework to guide the military realignment and buildup on  Guam. Originally, the Marine Corps realignment was discussed in the U.S.- Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative, which established the framework  for the future of the U.S. force structure in Japan. The Japan Ministry of  Defense reported that based on bilateral meetings in 2005 and 2006, the  government of Japan had decided to support the United States in its  development of necessary facilities and infrastructure, including  headquarters buildings, barracks, and family housing, to hasten the  process of moving Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam. In July  2006, U.S. Pacific Command developed the Guam Integrated Military  Development Plan to provide an overview of the projected military  population and infrastructure requirements. The plan is based on a  notional force structure that was used to generate land and facility  requirements for basing, operations, logistics, training, and quality of life  involving the Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, Navy, and Special Operations  Forces in Guam. However, this plan is not considered a master plan for the  military buildup and provides limited information on the expected effects  of the military buildup on the local community and off-base infrastructure.
The Joint Guam Program Office has completed its first phase of the Guam  planning process and developed basic facility requirements with general  cost estimates, mapping concepts, and land use plans with preferred  alternatives. Through an analysis of available land on the island and DOD  preliminary operational requirements, the joint office has identified  alternative sites for the Marine Corps main encampment, family housing,  and aviation operations and training and for the Navy transient aircraft  carrier pier. However, the office has not identified its preferred sites for  the ballistic missile defense task force and firing and nonfiring training  ranges. According to Joint Guam Program Office officials, the second  phase of planning is in progress and will include more details, including  more specific information on the placement of buildings, roads, training  facilities, and utilities systems.
The Joint Guam Program Office is coordinating the multi-service  development of a working-level plan for DOD that is expected to be  submitted to congressional staff in September 2008. However, this is a  onetime requirement, and DOD officials said that this working-level plan  will not be considered a final comprehensive master plan. According to  Joint Guam Program Office officials, the working-level plan will be a  snapshot of the status of the planning process at the time of its  completion. It is being developed to provide DOD components with an  opportunity to review and provide input. Moreover, the plan will address  the realignment of Marine Corps forces in the context of other DOD- proposed actions on Guam, including the Navy’s plan to enhance its  infrastructure, logistics capabilities, and waterfront facilities and the  Army’s plan to place a ballistic missile defense task force on Guam.
section_title: Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision Are Needed to Make Key Decisions but Will Not Be Completed until 2010
paragraphs: Before the Joint Guam Program Office can finalize its Guam master plan  and finalize key decisions, it will need to complete the environmental  impact statement and the resulting record of decision required by the  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. DOD officials said that the  results of these documents will influence many key decisions on the exact  location, size, and makeup of the military infrastructure development on  Guam. However, according to these officials, the environmental impact  statement and record of decision are not expected to be completed until  December 2009 and January 2010, respectively. Joint Guam Program  Office officials stated that development of a comprehensive master plan  for the military buildup on Guam depended on the completion date of the  record of decision and estimated that the office could complete a master  plan within 90 days once the record of decision is finalized.
On March 7, 2007, the Navy issued a public notice of intent to prepare an  environmental impact statement pursuant to the requirements of the  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as implemented by the  Council on Environmental Quality Regulations, and Executive Order  12114. The notice of intent in the Federal Register states that the  environmental impact statement will:    Examine the potential environmental effects associated with relocating  Marine Corps command, air, ground, and logistics units (which comprise  approximately 8,000 Marines and their estimated 9,000 dependents) from  Okinawa to Guam. The environmental impact statement will examine  potential effects from activities associated with Marine Corps units’  relocation including operations, training, and infrastructure changes.
Examine the Navy’s plan to enhance the infrastructure, logistic  capabilities, and pier/waterfront facilities to support transient nuclear  aircraft carrier berthing at Naval Base Guam. The environmental impact  statement will examine potential effects of the waterfront improvements  associated with the proposed transient berthing.
Evaluate placing a ballistic missile defense task force (approximately 630  soldiers and their estimated 950 dependents) in Guam. The environmental  impact statement will examine potential effects from activities associated  with the task force, including operations, training, and needed  infrastructure changes.
Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the regulations  established by the Council on Environmental Quality, an environmental  impact statement must include a purpose and need statement, a  description of all reasonable project alternatives and their environmental  effects (including a “no action” alternative), a description of the  environment of the area to be affected or created by the alternatives being  considered, and an analysis of the environmental impacts of the proposed  action and each alternative. Further, accurate scientific analysis, expert  agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to implementing the  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. For example, federal agencies  such as DOD are required to ensure the professional integrity, including  scientific integrity, of the discussions and analyses contained in the  environmental impact statement. Additionally, after preparing a draft  environmental impact statement, federal agencies such as DOD are  required to obtain the comments of any federal agency that has  jurisdiction by law or certain special expertise and request the comments  of appropriate state and local agencies, Native American tribes, and any  agency that has requested that it receive such statements. Following the  final environmental impact statement, DOD will prepare a record of  decision that will state what the decision is for the proposed military  buildup on Guam; identify alternatives considered and specify those that  are environmentally preferable; state whether all practicable mitigation  measures were adopted, and if not, explain why; and commit to a  monitoring and enforcement program to ensure implementation of  mitigation measures. Until an agency issues a final environmental impact  statement and record of decision, it generally may not take any action  concerning the proposal that would either have adverse environmental  effects or limit the choice of reasonable alternatives.
DOD officials stated that performing these alternative site analyses and  cumulative effects analyses may delay the completion of a comprehensive  master plan and affect the construction schedule of the required military  facilities and infrastructure. DOD will submit its fiscal year 2010 budget  request to Congress for the first phase of military construction projects  prior to the completion of the environmental impact statement. Thus, DOD  may be asking Congress to fund the military construction projects without  the benefit of a completed environmental impact statement or a final  decision on the full extent of its facility and funding requirements. DOD  officials said that this practice is consistent with the department’s normal  planning, programming, and budgeting procedures routinely used for  large-scale construction projects. In such cases, construction projects are  not awarded and funds are not expended until after the record of decision  is completed. Joint Guam Program Office officials told us that immediately  after the environmental impact statement and record of decision are  completed, the department will commence construction of facilities in  efforts to meet the 2014 goal of moving Marines and their dependents from  Okinawa to Guam. However, some DOD and government of Guam officials  believe that this is an ambitious schedule considering the possibility that  the environmental impact statement could be delayed, the complexities of  moving thousands of Marines and dependents from Okinawa to Guam, and  the need to obtain funding from the United States and Japan to support  military construction projects.
section_title: Size and Makeup of Forces and Other Variables Are Not Yet Known
paragraphs: Although the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative identifies Marine  Corps units to move to Guam, plans for the detailed force composition of  units relocating to Guam, associated facility requirements, and  implications for other services’ realignments on Guam continue to be  refined. The U.S.-Japan realignment roadmap states that approximately  8,000 Marines and their dependents will relocate to Guam. These units  include the Third Marine Expeditionary Force’s command element and its  major subordinate command headquarters: the Third Marine Division  Headquarters, Third Marine Logistics Group Headquarters, 1st Marine Air  Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters. The Marine  Corps forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground  Task Force elements.
Marine Corps officials said that the Corps was reviewing its Pacific force  posture and associated requirements for training operations on Guam in  light of DOD’s plan to increase the number of Marines under the Grow the  Force initiative. At this time, no decisions have been made on whether to  deploy additional forces to Guam under this initiative. If such a decision is  made, the government of Japan would have no commitment to support  such additional forces on Guam.
The type of missions to be supported from Guam is a key factor in the  planning for infrastructure capabilities. The operational, housing, utilities,  and installation support facilities needed on Guam depend on the type,  size, frequency, and number of units; units may be permanent, rotational,  or transient. Desired capabilities and force structure define the training  and facility requirements, such as the number and size of airfield facilities,  ranges, family housing units, barracks, and schools and the capacity of the  installation support facilities needed to support operations and the  military population. Accordingly, Joint Guam Program Office officials said  that the master plan they were initiating will reflect efforts to build  “flexible” infrastructure, such as site preparation and utilities, that may  operate on Guam.
section_title: DOD Has Not Yet Fully Addressed the Funding, Operational, and Local Infrastructure Challenges of Relocating to Guam
paragraphs: DOD faces several significant challenges associated with the military  buildup on Guam, including addressing funding and operational challenges  and community and infrastructure impacts, which could affect the  development and implementation of its planning efforts. First, DOD has  not identified all funding requirements and may encounter difficulties in  obtaining funding given competing priorities within the department.  Second, DOD officials need to address the operational and training  limitations on Guam, such as for sealift and airlift capabilities, and training  requirements for thousands of Marines. Third, the increase in military  personnel and their dependents on Guam and the large number of  construction workers needed to build the required military facilities will  create challenges for Guam’s community and civilian infrastructure.
subsections: section_title: Funding Requirements Are Not Fully Identified
paragraphs: DOD officials have yet to fully identify the funding requirements to  support the military buildup on Guam. The military services’ realignments  on Guam are estimated to cost over $13 billion; of that, the Marine Corps  buildup is estimated to cost $10.3 billion. Additionally, the $13 billion  estimate excludes the costs of all other defense organizations that will be  needed to support the additional military personnel and dependents on  Guam. For example, DOD agencies, including the Defense Logistics  Agency and the Defense Commissary Agency, will likely incur additional  costs to execute their missions to help support the services’ influx of  personnel, missions, and equipment to Guam.
Recently, Marine Forces Pacific officials estimated that the Marine Corps  realignment on Guam alone will exceed $15 billion, which is significantly  higher than the original $10.3 billion estimate. These additional operational  costs include the cost of high-speed vessels (procurement and  maintenance) to move Marines to and from Guam; training-related costs in  the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands; relocation costs for  personnel, equipment, and material to Guam; costs of facility furnishings,  such as furniture and office equipment; and real estate costs if additional  land is required in Guam or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana  Islands. These officials have also identified base operational and  maintenance costs that will be funded with U.S. appropriations after the  move to Guam but are currently reimbursed by the government of Japan  through its host nation funding programs like the Japan Facility  Improvement Program and special measures agreements that provide  support for labor and utility services for Marine Corps bases in Okinawa.  In addition, cost estimates for the relocation of forces to Guam do not  include all costs associated with the development of several training  ranges for the Marine Corps in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands— estimated to cost $2 billion. Also, the Marine Corps estimates that the  strategic lift operating from Guam will cost an additional $88 million  annually as compared with operations from Okinawa.
Some uncertainties also exist in the cost-sharing arrangement with the  government of Japan. The government of Japan is expected to contribute a  total of $6.09 billion of which up to $2.8 billion would be in funds without  reimbursement for the construction of operational and support  infrastructure, such as barracks and office buildings. The government of  Japan is also expected to provide the remainder, another $3.3 billion, in  loans and equity investments for installation support infrastructure, such  as on-base power and water systems, and military family housing. Most of  this $3.3 billion is planned to be recouped over time by the government of  Japan in the form of service charges paid by the Marine Corps and in rents  paid by U.S. servicemembers with their overseas housing allowances  provided by DOD using funds appropriated by Congress. Also, according  to DOD officials, several conditions must be met before the government of  Japan contributes some or all of the $6.09 billion to the cost of the Marine  Corps move. First, the government of Japan has stipulated that its funds  will not be made available until it has reviewed and agreed to specific  infrastructure plans for Guam. Second, failure or delay of any initiative  outlined in the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative may affect  another, because various planning variables need to fall into place in order  for the initiatives to move forward. For example, according to DOD, the  commencement of facility construction on Guam in fiscal year 2010  depends on the government of Japan showing progress in the construction  of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma replacement facility. Finally, the  government of Japan may encounter challenges in funding its share of the  Marine Corps move considering Japan’s other national priorities and its  commitments associated with funding several other major realignments of  U.S. forces in Japan under the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative.
section_title: Operational and Training Challenges
paragraphs: DOD also has not fully addressed operational challenges, such as  providing appropriate mobility support and training capabilities to meet  Marine Corps requirements. According to Marine Forces Pacific officials,  the Marine Corps in Guam will depend on strategic military sealift and  airlift to reach destinations in Asia that will be farther away than was the  case when the units were based in Okinawa. For example, in a  contingency operation that requires sealift, the ships may have to deploy  from Sasebo, Japan, or other locations to collect the Marines and their  equipment on Guam and then go to the area where the contingency is  taking place, potentially risking a delayed arrival at certain potential  trouble spots since Guam is farther away from these locations than  Okinawa. According to Marine Corps officials, amphibious shipping  capability and airlift capacity are needed in Guam, which may include  expanding existing staging facilities and systems support for both sealift  and airlift.
Existing training ranges and facilities on Guam are not sufficient to meet  the training requirements of the projected Marine Corps force. A DOD  analysis of training opportunities in Guam concluded that no ranges on  Guam are suitable for the needs of the projected Marine Corps force  because of inadequacy in size or lack of availability. U.S. Pacific Command  is also in the process of conducting a training study that covers Guam and  the Northern Mariana Islands to see what options are available for training  in the region. Marine Forces Pacific officials stated that live-fire artillery  training, amphibious landings, and tracked vehicle operations will be  challenging because of the combination of factors associated with the  limited size of training areas available and the environmental concerns on  the Northern Mariana Islands.
section_title: Increase in Military Presence Is Expected to Have Significant Impact on the Local Community and Public Infrastructure
paragraphs: The increase in military presence is expected to have a significant impact  on Guam’s community and public infrastructure; however, these potential  effects have yet to be fully addressed. This undertaking is estimated to  increase the current Guam population of approximately 171,000 by an  estimated 25,000 active duty military personnel and dependents (or 14.6  percent) to 196,000. The Guam population could also swell further  because DOD’s personnel estimates do not include defense civilians and  contractors who are also likely to move to Guam to support DOD  operations. DOD officials estimate that they will require 500 defense  civilians and contractors to support the Marine Corps base operations;  however, they expect many of these jobs to be filled by military spouses or  the local population. This estimate does not include personnel for other  service realignments on Guam.
DOD and government of Guam officials recognize that the increase in  construction due to the military buildup will exceed local capacity and the  availability of local workers. For example, DOD officials cite a July 2008  study that estimated the annual construction capacity to be approximately  $1 billion to $1.5 billion and potentially $2.5 billion with improvements to  the port and road networks compared with the estimated construction  capacity of more than $3 billion per year needed by DOD to meet the  planned fiscal year 2014 completion date. In addition, Guam currently  faces a shortage of skilled construction workers. Preliminary analysis  indicates that 15,000 to 20,000 construction workers will be required to  support the projected development on Guam. One estimate is that Guam  may be able to meet only 10 to 15 percent of the labor requirement locally.  Nearby countries may have workers willing to come to Guam to take jobs  to construct needed facilities, but these workers will have to enter the  United States on temporary nonagricultural workers visas. Joint Guam  Program Office officials cite the recently passed legislation that will  increase the cap of temporary workers in Guam from 2009 until 2014 as  addressing many of their concerns about temporary workers’ visas. At  the same time, the government of Guam reports that the influx of foreign  workers would put a strain on local emergency care services, medical  facilities, public utilities, transportation networks, and the availability of  temporary housing.
In addition, as we recently testified, DOD and government of Guam  officials recognize that the island’s infrastructure is inadequate to meet the  increased demand due to the military buildup. For example:    Guam’s commercial port has capacity constraints with pier berthing space,  crane operations, and container storage locations.
Guam’s two major highways are in poor condition and, when ordnance  (ammunition and explosives) is unloaded from ships for Andersen Air  Force Base now and for the Marine Corps in the future, the ordnance must  be transported on one of these major roads that run through highly  populated areas.
Guam’s electrical system—the sole power provider on the island—is not  reliable and has transmission problems resulting in brownouts and voltage  and frequency fluctuations. The system may not be adequate to deliver the  additional energy requirements associated with the military buildup.
Guam’s water and wastewater treatment systems are near capacity and  have a history of failure due to aged and deteriorated distribution lines.  The military buildup may increase demand by at least 25 percent.
Guam’s solid waste facilities face capacity and environmental challenges  as they have reached the end of their useful life. Currently, the solid waste  landfills in Guam have a number of unresolved issues related to discharge  of pollutants and are near capacity.
Government of Guam officials stated that Guam will require significant  funding to address anticipated public infrastructure challenges; however,  these officials have not identified sufficient resources necessary to  support this buildup. In a recent congressional hearing, the Governor of  Guam testified that the government of Guam will need $6.1 billion to  address infrastructure upgrades, such as projects regarding the port  expansion, road enhancements, power and water upgrades, education, and  public health improvements. These costs are separate from and in  addition to DOD’s cost estimates of the military realignments on Guam.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The evolution of U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and infrastructure  requirements continues, as reflected in the fiscal year 2009 overseas  master plans, and many efforts to consolidate, realign, and shift the U.S.  military presence globally are still under way and are years from  completion. For the last 4 years, the overseas master plans have been an  important means for keeping Congress informed of the challenges DOD  faces and the costs associated with such efforts. However, DOD has  submitted the plans to the congressional defense committees months after  the annual budget submissions even though the congressional reporting  requirement directs that updates of the plans be provided with each yearly  budget submission. Recently, a congressional committee report expressed  concern about the department’s frequent failure to comply with deadlines  for submitting mandated reports and reiterated the importance of  receiving the reports in a timely manner. The timely filing of the  department’s mandated reports was seen as essential to supporting the  committee’s need for current information when making decisions related  to DOD’s budget requests and to permit the committee to effectively  exercise its oversight responsibilities. Without having the mandated  reports in a timely manner, Congress is likely to be missing up-to-date  information needed for making funding decisions and carrying out its  oversight responsibilities. Since DOD intends to replace the overseas  master plans with annual updates of its global defense posture as DOD’s  overseas planning report to Congress, the department has an opportunity  to reexamine its timeline for producing these reports to issue them with  the administration’s annual budget submission to provide Congress with  adequate time for review.
With respect to the military buildup on Guam, it is likely that it will be  2010 or later before DOD is able to complete a comprehensive master plan  for the military buildup. A comprehensive master plan is important for  Congress, as it helps to ensure that Congress has a complete picture of  facility requirements and associated costs in order to make appropriate  funding decisions and to assist DOD, federal departments and agencies,  the government of Guam, and other organizations in addressing the  challenges associated with the military buildup. At the same time, it is  reasonable to expect that until DOD has the results of the environmental  impact statement and record of decision required by the National  Environmental Policy Act of 1969, it will not be able to finalize a  comprehensive master plan for the reasons that we stated in our report.  Meanwhile, the Joint Guam Program Office is coordinating the multi- service development of a working-level plan for DOD that is to be  submitted to Congress in September 2008. However, no requirement exists  to report periodically on the status of DOD’s planning efforts after this  date. In our 2007 report, we suggested that Congress consider requiring  the Secretary of Defense to report periodically to the defense committees  on the status of the department’s planning efforts for Guam to help ensure  the best application of federal funds and leveraging of options for  supporting the military buildup until DOD finalizes a comprehensive  master plan. Because of the uncertainty in DOD’s plans for the military  buildup, we continue to believe that this approach has merit and that the  defense committees would find annual updates of the Joint Guam Program  Office’s working-level plan for Guam useful to inform congressional  decisions and ensure proper congressional oversight from September 2008  to the date on which the office completes its comprehensive master plan,  currently expected no sooner than 2010.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To inform congressional decisions and ensure proper congressional  oversight, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following  two actions:    Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics to initiate a process of developing global defense posture  updates earlier each year so that DOD can provide the congressional  defense committees the overseas planning report with the administration’s  annual budget submission.
Direct the Executive Director of the Joint Guam Program Office to provide  the congressional defense committees with annual updates of the Guam  working-level plan until a comprehensive master plan is finalized and  submitted to Congress.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with  our recommendation to initiate a process of developing future overseas  master plans earlier each year so that DOD can provide them to the  congressional defense committees with the administration’s annual budget  submission, and agreed with our recommendation to provide the  congressional defense committees with annual updates of the Guam  working-level plan until a comprehensive master plan is finalized and  submitted to Congress. While DOD partially agreed with the first  recommendation, it also stated that it plans to replace the expired  requirements for the overseas master plans with annual updates of its  global defense posture as DOD’s overseas planning report to Congress.  DOD further commented that the report development process will support  submission with the administration’s annual budget request. Since the  Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2009 military construction  appropriation bill requires that these updates include data similar to those  presented in prior master plans and explains that the timely filing of  mandated reports is essential to the ability of the committee to exercise its  oversight responsibilities, we believe that this effort to replace the  overseas master plans with the global defense posture updates will meet  the intent of our original recommendation. Therefore, we revised our  recommendation to reflect that DOD plans to replace the master plans  with annual updates of its global defense posture as the department’s  overseas planning report to Congress.
DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided  technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report as  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of  the Marine Corps; the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; the  Commander, U.S. European Command; the Commander, U.S. Central  Command, and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies  will be made available to others upon request. In addition, this report will  be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me at  (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. The GAO staff members who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the fiscal year 2009 overseas master  plans have addressed changes since the last plans, the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) challenges, and our prior recommendations, and to  examine their timeliness, we analyzed the overseas master plans and  compared them to the reporting requirements in the congressional  mandate and the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) guidance. We  compared and contrasted the fiscal years 2008 and 2009 overseas master  plans in order to identify improvements and updated challenges in the  plans. We also assessed the quantity and quality of the data describing the  base categories, host nation funding levels, facility requirements and costs,  environmental remediation issues, and other issues affecting the  implementation of the plans. To discuss the reporting requirements, host  nation agreements and funding levels, U.S. funding levels and sources,  environmental remediation and restoration issues, property returns,  residual value, and training requirements, we met with officials from OSD;  U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Army Pacific; U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine  Forces Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Forces Korea; U.S. Eighth  Army; Seventh Air Force; U.S. Naval Forces Korea; U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers, Far East District; U.S. Forces Japan; U.S. Army Japan; U.S. Air  Forces Japan; U.S. Naval Forces Japan; U.S. Marine Forces Japan; Naval  Facilities Engineering Command Far East, Japan; U.S. European  Command; U.S. Army Europe; U.S. Naval Forces Europe; U.S. Air Force  Europe; U.S. Central Command; and U.S. Special Operations Command.  We also analyzed available reports, documents, policies, directives,  international agreements, and guidance to keep abreast of ongoing  changes in overseas defense basing strategies and requirements. To  directly observe the condition of facilities and the status of selected  construction projects, we visited and toured facilities at Garrison  Wiesbaden and Garrison Grafenwoehr, Germany; Camp Schwab, Camp  Zama, Yokosuka Naval Base, and Yokota Air Base, Japan; and Yongsan  Army Garrison and Garrison Humphreys, South Korea.
To determine the status of DOD’s planning efforts for the Guam military  buildup, we met with officials from OSD, the Air Force, the Navy, U.S.  Pacific Command, and the Joint Guam Program Office. In general, we  discussed the current planning framework for the military buildup, the  schedule and development of a comprehensive master plan, and the status  of the environmental impact study required by the National Environmental  Policy Act of 1969. In addition, we met with officials from U.S. Pacific  Fleet; U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific; U.S. Marine Forces Japan; Third  Marine Expeditionary Forces; U.S. Forces Japan; U.S. Army Pacific; and  Pacific Air Forces to discuss the challenges and various factors that can  affect U.S. infrastructure requirements and costs associated with the  military buildup, to determine if funding requirements to accommodate  the buildup have been identified, and to identify operational and training  challenges associated with the buildup. We also visited Naval Base Guam;  Andersen Air Force Base, Guam; and other military sites in Guam to  directly observe the installations and future military construction sites. We  analyzed available reports, documents, and international agreements to  keep abreast of ongoing activities in Guam pertaining to challenges that  may affect DOD’s development and implementation of a comprehensive  master plan for the military buildup. To identify the funding and local  infrastructure challenges, we met with the Governor and his staff, Guam  Delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, and representatives from  the Guam legislature, the Mayors’ Council of Guam, the Guam Chamber of  Commerce, Guam’s Civilian Military Task Force, and community groups  on Guam.
We met with U.S. Special Operations Command officials; however, its  planning efforts were not specifically required for the overseas master  plans in response to the congressional mandates. In addition, we did not  include U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command in our  analysis because these commands have significantly fewer facilities  overseas than the other regional commands in the Pacific, Europe, and  Central Asia.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 through  August 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Mark Little, Assistant Director;  Nelsie Alcoser; Mae Jones; Kate Lenane; Julia Matta; and Jamilah Moon  made major contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and  Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command.  GAO-08-947T. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD  Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military  Buildup on Guam. GAO-07-1015. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2007.
Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting  Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global Posture  Restructuring. GAO-06-852. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006.
DOD’s Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve. GAO- 06-913R. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2006.
Opportunities Exist to Improve Comprehensive Master Plans for  Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas. GAO-05-680R.  Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005.
Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure Costs  Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive Master Plans. GAO-04- 609NI. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2004.
Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S.  Military Presence on Okinawa. GAO/NSIAD-98-66. Washington, D.C.:  March 2, 1998.
subsections: section_title: Community Growth Bases
paragraphs: Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help  Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth. GAO- 08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road  Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R.  Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely  Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial  Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
section_title: U.S. Insular Areas
paragraphs: Defense Logistics: Navy Needs to Develop and Implement a Plan to  Ensure That Voyage Repairs Are Available to Ships Operating near  Guam when Needed. GAO-08-427. Washington, D.C.: May 12, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Planning Efforts for the Proposed Military  Buildup on Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many Challenges Yet  to Be Addressed. GAO-08-722T. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2008.
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Pending Legislation  Would Apply U.S. Immigration Law to the CNMI with a Transition  Period. GAO-08-466. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2008.
U.S. Insular Areas: Economic, Fiscal, and Financial Accountability  Challenges. GAO-07-119. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2006.
U.S. Insular Areas: Multiple Factors Affect Federal Health Care Funding.  GAO-06-75. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2005.
Environmental Cleanup: Better Communication Needed for Dealing  with Formerly Used Defense Sites in Guam. GAO-02-423. Washington,  D.C.: April 11, 2002.
Compact of Free Association: Negotiations Should Address Aid  Effectiveness and Accountability and Migrants’ Impact on U.S. Areas.  GAO-02-270T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2001.
Foreign Relations: Migration From Micronesian Nations Has Had  Significant Impact on Guam, Hawaii, and the Commonwealth of the  Northern Mariana Islands. GAO-02-40. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2001.
U.S. Insular Areas: Application of the U.S. Constitution. GAO/OGC-98-5.  Washington, D.C.: November 7, 1997.
Insular Areas Update. GAO/GGD-96-184R. Washington, D.C.:   September 13, 1996.
U.S. Insular Areas: Information on Fiscal Relations with the Federal  Government. GAO/T-GGD-95-71. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 1995.
U.S. Insular Areas: Development Strategy and Better Coordination  Among U.S. Agencies Are Needed. GAO/NSIAD-94-62. Washington, D.C.:   February 7, 1994.