Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals
Published: 2006-11-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The prevalence of opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan imperils the stability of its government and threatens to turn the conflict-ridden nation once again into a safe haven for traffickers and terrorists. To combat the drug trade, the U.S. government developed a counternarcotics strategy consisting of five pillars--alternative livelihoods, elimination and eradication, interdiction, law enforcement and justice, and public information. The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2005 directed GAO to examine the use of all fiscal year 2005 funds administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State (State) for Afghan counternarcotics programs. To comply with this mandate, we examined progress under each counternarcotics pillar, challenges faced, and efforts to ensure that funds were used for intended purposes. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed pertinent USAID and State documents and met with cognizant U.S. and international officials in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. GAO makes no recommendations in this report. USAID, State, Department of Defense, and Department of Justice were provided a draft of this report, but did not provide formal comments.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: USAID and State received about $532 million fiscal year 2005 funds and initiated a number of projects under each counternarcotics pillar, but delays in implementation limited progress. For example, State's provision of aircraft enhanced the mobility of eradicators, but coordination difficulties between Afghan officials and security forces delayed the eradicators' fielding. Despite increased eradication and other U.S. efforts, the poppy crop grew by 50 percent in 2006 to a record level. However, many projects have not been in place long enough to assess progress toward the overall goal of significantly reducing drug cultivation, production, and trafficking. For example, projects to provide rural credit and to field teams to discourage poppy cultivation were not in place prior to the 2005-2006 growing season. The worsening security situation and the lack of Afghan capacity are tremendous challenges to the success of U.S. counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan. The security situation continues to decline; during the 2005-2006 growing season, eradicators were attacked several times and alternative livelihoods project personnel were killed. Moreover, due to Afghanistan's lack of infrastructure, educated populace, and functioning governmental institutions, significantly reducing poppy cultivation and drug trafficking is expected to take at least a decade. USAID and State have made efforts to oversee the use of funds, including the use of self certifications, contract clauses, and vetting, when applicable. However, a lack of official records and reliable information limited efforts to vet Afghan nationals. In addition, although USAID and State have made efforts to monitor ongoing projects, security concerns and poor infrastructure limited site visits.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The continued prevalence of opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking  in Afghanistan imperils the stability of the Afghan government and  threatens to turn the conflict-ridden nation into a safe haven for traffickers  and terrorists. In 2005, opium poppy was cultivated in more than three- quarters of Afghanistan’s provinces. The estimated export value of opium,  morphine, and heroin equaled about half of the country’s licit economy,  with drug profits reportedly funding terrorists and other antigovernment  entities. As a result, counternarcotics—for which the United Kingdom  took the international lead in Afghanistan in 2002—has become one of the  top priorities of the United States. To combat opium poppy cultivation,  drug trafficking, and their negative effects on Afghan stability and pursuit  of democracy, in 2005, the U.S. government, working with allied  governments, developed a five-pillared counternarcotics strategy  addressing (1) alternative livelihoods, (2) elimination and eradication, (3)  interdiction, (4) law enforcement and justice reform, and (5) public  information. The overall goal of the strategy is to significantly reduce  Afghanistan’s poppy cultivation, drug production, and drug trafficking. In  fiscal year 2005, the United States provided about $782 million dollars for  programs administered by the Departments of Defense (Defense) and  State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and  the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for counternarcotics  programs in Afghanistan.
The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global  War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief of 2005 required the Comptroller  General to examine the use of all fiscal year 2005 funds administered by  USAID and State—about $532 million—for bilateral Afghanistan  counternarcotics and alternative livelihoods programs. To comply with  this mandate, we examined (1) USAID’s and State’s progress in  implementing counternarcotics programs, projects, and activities under  each pillar, and the factors, if any, limiting implementation; (2) challenges  faced by counternarcotics efforts; and (3) the agencies’ efforts to ensure  that the funds were used for intended purposes.
To address these objectives, we reviewed pertinent USAID and State  planning, funding, and reporting documents for counternarcotics  programs. We discussed these programs with cognizant officials from the  Departments of Defense, Justice (Justice), and State; USAID; DEA in  Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan; and with private contractors  implementing U.S. projects in Afghanistan. In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met  with officials from the United Nations (UN) and the governments of  Afghanistan and the United Kingdom to discuss counternarcotics efforts.  We traveled to the provinces of Balkh, Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar  to meet with U.S. and Afghan officials to discuss various U.S.–funded  projects. We determined the data provided to us were sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of this report.
We conducted our review from September 2005 through October 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. (See  app. I for a more complete description of our scope and methodology.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Afghanistan is a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with limited  natural resources, bordered by Pakistan to the east and south; Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China to the north; and Iran to the west. At  647,500 square kilometers, Afghanistan is slightly smaller than the state of  Texas. The country is divided into 34 provinces, more than 300 districts,  and approximately 30,000 villages.
Afghanistan is one of the world’s poorest countries; its population,  estimated at more than 31 million, is ethnically diverse, largely rural, and  mostly uneducated. Development indicators published by the World Bank  and the UN rank Afghanistan at the bottom of virtually every category,  including nutrition; infant, child, and maternal mortality; life expectancy;  and literacy.
Over the last two decades, conflict ravaged Afghanistan. The Soviet Union  invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and withdrew only after waging a prolonged  and destructive war against Afghan resistance groups. Following a  protracted civil war, by 1998, most of Afghanistan was under the control of  the fundamentalist Taliban group. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan became  a haven for terrorists. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the  United States and a coalition of its allies invaded Afghanistan and removed  the Taliban from power.
Following the Taliban’s removal, the coalition began the process of  establishing a new Afghan government. To help rebuild the country and  create a stable Afghan society that would not be a threat to itself or others,  in fiscal years 2002 through 2004 the United States spent $1.6 billion on  humanitarian and reconstruction projects. In June 2004 and again in July  2005, we reported that U.S. humanitarian and short-term assistance over  the two-year period had helped Afghanistan’s vulnerable population, but  that longer-term reconstruction efforts achieved limited results in creating  a stable Afghan society.
The United States and several other donor nations met in Geneva,  Switzerland, in April 2002, to help Afghanistan address threats to its  security. At the Geneva conference, the donors established a five-pillared  security reform agenda and designated a donor country to take the lead in  reforming each pillar. In a June 2005 report on efforts to establish the army  and police, we reported that there needed to be concurrent progress in all  security pillars, otherwise Afghanistan could again become a haven for  terrorists. Furthermore, we reported that limited progress had been made  in reforming Afghanistan’s judiciary and combating illicit narcotics.
subsections: section_title: Afghanistan’s Opium Industry
paragraphs: Afghanistan is the world’s largest supplier of opium and has been a source  of illegal opium for decades. Opium poppy is a hardy, drought-resistant  crop that is easily grown throughout Afghanistan’s rugged territory. Opium  poppy, as seen in figure 1, is an annual crop with a six to seven month  planting cycle that starts earlier in the south and later in the north of  Afghanistan. It is planted between September and December and flowers  approximately three months after planting. After the flower’s petals fall  away, the opium, an opaque, milky sap found in the plant’s seed capsule, is  harvested between April and July. The sap can then be refined into  morphine and heroin. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  (UNODC) surveys indicate that the primary deterrent to farmers growing  poppy is the threat of eradication. The majority of eradication takes place  after the poppy plant has sprouted and before it is harvested,  approximately a two-month long period.
According to UNODC, in the three-year period, 2002 through 2004,  Afghanistan’s opium harvest increased substantially. In 2005, the number  of hectares of opium poppy cultivation declined by over 20 percent, yet the  crop yield per hectare rose because of favorable weather conditions. Thus,  the estimated amount of potential opium produced declined only slightly.  In 2006, poppy cultivation increased to 165,000 hectares, yielding a record  poppy crop estimated at a potential 6,100 metric tons of opium, or more  than 90 percent of the world’s illicit opium (see table 1).
State attributed the reduction in cultivation in 2005 to surplus opium from  previous years, public information efforts by President Karzai and others,  promised alternative livelihoods assistance, and farmers’ fears of  eradication. However, eradication fears were not realized; only an  estimated 5,100 hectares of poppy were eradicated. Further, drug-related  corruption is a problem at all levels of government and remains pervasive  at the provincial and district levels. Conversely, the reasons for the growth  in 2006 cultivation are not fully known, but U.S. officials described a  combination of factors, including the relatively small amount of  eradication in 2005 and pressure from traffickers and the Taliban on  farmers to grow. For example, U.S. officials said that in southern  Afghanistan, farmers reported finding “night letters” from the Taliban left  on their doors threatening them if they did not cultivate poppy. Moreover,  UNODC reported that many farmers paid eradicators not to eradicate their  fields and that eradication was often a consensual decision between  eradicators and farmers.
section_title: The U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy
paragraphs: From 2002 through 2004, the United States saw increasing opium poppy  cultivation and drug trafficking as a growing threat to stability and security  of Afghanistan and provided approximately $380 million for Afghan- and  United Kingdom-led counternarcotics efforts. The United States used  these funds to train Afghan narcotics interdiction units, construct border  and highway checkpoint facilities, and supply operational support and  nonlethal equipment to Afghan eradication teams. These efforts failed to  have any significant effect on the illicit narcotics industry because of  limited security and stability across Afghanistan. As a result, the U.S.  government made counternarcotics a top priority and developed a strategy  in 2004 to reduce poppy cultivation, drug production, and trafficking. This  new strategy is comprised of five pillars, as illustrated in figure 2. The five- pillar counternarcotics plan is intended to offer incentives to stop the  growing of opium poppy through alternative livelihoods projects,  combined with strong disincentives in the form of forced eradication,  interdiction, and law enforcement, while spreading the Afghan  government’s antinarcotics message. These U.S. efforts are also expected  to build the Afghan government’s capacity to conduct counternarcotics  efforts on its own.
The United States originally planned to use crop-dusting airplanes to spray  herbicide on the opium poppy before it could be harvested. However, the  Afghan government would not allow the use of herbicides. Consequently,  the United States and Afghanistan rely on manual eradication, such as  police on foot using sticks, sickles, and scythes to knock or cut down  poppy, and mechanized eradication, which involves police using tractors,  all-terrain vehicles, and other vehicles to drive over or plow up the poppy.  USAID also modified some of its projects to specifically focus on  counternarcotics in those provinces where opium poppy cultivation was  greatest. These alternative livelihoods projects are coordinated with  USAID’s on-going reconstruction efforts, and several of the short term  cash-for-work projects stem from prior humanitarian assistance projects  designed to help vulnerable populations.
section_title: U.S. Funding for Counternarcotics
paragraphs: To accomplish U.S. counternarcotics goals in Afghanistan, the United  States provided about $782 million in fiscal year 2005, of which $532  million was administered by USAID and State, as shown in table 2, and  over $250 million by Defense and DEA. The majority of USAID and State  funding was provided by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act  for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, which  was enacted into law in May 2005. Several federal and agency regulations  govern USAID’s and State’s use of these funds for counternarcotics  programs, prohibiting use of the funds to assist terrorists, drug traffickers,  or human rights violators. Though not explicitly addressed in this report,  funds administered by Defense and DEA are being expended on projects,  such as constructing the counternarcotics justice center and supporting  Afghan interdiction efforts.
section_title: USAID and State Projects Made Progress, but Implementation Delays Limited Accomplishments
paragraphs: USAID and State established goals for each of the U.S. counternarcotics  strategy’s five pillars, funded projects under each pillar, and made  progress toward some project objectives. However, the implementation of  several projects was hindered by the security situation, poor  infrastructure, and other factors. Moreover, USAID’s and State’s projects  (see fig. 3) had not been in place long enough to determine whether they  had contributed toward the overall goal of significantly reducing poppy  cultivation, drug production, and drug trafficking.
subsections: section_title: Alternative Livelihoods: Despite Efforts, Increased Security Risks and Infrastructure Limited Achievements
paragraphs: As shown in table 3, USAID provided $180 million to fund licit economic  alternatives to poppy cultivation and thus reduce the amount of  Afghanistan’s economic activity attributable to the drug industry.  According to UNODC, as of 2006, 2.9 million Afghans were involved in a  narcotics industry that is equivalent to about half of Afghanistan’s legal  economic activity.
USAID provided about $125 million for regional alternative livelihoods  projects. The projects were split into three regions—Nangarhar, Laghman,  and Konar in the east; Badakshan and Takhar in the north; and Helmand,  Kandahar, Oruzgan in the south—and were implemented by different  contractors in an effort to ensure the projects were tailored to the  appropriate needs and potential of each region. In all the regions, similar  types of labor intensive, cash-for-work projects were implemented, such  as road repair, as illustrated in figure 4, and irrigation and drainage canal  rehabilitation. The contractors in each region were supposed to develop  longer-term projects more suited to their provinces. A key element of  these efforts was to develop industry “clusters.” For example, dairy,  poultry, and livestock industries were associated with feed development  and production; veterinary services; and milk, meat, and egg products  being packaged, processed, and stored. Although rehabilitating the  agriculture sector is a priority in all of these provinces, in the east, USAID  is also exploring ways to expand and add value to the marble industry and,  in the north, USAID is focusing on cattle and other livestock industries.
As shown in table 4, USAID reported the following results for its cash-for- work projects in the east, north, and south. USAID had not established  targets for all these activities in fiscal year 2006, but had established  targets in September 2006 for fiscal year 2007.
As part of the longer-term objectives of developing business clusters,  USAID conducted numerous studies in all three regions to assess various  business sectors that could be sustainable in the respective regions, such  as dairy, fruits and nuts, flour mills, carpets, and other industries. In  Nangarhar, a business center was opened in April 2006 and is expected to  boost development in the region. The business center will provide  computer training and other services to local businessmen. Also, in  Nangarhar and Laghman, fruit and nut trees were planted on some 1,500  hectares of former poppy-producing land.
The deteriorating security situation, the lack of infrastructure, and, in  northern Afghanistan, bad weather all contributed to delays in  implementing the alternative livelihoods projects. Contractors often  reported the security situation in a particular district or area forced them  to suspend projects for weeks or months at a time. For example, in May  2005, four Afghan subcontractors working on cash-for-work projects in the  south were killed, which led the USAID contractor to leave the area until  September 2005. Contractors and potential investors cited the lack of  adequate roads and electricity as deterrents to investors. For example, the  poor condition of the road leading into Badakshan made it difficult to  obtain the use of heavy machinery for construction and other projects, as  many contractors were unable or unwilling to transport such equipment  there. In addition, the weather in Badakshan led to the delay of projects  because the area was snowed in for much of the winter, while flooding in  the summer limited activities.
subsections: section_title: Seed and Fertilizer Distributed, but Agricultural Credit Project Delayed
paragraphs: USAID provided almost $30 million to purchase seed and fertilizer for  Afghan farmers to use as an alternative to growing poppy. The initial  quantity of wheat seed and fertilizer in the fall of 2005 was equally  distributed among all of Afghanistan’s provinces and was intended to  demonstrate the central government’s reach throughout Afghanistan. The  spring 2006 distribution of vegetable seeds was limited to the three  alternative livelihoods regions. According to USAID, this distribution of  seed and fertilizer targets farmers with access to both water to grow the  vegetables and markets to sell the produce. USAID reported that the fall  seed and fertilizer distribution reached all 34 provinces and 550,000  farmers. The spring seed and fertilizer project distributed vegetable seeds  and fertilizer to approximately 112,000 farmers in the east, north, and  south.
USAID provided almost $16 million for an agricultural-credit project.  Afghan farmers do not have access to credit for planting licit crops,  although drug traffickers provide credit to farmers for planting opium  poppies. USAID’s project seeks to remedy this situation by providing loans  to farmers to grow licit crops. USAID planned to initiate this project by  mid-summer 2006, but the funding was not obligated until the fall.  According to USAID officials, the project was delayed while they searched  for a contractor who was able to initiate the project in all the targeted  regions.
section_title: Elimination and Eradication: Despite More Eradication, Cultivation Increased
paragraphs: As shown in table 5, State provided $258 million to support the Afghan  government’s efforts to prevent poppy planting and eradicate poppy crops  if prevention failed. In 2005, after central and provincial government  eradication efforts, an estimated 104,000 hectares of opium poppy were  cultivated. In 2006, this number increased to an estimated 165,000 hectares  despite a threefold increase in eradication.
State provided $104 million to support the AEF’s operating costs and  purchase of additional equipment, and $124 million to purchase and lease  aircraft to move the force around the country. These efforts were intended  to address the challenges faced by the AEF’s predecessor, the Central  Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF). According to State officials, the CPEF’s  operational procedures and lack of mobility made getting the force into  the field and supplying it difficult. For example, a senior State official  stated that because the CPEF operated as one large unit and traveled in  convoys on the roads, impassable roads slowed or stopped their getting  out to planned locations. Moreover, because the CPEF lacked logistical  support, they had to return to Kabul to re-supply. In 2005, UNODC  reported, but did not verify, that the CPEF eradicated about 210 hectares  of opium poppy and the Afghan National Police eradicated about 890  hectares.
After the 2005 season, the CPEF was renamed the AEF and reorganized  into four smaller and more mobile units of 150 counternarcotics police  each. One half of this police force provided security while the rest served  as eradicators and support. The teams could be deployed in multiple areas  of the country simultaneously. In order to carry out its eradication efforts,  the force was expected to have the mobility to get into the field and the  logistics to remain there. State paid for a “wet lease” of four Russian- made aircraft and the purchase and operating costs of ten U.S. Huey-II  helicopters (see fig. 5). The leased aircraft were used primarily for troop  and cargo transport to support reconnaissance, establish camps, and  deploy the AEF, while the Huey-II helicopters provided enhanced security,  reconnaissance, and medical evacuation capacity, as well as limited  personnel and cargo transport for the AEF. The aircraft were also used to  provide additional lift and transport support to the PEP teams and  embassy personnel. The addition of airlift at airfields from Kabul, Parvan,  and Kandahar, and other vehicles allowed the AEF to travel more easily  and remain in the field for longer periods.
In 2006, UNODC reported the AEF eradicated an estimated 2,250 hectares  of opium poppy in Helmand and Badakshan provinces (see fig. 6).  Although the AEF eradicated over ten times the amount eradicated by the  CPEF in 2005, its initial deployment was delayed. According to USAID and  State officials, the governor of Helmand wanted additional alternative  livelihoods projects in place before allowing the AEF to begin working.  Moreover, State officials stated that because of the security risks in  Helmand, the AEF needed the Afghan National Police and Afghan National  Army to provide security. However, coordinating their efforts to assist the  AEF proved time-consuming. The combination of these challenges pushed  the AEF’s fielding date back from early February 2006 until late March  2006. Because most poppy growth occurs over a two-month period, the  AEF’s fielding delay prevented them from eradicating as much as it might  have had it been fielded in February, as intended.
State provided $6 million for equipment and training to provincial  authorities to conduct eradication activities and $24 million to create  seven provincial PEP teams to discourage poppy cultivation in the  provinces where it is most prevalent—Badakshan, Balkh, Farah, Helmand,  Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Oruzgan. Beginning in 2003, at the initiative of  President Karzai, provincial governors were given the responsibility for  carrying out their own eradication efforts with the financial support of the  central government and donors. In 2005, governor-led eradication was  responsible for more eradication than the central government’s efforts.  UNODC reported and verified about 4,000 hectares of governor-led  eradication.
In response to the larger amount of eradication conducted by governors  than the central government in 2005, State decided to increase support for  provincial authorities by reimbursing governor-led eradication efforts and  creating the PEP teams. In 2006, State began to reimburse provincial  authorities for their eradication expenses at a rate of $60 per hectare of  UNODC-verified eradication. However, when UNODC was not able to  verify provincial efforts, the governor was reimbursed based on his  submitted expenses. According to State officials, they also wanted to  enhance governor efforts to eliminate poppy cultivation by creating the  PEP teams attached to the offices of the seven provincial governors where  poppy cultivation was greatest. The teams were planned to consist of  seven Afghan advisors hired by the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics  and two international advisors hired by the United States. PEP teams were  to assist the provincial governors in discouraging farmers from growing  poppy and encouraging farmers to eradicate their own poppy fields by  coordinating antinarcotics public information messages, ensuring delivery  of assistance projects from all donors, and assisting with verification of  reported eradication. These teams were also designed to be closely  integrated with the public information campaign by helping to identify  local messages and local leaders to assist with the campaign, as well as to  assist central government counternarcotics efforts by reporting on any  obstacles that inhibit achieving provincial poppy reduction goals.
Even though the PEP teams were not fully fielded, governor-led  eradication, according to UNODC, more than tripled in 2006, to an  estimated 13,050 hectares. Governor-led eradication took place in 19  provinces and was again responsible for more eradication than central  eradication forces. Each PEP team was intended to be fully staffed and  provided security and housing by the end of 2005, however State did not  fully field the PEP teams because its contractor was unable to hire all of  the international advisors and supply each team with the required security,  housing, and equipment in time for the 2005 growing season. As of June  2006, 11 of 14 international PEP advisors had been hired. Moreover, the  Afghan government did not hire all the required Afghan nationals to staff  each team. Because the teams were not fully fielded, they were unable to  work as intended with provincial officials to coordinate alternative  livelihoods projects, assist with eradication verification as planned, or  coordinate public information projects to discourage poppy growing.
section_title: Interdiction: Border Security Projects Begun, but State’s Support of Counternarcotics Police Delayed
paragraphs: As seen in table 6, State provided $65 million to support DEA-led  interdiction efforts to help build Afghan capacity to destroy drug labs,  seize precursor chemicals and opiates, and arrest major traffickers. State’s  efforts to enhance border security in neighboring countries that serve as  transit points for narcotics are under way. State also planned to provide  support for the CNPA and NIU, but these projects were delayed while  State awaited the results of recently completed police-reform efforts and  construction of a new facility.
State provided $41 million to enhance border security in the neighboring  countries that often serve as transit points for drug traffickers, including  $30 million in Pakistan, $9 million in Tajikistan, and $2 million in  Turkmenistan. The planned assistance to Pakistan included the purchase  of vehicles and equipment for Pakistan’s Frontier Corp to conduct  counternarcotics and border security and Pakistan’s Anti Narcotics Force  to support poppy eradication and interdiction operations, as well as the  purchase of pre-fabricated steel bridges to increase mobility in the  Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The planned assistance for Tajikistan  and Turkmenistan included the purchase of vehicles and other equipment,  upgrading of border posts, and the training of border police.
State moved forward with border security enhancements. In Pakistan,  State began purchasing vehicles, body armor, and surveillance gear for  border security forces. State also issued a request for proposals for the  purchase of the pre-fabricated bridges. In Tajikistan, State, working with  UNODC and International Organization for Migration, started to equip  forensics labs and a police-dog training center; ordered a variety of  equipment for border police, including a communications system,  ambulances, surveillance gear, and vehicles; and started refurbishing  border posts such as the one seen in figure 7. In Turkmenistan, State  transferred the funds to UNODC, with whom State was already working,  to properly equip a major border checkpoint and provide relevant training  to border control personnel. UNODC contracted with a company for  construction and equipment.
State planned to provide $24 million to support the NIU and leadership of  the CNPA, but the spending of these funds was delayed. Of these funds,  State planned to spend $12.5 million to provide mentors, housing,  equipment, and vehicles for the CNPA leadership, with the remaining  funds going to operate and maintain the NIU Center for two years after its  completion; provide equipment for the center; and for NIU vetting,  training, and administrative costs.
As of August 2006, State’s support for the NIU was delayed while ongoing  police reform plans were finalized and Defense completed construction of  the NIU facility. Department of Defense-supported police reforms,  according to State officials, notably pay and rank reform, were only  recently completed, and State had been waiting until the CNPA’s  leadership was determined to begin using its support funds. The NIU  facility is expected to be completed November 30, 2006, almost eight  months later than the original completion date due, in part, to building  modifications.
section_title: Law Enforcement and Justice Reform: Efforts Led to New Counternarcotics Law and Supported Strengthening Corrections System
paragraphs: As seen in table 7, State provided nearly $24 million to support the Afghan  government’s efforts to increase its capacity to arrest, prosecute, and  punish traffickers and corrupt officials. State brought in senior federal  prosecutors from the Department of Justice to assist with legislative  reform efforts, such as the crafting of the new counternarcotics law, and  training investigators and prosecutors. State also began the Corrections  System Support Program (CSSP) to develop a professional, accountable,  and centralized Afghan corrections system. Under this program, State  started training corrections personnel and constructing new facilities.  State also planned support for the Counter Narcotics Justice Center, a  counternarcotics court and detention facility. However, construction of  the facility was still under way.
State transferred $2 million to the Department of Justice to continue to  pay for U.S. prosecutors from the Criminal Division’s Senior Federal  Prosecutors’ Program to provide legal and legislative assistance. The  prosecutors worked in several areas, including:  reform of key laws and implementation of regulations and authorities;   design, planning, and coordination of training in fundamentals and  advanced areas of the criminal law with emphasis on counternarcotics and  antimoney laundering enforcement; and   assessment of, mentoring of, and assistance to the Criminal Justice Task  Force (CJTF), a specialized unit of investigators and prosecutors  dedicated to working mid- and high-level narcotics and narcotics-related  investigations and prosecutions.
The Justice prosecutors, working with the government of Afghanistan,  helped develop and implement a new comprehensive counternarcotics law  that grants legal and investigative authority for mid- and high-level  investigations and prosecutions to a new counternarcotics legal  infrastructure apart from Afghanistan’s national judicial system. The new  law nationalized most drug crimes for investigation and prosecution by the  CJTF and trial by the Central Narcotics Tribunal, diminishing local  influences and chances of intimidation. The new law and the legal  authorities it provides are the centerpiece of CJTF training developed by  the United States. The Justice prosecutors, along with their international  partners, have mentored and guided the CJTF in the successful  prosecution of three mid- and high-level traffickers. The Justice  prosecutors are providing advice on the drafting of a more modern and  flexible criminal procedure code. The Justice prosecutors were also  instrumental in having the government of Afghanistan effect its first-ever  extradition to the United States of an Afghan narcotics trafficker.
subsections: section_title: Corrections Reform Program Ongoing
paragraphs: State provided almost $16 million for the CSSP, which is designed to  develop a professional, accountable, and centralized Afghan corrections  system. The CSSP is expected to devise and conduct training for Afghan  correctional officers and build and rehabilitate correctional facilities.
The CSSP began training prison guards and constructing new buildings,  with the award of the CSSP contract in March 2006. The contractor  finished a survey of Afghan prisons, developed corrections training  classes, trained its first 36 corrections officers at the Central Training  Facility in Kabul, and continued training in three other provinces (see fig.  8). In addition, the CSSP contractor began construction of an attorney  general’s office and a courthouse in Wardak province (see fig. 9).
State provided $6 million to pay the operations and maintenance costs of  the Counter Narcotics Justice Center—a counternarcotics court and  administrative offices for the CJTF and Central Narcotics Tribunal, as well  as a detention facility, which is still under construction. According to  Defense, State, and Justice, original plans called for Defense to erect a  temporary building for the Counter Narcotics Justice Center. However,  interagency discussions led to the decision to build a permanent set of  structures, which delayed expected completion while new plans were  drafted and a new contractor was chosen. Ongoing discussions may  further modify the construction.
The Counter Narcotics Justice Center is expected to be completed in  November 2006, over three months later than the original completion date  for the permanent structures. Additional modifications to the construction  design, should they be funded, will further delay the completion of the  facility.
section_title: Public Information: Campaign Launched, but Not Fully Coordinated with PEP Teams
paragraphs: As shown in table 8, State provided $5 million to support a public  information campaign intended to convince the Afghan populace to reject  poppy cultivation and trafficking. State transferred almost $1 million to  USAID for a grantee to begin a public information campaign. The  campaign was designed to (1) develop and produce media materials to  raise awareness and promote behavior change regarding poppy planting in  Afghanistan, (2) establish a regional network to disseminate the materials  and monitor and assess the efficacy of the campaign, and (3) support the  government of Afghanistan in its efforts to eliminate poppy cultivation.  State also provided almost $4 million for a new contractor, hired in May  2006, to continue and build on public information efforts.
The 2005 campaign, which used radio spots and printed media, was  developed to target key poppy-growing provinces over three phases  concerning (1) pre-planting, (2) pre-eradication and the health impact of  drugs, and (3) eradication and the rule of law. The grantee established  regional offices in the seven provinces with PEP teams to disseminate  materials and monitor the campaign. The grantee completed the campaign  on time between July 15, 2005 and May 15, 2006. According to information  provided by State, over the three phases, the campaign paid for 41 radio  spots that often featured prominent Afghans and were broadcast almost  9,000 times and prepared millions of stickers, matchboxes, booklets,  posters, banners, and billboards, as illustrated in figure 10, to publicize the  counternarcotics message. The grantee used focus groups and surveys to  assess its efforts. A survey conducted in November 2005 of more than  2,200 Afghans reported that about 75 percent of respondents had heard  counternarcotics radio messages. During the last two phases of the  campaign, the grantee worked with and paid the salaries of the Ministry of  Interior’s media office personnel.
Because of delays in getting PEP teams formed, the public-information  grantee was unable to rely on expected PEP support during the 2005-2006  poppy growing season. In several provinces, the grantee stated the PEP  teams did not coordinate their public information activities or were not  active in public information activities. In particular, the grantee had  expected the PEP teams to assist in compiling a map of the schools,  clinics, mosques, civil society organizations, and public gathering places in  the provinces to use in identifying community stakeholders for delivery of  public information materials. However, the grantee found most of the PEP  teams provided no support in building the maps, and the grantee had to  create them without the help of the provincial PEP teams. The new public  information contract requires the contractor to implement the campaign in  concert with the PEP teams.
section_title: U.S. Counternarcotics Programs Face Several Challenges
paragraphs: The deteriorating security situation and the lack of Afghan capacity,  including governmental institutions, are tremendous challenges to  reducing illicit drug production and trafficking. The worsening security  situation in Afghanistan threatens the achievement of the U.S.  counternarcotics strategy. Additionally, the narcotics trade continues to  undermine Afghanistan’s fragile institutions by fostering persistent  corruption and criminal activities. Consequently, U.S. officials and others  have commented that combating narcotics in Afghanistan will take at least  a decade.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts Jeopardized by Worsening Security
paragraphs: Progress toward the achievement of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in  Afghanistan is threatened by the worsening security situation. USAID  predicates the success of its reconstruction plans on an improving security  situation, however, continued attacks prevent some projects from being  implemented. Moreover, as we reported previously, State officials expect  that drug processing and trafficking will continue until security is  established. In early 2006, Afghanistan and the international community  agreed to the Afghanistan Compact, which stated that “genuine security  remains a fundamental prerequisite for achieving stability and  development in Afghanistan.”
The central government faces various threats, including Taliban and  terrorist attacks, tribal violence, and criminal activity. In 2006, U.S.  officials acknowledged that violence was increasing, including the use of  improvised explosive devices, such as the one used against the vehicle in  figure 11, and suicide bombers. U.S. military officials also stated the  presence and strength of the Taliban increased, particularly in the south;  that they demonstrated better command and control and fighting with  increased intensity; and that Afghanistan has seen the highest rates of  violence since the Taliban regime was removed from power in 2001.  Moreover, UN accessibility maps that denote the risk level of different  areas of Afghanistan also show that the security environment in many  areas of Afghanistan has worsened noticeably.
During the 2005-2006 growing season, eradication forces and alternative  livelihoods personnel were attacked several times and in some cases  killed, slowing or preventing their efforts.
In a two-week period in March 2006, Helmand had 20 confirmed security  incidents, including 4 rocket attacks, 8 improvised explosive devices, 5  assassinations, and 3 incidents of intimidation against public officials. U.S.  officials said that many of the incidents were related to the eradication  campaign.
In April 2006, AEF came under direct attack and encountered improvised  explosive devices and mines while eradicating in Helmand province,  including a mine that exploded on April 10, killing two AEF security  personnel and wounding two others.
In May 2006, the alternative livelihoods contractor in the north reported  that two staff members were killed when their vehicle was struck by an  improvised explosive device. USAID and contractor officials stated the  attack may have occurred in retribution for the contractor’s discovery of  fraud on one of its cash-for-work projects, or may have been because of  eradication occurring in the area.
That same month, AEF had a standoff with farmers in Badakshan  province, and in June, came under small arms fire that injured two AEF  police.
Also in May, in Nangarhar, where the security situation had been more  permissive, the alternative livelihoods contractor reported that  antigovernment groups were offering rewards for conducting attacks in  the region.
In June 2006, State decided not to allow the PEP international advisors to  move into their housing in Oruzgan province until the threat level  diminished and construction of an office complex could begin.
During the first half of June 2006, the USAID contractor reported that  Afghan nationals were threatened with retribution if they participated in  alternative-livelihoods projects. This circumstance, combined with the  travel restrictions resulting from the volatile security situation, restricted  the progress of road construction and irrigation system repairs.
section_title: Afghan Infrastructure, Human Capital, and Government Institutional Capacities Are Limited
paragraphs: Reducing opium cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan will take at  least a decade, in part because of the need to address Afghanistan’s lack of  infrastructure, human capital, and government capacity. According to U.S.,  International Monetary Fund, and other officials, the impoverished  country lacks adequate roads and access to power; its labor force is  mostly illiterate and untrained; and the government, saddled with  prevalent corruption, has a weak judicial sector and is not expected to be  able to cover its own expenses in the near future. These limitations  discourage investment in Afghanistan and make Afghanistan dependent on  foreign assistance.
The nation has few roads and poor access to power. Furthermore, the lack  of roads makes it difficult for farmers to get goods to markets and the lack  of electricity makes it difficult for farmers to store perishable goods.  Afghanistan has one major highway, the “ring-road,” but access to certain  areas can still take weeks or more and, during winter months, some areas  are completely inaccessible, according to U.S. and UN officials. In  Badakshan, the alternative livelihoods contractor reported that significant  upgrades to the primary road networks were needed in order to allow  farmers to deliver fresh vegetables to market centers without the produce  being bruised, smashed, or otherwise damaged. Further, project staff  reported that they were unable to visit some field sites in the province at  the end of April 2006 because of heavy rains that made the roads  impassable. The lack of reliable power was cited as a major concern by  potential investors. In the short term, USAID intends to provide generators  for the industrial parks it is planning to build to assure investors of reliable  power.
Afghanistan’s human capital provides another capacity problem as most of  the population is illiterate and many are untrained. U.S. and UN officials  stated that illiteracy is a tremendous problem, making it difficult to recruit  police, prosecutors, and investigators, adding that even some provincial  governors are illiterate. Furthermore, the high illiteracy further  complicated efforts to train Afghans, and the lack of trained personnel  meant that even government ministries had few adequately trained staff.  For example, the UN provided the Afghans a small lab for drug testing, but  it had to be staffed and funded by the UN.
Capacity is also a challenge for Afghanistan’s government; corruption is  endemic, the judicial sector is weak, and the government is not expected  to be able to support itself for at least 10 years, according to U.S. and other  officials.
According to U.S. embassy officials, most Afghan public salaries are very  low, which makes corruption more likely. Moreover, corrupt officials are  rarely removed from their government jobs, but are instead reassigned.  For example, as mentioned earlier, corrupt eradicators accepted bribes to  skip certain poppy fields, which eliminated the biggest deterrent to poppy  cultivation. In addition, corrupt judicial officials reduce the fear of legal  repercussions for drug traffickers.
U.S. officials stated that rebuilding the judicial sector of Afghanistan  lagged behind the other four security pillars—army, police, combating  drugs, and disarmament. In 2005, we reported that overall justice sector  reform was underfunded and understaffed. To date, four years after the  Geneva conference established the five-pillared security agenda, work to  establish a permanent criminal code has not been completed.
According to State officials, the government will be unable to support its  recurring costs without foreign assistance for at least 10 years. In 2004- 2005, Afghan government revenues equaled less than one-third of its  recurring expenditures. Consequently, Afghanistan remains dependent on  other nations for over half of its budget.
section_title: USAID and State Made Efforts to Oversee the Use of Funds, but Lack of Information and Security Limited Some Efforts
paragraphs: In an effort to prevent counternarcotics funds from assisting terrorists,  drug traffickers, or human rights violators in Afghanistan, USAID and State  required that grantees sign antiterrorism and antitrafficking certifications,  financial agreements contain antiterrorism and antitrafficking clauses, and  Afghan security personnel receiving training be vetted for associations  with prohibited activities when applicable. However, a lack of official  records and reliable information limited efforts to vet Afghan nationals. In  addition, although USAID and State made efforts to monitor ongoing  projects to ascertain their status, security concerns and poor  infrastructure limited the agencies’ monitoring of sites outside Kabul.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Required Certifications, Clauses, and Vetting to Help Prevent Funds from Being Used for Prohibited Purposes, but Lack of Information Hampered Vetting
paragraphs: To comply with federal bans on assisting terrorists, drug traffickers, and  human rights violators, USAID and State required that grantees certify  their nonsupport of prohibited individuals or groups; that financial  agreements contain clauses outlining U.S. prohibitions; and that  candidates for security training or assistance are vetted.
Certifications. USAID issued guidance requiring that recipients of all  grants and cooperative agreements sign certifications attesting that they  are not supporting, and have not supported, terrorists. In signing the  certifications, recipients also acknowledged the steps they are to take to  help prevent assistance from being provided to terrorists, including  reviewing U.S. and UN lists of known terrorists. In addition, USAID and  State require recipients of assistance to certify that they have not been  convicted of, or involved in, a narcotics offense. We reviewed USAID  grants and contracts and found that the required certifications were  included where required by USAID’s regulations. According to State, its  letter of agreement with the government of Afghanistan requires that each  recipient of foreign assistance sign a certification disclosing any past  narcotrafficking. State also included this requirement in fund transfers to  USAID, Justice, and Defense.
Clauses. USAID requires that financial agreements, including contracts  and grants, contain a clause intended to familiarize award recipients with  their legal responsibilities to comply with the executive order and law  prohibiting assistance to terrorists. In addition, both USAID and State  require that any financial agreement representing more than $100,000  contain a clause to familiarize award recipients with their legal  responsibilities to comply with the law prohibiting assistance to drug  traffickers. In our review of the 10 alternative livelihoods program grants  and contracts, we found that each agreement included the clauses that  were required.
Vetting. USAID and State require the vetting of individuals and  organizations for involvement with drug trafficking, through the review of  arrest records and assessment of the credibility of any trafficking  allegations. State also requires the vetting of individuals and organizations  against criminal and terrorist databases for any involvement in terrorism  or human rights violations. According to State, the U.S. embassy runs  initial screening of security force personnel against local databases and  with nongovernmental organizations. State then forwards biographical  data on security forces to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and  Labor and Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs for vetting against  classified and unclassified databases to identify criminal conduct,  including that related to terrorism, narcotrafficking, and human rights  violations. However, USAID’s and State’s vetting of Afghan nationals was  constrained by limited or incomplete records and the difficulty of  investigating widespread allegations of misconduct. According to State,  USAID, and contract officials, after years of conflict, Afghanistan lacks  many official records, such as birth, identification, and criminal records.  According to U.S. officials, this lack of records forced them to rely on  word of mouth to vet Afghan nationals. Moreover, rivals often accuse one  another of criminality and affiliation with terrorists or drug traffickers, and  it is difficult to investigate the truth of these allegations. To assist with  future vetting, State plans to administer lie-detector tests to certain project  participants. However, as of July 2006, State had not been able to initiate  the testing.
section_title: Efforts Made to Monitor Projects, but Access to Project Sites Is Limited
paragraphs: USAID and State monitor project performance through contractor reports,  site visits, and information from third parties, such as the U.S. military or  Afghan officials, as access to project sites outside Kabul is difficult  because of security conditions and poor infrastructure. Contractors  developed performance management plans, which include performance  indicators, a monitoring and evaluation plan, and reporting requirements.  Furthermore, according to U.S. officials, USAID and State used  experienced U.S. firms and international organizations as the primary  grantees and contractors. For example, State hired DynCorp International,  a company that State uses to carry out counternarcotics efforts in  Colombia and elsewhere, to implement its eradication efforts and used the  UN to carry out some of the border security station rehabilitation in  Tajikistan. USAID hired three U.S. firms already experienced with working  in Afghanistan—Chemonics International; Development Alternatives, Inc.;  and Planning and Development Collaboration International—to run its  alternative livelihoods projects.
USAID attempted to assess progress through various means. First,  USAID’s contractors submitted required biweekly reports detailing  challenges and progress in their respective provinces. For example, in May  2006, the contractor in the south reported that “security concerns have  dramatically decreased project activities… as such, no monitoring visits  were conducted.” During the same period, the contractor in the east  reported they were able “to monitor active and completed cash-for-work  projects.” In addition to these reports, USAID assigned a project officer to  each region’s provincial reconstruction teams’ compound to be  responsible for monitoring the contract. They attempted to get to the field  as often as possible to view the progress of projects and assist in  developing new ones. USAID also relied on the local U.S. military  commanders and Afghan officials to report on the status of any projects  they saw. For example, the U.S. commander in Nangarhar told us during  our visit that when he goes on routine patrols, he tries to visit any USAID  projects in the vicinity of his patrol and provides any information from  those patrols to the resident USAID representative.
State contractors and other implementers of State-funded projects  submitted the required reports on the progress and obstacles facing their  projects. For example, DynCorp submits biweekly reports detailing the  activities of the leased aircraft, AEF, and PEP teams, and reporting on  problems, such as the challenges of hiring qualified international advisors  for the PEP teams. In addition, State personnel stated that they regularly  travel to program sites. For example, State staff made visits to the AEF  while it was out in the field. Similarly, the Justice prosecutors stated that  they work several times a week with the CJTF.
Despite these efforts, external factors, such as security and Afghanistan’s  poor infrastructure, limited project monitoring by reducing USAID’s,  contractors’, and, to a lesser extent, State’s access to project sites. For  example, in Helmand, the monitoring and evaluation plan developed by  USAID’s alternative livelihoods contractor could not be implemented  because of the danger to both Afghans and foreign nationals traveling in  the area. Additionally, USAID field staff were constrained by security rules  and restrictions established by the military commanders in their areas. For  example, in Nangarhar, monitoring staff must provide U.S. commanders  96-hours notice for trips outside the military camp, and these trips can be  cancelled at any time if sufficient military personnel are not available to  provide security. Poor infrastructure limits the ability to monitor projects.  In northern Afghanistan, many roads are impassable during the winter  months. Furthermore, many areas can only be reached via helicopter or on  foot, as no roads exist. State projects in and around Kabul are more  accessible, and, therefore, are easier to monitor. Additionally, the  eradication efforts funded by State are being monitored by UNODC in  cooperation with Afghanistan’s government and are also confirmed  through satellite and other imagery. However, UNODC was unable to send  ground monitors to Helmand to verify governor-led eradication efforts  there.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Despite significant efforts by USAID and State, the deteriorating security  situation in Afghanistan threatens the success of the U.S. counternarcotics  goal of significantly reducing illicit drug cultivation, production, and  trafficking. Unlike in our prior reports concerning other programs in  Afghanistan, we found USAID and State had developed a strategy for  counternarcotics tailored to Afghanistan’s difficult environment. They  reported some accomplishments in each of the strategy’s five pillars;  nevertheless, the opium poppy crop in 2006 grew by over 50 percent,  reaching a record amount. The worsening security situation, particularly  because of the Taliban’s resurgence, threatens to derail U.S. efforts by  slowing or stopping projects. Moreover, the pace of U.S. efforts was  further slowed by the country’s persistent developmental challenges,  including inadequate access to roads and limited government institutions.  Given the difficulties of working in Afghanistan, sustainable progress  toward the U.S. counternarcotics goal will likely take a decade or more of  committed U.S. resources and efforts. Because many of the  counternarcotics projects are still in the early stages of implementation,  we have no recommendations at this time.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to State,  USAID, Defense, and Justice. Each agency informed us that they were not  providing formal comments. However, USAID and Justice provided  technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report where  appropriate.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3149 or GootnickD@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this report are listed  in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) and  Department of State’s (State) progress in implementing counternarcotics  programs, projects, and activities under each pillar, and the factors, if any,  limiting implementation, we reviewed pertinent USAID and State planning,  funding, and reporting documents for their counternarcotics programs in  Afghanistan. Our review of these documents provided us with information  regarding the program’s structure, goals, objectives, progress, and  limitations. In addition, we met with cognizant officials from Departments  of Defense (Defense), Justice (Justice), and State; USAID; and Drug  Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Washington, D.C. and Kabul,  Afghanistan. In Kabul, we also met with officials from the United Nations  (UN) and the governments of Afghanistan and the United Kingdom to  discuss counternarcotics efforts. We traveled to the provinces of Balkh,  Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar to meet with U.S. and Afghan officials  and discussed various U.S.–funded projects. For example, in Helmand and  Nangarhar, we met with the governors to discuss the progress of USAID’s  alternative livelihoods projects, visited several projects, and met with U.S.  contractors implementing the projects. In Balkh, we met with the governor  to discuss the governor-led eradication efforts and how U.S. assistance  was being used. While in Kandahar, we met with State contractors and  observed the aircraft being used to enhance the AEF’s eradication efforts.
To examine the challenges faced by counternarcotics efforts in  Afghanistan, we reviewed USAID, State, and Defense documents  addressing the status of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Additionally, we  reviewed UN, International Monetary Fund, and academic reports  regarding the current security and economic situation in Afghanistan, as  well as discussing its past problems and outlook for the future.  Specifically, we reviewed several months of UN reporting on the security  situation in Afghanistan in regards to what precautions their personnel  needed to take. In addition, we met with experts and attended academic  symposia in Washington, D.C., regarding Afghanistan’s current situation  and the challenges it faces in the future.
To examine USAID’s and State’s efforts to ensure that the fiscal year 2005  counternarcotics funds were used for intended purposes, we reviewed the  contracts, grants, and other financial agreements by which these funds  were obligated and expended. We reviewed USAID contracts and State  financial instruments that received fiscal year 2005 counternarcotics  funding. We met with USAID and State budget and financial officers in  Washington, D.C., and Kabul to discuss the safeguards placed on the  funds. Additionally, we talked to several contractors in Afghanistan about  their monitoring plans and ability to implement them.
To determine the reliability of the funding data, we compared data from  multiple sources. For example, we compared the funding data we received  from USAID and State with the appropriations language and congressional  notifications. Although we did not audit the funding data and are not  expressing an opinion on them, based on our examination of the  documents received and our discussions with cognizant agency officials,  we concluded that the funding data we obtained were sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of this report. To determine the reliability of  United  Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) eradication and opium  poppy cultivation data, we reviewed the methodology used to estimate the  areas where opium poppy was cultivated in Afghanistan in 2005. In  particular, we reviewed the sampling and estimation procedures used, the  ways in which satellite imagery was incorporated into the estimate, and  the procedures followed by the ground surveyors. We noted that the  sampling methods were appropriate for generating estimates for  Afghanistan as a whole, but that there were limitations to the estimates for  particular provinces. Overall, we determined that the methodologies used  by the UNODC were reasonable, and that the results were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report. To determine the reliability of  Afghan public opinion survey data, we reviewed the survey methodology  used by the Afghan Center for Socio-economic and Opinion Research, and  determined it to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. The information  on foreign law in this report does not reflect our independent legal  analysis, but is based on interviews and secondary sources.
However, because of the security situation in Afghanistan, we could not  independently verify or randomly test USAID or State project information  at field locations. Nevertheless, based on our assessments of the data  provided, our discussions with the cognizant officials, and limited field  visits, we concluded that the counternarcotics program data provided to  us were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report were Al Huntington, Hynek Kalkus,  Thomas Costa, Elizabeth Repko, Reid Lowe, and David Bruno.