Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Assess Resource Deployment and Progress
Published: 2016-03-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The southwest border continues to be vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity, with DHS apprehending over 331,000 illegal entrants, and making over 14,000 seizures of drugs in fiscal year 2015. DHS has employed a variety of resources to help secure the border, including personnel, technology—such as cameras and sensors, tactical infrastructure—such as fencing and roads, and air and marine assets.
This statement discusses (1) DHS efforts to deploy resources on the southwest border and measure the effectiveness of these resources in securing the border, and (2) DHS efforts to develop performance goals and measures for achieving situational awareness and border security. This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from September 2009 through May 2015, with selected updates through February 2016 on DHS enforcement efforts and actions to address prior GAO recommendations. To conduct the updates, GAO interviewed agency officials and reviewed related documentation.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has taken action to deploy various resources—including agents and technology—along the southwest border and assess those resources' contributions to border security. For example, in December 2012, GAO reported that CBP's Border Patrol scheduled agents for deployment differently across southwest border locations, and although in most locations less than half of Border Patrol apprehensions were made within five miles of the border in fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol had moved overall enforcement efforts closer to the border since the prior fiscal year. GAO also reported in December 2012, that Border Patrol tracked changes in the effectiveness rate for response to illegal activity across border locations to determine if the appropriate mix and placement of personnel and assets were deployed and used effectively, and took steps to improve the data quality issues that had precluded comparing performance results across locations at the time of GAO's review. For example, Border Patrol issued guidance in September 2012 for collecting and reporting data with a more standardized and consistent approach. DHS has reported the effectiveness rate as a performance measure in its Fiscal Year 2015-2017 Annual Performance Report.
Further, in March 2014, GAO reported that CBP had made progress in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, but that CBP could strengthen its management and assessment of the plan's programs. GAO reported that while CBP had identified mission benefits of technologies to be deployed under the plan, the agency had not developed key attributes for performance metrics to identify the technologies' individual and collective contribution, as GAO had recommended in 2011. GAO also reported in 2014 that CBP officials stated that baselines for each performance measure would be developed and that by the end of fiscal year 2016, CBP would establish a tool to explain the impact of technology and infrastructure on situational awareness in the border environment. CBP should complete these actions in order to fully assess its progress in implementing the plan and determine when mission benefits have been fully realized.
In December 2012, GAO reported on Border Patrol's efforts to develop performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of efforts to secure the border between ports of entry and informing the identification and allocation of border security resources. GAO reported that DHS had transitioned from a goal and measure related to the capability to detect, respond to, and address cross-border illegal activity to an interim performance goal and measure of apprehensions between the land border ports of entry beginning fiscal year 2011. GAO reported that this interim goal and measure did not inform program results or resource identification and allocation decisions, limiting DHS and congressional oversight and accountability. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation that CBP develop milestones and time frames for the development of border security goals and measures and Border Patrol works to define a new overarching performance goal for achieving a low-risk border and develop associated performance measures. CBP should complete these actions in order to fully assess its capabilities and progress to secure the border.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO previously made recommendations for DHS to, among other things, (1) strengthen its management of technology plans and programs and (2) establish milestones and time frames for the development of border security goals and measures. DHS generally agreed and has actions underway to address the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work reviewing actions  taken by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to deploy  resources at the southwest border, and the extent that DHS measures the  effectiveness of these deployed resources to improve situational  awareness and achieve a more secure border. The southwest border  continues to be vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity, and DHS  reported apprehending over 331,000 illegal entrants and making over  14,000 seizures of drugs in fiscal year 2015.
The U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol), within DHS’s U.S. Customs and  Border Protection (CBP), is the federal agency with primary responsibility  for securing the border between the U.S. ports of entry. CBP has divided  geographic responsibility for the southwest border among nine Border  Patrol sectors. Border Patrol’s 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy  (2004 Strategy), developed following the terrorist attacks of September  11, 2001, was designed to facilitate the buildup and deployment of border  resources to ensure the agency had the right mix of personnel,  technology—such as cameras and sensors, and tactical infrastructure— such as fencing, roads, and lighting and to deploy those resources in a  layered approach at the immediate border and in other areas distant from  the border. Since fiscal year 2004, the first full fiscal year DHS was in  operation, the number of agents assigned to patrol U.S. southwest land  borders increased from about 9,500 to about 17,500 agents near the end  of fiscal year 2015. In addition to personnel, DHS has employed a variety  of technology, tactical infrastructure, and air and marine assets to assist  with its efforts to secure the border. For example, in November 2005,  DHS announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program,  which was responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection  system using technology, known as the Secure Border Initiative Network  (SBInet), and tactical infrastructure along the southwest border to deter  smugglers and aliens attempting to illegally cross the border. In January  2011, in response to internal and external assessments that identified  concerns regarding the performance, cost, and schedule for implementing  the systems, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced the  cancellation of further procurements of SBInet systems. After the  cancellation of SBInet, under which CBP deployed surveillance systems  along 53 of the 387 miles of the Arizona border with Mexico, CBP  developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) in  January 2011, which includes a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras to  help provide security for the remainder of the Arizona border. Moreover,  we reported in 2011 that DHS continued to deploy other tactical  infrastructure along the southwest border, and CBP’s Air and Marine  Operations (AMO)—formerly known as the Office of Air and Marine— operates a fleet of air and marine assets in support of federal border  security efforts.
Through fiscal year 2010, these resources were used to support DHS’s  goal to achieve “operational control” of the nation’s borders by reducing  cross-border illegal activity. The extent of operational control—also  referred to as effective control—was defined as the number of border  miles where Border Patrol had the capability to detect, respond to, and  interdict cross-border illegal activity. In May 2012, Border Patrol issued  the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan),  stating that the buildup of its resource base and the operations conducted  over the past two decades would enable the Border Patrol to focus on  mitigating risk rather than further increasing resources to secure the  border. This new strategic plan, with a goal to achieve a low risk border,  emphasized using intelligence information to inform risk relative to threats  of cross-border terrorism, drug smuggling, and illegal migration across  locations; integrating border security operations with those of other law  enforcement partners; and developing rapid response capabilities to  deploy the resources appropriate to changes in threat.
Over the years, we have reported on the progress and challenges DHS  faces in implementing its border security efforts. My statement discusses  our key findings in the areas of (1) DHS efforts to deploy agents,  technology, tactical infrastructure, and air and marine assets on the  southwest border and measure the effectiveness of these resources in  securing the border, and (2) DHS performance measures for achieving  situational awareness and border security.
My statement today is based on reports and testimonies we issued from  September 2009 through May 2015 that examined DHS efforts to  enhance border security and assess the effectiveness of its border  security operations on the southwest border (see Related GAO Products  at the end of this statement). It also includes selected updates we  conducted through February 2016 on DHS enforcement efforts and  actions to address our previous recommendations. Our reports and  testimonies, as well as the selected updates, incorporated information we  obtained by examining CBP’s management of resources; analyzing  Border Patrol planning and operational assessment documents; reviewing  DHS’s processes for measuring security at the southwest border; and  interviewing relevant DHS officials. More detailed information about our  scope and methodology can be found in our reports and testimonies. We  conducted all of this work in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: CBP Has Deployed Resources to Secure the Southwest Border, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Measure Their Effectiveness
subsections: section_title: Border Patrol Scheduled Agents Differently across Sectors and Enforcement Activities, and Took Steps to Improve Data Measuring Overall Effectiveness
paragraphs: In December 2012, we reported on Border Patrol’s evolving approach for  deploying agents along the southwest border. In that report we found  that Border Patrol’s 2004 Strategy provided for increasing resources and  deploying these resources using an approach that provided for several  layers of Border Patrol agents at the immediate border and in other areas  100 miles or more away from the border (referred to as defense in depth).  According to the CBP officials we interviewed for our report, as resources  increased, Border Patrol sought to move enforcement closer to the border  over time to better position the agency to ensure the arrest of those trying  to enter the country illegally. Additionally, headquarters and field officials  said station supervisors determined (1) whether to deploy agents in  border zones or interior zones, and (2) the types of enforcement or  nonenforcement activities agents were to perform. Similarly, Border  Patrol officials from the five sectors we visited stated that they used  similar factors in making deployment decisions, such as intelligence  showing the presence of threat across locations, the nature of the threat,  and environmental factors including terrain and weather.
We reported in December 2012 on Border Patrol data from fiscal year  2011 that showed how agent workdays were scheduled and found  differences across sectors in the percentage of agent workdays  scheduled for border zones and interior zones and across enforcement  and nonenforcement activities. Specifically, we found that while Tucson  sector scheduled 43 percent of agent workdays to border zones in fiscal  year 2011, agent workdays scheduled for border zones by other  southwest border sectors ranged from 26 percent in the Yuma sector to  53 percent in the El Centro sector. Our analysis of agents deployed for  enforcement compared to nonenforcement activities ranged from 66  percent for Yuma sector to 81 percent in Big Bend sector.
Border Patrol officials we interviewed attributed the variation in scheduling  border zone deployment in fiscal year 2011 to differences in geographical  factors among the southwest border sectors—such as varying  topography, ingress and egress routes, and land access issues, and  structural factors such as technology and infrastructure deployments— and stated that these factors affect how sectors operate and may  preclude closer deployment to the border. Additionally, we found that  many southwest border sectors have interior stations that are responsible  for operations at some distance from the border, such as at interior  checkpoints generally located 25 miles or more from the border, which  could have affected their percentage of agent workdays scheduled for  border zones. We have planned work to assess Border Patrol deployment  and management of agents across the southwest border beginning later  this year.
We also reported in December 2012 that Border Patrol sector  management used changes in various data over time to help inform  assessment of its efforts to secure the border against the threats of illegal  migration, smuggling of drugs and other contraband, and terrorism. These  data showed changes in the (1) percentage of estimated known illegal  entrants who are apprehended, (2) number of seizures of drugs and other  contraband, and (3) number of apprehensions of persons from countries  at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism. In addition, apprehension  and seizure data could be analyzed in terms of where they occurred  relative to distance from the border as an indicator of progress in Border  Patrol enforcement efforts. Border Patrol officials at sectors we visited,  and our review of fiscal years 2010 and 2012 sector operational  assessments, indicated that sectors historically used these types of data  to inform tactical deployment of personnel and technology to address  cross-border threats. Our analysis showed that in most southwest border  sectors less than half of Border Patrol’s apprehensions and seizures were  made within five miles of the border in fiscal year 2011. In Tucson sector,  for example, 47 percent of Border Patrol’s apprehensions of illegal  entrants, 38 percent of the drugs and contraband seizures, and 8 percent  of the apprehensions of aliens from special interest countries were within  five miles of the border. However, our analysis also showed that Border  Patrol had moved overall enforcement efforts closer to the border since  the prior fiscal year.
Further, we reported that Border Patrol sectors and stations tracked  changes in their overall effectiveness as a tool to determine if the  appropriate mix and placement of personnel and assets were being  deployed and used effectively and efficiently, according to officials from  Border Patrol headquarters. Border Patrol calculated an overall  effectiveness rate using a formula in which it added the number of  apprehensions and “turn backs” in a specific sector and divided this total  by the total estimated known illegal entries—determined by adding the  number of apprehensions, turn backs, and “got aways” for the  sector. Border Patrol views its border security efforts as increasing in  effectiveness if the number of turn backs as a percentage of estimated  known illegal entries has increased and the number of got aways as a  percentage of estimated known illegal entries has decreased. In our  December 2012 report, we analyzed apprehension, turn back, and got  away data from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 for the Tucson sector and  found that while apprehensions remained fairly constant at about 60  percent of estimated known illegal entries, the percentage of reported turn  backs increased from about 5 percent to about 23 percent, while the  percentage of reported got aways decreased from about 33 percent to  about 13 percent. As a result of these changes in the mix of turn backs  and got aways, our analysis of Border Patrol data using Border Patrol  methodology for our report showed that the enforcement effort, or the  overall effectiveness rate for Tucson sector, improved 20 percentage  points from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011, from 67 percent to 87  percent. Border Patrol data showed that the effectiveness rate for eight of  the nine sectors on the southwest border also improved from fiscal years  2006 through 2011, using Border Patrol methodology.
At the time of our review in 2012, Border Patrol headquarters officials said  that differences in how sectors defined, collected, and reported turn back  and got away data used to calculate the overall effectiveness rate  precluded comparing performance results across sectors. They stated  that each Border Patrol sector decided how it would collect and report  turn back and got away data, and as a result, practices for collecting and  reporting the data varied across sectors and stations based on  differences in agent experience and judgment, resources, and terrain.  The ability to obtain accurate or consistent data using these identification  sources depends on various factors, such as terrain and weather,  according to Border Patrol officials. As a result of these data limitations,  Border Patrol headquarters officials said that while they considered turn  back and got away data sufficiently reliable to assess each sector’s  progress toward border security and to inform sector decisions regarding  resource deployment, they did not consider the data sufficiently reliable to  compare—or externally report—results across sectors at the time we  issued our report in December 2012.
Border Patrol headquarters officials issued guidance in September 2012  to provide a more consistent, standardized approach for the collection  and reporting of turn back and got away data by Border Patrol sectors. As  we reported in 2012, Border Patrol officials expected that once the  guidance was implemented, data reliability would improve. Since that  time, DHS has reported the effectiveness rate in its Fiscal Year 2015- 2017 Annual Performance Report as a performance measure and method  to publicly report results of its border security efforts on the southwest  border.
section_title: CBP Has Not Yet Fully Applied Performance Metrics or Assessed the Contributions of its Deployed Surveillance Technologies and Fencing
paragraphs: In March 2014 and April 2015, we reported that CBP had made progress  in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology  Plan, but that CBP could take additional action to strengthen its  management of the Plan and its various programs. The Plan’s  acquisition programs include fixed and mobile surveillance systems,  agent portable devices, and ground sensors. Specifically, we reported in  March 2014 that CBP had identified the mission benefits of its  surveillance technologies, as we recommended in November 2011. CBP  had identified mission benefits of surveillance technologies to be  deployed under the Plan, such as improved situational awareness and  agent safety. However, we also reported that the agency had not  developed key attributes for performance metrics for all surveillance  technology to be deployed as part of the Plan, as we recommended in  November 2011. As of May 2015, CBP had identified a set of potential  key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed  under the Plan; however, CBP officials stated that this set of measures  was under review as the agency continued to refine the measures to  better inform the nature of the contributions and impacts of surveillance  technology on its border security mission. While CBP had yet to apply  these measures, CBP had established a time line for developing  performance measures for each technology. In November 2014, CBP  officials stated that baselines for each performance measure were to be  developed, at which time the agency was to begin using the data to  evaluate the individual and collective contributions of specific technology  assets deployed under the Plan. Moreover, CBP plans to establish a tool  by the end of fiscal year 2016 that explains the qualitative and  quantitative impacts of technology and tactical infrastructure on situational  awareness in specific areas of the border environment. While these are  positive steps, until CBP completes its efforts to address our  recommendation and fully develop and apply key attributes for  performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed under the Plan, it  will not be able to fully assess its progress in implementing the Plan and  determine when mission benefits have been fully realized.
Further, in March 2014, we found that CBP did not capture complete data  on the contributions of these technologies, which in combination with  other relevant performance metrics or indicators could be used to better  determine the contributions of CBP’s surveillance technologies and inform  resource allocation decisions. Although CBP had a field within its  Enforcement Integrated Database for data on whether technological  assets, such as SBInet surveillance towers, and nontechnological assets,  such as canine teams, assisted or contributed to the apprehension of  illegal entrants and seizure of drugs and other contraband, according to  CBP officials, Border Patrol agents were not required to record these  data. This limited CBP’s ability to collect, track, and analyze available  data on asset assists to help monitor the contribution of surveillance  technologies, including its SBInet system, to Border Patrol apprehensions  and seizures and inform resource allocation decisions. We made two  recommendations that (1) CBP require data on asset assists to be  recorded and tracked within its database; and that once these data were  required to be recorded and tracked, (2) analyze available data on  apprehensions and technological assists, in combination with other  relevant performance metrics or indicators, as appropriate, to determine  the contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP’s border security  efforts. CBP concurred with our recommendations and has implemented  one of them. In June 2014, in response to our recommendation, CBP  issued guidance informing Border Patrol agents that the asset assist data  field within its database was now a mandatory data field. Agents are  required to enter any assisting surveillance technology or other  equipment before proceeding. As we testified in May 2015, to fully  address our second recommendation, CBP needs to analyze data on  apprehensions and seizures, in combination with other relevant  performance metrics, to determine the contribution of surveillance  technologies to its border security mission.
In addition, with regard to fencing and other tactical infrastructure, CBP  reported that from fiscal year 2005 through May 2015, the total miles of  vehicle and pedestrian fencing along the nearly 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico  border increased from approximately 120 miles to 652 miles. With the  completion of the new fencing and other tactical infrastructure, DHS is  now responsible for maintaining this infrastructure including repairing  breached sections of fencing. We have previously reported on CBP’s  efforts to assess the impact of tactical infrastructure on border security.  Specifically, in our May 2010 and September 2009 reports, we found that  CBP had not accounted for the impact of its investment in border fencing  and infrastructure on border security. CBP had reported an increase in  control of southwest border miles, but could not account separately for  the impact of the border fencing and other infrastructure. In September  2009, we recommended that CBP determine the contribution of border  fencing and other infrastructure to border security. DHS concurred with  our recommendation, and in response, CBP contracted with the  Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute to conduct an analysis  of the impact of tactical infrastructure on border security. We have  ongoing work for this subcommittee and others assessing CBP’s  deployment and management of tactical infrastructure, and we plan to  report on the results of this work later this year.
section_title: CBP Has Reassessed Its Mix and Placement of Air and Marine Assets to Better Address Mission Needs and Threats
paragraphs: Our March 2012 report on AMO assets highlighted several areas the  agency could address to better ensure the mix and placement of assets is  effective and efficient. These areas included: (1) documentation clearly  linking deployment decisions to mission needs and threats, (2)  documentation on the assessments and analysis used to support  decisions on the mix and placement of assets, and (3) consideration of  how deployment of border technology will affect customer requirements  for air and marine assets across locations.
Specifically, we found that AMO had not documented significant events,  such as its analyses to support its asset mix and placement across  locations, and as a result, lacked a record to help demonstrate that its  decisions to allocate assets were the most effective ones in fulfilling  customer needs and addressing threats, among other things. While  AMO’s Fiscal Year 2010 Aircraft Deployment Plan stated that AMO  deployed aircraft and maritime vessels to ensure its forces were  positioned to best meet the needs of CBP field commanders and respond  to the latest intelligence on emerging threats, AMO did not have  documentation that clearly linked the deployment decisions in the plan to  mission needs or threats.
We also found that AMO did not provide higher rates of support to  locations Border Patrol identified as high priority, a fact that indicated that  a reassessment of AMO’s resource mix and placement could help ensure  that it meets mission needs, addresses threats, and mitigates risk. AMO  officials stated that while they deployed a majority of assets to high- priority sectors, budgetary constraints, other national priorities, and the  need to maintain presence across border locations limited overall  increases in assets or the amount of assets they could redeploy from  lower-priority sectors. While we recognized AMO’s resource constraints,  the agency did not have documentation of analyses assessing the impact  of these constraints and whether actions could be taken to improve the  mix and placement of assets within them. Thus, the extent to which the  deployment of AMO assets and personnel, including those assigned to  the southwest border, most effectively utilized AMO’s constrained assets  to meet mission needs and address threats was unclear.
We further found in March 2012 that AMO did not document assessments  and analyses to support the agency’s decisions on the mix and placement  of assets. DHS’s 2005 aviation management directive requires operating  entities to use their aircraft in the most cost-effective way to meet  requirements. Although AMO officials stated that it factored in cost- effectiveness considerations, AMO did not have documentation of  analyses it performed to make these decisions. AMO headquarters  officials stated that they made deployment decisions during formal  discussions and ongoing meetings in close collaboration with Border  Patrol, and considered a range of factors such as operational capability,  mission priorities, and threats. AMO officials said that while they generally  documented final decisions affecting the mix and placement of assets,  they did not document assessments and analyses to support these  decisions.
Finally, we reported that CBP and DHS had ongoing interagency efforts  under way to increase air and marine domain awareness across U.S.  borders through deployment of technology that may decrease Border  Patrol’s use of AMO assets for air and marine domain awareness.  However, at the time of our review, AMO was not planning to assess how  technology capabilities could affect the mix and placement of air and  marine assets until the technology has been deployed. Specifically, we  concluded that Border Patrol, CBP, and DHS had strategic and  technological initiatives under way that would likely affect customer  requirements for air and marine support and the mix and placement of  assets across locations—CBP and DHS also had ongoing interagency  efforts under way to increase air and marine domain awareness across  U.S. borders through deployment of technology that may decrease  Border Patrol’s use of AMO assets for air and marine domain awareness.  AMO officials stated that they would consider how technology capabilities  affect the mix and placement of air and marine assets once such  technology has been deployed.
To address the findings of our March 2012 report, we recommended that  CBP, to the extent that benefits outweigh the costs, reassess the mix and  placement of AMO’s air and marine assets to include mission  requirements, performance results, and anticipated CBP strategic and  technological changes. DHS concurred with this recommendation and  responded that it planned to address some of these actions as part of the  Fiscal Year 2012-2013 Aircraft Deployment Plan. In September 2014,  CBP provided us this Plan, which was approved in May 2012, and  updated information on its subsequent efforts to address this  recommendation, including a description of actions taken to reassess the  mix and placement of AMO’s assets. According to AMO, after consulting  with DHS and CBP officials and approval from the Secretary of Homeland  Security in May 2013, the office began a realignment of personnel,  aircraft, and vessels from the northern border to the southern border  based on its evaluation of the utilization and efficiency of current assets  and available funding to accomplish the transfers. In September 2015,  AMO officials provided GAO with data and analysis documenting that  personnel, aircraft, and vessels were in the process of being moved to  support the realignment of assets, which addressed the intent of our  recommendation.
section_title: Border Patrol Has Not Yet Developed Goals and Measures for Assessing Efforts and Identifying Resource Needs under the Fiscal Year 2012- 2016 Strategic Plan
paragraphs: In December 2012, we reported on Border Patrol’s efforts to develop  performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts  to secure the border between ports of entry and for informing the  identification and allocation of resources needed to secure the border.  We found that until fiscal year end 2010, DHS used Border Patrol’s goal  and performance measure of operational control as the publicly reported  DHS goal and outcome measure for border security and to assess  resource needs to accomplish this goal. We had previously testified in  February 2011 that at the time this goal and measure was discontinued at  the end of fiscal year 2010, Border Patrol reported achieving varying  levels of operational control of 873 (44 percent) of the nearly 2,000  southwest border miles. Border Patrol officials attributed the uneven  progress across sectors to multiple factors, including terrain,  transportation infrastructure on both sides of the border, and a need to  prioritize resource deployment to sectors deemed to have greater risk of  illegal activity.
DHS transitioned from using operational control as its goal and outcome  measure for border security in its Fiscal Year 2010-2012 Annual  Performance Report. Specifically, citing a need to establish a new border  security goal and measure that reflected a more quantitative methodology  as well as the department’s evolving vision for border control, DHS  established the interim performance goal and measure of the number of  apprehensions between the land border ports of entry until a new border  control goal and measure could be developed. We testified in May 2012  that the interim goal and measure provided information on activity levels,  but did not inform program results or resource identification and allocation  decisions, and therefore, until new goals and measures could be  developed, DHS and Congress could experience reduced oversight and  DHS accountability. Further, studies commissioned by CBP  documented that the number of apprehensions bore little relationship to  effectiveness because agency officials did not compare these numbers  with the amount of cross-border illegal activity.
In our December 2012 report, we found that Border Patrol was in the  process of developing performance goals and measures for assessing  the progress of its efforts to secure the border between ports of entry and  for informing the identification and allocation of resources needed to  secure the border, but had not identified milestones and time frames for  developing and implementing them. According to Border Patrol officials,  establishing milestones and time frames for the development of  performance goals and measures was contingent on the development of  key elements of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, such as a risk assessment  tool, and the agency’s time frames for implementing these key  elements—targeted for fiscal years 2013 and 2014—were subject to  change. Specifically, under the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, the Border  Patrol planned to continuously evaluate border security—and resource  needs—by comparing changes in risk levels against available resources  across border locations. Border Patrol officials stated that the agency was  in the process of identifying performance goals and measures that could  be linked to the new risk assessment tools that would show progress and  status in securing the border between ports of entry, and determine  needed resources, but had not established milestones and time frames  for developing and implementing goals and measures because the  agency’s time frames for implementing key elements of the plan were  subject to change.
We recommended in our December 2012 report that Border Patrol  establish milestones and time frames for developing a (1) performance  goal, or goals, for border security between the ports of entry that defines  how border security is to be measured and (2) performance measure, or  measures—linked to a performance goal or goals—for assessing  progress made in securing the border between ports of entry and  informing resource identification and allocation efforts. DHS agreed with  these recommendations and since our December 2012 report, has added  performance measures for border security to its Annual Performance  Report. In its Fiscal Year 2015-2017 Annual Performance Report, these  measures included the percent of people apprehended multiple times on  the southwest border and the rate of effectiveness in responding to illegal  activity. Further, as part of its efforts to revise the Border Patrol strategic  plan, Border Patrol has developed outcome measures for each of 14  objectives, and according to officials, Border Patrol continues to work  toward the development of goals and measures to support its overarching  performance goal of low-risk borders. Until these new goals and  measures are in place, it is unknown the extent to which they will address  our past findings and would provide DHS and Congress with information  on the results of CBP efforts to secure the border between ports of entry  and the extent to which existing resources and capabilities are  appropriate and sufficient.
Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and members of the  subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy  to respond to any questions you or members of the committee may have.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Rebecca Gambler at  (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement  included David Alexander; Cindy Ayers; Tom Lombardi; Krista Mantsch;  Jon Najmi; and Edith Sohna.
section_title: GAO Related Products
paragraphs: Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Implement  and Assess Infrastructure and Technology, GAO-15-595T (Washington,  D.C.: May 13, 2015).
Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal  Actions Needed to Improve Accountability, GAO-15-171SP (Washington,  D.C.: April 22, 2015).
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed  to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-14-411T.  (Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014).
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed  to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-14-368  (Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2014)
Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS Implementation and  Assessment Efforts, GAO-13-653T. (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2013).
Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S.  Borders, GAO-13-414T. (Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2013).
Border Patrol: Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform Border  Security Status and Resource Needs, GAO-13-330T (Washington, D.C.:  Feb. 26, 2013).
Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to  Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs, GAO-13-25  (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2012).
Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in Implementation and  Assessment Efforts, GAO-12-688T (Washington D.C.: May 8, 2012).
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of  DHS’s Air and Marine Assets, GAO-12-518, (Washington, D.C. March 30,  2012).
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing,  Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan,  GAO-12-106R. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2011).
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and  Costs Is Needed before Proceeding, GAO-12-22 (Washington, D.C.: Nov.  4, 2011).
Border Security: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key  Southwest Border Technology Programs, GAO-11-448T (Washington,  D.C.: March 15, 2011).
Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures  for the Southwest Border, GAO-11-374T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15,  2011).
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying  Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, GAO-10-651T  (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010).
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the  Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO-09-896  (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2009).
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