Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Should Evaluate the Role of the Enhanced Surveillance Program in Assessing the Condition of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile
Published: 2016-09-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOE participates in the annual process to assess the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, which is now made up largely of weapons that are beyond their original design lifetimes. In 2007, faced with a mounting backlog of required tests, DOE's NNSA announced plans to use its Enhanced Surveillance Program for a more cost-effective surveillance approach under its 2007 Surveillance Transformation initiative. Under this initiative, predictive models were to assess the impact of aging on weapons in the stockpile without having to dismantle them as the agency has done in the past.
The Senate Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision that GAO review the status of the Enhanced Surveillance Program. This report assesses the extent to which NNSA implemented the vision for the Enhanced Surveillance Program from its 2007 initiative and developed a long-term strategy for the program. GAO reviewed NNSA plans and budget and other documents; interviewed agency officials; and discussed surveillance issues with members of a group of nationally known scientists who advise the government and who reviewed the program in September 2013.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) did not fully implement the Enhanced Surveillance Program as envisioned in the agency's 2007 Surveillance Transformation Project (2007 initiative) and has not developed a long-term strategy for the program. Surveillance is the process of inspecting a weapon through various tests of the weapon as a whole, the weapon's components, and the weapon's materials to determine whether they are meeting performance expectations, through dismantling the weapon or through the use of diagnostic tools. As called for in its 2007 initiative, NNSA took steps to improve the management of the overall surveillance program, which primarily tests dismantled weapons and their components, but the agency did not increase the role of the Enhanced Surveillance Program, as envisioned. The program develops computational models to predict the impact of stockpile aging; identifies aging signs; and develops diagnostic tools. Under the 2007 initiative, NNSA was to conduct more Enhanced Surveillance Program evaluations using computer models to predict the impacts of aging on specific weapon components—especially nonnuclear components and materials—and to assess the validity of more diagnostic tools. Instead of expanding the program's role, NNSA reduced program funding by more than 50 percent from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2015. NNSA also delayed some key activities and reduced the program's scope during this time. For example, NNSA did not complete its proposed evaluations of the impact of aging on nonnuclear components and materials. These evaluations, originally estimated to be completed by 2012, were dropped as program goals in fiscal year 2016, according to NNSA officials and contractor representatives.
In fiscal year 2016, NNSA broadly refocused the Enhanced Surveillance Program on multiple nuclear weapon life-extension efforts and supporting activities but has not developed a corresponding long-term strategy for the program. Instead, program officials have focused on developing general long-term goals and managing the program on a year-to-year basis under reduced funding levels to maintain key stockpile assessment capabilities. These general goals, however, do not provide measureable outcomes or encompass the entirety of the program. In addition, as GAO's previous work has shown, managing longer term work, such as multiyear technology development projects, on an annual basis makes it difficult for Congress and other decision makers to understand up front what they are funding and what benefits they can expect. As a result, these projects may receive a lower priority and may not be consistently funded. GAO's body of work has identified a number of leading practices in federal strategic planning that include defining strategic goals, defining strategies and resources for achieving these goals, and developing and using performance measures to track progress in achieving these goals and to inform management decision making. A new strategy for the Enhanced Surveillance Program that incorporates outcome-oriented strategic goals, addresses management challenges and identifies resources needed to achieve these goals, and develops and uses performance measures to track progress in achieving goals would allow the agency to better inform long-term planning and management decision making for the program as well as help ensure that it complements NNSA's other efforts to assess the nuclear weapons stockpile.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the NNSA Administrator develop a long-term strategy for the Enhanced Surveillance Program that incorporates leading practices. NNSA concurred with GAO's recommendation and estimated completion of a long-term strategy by June 2017.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons has grown smaller and older than  when the United States was in the midst of the Cold War, and much of  the stockpile has aged beyond its anticipated lifetime. From 1945 to 1992,  the United States conducted both nuclear and nonnuclear testing to  ensure the reliability and performance of these weapons. Nuclear testing  was largely conducted through underground, underwater, and  aboveground explosions, and, since the 1960s, the United States has  supplemented underground tests with a program of weapons analysis  using nonnuclear laboratory and flight testing. Since 1992, the United  States has observed a moratorium on nuclear testing, with the result that  the United States must rely on other methods to ensure that the aging  weapons remaining in the nuclear stockpile are safe and reliable.
In 1995, the President established an annual stockpile assessment and  reporting requirement to help ensure that the nation’s nuclear weapons  remained safe and reliable without underground nuclear testing.  Subsequently, Congress enacted into law the requirement for an annual  stockpile assessment process. The National Nuclear Security  Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the  Department of Energy (DOE), provides input to the annual assessment  on the basis of, in large part, a variety of tests that it conducts on  weapons returned from the stockpile and supplemental information  provided from aging studies under its stockpile surveillance program.  Surveillance is the process of inspecting individual weapons through  various tests of the weapon as a whole, the weapon’s components, and  the weapon’s materials to determine whether they are meeting  performance expectations. Through this program, NNSA obtains critical  information on the condition of the stockpile that, among other things,  informs the annual assessment process. According to NNSA’s Stockpile  Stewardship and Management Plan, the stockpile surveillance program  comprises two key efforts—the Core Surveillance program (Core  Surveillance) and the Enhanced Surveillance Program. While these  programs share the common goals of improving and reducing the cost of  surveillance, according to NNSA officials, NNSA has designed each effort  to conduct different types of activities. NNSA also provides separate  sources of funding for each effort.
According to officials at NNSA, Core Surveillance has historically been  used to detect “birth defects” of weapons—the manufacturing defects or  signs of aging in current components and materials. These weapons and  weapons components are chosen, either randomly or specifically, from  the stockpile each year for evaluation. NNSA’s national security  laboratories and NNSA production plants evaluate weapons and their  components largely by dismantling weapons to evaluate their condition  and obtain information on their reliability. According to agency  documents, NNSA’s Enhanced Surveillance Program is intended to gain  a better long-term understanding of the impacts of aging on weapons. To  do so, the Enhanced Surveillance Program conducts lifetime  assessments and aging studies to predict where and when defects may  occur in weapons and their components in the future; builds  computational models; and develops diagnostic tools primarily for Core  Surveillance, as well as other stockpile organizations. The program also  assists in assessing the safety and reliability of the U.S. stockpile and  evaluates weapons components and materials for NNSA weapons  programs focusing on component reuse or weapons life extension.
In 2007, faced with budgetary constraints; a mounting backlog of Core  Surveillance’s required weapons tests; and concerns raised by us,  Congress, the Department of Defense (DOD), and others, NNSA  developed an initiative to revise its approach to stockpile surveillance— the Surveillance Transformation Project (2007 initiative). According to  NNSA’s implementation plan for the 2007 initiative, it would provide a  more cost-effective, flexible way to address the mounting backlog of  mandatory tests and to meet the future surveillance needs of an aging  stockpile. NNSA outlined key goals for transforming Core Surveillance  and the Enhanced Surveillance Program in its 2007 initiative project  plan. According to an NNSA official who was involved in the 2007  initiative and NNSA documents, one key effort was to develop capabilities  to predict the condition of the stockpile over its lifetime by increasing the  ability to understand and predict the impacts of aging, particularly on  nonnuclear components, without dismantling them, thereby reducing the  overall number of weapons and components required to be  disassembled. By, among other things, increasing the nondestructive  evaluations of nonnuclear components and materials—work that was to  be largely conducted under the Enhanced Surveillance Program—NNSA  sought to reduce Core Surveillance’s backlog of mandated nonnuclear  laboratory tests requiring the dismantling of these components.
Over the past several years, NNSA has budgeted less funding for the  Enhanced Surveillance Program. For example, in fiscal year 2015,  NNSA budgeted about 30 percent less funding than for the prior fiscal  year for the program. Outside experts and the directors of NNSA’s three  national security laboratories have voiced concerns about the possible  impacts that Enhanced Surveillance Program cuts could have on the  agency’s ability to fully assess the condition of the stockpile in the future.  Specifically, according to representatives of the JASON group, recent  changes to Enhanced Surveillance Program funding pose a risk that  NNSA may not have the tools it needs in the future to fully assess  whether the stockpile remains safe and reliable. Within NNSA, the  directors for the agency’s three nuclear security laboratories, where the  majority of the Enhanced Surveillance Program activities are conducted,  have voiced similar concerns.
The Senate Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision that we review, among other  things, the status of the Enhanced Surveillance Program, including  NNSA’s long-term strategy for the program. This report assesses the  extent to which NNSA has implemented the vision for the Enhanced  Surveillance Program found in its 2007 initiative and the extent to which  NNSA has developed a long-term strategy for the program.
To do this work, we reviewed stockpile surveillance program documents,  including the annual Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan,  Enhanced Surveillance Program Implementation Plan, and Surveillance  Transformation Project Plan. We also reviewed NNSA budgetary  documents, our prior reports, and DOE Office of Inspector General  reports on NNSA’s stockpile surveillance program. We interviewed  federal officials at NNSA headquarters and federal officials and contractor  representatives at the three national security laboratories—Sandia  National Laboratory in Albuquerque, New Mexico; Los Alamos National  Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico; and Lawrence Livermore  National Laboratory in Livermore, California—either by visit or by  telephone. We also interviewed officials in DOE’s Office of Inspector  General who were involved in the November 2010 review of Core  Surveillance and the Enhanced Surveillance Program. In addition, we  interviewed representatives of the JASON group who were involved in the  organization’s September 2013 review of Core Surveillance and the  Enhanced Surveillance Program. We also reviewed NNSA’s strategic  planning efforts for the Enhanced Surveillance Program and selected  leading practices in federal strategic planning, including (1) practices  required at the federal department/agency level under the Government  Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), as amended by the  GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), which we have previously  reported also can serve as leading practices for planning at lower levels  within federal agencies, such as individual programs or initiatives; (2)  practices identified in Office of Management and Budget guidance to  federal agencies for implementing GPRA’s requirements; and (3)  related leading practices that our past work has identified. We also  reviewed our prior work on program evaluation and DOE’s performance  measurement guidelines.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2014 to  September 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The size and composition of the nuclear stockpile have evolved as a  consequence of the global security environment and the national security  needs of the United States. According to NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship  and Management Plan for Fiscal Year 2016, the stockpile peaked at  31,255 weapons in 1967, and in September 2013, the stockpile consisted  of 4,804 weapons—the smallest since the Eisenhower Administration.  The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and  Russia, which entered into force on February 5, 2011, is to reduce the  operationally deployed stockpile even further by 2018. Weapons that  were originally produced on average 25 to 30 years ago are now well past  their original design life of approximately 15 to 20 years. In addition, no  new nuclear weapons have been developed since the closing days of the  Cold War.
Before the end of the U.S. underground nuclear testing program in 1992,  developing and maintaining the nuclear stockpile were largely  accomplished by a continual cycle of weapon design, weapon testing,  and the incorporation of lessons learned in the next design. A critical step  in this process was conducting underground nuclear explosive tests.  Since 1992, the United States has observed a self-imposed moratorium  on nuclear explosive testing and has, instead, relied on a program of  nonnuclear testing and modeling to ensure the reliability, safety, and  effectiveness of the stockpile. While the United States maintains the  policy of no new nuclear testing or weapon designs, and the stockpile is  reduced in absolute numbers, confidence in the existing stockpile and the  effectiveness of the deterrent must remain high to meet U.S. national  security needs. For this reason, the United States is continuing to  modernize the existing stockpile through life-extension programs (LEP).  LEPs are modifications that refurbish warheads or bombs by replacing  aged components with the intent of extending the service life of weapons  by 20 to 30 years, while increasing safety, improving security, and  addressing defects.
NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs is responsible for the manufacture,  maintenance, refurbishment, surveillance, and dismantlement of nuclear  weapons. Most modern nuclear weapons consist of three sets of  materials and components—a primary, a secondary, and a set of  nonnuclear components. When detonated, the primary and secondary  components, which together are referred to as the weapon’s “nuclear  explosive package,” produce the weapon’s explosive force, or “yield.”  Some nonnuclear components—collectively called “limited-life  components”—have shorter service lives than the weapons themselves  and, therefore, must be periodically replaced.
There are two key efforts in the stockpile surveillance program—Core  Surveillance and the Enhanced Surveillance Program. NNSA’s Core  Surveillance, in one form or the other, has been in place for nearly 60  years. In contrast, the Enhanced Surveillance Program was established in  the mid-1990s to assist in surveillance and evaluation of the stockpile  primarily by identifying aging signs, developing aging models to predict  the impact of aging on the stockpile, and developing diagnostic tools.
subsections: section_title: Core Surveillance
paragraphs: Since the late 1950s, Core Surveillance has focused on sampling and  testing the nuclear stockpile to provide continuing confidence in its  reliability. Core Surveillance conducts tests that provide current  information—essentially a snapshot of the current condition of the  stockpile—for the annual assessment of the stockpile. According to  NNSA officials, Core Surveillance focuses mainly on identifying the “birth  defects” of a system—the manufacturing defects in current components  and materials. Under Core Surveillance, NNSA’s national security  laboratories and production plants are to evaluate the current state of  weapons and weapon components for the attributes of function, condition,  material properties, and chemical composition through the following  activities:
System-Level Laboratory Testing. For such tests, units from each  type of stockpiled weapon are chosen annually, either randomly or  specifically, and sent to the Pantex Plant in Texas for disassembly,  inspection, reconfiguration, and testing by the national security  laboratories.
System-Level Flight Testing. These tests drop or launch a weapon  with its nuclear material removed. NNSA coordinates flight testing with  DOD, which is responsible for providing the military assets (e.g.,  aircraft and missiles) needed to drop or launch a weapon.
Component and Material Testing. These tests are conducted on  nuclear and nonnuclear components and materials by both the  national security laboratories and the production plants that  manufactured them.
Organizationally, Core Surveillance is part of NNSA’s Directed Stockpile  Work Program. This program also conducts, among other things,  maintenance of active weapons in the stockpile, LEPs, and  dismantlement and disposition of retired weapons. Core Surveillance  activities were funded at approximately $217 million in fiscal year 2016.
section_title: Enhanced Surveillance Program
paragraphs: According to NNSA documents, through scientific and engineering efforts,  the Enhanced Surveillance Program enables the agency to better predict  where defects might occur in the future to help determine useful lifetimes  of weapons and certain key components, such as switches or detonators,  and to help plan when replacement is needed. The creation of the  Enhanced Surveillance Program in the mid-1990s came at a time when  concerns were growing (1) with an aging stockpile and (2) that Core  Surveillance tended to produce diminishing returns. More specifically, in a  2006 study, NNSA and the Sandia National Laboratories found that as  more is known about manufacturing and current aging defects—the focus  of Core Surveillance—fewer and fewer manufacturing-related defects are  discovered. This 2006 study suggested a different approach to  surveillance for aging weapons. According to NNSA officials, the  Enhanced Surveillance Program conducts three key activities:
Aging studies. Enhanced Surveillance Program aging studies  support decisions on when and whether to reuse or replace weapons  components and materials. As part of these studies the program  identifies and develops new materials and components that can  substitute for materials that are no longer available; identifies  inadequately performing components; and assesses performance of  existing components to assist in weapons life-extension decisions. For  example, to assist in making decisions on the life extension of  weapons, the Enhanced Surveillance Program assessed the  feasibility of reusing certain components. Specifically, according to  NNSA documents, in fiscal year 2014, the Enhanced Surveillance  Program validated the reuse of a battery for one weapon through  aging studies, resulting in eliminating the need and cost to redesign  the part. In another example, according to NNSA officials, Enhanced  Surveillance Program aging models made it possible to certify the  potential reuse of a key part of the W80 warhead to allow life  extension of that weapon. NNSA also uses information from these  aging studies in LEPs to guide decisions on when future weapons  modifications, alterations, and life extensions need to occur to reduce  the risk of potential problems from future defects. Finally, NNSA uses  information from the aging studies in the national security laboratory  directors’ annual assessment of the condition of the stockpile.
Computational modeling. On the basis of its aging studies and other  data, the Enhanced Surveillance Program develops computational  models to predict the impacts of aging on weapons components and  materials. According to the Enhanced Surveillance Program’s federal  program manager, computational predictive models primarily benefit  weapons systems managers at the three nuclear security laboratories.  The federal program manager noted that the models allow a  projection of the future performance of the systems and anticipate  failures with sufficient time to correct them.
Diagnostic tool development. The Enhanced Surveillance Program  develops diagnostic tools to support Core Surveillance and allow the  evaluation of weapons without the need to dismantle and destroy  them. This is important since new weapons are not being produced.
One diagnostic tool developed by the program was the high-resolution  computed tomography image analysis tool for a particular nuclear  component, implemented in fiscal year 2009. NNSA officials said this  diagnostic tool has enhanced the ability to identify potential defects or  anomalies without the need to dismantle or destroy the component.
Organizationally, the Enhanced Surveillance Program is a part of NNSA’s  Engineering Program, which is part of NNSA’s broader research,  development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) program. The Engineering  Program creates and develops tools and capabilities to support efforts to  ensure weapons are safe and reliable. NNSA’s total RDT&E budget  allocation for fiscal year 2016 is $1.8 billion; the Enhanced Surveillance  Program budget allocation for fiscal year 2016 is approximately $39  million.
section_title: 2007 Surveillance Transformation Initiative
paragraphs: According to agency documents, because of long-standing concerns over  the stockpile surveillance program, NNSA launched its 2007 initiative to,  among other things, better integrate stockpile surveillance program  activities. The concerns date back to the mid-1990s. For example, our  July 1996 report on the surveillance program found the agency was  behind in conducting surveillance tests and did not have written plans for  addressing the backlog. A January 2001 internal NNSA review of the  surveillance program made several recommendations to improve  surveillance, including addressing the selection and testing approach for  weapons and components, developing new tools to allow for  nondestructive testing of the stockpile, improving aging and performance  models, and achieving closer coordination and integration of Core  Surveillance and the Enhanced Surveillance Program. Further, an April  2004 review of the Enhanced Surveillance Program by DOE’s Office of  Inspector General found that NNSA experienced delays in completing  some Enhanced Surveillance Program milestones and was at risk of not  meeting future milestones. The report noted that such delays could  result in NNSA’s being unprepared to identify age-related defects in  weapons and impact the agency’s ability to annually assess the condition  of the stockpile. Finally, an October 2006 DOE Office of Inspector  General report found that NNSA had not eliminated its surveillance  testing backlog.
Faced with this criticism, a growing backlog of Core Surveillance’s  traditional surveillance testing, budgetary pressures, and an aging  stockpile, NNSA developed its 2007 initiative. According to its project  plan, the 2007 initiative sought to establish clear requirements for  determining stockpile surveillance needs and to integrate all surveillance  activities—to include Core Surveillance and the Enhanced Surveillance  Program—through a strengthened management structure. In addition,  NNSA sought to create a more flexible, cost-effective, and efficient  surveillance program by, among other things, dismantling fewer weapons  and increasing the understanding of the impact of aging on weapons,  components, and materials by being able to predict the effects of aging  activities. According to an NNSA official who previously oversaw  surveillance activities, because of the nature of its work, the Enhanced  Surveillance Program was intended to be a key part of this transformation  effort. More specifically, according to the 2007 initiative project plan, one  proposal was to increase evaluations of aging effects on nonnuclear  weapons components and materials. The 2007 initiative project plan  noted that more than 100 such evaluations would be undertaken at the  Sandia National Laboratories in fiscal year 2007, the first year of the  initiative’s implementation. In addition, the 2007 initiative project plan  stated that the Enhanced Surveillance Program would continue to assess  the viability of diagnostic tools in support of Core Surveillance.
section_title: NNSA Did Not Fully Implement Its 2007 Vision for the Enhanced Surveillance Program and Has Not Developed a Long- Term Strategy for the Program
paragraphs: NNSA implemented some aspects of its 2007 initiative but did not fully  implement its envisioned role for the Enhanced Surveillance Program and  has not developed a long-term strategy for the program. NNSA has  substantially reduced the program’s funding since 2007 and recently  refocused some of its RDT&E programs on multiple weapon life- extension efforts and supporting efforts.
subsections: section_title: NNSA Did Not Fully Implement the Increased Role for the Enhanced Surveillance Program Envisioned in Its 2007 Initiative and Budgeted Less Funding
paragraphs: A February 2010 internal NNSA review noted that NNSA had  implemented some important aspects of the 2007 initiative. For example,  NNSA updated guidance laying out processes for identifying surveillance  requirements. In addition, the agency had implemented a governance  structure consisting of working committees to harmonize requirements  between Core Surveillance and the Enhanced Surveillance Program.  Furthermore, the agency had created a senior-level position to lead the  overall surveillance effort and better integrate Core Surveillance and the  Enhanced Surveillance Program.
However, according to NNSA documents and officials, the agency did not  fully implement its envisioned role for the Enhanced Surveillance  Program. Instead of increasing the role of the program by conducting the  range of aging studies as envisioned, NNSA budgeted less funding to it,  delayed some planned work, and transferred work to other NNSA  programs. The amount of funding the agency budgeted to the Enhanced  Surveillance Program declined from $87 million in fiscal year 2007—the  first year of the 2007 initiative’s implementation—to $79 million in fiscal  year 2008. NNSA has continued to budget less funding to the Enhanced  Surveillance Program. Funding dropped to approximately $38 million in  fiscal year 2015, a reduction of more than 50 percent from fiscal year  2007. While the Enhanced Surveillance Program has experienced  reductions in funding and scope since the 2007 initiative, Core  Surveillance funding has generally kept pace with required stockpile  testing, according to an NNSA official. After an initial funding reduction  from $195 million in fiscal year 2007 to $158 million in fiscal year 2009,  NNSA increased the budgeted funding to Core Surveillance in 2010 and  has stabilized its funding levels since then. Agency officials said they  believe the Core Surveillance program is now generally stable. Figure 1  shows funding levels for the two programs for fiscal years 2007 through  2015.
NNSA also delayed some key Enhanced Surveillance Program activities  during this time. For example, NNSA did not complete the proposed  evaluations of the effects of aging on nonnuclear components and  materials that were to be largely carried out at the Sandia National  Laboratories. These evaluations—which NNSA viewed as an important  part of the Enhanced Surveillance Program when it was being managed  as a campaign, according to an NNSA official—were initiated in fiscal  year 2007 and originally estimated to be completed by 2012. However, a  2010 NNSA review concluded these evaluations had not occurred.  According to a contract representative at the Sandia National  Laboratories overseeing Enhanced Surveillance Program work, these  evaluations no longer have an estimated time frame for completion and  their systematic completion, as was once envisioned, is no longer a  program goal. Furthermore, while the program has developed some  diagnostic tools to aid Core Surveillance, such as high-resolution  computed tomography image analysis, NNSA officials and the NNSA  fiscal year 2016 budget request said that other efforts to develop  diagnostic tools had been deferred because of lack of funding.
In addition, NNSA transferred some Enhanced Surveillance Program  work to other programs. For example, NNSA transferred experiments  (and related funding) to measure aging effects and to provide lifetime  assessments on the plutonium pits—a key nuclear weapons  component—from the Enhanced Surveillance Program to NNSA’s  Science Campaign in fiscal year 2009.
According to the Enhanced Surveillance Program’s federal program  manager, NNSA has budgeted reduced funding because of competing  internal priorities. The federal program manager said that the Enhanced  Surveillance Program has to compete for funding with other internal high- priority activities, such as LEPs and infrastructure projects in a climate  of overall agency funding constraints caused by, among other things,  internal agency pressures to achieve budgetary savings to enable  modernization of the stockpile and other priorities. In addition, Core  Surveillance’s importance in detecting “birth defects” of weapons—the  manufacturing defects or signs of aging in current components and  materials—has increased, according to NNSA officials, as NNSA has  undertaken and completed more LEPs. In fiscal year 2016, NNSA shifted  the focus of some of its RDT&E efforts, including efforts in the Enhanced  Surveillance Program, to meet the immediate needs of its ongoing and  planned LEPs and related supporting efforts. According to NNSA officials,  the funding and scope reductions in the Enhanced Surveillance Program  reflect ongoing internal prioritization tensions within NNSA over meeting  immediate needs—such as understanding current stockpile condition  using traditional surveillance methods—and investing in the science,  technology, and engineering activities needed to understand the impacts  of aging on weapons and their components in the future.
The Enhanced Surveillance Program federal program manager as well as  other stakeholders, such as the JASON group of experts, noted funding  changes may have a larger impact on the program than is immediately  apparent. NNSA officials said that the program plays a considerably  broader role in assessing the condition of the stockpile than its name  suggests and supports a wide variety of efforts, including the statutorily  required annual assessment process, weapons life extension and  modernization programs, and ongoing efforts to maintain weapons  systems. According to a 2014 NNSA analysis conducted by the  Enhanced Surveillance Program’s federal program manager, slightly less  than 15 percent of the program’s fiscal year 2014 budget allocation  supported the development of diagnostic tools largely for Core  Surveillance. About half of the program’s fiscal year 2014 budget  allocation went to conducting aging studies, predictive modeling, and  component and material evaluation studies that may support Core  Surveillance but also benefit weapons life extension and modernization  programs and ongoing efforts to maintain weapons systems, according to  agency officials. The analysis found that about one-third of the Enhanced  Surveillance Program’s fiscal year 2014 budget allocation went to  activities supporting the annual assessment process and ongoing or  planned LEPs.
section_title: NNSA Has Not Developed a Current Long-Term Strategy for the Enhanced Surveillance Program
paragraphs: As of April 2016, NNSA was no longer pursuing the vision for the  Enhanced Surveillance Program contained in the 2007 initiative and did  not have a current long-term strategy for the program. Specifically, the  fiscal year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan noted that  NNSA refocused all of its RDT&E engineering activities—including the  activities within the Enhanced Surveillance Program—on supporting more  immediate stockpile needs and, according to the program’s federal  program manager, NNSA has not developed a corresponding long-term  strategy for the program. Enhanced Surveillance Program officials  continue to focus on year-to-year management of the program under  reduced funding levels to maintain key stockpile assessment capabilities,  such as supporting Core Surveillance activities, the annual assessment  process, and LEPs.
Our previous work has demonstrated that a long-term strategy is  particularly important for technology-related efforts such as the Enhanced  Surveillance Program. Specifically, our April 2013 report found that for  technology-related efforts, without a long-term strategy that provides an  overall picture of what an agency is investing in, it is difficult for Congress  and other decision makers to understand up front what they are funding  and what benefits they can expect.
In 1993, GPRA established a system for agencies to set goals for  program performance and to measure results. GPRAMA, which amended  GPRA, requires, among other things, that federal agencies develop long- term strategic plans that include agencywide goals and strategies for  achieving those goals. Our body of work has shown that these  requirements also can serve as leading practices for strategic planning at  lower levels within federal agencies, such as NNSA, to assist with  planning for individual programs or initiatives that are particularly  challenging. Taken together, the strategic planning elements  established under these acts and associated Office of Management and  Budget guidance, and practices we have identified, provide a framework  of leading practices in federal strategic planning and characteristics of  good performance measures. For programs or initiatives, these  practices include defining strategic goals, defining strategies that address management challenges and identify  resources needed to achieve these goals, and developing and using performance measures to track progress in  achieving these goals and to inform management decision making.
Our review of NNSA documents and interviews with NNSA officials found  that NNSA does not have a current long-term strategy for the Enhanced  Surveillance Program defining the program’s strategic goals that includes  these practices. Strategic goals explain the purpose of agency programs  and the results—including outcomes—that they intend to achieve. The  Enhanced Surveillance Program has general long-term goals, such as  “developing tools and information useful to ensure the stockpile is healthy  and reliable.” However, the program’s long-term goals do not provide  outcomes that are measurable or that encompass the entirety of the  program. NNSA officials told us they use annual goals, which help  manage work on a yearly basis. For example, the program’s goals for  fiscal year 2015 included “develop, validate and deploy improved  predictive capabilities and diagnostics to assess performance and lifetime  for nuclear and non-nuclear materials.” By managing work on an annual  basis, longer-term work—such as technology development projects  extended over several years—may receive a lower priority and thus,  according to NNSA officials, may not be funded.
In addition, NNSA funds the program’s annual requirements as part of the  agency’s annual budget formulation process and funds the program in  accordance with the agency’s internal process for allocating its budget  authority. For fiscal year 2016, the agency budgeted funding for the  program at a slightly higher level to meet stockpile requirements, such as  surveillance, and the annual assessment process. However, without a  current long-term strategy for the program, NNSA cannot plan for any  management challenges that threaten its ability to meet its long-term  strategic goals or the resources needed to meet those goals.
Moreover, NNSA program officials told us that the agency has not defined  specific quantifiable performance measures that could be used to track  the program’s progress toward its long-term goals, as called for by  leading practices. The need for NNSA to develop clear, measureable  performance metrics for the Enhanced Surveillance Program has been  highlighted in past reviews, namely by DOE’s Inspector General and by  the JASON group. For example, in a September 2012 report, the  Inspector General noted that NNSA’s performance measure for the  program was based on the percentage of funding spent rather than on  work accomplishments. Furthermore, a July 2013 memorandum from  the director of the Office of Management and Budget to executive agency  heads noted that, in accordance with OMB Circular A-11 and GPRAMA,  agencies should describe the targeted outcomes of research and  development programs using meaningful, measurable, quantitative  metrics, where possible, and describe how they plan to evaluate the  success of the programs.
We found in past work that effective long-term planning is needed to  guide decision making in programs, including laboratory research and  development programs, so that congressional and other decision makers  can better understand up front what they are funding and what benefits  they can expect. As NNSA refocused its research and technology  development efforts for the Enhanced Surveillance Program on LEPs and  related activities and as NNSA officials said that they recognized the need  for a new long-term strategy for the program, it is an opportune time to  incorporate sound federal strategic planning practices. A new strategy for  the program that incorporates outcome-oriented strategic goals,  addresses management challenges and identifies resources needed to  achieve these goals, and develops and uses performance measures to  track progress in achieving goals would allow the agency to better inform  long-term planning and management decision making for the program.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: By seeking to increase the nondestructive evaluations of nonnuclear  components—work that was to be conducted under the Enhanced  Surveillance Program—NNSA sought to reduce Core Surveillance’s  backlog of mandated system-level tests requiring the dismantling of these  components. However, NNSA did not fully implement its vision for the  Enhanced Surveillance Program in its 2007 initiative. For example, rather  than expanding the program, NNSA budgeted reduced funding for it, and  the program did not complete the proposed evaluations of the effects of  aging on nonnuclear components and materials. More recently, NNSA  directed its RDT&E programs to focus on LEPs and related activities. This  includes the Enhanced Surveillance Program. Enhanced Surveillance  Program personnel have focused on year-to-year management of a  program that has seen a nearly 50-percent funding reduction over the  past decade and have not yet sought to redefine a strategy for how the  program can best complement NNSA’s other efforts to assess the  condition of the stockpile, including Core Surveillance. With funding  appearing to have been stabilized and with NNSA’s adopting a different  approach for all of its RDT&E programs, it is an opportune time to  develop an Enhanced Surveillance Program strategy. A new long-term  strategy for the program that incorporates outcome-oriented strategic  goals, addresses management challenges and identifies resources  needed to achieve these goals, and develops and uses performance  measures to track progress in achieving goals would allow the agency to  better inform long-term planning and management decision making for  the program.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that NNSA can better inform long-term planning and  management decision making as well as to ensure that the Enhanced  Surveillance Program complements NNSA’s other efforts to assess the  nuclear weapons stockpile, we recommend that the NNSA Administrator  develop a long-term strategy for the Enhanced Surveillance Program that  incorporates outcome-oriented strategic goals, addresses management  challenges and identifies resources needed to achieve these goals, and  develops and uses performance measures to track progress in achieving  these goals.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the NNSA Administrator for review  and comment. In his written comments, the NNSA Administrator agreed  with our recommendation that the agency develop a long-term strategy  for the Enhanced Surveillance Program. The Administrator noted that the  growth envisioned for the Enhanced Surveillance Program did not  materialize as originally intended but that the agency remains committed  to long-term success of the program. The Administrator noted that the  agency estimated completing a long-term strategy for the program by  June 2017.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the NNSA Administrator, and other interested parties. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Jonathan M. Gill (Assistant  Director), Greg Campbell, William Horton, Nancy Kintner-Meyer, Rebecca  Shea, and Kiki Theodoropoulos made key contributions to this report.