Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Reassess Its Metrics and Assumptions for Ship Crewing Requirements and Training
Published: 2010-06-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2000, the Navy has undertaken a number of initiatives to achieve greater efficiencies and reduce costs. For example, it has reduced crew sizes on some of its surface ships and has moved from instructor-led to more computer-based training. In House Report 111-166, which accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the House Armed Services Committee directed GAO to review the training, size, composition, and capabilities of the Navy's ship crews. This report assesses the extent to which the Navy (1) used valid assumptions and standards in determining crew sizes for cruisers and destroyers, and (2) has measured the impact of changes to its training programs, including on the time it takes personnel to achieve various qualifications. To do so, GAO analyzed Navy procedures for determining crew size compared to guidance, analyzed current Navy metrics to measure training impact, and interviewed relevant officials and conducted visits to 11 ships.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since 2001, in an effort to achieve greater efficiencies and reduce costs, the Navy has reduced the requirements and size of crews for some types of ships. For example, from fiscal years 2001 to 2009, enlisted requirements declined by about 20 percent and crew sizes declined by about 16 percent on cruisers and destroyers. The Navy made these reductions based on an initiative it referred to as optimal manning as well as a decision to change certain standards it uses to translate estimated workload into workforce requirements. During pilot tests and the implementation of its optimal manning initiative, the Navy considered several elements, such as job task analysis and work studies, called for in its guidance. However, it analyzed only at-sea workload data because of a long-standing Navy assumption that at-sea workload exceeds in-port workload. While best practices require that valid and reliable data are used to assess workforce requirements, the Navy has not tested the validity of its assumption for excluding in-port data. Additionally, GAO was told by shipboard personnel that in-port workload has been increasing. Furthermore, when changing standards, such as increasing the standard workweek from 67 to 70 hours, the Navy did not conduct the types of analysis called for in its guidance to verify that these changes were warranted. Without performing additional analysis to determine that the assumption and standards it uses to determine personnel requirements are valid, the Navy cannot be assured that it has appropriately sized crews to maintain material readiness and accomplish necessary tasks aboard its ships. The Navy has made significant changes to its training programs and evaluated some aspects of these changes, specifically those related to cost and training time. However, it lacks outcome-based performance measures and complete data necessary to fully evaluate the impact changes to training have had on trainees' job performance and the time required for personnel to achieve various qualifications. For example, in 2003, the Navy replaced its 6-month division officer course with computer-based training and officials told GAO that this change has resulted in decreases in class length and saved the Navy about $50 million annually. While important, these input and output-based metrics do not enable the Navy to determine how its training programs are affecting the level of the trainees' job performance, knowledge, skills, and abilities once they report to their ships. The time it takes for personnel to achieve qualification standards is a potential metric the Navy could use to evaluate its training programs, however data on actual qualification times, while improving, are incomplete. GAO met with leaders from 11 different ships who told GAO that the sailors and officers taught using new methods such as computer-based training, required more on-the-job training when they arrived onboard than those who had previously received classroom instruction. They also noted that because of reductions in crew sizes, there are fewer personnel available to provide this on-the-job training. Without additional outcome-based performance measures to supplement its current metrics, the Navy cannot fully determine the effectiveness of the training changes it has implemented and whether further adjustments are necessary.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 2000, the Navy has undertaken a number of initiatives to achieve  greater efficiencies and reduce costs. For example, it has reduced the  workforce requirements for some of its ships and transitioned away from  instructor-led training programs to more computer-based training.  Specifically, in October 2001, the Navy initiated an effort referred to as  optimal manning to determine if it could reduce workload on board  selected surface ships while maintaining combat capability and readiness.  Based on the results of pilot tests on a guided-missile cruiser and guided- missile destroyer, in March 2004, the Navy reduced at-sea workload for  these ship classes. At the same time the optimal manning initiative was  being tested and implemented, the Navy changed several of the standards  it uses to translate a ship’s at-sea workload into workforce requirements,  including increasing the standard workweek from 67 to 70 hours. The  cumulative effect over time of the optimal manning initiative and the  changes to workload standards was a reduction in the enlisted workforce  requirements aboard cruisers and destroyers, which in turn affected the  sizes of these ships’ crews. This reduction in workforce requirements  caused the number of authorized enlisted positions on both cruisers and  destroyers to decline.
In an effort to reduce the cost and length of its off-ship training programs,  the Navy, in 2000, began a review of its training practices. Based on this  review, it began making changes that included using new technologies to  conduct training and improving and aligning training organizations. For  example, the Navy began using more computer-based training to provide  entry-level knowledge and skills to junior sailors. It also replaced the 6- month division officer course at the Surface Warfare Officers School with  computer-based, self-paced training that junior officers were to complete  after they reported aboard their ships. Additionally, in 2003 the Navy  revamped its education and training organizations. This included  establishing the Naval Personnel Development Command and 14 learning  centers to standardize the Navy’s approach to developing and delivering  training.
While the Navy has been adjusting crew sizes and training, several other  factors have placed demands on ship crews. For example, the Navy has  provided personnel, both officer and enlisted, to help the Army and Marine  Corps with staffing demands of ongoing operations. While most of these  personnel, referred to as individual augmentees, have been deployed from  shore duty assignments—or between their traditional Navy sea and shore  rotational assignments—some are drawn directly from cruisers or  destroyers. Most individual augmentees were initially deployed for 6 to 12  months, but more recently they have been deployed for 9 to 12 months or  longer in support of ongoing operations. Additionally, shipboard personnel  told us that the antiterrorism force protection workload has increased for  ships in port as the Navy has adopted more stringent standards associated  with guarding its ships. The Navy has also made changes to its shore  intermediate maintenance activities that have reduced the capacity of  these activities to assist ships with maintenance and repair tasks.
In view of these changes, the House Armed Services Committee, in a  report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2010, directed that GAO conduct a review of the training, size,  composition, and capabilities of the Navy’s ship crews. Our objectives  were to evaluate (1) the extent to which the Navy used valid assumptions  and standards in determining crew sizes for cruisers and destroyers and  (2) the extent to which the Navy has measured the impact of changes to its  training programs, including the effect on qualification time. As specified  in the committee’s report, we are also providing information on the  deployment of individual augmentees (see app. I) and changes in rank and  rate distributions that have occurred on cruisers and destroyers since 2001  (see app. II).
To address our first objective, we analyzed Navy policies and procedures  for determining crew sizes as well as various studies and reports on the  Navy’s optimal manning initiative and the manpower requirements process  for surface ships. We also interviewed officials from multiple Navy offices  and met with personnel on board four Navy cruisers, six destroyers, and  one frigate to discuss crew size, workload, and watchstanding  requirements. In addition, we analyzed Navy data to determine changes in  workforce requirements, authorized positions, and current onboard  personnel levels for cruisers and destroyers from fiscal years 2001 to 2009.  To determine what if any impact changes in crew size were having on the  material conditions or operations of these ships, we examined the results  of cruiser and destroyer inspections conducted by the Navy’s Board of  Inspection and Survey and Navy mishap data to assess whether there were  any discernable trends over this period. To address our second objective,  we reviewed relevant Navy instructions on training, studies on the Navy’s  Revolution in Training initiatives, and prior GAO work on assessing  strategic training and development efforts. We also interviewed Navy  training officials to discuss how the Navy has measured the impact of its  changes to its training programs. Furthermore, we met with ship personnel  to obtain their views on how the implementation of new training practices  has affected shipboard performance. In addition, we analyzed personnel  qualification data and the extent that ships are reporting these data.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2009 to June 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our scope and  methodology are in appendix III.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Navy uses a four-step process and considers various factors in  crewing its ships. First, it determines the workload of its ships. Second, it  loads workload data into its Manpower Requirements System model to  generate workforce requirements. Third, it determines the proportion of  its requirements it can fund and then determines the number of authorized  positions for each ship. Finally, it assigns individual personnel to its ships.  Figure 1 shows the four-step process that generates workforce  requirements and authorized positions and distributes personnel.
To determine the workload aboard a ship, the Navy Manpower Analysis  Center sends analysts to ships to assess the tasks that must be  accomplished and determine who should accomplish them. When  determining workload, analysts consider various Navy standards and  guidance with a focus on the ship’s required operational capability and  projected operating environment. The analysts base their assessments on  the amount of work necessary to accomplish the ship’s missions while at  sea.
The Navy Manpower Analysis Center converts the workload information  its analysts collect into workforce requirements using a computer model  called the Naval Manpower Requirements System. This model contains a  number of different standards to calculate workforce requirements, with  the goal of identifying the most efficient mix of personnel to accomplish  the required workload. A key standard used in this model is the Navy  Standard Workweek, which is the number of hours per week available to  accomplish required workload. The Navy Standard Workweek is used for  planning purposes, is not restrictive or binding on commanders or  commanding officers in establishing working hours, and is not intended to  reflect the limits of personnel endurance. In February 2002, the Navy  increased the Navy Standard Workweek from 67 to 70 hours. At the same  time, it reduced other standards used in the model, such as the  Productivity and Make Ready/Put Away Allowances. These changes to the  standards used by the model led to a reduction in the model’s output—the  ship’s workforce requirements—for any given ship’s workload  information. While these changes affected enlisted workforce  requirements, they did not affect those for officers since officer workforce  requirements are not based on workload analysis.
After the Navy determines the workforce requirements for its ships, it  estimates the level of funding that may be available to fill those  requirements. When the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations  (Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education) determines that a  requirement can be funded, the Navy then refers to that requirement as an  authorized billet (i.e., position) that can be filled.
The Navy’s Distribution Office fills the authorized positions with  personnel. Distribution Office officials consider several factors as they  assign personnel to authorized positions. These factors include the skills  required by the position, personnel preferences, deployment schedules,  and the “distributable” inventory of personnel—the number of personnel  available to be assigned to ships. This inventory is limited not only by  personnel levels but also by factors such as the servicemembers’ health  and administrative statuses. Because the inventory of personnel available  for assignment is generally less than the number of authorized positions,  ships generally do not receive personnel for all of their authorized  positions.
In October 2001, under an initiative referred to as optimal manning, the  Navy directed pilot projects aboard a cruiser and a destroyer to determine  if workload, while a ship is at sea, could be reduced by changing  watchstanding requirements and more effectively using technology on  board these ships. Based on the results, the Navy made certain  adjustments; for example, it eliminated the port and starboard lookouts  under typical at-sea conditions. In addition, it combined a number of  watchstations, so tasks that had previously been the responsibility of  several personnel were now consolidated into a single watchstation. The  reduced at-sea workloads were then loaded into the Naval Manpower  Requirements System model, which resulted in reduced workforce  requirements. The Navy subsequently reduced authorized positions and  actual personnel levels aboard its cruisers and destroyers.
The Navy uses both formal off-ship training programs and on-the-job  training to improve the knowledge and skill levels its personnel have in  their respective occupational specialties or jobs and to provide the  knowledge and skills necessary for personnel to qualify to stand various  watches, which may or may not relate directly to their occupational  specialties. In 2000, the Chief of Naval Operations initiated a review of the  Navy’s entire training system, including its organizational structure,  curriculum development, and execution. As a result of this review and  subsequent studies, the Navy made a number of changes to its training  structure and programs. For example, it replaced some classes that were  formerly led by instructors with computer-based training. It also  established the Naval Education and Training Command in March 2003 to  focus on education and training policy and strategy development. From  2003 to 2004, it created learning and support centers to administer training  and education programs at the fleet level. These centers were functionally  organized around enlisted ratings and mission areas. According to Navy  officials, in 2008, the centers were aligned under the Naval Education and  Training Command.
section_title: The Navy Lacks a Firm Analytical Basis for Some of Its Reductions to Cruiser and Destroyer Crew Sizes
paragraphs: Since 2001, the Navy has reduced the requirements and actual numbers of  enlisted personnel aboard its guided-missile cruisers and guided-missile  destroyers. The Navy made these adjustments based on its optimal  manning initiative as well as a decision to change certain standards it uses  to translate estimated workload into workforce requirements. In  performing the analysis to support these reductions, the Navy considered  various factors and made various assumptions but did not always address  the elements called for in Navy guidance and best practices. Additionally,  we were told by shipboard personnel that in-port workload is increasing,  which raises questions about the Navy’s assumption that workload while a  ship is underway exceeds in-port workload.
subsections: section_title: Requirements, Authorized Positions, and Current Onboard Personnel Have Decreased since 2001
paragraphs: In October 2001, the Navy initiated its optimal manning initiative by  conducting pilot projects on a cruiser and a destroyer to determine if it  could reduce their workloads while maintaining combat capability and  readiness. Based on the results of these projects, the Navy, in March 2004,  implemented the optimal manning initiative on its cruisers and destroyers.  At the same time the optimal manning initiative was being tested and  implemented, the Navy changed several of the standards it uses to  translate a ship’s workload into workforce requirements, including  increasing the standard workweek from 67 to 70 hours. The cumulative  effect of both the optimal manning initiative and the changes to workload  standards reduced the average enlisted workforce requirements aboard  cruisers by 21 percent and aboard destroyers by 20 percent from fiscal  years 2001 to 2009. Because of this decrease in workforce requirements,  the number of authorized positions and current onboard enlisted sailors  also decreased over this period, with the average number of enlisted  personnel listed as current onboard cruisers decreasing by 15 percent and  destroyers decreasing by 17 percent. During this time, the number of  officers on these ships has experienced little change; therefore, we  focused our analysis on the changes to enlisted personnel.
Table 1 shows the changes in average workforce requirements, authorized  positions, and current onboard enlisted personnel for cruisers and  destroyers from fiscal years 2001 to 2009.
Appendix IV contains additional details about changes in the workforce  requirements, authorized positions, and current onboard enlisted  personnel for cruisers and destroyers from fiscal years 2001 to 2009.
section_title: Some of the Navy’s Crew Size Reductions Were Supported by Analysis While Others Were Not
paragraphs: The Navy’s Total Force Manpower Policies Procedures Instruction  requires, among other things, that the workforce requirements  determination process methodology be based on data obtained through  engineering studies, industry standards, technical and operational  evaluations, job task analysis, work study, activity sampling, wartime  tasking identified in operational instructions, or through application of  staffing standards. Additionally, we have identified valid and reliable data  as a critical component in assessing an agency’s workforce requirements  as a human capital management best practice.
subsections: section_title: While Optimal Manning Reductions Were Based on Analysis They Also Relied on an Untested Assumption
paragraphs: In performing the analysis to support its optimal manning initiative, the  Navy considered several of the elements called for in the guidelines set  forth in the Navy’s Total Force Manpower Policies Procedures instruction  and human capital best practices. For example, beginning in October 2001,  it conducted pilot tests to reduce the at-sea workload on the guided- missile cruiser USS Mobile Bay and guided-missile destroyer USS Milius.  These tests consisted of job task analysis and work studies to verify that  proposed reductions to crew size under this initiative would not negatively  affect the capabilities of these ships. Based on the results of the pilot tests  and consultations with shipboard personnel, the Navy directed that the  lessons learned from these tests be applied to other surface ships in 2004.  Based on these reductions in at-sea workload, the workforce requirements  for cruisers and destroyers decreased.
In assessing workload as part of the optimal manning initiative, the Navy  used its long-held assumption that at-sea workload exceeds in-port  workload requirements. Although in-port workload has varied over time,  the Navy has not collected information to estimate such changes and  determine whether it should adjust its assumption. However, shipboard  personnel we interviewed consistently told us that in-port workload was  increasing, which raises questions about the Navy’s assumption that  workload while a ship is underway exceeds in-port workload. Specifically,  we conducted interviews with senior personnel, including the  commanding officer, executive officer, department heads, division  officers, and senior enlisted personnel, on board 11 ships—four guided- missile cruisers, six guided-missile destroyers, and one guided-missile  frigate. Personnel aboard these ships consistently told us that in-port  workload was increasing primarily because of the increases in  antiterrorism force protection requirements and the decrease in the size  and function of shore intermediate maintenance activities. Specifically, we  were told the following:    Antiterrorism force protection workload has been increasing, and imposes  additional training and qualification requirements beyond the increased  watchstanding requirements. However, because the antiterrorism force  protection watches—and the related required training and weapon  qualifications—occur in port, the Navy does not calculate this workload  when considering what the workforce requirement for a ship should be.
Assistance and support available to the ships from the shore intermediate  maintenance activities has decreased. Personnel said that because the  number of personnel working at these activities has decreased, some of  the workload that the activities previously accomplished was transferred  to the ship crews, thus increasing a ship’s in-port workload.
Some personnel also noted other factors that affect a ship’s ability to meet  in-port workload requirements. For example, while in port, crew members  can be temporarily pulled off their ships to support other waterfront  requirements, such as helping other ships to prepare for inspections or  conduct local operations. Additionally, the number of crew members  available to do work on a ship is generally lower in port than when the  ship is at sea because personnel complete many of their off-ship training  requirements while they are in port, and personnel generally take their  earned leave while their ships are in port. As a result of these factors, the  ships may have fewer personnel to perform the in-port workload.
section_title: Changes to Standards in the Manpower Requirements System Model Are Not Based on Navy’s Required Analysis
paragraphs: In addition to decreasing the workload entered into its Manpower  Requirements System model as a result of the optimal manning initiative,  the Navy changed some of the standards this model uses to translate  workload into workforce requirements. In February 2002, the Office of the  Chief of Naval Operations, Total Force Programming, Manpower and  Information Resources Division, directed the Navy Manpower Analysis  Center to change some of the standards in the model in order to decrease  workforce requirements. The Navy Manpower Analysis Center increased  the Navy Standard Workweek from 67 to 70 hours, decreased the Make  Ready/Put Away Allowance from 30 to 15 percent and decreased the  Productivity Allowance from a uniform 20 percent to a floating range from  2 to 8 percent. Each of these changes led to a reduction in the model’s  output, which is workforce requirements.
During our review, we found no evidence that the input changes to the  Navy’s Manpower Requirements System model were based on the type of  analysis required in the Navy’s Total Force Manpower Policies Procedures  Instruction and human capital best practices. For example, when  decreasing the Productivity Allowance, the Navy did not conduct the type  of analysis called for in its instruction, such as job task analysis or  engineering studies, to verify this change. Rather, according to Navy  officials, the standards were changed in order to decrease workforce  requirements to the level of authorized positions at the time. They said  that workforce requirements for cruisers and destroyers were overstated  as these ships had historically functioned with crew sizes smaller than  their calculated workforce requirements. Additionally, Navy officials said  that a 2001 study by the Center for Naval Analyses found that the current  workweek, which at the time was 67 hours, could be increased. However,  in analyzing this study we found that the study was based on workload  data from a single ship, and the study’s authors had stated that the study  should not be used to expand the standard workweek for other ships.
In a 2005 report, the Naval Audit Service also found that these changes  were not based on verifiable analysis or data. In response to that report,  the Office of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower,  Personnel, Training and Education) stated that it had requested funding  for the Center for Naval Analyses to conduct a formal study of the Navy  Standard Workweek in fiscal year 2006; however, as of April 2010 we  found no evidence that this study was conducted. By changing the  standards in its model without the analysis required by its instruction, the  Navy lacks assurance that the requirements generated by the model are  reliable and accurate. Without performing additional analysis to determine  that the factors and assumptions it uses to determine personnel  requirements are valid, the Navy cannot be assured that it has  appropriately sized ship crews.
section_title: Overall Impact of Reduced Crew Sizes on the Capabilities and Condition of Ships Is Unclear
paragraphs: While the Navy’s efforts to achieve efficiencies are important given  growing compensation costs, personnel aboard the ships we visited told us  that they believe the reductions in crew size have been detrimental to both  the capabilities and condition of the ships. For example, many shipboard  personnel cited changes in the way their ships prepared for material  inspections as examples of the impacts of decreased crew sizes.  Specifically, they said that their ships were no longer capable of preparing  for inspections by the Navy’s independent Board of Inspection and Survey  (INSURV) without outside help. INSURV conducts material inspections of  Navy ships every 5 years. Shipboard personnel and shore-based Navy  officials knowledgeable about these inspections told us that prior to  reductions in crew size, cruisers and destroyers would typically prepare  for these inspections with just the crew on board the ships. However, they  said the crew size of these ships is now insufficient to prepare the ships;  therefore personnel from other ships and shore establishments  supplement the ship crews in conducting maintenance and preservation  tasks to prepare the ships to be inspected. In addition, the shipboard  personnel we spoke with said that they thought the reductions in crew  sizes were negatively affecting the ships’ material condition and could  ultimately lead to an increase in ship mishaps.
In our analysis of the results of the INSURV inspections, we did not find  any specific trend showing a decline in the material condition of ships.  However, it is unclear in what way the results of these inspections may be  affected by the outside support these ships’ crew members told us they  were receiving. As part of its inspection process, INSURV identifies and  reports material conditions that substantially reduce a ship’s fitness for  naval service and its ability to perform its primary and secondary missions.  If INSURV determines that the results of its inspection of a particular ship  call into question that ship’s ability to conduct prompt and sustained  combat operations, it classifies that ship as unfit for sustained combat  operations and includes this classification in its report on the ship’s  inspection. Table 2 shows the numbers of cruisers and destroyers  inspected since 2003, the first year data were available on the  classification of ships as fit or unfit.
Regarding ship inspections, as shown in table 2, only one cruiser or  destroyer was deemed unfit for sustained combat operations by INSURV  from 2003 to 2007, while in both 2008 and 2009 three ships were  determined to be unfit. Because of the relatively small number of  inspections each year, it is not possible to draw the conclusion that the  last 2 years represents a trend in fitness of these ships. However, several  Navy officials told us they believe that reductions in crew sizes were  having a detrimental effect on the condition of these ships.
Regarding ship mishaps, we examined the number of class A and B  mishaps from 2001 to 2009 for cruisers and destroyers and did not find a  definitive trend in the number of mishaps. We did not evaluate the  circumstances of each reported mishap. Class A and B mishaps are the  most severe type of mishaps, with class A representing serious personal  injury or material damage of at least $1 million, and class B mishaps  representing at least $200,000 in damage. The results of this analysis are  shown in figure 2.
Based on the relatively small number of mishaps that occur each year, we  were unable to identify a trend in the results.
Shipboard personnel aboard destroyers also told us that prior to  reductions in crew sizes, their ships were able to simultaneously operate  two replenishment stations while underway but now the ships are only  able to operate one station at a time. This means the dangerous underway  replenishment evolution, where ships operate side by side while supplies  are transferred from one ship to the other, now takes longer to complete.
section_title: The Navy Has Evaluated Some Aspects of Its Training Changes but Lacks Performance Measures and Data to Fully Evaluate the Impact of These Changes
paragraphs: The Navy has made significant changes to its training programs and has  evaluated some aspects of these changes, specifically, those related to cost  and training time, but lacks the performance measures and data necessary  to fully evaluate the impact changes to training have had on trainees’ job  performance and the time required for personnel to achieve various  qualifications.
subsections: section_title: Since 2003, the Navy Has Made Significant Changes to Its Training Programs
paragraphs: The Navy has made a number of changes to its off-ship training programs,  including replacing many formerly instructor-led and lab-based classes  with computer-based training. For example, in January 2003, the Navy  eliminated the 6-month division officer course, held in Newport, Rhode  Island, and replaced it with the current Surface Warfare Officers School-at- Sea course, which consists of six computer discs that junior officers are  required to complete after they report to their first ships. After completing  the computer-based training program and certain on-the-job training and  watchstanding qualifications, junior officers report to the Surface Warfare  Officers School in Rhode Island for 3 weeks of advanced proficiency  training. After this training, they return to their ships where they may  receive additional training before being tested for qualification as surface  warfare officers. The Navy’s shift to computer-focused training was  intended to reduce both training cost and training time before on-ship  duty. Prior to the 2003 changes, instructors for the 6-month division officer  course taught fundamental skills such as navigation, communication,  maintenance, ship handling, and engineering, and students received hands- on training with simulators and patrol craft. The course also included  classified instruction on U.S. and enemy radar, sonar, and weapons  characteristics. Upon completion of the course, officers reported to their  ships for additional, on-the-job training before they were tested for  qualification as surface warfare officers.
In addition, the Center for Naval Engineering made changes to training for  enlisted sailors, including changes to basic engineering training. According  to Navy officials, prior to 2004, engineering courses were taught in eight  separate schools based on the occupational specialty of the enlisted sailor.  The instruction largely was instructor-led training held in a classroom or  lab. In August 2004, this classroom-based training was replaced by the  basic engineering common core, a general course integrating training from  eight separate engineering schools. This course uses a blended learning  approach with both self-paced computer-based training and instructor-led  training in the classroom.
section_title: Navy Lacks Performance Measures to Fully Evaluate the Impact of Its Training Programs
paragraphs: The Navy has evaluated the impact that its changes to training programs  have had on the length and cost of training, but it lacks a broader range of  performance measures needed to evaluate the impact on other key  aspects, such as the trainees’ job performance. Our prior work shows  that it is important for agencies to incorporate performance measures that  can be used to demonstrate the contributions training programs make to  improve results. By incorporating valid measures of effectiveness into  training and development programs, agencies can better ensure that they  adequately address training objectives and thereby increase the likelihood  that desired changes will occur in the target population’s skills,  knowledge, abilities, attitudes, or behaviors.
In evaluating its training programs, the Navy has, for the most part,  developed and applied input- and output-based metrics, such as the  number of individuals trained, training hours per individual, and training  cost per individual. For example, Navy training officials we spoke with  stated that the changes to training have resulted in improvements such as  decreases in class length and overall training cost. In addition, officials  from the Surface Warfare Officers School said that changing the traditional  methods of training for new officers from an on-site to a computer-based  training program reduced the time it took for new officers to achieve their  surface warfare officer qualification, both in terms of reducing time spent  in training and on board their ships before qualifying. Officials also  estimated that since implementing these new methods of training for  surface warfare officers, the Navy has saved about $50 million annually.  Similarly, officials at the Center for Naval Engineering told us that the shift  to the basic engineer common core reduced training time. Based on our  analysis of data provided by the center, we estimate that the average time  to complete the course decreased by 29 percent, from an average of 101 to  71 days, compared to the previous curriculum.
While important, these metrics do not enable the Navy to determine how  its training programs are affecting key aspects, such as the trainees’ job  performance, knowledge, skills, and abilities once they report to their  ships. For example, the Navy could measure the ability of personnel to  perform the tasks expected of them once they report to their ships or the  amount and types of on-the-job training required for personnel to perform  required tasks. While the Navy did initiate a pilot study to measure  trainees’ knowledge levels, officials told us that this study was only done  once. To conduct this study, the Center for Naval Engineering divided a  group of engineering students into two groups. One group received  training via the traditional curriculum and the other group received the  new curriculum. After completing their training, students from both  groups were given a test administered by the Navy’s Afloat Training Group  to determine their knowledge retention. The test results showed that  students taught under the new curriculum had a higher level of knowledge  retention than their counterparts. While this type of test is an example of a  potential performance measure the Navy could use to assess training  performance, it was a onetime study and did not measure knowledge  retention at additional intervals after sailors reported to their ships.
Navy officials told us that the Navy would like to measure the quality of  the instruction and its impact on job performance, knowledge, skills, and  abilities by observing students when they report to ships and measuring to  what extent they are able to use their training. However, they noted that  such an evaluation would be difficult and require participation from not  only the Navy training program but also operating forces. An official with  the Assessment Branch of the Navy Education and Training Command  told us that while the command is in the process of identifying potential  performance metrics for measuring the quality of instruction and its  impact on job performance, this effort is in a preliminary stage, and the  official could not estimate when these metrics would be developed or  implemented. Without performance measures in place, the Navy cannot  fully determine the effectiveness of training changes it has already  implemented and is not positioned to determine whether any adjustments  need to be made.
During the course of our review, we met with leadership personnel from  11 different ships who generally expressed similar opinions concerning the  impact of training changes on crew performance aboard their ships.  Many of these leaders said that those sailors and officers who did not  receive classroom instruction but instead were taught using new methods,  such as computer-based training, required more on-the-job training when  they arrived on board than those who had received classroom instruction.  In addition, many of the leaders noted that as crew sizes have decreased, it  has become more difficult to provide the on-the-job training these newer  crew members need to accomplish their duties. One officer equated  personnel receiving computer-based training instead of traditional  classroom training to searching the Internet to learn how to fix a car  versus learning on an actual car. He said that people are not really learning  how to use the equipment because they do not touch it. Many of the senior  enlisted personnel we spoke with said that because of declines in the  knowledge and abilities of junior sailors who had completed computer- based training, they themselves were now directly supervising or actually  completing work that junior sailors were previously able to do  independently.
To help mitigate the perceived lack of basic knowledge of new officers  who had not gone through the 6-month classroom-based division officer  course, personnel on one ship told us that they created an on board  classroom. The commanding officer told us that he created this program  because he recognized the knowledge gap of junior officers when they  arrived on board. The program consisted of new officers spending several  days with various members of the crew and learning various skills, which  the commanding officer said had previously been taught during the 6- month division officer course. In addition, because of a perceived lack of  knowledge of junior officers, in 2008 the Commander Naval Surface  Forces instructed the Navy’s Afloat Training Groups to develop and  implement a 3-week surface warfare officer introduction course to  supplement the computer-based training. This course is taught in San  Diego, California; Norfolk, Virginia; Mayport, Florida; Everett, Washington;  Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and Yokosuka, Japan, and uses both lectures and  simulator training to provide junior officers with the basic knowledge and  skills they need on their assigned ships. The instructors for these courses  are volunteers from both the Navy’s Afloat Training Groups as well as  senior officers from ships in these areas.
The opinions we heard from shipboard personnel were echoed in findings  of a 2009 report on computer-based training by the Naval Inspector  General. According to the official responsible for this report, it was  prompted by the results of a survey that the Naval Inspector General  conducted of civilian and military Navy personnel in 2007 and 2008. One of  the primary concerns of Navy personnel, according to this survey, was a  declining level of knowledge of sailors reporting to their ships after  completing computer-based training. The Inspector General’s office  interviewed officials at various levels in the Navy’s training infrastructure,  including officials at a number of schools as well as the fleet level to  gather a cross section of opinions from these groups. Focus groups were  conducted with personnel at various naval stations both inside and outside  the contiguous United States. The review looked at both the enlisted and  officer training. One of the key findings of this study was that speed of  completion is the prime motivational factor, with the reward for timely  completion being a priority for moving to the next stage of promotion. The  study also found that shipboard personnel reported that the use of  computer-based training resulted in more on board training in basic  knowledge, skills, and abilities than was necessary before the  implementation of computer-based training. Additionally, the inspection  team was unable to find a valid metric with which to compare the  occupational specialty knowledge obtained under computer-based training  to the knowledge obtained under the traditional training system, and  recommended that the Navy establish a training evaluation model to  measure the outcome and effectiveness of training on sailor performance  in the fleet.
section_title: The Navy Currently Lacks Complete Data to Track Personnel Qualification Times
paragraphs: While the Navy is taking steps to improve the completeness of its  personnel qualification data, such as the time it takes for officers to  achieve their surface warfare officer qualification, it currently lacks  complete data with which to track changes in these times. The time  required for personnel to achieve watchstation and warfare qualifications  is a potential metric the Navy could use to measure the effects of changes  of its training programs. Personnel qualification standards are an integral  part of a ship’s training program. They describe the minimum knowledge  and skills individuals must demonstrate prior to standing watches,  maintaining equipment, or performing other specific duties. To assign  qualification standards to shipboard personnel and track their progress,  the Navy uses the Relational Administrative Data Management system.  However, our assessment of the system’s 2005 through 2009 data found  that the data were incomplete. For example, we found that many cruisers  and destroyers did not report the qualification data monthly as required by  a Navy instruction and some of these ships did not report the data at all.  Navy Instruction 3502.1D states that all ships equipped with the  Relational Administrative Data Management system should, by the 10th  day of every month, upload personnel qualification data from the system  manually into the Navy’s official repository for individual skills training  called the Navy Training Management and Planning System. To determine  the completeness of available personnel qualification data, we compared  the actual number of data uploads to the potential number of uploads. The  potential number of uploads in a given year equals 12 times the number of  ships that have the Relational Administrative Data Management system  because each ship is supposed to upload data once a month. Table 3  shows that the upload rate among cruisers and destroyers was only 6  percent in 2005 but was 69 percent by 2009.
Although rates of reporting are now higher than in 2005, the rate of  reporting is still too low for us to use the data to make conclusions about  qualification times. In addition, we were told that the Navy lacks baseline  qualification data from the years prior to when it made changes to its  training programs. Therefore, we cannot evaluate whether changes to  these formal off-ship training programs have affected personnel  qualification times.
To facilitate ships’ reporting of the data, the Navy developed new software  that automatically transfers the qualification data from the Relational  Administrative Data Management system into the Navy Training  Management and Planning System. As of March 31, 2010, this new  software was installed on 2 of the Navy’s 22 cruisers and on 9 of its 57  destroyers. According to Navy officials responsible for this program, the  Navy plans to install the new release on its remaining cruisers and  destroyers by fiscal year 2018.
A Navy working group also found similar issues with the personnel  qualification standards data. In October 2006, the Commander, Naval  Surface Forces Surface Warfare Enterprise, chartered the Train Through  Qualification working group to research training and qualification  processes to identify constraints and define barriers preventing the  delivery of qualified or nearly qualified sailors to their ships. As a part of  its review, the working group attempted to evaluate the amount of time it  took for individuals to qualify for specific watchstations. However, the  working group determined that the quantity of the data was insufficient to  establish the time it took for a watchstander to qualify. According to the  working group, having complete data is important for the working group  to make appropriate and effective recommendations. Because it did not  see any improvements in the data over time, the working group suspended  its efforts in December 2009.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: To achieve greater efficiencies and reduce costs, the Navy, among other  things, has taken steps to reduce the size of the crews on its guided-missile  cruisers and guided-missile destroyers and changed its approach to  training sailors and surface warfare officers. While achieving efficiencies is  very important, particularly given the growing costs to compensate  personnel, the Navy must still ensure that it can perform its mission safely  and maintain adequate readiness. In performing the analysis to support  these reductions, the Navy considered some factors and made various  assumptions, but in some cases did not address other key elements called  for in its guidance and best practices for determining workforce  requirements. Without undertaking certain types of analysis—such as job  task analysis and engineering studies—or testing the validity of its long- standing assumptions, such as whether at-sea workload exceeds in-port  workload, the Navy will not have all the information it needs to measure  the workload of its ships and translate that workload into workforce  requirements. Without performing additional analysis to determine that  the standards and assumptions it uses to determine personnel  requirements are valid, the Navy cannot be assured that its ship crews are  appropriately sized to accomplish necessary tasks and maintain the  material readiness of ships both at sea and in port on a daily basis.
Additionally, while the Navy was reducing the size of its crews, it changed  its approach to training sailors and surface warfare officers by replacing  some instructor-led training classes with computer-based training. While  the Navy has metrics showing that some of these changes have reduced  costs and training time, it lacks outcome-based performance measures to  determine the effectiveness of the revised training in terms of trainees’ job  performance, knowledge, skills, or abilities. Without outcome-based  performance measures in place to measure the effectiveness of training  programs, it is unclear what the effect has been. Overall, without an  analysis of assumptions and standards used to reduce ship crew sizes— and without outcome-based performance metrics to evaluate the impact of  training program changes—the Navy cannot be assured that the sizes of its  ship crews are sufficient to operate and maintain its ships and cannot fully  determine the effectiveness of the training changes it has implemented and  whether further adjustments are necessary.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the analytic basis of the Navy’s workforce requirements  determination process, we recommend that the Secretary of the Navy  direct the Chief of Naval Operations to take the following two actions:    Conduct an assessment to validate the underlying assumptions and  standards used to calculate shipboard workforce requirements, including  the relative magnitude of in-port and at-sea requirements, the Navy  Standard Workweek, and its associated Productivity and Make Ready/Put  Away Allowances, while taking into account various other factors that can  affect ships’ crews, such as the availability of shore support.
Review the results of this comprehensive assessment and determine  whether it is necessary to adjust the personnel requirements for the Navy’s  cruisers and destroyers.
To better gauge the impact of changes to the Navy’s training programs, we  recommend that the Secretary of the Navy direct the Chief of Naval  Operations to develop metrics to be used to measure the impact of  training, such as the impact on job performance, knowledge, skills, and  abilities as they relate to occupational and watchstanding proficiency.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of the Navy  concurred with our recommendations and identified several actions it  plans to implement them. Concerning our recommendation to conduct an  assessment to validate the underlying assumptions and standards used to  calculate shipboard workforce requirements, the Navy agreed to conduct a  study and stated that such a study to validate the standards used to  calculate workforce requirements, including the Navy Standard Workweek  and Make Ready/Put Away Allowances, will provide additional rigor to its  current methodologies. Additionally, the Navy agreed to examine some of  the tenets of its optimal manning initiative with respect to anticipated, but  not achieved, workload reductions.
Concerning our recommendation to develop metrics to measure the  impact of training on job performance, knowledge, skills, and abilities as  they relate to occupational and watchstanding proficiency, the Navy stated  that it would leverage existing Surface Force efforts to measure the impact  of training. Specifically, the Navy detailed the process it uses to report  training readiness information by ship into the Defense Readiness  Reporting System-Navy. While these actions provide the chain of  command with information on training readiness once personnel are  aboard ship, they do not provide specific information about the impact of  off-ship training. Given that the Navy has made a number of changes in its  off-ship training programs and that many of the shipboard personnel we  interviewed had concerns about the effectiveness of current training  programs, it is important for the Navy to determine the impact of its  training changes. Additional metrics could be used to identify training  areas that could be improved. Therefore, while the Navy should continue  collecting and using the metrics it outlined in its comments on this report,  it is important for the Navy to develop or identify specific metrics it can  use to measure the impact of training at an individual level. The full text of  DOD’s written comments is reprinted in appendix V.
We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretary of Defense. This report also is available at  no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Deployment of Individual Augmentees
paragraphs: Military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism, particularly  those in Iraq and Afghanistan, have challenged the ability of the Army and  Marine Corps to provide needed ground forces. To help mitigate these  challenges, the Navy has provided personnel, known as individual  augmentees, to fill or augment units and organizations that support  missions such as maritime and port security, civil affairs, airlift support,  and detainee operations. U.S. Fleet Forces Command is responsible for  administering the Navy’s individual augmentee program.
According to the Navy, at any given time, active duty personnel make up  about half of the Navy’s individual augmentee force while the other half  are mobilized reserve personnel. According to data provided by the Navy,  about 37,000 active duty personnel were deployed as individual  augmentees from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2009. The Navy  selects active duty personnel to fill individual augmentee assignments  through one of two processes. In the first, the Individual Augmentee  Manpower Management Assignment process, personnel already assigned  to a command are deployed to carry out their individual augmentee  assignments, while they remain assigned to their current commands. They  then return to their assigned commands after completing their individual  augmentee assignments, which can last from a few months to a year or  more. The individual augmentee assignments generally occur on relatively  short notice and can be disruptive for both the personnel and their  commands. In June 2007, the Navy also began using a second process, the  Global War on Terrorism Support Assignment process, to provide more  predictability for sailors, their families, and Navy commands. Under this  process, personnel can negotiate for an individual augmentee assignment  when they are between their traditional Navy sea and shore rotational  assignments. The personnel detach from their current commands while  carrying out the individual augmentee assignments and transfer to their  next permanent change of station assignments upon completion of the  individual augmentee assignments. These individual augmentee  assignments vary in length, but the standard duration is from 8 to 14  months.
Our analysis of data provided by the Navy found that from fiscal year 2006  through fiscal year 2009, about 31,000 active duty personnel (84 percent)  were deployed using the Individual Augmentee Manpower Management  Assignment process and about 6,000 active duty personnel (16 percent)  were deployed using the Global War on Terrorism Support Assignment  process. During this time period, of the about 31,000 personnel deployed  as individual augmentees under the Individual Augmentee Manpower  Management Assignment process, almost 24,000 (76 percent) came from  shore commands and about 7,500 (24 percent) came from sea units, such  as ships. About 1,200 (16 percent) of the 7,500 personnel coming from  ships were deployed from guided-missile cruisers and guided-missile  destroyers. Table 4 shows the numbers of individual augmentees deployed  in fiscal years 2006 through 2009.
Of the 1,224 personnel deployed from cruisers and destroyers, the majority  (about 1,100) were enlisted sailors and the remainder (about 115) were  officers. Compared to the total number of sailors serving on these ships,  the number of enlisted sailors deployed as individual augmentees is a  relatively small percentage. For example, during fiscal year 2009 about 2  percent of the total current onboard enlisted personnel for cruisers were  deployed as individual augmentees, while 1.6 percent were deployed from  destroyers.
Our analysis also found that enlisted sailors, especially petty officers,  constituted most of the individual augmentees deployed from cruisers and  destroyers. Of the officers deployed as individual augmentees, most were  junior grade. Figure 3 shows the distribution of enlisted personnel and  officers deployed as individual augmentees from cruisers and destroyers  during fiscal years 2006 through 2009.
As part of our analysis, we examined whether particular occupational  fields on cruisers and destroyers were in higher demand than others for  the individual augmentee program. Table 5 lists the top job titles and  descriptions of the individual augmentees deployed from cruisers and  destroyers during fiscal years 2006 through 2009. Overall, personnel from  the nine occupational fields listed in the table made up 72 percent or 795  of the 1,102 enlisted individual augmentees deployed from cruisers and  destroyers. Among the enlisted occupational fields, we found that  information systems technicians topped the list for filling individual  augmentee assignments.
To obtain information on the deployment of individual augmentees, we  discussed this topic during our ship visits, which covered four cruisers, six  destroyers, and one frigate. During our visits, shipboard personnel  acknowledged that while the number of individual augmentees deployed  from their ships was relatively small, as a percentage of the overall size of  the crews, individual augmentee assignments result in staffing losses that  ships do not receive additional personnel to fill. They also noted that  returning individual augmentees cannot be required to immediately deploy  with the ship because Navy policy requires that, subject to certain  exceptions, they receive a period of “dwell-time” between deployments.  Because of the Navy’s reductions in crew sizes on cruisers and destroyers,  shipboard personnel said that every sailor on board is essential to the  operation of a ship and the loss of even one crewmember to an individual  augmentee assignment can be detrimental to a ship’s ability to carry out its  mission. Also, they said that the situation is compounded when the  individual augmentee is a middle- to senior-level crew member who  normally mentors, coaches, and trains junior staff. Personnel on board the  ships we visited said that having fewer sailors means more work for those  on board, which can lower morale and quality of life, and that some duties  such as ship maintenance, may be delayed or may not get done for an  indefinite period.
section_title: Appendix II: Distribution of Enlisted and Officer Pay Grades, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2009
paragraphs: The House Armed Services Committee, in its report accompanying the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, directed GAO to  compare shipboard rank/rate distributions over time and analyze  underlying reasons for any changes and their impact on ship capabilities  for selected ship types. For this review, we focused on guided-missile  cruisers and guided-missile destroyers. In our analysis of the rank  distribution for officers and rate distribution for enlisted sailors, we did  not find a major change in this distribution from fiscal years 2001 to 2009.
Figure 4 shows the distribution in terms of percentages of enlisted sailors  on cruisers from fiscal years 2001 to 2009.
As demonstrated in figure 4, the breakdown among the general categories  of enlisted pay grades—general rates (E-1 to E-3), petty officers (E-4 to E- 6), and chief petty officers (E-7 to E-9)—on cruisers showed only slight  variations from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2009.
The rate distribution for enlisted sailors on destroyers was similar to the  distribution on cruisers—displaying only relatively minor changes from  fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2009. Specifically, figure 5 shows the  distribution in terms of percentages of enlisted sailors on destroyers from  fiscal years 2001 to 2009.
section_title: Appendix III: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which the Navy used valid assumptions and  standards in determining crew sizes for cruisers and destroyers, we  analyzed various Navy documents and instructions related to determining  crew sizes, including Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction  1000.16K, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies Procedures in order to  identify the steps required in the Navy’s process to determine crew sizes.  We reviewed relevant prior GAO work on human capital management, as  well as various studies and reports from research organizations about the  Navy’s process to crew its ships. We analyzed reports from the Naval Audit  Service about the Navy’s optimal manning initiative and manpower  requirements process for surface ships for information about the ship  crewing process.
We also calculated whether workforce requirements and authorized  positions had changed from fiscal years 2001 to 2009 by analyzing data  provided by the Navy from its Total Force Manpower Management System  for cruisers and destroyers. To calculate whether the number of enlisted  personnel designated as current onboard personnel for cruisers and  destroyers had changed from fiscal years 2001 to 2009, we analyzed data  provided by the Navy from its Navy Manpower Program and Budget  System. We averaged the workforce requirements, authorized positions,  and current onboard data across each ship type for each fiscal year to find  an average value.
To assess the extent to which the Navy has measured the impact of  changes to its training programs, including qualification times, we  reviewed prior GAO work on assessing strategic training and development  efforts. We also reviewed Navy instructions on surface force training,  personnel qualification standards, and Navy training system requirements,  acquisition, and management. To assess the extent to which the Navy is  tracking performance measures, we interviewed Navy training officials  and ship personnel to obtain their views on how the implementation of  new training practices has affected shipboard performance. To assess  changes in training times and the cost of training related to occupational  specialties, we analyzed data and interviewed individuals from the Center  for Naval Engineering located in Norfolk, Virginia and the Surface Warfare  Officers School located in Newport, Rhode Island. Furthermore, we  reviewed reports from the Naval Inspector General, the Center for Naval  Analyses, LMI, and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations  (Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education) to gain insights about the  Revolution in Training.
In addition, we obtained and analyzed personnel qualification standards  data that are recorded in the Relational Administrative Data Management  system on board ships from the Naval Education and Training  Professional Development and Technology Center. To determine the  percentage of guided-missile cruisers and guided-missile destroyers that  were uploading their data into the Navy Training Management and  Planning System on a monthly basis as required, we compared the total  number of times cruisers and destroyers uploaded the data to the total  number of times these ships should have uploaded the data (i.e., once a  month or 12 times per year) for calendar years 2005 through 2009. We also  interviewed officials from the Navy’s Train Through Qualification working  group responsible for assessing sailor training and qualification processes  to discuss their findings. Based on our analysis and discussions with the  working group officials, we determined that the personnel qualification  standards data were not reliable for evaluating whether changes to formal  off-ship training programs have affected personnel qualification times  because they were not complete.
In the course of our work, we interviewed officials from the following  organizations and offices:    Aegis Training and Readiness Center    Afloat Training Group, Pacific    Center for Naval Engineering    Commander, Naval Surface Forces    Cruiser Class Squadron    Destroyer Class Squadron    Naval Education and Training Command    Naval Education and Training Professional Development and Technology    Naval Inspector General’s Office    Naval Postgraduate School    Naval Safety Center    Navy Manpower Analysis Center    Navy Personnel Command, Bureau of Naval Personnel    Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel,  Training and Education)
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness    Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Atlantic    Surface Warfare Officers School    Train Through Qualification working group    U.S. Fleet Forces Command  We also met with personnel on board four Navy cruisers, six destroyers,  and one frigate. Specifically, we visited the USS Leyte Gulf (CG-55), USS  San Jacinto (CG-56), USS Normandy (CG-60), USS Monterey (CG-61),  USS Benfold (DDG-65), USS Milius (DDG-69), USS Bulkeley (DDG-84),  USS Shoup (DDG-86), USS Momsen (DDG-92), USS Stockdale (DDG-106),  and USS Vandegrift (FFG-48). We conducted interviews with senior  personnel on board these ships, including the commanding officer,  executive officer, department heads, division officers, and senior enlisted  personnel.
Because ship personnel told us that they believed reduced crew sizes  affected the ships’ material condition and could lead to mishaps, we  analyzed inspection and mishap data. Specifically, we analyzed the results  of the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) inspections for  cruisers and destroyers from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2009. The  number of categories INSURV evaluates ships across has increased since  2001; therefore, we compared inspection results across the 17 categories,  which have consistently been measured since 2001. We averaged the  results of the ships inspected each year by category and classified the  average score as red, yellow, or green based on the standards INSURV  uses in its inspections. We compared the proportion of inspection  categories receiving red, yellow, or green scores each fiscal year to assess  whether there was a discernable trend in the inspection results over this  period. We also obtained mishap data from the Naval Safety Center. We  requested data for class A, B, and C mishaps, as these are the types of  mishaps that ships are required to report to the Safety Center through the  Navy’s Web Enabled Safety System. We compared the number of mishaps,  by class that had occurred in each fiscal year from 2001 to 2009, which  was the last full year available for analysis, to assess whether there was a  discernable trend in mishaps over this period. We reported on the number  of A and B mishaps, as these are the most severe types of mishaps in terms  of personal injury and material damage.
To assess the extent to which the Navy’s support for individual  augmentees and training and transition teams has affected the levels and  composition of shipboard manning, we reviewed the Navy’s policies  regarding the sourcing and assignment of individual augmentees. In  addition, we obtained and analyzed data from the Navy Personnel  Command on the number of active duty sailors deployed as individual  augmentees from fiscal years 2006 through 2009, which included sailors  deployed on training and transition teams. Officials from the command  stated that although the data are neither complete nor completely  accurate, they represent the Navy’s best available data on individual  augmentees. Using these data, we analyzed the rates and ranks of the  sailors deployed as individual augmentees from Navy cruisers and  destroyers to determine if there were any trends over this period. We also  looked at whether particular occupational fields on cruisers and  destroyers, such as information systems technicians or fire controlmen,  had sailors deployed as individual augmentees more often than other  occupational fields. To gain additional insight into the impact individual  augmentees have had on shipboard manning, we interviewed officials  from U.S. Fleet Forces Command; the Office of the Commander, Naval  Surface Forces; and personnel on board four Navy cruisers, six destroyers,  and one frigate.
To calculate whether the rank/rate distribution had changed from fiscal  years 2001 to 2009, we analyzed the current onboard data for enlisted  personnel and requirements data for officers. We used the current  onboard data for enlisted personnel provided by the Navy to analyze  whether the rate distribution had changed over this period because the  workforce requirements for enlisted personnel decreased by about 20  percent for cruisers and destroyers. This decrease caused the authorized  positions and current onboard enlisted personnel levels to decrease by  lesser amounts. We used the requirements data for officers because  workforce requirements for officers on these two ship classes have  experienced little change over this time period, and therefore we had no  indication that there was any corresponding change to the level of  authorized positions or current onboard personnel.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2009 through June 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix IV: Requirements, Authorized Positions, and Current Onboard Enlisted Personnel for Cruisers and Destroyers
paragraphs: Since 2001, in an effort to reduce costs and increase efficiencies, the Navy  has reduced the requirements and actual numbers of enlisted personnel  aboard its guided-missile cruisers and guided-missile destroyers. Figure 6  shows the average changes in workforce requirements, authorized  positions, and current onboard enlisted personnel for cruisers from fiscal  years 2001 to 2009.
Figure 6 shows that between fiscal years 2002 and 2004, the enlisted  requirements and level of authorized positions decreased. The average  number of enlisted sailors listed as currently on board these ships did no decline as rapidly as requirements and authorized positions since 2002,  because sailors were not removed from the ships after the decrease in  authorized positions. Instead, a Navy official told us that the Navy just  waited for sailors to rotate off the ships and did not replace them. As a  result, current onboard numbers continued to decline from 2003 through  2008, and in 2009, current oo and authorized positions.  and authorized positions.  nboard numbers dropped below requirements  nboard numbers dropped below requirements  Figure 7 shows the average change in workforce requirements, authoriz Figure 7 shows the average change in workforce requirements, authoriz positions, and current onboard enlisted personnel for destroyers from  positions, and current onboard enlisted personnel for destroyers from  fiscal years 2001 to 2009.  fiscal years 2001 to 2009.
Figure 7 shows that between fiscal years 2003 and 2008, the number of  enlisted requirements and authorized positions has declined, while the  average number of enlisted sailors listed as current onboard has declined  since fiscal year 2004.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Michael Ferren (Assistant Director), Elizabeth Deyo, Mary Jo  LaCasse, Tamiya Lunsford, Richard Powelson, Steven Putansu, Jerry  Sandau, Grant Sutton, and Ben Thompson.