DOD Civilian Workforce: Observations on DOD's Efforts to Plan for Civilian Workforce Requirements
Published: 2012-07-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DODs workforce of 783,000 civilians performs a wide variety of duties, including some traditionally performed by military personnel, such as mission-essential logistics support and maintenance, as well as providing federal civilian experts to Afghanistan and other theaters of operations.
With the long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation, reductions to the civilian workforce may be considered to achieve cost savings. Human capital has remained a critical missing link in reforming and modernizing the federal governments management practices, even as legislation and other actions since 1990 have been put in place to address major management areas. In the past, GAO has observed that the federal government has often acted as if people were costs to be cut rather than assets to be valued. DOD previously experienced significant downsizing in the 1990s where it did not focus on reshaping the civilian workforce in a strategic manner. Particularly as decision makers consider proposals to reduce the civilian workforce, it will be critical to DODs mission for the department to have the right number of federal civilian personnel with the right skills.
This testimony discusses DODs 1) prior experience with civilian workforce downsizing, and 2) current strategic human capital planning efforts.
This testimony is based on GAO reviews issued from March 1992 through June 2012.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Prior Department of Defense (DOD) civilian workforce downsizing efforts in the 1990s were not oriented toward shaping the makeup of the workforce, resulting in significant imbalances in terms of shape, skills, and retirement eligibility. Specifically, in a series of reviews GAO found that DODs efforts in the 1990s to reduce its federal civilian workforce to levels below that of 1987 were hampered by incomplete data and lack of a clear strategy for avoiding skill imbalances and other adverse effects of downsizing. For instance, in 1992, GAO found that DOD used incomplete and inconsistent data related to workers, workload, and projected force reductions. Further, the approaches DOD has relied on to accomplish downsizing have sometimes had unintended consequences. The use of voluntary attrition, hiring freezes, and financial separation incentives allowed DOD to mitigate some adverse effects of civilian workforce reductions, but were less oriented toward shaping the makeup of the workforce than was the approach the department used to manage its military downsizing. For DOD, this was especially true of the civilian acquisition workforce. The department, which in 2011 obligated about $375 billion to acquire goods and services, was put on the verge of a retirement-driven talent drain in this workforce after 11 consecutive years of downsizing, according to a DOD report. Finally, GAO has found that the use of strategies such as financial separation incentives makes it difficult to document or estimate the actual cost savings of government downsizing efforts, especially in cases where the work previously performed by the eliminated personnel continues to be required. For example, if the work continues to be required, it may need to be contracted out to private companies and contract costs should be considered in determining whether net savings resulted from workforce reductions.
DOD has taken positive steps towards identifying its critical skills, but there are opportunities to enhance the departments current strategic workforce plans. GAO and the Office of Personnel Management have identified leading principles to incorporate into effective workforce plans, such as the need to identify and address critical skills and competencies. DOD has been required to have a civilian strategic workforce plan since 2006. Currently, DOD is required to develop a strategic workforce plan that includes, among other things, an assessment of the skills, competencies and gaps, projected workforce trends, and needed funding of its civilian workforce. GAO has found improvements in DODs efforts to strategically manage its civilian workforce. For instance, GAO reported in 2010 that DODs 2009 strategic workforce plan assessed critical skills and identified 22 mission-critical occupations, such as acquisition and financial management. However, DODs plan only discussed competency gap analyses for 3 of its 22 mission-critical occupations, which GAO has reported is key to enabling an agency to develop specific strategies to address workforce needs. For example, GAO found that DOD had not conducted a competency gap analysis for its financial management workforce, and GAO remains concerned that DOD lacks critical information it needs to effectively plan for its workforce requirements. GAO is currently reviewing DODs latest strategic workforce plan, which was released in March 2012. The results of this review are expected to be released in September 2012.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for providing me the opportunity to be here today to discuss  GAO’s observations on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) civilian  workforce requirements. Having the right number of federal civilian  personnel with the right skills is critical to achieving the DOD mission— particularly as the department faces the current and emerging challenges  of the 21st century. DOD’s civilian workforce performs a wide variety of  duties and responsibilities, including mission-essential combat support  functions, such as logistics support and maintenance, which traditionally  have been performed by the uniformed military. A key component of this  workforce also provides federal civilian experts to Afghanistan and other  theaters of operation. Moreover, career civilian personnel possess  “institutional memory,” which is particularly important in DOD because of  the frequent rotation of military personnel and the short tenure of the  average political appointee. During its downsizing in the early 1990s, our  prior work found that DOD did not focus on reshaping the civilian  workforce in a strategic manner. That downsizing resulted in skills  imbalances and a workforce characterized by a growing gap between  older, experienced employees and younger, less experienced ones. At  the time of this downsizing, a common concern often voiced by Defense  managers was that workforce constraints were driving workload rather  than workload requirements being used to define workforce levels.
With the long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation, reductions to the  civilian workforce may be considered to achieve cost savings. Our prior  work has noted that an organization’s people—its human capital—are its  most critical asset in managing for results. However, human capital has  remained a critical missing link in reforming and modernizing the federal  government’s management practices, even as legislation and other  actions since 1990 have attempted to address most major management  areas. Further, GAO’s reports have noted that the federal government  has often acted as if people were costs to be cut rather than assets to be  valued. In 2001, after a decade of government downsizing and curtailed  investments in human capital, we reported that federal human capital  strategies were not appropriately constituted to adequately meet the  current and emerging needs of the government and the country’s citizens  in the most effective, efficient, and economical manner possible. That  same year, we designated strategic human capital management across  the entire federal government as a high-risk area because of the long- standing lack of leadership in the area and, in part, because critical skill  gaps could undermine agencies’ abilities to accomplish their missions.  While significant progress has been made—for example, through the  various authorities and flexibilities provided to agencies for managing the  federal workforce—the area remains high risk governmentwide because  of a need to develop and implement plans to address current and  emerging critical skill gaps that are undermining agencies’ abilities to  meet their vital missions. The federal government’s current budget and  long-term fiscal pressures underscore the importance of a strategic and  efficient approach to human capital management—an approach that  would help ensure the recruitment and retention of individuals with the  needed critical skills. Specifically, with regard to DOD, our subsequent  work has emphasized that effective planning can enable the department  to have the right people, with the right skills, doing the right jobs, in the  right places, at the right time by making flexible use of its internal  workforce and appropriately using contractors. Particularly as decision  makers consider proposals to reduce the civilian workforce, it will be  critical to DOD’s mission for the department to have the right number of  federal civilian personnel with the right skills.
My testimony today will discuss our observations on (1) DOD’s prior  experience with civilian workforce downsizing, and (2) its current strategic  human capital planning efforts. For this testimony, we relied on our prior  work on a range of governmentwide and human capital-related issues.  We conducted the work supporting our prior reports, which were issued  from March 1992 through June 2012, in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Prior Civilian Workforce Reductions Demonstrate the Importance of Strategic Workforce Planning
paragraphs: GAO’s body of work related to prior workforce reductions at DOD and other  organizations demonstrates the importance of strategic workforce planning,  including a consideration of costs, to help ensure that DOD has a fully  capable workforce to carry out its mission. According to GAO’s Standards  for Internal Control, management should ensure that skill needs are  continually assessed and that the organization is able to obtain a workforce  that has the required skills that match those necessary to achieve  organizational goals. Section 322 of the National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 1991 directed DOD to establish guidelines for reductions in  the number of civilian workers employed by industrial or commercial type  activities. The act also directed certain DOD agencies or components to  submit 5 year master plans for those workers, providing information on  workload, demographics, and employee furloughs and involuntary  separations, with the materials submitted to Congress in support of the  budget request for fiscal year 1991. Subsequently, in 1992, we reported  that DOD intended to undertake a multiyear downsizing effort aimed at  reducing the civilian workforce by nearly 229,000 positions, or to 20 percent  below its fiscal year 1987 levels. However, in 2000, we reported that DOD’s  approach to prior force reductions was not oriented toward shaping the  makeup of the workforce, resulting in significant imbalances in terms of  shape, skills, and retirement eligibility.
GAO, Defense Force Management: Expanded Focus in Monitoring Civilian Force  Reductions Is Needed, GAO/T-NSIAD-92-19 (Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1992); and  Defense Force Management: Challenges Facing DOD as It Continues to Downsize Its  Workforce, GAO/NSIAD-93-123 (Washington, D.C.: February 12, 1993).
Realignment round and the impacts of Operations Desert Shield and  Desert Storm. We concluded that broader assessments were needed to  determine the magnitude of civilian workforce reductions and their  potential impact on given areas and regions, as well as the impact of  hiring constraints on the ability of all DOD civilian organizations to  efficiently and effectively accomplish their missions.
We also have reported that the approaches DOD has relied on to  accomplish past civilian workforce downsizing have sometimes had  unintended consequences, such as workforce skills imbalances. For  instance, DOD’s approach to past civilian downsizing relied primarily on  voluntary attrition and retirements and varying freezes on hiring authority  to achieve force reductions, as well as the use of existing authorities for  early retirements to encourage voluntary separations at activities facing  major reductions-in-force. The National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 1993 authorized a number of transition assistance programs  for civilian employees, including financial separation incentives— ”buyouts”—to induce the voluntary separation of civilian employees.  DOD credited the use of these separation incentives, early retirement  authority, and various job placement opportunities in its avoidance of  nearly 200,000 involuntary demotions and separations. The tools  available to DOD to manage its civilian downsizing helped mitigate some  adverse effects of force reductions. However, DOD’s approach to civilian  workforce reductions was less oriented toward shaping the makeup of the  workforce than was the approach it used to manage its military  downsizing and resulted in significant imbalances in terms of shape,  skills, and retirement eligibility. We also reported that, while managing  force reductions for its uniformed military, DOD followed a policy of trying  to achieve and maintain a degree of balance between its accessions and  losses in order to “shape” its uniformed forces in terms of rank, years of  service, and specialties. In contrast, we did not see as much attention  devoted to planning and managing civilian workforce reductions.
Moreover, the Acquisition 2005 Task Force’s final reportinstance, that this was especially true of the civilian acquisition workforce,  which from September 1989 to September 1999 was reduced by almost  47 percent. This rate of reduction substantially exceeded that of the rest  of the DOD workforce. Eleven consecutive years of downsizing produced  serious imbalances in the skills and experience of the highly talented and  specialized civilian acquisition workforce, putting DOD on the verge of a  retirement-driven talent drain.
Our work on the downsizing conducted by other organizations adds  further perspective on some challenges associated with certain strategies  and the need to conduct effective planning when downsizing a workforce.   of downsizing undertaken by 17 private In 1995, we conducted a review companies, 5 states, and 3 foreign governments, generally selected  because they were reputed to have downsized successfully. We reported  that a number of factors may constrain organizations’ downsizing  strategies, such as public sentiment, budget limitations, legislative  mandates to maintain certain programs, and personnel laws. Moreover,  we found that using attrition as a sole downsizing tool can result in skills  imbalances in an organization’s workforce because the employees who  leave are not necessarily those the organization determined to be excess.  Further, we also found that attrition is often not sufficient to reduce  employment levels in the short term. In addition, some workforce  reduction strategies have been found to slow the hiring, promotion, and  transfer process and create skills imbalances. However, we found that  one key theme emerged from such downsizing efforts. Specifically, most  organizations found that workforce planning had been essential in  identifying positions to be eliminated and pinpointing specific employees  for potential separation. In organizations where planning did not occur or  was not effectively implemented, difficulties arose in the downsizing. For  example, we reported that a lack of effective planning for skills retention  can lead to a loss of critical staff, and that an organization that simply  reduces the number of employees without changing work processes will  likely have staffing growth recur eventually.
We have also identified the potential cost implications of downsizing in  our prior work. In 1995, we reported that the savings realized from  government downsizing efforts are difficult to estimate. Payroll savings  attributed to workforce reductions would not be the amount of actual  savings to the federal government from the personnel reductions because  of other costs associated with such efforts—for example, separation  incentives— or, in the case of reductions-in-force, severance pay. In  addition, the ultimate savings would depend on what happened to the  work previously performed by the eliminated personnel. For example, if  some of the work was contracted out to private companies, contract costs  should be considered in determining whether net savings resulted from  workforce reductions.
In 2001, we concluded that, considering the enormous changes that  DOD’s civilian workforce had undergone and the external pressures and  demands faced by the department, taking a strategic approach to human  capital would be crucial to organizational results. As I will discuss further,  this is no less true today than it was in 2001.
section_title: Opportunities Exist for DOD to Enhance Its Strategic Human Capital Planning
paragraphs: I turn now to opportunities we have identified for DOD to enhance its  strategic human capital planning. Since the end of the Cold War, the  civilian workforce has undergone substantial change, due primarily to  downsizing, base realignments and closures, competitive sourcing  initiatives, and DOD’s changing mission. For example, between fiscal  years 1989 and 2002, DOD’s civilian workforce shrank from 1,075,437 to  670,166—about a 38 percent reduction. According to the department, as  of January 2012, DOD’s total civilian workforce had grown to include  about 783,000 civilians. As I have noted, the achievement of DOD’s  mission is dependent in large part on the skills and expertise of its civilian  workforce, and today’s current and long-term fiscal outlook underscore  the importance of a strategic and efficient approach to human capital  management. The ability of federal agencies to achieve their missions  and carry out their responsibilities depends in large part on whether they  can sustain a workforce that possesses the necessary education,  knowledge, skills, and competencies. Our work has shown that  successful public and private organizations use strategic management  approaches to prepare their workforces to meet present and future  mission requirements. Preparing a strategic human capital plan  encourages agency managers and stakeholders to systematically  consider what is to be done, how it will be done, and how to gauge  progress and results. While the department has made progress adopting  some of these approaches, we remain concerned that some missing key  elements of strategic workforce planning will hinder DOD’s ability to most  effectively and efficiently achieve its mission.
As we have reported in the past, federal agencies have used varying  approaches to develop and present their strategic workforce plans. To  facilitate effective workforce planning, we and the Office of Personnel  Management have identified six leading principles such workforce plans  should incorporate, including: aligning workforce planning with strategic planning and budget   involving managers, employees, and other stakeholders in planning;  identifying critical skills and competencies and analyzing workforce  gaps; employing workforce strategies to fill the gaps; building the capabilities needed to support workforce strategies  through steps to ensure the effective use of human capital flexibilities;  and monitoring and evaluating progress toward achieving workforce  planning and strategic goals.
The application of these principles will vary depending on the particular  circumstances the agency faces. For example, an agency that is faced  with the need for a long lead time to train employees hired to replace  those retiring and an increasing workload may focus its efforts on  estimating and managing retirements. Another agency with a future  workload that could rise or fall sharply may focus on identifying skills to  manage a combined workforce of federal employees and contractors.
Over the past few years, Congress has enacted a number of provisions  requiring DOD to conduct human capital planning efforts for its overall  civilian, senior leader, and acquisition workforces and provided various  tools to help manage the department’s use of contractors, who augment  DOD’s total civilian workforce. For example, the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 directed DOD to create and  periodically update a strategic human capital plan that addressed, among  other things, the existing critical skills and competencies of the civilian  workforce as well as projected needs, gaps in the existing or projected  civilian workforce, and projected workforce trends. Subsequent acts  established additional requirements for the human capital plan, including  requirements to assess issues related to funding of its civilian  workforce.
We have closely monitored DOD’s efforts to address the aforementioned  requirements. In our September 2010 review of DOD’s 2009 update to its  human capital strategic plan we found that, although DOD had  demonstrated some progress in addressing the legislative requirements  related to its Civilian Human Capital Strategic Workforce Plan, several  key elements continued to be missing from the process—including such  elements as competency gap analyses and monitoring of progress. Our  work found that DOD’s plan addressed the requirement to assess critical  skills. Specifically, the overall civilian workforce plan identified 22 mission- critical occupations that, according to the department, represent the  results of its assessment of critical skills. According to DOD, mission- critical occupations are those occupations that are key to current and  future mission requirements, as well as those that present a challenge  regarding recruitment and retention rates and for which succession  planning is needed. Examples of mission-critical occupations include (1)  contracting, (2) accounting, and (3) information technology management.
However, as noted, DOD’s plan lacked such key elements as competency  gap analysis and monitoring of progress. Our prior work identified  competency gap analyses and monitoring progress as two key elements in  the strategic workforce planning process. Competency gap analyses  enable an agency to develop specific strategies to address workforce  needs and monitoring progress demonstrates the contribution of workforce  planning to achieving program goals. For example, at the time of our  review, because the plan discussed competency gap analyses for only 3 of  the 22 mission-critical occupations and did not discuss competency gaps  for the other 19 mission-critical occupations, we determined that the  requirement was only partially addressed. Moreover, DOD was in the initial  stages of assessing competency gaps for its senior leader workforce, but it  had not completed the analysis needed to identify gaps. Without including  analyses of gaps in critical skills and competencies as part of its strategic  workforce planning efforts, DOD and the components may not be able to  design and fund the best strategies to fill their talent needs through  recruiting and hiring or to make appropriate investments to develop and  retain the best possible workforce. Further, DOD leadership may not have  information necessary to make informed decisions about future workforce  reductions, should further reductions to its workforces become necessary.  We currently have ongoing work assessing DOD’s 2010 Strategic  Workforce Plan, which the department released in March 2012. The results  of this review are expected to be released in September 2012.
In light of the challenges DOD has faced in its strategic workforce  planning, we support the department’s participation in efforts being made  across the federal government to address governmentwide critical skills  gaps. Currently, the Office of Personnel Management and DOD are  leading a working group comprised of members of the Chief Human  Capital Officers Council tasked with (1) identifying mission-critical  occupations and functional groups, (2) developing strategies to address  gaps in these occupations and groups, and (3) implementing and  monitoring these strategies.
Our reviews of DOD’s acquisition, information technology, and financial  management workforces—which include a number of DOD’s identified  mission-critical occupations—amplifies some of our overarching  observations related to strategic workforce planning. In fiscal year 2011  alone, DOD obligated about $375 billion to acquire goods and services to  meet its mission and support its operations in the United States and  abroad. As noted, our prior work found that the significant reductions to  the acquisition workforce in the 1990s produced serious imbalances in  the skills and experience of this highly talented and specialized workforce.  The lack of an adequate number of trained acquisition and contract  oversight personnel has, at times, contributed to unmet expectations and  placed DOD at risk of potentially paying more than necessary. Our  February 2011 high-risk report noted that DOD needs to ensure that its  acquisition workforce is adequately sized, trained, and equipped to meet  department needs. We further reported in November 2011 that the  department has focused much-needed attention on rebuilding its  acquisition workforce and made some progress in terms of growing the  workforce, identifying the skills and competencies it needed, and used  such information to help update its training curriculum.
While DOD has acknowledged that rebuilding its acquisition workforce is a  strategic priority, our most recent review of the Defense Acquisition  Workforce Development Fund found that DOD continues to face  challenges in strategic workforce planning for its acquisition workforce.
Specifically, we found that DOD lacks an overarching strategy to clearly  align this fund with its acquisition workforce plan. The department has also  not developed outcome-related metrics, such as the extent to which the  fund is helping DOD address its workforce skills and competencies gaps.  Moreover, we remain concerned that the acquisition workforce continues to  face challenges in terms of the age and retirement eligibility of its members.  According to the most recent reported data from the Federal Acquisition  Institute, as of December 2011, the average age of the acquisition  workforce ranged from 47 years to 51.7 years, with at least 36 percent of  the workforce becoming eligible to retire over the next 10 years.
We have also identified a number of challenges associated with DOD’s  workforce planning for its financial management and information  technology workforces. With regard to the financial management  workforce, we reported in July 2011 that DOD’s financial management  has been on GAO’s high-risk list since 1995 and, despite several reform  initiatives, remains on the list today. Specifically, we noted that effective  financial management in DOD will require a knowledgeable and skilled  workforce that includes individuals who are trained and certified in  accounting. DOD accounting personnel are responsible for accounting for  funds received through congressional appropriations, the sale of goods  and services by working capital fund businesses, revenue generated  through nonappropriated fund activities, and the sales of military systems  and equipment to foreign governments or international organizations.  According to DOD’s fiscal year 2012 budget request, the Defense  Finance and Accounting Service processed approximately 198 million  payment-related transactions and disbursed over $578 billion in fiscal  year 2010. However, we also reported in July 2011 that DOD’s strategic  workforce plan lacked a competency gap analysis for its financial  management workforce, thus limiting the information DOD has on its  needs and gaps in that area and the department’s ability to develop an  effective financial management recruitment, retention, and investment  strategy to address other financial management challenges. With regard  to DOD’s information technology workforce, we reported2011 that, as threats to federal information technology infrastructure and  systems continue to grow in number and sophistication, the ability to  secure these infrastructure and systems will depend on the knowledge,  skills, and abilities of the federal and contractor workforce that  implements and maintains these systems. We noted that DOD’s  information assurance workforce plan—which addresses information  technology—incorporates critical skills, competencies, categories, and  specialties of the information assurance workforce, but only partially  describes strategies to address gaps in human capital approaches and  critical skills competencies.
DOD’s workforce is comprised of military personnel, civilians, and  contractors. DOD has acknowledged, however, that with approximately  30 percent of its workforce eligible to retire by March 31, 2015, and the  need to reduce its reliance on contractors to augment the current  workforce, it faces a number of significant challenges. Our September  2010 review of DOD’s strategic workforce plan found that the department  had issued a directive stating that missions should be accomplished using  the least costly mix of personnel (military, civilian, and contractors)  consistent with military requirements and other needs. However, the  department’s workforce plan did not provide an assessment of the  appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel capabilities.   accompanying a proposed bill for the  More recently, the House Report National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 directs GAO to  assess what measures DOD is taking to appropriately balance its current  and future workforce structure against its requirements. Specifically, we  plan for our review to include: (1) the process by which DOD identified its  civilian workforce requirements, taking into consideration the withdrawal  from Iraq and impending withdrawal from Afghanistan; and (2) the  analysis done by DOD to identify core or critical functions, including which  of those functions would be most appropriately performed by military,  civilian, or contractor personnel. Our report is due to the Armed Services  Committees of the House and Senate by March 15, 2013.
H.R. Rep. No. 112-479, at 196-197 (2012), which accompanies H.R. 4310, 112th Cong.  (2012).
In conclusion, DOD has a large, diverse federal civilian workforce that is  key to maintaining our national security. However, as we have noted,  DOD’s workforce also includes military and contractor personnel and  changes made to one of these groups may impact the others. As such,  we are currently assessing the measures the department is taking to  appropriately balance its current and future workforce structure and its  requirements.
Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, this concludes my prepared  remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you or other  Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For future questions about this statement, please contact Brenda S.  Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, at   (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. In addition, contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to  this statement include Margaret Best, Assistant Director; Spencer Tacktill;  Jennifer Weber; Erik Wilkins-McKee; Nicole Willems; and John Van  Schaik. In addition, Penny Berrier, Mark Bird, Timothy DiNapoli, Gayle  Fischer, Steven Lozano, Belva Martin, Carol Petersen, and Rebecca  Shea made contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisition Workforce: Improved Processes, Guidance, and  Planning Needed to Enhance Use of Workforce Funds. GAO-12-747R.  Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2012.
Defense Acquisitions: Further Actions Needed to Improve Accountability  for DOD’s Inventory of Contracted Services. GAO-12-357. Washington,  D.C.: April 6, 2012.
Defense Workforce: DOD Needs to Better Oversee In-sourcing Data and  Align In-sourcing Efforts with Strategic Workforce Plans. GAO-12-319.  Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2012.
Streamlining Government: Key Practices from Select Efficiency Initiatives  Should Be Shared Governmentwide. GAO-11-908. Washington, D.C.:  September 30, 2011.
DOD Financial Management: Numerous Challenges Must Be Addressed  to Improve Reliability of Financial Information. GAO-11-835T.  Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2011.
DOD Civilian Personnel: Competency Gap Analyses and Other Actions  Needed to Enhance DOD’s Strategic Workforce Plans. GAO-11-827T.  Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2011.
High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.:   February 16, 2011.
Human Capital: Further Actions Needed to Enhance DOD’s Civilian  Strategic Workforce Plan. GAO-10-814R. Washington, D.C.:   September 27, 2010.
Workforce Planning: Interior, EPA, and the Forest Service Should  Strengthen Linkages to Their Strategic Plans and Improve Evaluation.  GAO-10-413. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2010.
Human Capital: Opportunities Exist to Build on Recent Progress to  Strengthen DOD’s Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan. GAO-09-235.  Washington, D.C.: February 10, 2009.
High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.:   January 31, 2007.
Human Capital: Agencies Are Using Buyouts and Early Outs with  Increasing Frequency to Help Reshape Their Workforces. GAO-06-324.  Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.
DOD Civilian Personnel: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce Plans  Needed. GAO-04-753. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Human Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at the Departments of  Defense and State. GAO-01-565T. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2001.
High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-01-263. Washington, D.C.:   January 1, 2001.
Human Capital: Strategic Approach Should Guide DOD Civilian  Workforce Management. GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-00-120. Washington, D.C.:  March 9, 2000.
Human Capital: A Self Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders.  GAO/GGD-99-179. Washington, D.C.: September 1999.
Acquisition Management: Workforce Reductions and Contractor  Oversight. GAO/NSIAD-98-127. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 1998.
Workforce Reductions: Downsizing Strategies Used in Select  Organizations. GAO/GGD-95-54. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 1995.
Defense Civilian Downsizing: Challenges Remain Even With Availability  of Financial Separation Incentives. GAO/NSIAD-93-194. Washington,  D.C.: May 14, 1993.
Defense Force Management: Challenges Facing DOD As It Continues to  Downsize Its Civilian Workforce. GAO/NSIAD-93-123. Washington, D.C.:  February 12, 1993.
Defense Force Management: Expanded Focus in Monitoring Civilian  Force Reductions Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-92-19. Washington, D.C.:  March 18, 1992.
Defense Force Management: DOD Management of Civilian Force  Reductions. GAO/T-NSIAD-92-10. Washington, D.C.: February 20, 1992.
Defense Force Management: Limited Baseline for Monitoring Civilian  Force Reductions. GAO/NSIAD-92-42. Washington, D.C.:   February 5, 1992.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.