Troubled Asset Relief Program: Actions Needed by Treasury to Address Challenges in Implementing Making Home Affordable Programs
Published: 2011-03-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony discusses our work on the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program, including the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). Since the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) first announced the framework for its MHA program over 2 years ago, the number of homeowners facing potential foreclosure has remained at historically high levels. HAMP, the key component of MHA, provides financial incentives to servicers and mortgage holders/investors to offer modifications on first-lien mortgages. The modifications are intended to reduce borrowers' monthly mortgage payments to affordable levels to help these homeowners avoid foreclosure and keep their homes. Since HAMP's inception, concerns have been raised that the program is not reaching the expected number of homeowners. In two prior reports, we looked at the implementation of the HAMP first-lien modification program, noted that Treasury faced challenges in implementing it, and made several recommendations intended to address these challenges. In addition, our ongoing work examines the extent to which additional MHA programs have been successful at reaching struggling homeowners, the characteristics of homeowners who have been assisted by the HAMP first-lien modification program, and the outcomes for borrowers who do not complete HAMP trial or permanent modifications. These programs include the Second-Lien Modification Program (2MP) for those whose first liens have been modified under HAMP, the Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) program for those who are not successful in HAMP modifications, and the Principal Reduction Alternatives (PRA) program for borrowers who owe more on their mortgages than the value of their homes. This testimony is based on the report on HAMP that we issued in June 2010, as well as on preliminary observations from our ongoing work. Specifically, this statement focuses on (1) the extent to which HAMP servicers have treated borrowers consistently and the actions that Treasury and its financial agents have taken to ensure consistent treatment; (2) the status of Treasury's second-lien modification, foreclosure alternatives, and principal reduction programs; (3) the characteristics of borrowers who received HAMP modifications; and (4) outcomes for borrowers who are denied or fall out of HAMP trial or permanent first-lien modifications.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In June 2010, we reported on several inconsistencies in the way servicers treated borrowers under HAMP that could lead to inequitable treatment of similarly situated borrowers. These inconsistencies involved how servicers solicited borrowers for the program, how they evaluated borrowers who were not yet 60 days delinquent on their mortgage payments, and how they handled borrower complaints. In addition, we noted that while Treasury had taken some steps to ensure servicer compliance with program guidance, it had not yet finalized consequences for servicer noncompliance. We made eight recommendations to improve the transparency and accountability of HAMP in June 2010. Treasury stated that it intended to implement some of the recommendations, but little action has been taken to date. Further, as part of our ongoing work, we identified several implementation challenges that had slowed implementation of newer MHA programs, specifically 2MP, HAFA, and the Principal Reduction Alternative (PRA). For example, we found that servicers experienced difficulties in using a required database to identify borrowers who might be eligible for 2MP, contributing to a slow start for this program. We found that borrowers who were in HAMP trial or permanent modifications tended to share certain characteristics, such as reduced income and having high debt levels, and that those who were canceled from trial modifications or redefaulted from permanent modifications tended to be further into delinquency at the time of their modifications. Lastly, we found that many borrowers who were denied or fell out of HAMP modifications had been able to avoid foreclosure to date. But weaknesses in how Treasury reports the disposition paths, or outcomes, for these borrowers make it difficult to understand exactly what has happened to these homeowners.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the Making Home  Affordable (MHA) program, including the Home Affordable Modification  Program (HAMP). Since the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) first  announced the framework for its MHA program over 2 years ago, the  number of homeowners facing potential foreclosure has remained at  historically high levels. HAMP, the key component of MHA, provides  financial incentives to servicers and mortgage holders/investors to offer  modifications on first-lien mortgages. The modifications are intended to  reduce borrowers’ monthly mortgage payments to affordable levels to help  these homeowners avoid foreclosure and keep their homes.
Since HAMP’s inception, concerns have been raised that the program is  not reaching the expected number of homeowners. In two prior reports,  we looked at the implementation of the HAMP first-lien modification  program, noted that Treasury faced challenges in implementing it, and  made several recommendations intended to address these challenges. In  addition, our ongoing work examines the extent to which additional MHA  programs have been successful at reaching struggling homeowners, the  characteristics of homeowners who have been assisted by the HAMP first- lien modification program, and the outcomes for borrowers who do not  complete HAMP trial or permanent modifications. These programs include  the Second-Lien Modification Program (2MP) for those whose first liens  have been modified under HAMP, the Home Affordable Foreclosure  Alternatives (HAFA) program for those who are not successful in HAMP  modifications, and the Principal Reduction Alternatives (PRA) program for  borrowers who owe more on their mortgages than the value of their  homes.
My statement is based on the report on HAMP that we issued in June 2010,  as well as on preliminary observations from our ongoing work.  Specifically, this statement focuses on (1) the extent to which HAMP  servicers have treated borrowers consistently and the actions that  Treasury and its financial agents have taken to ensure consistent  treatment; (2) the status of Treasury’s second-lien modification,  foreclosure alternatives, and principal reduction programs; (3) the  characteristics of borrowers who received HAMP modifications; and (4)  outcomes for borrowers who are denied or fall out of HAMP trial or  permanent first-lien modifications.
To examine these questions, we spoke with and obtained information from  10 HAMP servicers of various sizes who collectively had been designated  71 percent of the TARP funds allocated to participating servicers. We  visited 6 of them for our June 2010 report. In addition, for our ongoing  work, we spoke with and obtained data from 6 large MHA-participating  servicers. We reviewed HAMP program documentation issued by Treasury,  including supplemental directives for the first-lien program and  announcements of new TARP-funded homeowner assistance programs. To  determine the key elements needed to ensure program stability and  adequate program management, we compared documents obtained from  Treasury regarding HAMP program governance and internal controls to  the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and the  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. We also  analyzed loan-level data from Treasury’s HAMP database, which included  data reported by servicers on borrowers evaluated for HAMP participation  through September 30, 2010, to analyze the characteristics of borrowers  who received HAMP modifications, were canceled from HAMP trial  modifications, or redefaulted from permanent HAMP modifications. We  coordinated our work with other TARP oversight entities, including the  Congressional Oversight Panel, the Office of the Special Inspector General  for TARP (SIGTARP), and the Financial Stability Oversight Board.
The work on which this testimony is based was performed in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In March 2009, Treasury issued the first HAMP guidelines for modifying  first-lien mortgages in an effort to help homeowners avoid foreclosure.  The goal of the first-lien mortgage modification program is to reduce  struggling homeowners’ mortgage payments to more affordable levels— specifically to 31 percent of the borrower’s income. To reduce mortgage  payments, servicers may modify the loan by lowering the interest rate,  extending the amortization period, or forbearing principal. According to  Treasury officials, the program was intended to offer reduced monthly  payments to up to 3 to 4 million homeowners.
Through December 2010, there were a total of 143 active servicers under  the TARP-funded portion of HAMP. Through December 2010, over 1.7  million HAMP trial modifications had been offered to borrowers, nearly  1.5 million of which had begun HAMP trial modifications. Of the trial  modifications begun, approximately 152,000 were active trial  modifications, and roughly 522,000 were active permanent modifications.  Approximately 735,000 trial modifications and around 58,000 permanent  modifications had been canceled (fig. 1). As of December 31, 2010, $1  billion in TARP funds had been disbursed for TARP-funded housing  programs, of which roughly $840 million was disbursed to servicers for  HAMP-related activity. Most of the disbursements to date have been made  for the first-lien modification program.
In addition to first-lien modifications, Treasury has announced a number  of TARP-funded housing programs, including those for modifying second  liens held by borrowers with first-lien modifications under HAMP,  reducing principal, offering temporary forbearance for unemployed  borrowers, and providing alternatives to foreclosure (see table 1). At the  current time, with the exception of the Housing Finance Agency (HFA)  Hardest-Hit Fund, the cutoff date for borrowers to be accepted into TARP- funded programs is December 31, 2012, and disbursements of TARP funds  may continue until December 2017.
section_title: Servicers Have Been Inconsistent in Soliciting and Evaluating HAMP Borrowers and More Treasury Action Is Needed to Ensure Equitable Treatment of Borrowers with Similar Circumstances
paragraphs: Although one of Treasury’s stated goals for HAMP is to standardize the  loan modification process across the servicing industry, in our June 2010  report, we identified several inconsistencies in the way servicers treated  borrowers under HAMP that could lead to inequitable treatment of  similarly situated borrowers. First, because Treasury did not issue  guidelines for soliciting borrowers for HAMP until a year after announcing  the program, the servicers we contacted solicited borrowers differently. A  few solicited those who were 31 days delinquent on their payments, but  other servicers waited until borrowers were at least 60 days delinquent.  We also noted that many borrowers had complained they did not receive  timely responses to their HAMP applications and had difficulty obtaining  information about the program. In March 2010, Treasury issued guidelines  to address some of the issues related to communicating with borrowers  about the program, and said it planned to monitor servicers’ compliance  with the guidelines.
Second, Treasury’s lack of specific guidelines for determining HAMP  eligibility for borrowers current or less than 60 days delinquent, but in  imminent danger of defaulting has led to inconsistencies in how servicers  evaluate them. The 10 servicers who GAO contacted reported seven  different sets of criteria for determining imminent default. Two servicers  considered borrowers in imminent default if they met basic HAMP  eligibility requirements, but other servicers had additional criteria, such as  requiring that a hardship situation has existed for more than 1 year.  Treasury’s goal was to create uniform, clear, and consistent guidance for  loan modifications across the servicing industry, but these differences may  result in one borrower’s being approved for HAMP and another borrower  with the same financial situation and loan terms being denied by a  different servicer. We recommended that Treasury establish clear, specific  criteria for determining whether a borrower was in imminent default to  ensure greater consistency across servicers. However, Treasury believes  the impact of these variations on borrowers is inconsequential and has  declined to implement this recommendation. We continue to believe that  further actions are warranted.
In addition, Treasury has not clearly informed borrowers that they can use  the HOPE Hotline to raise concerns about servicers’ handling of HAMP  loan modifications and to challenge potentially incorrect denials, likely  limiting the number of borrowers who have used the hotline for these  purposes. The HOPE Hotline also has procedures for referring borrowers  who need additional assistance to the Making Home Affordable Escalation  Team. However, it is unclear whether borrowers are aware of and using  the HOPE Hotline to raise concerns about their servicers and challenge  potentially incorrect denials. We recommended that Treasury (1) more  clearly inform borrowers that the HOPE Hotline may also be used for  these purposes and (2) monitor the effectiveness of the HOPE Hotline as a  process for handling borrower concerns.
Finally, Treasury has taken some steps to ensure that servicers comply  with HAMP program requirements, but has yet to establish specific  remedies for noncompliance with HAMP guidelines. For instance, the  HAMP servicer participation agreement describes actions that could be  taken in response to noncompliance and the HAMP Compliance  Committee monitors servicers’ performance and activities. But without  standardized remedies for noncompliance, Treasury risks treating servicer  noncompliance inconsistently and its methods of responding to incidents  of noncompliance lack transparency. In our June 2010 report, we  recommended that Treasury finalize and expeditiously issue consequences  for servicers who do not comply with HAMP requirements. We made eight  recommendations to improve the transparency and accountability of  HAMP in June 2010. Treasury stated that it intended to implement some of  the recommendations, but little action has been taken to date.
section_title: Implementation Challenges Have Affected the Progress of Treasury’s Newer Housing Programs
paragraphs: The implementation of Treasury’s 2MP, HAFA, and PRA programs has  been slow, and limited activity has been reported to date. This slow pace is  attributed in part to several implementation challenges, including the  following.
Difficulty matching first and second liens for 2MP. Because eligibility for  2MP required a first-lien HAMP modification, Treasury contracted with a  database vendor to provide data on existing second liens that  corresponded with these modifications. However, the servicers we  contacted noted that even differences in the spelling of addresses—for  example, in abbreviations or spacing—could prevent an accurate  identification. Initial 2MP guidelines stated that servicers could not offer a  second-lien modification without confirming a match with the database  vendor, even if they had serviced both first and second liens on the same  property. In November 2010, Treasury provided updated program  guidance that allowed servicers to offer a 2MP modification if they could  identify a first- and second-lien match within their own portfolio or had  evidence that a corresponding first lien existed, even if the database had  not identified it.
Extensive program requirements for HAFA. All six of the large MHA  servicers we spoke with identified extensive program requirements as  reasons for the slow implementation of HAFA, including the initial  requirement that applicants first be evaluated for a HAMP first-lien  modification. Because of this requirement, potential HAFA borrowers had  to submit extensive income and other documentation required for a  modification, even if they simply wanted to sell. In cases where a borrower  had already identified a potential buyer before executing a short-sale  agreement with the servicer, the additional time required for a HAMP first- lien evaluation may have dissuaded the buyer from purchasing the  property. Restrictive short-sale requirements and a requirement that  mortgage insurers waive certain rights may have also contributed to the  limited activity under HAFA. Servicers said that given these requirements,  they did not expect HAFA to increase their overall number of short sales  and deeds-in-lieu. In response to this concern, Treasury released updated  HAFA guidance on December 28, 2010, to no longer require servicers to  document and verify a borrower’s financial information to be eligible for  HAFA.
Voluntary nature of the PRA program. Treasury officials told us that 13 of  the 20 largest MHA servicers were planning to offer principal reduction to  some extent, but some servicers we spoke with said they would limit the  conditions under which they would offer principal forgiveness under PRA.  Treasury’s PRA guidelines require all servicers participating in HAMP to  consider principal forgiveness for HAMP-eligible borrowers with mark-to- market loan-to-value ratios (LTV) greater than 115 percent. But servicers  are not required to offer principal reduction, even if the net present value  (NPV) is higher when principal is forgiven. For example, one servicer had  developed a “second look” process that used internal estimates of default  rates to determine NPV and did not forgive principal unless these  estimates—not those calculated using program guidelines—indicated a  higher NPV with forgiveness. As a result, only 15 to 25 percent of those  who otherwise would have received principal forgiveness received it,  according to this servicer. We recommended in June 2010 that Treasury  report activity under PRA, including the extent to which servicers  determined that principal reduction was beneficial to mortgage investors  but did not offer it, to ensure transparency in the implementation of this  program. Treasury officials told us they would report PRA activity at the  servicer level once the data were available. We plan to continue to monitor  Treasury’s reporting of PRA and other TARP-funded housing programs.
In addition, we found that Treasury could do more to build on the lessons  learned from its first-lien modification program. For example, we  previously reported that Treasury had not sufficiently assessed the  capacity of servicers to implement the first-lien program. More recently,  we observed that Treasury has not obtained all required documentation to  demonstrate that servicers have the capacity to successfully implement  the newer programs. According to Treasury, Fannie Mae has conducted  program-specific readiness reviews for the top-20 large servicers for 2MP,  HAFA, and PRA, including all 17 servicers participating in 2MP. These  reviews assess servicers’ operational readiness, including the development  of key controls to support new programs, technology readiness, training  readiness, staffing resources, and program processes and documentation.  According to Treasury’s summary of these reviews, of those that had  completed reviews, 4 had provided all required documents for HAFA, and  3 had provided all required documents for PRA. None of the servicers  provided all required documents for 2MP. As a result, servicers’ ability to  effectively offer troubled homeowners second-lien modifications,  foreclosure alternatives, and principal reductions is unclear. Further,  Treasury has not implemented our June 2010 recommendation that it  establish goals and effective performance measures for these programs,  nor has it said how it will use any assessments to hold servicers  accountable for their performance. Treasury also has not established  actions it will take in cases where individual servicers are not performing  as expected in these programs. As we noted in June 2010, without  performance measures and goals, Treasury will not be able to effectively  assess the outcomes of these programs.
section_title: HAMP Borrowers Shared Several Characteristics, Including Reduced Income; Early Data Indicate that Borrowers Who Redefaulted from Permanent Modifications Were Further Into Delinquency
paragraphs: Our analysis of HAMP data for borrowers in trial and permanent  modifications indicated that over half of borrowers cited curtailed income,  such as reduced pay, as the primary reason for needing to lower their  mortgage payments (56 percent of borrowers in active modifications and  53 percent in trial modifications). However, only 5 percent of borrowers in  each of these groups cited unemployment as their primary reason for  financial hardship. Borrowers also had high levels of debt prior to  modification with monthly mortgage payments that were 45 and 46  percent of gross monthly income, respectively, and total debt levels of 72  and 76 percent of gross monthly income, respectively. Even after  modification, these borrowers continued to have high debt levels (median  back-end DTI ratios of 55 and 57 percent for those in trial and permanent  modifications, respectively). In addition, borrowers in trial and permanent  modifications tended to be “underwater,” with median mark-to-market  LTV ratios of 123 percent and 128 percent, respectively.
Borrowers who were either canceled from a trial modification or  redefaulted from a permanent one shared several of these characteristics,  including having high debt levels and being “underwater” on their  mortgages. However, some characteristics appeared to increase the  likelihood that a borrower would be canceled from a trial modification.  For example, borrowers who received a trial modification based on stated  income were 52 percent more likely to be canceled from trial  modifications than those who started a trial modification based on  documented income. In some cases, borrowers who received trial  modifications based on stated income were not able to or failed to provide  proof of their income or other information for conversion to permanent  modification. In other cases, borrowers may have submitted the required  documentation but the servicer lost the documents. In addition, borrowers  who were 60 or 90 days or more delinquent at the time of their trial  modifications were 6 and 9 percent more likely to have trial modifications  canceled, respectively, compared with borrowers who were not yet  delinquent at the time of their trial modifications. Treasury has  acknowledged the importance of reaching borrowers before they are  seriously delinquent by requiring servicers to evaluate borrowers still  current on their mortgages for imminent default. But, as we noted in June  2010, this group of borrowers may be defined differently by different  servicers.
Borrowers who had high mark-to-market LTV ratios (from 120 to 140  percent) were 7 percent less likely to be canceled from trial modifications  than those with mark-to-market LTV ratios at or below 80 percent, and  those with a mark-to-market LTV ratio of more than 140 percent were 8  percent less likely to be canceled. Borrowers who received principal  forgiveness of between 1 and 50 percent of their total loan balance were  less likely to be canceled from trial modifications compared with those  who did not receive principal forgiveness. In addition, larger monthly  payment reductions lowered the likelihood that a trial modification would  be canceled. For example, borrowers who received a principal and  interest payment reduction of least 10 percent were less likely to be  canceled from their trial modifications than other borrowers.
Our initial observations of over 15,000 non-GSE borrowers who had  redefaulted from permanent HAMP modifications through September 2010  indicated these borrowers differed from those in active permanent  modifications in several respects. Specifically, non-GSE borrowers who  redefaulted on their HAMP permanent modifications tended to have higher  levels of delinquency at the time they were evaluated for a trial  modification (median delinquency of 8 months compared to 5 months for  those still in active permanent modifications), lower credit scores, and  lower median percentage of payment reduction compared with those who  were still current in their permanent modifications (24 percent compared  with 33 percent). These borrowers may have received smaller reductions  in their payments because they had lower debt levels before modification  than borrowers who did not redefault.
section_title: Most Borrowers Denied or Canceled from Trial Modifications Have Avoided Foreclosure to Date, but Limits to Treasury’s Data Make Understanding Their Outcomes Difficult
paragraphs: We requested data from six servicers on the outcomes of borrowers who  (1) were denied a HAMP trial modification, (2) had their trial modification  canceled, or (3) redefaulted from a HAMP permanent modification.  According to the data we received, of the about 1.9 million GSE and non- GSE borrowers who were evaluated for a HAMP modification by these  servicers as of August 31, 2010, 38 percent had been denied a HAMP trial  modification, 27 percent had seen their HAMP trial modifications  canceled, and 1 percent had redefaulted from a HAMP permanent  modification.
According to these servicers’ data, borrowers who were denied HAMP trial  modifications were more likely to become current on their mortgages  without any additional help from the servicer (39 percent) than to have  any other outcome. Of those borrowers who were canceled from a HAMP  trial modification, servicers often initiated actions that could result in the  borrower retaining the home. Specifically, 41 percent of these borrowers  had received or were in the process of receiving a permanent proprietary  modification, and 16 percent had received or were in the process of  receiving a payment plan. However, servicers started foreclosure  proceedings on 27 percent of borrowers at some point after the HAMP trial  modification was canceled, but only 4 percent of these borrowers  completed foreclosure. Compared with borrowers who were denied,  borrowers who had a HAMP trial modification canceled were less likely to  become current on their mortgages (15 percent) or to pay off their loan (4  percent).
Finally, though data are limited, of the borrowers who redefaulted from a  HAMP permanent modification, almost half were reflected in categories  other than proprietary modification, payment plan, becoming current,  foreclosure alternative, foreclosure, or loan payoff. Twenty-eight percent  of borrowers who redefaulted from permanent modifications were  referred for foreclosure at some point after redefaulting, but, like  borrowers denied or canceled from a HAMP trial modification, the  percentage of borrowers who completed foreclosure remained low  relative to other outcomes (less than 1 percent). Unlike borrowers who  were denied or canceled, borrowers who redefaulted were less likely to  receive or be in the process for receiving a permanent proprietary  modification or payment plan after redefaulting, with 27 percent of  borrowers receiving or in the process for receiving one of the outcomes. In  addition, less than 1 percent of borrowers who redefaulted had become  current as of August 31, 2010.
We also looked at data that Treasury had begun reporting on the  disposition paths of borrowers who were denied or canceled from HAMP  trial modifications. However, weaknesses in how Treasury requires  servicers to report data make it difficult to understand the current status  of these borrowers. First, Treasury’s system for reporting the disposition  of borrowers requires servicers to place borrowers in only one category,  even when borrowers are being evaluated for several possible  dispositions, with non-HAMP (proprietary) modifications reported first. As  a result, the proportion of borrowers reported as receiving proprietary  modifications is likely to be overstated relative to other possible  dispositions, such as foreclosure starts. Further, Treasury does not require  servicers to distinguish between completed and pending actions, so some  reported outcomes may not be clear. For example, we asked six large  servicers to separate borrowers who had a HAMP trial modification  canceled into two groups: those who were being evaluated for permanent  proprietary modifications and those who had actually received them. The  servicers’ data indicated that 23 percent of these borrowers were in the  process of being approved for proprietary modifications, and 18 percent  had received one. At the same time, Treasury reported that 43 percent of  borrowers canceled from a HAMP trial modification through August 2010  were in the process of obtaining a proprietary modification.
Servicers told us they had been able to offer more proprietary  modifications than HAMP permanent modifications because proprietary  modifications offered greater flexibility. For example, several servicers  told us that their proprietary modification programs had fewer  documentation requirements. Several servicers told us they were able to  offer more proprietary modifications than HAMP modifications or help  borrowers when HAMP could not because their proprietary modifications  had fewer eligibility requirements, such as restrictions on occupancy type.  In addition, while HAMP guidelines require borrowers to have a mortgage  payment exceeding 31 percent of their income, all of the servicers we  spoke with indicated their proprietary modification programs also served  borrowers who had lower payment ratios. While the number of proprietary  modifications has outpaced the number of HAMP modifications, the  sustainability of both types of modifications is still unclear. For example,  proprietary modifications may not reduce monthly mortgage payments as  much as HAMP modifications, potentially affecting the ability of  borrowers to maintain their modified payments.
In summary, we reported in June 2010 that it would be important for  Treasury to expeditiously implement a prudent design for the remaining  TARP-funded housing programs. Our current work shows there is more  Treasury can do to ensure the effective implementation of these programs,  including ensuring that servicers have sufficient capacity to implement  them, and that borrowers are notified about potential eligibility for  second-lien modifications. We also believe it will be important for  Treasury to have clear and accurate information on the dispositions of  borrowers who are denied or fall out from HAMP modifications. Without  accurate reporting of borrower outcomes, Treasury cannot know the  actual extent to which borrowers who are denied, canceled, or redefaulted  from HAMP are helped by other programs or evaluate the need for further  action to assist this group of homeowners. We provided a copy of our  current draft report to Treasury for its review and comment. Treasury  acknowledged the report’s description of servicers’ challenges and  appreciated our assessment of Treasury’s housing programs. Treasury  indicated that the draft report raised certain criticisms of the design and  implementation of MHA that were unwarranted. We continue to believe  there are opportunities to improve the transparency, accountability, and  effectiveness of MHA and anticipating the report this month, in March  2011. We will continue to monitor Treasury’s implementation and  management of TARP-funded housing programs as part of our ongoing  oversight of the performance of TARP in meeting its legislative goals. We  are also conducting a broad-based study of the federal government’s  efforts to mitigate the impact of foreclosures, which will include an  assessment of how federal foreclosure mitigation efforts or alternatives  might better preserve homeownership, prevent avoidable foreclosures,  and otherwise help resolve troubled mortgages.
Chairman Biggert, Ranking Member Gutierrez, and Members of the  Subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss this important  program and would be happy to answer any questions that you may have.  Thank you.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For information on this testimony, please contact me at   (202) 512-8678 or sciremj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. GAO staff who made major contributions to this  statement include Lynda Downing, Harry Medina, John Karikari (Lead  Assistant Directors); Tania Calhoun; Emily Chalmers; William Chatlos;  Grace Cho; Rachel DeMarcus; Marc Molino; Mary Osorno; Jared Sippel;  Winnie Tsen; Jim Vitarello; and Heneng Yu.
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