Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
Published: 2008-07-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In April 2005, a Presidential Directive established the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within the Department of Homeland Security to enhance and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear smuggling domestically and abroad. DNDO was directed to develop, in coordination with the departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and State (State), an enhanced global nuclear detection architecture--an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities. DNDO implements the domestic portion of the architecture, while DOD, DOE, and State are responsible for related programs outside the U.S. This testimony provides preliminary observations based on ongoing work addressing (1) the status of DNDO's efforts to develop a global nuclear detection architecture, (2) the challenges DNDO and other federal agencies face in implementing the architecture, and (3) the costs of the programs that constitute the architecture. This statement draws on prior GAO reviews of programs constituting the architecture, and GAO's work on strategic planning
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: According to GAO's preliminary work to date, DNDO has taken steps to develop a global nuclear detection architecture but lacks an overarching strategic plan to help guide how it will achieve a more comprehensive architecture. Specifically, DNDO has developed an initial architecture after coordinating with DOD, DOE, and State to identify 74 federal programs that combat smuggling of nuclear or radiological material. DNDO has also identified gaps in the architecture, such as land border crossings into the United States between formal points of entry, small maritime vessels, and international general aviation. Although DNDO has started to develop programs to address these gaps, it has not yet developed an overarching strategic plan to guide its transition from the initial architecture to a more comprehensive architecture. For example, such a plan would define across the entire architecture how DNDO would achieve and monitor its goal of detecting the movement of radiological and nuclear materials through potential smuggling routes, such as small maritime craft or land borders in between points of entry. The plan would also define the steps and resources needed to achieve a more comprehensive architecture and provide metrics for measuring progress toward goals. DNDO and other federal agencies face a number of coordination, technological, and management challenges. First, prior GAO reports have demonstrated that U.S.-funded radiological detection programs overseas have proven problematic to implement and sustain and have not been effectively coordinated, although there have been some improvements in this area. Second, detection technology has limitations and cannot detect and identify all radiological and nuclear materials. For example, smugglers may be able to effectively mask or shield radiological materials so that it evades detection. Third, DNDO faces challenges in managing implementation of the architecture. DNDO has been charged with developing an architecture that depends on programs implemented by other agencies. This responsibility poses a challenge for DNDO in ensuring that the individual programs within the global architecture are effectively integrated and coordinated to maximize the detection and interdiction of radiological or nuclear material. According to DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted in fiscal year 2007 for the 74 programs included in the global nuclear detection architecture. Of this $2.8 billion, $1.1 billion was budgeted for programs to combat nuclear smuggling internationally; $220 million was devoted to programs to support the detection of radiological and nuclear material at the U.S. border; $900 million funded security and detection activities within the United States; and approximately $575 million was used to fund a number of cross-cutting activities. The future costs for DNDO and other federal agencies to address the gaps identified in the initial architecture are not yet known or included in these amounts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our preliminary work for several  members of Congress on the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO)  efforts to develop a global nuclear detection architecture—essentially, an  integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction  activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S.  border, and inside the United States. Preventing terrorists from using  radiological or nuclear material to carry out an attack in the United States  is a top national priority. Since the events of September 11, 2001, there is  heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear materials or  a nuclear weapon into the United States. If terrorists were to carry out  such an attack, the consequences could be devastating to our national  interests.
In April 2005, the President issued a directive establishing DNDO, within  the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to enhance and coordinate  federal, state, and local efforts to prevent radiological and nuclear attacks.  Congress subsequently passed the SAFE Port Act of 2006, which  established DNDO in statute. Among other things, DNDO must develop, in  coordination with the departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and  State (State), an enhanced global nuclear detection architecture. DNDO is  explicitly charged with implementing the domestic portion (at the U.S.  border and within the United States) of the architecture and with  coordinating the nuclear detection efforts of federal, state, and local  governments. It is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and  deploying radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and  other federal agencies. The directive and the SAFE Port Act also  reaffirmed that DOD, DOE, and State are responsible for programs to  combat radiological and nuclear smuggling outside the United States.
Over the past few months, we have been examining the steps that DNDO  has taken to develop a global nuclear detection architecture. Our work is  ongoing and our statement today will provide preliminary observations on  DNDO’s effort. Specifically, our statement will discuss (1) the status of  DNDO’s efforts to develop a global nuclear detection architecture, (2) the  challenges DNDO and the other federal agencies face in implementing the  architecture, and (3) the costs of the current and proposed programs that  constitute the global nuclear detection architecture. We plan to issue our  final report in January 2009.
To begin addressing these objectives, we interviewed officials from DNDO  about steps taken to develop and improve upon the existing architecture.  We reviewed and analyzed documents DNDO used to help create the  baseline, or initial, architecture, as well as studies on gaps identified in the  architecture. We interviewed agency officials from DOD, DOE, and State  who manage programs that are part of the architecture to get their  perspectives on challenges faced in implementing the architecture. In  addition, we interviewed subject matter experts from the academic and  nonprofit sectors, as well as representatives from the International Atomic  Energy Agency (IAEA), to gain their perspective on efforts to develop and  implement the architecture. We have conducted our work to date in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: According to IAEA, between 1993 and 2006, there were 1,080 confirmed  incidents of illicit trafficking and unauthorized activities involving nuclear  and radiological materials worldwide. Eighteen of these cases involved  weapons-usable material—plutonium and highly enriched uranium  (HEU)—that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon. IAEA also  reported that 124 cases involved materials that could be used to produce a  device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (known  as a “dirty bomb”). Past confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking in HEU  and plutonium involved seizures of kilogram quantities of weapons-usable  nuclear material but most have involved very small quantities. In some of  these cases, it is possible that the seized material was a sample of larger  quantities available for illegal purchase. IAEA concluded that these  materials pose a continuous potential security threat to the international  community, including the United States.
Nuclear material could be smuggled into the United States in a variety of  ways: hidden in a car, train or ship; sent through the mail; carried in  personal luggage through an airport; or walked across an unprotected  border. In response to these threats, U.S. agencies, including DHS, DOD,  DOE, and State, implemented programs to combat nuclear smuggling in  foreign countries and the United States. DOD, DOE, and State fund,  manage, and implement the global nuclear detection architecture’s  international programs. Many international detection programs were  operating for several years before DNDO was created. For example, DOE’s  Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program, initiated in 1995,  provides support to the Russian Federation and other countries of concern  to secure nuclear weapons and weapons material that may be at risk of  theft of diversion. In addition, during the 1990s, the United States began  deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the  former Soviet Union. DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program  launched a variety of programs in the early 1990s to help address  proliferation concerns in the former Soviet Union, including helping  secure Russian nuclear weapons. Two other DOD programs have provided  radiation portal monitors, handheld equipment, and radiation detection  training to countries in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.  Similarly, State programs have provided detection equipment and training  to numerous countries. DHS, in conjunction with other federal, state, and  local agencies, is responsible for combating nuclear smuggling in the  United States and has provided radiation detection equipment, including  portal monitors, personal radiation detectors (known as pagers), and  radioactive isotope identifiers at U.S. ports of entry.
All radiation detection devices have limitations in their ability to detect  and identify nuclear material. Detecting attempted nuclear smuggling is  difficult because there are many sources of radiation that are legal and not  harmful when used as intended. These materials can trigger alarms— known as nuisance alarms—that may be indistinguishable in some cases  from alarms that could sound in the event of a true case of nuclear  smuggling. Nuisance alarms can be caused by patients who have recently  had cancer treatments; a wide range of cargo with naturally occurring  radiation (e.g., fertilizer, ceramics, and food products) and legitimate  shipments of radiological sources for use in medicine and industry.
section_title: DNDO Has Begun to Develop Programs to Enhance the Initial Architecture, but It Lacks an Overarching Strategic Plan for Achieving Future Architecture Improvements
paragraphs: In October 2005, a few months after its inception, DNDO completed its  initial inventory of federal programs associated with detecting the illicit  transport of radiological and nuclear materials. As part of this effort,  DNDO defined the architecture’s general approach: a multilayered  detection framework of radiation detection equipment and interdiction  activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S.  border, and inside the United States. DNDO, in collaboration with other  federal agencies, such as DOD, DOE, and State, analyzed the gaps in  current planning and deployment strategies to determine the ability of  individual layers of the architecture to successfully prevent illicit  movement of radiological or nuclear materials or devices. DNDO identified  several gap areas with respect to detecting potential nuclear smuggling,  such as (1) land border crossings into the United States between formal  points of entry, (2) small maritime craft (any vessel less than 300 gross  tons) that enter the United States, and (3) international general aviation.
In November 2006, DNDO completed a more detailed analysis of programs  in the initial architecture. DNDO identified 72 programs across the federal  government that focused on combating radiological and nuclear smuggling  and nuclear security and it discussed these programs in depth by layer.  The analysis also included a discussion of the current and anticipated  budgets associated with each of these programs and each of the layers. In  June 2008, DNDO released the Joint Annual Interagency Review of the  Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. This report provides an updated  analysis of the architecture by layer of defense and a discussion of the 74  programs now associated with each of the layers, as well as an estimate of  the total budgets by layer.
To address the gaps identified in the domestic portions of the architecture,  DNDO has initiated pilot programs to address primary areas of concern or  potential vulnerability. For example:    For the land border in between ports of entry, DNDO and CBP are  studying the feasibility of equipping CBP border patrol agents with  portable radiological and nuclear detection equipment along the U.S.  border.
For small marine vessels, DNDO is working with the Coast Guard to  develop and expand the coverage of radiological and nuclear detection  capabilities that can be specifically applied in a maritime environment.
For international general aviation, DNDO is working with CBP, the  Transportation Security Administration, and other agencies to develop and  implement radiological and nuclear detection capabilities to scan  international general aviation flights to the United States for possible illicit  radiological or nuclear materials.
To date, we have received briefings on each of these programs from  DNDO, but we have not yet fully reviewed how they are being  implemented. We will examine each of these more closely during the  course of our review.
Our preliminary observation is that DNDO’s pilot programs appear to be a  step in the right direction for improving the current architecture. However,  these efforts to address gaps are not being undertaken within the larger  context of an overarching strategic plan. While each agency that has a role  in the architecture may have its own planning documents, DNDO has not  produced an overarching strategic plan that can guide its efforts to  address the gaps and move to a more comprehensive global nuclear  detection architecture. Our past work has discussed the importance of  strategic planning. Specifically, we have reported that strategic plans  should clearly define objectives to be accomplished, identify the roles and  responsibilities for meeting each objective, ensure that the funding  necessary to achieve the objectives is available, and employ monitoring  mechanisms to determine progress and identify needed improvements.  For example, such a plan would define how DNDO will achieve and  monitor the goal of detecting the movement of radiological and nuclear  materials through potential smuggling routes, such as small maritime craft  or land borders in between ports of entry. Moreover, this plan would  include agreed-upon processes and procedures to guide the improvement  of the architecture and coordinate the activities of the participating  agencies.
section_title: DNDO and Other Agencies Face Coordination, Technological, and Management Challenges
paragraphs: DNDO and other agencies face a number of challenges in developing a  global nuclear detection architecture, including (1) coordinating detection  efforts across federal, state, and local agencies and with other nations, (2)  dealing with the limitations of detection technology, and (3) managing the  implementation of the architecture.
subsections: section_title: Federal Agencies Have Experienced Difficulties Coordinating Radiation Detection Efforts
paragraphs: Our past work on key aspects of international and domestic programs that  are part of the architecture have identified a number of weaknesses. In  order for the architecture to be effective, all parts need to be well thought  out, managed, and coordinated. As a chain is only as strong as its weakest  link, limitations in any of the programs that constitute the architecture  may ultimately limit its effectiveness. Specifically, in past work, we have  identified the following difficulties that federal agencies have had  coordinating and implementing radiation detection efforts.
We reported that DOD, DOE, and State had not coordinated their  approaches to enhance other countries’ border crossing. Specifically,  radiation portal monitors that State installed in more than 20 countries are  less sophisticated than those DOD and DOE installed. As a result, some  border crossings where U.S. agencies had installed radiation detection  equipment were more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others. Since  issuing our report, a governmentwide plan encompassing U.S. efforts to  combat nuclear smuggling in other countries has been developed;  duplicative programs have been consolidated; and coordination among the  agencies, although still a concern, has improved.
In 2005, we reported that there is no governmentwide guidance for border  security programs that delineates agencies’ roles and responsibilities,  establishes regular information sharing, and defines procedures for  resolving interagency disputes. In the absence of guidance for  coordination, officials in some agencies questioned other agencies’ roles  and responsibilities.
More recently, in 2008, we found that levels of collaboration between U.S.  and host government officials varied at some seaports participating in  DHS’s Container Security Initiative (CSI). In addition, we identified  hurdles to cooperation between CSI teams and their counterparts in the  host government, such as a host country’s legal restrictions that CBP  officials said prevent CSI teams from observing examinations.
Furthermore, many international nuclear detection programs rely heavily  on the host country to maintain and operate the equipment. We have  reported that in some instances this reliance has been problematic. For  example:    About half of the portal monitors provided to one country in the former  Soviet Union were never installed or were not operational. In additional,  mobile vans equipped with radiation detection equipment furnished by  State have limited usefulness because they cannot operate effectively in  cold climates or are otherwise not suitable for conditions in some  countries.
Once the equipment is deployed, the United States has limited control over  it, as we have previously reported. Specifically, once DOE finishes  installing radiation equipment at a port and passes control of the  equipment to the host government, the United States no longer controls  the equipment’s specific settings or its use by foreign customs officials.  Settings can be changed, which may decreased the probability that the  equipment will detect nuclear material.
Within the U.S. borders, DNDO faces coordination challenges and will  need to ensure that the problems with nuclear detection programs  overseas are not repeated domestically. Many pilot programs DNDO is  developing to address gaps in the architecture will rely heavily on other  agencies to implement them. For example, DNDO is working closely with  the Coast Guard and other federal agencies to implement DNDO’s  maritime initiatives to enhance detection of radiological and nuclear  materials on small vessels. However, maritime jurisdictional  responsibilities and activities are shared among federal, state, regional,  and local governments. As a result, DNDO will need to closely coordinate  activities related to detecting radiological and nuclear materials with these  entities, as well as ensure that users are adequately trained and technical  support is available. DNDO officials told us they are closely coordinating  with other agencies, and our work to assess this coordination is still  underway. We will continue to explore these coordination activities and  challenges as we continue our review.
section_title: Limitations in Detection Technology Hamper the Architecture’s Effectiveness
paragraphs: The ability to detect radiological and nuclear materials is a critical  component of the global nuclear detection architecture; however, current  technology may not able to detect and identify all smuggled radiological  and nuclear materials. In our past work, we found limitations with  radiation detection equipment. For example:  In a report on preventing nuclear smuggling, we found that a cargo  container containing a radioactive source was not detected as it passed  through radiation detection equipment that DOE had installed at a foreign  seaport because the radiation emitted from the container was shielded by  a large amount of scrap metal. Additionally, detecting actual cases of illicit  trafficking in weapons-usable nuclear material is complicated: one of the  materials of greatest concern in terms of proliferation—highly enriched  uranium—is among the most difficult materials to detect because of its  relatively low level of radioactivity.
We reported that current portal monitors deployed at U.S. borders can  detect the presence of radiation but cannot distinguish between harmless  radiological materials, such as ceramic tiles, fertilizer, and bananas, and  dangerous nuclear materials, such as plutonium and uranium. DNDO is  currently testing a new generation of portal monitors. We have raised  continuing concerns about DNDO’s efforts to develop and test these  advanced portal monitors. We currently have additional work underway  examining the current round of testing and expect to report on our  findings in September 2008.
Environmental conditions can affect radiation detection equipment’s  performance and sustainability, as we also have previously reported. For  example, wind disturbances can vibrate the equipment and interfere with  its ability to detect radiation. In addition, sea spray may corrode radiation  detection equipment and its components that are operated in ports or near  water. Its corrosive nature, combined with other conditions such as coral  in the water, can accelerate the degradation of equipment.
It is important to note that radiation detection equipment is only one of the  tools that customs inspectors and border guards must use to combat  nuclear smuggling. Combating nuclear smuggling requires an integrated  approach that includes equipment, proper training, and intelligence  gathering on smuggling operations. In the past, most known interdictions  of weapons-useable nuclear materials have resulted from police  investigations rather than by radiation detection equipment installed at  border crossings.
section_title: DNDO Faces Challenges in Managing the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
paragraphs: The task DNDO has been given—developing an architecture to keep  radiological and nuclear materials from entering the country—is a  complex and large undertaking. DNDO has been charged with developing  an architecture that depends on programs implemented by other agencies.  This lack of control over these programs poses a challenge for DNDO in  ensuring that all individual programs within the global nuclear detection  architecture will be effectively integrated. Moreover, implementing and  sustaining the architecture requires adequate resources and capabilities to  meet needed commitments. However, the majority of the employees in  DNDO’s architecture office are detailees on rotation from other federal  agencies or are contractors. This type of staffing approach allows DNDO  to tap into other agencies’ expertise in radiological and nuclear detection.  However, officials told us that staff turnover may limit the retention and  depth of institutional memory since detailees return to their home  organizations after a relatively short time. In some cases, there have been  delays in filling these vacancies. We will continue to examine this potential  resource challenge as we complete our work.
In spite of these challenges, DNDO’s efforts to develop a global nuclear  detection architecture have yielded some benefits, according to DOD,  DOE, and State officials. For example, an official from the State  Department told us that DNDO is working through State’s Global Initiative  to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to develop model guidelines that other  nations can use to establish their own nuclear detection architectures and  recently sponsored a related workshop. In addition, DOE officials said that  DNDO’s actions have helped broaden their perspective on the deployment  of radiation detection equipment overseas. Previously, the U.S.  government had been more focused on placing fixed detectors at  particular sites, but as a result of DNDO’s efforts to identify gaps in the  global detection network, DOE has begun to work with law enforcement  officials in other countries to improve detection capabilities for the land in  between ports of entry. Finally, DNDO, DOD, DOE, and the Office of the  Director of National Intelligence for Science and Technology are now  formally collaborating on nuclear detection research and development and  they have signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to guide these  efforts. The MOU will integrate research and development programs by,  for example, providing open access to research findings in order to  leverage this knowledge and to reduce conflict between different agency  programs. In addition, the MOU encourages joint funding of programs and  projects and calls on the agencies to coordinate their research and  development plans. In our ongoing work, we will examine DNDO’s  progress in carrying through on these initiatives.
section_title: Approximately $2.8 Billion in Fiscal Year 2007 Funded Programs Associated with Detecting the Transport of Radiological and Nuclear Weapons or Materials
paragraphs: DNDO reported that approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted in fiscal year  2007 for 74 programs focused on preventing and detecting the illicit  transport of radiological or nuclear materials. These programs were  primarily administered by DHS, DOD, DOE, and State and spanned all  layers of the global nuclear detection architecture. Specifically:    $1.1 billion funded 28 programs focused on the international aspects of the    $221 million funded 9 programs to support detection of radiological and  nuclear material at the U.S. border;   $918 million funded 16 programs dedicated to detecting and securing  radiological or nuclear materials within the U.S. borders; and   $577 million funded 34 cross-cutting programs that support many different  layers of the architecture by, for example, research and development or  technical support to users of the detection equipment.
The fiscal year 2007 budget of $2.8 billion will not sustain the architecture  over the long term because additional programs and equipment will be  implemented to address the gaps. For example, this amount does not  include the cost estimates related to acquiring and deploying the next  generation of advanced portal monitors that are currently being tested. In  addition, DNDO is just beginning new efforts to mitigate gaps in the  architecture and budget estimates for these activities are limited. We are in  the process of reviewing this cost information and will provide more  detailed analysis in our final report.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DNDO has been given an important and complex task—develop a global  nuclear detection architecture to combat nuclear smuggling and keep  radiological and nuclear weapons or materials from entering the United  States. This undertaking involves coordinating a vast array of programs  and technological resources that are managed by many different agencies  and span the globe. Since its creation 3 years ago, DNDO has conceptually  mapped the current architecture and identified how it would like the  architecture to evolve in the near term. While DNDO’s vision of a more  comprehensive architecture is laudable, to achieve this goal, it will need to  address a number of key challenges including building close coordination  and cooperation among the various agencies involved and developing and  deploying more advanced radiation detection technology. Although DNDO  has taken some steps to achieve these ends, it has not done so within the  larger context of an overarching strategic plan with clearly established  goals, responsibilities, priorities, resource needs, and mechanisms for  assessing progress along the way. Developing and implementing a global  nuclear detection architecture will likely take several years, cost billions  of dollars, and rely on the expertise and resources of agencies and  programs across the government. Moving forward, DNDO should work  closely with its counterparts within DHS, as well as at other departments,  to develop a comprehensive strategic plan that helps safeguard the  investments made to date, more closely links future goals with the  resources necessary to achieve those goals, and enhance the architecture’s  ability to operate in a more cohesive and integrated fashion.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination  with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary  of State, develop a strategic plan to guide the development of a more  comprehensive global nuclear detection architecture. Such a plan should  (1) clearly define objectives to be accomplished, (2) identify the roles and  responsibilities for meeting each objective, (3) identify the funding  necessary to achieve those objectives, and (4) employ monitoring  mechanisms to determine programmatic progress and identify needed  improvements.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of the information in this testimony to DNDO. DNDO  provided oral comments on the draft, concurred with our  recommendations, and provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. We will continue  our review and plan to issue a report in early 2009. I would be pleased to  answer any questions that you or other Members of the Committee have at  this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512- 3841 or maurerd@gao.gov. Glen Levis, Assistant Director, Elizabeth  Erdmann, Rachel Girshick, Sandra Kerr, and Tommy Williams made key  contributions to this statement. Additional assistance was provided by  Omari Norman and Carol Herrnstadt Shulman. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this statement.
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