Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces' Personnel System Issues
Published: 2010-01-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks raised concerns about the security of Department of Energy's (DOE) sites with weapons-grade nuclear material, known as Category I Special Nuclear Material (SNM). To better protect these sites against attacks, DOE has sought to transform its protective forces protecting SNM into a Tactical Response Force (TRF) with training and capabilities similar to the U.S. military. DOE also has considered whether the current system of separate contracts for protective forces at each site provides sufficiently uniform, high-quality performance across its sites. Section 3124 of PL 110-181, the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, directed GAO to review protective forces at DOE sites that possess Category I SNM. Among other things, GAO (1) analyzed information on the management and compensation of protective forces, (2) examined the implementation of TRF, and (3) assessed DOE's two options to more uniformly manage DOE protective forces.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Over 2000 contractor protective forces provide armed security for DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) at six sites that have long-term missions to store and process Category I SNM. DOE protective forces at each of these sites are covered under separate contracts and collective bargaining agreements between contractors and protective force unions. As a result, the management and compensation--in terms of pay and benefits--of protective forces vary. Sites vary in implementing important TRF requirements such as increasing the tactical skills of protective forces so that they can better "move, shoot, and communicate" as a unit. While one site has focused on implementing TRF requirements since 2004, other sites do not plan to complete TRF implementation until the end of fiscal year 2011. In addition, broader DOE efforts to manage postretirement and pension liabilities for its contractors have raised concerns about a negative impact on retirement eligibility and benefits for protective forces. Specifically, protective force contractors, unions, and DOE security officials are concerned that the implementation of TRF's more rigorous requirements and the current protective forces' personnel systems threaten the ability of protective forces--especially older members--to continue their careers until retirement age. Efforts to more uniformly manage protective forces have focused on either reforming the current contracting approach or creating a federal protective force (federalization). Either approach might provide for managing protective forces more uniformly and could result in effective security if well-managed. Although DOE rejected federalization as an option in 2009 because it believed that the transition would be costly and would yield little, if any, increase in security effectiveness, the department recognized that the current contracting approach could be improved by greater standardization and by addressing personnel system issues. As a result, NNSA began a standardization initiative to centralize procurement of equipment, uniforms, and weapons to achieve cost savings. Under a separate initiative, a DOE study group developed a number of recommendations to enhance protective forces' career longevity and retirement options, but DOE has made limited progress to date in implementing these recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Contractor guard forces, or protective forces, are a key component of  security at Department of Energy (DOE) sites with special nuclear  material (SNM), which the department considers its highest security risk.  This material—including plutonium and highly enriched uranium—is  considered to be Category I when it is weapons grade and in specified  forms (e.g., nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, metals, and  oxides) and quantities. The risks associated with Category I SNM include  theft and the potential for sabotage through the use of a radioactive  dispersal device, also known as a “dirty bomb.” Currently, DOE and its  National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a agency within DOE  responsible for the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear  weapons stockpile, has six contractor-operated sites that possess—and  will possess for the foreseeable future—Category I SNM (sites with  “enduring” missions). The six sites include the Los Alamos National  Laboratory, in Los Alamos, New Mexico; the Y-12 National Security  Complex (Y-12), in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; the Pantex Plant, near Amarillo,  Texas; the Nevada Test Site, outside of Las Vegas, Nevada; the Savannah  River Site, near Aiken, South Carolina; and the Idaho National Laboratory,  near Idaho Falls, Idaho.
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE  embarked on a multifaceted effort to better secure its sites with Category I  SNM against a larger and more sophisticated terrorist threat by changing  policies, such as its Design Basis Threat (DBT)—a classified document  that specifies the potential size and capabilities of adversary forces that  the sites must defend against. Protective forces have been an important  focus of DOE security improvements. Initially, DOE deployed a larger  number of protective force members at its sites. More recently, DOE has  sought to improve the effectiveness of its protective forces by deploying  security technologies, such as sensors capable of detecting adversaries at  long ranges, and through the use of advanced weaponry, such as belt-fed  machine guns and grenade launchers. In addition, DOE has sought to  enhance protective forces’ tactical skills—the ability to move, shoot, and  communicate in a combat environment—through its Tactical Response  Force (TRF) initiative. Among other things, this initiative directed the  development of new training curricula at DOE’s National Training Center,  revised the application of DOE’s existing protective force categories to  emphasize tactical skills, and instituted more rigorous weapons and  physical fitness qualifications for many of DOE’s protective forces.
However, protective force unions have been concerned that the planned  implementation of TRF—with its potentially more demanding  requirements—threatens the ability of protective forces to work until  retirement age. These concerns contributed to a 44-day protective force  strike at the Pantex Plant in 2007. The strike raised broader issues in DOE  and Congress about the continued suitability of DOE’s model for managing  its protective forces. Unionized protective forces can strike when their  collective bargaining agreement ends and strikes may create security  vulnerabilities at DOE’s sites with Category I SNM. In addition, DOE’s  practice of managing its protective forces through separate contracts at  each site could create disparities in protective force performance, pay, and  benefits. A coalition of unions that represent a large number of DOE  protective forces has supported federalizing contractor-operated  protective forces to provide a federal personnel system that better  supports a TRF through standardized pay and retirement benefits. The  coalition noted that DOE’s Office of Secure Transportation’s (OST) federal  agents, who are responsible for transporting Category I SNM among DOE  sites and to military bases and who have a unique federal job  classification, could serve as a template for federalization. In January 2009,  DOE rejected federalization of contractor protective forces on the grounds  that it would be costly and would likely provide little, if any, increase in  security effectiveness. However, a DOE study group, composed of DOE  and union representatives, recently made a number of recommendations  that, while maintaining contractor protective forces, may better balance  protective forces’ concerns over their careers with the need to provide  effective security and control costs.
In this context, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2008 directed us to report on the management of DOE’s protective forces  at its sites with Category I SNM. As agreed with your offices, we (1)  analyzed information on DOE’s protective forces, including their contract  and management structures, responsibilities, number and categories,  training, pay, and benefits; (2) examined the implementation of TRF and  any resulting issues; (3) assessed compliance with the 2005 DBT; (4)  compared relevant characteristics of contractor protective forces with  OST federal agents; (5) reviewed law enforcement duties and capabilities  of protective forces and OST federal agents; and (6) assessed DOE’s  options for more uniformly managing protective forces. The act also  required DOE to submit a report on the management of its protective  forces 90 days after our report is issued.
subsections: section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To obtain information on DOE’s contractor protective forces, we visited  three of the sites with enduring Category I SNM missions—Pantex, the  Savannah River Site, and Los Alamos National Laboratory—and met with  protective force contractors, federal site office officials, and protective  force union representatives at these sites. We selected these sites because  each represented one of the three different types of protective force  contracts currently in place. In addition, we distributed a data collection  instrument to protective force contractors and federal site office officials  at each of these sites and at the other three sites with enduring Category I  SNM missions—Y-12, the Nevada Test Site, and the Idaho National  Laboratory. From this instrument, we received site information about the  protective forces, the status of TRF and DBT implementations, views on  DOE options for managing the protective forces, and the reliability of site  data. We conducted interviews and reviewed documents with NNSA and  DOE’s offices of Environmental Management (EM); Nuclear Energy (NE);  Science. We also met with several organizations within DOE’s Office of  Health, Safety and Security (HSS), including the Office of Policy; the Office  of Independent Oversight, which regularly performs inspections at  Category I SNM sites; and the National Training Center, in Albuquerque,  New Mexico, which is responsible for developing protective force training  curricula and certifying site protective force training instructors and  programs. To obtain comparative information on OST and its federal  agents, we reviewed documents and met with officials from OST  headquarters in Albuquerque, New Mexico. All data collected to describe  contractor protective forces and OST federal agents were current as of  September 30, 2008. To identify and assess options for the more uniform  protective force management through federalization, we met with the  NNSA Service Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and the Office of  Personnel Management (OPM) on cost and job classification of protective  forces. We developed criteria for options for more uniform management  by reviewing past and ongoing DOE protective force and federal agent  studies that HSS, NNSA, and OST provided. We also reviewed documents  and met with officials from the National Council of Security Police, which  is a coalition of unions that represent many of the protective forces at  DOE’s Category I SNM sites.
We conducted our work from April 2008 to January 2010 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards, which require us  to plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to  provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives.
section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOE’s HSS, which is the department’s central security organization, is  responsible for developing the department’s security policies and  overseeing their implementation. Specifically, HSS’s Office of Policy  develops and promulgates orders and policies such as the DBT policy, as  well as manuals such as Manual 470.4-3A, Contractor Protective Forces,  which details protective force’s duties and requirements. Other DOE  organizations with diverse program missions—EM, NE, and NNSA—are  responsible for the six DOE sites in our review with enduring Category I  SNM missions. In accordance with DOE policy, EM, NE, and NNSA must  ensure that each of their sites has a safeguards and security program with  the necessary protections to protect security interests against malevolent  acts such as theft, diversion, sabotage, modification, compromise, or  unauthorized access to nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components,  special nuclear material, or classified information. Each of these DOE  organizations has site offices staffed by federal employees located at or  near each site to oversee day-to-day operations, including security.
The management and operations (M&O) contractors that manage the six  sites we reviewed must develop effective programs to address DOE  security requirements. In particular, each site with Category I SNM must  prepare a Site Safeguards and Security Plan, which is a classified  document that identifies known vulnerabilities, risks, and protection  strategies for the site. The site’s protection measures are developed in  response to site-specific vulnerability assessments and become the basis  for executing and reviewing protection programs. Table 1 highlights some  of the site differences in mission, topography, and size that may dictate the  site-specific protection measures, including the protective forces’ size and  equipment.
Protective forces are one of the key elements in DOE sites’ layered  “defense-in-depth” protective systems. Specific elements vary from site to  site but almost always include, in addition to protective forces,    a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting intruders;    physical barriers, such as fences and antivehicle barriers;    numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers, vehicle  inspection stations, radiation detectors, and metal detectors;    operational security procedures, such as the “two-person” rule—which is  designed to prevent only one person from having access to SNM ; and    hardened facilities and storage vaults to protect SNM from unauthorized  access.
Increasing security at DOE sites since the terrorist attacks of September  11, 2001, has been costly and challenging. The complexwide funding for  protective forces and physical security systems rose almost 60 percent (in  constant dollars) from fiscal years 2001 through 2008, to $862 million.  Protective forces—the single most costly element of DOE security, as well  as one of the most important —have been a major focus of DOE security  efforts. The need to increase security at DOE sites as rapidly as possible  following the 2001 attacks meant that DOE protective forces worked large  amounts of overtime for an extended period. DOE’s Inspector General and  Office of Independent Oversight, as well as GAO, reported on the potential  for extended overtime to increase fatigue and reduce readiness, and  training opportunities for protective forces. Since then, DOE has sought  to control protective force costs by increasing the use of security  technology and advanced weaponry and by consolidating material into  fewer and better protected locations.
Since September 11, 2001, DOE security policies, including the DBT, have  been under almost constant examination and have undergone  considerable change. For example, DOE issued new DBTs in 2003, 2004,  and 2005, and, most recently, in November 2008. In its latest iteration, the  DBT was renamed the Graded Security Protection (GSP) policy. The GSP  is conceptually identical to DOE’s previous DBTs. However, compared  with the 2005 DBT, the GSP identifies a generally smaller and less capable  terrorist adversary force for DOE sites with Category I SNM.
DOE has also sought to increase the tactical effectiveness of protective  force performance. Specifically, according to a 2004 classified DOE  review, the then-current organization and tactics of DOE protective forces  needed improvement to deal with possible terrorist threats. The review  found that, historically, DOE protective forces had been more concerned  with a broad range of industrial security and order-keeping functions than  with preparing to conduct a defensive battle against a paramilitary  attacker, as described in DOE’s previous DBTs and GSP. To address this  situation, the review recommended shifting to an aggressive militarylike,  small-unit, tactical defense posture, which included enhanced tactical  training standards to allow protective forces to move, shoot, and  communicate effectively as a unit in a combat environment. It also  recommended more frequent, realistic, and rigorous force-on-force  performance testing and training for the department’s protective forces.
On the basis of this review, DOE has sought to transform DOE’s protective  forces who safeguard special nuclear material into an “elite force”—a  TRF—with training and capabilities similar to military units. To create  TRFs at Category I SNM sites, in 2005 DOE’s policy for protective forces  clarified which positions required more demanding physical fitness and  firearms qualification standards, increased tactical training, and  reorganized protective forces into tactically cohesive units.
Although DOE and NNSA considered federalizing the contractor  protective forces to better support the TRF, the department’s reviews of  this issue predate its post September 11, 2001, concerns. Since the early  1990s, the department has intermittently considered federalization  because of variety of security challenges, often involving actual or  potential strikes by contractor protective forces:    A 1992 DOE review concluded there was no clear evidence that  federalization of protective forces would significantly save costs or  improve security. DOE reviewed the issue of federalization in response to  a 1990 GAO report that examined a protective force strike at Los Alamos  National Laboratory in 1989.
A 1997 DOE report raised concerns about the potential deterioration of an  aging protective force’s physical and combat capabilities; the increasing  difficulties in meeting the sudden demand for additional personnel in the  event of a strike; and cost pressures, such as more overtime pay after the  department had downsized the protective forces. The report considered  federalization as a solution but recommended other options using existing  contractor protective forces.
A 2004 DOE study group, examining ways to strengthen DOE’s security  posture after September 11, 2001, recommended federalization to better  support tactical forces and to promote uniform, high-quality security  across sites, but the department did not implement the recommendation.
Two 2008 NNSA studies, which followed the 2007 strike at the Pantex  Plant, compared contractor and federalized options for improving  protective forces, but these studies did not make any firm  recommendations.
In 2009, partly in response to a union coalition calling for federalization,  NNSA and DOE’s HSS started protective force initiatives to address some  of the goals that federalization was meant to accomplish, such as  improving efficiency and effectiveness.
section_title: Protective Forces Are Not Uniformly Managed, Organized, Staffed, Trained, Equipped, or Compensated
paragraphs: Contractor protective forces—including 2,339 unionized officers and their  376 nonunionized supervisors—are not uniformly managed, organized,  staffed, trained, equipped, or compensated across the six DOE sites. These  differences occur because protective forces operate under separate  contracts and collective bargaining agreements at each site and because of  DOE’s long-standing contracting approach of defining desired outcomes  instead of detailed, prescriptive guidance on how to achieve those  outcomes. As we have previously reported, DOE’s contract model may  allow security to be closely tailored to site- and mission-specific needs.
subsections: section_title: Management and Organization Vary by Contract
paragraphs: As of September 30, 2008, protective forces at the six sites we reviewed  operated under the following three separate types of contracts:    Direct contract with DOE. At Y-12, Nevada Test Site (NTS), and Savannah  River Site (SRS), NNSA and DOE contract directly with private firms to  provide protective forces. These contracts are separate from NNSA’s and  DOE’s contracts with the site M&O contractors. Protective force managers  report to officials from federal site offices. To coordinate site operations  and protective force operations, managers from the M&O contractors meet  regularly to discuss issues with managers from the protective force and  site office.
Within the M&O contract. For two sites, Pantex Plant (PX) and Idaho  National Laboratory (INL), the M&O contractors provide the protective  forces. The M&O contractor directly manages the protective forces, and  DOE’s or NNSA’s site office oversees the protective force operations as  part of the overall M&O contract.
Subcontract to the M&O contractor: At Los Alamos National Laboratory  (LANL), the M&O contractor subcontracts the protective force operations.  The protective force manager reports to and is overseen by the M&O  contractor. Since NNSA has no direct contractual relationship with the  protective force manager, NNSA site office managers coordinate oversight  direction through the M&O contractor.
Protective force contractors at the six DOE sites have a management and  support structure that includes training and physical fitness, human  relations, legal and contract services, and procurement. Each protective  force also has uniformed supervisors who are not part of the protective  forces’ collective bargaining agreements. The duties, responsibilities, and  ranks of these supervisors are generally site specific and not detailed in  DOE’s protective force policies.
section_title: Protective Forces Differ in Number and Composition
paragraphs: According to DOE’s 2008 policy in Manual 470.4-3A, Contractor Protective  Force, protective forces are composed of unarmed and armed positions.  Security Officers (SO) are responsible for certain unarmed security duties,  such as checking for valid security badges at entrances and escorting  visitors. Security Police Officers (SPO), who are armed, are divided into  three main categories:    SPO-I: Primary responsibility is protecting fixed posts during combat.
SPO-II: Primary responsibility is mobile combat to prevent terrorists from  reaching their target but can also be assigned to fixed posts.
SPO-III: Primary responsibilities are mobile combat and special response  skills, such as those needed to recapture SNM (on site) and recover SNM  (off site) if terrorists succeed in acquiring it. SPO-IIIs are usually organized  into special response teams.
As shown in table 2, the number of personnel and composition of  protective forces vary considerably across sites. It should be noted that  three sites—INL, LANL, and NTS—had few or no SPO-Is as of September  30, 2008. At that time, not all sites had incorporated this position into their  collective bargaining agreements. In the interim, some SPO-IIs were  performing the SPO-I-type duties at these sites.
section_title: Training and Equipment Vary
paragraphs: DOE policy mandates certain protective force training but allows sites  some flexibility in its implementation. For example, DOE Manual 470.4-3A  requires newly hired protective forces to complete the Basic Security  Police Officer Training course that the sites tailor to meet their specific  needs. The site-specific courses range in length from 9 to 16 weeks. Other  required training includes annual refresher training in a wide variety of  topics; tactical exercises, including force-on-force exercises; physical  fitness training; and firearms training. The content and frequency of this  training varies by site and, to some extent, by type of protective forces,  with SPO-IIIs generally receiving more training than other protective  forces because of their special response mission. To ensure some degree  of equivalency, DOE’s National Training Center assesses sites’ training  plans and, while most sites perform their own training, the National  Training Center certifies instructors.
Some training requirements are driven by the type of protective force  equipment, such as firearms and vehicles, that are used at each site. The  primary protective force weapon at most sites is the M4 rifle, a weapon  that is widely used in the U.S. military. Other weapons, such as belt-fed  machine guns, are generally versions of the M240 and M249 family, also  widely used in the U.S. military. However, sites have variously adopted  other equipment, including the following:  three models of handguns with two different calibers of ammunition;  four types of grenade launchers, although all use 40mm grenades;    several types of precision rifles, capable of accurate long range fire, in  three different calibers; and    several different armored vehicles, but older vehicles are being replaced  by a single type of vehicle across the six sites.
section_title: Pay and Benefits Vary
paragraphs: Pay varies for protective forces, based on the site and the category of  protective forces. Table 3 shows that top pay, as negotiated in collective  bargaining agreements at each site, ranged from nearly $19 per hour to  over $26 per hour. SOs received the lowest hourly pay, and SPO-IIIs  received the highest. Overtime pay, accrued in different ways at the sites,  and other premium pay, such as additional pay for night shifts and  holidays, may significantly increase protective force pay.
Table 4 shows the types of benefits by site. While all employers  contributed to active protective force members’ medical, dental, and life  insurance benefits, they differed in the amount of their contributions and  in the retirement benefits they offered. In general, new hires were offered  defined contribution plans, such as a 401(k) plan, that provides eventual  retirement benefits that depend on the amount of contributions by the  employer or employee, as appropriate, as well as the earnings and losses  of the invested funds. At the time of our review, two sites offered new  hires defined benefit plans that promised retirees a certain monthly  payment at retirement. Two other sites had defined benefit plans that  covered protective force members hired before a particular date but were  not open to new hires. A coalition of unions has expressed its preference  for defined benefit plans.
section_title: Tactical Response Force Implementation Varies and Has Raised Concerns about the Longevity of Protective Forces Careers
paragraphs: Sites are at different stages in the implementation of TRF requirements.  However, TRF implementation, coupled with broader DOE efforts to limit  postretirement and pension liabilities, has raised concerns with DOE  security officials, protective force contractors, and protective force unions  about the longevity of protective forces’ careers and the adequacy of their  personnel systems.
subsections: section_title: TRF Implementation Varies
paragraphs: DOE has identified the following important TRF requirements for  protective forces:  Improved tactical skills, so that protective forces “move, shoot, and  communicate” as a unit. To better facilitate tactical training to meet a  sophisticated terrorist attack, TRF calls for the development and  implementation of TRF training curricula as well as the creation of  training relief elements or shifts to allow protective forces to participate in  unit-level training.
Revised application of DOE’s offensive and defensive combatant  standards for protective forces. DOE’s offensive combatant standard is  more demanding than its defensive combatant standard. Nevertheless,  prior to TRF, SPO-IIs hired before 2000 were allowed to meet DOE’s less  demanding defensive combatant standard but could retain their SPO-II  designation and fill some offensive combatant positions. TRF policy  eliminated this approach, known as “grandfathering,” and restricted  protective force members who meet only defensive combatant standards  to serve as SPO-Is. That is, SPO-IIs that did not meet offensive combatant  standards would be moved into SPO-I positions.
Career longevity plans to assist with the shift to the new application of  offensive and defensive combatant standards. TRF mandates that all  newly hired protective forces meet DOE’s more demanding offensive  combatant standard as SPO-IIs. Protective force members may advance to  the SPO-III level, which requires qualifying at a higher level of firearms  proficiency. However, under TRF policy, the forces who cannot maintain  their current standards—perhaps as their years of service accumulate and  they age—may “fall back” by applying for open protective force positions  with less demanding standards. For example, protective forces may move  from meeting offensive combatant standards to defensive combatant  standards or unarmed SO positions, although they may lose pay with each  “fall back.”
Table 5 summarizes the physical fitness, firearms and medical  qualifications protective forces must pass for DOE’s combatant standards.
One site we visited had implemented most of TRF’s key elements. Since  2005, this site has constructed new training facilities, implemented a  training cadre that allows unit-sized tactical training, increased the amount  of tactical training its protective forces receive, and integrated protective  force plans with other security elements and response plans.
As of September 30, 2008, three sites were still using an older job  classification of SPO-II (that is, allowing a defensive combat standard,  rather than the offensive combatant standard), which is not a TRF  classification. In addition, while some sites have created unarmed security  officer positions to provide fallback positions for protective forces that  can no longer meet DOE’s defensive combat standard, there are relatively  few unarmed positions (110—less than 5 percent—of the protective forces  at the sites we reviewed), and some of these positions, according to a  protective force contract official and a union representative, were  eliminated for budgetary reasons.
We also found that TRF training was not uniform across the six sites:    DOE’s National Training Center piloted a more tactically oriented basic  training course (Tactical Response Force - 1) at one site in 2008, but  according to a National Training Center official, this class will not replace  its existing multiweek Basic Security Police Officer Training course for  newly hired SPO-IIs until later in 2010.
All sites have increased the amount of tactical training for protective  forces but have been separately developing courses and training facilities.
Some sites had purchased and deployed advanced weapons but had not  adequately trained their protective forces to use these weapons and had  not integrated these weapons into their response plans, according to  DOE’s Inspector General and DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight. In  2007, DOE’s Inspector General reported that one site’s training program  for the use of a weapon that was key to the site’s security strategy did not  provide protective forces with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to  perform assigned tasks. A follow-up inspection in 2008 found similar  problems at several other sites.
According to a NNSA official, NNSA sites did not receive dedicated TRF  training funds until fiscal year 2009. Also, according to NNSA’s fiscal year  2010 budget submission, NNSA does not expect its sites to complete TRF  activities until the end of fiscal year 2011.
section_title: TRF Implementation Has Raised Concerns
paragraphs: Since its inception in 2005, TRF has raised concerns in DOE security  organizations, among protective force contractors, and in protective force  unions about the ability of protective forces—especially older individuals  serving in protective forces—to continue meeting DOE’s weapons,  physical fitness, and medical qualifications. As we reported in 2005, some  site security officials recognized they will have to carefully craft transition  plans for currently employed protective force officers who may not be  able to meet the new standards required for an elite force, which is now  known as TRF. Adding to these concerns are DOE’s broader efforts to  manage its long-term postretirement and pension liabilities for its  contractors, which could have a negative impact on retirement eligibility  and benefits for protective forces. In 2006, DOE issued its Contractor  Pension and Medical Benefits Policy (Notice 351.1), which was designed  to limit DOE’s long-term pension and postretirement liabilities. A  coalition of protective force unions stated that this policy moved them in  the opposite direction from their desire for early and enhanced retirement  benefits.
These concerns contributed to the 44-day protective force strike at the  Pantex Plant in 2007. Initially the site designated all of its protective force  positions as offensive positions, a move that could have disqualified a  potentially sizable number of protective forces from duty. Under the  collective bargaining agreement that was eventually negotiated in 2007,  some protective forces are allowed to meet the less demanding defensive  combat standards. DOE has also rescinded its 2006 Contractor Pension  and Medical Benefits Policy. However, according to protective force union  officials, tensions over TRF implementation and retirement benefits  remain driving forces behind protective force unions’ drive to federalize.
section_title: With the Issuance of the Graded Security Protection Policy, Most Sites Ceased Efforts to Implement the 2005 Design Basis Threat
paragraphs: With the issuance of the new GSP policy in August 2008, most sites ceased  2005 DBT implementation efforts. However, unlike its practice with  previous DBTs, DOE did not establish a deadline for GSP implementation.  While sites study GSP requirements and develop implementation plans, the  GSP directs that they continue to meet the requirements of the 2003 DBT.  Under the 2003 DBT, most DOE sites are required to maintain denial  protection strategies for Category I SNM. Under these strategies, DOE  requires that adversaries be denied “hands-on” access to nuclear weapons  and nuclear test devices at fixed sites, as well as all Category I SNM in  transit. For other Category I SNM at fixed sites, DOE requires that  adversaries be prevented from having enough time to complete malevolent  acts. If adversaries gain access to Category I SNM, DOE requires that  protective forces engage in recapturing the SNM on site or recovering the  material if it leaves the site. As required by the Fiscal Year 2006 National  Defense Authorization Act, DOE reported to Congress in 2007 that all its  sites could meet the 2003 DBT.
To verify the information DOE reported, we examined whether the sites  had approved Site Safeguards and Security Plans and whether they had  undergone an Office of Independent Oversight Inspection to test those  plans. We found that all sites (except for the one DOE site that had  implemented the 2005 DBT) had approved Site Safeguards and Security  plans for the 2003 DBT, and almost all had undergone inspections by the  Office of Independent Oversight to test those plans. In most cases,  protective forces performed effectively in these inspections. However, in a  2008 inspection, one site’s protective forces received a “needs  improvement” rating—that is, it only partially met identified protection  needs or provided questionable assurance that identified protection needs  were met.
section_title: Office of Secure Transportation Federal Agents and Protective Forces Differ Significantly in Several Respects
paragraphs: Although they are both responsible for protecting SNM, OST federal  agents substantially differ from site protective forces in terms of numbers,  organization, management, pay, benefits, mission, and training:    OST forces totaled 363 as of September 30, 2008, or less than one-seventh  the total number of protective forces members at DOE sites with enduring  Category I missions.
OST forces are geographically dispersed, but unlike protective forces,  management is centralized. OST operations are organized into three  commands, which are collocated at two DOE sites and a Department of  Defense military base. These commands report to a central command in  Albuquerque, New Mexico, which is under a single organization, NNSA. In  contrast, the protective forces at six sites have decentralized management  and are overseen by one of three DOE organizations.
Federal managers directly operate the OST organization and supervise  federal agents.
Unlike protective forces, OST federal agents cannot collectively bargain  and are covered by a single pay system. Effective in March 2008, the  NNSA’s Pay Band Demonstration is a pay system for most NNSA federal  employees—including OST federal agents. Table 6 shows the differences  between the protective forces’ many negotiated pay rates and the  nonsupervisory federal agents’ single pay band, which is linked to federal  pay grades that are established governmentwide.
In addition, while OST’s pay system is designed for more flexible pay,  protective forces’ pay rules generally do not provide for any variation in a  position’s pay rate after a few years of service. Specifically, OST agents’  pay rates can vary more when they are hired and in later years because the  NNSA pay system is designed to give OST managers more flexibility to  offer exceptional candidates higher entry salaries and to provide faster or  slower annual pay progression, depending on individual performance. In  contrast, fixed pay rules allow a contracted SPO to start at the top pay rate  or to reach or closely approximate it after only about 1 to 3 years of  service. However, as table 6 shows, both protective forces and federal  agents receive significantly higher pay for overtime hours.
Concerning benefits, OST federal agents generally receive those that are  broadly available to other federal employees, such as through the Federal  Employee Health Benefit program and the Federal Employee Retirement  System (FERS), which has a defined benefit component and a defined  contribution component. In contrast, at each site, protective force unions  negotiate for benefits such as medical insurance and retirement plans, and  new hires in protective forces generally do not receive defined benefits for  retirement. In addition, in 1998, Congress made OST federal agents eligible  to retire earlier (at age 50 after 20 years of service) with a higher monthly  retirement annuity (defined benefit) than is typical for other federal  employees. This early retirement provision contrasts with the provisions  for the two defined benefit plans open to new protective force hires as of  September 2008, which provides for retirement with more years served or  at older ages.
OST federal agents’ mobile mission also differs significantly from that of  protective forces that guard fixed sites. OST agents operate convoys of  special tractor trailers and special escort vehicles to transport Category I  SNM. These agents travel on U.S. highways that cross multiple federal,  state, tribal, and local law enforcement jurisdictions. They also travel as  many as 15 days each month. Agents may also provide security for  weapons components that are flown on OST’s small fleet of aircraft. In  contrast to the public setting of agents’ work, protective forces that guard  Category I SNM at fixed sites typically have elaborate physical defenses  and tightly restricted and monitored public access.
Finally, the training for OST federal agents and protective forces differs.  Although both OST and protective force contractors must comply with  DOE orders and regulations when developing and executing training, OST  agents undergo longer, more frequent, and more diverse training than do  most protective forces. For example, newly hired OST trainees undergo  longer basic training, lasting 21 weeks at OST’s academy in Fort Chaffee,  Arkansas. To operate OST’s fleet of vehicles, federal agents must also  complete the requirements for a commercial driver’s license. In addition,  all agents must meet DOE’s offensive combatant standard throughout their  careers. Overall, OST officials estimate that OST federal agents spend  about a third of their time in training, which, according to an NNSA  official, is much more frequent than most contractor protective forces.  Much of the training is tactically oriented, and OST convoy elements are  organized into tactical units.
section_title: Protective Forces and Office of Secure Transportation Federal Agents Do Not Routinely Use Their Federal Law Enforcement Authority to Make Arrests
paragraphs: In the performance of their official duties, both protective forces and OST  federal agents have limited arrest authority for a variety of misdemeanors  and felonies, though neither routinely exercises this arrest authority.  Both protective forces and OST federal agents are also authorized to use  deadly force to protect SNM and may pursue intruders in order to prevent  their escape and to arrest those they suspect have committed certain  misdemeanors or felonies or have obtained unauthorized control of SNM.  DOE’s Federal Protective Force manual (DOE M 470.4-8) and DOE’s  Contractor Protective Force manual (DOE 470.4-3A) set guidelines and  direct DOE sites to develop policies for using deadly force and for fresh  pursuit, which involves pursuing suspected criminals who flee across  jurisdictional boundaries, such as leaving the property of a DOE site.  These actions include developing memorandums of understanding that  establish, among other things, fresh pursuit guidelines with other law  enforcement agencies.
DOE protective forces and OST federal agents have limited authority to  make arrests for specific misdemeanors and felonies, such as trespassing  on, or the theft or destruction of, federal property. Other offenses against  government property subject to arrest include sabotage, civil disorder,  conspiracy, and the communication of or tampering with restricted data.  For the covered misdemeanors and felonies, protective forces and OST  federal agents have authority to arrest if they observe the offenses while  they are performing their official duties; for the covered felonies, they may  also make arrests if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the  person has committed a felony. If other federal law enforcement agencies,  such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), are involved in the  apprehension of suspected criminals, even on DOE property, protective  forces and OST federal agents must relinquish arresting authority to the  other federal agencies. While both protective forces and OST federal  agents receive initial and annual refresher training in law enforcement  authorities and duties, we found that protective forces at the six sites last  made an unassisted arrest using their federal authority more than 25 years  ago. The protective forces at Pantex arrested nine individuals, six in 1981  and three in 1983, for trespassing on site property. In both instances, the  offenders were convicted and sentenced to a federal detention facility.
According to OST officials, federal agents do not routinely make arrests  because they have not encountered individuals attempting to steal SNM  from their shipments, which is the focus of their legal concerns. Protective  forces do not routinely use their federal authority to make arrests for  several reasons, in addition to limited authority. First, one contractor site  official told us, federal courts, which have jurisdiction for all arrests made  by protective forces using their federal authority, are reluctant to pursue  what may be considered minor cases associated with a DOE site. Instead,  this official said, the site had more success prosecuting crimes in state and  local courts. In these cases, arrests are made by local and state law  enforcement agencies. Second, DOE security officials told us that sites  may be concerned about the legal liability of using contractor employees  to make arrests and potential lawsuits that could ensue. Finally, both  DOE and site contractor officials told us that routine law enforcement  duties may distract protective forces from performing their primary duty  to protect Category I SNM.
Rather than make arrests when witnessing possible crimes, protective  forces may gather basic facts, secure the crime scene, and notify  management, which decides whether to refer the matter to local law  enforcement agencies, DOE’s Inspector General, the U.S. Marshall, or the  FBI for arresting and transporting suspects. However, we could not  determine how often the forces take these actions because sites do not  typically document detainments or have facilities in which to hold such  detainees.
While protective forces and OST federal agents seldom use their federal  arrest authority, protective forces have used other legal authorities to  make arrests. For example, specially designated protective force officers  at the Savannah River Site (SRS), are authorized under South Carolina law  to make arrests and investigate crimes. The SRS protective force  includes 26 Special State Constables (about 5 percent of SRS’s total  protective force) who have state law enforcement jurisdiction on the 310- square-mile SRS complex, which spans three counties and includes publichighways. These officers wear special uniforms and drive specially marked vehicles. In addition, they must complete and maintain state law  complete and maintain state law  enforcement qualification requirements, in order to retain their state law  enforcement qualification requirements, in order to retain their state law  enforcement authority. This additional authority, according to SRS  enforcement authority. This additional authority, according to SRS  officials, allows the remaining protective force personnel to focus on the  officials, allows the remaining protective force personnel to focus on the  other aspects of the site’s nation other aspects of the site’s national security mission.  al security mission.  al security mission.
section_title: Either of the Two Principal Options DOE Has Considered Could Result in More Uniform Management of Protective Forces
paragraphs: To manage its protective forces more effectively and uniformly, DOE has  considered two principal options—improving elements of the existing  contractor system or creating a federal protective force. We identified five  major criteria that DOE, protective force contractors, and union officials  have used to assess the advantages and disadvantages of these options.  Overall, in comparing these criteria against the two principal options, we  found that neither contractor nor federal forces seem overwhelmingly  superior, but each has offsetting advantages and disadvantages. Either  option could result in effective and more uniform security if well-managed.  However, we identified transitional problems with converting the current  protective force to a federalized force. Furthermore, while DOE has  sought to improve protective force management by reforming protective  forces, this effort is still at an early stage and budgetary limitations may  constrain some changes.
subsections: section_title: Both a Contractor Force and a Federalized Force Present Advantages and Disadvantages
paragraphs: Table 7 summarizes the five criteria that DOE, protective force  contractors, and union officials have used to discuss whether to improve  the existing contractor system or federalize protective forces, as well as  associated issues or concerns.
Evaluating the two principal options against these criteria, we found that,  for several reasons, either contractor or federal forces could result in  effective and more uniform security if the forces are well-managed. First,  both options—maintaining the current security force structure or  federalizing the security force—have offsetting advantages and  disadvantages, with neither option emerging as clearly superior. For  example, one relative advantage of a contractor force is the perceived  greater flexibility for hiring, disciplining, or terminating an employee; one  relative disadvantage of a contractor force is that it can strike. In contrast,  federalization could better allow protective forces to advance or laterally  transfer to other DOE sites to meet protective force members’ needs or  DOE’s need to resize particular forces.
Second, key disadvantages, such as potential strikes, do not preclude  effective operations if the security force is well-managed. According to  one protective force manager, a well-managed protective force is less  likely to strike. In addition, a 2009 memo signed by the NNSA  administrator stated that NNSA had demonstrated that it can effectively  manage strikes through the use of replacement protective forces. With  respect to federal protective forces, a 2004 department work group on  protective force issues observed that even federal operations like OST had  experienced difficult labor-management relations that had to be carefully  managed in order to ensure effective performance.
Third, as can be seen in the following examples, distinctions between the  two options, each of which could have many permutations, can be  overstated by comparing worse- and best-case scenarios, when similar  conditions might be realized under either option.
While federalization might improve effectiveness and efficiency by driving  standardization, NNSA recently announced initiatives to increase  standardization among contract protective forces to achieve some of the  same benefits, including cost savings.
Federalization could potentially provide early and enhanced retirement  benefits, which could help to ensure a young and vigorous workforce.  However, such benefits might also be provided to contractor protective  forces.
Although more centralized federal control might impede both protective  forces’ support of a site’s operations and the coordination between  contractors and federal managers, this concern presumes a scenario in  which the department would choose a highly centralized organization,  whereas it might delegate responsibility for day-to-day operations to its  site managers.
Either option could be implemented with more or less costly features. For  example, adding the early and enhanced retirement benefits would  increase costs for either contractor or federal protective forces.
Reliably estimating the costs of protective force options proved difficult  and precluded our detailed reporting on it for two broad reasons. First,  since contractor and federal forces could each have many possible  permutations, choosing any particular option to assess would be arbitrary.  For example, a 2008 NNSA-sponsored study identified wide-ranging  federalization options, such as federalizing all or some SPO positions at  some or all facilities or reorganizing them under an existing or a new  agency. Second, DOE will have to decide on the hypothetical options’ key  cost factors before it can reasonably compare costs. For example, when  asked about some key cost factors for federalization, an NNSA Service  Center official said that a detailed workforce analysis would be needed to  decide whether DOE would either continue to use the same number of  SPOs with high amounts of scheduled overtime or hire a larger number of  SPOs who would work fewer overtime hours. Also, the official said that  until management directs a particular work schedule for federalized  protective forces, there is no definitive answer to the applicable overtime  rules, such as whether overtime begins after 8 hours in a day. The amount  of overtime and the factors affecting it are crucial to a sound cost estimate  because overtime pay can now account for up to about 50 percent of pay  for worked hours.
section_title: Transition to a Federalized Security Workforce Creates Difficult Issues Either under Current Laws or with Special Provisions for Enhanced Retirement Benefits
paragraphs: If protective forces were to be federalized under existing law, the current  forces might face a loss of pay or even their jobs. OPM told us that  legislation would be required to provide these federalized protective  forces with early and enhanced retirement benefits. However, provisions  associated with these benefits could create hiring and retirement  difficulties for current older members of the protective forces.
subsections: section_title: Federalization under Existing Laws May Not be Palatable to Current Protective Force Members and Their Unions
paragraphs: According to officials at OPM and NNSA’s Service Center, if contractor  SPOs were federalized under existing law, they would likely be placed into  the security guard (GS-0085) federal job series. Although a coalition of  unions has sought federalization to allow members to have early and  enhanced retirement benefits, which allows employees in certain federal  jobs to retire at age 50 with 20 years of service, security guards under the  GS-0085 job series are not eligible for these benefits. Under the applicable  rules for federal security guards, transitioning protective forces would not  become eligible to retire with immediate federal annuities until at least age  55, and only after accruing sufficient years of federal service. For example,  transitioning protective forces could begin receiving a federal annuity at  age 62 with 5 years of service or, with reduced benefits, at age 55 to 57  (depending on birth year) with 10 years of service.
In addition, transitioning force members may receive lower pay as federal  employees, according to our analysis of two tentative federal pay levels for  protective force positions at SPO levels of I, II, and III. As of September  30, 2008, contractors are generally paid higher top rates than the top rates  for the applicable federal General Schedule (GS) pay grades. Only SPO- III positions at three sites and SPO-II positions at one site could have the ir  top rates potentially matched by 2008 federal rates, but only under certain   Also, to reach federal pay rates that better approximate the  assumptions. contractor rates, transitioning contractor protective forces might have to  wait many years. While most collective bargaining agreements allow  protective forces to reach a position’s top pay rate after 3 years or fewer,  federal guards could take much longer because the 10 steps within a GS  pay grade have progressively longer periods of service between  incremental increases. This step progression means reaching the top of a  pay grade (step 10) could take up to 18 years.
Finally, if protective forces are federalized, OPM officials told us that  current members would not be guaranteed a federal job. According to  those officials, current members would have to compete for the new  federal positions, and thus they risk not being hired. Nonveteran members  are particularly at risk because competition for federal security guard  positions is restricted to those with veterans’ preference, if they are  available. According to NNSA Service Center officials, veterans groups  would likely oppose any waiver to this hiring preference. Thus, if the  protective forces were to be federalized, the department might lose some  of the currently trained and experienced personnel.
section_title: Legislation Could Provide Federalized Forces with Early and Enhanced Retirement Benefits, but Providing These Benefits Could Pose Problems for Current Force Members
paragraphs: According to OPM officials, legislation would be required to provide  federal protective forces with early and enhanced retirement because their  positions do not fit the current definition of law enforcement officers that  would trigger such a benefit. For the same reason, DOE had to pursue  legislation to extend early and enhanced retirement for OST federal agents  in 1998. OPM had determined that OST federal agents did not meet the  definition for law enforcement officer that would have made them eligible  for early and enhanced retirement benefits. Consequently, at DOE urging,  Congress enacted legislation to give OST federal agents the special 20-year  retirement provisions.
Although a coalition of unions has supported federalization to get early  and enhanced retirement benefits, provisions associated with these  benefits could create hiring and retirement difficulties for older force  members. Older members might not be rehired because agencies are  typically authorized to set a maximum age, often age 37, for entry into  federal positions with early retirement. In addition, even if there were a  waiver from the maximum age of hire, older protective forces members  could not retire at age 50 because they would have had to work 20 years to  meet the federal service requirement for “early” retirement benefits. These  forces could retire earlier if they were granted credit for their prior years  of service under DOE and NNSA contracts. However, OPM officials told us  OPM would strongly oppose federal retirement benefits being granted for  previous years of contractor service (retroactive benefits). According to  these officials, these retroactive benefits would be without precedent and  would violate the basic concept that service credit for retirement benefits  is only available for eligible employment at the time it was performed.  Moreover, retroactive benefits would create an unfunded liability for  federal retirement funds. When the law changed to allow OST federal  agents early retirement, these agents were already federal employees, and  they received retroactive enhanced credit for service; DOE paid the extra  liability (approximately $18 million over 4 years).
section_title: DOE Seeks to Address Protective Forces Issues by Reforming Contractor Forces, but Some Changes May Be Constrained by Budgetary Limitations, and Progress Has Been Limited to Date
paragraphs: In a joint January 2009 memorandum, the NNSA Administrator and DOE’s  Chief Health Safety and Security (HSS) Officer rejected the federalization  of protective forces as an option and supported the continued use of  contracted protective forces—but with improvements. They concluded  that, among other things, the transition to a federal force would be costly  and would be likely to provide little, if any, increase in security  effectiveness. However, these officials recognized that the current  contractor system could be improved by addressing some of the issues  that federalization might have resolved. In particular, they announced the  pursuit of an initiative to better standardize protective forces’ training and  equipment. According to these officials, more standardization serves to  increase effectiveness and cost efficiency as well as to better facilitate  responses to potential work stoppages. In addition, in March 2009, the  Chief HSS Officer commissioned a study group, which included DOE  officials and protective force union representatives and had input from  protective force contractors, to recommend ways to overcome the  personnel system problems that might prevent protective force members  from working to a normal retirement age, such as 60 to 65, and building  reasonable retirement benefits.
Both of these initiatives might benefit the department and its programs.  For example, the initiative to standardize protective forces has started  focusing on the inefficiencies arising from having each contractor  separately choose and procure security equipment and support services;  one identified inefficiency is that smaller separate orders hinder  contractors from negotiating better prices. In NNSA’s fiscal year 2010  budget request, NNSA predicted that standardizing procurement and  security equipment, such as vehicles, weapons, and ammunition, could  save NNSA, cumulatively, 20 percent of its costs for such equipment by  2013. With respect to the career and retirement initiative, the DOE study  group reported, among other potential benefits, that improving career  incentives for individuals to enter a protective force career and then  remain in the DOE security community for a lifetime of service could help  the department minimize the significant costs associated with hiring,  vetting, and training protective force members.
NNSA has established a Security Commodity Team—composed of security  and procurement professionals from NNSA, some DOE sites, and other  DOE organizations—to focus first on procuring ammunition and  identifying and testing other security equipment that can be used across  sites. According to NNSA officials, NNSA established a common  mechanism in December 2009 for sites to procure ammunition. Another  effort will seek greater standardization of protective force operations  across sites, in part by HHS or NNSA clarifying protective force policies  when sites do not have the same understanding of these policies or  implement them in different ways. To move toward more standardized  operations and a more centrally managed protective force program, NNSA  started a broad security review to identify possible improvements. As one  result of this security review, according to NNSA officials in January 2010,  NNSA has developed a draft standard for protective force operations,  which is intended to clarify both policy expectations and a consistent  security approach that is both effective and efficient.
For the personnel system initiative to enhance career longevity and  retirement options, in June 2009, a DOE-chartered study group made 29  recommendations that were generally designed to enable members to  reach a normal retirement age within the protective force, take another  job within DOE, or transition to a non-DOE career. The study group  identified 14 of its 29 career and retirement recommendations as involving  low- or no-cost actions that could conceivably be implemented quickly.  For example, some recommendations seek to ensure that protective force  members are prepared for job requirements through expanding fitness and  wellness programs and reviewing the appropriateness of training. Other  recommendations call for reviews to find ways to maximize the number of  armed and unarmed positions that SPOs can fill when they can no longer  meet their current combatant requirements. Other recommendations focus  on providing training and planning assistance for retirement and job  transitions. (All 29 recommendations are described in app. I.)
The study group recognized that some of its personnel system  recommendations may be difficult to implement largely because of budget  constraints. The study group had worked with the assumption that DOE  security budgets will remain essentially flat for the foreseeable future, and  may actually decline in real dollars. Nevertheless, it identified 15 of its 29  career and retirement recommendations as challenging because they  involve additional program costs, some of which are likely to be  substantial, and may require changes to management structures and  contracts. For example, to provide some income security when  protective officer members must take a lower-paying position because of  illness, injury, or age, one recommendation would include provisions in  collective bargaining agreements to at least temporarily prevent or reduce  drops in pay. Among the more challenging recommendations is a call to  enhance retirement plans and to make them more equivalent and portable  across sites—the types of changes that a coalition of unions had hoped  federalization might provide.
Progress on the 29 recommendations has been limited to date. When  senior department officials were briefed on the personnel system  recommendations in late June 2009, they took them under consideration  for further action but immediately approved one recommendation—to  extend the life of the study group by forming a standing committee. They  directed the standing committee to develop implementation strategies for  actions that can be done in the near term and, for recommendations  requiring further analysis, additional funding, or other significant actions,  to serve as an advisory panel for senior department officials. According to  a DOE official in early December 2009, NNSA and DOE were in varying  stages of reviews to advance the other 28 recommendations. Later that  month, NNSA achieved aspects of one recommendation about  standardization, in part by formally standardizing protective force  uniforms, as well as the uniforms’ cloth shields. In the Conference Report  for the fiscal year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, the conferees  directed the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National  Nuclear Security Administration to develop a comprehensive DOE-wide  plan to identify and implement the recommendations of the study group.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: Protective forces are a key component of DOE’s efforts to secure its Category  I SNM, particularly after the September 11, 2001, terrorism attacks. Since the  attacks, DOE has made multiple changes to its security policies, including  more rigorous requirements for its protective forces. However, in making  these changes, DOE and its protective force contractors through their  collective bargaining agreements have not successfully aligned protective  force personnel systems—which affect career longevity, job transitions, and  retirement—with the increased physical and other demands of a more  paramilitary operation. Without better alignment, in our opinion, there is  greater potential for a strike at a site, and potential risk to site security, when  protective forces’ collective bargaining agreements expire. In the event of a  strike at one site, the differences in protective forces’ training and equipment  make it difficult to readily provide reinforcements from other sites. Even if  strikes are avoided, the effectiveness of protective forces may be reduced if  tensions exist between labor and management. The potential for a strike and  for declines in protective forces’ performance have elevated the importance  of finding the most effective approach to maintaining protective force  readiness, including an approach that better aligns personnel systems and  protective force requirements. At the same time, DOE must consider its  options for managing protective forces in a period of budgetary constraints.
With these considerations in mind, DOE and NNSA, to their credit, have  recognized that the decentralized management of protective forces creates  some inefficiencies and that some systemic career and longevity issues are  not being resolved through actions at individual sites. NNSA’s recent  standardization initiatives and the 29 recommendations made by a DOE  study group in June 2009 offer a step forward. The responsibility lies with  DOE, working with protective force unions and contractors, to further  develop and implement these initiatives and recommendations. However,  if DOE decides not to take meaningful actions or if its actions will not  achieve the intended goals, an examination of other options, including the  federalization of protective forces, may be merited.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better align protective force personnel policies and systems with DOE’s  security requirements for Category I SNM sites, we recommend that the  Secretary of Energy promptly develop implementation plans and, where  needed, undertake additional research for the DOE study group’s 2009  recommendations to improve career longevity and retirement options for  protective force personnel. Specifically, we recommend the Secretary take  the following two actions:    For actions such as reviewing the appropriateness of training that the  study group identified as low or no cost, unless DOE can state compelling  reasons for reconsideration, it should develop and execute  implementation plans.
For actions that may involve substantial costs or contractual and  organizational changes, such as enhancing the uniformity and portability  of retirement benefits, DOE should plan and perform research to identify  the most beneficial and financially feasible options.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided DOE with a draft of this report for its review and comment.  In its written comments for the department, NNSA generally agreed with  the report and the recommendations. However, NNSA stated that the  report does not sufficiently credit the department for its significant efforts  taken to address protective force issues. We added some information to  the report about the status of the department’s efforts that NNSA provided  separately from its comment letter. Nevertheless, we continue to view  DOE’s progress on its study group’s 29 recommendations as generally  limited to date. The complete text of NNSA’s comments are presented in  appendix II. NNSA also provided technical clarifications, which we  incorporated into the report as appropriate.
OPM also received a draft of this report for review and comment. It chose  not to provide formal comments because it said our report fairly and  accurately represented the facts and policy issues that OPM provided to us.
We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees with  responsibilities for energy issues; the Secretary of Energy; and the  Director, Office of Management and Budget. This report is also available at  no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions regarding this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Recommendations from the Protective Force Career Options Initiative Study Group
paragraphs: In March 2009, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Chief Health, Safety and  Security (HSS) Officer commissioned a study to examine “realistic and  reasonable options for improving the career opportunities and retirement  prospects of protective force (PF) members while maintaining, within  current and anticipated budgetary constraints, a robust and effective  security posture.” Under the leadership of HSS and with input from  protective force contractors, a study group was formed consisting of  senior leaders of the National Council of Security Police and senior  technical staff from the National Nuclear Security Administration, the  Office of Environmental Management, the Office of Nuclear Energy, and  the Office of Fossil Energy.
The study group’s report, Enhanced Career Longevity and Retirement  Options for DOE Protective Force Personnel, released on June 30, 2009,  included 29 recommendations to overcome the problems that prevent  protective force members from working to a normal retirement age and  building reasonable retirement benefits. Summaries of these  recommendations follow.
subsections: section_title: Study Groups Recommendations
paragraphs: The study group thought the following 14 recommendations were  achievable mostly within existing management structures and anticipated  budgetary constraints.  1.  PF deployment strategies should be re-examined to ensure that  appropriate Security Police Officers’ (SPO) skill sets and response  capabilities (e.g., offensive or defensive capabilities) are matched to  current response plan requirements in a manner that maximizes  reliance on defensive combatants. The intent is to maximize the  number of defensive positions that could be filled by personnel who  can no longer meet the higher offensive combatant requirements.  2.  Anticipated requirements for security escorts and other security- related unarmed positions (including current outsourcing practices)  should be reviewed and procedures implemented to maximize work  opportunities for unarmed PF members (Security Officers). The intent  of this recommendation and the next is to provide positions to be filled  by PF members who can no longer meet either the offensive or the  defensive combatant standards.  3.  Unarmed PF-related work should be identified as part of the career  path for PF members.
4.  Measures should be adopted to minimize the impact of current  physical fitness standards upon career longevity, and these standards  should be reviewed against current job requirements.  5.  Revisions to current medical requirements should be developed to  ensure that existing medical conditions do not represent (given the  current state of the medical arts) unreasonable barriers to career  longevity.  6.  So long as the department expects PF personnel to meet explicit  medical and fitness standards, it should provide reasonable means to  prepare for testing and evaluation.  7.  Existing “fitness/wellness” programs should be expanded to help SPOs  maintain and prolong their ability to meet physical fitness  requirements and to achieve medical cost savings that result from  maintaining a well-managed program. According to the study group,  this recommendation is not cost-neutral.  8.  Retirement/transition planning should be integrated into PF training.  9.  The capabilities of the National Training Center should be used to  facilitate career progression and job transition training.  10. PF organizations should be encouraged to appoint “Career  Development/Transition” officers to assist personnel in career path  and transition planning.  11. The Human Reliability Program (HRP) monitors employees to ensure  they have no emotional, mental, or physical conditions that impede  them from reliably conducting their work. Under this program, if a  reasonable belief or credible evidence indicates that employees are not  reliable, they should be immediately removed from their duties as an  interim precautionary measure. The study group recommended taking  strong actions to correct HRP administrative errors and to rigorously  enforce existing prohibitions against using HRP in a punitive manner.  This recommendation and the next arise from a concern that some  protective force members may be punished without the opportunity  for timely recourse.  12. Contractor policies and actions that lead to placing PF members in  nonpaid status without appropriate review or recourse should be  closely monitored (and, where necessary, corrected).
13. DOE M 470.4-3A, Contractor Protective Force, should be reviewed to  ensure that requirements are supportable by appropriate training.  14. To encourage future communication on the issues considered in this  study, the life of the present study group should be extended as a  standing committee, and union participation in the DOE HSS  Protective Force Policy Panel should be ensured.
The study group thought the following 15 recommendations would require  currently unbudgeted resources or changes to existing contracts.  15. Existing defined contribution plans should be reviewed in order to  identify methods to improve benefits, to ensure greater comparability  of benefits from one site to the next, and to develop methods to  improve portability of benefits. This recommendation, and those  through number 19, involve changes to retirement plans that could  enhance benefits and allow protective force personnel to transfer  benefits more easily when moving to other sites.  16. Consistency in retirement criteria should be established across the  DOE complex (e.g., a point system incorporating age and years of  service or something similar).  17. The potential for incorporating a uniform cost-of-living allowance into  defined benefit retirement programs based on government indexes  should be examined.  18. Portability of service credit between PF and other DOE contractors  should be explored. This could be directed in requests for proposals  for new PF contracts.  19. Potential actions should be explored to create a reasonable disability  retirement bridge for PF personnel when alternate job placement is  unsuccessful.  20. Job performance requirements (such as firearms proficiency) should  be supported by training sufficient to enable PF members to have  confidence in meeting those requirements.  21. A retraining fund should be created to assist personnel with job  transitions and second careers.  22. A centralized job registry should be established to facilitate  identification of job opportunities across the complex.
23. Consideration should be given to sponsoring a student loan program to  assist PF members in developing second careers.  24. The department, as a matter of policy and line management procedure,  should establish the position that SPOs be considered for job  placement within each respective site’s organizational structure before  a contractor considers hiring personnel from outside of the site.  25. “Save pay” provisions should be included in collective bargaining  agreements to cover specified periods when a PF member must be  classified to a lower-paying position because of illness, injury, or aging.  26. DOE should explore the potential for facilitating partnerships among  the various contractor organizations in order to broaden employment  opportunities for aging or injured personnel and to encourage PF  personnel seeking alternative career paths to actively compete for  those opportunities.  27. Where possible, the department should review its separate PF prime  contracts and convert them to “total” security and emergency  management contracts. The intent of this recommendation is to permit  protective force personnel to better compete for emergency  management positions when they lack the ability or desire to continue  with their security positions.  28. PF arming and arrest authority should be reviewed with the objective  of enhancing the capabilities of SPOs. The intent of this  recommendation is to, among other things, ease SPOs’ postretirement  path into law enforcement positions.  29. Where possible, equipment, including uniforms, weapons, and badges,  should be standardized throughout the department. According to the  study group, more standardized uniforms might improve protective  forces’ morale and could offer some offsetting cost savings for the  department.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Jonathan Gill, Assistant Director;  John Cooney; Don Cowan; Cindy Gilbert; Terry Hanford; Mehrzad Nadji;  Cheryl Peterson; and Carol Herrnstadt Shulman made key contributions to  this report.  Other contributors include Carol Kolarik, Peter Ruedel, and  Robert Sanchez.