Hazardous Waste Cleanup: Numbers of Contaminated Federal Sites, Estimated Costs, and EPA's Oversight Role
Published: 2015-09-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The federal government owns over 700 million acres of land. Some of this land—which is primarily managed by USDA, Interior, DOD, and DOE—is contaminated with hazardous waste from prior uses, such as landfills and mining.
To respond to problems caused by improper disposal of hazardous substances in the past, in 1980, Congress passed CERCLA, also known as Superfund. Among other things, CERCLA requires owners and operators of hazardous waste sites to notify the federal EPA—which manages the Superfund program—of the existence of their facilities, as well as known, suspected, or likely releases of hazardous substances.
This testimony focuses on (1) numbers of contaminated and potentially contaminated federal sites for four departments; (2) spending and estimates of future costs for cleanup at these federal sites; and (3) EPA's role in maintaining the list of contaminated and potentially contaminated federal sites and ensuring that preliminary assessments of such sites are complete. This testimony is based on prior GAO reports issued from March 2009 through March 2015.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Departments of Agriculture (USDA), the Interior, Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE) have identified thousands of contaminated and potentially contaminated sites on land they manage but do not have a complete inventory of sites, in particular, for abandoned mines. GAO reported in January 2015 that USDA had identified 1,491 contaminated sites and many potentially contaminated sites. However, USDA did not have a reliable, centralized site inventory or plans and procedures for completing one, in particular, for abandoned mines. For example, officials at USDA's Forest Service estimated that there were from 27,000 to 39,000 abandoned mines on its lands—approximately 20 percent of which may pose some level of risk to human health or the environment. GAO also reported that Interior had an inventory of 4,722 sites with confirmed or likely contamination. However, Interior's Bureau of Land Management had identified over 30,000 abandoned mines that were not yet assessed for contamination, and this inventory was not complete. DOD reported to Congress in June 2014 that it had 38,804 sites in its inventory of sites with contamination. DOE reported that it has 16 sites in 11 states with contamination.
These four departments reported allocating and spending millions of dollars annually on environmental cleanup and estimated future costs in the hundreds of millions of dollars or more in environmental liabilities. Specifically:
GAO reported in January 2015 that, in fiscal year 2013, USDA allocated over $22 million to environmental cleanup efforts and reported in its financial statements $176 million in environmental liabilities to address 100 sites.
GAO reported in January 2015 that Interior in fiscal year 2013 allocated about $13 million for environmental cleanup efforts and reported $192 million in environmental liabilities in its financial statements to address 434 sites.
In July 2010, GAO reported that DOD spent almost $30 billion from 1986 to 2008 across all environmental cleanup and restoration activities at its installations. In its fiscal year 2014 Agency Financial Report , DOD reported $58.6 billion in total environmental liabilities.
DOE reported receiving an annual appropriation of almost $5.9 billion in fiscal year 2015 to support cleanup activities. In 2014, DOE estimated its total liability for environmental cleanup at almost $300 billion.
As part of maintaining the list of contaminated and potentially contaminated federal sites, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) compiled 2,323 federal sites that may pose a risk to human health and the environment, as of August 2015, according to EPA officials. EPA is responsible for ensuring that federal agencies assess these sites for contamination and has established 18 months as a reasonable time frame for agencies to complete a preliminary assessment. However, in March 2009, GAO reported that according to EPA officials, some agencies, such as DOD, may take 2 to 3 years to complete an assessment and that EPA does not have independent authority under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to enforce a timeline for completing the preliminary assessment. In March 2009, GAO suggested that Congress consider amending CERCLA section 120 to authorize EPA to require agencies to complete preliminary assessments within specified time frames.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is making no new recommendations. Previously, GAO made numerous recommendations to ensure that contaminated sites were identified and assessed, and some of these recommendations have not been fully implemented. GAO will continue to monitor implementation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on hazardous waste  cleanup at federal facilities. As you know, the federal government owns  over 700 million acres of land, which includes national parks, national  forests, research centers, defense installations, and laboratories. This  land is primarily managed by the following four departments: Agriculture  (USDA), Interior, Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE). Some of this land  may be contaminated with hazardous waste from prior uses, such as  landfills and mining. Many hazardous waste sites pose serious risks to  human health and the environment, and their cleanup can require  substantial time and expense. Abandoned mines from private mining  activities on Interior and USDA lands also can present major  environmental cleanup challenges and expenses for the federal  government.
To respond to problems caused by improper disposal of hazardous  substances in the past, in 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive  Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),  which created the Superfund program to protect human health and the  environment from the effects of hazardous waste. Under CERCLA,  potentially responsible parties, such as owners and operators of a site,  are liable for conducting or paying for site cleanup of hazardous waste, or  for reimbursing others who conduct cleanups on their behalf, including  federal agencies. By June 1981, all such facility owners and operators  were required to notify the federal Environmental Protection Agency  (EPA)—which manages the Superfund program—of the existence of their  facilities, as well as known, suspected, or likely releases of hazardous  substances. These notification and liability provisions apply to the federal  government and its contractors and lessees as well.
My testimony today focuses on (1) numbers of contaminated and  potentially contaminated federal sites for the four departments; (2)  spending on and estimates of future costs for cleanup at federal sites by  the four departments; and (3) EPA’s role in maintaining the list of  contaminated and potentially contaminated federal sites and ensuring that  preliminary assessments of such sites are complete. This testimony is  based on reports we issued from March 2009 through March 2015 and,  where possible, updates to numbers of contaminated and potentially  contaminated sites since our reports were issued. In particular, I will be  highlighting our January 2015 report that we conducted on USDA and  Interior’s inventory of contaminated and potentially contaminated federal  sites, as well as summarizing work that we have conducted on DOD and  DOE hazardous waste sites. For this work, we reviewed relevant  inventory data from September 2013 to June 2014 for 10 sources within  USDA and Interior and budget data related to environmental cleanup  projects for fiscal years 2003 through 2013 for those agencies. In that  report, we also reviewed documents, government accounting standards,  and laws, and we interviewed EPA, USDA, and Interior officials. Detailed  information on the scope and methods used for the January 2015 report,  as well as the other reports cited throughout this statement, can be found  in each of the issued products. The work upon which this statement is  based was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: CERCLA requires EPA to compile a list of contaminated and potentially  contaminated federal facilities. This list, known as the Federal Agency  Hazardous Waste Compliance Docket (docket), is based on information  that agencies are required to report to EPA. EPA compiled the first docket  in 1988 and, under CERCLA, EPA is to publish a list of any new sites  added to the docket in the Federal Register every 6 months. Under  section 120(c) of CERCLA, EPA is to update the docket after receiving  and reviewing notices from federal agencies concerning the generation,  transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes or  release of hazardous substances.
After a site is listed on the docket, CERCLA requires EPA to take steps to  ensure that a preliminary assessment is conducted. EPA has established  18 months as a reasonable time frame for agencies to complete the  preliminary assessment. After the agency conducts the preliminary  assessment, EPA reviews it to determine whether the information is  sufficient to assess the likelihood of a hazardous substance release, a  contamination pathway, and potential receptors. EPA may determine that  the site does not pose a significant threat and requires no further action. If  it determines that further investigation is needed, EPA may request that  the agency conduct a site inspection to gather more detailed information.  If, on the basis of the site inspection, EPA determines that hazardous  substances, pollutants, or contaminants have been released at the site,  EPA will use the information from the preliminary assessment and site  inspection to calculate and document a site’s preliminary Hazard Ranking  System (HRS) score, which indicates a site’s relative threat to human  health and the environment based on potential pathways of  contamination. Sites with an HRS score of 28.50 or greater become  eligible for listing on the National Priorities List (NPL), a list that includes  some of the nation’s most seriously contaminated sites. Based on the  risk a site poses, EPA may place the site on the NPL. According to an  EPA official, 158 federal sites are on the NPL, as of September 2015.
Once a site is on the NPL, EPA is to oversee the cleanup. As part of its  oversight responsibility, EPA works with the responsible federal agency to  evaluate the nature and extent of contamination at a site. The agency  must then enter into an interagency agreement with EPA that includes:  (1) a review of remedial alternatives and the selection of the remedy; (2)  schedules for completion of each remedy; and (3) arrangements for the  long-term operation and maintenance of the site. According to EPA, the  agreements also provide a process for EPA and the federal agency to  resolve any disagreements related to implementing the cleanup remedy,  with EPA being the final arbiter of such disputes. Once the agency and  EPA agree on a cleanup remedy, the agency implements the remedy at  the site. Afterwards, the agency must conduct long-term monitoring to  ensure the remedy remains protective of human health and the  environment. For federal sites not included on the NPL, CERCLA  provides that state cleanup and enforcement laws apply, and most states  have their own cleanup programs to address hazardous waste sites.
section_title: Four Departments Have Identified Thousands of Contaminated and Potentially Contaminated Sites
paragraphs: USDA, Interior, DOD, and DOE have identified thousands of  contaminated and potentially contaminated sites on land they manage,  but there is not a complete inventory of sites, in particular, for abandoned  mines.
We found in our January 2015 report that there were at least 1,491  contaminated sites on land managed by USDA. These sites include  1,422 Forest Service sites, which are primarily abandoned mines; 2  Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) sites; 3 Agricultural  Research Service (ARS) sites; 61 former grain storage sites once  managed by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC); and 3  foreclosure properties belonging to the Farm Service Agency (FSA).
In addition to sites with confirmed contamination, we found that USDA  agencies have also identified some potentially contaminated sites. ARS  had identified 3 sites that are potentially contaminated. Forest Service  regions maintain inventories of potentially contaminated sites that include  landfills, shooting ranges, and cattle dip vats, but there was no centralized  database of these sites and no plans or procedures for developing one.  These various inventories did not provide a complete picture of the extent  of USDA’s potentially contaminated sites. For example, there were an  unknown number of potentially contaminated former grain storage sites in  the 29 states where the CCC previously used carbon tetrachloride. This  number was unknown because the CCC relies on the states to notify  them of potential contamination, and 25 of the 29 states had not yet  reported whether there was suspected contamination at their former CCC  grain storage sites. The Forest Service also deals with various other  types of hazardous waste sites, such as methamphetamine laboratories,  roadside spills, and waste dumps. Forest Service officials said that, since  these types of sites may involve illegal activities and are, therefore, not  routinely reported, it is not possible to develop a comprehensive inventory  of these types of sites.
In addition, in January 2015, we reported that the Forest Service had not  developed a complete, consistent, or usable inventory of abandoned  mines and had no plans and procedures for developing such an inventory  because, according to Forest Service officials, they did not have the  resources to complete a comprehensive inventory of all potentially  contaminated abandoned mines on the agency’s lands. The Forest  Service estimated that there were from 27,000 to 39,000 abandoned  mines on their lands—approximately 20 percent of which may pose  some level of risk to human health or the environment, based on the  professional knowledge and experience of agency staff. Such risks may  include chemicals and explosives, acid mine drainage, and heavy metal  contamination in mine waste rock. However, we concluded that because  the Forest Service did not have a complete inventory of abandoned mine  sites, the actual number of abandoned mines on National Forest System  (NFS) lands was unknown.
According to a USDA official, USDA first attempted to create a national  inventory of mines on NFS lands in 2003. Then, in 2008, the Forest  Service established the Abandoned Mine Lands (AML) database to  aggregate all available data on abandoned mines on NFS lands. The  AML database drew data on pending abandoned mine sites from the  2003 database and Forest Service regional inventories, as well as from  the U.S. Geological Survey and various other federal, state, and local  databases. USDA officials said that, once the AML database was  established, the purpose of the earlier database shifted away from  maintaining an AML inventory to tracking sites that entered into the  CERCLA process.
However, as we reported in January 2015, the AML database has a  number of shortcomings. For example, the data migration from multiple  inventories led to data redundancy issues, such as some mine sites being  listed multiple times under the same or different names. In addition,  USDA officials told us that there was a lot of variation in the accuracy and  completeness of the data on these mine sites, but a quality assurance  review had not yet been performed. One Forest Service official said that,  because of these problems, the data in the AML database were unusable  for purposes of compiling a complete and accurate inventory of  abandoned mines. In 2012, the Forest Service tried to obtain the agency  resources necessary to clean up the database. Even though the Forest  Service rated this project as “critical,” the project did not receive any  resources because other projects were deemed more important,  according to a Forest Service official.
Similarly, in our January 2015 report, we found several problems with the  Forest Service’s regional abandoned mine inventories. First, some  regional inventories were incomplete. For example, officials in Forest  Service Region 10, which is composed solely of the State of Alaska, said  they believed there may be some abandoned mines scattered throughout  Tongass and Chugach National Forests that had not yet been  inventoried. They said that Forest Service Region 10 did not have enough  staff to assess all abandoned mines across such a large area. Second,  several Forest Service regional inventories contained inaccurate data.  Third, the Forest Service’s regional offices maintained their inventories  differently. Some regional offices maintained their own inventories of  potentially contaminated sites, whereas other regional offices utilized  state or local agencies’ inventories. Finally, the type of data on  abandoned mines varied from region to region, making it difficult to  consolidate into a coherent national database. Some regional offices  tracked mines at the site level, some by their features—such as mine  shafts, pits, ore piles, or machinery—and some used both approaches.  For example, officials in Forest Service Region 3 told us that they had  identified over 3,000 abandoned mine sites, and officials in Forest Service  Region 4 told us that they had identified approximately 2,000 mine  features but had not yet consolidated these features into mine sites. We  reported in January 2015 that, without a comprehensive inventory of such  sites or plans and procedures for developing one, USDA and the Forest  Service will not have reasonable assurance that they are prioritizing and  addressing the sites that pose the greatest risk to human health or the  environment.
Consequently, in January 2015, we recommended that the Secretary of  Agriculture direct the heads of the department’s land management  agencies to develop plans and procedures for completing their inventories  of potentially contaminated sites. USDA disagreed with our  recommendation and stated that it had a centralized inventory and that  this inventory was in a transition phase as a result of reduced funding  levels. USDA also stated that it had taken a number of actions to manage  its inventory in a more cost-effective manner, reduce operating costs, and  eliminate data collection redundancies across the USDA agencies.  Subsequently, in a June 2015 letter to GAO, USDA described three  corrective actions that the department planned to take in response to our  recommendation. We believe that these actions are needed.
subsections: section_title: Interior
paragraphs: We found in our January 2015 report that Interior had identified 4,722  sites with confirmed or likely contamination. These include 4,098 Bureau  of Land Management (BLM) sites that the agency reported had confirmed  contamination or required further investigation to determine whether  remediation was warranted. The majority of these sites were abandoned  mines. Interior’s National Park Service (NPS) identified 417 sites with  likely or confirmed contamination; the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 160 sites;  the Fish and Wildlife Service, 32 sites; and the Bureau of Reclamation, 15  sites. These Interior agencies identified additional locations of concern  that would require verification or initial assessment to determine if there  were environmental hazards at the sites. Officials we interviewed from  Interior agencies, except BLM, told us that they believed they had  identified all sites with likely environmental contamination. We also found  that the total number of sites BLM may potentially have to address is  unknown, due primarily to incomplete and inaccurate data on abandoned  mines on land managed by the agency.
BLM accounts for the largest number of contaminated sites and sites that  need further investigation in Interior’s inventory. Table 1 shows the  number of contaminated or potentially contaminated sites in BLM’s  inventory as of April 2014, and the extent to which remediation measures  had been undertaken or were completed.
We reported in January 2015 that BLM had also identified 30,553  abandoned mine sites that posed physical safety hazards but needed  verification or a preliminary assessment to determine whether  environmental hazards were present. However, the number of  potentially contaminated mines may be larger than these identified sites  because BLM had not identified all of the abandoned mines on the land it  manages. We reported that BLM estimated that there may be  approximately 100,000 abandoned mines that had not yet been  inventoried in California, Nevada, and Utah, and that it would take 2 to 3  years to complete the estimates for the other nine BLM states. BLM  estimated that it will take decades to complete the inventory. To inventory  a site, BLM field staff must visit the site to collect data, research the land  ownership and extent of mining activity that occurred, and record the  information in BLM databases.
In January 2015, we reported that BLM has an ongoing effort to estimate  the number of abandoned mines and mine features that have not yet  been inventoried on BLM lands and the approximate cost to complete the  inventory. BLM established inventory teams in several states to go out  and identify sites. In addition, BLM began an initiative in California to  determine the number of sites that need to be inventoried after the state  provided the agency with digitized maps of potential mine sites and  verified a sample of the sites. For California, BLM estimated that 22,728  sites and 79,757 features needed to be inventoried. BLM estimated that  approximately 69,000 and 4,000 sites remained to be inventoried in  Nevada and Utah, respectively, on BLM land. BLM officials told us that  they expect to provide a report to Congress on the inventory work  remaining in these three states in 2015. The nine remaining states with  BLM land do not have the digital geographic data available that BLM used  for California, Nevada, and Utah, according to BLM officials, making it  difficult for BLM to develop similar estimates for these states. BLM  officials told us that the U.S. Geological Survey was working on an effort  to develop datasets similar to those used to estimate the number of  abandoned mines on BLM land in California, Nevada, and Utah.
We found that Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Reclamation,  Fish and Wildlife Service, and NPS also have sites with environmental  contamination. Officials from each of these agencies told us that they  believed their inventories of sites with environmental contamination were  complete. Both Fish and Wildlife Service and NPS had identified locations  of concern, where contamination is suspected based on known past  activities or on observed and reported physical indicators requiring further  assessment. For NPS, nearly half of these sites are old dump sites.
NPS also has abandoned mines on the lands it manages. In 2013, NPS  completed a system-wide inventory and assessment project to identify  abandoned mines on lands it manages. NPS’s inventory identified 37,050  mine features at 3,421 sites on NPS land. In January 2015, we reported  that, of the total inventory, NPS officials said they believed that 3,841  features at 1,270 sites still required some level of effort to address human  health and safety and/or environmental concerns. As a result of NPS’  system-wide inventory, officials with the agency’s Abandoned Mineral  Lands Program told us that they believed that their inventory of all  potentially contaminated sites was largely complete.
As we reported in our July 2010 report, before federal environmental  legislation was enacted in the 1970s and 1980s regulating the generation,  storage, treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste, DOD activities and  industrial facilities contaminated millions of acres of soil and water on and  near DOD properties in the United States and its territories. DOD  activities released hazardous substances into the environment primarily  through industrial operations to repair and maintain military equipment, as  well as the manufacturing and testing of weapons at ammunition plants  and proving grounds.
In June 2014, DOD reported to Congress that it had 38,804 sites in its  inventory of sites with contamination from hazardous substances or  pollutants or contaminants at active installations, formerly used defense  sites, and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) locations in the United  States, as well as munition response sites that were known or suspected  to contain unexploded ordnance, discarded military munitions, or  munitions constituents., Of these 38,804 sites, DOD’s report shows  that 8,865 have not reached the department’s response complete  milestone—which occurs when a remedy is in place and required  remedial action operations, if any, are complete.
In May 2013, we reported that in addition to having a large number of  contaminated and potentially contaminated sites in its inventory, of all  federal agencies, DOD had the greatest number of sites listed on the  NPL. We reported that, as of April 2013, DOD was responsible for 129  of the 156 federal facilities on the NPL at the time (83 percent). Also, we  reported in March 2009 that the majority of DOD sites were not on the  NPL and that most DOD site cleanups were overseen by state agencies  rather than EPA, as allowed by CERCLA.
Our work has found that the lack of interagency agreements between  EPA and DOD has historically contributed to delays in cleaning up military  installations. For example, we reported in July 2010 that, as of February  2009, 11 DOD installations did not have an interagency agreement, even  with CERCLA’s requirement that federal agencies enter into interagency  agreements with EPA within a certain time frame to clean up sites on the  NPL, and even though the department had reached agreement with EPA  on the basic terms. Without an interagency agreement, EPA does not  have the mechanisms to ensure that cleanup by an installation proceeds  expeditiously, is properly done, and has public input, as required by  CERCLA. We found one DOD installation that, after 13 years on the NPL  and receipt of EPA administrative cleanup orders for sitewide cleanup,  had not signed an interagency agreement. We recommended that the  Administrator of EPA take action to ensure that outstanding CERCLA  section 120 interagency agreements are negotiated expeditiously. In May  2013, we reported that DOD had made progress on this issue by  decreasing the number of installations without an interagency agreement  from 11 to 2, but both of those sites still posed significant risks.  According to an EPA official, as of September 2015, one of these two  installations now has an interagency agreement. However, according to  this official, there is no interagency agreement at the other installation— Redstone Arsenal in Alabama. We recommended that EPA pursue  changes to a key executive order that would increase its authority to  hasten cleanup at sites without an interagency agreement. EPA agreed  but has not taken action to have the executive order amended. We also  suggested in July 2010 that Congress consider amending CERCLA  section 120 to authorize EPA to impose administrative penalties at federal  facilities placed on the NPL that lack interagency agreements within the  CERCLA-imposed deadline of 6 months after completion of the remedial  investigation and feasibility study. We believe that this leverage could  help EPA better satisfy its statutory responsibilities with agencies that are  unwilling to enter into agreements where required under CERCLA section  120.
As we reported in March 2015, 70 years of nuclear weapons production  and energy research by DOE and its predecessor agencies generated  large amounts of radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, excess plutonium  and uranium, contaminated soil and groundwater, and thousands of  contaminated facilities, including land, buildings, and other structures and  their systems and equipment. DOE’s Office of Environmental  Management (EM) is responsible for one of the world’s largest  environmental cleanup programs, the treatment and disposal of  radioactive and hazardous waste created as a by-product of producing  nuclear weapons and energy research. The largest component of the  cleanup mission is the treatment and disposal of millions of gallons of  highly radioactive waste stored in aging and leak-prone underground  tanks. In addition, radioactive and hazardous contamination has migrated  through the soil into the groundwater, posing a significant threat to human  health and the environment.
According to DOE’s fiscal year 2016 congressional budget request, EM  has completed cleanup activities at 91 sites in 30 states and in the  Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and EM has remaining cleanup  responsibilities at 16 sites in 11 states. EM cleanup work activities are  carried out by contractors, such as Washington River Protection  Solutions, for the operation of nuclear waste tanks at the Hanford Site in  Washington State.
In March 2015, we reported that the National Nuclear Security  Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE, also  manages many contaminated facilities. Some of these facilities are no  longer in use, others are still operational. Once NNSA considers these  facilities to be nonoperational, they may be eligible for NNSA to transfer  to EM. We found that NNSA had identified 83 contaminated facilities at  six sites for potential transfer to EM for disposition over a 25-year period,  56 of which were currently nonoperational. Until the sites are transferred  to EM, however, NNSA is responsible for maintaining its facilities and  incurring associated maintenance costs to protect human health and the  environment from the risk of contamination. NNSA’s responsibilities may  last for several years, or even decades, depending on when EM is able to  accept the facilities. We found that as NNSA maintains contaminated  nonoperational facilities, the facilities’ condition continues to worsen,  resulting in increased costs to maintain them.
As we reported in March 2015, EM has not accepted any facilities from  NNSA for cleanup in over a decade. EM does not accept facilities for  transfer until funding is available to carry out the decontamination and  decommissioning work. In addition, EM officials told us that they also do  not include facilities maintained by NNSA in their planning until they have  available funding to begin cleanup work. We concluded that without  integrating NNSA’s inventory of nonoperation facilities into its process for  prioritizing facilities for disposition, EM may be putting lower-risk facilities  under its responsibility ahead of deteriorating facilities managed by NNSA  that are of greater risk to human health and the environment. We  therefore recommended that EM integrate its lists of facilities prioritized  for disposition with all NNSA facilities that meet EM’s transfer  requirements and that EM should also include this integrated list as part  of the Congressional Budget Justification for DOE. We also  recommended that EM analyze and consider life cycle costs for NNSA  facilities that meet its transfer requirements and incorporate the  information into its prioritization process. Analyzing life cycle costs of  nonoperational facilities shows that accelerating cleanup of some  facilities, while others are maintained in their current states, could offer  significant cost savings. DOE stated that it concurred with the issues  identified in our report and described actions it plans to implement to  address them. For example, DOE stated that it has formed a working  group that may address GAO’s findings.
section_title: Four Departments Have Reported Spending Millions Annually for Cleanup at Federal Sites and Have Estimated Future Costs from Hundreds of Millions to Billions of Dollars
paragraphs: The four departments reported allocating and spending millions of dollars  annually on environmental cleanup. They also estimated future costs in  the hundreds of millions of dollars or billions to clean up sites and address  their environmental liabilities.
We reported in January 2015 that the majority of USDA’s environmental  cleanup funds are spent cleaning up ARS’s Beltsville NPL facility and  abandoned mines and landfills on NFS lands, as well as mitigating  potential groundwater contamination from activities at former CCC grain  storage sites. In fiscal year 2013, USDA allocated over $22 million to  environmental cleanup efforts. Specifically, USDA allocated (1) $3.7  million for department-wide cleanup projects, the majority of which were  for cleanup at USDA’s Beltsville site and to cover legal expenses; (2)  approximately $14 million for the Forest Service to conduct environmental  assessments and cleanup activities; and (3) $4.3 million in funds to  mitigate contamination at former grain storage sites. The Forest Service  also allocated approximately $20 million in one-time Recovery Act funds  in fiscal year 2009 to cleanup activities at 14 sites located on, or directly  impacting, land managed by the Forest Service.
In addition, USDA seeks cost recovery of cleanup costs and natural  resource damages under CERCLA from potentially responsible parties,  such as owners and operators of a site, to help offset cleanup costs at  sites where they caused or contributed to contamination. Cost recovery  amounts vary from year to year. We found that for fiscal years 2003 to  2013, USDA typically recovered $30 million or less annually. However,  according to department documents, USDA successfully recovered over  $170 million from a single mining company as part of a bankruptcy case  in 2009. These funds were used to conduct cleanup activities at 13 mine  sites located on NFS lands. In fiscal year 2011, USDA recovered $65  million from another mining company for restoration of injured natural  resources in the Coeur d’Alene River Basin NPL site in Idaho.
In its fiscal year 2013 financial statements, USDA reported a total of $176  million in environmental liabilities. These liabilities represent what USDA  determined to be the probable and reasonably estimable future costs to  address 100 USDA sites, as required by federal accounting standards.  The $176 million amount included: $165 million to address asbestos  contamination, $8 million for up to 76 CCC former grain storage sites in  the Midwest that are contaminated with carbon tetrachloride, and $3  million for 24 Forest Service sites, including guard stations, work centers,  and warehouses, among others. In addition, USDA reported $120  million in contingent liabilities in its fiscal year 2013 financial statements.  Of this amount, $40 million was for environmental cleanup at four  phosphate mine sites in southeast Idaho.
subsections: section_title: Interior
paragraphs: We reported in January 2015 that Interior allocated about $13 million for  environmental cleanup efforts in fiscal year 2013. Specifically, Interior  allocated $10 million for cleanup projects department-wide; NPS allocated  an additional $2.7 million, and the Fish and Wildlife Service allocated over  $800,000 for environmental assessment and cleanup projects. In  addition, BLM allocated more than $34 million to its hazardous  management and abandoned mine programs. BLM provided over $18  million to its state offices; however, the amount specifically used for  environmental cleanup projects was not readily available. BLM also spent  over $27 million in one-time Recovery Act funds on physical safety and/or  environmental remediation projects at 76 locations. According to BLM,  there were 31 projects for environmental activities.
For fiscal years 2003 through 2013, Interior allocated over $148 million in  Central Hazardous Materials Fund (CHF) resources to its agencies to  support response actions undertaken at contaminated sites under  CERCLA. This amount includes over $49 million in CHF cost recoveries.  Interior’s agencies undertook 101 projects with CHF funding during fiscal  years 2003 through 2013. These projects supported a range of activities,  from project oversight to advanced studies (e.g., remedial investigations,  feasibility studies, engineering evaluations, and cost analyses) to removal  and remedial actions. The majority of sites receiving CHF funding were  abandoned mines, landfills, and former industrial facilities. In fiscal year  2013, Interior allocated $10 million to the CHF.
During our work for the January 2015 report, BLM officials told us that the  current funding levels were not sufficient to complete the inventory and  address the physical and environmental hazards at abandoned mines. In  its 2014 and 2015 budget justifications, Interior described proposals to  charge the hardrock mining industry fees and use the funds to address  abandoned mines. Similarly, an NPS official told us that the agency has  inadequate funding to address its over 400 potentially contaminated and  contaminated sites. According to an NPS official, the agency had been  able to address its highest risk sites. If there is a very significant risk, NPS  can usually obtain funds to address the portion of the site that has the  highest risk, if not the site as a whole. According to NPS officials, NPS  has not selected response actions for almost 300 sites because current  funding levels are not sufficient to address them.
As we found in our January 2015 report, Interior reported $192 million in  environmental liabilities in its fiscal year 2013 financial statements. These  liabilities represent what the agency has determined to be the probably  and reasonably estimable future cost for completing cleanup activities at  434 sites, as required by federal accounting standards. These activities  include studies or removal and remedial actions at sites where Interior  has already conducted an environmental assessment and where Interior  caused or contributed to the contamination or has recognized its legal  obligation for addressing the site. Interior also disclosed in the notes to its  financial statements the estimated cost range for completing cleanup  activities at these sites. The cost range disclosed was approximately  $192 million to $1.3 billion.
Interior also disclosed the estimated costs for government-acknowledged  sites—sites that are of financial consequence to the federal government  with damage caused by nonfederal entities—where it was reasonably  probable that cleanup costs would be incurred. In fiscal year 2013,  Interior disclosed in the notes to its fiscal year 2013 financial statements a  cost range for these activities to be approximately $62 million to $139  million. The majority of this cost range was related to addressing 85  abandoned mine sites. As we have previously reported, cleanup costs  for abandoned mines vary by type and size of the operation. For example,  the cost of plugging holes is usually small, but reclamation costs for large  mining operations can reach tens of millions of dollars.
Historically, we have found that DOD has spent billions on environmental  cleanup and restoration at its installations. For example, in July 2010, we  reported that DOD spent almost $30 billion from 1986 to 2008 across all  environmental cleanup and restoration activities at its installations,  including NPL and non-NPL sites. In March 2010, we reported that  since the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) was  established, approximately $18.4 billion had been obligated for  environmental cleanup at individual sites on active military bases, $7.7  billion for cleanup at sites located on installations designated for closure  under BRAC, and about $3.7 billion to clean up formerly used defense  sites. In June 2014, DOD reported to Congress that, in fiscal year 2013,  DOD obligated approximately $1.8 billion for its environmental restoration  activities.
In its Agency Financial Report for fiscal year 2014, DOD reported $58.6  billion in total environmental liabilities. These liabilities include, but are  not limited to, cleanup requirements for DERP for active installations,  BRAC installations, and formerly used defense sites.
According to DOE’s fiscal year 2016 Congressional budget request,  DOE received an annual appropriation of almost $5.9 billion in fiscal year  2015 to support the cleanup of radioactive and hazardous wastes  resulting from decades of nuclear weapons research and production.  DOE has estimated that the cost of this cleanup may approach $300  billion over the next several decades. As we reported in May 2015, DOE  spent more than $19 billion since 1989 on the treatment and disposition  of 56 million gallons of radioactive and hazardous waste at its Hanford  site in Washington State. In July 2010, we reported that four large DOE  cleanup sites received the bulk of the $6 billion in Recovery Act funding  for environmental cleanup. We previously reported that those sites have  had problems with rising costs, schedule delays, and contract and project  management.
In 2014, DOE estimated that its total liability for environmental cleanup,  the largest component of which is managed by EM, is almost $300 billion  and includes responsibilities that could continue beyond the year 2089.  We are beginning work at the request of the Senate Armed Services  Committee to examine DOE’s long-term cleanup strategy, what is known  about the potential cost and timeframes to address DOE’s environmental  liabilities, what factors does DOE consider when prioritizing cleanup  activities across its sites, and how DOE’s long-term cleanup strategy  address the various risks that long-term cleanup activities encounter.
section_title: EPA’s Oversight Role Includes Maintaining a List of Potentially Hazardous Sites and Ensuring that Preliminary Assessments Are Completed
paragraphs: As part of its oversight role in maintaining the list of contaminated and  potentially contaminated federal sites and ensuring that preliminary  assessments of such sites are complete, EPA has compiled a docket of  over 2,300 federal sites that may pose a risk to human health and the  environment. EPA is responsible for ensuring that the federal agencies  assess these sites for contamination. Our January 2015 report focused  on reviewing the extent to which USDA and Interior have assessed the  majority of sites listed on the docket.
subsections: section_title: Federal Agency Hazardous Waste Compliance Docket
paragraphs: As of August 2015, the agency’s docket listing consisted of 2,323 sites  that may pose a risk to human health and the environment, which EPA  compiled largely from information provided by federal agencies. We  found in January 2015 that EPA has published many updates of the  docket, but the agency has not consistently met the 6-month reporting  requirement. Prior to 2014, the effort to compile and monitor the docket  listings was a manual process. However, in 2014, EPA implemented  revised docket procedures with a computer-based process that is to  compile potential docket listings from agency notices by searching  electronic records. EPA officials said that they expect the new system to  allow them to update the docket in a more timely way in the future. EPA  has published two docket updates with this new system, in December  2014 and August of 2015.
As we reported in January 2015, EPA officials told us that it is difficult for  EPA to know about a site to list if agencies have not reported it. However,  if EPA learns about a site that has had a release or threat of a release of  hazardous substances through other means, EPA will list the site on the  docket. It is important to note that the docket is a historical record of  potentially contaminated sites that typically have been reported to EPA by  agencies. Because it is a historical record, sites that subsequently were  found to not be contaminated, and sites that the agencies may have  addressed, are still included on the docket.
In our January 2015 report on USDA and Interior potentially contaminated  sites, we discussed the docket with officials from these two departments.  We found that Interior and USDA officials disagreed with EPA officials  over whether some of these sites should have been listed on the docket.  Interior officials believed that CERCLA does not give EPA the discretion  to list Interior sites unless Interior reports them to EPA and that EPA  should limit its listing of sites on the docket to those reported by an  agency under one of the provisions specifically noted in CERCLA. Interior  and USDA officials also believed that abandoned mines should not be  listed on EPA’s docket because the agencies did not cause the  contamination and, therefore, the sites should not be considered federal  sites. However, EPA officials believed that, regardless of whether USDA  and Interior are legally liable for addressing these sites, they have an  independent responsibility under Executive Order 12,580 and CERCLA  as land management agencies owning the sites to address them.
section_title: Preliminary Assessments
paragraphs: As I stated earlier, EPA established 18 months as a reasonable time  frame for agencies to complete a preliminary assessment. However, in  March 2009, we reported that EPA officials from two regions told us that  some agencies such as DOD may take 2 to 3 years to complete a  preliminary assessment because EPA does not have independent  authority under CERCLA to enforce a timeline for completion of a  preliminary assessment. In March 2009, we suggested that Congress  consider amending CERCLA section 120 to authorize EPA to require  agencies to complete preliminary assessments within specified time  frames.
For USDA and Interior, we found in our January 2015 report that as of  February 2014, both Interior and USDA had conducted a preliminary  assessment of the majority of their sites on EPA’s docket. However,  EPA, Interior, and USDA have differing information on the status of  preliminary assessments for the remaining docket sites. Our analysis of  data in in EPA’s Comprehensive Environmental Response,  Compensation, and Liability Information System for our January 2015  report found that USDA still needed to conduct a preliminary assessment  at 50 docket sites, and Interior needed to conduct a preliminary  assessment at 79 docket sites. When we reviewed the status of these  sites with USDA and Interior officials, the officials told us that they  believed their agencies had met the preliminary assessment requirement  for many of these sites.
To help resolve disagreements between EPA and USDA and Interior  regarding which remaining docket sites require preliminary assessments,  we recommended, in January 2015, that EPA take three actions. First,  EPA should review available information on USDA and Interior sites  where EPA’s Superfund Enterprise Management System indicates that a  preliminary assessment has not occurred to determine the accuracy of  this information, and update the information, as needed. After completing  this review, EPA should inform USDA and Interior whether the  requirement to conduct a preliminary assessment at the identified sites  has been met or if additional work is needed to meet this requirement.  Finally, EPA should work with the relevant USDA and Interior offices to  obtain any additional information needed to assist EPA in determining the  accuracy of the agency’s data on the status of preliminary assessments  for these sites. EPA agreed with these recommendations and, according  to EPA officials, the agency has started taking steps to address them.
Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member Tonko, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to answer any questions you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony,  please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or gomezj@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this testimony. Other individuals who made key  contributions include: Barbara Patterson (Assistant Director), Antoinette  Capaccio, Rich Johnson, Kiki Theodoropoulos, and Leigh White.
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