Drinking Water: Experts' Views on How Federal Funding Can Best Be Spent To Improve Security
Published: 2004-09-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: After the events of September 11, 2001, Congress appropriated over $140 million to help drinking water systems assess their vulnerabilities to terrorist threats and to develop response plans. Utilities are asking for additional funding, however, not only to plan security upgrades but also to support their implementation. This testimony is based on GAO's report, Drinking Water: Experts' Views on How Future Federal Funding Can Best Be Spent to Improve Security ( GAO-04-29 , October 31, 2003). Specifically, GAO sought experts' views on (1) the key security-related vulnerabilities affecting drinking water systems, (2) the criteria for determining how federal funds are allocated among drinking water systems to improve their security, and the methods by which those funds should be distributed, and (3) specific activities the federal government should support to improve drinking water security.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO's expert panel cited distribution systems as among the most vulnerable physical components of a drinking water utility, a conclusion also reached by key research organizations. Also cited were the computer systems that manage critical utility functions; treatment chemicals stored on-site; and source water supplies. Experts further identified two key factors that constitute overarching vulnerabilities: (1) a lack of the information individual utilities need to identify their most serious threats and (2) a lack of redundancy in vital system components, which increases the likelihood an attack could render an entire utility inoperable. According to over 90 percent of the experts, utilities serving high-density areas deserve at least a high priority for federal funding. Also warranting priority are utilities serving critical assets, such as military bases, national icons, and key academic institutions. Direct federal grants were clearly the most preferred funding mechanism, with over half the experts indicating that such grants would be "very effective" in distributing funds to recipients. Substantially fewer recommended using the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund for security upgrades. When asked to identify specific security-enhancing activities most deserving of federal support, experts' responses generally fell into three categories: (1) physical and technological upgrades to improve security and research to develop technologies to prevent, detect, or respond to an attack (experts most strongly supported developing near real-time monitoring technologies to quickly detect contaminants in treated drinking water on its way to consumers); (2) education and training to support, among other things, simulation exercises to provide responders with experience in carrying out emergency response plans; specialized training of utility security staff; and multidisciplinary consulting teams to independently analyze systems' security preparedness and recommend improvements; and (3) strengthening key relationships between water utilities and other agencies that may have key roles in an emergency response, such as public health agencies, law enforcement agencies, and neighboring drinking water systems; this category also includes developing protocols to encourage consistent approaches to detecting and diagnosing threats.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Drinking water utilities across the country have long been recognized as  potentially vulnerable to terrorist attacks of various types, including  physical disruption, bioterrorism, chemical contamination, and cyber  attack. Damage or destruction by terrorists could disrupt not only the  availability of safe drinking water, but also the delivery of vital services  that depend on these water supplies, such as fire suppression. Such  concerns were greatly amplified by the September 11, 2001, attacks on the  World Trade Center and the Pentagon and then by the discovery of  training manuals in Afghanistan detailing how terrorist trainees could  support attacks on drinking water systems.
Congress has since committed significant federal funding to assist  drinking water utilities—with over $140 million appropriated from fiscal  year 2002 through fiscal year 2004—to help systems assess their  vulnerabilities to terrorist threats and develop response plans. As  significant as these funds are, drinking water utilities are asking the  federal government to support efforts that go beyond the planning for  upgrading drinking water security to the actual implementation of  security upgrades. Consequently, at the request of the Senate Committee  on Environment and Public Works, we examined (1) the key security­ related vulnerabilities affecting the nation’s drinking water systems; (2)  the criteria that experts believe should be used to determine how federal  funds are allocated among recipients to improve their security, and the  methods that should be used to distribute these funds; and (3) specific  activities that experts believe the federal government should support to  improve drinking water security. My testimony is based on our October  2003 report entitled, Drinking Water: Experts’ Views on How Future  Federal Funding Can Best Be Spent to Improve Security.
To prepare our October 2003 report on these issues, we assembled a panel  of nationally recognized experts. In selecting members for the expert  panel, we sought individuals who were widely recognized as possessing  expertise on one or more key aspects of drinking water security. We also  sought to achieve balance in representation from key federal agencies, key  state or local agencies, key industry and nonprofit organizations, and  water utilities of varying sizes.
Our expert panel identified several key physical assets as the most  seriously vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Nearly 75 percent of the experts  (32 of 43) identified one or more components of the distribution system. In  fact, more experts identified the distribution system as the single most  important vulnerability (12 of 43) of all system components. The other  physical assets most frequently cited were source water supplies, critical  information systems, and chemicals that are stored on site for use in the  treatment process. Importantly, the experts also identified overarching  vulnerability issues that may involve multiple system components, or even  an entire drinking water system. Chief among these issues were (1) a lack  of redundancy in vital systems, which increases the likelihood that an  attack could render a system inoperable; and (2) the difficulty many  systems face due to a lack of information on the most serious threats to  which they are exposed. In general, the panelists’ observations were  similar to those of major public and private organizations that have  assessed the vulnerability of these systems to terrorist attacks, including  the National Academy of Sciences, Sandia National Laboratories, and key  industry associations.
About 90 percent of the experts agreed “strongly” or “somewhat” that  allocation decisions should be based on assessments of drinking water  utilities’ vulnerabilities, which the utilities are required to prepare by the  Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act  of 2002. In addition, the experts favored funding priority for utilities  serving high-density populations, with over 90 percent indicating that they  deserve at least a “high” priority and over 50 percent indicating they  deserve “highest” priority. Utilities serving critical assets (such as military  bases and other sensitive government facilities, national icons, and key  cultural or academic institutions) were also recommended as high-priority  recipients. When asked to identify the most effective mechanisms for  distributing these federal funds to recipients, over half the experts  indicated that direct federal grants would be “very effective” in doing so.  Many also favored including a requirement for matching funds as a grant  condition. Fewer experts recommended using the Drinking Water State  Revolving Fund (DWSRF) for this purpose, particularly to support  upgrades that need to be implemented quickly.
When asked to identify and set priorities for security-enhancing activities  most deserving of federal support, the experts most frequently identified  activities that fell into three broad categories:
Physical and technological improvements—needed for both physical  alterations to improve the security of drinking water systems, and for  the development of technologies to prevent, detect, or respond to an  attack. The need to develop near real-time monitoring technologies,  which would be particularly useful in quickly detecting contaminants in  water that has already left the treatment plant for the consumer, had by  far the strongest support.
Education and training—to be provided to both utility and nonutility  personnel responsible for preventing, responding to, and recovering  from an attack. These activities include, among other things, support  for simulation exercises to provide responders with experience in  carrying out utilities’ emergency response plans; specialized training of  utility personnel responsible for security; general training of utility  personnel to augment security awareness among all staff; and  multidisciplinary consulting teams to independently analyze utilities’  security preparedness and recommend security-related improvements.
Strengthened operational relationships—especially between water  utilities and other agencies (public health agencies, enforcement  agencies, and neighboring utilities, among others) that may have key  roles in an emergency response. This category also includes developing  common protocols to engender a consistent approach among utilities  in detecting and diagnosing threats, and the testing of local emergency  response systems to ensure that participating agencies coordinate their  actions effectively.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Drinking water systems vary by size and other factors, but as illustrated in  figure 1, they most typically include a supply source, treatment facility,  and distribution system. A water system’s supply source may be a  reservoir, aquifer, or well, or a combination of these sources. Some  systems may also include a dam to help maintain a stable water level, and  aqueducts and transmission pipelines to deliver the water to a distant  treatment plant. The treatment process generally uses filtration,  sedimentation, and other processes to remove impurities and harmful  agents, and disinfection processes such as chlorination to eliminate  biological contaminants. Chemicals used in these processes, most notably  chlorine, are often stored on site at the treatment plant. Distribution  systems comprise water towers, piping grids, pumps, and other  components to deliver treated water from treatment systems to  consumers. Particularly among larger utilities, distribution systems may  contain thousands of miles of pipes and numerous access points.
Nationwide, there are more than 160,000 public water systems that  individually serve from as few as 25 people to 1 million people or more. As  figure 2 illustrates, nearly 133,000 of these water systems serve 500 or  fewer people. Only 466 systems serve more than 100,000 people each, but  these systems, located primarily in urban areas, account for early half of  the total population served.
Until the 1990s, emergency planning at drinking water utilities generally  focused on responding to natural disasters and, in some cases, domestic  threats such as vandalism. In the 1990s, however, both government and  industry officials broadened the process to account for terrorist threats.  Among the most significant actions taken was the issuance in 1998 of  Presidential Decision Directive 63 to protect the nation’s critical  infrastructure against criminal and terrorist attacks. The directive  designated the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as the lead federal  agency to address the water infrastructure and to work with both public  and private organizations to develop emergency preparedness strategies.  EPA, in turn, appointed the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies to  coordinate the water industry’s role in emergency preparedness. During  this time, this public-private partnership focused primarily on cyber  security threats for the several hundred community water systems that  each served over 100,000 persons. The partnership was broadened in 2001  to include both the drinking water and wastewater sectors, and focused on  systems serving more than 3,300 people.
Efforts to better protect drinking water infrastructure were accelerated  dramatically after the September 11 attacks. EPA and the drinking water  industry launched efforts to share information on terrorist threats and  response strategies. They also undertook initiatives to develop guidance  and training programs to assist utilities in identifying their systems’  vulnerabilities. As a major step in this regard, EPA supported the  development, by American Water Works Association Research Foundation  and Sandia National Laboratories, of a vulnerability assessment  methodology for larger drinking water utilities. The push for vulnerability  assessments was then augmented by the Public Health Security and  Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Bioterrorism Act).  Among other things, the act required each community water system  serving more than 3,300 individuals to conduct a detailed vulnerability  assessment by specified dates in 2003 or 2004, depending on their size.
Since we issued our report in October, several Homeland Security  Presidential Directives (HSPDs) were issued that denote new  responsibilities for EPA and the water sector. HSPD 7 designates EPA as  the water sector’s agency specifically responsible for infrastructure  protection activities, including developing a specific water sector plan for  the National Infrastructure Protection Plan that the Department of  Homeland Security must produce. HSPD 9 directs EPA to develop a  surveillance and monitoring program to provide early warning in the event  of a terrorist attack using diseases, pests, or poisonous agents. EPA is also  charged, under HSPD 9, with developing a nationwide laboratory network  to support the routine monitoring and response requirements of the  surveillance program. HSPD 10 assigns additional responsibilities to EPA  for decontamination efforts.
To obtain information for our analysis, we conducted a three-phase, Web­ based survey of 43 experts on drinking water security. In identifying these  experts, we sought to achieve balance in terms of area of expertise (i.e.,  state and local emergency response, engineering, epidemiology, public  policy, security and defense, drinking water treatment, risk assessment  and modeling, law enforcement, water infrastructure, resource economics,  bioterrorism, public health, and emergency and crisis management). In  addition, we attempted to achieve participation by experts from key  federal organizations, state and local agencies, industry and nonprofit  organizations, and water utilities serving populations of varying sizes. To  obtain information from the expert panel, we employed a modified version  of the Delphi method. The Delphi method is a systematic process for  obtaining individuals’ views and seeking consensus among them, if  possible, on a question or problem of interest. Since first developed by the  RAND Corporation in the 1950s, the Delphi method has generally been  implemented using face-to-face group discussions. For this study,  however, we administered the method through the Internet. We conducted  our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards between July 2002 and August 2003.
section_title: Experts Identified Key Vulnerabilities That Could Compromise Drinking Water Systems’ Security
paragraphs: Our panel of experts identified several key physical assets of drinking  water systems as the most vulnerable to intentional attack. In general,  their observations were similar to those of public and private  organizations that have assessed the vulnerability of these systems to  terrorist attacks, including the National Academy of Sciences, Sandia  National Laboratories, and key industry associations. In particular, as  shown in figure 3, nearly 75 percent of the experts (32 of 43) identified the  distribution system or its components as among the top vulnerabilities of  drinking water systems. Experts also identified overarching issues  compromising how well these assets are protected. Chief among these  issues are (1) a lack of redundancy in vital systems, which increases the  likelihood that an attack could render a system inoperable; and (2) the  difficulty many systems face in understanding the nature of the threats to  which they are exposed.
I would first like to discuss the distribution system, since it was cited most  frequently as a key vulnerability by our panelists. The distribution system  delivers drinking water primarily through a network of underground pipes  to homes, businesses, and other customers. While the distribution systems  of small drinking water utilities may be relatively simple, larger systems  serving major metropolitan areas can be extremely complex. One such  system, for example, measures water use through 670,000 metered service  connections, and distributes treated water through nearly 7,100 miles of  water mains that range from 2 inches to 10 feet in diameter. In addition to  these pipelines and connections, other key distribution system  components typically include numerous pumping stations, treated water  storage tanks, and fire hydrants.
In highlighting the vulnerability of distribution systems, our panelists most  often cited their accessibility at so many points. One expert, for example,  cited the difficulty in preventing the introduction of a contaminant into the  distribution system from inside a building “regardless of how much time,  money, or effort we spend protecting public facilities.” Experts also noted  that since the water in the distribution system has already been treated  and is on the way to the consumer, the distribution of a chemical,  biological, or radiological agent in such a manner would be virtually  undetectable until it was too late to prevent harm. While research on the  fate and transport of contaminants within water treatment plants and  distribution systems is under way, according to one expert, limited  technologies are readily available that can detect a wide range of  contaminants once treated water is released through the distribution  system for public use.
Several other components, though not considered as critical as the  distribution system, were still the subject of concern. Nearly half the  experts (20 of 43) identified source water as among drinking water  systems’ top vulnerabilities. One expert noted, for example, that “because  of the vast areas covered by watersheds and reservoirs, it is difficult to  maintain security and prevent intentional or accidental releases of  materials that could have an adverse impact on water quality.” Yet some  experts cited factors that mitigate the risks associated with source water,  including (1) the source water typically involves a large volume of water,  which in many cases could dilute the potency of contaminants; (2) the  length of time (days or even weeks) that it typically takes for source water  to reach consumers; and (3) the source water will go through a treatment  process in which many contaminants are removed.
Also cited as vulnerabilities were the sophisticated computer systems that  drinking water utilities have come to rely upon to manage key functions.  These Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems allow  operators to monitor and control processes throughout their drinking  water systems. Although SCADA systems have improved water utilities’  efficiency and reduced costs, almost half of the experts on our panel (19 of  43) identified them as among these utilities’ top vulnerabilities.
Thirteen of the 43 experts identified treatment chemicals, particularly  chlorine used for disinfection, as among utilities’ top vulnerabilities.  Experts cited the inherent danger of storing large cylinders of a chemical  on site, noting that their destruction could release toxic gases in densely  populated areas. Some noted, however, that this risk has been alleviated  by utilities that have chosen to use the more stable liquid form of chlorine  instead of the more vulnerable compressed gas canisters that have  traditionally been used.
Finally, experts identified overarching issues that compromise the  integrity of multiple physical assets, or even the entire drinking water  system. Among these is the lack of redundancy among vital systems. Many  drinking water systems are “linear”—that is, they have single transmission  lines leading into the treatment facility and single pumping stations along  the system, and often use a single computer operating system. They also  depend on the electric grid, transportation systems, and single sources of  raw materials (e.g., treatment chemicals). Many experts expressed  concern that problems at any of these “single points of failure” could  render a system inoperable unless redundant systems are in place. Experts  also cited the lack of sufficient information to understand the most  significant threats confronting individual utilities. According to the  American Water Works Association, assessments of the most credible  threats facing a utility should be based on knowledge of the “threat  profile” in its specific area, including information about past events that  could shed light on future risks. Experts noted, however, that such  information has been difficult for utilities to obtain. One expert suggested  that the intelligence community needs to develop better threat information  and share it with the water sector.
section_title: Experts’ Views on the Allocation and Distribution of Federal Funds
paragraphs: Many drinking water utilities have been financing at least some of their  security upgrades by passing along the costs to their customers through  rate increases. Given the cost of these upgrades, however, the utility  industry is also asking that the taxpayer shoulder some of the burden  through the appropriations process. Should Congress and the  administration agree to this request, they will need to address key issues  concerning who should receive the funds and how they should be  distributed. With this in mind, we asked our panel of experts to focus on  the following key questions: (1) To what extent should utilities’  vulnerability and risk assessment information be considered in making  allocation decisions? (2) What types of utilities should receive funding  priority? and (3) What are the most effective mechanisms for directing  these funds to recipients?
Regarding the first of these questions, about 90 percent of the experts (39  of 43) agreed “strongly” or “somewhat” that funds should be allocated on  the basis of vulnerability assessment information, with some citing the  vulnerability assessments (VAs) required by the Bioterrorism Act as the  best available source of this information. Several experts, however,  pointed to a number of complicating factors. Perhaps the most significant  constraint is the Bioterrorism Act’s provision precluding the disclosure of  any information that is “derived” from vulnerability assessments submitted  to EPA. The provision protects sensitive information about each utility’s  vulnerabilities from individuals who may then use the information to harm  the utility. Hence, the law specifies that only individuals designated by the  EPA Administrator may have access to the assessments and related  information. Yet, according to many of the experts, even those individuals  may face constraints in using the information. They may have difficulty,  for example, in citing vulnerability assessments to support decisions on  allocating security-related funds among utilities, as well as decisions  concerning research priorities and guidance documents. Others cited an  inherent dilemma affecting any effort to set priorities for funding decisions  based on the greatest risk—whatever does not receive attention becomes  a more likely target.
Regarding the second question concerning the types of utilities that should  receive funding priority, 93 percent of the experts (40 of 43) indicated that  utilities serving high-density population areas should receive a high or the  highest priority in funding (See figure 4.). Fifty-five percent deemed this  criterion as the highest priority. Most shared the view of one expert who  noted that directing limited resources to protect the greatest number of  people is a common factor when setting funding priorities. Experts also  assigned high priority to utilities serving critical assets, such as national  icons representing the American image, military bases, and key  government, academic, and cultural institutions.
At the other end of the spectrum, only about 5 percent of the experts (2 of  43) stated that utilities serving rural or isolated populations should receive  a high or highest priority for federal funding. These two panelists  commented that such facilities are least able to afford security  enhancements and are therefore in greatest need of federal support.  Importantly, the relatively small percentage of experts advocating priority  for smaller systems may not fully reflect the concern among many of the  experts for the safety of these utilities. For example, several who  supported higher priority for utilities serving high-density populations  cautioned that while problems at a large utility will put more people at  risk, utilities serving small population areas may be more vulnerable  because of weaker treatment capabilities, fewer highly trained operators,  and more limited resources.
Regarding the mechanisms for distributing federal funds, 86 percent of the  experts (37 of 43) indicated that direct grants would be “somewhat” or  “very” effective in allocating federal funds (See figure 5.) One expert cited  EPA’s distribution of direct security-related grant funds in 2002 to larger  systems to perform their VAs as a successful initiative. Importantly, 74  percent also supported a matching requirement for such grants as  somewhat or very effective. One expert pointed out that such a  requirement would effectively leverage limited federal dollars, thereby  providing greater incentive to participate.
The Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) received somewhat  less support as a mechanism for funding security enhancements. About  half of the experts (22 of 43) indicated that the fund would be somewhat  or very effective in distributing federal funds, but less than 10 percent  indicated that it would be very effective. One expert cautioned that the  DWSRF should be used only if a process were established that separated  funding for security-related needs from other infrastructure needs. Others  stated that as a funding mechanism, the DWSRF would not be as practical  as other mechanisms for funding improvements requiring immediate  attention, but would instead be better suited for longer-term  improvements.
section_title: Activities Experts Identified as Most Deserving of Federal Support
paragraphs: When experts were asked to identify specific security-enhancing activities  most deserving of federal support, their responses generally fell into three  categories: (1) physical and technological upgrades to improve security  and research to develop technologies to prevent, detect, or respond to an  attack, (2) education and training to support, among other things,  simulation exercises to provide responders with experience in carrying  out emergency response plans, and specialized training of utility security  staff; and (3) strengthening key relationships between water utilities and  other agencies that may have key roles in an emergency response, such as  public health agencies, law enforcement agencies, and neighboring  drinking water systems.
As illustrated in figure 6, specific activities to enhance physical security  and support technological improvements generally fell into nine  subcategories. Of these, the development of “near real-time monitoring  technologies,” capable of providing near real-time data for a wide array of  potentially harmful water constituents, received far more support for  federal funding than any other subcategory—over 93 percent of the  experts (40 of 43) rated this subcategory as deserving at least a high  priority for federal funding. More significantly, almost 70 percent (30 of  43) rated it the highest priority—far surpassing the rating of any other  category. These technologies were cited as critical in efforts to quickly  detect contamination events, minimize their impact, and restore systems  after an event has passed. The experts’ views were consistent with those  of the National Academies of Science, which in a 2002 report highlighted  the need for improved monitoring technologies as one of four highest­ priority areas for drinking water research and development. The report  noted that such technologies differ significantly from those currently used  for conventional water quality monitoring, stating further that sensors are  needed for “better, cheaper, and faster sensing of chemical and biological  contaminants.”
In addition to real-time monitoring technologies, the experts voiced strong  support for (1) increasing laboratories’ capacity to deal with spikes in  demand caused by chemical, biological, or radiological contamination of  water supplies, and (2) “hardening” the physical assets of drinking water  facilities through improvements such as adding or repairing fences, locks,  lighting systems, and cameras and other surveillance equipment.  Regarding the latter of these two, however, some experts cited inherent  limitations in attempting to comprehensively harden a drinking water  facility’s assets. In particular, they noted in particular that, unlike nuclear  power or chemical plants, a drinking water system’s assets are spread over  large geographic areas, particularly the source water and distribution  systems.
Regarding efforts to improve education and training, over 90 percent of  the experts (39 of 43) indicated that improved technical training for  security-related personnel warrants at least a high priority for federal  funding. (See figure 7.) Over 55 percent (24 of 43) indicating that it  deserved the highest priority. To a lesser extent, experts supported general  training for other utility personnel to increase their awareness of security  issues. The panelists also underscored the importance of conducting  regional simulation exercises to test emergency response plans, with more  than 88 percent (38 of 43) rating this as a high or highest priority for  federal funding. Such exercises are intended to provide utility and other  personnel with the training and experience needed both to perform their  individual roles in an emergency and to coordinate these roles with other  responders. Finally, about half the experts assigned at least a high priority  to supporting multidisciplinary consulting teams (“Red Teams”),  comprising individuals with a wide array of backgrounds, to provide  independent analyses of utilities’ vulnerabilities.
As illustrated in figure 8, experts also cited the need to improve  cooperation and coordination between drinking water utilities and certain  other organizations as key to improving utilities’ security. Among the  organizations most often identified as critical to this effort are public  health and law enforcement agencies, which have data that can help  utilities better understand their vulnerabilities and respond to  emergencies. In addition, the experts cited the value of utilities’  developing mutual aid arrangements with neighboring utilities. Such  arrangements sometimes include, for example, sharing back-up power  systems or other critical equipment. One expert described an arrangement  in the San Francisco Bay Area—the Bay Area Security Information  Collaborative (BASIC)—in which eight utilities meet regularly to address  security-related topics. Finally, over 90 percent of the experts (39 of 43)  rated the development of common protocols among drinking water  utilities to monitor drinking water threats as warranting a high or highest  priority for federal funding. Drinking water utilities vary widely in how  they perceive threats and detect contamination, in large part because few  common protocols exist that would help promote a more consistent  approach toward these critical functions. Some experts noted, in  particular, the need for protocols to guide the identification, sampling, and  analysis of contaminants.
section_title: Observations
paragraphs: In 2002, EPA’s Strategic Plan on Homeland Security set forth the goal of  significantly reducing unacceptable security risks at water utilities across  the country by completing appropriate vulnerability assessments;  designing security enhancement plans; developing emergency response  plans; and implementing security enhancements. The plan further  committed to providing federal resources to help accomplish these goals  as funds are appropriated.
Key judgments about which recipients should get funding priority, and  how those funds should be spent, will have to be made in the face of great  uncertainty about the likely targets of attacks, the nature of attacks  (whether physical, cyber, chemical, biological, or radiological), and the  timing of attacks. The experts on our panel have had to consider these  uncertainties in developing their own judgments about these issues. These  judgments, while not unanimous on all matters, suggested a high degree of  consensus on a number of key issues.
We recognize that such sensitive decisions must ultimately take into  account political, equity, and other considerations. But we believe they  should also consider the judgments of the nation’s most experienced  individuals regarding these matters, such as those included on our panel. It  is in this context that we offer the results presented in this testimony as  information for Congress and the administration to consider as they seek  the best way to use limited financial resources to reduce threats to the  nation’s drinking water supply.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  respond to any questions you or other Members of this Subcommittee may  have.
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