Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs
Published: 2012-12-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Border Patrol has primary responsibility for securing the border between ports of entry, and reported that with its 18,500 agents it apprehended over 327,000 illegal entrants at the southwest border in fiscal year 2011. Across Border Patrol's nine southwest border sectors, most apprehensions occurred in the Tucson sector in Arizona. GAO was asked to review how Border Patrol manages resources at the southwest border. This report examines (1) apprehension and other data Border Patrol collects to inform changes in border security for the southwest border and the Tucson sector, in particular; (2) how the Tucson sector compares with other sectors in scheduling agent deployment and to what extent data show that deployments have been effective; and (3) the extent to which Border Patrol has identified mechanisms to assess resource needs under its new strategic plan. GAO analyzed DHS documents and data from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, and interviewed officials in headquarters and five southwest border sectors selected based on cross-border illegal activity, among other things. Results cannot be generalized across the southwest border, but provided insights into Border Patrol operations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported data meeting its goal to secure the land border with a decrease in apprehensions; our data analysis showed that apprehensions decreased within each southwest border sector and by 68 percent in the Tucson sector from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, due in part to changes in the U.S. economy and achievement of Border Patrol strategic objectives. These data generally mirrored the decrease in estimated known illegal entries across locations. Other data are used by Border Patrol sector management to assess efforts in securing the border against the threat of illegal migration, drug smuggling, and terrorism; and Border Patrol may use these data to assess border security at the national level as the agency transitions to a new strategic plan. Our analysis of these data indicated that in the Tucson sector, there was little change in the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants apprehended by Border Patrol over the past 5 fiscal years, and the percentage of individuals apprehended who repeatedly crossed the border illegally declined across the southwest border by 6 percent from fiscal years 2008 to 2011. Additionally, the number of drug seizures increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to 18,898 in fiscal year 2011, and apprehensions of aliens from countries determined to be at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism increased from 239 in fiscal year 2006 to 309 in fiscal year 2010, but decreased to 253 in fiscal year 2011.
The Tucson sector scheduled more agent workdays in fiscal year 2011 for enforcement activities related to patrolling the border than other sectors; however, data limitations preclude comparison of overall effectiveness in how each sector has deployed resources to secure the border. In fiscal year 2011 the Tucson sector scheduled 73 percent of agent workdays for enforcement activities, and of these activities, 71 percent were scheduled for patrolling within 25 miles of the border. Other sectors scheduled from 44 to 70 percent of agent enforcement workdays for patrolling the border. Border Patrol sectors assess how effectively they use resources to secure the border, but differences in how sectors collect and report the data preclude comparing results.
Border Patrol issued guidance in September 2012 to improve the consistency of sector data collection and reporting, which may allow future comparison of performance. Border Patrol is developing key elements of its 2012-2016 Strategic Plan needed to define border security and the resources necessary to achieve it, but has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing performance goals and measures in accordance with standard practices in program management. Border Patrol officials stated that performance goals and measures are in development for assessing the progress of agency efforts to secure the border between the ports of entry, and since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the southwest border as an interim goal and measure. However, as GAO previously testified, this interim measure does not inform program results and therefore limits DHS and congressional oversight and accountability. Milestones and time frames could assist Border Patrol in monitoring progress in developing goals and measures necessary to assess the status of border security and the extent to which existing resources and capabilities are appropriate and sufficient. Border Patrol expects to implement other key elements of its strategic plan over the next 2 fiscal years.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that CBP ensure Border Patrol develops milestones and time frames for developing border security goals and measures to assess progress made and resource needs. DHS concurred with these recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2011, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S.  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reported spending over $4 billion  to secure the U.S. border with Mexico. Border Patrol, within CBP, is the  federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the national  borders between the designated U.S. land border ports of entry (POE).  In fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol reported apprehending over 327,000  illegal entrants and making over 17,150 seizures of drugs along the  southwest border, with Border Patrol’s Tucson sector accounting for the  greatest percentage of apprehensions and drug seizures.  The Tucson  sector, which has primary responsibility for addressing cross-border  illegal activity in Arizona, reported making over 38 percent of  apprehensions and more than 28 percent of all drug seizures reported  across Border Patrol’s nine southwest border sectors in fiscal year 2011.
Border Patrol is moving to implement a new strategy for securing the  border. Border Patrol’s 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy (2004  Strategy) focused on improving border security by increasing resources— including personnel, infrastructure, and technology—and deploying these  resources using an approach that provided for several layers of Border  Patrol agents at the immediate border and in other areas up to 100 miles  (referred to as defense in depth). In May 2012 the Border Patrol issued  the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan).  Citing the buildup in border resources and the need to use these  enhanced capabilities most effectively, this new strategic plan  emphasizes using intelligence information to inform risk relative to threats  of cross-border terrorism, drug smuggling, and illegal migration across  locations; integrating border security operations with other law  enforcement partners to address threats; and developing rapid response  capabilities to deploy the resources appropriate to changes in threat.
You asked us to review the approach used by Border Patrol to deploy and  manage resources along the U.S.-Mexico border in Arizona compared  with approaches used at other southwest border locations. This report  addresses the following questions: (1) What do data show about  apprehensions across the southwest border, and in the Tucson sector in  particular, and what other types of data, if any, does Border Patrol collect  that inform changes in the status of border security? (2) How does the  Tucson sector schedule agent deployment compared with deployment in  other southwest border sectors and to what extent do the data show  these deployments have been effective in securing the border? (3) To  what extent has Border Patrol developed mechanisms to identify  resources needed to secure the border under its new strategic plan?
In conducting our work, we analyzed agency data related to Border Patrol  performance and cross-border threats, planning documents, sector  operational assessments, reports, guidance, and agency strategic plans,  and held discussions with relevant headquarters and field officials  concerning border strategy, border enforcement operations, the  deployment of resources—personnel, technology, and infrastructure— and data used to assess the status of border security.relevant data from DHS and Border Patrol databases for fiscal years 2006  through 2011. We chose this time period because fiscal year 2006 was  the first full year for which data were available following Border Patrol’s  implementation of its 2004 Strategy. To assess the reliability of these  data, we spoke with Border Patrol headquarters officials who oversee the  maintenance and analyses of the data and with selected sector and  station officials regarding guidance and processes for collecting and  reporting data in regard to apprehensions of illegal entrants, seizures of  drugs and other contraband, and scheduling the deployment of agents  tracked in Border Patrol databases. We determined that these data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted visits  and observed station and checkpoint operations within five Border Patrol  sectors on the southwest border: San Diego sector, California; Yuma  sector, Arizona; Tucson sector, Arizona; El Paso sector, Texas; and Rio  Grande Valley sector, Texas. We selected these sectors based on a  range of factors, including (1) threat level, (2) agency priorities for  resource deployment, (3) the use of enforcement strategies deemed  successful by Border Patrol in reducing cross-border illegal activity, and  (4) varied terrain and operational conditions. Among these five sectors,  we selected 21 Border Patrol stations to visit based on factors such as  the level of cross-border illegal activity as defined by Border Patrol data  and unique characteristics, such as terrain. While the results from our  visits are not representative of operations and conditions across the  southwest border, they provided us with an overall understanding of  Border Patrol operations.
To assess trends in apprehensions and other types of data used by  Border Patrol to inform changes in the status of border security across the  southwest border, and Tucson sector in particular, we obtained relevant  data from DHS and Border Patrol databases for fiscal years 2006 through  2011. We analyzed data on apprehensions, seizures, apprehensions of  repeat offenders (recidivist rates), and apprehensions of aliens from  special interest countries (ASIC) by sector to obtain an overall view of  changes in cross-border illegal activity. For fiscal years 2010 and 2011,  we also analyzed data for apprehensions, seizures, and apprehensions of  ASICs by location, in terms of distance from the border. Further, we  analyzed data used by Border Patrol to estimate the number of known  illegal entries by sector. Although estimated known illegal entry data can  be compared within a sector over time, these data cannot be compared or  combined across sectors, as discussed later in this report. We also spoke  or corresponded with 13 ranchers who operated in the Tucson sector at  the time of our review to discuss border security issues. We selected  these ranchers based on input from various entities, including Border  Patrol and select organizations that are knowledgeable about border  security issues. While the views of these individuals are not  representative of those of all ranchers within the Tucson sector, they  provided us with insights on ranchers’ perspectives.
To determine how the Tucson sector scheduled agent deployment  compared with deployment in other southwest border sectors and the  extent to which the data showed these deployments had been effective in  securing the border, we analyzed data on Border Patrol’s scheduled  deployment of agents, by sector, from fiscal years 2006 through 2011,  including the scheduling of agents near the border and the percentage of  workdays scheduled for enforcement-related activities. We interviewed  Border Patrol headquarters officials regarding agency guidance and  practices for deploying resources and conducted interviews with Border  Patrol sector and station officials regarding the processes used and  factors considered when determining the deployment and redeployment  of resources. We also analyzed data Border Patrol uses to calculate  overall effectiveness within sectors to determine if the appropriate mix of  assets is being deployed and used effectively and efficiently.
To assess to what extent Border Patrol had developed mechanisms to  identify resources needed to secure the border under its new 2012-2016  Strategic Plan, we interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials from  the Planning, Analysis, and Enforcement Systems Branches, and  analyzed relevant documents, such as Border Patrol planning and policy  documents, necessary to gain an understanding of Border Patrol’s  processes for developing and implementing key elements of the strategic  plan necessary to inform resource requirements for securing the border.  We compared these processes with standard practices in program  management for documenting the scope of a project, including the need  for milestones or time frames for project completion and   To assess to what extent Border Patrol sectors and  implementation. stations had identified the need for additional resources, we analyzed  southwest border sector operational assessments for fiscal years 2010  and 2012 and interviewed sector and station officials.
For example, see the Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program  Management © (Newtown Square, Penn., 2006). sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides further  details on our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: CBP has divided geographic responsibility for the southwest border  among nine Border Patrol sectors, as shown in figure 1 (see app. II for  general information about Border Patrol sectors). Each sector has a  varying number of stations, with agents responsible for patrolling within  defined geographic areas. Within these areas, Border Patrol has reported  that its primary mission is to prevent terrorists and weapons of terrorism  from entering the United States and also to detect, interdict, and  apprehend those who attempt to illegally enter or smuggle any person or  contraband across the nation’s borders.
Move mouse over the sector name to learn more about the sector.
Each Border Patrol sector is further divided into stations. For example,  the Tucson sector has divided geographic responsibility across eight  stations, seven of which have responsibility for miles of land directly on  the U.S.-Mexico border. Within the station areas Border Patrol refers to  “border zones”—those having international border miles—and “interior  zones”—those without international border miles. According to Border  Patrol officials, zones allow sectors to more effectively analyze border  conditions, including terrain, when planning how to deploy agents. Zone  dimensions are largely determined by geography and topographical  features, and zone size can vary significantly. See figure 2 for Tucson  sector station and zone boundaries (see app. III for general information  about the Tucson sector stations).
Move mouse over the station name to learn more about the station.
Border Patrol collects and analyzes various data on the number and  types of entrants who illegally cross the southwest border between the  land border POEs, including collecting estimates on the total number of  identified—or “known”—illegal entries. Border Patrol collects these data  composed of the total number of apprehensions, turn backs, and got  aways as an indicator of the potential border threat across locations.
Border Patrol reported that for nearly two-thirds of the remaining 1,120 southwest border  miles, resources were in place to achieve a high probability to detect illegal activity, but  the ability to respond may be compromised by insufficient resources or inaccessible  terrain; while for the remaining border miles, insufficient resources or infrastructure  inhibited detection or apprehension of illegal activity. its Fiscal Year 2010-2012 Annual Performance Report. DHS established  an interim performance measure until a new border control goal and  measure could be developed.
Border Patrol issued its new 2012-2016 Strategic Plan in May 2012,  stating that the buildup of its resource base and the operations conducted  over the past two decades would enable the Border Patrol to focus on  mitigating risk rather than increasing resources to secure the border. In  contrast to the 2004 Strategy, which also recognized the importance of  rapid mobility, the leveraging of partnerships, and accurate and useful  intelligence, the new strategic plan places a greater emphasis on the  integration of partner resources into operational planning and  enforcement efforts, particularly partners external to DHS. (See app. IV  for strategic goals and objectives presented in Border Patrol’s 2004  Strategy and 2012-2016 Strategic Plan.)
section_title: Apprehensions Have Decreased across the Southwest Border; However, Other Data on Illegal Migration, Drug Seizures, and Terrorism Also Provide Insights into Border Security
paragraphs: Border Patrol apprehensions have decreased in the Tucson sector and  across the southwest border, and DHS has reported data meeting its goal  to secure the land border with a decrease in apprehensions. The  decrease in apprehensions mirrored the decrease in estimated known  illegal entries within each southwest border sector. Border Patrol officials  attributed the decrease in apprehensions and estimated known illegal  entries within southwest border sectors to multiple factors, including  changes in the U.S. economy. While changes in apprehension levels  provide useful insight on activity levels, other types of data may also  inform changes in the status of border security, including changes in the  percentage of estimated known illegal entries who are apprehended and  who repeatedly cross the border illegally (recidivist rate), increases in  seizures of drugs and other contraband, and increases in apprehensions  of aliens from special interest countries (ASIC) that have been  determined to be at a potential increased risk of sponsoring terrorism.
subsections: section_title: Apprehensions Decreased at about the Same Rate as Estimated Known Illegal Entries in the Tucson Sector and across the Southwest Border
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of  apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim  measure for border security as reported in its Annual Performance  Report. In fiscal year 2011, DHS reported data meeting its goal to secure  the land border with a decrease in apprehensions. These data show that  Border Patrol apprehensions within each southwest Border Patrol sector  decreased from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, generally mirroring the  decrease in estimated known illegal entries within each sector. In the  Tucson sector, our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that  apprehensions decreased by 68 percent from fiscal years 2006 to 2011,  compared with a 69 percent decrease in estimated known illegal entries,  as shown in figure 3. (See app. V for additional information.)
Border Patrol officials attributed the decrease in apprehensions and  estimated known illegal entries within southwest border sectors to  multiple factors, including changes in the U.S. economy and successful  achievement of its strategic objectives. Border Patrol’s ability to address  objectives laid out in the 2004 Strategy was strengthened by increases in  personnel and technology, and infrastructure enhancements, according to  Border Patrol officials. For example, Tucson sector Border Patrol officials  said that the sector increased manpower over the past 5 years through an  increase in Border Patrol agents that was augmented by National Guard  personnel, and that CBP’s Secure Border Initiative (SBI) provided border  fencing and other infrastructure, as well as technology enhancements.  Border Patrol officials also attributed decreases in estimated known illegal  entries and apprehensions to the deterrence effect of CBP consequence  programs—programs intended to deter repeated illegal border crossings  by ensuring the most efficient consequence or penalty for individuals who  illegally enter the United States. One such multiagency initiative,  Streamline, is a criminal prosecutions program targeting aliens who  illegally enter the United States through designated geographic  locations.
section_title: Other Border Patrol Data Provide a Broader Perspective on Changes in Border Security Related to Illegal Migration, Smuggling of Drugs and Other Contraband, and Terrorism
paragraphs: Border Patrol collects other types of data that are used by sector  management to help inform assessment of its efforts to secure the border  against the threats of illegal migration, smuggling of drugs and other  contraband, and terrorism. These data show changes in the (1)  percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended, (2)  percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended  more than once (repeat offenders), (3) number of seizures of drugs and  other contraband, and (4) number of apprehensions of persons from  countries at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism. In addition,  apprehension and seizure data can be analyzed in terms of where they  occurred relative to distance from the border as an indicator of progress  in Border Patrol enforcement efforts. Border Patrol officials at sectors we  visited, and our review of fiscal years 2010 and 2012 sector operational  assessments, indicated that sectors have historically used these types of  data to inform tactical deployment of personnel and technology to  address cross-border threats; however, the agency has not analyzed  these data at the national level to inform strategic decision making,  according to Border Patrol headquarters officials. These officials stated  that greater use of these data in assessing border security at the national  level may occur as the agency transitions to the new strategic plan.
The 2004 Strategy recognized that factors in addition to apprehensions  can be used to assess changes in Border Patrol’s enforcement efforts to  secure the border, including changes in the percentage of estimated  known illegal entrants who are apprehended (apprehensions as a  percentage of estimated known illegal entrants), and changes in the  number and percentage of apprehensions made closer to the border.  Border Patrol headquarters officials said that the percentage of estimated  known illegal entrants who are apprehended is primarily used to  determine the effectiveness of border security operations at the tactical— or zone—level but can also affect strategic decision making. The data are  also used to inform overall situational awareness at the border, which  directly supports field planning and redeployment of resources.
Our analysis of Border Patrol data for the Tucson sector showed little  change in the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who were  apprehended by the Border Patrol over the past 5 fiscal years.  Specifically, our analysis showed that of the total number of estimated  known aliens who illegally crossed the Tucson sector border from Mexico  each year, Border Patrol apprehended 62 percent in fiscal year 2006  compared with 64 percent in fiscal year 2011, an increase of about 2  percentage points. Results varied across other southwest border sectors,  as shown in appendix V.
Over the last fiscal year, however, Border Patrol apprehensions across  the southwest border and in the Tucson sector have occurred closer to  the border. In the Tucson sector, for example, the percentage of  apprehensions occurring more than 20 miles from the border was smaller  in fiscal year 2011 than in fiscal year 2010, while a greater percentage of  apprehensions in fiscal year 2011 occurred more than 5 to 20 miles from  the border, as shown in figure 4. There was little change in the  percentage of apprehensions within 1 mile of the border. Similarly,  apprehensions across the southwest border have also moved closer to  the border over time, with the greatest percentage of apprehensions  occurring more than 5 to 20 miles from the border in fiscal year 2011.  (See app. VI for additional information.)
Of the 13 ranchers we spoke or corresponded with in the Tucson sector,  6 said they would like to see Border Patrol enforce closer to the border to  prevent illegal entry and trespass on their properties. Generally, these  ranchers indicated that the level of illegal migrants coming across their  properties had declined, but said the level of drug smuggling had  remained constant. They were most concerned about safety, but cited  considerable property damage and concerns that illegal trafficking had  affected land values and driven up costs in the ranching industry. Border  Patrol officials in the Tucson sector said that some factors precluding  greater border presence included terrain that was inaccessible or created  a tactical disadvantage, the distance from Border Patrol stations to the  border, and access to ranches and lands that were federally protected  and environmentally sensitive. Border Patrol officials also said they have  taken steps to address factors that prevent closer access to the border,  such as establishing forward operating bases—permanent facilities in  remote locations near the border—and substations closer to the border,  and working with ranchers and the federal government to ensure access  to protected lands.
The 2004 Strategy stated that changes in the percentage of persons  apprehended who have repeatedly crossed the border illegally (referred  to as the recidivism rate) is a factor that Border Patrol considers in  assessing its ability to deter individuals from attempting to illegally cross  the border. Our analysis of Border Patrol apprehension data showed that  the recidivism rate has declined across the southwest border by about 6  percentage points from fiscal year 2008 to 2011 in regard to the number  of apprehended aliens who had repeatedly crossed the border in the prior  3 years. Specifically, our analysis showed that the recidivism rate  across the overall southwest border was about 42 percent in fiscal year  2008 compared with about 36 percent in fiscal year 2011. The Tucson  sector had the third highest recidivism rate across the southwest border in  fiscal year 2011, while the highest rate of recidivism occurred in El Centro  sector, as shown in figure 5. According to Border Patrol headquarters  officials, the agency has implemented various initiatives designed to  address recidivism through increased prosecution of individuals  apprehended for crossing the border illegally.
The 2004 Strategy identifies the detection, apprehension, and deterrence  of smugglers of drugs, humans, and other contraband as a primary  objective. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that data regarding  seizures of drugs and other contraband are good indicators of the  effectiveness of targeted enforcement operations, and are used to identify  trends in the smuggling threat and as indicators of overall cross-border  illegal activity, in addition to potential gaps in border coverage, risk, and  enforcement operations. However, these officials stated that these data  are not used as a performance measure for overall border security  because while the agency has a mission to secure the border against the  smuggling threat, most smuggling is related to illegal drugs, and that drug  smuggling is the primary responsibility of other federal agencies, such as  the Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations.
Our analysis of Border Patrol data indicated that across southwest border  sectors, seizures of drugs and other contraband increased 83 percent  over the past 5 fiscal years, with drug seizures accounting for the vast  majority of all contraband seizures. Specifically, the number of drug and  contraband seizures increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to 18,898  in fiscal year 2011. Most seizures of drugs and other contraband occurred  in the Tucson sector, with about 28 percent, or 5,299, of the 18,898  southwest border seizures occurring in the sector in fiscal year 2011, as  shown in figure 6.
Further analysis of these data in the Tucson sector showed that the  percentage of drugs and other contraband seized closer to the border—  5 miles or less—decreased slightly from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year  2011. Specifically, the Tucson sector made 42 percent of drug and other  contraband seizures within 5 miles of the border in fiscal year 2010, and  38 percent within 5 miles of the border in fiscal year 2011. Across other  southwest border sectors, the distance from the border where seizures  occurred varied, as shown in figure 7. For example, about 49 percent of  the seizures in the El Centro sector occurred within 1 mile of the border in  fiscal year 2011 compared with less than 7 percent of seizures within 1  mile of the border in the El Paso sector. Border Patrol headquarters  officials stated that variances in data across sectors reflect geographical  and structural differences among Border Patrol sectors—each sector is  characterized by varying topography, unique ingress and egress routes,  land access issues, and differing technology and infrastructure  deployments, all of which affect how a sector operates and therefore the  ability to make seizures at or near the border.
The 2004 Strategy identified the detection and prevention of terrorists and  their weapons from entering the United States between the ports of entry  as a primary objective. ASICs are considered to pose a greater potential  risk for terrorism than other aliens, and Border Patrol headquarters  officials said that they collect data on the number of ASIC apprehensions  in accordance with the reporting and documentation procedures outlined  in policy and guidance. However, Border Patrol headquarters officials  stated that they did not consider changes in the number of ASICs  apprehended in their assessment of border security because until  recently, they had been primarily focused on reducing the overall number  of illegal entries, and that terrorism was addressed by multiple agencies  besides the Border Patrol, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation  within the Department of Justice.
Our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that apprehensions of ASICs  across the southwest border increased each fiscal year from 239 in fiscal  2006 to 399 in fiscal year 2010, but dropped to 253 in fiscal year 2011.  The Rio Grande Valley sector had more than half of all ASIC  apprehensions across the southwest border in both fiscal years 2010 and  2011, as shown in figure 8.
Further analysis of these data showed differences in progress to  apprehend ASICs closer to the border in support of Border Patrol’s overall  intention to prevent potential terrorist threats from crossing U.S. borders.  For example, Rio Grande Valley sector nearly doubled the percentage of  ASICs apprehended within 1 mile of the border from the preceding fiscal  year, from 26 percent in fiscal year 2010 to 48 percent in fiscal year 2011.  In contrast, ASIC apprehensions within 1 mile of the border in Tucson  sector decreased from 26 percent in fiscal 2010 to 8 percent in fiscal year  2011. Across the southwest border, the greatest percentage of ASICs  was apprehended more than 20 miles from the border in fiscal year 2011,  as shown in figure 9. Border Patrol headquarters officials said they are  transitioning to a new methodology to identify the potential terrorist risk in  fiscal year 2013. This new methodology will replace the use of a country- specific list with a range of other factors to identify persons posing an  increased risk for terrorism when processing deportable aliens.
section_title: Southwest Border Sectors Scheduled Agents Differently across Border Zones and Enforcement Activities; Data Limitations Preclude Comparison of Overall Effectiveness
paragraphs: The Tucson sector scheduled a higher percentage of agent workdays to  enforcement activities related to patrolling the border than other  southwest border sectors in fiscal year 2011. However, until recently  sectors have differed in how they collect and report data that Border  Patrol used to assess its overall effectiveness in using resources to  secure the border, precluding comparison across sectors. In September  2012, Border Patrol issued new guidance on standardizing data collection  and reporting practices that could increase data reliability and allow  comparison across locations.
subsections: section_title: Factors Affecting Agent Deployment in Border Zones Include Local Terrain, Infrastructure, and Technology, but Most Sectors Schedule Agents to Patrol the Border
paragraphs: Border Patrol’s 2004 Strategy provided for increasing resources and  deploying these resources using an approach that provided for several  layers of Border Patrol agents at the immediate border and in other areas  100 miles or more away from the border (referred to as defense in depth).  According to CBP officials, as resources increased, Border Patrol sought  to move enforcement closer to the border over time to better position the  agency to ensure the arrest of those trying to enter the country illegally.
Headquarters and field officials said station supervisors determine (1)  whether to deploy agents in border zones or interior zones, and (2) the  types of enforcement or nonenforcement activities agents are to perform.  Border Patrol officials from the five sectors we visited stated that they  used similar factors in making deployment decisions, such as intelligence  showing the presence of threat across locations, the nature of the threat,  and environmental factors including terrain and weather.
Our analysis of Border Patrol data showed differences across sectors in  the percentage of agent workdays scheduled for border zones and  interior zones in fiscal year 2011. Specifically, our analysis showed that  while Tucson sector scheduled 43 percent of agent workdays to border  zones in fiscal year 2011, agent workdays scheduled for border zones by  other southwest border sectors ranged from 26 percent in the Yuma  sector to 53 percent in the El Centro sector, as shown in figure 10.
Border Patrol officials attributed the variation in border zone deployment  to differences in geographical factors among the southwest border  sectors—such as varying topography, ingress and egress routes, and  land access issues, and structural factors such as technology and  infrastructure deployments—and stated that these factors affect how  sectors operate and may preclude closer deployment to the border.  Additionally, many southwest border sectors have interior stations that  are responsible for operations at some distance from the border, such as  at interior checkpoints generally located 25 miles or more from the border,  which could also affect their percentage of agent workdays scheduled for  border zones.
Southwest border sectors scheduled most agent workdays for  enforcement activities during fiscal years 2006 to 2011 and the activity  related to patrolling the border accounted for a greater proportion of  enforcement activity workdays than any of the other activities. Sectors  schedule agent workdays across various activities categorized as  enforcement or nonenforcement. Across enforcement activities, our  analysis of Border Patrol data showed that all sectors scheduled more  agent workdays for “patrolling the border”—activities defined to occur  within 25 miles of the border—than any other enforcement activity, as  shown in figure 11. Border Patrol duties under this activity include  patrolling by vehicle, horse, and bike; patrolling with canines; performing  sign cutting; and performing special activities such as mobile search and  rescue. Other enforcement activities to which Border Patrol scheduled  agent workdays included conducting checkpoint duties, developing  intelligence, and performing aircraft operations. (See app. VII for a listing  of nonenforcement activities.)
Border Patrol sectors and stations track changes in their overall  effectiveness as a tool to determine if the appropriate mix and placement  of personnel and assets are being deployed and used effectively and  efficiently, according to officials from Border Patrol headquarters. Border  Patrol calculates an overall effectiveness rate using a formula in which it  adds the number of apprehensions and turn backs in a specific sector  and divides this total by the total estimated known illegal entries— determined by adding the number of apprehensions, turn backs, and got  aways for the sector. Border Patrol sectors and stations report this  overall effectiveness rate to headquarters. Border Patrol views its border  security efforts as increasing in effectiveness if the number of turn backs  as a percentage of estimated known illegal entries has increased and the  number of got aways as a percentage of estimated known illegal entries  has decreased.
Our analysis of Tucson sector apprehension, turn back, and got away  data from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 showed that while Tucson  sector apprehensions remained fairly constant at about 60 percent of  estimated known illegal entries, the percentage of reported turn backs  increased from about 5 percent to about 23 percent, while the percentage  of reported got aways decreased from about 33 percent to about 13  percent, as shown in figure 12. As a result of these changes in the mix of  turn backs and got aways, Border Patrol data showed that enforcement  effort, or the overall effectiveness rate for Tucson sector, improved 20  percentage points from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011, from 67  percent to 87 percent. (See app. VIII for additional information.)
Border Patrol data showed that the effectiveness rate for eight of the nine  sectors on the southwest border improved from fiscal years 2006 through  2011. The exception was the Big Bend sector, which showed a decrease  in the overall effectiveness rate, from 86 percent to 68 percent, during this  time period. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that differences in  how sectors define, collect, and report turn back and got away data used  to calculate the overall effectiveness rate preclude comparing  performance results across sectors. Border Patrol headquarters officials  stated that until recently, each Border Patrol sector decided how it would  collect and report turn back and got away data, and as a result, practices  for collecting and reporting the data varied across sectors and stations  based on differences in agent experience and judgment, resources, and  terrain. In terms of defining and reporting turn back data, for example,  Border Patrol headquarters officials said that a turn back was to be  recorded only if it is perceived to be an “intended entry”—that is, the  reporting agent believed the entrant intended to stay in the United States,  but Border Patrol activities caused the individual to return to Mexico.  According to Border Patrol officials, it can be difficult to tell if an illegal  crossing should be recorded as a turn back, and sectors have different  procedures for reporting and classifying incidents. In terms of collecting  data, Border Patrol officials reported that sectors rely on a different mix of  cameras, sign cutting, credible sources, and visual observation to identify  and report the number of turn backs and got aways.additional information.)   (See app. IX for  According to Border Patrol officials, the ability to obtain accurate or  consistent data using these identification sources depends on various  factors, such as terrain and weather. For example, data on turn backs  and got aways may be understated in areas with rugged mountains and  steep canyons that can hinder detection of illegal entries. In other cases,  data may be overstated—for example, in cases where the same turn back  identified by a camera is also identified by sign cutting. Double counting  may also occur when agents in one zone record as a got away an  individual who is apprehended and then reported as an apprehension in  another zone. As a result of these data limitations, Border Patrol  headquarters officials said that while they consider turn back and got  away data sufficiently reliable to assess each sector’s progress toward  border security and to inform sector decisions regarding resource  deployment, they do not consider the data sufficiently reliable to  compare—or externally report—results across sectors.
Border Patrol headquarters officials issued guidance in September 2012  to provide a more consistent, standardized approach for the collection  and reporting of turn back and got away data by Border Patrol sectors.  Each sector is to be individually responsible for monitoring adherence to  the guidance. According to Border Patrol officials, it is expected that once  the guidance is implemented, data reliability will improve. This new  guidance may allow for comparison of sector performance and inform  decisions regarding resource deployment for securing the southwest  border.
section_title: Border Patrol Has Not Yet Developed Goals and Measures for Assessing Efforts and Identifying Resource Needs under the New Strategic Plan
paragraphs: Border Patrol does not yet have performance goals and measures in  place necessary to define border security and determine the resources  necessary to achieve it. Border Patrol officials said that they had planned  to establish such goals and measures by fiscal year 2012, but these  efforts have been delayed, and are contingent on developing and  implementing key elements of its strategic plan. Further, Border Patrol is  in the process of developing a plan for implementing key elements of the  2012-2016 Strategic Plan that may be used to inform resource needs  across locations, and expects to begin developing a process for  assessing resource needs and informing deployment decisions across  the southwest border once key elements of its strategic plan have been  implemented in fiscal years 2013 and 2014.
subsections: section_title: Border Patrol Has Not Established Milestones and Time Frames for Developing Performance Goals and Measures
paragraphs: Border Patrol officials stated that the agency is in the process of  developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress  of its efforts to secure the border between POEs and for informing the  identification and allocation of resources needed to secure the border, but  has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and  implementing them. Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of  apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim  performance goal and measure for border security as reported in its  Annual Performance Report. In February 2011, we testified that DHS  intended to use this indicator as an interim performance goal and  measure until it completed development of new border control  performance goals and measures, which DHS officials expected to be in  place by fiscal year 2012. However, as of September 2012, DHS had  not yet issued new performance goals and measures for assessing  border security or identified revised milestones and time frames for  developing and implementing them.
We previously testified that the interim goal and measure of number of  apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs provides  information on activity levels, but it does not inform program results or  resource identification and allocation decisions, and therefore until new  goals and measures are developed, DHS and Congress could experience  reduced oversight and DHS accountability. Further, studies  commissioned by CBP have documented that the number of  apprehensions bears little relationship to effectiveness because agency  officials do not compare these numbers with the amount of cross-border  illegal activity.
Border Patrol officials stated that DHS and Border Patrol have established a  performance goal—linked to relevant measures—addressing border security that, as of  October 2012, was being used as an internal management indicator. However, a DHS  official said it has not been decided whether this goal and the associated measures will be  publicly reported or used as an overall performance goal and measures for border  security. to ensure results are achieved.project planning—such as identifying time frames—to be performed in the  early phases of a program and recognize that plans may need to be  adjusted along the way in response to unexpected circumstances. Time  frames for implementing key elements of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan  can change; however, milestones and time frames for the development of  performance goals and measures could help ensure that goals and  measures are completed in a timely manner. Moreover, milestones and  time frames could better position CBP to monitor progress in developing  and implementing goals and measures, which would provide DHS and  Congress with information on the results of CBP efforts to secure the  border between POEs and the extent to which existing resources and  capabilities are appropriate and sufficient.
section_title: Border Patrol Is in the Process of Implementing Key Elements of the Strategic Plan and a Process for Assessing Resource Needs
paragraphs: Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that they were in the process  of developing a plan for implementing key elements of the 2012-2016  Strategic Plan that may be used to inform resource needs across  locations, and expect to begin developing a process for assessing  resource needs and informing deployment decisions across the  southwest border once those key elements have been implemented.  Border Patrol officials said that they planned to develop and implement  key elements of the new strategic plan in fiscal years 2013 and 2014.
According to Border Patrol officials, the Border Patrol 2012-2016  Strategic Plan identifies several key elements that are to inform agency  resource needs and deployment decisions. Border Patrol officials  reported in September 2012 that they were in the process of developing  an implementation plan that is to lay out how key elements of the new  strategic plan are to be implemented. Border Patrol officials reported that,  in general, key elements of the strategic plan are to be developed and  implemented during fiscal years 2013 and 2014. According to agency  officials, key strategic plan elements to be addressed by the  implementation plan that are to inform agency resource needs and  deployment decisions include (1) a process for identifying risk that is to  inform resource decisions, (2) the enhancement of mobile response  capabilities to redeploy resources to address the shifts in threat, and (3)  an approach to integrate partner resources and contributions to enhance  Border Patrol capabilities (“whole-of-government” approach). Border  Patrol officials told us that these elements are interdependent and must  be developed, refined, and disseminated to the field to strengthen the  effectiveness of the new strategic plan. According to these officials,  delays in the development of one element would likely affect the  development of others. For example, delays in implementing the new risk  assessment tools could affect sectors’ ability to identify appropriate  responses to changing levels of risk.
Risk assessment tools. In September 2012, Border Patrol officials  said they were in the process of developing two tools that are to be  used in the field to identify and manage risk under the agency’s new  risk management approach. The first tool for assessing risk is the  Operational Implementation Plan (OIP), a qualitative process that  prioritizes sector evaluations of border security threats and identifies  potential responses. Border Patrol is developing a second tool—a  quantitative model called the Integrated Mission Analysis Tool  (IMAT)—that is to, among other things, assess risk and capability by  predicting and identifying the need for various courses of action, such  as the rapid response of resources to the highest risks. Actions are to  be assessed based on a comparison of agency capability with risk. In  contrast to the OIP, the IMAT is to be completed at the zone level by  stations; consolidated station outputs may then be used by sectors to  inform the OIP process. The IMAT is to use data from various sources  to develop a “Border Assessment of Threat” of known or potential  threats by zone and compare that assessment with a point-in-time  operational assessment of each sector’s capability to determine to  what extent current capability—including resources—matches the  perceived risk. On the basis of the outcome, the station can then  choose from various predetermined courses of action to address the  perceived level of risk, such as reallocating resources or leveraging  external—law enforcement partner—resources. Once the IMAT is  fully implemented, Border Patrol plans for the resulting outputs to be  used to reassess and inform OIP decision making; information from  both systems is to be used to inform resource needs and deployment  decisions after the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan has been implemented.
According to Border Patrol officials, both the OIP and the IMAT are to  identify risk and potential responses at the sector level. However,  these tools will not allow Border Patrol to assess and prioritize risks  and response options across sectors. Moreover, agency officials  said that when the IMAT is fully deployed, in fiscal year 2014, it will  not have the capacity to differentiate among threats related to  terrorists and their weapons, drugs and other illegal contraband, and  illegal migration (such as recidivism, in which individuals repeatedly  cross the border illegally). Border Patrol officials said the agency  plans to explore mechanisms for developing these capabilities— assessing risk across sectors and differentiating threat—once OIP  and IMAT have been developed and implemented in fiscal year 2014.  According to Border Patrol headquarters officials, as of August 2012,  the agency was in the process of pilot testing the OIP and the IMAT in  the field and expected to begin to initially implement the OIP and  populate the IMAT through a web-based program that will record  baseline data on threat and operational conditions throughout fiscal  year 2013.
Rapid deployment of resources. A second key element of the 2012- 2016 Strategic Plan is to increase mobility and rapid deployment of  personnel and resources to quickly counter and interdict threats  based on shifts in smuggling routes and tactical intelligence. As we  testified in May 2012, CBP reported expanding the training and  response capabilities of the Border Patrol’s specialized response  teams to support domestic and international intelligence-driven and  antiterrorism efforts as well as other special operations. Additionally,  Border Patrol officials stated that in fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol  allocated 500 agent positions to provide a national group of  organized, trained, and equipped Border Patrol agents who are  capable of rapid movement to regional and national incidents in  support of high-priority CBP missions. However, we testified in May  2012 that Border Patrol officials had not fully assessed to what extent  the redeployment of existing resources would be sufficient to meet  security needs, or when additional resources would need to be  requested. In September 2012, Border Patrol officials said they had  not yet developed a process for assessing the need for, or  implementation of, rapid deployment of existing resources to mitigate  changing risk levels along the border, but expected to do so after  programs and processes—key elements—identified in the strategic  plan have been more fully developed. In the interim, deployment  decisions—such as the redeployment of agents and mobile  technology to border areas identified as having greater, or  unacceptable, levels of risk—are to be made at the sector level.
Integrated partner resources. A third key element of the 2012-2016  Strategic Plan is the capability of Border Patrol and federal, state,  local, and international partners working together to quickly and  appropriately respond to changing threats through the timely and  effective use of personnel and other resources. According to the new strategic plan, this “whole of government” approach will be  achieved through various efforts, including the expansion of  operational integration (the combining of best practices, capabilities  and strategies among partners) and jointly planned targeted  operations (the leveraging of combined partner assets to address  risks), the development and fusion of intelligence, and the creation of  integrated partnerships (the sharing of resources, plans, and  operations among partners). In December 2010, we recommended  that CBP develop policy and guidance necessary to identify, assess,  and integrate available partner resources in its operational  assessments and resource planning documents. CBP concurred  with this recommendation, but as of June 2012, Border Patrol had not  yet required partner resources to be incorporated into operational  assessments or into documents that inform the resource planning  process. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that the agency  has yet to finalize interim milestones for integrating partner resources  into Border Patrol operational assessments and resource planning  documents because it is still in the process of determining how  partner resources are to be integrated; however, Border Patrol plans  to have a process in place for that purpose in fiscal year 2014.
According to Border Patrol officials, since the beginning of fiscal year  2011, as the agency began transitioning from the 2004 resource-based  strategy to the 2012-2016 risk-based strategic plan, the Border Patrol has  been using an interim process for assessing the need for additional  personnel, infrastructure, and technology in agency sectors. Border Patrol  officials said that resource needs using this interim process are intended  to maintain the current status of border security, and will be used until key  elements of the strategic plan—such as the OIP and the IMAT—that are  necessary to develop a new process have been implemented in fiscal  years 2013 and 2014. Under this interim process, Border Patrol has  maintained, with some exceptions, personnel and resource levels  established in fiscal year 2010, the last year in which operational control  was used as a performance goal and measure for border security.
According to Border Patrol officials, under the new risk management  approach, the need for additional resources will be determined in terms of  unacceptable levels of risk caused by illegal activity across border  locations. Moreover, in considering ways to mitigate elevated risk levels,  Border Patrol will look to mechanisms other than resource enhancement  for expanding capacity, such as the rapid redeployment of resources from  locations with lower risk levels and the leveraging of partner resources  (i.e., a “whole of government” approach). Border Patrol officials said that  use of the new risk assessment tools—the OIP and the IMAT—in making  decisions for resource requests will be made at the sector level. Until a  new process for identifying resource needs has been developed, sectors  will continue to use annual operational assessments to reflect specific  objectives and measures for accomplishing annual sector priorities, as  well as identifying minimum budgetary requirements necessary to  maintain the current status of border security in each sector.
Border Patrol headquarters officials said that the resource levels  established at the end of fiscal year 2012 are to serve as a baseline  against which future needs are assessed, and that the personnel and  infrastructure in place across the southwest border by the end of fiscal  year 2012 should be sufficient to support the agency’s transition to a risk- based strategy for securing the border. Key elements—such as the OIP  and the IMAT—of the strategic plan are necessary to evaluate the need  for resources; until these elements are in place, Border Patrol sectors are  to continue to request resources they have identified as necessary to  maintain the current status of border security. However, our review of  Border Patrol’s fiscal year 2012 operational assessments showed that  sectors have continued to show concerns about resource availability. For  example, all nine southwest border sectors reported a need for new or  replacement technology to detect and track illegal activity, six southwest  border sectors reported a need for additional infrastructure (such as all- weather roads), and eight southwest border sectors reported a need for  additional agents to maintain or attain an acceptable level of border  security. Border Patrol officials stated that at the time these operational  assessments were developed—in fiscal year 2011—the agency had yet  to transition to the new risk-management approach under the 2012-2016  Strategic Plan and sectors were continuing to assess resource needs  according to the 2004 resource-based model. According to these  officials, Border Patrol has determined that for fiscal year 2013 resource  levels for most of the southwest border will remain constant, with the  exception of the Tucson and Rio Grande Valley sectors, because of  budget constraints. Border Patrol officials stated that the agency  recognizes the need to develop a new process for assessing resource  needs under the new risk management focus of the 2012-2016 Strategic  Plan and that this process will be different from the prior system, which  focused on increasing resources and activities at the border rather than  using existing resources to manage risk. As Border Patrol is in the initial  stages of developing and implementing the key elements of its 2012-2016  Strategic Plan, it is too early to assess how Border Patrol will identify the  level of resources needed to secure the border under the new plan.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Securing the nation’s borders against the evolving threat of terrorism and  transnational crime is essential to the protection of the nation.  Recognizing the importance of establishing secure national borders, DHS  has dramatically increased resources and activities at the southwest  border over the past several years to deter illegal border crossings and  secure the border.
With increased levels of resources and activities now in place, Border  Patrol intends to transition from a resource-based approach to securing  the nation’s borders to a risk management approach that seeks to  leverage existing resources to manage risk. Given the nation’s ongoing  need to identify and balance competing demands for limited resources,  linking necessary resource levels to desired outcomes is critical to  informed decision making. Accordingly, milestones and time frames— established as soon as possible—for the development of performance  goals that define the levels of security—or risk—to be achieved at the  border could help ensure that goals are developed in a timely manner.  The establishment of such goals could help guide future border  investment and resources decisions. Similarly, milestones and time  frames for developing and implementing performance measures under  the new strategic plan that are linked to the Border Patrol’s goal for  securing the border could better ensure accountability and oversight of  the agency’s programs by better positioning it to show progress in  completing its efforts. Once established, border security performance  goals and measures would also support Border Patrol’s efforts to assess  whether the key elements—programs and processes—of its new strategic  plan have brought the agency closer to its strategic goal of securing the  border.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To support the implementation of Border Patrol’s 2012-2016 Strategic  Plan and identify the resources needed to achieve the nation’s strategic  goal for securing the border, we recommend that the Commissioner of  Customs and Border Protection ensure that the Chief of the Office of  Border Patrol establish milestones and time frames for developing a performance goal, or goals, for border security between the POEs  that defines how border security is to be measured and a performance measure, or measures—linked to a performance goal  or goals—for assessing progress made in securing the border  between POEs and informing resource identification and allocation  efforts.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment.  DHS  provided written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix X,  and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS  concurred with our recommendations for the agency to establish  milestones and time frames for developing performance goals and  measures for border security between the POEs, and stated that it plans  to establish such milestones and time frames by November 30, 2013.   Establishing these milestones and time frames would meet the intent of  our recommendations, but doing so as soon as possible, as we reported,  would better position CBP to monitor progress in developing and  implementing goals and measures, which would provide DHS and  Congress with information on the results of CBP efforts to secure the  border between POEs and the extent to which existing resources and  capabilities are appropriate and sufficient. Further, DHS indicated that  Border Patrol cannot unilaterally develop a performance goal for border  security and define how it is to be measured, but can develop  performance goals that will likely become key components of an  overarching goal for border security. Since our recommendations were  directed at Border Patrol establishing milestones and time frames for  developing such goals and measures focused on border security between  the POEs, we believe that DHS’s proposed actions for Border Patrol in  this area would meet the intent of our recommendations, as Border Patrol  has primary responsibility for securing the border between POEs. Such  actions would help provide oversight and accountability for border  security between the POEs, support the implementation of Border Patrol’s  2012-2016 Strategic Plan, and help identify the resources needed to  achieve the goal for securing the border.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its  issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary  of Homeland Security and interested congressional committees, as  appropriate. The report will also be available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix XI.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The report addresses the following three questions:
What do data show about apprehensions across the southwest  border, and in the Tucson sector in particular, and what other types of  data, if any, does Border Patrol collect that inform changes in the  status of border security?
How does the Tucson sector schedule agent deployment compared  with deployment in other southwest border sectors and to what extent  do the data show these deployments have been effective in securing  the border?
To what extent has Border Patrol developed mechanisms to identify  resources needed to secure the border under its new strategic plan?
In conducting our work, we gathered information and interviewed officials  from the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and  Border Protection (CBP) and the Office of Border Patrol. Specifically, we  analyzed agency data related to Border Patrol performance and cross- border threats; policy, planning, and budget documents; sector  operational assessments; border security reports; operations manuals;  and strategic plans provided by Border Patrol. We interviewed Border  Patrol headquarters officials regarding data collection and analysis  procedures, strategic planning, operational assessments, and border  security programs and activities. We obtained relevant data from DHS  and Border Patrol databases for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We  chose this time period because fiscal year 2006 was the first full year for  which data were available following Border Patrol’s implementation of its  2004 National Border Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy). To assess the  reliability of these data, we spoke with Border Patrol headquarters  officials who oversee the maintenance and analyses of the data and with  select sector and station officials regarding guidance and processes for  collecting and reporting data in regard to apprehensions of illegal  entrants, seizures of drugs and other contraband, and scheduling the  deployment of agents tracked in a Border Patrol database. We  determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  this report.
We conducted visits to five of the nine Border Patrol sectors on the  southwest border—San Diego sector, California; Yuma sector, Arizona;  Tucson sector, Arizona; El Paso sector, Texas; and Rio Grande Valley  sector, Texas. We selected these sectors based on differences in (1) the  level of threat as defined by Border Patrol data, (2) agency priorities for  resource deployment, (3) the level of operational control achieved in fiscal  year 2010, (4) the use of enforcement strategies deemed successful by  the Border Patrol in reducing cross-border illegal activity, and (5) varied  terrain. Within these sectors we selected 21 Border Patrol stations to  visit based on factors such as the level of cross-border illegal activity as  defined by Border Patrol data and unique characteristics such as terrain  and topography. We visited both “border stations”—those having  international border miles—and “interior stations”—those without  international border miles. Because Border Patrol officials identified the  Tucson sector as the highest-priority sector for resource deployment in  fiscal year 2011 and it had the highest level of cross-border illegal activity,  we conducted site visits to each of the eight stations. (See table 1 for the  Border Patrol sectors and stations we visited and the location of each  station relative to the border.) While we cannot generalize the conditions  we found at these Border Patrol sectors and stations to all southwest  border locations, they provided us with an overall understanding of the  range of operating conditions across the southwest border, as well as  differences in how sectors and stations assess border security and deploy  resources.
In each location we observed conditions, including the use of personnel,  technology, and infrastructure, and conducted semistructured interviews  with Border Patrol sector and station officials.
To assess trends in apprehensions, seizures, and other types of data  Border Patrol uses to inform changes in the status of border security  across the southwest border and in the Tucson sector, we obtained  Border Patrol data for fiscal years 2006 through 2011 from DHS and  Border Patrol databases—apprehensions and seizure data from the  Enforcement Integrated Database (EID) and estimated cross-border  illegal activity data from the Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System  (BPETS). Because of the complexity and amount of the data sets we  requested, Border Patrol queried apprehension and seizure data in two  groups, with different run dates. We analyzed Border Patrol  apprehension and seizure data by sector for each fiscal year to obtain an  overall view of cross-border illegal activity over time and the types of  threats in each sector. In addition, we analyzed apprehension data to  identify the number of repeat offenders (recidivism rate) and aliens from  special interest countries (ASIC) apprehended across years by sector, as  indicators of the extent to which deportable aliens with increased levels of  associated risk were apprehended. For fiscal years 2010 and 2011, we  also analyzed data showing the location of apprehensions, seizures, and  apprehensions of ASICs relative to their distance from the border.
We also analyzed data Border Patrol uses to assess estimated known   Although  illegal entries (cross-border illegal activity) within each sector. estimated known illegal entry data can be compared within a sector over  time, these data cannot be compared or combined across sectors as  discussed in this report. Because of the complexity and amount of data  we requested, Border Patrol provided these data in two queries, with  different run dates.
We also interviewed relevant Border Patrol  headquarters and field officials regarding the maintenance of these data,  and how the agency analyzes the data to inform the status of border  security. In addition, we spoke or corresponded with 13 ranchers who  operated in the Tucson sector at the time of our review to discuss border  security issues. We selected these ranchers based on input from various  entities, including Border Patrol and select organizations that are  knowledgeable about border security issues. Because this selection of  ranchers was a nonprobability sample, the results from our discussions  cannot be generalized to other ranchers; however, what we learned from  the ranchers we contacted provided a useful perspective on the issues  addressed in this report.
To determine how the Tucson sector scheduled agent deployment  compared with other southwest border sectors and to what extent the data  showed these deployments had been effective in securing the border, we  analyzed Border Patrol BPETS data regarding the scheduled deployment  of agents, by sector, from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We also  analyzed to what extent agents were scheduled for deployment in “border  zones”—those having international border miles—and “interior zones”— those without international border miles. Because of the complexity and  amount of the data sets we requested, Border Patrol queried deployment  data in two groups, with different run dates.
We also interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials in the Planning,  Analysis, and Enforcement Systems Branches regarding agency guidance  and practices for allocating and deploying resources—personnel,  technology, and infrastructure. In addition, we conducted semistructured  interviews with Border Patrol sector and station officials regarding the  processes used and factors considered when determining the deployment  and redeployment of resources. Further, we analyzed data from fiscal  years 2006 through 2011 that Border Patrol uses to calculate overall  effectiveness within sectors and to determine if the appropriate mix of  assets is being deployed and used effectively and efficiently.interviewed Border Patrol headquarters and station officials regarding  agency practices for collecting and recording these data and how those  practices may vary across sectors. As previously discussed, because of  potential inconsistencies in how the data are collected, these data cannot  be compared across sectors but can be compared within a sector over time  as discussed in more detail in this report. In addition, we reviewed Border  Patrol guidance issued in September 2012 regarding the collection and  reporting of effectiveness data.
To assess to what extent Border Patrol has identified mechanisms for  assessing resource needs under the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic  Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan), we analyzed key elements of the  strategic plan defined by Border Patrol. To gain a better understanding of  Border Patrol’s plans for developing and implementing key elements of  the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, including processes for identifying resource  needs and the extent to which officials have identified interim milestones  and time frames, we interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials from  the Planning and Analysis Branches, and analyzed relevant documents,  such as Border Patrol planning and policy documents. We also reviewed  standard practices in program management for documenting the scope of  a project, including milestones or time frames for project completion and  implementation. stations had identified the need for additional resources, we interviewed  sector and station officials and analyzed southwest border sector  operational assessments for fiscal years 2010 and 2012. We analyzed  operational assessments for fiscal year 2010 because that was the last  fiscal year in which DHS used operational control as a performance goal  and measure, and for fiscal year 2012 because it was the most current  fiscal year available at the time we conducted our analysis.
For example, The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program  Management© (Newtown Square, Penn., 2006).
We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to December 2012  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: General Information about Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border
paragraphs: Information in this appendix is also presented in figure 1. Table 2  describes, for each of the nine sectors on the southwest border, the (1)  number of border miles and size, in square miles; (2) type of terrain; and  (3) number and type (border or interior) of stations. Figures 13 through 16  illustrate the types of terrain that can be found in four of the nine sectors.
section_title: Appendix III: General Information about Border Patrol Stations and Zones in the Tucson Sector
paragraphs: Information in this appendix is also presented in figure 2. Table 3  describes, for each of the eight stations in the Tucson sector, the (1)  number of border miles and size, in square miles; (2) type of terrain; and  (3) number and type (border or interior) of zones, and their distance from  the border. Figures 17 through 23 illustrate the types of terrain that can be  found in seven of the eight stations in the Tucson sector.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comparison of Border Patrol’s 2004 Strategy and 2012-2016 Strategic Plan
section_title: Appendix V: Border Patrol Estimated Known Illegal Entries and Apprehensions by Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011
paragraphs: Border Patrol collects and analyzes various data on the number and  types of entrants who illegally cross the southwest border between the  land border ports of entry, including estimates on the total number of  identified—or “known”—illegal entries. Border Patrol’s estimate of known  illegal entries includes the number of illegal entrants who were  apprehended as well as estimates of the number of entrants who illegally  crossed the border but were not apprehended (individuals who either  crossed back to Mexico—turn backs—or continued traveling to the U.S.  interior and who Border Patrol ceased pursuing—got aways). These data  are collectively referred to as known illegal entries because Border Patrol  officials have what they deem to be a reasonable indication that the  cross-border activity occurred. Border Patrol uses the estimated known  illegal entry data to inform tactical decision making within each of the nine  southwest border sectors.
Border Patrol apprehensions and estimated known illegal entries  decreased significantly across all nine southwest border sectors from  fiscal years 2006 through 2011, as shown in figures 24 through 32.  Apprehensions decreased by 46 percent or more across all the southwest  border sectors. Over this same time period, the number of estimated  known illegal entries also decreased by 28 percent or more across all  southwest border sectors. Apprehensions as a percentage of estimated  known illegal entries increased for six sectors over this time period.
section_title: Appendix VI: Apprehensions by Southwest Border Patrol Sectors and Distance from the Border, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011
paragraphs: Border Patrol’s 2004 Strategy recognized that both apprehensions and  apprehending individuals closer to the border affect border security. Our  analysis of Border Patrol data showed that apprehensions across the  southwest border decreased by 69 percent from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal  year 2011.  Across the southwest border, from fiscal year 2010 to 2011,  apprehensions within 5 miles of the border increased slightly, from 54  percent to 55 percent of total apprehensions. Apprehensions that  occurred more than 20 miles from the border decreased slightly from  fiscal year 2010 to 2011, from 28 percent to 26 percent across the  southwest border. See figures 33 and 34 for apprehensions by southwest  Border Patrol sector and distances from the border, for fiscal years 2010  and 2011.
section_title: Appendix VII: Border Patrol Nonenforcement Activities by Southwest Border Sector, Fiscal Year 2011
paragraphs: Border Patrol schedules the deployment of agents to various activities,  which are categorized as either enforcement or nonenforcement. In fiscal  year 2011 the percentage of agent workdays scheduled for  nonenforcement activities varied by southwest border sector, from 19  percent for the Big Bend sector to 34 percent for the Yuma sector. The  percentage of nonenforcement agent workdays scheduled to individual  activities in fiscal year 2011 varied across sectors, as shown in figure 35,  with “administration” accounting for a greater proportion of agent  workdays than any other nonenforcement activities across all southwest  border sectors. Border Patrol officials stated that examples of  administrative activities include remote-video surveillance, public and  congressional affairs duties, asset forfeiture duties, and employee support  duties. Agent workdays scheduled to administration ranged from about 39  percent of all nonenforcement agent workdays in the Rio Grande Valley  sector to almost 65 percent in the Laredo sector.  Within the Tucson  sector–our focus sector–training, intelligence support, and agent  nonenforcement duties (defined to include duties such as brush removal;  facility, fence, and vehicle maintenance; and video surveillance system  operations) each accounted for a greater proportion of agent workdays  than any other nonenforcement activity after administration. The  percentage of agent workdays scheduled to these activities in other  sectors varied, as shown in figure 35. “Other nonenforcement activities”  includes duties such as litigation, camera operations, and public relations.
section_title: Appendix VIII: Estimated Illegal Entries by Data Element (Apprehensions, Estimated Turn Backs, and Estimated Got Aways) by Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011
paragraphs: Figures 36 through 44 show the number of apprehensions, turn backs,  and got aways as percentages of total estimated known illegal entries for  each southwest border sector, from fiscal years 2006 through 2011.
section_title: Appendix IX: Identification Sources for Turn Backs and Got Aways by Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011
paragraphs: Border Patrol sectors rely on a different mix of cameras, sign cutting,  credible source, and visual observation to identify and report the number  of turn backs and got aways used to determine the number of estimated  known illegal entries across locations. Figure 45 shows the breakdown by  source of data that sectors used to estimate got aways and turn backs in  fiscal year 2011.
section_title: Appendix X: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Lacinda Ayers (Assistant  Director); Joshua S. Akery; Frances A. Cook; Barbara A. Guffy; Eric D.  Hauswirth; Stanley J. Kostyla; Brian J. Lipman; John W. Mingus, Jr.;  Jessica S. Orr; Susan A. Sachs; and Jerome T. Sandau made key  contributions to this report.