Emergency Communications: National Communications System Provides Programs for Priority Calling, but Planning for New Initiatives and Performance Measurement Could be Strengthened
Published: 2009-08-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Government functions and effective disaster response and management rely on the ability of national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) personnel to communicate. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Communications System (NCS), is responsible for ensuring continuity of NS/EP communications when network congestion or damage occurs. As requested, GAO assessed the (1) priority communication programs NCS provides, how it enlists subscribers, and to what extent NCS controls access to these programs; (2) challenges that can affect delivery of these programs; and (3) extent to which NCS plans for and evaluates its services. GAO reviewed NCS program documents, such as annual reports and access control procedures and data on program subscribers. GAO also interviewed officials from NCS and select state and local government entities. GAO compared NCS performance measures to federal best practices.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NCS has two programs to provide NS/EP personnel with priority calling service when telephone networks are congested or damaged--the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the Wireless Priority Service (WPS). NCS has undertaken several efforts, such as outreach at industry conferences, to increase participation in and control access to these programs. According to NCS, though outreach efforts have helped to increase overall enrollment, it is working to further address possible cost barriers to participation in WPS, such as discussing options with wireless carriers to help defray costs. In addition, NCS has implemented policies and procedures to ensure that access to its priority programs are limited to authorized users. GAO's review of select GETS and WPS subscriber data revealed that, of the 85 records we examined, NCS generally followed its policies and procedures to limit GETS and WPS access to authorized subscribers. NCS is taking steps to address inherent challenges in the communications environment--such as network congestion. For example, NCS initiated a satellite pilot program to allow NS/EP officials to circumvent severely damaged or congested traditional telephone networks. However, methods for implementation and evaluation of the pilot were unclear and NCS subsequently terminated the pilot. NCS is also working to provide priority voice and data NS/EP communications as part of the evolving telecommunications networks, but it has not finalized an acquisition approach based on available technologies, costs, or plans to mitigate technological and other challenges to deliver such capabilities. The lack of this information has led to congressional restrictions on NCS's funding. As NCS attempts to ensure that GETS and WPS services can operate in these evolving networks, an acquisition approach that includes this information will provide NCS officials and Congress with essential information to most effectively allocate resources and guide decision making. Although DHS agreed with GAO's June 2008 recommendation to complete the NCS strategic plan, NCS has not finalized its strategic plan which has been under development since 2007. Furthermore, existing performance measures do not cover all of its core responsibilities, as suggested by best practices, and certain performance measures could be strengthened. For example, NCS does not have a measure to gauge its performance in two of its key federal roles--critical infrastructure protection for communications under DHS's National Infrastructure Protection Plan as well as coordinating communications issues under the National Response Framework. Furthermore, NCS does not use prior years' enrollment levels to help determine increases, if any, to be made to future year's goals for user enrollment. Fully and accurately measuring performance is critical to ensuring the agency and key stakeholders--such as Congress--base program and resource decisions on actual performance.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The global community relies on telecommunications services and  infrastructure to conduct business, government, and daily life. Emergency  events such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and Hurricane  Katrina in 2005, during which communications capabilities were  substantially disrupted, remind us of the fragility of the complex  telecommunications infrastructure and the need to ensure availability of  communications capabilities for leaders responsible for functions critical  to the management of and response to national security and emergency  situations. Telecommunications infrastructure is susceptible not only to  flooding, fire, and power outages, but also to increased demand—all of  which can limit the availability of telecommunications services or render  services inoperable. In the United States, more than 2 billion calls are  made every day via wireline and wireless networks, and, in 2008, more  than 1 trillion text messages were transmitted. Additionally, since the mid- 1990s, U.S. wireless telephone subscriptions have grown from about 28  million to more than 270 million as of December 2008, resulting in a  significant surge in the number of daily voice and data transmissions. This  surge can create increased competition for critical telecommunications  resources that may be limited during disasters and emergencies.  Heightened network use, in combination with the effects of disasters and  emergencies, can produce cascading effects far beyond the physical  location of the disaster area.
In 1963, President Kennedy established the National Communications  System (NCS), which now falls under the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS), to facilitate continuity of government by maintaining  communications between the President and officials with national security  and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) functions. Given the critical nature  of their roles, it is essential that these individuals have access to vital  communications capabilities needed to carry out their NS/EP functions— particularly during disasters or emergencies. To that end, the NCS  provides a number of programs and services designed to enable  communications and facilitate continuity of government during  emergencies.
You requested that we review the communications capabilities and access  to the priority communications programs that NCS provides. In response  to your request, we prepared this report to answer the following questions:  (1) What priority communications programs does NCS provide, how does  NCS enlist subscribers, and to what extent does NCS control access to  these programs?  (2) What challenges, if any, can affect NCS’s delivery of priority  communications programs?  (3) To what extent does NCS plan and evaluate its services?
To analyze what priority communications programs NCS provides, we  reviewed relevant legislation, available NCS program plans, as well as  budget requests and annual reports. We also interviewed relevant NCS and  Federal Communications Commission (FCC) officials who have varying  responsibilities for priority communications. In addition, we interviewed  cognizant representatives from AT&T, Qwest Communications, and  Verizon. We selected these carriers because they provide NS/EP  communications services and were amenable to meeting with us.  Although their views cannot be generalized to all telecommunications  companies that provide NS/EP communications, the information we  obtained helped to enhance our understanding of their role in providing  emergency communications. We also interviewed NS/EP officials from a  nonprobability sample of 15 states and 13 localities, which we selected  based on a variety of factors including geographical location, terrain and  climate conditions, and types and frequency of natural disasters. While  the results of these interviews cannot be generalized to reflect the views of  NS/EP emergency management officials in all states and localities, the  information obtained provided us with useful information on the  perspectives of various NS/EP personnel about NCS and its priority  communications programs. To determine how NCS enlists subscribers and  controls access to its priority programs, we collected and reviewed  subscriber eligibility criteria, and interviewed NCS officials on these  criteria, NCS’s outreach efforts to enlist new subscribers, and its internal  controls for controlling access to these programs. We also obtained NCS  standard operating procedures and compared them with criteria in  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.
To determine whether NCS adhered to its procedures for terminating  access for subscribers who no longer meet the programs’ eligibility  criteria, we reviewed subscriber records for select former federal and  state government officials. Specifically, we reviewed a nonprobability  sample of records for former members of the U.S. Senate as well as  members and delegates of the U.S. House of Representatives; immediate  past heads of federal departments and agencies as of August 2008; and  immediate past governors of U.S. states and territories as of August 2008,  which is when we obtained the subscriber data. We selected these groups  because they served in public positions that would allow NCS to easily  determine that their positions ended, and in turn, work with the subscriber  organization’s to update account status, as appropriate. Although the  results of our work cannot be generalized to evaluate the effectiveness of  controls used for all NCS program subscribers, the information obtained  provided us with useful information about the extent to which subscriber  records were terminated for groups we reviewed following a change in the  subscriber’s eligibility status. Because the subscriber database, in its  entirety, is classified, we have limited our reporting of the results of our  analysis to only nonclassified information; however, this does not affect  our findings. To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed the data  for obvious problems with completeness or accuracy, interviewed  knowledgeable agency officials and contract support staff about the data  quality control processes, and reviewed relevant documentation such as  the database dictionary that describes various data fields in the subscriber  database. We performed electronic testing on the data and found the data  to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To determine what challenges can affect NCS’s delivery of its priority  communication programs, we interviewed relevant NCS officials who have  responsibilities for the implementation of these programs. We also  obtained information and reviewed documentation such as briefing slides  from the agency regarding its efforts to implement a pilot program to  explore utilizing satellite technology, the Satellite Priority Service pilot  program, as well as its efforts to leverage next generation network (NGN)  technology in its priority communication programs. We compared this  information with our previous work on pilot program planning and  technology acquisition to determine the extent to which it was consistent  with these criteria.
To assess NCS’s overall planning and evaluation efforts, we reviewed  related program and planning documentation including Program  Assessment Rating Tool (PART) reports submitted to the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB). We also interviewed NCS officials about  their strategic planning efforts and the mechanisms NCS uses to evaluate  its services. We compared these efforts with criteria in guidance from the  Office of Management and Budget (OMB), related legislation such as the  Government Performance and Results Acts of 1993, as well as federal best  practices contained in our past reports. Our work primarily focused on  the office that is charged with executing the day-to-day functions  necessary to meet federal national security and emergency preparedness  telecommunications needs, which is the Office of the Manager, NCS  (OMNCS). Throughout this report, unless otherwise noted, we refer to the  OMNCS as the NCS, though organizationally, the NCS includes the  OMNCS, as well as a 24-member interagency body, among other entities.  For more details on the overall NCS organization structure, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through August 2009  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. Appendix II contains more details on our  scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Telecommunications Infrastructure
paragraphs: The telephone remains an essential communication tool for business,  government, and the general public. The public switched telephone  network (PSTN), an interconnected network of telephone exchanges over  which telephone calls travel from person to person, is the backbone of the  communications architecture that enables the transmission of voice and  data communications. In general terms, the PSTN is the public  communications system that includes the networks of local and long  distance telephone carriers, as well as cellular networks and satellite  systems. To connect one wireline (also known as landline) telephone to  another, the telephone call is routed through various switches at telephone  exchanges that are operated by local and long-distance telephone  carriers. As a caller dials another party’s number, the transmission from  one caller to the other is made through a telephone company’s facility,  known as the central office, over copper wires or fiber-optic cables to the  called party’s telephone. Over time, the PSTN has evolved from an analog  system to one that is almost entirely digital and able to support voice and  data transmissions made from wireline and wireless devices.
Wireless networks, which include cellular and satellite-based systems,  among other systems, are an important and growing element of the  communications infrastructure. Cellular and satellite-based systems and  networks provide an alternative to wireline networks because they are  potentially accessible from any point on the globe without the cost of  installing a wire or cable. Rather than relying on wired connections,  wireless devices (such as cellular telephones) are essentially sophisticated  radio devices that send and receive radio signals. These devices connect to  a wireless network—which may also interact with the PSTN, depending on  the type of connection—that enables the wireless telephone to connect to  another wireless or wireline telephone. Wireless networks operate on a  grid that divides large geographical areas (such as cities) into smaller cells  that can range from a few city blocks to several miles. Each cell contains  or is adjacent to a base station equipped with one or more antennas to  receive and send radio signals to wireless devices within its coverage area,  which can range from less than a mile to 20 miles from the base station.  When a caller turns on a wireless device, the device searches for a signal  on an available channel from a nearby base station to confirm that service  is available. At that time, the base station assigns a radio frequency (also  known as radio channels) to the wireless device from among the group of  frequencies that the base station controls. Each base station is wirelessly  linked to a mobile switching office, as well as a local wireline telephone  network. The mobile phone switching office directs calls to the desired  locations, whether to another wireless device or a traditional wireline  telephone.
If a wireless caller is connecting with another wireless telephone, the call  may go through the wireline network to the recipient’s wireless carrier, or  it may be routed wholly within the wireless network to the base station  that is nearest the called party. On the other hand, when the wireless caller  is connecting to a wireline phone, the call travels to the nearest base  station and is switched by the caller’s wireless carriers to a wireline  telephone network. The call then becomes like any other phone call and is  directed over the PSTN to the destination number.
section_title: NS/EP Communications in the Next-Generation Networks
paragraphs: Because both voice and data transmissions have become common  functions in daily life, an effective communications infrastructure that  includes voice and data networks is essential to the nation’s ability to  maintain communications to enable public health and safety during a  natural disaster, such as a hurricane, or a man-made disaster, such as a  terrorist attack. Over the years, voice and data networks have evolved  separately, with voice networks relying on circuit-switching methods  while data networks largely use packet-switching techniques. Thus, a  user requiring voice, data, and videoconferencing services may have to use  three separate networks—a voice network, a data network, and a  videoconferencing network. The telecommunications industry has begun  to address the limitations of legacy communications infrastructure (such  as the PSTN) to provide integrated voice, data, and video services.  Technological advances in these networks have led to a convergence of  the previously separate networks used to transmit voice and data  communications. These new converged networks—commonly referred to  as next-generation networks—are capable of transmitting both voice and  data on a single network and eventually are to be the primary means for  voice and data transmissions. Converged voice and data networks use  technology that is based on packet switching which involves breaking a  message (such as an ongoing videoconference, images, or voice  conversation) into packets, or small chunks of data. Using the packet’s  destination address, computer systems called routers determine the  optimal path for the packets to reach their destination where they are  recombined to form the original message. In doing so, packets can be  transmitted over multiple routes rather than via a predetermined circuit,  which, in turn, can help to avoid areas that may be congested or damaged,  among other things. For example, information sent over the Internet is  packet-switched, the transmission of which is defined by Internet protocol  (IP). Wireline and wireless carriers have begun transforming their  networks to route voice data this way, called Voice over Internet Protocol  (VoIP) rather than circuit-switched methods. The adoption of VoIP and  other technological advances is changing the way in which people  communicate and, as a result, are likely to become central to the future of  NS/EP communications. Figure 1 shows a comparison between how  information is transmitted via packet switching versus circuit switching.  Industry analysts have said that although the transition to converged  networks is well underway, they expect the process to take many years.  Furthermore, NCS projects that half of the existing circuit-switched  network will be transitioned to packet-based network by 2015 with the  remainder reaching full transition by 2025.
section_title: Network Congestion Can Affect Communications Capabilities
paragraphs: Despite the evolution in telecommunications technology, congestion in the  wireline and wireless telephone networks occurs. Damage or destruction  of infrastructure, or extreme demand for service, can result in outages or  congestion on the wireline and wireless networks which can impede or  obstruct successful communications. During periods of congestion, the  caller may encounter signs that the network is congested such as (1) a fast  busy signal and (2) a prerecorded message alerting the caller that all  circuits are busy. Given the importance of telecommunications to  coordinating response and recovery efforts, it is essential that NS/EP  officials successfully complete their calls even when there is damaged  infrastructure or network congestion. For example, nationwide  telecommunications congestion and failures during the September 11,  2001, attacks and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 were due, in part, to both  damaged infrastructure and high call volume. Additionally, high call  volume that has the potential to create network congestion can occur  independent of emergencies. For example, Mother’s Day has historically  generated the highest volume of telephone calls of any day of the year.  This increased call volume can create network congestion and cause call  delay or disruption during normal operations; this congestion would also  reduce the likelihood NS/EP personnel would be able to successfully place  calls in the event of an emergency during this period. A similar issue exists  for text messaging, wherein high volumes of text transmissions can create  network congestion. For instance, on New Year’s Eve, a spike in the  number of text messages transmitted in the minutes immediately  preceding and following midnight could overload cellular networks. The  effects of this congestion could be severe for emergency responders in the  event they needed to coordinate planning for or response to an emergency  at that time.
section_title: Organization and Responsibilities of the National Communications System
paragraphs: As part of the creation of DHS under the Homeland Security Act of 2002,  NCS was transferred to DHS from the Department of Defense. Within  DHS, NCS is organized as part of the Office of Cyber Security and  Communications and has a fiscal year 2009 budget of $141 million. While  the Secretary of Homeland Security has overall responsibility for the  broader NCS organization, the duties are delegated to the NCS Manager  who has primary responsibility for day-to-day activities of the NCS,  including coordinating the planning and provisioning of communications  services that support NS/EP needs. Central to its functions are the  partnerships that NCS has established with federal, state, and local  government entities, and with the service providers and equipment  vendors that provide wireline and wireless communications services to   support NS/EP communications. For example, NCS has long-standing  relationships with industry groups such as the National Security  Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC)—a presidentially  appointed committee of industry leaders—that help keep it abreast of  changes in the commercial telecommunications marketplace. The  committee provides industry-based analyses and recommendations to the  President and executive branch regarding telecommunications policy and  proposals for enhancing national security and emergency preparedness.
Since joining DHS when DHS became operational in March 2003, federal  policies provided that NCS’s responsibilities include, among other things,  serving as the lead coordinating agency for communications issues  (defined as emergency support function no. 2, or ESF-2), under the  National Response Framework. As part of this responsibility, when  significant impact to the communications infrastructure occurs or is  expected, NCS is to serve as one of the primary agencies to (1) support the  restoration of the communications infrastructure and (2) coordinate the  deployment of federal communications support to response efforts. As  part of its ESF-2 role, NCS conducts and/or supports training and  exercises intended to test and improve response and recovery capabilities  needed in the event of an emergency or disaster. For example, NCS has  supported exercises that model emergency scenarios that include  potential and actual impacts to the communications infrastructure. In  addition to its ESF-2 responsibilities, NCS serves as the Sector-Specific  Agency to lead the federal government’s efforts to protect critical  communications infrastructure. In this regard, NCS works with industry  that owns and operates the vast majority of communications  infrastructure to develop strategies to protect against and mitigate the  effects of natural disasters or manmade attacks against critical  communications infrastructure. As part of this function, NCS is working  with industry to develop a risk assessment methodology for use in  assessing the communications sector’s overall exposure including the  threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences of an incident such as a natural  disaster or man-made attack.
Within NCS, the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications  (NCC), which serves as the operational component, is an industry- government collaborative body that coordinates the restoration and  provisioning of NS/EP communications services during crises or  emergencies. The NCC consists of officials from 24 government agencies  and 49 companies including eight industry members that are co-located at  the center (such as AT&T, Sprint, and Verizon) as well as nonresident  members that comprise the telecommunications sector—wireless  companies, cable companies, internet service providers, satellite  providers, and communications equipment manufacturers and suppliers,  among others. Since January 2000, the center also functions as the  Telecommunications Information Sharing and Analysis Center to allow  information sharing between representatives of the telecommunications  companies. During a disruption to telecommunications services, the NCS,  through the NCC, coordinates with both resident and nonresident  members with the goal of restoring service as soon as possible. According  to NCS, this partnership allows both industry and government to work in  close proximity, helping to ensure that NCS successfully executes its  mission. For example, during the 2008 hurricane season, the NCC worked  with its government and industry partners to identify communications  assets and infrastructure in the impacted areas and develop pre- and post- landfall strategies and response activities to help ensure availability of  communications.
section_title: NCS Provides Priority Calling Services for NS/EP Personnel and Has Designed Mechanisms to Manage Access to These Services
paragraphs: In order to overcome network congestion, NCS has implemented priority  calling programs to provide NS/EP personnel within all levels of  government, as well as the private and non-profit sectors, with  communications services during incidents of national security or  emergency that can overwhelm the telecommunications network.  The  two primary programs NCS provides to deliver priority calling are the  Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the  Wireless Priority Service (WPS). NCS has undertaken a number of  outreach efforts to help increase participation in these priority calling  programs and has designed controls to help ensure the use of these  programs is only for authorized personnel and purposes.
subsections: section_title: NCS’s Two Main Programs Provide Priority Calling for NS/EP Personnel in the Event of Network Congestion During Emergencies
paragraphs: NCS has implemented two main programs intended to overcome busy  networks during periods of congestion or network failure due to  abnormally high usage or infrastructure damage; the GETS program  provides wireline priority calling, and WPS provides wireless priority  calling for authorized NS/EP officials.
According to NCS, it established GETS in conjunction with the nation’s  telecommunications industry to meet White House requirements for a  nationwide voice and limited data service intended for authorized  personnel engaged in NS/EP missions. GETS is designed to provide  priority treatment in the wireline portions of the PSTN during an  emergency or crisis situation when the PSTN is congested and the  probability of completing a call by normal means has been significantly  decreased. For example, during the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing—one of  the earliest uses of GETS in an emergency event—a high call volume of  three times more than the usual volume resulted in an overload of the  telephone network in the Oklahoma City area, according to NCS. During  this emergency event, officials from the federal government and the  private sector were able to successfully complete about 300 calls using the  GETS service. According to a senior official from the Florida Division of  Emergency Management, GETS was also used in Florida during Hurricane  Katrina. Prior to hitting the Gulf Coast, the hurricane made landfall in  South Florida, damaging the communications infrastructure and resulting  in network congestion that prevented Florida emergency management  officials from completing calls. According to this official, GETS allowed  Florida emergency management officials to circumvent the congested  lines and successfully complete calls.
To activate a GETS call, subscribers follow a three-step process similar to  that of using a traditional calling card. First, subscribers must dial the  universal access number by using equipment such as a standard desk  phone, payphone, secure telephone, cellular phone, VoIP telephone, or  facsimile. Next, a tone prompts the subscriber to enter their GETS  personal identification number (PIN) found on the calling card distributed  to the subscriber. (Figure 2 shows the GETS calling card that is provided  to each authorized NS/EP subscriber.) Lastly, the subscriber is prompted  to enter a destination telephone number. Once the calling party’s identity  is authenticated (via the PIN), the call receives priority treatment that  increases the probability of call completion in damaged or congested  networks. GETS is designed to achieve a probability that 90 percent of  calls made via the PSTN will be successfully completed—that is, establish  a connection with the intended called party—during periods of network  congestion or outage. The service achieves a high probability of call  completion through a combination of features such as re-routing GETS  calls around network blockage areas, routing calls to a second or third  carrier if the first carrier’s network is congested, and queuing pending  GETS calls for up to 30 seconds, among other things. Subscribers can  place local, long distance, and international calls; however, it is not  possible to use GETS to dial a toll-free destination number. When using  GETS, subscribers are billed by the wireline carrier at a rate of $0.07 to  $0.10 per minute for calls within the United States and its territories. As  of April 2009, the program had grown to more than 227,000 subscribers,  according to NCS.
As significant increases in wireless telephone subscribers occurred in the  mid-1990s, the concept for a wireless priority capability first emerged,  according to NCS; however, it was in the wake of the events of Tuesday,  September 11, 2001, that the Executive Office of the President, through the  National Security Council, directed NCS to implement a wireless priority  capability. According to NCS, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks,  wireless carriers experienced significant difficulties trying to cope with  the unprecedented call volume. The reported increase in the number of  phone calls in the Washington, D.C., New Jersey, and New York City areas  made between 9:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. was 2 to 10 times the number on an  average Tuesday. The resulting effort became WPS, which is a  subscription-based service designed to help increase the probability of call  completion for NS/EP personnel that rely on wireless devices—typically, a  cell phone—while performing duties related to emergency response and  recovery. To that end, WPS provides nationwide wireless priority calling  capabilities, from call initiation through to when a connection is  established with the called party, to NS/EP personnel during natural or  man-made disasters or emergencies that result in network congestion or  outages in the nation’s wireless networks.
Like the average U.S. consumer, NS/EP personnel have great flexibility in  choosing a wireless carrier for wireless communications services. In order  to assure that WPS capabilities are accessible by the majority of wireless  services that could be used by NS/EP personnel, NCS has taken steps to  ensure that the nationwide and regional wireless carriers that provide  services to the greatest number of wireless customers upgrade their  networks to support WPS functionalities. As a result, authorized WPS  subscribers are able to access WPS in nearly all the major wireless  markets in the continental United States and its territories. Currently, WPS  is supported by all the nationwide wireless carriers (AT&T, Sprint Nextel,  T-Mobile, and Verizon Wireless). Additionally, regional carriers (such as  Cellcom and Cellular South) that can help to provide WPS coverage in  geographically remote or sparsely populated areas are at varying stages of  updating their networks to support WPS.
To initiate a WPS call, authorized subscribers must dial *272 plus the  destination number from their WPS-enabled cell phone. If all radio  channels in the caller’s area are busy, the call will be placed in queue for  up to 28 seconds for access to the next available local radio channel. WPS  subscribers receive additional priority based on their office or position to  ensure that communications are first available for senior leadership (see  app. V for a description of how this priority is determined). While WPS  provides priority access to the next available radio channel, it does not  guarantee call completion as a WPS call may encounter further congestion  while being routed through the wireline or wireless portions of the PSTN.  Therefore, according to NCS, WPS is most effective when used in  conjunction with GETS because GETS is also designed to help activate  priority calling features in the wireless network in addition to the wireline  network. Thus, using a GETS calling card after activating WPS can help to  ensure a higher probability of call completion for calls placed from a  cellular telephone to another cellular or wireline telephone number.
As with GETS, WPS subscribers incur expenses as part of their  subscription; however, the WPS fee structure is more expensive. In  addition to wireless calling plan fees, WPS subscribers must pay (1) a one- time activation fee of up to $10.00, (2) a monthly service fee of up to $4.50,  and (3) a $0.75 per minute fee when WPS is invoked by dialing the WPS  code, *272. These fees help wireless carriers to recoup the costs  associated with providing NS/EP calling features in their respective  wireless networks, according to NCS. As of April 2009, there are  approximately 93,000 WPS subscribers, according to NCS.
section_title: NCS Uses Outreach to Enlist Subscribers and Has Designed Controls to Help Ensure Priority Calling Services Are Used as Intended by Eligible Subscribers
subsections: section_title: Priority Calling Programs Available to Diverse Groups with NS/EP Responsibilities
paragraphs: NCS priority calling programs are primarily intended for officials with  responsibilities for coordinating the functions critical to the planning,  management, and response to national security and emergency  situations—particularly during the first 24 to 72 hours following an  emergency. According to NCS, participants in its priority programs come  from federal, state, local, or tribal government, and private industry or  nonprofit organizations. In order to subscribe to GETS and WPS,  applicants must prove that their organization is engaged in activities  essential to NS/EP functions including (1) national security leadership;   (2) national security posture and U.S. population attack warning; (3)  public health, safety, and maintenance of law and order; (4) public welfare  and maintenance of national economic posture; and (5) disaster recovery.  Furthermore, these individuals must demonstrate that they perform a  function that is critical to the planning, management, and response to  national security and emergency situations. At the federal government  level, personnel that qualify to subscribe to the GETS and WPS service  range from staff in the Executive Office of the President to members of  Congress and officials in federal departments and agencies. Nonfederal  representatives such as state governors, mayors, police and fire chiefs, as  well as personnel engaged in restoration of services such as  telecommunications and electricity, are among those who can qualify to  use the priority calling programs. Appendix V provides further details  about the types of positions and functions that generally qualify for access  to the GETS and WPS programs.
According to NCS, the number of personnel in the public and private  sectors that perform functions critical to national security and emergency  preparedness range from about 2 to 10 million people. In planning for  future growth in its programs, NCS estimates that the communications  network can successfully support up to 2 million priority subscribers. To  that end, NCS has plans underway to achieve up to 2 million GETS  subscribers. NCS officials have not yet finalized this goal or a goal for WPS  subscribers but indicated that the WPS goal may be about 225,000  subscribers. As of April 2009, NCS has 227,614 active subscribers in the  GETS program. For WPS, there were 92,820 active subscribers. As table 1  shows, the federal government accounts for about 46 percent of active  GETS subscribers and 72 percent of active WPS subscribers.
NCS has undertaken several outreach efforts to help increase awareness  of and participation in its priority calling programs across essential NS/EP  personnel. These efforts include, for example, attending emergency  management conferences, writing articles for emergency management and  telecommunications publications, as well as deploying outreach  coordinators to promote NCS’s priority calling programs. For example,  since 1995, NCS has participated in various conferences hosted by the  National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) and the  International Association of Emergency Managers to facilitate its outreach  and marketing efforts. At these conferences, NCS operates display booths  and distributes marketing materials and may conduct presentations to  help increase awareness about the benefits of its priority calling programs.  NCS officials and/or contract personnel attend approximately 30  conferences annually that target federal, state, local, and industry NS/EP  members. NCS officials told us that it has enlisted all but 1 of the 50 state  emergency operations centers to participate in GETS and/or WPS because  of initial contacts made at events hosted by NEMA. Similarly, to expand its  outreach to other essential emergency personnel who also rely on wireline  and wireless communications services during emergencies such as those  from water, gas, and electric companies, NCS has attended conferences  and other events that attract this target audience.
In addition to attending conferences to reach general NS/EP personnel,  NCS has implemented targeted outreach efforts to groups such as  governors and state homeland security advisors; critical infrastructure  facilities, such as nuclear power plant operations centers, national and  regional airport traffic control centers; and federal officials who serve as  the designated continuity coordinator within their respective agency. NCS  officials report that they have generally made progress in enlisting these  groups in its priority calling programs. For example, in 2008 NCS enlisted  56 of 71 federal continuity coordinators in the GETS program. NCS also  worked with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Aviation  Administration to ensure that GETS cards are available at all nuclear  facilities and at all national and regional airports respectively. In 2005,  NCS began deploying regional outreach coordinators to promote NCS’s  priority calling programs to emergency management officials and other  key decision makers (such as governors) that coordinate emergency  response and recovery and continuity of government in state and local  government. NCS credits the addition of the regional outreach  coordinators as a key reason for significant growth in enrollment rates  across all NS/EP categories since 2005.
Despite the outreach efforts NCS has undertaken to increase participation  in its priority calling programs, WPS fees are a barrier to participation in  the program, according to NCS. For example, as of October 2008, while  the majority of federal continuity coordinators enrolled in the GETS  program, only 44 percent or 31 of 71 federal continuity coordinators are  WPS subscribers. Additionally, while 24 of 56 state homeland security  advisors subscribe to GETS, only 10 subscribe to WPS, and only 8  governors subscribe to WPS while 43 subscribe to GETS. The subscriber  levels for the GETS program are more than twice that of the WPS program  as shown in table 2. For each WPS-activated device, subscribers pay an  initial activation fee of $10, a monthly fee of $4.50 as well as a usage fee of  $0.75 per minute. In 2006, NCS commissioned a study to examine barriers  to WPS participation, among other things. According to NCS, the survey  results found that program cost was the single largest impediment to  participating in WPS. Similarly, our work showed that WPS fees can be a  burden particularly for NS/EP members at the state and local government  level due to limited financial resources. At least one-third of 37 state and  local government entities that we spoke with—including some who  subscribe to WPS—stated that WPS fees affected the extent to which they  participate in the program. For example, an official from the Oregon  Emergency Management Division stated his organization’s participation in  the WPS is relatively low because the overall WPS costs can become very  expensive when calculated across all subscribers in a particular agency.  Another official from Ohio Emergency Management Division stated that  his organization does not participate in the program due to budget  constraints even though they consider WPS to be more beneficial than  GETS because the wireless component is more widely used among staff  performing emergency management functions.
In light of concerns about WPS subscription costs, NCS has been  exploring ways to minimize the burden of program fees for its intended  subscribers. For example, NCS examined the feasibility of the federal  government subsidizing all or part of the WPS fees; however, DHS and  OMB determined that this may not be feasible because of questions about  the federal government’s ability to sustain these costs in the future.  Further, NCS has had discussions with the wireless carriers to explore  ways to eliminate or defray the costs; however, the wireless carriers  maintain that the fees are necessary to operate and maintain WPS  capabilities in their networks in order to comply with the NCS  requirements. Nevertheless, some carriers have made arrangements with  WPS subscribers to provide WPS as part of a bundled telecommunications  service package, which, according to NCS, can defray the costs. NCS  officials have stated that they plan to continue to explore ways to address  the WPS cost issue as it believes doing so can help increase participation  in the WPS program.
section_title: NCS Has Designed Procedures and Controls to Limit Access to Authorized Subscribers
paragraphs: Federal internal control standards state that documented policies and  procedures to control access to agency resources and records to  authorized individuals are essential to accountability and safeguarding  assets, and NCS has developed and implemented policies and procedures  to help ensure that access to its programs is limited to authorized  subscribers. NCS has standard operating procedures that document how  potential subscribers can gain access to its priority calling programs. To be  approved for a GETS card and/or WPS service request, the NCS contractor  must be able to confirm that the request is from an organization that  performs any of five NS/EP functions mentioned earlier in this report. If  the organization’s NS/EP status is unclear (such as chemical suppliers,  radio and TV stations, or housing shelters), the organization must obtain  sponsorship from NCS, 1 of the 24 NCS member agencies, or through the  emergency management agency in the state or locality in which they  operate. Once approved, the organization must identify a primary point- of-contact (POC) and an alternate POC, if available. Within each  organization, the POC is the primary liaison between NCS and individual  GETS and WPS subscribers. The POC is responsible for (1) determining  who should have access to the GETS and WPS service within their  organization; (2) processing all GETS and WPS service requests; (3)  notifying NCS of changes to subscriber account data such as changes in  name, telephone number, or eligibility status; (4) reviewing and certifying  monthly subscriber calling data; (5) familiarizing subscribers with GETS  and WPS functionalities, and (6) annual verification of subscriber  eligibility.
As evidenced by their responsibilities, NCS relies on the POCs to manage  almost all aspects of subscriber accounts. However, through an annual  verification process, NCS seeks to ensure that POCs provide a current  account of subscribers who meet the eligibility requirements. NCS will  make multiple attempts over a 90-day period to ensure the POC responds  to its request to validate subscriber information, according to NCS officials  and failure to do so can result in cancellation of the subscribers’ account.  NCS officials told us that they designed these verification procedures to  help ensure that only eligible subscribers have access to NCS’s priority  programs. From our review of selected GETS and WPS records as a  limited check on whether current positions meet eligibility criteria, we  found that the GETS and/or WPS accounts for former members and  delegates of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate in the  109th Congress were terminated in accordance with NCS’s procedures.  However, when we reviewed accounts for 15 immediate past heads of  federal departments and agencies as of August 2008, we found 4 of 15  instances where these officials’ GETS and/or WPS accounts were not  terminated. We brought this to NCS’s attention and officials told us that  these accounts were terminated effective July 2009. Further, NCS plans to  institute new processes that are to include more frequent monitoring of  GETS and WPS accounts that coincide with administration changes to  ensure that the subscriber’s account status is appropriately updated.
In addition to verifying whether a subscriber is authorized to enroll in  NCS’s programs, telephone carriers as well as NCS and its contractors  have applied fraud detection mechanisms intended to protect against  fraudulent calls in their networks as well as others that are unique to the  GETS and WPS services. For example, carriers have fraud detection for  general telephone use that also detects fraud for GETS and WPS services.  These detection mechanisms include detection of a single PIN being used  simultaneously from multiple originating phone numbers and calls of long  duration, among other things. NCS and its contractor said that they have  also instituted procedures to determine the legitimacy of calls and to take  corrective action, which may include disabling the GETS and WPS account  in question. According to NCS, it has rarely found actual cases of fraud  and abuse. For example, although there were 45 reported cases of  potential fraudulent calls in 2008, through further investigation NCS  determined that the calls were legitimate and the reports typically resulted  from calls placed by authorized subscribers conducting test calls or  participating in preparedness exercises. Even if fraudulent calls were  made using GETS and WPS services, the implications would likely be  minimal due to two factors. First, the subscriber levels for GETS and WPS,  which currently stand at more than 227,000 and about 93,000 respectively,  are well below the capacity of the system. For example, according to NCS,  the GETS system was designed to support up to 2 million subscribers,  however, the current subscriber level—227,000 GETS subscribers—is well  below the intended capacity. Second, the potential financial implications  for the federal government would be nominal as NCS does not bear the  costs for GETS and WPS charges for nonfederal subscribers. State and  local governments as well as private and nonprofit organizations bear all  of the costs related to the usage of the GETS and WPS programs. In  general, NCS may cover GETS charges for federal departments and  agencies up to an annual budget threshold; however, federal agencies may  be responsible for these costs in the event of fraudulent or abusive calling  activity. Federal and nonfederal WPS subscribers are responsible for all  associated costs.
section_title: Initiatives Exist to Address Challenges in NCS’s Operating Environment, but Planning Efforts to Leverage Evolving Technology Could Be Strengthened
paragraphs: The delivery of NCS’s priority calling services faces challenges related to  the inherent vulnerabilities of the communication infrastructure such as  downed phone lines, damaged cell towers, and broken circuits and  switches. Therefore, NCS seeks to build redundancy into the  communication capabilities and services it provides and has explored  satellite technology to overcome such challenges. However, methods for  implementation and evaluation of its related satellite pilot were unclear  and NCS subsequently terminated the pilot. In addition, NCS faces the  challenge of keeping pace with the rapid evolution in telecommunications  technology and it is working with the telecommunications industry to  ensure that NS/EP communications requirements are integrated into the  next-generation communications networks. However, NCS’s planning  efforts to update its programs as technology evolves could be  strengthened.
subsections: section_title: NCS Launched the Satellite Pilot Program without Clear Methods for Implementation and Evaluation and Has Since Terminated the Pilot
paragraphs: In December 2007, NCS launched a satellite pilot program to provide an  alternative means to support NS/EP communications to help circumvent  network congestion or outages in the PSTN. According to NCS, because  GETS and WPS leverage PSTN-based infrastructure to enable  communications for NS/EP personnel, these programs can be limited in  their ability to provide services when damage renders the PSTN  infrastructure inoperable, such as it did in certain regions affected by  Hurricane Katrina. In February 2004, the National Security  Telecommunications Advisory Council (NSTAC) issued a report to the  Executive Office of the President recommending that NCS develop a  satellite capability to facilitate NS/EP communications. The  communications challenges that arose during the 2005 Gulf Coast  hurricanes due to flooding and loss of power, among other things,  underscored the need for a communications capability that could  transcend these infrastructure issues, and NCS observed that satellite  networks appeared to be the least disrupted communications service  during this event. To that end, 3 years following the 2005 Gulf Coast  Hurricanes, NCS launched the first of two phases of the satellite pilot  program intended to enable unclassified voice connectivity during  emergencies that leverages satellite infrastructure independent of the  PSTN. As part of the pilot, according to NCS officials, NCS is to provide  participants with a wall-mounted unit that consists of battery backup and  surge protection and a satellite phone. According to NCS officials, one  objective of the pilot is to evaluate two voice communications capabilities  via satellite technologies: push-to-talk communication functions and GETS  priority calling using a satellite phone. Push-to-talk is a radio-like function,  similar to that of a walkie-talkie or three-way radio, with which a group of  users would connect back-and-forth with each other from their individual  satellite phones at the push of a button without having to make individual  calls. NCS also plans to use the pilot to test the ability to make GETS  priority functions to call a wireline or cellular telephone number using a  satellite phone. According to NCS, calls made from a satellite phone to a  cellular or wireline telephone can bypass congested or damaged areas of  the PSTN, as such calls can be routed via satellite networks to a less  congested area of the PSTN, thus increasing the likelihood of call  completion. However, because these calls are still expected to travel  through the wireline and wireless portions of the PSTN to reach their  destination, they could face congestion while trying to connect to the  PSTN. To bypass such congestion, NCS officials stated that the GETS  priority calling features must be supported on the satellite networks,  which currently they are not. By inserting priority calling functionality in  satellite networks, GETS calls that originate from a satellite phone will  have a greater likelihood of being successfully routed through the PSTN in  times of network congestion. NCS officials also told us that other  objectives for the pilot include determining the extent to which satellite  communications meet NS/EP needs and educating NS/EP personnel about  the availability of satellite communications for use in emergency  situations.
Although the pilot began in December 2007 and is estimated to last 3 years  and cost $1.9 million, as of May 2009 NCS could provide little  documentation to explain its objectives for the pilot, and how it planned to  meet those objectives. For example, while NCS officials provided briefing  slides to elaborate on the pilot program and describe some high-level  program objectives, these slides lacked key program information such as a  methodology for evaluating pilot results to determine whether the  intended pilot objectives were met, and milestones for pilot  implementation. Specifically, although the briefing slides noted the  planned number of sites to be included in the pilot, it did not specify when  the site selection would be completed, when sites would begin  participating in the pilot, or the data that would be collected and analyzed  to evaluate pilot performance. According to NCS, the pilot was to include  up to 65 participating sites comprising emergency operations centers  supporting federal and state government, and NCS officials stated they had  initially identified six sites and conducted an evaluation of additional  candidate sites. However, NCS officials could not provide any detailed  information about what criteria or rationale was used to determine which  sites to include in the pilot. For instance, while NCS officials told us they  evaluated sites based on two factors (effects of disaster scenarios and  population served by the respective location), they did not provide any  documentation that outlined these details or demonstrated how these two  factors would help it determine if the pilot objectives were met. In  addition, as part of phase two of the satellite pilot, NCS officials said they  intended to use lessons learned from the experience of phase one of the  pilot to migrate the satellite capability to another NCS technology  initiative already underway; however, NCS launched the pilot program  without the benefit of completing a methodology to evaluate the pilot. In  addition, NCS could not provide documentation as to how the results of  the pilot would be evaluated and used to inform future program decisions  such as future rollout. Exacerbating the absence of program planning  documents, is that key staff originally involved in the pilot have since left  NCS resulting in the loss of institutional knowledge about the original  decisions and planning for the pilot.
In April 2009, officials told us that the pilot had been placed on hold as  they were reassessing various aspects of the pilot such as conducting a  cost-benefit analysis to determine which satellite provider and equipment  to use. After reassessing the pilot, NCS subsequently terminated the pilot  in May 2009, according to NCS officials. NCS officials acknowledged that  the pilot program needed improved planning and metric documentation  and noted that NCS took a number of issues into consideration including  the current availability of push-to-talk capability among existing satellite  service providers in making the decision to end the pilot.
section_title: NCS Is Restructuring Efforts to Keep Pace with Emerging Telecommunications Technology, but Further Development of Plans and Program Details Would Better Inform Program and Budget Decisions
paragraphs: NCS is mandated by presidential directive to support the use of  technological advances and evolutionary communications networks for  NS/EP communications functions assigned to NCS, including programs it  provides to maintain continuity of communications. GETS and WPS are  designed to operate on the circuit-based PSTN platform, while packet- based IP networks are increasingly used and expected to eclipse the use of  circuits in telecommunications, according to representatives from the  telecommunications industry. As a result, NCS and its GETS and WPS  subscribers face the risk that these services will not work within these  next-generation networks. To avoid disruption or degradation of service,  NCS plans to migrate existing GETS and WPS priority calling features  from circuit-based networks to public telephone packet-based networks to  assure that the programs will be operable on new technologies available  from wireline and wireless carriers. NCS’s efforts to integrate new and  existing NS/EP services into next-generation networks (NS/EP NGN)   consist of two primary components: (1) priority voice communications  and (2) priority data communications that includes priority treatment for  the transmission of e-mail, streaming video, text messaging, and Internet  access, among other things.
NCS has taken steps to assess how the evolution of technology will affect  the provision of its priority calling services and to plan for these changes.  In addition, because NCS’s programs are largely dependent on the  telecommunications industry, which owns and operates most of the  communications infrastructure on which GETS and WPS operate, NCS has  partnered with industry to inform and implement these changes.  According to NCS, adding the priority voice communications component  of NS/EP NGN is less challenging than adding data services because while  priority calling programs exist (GETS and WPS), priority data programs do  not. NCS officials estimate that at least one of the three major carriers  (AT&T) will begin supporting priority communications via VoIP by 2010  and the remaining carriers (Sprint and Verizon) by 2014. However, less is  known about supporting priority data communications and, consequently,  this effort is more challenging, according to NCS officials.
The challenge to develop priority data services is not a new issue; in 2006  we reported that the obstacles to offering the service include both  technical and financial challenges. For example, the commonly used  version of Internet protocol (known as IPv4) does not guarantee priority  delivery and has certain security limitations that may not adequately  protect information from being monitored or modified while in transit via  the Internet. Though the next version (IPv6) has features that may help  prioritize the delivery of data in the future and provide enhanced security,  it is not yet widely adopted. Also, in March 2006, the NSTAC reported that  while the NS/EP NGN initiative is expected to offer improvements for  NS/EP communications, the security challenges are likely to have an  operational impact on the transmission of NS/EP communications if not  adequately addressed. Specifically, they noted that robust user  authentication methods are needed in order to enable NS/EP personnel to  share information in a secure manner. While these authentication methods  are to be available through IPv6, they are not available through IPv4,  which is the more widely used version. In April 2009, NCS officials told us  they have not yet finalized what types of authentication methods or which  IP version would support the NS/EP NGN, though they plan to request  additional information from industry experts about how to address  authentication issues. In our 2006 report, we noted that NCS had  previously requested information from private companies on the potential  for prioritizing services, and found that there was no offering for a priority  service, nor was there any consensus on a standard approach to  prioritization. Although, NCS, in conjunction with international standards  bodies, completed the first set of engineering standards for priority VoIP in  December 2007, as of May 2009, standards had not yet been established to  support prioritized NS/EP NGN data communications. Moreover, NCS  could not provide further detail as to how its planning efforts account for  the different capabilities of the available technology, and the associated  challenges.
In addition to NCS not fully detailing how it plans to mitigate existing  challenges, it also could not provide details about key program elements  such as, the estimated total costs, and a timeline for implementation of the  NS/EP NGN initiative. Officials said the information was not yet finalized.  Our previous work on acquisition and technology investment management  has shown that undertaking such efforts is strengthened by first ensuring  that (1) an acquisition approach, such as the one for NS/EP NGN, is based  on available technologies that support the intended capability; (2) cost  estimates are realistic; and (3) risks have been identified and analyzed, and  corresponding mitigation plans have been developed. NCS officials told  us they planned to develop program plans that included this information,  but as of May 2009 these documents were in the early stages of  development, and officials stated they were finalizing cost and schedule  estimates for the initiative, which may be greater than previously  projected. In addition, for the last 2 years, Congress has raised questions  about the absence of detailed program information such as costs of  planned investments for some of NCS’s programs, and NCS has faced  difficulties in justifying its budget requests. For example, during the  appropriations process for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, the House and  Senate Committees on Appropriations raised questions about the intended  investments in NS/EP NGN. Because of the lack of explanation about the  significant increase in funds requested for fiscal year 2008 compared to the  previous year, the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations stated  that NCS had not adequately justified funding for the NS/EP NGN effort.  Consequently, Congress appropriated $21 million—about 60 percent less  than requested—to DHS for NS/EP NGN. In addition, the House of  Representatives Committee on Appropriations directed DHS to brief them  on the planned expenditures for NS/EP NGN in fiscal year 2008. Again,  for the fiscal year 2009 budget request for NS/EP NGN, the House of  Representatives Committee on Appropriations raised questions about the  lack of a thorough explanation of (1) information about planned  investments, (2) clarity about how the initiative aligns with DHS’s  homeland security goals, and (3) information about the total costs to  complete the initiatives. As a result, Congress withheld half of the fiscal  year 2009 funding for NS/EP NGN until NCS completes an expenditure  plan to be approved by the House and Senate Committees on  Appropriations that identifies the strategic context, specific goals and  milestones, and planned investments. Although NCS had planned to  submit the expenditure plan to the Committees on Appropriations in  January 2009, they have not done so, and as of May 2009, the plan was still  being reviewed internally.
Based on technological and planning challenges, NCS officials told us that  in 2008 it began taking steps to restructure its acquisition approach to  focus first on voice with data to follow much later. However, as noted by  Congress in its response to NCS’s fiscal year 2009 budget request, little is  known about this restructuring, including key program information such  as what capabilities will be delivered, total costs, and milestones.  Moreover, despite requirements from Congress to articulate its strategy for  the NS/EP NGN initiative, as of May 2009 NCS had not yet clearly defined  program objectives and total costs, among other things. While NCS  officials told us that they expect increased costs and schedule delays, they  have not provided any further details or plans to mitigate these challenges,  and it is unclear when important technological and program details of the  restructuring will be finalized. In February 2009, NCS hired a new manager  whose responsibilities include NS/EP NGN, who stated the need to plan  for these issues and develop corresponding program plans that outline the  NS/EP NGN acquisition approach including costs, milestones, and risk  mitigation plans.
GAO and commercial best practices show that incorporating cost  information and strategies to mitigate program and technical challenges  are essential to successfully meeting program objectives and minimizing  the risk of cost overruns, schedule delays, and less than expected  performance. As NCS moves forward with the NS/EP NGN effort, clearly  defining and documenting its technical approach to achieve program  objectives within the constraints imposed by known challenges—such as  the limitations of available technologies and NCS’s dependence on the  telecommunications industry—could help provide reasonable assurance  that an executable approach is in place to meet current and future NS/EP  communications needs. Furthermore, such planning could provide a  sound basis for determining realistic cost and schedule estimates and  provide key stakeholders such as Congress with information they need to  make funding decisions over time.
section_title: NCS Has Implemented Strategic Planning Efforts, but These Could Be Strengthened by Incorporating Key Planning and Performance Measurement Practices
paragraphs: NCS has been developing its strategic plan since 2007, and although  officials have stated that a strategic plan could help inform their efforts, it  has not been finalized. In addition, while NCS has generally linked the  performance of its programs to broader agency and department goals, the  performance of two of NCS’s core responsibilities is not measured. Finally,  focusing program evaluation efforts on outcomes, gauging progress,  incorporating past performance, and clarity can improve the usefulness of  NCS’s performance measures.
subsections: section_title: NCS Has Been Developing a Strategic Plan since 2007, but It Has Not Been Finalized and Could Be Strengthened with Key Planning Practices
paragraphs: NCS has undertaken strategic planning for its programs and documented  some key elements of strategic planning—such as a statement of the  agency’s mission, strategic goals, and objectives—across a range of  documents and sources. For example, the mission statement is  documented in program documents such as NCS’s Annual Reports, and  NCS officials told us they have identified 21 strategic objectives that align  with its three strategic goals (information on the three strategic goals and  some of the related objectives is shown in table 3). However, this  information has not been incorporated into a strategic plan. Furthermore,  NCS officials stated that these goals and objectives are being revised, but  they did not provide a date when this would be finalized. Additionally,  NCS’s congressional budget justification documents for fiscal years 2007  through 2009 contain planned milestones and spending for various  program initiatives.
In June 2008, we reported that efforts were under way to draft a strategic  plan for the NCS, and recommended that DHS establish milestones for  completing the development and implementation of the strategic plan.  DHS agreed with our recommendation and stated that it was taking steps  toward finalizing the strategic plan. However, as of April 2009, the plan,  which has been in draft since mid-2007, had not yet been finalized and  NCS officials could not provide a date for when this would occur. A draft  strategic plan for fiscal years 2007 to 2013 did not include some of the key  elements associated with effective strategic plans. For example, while the  plan included NCS’s mission, strategic goals and high-level objectives, it  did not include a discussion of the resources needed to achieve these  goals and objectives. Although NCS intends to enhance its priority  communications offerings to keep pace with emerging technology (such as  priority data in an IP environment), it has not yet finalized the total costs  to do so. In addition, the draft plan did not identify external factors that  could affect achievement of strategic goals (such as management or  technological challenges). Moreover, the plan did not articulate how  current and planned initiatives such as the NS/EP NGN and the satellite  pilot program fit into the broader agency goals.
Our past work has discussed the importance of strategic planning as the  starting point for results-oriented management. Strategic plans are to  articulate the mission of an organization or program, and lay out its long- term goals and objectives for implementing that mission, including the  resources needed to reach these goals. Leading management practices  state that federal strategic plans include six key elements: (1) a  comprehensive mission statement, (2) strategic goals and objectives,   (3) strategies and the various resources needed to achieve the goals and  objectives, (4) a description of the relationship between the strategic goals  and objectives and performance goals, (5) an identification of key external  factors that could significantly affect the achievement of strategic goals,  and (6) a description of how program evaluations were used to develop or  revise the goals and a schedule for future evaluations. As we have  previously reported, strategic plans are strengthened when they include a  discussion of management challenges facing the program that may  threaten its ability to meet long-term, strategic goals.
While NCS has completed some key aspects of strategic planning, critical  elements such as the key external factors that could affect achievement of  its mission—for example, challenges affecting the NS/EP NGN initiative— have not yet been documented and NCS has not committed to  incorporating these elements in its strategic plan. A strategic plan that  captures these key elements in a centralized way would help inform  stakeholders, such as departmental leadership, Congress, and the  administration about NCS’s priorities and plans and assist stakeholders in  making efficient and effective program, resource, and policy decisions. In  addition, because NCS has experienced frequent turnover in leadership,  such a plan would be beneficial for new agency management during  transition periods. For example, since January 2007, there have been two  directors and one acting director as well as three different staff serving in  the capacity of Chief for the Technology and Programs Branch—a position  that oversees the day-to-day operations regarding NS/EP NGN, among  other initiatives.
section_title: NCS’s Performance Measures Are Generally Linked to Broader Agency and Department Goals and Objectives, but Measures Do Not Cover All Core Program Activities
paragraphs: NCS has five performance measures which relate to three aspects of GETS  and WPS—the number of subscribers, priority call completion rates in  emergencies, and cost to support GETS and WPS subscribers. While NCS  has not documented how its performance measures link to NCS’s and  DHS’s strategic goals and objectives, we used various documents, such as  DHS’s fiscal year 2008 to 2013 strategic plan, to determine that NCS’s five  performance measures link to agency and department strategic goals and  objectives (see figure 3, which illustrates the connection between DHS’s  mission to NCS’s performance measures). For example, NCS’s  performance measure to track the call completion rate of priority calls is  linked to its strategic goal of ensuring availability of communications as  well as to DHS’s strategic objective to ensure continuity of government  communications. Consistent with our past work on performance  management, linking performance measures with strategic goals and  objectives in this way provides managers and staff with a roadmap that  shows how their day-to-day activities contribute to achieving broader DHS  and NCS goals.
While NCS’s performance measures generally link to overall goals and  objectives, NCS’s performance measures focus exclusively on its priority  calling programs, and NCS does not have measures to assess the  performance of its other two primary responsibilities—serving as the ESF- 2 coordinator and the lead federal agency for critical infrastructure  protection for the communications sector. Although NCS officials  acknowledged that they do not have such measures and noted that they  could be helpful, these officials did not commit to developing such  measures. While we have previously reported that agencies do not need to  develop performance measures that cover all of their activities, OMB  requires that performance measures reflect a program’s mission and  priorities. Furthermore, we have also reported that an agency’s  performance measurement efforts are strengthened when they sufficiently  cover its core activities. NCS’s critical infrastructure protection and ESF- 2 responsibilities are key components of the agency’s mission to help  ensure that NS/EP communications are available during disasters or  emergencies, and are articulated in NCS’s strategic goals (see table 3). For  example, NCS, in conjunction with the telecommunication industry is  responsible for conducting risk assessments of the nation’s critical  communication infrastructure; according to Executive Order 13,231, as  amended, communications infrastructure is critical not only to emergency  preparedness, but all aspects of U.S. national security and economy.  Without the benefit of performance measures that cover these functions,  NCS may be limited in its ability to assess its overall effectiveness in  meeting all three of its strategic goals. Moreover, developing performance  measures for these mission-critical functions would help strengthen and  inform future program and budget decisions, improve critical program  activities, and as we have previously reported, help verify that NCS’s  resources are being used responsibly.
section_title: Focusing on Outcomes, Progress, and Past Performance to Set Performance Targets and Clarity Can Improve the Usefulness and Reliability of Performance Measures
paragraphs: Of its five performance measures, NCS has identified two as outcome  measures, two as output measures, and one as an efficiency measure (see  table 4 for more information on each of these measures). While OMB  guidance defines output measures (such as the number of products or  services delivered) as a description of the level of activity provided over a  period of time, it asserts program performance is most effectively  measured by focusing on how those outputs support the achievement of  desired outcomes—the intended results of carrying out a program or  activity. NCS’s two output measures—the number of GETS subscribers  and the number of WPS subscribers—could be strengthened to focus on  outcomes, more effectively gauge progress toward achieving results, and  set more reliable targets. In addition, one of NCS’s outcome measures, the  call completion rate, does not clearly illustrate the measures’ intended  purpose. OMB guidance emphasizes the use of outcome measures as a  more meaningful indicator of performance and encourages agencies to  translate existing measures that focus on outputs into outcome measures,  or at least demonstrate that measured outputs would logically lead to  intended outcomes. Currently, neither of NCS’s output measures fully  demonstrates how it supports NCS in the achievement of the intended  outcomes of the GETS and WPS programs, which, as articulated in one of  NCS’s strategic goal, is to ensure the availability of communications  capabilities for all NS/EP officials. For example, NCS told us that the long- term goal for the GETS program may be to reach 2 million subscribers;  however, NCS has not demonstrated how reaching 2 million subscribers  achieves the result of ensuring the availability of communications  capabilities for NS/EP officials that could benefit from the use of the GETS  service. According to NCS officials, NCS based this number on an internal  study that identified 2 million subscribers as the capacity level that the  PSTN can support. However, NCS could not provide a rationale as to how  2 million subscribers appropriately quantifies the population of NS/EP  personnel critical to NCS achieving its desired results. Therefore, it is  unclear whether achieving 2 million GETS subscribers means that all the  NS/EP personnel who have the greatest need for access to priority calling  capabilities are enlisted in the program thereby enabling them to make  calls that can help to coordinate planning for national security incidents  and emergencies and facilitate continuity of government under these  conditions—a key function of the GETS program. In addition, NCS  officials have told us that the agency has an unofficial long-term goal of  225,000 subscribers for the WPS program. Although NCS officials noted  that this number has not been finalized, the measure also does not portray  how well or if WPS is achieving its desired program outcome.  Furthermore, NCS has not been able to provide information regarding how  it developed this WPS subscriber goal or describe how it will do so in the  future.
Our past work, along with federal guidance, has discussed the importance  of using a series of output and outcome goals and measures to depict the  complexity of the results that agencies seek to achieve. We recognize  that it can be difficult to develop outcome goals and corresponding  measures. Nonetheless, by further articulating how NCS’s measures  support the intended outcome articulated in its strategic goal—ensuring  availability of communications for NS/EP functions—, NCS and its  stakeholders could more effectively gauge the extent to which subscriber  levels in GETS and WPS reflect if communications capabilities are  available to all critical NS/EP personnel as intended.
NCS’s progress can be better measured through annual performance  targets that track subscriber levels to demonstrate how overall subscriber  goals for GETS and WPS lead to program outcomes. This would help to  better illustrate NCS’s annual progress toward achieving its desired  results. Furthermore, although both of NCS’s output measures reflect the  number of subscribers in each program for a given year, the measures do  not reflect whether NCS’s annual achievement demonstrate significant or  marginal progress toward reaching 2 million subscribers, and NCS has not  defined a time by which it hopes to achieve this goal. In its GETS and WPS  performance measures, NCS states annual results as an output of the  number of subscribers in a particular year—for example, 208,600 GETS  subscribers in fiscal year 2008. These output measures do not capture  percentage increases in the number of subscribers from year to year to  help measure performance changes in achieving any long-term goal for  subscribers. According to OMB guidance, performance over time is to be  expressed as a tangible, measurable objective, against which actual  achievement can be compared, such as a quantitative standard, value, or  rate. For example, for NCS’s performance measure related to the percent  of federal continuity coordinators with access to priority calling  programs—NCS tracks change over time by showing a rate of annual  progress toward enlisting these particular officials in the GETS and WPS  programs. In doing so, NCS can provide insight as to the extent to which  this group can successfully place calls to help facilitate continuity of  government at the federal level—particularly in the event of network  congestion during emergencies. Although NCS has reported ongoing or  planned targeted outreach efforts to similar groups that play a leadership  role in coordinating emergency response and continuity of government  such as governors or mayors, they have not developed similar  performance measures to track their annual progress in enlisting and  maintaining these subscribers. NCS has not finalized its overall goal for the  number of GETS and WPS subscribers or set a timeline for when it plans  to achieve its unofficial goals for the number of GETS and WPS  subscribers. Based on GETS enrollment levels over the last 3 fiscal years,  at current rates NCS may not achieve its unofficial subscriber goals until  somewhere between 2015 and 2047. OMB guidance states that  performance goals are to be comprised not only of performance measures  and targets, but also include time frames for achieving these goals.
In addition, OMB guidance states that targets are to consider past  performance, adjusted annually as conditions change, such as funding  levels and legislative constraints. However, NCS did not consider past  performance when setting annual performance targets for several of its  performance measures. As a result, the targets are not ambitious or based  on reliable baselines. For example, NCS did not modify its targets for the  number of GETS subscribers for fiscal years 2007 and 2009 based on  actual results achieved in the previous fiscal year. According to OMB  performance guidance, baselines are the starting point from which gains  are measured and targets set; and performance targets are to be ambitious.  Our past work has also emphasized the importance of baselines and  multiyear goals particularly when results are expected to take several  years to achieve. As detailed in table 4, for fiscal year 2006, NCS reported  a target of 118,000 GETS subscribers and achieved 158,669, which also  surpassed its 2007 goal. However, NCS did not update its fiscal year 2007  goal of 155,000 when it was achieved in 2006. Similarly, in fiscal year 2008,  NCS set a target of 185,000 subscribers and achieved 208,600 subscribers,  which surpassed the fiscal year 2009 goal. However, as of April 2009, the  goal remained at 204,000 subscribers even though NCS exceeded this level  in the previous fiscal year. Similarly, the target level for another  measure—the average cost to maintain a priority telecommunications  service subscriber—has not been modified to reflect the actual results of  the prior year. NCS began using this measure in fiscal year 2007 and has  exceeded its target reductions in cost for the 2 years that the measure has  been in place. For fiscal years 2008 and 2009, the average cost targets were  $15.63 and $14.22, respectively; however, NCS reported that the average  cost to maintain a priority service subscriber in 2008 was $13.70,  surpassing targeted reductions for both 2008 and 2009. As with the target  for the subscriber measures, the average cost target was not modified to  build upon actual results of the prior fiscal year. Furthermore, the baseline  upon which each annual average cost goal is determined is the number of  GETS and WPS subscribers. While officials cite reductions in operating  costs as one reason for exceeding the target, they also stated that the  achievement was more a function of the fact that they exceeded the  projected number of GETS subscribers. As a result, because the annual  GETS subscriber performance measure is not composed of ambitious  targets from year to year, the baseline it provides for determining the  average cost target is unreliable. Without considering changes in this  baseline information—in this case, number of subscribers—valid  comparisons to measure improvement over time cannot be made.  Considering past performance in setting targets could help NCS develop a  true sense of continued improvement in enlisting priority service  subscribers and reducing costs to service the subscribers.
Finally, while NCS has implemented an outcome-oriented measure to  assess the effectiveness of its priority calling programs during periods of  congestion, the information the measure intends to convey—priority  service call completion rate—is not consistent with the methodology used  to calculate the results. Specifically, the measure is intended to capture  and measure combined call completion rates for GETS and WPS.  However, wireless carriers collect the relevant information that NCS  reports via this measure, and under current processes for capturing  attempted WPS calls, wireless carriers are unable to identify all attempted  WPS calls that are not completed. Our previous work holds that  performance measures should be clearly stated in order to ensure that the  name and definition of the measure are consistent with the methodology  used to calculate it. Furthermore, OMB guidance states that agencies are  required to discuss the completeness and reliability of their performance  data, and any limitations on the reliability of the data. As the call  completion measure does not provide clear information about program  performance and limitations, NCS risks overstating the completion rate for  WPS and the use of this measure may affect the validity of managers’ and  stakeholders’ assessment of WPS performance in comparison to the  intended result. NCS officials agreed that opportunities exist to strengthen  this measure to ensure that it accurately reflects the activity being  measured, and stated they are taking steps to work with carriers that  support WPS services to develop a solution that would allow them to track  the full range of WPS calls. However, in the meantime, NCS has not  committed to revising the measure to accurately reflect the activity being  monitored.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The events of September 11, 2001, and the 2005 hurricane season  dramatically demonstrated how catastrophic man-made and natural  disasters can disrupt communication capabilities and highlight the need  for essential NS/EP officials to be able to communicate during and in the  aftermath of such events. NCS continues to recognize the need to keep  pace with technological changes and look for ways to better meet NS/EP  personnel’s current and future communications needs as evidenced by the  development of its NGN initiative. Information such as costs, available  technology, and future capabilities for these types of initiatives are  unknown, and as such require thoughtful planning to most effectively  allocate current and future resources. These efforts to ensure that the  communication capabilities it provides to NS/EP personnel will be  operable on and leverage next-generation networks could benefit from  better planning. By clearly defining its acquisition approach for the  initiative and developing mitigation plans to address known risks and  technical challenges, NCS can help minimize cost overruns and schedule  delays, and more importantly help ensure that it is developing services that  meet the emerging communication needs of the NS/EP community.
Strategic plans are an essential element in results-oriented program  management, and provide agencies and stakeholders a common set of  operational principles with which to guide actions and decisions. Although  DHS stated that it was taking steps to finalize its strategic plan in response  to our June 2008 recommendation, it has not yet finalized the plan which  has been in draft since mid-2007 or committed to incorporating key  elements of a strategic plan. We continue to believe that our prior  recommendation has merit and that NCS could benefit from completing a  strategic plan. A strategic plan that includes identifying strategic goals and  objectives, the resources needed to achieve those goals and objectives,  and a description of the relationship between planned initiatives and  strategic goals could serve as the foundation to help NCS align its daily  activities, operations, program development, and resource allocation to  support its mission and achieve its goals. As NCS undertakes a variety of  new initiatives and attempts to strengthen existing programs, finalizing its  strategic plan will also help strengthen NCS’s ability to efficiently and  effectively allocate resources, inform key stakeholders, and provide  agency and congressional decision makers the ability to assess NCS’s  programs and initiatives.
As part of strategic planning, it is important that related performance  measures are linked and support NCS strategic goals, as well as DHS’s  strategic goal of ensuring continuity of communications. In the absence of  performance measures for the key functions NCS performs as the lead for  the federal government’s efforts to protect critical communications and as  the coordinator for ESF-2, NCS cannot reasonably measure or  demonstrate how these core program activities are contributing to  achieving all three of its strategic goals and DHS’s overall mission of  providing continuity of communications. For a performance measure to be  used effectively, it is essential that a measure’s definitions, and its  intended use, are consistent with the methodology used to calculate it.  While NCS acknowledges that its primary performance measure for its  priority calling programs—call completion rate—does not capture all WPS  calls completed and is exploring ways to capture the full spectrum of  uncompleted, by not revising the measure in the meantime to accurately  portray what is being measured, NCS continues to inaccurately measure  performance and provide potentially misleading information to decision  makers. Similarly, by not adjusting the performance targets that intend to  measure number of subscribers and average costs to build upon and  reflect previous years’ results, NCS cannot make valid comparisons to  measure improvement over time, and cannot ensure whether performance  goals are reasonable and appropriate. Beyond adjusting targets for the  number of subscribers, opportunities exist to make these measures more  outcome oriented to reflect the progress in reaching NCS’s ultimate goals  for the number of subscribers to its GETS and WPS programs. However,  without clearly defining or demonstrating how its ultimate subscriber  goals achieve the result of ensuring the availability of communications  capabilities for NS/EP personnel who need these services, it will remain  difficult to measure progress. To its credit, NCS has identified federal  continuity coordinators as critical NS/EP personnel needing access to its  programs and has developed an outcome measure to track progress in  enlisting and maintaining this group of subscribers. However, without  similar measures for other groups that play a significant role in  coordinating emergency response and continuity of government, NCS will  not be in a position to evaluate its efforts to reach out, target, and  ultimately provide priority calling programs to these groups.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that NCS management has sufficient information needed to  assess and improve NCS’s programs and new initiatives and to effectively  support budget decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of DHS direct  the Manager of the NCS to take the following three actions:    Develop program plans for the NS/EP NGN initiative that outline an  acquisition approach based on available technologies, realistic cost  estimates, and that include mitigation plans to address identified  challenges and risks.
Follow best practices for strategic planning in finalizing the NCS strategic  plan including identifying the resources needed to achieve its strategic  goals and objectives and providing a description of the relationship  between planned initiatives such as the NS/EP NGN and strategic goals.
Strengthen NCS’s performance measurement efforts by (1) developing  measures to cover all core program activities, (2) exploring opportunities  to develop more outcome-oriented measures, (3) ensuring performance  measure baselines are reliable and based upon past performance, (4) and  improving the clarity of its call completion measure.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided DHS a draft of this report for review and comment. DHS  provided written comments on August 7, 2009, which are summarized  below and presented in their entirety in appendix VI.  DHS also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
DHS disagreed with the recommendation in our draft report that it develop  an evaluation plan for its satellite program that includes milestones for  continued implementation and a methodology for assessing the results of  the pilot before moving forward with the program. Specifically, DHS noted  that the pilot program, which was on hold at the time of our review, was  now complete.  However, at the conclusion of our field work, our  understanding from the NCS Director was that the pilot was on hold and  that NCS was reassessing various aspects of the pilot such as conducting a  cost-benefit analysis to determine which satellite provider and equipment  to use.  In light of this discrepancy, we subsequently obtained clarification  on the status of the pilot.  Our discussion with DHS revealed that the pilot  program was terminated rather than completed.  In providing clarification,  DHS stated that it agreed with our assessment that the pilot program  needed improved planning and metrics documentation and that NCS took  a number of issues into consideration including the current availability of  push-to-talk capability among existing satellite service providers to  determine whether the pilot should be continued.  Given these  considerations, as well as the issues that we identified such as lack of  program objectives, documentation and metrics, NCS terminated the pilot.   According to NCS, about $900,000 had already been spent or obligated to  support various activities for the pilot program.  According to NCS  officials, the remaining $1 million for the pilot will be reprogrammed and  any funds that had already been obligated but not yet spent will be  deobligated and also reprogrammed for other priority communications  services.  Thus, based on the termination of the pilot, we withdrew our  recommendation and have modified our report to reflect the current status  of the pilot.
DHS concurred with our recommendation that it develop program plans  for the NS/EP NGN initiative that outline an acquisition approach based on  available technologies, realistic cost estimates, and that include mitigation  plans to address identified challenges and risks.  Although it concurred  with our recommendation, DHS also reported that NCS currently follows a  structured approach in the design and implementation of program plans  and that it assesses industry trends to help determine program  enhancements and mitigation plans.  Developing program plans for the  NS/EP NGN initiative as we recommended can help NCS minimize cost  overruns and schedule delays and help ensure that it is developing  services that meet the needs of the NS/EP community.
DHS concurred with our recommendation that NCS follow best practices  for strategic planning in finalizing the NCS strategic plan including  identifying the resources needed to achieve its strategic goals and  objectives and providing a description of the relationship between planned  initiatives, such as the NS/EP NGN, and strategic goals.  DHS stated that  all NCS activities are directly linked to its mission and associated  performance measures.  Finalizing its strategic plan as we have  recommended will help provide decision makers with information to help  them assess NCS’s programs and initiatives.
With regard to our recommendation that NCS strengthen its performance  measurement efforts by (1) developing measures to cover all core program  activities, (2) exploring opportunities to develop more outcome-oriented  measures, (3) ensuring performance measure baselines are reliable and  based upon past performance, and (4) improving the clarity of its call  completion measure, DHS concurred.  Specifically, DHS reported that NCS  will continue to develop performance measures. Taking action to  strengthen its performance measures as we recommended should help  NCS improve its ability to evaluate its efforts to reach out, target, and  provide priority calling programs.
DHS also commented on the report’s discussion of subscriber database  accuracy, stating that it disagreed with what it viewed as our assertion that  NCS should be able to easily determine whether certain individuals  serving in public positions were still entitled to be GETS subscribers, as  well as our expectation that NCS terminate access for individuals  regardless of whether the subscriber’s organization has notified NCS to do  so. DHS also highlighted the steps that NCS takes to help ensure agency  points of contact keep NCS’s subscriber database updated.  We modified  the report to better recognize the role agency Points of Contacts play in  updating NCS’s database.
DHS also noted that the report suggested that NCS’s outreach efforts are  limited to a select number of activities and noted that NCS also meets with  other governmental bodies.  We have modified our report to clarify the  discussion that these are examples of outreach efforts that are not  intended to be inclusive of all of NCS’s efforts.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date.  At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Secretary of Homeland Security, and any other interested parties. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8777, or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  Appendix VII.
William O. Jenkin Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues  s, Jr.
section_title: Appendix I: The NCS Organization Structure
paragraphs: The National Communications System (NCS) was established by a  memorandum signed by President Kennedy in 1963, in the wake of the  communications challenges that arose during the Cuban Missile Crisis  when, according to NCS, delays in sending and receiving communications  between the United States and foreign governments involved in the crisis  threatened to further complicate the crisis. The original memorandum  which has been amended and superseded over time, called for establishing  a national communications system by linking together, and improving the  communications assets of various federal agencies. Such a system is to  provide the necessary communications for the federal government under  all conditions ranging from normal conditions to domestic emergencies  and international crises. Today, Executive Order 12,472 is the primary  federal guidance in force that dictates the composition and functions of  the NCS. Executive Order 12,472 defined the NCS as those  telecommunications assets owned or leased by the federal departments,  agencies, or entities that comprise the NCS that can meet the national  security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) needs of the federal  government together with a management structure that could ensure that  a national telecommunications infrastructure is developed that is  responsive to NS/EP needs, among other things. Executive Order 12,472  which was amended by Executive Order 13,286 on February 28, 2003,  provided that NCS’s mission is to assist the President, the National  Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Directors of the  Office of Science and Technology and Office of Management and Budget  in, among other responsibilities, “the coordination of the planning for and  provision of NS/EP communications for the Federal government under all  circumstances, including crisis or emergency, attack, recovery, and  reconstitution.”
The NCS organization structure largely consists of federal entities.  However, the telecommunications industry serves in an advisory capacity  to the federal government on matters regarding NS/EP communications. A  description of the roles and responsibilities of the entities that comprise  the NCS organization follows. See figure 4 for an illustration of the current  NCS management structure.
Executive Office of the President (EOP). Within the EOP, the National  Security Council (NSC), the Homeland Security Council (HSC), the Office  of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and the Office of Management  and Budget (OMB) have varying responsibilities for setting the policy  direction for NS/EP communications and providing oversight of the NCS.  For example, in consultation with the Executive Agent and a group of  federal telecommunications officers (known as the NCS Committee of  Principals), the EOP helps to determine NS/EP telecommunications  requirements.
NCS Executive Agent. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the  functions and responsibilities of the NCS Executive Agent were  transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Among other things,  the Executive Agent is responsible for ensuring that the NCS conducts  unified planning and operations, in order to coordinate the development  and maintenance of an effective and responsive capability for meeting the  domestic and international NS/EP telecommunications needs for the  federal government as well as ensuring coordination with emergency  management activities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  Additionally, the Executive Agent designates the NCS Manager and  oversees related activities including the delivery of priority  communications programs (such as Government Emergency  Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the Wireless Priority Service  (WPS)).
Office of the Manager, NCS. The Office of the Manager, NCS (OMNCS)  falls under the Office of Cyber Security and Communications which is part  of the National Protection and Programs Directorate within DHS. The  responsibilities of the NCS Manager include, among other responsibilities,  preparing for consideration by the NCS Committee of Principals and the  Executive Agent:  recommendations on an evolutionary telecommunications architecture  to meet current and future NS/EP needs; and    plans and procedures for the management, allocation and use,  including the establishment of priorities or preferences, of federally  owned or leased telecommunications assets under all conditions of  crisis or emergency.
Additionally, the NCS Manager is responsible for implementing and  administering any approved plans or programs as assigned, including any  system of priorities and preferences for the provision of communications  service, in consultation with the NCS Committee of Principals and the  Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to the extent practicable or  otherwise required by law or regulation. Further, the NCS Manager is to  conduct technical studies or analyses for the purpose of identifying  improved approaches which may assist in fulfilling NS/EP  telecommunications objectives, among other things. Additionally, in  consultation with the NCS Committee of Principals and other appropriate  entities of the federal government, the NCS Manager is to ensure that,  where feasible, existing and evolutionary industry, national, and  international standards are used as the basis for federal  telecommunications standards. The OMNCS also includes the National  Coordinating Center—a joint industry-government entity—which assists in  coordinating the initiation and restoration of NS/EP communications  services and is involved in critical infrastructure protection of  telecommunications assets.
NCS Committee of Principals. According to NCS, this collaborative body,  chaired by the NCS Manager comprises of the key telecommunications  officers of those agencies designated by the President that own or lease  telecommunications assets of significance to national security or  emergency preparedness, and other executive entities which bear policy,  regulatory, or enforcement responsibilities of importance to NS/EP  telecommunications capabilities. Currently, the NCS Committee of  Principals includes representatives from 24 federal departments and  agencies—known as the NCS Member Agencies. In accordance with  Executive Order 12,472, the NCS Committee of Principals, among other  things, provides comments and recommendations to the National Security  Council, the Director of OSTP, the OMB Director, the NCS Executive  Agent, or NCS Manager regarding ongoing or prospective activities of the  NCS. According to NCS, the NCS Committee of Principals, in accordance  with its bylaws, has established subgroups such as the NCS Council of  Representatives to help support the work activities of the NCS. Further,  the NCS Committee of Principals established other groups such as the  Priority Services Working Group to analyze the potential impact of future  technologies on priority services programs and examine the outreach  efforts for the GETS and WPS programs, among other things.
The National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC).
The NSTAC was established in 1982 by Executive Order 12,382 to serve as  an advisory committee to the President on matters related to NS/EP  communications and may comprise of no more than 30 industry leaders  appointed by the President. The NSTAC members are usually chief  executive officers, from the telecommunications companies, network  service providers, information technology firms, finance, and aerospace  companies. As we previously reported, over the course of its longstanding  relationship with the NSTAC, the NCS has worked closely with NSTAC  member companies during emergency response and recovery activities  following a terrorist attack or natural disaster.  For example, after the  September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, NSTAC member companies  immediately coordinated with NCS to assist with communication  restoration efforts despite the fact that some of their network  infrastructure had been among the most severely damaged. As we have  previously reported, the NCS and NSTAC share information on a variety of  issues including federal policies related to NS/EP communications and  changes in the telecommunications marketplace. The NSTAC has also  issued multiple reports addressing a wide range of policy and technical  issues regarding communications, information systems, information  assurance, critical infrastructure protection, and other NS/EP  communications concerns. For example, in 2006, NSTAC issued a report  that identified challenges related to NS/EP communications and provided  recommendations to the President intended to help ensure that next  generation network initiatives meet NS/EP user’s need, among other  things. As provided under Executive Order 12,382, the NSTAC has  established subgroups such as the Industry Executive Committee to help it   it  carry out its functions.  carry out its functions.
These subgroups may be composed, in whole or in part, of individuals who are not  members of the NSTAC.
section_title: Appendix II: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To analyze the extent to which the National Communications System  (NCS) provides priority communications programs, we reviewed relevant  legislation, regulations and other documentation that outline NCS  responsibilities in ensuring the continuity of communication including the  Homeland Security Act of 2002, Executive Orders 12,472 and 13,231, and  NCS Directive 3-10. We also reviewed budget requests, annual reports, the  Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) reports submitted to the  Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and other documentation  related to NCS activities. We also obtained and reviewed relevant agency  documents such as internal briefings, program planning documents, and  standard operating procedures that describe how Government Emergency  Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the Wireless Priority Service  (WPS) operate and the capabilities that each program delivers. We  obtained information on the mechanisms NCS utilizes to collect, track and  analyze the performance of GETS and WPS. In addition, we obtained and  analyzed data on the performance of GETS and WPS during select  emergency or national special security events such as the 1995 Oklahoma  City Bombing, the September 11, 2001, attacks, Hurricane Katrina in 2005,  and the 2009 Presidential Inauguration, among others. We also interviewed  NCS officials to obtain information on the agency’s role in ensuring  continuity of communications, the types of priority communications  capabilities it provides to the national security and emergency  preparedness (NS/EP) community—specifically through the GETS, WPS,  and Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) programs—as well as the  types of challenges, if any, the agency may face in providing these  services. We interviewed officials from the Federal Communications  Commission (FCC) to obtain information on the agency’s role in providing  emergency communications, including how it works with NCS in  providing priority communications capabilities. Furthermore, we  interviewed telecommunications industry representatives from AT&T,  Qwest Communications, and Verizon that are among the U.S. telephone  carriers that provide NS/EP communications services. Although their  views cannot be generalized to all telecommunications companies that  provide NS/EP communications, the information we obtained helped to  enhance our understanding of their role in providing emergency  communications and their views on the impact the next generation  network (NGN) technology transition may have on NCS’s priority  communication programs.
We also interviewed NS/EP officials from a non-probability sample of 15  states and 13 localities to obtain their perspectives and views on the NCS  and its priority communication programs. Specifically, we obtained  information from these officials regarding (1) their awareness of the NCS  and the GETS, WPS, and TSP programs; (2) the extent they had utilized  these programs in responding to an emergency situation and/or in their  training and exercise activities; and (3) their perspectives on the benefits  of these priority calling programs and potential barriers to participation. In  selecting these states and localities, we considered a variety of factors  including (1) the frequency and types of declared disasters by the Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), (2) geographic dispersion, and  (3) topographical factors that could affect the functionality of  communications. The selected states and localities represent a range of  natural disasters, terrains, climates, and population densities and also  include areas that have recently experienced high-profile natural disasters  or man-made attacks. While the perspectives of the officials we  interviewed cannot be generalized to reflect the views of NS/EP  emergency management officials in all states and localities, we believe the  perspectives of the officials in these locations provided us with an  overview and useful information on the NCS and the priority  communications programs it provides.
To determine how NCS enlists subscribers and controls access to its  priority programs, we collected and analyzed documentation, and  interviewed NCS officials (1) on subscriber eligibility criteria, (2) to  determine NCS’s outreach efforts to enlist new subscribers for its priority  calling programs, and (3) to identify its internal controls for controlling  access to these programs. With regards to NCS’s outreach efforts, we  obtained and reviewed documentation such as brochures, newsletters, and  conference schedules on NCS outreach efforts including its use of regional  outreach coordinators and its awareness booth deployments at various  emergency management conferences. We also attended several NCS user- focused meetings and obtained documentation which detailed NCS efforts  to attract new subscribers and provide support to current subscribers. To  determine what internal controls NCS utilizes to grant and control access  to its priority calling programs, we obtained the NCS standard operating  procedures for GETS and WPS programs which outlined the procedures  and processes to participate in the programs including the eligibility  criteria, the approval process, and the re-validation process. We also  obtained NCS standard operating procedures and compared them with  criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. To  determine whether NCS adhered to its procedures for terminating access  for subscribers who no longer meet the programs’ eligibility criteria, we  reviewed a nonprobability sample of records for 76 former federal and 9  former state government officials including former members of the U.S.  Senate as well as members and delegates of the U.S. House of  Representatives for the 109th Congress; immediate past heads of federal  departments and agencies as of August 2008; and immediate past  governors of U.S. states and territories as of August 2008, which is when  we obtained the subscriber data. We selected these groups because they  served in public positions that would allow NCS to easily determine that  their positions ended, and in turn, work with the subscriber’s organization  to update account status, as appropriate. Although the results of our work  cannot be generalized to evaluate the effectiveness of controls used for all  NCS program subscribers, the information obtained provided us with  useful information about the extent to which subscriber records for these  groups were terminated following a change in the subscriber’s eligibility  status. Because the subscriber database, in its entirety, is classified, we  have limited our reporting of the results of our analysis to only  nonclassified information; however, this does not affect our findings.
To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed the data for obvious  problems with completeness or accuracy and interviewed knowledgeable  agency officials and contract support staff about the data quality control  processes and reviewed relevant documentation such as the database  dictionary that describes the data fields in the subscriber database. When  we found discrepancies (such as duplicate records), we brought them to  the attention of NCS officials and its contract support staff to better  understand the nature of the discrepancies and resulting impact on our  work. We performed electronic testing on the data and found the data to  be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To determine what challenges can affect NCS’s delivery of its priority  communications programs, we interviewed relevant NCS officials who  have responsibilities for these programs. We also obtained information  and reviewed documentation from the agency regarding its efforts to  implement the Satellite Priority Service pilot program, as well as its efforts  to leverage NGN technology in its priority communication programs. We  compared this information with our previous work on pilot program  planning and technology acquisition.
To assess NCS’s overall planning and evaluation efforts, we interviewed  NCS officials and reviewed relevant documentation regarding their  strategic planning efforts and the mechanisms they use to evaluate their  services. Specifically, we reviewed and analyzed NCS’s draft strategic plan  to determine the extent to which the plan outlined the agency’s short and  long term strategic goals and objectives, the associated time frames with  their identified goals and objectives, the current status of the goals and  objectives and internal and external factors that may affect their ability to  achieve their goals and objectives. We also obtained and reviewed the  OMB Performance Assessment Rating Tool, NCS’s Congressional Budget  Justifications, and other documents that outlined the performance  measures utilized to assess the extent they are achieving their goals and  objectives; and planned milestones and spending for their priority calling  programs. To assess the effectiveness of NCS planning efforts, we  compared their efforts with federal best practices contained in our past  reports which discussed the importance of strategic planning. We also  utilized guidance from OMB Circular A-11, and related federal legislation,  such as the Government Performance and Results Acts of 1993, which  identifies the six key element of a strategic plan. In addition, we  interviewed NCS officials about their strategic planning efforts and the  mechanisms they use to monitor and evaluate their services. While NCS is  not required to explicitly follow these guidelines, the guidelines do provide  a framework for effectively developing a strategic plan and the basis for  program accountability.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through August 2009  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our  audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Telecommunications Service Priority Program
paragraphs: The Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) program provides priority  provisioning and restoration of telecommunications services that support  emergency operations facilities for certain federal, state, and local  governments and other entities. Such services include equipment used to  transmit voice and data communication by wire, cable, and satellite,  among other things. During and following an emergency event, wireless  and wireline carriers may receive numerous requests for new  telecommunications service as well as for the restoration of existing  services. Under this program, telecommunications carriers and their  partners (collectively referred to as service vendors) are required to  restore national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP)  telecommunications services that suffer outage, or are reported as  unusable or otherwise in need of restoration, before non-NS/EP services.  As with Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and  the Wireless Priority Service (WPS), certain government agencies and  other groups are identified as having specific NS/EP responsibilities that  qualify them for priority provisioning and restoration of services.  However, unlike GETS and WPS, for which new subscriptions can be  requested and approved during emergency response and recovery  activities, authorization to receive TSP priority services must be in place  before it is needed. Although the federal government does not charge a  fee, telecommunications service providers (such as wireless carriers and  cable and satellite providers) may charge an initial startup fee of up to  $100 per circuit and a monthly fee of up to $10 per circuit. The National  Communications System (NCS) reported that as of fiscal year 2008, over  1,000 organizations have registered more than 191,000 circuits under the  TSP program.
Telecommunications personnel have traditionally faced difficulties in  accessing disaster areas in order to make TSP repairs to communications  assets. According to telecommunications representatives that are part of  the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC) within  NCS, access for repair crews to disasters areas has been an issue dating  back to Hurricane Hugo in 1989, and during the aftermath of Hurricane  Katrina. For example, an independent panel formed to examine the  telecommunications challenges during Hurricane Katrina, reported that  inconsistent and unclear requirements for repair crews and their  subcontractors to gain access to the affected area impeded their efforts to  make necessary repairs including those that they are required to complete  under the TSP program. The panel reported that there were no  mechanisms in place to issue credentials to those who needed them prior  to Hurricane Katrina making landfall. Consequently, personnel from  telecommunications companies were unable to gain access to repair some  communications assets in the disaster area because they lacked the  necessary credentials to access these areas. For example, during  Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana authorities, among others, provided  credentials to telecommunications repair crews to permit them access to  certain affected areas; however, telecommunications personnel reported  that within disaster areas, credentials that permitted access through one  checkpoint would not be honored at another. In addition these personnel  reported that in some cases the checkpoints required different  documentation and credentialing before granting access to repair  personnel. As a result, repair personnel had to carry multiple credentials  and letters from various federal, state, and local officials authorizing their  access to the disaster area. Furthermore, telecommunications personnel  were unclear about which government agency had the authority to issue  the necessary credentials. Similarly, repair crews reported that other  factors delayed or interrupted the delivery of TSP services, such as the  enforcement of curfews and other security procedures intended to  maintain law and order.
Although the full scope of these credentialing issues is outside NCS’s  jurisdiction, under the communications annex of the revised 2008 National  Response Framework, NCS is to coordinate with other emergency support  function 2 (ESF-2) support agencies, among others, to ensure that  telecommunications repair personnel have access to restore  communications infrastructure in the incident area. To help facilitate this,  NCS has taken steps to work with federal, state, and local government  agencies as well as the private sector to identify solutions. For instance,  NCS has coordinated with emergency management officials in Georgia and  Louisiana to develop standard operating procedures to ensure access for  critical infrastructure workers during emergencies or disasters. NCS  officials also told us that they have begun to catalog the access procedures  for various states and localities that could be provided to  telecommunications personnel in order to facilitate access to damaged  infrastructure in the aftermath of an emergency or disaster. In addition,  other federal agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management  Agency (FEMA), have also taken steps to address this issue. For example,  in November 2008, FEMA released for comment credentialing guidelines  for essential personnel who need access to disaster areas in order to  facilitate response, recovery and restoration efforts. The guidelines are  intended to provide a uniform approach at the state and local level to  provide telecommunications repair personnel, among others with access  and credentials needed to enter a disaster area in order to expedite the  restoration of communication capabilities.
section_title: Appendix IV: GETS and WPS Performance during Select Emergency Events
paragraphs: Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the  Wireless Priority Service (WPS) are designed to achieve a probability that  90 percent of calls made using these services will successfully connect.  The ability to communicate is critical to coordinating emergency response  and recovery efforts during the first 72 hours following an emergency;  however, the availability of communications can be disrupted by increased  call volume or outages that occur in wireline and wireless networks.  According to NCS, telephone calls made without the use of GETS or WPS  during nonemergency periods generally result in a 99 percent likelihood of  successful completion—that is the (1) called party answers the call, (2)  called number rings but is not answered, or (3) called number responds  with a busy signal. However, during a disaster or emergency event, NCS  officials stated that the public switched telephone network (PSTN) can  experience up to 10 times the normal call volume. Conversely, without  using GETS or WPS, approximately 9 out of every 10 calls would not  complete during a time period when the PSTN is highly congested.
NCS’s priority calling programs services have been used to facilitate  communications across the spectrum of emergencies and other major  events dating back to the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombings through the  recent 2009 Presidential Inauguration. GETS and WPS usage has varied  greatly during disasters or emergencies as the programs have evolved and  the programs have generally achieved call completion rates that range  from 68 percent to 99 percent. For example, during the 1995 Oklahoma  City bombings, of 429 GETS calls attempted 291 calls that may not have  otherwise been completed due to network overload reached the intended  destination number and resulted in a call completion rate of about 68  percent. In contrast, during Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the number of  GETS calls attempted was 28,556, of which 27,058 (or 95 percent) were  successfully completed (see table 5). Additionally, GETS and WPS  capabilities were also used during the 2003 power outage that affected  New York City and other areas. During this event, there were fewer GETS  and WPS calls made in comparison to other events; however, the call  completion rates for the duration of the event were 92 percent and 82  percent respectively.
section_title: Appendix V: NS/EP Categories That Qualify for NCS’s Priority Telecommunications Services
paragraphs: The National Communications System (NCS) uses five broad categories to  determine who may be eligible to participate in its priority calling  programs such as the Government Emergency Telecommunications  Service (GETS) and the Wireless Priority Service (WPS). Eligible  subscribers may include personnel from federal, state, local, or tribal  government; as well as private industry and or non-profit organizations  (see table 6 below for further detail on each of these categories). In  addition, these categories are used to prioritize WPS calls in order to  further ensure that communications are first available for senior executive  leaders and policy makers at the federal, state, and local government level.  The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in response to NCS’s  request, established these priority levels that are used to determine which  WPS calls are to receive the first available channel with level five receiving  the lowest priority (though all levels receive priority over non-WPS  callers). In the event of an emergency and network congestion, the  mobile switching center queues the call according to the subscriber’s  priority level and call initiation time. For example, authorized staff from  the Executive Office of the President would receive priority over national  security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) officials who have  responsibility for public health and law enforcement if they placed calls at  the same time. NCS has not determined whether a similar approach is  required for the GETS program; however, if it is determined that a similar  approach is needed—NCS believes it can apply the WPS approach to the  GETS program. Table 6 also shows the priority level for each user  category.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Kirk Kiester, Assistant Director,  and Candice Wright, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this review. Mark  Abraham, Flavio Martinez, and Daniel Paepke made significant  contributions to the work. David Alexander and Arthur James assisted  with design, methodology, and data analysis. Sally Williamson provided  assistance in report preparation. Pille Anvelt provided assistance with the  report’s graphics.