Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability
Published: 2008-06-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2005, the Department of Defense (Defense), with support from the Department of State (State), has directed U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Police (ANP) into a force capable of enforcing the rule of law and supporting actions to defeat insurgency, among other activities. This testimony discusses (1) U.S. efforts to develop a capable ANP; (2) challenges that affect the development of a capable ANP; and (3) GAO analysis of U.S. efforts to develop a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which comprise the ANP and the Afghan National Army (ANA). This statement is based on a concurrently issued GAO report titled Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, GAO-08-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008).
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of more than $6 billion, no Afghan police unit (0 of 433) is assessed by Defense as fully capable of performing its mission and over three-fourths of units (334 of 433) are assessed at the lowest capability rating. In addition, while the ANP has reportedly grown in number to nearly 80,000 personnel, concerns exist about the reliability of this number. Several challenges impede U.S. efforts to develop capable ANP forces. First, the shortage of police mentors has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training and evaluation and verify that police are on duty. Second, the ANP continues to encounter difficulties with equipment shortages and quality. Third, the ANP faces a difficult working environment, including a weak Afghan judicial sector and consistent problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks by insurgents. Defense has recognized challenges to ANP development and, in November 2007, began a new initiative called Focused District Development--an effort to train the police as units--to address them. This effort is too new to fully assess, but the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put the effort at risk. Despite a 2005 GAO recommendation calling for a detailed plan and a 2008 congressional mandate requiring similar information, Defense and State have not developed a coordinated, detailed plan with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, milestones for completing and sustaining the ANSF, and a sustainment strategy. In 2007, Defense produced a 5-page document intended to address GAO's 2005 recommendation. However, the document does not identify the role or involve the participation of State--Defense's partner in training the ANP. Further, State has not completed a plan of its own. In the absence of a coordinated, detailed plan that clearly defines agency roles and responsibilities, a dual chain of command exists between Defense and State that has complicated the efforts of mentors training the police. Defense's 5-page document also contains few milestones, including no interim milestones that would help assess progress made in developing the ANP. Without interim milestones, it is difficult to know if current ANP status represents what the United States intended to achieve by 2008. In addition, Defense's 5-page document lacks a sustainment strategy. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this important mission.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss U.S. efforts to assist in the  development of Afghan National Police (ANP) forces and the  establishment of rule of law in Afghanistan. My testimony is based on our  concurrently issued report regarding U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan  National Security Forces (ANSF), which consist of the Afghan National  Army (ANA) and the ANP. According to Defense, an improved police force  is vital to stabilizing and maintaining security throughout Afghanistan. U.S.  support for the ANP began in 2002 and increased significantly in 2005 in  response to deteriorating security in Afghanistan and concerns that ANP  development was proceeding too slowly. U.S. activities currently include  manning, training, and equipping of police forces as well as efforts to  reform the Afghan Ministry of Interior, which oversees the ANP.
My testimony today focuses on (1) U.S. efforts to develop capable ANP  forces; (2) challenges that affect the development of capable ANP forces;  and (3) our analysis of U.S. efforts to develop a coordinated, detailed plan  for completing and sustaining the ANSF, including the ANP. Over the  course of our work, we reviewed and analyzed Defense reporting and  planning documents. In addition, we interviewed cognizant Defense, State,  and contractor officials in Washington, D.C., as well as in Kabul,  Afghanistan, where we also met with Afghan government officials. We also  visited an equipment warehouse and police training facilities.
We conducted our work for the concurrently issued report from March  2007 through June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and  perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Afghanistan’s security institutions, including its police and judiciary, were  severely damaged prior to the U.S. and coalition overthrow of the Taliban  regime in 2001. Reconstitution of the ANP formally began in February 2002  when donor nations agreed to establish a multiethnic, sustainable, 62,000- member professional police service committed to the rule of law. Germany  volunteered to lead the police reform effort; however, due, in part, to  Afghanistan’s pressing security needs and concerns that the German  training program was moving too slowly, the United States expanded its  role in the police training effort in 2005—including involvement, for the  first time, of the U.S. Department of Defense, as well as increased funding.  In May 2007, the Afghan government and its international partners  approved an interim increase in the number of police forces from 62,000 to  82,000, to be reviewed every 6 months. The force structure for the police  includes Ministry of Interior headquarters and administrative staff,  uniformed police personnel, and several specialized police units. (See app.  I for further details on the force structure and functions of the ANP.)
In addition to enforcing the rule of law, the role of the ANP is to protect  the rights of citizens, maintain civil order and public safety, control  national borders, and reduce the level of domestic and international  organized crime, among other activities. Also, the deterioration in  Afghanistan’s security situation since 2005 has led to increased ANP  involvement in counterinsurgency operations, resulting in additional  training in weapons and survival skills and counterinsurgency tactics.
U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip the ANP are directed by Defense  through its Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC- A), with support from State, which provides policy guidance to the effort  and oversight of civilian contractors implementing police training courses.  The primary U.S. contractor involved in training the ANP is DynCorp  International.
From 2002 to 2008, the United States provided about $16.5 billion to train  and equip the ANSF, including about $6.2 billion for the ANP (see table 1).  Over 40 percent (about $2.7 billion) of funds for training and equipping the  ANP were provided in fiscal year 2007, in an effort to accelerate ANP  development and enhance its capability in response to increased levels of  violence and insurgent activity.
Defense has developed criteria—called capability milestones (CM)—to  assess police and army capability. The table below provides descriptions  of the capability milestones.
section_title: Most Afghan National Police Units Are Rated as Not Capable of Performing Their Mission
paragraphs: After an investment of more than $6 billion, Defense reporting indicates  that, as of April 2008, no police unit (0 of 433) was assessed as fully  capable of performing its mission and more than three-fourths of units  rated (334 of 433) were assessed as not capable (see table 3).  Furthermore, among rated units, about 96 percent (296 of 308) of  uniformed police districts and all border police battalions (33 of 33),  which together comprise about 75 percent of the ANP’s authorized end- strength, were rated as not capable.
Six of the remaining 12 uniformed police districts were rated as capable of  leading operations with coalition support, and the other 6 as partially  capable. Overall, Defense assessed approximately 4 percent (18 of 433  units rated) of police units as partially capable and about 3 percent (12 of  433 units rated) as capable of leading operations with coalition support.  According to Defense reporting as of April 2008, the expected date for  completion of a fully capable Afghan police force is December 2012.  However, the benchmark set by the Afghan government and the  international community for establishing police forces that can effectively  meet Afghanistan’s security needs is the end of 2010.
subsections: section_title: Growth of Police Force Is Difficult to Quantify
paragraphs: Defense reporting indicates that, as of April 2008, nearly 80,000 police had  been assigned out of an end-strength of 82,000. This is an increase of more  than double the approximately 35,000 we reported as trained as of January  2005. Despite this reported increase in police manning, it is difficult to  determine the extent to which the police force has grown. As we noted in  May 2007, the Afghan Ministry of Interior produces the number of police  assigned and the reliability of these numbers has been questioned. A  Defense census undertaken since our May 2007 report to check the  reliability of ministry payroll records raises additional concerns about  numbers of police reportedly assigned. In September 2007, Defense  reported that it was unable to verify the physical existence of about 20  percent of the uniformed police and more than 10 percent of the border  police listed on the ministry payroll records for the provinces surveyed.  Because Defense’s census did not cover all 34 Afghan provinces, these  percentages cannot be applied to the entire police force. Nonetheless, the  results of Defense’s census raise questions about the reliability of the  nearly 80,000 number of police reportedly assigned.
section_title: Several Challenges Impede Development of Capable Police Forces
paragraphs: Several challenges impede U.S. efforts to build a capable police force.  These include (1) shortages in the police mentors needed to provide  training and evaluation and verify that police are on duty; (2) shortfalls in  several types of equipment that Defense considers critical; (3) a weak  judicial system; and (4) consistent problems with police pay, corruption,  and attacks by insurgents. Recognizing these challenges to ANP  development, Defense began a new initiative in November 2007 to  reconstitute the uniformed police—the largest component of the Afghan  police. Although this effort is too new to fully assess, the continuing  shortfall in police mentors may put the initiative at risk.
subsections: section_title: Shortage of Police Mentors Hinders Training, Evaluation, and Verification of Police on Duty
paragraphs: According to Defense officials, the shortage of available police mentors  has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training and  evaluation and to verify that police are on duty. Police mentor teams in  Afghanistan consist of both civilian mentors, who teach law enforcement  and police management, and military mentors, who provide training in  basic combat operations and offer force protection for the civilian  mentors. As of April 2008, only about 32 percent (746 of 2,358) of required  military mentors were present in country. Due to this shortage of military  mentors to provide force protection, movement of available civilian  mentors is constrained. According to Defense officials, the shortfall in  military mentors for the ANP is due to the higher priority assigned to  deploying U.S. military personnel elsewhere, particularly Iraq.
Defense officials identified the continuing shortfall in police mentors as an  impediment to U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan police in three areas.
First, senior Defense officials, including the commanding general of CSTC- A, stated that the ongoing shortfall in police mentors has been the primary  obstacle to providing the field-based training necessary to develop a fully  capable police force. Second, while Defense recently introduced a monthly  assessment tool to be used by mentors to evaluate police capability and  identify areas in need of further attention, CSTC-A identified extremely  limited mentor coverage as a significant challenge to using this tool. Third,  the shortage of available police mentors has impeded U.S. efforts to verify  the number of Afghan police on duty. For example, as of April 2008,  Defense could not verify whether any police were reporting for duty in 5 of  Afghanistan’s 34 provinces due to the lack of mentors. Without sufficient  police mentors present to conduct field-based training and evaluation and  verify police manning, the development of fully capable, fully staffed  Afghan police forces may continue to be delayed.
section_title: Police Continue to Face Difficulties with Equipment Shortages and Quality
paragraphs: As of February 2008, shortages remained in several types of police  equipment that Defense considers critical, such as trucks, radios, and body  armor. In addition, Defense officials expressed concerns with the quality  and usability of thousands of weapons donated to the police. For example,  officials estimated that only about 1 in 5 of the nearly 50,000 AK-47  automatic rifles received through donation was of good quality (see fig. 1).
Our analysis of weekly progress reports produced in 2007 by DynCorp  civilian police mentors provides additional evidence of equipment-related  challenges and other logistical difficulties. Specifically, 88 percent (46 of  52) of weekly reports contained instances of police operating with  equipment of insufficient quality or quantity or facing problems with  facilities or supplies. In addition, 81 percent (42 of 52) of weekly reports  contained examples of limited police ability to account for the equipment  provided to them. In July 2007, CSTC-A initiated efforts to train the police  in basic supply and property accountability procedures. According to  CSTC-A, equipment is no longer being issued to police districts unless the  districts’ property officers are first trained. For example, according to  Defense, more than 1,500 trucks have been on hand and ready for issue  since late 2007 (see fig. 2), but the Afghan Minister of Interior has delayed  distribution of these vehicles until adequate accountability procedures are  established in the target districts.
section_title: Police Face Problems with Weak Judicial Sector, Pay, Corruption, and Attacks
paragraphs: Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule of law is a  prerequisite for effective policing. However, in 2005, we reported that few  linkages existed in Afghanistan between the Afghan judiciary and police, and  the police had little ability to enforce judicial rulings. Our 2005 report also  noted that overall justice sector reform was underfunded and understaffed.  Subsequently, we reported in 2006 and 2007 that rebuilding the Afghan  judicial sector lagged behind the other four security pillars—army, police,  combating drugs, and disarmament. According to State, much of  Afghanistan continues to lack a functioning justice system. In addition,  according to CSTC-A, the slow rate at which the rule of law is being  implemented across Afghanistan inhibits effective community policing.
Furthermore, our analysis of DynCorp’s weekly progress reports from  2007 indicates that police in the field also face persistent problems with  pay, corruption, and attacks (see table 4).
section_title: New Initiative to Reconstitute Police Has Begun, but Limited Mentor Coverage Is a Risk Factor
paragraphs: Defense has recognized challenges to ANP development and began a new  initiative called Focused District Development in November 2007 to  address them. According to Defense documentation, the objective of this  initiative is to focus resources on reforming the uniformed police—the  largest component of the ANP—as the key to the overall reform of the  ANP.  Under this initiative, the entire police force of a district is  withdrawn from the district and sent to a regional training center for 8  weeks to train as a unit—similar to how Defense trains the Afghan army— and receive all authorized equipment while their district is covered by the  Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a specialized police force  trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness. The police  force then returns to its district, where a dedicated police mentor team  provides follow-on training and closely monitors the police for at least 60  days. Defense expects to be able to reconstitute about 5 to 10 districts at a  time, with each training cycle lasting about 6 to 8 months. Overall,  according to State, it will take a minimum of 4 to 5 years to complete the  initiative.
Defense documentation indicates that no districts had completed an entire  Focused District Development cycle as of April 2008. Until an entire cycle  is completed, it will be difficult to fully assess the initiative. However,  limited police mentor coverage may complicate efforts to execute this new  program. Defense documentation identifies sufficient police mentor teams  as the most important requirement for successful reform. However,  according to the commanding general of CSTC-A, the ongoing shortfall in  police mentors available to work with newly trained district police will  slow implementation of the initiative. In addition, a senior Defense official  stated that unless the mentor shortage is alleviated, the number of police  mentor teams available to provide dedicated training and monitoring will  eventually be exhausted.
section_title: Defense and State Have Not Developed a Coordinated, Detailed Plan for Completing and Sustaining the ANSF
paragraphs: In our June 2005 report, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense  and State develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the ANSF  that contain several elements, including milestones for achieving stated  objectives and a sustainability strategy. Despite the concurrence of both  agencies with our recommendation, Defense and State have not completed  a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF. In  the absence of such a plan, coordination difficulties have occurred and  progress is difficult to assess. In 2008, Congress mandated that the  President, acting through the Secretary of Defense, submit reports to  Congress on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan,  including a comprehensive and long-term strategy and budget for  strengthening the ANSF. Congress also mandated that Defense submit  reports on a long-term detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF. The first  submission of each of these reports was due at the end of April 2008, but  neither has yet been provided to Congress.
subsections: section_title: Recurrent Coordination Difficulties Have Arisen in the Absence of a Coordinated Plan
paragraphs: In February 2007, Defense provided us a 5-page document that, according  to Defense officials, is intended to meet GAO’s 2005 recommendation for  detailed plans to complete and sustain the ANSF. Although Defense and  State are partners in training the ANP, the Defense document does not  identify or discuss the roles and responsibilities of State. State also did not  contribute to the development of this document and has not developed a  plan of its own. In the absence of such a plan, coordination has been a  problem. For example, DynCorp stated that a dual chain of command  between Defense and State has affected the efforts of civilian mentors in  multiple ways, such as by producing conflicting guidance and  complicating reporting, placement of personnel, the use of facilities, and  training and mentoring activities. Prior work by the State and Defense  inspectors general highlighted the same challenge over a year ago. While  Defense and State have both cited improvements in coordination since our  August 2007 visit to Afghanistan, a coordinated plan that clearly states the  various agencies’ roles and responsibilities would nonetheless be  beneficial given the continuous turnover of U.S. government staff. For  example, Defense officials told us that CSTC-A staff typically serve tours  of 1 year or less and often have no period of overlap with outgoing  officials during which to gain knowledge about their new positions. Given  such turnover and loss of institutional knowledge, a coordinated, detailed  plan that clearly identifies the agencies involved in developing the ANP  and their respective roles and responsibilities could help incoming  personnel become familiarized with their new duties.
section_title: Limited Milestones Hinder Assessment of Progress
paragraphs: Defense’s 5-page document developed in response to our 2005  recommendation contains few milestones, including no interim milestones  that would help assess progress made in developing the ANP.  Furthermore, while Defense maintains that the monthly status reports it  produces allow progress to be monitored, these status reports also lack  the interim milestones needed to determine if the program is on track. For  instance, Defense status reports as of April 2008 note that no ANP units (0  of 433) are rated as fully capable and 3 percent (12 of 433) are capable of  leading operations with coalition support. Without interim milestones  against which to assess the ANP, it is difficult to know if this status  represents what the United States intended to achieve after 3 years of  increased efforts and an investment of more than $6 billion in the program.
Defense’s monthly status reports also lack consistent end dates. In  particular, completion dates cited in Defense status reports have shifted  numerous times during the course of our review. For instance, the  completion dates for development of the ANP stated in monthly status  reports dated June 2007, November 2007, and May 2008 fluctuated from  December 2008 to March 2009 to December 2012, with a 3-month period  when the completion date was reported as “to be determined.”
Similarly, although Defense’s newly adopted Focused District  Development initiative to reconstitute the uniformed police involves  considerable resources and is expected to last 4 to 5 years at a minimum,  no interim milestones or consistent end date for the effort are identified in  Defense’s 5-page document, monthly status reports, or briefings that  outline the effort. In the absence of interim milestones and a consistent  end date for Focused District Development, it will be difficult to determine  if this ambitious new effort is progressing as intended. Furthermore,  without an end date and milestones for the U.S. effort to complete and  sustain the entire ANP, it is difficult to determine how long the United  States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this  important mission—one that U.S. military officials stated may extend  beyond a decade.
section_title: Defense Document Lacks Sustainment Strategy
paragraphs: Defense’s 5-page document developed in response to our 2005  recommendation does not provide a detailed strategy for sustaining the  ANSF. Defense currently estimates that approximately $1 billion a year  will be needed to sustain the ANP, and expects the sustainment transition  to begin in fiscal year 2009. However, despite the estimate of U.S. military  officials in Afghanistan that U.S. involvement in training and equipping the  ANSF may extend beyond a decade, neither Defense nor State has  identified funding requirements or forecasts beyond 2013.
U.S. officials stated that until Afghan revenues increase substantially, the  international community would likely need to assist in paying sustainability  costs. At present, Afghanistan is unable to support the recurring costs of  its security forces, such as salaries, equipment replacement, and facilities  maintenance, without substantial foreign assistance. According to Defense  and State, sustainment costs will be transitioned to the government of  Afghanistan commensurate with the nation’s economic capacity, and the  United States and the international community will need to assist Afghanistan  in developing revenues. Defense officials in Washington have not indicated  how long and in what ways the U.S. government expects to continue assisting  the ANSF. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF, it is difficult to  determine how long the United States may need to continue providing  funding and other resources for this important mission.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: Establishing capable Afghan police is critical to improving security in  Afghanistan. The United States has invested more than $6 billion since  2002 to develop the ANP, but no police forces are assessed as fully capable  of conducting their primary mission. As such, interagency coordination,  assessment of progress, and estimation of long-term costs are particularly  important given that Defense has begun a new initiative that is expected to  last at least 4 to 5 years and military officials estimate that U.S.  involvement in developing the ANP could exceed a decade. We believe a  coordinated, detailed plan that outlines agency roles and responsibilities,  lists clear milestones for achieving stated objectives, and includes a  sustainment strategy may improve coordination and would enable  assessment of progress and estimation of costs. However, despite our  prior recommendation and a mandate from Congress that a plan be  developed, Defense and State have not done so. Until a coordinated,  detailed plan is completed, Congress will continue to lack visibility into  the progress made to date and the cost of completing this mission— information that is essential to holding the performing agencies  accountable.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: Because Defense and State have not developed a coordinated, detailed  plan, we state in our concurrently issued report that Congress should  consider conditioning a portion of future appropriations related to training  and equipping the ANSF on completion of a coordinated, detailed plan.  This plan should include, among other things, clearly defined objectives  and performance measures, clearly defined roles and responsibilities,  milestones for achieving these objectives, future funding requirements,  and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved, including plans for  transitioning responsibilities to Afghanistan.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In response to our concurrently issued report, Defense disagreed that  Congress should consider conditioning a portion of future appropriations  on completion of a detailed plan to develop the ANSF, stating that current  guidance provided by State and Defense to the field is sufficient to  implement a successful program to train and equip the ANSF. State also  expressed concerns about conditioning future appropriations on the  completion of a detailed plan. We continue to believe that a coordinated,  detailed plan that outlines agency roles and responsibilities and includes  clear milestones is essential to ensuring accountability of U.S. efforts and  facilitating assessment of progress.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my  prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Charles Michael  Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Other contributors  to this statement were Hynek Kalkus (Assistant Director), Elizabeth  Guran, Aniruddha Dasgupta, Elizabeth Repko, Al Huntington, Lynn  Cothern, Cindy Gilbert, and Mark Dowling.
section_title: Appendix I: Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police
paragraphs: The Afghan National Police (ANP) currently consists of six authorized  components under the Ministry of Interior. The uniformed police, the  largest of these six components, report to the police commanders of each  Afghan province. Provincial commanders report to one of five regional  commanders, who report back to the Ministry of Interior. The other five  authorized components of the ANP all report directly to the ministry   (see fig. 2).
Table 5 provides further detail on the Ministry of Interior and the various  components of the ANP that it oversees.