Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Process for Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities
Published: 2008-07-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) established the Missile Defense Agency to develop and deploy globally integrated ballistic missile defenses to protect the U.S. homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies. To deliver an operational capability as quickly as possible, the agency was not subject to traditional DOD requirements and oversight processes. While directed to work closely with the combatant commands, the agency was not required to build missile defenses to meet specific operational requirements. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DOD has developed a process that identifies, prioritizes, and addresses overall combatant command priorities as the Missile Defense Agency develops ballistic missile defense capabilities. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed relevant documents and visited several combatant commands, the Missile Defense Agency, Joint Staff, and other DOD organizations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has taken some steps to address the combatant commands' ballistic missile defense needs, but it has not yet established an effective process to identify, prioritize, and address these needs, or to provide a DOD-wide perspective on which priorities are the most important. U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency created the Warfighter Involvement Process in 2005. Although the process is still evolving, the Missile Defense Agency has addressed some combatant command capability needs. However, even as they move forward with the process, U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency have not yet overcome three interrelated limitations to the process's effectiveness. First, U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency have not put into place the approved and complete guidance needed to implement the Warfighter Involvement Process, which would clearly define each organization's respective roles and responsibilities for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing the combatant commands' capability needs. This has left the combatant commands without an agreed-upon mechanism for influencing agency investments. Second, the Missile Defense Agency has lacked clear information about how to best address the commands' needs, and until recently has not clearly communicated how it has adjusted its investments in response to these needs. Without such information, the commands have not been able to provide feedback to the Missile Defense Agency about how well the agency has addressed their priorities in its funding plans. Third, senior civilian DOD leadership has not been involved in adjudicating potential differences among the commands' priorities. Instead, U.S. Strategic Command has consolidated and submitted the commands' prioritized capability needs to the Missile Defense Agency without first vetting these priorities though senior civilian DOD officials with departmentwide responsibilities for assessing risk and allocating resources. As a result, the Missile Defense Agency has not benefited from receiving a broader, departmentwide perspective on which of the commands' needs were the most significant. DOD has established a new board to advise senior Office of the Secretary of Defense officials on ballistic missile defense priorities; however, whether this board will be involved in reviewing or adjudicating differences among the commands' priorities is unclear. Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic Command officials stated that the Warfighter Involvement Process is evolving. However, unless and until they overcome these interrelated limitations, DOD remains at risk of not effectively providing the combatant commands with the missile defense capabilities they need.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 2002, the President directed the development and deployment of a  globally integrated ballistic missile defense system to protect the United  States, deployed forces, friends, and allies from the threat of ballistic  missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. Also in 2002, the  Secretary of Defense established the Missile Defense Agency and directed  it to develop and deploy a useful military capability to detect, track,  intercept, and defeat short-, medium-, intermediate-, and long-range  ballistic missiles in all phases of flight. With the establishment of the  Missile Defense Agency, the Secretary of Defense delegated it the  authority to manage all ballistic missile defense systems then under  development by the military services. Funded at $8 billion to nearly         $10 billion annually since its creation, the Missile Defense Agency is  responsible for managing the largest research and development program  in the Department of Defense (DOD) budget. Since the 1980s, DOD has  spent more than $100 billion to develop and deploy missile defenses.
To expedite the delivery of an operationally capable missile defense  system to the combatant commands, the Secretary of Defense directed  that the Missile Defense Agency would not be subject to DOD’s traditional  joint requirements determination and oversight processes. Combatant  commanders are responsible for performing missions assigned to their  command by the President or the Secretary of Defense. These  responsibilities include deterring attacks against the United States, its  territories, possessions, and bases, and employing appropriate force  should deterrence fail. Under DOD’s traditional requirements processes,  the combatant commands play a key role in setting operational  requirements for new weapon systems. However, DOD concluded that  streamlined executive oversight, instead of its traditional process, was  needed to rapidly deliver needed missile defense capabilities to the  commands. Instead, the Secretary of Defense gave the Missile Defense  Agency expanded responsibility and authority to define the ballistic  missile defense system’s technical requirements, change goals and plans,  and allocate resources. Although not required to build systems to meet  specific operational requirements as it would under traditional DOD  processes, the Secretary of Defense directed the Missile Defense Agency  to work closely with the combatant commands when developing ballistic  missile defense capabilities.
Other organizations have a stake in developing defenses against ballistic  missiles. Even as DOD established the Missile Defense Agency, the  President established U.S. Strategic Command in 2002 to more effectively  and efficiently anticipate and counter the diverse and increasingly  complex global threats the United States faces for the foreseeable future,  including the threats posed by ballistic missiles. In 2003, the President  made U.S. Strategic Command responsible for advocating for desirable  missile defense characteristics and capabilities on behalf of all combatant  commands to the Missile Defense Agency. To carry out this responsibility,  U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency created the  Warfighter Involvement Process in 2005. A primary focus of the  Warfighter Involvement Process has been to identify and prioritize the  combatant commands’ capability needs and provide the resulting  Prioritized Capabilities List to the Missile Defense Agency.
Although the Missile Defense Agency has been given a significant amount  of flexibility to develop ballistic missile defenses, including the ability to  operate with considerable autonomy to change goals and plans, the Office  of the Secretary of Defense retains executive oversight authority over the  agency. For example, in establishing the Missile Defense Agency in 2002,  the Secretary of Defense designated responsibility to the Deputy Secretary  of Defense, as chairman of the Senior Executive Council, for providing  the agency with policy, planning, and programming guidance; overseeing  DOD missile defense activities; and approving recommendations for  fielding ballistic missile defense assets. The Secretary of Defense also  placed the Missile Defense Agency directly under the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and assigned  responsibility to the Under Secretary’s office for establishing a single  development program for all work needed to develop integrated ballistic  missile defenses. In 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense also assigned  responsibility to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics for providing acquisition policy direction and  overall management oversight of the Missile Defense Agency. In March  2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense created a new Missile Defense  Executive Board. Comprised of senior-level representatives from the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Strategic  Command, the military departments, and other organizations, the Board is  responsible for advising the Missile Defense Agency; the Under Secretary  of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and for making  recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for action.
To help Congress exercise oversight of ballistic missile defenses as these  capabilities increasingly become operational, this report assesses the  extent to which DOD has developed a process that identifies, prioritizes,  and addresses overall combatant command priorities as the Missile  Defense Agency develops ballistic missile defense capabilities. To obtain  information on DOD’s process for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing  overall combatant command priorities in developing ballistic missile  defense capabilities, we obtained and reviewed U.S. Strategic Command,  Missile Defense Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Staff  guidance, directives, instructions, concepts, testimonies, and plans. We  reviewed drafts of U.S. Strategic Command’s instruction establishing the  Warfighter Involvement Process, and obtained from U.S. Strategic  Command the prioritized lists of the combatant commands’ ballistic  missile defense capability needs, which U.S. Strategic Command provided  to the Missile Defense Agency in 2006 and 2007. We reviewed Missile  Defense Agency guidance, plans, directives, briefings, and other  documents that identify key steps, stakeholders, and factors that the  Missile Defense Agency considers during its process for planning,  designing, developing, and fielding ballistic missile defense capabilities.  We also obtained and reviewed briefings describing a 2007 Missile Defense  Agency and U.S. Strategic Command study of how to more effectively  involve the combatant commands in developing missile defense  capabilities. We visited U.S. Strategic Command and met with officials to  discuss the command’s role as advocate for the warfighter for ballistic  missile defense capabilities, and met with Missile Defense Agency officials  to obtain their perspectives on how the agency has addressed combatant  command priorities. We also obtained information from U.S. Central  Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Northern Command, and   U.S. Pacific Command about their respective priorities for ballistic missile  defenses. We also obtained documentation from and met with officials  from the Joint Staff and from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to  understand their perspectives. Further, we reviewed DOD directives,  memorandums, and other guidance to the Missile Defense Agency that  establishes DOD’s overall approach for developing ballistic missile defense  capabilities. We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to  May 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Our scope and  methodology are described in more detail in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Missile Defense Agency has been charged with developing and  deploying ballistic missile defenses against threats posed by adversaries  from all geographic regions, at all ranges, and in all phases of flight. At  least 25 countries have acquired ballistic missiles, including many  countries that are also seeking or have acquired weapons of mass  destruction that could be used on these missiles. In response, the Missile  Defense Agency has been developing defenses against short-, medium-,  intermediate-, and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles that could be  targeted against U.S. forces abroad, U.S. friends and allies, and the         U.S. homeland. For example, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense  system, Patriot Advanced Capability-3, and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense  system are being developed primarily to provide an integrated capability  to defend deployed U.S. forces, friends, and allies against short- and  medium-range ballistic missiles. The Missile Defense Agency is also  developing sea-based defenses to destroy short-range missiles in the  terminal phase of flight in order to defend deployed forces. In addition, the  Missile Defense Agency is developing a Ground-based Midcourse Defense  system designed to destroy intercontinental-range ballistic missiles  targeted against the U.S. homeland, deployed U.S. forces, friends, and  allies. Some ballistic missile defense systems are being designed to defend  against more than one type of threat. For example, the Aegis Ballistic  Missile Defense system is being designed not only to defend deployed    U.S. forces, allies, and friends from short- and medium-range missiles, but  also to help defend the U.S. homeland from longer range missiles. Table 1  summarizes the threat categories to be addressed by U.S. ballistic missile  defenses.
While the Missile Defense Agency is responsible for developing missile  defenses, the unified combatant commands are the military organizations  primarily responsible for deterring attacks and for employing forces  should deterrence fail. The Unified Command Plan, which is signed by  the President, establishes the combatant commanders’ missions and  responsibilities and establishes their geographic areas of responsibility.  The most recent version of the Unified Command Plan, which was  published in 2006, identified five combatant commands—U.S. Central  Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command,               U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command—with  responsibilities covering specific geographic regions. For example,       U.S. Northern Command’s area of responsibility includes all of North  America and surrounding waters; for missile defenses, U.S. Northern  Command would have primary responsibility for defending the continental  United States from an intercontinental-range missile attack.
U.S. Strategic Command is a unified combatant command with  responsibilities to integrate global missions and capabilities that cross the  boundaries of the geographic commands. Initially assigned responsibility  for nuclear deterrence, space, and computer network operations, the  President, in January 2003, expanded the command’s responsibilities to  include several missions not previously assigned to a combatant  command. These missions were: global strike planning and execution;  planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense (including  missile defense advocacy); oversight of intelligence, surveillance,  reconnaissance, and global command and control; and DOD information  operations. In January 2005, the Secretary of Defense also assigned the  command responsibility for integrating and synchronizing DOD’s efforts in  combating weapons of mass destruction. DOD envisioned that                U.S. Strategic Command’s global operations would potentially add value to  the geographic combatant commands as they carried out their  responsibilities, and provide the President and Secretary of Defense with  an expanded range of military options for responding to future threats.
U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency created the  Warfighter Involvement Process in 2005 to accomplish U.S. Strategic  Command’s responsibility to advocate for desired global missile defense  characteristics and capabilities on behalf of all combatant commanders.  Additionally, U.S. Strategic Command envisions using the process as a way  for the military services and the Joint Staff to provide the Missile Defense  Agency with guidance and advice on desired ballistic missile defense  capabilities, operational approaches, and suitability and supportability  features. The Warfighter Involvement Process is intended to provide a  collaborative forum for the combatant commands, U.S. Strategic  Command, Joint Staff, and military services to identify, assess, and  articulate capability needs to the Missile Defense Agency, analyze the risks  associated with capability gaps and redundancies, and examine possible  solutions and implementation timelines. Although the Warfighter  Involvement Process involves a variety of organizations, U.S. Strategic  Command is responsible for administering and managing the various  analytical activities, software tools, focus groups, and review boards that  make up the process.
GAO has previously reviewed DOD’s plans to operate ballistic missile  defense systems as certain systems have transitioned from a research and  development emphasis to operational military capabilities. For example,  in 2006 we assessed DOD’s preparations to operate and support ballistic  missile defenses that are under continuous development. In 2007, we  reported that DOD’s long-term plans to develop boost and ascent phase  missile defense systems did not consider operational perspectives on how  many of these systems would be required for various deployment periods,  or the challenges of establishing bases at potential deployment locations.  Additionally, in response to a congressional mandate, we have annually  reported since 2003 on the cost, schedule, testing, and performance  progress that the Missile Defense Agency is making in developing ballistic  missile defenses.
section_title: Warfighter Involvement Process Has Helped the Missile Defense Agency Address Some Capability Needs but the Process Faces Key Limitations
paragraphs: U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency created the  Warfighter Involvement Process in 2005 to identify and address the  combatant commands’ ballistic missile defense capability needs, but the  process has yet to overcome key limitations to its effectiveness. Although  the Warfighter Involvement Process is still evolving, it has helped the  Missile Defense Agency address some of the combatant commands’ needs.  However, even as U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency  move forward with the process, they have not finalized the  implementation guidance needed to clarify their respective roles and  responsibilities; have not yet established effective methodologies for  identifying, prioritizing, and addressing combatant command needs; and  have not involved senior civilian DOD leadership to adjudicate potential  differences among the combatant commands’ priorities and provide a  departmentwide perspective about how to best allocate resources. As a  result, DOD is at risk of not addressing the combatant commands’ missile  defense needs if improvements are not made that establish an effective  and well documented process and provide a DOD-wide perspective when  prioritizing these needs.
subsections: section_title: Warfighter Involvement Process Is Still Evolving but Has Helped the Missile Defense Agency Address Some Combatant Command Needs
paragraphs: Although the Warfighter Involvement Process was created in 2005 and is  still evolving, the process has helped the Missile Defense Agency to  address some combatant command ballistic missile defense capability  needs. Since 2001, DOD has emphasized a capabilities-based development  strategy to provide the combatant commands with the capabilities they  require to deter and defeat a broad range of adversaries. By establishing  the Missile Defense Agency in 2002, DOD intended to follow a more  streamlined capabilities-based development strategy to rapidly develop  and field ballistic missile defenses. Through the Warfighter Involvement  Process, the agency has addressed some of the combatant commands’  capability needs in developing ballistic missile defenses. However,  because the Warfighter Involvement Process is still evolving, the  combatant commands have not yet formally determined the extent to  which the agency’s plans are in line with the commands’ needs.
subsections: section_title: Warfighter Involvement Process Is Still Evolving
paragraphs: The Warfighter Involvement Process has not fully evolved to effectively  convey either the commands’ priorities to the Missile Defense Agency or  the Missile Defense Agency’s planned adjustments back to the commands.  When the Secretary of Defense created the Missile Defense Agency in  2002, DOD lacked a process for the agency to consider the combatant  commands’ priorities as it developed ballistic missile defenses. Instead,  the Missile Defense Agency focused on developing and deploying  capabilities based on its own technology-driven assessment of what could  be fielded quickly in order to meet the President’s direction to quickly field  a limited ballistic missile defense system by 2004. As a result, the Missile  Defense Agency expedited its initial designs and development plans  without formally considering the combatant commands’ needs, according  to the DOD Inspector General. Additionally, the agency identified long- term ballistic missile defense system capability goals before having a  process in place to identify the commands’ capability needs.
In emphasizing the rapid initial development of ballistic missile defense  systems, the Missile Defense Agency anticipated that further investments  could be needed to better meet the combatant commands’ requirements.  Under the Secretary of Defense’s 2002 direction, the Missile Defense  Agency’s approach has been to deploy capabilities early, which may only  partially meet warfighter needs, and then incrementally improve the  deployed capabilities’ effectiveness by inserting new technologies as they  become available and as the threat warrants. To initiate this approach, the  agency focused on further developing ballistic missile defenses that had  been previously under development by the military services and subjected  to DOD’s traditional joint requirements determination process. Officials  from U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Northern Command, the Missile  Defense Agency, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us that the  agency’s approach resulted in the rapid deployment of operational missile  defenses. A senior Missile Defense Agency official added that the  Secretary of Defense reviewed and approved the agency’s plans for  developing this initial defensive capability. However, absent the  combatant commands’ inputs, U.S. Strategic Command concluded in  January 2005 that taking this approach made it difficult not only for the  Missile Defense Agency to associate its actions with the commands’  requirements, but also for the combatant commands to evaluate the  agency’s progress. According to U.S. Strategic Command, the lack of a  process also created the potential for inefficiencies and unnecessary  redundancies in the Missile Defense Agency’s investments, resulting in  increased risk to the baseline costs and operational effectiveness of the  ballistic missile defense systems under development.
U.S. Strategic Command recognized the need to formalize a process to  carry out its missile defense advocacy responsibilities, even as the Missile  Defense Agency was focused on developing and deploying capabilities  quickly. Following U.S. Strategic Command’s creation in 2002 and  assignment of several new missions in January 2003, the command took a  wide range of actions to implement and integrate these missions, such as  developing various plans, concepts, and guidance; establishing procedures  and processes; identifying personnel and funding resources; developing  new relationships; building communication networks; and providing  training, education, and exercises. Among these activities, U.S. Strategic  Command took steps to establish its role as the combatant commands’  advocate for missile defenses. For example, in its November 2003  Strategic Concept for Global Ballistic Missile Defense, U.S. Strategic  Command outlined its initial concept for developing and advocating for  desired ballistic missile defense capabilities. Subsequently, in late 2004  and early 2005, U.S. Strategic Command recognized the need for creating a  more formalized process for identifying and addressing the warfighter’s  ballistic missile defense needs. Additionally, the command undertook  several reorganizations, the latest occurring in late 2004 and early 2005,  where it established a new functional component for integrated missile  defense to bring focus and attention to the command’s operational  responsibilities.
section_title: Missile Defense Agency Has Addressed Some Combatant Command Needs following the Warfighter Involvement Process’s Creation
paragraphs: The Missile Defense Agency has addressed some combatant command  needs since it and U.S. Strategic Command created the Warfighter  Involvement Process in 2005. A key output of this newly established  process is the Prioritized Capabilities List, which is intended to specify  how the combatant commands collectively prioritize the full range of  capabilities needed to perform ballistic missile defense missions. U.S.  Strategic Command first provided the Prioritized Capabilities List to the  Missile Defense Agency in 2006; a revised list was also provided in 2007.  Combatant commands that provided inputs to the Prioritized Capabilities  List include: U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Joint  Forces Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and  U.S. Strategic Command. Appendix II identifies short descriptions of the  27 capabilities listed in the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List.
Following the Warfighter Involvement Process’s creation and preparation  of the first Prioritized Capabilities List, the Missile Defense Agency  adjusted some investment programs in response to the combatant  commands’ prioritized requirements. In particular:    The Missile Defense Agency created new investment programs to  develop sea-based defenses against short-range missiles in their  terminal phase of flight. The first Prioritized Capabilities List identified  the combatant commands’ need for a sea-based terminal defense  capability, but at that time the Missile Defense Agency was not  investing resources to develop sea-based terminal defenses. After  receiving the first Prioritized Capabilities List, the Missile Defense  Agency included a program in its fiscal year 2008 budget proposal to  modify and deploy up to 100 Navy Standard Missile-2 interceptors as a  near-term option. Additionally, the Missile Defense Agency created a  second program to develop more capable systems that would be  available in the long term. The Missile Defense Agency’s current plans  for these programs include spending a total of $124 million through  fiscal year 2011 on the near-term option, and $487 million through  fiscal year 2013 to develop more advanced, long-term options.
The Missile Defense Agency shifted funding to place greater emphasis  on some existing investments because of requirements identified on  the Prioritized Capabilities List. In particular, the Missile Defense  Agency has been developing capabilities to sustain ballistic missile  defense operations while simultaneously making the system available  for testing, training, upgrades, and maintenance. Although the  combatant commands had identified this capability need and the  Missile Defense Agency funded this capability, it took on new urgency  when the ballistic missile defense system was taken out of test mode  and put in an operational status for the first time in 2006. While the  system was operational, it was not available to either the Missile  Defense Agency for developmental activities and maintenance or to the  combatant commands for training. To address this shortfall, the Missile  Defense Agency increased resources to more quickly develop  concurrent testing, training, and operations capabilities. According to  the Missile Defense Agency, the agency increased funding for this  effort from about $0.5 million in fiscal year 2006 to $6.9 million in fiscal  year 2007.
The Missile Defense Agency has responded to numerous combatant  command requests to change systems that have already been fielded.  Working closely with U.S. Strategic Command’s functional component  for integrated missile defense, the Missile Defense Agency has modified  some systems’ hardware and software to meet the combatant  commands’ capability needs. U.S. Strategic Command officials told us  that the combatant commands typically identify the need for such  changes as the result of exercises, training, or operational experience.  Although officials we spoke with viewed the agency’s responsiveness  to these requests as positive, some observed that a more effective  process for involving the warfighter earlier in developing systems could  reduce the need to change these systems once they had been  developed and fielded.
Although the Warfighter Involvement Process has not yet fully evolved,  Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic Command officials believe the  agency has generally been responsive to the combatant commands’  capability needs. For example, a 2007 joint study by the Missile Defense  Agency and U.S. Strategic Command concluded that the agency was at  least partially addressing all of the combatant commands’ capability needs.  Additionally, Missile Defense Agency officials told us that, based on the  study’s results and the agency’s assessment of the 2007 Prioritized  Capabilities List, the agency was making adjustments to its investment  plans to help mitigate potential gaps between the commands’ needs and  the agency’s programs. However, for approximately 3 years after it began  making investments to develop and deploy systems, the Missile Defense  Agency lacked the ability to ascertain the extent to which its efforts were  aligned with the commands’ needs. Moreover, as of May 2008, the  combatant commands had not yet formally assessed and responded to the  Missile Defense Agency’s recently revised plans. As a result, the  commands have not formally determined the extent to which the agency’s  plans are in line with the commands’ needs.
section_title: Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic Command Have Not Yet Overcome Key Limitations
paragraphs: Although the Warfighter Involvement Process has helped address some of  the commands’ needs, U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense  Agency have yet to overcome key limitations as they move forward with  the process. These interrelated limitations include a lack of clear and well  documented roles and responsibilities; ineffective methodologies for  identifying, prioritizing, and addressing combatant command priorities;  and the lack of senior civilian DOD participation in the process to  adjudicate among the commands’ priorities and assess departmentwide  risk about how to best allocate resources.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Strategic Command and Missile Defense Agency Roles and Responsibilities Are Not Well Documented
paragraphs: U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency have not yet  clarified their respective roles and responsibilities by putting into place  the approved and complete guidance needed to implement the process  and to hold them accountable for achieving results. The Office of  Management and Budget’s guidance on establishing internal controls  emphasizes that agencies should design management structures for  programs to help ensure accountability for results. According to GAO’s  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, such  management structures include clearly documented guidance, including  policies, procedures, directives, instructions, and other documentation  that establish roles and responsibilities needed to achieve an  organization’s mission and objectives. Additionally, our prior work on  internal controls and management accountability also has emphasized that  complete guidance should be approved, current, and binding on all  appropriate stakeholders. Lacking approved and complete guidance, the  combatant commands have not had a clear understanding of U.S. Strategic  Command’s and the Missile Defense Agency’s roles and responsibilities,  and have lacked a mechanism to hold either organization accountable for  effectively identifying, prioritizing, and addressing their needs.
U.S. Strategic Command has not yet put into place approved guidance  formally establishing its roles and responsibilities under the Warfighter  Involvement Process, although it has been developing a commandwide  instruction to do so since 2005. In preparing the instruction, U.S. Strategic  Command solicited comments from stakeholder organizations, including  other combatant commands and the Joint Staff, in order to build  consensus around key relationships that support the Warfighter  Involvement Process. Some stakeholders raised key issues about            U.S. Strategic Command’s roles in the Warfighter Involvement Process.  For example, U.S. Central Command officials commented that a draft  version of U.S. Strategic Command’s instruction conveyed too much  responsibility to U.S. Strategic Command for speaking on behalf of the  other commands when advocating for their capability needs. In response,  U.S. Strategic Command modified its instruction to more clearly limit its  responsibilities for prioritizing the different commands’ needs. In addition  to addressing stakeholder comments, U.S. Strategic Command changed  the draft instruction to incorporate recommendations from a 2007 joint  study by the Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic Command on how  to improve the Warfighter Involvement Process. In February 2008, the  command also updated the draft instruction to account for its newly  assigned responsibility relating to DOD’s efforts to integrate air and  missile defenses across the department. U.S. Strategic Command officials  told us that the command plans to approve and issue the instruction by  mid-2008. However, the command’s draft instruction recognizes that  further clarifications and details for implementing the Warfighter  Involvement Process are still needed, which may require additional  revisions after the current draft is approved. Until U.S. Strategic Command  has approved guidance in place, the combatant commands continue to  lack a mechanism that holds U.S. Strategic Command accountable for its  roles and responsibilities under the Warfighter Involvement Process.
The Missile Defense Agency also does not have finalized guidance in place  detailing its responsibilities in the Warfighter Involvement Process.  Lacking such guidance, officials from several combatant commands told  us that the Missile Defense Agency has not provided them with enough  insight into how it takes their needs into account. Although some of the  Missile Defense Agency’s Warfighter Involvement Process responsibilities  are identified in U.S. Strategic Command’s draft instruction, this  instruction does not provide specific details about how the agency will  carry them out. Additionally, the U.S. Strategic Command draft instruction  will not be binding on the Missile Defense Agency once it is completed. In  commenting on U.S. Strategic Command’s draft instruction, Joint Staff  officials asked U.S. Strategic Command how the Missile Defense Agency  would be held accountable for its Warfighter Involvement Process  responsibilities. U.S. Strategic Command responded that its goal was for  the Missile Defense Agency to either approve the U.S. Strategic Command  instruction, or publish a complementary document stipulating its  responsibilities. Missile Defense Agency officials told us in May 2008 that  the agency had not yet taken either of these actions because U.S. Strategic  Command’s instruction was still incomplete.
Until recently, the Missile Defense Agency did not plan to prepare its own  guidance for establishing its roles and responsibilities in the Warfighter  Involvement Process. In March 2006, a senior Missile Defense Agency  official stated to the DOD Inspector General that the agency did not plan  to issue a new directive that complemented U.S. Strategic Command’s  instruction. Instead, the official stated that the agency’s Integrated  Program Policy and Systems Engineering Plan would be used to  document the agency’s Warfighter Involvement Process responsibilities.  However, these documents provide top-level direction and descriptions of  the agency’s decision-making processes and lack specific details about  how the agency would fulfill its Warfighter Involvement Process  responsibilities. Moreover, the agency has not yet updated these  documents to identify specific Warfighter Involvement Process roles and  responsibilities. Additionally, a Missile Defense Agency official told us  that, based on its experience during 2006 and 2007, the agency needed to  prepare internal guidance to ensure that all of its project offices  understood and could be held accountable for their responsibilities under  the process. In May 2008, agency officials told us that the agency not only  was planning to update some of this internal guidance, but also was  beginning to prepare its own Warfighter Involvement Process guidance to  complement U.S. Strategic Command’s instruction. Until the Missile  Defense Agency completes this effort, the combatant commands will  continue to lack both transparency into the Missile Defense Agency’s  process for addressing their needs, and the means to hold the agency  accountable.
section_title: Warfighter Involvement Process Has Not Resulted in Effective Methodologies for Identifying, Prioritizing, and Addressing Capability Needs
paragraphs: The Warfighter Involvement Process has not yet resulted in effective  methodologies for the combatant commands to identify and prioritize their  capability needs and for the Missile Defense Agency to address the  combatant commands’ capability needs. According to U.S. Strategic  Command’s draft instruction, the goals of the Warfighter Involvement  Process include providing a unified means for the combatant commands  to communicate desired capabilities to the Missile Defense Agency, and  for the Missile Defense Agency to communicate its resultant acquisition  plans back to the commands. The Prioritized Capabilities List is intended  to achieve these goals through methodologies that clearly, completely, and  accurately identify the commands’ needed capabilities, and distinguish one  priority from the next. Additionally, U.S. Strategic Command’s draft  Warfighter Involvement Process instruction indicates that an effective  methodology for addressing the commands’ needs would clearly associate  the agency’s investments with those needs. Lacking effective  methodologies, the combatant commands have not communicated their  capability needs in an understandable and useful way to the Missile  Defense Agency, and the agency has not clearly communicated how the  combatant commands’ capability needs are being addressed in its  development and investment decisions.
Some Combatant Commands’ Needs Not Clearly Identified  Our work revealed several examples where the methodology used to  develop the Prioritized Capabilities List did not effectively identify the  specific capability needs of some of the combatant commands. In  identifying the capability needs on the Prioritized Capabilities List,         U.S. Strategic Command used a capabilities-based approach to prepare  broad, generalized statements describing the full range of capabilities  needed to operate a global ballistic missile defense system. As a result of  this approach, several of the capabilities on the list encompass multiple  functional areas, such as interceptors, sensors, and communications,  which has made it difficult for the Missile Defense Agency to identify the  specific capabilities that the commands require. Additionally, by focusing  on developing the capabilities that the combatant commands would need  in the future, U.S. Strategic Command officials told us the Prioritized  Capabilities List has not provided an adequate format for the combatant  commands to identify their needs for forces to meet ongoing operational  requirements. Although U.S. Joint Forces Command officials told us that  the 2007 list clearly identified the capabilities that were important to their  command, officials from the three geographic combatant commands with  whom we spoke told us that the list did not effectively represent their  needs. For example:    U.S. Northern Command officials told us that the capabilities did not  adequately or clearly identify some of their more specific needs  because the capabilities on the list encompass the specific needs of  multiple commands, which could obscure the meaning and intent of  the underlying needs of the individual commands.
U.S. Pacific Command officials told us that the 2007 Prioritized  Capabilities List did not fully meet their command’s needs because the  list was not designed to identify the quantities of interceptors that the  command needs to meet specific requirements for missile defense  operations in the Pacific region, given the potential ballistic missile  threats posed to U.S. forces and allies in the region.
U.S. Central Command officials told us that the 2007 Prioritized  Capabilities List provided the appropriate detail for systems that have  yet to be developed. However, the officials also told us that                U.S. Central Command’s primary need is to be sure that the command  has access to sufficient short-range missile defense systems for  operations in its region. They added that the Prioritized Capabilities  List has not been an effective tool for advocating for these needs  because it is focused, instead, on future capability requirements.
U.S. Strategic Command officials stated that they used a capabilities-based  approach to identify and prioritize capability needs because this approach  is consistent with DOD’s traditional joint requirements determination  process used by the combatant commands in non-missile-defense areas,  which initially identifies requirements in broad terms. U.S. Strategic  Command stated that this approach allowed it to identify and condense  over 100 tasks required to plan and execute ballistic missile defense  missions into the 27 capabilities on the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List.  U.S. Strategic Command officials added that this approach resulted in a  list of manageable length and level of detail needed to provide the Missile  Defense Agency with insight into the commands’ needs. The officials  further stated that the list was not designed to identify the commands’  short-term operational requirements, adding that U.S. Strategic Command  planned to put into place a Warfighter Involvement Process function to  identify and advocate for the commands’ operational force requirements.  However, the U.S. Strategic Command and Missile Defense Agency  officials agreed that the lists prepared to date have not provided enough  specific detail to inform the Missile Defense Agency about how to best  address the commands’ needs when developing new capabilities. Until  U.S. Strategic Command develops a methodology to more clearly identify  the commands’ capability needs, the Prioritized Capabilities List’s  effectiveness as a guide for the Missile Defense Agency for investing  resources will continue to be limited.
Combatant Commands’ Needs Not Consistently Prioritized  In addition to not effectively identifying some of the combatant  commands’ capability needs, the Warfighter Involvement Process also has  not resulted in a consistent methodology for prioritizing these needs. In  preparing the 2006 Prioritized Capabilities List, the combatant commands  grouped the capabilities by the time frames in which they will be   needed—either near-, mid-, or far-term. In contrast, for preparing the  2007 Prioritized Capabilities List, U.S. Strategic Command asked the  combatant commands to evaluate each capability’s relative importance to  (1) the command’s ballistic missile defense mission, weighted at 60  percent; (2) the command’s other missions, weighted at 30 percent; and   (3) other joint capability areas, weighted at 10 percent. For each  capability, the combatant commands were told to assign a rating of 1  (lowest importance) to 5 (highest importance) for each factor, multiply the  rating by the appropriate weight, and add the three ratings up to develop a  score for each capability. However, the individual combatant commands  did not consistently apply this methodology:    Some combatant commands took additional factors into account when  prioritizing their individual capability needs. U.S. Strategic Command  officials told us that each of the combatant commands was best  positioned to determine for itself how to use the criteria for prioritizing  the capabilities on the list. However, in the analysis accompanying the  2007 Prioritized Capabilities List, U.S. Strategic Command recognized  as a limitation that the commands may have considered the current  performance of a system or other criteria when prioritizing their needs.  Missile Defense Agency officials told us that some combatant  commands appeared to follow U.S. Strategic Command’s direction and  prioritize the capabilities based on their overall importance to their  current responsibilities, while other commands appeared to prioritize  their needs based on what capabilities they were lacking. As a result,  the Missile Defense Agency officials told us that the Missile Defense  Agency lacked clarity on what the commands were trying to  communicate in the Prioritized Capabilities List.
The combatant commands also did not consistently rank their  capability needs. For example, U.S. Northern Command officials told  us that they believed it was important to clearly distinguish among  priorities by not assigning the same score to more than one capability,  whereas U.S. Joint Forces Command officials told us that duplicate  scores indicated that some capabilities were equally important to the  command. Additionally, U.S. Joint Forces Command officials told us  that U.S. Strategic Command did not initially provide guidance on  whether duplicate scores were acceptable; however, they stated that  U.S. Strategic Command officials later told them that such results were  valid. In addition to U.S. Joint Forces Command, which assigned the  second-highest score to four capabilities, U.S. Central Command and  U.S. Pacific Command both assigned the highest score to four  capabilities, and U.S. European Command assigned the second-highest  score to three capabilities. However, Missile Defense Agency officials  told us that it would be more useful to the agency if the combatant  commands more clearly distinguished among their prioritized needs by  not assigning duplicate scores.
Missile Defense Agency’s Response to the Prioritized Capabilities  List Not Formally Assessed  U.S. Strategic Command has not formally assessed the Missile Defense  Agency’s responses to the 2006 and 2007 Prioritized Capabilities Lists to  determine whether the agency has developed an effective methodology for  addressing the combatant commands’ needs. Such an analysis of the  Missile Defense Agency’s response is envisioned in U.S. Strategic  Command’s draft Warfighter Involvement Process instruction. However,  U.S. Strategic Command did not prepare a formal response to the agency’s  first Achievable Capabilities List, which the Missile Defense Agency  provided to the combatant commands in 2006. U.S. Strategic Command  and Missile Defense Agency officials stated that the 2006 Achievable  Capabilities List was ineffective because the agency did not analyze its  detailed investment programs to determine the extent to which its  programs were well aligned with the commands’ priorities. U.S. Strategic  Command officials told us that clear, direct linkages between the  Prioritized Capabilities List and the Missile Defense Agency’s programs  were difficult to establish because the capabilities on the Prioritized  Capabilities List are at a broad, generalized level and the Missile Defense  Agency’s program of record is at a system-specific level. As a result, the  Missile Defense Agency’s response to the first Prioritized Capabilities List  did not provide U.S. Strategic Command with funding or budget  information needed to prepare a formal response to the 2006 Achievable  Capabilities List.
The Missile Defense Agency has prepared a more complete and detailed  response to the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List, but U.S. Strategic  Command has not yet formally analyzed the agency’s response. Missile  Defense Agency officials told us that compared to the 2006 Achievable  Capabilities List, the 2007 Achievable Capabilities List provides better  information about how the agency has addressed the commands’ needs.  Unlike the previous list, the 2007 Achievable Capabilities List provides  more information, including a capability gap analysis and a detailed budget  analysis that links each of the commands’ 27 capability needs to the  agency’s investment programs. According to the Missile Defense Agency,  at least four combatant commands have provided favorable feedback to  the Missile Defense Agency about its 2007 response. However, the  combatant commands have not yet formally assessed whether the  agency’s methodology for addressing their needs is effective. As  envisioned by the U.S. Strategic Command’s Warfighter Involvement  Process draft instruction, U.S. Strategic Command would analyze and  reply to the agency’s Achievable Capabilities List by preparing a Capability  Assessment Report. U.S. Strategic Command stated that this report is to  appraise the Missile Defense Agency’s funding plans, assess whether the  agency’s development trends are expected to provide effective  capabilities, and facilitate further interaction with the agency about  potential changes to the Missile Defense Agency’s investments. Having  received the agency’s most recent Achievable Capabilities List in April  2008, U.S. Strategic Command officials told us that they plan to complete  this assessment and provide the Capability Assessment Report to the  Missile Defense Agency by mid-August 2008. However, the officials told us  that they did not expect that the Missile Defense Agency would have time  to make significant adjustments to its fiscal year 2010 budget proposal  after receiving the Capability Assessment Report. Until U.S. Strategic  Command prepares this assessment, the agency will lack the commands’  formal feedback on how well it is addressing their needs and may miss  opportunities to make adjustments to its plans and future budgets.
U.S. Strategic Command and Missile Defense Agency Are Taking  Steps to Improve Warfighter Involvement Process  U.S. Strategic Command and Missile Defense Agency officials told us that  the Warfighter Involvement Process has provided the Missile Defense  Agency with important information about the combatant commands’  needed capabilities, and that they are taking steps to improve their  respective inputs to the process. U.S. Strategic Command officials told us  that the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List highlighted an overall preference  among the commands for the Missile Defense Agency to further improve  existing capabilities, rather than develop new types of ballistic missile  defenses. Missile Defense Agency officials added that the Warfighter  Involvement Process has increased the agency’s interactions with the  combatant commands, which has provided the agency a broader  perspective of the combatant commands’ operational responsibilities,  including insight into their operational needs for integrated planning,  communications, and consequence management. Further, U.S. Strategic  Command has sought new methodologies to enhance the ability to identify  and prioritize the commands’ capability needs as the process has evolved.  Moving forward, U.S. Strategic Command plans to improve the Prioritized  Capabilities List by distinguishing between overall, long-term capability  needs and shorter-term development goals. Command officials also told us  that they intend to improve the list by clarifying the capability statements  to provide better guidance to the Missile Defense Agency. According to the  officials, this improved list would be prepared in time for the Missile  Defense Agency to consider when it prepares its 2012 budget proposal.  However, as of May 2008, U.S. Strategic Command had only begun the  process of determining the methodologies for identifying and prioritizing  the commands’ capability needs. Until U.S. Strategic Command prepares  effective and consistent methodologies for identifying and prioritizing  these capabilities, the Prioritized Capabilities List will continue to be of  limited use to the Missile Defense Agency. Moreover, Missile Defense  Agency officials indicated that they may need to make further  improvements to the agency’s approach for addressing the commands’  needs. Unless the Missile Defense Agency has developed an effective  methodology for addressing their needs, the commands’ ability to provide  a detailed, formal assessment of the agency’s plans will be limited.
section_title: Warfighter Involvement Process Lacked Senior Civilian DOD Leadership Involvement
paragraphs: Unlike DOD’s traditional process for prioritizing combatant command  capability needs when DOD prepares its funding plans, the Warfighter  Involvement Process has lacked the involvement of senior civilian DOD  officials with a departmentwide perspective to adjudicate potential  differences among the combatant commands’ priorities. Under DOD’s  traditional process, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, evaluates the  combatant commands’ individual and collective requirements, and advises  the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which DOD investment plans are  addressing these requirements. In contrast, the Warfighter Involvement  Process is not structured to involve senior civilian DOD leadership to  provide their perspective on how to assess risk and allocate resources for  missile defenses and other DOD needs. Instead, U.S. Strategic Command  consolidated each command’s capability needs into an overall prioritized  list, and then provided the list directly to the Missile Defense Agency.  Lacking the involvement of senior civilian DOD officials in reviewing the  commands’ priorities, the Missile Defense Agency has not benefited from  receiving a broader, departmentwide perspective on which of the  commands’ needs were the most significant.
Under traditional DOD requirements processes, each combatant command  is responsible for identifying and seeking the specific military capabilities  that it needs to implement its own mission. Moreover, the commands’  capability needs differ and depend on their individual mission  responsibilities. For example, U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central  Command’s missions and geographic responsibilities primarily call for  ballistic missile defenses that can address short- and medium-range  missile threats to deployed forces and to U.S. friends and allies.               U.S. Central Command officials added that they also require sea-based  missile defense capabilities to provide greater operational flexibility in a  politically volatile region. U.S. Northern Command’s mission is to defend  the U.S. homeland, and its primary operational focus for ballistic missile  defense is on intercontinental threats. As the combatant command  responsible for developing robust, joint command and control capabilities  and interoperable systems, U.S. Joint Forces Command has emphasized  the need to integrate ballistic missile defense capabilities with air and  cruise missile defenses. U.S. Strategic Command, which is responsible for  planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense operations,  has worldwide responsibilities that include working with all of the  geographic commands on an equal basis to defend their respective  regions.
Given these varied mission needs, some combatant command officials told  us that they were not satisfied with U.S. Strategic Command’s approach  for preparing the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List. To prepare the list,   U.S. Strategic Command determined an overall score for each of the 27  capabilities on the list by adding together the scores that the commands  had assigned to each individual capability. U.S. Strategic Command then  listed the capabilities from highest to lowest aggregate score to  consolidate the commands’ needs into a single, overall prioritized list.    U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Joint Forces Command officials told us  that this was a reasonable approach to follow for consolidating the  commands’ priorities because it equitably represented each command’s  needs. However, other combatant command officials told us that they  were dissatisfied with this approach. For example, U.S. Central Command  officials told us this approach had limited utility because it did not  consider or distinguish among the different commands’ mission  responsibilities. U.S. Pacific Command officials similarly told us that  compiling a single list should not be based only on the sum of each  capability’s score, but should also consider each command’s specific  military responsibilities relative to each other. U.S. Northern Command  officials told us that the combatant commands’ varied mission  requirements made it difficult to consolidate the commands’ capability  needs in a meaningful way without judging which missile defense missions  were the most pressing.
Although they prefer to have their commands’ individual mission  responsibilities taken into account when preparing the Prioritized  Capabilities List, some combatant command officials told us that the  Warfighter Involvement Process was not well structured to adjudicate  potential differences among their needs. For example, in comments on a  draft of U.S. Strategic Command’s Warfighter Involvement Process  instruction, U.S. Central Command stated the Unified Command Plan did  not implicitly or explicitly convey to U.S. Strategic Command the  responsibility to assess the relative importance of the other commands’  capability needs. U.S. Northern Command officials told us that although  U.S. Strategic Command is best positioned among the combatant  commands to advocate for warfighter-desired ballistic missile defense  capabilities, they were unsure whether the Unified Command Plan gave  U.S. Strategic Command the responsibility, as the Warfighter Involvement  Process administrator, to determine which of the other commands’ needs  were the most important. U.S. Pacific Command officials also told us that  U.S. Strategic Command may lack the proper perspective to assess and  evaluate the other commands’ mission areas when determining overall  priorities. The U.S. Pacific Command officials added that senior civilian  DOD officials could apply a broader perspective to help specify whether  the prioritized list should emphasize one command’s mission needs over  another’s. Although U.S. Joint Forces Command officials told us that      U.S. Strategic Command has the appropriate authorities to develop a  Prioritized Capabilities List on behalf of the other commands, they stated  that U.S. Strategic Command would have difficulty reaching consensus  among the combatant commands about which of their mission needs were  the most important, which could make the process of preparing a final list  unnecessarily complicated and difficult. U.S. Strategic Command officials  also stated that adjudicating the priorities of the other commands is not  within the scope of the Warfighter Involvement Process; rather, the  command officials told us that they intended use the Prioritized  Capabilities List to identify the combatant commands’ collective priorities  for developing a globally integrated ballistic missile defense system. U.S.  Strategic Command further stated that senior DOD leadership should be  responsible for instructing the Missile Defense Agency about how to best  address these priorities.
U.S. Strategic Command officials stated that, even as they did not  adjudicate the other commands’ mission needs in preparing the              2007 Prioritized Capabilities List, they did not involve senior civilian DOD  authorities to do so. Rather, U.S. Strategic Command sought the other  combatant commands’ approval of the list, and then provided the list to  the Missile Defense Agency without first seeking a review outside the  Warfighter Involvement Process by DOD officials with responsibilities for  assessing risk and allocating resources. In particular, U.S. Strategic  Command convened a meeting of 1-star and 2-star general and flag officers  from the combatant commands to review the list and resolve any  disagreements before it was finalized. U.S. Strategic Command also  circulated drafts of the list for the commands’ senior leadership to review,  and made changes to the list in response to critical comments from one of  the commands. As a result, while the commanders of the combatant  commands approved the list before U.S. Strategic Command sent it to the  Missile Defense Agency, the list did not receive a higher-level review to  determine which of their priorities was most important.
U.S. Strategic Command officials told us that they recognized that  consolidating the individual commands’ needs into an overall set of  priorities would result in some commands having their priorities ranked  higher than those of other commands. However, U.S. Strategic Command  officials added that they were responsive to the need to make the  individual commands’ priorities transparent. For example, the analysis  accompanying the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List documented how each  command individually ranked the 27 capabilities on the list, so that the  Missile Defense Agency could gain insight into what the individual  commands needed. Additionally, the analysis accompanying the 2007 list  highlighted that U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and  U.S. Pacific Command gave higher scores for capabilities needed to  defend deployed forces, U.S. allies, and friends, while U.S. Strategic  Command and U.S. Northern Command prioritized higher those  capabilities needed to defend the U.S. homeland. Further, U.S. Strategic  Command and U.S. Joint Forces Command officials told us that the overall  list provided a fair perspective on the commands’ overall priorities  because the capabilities ranked highest on the consolidated list were  highly ranked by multiple commands. However, without involving senior  DOD officials to provide a departmentwide review of these overall  priorities, assess the commands’ varied mission responsibilities, and  provide their perspective on which priorities were the most significant, the  consolidated list could obscure the importance of a key national defense  priority if that need was ranked highly by only one command.
In contrast to preparing the Prioritized Capabilities List, other aspects of  U.S. Strategic Command’s ballistic missile defense responsibilities involve  senior DOD officials for reviewing and adjudicating decisions that affect  the other combatant commands. For example, under U.S. Strategic  Command’s 2003 concept for planning, integrating, and coordinating  global ballistic missile defense forces during a crisis, the Chairman, Joint  Chiefs of Staff, would be responsible for considering a U.S. Strategic  Command recommendation to reallocate ballistic missile defense forces  from one combatant command’s region to another’s. Although U.S.  Strategic Command’s concept states that “in most cases, U.S. Strategic  Command’s recommendations will be understood and accepted by the  other combatant commands,” the affected commands could present  alternative recommendations to the Secretary of Defense if they disagreed  with U.S. Strategic Command’s proposal. By providing for senior-level  involvement during planning, U.S. Strategic Command ensures that the  decision to reallocate forces from one region to another is made based on  a full, DOD-wide perspective on how to best meet national security needs.
DOD is taking steps to improve the oversight of ballistic missile defense  developments, but so far these steps have not included plans to involve  senior civilian DOD officials to adjudicate the combatant commands’  priorities. The Missile Defense Executive Board was chartered in March  2007 to review and make recommendations on the Missile Defense  Agency’s comprehensive acquisition strategy to the Deputy Secretary of  Defense. U.S. Northern Command officials stated to us that the Missile  Defense Executive Board could play a valuable role by reviewing the  Prioritized Capabilities List before it was provided to the Missile Defense  Agency. Similarly, U.S. Strategic Command officials told us that the Missile  Defense Executive Board could provide the combatant commands with a  venue outside the Warfighter Involvement Process for reviewing and  adjudicating their differing mission needs after the Prioritized Capabilities  List is completed, but before the list is provided to the Missile Defense  Agency. The U.S. Strategic Command officials added that the board could  provide a perspective that U.S. Strategic Command lacked on the cost,  risk, and benefits of allocating resources to develop specific priorities.  Since late 2007 the board has been considering new processes to improve  the management of DOD resources to develop and operate ballistic missile  defenses. Chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics, the Board’s membership includes senior-level  representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of  Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, and other organizations. As a result, the  board is expected to provide DOD with a means to exercise broader  oversight of the Missile Defense Agency than its predecessor  organizations. However, U.S. Strategic Command and Office of the  Secretary of Defense officials told us that the board’s current focus is to  align the services’ and Missile Defense Agency’s resource plans to support  ballistic missile defense operations, rather than assess the relative  importance of the combatant commands’ ballistic missile defense mission  responsibilities and corresponding capability needs. Unless senior civilian  DOD officials get involved in adjudicating the commands’ overall priorities  before DOD makes resource decisions, the Missile Defense Agency will  lack a departmentwide perspective on how to best allocate resources to  meet the broad array of missile threats that confront U.S. national security.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Warfighter Involvement Process continues to evolve and mature as  U.S. Strategic Command works with the other combatant commands to  identify priorities and communicate them to the Missile Defense Agency.  Because the process is distinct from DOD’s traditional process,               U.S. Strategic Command has had to build consensus around new roles,  responsibilities, and authorities needed to make the combatant  commands’ capability needs known to the Missile Defense Agency. Even  without a mature and effective Warfighter Involvement Process in place,  the Missile Defense Agency has adjusted some of its investments to better  meet the combatant commands’ capability needs. However, U.S. Strategic  Command and the Missile Defense Agency have yet to overcome key  limitations that complicate both U.S. Strategic Command’s efforts to  advocate on behalf of the other commands, and the Missile Defense  Agency’s ability to address their needs. Although U.S. Strategic Command  has been drafting implementation guidance since 2005, neither the  command nor the Missile Defense Agency has finalized such guidance,  which is needed to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities.  Additionally, the Prioritized Capabilities List has not been a clear and  effective guide for the Missile Defense Agency to follow when making  investment decisions. Moreover, the Missile Defense Agency has only  recently analyzed the combatant commands’ needs and linked them to its  investment programs; until the combatant commands formally assess and  respond to the agency’s analysis, the extent to which the agency has  effectively addressed the commands’ needs will remain unclear. Finally,  the Warfighter Involvement Process faces challenges in determining the  relative importance of the combatant commands’ varied ballistic missile  defense responsibilities. Unless these priorities are vetted by senior  civilian DOD officials with departmentwide responsibilities for assessing  risk and allocating resources, the Missile Defense Agency will be left to act  on the commands’ priorities without the benefit of a DOD-wide  perspective on the best approach to counter the short-, medium-,  intermediate-, and intercontinental-range missile threats facing the United  States.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve DOD’s process for identifying and addressing combatant  command priorities for ballistic missile defense capabilities, we  recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic  Command, in conjunction with the Director, Missile Defense Agency, to  take the following two actions:  1.  complete and publish the implementation guidance needed to clearly  define each organization’s roles and responsibilities for identifying,  prioritizing, and addressing combatant command capability needs for  ballistic missile defenses, and review and update such guidance, as  needed, as DOD’s process continues to evolve; and  2.  establish effective methodologies for identifying, prioritizing, and  addressing combatant command capability needs for ballistic missile  defenses.
Further, to provide the Missile Defense Agency with feedback as to how  well it has addressed the combatant commands’ priorities in preparing  future funding plans, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the  Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, in conjunction with the other  combatant commands, to prepare an assessment of the Missile Defense  Agency’s funding plans compared to the commands’ priorities, and provide  the assessment to the Director, Missile Defense Agency.
To provide a DOD-wide perspective on the combatant commands’  priorities, given their views on the range of ballistic missile threats facing  the United States, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the  Missile Defense Executive Board to review each Prioritized Capabilities  List upon its release, including the individual commands’ priorities, and  recommend to the Deputy Secretary of Defense an overall DOD-wide list  of prioritized capabilities. We further recommend the Secretary of Defense  direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide guidance to the  Director, Missile Defense Agency, on program priorities taking into  account the Missile Defense Executive Board’s recommendation.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with three  recommendations and partially agreed with two recommendations. DOD  also provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.  DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that U.S. Strategic Command and  the Missile Defense Agency complete and publish implementation  guidance needed to clearly define each organization’s roles and  responsibilities for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing combatant  command capability needs for ballistic missile defenses. In its comments,  DOD stated that the department has initiated the implementing guidance  to define organizational roles and responsibilities. Specifically, DOD  commented that on June 25, 2008, U.S. Strategic Command approved an  instruction, titled Missile Defense Warfighter Involvement Process, that  defines and establishes the process and outlines the command’s roles and  responsibilities to influence the development, coordination,  administration, and advocacy of global missile defense capabilities. We  believe this is a positive step. However, the issued instruction indicates  that the command anticipates the need for future revisions to the  instruction as the process continues to evolve and as DOD undertakes  efforts to integrate air and missile defenses across the department. Since  U.S. Strategic Command issued the instruction when our draft report was  with DOD for comment, we modified the recommendation to direct        U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency to regularly  review and update their guidance as the process evolves. DOD also  commented that the Missile Defense Agency is defining its own guidance  for its organizational roles and responsibilities to complement                 U.S. Strategic Command’s guidance; however, DOD’s comments did not  provide us with a schedule or time frame for the completion of this effort.  Until the Missile Defense Agency’s guidance is completed, the combatant  commands will continue to lack transparency into the Missile Defense  Agency’s process for addressing their needs and the means to hold the  agency accountable.
DOD also agreed with our recommendation that U.S. Strategic Command  and the Missile Defense Agency establish effective methodologies for  identifying, prioritizing, and addressing the combatant commands’  capability needs for ballistic missile defenses. In its comments, DOD  stated that U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency are  implementing effective methodologies for identifying, prioritizing, and  addressing combatant command capability needs. Yet DOD also  acknowledged that these methodologies continue to be refined. Our report  recognizes that U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency  are taking steps to improve the methodologies used in the Warfighter  Involvement Process; however, we identified limitations with the current  methodologies used to identify and prioritize the combatant commands’  capability needs. For example, we found that the Prioritized Capabilities  List did not fully identify some of the combatant commands’ specific  needs. We also determined that the combatant commands did not  consistently apply criteria for prioritizing their capability needs, and also  did not clearly distinguish among their priorities. As U.S. Strategic  Command works to refine the methodologies for identifying and  prioritizing capabilities, it will need to overcome these challenges.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that U.S. Strategic Command, in  conjunction with the other combatant commands, prepare an assessment  of the Missile Defense Agency’s funding plans compared to the commands’  priorities and provide feedback to the Missile Defense Agency. In its  comments, DOD stated that U.S. Strategic Command is preparing a  Capabilities Assessment Report that examines the effectiveness and  programmatic aspects of the ballistic missile defense system compared to  the commands’ priorities, which it will present to the Missile Defense  Agency in the fall of 2008. DOD also commented that U.S. Strategic  Command has prepared a “Quick Look” of this report, which it provided to  the Missile Defense Agency in June 2008. We encourage U.S. Strategic  Command to provide the final assessment to the Missile Defense Agency  as soon as possible so that the agency can consider the results of the  assessment in developing its future funding plans.
DOD partially agreed with both of our recommendations intended to  provide the Missile Defense Agency with a DOD-wide perspective on the  combatant commands’ priorities. First, DOD partially agreed with our  recommendation to direct the Missile Defense Executive Board to review  each Prioritized Capabilities List upon its release, including the individual  commands’ priorities, and recommend to the Deputy Secretary of Defense  an overall DOD-wide list of prioritized capabilities. Second, DOD partially  agreed with our recommendation to direct the Deputy Secretary of  Defense to provide guidance to the Missile Defense Agency on program  priorities based on the Missile Defense Executive Board’s  recommendation. However, it is not clear how DOD intends to implement  these recommendations. In its comments, DOD stated that the Missile  Defense Executive Board reviews the Prioritized Capability List prepared  by U.S. Strategic Command, but added that a DOD-wide list of prioritized  capabilities is not needed because the U.S. Strategic Command-prepared  list provides the agency with a single list of prioritized needs. DOD also  commented that it disagreed with the need for the Deputy Secretary of  Defense to provide additional guidance to the Missile Defense Agency. We  believe that additional actions to implement both recommendations are  needed. First, officials from U.S. Strategic Command and other combatant  commands told us during our review that the Warfighter Involvement  Process was not well structured to consider the combatant commands’  individual mission responsibilities when preparing a consolidated list of  the commands’ priorities. As a result, U.S. Strategic Command’s list could  obscure the importance of a key ballistic missile defense capability if that  capability was ranked high by only one of the combatant commands.  Comprised of senior-level representatives from the Office of the Secretary  of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, the military  departments, and other organizations, the Missile Defense Executive  Board could provide a broader, defensewide perspective factoring in the  cost, risk, and benefits of supporting one command’s priorities over  another’s. Absent a DOD-wide list of prioritized capabilities, the Missile  Defense Agency will continue to lack the benefit of a departmentwide  perspective on which of the combatant commands’ priorities are the most  significant. Additionally, we continue to believe that the Deputy Secretary  of Defense should provide the Missile Defense Agency with guidance on  program priorities based on a DOD-wide list of prioritized capabilities. In  its comments, DOD stated that the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as chairman of the Missile Defense  Executive Board, has established a process for issuing Acquisition  Decision Memorandums to the Director, Missile Defense Agency. Although  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics  is responsible for overseeing the Missile Defense Agency, the Deputy  Secretary of Defense has been responsible for providing policy, planning,  and programming guidance to the Missile Defense Agency since the  agency’s establishment in 2002. Further, as discussed in our report, the  Missile Defense Executive Board is responsible for making  recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on the Missile  Defense Agency’s comprehensive acquisition strategy.
We are sending electronic copies of this report to interested congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;  the Director, Missile Defense Agency; and the Commander, U.S. Strategic  Command. We will also make electronic copies available to others on  request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at 404-679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: During this review, we focused on assessing the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) process for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing overall  combatant command priorities in developing ballistic missile defense  capabilities. To do so, we obtained and reviewed key documentation from  U.S. Strategic Command relevant to how the combatant commands  identify and prioritize their ballistic missile defense capability needs. The  U.S. Strategic Command documentation that we obtained included the   July 4, 2007, October 31, 2007, and February 29, 2008, versions of a draft  U.S. Strategic Command instruction establishing the Warfighter  Involvement Process, U.S. Strategic Command’s November 2003 Strategic  Concept for Global Ballistic Missile Defense, and the command’s  November 2007 Report to Congress on USSTRATCOM Warfighter  Involvement Process. We also obtained and reviewed U.S. Strategic  Command briefings on the evolution of the Warfighter Involvement  Process, current features of the process, and efforts to improve the  process. Additionally, we obtained and reviewed the 2006 and 2007  Prioritized Capabilities Lists to understand the commands’ prioritized  capability needs and U.S. Strategic Command’s approach for preparing  these lists. To further our knowledge, we obtained and reviewed minutes  of Warfighter Involvement Process management and focus group  meetings, including the minutes of the meeting where the 2007 Prioritized  Capabilities List was approved before it was sent to the Missile Defense  Agency. In addition to U.S. Strategic Command documentation, we also  obtained written comments provided by U.S. Central Command,             U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Pacific  Command to U.S. Strategic Command on the draft Warfighter Involvement  Process instruction. We also obtained combatant command comments  provided to U.S. Strategic Command to help develop the Prioritized  Capabilities Lists. We also reviewed testimonies from the commanders of  U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern  Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Strategic Command to help us  better understand each command’s specific ballistic missile defense  capability needs. In order to gain the Missile Defense Agency’s perspective  on how it is addressing combatant command priorities, we reviewed  Missile Defense Agency guidance, plans, directives, briefings, and other  documentation that identifies key steps, stakeholders, and factors that the  Missile Defense Agency considers during its process for planning,  designing, developing, and fielding ballistic missile defense capabilities.  For example, we reviewed the Missile Defense Agency’s Integrated  Program Policy, dated July 2005, Ballistic Missile Defense Integrated  Program Policy Implementation Guide, dated June 2005, and System  Engineering Plan, dated July 2006, in order to understand the extent to  which the agency has documented how it addresses combatant command  priorities in its decision making. We also reviewed the Missile Defense  Agency’s 2006 Achievable Capabilities List, which was its response to the  2006 Prioritized Capabilities List, and examined Missile Defense Agency  briefings, budget documents, and testimonies by the Director, Missile  Defense Agency. We also obtained and reviewed briefings describing a  2007 Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic Command study of how to  make the Warfighter Involvement Process more effective, and reviewed  the 2007 Achievable Capabilities List to identify changes in the Missile  Defense Agency’s approach for addressing combatant command priorities.  Additionally, we obtained and reviewed drafts of the agency’s directive  and instruction for implementing the Warfighter Involvement Process. We  also reviewed public law, presidential guidance, and DOD directives,  memorandums, briefings, and other documentation that establishes DOD’s  overall approach to developing missile defense capabilities. Such  documentation included chapters 5 and 6 of Title 10 of the United States  Code; National Security Presidential Directive 23 dated December 16,  2002; the Unified Command Plan dated May 2006; DOD Directive 5134.9,  Subject: Missile Defense Agency, dated October 9, 2004; and other  Secretary of Defense guidance outlining the Missile Defense Agency’s  roles and responsibilities. We also obtained and reviewed the Missile  Defense Executive Board’s charter, as well as agendas and minutes from  board meetings held in 2007.
In conducting our work, we contacted officials at the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Strategic  Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command,              U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the military services, and  other organizations. Table 2 provides information on the organizations and  offices contacted during our review. We conducted this performance audit  from August 2007 to May 2008 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and  perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: The 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List
paragraphs: The Prioritized Capabilities List provided to the Missile Defense Agency in  2007 includes four categories of desired capabilities: weapons, sensors,  battle management, and cross-functional capabilities. Each of the desired  capabilities on the list is identified by a title and short description, and  includes the following information:  listing of the overall priority ranking of the capability, and whether the  capability was ranked as one of the five highest priorities by one or  more of the combatant commands;   rationale for the capability;    mission effect if the capability is not satisfied;   summary of the applicable phases of flight, threats, and regions of    key attributes, measures, and criteria for satisfying the capability.
Additionally, the classified U.S. Strategic Command report that conveys  the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List to the Missile Defense Agency  included a table that lists the combatant commands’ consolidated  capability needs in order from highest to lowest priority. This table also  identifies the scores that each of the participating combatant commands  assigned to these capabilities.
In preparing the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List, U.S. Strategic Command  updated the 26 capabilities that had been identified and provided to the  Missile Defense Agency in the first list in 2006. These updates and  revisions were intended to eliminate redundancies and more clearly  communicate the commands’ intent. For example, the 2007 Prioritized  Capabilities List included a 27th capability capturing the need for effective  communication standards, which previously had been embedded into  multiple capabilities on the 2006 list. Short descriptions of the capabilities  on the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List are provided in table 3.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Assistant  Director; Grace A. Coleman; Nicolaas C. Cornelisse; Ronald La Due Lake;  Jennifer E. Neer; Kevin L. O’Neill, Analyst in Charge; and Karen D.  Thornton made significant contributions to this report.