Warfighter Support: Cultural Change Needed to Improve How DOD Plans for and Manages Operational Contract Support
Published: 2010-06-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony discusses the challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in institutionalizing operational contract support throughout the department. The institutionalization of operational contract support includes planning for the use of contractors, training of military personnel on the use of contractor support, accurately tracking contractor use, and establishing measures to ensure that contractors are accountable. For decades, DOD has relied on contractors to support contingency operations and has long considered them a part of the total force. For example, in its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review the department reiterated that contractors were part of a total force that includes active and reserve military components, civilians and contractors. Additionally, in 2008 the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness testified that the structure of the U.S. military had been adapted to an environment in which contractors were an important part of the force. Further, an Army commission chaired by Dr. Jacques Gansler acknowledged that contractors were a significant part of the military's total force. While DOD joint guidance recognizes contractors as part of its total workforce, we have previously reported that DOD has not yet developed a strategy for determining the appropriate mix of contractor and government personnel. In addition, we recently testified that several long-standing challenges have hindered DOD's ability to manage and oversee contractors at deployed locations. For example, DOD has not followed long-standing planning guidance, ensured that there is an adequate number of contract oversight and management personnel, and comprehensively trained non-acquisition personnel, such as military commanders. Since 1992, we have designated DOD contract management as a high-risk area, in part due to concerns over the adequacy of the department's acquisition and contract oversight workforce. As we have previously testified, many of the long-standing problems we have identified regarding managing and overseeing contractor support to deployed forces stem from DOD's reluctance to plan for contractors as an integral part of the total force. We have also testified that DOD's long-standing problems in managing and overseeing contractors at deployed locations make it difficult for the department to ensure that it is getting the services it needs on time and at a fair and reasonable price. We have found numerous instances where poor oversight and management of contractors have led to negative monetary and operational outcomes. As a result, since the advent of our work on contractor support to deployed forces in 1997, we have made numerous recommendations to improve DOD's management of contractors in deployed locations. While DOD has taken some actions to address these challenges, it has not addressed all of them, as I will discuss in further detail. statement today will focus on the extent to which DOD has institutionalized operational contract support. This statement is based on recently published reports and testimonies that examined planning for operational contract support and the department's efforts to manage and oversee contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as our ongoing work involving operational contract support related issues in Iraq and Afghanistan.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In response to congressional direction and GAO recommendations, DOD has taken some actions to institutionalize operational contract support, such as establishing a focal point to lead the department's effort to improve contingency contractor management and oversight at deployed locations, issuing new guidance, and beginning to assess its reliance on contractors. However, DOD still faces challenges in eight areas related to operational contract support. 1) Developing guidance. DOD has yet to finalize joint policies required by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008. 2) Planning for contractors in ongoing operations. The department has not fully planned for the use of contractors in support of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, although some efforts are underway at the individual unit level. 3) Planning for contractors in future operations. DOD needs to take additional actions to improve its planning for operational contract support in future operations. For example, while DOD has started to institutionalize operational contract support into combatant commands' operation plans, it has not yet made significant progress. 4) Tracking contractor personnel. While DOD has developed a system to collect data on contractors deployed with U.S. forces, our reviews of this database have highlighted significant shortcomings in its implementation in Iraq and Afghanistan. 5) Providing oversight personnel. DOD continues to face challenges in providing an adequate number of personnel to oversee and manage contractors in contingency operations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 6) Training non-acquisition personnel. DOD faces challenges in ensuring that non-acquisition personnel, such as unit commanders, have been trained on how to work effectively with contractors in contingency operations. 7) Screening contractor personnel. DOD has yet to develop a departmentwide policy for screening the significant number of local and third-country national contractor personnel who support deployed U.S. forces. 8) Capturing lessons learned. DOD has not implemented previous GAO recommendations to develop a departmentwide lessons learned program to capture the department's institutional knowledge regarding all forms of contractor support to deployed forces in order to facilitate a more effective working relationship between contractors and the military. Given the contractor-related challenges DOD continues to face, a cultural change is necessary to integrate operational contract support throughout the department. Without such a change, DOD is likely to continue to face these challenges in ongoing and future contingency operations. DOD has acknowledged that operational contract support plays an integral role in contingency operations and that successful execution of operational contract support requires significant planning and management. While some efforts have been made within the department and the individual services to improve the planning for and management of contractors, these efforts do not fully work toward integrating operational contract support throughout DOD. As we have discussed, many of the operational contract support challenges the department continues to face are long-standing and while the department has acknowledged many of these challenges, and taken some actions, it has not systematically addressed them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the challenges the Department of  Defense (DOD) faces in institutionalizing operational contract support  throughout the department. The institutionalization of operational  contract support includes planning for the use of contractors, training of  military personnel on the use of contractor support, accurately tracking  contractor use, and establishing measures to ensure that contractors are  accountable. For decades, DOD has relied on contractors to support  contingency operations and has long considered them a part of the total  force. For example, in its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review the  department reiterated that contractors were part of a total force that  includes active and reserve military components, civilians and contractors.  Additionally, in 2008 the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics  and Materiel Readiness testified that the structure of the U.S. military had  been adapted to an environment in which contractors were an important  part of the force. Further, an Army commission chaired by Dr. Jacques  Gansler acknowledged that contractors were a significant part of the  military’s total force.
While DOD joint guidance recognizes contractors as part of its total  workforce, we have previously reported that DOD has not yet developed a  strategy for determining the appropriate mix of contractor and  government personnel. In addition, we recently testified that several long- standing challenges have hindered DOD’s ability to manage and oversee  contractors at deployed locations.  For example, DOD has not followed  long-standing planning guidance, ensured that there is an adequate  number of contract oversight and management personnel, and  comprehensively trained non-acquisition personnel, such as military  commanders. Since 1992, we have designated DOD contract management  as a high-risk area, in part due to concerns over the adequacy of the  department’s acquisition and contract oversight workforce. As we have  previously testified, many of the long-standing problems we have  identified regarding managing and overseeing contractor support to  deployed forces stem from DOD’s reluctance to plan for contractors as an  integral part of the total force. We have also testified that DOD’s long- standing problems in managing and overseeing contractors at deployed  locations make it difficult for the department to ensure that it is getting the  services it needs on time and at a fair and reasonable price. We have found  numerous instances where poor oversight and management of contractors  have led to negative monetary and operational outcomes. As a result, since  the advent of our work on contractor support to deployed forces in 1997,  we have made numerous recommendations to improve DOD’s  management of contractors in deployed locations. While DOD has taken  some actions to address these challenges, it has not addressed all of them,  as I will discuss in further detail.
My statement today will focus on the extent to which DOD has  institutionalized operational contract support. My statement is based on  recently published reports and testimonies that examined planning for  operational contract support and the department’s efforts to manage and  oversee contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as our ongoing work  involving operational contract support related issues in Iraq and  Afghanistan. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The U.S. military has long used contractors to provide supplies and  services to deployed U.S. forces. However, the scale of contractor support  DOD relies on today has increased considerably from what DOD relied on  during previous military operations. In Iraq and Afghanistan contractor  personnel now outnumber deployed troops. For example, according to  DOD, as of March 2010, there were more than 95,000 DOD contractor  personnel operating in Iraq and more than 112,000 DOD contractor  personnel operating in Afghanistan. While the number of troops fluctuates  based on the drawdown in Iraq and the troop increase in Afghanistan, as  of June 2010 there were approximately 88,000 troops in Iraq and DOD  estimates that the number of troops in Afghanistan will increase to 98,000  by the end of fiscal year 2010. DOD anticipates that the number of  contractor personnel will grow in Afghanistan as the department increases  its troop presence in that country. However, these numbers do not reflect  the thousands of contractor personnel located in Kuwait and elsewhere  who support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. By way of contrast, an  estimated 9,200 contractor personnel supported military operations in the  1991 Gulf War.
Furthermore, the composition of the contractor workforce in Iraq and  Afghanistan differs. For example, in Iraq the majority of contractor  personnel are U.S. citizens or third-country nationals (82 percent),  whereas in Afghanistan the majority of contractor personnel are local  Afghan nationals (70 percent). The difference becomes even more  apparent when looking at the subset of private security contractor  personnel who perform personal security, convoy security, and static  security missions. In Iraq, 90 percent of private security contractors are  U.S. citizens or third-country nationals, whereas in Afghanistan 93 percent  of private security contractors are Afghans. Today, contractors located  throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia provide U.S. forces with  such services as linguist support, equipment maintenance, and support for  base operations and security. Contractors are an integral part of DOD’s  operations, and DOD officials have stated that without a significant  increase in the department’s civilian and military workforce, DOD is likely  to continue to rely on contractors both in the United States and overseas  in support of future deployments.
DOD defines operational contract support as the process of planning for  and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial  sources in support of joint operations along with the associated contractor  management functions. According to DOD joint guidance, successful  operational contract support is the ability to orchestrate and synchronize  the provision of integrated contracted support and management of  contractor personnel providing that support to the joint force in a  designated operational area.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Institutionalize Operational Contract Support, though Challenges Remain
paragraphs: In response to congressional direction and GAO recommendations, DOD  has taken some actions to institutionalize operational contract support,  such as establishing a focal point to lead the department’s effort to  improve contingency contractor management and oversight at deployed  locations, issuing new guidance, and beginning to assess its reliance on  contractors. However, DOD still faces challenges in eight areas related to  operational contract support.  (1) Developing guidance. DOD has yet to finalize joint policies  required by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Acts  for Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008.  (2) Planning for contractors in ongoing operations. The  department has not fully planned for the use of contractors in  support of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, although  some efforts are underway at the individual unit level.  (3) Planning for contractors in future operations. DOD needs to  take additional actions to improve its planning for operational  contract support in future operations. For example, while DOD has  started to institutionalize operational contract support into  combatant commands’ operation plans, it has not yet made  significant progress.  (4) Tracking contractor personnel. While DOD has developed a  system to collect data on contractors deployed with U.S. forces,  our reviews of this database have highlighted significant  shortcomings in its implementation in Iraq and Afghanistan.  (5) Providing oversight personnel. DOD continues to face  challenges in providing an adequate number of personnel to  oversee and manage contractors in contingency operations, such  as Iraq and Afghanistan.  (6) Training non-acquisition personnel. DOD faces challenges in  ensuring that non-acquisition personnel, such as unit commanders,  have been trained on how to work effectively with contractors in  contingency operations.  (7) Screening contractor personnel. DOD has yet to develop a  departmentwide policy for screening the significant number of  local and third-country national contractor personnel who support  deployed U.S. forces.  (8) Capturing lessons learned. DOD has not implemented previous  GAO recommendations to develop a departmentwide lessons  learned program to capture the department’s institutional  knowledge regarding all forms of contractor support to deployed  forces in order to facilitate a more effective working relationship  between contractors and the military.
Given the contractor-related challenges DOD continues to face, a cultural  change is necessary to integrate operational contract support throughout  the department. Without such a change, DOD is likely to continue to face  these challenges in ongoing and future contingency operations.
subsections: section_title: Some Departmentwide Steps Taken to Institutionalize Operational Contract Support
paragraphs: In October 2006, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and  Materiel Readiness established the Office of the Assistant Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense (Program Support) to act as a focal point for leading  DOD’s efforts to improve contingency contractor management and  oversight at deployed locations. Among the office’s accomplishments is  the establishment of a community of practice for operational contract  support comprising of subject matter experts from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the services. In March 2010 the  office issued an Operational Contract Support Concept of Operations, and  it has provided the geographic combatant commanders with operational  contract support planners to assist them in meeting contract planning  requirements.
To provide additional assistance to deployed forces, the department and  the Army introduced several handbooks and other guidance to improve  contracting and contract management in deployed locations. For example:  In 2007 the department introduced the Joint Contingency Contracting  Handbook, Contingency Contracting: A Joint Handbook for the 21st  Century, which provides tools, templates, and training that enable a  contingency contracting officer to be effective in any contracting  environment. The handbook is currently being updated and the  department expects the revised edition to be issued in July 2010.
In 2008 the Army issued the Deployed Contracting Officer’s  Representative Handbook. This handbook provides the basic tools and  knowledge to use in conjunction with formal contracting officer’s  representative (COR) training and was designed to address the  realities that CORs face when operating outside the United States in a  contingency operation.
Additionally, in October 2008, the department issued Joint Publication  4-10, Operational Contract Support, which establishes doctrine and  provides standardized guidance for, and information on, planning,  conducting, and assessing operational contract support integration,  contractor management functions, and contracting command and  control organizational options in support of joint operations.
Finally, in 2008, the Joint Staff (J-4, Logistics), at the direction of the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, undertook a study to determine how  much the department relied on contractors in Iraq. The intent of the study  was to (1) better understand contracted capabilities in Iraq, to determine  areas of high reliance or dependence; (2) determine where the department  is most reliant, and in some cases dependent, on contractor support; and  (3) guide the development of future contingency planning and force  development. The Joint Staff’s initial findings suggest that in Iraq the  department was highly dependent on contractors in four of the nine joint  capability areas, including Logistics. For example, the study showed that  in the third quarter of fiscal year 2008, over 150,000 contractors were  providing logistical support, while slightly more than 31,000 military  personnel were providing similar support. Having determined the level of  dependency and reliance on contractors in Iraq, the Joint Staff plans to  examine ways to improve operational contract support planning, including  the development of tools, rules, and refinements to the existing planning  process.
In addition, in July 2009, DOD provided Congress with a report containing  an inventory of contracts for fiscal year 2008, including but not limited to  service contracts supporting contingency operations.  According to Army  officials, the Army is using information derived from this effort to help  inform discussions on the appropriate mix of DOD civilian, military and  contractor personnel in future contingency operations. However, DOD has  acknowledged and we have reported limitations associated with the  methodologies used to develop this initial inventory.
section_title: Operational Contract Support Guidance Has Not Been Finalized
paragraphs: DOD has developed some policies and guidance as described above, but  has not finalized other key operational contract support guidance directed  by Congress. In 2006, Congress amended title 10 of the United States Code  by adding section 2333, which directed the Secretary of Defense, in  consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop  joint policies by April 2008 for requirements definition, contingency  program management, and contingency contracting during combat and  postconflict operations. In January 2008, the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 amended section 2333 by adding a  new subsection directing that these joint policies also provide for training  of military personnel outside the acquisition workforce who are expected  to have acquisition responsibility, including oversight duties associated  with contracts or contractors, during combat operations, postconflict  operations, and contingency operations. In 2008 we reported that DOD  was developing an Expeditionary Contracting Policy to address the  requirement to develop a joint policy on contingency contracting. In  addition, we reported that DOD was revising the October 2005 version of  DOD Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany  the U.S. Armed Forces, to strengthen the department’s joint policies and  guidance on requirements definition; program management, including the  oversight of contractor personnel supporting a contingency operation; and  training. As of June 2010, the department has yet to issue either of these  documents. According to the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  (Program Support), the revisions to DOD Instruction 3020.41 have been  held up in the review process. Further, the department has determined  that it will not issue the Expeditionary Contracting Policy because the  practitioners do not believe a joint policy is necessary.
section_title: Identifying and Planning for Operational Contract Support Requirements in Current Operations
paragraphs: DOD guidance highlights the need to plan for operational contract support  early in an operation’s planning process, in part because of the challenges  associated with using contractors in contingencies. These challenges  include overseeing and managing contractors in contingency operations.  However, in previous reports and testimonies we have noted that DOD has  not followed long-standing guidance on planning for operational contract  support. Our work continues to show that DOD has not fully planned for  the use of contractors in support of ongoing contingency operations in  Iraq and Afghanistan, although some efforts are under way at the  individual unit level.
On December 1, 2009, the President announced that an additional 30,000  U.S. troops would be sent to Afghanistan to assist in the ongoing  operations there, and the Congressional Research Service has estimated  that from 26,000 to 56,000 additional contractors may be needed to  support the additional troops. Despite the additional contractors who will  be needed to support the troop increase, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR- A), with the exception of planning for the increased use of the Army’s  Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), was engaged in very  little planning for contractors. We did, however, identify several individual  unit efforts to plan for contractors.
For example, we found some planning being done by U.S. military officials  at Regional Command–East. According to planners from Regional  Command–East, the command had identified the types of units that are  being deployed to its operational area of Afghanistan and was  coordinating with similar units already in Afghanistan to determine what  types of contract support the units relied on. Furthermore, according to  operational contract support personnel associated with a Marine  Expeditionary Force getting ready to deploy to Afghanistan, the staff  offices within the Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters organization  were directed to identify force structure gaps that could be filled by  contractors prior to deployment and begin contracting for those services.  For example, one section responsible for civil affairs identified the need to  supplement its staff with contractors possessing engineering expertise  because the needed engineers were not available from the Navy.
Additionally, in April 2010 we reported that while U.S. Forces-Iraq   (USF-I) had taken steps to identify all the LOGCAP support it needed for  the drawdown, it had not identified the other contracted support it may  need to support the drawdown. We reported that according to DOD joint  guidance and Army regulations, personnel who plan, support, and execute  military operations must also determine the contracted support needed to  accomplish their missions. Such personnel include combat force  commanders, base commanders, and logistics personnel. In particular,  these personnel are responsible for determining the best approach to  accomplish their assigned tasks and—if the approach includes  contractors—for identifying the types and levels of contracted support  needed. As we reported in April 2010, Multi-National Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I)  May 2009 drawdown plan delegated the responsibility for determining  contract support requirements to contracting agencies, such as the Joint  Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, rather than to operational  personnel. However, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan  officials told us that they could not determine the theaterwide levels of  contracted services required, or plan for reductions based on those needs,  because they lack sufficient, relevant information on future requirements  for contracted services—information that should have been provided by  operational personnel. For example, according to MNF-I documentation,  during an October 2009 meeting between operational personnel and  contracting officials, MNF-I reiterated that the levels of contracted service  ultimately needed in Iraq during the drawdown were unknown. This is  consistent with an overarching weakness identified by a Joint Staff task  force, which noted limited, if any, visibility of contractor support and  plans and a lack of requirements definition. As a result, rather than relying  on information based on operationally driven requirements for contracted  services, MNF-I planned for, and USF-I is subsequently tracking, the  reduction of contracted support in Iraq by using historical ratios of  contractor personnel to servicemembers in Iraq. Such ratios may not  accurately reflect the levels of contracted support needed during the  drawdown.
In our April 2010 report we recommended, among other things, that DOD  direct the appropriate authorities to ensure that joint doctrine regarding  operational planning for contract support is followed and that operational  personnel identify contract support requirements in a timely manner to  avoid potential waste and abuse and facilitate the continuity of services.  DOD concurred with this recommendation and noted that it recognized  that improvements could be made to DOD’s planning for contractor  support and stated that the Joint Staff is working to improve strategic  guidance, processes, and tools available to plan for contracted support  through the Chairman’s Operational Contract Support Task Force. DOD  also commented that it recognized the need for better synchronization  between operational needs and contractor activities and, to that end, U.S.  Central Command has taken steps to increase visibility and  synchronization of operational contract support through initiatives such  creating the Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, instituting a  Joint Contracting Support Board, and collaborating with the Joint Staff to  improve guidance. Also, in our April report, we recommended that DOD  direct the appropriate authorities to conduct an analysis of the benefits,  costs, and risks of transitioning from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV and other  service contracts in Iraq under current withdrawal timelines to determine  the most efficient and effective means for providing essential services  during the drawdown. DOD concurred with this recommendation and as  of May of this year, has canceled the transition from LOGCAP III to  LOGCAP IV for base life support in Iraq due partly to concerns about the  interruption of essential services. The decision to continue LOGCAP III  rather than transition to LOGCAP IV for base life support services was  based on three main factors: input from military commanders in Iraq, the  projected cost of the transition, and contractor performance. Commanders  in Iraq had raised concerns that a transition from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP  IV would strain logistics and transportation assets in Iraq at the same time  that a massive withdrawal of U.S. forces, weapons, and equipment is under  way.
In the past, we have repeatedly reported on DOD’s failure to fully plan for  contract support and the impact that this can have on operations. Several  units that recently returned from Afghanistan discussed how a lack of  planning for contract support resulted in service shortages and diminished  operational capability.  For example, officials from several battalions told  us that when they arrived at locations that were intended to be their  combat outposts, they found the area largely unprepared, including a lack  of housing, heating, washing machines, showers and food.  These bases  were too small or too remote to be serviced by LOGCAP, and therefore the  units had to make their own contract support arrangements through the  appropriate regional contracting command to build, equip and maintain  their bases.  Because the units were unaware they would have to take on  this responsibility prior to deploying, they did not plan for and allocate  adequate personnel to handle the extensive contract management and  oversight duties associated with building and maintaining their combat  outpost.  As a result, these units had to take military personnel away from  their primary missions in order to handle these contract management  duties.  Other units faced different challenges as a result of a lack of  planning for contract support. For example, another unit that recently  returned from Afghanistan stated that the lack of planning for an increased  requirement for linguists due to increased troop levels led to shortages  that resulted in the delaying of some operations.
section_title: Limited Progress Integrating Contractors into Combatant Commands’ Operation Plans
paragraphs: DOD guidance recognizes the need to include the role of contractors in its  operation plans. For example, joint guidance indicates that military  commanders must ensure that requisite contract planning and guidance  are in place for any operations where significant reliance on contractors is  anticipated, and planning for contractors should be at a level of detail on  par with that for military forces. To provide greater details on contract  services needed to support an operation and the capabilities that  contractors would bring, DOD’s guidance for contingency planning was  revised in February 2006 to require planners to include an operational  contract support annex—known as Annex W— in the combatant  commands’ most detailed operation plans, if applicable to the plan. In  addition, joint guidance gives the combatant commanders the discretion to  require Annex Ws for additional, less detailed plans. Incorporating  operational contract support into these types of plans represents a critical  opportunity to plan for the use of contractors at the strategic and tactical  levels.
Although DOD guidance has called for the integration of an operational  contract support annex—Annex W—into certain combatant command  operation plans since February 2006, the department has made limited  progress in meeting this requirement. We reported in March 2010 that  while planners identified 89 plans that may require an Annex W, only four  operation plans with Annex Ws had been approved by the Secretary of  Defense or his designee, and planners had drafted Annex Ws for an  additional 30 plans. According to combatant command officials, most of  the draft Annex Ws developed restated broad language from existing DOD  guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces, and they  included few details on the types of contractors needed to execute a given  plan, despite guidance requiring Annex Ws to list contracts likely to be  used in theater. As a result, DOD risks not fully understanding the extent  to which it will be relying on contractors to support combat operations  and being unprepared to provide the necessary management and oversight  of deployed contractor personnel. Moreover, the combatant commanders  are missing a chance to fully evaluate their overall requirements for  reliance on contractors.
section_title: Data Collected by DOD’s System to Track Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan Are Unreliable
paragraphs: In January 2007, DOD designated the Synchronized Pre-deployment and  Operational Tracker (SPOT) as its primary system for collecting data on  contractor personnel deployed with U.S. forces, and it directed the use of  a contract clause that requires contractor firms to enter personnel data for  contracts performed in Iraq and Afghanistan into this system. In July  2008, DOD signed a memorandum of understanding with the Department  of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development  (USAID) in which the three agencies agreed to track information on  contracts meeting specified thresholds performed in Iraq or Afghanistan  and the personnel working on those contracts. Although the SPOT  database is designed to provide accountability of all U.S., local, and third- country national contractor personnel by name; a summary of the services  being provided; and information on government-provided support, our  reviews of SPOT have highlighted shortcomings in DOD’s implementation  of the system in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, we found that as a  result of diverse interpretations by DOD officials as to which contractor  personnel should be entered into the system, the information in SPOT  does not present an accurate picture of the total number of contractor  personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. While one of the functions of SPOT is  to generate letters of authorization, not all contractor personnel in Iraq,  particularly local nationals, need such letters, and agency officials  informed us that such personnel were not being entered into SPOT.  Similarly, officials at one contracting office in Afghanistan stated that the  need for a letter of authorization determined whether someone was  entered into SPOT, resulting in Afghans not being entered. Additionally,  tracking local nationals in SPOT presents particular challenges because  their numbers tend to fluctuate because of the use of day laborers and  because local firms do not always keep track of the individuals working on  their projects.
We made several recommendations to DOD, State, and USAID in October  2009 to better ensure consistency in requirements for data entry in SPOT  and to ensure that the use and reporting capabilities of SPOT are fulfilling  statutory requirements among other things. DOD, State, and USAID  agreed that coordination among the three agencies is important, but DOD  and State disagreed that they needed a new plan to address the issues we  identified. They cited their ongoing coordination efforts and anticipated  upgrades to SPOT as sufficient. However, we believe continued  coordination among the three agencies is important as they attempt to  obtain greater visibility into their reliance on contractors, grantees, and  cooperative agreement recipients in dynamic and complex environments.  Otherwise, the agencies not only risk not collecting the information they  need but also risk collecting detailed data they will not use.
section_title: Lack of Adequate Numbers of Contract Oversight and Management Personnel in Deployed Locations
paragraphs: One important aspect of operational contract support is the oversight of  contracts—which can refer to contract administration functions, quality  assurance surveillance, corrective action, property administration, and  past performance evaluation. Our work has found, however, that DOD  frequently did not have a sufficient number of trained contracting and  oversight personnel to effectively manage and oversee its contracts. While  several individual organizations or services within DOD have taken actions  to help mitigate the problem of not having enough personnel to oversee  and manage contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq, these efforts have been  driven by individual services and units and are not part of a systematic  approach by DOD.
Ultimately, the responsibility for contract oversight rests with the  contracting officer, who has the responsibility for ensuring that  contractors meet the requirements as set forth in the contract. Frequently,  however, contracting officers are not located in the contingency area or at  the installations where the services are being provided. As a result,  contracting officers appoint contract monitors, known as CORs, who are  responsible for providing much of the day-to-day oversight of a contract  during a contingency operation. CORs are typically drawn from units  receiving contractor-provided services and are not normally contracting  specialists.  Often their service as CORs is an additional duty. They  cannot direct the contractor by making commitments or changes that  affect price, quality, quantity, delivery, or other terms and conditions of  the contract. Instead, they act as the eyes and ears of the contracting  officer and serve as the liaison between the contractor and the contracting  officer.
The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement requires that  CORs be qualified by training and experience commensurate with the  responsibilities to be delegated to them; however, we have reported in the  past that individuals have been deployed without knowing that they would  be assigned as CORs, thus precluding their ability to take COR training  prior to deployment. This can be a problem because although the courses  are offered online, there is limited Internet connectivity in theater— particularly in Afghanistan. During our recent visits with deployed and  recently returned units, we found that units continue to deploy to  Afghanistan without designating CORs beforehand. As a result, the  personnel assigned to serve as CORs have to take the required training  after arriving in theater, which provides technical challenges. Several  recently returned units told us that it could take days to complete the   2-hour online training because of poor Internet connectivity in  Afghanistan.
We also found that although CORs and other oversight personnel are  responsible for assisting in the technical monitoring or administration of a  contract, these oversight personnel often lack the technical knowledge  and training needed to effectively oversee certain contracts. Several units  that have recently returned from Afghanistan told us that CORs with no  engineering background are often asked to oversee construction projects.  These CORs are unable to ensure that the buildings and projects they  oversee meet the technical specifications required in the drawing plans.  An additional complication is that the plans are not always provided in  English for the CORs or in the appropriate local language (Dari or Pashto)  for the Afghan contractors.
Some steps have been taken to address these challenges. For example, the  Army issued an execution order on CORs in December 2009, in which the  Army Chief of Staff directed the commanders of deploying units to  coordinate with the units they will replace in theater to determine the  number of CORs they will need to designate prior to deployment. The  order states that if the commander is unable to determine specific COR  requirements, each deploying brigade must identify and train 80 COR  candidates. In addition, the Army order directs the Army’s Training and  Doctrine Command to develop training scenarios and include COR  contract oversight scenarios in mission rehearsal exercises by March 30,  2010. The order also directed the Training and Doctrine Command to  ensure that contingency contracting responsibilities are included in  appropriate professional military education courses.
In addition, a deploying Marine Expeditionary Force has created an  operational contracting support cell within the logistics element of its  command headquarters. The members of the cell will assist subordinate  units with contracting oversight and guidance on policy, and they will act  as contracting liaisons to the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan  and as conduits to the regional contracting commands should any issues  arise. The Marines were prompted to set up this cell by lessons learned  from their deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom, where problems arose  as a result of a lack of expertise and personnel to help oversee and  manage contractors. In addition, the Marine Expeditionary Force trained  approximately 100 Marines as CORs prior to its deployment to Afghanistan  this spring. While not all these personnel have been designated as CORs  for the upcoming deployment, all could be called upon to serve as CORs  should the need arise.
While we recognize the efforts DOD has under way to develop long-term  plans intended to address its personnel shortages, many of the problems  we have identified in the past continue. In previous reports we have  recommended that DOD develop strategies to address its oversight  problems, and noted that unless DOD takes steps to address its current  shortages, the department will continue to be at risk with regard to its  assurance that contractors are providing their required services in an  effective and efficient manner.
section_title: Training of Non- Acquisition Personnel to Provide Contract Oversight and Management
paragraphs: Currently, military commanders and other unit leaders are not required to  complete operational contract support training prior to deployment. We  have previously reported on the potential issues that can arise when  commanders are unaware of their responsibility toward contractors and  are unclear about the difference between command authority and contract  authority.
During our December 2009 trip to Afghanistan and in conversations with  personnel from recently redeployed units, we continued to find that some  commanders had to be advised by contract oversight personnel that they  had to provide certain support, such as housing, force protection, and  meals to the contractors they were overseeing, and concerns were raised  about the potential risk of military commanders directing contractors to  perform work outside the scope of the contract—something commanders  lack the authority to do. In addition, officials within several units we  spoke with that have just redeployed from Afghanistan told us that lack of  knowledge about contracting resulted in the failure to include the right  mix of personnel in their manpower planning document. This led to  shortfalls in critical oversight areas, such as in the badging and screening  office for contractor employees coming on base. Units that had recently  returned from Afghanistan whose personnel we spoke with also did not  anticipate the sheer volume of contractors and the time and manpower  they would need to devote to properly process and oversee these  contractor personnel. This led to the use of soldiers and Marines to  perform contract-related duties such as escort duty, which had not been  adequately planned for prior to deployment.
Contractors in contingency operations are integrated into a wide spectrum  of activities and support a diverse range of military functions and  operations that are not confined to the logistics world, and therefore all  military personnel should be aware of contractors and how to work with  them. We have previously recommended that DOD develop training  standards for the services to integrate basic familiarity with contractor  support to deployed forces into their professional military education to  ensure that military commanders and other senior leaders who may  deploy to locations with contractor support have the knowledge and skills  needed to effectively manage contractors. DOD concurred with this  recommendation and recognizes the need for broad training for non- acquisition personnel in order for them to understand the basics regarding  contractor personnel. However, as DOD reported in November of 2009, the  effort to incorporate operational contract support into professional  military education was still ongoing. We continue to believe that  integrating operational contract support into professional military  education is an important step in institutionalizing the concept throughout  DOD.
section_title: Screening and Providing Badges to Contractors
paragraphs: In Iraq and Afghanistan, military commanders and other military officials  have expressed concerns about the security risks that contractor  personnel, particularly third-country and local nationals, pose to U.S.  forces because of limitations in the background screening process. In  2006, we first reported on the challenges that DOD faced in ensuring that  contractor personnel had been thoroughly screened and vetted. In July  2009, we reported that DOD had not developed departmentwide  procedures to screen local national and third-country national contractor  personnel in part because two offices within the department—–those of  the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics—could not agree on the  level of detail that should be included in background screening for third- country and local national employees and therefore lacked assurance that  all contractor personnel were properly screened. As a result, we  recommended that the Secretary of Defense designate a focal point at a  sufficiently senior level and possessing the necessary authority to ensure  that the appropriate offices in DOD coordinate, develop, and implement  policies and procedures to conduct and adjudicate background screenings  in a timely manner. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation  and responded that the Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of  Defense (Program Support) has been given responsibility for monitoring  the registration, processing, and accounting of private security contractor  personnel in the area of contingency operations. We noted that while we  did not dispute this office’s role, we did not believe it was the correct  office to resolve disagreements among the offices responsible for  developing DOD’s background screening policy. DOD has still not  developed a departmentwide policy on how to screen local national and  third-country national contractor personnel, and as a result it continues to  face challenges in conducting background screening of these personnel.  As we reported in July 2009, absent a DOD-wide policy, commanders  develop their own standards and processes to ensure that contractor  personnel have been screened.
In Iraq, USF-I, the U.S.-led military organization responsible for conducting  the war in Iraq, has a commandwide policy for screening and badging  contractors. However, in Afghanistan, USFOR-A has not established a  commandwide policy for screening and badging contractors. Instead, we  found that each base develops its own background screening and base  access procedures, resulting in a variety of different procedures. The lack  of guidance also affects the ability of force protection officials to  determine the sufficiency of their background screening procedures. For  example, at one base, force protection officials told us that while they  require contractor personnel to provide valid background screenings from  their home countries, they had not received guidance on how to interpret  those screenings, and did not know whether the screenings they received  were valid. Officials stated that they rely on a biometric system, also used  in Iraq, to screen local and third-country national contractor personnel.  However, as we have previously reported, the name checks and biometric  data collection associated with issuing badges rely primarily upon U.S.- based databases of criminal and terrorist information and background  checks that rely on U.S.-based databases, such as the biometric system  used in Iraq and Afghanistan, may not be effective in screening foreign  nationals who have not lived or traveled to the United States. As we  concluded in July 2009, without a coordinated DOD-wide effort to develop  and implement standardized policies and procedures to ensure that  contractor personnel—particularly local nationals and third-country  nationals—have been screened, DOD cannot be assured that it has taken  all reasonable steps to thoroughly screen contractor personnel and  minimize any risks to the military posed by these personnel.
section_title: Collecting and Distributing Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Although DOD has policy requiring the collection and distribution of  lessons learned to the maximum extent possible, we found in our previous  work that no procedures were in place to ensure that lessons learned are  collected and shared. Many issues that we continue to report result from  the failure to share lessons learned from previous deployments.
The lack of a lessons learned program means that the knowledge that is  gained by a currently or previously deployed unit is not fully leveraged to  DOD’s advantage. Personnel we spoke to from units that were deployed or  had just returned from deployment told us that they left for their  deployment not knowing the extent to which they would have to rely on  contractors or how to staff their manpower planning document and, as a  result, were short handed in several critical oversight areas and had to use  troops to perform functions other than their primary duties.
We have previously recommended developing a departmentwide lessons  learned program to capture the experiences of military units that have  used logistics support contracts and establishing a focal point within the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics, to lead and coordinate the implementation of the  departmentwide lessons learned program to collect and distribute the  department’s institutional knowledge regarding all forms of contractor  support to deployed forces. DOD concurred with this recommendation but  as of November 2009 these efforts were still ongoing. Implementing these  recommendations would facilitate a more effective working relationship  between contractors and the military.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: DOD has acknowledged that operational contract support plays an integral  role in contingency operations and that successful execution of  operational contract support requires significant planning and  management. While some efforts have been made within the department  and the individual services to improve the planning for and management of  contractors, these efforts do not fully work toward integrating operational  contract support throughout DOD. As we have discussed, many of the  operational contract support challenges the department continues to face  are long-standing and while the department has acknowledged many of  these challenges, and taken some actions, it has not systematically  addressed them.
Looking toward the future, the challenges we have discussed demonstrate  the need for DOD to consider how it currently uses contractors in  contingency operations, how it will use contractors to support future  operations, and the impact that providing management and oversight of  these contractors has on the operational effectiveness of deployed units.  These considerations would also help shift the department’s culture as it  relates to operational contract support. As DOD doctrine recognizes,  operational contract support is more than just logistical support.  Therefore, it is important that a significant culture change occur, one that  emphasizes operational contract support throughout all aspects of the  department, including planning, training, and personnel requirements. It is  especially important that these concepts be institutionalized among those  serving in leadership positions, including officers, noncommissioned  officers, and civilians. Only when DOD has established its future vision for  the use and role of contractors supporting deployed forces and fully  institutionalizes the concepts of operational contract support can it  effectively address its long-term capability to oversee and manage those  contractors.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer  any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this  time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact William M.  Solis at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this  statement are Carole F. Coffey, Assistant Director; James A. Reynolds,  Assistant Director; Vincent Balloon; Melissa L. Hermes; Charles Perdue;  Michael Shaughnessy; Cheryl Weissman; and Natasha Wilder.
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