Unmanned Aerial Systems: Air Force and Army Should Improve Strategic Human Capital Planning for Pilot Workforces
Published: 2017-01-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The demand for UAS combat operation support has grown dramatically in the last decade. Since 2008, the Air Force has more than quadrupled its requirements for UAS pilots but faced challenges meeting the requirements due to UAS pilot shortages. Meanwhile, a 2015 Army review found that Army UAS units' mishap rate was higher than for other aircraft and Army officials stated that training shortfalls had contributed to the mishaps.
Senate Report 114-49 included a provision that GAO review Air Force and Army UAS personnel strategies. GAO assesses the extent to which the Air Force and the Army have (1) applied key principles of effective strategic human capital planning for managing UAS pilots and (2) evaluated the workforce mix to meet UAS pilot requirements. GAO compared its previously developed key principles of effective strategic human capital planning with Air Force and Army actions. GAO analyzed data on required and actual Air Force UAS pilots and data on Army UAS training.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Air Force and the Army have not fully applied four of the five key principles for effective strategic human capital planning for managing pilots of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that are important for resolving the Air Force's pilot shortages and the Army's training shortfalls (see table below). Consistent with the first principle, the Air Force involved top senior leaders, UAS pilots, and stakeholders to develop a plan to resolve its UAS pilot shortages—including reassigning UAS workload to Air National Guard units and supporting training and operations with contractors. The Air Force partially applied the second principle to tailor its strategy to address gaps, or shortages, in UAS pilots, such as by using temporary personnel. As of March 2016, 37 percent of the personnel filling UAS pilot positions are temporarily assigned manned-aircraft pilots. Air Force headquarters personnel stated that no other career field in the Air Force relies on temporarily assigned personnel to this extent. Without tailoring its strategy to provide more permanently assigned pilots, the Air Force risks losing the experience that temporarily assigned manned-aircraft pilots have acquired. The Army partially applied the second principle because its strategy is not fully tailored to address its shortages in unit training. The Army experienced training shortfalls—61 of 73 UAS units flew fewer than half of the 340-flight-hour per unit annual minimum training goal in fiscal year 2015. A Senior Army official acknowledged the continued training shortfalls was a concern for the Army. Without revising its strategy to address the remaining training shortfalls, the Army risks that its UAS units may continue to train at levels below Army goals.
The Air Force and the Army have not evaluated their workforce mix—that is the mix of military, federal civilian, and private sector contractor personnel—to determine the extent to which these personnel sources could be used to fly UAS. Furthermore, although neither the Air Force nor the Army have evaluated how and to what extent federal civilians could be used as UAS pilots, both services are using private sector contractors to fly some UAS. Without evaluating their workforce mix, the Air Force and the Army do not have information on alternatives for meeting UAS pilot personnel requirements to meet mission needs. In addition, although the Air Force and the Army deci use private sector contractors to meet mission needs, they did not conduct cost analyses to inform this decision. Without such an analysis, the Air Force and the Army may not be using the most cost-effective workforces to achieve UAS missions.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO's 11 recommendations include that the Air Force tailor its strategy to address UAS pilot shortages; the Army revise its strategy to address UAS training shortfalls; and that both services evaluate their workforce mix for UAS pilot positions and conduct analysis to ensure cost effectiveness of workforce decisions. DOD concurred with 2 recommendations and partially concurred with 9, noting actions that it believed addressed the intent of GAO's recommendations. GAO continues to believe that DOD needs to take actions to fully address the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The demand for unmanned aerial system (UAS) has grown dramatically  in the last decade to support combat operations. In response to the  increased demand for UAS, over the last 8 years the Air Force has more  than quadrupled the number of UAS pilots that it requires, from about  400 in 2008 to close to 1,650 in 2016. However, the Air Force has faced  challenges meeting its UAS pilot requirements. The Commanding  General of the Air Force’s Air Combat Command testified before the  Senate Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Airland in March  2016 that the Air Force had a shortage of about 200 UAS pilots.  Meanwhile, the Army has faced a different challenge in managing its UAS  pilot workforce—keeping the UAS pilots trained. A March 2015 Army  review found that UAS mishaps were occurring at a rate higher than for  other types of Army aircraft and Army officials stated that training  shortfalls had contributed to these mishaps.
The Air Force and the Army primarily rely on military servicemembers to  serve as UAS pilots, although both services augment their UAS pilot  workforce with contractors. In the last 2 decades, Air Force and Army  UAS platform capabilities and missions have evolved.
For example, the Air Force initially used the MQ-1 Predator to perform  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions before adding weapons to the Predator and acquiring the MQ-9 Reaper, which can  perform strikes, combat search and rescue, and close air support, among  other missions and tasks.
We have previously reported on the challenges that the Air Force and the  Army have faced managing their UAS pilot workforce. In April 2014, we  found that the Air Force had UAS pilot shortages and as a result its UAS  pilots had experienced a high work load and had limited time for training  and development activities. We recommended, among other things, that  the Air Force use feedback from UAS pilots to develop its approach to  managing challenges related to the recruiting, retention, training, and  development of UAS pilots, and that the Air Force evaluate the viability of  using enlisted or federal civilian personnel as UAS pilots. The Air Force  generally concurred with the seven recommendations we made in 2014  and has implemented two of them. In addition, while data show that the  Army did not face shortages between fiscal years 2012 and 2015, in May  2015 we reported that the Army unit status reports did not require UAS  pilot training information, and thus the Army did not know the extent to  which pilots had been trained and were ready to deploy. We  recommended that the Army require unit status reports to include UAS  pilot readiness information, among other things. The Army concurred with  this recommendation as well as with one additional recommendation and  has taken action to address them since we issued our report, but the  Army has not fully implemented these recommendations. Further in  March 2016, we testified that the Air Force and the Army had taken steps  in response to our recommendations that made in the April 2014 and May  2015 reports but that further action was needed to fully address these  workforce challenges. See appendix I for the status of actions taken on  the recommendations that we made in the April 2014 and May 2015  reports.
A Senate report accompanying a bill for the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision for us to  review the Department of Defense’s (DOD) personnel strategies for  UAS. This report assesses the extent to which the Air Force and the  Army have (1) applied key principles of effective strategic human capital  planning in the actions taken to address challenges with managing UAS  pilots and (2) evaluated the workforce mix to meet UAS pilot  requirements.
For our first objective, we compared criteria that we previously developed  on key principles of effective strategic human capital planning with actions  the Air Force and the Army have taken to address challenges that each  has faced with managing the UAS pilot workforce. In our prior work, we  found that strategic human capital planning is an important component of  an agency’s effort to develop long-term strategies for acquiring,  developing, and retaining staff needed for an agency to achieve its goals  and of an agency’s effort to align human capital activities with the  agency’s current and emerging mission. Specifically, we have found that  an agency’s efforts to conduct strategic human capital planning should be  characterized by five key principles: (1) involving top senior leaders,  employees, and other stakeholders in developing, communicating, and  implementing strategic workforce plans; (2) developing strategies tailored  to address gaps in critical skills and competencies that need attention; (3)  monitoring and evaluating progress toward meeting workforce planning  goals; (4) building the capability needed to address administrative,  educational, and other requirements important to supporting workforce  strategies; and (5) determining the critical skills and competencies  needed to achieve goals.
To identify the extent to which the Air Force and the Army have applied  these key principles in actions to address challenges with managing UAS  pilots, we reviewed Air Force and Army documentation related to those  services’ challenges and the actions taken to address those challenges.  These documents include data on the number of required and actual UAS  pilots in the Air Force for fiscal year 2016, Air Force data on the number  of personnel filling UAS pilot instructor positions as of July 2016, Air  Force data on the number of hours that UAS pilots and manned-aircraft  pilots fly on average per year from fiscal year 2015. These documents  also included Army data on the number of personnel filling UAS pilot  positions as of May 2016 and the average number of training hours  completed by certain UAS units for fiscal year 2013 through the third  quarter of fiscal year 2016. We assessed the reliability of these data by  reviewing related documentation and interviewing agency officials  knowledgeable about the data. We determined that these data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our reporting objectives. We  determined that the services “applied” a key principle for strategic human  capital planning when their actions generally demonstrated the  characteristics specified in the principle; we determined that the services  “partially applied” a key principle for strategic human capital planning  when their actions explicitly demonstrated at least one characteristic of  the principle; and we determined that the services did “not apply” a key  principle for strategic human capital planning when their actions did not  demonstrate any characteristics of the principle.
For our second objective, we compared Air Force and Army efforts to  determine the type of personnel to use for UAS pilots positions to criteria  in DOD Directive 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower Management,  articulating DOD policy that assigned missions shall be accomplished  using the least costly mix of military, federal civilian, and contract  personnel consistent with military requirements and other needs of the  department and DOD Instruction 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for  Determining Workforce Mix, establishing the workforce mix decision  process, which includes the consideration of cost as a deciding factor in  workforce mix decisions and states that manpower authorities consider all  available personnel when determining the workforce mix, including active  military, federal civilians, and contractors. We also reviewed  documentation and data on the use of additional sources of personnel,  such as performance work statements for contractors and hours flown for  some contractors. In addition, we requested documentation on efforts to  reevaluate personnel determinations for UAS pilot positions and  interviewed knowledgeable officials.
For both objectives, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; the Headquarters Air  Force Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Personnel, and  Services; the Headquarters Air Force Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  for Operations; the Air Combat Command; the Air Education and Training  Command; the Air Force Personnel Center; the Air Force Academy; the  Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps program; the Air Force  Recruiting Service; the Headquarters Army Deputy Chief of Staff for  Operations; the Headquarters Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel;  the Army Research Institute; the Army Aviation Center of Excellence; and  the Army Human Resources Command. We provide further details on our  scope and methodology in appendix II.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to January 2017 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Unmanned Aerial Systems
paragraphs: DOD defines “UAS” as systems whose components include the  necessary equipment, networks, and personnel to control unmanned  aircraft—that is, aircraft that do not carry human operators and are  capable of flight under remote control or autonomous programming. The  components of a UAS include an unmanned aircraft ground control  station from which a UAS pilot flies an aircraft, a communications terminal  that receives signals from the aircraft and relays these signals to the  ground control station, sensors installed on the aircraft that collect data  and images that are then sent to the ground control station, and weapons  that are attached to some unmanned aircraft.
DOD classifies its UAS into five groups on the basis of their weight and  capabilities, including airspeed and operating altitude. For example, group  one UAS weigh fewer than 20 pounds, whereas group five UAS weigh  more than 1,320 pounds. The Air Force UAS pilots fly three types of  UAS in groups four and five5: the MQ-1 Predator, the MQ-9 Reaper, and  the larger RQ-4 Global Hawk. The Army UAS pilots fly two types of UAS  in groups three and four: the RQ-7B Shadow and the MQ-1C Gray Eagle.
section_title: UAS Pilot Staffing Strategies
paragraphs: Servicemembers in the Air Force and the Army who operate the larger  and more capable UAS in group three or above are either manned- aircraft pilots or pilots specializing in flying UAS. In contrast, personnel  who operate the less capable UAS that are classified in groups one and  two generally operate UAS as an additional duty. The Air Force and the  Army use different strategies to assign personnel to this position. The Air  Force assigns four different types of officers to this position: (1)  temporarily re-assigned manned-aircraft pilots, (2) manned-aircraft pilots  and other Air Force aviation officers who have converted to this career  field permanently, (3) graduates of manned-aircraft pilot training on their  first assignment, and (4) pilots who specialize in flying UAS with limited  manned-aircraft experience. The Army assigns enlisted personnel to this  position and they receive no training on how to fly a manned-aircraft.
section_title: Demand for UAS
paragraphs: Over the past decade, the size, sophistication, and cost of DOD’s UAS  have grown to rival DOD’s portfolio of traditional manned-aircraft systems  and UAS have become integral to warfighter operations. However, the  demand for UAS has outpaced the Air Force’s ability to produce UAS  pilots using the existing training pipeline. To meet the demand for UAS  pilots, the Air Force has relied on support from the Air National Guard and  has pursued efforts to increase the number of UAS pilots. For example,  the Air Force trained traditional manned-aircraft pilots to fly UAS and  placed graduates of manned-aircraft pilot training into UAS training rather  than in advanced manned-aircraft training. In 2010, the Air Force created  a dedicated UAS pilot career field and developed a training program for  pilots who specialize in flying UAS. As of 2015, the Secretary of Defense  had tasked the Air Force to provide 60 “combat lines” to combatant  commanders, which is the measure of the capability to provide near- continuous 24-hour presence of a UAS over a specific region on Earth. At  the same time, in March 2016, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force testified  that the DOD-wide requirement is 90 combat lines and in addition to the  Air Force, DOD is relying on the Army and private sector contractors,  among others, to help meet this increased requirement.
section_title: Roles and Responsibilities Related to UAS
paragraphs: Various offices within the Air Force, the Army, and the Office of the  Secretary of Defense have roles and responsibilities to evaluate the UAS  pilot “workforce mix,” which is the mix of military, federal civilian, and  contractors that might be used to fill UAS pilot positions.
Air Force and Army: Section 129a of title 10 establishes that the  Secretaries of the Air Force and the Army have overall responsibility for  the requirements determination, planning, programming, and budgeting  for policies and procedures for determining their most appropriate and  cost-effective mix of personnel. DOD Directive 1100.4 directs the services  to designate an individual with full authority for manpower management,  and DOD Instruction 1100.22 directs the heads of DOD components to  require their designated manpower authority to issue implementing  guidance requiring the use of the instruction when determining the  workforce mix for current, new, or expanded missions. DOD Instruction  7041.04 requires the component heads to use the business rules in the  instruction when estimating the full costs of a workforce in support of  force structure decisions and when performing a cost benefit analysis, an  economic analysis, or a business analysis in support of workforce mix  decisions—including when determining the workforce mix of new and  expanding mission requirements not exempt from private-sector  performance and when deciding whether to use federal civilians to  perform functions that are being performed by contractors.
Office of the Secretary of Defense: According to Section 129a of Title  10 of the United States Code, which governs DOD’s general policy for  total force management, the Secretary of Defense is required to establish  policies and procedures for determining the most appropriate and cost  efficient mix of military, federal civilian, and contractor personnel to  perform the missions of the department. The statute also requires that,  within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall responsibility for  guidance to implement such policies and procedures. DOD policies also  establish roles and responsibilities for the Office of the Secretary of  Defense:
DOD Directive 1100.4 establishes DOD policy concerning manpower  management. The directive also establishes multiple responsibilities  for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness, including that the office review the personnel  management guidelines and practices of DOD components for  compliance with established policies and guidance.
DOD Instruction 1100.22 implements policy set forth under DOD  Directive 1100.4 and establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and  prescribes procedures for determining the appropriate mix of military,  federal civilian, and contractor personnel. The instruction assigns to  the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness the  responsibility for overseeing programs that implement the instruction  for working with the heads of DOD components to ensure that they  establish policies and procedures consistent with this instruction.
DOD Instruction 7041.04 states that the Under Secretary of Defense  for Personnel and Readiness, the Comptroller, and with the Director  of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation are responsible for  developing a cost model applicable DOD-wide to employ business  rules for estimating and comparing the full costs of DOD manpower  and contract support.
section_title: The Air Force and the Army Have Not Fully Applied Most of the Key Principles for Effective Strategic Human Capital Planning for UAS Pilots to Resolve Key Challenges in Managing UAS Pilots
paragraphs: The Air Force and the Army have not fully applied four of the five key  principles for effective strategic human capital planning in the actions  taken to resolve the challenges that each faces in managing its UAS pilot  workforce (see table 1 for a summary of our assessment). The Air Force  has continued to experience challenges staffing its UAS pilot career field,  and the Army has continued to experience challenges ensuring that units  that operate the RQ-7B Shadow UAS conduct homestation training to  address UAS unit readiness concerns.
subsections: section_title: The Air Force Has Involved Senior Leaders, Stakeholders, and UAS Pilots Serving in Units in Strategic Human Capital Planning Efforts to Address UAS Pilot Shortfalls, but the Army Has Not Involved UAS Pilots Serving in Units in Such Efforts
paragraphs: One key principle for effective strategic human capital planning is that  organizations can benefit from ensuring that top leadership sets the  overall direction and goals of human capital planning and that  organizations can also benefit from including employees and  stakeholders in developing and implementing human capital plans.
Air Force—applied. We determined that the Air Force applied this  principle in the actions taken to address UAS pilot shortages because the  Air Force has involved top senior Air Force leaders, stakeholder offices,  and UAS pilots in UAS units to develop a strategy (i.e., the Get Well Plan)  to address UAS pilot shortages. In documentation of the Get Well Plan  the Air Force describes its UAS pilot shortage, the plan’s goals, and  initiatives to address the shortages, such as by reassigning some of the  UAS workload to Air National Guard units and by supporting training and  operations through the use of contractors. According to Air Force  headquarters officials, in 2015 top senior Air Force leaders developed the  Get Well Plan, and the Secretary of the Air Force and other top senior  leadership helped develop the plan’s two goals to staff 100 percent of the  positions for (1) instructors at the UAS pilot school and (2) combat UAS  pilots. Further, stakeholder offices such as the Air Combat Command and  the Air Force Special Operations Command participated in developing the  plan, according to headquarters Air Force officials. In addition, the Air  Combat Command’s Culture and Process Improvement Program Office  surveyed and interviewed UAS pilots in UAS units from August 2015  through September 2015 to identify any challenges the pilots and units  faced and subsequently developed over 150 initiatives to address these  challenges. For example, according to a draft report of this effort, UAS  pilots reported that their morale was low and some attributed this to the  isolated locations of UAS bases. In response, the Air Force announced  that it would establish new UAS units at up to two existing Air Force  bases in possible locations that include Arizona, Georgia, and Idaho.
Army—partially applied. Top senior Army leaders and stakeholders  developed a strategy to address UAS unit training shortfalls and UAS unit  readiness issues including UAS mishaps that the Army identified in 2015,  but we determined that the Army had partially addressed this principle  because the Army did not involve UAS pilots serving in UAS units in this  effort. According to senior officials from the Army Aviation Center of  Excellence, the Army’s top senior leaders, stakeholders from the Army  Combat Readiness Center, and other organizations prepared a briefing in  March 2015 that documented findings about UAS training shortfalls, UAS  mishaps, and an Army strategy to address UAS training shortfalls.  The  strategy included initiatives to (1) increase the amount of flight training  that UAS pilots conduct at their homestations, (2) issue guidance on UAS  training requirements, and (3) establish a system to report the amount of  training that UAS units complete to higher level commands. According to  Army officials, by addressing UAS unit training shortfalls, the Army could  address those UAS mishaps that are due to human error.
Army officials told us that the Army had involved three senior enlisted  UAS pilots serving in management support positions at the Army Aviation  Center of Excellence. These three UAS pilots, who supported top senior  leaders who developed the strategy communicated with UAS units to  verify the amount of training that they had completed and collect  information on unit needs, among other things, according to senior  officials at the Aviation Center of Excellence. However, this approach  does not constitute involving employees in developing a strategy to  address UAS training shortfalls and mishaps. The senior enlisted UAS  pilots involved in developing the Army’s strategy are not currently serving  in UAS units but instead serve in a support role to senior leadership that  oversee Army UAS programs. However, the Army was experiencing  training shortfalls within UAS units, not at higher level commands that  oversee these units. Without soliciting input directly from UAS pilots in  UAS units, such as by conducting focus groups or surveys, the Army is  not able to capture and incorporate the unique perspective of employees  who are conducting the day-to-day work of serving as UAS pilots. Had it  done so the Army may have been able to identify any challenges that  these pilots might face in completing their training or in avoiding mishaps.  By collecting input from personnel serving as unit-level UAS pilots, the  Army could help ensure that any strategy developed might address root  causes of training shortfalls and mishaps that top leadership and other  stakeholders might not be aware of. For example, as discussed above,  the Air Force involved UAS pilots in its planning to address quality-of-life  challenges that those pilots face and these pilots were uniquely suited to  identify those challenges. Responding to those challenges, the Air Force  developed an initiative to establish additional UAS bases to address the  low morale that was attributed to serving in the isolated locations of some  UAS bases.
section_title: The Air Force and the Army Have Developed Strategies to Address Gaps in Critical Skills and Competencies for UAS Pilots but Have Not Fully Tailored the Strategies to Address Persistent Gaps
paragraphs: Another key principle for effective strategic human capital planning is that  it is important for organizations to develop human capital strategies that  are tailored to organizations’ unique needs and these strategies can be  used to address human capital conditions that need attention such as  gaps, or shortages, in critical skills and competencies.
Air Force—partially applied. The Air Force has developed a strategy  designed to address UAS pilot shortfalls and the Air Force has increased  the staffing levels of UAS pilots; however, we determined that the Air  Force partially applied this principle because its strategy is not fully  tailored to address persistent gaps such as continuing to rely on manned- aircraft pilots, limitations in cadet interest in the UAS pilot career field, and  the high workload of UAS pilots.
Since we reported on UAS pilot shortages in April 2014, the Air Force has  developed a personnel strategy designed to help improve the staffing  level of the UAS pilot career field. For example, the Air Force’s UAS  workload was reduced when the Secretary of Defense reduced the  number of UAS combat lines that Air Force military units fly from 65 to 60  and the active-duty UAS pilot workload was also reduced when the Air  Force reassigned 3 combat lines from active-duty units to Air National  Guard units. The Air Force also extended the assignments of manned- aircraft pilots who were serving as temporary UAS pilots and increased  the number of UAS pilot candidates that it brought in to the Air Force. The  Air Force as of July 2016 had met the goal in the Get Well Plan to staff  100 percent of the UAS pilot positions needed for combat. The Air Force  has also made progress in achieving the second goal in the Get Well  Plan, to staff 100 percent of the instructor pilot positions, staffing 93  percent of these positions as of July 2016. Further, the Air Force  improved the overall staffing level of the UAS pilot career field staffing 90  percent of the total number of required UAS pilot positions with pilots who  specialize in flying UAS with temporarily assigned manned-aircraft pilots  as of March 2016. This is an improvement from the 85 percent of these  positions that the Air Force had filled when we reported on UAS pilot  shortages in 2014.
However, we determined that the Air Force partially applied this principle  because the Air Force has not developed human capital strategies that  are fully tailored to address issues that the Air Force has to eliminate  remaining shortfalls. For example, the Air Force continues to rely on a  significant number of manned aircraft pilots who are temporarily  reassigned to fly UAS. As of March 2016, 37 percent of the personnel  filling UAS pilot positions were temporarily assigned manned-aircraft  pilots. Air Force Headquarters officials told us that no other career field in  the Air Force relies on temporary personnel to the extent that the UAS  pilot career field does. Manned-aircraft pilots who are temporarily serving  as UAS pilots acquire experience in flying UAS and the unique needs of  how UAS operate in operational settings. When these manned aircraft  pilots leave the UAS pilot career field and return to assignments flying  manned aircraft, the UAS pilot career field loses that experience. Without  developing strategies and tools that are more fully tailored to address this  gap, the Air Force’s UAS pilot workforce will continue to lose the  experience that temporarily assigned manned aircraft pilots have  acquired.
Further, the Air Force strategy is not fully tailored to address the issue of  a lack of cadet interest in the UAS pilot career field at the Air Force  Academy and in the Reserve Officer Training Corps, and Air Force  headquarters officials told us that this is a challenge for the Air Force. Air  Force officials at the Air Force Academy and Reserve Officer Training  Corps told us that most cadets who join the Air Force express limited  interest in becoming a UAS pilot and instead want to become a manned- aircraft pilot. Air Force headquarters officials told us that the Air Force has  taken some steps to address this issue, including headquarters personnel  visits to some Reserve Officer Training Corps units at several universities  to discuss with cadets the merits of the UAS pilot career field.  However,  the Air Force’s strategies are not tailored to address the lack of cadet  interest in the UAS pilot career field.
In addition, the Air Force’s strategy has not been tailored to address the  high workload of UAS pilots. For example, the Air Force estimates that its  UAS pilots fly their aircraft in operations much more than other pilots in  the Air Force. In particular, the Air Force estimates that UAS pilots fly an  average of 900 hours annually, while fighter pilots fly an average of 200  hours annually, and pilots of cargo and air refueling tankers fly an  average of 500 hours annually. Further, Air Force headquarters officials  told us that most of the hours that fighter pilots fly are to conduct training  exercises while virtually all of the hours that UAS pilots fly are to conduct  operations (see fig. 1).
Air Force officials stated that it is difficult to compare the number of hours  that different types of pilots fly and draw conclusions about the  comparative effects of differing workloads. However, as we reported in  2015, the amount of time that Air Force UAS pilots work leaves them little  time to train.
Air Force headquarters officials agreed with our assessment that UAS  pilot shortages remain a significant challenge for the Air Force and called  attention to the comments made by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force  acknowledging these challenges in August 2016. Officials told us that  the shortages in the UAS pilot and fighter pilot careers are the two areas  of greatest concern regarding the Air Force operations career fields. In  addition, an Air Force headquarters official told us that the Air Force has  not advocated for providing additional personnel to fill the remaining  unmet UAS pilot requirements because the Air Force would not be able to provide enough personnel to fully meet them. Without tailoring its strategy  to address this shortfall between all UAS pilot position requirements and  the actual positions filled, the Air Force risks continuing to not meet its  requirements.
Army—partially applied. The Army developed a strategy to address  shortfalls in UAS unit training, but we determined that the Army partially  applied this principle because its strategy is not fully tailored to address  its issues such as a lack of adequate facilities and access to airspace,  resulting in the Army experiencing considerable training shortfalls for UAS  pilots. As discussed earlier, the Army’s strategy for addressing training  shortfalls includes a number of initiatives: (1) increasing the amount of  flight training that UAS pilots conduct at their homestation, (2) issuing  guidance on UAS training requirements, and (3) establishing a system to  report the amount of training that UAS units complete to higher level  commands. However, according to data provided by the Army Aviation  Center of Excellence, in fiscal year 2015 61 of the 73 RQ-7B Shadow  units that were training at their homestation flew an average of 129 hours  of the 340-hour unit goal, and as of the end of the third quarter in fiscal  year of 2016, 68 of the 78 RQ-7B Shadow units flew an average of 79  hours of the 340-hour unit goal (see fig. 2). A senior Army official  acknowledged that continued UAS unit training shortfalls is a concern for  the Army.
According to Army officials, a lack of adequate facilities, lack of access to  airspace, and the inability to fly more than one UAS at a time contributed  to the lack of progress toward improving UAS homestation training.  Without revising its strategy to address root causes of training shortfalls to  address these contributing factors, the Army risks that its Shadow units  may continue to train at levels that are well below Army requirements.
section_title: The Air Force and the Army Have Monitored and Evaluated Progress toward Meeting Strategic Human Capital Planning Goals, but the Air Force Has Not Monitored Whether Progress Made Achieving Goals Has Improved UAS Programs
paragraphs: Another key principle for effective strategic human capital planning is that  organizations should periodically measure (1) their progress toward  achieving their human capital goals, and (2) the extent to which achieving  those goals helps the organization achieve programmatic goals.
Air Force—partially applied. Air Force officials at headquarters, Air  Combat Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, and the Air  National Guard monitor and evaluate progress toward meeting the human  capital goals in the Get Well Plan. In particular, Air Force documentation  shows that headquarters officials collect data from the Air Force  Personnel Center on the extent to which positions for combat UAS pilots  and instructors are filled—the two goals in the Air Force’s Get Well Plan.
Officials in this headquarters office then provide these data to officials  within the Air Combat Command, the Air Force Special Operations  Command, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve Command,  which also monitor these human capital goals according to an Air Force  official. For example, officials from the Air Combat Command  headquarters told us that they provide updates to the leadership of the Air  Combat Command on the status of the Air Force Get Well Plan. In  addition, officials at Air Combat Command told us that they use data from  the Get Well Plan updates that show which units are more fully staffed to  identify those that can support training personnel on any new equipment  that the Air Force deploys while maintaining combat operations.
However, we determined that the Air Force partially applied this principle  because the Air Force does not monitor the extent to which achieving the  human capital goals in its Get Well Plan helps it to achieve programmatic  goals. According to headquarters Air Force officials, the Air Force has  three program goals that are related to addressing UAS pilot shortfalls: to  (1) meet combat demand, (2) staff enough personnel to UAS units to  allow UAS pilots time to train and take part in development activities, and  (3) provide surge UAS combat capabilities when needed. When we asked  Air Force officials how the Air Force measures the extent that achieving  goals in the Get Well Plan helps it to achieve its three programmatic  goals, these officials provided documentation that shows the Air Force  monitors the sequencing of requirements that it needs in its various UAS  units. However, this approach does not constitute an approach to  measure how achieving goals in its Get Well Plan helps it to achieve its  three programmatic goals. For example, the documentation does not  address how achieving goals it the Get Well Plan will help the Air Force  provide UAS pilots time to train or help the Air Force provide surge UAS  capabilities. Until the Air Force begins monitoring the extent to which  achieving the human capital goals in its Get Well Plan helps it to achieve  programmatic goals, the Air Force will not know whether its strategies are  having the effect that the Air Force intends regarding its program goals.
Army—applied. The Army Forces Command initiated a monthly aviation  readiness review in May 2016 that is overseen by the Commanding  General of the Army Forces Command to monitor the extent to which the  Army is achieving its goal to increase UAS unit training, according to  Army officials. During these monthly reviews, the Commanding General  reviews the amount of training hours that UAS units have flown,  according to Army officials. In addition, through weekly meetings senior  Army officials including general officers from organizations that are  stakeholders to UAS readiness, monitor progress regarding the extent to  which the initiatives of the strategy are helping the Army to achieve its  program goal for UAS units, which is to increase UAS unit readiness.  During these meetings, Army officials monitor the status of the initiatives  in the Army’s strategy, the status of UAS unit training, and the status of  UAS unit readiness, according to Army officials.
section_title: The Air Force and the Army Have Taken Some Steps to Incorporate Flexibilities into Their Strategies, but It Is Too Early to Assess the Effectiveness of these Flexibilities and the Air Force Has Not Explored Additional Flexibilities to Meet Future Expected Needs
paragraphs: Another key principle for effective strategic human capital planning is that  organizations should ensure that flexibilities are part of the overall human  capital strategy to ensure effective workforce planning. Human capital  flexibilities are any policies, practices or adjustments to existing policies  and practices that an agency has the authority to implement and that it  uses to manage its workforce to accomplish its mission. For example,  agencies may implement policies related to recruiting, retention, work-life  policies, and training, among other things.
Air Force—partially applied. The Air Force has taken some steps to  incorporate two flexibilities into its strategy to address UAS pilot  shortages; however, we determined that the Air Force partially applied  this principle because it is too early to assess whether these steps will  result in effective workforce planning that reduces the Air Force UAS pilot  shortages and the Air Force has not explored additional flexibilities that it  may need to use to address additional requirements for UAS pilots. First,  the Air Force is working on an initiative that would enable it to provide  UAS pilots with “dwell time”—a time during which servicemembers are at  their homestation during which they are able to take leave, attend  training, and recuperate. As part of its Culture and Process Improvement  effort, Air Force UAS pilots recommended that the Air Force provide them  dwell time. Because most Air Force UAS pilots remotely operate UAS  from Air Force bases in the United States they can live at home.  However, the Secretary of the Air Force noted in January 2015 that UAS  pilots fly 6 days in a row and work 13 to 14 hour days on average. The  Secretary noted that an average manned-aircraft pilot flies between 200  and 300 hours per year. The Air Force provides dwell time to  servicemembers who return from certain overseas deployments. In  particular, an Air Force policy states that for every 1 year an active duty  servicemember is deployed to certain overseas locations, they are  required to be assigned for 2 years at their homestation. However, this  requirement does not apply to UAS pilots because most operate their  UAS remotely from the United States. In October 2016, the Commanding  General of the Air Combat Command drafted a request to the Chief of  Staff of the Air Force to provide dwell time to UAS pilots. According to a  draft memorandum of the request, for every month that an Air Force UAS  unit spends performing a combat role the personnel in that unit would  subsequently receive half a month to focus solely on training. As of  October 2016, the Air Force had not implemented this initiative and the  Commanding General of the Air Force’s Air Combat Command testified  before the Senate Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Airland  in March 2016 that to implement dwell time for UAS pilots the Air Force  would need to increase the size of its UAS capability by 25 to 30  percent.
Second, in September 2016, the Air Force increased the maximum  annual retention pay for UAS pilots from $25,000 to $35,000, the  maximum amount allowed under the authority provided in the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2016. It is too early to assess  the effectiveness of this flexibility in addressing the persistent UAS pilot  shortages, because this flexibility was only recently incorporated and  might be followed by a corresponding bonus for manned-aircraft pilots.  Earlier in an April 2016 letter that the Secretary of the Air Force sent to  the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Secretary  expressed the need to ensure equity in the amount of retention bonuses  that the Air Force pays UAS pilots and manned-aircraft pilots. However,  during the course of our review, Air Force officials acknowledged that in  March 2016 and April 2016 the Air Force had indicated to Congress the  need to authorize an increase to the maximum annual amount of  retention bonus that the Air Force pays to manned-aircraft pilots to  $60,000 per year—about 70 percent more than the amount that the Air  Force will pay UAS pilots. While the Air Force has taken some steps to  incorporate the dwell time and retention pay flexibilities into its strategy to  address UAS pilot shortages, it is too early to tell whether these steps will  result in effective workforce planning outcomes that reduce Air Force  UAS pilot shortages.
While the Air Force has taken steps to implement flexibilities to its  strategy, Air Force requirements for the number of UAS pilots it needs  may underrepresent those needs and Air Force leadership expect  demand for UAS pilots to grow, but the Air Force has not explored  additional flexibilities to meet these needs. In 2014, we found that the Air  Force had conducted a study in 2008 to determine the required number of  UAS pilots in UAS units, but the study did not account for all tasks those  units perform. Air Force officials stated that, as a result, the requirement  was probably too low. We recommended that the Air Force update its  requirement for UAS units and the Air Force concurred with our  recommendation. However, since we issued our report, the Air Force has  not updated its requirement, although it conducted a new study in 2015.  In addition, in March 2016, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force testified that  he expected that the Air Force will continue to experience growth in the  demand for UAS capabilities in the long term, and that to meet this  expected growth, the Air Force would need more personnel. Updating  the requirement for the number of UAS pilots in a unit and growth in  future demand for Air Force UAS capabilities could both result in an  increase in the number of UAS pilots that the Air Force needs. However,  the Air Force has not explored the potential of adding flexibilities related  to recruiting, such as recruiting bonuses or other recruitment incentives  according to an Air Force official. Without exploring additional flexibilities  that the Air Force may need in the future, the Air Force may not be poised  to meet future needs for additional pilots.
Army—partially applied. The Army has taken some steps to incorporate  flexibilities into its strategy to address UAS unit training shortfalls;  however we determined that the Army partially applied this principle  because it is too early to assess whether these steps will result in  effective workforce planning that reduces Army UAS training shortfalls. As  we noted earlier, Army officials told us that Army UAS units continue to  face training shortfalls due to inadequate facilities and shortfalls in  airspace. To address these factors, some Army units are implementing  flexibilities to overcome these factors at their installations, according to  Army officials. For example, to overcome airspace restrictions, a unit at  Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, travels to the Yakima Training  Center in Washington where there is more available airspace to conduct  training. In addition, personnel at the National Training Center at Fort  Irwin, California launch UAS and then transfer control of the aircraft to  UAS pilots at Fort Hood, Texas, which increases the opportunities for the  pilots at Fort Hood to train. However, as we noted earlier, the Army  continues to experience training shortfalls and, as of the end of the third  quarter in fiscal year of 2016, 68 of the 78 RQ-7B Shadow units that were  not deployed flew an average of 79 hours of the 340-hour minimum  identified by the Army in its UAS Holistic Review. While the Army has  taken steps to incorporate flexibilities into its strategy to address UAS unit  training shortfall, it is too early to tell whether these steps will result in  effective workforce planning outcomes that reduce these shortfalls.
section_title: The Air Force and the Army Have Determined Some, but Not All of the Critical Skills and Competencies That UAS Pilots Need to Achieve Their Missions and Goals
paragraphs: A final key principle for effective strategic human capital planning is that  organizations should determine the skills and competencies that are  critical to successfully achieving missions and goals.
Air Force—partially applied. The Air Force has determined some  competencies that UAS pilots need; however, we determined that the Air  Force partially applied this principle because a multiservice research  team identified additional competencies important for UAS pilots that the  Air Force has not fully incorporated into its method to assess the  competencies of its UAS pilot candidates. However, the Air Force has  taken steps to ensure that its assessment approach is valid and the Air  Force is working to incorporate findings from relevant research into the  methods it uses to assess the competencies of UAS pilot candidates,  according to Air Force researchers.
The Air Force uses selection criteria to identify candidates who are more  apt to succeed in UAS pilot training and perform well as a UAS pilot. To  make its selections, the Air Force assesses whether candidates for UAS  pilot training display a certain amount of aptitude in competencies such as  instrument comprehension, time sharing, and spatial orientation. The Air  Force evaluates whether UAS pilot candidates display these  competencies to a sufficient degree using aptitude tests that are also  used to assess the competencies of manned-aircraft pilot candidates  including the Air Force Officer Qualification Test, the Test of Basic  Aviation Skills, and the Multi-Tasking Test. Officials at the Air Force  Personnel Center told us that their research has found that UAS pilots  and manned-aircraft pilots need many of the same competencies to be  successful. Air Force researchers told us that because the Air Force  adopted the manned-aircraft pilot selection method to select UAS pilots,  Air Force researchers conducted validation research to ensure that this  approach was sound and found that this method is a valid predictor of  whether UAS pilot candidates will successfully complete UAS training.  According to the Society for Industrial Organizational Psychology—a  professional organization of researchers devoted to the conduct and  application of workplace research including personnel selection— validation is the most important consideration when developing a  procedure to select employees because it provides evidence to provide  sound scientific basis for organizations to interpret scores that candidates  achieve on aptitude assessment tests.
However, researchers have identified additional competencies that are  important for UAS pilots to possess and the Air Force has not  incorporated an assessment for all of these competencies into its method  to select UAS pilots. Specifically, the Office of Naval Research initiated a  multiphased research project in May 2014 to improve the processes of  selecting, training, and equipping UAS pilots across the services and  identified 78 competencies that are “moderately,” “highly,” or “extremely  important” for UAS pilots. The team found that the Air Force tests  measure 45 of the 78 important competencies, including some of the  most important ones such as spatial orientation and time sharing.  However, the team found other important competencies that are not  measured by the Air Force’s tests, such as attention to detail. Air Force  Personnel Center researchers told us that, while the Air Force has no  measures that focus specifically on measuring attention to detail, another  Air Force test partially measures attention to detail. The researchers  noted that some of the competencies that Air Force tests do not  specifically measure are related to other competencies that the Air Force  tests do measure and that when two competencies are related, the Air  Force may only need to assess if a candidate has aptitude for one of  those competencies. Moreover, they told us that the Air Force’s tests do  not measure all of the competencies that are important for UAS pilots. For  example, they told us that the Air Force does not have a test to measure  oral comprehension and listening that focuses on understanding  messages similar in complexity to those that must be processed by UAS  pilots.
Air Force researchers acknowledge that Air Force tests do not measure  all of the competencies that are important for UAS pilots. However, the Air  Force has taken a number of positive steps to determine the skills and  competencies important to UAS pilots. It has updated its personnel  selection methods to incorporate findings from research it has conducted,  and has efforts underway to improve the ability to select the best UAS  pilot candidates, including by conducting additional research and testing a  tool that measures multitasking ability, a competency important for UAS  pilots, according to Air Force researchers.
Army—partially applied. The Army has determined some competencies  that UAS pilots need; however, we determined that the Army partially  applied this principle because the multiservice research team we  mentioned earlier identified additional competencies important for UAS  pilots that the Army has not incorporated into its method to select UAS  pilot candidates. In addition, an Army-funded research project  recommended that the Army supplement the test the Army currently uses  to select UAS pilot candidates with additional, existing tests that the Army  does not use, but the Army has not taken action to implement this  recommendation. In addition, the Army could not provide evidence that it  has validated that its personnel selection method has utility in predicting  the success of the UAS pilot candidates in training or on the job.
The Army uses selection criteria to identify candidates that are more apt  to succeed in UAS pilot training and perform well as a UAS pilots and to  make its selections, the Army assesses whether candidates for UAS pilot  training display a certain amount of aptitude in four competencies:
Verbal expression: the ability to obtain information from written  passages, select the correct meaning of words presented in context,  and identify the best synonym for a given word;
Arithmetic reasoning: the ability to solve arithmetic word problems;
Auto and shop information: the knowledge of automobile technology,  tools, and shop terminology and practices; and
Mechanical comprehension: knowledge of mechanical and physical  principles.
Since at least 2002 the Army has evaluated whether UAS pilot candidates  can display these competencies to a sufficient degree using the Armed  Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, which is a test that measures the  competencies of people who apply to join the military services as enlisted  personnel. Officials at the Army Aviation Center of Excellence were not  able to provide information to explain how the Army determined that its  UAS pilots needed to possess these particular competencies because  they told us that these actions took place over a decade ago when Army  UAS were organized under the military intelligence branch of the Army.
However, as we noted earlier, researchers from a multiservice research  team have identified additional competencies that are important for UAS  pilots to possess and the Army has not incorporated an assessment for  most of these competencies into its method to select UAS pilots.  Specifically, the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery measures  just 3 of the 78 competencies that the multiservice research team  determined are “moderately,” “highly,” or “extremely important” for UAS  pilots. We note, however, that the research team also reported that the  battery may still be a valuable indicator of UAS pilot aptitude.
In addition, researchers funded by the Army Research Institute found  additional competencies that are important for Army UAS pilots to  possess and recommended that the Army supplement the Armed  Services Vocational Aptitude Battery with additional, existing measures to  assess these important competencies. Specifically, the researchers  reported in 2007 that the competencies that Army UAS pilots need had  likely changed based on a change in the missions, operations, and the  organization of Army UAS when responsibility for UAS training was  reassigned from the Army’s Military Intelligence Branch to the Army’s  Aviation Branch. The researchers identified 49 competencies that are  critical for UAS pilots and recommended that the Army use existing tests  that the Army and Navy use to measure additional competencies.  However, the Army has not implemented this recommendation. An official  at the Aviation Center of Excellence told us that senior officials in the  Army decided not to use this test because the Army did not have any had  not identified any problems in selecting UAS pilots using the Armed  Services Vocational Aptitude Battery.
However, Army officials could not provide evidence that the Army has  validated that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery is a valid  predictor of the training performance or job performance of UAS pilot  candidates. According to the Society for Industrial Organizational  Psychology, validation is the most important consideration when  developing a procedure to select employees because it provides  evidence to provide sound scientific basis for organizations to interpret  scores that candidates achieve on aptitude assessment tests. However,  officials we spoke with at Army headquarters, the Army Aviation Center of  Excellence, and the Army Research Institute were not able to determine  whether the Army had conducted such validation research to determine  that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery is an effective  predictor of success of UAS pilot candidates in training or job  performance. Army officials told us that the Army is satisfied with its  approach to selecting candidates for its UAS pilot training because UAS  pilot candidates perform well in training and in operational units. However,  other Army officials told us that senior Army leaders pressure officials at  the schoolhouse to ensure that UAS pilot candidates make it through  training, in some cases to provide enough personnel UAS units.
Without validating that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery is  an effective predictor of UAS candidate performance in UAS pilot training  and job performance, the Army may not be basing decisions to select  individuals for the UAS pilot career field on sound evidence. In addition,  without incorporating findings from research that has identified additional,  important UAS pilot competencies, the Army may not be taking  advantage of key benefits associated with effective personnel selection  that could include reducing training costs, improving job performance, and  enhancing the effectiveness of the Army’s UAS organizations.
section_title: The Air Force and the Army Have Not Evaluated the Workforce Mix of Personnel to Fly UAS and Have Not Conducted Workforce Cost Analyses
paragraphs: The Air Force and the Army have not evaluated their workforce mix—that  is the mix of military, federal civilian, and private sector contractor  personnel—to determine the extent to which these personnel sources  could be used to fly UAS. Furthermore, although neither the Air Force nor  the Army has evaluated how and to what extent federal civilians could be  used as UAS pilots, both services are using private sector contractors to  fly some UAS. DOD Directive 1100.4 Guidance for Manpower  Management articulates DOD policy that assigned missions shall be  accomplished using the least costly mix of military, federal civilian and  private sector contractor personnel consistent with military requirements  and other needs of the department. Moreover, the Air Force and the Army  have conducted limited analysis to determine whether federal civilians or  private sector contractors would perform UAS pilot functions at a more  efficient cost. DOD Instruction 1100.22 Policy and Procedures for  Determining Workforce Mix establishes the workforce mix decision  process, which includes the consideration of cost as a deciding factor in  workforce mix decisions. DOD Instruction 1100.22 directs that among  other considerations when establishing a workforce mix, DOD  components shall conduct a cost analysis to determine the low-cost  provider for all current, new or expanding mission requirements and for  functions that have been contracted for but could be performed by federal  civilian employees.
subsections: section_title: The Army and the Air Force Have Not Evaluated Their UAS Pilot Workforce
paragraphs: Over time, the Air Force and Army UAS platform capabilities have  evolved, but neither the Air Force nor the Army has evaluated its current  UAS pilot workforce mix to determine an effective and efficient mix of  personnel for meeting mission needs. The Air Force and Army UAS pilot  workforces are primarily made up of military personnel–both active duty  and National Guard and Reserve–for positions to fly UAS because the  UAS pilot position includes functions that are designated for military  personnel, such as direction and control of combat situations and laser  designation of targets. As stated previously, the Air Force primarily uses  officers to fly its UAS and the Army uses enlisted personnel to perform  this function. In addition, both the Air Force and the Army use private  sector contractors as UAS pilots in government-owned, private sector  contractor operated (GOCO) units. According to Air Force and Army  officials, the GOCO units only fly intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance missions on unarmed UAS.
Air Force and Army UAS capabilities have evolved over time, but neither  service has evaluated its UAS pilot workforce mix. For example, the MQ-1  Predator UAS was established in 1996 as a reconnaissance aircraft and  was weaponized in 2002 with hellfire missiles, adding new capabilities  such as precision-strike. In 2007 the Air Force added the MQ-9 Reaper  UAS, which is similar to but larger and more powerful than the MQ-1  Predator UAS. DOD Instruction 1100.22 tasks the heads of DOD  components to issue implementing guidance requiring the use of the  instruction’s policies and procedures for workforce mix when determining  the appropriate mix for current, new, or expanded missions. Despite the  changes in capabilities and usage to both MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9  Reaper UAS, the Air Force has not evaluated its current workforce mix for  UAS pilots as described in DOD Instruction 1100.22. According to an Air  Force headquarters official, the Air Force has been focused on  addressing its pilot shortages but agreed that it should also evaluate its  workforce mix for UAS pilots.
Army headquarters officials told us that a change in mission or a new  airframe could trigger an evaluation. Since the Army first established a  UAS pilot specialty in 1990, the Army has acquired new UAS platforms  with additional mission capabilities, and has expanded its use of UAS. For  example, when the Army UAS pilot career specialty was first established  in 1990, the Army flew the RQ-2A Pioneer UAV, which performed  missions such as reconnaissance, surveillance, and battle damage  assessment. In contrast, some Army UAS pilots currently fly the MQ-1C  Gray Eagle, which is a larger, weaponized UAS with longer endurance  and additional mission capabilities, including attack capabilities. In  addition, in 2003, the Army transferred its UAS program from its Military  Intelligence Branch to the Aviation Branch. According to a 2007 Army  Research Institute study on the selection of Army UAS pilots, with that  shift there was also an increase in the number and types of UAS  employed by the Army and changes in UAS missions and operations.  Like the Air Force, despite changes to its UAS platforms and  organization, the Army has not evaluated its UAS pilot workforce mix  because, according to Army headquarters officials, its current workforce  is working and meets mission requirements. However, evaluating its UAS  pilot workforce mix could help the Army ensure that it is using the  minimum personnel resources organized and employed to provide the  maximum effectiveness and combat power, which DOD articulates as the  guiding principle of DOD manpower management.
The Air Force and the Army have not used federal civilians as UAS pilots  or evaluated how and to what extent federal civilians may be used in the  future, even though both services are using private sector contractors to  fly UAS in GOCO units. DOD Directive 1100.4 articulates DOD policy  that manpower shall be designated as federal civilian except when  military personnel are required for such reasons as law, command and  control of crisis situations, combat readiness, or when military-unique  knowledge and skills are required for successful performance of the  duties, among other reasons. Air Force headquarters officials stated that  the Air Force had not evaluated the use of federal civilians as UAS pilots,  but agreed that the Air Force should consider how federal civilians may  be used for UAS pilot positions.
During the course of our review, the Air Force began to take initial steps  to evaluate the use of federal civilians to fly its UAS, providing a response  in May 2016 and then again in July 2016 to a congressional inquiry  regarding DOD’s plans to replace contracted UAS pilots with military UAS  pilots. Specifically, in May 2016 the Air Force issued a 3-page response  comprising fiscal year 2018 estimates for personnel, initial investment,  and sustainment costs associated with using military, federal civilian, or  private sector contractor personnel to fly 8 UAS combat lines and totaling  the estimates for a period of 5 years. In July 2016, the Air Force  updated the May 2016 response, issuing a 4-page document revising the  cost estimates so that they included the respective personnel, initial  investment, and sustainment costs for calendar year 2017, instead of for  the 5-year time frame. The July 2016 document also included additional  assumptions that the Air Force had used to inform its development of the  cost estimates, such as assumptions related to the Air Force’s decision to  exclude certain costs from the estimates when those costs were assumed  to be common across the three personnel groups, and the assumptions  regarding costs to acquire equipment for private sector contractor units  and build facilities for military or federal civilian personnel. The Air Force  headquarters official who provided us the documents said he was not  aware of any plans to take additional steps to evaluate the use of federal  civilians to fly UAS.
The Air Force and the Army stated that federal civilians are limited in the  UAS pilot functions that they can perform, but both services use private  sector contractors to augment their UAS pilot personnel and private  sector contractors are further restricted when compared with federal  civilians. In its July 2016 congressional inquiry response, the Air Force  stated that both federal civilians and private sector contractors would be  limited to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. Army  headquarters officials stated that the Army has not used federal civilians  as UAS pilots because of limitations on the functions that federal civilians  can perform that are needed for some Army UAS missions. For example,  combat operations are designated as an “inherently governmental”  activity that may only be performed by military personnel specifically.  Private sector contractors are further restricted from performing any  inherently governmental activities, such as federal procurement activities  performed in operational environments, which federal civilians are  permitted to perform. Army headquarters officials stated that the  disadvantage to using private sector contractors is that GOCO units are  less capable with respect to functions they may perform and more  expensive than military units, but according to these officials, the Army  continues to use them due to limits set by the administration on the  number of uniformed personnel that can be used in conflicts in the Middle  East. Similarly, one Air Force official we spoke with indicated that in some  cases, these limitations on private sector contractors performing certain  activities may impact the mission. An Air Force official who oversaw  GOCO units operating overseas, which is similar to Army UAS GOCO  units, stated that there were occasions when targets were lost because  the private sector contractor operated units could not assist with  pinpointing the target locations since private sector contractors are  prohibited by regulation from using laser designators.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (Personnel  and Readiness) is responsible for issuing guidance for the DOD  components regarding manpower management and reviewing the DOD  components’ manpower management guidelines and practices for  compliance with established policies and guidance. DOD Instruction  1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix,  elaborates on the responsibilities of Personnel and Readiness, directing  that the Under Secretary shall work with the heads of DOD components  to ensure that the components establish policies and procedures  consistent with the instruction and require the use of specific policies and  procedures when determining the workforce mix for current, new, or  expanded missions.
Personnel and Readiness has made efforts to identify additional  personnel options for UAS pilots. In June 2016, the Institute for Defense  Analysis published a study commissioned by Personnel and Readiness  and other Office of the Secretary of Defense entities on alternative  staffing strategies to enable DOD to accomplish UAS-related missions  more cost-effectively. The study found that using DOD federal civilians  may be an option for realizing cost savings. Personnel and Readiness  also sponsored a RAND Corporation study examining effective ways to  convert military positions to positions filled by federal civilian personnel,  referred to as military-to-civilian conversions. The study was published in  June 2016 and recommended changes to statutes, policies, and business  practices to facilitate military-to-civilian conversions. According to  Personnel and Readiness officials, they have discussed implementing the  RAND Corporation’s recommendations on developing guidance on the  process to implement military-to-civilian conversions but have not yet  done so. Personnel and Readiness has not directed the services to  conduct an evaluation of their workforce mix and of using federal civilians  for positions required to fly UAS. Personnel and Readiness officials stated  that doing so would not be standard practice for Personnel and  Readiness because such an evaluation is an activity that the services  would typically initiate based on their authority to organize, train, and  equip their own forces. However, the officials also stated that Personnel  and Readiness can direct such an evaluation. DOD Instruction 1100.22  also directs component heads to provide sufficient oversight to ensure  compliance with the instruction through periodic reviews of the  component’s workforce. Without evaluating the workforce mix, the Air  Force and the Army risk using a UAS pilot workforce mix that may not  efficiently meet their mission needs. Without specifically evaluating how  and to what extent federal civilians could be used as UAS pilots, the Air  Force lacks information on another population that may be able to help  address its UAS pilot shortages. In addition, the Army lacks information  on a personnel population that may be able to help address the limitations  on the use of military personnel due to force management levels.
section_title: The Air Force and the Army Have Conducted Limited Cost Analyses to Inform Workforce Decisions and Ensure Efficiency and Cost Effectiveness
paragraphs: The Air Force has conducted limited analysis and the Army has  conducted no analysis to ensure the efficiency and cost effectiveness of  the UAS workforce mix, particularly in light of evolving UAS platform  capabilities. DOD Instruction 1100.22 directs that DOD components shall  conduct a cost analysis to determine the low-cost provider for all new or  expanding mission requirements and for functions that have been  contracted but could be performed by federal civilians. Neither service  provided evidence that they had completed cost analyses prior to  securing contracts for UAS pilots to determine whether federal civilians or  private sector contractors would perform UAS pilot functions at a lower  cost, a process that is part of ensuring an efficient use of personnel for  new or expanded missions.
Air Force officials stated that the Air Force has not analyzed the costs of  its GOCO units as compared with the costs of using federal civilians prior  to securing its contracts because it does not have a cadre of federal  civilians trained to fly UAS. The Air Force began establishing the GOCO  units for its 10 private sector contractor-supported combat lines in fiscal  year 2014 and Air Force headquarters officials told us they anticipate it  will not finish establishing those units until the end of fiscal year 2018. As  mentioned above, in its July 2016 congressional inquiry response, the Air  Force included cost estimates for active duty, federal civilian, and private  sector contractor personnel and determined that using private sector  contractors is the option with the lowest cost for calendar year 2017 for  the additional 10 combat lines to help meet the DOD-wide 90 combat line  requirement. The Air Force conclusion was based in part on the  assumption that active duty and federal civilian personnel would increase  long-term costs such as an enduring increase in force structure that  private sector contractors would not similarly require. However, according  to an Office of the Secretary of Defense official, federal civilians can be  hired on a short-term basis. In addition, the Air Force response to the  congressional inquiry assumes that the private sector contractors will be  used only to meet a temporary increase in demand and as such includes  cost estimates for one calendar year. However, in March 2016, the  Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force testified  that demand for UAS capabilities will likely continue to increase, calling  into question whether the 10 private sector contractor-supported combat  lines will remain temporary. While the use of private sector contractors  might be a viable solution in the short-term, without a more in-depth cost  analysis, the Air Force will lack information on the most cost-effective  options in the long-term, particularly if the demand for UAS increases.
Army headquarters officials said the Army has not completed a cost  analysis of private sector contractors and federal civilians because its use  of GOCO units was intended to be a short-term solution to meet mission  needs. According to these officials, hiring federal civilians as UAS pilots  would be a permanent action that would require a permanent personnel  structure. However, as noted above, there are options for hiring federal  civilians to meet short-term needs. In addition, while Army headquarters  officials say the Army’s use of private sector contractors began as a  short-term need, private sector contractors have been flying Army UAS  for 8 years because of ongoing conflict in the Middle East. Completing a  cost-analysis could better inform decision-making on the workforce,  including continuing to rely on private sector contractors instead of  exploring other options, such as using federal civilians. Without  conducting a cost analysis, both the Air Force and the Army may not  know whether they are using the most cost effective workforce mix for  meeting mission needs.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The demand for UAS capabilities has grown considerably in recent years  to support combat operations, as has the demand for a sufficient number  of trained UAS pilots needed to provide those capabilities. The Air Force  has experienced challenges providing the required number of UAS pilots  to meet that demand. In addition, the Army has experienced challenges in  providing its goal number of training hours to its UAS pilots when not  deployed. Both the Air Force and the Army have, in most cases, partially  addressed strategic human capital planning principles to help them  address those challenges. However, by not taking actions consistent with  certain elements of the principles, the Air Force and the Army could  hinder their ability to address their personnel challenges. For example,  because the Army had not involved UAS pilots in UAS units in developing  its strategy to address training shortfalls, it may have missed an  opportunity to gain valuable information and insight from UAS pilots that  may help address root causes of training shortfalls and mishaps. In  addition, if the Air Force and the Army do not revise their strategies to  fully tailor them to address remaining issues with gaps, the Air Force risks  continuing to not meet its requirements and the Army risks continuing to  train at levels that are below Army requirements. Moreover, because the  Air Force has not monitored the extent to which achieving the human  capital goals it has set also helps it achieve its programmatic goals, the  Air Force may be limited in its understanding whether its goals and  strategies are having their intended effects. Further, while the Air Force  has taken steps to incorporated flexibilities into its human capital  strategies, without exploring the potential to use additional flexibilities,  such as recruiting bonuses or other recruitment incentives, it may not be  poised to meet future needs for UAS pilots. For the Army, because it has  not incorporated additional, important UAS pilot competencies in its UAS  pilot candidate selection method and validated that selection method, it  may be missing opportunities to improve its personnel selection and  realize associated benefits, such as reduced training costs.
The Air Force and the Army primarily use military personnel to fill UAS  pilot positions and have also used contractors to fly UAS, yet neither  service has evaluated its workforce mix for UAS pilot positions, including  specifically evaluating the use of federal civilians, because the Office of  the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has not directed  the services to conduct such an evaluation as part of its oversight  responsibilities. Evaluating the workforce mix would help to ensure that  the Air Force and the Army are using the mix of personnel best suited to  meeting mission needs and would provide information on options for  addressing shortages and limitations on using military personnel. In  addition, the Air Force and Army did not inform their workforce decisions  with cost analyses that would provide information on the most cost- effective workforce for meeting mission needs.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making 11 recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to  improve the strategic human capital planning of the Air Force’s and the  Army’s UAS pilot workforces.
To help the Air Force in its effort to address UAS pilot shortfalls, we are  making the following 3 recommendations related to three of the five  principles for effective strategic human capital planning.
To help ensure that the Air Force strategies to address UAS pilot  shortages are tailored to address remaining issues, such as the  significant amount of pilots who are temporarily assigned to the UAS  pilot career, the limited amount of cadet interest in the UAS pilot  career, and the workload of UAS pilots, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to revise  the Get Well Plan to address these issues.
To help the Air Force ensure that its strategies are having the  intended effects, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Air Force to monitor the extent to which that  achieving the human capital goals in its strategy helps the Air Force  achieve its programmatic goals.
To help the Air Force ensure that it is poised to meet future needs for  UAS pilots, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretary of the Air Force to explore the potential use of additional  flexibilities that would enable it to increase the number of UAS pilots in  its workforce.
To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, we  are making the following 6 recommendations related to three of the five  principles for effective strategic human capital planning.
To help the Army identify challenges that UAS pilots face in  completing their training, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to  collect feedback from UAS pilots in UAS units, such as by  surveying, or conducting focus groups with them and  incorporate such feedback into the Army’s strategy to address  UAS training shortfalls.
To help ensure that Army Shadow units meet minimum training  requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretary of the Army to revise its strategy to address UAS training  shortfalls to ensure that it is fully tailored to address training issues  and address factors such as lack of adequate facilities, lack of access  to airspace, and the inability to fly more than one UAS at a time.
To help the Army ensure that it is basing its decisions to select  individuals for UAS pilot training on sound evidence and to help it take  advantage of the key benefits associated with effective personnel  selection that could include reducing training costs, improving job  performance, improving retention of qualified personnel, enabling  leadership development, and enhancing organizational effectiveness,  we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of  the Army to  validate that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery is an  effective predictor of UAS pilot candidate performance in UAS  pilot training and job performance; assess existing research that has been performed that identifies  UAS pilot competencies; and  incorporate relevant findings from such research into the Army’s  approach for selecting UAS pilot candidates, as appropriate.
To help address personnel shortages and meet mission needs cost  effectively, we are making two recommendations that the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, through the Under Secretary of Defense  (Personnel & Readiness) direct the Air Force and the Army to: evaluate the workforce mix and the use of federal civilians for UAS  conduct cost analyses consistent with DOD guidance to inform their  workforce decisions and ensure cost effectiveness of the UAS pilot  workforce mix.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written  comments, DOD partially concurred with nine recommendations and  concurred with two recommendations. For the nine recommendations  with which DOD partially concurred, DOD noted actions that it had been  taken that DOD believed addressed the intent of our recommendations.  DOD’s comments are summarized below and reprinted in their entirety in  appendix III.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Air Force  revise the Get Well Plan to help ensure that the Air Force strategies to  address UAS pilot shortages are tailored to address the significant  amount of pilots who are temporarily assigned to the UAS pilot career, the  limited amount of cadet interest in the UAS pilot career, and the workload  of UAS pilots. In its comments, DOD stated that it does not disagree with  our recommendation. However, DOD believes that the Get Well Plan  addresses these issues and significant steps have already been taken to  fulfill the intent of our recommendation; therefore, no further direction is  needed in response to our recommendation. We disagree. The Get Well  Plan has two stated goals: to staff 100 percent of the positions for (1)  instructors at the UAS pilot school; and (2) combat UAS pilots, and does  not address the three issues we discuss in this recommendation. We  continue to believe that the Air Force needs to take action to help ensure  that its strategy is fully tailored to address the challenges we identified  and that the Air Force acknowledged existed.
DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation that the Air Force  monitor the extent to which achieving the human capital goals in its  strategy helps the Air Force achieve its programmatic goals. DOD stated  that it agrees that continuous monitoring of the Air Force Get Well Plan is  critical and noted that the Air Force provides regular updates to the senior  leadership of the department on the goals and status of the Get Well  Plan. DOD also stated that based on those updates, the Office of the  Secretary of Defense will provide additional direction as necessary and  appropriate. As we noted in the report, the Air Force does not measure  how achieving goals in its Get Well Plan helps it to achieve its three  programmatic goals: (1) meeting combat demand, (2) staffing enough  personnel to UAS units to allow UAS pilots time to train and take part in  development activities, and (3) providing surge UAS combat capabilities  when needed. For example, the Air Force’s current monitoring does not  address how achieving goals in the Get Well Plan will help the Air Force  provide UAS pilots time to train or help the Air Force provide surge UAS  capabilities. We continue to believe that until the Air Force develops such  an approach and begins monitoring the extent to which achieving the  human capital goals in its strategy helps the Air Force achieve its  programmatic goals, the Air Force will not know whether its strategies are  having the intended effect on its program goals.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Air Force  explore the potential use of additional flexibilities to enable it to increase  the number of UAS pilots in its workforce to meet future needs. DOD  stated that the Air Force is exploring additional measures with the  potential to increase the number of pilots in the UAS pilot workforce. It  stated that, as needed, the Air Force will engage with the Office of the  Secretary of Defense to secure authorities necessary to implement  desired measures relating to the workforce, but that further direction from  the Secretary of Defense is not necessary at this time. As we stated in the  report, the Air Force has taken some steps to incorporate two  flexibilities—providing “dwell time” and retention bonuses—into its  strategy to address UAS pilot shortages. We continue to believe that  exploring the use of additional flexibilities to increase the number of UAS  pilots is important given that current Air Force requirements for the  number of UAS pilots it needs may underrepresent those needs, and Air  Force leadership expects demand for UAS pilots to grow.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendations that the Army (1)  collect feedback from pilots in UAS units to help the Army identify  challenges faced in completing their training and (2) incorporate such  feedback into the Army’s strategy to address UAS training shortfalls. DOD  stated that incorporating feedback from the field is already an element of  the Army’s strategy for improving the sustainability, maturity, and health  of its UAS workforce. DOD stated that our findings will reinforce the  importance of using feedback to improve and refine the Army's overall  strategy. DOD also stated that it does not believe that further direction is  necessary. We disagree that additional direction is not necessary for  addressing UAS training shortfalls. While it is encouraging that the Army  is incorporating feedback from the field to improve the sustainability,  maturity, and health of its UAS workforce, we specifically address training  shortfalls in UAS units in our findings, which the Army does not discuss in  its response to this recommendation. As noted in our report, we believe  that by collecting input through focus groups or surveys of UAS pilots  serving in UAS units, the Army could identify the root causes of chronic  training shortfalls in RQ-7B Shadow units and use its findings to shape its  strategy to address its documented training shortfalls.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Army revise its  strategy to address UAS training shortfalls to ensure that it is fully tailored  to address training issues and address factors such as lack of adequate  facilities, lack of access to airspace, and the inability to fly more than one  UAS at a time. DOD stated that the Army has already taken steps to  continuously improve its training strategy and that our findings will  underline the importance of those initiatives, but that additional direction  related to our recommendation is not necessary. We disagree. We  acknowledge in our report that the Army has taken steps to overcome  some of its training challenges. For example, to overcome airspace  restrictions, a unit at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, travels to  the Yakima Training Center in Washington where there is more available  airspace to conduct training. However, these steps have not resulted in   Army RQ-7B Shadow units meeting homestation training goals since at  least 2013. Given this, we believe that the Army needs to revise its  strategy to more fully tailor it to address the barriers to help it address  these training shortfalls.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Army validate  that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery is an effective  predictor of UAS pilot candidate performance in UAS pilot training and job  performance. DOD stated that it believes that the current graduation rate  of soldiers from its UAS pilot school of 98 percent is an indication that the  existing personnel resource predictors and practices are sufficient. It also  stated that periodic re-validation is prudent, but specific direction to do so  is not necessary. We disagree. Regarding the Army’s graduation rate of  personnel attending UAS pilot training, Army officials told us that senior  Army leaders pressure officials at the Army UAS pilot schoolhouse to  ensure that UAS pilot candidates make it through training. As a result, this  statistic may not provide the Army with reliable evidence that its approach  to selecting personnel to serve as UAS pilots is providing the Army with  personnel who have the aptitude for this career. Validating that the Armed  Services Vocational Aptitude Battery is an effective predictor of training  and job performance of UAS pilot is an important step that would help the  Army ensure that it is basing its decisions to select individuals for the  UAS pilot career field on sound evidence.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendations that the Army (1)  assess existing research that has been performed that identifies UAS  pilot competencies and (2) incorporate relevant findings from such  research into the Army’s approach for selecting UAS pilot candidates, as  appropriate. DOD stated that incorporating findings regarding UAS pilot  competencies is already an integral part of both workforce and community  management and that effective and efficient resource management, as  well as force shaping and management processes, will help ensure that  the Army's selection of candidates is consistent with the findings of  existing research in this area. DOD stated that it does not believe it is  necessary to provide additional direction or guidance to the Army to  leverage existing research that identifies UAS pilot competencies. We  disagree. As we noted in our report, the Army has used the same  approach to assess the competencies of UAS pilot candidates since at  least 2002 and has not incorporated findings from scientific research,  such as results from an Army Research Institute study conducted in 2007,  on UAS pilot candidates. We believe that by assessing existing research  that identifies UAS pilot competencies and incorporating relevant findings  from such research into the Army’s approach for selecting UAS pilot  candidates that the Army could take advantage of the benefits associated  with effective personnel selection. Assessing and incorporating such  findings may allow the Army to  reduce training costs, improve job  performance, improve retention of qualified personnel, enable leadership  development, and enhance organizational effectiveness.
Finally, DOD concurred with our two recommendations that the Air Force  and the Army evaluate the UAS workforce mix and the use of federal  civilians for their UAS pilot positions and that the Air Force and Army  conduct cost analyses consistent with DOD guidance to inform their  workforce decisions and ensure cost effectiveness of their UAS pilot  workforce mix.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force  and the Army; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Actions Taken by the Air Force, the Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to Address Our Recommendations
paragraphs: In April 2014, we found that the Air Force had shortages of pilots of  unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and faced challenges to recruit, develop,  and retain pilots and build their morale. We also found that Air Force  UAS pilots experienced potentially challenging working conditions and  were promoted at lower rates than personnel in other career fields. In  particular, we found that the Air Force (1) had operated below its optimum  crew ratio, which is a metric used to determine the personnel needs for  Air Force aviation units; (2) had not developed a minimum crew ratio; (3)  had not tailored its recruiting and retention strategy to align with the  specific needs and challenges of UAS pilots; (4) had not considered the  viability of using personnel other than officers such as enlisted or civilians  as UAS pilots; (5) had not incorporated feedback from UAS pilots into  efforts to manage the career field; (6) had not fully analyzed the effects of  being deployed-on-station on UAS pilots’ quality of life; and (7) had not  analyzed the effect of being a UAS pilot on the chances for promotion.  We made seven recommendations related to these findings. Since we  issued our report in April 2014, the Air Force has fully implemented two of  the recommendations, taken action on three recommendations, and has  not taken action on two others.
In May 2015, we found that the Air Force and the Army faced challenges  ensuring that their UAS pilots completed their required training. We also  found that Army unit status reports did not require UAS pilot training  information and that the Army had not fully addressed the risks of using  less experienced instructor pilots. We made three recommendations  related to these findings. Since we issued our report in May 2015, the  Army and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness have taken actions to address the three recommendations but  have not fully implemented any of the recommendations.
In table 2, we list the seven recommendations that we made in the April  2014 report and the three recommendations that we made in the May  2015 report and summarize the actions that the Air Force, the Army, and  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness have taken to address those recommendations.
section_title: Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We focused our review on the personnel programs for unmanned aerial  system (UAS) pilots in the Army and the Air Force. We focused our  review on the Army and the Air Force programs because these services  have significantly more UAS pilots than the Navy and the Marine Corps.  We also included efforts that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  for Personnel and Readiness had taken because that office is responsible  for developing guidance to implement policies and procedures for  determining the most appropriate and cost efficient mix of military, civilian,  and contractor personnel to perform the missions of the department.
To assess the extent to which the Air Force and the Army have applied  key principles of effective strategic human capital planning in the actions  taken to address challenges with managing UAS pilots, we compared  criteria that we previously developed on key principles of effective  strategic human capital planning with actions the Air Force and the Army  have taken to address challenges that each has faced with managing the  UAS pilot workforce. In our prior work, we found that strategic human  capital planning is an important component of an agency’s effort to  develop long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff  needed for an agency to achieve its goals and of an agency’s effort to  align human capital activities with the agency’s current and emerging  mission. Specifically, we have found that an agency’s efforts to conduct  strategic human capital planning should be characterized by five key  principles: (1) involving top senior leaders, employees, and other  stakeholders in developing, communicating, and implementing strategic  workforce plans; (2) developing strategies tailored to address gaps in  critical skills and competencies that need attention; (3) monitoring and  evaluating progress toward meeting workforce planning goals; (4) building  the capability needed to address administrative, educational, and other  requirements important to supporting workforce strategies; and (5)  determining the critical skills and competencies needed to achieve goals.
To identify the extent to which the Air Force and the Army have  implemented these key principles in actions to address challenges with  managing UAS pilots, we reviewed Air Force and Army documentation  related to these services challenges and the actions taken to address  those challenges. These documents include data on the number of  required and actual UAS pilots in the Air Force for fiscal year 2016, Air  Force data on the number of personnel filling UAS pilot instructor  positions as of July 2016, and Air Force data on the number of hours that  UAS pilots and manned-aircraft pilots fly on average per year from fiscal  year 2015. These documents also included Army data on the number of  personnel filling UAS pilot positions as of May 2016 and the average  number of training hours completed by certain UAS units for fiscal year  2013 through the third quarter of fiscal year 2016. We assessed the  reliability of these data by reviewing related documentation and  interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We  determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  our reporting objectives. We determined that the services “applied” a key  principle for strategic human capital planning when their actions generally  demonstrated the characteristics specified in the principle, we determined  that the services “partially applied” a key principle for strategic human  capital planning when their actions explicitly demonstrated at least one  characteristic of the principle, and we determined that the services did  “not apply” a key principle for strategic human capital planning when their  actions did not demonstrate any characteristics of the principle.
To assess the extent to which the Air Force and the Army have evaluated  the workforce mix to meet UAS pilot requirements, we compared Air  Force and Army efforts to determine the type of personnel to use for UAS  pilots positions with criteria in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive  1100.4 Guidance for Manpower Management which articulates DOD  policy that assigned missions shall be accomplished using the least costly  mix of military, civilian, and contract personnel consistent with military  requirements and other needs of the department and DOD Instruction  1100.22 Policies and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, which  establishes the workforce mix decision process, including the  consideration of cost as a deciding factor in workforce mix decisions, and  states that manpower authorities consider all available personnel when  determining the workforce mix, including active military, federal civilians,  and contractors. We also reviewed documentation and data on the use  of additional sources of personnel, such as performance work statements  for contractors and hours flown for some contractors. In addition, we  requested documentation on efforts to reevaluate personnel  determinations for UAS pilot positions and interviewed knowledgeable  officials. We compared the documentation, or lack thereof, and  information obtained from the officials to criteria in DOD Instruction  1100.22, which directs component heads to provide sufficient oversight to  ensure compliance with the Instruction through periodic reviews of the  component’s workforce.
For both objectives, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; the Headquarters Air  Force Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Personnel, and  Services; the Headquarters Air Force Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  for Operations; the Air Combat Command; the Air Education and Training  Command; the Air Force Personnel Center, the Air Force Academy, the  Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps program; the Air Force  Recruiting Service, the Headquarters Army Deputy Chief of Staff for  Operations; the Headquarters Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel;  the Army Research Institute, the Army Aviation Center of Excellence; and  the Army Human Resources Command.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to December 2017  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact:
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments:
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Lori Atkinson, Assistant Director; Mae Jones, James P. Klein, Amie  Lesser, Kelly Liptan, Felicia Lopez, Shari Nikoo, and Mike Silver.