Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Needs to Improve Guidance on Weapon Limitations and Planning for Its Stockpile Surveillance Program
Published: 2012-02-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Most weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile were produced over 20 years ago and are being sustained beyond original design lifetimes. It is critical to ensure that these weapons are safe, secure, and reliable to perform as the nations nuclear deterrent. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy, is responsible for the nations nuclear weapons program. NNSA identifies nuclear weapon limitationsareas where military requirements may not be metand conducts nonnuclear tests to evaluate the condition and reliability of weapons through its nuclear stockpile surveillance program. GAO was asked to determine the (1) number and types of such limitations and any concerns raised by Department of Defense (DOD) officials, and (2) actions NNSA has taken to implement its prior recommendations for the nuclear stockpile surveillance program. GAO reviewed agency documents, analyzed limitations, and interviewed key NNSA and DOD officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: For the 52 NNSA identified limitations for all weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, 86 percent fall into six types: detonation safety under abnormal conditions, weapon reliability, weapon delivery, more frequent replacement of limited life components, nuclear yield, and worker safety. Some DOD officials expressed concern over the impact that certain weapon limitations have on weapon operation, maintenance, and war planning. According to DOD officials, current DOD mitigation actions, as well as the successful completion of ongoing and planned NNSA efforts, should address most limitations for which the officials raised concerns. DOD officials stated that the current stockpile allows sufficient flexibility to mitigate limitations. However, they told GAO that there may be less flexibility in the future as the stockpile continues to age and decreases in size. For each weapon system, NNSA provides DOD with guidance containing additional information on nuclear weapon limitations. However, GAO found that this guidance does not cover all limitations and some DOD officials said that it may not provide them with relevant information for some limitations. Specifically, the guidance addresses approximately 60 percent of all limitations but does not include limitations based on certain weapon components. In addition, one senior DOD official stated that the guidance did not help clarify the potential impact that a particular limitation may have on weapon operation and maintenance. The applicable military service is now conducting its own analysis of this limitations potential impact. Furthermore, the national laboratories identified four existing weapon limitations (8 percent of all limitations) that are no longer valid because, among other reasons, corrective action to address the limitations is complete. In addition, it is uncertain if an ongoing DOD and NNSA review of nuclear weapon military requirements will be used to eliminate limitations based on potentially outdated military requirements.
NNSA has begun to implement some recommendations from the agencys draft October 2010 management review of the nuclear stockpile surveillance program but has not developed a corrective action plan to guide its multiple actions. For example, NNSA (1) created and staffed the position of Senior Technical Advisor for Surveillance in response to the reviews recommendation to establish strong NNSA leadership and (2) established a formal process for setting surveillance testing requirements. National laboratory and DOD officials GAO interviewed generally viewed NNSAs actions as positive steps to improve the program. However, NNSA has not developed a corrective action plan, as called for by Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123. According to this circular on management controls, federal managers are to develop a corrective action plan to address program operations weaknesses identified through management reviews, among other things. Such plans are to include specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and metrics to measure progress and hold management accountable. According to a senior level NNSA official, the agency did not implement many of the recommendations from three prior surveillance program management reviews primarily because there was no specific approach for implementation. Without a corrective action plan, it is unclear how NNSA will (1) ensure that the draft October 2010 management reviews recommendations are fully implemented and (2) demonstrate to key stakeholders, such as Congress and DOD, that NNSA is committed to improving the surveillance program.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: Among other things, GAO recommends that NNSA, in appropriate collaboration with DOD, expand guidance on weapon limitations to include all limitations, revise this guidance to clearly describe the limitations potential impacts, and develop a corrective action plan for implementing surveillance program recommendations. NNSA generally agreed with GAOs recommendations and outlined planned actions to address them. DOD agreed with GAOs recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Arms control agreements and other policies since the 1960s have led the  United States to maintain nuclear deterrence with decreasing numbers of  weapons. Most nuclear weapons currently in the stockpile were produced  over 20 years ago and are being sustained beyond their original design  lifetimes. Consequently, it is critical to ensure that the weapons in the  nuclear stockpile are safe, secure, and reliable.
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous  agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is responsible for, among  other things, the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval  reactors programs. NNSA manages the nuclear stockpile through the  three national nuclear weapons design laboratories—Los Alamos  National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory  (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL); four production plants— Pantex Plant in Texas, Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee,  Savannah River Site in South Carolina, and Kansas City Plant in  Missouri; and the Nevada National Security Site.
The U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), part of the Department of  Defense (DOD), has primary responsibility for targeting nuclear weapons,  preparing the U.S. strategic nuclear war plan, and, if ordered by the  President, executing the war plan. The Nuclear Weapons Council,  established by Congress in 1986, is a joint DOD/DOE organization that  facilitates high-level coordination to secure, maintain, and sustain the  nuclear stockpile. Officers Group for each weapon system to provide a technical forum for  weapon development and management activities. Each Project Officers  Group is led by a lead project officer from either the Navy or Air Force;  both the Navy and Air Force (referred to in this report as military service)  maintain and operate nuclear weapons.
Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 3137 (1986).
Weapons are designed and produced to meet DOD’s military  requirements—key operational, nuclear yield, and maintenance  requirements—throughout the Stockpile-to-Target Sequence, which is the  range of physical environments that could be encountered as the weapon  travels from stockpile storage to a potential target. The responsible  national laboratories prepare a major assembly release (MAR) when they  determine that a nuclear weapon is satisfactory for release to the military  service. Among other things, the MAR contains a list of the weapon’s  limitations, which are areas where the weapon may not meet certain  military requirements throughout the Stockpile-to-Target Sequence.  Limitations may specify additional conditions for storing, maintaining, or  operating the weapon.
According to NNSA and DOD officials, identifying limitations is important  to stockpile management because it provides a mechanism for explicitly  knowing where DOD requirements may not be met and suggests  strategies to mitigate risk. Some limitations are unique to a particular  weapon, and other limitations may occur in multiple weapons. NNSA  periodically updates a weapon’s MAR for a variety of reasons, including a  completion of a weapon alteration or a life extension program (referred to  in this report as activities). A weapon alteration is a material change  regarding assembly, maintenance, or storage that does not alter the  weapon’s operational capability. A life extension program, which can take  up to a decade to complete, is a refurbishment intended to extend the  lifetime of a weapon for an additional 20 to 30 years. When NNSA  updates a weapon’s MAR, existing limitations may either remain  unchanged or be deleted, and new limitations may be added.
Since 1992, the United States has observed a moratorium on  underground testing of nuclear weapons. In 1995, the President  established an annual stockpile assessment and reporting requirement to  help ensure that the nation’s nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable  without underground nuclear testing. Subsequently, Congress enacted  the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, which  requires that the directors of the national laboratories and the  Commander of STRATCOM each complete an annual nuclear weapons  stockpile assessment report. These reports cover, among other things,  issues of particular concern about the nuclear stockpile as a whole, as  well as issues of concern for individual weapons.
Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 3138 (1993). defense committees on its plans to address the 2009 JASON  recommendation.
Recognizing the need for a revised surveillance program in the post Cold  War era, NNSA has conducted management reviews of the surveillance  program in 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010. The latest management review,  issued in draft in October 2010 and not yet made final, found that NNSA did  not implement the majority of prior recommendations to revise the program  because NNSA (1) does not have a well-defined, documented process for  executing the surveillance program; (2) changed leadership of the  surveillance program at critical points in the implementation of early  recommendations; and (3) did not develop a metric to ensure full  implementation of any recommendation, which resulted in a continuing  emphasis on reassessing the program. The draft 2010 review observed  that many prior recommendations were still applicable today and provided  additional recommendations, such as establishing strong federal  leadership, implementing formal processes to guide program planning and  execution, and establishing communication and information pathways.
In this context, you asked us to review nuclear weapon limitations and the  state of the surveillance program. Specifically, we examined the (1)  number and types of identified weapon limitations and any concerns  raised by DOD officials (Navy, Air Force, and STRATCOM); and (2)  actions NNSA has taken to implement its prior recommendations for the  nuclear stockpile surveillance program.
subsections: section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the number and type of nuclear weapon limitations, we  reviewed each weapon’s current MAR and associated NNSA guidance. We  then interviewed officials from NNSA and the national laboratories to obtain  clarification on technically complicated limitations. NNSA and DOD do not  group limitations into types or categories. However, in order to report  unclassified weapon limitation information in this report, we developed  categories for types of limitations based on the MAR information. Using  content analysis methodology, two analysts independently assessed each  limitation and coded it as a certain type of limitation. To determine DOD  officials’ concerns with the limitations’ impact for nuclear weapon  operations, maintenance, and war planning, we interviewed officials in the  Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters,  Navy and Air Force lead project officers from each weapon’s Project Officer  Group and interviewed and received briefings from officials in  STRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component Command For Global Strike,  the entity responsible for preparing and maintaining the nation’s nuclear  war plan. In addition, we reviewed and analyzed the last five annual  assessment reports (fiscal years 2006 to 2010) to determine what  limitations the STRATCOM Commander reported. We also interviewed the  current chairman of a technical advisory group who is responsible for  completing the majority of the STRATCOM Commander’s annual  assessment report and reviewed prior GAO work on the annual  assessment process. To determine what, if any, mitigation actions DOD  and NNSA currently engage in or plan to complete to address nuclear  weapon limitations, we reviewed NNSA guidance and interviewed NNSA,  national laboratory, and DOD officials. To determine how NNSA manages  and reports on nuclear weapon limitations, we reviewed (1) established  procedures governing the MAR development and revision process, (2)  NNSA guidance on nuclear weapon limitations, and (3) documents  associated with an ongoing joint DOD/NNSA review of nuclear weapon  military requirements. We compared the documents with the Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government. To determine if certain  nuclear weapon limitations were potentially no longer applicable, we  compared limitations with the most current information related to corrective  actions as well as the current applicability of military requirements, as  reported by NNSA guidance on limitations and officials from NNSA, the  national laboratories, and DOD.
To determine the extent to which NNSA has taken actions to address its  recommendations on its surveillance program, we reviewed NNSA’s draft  October 2010 management review and analyzed key NNSA  documentation related to implementation efforts. This documentation  includes a draft version of NNSA’s surveillance program manual; charters  establishing the roles and responsibilities for entities responsible for  managing the program; draft project management tools; and newly  established procedures for establishing, executing, and tracking  surveillance testing requirements. In addition, we interviewed key NNSA  personnel, including the acting senior technical advisor for surveillance,  about NNSA’s planned efforts to address its recommendations. We also  compared NNSA’s actions against the federal standards for addressing  recommendations from management reviews contained in the Standards  for Internal Control in the Federal Government and Office of Management  and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-123, Management’s Responsibility for  Internal Control. To determine the national laboratories’ role in the  surveillance program, we conducted site visits, toured select facilities  used to conduct surveillance tests, interviewed officials, and received  briefings from officials at LLNL and SNL.information in writing from LANL.
We conducted our work from October 2010 to February 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Background
paragraphs: NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs is responsible for the manufacture,  maintenance, refurbishment, surveillance, and dismantlement of nuclear  weapons. Most modern nuclear weapons consist of three sets of  components—a primary, a secondary, and a set of nonnuclear  components enclosed in a case. When detonated, the primary and  secondary components, which together are referred to as the weapon’s  “nuclear explosive package,” produce the weapon’s explosive force, or  “yield.” LANL, located in Los Alamos, New Mexico, and LLNL, located in  Livermore, California, have design responsibility for the nuclear explosive  package. SNL, located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore,  California, has design responsibility for nonnuclear components. Some  nonnuclear components—collectively called “limited-life components”— have shorter service lives than the weapon itself and, therefore, must be  periodically replaced. The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile consists of  eight weapons systems. Table 1 shows the weapon systems in the U.S.  nuclear stockpile, their dates of entry into the stockpile, and the  laboratories and military services responsible for each system.
In February 2007, we reported on the process that DOD and DOE have  established for fulfilling the annual assessment of the safety, performance,  and reliability of the nation’s nuclear stockpile.STRATCOM Commander’s annual assessment of the nuclear stockpile is  based primarily on the advice of a technical advisory group and provides an  operational perspective; (2) the technical advisory group holds an annual  conference where each entity involved in managing the stockpile—national  laboratories, Project Officer Groups, NNSA, and DOD—present briefings to  provide a complete perspective on the various issues affecting the stockpile;  and (3) the laboratory director’s annual assessment is derived primarily from  ongoing activities associated with NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program,  such as the results of weapon system and component level tests conducted   We found that (1) the  by NNSA’s stockpile surveillance program as well as data that provides an  assessment of a weapon’s current reliability.
NNSA’s stockpile surveillance program comprises the Core Surveillance  Program and the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign, which are funded  separately. Under the Core Surveillance Program, the national  laboratories and production plants evaluate weapons and weapon  components for the attributes of function, condition, material properties,  and chemical composition through the following:
System-Level Laboratory Testing. For such tests, units from each  stockpiled weapon are chosen annually, either randomly or  specifically, and sent to the Pantex Plant for disassembly, inspection,  reconfiguration, and testing by the national laboratories.
System-Level Flight Testing. These tests drop or launch a weapon  with its nuclear material removed. NNSA coordinates flight testing with  DOD, which is responsible for providing the military assets (e.g.,  aircraft and missiles) needed to drop or launch a weapon.
Component and Material Testing. These tests are conducted on  nuclear and nonnuclear components and materials by both the national  laboratories and the production plants that manufactured them.
NNSA defines campaigns as technically challenging, multiyear, multifunctional efforts to  develop and maintain the critical capabilities needed to continue assessing the safety and  reliability of the nuclear stockpile without underground testing. tomography (CT) image analysis tool for a particular nuclear component,  which NNSA officials said they believe will enhance its ability to identify  potential defects or anomalies. NNSA plans to conduct approximately 30  of these CT component tests in fiscal year 2012 under Core Surveillance,  according to planning documents. Figure 1 shows the interrelationships  among the segments of NNSA’s Stockpile Surveillance Program.
section_title: Action Being Taken to Address Limitations of U.S. Nuclear Weapons
paragraphs: For all U.S. nuclear weapons in the current nuclear stockpile, NNSA  identified 52 weapon limitations, and of these, the majority fall into six  types. DOD officials told us that a few limitations are a concern due to the  potential impact on DOD weapon operation, maintenance, and war  planning, but these officials also said that current and planned mitigation  actions generally address their concerns with weapon limitations. We  found that NNSA guidance to DOD on some limitations contains  incomplete information, and DOD officials told us that the way NNSA  communicates the potential impact of limitations on nuclear weapon  operation, maintenance, and war planning is sometimes unclear.  Furthermore, the national laboratories identified four existing weapon  limitations (8 percent of all limitations) that are no longer valid—because,  among other things, corrective action to address the limitation is  complete—while some limitations will remain in effect until DOD changes  potentially outdated military requirements.
subsections: section_title: Types of Limitations, DOD Concerns, and Mitigation Actions
paragraphs: We characterized the 52 limitations that NNSA identified for all U.S. nuclear  weapons into 10 types of limitations based on our analysis of each  weapon’s MAR and associated guidance documents as well as through  interviews with officials from NNSA, the national laboratories, and DOD.  Eighty-six percent of these limitations fall into 6 types: detonation safety  under abnormal conditions, weapon reliability, weapon delivery, more  frequent replacement of limited life components, nuclear yield, and worker  safety. According to DOD officials, a large majority of these weapon  limitations do not impact DOD nuclear weapon operation, maintenance,  and war planning activities. However, some DOD officials expressed  concerns to us over the impact of a few weapon limitations, such as  increased maintenance costs or additional issues to consider when  developing war plans. For most limitations about which they raised  concerns, DOD officials told us that current DOD mitigation actions, as well  as the successful completion of ongoing and planned NNSA efforts, should  address these concerns. DOD officials stated that the current stockpile  allows sufficient flexibility to mitigate limitations. However, they told us there  may be less flexibility in the future as the stockpile continues to age and  decreases in size. Moreover, officials at one national laboratory told us that  a smaller stockpile may not be able to support required mitigation actions if  additional limitations, especially those that result in large decreases to  weapon reliability, are identified in the future. The 2010 Nuclear Posture  Review states that the United States is currently considering future  stockpile reductions that would be based on a variety of factors, including  the continuing implementation of NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship  Program.nuclear weapon limitations and the percentage of those limitations by type.
section_title: NNSA Has Not Developed a Corrective Action Plan to Improve the Nuclear Stockpile Surveillance Program
paragraphs: NNSA has begun to implement some of the recommendations from its  draft October 2010 management review of the nuclear stockpile  surveillance program, but NNSA has not developed a formal corrective  action plan to guide its multiple actions. The draft October 2010 review,  conducted jointly by NNSA and the three national laboratories, makes  multiple recommendations to NNSA to address a number of weaknesses  in the surveillance program, such as the lack of federal leadership in  program management and the absence of formal, documented processes  for surveillance planning and management. Actions NNSA has taken to  implement the recommendations include the following:
The creation of a Senior Technical Advisor for Surveillance (senior  advisor) position. This position was created in response to the  review’s recommendation to establish strong NNSA leadership for the  surveillance program. According to the official position description, the  senior advisor is to serve as the agency’s lead official for surveillance  execution and integration and is responsible for providing direction  and oversight to major surveillance modernization efforts. The senior  advisor reports directly to the senior NNSA official responsible for  overseeing stockpile activities related to research, development,  design, and production. NNSA designated an acting senior advisor  in October 2010 and hired a permanent senior advisor in July 2011.  According to NNSA officials, the senior advisor has brought  leadership to the surveillance program. For example, when a dispute  between national laboratory and production plant officials on the  appropriate safety standards for handling a toxic chemical caused a  backlog of a key component test, the acting senior advisor was able to  mediate this dispute, and the component testing was resumed.
Establishment of a formal requirements-setting process. NNSA  formalized the process for having the national laboratories submit  surveillance testing requirements and having NNSA’s production  plants evaluate the requirements. The process is being applied to  surveillance testing requirements for fiscal years 2012 through 2017.  Specifically, the national laboratories determine surveillance testing  requirements; production plants review these requirements for  technical feasibility and resource availability; and a new committee  adjudicates unresolved conflicts in priorities. Previously, NNSA had  set surveillance testing requirements informally and on an annual  basis. National laboratories and production plant officials said that  informal planning created problems in executing surveillance tests  because, among other reasons, they did not have sufficient time to  schedule tests around other stockpile work—such as life extension  programs—that used the same personnel and equipment.
A new surveillance governance structure. This structure is intended to  promote integrated planning and prioritization as recommended by the  management review. Elements of the new structure include the  Surveillance Integrated Requirements Working Group (requirements  group) and the Surveillance Enterprise Steering Committee (steering  committee). Established in July 2011, the requirements group  resolves mismatches between surveillance testing requirements and  financial, human, and material resources. Specifically, this group  examines surveillance testing requirements and assesses the impact  of uncompleted tests. Established in May 2011, the steering  committee is the highest-level organization in NNSA solely  responsible for surveillance; the steering committee approves  surveillance testing requirements and will resolve disputes between  the national laboratories and the production plants that are not  resolved by the requirements group.
Management of the requirements process through a centralized  database called the Quality Evaluation Requirements Tracking  System. In line with the review’s recommendation regarding critical  communication and information pathways, NNSA will require each  entity in the Core Surveillance process to use this system to input,  access, or manage surveillance data. For example, within this system,  the laboratories will issue surveillance testing requirements, and the  plants will track progress and document completion of tests. NNSA  will use the data in this system as a basis for the formal performance  measures the agency uses to hold the national laboratories and  production plants accountable for the execution of surveillance  activities.
Codification of surveillance governance and processes. Codification  supports the review’s recommendation to implement a disciplined and  integrated management process, with clear roles and responsibilities.  NNSA is codifying surveillance governance and processes in section  5 of the Requirements Management Integration (RMI) manual.  When completed, this manual will include the charters for key entities  in the newly established surveillance governance structure and clear  delineation of roles and responsibilities, according to NNSA officials.  The manual will also include at least 12 guidance documents to serve  as project management tools. For example, one such document  codifies the process for investigating anomalies identified through  surveillance activities; another addresses the process for adjusting  surveillance schedules or plans. The guidance documents are all  currently in draft, with completion expected by the end of September  2012, according to NNSA surveillance program planning documents.  The 2010 management review cited the critical need for clear roles  and responsibilities for all individuals and committees throughout the  surveillance enterprise; it found that the number of committees with  undefined or poorly defined roles and responsibilities, combined with  inadequate documentation, clearly contributed to NNSA’s past  difficulties in modernizing the surveillance program.
Better Integration of Core and Enhanced Surveillance. As of August  2011, NNSA charged the managers of the Core Surveillance Program  and the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign with defining integration  points between them. NNSA also began developing an RMI guidance  document detailing how the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign should  develop new diagnostic tools. The 2010 review found that NNSA lacked  a clearly defined interface between the Core Surveillance Program and  Enhanced Surveillance Campaign and that the lack of a documented  process for promoting integration, among other things, has resulted in  the underutilization of Enhanced Surveillance Campaign capabilities in  the Core Surveillance Program’s testing activities. In June 2011, the  acting senior advisor told us that integration between Core and  Enhanced Surveillance is central to the surveillance program’s future  and that increased integration presents a management challenge. Two  of the surveillance program’s objectives are to detect precursors of  aging weapon components sufficiently early for corrective action in  existing weapons and to ensure any defects are not repeated in life  extension programs. According to NNSA officials, these objectives  depend on the continued development of Enhanced Surveillance  Campaign technologies that are then used to improve the number and  scope of the Core Surveillance Program’s component and material  tests.
National laboratory and DOD officials we spoke with generally viewed  NNSA’s current and planned actions to improve the surveillance program  as positive developments. However, these actions are not guided by a  formal corrective action plan. According to an OMB circular that defines  management’s responsibility for internal control in federal agencies,  federal managers are to develop a corrective action plan to address  weaknesses found in program operations, as identified through  management reviews, inspector general and GAO reports, program  evaluations, and financial statement audits. Corrective action plans are  to include specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and metrics to  measure progress to resolve the findings of audits and reviews. The  circular also states that agencies should periodically assess and report on  the progress of those plans. Furthermore, under the Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government, federal managers are to take  steps to ensure that the findings of audits and other reviews are promptly  resolved by completing, within established time frames, all actions that  correct or otherwise resolve the matters brought to management’s  attention. A corrective action plan would provide a framework for such  time frames, as well as a mechanism for holding management  accountable for meeting the time frames. According to the acting senior  advisor, NNSA did not address many of the findings and  recommendations in its three previous surveillance program management  reviews primarily because the agency did not have a specific approach  for implementation. This statement echoes the 2010 draft management  review finding that the prior reviews’ recommendations were not  implemented because, among other reasons, NNSA did not have a well- defined, documented process for executing the surveillance program. In  May 2011, more than 6 months after NNSA issued its draft October 2010  management review, the acting senior advisor directed the steering  committee to establish a working group to develop a plan to implement  the review’s recommendations, but both the scope and time frame of this  plan remain uncertain. In the interim, NNSA officials have requested  reports on individual actions taken to implement the review’s  recommendations but not on the agencywide effort to implement these  recommendations. Without such a plan, it is unclear how NNSA will (1)  ensure that the draft review’s recommendations are fully implemented  and (2) demonstrate to key stakeholders, such as Congress and DOD,  that NNSA is committed to improving the surveillance program.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: It is critical that U.S. nuclear capability continues to reassure our allies  and deter potential adversaries. With most weapons currently in the  stockpile having been produced over 20 years ago and being sustained  beyond their original design lifetimes, it is a testament to NNSA, the  national laboratories, and the production plants that DOD officials were  confident that nuclear weapon limitations do not currently reduce the  effectiveness of the nation’s strategic deterrent. However, several factors  raise concerns with the limitations and NNSA’s management of them.  First, some limitations require mitigation actions, which can impose  logistical burdens, increased security risks, and war planning restrictions  on the Air Force, Navy, and STRATCOM. DOD officials said they would  have less flexibility in mitigating limitations in the future should the  stockpile’s size be reduced as future arms control agreements are  pursued. Second, NNSA guidance on limitations does not always clearly  communicate to DOD the potential impacts that limitations have on  nuclear weapon operations, maintenance, and war planning and does not  include all identified limitations; it is uncertain if the risks associated with  limitations are comprehensively identified and analyzed. Third, NNSA’s  current list of nuclear weapon limitations may not reflect the most up-to- date information, and the joint DOD and NNSA military requirements  review may not contain enough specificity to ensure a relevant and  reliable count of limitations.
The stockpile surveillance program provides critical data that informs  stockpile decisions. A smaller, aging stockpile calls for increasingly  complex and time-sensitive data. NNSA’s multiple actions taken in  response to recommendations in its draft 2010 surveillance program  management review demonstrate the agency’s commitment to improving  the program. NNSA is planning to fully address the findings and  implement the recommendations contained in its draft review. However, it  is unclear how or if NNSA will do so because the agency has not  developed a comprehensive corrective action plan in accordance with  OMB Circular No. A-123 that details actions that agency personnel must  take to implement the recommendations with specific dates, assigned  responsibilities, and metrics to measure progress of this implementation.  Completion of such a plan would provide the agency with a reasonable  basis for ensuring that recommendations are fully implemented. Without  such a plan, NNSA is in danger of not implementing many of the draft  review’s recommendations, as it failed to do in its three previous  surveillance program management reviews. For example, previous delays  in integrating Core and Enhanced Surveillance have been attributed, in  part, to a lack of a documented process. Furthermore, the successful  development and completion of a comprehensive corrective action plan  would demonstrate to key congressional and DOD stakeholders NNSA’s  commitment to improving the surveillance program. Without such a plan,  it is unclear how NNSA will provide itself and key stakeholders with these  assurances.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the processes used to test and report on the nation’s nuclear  weapons stockpile, we are making four recommendations to the  Secretaries of Defense and of Energy and the Administrator of the  National Nuclear Security Administration, as appropriate:
To improve the clarity of information NNSA provides to DOD about  nuclear weapon limitations, we recommend that the Secretary of  Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security  Administration, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, (1)  expand the guidance provided by NNSA to DOD so that it includes  each existing limitation and (2) assess, and revise as appropriate, the  guidance provided by NNSA to DOD to ensure it clearly describes the  potential impacts that each limitation may have on nuclear weapon  operations, maintenance, and war planning.
To improve the reliability and relevance of information associated with  limitations, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the  Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, in  coordination with the Secretary of Defense, determine if the findings  of the joint DOD and NNSA military requirements review can be used  to eliminate certain limitations.    To increase confidence in NNSA’s ability to fully address all findings  and recommendations from its draft surveillance management review,  we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of  the National Nuclear Security Administration prepare and complete a  comprehensive corrective action plan in accordance with OMB  Circular No. A-123. This plan should identify the detailed actions that  agency personnel must take to fully implement the recommendations  in the review and include specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and  metrics to measure progress of this implementation. This corrective  action plan should also address how to better integrate Core and  Enhanced Surveillance.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided NNSA and DOD with a draft of this report for their review  and comment. In its written comments, NNSA said that GAO did a  commendable job in reviewing a highly complex and technical area.  NNSA agreed with two of the four recommendations and “agreed in  principle” with the other two recommendations. NNSA also outlined the  actions that it plans to take to address all four of the report’s  recommendations. The complete text of NNSA’s comments is presented  in appendix I. NNSA also provided technical clarifications, which we  incorporated into the report as appropriate.
For two of the recommendations, NNSA stated that the Assistant Deputy  Administrator for Stockpile Management will oversee the development  and execution of a corrective action plan for the nuclear stockpile  surveillance program and ensure that the findings of the joint DOD and  NNSA military requirements review be appropriately implemented. NNSA  agreed in principle with the other two recommendations aimed at  clarifying the information NNSA provides to DOD on nuclear weapon  limitations. NNSA stated that it agrees with the desired outcome of these  two recommendations, but NNSA concluded that a key procedural  weakness in the process used to report on weapon limitations is the  absence of a document that formally communicates DOD’s position on  limitations. NNSA said that it will ask the Nuclear Weapons Council to  require that military service lead project officers provide NNSA with a  consolidated DOD response each time a MAR is issued, and that this  response could include any concerns with nuclear weapon limitations. We  agree with NNSA that the management of nuclear weapon limitations  requires active participation from both NNSA and DOD through the  Nuclear Weapons Council. If NNSA and DOD follow through with these  planned actions, we believe that the agencies will be responsive to our  recommendations.
In its written comments, DOD agreed with all four of the report’s  recommendations and said that the process by which nuclear weapon  limitations are managed needs to be addressed. DOD said that it will  coordinate with NNSA, through the Nuclear Weapons Council, to  implement our recommendations. The complete text of DOD’s comments  is presented in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of NNSA, the appropriate  congressional committees, and other interested parties. The report also is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report  are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Jonathan Gill, Assistant Director;  Patrick Bernard; and Alisa Beyninson made key contributions to this  report. Colin Chambers, Penney Harwell-Caramia, Jon Kucskar, Michelle  Munn, Kevin O’Neil, Tim Persons, Rebecca Shea, Carol Shulman, and  Kiki Theodoropoulos provided technical assistance.