Embassy Construction: Better Long-term Planning Will Enhance Program Decision-making
Published: 2001-01-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The State Department has determined that about 80 percent of overseas U.S. diplomatic facilities lack adequate security and may be vulnerable to terrorist attack. In September 1998, State expanded its capital construction program to accelerate replacing its most vulnerable embassies and consulates by acquiring sites and preparing plans at 10 priority locations. This report summarizes (1) the status of the 10 priority embassy and consulate construction projects and (2) State's plans for the overall construction program.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As of November 2000, seven projects are in the construction phase. The remaining three projects are on hold pending agreement between State and Congress about the Department's construction proposals. Although State envisions a long-term, multi-billion dollar program and has ranked more than 180 facilities it may need to replace, it has not prepared a long-term capital construction plan that identifies (1) proposed construction project's cost estimates and schedules and (2) estimated annual funding requirements for the overall program.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The State Department has determined that about 80 percent of overseas  U.S. diplomatic facilities do not have adequate security and may be  vulnerable to terrorist attack. In August 1998, after the U.S. embassies in  Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were bombed by terrorists,  the State Department began a program to replace its vulnerable facilities on  an accelerated basis with new, secure embassies and consulates. State  selected 10 projects that it believed should be built first. State envisions a  10- to 15-year program costing $15 billion or more for construction projects  in more than 180 locations around the world where the existing facilities  may be vulnerable. Planning and implementing this program will be a  massive and difficult undertaking, requiring that State, other U.S. agencies,  and the Congress work together to determine facility needs, priorities, and  funding levels. The Congress has appropriated a total of about $1.1 billion  for this program for fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001.
In response to your concerns regarding the planning and execution of this  multibillion dollar program, we (1) determined the status of the 10 priority  embassy and consulate construction projects and (2) assessed State’s plans  for the overall construction program. As you requested, we also identified  the steps State is considering to improve the management of its Office of  Foreign Buildings Operations, which is responsible for managing the  embassy construction program, as well as State’s efforts to increase the  efficiency of its embassy construction processes. This information is  contained in appendix IV.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The State Department has security standards for U.S. diplomatic facilities  to protect employees and property. A key legal requirement is that new  embassy and consulate buildings have a setback of 100 feet from the  exterior wall of the building to the perimeter wall or fence to provide  protection against blast and for other reasons. To provide adequate  security, State has determined that it needs to replace most existing  facilities that do not meet these standards. Although the Department of  State has made substantial security enhancements at U.S. embassies and  consulates, including acquiring adjacent properties to increase setback,  building concrete barriers, and installing electronic cameras and sensors,  these enhancements cannot bring most existing facilities in line with the  desired setback and related blast protection requirements because the  facilities are on small pieces of land. Larger building sites, which are  expensive and frequently hard to acquire in urban areas, are typically  needed to construct new facilities with sufficient setback to protect against  attacks.
After the Africa bombings, the administration established two  Accountability Review Boards, pursuant to the Omnibus Diplomatic  Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 (P. L. 99-399, 22 U.S.C. 4831, et seq.,  as amended), to review the circumstances surrounding the bombings and  State’s vulnerability to terrorist threats. In January 1999, the boards made  recommendations on responding to terrorist threats, strengthening  security standards and procedures, determining the size and composition  of U.S. missions, and providing funding for safe buildings and security  programs in the future. The boards recommended that State receive $1 billion annually over a 10-year period to construct new, secure facilities.
The State Department’s Office of Foreign Buildings Operations is  responsible for managing construction of embassies and consulates as well  as performing construction-related security upgrades and maintaining  overseas properties valued at over $12 billion. Throughout the 1990s, this  Office typically received about $400 million yearly to carry out its routine,  real property functions. In this time period, the Office also managed the  completion of the construction of more than 20 new embassy and  consulate facilities, most of which were authorized and funded under the  Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 (commonly  called the “Inman Program”).
In fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, State received a total of about $1.1 billion to build new, secure embassies and consulates. State had also  requested an advance appropriation of $3.35 billion for fiscal years 2002- 2005 to ensure a steady stream of funding for an expanded construction  program, but this was not approved by the Congress. The Conference  Committee Reports on State’s appropriations for embassy construction  have directed State to submit a plan on how it plans to use the money. The  reports also direct State to receive approval of the appropriations  committees before an obligation or expenditure of funds for capital and  rehabilitation projects. If issues arise with a particular proposal or project,  State pursues a number of options with the Committees, including making  adjustments to the planned project and/or reprogramming of appropriated  funds for other projects. Appendix I provides greater detail on State’s  budget requests and related Committee actions.
section_title: Status of Initial Projects
paragraphs: Following the 1998 embassy bombings, State placed a priority on 10  projects. These projects were for five posts in Africa—Kampala, Uganda;  Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Nairobi, Kenya; Tunis, Tunisia; and Luanda,  Angola—and five posts in other regions—Doha, Qatar; Istanbul, Turkey;  São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Zagreb, Croatia. Seven of the 10  projects are moving forward, and 3 are on hold. State also began to identify  sites and perform preliminary planning for projects at more than 30 other  posts. (See app. I.)
Table 1 shows scheduled occupancy dates, planned number of personnel at  the post, and estimated cost for State’s first 10 priority projects, as of  November 2000. Appendix II provides a detailed description of the status of  the 10 priority projects.
The estimated costs for these projects ranged between $22 million and  about $100 million. According to State, these costs are much higher than  for a typical commercial office building of similar size in the United States  due to several factors, including basic structural requirements, the unique  access control and security requirements, and the difficulties associated  with construction in developing countries. Appendix III provides more  information about some of the factors contributing to the costs for  constructing diplomatic facilities.
subsections: section_title: Seven Projects Moving Ahead
paragraphs: Seven of the 10 priority projects are progressing and are in the construction  phase. The first project scheduled for completion is in Kampala. State  signed a design/build contract for this project with a major U.S. contractor  in September 1999 and move-in is scheduled for January 2001. Because of  security concerns at the post, the Kampala project was “fast-tracked” on  the most compressed schedule ever attempted by State. Construction is  scheduled to be completed in about 15 months, which is about half the time  normally required for the construction phase of a project of similar size.  Figure 1 illustrates the status of construction.
The second project scheduled for completion is in Doha, Qatar. State has  leased an unfinished building in Doha to replace its current embassy.  Construction by a local firm began in August 1999 to retrofit the building to  meet embassy requirements, and the move-in is scheduled for April 2001.
In Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the contractor is preparing the site for  construction (site mobilization). In September 1999, State hired a major  U.S. construction firm to design and build these embassies. Construction  contracts have been signed for the projects in Zagreb, Tunis, and Istanbul.
section_title: Three Projects Are on Hold
paragraphs: As of November 2000, State’s site acquisition/design proposal for a new  consulate in Rio de Janeiro, its design proposal for a new consulate in  São Paulo, and its construction proposal for a new embassy in Luanda,  were on hold.
According to State officials, State’s site acquisition proposal for Rio de  Janeiro encountered congressional concerns that State had not adequately  considered options for reducing post size by (1) combining some post  functions in regional operations and (2) right-sizing consular operations in  Brazil, which include major operations in both Rio de Janeiro and  São Paulo. In addition to the existing embassy in Brasilia, Brazil, State  proposed to spend about $200 million to build two new consulates—one in  Rio de Janeiro to accommodate about 145 personnel and one in São Paulo  to accommodate 97 staff. The congressional concerns are consistent with  overseas staffing issues identified in our prior work. For several years, we  have encouraged the executive branch to rethink its overseas presence  with a view to right-sizing posts and conducting regional operations where  feasible. Because the Congress has not approved State’s proposal for the  Rio de Janeiro project, State has notified the Congress of its intent to  reprogram $22.8 million from the fiscal year 1999 supplemental  appropriation for this project to partially fund the project in Abu Dhabi,  United Arab Emirates. In September 2000, State signed a design/build  construction contract for a new embassy in Abu Dhabi.
For the project in São Paulo, site acquisition has been approved but  according to State officials, the Senate Appropriations Committee has not  approved State’s plan to demolish buildings on the site. The Committee  suggested that State attempt to incorporate the existing buildings into its  overall construction design. State does not believe that it would be feasible  to bring the existing buildings up to security standards and plans to discuss  other options with the Committee.
The proposed construction project in Luanda is not moving forward  because of congressional concerns that it does not meet the 100-foot  setback requirement. State proposed building a facility with a 65-foot  setback, which is 35 feet less than required by State’s current security  standards. The Secretary of State granted a waiver from the security  standards based on State’s plan to design the building to meet blast  standards at the lesser distance. According to State, potential blast effects  on the planned facility would be mitigated by strengthened construction  methods and techniques, providing equal security performance to that of a  standard blast-resistant building with a 100-foot setback, thus providing the  same level of protection. State indicated that the alternative sites it had  identified that would meet the setback requirements did not have a secure  title due to uncertainties regarding land ownership in Luanda. According to  State officials, as of November 2000, the Congress had not agreed to  provide security appropriations for the Department’s Luanda project.
section_title: State Has Ranked Future Projects, but Has Not Developed a Long-Term Construction Plan
paragraphs: State envisions a long-term program, but it has not prepared a long-term  capital construction plan for facility replacement that identifies the  estimated cost and construction schedules for planned projects, as well as  projected annual funding requirements for the overall program. According  to State officials, it is difficult to accurately estimate long-term  construction costs and schedules and they cited changing staffing needs  and space requirements as one of the primary reasons. State also indicated  that construction schedules will depend on the level of funding provided by  the Congress. Industry and local government leaders use long-term capital  plans as management and oversight tools even when the plans are based on  preliminary assumptions and estimates. Those estimates and assumptions  are typically revised and refined as information becomes available, further  enhancing the decision-making process.
State has ranked the more than 180 facilities that it proposes to replace  and/or provide with major security enhancements into groups or “bands” of  20 in order from the most vulnerable to the least vulnerable to terrorist  attack. The ranking, which is provided to the Congress annually, is intended  to serve as a guide for which embassies and consulates State would replace  first. In addition to its 10 priority projects, State’s planned uses of funds  appropriated and/or requested for fiscal years 1999-2001 included initial  project planning, site identification, and/or site acquisition stages for  potential construction projects at more than 30 posts. State had also  requested an advance appropriation of $3.35 billion as part of the fiscal  year 2001 budget to continue the replacement program in fiscal years 2002  through 2005. In its budget request, State did not identify specific  projects, or their potential costs and replacement schedules, for the  requested advance appropriation. According to State officials, although the  request did not identify specific projects, costs, and schedules, they had  intended to use the funds to address projects primarily in the first three  bands.
However, State officials said that some of State’s initial site acquisition  proposals at these posts have encountered congressional opposition. For  example, the Senate Appropriations Committee approval was denied in  April and later in September 2000 for the acquisition of proposed sites in  Antananarivo, Madagascar; Bamako, Mali; Bujumbura, Burundi; Karachi,  Pakistan; and Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to State officials,  issues that have led to difficulties in obtaining Committee approval  included questions about the location of proposed sites and the priority of  projects. State indicated that it is working to resolve these issues and that it  hopes to receive congressional support so it can move forward on  proposals and will remain able to acquire its preferred sites in the future.
State’s planning for the program focuses on its ranking of banded projects  along with a more detailed budget submission for the upcoming fiscal year.  State does not clearly indicate the order that projects will be done; identify  estimated costs for critical project elements, such as site acquisition and  construction; or indicate project completion schedules beyond the  upcoming fiscal year.
State officials questioned the value of preparing and presenting a longer- term, more detailed plan at this time largely because of uncertainties  involving future funding and the limited availability of acceptable sites.  They also cited uncertainties about estimating project costs early in the  program cycle; the difficulties sometimes encountered with other “tenant”  agencies in planning their personnel and space requirements in new  embassies; and the risks associated with working in overseas  environments. While we agree such factors affect programs, their existence  dictates the need for sound planning to ensure program objectives are met  in the most effective and efficient manner. The advantages of long-term  planning have been endorsed by industry and local government leaders as  an effective management tool for controlling costs and making more  effective decisions.
subsections: section_title: Industry and Local Government Leaders Prepare Long-Term Capital Plans
paragraphs: In our December 1998 Executive Guide on Capital Decision-Making, we  reported that leading private sector and local state organizations not only  rank their future capital projects based on applicable criteria, but they also  prepare long-term capital plans based on preliminary assumptions and  estimates to identify specific planned projects, plan for resource use over  the long term, and establish priorities for implementation. These plans  usually cover 5-, 6-, or 10-year periods and are updated either annually or  biennially. Industry and state government leaders have also found that long-term plans help control capital costs. Developing long-term capital  plans also enables these organizations to review and refine a proposed  project’s scope and cost estimates over several years, which helps reduce  cost overruns.
For example, one medium-sized state government we have studied  prepares a 5-year capital plan that assists the government in refining the  scope and cost estimate of individual project requests. An annual review of  capital project proposals in the plan allows the state budget office to  determine if a project continues to meet the goals and objectives outlined  by the agencies. State governmental officials believe that this up-front  planning and continuous reviews are key factors in why the state has  limited cost overruns and few surprises once project funding is approved.
While the cost estimates contained in long-term capital plans are  preliminary, they provide decisionmakers with an overall sense of a  project’s funding needs. Moreover, the Office of Management of Budget  encourages federal agencies to develop long-term agency capital plans as  part of their capital planning process. Our prior work at the General  Services Administration has shown that long-term strategic planning for  federal courthouse construction is critical to helping congressional  decisionmakers compare and evaluate the merits of project proposals and  priorities and to providing a rationale for providing resources to the highest  priority projects.
Moreover, in a recent prepared statement for the Congress, Admiral  Crowe, Chairman of the Accountability Review Boards set up to investigate  the embassy bombings in Africa, supported the formulation of a long-term  capital plan for embassy construction in view of the threats staff face at  overseas embassies and consulates.
section_title: Studies Undertaken for Planning and Managing Construction Program
paragraphs: While State has expressed a reluctance to prepare a long-term plan for  embassy and consulate replacements, it is conducting a series of studies  that could provide valuable inputs into the preparation of a long-term plan  that would strengthen the overall management process. These studies  represent a significant part of State’s efforts to determine future resource  and funding needs of the program. In May 2000, the Office of Foreign  Buildings Operations initiated several studies. One study is underway to  identify alternative construction schedules for the life of the program based  on preliminary cost and funding assumptions. Preliminary results of the  study have been submitted to Office management, but completion dates for  the study have not been set.
A second study is assessing potential industry bottlenecks that could affect  construction. Potential problems to be addressed include availability of  appropriately cleared U.S. labor; construction materials; and unique  security materials, such as glazing for windows and forced entry- and  ballistic-resistant doors. The Office of Foreign Buildings Operations  expects that the study will be completed in fiscal year 2001.
A third study is determining what additional staffing and contractor  resources may be necessary to implement and manage the program. The  Office of Foreign Buildings Operations has had a staffing increase since  the Africa bombings, but its officials indicated that additional staffing or  contracting resources to manage the construction program may be  required. Although no date has been set for completion of this study, the  Office expects that preliminary results will be available in the third quarter  of fiscal year 2001.
The State Department is also studying the size and deployment of the U.S.  overseas presence, which are key factors affecting construction  requirements and costs at overseas posts. The January 1999 report of the  Accountability Review Boards concluded that as the United States works  to upgrade the physical security of U.S. missions, it should also consider  reducing the costs and number of embassies through the use of modern  technology and regional operations. To begin implementing this  recommendation, a State-appointed panel reviewed the overseas  operations of the U.S. government and concluded that the U.S. presence  has not adequately adjusted to the new economic, political, and  technological landscape. In November 1999, the panel recommended that  the President establish an interagency committee to determine the right  size and composition of overseas posts.
In March 2000, State announced that a committee had been formed to look  at how to implement right-sizing and to conduct pilot programs at selected  posts. According to State officials, the Department has prepared a draft  report on the results of the pilot programs that may help the Department  determine the size of and other requirements for new embassies and  consulates.
Results of the studies by the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations, as well  as efforts to right-size embassies and consulates, could provide valuable  inputs to preparation of a long-term capital plan. Although not all the  studies and efforts have been completed, the studies’ preliminary results  could be used by State to develop an initial capital plan, with modifications  after additional study results become available.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: State’s large-scale embassy and consulate construction effort is underway,  and State is making progress on most of its initial priority projects.  Sustained funding will be needed for State to make substantial progress in  replacing its vulnerable embassies and consulates, and State must work  effectively with the Congress in charting the future course, priorities, and  funding levels for the program. State has asked for advance appropriations  through fiscal year 2005 for the program but has not developed a detailed  capital construction plan detailing how these funds would be used that  would provide a sound foundation for moving this important and costly  program forward.
Long-term capital plans have been used by leading organizations to  effectively establish project priorities, plan for resource use, control costs,  and provide decisionmakers a rationale for allocating funding. A long-term  capital construction plan will strengthen State’s ability to support and  sustain its funding needs, encourage dialogue with congressional  committees, and promote consensus by decisionmakers in the executive  and legislative branches on funding levels and expectations for program  progress. A long-term plan would also improve accountability and  transparency (openness) over State and congressional decision-making for  a program that is likely to be in the forefront of the U.S. government’s  foreign affairs agenda for many years.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance management and decision-making regarding the replacement  of embassies and consulates that are vulnerable to terrorist attack, we  recommend that the Secretary of State prepare and present to the Congress  a long-term capital construction plan that identifies proposed construction  projects and their estimated costs and when the Department plans to start  and complete site acquisition, design, and construction. This plan should  cover at least 5 years and be updated annually. It should be modified  periodically as funding decisions are made and cost estimates and building  schedules are revised, as well as to adjust to key management factors that  could potentially influence program implementation, such as program  staffing and private industry supply capacity and other significant factors  that may affect construction requirements and priorities, including future  decisions concerning right-sizing of overseas posts. Recognizing that  precise estimates cannot be easily made in the later years, we nevertheless  believe that State’s plan should include notional estimates of the overall  program cost and duration, including estimated annual funding  requirements over the life of the program.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: The State Department indicated that it does not plan to implement our  recommendation to prepare, and does not see the merits of, a long-term  capital plan for its multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to replace  embassies and consulates. In view of the State Department’s position, the  Congress may wish to consider requiring that State prepare such a plan,  consistent with our recommendation, to assist the Congress in considering  State’s requests for program authorizations and appropriations and for  conducting program oversight.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, the State Department disagreed  with the report’s conclusions and recommendation regarding long-term  planning. State indicated that it had already established a long-term capital  plan based on its ranking of facilities into bands of priority. It said that  these priority bands, combined with the information it provides the  Congress on projects to be executed in the current fiscal year and the  semiannual reports on these projects, constituted a sound approach to  program decision-making and accountability. State said that development  of a capital plan along the lines that we recommend would be of no value  because it would be prone to guesswork, would be impractical given  uncertain future funding levels and project costs, and would be resource  intensive. State also emphasized that sustained long-term funding was  needed for its program, and criticized our report for not adequately  addressing this need and the interrelationships between program planning  and funding. State’s comments are reprinted in appendix V. State also  provided technical comments that we incorporated in the report where  appropriate.
Despite the best practices of leading organizations and the need to work  with the Congress to determine funding needs, State’s comments reflect a  view that no change is needed in its approach to planning and  implementing a multibillion-dollar overseas construction program. State  believes it should wait until it knows how much funding it is likely to  receive before preparing a long-term plan consistent with our  recommendation. In contrast, we believe that State should prepare a long-term plan with project cost estimates and schedules for at least a 5-year period, to assist decisionmakers in deciding program scope and  funding. We also believe that the information that State has provided the  Congress is not sufficient to guide judgments regarding long-term program  funding and direction because it does not clearly indicate the order that  projects will be done, their estimated costs, or when the projects will be  completed. Our report noted that leading organizations use long-term  capital plans to define capital asset decisions, promote informed choices  about resource needs, and provide decisionmakers with an overall sense of  projects’ merits and funding needs. Information on the scope and  composition of the overall program envisioned by State would encourage  dialogue with congressional committees regarding funding levels and  program expectations over the life of this long-term program. Without a  long-term capital plan that includes such information, it will be difficult for  State and congressional decisionmakers to accurately judge how much the  program will cost; when it can be reasonably expected to be completed;  and how key factors, such as funding and changes in the size of overseas  posts, may affect program implementation. A long-term capital plan would  also improve the accountability and transparency of decisions made by  State, other agencies, and the Congress that affect this important program.
State’s comments indicate that it has interpreted our recommendation as  requiring the development of detailed plans that accurately predict the  exact space requirements, precise cost, and construction schedule of each  of more than 180 projects over the life of this program. This was not our  intention. Our recommendation was intended to provide decisionmakers  with better information on the potential long-term costs and schedules for  this effort to enable them to weigh the merits of individual projects and  make related funding decisions. We believe it is reasonable for State to  prepare a detailed plan over a 5-year or longer period. As noted in our  report, leading organizations not only rank projects by priority, but they  also provide more detailed cost estimates and other information in plans  covering 5-, 6-, or 10-year periods. State already has the foundation to adopt  this best practice. We share State’s view that precision in planning  estimates becomes less practical and important for the later years of the  overall program. However, we believe that it is reasonable to expect  notional estimates for the program’s later years so that decisionmakers  have better information on the overall cost and duration of the program.  We have modified our recommendation accordingly.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the status of the 10 priority embassy and consulate projects,  we met with project managers in State’s Office of Foreign Buildings  Operations and officials that oversee the work of the Office. In addition to  obtaining overall information on the status of the construction effort, such  as State’s quarterly internal reports on its progress in implementing the  emergency security supplemental program, we obtained detailed  information on the history and status of the 10 priority projects for  replacement identified by the Department shortly after the bombings of the  two embassies in Africa. Those priority posts were Kampala, Uganda;  Doha, Qatar; Tunis, Tunisia; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Nairobi, Kenya;  Istanbul, Turkey; Zagreb, Croatia; São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and  Luanda, Angola.
We also met with a representative of J.A. Jones Construction Co., which is  the contractor responsible for building the new embassy complexes in  Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and Zagreb. Issues discussed included cost and  implementation challenges facing those projects as well as potential  options for reducing the time to construct new embassies.
To assess State’s plans for the overall program, we met with senior State  officials to discuss their vision for the program, their method for  establishing project priorities, and their approach to requesting funding. We  also examined State’s requests for appropriations in fiscal years 1999-2001  and the supporting material. We received briefings on State’s ongoing  studies to identify program requirements, alternatives, and obstacles. We  also identified leading best practices in capital planning decision-making  that could be applied to State’s construction program.
To identify steps State is taking to improve the management of the Office of  Foreign Buildings Operations and the efficiency of its construction  processes, we received briefings from the Office on its initiatives and plans.
We conducted our review from March through November 2000 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of State and interested  congressional committees. We will make copies available to others upon  request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions  about this report. An other GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are  listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Funding for the State Department’s Embassy Security Construction Program
paragraphs: The Department of State has received about $1.1 billion for security  construction since the bombings in Africa. As of September 30, 2000, State  estimates that it had obligated over half of the $604 million it had received  for fiscal years 1999 and 2000. In December 2000, State received its fiscal  year 2001 appropriation of about $515 million for the program. State also  requested $3.35 billion in advanced appropriations to continue the program  through fiscal year 2005, but this request was rejected. This appendix  describes in more detail the funds requested and received, as well as the  planned uses of the funds.
Of the $604 million State received in fiscal years 1999 and 2000 for its  embassy security construction program, State estimates it obligated about  $341 million through the end of fiscal year 2000, mostly for large-scale  construction contracts, as well as to acquire sites and procure design and  other immediate goods and services. Table 2 provides appropriation,  obligation, and expenditure data for State’s embassy and consulate  replacement program.
subsections: section_title: Emergency Supplemental Funding in 1999
paragraphs: Included in State’s 1999 emergency security supplemental funding was  about $119 million to build new embassy compounds in Nairobi, Kenya,  and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. State also allocated $185 million of its  emergency supplemental appropriations to begin replacing facilities at  other posts. Table 3 provides State’s planned uses for most of these funds.  In May 1999, State notified the Congress that it intended to also use part of  the funds to pursue the acquisition of construction sites for embassies and  consulates in 26 other locations.
section_title: Fiscal Year 2000 Funding
paragraphs: State requested and received $300 million in fiscal year 2000 funds for  security construction projects. Specific planned uses of the funds cited by  State in March 2000 included the projects listed in table 4.
State also identified 13 posts for potential site acquisition using fiscal  year 2000 funds. These posts are Asmara, Eritrea; Conakry, Guinea; Dakar,  Senegal; Harare, Zimbabwe; Peshawar, Pakistan; Phnom Penh, Cambodia;  Tbilisi, Georgia; Yerevan, Armenia; Antananarivo, Madagascar; Bamako,  Mali; Bujumbura, Burundi; Karachi, Pakistan; and Sarajevo, Bosnia- Herzegovina.
section_title: Fiscal Year 2001 Funding Request
paragraphs: State requested $500 million for fiscal year 2001 to continue replacing its  highest risk facilities. Projects identified by State as having priority for  construction were Cape Town, South Africa; Damascus, Syria; Rio de  Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil; Sofia, Bulgaria; and Yerevan, Armenia. In  addition to these projects for which site acquisition and/or design was to be  funded in previous years, State planned to use the funds to acquire five to  eight additional sites for which construction funding would be sought in  subsequent years. State’s request for fiscal year 2001 included $50 million  to construct separate, on-compound U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID) facilities in Kampala, Uganda, and Nairobi, Kenya.  State also requested an additional advance appropriation of $3.35 billion to  continue the facility replacement program through fiscal year 2005.  However, it did not indicate the projects it planned to construct with this  advance appropriation or provide estimates of project costs and  construction schedules.
The House Committee on Appropriations recommended full funding of  State’s $500 million request for security construction but did not  recommend approval of the request for an advance appropriation in its  June 19, 2000, report to the full House. The Committee also did not approve  the use of $50 million to construct USAID facilities, explaining that funding  requirements for USAID would first have to be considered by another  Subcommittee with jurisdiction.
In its September 2000 report, the Senate Appropriations Committee also  rejected the request for an advance appropriation and recommended  funding for fiscal year 2001 totaling $271.6 million for replacing embassies  and consulates (planning, site acquisition, design, and construction), which  is about $228 million less than State had requested. The Committee  expressed concerns that State was accumulating large, unfunded  construction requirements. The Committee report recommended that the  Congress limit the number of new construction starts and, where possible,  only fully fund ongoing projects to prevent the unfunded requirements  from growing. Projects recommended for construction funding in the  report were Sofia, Bulgaria ($78.3 million); Yerevan, Armenia ($64 million);  Damascus, Syria ($69.7 million); and Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire ($6.2 million).
The Conference Report on State’s Fiscal Year 2001 appropriations, issued in  October 2000, provided $515 million for the program (H.Rept. 106-1005).  Legislation enacting this provision was passed in December 2000.
section_title: Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority Projects
paragraphs: This appendix provides an overview of the 10 embassy and consulate  projects State gave priority for replacement shortly after the 1998  bombings in Africa. These projects are in Kampala, Uganda; Doha, Qatar;  Tunis, Tunisia; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Nairobi, Kenya; Istanbul, Turkey;  Zagreb, Croatia; São Paulo, Brazil; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Luanda,  Angola. The overview presents a description of the facilities’ status and  history, as well as tables showing construction cost estimates and pictures  of the current and planned facilities, where available.
subsections: section_title: Kampala, Uganda
subsections: section_title: Project History and Status
paragraphs: The existing embassy in Kampala is located on a major street whose  activities cannot be controlled, and it lacks adequate setback on three  sides. Unclassified functions are in an annex, which also is not secure.  State had initiated the design of a new embassy before the August 1998  embassy bombings in Africa. In fact, State had planned to build a new  facility as part of the Diplomatic Security Construction (Inman) program of  the late 1980s/early 1990s. The project did not proceed at that time largely  due to problems in obtaining title to a site. In the aftermath of the 1998  bombings, relocation of the embassy became a high priority. In December  1998, State issued a solicitation seeking qualified firms to bid on the  building project. State prequalified three contractors to bid and in  September 1999 awarded a design/build contract to Washington Group  International, formerly Morrison Knudsen Corporation. (See table 5 for the  project cost estimates, fig. 2 for the existing embassy, and fig. 3 for the  planned new embassy.) The master plan for the new embassy compound  includes a USAID annex, but its construction has not started. Building  costs for the annex are estimated at $19.5 million. Fiscal year 1999 and 2000  funds are being used for the design and preconstruction site improvements  of the USAID facility. Fiscal year 2001 State funds will be used for the  construction of the new USAID facility, assuming congressional approval.
section_title: Doha, Qatar
subsections: section_title: Project History and Status
paragraphs: Plans to build a new embassy in Doha began with State’s diplomatic  security construction program that started in the late 1980s. Funding  allocated for the new embassy totaled nearly $19 million under that  program, but the project did not progress beyond the design stage because  of high estimated costs and other factors. The current project is an  operating lease and construction agreement for an unfinished villa that is  locally owned. The Qatari owners will finish construction of the facility  based on State’s floor plan and other specifications. The Qatari landlord  hired the design and building contractors, both uncleared local firms. All  work is being coordinated on site by State personnel, and certain secure  areas of the facility will be completed by cleared American contractors  after the building is turned over to State, scheduled for late 2000. A contract  for construction of a limited, controlled access area by cleared Americans  has been awarded, and most of the orders for furniture and furnishings  have been issued. Construction began in August 1999, and occupancy is  scheduled for April 2001. The estimated project cost of $22.5 million (see  table 6) includes the cost of a temporary embassy (about $3 million) and  the first 2 years of lease payments (about $1.2 million per year). The initial  lease is for 6 years but can be renewed for five additional 6-year periods.  Over 36 years, the total cost will be more than $60 million: $22.5 million for  the project plus more than $40 million in lease costs. See figures 4 and 5 for  the embassy prior to the attacks in Africa and the planned embassy in  Doha.
section_title: Tunis, Tunisia
subsections: section_title: Project History and Status
paragraphs: Efforts to construct a new, fully secure embassy compound in Tunisia  began with the Inman program initiated in the late 1980s. A 21-acre site was  purchased in 1992 but, due to funding priorities and other reasons, the  project did not enter the construction phase. After the 1998 bombings in  Africa, this project again became a high priority. Facility design by Tai Soo  Kim Partners began in September 1999. State also prequalified five  construction firms as potential builders of the new facility. Bids for  construction were solicited in August 2000. (See table 7 for estimated  project costs.) A construction contract was awarded to Bill Harbert  International Construction Company in September 2000. The embassy  compound will be a campus-style complex and include a classified  chancery as well as separate general services, marine security guard, and  warehouse buildings. Figure 6 shows the existing embassy, and figure 7  depicts the planned new embassy.
section_title: Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
subsections: section_title: Project History and Status
paragraphs: Following the August 1998 terrorist bombing that destroyed the embassy in  Dar es Salaam, State started the process to relocate the embassy. To  temporarily restore embassy operations, State converted a residential  compound to function as the interim embassy, which opened in February  1999 at a cost of approximately $12.3 million. Concurrent to that activity,  State issued a solicitation in November 1998 seeking qualified firms to bid  on the design and construction of a new permanent embassy. Three  design/build contractors were prequalified and allowed to compete.  However, in May 1999, the project was placed on hold because the  purchase of the proposed site fell through, and State had to look for  another site. Once State identified a second site and was reasonably certain  that the acquisition would go through, the competition resumed.
State awarded a design/build contract to J.A. Jones Construction Co. in  September 1999. The contractor began the design of the new embassy in  October 1999. Initial groundwork at the 21-acre site began in August 2000,  and occupancy is expected in November 2002. (See table 8 for estimated  project costs.) Figure 8 shows the embassy before the 1998 bombing, and  figure 9 shows the design for the new embassy. All other U.S. agencies are  scheduled to be in the compound, including USAID, whose facility will be  constructed as a separate, unclassified facility. According to USAID data,  $15 million was available in its fiscal year 2000 budget for construction.
section_title: Nairobi, Kenya
subsections: section_title: Project History and Status
paragraphs: Following the August 1998 terrorist bombing that destroyed the embassy in  Nairobi, the embassy temporarily moved into the offices of USAID.  Subsequently, State searched for an office building to renovate and use as  an interim embassy. Renovation of the building started in January 1999, and  the interim embassy became fully operational in August 1999, at a cost of  about $21.7 million. Concurrently, State issued, in November 1998, a  solicitation seeking qualified design/build firms to bid on the design and  construction of a new, permanent embassy compound. Three contractors  were prequalified and allowed to compete.
State awarded a design/build contract to J.A. Jones Construction Co. in  September 1999. (See table 9 for estimated project costs.) The contractor  started the design of the new embassy in October 1999. Initial groundwork  at the 16-acre site began in August 2000, and occupancy is expected in  March 2003. Figure 10 shows the previous embassy in Nairobi, and figure  11 depicts the new embassy. All other U.S. agencies are scheduled to be in  the compound, including USAID, whose facility will be constructed as a  separate unclassified facility. Additional building costs for USAID’s facility  are estimated at $36.1 million. Fiscal year 1999 State funds are being used  for the design and preconstruction preparation of the new USAID facility.  Fiscal year 2001 funds were requested to fund the facility’s construction.
section_title: Istanbul, Turkey
subsections: section_title: Project History and Status
paragraphs: The existing consulate office building is 125 years old and is built on  unreinforced masonry construction, which makes it unstable in case of  earthquakes. It also has insufficient setback and is very vulnerable to  attack because narrow and busy urban streets bound the property on three  sides. Planning for a new facility began as part of the Inman program;  funding allocated for the facility totaled $34.9 million as of November 1990.  This Inman project did not proceed largely because of difficulties  encountered at that time in acquiring a suitable site. In the aftermath of the  August 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, the relocation of the consulate  again became a high priority. State awarded the office building concept  design to Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership. (See table 10 for estimated  project costs.)
The building site was under purchase contract as of August 2000.  Occupancy is expected in April 2003. For construction of the consulate,  State issued a solicitation in December 1999 seeking qualified construction  firms to bid on the project. Five contractors were prequalified to bid, and  State awarded a construction contract in September 2000 to Caddell  Construction Company. See figure 12 for the existing consulate and figure  13 for the design of the new consulate.
section_title: Zagreb, Croatia
subsections: section_title: Project History and Status
paragraphs: The planned new embassy in Zagreb will replace the existing facility  located on the corners of two very busy streets in the center of the city. All  U.S. mission elements in Zagreb will be consolidated into the new embassy.  State started the process for replacing the existing facility in January 1999.  Because the selected site had multiple parcels with different owners, the  acquisition negotiations were prolonged, lasting until March 2000.  Concurrent with this activity, State issued a solicitation in March 1999  seeking qualified firms to bid on the design and construction of a new  office building. Three contractors were prequalified and allowed to  compete. State awarded a design/build contract to J.A. Jones Construction  Co. in September 1999. (See table 11 for estimated project costs.)  Occupancy is expected in May 2003. Figure 14 shows the present embassy,  and figure 15 depicts the planned new embassy.
section_title: São Paulo, Brazil
subsections: section_title: Project History and Status
paragraphs: The existing consular facility in São Paulo is considered highly vulnerable  to terrorist attack because of the lack of setback and other undesirable  security characteristics. The consulate consists of floors 1 through 5 of a  14-floor commercial office building, and several other agencies are located  in even more vulnerable space at separate locations. A new consular site  costing $19 million has been located, and site negotiations were complete  as of August 2000 (see table 12 for estimated project costs). State prepared  to demolish existing buildings on the site. Congressional committees  approved site acquisition, but the Senate Appropriations Committee is  encouraging State to make use of existing buildings on the site. State does  not believe that it would be feasible to bring the existing building design up  to security requirements and is working with the Committee to discuss  options. Figure 16 shows the current consulate in São Paulo; the new  consulate has not yet been designed.
section_title: Rio de Janeiro
subsections: section_title: Project History and Status
paragraphs: Similar to the situation in São Paulo, the existing Rio de Janeiro consular  facility is considered highly vulnerable to terrorist attack because of the  lack of setback and other undesirable security characteristics. The 13-story  consulate office building had served as the U.S. embassy until Brazil’s  capital was moved to Brasilia in the 1960s. The consulate is in a crowded,  high-crime area of the city. Progress on the project has been slow due to a  number of factors, including difficulties in finding suitable sites. State  officials eventually identified a potential site and negotiated a price (see  table 13 for estimated project costs). As of August 2000, State documents  indicated that the Senate Appropriations Committee had not approved the  acquisition of this site. According to State officials, the Committee cited  concerns that State had not sufficiently considered options for reducing the  size of the post by regionalizing its operations in Brazil. (In addition to its  existing embassy facility in Brasilia, State was proposing to spend  $200 million to build two consulate facilities in Brazil—one in Rio de  Janeiro and the other in São Paulo.) According to State, the purchase  contract on the Rio de Janeiro site has expired, and State is no longer  pursuing its purchase. Figure 17 shows the existing consulate in Rio de  Janeiro; a design for the new consulate is not available.
On July 25, 2000, State notified the Congress of its intent to reprogram  $22.8 million of the funds appropriated for Rio de Janeiro to meet part of  the requirements for a new embassy in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.  The Congress approved the reprogramming and in September 2000 State  signed a design/build contract for a new embassy in Abu Dhabi. August  2000 State documents indicate that the Department is developing a revised  staffing pattern for the Rio de Janeiro facility, that State officials have  visited the post to review additional potential sites, and that State is  evaluating alternative uses of the existing consulate site.
section_title: Luanda, Angola
subsections: section_title: Project History and Status
paragraphs: Luandan embassy functions are housed in prefabricated buildings and  trailers, some of which are virtually on the perimeter wall. The lack of  setback from the streets on three sides and the temporary nature of the  facility make its occupants unusually vulnerable to attack. Other functions  are housed outside the embassy above an auto repair shop, which provides  no perimeter protection and also gives no protection from violence or  terrorist actions. State has proposed to construct the embassy on the  present site, even though it would have a setback of 65 feet and therefore  would not meet the 100-foot minimum security standards for setback. State  indicated that alternative properties it has identified that would permit the  required setback were not in desirable locations or did not have secure  titles because of land ownership uncertainties. The very small size of the  existing site dictated a design for a compact, multistory building located in  the center of the compound, completed in phases to minimize disruptions  to embassy operations. (See table 14 for estimated project costs.) All other  U.S. agencies, including USAID, would be co-located in the new embassy.  The Secretary of State granted an exception to the setback policy based on  State’s plans to achieve blast resistance through other means, such as  thicker walls and windows. According to State, the blast effects on the  proposed new embassy would be mitigated by strengthened construction  methods and techniques, which would provide performance equivalent to  that of a standard blast-resistant building with a 100-foot setback.
According to State officials, the project design is complete, but the House  and Senate Appropriations Committees have not approved the use of fiscal  year 2000 funding for construction. The House Committee believed that all  new construction should result in buildings that fully comply with State’s  own standards, and therefore it rejected State’s plan to spend $39.2 million  in appropriations on a facility with insufficient setback. The House  Committee reconsidered its position, granting State approval to move  ahead if it uses the proceeds from the sale of other properties to finance the  project. As of September 2000, the Senate Committee had not approved the  project. If that Committee does not approve the current plan, State plans to  reprogram funds to other projects until it can find another site in Luanda  and prepare a new facility design. In November 2000, State officials said  that the Congress had not agreed to provide security appropriations for this  project. Figure 18 shows the existing embassy, and figure 19 depicts the  design for the new facility.
section_title: Factors Contributing to Costs of New Embassies and Consulates
paragraphs: The estimated costs for the 10 initial priority new office buildings vary  between $22 million to retrofit a leased facility in Doha to about  $100 million for constructing a government-owned facility in Sao Paulo.  State officials believe that in some other locations, costs to replace existing  facilities could exceed $200 million. State estimates that constructing a  new embassy costs roughly three times as much as it would cost to build a  commercial office building of similar size in the United States.
Several factors contribute to the additional expenses of constructing a new  embassy compared to the costs of constructing a typical commercial  building. For example, the basic structure for a typical commercial building  uses steel columns and one-way steel beams, steel decks/light-weight  concrete floors, and steel joisted roofs and a steel deck. In comparison, a  new embassy is typically constructed almost entirely of reinforced  concrete, thicker roof and floor slabs, and other elements to meet State’s  blast standards.
Other key cost factors include substantially higher design costs partially  due to unique perimeter access control and communications requirements;  specialty construction for communications and access control; use of  American contractors overseas; perimeter walls; material shipping and  transit security; shielding against electronic surveillance; substantial  construction supervision and site security costs; and unique designs and  tailoring of each building to the requirements of each co-located agency.  Seismic concerns, and the costs of large sites in urban areas, further  contribute to the high costs of new embassies and consulates. Another  fundamental issue affecting costs is the special difficulties often associated  with performing construction in developing countries. These difficulties  involve obtaining host country permits in a timely fashion, ensuring work  quality, planning for worker illness and disease, adjusting to cultural  differences, and working out technical communication difficulties.
section_title: Initiatives to Improve Management and Project Delivery Processes at the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations
paragraphs: This appendix briefly describes State’s key initiatives to improve  management and project delivery processes at the Office of Foreign  Buildings Operations.
Management Processes A key recommendation of State’s November 1999 overseas presence panel  dealt with the management capacity of State’s Office of Foreign Buildings  Operations. The panel recommended that a new, federally chartered  government corporation be established to replace that Office. Such a  corporation would exercise responsibility for building, renovating,  maintaining, and managing the federal government’s overseas civilian  facilities. The issues that led to the panel’s recommendation included the  perception that projects managed by the Office of Foreign Buildings  Operations took longer and cost more than comparable private sector  projects, that time lines were not always met, and that staffing levels  appeared too high for the number of projects managed. State has not  agreed with the recommendation in the belief that the staff work leading to  the recommendation was faulty and did not give due consideration to  security requirements and special overseas needs. State noted, however,  that it has established special study teams that are giving serious attention  to related panel proposals.
Special teams are studying the critical business practices and other issues  affecting the performance of State’s Office of Foreign Buildings Operations.  These include   business process reengineering, with the objective of optimizing current  processes and identifying and resolving overlaps, gaps, inefficiencies,  and non-value-added activities;   capital funding issues, with the goal of developing alternative sources of  financing to supplement congressional appropriations, such as charging  capital rent, making asset sales, and seeking federal loans;   organizational structure, with the goal of providing an assessment of the  benefits and consequences of becoming a performance-based  organization;   communications strategy, with the goal of better communicating  internally and externally and addressing what the Office perceives to be  a lack of confidence in its work by overseas posts, headquarters  agencies, and the Congress; and   customer focus, with a goal of developing a strategy to better meet State  and external needs.
These studies and related efforts are scheduled to be completed after 2001.  Actions that may be taken on the study results will depend on several  factors, including “doability”, other agency participation, and costs.
subsections: section_title: Project Delivery Process
paragraphs: Design/Build Contracting: State is using this contracting method,  which involves providing design and construction services under a  single, lump-sum contract. This is being used for projects in Nairobi,  Kenya; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Zagreb, Croatia; and Kampala, Uganda.  State’s objective is to receive faster product delivery through concurrent  design and construction activities. Generally, it is anticipated that total  project implementation time can be reduced as much as 6 months using  this contracting method. Construction industry experience also  indicates that project costs can be reduced slightly by this form of  contracting. However, deterrents to greater use of the approach are the  reductions in time available for project definition, design, development  and review, and overall quality control.
Fast-tracking: State is implementing its first fact-track project in  Kampala, Uganda. Essentially, fast-tracking involves using innovative  scheduling to speed up delivery of the completed facility. The post is the  first one set to move into a secure replacement facility since the  bombings in Africa. State officials acknowledge that the compressed  schedule has added costs to the project, but said that its subsequent  development of an “evaluated total cost method” for determining a  contract’s best value award, validated its contract award decision for the  Kampala project.
Site-adapted Office Building: State has initially identified projects in  the Africa region for potential use of this concept, which involves a  single building design that can be used at a number of posts with similar  functions, staffing, and tenant agency complement. The base building  would be modified to respond to unique site conditions and local  culture, and the concept is expected to save design time and costs by  reusing design documentation. Posts identified as potential candidates  include Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Bamako, Mali; Bujumbura, Burundi;  Kigali, Rwanda; Yaounde, Cameroon; Nouakchott, Mauritania;  Antananarivo, Madagascar; Asmara, Eritrea; Conakry, Guinea; Dakar,  Senegal; Lomé, Togo; Maputo, Mozambique; and Harare, Zimbabwe.
Standard Delivery Approach: State reported that it has developed a  standard delivery approach based on standardizing elements of project  designs. Benefits expected include replicating project design elements  on multiple projects. Posts identified by State for potential application  of this initiative included Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire; Damascus, Syria;  Tashkent, Uzbekistan; and Yerevan, Armenia.
section_title: Comments From the Department of State
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter  dated December 19, 2000.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. The basic premise of our report is that State can do a better job of  planning its capital construction program to help decisionmakers make  more informed decisions about the program in the long term. Our  report acknowledges that State has ranked more than 180 projects for  potential replacement. However, as noted in our report, leading  organizations not only rank capital projects by priority, but they also  provide more detailed cost estimates and other information in plans  covering 5-, 6-, or 10-year periods. State has the foundation to adopt this  best practice, which we believe would be useful to the Department,  other agencies operating overseas, and the Congress for decision- making and other purposes. 2. We believe that the planning information that State has provided the  Congress is not sufficient to guide judgments regarding long-term  program funding, accountability, and direction. Our report noted that  leading organizations use long-term capital plans to define capital asset  decisions, promote informed choices about resource needs, and  provide decisionmakers with an overall sense of projects’ merits and  funding needs. Information on the scope and composition of the  program envisioned by State, including the estimated cost and schedule  of planned projects, would encourage dialogue with congressional  committees regarding funding levels and program expectations over  the life of this program. Without a long-term capital plan that includes  such information, it will be difficult for State and congressional  decisionmakers to accurately judge how much the program will cost;  when it can be reasonably expected to be completed; and how key  factors, such as funding and changes in the size of overseas posts, may  affect program implementation. A long-term capital plan would also  improve the accountability and transparency of decisions made by  State, other agencies, and the Congress that affect this important  program.  3. We disagree with State’s view that implementing our recommendation  would involve too much guesswork because of uncertainties regarding  funding and future projects’ exact scope and estimated costs. A  long-term plan is typically based on assumptions about the future and  estimates that are imprecise and subject to change. Once prepared, a  plan can be adjusted to reflect changes and refinement of estimates in  projects’ scope, cost, and implementation schedule, and to adjust to  funding decisions and other factors. State has many years of experience  in estimating construction schedules and costs and has already begun  several studies that would provide valuable inputs to such a plan. 4. We agree that sustained funding will be needed for State to make  substantial progress in replacing its vulnerable embassies and  consulates, and we have modified the report’s conclusion to recognize  this. However, we do not agree with State’s view that it should wait  until it knows how much funding it is likely to receive before preparing  a long-term plan consistent with our recommendation. Our report title  reflects the message of the report that better planning will enhance  program decision-making. Regarding funding, our report describes  State’s requests for funding and the appropriations it has received in  detail, including State’s request for $3.35 billion in advance  appropriations for fiscal years 2002-05 that was rejected.
5.
In appendix I, we describe the concerns expressed by the Senate  Appropriations Committee in September 2000 that State was  accumulating large, unfunded construction requirements. We also  describe the Committee’s recommendations that the Congress limit the  number of new construction starts and provide substantially less  funding for the program than what State requested.
6.
In its September 2000 report, the Senate Appropriations Committee did  not say that it did not intend to fund long-term planning efforts. Rather,  the report expressed the view that land acquisition, site preparation,  and building design are relatively inexpensive, allowing the Department  to pursue a large number of projects at a very modest up front cost, and  that this had led to the accumulation of large, unfunded construction  requirements. 7. State’s comments indicate that it has interpreted our recommendation  as requiring the development of detailed plans that accurately predict  the exact space requirements, precise cost, and construction schedule  of each of more than 180 projects over the life of this program. This was  not our intention. We have modified our recommendation, calling for  State to prepare a long-term plan that covers at least 5 years and to  provide notional estimates of the overall program’s cost and duration.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Lynn Moore, Jesus Martinez, and  Rona Mendelsohn made key contributions to this report.
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