Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying Lessons Learned to Future Projects
Published: 2008-02-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure U.S. borders. One element of SBI is the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) SBI program, which is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system through a mix of security infrastructure (e.g., fencing) and surveillance and communication technologies (e.g., radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones). GAO was asked to monitor DHS progress in implementing CBP's SBI program. This testimony provides GAO's observations on (1) technology implementation; (2) the extent to which Border Patrol agents have been trained and are using SBI technology; (3) infrastructure implementation; and (4) how the CBP SBI program office has defined its human capital goals and the progress it has made to achieve these goals. GAO's observations are based on analysis of DHS documentation, such as program schedules, contracts, status, and reports. GAO also conducted interviews with DHS officials and contractors, and visits to sites in the southwest border where SBI deployment is under way. GAO performed the work from November 2007 through February 2008. DHS generally agreed with GAO's findings.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: On February 22, 2008, DHS announced final acceptance of Project 28, a $20.6 million project to secure 28 miles along the southwest border, and is now gathering lessons learned to use in future technology development. The scope of the project, as described in the task order DHS issued to Boeing--the prime contractor DHS selected to acquire, deploy, and sustain systems of technology across the U.S. borders--was to provide a system with the capabilities required to control 28 miles of border in Arizona. CBP officials responsible for the program said that although Project 28 will not be replicated, they have learned lessons from their experience that they plan to integrate into future technology development. CBP has extended its timeline and approach for future projects and does not expect all of the first phase of its next technology project to be completed before the end of calendar year 2011. Border Patrol agents began using Project 28 technologies in December 2007, and as of January 2008, 312 agents in the area had received updated training. According to Border Patrol agents, while Project 28 is not an optimal system to support their operations, it has provided greater technological capabilities than did their previous equipment. Not all of the Border Patrol agents in the Tucson sector have been trained on Project 28 because the system will be replaced with newer technologies. Deployment of fencing along the southwest border is on schedule, but meeting CBP's goal to have 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence in place by December 31, 2008, will be challenging and total costs are not yet known. As of February 21, 2008, the SBI program office reported that it had constructed 168 miles of pedestrian fence and 135 miles of vehicle fence. CBP officials reported that meeting deadlines has been difficult because of various factors including difficulties in acquiring rights to border lands. Moreover, CBP officials are unable to estimate the total cost of pedestrian and vehicle fencing because they do not yet know the type of terrain where the fencing is to be constructed, the materials to be used, and the cost to acquire the land. As CBP moves forward with construction, it is making modifications based on lessons learned from previous efforts. For example, CBP plans to buy construction items, such as steel, in bulk; use approved fence designs; and contract out the maintenance and repair. CBP's SBI program office established a staffing goal of 470 employees for fiscal year 2008, made progress toward meeting this goal and published its human capital plan in December 2007; however, it is in the early stages of implementing the plan. As of February 1, 2008, the office reported having a total of 305 employees. SBI program officials said that they believe they will be able to meet their staffing goal of 470 staff by the end of the fiscal year. In December 2007, the SBI office published the first version of its Strategic Human Capital Management Plan and is now in the early implementation phase. The plan outlines seven main goals for the office and activities to accomplish those goals, which align with federal government best practices.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss observations on selected aspects  of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program implementation.
Securing the nation’s borders from illegal entry of aliens and contraband,  including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a  major concern. Much of the United States’ 6,000 miles of international  borders with Canada and Mexico remains vulnerable to illegal entry.  Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) apprehends  hundreds of thousands of people entering the country illegally each year,  several hundreds of thousands of individuals also enter the United States  illegally and undetected. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of  SBI, a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S.  borders and reducing illegal immigration. Elements of SBI will be carried  out by several organizations within DHS. One component is the U.S.  Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) SBI program office which is  responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system  using people, technology, known as SBInet, and tactical infrastructure— fencing, roads, and lighting.
You requested that we monitor CBP’s SBI program and provide periodic  updates on the status of the program. My testimony today is the second in  a series of interim reports on SBI implementation and focuses on the  following issues:  the extent to which Border Patrol agents have been trained and are using  SBInet technology;    SBI tactical infrastructure implementation; and    how the SBI program office has defined its human capital goals and the  progress it has made to achieve these goals.
To address these issues, we analyzed DHS documents, including program  schedules and status reports, and workforce data. We determined that the  data were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this testimony. We  interviewed DHS and CBP headquarters and field officials, including  representatives of the SBI program office, Border Patrol, CBP Air and  Marine, CBP Office of Field Operations, and the DHS Science and  Technology Directorate. We also visited the Tucson Border Patrol  sector—a site where SBInet technology and fencing deployment was  under way at the time of our review. We performed our work from  November 2007 through February 2008 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we  plan and perform the work to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to  provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our objectives.
We also have work under way to review other components of the SBI  program. Specifically, we are conducting work for this committee to  assess the development and deployment of SBInet’s command, control,  and communications systems and surveillance and detection systems and  expect to issue a report later this year. In addition, we are reviewing  SBInet as part of a broader look at DHS’s use of performance-based  services acquisition, an acquisition method structured around the results  to be achieved instead of the manner by which the service should be  performed. We expect to issue a report on this effort in spring 2008.  Finally, as mandated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, we are  examining DHS’s fiscal year 2008 expenditure plan for the SBI program  and also expect to report to Congress in spring 2008.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: CBP’s SBI program is responsible for identifying and deploying an  appropriate mix of technology, known as SBInet (e.g., sensors, cameras,  radars, communications systems, and mounted laptop computers for agent  vehicles); tactical infrastructure (e.g., pedestrian and vehicle fencing,  roads, and lighting); and personnel (e.g., program staff and Border Patrol  agents) that are intended to enable CBP agents and officers to gain  effective control of U.S. borders. SBInet technology is also intended to  include the development and deployment of a common operating picture  (COP) that provides uniform data through a command center environment  to Border Patrol agents in the field and all DHS agencies and to be  interoperable with stakeholders external to DHS, such as local law  enforcement. The current focus of SBI is on the southwest border areas  between the ports of entry that CBP has designated as having the highest  need for enhanced border security because of serious vulnerabilities. The  SBI program office and its offices of tactical infrastructure and SBInet are  responsible for overall program implementation and oversight. Figure 1 is  a map of the southwest border and the Border Patrol sectors.
In September 2006, CBP awarded a prime contract to the Boeing Company  for 3 years, with three additional 1-year options. As the prime contractor,  Boeing is responsible for acquiring, deploying, and sustaining selected SBI  technology and tactical infrastructure projects. In this way, Boeing has  extensive involvement in the SBI program requirements development,  design, production, integration, testing, and maintenance and support of  SBI projects. Moreover, Boeing is responsible for selecting and managing a  team of subcontractors that provide individual components for Boeing to  integrate into the SBInet system. The SBInet contract is largely  performance-based—that is, CBP has set requirements for the project and  Boeing and CBP coordinate and collaborate to develop solutions to meet  these requirements—and designed to maximize the use of commercial off- the-shelf technology. CBP’s SBI program office oversees the Boeing-led  SBI contractor team.
CBP is executing part of SBI’s activities through a series of task orders to  Boeing for individual projects. As of February 15, 2008, CBP had awarded  eight task orders to Boeing. Table 1 is a summary of the task orders  awarded to Boeing for SBI projects.
In addition to deploying technology across the southwest border, the SBI  program office plans to deploy 370 miles of single-layer pedestrian fencing  and 300 miles of vehicle fencing by December 31, 2008. Pedestrian fencing  is designed to prevent people on foot from crossing the border and vehicle  fencing is physical barriers meant to stop the entry of vehicles. The SBI  program office, through the tactical infrastructure program, is using the  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to contract for fencing and  supporting infrastructure (such as lights and roads), complete required  environmental assessments, and acquire necessary real estate. In addition,  in January 2008, CBP issued Boeing a supply and supply chain  management task order for the purchase of construction items, such as  steel.
In December 2006, DHS estimated that the total cost for completing the  deployment along the southwest border will be $7.6 billion from fiscal  years 2007 through 2011. DHS has not yet reported the estimated life cycle  cost for the SBI program, which is the total cost to the government for a  program over its full life, consisting of research and development,  operations, maintenance, and disposal costs. Since fiscal year 2007,  Congress has appropriated about $2.5 billion for SBI. DHS has requested  an additional $775 million for SBI for fiscal year 2009.
section_title: First SBInet Technology Deployment Is Complete, but Lessons Have Been Learned
paragraphs: DHS announced its final acceptance of Project 28 from Boeing on  February 22, 2008, completing its first efforts at implementing SBInet, and  is now gathering lessons learned from the project that it plans to use for  future technology development. The scope of the project, as described in  the task order between Boeing and DHS, was to provide a system with the  detection, identification, and classification capabilities required to control  the border, at a minimum, along 28 miles within the Tucson sector. To do  so, Boeing was to provide, among other things, mobile towers equipped  with radar, cameras, and other features, a COP that communicates  comprehensive situational awareness, and secure-mounted laptop  computers retrofitted in vehicles to provide agents in the field with COP  information. As we previously reported, Boeing delivered and deployed  the individual technology components of Project 28—such as the towers,  cameras and radars—on schedule. See figures 2 and 3 below for  photographs of SBInet technology along the southwest border.
However, Boeing’s inability to integrate these components with the COP  software delayed the implementation of Project 28 over 5 months after the  planned June 13, 2007, milestone when Border Patrol agents were to begin  using Project 28 technology to support their activities. Specifically, SBI  program office officials said that the software that Boeing selected for the  COP was intended to be used as a law enforcement dispatch system and  was not designed to process and distribute the type of information being  collected by the cameras, radars, and sensors. However, SBI officials told  us that Boeing selected the system based on initial conversations with  Border Patrol officials, but when deployed to the field, Boeing found  limitations with the system. As we reported in October 2007, among other  technical problems reported were that it was taking too long for radar  information to display in command centers and newly deployed radars  were being activated by rain or other environmental factors, making the  system unusable. According to officials from the SBI program office,  Boeing worked to correct these problems from July through November  2007. As one example of improvement, Border Patrol officials reported  that Boeing added an auto focus mechanism on the cameras located on  the nine towers. However, SBInet and Border Patrol identified issues that  remain unresolved. For example, the Border Patrol reported that as of  February 2008 problems remained with the resolution of the camera image  at distances over 5 kilometers, while expectations were that the cameras  would work at about twice that distance.
From June 26 through November 19, 2007, Boeing submitted three  corrective action plans, documents that defined Boeing’s technical  approach for correcting the problems associated with Project 28 and the  steps that needed to occur for DHS to conditionally accept the system. As  we reported in October, DHS officially notified Boeing in August 2007 that  it would not accept Project 28 until certain problems were corrected. DHS  conditionally accepted Project 28 on December 7, 2007, but included a  requirement for Boeing to analyze the quality of the project’s video signals,  radar data, and the timing of all components by January 11, 2008. Upon  conditional acceptance, the government began operating Project 28, and  SBI program office and Border Patrol officials told us that plans were  under way to conduct additional testing of the system capabilities— including operational testing, which is used to determine that the system  performs in the environment in which it is to operate. This testing was not  scheduled to take place until after final acceptance of Project 28.  According to SBI program office and Border Patrol officials, the results of  this testing will not be used to make changes to Project 28, but will instead  be used to guide future SBInet development. In addition, DHS announced  its final acceptance of Project 28 on February 22, 2008 noting that Boeing  met its contractual requirements. However, according to SBI program  officials, the outcomes of future SBInet development will define the  equipment that will replace most of Project 28 system components. Both  SBI program office and Border Patrol officials stated that although Project  28 did not fully meet their expectations, they are gathering lessons learned  and are ready to move forward with developing SBInet technologies that  will better meet their needs. Table 2 summarizes key events for Project 28.
The SBI program office reported that it is moving forward with SBInet  development beyond Project 28; however, it has revised its approach and  timeline for doing so. As noted earlier in this statement, in addition to the  $20.6 million task order awarded for Project 28, Boeing has also received  other task orders as part of its overall contract with CBP. For example, in  August 2007 DHS awarded a $69 million task order to Boeing to design the  technical, engineering, and management services it would perform to plan  and deploy SBInet system components within the Border Patrol’s Tucson,  Yuma, and El Paso sectors. In addition, the SBI program office reported  that on December 7, 2007, DHS awarded a 14-month task order worth  approximately $64.5 million to Boeing to design, develop, and test, among  other things, an upgraded COP software system for CBP command centers  and agent vehicles, known as COP version 0.5. According to the SBI  program office, planned SBInet development, such as the work being  conducted by Boeing under these task orders, will eventually replace and  improve upon Project 28. These officials stated that in light of the  difficulties that DHS encountered during Boeing’s deployment of Project  28, the Secretary requested and CBP has proposed a revised strategy that  is more deliberative. As two SBInet program managers put it, they want to  develop SBInet “right, not fast”. We reported in October 2007 that SBI  program office officials expected to complete all of the first phase of  technology projects by the end of calendar year 2008. However, in  February 2008, the SBI program office estimated that the first planned  deployment of technology—including components linked to the updated  COP—will occur in two geographic areas within the Tucson sector by the  end of calendar year 2008, with the remainder of the deployments to the  Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors completed by the end of calendar year  2011. Officials from the SBI program office said that the Project 28  location is one of the two areas where the planned first deployments will  occur. An official from the SBI program office noted that this schedule  reflects DHS’s revised approach to developing SBInet technology and that  meeting this timeline depends, in part, on the availability of funding. At  this time, the SBI program office is still in the process of defining life cycle  costs for SBInet development.
SBI program office and Border Patrol officials told us they have learned  lessons during the development of Project 28 that will influence future  SBInet development, including the technology that is planned to be  deployed along the southwest border. For example, testing to ensure the  components—such as radar and cameras—were integrated correctly  before being deployed to the field at the Tucson sector did not occur given  the constraints of the original 8-month timeline of the firm-fixed-price task  order with Boeing, according to officials from the SBI program office. As  a result, incompatibilities between individual components were not  discovered in time to be corrected by the planned Project 28 deployment  deadline. To address this issue moving forward with SBInet development,  Boeing has established a network of laboratories to test how well the  integration of the system works, and according to the SBI program office,  deployment will not occur until the technology meets specific  performance specifications.
Another lesson learned involved how the Project 28 system requirements  were developed by Boeing. SBI program office and Border Patrol officials  told us that the requirements for how the Project 28 system was to operate  were designed and developed by Boeing with minimal input from the  intended operators of the system, including Border Patrol agents. Instead,  Boeing based the requirements for how Project 28 was to be designed and  developed on information in the contract task order. The lack of user  involvement resulted in a system that does not fully address or satisfy user  needs. In February 2008, SBI program officials reported that Project 28  was designed to be a demonstration project, rather than a fully operating  system, and there was not enough time built into the contract to obtain  feedback from all of the intended users of the system during its design and  development. While Border Patrol agents in the Tucson sector agreed with  Boeing’s conceptual design of Project 28, they said the final system might  have been more useful if they and others had been given an opportunity to  provide feedback throughout the process. For example, Border Patrol  agents told us they would have found the laptops mounted into agent  vehicles safer and easier to use if they were larger and manipulated by a  touch screen rather than with a pencil-shaped stylus, as using a stylus to  manipulate the screen while driving is impractical. In addition, the laptops  were not mounted securely enough to prevent significant rattling when  driving on rough terrain, making the laptops difficult to use and prone to  needing repair.
While user feedback was limited for Project 28, SBI program office  officials have recognized the need to involve the intended operators when  defining requirements and have efforts underway to do so for future  SBInet development. For example, officials from the Border Patrol, CBP  Air and Marine, and the CBP Office of Field Operations reported that  representatives from their offices were involved in the development of  requirements for SBInet technology as early as October 2006 and on an  ongoing basis since then. Specifically, SBI program officials stated that  Border Patrol users participated in requirements workshops with Boeing  held in October 2006 at CBP headquarters and then at various field  locations from December 2006 through June 2007, from which the SBInet  operational requirements were derived (a process separate from Project  28). According to the SBI program office, users from other CBP offices  such as the Office of Field Operations and Air and Marine have been  involved in meetings as the SBI program office updates these requirements  in preparation for the next development efforts. Additionally, SBI program  officials stated that Boeing held meetings in January and February 2008  specifically designed to integrate user input to the development of the  COP version 0.5.
section_title: Local Border Patrol Users Report that Project 28 is Not an Optimal System, but Those Trained on the System Will Operate it Until It Is Replaced
paragraphs: Since DHS conditionally accepted the task order from Boeing on  December 7, 2007, those Border Patrol agents in the Tucson sector that  have received updated training on Project 28 have been using the  technologies as they conduct their border security activities. Border Patrol  agents reported that they would have liked to have been involved sooner  with the design and development of Project 28, since they are the ones  who operate the system. Border Patrol officials stated that it is not an  optimal system. Border Patrol agents from the Tucson sector provided  examples of Project 28 capabilities that do not adequately support Border  Patrol operations because of their design. As noted earlier in this  statement, Border Patrol agents have had difficulties using the laptops  mounted into agent vehicles to provide them with COP information.  However, according to Border Patrol agents, Project 28 has provided them  with improved capabilities over their previous equipment, which included  items such as cameras and unattended ground sensors that were only  linked to nearby Border Patrol units, not into a centralized command and  control center. In addition, Border Patrol officials we spoke with at the  Tucson sector noted that Project 28 has helped its agents become more  familiar with the types of technological capabilities they are integrating  into their operations now and in the future. As we reported in October  2007, the Border Patrol’s Tucson sector was developing a plan to integrate  SBInet into its operating procedures. However, in February 2008 a senior  official from the Border Patrol’s Tucson sector told us that the plan is still  in draft form because of the delays in the deployment of Project 28.
In October 2007 we reported that the 22 trainers and 333 operators who  were initially trained on the Project 28 system were to be retrained with  revised curriculum because of deployment delays and changes to the COP  software. As of January 2008, 312 Border Patrol operators and 18 trainers  had been retrained on Project 28. According to Border Patrol agents we  spoke with at the Tucson sector, a group of Border Patrol agents provided  significant input into the revisions that the Boeing subcontractor made to  the Project 28 training curriculum. Officials from the SBInet Training  Division and Border Patrol agents reported that originally there were plans  to train 728 Border Patrol operators located in the Project 28 area by  January 2008. However, now no additional training will be conducted on  Project 28, as they are expecting that future SBInet development will  eventually replace Project 28. For example, according to the SBInet  Training Division, the COP version 0.5 currently under development by  Boeing will replace the Project 28 COP, and this will require new training.
section_title: Tactical Infrastructure Deployment on Schedule, but Further Deployment Will Be Challenging and Total Costs Are Not Yet Known
paragraphs: Deployment of tactical infrastructure projects along the southwest border  is on schedule, but meeting the SBI program office’s goal to have 370 miles  of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fencing in place by December  31, 2008, will be challenging and total costs are not yet known. As of  February 21, 2008, the SBI program office reported that it had constructed  168 miles of pedestrian fence and 135 miles of vehicle fence (see table 3).
According to SBI program office officials, the deployment of tactical  infrastructure projects is on schedule, but these officials reported that  keeping on schedule will be challenging because of various factors,  including difficulties in acquiring rights to border lands. Unlike prior  fencing projects that were primarily located on federal land,  approximately 54 percent of planned projects are scheduled to be  constructed on private property. We previously reported that as of July  2007, CBP anticipated community resistance to deployment for 130 of its  370 miles of pedestrian fencing miles. CBP officials told us that, of 480  owners of private property along the relevant segments of the border, all  but 148 gave CBP access to survey their land prior to December 2007.  In  December, CBP, working in conjunction with the Department of Justice  (DOJ), sent letters to most of the 148 remaining land owners reiterating  the request for access and notifying them of the government's intent to  pursue court-ordered access if necessary.  As of February 16, 2008,  approximately 50 percent of the land owners who received these letters  had given CBP access to their land to do surveys.  In some cases where  access has not been granted, DOJ has begun the legal process known as  “eminent domain” to obtain court-ordered access to the property. SBI  program office officials state that they are working to acquire rights to  border lands; however, until the land access issues are resolved, this factor  will continue to pose a risk to meeting the deployment targets.
SBI program office officials are unable to estimate the total cost of  pedestrian and vehicle fencing because they do not yet know the type of  terrain where the fencing is to be constructed, the materials to be used, or  the cost to acquire the land. In addition, in October 2007, we reported that  to minimize one of the many factors that add to the cost, CBP has  previously drawn upon its Border Patrol agents and Department of  Defense military personnel to assist in such efforts. However, SBI  program office officials reported that they plan to use more costly  commercial labor for future infrastructure projects to meet their  deadlines. In February 2008, SBI program office officials told us that they  estimate construction costs for pedestrian fencing will be about $4 million  per mile and vehicle fencing costs will be about $2 million per mile.  However, total costs will be higher because this estimate does not include  other expenses, such as contract management, contract incentives to meet  an expedited schedule, higher-than-expected property acquisition costs,  and unforeseen costs associated with working in remote areas.
As the SBI program office moves forward with tactical infrastructure  construction, it is making modifications based on lessons learned from  previous fencing efforts. For example, for future fencing projects, the SBI  program office plans to buy construction items, such as steel, in bulk; use  approved fence designs; and contract out the maintenance and repair of  the tactical infrastructure. SBI program office officials estimate that  buying essential items in bulk will make fencing deployment more  economical and will reduce the likelihood of shortages and delays of  critical equipment. SBI program office officials also believe that using pre- approved and tested fence designs (see fig. 4) will expedite  preconstruction planning and will allow for more efficient maintenance  and repair. In addition, the SBI program office plans to award a contract to  maintain and service all initial, current, and future tactical infrastructure  deployed through SBI because it believes that it will be more efficient than  relying on Border Patrol agents and military personnel who also have  other duties.
section_title: Progress Made to Meet Staffing Goals and a Human Capital Plan Published, but Implementation Is in the Early Stages
paragraphs: The SBI program office established a staffing goal of 470 employees for  fiscal year 2008, made progress toward meeting this goal and published a  human capital plan in December 2007; however, the SBI program office is  in the early stages of implementing this plan. As of February 1, 2008, the  SBI program office reported having 142 government staff and 163  contractor support staff for a total of 305 employees, up from 247 staff on  September 30, 2007. In addition, SBI program office officials reported that  they had selected an additional 39 staff that the program office is in the  process of bringing onboard. These officials also told us that they believe  they will be able to meet their staffing goal by the end of September 2008  and will have 261 government staff and 209 contractor support staff on  board (see table 4). In addition, according to SBI program office officials,  they would like to bring the ratio of government employees to contractor  staff closer to 1:1 because their office has determined that that ratio  provides the right mix of personnel with the skills necessary to ensure  appropriate government oversight. The targeted ratio, based on the  staffing goal for fiscal year 2008, would result in a better than 1:1 ratio of  government to contract support staff.
In December 2007, the SBI program office published the first version of its  Strategic Human Capital Management Plan and is now in the early  implementation phase. As we have previously reported, a strategic human  capital plan is a key component used to define the critical skills and  competencies that will be needed to achieve programmatic goals and  outline ways an organization can fill gaps in knowledge, skills, and  abilities. The SBI program office’s plan outlines seven main goals for the  office and includes planned activities to accomplish those goals, which  align with federal government best practices. However, the activities are  in the early stages of implementation. We have previously reported that a  properly designed and implemented human capital program can  contribute to achieving an agency’s mission and strategic goals. Until the  SBI program office fully implements its plan, it will lack a baseline and  metrics by which to judge the program. Table 5 summarizes the seven  human capital goals, the SBI program office’s planned activities and steps  taken to accomplish these activities, as of February 20, 2008.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Securing the nation’s borders is a daunting task. Project 28, an early  technology project, resulted in a product that did not fully meet user needs  and the project’s design will not be used as the basis for future SBInet  development. To ensure that future SBInet development efforts deliver an  operational capability that meets user needs and delivers technology that  can be used in additional projects, it is important that the lessons learned  on Project 28 continue to be applied and that user input continues to be  sought so that future technology projects are successful. In the tactical  infrastructure area, although fencing projects are currently on schedule,  meeting future deadlines will be challenging because of various factors,  including difficulties in acquiring rights to border land. Furthermore,  future tactical infrastructure costs are not yet known because issues  regarding land acquisition have not been resolved and other decisions,  such as the materials to be used, have not been made. These issues  underscore Congress’ need to stay closely attuned to DHS’s progress in the  SBI program to make sure that performance, schedule, and cost estimates  are achieved and the nation’s border security needs are fully addressed.
This concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to respond to  any questions that members of the subcommittees may have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please call Richard M. Stana at  (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Other key contributors to this statement were Susan  Quinlan, Assistant Director; Deborah Davis, Assistant Director; Jeanette  Espínola; Karen Febey; Michael Parr; Jamelyn Payan; David Perkins;  Jeremy Rothgerber; and Leslie Sarapu.
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