Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of Future ISR Requirements
Published: 2008-03-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense's (DOD) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities-such as satellites and unmanned aircraft systems-are crucial to military operations, and demand for ISR capabilities has increased. For example, DOD plans to invest $28 billion over the next 7 years in 20 airborne ISR systems alone. Congress directed DOD to fully integrate its ISR capabilities, also known as the ISR enterprise, as it works to meet current and future ISR needs. GAO was asked to (1) describe the challenges, if any, that DOD faces in integrating its ISR enterprise, (2) assess DOD's management approach for improving integration of its future ISR investments, and (3) evaluate the extent to which DOD has implemented key activities to ensure proposed new ISR capabilities fill gaps, are not duplicative, and use a joint approach to meeting warfighters' needs. GAO assessed DOD's integration initiatives and 19 proposals for new ISR capabilities. We supplemented this analysis with discussions with DOD officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD faces a complex and challenging environment in supporting defense requirements for ISR capabilities as well as national intelligence efforts. Past efforts to improve integration across DOD and national intelligence agencies have been hampered by the diverse missions and different institutional cultures of the many intelligence agencies that DOD supports. For example, DOD had difficulty obtaining complete information on national ISR assets that could support military operations because of security classifications of other agency documents. Further, different funding arrangements for defense and national intelligence activities complicate integration of interagency activities. While DOD develops the defense intelligence budget, some DOD activities also receive funding through the national intelligence budget to provide support for national intelligence efforts. Disagreements about equitable funding from each budget have led to program delays. Separate military and intelligence requirements identification processes also complicate efforts to integrate future ISR investments. DOD does not have a clearly defined vision of a future ISR enterprise to guide its ISR investments. DOD has taken a significant step toward integrating its ISR activities by developing an ISR Integration Roadmap that includes existing and currently planned ISR systems. However, the Roadmap does not provide a long-term view of what capabilities are required to achieve strategic goals or provide detailed information that would make it useful as a basis for deciding among alternative investments. Without a clear vision of the desired ISR end state and sufficient detail on existing and planned systems, DOD decision makers lack a basis for determining where additional capabilities are required, prioritizing investments, or assessing progress in achieving strategic goals, as well as identifying areas where further investment may not be warranted. DOD policy calls for the services and agencies that sponsor proposals for new ISR capabilities to conduct comprehensive assessments of current and planned ISR systems, but GAO's review of 19 proposals showed that 12 sponsors did not complete assessments, and the completeness of the remaining 7 sponsors' assessments varied. GAO found that the DOD board charged with reviewing ISR proposals did not consistently coordinate with sponsors to ensure the quality of the assessments supporting their proposals or review the completed assessments. There were three key reasons for this. First, the board did not have a comprehensive, readily available source of information about existing and developmental ISR capabilities that could help identify alternatives to new systems. Second, the board has no monitoring mechanism to ensure that key activities are fully implemented. Third, DOD board officials said that the board lacks adequate numbers of dedicated, skilled personnel to engage in early coordination with sponsors and to review sponsors' assessments. Without more complete information on alternatives and a monitoring mechanism to ensure these key activities are fully implemented, DOD is not in the best position to ensure that investment decisions are consistent with departmentwide priorities.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense’s (DOD) intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance (ISR) systems—including manned and unmanned  airborne, space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems—play critical  roles in supporting military operations and national security missions. ISR  encompasses multiple activities related to the planning and operation of  systems that collect, process, and disseminate data in support of current  and future military operations. Examples of these ISR systems include  surveillance and reconnaissance systems ranging from satellites, to  manned aircraft such as the U-2, to unmanned aircraft systems such as the  Air Force’s Global Hawk and Predator and the Army’s Hunter, to other  ground-, air-, sea-, or space-based equipment, and to human intelligence  teams. The intelligence data provided by these ISR systems can take many  forms, including optical, radar, or infrared images or electronic signals.  Effective ISR data can provide early warning of enemy threats as well as  enable U.S. military forces to increase effectiveness, coordination, and  lethality, and demand for ISR capabilities to support ongoing military  operations has increased. To meet this growing demand, DOD is planning  to make sizeable investments in ISR systems, which provide ISR  capabilities. For example, over the next 7 years, DOD plans to invest over  $28 billion to develop, procure, and modify 20 major airborne ISR systems  alone, and maintain existing systems until new ones are fielded. These  investments are planned at a time when, as we have previously reported,  the nation is facing significant fiscal challenges in the future, due primarily  to demographic changes and rising health care costs, which are expected  to increase downward pressure on all federal spending, including defense  spending.  In this environment, it will be increasingly important for DOD  decision makers to evaluate competing priorities and alternatives to  determine the most cost-effective solutions for providing needed  capabilities, including ISR capabilities. The Senate Armed Services  Committee has stated concerns that the effectiveness of United States ISR  capabilities has been hampered by capability gaps as well as parallel  systems across the services and intelligence agencies that do not fully  complement one another and may duplicate some capabilities. For this  reason, the Committee has expressed a question about whether enough  has been done, in a comprehensive, defensewide enterprise manner, to  require that new intelligence capabilities being developed by the military  services and the defense intelligence agencies be conceived as part of a  larger system of systems.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 states that it  shall be a goal of DOD to fully integrate the ISR capabilities and  coordinate the developmental activities of the services, DOD intelligence  agencies, and combatant commands as they work to meet current and  future ISR needs. Moreover, the position of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) was established to facilitate resolution  of the challenges to achieving an integrated DOD ISR structure. Within  DOD, USD(I) exercises policy and strategic oversight over all defense  intelligence, counterintelligence, and security plans and programs,  including ISR. As part of this responsibility, USD(I) manages ISR  capabilities across the department, as well as DOD’s intelligence budget,  which includes DOD spending on ISR. USD(I) carries out these  responsibilities within the context of the department’s resource allocation  process, known as the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution  process. DOD’s ISR capabilities are often referred to as DOD’s ISR  enterprise, which consists of DOD intelligence organizations that operate  ISR systems that collect, process, and disseminate ISR data in order to  meet defense intelligence needs, as well as to meet a significant set of U.S.  governmentwide intelligence needs, as tasked by the Director of National  Intelligence.
DOD implemented the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development  System (JCIDS) in 2003 as the department’s principal process for  identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capabilities. JCIDS  supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is responsible for  advising the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of military requirements  in support of the national military strategy. The Joint Requirements  Oversight Council assists the Chairman in this role by reviewing and  approving proposals for new military capabilities, among other  responsibilities. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is supported  by eight Functional Capabilities Boards that review and analyze initial  proposals for new military capabilities. The Functional Capabilities Board  responsible for reviewing proposals for new ISR capabilities is known as  the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board (BA FCB).  Proposals for new military capabilities may be developed by any of the  military services, defense agencies, or combatant commands, who are  referred to as sponsors. To support these proposals and to facilitate the  development of capabilities that are as joint and efficient as possible, Joint  Staff policy calls for the sponsors to conduct capabilities-based  assessments that identify gaps in military capabilities and potential  solutions for filling those gaps. Specifically, the capabilities-based  assessment identifies the capabilities required to successfully execute  missions, the shortfalls in existing systems to deliver those capabilities,  and the possible solutions for the capability shortfalls.
We conducted several reviews in 2007 related to DOD’s management of its  ISR capabilities. In April 2007, we testified that, although DOD is  undertaking some initiatives to set strategic goals and improve integration  of ISR assets, it has not comprehensively identified future ISR  requirements, set funding priorities, or established mechanisms to  measure progress. We also testified that DOD did not have efficient  processes for maximizing the capabilities of its current and planned  unmanned aircraft systems or measuring their effectiveness. Furthermore,  we reported that acquisition of ISR systems continued to suffer from cost  increases or schedule delays, and we noted opportunities to improve ISR  acquisition outcomes through greater synergies among various ISR  platforms. In May 2007, we reported on DOD’s acquisition of ISR systems  and made recommendations to improve acquisition outcomes by  developing and implementing an integrated, enterprise-level investment  strategy approach based on a joint assessment of warfighting needs and a  full set of potential and viable alternative solutions, considering cross- service solutions including new acquisitions and modifications to legacy  systems within realistic and affordable budget projections. In July 2007,  we issued a report on DOD’s processes for using unmanned aircraft  systems that made recommendations to improve visibility over and the  coordination of those assets and to measure their effectiveness. In  addition, we are currently conducting a separate review of the JCIDS  process that addresses the extent to which the process has improved  outcomes in weapons system acquisition programs. We expect our report  based on this review to be issued later in 2008.
In response to your request, our objectives for this report were to (1)  describe the challenges, if any, that DOD faces in achieving an integrated  ISR enterprise; (2) assess DOD’s management approach for improving  integration of its future ISR investments; and (3) evaluate the extent to  which DOD has implemented key activities within the JCIDS process to  ensure that proposed new ISR capabilities fill gaps, are not duplicative,  and use a joint approach to filling warfighters’ needs.
To describe the challenges DOD faces in integrating its ISR enterprise, we  reviewed documents on the operation of DOD’s ISR enterprise and the  national intelligence community. To assess DOD’s management approach  for improving integration of future ISR investments, we reviewed and  analyzed DOD’s ISR Integration Roadmap and other DOD ISR integration  efforts and evaluated them against best practices for enterprise  architecture and portfolio management. To assess the extent to which  DOD has implemented key activities within the JCIDS process, we  reviewed policies and procedures related to the review and approval of  proposals for new ISR capabilities through DOD’s JCIDS. We reviewed 19  of the 20 proposals for new ISR capabilities that were submitted to the  Joint Staff since the implementation of JCIDS in 2003 and for which the  BA FCB was designated as the primary Functional Capabilities Board. We  focused our efforts on the capabilities-based assessments that underpin  these proposals by evaluating the extent to which the capabilities-based  assessments incorporated key elements of Joint Staff policy and guidance.  We discussed ISR-related efforts and challenges concerning these  objectives with officials from such offices as the Office of the USD(I);  Joint Staff; National Security Space Office; Air Force; Army; Navy; Marine  Corps; U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component Command  for ISR; U.S. Special Operations Command; U.S. Joint Forces Command;  Defense Intelligence Agency; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;  National Security Agency; and the Office of the Director of National  Intelligence. We did not review other processes within DOD that may be  used for rapidly identifying ISR capability needs, such as Joint Urgent  Operational Needs, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, and Joint Improvised  Explosive Device Defeat Organization initiatives.
We conducted our review from April 2007 through March 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. More  detailed information on our scope and methodology is provided in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 2001, DOD shifted from a threat-based planning process focused on  preparing the department for a set of threat scenarios to a capabilities- based process focused on identifying what capabilities DOD would need  to counter expected adversaries. The expectation was that a capabilities- based process would prevent DOD from over-optimizing for a limited set  of scenarios. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review continued this shift in  order to emphasize the needs of the combatant commanders by  implementing portfolio management principles for cross-sections of  DOD’s capabilities. Portfolio management principles are commonly used  by large commercial companies to prioritize needs and allocate resources.  In September 2006, DOD initiated a test case of the portfolio management  concept, which included DOD’s management of its ISR capabilities. The  USD(I) is the lead office for this ISR portfolio, and the ISR Integration  Council, a group of senior DOD intelligence officers created as a forum for  the services to discuss ISR integration efforts, acts as the governance body  for the ISR portfolio management effort. In February 2008, DOD  announced its plans to formalize the test cases, including the ISR portfolio,  as standing capability portfolio management efforts.
DOD established JCIDS as part of its capabilities-based planning process  and to be a replacement for DOD’s previous requirements identification  process, which, according to DOD, frequently resulted in systems that  were service-focused rather than joint, programs that duplicated each  other, and systems that were not interoperable. Under this previous  process, requirements were often developed by the services as stand-alone  solutions to counter specific threats and scenarios. In contrast, the JCIDS  process is designed to identify the broad set of capabilities that may be  required to address the security environment of the twenty-first century. In  addition, requirements under the JCIDS process are intended to be  developed from the “top-down,” that is, starting with the national military  strategy, whereas the former process was “bottom-up,” with requirements  growing out of the individual services’ unique strategic visions and lacking  clear linkages to the national military strategy.
The BA FCB has responsibilities that include both JCIDS and non-JCIDS  activities. The BA FCB provides input on the ISR capability portfolio  management test case to the USD(I), who leads the test case and who, in  turn, often provides inputs to the BA FCB deliberations on ISR capability  needs. The BA FCB also generally provides analytic support for Joint Staff  discussions and decisions on joint concepts and programmatic issues. In  addition, the BA FCB has responsibilities for helping to oversee materiel  and non-materiel capabilities development within JCIDS. To do this, the  BA FCB reviews proposals for new ISR capabilities, as well as proposals  for non-materiel ISR capabilities and for ISR capabilities already in  development, and submits recommendations to the Joint Requirements  Oversight Council on whether or not to approve them. To support their  proposals for new ISR capabilities, the sponsors are expected to conduct a  robust, three-part capabilities-based assessment that identifies (1)  warfighter skills and attributes for a desired capability (Functional Area  Analysis), (2) the gaps to achieving this capability based on an assessment  of all existing systems (Functional Needs Analysis), and (3) possible  solutions for filling these gaps (Functional Solution Analysis). According  to Joint Staff guidance, the latter assessment should consider the  development of new systems, non-materiel solutions that do not require  the development of new systems, modifications to existing systems, or a  combination of these, as possible solutions to filling identified capability  gaps. Figure 1 provides an overview of the JCIDS analysis process as it  relates to proposals for new capabilities, showing that these proposals are  supposed to flow from top-level defense guidance, including DOD  strategic guidance, Joint Operations Concepts, and Concepts of  Operations. This guidance is to provide the conceptual basis for the  sponsor’s capabilities-based assessment, which ultimately results in the  sponsor’s proposal for a new capability.
section_title: The Wide Range of DOD ISR Enterprise Commitments across the U.S. Intelligence Community Presents a Challenging Environment for Greater DOD ISR Integration
paragraphs: DOD provides ISR capabilities in support of a wide range of defense and  non-defense agencies across the intelligence community, creating a  complex environment for DOD as it tries to integrate defense and national  ISR capabilities. As DOD works to define its ISR capability requirements  and improve integration of enterprisewide ISR capabilities, the department  is faced with different and sometimes competing organizational cultures,  funding arrangements, and requirements processes, reflecting the diverse  missions of the many intelligence community agencies that DOD supports.  This wide range of DOD ISR enterprise commitments across the U.S.  intelligence community presents challenges for DOD as it works to  increase ISR effectiveness and avoid unnecessary investments in ISR  capabilities.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s ISR Enterprise Supports a Wide Array of Intelligence Organizations, Making Greater Integration Complex
paragraphs: DOD’s ISR enterprise is comprised of many organizations and offices from  both the defense intelligence community and the national intelligence  community. DOD relies on both its own ISR assets and national ISR assets  to provide comprehensive intelligence in support of its joint warfighting  force. For example, the National Reconnaissance Office, a DOD agency,  provides overhead reconnaissance satellites which may be used by  national intelligence community members such as the Central Intelligence  Agency. Figure 2 demonstrates that DOD’s ISR enterprise supports a wide  range of intelligence community organizations.
DOD organizations are involved in providing intelligence information to  both the defense and national intelligence communities, using their  respective or joint ISR assets. In addition to the intelligence branches of  the military services, there are four major intelligence agencies within  DOD: the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and the National Reconnaissance  Office. The Defense Intelligence Agency is charged with providing all- source intelligence data to policy makers and U.S. armed forces around  the world. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, a three-star  military officer, serves as the principal intelligence advisor to the  Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The  National Security Agency is responsible for signals intelligence and has  collection sites throughout the world. The National Geospatial-Intelligence  Agency prepares the geospatial data, including maps and computerized  databases necessary for targeting in an era dependent upon precision- guided weapons. The National Reconnaissance Office develops and  operates reconnaissance satellites. Although these are DOD intelligence  agencies, all of these organizations nevertheless provide intelligence  information to meet the needs of the national intelligence community as  well as DOD. The National Reconnaissance Office, in particular, is a joint  organization where ultimate management and operational responsibility  resides with the Secretary of Defense in concert with the Director of  National Intelligence. In addition, the national intelligence community  includes agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency, whose  responsibilities include providing foreign intelligence on national security  issues to senior policymakers, as well as the intelligence-related  components of other federal agencies, all of which have different missions  and priorities. For example, the intelligence component of the Department  of State is concerned with using intelligence information, among other  things, to support U.S. diplomatic efforts, while the intelligence  component of the Department of Energy may use intelligence to gauge the  threat of nuclear terrorism and counter the spread of nuclear technologies  and material.
section_title: Different Organizational Cultures, Funding Arrangements, and Requirements Processes Present a Challenging Environment in Which to Coordinate DOD and National Intelligence Activities
paragraphs: The complex context of different organizational cultures, funding  arrangements, requirements processes, and diverse missions of other  members of the intelligence community that DOD supports presents a  challenge for DOD in integrating its ISR enterprise, as highlighted by  previous efforts to achieve greater ISR integration within DOD. Observers  have noted in the past that cultural differences between the defense and  national intelligence agencies and their different organizational constructs  often impede close coordination. For example, Congress found in the past  that DOD and the national intelligence community may not be well- positioned to coordinate their intelligence activities and programs,  including ISR investments, in order to ensure unity of effort and avoid  duplication of effort, and a congressionally chartered commission that  reviewed the management and organization of national security space  activities—known as the Space Commission—noted that understanding  the different organizational cultures of the defense and national space  communities is important for achieving long-term integration.  Subsequently, in 2003 and 2004, a joint task force of the Defense Science  Board observed that there was no procedural mechanism for resolving  differences between DOD and the national intelligence community over  requirements and funding for national security space programs. In 2005, a  private sector organization indicated that DOD and the intelligence  community should improve their efforts to enhance information sharing  and collaboration among the national security agencies of the U.S.  government. In addition, according to the ODNI, the traditional  distinction between the intelligence missions of DOD and the national  intelligence community have become increasingly blurred since the events  of September 11, 2001, with DOD engaging in more strategic missions and  the national intelligence community engaging in more tactical missions.  Because of this trend, government decision makers have recognized the  increased importance of ensuring effective coordination and integration  between DOD and the national intelligence community in order to  successfully address today’s security threats. Two areas within DOD’s ISR  enterprise where coordination between DOD and the national intelligence  community are important are: (1) managing funding and budget decisions  for ISR capabilities, and (2) developing requirements for new ISR  capabilities. DOD has two decision-support processes in place to conduct  these functions: its Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution  process, and its Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.  However, DOD also coordinates with the Office of the Director of National  Intelligence, which uses separate budgeting and requirements  identification processes to manage the national intelligence budget.
subsections: section_title: Previous Efforts toward ISR Integration Highlight Organizational Challenges
paragraphs: Past DOD efforts to integrate its own ISR activities with those of the  national intelligence community have shown the difficulty of  implementing organizational changes that may appear counter to  institutional culture and prerogatives. For example, in its January 2001  report, the Space Commission made recommendations to DOD to improve  coordination, execution, and oversight of the department’s space  activities. Among other things, the Space Commission stated that the  heads of the defense and national space communities should work closely  and effectively together to set and maintain the course for national  security space programs—a subset of ISR capabilities—and to resolve  differences that arise between their respective bureaucracies. To  accomplish this, the Space Commission called for the designation of a  senior-level advocate for the defense and national space communities,  with the aim of coordinating defense and intelligence space requirements.  In response to this recommendation, in 2003 the department assigned to  the DOD Executive Agent for Space the role of the Director of the National  Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Space Office was  established to serve as the action agency of the DOD Executive Agent for  Space. The National Security Space Office received both DOD and  National Reconnaissance Office funding and was staffed by both DOD and  National Reconnaissance Office personnel. However, in July 2005, the  Secretary of Defense split the positions of the National Reconnaissance  Office Director and the Executive Agent for Space by appointing an  official to once again serve exclusively as the Director of the National  Reconnaissance Office, citing the need for dedicated leadership at that  agency. The National Reconnaissance Office Director subsequently  removed National Reconnaissance Office personnel and funding from the  National Security Space Office, and restricted the National Security Space  Office’s access to a classified information-sharing network, thereby  inhibiting efforts to further integrate defense and national space  activities—including ISR activities—as recommended by the Space  Commission. In another case, DOD officials stated that, when developing  the ISR Integration Roadmap, they had difficulty gaining information to  include in the Roadmap on national-level ISR capabilities that were funded  by the national intelligence budget.
section_title: Funding of ISR Assets across DOD and National Intelligence Budgets Presents a Challenge for ISR Integration Efforts
paragraphs: Spending on most ISR programs is divided between the national  intelligence budget, known as the National Intelligence Program (NIP),  and the defense intelligence budget, known as the Military Intelligence  Program (MIP).
The NIP consists of intelligence programs that support national  decision makers, especially the President, the National Security  Council, and the heads of cabinet departments, to include the  Department of Defense. The Director of National Intelligence is  responsible for developing and determining the annual NIP budget,  which, according to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,  amounted to $43.5 billion appropriated for fiscal year 2007. To assist  in this task, officials from the Office of the Director of National  Intelligence stated that they currently use a framework known as the  Intelligence Community Architecture, the focus of which is to facilitate  the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s intelligence budget  deliberations by providing a set of repeatable processes and tools for  decision makers to make informed investment decisions about what  intelligence systems, including ISR systems, to buy. According to  officials from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, they  are working with DOD to finalize guidance related to the Intelligence  Community Architecture as of January 2008.
The MIP encompasses DOD-wide intelligence programs and most  intelligence programs supporting the operating units of the military  services. The USD(I) is responsible for compiling and developing the  MIP budget. To assist in informing its investment decisions for MIP- funded activities, the USD(I) is currently employing an investment  approach that is intended to develop and manage ISR capabilities  across the entire department, rather than by military service or  individual program, in order to enable interoperability of future ISR  capabilities and reduce redundancies and gaps. The total amount of the  annual MIP budget is classified.
Given that DOD provides ISR capabilities to the national intelligence  community, some defense organizations within DOD’s ISR enterprise are  funded through the NIP as well as the MIP. For example, three DOD  intelligence agencies—the National Security Agency, the National  Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency— are included in the NIP. While the Director of National Intelligence is  responsible for preparing a NIP budget that incorporates input from NIP- funded defense agencies, such as the National Security Agency, National  Reconnaissance Office, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,  USD(I) has responsibility for overseeing defense ISR capabilities within  the NIP as well as within the MIP. The statutorily required guidelines to  ensure the effective implementation of the Director of National  Intelligence’s authorities, including budgetary authority over defense  intelligence agencies, had not been established as of January 2008. In  recognition of the importance of coordinated intelligence efforts, the  Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence signed a  memorandum of agreement in May 2007 that assigned the USD(I) the role  of Director of Defense Intelligence within the Office of the Director of  National Intelligence, reinforcing the USD(I)’s responsibility for ensuring  that the investments of both the defense and national intelligence  communities are mutually supportive of each other’s roles and missions.  The specific responsibilities of this position were defined by a January  2008 agreement signed by the Director of National Intelligence, after  consultation with the Secretary of Defense, but it is too early to know  whether this new position will increase coordination between the defense  and national intelligence communities with regard to planning for current  and future spending on ISR capabilities.
Although DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence have  begun working together to coordinate funding mechanisms for joint  programs, DOD efforts to ensure funding for major ISR programs that also  support national intelligence missions can be complicated when funding  for those systems is shared between the separate MIP and NIP budgets.  For example, as the program executive for the DOD intelligence budget,  the USD(I) is charged with coordinating DOD’s ISR investments with those  of the non-DOD intelligence community. A DOD official stated that, as part  of the fiscal year 2008 ISR budget deliberations, the USD(I) and the Air  Force argued that funding for the Space Based Infrared Radar System and  Space Radar satellite systems, which are managed jointly by the Air Force  and National Reconnaissance Office, should be shared between the DOD  ISR budget and the national intelligence community ISR budget to better  reflect that these programs support both DOD and national intelligence  priorities. As a result, according to a DOD official, USD(I) negotiated a  cost-sharing arrangement with the Director of National Intelligence, and,  although the Air Force believed that its funding contribution under the  cost-sharing agreement was too high, the Deputy Secretary of Defense  ultimately decided that the Air Force would assume the higher funding  level. A DOD official stated that the delay in funding for the Space Radar  system caused its initial operational capability date to be pushed back by  approximately one year.
section_title: Separate Defense and Non- Defense ISR Requirements Processes Add to Complexity of ISR Integration
paragraphs: In addition to having separate intelligence budgets, DOD and the Office of  the Director of National Intelligence also conduct separate processes to  identify future requirements.
In DOD, proposals for new ISR capabilities are often developed by the  individual services, which identify their respective military needs in  accordance with their Title 10 responsibilities to train and equip their  forces. Proposals for new ISR capabilities may also be developed by  defense agencies or combatant commands. Proposals for new ISR  capabilities that support defense intelligence requirements may be  submitted through DOD’s JCIDS process, at which time the department  is to review the proposals to ensure that they meet the full range of  challenges that the services may face when operating together as a  joint force.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has its own separate  process, carried out by the Mission Requirements Board, which is  intended to serve as the approval mechanism for future national  intelligence requirements as well as to provide input on future  intelligence capabilities being acquired by DOD that may also support  national intelligence community missions. According to officials from  both the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and DOD, the  process carried out by the Office of the Director of National  Intelligence is evolving and is less formalized than DOD’s JCIDS  process.
These separate ISR requirements identification processes for DOD and the  Office of the Director of National Intelligence may present challenges for  DOD since there are not yet any standard procedures for ensuring that ISR  capability proposals affecting both the defense and national intelligence  communities are reviewed in a timely manner by both processes. Although  there is coordination between the two processes, DOD officials related  that the nature of the relationship between JCIDS and the Mission  Requirements Board process is still unclear. Officials from the Office of  the Director of National Intelligence confirmed that the structure of their  office is still evolving, and therefore no standard process currently exists  for determining what DOD capability proposals the Mission Requirements  Board will review, or what criteria will be used to conduct such reviews.  Officials from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence stated that  Mission Requirements Board members exercise their professional  judgment on which DOD systems need to be reviewed and whether  enough of the capability is already being delivered by existing systems.  Although there is a 2001 Director of Central Intelligence directive that  establishes the Mission Requirements Board and calls upon it to oversee,  in consultation with DOD’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the  development of requirements documents that are common to both  national and joint military operational users, this directive contains no  specific criteria for doing so. Officials from the Office of the Director of  National Intelligence stated that they are planning to update this 2001  directive on the Mission Requirements Board. Moreover, coordinating the  separate requirements processes to ensure that an ISR capability proposal  receives timely input on requirements from both DOD and the national  intelligence community can be challenging. DOD and the Office of the  Director of National Intelligence have not determined systematic  procedures or clear guidance for handling situations in which they have  different opinions on ISR capability proposals. For example, the Mission  Requirements Board did not approve a proposal for a new ISR capability  to ensure that the proposal incorporated certain changes, even though  DOD had already given its approval to the proposal through the JCIDS  process. The unclear nature of the relationship between DOD’s and the  Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s ISR requirements  identification processes may complicate DOD efforts to develop future ISR  systems that provide capabilities across the defense and national  intelligence communities.
section_title: DOD Has Initiatives to Improve the Integration of Its Future ISR Investments, but the Initiatives Do Not Provide Key Management Tools Needed to Effectively Guide ISR Investments
paragraphs: To improve the integration of its ISR investments, DOD has developed two  initiatives—the ISR Integration Roadmap and a test case for managing ISR  investments as part of a departmentwide portfolio of capabilities.  These  initiatives are positive steps toward managing ISR investments from an  enterprise-level perspective rather than from a service or agency  perspective. However, our review has shown that these initiatives do not  provide ISR decision makers with two key management tools: (1) a clearly  defined vision of a future ISR enterprise that lays out what investments are  needed to achieve strategic goals, and (2) a unified investment  management approach with a framework that ISR decision makers can use  to weigh the relative costs, benefits, and risks of proposed investments  using established criteria and methods. Without these key tools, ISR  decision makers lack a robust ISR analytical framework they can use to  assess different ISR investments in order to identify the best return on  investment in light of strategic goals. As a result, senior DOD leaders are  not well-positioned to exert discipline over ISR spending to ensure ISR  investments reflect enterprisewide priorities and strategic goals.
subsections: section_title: The ISR Roadmap Does Not Provide a Clear Vision of a Future ISR Enterprise That Lays Out What Capabilities Are Required to Achieve DOD’s Strategic Goals
paragraphs: Based on our review and analysis, DOD’s ISR Integration Roadmap does  not yet provide (1) a clear vision of a future integrated ISR enterprise that  identifies what ISR capabilities are needed to achieve DOD’s strategic  goals, or (2) a framework for evaluating tradeoffs between competing ISR  capability needs and assessing how ISR capability investments contribute  toward achieving those goals. DOD issued the ISR Integration Roadmap in  May 2005 in response to a statutory requirement that directed USD(I) to  develop a comprehensive plan to guide the development and integration of  DOD ISR capabilities. DOD updated the Roadmap in January 2007. As we  testified in April 2007, the Roadmap comprises a catalogue of detailed  information on all the ISR assets being used and developed across DOD,  including ISR capabilities related to collection, communication,  exploitation, and analysis. Given the vast scope of ISR capabilities, which  operate in a variety of media and encompass a range of intelligence  disciplines, the ISR Integration Roadmap represents a significant effort on  the part of DOD to bring together information needed to assess the  strengths and weaknesses of current ISR capabilities. DOD officials have  acknowledged that the Roadmap has limitations and stated that those  limitations will be addressed in future revisions.
As DOD develops future revisions of the ISR Integration Roadmap,  enterprise architecture is a valuable management tool that the department  could use to develop a clear vision of a future ISR enterprise and a  framework for evaluating tradeoffs between competing ISR needs and  assessing how future ISR investments contribute to achieving strategic  goals. Our previous work has shown that effective use of enterprise  architecture is a hallmark of successful public and private organizations.  An enterprise architecture provides a clear and comprehensive picture of  that organization, consisting of snapshots of its current (As-Is) state and  its target (To-Be) state, and a transition plan for moving between the two  states, and incorporates considerations such as technology opportunities,  fiscal and budgetary constraints, legacy and new system dependencies and  life expectancies, and the projected value of competing investments. DOD  and federal guidance on enterprise architecture state that a framework for  achieving an integrated enterprise should be based on a clearly defined  target architecture, or vision, for a future enterprise derived from an  analysis of the organization’s future requirements and strategic goals. A  target architecture for the DOD ISR enterprise would (1) describe the  structure of the future ISR enterprise and its desired capabilities in a way  that is closely aligned with DOD ISR enterprise strategic goals, and (2)  include metrics that facilitate evaluating tradeoffs between different  investments and periodic assessment of progress toward achieving  strategic goals.  Since it is likely that the architecture will evolve over  time and be revised, it may also include an exploration of alternative  investment options, and an acknowledgment of unknown factors. A clearly  defined target architecture that depicts what ISR capabilities are required  to achieve strategic goals would provide DOD with a framework for  assessing its ISR capability gaps and overlaps by comparing its existing  ISR capabilities to those laid out in the target architecture. Identified  capability gaps and overlaps would be the basis for guiding future ISR  capability investments in order to transition the ISR enterprise from its  current state toward the desired target architecture. Furthermore, as our  previous work has emphasized, resources for investments such as those in  ISR capabilities are likely to be constrained by fiscal challenges in the  federal budget. By clearly defining what ISR capabilities are required to  achieve strategic goals over time, with metrics for assessing progress, an  ISR target architecture would provide DOD with a framework for  prioritizing its ISR investments when programs are affected by fiscal or  technological constraints and an understanding of how changes to  investment decisions in response to those constraints affect progress  toward achieving strategic goals.
The ISR Integration Roadmap does not provide a clearly defined target  architecture—or vision—of a future ISR enterprise or a framework for  assessing progress toward achieving this vision because, in developing the  Roadmap, USD(I) chose to take an incremental approach that limited it to  articulating how capabilities already in DOD’s existing ISR budget support  strategic goals, rather than developing a longer term, more comprehensive  target architecture based on an analysis of ISR capability needs beyond  those defined in the existing DOD budget. In doing so, DOD did not fully  address the time frame and subject areas listed in the statute. Congress  tasked USD(I) to develop a plan to guide the development and integration  of DOD ISR capabilities from 2004 through 2018, and to provide a report  with information about six different management aspects of the ISR  enterprise. However, USD(I) limited the Roadmap to the 5-year period  covered by the existing ISR budget, and did not address three of the six  areas the statute listed. The three areas listed in the statute that USD(I)  did not cover were (1) how DOD intelligence information could enhance  DOD’s role in homeland security, (2) how counterintelligence activities of  the armed forces and DOD intelligence agencies could be better  integrated, and (3) how funding authorizations and appropriations could  be optimally structured to best support development of a fully integrated  ISR architecture. USD(I) officials stated that due to the difficulty of  projecting future operational requirements given ever-changing threats  and missions, developing a detailed future ISR architecture beyond the  scope of the capabilities already included in the 5-year ISR budget is very  challenging. As such, the initial versions of the ISR Integration Roadmap  were limited to the existing ISR budget.
Due to the limited scope of the ISR Integration Roadmap, it does not  present a clear vision of what ISR capabilities are required to achieve  strategic goals. In relying on DOD’s existing ISR budget rather than  developing a target architecture that details what ISR capabilities are  required to achieve strategic goals, the Roadmap does not provide ISR  decision makers with a point of reference against which to compare  existing DOD ISR assets with those needed to achieve strategic goals. A  clearly defined point of reference is needed to comprehensively identify  capability gaps or overlaps. This limits the utility of the Roadmap as a  basis of an ISR investment strategy linked to achieving strategic goals. For  example, the most recent revision of the ISR Integration Roadmap lists  global persistent surveillance as an ISR strategic goal but does not define  the requirements for global persistent surveillance or how DOD will use  current and future ISR assets to attain that goal.  The Roadmap states  that the department will conduct a study to define DOD’s complete  requirements for achieving global persistent surveillance. The study was  launched in 2006 but was limited to the planning and direction of ISR  assets, which constitutes only one of the six intelligence activities,  collectively known as the intelligence process, that would interact to  achieve the global persistent surveillance goal. Because the study is  limited to only the planning and direction intelligence activity, it will not  examine whether there are capability gaps or overlaps in other areas, such  as collection systems that include unmanned aircraft systems and  satellites, or its intelligence information-sharing systems, and therefore is  unlikely to define complete requirements for achieving this strategic goal.  While DOD has other analytical efforts that could be used in assessing  global persistent surveillance capability needs, these efforts are generally  limited in scope to addressing the immediate needs of their respective  sponsors. For example, U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Functional  Component Command for ISR conducts assessments of ISR asset  utilization and needs. However, these assessments are primarily intended  to inform that organization’s ISR asset allocation process, rather than to  identify enterprisewide capability gaps with respect to strategic goals.
Further, lacking a target architecture, the Roadmap does not provide ISR  decision makers a framework for evaluating tradeoffs between competing  needs and assessing progress in achieving goals. As figure 3 illustrates, a  clearly defined ISR target architecture would serve as a point of reference  for ISR decision makers to develop a transition plan, or investment  strategy for future ISR capability investments, based on an analysis that  identifies capability gaps and overlaps against the ISR capabilities needed  to achieve the target architecture, which would be based on DOD ISR  strategic goals. Such an analysis would provide ISR decision makers with  an underlying analytical framework to (1) quantify the extent of shortfalls,  (2) evaluate tradeoffs between competing needs, and (3) derive a set of  metrics to assess how future ISR investments contribute to addressing  capability shortfalls. With this analytical framework, ISR decision makers  at all levels of DOD would have a common set of analytical tools to  understand how changing investment levels in different ISR capabilities  would affect progress toward achieving goals. This same set of tools could  be used by different ISR stakeholders evaluating how proposed ISR  capabilities contribute to addressing different gaps or to possibly  saturating a given capability area. For example, such a framework would  allow ISR decision makers to identify areas where ISR collection  capabilities are sufficiently robust or even saturated—areas where further  investment may not be warranted given priority needs in other less robust  collection areas.
Moreover, lacking a target architecture that depicts what capabilities are  required to achieve DOD’s strategic goals for the ISR enterprise, the  Roadmap does not serve as a guide for the development of future ISR  capabilities. A comprehensive source of information on how different ISR  capabilities support strategic goals, and relate to other ISR capabilities,  would be useful not only to ISR decision makers evaluating tradeoffs  between competing needs, but also to program managers developing  proposals for new ISR capabilities. Officials responsible for reviewing  proposals for new ISR capabilities stated that a long-term vision of a future  end state for the ISR enterprise would help sponsors to see what future  ISR capabilities DOD needs and how their needs align with DOD’s  strategic goals. For example, officials from DOD’s National Signatures  Program said that, although they had a clear program goal in mind when  developing their proposal for this new ISR capability, they experienced  difficulty in developing an architecture because they lacked a  comprehensive source of information to assess the full range of DOD and  non-DOD databases and ISR assets that their proposed program would  need to support. Instead, these officials had to conduct an ad hoc survey  of the ISR community, primarily in the form of meetings with other groups  that maintained signatures databases, to ensure their program would be  sufficiently interoperable with other information-sharing networks and  ISR sensors. Without a clearly defined target architecture for the ISR  enterprise, DOD lacks an analytical framework for conducting a  comprehensive assessment of what investments are required to achieve  ISR strategic goals, or for prioritizing investments in different areas when  faced with competing needs.
Instead of providing an underlying analytical framework, the ISR  Integration Roadmap simply lists capability gaps that exist with respect to  DOD ISR strategic objectives, and depicts ISR capability investments  already in the DOD ISR budget as fully meeting those capability shortfalls.  For example, the Roadmap lists as an ISR strategic goal the achievement  of “horizontal integration of intelligence information,” which is broadly  defined as making intelligence information within the defense intelligence  enterprise more accessible, understandable, and retrievable. The Roadmap  then lists a variety of ISR investments in DOD’s 5-year ISR budget as the  means of achieving this strategic goal. For example, one of these  investments is the Distributed Common Ground System, a major DOD  intelligence information-sharing network that spans the entire DOD  intelligence community. However, the Roadmap does not present an  analysis to facilitate evaluation of tradeoffs in that it does not quantify how  the Distributed Common Ground System and other DOD information- sharing networks fall short of meeting the “horizontal integration of  intelligence information” strategic goal, nor does it examine the extent to  which some aspects of that capability area may in fact be saturated.  Furthermore, the Roadmap does not prioritize investments in the  Distributed Common Ground System with other major investments  intended to achieve this strategic goal, or define their interrelationships.  Finally, the Roadmap does not provide metrics to allow decision makers  to assess how these investments contribute to achieving the “horizontal  integration of intelligence information” strategic goal. For example, if the  Distributed Common Ground System were to face fiscal or technological  constraints, ISR decision makers would not have the information needed  to assess what the impact would be on ISR strategic goals if it should not  achieve those capability milestones as envisioned in the Roadmap. As a  result, ISR decision makers cannot assess how new ISR capabilities would  contribute to elimination of whatever capability gaps exist in that area,  determine the most important gaps to fill, or make tough go/no-go  decisions if those capabilities do not meet expectations.
section_title: The ISR Portfolio Management Effort Does Not Facilitate a Unified Investment Approach Needed to Guide DOD’s ISR Investments
paragraphs: While DOD’s ISR portfolio management effort is intended to enable the  department to better integrate its ISR capabilities, it does not provide a  framework for effectively evaluating different ISR investment options or  clearly empower the ISR portfolio manager to direct ISR spending. As a  result, DOD is not well-positioned to implement a unified investment  approach that exerts discipline over ISR investments to ensure they reflect  enterprisewide priorities and achieve strategic goals. In September 2006,  the Deputy Secretary of Defense decided to bring ISR systems across the  DOD together into a capability portfolio as part of a test case for the joint  capability portfolio management concept. Under this concept, a group of  military capabilities, such as ISR capabilities, is managed as a joint  portfolio, in order to enable DOD to develop and manage ISR capabilities  across the entire department—rather than by military service or individual  program—and by doing so, to improve the interoperability of future  capabilities, minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize  capability effectiveness. The USD(I) was assigned as the lead office for  this ISR portfolio, which is known as the battlespace awareness portfolio.  As the portfolio manager for ISR investments, the role and authorities of  the USD(I) are limited to two primarily advisory functions: (1) USD(I) is  given access to, and may participate in, service and DOD agency budget  deliberations on proposed ISR capability investments, and (2) USD(I) may  recommend that service and DOD agency ISR spending be altered as part  of the established DOD budget review process. Under this arrangement,  USD(I)’s recommendations represent one of many points of view that are  considered by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and other DOD offices  involved in reviewing and issuing budget guidance, and therefore USD(I)  lacks the ability to ensure ISR spending reflects enterprisewide priorities  to achieve strategic goals.
Our previous work on portfolio management best practices has shown  that large organizations, such as DOD’s ISR enterprise, are most successful  in managing investments through a single enterprisewide approach.  Further, to be effective, portfolio management is enabled by strong  governance with committed leadership, clearly aligned organizational  roles and responsibilities, and portfolio managers empowered to  determine the best way to invest resources. To achieve a balanced mix of  programs and ensure a good return on their investments, successful large  commercial companies that we have reviewed take a unified, enterprise- level approach to assessing new investments, rather than employing  multiple, independent initiatives. They weigh the relative costs, benefits,  and risks for proposed investments using established criteria and methods,  and select those investments that can best move the company toward  meeting its strategic goals and objectives. Their investment decisions are  frequently revisited to ensure products are still of high value, and if a  product falls short of expectations, they make tough go/no-go decisions.
We have previously recommended that DOD establish portfolio managers  who are empowered to prioritize needs, make early go/no-go decisions  about alternative solutions, and allocate resources within fiscal  constraints. However, since DOD is still developing the capability  portfolio management effort, it has not fully defined the role of the  portfolio managers or their authority over spending. DOD’s September  2006 guidance on the implementation of the portfolio management test  case discusses options for increased authority over spending for the  portfolio managers. Nevertheless, USD(I) and DOD officials involved in  the implementation of the portfolio management effort stated that DOD  views the role of the portfolio managers primarily as providing an  assessment of spending in their respective portfolio areas independent of  the analysis offered by the military services in support of their ISR  spending proposals. If USD(I)’s portfolio management role is limited to an  advisory function as DOD moves forward in implementing its portfolio  management effort, situations where senior DOD officials must evaluate  the merits of alternate analyses that advocate different solutions to ISR  capability needs are likely to continue to arise. A robust ISR analytical  framework based on a well-defined ISR target architecture would establish  a common methodology and criteria, as called for by portfolio  management best practices, that is agreed upon by the various ISR  stakeholders and that can be used for conducting a data-driven assessment  of different ISR capability solutions. For example, as part of fiscal year  2008 ISR budget deliberations, USD(I) conducted an analysis of planned  increases in fiscal year 2008 funding to procure more Predator unmanned  aircraft systems in order to meet U.S. Central Command’s need for  increased surveillance capability. U.S. Central Command and the Air  Force conducted an analysis that was based on validating the requirement  for more aircraft, rather than on examining potential efficiencies in other  aspects of employing them. As the ISR portfolio manager, USD(I)’s  analysis focused on identifying opportunities for increased efficiencies in  how existing Predators were being employed in surveillance missions.  USD(I) determined, among other things, that Predator support to deployed  forces was not being maximized because each ground control station  could only operate one Predator aircraft at a time, resulting in gaps in the  coverage of a target as Predator aircraft rotated to and from the launch  area. On the basis of this analysis, USD(I) concluded that planned  increases in fiscal year 2008 Predator spending may not be the best, or  only, solution to U.S. Central Command’s need for more surveillance  capability; instead, the solution should include additional Predator ground  control stations, or the tasking of other ISR assets in situations where a  Predator would have longer transit times to and from the target area. The  ISR Integration Council agreed with the USD(I)’s recommendation.  Ultimately, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who makes final decisions on  changes advocated by the ISR portfolio manager, included the increase in  Predator aircraft spending in the fiscal year 2008 budget. However, lacking  a single, agreed-upon framework within the ISR enterprise for evaluating  the merits of the alternate analyses advocating different capability  solutions, DOD officials did not have the benefit of a single, authoritative  analysis that identified the best return on investment of these different ISR  investment options in light of strategic goals and validated requirements.  Given USD(I)’s limited authority as the ISR capability portfolio manager,  and the lack of a framework for effectively evaluating alternate investment  plans, DOD is constrained in its ability to implement an enterprise-level,  unified investment approach that employs a single set of established  criteria to ensure its ISR investments reflect enterprisewide priorities and  strategic goals.
section_title: DOD Has Not Fully Implemented Its Process to Develop, Integrate, and Approve Future ISR Capabilities
paragraphs: DOD has not implemented key activities within the JCIDS process to  ensure that proposed new ISR capabilities are filling gaps, are not  duplicative, and use a joint approach to addressing warfighters’ needs. The  services and DOD organizations that sponsored most of the JCIDS  proposals for new ISR capabilities since 2003 have not conducted  comprehensive assessments, and the BA FCB has not fully conducted key  oversight activities. Specifically, our review of 19 proposals for new ISR  capabilities that sponsors submitted to the BA FCB since 2003 showed  that 12 sponsors did not complete the capabilities-based assessment of  current and planned ISR systems called for by Joint Staff policy in order to  identify possible solutions to meet warfighters’ needs. We also found that,  for the 7 sponsors who did conduct these assessments, the assessments  varied in completeness and rigor. Moreover, we found that the BA FCB did  not systematically coordinate with the sponsors during the sponsors’  assessment process to help ensure the quality of the assessments, and did  not generally review the assessments once they were completed. As a  result, DOD lacks assurance that ISR capabilities approved through JCIDS  provide joint solutions to DOD’s ISR capability needs and are the solutions  that best minimize inefficiency and redundancy.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Complete and Rigorous Analysis Hampers DOD’s Process That Informs the Development of Its ISR Capabilities
paragraphs: Joint Staff policy and guidance implementing the JCIDS process, as well as  a significant DOD study on defense capabilities, indicate the importance  of analyzing capability needs from a crosscutting, department-level  perspective to enable a consistent view of priorities and acceptable risks.  Specifically, Joint Staff policy on the JCIDS process calls for sponsors to  use a robust analytical process to ensure that the proposed ways to fill  capability gaps are joint and efficient to the maximum extent possible.  This analytical process is known as a capabilities-based assessment, and  Joint Staff policy and guidance specify that a capabilities-based  assessment should include an analysis of the full range of existing and  developmental ISR capabilities to confirm whether a shortcoming in  mission performance exists, and of possible ways to fix those  shortcomings, such as modifications to existing systems and the use of  national-level systems. Nonetheless, Joint Staff guidance also notes that  the breadth and depth of a capabilities-based assessment must be tailored  to suit the issue, due to the wide array of issues considered as part of the  capabilities-based assessment process.
subsections: section_title: The Majority of ISR Capability Proposals Lacked Assessments Called for under the JCIDS Process
paragraphs: Despite Joint Staff policy that calls for capabilities-based assessments, we  found that 12 sponsors—almost two-thirds—did not carry out capabilities- based assessments to identify the ISR capabilities that they proposed to  the Joint Staff as ways to meet warfighters’ needs. Figure 4 lists the 19 ISR  capability proposals we reviewed and specifies which proposals were  supported by capabilities-based assessments.  Figure 4 also shows that  three of the proposals that lacked capabilities-based assessments were  ones that DOD expected to cost more than $365 million for research,  development, test and evaluation, or more than $2.190 billion for  procurement, using fiscal year 2000 constant dollars.
The 12 sponsors that did not conduct capabilities-based assessments, as  called for under the JCIDS process, cited the following reasons for not  doing them:    Sponsors decided to use pre-existing analysis as an alternative to the  capabilities-based assessment. Many of the sponsors that did not  conduct formal capabilities-based assessments nevertheless based  their proposals for new ISR capabilities on other forms of analysis or  pre-existing mission needs statements. For example, Air Force  sponsors stated that they supported their ISR capability proposal with  analysis conducted in 1998 and 1999 and a mission needs statement  from 2002, before JCIDS was implemented, while National Security  Agency sponsors used the results of a substantial analytical effort they  had completed just prior to the implementation of JCIDS in 2003. We  did not evaluate these alternative types of analysis because they were  not required to take the form of capabilities-based assessments as  called for by Joint Staff policy and guidance on JCIDS.
Sponsors had developed the capabilities prior to the implementation of  JCIDS. Two Air Force proposals, both submitted to the Joint Staff in  2004, lacked capabilities-based assessments and, according to the  sponsors of each, the Air Force had previously developed ISR systems  that were similar to those described in their proposals prior to the  implementation of JCIDS. Once JCIDS was implemented, the sponsor  sought to obtain Joint Staff approval through the new process; since  their ISR systems were already in development and pre-JCIDS analysis  may have been conducted, the sponsors did not conduct the  capabilities-based assessments. Other sponsors that had developed ISR  systems prior to JCIDS being implemented nevertheless conducted  capabilities-based assessments when they submitted their proposals.  For example, one sponsor developed its proposal and performed its  assessment at least 2 years after its organization officially established  the program, and another sponsor’s proposal was for a capability to be  delivered through an upgrade of an aircraft developed in the late 1960s.  These sponsors also sought approval for their ISR systems through the  new JCIDS process, but since their systems were already in  development, our review showed that these sponsors’ capabilities- based assessments indicated they had the solution already in mind  when conducting the assessments.
Sponsors developed the capabilities through DOD processes other  than JCIDS. Joint Staff policy allows for sponsors to develop a new  capability through processes other than JCIDS and then later submit it  to the Joint Staff for approval through JCIDS. For example, one  sponsor said that it did not perform an assessment prior to developing  its proposal because the service originally developed and validated the  proposed capability through a technology demonstration process  separate from the JCIDS process.
Sponsors lacked clear guidance on the JCIDS process, including how  to conduct a capabilities-based assessment. One Air Force sponsor that  submitted an ISR capability proposal in 2005 said that the Joint Staff  policy implementing the JCIDS process was relatively new at the time,  and did not contain clear guidance about how to conduct a capabilities- based assessment. Another sponsor did not conduct an assessment  because the ISR capability it sought to develop was not a system, but  rather a way of carrying out ISR-related activities, and it believed that,  in such cases, a capabilities-based assessment was not expected.
Sponsors had limited time and resources in which to carry out a  capabilities-based assessment. Two sponsors cited lack of resources,  including time, as a reason for not conducting a capabilities-based  assessment. In one of these cases, the sponsor noted that conducting a  capabilities-based assessment would not likely have resulted in a  different type of capability being proposed to the Joint Staff.
section_title: One-Third of ISR Capability Proposals Included Assessments, but Assessments Varied in Rigor and Completeness
paragraphs: Our review found that 7 of the 19 sponsors conducted capabilities-based  assessments, but these assessments varied in rigor and completeness. For  example, 4 of these 7 sponsors did not include the cost information called  for by Joint Staff guidance and 1 sponsor completed only one phase of the  capabilities-based assessment. Figure 5 shows the 7 sponsors that did  conduct capabilities-based assessments in support of their proposals and  the extent to which these assessments contained elements called for by  Joint Staff policy and guidance. We assessed these proposals as lacking an  element called for by Joint Staff policy and guidance when our document  review of the sponsor’s capabilities-based assessment found no evidence  of the element. Additional information about our methodology for  conducting this analysis is contained in appendix I.
The majority of the seven capabilities-based assessments that we reviewed  did not consider the full range of existing ISR capabilities, including the  use of national systems, such as satellites, as potential ways to fill  identified shortcomings. For example, only one assessment documented  that the sponsor had considered the use of national systems. Specifically,  one Air Force sponsor’s capabilities-based assessment showed  consideration of the use of satellites to assist in quickly sending  intelligence information gathered by unmanned aircraft systems to the  warfighter in theater. The remaining six sponsors did not demonstrate in  their capabilities-based assessments that they had fully assessed the use of  national systems, although two of the assessments addressed capabilities  that were unlikely to utilize national systems as potential solutions, such  as a foreign language translation capability and an intelligence database.  The sponsors who did not fully assess the potential for national systems to  fill gaps gave a number of reasons for this. Navy sponsors of a manned  platform told us that satellites were not included among the ways that they  considered to fill capability gaps because the personnel conducting the  assessment did not possess the appropriate security clearances needed to  evaluate national systems and because of lack of time. Moreover, Marine  Corps sponsors reported that neither of their two unmanned aircraft  system capability proposals fully evaluated the use of satellites as  potential ways to meet ISR needs because they assumed that satellites  could not be quickly re-tasked to support the tactical user and lacked the  imagery quality needed. In one of their assessments, they noted that  satellite data, when available, are not responsive enough to the tactical  user due to the long processing time, and that tactical users of satellite  data also face challenges resulting from lack of connectivity between the  systems that provide these data. In the other assessment, Marine Corps  sponsors stated that one of their assumptions in conducting the analysis  was that satellites, as well as theater-level unmanned aircraft systems,  would not be available to support Marine Corps tactical operations.
All seven sponsors that conducted capabilities-based assessments  considered the capacity of some existing and developing systems to meet  capability gaps, but none documented in their assessments whether and  how these systems could be modified to fill capability gaps—a potentially  less expensive and less time-consuming solution than developing a new  system. In some cases, DOD achieved efficiencies by combining related  acquisition programs, although these actions were not the result of  sponsors proactively seeking reduced overlap and duplication. For  example, in the capabilities-based assessment for one of its two unmanned  aircraft systems, Marine Corps sponsors identified several solutions with  the potential to provide an ISR capability using existing or planned assets.  Identified solutions included relying on or adopting systems provided by  other services. In this case, the sponsors did not propose modifications to  any existing systems as potential solutions or demonstrate that they  considered leveraging the capabilities resident in a similar Navy unmanned  aircraft system. The Joint Staff approved this proposal and Marine Corps  officials plan to develop a new system that addresses Marine Corps  warfighting requirements for vertical takeoff and landing capability for use  on ships. In contrast, in another case involving a proposed capability  sponsored by the Marine Corps, at the direction of the Assistant Secretary  of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, the Marine Corps  combined its unmanned aircraft system program with a different Navy  effort to form a single acquisition program, with the goal of producing an  integrated and interoperable solution, reducing costs, and eliminating  overlap and duplication of development efforts. In this case, the JCIDS  process did not help to identify the potential for collaboration on similar  ISR capabilities.
The majority of sponsors’ capabilities-based assessments that we reviewed  did not mention redundancies that existed or might result from the  development of their proposed new ISR capabilities. Specifically, only  three of the seven sponsors demonstrated that they had considered  potential redundancies in ISR capabilities when conducting their  assessments. For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency sponsor of a  proposal to develop a database cited the need to reduce redundant data  systems as a reason for its proposed capability. In addition, a Marine  Corps sponsor noted in its capabilities-based assessment that existing ISR  systems are experiencing overlaps in five capability areas related to  identification, monitoring, and tracking. Despite these examples of  identified redundancies in existing ISR capabilities, all of the sponsors  concluded that important capability gaps still existed and submitted  proposals that supported the development of a new ISR capability.
The seven sponsors of the capabilities-based assessments that were not  thorough and complete provided similar reasons as those provided by the  sponsors that did not conduct capabilities-based assessments at all—for  example, a shortage of time and resources and confusion about what was  required under the JCIDS process. In addition, some sponsors had already  developed a capability, or had the intended solution in mind, when  conducting their capabilities-based assessments. Moreover, sponsors that  conducted the assessments were hindered by a lack of comprehensive  information on existing and developmental ISR capabilities that might  potentially be used to fill the identified capability gap, and so could not  use this information to fully inform their assessments. Several sponsors  that conducted assessments told us that they faced challenges in  identifying the full range of existing and developmental-stage ISR systems,  in part because no centralized source of information existed. For example,  Army sponsors of a language translation capability said that, despite use of  personal connections and outreach to identify existing and developmental  technologies, it was only after they had finished their capabilities-based  assessment that they learned of a particular ISR technology that could  have informed their assessment. Sponsors agreed that a source of readily  available information on existing and developmental ISR capabilities  would be useful.
section_title: DOD Has Not Fully Implemented Key Oversight Activities in the Process for Developing Future ISR Capabilities
paragraphs: Although the BA FCB’s mission includes engaging in coordination during  the sponsors’ assessment process and providing oversight of potential  solutions to achieve optimum effectiveness and efficiency in ISR capability  development, the BA FCB did not systematically coordinate with the  sponsors to help ensure the quality of their capabilities-based assessments,  nor did it routinely review those assessments once they were completed.  The BA FCB did not implement these activities because it lacks a readily  available source of information that identifies all ISR capabilities that  would serve as a tool for reviewing the efficiency of sponsors’  assessments, and because the BA FCB does not have a monitoring  mechanism, which could ensure that key oversight activities are fully  implemented, as described in Joint Staff policy. In addition, BA FCB  officials said that they lack adequate numbers of dedicated, skilled  personnel to engage in early coordination with the sponsors and review  the sponsors’ capabilities-based assessments. As a result, DOD cannot be  assured that ISR capabilities approved through JCIDS provide joint  solutions to DOD’s ISR capability needs and are the solutions that best  minimize inefficiency and redundancy.
subsections: section_title: DOD Did Not Ensure Quality of Sponsors’ Assessments through Coordination with Sponsors or Review of Assessments
paragraphs: As described in Joint Staff policy, each Functional Capabilities Board’s  mission is to provide assessments and recommendations to enhance  capabilities integration, examine joint priorities among existing and future  programs, minimize duplication of effort throughout the services, and  provide oversight of potential solutions to achieve optimum effectiveness  and efficiency. Moreover, Joint Staff policy states that each Functional  Capabilities Board’s functions include assisting in overseeing capabilities  development within JCIDS through assessment of proposals for new or  improved capabilities. The BA FCB is the Functional Capabilities Board  that holds responsibility for the ISR functional area and, as such, is  responsible for seeking to ensure that the joint force is best served  throughout the JCIDS process. Additionally, Joint Staff policy calls on  each Functional Capabilities Board and its working group to perform  coordination functions within its respective capability area, to include (1)  engaging in coordination throughout the sponsors’ assessment process in  order to promote cross-service efficiencies, and (2) coordinating and  integrating departmentwide participation to ensure that sponsors’  assessments adequately leverage the expertise of the DOD components to  identify promising solutions. Through these assessment and coordination  functions, as well as other feedback avenues, the BA FCB provides the  analytical underpinnings in support of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council. After assessing proposals  and coordinating departmentwide participation, the BA FCB then makes  recommendations on ISR capability proposals to the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff in order to assist in the Chairman’s task of identifying and  assessing the priority of joint capabilities, considering alternatives to  acquisition programs, and ensuring that the priority of joint capabilities  reflects resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense.
Despite its coordination role, the BA FCB did not routinely engage in early  coordination with sponsors to communicate information necessary to  ensure comprehensive and rigorous analysis and to ensure that sponsors  were aware of other organizations’ and services’ existing and  developmental ISR capabilities. Our review showed that the BA FCB did  not coordinate with five of the seven sponsors while they were conducting  their capabilities-based assessments, although Joint Staff policy calls upon  the BA FCB to do so in order to promote efficiencies in ISR capability  development and to ensure that sponsors’ assessments adequately  leverage the expertise of the DOD components to identify promising  solutions. The five sponsors told us that they coordinated with the BA FCB  only after they had submitted their completed ISR capability proposals to  the BA FCB. Of the remaining two sponsors, one had minimal interaction  with the BA FCB, while the other was in contact with a member of the BA  FCB working group while conducting the capabilities-based assessment.  Once the BA FCB received copies of these ISR capability proposals, it did  facilitate departmentwide participation by serving as a forum where DOD  components formally commented on ISR capability proposals. Sponsors  are nevertheless responsible for addressing and resolving these comments.  For example, during the commenting process for an Army proposal for a  language translation capability, the National Security Agency expressed  disagreement, commenting that the Army proposal omitted practical  descriptions of how the technology would be achieved and did not address  policy and programming issues that it believed were the underlying cause  of the capability gap. Thus, although the BA FCB oversaw the commenting  process and provided the forum in which this discussion took place, the  Army and the National Security Agency resolved their disagreement by  revising the proposal with limited Joint Staff involvement.
Furthermore, the BA FCB did not systematically review the quality of the  sponsors’ capabilities-based assessments. Although the BA FCB is not  required by Joint Staff policy and guidance to review the sponsors’  capabilities-based assessments, such a review would serve as a means of  providing oversight of potential solutions to achieve optimum  effectiveness and efficiency—a key BA FCB task. Moreover, the lack of  early coordination to ensure the quality of the sponsors’ assessments  makes the review of the completed assessments an important tool for  enhancing capabilities integration and minimizing redundancies. BA FCB  members noted that sponsors’ analysis can and does take a variety of  forms, including studies that were done on related topics but were not  initially intended to support the ISR capability proposal. Members of the  BA FCB stated that they look for evidence of analysis underpinning the  ISR capability proposal, and if analysis has been conducted, they generally  consider it sufficient. However, BA FCB officials also told us that they  generally do not review sponsors’ capabilities-based assessments when  evaluating proposals for new ISR capabilities. We found that, of the seven  capabilities-based assessments that the sponsors conducted, the BA FCB  obtained copies of six, which were proactively provided to them by the  sponsors. For the one remaining capabilities-based assessment, the  sponsor reported that it did not provide copies of its assessment and the  BA FCB did not request them. In addition, the BA FCB did not obtain or  systematically review any alternative types of analysis that were used in  place of a capabilities-based assessment by the other sponsors that did not  conduct capabilities-based assessments. In all of these cases, the BA FCB  neither requested copies of the analysis, nor did the sponsor proactively  provide its alternative type of analysis.
section_title: DOD’s Limited Oversight of the Process for Developing Future ISR Capabilities Is Attributable to Several Factors
paragraphs: The BA FCB did not effectively oversee the process for developing future  ISR capabilities by ensuring the implementation of existing guidance  related to oversight activities, such as coordination with sponsors and  reviews of assessments, for three key reasons. First, the BA FCB has not  developed tools to enable systematic review of sponsors’ capabilities- based assessments. Specifically, the BA FCB lacks a comprehensive  source of information, augmenting the ISR Integration Roadmap, that  would identify the full range of existing and developmental ISR  capabilities within the ISR enterprise and serve as a tool for assessing the  jointness and efficiency of the sponsors’ proposed ISR solutions. Although  BA FCB officials agreed that knowing the full range of existing and  developmental ISR capabilities would be useful in reviewing sponsors’ ISR  capability proposals, no such complete and up-to-date source of  information currently exists. Without readily available information about  existing and developmental ISR capabilities, the BA FCB is limited in its  ability to systematically review sponsors’ capabilities-based assessments  to promote cross-service efficiencies in ISR capability development and to  conduct oversight of potential solutions to achieve optimum effectiveness  and efficiency. Moreover, the majority of the sponsors that conducted  assessments said they could not be certain that they had gathered all  relevant information to inform their respective assessments, stating that  their efforts to obtain information on existing and developmental ISR  capabilities were not systematic and often dependent on the use of  personal contacts. Some sponsors did take steps to identify existing DOD  ISR capabilities when conducting their assessments, such as reviewing a  JCIDS database containing other ISR capability proposals and contacting  others, both within and outside of their organizations, about potentially  related ISR capabilities. Nonetheless, the JCIDS database only contains  information on proposals submitted to the Joint Staff, not on existing and  developmental ISR capabilities that have been developed and fielded  through DOD processes other than JCIDS. In the absence of a  comprehensive source of information and early coordination to facilitate  the sharing of such information from the BA FCB to the sponsors,  sponsors drew from incomplete informational sources when conducting  their capabilities-based assessments and sponsors became aware of  shortfalls late in the review process. For example, one sponsor said its  proposal passed through two levels of Joint Staff review before the  sponsor was asked, at the final level of review, whether leveraging a  particular technology had been considered as a potential way to fill an  identified capability gap; the technology had not been considered because  the sponsor was not aware of it. In another case, a request from a high- level Joint Staff official later in the review process resulted in a Navy  sponsor and the BA FCB conducting an ad hoc effort, after the  development of the proposal, to research and develop a list of all DOD’s  ISR capabilities and demonstrate that a relevant capability gap existed.
Second, the BA FCB does not have the ability to effectively oversee the  process for developing future ISR capabilities because there is no  monitoring mechanism to ensure that key activities—such as early  coordination between sponsors and the BA FCB to facilitate the sharing of  information relevant to the sponsors’ assessments, and BA FCB review of  the assessments—are fully implemented. Standards for internal control in  the federal government provide a framework for agencies to achieve  effective and efficient operations and ultimately to improve  accountability. One of these standards requires that monitoring, such as  supervisory activities, should assess the quality of performance over time.  Specifically, managers should (1) identify performance gaps by comparing  actual performance and achievements to planned results, and (2)  determine appropriate adjustments to program management,  accountability, and resource allocation in order to improve overall mission  accomplishment. To this end, managers should use both ongoing  monitoring activities as well as separate evaluations to identify gaps, if  any, in performance. Without the development of a monitoring mechanism  to ensure implementation of key activities, the BA FCB may not be well- positioned to carry out its oversight of new ISR capabilities as called for  by existing Joint Staff guidance.
Third, BA FCB staff said that they lack adequate numbers of dedicated  personnel with engineering expertise to engage in early coordination with  sponsors and review the capabilities-based assessments that support the  ISR capability proposals. For example, BA FCB officials related that they  have 12 authorized positions to carry out the BA FCB’s responsibilities,  but, as of early December 2007, they had 7 assigned personnel— representing a fill rate of 58 percent—with only 4 or 5 of these devoted  full-time to BA FCB duties. BA FCB officials also stated that  representatives from DOD components who attend BA FCB meetings in  order to provide comments on new ISR capability proposals generally do  so as a collateral duty, while other components may not send a regularly  attending representative. Because the representatives who attend  sometimes vary from meeting to meeting and are attending only as a  collateral duty, BA FCB officials expressed concern about the ability of  the BA FCB to most effectively review proposals for new ISR capabilities.  Moreover, in addition to reviewing proposals for new ISR capabilities, BA  FCB officials have additional responsibilities, such as reviewing other  JCIDS documents for ISR capabilities that are in more advanced stages of  development and in obtaining feedback from combatant commanders on  warfighter needs. Determining the necessary workforce skills and  competencies for achieving current and future needs is a key function of  workforce planning. Without an assessment of the BA FCB’s capabilities  to perform its oversight activities related to the review of new ISR  capability proposals and coordination with the sponsors, the BA FCB may  not be well-positioned to fully carry out the task of promoting efficiencies  in ISR capability development.
Furthermore, Joint Staff officials stated that although the BA FCB has  coordination and oversight responsibilities, it lacks the ability to correct  stovepiped efforts that it identifies through the JCIDS process. For  example, BA FCB officials described a recent case in which two proposals  for similar environmental capabilities were submitted to the BA FCB by  different sponsors. However, the BA FCB does not have the ability to  require these two sponsors to work together on their respective capability  proposals or to combine them, according to Joint Staff officials. Despite  this, a Joint Staff official said the BA FCB is currently coordinating with  these sponsors to try to increase efficiencies. The Joint Requirements  Oversight Council approved both proposals, while directing the sponsors  of each to work with a designated board to examine ways to make the  programs more efficient, such as combining them. In addition, the  sponsors have preliminarily agreed to merge their respective ISR programs  during the next phase of the acquisition process. We are currently  conducting a separate review of the JCIDS process that focuses on the  extent to which the process has improved outcomes in weapons system  acquisition programs, including structural factors, if any, that affect DOD’s  ability to prioritize and balance capability needs. We expect our report  based on this review to be issued later in 2008.
Since the BA FCB did not conduct key oversight activities, including early  coordination with sponsors and review of their assessments, neither the  BA FCB nor the sponsors can be assured that the sponsors’ assessments  have considered the full range of potential joint solutions to minimize  inefficiency and redundancy in ISR capability development—a key aim of  the JCIDS process. Moreover, without a readily available source of  information about all existing and developmental ISR capabilities that  might potentially fill a gap, the BA FCB and the sponsors lack a tool to  facilitate departmentwide efficiencies when reviewing proposed ISR  capabilities. Accordingly, the process for developing future ISR  capabilities may not ensure identification of joint solutions for  requirements. The BA FCB recommendations inform which ISR capability  proposals are ultimately approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff as being essential to DOD’s ability to fight and win future wars. After  the Chairman approves ISR capability proposals, the military services and  DOD organizations may begin the process of developing and acquiring the  systems that deliver the validated capability. The systems, once acquired,  will likely deliver capabilities not only to the warfighter, but also to the  broader national intelligence community. Without effective oversight of  ISR capability development, efficient solutions are likely to go  unidentified, while new programs continue to move through development  without sufficient knowledge, potentially resulting in unnecessary  investment or cost increases and schedule delays further in the acquisition  process that affect the entire ISR enterprise. As sponsors of proposed ISR  capabilities each currently plan unique solutions to their similar needs,  oversight is key to achieving efficiencies among proposed ISR capabilities  at the outset of the capability development process.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Congress and DOD have consistently emphasized the importance of DOD  integrating its ISR activities across the defense and national intelligence  components of the ISR enterprise. Increased integration of the ISR  enterprise would help minimize capability redundancies and gaps and  maximize capability effectiveness by improving communication across the  defense and intelligence communities to leverage common investments for  common missions. Although DOD has taken steps to improve the  integration of ISR investments—such as by issuing the ISR Integration  Roadmap and managing a departmentwide portfolio of ISR capabilities— these initiatives do not provide ISR decision makers with a clear vision of  a future ISR enterprise and a unified investment approach to achieve that  vision. Without a clear vision and a unified investment approach, ISR  decision makers lack the key management tools they need to  comprehensively identify what ISR investments DOD needs to make to  achieve its strategic goals, evaluate tradeoffs between competing needs,  and assess progress in achieving strategic goals. Thus, USD(I) and other  senior DOD officials are not well-positioned to meet future ISR needs in a  more integrated manner by exerting discipline over ISR spending to  ensure progress toward strategic goals. Moreover, a long-term vision of a  future ISR enterprise, consisting of a well-defined target architecture that  depicts what ISR capabilities are needed to support strategic goals, would  be useful not only to ISR decision makers evaluating tradeoffs between  competing needs but also to sponsors developing proposals for new ISR  capabilities. Without readily available information on existing and  developmental ISR capabilities to assist the sponsors in developing the  assessments and the BA FCB in reviewing them, neither the sponsors nor  the BA FCB can be assured that these assessments have considered the  full range of potential joint solutions to minimize inefficiency and  redundancy in ISR capability development. Further, without a monitoring  mechanism to ensure implementation of Joint Staff policy calling for early  coordination between the BA FCB and the sponsors and for completion of  capabilities-based assessments, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council  may not receive complete assessments to support its decisions about the  most efficient and effective proposed ISR capabilities to meet defense and  national intelligence needs. Additionally, without consistent early  coordination and thorough reviews of assessments, sponsors participating  in DOD’s requirements identification process may not have an incentive to  conduct thorough assessments and may focus their proposals on their  individual needs without fully ensuring identification of joint solutions for  requirements. Finally, without a needs assessment that reviews the BA  FCB’s staffing levels, expertise, and workload to engage in early  coordination with sponsors and review capabilities-based assessments and  a plan, if needed, that addresses any identified shortfalls, the BA FCB may  not be well-positioned to conduct oversight of potential ISR solutions to  achieve optimum effectiveness and efficiency. Thus, DOD cannot be  assured that it is developing the optimal mix of ISR capabilities to achieve  its goals of better integrating the ISR enterprise.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following four actions:    Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to develop a  vision of a future ISR architecture that addresses a longer period of  time than the 5-year ISR budget and is based on an independent  analysis of expected future requirements and strategic goals. This  architecture should be sufficiently detailed to inform a comprehensive  assessment and prioritization of capability gaps and overlaps, to allow  decision makers to evaluate tradeoffs between competing needs, and to  assess progress in addressing capability gaps and overlaps in order to  achieve ISR strategic goals.
Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under  Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to collaborate, with one of these  organizations assigned as the lead, in developing a comprehensive  source of information, which augments the ISR Integration Roadmap,  on all existing and developmental ISR capabilities throughout the ISR  enterprise for sponsors to use in conducting capabilities-based  assessments and for the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities  Board to use in evaluating them.
Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a  supervisory review or other monitoring mechanism to ensure that (1)  the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board and the  sponsors engage in early coordination to facilitate sponsors’  consideration of existing and developmental ISR capabilities in  developing their capabilities-based assessments, (2) capabilities-based  assessments are completed, and (3) the Battlespace Awareness  Functional Capabilities Board uses systematic procedures for  reviewing the assessments.
Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to (1) review the  Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board’s staffing levels  and expertise and workload to engage in early coordination with  sponsors and review capabilities-based assessments, and (2) if  shortfalls are identified, develop a plan that addresses any identified  shortfalls of personnel, resources, or training, assigns responsibility for  actions, and establishes time frames for implementing the plan.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD and the Office of the Director of  National Intelligence. DOD provided written comments, in which it agreed  or partially agreed with three recommendations and disagreed with one  recommendation. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in  appendix II. In addition, both DOD and the Office of the Director of  National Intelligence provided technical comments, which we have  incorporated into the report as appropriate.
DOD agreed with our recommendation to develop a vision of a future ISR  architecture that addresses a longer period of time than the 5-year ISR  budget and is based on an independent analysis of expected future  requirements and strategic goals. The department stated that work is  underway to develop a future ISR architecture, including a plan of action  and milestones.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to develop a  comprehensive source of information on existing and developmental ISR  capabilities. In its written comments, DOD agreed that such a source of  information is needed to augment the ISR Integration Roadmap. However,  DOD stated that the task of developing this comprehensive source of  information to facilitate the identification of all capabilities throughout the  ISR enterprise should be assigned to the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence, as the Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Manager,  rather than the Joint Staff as we recommended. We originally  recommended that this task be directed to the Joint Staff because the need  for such a comprehensive source of information was most evident in the  difficulties in developing and reviewing ISR capability proposals as called  for under the JCIDS review process, which is managed by the Joint Staff.  We agree with DOD that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence,  who is responsible for both developing the ISR Integration Roadmap and  leading the Battlespace Awareness capability portfolio management effort,  is a key player in efforts to improve integration of future joint ISR  capabilities and could be logically assigned leadership responsibilities for  this task. We have modified this recommendation in the final report to  clarify that the Secretary of Defense could assign leadership to either  organization, in consultation with the other, to develop the comprehensive  source of information that sponsors and the BA FCB need. In the draft  report, we had included in this recommendation two actions that the Joint  Staff could take to improve the process for identifying future ISR  capabilities. In modifying this recommendation to reflect DOD’s comment  that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence could have the lead  role in developing the information source, we moved these two actions to  our third recommendation, thereby consolidating actions that the Joint  Staff needs to take into one recommendation that considers key  responsibilities within the JCIDS process.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation related to the need to  ensure that (1) the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board  and the sponsors engage in early coordination to facilitate sponsors’  consideration of existing and developmental ISR capabilities in developing  their capabilities-based assessments, (2) capabilities-based assessments  are completed, and (3) the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities  Board uses systematic procedures for reviewing the assessments. In its  written comments, DOD agreed that all three elements of this  recommendation are needed but stated that changes in guidance were not  needed. Our recommendation did not specifically call for additional  guidance but was focused on the need to execute existing guidance. For  example, as the report describes, Joint Staff policy calls for the sponsors  and Functional Capabilities Board to work together during the analysis  process, but the sponsors of the proposals we reviewed and the BA FCB  did not consistently engage in this coordination. In addition, although  Joint Staff policy gives the BA FCB responsibility for providing oversight  of potential solutions to achieve optimum effectiveness and efficiency in  ISR capability development, we found that the BA FCB did not  systematically review capabilities-based assessments as a means of  providing such oversight. In response to DOD’s comments, we modified  this recommendation to clarify that DOD should ensure compliance with  its existing guidance by developing a monitoring mechanism that would  ensure that early coordination takes place and that capabilities-based  assessments are completed and reviewed. In its comments, the  department also stated that our report is misleading because we evaluated  some programs initiated prior to the genesis of JCIDS. As our report  describes, the scope of our review included 19 ISR capability proposals  that were introduced only after the implementation of JCIDS in 2003. We  noted that some of these proposals used analysis conducted prior to the  implementation of JCIDS as a substitute for the capabilities-based  assessment that is required by the JCIDS process. However, we were  unable to apply JCIDS criteria to evaluate them because these proposals  did not have capabilities-based assessments. In addition, our  recommendation to ensure that capabilities-based assessments are  completed was based on our observations of all 19 ISR capability  proposals, including not only the 12 proposals that lacked capabilities- based assessments but also the 7 proposals whose assessments varied in  rigor and completeness.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the department (1) review  the BA FCB’s staffing levels and expertise and workload to engage in early  coordination with sponsors and review capabilities-based assessments,  and (2) if shortfalls of personnel, resources, or training needed are  identified, develop a plan to address them, including assigning  responsibility for actions and establishing time frames for implementing  the plan. In its written comments, the department stated that Joint Staff  policy clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of the sponsors and  Functional Capabilities Boards. We agree that Joint Staff policy defines  roles and responsibilities of these groups, and we note that this policy  assigns responsibility to both the sponsors and the Functional Capabilities  Board to coordinate with each other. We did not recommend that further  policy direction was needed, as DOD stated in its comments. DOD also  noted that it had conducted a review of Functional Capabilities Board  personnel and resources in fiscal year 2007, which did not identify  deficiencies. However, workload issues and lack of technical skills among  staff were mentioned to us by defense officials as reasons why early  coordination and reviews were not being systematically performed as part  of the BA FCB’s oversight function—a key function called for in Joint Staff  policy. Therefore, in light of our finding that the BA FCB did not fully  implement these key oversight activities, we continue to believe that the  department should reconsider whether the BA FCB has the appropriate  number of staff with the appropriate skills to fully implement these  oversight activities.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its  date. At that time, we will send  copies of this report to interested  congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary  of Defense for Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the  Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the  Marine Corps; the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and the  Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, this report is available at no  charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To describe the challenges, if any, that the Department of Defense (DOD)  faces in working to achieve an integrated ISR enterprise, we reviewed  documents on the operation of DOD’s ISR enterprise and the national  intelligence community and discussed the ISR enterprise and its  complexities with a variety of defense-related intelligence organizations,  as well as with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.  Specifically, we discussed coordination challenges faced by components  of DOD’s ISR enterprise with officials from the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Arlington, VA; the Joint Staff,  Arlington, Va.; the National Security Space Office, Fairfax, Va.; U.S.  Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component Command for ISR,  Washington, D.C.; the Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.; the  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Reston, Va.; and the National  Security Agency, Annapolis Junction, Md.; and the Office of the Director of  National Intelligence, Washington, D.C.
To assess DOD’s management approach for improving integration of  future ISR investments, we reviewed DOD’s ISR Integration Roadmap and  other ISR integration efforts within DOD. We compared DOD’s ISR  Integration Roadmap to key elements of an enterprise architecture to  determine whether the Roadmap, in whole or in part, met these key  elements. We identified these key elements by reviewing DOD and federal  guidance on enterprise architecture best practices, specifically the  Department of Defense Architecture Framework and the Chief  Information Officer Council’s Practical Guide to Federal Enterprise  Architecture. In addition, we reviewed the implementation of the  Battlespace Awareness capability portfolio management test case led by  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. We  compared these efforts to portfolio management best practices we  identified by reviewing our past work on this subject. We also obtained  information from and discussed DOD’s ISR Integration Roadmap and DOD  ISR integration efforts and challenges with senior officials from the Office  of the Secretary of Defense, Arlington, Va.; the Joint Staff, Arlington, Va.;  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Arlington,  Va.; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and  Information Integration, Arlington, Va.; the National Security Space Office,  Fairfax, Va.; U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component  Command for ISR, Washington, D.C.; the Defense Intelligence Agency,  Washington, D.C.; and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,  Washington, D.C.
To evaluate the extent to which DOD has implemented key activities  within the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)  to ensure that proposed new ISR capabilities fill gaps, are not duplicative,  and use a joint approach to filling warfighters’ needs based on a thorough  analysis of existing capabilities, we identified 19 ISR capability proposals,  described in table 1, that were submitted to the Joint Staff since the  implementation of JCIDS in 2003 and for which the Battlespace Awareness  Functional Capabilities Board was designated the lead Functional  Capabilities Board. In total, there were 20 ISR capability proposals that  met these criteria; however, 1 of the 20 proposals, along with its  underlying capabilities-based assessment, was highly classified and, since  we did not have the appropriate security clearances, we did not review  this proposal. For the remaining 19 ISR capability proposals, we evaluated  the extent to which they were generated and validated in accordance with  Joint Staff policies and procedures.
Specifically, for each of the 19 capability proposals, we obtained  capabilities-based assessments or other JCIDS analysis documents that  were produced by sponsors of these ISR capability proposals, and we  performed a dependent document review of the 7 ISR capability proposals  that included a capabilities-based assessment, using a data collection  instrument based on applicable versions of the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01, Joint Capabilities Integration and  Development System. In conducting this document review, we considered  whether these JCIDS analysis documents showed evidence of the  following elements: (1) a full review conducted, (2) cost information  included, (3) consideration of the full range of existing and developmental  stage ISR assets, (4) consideration of modifications as potential solutions,  and (5) consideration of potential redundancies. The results of this  analysis are shown in figure 5 of this report. Our specific methodology for  this analysis is as follows:    To determine whether a full review had been conducted, we  determined whether a Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) and  Functional Solution Analysis (FSA) existed and whether they flowed  from a Functional Area Analysis (FAA) and FNA, respectively. As  generally described in Joint Staff guidance, an FAA identifies the  operational tasks, conditions, and standards needed to achieve military  objectives. An FNA assesses the ability of current and planned systems  to deliver the capabilities and tasks identified in the FAA in order to  produce a list of capability gaps and identify redundancies. An FSA will  identify joint approaches to fill the identified capability gaps.
To determine whether cost information was included, we reviewed  whether the FSA considered costs of the proposed solutions. As  generally described in Joint Staff guidance, the FSA analysis must  evaluate the cost to develop and procure materiel approaches  compared to the cost of sustaining an existing capability.
To determine whether the full range of existing and developmental- stage ISR assets was considered, we reviewed whether the FSA  considered interagency or foreign materiel solutions and whether the  FNA or FSA considered the full range of joint solutions. We defined the  full range of joint solutions as including strategic, operational, and  tactical ISR assets as well as developing or recently developed ISR  systems. As generally described in Joint Staff policy, the FNA assesses  the entire range of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, logistics,  personnel, and facilities and policy as an inherent part of defining  capability needs, and the FSA assesses all potential materiel and non- materiel ways to fill capability gaps as identified by the FNA, including  changes that leverage existing materiel capabilities, product  improvements, and adoption of interagency or foreign materiel  solutions.
To determine whether modifications were considered as potential  solutions, we reviewed whether the FSA considered using existing  systems differently or modifying policies and processes. As generally  described in Joint Staff guidance, the FSA is to identify combinations of  materiel and non-materiel approaches and examine additional  approaches by conducting market research to determine whether  commercial or non-developmental items are available or could be  modified to meet the desired capability.
To determine whether potential redundancies were considered, we  reviewed whether either the FNA or the FSA identified potentially  redundant ISR capabilities. As generally described in Joint Staff  guidance, an FNA should describe a capability overlap by comparing  desired functions with current capabilities. However, we considered  the capabilities-based assessment as having identified potential  redundancies if such redundancies were included in either the FNA or  FSA.
We identified the above elements by analyzing current and superseded  versions of the Joint Staff instruction on the JCIDS process—specifically,  the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01, Joint  Capabilities Integration and Development System—to determine the  changes over time and the criteria common to all versions. Further, we  reviewed the following policies and procedures related to the validation of  ISR capabilities through JCIDS: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  Instruction 5123.01, Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight  Council; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3137.01, The  Functional Capabilities Board Process; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff Instruction 3170.01, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development  System; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01,  Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development  System. In order to conduct this review of JCIDS policies and procedures,  we included in our scope the current and superseded versions of these  guidance documents; accordingly, we reviewed all instructions and  manuals relevant to DOD’s JCIDS process that were in effect at some point  between the publication of the initial JCIDS instruction (Joint Chiefs of  Staff Instruction 3170.01A, dated June 24, 2003) and the conclusion of our  review (March 2008). In addition, we obtained insight into the procedures  and challenges associated with validating proposals for new ISR  capabilities through discussions with officials from the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Arlington, Va.; the Joint Staff,  Arlington, Va.; the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board,  Arlington, Va.; and the sponsors of the 19 ISR capability proposals that we  reviewed. The sponsors with whom we spoke were officials from the Air  Force; Army; Navy; Marine Corps; U.S. Special Operations Command; U.S.  Joint Forces Command; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency; and National Security Agency.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Margaret G. Morgan, Assistant  Director; Catherine H. Brown; Gabrielle A. Carrington; Frank Cristinzio;  Grace Coleman; Jay Smale; and Karen Thornton made key contributions to  this report.