Military Personnel: A Strategic Approach Is Needed to Improve Joint Officer Development
Published: 2003-03-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has increasingly engaged in multiservice and multinational operations. Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, in part, so that DOD's military leaders would be better prepared to plan, support, and conduct joint operations. GAO assessed DOD actions to implement provisions in the law that address the development of officers in joint matters and evaluated impediments affecting DOD's ability to fully respond to the provisions in the act.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has not taken a strategic approach to develop officers in joint matters. It has not identified how many joint specialty officers it needs, and it has not yet, within a total force concept, fully addressed how it will provide joint officer development to reserve officers who are serving in joint organizations--despite the fact that no significant operation can be conducted without reserve involvement. As of fiscal year 2001, DOD has promoted more officers with previous joint experience to the general and flag officer pay grades that it did in fiscal year 1995. However, in fiscal year 2001, DOD still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to promote one in four officers to these senior pay grades. Furthermore, DOD is still not fully meeting provisions to promote mid-grade officers who are serving or who have served in joint positions at rates not less than the promotion rates of their peers who have not served in joint positions. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met more than 90 percent of its promotion goals for officers who served on the Joint Staff, almost 75 percent of its promotion goals for joint specialty officers, and just over 70 percent of its promotion goals for all other officers who served in joint positions. DOD has met provisions in the act that require it to develop officers in joint matters through education by establishing a two-phased joint professional military education program. The act, however, did not establish specific numerical requirements, and DOD has also not determined the number of officers who should complete the joint education. In fiscal year 2001, only one-third of the officers who were serving in joint organizations had completed both phases of the education. DOD has also increasingly relied on allowable waivers and has not filled all of its critical joint duty positions with officers who hold a joint specialty designation. This number reached an all-time high in fiscal year 2001 when DOD did not fill 311, or more than one-third, of its 808 critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee to  discuss the implementation of legislative provisions addressing joint  officer development that are contained in the Goldwater-Nichols  Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Prior to 1986, the  Department of Defense (DOD) primarily operated under a culture in which  the four military services educated their officers in service-specific  matters, assigned their most talented officers to key service positions, and  promoted them to leadership positions within their own service. This  arrangement served DOD well when military operations fell primarily  within the capabilities of one of the military branches. Given that DOD  was increasingly moving toward engaging in joint – multiservice and  multinational – operations, however, Congress recognized that cultural  change was needed to move DOD away from its service parochialisms  toward interservice cooperation and coordination. Congress also believed  that DOD needed to better prepare its military leaders to plan, support,  and conduct joint operations.
Toward that end, Mr. Chairman, the act has been hailed as landmark  legislation, given the significance of the cultural change that it was  designed to achieve, and DOD has, in fact, subsequently issued joint vision  statements that anticipate an armed force that will be “fully joint:  intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.”  During the 16 years since the act’s passage, however, DOD has repeatedly  sought legislative relief from the act’s provisions that address the  development of officers in joint matters and, although it has complied with  many of these provisions, it is still experiencing difficulties in  implementing some of its joint officer development programs and policies.
Mr. Chairman, in our recently issued report to you on joint officer  development, we recommended that DOD develop a strategic plan that  will link joint officer development to DOD’s overall mission and goals.   My statement today will address (1) the need for DOD to develop this  strategic plan, (2) the successes and limitations that DOD has experienced  in promoting officers who have previous joint experience, and (3) the  challenges DOD has experienced in educating its officers in joint matters  and then filling key positions with officers who have the requisite joint  education and experience.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was, in part, to reorganize DOD  into a more unified military structure. Within that act, Congress included  several provisions that specifically address the promotion of officers  serving in joint positions, the education of officers in joint matters, and  their assignment to joint organizations. The act also established a joint  specialty officer designation for officers who are specifically trained in  and oriented toward joint matters. Although the act contains a number of  specific requirements, Congress also provided DOD with flexibility in  meeting the requirements by granting it waiver authority when it can  demonstrate justification. DOD approves waivers on a case-specific basis.  These waivers apply to a number of the provisions, including (1) the  methods for designating joint specialty officers, (2) the posteducation  assignments for joint specialty officers, (3) the assignment of joint  specialty officers to critical joint duty positions, and (4) the promotions of  officers to the general and flag officer pay grades.
Moreover, Congress has issued follow-on reports and made changes to the  law in subsequent legislation. For example, a congressional panel on  military education issued a report in April 1989 that contained numerous  recommendations regarding joint professional military education. Among  other things, this panel recommended that the services’ professional  military education schools teach both service and joint matters and that  the student body and faculty at each of the service schools include officers  from the other services. DOD has implemented these recommendations.  Most recently, Congress amended the law regarding the promotion criteria  for officers being considered for promotion to the general and flag officer  pay grades. The Goldwater-Nichols Act established a requirement that  officers must have served in a joint position prior to being selected for  these promotions. The amendment, contained in the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, will require most officers being  considered for appointment to this grade after September 30, 2007, to  complete the joint education program as well.
DOD uses a number of multiservice and multinational commands and  organizations to plan and support joint matters. Since passage of the  Goldwater-Nichols Act, officers serving in these commands and  organizations have overseen a number of joint and multinational military  operations that range from humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping to  major operations such as Operation Desert Storm and ongoing operations  in Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2001, DOD had a total of 9,146 joint positions.  Of these positions, 3,400 positions, or 37 percent, were allocated to the Air  Force; 3,170 positions, or 35 percent, were allocated to the Army;   2,004 positions, or 22 percent, were allocated to the Navy; and  572 positions, or 6 percent, were allocated to the Marine Corps.
Officers in pay grades O-4 (majors in the Air Force, Army, and Marine  Corps and lieutenant commanders in the Navy) and above can receive  credit for joint experience when they serve in the Joint Staff, joint  geographic and functional commands, combined forces commands, and  defense agencies. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has the authority to  award joint credit to officers for serving in certain joint task force  headquarters staffs. DOD has developed a joint duty assignment list that  includes all active duty positions in pay grades O-4 and above in the  multiservice organizations that are involved in or support the integrated  employment of the armed forces. DOD’s policy places limits on the  number of positions in the defense agencies and other jointly staffed  activities that can be included on the list.
DOD uses a two-phased approach to educate officers in joint matters. It  incorporated the first phase of the program into the curricula of the  services’ intermediate- and senior-level professional military education  schools. DOD offers the second phase of the program at the National  Defense University’s Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. This  phase is designed to provide officers with the opportunity to study in a  truly joint environment and to apply the knowledge they gained during the  first phase of their joint education. DOD also offers a combined program  that includes both phases at the National Defense University’s National  War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington,  D.C.
section_title: Lack of a Strategic Approach Is Contributing to DOD’s Difficulties to Fully Respond to the Act’s Intent
paragraphs: A significant impediment affecting DOD’s ability to fully realize the  cultural change that was envisioned by the act is the fact that DOD has not  taken a strategic approach that establishes clear goals for officer  development in joint matters and links those goals to DOD’s overall  mission and goals. This lack of an overarching vision or strategy may  continue to hamper DOD’s ability to make continued progress in this area.  A well-developed human capital strategy would provide a means for  aligning all elements of DOD’s human capital management, including joint  officer development, with its broader organizational objectives.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act not only defined new duty positions and  educational requirements but also envisioned a new culture that is truly  oriented toward joint matters. Moreover, DOD’s Joint Vision 2020 portrays  a future in which the armed forces are “fully joint: intellectually,  operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.” The key  question, today, is how does DOD best seize the opportunity to build on  current momentum. In April 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense  issued the Military Personnel Human Resource Strategic Plan to establish  military priorities for the next several years. The new military personnel  strategy captures DOD leadership’s guidance regarding aspects of  managing human capital, but the strategy’s linkage to the overall mission  and programmatic goals is not stated. DOD’s human capital strategy does  not address the vision cited in Joint Vision 2020. DOD’s human capital  approach to joint officer development – if it were linked to its overall  mission – would emphasize individuals with the knowledge, skills, and  abilities needed to function in the joint environment.
DOD, for example, has not fully assessed how many joint specialty officers  it actually needs. The number of joint specialty officers has decreased by  almost 60 percent over the years, from just over 12,400 joint specialty  officers in fiscal year 1990 to approximately 4,900 joint specialty officers in  fiscal year 2001, yet DOD has a significant backlog of officers who,  although otherwise qualified, have not been designated as joint specialty  officers. Moreover, without knowing how many joint specialty officers it  needs, DOD’s joint professional military education system may not be  structured or targeted properly. For example, without first defining how  many officers should be joint specialty officers – all officers, most officers,  or only those needed to fill joint positions – DOD has not been able to  determine the number of joint professional military graduates it needs.  DOD does not know if the total number of available seats is sufficient to  meet its needs or if it will need to explore alternatives for providing joint  education to greater numbers of officers.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act states that the Secretary of Defense should  establish personnel policies for reserve officers that emphasize education  and experience in joint matters. However, at the time of our review, the  Secretary of Defense had not yet, within a total force concept, fully  addressed how it will provide joint officer development to reserve officers  who are serving in joint organizations – despite the fact that no significant  operation can be conducted without reserve involvement. Providing  education in joint matters to reservists has become increasingly important  since 1986, given that DOD has increasingly relied on reservists in the  conduct of its mission. Further, with 1.2 million reservists in seven  components, they represent almost half of our nation’s total force. When  the act was enacted, reservists were viewed primarily as an expansion  force that would supplement active forces during a major war. In addition,  the current mobilization for the war on terrorism is adding to this  increased use and is expected to last a long time. We interviewed officers  at several joint organizations and found that reservists are serving in  positions at all levels from the Chief of Staff at one command down to the  mid-grade officer positions. Moreover, DOD has identified 2,904 additional  positions that it will fill with reservists when it operates under mobilized  conditions.
Moreover, data suggest that the four services continue to struggle to  balance joint requirements against their own service needs and vary in the  degree of importance that they place on joint education, assignments, and  promotions. The Air Force, for example, has been able to send a higher  percentage of its officers to a joint position after the officers attend a joint  professional military education school. In fiscal year 2001, 44 percent of  Air Force officers serving in joint positions had previously attended a joint  professional military education school. In contrast, 38 percent of Army  officers and 33 percent of Navy and Marine Corps officers serving in joint  positions had attended a joint professional military education school prior  to their joint assignments.
section_title: DOD Is Promoting Officers with Joint Experience with Mixed Results
paragraphs: The Goldwater-Nichols Act set a requirement that officers must complete  a full tour of duty in a joint assignment, or receive a waiver, prior to being  selected for appointment to the general and flag officer pay grade.
DOD’s reliance on good-of-the-service waivers, in particular, to promote  officers who had not previously served in joint positions is one indicator  of how DOD is promoting its general and flag officers. The service  secretaries request use of this waiver authority when they believe they  have sound justification for promoting an officer who (1) has not  completed a full tour of duty in a joint position and (2) does not qualify for  promotion through one of the other four specific waivers. We analyzed the  extent to which DOD has relied on this waiver category to promote its  senior officers because these waivers apply most directly to the population  of general and flag officers who are likely to be assigned to senior  leadership positions in joint organizations.
DOD approved 185 good-of-the-service waivers, representing 11 percent of  the 1,658 promotions to the general and flag officer pay grades, between  fiscal years 1989 and 2001. Specifically, DOD approved 10 or more good-of- the-service waivers each year between fiscal years 1989 and 1998 and only  3 to 7 waivers in fiscal years 1999 through 2001. The Secretary of Defense  has paid particular attention to this waiver category and, in 2000,  established a policy that restricts the use of good-of-the-service waivers to  10 percent of total promotions to the general and flag officer pay grades  each year. In the 2 years since the Secretary of Defense issued limitations  on the use of these waivers, DOD has used them in about  5 percent of its promotions. Our analysis of general and flag officer  promotions showed that, between fiscal years 1995 and 2000, the Marine  Corps used good-of-the-service waivers to promote 19 percent of its  officers to brigadier general. The Army used this waiver authority for  17 percent of its promotions, and the Navy used the authority for   13 percent of its promotions. In contrast, the Air Force only requested one  good-of-the-service waiver during that time period.
For most appointments to the general and flag level made after September  30, 2007, officers will have to meet the requirements expected of a joint  specialty officer. This means that most officers, in addition to completing  a full tour of duty in a joint position, will also have to complete DOD’s  joint education program as well. Our analysis of the 124 general and flag  officers promoted in fiscal year 2001 showed that 58 officers, or  47 percent, had not fulfilled the joint specialty officer requirements. These  58 officers included 18 of 43 officers promoted in the Air Force, 18 of   40 officers promoted in the Army, 19 of 33 officers promoted in the Navy,  and 3 of the 8 officers promoted in the Marine Corps.
We also analyzed DOD’s use of the four additional waiver categories. As of  fiscal year 2001, DOD has been promoting more officers who had the  requisite joint experience to the general and flag officer pay grades than it  did in fiscal year 1995. In fiscal year 2001, however, DOD still relied on  allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to promote one in four  officers to these senior pay grades. Figure 1 shows that the percentage of  officers who were selected for promotion to the general and flag officer  pay grades, and who had previous joint experience, rose from 51 percent  in fiscal year 1995 to 80 percent in fiscal year 1999. Figure 1 also shows,  however, that DOD experienced slight increases in the use of waivers in  fiscal years 2000 and 2001.
DOD has made progress, but is still not fully meeting provisions to  promote mid-grade officers (majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels in  the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps and lieutenant commanders,  commanders, and captains in the Navy) who are serving or who have  served in joint positions at rates not less than the promotion rates of their  peers who have not served in joint positions. The Goldwater-Nichols Act  established promotion policy objectives for officers serving in pay grades  O-4 and above who (1) are serving on or have served on the Joint Staff,  (2) are designated as joint specialty officers, and (3) are serving or have  served in other joint positions.
DOD has been most successful in meeting the promotion objective set for  officers assigned to the Joint Staff. The act established an expectation that  officers who are serving or have served on the Joint Staff be promoted, as  a group, at a rate not less that the rate of officers who are serving or have  served in their service headquarters.  Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001,  DOD met this objective 92 percent of the time.
The act further established an expectation that joint specialty officers, as a  group, be promoted at a rate not less than the rate of officers who are  serving or have served in their service headquarters. Between fiscal years  1995 and 2001, DOD met this promotion objective 74 percent of the time.  Where DOD did not meet its promotion objective was somewhat random,  and we were not able to attribute problem areas to specific pay grades or  services. This standard has been temporarily reduced, and, through  December 2004, DOD is required to promote joint specialty officers, as a  group, at a rate not less than the rate for other officers in the same service,  pay grade, and competitive category. We also compared the promotion  rates of joint specialty officers against this lower standard and found that,  with few exceptions, DOD would have met this standard between fiscal  years 1988 and 2001.
DOD has made less significant improvement in meeting its promotion  objective for officers assigned to other joint organizations. The act  established an expectation that officers who are serving or have served in  joint positions be promoted, as a group, at a rate not less than the rate for  all officers in their service. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met  this objective 71 percent of the time. With few exceptions during the last  7 years, all services met the promotion objective for their officers being  promoted to the O-5 pay grade who are assigned to other joint  organizations. However, the services have had significant difficulty  meeting the promotion objectives for their officers being promoted to the  O-6 pay grade. For example, the Navy has failed to meet this objective for  its O-6 officers since fiscal year 1988, and the Army has only met this  promotion objective twice – in fiscal years 1995 and 2001 – since fiscal  year 1988. The Air Force has generally met this objective for its officers at  the O-6 pay grade, but it has not met this objective in the past 4 years.  Conversely, the Marine Corps had difficulty in meeting this promotion  objective for its officers at the O-6 pay grade between fiscal years 1988 and  1994, but it met this objective in every year until fiscal year 2001.
section_title: Positive Actions Taken, but Gaps Remain in Education and Assignments
paragraphs: One of the provisions in the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires DOD to  develop officers, in part, through education in joint matters. Accordingly,  DOD has defined joint education requirements in terms of a two-phased  program in joint matters. Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense is  required to educate sufficient numbers of officers so that approximately  one-half of the joint positions are filled at any time by officers who have  either successfully completed the joint professional education program or  received an allowable waiver to complete the education after their  assignment. The act, however, did not identify a specific numerical  requirement and, similarly, DOD has not established numerical goals  concerning the number of officers who should complete joint professional  military education.
According to DOD data, only one-third of the officers serving in joint  positions in fiscal year 2001 had received both phases of the joint  education program. This is due, in large part, to space and facility  limitations at the National Defense University Schools that provide the  second phase. Although DOD assigns approximately 3,000 active duty  officers to joint positions each year, the three schools, collectively, have  about 1,200 seats available for active duty officers.
Furthermore, the Joint Forces Staff College, from which most officers  receive the second phase, is currently operating at 83 percent of its  906-seat capacity. Moreover, the number of unfilled seats at the Joint  Forces Staff College has risen significantly in recent years, from a low of  12 empty seats in fiscal year 1998 to a high of 154 empty seats in fiscal year  2001. DOD officials cited pressing needs to assign officers to the  increasing number of military operations as the major reason for these  vacancies. A Joint Staff officer responsible for joint education expressed  concern about the services’ ability to fill seats in the future due to the  ongoing war on terrorism.
Logistics, timing, and budget issues are also making it difficult for officers  to attend the second phase of the joint education program. The Joint  Forces Staff College offers the second phase three times during the year  and, by law, may not be less than 3 months. The Joint Forces Staff  College can only accommodate approximately 300 students in each  3-month term and does not have the space to receive all of the service  professional military education school graduates at the same time. Given  that, officers can report to their joint position after completing the first  phase and subsequently attend the second phase on a temporary duty  basis at some point during their assignment. However, officers and senior  leaders at the sites we visited told us that their joint commands cannot  afford a 3-month gap in a position due to pressing schedules and workload  demands. Officers serving on the Joint Staff told us that a former  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had instituted a policy that the Joint  Staff would not send officers to the Joint Forces Staff College – or to any  other training lasting more than 30 days – after they reported to the Joint  Staff for duty. DOD officials confirmed this and explained that the former  chairman instituted this policy with the expectation that the services  would send their officers to the second phase of the education before  sending them to their Joint Staff assignments. The services, however, are  still not sending all officers to the second phase before they assign officers  to the Joint Staff. In addition to logistics and timing issues, related budget  issues exist. When an officer attends the second phase en route to a joint  command, the officer’s service pays the expenses associated with sending  the officer to the Joint Forces Staff College. When the officer attends the  program midtour, the joint organization pays the expenses.
In addition, considerable variation exists among the services in terms of  the number of officers each service sends to the Joint Forces Staff College.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has directed that the seats be  allocated among the services in accordance with the distribution of  service positions on the joint duty assignment list. The percentage of seats  reserved for each service at the school does, in fact, reflect the distribution  on the list. However, while the Air Force filled almost 98 percent and the  Marine Corps 91 percent of their allocated seats in academic year 2001, the  Army filled only 77 percent of its seats and the Navy filled only 67 percent  of its seats. Moreover, vacancy rates for the Army and the Navy have, for  the most part, increased between academic years 1996 and 2001.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act, as amended, further requires DOD to  designate at least 800 joint positions as critical joint duty positions –  positions where the duties and responsibilities are such that it is highly  important that officers assigned to the positions are particularly trained in,  and oriented toward, joint matters. DOD has met this requirement and has  designated 808 positions as critical joint duty positions. However, DOD is  also required to place only joint specialty officers in these positions unless  the Secretary exercises his waiver authority. DOD has increasingly used  its waiver authority to meet this requirement. The percentage of critical  joint duty positions that were filled by officers other than joint specialty  officers steadily increased from 9 percent in fiscal year 1996 to 38 percent  in fiscal year 2001. This number reached an all-time high in fiscal year  2001, when DOD did not fill 311, or more than one-third, of its critical joint  duty positions with joint specialty officers. In addition, DOD has left other  critical joint duty positions vacant. The percentage of unfilled critical joint  duty positions has steadily increased from 8 percent in fiscal year 1989 to  22 percent in fiscal year 2001. Therefore, only 331 positions, or 41 percent,  of the 808 critical joint duty positions were filled by joint specialty officers  in fiscal year 2001.
The services fill these critical joint duty positions with officers who have  both the joint specialty designation and the appropriate primary military  skill, any additional required skills, and pay grade. However, when (1) no  joint specialty officer with the other requisite skills is available for  assignment (e.g., pay grade and military occupation) or (2) the best- qualified candidate is not a joint specialty officer, a waiver must be  approved to fill the position with an otherwise qualified officer. Service  and Joint Staff officials explained DOD’s inability to fill a critical position  with a joint specialty officer may be due to the fact that the critical joint  duty position description may not reflect the commander’s needs at the  time the position is filled. These officials told us that the most frequently  cited reason for requesting an allowable waiver was because the  commander believed that the best-qualified officer for the position was not  a joint specialty officer.
In addition, DOD’s population of joint specialty officers may not be  sufficient to meet this requirement. By fiscal year 1990, DOD had  designated just over 12,400 officers, who already had the joint education  and experience, as joint specialty officers. However, DOD experienced a  56 percent decrease in its joint specialty officers between fiscal years 1990  and 1997 and has experienced moderate decreases in fiscal years 2000 and  2001. By fiscal year 2001, DOD had approximately 4,900 designated joint  specialty officers. Officials on the Joint Staff attributed the decreases in  the early years to the fact that the attrition of officers who received the  designation in fiscal year 1990 has exceeded the number of new  designations of joint specialty officers. DOD officials also projected that  they would need to designate approximately 800 new joint specialty  officers each year to maintain its current population. Our review of data  since fiscal year 1990 found that DOD only met this projection in fiscal  years 1998, 1999, and 2001. Figure 2 shows the number of new  designations of joint specialty officers each year and the total number of  joint specialty officers for fiscal years 1990 through 2001.