Presidential Helicopter Acquisition: Program Makes Progress in Balancing Requirements, Costs, and Schedule
Published: 2013-04-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The VXX is a Navy program to develop a replacement for the current fleet of presidential helicopters. The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 directed GAO to review and report annually to the congressional defense committees on the program. GAO has reported on the program twice previously. The first report identified major lessons learned from a prior terminated program that should be applied in the follow-on program. The second covered the program's progress, upgrades to the existing helicopters, and plans for moving the program forward. This is the last of the required reports. It discusses (1) the program's progress over the past year, particularly regarding evaluation of alternatives, and (2) DOD's efforts to develop key technologies for the VXX aircraft. GAO examined program documents; interviewed officials; and compared the AOA with elements GAO previously reported are needed for a robust AOA, and cost estimating and analysis standards. GAO also assessed the Navy's approach to developing key technologies and progress made.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Navy made progress in the past year in establishing a sound VXX business case that reflects a rational balance between requirements, costs and schedule. In 2012, the Navy completed an updated Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) based on refined requirements and an acquisition approach that would leverage mature technologies from outside the program onto an in-production commercial or military airframe--allowing the program to begin in the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the Department of Defense's (DOD) acquisition process. The 2012 AOA reflected additional trade-offs made among cost, schedule, risk, and performance. Some key performance requirements changed from the terminated VH-71 program to the VXX.
Per the AOA, using this approach would reduce investment cost by approximately $1.5 billion (19.7 percent) and shorten the schedule by about 18 percent from the approach anticipated in 2010, which included more time and cost to develop technology within the program.
DOD's Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation deemed the AOA sufficient to inform future acquisition decisions and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics approved the program to move forward toward a decision to begin engineering and manufacturing development. GAO's review of the AOA found it to be sufficient for this phase of the acquisition.
DOD's efforts to ensure key technologies are ready for integration into VXX aircraft are also making progress. The Navy's acquisition approach relies on the government providing mature technologies for integration into an in-production aircraft selected for the VXX program. These technologies either exist or are in development. Their use will be an important factor in achieving the reduced cost and schedule the Navy seeks. While the program reports that these efforts are on track and assesses the risks of integration as low, it is possible that key technologies may not be realized as planned or be as easy to integrate as anticipated. To mitigate integration risk, the Navy is making use of an integration laboratory and plans to demonstrate key technologies in a test aircraft.
Building on these decisions, the program will have to manage challenges in a number of areas, including holding the line on VXX requirements, controlling helicopter weight growth, and ensuring that efforts to mitigate integration risks are adequately planned, resourced, and executed.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD stated that it would ensure that mitigations are in place to address potential risk areas. It believes its efforts are aligned with GAO's best practices and the recommendations in GAO's 2011 report on the program and plans to continue to monitor program progress in view of these standards.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In June 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) terminated the Navy’s  VH-71 presidential helicopter program because of cost growth, schedule  delays, and a projected shortfall in system performance. The Navy  subsequently began work to define a follow-on program, now known as  VXX, to acquire aircraft to replace the current presidential helicopters.  The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011  directed that we review and report annually to the congressional defense  committees on the program beginning in 2011 and ending in 2013. We  have previously issued two reports in response to this requirement. In the  first, we identified major lessons learned from the terminated program that  should be applied in the follow-on program. In the second, we provided  information on the program’s delays and on DOD’s planned upgrades to  the in-service fleet of presidential helicopters and plans for moving the  program forward. This is the last of the required GAO reports. It  discusses (1) the program’s progress over the past year, particularly  regarding the evaluation of alternatives, and (2) DOD’s efforts to develop  key technologies and capabilities for integration into VXX aircraft.
To determine the progress of the VXX program since our last report, we  examined program documents and interviewed program officials. We  assessed the program’s Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) report and  supporting materials against GAO identified factors that have affected the  scope and quality of AOAs in the past. We also reviewed and assessed  the AOA report and supporting materials against cost estimating and  analysis best practice standards. In addition, we discussed the AOA  report with the study team director and other study team staff. We also  compared the requirements for VXX to the requirements for the  terminated VH-71 program. However, because the VXX requirements  were not finalized until January 2013, we were unable to complete our  analysis of them during this review. To determine the status of DOD’s  efforts to develop key technologies and capabilities for integration in VXX  aircraft, we obtained a list of ongoing and planned upgrades to the current  presidential helicopters and had the program office identify those  intended for use in the VXX platform. We reviewed documents related to  each upgrade, discussed those efforts with program officials, including  those responsible for the cockpit mission system and the aircraft’s  avionics system, and analyzed those documents and the results of those  discussions to identify issues. We discussed the benefits and status of  each upgrade effort. We also discussed the risks associated with  maturing key technologies in time for insertion into the platform. We  toured the systems integration laboratory at the Naval Air Station  (Patuxent River, Maryland) and observed some of the upgraded  equipment installed on demonstration test assets.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2012 to April 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Marine Corps’ HMX-1 squadron uses a fleet of 19 VH-3D and VH- 60N helicopters to transport the President in the national capital region,  as well as when the President is traveling in the continental U.S. and  overseas locations. These aircraft have been in service for decades. The  events following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United  States highlighted the need for improved transportation, communication,  and security capabilities for the presidential helicopter fleet. As a result, a  program (subsequently designated the VH-71 program) was initiated in  April 2002 to develop aircraft to replace the helicopters currently in  service. Initial plans to field the VH-71 by 2011 were accelerated in  response to a November 2002 White House memorandum directing that  a replacement helicopter be fielded by the end of 2008. By 2009  significant cost growth, plus schedule delays and performance issues  resulted in the decision to terminate the VH-71 program. At the time of  termination, in June 2009, the estimated VH-71 program cost had  doubled from about $6.5 billion at development start in 2005 to $13  billion. Because there remained a need to replace the current in-service  presidential helicopters, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition Technology and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) directed the Navy  by late June 2009 to present a plan to develop options for a new program  to acquire replacement aircraft, now designated VXX.
The Navy’s VXX efforts began immediately with the initiation of an AOA to  assess options on how to proceed toward developing and fielding the  replacement presidential helicopter. It was focused, at least in part, on  one of the primary lessons learned from the VH-71 program experience— the need to establish and maintain a sound business case. A sound  business case is one in which a balance is established between  requirements, costs, and schedule that reflects an executable program  with acceptable risk. According to program officials, the program would  be aligned to pursue a best practices knowledge-based acquisition  approach with the intent of establishing and maintaining an affordable  business case.
Last year, we reported that VXX program’s entry into development had  been delayed as the program worked to provide a sound initial business  case for development, which is a best practice that was not followed by  the terminated VH-71 program. The Navy had produced an initial AOA  report under June 2010 study guidance from DOD’s Office of Cost  Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE). This initial work presumed  an acquisition strategy under which the program would start in the  technology development phase of DOD’s acquisition process. The Navy  released this initial AOA report to DOD. While CAPE found this initial  work sufficient, OUSD(AT&L) did not accept its results. Rather, it  identified the need for a 2012 update to address using a streamlined  acquisition strategy focused on mitigating cost drivers identified in the  2010 AOA study. Additional guidance was provided by the Office of the  Secretary of Defense (OSD) in December 2011. That guidance reflected  insights on requirements gained in the 2010 study and expectations of  using a streamlined acquisition approach proposed by the Navy. The  proposed approach would leverage mature technologies being developed  outside of the program before including them on aircraft selected for the  program with their adoption being facilitated by open systems  architectures. This would allow the program to start with Milestone B  approval for engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) and then  selecting an existing in-production commercial or military platform and  working to integrate communications and mission systems provided by  the government, which are expected to be mature by that time. Figure 1  depicts the program’s entry into DOD’s acquisition process as currently  anticipated.
DOD is investing in the current fleet of presidential helicopters to increase  their service life and address capability gaps while working to field VXX  aircraft. The current inventory of 19 aircraft are sometimes stressed to  meet operational demands—demands that have been growing—making it  difficult to take them out of service for lengthy upgrades. A larger VXX  inventory of 21 aircraft is expected to help address this.
section_title: Program Makes Progress Toward Establishing a Sound Business Case
paragraphs: The Navy has made progress in the past year toward establishing a  sound business case for development that reflects a rational balance  between requirements, costs and schedule. The Navy completed the  AOA, which was deemed sufficient by CAPE to inform future acquisition  decisions, and OSD has approved the program to proceed to a Milestone  B decision. The CAPE did note, however, some areas of caution, for  example, that some air vehicles would require aggressive efforts to  manage the weight of the VXX while other air vehicles would be more  challenged in other respects. We reviewed that AOA and found that it  included elements of a sound AOA.
subsections: section_title: Navy Completes AOA
paragraphs: The Navy, building on its initial 2010 study, completed its AOA on April 4,  2012, and concluded that the currently proposed acquisition approach of  using mature technologies from outside the program on an in-production  commercial or military helicopter was acceptable. The initial 2010 study,  which considered nine alternative aircraft, revealed that technology  development and recertification of aircraft for airworthiness were primary  cost drivers of the total projected program cost under the approach it  presumed. The 2012 updated study (focused on the most promising  aircraft) assessed that mature, certified, and capable in-production  commercial and military aircraft exist that can be modified for presidential  requirements and be procured under the proposed strategy using a  “Customized” rather than a “Min Mod” approach. It determined that there  are candidate aircraft with performance characteristics that can meet to  varying degrees the February 2012 draft Capability Development  Document (CDD) requirements used to conduct the study and found that  the Navy’s proposed streamlined acquisition strategy is feasible and  would reduce the program’s expected schedule, cost, and risk.
Specifically, the 2012 study estimates suggest that using the proposed  approach of having the program enter the acquisition process in the  engineering and manufacturing development phase rather than the  technology development phase, as was anticipated in the 2010 study,  would reduce investment cost by approximately $1.5 billion (19.7 percent)  and shorten the development schedule by about 18 percent. The 2012  study also revealed, however, that the alternatives offered varying  degrees of individual system performance with no single alternative  meeting all of the VXX requirements. For example, while one alternative  met most of the requirements, it would require strict weight and  requirements management throughout its life to avoid a more costly Min  Mod approach. While other alternatives provided differing capacities for  weight growth, they would be challenged in meeting other requirements,  such as range, transportability, landing zone suitability, or material  supportability requirements. Further, for all of the alternatives in the 2012  study, it was found that if they were required to meet the military’s  airworthiness standards (as opposed to the certifying authority standard  they currently meet), the weight growth associated with meeting some of  these standards would likely trigger a more costly Min Mod approach.
The 2012 VXX AOA study team made a number of recommendations  including:
To mitigate aircraft certification risk, the airworthiness certifying  authority actively participate in all government development activities  for the cockpit, communications, and mission systems and be  involved in the source selection process for the aircraft;
To reduce the risk of having to resort to a Min Mod approach, an  active and aggressive life cycle weight management effort should be  put in place if the selected platform does not provide a large enough  margin to accommodate future weight growth; and
The release of a request for proposals be contingent upon achieving  acceptable technical maturity of critical government developments,  such as communications and mission systems.
section_title: AOA Accepted and VXX Program Approved to Proceed
paragraphs: The Director of CAPE in a May 30, 2012, memorandum concluded that  the 2012 study achieves a logical outcome and was sufficient to inform  future acquisition decisions. The CAPE found that the AOA demonstrates  that each of the alternatives examined can be provided in a manner  consistent with the streamlined acquisition approach, though with  assessed limitations as described in the report. It concluded that the  study also shows that an approach that avoids recertification was feasible  for some of the options considered, and, if adopted, offers potential for  reduced cost and schedule.
There are some areas of caution, however, in the CAPE’s assessment.
The alternatives examined in the 2012 study identified similar mission  limitations as those seen in the 2010 study. In particular, it was noted  that some air vehicles studied exhibited weight sensitivities that would  require aggressive weight management for the program’s lifecycle.  Other air vehicles exhibited better performance in some aspects  including allowing for weight growth, but were more challenged in  others, for example, landing zone suitability and transportability.
The AOA did not examine the integration risk of the government- developed communications package and mission systems—key  system components that under the Navy’s acquisition strategy are  being developed outside of the program but must then be successfully  integrated into the selected aircraft.
The CAPE’s assessment also stated that the validity of the study results  was contingent on the reduced requirements in the draft CDD—reduced  from the requirements for the VH-71 acquisition—becoming finalized as  documented and that a return to the previous requirements would require  additional analysis. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)   subsequently approved the CDD on January 3, 2013. While program  officials informed us that there were changes to requirements reflected in  the approved CDD, they stated that none would affect the validity of the  AOA or require the additional analysis mentioned in CAPE’s memo. A  CAPE official subsequently informed us that they had reviewed the CDD  and do not believe that any of the changes affect the AOA’s validity. In  addition, the official stated that they reviewed the requirements changes  and were satisfied that they made sense.
In an August 28, 2012 Acquisition Decision Memorandum, the USD  (AT&L) approved the VXX to proceed to Milestone B—approval to enter  engineering and manufacturing development—as the program’s initial  acquisition milestone. The Under Secretary decided that:
Milestone B, scheduled for 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2014, will be the  first formal acquisition system milestone for VXX; however, a Pre- EMD Review will occur prior to release of the Request for Proposals  for development, integration, and production;
Prior to the pre-EMD review, the Navy and the JROC are to approve  the CDD and the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation  is to develop an Independent Cost Estimate based on the approved  CDD; and
The Under Secretary will establish affordability targets for the VXX  program concurrent with CDD approval by the JROC.
The Under Secretary concluded that based on utilization of mature  technologies and a proven, mature, existing aircraft, this approach would  not require a technology development phase. In addition, the Under  Secretary expects to waive a requirement in the Weapon Systems  Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, as amended, for competitive prototyping  because its anticipated cost outweighs the expected risk reduction and  life cycle benefit it would provide.
section_title: Our Assessment of the AOA
paragraphs: In our prior two reports on this acquisition, we stated that when the AOA  was issued we would assess it for its robustness—the range of  alternatives it considered, its depth of analysis, and its consideration of  trade-offs. Based on our review of the AOA report, supporting material,  and interviews of program and other defense officials, we found the AOA  to be sufficient for this stage of the acquisition. It included elements that  GAO has reported should be part of a robust AOA. We also found it  used a cost estimating process that was substantially compliant with GAO  identified best practices.
An AOA compares the operational effectiveness, suitability, and life-cycle  cost estimates of alternatives that appear to satisfy established capability  needs. Cost estimating and analysis are significant components of an  AOA. We have previously reported on the importance of a robust AOA  as a key element in ensuring a program has a sound, executable  business case prior to program initiation. Our work has found that  programs that conduct a limited AOA (failing to consider a broad range of  alternatives or assess technical and other risks associated with each  alternative) tended to experience poorer outcomes—including cost  growth.
We found that the AOA study team considered a broad range of  alternatives. The initial 2010 study effort evaluated 9 platforms and 19  possible alternatives to satisfy the mission and the 2012 update studied  the most promising platforms in the 2010 study to document the impact of  the Navy’s proposed streamlined acquisition strategy would have on the  merits of each of those alternatives. The study team assessed  effectiveness, suitability, technical, schedule, and operational risks  associated with the alternatives, though, according to CAPE, it did not  assess the risks of integrating government-furnished communications and  mission control systems into those alternatives. The study director noted  that this integration risk could not be assessed by the study team, given  the maturity of these subsystems at the time. Rather, the AOA identified  the need to consider this issue at a future engineering review when  sufficient maturity existed and an accurate assessment could be made.
The AOA process reflected and influenced performance trade-offs. The  initial 2010 analysis was based on performance requirements that were  lower in a number of areas than for the VH-71 program. The 2012 AOA  study reflected additional trade-offs made with regard to cost, schedule,  risk and performance. The performance trade-offs enabled the Navy’s  revised strategy, and is expected to result in reduced costs and schedule.  Following the 2012 study the performance requirements were further  refined as reflected in the final CDD. Table 1 illustrates some of the  performance trade-offs made by comparing the minimum requirements  for VXX aircraft as captured in the final CDD to the minimum VH-71  requirements captured in the equivalent Operational Requirements  Document for that program.
We also assessed the cost estimating procedure for the AOA using  GAO’s criteria for cost estimating and assessment and found that it was  substantially compliant with those criteria. For the purposes of this review,  we collapsed the best practices identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and  Assessment Guide into four general characteristics: well documented,  comprehensive, accurate, and credible.  The cost estimating best  practices associated with each of those characteristics used in judging  the AOA are provided in appendix I.
We found the AOA cost estimate to be comprehensive and well  documented. We also found that it was substantially accurate and  partially met our criteria for being credible. The AOA cost estimate was  properly adjusted for inflation, relied on historical analogous aircraft data,  contained no significant calculation errors, and had been recently updated  from the estimate contained in the 2010 study. While the documentation  stated that the estimate reflected most likely costs, it did not specifically  identify potential contingency costs and no cost risk analysis was  performed to determine a level of confidence for the cost estimate. As  result, we were unable to determine if the costs were indeed most likely.  In addition, the AOA cost estimate was deemed as having partially met  the best practices criteria for being credible as there was evidence that a  robust sensitivity analysis had been performed but not an independent  cost estimate or cost risk analysis.
Although there was not a cost risk analysis, a detailed technical risk  assessment process was followed for identifying technical risks, their  likelihood of occurring, and the consequences if they occurred. The  technical risks were mitigated by incorporating costs into the cost  estimate through derivation of realistic and reasonable staffing levels and  sufficient schedule for design, development and testing of each  alternative. In addition, while an independent cost estimate had not been  conducted, the USD(AT&L)’s August 28, 2012, acquisition decision  memorandum directs CAPE’s completion of one prior to the Pre-EMD  Review. This is to occur in the second quarter of fiscal year 2013. As a  result, the program could have confirmation of the AOA cost estimating  results at that point. The program will then continue to work on its cost  estimate to result in a more refined estimate supporting the Milestone B  decision in the third quarter of fiscal year 2014.
section_title: Efforts Intended to Leverage Technologies into VXX Aircraft Progress
paragraphs: The Navy’s currently proposed acquisition approach relies on the  government’s providing, as government furnished equipment, mature  technologies for integration into aircraft. Those technologies either  already exist or are in development, some as legacy fleet aircraft  upgrades. Their provision will be an important factor in the Navy’s  achieving the reduced cost and schedule it seeks through its proposed  acquisition approach. The program assesses their risks for integration  into VXX aircraft as low—supporting the Navy’s goal of providing initial  operational capability in fiscal year 2020.
While the program reports the key technologies to be provided by the  government for integration are on track, there are risks that they will not  work out as planned. For example, the Navy had originally anticipated  that the cockpit technologies leveraged into the VXX acquisition would  include a “glass cockpit” display system installed as an upgrade on VH- 60N aircraft. It dropped its planned use of this system. Adopting its use  would likely necessitate an airworthiness recertification of the platform  selected to be the VXX aircraft, a costly and time-consuming endeavor.  As a result, the Navy now plans on the prime contractor using the display  systems already in use in its certified aircraft—systems that the program  manager noted are as capable if not more capable than the VH-60N’s.
Even if individual technologies work out as anticipated, they will still have  to be successfully integrated in the aircraft. The program depends on a  number of government-defined sub-systems and technologies being  hosted in a new airframe. Environmental issues such as size, weight,  thermal profile, and stability will have to be ascertained, not separately  but in totality as a dynamic system. Only then will it be known whether  key performance parameters are met, how closely, and what, if any,  refinements need to be applied. In the past, we found integration issues  can be significant. For example, in fiscal year 2004 DOD rebaselined the  Joint Strike Fighter program extending its development by 18 months and  adding resources to address problems discovered during systems  integration and the preliminary design review. To mitigate integration  risk, though, the VXX program is making use of a systems integration  laboratory and also plans to install the communications and mission  systems into a test aircraft and do demonstration testing before  integration efforts begin on the VXX platform. Table 2 provides more  information on the technologies to be provided by the government for  integration in VXX aircraft.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: The program has made progress toward establishing a sound business  case for development, one that rationally balances requirements, costs,  and schedule. The program still faces challenges that will need to be  actively managed to provide greater assurance that a sound business  case is maintained throughout development as the program moves  forward. These challenges include:
Maintaining the VXX requirements without significant deviation  throughout the acquisition process. Subsequent requirement changes  will need to be considered carefully in the context of their implications  for cost, schedule, risk, and performance and the program will need to  effectively manage technology maturation and integration to achieve  success.
Managing weight growth of the platform during development so as to  not trigger the need for modifications that could then require a flight  recertification of the VXX platform. Also, having a weight margin once  fielded will place the program in a better position in the future to more  readily enhance the platform over its anticipated 40-year service life.
Ensuring the technologies being developed for integration into the  selected VXX platform develop as needed and integration mitigation  efforts are adequately planned, resourced, and executed.
Failing to address these challenges could impact the program’s ability to  stay on track and delay replacement of the in-service helicopter fleet,  which is currently stressed at times to meet demand. Additionally, in our  prior reports we described both VH-71 lessons learned and acquisition  best practices that, if heeded, should help the program remain on track.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. The comments  are reprinted in appendix II.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it would ensure  that mitigations are in place to address potential risk areas. It believes its  efforts are aligned with GAO’s best practices and the recommendations in  GAO’s 2011 report on the program and plans to continue to monitor  program progress in view of these standards.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and the Secretary of the Navy.  This report also is available at no charge on GAO’s website at  http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions on the matters covered in  this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to  this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Cost Estimating Best Practices
subsections: section_title: Characteristic Comprehensive
paragraphs: The cost estimate includes all life cycle costs.  The cost estimate completely defines the program, reflects the current schedule, and is technically  reasonable.  The cost estimate work breakdown structure (WBS) is product-oriented, traceable to the statement of  work/objective, and at an appropriate level of detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted  nor double-counted.  The estimate documents all cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions.   The documentation should capture the source data used, the reliability of the data, and how the data  were normalized.  The documentation describes in sufficient detail the calculations performed and the estimating  methodology used to derive each element’s cost.  The documentation describes step by step how the estimate was developed so that a cost analyst  unfamiliar with the program could understand what was done and replicate it.  The documentation discusses the technical baseline description and the data in the baseline is  consistent with the estimate.  The documentation provides evidence that the cost estimate was reviewed and accepted by  management.  The cost estimate results are unbiased, not overly conservative or optimistic and based on an  assessment of most likely costs.  The estimate has been adjusted properly for inflation.  The estimate contains few, if any, minor mistakes.  The cost estimate is regularly updated to reflect significant changes in the program so that it is always  reflecting current status. Variances between planned and actual costs are documented, explained,  and reviewed.  The estimate is based on a historical record of cost estimating and actual experiences from other  comparable programs.   The cost estimate includes a sensitivity analysis that identifies a range of possible costs based on  varying major assumptions, parameters, and data inputs.  A risk and uncertainty analysis was conducted that quantified the imperfectly understood risks and  identified the effects of changing key cost driver assumptions and factors.
Major cost elements were cross-checked to see whether results were similar.
An independent cost estimate was conducted by a group outside the acquiring organization to  determine whether other estimating methods produce similar results.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report were Bruce H. Thomas, Assistant Director;  Jerry W. Clark, Analyst-in-Charge; Bonita J.P. Oden; Karen A. Richey;  Jennifer K. Echard; Tisha D. Derricotte; Marie P. Ahearn; Hai V. Tran;  and Robert S. Swierczek.