Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti
Published: 2006-02-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The UN employs about 85,000 military and civilian personnel in peacekeeping operations in 16 countries. The United States has provided about $1 billion annually to support UN peacekeeping operations. In addition, the United States has led and participated in many such operations. UN reports and congressional hearings have raised concerns about accountability for UN peacekeeping operations and the need for reforms. We were asked to provide information relating to the cost and relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping. In particular, we have (1) compared the cost of the ongoing UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti with the cost that the United States would have incurred had an operation been deemed in the U.S. national interest and undertaken without UN involvement; (2) analyzed factors that could materially affect the estimated costs of a U.S. operation; and (3) identified the strengths of the United States and the UN for leading the operation. We developed our cost estimate of a U.S.-led operation using cost models from the Departments of Defense and State. The estimate is based on various military assumptions, such as the use of primarily active duty troops. It includes only those costs directly attributable to the operation that would not otherwise be incurred.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as the United Nations (UN) to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the current UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (designated "MINUSTAH"). The UN budgeted $428 million for the first 14 months of this mission. A U.S. operation in Haiti of the same size and duration would cost an estimated $876 million, far exceeding the U.S. contribution for MINUSTAH of $116 million. Virtually all of the cost difference is attributable to (1) civilian police, (2) military pay and support, and (3) facilities, and reflects high U.S. standards for police training, troop welfare, and security. Various military and nonmilitary factors can substantially affect the estimated costs of a U.S. operation. We analyzed three military factors: the mix of reserve and active duty troops, the rate of deployment, and the operational tempo. Deploying all reserve troops would increase the cost estimate by $477 million, since it would require paying more reservists a full salary. Deploying troops at a faster rate than the UN--within the first 60 days instead of 180--would cost an additional $60 million. Conducting the operation at a higher tempo--with more intensive use of vehicles and equipment--would increase estimated costs by $23 million. In addition to military considerations, including nation-building and development assistance activities in the scope of the operation would increase the cost significantly. Official donors, including the United States, distributed $382 million for these activities during the first year of MINUSTAH. Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or the UN should lead an operation, and each offers strengths for this responsibility. U.S.-led operations in Haiti between 1994 and 2004 benefited from a vast military infrastructure, which provided strong communications, command and control, readiness to deploy, tactical intelligence, and public information. The UN's strengths include multinational participation, extensive peacekeeping experience, and an existing structure for coordinating nation-building activities. Complex political considerations are likely to influence decisions about the role of the United States and the UN in peacekeeping.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: As of November 2005, the United Nations (UN) maintained about 70,000  peacekeeping troops and about 15,000 related international civil servants in  16 countries, including Haiti, Lebanon, Georgia, Cyprus, Sudan, and the  Democratic Republic of the Congo. Currently, the United States provides  about $1 billion annually to support UN peacekeeping missions. In addition  to these financial contributions, the United States has led and participated  in a variety of peacekeeping operations, most recently in Somalia, Haiti,  Bosnia, and Kosovo. UN reports and congressional hearings have raised  concerns about accountability for UN peacekeeping operations and the  need for management reforms.
To advance UN reform efforts and determine the value of peacekeeping  operations to the United States, you asked us to provide information  relating to the cost and relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping. In  particular, we have (1) compared the cost of a specific UN mission with the  cost that the United States would have incurred had an operation been  deemed in the U.S. national interest and undertaken without UN  involvement; (2) analyzed factors that could affect the estimated costs of a  U.S. operation; and (3) identified strengths of U.S. and UN peacekeeping  forces in leading the operation. We selected the UN Stabilization Mission in  Haiti (officially designated “MINUSTAH”) as a case study for comparison.  This mission provides a strong basis for estimating costs and assessing UN  and U.S. strengths because it is located in a country in which both the U.S.  and UN have a history of military intervention. However, given the  operational, structural, and doctrinal differences between the U.S. and UN  military and civilian infrastructures, it is uncertain whether the United  States would implement a peacekeeping operation in Haiti in the same way  as the UN, as we have generally assumed for the purposes of this report.  Moreover, because the results of our review are based on a single case  study, they cannot be generalized to all U.S. and UN peacekeeping  operations. Nonetheless, we believe this case study provides some useful  insights into cost and effectiveness-related issues for other peacekeeping  missions.
We analyzed detailed cost and operational data from the UN relating to  MINUSTAH for the first 14 months of this mission. Using these data, we  developed a comparable scenario for a U.S. operation, which officials from  the Joint Chiefs of Staff validated as reasonable; this scenario assumes  deployment of the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel  and aircraft in Haiti over the same period. We derived a cost estimate for  the military portion of this scenario using the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) Contingency Operation Support Tool, the official DOD cost  estimation mechanism for all contingency military operations. For the  civilian portions, we based cost estimates primarily on historical data and  formulas from the Department of State. We determined that data we  collected for this report are sufficiently reliable for the purpose of  estimating U.S. peacekeeping costs and comparing them with UN budget  figures. We conducted our work from June to February 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See  appendix I for a detailed description of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Both the UN and United States have a long history of peace support  operations upon which to base cost estimates. The UN has carried out 60  peacekeeping missions worldwide since 1948. For each mission, the UN  Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) prepares a budget, which  is reviewed in detail at high levels of UN management and is ultimately  approved by the General Assembly. The UN assesses each member for its  allocated portion of this amount based on the country’s per capita gross  national income and its membership status on the Security Council. The  United States currently pays about 27 percent of the total for each mission,  and in fiscal year 2005 directly contributed about $1.3 billion in support of  UN peacekeeping operations overall. The United States has also led and  participated in a variety of peacekeeping operations since World War II,  most recently in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. U.S. military  operations are funded largely by DOD appropriations, and, under DOD  regulations, the budgets are based primarily on cost estimates generated  with the department’s Contingency Operations Support Tool. This  computer model uses financial formulas that draw upon a database of  historical costs from past military operations and other regularly updated  cost information. In addition, the State Department has extensive  experience posting foreign service officers in conflict areas and funding  U.S. police officers to support UN peacekeeping missions, for which it  maintains cost estimation formulas and historical cost databases.
The UN Security Council has authorized five peacekeeping missions in  Haiti since 1993, of which the United States has led two between 1994 and  2004. The primary task of the ongoing MINUSTAH operation is to provide a  secure and stable environment through its military and police presence and  operational support to the Haitian National Police. MINUSTAH assists the  transitional government in police reform and institutional strengthening;  disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; elections monitoring; and  promotion and protection of human rights and the political process. The  initial authorized force strength was 6,700 troops, 1,622 civilian police  officers, and 1,697 civilian administrators and staff. Although initially  authorized for 6 months, the UN Security Council has renewed the  mission’s authorization and funding through June 2006.
Criticism and controversy, including allegations of sexual misconduct of  peacekeepers, have brought calls for reform of UN peacekeeping  operations within the UN and from U.S. observers. In 2000, the UN  Secretary General convened a high-level panel to review UN peace and security, which recommended a variety of reforms. The 2005 bipartisan  Task Force on the United Nations highlighted the need for more rapid  deployment and more clearly defined mandates. Proposed legislation, the  Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005, calls for more oversight  and investigation over UN operations and mandates that the UN adopt and  enforce a code of conduct for all peacekeeping personnel.
section_title: Estimated Cost of a Hypothetical U.S. Operation Is Twice as High as Ongoing UN Mission
paragraphs: We estimate that it would cost the United States twice as much as the UN to  conduct an operation similar to MINUSTAH. The higher U.S. cost of civilian  police, military pay and support, and facilities account for virtually the  entire difference between our estimate and the MINUSTAH budget, and  reflects the additional cost of ensuring high U.S. standards for training,  troop welfare, and personnel security.
From May 1, 2004, to June 30, 2005—the first 14 months of MINUSTAH— the UN budgeted mission costs totaled $428 million. This budget assumed a  phased deployment of 6,700 military personnel, 750 personnel in formed  police units, 872 civilian police officers, and 1,184 civilian administrators  and staff. It included the cost of personnel, operational support, equipment,  facilities, and transportation. Using the same basic parameters of troop  and staff deployment in Haiti for 14 months, we estimated that the United  States would likely budget about $876 million, nearly twice the UN  estimate, for a comparable U.S. peacekeeping operation. (This cost  estimate is based on a variety of assumptions, described in detail in app. I.)  The United States was financially responsible for $116 million of the  budgeted cost of MINUSTAH, based on the U.S. assessed contribution of  27.1 percent of the DPKO regular budget. Hence, we estimate that  conducting a U.S. operation similar to MINUSTAH would cost the United  States about 7.5 times as much as its official contribution to the UN for that  mission ($876 million versus $116 million).
Major disparities in the cost for civilian police, military pay and support,  and facilities account for virtually all of the difference between the UN  budget and our cost estimate. Our estimate reflects the additional expense  of paying salaries for personnel that would otherwise be donated by other  countries as well as the cost of ensuring U.S. standards for police training,  the equipment and welfare of military personnel, and the security of staff  posted overseas. (See table 1 for a detailed comparison of the UN budget  and our estimate by major cost category.)
Civilian police. The UN budgeted $25 million to deploy 872 civilian officers  for MINUSTAH, while we estimate that it would cost the United States $217  million to deploy the same number of U.S. officers. The UN does not  reimburse countries contributing police for the officers’ salaries and only  pays for living expenses, clothing allowance, and death and disability  compensation. U.S. costs, however, include salaries, special pay, benefits,  equipment, and special training. Furthermore, U.S. officers deployed in  Haiti under MINUSTAH are required to meet standards for training,  experience, and skills significantly beyond those applied by the UN. For  instance, U.S. officers deployed to Haiti must be proficient in French or  Haitian Creole and have a minimum of 8 years’ work experience with five  years in a position of sworn civilian law enforcement. Candidates must  pass several tests that measure physical capabilities and weapons  proficiency. UN-sponsored officers deployed to Haiti are required by the  UN to demonstrate only the ability to operate a firearm and drive a vehicle;  the ability to communicate in French is preferred but not required.
Military pay and support. The UN budgeted $131 million for pay and  support of military troops, while we estimate it would cost the United  States $260 million for the same number of soldiers. The UN costs are  based primarily on a per-soldier payment to contributing nations of up to  $1,400 monthly for basic pay and allowances, clothing, gear, equipment,  and ammunition. U.S. costs include pay and allowances for reservists and  active duty personnel as well as clothing, arms, protective gear, and rations.  The higher U.S. costs help ensure a basic standard of living for U.S. soldiers  and their families and relatively high standards of welfare in the field in  terms of equipment, nutrition, health, and morale. For example, estimated  costs for food and water for U.S. military personnel total $85 million,  compared to $20 million in the UN budget. Medical support for the military  and civilian personnel on a U.S. operation would cost an estimated $22  million, over four times the UN budgeted cost of $5 million. According to  officials of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, UN multinational forces in Haiti prior  to MINUSTAH had difficulty providing adequate troop support and relied  on accompanying U.S. forces for supplementary rations and health care. A  Rand Corporation study of the multinational force cooperation in Haiti in  1994 indicates that the U.S. forces provided UN forces with intelligence and  training, as well as logistical and communications support, including  housing, food, transportation, and vehicle maintenance.
Facilities. The UN budgeted $100 million for facilities-related costs, while  we estimate that the cost to the United States would be $208 million. The  UN budget includes acquisition and construction of troop and civilian  housing and other facility-related equipment and supplies. While  MINUSTAH staff offices are donated by the Government of Haiti, U.S.  facilities must meet State Department security standards, which include  posting civilian staff within secure U.S. embassy or consulate compounds.  In addition to administrative and security expenses, U.S. government  agencies with staff in these compounds would be required to contribute a  total of about $12 million to the State Department’s Capital Security Cost- Sharing Program, which funds the construction of secure embassies  worldwide.
Estimated costs in other categories are likely to be similar for the UN and  the United States. For example, we estimate that the transport of U.S.  troops, civilian personnel, and equipment would cost about $100 million;  the UN budgeted $94 million for these costs.
section_title: Alternative Scenarios with Differing Assumptions Could Generate Higher Cost Estimates
paragraphs: Various military and nonmilitary factors can influence the composition of a  peacekeeping operation and thus impact the estimated cost. We identified  three different military scenarios that could substantially affect the  estimated costs of a U.S. peacekeeping operation. Greater concentration of  reserve troops could almost double the military costs, while a quicker  deployment of forces and higher operational tempo would also increase  costs. Further, the addition of nation-building and development assistance  activities to the scope of an operation in Haiti would increase the estimated  cost substantially.
subsections: section_title: Analysis of Alternative Military Assumptions Generated Higher U.S. Cost Estimates
paragraphs: According to U.S. experts in military operations and cost estimation we  consulted, various factors could significantly influence the cost estimate  for a U.S. peacekeeping operation. These factors include the number of  troops and types of military units deployed, the pace of deployment, the  intensity or operational tempo, the modes of transportation for  deployment, and the mix of active duty and reserve troops. These factors  depend heavily on the needs of the operation and demands of other military  commitments; decisions about such factors involve complex military,  political, and financial considerations that can change rapidly.
We analyzed the potential impact of three principal cost factors by altering  the assumptions of our cost estimate to reflect (1) military forces  comprised entirely of reserve soldiers, (2) deployment of military forces  within the first 60 days of the operation rather than 180 days, and (3) higher  operational tempo (more intensive use of vehicles and equipment). Figure  2 illustrates how altering the assumptions for these factors affects the cost  estimate.
Deployment of all-reserve forces. Our base cost estimates assume that the  military contingent of a U.S. operation would consist primarily of active  duty forces (85 percent). Officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed  that this is one of a number of possible scenarios, depending on the  availability of active duty and reserve troops, ongoing military  commitments, specific operational needs, and other factors. A change in  this fundamental assumption can have a significant impact on the  estimated cost of the operation, as pay for troops is one of the largest  components of the estimate. We altered this assumption to reflect an  operation comprised entirely of reserve forces, which increased the cost  estimate by $477 million. This difference has such a significant impact  because DOD does not include regular pay for active duty troops in the cost  estimates; the department would incur these costs regardless of whether  the troops were deployed in Haiti, the United States, or elsewhere. In  contrast, pay for reserve troops is considered a direct cost of the operation  since DOD would pay reservists full salaries only when activated for the  operation.
More rapid deployment. Although the UN Security Council Resolution  establishing MINUSTAH calls for an immediate deployment of  peacekeeping forces, the MINUSTAH budget reflects full military  deployment within 180 days of mission authorization. Thus, similar to the  UN budget, our base cost estimate assumes a military force strength below  authorized levels during the first six months of the operation. We altered  this assumption to reflect full deployment within the first 60 days. We  estimate that this would increase U.S. costs by about $60 million,  consisting essentially of military pay and support for additional troops  deployed during the operation’s initial months.
Higher operational tempo. DOD measures the intensity of a military  operation, or operational tempo, on a scale from 1 to 3, with normal  operations being level 1. The higher the operational tempo, the more  heavily the forces use equipment and vehicles and the higher the cost for  fuel, operations, and maintenance. Military experts we consulted at the  Institute for Defense Analysis and the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that a  peacekeeping operational tempo would normally be considered to be at  level 1.5, as reflected in our base cost estimate. We altered this assumption  to reflect a slightly higher operational tempo, level 2, which increased the  estimated military costs by $23 million due to increased equipment,  maintenance, and other support costs.
section_title: Including Nation-Building and Development Assistance in the Operation’s Scope Would Significantly Increase Costs
paragraphs: Our estimate does not include costs for complementary nation-building and  development activities, which would be needed to support the economic  and political goals of a peacekeeping operation. In 2004, to bolster  MINUSTAH, official donors agreed with the Government of Haiti on an  Interim Cooperative Framework, to which they pledged a total of $1.3  billion for an array of activities to strengthen political governance and  promote national dialogue, strengthen economic governance and  contribute to institutional development, promote economic recovery, and  improve access to basic services. From July 2004 to March 2005, bilateral  and multilateral donors have spent more than $382 million for such  activities (see table 2). The United States directly funded over 27 percent of  this total, or $102 million, through its bilateral aid programs in Haiti. The  United States has made additional contributions to this aid effort through  its financial support of UN agencies and multilateral financial  organizations, including the World Bank and the Inter-American  Development Bank. Table 2 shows the distribution of funding for these  activities by donor and type of activity.
Our cost estimate assumes that the United States and other donors would  spend the same amount on these programs and activities regardless of  whether the United States undertook a peacekeeping operation in Haiti.  Historically, the United States has depended on other official donors and  multilateral organizations to participate in reconstruction and rebuilding  efforts following an armed conflict.
section_title: U.S. and UN Peacekeeping Forces in Haiti Each Have Key Strengths
paragraphs: In addition to cost, other factors would be considered when determining  the most appropriate role of the United States and the UN in conducting  peacekeeping operations. The United States and the UN each have  strengths that can affect the achievement of peacekeeping objectives in  Haiti. Past U.S. operations in Haiti have benefited from a strong central  communications, command and control structure and a vast military  infrastructure supporting its operations, particularly in terms of troop  deployment, military intelligence, and public information. Among the  strengths of a UN mission are its multinational participation, its extensive  experience in peace operations, and a coordinated network of agencies to  assist nation building.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Peacekeeping Forces in Haiti Had Elements Found to Be Critical for Effective Peacekeeping
paragraphs: U.S. peacekeeping operations have benefited from strong communications,  command and control structures, direct access to well-trained military  personnel and equipment, and other advantages of a large, well-established  military infrastructure. U.S.-led peacekeeping efforts in Haiti have been  widely recognized as operationally effective, having achieved their military  objectives rapidly and with minimal loss of life. As we previously reported,  U.S. leadership has enhanced operational effectiveness of UN  peacekeeping in Haiti. In the 1995 UN Mission to Haiti, the United States  provided leadership to multinational forces that ensured adequate troops  and resources were available to carry out assigned tasks, used its  command and control structure for the operation, and applied its doctrine  for “operations other than war” to help guide actions. Officials from the  Joint Chiefs of Staff with experience with more recent multinational forces  in Haiti also highlighted rigorous training, a reliable communications  infrastructure, and a cohesive command structure as key factors that made  U.S. forces operationally effective there.
Furthermore, by virtue of the vast U.S. military infrastructure of DOD and  other U.S. agencies, U.S. peacekeeping forces have many elements that UN  peacekeeping studies have identified as critical for mission effectiveness,  particularly in Haiti. In March 2000, the UN high-level panel reviewing UN  peace and security identified elements critical to effective peacekeeping. In May 2005, a UN Security Council evaluation of MINUSTAH emphasized  the particular importance of three of these elements for operations in  Haiti—rapid troop deployment, effective tactical intelligence, and a public  information strategy—noting that MINUSTAH was hindered by weaknesses  in these elements.
Dedicated DOD organizations support U.S. military operations in these  three elements, and have contributed to military successes in past  operations in Haiti. Funding for these organizations is not reflected in cost  estimates in this report because they are part of the infrastructure that  supports all DOD objectives and operations, and costs are not readily  attributable to specific contingency operations.
Rapid deployment. The 2000 UN report on peacekeeping indicated that it  was important to fully deploy an operation within 30 to 90 days after the  adoption of a Security Council Resolution establishing the mission.  According to the report, the first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or  peace accord are often the most critical for establishing a stable peace and  a credible new operation; opportunities lost during that period are hard to  regain. At DOD, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness is  responsible for developing and overseeing policies and programs, including  training, to ensure the readiness of U.S. forces for peacetime contingencies,  crises, and warfighting. Military readiness of both personnel and equipment  is a major objective throughout DOD. The department spends more than  $17 billion annually for military schools that offer nearly 30,000 military  training courses to almost 3 million military personnel and DOD civilians.  With continued heavy military involvement in operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan, DOD is also spending billions of dollars sustaining or  replacing its inventory of key equipment items. The United States has  historically deployed troops in Haiti relatively rapidly. (Fig. 3 illustrates  deployment of U.S. marines in Haiti.) For example, in 1994 the United  States deployed an operation in Haiti within 60 days of the issuance of a UN  Security Council Resolution authorizing the restoration of Haiti’s  constitutionally elected leadership to power. The 20,000-member force  quickly established itself in 500 locations throughout Haiti and achieved its  primary goals within 76 days.
Intelligence apparatus. The 2000 UN report on peacekeeping indicated  that missions should be afforded the necessary field intelligence and other  capabilities to mount an effective deterrence against violent challengers.  For its intelligence needs in an operation in Haiti, DOD can draw upon the  extensive resources of the U.S. intelligence community, consisting of a  wide array of agencies, departments, and offices throughout the U.S.  government. The Defense Intelligence Agency, for example, employing over  7,500 military and civilian employees worldwide, produces and manages  foreign military intelligence for warfighters, defense policymakers, and  force planners in support of U.S. military planning and operations. The  Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Air  Force, among other organizations, also provide intelligence support to U.S.  military operations. U.S. forces had these resources at their disposal when  they led multinational forces in Haiti in 1994-95, successfully disbanding  the Haitian army and paramilitary groups and confiscating the weapons  caches held by government opponents within 7 months.
Public information. The 2000 UN report indicated that an effective  communications and public information capacity is an operational  necessity for nearly all UN peacekeeping operations. According to the  report, “effective communication helps to dispel rumor, to counter  disinformation, and secure the cooperation of local populations.”  Furthermore, it can provide leverage in dealing with leaders of local rival  groups and enhance the security of UN personnel. The report recommends  that such strategies and the personnel to carry them out be included in the  very first elements deployed to help start up a mission. At DOD, the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs is responsible for  developing programs and plans relating to DOD news media relations,  public information, internal information, community relations, and public  affairs in support of DOD objectives and operations. DOD developed a  public affairs strategy that was a central element of the operation it led in  Haiti in 2004; it included issuing regular press releases and briefing local  and international media frequently on the progress and developments of  the operation. U.S. military forces in Haiti were met with relatively little  violent opposition, resulting in a minimal loss of life, either Haitian or  American.
section_title: UN Has Multinational Participation, Extensive Experience, and Structure for Coordinating Nation Building
paragraphs: The UN’s strengths in peacekeeping in Haiti are rooted in the multinational  character of its operation as well as extensive experience with  peacekeeping and related nation building. The UN’s experience has  enabled it to develop a structure for coordinating international  organizations involved in nation building and give it access to a pool of  experienced and skilled international civil servants, including personnel  with diverse language capabilities.
Multinational participation. The multinational cooperation on UN  peacekeeping missions, such as in MINUSTAH, provides some notable  advantages. According to a 2005 study sponsored by the Rand Corporation,  the UN may have the ability to compensate for its relatively small military  presence with its reputation of international legitimacy and local  impartiality. Furthermore, its multinational character likely lends the UN  a reputation for impartiality that a single nation may not enjoy. The study  concluded that this has afforded the UN a degree of success with relatively  small missions that include both security and nation-building components.  MINUSTAH represents a multinational effort that is not dominated by any  single country. (Fig. 4 illustrates multinational peacekeeping operations  under MINUSTAH.) During its first year of operation in Haiti, MINUSTAH  comprised 7,624 military staff and police personnel from 41 countries.  Unlike earlier U.S.-led operations, where the U.S. troops represented up to  90 percent of military personnel, U.S. participation on the ground in  MINUSTAH was limited to 29 U.S. military and police personnel—less than  1 percent of the total. As officials of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out,  development of coalition partners through multinational operations is  important not only for strengthening ongoing and future operations in  Haiti, but also for building strong international capacity for facing future  military challenges globally. The advantages for the United States include a  lower overall cost for peacekeeping and reduced exposure of U.S.  personnel to the inherent dangers of operating in conflict zones. However,  according to DOD and State Department officials, the multinational nature  of a military force may also limit its operational effectiveness by  introducing variations in training among the personnel from different  nations and difficulties in communications, command, and control.
Experienced peacekeeping officials. The UN has developed a cadre of  senior officials that has gained experience with peacekeeping and nation- building activities over many missions. While there are acknowledged  deficiencies in UN peace operations, the UN established a best practices  unit in DPKO in 1995 to study and adopt lessons learned. Senior  MINUSTAH officials, including the Chilean UN Special Representative and  his deputies, the Brazilian Force Commander, and the Canadian Police  Commissioner bring experience in peacekeeping and development  activities from diverse geographic areas, and particularly from other  countries in the region. The international nature of the UN also provides  access to a large pool of civil servants and security personnel with native  language speaking abilities and translation skills. In Haiti, 11 French- speaking countries have provided peacekeeping troops and police officers  for MINUSTAH.
Structure for coordinating international assistance. The UN has fostered  a network of agencies and development banks. UN peacekeeping missions  can draw directly upon this network in coordinating the extensive  humanitarian and developmental activities that are related to operations  with expansive, integrated mandates that include nation building. In Haiti,  MINUSTAH has established a framework for coordination integral to the  mission’s organization. With UN co-sponsorship, official donors in this  network, including the World Bank and the Inter-American Development  Bank, have pledged $1.3 billion in development assistance. The UN  Development Program coordinates the efforts of nine agencies in Haiti,  which, during the first year of MINUSTAH, disbursed $60 million in  development assistance. To help ensure that these funds are well  coordinated and support MINUSTAH’s objectives, these UN agencies  operating in Haiti report directly to a senior MINUSTAH official, who also  serves as the chief UN Development Program representative for Haiti.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While a U.S. peacekeeping operation in Haiti would be more expensive  than the current UN mission, it would be subject to higher operational  standards and supported by an extensive military infrastructure. Strong,  well-trained, and quickly deployed U.S. forces have proven militarily  effective in short-term operations in Haiti in the past. However, involving  the international community extensively in peacekeeping operations such  as MINUSTAH has notable advantages for leveraging development funding,  experience, and other resources of nations and organizations. The situation  in other peacekeeping missions may differ significantly from the conditions  in Haiti, and complex domestic and international political considerations  may ultimately weigh heavily in determining the role of U.S. and UN  peacekeepers in future operations. Chief among these are the political  interests of the United States and other UN member states.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense and State  and the United Nations for their comment. They provided technical  corrections, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate, but they  had no further comments.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State  and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We will also make copies  available to others on request. In addition, it will be available at no cost on  our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202)  512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in  appendix II.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To compare the cost of a specific United Nations (UN) mission with the  cost that the United States would have incurred had an operation been  deemed in the U.S. national interest and undertaken without UN  involvement, we obtained and analyzed cost data from the UN and the U.S.  Government.
To determine the UN costs for peacekeeping operations, we analyzed  the 2004-2005 budget and supporting documents for the UN Stabilization  Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH). We spoke with officials of the UN  Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other UN departments,  offices, and agencies at UN headquarters in New York about the  assumptions, cost factors and ratios, and cost estimation methods used  to generate the budget. We used MINUSTAH as our case study because it  illustrates the various categories of cost for a contemporary mission  located in a country where the United States has an expressed national  interest. Additionally, we believe this case provides a strong basis for  estimating costs, given the long history of U.S. and UN military  intervention in Haiti. We chose the period May 1, 2004 to June 30, 2005  for analysis because it reflected the first approved mission budget and  incorporated the initial start-up costs. According to UN officials, the  budget provides a reasonable estimate of costs, though actual expenses  may vary from the budget. We also discussed with UN officials the  methodology for determining the U.S. assessment for MINUSTAH,  which was 27.1 percent of the mission budget. We did not include  peacekeeping support costs, which are indirect costs allocated to the  mission for overhead and administrative expenses incurred outside of  Haiti (at UN headquarters and the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy),  as the U.S. Government does not allocate corresponding overhead and  administrative costs to individual operations in a comparable way.
To estimate the military costs of a unilateral U.S. operation, we  developed a comparable U.S. operational scenario based on the  MINUSTAH budget and supporting documents, assuming deployment of  the same number of military, civilian, and police peacekeeping  personnel and aircraft in Haiti over a similar time period of time (14  months). To devise the military portion of the scenario, we interviewed  DOD officials and contractor staff involved in developing cost estimates  for U.S. contingency operations. The Department of Defense (DOD)  Office of the Comptroller and its contractor, the Institute for Defense  Analyses (IDA), generated cost estimates for the military components of  this scenario using the DOD’s Contingency Operations Support Tool  (COST), since DOD financial management regulations designate COST  as the department’s common cost-estimating platform. The cost  estimate DOD provided included only the incremental costs of the  operation—those directly attributable to the operation that would not  be incurred if the operation did not take place. We based the scenario,  and hence the cost estimate, on the following assumptions, which  correspond closely with MINUSTAH budget assumptions and actual UN  personnel deployments.
Military contingents: 6,594 total personnel divided as follows: Hospital units: 500 personnel Military police: 820 personnel  Light infantry: 5,074 personnel less the number of aviation  support personnel for 8 UH-60 Black Hawk and 10 CH-47 Chinook  helicopters.
Type of military personnel: 85 percent active duty, 15 percent reserve.
Theater of operations: Haiti.
Operation dates: orders provided April 30, 2004; costs end June 30,  2005.
Deployment schedule: gradual deployment to theater over 180 day  period; 30-day pre-deployment and deployment phase for active duty  units and 60 days for reserve units; 6-month rotation period for all units;  7-day re-deployment for all units.
Operational tempo: level 1.5 for pre-deployment, deployment, and  sustainment.
Construction of troop housing equivalent to semi-rigid soft wall  dormitory tents.
Transportation: departure from Columbus, Georgia, to Port-au-Prince,  Haiti; personnel deployed and rotated by commercial air; all equipment  shipped by sea.
We obtained input on the scenario design from DOD’s Joint Chiefs of Staff,  who validated it as reasonable. However, the military component of the  scenario and the corresponding cost estimate have some limitations. An  actual U.S. military plan may differ significantly from the UN plan, due to  differences between U.S. and UN military infrastructures in operations,  structure, doctrine, and circumstances at the time of the operation.  Additionally, we did not include reconstitution—the cost of returning  equipment to useable standards after operation—in our cost estimate,  since the UN does not include this cost in its peacekeeping mission  budgets, and we assumed that reconstitution would occur after the initial  budget cycle on which our comparison is based. Further, some cost factors  used in COST, such as some pre-deployment costs and transportation for  certain supplies and mail, are based on various contingency operations,  such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, and may not be representative of costs in  Haiti.
To estimate civilian police costs, we obtained and analyzed data from  the Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law  Enforcement Affairs on actual contract costs for providing civilian  police to support UN missions. As these contracts do not include the  costs for daily subsistence and transportation, we calculated these  additional costs based on the U.S. government meals and incidental  expense rate for Port-au-Prince and published contract airfare  schedules. We applied the average costs per officer to the total number  of civilian police officers included in the MINUSTAH budget. Formed  police units were not calculated in this manner, as we assumed that such  personnel would be provided in the military portion of the operation as  military police and are included as such in that estimate.
To estimate U.S. civilian personnel costs for the operation, we obtained  and analyzed data from the Department of State to determine the  average annual cost of a foreign service officer in Haiti during fiscal year  2005, including salary and benefits, office furnishings, housing,  residential furnishings, post differential, airfare, shipping, rest and  recuperation, danger pay, cost of living adjustments, educational  allowance for one child, and miscellaneous expenses. We applied this  average cost to the number of non-administrative international staff  included in the MINUSTAH budget. (We subtracted several senior  executive positions from this number, as the ambassador and U.S.  Agency for International Development mission director and other senior  U.S. officials already posted to Haiti would likely serve their functions.)  To estimate the cost of locally-employed national staff, we obtained  staffing information for the U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince for fiscal  years 2004 and 2005 from the Department of State and calculated the  average annual salary for locally-employed national staff in Haiti. We  applied this figure to the number of non-administrative national staff  included in the MINUSTAH budget. We calculated benefits for this staff  at 27.6 percent of salaries, per information on these costs provided by  the Department of State.
To estimate civilian facilities and administrative costs, we obtained and  analyzed data provided by the Department of State and the U.S. embassy  in Port-au-Prince. The department’s Capital Security Cost-Sharing  Program requires agencies posting staff overseas to pay fees into a cost- sharing pool that funds construction of secure embassies and  consulates. We used data on these fees to calculate the total cost-sharing  fee for the civilian staff in our U.S. operational scenario for Haiti. To  determine administrative support costs, we obtained and analyzed cost  data from the Department of State’s International Cooperative  Administrative Support Services program for the Port-au-Prince  embassy for fiscal year 2004. We calculated the average administrative  cost per non-administrative foreign service officer and applied this  amount to the total number of non-administrative civilian personnel in  the MINUSTAH budget.
To estimate the cost of deploying civilian volunteers, we obtained and  analyzed data from two U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations that  contract with the U.S. government to provide volunteers for  development and humanitarian activities overseas. These organizations  provided the cost estimates for deploying 153 volunteers in Haiti for 14  months, which corresponds to the parameters of the MINUSTAH budget  for volunteers. Our cost estimate includes the average of these two  estimates.
For all of the cost data used in these estimates, we obtained and analyzed  supporting information or discussed the data source with the  corresponding officials and determined that the data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report.
To analyze factors that could substantially affect the estimated costs of the  U.S. operation, we developed alternative scenarios and cost estimates,  varying one major assumption for each scenario. We identified the  assumptions to vary through discussions with DOD and Institute for  Defense Analysis officials, who identified those factors they believed,  based on their experience, would have the most influence on the cost  estimate for the operation’s military component. The three variations we  selected were (1) an all-reserve force, (2) deployment of all troops in Haiti  within the first 60 days of the operation, and (3) an operational tempo of 2.  DOD generated alternative cost estimates for each scenario, using COST,  and we compared these with the base estimate to identify and explain the  major differences associated with each alternative scenario.
To identify and assess the strengths of the United States and the UN in  leading peacekeeping operations in Haiti, we obtained and analyzed UN  reports and evaluations relating to MINUSTAH and information on past  U.S.-led operations in Haiti. We interviewed officials from DOD, the  Department of State, and the UN, as well as peacekeeping experts from the  Stimson Center in Washington, D.C., to discuss their views on factors that  contribute to successful peacekeeping operations. We also reviewed  published reports from various organizations relating to the effectiveness  of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations.
We conducted our review from June through February 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report include Tetsuo Miyabara (Assistant  Director), James Michels, Charles Perdue, Kendall Schaefer, Suzanne Sapp,  Grace Lui, Lynn Cothern, Joseph Carney, and Sharron Candon.