Nuclear Weapons: Actions Needed by NNSA to Clarify Dismantlement Performance Goal
Published: 2014-04-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: NNSA is responsible for the nation's nuclear weapons programs. As part of this mission, it oversees dismantlement of retired nuclear weapons and disposition of their components. Dismantlement occurs at NNSA's Pantex Plant, and disassembly of CSAs from dismantled weapons occurs at the Y-12 site. GAO was asked to assess NNSA's weapons dismantlement and component disposition efforts.
This report examines, among other things, (1) how NNSA measures progress toward its fiscal year 2022 dismantlement performance goal, as well as any challenges it might face in achieving the goal; (2) the schedule for and any challenges in dismantling weapons to be retired as a result of the New START treaty; (3) physical capacity available at Pantex to meet or accelerate planned dismantlement workload; and (4) any challenges in disassembling and disposing of weapon components. GAO analyzed NNSA's future dismantlement schedule, observed weapons dismantlement and component disposition activities at Pantex and Y-12, and interviewed NNSA officials. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on nuclear weapons dismantlement.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: How the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) measures progress toward its performance goal of dismantling all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022 is unclear for two reasons. First, NNSA does not track the actual date that dismantled weapons were retired and may be counting some dismantled weapons retired after fiscal year 2009 as equivalent to weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009. Second, NNSA will not dismantle some weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 but will reinstate them to the stockpile to save on rebuilding other weapons and count the reinstated weapons as equivalent dismantlements. Having clear goals and measures is a key element of program management. Because the dismantlement performance goal does not make these practices clear, NNSA risks providing misleading information about progress related to its goal.
NNSA has a schedule for future weapon dismantlements but has not scheduled for dismantlement any weapons to be removed from the stockpile resulting from implementation of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). These weapons are not expected to be retired until the late 2020s or early 2030s. The deferred retirement of these weapons could result in a significant dismantlement workload gap during the mid-2020s. Such a gap could result in the loss of certified dismantlement personnel because dismantlement technicians at Pantex lose their certifications if they have not worked on a weapon type in the past year. By extending the fiscal year 2022 dismantlement performance goal, NNSA could allow the current dismantlement workload to be leveled and extended through the mid-2020s to sustain its dismantlement workforce.
The physical capacity at the Pantex Plant in Texas should be sufficient to meet NNSA's planned dismantlement workload and other stockpile commitments through fiscal year 2022. According to NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors, the site's ability to significantly accelerate its dismantlement rates and complete planned workload earlier than fiscal year 2022 could be costly, and it is unclear whether the site would have sufficient capacity to do so.
GAO identified policy and technical challenges complicating NNSA's disassembly and disposition of nuclear and nonnuclear components from dismantled nuclear weapons. For instance, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee disassembles canned subassemblies (CSA)—a major nuclear component that can contain highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is uranium enriched in the isotope uranium-235 to 20 percent or greater. NNSA is retaining many CSAs, leaving far fewer of them for disassembly, and creating challenges for Y-12's ability to plan its disassembly workload. However, NNSA bases its retention decisions on national security considerations and not Y-12 workload. Moreover, NNSA's ability to effectively manage a contingency inventory of millions of nonnuclear components at Pantex is complicated by decisions to retain many components for potential reuse in weapons, including old parts for weapons no longer in the stockpile, and by limitations in Pantex's previous component inventory management system. GAO is not making a recommendation on these matters because of efforts already under way at Pantex to address the need to retain older parts and to upgrade its component inventory management system.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that NNSA (1) clarify the dismantlement performance goal and (2) consider extending the goal to avoid a dismantlement workload gap. NNSA generally agreed with these recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Nuclear weapons remain an essential element of U.S. national security.  However, the number of nuclear weapons needed by the United States to  maintain deterrence has shifted dramatically since the end of the cold war  and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Since the early  1990s, the United States has greatly reduced its nuclear forces through  arms control treaties with the Soviet Union and Russia—including the  1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and the 2002 Strategic  Offensive Reductions Treaty.
As a result of these force reductions and other initiatives reducing the size  of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile,  thousands of weapons have been  retired from service and made available for dismantlement.overseeing the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, the Department of  Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) helps  ensure that the United States is not maintaining more nuclear weapons   By  than necessary and is meeting international treaty commitments. From  fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2012, NNSA and DOE dismantled  more than 12,000 retired nuclear weapons. However, there are several  thousand retired weapons awaiting dismantlement, and additional  weapons will enter the dismantlement queue as a result of ongoing  weapon retirement decisions. Moreover, further stockpile reductions are  expected as a result of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known  as New START, signed by the United States and Russia in 2010.
The dismantlement of nuclear weapons also supports U.S.  nonproliferation objectives. NNSA and Department of State officials have  noted the importance of U.S. nuclear weapons dismantlement in  demonstrating the nation’s commitment to disarmament under the 1970  Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and NNSA officials  and documents have stated that dismantlement represents a concrete  step toward the President’s long-term goal of a world without nuclear  weapons. Other organizations—including the Secretary of Energy  Advisory Board—have recommended that NNSA accelerate its  dismantlement of retired nuclear weapons to further demonstrate the  United States’ commitment to nuclear weapons reductions. The 2010  Nuclear Posture Review—which provides a road map for implementing  the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear risks to the United States— also highlights nuclear weapons dismantlement and the administration’s  intention to consider accelerating the pace of dismantlement.
NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs oversees the maintenance,   and dismantlement of nuclear weapons.  refurbishment, surveillance,Within this office, the Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition (WDD)  program oversees, among other things, nuclear weapons dismantlement  and the further disassembly of major weapon components,  “characterization” of components to identify hazards and security  concerns, and disposal of most weapon-system components. The WDD  program’s performance goal is to dismantle all nuclear weapons that were  retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022.
The physical work of dismantling weapons and disassembling and  disposing of weapon components is performed by contractors operating  facilities in NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise. dismantlement of a nuclear weapon involves reducing it to its component  parts and takes place at the Pantex Plant in Texas. NNSA defines a  weapon as dismantled when the high explosive surrounding the weapon’s  fissile core, known as the “pit,” is removed. The dismantlement of a  weapon results in nuclear components, such as the pit, and numerous  nonnuclear components of various types and sizes, from screws to  parachutes. Figure 1 depicts some of the components from a B61 bomb.
NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise—formerly known as the nuclear weapons complex— consists of the laboratories, production plants, and a test site that carry out missions to  support NNSA’s programs.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: This section discusses the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; the stockpile  planning and retirement process; nuclear weapons design and  components; nuclear weapons dismantlement planning, facilities,  supporting programs, and budget; and the nuclear weapons  dismantlement process.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile
paragraphs: Since 1945, the United States has fielded more than 70 different nuclear  weapon systems; currently, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile consists  of 8 such systems. These systems can be strategic or nonstrategic, and  can include gravity bombs deliverable by long-range bombers and dual- capable aircraft, as well as warheads deliverable by submarine-launched  ballistic missiles (SLBM), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and  air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM).
For some systems in the stockpile—such as the B61 bomb—there may  be multiple versions as a result of modifications, or “mods,” that change  weapon components related to their operational characteristics, safety, or  control features. Life extension programs have been initiated for some  weapons to address aging and enhance the safety, security, and  reliability of the weapons in the stockpile. Table 1 shows the weapon  systems in the U.S. stockpile, including information on their delivery  systems and missions, responsible military services, and dates of entry  into the stockpile.
The nuclear weapons stockpile is configured into “active” and “inactive”  categories, and individual nuclear weapons are identified as being in 1 of  10 states of readiness across both categories. Active weapons  maintained at the top readiness state are operationally deployed  weapons; the numbers of these weapons have been limited under  strategic arms control treaties, such as New START. Inactive weapons  are normally maintained at a depot in a nonoperational status.nondeployed weapons are “hedge” weapons, maintained in both the  active and inactive categories and retained both for technical hedge  purposes (i.e., to hedge against an unforeseen catastrophic failure in a  weapon type or family) and for geopolitical hedge purposes (i.e., to hedge  against a reversal in the geopolitical situation that would require more  weapons to be available for use).
Retired nuclear weapons have been removed from their delivery  platforms and are no longer part of the stockpile. Retired weapons fall into  one of the following two categories:
Weapons released for dismantlement. These weapons have been  released for dismantlement, consistent with the capacity available at  NNSA facilities and DOD requirements. Some of these weapons may  be “reinstated” to the stockpile in lieu of being dismantled. Specifically,  the Nuclear Weapons Council has approved a practice that allows  NNSA to reinstate some retired weapons awaiting dismantlement to  the stockpile to replace weapons that have been disassembled and  inspected under the stockpile surveillance program.
Weapons in managed retirement. These weapons have been  removed from the stockpile but have not been approved for  dismantlement. These weapons are maintained in such a way that  they could be reactivated should there be a catastrophic failure in the  stockpile necessitating such action. The Nuclear Weapons Council  Standing and Safety Committee must approve dismantlement of these  weapons.
In addition, NNSA also characterizes retired nuclear weapons as either  “war reserve” weapons or “quality assurance” weapons. Retired war  reserve weapons are those withdrawn from the active or inactive stockpile  categories that are surplus to defense needs and that could be reinstated  to the stockpile if not dismantled. Retired quality assurance weapons are  those that have been retired from the active or inactive stockpile  categories for surveillance purposes—specifically, some of their  components are destructively tested as part of the surveillance process,  and these weapons are subsequently dismantled rather than being  rebuilt. In discussing its future dismantlement schedule, NNSA tends to  focus on the inventory of war reserve weapons because this inventory  includes a large number of weapons that have been retired and  accumulated in inventory over time and are weapons to be counted  toward NNSA’s dismantlement performance goal. The number of retired  quality assurance weapons is generally small and consistent from year to  year, and the dismantlement of all quality assurance weapons is generally  completed within the year they are retired.
section_title: Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Planning and Retirement Process
paragraphs: The decision to retire and subsequently dismantle nuclear weapons is  tied to a high-level policy-making process establishing the U.S. nuclear  stockpile’s size and composition. This process begins with nuclear  weapons policy and strategy guidance provided by the President in the  form of a Presidential Policy Directive. Based on this presidential directive  and other inputs—including guidance from the Secretary of Defense in  the form of DOD directives and planning guidance—the military services,  combatant commanders, and Joint Chiefs of Staff develop nuclear  weapons requirements.
These requirements are submitted to the Nuclear Weapons Council staff  and, combined with other inputs, inform the development of a nuclear  weapons Requirements and Planning Document, which specifies nuclear  weapon policies, military requirements, joint DOD and DOE planning  factors, long-term planning considerations that affect the future of the  stockpile, and supporting programmatic details. The Requirements and  Planning Document provides detailed technical information and analyses  that support the development of a Nuclear Weapons Stockpile  Memorandum and a proposed presidential directive containing a  proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. The Nuclear Weapons  Stockpile Memorandum is an annual memorandum from the Secretary of  Defense and Secretary of Energy that transmits the proposed directive,  which, if approved, becomes the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. The  Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan specifies the size and composition of  the stockpile for a projected multiyear period. The coordination process  for these documents serves as the key forum in which DOD and DOE  resolve issues concerning DOD nuclear weapon requirements and DOE  capacity and capability to support those requirements. Once the  President signs the directive, the Nuclear Weapons Council is authorized  to approve changes in the stockpile within certain percentage limits  specified by the President.
Nuclear weapons are retired from the stockpile by the Nuclear Weapons  Council in accordance with the presidential guidance in the Nuclear  Weapons Stockpile Plan. Project Officers Groups—which are joint DOD- DOE committees established for each weapon type to coordinate on  technical matters relating to the weapon—develop prioritized retirement  plans for the weapon systems identified for retirement in the  Requirements and Planning Document.
NNSA uses the information from each Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan  and the Requirements and Planning Document to develop a Nuclear  Weapons Production and Planning Directive, which includes long-term  schedules for weapons dismantlement at Pantex and CSA disassembly at  Y-12, as well as plans for nuclear weapon life extension programs,  surveillance, and other stockpile-related activities executed by the  agency.specific weapon Program Control Documents used to manage the  workload outlined in the Production and Planning Directives. NNSA  coordinates with the Navy and the Air Force to arrange delivery of specific  weapons to the Pantex Plant for dismantlement, consistent with the  Production and Planning Directive and the Program Control Documents.
section_title: Nuclear Weapons Design and Components
paragraphs: All weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile are two-stage nuclear weapons,  sometimes referred to as thermonuclear weapons, involving fission and  fusion reactions to achieve the explosive yield. The first stage, known as  the primary, consists of a hollow pit—containing a central shell of fissile  material typically made of plutonium or of plutonium and uranium inside a  tamper shell—surrounded by high explosives. The second stage, or  secondary, is encased inside a CSA that can contain HEU and other  materials. The primary and the CSA are referred to as the weapon’s  nuclear explosive package.
Outside of the nuclear explosive package, a nuclear weapon contains  other nonnuclear components that control the use, arming, and firing of  the weapon, including arming, fuzing, and firing systems; reservoirs of  tritium and deuterium gas that are injected into the pit through gas  transfer systems to boost the nuclear reaction during detonation; neutron  generators that produce neutrons for primary detonation; and other  nonnuclear components such as radars, batteries, and parachutes (for  gravity bombs dropped from aircraft).
section_title: Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement Planning, Facilities, Supporting Programs, and Budget
paragraphs: Nuclear weapons dismantlement is a multistage process that requires  extensive planning, utilizes a mix of facilities at Pantex, and relies on a  number of supporting NNSA programs. For fiscal years 2008 through  2012, the WDD program budget generally ranged from approximately $50  million to $60 million per year.
subsections: section_title: Planning for Dismantlement
paragraphs: Before a weapon system can be dismantled, Pantex must conduct  planning to identify and analyze potential hazards, locate or create  appropriate tools, train its workforce, identify disposition pathways for  nuclear and nonnuclear components, allocate time and facilities for  dismantlement activities, ensure space is available to receive and store,  or “stage,” the weapons, identify on-site storage for pits, and coordinate  transport of CSAs recovered from the weapons to Y-12 for further  disassembly.
Since 1999, Pantex has managed the planning for dismantlement of  weapons through an integrated safety management process known as  Seamless Safety for the 21st Century (SS-21). Among other things, this  process ensures that appropriate safety authorizations have been  developed, reviewed, and approved for each weapon system before it is  dismantled. The SS-21 process is unique to Pantex and comprises  several steps, including: (1) hazard analysis to review all possible  hazards at each step, such as the risk of electrostatic discharge within a  dismantlement facility and the number of times a warhead must be lifted  and moved; and (2) tooling preparation to ensure that workers have the  necessary specialized tooling designed to mitigate the hazards; and (3)  reviews, safety analyses, and readiness assessments, which must be  completed before dismantlement authorization is given.
section_title: Pantex Facilities for Dismantlement
paragraphs: Dismantlement operations at Pantex occur at a secure area of the site— referred to as Zone 12—inside specialized bays and cells authorized for  nuclear explosive operations. Intact nuclear weapons on-site awaiting  dismantlement are stored inside magazines, located in a separate secure  area of the plant—known as Zone 4. Zone 12 contains 37 bays where  mechanical dismantlement of weapons and dismantlement of nuclear  explosive packages utilizing insensitive high explosives may be  conducted, as well as 10 cells that are reserved for nuclear explosive  operations involving conventional high explosives.these 47 facilities as nuclear explosive production facilities.
Physical capacity available at any given time at Pantex is influenced by  several factors, including the physical size of the weapons, whether they  use conventional or insensitive high explosives, weight limitations within  facilities, and the time requirements to perform dismantlement operations,  which vary from weapon system to weapon system. Furthermore,  physical capacity at the site to dismantle weapons is limited, and it must  be balanced against other stockpile-related operations at Pantex that  require use of bays and cells. Other stockpile-related operations that use  the site’s bays and cells include temporarily staging weapons brought into  Zone 12 from Zone 4 prior to being worked on, life extension program  work, and weapon surveillance work. In addition, nuclear explosive  operations at the site halt during thunderstorms that occur nearby—to  minimize electrostatic detonation risks inside bays and cells during  weapons assembly and disassembly. According to Pantex site  contractors, the site plans for a small loss of capacity each year in the  form of facility downtime due to lightning risks.
section_title: NNSA Programs Supporting Dismantlement
paragraphs: The WDD program relies on several other NNSA programs to support the  dismantlement mission. For instance, funding from NNSA’s Readiness in  Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) program provides the facilities,  infrastructure, and base capabilities that indirectly support the WDD  program. RTBF funds also provide storage and material recycle and  recovery support to WDD efforts. NNSA’s Office of Secure  Transportation pays for transportation of weapons to Pantex for  dismantlement and transportation of resulting components to other sites  for further disassembly or processing, utilizing specialized vehicles called  Safeguards Transporters. NNSA’s Stockpile Services Production Support  program supports shipping, receiving, equipment maintenance and  calibration services, and other activities that facilitate dismantlement and  other weapons-related work.
section_title: Dismantlement Budget
paragraphs: In general, for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, the WDD program budget  has ranged from approximately $50 million to $60 million per year. The  WDD budget supports weapons dismantlement, characterization of  components to identify hazards and classification issues, disposition of  components, and other activities. According to an NNSA official,  approximately 80 percent of the current and anticipated future program  budget is allocated to weapons dismantlement and disassembly, with the  remaining funding allocated to component characterization, disposition,  and other activities.
NNSA does not track the indirect dismantlement costs incurred by other  NNSA supporting programs because these programs do not separately  account for or apportion their costs between support for WDD and other  stockpile support activities. For instance, the Office of Secure  Transportation provides transportation support for programs across the  NNSA nuclear security enterprise but does not collect or maintain  accounting data based on weapon type or functional workload for  weapons.
section_title: Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement Process
paragraphs: The dismantlement process begins when a weapon is transferred from a  storage magazine in Zone 4 to a dismantlement bay in Zone 12. In the  bay, the nuclear explosive package containing the primary and CSA; the  arming, fuzing and firing system; and other nonnuclear components are  removed from the weapon. Nuclear explosive packages that contain  conventional high explosives are transferred to a cell for further  dismantlement, while those with insensitive high explosives may be  dismantled in a bay. Within the bay or cell, the high explosive is  separated from the pit, and the weapon is considered officially  dismantled.
From this stage forward, nuclear and nonnuclear components are  accounted for individually, and each component has an established  disposition path—it may be stored, recycled, or disposed of. The pit is  packaged and returned to Zone 4 at Pantex and is stored pending either  reuse in refurbished weapons or eventual disposal as part of NNSA’s  plutonium disposition program. The high explosives are disposed of at  Pantex through open-air burning. Other components recovered are  returned to their original manufacturer—such as nonnuclear components  sent to KCP for further disposition. Some classified or radiologically  contaminated components may be disposed of through burial at the  NNSS. Nonnuclear components may be returned to KCP; demilitarized,  sanitized, and disposed of at Pantex; or stored at Pantex for reuse.
The CSAs from dismantled weapons are sent to Y-12 for disassembly to  recover HEU and other materials they contain. Because Y-12 is the sole  national supplier of HEU, disassembly of CSAs is critical in supplying  HEU for refurbished weapons and meeting HEU supply commitments for  fuel for naval reactors and research reactors. The HEU retrieved from the  CSAs is stored at Y-12 in the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility,  and other recovered materials are stored elsewhere on site. Materials that  are not suitable for recycling or reuse are sent for burial at NNSS. See  figure 3 for a general illustration of the nuclear weapons dismantlement  process workflow.
section_title: Weapons Inventory to Be Dismantled Shrank Then Increased, While NNSA’s Annual Dismantlement Rates Generally Declined
paragraphs: After generally declining from fiscal year 1992 through the early 2000s,  the inventory of retired nuclear weapons awaiting dismantlement  increased following nuclear stockpile reductions and significant additional  weapon retirements in 2004 and 2007. At the same time, the number of  weapons dismantled annually—NNSA’s annual dismantlement rate— generally declined over the past 20 years because of a greater emphasis  on dismantlement safety and increased weapon complexity.
subsections: section_title: Inventory of Weapons Awaiting Dismantlement Declined Until the Early 2000s but Then Increased Following Substantial Additional Weapon Retirements
paragraphs: In the early 1990s, following the end of the cold war, the United States  had a large inventory of retired nuclear weapons awaiting  dismantlement. This inventory shrank through the mid-1990s and early  2000s. However, according to NNSA and DOD officials, significant  stockpile reductions stemming from presidential direction in 2004 and  2007 resulted in large numbers of additional weapons being declared  surplus to defense needs and retired. For instance, in 2004, the President  directed that the stockpile be reduced by nearly one-half by fiscal year  2012. In 2007, the President directed substantial additional reductions in  the stockpile. These decisions resulted in substantial growth in the  inventory of retired weapons awaiting dismantlement. NNSA has reduced  this inventory since that time. However, at the end of fiscal year 2012, the  inventory of retired weapons that were awaiting dismantlement was  similar in size to the inventory of weapons awaiting dismantlement in the  mid-1990s.
section_title: NNSA’s Annual Dismantlement Rate Has Generally Decreased over the Past 20 Years as a Result of Increased Safety Emphasis and Weapon Complexity
paragraphs: According to our analysis of dismantlement data, since the early 1990s,  NNSA’s dismantlement rates have generally decreased, with NNSA  dismantling about 1,000 fewer weapons annually in recent years than it  was dismantling in the mid-1990s. In addition, in some years, only one or  two types of retired war reserve weapons were dismantled.
NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors attributed the overall decline in  dismantlement rates in part to an increased emphasis on safety in nuclear  explosive operations performed at the Pantex site. The initiation of the  SS-21 process at Pantex in 1999 provided a more comprehensive  framework for evaluating and mitigating the hazards associated with  nuclear weapon activities, including dismantlement. According to NNSA  officials and Pantex site contractors, the SS-21 process also led to  greater efficiency in dismantling individual weapons. For example, the  SS-21 redesign of the B83 dismantlement process included development  of a new work stand that holds the bomb throughout the dismantlement  process, allowing Pantex to mitigate both the safety risks and time losses  previously experienced in moving the weapon from one work stand to  another. Figure 4 shows the old and new B83 work stands.
However, according to NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors, the  new emphasis on safety stemming from SS-21 led Pantex to suspend the  practice of dismantling multiple weapons within one bay or cell—a  practice referred to as multiunit dismantlement. Some weapon systems  are currently authorized for different types of multiunit dismantlement but,  as a matter of practice, Pantex is not dismantling multiple weapons within  individual bays and cells. According to Pantex site contractors, this  move away from multiunit processing offset other processing efficiencies,  resulting in a significant decline in the number of weapons dismantled by  the site annually. For instance, Pantex site contractors told us that  throughout the 1990s, the site was processing multiple weapons in a bay  or cell at a time, which enabled the site to typically dismantle 1,000 to  2,000 weapons per year. With suspension of multiunit dismantlement,  Pantex site contractors told us that it was unlikely the site could achieve a  comparable rate of dismantlement today. Pantex site contractors provided  us with data showing that, in the 1990s, some weapon systems were  dismantled three- or four-at-a-time within a bay or cell, including the  following systems:
W48 warheads: dismantled two per cell, three per bay;
B57 bombs: dismantled two per cell, four per bay;
W68 warheads: dismantled three per cell, four per bay;
W70 warheads: dismantled three per cell, four per bay; and
W79 warheads: dismantled two per cell, four per bay.
According to NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors, as a result of the  reevaluation of safety at Pantex, NNSA concluded that the potential  additional risk during multiunit dismantlement processing outweighed the  benefits of dismantling multiple weapons within one bay or cell at a time.
NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors also told us that  dismantlement rates have generally decreased over time because  weapons dismantled recently have tended to be more difficult and time- consuming to dismantle than weapons dismantled in the 1990s. More  specifically, an NNSA official told us that many of the weapons  dismantled in the 1990s were smaller, less complex tactical nuclear  weapons, such as nuclear artillery shells that were retired as a result of  the 1991 presidential nuclear initiatives, and that more recently  dismantled weapons—such as the B53 and B83 strategic bombs—have  tended to be larger, more complex weapon systems.
Pantex site contractors told us that each weapon system comes apart  differently and poses different dismantlement challenges. These  variations affect the length of dismantlement time. Pantex has developed  data to measure the time requirements in dismantling different weapon  systems, referred to as dismantlement “difficulty quotients” (DQ).  According to Pantex officials, dismantlement DQs are not measures of  technical difficulty per se in dismantling a weapon, but they are measures  of the amount of time involved in the dismantlement operation. These  DQs are developed by Pantex planning staff who work with individual  weapon program engineers to determine the number of hours required for  each dismantlement activity associated with the weapon in question.  These hours are rolled up for each weapon type and then divided by the  number of hours required for a “standard” life extension program involving  disassembly, inspection, refurbishment, and rebuilding of the weapon.  NNSA has used the DQ data to establish “dismantlement equivalent  units” (DEQ) for each weapon type, in order to measure the relative  dismantlement time requirements among different weapon systems. The  DEQs are derived by dividing a weapon’s DQ against the DQ of a  dismantlement base case. According to NNSA officials and Pantex site  contractors, and based on our review of DQ and DEQ data, some  weapon systems that have recently been dismantled in large numbers  were more time-consuming to dismantle than other weapons due to their  complexity and size, and these have high DEQs.
section_title: How NNSA Measures Progress Toward Its Dismantlement Performance Goal May Be Misleading, and NNSA Is Unlikely to Achieve This Goal
paragraphs: How NNSA measures progress toward its performance goal of  dismantling all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of  fiscal year 2022 is unclear and may make its reported progress  misleading, including its practice of not tracking the actual date of  retirement of individual dismantled weapons and its plans to reinstate to  the stockpile—rather than dismantle—certain weapons retired prior to  fiscal year 2009. In addition, NNSA faces challenges in managing  planned dismantlement workload and is unlikely to achieve its  dismantlement performance goal because a large number of weapons  retired prior to fiscal year 2009 are in managed retirement status, and it is  uncertain whether these weapons will be released for dismantlement in  time for NNSA to meet its dismantlement goal.
subsections: section_title: How NNSA Measures Dismantlement Progress May Be Misleading
paragraphs: In 2006, NNSA established a performance goal for the WDD program to  dismantle all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal  year 2022. This goal was established to demonstrate to Congress that  NNSA had a plan for timely, safe, and secure dismantlement of nuclear  weapons. In March 2013, we obtained a draft of NNSA’s future  dismantlement schedule for all retired war reserve weapons, which  included the schedule for the dismantlement, or other disposition, of the  subset of weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009. Our analysis of  NNSA’s dismantlement schedule for weapons retired prior to fiscal year  2009 and interviews with NNSA officials indicate that how NNSA  measures progress toward this performance goal is unclear and may be  misleading for two reasons.
First, the way in which NNSA measures progress toward its  dismantlement performance goal is unclear and may be misleading  because NNSA as a matter of practice does not identify and track the  actual retirement date of individual weapons that are dismantled.  According to an NNSA official, NNSA knows how many weapons of each  system type were retired prior to fiscal year 2009. However, NNSA and  Pantex do not track the date of retirement of individual weapons when  they are dismantled at the Pantex Plant. Instead, whenever Pantex  dismantles an individual retired weapon of a system type represented in  the pre-fiscal year 2009 inventory—regardless of that weapon’s actual  date of retirement—NNSA counts that dismantlement as being equivalent  to a weapon retired prior to fiscal year 2009 and counts it toward the fiscal  year 2022 goal. Because of this approach, it is possible, according to an  NNSA official, that NNSA is counting weapons toward the achievement of  its performance goal that were retired after fiscal year 2009. This official  told us that while individual retired weapons in storage at military facilities  can be tracked by retirement date, weapons retired prior to fiscal year  2009 are not marked or designated for priority dismantlement. However,  this official stated that, in general, it is unlikely that a more recently retired  weapon would be selected for dismantlement if older retired weapons of  the same type are available.
An NNSA official also commented that there may be technical reasons  why an individual weapon retired after fiscal year 2009 may be  transferred to NNSA for dismantlement before a weapon retired prior to  fiscal year 2009. For instance, an NNSA official told us that NNSA’s  stockpile surveillance program might identify potential problems with a  specific component, such as a capacitor, that might apply only to  individual weapons retired after fiscal year 2009 and not to those retired  before, making dismantlement of the weapons retired after fiscal year  2009 a higher priority.
Second, how NNSA measures progress toward its dismantlement  performance goal is also unclear and may be misleading because some  weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 are reinstated to the stockpile  rather than dismantled. Specifically, in our analysis of NNSA’s  dismantlement schedule as of March 2013 for weapons retired prior to  fiscal year 2009, we found that approximately 9 percent of the weapons  retired prior to fiscal year 2009 are scheduled to be reinstated during  fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2022 or later.
According to NNSA officials, NNSA plans to reinstate these weapons, in  part, to offset the costs of rebuilding weapons disassembled under the  stockpile surveillance program. Through this program, in a given year, a  random sample of weapons from each weapon system is selected and  withdrawn from the stockpile, disassembled, and inspected, and usually  one weapon in each weapon system sample is subjected to nonnuclear,  destructive testing of its nuclear components and cannot be rebuilt. The  destructively tested units are replaced by weapons kept in readiness  states in the inactive category of the stockpile, known as quality  assurance and reliability testing replacement weapons. The remaining  weapons from the sample set could be rebuilt following inspection and  returned to the stockpile. However, in lieu of rebuilding all of the  disassembled weapons, NNSA replaces some of them by reinstating  retired war reserve weapons to the stockpile. According to NNSA officials,  this is a cost-effective practice that avoids the costly rebuilding of  weapons evaluated under the surveillance program and also reduces the  number of weapons in the dismantlement queue.
An NNSA official told us that it is technically correct that under this  practice some weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 are not expected  to be dismantled but reinstated to the stockpile instead. However, this  official noted that, under the reinstatement practice, NNSA is still  dismantling a weapon for each weapon that is reinstated to the  stockpile—that is, the weapon in the stockpile that is disassembled and  inspected under the surveillance program. Thus, the reinstatement  practice represents an equivalent dismantlement that has a neutral  impact on the size of the stockpile.
We have found in our prior work that having clear performance goals and  measures is a key element of effective program management.Performance goals or measures that are not clearly stated may be  confusing or misleading. Neither NNSA’s dismantlement performance  goal as currently written, nor the way that progress toward the goal is  measured, makes it clear that NNSA is counting equivalent numbers of  weapons dismantled. Without such clarity, Congress and other users of  this performance information may not understand the age or types of  weapons that NNSA is counting toward achievement of the performance  goal.
section_title: Uncertainties Related to Weapons in Managed Retirement Make It Unlikely That NNSA Will Achieve Its Dismantlement Goal
paragraphs: The uncertainties surrounding when weapons in managed retirement— retired weapons that have not been approved by the Nuclear Weapons  Council for dismantlement—may be released for dismantlement present  challenges for NNSA in scheduling future dismantlement workload and  make it unlikely that NNSA will achieve its goal of dismantling all weapons  retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022. During our  review, weapons from three different weapon systems were in managed  retirement. These include some
W84-0s retired in fiscal year 2006,
W80-1s retired in fiscal year 2007, and
W76-0s retired from fiscal years 2004 through 2012.
The W84-0s and W80-1s currently in managed retirement may not be  available to NNSA for dismantlement prior to fiscal year 2022 because  both of these systems are being held in managed retirement as  candidates for potential reuse as the warhead on a future long-range  standoff missile to replace the Air Force’s current ALCM.DOD officials told us that release of the W84-0s and W80-1s in managed  retirement for dismantlement is contingent on a future Nuclear Weapons  Council selection of a warhead for potential reuse on the future missile.  However, the timing of the future Nuclear Weapons Council’s decision,  whether it will select the W84-0 or W80-1 for the long-range standoff  missile, and when weapons will be released for dismantlement remains  uncertain, according to NNSA and DOD officials.
According to an NNSA official, if the W80-1 is selected for reuse on the  future missile, NNSA could move the W84-0s back into its dismantlement  schedule in the future. Depending on the timing, such a decision could  present challenges to NNSA and Pantex in meeting the fiscal year 2022  dismantlement goal, as the W84-0 is considered a relatively difficult, or  time-consuming, weapon to dismantle based on our review of DQ and  DEQ data. However, this official told us that the W84-0 has many modern  features. For this reason, there is a possibility that, even if this weapon  system is not selected for reuse as the long-range standoff missile  warhead, NNSA and the national labs may seek to retain the W84-0s  indefinitely for other potential future warhead reuse options. Because of  these uncertainties, NNSA had not scheduled dismantlement of any W84- 0s—including those in managed retirement—in the dismantlement  schedule we reviewed, as of March 2013, and NNSA officials told us that  these weapons will be addressed in one way or another after fiscal year  2022. Given this time frame, and since all W84-0s in managed retirement  were retired in fiscal year 2006, NNSA is unlikely to achieve its goal of  dismantling all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of  fiscal year 2022 unless these weapons are released from managed  retirement, and a decision is made to dismantle them.
Alternatively, if the W84-0 is selected for reuse on the future missile, the  time frame for dismantlement of the W80-1s in managed retirement  remains uncertain. NNSA has tentatively scheduled the W80-1s for  dismantlement before fiscal year 2020. However, DOD officials told us  that, given the need to sustain the ALCM through the mid-2020s, it is  unlikely that the W80-1s in managed retirement would be released for  dismantlement before the first warhead is produced for the new missile  and before the missile achieves initial operating capability, projected for  later in the 2020s.
Uncertainties also surround the W76-0s in managed retirement and when  they might be released for dismantlement, which could pose challenges  for NNSA in meeting its dismantlement performance goal. NNSA is  currently conducting a W76 life extension program under which W76-0  warheads in the stockpile are replaced with refurbished W76-1 warheads.  NNSA expects to complete this life extension program by fiscal year  2019. As a hedge against technical problems in the life extension  program process and in the refurbished warheads, however, the W76-0s  are to remain in managed retirement and be unavailable for  dismantlement until the life extension program processes and W76-1 unit  reliability are “satisfactorily established,” according to the fiscal year 2011  nuclear weapons Requirements and Planning Document. However, the  criteria for “satisfactory establishment” of the W76 life extension program  process and W76-1 unit reliability are unclear, creating uncertainty as to  whether the W76-0s in managed retirement will be released to NNSA in  time for dismantlement by the end of fiscal year 2022.
This uncertainty is driven by concerns about the life extension program  that have been raised by DOE and DOD officials. For instance, in 2006  and 2012, the DOE Inspector General reported on delays in the W76-1  life extension program that put program startup and production goals at  risk. In March 2013, DOD officials expressed concerns to us about the  W76-1 life extension program, including that NNSA has been unable to  produce consistent quantities of W76-1 warheads, and they told us that  there are no formal criteria for the Nuclear Weapons Council’s decision to  release the W76-0s in managed retirement. These officials stated that it  would be difficult to predict the completion of the W76-1 life extension  program given inconsistent production, and that it was impossible to say  whether the W76-0s in managed retirement could be released for  dismantlement prior to fiscal year 2019 without additional confidence in  NNSA’s production capability.
section_title: Deferred Retirement of Weapons under New START Will Pose Challenges to NNSA’s Management of Future Dismantlement Workload and Workforce
paragraphs: According to DOD officials we interviewed, the 2010 New START treaty  may eventually result in the retirement of additional weapons from the  U.S. stockpile. However, DOD officials told us it is unlikely that entry into  force of New START will lead immediately to additional warhead  retirements and increased dismantlement workload for NNSA. Instead,  DOD officials said that the United States will meet the New START  ceiling—1,550 operationally deployed nuclear weapons—to be in force by  2018 by transitioning currently deployed nuclear weapons to nondeployed  “hedge” status without any significant change in the total stockpile size.
DOD officials told us that the retirement of additional weapons from the  stockpile stemming from New START will be predicated on the successful  restoration of the NNSA weapons production infrastructure, including the  construction and operation of new NNSA facilities supporting nuclear  weapons production—the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research  Replacement Nuclear Facility at LANL, and the Uranium Production  Facility at Y-12—which they did not believe could be achieved until the  late 2020s or early 2030s. Because of these conditions, it remains  unclear when the weapons associated with the New START reductions  will be retired. Due to the uncertainty on the timing of these retirements  NNSA has not yet scheduled for dismantlement any weapons that may be  removed from the stockpile under New START.
The deferred retirement of weapons following entry into force of the New  START treaty until the late 2020s or early 2030s could present challenges  to NNSA in managing its future dismantlement schedule and workforce.  Specifically, there could be a significant gap in dismantlement work during  the mid- to late-2020s, between the end of fiscal year 2022, when NNSA  expects to complete most of its planned dismantlement workload, and the  time when a large number of additional weapons would be available for  dismantlement resulting from New START. This gap could affect NNSA’s  ability to manage the dismantlement workforce, posing challenges for  NNSA in dismantling weapons retired as a result of the treaty. In  particular, an NNSA official expressed concern that this gap in  dismantlement workload in the mid-2020s could result in the loss of  certified dismantlement personnel because dismantlement technicians at  Pantex lose their certifications if they have not worked on a weapon type  within the past year. As a result, Pantex may need to retrain and recertify  sufficient numbers of new dismantlement personnel in the late 2020s to  resume dismantlement efforts to address retired weapons stemming from  New START.
According to an NNSA official we interviewed, relaxing the fiscal year  2022 dismantlement performance goal could allow the dismantlement  workload to be leveled, and a steady dismantlement workforce to be  maintained at Pantex through the mid-2020s. Pantex site contractors  agreed with this view and stated that they were working with the WDD  program manager to avoid a potential dismantlement workload gap. An  NNSA official also told us that stretching out the dismantlement workload  beyond fiscal year 2022 could free up program resources—assuming  future WDD program budgets are comparable in size to the current  budget of approximately $50 million per year—to allow the program to  focus greater attention on disposing of a large inventory of legacy  components from weapons dismantled long ago that are no longer in the  current stockpile.
section_title: Pantex Capacity Sufficient to Meet NNSA’s Planned Dismantlement Workload but Accelerating Dismantlement Could Be Costly
paragraphs: Our analysis of Pantex data indicates that the physical capacity at Pantex  should be sufficient to allow the site to meet NNSA’s planned  dismantlement workload through fiscal year 2022 and to meet all other  stockpile commitments, including surveillance and life extension program  activities. NNSA’s ability to significantly accelerate dismantlement and  complete planned workload earlier than fiscal year 2022 could be costly,  and it is unclear whether Pantex would have sufficient capacity to do so.
subsections: section_title: Physical Capacity at Pantex Should Be Sufficient to Meet NNSA’s Planned Dismantlement Workload and Other Stockpile Commitments
paragraphs: In April 2013, we obtained and analyzed data on the physical capacity at  Pantex to address NNSA’s long-term dismantlement schedule and other  stockpile plans as of March 2013 and found that sufficient bay and cell  capacity should be available to meet these commitments. Specifically, we  analyzed data from a computer-based system, known as the Long Range  Production Planning Model (LRPPM), that Pantex uses to forecast the  numbers of bays and cells needed to address future planned workload at  the site—including dismantlement, surveillance, maintenance, staging,  and life extension program activities.
The LRPPM also provides a tool to NNSA to evaluate the capacity  available at Pantex to support different potential stockpile plans and  scenarios—such as the effect of a delay in completing or initiating a life  extension program for a certain weapon system, or the impact of  accelerating the dismantlement of certain weapons. On the basis of the  workload schedules at any given time, Pantex site contractors can use  the LRPPM to calculate the amount of time and the numbers of bays and  cells needed to complete annual workload from year to year. We used  data generated by the LRPPM to assess the future bay and cell  requirements for dismantlement and other stockpile related activities at  Pantex on the basis of NNSA’s dismantlement schedule and other long- term stockpile plans as of March 2013.system itself.
We did not validate the LRPPM  Based on the LRPPM data, sufficient bay and cell capacity should be  available to meet NNSA’s planned weapon dismantlement, life extension  program, and surveillance workload from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal  year 2022. In many years, the total number of bays and cells needed to  complete total planned workload at the site exceeds the capacity limit at  one work shift but does not require a second work shift. Pantex site  contractors told us in those cases that they could address excess  workload through overtime pay or a partial second shift, which they  believed would be less expensive than maintaining a larger workforce to  sustain the use of two work shifts.
section_title: NNSA’s Ability to Significantly Accelerate Dismantlement and Complete Planned Workload Earlier Than Planned Could Be Costly
paragraphs: NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors said that they believe that  significantly accelerating future dismantlement workload—to complete  total planned workload earlier than fiscal year 2022—could be costly and  that it is unclear whether the site would have sufficient capacity to do so.  However, NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors told us that Pantex  can and has accelerated some planned dismantlement work in response  to changing military needs and to annual financial performance incentives  provided by NNSA to the Pantex site operating contractor.
The U.S. Strategic Command, part of the Department of Defense, has primary  responsibility for targeting nuclear weapons, preparing the U.S. strategic nuclear war plan,  and, if ordered by the President, executing the war plan.
subsections: section_title: Capacity to Significantly Accelerate Future Dismantlement Workload Is Uncertain and Would Likely Entail Significant Costs
paragraphs: NNSA has assessed the capacity at the Pantex site and the costs to  significantly accelerate the dismantlement schedule in order to dismantle  all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 earlier than the end of fiscal  year 2022. Specifically, in March 2011, the Office of the Vice President  asked NNSA to assess the possibility of accelerating its dismantlement  schedule, to dismantle all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by  fiscal year 2018, or 4 years earlier than the performance goal date. In  December 2011, the Office of the Secretary of Defense also asked NNSA  to evaluate this scenario and a second scenario for completing  dismantlement of all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal  year 2020, or 2 years earlier than the performance goal date. In response  to these inquiries, in fiscal year 2011, NNSA identified the requirements  and estimated the costs of increasing annual dismantlement rates.
To achieve the rate of dismantlement associated with either scenario,  NNSA identified the need for certain technical improvements at Pantex,  including bringing one bay and one cell that were unavailable for  dismantlement operations back online, among other things. In addition,  NNSA estimated at the time that approximately $212 million in additional  funding on top of the projected baseline budgets for WDD and other  NNSA programs supporting WDD for fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year  2018 would be needed to achieve the fiscal year 2018 dismantlement  scenario. Alternatively, NNSA estimated that $265 million in additional  funding on top of the projected baseline budgets for WDD and other  NNSA programs supporting WDD for fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year  2020 would be needed to achieve the fiscal year 2020 scenario. We did  not verify the accuracy of these funding estimates. See table 2 for more  information on NNSA’s estimated annual funding needs associated with  these dismantlement acceleration scenarios.
Under NNSA’s 2011 estimate, achieving either of these acceleration  scenarios was predicated on additional funding being made available to  the WDD program and the other supporting NNSA programs beginning in  fiscal year 2012. According to an NNSA official, no additional funding was  provided by Congress to NNSA in fiscal year 2012 or 2013 to support  either the 2018 or 2020 dismantlement acceleration scenario. NNSA  officials and Pantex site contractors told us that, since the 2011 estimate,  they have not reassessed the costs of accelerating its dismantlement  schedule and have not reevaluated the constraints—including bay and  cell capacity, and the numbers of certified workers available—or the  impact on the site’s other scheduled stockpile life extension program and  surveillance work that would be associated with accelerating  dismantlement rates to meet the fiscal year 2018 or 2020 dismantlement  scenario. NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors told us they were  reluctant to undertake such a reevaluation without a clear signal of new  congressional interest in accelerated dismantlement. As a result, we  could not determine whether it would be possible for NNSA to accelerate  dismantlement workload to complete dismantlement of all weapons  retired prior to fiscal year 2009 earlier than fiscal year 2022.
NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors told us that they believed it  would not be possible to complete dismantlement of the remaining  weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal year 2018 without  compromising the site’s planned stockpile life extension program and  surveillance workload. However, an NNSA official told us that completing  dismantlement work 2 years early, or by the end of fiscal year 2020, might  be possible if (1) Congress provided additional funding to the WDD  program and supporting NNSA programs beginning in fiscal year 2014  and (2) other conditions were met, including timely Nuclear Weapons  Council decisions on the release of weapons in managed retirement and  rehabilitation of the additional bay and cell at Pantex. To accelerate  dismantlement to meet a fiscal year 2020 goal, an NNSA official  estimated that additional funding of approximately $212 million, as a  rough order of magnitude, would likely be required on top of current  projected baseline budgets for WDD and supporting NNSA programs— that is, the amount of additional funding NNSA estimated in 2011 that  would be needed to achieve the dismantlement rates for the fiscal year  2018 acceleration scenario described above.
section_title: Pantex Has Accelerated Dismantlement of Some Weapons in Response to Military Needs and Financial Performance Incentives
paragraphs: Even though NNSA and Pantex have not formally reassessed the costs  and capacity constraints of accelerating dismantlement to complete  planned workload earlier than fiscal year 2022, according to NNSA  officials and Pantex site contractors, the Pantex site is generally able to  accelerate dismantlement work. Specifically, Pantex has regularly  exceeded annual dismantlement targets established in the Production  and Planning Directives and Program Control Documents by running  extra dismantlement shifts and allowing overtime pay. Based on our  analysis of NNSA data for fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2012, the  Pantex site exceeded the annual planned dismantlement rates every year  by approximately 14 percent on average.
Pantex has accelerated some dismantlement work in response to  changing military needs that have required some weapons to be  dismantled more quickly. For instance, in 2011, NNSA agreed to a Navy  request to accelerate dismantlement of retired W76-0 warheads at the  rate of 100 units per year, with the goal of dismantling 500 warheads by  the end of fiscal year 2016. At the time, NNSA had not planned for  significant and consistent dismantlement of W76-0 warheads until fiscal  year 2015. According to Navy officials we interviewed, accelerating  dismantlement of retired W76-0 warheads allowed the Navy to avoid  constructing new weapon storage facilities, saving the Navy  approximately $190 million in estimated construction costs.
NNSA has also provided financial performance incentives to the Pantex  site operating contractor to encourage the site to pursue accelerated  rates of dismantlement. NNSA has included dismantlement-related  financial incentives in the annual performance evaluation plans that set  forth the criteria used by NNSA to evaluate the Pantex site operating  contractor’s performance and determine the total fee the contractor  earned. For example, the fiscal year 2012 performance evaluation plan  included five dismantlement-related performance incentives, as follows: exceed planned dismantlements of B53s, complete scheduled W76-0 dismantlement quantities, exceed scheduled W76-0 dismantlement quantities, complete dismantlement of at least 14 W31 trainer units from Y-12,  and exceed scheduled W80-0 dismantlement quantities.
NNSA determined, in its fiscal year 2012 performance evaluation report,  that the Pantex site operating contractor substantially exceeded each of  these goals. On the basis of this performance, along with the site’s  performance in meeting other objectives not related to dismantlement, the  site contractor earned over $16.5 million in award fees for defense  program-related work that year.
In addition to accelerating dismantlement activities at Pantex, NNSA  officials told us that consideration had been given in the past to  augmenting dismantlement capacity by using a similar weapons  assembly/disassembly facility, known as the Device Assembly Facility,  located at the NNSS. Using this facility in such a way would be similar to  an approach to increase dismantlement capacity recommended by the  Secretary of Energy Advisory Board in 2005.told us that using the Device Assembly Facility for nuclear weapons  dismantlement operations could carry significant costs. According to  NNSA officials, the facility currently does not have the necessary safety  authorizations, sufficient numbers of certified technicians and security  personnel, and other required tooling and resources to perform  dismantlement operations there. For example, because the SS-21  process is a Pantex-specific plan for dismantlement that takes into  account the unique features of the site, Pantex site contractors told us the  SS-21 process would need to be recreated at the Device Assembly  Facility to adjust for features specific to that facility and the weapons to be  dismantled there. NNSA officials said that they believed meeting these  requirements could take a significant amount of time, so that the  augmented dismantlement capacity at the facility might be operational for  only a few years before the planned dismantlement workload is expected  to be completed.
section_title: Disassembly and Disposition of Some Nuclear and Nonnuclear Components from Dismantled Weapons Is Complicated by Policy and Technical Challenges
paragraphs: We identified several policy and technical challenges affecting NNSA’s  disassembly and disposition of nuclear and nonnuclear components from  dismantled nuclear weapons. First, NNSA has not established a capability  for the disassembly and disposition of pits from dismantled nuclear  weapons, creating uncertainty about when they will be removed from  Pantex. Second, NNSA is retaining much of its inventory of CSAs, which  is not expected to have a near-term effect on NNSA’s ability to meet its  external HEU supply commitments to the U.S. Naval Reactors Program  and others, but poses challenges to Y-12’s ability to plan its workload.  Third, NNSA is storing millions of nonnuclear components from  dismantled weapons at Pantex in a contingency inventory that may  exceed future weapons needs, and the agency’s ability to effectively  manage this inventory is complicated by decisions to retain many  components for potential reuse in weapons and by limitations in Pantex’s  previous component inventory management system. Finally, there is a  large backlog of legacy components and unknown legacy material that, at  current funding levels, could take up to a decade or longer to dispose of  because of technical and classification security challenges associated  with the characterization of components. However, efforts to address the  need to retain older parts and upgrade Pantex’s component inventory  management system are already under way.
subsections: section_title: NNSA Has Not Established a Capability for Disassembly and Disposition of Pits Stored at Pantex
paragraphs: NNSA has not established a capability for the disassembly and  disposition of pits from dismantled nuclear weapons, creating uncertainty  about when they will be removed from Pantex and potentially posing  challenges to site operations. In 1994, the United States declared 38.2  metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium as surplus to national security  needs, and in 1997 NNSA announced a plan to dispose of this plutonium  through conversion into mixed oxide fuel by building a dedicated pit  disassembly and conversion capability and a mixed oxide fuel fabrication   Much of the plutonium slated for  facility, among other means.disposition is contained in nuclear weapon pits, which must be  disassembled and converted to plutonium oxide before it can be  fabricated into mixed oxide fuel.
The plutonium disposition program is managed by NNSA’s Fissile Materials Disposition  Program. assessing alternative strategies for a plutonium disposition capability,  which may further delay the timelines for pit removal from Pantex.
Because NNSA has not established a capability for pit disassembly and  conversion, Pantex has accrued a large inventory of pits that are surplus  to defense needs. These pits are being stored on-site until a pit  disassembly capability is operational. Many of the surplus pits are  available for disassembly. The remaining pits on site comprise the U.S.  strategic reserve of plutonium, or serve as candidates for potential reuse  in refurbished stockpile weapons.
Pantex is authorized by federal authorities to store up to 20,000 pits on- site. Pantex site contractors told us that the pits from all weapons to be  dismantled by fiscal year 2022 could be accommodated at the site without  surpassing the 20,000 pit limit. According to our analysis of NNSA’s future  dismantlement schedule, additional weapons, each with one pit, are to be  dismantled from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2022, but the site will  remain within the overall storage limit.
However, as future weapons are retired and dismantled and, in the  absence of a plutonium disposition capability, storing an increasing  number of pits will require a reconfiguration of some of the nonnuclear  bays at Pantex. Pantex site contractors told us that while Zone 4  magazine storage is reaching capacity under its current configuration, if a  dedicated pit disassembly and conversion capability is not built, additional  nonnuclear bays within Zone 12 would need to be converted to permit the  storage of the remaining pits up to the 20,000 pit limit. An NNSA official  told us that these bays have recently been authorized for nuclear  explosive operations and could be used for pit storage without any  adverse impact on the site’s ability to perform its anticipated workload.  See figure 5 for photos of the weapon and pit storage magazines in  Pantex Zone 4.
section_title: NNSA’s Decision to Retain Many CSAs Poses Challenges to Y-12’s Workload Planning
paragraphs: NNSA has made a policy decision to retain many CSAs for potential  reuse in refurbished weapons and as part of the U.S. strategic reserve.  Retention of these CSAs is not currently expected to have a near-term  impact on NNSA’s external HEU supply commitments to the U.S. Naval  Reactors Program and other programs, but retention poses challenges to  Y-12’s ability to plan its future workload.
subsections: section_title: NNSA Is Retaining Many CSAs
paragraphs: At the end of fiscal year 2012, NNSA identified a large number of CSAs  from dismantled weapons or in retired weapons awaiting  dismantlement.NNSA and were available for disassembly at Y-12. The HEU from the  excess CSAs may be used to meet NNSA’s external HEU supply  commitments to the U.S. Naval Reactors Program and other programs.  However, there were many remaining CSAs being retained by NNSA that  were not available for disassembly. According to NNSA documents and  officials, as well as Y-12 site contractors, NNSA is retaining many CSAs  for several reasons, including the following:   Some of these CSAs were identified as excess by
To provide NNSA with multiple options in selecting which CSAs to  reuse in refurbished weapons. According to data provided by NNSA  officials and Y-12 site contractors in March 2013, NNSA is retaining  two types of CSAs as options for reuse in a potential future W78  warhead refurbishment. An NNSA official told us that NNSA  anticipated a decision on the CSAs for W78 reuse by 2016, which  would lead to the release for disassembly of the retained CSAs not  selected shortly thereafter. In addition, NNSA is also retaining four  types of CSAs as options for reuse in a warhead on the Air Force’s  planned long-range standoff missile. An NNSA official told us that the  work to select CSAs for a long-range standoff missile warhead was in  a very preliminary stage and that it was not possible to estimate a  date for the release of the CSAs currently being held as reuse  candidates.
To provide a technical hedge for aging CSAs. Additional CSAs are  being retained because of uncertainty about the effects of aging on  the retained CSAs. Some of the retained CSA types have not been  disassembled and inspected in many years, and the national  laboratories have expressed the concern that the age and  degradation of components may affect the number of useable CSAs  and CSA parts. The laboratories recommend that the condition of  many of the systems be reassessed and that those systems found  unacceptable be removed from the list, but NNSA officials told us they  had no plans to do so. NNSA officials told us they could not estimate  the number of CSAs that the laboratories have requested as a hedge  due to concerns about their age.
For potential use in planetary defense against earthbound asteroids.
NNSA officials told us that CSAs associated with a certain warhead  indicated as excess in the 2012 Production and Planning Directive are  being retained in an indeterminate state pending a senior-level  government evaluation of their use in planetary defense against  earthbound asteroids. While NNSA has declared these CSAs to be  excess and, until March 2013, had scheduled them for disassembly  beginning in fiscal year 2015, the national labs’ retention letter has  also characterized the CSA associated with this warhead as an  “irreplaceable national asset.” The WDD program is coordinating  NNSA’s evaluation of their use in planetary defense with the support  of LLNL, LANL, and Y-12.
To provide a strategic reserve of HEU. Because the United States no  longer produces HEU, since 1994, the United States has retained a  strategic reserve of HEU—in the form of CSAs and HEU metal—to  ensure an adequate HEU supply is available for the weapons program  in the future. Some of the HEU from retained CSAs is expected to  remain in the strategic reserve even after disassembly. For example,  once a decision is reached regarding which of the two retained CSA  types will be used in the refurbished W78, the remaining CSA types  not selected will be released for disassembly, but their HEU metal will  continue to make up part of the U.S. strategic reserve.
section_title: CSA Retention Is Not Expected to Have an Impact on NNSA’s External Supply Commitments but Poses Challenges to Y-12’s Ability to Plan Its Disassembly Workload
paragraphs: NNSA’s decision to retain many CSAs is not expected to have a near- term impact on NNSA’s external HEU supply commitments to the U.S.  Naval Reactors Program, space and research reactors, and nuclear  nonproliferation programs. Based on our review of a March 2013 Y-12  analysis of the site’s ability to supply HEU over the next 20 years and  interviews with an NNSA official and an NNSA contractor, CSA  disassembly through the end of fiscal year 2020 is projected to provide Y- 12 with enough HEU to meet its external supply commitments through  2032. However, the Y-12 analysis noted that, unless additional CSAs are  made available for disassembly, after fiscal year 2020 Y-12 will need to  draw HEU from its on-hand inventory to meet its commitments.  Furthermore, an NNSA official confirmed that a significant delay in the  release of managed retirement weapons would impact NNSA’s ability to  meet external HEU supply commitments to the U.S. Naval Reactors  Program after 2032. According to the Y-12 analysis, additional supplies of  HEU to support the U.S. Naval Reactors Program after 2032 are required,  and NNSA is currently reviewing weapon life extension program  requirements that will ensure additional supply.
However, NNSA’s decision to retain many CSAs has reduced the number  of CSAs available for disassembly at Y-12, which poses significant  challenges to Y-12’s ability to plan its disassembly workload. We  analyzed Y-12 CSA disassembly data from the 2009 Production and  Planning Directive—published before the number of CSAs retained was  increased—and from the March 2013 draft CSA disassembly schedule  and found that, from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2032, Y-12 is  projected to disassemble far fewer CSAs than in NNSA’s 2009 Production  and Planning Directive.
NNSA’s decision to retain many CSAs, and uncertain policy decisions  regarding when some will be released for disassembly, pose challenges  to Y-12’s ability to plan future work. Under NNSA’s September 2012  retention plan, the March 2013 draft disassembly schedule shows a  significant drop-off in workload in fiscal year 2018 through fiscal year  2020, and after fiscal year 2022. Y-12 site contractors told us that they  need approximately 2 to 3 years to plan for the disassembly of CSAs,  including training personnel and ensuring that adequate equipment is in  place. Y-12 site contractors raised serious concerns about how this  potential drop-off in workload could affect both their near-term planning  and their long-term workload, resulting in the need to lay off workers, and  that the effects could be felt at the site earlier than the first year of the  drop-off.
An NNSA official also told us that upcoming decisions regarding which  CSAs would be used for certain refurbished weapons would result in the  release of additional CSAs for disassembly by late 2016. However, based  on our discussions with Y-12 site contractors, a decision in late 2016  could already affect Y-12’s ability to prepare for upcoming disassembly  work. When we raised these concerns with an NNSA official, the official  told us that CSA retention decisions are driven by national security  considerations and not by Y-12 workload considerations.
section_title: NNSA Is Retaining a Contingency Inventory of Nonnuclear Components That May Exceed Future Weapon Needs
paragraphs: NNSA is storing millions of nonnuclear components from dismantled  weapons at Pantex—including millions of parts for potential reuse in  repairing, maintaining, or refurbishing weapons in the current and future  stockpiles—as a contingency inventory that may exceed future weapon  needs. However, NNSA’s ability to effectively manage and evaluate the  retention of some parts in this inventory is complicated by decisions to  retain many components for potential reuse in weapons, including old  parts from weapons no longer in the stockpile, and by limitations in  Pantex’s previous component inventory management system.
The inventory of nonnuclear components at Pantex includes several  categories of components that are managed in different ways.  Nonnuclear components from weapons still active in the stockpile are  categorized within Pantex’s “active” component inventory, and nonnuclear  components from weapons no longer in the stockpile are considered  “legacy” components. “Mark quality” components are those that have  been retained for reuse—Pantex retains those in the active category but  is authorized to dispose of those in the legacy category. The “non- netable” category comprises components that will not be retained at  Pantex and that will be disposed of. Table 3 illustrates Pantex’s  nonnuclear component inventory as of May 2013.
In arranging for the disposition of nonnuclear components from  dismantled weapons, Pantex’s first priority is disposing of components  from ongoing weapon dismantlement to avoid adding unnecessarily to  Pantex’s preexisting inventory. However, because remanufacturing  certain nonnuclear components and parts could be time-consuming and  expensive—or, in some cases, is impossible—NNSA officials and the  national laboratories ask Pantex to store components for potential reuse  in current weapons, future modernized weapons, or for other weapons- related contingencies. These component retention instructions are  outlined in a weapon type’s Program Control Document, which targets the  numbers of components to retain, and detailed in each weapon type’s  Retirement Disposition Instruction, developed by the national laboratories  and weapon program managers, which specifies the method of  disposition for each component—saved for reuse, disposed of, or sent to  KCP or NNSS. According to a 2011 Pantex chart, Pantex will add an  estimated 53,000 components to the mark quality inventory per year from  fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2015. Figure 6 shows nonnuclear  component storage within Pantex’s warehouses and nonnuclear  components packaged and ready for shipment from Pantex.
Our review of nonnuclear component inventory data and Pantex  documents, as well as our interviews with NNSA officials and Pantex site  contractors, suggest that Pantex may be retaining more nonnuclear  components as “mark quality” for potential reuse than necessary and that  the age and condition of some mark quality components raises questions  about their suitability for reuse. As of May 2013, Pantex was storing 3  million mark quality nonnuclear components as a contingency inventory  for potential reuse in maintaining active stockpile or refurbished weapons.  In January 2013, Pantex site contractors estimated that 1.4 million of  these components were commercially available hardware, such as  screws, nuts, and bolts. According to Pantex documentation, “a large  number” of the components retained in the mark quality inventory are  believed to be excess based on the current stockpile. Pantex site  contractors also told us that some retention requests from the laboratories  for nonnuclear components may be overly conservative. For instance,  Pantex site contractors told us that, in 2012, NNSA—at the request of the  national laboratories—directed Pantex to retain approximately 650 spin  rocket motors, but that after questioning from Pantex, they revised the  request to 50 motors. In addition, some mark quality components in  storage are very old. For example, our review found that 1.7 million  components—or more than half of the mark quality inventory at Pantex,  as of August 2012—were placed in storage in 1989 or before.our site visit to Pantex, we observed several components covered in dust   During  that appeared not to have been touched or moved in years, if not  decades.
NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors, however, told us that they  believed that it made sense to retain more components in mark quality  inventory than may be necessary because of uncertain future stockpile  maintenance, repair, or refurbishment needs, and because it could be  costly to remanufacture or replace components that had been disposed  of. An NNSA official told us that, in the past, NNSA had disposed of  components that the agency later needed. For instance, an NNSA official  told us that NNSA had disposed of the center cases—a section of the  case that contains the CSA—from dismantled B61 bombs through burial  at NNSS but later found the agency would need them for the B61 life  extension program. NNSA officials told us that the components’  importance was such that NNSA had decided to dig up the cases  because doing so cost less than remanufacturing them. In addition,  NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors told us that, since some parts  will always need to be retained to sustain the current stockpile, and since  the cost to sustain the warehouses varies little by the number of parts  stored, they believed that any marginal costs associated with storing  excess components were justified by the potential cost of any future  scenario requiring their remanufacture or reacquisition.
However, we found that some active mark quality nonnuclear  components in the Pantex inventory are associated with weapon systems  no longer in the stockpile, raising questions about whether these  components will ever be reused. For example, as of August 2012, we  found that Pantex was storing in its mark quality inventory for reuse  493,305 components from weapons that were no longer in the active  stockpile, including approximately 6,135 components from the B43—a  weapon produced in the early 1960s and retired from the stockpile in  1991—and 5,092 components from the Mk-11—a weapon produced in  the 1950s and retired in 1960. Both of these weapons were dismantled  before 1992, but some of their components remain in Pantex’s  contingency inventory. In addition, Pantex continues to store 58,854  components from dismantled B57s, a weapon that was last dismantled in  1995. Pantex site contractors told us that NNSA retains some  components from weapons no longer in the stockpile because they can  be reused in active stockpile weapons, but Pantex site contractors said it  was unlikely that many of the components from some of these very old  weapons would be reused. An NNSA official told us that NNSA is working  with the national laboratories to reassess the need to retain these  components, but that efforts were hampered under current funding levels.
In recognition of these inventory issues, in September 2012, NNSA  created a capability to track “slow moving” inventory and reevaluate the  continuing need to retain it. However, in January 2013, NNSA officials  told us that the capability was too new to judge its usefulness to weapons  program managers and the national laboratories. NNSA officials told us  that they would use this capability to evaluate the ongoing necessity to  retain some of these slow moving components during their next annual  review of retained weapons components to be held in the fall of 2013.
Management of the large nonnuclear component inventory at Pantex has  been further complicated by limitations in the site’s previous inventory  management system. For example, the inventory system, which dated to  1989, did not have the fields to collect financial and other information to  establish storage component costs, the value of the components in  storage, or forecast future storage capacity needs. In January 2013, we  requested data on the cost of storage for nonnuclear components at  Pantex. NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors said they did not have  an estimate of those costs. NNSA officials also did not have an estimate  of the value of the components in storage that could enable NNSA to  make economic decisions about retaining or disposing of certain  components, particularly those weapons no longer in the stockpile.
In addition, according to an NNSA official and Pantex site contractors, the  system could not be used to forecast future component inflows or  outflows based on anticipated capacity and workload at Pantex. Pantex  site contractors estimated that Pantex’s inventory was at 86 percent of  the site’s storage capacity, which was a decrease from the 1990s, when  inventory was at nearly 95 percent capacity. In January 2013, the DOE  Inspector General found that the warehouses that Pantex uses to store  weapons components are nearing capacity levels. Pantex site  contractors were able to show us pictures demonstrating reductions in  stored components that had freed up space, but the inventory system  could not project if current storage capacity will be sufficient to contain the  estimated 53,000 components that will be added to the mark quality  inventory on average through fiscal year 2015. Pantex site contractors  told us that, if they ran out of storage space, they could store components  in special containers outside in Zone 12, or create additional storage by  opening up an unused warehouse on-site, but that doing so may add to  operating costs. Furthermore, when we requested basic information such  as how long components had been in storage and their associated  weapon system, Pantex site contractors told us they would have to write  special queries to extract this information from the system.
In May 2013, Pantex site contractors informed us that they would be  addressing some of these limitations through a $38 million upgrade to the  site’s computer systems in July 2013 that would include improvements to  the component inventory management system. However, this system was  still being implemented in August 2013, and we were not able to assess  the extent to which the upgrades may address the issues we identified.  According to NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors, the upgraded  system will include fields to collect cost information and the physical size  of a component. However, it will not contain fields to track the age of a  part, though a Pantex site contractor said that the upgraded system will  make it easier to research that data.
section_title: Disposing of a Large Nonnuclear Legacy Component Inventory Could Take a Decade or Longer
paragraphs: In addition, there is a large backlog of legacy components and unknown  legacy material that could take up to a decade or longer to dispose of  because of technical and classification security challenges associated  with the characterization of components. Nonnuclear components must  be characterized before Pantex can safely and securely dispose of them.  Characterization is the process of understanding, documenting,  classifying according to security level, and establishing a waste disposal  pathway. To characterize a component, Pantex relies heavily on  engineers at SNL, as well as weapons component information contained  in a database maintained by SNL called the Stockpile Dismantlement  Database.
Legacy components: As previously mentioned, these are components  from dismantled weapons that are no longer in the active stockpile  and that Pantex is authorized to dispose of. These components may  be partially characterized—in that they have been identified and  recorded in the inventory system—but do not yet have an appropriate  disposal pathway established by Pantex.
Legacy material: There is an unknown quantity of components in  boxes left over from previous decades’ dismantlement. These  components have not been characterized, and, once identified and  recorded, may or may not have an established disposal pathway.
In 2011, after several years of review, NNSA authorized Pantex to  dispose of all of the site’s legacy components, but approximately 1,300  components need characterization before they can be disposed of.  According to an NNSA official, in November 2012, characterization and  disposal of legacy components and material in legacy boxes is the lowest  priority for the WDD program and would be the first activity to be reduced  under program budget cuts. In September 2013, an NNSA official told us  that the net impact of sequestration had been a delay to legacy  component disposition work in fiscal year 2013. According to Pantex data,  by May 2013, Pantex had successfully disposed of more than 75 percent  of the legacy component inventory it had in September 2011—from  350,249 to 82,675 components. However, 1,300 of these legacy  components had not been fully characterized, as of April 2013, and could  not be disposed of. Pantex site contractors told us that they could  characterize 730 of these components on-site but that information on the  remaining 570 had been sent to SNL for additional research. In April  2013, Pantex site contractors told us this additional research could take  over a year to complete.
Additionally, Pantex currently has an unknown quantity of legacy material  in boxes left over from previous decades’ dismantlement operations that it  is attempting to eliminate over time. Pantex site contractors and an NNSA  official told us that, in previous decades, less emphasis was placed on  properly disposing of nonnuclear weapons components. During our site  visit, we observed a number of cardboard and wooden boxes containing  unknown weapons parts from previous decades’ dismantlements. Pantex  site contractors told us that some of these boxes may contain parts that  are up to 60 years old and that may be radiologically contaminated, which  makes them difficult to handle and identify.
An NNSA official told us that they have an informal goal of disposing of  the entire backlog of legacy components and legacy material by fiscal  year 2022. However, Pantex site contractors told us that their efforts are  hampered when weapons component information in the Stockpile  Dismantlement Database does not exist or is incomplete. Pantex site  contractors told us they rely heavily on information in the database to  identify these legacy components, but some very old weapons  information—which may contain highly classified additional details about  the design of early nuclear weapons—is incomplete or has not been  added to the database out of “need to know” security concerns. NNSA  officials told us that because the database can be accessed by a variety  of individuals across the weapons complex, LLNL and LANL site  contractors are often reluctant to share drawings with SNL for inclusion in  the database, hampering SNL and Pantex’s efforts to identify and dispose  of legacy components. Pantex site contractors told us that they could  request the drawings directly from the weapons design laboratories, but a  Pantex document states that the time required to characterize a  component is significantly lengthened when it is not in the database.  NNSA officials told us that they are working to identify a solution, in  concert with site contractors at Pantex, SNL, LLNL, and LANL.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: NNSA’s WDD program is instrumental in enabling the United States to  eliminate nuclear weapons excess to defense needs and to meet  international treaty commitments. To these ends, DOE and NNSA have  dismantled more than 12,000 weapons since the dissolution of the Soviet  Union, and the WDD program will play a critical role in dismantling  weapons through fiscal year 2022 and beyond as the nuclear weapons  stockpile continues to shrink, and more weapons are retired. While we  recognize the progress NNSA has made, we identified concerns related  to its dismantlement performance goal.
NNSA is unlikely to achieve its goal of dismantling all weapons retired  prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022 because of  uncertainties surrounding when large numbers of retired weapons that  are currently in managed retirement might be released for dismantlement.  In addition, because of the possible delay in the retirement of additional  weapons resulting from New START treaty implementation, there could  be a significant gap in dismantlement workload during the mid- to late- 2020s that could affect NNSA’s ability to sustain sufficient numbers of  certified dismantlement personnel. By relaxing and extending the fiscal  year 2022 dismantlement performance goal deadline, NNSA could give  itself flexibility to account for the uncertainties associated with weapons in  managed retirement and could allow the dismantlement workload to be  leveled and extended through the mid-2020s to sustain the  dismantlement workforce.
In addition, NNSA’s level of progress toward its dismantlement  performance goal is unclear because it does not track the actual date of  retirement of individual weapons as they are dismantled. As a result,  some weapons retired after 2009 may be dismantled and counted toward  meeting this performance goal. In addition, some weapons retired prior to  fiscal year 2009 will be reinstated to the stockpile, but counted as  dismantled, because they are replacing weapons disassembled and not  rebuilt under the stockpile surveillance program. As a result, NNSA  counts equivalent numbers of weapons as dismantled toward its  performance goal. Because the dismantlement performance goal as  written does not make these practices clear, NNSA risks providing  misleading or confusing information about the age or types of weapons  being dismantled.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the NNSA Administrator take the following two  actions:
Reevaluate and consider extending the fiscal year 2022  dismantlement performance goal, to account for the uncertainties  about when weapons currently in managed retirement will be released  for dismantlement, and to avoid a potential dismantlement workload  gap due to the deferred retirement of large numbers of additional  weapons following entry into force of the New START treaty.
Revise the dismantlement performance goal to clarify that NNSA  intends to dismantle all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009, or an  equivalent number of weapons, by the end of fiscal year 2022 or an  updated deadline, to reflect that NNSA may be counting some  dismantled weapons retired after fiscal year 2009 as equivalent to  weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009, and is counting some  reinstated weapons as being equivalent dismantlements.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to NNSA and DOD for comment.  NNSA  provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix II.  DOD  did not provide written comments.
In its comments, NNSA generally agreed with our two recommendations  that it (1) reevaluate and consider extending the fiscal year 2022  dismantlement performance goal, to account for the uncertainties when  weapons currently in managed retirement will be released for  dismantlement, and to avoid a potential dismantlement workload gap due  to the deferred retirement of large numbers of additional weapons  following entry into force of the New START treaty and (2) revise the  dismantlement performance goal to clarify that NNSA intends to  dismantle all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009, or an equivalent  number of weapons, by the end of fiscal year 2022 or an updated  deadline.
Regarding the first recommendation, in its written comments, NNSA  stated that it is committed to the development of a comprehensive, long- term strategy to address not only weapons retired before fiscal year 2009,  but also weapons retired in fiscal year 2009 and thereafter.  NNSA stated  that such a strategy would allow the agency to manage dismantlement  and production activities at Pantex and Y-12 in order to balance the  workload at those facilities and to allow NNSA to manage critical skills  and technologies to maintain its dismantlement commitments.  NNSA  also stated that it is fully committed to dismantling all weapons retired  prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal year 2022.  NNSA’s proposed action to  develop a long-term dismantlement strategy to balance workload is  responsive to our recommendation and our concerns about the impacts of  a potential gap in dismantlement workload from fiscal year 2022 to the  late 2020s or early 2030s.  However, as discussed in this report, NNSA is  likely to face challenges in achieving its goal of dismantling all weapons  retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal year 2022 due to the  uncertainties surrounding when weapons in managed retirement— including some weapons retired before fiscal year 2009—may be  released for dismantlement.
Regarding the second recommendation, in its written comments, NNSA  responded that the dismantlement performance goal of dismantling by  fiscal year 2022 all weapons retired before fiscal year 2009 should focus  on the equivalent numbers of weapons that are being dismantled.  NNSA  agreed with the recommendation and noted that changing how the  agency calculates a performance goal requires approval from the Office  of Management and Budget.  NNSA agreed to work with the Office of  Management and Budget during fiscal year 2014 to identify appropriate  changes to the dismantlement performance goal in response to our  recommendation.  In addition, NNSA commented that it was incorrect of  us to characterize the way in which NNSA tracks progress toward its  dismantlement performance goal as being misleading.  Our  characterization is accurate.  As stated in the report, in tracking progress  under its dismantlement performance goal, NNSA counts weapons retired  prior to fiscal year 2009 that are reinstated to the stockpile rather than  being dismantled.  We also found that NNSA does not track the actual  retirement date of individual weapons that are dismantled and may be  counting weapons toward its dismantlement performance goal that were  retired from service after fiscal year 2009.  NNSA’s performance goal, as  written, does not make these practices clear.  As we have previously  reported, having clear performance goals and measures is a key element  of effective program management, and performance goals and measures  that are not clearly stated may be confusing or misleading.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the NNSA Administrator, and the Secretary of Defense. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which the annual  inventories of weapons awaiting dismantlement and the National Nuclear  Security Administration’s (NNSA) annual dismantlement rates have  changed over time, and, if so, the reasons why; (2) how NNSA measures  progress toward achieving its performance goal of dismantling all  weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022,  and any challenges it might face in meeting the goal; (3) NNSA’s  schedule for dismantlement of weapons retired as a result of the New  Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and the challenges, if  any, NNSA faces in dismantling those weapons; (4) the physical capacity  available at Pantex to meet NNSA’s planned future dismantlement  workload and to potentially accelerate dismantlement; and (5) the  challenges, if any, affecting disassembly and disposition of components  from dismantled weapons.
In general, we addressed these objectives by reviewing relevant nuclear  weapons stockpile guidance and planning documents and interviewing  NNSA officials. These documents include Nuclear Weapons Stockpile  Plans, the nuclear weapons stockpile Requirements and Planning  Documents, and NNSA’s Nuclear Weapons Production and Planning  Directives. We interviewed NNSA officials responsible for overseeing the  Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition (WDD) program and obtained  technical information and data from them on the stockpile, past and future  dismantlement workload, component management, and on other issues  pertaining to the program. To understand stockpile planning, weapons  retirement, and how the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military  services interact with NNSA on dismantlement issues, we obtained  information and interviewed officials from the Office of the Deputy  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, U.S. Air Force, U.S.  Navy, and U.S. Strategic Command. We also visited the Pantex and Y-12  sites where we observed weapon dismantlement and canned  subassembly (CSA) disassembly operations for several weapon systems,  viewed component storage facilities, and interviewed representatives of  the site operating contractors at each location on issues relating to  dismantlement operations and component management processes. We  identified a nonprobability sample of seven weapons systems—B53, B61,  W62, W70, W71, W76, and B83—based on several factors, including the  branch of the military associated with the weapons, the weapon delivery  platform (i.e. bomber or missile), and whether the weapon is strategic or  nonstrategic. We used a list of standardized questions to conduct  interviews with nuclear weapon engineers at Pantex on the time,  requirements, challenges, and other issues associated with the  dismantlement of those systems. We also received presentations from  Y-12 weapon engineers on issues related to the disassembly of the CSAs  of these seven weapon systems.
To assess the extent to which and the reasons why the annual  inventories of weapons awaiting dismantlement and NNSA’s annual  dismantlement rates have changed over time, we obtained and analyzed  data from NNSA’s Weapons Information System on the annual  inventories of retired weapons awaiting dismantlement and on annual  numbers of weapons dismantled for fiscal years 1992 through 2012. We  selected this time frame for several reasons, including that it allowed us to  assess weapon retirements and dismantlements since the dissolution of  the Soviet Union in December 1991 and resulting from stockpile  reductions through strategic arms control treaties and presidential  initiatives. The Weapons Information System does not include a specific  field or category of nuclear weapons that are awaiting dismantlement.  According to NNSA officials, the annual inventory of retired nuclear  weapons—which is tracked—approximates, but is not a precise figure for,  the number of weapons awaiting dismantlement. According to NNSA  officials, during the time frame of our review, each year some number of  retired weapons were reinstated, or held for future reinstatement, to the  stockpile and were not available for dismantlement.retired weapons were not immediately available for dismantlement  because they were in managed retirement status and had not been  released by the Nuclear Weapons Council. Because NNSA officials told   In addition, some  us that it would be difficult and time-consuming to locate older stockpile  records and reconcile the data to develop accurate figures on the actual  inventory of weapons that were awaiting dismantlement by year over the  past 20 years, we agreed with NNSA officials to use the annual retired  inventory of weapons as an approximate measure of the number of  weapons awaiting dismantlement from year to year, for fiscal year 1992  through fiscal year 2012. We also interviewed NNSA and DOD officials on  reasons why the inventories of retired weapons have changed over time,  and interviewed NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors on issues that  have affected dismantlement processes and rates. We obtained and  analyzed data that Pantex has developed to measure the difficulty, or  time requirements, in dismantling different weapon types, referred to as  dismantlement “difficulty quotients” (DQ). NNSA has used the DQ data to  establish “dismantlement equivalent units” (DEQ) for each weapon type to  measure the relative dismantlement time requirements of different  weapon types. Pantex had DQ data available only for weapons  dismantled since fiscal year 1998. As a result, we were unable to analyze  dismantlement DQ and DEQ data for all weapon types dismantled since  fiscal year 1992 and determine whether weapon systems have become  more time-consuming to dismantle over the past 20 years based on this  data. However, we did interview weapon engineers at Pantex regarding  the challenges in dismantling weapons, including two recently dismantled  weapon systems that both had relatively large DEQs.
To assess how NNSA measures progress toward achieving its  performance goal of dismantling all weapons retired prior to fiscal year  2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022, and any challenges it might face in  meeting the goal, we obtained and analyzed NNSA data on the inventory  of retired weapons potentially available for dismantlement over fiscal year  2013 through fiscal year 2022. Specifically, we analyzed a March 2013  draft schedule for the dismantlement or other disposition of all retired  weapons over this time, which included the schedule for dismantling the  subset of remaining weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009. We  interviewed NNSA and DOD officials on issues related to or that could  affect the dismantlement schedule, including reinstatement of retired  weapons and release of retired weapons in managed retirement status for  dismantlement.
To assess NNSA’s schedule and the challenges, if any, in the  dismantlement of weapons to be retired as a result of the New START  treaty, we interviewed NNSA officials to determine whether those  weapons had been scheduled for dismantlement. We interviewed DOD  officials to understand how many and when those weapons are expected  to be retired and other conditions affecting the timing and release of those  weapons to NNSA for dismantlement. We interviewed NNSA officials and  Pantex site contractors on issues related to how this additional future  dismantlement workload will be managed.
To assess the physical capacity available at Pantex to meet NNSA’s  dismantlement goal and to potentially accelerate achievement of this  goal, we obtained and analyzed data from Pantex’s Long Range  Production Planning Model and interviewed Pantex site contractors on  the physical capacity at Pantex available to meet the future  dismantlement schedule and all other future stockpile production  commitments such as weapon life extension and surveillance efforts. We  also analyzed data and interviewed NNSA officials and Pantex site  contractors on Pantex’s ability to accelerate dismantlement work,  including data on the extent to which Pantex has exceeded annual  dismantlement goals in response to contract performance incentives and  information from NNSA on previously developed scenarios for  accelerating dismantlement workload to meet the fiscal year 2022  dismantlement goal by fiscal year 2018 or fiscal year 2020.
To assess the challenges affecting disassembly and disposition of  components from dismantled weapons, we reviewed NNSA program and  planning documents and interviewed NNSA officials and Pantex and Y-12  site contractors on the full scope of the weapons dismantlement and  disposition process. We reviewed NNSA data and interviewed NNSA  officials and Pantex site contractors on the number and location of pits  from dismantled weapons and future plans for reuse or disposition, as  well as effects of storage on Pantex operations. We reviewed NNSA  documents, analyzed data, and interviewed NNSA officials and Y-12 site  contractors on current and future CSA inventories, draft CSA disassembly  schedules, and related policy issues affecting CSA management to  assess the effects of CSA disassembly and retention on Y-12’s workload  and ability to supply highly enriched uranium to the U.S. Naval Reactors  Program and other programs. We reviewed data from Pantex’s  nonnuclear weapons component inventory management system and  interviewed NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors on the size of the  overall inventory, age and weapon system associated with these  components, impact of requests from the national labs to retain some  components, and limitations of the inventory management system.
We conducted reliability assessments of the data on: (1) the inventories  of retired weapons available for dismantlement and on annual numbers of  weapons dismantled for fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2012  (NNSA’s Weapons Information System); (2) future capacity requirements  at Pantex (Pantex’s Long Range Production Planning Model); and (3)  nonnuclear component inventories (Pantex’s nonnuclear weapons  component inventory management system). We analyzed the data from  each system for accuracy by, among other things, manually testing the  data for errors and missing data, and interviewed knowledgeable officials  on the reliability of the data. We found discrepancies in the data provided  to us on the retired and dismantled weapon inventories and on the Pantex  capacity projections, but we were able to correct or reconcile the  differences through interviews with NNSA officials and Pantex site  contractors. We did not identify any material weaknesses in the three  data sources that would significantly alter our findings. We determined  that, overall, the data provided to us were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this review.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to April 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Jonathan Gill (Assistant Director),  Julia Coulter, and William Hoehn made key contributions to this report.  Other technical assistance was provided by Antoinette Capaccio, Penney  Harwell Caramia, Karen Keegan, Cynthia Norris, Kevin L. O’Neill, Dr.  Timothy M. Persons, Dan Royer, Justin Schnare, Rebecca Shea, Amie  Steele, and Kiki Theodoropoulos.