Election Reform: Nine States' Experiences Implementing Federal Requirements for Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists
Published: 2006-02-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted in part to help ensure that only eligible persons are registered to vote. Under HAVA, as of January 1, 2004, states were to create computerized statewide voter registration lists to serve as official rosters of legally registered voters for elections for federal office. States, however, were given the option to seek a waiver to postpone implementation of HAVA provisions until 2006. All but nine states did so. This report discusses the experiences of the nine states that were subject to the original HAVA deadline--Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia. The report describes actions election officials in these states reported taking to meet specific HAVA requirements--as applicable to their states--for (1) establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists and (2) verifying the accuracy of information on voter registration applications and maintaining accurate computerized voter lists. GAO is also reporting what states said about challenges they faced and lessons learned implementing the requirements. Draft sections of this report were reviewed by the nine states; the Election Assistance Commission, which was responsible for coordinating HAVA waivers; and the Department of Justice. GAO incorporated technical comments, as appropriate.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: To establish the HAVA-required registration lists, five states modified existing computerized statewide voter registration systems; one state replaced an older system with a new one; and two states created statewide voter registration systems for the first time, according to election officials. Officials from the ninth state reported no actions were taken because the state had such a registration list in place prior to HAVA. State election officials reported they took steps to verify information provided on voter registration applications and maintain their voter lists as required by HAVA. States either completed or were in the process of completing the required matches of voter registration information with state motor vehicle agency (MVA) or Social Security Administration (SSA) records. Officials from all nine states reported conducting the list maintenance activities required by HAVA: eliminating duplicate registrations and coordinating the voter list with state agency records on felons and the deceased to identify and remove the names of ineligible registrants. According to officials from four states, implementing HAVA improved the accuracy of the voter lists, for example, by correcting errors in voter information before they were entered into the statewide list. Officials from the other five states reported little to no improvements to the accuracy of their lists in part, some said, because they had established systems similar to those required by HAVA prior to the enactment of the law. State election officials reported they faced challenges and learned lessons while implementing the HAVA requirements. For example, officials from seven states reported their experiences taught them that collaborating with local officials to develop the computerized statewide systems later helped them successfully implement the systems.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Confidence in the electoral process to produce free and fair elections is of  the utmost importance to a legitimate democratic political system. The  basic goal of an election system is simple to state but not simple to  achieve—enable all eligible voters to register to vote, cast their votes, and  have those votes counted accurately. The Help America Vote Act of 2002  (HAVA) was enacted, in part, to help ensure that only eligible persons are  registered to vote. This law provides that, among other things, as of  January 1, 2004, states are to create computerized statewide voter  registration lists that serve as official rosters of legally registered voters  for elections for federal office. Under this provision, most states are also  to verify the accuracy of information provided on voter registration  applications by matching it with information contained in the state motor  vehicle agency’s (MVA) database or the Social Security Administration’s  (SSA) records, as appropriate. In addition, states are to perform list  maintenance on statewide voter lists by coordinating them on a regular  basis with state records on felony status and deaths, in order to identify  and remove names of ineligible voters.
Under HAVA, states could apply to the Election Assistance Commission  (EAC) by January 1, 2004, for a waiver, postponing the effective  implementation date of the statewide voter registration list requirement  for 2 years until January 1, 2006. All but nine states exercised the waiver  option. The nine states that were to implement the HAVA requirements  described above, by the original 2004 deadline were Alaska, Arizona,  Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and  West Virginia. This report discusses the experiences of these nine states as  they implemented these HAVA requirements, in particular, the actions that  state election officials reported taking to (1) establish computerized  statewide voter registration lists and (2) verify the accuracy of information  on voter registration applications and maintain accurate computerized  voter lists. In addition, we report what states told us regarding (3) the  challenges they faced and lessons they learned while implementing these  requirements.
In addition to this report, we have issued or plan to issue reports this year  on other specific election issues. These reports, as did our earlier work  issued in 2001, in general focus on the people, processes, and technology  associated with the preparation for and administration of elections.  Specifically, in June 2005, we issued a report on the efforts of selected  state and local election officials in seven states to ensure that voter  registration lists are accurate. In September 2005, we issued two reports,  one on the efforts of selected local election officials in these same seven  states on managing voter registration and ensuring eligible citizens can  vote and the other on significant security and reliability concerns that  have been identified for electronic voting systems. Later this year, we plan  to issue a report on the Department of Defense’s implementation of the  Federal Voting Assistance Program to facilitate absentee voting by military  personnel during the November 2004 election. These reports respond to  congressional requests made prior to the November 2004 election. In  addition, we are undertaking a broader, more comprehensive review of  election administration processes related to the November 2004 general  election. This comprehensive study, which we plan to issue in 2006, will  address activities and challenges—people, processes, and technology— associated with each major stage of election administration to include  registration, absentee and early voting, election day preparation and  activities, and vote counting and certification.
To meet our objectives for this report, we conducted structured telephone  interviews with state election officials in each of the nine states. We also  interviewed officials with and obtained documents from the EAC and the  Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division, which is responsible for  enforcing parts of HAVA. In addition, we reviewed relevant state and  federal laws.
We did not independently verify the responses to questions posed to state  officials during our telephone interviews. However, state election officials  were provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their responses for  this report. We also provided relevant sections of the report to EAC and  DOJ officials to verify the accuracy of the information they provided.  Appendix I provides a more detailed description of our scope and  methodology.
We conducted our work from January 2005 through December 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: As election officials manage voter registration processes and voter lists,  they must balance two competing goals. On the one hand, officials seek to  minimize the burden on eligible people registering to vote. On the other  hand, they also seek to ensure that the voter lists are accurate, a task that  involves including the name of each eligible voter on the voter list,  removing names of ineligible voters, and having safeguards in place so that  names of voters are not removed in error from the list.
Congress has passed legislation relating to the administration of both  federal and state elections, pursuant to its various constitutional powers,  including processes related to maintaining voter lists. The constitutional  framework for elections contemplates both state and federal roles. States  are responsible for the administration of both their own elections and  federal elections. States regulate various aspects of the election process,  including, for example, ballot access, registration procedures, absentee  voting requirements, establishment of polling places, provision of election  day workers, and counting and certifying the vote. The states in turn incur  the costs associated with these activities. Although the states are  responsible for running elections, Congress has authority to affect the  administration of elections. Congress’ authority to regulate elections  depends upon the type of election. With regard to federal elections,  Congress has constitutional authority over both congressional and  presidential elections. In addition, with respect to federal, state, and local  elections, a number of constitutional amendments authorize Congress to  enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory acts.
Most recently, HAVA was enacted in 2002, and among other things,  mandated that each state establish a computerized statewide voter  registration list to serve as the official voter registration list for conducting  elections for federal office in each state. The voter registration list is to  serve as a secure, centralized, and interactive database that is coordinated  with other state agency databases and grants state and local election  officials immediate electronic access to enter and update voter  information. States and territories were to implement a computerized  statewide voter registration database by January 1, 2004. States could  apply to EAC by January 1, 2004, for a waiver of the effective date until  January 1, 2006. Nine states and one territory—Alaska, Arizona, Georgia,  Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, West  Virginia, and Guam—did not apply for a waiver.
States subject to HAVA must also take steps to ensure that the statewide  voter registration lists are accurate. Under HAVA, states are to perform list  maintenance on a regular basis by removing ineligible voters from the  statewide voter list. States are to coordinate the computerized list with  their state agencies’ records on felony status and death to verify voters’  eligibility. For example, states must cross-reference the voter registration  list with their state’s records on felons to remove the names of ineligible  voters and records on death to remove deceased registrants. States are  also required to remove duplicate registrants, that is, names of voters that  appear more than once on the statewide voter list. HAVA, in general,  leaves it to the states’ discretion to determine the type and frequency of  actions to implement this list maintenance requirement.
In addition to undertaking list maintenance, states are required under  HAVA to verify voter registration application information. For federal  elections, a voter registration application may not be processed or  accepted by a state unless it contains the applicant’s driver’s license  number or the last four digits of the Social Security number. If the voter  has neither of these numbers, the state must assign the voter a voter  identification number. Voter registration information is to be matched  with motor vehicle agency (MVA) records or Social Security  Administration (SSA) records, depending on the information provided by  the applicant. Certain state laws require applicants to provide their full  Social Security number on voter registration applications. HAVA provides  that for those states requiring full Social Security numbers on such  applications, in accordance with Section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974, the  HAVA voter registration verification requirements are optional. Of the nine  states that did not receive waivers, four—Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and  South Carolina—collect the full Social Security number and, therefore, are  not subject to this HAVA requirement, according to state officials.
Under HAVA, the state MVA must enter into an agreement with SSA to  verify the applicant information when applicants provide the last four  digits of their Social Security number rather than a driver’s license number  on voter registration applications. HAVA additionally requires SSA to  develop methods to verify the accuracy of information on the voter  registration applications by matching the name, date of birth, and the last  four digits of the Social Security number provided on the voter registration  application with SSA records. SSA is to determine whether SSA records  indicate the individual is deceased.
Figure 1 provides an example of how a computerized statewide voter  registration list could verify voter eligibility through matching registration  applications with MVA and SSA, matching the statewide list with state  records on felons and death notices from the state courts and the state  vital statistics agency, and identifying duplicate registrants in the  statewide list.
To assist states with implementing these federal mandates, HAVA  authorizes funding to states for the creation and maintenance of the  computerized statewide voter lists. In turn, HAVA requires states to  provide such support as may be required to local jurisdictions to enable  them to use the computerized voter list. HAVA also established EAC and  charged it with, among other things, providing voluntary technical  guidance on the administration of federal elections, serving as a national  clearinghouse for information on election administration, and providing  federal funding to the states to implement the HAVA provisions. Also, DOJ  has enforcement authority with respect to the uniform and  nondiscriminatory implementation of certain HAVA requirements such as  those relating to the statewide voter registration list and verifying  information on voter registration applications. According to DOJ officials,  following the passage of HAVA, it was unnecessary to take enforcement  actions against any of the nine nonwaiver states. DOJ officials also  reported working with the states to address initial challenges and provide  informal guidance while EAC awaited staff and resources. Appendix II  discusses EAC’s and DOJ’s roles regarding computerized statewide voter  registration lists in greater detail.
section_title: Eight States Reported Taking Actions to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists, and the Ninth Reported Having Such a List Prior to HAVA
paragraphs: Officials from eight of the nine states reported taking a variety of actions  in order to implement the HAVA computerized voter registration list  requirement; an official from one state, Kentucky, reported no actions  were taken because the state had such a system in place prior to the  enactment of HAVA. Officials from Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, South  Carolina, and South Dakota reported modifying their existing  computerized statewide voter registration systems; officials from  Minnesota said the existing computerized voter registration system was  replaced; and officials from Arizona and West Virginia said their states  created computerized statewide voter registration systems for the first  time. Although these eight states reported taking different steps to  establish computerized statewide voter registration systems, election  officials reported that all of these systems met the HAVA provisions that  called for computerized statewide voter registration lists. According to  officials, these computerized lists served as centralized and interactive  databases containing the names of all legally registered voters in the state  and granted election officials immediate electronic access to query,  update, and enter voter information. They also said these computerized  lists were capable of generating official voter registration lists. Figure 2  summarizes the actions that eight of the nine states reported taking to  establish computerized voter registration lists.
Election officials from six states, Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky,  South Carolina, and South Dakota, said their states’ existing computerized  statewide voter registration systems, in place in some cases for many  years prior to HAVA, allowed state and local election officials to share and  maintain an interactive database of registered voters and generate official  voter registration lists. As a result, officials from Kentucky reported they  were required to make no change to their existing system to implement the  HAVA requirements. Officials from these other states reported that they  were required to only modify their existing systems, in some cases making  only minor changes, in order to implement HAVA. For example, in Hawaii,  election officials reported their state has operated a computerized  statewide voter registration system since 1982 and only made minor  technical changes as a result of HAVA, such as adding the ability to flag  inactive voters. In addition, since Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and South  Carolina collect voters’ full Social Security numbers on voter registration  applications, they are not subject to the HAVA provisions for verifying  information on voter registration applications by matching it with MVA  and SSA records, officials reported. Accordingly, officials said they did not  have to modify their existing systems to provide this matching capability.  Alaska and South Dakota are subject to HAVA’s data matching provisions.  These states also had computerized statewide voter lists in place prior to  HAVA, and their election officials said they modified them as a result of  HAVA. Alaska election officials reported that they added new data fields to  the computerized statewide voter registration system to capture the last  four digits of the voters’ Social Security numbers and to identify first-time  voters who registered by mail, which required little or no effort. South  Dakota election officials reported making similar changes as well as  adding the capability to match voter registration applications with MVA  and SSA records, actions that required a moderate level of effort, they  said.
In the three remaining states, officials reported creating new systems in  order to implement HAVA. Officials from Minnesota said their state  operated a computerized statewide voter registration system prior to  HAVA. Their state replaced rather than modified this system. Arizona and  West Virginia election officials reported that their states did not have  computerized statewide voter lists in place prior to HAVA and that they  expended a significant level of effort to create such systems. Prior to  HAVA, some counties and local jurisdictions in these states had  computerized voter registration systems in place. However, the systems  were not interconnected to create statewide databases of legally  registered voters. Election officials in Arizona said that creating the  computerized list was also complicated because state and county election  officials lacked the legal authority to access state records they were to  match with the statewide voter list. The state had to pass new statutes and  amend others so that election officials could receive information from  state agencies, such as felony records, according to a senior election  official.
Some officials told us that in addition to the capabilities required by HAVA  their states’ computerized voter registration systems provide election  management tools that help them prepare for and conduct elections. For  example, West Virginia election officials told us their computerized voter  registration list is also able to identify voters who wished to serve as poll  workers and produce reports on absentee ballots, early voters, poll  workers, and election data statistics. Minnesota state election officials said  that their computerized voter registration list includes a module that  centrally tracks absentee ballots provided to military personnel or other  citizens residing overseas.
Some state officials are planning to enhance their systems’ election  management features. For example, Arizona plans to award a contract to  implement an updated version of its current system, which is to include  the ability to track out-of-state moves by voters and manage issues such as  petitions, provisional ballots, poll workers, and poll locations. Kentucky  election officials told us that they wish to upgrade their system to provide  more election management tools to counties, including a new function to  identify poll workers and complete absentee ballot forms. See appendixes  III through XI for more information on each state’s current computerized  statewide voter registration system and future plans.
Federal funds are available to states to assist them as they implement the  HAVA provisions. In turn, HAVA requires states to provide such support  as may be required to local jurisdictions to help them use the  computerized voter lists. Officials from six states we interviewed—Alaska,  Arizona, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia— reported receiving federal funds to establish computerized voter lists;  these states said they spent a combination of federal and state funds  totaling about $8.4 million to establish their computerized lists. As  required by HAVA, each of the nine states, except Alaska, where the state  is solely responsible for entering and maintaining voter registration  information, provided some type of support to local jurisdictions to help  them operate the computerized statewide voter registration systems,  according to officials. For example, South Carolina election officials told  us that they provided personal computers and software to local  jurisdictions, as well as training for staff.
section_title: States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Information on Registration Applications and Maintain Lists, Improving the Accuracy of Some Lists
paragraphs: State election officials reported taking required steps to verify information  provided on voter registration applications and to maintain accurate  computerized voter lists. Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and  West Virginia—the states subject to the HAVA provisions to verify  information provided on voter registration applications—took steps to do  so by collecting the required unique identifying information from voters,  officials told us. As of November 2005, Arizona and South Dakota were  matching information on the applications with state MVA or SSA records,  according to election officials. The remaining states were in various stages  of implementing the matching requirement. All nine states conducted  regular voter list maintenance activities to purge duplicates and remove  names of persons ineligible to vote, such as deceased registrants, as  required by HAVA, officials also reported. Officials from four of the nine  states we reviewed said that implementing the HAVA requirements led to  some or great improvement in the accuracy of their voter lists. While  HAVA contains requirements that should help states maintain accurate  voter registration lists, maintaining accurate voter lists will likely remain a  challenge for election officials, in part because lists are dynamic and  constantly changing as voters move, change names, or become ineligible  to vote.
subsections: section_title: States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Voter Registration Applications with MVAs and SSA
paragraphs: Under HAVA, most states are to verify the accuracy of information on  voter registration applications by matching information, such as the name  and date of birth, with MVA or SSA records, depending on the information  provided by the applicant. As noted earlier, HAVA also requires that voter  registration applicants for federal elections provide or be assigned one of  several types of unique identifying information that can be matched with  other records for verification. For matching purposes, applicants are to be  asked for their state driver’s license number or, if an applicant has not  been issued a driver’s license, the last four digits of the voter’s Social  Security number. An eligible applicant who has not been issued a state  driver’s license or a Social Security number can still register to vote. In  those cases, election officials are required to assign the registrant an  identification number.
Not all states are subject to the HAVA requirement to verify voter  registration application information by comparing or matching the  information with MVA or SSA records. In general, under HAVA, states  requiring full Social Security numbers on voter registration applications  prior to 1975 in order to verify the identity of a registrant are not subject to  the HAVA requirement that application information be matched with MVA  or SSA records. HAVA provides that for those states the voter registration  verification requirement is optional. Four of the nine states we reviewed— Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and South Carolina—collect the full Social  Security number on voter registration applications and, therefore,  according to state officials, are not subject to this provision. Five of the  nine states we reviewed—Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and  West Virginia—are subject to this HAVA provision to collect or assign a  unique identifying numbers and then verify voter information by matching  it with MVA or SSA information.
Officials from all five of these states subject to this HAVA provision  reported their systems collected or assigned the required unique  identifying numbers for registered voters, as indicated in table 1.
Officials from four of the five states also reported taking steps to match  information on voter registration applications with state MVA records and  provided the date by which MVA matching became available, as indicated  in table 2.
In West Virginia, officials said that their state was not yet conducting these  required matches because they were still in the process of developing an  agreement with the MVA to verify information on applications. They also  reported difficulty conducting data matches because the MVA lacked the  ability to interface with the statewide voter list. They expected this issue  to be resolved by 2006. Although not required to do so, Hawaii voluntarily  implemented this HAVA requirement, election officials said.
In addition, officials from all five of these states subject to this HAVA  provision reported taking steps to match information on voter registration  applications with SSA records. As noted earlier, if voter registration  applicants provide the last four digits of their Social Security number on  the registration applications rather than their driver’s license numbers,  states are to verify information on the application by matching it with SSA  records. Officials from two states—Arizona and South Dakota—reported  that their states were currently conducting the required matches. They  were not able to conduct these matches by the January 1, 2004, deadline  because SSA’s computer program to process these matches was not  operational until 8 months after the deadline had passed, in August 2004.  Election officials from three states—Alaska, Minnesota, and West  Virginia—said their states were not yet conducting these required matches  because they were still in the process of developing an agreement with  SSA to verify information on applications. Minnesota officials also said  they encountered technical difficulties electronically sharing data with  SSA but anticipated the agreement and the technological issues would be  resolved so that they could conduct matches by 2006. Alaska and West  Virginia officials could not provide an estimated date by which the  agreement would be completed and the required matches conducted.
section_title: All States Reported Taking Steps to Perform Required List Maintenance on a Regular Basis
paragraphs: In addition to requiring most states to verify information on voter  registration applications, HAVA provides that all states, including the nine  states discussed in this report, are to perform list maintenance on the  HAVA-required statewide voter registration lists on a regular basis. In  general, list maintenance activities include adding new voters to the voter  list; updating voter information if a voter moves within the state; and  removing the names of ineligible voters from the voter list, such as  persons who are deceased or convicted of a felony that, under state law,  makes them ineligible to be registered to vote. HAVA requires that the  computerized list be coordinated with state agency records on felony  status and death to remove the names of ineligible voters. Duplicate  registrations, that is, names of voters that appear more than once on the  statewide voter list, are also to be eliminated.
Election officials in all nine states reported taking the required actions to  perform list maintenance on a regular basis to identify and remove  duplicates and names of registrants ineligible to vote. The sections below  identify the type and frequency of actions states reported taking to  implement the HAVA-required list maintenance activities in accordance  with state and local procedures. These procedures for maintaining the  statewide voter list varied from state to state, as detailed in appendixes   III-XI.
Identifying duplicate voter registrations. HAVA requires that states are to  remove duplicate registrations, that is, names of voters that appear more  than once, from the statewide voter list. Duplicate registrations may occur  in the statewide lists when, for example, voters move within a state,  reregister, and then fail to notify the county in which they were previously  registered to vote. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states’ discretion to  determine the type and frequency of actions to implement this list  maintenance requirement. Officials from all nine states reported that their  systems check for duplicate registrants to ensure that voters are not listed  in the statewide voter list more than once. When applications are entered  into the statewide database of registered voters, some states’ systems  automatically screen the applications on a real-time basis, that is, as the  data are entered, to ensure that they do not duplicate an existing  registration; other states screen the entire list on a regular basis. Table 3  shows the variation by state in the reported type and frequency of actions  taken to identify duplicate registrations.
Identifying names of deceased voters. HAVA requires that states are to  coordinate the voter list with their state agencies’ death records to verify  voters’ eligibility. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states’ discretion to  determine the type and frequency of actions to implement this list  maintenance requirement. Officials from all nine states reported that they  or local officials regularly matched state agency death records with the  statewide voter lists to ensure that names of deceased registrants do not  remain on the rolls. Most of these matches were based on electronic or  paper records. Table 4 shows the variation by state in the reported type  and frequency of actions taken to identify deceased registrations.
Identifying persons convicted of a disqualifying felony. HAVA requires  states to coordinate the voter list with their state agencies’ records on  felony status to verify voters’ eligibility. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the  states’ discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions to  implement this list maintenance requirement. Officials from all nine states  reported that their states matched state court records with the statewide  lists to identify persons ineligible under state law to vote because of a  disqualifying felony conviction. These matches were based on electronic  or paper records. Table 5 shows the variation by state in the reported type  and frequency of actions taken to identify voters ineligible to register  because of a felony conviction.
Identifying individuals ineligible to vote because of mental  incompetence. The voter eligibility requirements in the nine states we  reviewed provided that applicants declared mentally incompetent to vote  are not eligible to register to vote. Officials in eight states reported they  have procedures in place to identify registrants ineligible to vote because  of court orders of mental incompetence. All reported that removing  registrants for this reason was a rare occurrence. The ninth state, West  Virginia, did not report such procedures are in place.
section_title: Four States Reported That Voter List Accuracy Improved as a Result of HAVA, but Managing Inherent Risks to Voter List Accuracy Remains a Challenge
paragraphs: Officials from four states—Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and West  Virginia—reported that implementing the HAVA requirements improved  the accuracy of their voter lists somewhat or to a great extent. South  Dakota officials reported that verifying applications has helped identify  inaccurate information on applications and that matching applications  with the MVA helped reduce the number of duplicate registrations.  Officials from Minnesota, which replaced its existing computerized voter  registration with a new one in order to implement HAVA, also reported  that implementing the HAVA requirements reduced the incidence of  duplicate registrations. And officials in the states of Arizona and West  Virginia, which built entirely new systems to comply with HAVA, reported  a great improvement in the accuracy of their voter rolls.
Officials from the remaining states—Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky,  and South Carolina—reported that HAVA had little or no effect on the  accuracy of their voter lists. This result likely occurred, some of these  officials said, because their states have had well-established computerized  statewide lists, similar to those required by HAVA, in place for many years  prior to HAVA. Officials from Georgia, Hawaii, and Kentucky also  attributed this result to their states’ ability to require the full Social  Security number on voter registration applications. Having this unique  identifier provided a means to identify and remove duplicate registrants  from voter lists, they stated.
While HAVA contains requirements directed at maintaining accurate voter  registration lists, even after such requirements are implemented,  maintaining accurate computerized lists will likely remain a challenging  task for state and local officials. In part this is because of the inherent  risks of managing a dynamic body of information that is constantly  changing as voters move, change names, come of age to vote, or become  ineligible to vote. Managing these risks has challenged election officials  across the country for some time, as we have documented in a series of  past reports. In October 2001 we issued a report that described the  operations and challenges associated with each stage of the election  process, including list maintenance. We reported that, judging from our  national survey of local election officials, officials were challenged by  continually updating and deleting information from voter registration lists  and had concerns related to obtaining accurate and timely information to  keep voter lists accurate. In June 2005 we reported on the processes   14 local voting jurisdictions from seven states used to verify voter  registration eligibility and the challenges officials faced in maintaining  accurate voter lists. We reported that while some of these challenges,  such as reducing duplicate registrations among jurisdictions within the  state, may be resolved when HAVA is fully implemented, others may  continue to be issues. Problems identifying voters who are registered  concurrently in more than one state and problems using incomplete,  untimely, or hard-to-decipher felony, death, and other information could  also continue to hinder efforts to maintain accurate voter lists. In  September 2005 we issued a report that described the experiences of  selected local election officials in the same seven states as they processed  voter registration applications. We reported that officials in these  jurisdictions face a number of challenges, such as processing incomplete  or inaccurate applications received from voter registration drives  sponsored by nongovernmental organizations.
Some of the concerns highlighted in our October 2001, June 2005, and  September 2005 reports remain issues in states we discussed in this report,  even after these nine states implemented the HAVA-required computerized  lists. For example:  Duplicate voter registrants. Echoing concerns reported in our previous  work, the majority of state election officials interviewed for this report  said that their states might not receive information about residents who  leave the state and reregister to vote in another state. As a result, voters  could be registered and vote in two states concurrently. One senior  election official described this type of duplicate registration as a  “universal” problem affecting all states. States are not required to share  information that would allow them to identify persons registered in more  than one state, although some states voluntarily notify other states when  a voter relocates and reregisters in that state, officials said. Officials from  Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Minnesota, South Carolina, South  Dakota, and West Virginia told us they notify other states of voters who  relocate and then reregister. However, such notifications are possible only  if voters disclose on their voter registration application they have  relocated from another state, officials also told us. This issue, caused in  part by a lack of consistently available information, poses an inherent risk  to the accuracy of voter lists and may not be resolved solely by  implementing the HAVA-required computerized list requirement.
Deceased registrants. We previously reported that concerns regarding  timeliness and completeness of vital statistics data on deceased persons  used to match against voter lists may continue to be an issue, even after  the HAVA requirements for a computerized list are implemented.  However, the election officials we interviewed in most of the states did not  share concerns about the timeliness of information their offices receive on  deceased persons from the vital statistics office. One official observed that  the vital statistics office may not receive timely information from coroners  or funeral home directors. Officials in a majority of the states we reviewed  observed that data on deceased persons may not be complete because  states are not able consistently to identify and remove names of deceased  registrants if the deaths occur out of state. According to an official in  South Dakota, some states are prohibited by state laws from sharing  information on deaths, a fact that has, in part, prevented this issue from  being resolved. Even in states that share such information, unless officials  are aware that the deceased was registered to vote in a certain state,  officials are not able to pass the information to the appropriate election  office. This issue, related in part to the unavailability of information, poses  an inherent risk to the accuracy of voter lists and is not resolved by  implementing the HAVA-required computerized list requirement.
Felons. While HAVA requires coordinating the voter list with state  information on persons convicted of a felony, election officials we  interviewed in several of the states expressed concerns similar to those  reported in our previous work that the criminal information they receive is  incomplete, not timely, or difficult to decipher. This issue, similar to  concerns related to the availability, timeliness, and quality of other types  of voter registration information, poses an inherent risk to the accuracy of  lists because it could limit the ability of officials to identify and remove  names of felons ineligible to register to vote from the computerized voter  lists.
U.S. citizenship. In addition to having concerns regarding felony status,  election officials from two states also expressed concerns regarding the  willingness of registrants to self-attest that they were U.S. citizens and  therefore eligible to vote under state eligibility requirements, concerns that  are consistent with those documented in our previous work. The HAVA- required unique identifying numbers, such as driver’s license numbers or  Social Security numbers, are not useful for this purpose because neither is  generally accepted as evidence of U.S. citizenship. This lack of information  poses an inherent risk to the accuracy of lists, as illustrated by an example  from Minnesota. Officials told us that they discovered 30 noncitizens on  the Minnesota voter list during the November 2004 general election despite  having the HAVA-required computerized statewide voter list in place.  Minnesota’s MVA has since added visa expiration dates to the driver’s  licenses of noncitizens to indicate their citizenship status. South Dakota  officials reported their MVA provides similar information on driver’s  licenses. To address this concern, Arizona officials told us that their state  no longer accepts the registration applicants’ self-attestation of  citizenship; all voter registration applicants are now required to provide  proof of citizenship. As we reported in our June 2005 report, federal jury  administrators could identify possible noncitizens on the basis of  information that potential jurors provide when identifying themselves as  noncitizens on their jury service questionnaire. We recommended that  the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts determine the feasibility and  steps necessary for U.S. district court jury administrators to provide notice  to state election officials of potential jurors who identify themselves as  noncitizens. Officials from Hawaii reported that their state periodically  checks the voter list with this type of information and other citizenship  indexes.
Receiving voter registration applications. Officials from Georgia, South  Carolina, and South Dakota said that their state received voter registration  applications from registration drives that contained inaccuracies such as  fictitious names, a problem that we had identified in past reports. South  Carolina officials also said that only a small number of such applications  are generally received. Officials from a majority of the nine states we  reviewed reported that they received a small number of complaints from  voters who said that they had registered through a registration drive but  that their names did not appear on the voter list on Election Day.
section_title: State Election Officials Reported Numerous Challenges and Lessons Learned while Implementing HAVA Requirements for Their Statewide Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: Creating statewide computerized lists required by HAVA presented a  number of challenges and resulted in lessons learned, officials told us, as  they developed their computerized statewide voter registration systems,  made them operational, and later managed them. The challenges and  lessons learned they shared are consistent with those that our past  research has shown to be important to effectively acquiring, developing,  and implementing information systems in public and private sector  organizations. Officials shared their experiences as they developed their  systems, for example:    Election officials from Minnesota and West Virginia reported that meeting  the time frames they established for developing their computerized lists  was challenging, in part because of limited staff available to complete the  work.
Designing a system with the appropriate scope was an issue raised by  Arizona, Hawaii, Kentucky, and Minnesota officials. This challenge  involved determining the functional requirements of the system, for  instance, the number of election management features the system should  provide, if any, in addition to the capabilities required by HAVA. A senior  Minnesota official reported Minnesota reduced the scope of its new  system from what it had initially planned because of resource and time  constraints, keeping the necessary elements but eliminating some election  administration functions. Officials said this experience taught them that  the functional requirements of the system should be prioritized as early as  possible to differentiate features that are necessary from those that would  be nice to have. Arizona officials addressed this design challenge by  initially implementing a system that performed only the basic tasks  required under the HAVA provisions, they reported. In the near term, they  told us, local officials used the computerized statewide system to manage  voter registration information while continuing to use their local  computerized systems to manage elections. This decision minimized  changes to the way counties historically managed elections, officials said.  The state plans to expand the scope of its new statewide system in the  future, providing counties with additional election management  capabilities, an official told us. Their plan, officials said, is to draw upon  local and state officials’ experiences with the statewide system to identify  and prioritize what additional features to add to their system. The  Kentucky official offered a lesson learned as well, suggesting that election  officials, as they define the capabilities the system is to offer, should be  mindful of selecting a system that the state can afford now and in the  future.
Converting data on registered voters from the old system to the new  system was time-consuming and required processes to ensure that data  were accurately entered into the new system, election officials from  Arizona, Minnesota, and West Virginia observed. This work was  complicated, in part, because of inaccurate information in existing records  such as misspelled street addresses or duplicate registrations that needed  to be resolved before inputting the corrected data into the new systems’  databases. Minnesota officials said that to help local officials with this  work, they developed a tool that allowed them to compare old records of  voter information with the new ones on a case-by-case basis.
Officials from Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, South Carolina, South  Dakota, and West Virginia also said that as states develop their  computerized systems, they should adopt a collaborative approach,  working with local officials to design, develop, or implement the systems  in order to obtain local officials’ cooperation. The state officials provided  various reasons for emphasizing the importance of maintaining  cooperative relationships with local officials. For example, West Virginia  officials told us local officials resisted moving from their county-based  systems to the statewide system, which made implementing the system  more difficult. Local officials resisted in part because many of them  viewed the new statewide system as an intrusion into a domain of election  administration that had been a local—not a state—responsibility, state  officials told us. Involving county officials in designing and implementing  the system, the state officials said, might have addressed this issue and  simplified implementation of the new system. Arizona and South Carolina  officials said they involved local officials by convening a working group  composed of both local and state officials that was responsible for  developing the system. Hawaii state officials told us that frequent, regular  communication helped their state maintain a cooperative relationship with  local officials; for instance, this state holds quarterly meetings with county  officials in order to coordinate activities such as completing list  maintenance and data entry before poll books and voter lists are printed.  Kentucky officials said the key to their success was the cooperative  working relationship they cultivated with local officials by keeping them  involved.
Officials also shared challenges and lessons learned while making their  systems operational. For example, West Virginia officials said that their  system became operational in every county on the same day. However, it  may have been beneficial for their state, they stated, to introduce the  system incrementally county by county rather than bringing every election  jurisdiction online the same day. They reasoned that such a staggered  rollout schedule might have been easier on the state election officials,  given their staffing constraints. Officials from some states also told us that  prior to putting systems into service, it is important to train staff to use the  new system. In order to provide local officials access to the most current  information, Minnesota officials said they provide the user’s manual  online.
State election officials also shared their lessons learned from their  experience managing computerized voter registration systems once they  were operational. Officials from Hawaii and Kentucky, two states that  have managed computerized voter registrations systems for some years,  observed that as technology develops, officials may decide to enhance  their systems, as both of their states have done over the years. These  officials offered lessons to keep in mind as states contemplate system  upgrades: be mindful that selecting upgrades to the system may require  compromises among local jurisdictions that may have competing needs or  different administrative or technical constraints and that changes to the  system affect all local jurisdictions equally. Hawaii officials shared another  issue they encountered while managing their system; they could not use  the computerized system while updating voter information. To address  this issue, officials from Hawaii said their staff created a shadow system  so that the system could be updated and available at the same time. Hawaii  officials also recommended that states establish uniform processing  procedures among their jurisdictions so that all jurisdictions function as  one.
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If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix XII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report describes the experiences of election officials in Alaska,  Arizona, Hawaii, Georgia, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South  Dakota, and West Virginia implementing the Help America Vote Act of  2002 (HAVA) requirements pertaining to the establishment of  computerized statewide voter registration lists and steps to verify and  maintain the accuracy of those lists. Specifically, our objectives were to  describe the actions election officials from nine states reported taking to  (1) establish computerized statewide voter registration lists and (2) verify  information provided on voter registration applications and maintain the  statewide voter lists. In addition, we describe what these state officials  told us regarding (3) the challenges they faced and lessons they learned  while implementing these requirements. Most states obtained a waiver  from the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to postpone  implementation of this HAVA requirement until January 1, 2006. However,  these nine states did not obtain a waiver and, therefore, were to implement  these HAVA requirements by the original deadline, January 1, 2004.
To meet our objectives, we reviewed HAVA provisions related to the  establishment of statewide computerized voter registration list  requirements. We then identified the proper points of contact within each  state and conducted telephone interviews using a structured interview  format. Among other things, we asked election officials in the nine states  to describe when their computerized systems had been developed; the  capabilities of their systems; what actions, if any, their states took to  implement the HAVA requirements for a computerized list; what level of  effort was required to make any HAVA-related modifications; what effect  implementing these changes, if any, might have had on the accuracy of  their statewide voter lists; and what challenges they faced and lessons they  learned while implementing these HAVA requirements. We did not  independently verify the accuracy of state election officials’ responses.  However, state election officials were provided the opportunity to verify  the accuracy of their responses for this report, and on the basis of the  comments we received, we made technical changes where appropriate. As  part of our interviews, we also asked state officials how much federal and  state money was spent on their computerized statewide systems in order  to implement the HAVA requirements. We did not independently verify the  amounts they reported to us. However, we attempted to compare the  amounts of money the states reported that they spent with data reported  by them to EAC on the implementation of all HAVA requirements. Because  of variations in the way these amounts were reported by the states, we  could not identify the amounts spent solely on implementation of the  computerized list requirement.
Our work focused primarily on the states, since most of the  responsibilities for implementing HAVA statewide computerized list  provisions took place at the state level. We did, however, communicate  with officials from the EAC and Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights  Division to obtain information about and documentation on their roles and  responsibilities related to the HAVA statewide computerized list  provisions. We also provided sections of the report discussing EAC and  DOJ to officials with those organizations to verify the accuracy of the  information they provided and, on the basis of their comments, made  technical changes where appropriate. In addition, we reviewed prior GAO  reports on elections, including voter registration issues.
We conducted our work from January 2005 through December 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: EAC and DOJ Roles in Implementing HAVA Statewide Voter Registration List Provisions
paragraphs: The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) provides that the Election Assistance  Commission (EAC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are to have  specific roles in states’ efforts to implement the Help America Vote Act’s  statewide voter registration list provisions. HAVA established EAC to,  among other things, serve as a national clearinghouse for information on  election administration and provide information and guidance with  respect to laws, procedures, and technologies affecting the administration  of federal elections.
On August 4, 2005, EAC released its final version of the Voluntary  Guidance on Implementation of Statewide Voter Registration Lists. The  purpose of the voluntary guidance was to assist states in their efforts to  develop and maintain a statewide voter registration list pursuant to HAVA  Section 303(a). The guidance describes a set of specifications and  requirements states may use to implement the HAVA provisions, such as  establishing real-time access to all registration data, securing the  registration list, synchronizing the statewide list with local databases at  least every 24 hours, and coordinating with other databases for the  purpose of performing voter registration verification and list maintenance.  EAC’s guidance also contains recommendations on dealing with outcomes  that may result from the verification process, the type of voting history  information states should track, and the type of system that is most closely  aligned with HAVA requirements. In addition to the voluntary guidance,  EAC has also created and posted on its Web site two best practices  documents—“Best Practices in Administration, Management, and Security  in Voting Systems and Provisional Voting” and “Best Practices for  Facilitating Voting by U.S. Citizens Covered by the Uniformed and  Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act”—and other information on  election administration. According to EAC officials, EAC expects that the  clearinghouse will be fully operational during 2006.
HAVA also provides enforcement authority to DOJ with respect to the  uniform and nondiscriminatory implementation of certain HAVA  requirements such as those relating to the statewide voter registration list  and voter eligibility verification provisions. Officials with DOJ’s Civil  Rights Division told us that in addition to monitoring states’ compliance  with HAVA, DOJ has promoted pre-enforcement compliance, which  includes working with states to identify what actions are reasonable to  expect them to take, educating state and local officials, and responding to  states’ inquiries. According to DOJ officials, at the time of our review, DOJ  had not taken enforcement actions against any of the nine nonwaiver  states. DOJ officials also said that they worked with the states following  the passage of HAVA to address initial challenges and provide informal  guidance while EAC began operations and hired staff.
section_title: Appendix III: Reported Experiences of Alaska Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions
paragraphs: This appendix describes steps Alaska election officials reported taking to  implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 2002  (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing  computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of  information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate  statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and  lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing  HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses  to our telephone interviews with Alaska election officials and were not  independently verified by us.
subsections: section_title: Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: Alaska had in place a computerized statewide voter registration system  prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created a mainframe-based  system in 1985. To implement the provisions of HAVA, minor  modifications were made to the system to allow election officials to record  driver’s license numbers and the last four digits of the voter’s Social  Security number. These modifications cost approximately $5,000 in state  and federal funds to implement. Alaska state officials awarded a contract  to upgrade its statewide voter registration system, in order to include  additional election management capabilities, such as poll worker  management and Internet voter registration, at a cost of $2.6 million.
section_title: Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Applications
paragraphs: To implement the HAVA voter application verification requirements, the  state’s four regional election supervisors, who function as state  employees, verified application information by comparing voter eligibility  information (full name; date of birth; and either a driver’s license number,  full Social Security number, the last four digits of the Social Security  number, or a unique identifier assigned by the state if the individual lacks  a Social Security number and a driver’s license) with state motor vehicle  agency records to verify identity, age, and duplicate registrations. At the  time of our review, Alaska was not comparing information with the Social  Security Administration (SSA) because the state did not have a signed  memorandum of understanding with SSA.
section_title: Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
paragraphs: To implement HAVA, Alaska has taken steps to maintain the accuracy of  its voter registration list by coordinating the list with other state agency  records, as described below.
Duplicate registrants. State officials perform an electronic check on the  entire statewide voter registration list for duplicates once a year and on an  as-needed basis.
Deceased registrants. State officials conduct monthly electronic updates  of vital statistics death records by checking name, date of birth and either  the full Social Security number or the last four digits.
Disqualified felons. State officials update court system records on a  monthly basis. Specifically, court system records from the Department of  Corrections and Bureau of Vital Statistics are checked against the voter  registration list, comparing name, date of birth, and full Social Security  number.
Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. In the event of a  court declaration of mental incompetence, the court would notify state  officials of the judgment and the Division of Elections would inactivate the  voter’s registration. Officials reported that disqualification because of  mental incompetence does not occur often.
To ensure that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed from the state  voter registration list, election officials send letters notifying individuals of  their pending removal from the statewide voter registration list. These  letters are sent to those who have not voted in the most recent two federal  elections and those who have disqualifying felony convictions, as allowed  under state law. Alaska officials reported that they removed the names of  ineligible voters in 2004.
section_title: Challenges and Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Election officials did not report any challenges or lessons learned while  implementing these HAVA requirements.
section_title: Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of Arizona Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions
paragraphs: This appendix describes steps Arizona election officials reported taking to  implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 2002  (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing  computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of  information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate  statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and  lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing  HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses  to our telephone interviews with Arizona election officials and were not  independently verified by us.
subsections: section_title: Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: Prior to HAVA, Arizona did not have a computerized statewide voter  registration system in place, although several counties operated  computerized voter registration systems. Arizona created an  interconnected, statewide Web-based voter registration system called  Voter Registration Arizona (VRAZ) to implement the requirements of  HAVA. VRAZ became operational by the HAVA deadline of January 1,  2004. VRAZ had an initial development cost of $1 million and was jointly  funded by state and federal sources. The system took approximately   6 months to develop. The state had to pass new statutes and amend others  so that election officials could receive information from state agencies,  such as felony records. In addition to carrying out the required functions  of the voter registration system, election officials can query all state voter  registration records on Election Day if their polling place has an Internet  connection.
A new version of VRAZ is under development and is expected to replace  voter registration systems in 13 of 15 counties. The new version of VRAZ,  called VRAZ II, is expected to reflect reciprocity agreements with other  states whereby officials will be alerted when a voter moves from state to  state and registers to vote in those states covered by the agreement. In  addition, the new system is expected to contain additional election  management capabilities beyond those required by HAVA, including the  ability to retrieve data on election administration issues such as voter  petitions, provisional ballots, training of poll workers, and polling  locations. The estimated cost for VRAZ II is $10 million. At the time of our  review, Arizona officials were anticipating that VRAZ II would go online in  2007.
section_title: Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications
paragraphs: To implement the HAVA voter application verification requirements,  Arizona compared the applicant’s name, date of birth, driver’s license  number, or the last four digits of the Social Security number with motor  vehicle agency (MVA) records to identify potentially inaccurate  applications. In addition, Arizona’s Web-based voter registration software,  EZ Voter—which allows Arizona citizens to register to vote via the  Internet—electronically verified the accuracy of the voter registration  applications filed online by matching the applicant’s name, date of birth,  driver’s license number, or last four digits of the Social Security number  with MVA records. EZ Voter registrations were then entered at the county  level daily and submitted to the statewide voter registration list.
At the time of our review, Arizona had completed a memorandum of  understanding with the Social Security Administration (SSA) and was  verifying information on voter registration applications by matching it with  SSA records as required by HAVA.
section_title: Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: As state officials developed the VRAZ system, they identified and  corrected inaccurate voter registration data prior to entering the data into  the new system; through this process they were also able to eliminate  duplicate registrants from the statewide list. Election officials also took  steps to maintain the accuracy of the voter registration list by coordinating  the list with other state agency records, as described below.
Duplicate registrants. State officials electronically identify duplicate  matches by checking name, address, driver’s license number, and the last  four digits of the Social Security number on voter registration applications  on a daily basis. The entire list is screened once a month to identify  duplicate registrants.
Deceased registrants. The Secretary of State’s office receives an electronic  file of recent deaths from the Department of Health Services once a  month. Officials identify any matches by checking name, date of birth, and  the last four digits of the Social Security number.
Disqualifying felons. State officials receive information on felony  convictions from Arizona courts on a varying basis—weekly or monthly in  the case of the state’s superior courts and on an ongoing basis from   U.S. district courts. Once a felon’s sentence has been completed, voting  rights are reinstated and the individual may register to vote by submitting  a new voter registration application. Officials identify any matches by  checking name, date of birth, and the last four digits of the Social Security  number. This is a paper-based process in smaller courts and an electronic  process in larger courts.
Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. As with  information on felons, courts submit information in an electronic or paper  format to state officials on individuals declared mentally incompetent at  different times for comparison with the statewide voter registration list.
To ensure that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed from voter  registration lists, local officials send a letter to voters to notify them of  their impending removal from the statewide voter registration list. For  example, letters are sent to individuals with a disqualifying felony  conviction.
section_title: Challenges and Lessons Learned
paragraphs: One challenge Arizona election officials faced was designing a system with  the appropriate scope. Election officials said they addressed this design  challenge by initially implementing a system that performed only the basic  tasks required under the HAVA provisions. To minimize changes to the  way counties historically managed elections, local officials used the  computerized statewide system to manage voter registration information  while continuing to use their local computerized systems to manage  elections. The state plans to expand the scope of its new statewide system  in the future, providing counties with additional election management  capabilities. Another challenge reported by Arizona election officials was  the conversion of data on registered voters from the old system to the new  system. Officials said it was time-consuming and required processes to  ensure that data were accurately entered into the new system.
Election officials also reported on the importance of collaboration among  state and local officials. The state convened a working group composed of  both local and state officials that was responsible for developing its  statewide computerized system. Arizona officials stated that a  communications plan that allows information about the voter list  management process to be shared among state and county officials can  help lessen political resistance and facilitate buy-in by state and county  officials. The implementation of VRAZ in stages was another way state  officials gained the trust of the counties.
section_title: Appendix V: Reported Experiences of Georgia Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions
paragraphs: This appendix describes steps Georgia election officials reported taking to  implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 2002  (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing  computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of  information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate  statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and  lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing  HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses  to our telephone interviews with Georgia election officials and were not  independently verified by us.
subsections: section_title: Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: Georgia had in place a computerized statewide voter registration system  prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created this mainframe-based  system in 1995. To implement HAVA, state officials made one minor  modification to their voter registration system—adding the capability to  identify whether a voter had registered for the first time by mail. Officials  have plans to enhance the current system in order to provide election  administration management capabilities, such as identifying potential poll  workers and giving election officials on Election Day immediate electronic  access to the voter list so they can verify where voters are registered to  vote. At the time of our review, officials were planning to conduct a pilot  program to test the enhanced system.
section_title: Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications
paragraphs: In Georgia, voter registration applicants were required to provide their full  Social Security number on voter registration applications as a unique  identifier. Since Georgia collected the full Social Security number, the  state was not subject to the HAVA requirements to collect a unique  identifying number or to verify information on voter registration  applications with motor vehicle agency or Social Security Administration  records. Georgia elected not to verify information with these agencies, as  HAVA allows. However, the state had processes in place to conduct real- time checks of voter registration applications to ensure they did not  duplicate an existing registration and that the application information did  not match the records of deceased persons. The state procedures also  provide for verifying voter eligibility by comparing voter registration  applications with state court records on felony lists to identify persons  ineligible to vote because of a disqualifying felony conviction.
section_title: Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: Prior to and since the enactment of HAVA, Georgia has maintained the  accuracy of its voter registration list by coordinating the list with other  state agency records, as described below.
Duplicate registrants. On a monthly basis, state officials check the  statewide voter list to identify duplicate registrants and transmit the list of  duplicates to the counties for updating.
Deceased registrants. Every month, county officials receive electronic  files on deceased persons from the Department of Vital Statistics. Officials  identify any matches with the statewide voter registration list by checking  name, date of birth, full Social Security number, and address. On a  quarterly basis, the state receives an electronic report from the  Department of Vital Statistics and verifies that the counties have made the  changes and checks for errors. The information is compiled into a  quarterly report that verifies that the counties have made the necessary  changes and that an error report is generated showing the records that did  not match.
Disqualified felons. On a monthly basis, the state receives a paper list of  felony convictions from state courts. The felony list is then sent to  counties for updating. County officials identify any matches with the  statewide voter registration list by checking name, date of birth, full Social  Security number, and address.
Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. In the case of  mental incompetence, a court order must specify that a person is barred  from voting; otherwise, the person may continue to vote. As with  information on felons, on a monthly basis, the state receives from state  courts a paper list of individuals declared mentally incompetent. The list is  then sent to counties for updating. County officials identify any matches  with the statewide voter registration list by checking name, date of birth,  full Social Security number, and address.
To ensure that eligible voters’ names are not inadvertently removed from  the statewide voter registration list, county officials send a letter to voters  to notify them of their impending removal from the voter registration rolls.  These letters are sent to individuals who have requested to be removed,  those with a disqualifying felony conviction, and those who have been  declared mentally incompetent. Georgia officials reported that they  removed the names of ineligible voters in 2004.
section_title: Challenges and Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Although Georgia has had a statewide computerized voter list in place for  10 years, officials reported that a challenge they continue to face is  training employees on how to use the system. Officials said that one lesson  learned is that states need to get buy-in from county officials early on in  the process of developing a statewide voter registration system. They  suggested that one way to accomplish this may be to form a task force,  composed of state and local officials, to review system development issues  and design.
section_title: Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Hawaii Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions
paragraphs: This appendix describes steps Hawaii election officials reported taking to  implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 2002  (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing  computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of  information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate  statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and  lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing  HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses  to our telephone interviews by Hawaii election officials and were not  independently verified by us.
subsections: section_title: Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: Hawaii has had a computerized voter registration system since the 1970s  and developed a statewide interactive system in 1982. Hawaii’s system  provides election officials with immediate access to the computerized  statewide voter list whereby they can enter new or update existing voter  registration information and query all state voter registration records. To  implement HAVA, election officials made minor technical changes to the  statewide voter registration system, such as adding the ability to flag  inactive voters. At the time of our review, Hawaii was making additional  arrangements to enhance its current computerized voter registration  system by modifying the absentee voting component of the system.
section_title: Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications
paragraphs: In Hawaii, voter registration applicants were required to provide their full  Social Security number on voter registration applications as a unique  identifier. Since Hawaii collected the full Social Security number, the state  was not subject to the HAVA requirements to collect a unique identifying  number or to verify information on voter registration applications with  motor vehicle agency (MVA) or Social Security Administration records.  Hawaii voluntarily matched information on voter registration forms with  MVA records, comparing information such as the individual’s name,  driver’s license number, and full Social Security number. The  computerized voter registration system conducted real-time checks for  duplicate registrations and age requirements prior to accepting the new  application into the statewide voter registration system.
section_title: Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
paragraphs: Prior to and since the enactment of HAVA, Hawaii officials have  maintained the accuracy of Hawaii’s statewide voter registration list by  coordinating the list with other state agency records, as described below.
Duplicate registrants. The computerized statewide voter registration  system automatically checks for duplicate registrations as soon as an  application is processed.
Deceased registrants. Twice a month, county officials check paper death  records from the Department of Vital Statistics to identify deceased  registrants by checking the name, date of birth, and the full Social Security  number.
Disqualified felons. Twice a month, county clerks receive paper records  from circuit court officials. These records are then checked against the  information in the statewide voter registration list by comparing name,  date of birth, and the full Social Security number.
Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. Officials  reported that disqualification because of mental incompetence does not  occur often in Hawaii. The courts are the only entity that can make a  judgment regarding mental incompetence that would disqualify a person  from being registered to vote.
To ensure that eligible voters’ names are not inadvertently removed from  the statewide voter registration list, local officials send a letter to every  voter prior to the general election before removing voters’ names from the  list, in accordance with the National Voter Registration Act provisions for  removing voters’ names from lists.
section_title: Challenges and Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Although Hawaii had a statewide voter registration system in place prior  to HAVA, officials shared their general perspectives on implementing voter  registration systems. Hawaii election officials said that one of the biggest  challenges can be coordinating with counties and developing a rapport  with county officials. To assist in coordination efforts, the state holds  quarterly meetings with county officials. In these meetings, state and local  officials coordinate activities such as completing list maintenance and  data entry prior to the printing of poll books and voter lists. Another issue  raised by Hawaii officials was designing a system with the appropriate  scope. These officials also shared lessons learned about managing a  computerized voter registration system. They stated that technological  developments will require compromise among local jurisdictions that have  different administrative and technological constraints. Officials also  recommended that states establish uniform processing procedures among  their jurisdictions so that all jurisdictions function as one. Finally, Hawaii  created a shadow system so that the system could be both updated and  available for use at the same time.
section_title: Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Kentucky Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions
paragraphs: This appendix describes steps Kentucky election officials reported taking  to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 2002  (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing  computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of  information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate  statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and  lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing  HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses  to our telephone interviews by Kentucky election officials and were not  independently verified by us.
subsections: section_title: Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: Kentucky had in place a computerized statewide voter registration system  prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created this mainframe-based  system in 1973. Kentucky’s current system allows all local election  officials immediate access to enter new or update existing voter  registration information in their jurisdiction, and immediate access to  query all state voter registration records. In addition, election officials  provided a toll-free number for precinct officers to access an interactive  voice response phone system to check voter eligibility. As a result,  Kentucky did not have to take any additional steps to implement HAVA  statewide computerized list requirements.
Election officials planned to upgrade their computerized statewide voter  registration system in the future to provide more election management  tools to counties, such as including a function to track poll workers and  complete absentee ballot forms. The state has developed the absentee  ballot application and expects it to be used by its counties in the 2006  elections.
section_title: Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications
paragraphs: In Kentucky, voter registration applicants were required to provide their  full Social Security number on voter registration applications as a unique  identifier. Since Kentucky collected the full Social Security number, the  state was not subject to the HAVA requirements to collect a unique  identifying number or to verify information on voter registration  applications with motor vehicle agency or Social Security Administration  records. Kentucky elected not to verify information with these agencies, as  HAVA allows. To verify information on voter registration applications,  Kentucky’s computerized statewide voter registration automatically  checked for duplicate registrations before new registrants were added to  the statewide list.
section_title: Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: Kentucky currently has processes in place to maintain the accuracy of the  statewide voter registration list by comparing the statewide voter  registration list with state agency records, as described below.
Duplicate registrants. The computerized statewide voter registration  system automatically checks for duplicate registrations as soon as a new  application is entered into the system.
Deceased registrants. On a monthly basis, election officials check the  computerized statewide voter registration list against the records from the  Department of Vital Statistics to identify deceased registrants by  comparing name, date of birth, and full Social Security number.
Disqualified felons. On a monthly basis, court records are electronically  checked against the computerized statewide voter registration list to  identify persons convicted of a disqualifying felony by comparing name,  date of birth, and full Social Security number.
Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. Officials use  court records to identify voters ineligible because of mental incompetence  by comparing applicant’s name, date of birth, and full Social Security  number with the computerized statewide voter registration list.
To ensure that the names of eligible voters are not inadvertently removed  from the statewide voter registration list, state officials match voters’  identifying information with U.S. Postal Service, felony, mental  competency, and death records. State officials also send letters to voters  to notify them of pending removal based on a disqualifying felony  conviction.
section_title: Challenges and Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Since Kentucky had a computerized statewide voter registration system in  place prior to HAVA, election officials did not report any challenges.  However, Kentucky election officials provided examples of lessons  learned while maintaining their current computerized statewide voter  registration system. They said it is important to develop a computerized  statewide voter registration system that will be sustainable now and in the  future. Officials suggested that as states contemplate system upgrades,  they be mindful that changes to the system affect all jurisdictions, despite  their differing needs and constraints. A key to their success has been the  cooperative working relationship they cultivated with local officials by  keeping them involved. Election officials also recommended that states  “think outside the box” when designing ways to use the voter registration  database. For example, they utilized their statewide computerized system  to established voter information centers on Kentucky’s state Web site to  assist applicants and staff in the voter registration process.
section_title: Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Minnesota Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions
paragraphs: This appendix describes steps Minnesota election officials reported taking  to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 2002  (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing  computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of  information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate  statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and  lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing  HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses  to our telephone interviews by Minnesota election officials and were not  independently verified by us.
subsections: section_title: Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: Minnesota is unique in the way election administration functions are  structured and can vary by jurisdiction. In this state, the county auditor  has certain election responsibilities and can choose to delegate other  election responsibilities to minor civil division-level (MCD) government— townships and cities. For example, while counties manage voter  registration, county auditors may delegate other functions, such as  absentee voting to MCDs. There are some functions that MCDs are  responsible for handling, such as polling place matters.
Minnesota had a computerized statewide voter registration system in place  prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created this mainframe-based  system in 1988. To comply with the provisions of HAVA, the state amended  its election laws and replaced its existing computerized statewide voter  registration system in 2004. The system included new election  management capabilities, such as providing election officials with  immediate access to enter and update applicant information and creating  electronic matching capabilities with state agencies to verify voter  eligibility. The system also centrally tracked absentee ballots provided to  military personnel or other citizens residing overseas. The project was  completed in 11 months at a reported cost of about $5.3 million.
section_title: Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications
paragraphs: To implement HAVA, Minnesota verifies voter registration application  information by comparing name, date of birth, driver’s license number, or  the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security number with motor  vehicle agency records to identify potentially ineligible applications. Since  Minnesota is a same-day registration state, checks for duplicates are  automatically run on voter applications on a daily basis. In addition, the  Department of Public Service tracks visas issued to ensure that  noncitizens are unable to vote.
At the time of our review, Minnesota was in the process of completing a  memorandum of understanding with the Social Security Administration  (SSA) to allow verification of information on voter registration  applications by comparing it with SSA records. Officials anticipated that  they would begin conducting matches by 2006.
section_title: Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
paragraphs: To implement HAVA, Minnesota election officials took steps to maintain  the accuracy of the voter registration list by coordinating with other state  agency records, as described below.
Duplicate registrants. The statewide voter registration system produces  maintenance reports to identify potential duplicates. In addition, checks  for duplicates are run on an annual basis.
Deceased registrants. On a monthly basis, county officials conduct manual  checks of oral and paper death records from the Department of Vital  Statistics by checking the name, date of birth, and the full Social Security  number.
Disqualified felons. On a monthly basis, officials receive paper records  from the courts to check for those persons convicted of a disqualifying  felony. Once the court computer system is in place, this process will have  the capability to provide electronic matching by comparing the applicant’s  name, date of birth, driver’s license, identification card, full Social Security  number, and last four digits of the Social Security number.
Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. On a monthly  basis, officials receive paper records from the courts to check for those  declared mentally incompetent.
To ensure that the names of eligible voters are not inadvertently removed  from the statewide voter registration list, state officials send notices to  voters prior to removing their names from the list.
section_title: Challenges and Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Minnesota election officials reported that one of the major challenges they  faced was replacing the existing voter registration system in an 11-month  time frame. Also, officials told us that conducting elections while updating  their voter registration system further complicated their efforts. Another  challenge that election officials reported was converting data on registered  voters from the old system database to the new system. Minnesota  officials said that to help local officials with this work they developed a  tool that allowed them to compare old records of voter information with  the new ones on a case-by-case basis.
In addition, Minnesota election officials discussed various lessons learned  while implementing the HAVA requirements. The first lesson learned was  the importance of identifying and prioritizing the functional requirements  for the computerized statewide voter registration system. In order to  manage the scope of replacing a computerized statewide voter registration  system, election officials told us they had to separate the “nice to have”  features from the features required by HAVA. This step assisted election  officials in managing the scope and cost of their project.
Second, Minnesota election officials reported using in-house resources to  replace the existing computerized statewide voter registration system.  According to election officials, it is best to use in-house resources to  establish a computerized statewide voter registration system when there  are sufficient in-house resources and staff expertise.
Third, Minnesota election officials said that it was useful to create an  online user’s manual for the computerized statewide voter registration  system. Election officials reported that by having the user’s manual online,  staff at all levels had immediate access to information on how to operate  the computerized statewide voter registration system.
section_title: Appendix IX: Reported Experiences of South Carolina Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions
paragraphs: This appendix describes steps South Carolina election officials reported  taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of  2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing  computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of  information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate  statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and  lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing  HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses  to our telephone interviews by South Carolina election officials and were  not independently verified by us.
subsections: section_title: Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: South Carolina had an interactive computerized statewide voter  registration system in place prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state  created this mainframe-based system in the late 1960s and modified it in  1992. Election officials made minor modifications to its system by adding  additional data fields in order to implement the provisions of HAVA. The  system also has election management capabilities beyond HAVA, including  the ability to track absentee voters and poll managers. The state reportedly  spent about $67,000 in federal funds for the most current system  modifications.
Election officials began work on a new Web-based, menu-driven system in  2000. The system is expected to be more flexible and is to allow election  officials to perform election administration tasks such as signature  verification. The new system is also expected to have the capability to run  checks with the motor vehicle agency database. Officials reported that the  implementation of the new system will not take place until after the 2006  elections.
section_title: Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Applications
paragraphs: South Carolina required voter registration applicants to provide their full  Social Security number on voter registration applications as a unique  identifier. Since South Carolina collects the full Social Security number,  the state is not subject to the HAVA requirements to collect a unique  identifying number or to verify information on voter registration  applications with the motor vehicle agency or Social Security  Administration. South Carolina elected not to verify information with  these agencies, as HAVA allows. Prior to entering applicants into the  statewide list, county officials check to ensure the application does not  duplicate an existing registration. State officials compare voter  registration applications with records on deceased persons and persons  ineligible to register to vote because of a disqualifying felony conviction,  as allowed under state law.
section_title: Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
paragraphs: Prior to and since the enactment of HAVA, South Carolina officials  maintain the accuracy of the state’s voter registration list by coordinating  the list with other state agency records, as described below.
Duplicate registrants. South Carolina produces a report on duplicates  quarterly. The voter registration system identifies duplicate registrants  using the full Social Security number and date of birth. County officials  make the necessary changes.
Deceased registrants. State officials conduct monthly electronic  comparisons with state agency death records. Officials identify any  matches by checking name, date of birth, and full Social Security number  and remove names of ineligible registrants.
Disqualified felons. State officials conduct monthly electronic  comparisons with state agency felony records. Officials identify any  matches based on name, address, date of birth, and full Social Security  number and remove names of ineligible registrants.
Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. The counties  maintain paper records on the mentally incompetent. Upon receipt of a  written court order, county officials identify and remove ineligible voters.
In order to ensure that eligible voters’ names are not inadvertently  removed, state officials send a letter to voters to notify them of their  impending removal from the statewide voter registration list. Letters are  sent to individuals who have filed a change-of-address with the U.S. Postal  Service, failed to appear in the most recent two federal elections, or have a  disqualifying felony conviction. South Carolina officials reported that they  removed the names of ineligible voters in 2004.
section_title: Challenges and Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Although South Carolina had a statewide voter registration system in place  prior to HAVA, officials shared their general perspectives on implementing  voter registration systems. Officials stated that forming a working group  composed of state and local officials helped to ensure stakeholder buy-in.  State officials also reported that the updated system that they are in the  process of creating is proving challenging because they are developing it  in-house instead of purchasing the system from a vendor. Officials  reported that states should assess their available resources and skills  before deciding to develop a system on their own.
section_title: Appendix X: Reported Experiences of South Dakota Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions
paragraphs: This appendix describes steps South Dakota election officials reported  taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of  2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing  computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of  information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate  statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and  lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing  HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses  to our telephone interviews by South Dakota election officials and were  not independently verified by us.
subsections: section_title: Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: South Dakota had a computerized statewide voter registration system in  place prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created the system in  2002. Election officials added new data fields and data matching capability  to the existing computerized list in order to implement the provisions of  HAVA. The modifications cost $302,004, of which $103,598 came from  federal funds and $198,406 from state funds.
section_title: Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications
paragraphs: To implement HAVA, county election officials verified voter registration  application information by comparing name, date of birth, and driver’s  license number, or the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security  number, with state motor vehicle agency records to identify potentially  inaccurate applications. These officials also compared applications with  records on the deceased and persons convicted of a disqualifying felony  prior to adding them to the statewide voter list. South Dakota local  election officials verified voter registration information by comparing it  with the Social Security Administration’s records beginning in August  2005.
section_title: Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
paragraphs: As required to implement HAVA, election officials have taken steps to  maintain the accuracy of South Dakota’s voter registration list by  coordinating the list with other state agency records, as described below.
Duplicate registrants. State officials check the statewide list for  duplicates at least annually and more often during an election cycle. State  officials identify duplicate registrants by checking for voters with the same  name, driver’s license number, and the last four digits of the Social  Security number and forward the names of ineligible registrants to county  officials for processing.
Deceased registrants. Local officials match name, date of birth, and the  last four digits of the Social Security number on voter registration  applications with the state vital statistics agency’s death records through  weekly electronic batch comparisons.
Disqualified felons. Local officials electronically compare voter  registration applications with records of persons convicted of a  disqualifying felony that makes them ineligible to register to vote. Officials  identify persons ineligible to register to vote based on name, date of birth,  driver’s license number, and last four digits of the Social Security number.
Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. In the event  that a court issues a declaration of mental incompetence, the court  provides the written declaration to the county election official who  removes the ineligible registrant from the voter list.
In South Dakota, local officials are responsible for updating voter  information and removing names from the voter registration list. To  ensure that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed from the state  voter registration list, local election officials send letters notifying  individuals of their pending removal from the statewide voter registration  list.
section_title: Challenges and Lessons Learned
paragraphs: State officials reported that working as a team and maintaining a positive  working relationship with the counties enabled South Dakota to  implement HAVA by the deadline.
section_title: Appendix XI: Reported Experiences of West Virginia Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions
paragraphs: This appendix describes steps West Virginia election officials reported  taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of  2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing  computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of  information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate  statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and  lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing  HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses  to our telephone interviews by West Virginia election officials and were  not independently verified by us.
subsections: section_title: Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: With regard to the HAVA statewide computerized list provisions, West  Virginia created an interactive, computerized statewide voter registration  system. According to state election officials, some counties had  computerized voter registration systems prior to the enactment of HAVA,  but they were not interconnected through a statewide computer system.  Election officials hired a vendor to create the new statewide system,  which went into service in January 2004 at a reported cost of  approximately $1.9 million in federal funds. The new system also has  election management capabilities beyond the requirements of HAVA,  including the ability to produce reports on absentee ballots, early voters,  poll workers, and election data statistics. It also provides a separate  database to track poll workers.
section_title: Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration Applications
paragraphs: To implement HAVA, West Virginia developed the capability to verify voter  registration application information by comparing name, date of birth, and  driver’s license number or the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security  number with motor vehicle agency (MVA) records. However, officials  reported that the state had difficulty conducting data matches with MVA  because MVA lacked the ability to interface with the statewide voter list.  Officials said that they expected this problem to be resolved by 2006. Since  the enactment of HAVA, the state system checks new applications for  duplicates, automatically flags duplicates, and notifies county officials to  eliminate them.
West Virginia is in the process of finalizing the agreement with the Social  Security Administration (SSA) to allow a comparison between voter  eligibility information and SSA data as required by HAVA. This agreement  will enable state officials to compare the last four digits of a voter’s Social  Security number with SSA records. Officials reported that they expected  the agreement to be completed by December 2005.
section_title: Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists
paragraphs: Prior to HAVA, county voter registration systems could only check for  duplicates within the county, and local officials could only check felony  and death lists using paper records. Since the enactment of HAVA, election  officials have taken steps to maintain the accuracy of the statewide voter  registration list by coordinating the list with other state agency records, as  described below.
Duplicate registrants. West Virginia checked the entire database for  duplicates during the implementation of its new statewide system. The  county clerks also periodically check the system for duplicate registrants.
Deceased registrants. County officials maintain the voter registration list  through a monthly comparison of the list with state death records. At the  time of this report, officials rely on oral and paper records to identify any  matches by checking name, address, date of birth, and the last four digits  of the Social Security number. Officials said they expected in the future to  conduct these comparisons electronically.
Disqualified felons. County officials receive paper records from federal  and state courts on disqualifying felony convictions.
Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. The state does  not conduct list maintenance based on this information.
Local officials are responsible for updating voter information and for  removing voter records; state officials said that they follow the National  Voter Registration Act provisions for removing names from the list. In  general, section 8 of NVRA provides that, in the administration of voter  registration for federal elections, states may not remove names of  registrants for non-voting and that names of registrants may be removed  only for certain specified reasons.
section_title: Challenges and Lessons Learned
paragraphs: implementation of the new system. Other challenges reported by West  Virginia officials included data conversion, obtaining timely approvals for  purchases, changing necessary provisions of state law, and overcoming  technology problems.
section_title: Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact person named above, John Mortin, Assistant  Director; David Alexander; Leo Barbour; Amy Bernstein; Michelle Fejfar;  Geoff Hamilton; E. Anne Laffoon; Jean Orland; Dan Rodriguez;   Miquel Salas: Stephanie Sand; and Ashanta Williams made key  contributions to this report.