Air Traffic Control System: Selected Stakeholders' Perspectives on Operations, Modernization, and Structure
Published: 2014-09-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Over the past two decades, U.S. aviation stakeholders have debated whether FAA should be the entity in the United States that operates and modernizes the ATC system. During this period, GAO reported on challenges FAA has faced in operating and modernizing the ATC system. FAA reorganized several times in attempts to improve its performance and implement an initiative to modernize the ATC system, known as NextGen. Recent budgetary pressures have rekindled industry debate about FAA's efficiency in operating and modernizing the ATC system.
GAO was asked to gather U.S. aviation industry stakeholder views on the operation and modernization of the current ATC system. This report provides perspectives from a wide range of stakeholders on
(1) the performance of the ATC system and the NextGen modernization initiative and any challenges FAA may face in managing these activities and
(2) potential changes that could improve the performance of the ATC system, including the NextGen modernization initiative.
Based on GAO's knowledge and recommendations from interviewees, GAO interviewed a non-probability, non-generalizable sample of 76 U.S. aviation industry stakeholders—including airlines, airports, labor unions, manufacturers, and general aviation—using a semi-structured format with closed and open-ended questions. GAO also discussed the perspectives with current FAA officials. The Department of Transportation provided technical comments on a draft of this product.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The 76 aviation industry stakeholders with whom GAO spoke were generally positive regarding the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) operation of the current air traffic control (ATC) system but identified challenges about transitioning to the Next Generation Air Traffic Control System (NextGen). Specifically, the majority of stakeholders rated FAA as moderately to very capable of operating an efficient ATC system, but the majority also rated FAA as only marginally to moderately capable of implementing NextGen, FAA's initiative to modernize the system. Almost all (75) of the stakeholders identified challenges that they believe FAA faces, particularly in implementing the NextGen initiatives. These challenges included difficulty in (1) convincing reluctant aircraft owners to invest in the aircraft technology necessary to benefit from NextGen (46 stakeholders) and (2) mitigating the effects of an uncertain fiscal environment (43 stakeholders). FAA officials acknowledged and generally agreed with these challenges.
Sixty four stakeholders suggested a range of changes they believe could improve the efficiency of ATC operations and NextGen's implementation. The change stakeholders suggested most often was to modify how FAA's ATC operations and NextGen programs are funded, including the need to ensure that FAA has a predictable and long-term funding source. Other suggested changes were to improve human capital activities, such as air traffic controllers' training, and improve coordination with industry stakeholders. GAO has reported on these issues in the past, and in some cases, made recommendations, with which FAA concurred but has not yet implemented. GAO also asked stakeholders whether separating ATC services from FAA, such as the privatization of the ATC service provider, was an option; 27 of the stakeholders believed it was an option; another 26 believed it was an option, but had significant reservations about such a change. Support for this option was mixed among categories of stakeholders (see table below). Stakeholders identified several issues that would need to be taken into account before making any changes to the provision of ATC services, including lessons learned from other countries, funding sources for such a system, and the extent of Congress's role in overseeing a separate ATC system.
a Maybe represents stakeholders who qualified their “Yes” responses with significant reservations.
b Included in this other category are three industry categories with fewer than four stakeholders—Research & Development Organizations, Other Federal Agencies, and Passenger and Safety Groups.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) handles over 50,000 flights a  day and more than 700 million passengers each year and is generally  considered not only the busiest and most complex air traffic control  system in the world but also the safest. Key aviation stakeholders— the  Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), airlines, airports, aircraft  manufacturers, and the National Transportation Safety Board—work  together to ensure these results. However, over the past two decades,  U.S. aviation stakeholders have debated whether the FAA should be the  entity in the United States that operates and modernizes the air traffic  control (ATC) system. Since its inception in 1958, FAA has overseen the  entire NAS, owning and operating the ATC system and regulating  industry safety, aircraft, and operations. In 1995, Congress considered  reforming FAA in response to government and industry frustration with  the agency's slow pace in modernizing the ATC system and concerns  about constrained spending for aviation due to efforts to reduce the  budget deficit. Similar conditions exist today: the recent constrained fiscal  environment has forced federal agencies—including FAA—to cut their  spending through budget sequestration and employee furloughs. At the  same time, the current ATC system continues to use aging technologies  and infrastructure—such as analog communications and ground-based  radar—and FAA continues to face challenges modernizing the ATC  system through its Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)  initiative. These conditions have rekindled industry debate about whether  (1) organizational changes need to be made within FAA and (2)  alternative NAS structures—such as making FAA an independent agency  or commercializing ATC services—could provide ATC services, as well as  modernize the ATC system, more efficiently.
You requested that we gather U.S. aviation industry views on FAA’s ATC  system operations and modernization. This report examines the  perspectives of a wide range of aviation stakeholders on:  the performance of the current ATC system and its modernization  through the NextGen initiative, and any challenges FAA may face in  managing these activities, and potential changes, if any, that could improve the performance of the  ATC system, including FAA’s modernization initiative.
To perform this work, we interviewed a non-probability sample of 76  aviation industry stakeholders from a cross-section of the industry. We  selected stakeholders based on our knowledge of the industry and  recommendations from interviewees. We wanted to obtain perspectives  from individuals and organizations with direct experience, as users, or  knowledge, through research or study, of the current ATC system,  modernization efforts, and FAA’s management of the system. As such,  we limited our review to U.S.-based companies and airlines and sought  the views of individuals and organizations with a stake in the performance  of the NAS. The selected stakeholders represented the following industry  sectors: airlines, airports, aviation experts and other relevant  organizations, general aviation, labor unions and professional  associations, manufacturers and service providers, other federal  government agencies—the Department of Defense and National  Aeronautics and Space Administration, passenger and safety groups, and  research and development organizations.
To obtain stakeholder perspectives, we used a semi-structured interview  format with both closed- and open-ended questions. The intent of our  open-ended questions was to engage the stakeholders in a conversation  about the issues they considered most important and relevant. To  determine the common themes that we are reporting on, we conducted a  content analysis of each of the interviewees’ responses. The numbers  reported for our open-ended questions represent those stakeholders who,  during our interviews, raised a challenge or issue to consider or  suggested a change. It does not mean that the remaining stakeholders  agreed or disagreed with that challenge, change, or issue. In our  discussion of stakeholder views obtained through our open-ended  questions, we aggregated their responses and reported on stakeholders  perspectives in general. The results of our review are not generalizable to  the industry as a whole.
We also interviewed the following FAA senior management officials on  their perspectives and reactions to our preliminary results on stakeholder  perspectives: Administrator; Deputy Administrator/Chief NextGen Officer;  Assistant Administrator for NextGen; Associate Administrator for Aviation  Safety; Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the Air Traffic Organization  (ATO); and the Assistant Administrator for Policy, International Affairs,  and Environment. Finally, we reviewed GAO reports that were related to  stakeholder-identified themes, including collaboration with stakeholders,  delivery of NextGen capabilities, and Performance Based Navigation  procedures, and FAA leadership in overseeing NextGen implementation.  Appendix I describes our objectives, scope, and methodology in greater  detail. See also appendix II for the complete list of stakeholders we  interviewed.
In addition, you asked us to obtain stakeholders’ perspectives on the  safety of the NAS. Nearly all of the stakeholders we interviewed agreed  that the NAS is extremely or very safe. (See app. III for stakeholders’  ratings of the safety of the NAS.) For this reason, we focused this report  on the stakeholders’ perspectives on ATC operations and NextGen  modernization and changes that could improve FAA’s efforts in these  areas.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2013 to September  2014, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: FAA’s primary mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace  system in the world. FAA oversees operating and maintaining this  system, known as the NAS, as well as the safety of aircraft and operators.  FAA operates and maintains the NAS through the following: a workforce of technicians, air traffic controllers, and other staff who  work in airport towers, terminal areas, en-route centers, oceanic air  traffic control centers, and other facilities, and   the ATC and other supporting systems and infrastructure, including  ground-based surveillance radar facilities, communication equipment,  automation systems, and the facilities that house and support these  systems.
Various offices within FAA are responsible for the air traffic control system  and its modernization through the NextGen initiative. The ATO, headed  by the COO, is responsible for the day-to-day operations and  maintenance of the air traffic control system. The NextGen Office, ATO,  and Office of Aviation Safety are involved with various aspects of  NextGen’s management and implementation. The Office of Airports is  responsible for all programs related to airport safety and inspections,  standards for airport design, construction, and operation. In this role, the  Office of Airports supports the implementation of NextGen. These offices  report to the Deputy Administrator, who also has the designation Chief  NextGen Officer (see fig. 1).
FAA receives funds annually through congressional appropriations into  four accounts:
The operations account funds, among other things, the operation and  maintenance of the air traffic control system.
The facilities and equipment account funds technological  improvements to the air traffic control system, including NextGen.
The research, engineering, and development account funds research  on issues related to aviation safety and NextGen systems.
The Airport Improvement Program account provides grants for airport  planning and development.
See figure 2 for percentage of fiscal year 2013 congressional  appropriations by account.
Congress appropriates funding from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund,  which receives revenues from a series of excise taxes paid by users of  the national airspace system, as well as from general revenues. The  Trust Fund provides nearly all of the funding for FAA’s capital investments  in the airport and airway system. Revenue sources for the trust fund  include passenger ticket taxes, segment taxes, air cargo taxes, and taxes  paid by both commercial and general aviation aircraft. The trust fund also  provides a substantial portion of funding for operations—for example 80  percent of FAA’s $15.9-billion funding in fiscal year 2014. The remaining  amount was appropriated from general revenues.
subsections: section_title: The U.S. Air Traffic Control System versus International Air Traffic Control Systems
paragraphs: Whereas FAA operates, maintains, and regulates the air traffic control  system in the United States, in countries such as the United Kingdom,  Germany, and Canada, their air navigation service providers (ANSP) are  commercialized and handle the day-to-day operations of the air traffic  control systems, while the governments regulate these activities. These  ANSPs employ the workforce, maintain the infrastructure, and undertake  modernization efforts. International ANSPs vary in the extent of  government ownership and commercialization, with some as state-owned  corporations, some as public-private partnerships, and some as private  corporations.
According to two recent international analyses comparing ANSPs from  different countries on a range of performance measures including  productivity, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness, FAA operates one of the  most efficient ATC systems. According to a 2012 comparison of air traffic  management performance between FAA and the combined 37 ANSPs of  Europe, the United States had a similar arrival punctuality rate with  Europe for a similar amount of continental airspace. Another international  comparison, completed in 2013, of performance data from FAA and 22  global ANSPs showed similar results, with FAA ranking second in  productivity. However, it is difficult to compare performance, as air  spaces are different. For example, FAA’s ATC system controls about 60  percent more flights than Europe, its airspace is nearly twice as dense as  that of the European ANSPs, and it has 23 percent fewer air traffic  controllers. In addition, Europe has to coordinate among 37 ANSPs, while  the United States has one.
section_title: Air Traffic Control Modernization
paragraphs: Although FAA is recognized for safety and relative efficiency, its attempts  to modernize the ATC system have been less successful. We have  chronicled the difficulties FAA has faced completing what it envisioned  initially in 1981 as a 10-year program to upgrade and replace NAS  facilities and equipment. For example, in August 1995, we found  substantial cost and schedule overruns. To address these difficulties, in  the past, Congress gave FAA acquisition and human capital flexibilities to  improve the agency’s management of the modernization program.  Specifically, in 1995, Congress directed FAA to implement new  acquisition and personnel management systems and exempted the  agency from certain federal acquisition and personnel laws and rules. In  June 2005, we found that FAA had largely implemented these  flexibilities.
However, modernization difficulties persisted, and Congress directed FAA  in 2003 to conceptualize and plan NextGen. NextGen was envisioned at  that time as a major redesign of the air transportation system to increase  efficiency, enhance safety, and reduce flight delays. NextGen is planned  to incorporate precision satellite navigation and surveillance; digital,  networked communications; an integrated weather system; and more.  This complex undertaking requires acquiring new integrated air traffic  control systems; developing new flight procedures, standards, and  regulations; and creating and maintaining new supporting infrastructure.  This transformation is designed to dramatically change the roles and  responsibilities of both air traffic controllers and pilots and change the way  they interface with their systems. The involvement of airlines and other  aviation stakeholders is also critical, since full implementation of NextGen  will necessitate airlines and others to invest in new avionics and other  technologies to take advantage of NextGen technologies. See figure 3 for  the expected benefits from NextGen implementation as depicted through  improvements to the phases of flight.
In addition, to address stakeholder and congressional concerns over  NextGen management practices and the pace of modernization efforts  over the last decade, FAA has reorganized several times. These changes  included:  In 2003, FAA hired a COO and in 2004 created the ATO to  transform the air traffic control system into a more performance- based organization and improve the modernization effort.
In 2011, FAA moved the office responsible for coordinating  NextGen activities—the NextGen Office—out of the ATO and  made it report directly to the Deputy Administrator to increase  NextGen’s visibility within and outside of the agency and create a  direct line of authority for NextGen.
In 2012, FAA created the Program Management Office (PMO),  within the ATO, to improve the oversight of ATO’s acquisition and  implementation efforts, including those for NextGen.
At the direction of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of  2012, FAA created the Chief NextGen Officer position, currently  held by the Deputy FAA Administrator, who reports directly to the  FAA Administrator.
However, challenges continue to persist, as we found in April 2013,  August 2013, and February 2014. Specifically, we found that while FAA  had made some progress in implementing the NextGen modernization  program, FAA continued to experience challenges, including in the  following areas:
Human capital activities: Improving and sustaining NextGen  leadership and preparing FAA’s workforce.
Program management: Prioritizing projects to achieve some near-and  mid-term benefits and managing NextGen interdependencies.
Coordination with industry stakeholders: Gaining greater involvement  from industry stakeholders in FAA’s initiatives and equipping aircraft  with NextGen technologies.
Transitioning to NextGen: Balancing the needs of the current ATC  system and NextGen and consolidating and realigning FAA’s facilities.
In these reports, we made six recommendations to FAA regarding the  improvement of budget planning, performance-based navigation  implementation, and stakeholder coordination and communication. DOT  concurred with these recommendations, but as of August 2014, had not  yet implemented them.
section_title: Industry Stakeholders Were Generally Positive Regarding the Performance of the Current ATC System but Cited Challenges to Transitioning to a Modernized System
subsections: section_title: Stakeholders Said that the United States’ Current ATC System is Efficient, whereas NextGen Has Experienced Difficulties
paragraphs: Stakeholders’ views on FAA’s capability to operate an efficient ATC  system generally align with the two international analyses described  previously. Almost three-quarters (53) of the 72 stakeholders who  provided a rating rated FAA as moderately to very able to operate an  efficient ATC system. Four stakeholders did not rate FAA on this issue.  (See table 1 for the stakeholders’ ratings.) In addition, during our  interviews, over three times as many of the stakeholders specifically  mentioned that the ATC system is generally efficient (37) than those who  said the system is not (12). Fourteen stakeholders specifically said that  FAA operates the most efficient system in the world. Notwithstanding this  generally positive assessment, stakeholders raised areas where FAA  could improve. For example, 29 stakeholders indicated that FAA does not  handle irregular air traffic operations very well, such as those caused by  inclement weather.
Stakeholders’ views regarding NextGen implementation also reflect our  past findings on FAA’s difficulties in implementing the initiative. Eighty  percent (56) of the 70 stakeholders who provided a rating rated FAA as  marginally to moderately able to implement NextGen. Six stakeholders  did not rate FAA. (See table 1.) In addition, during our interviews, more  than three times as many of the stakeholders (43) said that FAA’s overall  implementation of NextGen was not going well than those who said it was  going well (13), and 30 specifically mentioned that FAA was not doing  well managing technology programs in general and NextGen acquisitions  and contracts in particular.
In our interviews with FAA senior management, officials acknowledged  that stakeholders’ complaints about NextGen were not new. They also  said that the agency is taking steps to improve implementation, that  NextGen is now on track and that the agency is starting to focus more on  using these technologies to improve flight efficiencies and reduce flight  time and fuel use, steps and a focus that should result in stakeholders  realizing tangible benefits in the future.
section_title: Stakeholders Identified Challenges Related to Overcoming NextGen Implementation Difficulties
paragraphs: Almost all (75) of the 76 stakeholders identified challenges that they  stated FAA faces in improving ATC operations and overcoming difficulties  in implementing NextGen. (See app. IV for a list and description of the  challenges for FAA that stakeholders identified during our interviews.)  The six challenges stakeholders noted most often are discussed below.  These challenges are long-standing, as we have issued reports on them  as far back as the 1980s, and more recently in the past few years.
subsections: section_title: Ensuring Aircraft Are Equipped to Take Advantage of NextGen
paragraphs: Automatic Dependent Surveillance- Broadcast (ADS-B)  ADS-B, a key NextGen program, is a  technology that enables aircraft to continually  broadcast flight data—such as position, air  speed, and altitude, among other types of  information—to air traffic controllers and other  aircraft.
ADS-B Out is the ability to transmit ADS- signals from the ground and other aircraft,  process those signals, and display traffic  and weather information to flight crews.
The Federal Aviation Administration required  that airplanes be equipped with ADS-B Out by  January 1, 2020. On the other hand, aircraft  operators are not required to install ADS-B In,  but may choose to do so, as is the case for  most NextGen equipment.
Consistent with what we have found in the past, stakeholders and FAA  officials told us that ensuring that aircraft are equipped with avionics to  take advantage of NextGen technologies is a challenge. Full  implementation of NextGen will necessitate that system users make  significant investment in new technologies. FAA estimated in 2013 that, of  the estimated $18.1-billion overall implementation cost that is to be  shared between airlines and FAA, airlines would need to invest $6.6  billion on avionics to realize the full potential benefits from NextGen  capabilities. Forty-six of the stakeholders we interviewed raised this  issue as a challenge for FAA, such as in convincing users to equip their  aircraft with avionics to take advantage of NextGen technologies.  Stakeholders explained that users have been reluctant to equip their  aircraft due to the expense and uncertainty over FAA’s ability to meet  timelines for deploying NextGen technologies. In April 2013, we found  that airlines and other stakeholders had expressed skepticism about the  progress FAA had made to date in implementing NextGen technologies,  skepticism that, in turn, had affected their confidence about whether  benefits would justify these investments. While some stakeholders  agreed that equipping aircraft is necessary for successful and continuous  modernization, they differed in who bore responsibility for paying for  equipage—users or FAA. In August 2013, we noted that the 2012 FAA  Modernization and Reform Act required FAA to report on options to  encourage equipping aircraft with NextGen technologies and the costs  and benefits of each option. FAA officials we interviewed said that they  have completed the installation of the ground infrastructure for Automatic  Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out and that aviation system  users, in turn, must equip their aircraft with ADS-B Out avionics by the  FAA’s 2020 equipage deadline.
section_title: Mitigating the Effects of an Uncertain Fiscal Environment
paragraphs: Both the aviation stakeholders and FAA officials we interviewed regard  budget uncertainty as a challenge for FAA. Forty-three stakeholders  raised budget uncertainty as a difficulty for FAA’s ability to continue  operation of an efficient ATC system and/or implementation of NextGen.  One factor stakeholders raised as contributing to budget uncertainties is  the annual appropriations process. In all but 3 of the last 30 years,  Congress has passed “continuing resolutions” to provide funding for  agencies to continue operating until agreement is reached on final  appropriations. Further, according to the House Transportation and  Infrastructure Committee, prior to the FAA Modernization and Reform Act  of 2012, FAA had operated under 22 extensions, that provided short-term  funding for the agency since the expiration of the 2007 Aviation  Authorization legislation. According to some stakeholders, the stops and  starts associated with continuing resolutions make it difficult for FAA to  carry out long-term planning and strategic development of future  technologies and innovation. We found in September 2009 and March  2013 that continuing resolutions can create budget uncertainty for  agencies about both when they will receive their final appropriation and  what level of funding will ultimately be available. We further found that  operating under continuing resolutions can also complicate agency  operations and cause inefficiencies, such as leading to repetitive work,  limiting agencies’ decision-making options, and making trade-offs more  difficult. On the other hand, attempting to mitigate the effects of an  unpredictable funding stream is not a new challenge for FAA, or for many  other federal agencies that have had to operate in times of an uncertain  fiscal environment.
Stakeholders also indicated that the current budgetary conditions—the  fiscal year 2013 budget sequestration (the across-the-board cancellation  of budgetary resources) along with the associated employee furloughs  and the October 2013 government shutdown—have made FAA’s funding  less predictable. In turn, this can make it difficult for FAA to run a 24/7  operation and maintain the ATC system as part of the transition to  NextGen. In March 2014, we detailed the effects of the fiscal year 2013  budget sequestration on federal agencies, including FAA, such as  reducing or delaying some public services and disrupting some  operations. We found that the DOT took actions to minimize the effects  of sequestration on FAA operations by beginning to plan for it during the  summer of 2012, focusing on ensuring the safety of the traveling public,  according to DOT officials. DOT halted these actions when it was  provided with statutory authority to make a one-time transfer of $253  million between budget accounts to address these issues. As a result of  this transfer, FAA minimized the number of planned furlough days and  restored ATC services and other aviation activities; however, these efforts  did not prevent delays from occurring in major metropolitan areas— including New York, Chicago, and Southern California—according to  FAA, because fewer controllers were available to manage air traffic.
FAA senior management generally agreed with the stakeholders’  perspective that unpredictable budgets make planning and managing the  ATC system and NextGen programs difficult and result in delays and  inefficiencies. The senior managers did not offer specific solutions;  however, they indicated that if FAA received more funding that was  available across fiscal years, rather than just for one fiscal year at a  time, and had a greater ability to move funds between accounts, FAA  would be able to improve its operations and NextGen implementation.
section_title: Improving Human Capital Activities to Meet Future NextGen and Operational Requirements
paragraphs: Consistent with what we have found in the past, the stakeholders and  FAA senior management agree that improving human capital activities is  a challenge for FAA. Forty-two stakeholders identified human capital  activities as a challenge for FAA in improving the efficiency of the ATC  systems and/or implementing NextGen. Among the human capital  challenges the stakeholders identified were matching workforce skills with  FAA needs for hiring and staffing, insufficient training, and planning for  upcoming retirements. FAA senior management also raised human  capital challenges during our discussions with them. For example, one  senior official acknowledged that providing required training is an element  of delivering the full capability of NextGen and is a challenge but that FAA  was working to address this challenge.
We have also reported on FAA’s workforce training and staffing issues in  the past. For example, in August 2013 we found that FAA had been  working to address long-standing challenges associated with involving its  air traffic controller and technician workforce in developing and  implementing NextGen systems, steps that are critical to the successful  implementation of NextGen. In addition, we found that during the  NextGen transition, FAA would need a sufficient number of skilled  controllers who are able to increasingly rely on automation, technicians  who are able to properly maintain and certify both existing and NextGen  systems, and a sufficient acquisitions workforce to successfully acquire  NextGen systems and equipment.
section_title: Implementing New Navigation Procedures
paragraphs: Stakeholders identified challenges in implementing new navigation  procedures, and we have found similar challenges in previous work. A  large percentage of the current U.S. air carrier fleet is equipped to fly  using Performance Based Navigation (PBN) procedures, which are  precise routes that use the Global Positioning System or glide descent  paths (see fig. 4). While 21 stakeholders said the development and  implementation of PBN-related procedures was improving or working  well, almost twice as many, or 41, of the stakeholders said that this   process was not working well or moving too slowly. Even when  stakeholders said that there have been some things working well, such as  successes like the Greener Skies Over Seattle initiative—a satellite- based navigation arrival procedure intended to save aviation system  users more than two million gallons of fuel a year and significantly reduce  aircraft exhaust and emissions—they pointed to other areas where  implementation is taking too long. In April 2013, we found that FAA  continues to face challenges in implementing PBN procedures and in  explaining to stakeholders the benefits that accrue from their use.  Specifically, FAA is not fully leveraging its ability to streamline the  development of PBN procedures and the use of third parties to develop,  test, and maintain these flight procedures.
Senior FAA officials emphasized that their Optimization of Airspace and  Procedures in the Metroplex (OAPM) initiative is yielding good results  and pointed to the successful use of PBN procedures not only in Seattle  but also in the areas around Houston, North Texas, Washington, D.C.,  and Denver. Officials also said that implementing PBN is one of their top  priorities and is part of an effort to deliver near term-benefits and  capabilities to system users by 2016. Officials explained that they are  working on PBN, through several metroplex-based initiatives, and all  parts of the country will not see PBN benefits at the same time.
Consistent with what we have found in previous work, stakeholders told  us that FAA needs to deliver benefits of NextGen in the near term. To  convince aviation system users to make investments in NextGen  equipment, FAA must continue to deliver systems, procedures, and  capabilities that demonstrate near-term benefits and returns on users’  investments. Forty stakeholders identified as a challenge FAA’s inability  to articulate to the industry what NextGen is and what near-term benefits  NextGen is going to provide to users. Similarly, in April 2013, we noted  the need for FAA to demonstrate to stakeholders NextGen benefits over  the next few years. For example, we found that FAA had made some  progress in key operational improvement areas, such as upgrading  airborne traffic management to enhance the flow of aircraft in congested  airspace, revising standards to enhance airport capacity, and focusing  FAA’s PBN efforts at priority OAPM sites with airport operations that  have a large effect on the overall efficiency of the NAS. However, we also  found that in pursuing these near-term benefits, FAA had to make trade- offs in selecting sites and did not fully integrate implementation of its  operational improvement efforts at airports. We concluded that because  of the interdependency of the improvements, their limited integration  could also limit benefits in the near term. Accordingly, we recommended,  among other things, that FAA should proactively identify new PBN  procedures for the NAS, based on NextGen goals and targets, and  evaluate external requests so that FAA can select appropriate solutions  and implement guidelines for ensuring timely inclusion of operational  improvements at metroplexes such as OAPMs. DOT concurred with  these recommendations and is working to address them.
FAA senior managers said they were aware of stakeholders’ desire for  near-term benefits and told us that they either have taken or plan to take  the following steps to address stakeholders’ concerns.
FAA plans to emphasize “high priorities” for users based on  recommendations of two FAA advisory committees—the NextGen  Advisory Committee (NAC) and the RTCA (once called the Radio  Technical Commission for Aeronautics). The high priorities are new  multiple runway operational procedures at 7 airports by fiscal year  2015, PBN procedures at 9 metroplexes and an additional two  metroplexes by October 2014, surface surveillance at 44 airports by  fiscal year 2017, and data communications to provide tower clearance  delivery at 57 airports by fiscal year 2016.
FAA has identified seven NextGen and NextGen-related programs  that will be able to deliver near-term benefits and capabilities by 2016,  with no additional requirements for users to equip their aircraft until  the January 1, 2020, FAA-required deadline for aircraft to be equipped  with ADS-B Out technology.
The FAA Administrator has begun holding quarterly briefings on  NextGen progress and benefits with airline chief executive officers  (CEO); however, senior management noted that the diverse range of  interests within the industry, and even between CEOs and operations  staff within the same company, can make the communication of  NextGen progress and benefits challenging.
According to FAA’s Assistant Administrator for NextGen, in October  2014 FAA will release a road map outlining the official timeline of the  implementation of its NextGen modernization project that will guide  FAA through 2025.
section_title: Maintaining the ATC Infrastructure through the Transition to NextGen while Consolidating or Closing Aging Facilities
paragraphs: Stakeholders and FAA officials agree that a challenge for FAA is to  maintain the ATC infrastructure through the transition to NextGen while  also consolidating or closing aging facilities. Because NextGen  represents a transition from existing ATC systems and facilities to new  systems, it necessitates changes to or consolidation of existing facilities.  Thirty-seven of 76 stakeholders mentioned that consolidating or closing  older air traffic control facilities and the need to maintain older “legacy”  systems was a challenge. Stakeholders noted congressional interest in  preserving ATC facilities and the associated jobs in their districts as a  cause for making it more difficult for FAA to close facilities. FAA officials  acknowledged that reducing the “footprint” of the air traffic control  infrastructure has been difficult but added that they are working on their  first set of facility consolidation recommendations, as required by law, and  will have those recommendations ready by the end of 2014. In August  2013, we found that if aging systems and associated facilities were not  retired, FAA would miss potential opportunities to reduce its overall  maintenance costs at a time when resources needed to maintain both  systems and facilities may become scarcer and recommended that FAA  develop a strategy for implementing the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization’s  (ATO) plans. FAA concurred with this recommendation and is working to  develop such a strategy by September 2014. An example of a facility FAA  plans to close—a very high frequency omnidirectional radio range (VOR)  station—is shown in figure 5.
section_title: Industry Stakeholders Suggested Changes That Could Improve ATC System Performance and Modernization and Identified Issues to Be Considered If ATC Operations Were Separated from FAA
subsections: section_title: Stakeholders Suggested Changes to Improve Performance of ATC Operations and Modernization of the ATC
paragraphs: Overall, while stakeholders generally thought the current ATC system  was operating at least moderately efficiently under FAA’s leadership,  when asked what potential changes, if any, to FAA could improve the  performance of ATC operations and NextGen implementation, 64 of the  76 stakeholders we interviewed suggested changes. The six most often  suggested changes are discussed below. (See app. V for a list and  examples of the changes to FAA that the stakeholders suggested during  our interviews with them.) Some of these changes address the six  challenges raised by stakeholders previously mentioned, while the rest  address other challenges stakeholders identified.
Change how FAA Is Funded. The change suggested by the most  stakeholders (36 of the 64 stakeholders who suggested a change) was to  modify how FAA’s ATC operations and NextGen programs are funded. As  discussed earlier, budget uncertainty was raised by stakeholders as a  challenge for FAA’s ATC operations, NextGen modernization, or both.  While 36 stakeholders said a change to the funding process or source of  funding was needed, most focused on the outcome they would like to  see, namely a more stable or predictable funding stream. Fewer  stakeholders (11) offered specific suggestions on how to achieve this  outcome. For example, one stakeholder suggested providing FAA with a  top-line budget number and then allowing FAA to determine how to  allocate resources based on its priorities. FAA officials suggested  changes to the agency’s funding mechanism that could improve FAA’s  ability to operate the ATC system and implement NextGen, including  allowing FAA the flexibility to use funds for their highest priority areas,  increasing the fees for registering aircraft, and authorizing FAA to use  multi-year funds.
Improve Human Capital Activities. Twenty-four of the 64 stakeholders  who suggested a change suggested human capital improvements.  Stakeholder suggestions included updating the air traffic controller’s  handbook, improving the training air traffic controllers receive on new  technologies, and streamlining the hiring process. For example,  stakeholders said changes were needed to streamline FAA’s air traffic  controller-training programs and to ensure the best applicants are hired,  especially as many current controllers begin to retire. In June 2008, we  reported on FAA’s efforts to hire and train new controllers, in light of the  expected departure, mostly due to retirements, of much of the current air  traffic controller workforce of over 15,000 controllers between 2008 and  2017. We also found FAA needed to ensure that technician- and  controller-training programs were designed to prepare FAA’s workforce to  use NextGen technologies. Regarding updating the air traffic controller’s  handbook, a senior FAA official said that stakeholders do not appreciate  what changing the handbook involves, such as running safety scenarios  and testing new procedures to ensure any changes do not adversely  affect safety. More broadly, another senior FAA official said that shifting to  NextGen would require a cultural change in how air traffic controllers are  trained to respond to traffic.
Improve Internal Collaboration. Twenty-four of the 64 stakeholders who  suggested a change suggested FAA needs to improve internal  collaboration within the organization. Stakeholders said different offices  within FAA do not communicate well with one another and that this  situation has resulted in difficulties and delays in the roll out of NextGen  technologies and procedures. Stakeholder suggestions included  improving how FAA’s lines of business work together to implement  NextGen. In August 2013, we found that FAA is making progress in  ensuring communication on NextGen issues across lines of business, for  example, through the NextGen Management Board and biweekly  program review meetings. In the same report, we also discussed how  designating one leader, such as the Deputy Administrator’s responsibility  over NextGen, can improve interagency collaboration and speed  decision-making. While external stakeholders raised internal  collaboration as an area in need of improvement, FAA senior  management said that there are good working relationships between the  lines of business responsible for ATC operations and NextGen  implementation, especially between the Assistant Administrator of  NextGen, the COO of the ATO, and the Associate Administrator of  Aviation Safety.
Streamline Processes. Twenty-three of the 64 stakeholders suggesting  a change suggested that FAA needs to streamline some of its processes.  Stakeholder suggestions included streamlining the development and  implementation of flight navigation procedures, the certification of new  aircraft equipment, and the acquisition of new technology. For example,  to streamline its process for certifying new technology, one stakeholder  said that FAA should use an approach that recognizes that once a type of  equipment, such as an antenna, is found to be safe, every piece of that  equipment produced does not have to be personally inspected by FAA.  FAA officials said that they are making progress streamlining both the  certification of new technology and development of new procedures;  however, FAA must ensure that new procedures and technology are  evaluated for potential safety and environmental concerns and that  community outreach occurs. In April 2013, we found that FAA’s  processes and requirements, while keeping the U.S. airspace safe, are  also complex and lengthy. This includes the processes for developing  PBN and other new flight navigation procedures. In the April 2013 report,  we also found that FAA had efforts under way to address some of these  issues, such as the Navigation Lean (NAV Lean) initiative, which is  focused on streamlining the implementation and amendment processes  for all flight procedures, but it will be several years before the impact is  known. In June 2014, the Department of Transportation Inspector  General’s office found that aviation stakeholders are unlikely to see the  full benefits of the NAV Lean initiative, namely a reduction in the time it  takes to implement new procedures, until September 2015 or later. In  October 2010 and October 2013, we found inefficiencies in the  certification and approvals process and variations in FAA’s interpretation  of certification standards, and recommended improvements FAA could  make to evaluate and track certification and approval processes. In  October 2013, we also found that while FAA had developed milestones  and deployed a tracking system to monitor each certification-related  initiative, FAA had not identified overall performance metrics for these  efforts to determine whether they would achieve their intended effects.  Ultimately, we concluded that having efficient and consistent certification  processes will allow FAA to better use its resources as its workload  increases with the implementation of NextGen.
Improve Coordination with Industry Stakeholders. Stakeholders  acknowledged the improvements FAA has made in involving stakeholders  in the planning and implementation of NextGen initiatives, especially  through the NextGen Advisory Committee. However, 23 of the 64  stakeholders who suggested a change suggested FAA should do more to  encourage participation and communication with industry stakeholders.  For example, one stakeholder said that while FAA has improved its  collaboration with industry stakeholders, particularly by including a wider  range of stakeholders, FAA needs to ensure that stakeholders are  involved early in the planning process for NextGen initiatives. FAA  officials said that ensuring the appropriate stakeholders are involved in an  effort is a challenge, but noted that FAA has on-going efforts to ensure  the right stakeholders are involved to avoid some of the earlier difficulties  rolling out NextGen programs. Similarly, in April 2013, we found that FAA  is making progress in systematically involving industry stakeholders, air  traffic controllers, and other key subject matter experts in its initiatives,  such as the OAPM initiative. However, we have also recommended areas  for improvement, such as developing and implementing guidelines for  ensuring timely inclusion of appropriate stakeholders, including airport  representatives, in the planning and implementation of NextGen  improvement efforts. DOT concurred with these recommended areas for  improvement and is taking steps to implement the recommendations.
Increase Accountability. Twenty-one of the 64 stakeholders who  suggested a change suggested FAA needs to increase accountability.  Stakeholder suggestions included that FAA should hold its employees  and management accountable for how well they accomplish program and  plan goals and for how funds are spent. For example, one stakeholder  suggested an annual operating plan could help hold FAA accountable to  its performance goals. The need for more accountability at FAA,  specifically regarding the implementation of NextGen, cuts across several  areas we have previously reported on. In February 2014, we found that  complex organizational transformations, such as NextGen, require  substantial leadership commitment over a sustained period and that  leaders must be empowered to make critical decisions and held  accountable for results. In April 2013, we also found that to address  accountability issues, FAA has taken steps, such as designating the  Deputy Administrator as the Chief NextGen Officer with responsibility for  all NextGen activities. In the same report, we also discussed that the use  of performance measures would allow stakeholders to hold FAA  accountable for results.
section_title: While Most Stakeholders Agreed That Separating ATC Operations from FAA Was an Option to Consider, They Identified Several Issues That Would Need to be Taken into Account
paragraphs: In light of the ongoing discussion within the aviation industry on new  approaches for operating and modernizing the ATC system, we also  asked stakeholders about changing the provision of ATC services to  improve ATC efficiency and NextGen implementation. These potential  changes include moving the provision of ATC services out of FAA into a  separate unit or organization and commercializing ATC services as has  been done in Canada. Seventy percent of the stakeholders (53 of 76)  agreed that separating ATC operations out from FAA was an option, but  half of these stakeholders (26) voiced serious reservations or indicated  such a change was unlikely to occur. Stakeholders also cited potential  benefits of separating air traffic control operations from FAA, including a  more predictable funding source; potentially reduced political involvement  in ATC operational decisions; faster and less costly modernization of the  ATC system; and more efficient day-to-day operations. The remaining  stakeholders we interviewed were split between the opinion that a  separate ATC system was not a good idea (12) and either not providing  an opinion on this question or not answering it (11). See table 2 below for  stakeholder responses. Stakeholders also raised several issues that  would need to be taken into account before making changes to the  provision of ATC services.
Further, no stakeholder category was unanimous in either supporting or  rejecting the option to change provision of ATC services. Airlines were  generally more supportive of separating the ATC system from FAA than  labor unions and professional associations. General aviation stakeholders  were open to the idea but had reservations about the funding scheme.  See table 2 for stakeholder responses to this question by industry  category. In addition, FAA officials said that they were not opposed to  privatization or commercialization of the ATC system, but they would  rather focus on what services FAA should provide and what is the best  way to pay for these services.
Few stakeholders suggested a specific alternative structure for the  provision of ATC services, although some listed potential characteristics  of an alternative structure, such as user fees, public-private partnership,  and a board of directors composed of system users. One example of a  specific alternative structure suggested by a stakeholder was a Consumer  Service Corporation with no shareholders, so as to avoid vested interests.  Others suggested models similar to NAV CANADA, a non-profit trust with  a board of representatives made up of industry and government, financed  with user fees, and regulated by government.
Both stakeholders and FAA officials said it was important to identify what  problem or problems separating ATC services out of FAA is intended to  solve, before proceeding with it as a solution. However, if a change were  to be made, 65 of the 76 stakeholders suggested actions to take or raised  issues or concerns to consider. These issues and concerns include the  following:
Funding: Forty of these 65 stakeholders said the source of funding for  a separate air traffic control system is important to consider.  Stakeholders suggested different sources of revenue to support a  separated ATC system including user fees and a fuel tax. Several  stakeholders suggested the possibility of accessing funds through  capital markets as an advantage of a separated ATC system.  Because the expectation of a future revenue stream (through user  fees, for example) may enable a corporatized or privatized ATC  system to access private capital markets (to obtain, for example, a  bond issuance), a potential benefit of such a structure could be more  reliable financing for multiyear investment projects as well as for  operations.
Lessons Learned: Thirty-eight of these 65 stakeholders suggested  studying what the separation of air traffic services from FAA would  look like. Stakeholders suggested looking at how air-navigation  service providers function in other countries and trying to learn from  their successes and mistakes. For example, one stakeholder said that  given the efficiency of the current system, before any changes are  made, there needs to be an analysis of how privatization would affect  passengers, airlines, the aviation industry, and what improvements,  including fewer delays and more capacity, it could offer. In a 2005  review of selected foreign air navigation service providers (ANSP), we  also found some lessons learned during commercialization, including  being prepared to mitigate the financial effects of an industry  downturn; the importance of involving industry stakeholders in efforts  to design, acquire, and deploy new technologies; balancing the  business needs of an ANSP with smaller communities’ need for air  service; and the importance of maintaining appropriate level of staff to  carry out safety regulation.
Congressional involvement: Twenty-nine of these 65 stakeholders  suggested that the extent of Congress’s role in overseeing a separate  ATC system must be clarified. For example, stakeholders said  Congress’s oversight responsibilities of a separate ATC system and  even whether Congress should have oversight of such a system  needs to be considered.
Regulatory coordination: Twenty-seven of these 65 stakeholders  suggested that ensuring coordination between the safety regulator  and a separate ATC system should be considered. Stakeholders  noted, for example, that ensuring coordination might be more difficult  with a separated ATC system than under the current structure.
Governance: Twenty-five of these 65 stakeholders suggested that  governance of a separated ATC system, such as including system  users on an oversight body, needs to be considered. For example,  one stakeholder asked who would be on a board of directors and how  those individuals would be chosen.
Safety: Twenty-four of these 65 stakeholders raised concerns about  safety under a separate ATC system. Stakeholders were concerned  about several issues, including the effect of a non-governmental  operator’s profit motive on safety and whether requiring users to pay a  fee to use air traffic control services may disincentivize use of the  system.
Transition management: Twenty-one of these 65 stakeholders raised  concerns about how to transition from the current system to a  separate ATC system. Stakeholder concerns included the length and  difficulty of such a transition and included questions about what to do  with the infrastructure and personnel in the current system, and the  modernization efforts already under way. FAA senior management  also cited transition management as a potential impediment to moving  to a different air traffic control structure. Specifically, an FAA official  said there does not appear to be an understanding by those  advocating privatization of how to move from a government-operated  system to a privatized system given the need to operate the NAS at a  high level of safety and efficiency. FAA officials also raised concerns  about the length and difficulty of such a transition. For example, one  official mentioned that such a transition to a new organization would  have to include cultural and personnel changes and could take many  years to implement. Another official was concerned that a transition  occurring now to a privatized system could negatively affect the  implementation of NextGen. In November 2002, we found that  successful change management initiatives in large private and public  sector organizations can often take at least 5 to 7 years.
Access: Nineteen of these 65 stakeholders also raised concerns  about access to the NAS under a separate ATC system. For example,  stakeholders were concerned about small communities losing access  to the ATC system and that the fees charged by a separate ATC  system might reduce general aviation’s access to the ATC system.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided DOT with a draft of this report for its review and comment.  DOT provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of the Department of Transportation, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me on (202) 512-2834 or at dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our work for this report focused on aviation stakeholders’ perspectives on  the performance of the air traffic control (ATC) system and efforts to  modernize it. This report examines stakeholder perspectives on: (1) the  performance of the current ATC system and its modernization through the  NextGen initiative, and any challenges the Federal Aviation  Administration (FAA) may face in managing these activities; and (2)  potential changes, if any, that could improve the performance of the ATC  system, including FAA’s modernization initiative. We were also asked to  obtain stakeholders’ perspectives on the safety of the National Airspace  System (NAS). However, since nearly all stakeholders we interviewed  agreed that the NAS is extremely or very safe, we did not focus on this  area in this report.
To obtain aviation stakeholders’ perspectives on these issues, we  interviewed a non-probability sample of 76 aviation stakeholders. We  created an initial list of stakeholders using internal knowledge of the  aviation industry. We then added more stakeholders based on  interviewee responses to our question on whom else they thought we  should speak with. Specifically, we wanted to obtain perspectives from  individuals and organizations with direct experience, as users, or  knowledge, through research or study, of the current ATC system,  modernization efforts, and FAA’s management of the system. As such,  we limited our review to U.S.-based companies and airlines and sought  the views of individuals and organizations with a stake in the performance  of the NAS. We divided stakeholders into the following nine categories:  airlines, airports, aviation experts and other relevant organizations,  general aviation, labor unions and professional associations,  manufacturers and service providers, other federal government agencies  (Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA)), passenger and safety groups, and research and  development organizations. A list of the individuals and groups we  interviewed is in appendix II. We used a semi-structured interview format  with both closed- and open-ended questions to obtain aviation  stakeholder perspectives on the efficiency of the current ATC,  implementation of NextGen, and changes, if any, that could improve the  operation of the ATC and implementation of NextGen. Our interview  format contained four closed-ended questions with either a five-level  scale or a yes/no response. These closed-ended questions, the response  categories, and stakeholder responses are either included in the body of  the report or in appendix III, as appropriate.
The intent of our open-ended questions was to engage the stakeholders  in a conversation about the issues they considered most important and  relevant. The results of our review are not generalizable to the industry as  a whole.
Our discussion of the challenges FAA faces, potential changes to FAA,  and issues to consider if the ATC system were separated from FAA is  based on stakeholder responses to our open-ended questions. As such,  the numbers we reported with these items represent those stakeholders  that raised a challenge or issue to consider or suggested a change during  our interview. When we report that 43 stakeholders raised budget  uncertainty as a challenge, this does not necessarily mean that the  remaining 33 stakeholders we interviewed disagreed. Rather, it means  that those stakeholders did not raise it during the course of our interview.
We analyzed the responses to these open-ended questions to identify the  main themes raised by stakeholders. To ensure the accuracy of our  content analysis, we internally reviewed our coding and reconciled any  discrepancies. In discussing stakeholder responses to our open-ended  questions, we aggregated their responses and reported on stakeholders’  perspectives in general.
Stakeholder responses to the yes-no question: Do you think that  separating the functions of safety regulator and ATC service provider into  separate units or organizations is an option for the United States?—fell  into four general responses, which we describe in this report as yes;  maybe; no; and no opinion. Respondents who answered “yes” to this  question said that separating the ATC service provider from the safety  regulator (FAA) was not only an option, but also a good idea. While these  respondents still provided issues to consider, they said that this option  should be considered and were generally supportive of it. GAO classified  respondents’ answers as “Maybe” for those who answered that this was  an option, but generally said either it was not a good idea, it was not  feasible in the United States, or that they had very strong reservations  about such a change.
Respondents who answered “no” generally said that it was a bad idea or  would simply not work in the United States. Finally, some respondents  indicated that they had “no opinion,” meaning that their organization did  not have an official position on whether this change was an option in the  United States.
We reported on stakeholder responses to this closed-ended question— Do you think that separating the functions of the safety regulator and ATC  service provider into separate units or organizations is an option for the  United States?—by industry category. For the three industry categories  with fewer than four respondents—other federal government agencies,  passenger and safety groups, and research and development  organizations—we combined these into one category and refer to them in  table 2 as Other stakeholders.
To obtain FAA senior management views on the preliminary results of our  content analysis of stakeholder perspectives, we conducted semi- structured interviews with: Administrator; Deputy Administrator/Chief  NextGen Officer; Assistant Administrator for NextGen; Associate  Administrator for Aviation Safety; Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the Air  Traffic Organization (ATO); and Assistant Administrator for Policy,  International Affairs, and Environment.
We reviewed GAO reports and other sources of aviation information to  provide context to the challenges raised by the stakeholders and their  suggested changes to the current structure. We identified reports that had  discussed the stakeholder-identified themes, including collaboration with  stakeholders, delivery of NextGen capabilities, and Performance-Based  Navigation procedures, and FAA leadership in overseeing NextGen  implementation.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2013 to September  2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: List of the 76 Aviation Industry Stakeholders GAO Interviewed
subsections: section_title: Category Airlines
paragraphs: Stakeholder  Airlines for America (A4A)
Cargo Airline Association (CAA)
National Air Carrier Association (NACA)
Regional Airline Association (RAA)
Regional Air Cargo Carriers Association (RACCA)
United Parcel Service (UPS)
Houston Airport System (George Bush Intercontinental Airport, William P. Hobby  Airport, and Ellington Airport)
Los Angeles World Airports (Los Angeles International Airport, LA/Ontario  International Airport, and Van Nuys Airport)
Metropolitan Airports Commission (Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport)
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (John F. Kennedy International  Airport, Newark Liberty International Airport, LaGuardia Airport, Stewart  International Airport, and Teterboro Airport)
Airports Council International—North America (ACI-NA)
American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE)
Bill Ayer, Chair of the NextGen Advisory Committee (NAC)
Air Traffic Control Association (ATCA)
Michael Baiada, President and Chief Executive Officer, ATH Group  Gary Church, President, Aviation Management Associates  Dr. George Donohue, Systems Engineering and Operations Research, George  Mason University  Michael Dyment, Managing Partner, NEXA Capital Partners, LLC  Amr ElSawy, President and Chief Executive Officer, Noblis Inc.
section_title: Category
paragraphs: Dr. Mark Hansen, Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of California,  Berkley   Dr. John Hansman, Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of  Technology  Robert Poole, Director of Transportation Policy, Reason Foundation   RTCA (formerly known as the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics)
Dr. Stephen Van Beek, Vice President, ICF International  J. Randolph Babbitt, Former Administrator (2009-2011)
Russell Chew, Former Chief Operations Officer, Air Traffic Organization (2003- 2007)
Richard Day, Former Senior Vice President of Operations, Air Traffic Organization  (2008-2010)
David Grizzle, Former Chief Operations Officer, Air Traffic Organization (2011- 2013)
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA)
Helicopter Association International (HAI)
National Air Transportation Association (NATA)
National Business Aviation Association (NBAA)
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)
Allied Pilots Association (APA)
Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA)
National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA)
NetJets Association of Shared Aircraft Pilots (NJASAP)
Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS)
Southwest Airlines Pilots’ Association (SWAPA)
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)
Aircraft Electronics Association (AEA)
General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA)
section_title: Category
paragraphs: United Technologies (UTC) Aerospace Systems  Department of Defense (DOD)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Travelers United (formerly Consumer Travel Alliance)
MITRE Center for Advanced Aviation System Development (CAASD)
section_title: Appendix III: Responses to GAO’s Closed- Ended Question on Safety
paragraphs: This rating was not given to the stakeholders as a choice; however, the stakeholders’ answers fell  between these categories.
section_title: Appendix IV: List of Challenges FAA Faces in Improving the Efficiency of the Air Traffic Control (ATC) System and Implementing NextGen, as Raised by the 76 Aviation Industry Stakeholders GAO Interviewed
paragraphs: Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders  Due to the expense and uncertainty over FAA’s ability to meet  timelines for deploying NextGen technologies users have been  reluctant to equip their aircraft   Budget uncertainty makes it difficult for FAA to continue operation of  an efficient ATC system and/or implement NextGen  FAA does not match workforce skills with needs for hiring and  staffing, provides insufficient training, and has insufficient planning  for upcoming retirements  FAA’s development and implementation of PBN-related procedures  is not working well or is moving too slowly.
FAA must continue to deliver systems, procedures, and capabilities  that demonstrate near-term benefits and returns on users’  investments to convince aviation system users to make investments  in NextGen equipment.
FAA must plan for changes to or consolidation of existing facilities  because NextGen represents a transition from existing ATC systems  and facilities to new systems.
FAA’s offices are stove-piped, do not share information with each  other well, or are not horizontally integrated.
FAA’s aversion to risk and focus on safety prevents improvements in  efficiency and adoption of new technologies and procedures.
FAA does not handle ATC operations well when airspace capacity is  affected by congestion and disruptions due to, for example,  inclement weather and power outages.
Congress politicizes FAA’s budget and micromanages FAA  operations.
FAA’s organizational structure misplaces offices and blurs lines of  authority and responsibilities.
FAA does not communicate, coordinate, or collaborate well with the  aviation industry.
FAA does not plan well, such as setting unrealistic deadlines, or its  plans lack clarity and precision.
FAA’s leadership and political appointees lack the right professional  background and experience.
FAA does not operate airport surface operations well to  accommodate increased air capacity or maintain surface  infrastructure well.
FAA’s policies and procedures are not up-to-date or lack clarity.
FAA controllers in different regions and airports are not consistent in  applying procedures, such as approach and departure procedures.
There is little accountability in FAA, such as for NextGen delays.
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders  FAAs’ process for certifying safety, aircraft, avionics, and personnel  takes too long, or is inconsistent.
FAA lacks adequate performance measures or its measures are  output-related, instead of outcome-related.
section_title: Appendix V: List of Changes to FAA to Improve the Efficiency of the Air Traffic Control (ATC) System or the Implementation of NextGen, or Both, as Cited by the 76 Aviation Industry Stakeholders GAO Interviewed
paragraphs: Examples of suggested changes  FAA needs a more stable or predictable funding stream.
FAA needs to improve human capital activities including updating the air traffic  controller handbook, improving the training air traffic controllers receive on new  technologies, and streamlining the hiring process.
FAA needs to improve communication within the agency to reduce difficulties and  delays in the roll out of NextGen technologies and procedures.
Streamline processes  FAA needs to streamline the development and implementation of flight navigation  procedures, the certification of new aircraft equipment, and the acquisition of new  technology.
While FAA has made improvements involving stakeholders in the planning and  implementation of NextGen initiatives, FAA should do more to encourage participation  and communication with industry stakeholders.
FAA should hold its employees and management accountable for how well they  accomplish program and plan goals and for how funds are spent.
There needs to be consistent and empowered leadership at FAA.
FAA needs to ensure that all NextGen activities are overseen by one NextGen office.
FAA needs to create relevant performance measures that measure improvements  resulting from the implementation of NextGen.
FAA needs to focus on delivering NextGen capabilities with near-term benefits.
FAA needs to reconsider how it oversees the industry and/or reduce its layers of  oversight.
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Catherine Colwell, Assistant  Director; Amy Abramowitz; Sarah Arnett; William Colwell; Kevin Egan;  Sam Hinojosa; David Hooper; Stuart Kaufman; Jennifer Kim; Josh  Ormond; Amy Rosewarne; and Rebecca Rygg made key contributions to  this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: FAA Reauthorization Act: Progress and Challenges Implementing Various  Provisions of the 2012 Act. GAO-14-285T. Washington, D.C.: February 5,  2014.
National Airspace System: Improved Budgeting Could Help FAA Better  Determine Future Operations and Maintenance Priorities. GAO-13-693.  Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2013.
NEXTGEN Air Transportation System: FAA Has Made Some Progress in  Midterm Implementation, but Ongoing Challenges Limit Expected  Benefits. GAO-13-264. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2013.
Next Generation Air Transportation System: FAA Faces Implementation  Challenges. GAO-12-1011T. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2012.
Air Traffic Control Modernization: Management Challenges Associated  with Program Costs and Schedules Could Hinder NextGen  Implementation. GAO-12-223. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2012.
Next Generation Air Transportation: Collaborative Efforts with European  Union Generally Mirror Effective Practices, but Near-term Challenges  Could Delay Implementation. GAO-12-48. Washington, D.C.: November  3, 2011.
Next Generation Air Transportation System: FAA Has Made Some  Progress in Implementation, but Delays Threaten to Impact Costs and  Benefits. GAO-12-141T. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2011.
NEXTGEN Air Transportation System: Mechanisms for Collaboration and  Technology Transfer Could Be Enhanced to More Fully Leverage Partner  Agency and Industry Resources. GAO-11-604. Washington, D.C.: June  30, 2011.
subsections: section_title: Aviation Safety and Certification
paragraphs: Aviation Safety: Status of Recommendations to Improve FAA’s  Certification and Approval Processes. GAO-14-142T. Washington, D.C.:  October 30, 2013.
section_title: Facilities
paragraphs: FAA Facilities: Improved Condition Assessment Methods Could Better  Inform Maintenance Decisions and Capital-Planning Efforts. GAO-13-757.  Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2013.
section_title: International Air Navigation Service Providers
paragraphs: Air Traffic Control: Characteristics and Performance of Selected  International Air Navigation Service Providers and Lessons Learned from  Their Commercialization. GAO-05-769. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005.