Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention
Published: 2005-04-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Sharing information with nonfederal officials is an important tool in federal efforts to secure the nation's ports against a potential terrorist attack. The Coast Guard has lead responsibility in coordinating maritime information sharing efforts. The Coast Guard has established area maritime security committees--forums that involve federal and nonfederal officials who identify and address risks in a port. The Coast Guard and other agencies have sought to further enhance information sharing and port security operations by establishing interagency operational centers--command centers that tie together the efforts of federal and nonfederal participants. GAO was asked to review the efforts to see what impact the committees and interagency operational centers have had on improving information sharing and to identify any barriers that have hindered information sharing.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Area maritime security committees provide a structure that improves information sharing among port security stakeholders. At the four port locations GAO visited, federal and nonfederal stakeholders said that the newly formed committees were an improvement over previous information sharing efforts. The types of information shared included assessments of vulnerabilities at port locations and strategies the Coast Guard intends to use in protecting key infrastructure. The three interagency operational centers established to date allow for even greater information sharing because the centers operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis, and they receive real-time information from data sources such as radars and sensors. The Coast Guard is planning to develop its own centers--called sector command centers--at up to 40 additional port locations to monitor information and to support its operations. The relationship between the interagency operational centers and the planned expansion of sector command centers remains to be determined. The major barrier hindering information sharing has been the lack of federal security clearances for nonfederal members of committees or centers. By February 2005--or 4 months after the Coast Guard developed a list of 359 committee members who needed a security clearance--28 of the 359 members had submitted the necessary paperwork for a security clearance. Coast Guard field officials did not clearly understand that they were responsible for contacting nonfederal officials about the clearance process. To deal with this, in early April 2005, the Coast Guard issued guidance to field offices that clarified their role. In addition, the Coast Guard did not have formal procedures that called for the use of data to monitor application trends. Developing such procedures would aid in identifying deficiencies in the future. As the Coast Guard proceeds with its program, another way to improve the submission of paperwork involves educating nonfederal officials about the clearance process.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Securing the nation’s ports against a potential terrorist attack has become  one of the nation’s security priorities since the terrorist attacks of  September 11, 2001. Factors that make ports vulnerable to a terrorist  attack include their location near major urban centers, such as New York  and Los Angeles; their inclusion of critical infrastructure such as oil  refineries and terminals; and their economic importance for the nation’s  economy and trade. Although no port-related terrorist attacks have  occurred in the United States, internationally terrorists have demonstrated  their ability to access and destroy infrastructure, assets, and lives in and  around seaports. According to the Coast Guard, a major port closure for 1  month could cost tens of billions of dollars, disrupting trade and the U.S.  economy as a whole.
Given that ports are sprawling enterprises that often cross jurisdictional  boundaries, the need to share information among federal, state, and local  agencies is central to effective prevention and response. The Homeland  Security Act of 2002, which provided the basis for federal efforts against  terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, underscores the  importance of sharing timely, effective, and useful information to enhance  the shared partnership among federal, state, and local entities in the fight  against terrorism. The act recognizes that sharing information with state  and local officials can improve the capability of nonfederal officials to  deter, prevent, or disrupt a possible terrorist attack.
Since the terrorist attacks, the federal government has taken a number of  approaches designed to enhance information sharing. One of these  approaches, called for under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of  2002 (MTSA), was to provide the Coast Guard with authority for creating  area maritime security committees at the port level. These committees— which were to include representatives from the federal, state, local, and  private sectors—were intended as a way to identify and deal with  vulnerabilities in and around ports, as well as to provide a forum for  sharing information on issues related to port security. Much of the  federally generated information about port security—such as assessments  of specific port vulnerabilities or information about potential threats being  monitored—is classified national security information and cannot be  released, even to law enforcement personnel, if they have not undergone  the necessary federal background checks and received a security  clearance. Lacking access to such information, nonfederal officials may be  at a disadvantage in their efforts to respond to or combat a terrorist threat.
As another approach to improving information sharing and port security  operations, various federal agencies, including the Department of  Homeland Security (through the U.S. Coast Guard), the Department of the  Navy, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), have developed interagency  operational centers at certain port locations. These centers are command  posts that tie together the intelligence and operational efforts of various  federal and nonfederal participants. They currently exist in three  locations: Charleston, South Carolina; Norfolk, Virginia; and San Diego,  California. Congress has expressed interest in knowing more about the  applicability of such centers in other locations, and it required the Coast  Guard to submit a report by February 2005 that describes, among other  things, the number of ports that could benefit from such centers and the  associated cost of implementing them.
The experience gleaned to date from both of these approaches to  improving information sharing represents an opportunity that could help  guide future efforts to improve port security. Therefore, we examined the  efforts of the Coast Guard and other federal agencies in improving  information sharing between and among federal, state, local, and industry  stakeholders. This report addresses the following questions:    What impact have area maritime security committees had on  information sharing?
What impact have interagency operational centers had on information  sharing?
What barriers, if any, have hindered improvements in information  sharing among port security stakeholders?
To answer these questions, we focused much of our work at the port level.  To review the activities of area maritime security committees, we selected  four ports for detailed review. These four ports—Baltimore, Maryland;  Charleston, South Carolina; Houston, Texas; and Seattle, Washington— were selected to reflect various coastal regions and a wide range of  volume and types of operations. To review the activities of the interagency  operational centers, we visited all three centers currently in operation,  discussing ways in which the centers operate with both federal and  nonfederal participants as well as observing operations at the centers.  During our visits, we talked with Coast Guard officials involved in sharing  information and we also discussed information sharing issues with  numerous nonfederal stakeholders, including private sector officials and  officials from port authorities or local law enforcement. We examined in  more detail the Coast Guard’s procedures for processing security  clearances for members of area maritime security committees. We also  reviewed legislation and congressional committee reports related to  information sharing, reviewed numerous other documents and reports on  the issue, and spoke with officials at the Coast Guard and the Federal  Bureau of Investigation (FBI) about their approaches to sharing  information with nonfederal entities. See appendix I for further  explanation of our scope and methodology. Our work, which was  conducted between May 2004 and March 2005, was done in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Ports Are Important and Vulnerable
paragraphs: Ports play an important role in the nation’s economy and security. Ports  are used to import and export cargo worth hundreds of billions of dollars,  generating jobs, both directly and indirectly, for Americans and our  trading partners. Ports, which include inland waterways, are used to move  bulk agricultural, mineral, petroleum, and paper products. In addition,  ports are also used to move cargo containers (as shown in fig. 1)—one of  the most important segments of global commerce, accounting for 90  percent of the world’s maritime cargo. In 2002, approximately 7 million  containers arrived in U.S. seaports, carrying more than 95 percent of the  nation’s non-North American trade by weight and 75 percent by value.  Ports also contribute to the economy through recreational activities such  as boating, fishing, and cruises. As an indication of the economic  importance of ports, a 2002 simulation of a terrorist attack at a port led to  the temporary closure of every seaport in the United States and resulted in  an estimated loss of $58 billion in revenue to the U.S. economy, including  spoilage, loss of sales, manufacturing slowdowns, and halts in production.  Ports are also important to national security because they host naval bases  and vessels, facilitate the movement of military equipment, and supply  troops deployed overseas.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the nation’s 361 seaports have  been increasingly viewed as potential targets for future terrorist attacks.  Ports are vulnerable because they are sprawling, interwoven with complex  transportation networks, close to crowded metropolitan areas, and easily  accessible. Ports and their maritime approaches facilitate a unique  freedom of movement and flow of goods while allowing people, cargo, and  vessels to transit with relative anonymity. Because of their accessibility,  ports are vulnerable to a wide variety of types of attacks. Cargo  containers—mentioned above as important to maritime commerce—are a  potential conduit for terrorists to smuggle weapons of mass destruction or  other dangerous materials into the country. Finally, ports contain a  number of specific facilities that could be targeted by terrorists, including  military vessels and bases, cruise ships, passenger ferries, terminals, dams  and locks, factories, office buildings, power plants, refineries, sports  complexes, and other critical infrastructure.
section_title: Multiple Jurisdictions Are Involved in Securing the Nation’s Ports
paragraphs: The responsibility for protecting ports from a terrorist attack is a shared  responsibility that crosses jurisdictional boundaries, with federal, state,  and local organizations involved. For example, at the federal level, the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has overall homeland security  responsibility, and the Coast Guard, an agency of the department, has lead  responsibility for maritime security. Other federal departments that may  be involved include the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOJ. The Coast  Guard and other federal agencies share their security responsibilities with  several local stakeholder groups. Some port authorities, operated privately  or by the state or local government, have responsibility for protecting  certain facilities in and around ports. Port authorities provide protection  through designated port police forces, private security companies, and  coordination with local law enforcement agencies. Private sector  stakeholders play a major role in identifying and addressing the  vulnerabilities in and around their facilities, which may include oil  refineries, cargo facilities, and other property adjacent to navigable  waterways.
section_title: Information Sharing Is Important to Port Security Activities
paragraphs: Information sharing among federal, state, and local officials is central to  port security activities. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and several  congressionally chartered commissions call attention to the importance of  sharing information among officials from multiple jurisdictions as a way to  prevent or respond to a terrorist attack. The act recognizes that the  federal government relies on state and local personnel to help protect  against terrorist attacks, and these officials need homeland security  information to prevent and prepare for such attacks. One of the  congressionally chartered commissioned reports—the 9/11 Commission  Report—placed emphasis on the importance of sharing information  among federal and nonfederal entities as a means of deterring a terrorist  attack in the future. In January 2005, we designated information sharing  for homeland security as a high-risk area because the federal government  still faces formidable challenges in gathering, identifying, analyzing, and  disseminating key information within and among federal and nonfederal  entities.
Information sharing between federal officials and nonfederal officials can  involve information collected by federal intelligence agencies. In order to  gain access to classified information, state and local law enforcement  officials generally need to apply for and receive approval to have a federal  security clearance. Presidential Executive Order 12968, Access to  Classified Information, dated August 1995, established federal criteria for  granting access to classified information. As implemented by the Coast  Guard, the primary criterion for granting access to classified information  is an individual’s “need to know,” which is defined as the determination  made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective  recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to  perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function. To  obtain a security clearance, an applicant must complete a detailed  questionnaire that asks for information on all previous employment,  residences, and foreign travel and contacts that reach back 7 years. After  submitting the questionnaire, the applicant then undergoes a variety of  screenings and checks by the Coast Guard Security Center. The Office of  Personnel Management conducts background investigations on the  applicant.
section_title: Area Maritime Security Committees Are Established to Facilitate Information Sharing between Port Security Stakeholders
paragraphs: The Maritime Transportation Security Act, passed in the aftermath of the  September 11 attacks and with the recognition that ports contain many  potential security targets, provided for area maritime security committees  to be established by the Coast Guard at ports across the country. A  primary goal of these committees is to assist the local Captain of the  Port—the senior Coast Guard officer who leads the committee—to  develop a security plan—called an area maritime security plan—to  address the vulnerabilities and risks in that port zone. In developing these  plans, the committees serve as forums to communicate with stakeholders  from federal agencies, state and local governments, law enforcement, and  private industries in an effort to gain a comprehensive perspective of  security issues at a port location. The committees also serve as a link for  communicating threats and disseminating security information to port  stakeholders. In all, the Coast Guard ultimately organized 43 area maritime  security committees, covering the nation’s 361 ports. Besides the Coast  Guard, federal agencies such as the Customs and Border Protection, FBI,  or Maritime Administration may be part of the committee. State, local, and  industry members could include officials from port authorities, oil  refineries, and local police or fire departments. Appendix II lists the  various stakeholder groups that may be eligible.
To supplement the statutory and regulatory framework of the committees,  the Coast Guard developed specific guidelines on communication and  collaboration among committee members. This guidance emphasizes the  importance of information in successfully implementing security measures  and recognizes that the committee structure allows stakeholders to  identify other federal, state, and local agencies that are simultaneously  developing security standards for other critical infrastructure, such as  bridges and airports. The guidance tasks the committee with developing  information sharing procedures for various situations, including relaying  instances of suspicious activity to appropriate authorities and  communicating to port stakeholders threat information, among other  things.
section_title: Interagency Operational Centers Involve Multiple Participants and Offer Another Means of Improving Information Sharing
paragraphs: Another approach at improving information sharing and port security  operations involves interagency operational centers—command centers  that bring together the intelligence and operational efforts of various  federal and nonfederal participants. These centers provide intelligence  information and real-time operational data from sensors, radars, and  cameras at one location to federal and nonfederal participants 24 hours a  day. The three current centers are in Charleston, South Carolina; Norfolk,  Virginia; and San Diego, California. Two of the centers (Norfolk and   San Diego) are located in ports that have a substantial number of vessels  and facilities operated by the Department of the Navy. The third center  (Charleston) is located at a port that moves military equipment in and out  of the port, and it is a major container cargo port.
The development of interagency operational centers represents an effort  to improve awareness of incoming vessels, port facilities, and port  operations. In general, these centers are jointly operated by federal and  nonfederal law enforcement officials. The centers can have command and  control capabilities that can be used to communicate information to  vessels, aircraft, and other vehicles and stations involved in port security  operations.
section_title: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and Supports, National- Level Intelligence Infrastructure
paragraphs: While area maritime security committees and interagency operational  centers are port-level organizations, they are supported by, and provide  support to, a national-level intelligence infrastructure. National-level  departments and agencies in the intelligence and law enforcement  communities may offer information that ultimately could be useful to  members of area maritime security committees or interagency operational  centers at the port level. These intelligence and law enforcement agencies  conduct maritime threat identification and dissemination efforts in  support of tactical and operational maritime and port security efforts, but  most have missions broader than maritime activities as well. In addition,  some agencies also have regional or field offices involved in information  gathering and sharing. See appendix III for a description of the  departments and agencies or components involved in maritime  information sharing at the national and port levels.
section_title: Area Maritime Security Committees Have Improved Information Sharing
paragraphs: Area maritime security committees have improved information sharing  among port security stakeholders, and made improvements in the  timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information. The types of  information shared include assessments of vulnerabilities at specific port  locations, information about potential threats or suspicious activities, and  strategies the Coast Guard intends to use in protecting key infrastructure.  These efforts at sharing information generally did not exist prior to the  creation of area maritime security committees. At the ports we visited, the  collaboration and sharing of information between committee members  reflected the different types of stakeholders and variations in the  information needs of each port location. While improvements were noted,  it is too early to determine if any one port has developed a better structure  for information sharing than another, because the committees have only  been operating for just over a year.
subsections: section_title: Ports Reviewed Showed Improvements in Timeliness, Completeness, and Usefulness of Shared Information
paragraphs: Area maritime security committees have provided a structure to improve  the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information sharing. For  example, a primary function served by the committees was to develop  security plans for port areas—called area maritime security plans. The  goal of these plans was to identify vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack in  and around a port location and to develop strategies for protecting a wide  range of facilities and infrastructure (as shown in fig. 2). In doing so, the  committees established new procedures for sharing information by  holding meetings on a regular basis, issuing electronic bulletins on  suspicious activities around port facilities, and sharing key documents,  including vulnerability assessments and the portwide security plan itself,  according to committee participants. These activities did not exist prior to  the creation of the committees, and they have contributed to the  improvements in information sharing. The area maritime security plan  provides a framework for communication and coordination among port  stakeholders and law enforcement officials, and identifies strategies for  reducing vulnerabilities to security threats in and near ports. It is designed  to capture the information necessary to coordinate and communicate  security procedures at each maritime security level, complement and  encompass facility and vessel security plans, and ultimately be integrated  into the National Maritime Security Plan. Coast Guard officials and  nonfederal stakeholders we contacted agreed that efforts such as these  have improved information sharing.
Committee participants we spoke with noted that an essential component  that has improved the timeliness of information sharing has been the  development of both formal and informal stakeholder networks resulting  from the formation of area maritime security committees. As part of the  process for developing the plan, the committee identifies critical  stakeholders and assembles their contact information, allowing for timely  dissemination of relevant information. For example, in the event the Coast  Guard learns of a potential and credible threat, the committee would  designate who should be contacted, the order in which members should  be contacted, and what information the committee provides or receives.  Participants in the committees told us that the interactions of committee  members have also led to the formation of informal stakeholder networks  as committee members encounter other stakeholders with similar  concerns and perspectives. The committee also provides a forum for real- time sharing of information between stakeholders through meetings or  electronic communications. For example, our discussions with federal and  nonfederal officials at the ports of Charleston and Houston indicated that  committee members representing private industries were granted access  to daily information bulletins that they had not received prior to the  formation of area maritime security committees, and these information  bulletins have allowed them to stay informed of important Coast Guard  decisions. In Houston, the Captain of the Port has used such bulletins to  notify and inform local stakeholders of unannounced drills, changes in  security levels, and Coast Guard guidance for vessel inspections and  voluntary screening. In Charleston, bulletins have been used to share  information on closure of waterways, release of new regulations, and  methods for preventing a possible terrorist attack.
At the ports we visited, committee members noted that their participation  has allowed them to disseminate more complete information and receive  more useful information in return. Committee members representing the  private sector at two of the ports we visited noted an increased willingness  to disclose vulnerabilities to federal stakeholders with confidence that the  information would be protected. Coast Guard officials noted that access to  more complete information regarding vulnerabilities and threats at  individual facilities has aided them in mitigating risks. Additionally, having  a complete view of vulnerabilities at the port as a whole has been useful in  identifying gaps and common security needs. For example, while private  sector stakeholders are sharing their written assessments of their  vulnerabilities with the Coast Guard, the Coast Guard is, in turn, sharing  its strategies for the overall protection of ports against potential terrorist  activities. State and local port authority operators and private sector  stakeholders commented that the committees have increased their  awareness of security issues around the port and that information received  from the Coast Guard has been useful in identifying and addressing  security concerns at their facilities. Efforts at sharing information prior to  the creation of area maritime security committees had not produced such  effects.
section_title: Committees Have Flexibility in Their Structure and in the Way in Which They Share Information
paragraphs: While the committees are required to follow the same guidance regarding  their structure, purpose, and processes, each of the committees is allowed  the flexibility to assemble and operate in a way that reflects the needs of  its port area. Each port is unique in many ways, including the geographic  area covered and the type of operations that take place there. These port- specific differences influence the number of members that participate, the  types of state and local organizations that members represent, and the way  in which information is shared.
One aspect of this flexibility is the way in which information is channeled  to specific stakeholders. The representation of various stakeholders on a  committee can cause differences in the type of information that is shared.  While committee members from federal agencies may have access to  classified information because they have obtained a security clearance,  other members may receive a sanitized version of the information or be  restricted from participating in certain committee meetings. To mitigate  this situation, some committees have formed subcommittees that deal  with classified materials such as intelligence reports or details of military  deployments. The role stakeholders play in protecting strategic assets or  the type of cargo they handle may also affect what types of information  they receive as well as what types of information they can share with the  committee at large. For example, at one port we visited, the details  regarding a shipment of a sensitive material were restricted to committee  members that had a direct involvement in the operation.
The committees also show marked differences in how their meetings  occur, and these differences in turn affect the specific ways in which  information is shared. For example, at Baltimore, officials told us that  committee meetings are open to the general port community and can draw  over 80 participants in addition to the 48 committee members. Coast  Guard officials told us that such a large attendance made it difficult to  conduct committee business. To include all interested stakeholders in the  information network while maintaining a working structure for the  committee, the Captain of the Port designated 17 members to an executive  committee, while the remaining 31 members served on a general  committee. This structure allowed the committee to incorporate a large  amount of stakeholder input and to share information with all interested  parties while keeping the decision making duties of the committee at a  manageable level. In contrast to Baltimore’s 48 members, the Puget Sound  area maritime security committee consists of 25 members who each share  in decision making. The smaller committee allows for greater familiarity  amongst members as well as immediate decision making at meetings  because stakeholders with decision making authority are all present.
At least two of the other committees we reviewed leveraged existing  information sharing networks, such as trade and industry associations, by  having Coast Guard officials participate in these groups. For example, at  Charleston, Coast Guard officials noted that many of the stakeholders  included on the area maritime security committee were already members  of a local maritime association that had been operating since 1926.  Officials from the Coast Guard and other federal agencies are members of  the association and use the group’s meetings as one way of sharing  information with stakeholders. Coast Guard officials noted that while this  approach may reduce the role and level of participation in the committee,  it avoids duplication of efforts and allows the committee to be part of a  broader information sharing network. At the port of Houston, the strong  presence of the petrochemical industry also made sharing information  easier since an association of petrochemical companies was already in  place, according to local petrochemical and Coast Guard officials.
Regardless of the structures and communication networks a committee  adopted, stakeholders at all four locations we reviewed agreed that the  committees fostered improved information sharing. We were not able,  however, to determine if any of these structures worked better than others  for two reasons. First, the different structures reflected the specific needs  of each port location. Second, the committees are still in their early stages  of operation and more time will be needed before any comparative  assessments can be made.
section_title: Interagency Operational Centers Have Also Improved Information Sharing
paragraphs: Interagency operational centers—command centers where officials from  multiple agencies can receive data 24 hours a day on maritime activities— have further improved information sharing at three locations. According to  participants at each of these centers, the improvements come mainly from  the 24-hour coverage and greater amount of real-time, operational data,  which the centers can use in their role as command posts for coordinating  multi-agency efforts. The Coast Guard is developing plans to develop its  own centers, called sector command centers, as part of an effort to  reorganize and improve its awareness of the maritime domain. Some of  these sector command centers may be interagency on either a regular or  an ad hoc basis. However, the potential relationship between interagency  operational centers and the Coast Guard’s new sector command centers  remains to be determined, pending a Coast Guard report to Congress.
subsections: section_title: Centers Process and Share Information on Operations
paragraphs: Information sharing at the three existing interagency operational centers  (Charleston, Norfolk, and San Diego), represents a step toward further  improving information sharing, according to participants at all three  centers. They said area maritime security committees have improved  information sharing primarily through a planning process that identifies  vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies, as well as through development of  two-way communication mechanisms to share threat information on an as- needed basis. In contrast, interagency operational centers can provide  continuous information about maritime activities and involve various  agencies directly in operational decisions using this information. Radar,  sensors, and cameras offer representations of vessels and facilities. Other  data are available from intelligence sources, including data on vessels,  cargo, and crew. For example:  In Charleston, four federal agencies (DOJ, Coast Guard, U.S. Customs  and Border Protection, and U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement) coordinate in a unified command structure, and each of  these agencies feeds information into the center. Eight state or local  agencies (such as the county sheriff and the state’s law enforcement  division) have participants at the center full-time, and eight others  participate on an as-needed or part-time basis. Federal and nonfederal  officials told us that information sharing has improved, since  participants from multiple agencies are colocated with each other and  work together to identify potential threats by sharing information.
In San Diego, the center is located in a Coast Guard facility that  receives information from radars and sensors operated by the Navy and  cameras operated by the local harbor patrol. Local harbor patrol  officials are colocated with Coast Guard and Navy personnel. Harbor  patrol and Coast Guard staff said the center has leveraged their  resources through the use of shared information.
In Norfolk, the center is staffed with Coast Guard and Navy personnel  and receives information from cameras and radars. A Coast Guard  Field Intelligence Support Team is colocated at the center and shares  information related to the large concentration of naval and commercial  vessels in and around the port area with Navy and Coast Guard  personnel. According to Coast Guard officials, having a central location  where two agencies can receive data from multiple sources on a 24- hour-a-day basis has helped improve information sharing.
Greater information sharing among participants at these centers has also  enhanced operational collaboration, according to participants. Unlike the  area maritime security committees, these centers are operational in  nature—that is, they have a unified or joint command structure designed  to receive information and act on it. In the three centers, representatives  from the various agencies work side by side, each having access to  databases and other sources of information from their respective agencies.  The various information sources can be reviewed together, and the  resulting information can be more readily fused together. Officials said  such centers help leverage the resources and authorities of the respective  agencies. For example, federal and nonfederal participants collaborate in  vessel boarding, cargo examination, and other port security  responsibilities, such as enforcing security zones (as shown in fig. 3). If the  Coast Guard determines that a certain vessel should be inspected on  maritime safety grounds and intends to board it, other federal and  nonfederal agencies might join in the boarding to assess the vessel or its  cargo, crew, or passengers for violations relating to their areas of  jurisdiction or responsibility.
section_title: Variations across Centers Affect Information Sharing
paragraphs: The types of information and the way information is shared varies at the  three centers, depending on their purpose and mission, leadership and  organization, membership, technology, and resources, according to  officials at the centers. The Charleston center has a port security purpose,  so its missions are all security related. It is led by DOJ, and its membership  includes 4 federal agencies and 16 state and local agencies. The San Diego  center has a more general purpose, so it has multiple missions to include,  not just port security, but search and rescue, environmental response,  drug interdiction, and other law enforcement activities. It is led by the  Coast Guard, and its membership includes two federal agencies and one  local agency. The Norfolk center has a port security purpose, but its  mission focuses primarily on force protection for the Navy. It is led by the  Coast Guard, and its membership includes two federal agencies and no  state or local agencies. As a result, the Charleston center shares  information that focuses on law enforcement and intelligence related to  port security among a very broad group of federal, state, and local agency  officials. The San Diego center shares information on a broader scope of  activities (beyond security) among a smaller group of federal and local  agency officials. The Norfolk center shares the most focused information  (security information related to force protection) among two federal  agencies. While the Norfolk center officials said they were planning to  broaden the scope of their purpose, mission, and membership, they had  not done so at the time of our visit.
The centers also share different information because of their technologies  and resources. The San Diego and Norfolk centers have an array of  standard and new Coast Guard technology systems and access to Coast  Guard and various national databases, while the Charleston center has  these as well as additional systems and databases. For example, the  Charleston center has access to and shares information on Customs and  Border Protection’s databases on incoming cargo containers from the  National Targeting Center. In addition, Charleston has a pilot project with  the Department of Energy to test radiation detection technology, which  provides additional information to share. The Charleston center is funded  by a special appropriation that allows it to use federal funds to pay for  state and local agency salaries. This arrangement boosts the participation  of state and local agencies, and thus information sharing beyond the  federal government, according to port stakeholders in Charleston. While  the San Diego center also has 24-hour participation by the local harbor  patrol, that agency pays its own salaries.
section_title: Other Ad Hoc Arrangements for Interagency Information Sharing
paragraphs: In addition to the three interagency operational centers we visited, our  work has identified other interagency arrangements that facilitate  information sharing and interagency operations in the maritime  environment. One example is a predesignated single-mission task force,  which becomes operational when needed. DHS established the Homeland  Security Task Force, South-East—a working group consisting of federal  and nonfederal agencies with appropriate geographic and jurisdictional  responsibilities that have the mission to respond to any mass migration of  immigrants affecting southeast Florida. Task force members (both  agencies and individuals) are predesignated, and they have a contingency  plan (called Vigilant Sentry) that describes each agency’s specific  coordination and mission responsibilities. The task force meets regularly  to monitor potential migration events, update the contingency plan, and  otherwise coordinate its activities. When a mass migration event occurs,  the task force is activated and becomes a full-time interagency effort to  share information and coordinate operations to implement the  contingency plan. This task force was activated in February 2004 to  implement Operation Able Sentry to interdict a mass migration from Haiti.
Another example of an interagency arrangement for information sharing  can occur in single-agency operational centers that become interagency to  respond to specific events. For example, the Coast Guard has its own  command centers for both its District Seven and Sector Miami. While  these centers normally focus on a variety of Coast Guard missions and are  not normally interagency in structure, they have established protocols  with other federal agencies, such as Customs and Border Protection and  Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to activate a unified or incident  command structure should it be needed. For example, the interagency  Operation Able Sentry (discussed above) was directed from the Coast  Guard’s District Seven command center. Similarly, to respond to a  hijacking of a ship, an interagency operation was directed from the Coast  Guard’s Sector Miami command center. While an interagency operation  might be directed from these Coast Guard command centers, it might be  led by another agency with greater interests or resources to respond to an  event. For example, this was the case with a recent interagency operation  to arrange for the security of dignitaries at an international conference in  Miami that was led by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. These  Coast Guard centers make it possible to host interagency operations  because they have extra space and equipment that allow for surge  capabilities and virtual connectivity with each partner agency.
Officials from the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and  Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Miami all said that these ad hoc  interagency arrangements were crucial to sharing information and  coordinating operations.
section_title: Coast Guard Plans to Develop Sector Command Centers at Ports
paragraphs: The Coast Guard is planning to develop its own operational centers— called sector command centers—at additional ports. These command  centers are being developed to provide local port activities with a unified  command as the Coast Guard reorganizes its marine safety offices and  groups into unified sectors. In addition, the Coast Guard sector command  centers are designed to improve awareness of the maritime domain  through a variety of technologies. The Coast Guard is planning to have  command centers feed information to the Coast Guard’s two area  offices—one on the Pacific Coast and the other on the Atlantic Coast. Over  the long term, the Coast Guard plans to have information from sector  command centers and area offices channeled to a center at the national  level—allowing the Coast Guard to have a nationwide common operating  picture of all navigable waters in the country. A Coast Guard official  indicated that this nationwide information will be available to other field  office commanders at the same time it is given to area and headquarters  officials. To develop this nationwide operating picture, the Coast Guard  hopes to install equipment that allows it to receive information from  sensors, classified information on maritime matters, and data related to  ships and crewmembers as part of its expansion plans. Communication  from Coast Guard ships and aircraft, as well as federal and nonfederal  systems for monitoring vessel traffic and identifying the positions of large  ships, would be among the other types of information that could be  integrated into a command center.
The Coast Guard plans to develop sector command centers at 10 port  locations, with potential expansion to as many as 40 port locations. The  Coast Guard is currently conducting site surveys to identify locations  where it believes centers should be located. For fiscal year 2006, the Coast  Guard is requesting funds that support its plans to improve awareness of  the maritime domain by, among other things, continuing to evaluate the  potential expansion of sector command centers to other port locations.  For example, the Coast Guard’s budget request includes $5.7 million to  continue developing a nationwide maritime monitoring system, the  common operational picture. The common operational picture is primarily  a computer software package that fuses data from different sources, such  as radar, sensors on aircraft, and existing information systems. The Coast  Guard has also requested funding for training personnel in common  operational picture deployment at command centers and to modify  facilities to implement the picture in command centers. While the total  cost of operating command centers is still unknown, the Coast Guard’s  Five-Year Capital Investment Plan shows that the capital costs of this  effort amount to an estimated $400 million, with acquisition of the system  estimated to start in fiscal year 2007.
section_title: Coast Guard Report Pending on Interagency Operational Centers
paragraphs: The relationship between the interagency operational centers and the  Coast Guard’s sector command centers has not been determined yet.  Coast Guard sector command centers can involve multiple agencies, and  the Coast Guard has begun using the term “sector command center—joint”  for the interagency operational centers in San Diego and Norfolk. Coast  Guard officials have told us that their planned sector command centers  will be the basis for any interagency operational centers at ports.  However, the sector command center we visited, in Sector Miami, was not  interagency on a routine basis—the Coast Guard is the single entity  operating the center.
During our visits to the interagency operational centers, port stakeholders  raised the following issues as important factors to consider in any  expansion of interagency operational centers: (1) purpose and mission— the centers could serve a variety of overall purposes, as well as support a  wide number of specific missions; (2) leadership and organization—the  centers could be led by several departments or agencies and be organized  a variety of ways; (3) membership—the centers could vary in membership  in terms of federal, state, local, or private sector participants and their  level of involvement; (4) technology deployed—the centers could deploy a  variety of technologies in terms of networks, computers, communications,  sensors, and databases; and (5) resource requirements—the centers could  also vary in terms of resource requirements, which agency funds the  resources, and how resources are prioritized.
In a related step, Congress directed the Coast Guard to report on the  existing interagency operational centers, covering such matters as the  composition and operational characteristics of existing centers and the  number, location, and cost of such new centers as may be required to  implement maritime transportation security plans and maritime  intelligence activities. This report, which Congress called for by February  2005, had not been issued by the time we had completed our work and  prepared our report for printing.  According to DHS, the report has been  written and has been approved by DHS and the Office of Management and  Budget (OMB), and is now in the final stages of review at the Coast Guard.  Until the report on the centers is issued, it is unclear how the Coast Guard  will define the potential relationship between interagency operational  centers and its own sector command centers.
section_title: Lack of Security Clearances Is a Key Barrier to More Effective Information Sharing
paragraphs: The lack of security clearances was most frequently cited as a barrier to  more effective information sharing among port stakeholders, such as those  involved in area maritime security committees and interagency operational  centers. The Coast Guard has initiated a security clearance program for  members of area maritime security committees. However, the results of  the Coast Guard’s efforts have been mixed. For example, only a small  percentage of application forms from state, local, and industry officials  had actually been submitted by February 2005—over 4 months after the  Coast Guard had developed its list of officials. The primary reason given  for this was that Coast Guard field office officials did not clearly  understand their role in helping nonfederal officials apply for a security  clearance. The Coast Guard’s program does not have formal procedures  for using data to manage the program, but developing such procedures  would allow the Coast Guard to identify and deal with possible problems  in the future. Finally, as the Coast Guard moves forward with its state,  local, and industry security clearance program, the experience of other  federal agencies that manage similar programs suggests that the limited  awareness of state, local, and industry officials about the process for  obtaining a security clearance could also impede the submission of  applications for a security clearance.
subsections: section_title: Port Security Stakeholders Cite the Lack of Clearances as a Problem
paragraphs: At the ports we visited, the lack of security clearances was cited as a key  barrier to information sharing among participants of area maritime  security committees and interagency operational centers we contacted.  Port stakeholders involved in the four area maritime security committees  consistently stated that the lack of federal security clearances for  nonfederal members was an impediment to effective information sharing.  Here are several examples:    An official of the Washington State Ferries who participates on the  Puget Sound area maritime security committee said that not having a  security clearance—and therefore the ability to access classified  information—affected his ability to carry out security-related  activities. He noted that the local U.S. Attorney reported to a local  newspaper in the summer of 2004 that suspicious activities had been  reported on the state ferry system. The Washington State Ferries  official indicated that he or his staff was the source for some of the  data but that federal officials would not provide him with more details  on the activities because he did not have a security clearance. A Coast  Guard field intelligence official corroborated this by stating that the  Captain of the Port was unable to share classified information from the  U.S. Attorney’s office that indicated a pattern of incidents involving the  ferries. Although Coast Guard officials said they wanted to share this  information, ferry officials’ lack of a federal security clearance  precluded them from doing so. Both Coast Guard and ferry officials  indicated that more complete information would aid local security  officers in identifying or deterring illegal activities.
A senior Maryland state official involved in making budget decisions on  improving security around facilities in the port of Baltimore indicated  that having a security clearance would aid his ability to make decisions  on how the state could more effectively spend its resources on  homeland security. He said information on what transportation sectors  are probable targets would be a valuable input on where the state  should prioritize its spending decisions.
A senior Coast Guard official in Houston told us that granting security  clearances to selected members of the area maritime security  committee would make it easier for nonfederal officials to make  decisions on how to respond to specific threats. A local Coast Guard  intelligence official cited an example in which classified information  could not be shared with port stakeholders. The official told us that  there were delays in sharing the information until the originator of the  information supplied a sanitized version.
Similar to the concerns expressed by area maritime security committee  members, participants we contacted at the three interagency operational  centers cited the lack of security clearances as a barrier to information  sharing. At the center in San Diego, the chief of the local harbor patrol  noted that the lack of security clearances was an issue for patrol staff who  are involved in the center. Subsequent to raising this issue, DHS sponsored  security clearances for 18 harbor patrol officials. At the center in  Charleston, participants in the interagency operational center cited the  lack of security clearances as a potential barrier to information sharing.  The Department of Justice addressed this potential barrier by granting  security clearances to nonfederal officials involved in the center. Finally,  Coast Guard officials indicated that when nonfederal officials begin  working at the interagency operational center in Norfolk, granting security  clearances to nonfederal participants will be critical to their success in  sharing information.
According to the Coast Guard and state and local officials we contacted,  the shared partnership between the federal government and state and  local entities may fall short of its potential to fight terrorism because of  the lack of security clearances. If state and local officials lack security  clearances, the information they possess may be incomplete. According to  Coast Guard and nonfederal officials, the inability to share classified  information may limit their ability to deter, prevent, and respond to a  potential terrorist attack.
While security clearances for nonfederal officials who participate in  interagency operational centers are sponsored by DOJ and DHS, the Coast  Guard sponsors security clearances for members of area maritime security  committees. For the purposes of our review, we examined in more detail  the Coast Guard’s efforts to address the lack of security clearances among  members of area maritime security committees.
section_title: Coast Guard Has Taken Steps to Grant Additional Clearances to State, Local, and Industry Officials, but Efforts to Date Have Been Mixed
paragraphs: As part of its effort to improve information sharing at ports, the Coast  Guard initiated a program in July 2004 to sponsor security clearances for  members of area maritime security committees, but nonfederal officials  have been slow in submitting their applications for a security clearance.  By October 2004, the Coast Guard had identified 359 nonfederal  committee members who had a need to know and should receive a  security clearance, but as of February 2005, only 28 officials, or about 8  percent, had submitted the application forms for a security clearance.  Twenty-four of these officials have been granted an interim clearance,  which allows access to classified material while the final clearance is  being processed.
We interviewed local Coast Guard officials at the four ports we visited to  gain a better understanding of the role of the Coast Guard in guiding state  and local officials through the process. Our work shows that there were  two areas that affected the Coast Guard’s efforts: (1) local Coast Guard  officials did not clearly understand their role in the security clearance  program and (2) the Coast Guard did not use available data to track the  status of security clearances for state and local officials.
subsections: section_title: Coast Guard Field Office Officials Said They Did Not Clearly Understand Their Role in the Security Clearance Program
paragraphs: Coast Guard field office officials said they did not clearly understand their  role in helping nonfederal officials apply for a security clearance. In July  2004, Coast Guard headquarters sent guidance to Coast Guard field offices  requesting them to proceed with submissions of personnel security  investigation packages and to submit the additional names of state and  local officials who had a need for a security clearance. However, this  guidance evidently was unclear to field office officials. For example, by  January 2005—3 months after they submitted names to headquarters— Coast Guard officials at three of the ports we visited were still awaiting  further guidance from headquarters on how to proceed. These officials  said they thought that headquarters was processing security clearances for  nonfederal officials, and they were waiting for notification from  headquarters that security clearances had been granted.
Our discussions with a Coast Guard field office official at the fourth port  location suggest that additional guidance about the process for the state,  local, and industry security clearance program could be beneficial. For  example, according to this official, membership on area maritime security  committees changes over time, and it would be helpful to have guidance  on the process for obtaining additional security clearances or dropping  clearances for officials who no longer participate on the committees or  who no longer have a need to know classified information. This official  noted that the process differed depending on whether a committee  participant is considered to be a military or civilian official.
In early February 2005, we expressed our concerns about the security  clearance program to Coast Guard officials. On the basis, in part, of our  discussions, Coast Guard headquarters took action and drafted guidance  informing its field office officials that they were responsible for contacting  nonfederal officials and for providing them with application forms for  obtaining a security clearance, according to Coast Guard officials.  Additionally, to further clarify the role of field office officials, the Coast  Guard’s draft guidance included information on various procedures for  obtaining a security clearance. After receiving a draft of this report, the  Coast Guard finalized this guidance and sent it to field office officials in  early April 2005.  Our review of the guidance shows that it clarifies the role  of field office officials in administering the security clearance process at  the local level and that it provides more detailed procedures on how to  check the status of applications that have been submitted for a security  clearance.
In addition to writing draft guidance on the program, the Coast Guard  recently demonstrated that the security clearance program has produced  some positive results. For example, in late 2004, the Coast Guard  determined the need to share the results of a security study on ferries,  portions of which were classified, with some members of an area maritime  security committee. Working with Coast Guard field office officials, Coast  Guard headquarters and the Coast Guard Security Center were able to  process and grant about a dozen security clearances to state, local, and  industry officials. As a result, the Coast Guard was able to share classified  information with state, local, and industry officials that it believed would  help them in carrying out their port security responsibilities.
section_title: Data Could Be More Effectively Used as a Tool to Manage the Security Clearance Program
paragraphs: A key component of a good management system is to have relevant,  reliable, and timely information available to assess performance over time  and to correct deficiencies as they occur. The Coast Guard has two  databases that contain information on the status of security clearances for  state, local, and industry officials. The first database is a commercial off- the-shelf system that contains information on the status of all applications  that have been submitted to the Coast Guard Security Center, such as  whether a security clearance has been issued or whether personnel  security investigations have been conducted. In February 2004, the Coast  Guard began testing the database for use by field staff, and while  headquarters has still not granted field staff access to the database, it  plans to do so in the future. The second database—an internally developed  spreadsheet on the 359 area maritime committee participants— summarizes information on the status of the security clearance program,  such as whether they have submitted their application forms and whether  they have received their clearances.
Although the Coast Guard has databases that could be used to manage the  state, local, and industry security clearance program, thus far, it has not  developed formal procedures for using the data as a management tool to  follow up on possible problems at the national or local level to verify the  status of clearances. In regard to the database used by the Security Center,  a Coast Guard official told us that the database was not designed to  monitor application trends, but instead is used to provide information on  individual applicants. The Coast Guard’s internally developed spreadsheet  on committee participants who have been deemed candidates for a  security clearance, however, does offer information on application trends,  and could be used to monitor progress that has been made at the national  or local level. For example, updating the database on a routine basis could  identify port areas where progress is slow and indicate that follow-up with  local field office officials may be needed. In a similar security clearance  program, the experience of the FBI shows the utility of data as a tool for  managing the program. For example, FBI officials indicated that its  databases have served as management tools for tracking state, local, and  industry security applications and for monitoring application trends and  percentages. The Coast Guard has yet to develop formal procedures for  using its data on committee participants as a tool to assess potential  problems and to take appropriate action, if necessary. Doing so would  likely aid its efforts to manage the state, local, and industry security  clearance program at both the local and the national levels.
While the Coast Guard’s databases on security clearances shows promise  as a tool for monitoring the state, local, and industry security clearance  program, the database also has limitations in that it cannot be used to  determine how many nonfederal officials have a federal security clearance  sponsored by other federal agencies. For example, a Coast Guard official  stated that this information is difficult to obtain because the Coast Guard  does not have easy access to databases of other agencies. In September  2004, we testified that existing impediments to managing the security  clearance process include the lack of a governmentwide database of  clearance information, which hinders efforts to provide timely, high- quality clearance determinations. As a way to deal with this problem, a  local Coast Guard official sent a survey to port security stakeholders to  determine how many stakeholders had security clearances sponsored by  other federal agencies.
section_title: Raising the Awareness of State, Local, and Industry Officials Might Improve the Processing of Application Forms
paragraphs: Our prior reviews of DOD and FBI efforts to manage a large number of  security clearances for service members, government employees, and  industry personnel have demonstrated long-standing backlogs and delays.   In addition, our FBI work showed that it is important to address training  and education to successfully carry out an effective security clearance  program. Our reviews also showed that the use of internal controls to  ensure that security clearances are granted in compliance with existing  rules and regulations will become increasingly important.
The experience of the FBI in managing its security clearance program  shows that educating nonfederal officials about the security clearance  program resulted in improvements in the processing of applications for a  security clearance. The FBI grants security clearances to state and local  law enforcement officials who may require access to classified national  security information to help prevent or respond to terrorist attacks. After  September 11, an increasing number of state and local officials began  requesting security clearances to obtain terrorism-related information that  might affect their jurisdictions. However, when the FBI received a low  percentage of application forms for security clearances from nonfederal  officials, the agency consulted with state and local officials to collect their  views and recommendations regarding information sharing and improving  the security clearance process, and the FBI identified unfamiliarity with  the requirements for processing security clearance applications as one of  the main impediments to timely processing of applications. For example,  some state and local officials said that they did not have adequate  guidance for filling out and submitting the appropriate application forms.  In response, the FBI widely distributed step-by-step guidance to state and  local law enforcement officials through informational brochures (available  on a FBI Web site) and meetings with state and local officials, among other  efforts. Some law enforcement officials we interviewed stated that the  FBI’s guidance and consultation with law enforcement professional  organizations helped improve state and local officials’ understanding of  the security clearance application process.
Once the Coast Guard begins notifying more state, local, and industry  officials about the process for obtaining a security clearance, raising the  awareness of nonfederal officials about the program could improve the  processing of application forms. An official at the field office that had  actually contacted state and local officials about the security clearance  program indicated that field office officials did not have basic information  about the security clearance program. Among other things, he mentioned  that informational brochures and Web sites could be given to nonfederal  officials as a way to improve their awareness of the security clearance  process.
Attending to the potential lack of awareness by nonfederal officials about  the security clearance program is important because the number of  nonfederal officials who submit application forms for a security clearance  may be much larger than the several hundred state, local, and industry  officials who participate on area maritime security committees. For  example, DHS will sponsor an estimated 5,000 security clearances for  state, local, and industry officials and the Coast Guard Security Center will  process these clearances, according to Coast Guard officials. Additionally,  the Coast Guard plans to grant clearances to about 200 other nonfederal  officials who are involved in supporting other Coast Guard operations,  such as sector command centers. In addition, as the Coast Guard’s  security clearance program evolves, participants on area maritime security  committees or in sector command centers may change over time, thus  highlighting the importance of having ways to raise the awareness of  nonfederal officials about the security clearance process.
section_title: Other Barriers Intrinsic to Port Operations May Also Impede Information Sharing
paragraphs: Port security stakeholders cited other barriers to effective information  sharing intrinsic to ports we visited, but none of these barriers were  mentioned as frequently as the lack of security clearances. At the four  ports we visited, characteristics intrinsic to the port, such as their size and  complexity were stated as barriers to effective information sharing. In  Houston, for example, multiple stakeholders, such as port authorities,  numerous jurisdictions, and a diverse set of users, were presented as  challenges in information sharing efforts. The length of the Houston Ship  Channel (50 miles), with numerous public and private entities using the  channel, also complicates information sharing efforts. To deal with the  size and complexity of this port area, Coast Guard officials said they have  worked with associations representing the commercial fishing industry,  petrochemical companies, and state and local law enforcement as a means  to share information about port security with as many users of the port  and the Houston Ship Channel as possible. For example, the local Coast  Guard officials said they held informational meetings with recreational  boating associations and with area maritime security committee  participants to inform boaters and other stakeholders of “safety zones”— areas where recreational use of the waterway is prohibited—in the  Houston Ship Channel. Another barrier mentioned at another port location  was the “cultural” barrier between various members of the area maritime  security committees. For example, officials at this port location stated that  an informal network has created insiders and outsiders drawing particular  distinctions between law enforcement and non-law enforcement officials.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Effective information sharing among members of area maritime security  committees and participants in interagency operational centers can  enhance the partnership between federal and nonfederal officials, and it  can improve the leveraging of resources across jurisdictional boundaries  for deterring, preventing, or responding to a possible terrorist attack at the  nation’s ports. The Coast Guard has recognized the importance of granting  security clearances to nonfederal officials as a means to improve  information sharing, but progress in moving these officials through the  application process has been slow. In the future, the Coast Guard may  need to grant additional security clearances to state, local, or industry  participants who join area maritime security committees or sector  command centers to support counterterrorism programs. In this way, as  the Coast Guard’s state, local, and industry security clearance program  matures, the importance of effectively managing the security clearance  program will become even more important. Increased management  attention and guidance about the process would strengthen the program  for security clearances, and it would reduce the risk that nonfederal  officials may have incomplete information as they carry out their law  enforcement activities.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that nonfederal officials receive needed security clearances  as quickly as possible, both now and in the future, we recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commandant of the Coast  Guard to take the following two actions.
Develop formal procedures so that local and headquarters officials use  the Coast Guard’s internal databases of state, local, and industry  security clearances for area maritime committee members as a  management tool to monitor who has submitted applications for a  security clearance and to take appropriate action when application  trends point to possible problems. For example, updating the database  on a routine basis could identify port areas where progress is slow and  indicate that follow-up with local field office officials may be needed.
Raise the awareness of state, local, and industry officials about the  process of applying for security clearances. This effort could involve  using brochures, Web sites, or other information that the FBI has used  in its program for educating state and local officials about the security  clearance process.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOJ, and DOD for comment.   DHS, including the Coast Guard, generally agreed with our findings and  recommendations.  Specifically, DHS noted that our recommendations  should enhance the Coast Guard’s efforts to promote information sharing  among port security stakeholders.  DHS also indicated that changes  associated with processing security clearances should overcome identified  impediments.  DOJ and DOD declined to provide comments.
Our draft report included a recommendation that the Coast Guard clarify  the role of field office officials in communicating with state, local, and  industry officials about the process for obtaining a security clearance.   After receiving our draft report, the Coast Guard issued a memo to field  office officials that clarified their role in the security clearance program.   The Coast Guard’s memo also provided more detailed guidance on the  process for sponsoring additional state, local, or industry officials for a  security clearance.  As a result of the Coast Guard’s action, we have  dropped this recommendation from our final report.  In regard to  interagency operational centers, DHS also noted that the Coast Guard  report required by Congress on existing interagency operational centers  has been approved by DHS and OMB and is now in the final stages of  review at the Coast Guard.  In addition to commenting on our findings and  recommendations, DHS provided technical comments on the report under  separate cover and we revised the draft report where appropriate.  Written  comments from DHS are reprinted in appendix IV.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its  issue date.  At that time, we will provide copies of this report to  appropriate departments and interested congressional committees.  We  will also make copies available to others upon request.  This report will  also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any question about this report, please contact me  at (415) 904-2200 or at wrightsonm@gao.gov or Stephen L. Caldwell,  Assistant Director, at (202) 512-9610 or at caldwells@gao.gov. Key  contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Each of our objectives involved information sharing between federal  agencies and nonfederal stakeholders. Specifically,    What impact have area maritime security committees had on  information sharing?
What impact have interagency operational centers had on information  sharing?
What barriers, if any, have hindered improvements in information  sharing among port security stakeholders?
We carried out part of our work at Coast Guard headquarters or in  consultation with headquarters officials. We spoke with Coast Guard  officials to obtain information on how information is shared within the  maritime security community and reviewed pertinent legislation, guidance,  rules, and other relevant documents related to the sharing of maritime  security information with nonfederal stakeholders. For example, we  reviewed pertinent statutes, such as the Maritime Transportation Security  Act and the Homeland Security Act. We also reviewed selected maritime  security plans, Coast Guard regulations implementing the Maritime  Transportation Security Act, and various reports from congressionally  chartered commissions related to information sharing.
To address our first objective, we conducted structured interviews with  officials from federal agencies and representatives from state and local  governments, law enforcement agencies, maritime industry associations,  and private sector entities who were stakeholders in port security issues.  Many of these officials were members of area maritime security  committees. These interviews were largely conducted during site visits to  four specific maritime port areas. We selected these ports to provide a  diverse sample of security environments and perspectives, basing our  selections on such matters as geographic location, varying levels of  strategic importance, and unique local characteristics. The four port areas  and some of our reasons for choosing them are as follows:    Baltimore, Maryland: a Mid-Atlantic port that is managed by a state  agency and services a variety of cargo, including bulk and container  cargo, and cruise passengers;   Charleston, South Carolina: a South Atlantic port that is state owned  and operated, with three separate facilities and military facilities and  installations;    Houston, Texas: a Gulf coast port that is governed by an appointed  commission and consists of a 25-mile-long complex of diversified  public and private facilities, including the nation’s largest  petrochemical complex; and   Seattle/Tacoma, Washington: a Pacific coast port area that is operated  by municipal corporations, represents the third largest container cargo  port in the country, and services the country’s largest state-operated  passenger ferry system.
During each of our visits to these four ports, we met with the identified  port stakeholders, Coast Guard marine safety offices, and Captains of the  Port. In our meetings with Captains of the Port and marine safety offices,  we discussed the creation of and composition of the area maritime  security committee at their port and the effectiveness of the committee in  facilitating information sharing. We also discussed and collected  documents related to policies and procedures pertaining to sharing  information with nonfederal stakeholders. We collected documentary  evidence in the form of information bulletins that are used to disseminate  information to stakeholders. When we met with the nonfederal  stakeholders at the ports, we discussed specific security concerns at their  facilities or in their jurisdictions and how they were being addressed. We  also discussed their involvement and experiences with the local area  maritime security committee, of which most were members, and how they  receive and share information with federal agencies, particularly the Coast  Guard. With both groups, we discussed any perceived barriers to  information sharing and ideas and plans to resolve these issues. This  information was used in conducting a comparative analysis of the port  areas and allowed us to distinguish differences between the locations  while identifying common issues.
In addressing the second objective, we conducted site visits at the three  interagency operational centers located in Charleston, South Carolina;  Norfolk, Virginia; and San Diego, California. Related to this, we visited the  Homeland Security Task Force South-East and command centers for the  Coast Guard district and sector in Miami, Florida because these centers  also aim to facilitate information sharing and joint operations related to  maritime security. At each location, we conducted structured interviews  with officials from the agencies participating in the centers. These  interviews allowed us to obtain information regarding the history of the  centers and how their missions and structures are changing. Specifically,  we discussed how their presence affects information sharing among  federal stakeholders as well as with nonfederal stakeholders. We also  discussed challenges facing the centers as they become more formalized.  During the visits, documents that describe the centers as well as examples  of the products they distribute were collected. Observations made at the  facilities allowed us to provide context to the testimonial evidence we  collected. We also viewed demonstrations of the emerging technologies as  well as differences in the physical attributes of each center. The  testimonial evidence, aided by our observations, was synthesized and  analyzed, allowing us to perform a comparative analysis, identifying  differences and commonalities in information sharing among the centers.
To address the third objective, we followed up with officials at Coast  Guard headquarters and obtained guidance and data regarding the current  effort to administer security clearances at the secret level to selected  nonfederal stakeholders at each port. In subsequent phone interviews with  the officials of marine safety offices at the ports we visited, we discussed  problems encountered in the communication and implementation of this  effort and steps that are being taken to resolve these problems. In  addition, we reviewed Coast Guard documents related to information  sharing, such as data on the number of nonfederal officials who had  received security clearances, guidance from Coast Guard headquarters to  field offices, and other pertinent instructions. In regard to this database,  we checked the reliability of the database for the four ports we visited and  found that the database was generally accurate. We found that 24 of the 27  entries were correct. In addition, we reviewed prior GAO reports that dealt  with information sharing issues. Finally, we interviewed 64 federal and  nonfederal stakeholders at the four ports we visited and asked them  whether there were any barriers to information sharing. The results of our  interviews cannot be projected to all participants on the area maritime  security committees.
Our review was conducted from May 2004 to March 2005 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Stakeholder Groups Recommended for Membership on Area Maritime Security Committees
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on the Coast Guard’s guidance for  developing the local membership and organization of the area maritime  security committee. The Coast Guard’s guidance directs the Captain of the  Port to take into account all aspects of each port area and its adjacent  waterways and coastal areas. The committees should be composed of  federal, state, and local agencies; law enforcement and security agencies;  and port stakeholders. Representatives for each aspect of the port and  those charged with its regulation or enforcement should be encouraged to  participate. Table 1 provides a list of representatives that an area maritime  security committee could include.
Area maritime security committees are not limited to the agencies and  organizations on this list. As each port has specific needs and issues, the  membership of committees can vary greatly from port to port.
section_title: Appendix III: Port-Level Information Sharing Is Supported by, and Supports, National-Level Intelligence Infrastructure
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on the departments and  agencies/components involved in maritime information sharing, at both  the national level and the regional or field level. Table 2 lists departments  and agencies/components (including the Coast Guard) that potentially  play a role in disseminating maritime threat information to, and receiving  information from, area maritime security committees and interagency  operational centers.
The Coast Guard, as the lead in domestic maritime security, plays a central  role in maritime threat information sharing and has a robust presence at  the national, regional, and port levels. In this capacity, it conducts  intelligence activities in support of all its missions, maritime homeland  security, and national security objectives, including information collection,  analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information. Figure 4 illustrates  how Coast Guard national and regional maritime information is channeled  to and from representatives of a local area maritime security committee  (AMSC) or interagency operational center.
Beyond the Coast Guard, other agencies can also play a major role in  channeling maritime security information to the port level. As shown in  table 2, some of these agencies have broader responsibilities for  intelligence across all domains. For example, DOJ has a number of  organizations involved in terrorist threat information sharing, such as the  National Joint Terrorism Task Force, which act as a liaison and conduit  for “all domain” (e.g., maritime and nonmaritime) information from FBI  headquarters to Joint Terrorism Task Forces operating in the field. The  FBI also has designated Maritime Liaison Agents at the port level who  interact with state, local, and private sector officials and other federal  agencies, to enhance security at the nation’s seaports. In addition, U.S.  Attorneys’ Offices of DOJ set up Anti-terrorism Advisory Councils that  sponsor state- or regional-level task forces or coordination centers that  may include a maritime security component. Figure 5 graphically  illustrates (1) how maritime and nonmaritime information and intelligence  is shared among agencies at the national level and (2) organizational  conduits through which information is shared with the port level. The left  side of the figure shows DOJ channels for information discussed above.  On the right side, the figure also shows the flow of information through  Coast Guard channels, as already shown in figure 4.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, David Alexander, Neil Asaba, Juliana  Bahus, Christine Davis, Kevin Heinz, Emily Pickrell, Albert Schmidt, Amy  Sheller, Stan Stenersen, and April Thompson made key contributions to  this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Coast Guard:  Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006  Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport  Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.:  January 14, 2005.
Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime  Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.:  December 10, 2004.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective  Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.:  September 30, 2004.
Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and  Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System.  GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New  Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year  2005 and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting  Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington,  D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Coast Guard Programs: Relationship between Resources Used and  Results Achieved Needs to Be Clearer. GAO-04-432. Washington, D.C.:  March 22, 2004.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target  Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington,  D.C.: December 16, 2003.
Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security.   GAO-04-315R. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003.
Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime  Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be  Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington D.C.: August 27, 2003.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require  Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,  D.C.: July 25, 2003.
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland  Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation  Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.
Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of  Homeland Security. GAO-03-594T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor  Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions. GAO-03-544T.  Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003.
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as It  Transitions to the New Department. GAO-03-467T. Washington, D.C.:  February 12, 2003.
Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of  Effort for All Missions. GAO-03-155. Washington, D.C.: November 12,  2002.
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New  Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in  Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports. GAO- 02-955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.