Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts
Published: 2012-05-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD is emphasizing security force assistance (e.g., efforts to train, equip, and advise partner nation forces) as a distinct activity to build the capacity and capability of partner nation forces. In anticipation of its growing importance, DOD has identified the need to strengthen and institutionalize security force assistance capabilities within its general purpose forces. Accordingly, a committee report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to report on DODs plans. GAO evaluated: (1) the extent to which DOD has established its concept for conducting security force assistance, including defining the term and identifying actions needed to plan for and prepare forces to execute it; (2) the extent to which the geographic combatant commands have taken steps to plan for and conduct security force assistance, and what challenges, if any, they face; and (3) what steps the services have taken to organize and train general purpose forces capable of conducting security force assistance, and what challenges, if any, they face. GAO reviewed relevant documents, and interviewed officials from combatant commands, the services, and other DOD organizations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to establish its concept for conducting security force assistance, including broadly defining the term and identifying actions needed to plan for and prepare forces to execute these activities. For example, in October 2010, the department issued an instruction that broadly defines security force assistance and outlines responsibilities for key stakeholders, including the geographic combatant commands and military services. DOD also identified gaps in key areas of doctrine, organization, and training related to the implementation of security force assistance and tasks needed to address those gaps. The tasks include reviewing joint and service-level doctrine to incorporate security force assistance as needed and developing measures to assess progress in partner nations. Citing a need to clarify the definition of security force assistance beyond the DOD Instruction, DOD published a document referred to as a Lexicon Framework in November 2011 that included information to describe how security force assistance relates to other existing terms, such as security cooperation.
The geographic combatant commands conduct activities to build partner nation capacity and capability, but face challenges planning for and tracking security force assistance as a distinct activity. Notwithstanding DODs efforts to present security force assistance as a distinct and potentially expansive activity and clarify its terminology, the commands lack a common understanding of security force assistance, and therefore some were unclear as to what additional actions were needed to meet DODs intent. Specifically, officials interviewed generally viewed it as a recharacterization of some existing activities, but had different interpretations of what types of activities should be considered security force assistance. Further, some command officials stated that they were not clear as to the intent of DODs increased focus on security force assistance and whether any related adjustments should be made in their plans and scope or level of activities. As a result, they do not currently distinguish security force assistance from other security cooperation activities in their plans. DOD intended the Lexicon Framework to provide greater clarity on the meaning of security force assistance and its relationship to security cooperation and other related terms. However, some officials said that they found the distinctions to be confusing and others believed that additional guidance was needed. GAOs prior work on key practices for successful organizational transformations states the necessity to communicate clear objectives for what is to be achieved. Without additional clarification, the geographic combatant commands will continue to lack a common understanding, which may hinder the departments ability to meet its strategic goals. Moreover, the system that the commands are directed to use to track security force assistance activities does not include a specific data field to identify those activities. The commands also face challenges planning for and executing long-term, sustained security force assistance plans within existing statutory authorities, which contain some limitations on the types of activities that can be conducted.
The services are taking steps and investing resources to organize and train general purpose forces capable of conducting security force assistance based on current requirements. For example, to conduct activities with partner nation security forces, the Army and the Air Force are aligning certain units to geographic regions, and the Marine Corps has created tailored task forces. However, the services face certain challenges. Due to a lack of clarity on how DODs increased emphasis on security force assistance will affect future requirements, they are uncertain whether their current efforts are sufficient or whether additional capabilities will be required. Further, services face challenges in tracking personnel with security force assistance training and experience, particularly in identifying the attributes to track.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends DOD clarify its intent for security force assistance, including how combatant commands should adjust their current planning efforts and provide a means to track activities. DOD partially concurred, stating that recent guidance addresses planning requirements. GAO continues to believe that more specific direction is needed.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In the past few years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been  emphasizing security force assistance as an important and distinct activity  to build the capacity and capability of partner nation security forces in light  of lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and  counterterrorism operations with partner nations in other parts of the  world. For example, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review generally  described security force assistance as DOD’s “hands on” efforts to train,  equip, advise, and assist countries’ forces in becoming more proficient at  providing security to their populations, protecting their resources and  territories, and enabling them to participate in operations that improve  regional security, such as coalition and peacekeeping operations.  Similarly, DOD’s January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance reiterated  security force assistance as a key element of DOD’s mission to counter  terrorism, provide a stabilizing presence overseas, and share the costs  and responsibilities of global leadership.
While security force assistance is a recently introduced term within the  department, the objective to develop the capabilities of partner nation  security forces is not new and has traditionally been achieved through a  broader set of activities and programs planned for and conducted by the  geographic combatant commands, such as security cooperation, security   assistance, and foreign internal defense. Historically, special operations  forces have conducted the majority of DOD’s activities to train, advise,  and assist partner nation security forces, whereas the involvement of  general purpose forces has been more limited. As such, these forces  had not been permanently organized and trained to carry out this mission.  However, during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, general purpose  forces have been tasked with training and advising the security forces of  those countries. Our prior work that was focused on U.S. efforts to advise  and assist Iraqi and Afghan security forces observed challenges related  to the way that ground forces were organized to conduct these missions.In light of the experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and in anticipation of the  growing role of security force assistance in U.S. strategy and future  operations, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review identified the need to  strengthen and institutionalize capabilities within the general purpose  force to conduct security force assistance.
The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying the Fiscal  Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act bill (H.R. 1540) directed us  to report on the department’s plans to institutionalize security force  assistance capabilities in the general purpose force. To address this requirement, this report evaluates (1) the extent to which DOD has  established its concept for conducting security force assistance, including  defining the term and identifying actions needed to plan for and prepare  forces to execute security force assistance; (2) the extent to which the  geographic combatant commands have taken steps to plan for and  conduct security force assistance, and what challenges, if any, they face;  and (3) what steps the services have taken to organize and train general  purpose forces to be capable of conducting security force assistance, and  what challenges, if any, they face.
To address these objectives, we reviewed DOD and service strategic  guidance, policy, and doctrine related to security force assistance. We  also examined the roles and responsibilities for security force assistance  identified in DOD Instruction 5000.68 Security Force Assistance and the  tasks identified through DOD’s security force assistance capabilities- based assessment. Further, we reviewed documentation related to  activities currently being conducted by the geographic combatant  commands to engage with partner nation security forces and evaluated  various military service efforts to organize and train forces capable of  meeting current requirements from the geographic combatant commands  to conduct such activities and address future requirements. Finally, we  met with officials throughout the department and its components,  including, but not limited to, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict; the Joint Staff; Defense  Security Cooperation Agency; military service headquarters, force  providers, and training organizations; U.S. Special Operations Command;  four of the six geographic combatant commands—U.S. Africa Command,  U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Southern  Command—and selected service component commands. In these  discussions we corroborated the information provided in the documents  above and discussed the commands’ understanding of the security force  assistance concept and steps being taken to implement it, and the  development of relevant plans, requirements, and capabilities. We  focused on the department’s efforts to plan for and conduct security force  assistance in areas of responsibility other than Afghanistan because  DOD’s focus on security force assistance is more long term than current  operations in Afghanistan and the scope of the mission in that country  may not be typical of efforts worldwide. In addition, while we understand  the State Department is a critical stakeholder in U.S. security force  assistance efforts, our review focused solely on DOD efforts to plan for  and institutionalize security force assistance.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to May 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains additional  information about our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Range of DOD Efforts to Engage with Partner Nation Security Forces
paragraphs: DOD engages with partner nation security forces through a range of  security cooperation efforts, which can include security assistance and  foreign internal defense. Security cooperation is the broad term used to  define those activities taken by DOD to build relationships that promote  specified U.S. interests, build partner nation capabilities for self-defense  and coalition operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and  contingency access. These activities are carried out under various  statutory authorities. For example, DOD may conduct activities with  partner nations, such as sending out military liaison teams, exchanging  military personnel between units, and conducting seminars and  conferences in theaters of operations under U.S. Code Title 10. DOD  also may conduct security cooperation activities through security  assistance programs, authorized by U.S. Code Title 22, which include  foreign military sales and foreign military financing programs, and allow  DOD to provide defense articles and services to partner nations in  support of U.S. national policies and objectives. These security  assistance programs are tools that can allow DOD to train and equip  partner nation security forces. Additionally, the National Defense  Authorization Act provides for authorities to facilitate DOD’s engagement  with partner nations under certain conditions.
DOD’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review cites building the security  capacity of partner nations as a key mission area and emphasizes  security force assistance as an increasingly critical element of this  mission. It also identifies several initiatives to enhance its ability to build  partner nation security capacity, such as strengthening and  institutionalizing general purpose force capabilities to conduct security  force assistance; enhancing linguistic, regional, and cultural abilities;  strengthening and expanding capabilities to train partner nation aviation  forces; and strengthening the department’s capacities for ministerial-level  training. Historically, DOD has primarily relied on special operations  forces to train and advise partner nation security forces as part of their  foreign internal defense mission, which is to assist foreign governments in  protecting themselves from internal threats. More recently, the increased  demand on special operations forces in Iraq and Afghanistan has  required the department to use general purpose forces to advise and  assist the Iraqi and Afghan security forces. For example, in Iraq and  Afghanistan, DOD has used training and transition teams and augmented  brigade combat teams, respectively, to train, advise, equip, and mentor  those countries’ security forces. As a result of its experiences in Iraq and  Afghanistan, its increasing emphasis on the importance of security force  assistance, and its intent to expand these types of efforts to other parts of  the globe, DOD has highlighted the need to further develop security force  assistance capabilities within its general purpose forces.
section_title: Geographic Combatant Command Theater Campaign Plans Develop Strategies for Engaging with Partner Nations
paragraphs: To perform its military missions around the world, DOD operates six  unified military geographic combatant commands, which are responsible  for a variety of functions including planning for and conducting missions  that range from humanitarian assistance to combat operations. Each  geographic combatant command is supported by service component  commands (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force) and a theater  special operations command. In addition, the military services are  responsible for organizing, training, and equipping their forces to execute  the current and future operational requirements of the combatant  commands.
As part of their planning responsibilities, geographic combatant  commands develop theater campaign plans, which are multiyear plans  that reflect the command’s strategy to achieve certain end states within  their areas of responsibility. These plans are the primary vehicle for designing, organizing, integrating, and executing security cooperation  activities. A hierarchy of national and strategic guidance—including the  National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National  Military Strategy, and the Guidance for Employment of the Force—  informs the development of the combatant commands’ theater campaign  plans. For example, the Guidance for Employment of the Force provides  2-year direction to geographic combatant commands on security  cooperation, among other things, and consolidates and integrates DOD  planning guidance related to operations and other military activities into a  single overarching document. This guidance is considered essential to  geographic combatant command planners as it provides the strategic end  states that form the basis for theater campaign plans, including the  assumptions and level of detail to be considered in developing those  plans. For example, the Guidance for Employment of the Force has eight  security cooperation focus areas, which include Operational Access and  Global Freedom of Action, Operational Capacity and Capability Building,  and Interoperability with U.S. Forces / Support to U.S. Capabilities. These  focus areas are designed to link geographic combatant command security  cooperation activities to achieve theater campaign plan end states. In  order to execute the activities in their theater campaign plans, geographic  combatant commands request the required force capabilities through the  Global Force Management system. The Global Force Management  system is a DOD system that provides insight into the global availability of  U.S. military forces to meet rotational and emergent force requirements  from geographic combatant commands as they arise.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Steps to Establish Its Concept for Conducting Security Force Assistance, Including Broadly Defining the Term and Identifying Actions Needed to Plan for and Prepare Forces to Execute It
paragraphs: DOD has taken steps to establish its concept for conducting security force  assistance, including broadly defining the term and identifying actions  needed to plan for and prepare forces to execute security force  assistance activities. For example, DOD issued an instruction that broadly  defines security force assistance and outlines responsibilities for key  stakeholders. The department also conducted an assessment to identify  gaps in key areas such as doctrine, organization, and training related to  the implementation of security force assistance across the department.  This effort identified tasks to address these gaps and called on DOD to  develop a document, referred to as the Lexicon Framework, to clarify the  term security force assistance and its relationship to other key terms.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Issued an Instruction That Broadly Defines Security Force Assistance and Outlines Responsibilities for Key Stakeholders
paragraphs: In October 2010, DOD issued an instruction—DOD Instruction 5000.68— that broadly defines security force assistance and outlines responsibilities  for key stakeholders to plan, prepare for, and execute security force  assistance. The instruction defines security force assistance as “DOD  activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. government to  support the development of the capacity and capability of partner nation   The instruction states that DOD  forces and their supporting institutions.”should develop and maintain forces, including general purpose forces and  special operations forces, that can conduct security force assistance  activities in a variety of conditions that include (1) politically sensitive  environments where an overt U.S. presence is unacceptable to the host  country government; (2) environments where a limited, overt U.S.  presence is acceptable to the host country government; and (3)  environments where a large-scale U.S. presence is considered necessary  and acceptable by the host country government. According to Office of  the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and U.S. Special Operations Command  officials, special operations forces would be favored to lead missions in  the first environment, and the other environments could either use  general purpose forces or an appropriate combination of forces.
In addition, responsibilities of key stakeholders, including the geographic  combatant commands and the military services, to plan for and conduct  security force assistance are outlined in the instruction. For example,  DOD Instruction 5000.68 states that the geographic combatant commands should incorporate security force  assistance into their theater campaign plans; conduct security force  assistance within their areas of responsibility; annually forecast and  report security force assistance requirements for a 5-year time frame;  and record security force assistance activities into the Theater  Security Cooperation Management Information System; and military services should develop, maintain, and institutionalize  capabilities to support DOD efforts to organize, train, equip, and  advise foreign military forces and their supporting institutions; provide  scalable capabilities to meet geographic combatant command  requirements for security force assistance; develop training and  education standards for security force assistance capabilities; and  identify and track military service personnel who have security force  assistance-related training, education, or experience.
section_title: DOD Has Identified Tasks to Address Gaps in Implementing Security Force Assistance and Developed a Lexicon Framework Intended to Clarify the Meaning of Security Force Assistance
paragraphs: DOD conducted a capabilities-based assessment to identify gaps in key  areas of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and  education, personnel, and facilities, related to the implementation of  security force assistance across the department. The effort resulted in an  April 2011 Joint Staff memorandum that identified 25 tasks needed to  address the identified gaps, along with the organizations responsible for  completing the tasks and associated milestones. The tasks have  targeted completion dates through April 2014 and include recommending  changes to joint and service-level doctrine to incorporate security force  assistance as needed; developing measures to assess security force  assistance progress in partner nations; and developing joint training  standards for U.S. forces training for security force assistance missions.
Citing a need to clarify the definition of security force assistance beyond  the information found in DOD Instruction 5000.68, the Joint Staff  memorandum also directed DOD to develop a lexicon framework. In  November 2011, DOD published the Security Force Assistance Lexicon  Framework. According to the Lexicon Framework, its intent was to  promote a common understanding of security force assistance and  related terms by providing greater clarity on the definition of security force  assistance and how it relates to other existing terms, such as security  cooperation and security assistance. The Lexicon Framework also  expands upon the DOD Instruction’s definition of security force  assistance. Specifically, DOD Instruction 5000.68 states that security  force assistance is defined as “DOD activities that contribute to unified  action by the U.S. government to support the development of the capacity  and capability of partner nation forces and their supporting institutions.”  The Lexicon Framework restates this definition, but also adds that  security force assistance is all DOD activities conducted under various  programs to “organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise foreign  security forces and their supporting institutions from the tactical to  ministerial levels.”
section_title: DOD Has Established Organizations to Manage Its Efforts to Implement Security Force Assistance
paragraphs: DOD has established organizations to help manage its security force  assistance implementation efforts. For example, in February 2011, the  department established a Security Force Assistance Steering Committee  and Working Group to guide the department’s efforts to develop security  force assistance policy and capabilities, and manage the implementation  of DOD Instruction 5000.68 and the completion of the tasks noted in the  Joint Staff memorandum. The Steering Committee and Working Group  are both cochaired by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special  Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and the Joint Staff J-5 Strategic Plans  and Policy directorate, and also include other DOD organizations. For  example, U.S. Special Operations Command and the military services are  included in the steering committee, and the geographic combatant  commands participate in the working group.
Additionally, DOD established the Joint Center for International Security  Force Assistance in 2006, which according to its charter is supposed to  collect, analyze, and document security force assistance lessons learned  and best practices, advise and assist the geographic combatant  commands, the military services, and other government agencies with  security force assistance, and actively support the long-term integration of  security force assistance into joint training, leader development, and  doctrine. This center is funded through the Army’s training budget and  received $1.3 million in base funding for fiscal year 2012 with the majority  of this used to cover civilian personnel costs, as well as operating costs  and travel costs for personnel. The center has focused on supporting the  warfighter in Iraq and Afghanistan, but recently has begun to conduct  outreach with geographic combatant command planners to educate key  staff on security force assistance and how to incorporate it into theater  campaign planning efforts. It previously published a Security Force  Assistance Planner’s Guide in 2008, most recently updated in 2009, and  officials stated that the center is updating the Planner’s Guide for 2012 in  light of the generally accepted set of terms in the lexicon and to serve as  a resource for planners of security force assistance.
The department also relies on other long-standing organizations to  support U.S. efforts to interact with partner nation security forces. For  example, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency is responsible for  administering certain security cooperation and security assistance  activities that fall under Title 10 and Title 22 of the U.S. Code. In addition,  Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials said the agency offers  opportunities to help educate personnel on ways to provide security  cooperation assistance to partner nations. For example, the Defense  Institute of Security Assistance Management, an institute run by the  Defense Security Cooperation Agency, provides professional education,  research, and support to enhance security assistance management  capabilities of DOD military and civilian personnel. Moreover, Defense  Security Cooperation Agency officials cited the Defense Institution  Reform Initiative and the Ministry of Defense Advisors program as two  efforts that were developed to help support geographic combatant  command efforts to build capacity and capability of partner nations’  ministerial institutions.
section_title: Geographic Combatant Commands Face Challenges That Limit Their Ability to Plan for and Track Security Force Assistance as a Distinct Activity
paragraphs: The geographic combatant commands are conducting activities to build  partner nation capacity and capability, but face challenges planning for  and conducting security force assistance as a distinct activity, including  the following: (1) a lack of common understanding of security force  assistance which may limit their ability to plan for it as OSD intends; (2)  limitations in the system where security force assistance activities are to  be tracked; and (3) the ability to develop and execute long-term security  force assistance plans within existing legislative authorities.
subsections: section_title: Geographic Combatant Commands Lack a Common Understanding of Security Force Assistance
paragraphs: OSD has presented security force assistance as a distinct activity  requiring the geographic combatant commands to develop new and  innovative strategies that go beyond traditional security cooperation.  However, despite DOD’s effort to clarify its terminology, the four  geographic combatant commands we spoke to lack a common  understanding of security force assistance, and therefore some are  unclear as to the additional efforts that may be needed on their part to  meet the department’s intent for security force assistance and do not see  the value in distinguishing security force assistance from other security  cooperation activities.
According to officials from the Security Force Assistance Working Group,  the emphasis recently placed on security force assistance in the  Quadrennial Defense Review, Defense Strategic Guidance, and other  documents like DOD Instruction 5000.68 and the Lexicon Framework, is  indicative of DOD’s intention to take a more strategic and proactive  approach to building the capacity and capability of partners and allies  around the world. DOD documents characterize security force assistance  as a subset of security cooperation, but identify it as a distinct activity  from other types of security cooperation activities. The Lexicon  Framework states that the purposes of security force assistance are to  create, maintain, or enhance a capacity or capability to achieve a desired  end state. It distinguishes these purposes from other types of security  cooperation activities, such as activities conducted to gain access,  influence, or diplomatic or political action with a partner nation, but do not  enhance any capacity or capability. To further illustrate this distinction, an  OSD official said that the geographic combatant commands conduct  security cooperation activities, such as military-to-military engagements  and joint exercises, but these activities do not have the primary purpose  to build partner nation capacity and capability and thus are not considered  security force assistance. The Lexicon Framework states that the  effective execution of security force assistance requires geographic  combatant commands to develop objectives for the development of  partner nation security forces, articulate regional objectives, link  resources to overarching goals, and create operational roadmaps for  persistent cooperation. It further states that this comprehensive, global  approach to improving partner security capacity will require new and  innovative strategies and authorities that go beyond traditional security  cooperation applications.
According to OSD, the emphasis on security force assistance in recent  guidance reflects an expectation that geographic combatant commands  will conduct increased security force assistance activities through  sustained and proactive plans focused on building partner nation capacity  and capability. For example, Security Force Assistance Working Group  officials said that as U.S. forces are drawn down in Afghanistan, the  demand for security force assistance outside of Afghanistan is expected  to increase over the next few years. The geographic combatant  commands are expected to identify and plan for security force assistance  based on the needs of the partner nations in their areas of responsibility  and forecast the forces needed to conduct planned activities. The  services, in turn, are responsible for providing forces to meet the  geographic combatant commands’ forecasted requirements.
DOD Instruction 5000.68 directs the geographic combatant commands to  incorporate security force assistance into their theater campaign plans  and to forecast their force requirements for security force assistance.  Notwithstanding DOD’s efforts to present security force assistance as a  distinct and potentially expansive activity beyond existing security  cooperation efforts, geographic combatant commands lack a common  understanding of security force assistance, and therefore some are  unclear as to the additional efforts that may be needed on their part to  meet the department’s intent for security force assistance and do not see  the value in distinguishing security force assistance from other security  cooperation activities. Generally, all four of the geographic combatant  commands we spoke to viewed security force assistance as a  recharacterization of some of their existing security cooperation activities  since all of the commands conducted some activities, such as training  partner nation forces, targeted to build partner nation capacity and  capability. The lack of common understanding of security force assistance  both among and within geographic combatant commands led to  inconsistencies regarding which of their current activities they considered  to be security force assistance when discussing their efforts, including the  following:
Officials from one service component command told us that they  consider nearly every activity with partner nations to be security force  assistance—from subject matter expert exchanges that are meant to  increase interoperability between the nations to U.S. instructor-led  training of partner nation security forces—because they believe them  to build the capacity and capability of partner nations.
U.S. European Command identified individual efforts to train partner  nations as security force assistance, such as its efforts to train infantry  battalions from the country of Georgia to deploy to Afghanistan, but  excluded activities such as military-to-military exchanges.
U.S. Africa Command considered only comprehensive, persistent  programs to improve partner nation security forces from the tactical to  the ministerial to be security force assistance and identified only one  activity as such. However, officials from one of the command’s service  components identified episodic activities aimed at increasing regional  and maritime safety and security within the command’s area of  responsibility as security force assistance.
In addition, the geographic combatant commands we visited plan for  interactions with partner nations, including some activities to build partner  nation capacity and capability. However, because the geographic  combatant commands view security force assistance as a  recharacterization of some of their existing security cooperation activities,  they did not see a need to distinguish security force assistance from other  security cooperation activities in their planning efforts, as indicated in the  following examples:
U.S. European Command officials said that they did not incorporate  the term security force assistance in their theater campaign plan, but  the plan emphasizes the importance of building allies’ and partners’  capacity to contribute to regional security.
U.S. Southern Command’s theater campaign plan includes one  specific reference to security force assistance, but includes references  to other activities that link back to the command’s military objectives,  including objectives related to building partner capacity and capability.
U.S. Africa Command’s theater campaign plan includes some general  references to security force assistance, but the references are not  linked to specific objectives. The plan does include information on the  need to develop partner nation capacity and capability.
U.S. Central Command officials said they do not use the term security  force assistance in their theater campaign plan.
Further, some geographic combatant command officials said that they  were not clear as to OSD’s intent behind the emphasis on security force  assistance, including the level of effort that should be devoted to it, and  whether that intent should have any effect on their future theater plans  and activities. Officials from several combatant commands said that they  develop their theater campaign plans and strategies based on the  Guidance for Employment of the Force and other strategic guidance and  that they would expect any emphasis requiring them to change how they  plan for and conduct activities to be reflected in that guidance. According  to OSD, strategic guidance documents are being reviewed to determine  whether they should be revised based on the January 2012 Defense  Strategic Guidance to reflect greater emphasis on security force  assistance.
We recognize that the department has taken steps intended to increase  understanding of security force assistance, such as the issuance of the  Lexicon Framework in November 2011. Nonetheless, as the above  examples demonstrate, the geographic combatant commands continue to  lack a common understanding of security force assistance, what  additional efforts may be needed on their part to meet the department’s  intent for security force assistance, and the value of distinguishing  security force assistance from other security cooperation activities. We  also recognize that the Lexicon Framework was issued recently.  However, some geographic combatant command and service officials  familiar with the framework said that they found some of the distinctions  within the document to be confusing and others cited the need for  additional guidance that provides greater clarity on what is required to  plan for and conduct security force assistance as OSD intends. Further,  officials from the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance  said that, while they believe the Lexicon Framework is helpful to clarify  the relationship between security force assistance and other related  terms, joint doctrine on security force assistance is necessary to ensure  that all stakeholders understand security force assistance. Moreover, we  found that neither the framework nor the instruction provide clear  guidance on the level of effort that geographic combatant commands  should devote to security force assistance and how security force  assistance differs from some of the geographic combatant commands’  current efforts to build partner nation capacity and capability. Our prior  work on key practices for successful organizational transformations  shows the necessity to communicate clear objectives for what is to be  achieved. Further, DOD guidance states that clear strategic guidance  and frequent interaction between senior leaders and planners promotes  an early, shared understanding of the complex operational problem  presented, and of strategic and military end states, objectives, and  missions. Without additional clarification from OSD, the geographic  combatant commands will continue to lack a common understanding of  security force assistance, which may hinder the department in meeting its  strategic goals.
section_title: System for Tracking Security Force Assistance Activities Contains Limitations
paragraphs: DOD Instruction 5000.68 directs the geographic combatant commands to  record their security force assistance activities in the Theater Security  Cooperation Management Information System, which, according to  officials, has been identified by the Guidance for Employment of the  Force as the system of record for tracking all security cooperation  activities. Beyond the challenges that commands face in distinguishing  between security force assistance activities and other types of activities,  we also found that the system into which they are instructed to track  security force assistance activities has limitations. For example, the  system does not contain a corresponding data field specifically for  security force assistance activities. There are several different versions of  the Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System  currently in use by the geographic combatant commands and service  component commands, including individual command legacy systems  and an interim system being used by multiple commands. According to a  Joint Staff official, neither the interim version of the Theater Security  Cooperation Management Information System nor the legacy systems,  with the exception of the system put in place by the Army, contain a data  field for specifically tracking security force assistance activities. The Joint  Staff is currently developing the Global Theater Security Cooperation  Management Information System to replace the legacy and interim  systems in order to create a single global interface for users, with initial  fielding planned for fiscal year 2013. Joint Staff officials responsible for  the development of this system told us no plans currently exist to create  such a data field within the Global Theater Security Cooperation  Management Information System. According to these officials, they are  not planning to add this field because they believe security force  assistance is a broad category and different users of the system may  prefer more specific data fields for the individual types of engagements  with partner nations, such as military-to-military engagement and training.  Security Force Assistance Working Group officials have suggested that a  security force assistance field should be added to the Global Theater  Security Cooperation Management Information System because tracking  and monitoring security force assistance activities is important to ensure  that the department is directing resources toward its strategic goal of  building partner capacity and capability. As the department continues to  develop and manage security force assistance as a stand-alone concept,  without a data field or other mechanism within the future Global Theater  Security Cooperation Management Information System to specify which  activities are security force assistance activities, and a consistent  approach to collecting data on these activities, OSD will lack visibility over  both security force assistance activities and the U.S. resources being  invested in building the capacity and capability of partner nations.
Moreover, while the Theater Security Cooperation Management  Information System is intended to enable planning, tracking, and  forecasting security cooperation activities, eliminate potential overlap and  duplication of activities by different commands, and ensure that resources  are being directed towards priority countries, the different versions of the  system currently lack standard global business rules to guide how  information on activities should be entered. Thus, it is up to the  geographic combatant commands and services to develop their own set  of rules—formal or informal—governing how activities are entered into the  legacy and interim systems. Some commands enter all proposed  activities into the system, while another enters data less consistently thus  reducing the value of the system as a planning and forecasting tool. The  inconsistency of reporting in this system can result in an inefficient use of  resources. For instance, Navy officials told us of a recent example in  which an Air Force-sponsored medical engagement with a partner nation  was conducted in the same location as a similar Navy-sponsored medical  engagement, but the Air Force was unaware of this until it arrived on  location. The officials noted that, had the activities been identified and  forecasted in the system, the Air Force and Navy could have coordinated  and either chosen to redirect resources to another location or planned the  activities to build upon one another. As part of the process to update the  Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System,  Joint Staff officials recognize the need to have some level of  standardization in how activities are entered across the department so  that they have a complete and consistent picture of global activities, and  are in the process of developing global business rules to that effect,  expected to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2012.
section_title: Geographic Combatant Commands May Face Challenges in Developing and Executing Long-Term Security Force Assistance Plans within Existing Statutory Authorities
paragraphs: Geographic combatant commands conduct security cooperation and  security assistance activities, which may include security force  assistance, through a variety of different statutory authorities within Title  10 (Armed Services) and Title 22 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse) of  the U.S. Code. For example, geographic combatant commands conduct  security cooperation activities including military-to-military engagements,  interoperability activities, and joint training exercises under traditional Title  10 authorities. DOD also can conduct activities involving interactions with  partner nation security forces through State Department-led Title 22  security assistance programs and authorities, which include, foreign  military sales, foreign military financing, international military training and  education, and peacekeeping operations. All of the geographic combatant  commands we spoke with told us that they used Title 22 programs such  as Foreign Military Assistance and International Military Education and   to provide training to partner nation forces. While the statutory  Trainingauthorities codified within Title 10 or Title 22 remain available unless  Congress repeals them, other authorities are temporary and must be  renewed periodically through legislation. For example, the annual  National Defense Authorization Acts can provide specific authorities that  allow the geographic combatant commands to conduct activities, such as  counternarcotics training with partner nations. Table 1 below shows  selected statutory authorities used by geographic combatant commands  to conduct security cooperation and security force assistance activities.
These statutory authorities are specific in nature and some contain  limitations and restrictions on the types of activities that can be conducted  under these authorities. For example, the authorities codified within Title  10 do not authorize general purpose forces to conduct security force  assistance activities, such as training, advising, and assisting partner  nation security forces. Thus, geographic combatant commands rely on  statutory authorities beyond traditional Title 10 authorities, such as the  aforementioned specific authorities provided for in the National Defense  Authorization Acts or through Title 22 security assistance programs. For  example, both U.S. Central Command and U.S. Southern Command  stated that they used authority originally provided by section 1004 of the  Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act to conduct  counterdrug and counternarcotics training with militaries in their  respective regions. Further, all four of the geographic combatant  commands that we spoke to had at some point used authority originally  provided by section 1206 of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense  Authorization Act to train and equip partner nation forces. Like Title 10,  many of these National Defense Authorization Act authorities and Title 22  security assistance programs have limitations in how they can be used.  For example, section 1206 of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense  Authorization Act only allows for training and equipping programs that  build the capacity of foreign militaries to conduct counterterrorism  operations or participate in or support military and stability operations in  which U.S. forces participate.
Once the geographic combatant commands’ theater campaign plans are  approved by the Secretary of Defense, they must find separate  authorization for activities that they will conduct with partner nations.  Some geographic combatant command and service component  command officials said that they often have to cobble together multiple  authorities in order to carry out a single activity with partner nation forces  because of the specificity of the authorities. For example, officials from  one service component command stated that a single training event  targeted toward building the aviation capabilities of a partner nation  required 11 different authorities and funding streams.
Some geographic combatant command officials noted that they may  require additional or revised authorities in order to plan for and conduct  increased and sustained security force assistance activities, such as  training and equipping partner nation forces, beyond their current level of  effort. According to an OSD official, current authorities generally allow for  more short-term relationships with partner nations, but planning for and  conducting security force assistance as the department envisions it  requires longer-term, sustained interaction. In that regard, this official  stated that the department has efforts underway to review the current  statutory authorities available to DOD to determine whether additional  authorities are needed and to potentially develop proposals to Congress.  As of February 2012, DOD was still conducting this review.
section_title: The Services Are Developing General Purpose Forces with Capabilities to Conduct Security Force Assistance to Meet Current Requirements but Lack Clarity on Future Requirements
paragraphs: The services are taking steps and investing resources to organize and  train general purpose forces that are capable of conducting security force  assistance and tracking uniformed military personnel with related  experience and training. However, the services’ efforts are still in  progress and uncertainties remain about any additional capabilities that  may be needed due to a lack of clarity in regard to future geographic  combatant command requirements.
subsections: section_title: The Services Have Taken Some Steps and Invested Resources to Organize Dedicated Forces
paragraphs: DOD Instruction 5000.68 directs the services to develop, maintain, and  institutionalize the capabilities to support DOD efforts to organize, train,  equip, and advise foreign military forces and relevant supporting  institutions in order to meet the geographic combatant command  requirements. In providing these capabilities, it further elaborates that the  services are to meet the requirements of all three conditions identified by  the instruction under which security force assistance activities are  conducted, and to identify joint capabilities across all domains, such as  air, land, maritime, and cyberspace. The services have historically built  teams on an as-needed basis to engage with partner nation security  forces rather than developing dedicated forces to conduct these activities.  However, officials stated that lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan  established the need to organize and deploy forces to train and advise  partner nation security forces in a more deliberate manner. In light of this  experience, and the department’s growing emphasis on security force  assistance, the services have undertaken efforts to organize dedicated  forces that they consider to be capable of conducting security force  assistance. For example, service efforts include the following:
The Army is planning to regionally align forces that will be tailored to  meet the requirements of the geographic combatant command to  which they are aligned. The regionally-aligned forces will remain at  homestation and deploy only those elements of the unit that are  required to meet the specific geographic combatant command  requirements. The Army’s initial regionally-aligned force will be a  brigade combat team that will be aligned to U.S. Africa Command  starting in January 2013, with additional forces expected to be aligned  to the other geographic combatant commands beginning in fiscal year  2014. Although the initial unit will be a brigade combat team, officials  said that future aligned forces could be smaller or larger units,  depending on geographic combatant command requirements and can  be augmented by specialized capabilities as needed. This initial  regionally-aligned brigade is to conduct approximately 120 activities  with partner nations within U.S. Africa Command’s area of  responsibility over the course of a year. According to Army  headquarters officials, most of the 120 activities will be short-duration,  small-footprint activities, conducted by teams as small as three  people, while larger exercises with partner nations may be longer  duration events, conducted by battalion-sized units.
The aligned brigade will receive training for the full spectrum of  operations, comprising offense, defense, and stability operations, as  well as tailored language, culture, and advising training for the specific  missions. The Army has identified language proficiency as a beneficial  skill but is still determining the level of language proficiency required  within its regionally-aligned forces. For the initial regionally-aligned  brigade, the Army plans to provide the majority of the brigade with  basic language training that would allow it to build rapport with partner  nation security forces, while smaller elements of the brigade are  intended to receive more specialized training in one of the five key  languages identified for Africa: Arabic, French, Swahili, Hausa, or  Portuguese. In addition, a small portion of the brigade may be sent  through a full culturally-based language training course provided by a  language training detachment at the unit’s homestation. After the  initial regional alignment, the Army will assess the level of language  training that was provided to see whether it is sufficient or whether it  should be adjusted for future regionally-aligned forces.
Once fully established, the Army’s regionally-aligned forces are  expected to conduct most engagements with partner nation security  forces, but officials stated that the Army will still employ other options  as necessary to meet combatant command requirements. The Army  is projecting costs of approximately $1 million to establish the  aforementioned language training detachment. In addition, the Army  is estimating costs of about $100,000 for soldiers to travel to train with  the 162nd Infantry Brigade. Army headquarters officials told us that  the costs for force generation of the initial regionally-aligned brigade  are not expected to be substantially different than those for a standard  infantry brigade being trained for full-spectrum operations.
The Marine Corps has organized several types of forces to meet  geographic combatant command requirements with deployed teams  ranging in size from one or two marines to larger task forces. For  example, the Marine Corps deploys tailored special-purpose marine- air-ground task forces on a rotational basis to different regions to  conduct activities with partner nation security forces. These task  forces are meant to build military capacity of partner nations, provide  regional stability, and develop lasting partnerships with nations in the  region. According to officials, the Marine Corps also has small teams,  such as 15-to-50-person security cooperation teams to conduct  military-to-military engagements, and 11-person coordination, liaison,  and assessment teams that have specific cultural knowledge of  regions and are available to help the Marine Corps component  commands with planning, coordination with partner nation forces, and  assessment of partner nation forces. In addition to these efforts, the  Marine Corps has been conducting a sustained effort with the country  of Georgia’s military, called the Georgia Deployment Program, to train  and deploy Georgian battalions for full-spectrum operations in  Afghanistan.
According to officials, the Navy builds partner nation capacity and  capability through a variety of ways using both its fleet and  expeditionary forces. For example, officials stated that personnel from  Navy ships regularly interact with partner nation security forces  through port visits and engagements with partner nation navies.
Further, the Navy conducts ship-based rotational deployments,  referred to as Partnership Stations, which include activities with  partner nation security forces such as military-to-military  engagements, exercises, and training. In addition to naval personnel,  partnership stations also can include embarked marines or mobile  training teams from other services depending on the activities planned  by the respective geographic combatant commands. Moreover, the  Navy provides expeditionary capabilities through its Naval  Expeditionary Combat Command and Maritime Civil Affairs and  Security Training Command. Specifically, the Maritime Civil Affairs  and Security Training Command, budgeted in the Navy base budget  to cost approximately $41 million for fiscal year 2012, is organized to  provide tailored mobile training teams, referred to as Security Force  Assistance Detachments, to geographic combatant commands to  conduct training with partner nation navies across a range of topics  such as small boat operations, weapons training, and leadership and  professional development.
The Air Force is standing up two mobility support advisory squadrons  with one to be aligned to U.S. Africa Command and the other to U.S.  Southern Command for the purposes of conducting capacity- and  capability-building activities with partner nations. Mobility support  advisory squadrons are expected to conduct activities in air mobility  processes, such as maintenance, air traffic control, and airfield  operations. All airmen assigned to the mobility support advisory  squadrons receive training that is tailored to the region to which the  squadron will be aligned. The mobility support advisory squadrons will  remain at homestation and deploy only elements of the unit for  specific activities as required to meet specific geographic combatant  command requirements. Officials from Air Force Mobility Command  stated that the approximate cost of standing up each squadron is just  over $2 million, which covers the organizing, training, and equipping  costs for the squadrons annually, but not the man-hours for the  personnel in the squadrons. In addition to the mobility support  advisory squadrons, the Air Force provides capabilities through  mobile training teams and Extended Training Service Specialist  teams, among others.
As previously discussed, the department’s emphasis on security force  assistance is indicative of its expectation that the geographic combatant  commands will conduct more security force assistance activities, such as  organizing, training, and advising partner nation security forces to build  their capacity and capability, and officials stated that they expect  requirements for forces capable of conducting security force assistance  activities outside of Afghanistan to increase in the future. The services’  efforts to develop capabilities are based on the current requirements from  geographic combatant commands, but without greater clarity in regard to  future requirements, service officials stated that they are not able to  assess whether their current efforts to develop force capabilities in this  area are sufficient or whether additional capabilities may be required. For  example, an Army official stated that the initial regionally-aligned force will  provide the Army valuable information in regard to the sufficiency of the  force to meet geographic combatant command requirements, the  effectiveness of the training provided for the security force assistance  mission, and the level of language proficiency required, but that future  geographic combatant command requirements would influence the scope  of the Army’s efforts to develop capabilities for this mission. Additionally,  Air Force officials said that the Air Force Campaign Support Plan is  intended to provide structure and guidance to Air Force theater planners  to support the development of future geographic combatant command  security cooperation requirements, including security force assistance,  which will then inform the Air Force’s efforts to develop security force  assistance capabilities.
section_title: Services Are Training Certain Personnel for Security Force Assistance, but Have Not Yet Fully Determined the Level of Training Required for All Security Force Assistance Activities
paragraphs: DOD Instruction 5000.68 directs the services to establish training and  education requirements for personnel conducting security force  assistance activities and to develop service-specific training and  education proficiency standards for security force assistance capabilities.  Training is a standard part of predeployment preparations for the formally  organized units, such as the Army’s regionally-aligned forces, the Air  Force’s mobility support advisory squadrons, the Navy’s security force  assistance detachments, or the Marine Corps special-purpose marine-air- ground task forces, and most of the services have established schools or  organizations that provide language, culture, and advising training to  these forces, as identified below:
The Army provides some language, culture, and advising training  through the 162nd Infantry Brigade located at Fort Polk, which was  originally stood up to train forces for advise and assist missions in Iraq  and Afghanistan. The 162nd is primarily focused on training advisors  deploying to Afghanistan and will also assume the mission to train the  Army’s regionally-aligned brigade. As such, this organization receives  funding from both the Army’s base budget and overseas contingency  operations funds at a cost of $40.1 million for fiscal year 2012. The  162nd also can provide training to other Army teams that will engage  with partner nation security forces at the request of unit commanders.
The Marine Corps provides tailored language, culture, and advising  training through the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group. This  group, budgeted to cost about $3.1 million in fiscal year 2012,  provides training to the Marine Corps’ special-purpose marine-air- ground task forces and security cooperation teams, among others.
The Air Force provides language, culture, and advising training  through the Air Advisor Academy, which was initially stood up to train  airmen deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan as advisors. According to  Air Force headquarters officials, the Air Advisor Academy will provide  training for up to 1,500 airmen in fiscal year 2013, including advisors  deploying to Afghanistan, mobility support advisory squadrons, mobile  training teams, and extended training service specialist teams, among  others. The total cost for the Air Advisor Academy for fiscal year 2012  is expected to be approximately $6.4 million.
The Navy provides its forces with language and culture training prior  to every deployment, but has not established specific advisor training.  According to Navy headquarters officials, because sailors typically  deploy on ships for extended periods of time, the service trains them  for a broad range of missions in accordance with the Fleet Readiness  Training Program and based on the requirements set forth by the  geographic combatant commands. As a result, Navy officials said that  they would need clear security force assistance requirements from the  geographic combatant commands to train forces to meet those  specific requirements. Unlike the other services, the Navy’s method  for training depends less on training at schools and more on learning  required skills from superiors while on the job. Officials added that,  since sailors can train their subordinates, they can also deliver  subject-matter training to partner nation security forces, if necessary.  However, expeditionary personnel assigned to the Maritime Civil  Affairs and Security Training Command may receive training in  methods of instruction and in the course topics they will be teaching  while deployed.
Further, DOD and service officials noted that theater security cooperation  planners’ courses are available to personnel who may assist or be  responsible for the geographic combatant command and service  component command planning efforts. According to these officials, these  courses are intended to provide an understanding of security cooperation  planning, including some information related to security force assistance.  For example, Marine Corps officials told us that the Marine Corps offers  the Security Cooperation Planner’s Course, which is a 1-week course that  provides students with basic knowledge regarding security cooperation  planning systems and operations, as well as the statutory authorities that  allow for activities with partner nation security forces. Over the past 2  years, officials said that this course has been offered to a variety of  organizations, including personnel from all of the military services, OSD,  the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and State Department.  Additionally, according to Air Force officials, the Air Force has recently  established an online course intended to provide Air Force planners and  air advisors education and training in the areas of irregular warfare,  security cooperation, security force assistance, and theater campaign  planning, among other topics, and is developing a 1-week in-residence  course at the Air Advisor Academy, projected to begin in September  2012.
However, while personnel complete predeployment training prior to  deploying on missions, and the services have established the various  training and education efforts discussed above, the services have not yet  fully determined what level of training should be provided for forces  deploying on an as-needed basis for shorter-term missions, such as for  mobile training teams or for teams of individuals formed and deployed to  conduct individual activities. The Air Force is in the process of developing  an instruction that identifies which airmen will get training from the Air  Advisor Academy and for which missions, and officials said that, at a  minimum, the instruction will likely direct that all security force assistance  missions will require some air advisor training. An Army headquarters  official stated that it is difficult to determine which missions should require  advisor training for the purposes of establishing an official requirement.  For example, regionally-aligned forces deploying for months at a time to  provide training to partner nation forces in Africa and a team of four  individuals from Army Training and Doctrine Command deploying to  conduct a 1-week classroom training could both potentially be considered  security force assistance, but training and mission requirements could be  significantly different, and it is unclear whether the latter would really  require training on advising, language, and culture skills. Moreover, the  Army has established security force assistance mission essential tasks  and incorporated them into their mission essential tasks for full-spectrum  operations. Similarly, the Marine Corps has published a security  cooperation training and readiness manual, which includes training tasks  required for personnel deploying on security cooperation missions,  including security force assistance. Army and Marine Corps officials  stated that personnel who do not attend the formal training provided by  the 162nd Infantry Brigade and the Marine Corps Security Cooperation  Group are still expected to be trained for those tasks based on unit  commanders’ analysis of the mission.
section_title: Services Have Taken Steps to Track Uniformed Military Personnel with Security Force Assistance Training and Experience, but Face Challenges Identifying What Should Be Tracked
paragraphs: DOD Instruction 5000.68 also directs the services to identify and track  individuals who have completed security force assistance-related training,  education, or experience in the Defense Readiness Reporting System  with a relevant skill-designator indicating their security force assistance  qualifications. The services are taking steps to approach this requirement  in a variety of ways, including the following:
The Army has established eight different Personnel Development Skill  Identifiers that it believes are related to security force assistance,  including an identifier for uniformed military personnel who have  completed certain advisor training, such as that provided by the 162nd  Infantry Brigade. These identifiers are self-reported or reported by unit  commands to Army Human Resources Command and are recorded  on each individual soldier’s personnel record. In addition to identifying  personnel through these identifiers, Army headquarters officials stated  that they can identify individuals who have completed certain security  force assistance deployments through existing personnel systems,  such as deployments as advisors to Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result,  these officials believe that the Army’s current efforts to track  individuals for security force assistance are sufficient until new  requirements are determined by the geographic combatant  commands or OSD.
The Marine Corps has a database to track uniformed military  personnel training and experience and will eventually be using that to  track security force assistance and irregular warfare skills in  accordance with those identified in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs  Instruction 3210.06 on irregular warfare. According to both OSD and  service officials, irregular warfare skills would include those skills  needed to conduct security force assistance. Marine Corps officials  stated that the Marine Corps is still evaluating different options of  tracking deployment experience for security force assistance missions  and has not yet identified how it will track skills related to advising.
The Navy has personnel systems that would allow them to track  security force assistance training and experience—to include  qualification designators, Navy enlisted classifications, subspecialty  codes, and community designators—but is not currently so. According  to Navy officials, greater clarity is needed from OSD on what skills  should be tracked and officials further stated that it is difficult to  identify and track individuals who may conduct some security force  assistance activities as part of a fleet rotation. For example, a sailor  may conduct a single activity with a partner nation navy while aboard  a ship, but it is not clear whether that experience merits tracking.
The Air Force plans to track uniformed military personnel with security  force assistance training and experience within its Career Path Tool  database as part of its broader effort to track irregular warfare  capabilities, in accordance with the aforementioned instruction on  irregular warfare. Air Force headquarters officials said that they are  not tracking personnel yet because the system has to be updated to  allow for such tracking.
As noted above, the services are taking steps to track uniformed military  personnel, but service officials have cited general challenges with regard  to tracking, such as how best to capture the varying degrees of  experience individuals may have in conducting security force assistance  (e.g., a 2-week mission training partner nation security forces in Africa  versus a year-long deployment as an advisor in Afghanistan). OSD  Personnel and Readiness and the services are currently working together  as part of the Security Force Assistance Working Group to discuss what  types of skills, training, and experience should be tracked and in what  systems, but these efforts are still in progress. Moreover, OSD Personnel  and Readiness, in coordination with the services, is working to finalize a  DOD Instruction that will define the process for tracking irregular warfare  and security force assistance skills. According to officials, the instruction  is expected to be completed before the end of fiscal year 2012.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Security force assistance has become an increasingly important and  distinct element of U.S. military strategy, both in Afghanistan and  elsewhere in the world, as the United States seeks to enable partner  nations to assist in countering terrorism and establishing and maintaining  regional security. In anticipation of its growing importance, DOD has  taken steps intended to define and institutionalize the security force  assistance concept throughout the department. We recognize this  concept is still evolving, but the challenges we have identified suggest  that additional clarification is necessary to better position stakeholders to  plan for and prepare forces to execute security force assistance activities  to meet the department’s strategic goals. DOD needs to do more to  define its intent for security force assistance, including the level of effort  that geographic combatant commands should devote to security force  assistance, how that intent should influence the geographic combatant  commands’ strategies, and what additional actions are required by the  geographic combatant commands to plan for and conduct security force  assistance beyond their existing security cooperation efforts. This  clarification, along with an increased ability to track security force  assistance activities, would facilitate the geographic combatant  commands’ planning efforts and would increase DOD’s visibility over  security force assistance efforts to ensure that resources are being  directed toward identified strategic goals and measure progress in  implementing various initiatives. Furthermore, these steps would inform  the services’ efforts to ensure that the capabilities that they are  developing and thus, the resources that they are investing, are  appropriate and adequate to meet future security force assistance  requirements.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To instill a common understanding of security force assistance throughout  DOD and therefore better guide the geographic combatant commands’  and services’ efforts to plan for and prepare forces to execute security  force assistance, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in  consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity  Conflict and the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff J-5, in their positions as  cochairs of the Security Force Assistance Steering Committee, to develop  or modify existing guidance that further defines the department’s intent for  security force assistance and what additional actions are required by the  geographic combatant commands to plan for and conduct security force  assistance beyond their existing security cooperation efforts. For  example, DOD could include more-specific direction as to how to  determine which activities should be considered security force assistance,  how they should be discussed in plans, and whether an increased level of  effort, such as increased scope, nature, or frequency of activities, is  required.
To facilitate the management and oversight of resources being directed  toward building partner capacity and capability, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff, take actions to ensure that updates to the Global Theater  Security Cooperation Management Information System and the business  rules being developed provide a mechanism and guidance to  stakeholders to specifically identify and track security force assistance  activities.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with  our two recommendations, adding that it believes that the department has  taken some steps that it believes address some of the issues identified in  our report. The full text of DOD’s written comments is reprinted in  appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments, which were  incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low  Intensity Conflict and the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff J-5, in their positions  as cochairs of the Security Force Assistance Steering Committee, to  develop or modify existing guidance that further defines the department’s  intent for security force assistance and what additional actions are  required by the geographic combatant commands to plan for and conduct  security force assistance beyond their existing security cooperation  efforts. In its comments, DOD stated that additional guidance to the  geographic combatant commands and services would be useful to  promote understanding of security force assistance. However, the  department believes that recently published strategic and planning  guidance incorporates security force assistance planning requirements.  Specifically, it noted that the recently released Strategic Guidance,  Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense  emphasizes the importance of security force assistance planning and  execution. Further, DOD stated that the recently released Theater  Campaign Planning Planner’s Handbook provides additional direction to  the geographic combatant commands to incorporate security force  assistance into campaign planning. DOD added that it will review other  existing guidance for necessary modifications, as required.
We recognized in our report that DOD has issued various documents that  emphasize the importance of building partner nation capacity and  capability through security force assistance activities. Notwithstanding this  guidance, we found that the geographic combatant commands continued  to lack a common understanding of security force assistance, what  additional efforts may be needed on their part to meet the department’s  intent for security force assistance, and the value of distinguishing  security force assistance from other security cooperation activities. While  we agree that the Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizes the  importance of security force assistance in broad terms, it does not specify  the level of effort that the geographic combatant commands should  devote to security force assistance or how the emphasis on security force  assistance should influence the geographic combatant commands’  strategies. Further, we note that the handbook that DOD cited focused on  theater campaign planning in general and does not specifically address  planning for security force assistance as a distinct activity. Therefore, we  continue to believe that more specific guidance is necessary.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the Joint Staff to ensure that updates to the  Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System  and the business rules being developed provide a mechanism and  guidance to stakeholders to specifically identify and track security force  assistance activities. The department stated that the Global Theater  Security Cooperation Management Information System will be an  important tool in identifying and tracking security force assistance  activities. While DOD concurred that the global system and the business  rules being developed should provide a mechanism to specifically identify  and track these activities, it did not agree that it is the responsibility of the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct this. Instead, DOD noted  that a Governance Council, chaired by members from the Deputy  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability  Operations, the Joint Staff J-5, and the Joint Staff J-8, maintains oversight  and management of the system. In light of DOD’s comments, we have  modified our recommendation to reflect both Office of the Secretary of  Defense and the Joint Staff’s shared role in overseeing the development  of this system.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the  Commandant of the Marine Corps. The report also is available at no  charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report  are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent that the Department of Defense (DOD) has  established its concept for conducting security force assistance, including  defining the term and identifying actions needed to plan for and prepare  forces to execute security force assistance, we reviewed relevant existing  DOD doctrine, policy, and guidance, including the DOD Instruction  5000.68 Security Force Assistance. We also examined the Joint  Requirements Oversight Council Security Force Assistance Change  Recommendation Memorandum, which identified actions to be taken and  organizations of primary responsibility and support to implement security  force assistance across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel,  leadership and education, personnel and facilities spectrum. Additionally,  we reviewed the department’s Security Force Assistance Lexicon  Framework document to understand the department’s attempt to further  explain and clarify the security force assistance concept. We also met  with officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special  Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Joint Staff J-5 Strategic Plans  and Policy directorate, and Joint Staff J-7 Operational Plans and Force  Development directorate to discuss the security force assistance concept,  its definition, the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders identified in the  DOD Instruction and the Joint Staff Security Force Assistance Change  Recommendation Memorandum, and what other steps the department  has taken to implement the security force assistance concept. In addition,  we met with Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance and  U.S. Special Operations Command officials to discuss their  understanding of security force assistance and role in the department’s  efforts to institutionalize the concept. Further, we examined the charter for  the Security Force Assistance Steering Committee and Working Group,  which the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low- Intensity Conflict and Joint Staff J-5 cochair, to determine the group’s  responsibilities to implement and oversee security force assistance efforts  throughout the department.
To identify the extent to which the geographic combatant commands have  taken steps to plan for and conduct security force assistance, and what  challenges, if any, they face, we met with officials from U.S. Africa  Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S.  Southern Command and selected military service component commands.  In these meetings, we discussed their understanding of the security force  assistance concept, their responsibilities as outlined in the DOD  Instruction, as well as their efforts to plan for, request forces for, and track  theater security cooperation activities. These commands were selected  and visited as a nonprobability sample of four of the six geographic  combatant commands. U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern  Command and their service component commands were selected  because the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) suggested them as  primary examples of geographic combatant commands conducting  security force assistance in a peacetime environment—the expected  environment of future security force assistance efforts. The two other  commands—U.S. Central Command and U.S. European Command and  their service component commands—were selected because of  efficiencies gained by colocation to other site visits. We examined  relevant geographic combatant command and service component  command planning documentation, such as theater campaign plans and  strategy briefings related to theater security cooperation planning,  requirements, and activities being conducted in their respective areas of  responsibility. We further met with geographic combatant command and  Joint Staff J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy officials regarding the Theater  Security Cooperation Management Information System to discuss how  the system is intended to be used, and reviewed documentation related to  its development. Finally, we reviewed relevant statutory authorities and  Defense Security Cooperation Agency and geographic combatant  command guidance documents outlining available statutory authorities to  determine the authorities and funding available for the execution of  security force assistance, and discussed these authorities and related  challenges with geographic combatant command and service component  command officials.
To identify what steps the services have taken to organize and train  general purpose forces to be capable of conducting security force  assistance, and what challenges, if any, they face, we met with officials  from the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force  who were responsible for implementing security force assistance within  each service, including officials from each service’s headquarters, force  providers and training commands, and other service organizations related  to security force assistance. We examined relevant service-level  documentation, which included doctrine, policy and guidance, briefings,  and white papers related to security force assistance. We also discussed  with each service their efforts to implement the security force assistance  concept, their understanding of the concept, service capabilities being  developed, and any potential cost factors related to security force  assistance. To understand how the services are organizing for security  force assistance and what capabilities are being provided, we met with  officials from the service headquarters and service force providers,  including U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Marine Forces Command,  U.S. Fleet Forces Command, U.S. Air Force Combat Command, and U.S.
Air Force Mobility Command. To understand the training and education  that is being provided to service personnel who conduct security force  assistance missions, we met with officials about service-level training and  education from the U.S. Army 162nd Infantry Brigade, U.S. Marine Corps  Security Cooperation Group, and the U.S. Air Force Air Advisor Academy,  and discussed joint training standards with U.S. Special Operations  Command. In addition, we met with service officials to discuss each  service’s efforts to track uniformed military personnel with security force  assistance-related skills, training, or experience. We also met with the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to  discuss DOD efforts to establish policy and guidance for tracking  uniformed military personnel with security force assistance skills, training,  and experience departmentwide.
We interviewed the following organizations during our review:
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special  Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, Arlington, Va.
Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness, Arlington, Va.
Office of Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation, Arlington, Va.
Security Cooperation Reform Task Force, Arlington, Va.
Joint Staff, Operations (J-3), Arlington, Va.   Joint Staff, Chief of Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), Arlington, Va.  Joint Staff, Chief of Joint Exercises and Training Division (J-7),  Arlington, Va.
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Arlington, Va.
Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Fort  Leavenworth, Kans.
Unified and Geographic Combatant Commands
U.S. Africa Command, Stuttgart, Germany
U.S. Central Command, Tampa, Fla.
U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany
U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Fla.
U.S. Special Operations Command, Tampa, Fla.
Service and Unified Component Commands
U.S. Army Africa Command, Vicenza, Italy
U.S. Army European Command, Heidelberg, Germany
U.S. Army South, Fort Sam Houston, Tex.
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa, Stuttgart, Germany
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command, Tampa, Fla.
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe, Stuttgart, Germany
U.S. Marine Corps Forces South, Miami, Fla.
U.S. Naval Forces Africa, Naples, Italy
U.S. Naval Forces Europe, Naples, Italy
U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, Mayport, Fla.
U.S. Air Force Africa, Ramstein, Germany
U.S. Air Force Europe, Ramstein, Germany
U.S. Air Force South, Tucson, Ariz.
Special Operations Command Central, Tampa, Fla.
Special Operations Command Europe, Stuttgart, Germany
Special Operations Command South, Miami, Fla.
Department of the Army, Military Operations-Security and Stability  Office, Arlington, Va.
Army Security Force Assistance Proponent Office, Fort  Leavenworth, Kans.
U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Security Assistance Training Management Organization, Fort  Bragg, N.C.
162nd Infantry Training Brigade, Fort Polk, La.
Headquarters Marine Corps, International Affairs Branch,  Arlington, Va.
Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Virginia Beach, Va.
Marine Forces Command, Norfolk, Va.
Center for Irregular Warfare Integration Division, Quantico, Va.
Naval Operations N52 and N523, Arlington, Va.
U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Va.
Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Virginia Beach, Va.
Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command, Virginia  Beach, Va.
Naval Education and Training Command, Pensacola, Fla.
Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity,  Pensacola, Fla.
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Irregular Warfare Integration,  Arlington, Va.
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Secretary of the Air Force  International Affairs, Arlington, Va.
Air Combat Command, Langley, Va.
Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.
Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base,  Tex.
We focused on the department’s efforts to plan for and conduct security  force assistance in areas of operation other than Afghanistan because  DOD’s focus on security force assistance is more long term than current  operations in Afghanistan and the scope of the mission in that country  may not be typical of efforts worldwide. Finally, we understand the State  Department is a critical stakeholder in U.S. security force assistance  efforts, but our review focused solely on DOD efforts to plan for and  institutionalize security force assistance within the general purpose force.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to May 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, James A. Reynolds, Assistant  Director; Grace Coleman; Mark Dowling; Kasea Hamar; Ashley Lipton;  Charles Perdue; Michael Pose; and John Van Schaik made key  contributions to this report.