National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration
Published: 2010-06-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Recent terrorist events such as the attempted bomb attacks in New York's Times Square and aboard an airliner on Christmas Day 2009 are reminders that national security challenges have expanded beyond the traditional threats of the Cold War Era to include unconventional threats from nonstate actors. Today's threats are diffuse and ambiguous, making it difficult--if not impossible--for any single federal agency to address them alone. Effective collaboration among multiple agencies and across federal, state, and local governments is critical. This testimony highlights opportunities to strengthen interagency collaboration by focusing on four key areas: (1) developing overarching strategies, (2) creating collaborative organizations, (3) developing a well-trained workforce, and (4) improving information sharing. It is based on GAO's body of work on interagency collaboration.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Federal agencies have an opportunity to enhance collaboration by addressing long-standing problems and better positioning the U.S. government to respond to changing conditions and future uncertainties. Progress has been made in enhancing interagency collaboration, but success will require leadership commitment, sound plans that set clear priorities, and measurable goals. The agencies involved in national security will need to make concerted efforts to forge strong and collaborative partnerships, and seek coordinated solutions that leverage expertise and capabilities across communities. Today, challenges exist in four key areas: 1) Developing and implementing overarching strategies. Although some agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies on national security-related issues, GAO's work has identified cases where U.S. efforts have been hindered by the lack of information on roles and responsibilities of organizations involved or coordination mechanisms. 2) Creating collaborative organizations. Organizational differences--including differences in agencies' structures, planning processes, and funding sources--can hinder interagency collaboration. Agencies lack adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate this collaboration during planning and execution of programs and activities. 3) Developing a well-trained workforce. Agencies do not always have the right people with the right skills in the right jobs at the right time to meet the challenges they face--including having a workforce that is able to quickly address crises. Moreover, agency performance management systems often do not recognize or reward interagency collaboration, and training is needed to understand other agencies' processes or cultures. 4) Sharing and integrating national security information across agencies. U.S. government agencies do not always share relevant information with their national security partners due to a lack of clear guidelines for sharing information and security clearance issues. Additionally, incorporating information drawn from multiple sources poses challenges to managing and integrating that information. Strengthening interagency collaboration--with leadership as the foundation--can help transform U.S. government agencies and create a more unified, comprehensive approach to national security issues at home and abroad.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss some of the key challenges for  interagency collaboration on national security matters and to share with  you ways U.S. government agencies could implement actions to enhance  collaboration. Recent terrorist events such as the attempted bomb attacks  in New York’s Times Square and on board an airliner on Christmas Day  2009 are reminders that national security challenges have expanded  beyond the traditional threats of the Cold War era to include  unconventional threats from nonstate actors. Today’s threats are diffuse  and ambiguous. They include terrorist threats from extremist groups,  cyber attacks, drug trafficking, infectious diseases, and energy threats.  Moreover, they arise from multiple sources and are interrelated, which  makes it difficult, if not impossible, for any single agency to effectively  address alone. Effective collaboration among multiple agencies and across  federal, state, and local governments is critical. The May 2010 National  Security Strategy highlighted the need to take a whole of government  approach to strengthening national capacity.
Congress and other organizations are becoming increasingly focused on  this topic and have recently taken steps to improve interagency  collaboration. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2008 directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan to  improve and reform the Department of Defense’s (DOD) participation in  and contribution to the interagency coordination process on national  security issues. In the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2009, Congress gave authority to the Secretaries of  Defense and State and the Administrator of U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID) to jointly establish an advisory panel to advise,  review, and make recommendations on ways to improve coordination  among those agencies on national security issues, including reviewing  their respective roles and responsibilities. Most recently, National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required the President to designate  an executive agency to commission a study on a system for the career  development and management of interagency national security  professionals. A number of commissions, research institutions, and  congressionally mandated studies have also put forth proposals to reform  part or all of the national security system. These proposals range from far- reaching restructuring of the system to smaller-scale proposals such as  increasing resources for civilian agencies. A recurring theme of many of  these proposals is the need for change to improve interagency  collaboration on national security matters.
Last September, we issued a report discussing key issues and actions  necessary to enhance interagency collaboration on national security for  Congress and the administration to consider in their oversight and  management agendas. For that report, we reviewed GAO’s body of work  on interagency collaboration related to national security, which includes  reports and testimonies on a variety of issues, including stabilization and  reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD’s establishment of  U.S. Africa Command to build partner capacity, planning and coordination  for an influenza pandemic, information sharing, critical infrastructure  protection, disaster recovery, acquisitions and contracting, strategic  planning, human capital, and foreign aid reform. We also examined studies  from U.S. government agencies and research institutions. Since that time,  we have continued to conduct work on various aspects of interagency  collaboration. We are conducting ongoing reviews of U.S. Africa  Command’s activity planning with interagency partners, U.S. Southern  Command’s efforts to enhance and sustain collaboration with interagency  partners, interagency collaboration on counterpiracy efforts, and  professional development activities intended to improve the federal  workforce’s ability to collaborate on national security issues. We plan to  report on these issues later this year. My statement today will highlight  opportunities to strengthen interagency collaboration by focusing on four  key areas: (1) developing overarching strategies, (2) creating collaborative  organizations, (3) developing a well-trained workforce, and (4) improving  information sharing. I will also discuss the importance of sustained  leadership in addressing these areas. This statement is based on  completed GAO work, which was performed in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Opportunities for Strengthening Interagency Collaboration
paragraphs: National security threats have evolved and require involvement beyond the  traditional agencies of DOD, the Department of State, and USAID. The  Departments of Homeland Security, Energy, Justice, the Treasury,  Agriculture, Commerce, and Health and Human Services are now a bigger  part of the equation. What has not yet evolved are the mechanisms that  agencies use to coordinate national security activities such as developing  overarching strategies to guide planning and execution of missions, or  sharing and integrating national security information across agencies. The  absence of effective mechanisms can be a hindrance to achieving national  security objectives. Within the following key areas, a number of challenges   exist that limit the ability of U.S. government agencies to work  collaboratively in responding to national security issues. Our work has  also identified actions that agencies can take to enhance collaboration.
subsections: section_title: Developing and Implementing Overarching, Integrated Strategies to Achieve National Security Objectives
paragraphs: Although some agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies  on national security-related issues, our work has identified cases where  U.S. efforts have been hindered by the lack of information on roles and  responsibilities of organizations involved or the lack of mechanisms to  coordinate their efforts. National security challenges covering a broad  array of areas, ranging from preparedness for an influenza pandemic to  Iraqi governance and reconstruction, have necessitated using all elements  of national power—including diplomatic, military, intelligence,  development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support. These  elements fall under the authority of numerous U.S. government agencies,  requiring overarching strategies and plans to enhance agencies’ abilities to  collaborate with each other. Strategies can help agencies develop mutually  reinforcing plans and determine activities, resources, processes, and  performance measures for implementing those strategies. The  Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) provides a strategic  planning and reporting framework intended to improve federal agencies’  performance and hold them accountable for achieving results. Effective  implementation of GPRA’s results-oriented framework requires, among  other things, that agencies clearly establish performance goals for which  they will be held accountable, measure progress towards those goals, and  determine strategies and resources to effectively accomplish the goals.  Furthermore, defining organizational roles and responsibilities and  mechanisms for coordination in these strategies can help agencies clarify  who will lead or participate in which activities and how decisions will be  made. It can also help them organize their individual and joint efforts, and  address how conflicts would be resolved.
Our prior work, as well as that by national security experts, has found that  strategic direction is required as a foundation for collaboration toward  national security goals. We have found that, for example, in the past,  multiple agencies, including the State Department, USAID, and DOD, led  separate efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq’s ministries to govern,  without overarching direction from a lead entity to integrate their efforts.
Since 2007, we have testified and reported that the lack of an overarching  strategy contributed to U.S. efforts not meeting the goal for key Iraqi  ministries to develop the capacity to effectively govern and assume  increasing responsibility for operating, maintaining, and further investing  in reconstruction projects. We recommended that the Department of  State, in consultation with the Iraqi government, complete an overall  strategy for U.S. efforts to develop the capacity of the Iraqi government.  State recognized the value of such a strategy but expressed concern about  conditioning further capacity development investment on completion of  such a strategy. Moreover, our work on the federal government’s  pandemic influenza preparedness efforts found that the Departments of  Homeland Security and Health and Human Services share most federal  leadership roles in implementing the pandemic influenza strategy and  supporting plans; however, we reported that it was not clear how this  would work in practice because their roles are unclear. The National  Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and its supporting implementation plan  describes the Secretary of Health and Human Services as being  responsible for leading the medical response in a pandemic, while the  Secretary of Homeland Security would be responsible for overall domestic  incident management and federal coordination. However, since a  pandemic extends well beyond health and medical boundaries—to include  sustaining critical infrastructure, private-sector activities, the movement of  goods and services across the nation and the globe, and economic and  security considerations—it is not clear when, in a pandemic, the Secretary  of Health and Human Services would be in the lead and when the  Secretary of Homeland Security would lead. This lack of clarity on roles  and responsibilities could lead to confusion or disagreements among  implementing agencies that could hinder interagency collaboration.
Furthermore, a federal response could be slowed as agencies resolve their  roles and responsibilities following the onset of a significant outbreak.
We have also issued reports recommending that U.S. government agencies,  including DOD, the State Department, and others, develop or revise  strategies to incorporate desirable characteristics for strategies for a range  of programs and activities. These include humanitarian and development  efforts in Somalia, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,  foreign assistance strategy, law enforcement agencies’ role in assisting  foreign nations in combating terrorism, and meeting U.S. national security  goals in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. In commenting on  drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred with our  recommendations. Officials from one organization—the National  Counterterrorism Center—noted that at the time of our May 2007 report  on law enforcement agencies’ role in assisting foreign nations in  combating terrorism, it had already begun to implement our  recommendations.
section_title: Creating Collaborative Organizations That Facilitate Integrated National Security Approaches
paragraphs: Organizational differences—including differences in agencies’ structures,  planning processes, and funding sources—can hinder interagency  collaboration. Agencies lack adequate coordination mechanisms to  facilitate this collaboration during planning and execution of programs  and activities. U.S. government agencies, such as the Department of State,  USAID, and DOD, among others, spend billions of dollars annually on  various diplomatic, development, and defense missions in support of  national security. Achieving meaningful results in many national security– related interagency efforts requires coordinated efforts among various  actors across federal agencies; foreign, state, and local governments;  nongovernment organizations; and the private sector. Given the number of  agencies involved in U.S. government national security efforts, it is  important that there be mechanisms to coordinate across agencies.  Without such mechanisms, the results can be a patchwork of activities that  waste scarce funds and limit the overall effectiveness of federal efforts.
A good example of where agencies involved in national security activities  define and organize their regions differently involves DOD’s regional  combatant commands and the State Department’s regional bureaus. Both  are aligned differently in terms of the geographic areas they cover, as  shown in figure 1. As a result of differing structures and areas of coverage,  coordination becomes more challenging and the potential for gaps and  overlaps in policy implementation is greater. Moreover, funding for  national security activities is budgeted for and appropriated by agency,  rather than by functional area (such as national security), resulting in  budget requests and congressional appropriations that tend to reflect  individual agency concerns. Given these differences, it is important that  there be mechanisms to coordinate across agencies.
In addition to regional bureaus, the State Department is organized to  interact through U.S. embassies located within other countries. As a result  of these differing structures, our prior work and that of national security  experts has found that agencies must coordinate with a large number of  organizations in their regional planning efforts, potentially creating gaps  and overlaps in policy implementation and leading to challenges in  coordinating efforts among agencies.
Given the differences among U.S. government agencies, developing  adequate coordination mechanisms is critical to achieving integrated  approaches. In some cases, agencies have established effective  mechanisms. For example, DOD’s U.S. Africa Command had undertaken  efforts to integrate personnel from other U.S. government agencies into its  command structure because the command is primarily focused on  strengthening security cooperation with African nations and creating  opportunities to bolster the capabilities of African partners, which are  activities that traditionally require coordination with other agencies.  However, in other cases, challenges remain. For example, we reported in  May 2007 that DOD had not established adequate mechanisms to facilitate  and encourage interagency participation in the development of military  plans developed by the combatant commanders. Furthermore, we noted  that inviting interagency participation only after plans have been  formulated is a significant obstacle to achieving a unified government  approach in the planning effort. In that report, we suggested that Congress  require DOD to develop an action plan and report annually on steps being  taken to achieve greater interagency participation in the development of  military plans.
Moreover, we reported in March 2010 that DOD has many strategy, policy,  and guidance documents on interagency coordination of its homeland  defense and civil support mission; however, DOD entities do not have fully  or clearly defined roles and responsibilities because key documents are  outdated, are not integrated, or are not comprehensive. More specifically,  conflicting directives assigned overlapping law enforcement support  responsibilities to three different DOD entities, creating confusion as to  which DOD office is actually responsible for coordinating with law  enforcement agencies. DOD’s approach to identifying roles and  responsibilities and day-to-day coordination processes could also be  improved by providing relevant information in a single, readily-accessible  source. This source could be accomplished through a variety of formats  such as a handbook or a Web-based tool and could provide both DOD and  other agencies a better understanding of each other as federal partners  and enable a unified and institutionalized approach to interagency  coordination. We recommended, and DOD agreed, that the department  update and integrate its strategy, policy, and guidance; develop a partner  guide; and implement key practices for management of homeland defense  and civil support liaisons.
We have reported other instances in which mechanisms are not formalized  or fully utilized. For example, we found that collaboration between DOD’s  Northern Command and an interagency planning team on the development  of the command’s homeland defense plan was largely based on the  dedicated personalities involved and informal meetings. Without  formalizing and institutionalizing the interagency planning structure, we  concluded efforts to coordinate may not continue when personnel move  on to their next assignments. We made several recommendations, and  DOD generally concurred, that the department take several actions to  address the challenges it faces in its planning and interagency  coordination efforts.
In recent years we have issued reports recommending that the Secretaries  of Defense, State, and Homeland Security and the Attorney General take a  variety of actions to address creating collaborative organizations,  including taking actions to    provide implementation guidance to facilitate interagency  participation and develop clear guidance and procedures for  interagency efforts,    develop an approach to overcome differences in planning processes,   create coordinating mechanisms, and   clarify roles and responsibilities.
In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred  with our recommendations. In some cases, agencies identified planned  actions to address the recommendations. For example, in our April 2008  report on U.S. Northern Command’s plans, we recommended that clear  guidance be developed for interagency planning efforts, and DOD stated  that it had begun to incorporate such direction in its major planning  documents and would continue to expand on this guidance in the future.
section_title: Developing a Well-Trained Workforce
paragraphs: Federal agencies do not always have the right people with the right skills  in the right jobs at the right time to meet the challenges they face, to  include having a workforce that is able to quickly address crises. As the  threats to national security have evolved over the past decades, so have  the skills needed to prepare for and respond to those threats. To  effectively and efficiently address today’s national security challenges,  federal agencies need a qualified, well-trained workforce with the skills  and experience that can enable them to integrate the diverse capabilities  and resources of the U.S. government. Our work has found that personnel  often lack knowledge of the processes and cultures of the agencies with  which they must collaborate. Some federal government agencies lack the  personnel capacity to fully participate in interagency activities and some  agencies do not have the necessary capabilities to support their national  security roles and responsibilities. For example, in June 2009, we  reported that DOD lacks a comprehensive strategic plan for addressing its  language skills and regional proficiency capabilities. Moreover, as of  September 2009, we found that 31 percent of the State Department’s  generalists and specialists in language-designated positions did not meet  the language requirements for their positions, an increase from 29 percent  in 2005. Similarly, we reported in September 2008 that USAID officials at  some overseas missions told us that they did not receive adequate and  timely acquisition and assistance support at times, in part because the  numbers of USAID staff were insufficient or because the USAID staff  lacked necessary competencies. We also reported in February 2009 that  U.S. Africa Command has faced difficulties integrating interagency  personnel into its command. According to DOD and Africa Command  officials, integrating personnel from other U.S. government agencies is  essential to achieving Africa Command’s mission because it will help the  command develop plans and activities that are more compatible with  those agencies. However, the State Department, which faced a 25 percent  shortfall in midlevel personnel, told Africa Command that it likely would  not be able to fill the command’s positions due to personnel shortages.  DOD has a significantly larger workforce than other key agencies involved  in national security activities as shown in figure 2.
Furthermore, agencies’ personnel systems often do not recognize or  reward interagency collaboration, which could diminish agency  employees’ interest in serving in interagency efforts. In June 2009 we  reviewed compensation policies for six agencies that deployed civilian  personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan, and reported that variations in policies  for such areas as overtime rate, premium pay eligibility, and deployment  status could result in monetary differences of tens of thousands of dollars  per year. The Office of Personnel Management acknowledged that laws  and agency policy could result in federal government agencies paying  different amounts of compensation to deployed civilians at equivalent pay  grades who are working under the same conditions and facing the same  risks. In another instance, we reported in April 2009 that officials from the  Departments of Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, and the  Treasury stated that providing support for State Department foreign  assistance program processes creates an additional workload that is  neither recognized by their agencies nor included as a factor in their  performance ratings.
Various tools can be useful in helping agencies to improve their ability to  more fully participate in collaboration activities. For example, increasing  training opportunities can help personnel develop the skills and  understanding of other agencies’ capabilities. We have previously testified  that agencies need to have effective training and development programs to  address gaps in the skills and competencies that they identified in their  workforces. Moreover, we issued a report in April 2010 on DOD’s Horn of  Africa task force, which found that DOD personnel did not always  understand U.S. embassy procedures in carrying out their activities. This  resulted in a number of cultural missteps in Africa because personnel did  not understand local religious customs and may have unintentionally  burdened embassies that must continuously train new staff on procedures.  We recommended, and DOD agreed, that the department develop  comprehensive training guidance or a program that augments personnel’s  understanding of African cultural awareness and working with interagency  partners. Training and developing personnel to fill new and different roles  will play a crucial part in the federal government’s endeavors to meet its  transformation challenges. Also, focusing on strategic workforce planning  can support agencies’ efforts to secure the personnel resources needed to  collaborate in interagency missions. We have found that tools like  strategic workforce planning and human capital strategies are integral to  managing resources as they enable an agency to define staffing levels,  identify critical skills needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate or  mitigate gaps between current and future skills and competencies.
In recent years we have recommended that the Secretaries of State and  Defense, the Administrator of USAID, and the U.S. Trade Representative  take a variety of actions to address the human capital issues discussed  above, such as staffing shortfalls, training, and strategic planning.  Specifically, we have made recommendations to    develop strategic human capital management systems and undertake  strategic human capital planning,  include measurable goals in strategic plans,  identify the appropriate mix of contractor and government employees  needed and develop plans to fill those needs,  seek formal commitments from contributing agencies to provide  personnel to meet interagency personnel requirements,    develop alternative ways to obtain interagency perspectives in the  event that interagency personnel cannot be provided due to resource  limitations,    develop and implement long-term workforce management plans, and  implement a training program to ensure employees develop and  maintain needed skills.
In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred  with our recommendations. In some cases, agencies identified planned  actions to address the recommendations. For example, in our April 2009  report on foreign aid reform, we recommended that the State Department  develop a long-term workforce management plan to periodically assess its  workforce capacity to manage foreign assistance. The State Department  noted in its comments that it concurred with the idea of further improving  employee skill sets and would work to encourage and implement further  training.
section_title: Sharing and Integrating National Security Information Across Agencies
paragraphs: U.S. government agencies do not always share relevant information with  their national security partners due to a lack of clear guidelines for sharing  information and security clearance issues. The timely dissemination of  information is critical for maintaining national security. Federal, state, and  local governments and private-sector partners are making progress in  sharing terrorism-related information. For example, we reported in  October 2007 that most states and many local governments had  established fusion centers—collaborative efforts to detect, prevent,  investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity—to address gaps  in information sharing. However, we found that non-DOD personnel  could not access some DOD planning documents or participate in planning  sessions because they may not have had the proper security clearances.  Moreover, because of concerns about agencies’ ability to protect shared  information or use that information properly, other agencies and private- sector partners may be hesitant to share information. For example, we  have reported that Department of Homeland Security officials expressed  concerns about sharing terrorism-related information with state and local  partners because such information had occasionally been posted on public  Internet sites or otherwise compromised. To facilitate information sharing,  it is important to establish clear guidelines, agreements, and procedures  that govern key aspects, such as how information will be communicated,  who will participate in interagency information sharing efforts, and how  information will be protected.
When agencies do share information, managing and integrating  information from multiple sources presents challenges regarding  redundancies in information sharing, unclear roles and responsibilities,  and data comparability. For example, we reported in December 2008 that  in Louisiana, reconstruction project information had to be repeatedly  resubmitted separately to state and Federal Emergency Management  Agency officials during post-Hurricane Katrina reconstruction efforts  because the system used to track project information did not facilitate the  exchange of documents. Information was sometimes lost during this  exchange, requiring state officials to resubmit the information, creating  redundancies and duplication of effort. As a result, reconstruction efforts  in Louisiana were delayed. In another instance, we reported in October  2008 that biometric data, such as fingerprints and iris images, collected in  DOD field activities such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, were not  comparable with data collected by other units or with large federal  databases that store biometric data, such as the Department of Homeland  Security biometric database or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  fingerprint database. A lack of comparable data, especially for use in DOD  field activities, prevents agencies from determining whether the  individuals they encounter are friend, foe, or neutral, and may put forces  at risk.
Since 2005, we have recommended that the Secretaries of Defense,  Homeland Security, and State establish or clarify guidelines, agreements,  or procedures for sharing a wide range of national security information,  such as planning information, terrorism-related information, and  reconstruction project information. We have recommended that such  guidelines, agreements, and procedures    define and communicate how shared information will be protected;  include provisions to involve and obtain information from nonfederal  partners in the planning process;  ensure that agencies fully participate in interagency information- sharing efforts;  identify and disseminate practices to facilitate more effective  communication among federal, state, and local agencies;  clarify roles and responsibilities in the information-sharing process;  and  establish baseline standards for data collecting to ensure  comparability across agencies.
In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred  with our recommendations. In some cases, agencies identified planned  actions to address the recommendations. For example, in our December  2008 report on the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s public  assistance grant program, we recommended that the Federal Emergency  Management Agency improve information sharing within the public  assistance process by identifying and disseminating practices that  facilitate more effective communication among federal, state, and local  entities. In comments on a draft of the report, the Federal Emergency  Management Agency generally concurred with the recommendation and  noted that it was making a concerted effort to improve collaboration and  information sharing within the public assistance process. Moreover,  agencies have implemented some of our past recommendations. For  example, in our April 2006 report on protecting and sharing critical  infrastructure information, we recommended that the Department of  Homeland Security define and communicate to the private sector what  information is needed and how the information would be used. The  Department of Homeland Security concurred with our recommendation  and, in response, has made available, through its public Web site, answers  to frequently asked questions that define the type of information collected  and what it is used for, as well as how the information will be accessed,  handled, and used by federal, state, and local government employees and  their contractors.
section_title: Importance of Sustained Leadership
paragraphs: Underlying the success of these key areas for enhancing interagency  collaboration for national security-related activities is committed and  effective leadership. Our prior work has shown that implementing large- scale change management initiatives or transformational change—which  is what these key areas should be considered—are not simple endeavors  and require the concentrated efforts of leadership and employees to  realize intended synergies and to accomplish new goals. Leadership must  set the direction, pace, and tone and provide a clear, consistent rationale  for the transformation. Sustained and inspired attention is needed to  overcome the many barriers to working across agency boundaries. For  example, leadership is important in establishing incentives to promote  employees’ interest in serving in interagency efforts.
The 2010 National Security Strategy calls for a renewed emphasis on  building a stronger leadership foundation for the long term to more  effectively advance our interests in the 21st century. Moreover, the  strategy identifies key steps for improving interagency collaboration.  These steps include more effectively ensuring alignment of resources with  our national security strategy, adapting the education and training of  national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges,  reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate  assistance programs, and other policies and programs that strengthen  coordination. National security experts also note the importance of and  need for effective leadership for national security issues. For example, a  2008 report by the Project on National Security Reform notes that the  national security system requires skilled leadership at all levels and, to  enhance interagency coordination, these leaders must be adept at forging  links and fostering partnerships all levels. Strengthening interagency  collaboration—with leadership as the foundation—can help transform  U.S. government agencies and create a more unified, comprehensive  approach to national security issues at home and abroad.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be pleased to  respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may  have.
For future information regarding this statement, please contact John H.  Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or at pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on  the last page of this statement. Key contributors to this statement are  listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of  Africa Task Force, GAO-10-504, Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2010.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency  Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions,  GAO-10-364, Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010.
Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of  National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information  Sharing, GAO-09-904SP, Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2009.
Military Training: DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better Inventory  and Requirements Data to Guide Development of Language Skills and  Regional Proficiency. GAO-09-568. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2009.
Influenza Pandemic: Continued Focus on the Nation’s Planning and  Preparedness Efforts Remains Essential. GAO-09-760T. Washington, D.C.:  June 3, 2009.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight.  GAO-09-679SP. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2009.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and  Interagency Coordination for the Commander’s Emergency Response  Program in Afghanistan. GAO-09-61. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2009.
Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency  Coordination, and Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current  Efforts. GAO-09-192. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2009.
Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges  to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies.  GAO-09-476T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2009.
Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland  Security and an Updated Accountability Framework Can Further  Enhance DEA’s Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities. GAO-09-63.  Washington, D.C.: Mar. 20, 2009.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns,  Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs  Associated with the U.S. Africa Command. GAO-09-181. Washington,  D.C.: Feb.  20, 2009.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of  Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. GAO-08-860. Washington,  D.C.: July 31, 2008.
Information Sharing: Definition of the Results to Be Achieved in  Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide  Implementation and Assess Progress. GAO-08-637T. Washington, D.C.:  July 23, 2008.
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Enhancing U.S. Partnerships in  Countering Transnational Terrorism. GAO-08-887SP. Washington, D.C.:  July 2008.
Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a  Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian  Reserve Corps. GAO-08-39. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2007.
Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some  Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.  GAO-08-35. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Stability  Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. GAO-07-549.  Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007.
Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to  Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists.  GAO-07-697. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2007.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and  Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. GAO-06-15. Washington,  D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact name above, Marie Mak, Assistant Director;  Laurie Choi; Alissa Czyz; Rebecca Guerrero; and Jodie Sandel made key  contributions to this testimony.
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