Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges
Published: 2006-05-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: To prepare for potential attacks in the United States involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Congress approved the development of National Guard Civil Support Teams (CST) tasked to identify chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive weapons; assess consequences; advise civil authorities on response measures; and assist with requests for additional support. Thus far, 36 of the 55 approved teams have been fully certified to conduct their mission. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is in the process of establishing, certifying, and planning for the long-term sustainment of the CSTs. GAO was asked to address the extent to which (1) the CSTs are ready to conduct their mission and (2) effective administrative mechanisms are in place for the CSTs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The established CSTs have thus far been trained, equipped, and staffed and have command and control mechanisms in place to conduct their domestic mission. However, confusion resulting from a lack of guidance on the types of non-WMD missions the CSTs can conduct to prepare for their WMD terrorism mission could impede coordination between state authorities and local emergency management officials on the appropriate use of the CSTs. CSTs were created to focus on assisting civil authorities in domestic WMD events. Based on its review of the CSTs' training, equipment, and staffing criteria; analysis of CST readiness data; site visits to 14 CSTs; and discussions with state, local, and federal responders, GAO found the certified teams visited to be ready to conduct their mission. NGB and the states have a clear structure for operational command and control of the CSTs. Though current NGB guidance and the CSTs' message to state and local officials emphasize the CST mission as being focused on WMD events, some CSTs have responded to non-WMD events, such as providing emergency assistance to the Gulf Coast states after the 2005 hurricanes. While NGB views such missions as useful preparations for WMD events, guidance has not been clarified to reflect the type of non-WMD missions that would be appropriate. This lack of clarity has caused confusion among state, local, and NGB officials, potentially slowing coordination efforts. Also, DOD is proposing a limited role for the CSTs to coordinate and operate with Mexican and Canadian officials in the event of a cross-border WMD incident. DOD and NGB are informally considering limited overseas missions for the teams, though they have no plans to request a further expansion of the CSTs' mission to encompass overseas operations. According to NGB and the CST commanders, some overseas missions could provide valuable experience and have a positive effect on CST readiness, while other, more demanding missions, such as supporting the warfighter, could be detrimental to the readiness and availability of the CSTs. Although NGB continues to develop a long-term sustainment plan for the CST program, going forward, it faces challenges to the administration and management of the CSTs that could impede both the progress of newer teams and the long-term sustainment of the program. NGB has made progress in establishing an administrative management structure for the CSTs, including issuing a broad CST management regulation and initiating a standardization and evaluation program. However, the CSTs face challenges in personnel, coordination plans, equipment acquisition and planning, training objectives, readiness reporting and facilities. Further, insufficient NGB guidance on state National Guard roles and responsibilities for overseeing and supporting their CSTs has resulted in varied support at the state National Guard level. NGB is aware of the challenges and has efforts under way to address them. While these challenges have not yet undermined CST readiness, if NGB efforts are unsuccessful, the progress of newer teams could be impeded and the long-term sustainment of the CST program put at greater risk.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: To help prepare the United States for potential terrorist attacks involving  weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Congress in 1998 approved the  development of federally funded, state controlled, National Guard WMD  Civil Support Teams (CSTs). The CSTs’ principal mission is to assist civil  authorities in the United States in responding to incidents involving WMD  or catastrophic terrorism, including the use of chemical, biological,  radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive weapons and agents. The  CSTs are to identify these agents and substances, assess current or  projected consequences, advise civil authorities on response measures, and  assist with requests for additional support. Like traditional National Guard  units, the CSTs are under the control of the governors of their respective  states and territories, unless they are activated for federal service, at which  time they would fall under the control of the Department of Defense  (DOD). However, unlike traditional National Guard units, these highly  specialized teams are each composed of 22 members who are on full-time  duty. The teams include both Army and Air National Guard personnel who  are divided into six sections, including command, operations,  administration/logistics, medical science, communications, and survey. The  teams possess highly technical mobile laboratory and communications  equipment to accomplish their mission.
Congress initially approved the establishment of 10 CSTs. Since 1998,  Congress has incrementally increased the number of authorized teams to  the currently approved 55: one in each state; a second team in California;  and one each in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,  and Guam. DOD established the stationing plan for the CSTs in five phases.  The National Guard Bureau (NGB), the managing organization for the  CSTs, executed the establishment, certification, and sustainment program  for the teams. Phase one comprised 10 teams; phase two 17 teams; phase  three 5 teams; phase four 12 teams; and phase five 11 teams. Each team  must be certified by the Secretary of Defense as capable of conducting its  mission. To accomplish this, each team must complete a battery of  individual and team training, receive all its authorized equipment, achieve  full staffing, pass an external evaluation by Army experts, and apply (via its  state adjutant general) to the Secretary of Defense for certification. Thirty- six teams have been certified as of May 2006; the remaining 19 will be  certified by the end of fiscal year 2007. The approximate cost for  establishing all 55 teams is $424 million, and it costs approximately   $3.4 million annually to sustain each team.
The challenges DOD faces in managing its reserve forces and allocating its  resources across services and programs are some of the many issues that  we highlighted for Congress as the nation entered the 21st century.  For  example, we issued a report in November 2004 that recommended the  establishment of readiness standards and measures for the National  Guard’s homeland security missions. In 2001, the DOD Inspector General  highlighted a number of structural and management problems with the CST  program, including the standards for certification and readiness of the  teams as well as other problems that may impede the CSTs from  conducting their mission.
We examined the operational readiness of the Army National Guard’s WMD  CSTs. Our objectives were to address (1) the extent to which the CSTs are  ready to conduct their mission and (2) the extent to which there are  effective administrative mechanisms in place for the CSTs.
To address these objectives, we reviewed the readiness criteria and  categories for the two systems used to track CST readiness. We also  incorporated these criteria into our questions as we designed and  distributed a broad data collection instrument to all 55 CSTs to collect  information regarding the status and availability of CST equipment, training  and certification, mission, coordination, and personnel. We received  complete responses from 52 CSTs. Further, we supplemented this  information with visits to 14 CSTs, and we conducted interviews with state  National Guard personnel as well as with local, State, and federal officials  who currently or will potentially work with CSTs.  In preparing the data  collection instrument, we tested the reasonableness of our questions in  discussions with the commanders of two CSTs not included in our 14 site  visits. During several of our site visits, we observed exercises, an external  evaluation, and other training events. We also compared the information  collected during our visits, including interviews; after-action reports; and  existing command, control, and coordination mechanisms, with policies  and the expectations of officials with whom the CSTs must work in the  states. We selected the site-visit sample to comprise a wide distribution of  states and territories based on such criteria as geographic distribution, age  of team, certification status, state size, and population. Additionally we  collected cost data related to the establishment and sustainment of the  CSTs from NGB, state National Guard personnel, and the CSTs themselves.  We did not independently verify cost data, but we interviewed NGB  officials who manage the data about data quality control procedures. We  determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report. Further details on our scope and methodology appear in appendix I.  We performed our work from April 2005 through March 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In response to an increase in the threat of potential terrorist attacks in the  United States involving WMDs, Congress directed the federal government  to enhance its capability to deter, prevent, respond, and recover from  terrorist attacks using such weapons. Among the resulting efforts,  Congress in fiscal year 1999 approved the development of National Guard  WMD CSTs. The CSTs are designed to support civil authorities in the event  of a domestic WMD event by identifying WMD agents and substances,  assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response  measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional support. In  describing WMD agents, DOD commonly uses the term chemical,  biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE). Like  traditional National Guard units, the CSTs are under the day-to-day control  of the governors of their respective states and territories. The CSTs can  also be activated for federal service by the President, at which time they  would fall under DOD command. Unlike traditional National Guard units,  which generally consist of part-time soldiers who conduct regular drills,  the CSTs are composed of full-time Army and Air National Guard members.  Each 22-person team is divided into six sections: command, operations,  communications, administration and logistics, medical/analytical, and  survey. The members of the CSTs are trained in their various disciplines  and operate sophisticated equipment that helps them accomplish their  mission. Table 1 shows examples of some of the tasks associated with each  CST section.
The CSTs employ military-provided equipment that is common to active  duty military units, such as chemical defense equipment and uniforms.  They also use a large variety of specialized commercial equipment, such as  the protective ensembles worn in the hazard zone and much of the teams’  laboratory equipment. The CSTs employ several vehicles for transporting  and supporting the six sections of the team. Among these are two specially  constructed vehicles: the Unified Command Suite, which contains a wide  range of radio, data, and video communications equipment, and the  Analytical Laboratory System, which contains such equipment as a gas  chromatograph/mass spectrometer for organic material analysis and a  gamma spectrometer for radiological material analysis as well as other  laboratory support equipment. Figures 1 and 2 show the Unified Command  Suite and the Analytical Laboratory System, respectively.
The equipment in the Analytical Laboratory System helps the CSTs conduct  a “presumptive identification” of a CBRNE sample. If requested by the  incident commander, the CST then transfers a sample to a Centers for  Disease Control and Prevention-approved laboratory for confirmation and  official identification.
NGB is responsible for managing the CST program and is the principal  channel of communication between DOD and the adjutant general  commanding the National Guard unit in each state. NGB also coordinates  with other DOD commands and organizations to support various aspects of  the CST program. For example, the joint service Chemical and Biological  Defense Program conducts the acquisition process for much of the CST  equipment, and the Army’s Maneuver Support Center assists in developing  CST doctrine and conducting key CST-specific training.
The Secretary of Defense must certify each CST as ready to execute its  WMD mission. This certification involves a series of staffing, equipping,  and training steps that take from 18 to 24 months. To achieve certification,  each CST must complete the following steps: 1. Have the required personnel and equipment resources and be trained to  undertake the full mission for which it is organized or designed. For  example, at least 85 percent of assigned personnel must have  completed all of their CST-specific individual training. 2. Undergo an external evaluation by Army experts according to the CST’s  approved mission training plan. 3. Notify its adjutant general that it has completed the above steps,  whereupon the adjutant general submits a request for certification to  NGB, which then reviews and forwards the request to the Army Staff  and to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
The Secretary of Defense makes the final determination of approval for  CST certification. Although certification is a onetime event, a CST that  loses a significant number of key personnel associated with command and  control or with medical and assessment capabilities that substantially  degrades the team’s ability to conduct its mission must undergo a  revalidation process. In addition, each CST undergoes an external  evaluation every 18 months, during which Army experts assess each team’s  ability to meet specific mission standards associated with all related WMD  threats.
Both civil and military responders, including the CSTs, conduct WMD  response operations in a three-tiered approach based on the National  Response Plan and the National Incident Management System. The  National Response Plan represents a comprehensive all-hazards approach  intended to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic  incidents. Fire and rescue, law enforcement, and emergency medical  personnel constitute the first tier. If the extent of the event exceeds the  ability of the first tier to manage the consequences of the situation, the  state-level civil and military forces may be activated and deployed as the  second tier. If the governor determines that the forces and resources  available in the state require additional support, then the governor may  request assistance from the President of the United States, constituting the  third tier. The CSTs are generally included in the second tier of the  response.
In addition to preparing to respond to WMD and catastrophic terrorist  events in their respective states, the CSTs also adhere to NGB’s Response  Management Plan. Under this plan, NGB monitors the readiness status of  each certified CST to ensure that at a given time, a designated number of  CSTs are always ready to respond to a national need or the need of a state  without an available CST. To facilitate planning for such responses, the plan  divides the nation into six response sectors, as shown in table 2.
Under the Response Management Plan, the CSTs are scheduled on either  “bronze,” “silver,” or “gold” status on a rotating basis. At any given time one  certified team per response region is in gold status and must be ready to  deploy a full CST (personnel and equipment) within 3 hours from its home  station to an incident site within its region, should the need arise. At the  same time, another certified team per response region is placed in silver  status. While this team is in a slightly lower state of readiness it must be  prepared to assume gold status in the event the gold team is deployed. The  remaining certified teams are in bronze status and are focused more on  training, block leave, equipment preparation, and state-directed missions.  Bronze teams must, however, be prepared to respond to incidents within  their region within 72 hours and to assume silver or gold status within 48  and 96 hours, respectively.
Because the CSTs are state-controlled units, the respective governors are  the final deployment authority for CST missions and, unless the CSTs are  federalized, they remain under the command authority of the governors  and state adjutants general. The CSTs generally conduct three types of  mission: response, stand-by, and assist. Response missions are  deployments in support of requests from local, state, or federal agencies,  such as a CST deployment to help civil authorities identify a potentially  toxic chemical left by a suspected terrorist. Stand-by missions involve  providing CST expertise at special events, such as the national political  conventions. Assist missions include a range of CST involvement, including  technical assistance, reconnaissance, or assistance with CBRNE  vulnerability assessments. For example, CST commanders and team  members may provide technical assistance by phone to a local incident  commander at a hazardous materials scene. Table 3 summarizes  deployments of the CSTs for missions other than training exercises.
As shown in table 3, CSTs deployed on response missions far less often  than on stand-by and assist missions. The table does not show total activity  by the CSTs, since the majority of their time is devoted to training in order  to maintain individual and team readiness. It also may not reflect all CST  deployments to assist in states affected by hurricanes in 2005.
Each CST costs approximately $7.7 million to establish, or approximately  $424 million to establish all 55 CSTs. This cost estimate includes initial  equipment, vehicles, personnel, and training support. Sustaining each CST  in these categories costs approximately $3.4 million a year, or $189 million  a year to sustain all 55 teams. DOD funds the establishment and  sustainment of the CST program and NGB manages most of this funding.  These estimates do not include utilities for CST facilities, which are paid by  the states via a general calculation of all state facilities requirements and  funded through NGB. The estimates also do not include federally funded  costs for construction of CST facilities, since these costs vary widely  depending on how and where the states decide to station their teams.  There are also additional federal costs associated with the CST program  that are not associated with the specific teams themselves. For example,  approximately $65 million for fiscal year 2006 is associated with the  following categories:  funding for CST airlift;  various CST-unique training courses;  equipment replenishment and modifications;  maintenance of secure Internet access for CSTs;  Unified Command Suite maintenance and support;  civilian personnel involved in CST oversight functions; and  U.S. Army personnel whose mission is to evaluate, train, and develop  doctrine for CSTs.
NGB is also in the process of creating additional units meant to follow CSTs  in response to WMD events and to be part of larger National Guard  response forces. The mission of the 17 currently authorized National Guard  CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP) is to support local,  state, and federal agencies managing the consequences of a CBRNE event  by providing capabilities to conduct personnel decontamination,  emergency medical services, and casualty search and rescue. Each CERFP  comprises approximately 186 personnel taken from existing Army and Air  National Guard medical, engineer, chemical, and other units. Unlike CST  members, CERFP personnel do not serve in their units on a full-time basis  but rather must be mobilized for duty. Like CSTs, however, CERFPs are  intended to be part of the state response to a WMD incident and can also be  federalized and placed under DOD authority.
section_title: CSTs Are Prepared to Conduct Their Mission, but the Role of Non- WMD Missions Causes Confusion
paragraphs: Based on the CSTs’ readiness measures for staffing, training, and  equipment; the data we obtained from the CSTs on each of these measures;  the process NGB has in place to maintain and monitor CST readiness; and  the discussions we had with CSTs and state, local, and federal officials in  the 14 states and territories we visited, we found that the certified CSTs  have thus far been trained, equipped, and staffed to conduct their mission.  Further, NGB, DOD, and the states have guidance in place for operational  command and control of the CSTs, specifying how and when teams will  operationally respond to a WMD event. However, confusion about the types  of non-WMD missions the CSTs conduct to help them prepare for WMD  missions could impede coordination between state, local, and federal  officials about the appropriate use of the CSTs.
subsections: section_title: Certified CSTs Are Ready to Perform Their Mission
paragraphs: The certified CSTs have thus far had the staff, equipment, and training they  need to conduct the mission that Congress intended for them. Staffing,  equipment, and training data we collected from 52 of the 55 CSTs in late  2005 confirmed this state of readiness, as did the discussions we had with  CST personnel in the 14 states and territories we visited and state National  Guard command staff, CST program managers at NGB, and state and local  emergency responders. Additionally, NGB has a clear plan to maintain,  monitor, and periodically evaluate the teams’ overall readiness. For  example, for the certified CSTs we visited, in addition to fulfilling initial  certification criteria that established strict standards for staffing,  equipment, and training readiness, these teams have passed the external  evaluations they are required to undergo every 18 months and have  continued to prepare and execute training and exercise plans to maintain  their readiness.
Based on our review of the mission and training standards for the CST  program and our interviews and observations of CST personnel during our  site visits, we found CST members to be motivated soldiers who have  mastered complex technical tasks and can perform them under duress. The  teams we visited reported that they maintain high morale in spite of the  training pressures, the need for around-the-clock availability, and the added  burden of training to perform the duties of other positions on the team so  that the CST will have added depth and flexibility. Their fitness regimen is  designed to keep them in superior physical condition, allowing them to  perform in physically challenging response environments for an extended  time. For example, teams are trained to conduct their work in fully  contained protective suits and masks while carrying their own oxygen  supply tanks on their backs. This is physically challenging even in  moderate climate conditions.
CST personnel are prepared for their mission through a regimen of  individual training that varies from 376 to 1,148 hours in the first 2 years,  depending upon the duty position. The teams complete an initial external  evaluation in order to obtain DOD certification, and they undergo a similar  evaluation every 18 months thereafter. The teams are required to conduct  12 collective training events each year to help them develop and maintain  the skills necessary to complete the WMD response tasks outlined in the  CST’s Mission Training Plan. NGB further monitors the 55 CSTs through  two readiness reporting databases that inform NGB as to how well teams  are meeting basic readiness criteria and provide detailed information on  their personnel, equipment, and training status. One of these systems is a  primary mechanism for NGB’s administration of the Response Management  Plan.
DOD assesses the teams’ proficiency in their critical tasks through external  evaluations administered by U.S. Army subject matter experts. We  observed an external evaluation for a phase one CST that required the team  to locate and identify small amounts of chemical, biological, and  radiological substances hidden inside a large warehouse, and it was able to  do this successfully. Following the event, the Army experts and the CST  members held an after-action review during which they discussed and  assessed the team’s performance in critical mission areas, highlighting  processes and procedures that worked well and those that required  improvement. Army experts administer external evaluations to each CST  every 18 months to assure both DOD and NGB of the team’s continued  readiness.
In response to our data collection instrument, 94 percent of CST  commanders characterized external evaluations as an accurate indicator of  their readiness. Some CST commanders who responded to our data  collection instrument said the evaluations were good measures of the basic  readiness of the teams to conduct their mission but did not adequately  assess teams for their ability to interact with and support a civilian incident  commander while at a site in company with multiple other local, state, and  possibly federal authorities. CST members told us that a multiple-agency  incident response site will be the normal circumstance for an actual CST  WMD mission. In addition to the external evaluations, the CSTs conduct a  number of exercises every year that involve other civil responders with  which they would work in the event of an actual WMD response. CST  members and state, local, and federal officials we met with reported that  these exercises are invaluable for helping all stakeholders understand each  other’s capabilities and how best to work together.
Emergency responders and state officials who work with CSTs in the states  and territories we visited gave generally positive reviews of the teams.  Reflecting mostly on their experience with the CSTs in exercises and other  coordinating venues, state and local officials we interviewed reported a  high degree of confidence in the readiness of the CSTs to conduct their  mission. They also reported that the CSTs’ ability to provide on-scene initial  identification of CBRNE substances, along with their communications  capability, exceed that of most civilian response teams and are vital assets  for WMD response in their states.
section_title: Mechanisms Are in Place for CSTs to Operationally Respond to Missions
paragraphs: NGB, DOD, and the states have guidance in place for operational command  and control of the CSTs, specifying how and when teams will operationally  respond to a WMD event. The basis of CST operational deployment  guidance is the National Response Plan and the National Incident  Management System.  States and territories we visited were in the process  of updating their emergency response plans, and these plans identify the  state National Guard’s role, and sometimes specifically the CST role, in the  response. State officials acknowledged that their plans were being revised  to conform to the National Response Plan. Officials in states and territories  we visited expressed a need to become better organized to address  homeland security and WMD threats.
CSTs have successfully tested their command and control structures by  deploying to response, stand-by, and assist missions under the authority of  their respective state governors and adjutants general. To practice  operational command and control, the CSTs also participate in various  training exercises with federal, state, local, and nongovernmental agencies  and organizations. Evaluation data on these missions and exercises are  limited and often informal. However, the information available indicates  that CSTs met NGB, state, and local expectations about coordination  command and control, and comments by state and local officials we  interviewed were overwhelmingly positive.
In addition to operations within their states, CSTs have sometimes  deployed outside their state based on requests for assistance. In these  cases, the CSTs come under the command and control of the governors and  adjutants general of the states in which they are operating. The CSTs have  also been deployed to other states based on NGB requests that they  respond to an event or disaster. For example, NGB managed the  deployment of the CSTs to states affected by hurricanes in 2005 using the  Response Management Plan to maintain enough teams in a high state of  readiness in each response region. According to after-action reports on  these events and comments from officials we interviewed during our site  visits, the CSTs were integrated into the operational command and control  of state military commands in the Gulf states, reported to incident  commanders when responding to specific events, and performed their  duties according to the response plan.
DOD also has guidance in place for operational command and control of  the CSTs in the event the teams are federalized. In such an event, the CSTs  would come under the command of DOD’s U.S. Northern Command. To  date, no CSTs have been federalized.
section_title: Role of Non-WMD Missions Causes Confusion
paragraphs: While the CSTs principally focus on responding to WMD and catastrophic  terrorist attacks, some CSTs are preparing for this mission by responding  to non-WMD events, causing confusion among civilian as well as National  Guard officials about when the CSTs should and should not be employed.  This confusion results from a lack of clear guidance interpreting the   legislation that establishes the CST mission to “prepare for or to respond  to” WMD or terrorist attacks and from DOD’s use of the term chemical,  biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) in  its  characterization of the CSTs’ official mission. In a 2004 memo, the NGB’s  Deputy Director for Domestic Operations advised all state National Guard  headquarters that approve missions for their respective CSTs to ensure that  their teams responded only to intentional uses of WMD, to terrorist attacks,  or to threatened terrorist attacks. He cautioned that the military’s formal  definition of CBRNE included unintentional events, such as accidental  hazardous materials spills, that were outside the scope of the CSTs’  mission. As part of their coordination efforts with state and local  emergency management officials, CST members highlight the WMD and  catastrophic terrorism mission limitation of the CSTs. While CST  commanders and team personnel accepted this formal limitation on their  mission, they also reported that it is sometimes necessary for mission  readiness purposes to respond to events that have no connection to WMD  or terrorism. For example, 61 percent of CST commanders who responded  to our data collection instrument consider it to be part of their respective  CST’s mission to respond to CBRNE incidents that are known to be the  result of accidents or acts of nature—that is, to incidents that are not  attacks. Additionally, 92 percent of commanders who responded thought  that this type of response should be part of their mission, and many of  those with whom we met endorsed responding to non-CBRNE events as  well.
CST commanders value non-WMD and nonterrorism responses for a  variety of reasons, and NGB officials agreed. Deployments to actual  incidents, regardless of the cause, can function as a valuable means of  exercising the CSTs’ core capabilities, such as communication and  coordination with state, local, and federal responders and authorities, and  help CSTs prepare for responses to incidents that are WMD related.  Moreover, CST commanders and other officials explained that it is often  difficult to determine the cause of a destructive event until the CST arrives  on scene—only then can the possibility of terrorism be conclusively  dismissed.
The Hurricane Katrina response provides a recent example of CST  deployments that were not directly related to WMD or terrorism but  provided CSTs with real-life opportunities to exercise their capabilities to  respond to WMD events. Following an NGB request, 18 teams sent  personnel and vehicles to assist in the response effort. This assistance,  often in the form of satellite communications capabilities, enabled local  authorities to coordinate with each other as well as with state and federal  officials. For example, one southeastern CST sent personnel to establish a  communications outpost just outside the Louisiana Superdome. According  to NGB officials, there were lengthy discussions about whether these types  of responses were appropriate CST missions. They ultimately concluded  that response to large-scale disasters like Katrina were within the CSTs’  mandate to prepare for or respond to WMD or terrorism events.
The use of CSTs for missions that do not involve catastrophic terrorist acts  or WMD, as well as deployment criteria that can differ across 54 state and  territorial governments, can lead to confusion at the local level and the  potential for unmet expectations. Local responders we met in the 14 states  and territories we visited reported that they value the CSTs’ expertise and  capabilities and think that they can be put to wider use within their  communities, although they recognized the need to protect the CSTs from  overuse. But there remains no guidance that would assist CSTs or state and  local officials in understanding what types of non-WMD missions are  appropriate for the CSTs to conduct in preparing for their WMD terrorism  mission. As a result, the parameters of allowable CST missions vary across  states and among state civilian authorities, state National Guard  headquarters staff, CST commanders, and others involved in approving  CST missions. For example, some states did not acknowledge NGB’s  requests for use of their CSTs for hurricane response operations, and at  least one state refused to allow its team to participate. Following the  destruction of the space shuttle Columbia in February 2003, multiple CSTs  were involved in collecting debris across five states; but some state  authorities and CST commanders declined to assist because they did not  consider it to be a legitimate deployment. Further, in their responses to our  data collection instrument, 59 percent of CST commanders recognized a  need for their CSTs to provide operational support to local hazardous  materials teams prior to those teams’ deployment to an incident scene,  while 41 percent did not. Seventy-eight percent of commanders who  responded identified a need to support hazardous materials teams during  the response itself, while 22 percent did not.
NGB officials acknowledged that while the conduct of non-WMD specific  operations by the CSTs is a valuable way for the teams to satisfy their  mission to prepare for or respond to WMD or catastrophic terrorist attacks,  some confusion results among the CSTs and state and local officials. They  also acknowledge that NGB needs to work with DOD to clarify the types of  missions that are appropriate for CSTs to perform as part of the  preparation to respond to a WMD or catastrophic terrorist attack. A  February 2006 report by the White House on lessons learned from the  Hurricane Katrina operations recommended that the option of expanding  the role of CSTs to an all-hazards approach should be explored. Further,  DOD has requested that Congress expand the CSTs’ mission to include  man-made and natural disasters. If the types of such non-WMD missions in  which the CSTs participate are not made clear, this could exacerbate  confusion at the state and local levels about the mission of the CSTs.
section_title: DOD Plans to Expand Role of CSTs Outside the United States
paragraphs: The CSTs are currently limited to conducting operations within the borders  of the United States and its territories. However, DOD has requested that  Congress allow CSTs to operate in conjunction with officials in Mexico and  Canada in order to help accomplish their mission in states bordering these  countries. CST members and NGB and DOD officials also told us that there  have been informal discussions within DOD regarding a range of potential  overseas operations for CSTs, including training, cooperative programs  with foreign countries, prestaged support missions, as well as possibly  direct support to the warfighter. However, DOD officials could not identify  for us whether there is a validated requirement for CSTs to operate  overseas, and they told us they have no plans to request a further  expansion of the CST’s mission to encompass overseas operations.
Legislation governing the CST program specifically prohibits the CSTs from  conducting operations outside the borders of the United States or its  territories. This law emphasizes this restriction by requiring that any  request by the Secretary of Defense for a legal change be submitted with a  justification for the request and a written plan to sustain the CSTs’  capabilities. Regulations detailing the composition, management, training,  and doctrine of the CSTs explicitly define the CST mission as supporting  civil authorities at a domestic CBRNE incident site, whether the CSTs are  operating in a state or federal status.
DOD has requested that Congress allow CSTs to coordinate and operate  with Mexican and Canadian officials in the event of a cross-border WMD  incident. The CSTs in border states are currently not permitted to conduct  exercises and coordination that involve cross-border movement, which  may limit their effectiveness in planning for WMD events in their regions.  Therefore, the legislative change DOD proposed could improve the  effectiveness of state WMD emergency planning. DOD officials said that  the CSTs would be federalized in order to conduct operations across the  border.
Some CST members we spoke with during our site visits said they would  like to engage in training outside the United States in order to exploit  unique or superior training opportunities. For example, several CSTs  expressed a desire to train at facilities such as the Defense Research and  Development Center in Alberta, Canada, in order to undergo live-agent  training, which several CST members told us would significantly enhance  their training and exercise efforts. They also pointed out that the U.S.  Marine Corps’ Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force has  trained at the Canadian facility and greatly benefited as a result. CST  members with whom we spoke said that permitting the CSTs to train at  superior or unique facilities in other countries could increase their  knowledge, skills, and experience, better preparing them to execute their  mission.
DOD and NGB are also informally considering such limited overseas  missions as assisting foreign nations in developing CBRNE response teams  similar to the CSTs and prepositioning CSTs at international events, such as  the Olympics, to help provide critical monitoring and response support.  CST commanders with whom we spoke told us that limited overseas roles  for CSTs, such as foreign assistance and prestaged support missions, may  provide them valuable experience and therefore have a positive effect on  CSTs’ readiness to perform their stated mission.
During the course of our work, we heard from NGB and DOD officials and  some CST commanders that NGB and DOD have also informally  considered even more demanding overseas missions for the CSTs,  including assisting warfighting forces in such places as Iraq and  Afghanistan. DOD officials could not identify for us whether a validated  requirement exists for any of these more expansive overseas missions, and  they told us that they have no plans to request that Congress expand the  CSTs’ mission to encompass them. Should such overseas missions be  contemplated in the future, however, our review of CST capabilities, along  with our discussions with CST members, indicates that support to the  warfighter in places like Iraq and Afghanistan is not practicable because of  inappropriateness of the CSTs’ commercial-grade equipment for use in  austere conditions. Further, such operations would likely have a negative  effect on CST readiness and availability, drawing much more heavily on  existing CST equipment and personnel and reducing states’ access to CSTs,  a critical component of the domestic WMD response infrastructure.
section_title: CST Program Faces Management Challenges That Could Increase Risk to Long- term Sustainment
paragraphs: NGB has made progress in establishing an institutional management  approach to sustain the CST program once all 55 teams are certified.  However, NGB faces several challenges to the program in such areas as  staffing, coordination planning, equipment maintenance and acquisition,  training and exercise oversight, readiness reporting, facilities, and varying  state oversight and support of their CSTs. Although these challenges have  not yet affected the overall readiness of the CSTs, if the current efforts to  address them are unsuccessful, they could impede the progress of the  newer teams and increase the risk to the long-term sustainment of the  program.
subsections: section_title: NGB Is Pursuing Institutional Management Efforts
paragraphs: NGB recognizes that the CST program—with 19 teams not yet certified—is  still in the development process. In seeking to fully establish and sustain  the CST program, NGB has made progress in developing institutional  mechanisms that should facilitate standardization and continuous  improvement within individual CSTs and across the program as a whole.  For example, NGB’s CST standardization program is an attempt to  establish a baseline level of interoperability among all CSTs in critical  areas, such as training, logistics, personnel administration, and budgeting.  One of the CST program managers responsible for developing the  standardization program explained that it was initiated to ensure total  program oversight and accountability for the CSTs and to assist the states  in their CST oversight responsibility. Under the standardization program,  NGB will evaluate each CST every 18 months. This evaluation will be  coordinated with state-level command inspections that the Army requires.  Program personnel have completed a series of test visits to uncertified  CSTs, and NGB expects to begin formal evaluative visits in May 2006.
NGB has also issued a CST regulation that details the processes and  procedures for CST management. One of the CST program managers  described the regulation as a desk reference guide for state officials as well  as for the CSTs themselves. It clarifies CST operations in many areas,  including mission requests and validation, command and control,  personnel and administration, reporting requirements, funding, and  certification.
Other general management efforts NGB has led or helped coordinate  include the following:  The recent consolidation of Army-directed training and external  evaluation responsibilities for the CSTs. This should facilitate progress  and consistency across the program in terms of collective training and  external evaluations.
Establishment of working groups at both the CST and program  management levels to facilitate improvements in doctrine, organization,  training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities for  the CST program.
Development and oversight of doctrine and other guidance to assist the  establishment of the 55 CSTs. In creating this doctrine and guidance,  NGB and the Army organization responsible for writing the doctrine  have sought to incorporate lessons learned by the teams from the first  few phases of the program as they established themselves in their  respective states and territories.
Further information on DOD management efforts related to the CSTs can  be found in appendix II.
subsections: section_title: CSTs Struggle to Fully Staff Teams
paragraphs: NGB faces several challenges to the CST program that could impede the  progress of the newer teams as well as hinder the long-term sustainment of  the CST program. One challenge is that CSTs struggle to maintain their  official allotment of 22 fully trained, mission-capable personnel because of  turnover, team structure, and retention challenges.
NGB officials reported that CST positions exhibit an annual turnover rate  of 25 to 35 percent. This is due to team members departing after their tours  are complete, dismissal of team members for a variety of reasons, and  reassignments within teams to replace departed personnel. After vacant  positions are filled, new CST members are away from their teams for the  first year, satisfying training requirements. Once they return they must be  integrated into the team’s collective exercises and other existing  operations. As a result, CSTs sometimes conduct their missions with less  than full unit strength, and 75 percent of CST commanders responding to  our data collection instrument reported that the ability of CSTs to perform  their mission is adversely affected by the lack of available personnel  because of training, leave, and other manpower issues. However, the  commanders also said that their teams remain ready to conduct their  mission, reporting, for example, that a CST can perform its mission with  less than 22 people as long as other members of the team can substitute for  a gap.
The CST structure also creates a staffing challenge because few of the  advanced military occupational specialties on the team are represented by  more than one person. For example, the nuclear medical science officer,  who is responsible for operating the CST’s mobile laboratory and is critical  to the CST’s ability to identify CBRNE substances, is the only member of  the team with that special skill. Likewise, there is a single physician’s  assistant and a single modeler assigned to each team. If these or other  highly technical positions remain vacant for an extended period, the team  must rely upon cross-trained personnel within the team or borrow key  personnel from other teams. Seventy-nine percent of CST commanders  responding to our data collection instrument reported that this lack of  depth among key personnel adversely affects the team’s ability to perform  its mission. Additionally, 88 percent of commanders who responded report  that there are too few duty positions in the team’s eight-member survey  section. CST commanders reported to us that the survey teams should have  more people and that responding with too few personnel restricts a CST’s  ability to make multiple entries into an incident scene in search of  suspected CBRNE substances, degrades its ability to remain on scene for  long periods without relief, and increases the time required for resolution  of an incident. CSTs reported that their teams have still been able to  conduct their missions and that cross-training other team members to add  depth to various team sections may actually increase their overall  capabilities.
CST staffing challenges are further exacerbated by recruiting and retention  difficulties. When key personnel such as the nuclear medical science  officer or physician’s assistant depart, the resulting open spots are  especially hard to fill because qualified applicants are difficult to attract  from the civilian world and are not widely represented within the military.  CST commanders and NGB officials explained that the lack of promotion  opportunity within the teams was another major factor affecting a soldier’s  decision to become or remain a CST member, and that career progression  is particularly limited for the team’s Air Guard contingent. They also listed  other factors that frustrate a team’s ability to recruit and retain CST  members, including the team’s substantial training requirements and its  full-time alert status for possible deployment.
NGB has pursued a number of efforts aimed at addressing these staffing  challenges. For example, during live responses, NGB augments the lead  CST with additional individuals and sometimes with entire teams. NGB has  also been working to fund and conduct a limited operational experiment to  validate the CSTs’ personnel and equipment list. Recommendations for  adjustments to the number of authorized personnel may result from this  experiment.
In a further attempt to address staffing challenges, NGB is currently  compiling the latest turnover data and other relevant personnel  information to send to the service secretaries to encourage them to  authorize $150 per month incentive pay for CST personnel in accordance  with Title 37 United States Code, Section 305(b).
Although these efforts may ease some of the staffing challenges discussed  above, it is too early to know whether they will fully address them.
section_title: CSTs Lack Guidance on Conducting Coordination in Their States
paragraphs: Another challenge is that NGB provides little guidance to the CSTs on how  they should coordinate with state and local emergency responders and  officials, potentially lengthening the amount of time it takes new teams to  become incorporated into their home state emergency response  infrastructure. CST coordination and outreach efforts vary in nature and  scope from state to state, and they include practices such as briefing state  and local officials and responders on the mission and capabilities of the  CST, developing protocols for working with emergency responders and  state officials, participating in training with other responders, conducting  exercises with other responders, and offering technical advice to other  responders.
Established CSTs, state and local officials, and state and local responders  have identified CST coordination and outreach efforts as being critical to  the success of CST operations. Such efforts increase the CSTs’ visibility at  the local level, improve responders’ understanding of the CST mission (for  example, when they can be legitimately deployed), solidify working  relationships and open communication between the CSTs and state and  local responders, and increase the CSTs’ familiarity with the vulnerabilities  and strategic targets in all areas of their states.
Some CSTs reported a learning curve with respect to conducting successful  coordination and outreach. For example, a few CSTs initially did not have  good relationships with other emergency responders until outreach efforts  clarified the role of the CST as working to support local and state  emergency responders. One CST we visited coordinated closely with its  state and local partners to prepare a clear set of written protocols and  coordination mechanisms that it found to be highly successful. Some state  officials reported that their CSTs have not yet developed written  coordination protocols for state and local emergency responders, even  though responders expressed confusion regarding CST capabilities and  mission. NGB has not issued any guidance or requirements regarding the  development, implementation, or assessment of CST coordination plans  and outreach efforts. NGB has not included such outreach efforts in CST  regulations as a mission-essential task, there is no formal system in place  for sharing coordination best practices across teams, and there are no  requirements to develop written protocols with local and state officials and  responders.
NGB officials told us that they recognize the importance of coordination  and outreach to ensure the success of CSTs in their home states. However,  they have not yet considered formal guidance for the teams on the subject.
section_title: CSTs Face Equipment, Training, Readiness Reporting, and Facilities Challenges
paragraphs: CSTs experience other challenges that NGB recognizes as important, and it  has efforts under way to address them. Many of these efforts are new or  ongoing, and it is therefore not clear how effective they will be in  addressing the specific challenges. While these challenges have not yet  affected the CSTs’ overall readiness, if the current efforts to address them  are unsuccessful, the challenges could threaten the long-term success and  sustainability of the program.
One of challenges the CSTs face is maintaining and replacing military and  commercial equipment at the pace required to sustain CST readiness. CST  members told us that they experience varying or poor maintenance support  for their military equipment, which is the responsibility of the National  Guard in each state. They, as well as state National Guard and NGB  officials, told us that the varying degree of state National Guard support  stems mostly from the state National Guards’ lack of understanding of the  unique nature of the CST as a unit as opposed to a more traditional  National Guard military unit. CST members reported that maintenance  support for their commercial equipment, which is done through the NGB- managed Consequence Management Support Center in Lexington,  Kentucky, tends to be better. They also expressed concern that the pace of  equipment replacement and development is too slow to ensure that the  CSTs have the most relevant equipment available to accomplish their  mission and that their existing equipment is updated to prevent its being  worn out. NGB officials report that NGB and DOD have heard these  concerns from the CSTs and are taking the following steps to address these  equipment-related challenges:  NGB is working with the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical  and Biological Defense and the Army Maneuver Support Center to plan  for future generations of CST equipment.
NGB Logistics is assessing the cost of each piece of CST equipment and  developing new items where appropriate.
NGB Resource Management is requesting an increase in funds in future  years to maintain the CST equipment sets.
These efforts may help address some equipment challenges, such as  adequate equipment update and re capitalization plans, but it is not yet  clear whether they will be successful in the near or long term. NGB’s  standardization program may help the state National Guard organizations  provide better maintenance support for the CSTs’ military equipment, but it  will take time and cooperation between NGB, the CSTs, and their  respective state National Guard commands to accomplish this.
Another challenge the CSTs face is a lack of oversight and evaluation of  exercises required of CSTs each year. Unlike the external evaluations the  CSTs undergo before certification and every 18 months thereafter, the 12 or  more exercises the CSTs plan for and conduct each year do not follow the  same specific set of objectives and criteria and are not evaluated to  determine the extent to which those objectives were met.  NGB officials  told us that they recognize the need for more oversight of these exercises at  the NGB and state levels. NGB and DOD have the following efforts under  way to help address the lack of exercise oversight and evaluation:  NGB and the Army Maneuver Support Center revised the CST  Commanders Pre-Command Course to include instruction on training  management.
NGB is incorporating into its ongoing standardization initiative training  management components to ensure teams are adhering to Army training  regulation.
NGB is bringing a member of the standardization initiative to NGB to  assist in training oversight.
DOD is consolidating Army-directed external evaluations and related  training responsibilities under U.S. Army North to facilitate progress  and consistency across the CST program.
These efforts should help NGB and the states better oversee and evaluate  the effectiveness of the CST program. However, since many of the  initiatives are new, particularly the standardization program, it is not clear  how effective they will be.
The CSTs use two separate systems to report their readiness measures.  CST members we interviewed said that one system, the standard Army  readiness system (DOD’s Status of Resources and Training System), is ill  suited to the unique nature of the CSTs. They also said that while the other  system—maintained by NGB—is better suited to the CSTs as a unit, the  system requires constant effort by team members to update and involves  using secure Internet connections the teams do not always have readily  available at their home stations. Many of the CST members we interviewed  said that because the two systems overlapped, they should be merged or  one should be eliminated. NGB officials explained that the system they  maintain is critical for administering the Response Management Plan and is  not meant to supplant the standard Army system. They also said that DOD  is transitioning to the new Defense Readiness Reporting System. NGB  expects the CSTs to replace the two existing systems with the new one in  October 2006. This should solve the problem of having two separate  readiness reporting systems. However, until the new system is in place and  NGB and CST members can evaluate the extent to which it suits the unique  nature of the CSTs and helps NGB administer the Response Management  Plan, it remains unclear how fully the new system will address this  challenge.
Finally, some CSTs have reported that their facilities are inadequate in  terms of vehicle, storage, and training space. NGB recognizes that some  CST facilities are not adequate and has issued revised planning templates  for CST facilities to the states. However, as we discuss further below, the  varying degree to which states understand how to use these templates and  fully meet the needs of their CSTs indicates that the challenge remains to  be fully addressed.
section_title: NGB Lacks Guidance to Help State National Guard Commands Oversee and Support CSTs
paragraphs: NGB has made progress in issuing guidance that explains state National  Guard roles and responsibilities for overseeing and supporting their CSTs,  but this has been insufficient to fully inform the states about the unique  nature and requirements of the CSTs and how to integrate such a unit into  the state National Guard command structure. The result has been varied  oversight of the CSTs at the state level in important administrative areas  and varied support to their CSTs in areas such as staffing and equipment  augmentation and designing and building the facilities to house the teams.
According to NGB officials and the certified teams we visited, DOD  established the first CSTs without the benefit of a great deal of direction  and guidance that would help create a unique unit from scratch and  incorporate that unit into a state National Guard structure that is  unaccustomed to such units. Subsequently, NGB issued its CST  management regulation, which listed responsibilities for state National  Guard headquarters to exercise fiscal and administrative management and  oversight of the CSTs in their states or territories. This guidance includes  state National Guard responsibility for such CST oversight as issuing  training guidance, approving mid- and long-range training plans and  objectives, property accountability, and conducting readiness and  compliance inspections. While this guidance represents progress in  clarifying the roles of NGB and the states in overseeing and supporting the  CSTs, it is not as detailed as NGB’s guidance on operational command and  control and mission-related topics in explaining roles and responsibilities.
Although the CST program has been under way for over 7 years, CST  members and state National Guard officials with whom we met said the  guidance on how the states should integrate the CSTs into their National  Guard structures and how CST oversight and support should be conducted  is still lacking. NGB officials told us that they recognized that the states  have varied widely in how they have integrated the CSTs into their state  National Guard structures. They also said they are planning to issue further  guidance to clarify how states should integrate their CSTs into the new  state Joint Force Headquarters organizations but that they are waiting for  these organizations to be fully in place.
Because of the lack of clear guidance from NGB on how state National  Guard organizations should oversee and support their CSTs, the level and  quality of oversight and support for CSTs varies by state. Some states and  territories we visited did not have formal plans in place at their National  Guard headquarters or at the CST level for evaluating the effective use of  resources, and very few of those states conducted periodic internal reviews  of the CSTs. The states set up budget and accounting records to ensure  funds for the CSTs were available when and where needed, but they  conducted no regular program reviews for the CSTs.
Many of the states and territories we visited did not have specific  objectives for collective training, and they did not measure  accomplishments against previously determined specific mission  objectives. Therefore, those states could not identify deficiencies or make  command management decisions based on such analyses. As a result, NGB  and the states were not in a position to know if they were making the most  effective use of CST resources.
Again, because NGB has no clear guidance to the states, state National  Guard support of the CSTs also varies widely in terms of staffing,  equipment, and facilities. One state we visited provides additional  administrative support to its CST through the use of three or four regular  part-time National Guard members. This arrangement also allows those  part-time members access to some CST training and, in the event those  individuals apply for vacant permanent CST positions, can cut down on  hiring and training delays. Another state hired an additional full-time duty  member to support the team’s logistics. Some states provided limited  amounts of additional equipment to support their CSTs, such as laptop  computers. Other states do not augment their CSTs. Among the reasons  some state National Guard officials reported for why their state’s National  Guard headquarters did not augment their CSTs were a lack of money and  lack of interest by the headquarters in the CSTs because they are small  units. NGB officials acknowledged that they need to help the states  understand that the CSTs are unique units and should therefore be  considered high priority.
During our site visits, we found inconsistencies in how states interpret and  apply procurement guidance to CST equipment requests. As a result, some  states approved equipment for a CST while other states did not. For  example, NGB guidance permits the purchase of nonstandard uniforms  with state funds only and if necessary for CSTs to accomplish their mission  by blending in with other police and first responder personnel. However,  some states we visited refused to purchase uniforms for their teams, even  though the teams indicated a need. Other states did support the purchase  of the nonstandard uniforms. While NGB, state National Guard, and CST  officials stated that they believed it was important to have the flexibility to  make purchases that best support the CSTs’ mission, some CST  commanders however thought this subjectivity sometimes negatively  affected the CSTs’ ability to obtain material support.
States have also had difficulties designing and renovating or building  facilities that meet the needs of the CSTs. State National Guard officials  said the unique nature of the CST mission made it more difficult for states  to understand the support requirements and expectations placed upon  their CSTs. For example, in addition to the need for climate controlled  spaces for sensitive equipment, most CST members we interviewed said  that there is a need for enclosed bays for all vehicle storage because it  facilitates ready-to-roll deployment, improves vehicle security, and  provides an all-weather maintenance and training area. However, 78  percent of the CST commanders who responded to our data collection  instrument reported that their facilities are not large enough to hold all  vehicles and other CST equipment. Approximately half reported that their  facilities are not large enough for all personnel to have an adequate  workspace. National Guard officials in the states and territories we visited  also identified inadequacies with their facilities. They said they followed  Army procurement and budgeting guidance, which sometimes affected  whether identified changes could be made to the design or construction.  Sometimes the state National Guard did not recognize the unique mission  of the CST as compared to building an armory, and sometimes the design  was set before the CST commander or other members had a chance to  review the plans. Because of varying interpretations, some states have  constructed new or remodeled facilities that are in need of further  remodeling. Other CSTs we visited were satisfied with their facilities,  despite believing that such things as vehicle bay space were not completely  adequate. These CST members reported that their state National Guard  headquarters worked well with the CST to design the most effective facility  they could to meet the unique needs of the team.
In addition to the CST management regulation, NGB instituted the CST  standardization program partially in response to its concerns that states  were not adequately monitoring the CSTs’ implementation of key Army  management controls in training, logistics, budgeting, and other areas.  According to preliminary standardization program reviews, state National  Guard headquarters have done few periodic reviews and inspections.  NGB  officials told us they intend to use these reviews to increase state  participation in oversight of the CSTs and will also spell out in greater  detail for the states the type of interaction NGB believes is necessary and  required by regulation. If pursued consistently, the standardization  program should help NGB better coordinate with the states on how to  oversee and support the CSTs, though a significant NGB-state National  Guard cooperative effort will be needed to facilitate success.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In managing the CST program, DOD and NGB have made significant  progress toward establishing 55 highly specialized teams in every state and  U.S. territory. The focus has thus far been on reaching the goal of certifying  all 55 teams. As the CST program seeks to institutionalize its key processes  and sustain itself in the long term, we see four areas that could increase the  risk to that effort.
First, confusion about what types of non-WMD deployments the CSTs can  and should use to help them accomplish their mission of preparing for or  responding to WMD events could make it more difficult to effectively  coordinate efforts at the state and local levels and possibly inhibit regional  and national coordination between the states and the federal government.  Expanding the CSTs’ mission to encompass natural and man-made  disasters may not sufficiently clarify what types of such missions are  appropriate for the CSTs to conduct, possibly exacerbating confusion  among state and local officials about the mission of the CSTs.
Second, some limited overseas missions, such as coordinating with  officials from Canada and Mexico or training at live agent facilities, may be  beneficial to CST training and operational effectiveness. Though DOD  indicates that it is not planning to request that Congress expand the CSTs’  role to encompass more demanding overseas missions, to the extent  missions such as regular CST support to overseas combatant commands  are considered in the future, they would likely have a detrimental impact  on the readiness and availability of the teams to perform their original  mission to support domestic WMD response.
Third, despite the progress NGB has made in fully establishing the CST  program and formalizing institutional sustainment plans for the teams,  many areas of the program face significant challenges that require specific  guidance and action from NGB. NGB understands these challenges,  particularly in the areas of team staffing, coordination guidance, equipment  maintenance and acquisition, training and exercise oversight, readiness  reporting, and facility adequacy. While individual team readiness has not  yet suffered, if current and planned NGB efforts to address these  challenges are not successful, the challenges could eventually cause harm  to overall CST readiness.
Fourth, despite NGB’s progress in establishing such unique and specialized  units as the CSTs, there remains a need for additional guidance on the  administrative oversight structure for the CSTs at the state level. Small  differences between the way each state manages its CST may be expected,  given the fact of 54 different military commands. While NGB’s plans for  additional guidance on the oversight and support of the CSTs and its  standardization program should help states better integrate the CSTs,  further guidance and coordination efforts between NGB, the CSTs, and the  state National Guard commands is warranted.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help address management challenges and further efforts to sustain the  CST program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in concert  with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Secretaries of the  Army and of the Air Force, take the following three actions:   Clarify the types of non-WMD responses that are appropriate for CSTs  as part of their mission to prepare for domestic WMD and catastrophic  terrorist attacks.
Fully incorporate into ongoing management efforts to sustain the CST  program a plan with goals, objectives, and evaluation mechanisms to  address challenges such as team staffing issues, coordination guidance,  equipment maintenance and acquisition, training and exercise oversight,  readiness reporting, and facilities requirements.
Develop clear guidance for the states on how CSTs should be integrated  into state National Guard commands in order to facilitate an effective  administrative oversight and support structure for the CSTs in each  state that reflects familiarization with the role, mission, and  requirements of these specialized units, and work with state adjutants  general and federal financial officers at the state level to find  appropriate ways to exchange ideas and best practices for ensuring  effective NGB-state National Guard partnership in overseeing the CST  program. One such method could be to create or modify an existing  working group or team to allow state National Guard membership.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with the intent  of our recommendations. DOD discussed steps it is currently taking as well  as actions it plans to take to address these recommendations. DOD also  provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report  where appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that DOD clarify the types of non- WMD responses that are appropriate for CSTs, DOD reported that it has  requested that Congress authorize the CSTs to respond to catastrophic  events of intentional or unintentional origin and that if this is enacted, DOD  will direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to develop implementing  instructions. DOD reiterated its view that the CSTs have been participating  in non-WMD responses as training. Expanding the CSTs’ mission to include  both WMD and non-WMD events should help clarify the role of the latter in  the CSTs’ overall mission. We continue to believe that as NGB develops  implementing instructions, it should provide clear guidance on the types of  non-WMD responses that are appropriate for the CSTs. This should help  alleviate confusion about the CSTs’ mission and prevent their being  overemployed to the detriment of their WMD-related training and mission  requirements.
In its comments on our recommendation regarding incorporation into  ongoing CST management efforts of a plan to address critical challenges to  the CST program, DOD highlighted some of the CST management efforts  we discussed in our report, such as the CST Working Group and the CST  standardization program. DOD further stated that additional management  efforts should be deferred until the effectiveness of the standardization  program can be assessed. We agree that the program offers the potential of  a good evaluation tool for NGB, the CSTs, and the states’ National Guard  headquarters and that further information on many of the challenges we  highlight in our report may be gleaned from the results of the  standardization program. To the extent the program further highlights  these and other challenges for which no immediate corrective measures  are in place, we would expect the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to  take the appropriate management action.
In response to our recommendation that NGB develop clear guidance for  the states on how CSTs should be integrated into state National Guard  commands to facilitate effective administrative oversight and support,  DOD indicated that in addition to guidance on state oversight of the CSTs in  the recently published CST management regulation, the CST  standardization program and NGB-conducted formal training for state  National Guard leadership provide additional measures to review and  reinforce state National Guard administrative oversight of their CSTs. DOD  further recognized the value of currently available venues for coordination  between NGB, the CSTs, and the states’ National Guard commands. As we  state in our report, we believe that if pursued consistently, the  standardization program should help NGB better coordinate with the states  on how to oversee and support the CSTs. This should help NGB and the  states provide an effective long-term partnership to sustain the CST  program. To the extent necessary based on the result of standardization  program evaluations, we would expect NGB to expand its efforts to assist  state National Guard commands to provide effective oversight and support  of their CSTs.
DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix IV.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its  date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army. We  will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the  report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key staff members who contributed to this  report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which the Civil Support Teams (CST) are prepared  to conduct their mission, we gathered information on the categories and  process of the two CST readiness measurement mechanisms; reviewed  readiness-related documents for the 14 teams we visited; included similar  readiness information in a data collection instrument sent to all 55 CSTs;  and discussed CST readiness with local, state, and federal officials who  have worked with CSTs. We observed the external evaluation of 1 CST by  U.S. Army officials and attended the after action review following the  evaluation. We also observed an exercise that included one CST and a  number of local and state responders. During our site visits, we discussed  operational command and control mechanisms with CST members and  their National Guard headquarters officials. We compared the published  mission of the CSTs to the types of missions the CSTs are performing and  discussed the extent to which their mission is well understood with CST  members and local, state, and federal officials. Further, we discussed the  potential effect of overseas missions on CST readiness with CST members  and civilian emergency management officials in the states and territories  we visited.
To assess the extent to which effective administrative mechanisms are in  place for the CSTs, we compared National Guard Bureau (NGB)  regulations and guidance on management of the CSTs with the practices in  place at the 14 CSTs we visited. We also discussed operational and  administrative issues with CST members in those states and their National  Guard headquarters officials. We collected similar information in the data  collection instrument sent to all 55 CSTs. During our site visits, we  discussed with CST members those challenges they believed could inhibit  CST readiness in future. We categorized these challenges, discussed them  with NGB officials, and compared the challenges to information on NGB  efforts related to those areas. We also collected cost data related to the  establishment and sustainment of the CSTs from NGB, state National  Guard personnel, and the CSTs themselves. We did not independently  verify cost data, but we interviewed NGB officials who manage the data  about data quality control procedures. We determined the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To address our objectives, we visited and interviewed officials from the  Department of Defense (DOD), including the Office of the Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, NGB, U.S. Army Forces  Command, First Army, Fifth Army, and United States Northern Command.  During each state site visit we met with members of the CST and officials  from the state National Guard headquarters, state emergency management  and homeland security officials, representatives from local community  emergency response agencies (such as fire and police departments), and  representatives of federal agencies and organizations (such as the Federal  Bureau of Investigation and Department of Energy).
Our site visits to 14 of the 55 CSTs were conducted from August through  December 2005. We selected the 14 teams in order to obtain a reasonable  sample of CSTs based on a number of criteria, including geographic  distribution, age of team, certification status, state size, state population,  state government emergency management and homeland security  organization, and DOD-related command structure.  We visited the  following locations:  Alabama  Alaska  Colorado  Iowa  Massachusetts  Montana  New Mexico   New York  North Carolina  Puerto Rico  Rhode Island  Tennessee  Texas  Washington To supplement the interviews we conducted during the site visits, we  collected supporting documents from the CSTs and individuals we  interviewed and made physical observations of CST facilities in every state  we visited.
To further address our objectives, we designed a broad data collection  instrument for all 55 CSTs that would collect information regarding CST  personnel, equipment, training, certification, costs, coordination, and  mission scope. Within these major topic areas, we developed and tested  relevant questions based upon previous GAO work, current research, and  interviews at both the NGB and CST level. After two formal pretests with  the command staff of 2 separate CSTs, we deployed the data collection  instrument simultaneously to the National Guard’s state supervisory  auditors for all 55 teams and asked that they be forwarded to the CST  commanders in each of their respective states or territories. The data  collection instrument was administered via e-mail using an ActiveX-  enabled Microsoft Word attachment.
Although every team received an identical version of the data collection  instrument, we advised the team commanders that because of differing  experiences, locations, certification statuses, and lengths of service, we  recognized that not all teams would be able to respond to every question.  Each section of the instrument contained questions that could be answered  by both certified and uncertified teams, as well as questions that were  applicable to certified teams only. The data collection instrument was  addressed to the 55 unit commanders, and while these individuals were  explicitly responsible for the overall content of the completed data  collection instruments, we permitted them to delegate specific questions or  sections to other appropriate members within the CST. To ensure a full and  candid response, we noted that individual responses would be attributed  neither to individual CSTs nor to their individual members. Further, we  requested that the teams transmit their responses over a secure e-mail  channel to safeguard any sensitive information.
We distributed the data collection instrument via e-mail on September 26,  2005, and it was deployed through December 27, 2005. Out of the 55  deployed, we received 52 completed data collection instrument responses  during our 3-month response window. To analyze the results of the  completed responses, we noted responses for all questions and highlighted  those we deemed significant, such as responses where there was  overwhelming agreement among CST commanders. These responses and  others were compared with preliminary results from our site visits and  used to verify that the GAO site visit teams had not overlooked significant  widespread CST issues.
Percentage results from the data collection instrument are discussed in the  letter. In some cases, there are fewer than 52 respondents for a given  question. Because some respondents did not answer all questions, the  percentages we report are calculated using the base of respondents who  answered the question. In no cases did fewer than 48 of the 52 respondents  answer a question whose percentage results appear in the report.
Because this was not a sample survey, there are no sampling errors.    However, the practical difficulties of conducting any data collection effort  may introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For  example, difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in the  sources of information that are available to respondents, or in how the data  are entered into a database or  are analyzed, can introduce unwanted  variability into the survey results. We took steps in the development of the  data collection instrument, the data collection, and the data analysis to  minimize these nonsampling errors. For example, GAO staff with subject  matter expertise designed the data collection instrument in collaboration  with social science survey specialists. Then, the draft questionnaire was  pre-tested with the command staff of two CSTs to ensure (1) the questions  were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to comprehend; (2) terminology was  used correctly; (3) the questionnaire did not place an undue burden on the  respondents; (4) the information was feasible to obtain; and (5) the survey  was comprehensive and unbiased. Finally, when the data were analyzed, a  second, independent analyst checked all computer programs.
The entire data collection instrument appears in appendix III.
We performed our work from April 2005 through March 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: CST Program Management Efforts
paragraphs: NGB has focused much of its management on establishing and certifying all  55 of the authorized CSTs. But NGB also recognizes that a significant  amount of effort is required to ensure that the CST program is sustained for  the long term, while it also provides for the continued improvement of the  process for establishing the teams and modifying doctrine, training,  equipment, and operational considerations as necessary.  Some of the  institutional efforts NGB has coordinated or led include a CST  standardization program, coordinating Army-directed CST training and  evaluations, and establishing working groups to evaluate and recommend  improvements to the CST program.
subsections: section_title: Standardization and Evaluation Program
paragraphs: The standardization program is scheduled to evaluate each CST every 18  months and is intended to be coordinated with state-level command  inspections that the Army requires. The process begins with a  precoordination meeting 6 months prior to the scheduled standardization  visit that explains the purpose, evaluation method, and desired outcome for  the upcoming visit. Ninety days prior to the scheduled visit, a second  coordination meeting is held to resolve any remaining administrative  details and to allow the standardization team personnel responsible for  conducting the evaluation to become familiar with the CST’s location.  During the visit itself, these personnel conduct compliance-oriented  evaluations using a series of checklists that monitor various subtasks  within the evaluated areas. For example, the training checklist assesses 55  items, including whether the CST has an approved Mission Essential Task  List, whether the team publishes quarterly training guidance, and whether  the team conducts after-action reports for all training. Each checklist item  is evaluated as “go,” “no-go,” or “not applicable.” Items that are initially  characterized as needing improvement (no-go) may be upgraded to  satisfactory (go) as a result of on-the-spot corrections. At the evaluation’s  conclusion, standardization team personnel will present the results of their  evaluation to the state adjutant general. They must issue a formal report to  the adjutant general within 6duty days after the end of their visit. Among  the standardization program’s objectives is integrating with state and  intermediate command inspections that could reduce the total amount of  time committed to the inspection process, as well as imposing CST-specific  management controls to assist in the prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse  of Army resources. Program personnel have completed a series of test  visits to CSTs, and they expect to begin formal evaluation visits in May  2006.
section_title: Army Training and Evaluation Support
paragraphs: As of October 1, 2005, Fifth Army assumed sole responsibility for all CST  external evaluations and related training, with the exception of CSTs in  Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam, which remain under U.S. Army Pacific. Under  Fifth Army, the organization and protocols of all CST training and  evaluation teams should be standardized. Army, NGB, and CST officials  report that training, education, and experience requirements of  trainer/evaluators will also be standardized. They indicate that this  standardization should increase the consistency of external evaluations  and related collective training across all teams. Consolidation of Army  training, readiness, and oversight responsibilities could also promote better  information sharing and guidance development both across the Fifth Army  training and evaluation teams and the program as a whole. Responsibility  for all CST external evaluations and related training was previously divided  geographically between the First Army and Fifth Army under the U.S. Army  Forces Command, with the exception of Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam.  Although both First and Fifth Armies were required to train and evaluate  teams to the standards set forth in the CSTs’ Mission Training Plan, Army  field manuals and other regulations,  each Army organized its CST training  and evaluation teams differently and followed different protocols for  executing training and external evaluations.
section_title: CST Working Groups
paragraphs: In April 2005 NGB formally established the Civil Support Team Working  Group to (1) increase the operational effectives of CSTs by providing  operationally relevant advice on gaps, shortfalls, and improvements to CST  doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,  personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF); (2) assist in implementing any  resulting plans, and (3) promote standardization and interoperability  among CSTs. The working group process had already been working  informally since the establishment of the first 10 CSTs. In addition to NGB,  working group membership includes the CST commanders and  representatives from the Army Maneuver Support Center and the joint  service Chemical and Biological Defense Program. The working group is  organized to include several technical working groups and subgroups that  focus on specific aspects (e.g., equipment, personnel, and training) or  components (e.g., operations, survey, medical and science assessment,  communications, computer and information systems, and  logistics/sustainment) of the CST program. In June 2004 the Army  Maneuver Support Center and NGB initiated the Integrated Concept Team  to determine the tasks, schedules, milestones, and products required to  develop operational concepts and provide DOTMLPF solutions to support  the CST program. In addition to directing the efforts of the other CST  working groups with regard to DOTMLPF responsibilities, the Integrated  Concept Team is also tasked with more broadly addressing CST issues  within the larger scope of DOD force management and operational  capabilities plans.
section_title: Data Collection Instrument
paragraphs: The  United  States  Government  Accountability  Office  (GAO)  is  an  independent,  non- partisan  agency  that  assists  Congress  in  evaluating  federal  programs.  We  have  been  asked  to  report  to  Congress  on  the  following  aspects  of  the  Civil  Support  Team  (CST)  program: readiness and capability to respond to WMD incidents; coordination with other  local,  regional,  state,  and  federal  emergency  responders;  and  costs  associated  with  establishment  of  teams  and  continuing  operations  for  both  certified  and  uncertified  teams.
In order to obtain similar information across all CSTs, we are sending this data collection  instrument (DCI) to all 55 unit commanders. The questions in the DCI are grouped into  six sections:  1) Threats and responders  2) Coordination and communication  3) Mission readiness and certification  4) Equipment, transport, and medical  5) Training 6) Personnel Each section contains questions that can be answered by both certified and uncertified  teams,  as  well  as  questions  that  may  be  applicable  to  certified  teams  only.  While  it  is  necessary for methodological reasons for every team to receive the same version of the  DCI, it  is  understood  that  due  to  differing  experiences,  locations,  certification  statuses, and lengths of service, not all teams will be able to respond to every question.
The  DCI  is  addressed  to  the  55  unit  commanders,  and  while  these  individuals  are  responsible  for  the  overall  content  of  the  completed  DCIs,  the  unit  commander  may  delegate  specific  questions  or  sections  to  other  appropriate  members  within  the  CST.  There is a blank field at the end of each of the six sections that asks for a name, phone  number,  and  email  address  for  follow-up  questions  regarding  the  responses  to  that  section.  This  field  should  be  used  to  identify  any  team  member  other  than  the  commander  who  should  be  contacted  about  that  section’s  responses;  if  the  unit  commander is the contact point for that section, the field may be left blank.
Although  there  is  a  possibility  that  sources  both  within  and  outside  the  CST  may  be  contacted to validate responses, it is important to note that responses will be attributed  neither  to  individual  CSTs  nor  to  their  individual  members.  Data  from  the  DCI  will  be  presented  in  larger  groupings  for  summary  purposes  only  and  will  not  identify  the  responses from any one CST.
subsections: section_title: Section 1: THREATS & RESPONDERS
paragraphs: 1. For each of the potential threats in your state that are listed across the top of the table below, please  identify the potential responders in the left-hand column that you would expect to encounter at the  corresponding incident scene. (Please check all that apply.)
LOCAL & REGIONAL RESPONSE  Local/Regional police depts.
Local/Regional fire depts.
Other local/regional response (please identify)
Other local/regional response (please identify)
State Office of Homeland Security   or similar  State Office of   Environmental Management   or similar  State Health Dept  Other state response  (please identify)
Other state response   (please identify)
FEDERAL RESPONSE  Joint Task Force-Civil Support   (JTF-CS)  Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  Hazardous Materials Response Team  (HMRT)  Other FBI agent(s) or team(s)
U.S. Coast Guard’s National Strike  Force (NSF) teams  U.S. Secret Service  Federal Incident Response Support  Team (FIRST)  Nuclear Incident Response Team  (NIRT)
Other federal response   (please identify)
Other federal response   (please identify) 2. Does the team consider itself to be a CBRNE responder, a WMD responder, both, or neither?
Follow-up to #2: Is there a practical difference between being a CBRNE responder and being a WMD  responder? 3. Other than those possessed by CSTs, what response capabilities exist for CBRNE incidents at the  local/regional, state, and federal levels? Who possesses these capabilities at each level?  at the local level?
If YES, who possesses this capability? at the state level?
If YES, who possesses this capability? at the federal level?
If YES, who possesses this capability?  4. Approximately how many times has the CST been formally deployed for the following types of  missions other than training exercises? (contingency ops,  capabilities briefs,  (deployed in  response to a  (pre-positioned, deployed for a  special event, VIP,  request) etc.) exercises, etc.)
section_title: 5. Please list the last 10 deployments (RESPONSE, STAND-BY, ASSIST, and/or Other) deployments
paragraphs: – excluding training exercises -- for your CST in the past two fiscal years (FY 2004-2005) and then  provide the information requested in each column.   (must be in  yyyy-mm-dd  format, e.g.  2005-07-25 to deploy  the CST’s  the whole  team, if no  2004-12-15)
Bronze)
Black)
ADVON)? once? 6. Do any of the following potential issues adversely affect the ability of CSTs to perform their mission?  (Please check all that apply.)
CSTs are not considered a “first responder” like police, fire, etc.
CSTs limited to specific role and capabilities: Identify, Assess, Advise, Assist.
CSTs have mobility constraints.
Other federal, state, regional, and/or local organizations have capabilities that are similar to the CST’s capabilities.
Other federal, state, regional, and/or local organizations have unrealistic expectations for the CST.
Geographic location of CST facilities within the state makes wide-area response difficult.
There are not enough personnel available (because of training, leave, etc.) within the CST.
section_title: CST is thin with respect to certain key personnel (e.g., only one Nuclear Medical Science Officer).
paragraphs: Other / Please identify:             7. What changes, if any, would you suggest to make the CSTs better able to respond to incidents?
If you have further comments in response to any of the questions in this section, you may use this  space to provide them. Please identify your comments by preceding them with the number of the  earlier question to which they refer (e.g., 1, 3, 7, etc.).  9. Please provide a name, phone number, and email address for follow-up questions regarding the  responses to this section. (Field may be left blank if the unit commander is the contact point.)
Section 2:   COORDINATION & COMMUNICATION 1. How familiar is the unit’s leadership with each of the following emergency planning documents?  (Please check only one box per row.)
National Response Plan (NRP)
National Incident Management  System (NIMS)  State Emergency Response Plan(s)
State Terrorism Response Plan(s)
section_title: 2. To what extent is your CST integrated into your state’s primary emergency response plan?
paragraphs: (Please select the best response.)
Fully integrated – CST’s roles/responsibilities are specifically outlined and CST participates in  emergency response training exercises.
Partially integrated – CST is not directly mentioned, but National Guard’s responsibilities are  outlined.
Not integrated – Emergency response plan has been updated since CST establishment, but neither  CST nor National Guard is mentioned.
Not applicable – State’s emergency response plan has not been updated since CST establishment.
State has no emergency response plan.  3. To what extent is your CST integrated into your state’s primary terrorism response plan?  (Please select the best response.)
Fully integrated – CST’s roles/responsibilities are specifically outlined and CST participates in  terrorism response training exercises.
Partially integrated – CST is not directly mentioned, but National Guard’s responsibilities are  outlined.
Not integrated – Terrorism emergency response plan has been updated since CST establishment,  but neither CST nor National Guard is mentioned.
Not applicable – State’s terrorism response plan has not been updated since CST establishment.
State has no terrorism response plan.  4. Are you aware of your CST’s inclusion in any local emergency response plans or local terrorism  response plans within your state?  5. Which of the following mutual aid agreements or compacts, if any, are in place in your state? (Please  check all that apply.)
section_title: 6. Does your CST regularly participate in any local consortiums or task forces?
paragraphs: Follow-up to #6: If YES, please identify the name of the consortium/task force (up to five), contact  information for someone within the organization, and your frequency of contact.
LOCAL & REGIONAL RESPONSE  Local/Regional  police depts.  Local/Regional   fire depts.  Local/Regional  HAZMAT teams  Local/Regional  bomb squads  Local/Regional  EMTs Local/Regional  utilities  Other local/regional  response (please  identify) participate on the same  task forces  participate in the same  conference  8. Are there teams, agencies, or governments that have been problematic in coordinating with your CST?
Follow-up to #8: If YES, please identify up to five of those entities as well as the nature and frequency  of the coordination problems that you have faced in the past or are currently facing. (Reminder: survey  answers will not be attributed to individual CSTs or to their personnel.)
In general, how would you rate your local, regional, and state authorities’ understanding of your CST’s  overall capabilities and duties?
Local/Regional   HAZMAT teams  Local/Regional police depts.
Follow-up to #9: If you reported a lack of understanding, how have you attempted to address this?  10. In general, how would you rate the capabilities of the local HAZMAT teams in the metropolitan areas of your state? (Please check only one.)
Robust Presence - Fully capable, staffed, and equipped   Significant Presence – Generally capable, staffed, and equipped   Presence – Staffed and equipped but with some weaknesses   Weak Presence – Scattered capabilities and staff, out-of-date equipment, and/or other serious  deficiencies  Not applicable – There are no local HAZMAT teams in our state  11. Outside of the metropolitan areas, how would you rate the capabilities of the local HAZMAT teams  across your state, in general? (Please check only one.)
section_title: Presence – Staffed and equipped but with some weaknesses
paragraphs: Weak Presence – Scattered capabilities and staff, out-of-date equipment, and/or other serious  deficiencies  Not applicable – There are no local HAZMAT teams in our state  12. Do you see a need for your CST to provide support to the local HAZMAT teams across your state?  (Please check only one.)
YES, but mostly outside the metropolitan areas   YES, but mostly inside the metropolitan areas   YES, both inside and outside the metropolitan areas equally   Cannot generalize; it varies too greatly by local team  Not applicable – There are no local HAZMAT teams in our state  Follow-up to #12: If you do see a need for your CST to provide support to local HAZMAT teams, in  which of the following areas do these teams need your support? (Please check all that apply.)
Operational support prior to deployment   Operational support during a response  Not applicable – I do not see a need to support local HAZMAT teams in my state, or these  teams do not exist in my state  13. If there are state-supported teams with HAZMAT capability (other than the CST) in your state, how  would you rate their capabilities, in general? (Please check all that apply.)
section_title: 14. Do you see a need for your CST to provide support to the other state-supported HAZMAT teams in
paragraphs: Cannot generalize; it varies too greatly by local team  Not applicable – There are no other state-supported teams with HAZMAT capability in my state  Follow-up to #14: If you do see a need for your CST to provide support to other state-supported HAZMAT teams, in which of the following areas do these teams need your support?   (Please check all that apply.)
Operational support prior to deployment  Operational support during a response  Not applicable – I do not see a need to support other state-supported teams with HAZMAT  capability in my state, or these teams do not exist in my state  15. Do you feel that your CST has HAZMAT capabilities that overlap with other state, regional, or local  emergency responders in your state?
Follow-up to #15: If YES, to what extent to do they overlap?  16. What capabilities does the CST possess that are not shared by other state, regional, or local emergency  responders in your state?
section_title: 17. Once a CST has been deployed to a CBRNE incident scene, what additional capabilities would a
paragraphs: CERFP bring to that incident scene that would not already be provided by the CST?  18. Which states, if any, have formal mutual aid agreements with your state with regard to sharing CST  resources or responding to incidents in other states?
Follow-up to #18: What is your assessment of these formal arrangements’ effectiveness?  19. Which states, if any, have informal mutual aid agreements with your state with regard to sharing CST  resources or responding to incidents in other states? (Informal agreements include TAG-to-TAG and  CST-to-CST.)
Follow-up to #19: What is your assessment of these informal arrangements’ effectiveness?  20. If you have further comments in response to any of the questions in this section, you may use this  space to provide them. Please identify your comments by preceding them with the number of the  earlier question to which they refer (e.g., 1, 3, 7, etc.).  21. Please provide a name, phone number, and email address for follow-up questions regarding the  responses to this section. (Field may be left blank if the unit commander is the contact point.)
section_title: Section 3: MISSION READINESS & CERTIFICATION
paragraphs: 1. What is the CST’s mission, and which documents or guidance do you use to define it?  2. Considering the National Guard Bureau’s expectations of your CST, how does this differ from your  CST’s mission, if at all?  3. Considering your state’s expectations of your CST, how does this differ from your CST’s mission,   4. What documents or guidance do you use to define the mission and readiness of the CST?  5. Do you consider it a part of your CST’s mission to respond to CBRNE incidents that are known to be  the result of accidents or acts of nature (i.e., that are NOT attacks)?
Follow-up to #5: Whether it is part your CST’s mission or not, do you think that this type of response  should be part of your mission?
Please explain your answers to #5.
section_title: 6. Which of the following is an accurate indicator of readiness (or unreadiness) to perform the CST’s
paragraphs: Unit Status Report (USR)
Operational Reporting System (ORS)
Other / Please identify: Additional comments for #6, if any:  7. Were there (or have there been) any significant obstacles for your CST in achieving initial  obstacle?
section_title: 8. Please identify the readiness level for each CST component at each specified time:
paragraphs: Equipment on hand  (S-level)   9. After the EXEVAL that supported your CST’s certification, what extra training (if any) was  recommended by the Adjutant General and implemented by the CST commander before the  certification package was sent to the Department of the Army?  10. Please identify which readiness component is the most challenging to sustain with regard to each of  the following CST capabilities. (Please check only one capability per row.)
section_title: 11. Does the state government (i.e., non-military) have any additional readiness and/or capability
paragraphs: requirements for the CST beyond what is required by the National Guard?
Follow-up to #11: If YES, what are these additional requirements, and what guidance is provided by  the state for achieving these requirements?  12. Does the state government (i.e., non-military) provide any of the following additional resources for the  CST beyond what is provided by the National Guard? 13. Please describe the process by which a request for CST deployment is approved or denied: How many  decisionmakers must approve the request, and what positions (or titles) do these decisionmakers  hold? 14. Who receives the following mission information from your CST? (Please check all that apply.)
TAG? officials?
Reported to NGB?
Army?
Army? officials?
Reported to NGB?
TAG?
Army?
Army?  15. If you have further comments in response to any of the questions in this section, you may use this  space to provide them. Please identify your comments by preceding them with the number of the  earlier question to which they refer (e.g., 1, 3, 7, etc.).  16. Please provide a name, phone number, and email address for follow-up questions regarding the  responses to this section. (Field may be left blank if the unit commander is the contact point.)
section_title: Section 4: EQUIPMENT, TRANSPORT, & MEDICAL
paragraphs: 1. Which documents or guidance do you use to develop your equipment list?  2. Has your team experienced any problems in acquiring CST equipment?
Follow-up to #2: If YES, please describe these problems and discuss their impact.  3. Please provide the following financial information for the requested years.
If your state has a  CERFP, did it  receive any of  this funding? (NGPA) (OMNG) (YES, NO, or N/A)
section_title: 4. Please provide a list of the top 5 equipment items (or equipment capabilities) that are NOT currently
paragraphs: provided to your CST (by either the state or the National Guard Bureau) that you would like to see  provided, if any. (Please list in order of importance, with ‘1’ being the most important item or  capability.)
EQUIPMENT ITEM or  EQUIPMENT CAPABILITY  1.
Intended Use?
In your opinion, what are the primary advantages and disadvantages of having non-military (i.e.,  commercial off-the-shelf) equipment?
Is the facility that houses the CST large enough to hold all vehicles and other CST equipment?
Follow-up to #6: What improvements to your facility could you suggest, if any?
section_title: 7. Have there been any recurrent equipment issues during deployments and exercises?
paragraphs: Follow-up to #7: If YES, please describe the most frequent equipment issues.  8. Please respond to the following questions about your CST’s formulary:  Has the state augmented the  standardized CST formulary?
Has the State Surgeon approved the CST  formulary?
Has the NGB Surgeon approved the CST  formulary?
Does the CST carry any medications  that are not listed on the CST formulary? 9. Does your CST have a Delegation of Services Agreement (DSA) from the State Surgeon?
Follow-up to #9: If YES, what was the date of this DSA?   (Date must be in yyyy-mm-dd format, e.g. 2005-07-25 or 2004-12-15)
Follow-up to #9: What problems, if any, did you encounter in securing the DSA?
section_title: 10. Please use the following matrix to describe your transport strategy. Under what conditions does your
paragraphs: CST rely on land transport? On air transport? On water transport?
Geography of incident  setting (urban, rural,  coastal, inland, etc)
Additional comments about transport strategy, if any:  11. For each of the following types of transport, please identify what the CST has access to and whether or  not this access is a dedicated asset (i.e., owned by the CST). If it is borrowed from other agencies,  please indicate the process by which the CST would gain access to a specific means of transport:  (Land/Air/Water)
If borrowed, how would the CST  helicopter?) other forces? gain access to it?  12. If you have further comments in response to any of the questions in this section, you may use this  space to provide them. Please identify your comments by preceding them with the number of the  earlier question to which they refer (e.g., 1, 3, 7, etc.).
section_title: 13. Please provide a name, phone number, and email address for follow-up questions regarding the
paragraphs: responses to this section. (Field may be left blank if the unit commander is the contact point.)  1. Which documents or guidance do you use to develop your training plan?  2. Please provide the requested information about training and certification for the following duty  qualified? (YES, NO,  or N/A) training was  completed? of collective  training was  completed? (e.g. fully trained,  currently certified,  experienced, etc.) qualified? (YES, NO,  or N/A) training was  completed? of collective  training was  completed? (e.g. fully trained,  currently certified,  experienced, etc.) qualified? (YES, NO,  or N/A) training was  completed? of collective  training was  completed? (e.g. fully trained,  currently certified,  experienced, etc.)
In addition to the EXEVALs and annual lanes training, what other tests, certifications, or proofs of  competence do CST members complete, if any?  4. Should anything more be done to ensure technical and duty-specific expertise among CST members?
section_title: Follow-up to #4: If YES, what more should be done?
paragraphs: 5. Do members of the CST receive any training regarding chain-of-evidence and other evidence collection  Follow-up to #5: If YES, who provides this training?  6. What supplementary training, if any, does the state require that is in addition to what is already  required by the National Guard Bureau?  7. At the present time, what are the training strengths of your CST?  8. At the present time, what are the training weaknesses of your CST?  If weaknesses exist, how could  training be improved to address them?  9. What is the impact of personnel turnover on training?
section_title: 10. If you have further comments in response to any of the questions in this section, you may use this
paragraphs: space to provide them. Please identify your comments by preceding them with the number of the  earlier question to which they refer (e.g., 1, 3, 7, etc.).  11. Please provide a name, phone number, and email address for follow-up questions regarding the  responses to this section. (Field may be left blank if the unit commander is the contact point.)  1. For each of the following sections of the CST, is the number of duty positions adequate to perform all  of the CST’s missions? If not, what would be the ideal number?
Administration/Logistics (2)
Medical/Analytical (4)
Communications (2)
Follow-up to #1: Which additional specialties, if any, would you add if your authorized strength were  increased?
section_title: Is the facility that houses the CST large enough for all personnel to have an adequate workspace?
paragraphs: Will this  position likely be  vacant in  the next  months?
Will this  position likely be  vacant in  the next 7- 12 months? months?
Average  fill time  for this  position (i.e. how  many  days,  weeks, position? team) team) team) team) months)
Will this  position likely be  vacant in  the next  months?
Will this  position likely be  vacant in  the next 7- 12 months? months?
Average  fill time  for this  position (i.e. how  many  days,  weeks, position? team) team) team) team) months)
4. Do you ever perform CST missions (training or live response) with fewer personnel than you need?
Follow-up to #4: If YES, what is the impact of responding with fewer personnel than you need?
section_title: 5. What has been your CST’s annual turnover totals for personnel?
paragraphs: (number of positions, including  promotions within the team) estimated?
6. What are the primary factors that affect these personnel trends?   7. What have been the effects of your turnover rate on team operations?  8. Have any CST members left to become members of state, regional, or local fire departments, HAZMAT  teams, or other emergency response agencies?
Follow-up to #8: If YES, approximately how many?
section_title: 9. Has any of your team’s turnover been due to dismissal of team members?
section_title: 15. If you have further comments in response to any of the questions in this section, you may use this
paragraphs: space to provide them. Please identify your comments by preceding them with the number of the  earlier question to which they refer (e.g., 1, 3, 7, etc.).  16. Please provide a name, phone number, and email address for follow-up questions regarding the  responses to this section. (Field may be left blank if the unit commander is the contact point.)
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Ann Borseth, Assistant Director; Bari L.  Bendell; Jaclyn A. Bowland; David A. Brown; Carole F. Coffey; Lee Cooper;  Joseph W. Kirschbaum; David A. Mayfield; Walter K. Vance; and Tamika S.  Weerasingha made key contributions to this report.