2000 Census: Best Practices and Lessons Learned for More Cost-Effective Nonresponse Follow-up
Published: 2002-02-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Nonresponse follow-up--in which Census Bureau enumerators go door-to-door to count individuals who have not mailed back their questionnaires--was the most costly and labor intensive of all 2000 Census operations. According to Bureau data, labor, mileage, and administrative costs totaled $1.4 billion, or 22 percent of the $6.5 billion allocated for the 2000 Census. Several practices were critical to the Bureau's timely competition of nonresponse follow-up. The Bureau (1) had an aggressive outreach and promotion campaign, simplified questionnaire, and other efforts to boost the mail response rate and thus reduce the Bureau's nonresponse follow-up workload; (2) used a flexible human capital strategy that enabled it to meet its national recruiting and hiring goals and position enumerators where they were most needed; (3) called on local census offices to identify local enumeration challenges, such as locked apartment buildings and gated communities, and to develop action plans to address them; and (4) applied ambitious interim "stretch" goals that encouraged local census offices to finish 80 percent of their nonresponse follow-up workload within the first four weeks and be completely finished by the end of the eighth week, as opposed to the ten-week time frame specified in the Bureau's master schedule. Although these initiatives were key to meeting tight time frames for nonresponse follow-ups, the Bureau's experience in implementing them highlights challenges for the next census in 2010. First, maintaining the response rate is becoming increasingly expensive. Second, public participation in the census remains problematic. Third, the address lists used for nonresponse follow-up did not always contain the latest available information because the Bureau found it was infeasible to remove many late-responding households. Fourth, the Bureau's stretch goals appeared to produce mixed results. Finally, there are questions about how reinterview procedures aimed at detecting enumerator fraud and other quality problems were implemented.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Nonresponse follow-up—where enumerators from the Bureau of the Census went door-to-door to count those individuals who did not mail back  their questionnaires—was the most costly and labor intensive of all 2000 Census operations.  According to bureau data, labor, mileage, and certain  administrative costs alone amounted to about $1.4 billion, or about 22  percent of the total $6.5 billion allocated for the 2000 Census from fiscal  year 1991 through fiscal year 2003.  In terms of employment, the bureau  hired about a half a million enumerators, which temporarily made it one of  the nation’s largest employers, surpassed by only a handful of big  organizations like Wal-Mart and the U.S. Postal Service.  Moreover, the  workload and schedule of nonresponse follow-up—the need to collect data from about 42 million nonresponding households within a 10-week time  frame—made the conduct of this operation extraordinarily difficult and  complex.
In our prior work we noted that the success of nonresponse follow-up  would depend in large part on the bureau’s ability to maintain data quality while completing the operation on schedule, before error rates increased  as people moved or had trouble recalling who was living at their homes on  Census Day—April 1.  Timeliness was also important for keeping  subsequent census operations on-track.  In particular, this included the  Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation (A.C.E.), which was a separate sample  survey designed to assess the quality of the population data collected in the  2000 Census.  For methodological reasons, the bureau needed to complete  its field data collection workload for nonresponse follow-up before A.C.E.  field data collection could begin.
To its credit, the bureau generally completed nonresponse follow-up  consistent with its operational plan.  Nationwide, according to bureau data,  the 511 local census offices located in the 50 states generally completed  nonresponse follow-up in slightly less time than the bureau’s planned 10- week schedule.  This was a noteworthy accomplishment given the  operational uncertainties the bureau faced, and stands in sharp contrast to  the bureau’s 1990 experience when nonresponse follow-up was hampered  by unanticipated workload and staffing problems and was completed 6  weeks behind schedule.
This report is the latest in our series of reviews that examine the results of  key census-taking operations and highlight opportunities for reform (see  the last page of this report for a list of products issued to date).  Our  objectives were to identify (1) practices that contributed to the timely  completion of nonresponse follow-up and (2) lessons learned in  implementing these practices that the bureau may want to consider as it  plans for nonresponse follow-up during the next census in 2010.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In conducting nonresponse follow-up, the bureau has historically faced the  twin challenge of (1) collecting quality data (by obtaining complete and  accurate information directly from household members) while (2) finishing  the operation on schedule, before error rates can increase as people move  or have trouble recalling who was living at their homes on Census Day  (April 1), as well as keeping subsequent operations on-track.  Nonresponse  follow-up was scheduled to begin on April 27, 2000, and end 10 weeks later,  on July 7, 2000.
Local census offices generally finished their nonresponse follow-up  workloads ahead of the bureau’s 10-week schedule. As shown in figure 1,  of the bureau’s 511 local offices in the 50 states, 463 (91 percent) finished  nonresponse follow-up by the end of the eighth week of the operation,  consistent with the bureau’s internal stretch goals.  Moreover, nine local  offices completed their workloads in as little as 5 weeks or less.
The timely completion of nonresponse follow-up in 2000 stands in sharp  contrast to the bureau’s experience during the 1990 Census.  As shown in  figure 2, at the end of the 6-week scheduled time frame for nonresponse  follow-up during the 1990 Census, the bureau had not completed the  operation.  In fact, as of two days prior to the scheduled end date, just two  local census offices had completed the operation and the bureau had only  completed about 72 percent of its 34 million household follow-up  workload.  It took the bureau a total of 14 weeks to complete the entire  operation.  By comparison, as noted above, the bureau completed  nonresponse follow-up in less than 10 weeks during the 2000 Census.
Figure 2 also highlights the drop-off in production that occurs during the  later weeks of nonresponse follow-up.  According to the bureau, the  decline occurs because unresolved cases at the end of nonresponse follow- up are typically the most difficult to reach, either because they are  uncooperative or are rarely at home and are unknown to neighbors.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To meet our objectives, we used a combination of approaches and methods  to examine the conduct of nonresponse follow-up.  These included  statistical analyses; interviews with key bureau headquarters officials,  regional census center officials, and local census office managers and staff;  observations of local census offices’ nonresponse follow-up operations;  and reviews of relevant documentation.
To examine the factors that contributed to the timely completion of  nonresponse follow-up, we interviewed local census office managers and  other supervisory staff at 60 local census offices we visited across the  country.  These offices generally faced specific enumeration challenges  when nonresponse follow-up began in late April, and were thus prone to  operational problems that could affect data quality (see app. I for a  complete list of the offices we visited).  Specifically, these offices had (1) a  larger nonresponse follow-up workload than initially planned; (2) multiple  areas that were relatively hard-to-enumerate, such as non-English-speaking  groups; and (3) difficulties meeting their enumerator recruiting goals.  During these visits, which took place in June and July 2000, we also  observed office operations to see how office staff were processing  questionnaires; at 12 of these offices we attended enumerator training; and  at 31 offices we reviewed key reinterview documents in a given week  during nonresponse follow-up.  The local census offices we visited  represent a mix of urban, suburban, and rural locations.  However, because  they were judgmentally selected, our findings from these visits cannot be  projected to the universe of local census offices.
To obtain a broader perspective of the conduct of nonresponse follow-up,  we used the results of our survey of a stratified random sample of  managers at 250 local census offices.  The survey—which asked these  managers about the implementation of a number of key field operations—  is generalizable to the 511 local census offices located in the 50 states.  We  obtained responses from managers at 236 local census offices (about a 94  percent overall response rate).  All reported percentages are estimates  based on the sample and are subject to some sampling error as well as  nonsampling error.  In general, percentage estimates in this report for the  entire sample have confidence intervals ranging from about ± 4 to ± 5  percentage points at the 95 percent confidence interval. In other words, if  all managers in our local census office population had been surveyed, the  chances are 95 out of 100 that the result obtained would not differ from our  sample estimate in the more extreme cases by more than ± 5 percent.
To examine whether the pace of nonresponse follow-up was associated  with the collection of less complete data, in addition to the efforts  described above, we analyzed bureau data on the weekly progress of  nonresponse follow-up.  Specific measures we analyzed included the time  it took local census offices to finish nonresponse follow-up and the  proportion of their cases completed by (1) “close-out” interviews, where  questionnaires only contain basic information on the status of the housing  unit (e.g., whether it was occupied), or (2) “partial” interviews, which  contain more information than a close-out interview but are still less than  complete.  The completeness of the data collected by enumerators is one  measure of the quality of nonresponse follow-up, and these two measures  were the best indicators of completeness available from the database.  We  included data from the 511 offices located in the 50 states and controlled  for enumeration difficulty using an index measure developed by the  bureau. We did not include any outliers that the bureau identified as  erroneous (for example, outliers resulting from coding errors).
We did our audit work at the local census offices identified in appendix I  and their respective regional census centers; bureau headquarters in  Suitland, Maryland; and Washington, DC, from March 2000 through  September 2001.  Our work was done in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of  Commerce.  On January 10, 2002, the Secretary forwarded the bureau’s  written comments on the draft (see app. II) which we address at the end of  this report.
section_title: The Bureau Used an Aggressive Outreach and Promotion Campaign and Other Strategies to Boost the Mail Response Rate but Public Cooperation Remains Problematic
paragraphs: Key to the bureau’s timely completion of nonresponse follow-up in 2000  was a higher than expected initial mail response rate that decreased the  bureau’s follow-up workload.  In addition to reducing the staff, time, and  money required to complete the census count, the bureau’s past experience  and evaluations suggest that the quality of data obtained from  questionnaires returned by mail is better than the data collected by  enumerators.
To help raise the mail response rate, the bureau (1) hired a consortium of  private-sector advertising agencies, led by Young & Rubicam, to develop a  national, multimedia paid advertising program, and (2) partnered with local  governments, community groups, businesses, nongovernmental  organizations, and other entities to promote the census on a grassroots  basis (we discuss the bureau’s partnership program in more detail in our  August 2001 report). The outreach and promotion campaign encouraged  people to complete their census questionnaires by conveying the message  that census participation helped their communities. The bureau also helped  boost the mail response rate by using simplified questionnaires, which was  consistent with our past suggestions, and by developing more ways to  respond to the census, such as using the Internet.
The bureau achieved an initial mail response rate of about 64 percent,  which was about 3 percentage points higher than the 61 percent response  rate the bureau expected when planning for nonresponse follow-up.This,  in turn, resulted in a nonresponse follow-up workload of about 42 million  housing units, which was about 4 million fewer housing units than the  bureau would have faced under its planning assumption of a 61 percent  mail response rate.
In addition to surpassing its national response rate goals, the bureau  exceeded its own expectations at the local level.  Of the 511 local census  offices, 378 (74 percent) met or exceeded the bureau's expected response  rate.  In so doing, these offices reduced their nonresponse follow-up  workloads from the expected levels by between 54 and 58,329 housing  units.  The remaining 133 offices (26 percent) did not meet their expected  response rate and the workload at these offices increased from their  expected levels by between 279 and 33,402 housing units.
subsections: section_title: Securing Public Participation While Controlling Costs Remains a Considerable Challenge for the 2010 Census
paragraphs: The bureau’s success in surpassing its response rate goals was noteworthy  given the formidable societal challenges it faced.  These challenges  included attitudinal factors such as concerns over privacy, and  demographic trends such as more complex living arrangements.  However,  as the bureau plans for the next census in 2010, it faces the difficulty of  boosting public participation while keeping costs manageable.
As we noted in our December 2001 report, although the bureau achieved  similar response rates in 1990 and 2000 (65 percent in 1990 and 64 percent  in 2000), the bureau spent far more money on outreach and promotion in  2000:  about $3.19 per household in 2000 compared to $0.88 in 1990 (in  constant fiscal year 2000 dollars), an increase of 260 percent. Moreover,  the societal challenges the bureau encountered in 1990 and 2000 will  probably be more complex in 2010, and simply staying on par with the 2000  response rate will likely require an even greater investment of bureau  resources.
Further, while the mail response rate provides a direct indication of the  nonresponse workload, it is an imperfect measure of public cooperation  with the census as it is calculated as a percentage of all forms in the mail- back universe from which the bureau received a questionnaire.  Because  the mail-back universe includes housing units that the bureau determines  are nonexistent or vacant during nonresponse follow-up, a more precise  measure of public cooperation is the mail return rate, which excludes  vacant and nonexistent housing units.  According to preliminary bureau  data, the mail return rate for the 2000 Census was 72 percent, a decline of 2  percentage points from the 74 percent mail return rate the bureau achieved  in 1990.  As shown in figure 3, in 2000, the bureau reduced, but did not  reverse, the steady decline in public cooperation that has occurred with  each decennial census since the bureau first initiated a national mail- out/mail-back approach in 1970.  Bureau officials said they would further  examine the reasons for the decline in the return rate as part of its Census  2000 evaluations.
In addition, as shown in figure 4, the results to date show that just three  states increased their mail return rates compared to the 1990 Census.  Overall, preliminary bureau data shows the change in mail return rates  from 1990 through 2000 ranged from an increase of about 1 percentage  point in Massachusetts and California to a decline of about 9 percentage  points in Kentucky.
The bureau’s outreach and promotion efforts will also face the historical  hurdle of bridging the gap that exists between the public’s awareness of the  census on the one hand, and its motivation to respond on the other.  Various polls conducted for the 2000 Census suggested that the public’s  awareness of the census was over 90 percent; and yet, as noted earlier, the  actual return rate was much lower—72 percent of the nation’s households.  The bureau faced a similar issue in 1990 when 93 percent of the public  reported being aware of the census, but the return rate was 74 percent.  In  our previous work, we noted that closing this gap would be a significant  challenge for the bureau, and as the bureau plans for the 2010 Census, it  will be important for it to explore approaches that more effectively convert  the public’s awareness of the census into a willingness to respond.
section_title: Flexible Human Capital Strategies Helped the Bureau Meet Its Recruitment Goals
paragraphs: A second factor that was instrumental to the operational success of  nonresponse follow-up was an ample and sufficiently skilled enumerator  workforce.  Based on anticipated turnover and the expected workload to  carry out its four largest field data collection operations—of which  nonresponse follow-up was the largest—the bureau set a recruitment goal  of 2.4 million qualified applicants. In addition to the sheer volume of  recruits needed, the bureau's efforts were complicated by the fact that it  was competing for employees in a historically tight national labor market.  Nevertheless, when nonresponse follow-up began on April 27, the bureau  had recruited over 2.5 million qualified applicants.
The bureau surmounted its human capital challenge with an aggressive  recruitment strategy that helped make the bureau a more attractive  employer to prospective candidates and ensured a steady stream of  applicants.  Key ingredients of the bureau’s recruitment efforts included the  following:  1.	 A geographic pay scale with wages set at 65 to 75 percent of local  prevailing wages (from about $8.25 to $18.50 per hour for  enumerators).  The bureau also used its flexibility to raise pay rates for  those census offices that were encountering recruitment difficulties.
For example, a manager at one of the Charlotte region’s local census  offices told us that the office was having difficulty obtaining needed  staff in part because census wages were uncompetitive.  According to  this manager, the region approved a pay increase for the office’s  enumerators and office clerks, which helped the office obtain staff.  In  all, when nonresponse follow-up began, the bureau raised pay rates for  field staff at eight local offices to address those offices’ recruiting  challenges.  2.	 Partnerships with state, local, and tribal governments, community  groups, and other organizations to help recruit employees and provide  free facilities to test applicants.  For example, Clergy United, an  organization representing churches in the Detroit metropolitan area,  provided space for testing census job applicants in December 1998.  The organization even conducted pre-tests several days before each  bureau-administered test so those applicants could familiarize  themselves with the testing format.  3.	 A recruitment advertising campaign, which totaled over $2.3 million,  that variously emphasized the ability to earn good pay, work flexible  hours, learn new skills, and do something important for one’s  community.  Moreover, the advertisements were in a variety of  languages to attract different ethnic groups, and were also targeted to  different races, senior citizens, retirees, and people seeking part-time  employment.  The bureau advertised using traditional outlets such as  newspaper classified sections, as well as more novel media including  Internet banners and messages on utility and credit card bills.  4.	 Obtaining exemptions from the majority of state governments so that  individuals receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,  Medicaid, and selected other types of public assistance would not have  their benefits reduced when earning census income, thus making  census jobs more attractive. At the start of nonresponse follow-up, 44  states and the Virgin Islands had granted an exemption for one or more  of these programs.  5.	 Encouraging local offices to continue their recruiting efforts  throughout nonresponse follow-up, regardless of whether offices had  met their recruiting goals, to ensure a steady stream of available  applicants.
The bureau matched these initiatives with an ongoing monitoring effort  that enabled bureau officials to rapidly respond to recruiting difficulties.  For example, during the last 2 weeks of April, the bureau mailed over 5  million recruiting postcards to Boston, Charlotte, and other locations  where it found recruitment efforts were lagging.
Based on the results of our local census office visits, it is clear that the  bureau’s human capital strategy had positive outcomes.  Of the 60 local  census offices we visited, officials at 59 offices provided useable responses  to our question about whether their offices had the type of staff they  needed to conduct nonresponse follow-up, including staff with particular  language skills to enumerate in targeted areas. Officials at 54 of the 59  offices said they had the type of staff they needed to conduct nonresponse  follow-up.  For example, officials in the Boston North office said they hired  enumerators who spoke Japanese, Vietnamese, Portuguese, Spanish,  French, Russian, and Chinese, while Pittsburgh office officials said they  had enumerators that knew sign language to communicate with deaf  residents.
Managers at local census offices we surveyed provided additional  perspective on recruiting needed field staff.  As shown in figure 5, 30  percent of the respondents believed that the bureau’s ability to recruit and  hire high-quality field staff needed no improvements.  While managers at 52  percent of the local offices commented that some improvement to the  recruiting and hiring process was needed and another 17 percent  commented that a significant amount of improvement was needed, their  suggestions varied.  Managers’ suggestions generally related to various  hiring practices, such as a greater use of face-to-face interviews to select  managers at local census offices and earlier recruitment advertising.
Once nonresponse follow-up began, bureau officials tracked production  rates as the primary measure of whether local offices had met their staffing  goals.  For example, bureau officials said that both bureau headquarters  and regional census center staff monitored local census offices’ production  daily.  If an office was not meeting its production goals, bureau  headquarters officials said they worked with regional census personnel,  who in turn worked with the local census office manager, to determine the  reasons for the shortfall and the actions necessary to increase production.  Possible actions included bringing in enumerators from neighboring local  census offices.
Overall, preliminary bureau data shows that about 500,000 enumerators  worked on nonresponse follow-up.  Nationally, the bureau established a  hiring goal of 292,000 enumerator positions for nonresponse follow-up,  which represented two people working approximately 25 hours per week  for each position and assumed 100 percent turnover, according to bureau  officials.  The bureau has not yet analyzed how many enumerators charged  at least 25 hours per week during nonresponse follow-up.  Moreover,  according to a senior bureau official, the bureau has not decided whether it  will do such an analysis for 2010 planning purposes.  According to this  official, because the bureau hired about 500,000 enumerators and  completed the operation a week ahead of schedule, they believe the bureau  generally met its hiring goal.
section_title: Local Census Offices Planned in Advance for Specific Enumeration Challenges
paragraphs: A third factor that contributed to the timely completion of nonresponse  follow-up was preparing in advance for probable enumeration challenges.  To do this, the bureau called on local census offices and their respective  regional census centers to develop action plans that, among other things,  identified hard-to-enumerate areas within their jurisdictions, such as  immigrant neighborhoods, and propose strategies for dealing with those  challenges.  These strategies included such methods as paired/team  enumeration for high-crime areas, and hiring bilingual enumerators.  While  this early planning effort helped local census offices react to a variety of  enumeration challenges, the currency and accuracy of the nonresponse  follow-up address lists and maps remained problematic for a number of  local census offices.
subsections: section_title: Most Local Offices Used Action Plans to Address Enumeration Challenges
paragraphs: Of the 60 local census offices we visited, officials at 55 offices provided  useable responses to our question about how, if at all, their offices used  their action plan for hard-to-enumerate areas during nonresponse follow- up. Officials at 51 of 55 offices said their offices used the strategies in  their action plan to address the enumeration challenges they faced.
At the offices we visited, a frequently cited enumeration challenge was  gaining access to gated communities or secure apartment buildings.  Officials at 42 of the 60 offices we visited identified this as a problem.  To  address it, officials said they developed partnerships with building  management and community leaders, among other strategies.  In an Atlanta  office, for example, local officials said they sent letters to managers of  gated communities that stressed the importance of the census.  Similarly,  officials in a Chicago office said they personally phoned managers of  secure apartment buildings.  When enumerators from a Milwaukee local  census office encountered problems accessing locked apartment buildings,  local census officials told us that the City of Milwaukee sent aldermen to  visit the building managers and encourage them to participate in the  census.
Another common enumeration challenge appeared to be obtaining  cooperation from residents—cited as a difficulty by officials at 34 of the 60  offices we visited.  One problem they noted was obtaining responses to the  long-form questionnaire—either in its entirety or to specific items, such as  income-related questions--which, according to local census officials, some  residents found to be intrusive.
Enumerators also encountered residents who were unwilling to participate  in the census because of language and cultural differences, or their fears of  government.  The bureau’s standardized training for enumerators included  procedures for handling refusals.  Local census officials encouraged public  participation with a variety of approaches as well.  For example, census  officials in Cleveland and Cincinnati said they provided additional training  for enumerators on how to handle refusals and practiced what was taught  in mock interviews.  Officials in other census offices said they partnered  with local community leaders who subsequently helped reach out to hard- to-enumerate groups, hired people who were bilingual or otherwise trusted  and known by residents, and held media campaigns.  Overall, according to  bureau data, close to 470,000 households of the approximately 42 million  making up the nonresponse follow-up workload (about 1 percent), refused  to participate in the census.
section_title: The Accuracy and Currency of Nonresponse Follow-up Address Lists and Maps Appeared to Be Problematic
paragraphs: Of the 60 local census offices we visited, officials at 52 offices provided  useable responses to our question about whether their offices’  nonresponse follow-up address list reflected the most accurate and current  information. Officials at 21 of the 52 offices said that their lists generally  were not accurate and current.  Nationwide, as shown in figure 6, based on  our survey of local census office managers, we estimate that managers at  approximately 50 percent of local census offices believed that some  improvement was needed in the accuracy of address lists for nonresponse  follow-up.  We estimated that managers at about 22 percent of local census  offices believed that a significant amount of improvement was needed.
Among the more frequent problems managers cited were duplicate  addresses and changes not being made from prior operations.  For  example, at a local census office in the Seattle region, managers said that  some addresses were residences or businesses that had been gone for 10-15  years and should have been deleted in previous census operations but were  not.
Local census officials we visited cited problems with the accuracy of the  census maps as well. Of the 60 local census offices we visited, officials at 58  offices provided useable responses to our question about whether the most  accurate and current information was reflected on the nonresponse follow- up maps.  Officials at about a third of local census offices—21 of 58  offices—said the nonresponse follow-up maps did not reflect the most  accurate and current information.
Further, as shown in figure 7, based on our survey of local census office  managers, at about 41 percent of the offices, managers believed that some  improvement was needed in maps for nonresponse follow-up.  At about 23  percent of the offices, managers believed that a significant amount of  improvement was needed in these maps.
Managers who commented that improvements were needed to the  nonresponse follow-up maps said the maps were difficult to use, not  updated from prior operations, and contained errors.  For example, an  official at a local census office in the Atlanta region said that some roads on  the map did not exist or were not oriented correctly on the census maps.  To address this difficulty, local office staff purchased commercial maps or  used the Internet to help them locate some housing units.
The bureau developed its master address list and maps using a series of  operations that made incremental updates designed to continuously  improve the completeness and accuracy of the master address file and  maps.  A number of these updates occurred during nonresponse follow-up  when enumerators encountered, for example, nonexistent or duplicate  housing units, or units that needed to be added to the address list.  As a  result, the bureau was expecting some discrepancies between the  nonresponse follow-up address list and what enumerators found in the  field when they went door-to-door, which could account for some of the  local census officials’ perceptions.
Another factor that affected the currency of the nonresponse follow-up  address list was the cut-off date for mail-back responses.  The bureau set  April 11, 2000, as the deadline for mail-back responses for purposes of  generating the address list for nonresponse follow-up.  In a subsequent late  mail return operation, the bureau updated its field follow-up workload by  removing those households for which questionnaires were received from  April 11 through April 18.  However, according to bureau officials, the  bureau continued to receive questionnaires, in part because of an  unexpected boost from its outreach and promotion campaign.  For  example, by April 30—less than 2 weeks after the bureau removed the late  mail returns that it had checked-in as of April 18--the bureau received  773,784 additional questionnaires.  Bureau headquarters officials told us it  was infeasible to remove the late returns from the nonresponse follow-up  address lists and thus, enumerators needed to visit these households.
The cost of these visits approached $22 million, based on our earlier  estimate that a 1-percentage point increase in workload could add at least  $34 million in direct salary, benefits, and travel costs to the price tag of  nonresponse follow-up. In addition, the bureau’s data processing centers  then had to reconcile the duplicate questionnaires.  According to officials  at some local offices we visited, the visits to households that had already  responded confused residents who questioned why enumerators came to  collect information from them after they had mailed back their census  forms.
section_title: The Bureau’s Stretch Goals to Complete Nonresponse Follow- up May Have Produced Mixed Results
paragraphs: To help ensure that local census offices completed nonresponse follow-up  on schedule, the bureau developed ambitious interim stretch goals.  These goals called on local census offices to finish 80 percent of their  nonresponse follow-up workload within the first 4 weeks of the operation  and be completely finished by the end of the eighth week.  Under the  bureau’s master schedule, local census offices had 10 weeks to complete the operation.
subsections: section_title: Local Census Office Managers Cited Both Positive and Negative Effects of the Nonresponse Follow-up Schedule on the Quality of the Operation
paragraphs: Our survey of local census office managers asked what impact, if any,  scheduling pressures to complete nonresponse follow-up had on the quality  of the operation.  On the one hand, as shown in figure 8, about 41 percent of  the local census office managers believed that scheduling pressures had  little or no impact on the quality of the operation, while about 17 percent  believed that such pressure had a positive or significantly positive impact.  At a local census office in the New York region, for example, the local  census office manager stated that, "pressuring people a little gave them the  motivation to produce.”  Managers in local census offices located in the  Dallas region commented that the schedule “kept people on their toes and  caused them to put forth their best effort" and that it “had a positive impact,  particularly on quality.”
On the other hand, managers at a substantial number of local census  offices had the opposite view.  As shown in figure 8, about 40 percent of the  respondents believed that scheduling pressure during nonresponse follow- up had a negative or significantly negative impact on the quality of the  operation.
Of those managers who believed that the pressure to complete  nonresponse follow-up adversely affected the quality of the operation, a  common perception appeared to be that production was emphasized more  than accuracy and that the schedule required local census offices to curtail  procedures that could have improved data quality.  For example, managers  at some local census offices told us that the bureau’s regional census  centers encouraged competition between local census offices by, among  other actions, ranking local census offices by their progress and  distributing the results to local managers.  Managers at some local census  offices believed that such competition fostered a culture where quantity  was more important than quality.  As one manager told us, the bureau’s  ambitious nonresponse follow-up schedule led the manager “to put  enormous pressure on people in the field to complete the operation  quickly, and this affected the quality of data.”  However, none of the  managers we surveyed cited specific examples of where corners were cut  or quality was compromised.
section_title: The Pace of Nonresponse Follow-up Was Not Associated with the Collection of Less Complete Data
paragraphs: One measure of the quality of nonresponse follow-up is the completeness  of the data collected by enumerators.  The bureau went to great lengths to  obtain complete data directly from household members.  Bureau  procedures generally called for enumerators to make up to three personal  visits and three telephone calls to each household on different days of the  week at different times until they obtained needed information on that  household.
However, in cases where household members could not be contacted or  refused to answer all or part of the census questionnaire, enumerators  were permitted to obtain data via proxy (a neighbor, building manager, or  other nonhousehold member presumed to know about its residents), or  collect less complete data than called for by the census questionnaire.  Such data include (1) “closeout” interviews, where questionnaires only  contain the information on the status of the housing unit (e.g., whether or  not it was occupied), and the number of residents and (2) “partial”  interviews, which contain more information than a closeout interview but  less than a completed questionnaire.
There were several well-publicized breakdowns in these enumeration  procedures at a small number of local census offices that took short cuts to  complete their work (which the bureau later took steps to rectify).  Nationally, however, our analysis of bureau data found no statistically  significant association between the week individual local census offices  finished their nonresponse follow-up workload and the percentage of  partial or closeout interviews they reported, after controlling for the  enumeration difficulty level of each local office’s area (at the time of our  review, the bureau did not have information on data collected via proxy  interviews).
Neither did we find a statistically significant relationship between the week  that local census offices finished their nonresponse follow-up workload  and the amount of residual workload, they had, if any.  The residual  workload consisted of households that were part of the original follow-up  workload, but from which the bureau did not receive a questionnaire from  the local census offices, and thus had not been processed through data  capture.  According to bureau data, 519 local offices had to conduct  residual nonresponse follow-up on 121,792 households.
Similarly, we did not find an association between week-to-week “spikes” in  local census offices’ production and the percentage of either partial or  closeout interview data reported.  Spikes or surges in production could  indicate that local census offices were cutting corners to complete their  workloads by a specific deadline.  Nationally, we found no relationship  between the number of questionnaires finished each week and either the  percentage of those finished that were closeout interviews or partial  interviews.
Overall, as shown in figure 9, as nonresponse follow-up progressed, the  proportion of closeout and partial interview data collected relative to the  amount of questionnaires finished remained relatively constant.
Moreover, only a small percentage of most local census offices’  nonresponse follow-up workload was finished using closeout and partial  interviews.  As shown in figure 10, of the 499 local offices where reliable  closeout data were available, 413 (83 percent) reported that less than 2  percent of their questionnaires were finished in this manner, while 19  offices (4 percent) reported 5 percent or more of their finished  nonresponse follow-up work as closeout interviews.  For partial interviews,  of the 508 offices where reliable data were available, 267 (53 percent)  reported collecting less than 2 percent of such data, while 47 offices (9  percent) reported 5 percent or more of their finished work as partial  interviews.  The median percentages of closeout and partial interviews  were .8 percent and 1.9 percent, respectively.
At those local census offices that had substantially higher levels of closeout  and partial interview data than other offices, the bureau said that some of  this was understandable given the enumeration challenges that these  census offices faced.  For example, according to the bureau, the relatively  high partial interview rate at a New York local office (3.8 percent of that  office’s finished nonresponse follow-up workload) was in line with the  regional average of 2.2 percent, partly due to the difficulty that staff had in  gaining access to apartment buildings.  Once building managers gave  enumerators access and they were able to obtain information from proxies,  the number of refusals may have decreased, but the number of partial  interviews increased because the proxies could not provide complete  information.
Still, as noted above, some local census offices inappropriately used certain  enumeration techniques.  For example, the Hialeah, Florida, office reported  finishing its nonresponse follow-up workload in 5 weeks—well ahead of  the 8-week stretch goals and 10 weeks allotted for the operation.  The  Homestead, Florida, office—where Hialeah-trained enumerators were later  transferred to help complete nonresponse follow-up—reported finishing its  workload in 7 weeks.  The Commerce Department’s Office of the Inspector  General later found that Hialeah-trained enumerators did not make the  required number of visits and telephone calls before contacting a proxy for  information, and did not properly implement quality control procedures  designed to detect data falsification. The bureau responded to these  findings by, among other actions, reworking over 64,000 questionnaires  from the Hialeah and Homestead offices.
section_title: Questions Surround Whether Certain Reinterview Procedures Were Implemented as Intended
paragraphs: To help ensure that enumerators followed proper enumeration procedures  and were not falsifying data, the bureau “reinterviewed” households under  certain circumstances to check enumerators’ work.  As such, reinterviews  were a critical component of the bureau’s quality assurance program for  nonresponse follow-up. If falsification was detected during a reinterview,  the local office was to terminate the enumerator and redo all of the  enumerator’s work.  Enumerators making inadvertent errors were to  correct their mistakes and be retrained.  The bureau conducted three types  of reinterviews:  1.	 Random reinterviews were to be performed on a sample of  enumerators’ work during the early weeks of their employment.  Seven  randomly selected questionnaires from each enumerator’s first 70 cases  were to have been reinterviewed.  2.	 Administrative reinterviews checked the work of enumerators whose  performance in certain dimensions (e.g., the number of partial  interviews conducted) differed significantly from that of other  enumerators employed in the same area—and there was no  justification for the difference.  In such cases, enumerators could be  fabricating data.  According to the bureau, administrative tests were  designed to identify enumerators who were making errors that were  more likely to occur toward the end of the operation, after the random  check of enumerators’ initial work.  They were conducted at the  discretion of local census officials.  3.	 Supplemental reinterviews were to be conducted at the discretion of  local census officials when they had some basis for concern about the  quality of an enumerator’s work.
On the basis of our work and that of the bureau, we found that local census  office officials often used their discretion to not conduct administrative  and supplemental reinterviews and thus, a number of local offices did not  conduct such reinterviews.  At those offices, once the random check of  enumerators’ initial work was completed, there were no additional checks  specifically designed to catch enumerators suspected of falsifying data.  This raises questions about the reinterview program’s ability to ensure the  quality of enumerators’ work over the full duration of their employment on  nonresponse follow-up.
subsections: section_title: Local Managers Often Decided Against Conducting Administrative Reinterviews
paragraphs: Of the 520 local census offices, 52 offices (10 percent) conducted no  administrative and no supplemental reinterviews, according to bureau  data.An additional 14 offices (3 percent) conducted no administrative  reinterviews, and an additional 231 offices (44 percent) conducted no  supplemental reinterviews.
A chief in the bureau’s Quality Assurance Office expressed concern about  the adequacy of quality assurance coverage toward the end of nonresponse  follow-up for offices that did not conduct administrative and supplemental  reinterviews.  According to this official, this meant that once random  reinterviews were completed at those offices, there were no additional  checks specifically designed to detect fabricated data.  Although  enumerators’ immediate supervisors were to check enumerators’ work  daily, these reviews were generally designed to identify enumerators who  were completing questionnaires incorrectly (e.g., not following the proper  question sequence and writing illegibly), whereas administrative and  supplemental reinterviews were aimed at identifying enumerators who  were intentionally falsifying data.
Bureau officials said that at those local census offices that did not conduct  any administrative reinterviews, local census office managers could  conduct supplemental reinterviews if warranted.  However, managers  employed this option infrequently.  Of the 66 local offices that did not  conduct any administrative reinterviews, just 14 conducted supplemental  reinterviews.
Reasons that local census managers could use—as specified by the  bureau—for not conducting an administrative reinterview included (1) the  enumerator no longer worked in the area for which the administrative test  was conducted; (2) the enumerator’s work was characteristic with the area  (e.g., the enumerator reported a large number of vacant housing units and  the area had a large number of seasonal housing units); or (3) other reason,  with an accompanying explanation.  Managers were to document their  decision on the bureau’s administrative reinterview trouble reports listing  the suspect enumerators.
Our analysis of a week’s worth of administrative reinterview trouble  reports at 31 local census offices found that while a number of enumerators  were flagged for administrative reinterviews, local census office officials  typically decided against conducting them.  Specifically, of the 3,784  enumerators identified for possible reinterview, local officials subjected  the work of 154 enumerators (4 percent) to reinterviews, and passed on  3,392 enumerators (90 percent).  For 306 of the 3,874 enumerators (8  percent) listed on the administrative trouble reports we reviewed, there  was no indication of a final decision on whether or not to subject the future  work of these enumerators to administrative reinterview.
Overall, local census offices conducted far fewer administrative  reinterviews than the bureau had anticipated.  Local census offices  conducted 276,832 administrative reinterviews—146,993 (35 percent)  fewer than the 423,825 administrative reinterviews the bureau had  expected based on a number of factors, including the number of cases  completed per hour during the 1990 Census, and the estimated workload in  2000.  Whether this was due to better quality work on the part of  enumerators, or local managers deciding against subjecting enumerators’  work to reinterviews, is unknown.  However, as administrative  reinterviews were designed to detect fabrication and other quality  problems more likely to occur toward the end of nonresponse follow-up  after the random check of enumerators’ initial work, it will be important for  the bureau to examine whether local census offices properly conducted  administrative reinterviews, and thus ensure the quality of nonresponse  follow-up data throughout the duration of the operation.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Although nonresponse follow-up was fraught with extraordinary  managerial and logistical challenges, the bureau generally completed  nonresponse follow-up consistent with its operational plan—a remarkable  accomplishment given the scope and complexity of the effort.  Our review  highlighted several strategies that were key to the bureau’s success  including (1) an aggressive outreach and promotion campaign and other  efforts aimed at boosting the mail response rate and lowering the bureau’s  nonresponse follow-up workload; (2) a flexible recruiting strategy that  made the bureau a competitive employer in a tight national labor market;  (3) advance planning for addressing location-specific enumeration  challenges; and (4) ambitious stretch goals that encouraged local managers  to accelerate the pace of the operation.  It will be important for the bureau  to document the lessons learned from these initiatives and use them to help  inform planning efforts for the next decennial census in 2010.
It will also be important for the bureau to address the continuing significant  challenges that were revealed by the conduct of nonresponse follow-up in  2000, including achieving an acceptable response rate (and thus lowering the bureau’s  follow-up workload) while controlling costs; reversing the downward trend in public participation in the census, in  part by converting the relatively large number of people who are aware  of the census into census respondents; keeping the address list and maps used for nonresponse follow-up finding the right mix of incentives to motivate local census offices to  complete nonresponse follow-up on schedule without compromising  data quality; and ensuring that reinterview procedures provide sufficient quality  assurance coverage through the full duration of enumerators’  employment on nonresponse follow-up.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: As the bureau plans for the next national head count in 2010, we  recommend that the Secretary of Commerce ensure that the bureau take  the following actions to help ensure that nonresponse follow-up is  conducted as cost effectively as possible:
Identify and refine lessons learned from the 2000 nonresponse follow-up  operation and apply them to the bureau’s plans for the 2010 Census.
Assess to the extent practicable, why people who were aware of the  census did not return their census questionnaires and develop  appropriate marketing countermeasures to bridge the gap between their  awareness of the census on the one hand, and their motivation to  respond on the other.
Develop and test procedural and technological options that have the  potential to generate a more accurate and up-to-date address list and set  of maps for nonresponse follow-up.  As part of this effort, the bureau  should explore how to refresh the nonresponse follow-up address list  more frequently, even as nonresponse follow-up is underway, so that  enumerators would not have to make costly visits to late-responding  households.  The bureau also needs to examine the methods it uses in  activities that precede nonresponse follow-up to develop and update the  nonresponse address list and associated maps.  Specifically, the bureau  should determine the extent to which updates that should have been  made were properly reflected in the nonresponse follow-up list and  maps, and take appropriate corrective actions to address any problems  it identifies.
Ensure that the bureau’s procedures and incentives for the timely  completion of nonresponse follow-up emphasize the collection of  quality data and proper enumeration techniques as much as speed.
Examine the bureau’s reinterview procedures—particularly as they  relate to the discretion given to local census officials—to help ensure  that the procedures are sufficient for consistently and reliably detecting  potential problems throughout the duration of enumerators’  employment on nonresponse follow-up.
Agency Comments and 	 The Secretary of Commerce forwarded written comments from the Bureau  Our Evaluation	 of the Census on a draft of this report.  The bureau concurred with all five of our recommendations and had no specific comments on them.  The  bureau also clarified several key points and provided additional  information and perspective, which we incorporated in our report as  appropriate.
The bureau noted that, in addition to the locked apartment buildings that  we cited in the Results in Brief section of our report, gated communities  were also an enumeration challenge.  While the body of the report already  contained this information, we added it to the Results in Brief section as  well.
Our draft report stated: “One reason for the errors in the nonresponse  follow-up address lists was that the bureau found it was infeasible to  remove late-responding households.  As a result, enumerators needed to  visit over 773,000 households that had already mailed back their  questionnaires. . . .”  The bureau commented that it made a conscious  decision to conduct these visits based on logistical concerns and, as a  result, the bureau believes that our use of the terms “errors” and  “needlessly” do not take this into consideration and are misleading.
Because the bureau could not refresh its nonresponse follow-up address  list to reflect households that responded after April 18, the bureau had no  choice but to send enumerators to those households and collect the  information in-person.  However, the term “needed to” better characterizes  the bureau’s lack of options and we revised the text accordingly.  We also  deleted the term “errors.”
In response to our finding that 52 local census offices did not conduct any  reinterviews after an initial random check of enumerators’ work, the  bureau commented that the initial random check was not a minimal activity  in that it involved reinterviewing up to seven cases per enumerator.  The  bureau also noted that there were no operational requirements to conduct  a specific number of administrative or supplemental reinterviews.  We  agree with the bureau’s comments.  Indeed, the draft report already  included information on the number of initial random reinterviews the  bureau conducted and the discretionary nature of administrative and  supplemental reinterviews.  Nevertheless, it is also true, as we note in our  report, that once those 52 local census offices completed the seven random  reinterviews, there were no additional checks specifically designed to  catch enumerators suspected of falsifying data.  Moreover, we reported  that nationwide, local census offices conducted far fewer administrative  reinterviews than the bureau had expected.  As we note in the report,  whether this was due to the quality of enumerators’ work or local managers  using their discretion and opting not to subject enumerators’ work to  reinterviews, is unknown.
With respect to the bureau’s monitoring of local census office’s  productivity, the bureau noted that headquarters officials did not work  directly with local census office staff as noted in the draft; rather,  headquarters personnel worked with the bureau’s regional census centers,  and they in turn worked with the local offices.  We revised the text to  reflect this information.
With respect to our observation that several local census offices had to  quickly respond to unanticipated challenges, such as working with  nonresponse follow-up address lists and maps that were not accurate or  current, the bureau commented that there were standard procedures in the  nonresponse follow-up enumerator manual on how to deal with  map/register discrepancies.  We verified this and revised the text  accordingly.
In describing the steps that local census officials took to encourage public  participation in the census, we noted that census officials in Cleveland and  Cincinnati said they provided additional training for enumerators on how  to handle refusals.  The bureau noted that standardized training was  provided, across the nation, on options for handling refusals, and  information was also provided in the nonresponse follow-up enumerator  manual.  We verified this information and added it to the report.
The bureau commented that the address list and map difficulties that  enumerators encountered were not nonresponse problems because, as we  note in the report, and the bureau agrees, they should have been dealt with  in earlier census operations.  Nevertheless, the problems did not surface  until nonresponse follow-up when enumerators encountered duplicate and  nonexistent addresses, and were less productive as a result.  For this  reason, the report recommends that the bureau examine the methods it  uses in activities that precede nonresponse follow-up to ensure the address  lists and maps used for nonresponse follow-up are accurate and up-to-date.
In response to our statement that nonresponse follow-up was to help verify  changes to the address list from earlier address list development  operations, the bureau commented that nonresponse follow-up was  conducted to enumerate households from which it did not receive a  completed questionnaire; map and address updates were incidental.  We  agree with the bureau on the primary purpose of nonresponse follow-up  and revised the text to better reflect this point.  However, the bureau’s  program master plan for the master address file includes nonresponse  follow-up as one of a number of address list development and maintenance  operations, and the bureau expected enumerators to update maps and  address registers as needed as part of their field visits.
The bureau said it could not confirm data in our draft report on the number  of vacant and deleted units identified during nonresponse follow-up and  suggested removing this information.  Although we obtained the data  directly from the bureau, given the bureau’s concerns, we deleted the  section.
In commenting on the fact that we did not find a statistically significant  relationship between the week that local census offices finished their  follow-up workload and the amount of their residual workload, the bureau  stated that the report needed to reflect the fact that residual nonresponse  consisted of housing units for which completed questionnaires had not  been processed through data capture.  We revised the draft accordingly.
The bureau noted that assistant managers for field operations, among other  local census officials, could request supplemental reinterviews, and not  just field operations supervisors as we stated in our report.  We revised our  draft to include this information.
With respect to our findings concerning the reinterview program’s ability to  detect problems, particularly at the end of nonresponse follow-up, the  bureau commented that there was turnover in the enumerator workforce;  consequently, with new hires, random reinterviews were conducted during  all stages of the operation.  As we note in the report, 52 local census offices  (about 10 percent of all local offices), did not conduct any administrative  and supplemental reinterviews.  Thus, once these offices completed the  random reinterviews on the initial work of newly hired enumerators, there  were no additional checks specifically designed to catch enumerators  suspected of falsifying data.  We added language to better clarify this point.
The bureau said that it was uncertain as to the methodology and  documentation used for deriving figures on the number of reinterviews the  bureau conducted.  We obtained the data from the bureau’s cost and  progress system.
The bureau stated that there was no evidence that data quality was  compromised to motivate on-time completion of nonresponse follow-up.  Our research suggests that the impact of the bureau’s incentives to  motivate timeliness was less clear-cut given the fact that, as we note in our  report, (1) about 40 percent of the local census office managers believed  that scheduling pressures had a negative or significantly negative impact on  the quality of nonresponse follow-up, and (2) a small number of local  census offices took short-cuts to complete their work (which the bureau  later took steps to rectify).  Thus, while we agree with the bureau that  maintaining data quality should be a given in determining motivational  elements, the extent to which the bureau accomplished this goal for  nonresponse follow-up appeared to have had mixed results.
In commenting on our conclusion that it will be important for the bureau to  ensure that reinterview procedures provide sufficient quality assurance  through the full duration of nonresponse follow-up, the bureau noted that  the reinterview operation must be designed to provide sufficient quality  assurance coverage.  We revised the text accordingly  We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Dan Miller and  Carolyn B. Maloney, House of Representatives, and those in other  interested congressional committees; the Secretary of Commerce; and the  Acting Director of the Bureau of the Census.  Copies will be made available  to others on request.  Major contributors to this report are included in  appendix III.  If you have any questions concerning this report, please call  me on (202) 512-6806.
section_title: Local Census Offices Included in This Review
subsections: section_title: Local Census Offices in the Census Bureau’s Atlanta Region
section_title: Local Census Offices in the Census Bureau’s Boston Region
section_title: Local Census Offices in the Census Bureau’s Charlotte Region
section_title: Local Census Offices in the Census Bureau’s Chicago Region
section_title: Local Census Offices in the Census Bureau’s Dallas Region
section_title: Local Census Offices in the Census Bureau’s Denver Region
section_title: Local Census Offices in the Census Bureau’s Kansas City Region
section_title: Local Census Offices in the Census Bureau’s Philadelphia Region
section_title: Local Census Offices in the Census Bureau’s Los Angeles Region
section_title: Local Census Offices in the Census Bureau’s New York Region
section_title: Local Census Offices in the Census Bureau’s Seattle Region
section_title: Comments from the Secretary of Commerce
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, the following headquarters staff made  key contributions to this report: Wendy Ahmed; Tom Beall; James Fields;  Rich Hung; Lily Kim; J. Christopher Mihm; Victoria E. Miller; Vicky L.  Miller; Ty Mitchell; Anne Rhodes-Kline; Lynn Wasielewski; Susan Wallace.
The following staff from the Western Regional Office also contributed to  this report: James Bancroft; Robert Bresky; Arthur Davis; Julian Fogle;  Araceli Hutsell; RoJeanne Liu; Elizabeth Dolan; Thomas Schulz; Nico Sloss;  Cornelius Williams.
The following staff from the Central Regional Office also contributed to  this report: Richard Burrell; Michael De La Garza; Maria Durant; Donald  Ficklin; Ron Haun; Arturo Holguin, Jr.; Reid Jones; Stefani Jonkman; Roger  Kolar; Tom Laetz; Miquel Salas; Enemencio Sanchez; Jeremy Schupbach;  Melvin Thomas; Richard Tsuhara; Theresa Wagner; Patrick Ward; Linda Kay  Willard; Cleofas Zapata, Jr.
The following staff from the Eastern Regional Office also contributed to  this report: Cammillia Campbell; Lara Carreon; Betty Clark; Johnetta  Gatlin-Brown; Marshall Hamlett; Carlean Jones; Janet Keller; Cameron  Killough; Jean Lee; Christopher Miller; S. Monty Peters; Sharon Reid;  Matthew Smith.
section_title: Related GAO Products on the Results of the 2000 Census and Lessons Learned for a More Cost-Effective Census in 2010
paragraphs: 2000 Census: Coverage Evaluation Interviewing Overcame Challenges,  but Further Research Needed (GAO-02-26, December 31, 2001).  2000 Census: Analysis of Fiscal Year 2000 Budget and Internal Control  Weaknesses at the U.S. Census Bureau (GAO-02-30, December 28, 2001).  2000 Census: Significant Increase in Cost Per Housing Unit Compared  to 1990 Census (GAO-02-31, December 11, 2001).  2000 Census: Better Productivity Data Needed for Future Planning and  Budgeting (GAO-02-4, October 4, 2001).  2000 Census: Review of Partnership Program Highlights Best Practices  for Future Operations (GAO-01-579, August 20, 2001).
Decennial Censuses: Historical Data on Enumerator Productivity Are  Limited (GAO-01-208R, January 5, 2001).  2000 Census: Information on Short- and Long-Form Response Rates  (GAO/GGD-00-127R, June 7, 2000).
subsections: section_title: GAO’s Mission
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subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: Visit GAO’s Document Distribution Center
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
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section_title: Public Affairs