District of Columbia Public Schools: Availability of Funds and the Cost of FY 1997 Roof Projects
Published: 1998-03-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the District of Columbia Public Schools' (DCPS) efforts to repair school roofs during the summer of 1997, focusing on the conflicting information on the availability of funds to pay for the roof work and the cost, including cost per square foot, of the work completed in fiscal year (FY) 1997.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO noted that: (1) sufficient funding was available to begin roof work when schools were closed for the summer June 20, 1997; (2) the District's records show that the Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority had about $18 million available in March 1997 for DCPS-managed roof work, with the available amount increasing to about $38 million by June 1997; (3) a series of events preceeding the efforts to repair D.C. school roofs contributed to the delayed start; (4) although it was decided that DCPS would manage the majority of this work, DCPS was not prepared to start immediately because it had not completed sufficient planning, such as determining the scope of work on individual projects which would be the basis for seeking bids for that work; (5) a contributing factor to this delay was the almost complete turnover in technical capital project staff during the school year; (6) these problems were compounded by difficulties in securing bids, resulting in DCPS-managed work not starting until the third week of July; (7) DCPS stated that at the time the long-range plan was submitted in February 1997, it had expected to complete roof work by the end of October 1997 but accelerated it in response to a court order that roof work would not be done while classes were in session; (8) consequently, the work was accomplished under a highly compressed schedule; (9) GAO's review showed that DCPS spent about $37 million for roof replacement or repair in FY 1997; (10) this included a extensive amount of work not only on the roofs, but also on adjacent upper portions of the buildings to achieve structurally sound, watertight facilities; (11) as a result, the costs were higher than what would have been incurred for roofing work only; (12) considering all of these costs, the average cost per square foot of roof surface replaced or repaired was about $20, with DCPS-managed contracts somewhat higher than those managed by the General Services Administration; (13) insufficient data exist to ascertain with any certainty the added cost associated with the degree of deferred maintenance encountered in this extensive project; (14) years of neglect and inadequate repair and maintenance practices all served to increase costs over what could be expected in well-managed, adequately financed entities; (15) DCPS plans for FY 1998 show additional roof work at 40 more schools at an approximate cost of $35 million; and (16) in addition, DCPS proposed Capital Improvement Program Plan for fiscal years 1999-2004 indicates that an additional $63 million is anticipated for roof replacement or repairs during this period.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In a September 30, 1997, letter, you requested that we review the District of Columbia Public Schools’ (DCPS) efforts to repair school roofs during the summer of 1997. You indicated that your Subcommittee had received widely varying information on the cost of the roof repair work ranging from $11 to $19 per square foot, and that there were divergent views on when funds were available to do that work, ranging from as early as April 1997 to July 1997. Consistent with your request, we focused on the conflicting information presented to the Subcommittee on the availability of funds to pay for the roof work and the cost, including the cost per square foot, of the work completed in fiscal year 1997. This report also provides information on DCPS’ plans for roof work during fiscal year 1998 and beyond.
This report contains technical terms concerning roofing structures and repairs, which are defined in the glossary at the end of this report. In addition, key events and related dates pertaining to the fiscal year 1997 roof repairs are in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The District of Columbia Public Schools’ draft Long-Range Facilities Master Plan, dated July 17, 1997, states that the majority of District public schools were built over 50 years ago, generally have not been well maintained, and consequently, substantial deferred maintenance exists. In addition, concerns about safety and problems with leaky school roofs have been widely reported. We have documented the less-than-adequate condition of the District’s public schools in several reports. In 1992, Parents United for the District of Columbia, an education advocacy group, filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia naming several city officials and alleging their failure to perform their duties with respect to the D.C. public schools, including but not limited to, their duties related to hundreds of fire code violations in aging D.C. school buildings.
In an effort to respond to these concerns, the Congress included legislative provisions on this matter in recently enacted legislation: Secs. 2550-2552 of the District of Columbia School Reform Act of 1995, called for the Administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA) to provide technical assistance to the District public schools in the area of facilities management and for the Mayor and the District of Columbia Council, in consultation with the Administrator of GSA, the Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority (Authority), the Board of Education, and the Superintendent of Schools, to design and implement a comprehensive long-term program for the repair, improvement, maintenance, and management of District public school facilities and to designate or establish an agency within the District of Columbia government to administer the program. The plan also was required to include short-term and long-term funding sources.
Section 603(e)(2)(A) of the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1997,authorized the Authority to establish an account to receive the proceeds from privatization of certain government entities to carry out the District of Columbia School Reform Act of 1995 (which provides for the repairs and improvement of District schools) and to finance public elementary and secondary school facility construction and repair within the District of Columbia. Section 5201 of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 authorized the Authority to contract with private entities to carry out a program of school facility repair of District public schools, in consultation with GSA.
On November 15, 1996, the Authority restructured DCPS, installing a nine-member Emergency Transitional Education Board of Trustees and a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), both as Agents of the Authority. The Authority also delegated its authorities to oversee all facilities and property to the new Board of Trustees. The Authority removed the then Superintendent of Schools and gave the CEO responsibility for all the authorities, powers, functions, exemptions, and immunities of the former Superintendent. The CEO established an office of Chief Operating Officer (COO)/Director of Facilities and hired a COO in January 1997 to manage and implement the school facilities improvement program.
To assist in this effort, GSA updated a study, by developing a comprehensive facilities revitalization plan, Determination and Prioritization of the District of Columbia Public Schools Projects, which was delivered to DCPS on February 18, 1997. The plan described problems such as leaky roofs, inoperable boilers, numerous fire code violations, and the absence of a long-range facilities master plan and estimated the cost of upgrading the school infrastructure to be $2 billion. The February 1997 plan and the underlying work were the basis for the long-range facilities master plan. To develop the long-range facilities master plan, a task force was formed including representatives from DCPS, the Office of the Mayor, and the 21st Century School Fund. A February 28, 1997, draft report of the long-range plan was submitted to the D.C. Council in February, and was resubmitted with changes in April, and again in July. The Council did not vote on the plan, and DCPS submitted it to the Congress to meet the congressionally mandated submission date of April 25, 1997. The draft long-range facilities master plan considered roof replacement to be the number one priority.
GSA contracted for and managed roof work at 10 schools—initially 7 schools at the Authority’s request. In June 1997, DCPS requested GSA’s assistance, and GSA managed work on an additional three schools. DCPS oversaw work on another 51 schools for which roof work was completed in fiscal year 1997.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to determine (1) when funds were made available to pay for roof repairs, (2) the cost of the roof repairs, including the cost per square foot, and (3) whether there are additional roofs to be repaired in fiscal year 1998 and beyond.
To determine when the capital funds were available to pay for roof repairs, we reviewed documents provided by the U.S. Department of Education, Authority, District CFO’s office, and DCPS CFO. In addition, we reviewed funding request modification documents prepared by DCPS and approved by the District’s Office of Budget and Planning, monthly reports produced by the District’s Financial Management System, and other financial documents provided by DCPS.
To determine the cost of the roof repairs, we obtained and reviewed information from the contract files at DCPS for fiscal year 1997 projects, which included information on each school, such as the dollar amount and other terms of each contract, types of roofing material used, size of the area replaced/repaired, modifications (change orders), daily inspection sheets, invoices submitted for payment and actual amounts paid to contractors.
In addition, we compared design and construction cost estimates prepared by a DCPS engineering consultant and GSA to the contract amount and change orders for the schools’ roofs replaced/repaired. We held discussions with DCPS officials to obtain reasons for any significant variances from the cost estimates.
We also interviewed District Government officials, including officials from the Authority, the Chief Financial Officer for the District, the Deputy Chief Financial Officer for the District’s Office of Budget and Planning, the Chief Operating Officer of DCPS and his Capital Project Division staff, the Chief Financial Officer of DCPS, and District Council officials. In addition, we interviewed officials from the General Services Administration, the U.S. Department of Education, a DCPS consultant, Parents United, and the 21st Century School Fund to obtain additional information to satisfy our objectives.
To determine whether additional roofs required repairs, we reviewed DCPS’ fiscal year 1997 Capital Improvement Program priority lists of schools needing roof work and various facility assessments prepared by contractors, and we discussed modifications/changes to the plans with DCPS officials. We also reviewed the DCPS’ proposed Capital Improvement Program Plan for fiscal years 1999-2004, including roof replacement prioritization schedules, to determine the extent of roofing repair projects planned for fiscal year 1998 and future years.
While we reviewed the information contained in the contract files to determine the cost per square foot of roofs replaced/repaired, we did not independently verify the accuracy of the square footage estimates but instead relied on the measurements prepared by GSA and DCPS engineering consultant. We did not review support for payments made to contractors to determine validity nor did we attempt to determine whether the cost of individual projects was reasonable. We reviewed the work performed by the District’s independent public accounting firm on DCPS capital project funds.
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Authority, DCPS, the District’s CFO, GSA, and the U.S. Department of Education. Written comments were received from the Authority, DCPS, and GSA and are reprinted in appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively. Oral comments were obtained from the District’s CFO and the Department of Education. Those comments have been considered and incorporated in our report as appropriate. We conducted our work from October 1997 through February 1998 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Availability of Funding for Roof Repairs
paragraphs: Based on our review of the information obtained from the Authority, the District’s Chief Financial Officer, the Department of Education, and the District of Columbia Public Schools’ Chief Financial Officer, funds were available to begin roof repairs on June 20, 1997, when D.C. Public Schools closed for the summer vacation. Table 1 shows the sources, dates, and amounts of funds received by the Authority. By June 1997, the Authority had received on behalf of DCPS a total of $49.7 million in capital funds, as follows: $11.5 million in October 1996 from fiscal year 1996 general obligation bond proceeds, approximately $18 million in March 1997 from the federal government’s sale of the College Construction Loan Insurance Association (Connie Lee), and $20 million from the June 1997, general obligation bond proceeds. In addition, in September 1997, the Authority received about $36.8 million from the sale of Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae) stock warrants, making the total received in fiscal year 1997 for capital projects about $86.5 million.
Prior to DCPS assuming responsibility for managing the fiscal year 1997 capital program work, the Authority had engaged GSA to oversee roof repair and other work, such as installing boilers and chillers. On November 19, 1996, the Authority entered into a memorandum of agreement with GSA to provide contract administration and program management services for those contracts. On November 27, 1996, GSA issued a task order to an architectural and engineering consultant (DMJM) for design work related to five schools. In February 1997, construction work began on those five schools. According to GSA and DCPS officials, the $11.5 million that the Authority had received in October 1996 was earmarked for GSA-managed contracts.
According to DCPS’ Chief Operating Officer (COO), when he assumed his position in January 1997, neither funds nor technical capital project staffwere available to prepare or manage the preparation of scope of work, drawings, and cost estimates. While the Authority records showed that additional funds were available in March 1997, the COO stated that he began to hire technical capital staff to address capital program needs in April 1997 after being told that funds were available. We were not provided any documentation indicating when DCPS was notified that additional funds were available for capital projects on the school facilities.
In its audit report on the District’s financial statements for fiscal year 1997, the District’s independent auditors identified a material weakness concerning control over transactions involving the Authority. The report indicated that the District has not developed adequate procedures to account for funds held by the Authority and does not effectively reconcile the amounts which are recorded. The auditor noted that the District and the Authority have not developed procedures to notify each other of amounts anticipated or actually received by the Authority on behalf of the District.
On May 19, 1997, DCPS issued a Request for Qualifications (RFQ) for capital projects it intended to manage, which resulted in prequalification of nine contractors. In June 1997, DCPS authorized consulting architectural and engineering firm, DMJM, which had a competitively bid contract with GSA, to provide scope of work for roof replacement at 48 schools. This work was performed from the beginning of June to mid-July and included surveying each roof, reviewing and photographing existing conditions, and developing technical specifications to establish quality standards and a cost estimate.
On July 1, 1997, DCPS issued an Invitation for Bid and Contract (IFBC) for a single (or package) contract for roof replacement at 15 schools and for work on boilers and chillers at five schools. DCPS officials told us that they were not initially successful in obtaining bidders because contractors were hesitant to bid on such a large package, involving such diversity of work. On July 11, 1997, DCPS issued an addendum to the IFBC, resulting in eight separate, smaller packages, two of which included the boiler and chiller work. The other six included roof replacements on 48 schools. Contracts for two of those six packages (15 schools) were awarded. The remaining four packages (33 schools) were reissued as another addendum covering 23 schools. The remaining 10 schools were deferred at that time. Of these 10 schools, 2 were repaired by DCPS in-house maintenance staff. The addendum for the 23 schools allowed prequalified contractors to bid on one or more of those schools; work on 19 schools was awarded on that basis for a total of 34 schools under contract. Roof work for the remaining 12 DCPS managed projects completed during fiscal year 1997 included 3 from the original IFBC and 9 others. DCPS officials told us they urged contractors to submit bids. Based on our analysis of contract documents, the majority (46 schools) of the roof repair work started the third week in July or later.
The draft Long-Range Facilities Master Plan called for roof replacement work at 50 schools. According to the COO, when the Plan was presented at the end of February 1997, he had believed that the work could not be completed until the end of October 1997 but had hoped that a substantial number of schools could be completed prior to September 30, 1997. The COO advised us that on July 10, 1997, he had informed the Superior Court that the estimated completion dates based on the best available data, ranged from mid-August 1997 through September 20, 1997. He said that these estimates did not consider the July 11, 1997, court ruling that this type of work could not be performed while schools were occupied. Ultimately, because of the large number of schools involved, it was decided to delay the opening of D.C. public schools until September 22, 1997.
section_title: Cost of Roof Repairs
paragraphs: DCPS records show that as of February 4, 1998, the total cost of the fiscal year 1997 roof repair project, including change orders and consulting fees, was about $37 million. A significant, but not determinable amount of these costs was attributable to factors other than what would be strictly interpreted as roof replacement/repair work. Among these were structural integrity, fire damage, the general deterioration from deferred maintenance, and warranty stipulations concerning deferred maintenance. Extensive work was performed to repair and replace masonry, cornices, flashing, coping, and cupolas, as well as cleaning drains. For ease of presentation, we have characterized this work as roof and roof-related work.
Based on our review and analysis of the data, the average cost per square foot for roof repair work performed on schools managed by both DCPS and GSA in fiscal year 1997 was about $20 per square foot—with costs at individual schools ranging from about $4 to $77. The average cost per square foot for GSA-managed contracts was about $13, whereas the average cost per square foot for DCPS-managed contracts was about $22 per square foot.
As part of its fiscal year 1997 Capital Program budget, DCPS had initially budgeted $22 million for roof work to be performed in fiscal year 1997. According to DCPS officials, the $22 million was a preliminary estimate and did not include amounts for work such as repairing flashing, masonry, or cornices. In addition, the $22 million did not include costs to address the complexity of the roof areas and other issues discussed below, such as the compressed time schedule. Further, the priority list of schools on which the $22 million estimate was based was modified several times during fiscal year 1997. DCPS officials were aware that they would have to pay a premium for labor and materials because of the various factors that affected costs.
Table 2 summarizes the work performed, cost per square foot, and other information for the roof work managed by both DCPS and GSA. In total, roof work was completed at 61 schools. DCPS capital project staff managed roof projects at 46 schools, and its in-house maintenance staff performed minor work at 7 schools (Cardozo Senior High, Cleveland Elementary, Eaton Elementary, Eliot Junior High, Hart Junior High, Janney Elementary, and Winston Elementary). GSA managed roof projects at 10 schools. Included were two schools (Tyler and Spingarn) where DCPS and GSA managed separate projects. Table 2 does not include data for minor work performed at the seven schools because the cost data were not complete. Accordingly, that work, which DCPS officials estimated to have cost about $189,000, is not included in our computations of total cost or cost per square foot.
Table 2 indicates a wide range of costs per square foot by school and by responsible agency (DCPS or GSA). The roofs worked on by DCPS contractors had square foot costs ranging from a low of $4.19 (Ketcham Elementary) to a high of $77.27 (Cook Elementary) per square foot. In contrast, costs for schools worked on by GSA’s contractors ranged from a low of $10.10 per square foot (Shadd Elementary) to a high of $27.43 per square foot (Spingarn Gym, where, according to GSA officials, as a result of a fire, a new roof deck and supporting structure were installed and a significant amount of asbestos was removed).
DCPS officials provided various explanations for the wide range in costs per square foot among schools such as Cook Elementary ($77.27), MacFarland Junior High School ($64.45), and Ketcham ($4.19). According to DCPS’ officials, less than 20 percent of Cook’s total cost pertains to roof replacement. The majority of the cost was due to repairing an ornamental cornice around most of the building just below the roof level. The cornice had deteriorated and portions of it were at risk of falling off; therefore, Cook was considered a major safety concern. In addition, the cornice had to be repaired from a crane. Further, DCPS stated that much work was done to repair the skylight and to repair coping with new stainless steel covering.
According to DCPS officials, work at MacFarland Junior High was awarded to the low bidder of a package, covering nine schools. DCPS officials and engineering consultants stated that large amounts of masonry repair (repointing and replacement of broken brick), installation of metal panels on high parapet walls, and skylight repair were performed. The engineers’ original scope of work describes badly deteriorated mortar joints, broken brick, and severely cracked parging on parapet walls—with resulting leaks. In addition, according to DCPS, repairs were performed on the flashing; the stone coping was replaced; and the drain was cleaned. On the other hand, Ketcham was awarded at the low end. According to DCPS officials, the contractor did not give full consideration to the condition of the roof or the complexity of the work to be done.
subsections: section_title: Several Factors Result in Higher Square Foot Costs for Repairs
paragraphs: Several factors contributed to the costs being considerably higher than what GSA officials stated has been their experience for roofing work in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. GSA’s estimates ranged from $8 to $10 per square foot and reflect work required to repair and renovate typical flat, large, built-up roof systems that generally have had a good repair record. However, a combination of factors resulted in substantially higher per square foot cost for the D.C. Public Schools. Among these are the compressed schedule under which most of the 1997 roof work was performed; the diversity and complexity of the roofs on the D.C. public school buildings; the extensive deferred maintenance and other roof-related work, including additional work required to secure the long-term warranties from materials suppliers and contractors; and other factors such as the District’s history of paying vendors.
subsections: section_title: Compressed Time Schedule
paragraphs: DCPS-managed work was completed within extremely narrow time frames. This tight schedule was caused by the lack of (1) technical capital project staff, (2) advance project planning to provide an adequate basis for seeking bids, and (3) the fast approaching opening of schools slated for September 2, 1997. This situation resulted in DCPS scrambling to get contractors in what they found to be a tight summer market and selecting an approach that while faster for getting the work done on time, could have been more costly.
To accelerate the roof work, DCPS relied exclusively on the design-build approach versus the traditional method. Under the traditional method, management separately performs or contracts for project design to provide the drawings, specifications, reports, and other materials needed to obtain bids for the actual repair work. Thus, separate procurements are involved in first designing and then contracting for the renovation work. This approach tends to stretch out the time frame, but provides a great measure of detail to the prospective bidder, thus lowering the risk. In contrast, the design-build method involves the winning bidder providing both the design and performing the renovation work. One of the primary advantages of using the design-build approach is that the project can be completed in a shorter time frame because the design phase can be done concurrently with the construction phase. However, since the contractor assumes more risk for the job under the design-build approach because of unforeseen difficulties, the costs can be higher. Given the level of deferred maintenance and the limited time available both for submitting bids and performing the work, it would appear that the risk assumed was substantial.
GSA’s earlier involvement allowed it an average of 67 days to complete its 10 projects. In contrast, all of the DCPS-managed work was completed in well under the 67-day average of GSA’s work, with the longest project taking 50 days and the average being 36 days. The shortest DCPS project took 3 days. Despite taking less time, our analysis of the data on table 2 shows that the DCPS-managed work involved more roof areas and, as discussed later in greater detail, more complex work.
GSA was able to secure contracts earlier in the year as it stated when the market was not saturated with roof work, which typically results in lower cost. Similarly, neighboring school systems in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area pointed out that they did not typically attempt to complete roofing projects in the short time frames accomplished by DCPS during 1997. According to a Montgomery County Public Schools roofing specialist, roof replacement work would typically be done over the full summer session, from about June 20 to August 31. In addition, according to the Fairfax County Public Schools engineer, contracts are usually awarded in the early part of the year for work to begin in June and they normally operate on a 2-year planning horizon. The Fairfax County Public Schools Director of Design and Construction also told us that depending on the size of the building and material used, a roofing replacement can take from 6 weeks to 6 months. The Fairfax County Public Schools engineer further stated that the cost is generally 20 to 30 percent higher when a project is put out for bid in the summer.
DCPS was unsuccessful in obtaining bids on a larger package advertised on July 1, 1997, for 15 schools and subsequently repackaged all planned work into 8 smaller packages, which went out in mid-July. DCPS officials advised us that they actively solicited bids to get the work performed and that 2 out of 16 vendors involved were from outside the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, including one brought in purposely to handle the clay tile roof project at Bancroft Elementary.
DCPS also used a sole source procurement in fiscal year 1997 for one project, which it performed on an emergency basis. Work was completed in 18 days, involving extensive overtime. DCPS officials advised us that the Langdon Elementary School project was initiated after the DCPS Quality Assurance Task Force identified a potential structural problem shortly before school was to open. Work started on September 9, and was substantially completed on September 27, 1997, at a cost of $32.99 per square foot.
While a common denominator of much of this work was the premium time (labor costs) involved, DCPS officials told us that they did not believe they had any clear alternatives. According to the COO, it could not cut back on the number of schools or the scope of work at those schools because of the court’s mandate regarding fire code violations.
section_title: Complexity and Diversity of the Roofs
paragraphs: GSA and the DCPS engineering and architectural consultant agreed that DCPS roof renovation work was not typical since the roofs were diverse and complex and had significantly deteriorated. According to DCPS officials and the DCPS engineering consultant, the diversity and complexity of the roofs on the schools resulted in higher costs. These officials stated that the roofs were not generally the typical flat roofs used on more recently built schools but instead are made up of multiple roof areas and materials. To illustrate, Fairfax and Montgomery County school engineers pointed out that 90 percent of their roofs are generally flat, and use modified bitumen. In contrast, 18 of the 56 DCPS and GSA-managed projects worked on during fiscal year 1997 involved two types of material, such as modified bitumen and slate, and 7 involved three types of roofing material. Inherent in these contrasts are that the newer suburban structures have larger, flat, easier and safer-to-work on surfaces versus DCPS often smaller and sloped surfaces using metal and slate.
The number of roof areas is also a factor. The number of roof areas that were replaced/repaired at each school ranged from 1 (at Leckie Elementary) to as many as 37 roof areas (at Dunbar Senior High School). Forty had 6 or more areas repaired; 25 had at least 10; and 6 had 20 or more. (Appendix II illustrates a typical District of Columbia public school roof, where multiple roof areas were replaced/repaired. It also highlights some of the technical features, including cupolas and skylights.)
According to the DCPS engineering consultant, different types of roofing specialists were required to address the diversity of the roofs. The material that was most frequently used to replace these roofs was two-ply modified bitumen. Table 2 reveals that in addition to two-ply modified bitumen, a variety of materials were used to repair the roofs, such as slate tiles, clay tiles, metal, asphalt shingle, and fiberglass asphalt. Some materials are more expensive than others. Metal and slate roofs are commonly considered more expensive than a modified bitumen roof. In addition, DCPS officials stated that a subcontractor was brought in from another state to repair clay tiles since no local firm was available at the time work had to be completed.
section_title: Deferred Maintenance and Warranties
paragraphs: In recent years, it has been widely documented that the majority of DCPS roofs were badly deteriorated because maintenance had been deferred for many years. DCPS officials stated that the $22 million, which was budgeted for roof repairs at the beginning of fiscal year 1997 did not assume funding for deferred maintenance and the 20-year manufacturers’ warranties. The manufacturers’ warranties were conditional on certain deferred maintenance and other roof-related work being done.
Table 2 reveals that for the majority of the schools, a substantial amount of roof-related or deferred maintenance work was performed. For instance, common roof-related work included replacing skylights and gutters, repairing coping and flashing, repointing masonry, and cleaning drains. In addition, many roofs required tapered insulation, resealing or repointing of parapets, and structural reinforcement of the roof to redirect the water flow. According to DCPS officials, many of the roofs and supporting structures had to be completely replaced because they were badly deteriorated and beyond patching. They stated that patching would have been only a short-term solution to a long-standing problem. For example, Spingarn Senior High School repairs averaged $36.18 per square foot because of the major structural work required. DCPS officials informed us that the entire slate roof was badly deteriorated and that daylight could be seen from inside the attic. Slate on 14 roof areas was replaced. To support the new slate, new wood blocking was required and 700 feet of new coping was installed. In addition, we were told that numerous roof expansion joints were repaired and that the triangular pediment over the colonnade at the front entrance was also repaired.
The bid solicitation process used in the replacement of DCPS roofs required contractors to provide 2-year guarantees on workmanship and 20-year manufacturers’ warranties on materials. DCPS officials stated that the deferred maintenance work was necessary to obtain the guarantees/warranties that they had required. According to DCPS officials, manufacturers perform site inspections to ensure that the roofs are installed according to their design specifications and that factors, such as flashing and caulking, which can contribute to premature roof failure, are up to industry standards. DCPS officials told us that as of January 26, 1998, it had received 20-year manufacturers’ warranties for 44 roof projects and 2-year contractor guarantees for 35 roof projects.
DCPS officials also stated that while some of the school roofs that were replaced this summer may have had existing warranties, they believe that since the roofs were not well maintained and protected, DCPS would not have prevailed in a warranty claim. For example, the officials cited numerous cases in which inspections of leaky roofs disclosed that large amounts of debris, or even mattresses, had been allowed to accumulate.
To the extent that such items retain water, they keep the roof surface saturated, thus accelerating deterioration of the roof membrane and substrate.
section_title: Other Factors
paragraphs: The District had a well-publicized poor payment history in recent years. For example, in fiscal years 1994, 1995, and 1996, the District delayed payments owed to vendors and Medicaid providers because it had cash flow problems. Consequently, contracting firms have expressed reluctance to do business with the District, and this, according to DCPS officials, became quite evident in the summer of 1997 when it issued its invitation for bids. Contractors were particularly reluctant to submit bids for large contracts (packages), fearing that DCPS would not be able to honor its obligations. Therefore, according to DCPS officials, contractors had to be urged to submit proposals, which DCPS officials believe could have resulted in DCPS paying a higher than normal cost to repair the roofs.
section_title: Cost Estimates Versus Contract Amounts and Change Orders
paragraphs: Given the nature of the work and the circumstances involved, the costs have not differed significantly from what was expected before contracting for this work. The aggregate estimated cost for the roof work managed by both GSA and DCPS in fiscal year 1997 was approximately $31.7 million, about 3.5 percent less than the $32.7 million contract amounts. As of February 4, 1998, DCPS had provided us with change orders totaling about $2 million, which brings the preliminary total to about $34.7 million, or about 10 percent over the consultants’ cost estimates. In addition, DCPS incurred about $2.1 million for consulting, contract administration, and construction management fees.
Prior to contracting out the roof work, DCPS had engaged an architectural and engineering firm, with whom GSA had a contract under which it could issue task orders, to develop cost estimates of the roof replacement/repair work. Almost all estimates were prepared by one of two architectural and engineering consultants, and in a few instances DCPS or GSA staff worked with contractors to prepare estimates. Estimates were based on field observations to determine existing conditions and the specific location and extent of required work, and included diagrams (and, for most schools, photographs) of each roof, narrative descriptions, quality specifications of material to be installed, and a cost estimate for each school.
As of February 4, 1998, DCPS had received proposals for change orders pertaining to 27 schools for a total of about $2 million. In most cases, the proposals resulted from requiring additional work beyond the original scope of work, such as structural repairs of decks and work to clean or replace drains, flashing, and coping. About 60 percent, or $1.2 million, of the change orders are associated with additional costs at two schools, Browne Junior High and Roosevelt Senior High. About 35 percent of this $1.2 million was a result of premium labor rates required to accelerate the work, and the remainder was primarily for additional masonry work, installation of a new metal roof, and drain and gutter repairs.
section_title: Planned Roof Repairs
paragraphs: As of February 4, 1998, the DCPS Capital Improvement Program budget indicates that about $35 million is expected to be spent on 40 school roof projects in fiscal year 1998. According to the DCPS COO, DCPS has about $41.8 million available to enable it to get an early start with the procurement process.
According to DCPS officials, on October 31, 1997, they engaged an engineering consultant to (1) identify the scope of work and (2) develop cost estimates. The scope of work and cost estimates for 12 schools were completed in fiscal year 1997. DCPS officials told us that as of February 27, 1998, the engineering consultant had inspected an additional 19 school roofs and developed scope of work and cost estimates that reflect direct labor and materials costs and other costs, such as overhead, general conditions, bond and insurance, and contingencies. According to DCPS officials, scope of work and cost estimates for the remaining nine schools will be prepared in May 1998.
DCPS officials informed us that as of November 3, 1997, they had completed roof repair work on five schools for which the scope of work and cost estimates had been completed in fiscal year 1997. DCPS officials anticipate that roof repair work at the remaining 35 schools will begin in the spring and will be completed during the summer 1998 recess. Because the lawsuit from which the court ruling on performing roof work while the schools are occupied has been settled, DCPS expects to be able to work during the school year using similar precautions as are employed in neighboring school jurisdictions. It advised us that in the event of emergency roof repairs, DCPS has a plan that involves relocating students so that the necessary work can be completed during the school year. This earlier start than for fiscal year 1997 should allow more time to have roof work conducted under normal conditions, possibly resulting in lower costs to the District Government.
The District of Columbia Public Schools proposed Capital Improvements Plan for fiscal years 1999-2004 indicates that an additional $63 million in roof replacement is anticipated during this period. According to a Facilities Planning, Programming and Quality Assurance Division official, the $63 million projection is an estimate for budget and planning purposes and the amount is not associated with particular schools.
DCPS expects to use proceeds from the sale of schools to help finance fiscal year 1998 and later school projects. Section 5206(a) of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, authorizes the Authority to dispose of certain school property and deposit the proceeds in the Board of Education Real Property Maintenance and Improvement Fund.
Currently, DCPS has 45 closed schools, which it intends to either sell, lease, lease with the option to buy, or develop as public/private partnerships. DCPS sold 1 school in the fall of 1997 and expects to generate $20 million from the sale of an additional 15 schools in fiscal year 1998. In addition, the Authority has agreed to commit a minimum of 27.5 percent of the District’s general fund long-term financing authority (annual bond proceeds) toward completion of the repairs required by the Long Range Facilities Master Plan.
section_title: Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We received comments from the Authority, the District’s Chief Financial Officer, DCPS, GSA, and the U.S. Department of Education on a draft of this report. Written comments from the Authority, DCPS, and GSA are reprinted in appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively.
Those commenting generally agreed with the facts presented in this report. The Authority noted that most of the significant events and time frames outlined in the report are consistent with its records. DCPS stated that our major findings on the cost and conduct of the 1997 upper building stabilization program are accurate. The District’s CFO, GSA and the U.S. Department of Education agreed with the report as related to their respective activities.
Both the Authority and DCPS offered their perspectives on the availability of funds issue discussed in the report. DCPS stated that funds were not available to DCPS for capital projects until April 1997. In that regard, the Authority stated that it advises the Office of the Chief Financial Officer of the District regarding the availability of funds which, in turn, is responsible for communicating with District agencies, including DCPS.
The Authority and DCPS also suggested additional discussion of the impact of the D.C. Superior Court ruling related to the roof repair projects. The Authority noted that the additional requirements imposed by the court ruling increased the difficulty of project management and added to the cost of the repair program. Similarly, in several sections of its comments to our draft report, DCPS referred to the July 11, 1997, court order as imposing restrictions, compressing the work schedule, and ultimately delaying the opening of all District public schools until September 22, 1997.
Regarding the availability of funds to DCPS during fiscal year 1997, as discussed in the report, we were not provided documentation that would establish when DCPS was notified that the Authority had funds available for capital projects. This communication issue, which apparently is not isolated to the DCPS capital projects funding, was highlighted in the most recent report of the independent public accounting firm hired by the District. As noted in our report, the independent auditors identified a material weakness concerning control over transactions involving the Authority. The report indicated that the District has not developed adequate procedures to account for funds held by the Authority and does not effectively reconcile the amounts which are recorded. The auditor noted that the District and the Authority have not developed procedures to notify each other of the amounts anticipated or actually received by the Authority on behalf of the District.
Concerning the impact of the court involvement, as discussed in our report, there were a number of factors that were either within or outside the managerial control of the Authority and current or former DCPS management. We do not offer any view on whether any one of these factors was the dominant reason for either the cost or timing issues concerning the roof repairs or whether current DCPS management could have reasonably mitigated those effects.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 15 days from the date of the report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Member of your Subcommittee and the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations and their Subcommittees on the District of Columbia and the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. We will also send copies to the Chairman of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority, the Chief Financial Officer of the District of Columbia, and the Chief Executive Officer of the District of Columbia Public Schools. Copies will be made available to others upon request.
Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. If you or your staff need further information, please call me at (202) 512-4476.
section_title: Key Dates Related to Fiscal Year 1997 Roof Repairs at D.C. Public Schools
paragraphs: Parents United for the District of Columbia, an education advocacy group, filed a lawsuit against the former Mayor, the District of Columbia, and the Fire Chief of the D.C. Fire Department alleging failure of the D.C. officials to adequately inspect for and remedy violations of the District of Columbia Fire Prevention Code and other safety hazards in the public schools.
A trial was held regarding the Parents United lawsuit.
The trial resulted in a D.C. Superior Court Order requiring: (1) the D.C. Fire Chief to conduct semiannual inspections of every public school in the District and to submit reports of fire code violations to the Court and the plaintiffs, (2) the Fire Chief to order the immediate closing of any public school building in D.C. with life threatening fire code violations, including ruptured ceilings, and (3) the plaintiffs to file reports with the Court detailing the abatement or the abatement plan for the fire code violations noted.
The District of Columbia Public School Superintendent’s Task Force on Education Infrastructure for the 21st Century issued the Preliminary Facilities Master Plan 2005 for the District of Columbia Public Schools. The task force was established by the Superintendent of D.C. schools to address the aging and physical deterioration of the D.C. public schools.
Public Law 104-134 was enacted, requiring the General Services Administration to provide technical assistance to the District of Columbia Public Schools and to assist the District of Columbia Public Schools in developing a facilities revitalization plan. The General Services Administration was to consider the Preliminary Facilities Master Plan 2005 for the District of Columbia Public Schools in the development of the facilities revitalization plan.
A Memorandum of Understanding between the General Services Administration and the Superintendent of the District of Columbia Public Schools was signed, requiring the General Services Administration to provide technical assistance and related services to the District of Columbia in the development of a repair and capital improvement program for the District of Columbia Public Schools.
Public Law 104-194, the 1997 Appropriations Act for the District of Columbia, was enacted, providing $9.2 million for school repairs in a restricted line item.
September 30, 1996 Public Law 104-208 was enacted, providing Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae) and College Construction Loan Insurance Association (Connie Lee) funds as well as transferring the $9.2 million from Public Law 104-194 to the Authority to finance D.C. public school facility construction and repair. The law also gave the Authority authorization to contract out for public school repair, in consultation with the General Services Administration. Further, the General Services Administration was required to assist in the short-term management of the repairs and capital improvements. (continued)
The Authority received $11.5 million from fiscal year 1996 general obligation bond proceeds to be used for D.C. public school repairs and capital improvements.
The Authority restructured the District of Columbia Public School by establishing a Board of Trustees and replacing the then Superintendent of Schools with a new Chief Executive Officer.
November 19, 1996 A Memorandum of Understanding between the General Services Administration and the Authority was signed, requiring the General Services Administration to provide program management services to assist in the short-term management of the repairs and capital improvements for the District schools, per Public Law 104-208.
The District of Columbia Public School Chief Executive Officer hired a Chief Operating Officer to manage and implement the school facilities improvement program.
The General Services Administration provided the District of Columbia Public Schools with a facilities revitalization plan as agreed to in the Memorandum of Understanding dated July 25, 1996.
The General Services Administration issued Notices to Proceed to roofing contractors for certain D.C. public schools.
The District of Columbia Public Schools submitted a draft Long-Range Facilities Master Plan to the D.C. Council for approval. The plan included a priority listing of 50 schools to receive roof replacement in Fiscal Year 1997.
The Authority received $18.25 million from the federal government’s sale of Connie Lee to be used for D.C. public school repairs and facility construction.
The District of Columbia Public Schools submitted a request to D.C. Office of Budget and Planning for $28.5 million for capital improvements.
District of Columbia Public School Chief Operating Officer hired a Chief of Capital Projects to direct the program management, program planning and control, and design review team managers.
The Authority requested $36.85 million in supplemental funds from Congress for emergency public school facility improvements. Congress declined to provide any additional funds.
The District of Columbia Public Schools submitted a revised Long-Range Facilities Master Plan to the D.C. Council for approval. The plan was also submitted to the Congress. The plan included a priority list of 50 schools to receive roof replacement in fiscal year 1997. The priority list changed slightly—Tyler was added to the list of school roof projects to be managed by the District of Columbia Public Schools, and Spingarn no longer appeared on the list of school roof projects to be managed by the General Services Administration.
The District of Columbia Public Schools issued a Request for Qualifications to pre-qualify potential roofing contractors. (continued)
The Authority received $20 million from the May 28, 1997, general bond proceeds to be used for school repairs and capital improvements.
District of Columbia Public Schools recessed for summer vacation.
The District of Columbia Public Schools issued an Invitation for Bid and Contract notice seeking a single contractor to perform 15 roof repair projects and 5 boiler/chiller projects. No bids were received.
The District of Columbia Public School Chief Operating Officer testified before D.C. Superior Court that there were 47 school roof repair projects scheduled and that some roofs would not be completed before September 20, 1997. The 47 schools listed differed from the priority list included in the April 25, 1997, Long-Range Facilities Master Plan. For example, the 47 school roof repair projects did not indicate that roof repairs would be performed at 13 of the schools on the roof repair list included in the Long-Range Facilities Master Plan, dated April 25, 1997.
A District of Columbia Superior Court judge reiterated the June 10, 1994, Order and stated that schools would be closed while roof work was performed. The Order also required the District of Columbia Public Schools to submit a plan, by August 18, 1997, to the Superior Court detailing alternative sites for students to report to on September 2, 1997, the first day of the 1997-1998 school year.
The District of Columbia Public Schools issued an amendment to the July 1, 1997, Invitation for Bid and Contract notice. The amended Invitation for Bid and Contract notice divided the required construction work into packages. There were six roof repair packages at a total of 48 schools, and two boiler/chiller packages at a total of 16 schools. Contractors were asked to submit bids on one, more, or all project packages.
The schools scheduled for roof repairs indicated on the Invitation for Bid and Contract differed somewhat from the schools scheduled for roof repairs indicated on the July 11, 1997, Order. For example, the Invitation for Bid and Contract included roof repair projects at seven schools that were not listed on the July 11, 1997, Order.
The District of Columbia Public Schools submitted a request to D.C. Office of Budget and Planning for an additional $20 million for capital improvements.
The District of Columbia Public Schools submitted a revised Long-Range Facilities Master Plan to the D.C. Council for approval. The plan included a priority listing of 56 schools to receive roof replacement in fiscal year 1997. The priority list included thirteen schools that were not indicated in the July 11, 1997, Court Order and 6 schools that were not on the amended (July 11, 1997) Invitation for Bid and Contract.
The District of Columbia Public Schools issued first Notices to Proceed to roofing contractors. (continued)
The District of Columbia Public Schools submitted a report to the Superior Court stating that there was no contingency plan for relocating students and staff who attend those schools where roof repairs were taking place, and that the plan was to delay the start of the school year until roof repairs were completed (September 22, 1997).
The Authority received $36.8 million of Sallie Mae proceeds (from stock warrants) to be used for school repairs and capital improvements.
September 22, 1997 District of Columbia public schools opened, commencing the 1997-1998 school year.
The Authority received $5 million of Sallie Mae proceeds (from the sale of naming rights) to be used for school repairs and capital improvements.
A settlement was reached among Parents United, the Mayor, the Fire Chief, and the District of Columbia Public Schools Chief Executive Officer, which laid the foundation for ensuring that D.C. public schools were free of Fire Code violations and requiring the District of Columbia Public Schools to continue the necessary repairs and capital improvements to the school buildings, as indicated in the Long-Range Facilities Master Plan.
section_title: A Typical District of Columbia School With Multiple Roof Areas
section_title: Comments From the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority’s letter dated February 20, 1998.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. Our report does not address whether ample funding was available for the emergency school repair program during fiscal year 1997. However, table 1 in the report shows that DCPS had about this same amount of funds ($86.5 million) available for capital projects during the fiscal year. 2. This point is discussed in the Comments and Our Evaluation section of the report. 3. We have augmented our discussion in the Planned Roof Repairs section of the report to refer to the additional $5 million from Sallie Mae. The report refers to the Authority’s commitment to provide a minimum percentage of the District’s general fund long-term financing authority (annual bond proceeds) for completion of repairs required by the Long-Range Facilities Master Plan.
section_title: Comments From the District of Columbia Public Schools
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the District of Columbia Public Schools’ letter dated February 17, 1998.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. This point is discussed in the Comment and Our Evaluation section of the report. 2. We modified this section of the report slightly. Of the 46 schools at which DCPS-managed roof work during fiscal year 1997, DCPS received three to five bids for 29 schools; 2 bids for each of 9 schools; and one bid for each of the remaining 8. 3. We modified the report to provide additional information concerning bidder risk associated with the extensive deferred maintenance and the short time frames provided for submitting bids and completing the work.
section_title: Comments From the General Services Administration
section_title: Major Contributors to This Report
subsections: section_title: Accounting and Information Management Division, Washington, D.C.
section_title: Office of General Counsel
section_title: Glossary
subsections: section_title: Asphalt
paragraphs: A petroleum compound, dark brown or black in color, used in the manufacture of roofing products.
section_title: Ballast
paragraphs: Coarse stone, gravel slag, etc., used as an underlayer for poured concrete.
section_title: Bitumen
paragraphs: Asphalt or coal-tar pitch.
section_title: Blocking
paragraphs: Sections of wood built into a roof assembly, usually attached above the deck and below the membrane or flashing, used to stiffen the deck around an opening, act as a stop for insulation, support a curb, or to serve as a nailer for attachment of the membrane and/or flashing.
section_title: Built-Up Roofing
paragraphs: A continuous semiflexible roof covering of lamination, or plies, or saturated or coated plies alternated with layers of bitumen, surfaced with mineral aggregate or asphaltic materials.
section_title: Cant Strip
paragraphs: A continuous strip of flashing forming a triangle with a structural deck and a wall or other vertical surface.
section_title: Cladding
paragraphs: A material used as the exterior wall enclosure of a building.
section_title: Colonnade
paragraphs: A number of columns supporting one side of a roof.
section_title: Coping
paragraphs: Top covering of a wall that is exposed to the weather, usually made of metal, masonry, or stone. It is preferably sloped to shed water back onto the roof.
section_title: Counterflashing
paragraphs: Metal strips used to prevent moisture from entering the top edge of roof flashing, as on a chimney or wall.
section_title: Cupola
paragraphs: A terminal structure, square or round, rising above a main roof. While generally ornamental, a cupola can provide for ventilation.
section_title: Cornice
paragraphs: The molded and projecting horizontal member that crowns a wall.
section_title: Deck
paragraphs: The structural surface to which a roof covering system is applied.
section_title: Design
paragraphs: The architectural concept of a building as represented by plans, elevations, renderings, and other drawings.
section_title: Design-Build
paragraphs: The design-build approach gives a single contractor the responsibility for both designing and constructing a project rather than separating the responsibilities among a number of contractors.
section_title: Downspout
paragraphs: A conduit that carries runoff water from a scupper, conductor head, or gutter of a building to a lower level, or to the ground or storm water runoff system.
section_title: Drain
paragraphs: An outlet or other device used to collect and direct the flow of runoff water from a roof area.
Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (rubber roof).
section_title: Estimate (Scope)
paragraphs: A forecast of construction cost based on a detailed analysis of materials and labor. Also referred to as a conceptual estimate or parametric estimate.
section_title: Expansion Joint
paragraphs: A structural separation between two building elements that allows free movement without damage to the roofing or waterproofing system.
section_title: Fascia
paragraphs: A vertical or steeply sloped roof or trim located at the perimeter of a building. Typically, it is a border for the low-slope roof system that waterproofs the interior portions of the building.
section_title: Flashing
paragraphs: Strips of copper, aluminum, galvanized sheet metal, or similar materials used along walls, dormers, valleys, and chimneys to prevent moisture seepage.
section_title: Flood Test
paragraphs: The procedure in which a controlled amount of water is temporarily retained over a horizontal surface to determine the effectiveness of the waterproofing.
section_title: Glazing
paragraphs: Cutting and fitting panes of glass into frames.
section_title: Gravel Stop
paragraphs: A low profile upward-projecting metal edge flashing with a flange along the roof side, usually formed from sheet or extruded metal, designed to prevent loose gravel from washing off the roof and to provide a finished edge detail for the built-up roofing assembly.
section_title: Gutter
paragraphs: A channelled component installed along the downslope perimeter of a roof to carry runoff water from the roof to the drain leaders or downspouts.
section_title: Insulation
paragraphs: Materials designed to reduce the flow of heat either into or from a building.
section_title: Masonry
paragraphs: Anything constructed of material such as brick, stone, concrete blocks, or ceramic blocks.
section_title: Modified Bitumen
paragraphs: A roofing bitumen which generally has been rubberized or plasticized to provide greater elasticity, flexibility, and improved working characteristics.
section_title: Parapet
paragraphs: A low, retaining wall at the edge of a roof. Usually an upward extension of a building’s exterior curtain wall.
section_title: Parging
paragraphs: In masonry construction, a coat of cement (generally containing dampproofing ingredients) on the face of rough masonry, the earth side of foundation, or basement walls.
section_title: Pediment
paragraphs: A triangular face forming the gable of a two-pitched roof.
section_title: Pitch
paragraphs: The incline, or slope, of a roof.
section_title: Pitch Pocket
paragraphs: A flanged metal container placed around a column or other roof penetrating element and filled with flashing cement to seal the area around the penetration.
section_title: Ply
paragraphs: A single layer of organic or inorganic roofing material in a roof membrane or roof system.
section_title: Replacement
paragraphs: The practice of removing an existing roof system down to the roof deck and replacing it with a new roofing system.
section_title: Repointing
paragraphs: The process of removing deteriorated mortar from an existing masonry joint and troweling new mortar or other filler into the joint.
section_title: Reroofing
paragraphs: The process of recovering, or tearing off and replacing an existing roof system.
section_title: Ridge
paragraphs: Where the rising sides of the roof come together. The highest point of the roof.
section_title: Roofing System
paragraphs: An assembly of interacting roof structures and components designed to be weatherproof, and normally to insulate the building’s top surface.
section_title: Saddle
paragraphs: A relatively small raised substrate or structure that directs surface water to drains or a valley; is often constructed like a small hip roof or like a pyramid with a diamond shaped base.
section_title: Scupper
paragraphs: An opening cut through the wall of a building through which water can drain from a floor or roof.
section_title: Shingle
paragraphs: Roof covering made from asphalt, fiberglass, wood, aluminum, tile, slate, or other water-shedding material.
section_title: Skylight
paragraphs: A roof accessory, set over an opening in the roof, designed to admit light. Normally transparent, and mounted on a raised framed curb.
section_title: Splash Block
paragraphs: A small masonry block laid on the ground below a downspout to carry roof drainage away from a building.
section_title: Substrate
paragraphs: See Deck.
section_title: Tapered Insulation
paragraphs: A strip used to elevate and slope the roof at the perimeter and at the curbs.
section_title: Traditional Method
paragraphs: In traditional project organization, the owner hires the services of a design team and a construction team. The design team is responsible for transmitting owner/user needs in plan documents describing the physical form for the construction team to assemble.
section_title: Valley
paragraphs: Where two roofs coming from different horizontal directions meet and form an internal angle.
section_title: Wing
paragraphs: Roof section broadly extended or projecting at an angle from the main building.
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