Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems
Published: 2005-07-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Mandated to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems at airports by December 31, 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deployed two types of screening equipment: explosives detection systems (EDS), which use computer-aided tomography X-rays to recognize the characteristics of explosives, and explosives trace detection (ETD) systems, which use chemical analysis to detect traces of explosive material vapors or residues. This testimony discusses (1) TSA's deployment of EDS and ETD systems and the impact of initially deploying these systems, (2) TSA and airport actions to install EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems, and the federal resources made available for this purpose, and (3) actions taken by TSA to optimally deploy checked baggage screening systems.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at the nation's more than 400 airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by Congress. However, in initially deploying EDS and ETD equipment, TSA placed stand-alone ETD and the minivan-sized EDS machines--mainly in airport lobbies--that were not integrated in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems. TSA officials stated that the agency's ability to initially install in-line systems was limited because of the high costs and the time required for airport modifications. These interim lobby solutions resulted in operational inefficiencies, including requiring a greater number of screeners, as compared with using EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems. TSA and airport operators are taking actions to install in-line baggage screening systems to streamline airport and TSA operations, reduce screening costs, and enhance security. Eighty-six of the 130 airports we surveyed either have, are planning to have, or are considering installing full or partial in-line systems. However, resources have not been made available to fund these capital-intensive systems on a large-scale basis. Also, the overall costs of installing in-line baggage screening systems at each airport are unknown, the availability of future federal funding is uncertain, and perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the federal government, airport operators, and air carriers in funding these systems. TSA has not conducted a systematic, prospective analysis to determine at which airports it could achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies and security by installing in-line systems or, where in-line systems may not be economically justified, by making greater use of stand-alone EDS systems rather than relying on the labor-intensive and less efficient ETD screening process. However, at nine airports where TSA has agreed to help fund the installation of in-line baggage screening systems, TSA conducted a retrospective cost-benefit analysis which showed that these in-line systems could save the federal government about $1 billion over 7 years. TSA further estimated that it could recover its initial investment in the in-line systems at these airports in a little over 1 year.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on leveraging  technology to improve aviation security, and to discuss our work on the  Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) deployment of checked  baggage screening systems. After the terrorist attacks of September 11,  2001, which highlighted the vulnerability of U.S. aircraft to acts of  terrorism, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Aviation  and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), mandating, among other things,  that all checked baggage at U.S. airports be screened using explosive  detection systems by December 31, 2002. To meet this requirement, the  Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deployed two types of  equipment to screen checked baggage for explosives: (1) explosives  detection systems (EDS) that use specialized x-rays to detect  characteristics of explosives that may be contained in baggage as it moves  along a conveyor belt; and (2) explosive trace detection (ETD) systems,  whereby an individual (i.e., a baggage screener) swabs baggage and then  inserts the swab into the ETD machine, which in turn can detect chemical  residues that may indicate the presence of explosives within a bag.
As we reported in February 2004, largely because of shortages of  equipment and insufficient time to modify airports to accommodate EDS  machines, TSA was unable, at certain airports, to meet the 2002  congressionally established deadline to screen all checked baggage for  explosives using EDS and ETD machines. Recognizing the obstacles  encountered by TSA, Congress passed, and the President signed into law,  the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which, in effect, extended the  deadline for screening all checked baggage for explosives until December  31, 2003, for airports at which TSA was unable to meet the earlier deadline  established by ATSA. We also reported that TSA fell short of fully  satisfying the extended 2003 mandate and continued to face challenges in  deploying and leveraging screening equipment and technologies.
My testimony today discusses (1) TSA’s initial deployment of EDS and  ETD systems and the impact of that deployment; (2) actions taken by  airports and TSA to install automated in-line EDS baggage screening  systems, and the key federal resources that have been made available to  fund these systems; and (3) TSA’s actions to plan for the optimal  deployment of EDS and ETD equipment, including in-line checked  baggage screening systems, in order to ensure the efficiency, cost  effectiveness, and security of its checked baggage screening operations.
My comments are based primarily on our March 15, 2005, report on our  assessment of TSA’s checked baggage screening program. As part of that  assessment, we reviewed available documentation on TSA’s checked  baggage screening program and interviewed officials from TSA, air  carriers, airports, EDS and ETD equipment manufacturers, and airport  industry associations to obtain information regarding TSA’s efforts to  improve checked baggage screening operations using EDS and ETD  machines. We also visited 22 airports to observe baggage screening  procedures and discuss these procedures with TSA, airport, and airline  officials. In addition, we surveyed all 155 federal security directors, who  oversee federal security operations at one or more airports in the United  States where screening is required, to obtain their perspectives on the  implementation of checked baggage screening operations at 263 airports  under their supervision, and to obtain information on these airports’ plans  regarding the incorporation of EDS machines within the airports’ baggage  conveyor systems for screening checked baggage for explosives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: With the passage of ATSA in November 2001, TSA assumed from the  Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) the majority of the responsibility  for securing the commercial aviation system. Under ATSA, TSA is  responsible for ensuring that all baggage is properly screened for  explosives at airports in the United States where screening is required, and  for the procurement, installation, and maintenance of explosive detection  systems used to screen checked baggage for explosives. ATSA required  that TSA screen 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection  systems by December 31, 2002. As it became apparent that certain airports  would not meet the December 2002 deadline to screen 100 percent of  checked baggage for explosives, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in  effect extended the deadline to December 31, 2003, for noncompliant  airports. Prior to the passage of ATSA in November 2001, only limited  screening of checked baggage for explosives occurred. When this  screening took place, air carriers had operational responsibility for  conducting the screening, while FAA maintained oversight responsibility.  With the passage of ATSA, TSA assumed operational responsibility from  air carriers for screening checked baggage for explosives. Airport  operators and air carriers continued to be responsible for processing and  transporting passenger checked baggage from the check-in counter to the  airplane.
Explosive detection systems include EDS and ETD machines. EDS  machines, which cost approximately $1 million each, use computer-aided  tomography X-rays adapted from the medical field to automatically  recognize the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. By taking the  equivalent of hundreds of X-ray pictures of a bag from different angles, the  EDS machine examines the objects inside of the baggage to identify  characteristic signatures of threat explosives. TSA certified, procured, and  deployed EDS machines manufactured by two companies, and has  recently certified a smaller, less costly EDS machine, which is currently  being operationally tested. ETD machines, which cost approximately  $40,000 each, work by detecting vapors and residues of explosives.  Because human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs,  which are then chemically analyzed in the ETD machines to identify any  traces of explosive materials, the use of ETD is more labor-intensive and  subject to more human error than the automated process of using EDS  machines. ETD is used both for primary, or the initial, screening of  checked baggage, as well as secondary screening, which resolves alarms  from EDS machines that indicate the possible presence of explosives  inside a bag. TSA has certified, procured, and deployed ETD machines  from three manufacturers.
As we reported in February 2004, to initially deploy EDS and ETD  equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for explosives, TSA  implemented interim airport lobby solutions and in-line EDS baggage  screening systems. The interim lobby solutions involved placing stand- alone EDS and ETD machines in the nation’s airports, most often in  airport lobbies or baggage makeup areas where baggage is sorted for  loading onto aircraft. For EDS in a stand-alone mode (not integrated with  airport’s or air carrier’s baggage conveyor system) and ETD, TSA  screeners are responsible for obtaining the passengers’ checked baggage  from either the passenger or the air carrier, lifting the bags onto and off of  EDS machines or ETD tables, using TSA protocols to appropriately screen  the bags, and returning the cleared bags to the air carriers to be loaded  onto departing aircraft. In addition to installing stand-alone EDS and ETD  machines in airport lobbies and baggage makeup areas, TSA collaborated  with some airport operators and air carriers to install integrated in-line  EDS baggage screening systems within their baggage conveyor systems.
section_title: TSA Equipped More than 400 Airports to Screen Checked Baggage for Explosives, but the Initial Deployment Led to Operational Inefficiencies, and Additional Security Risks
paragraphs: Since its inception in November 2001 through September 2004, TSA used  its funds to procure and install about 1,200 EDS machines and about 6,000  ETD machines to screen checked baggage for explosives at over 400  airports and to modify airport facilities to accommodate this equipment.  For the most part, TSA deployed EDS machines at larger airports and ETD  machines at smaller airports, resulting in primary screening being  conducted solely with ETD machines at over 300 airports. Table 1  summarizes the location of EDS and ETD equipment at the nation’s  airports by airport category, based on a June 2004 TSA inventory listing.  The number of machines shown in table 1 includes EDS and ETD  machines procured by both TSA and FAA prior to and during the  establishment of TSA.
Although TSA made significant progress in fielding this equipment, TSA  used most of its fiscal years 2002 through 2004 funds for its checked  baggage screening program to design, develop, and deploy interim lobby  screening solutions rather than install more permanent in-line EDS  baggage screening systems. During our site visits to 22 category X, I, and II  airports, we observed that in most cases, TSA used stand-alone EDS  machines and ETD machines as the primary method for screening checked  baggage. Generally, this equipment was located in airport lobbies and in  baggage makeup areas. In addition, in our survey of 155 federal security  directors, we asked the directors to estimate, for the 263 airports included  in the survey, the approximate percentage of checked baggage that was  screened on or around February 29, 2004, using EDS, ETD, or other  approved alternatives for screening baggage such as positive passenger  bag match or canine searches. As shown in table 2, the directors reported  that for 130 large to medium-sized airports in our survey (21, 60, and 49  category X, I, and II airports, respectively), most of the checked baggage  was screened using stand-alone EDS or ETD machines. The average  percentage of checked baggage reported as screened using EDS machines  at airports with partial or full in-line EDS capability ranged from 4 percent  for category II airports to 11 percent for category X airports. In addition,  the directors reported that ETD machines were used to screen checked  baggage 93 to 99 percent of the time at category III and IV airports,  respectively.
Stand-alone EDS and ETD machines are both labor- and time-intensive to  operate since each bag must be physically carried to an EDS or ETD  machine for screening and then moved back to the baggage conveyor  system prior to being loaded onto an aircraft. With an in-line EDS system,  checked baggage is screened within an airport’s baggage conveyor system,  eliminating the need for a baggage screener or other personnel to  physically transport the baggage from the check-in point to the EDS  machine for screening and then to the airport baggage conveyor system.  Further, according to TSA officials, ETD machines and stand-alone EDS  machines are less efficient in the number of checked bags that can be  screened per hour per machine than are EDS machines that are integrated  in-line with the airport baggage conveyor systems. As shown in table 3, as  of October 2003, TSA estimated that the number of checked bags screened  per hour could more than double when EDS machines were placed in-line  versus being used in a stand-alone mode.
In January 2004, TSA, in support of its planning, budgeting, and acquisition  of security screening equipment, reported to the Office of Management  and Budget (OMB) that the efficiency benefits of in-line rather than stand- alone EDS are significant, particularly with regard to bags per hour  screened and the number of TSA screeners required to operate the  equipment. According to TSA officials, at that time, a typical lobby-based  screening unit consisting of a stand-alone EDS machine with three ETD  machines had a baggage throughput of 376 bags per hour with a staffing  requirement of 19 screeners. In contrast, TSA estimated that  approximately 425 bags per hour could be screened by in-line EDS  machines with a staffing requirement of 4.25 screeners.
In order to achieve the higher throughput rates and reduce the number of  screener staff needed to operate in-line baggage screening systems, TSA  (1) uses a screening procedure known as “on-screen alarm resolution” and  (2) networks multiple in-line EDS machines together, referred to as  “multiplexing,” so that the computer-generated images of bags from these  machines are sent to a central location where TSA screeners can monitor  the images of suspect bags centrally from several machines using the on- screen alarm resolution procedure. When an EDS machine alarms,  indicating the possibility that explosive material may be contained in the  bag, the on-screen alarm resolution procedure allows screeners to  examine computer-generated images of the inside of a bag to determine if  suspect items identified by the EDS machines are in fact suspicious. If a  screener, by viewing these images, is able to determine that the suspect  item or items identified by the EDS machine are in fact harmless, the  screener is allowed to clear the bag, and it is sent to the airline baggage  makeup area for loading onto the aircraft. If the screener is not able to  make the determination that the bag does not contain suspicious objects,  the bag is sent to a secondary screening room where the bag is further  examined by a screener. In secondary screening, the screener opens the  bag and examines the suspect item or items, and usually swabs the items  to collect a sample for analysis using an ETD machine. TSA also uses this  on-screen alarm resolution procedure with stand-alone EDS machines.
A TSA official estimated that the on-screen alarm resolution procedure  with in-line EDS baggage screening systems will enable TSA to reduce by  40 to 60 percent the number of bags requiring the more labor-intensive  secondary screening using ETD machines. In estimating the potential  savings in staffing requirements, TSA officials stated that they expect to  achieve a 20 to 25 percent savings because of reductions in the number of  staff needed to screen bags using ETD to resolve alarms from in-line EDS  machines.
TSA also reported that because procedures for using stand-alone EDS and  ETD machines require screeners to lift heavy baggage onto and off of the  machines, the interim lobby screening solutions used by TSA led to  significant numbers of on-the-job injuries. In addition, in responding to  our survey about 263 airports, numerous federal security directors  reported that on-the-job injuries related to lifting heavy baggage onto or  off the EDS and ETD machines were a significant concern at the airports  for which they were responsible. Specifically, these federal security  directors reported that on-the-job injuries caused by lifting heavy bags  onto and off of EDS machines were a significant concern at 65 airports,  and were a significant concern with the use of ETD machines at 110  airports. To reduce on-the-job injuries, TSA has provided training to  screeners on proper lifting procedures. However, according to TSA  officials, in-line EDS screening systems would significantly reduce the  need for screeners to handle baggage, thus further reducing the number of  on-the-job injuries being experienced by TSA baggage screeners.
In addition, during our site visits to 22 large and medium-sized airports,  several TSA, airport, and airline officials expressed concern regarding the  security risks caused by overcrowding due to ETD and stand-alone EDS  machines being located in airport lobbies. The location of the equipment  resulted in less space available to accommodate passenger movement and  caused congestion due to passengers having to wait in lines in public areas  to have their checked baggage screened. TSA headquarters officials also  reported that large groups of people congregating in crowded airport  lobbies increases security risks by creating a potential target for terrorists.  The TSA officials noted that crowded airport lobbies have been the scenes  of terrorist attacks in the past. For example, in December 1985, four  terrorists walked to the El Al ticket counter at Rome’s Leonardo DaVinci  Airport and opened fire with assault rifles and grenades, killing 13 and  wounding 75. On that same day, three terrorists killed three people and  wounded 30 others at Vienna International Airport.
section_title: Airports and the Federal Government Are Taking Actions to Install In-line Baggage Screening Systems, but Resources Have Not Been Made Available to Fund These Systems on a Large-Scale Basis
paragraphs: Airport operators and TSA are taking actions to install in-line EDS baggage  screening systems because of the expected benefits of these systems. Our  survey of federal security directors and interviews with airport officials  revealed that 86 of 130 category X, I, and II airports (66 percent) included  in our survey either have, are planning to have, or are considering  installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems throughout or at a  portion of their airports. As of July 2004, 12 airports had operational in-line  systems airportwide or at a particular terminal or terminals, and an  additional 45 airports were actively planning or constructing in-line  systems. Our survey of federal security directors further revealed that an  additional 33 of the 130 category X, I, and II airports we surveyed were  considering developing in-line systems.
While in-line EDS baggage screening systems have a number of potential  benefits, the total cost to install these systems is unknown, and limited  federal resources have been made available to fund these systems on a  large-scale basis. In-line baggage screening systems are capital-intensive  because they often require significant airport modifications, including  terminal reconfigurations, new conveyor belt systems, and electrical  upgrades. TSA has not determined the total cost of installing in-line EDS  baggage screening systems at airports that it had determined need these  systems to maintain compliance with the congressional mandate to screen  all checked baggage for explosives using explosive detection systems, or  to achieve more efficient and streamlined checked baggage screening  operations. However, TSA and airport industry association officials have  estimated that the total cost of installing in-line systems is—a rough order- of-magnitude estimate—from $3 billion to more than $5 billion. TSA  officials stated that they have not conducted a detailed analysis of the  costs required to install in-line EDS systems at airports because most of  their efforts have been focused on deploying and maintaining a sufficient  number of EDS and ETD machines to screen all checked baggage for  explosives. TSA officials further stated that the estimated costs to install  in-line baggage screening systems would vary greatly from airport to  airport depending on the size of the airport and the extent of airport  modifications that would be required to install the system. While we did  not independently verify the estimates, officials from the Airports Council  International-North America and American Association of Airport  Executives estimated that project costs for in-line systems could range  from about $2 million for a category III airport to $250 million for a  category X airport.
TSA and airport operators are relying on LOI agreements as their principal  method for funding the modification of airport facilities to incorporate in- line baggage screening systems. As of January 2005, TSA had issued eight  LOIs to reimburse nine airports for the installation of in-line EDS baggage  screening systems for a total cost of $957.1 million to the federal  government over 4 years. In addition, TSA officials stated that as of July  2004, they had identified 27 additional airports that they believe would  benefit from receiving LOIs for in-line systems because such systems are  needed to screen an increasing number of bags due to current or projected  growth in passenger traffic. TSA officials stated that without such systems,  these airports would not remain in compliance with the congressional  mandate to screen all checked baggage using EDS and ETD. However,  because TSA would not identify these 27 airports, we were unable to  determine whether these airports are among the 45 airports we identified  as in the process of planning or constructing in-line systems.
TSA officials stated that they also use other transaction agreements as an  administrative vehicle to directly fund, with no long-term commitments,  airport operators for smaller in-line airport modification projects. Under  these agreements, as implemented by TSA, the airport operator also  provides a portion of the funding required for the modification. As of  September 30, 2004, TSA had negotiated arrangements with eight airports  to fund small permanent in-line projects or portions of large permanent in- line projects using other transaction agreements. These other transaction  agreements range from about $640,000 to help fund the conceptual design  of an in-line system for one terminal at the Dallas Fort-Worth airport to  $37.5 million to help fund the design and construction of in-line systems  and modification of the baggage handling systems for two terminals at the  Chicago O’Hare International Airport. TSA officials stated that they would  continue to use other transaction agreements to help fund smaller in-line  projects.
Airport operators also used the FAA’s Airport Improvement Program— grants to maintain safe and efficient airports—in fiscal years 2002 and  2003 to help fund facility modifications needed to accommodate installing  in-line systems. Twenty-eight of 53 airports that reported either having  constructed or planning to construct in-line systems relied on the Airport  Improvement Program as their sole source of federal funding.
Airport officials at over half of the 45 airports that we identified are in the  process of planning or constructing in-line systems stated that they will  require federal funding in order to complete the planning and construction  of these in-line systems. TSA officials also reported that additional airports  will require in-line systems to maintain compliance with the congressional  mandate to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for explosives. Despite  this reported need, TSA officials stated that they do not have sufficient  resources in their budget to fund additional LOIs beyond the eight LOIs  that have already been issued. The Vision 100—Century of Aviation  Reauthorization Act (Vision 100) provided for the creation of the Aviation  Security Capital Fund to help pay for, among other things, placing EDS  machines in line with airport baggage handling systems. However,  according to OMB officials, the President’s fiscal year 2005 budget request,  which included the Aviation Security Capital Fund’s mandatory  appropriation of $250 million, only supported continued funding for the  eight LOIs that have already been issued and did not provide resources to  support new LOIs for funding the installation of in-line systems at  additional airports. Further, while the fiscal year 2005 Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act provided $45 million for  installing explosive detection systems in addition to the $250 million from  the Aviation Security Capital Fund, Congress directed, in the  accompanying conference report, that the $45 million be used to assist in  the continued funding of the existing eight LOIs. Further, the President’s  fiscal year 2006 budget request for TSA provides approximately   $240.5 million for the continued funding of the eight existing LOIs and  does not allocate any funding for new LOI agreements for in-line system  integration activities. The fiscal year 2006 Department of Homeland  Security appropriations bill passed by the House on May 17, 2005, and the  appropriations bill pending before the Senate include, among other things  $75 million and $14 million for installation of checked baggage explosive  detection systems, respectively. The committee reports accompanying the  House and Senate appropriations bills state that the amounts included for  installation are in addition to the $250 million mandatory appropriation of  the Aviation Security Capital Fund but do not earmark these funds  specifically for the installation of in-line EDS systems.
In addition, perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the  federal government, airport operators, and air carriers in funding these  capital-intensive in-line EDS systems. Airport operators and TSA have  shared in the total costs—25 percent and 75 percent respectively under  LOI agreements, which have been TSA’s primary method for funding in- line EDS systems. A 75 percent federal cost-share will apply to any project  under an LOI for fiscal year 2005. Further, the President’s fiscal year 2006  budget request for TSA requests to maintain the 75 percent federal  government cost share for projects funded by LOIs at large and medium  airports. For fiscal year 2006 appropriations for DHS, both the Senate, in  its pending appropriations bill, and the House, in its committee report,  also propose to maintain the 75 percent federal cost share for LOIs.  However, in testimony before Congress, an aviation industry official  expressed a different perspective regarding the cost sharing between the  federal government and the aviation industry for installing in-line checked  baggage screening systems. Testifying in July 2004, the official said that  airports contend that the cost of installing in-line systems should be met  entirely by the federal government, given its direct responsibility for  screening checked baggage, as established by law, in light of the national  security imperative for doing so, and because of the economic efficiencies  of this strategy. Although the official stated that airports have agreed to  provide a local match of 10 percent of the cost of installing in-line systems  at medium and large airports, as stipulated by Vision 100, he expressed  opposition to the administration’s proposal, which was subsequently  adopted by Congress for fiscal year 2005, to reestablish the airport’s cost- share at 25 percent.
In July 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the  United States (the 9/11 Commission) also addressed the issue of the  federal government/airport cost-share for installing EDS in-line baggage  screening systems. Specifically, the commission recommended that TSA  expedite the installation of in-line systems and that the aviation industry  should pay its fair share of the costs associated with installing these  systems, since the industry will derive many benefits from the systems.  Although the 9/11 Commission recommended that the aviation industry  should pay its fair share of the costs of installing in-line systems, the  commission did not report what it believed the fair share to be.
section_title: TSA Has Not Systematically Planned for the Optimal Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Equipment to Ensure the Efficient and Cost- Effective Screening for Explosives while Enhancing Security Benefits
paragraphs: At the time of our March 2005 report, TSA has not completed a  systematic, prospective analysis of individual airports or groups of airports  to determine at which airports installing in-line EDS systems would be  cost-effective in terms of reducing long-term screening costs for the  government and would improve security. Such an analysis would enable  TSA to determine at which airports it would be most beneficial to invest  limited federal resources for in-line systems rather than continue to rely  on the stand-alone EDS and ETD machines to screen checked baggage for  explosives, and it would be consistent with best practices for preparing  benefit-cost analysis of government programs or projects called for by  OMB Circular A-94. TSA officials stated that they had not conducted the  analyses related to the installation of in-line systems at individual airports  or groups of airports because they have used available staff and funding to  ensure all airports have a sufficient number of EDS or ETD machines to  meet the congressional mandate to screen all checked baggage with  explosive detection systems. During the course of our review, in  September 2004, TSA contracted for services to develop methodologies  and criteria for assessing the effectiveness and suitability of airport  screening solutions requiring significant capital investment, such as those  projects associated with the LOI program. In July 2005, TSA officials  stated that TSA and DHS are reviewing a draft report from the study.  According to these officials, the study will provide TSA with a strategic  plan for its checked baggage screening program, including the best  screening solution for airports processing most of the airlines’ baggage  volume, and the capital costs and staffing requirements for each solution.
Although TSA had not conducted a systematic analysis of cost savings and  other benefits that could be derived from the installation of in-line baggage  screening systems, TSA’s limited, retrospective cost-benefit analysis of in- line projects at the nine airports with signed LOI agreements found that  significant savings and other benefits may be achieved through the  installation of these systems. This analysis was conducted in May 2004— after the eight LOI agreements for the nine airports were signed in July  and September 2003 and February 2004—to estimate potential future cost  savings and other benefits that could be achieved from installing in-line  systems instead of using stand-alone EDS systems. TSA estimated that in- line baggage screening systems at these airports would save the federal  government about $1 billion compared with stand-alone EDS systems and  that TSA would recover its initial investment in a little over 1 year.  TSA’s  analysis also provided data to estimate the cost savings for each airport  over the 7-year period. According to TSA’s data, federal cost savings varied  from about $50 million to over $250 million at eight of the nine airports,  while at one airport, there was an estimated $90 million loss.
According to TSA’s analysis of the nine LOI airports, in-line cost savings  critically depend on how much an airport’s facilities have to be modified  to accommodate the in-line configuration. Savings also depend on TSA’s  costs to buy, install, and network the EDS machines; subsequent  maintenance cost; and the number of screeners needed to operate the  machines in-line instead of using stand-alone EDS systems. In its analysis,  TSA also found that a key factor driving many of these costs is  throughput—how many bags an in-line EDS system can screen per hour  compared with the rate for a stand-alone system. TSA used this factor to  determine how many stand-alone EDS machines could be replaced by a  single in-line EDS machine while achieving the same throughput.  According to TSA’s analysis, in-line EDS would reduce by 78 percent the  number of TSA baggage screeners and supervisors required to screen  checked baggage at these nine airports, from 6,645 to 1,477 screeners and  supervisors. However, the actual number of TSA screeners and supervisor  positions that could be eliminated would be dependent on the individual  design and operating conditions at each airport.
TSA also reported that aside from increased efficiency and lower overall  costs, there were a number of qualitative benefits that in-line systems  would provide over stand-alone systems, including:  fewer on-the-job injuries, since there is less lifting of baggage when EDS  machines are integrated into the airport’s baggage conveyor system; less lobby disruption because the stand-alone EDS and ETD machines  would be removed from airport lobbies; and   unbroken chain of custody of baggage because in-line systems are more  secure, since the baggage handling is performed away from passengers.
TSA’s retrospective analysis of these nine airports indicates the potential  for cost savings through the installation of in-line EDS baggage screening  systems at other airports, and it provides insights about key factors likely  to influence potential cost savings from using in-line systems at other  airports. This analysis also indicates the merit of conducting prospective  analyses of other airports to provide information for future federal  government funding decisions as required by the OMB guidance on cost- benefit analyses. This guidance describes best practices for preparing  benefit-cost analysis of government programs or projects, one of which  involves analyzing uncertainty. Given the diversity of airport designs and  operations, TSA’s analysis could be modified to account for uncertainties  in the values of some of the key factors, such as how much it will cost to  modify an airport to install an in-line system. Analyzing uncertainty in this  manner is consistent with OMB guidance.
TSA also has not systematically analyzed which airports could benefit  from the implementation of additional stand-alone EDS systems in lieu of  labor-intensive ETD systems at more than 300 airports that rely on ETD  machines, and where in-line EDS systems may not be appropriate or cost- effective. More specifically, TSA has not prepared a plan that prioritizes  which airports should receive EDS machines (including machines that  become surplus because of the installation of in-line systems) to balance  short-term installation costs with future operational savings. Furthermore,  TSA has not yet determined the potential long-term operating cost savings  and the short-term costs of installing the systems, which are important  factors to consider in conducting analyses to determine whether airports  would benefit from the installation of EDS machines. TSA officials said  that they had not yet had the opportunity to develop such analyses or  plans, and they did not believe that such an exercise would necessarily be  an efficient use of their resources, given the fluidity of baggage screening  at various airports.
There is potential for TSA to benefit from the introduction of smaller  stand-alone EDS machines—in terms of labor savings and added  efficiencies—at some of the more than 300 airports where TSA relies on  the use of ETD machines to screen checked baggage. Stand-alone EDS  machines are able to screen a greater number of bags in an hour than the  ETD used for primary screening while lessening reliance on screeners  during the screening process. For example, TSA’s analysis showed that an  ETD machine can screen 36 bags per hour, while the stand-alone EDS  machines can screen 120 to 180 bags per hour. As a result, it would take  three to five ETD machines to screen the same number of bags that one  stand-alone EDS machine could process. In addition, greater use of the  stand-alone EDS machines could reduce staffing requirements. For  example, one stand-alone EDS machine would potentially require 6 to 14  fewer screeners than would be required to screen the same number of  bags at a screening station with three to five ETD machines. This  calculation is based on TSA estimates that 4.1 screeners are required to  support each primary screening ETD machine, while one stand-alone EDS  machine requires 6.75 screeners—including staff needed to operate ETD  machines required to provide secondary screening.
Without a plan for installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems, and  for using additional stand-alone EDS systems in place of ETD machines at  the nation’s airports, it is unclear how TSA will make use of new  technologies for screening checked baggage for explosives, such as the  smaller and faster EDS machines that may become available through  TSA’s research and development programs. For example, TSA is working  with private sector firms to enhance existing EDS systems and develop  new screening technologies through its research and development (R&D)  efforts. As part of these efforts, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent almost   $2.4 million to develop a new computer-aided tomography explosives  detection system that is smaller and lighter than systems currently  deployed in airport lobbies. The new system is intended to replace systems  currently in use, including larger and heavier EDS machines and ETD  equipment. The smaller size of the system creates opportunities for TSA to  transfer screening operations to other locations such as airport check-in  counters. TSA certified this equipment in December 2004 and is  operationally testing the machine at three airports to evaluate its  operational efficiency.
GAO, Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching and Developing  Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management, GAO-04-890 (Washington, D.C.:  Sept. 30, 2004).
GAO, Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach, GAO-02-150T  (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2001). development, the agency had not estimated deployment dates, without  which managers do not have information needed to plan, budget, and  track the progress of projects. We also found that TSA and DHS did not  have adequate databases to monitor and manage the spending of the  hundreds of millions of dollars that Congress had appropriated for R&D.  In moving forward, it will be important for DHS to resolve the these  challenges to help ensure that limited R&D recourses are focused on the  areas of greatest need.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at  the nation’s airports—mainly as part of interim lobby screening  solutions—to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage for  explosives, as mandated by Congress. With the objective of initially  fielding this equipment largely accomplished, TSA needs to shift its focus  from equipping airports with interim screening solutions to systematically  planning for the more optimal deployment of checked baggage screening  systems. Part of such planning should include analyzing which airports  should receive federal support for in-line EDS baggage screening systems  based on cost savings that could be achieved from more effective and  efficient baggage screening operations and on other factors, including  enhanced security. Also, for airports, where in-line systems may not be  economically justified because of high investment costs, a cost  effectiveness analysis could be used to determine the benefits of  additional stand-alone EDS machines to screen checked baggage in place  of the more labor-intensive ETD machines that are currently being used at  the more than 300 airports. In addition, TSA should consider the costs and  benefits of the new technologies being developed through its research and  development efforts, which could provide smaller EDS machines that have  the potential to reduce the costs associated with installing in-line EDS  baggage screening systems or to replace ETD machines currently used as  the primary method for screening.
An analysis of airport baggage screening needs would also help enable  TSA to determine whether expected reduced staffing costs, higher baggage  throughput, and increased security would justify the significant up-front  investment required to install in-line baggage screening. TSA’s  retrospective analysis of nine airports installing in-line baggage screening  systems with LOI funds, while limited, demonstrated that cost savings  could be achieved through reduced staffing requirements for screeners  and increased baggage throughput. In fact, the analysis showed that using  in-line systems instead of stand-alone systems at these nine airports would  save the federal government about $1 billion over 7 years and that TSA’s  initial investment would be recovered in a little over 1 year. However, this  analysis also showed that a cost savings may not be achieved for all  airports. In considering airports for in-line baggage screening systems or  the continued use of stand-alone EDS and ETD machines, a systematic  analysis of the costs and benefits of these systems would help TSA justify  the appropriate screening for a particular airport, and such planning would  help support funding requests by demonstrating enhanced security,  improved operational efficiencies, and cost savings to both TSA and the  affected airport.
To assist TSA in planning for the optimal deployment of checked baggage  screening systems, we recommended in our March 2005 report that TSA  systematically evaluate baggage screening needs at airports, including the  costs and benefits of installing in-line baggage screening systems at  airports that do not yet have in-line systems installed. DHS agreed with our  recommendation, stating that TSA has initiated an analysis of deploying in- line EDS machines and is in the process of formulating criteria to identify  those airports that would benefit from an in-line EDS system. DHS also  stated that TSA has begun conducting an analysis of the airports that rely  heavily on ETD machines as the primary checked baggage screening  technology to identify those airports that would benefit from augmenting  ETDs with stand-alone EDS equipment.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee have.
section_title: Contact Information
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.  Berrick at (202) 512-3404.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included   Charles Bausell, Amy Bernstein, Kevin Copping, Christine Fossett,   David Hooper, Noel Lance, Thomas Lombardi, and Alper Tunca.
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