Defense Space Activities: DOD Needs to Further Clarify the Operationally Responsive Space Concept and Plan to Integrate and Support Future Satellites
Published: 2008-07-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense's (DOD) operational dependence on space has placed new and increasing demands on current space systems to meet commanders' needs. DOD's Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concept is designed to more rapidly satisfy commanders' needs for information and intelligence during ongoing operations. Given the potential for ORS to change how DOD acquires and fields space capabilities to support the warfighter, this report discusses to what extent DOD (1) is developing ORS to support warfighter requirements and (2) has a plan that integrates ORS into existing DOD and intelligence community processes and architecture. GAO reviewed and analyzed ORS planning documents, the ORS concept of operations, and processes for meeting warfighter needs and also interviewed defense and intelligence community officials who are involved with the ORS concept.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD is making some progress in developing the ORS concept, but whether it will meet warfighter requirements is unclear, principally because the concept is in the early stages of development and not commonly understood by all members of the warfighter and national security space communities. Our prior work examining successful organizational transformations shows the need to communicate to stakeholders often and early and to clearly define specific objectives. Since the Joint ORS Office was established in May 2007, it has developed a process for converting warfighter needs into formal requirements and identifying potential ORS solutions. Moreover, DOD issued the ORS Implementation Plan in April 2008 and is also developing new ORS guidance documents. However, GAO found disparity in stakeholder understanding of the ORS concept within the warfighter and national security space communities. This disparity exists because DOD has not clearly defined key elements of the ORS concept and has not effectively communicated the concept with key stakeholders. For example, initial ORS planning documents are broad and lack the specificity needed to guide the ORS concept, according to some members of the warfighter and national security space communities. Moreover, officials from the intelligence community were concerned about DOD's lack of consultation and communication with them regarding the ORS concept. Without having a well-defined and commonly understood concept, DOD's ability to fully meet warfighter needs may be hampered. DOD has acknowledged the need to integrate ORS into existing DOD and intelligence community processes and architecture, but it has not fully addressed how it will achieve this integration. The 1999 DOD Space Policy states that an integrated national security space architecture that addresses defense and intelligence missions shall be developed to the maximum extent feasible in order to minimize unnecessary duplication of missions. DOD plans to begin integrating any new ORS processes or systems that are developed for ORS sometime between 2010 and 2015. However, integrating national security space systems can be a complex activity, involving many entities within DOD and the intelligence community. GAO previously reported that DOD's existing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) processes activities already face significant integration challenges, and adding new ORS systems into the existing ISR enterprise will increase the challenges of an already complex and challenging environment. Given the concept's immaturity, members of the national security space community have raised concerns about how the ORS concept will be integrated with existing DOD and intelligence processes and architecture, and voiced concerns about being burdened by an additional new requirements process specific to ORS. Nonetheless, as GAO described earlier, DOD is developing a process unique to ORS for submitting ORS warfighter requirements. The complexity of the national security space environment calls for DOD to begin to adequately plan integration of the ORS concept now to help ensure that DOD avoids the risk of duplicative efforts and wasted resources.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) depends on space assets to support a  wide range of military missions to include intelligence collection;  battlefield surveillance and management; global command, control, and  communications; and navigation assistance. This operational dependence  on space has placed new and increasing demands on current space  systems and organizations to meet Joint Force Commanders’ needs.  Moreover, the potential for emerging threats could affect the United  States’ and other countries’ access to the free use of space.
The Director of Space Policy in the Office of the Undersecretary of  Defense for Policy explained that the 2004 U.S. Space Transportation  Policy calls for demonstrating an initial capability for operationally  responsive access to and use of space to support national security  requirements before 2010. This includes demonstrating the capacity to  respond to unexpected loss or degradation of selected capabilities or  providing timely availability of tailored or new capabilities or both. In that  regard, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of  Central Intelligence, shall develop the requirements and concept of  operations for launch vehicles, infrastructure, and spacecraft to provide  operationally responsive access to and use of space to support national  security. DOD designated Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) as the  concept to implement one of the policy goals contained in the U.S. Space  Transportation Policy. DOD defines ORS as assured space power focused  on timely satisfaction of Joint Force Commanders’ needs.
In the conference report accompanying the John Warner National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress made a finding that  access to and use of space are critical to preserving and protecting U.S.  national security. The Act required the Secretary of Defense to establish an  Operationally Responsive Space Program Office within DOD whose  mission is (1) to contribute to the development of low-cost, rapid-reaction  payloads, buses, spacelift, and launch-control capabilities in order to  fulfill joint military operational requirements for on-demand space support  and reconstitution and (2) to coordinate and execute operationally  responsive space efforts across DOD with respect to planning, acquisition,  and operations. The Joint ORS Office, located at Kirtland Air Force Base,  New Mexico, was officially activated in May 2007.
In the warfighter and national security space communities, U.S. Strategic  Command is responsible for establishing overall operational requirements  while the services are responsible for meeting those requirements. The Air  Force is DOD’s primary procurer and operator of space systems. The Army  controls a defense satellite communications system and operates ground  mobile terminals. The Navy procures DOD narrowband satellite  communications capability and operates several space systems that  contribute to surveillance, meteorology, and warning. The National  Reconnaissance Office designs, procures, and operates space systems  dedicated to intelligence activities. The National Security Space Office  facilitates the integration and coordination of defense, intelligence, civil,  and commercial space activities. The Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is responsible for  various DOD initiatives to improve the department’s acquisition processes  and management of investments. The Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Intelligence exercises policy and strategic oversight over all  defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security plans and programs,  including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
We reviewed aspects of the ORS concept in 2006 and determined that DOD  needed a departmentwide strategy for pursuing low cost, responsive  tactical capabilities—both satellite and launch—for the warfighter, and to  identify corresponding funding. Subsequently, the John Warner National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 directed DOD to submit a  report that sets forth a plan for DOD acquisition of ORS capabilities to  support military users and military operations. This plan was submitted to  Congress in April 2007. We also reviewed DOD’s development of a higher- level strategy to guide the ORS concept, as well as other future space  efforts, and issued a report regarding the need for the Secretary of Defense  and the Director of National Intelligence to identify and resolve any  remaining differences of opinion and issue a National Security Space  Strategy. Moreover, we recently reported on the status of DOD’s progress  to date in implementing the ORS concept and assessing associated  challenges. In that report, we recommended that the Secretary of the Air  Force develop an investment plan to guide the Joint ORS Office as it  works to meet urgent needs and develops a technological foundation to  meet future needs. Given the potential for ORS to change how DOD  acquires and fields space capabilities to support the warfighter, for this  report, we determined to what extent DOD (1) is developing ORS to  support warfighter requirements, and (2) has a plan that integrates ORS  into existing DOD and intelligence community processes and architecture.
To determine whether ORS is being developed to support warfighter needs  and the extent to which DOD has a plan that integrates ORS into existing  DOD and intelligence community processes and architecture, we reviewed  and analyzed ORS planning documents, the ORS concept of operations  and processes for meeting warfighter needs. We also interviewed defense  and intelligence community officials that are involved with the ORS  concept, including the Undersecretaries of Defense for Policy and  Intelligence, the National Security Space Office, U.S. Strategic Command,  the Joint ORS Office, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Office of the  Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, and the  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
We have conducted our performance audit from June 2007 through July  2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. More detailed information  on our scope and methodology is provided in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Challenges in global political affairs have placed increasing demands on  the way the United States uses space capabilities to achieve national  security objectives. DOD’s space network is expected to play an  increasingly important role in military operations. Yet in each major  conflict over the past decade, senior military commanders have reported  shortfalls in tactical space capabilities, such as those intended to provide  communications and imagery data to the warfighter. To provide short-term  tactical capabilities as well as identify and implement long-term solutions  to developing low-cost satellites, DOD initiated the ORS concept. The ORS  concept aims to quickly deliver low-cost, short-term tactical capabilities to  address unmet needs of the warfighter. Unlike traditional large satellite  programs, the ORS concept is intended to address only a small number of  unmet tactical needs—one or two—with each delivery of capabilities. It is  not designed to replace current satellite capabilities or major space  programs in development. Rather, the ORS concept has long-term goals of  reducing the cost of space development by fostering low cost launch  methods as well as common design and interface methods.
The ORS concept is based on three tiers, as shown in figure 1, that are  distinguished by the means to achieve the effects as well as the length of  time required to deliver ORS capabilities. According to DOD, the timelines  may not be possible at the outset, but will remain an important goal as the  ORS program matures. The Joint ORS Office plans to focus on fielding Tier  2 and 3 space capabilities and when directed, support the achievement of  Tier 1 response times in coordination with other members of the  warfighter and national security space communities. ORS solutions can be  derived from ORS activities from more than one tier.
The Joint ORS Office has intentionally been limited in size, and therefore it  will rely on existing space organizations for specific ORS support and  execution activities. Capabilities developed under the ORS concept will be  complementary to other fielded space capabilities. With a focus on  augmenting, reconstituting, and filling unanticipated gaps in U.S. space  capabilities, ORS aims to provide a critical capability for the United States  to maintain the asymmetric advantage it has derived from its space-based  capabilities over potential adversaries.
section_title: DOD Is Making Progress in Developing the ORS Concept to Meet Warfighter Needs, but the Concept Is in the Early Stages of Development and Not Commonly Understood
paragraphs: DOD has taken several steps to develop the ORS concept to meet  warfighter needs; however, the concept is still in the early stages of its  development and not commonly understood by all members of the  warfighter and national security space communities. DOD has developed a  process for converting warfighter needs into formal requirements and  identifying potential ORS solutions. In April 2008, DOD issued an  Implementation Plan and continues to draft instructions and guidance to  further clarify ORS and how it can meet warfighter needs. In spite of this  progress, common understanding of the ORS concept is lacking because  DOD has not clearly defined key elements of the ORS concept and has not  effectively communicated the concept to key stakeholders.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Made Some Progress in Developing the ORS Concept
paragraphs: DOD has made some progress in developing the ORS concept. Since the  Joint ORS Office was established in May 2007, it has developed a process  that converts warfighter needs into formal requirements and potential ORS  solutions. DOD also issued an Implementation Plan in April 2008 and  continues to develop further ORS guidance.
subsections: section_title: Process to Identify ORS Solutions Has Been Developed
paragraphs: DOD has established a process that converts a warfighter need into formal  requirements and identifies potential ORS solutions for those  requirements. As shown in figure 2, the ORS Requirements and Solutions  Generation process begins when a Joint Force Commander or other user  submits a capability need to U.S. Strategic Command.
During the requirements development phase and the solutions  development phase, teams are assembled from across the warfighter and  national security space communities by the designated lead for the  respective phases. At this time, the Joint ORS Office has asked Air Force  Space Command to facilitate the requirements development phase and  has asked the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center to facilitate  the solutions development phase. The solutions development phase can  begin before the formal Capability Requirements Document is delivered.  The Joint Force Commander or other user who submitted the need has  multiple opportunities to provide input throughout the ORS Requirements  and Solutions Generation process to ensure that the solutions being  considered will actually fit the need.
At the time of this report, one warfighter need has completed the ORS  Requirements and Solutions Generation process and two other warfighter  needs are in process. The need that has completed the process was a  request to augment global ultra-high-frequency communications. The Joint  ORS Office received the need from U.S. Strategic Command on September  14, 2007, and the initial solutions were presented to the Commander of  U.S. Strategic Command on October 17, 2007. The second need is a  classified space situational awareness need. Possible solutions for the  second need have also been presented to the Commander of U.S. Strategic  Command and the DOD Executive Agent for Space for approval.  According to the Deputy Director of the Joint ORS Office, after completing  the process, there was some question whether a space-based capability  was the best way to meet the need. He said that the DOD Executive Agent  for Space has asked for more information and the potential solutions are  now in senior leadership review. A third need for an ISR capability has  begun the ORS Requirements and Solutions Generation process. As of the  end of May 2008, this need has completed the requirements development  phase of the ORS Requirements and Solutions Generation process.
section_title: The ORS Implementation Plan Has Been Released and Additional Guidance Documents Are Currently Being Developed
paragraphs: In July 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the DOD Executive  Agent for Space to develop by October 15, 2007, an ORS Implementation  Plan to guide ORS activities. The DOD Executive Agent for Space did not  meet this deadline, but the plan was issued April 28, 2008. The ORS  Implementation Plan identifies the DOD processes and staffing resources  required to meet ORS needs, and outlines the elements necessary to  implement the ORS concept as well as serving as the initial charter for the  Joint ORS Office. Additionally, the Deputy Secretary of Defense required  the military departments to assign personnel to fully staff the Joint ORS  Office no later than August 1, 2008, and to establish dedicated funding for  ORS beginning in fiscal year 2010.
In addition to issuing the implementation plan, three ORS guidance  documents are currently being drafted, but no timeline has been  established for their completion. First, U.S. Strategic Command is drafting  an update to its Initial ORS Concept of Operations that is intended to make  the initial concept of operations shorter and more concise, to clarify the  services’ roles and responsibilities, and to provide more information on  ORS capabilities, including who will be able to operate them. Second,  DOD is drafting an instruction to assign responsibilities and to prescribe  procedures for Joint Force Commanders to submit urgent operational  needs for a possible ORS solution. Third, U.S. Strategic Command is  drafting an instruction that is designed to assign responsibilities for ORS  within U.S. Strategic Command and its supporting Joint Functional  Component Commands. According to U.S. Strategic Command officials,  this instruction will implement and expand upon the guidance found in the  DOD instruction mentioned above. U.S. Strategic Command’s instruction  will also detail the procedures the command will use to prioritize  warfighter needs. According to a U.S. Strategic Command document,  factors that will be taken into consideration for prioritization include:   (1) the operational relevance of the need, (2) the degree of urgency of the  need and how soon the need must be satisfied, (3) whether the need has a  potential space solution, (4) the technical feasibility of the need,   (5) whether ORS resources can address the need, and (6) whether ORS is  the best choice of all possible means to address the need.
section_title: The ORS Concept Is in the Early Stages of Development
paragraphs: Most ORS efforts are in their initial phases and thus it is too early to judge  their success. According to the ORS Implementation Plan, the Joint ORS  Office will accomplish its objectives over time in a “crawl, walk, and run,”  approach. At this time, the ORS concept is still in the “crawl” phase which  means that the warfighter is getting involved with the ORS concept and the  focus of ORS efforts is on demonstrating building blocks for later efforts,  conducting experiments, and determining what can be accomplished with  current assets. “Walking” would be characterized as the evolution of the  ORS concept into a warfighter-driven concept with selected capabilities  tied to gaps and integrated within the existing architecture. The ORS  Implementation Plan states that this phase would not begin until  approximately 2010. A “run” would involve a full range of space effects  delivered when and where needed and is expected to begin in  approximately 2015. The former Deputy Commander of U.S. Strategic  Command told us that he expects the current tactical satellites to propel  the ORS concept to somewhere between a walk and a run.
section_title: A Common Understanding of the ORS Concept Is Lacking
paragraphs: Key stakeholders do not share a common understanding of the ORS  concept for two primary reasons—the ORS concept is not clearly defined  in its initial guidance documents and DOD has not adequately  communicated the concept to key stakeholders. As a result, stakeholders  throughout the warfighter and national security space communities do not  share a common understanding of the ORS concept.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Not Clearly Defined the ORS Concept
paragraphs: DOD has not documented a clear definition of the ORS concept and as a  result key stakeholders in the warfighter and national security space  communities do not share a common understanding of the concept. Our  prior work examining successful organizational transformations shows the  necessity to communicate clearly defined goals and specific objectives to  key stakeholders. Initial ORS planning documents—the Plan for ORS and  the Initial Concept of Operations—are broad and lack the specificity  needed to guide the ORS concept, according to some members of the  warfighter and national security space communities. For example, the  associate director of the National Security Space Office said that the Plan  for ORS addressed the eight areas required by the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 in only a broad sense. Moreover, an  official from one combatant command said that the Initial Concept of  Operations was not well-defined, and officials from another combatant  command told us that the concept of operations was really more of a  vision statement.
We found several examples of a lack of clarity within these initial  documents. First, the Initial ORS Concept of Operations states that ORS is  focused on the timely satisfaction of the urgent needs of the Joint Force  Commanders, but it does not adequately define what constitutes “urgent.”  Additionally, the approach presented in the April 2007 Plan for ORS for  enhancing the responsiveness of space systems is to implement ORS to  develop more affordable, small systems that can be deployed in  operationally relevant time frames, but does not clarify what is meant by  “operationally relevant time frames.” According to the Plan for ORS and  the Initial Concept of Operations, some ORS solutions could take up to 1  year to execute. Officials in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense  for Policy questioned whether these time frames could really meet an  urgent need. Additionally, officials from one combatant command told us  that a time frame of 1 year to get a need met would not be considered  responsive enough for them unless a satellite was already in orbit so that  they could task it directly. Based on these examples, key stakeholders are  not operating under a common understanding regarding the time frames  for ORS. Moreover, key stakeholders in the intelligence community have  said that they are not sure which operational needs or urgent needs the  ORS concept is to satisfy.
Additionally, at the time of our review, other guidance documents needed  to clarify the ORS concept had not yet been developed. The August 2007  memorandum from the DOD Executive Agent for Space directed the Joint  ORS Office to develop an ORS Strategy, an ORS Road Map, and an ORS  Program Plan in addition to the ORS Implementation Plan. The Deputy  Director of the ORS Office said that they decided to complete the ORS  Implementation Plan before writing the other documents so that it could  guide the development of the other required documents. Now that the ORS  Implementation Plan has been released, he said that they will need to get  more guidance from the DOD Executive Agent for Space regarding what  specific information should be included in the remaining documents.
section_title: DOD Has Not Communicated Effectively with Key Stakeholders
paragraphs: DOD has not effectively communicated with key stakeholders or engaged  them regarding the ORS concept. Our prior work examining successful  organizational transformations shows the need to adopt a communication  strategy that provides a common framework for conducting consistent and  coordinated outreach within and outside its organization often and early  and seeks to genuinely engage all stakeholders in the organization’s  transformation. However, DOD did not initially involve the geographic  combatant commands in the development of the ORS concept. For  example, officials from one geographic combatant command told us that  they did not have any input into the development of the Initial Concept of  Operations for ORS and were not involved in any of the ORS working  groups. These officials were concerned that failing to involve the  geographic combatant commands in the ORS concept development would  lead to new capabilities that drive warfighter requirements instead of  warfighter requirements determining how to develop ORS capabilities.  Additionally, officials from a functional combatant command told us that  key ORS meetings took place in August 2007 but they were not invited to  participate and neither were the geographic combatant commands. These  officials were concerned that failing to invite these combatant commands  to the meetings might result in the development of requirements that really  do not benefit the warfighter.
The first extensive outreach to the combatant commands was in  preparation for the November 2007 ORS Senior Warfighters Forum, which  took place 6 months after the standup of the Joint ORS Office. A senior  space planner, who is the lead for ORS for one combatant command, told  us that during preparatory briefings for the ORS Senior Warfighters  Forum, participants were told that the purpose of the forum would be to  learn what space capabilities the combatant commands needed that ORS  might be able to address. However, after a couple of briefings, he learned  that the purpose of the ORS Senior Warfighters Forum had shifted to that  of educating the combatant commands on the ORS process and how to get  an ORS capability. The senior space planner explained that rather than  asking the warfighter what they need, the focus was now on placing their  needs into a process that had already been developed. This same  combatant command official told us that no clear answers were provided  to questions asked at the ORS Senior Warfighters Forum regarding the  submission of warfighter needs or how these needs would be prioritized  and, as of the end of February 2008, they had received no updates from  U.S. Strategic Command on any of the issues discussed at the forum.  Similarly, an intelligence agency official told us that no consensus was  reached during the forum and very little concrete information was relayed  regarding how ORS will be used in the future.
Officials from various commands called for better communication  strategies to enhance their understanding of the ORS concept. Various  geographic combatant command officials we spoke with generally said  that U.S. Strategic Command should increase its ORS outreach activities  (e.g., visits, briefings, and education) to reach more staff throughout the  commands and services. The Chief of Staff at the U.S. Strategic Command  Joint Functional Component Command for Space acknowledged that  outreach activities need to be completed with the combatant commands  so that they can better understand how future ORS capabilities can benefit  their area of operation. Officials from U.S. Strategic Command  acknowledged that they had not done a good job of educating the  combatant commands on the ORS concept in its early days. However, the  Deputy Director of the ORS Office told us that one of the responsibilities  of one of the division chiefs who arrived in March 2008 at the Joint ORS  Office will be to reach out to the combatant commands and engage the  warfighter on the ORS concept.
Additionally, DOD has not communicated well with the intelligence  community regarding the ORS concept. Officials from the National  Security Agency said that they are very concerned about the lack of  consultation that has been done with the intelligence community regarding  the ORS concept. Officials from the National Geospatial-Intelligence  Agency also said that they believe that communication with the  intelligence community regarding the ORS concept has been insufficient.  However, both agencies acknowledged that communication between DOD  and the intelligence community has improved since they started working  together on tactical satellites, but their concerns regarding communication  remain.
While the U.S. Strategic Command and the Joint ORS Office have taken  some steps to promote the ORS concept such as the November 2007 ORS  Senior Warfighters Forum, directing one of the Joint ORS Office division  chiefs to reach out to the combatant commands, and engaging the  intelligence community on the tactical satellites, they have not developed  a consistent and comprehensive outreach strategy. The lack of a clearly  defined ORS concept and effective outreach to the stakeholders has  affected the acceptance and understanding of the ORS concept throughout  the warfighter and national security space communities. Without a  complete and clearly articulated concept that is well communicated with  key stakeholders, DOD could encounter difficulties in fully implementing  the ORS concept and may miss opportunities to meet warfighter needs.
section_title: DOD Plans to Integrate ORS into Existing DOD and Intelligence Processes and Architecture, but Has Not Identified How It Will Accomplish This
paragraphs: DOD has recognized the need to integrate the ORS concept into the  warfighter and national security space communities’ processes and  architecture, but it has not yet determined specific steps for achieving  integration. DOD does not plan to begin integrating the ORS concept in  accordance with the 1999 DOD Space Policy until between 2010 and 2015.  However, integrating space systems is a complex activity that involves  many entities inside DOD and the intelligence community and may take  more time to accomplish than expected. Therefore, taking incremental  steps as the ORS concept matures may help the Joint ORS Office to  achieve timely integration and help assure that warfighter requirements  will be met. Senior ORS officials have told us that the ORS concept is still  too new to begin its integration, but combatant command and intelligence  community officials are concerned about how the ORS concept will be  integrated into their existing processes for submitting warfighter needs  and processing ISR data.
According to the 1999 DOD Space Policy, an integrated national security  space architecture that addresses defense and intelligence missions shall  be developed to the maximum extent feasible in order to eliminate  programs operating in isolation of one another and minimize unnecessary  duplication of missions and functions and to achieve efficiencies. This  policy also directs the Secretaries of the Military Departments and  Combatant Commanders to integrate space capabilities and applications  into their plans, strategies, and operations. In order to be consistent with  DOD Space Policy, new processes or systems developed under the ORS  concept should be integrated into all facets of DOD’s strategy, doctrine,  education, training, exercises and operations. DOD has acknowledged that  the ORS concept needs to be integrated and one of the goals in the ORS  Implementation Plan is to integrate the ORS concept into the existing  space architecture between 2010 and 2015.
Given the complex environment of the warfighter and national security  space communities, changes that affect one organization can have an  effect on integrating national security space systems, and may take longer  than anticipated. We previously reported that DOD is often presented with  different and sometimes competing organizational cultures and funding  arrangements, and separate requirements processes among the agencies  involved in the defense and national space communities. This complex  environment has prevented DOD from reaching some of its past  integration goals. For example, in 2005, changes at the National  Reconnaissance Office resulted in the removal of National Reconnaissance  Office personnel and funding from the National Security Space Office, and  restricted the National Security Space Office’s access to a classified  information-sharing network, thereby inhibiting efforts to further integrate  defense and national space activities—including ISR activities—that had  been recommended by the Space Commission. If the Joint ORS Office  does not successfully integrate the ORS concept into the existing space  architecture within established time frames, this may result in a lack of  coordination among various members of the warfighter and national  security space communities.
Officials from the Joint ORS Office and U.S. Strategic Command  acknowledged that they have not yet determined how any future ORS  processes and systems will be integrated into existing national security  space processes and systems, because the concept is still too new for  them to determine the best way to achieve integration. Furthermore, the  ORS Implementation Plan states that the Joint ORS Office will be working  with the military departments and appropriate agencies to prepare for a  smooth transition of systems when they are developed and acquired by the  Joint ORS Office. However, the Joint ORS Office does not yet have any  new space capabilities to be transitioned. Senior ORS officials told us that  they cannot develop a comprehensive plan for the integration of ORS  processes into existing DOD and intelligence community processes and  architecture until they know more about the nature of ORS capabilities  that they will be able to develop.
Moreover, U.S. Strategic Command officials said that integration of new  systems will have to take place on a case-by-case basis depending on the  type of capability that is developed. They also said that it is conceivable  that in certain situations, integrating some ORS solutions might not be the  most cost-effective and efficient way to provide an urgent capability to a  warfighter. For example, some of the architecture for addressing ISR  needs requires high levels of data classification. If a warfighter had a need  that could be met at a lower classification level than a particular ISR  system would allow, it might be faster and less expensive to not integrate  that particular ORS capability in order to preserve a lower classification of  the data obtained and avoid the expense and complications associated  with processing data with higher classifications.
For these reasons, DOD has not laid out any specific steps toward the  longer-term goal of integrating the ORS concept into the existing space  architecture, which has raised some concern within the warfighter and  national security space communities about the possible creation of  unnecessary duplicative processes. For example, combatant command  officials told us that they are already burdened by multiple processes for  submitting their warfighter requirements. They emphasized that any  processes developed for submitting ORS requirements should be  integrated into existing requirements submission processes so as not to  require a new process for them to learn to use and manage. However, the  Deputy Director of the ORS Office said that the process of submitting ORS  requirements currently under development is a separate and parallel  process to existing methods of submitting warfighter needs and he does  not yet know how it will be integrated. He explained that the ORS concept  has only been tested with two warfighter needs so it is too soon for them  to determine how particular ORS processes—such as the requirements  submission process—will be integrated into existing warfighter  requirements processes. U.S. Strategic Command officials told us that in  the future, they envision receiving ORS requirements from multiple  existing processes already in place, but time is needed to allow the  concept to mature and develop before integration can be fully addressed.
Intelligence community officials also raised concerns about the  importance of using their current processes and architecture so as not to  create unnecessary duplicative processes to get data to the warfighter.  Furthermore, officials from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency  told us that their analysts cannot keep up with the data being collected  from existing space assets, and they do not know who will process  information from any new assets that might be developed under ORS.
DOD officials have acknowledged the need to integrate ORS into the  existing ISR enterprise; however, accomplishing this goal will be  especially challenging. We recently reported that DOD’s existing roadmap  for integrating current ISR capabilities does not provide DOD with a long- term comprehensive vision of the desired end state of the ISR enterprise.  We also reported that DOD has not been able to ensure that ISR  capabilities developed through existing processes are really the best  solutions to minimize inefficiency and redundancy. Therefore, it will be  difficult for the Joint ORS Office to reduce inefficiency by integrating its  processes and systems into the current ISR enterprise, which already faces  numerous integration challenges. The Deputy Director of the Joint ORS  Office said that the office has not yet determined how data collected by  any new ORS solutions developed for ISR needs will be integrated into  existing intelligence community back-end processes for analyzing and  distributing data collected from space assets.
Integrating the ORS concept will involve many agencies across the  warfighter and national security space communities and may take more  time than anticipated. If the integration of the ORS concept is not  adequately planned, DOD may not meet its time frames for integrating the  ORS concept. If the ORS concept is not integrated into the existing space  architecture as integration issues arise, the ORS concept could create  duplicative efforts resulting in wasted resources and inhibiting the ORS  concept’s ability to fully meet warfighter needs.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While DOD has taken a number of steps to advance the ORS concept and  to develop a process for providing ORS capabilities to the warfighter, its  ability to implement the concept will be limited until it more clearly  defines key aspects of the ORS concept and increases its outreach and  communication activities. Without a complete and clearly articulated  concept that is well communicated and practiced among key stakeholders,  DOD could encounter difficulties in fully implementing the ORS concept  and building the relationships necessary to ensure ORS’s success.  Furthermore, even though it may be too early to develop a comprehensive  plan for integrating ORS processes and systems into the existing national  security space architecture, DOD can identify the steps necessary to  achieve integration as the concept matures. Integrating the ORS concept  will be very challenging, especially as it pertains to ISR activities that will  have to be coordinated among many agencies across DOD and intelligence  community agencies. Identifying the incremental steps toward integration  could help DOD meet its time frames for integrating the ORS concept,  prevent the ORS concept from creating duplicative efforts, ensure that the  ORS concept meets warfighter needs, and ensure its future satellites are  adequately supported.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend the DOD Executive Agent for Space take the following  three actions:    Direct the Joint ORS Office, in consultation with U.S. Strategic Command,  to define ORS key terms including what qualifies as an urgent need, how  timely satisfaction of a need is evaluated, and what Joint Force  Commander needs the ORS concept is trying to satisfy.
Direct the Joint ORS Office, in consultation with U.S. Strategic Command,  to establish an ongoing communications and outreach approach for ORS  to help guide DOD’s efforts to promote, educate, and foster acceptance  among the combatant commands, military services, intelligence  community, and other DOD organizations.  In consultation with the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics and the Undersecretary of Defense for  Intelligence, and in cooperation with the military services, identify the  steps necessary to ensure the integration of the ORS concept into existing  DOD and intelligence community processes and architecture as the Joint  ORS Office continues its long-term planning of the ORS concept.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred  with our recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II.   The National Reconnaissance Office also provided technical comments,  which we incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to define ORS key  terms including what qualifies as an urgent need, how timely satisfaction  of a need is evaluated, and what Joint Force Commander needs the ORS  concept is trying to satisfy. In its comments, DOD stated that it codified  the definition of ORS on July 9, 2007, and U.S. Strategic Command  developed an Initial Concept of Operations containing additional terms  intended to further define and clarify ORS activities. However, our work  showed that the warfighter and intelligence community believe that key  ORS terms need to be better defined and clearer. As we stated in our  report, the initial guidance documents—such as the Plan for ORS and the  Initial Concept of Operations—are considered broad by users and lack the  specificity needed to guide the ORS concept. Based on our work, this has  led to a lack of a common understanding of the concept among the  warfighter and national security space communities. DOD also stated that  responsibility for providing overarching definitions and policy guidance  will remain with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,  and U.S. Strategic Command will continue to validate ORS requirements  and provide additional clarification, definition, and direction to the ORS  Office as the capability matures. However, our recommendation focuses  on the need for better-defined and clear ORS terms. Therefore, we  continue to believe that DOD should take additional steps now to define  and clarify ORS and provide more definition of key terms.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to establish an  ongoing communications and outreach approach for ORS to help guide  DOD’s efforts to promote, educate, and foster acceptance among the  combatant commands, military services, intelligence community, and  other DOD organizations. In its comments, DOD stated that  communicating a clear, concise message was vitally important to the  success of ORS and it is currently conducting outreach efforts in  numerous forums. We acknowledged DOD’s efforts to promote the ORS  concept in our report; however, despite these efforts, confusion regarding  the ORS concept persists. As stated in our report, the lack of a clear  definition combined with the lack of a consistent and comprehensive  outreach strategy has affected the acceptance and understanding of the  ORS concept throughout the warfighter and national security space  communities. DOD’s comments also stated that the burden of outreach  should not be placed solely upon the ORS Office and that all ORS  stakeholders will continue to play an active role in promoting and  fostering acceptance of the ORS concept. Apart from who is designated to  develop and implement it, our work showed that a comprehensive  communication and outreach approach or strategy that reflects agreed- upon definitions and direction for the ORS concept is needed or DOD  could encounter difficulties in fully implementing the ORS concept and  may miss opportunities to meet warfighter needs.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to identify the steps  necessary to ensure the integration of the ORS concept into existing DOD  and intelligence community processes and architecture as the Joint ORS  Office continues its long-term planning of the ORS concept. In its  comments, DOD stated that integration of ORS capabilities into current  processes and architecture will depend upon the value provided by the  current processes and architectures and that integration into existing  systems will be considered by the ORS Office as a matter of course. DOD  also stated that personnel assigned to the ORS Office from across DOD  and the intelligence community bring knowledge and experience that will  help to identify ways to selectively integrate ORS capabilities into current  systems, when appropriate, in order to streamline delivery of products to  the customers. However, based on our work, if integration of the ORS  concept is not timely and adequately planned, DOD may not meet its time  frames for integrating the ORS concept into the existing space architecture  between 2010 and 2015. Moreover, if the ORS concept is not developed  and integrated well in advance of launching future satellites, the ORS  concept could create duplicative efforts resulting in wasted resources and  inhibiting the ORS concept’s ability to fully meet warfighter needs.   Therefore, we believe our recommendation to take a more proactive  approach to integrating the ORS concept, once better defined and  communicated with the warfighter and national security space  community, continues to have merit.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the  Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Copies will be made available to others  upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on our  Web site at http://www.gao.gov/.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine whether the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concept  is being developed to support warfighter needs and the extent to which  DOD has a plan that integrates ORS into existing DOD and intelligence  community processes and architecture, we reviewed and analyzed ORS  planning documents, the ORS concept of operations, and ORS processes  for meeting warfighter needs. We also reviewed relevant legislation,  policies, and prior GAO reports. We interviewed officials at the U.S.  Strategic Command including the Joint Force Component Command for  Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and the Joint Force  Component Command for Space as well as officials from the Joint ORS  Office to discuss the progress of developing the ORS concept, the initial  ORS planning documents, outreach regarding the ORS concept, and plans  to integrate the ORS concept into the existing space architecture. We also  interviewed officials at Air Force Space Command and the Air Force  Space and Missile Systems Center to discuss the new process developed  for converting warfighter needs into formal requirements and potential  ORS solutions. In addition, we interviewed officials from the U.S. Central  Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S.  Southern Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command regarding  warfighter involvement in the creation of the ORS concept, the ability of  the ORS concept to meet warfighter needs, the degree of outreach  received regarding the ORS concept, and the integration of the ORS  concept into current processes for submitting warfighter needs. To discuss  issues regarding ORS capabilities that may address warfighter ISR needs  and the integration of these capabilities into current intelligence  community processes and systems, we interviewed officials from the  Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National  Security Agency. Furthermore, we interviewed officials from the Office of  the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the Office of the Undersecretary  of Defense for Intelligence, and the National Security Space Office to  discuss policy issues related to ORS. Finally, we interviewed officials from  U.S. Air Force Headquarters, U.S. Army Space Branch, the Air Force  Research Lab, and the Naval Research Lab to discuss service involvement  with the ORS concept and the tactical satellite experiments.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Lorelei St James, Assistant  Director; Grace Coleman; Jane Ervin; Amy Higgins; Enemencio Sanchez;  Kimberly Seay; Jay Spaan; Matthew Tabbert; Karen Thornton; and Amy  Ward-Meier made key contributions to this report.