Aviation Security: 9/11 Anniversary Observations on TSA's Progress and Challenges in Strengthening Aviation Security
Published: 2012-09-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Securing commercial aviation operations remains a daunting task, with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of carry-on and checked baggage. The attempted terrorist bombing of Northwest flight 253 on December 25, 2009, and the October 2010 discovery of explosive devices in air cargo packages on an all-cargo aircraft bound for the United States from Yemen highlight the continuing need for effective passenger, cargo, and baggage screening. This statement discusses actions TSA has taken to (1) validate the scientific basis of its behavior-based passenger screening program (the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT); (2) strengthen the security of inbound air cargo (3) acquire checked baggage screening technology in accordance with established guidance; and (4) vet foreign nationals training at U.S. flight schools. This statement is based on GAO's work issued from September 2009 through July 2012, and includes selected updates on air cargo screening conducted from July through September 2012. For the selected updates, GAO interviewed TSA officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken actions to validate the science underlying its behavior-based passenger screening program, the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT, program, but more work remains. GAO reported in May 2010 that (1) TSA deployed SPOT before first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance indicators to reliably identify passengers who may pose a risk; and (2) it is unknown if the SPOT program has ever resulted in the arrest of anyone who is a terrorist, or who was planning to engage in terrorist related activity, although there is other evidence that terrorists have transited through SPOT airports. GAO recommended in May 2010 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) convene an independent panel of experts to review the methodology of the ongoing validation study on the SPOT program to determine whether it is sufficiently comprehensive to validate the program. DHS concurred and subsequently revised its validation study to include an independent expert review. DHS's study, completed in April 2011, found that SPOT was more effective than random screening to varying degrees; however, DHS noted limitations to the study, such as that it was not designed to comprehensively validate whether SPOT can be used to reliably identify individuals who pose a security risk. GAO is currently reviewing the program and will issue our report next year. TSA has taken actions to enhance the security of cargo on inbound aircraft, but challenges remain. For example, TSA issued new screening requirements aimed at enhancing the security of cargo on aircraft, such as prohibiting the transport of air cargo on passenger aircraft from Yemen. In June 2010, GAO recommended that TSA develop a mechanism to verify the accuracy of all screening data. TSA concurred in part and required air carriers to report inbound cargo screening data, but has not yet fully addressed the recommendation. In June 2012, TSA required air carriers to screen 100 percent of inbound air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by December 3, 2012. However, air carriers and TSA face challenges in implementing this requirement and in providing reasonable assurance that screening is being conducted at reported levels. DHS and TSA have experienced difficulties establishing acquisition program baselines, schedules, and cost estimates for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP). For example, GAO reported in July 2011 that TSA had established a schedule for the acquisition of the explosives detection systems (EDS) TSA deploys to screen checked baggage, but it did not fully comply with leading practices. GAO recommended that DHS develop and maintain a schedule for the EBSP in accordance with leading practices. DHS concurred. GAO reported in July 2012 that TSA has worked to enhance general aviation security, such as though issuing regulations, but there are weaknesses in its process for vetting foreign flight school student applicants, and in DHS's process for identifying flight school students who may be in the country illegally. For example, TSA's program to help determine whether flight school students pose a security threat does not determine whether they entered the country legally. GAO recommended actions that DHS and TSA could take to address these concerns, with which DHS and TSA have concurred, and are starting to take actions.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making any new recommendations. GAO has previously recommended that TSA take actions to improve aviation security. In general, TSA concurred with the recommendations, and is taking actions to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on the  anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to discuss our  work examining key layers of aviation security: (1) the Transportation  Security Administration’s (TSA) behavior-based passenger screening  program; (2) the security of air cargo on flights bound for the United  States from foreign countries (known as inbound air cargo); (3) the  deployment of checked baggage screening technology; and (4) the  federal government’s vetting process for individuals training at U.S. flight  schools. This work may help inform future deliberations about any  potential challenges and corrective actions regarding U.S. aviation  security.
In the years that have passed since TSA assumed responsibility for  aviation security, TSA has spent billions of dollars and implemented a  wide range of initiatives to strengthen aviation security. Our work has  shown that TSA has enhanced aviation security with respect to  passenger, checked baggage, and air cargo screening, among other  areas. Securing commercial aviation operations, however, remains a  daunting task—with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and  thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and their  property, as well as cargo. The attempted terrorist bombing of Northwest  flight 253 on December 25, 2009, and the October 2010 discovery of  explosive devices in air cargo packages on an all-cargo aircraft bound for  the United States from Yemen provides a vivid reminder that civil aviation  remains an attractive terrorist target and highlights the continuing need for  effective passenger, cargo, and baggage screening. According to the  President’s National Counterterrorism Strategy, released in June 2011,  aviation security and screening is an essential tool in our ability to detect,  disrupt, and defeat plots to attack the homeland.
My statement today discusses actions TSA has taken to (1) validate the  scientific basis of its behavior-based passenger screening program  (known as the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques, or  SPOT program), (2) strengthen the security and screening of inbound air  cargo, (3) acquire checked baggage screening technology in accordance  with established guidance, and (4) vet foreign nationals seeking to  undertake flight training at U.S. flight schools,associated with implementing these actions.  as well as the challenges  This statement is based on our prior work issued from May 2010 through  July 2012, and includes selected updates conducted from July 2012  through September 2012 on TSA’s efforts to improve security of inbound  air cargo. Our previously published products contain additional details on  the scope and methodology, including data reliability, for these reviews.  For the updated information on air cargo screening, we obtained TSA  views on our findings and incorporated technical comments where  appropriate. We conducted our work in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Aviation and Transportation Security Act established TSA as the  federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the nation’s civil  aviation system, which includes the screening of all passenger and  property transported by commercial passenger aircraft.  At the more than  450 TSA-regulated airports in the United States, prior to boarding an  aircraft, all passengers, their accessible property, and their checked  baggage are screened pursuant to TSA-established procedures. TSA  relies upon multiple layers of security to deter, detect, and disrupt persons  posing a potential risk to aviation security. These layers include behavior  detection officers (BDOs), who examine passenger behaviors and  appearances to identify passengers who might pose a potential security  risk at TSA-regulated airports; travel document checkers, who examine  tickets, passports, and other forms of identification; transportation security  officers (TSO), who are responsible for screening passengers and their  carry-on baggage at passenger checkpoints using x-ray equipment,  magnetometers, Advanced Imaging Technology, and other devices, as  well as for screening checked baggage; random employee screening; and  checked baggage screening systems. The Implementing  Recommendations of 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 further mandates that  the Secretary of Homeland Security establish a system to screen 100  percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft, and defines screening  for purposes of meeting this mandate, in general, as a physical  examination or the use of nonintrusive methods to assess whether cargo  poses a threat to transportation security. Such cargo ranges in size from  1 pound to several tons and ranges in type from perishable commodities  to machinery.  In 2011, all-cargo carriers transported approximately 66  percent (6.9 billion pounds) of the total cargo (10.4 billion pounds)  transported to the United States. Additionally, TSA has responsibilities  for general aviation security, and developed the Alien Flight Student  Program (AFSP) to help determine whether foreign students enrolling at  flight schools pose a security threat. U.S. government threat  assessments have discussed plans by terrorists to use general aviation  aircraft to conduct attacks. Further, analysis conducted on behalf of TSA  has indicated that larger general aviation aircraft may be able to cause  significant damage to buildings and other structures.
section_title: TSA Has Taken Actions to Validate the Science Underlying Its Behavior Detection Program, but More Work Remains
paragraphs: We reported in May 2010 that TSA deployed SPOT nationwide before  first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using  behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably identifying  passengers who may pose a risk to the U.S. aviation system.
According to TSA, SPOT was deployed before a scientific validation of  the program was completed to help address potential threats to the  aviation system, such as those posed by suicide bombers. TSA also  stated that the program was based upon scientific research available at  the time regarding human behaviors. We reported in May 2010 that  approximately 14,000 passengers were referred to law enforcement  officers under SPOT from May 2004 through August 2008. Of these  passengers, 1,083 were arrested for various reasons, including being  illegal aliens (39 percent), having outstanding warrants (19 percent), and  possessing fraudulent documents (15 percent). The remaining 27 percent  were arrested for other reasons such as intoxication, unruly behavior,  theft, domestic violence, and possession of prohibited items. As noted in  our May 2010 report, SPOT officials told us that it is not known if the  SPOT program has ever resulted in the arrest of anyone who is a  terrorist, or who was planning to engage in terrorist-related activity. More  recent TSA data covering the period from November 1, 2010, to April 18,  2012, indicates that SPOT referred 60,717 passengers for additional  screening, which resulted in 3,803 referrals to law enforcement officers  and 353 arrests. Of these 353 arrests, 23 percent were related to  immigration status, 23 percent were drug-related, 9 percent were related  to fraudulent documents, 22 percent were related to outstanding  warrants, and 28 percent were for other offenses.
A 2008 report issued by the National Research Council of the National  Academy of Sciences stated that the scientific evidence for behavioral  monitoring is preliminary in nature. The report also noted that an  information-based program, such as a behavior detection program,  should first determine if a scientific foundation exists and use scientifically  valid criteria to evaluate its effectiveness before deployment. The report  added that such programs should have a sound experimental basis and  that the documentation on the program’s effectiveness should be  reviewed by an independent entity capable of evaluating the supporting  scientific evidence.
As we reported in May 2010, an independent panel of experts could help  DHS determine if the SPOT program is based on valid scientific principles  that can be effectively applied in an airport environment for  counterterrorism purposes. Thus, we recommended that the Secretary of  Homeland Security convene an independent panel of experts to review  the methodology of DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate’s ongoing  validation study on the SPOT program being conducted to determine  whether the study’s methodology is sufficiently comprehensive to validate  the SPOT program. We also recommended that this assessment include  appropriate input from other federal agencies with expertise in behavior  detection and relevant subject matter experts. stated that its validation study, completed in April 2011, included input  from a broad range of federal agencies and relevant experts, including  those from academia.  DHS’s validation study found that SPOT was  more effective than random screening to varying degrees. For example,  the study found that SPOT was more effective than random screening at  identifying individuals who possessed fraudulent documents and  identifying individuals who law enforcement officers ultimately arrested.
See GAO-10-763.
According to DHS’s study, no other counterterrorism or screening  program incorporating behavior and appearance-based indicators is  known to have been subjected to such a rigorous, systematic evaluation  of its screening accuracy. However, DHS noted that the identification of  high-risk passengers was rare in both the SPOT and random tests. DHS’s  study also noted that the assessment was an initial validation step, and  was not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection can be used  to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment who pose a  security risk. According to DHS, further research will be needed to  comprehensively validate the program.
In addition, DHS determined that the base rate, or frequency, of SPOT  behavioral indicators observed by TSA to detect suspicious passengers  was very low and that these observed indicators were highly varied  across the traveling public. Although details about DHS’s findings related  to these indicators are sensitive security information, the low base rate  and high variability of traveler behaviors highlights the challenge that TSA  faces in effectively implementing a standardized list of SPOT behavioral  indicators. In addition, DHS outlined several limitations to the study. For  example, the study noted that BDOs were aware of whether individuals  they were screening were selected as the result of identified SPOT  indicators or random selection. DHS stated that this had the potential to  introduce bias into the assessment. DHS also noted that SPOT data from  January 2006 through October 2010 were used in its analysis of  behavioral indicators even though questions about the reliability of the  data exist.
The study made recommendations related to SPOT in three areas: (1) future validation  efforts, (2) comparing SPOT with other screening programs, and (3) broader program  evaluation issues. TSA designated the specific details of these recommendations  sensitive security information. program evaluation including a cost-benefit analysis, reiterate  recommendations made in our prior work. In March 2011, we reported  that Congress may wish to consider the study’s results in making future  funding decisions regarding the program. TSA is reviewing the study’s  findings and assessing the steps needed to address DHS’s  recommendations. If TSA decides to implement the recommendations in  the April 2011 DHS validation study, it may be years away from knowing  whether there is a scientifically valid basis for using behavior detection  techniques to help secure the aviation system against terrorist threats  given that the initial study took about 4 years to complete. We are  conducting a follow-on review of TSA’s behavior detection program, and  its related variant, the so-called “Assessor Program”, which incorporates  more extensive verbal interactions (“chat downs”) with the traveling  public. The Assessor program is currently being test piloted in Boston and  Detroit. Our follow-on report on this program will be issued early next  year.
section_title: DHS and TSA Have Taken Actions to Enhance the Security of Cargo on Inbound Aircraft, but Challenges Remain
paragraphs: DHS and TSA have taken four primary actions to enhance the security of  inbound cargo on passenger and all-cargo aircraft following the October  2010 bomb attempt originating in Yemen.
TSA issued new screening requirements aimed at enhancing  the security of cargo on passenger and all-cargo aircraft.  Beginning in October 2010, TSA imposed new risk-based security  procedures on passenger and all-cargo aircraft aimed at focusing more  detailed screening measures on high risk shipments and, among other  things, prohibited the transport of cargo on passenger aircraft from  Yemen and Somalia due to threats stemming from those areas.
DHS instituted working groups with air cargo industry stakeholders  to identify ways to enhance air cargo security. In January 2011, the  Secretary of Homeland Security established an Air Cargo Security  Working Group to obtain advice and consultations from air cargo security  stakeholders on ways to enhance the security of the air cargo system.The Air Cargo Security Working Group briefed the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection  (CBP), and the TSA Administrator in April 2011 on proposed solutions,  and recommended that TSA reevaluate the agency’s implementation  plan, timeline, and resources related to TSA’s program to recognize the  security programs of foreign countries, known as the National Cargo  Security Program (NCSP). According to TSA officials, participants of this  working group have reconvened as part of the Aviation Security Advisory  Committee, which held its first meeting in May 2012, and the committee  will meet again in mid-September 2012 to discuss the implementation of  the recommendations.
All-cargo express carriers and companies focus on transporting cargo under quick time  frames. up” and en route directly to the United States) from locations in North  America. Under the pilot program, however, participants provide  manifest data prior to loading cargo aboard aircraft.
TSA developed a program to recognize foreign air cargo security  programs. TSA has developed the NCSP recognition program to review  and recognize the air cargo security programs of foreign countries if TSA  deems those programs as providing a level of security commensurate  with TSA’s air cargo security standards. In May 2012, TSA recognized  Canada as providing a level of security commensurate with U.S. air cargo  security standards, and in June 2012, the agency recognized the  European Union and Switzerland as also providing this same level of   TSA officials  security based on the principle of “mutual recognition.” stated that the NCSP recognition program is a key effort in meeting the  100 percent screening mandate because it will eliminate the need for air  carriers to comply with two countries’ security programs.
Despite these actions, air carriers and TSA face three key challenges  that, among other things, could limit TSA’s ability to meet the 9/11  Commission Act mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on  passenger aircraft as it applies to inbound air cargo and to provide  reasonable assurance that screening is being conducted at reported  levels. All-cargo carriers subject to TSA regulation also reported facing  challenges in implementing new TSA screening requirements established  after the October 2010 Yemen incident.
TSA had previously recognized France and the United Kingdom as providing a level of  security commensurate with U.S. air cargo security standards. screen a certain percentage of all cargo. TSA proposed changes that  would require passenger air carriers to screen 100 percent of cargo as  part of its efforts to meet the 9/11 Commission Act mandate. Passenger  air carriers expressed concerns about being able to meet the 100 percent  screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo stating that it would  cause significant disruptions in the air cargo supply chain, among other  issues. In response to these concerns, TSA officials stated that they  revised the proposed requirements and issued new passenger security  requirements in June 2012. Agency officials said they plan to require air  carriers to screen 100 percent of inbound air cargo transported on  passenger aircraft by December 3, 2012.
GAO-10-446. data reported by air carriers, the agency has not yet fully met the intent of  the recommendation. It will be important for TSA to continue to work  towards ensuring verification of inbound air cargo screening data  submitted by air carriers and that inbound air cargo is screened in  accordance with the mandate.
Reporting screening data could facilitate oversight of all-cargo  carrier compliance requirements. TSA relies on data submitted by  passenger carriers to determine the amount of air cargo screened on  inbound passenger aircraft but there is no requirement for all-cargo  carriers to report comparable screening data to TSA, even though most of  the cargo shipped from abroad into the United States is shipped on all- cargo carriers. Thus, TSA does not know the extent to which all-cargo  carriers are screening cargo or meeting the enhanced screening  requirements introduced after the October 2010 incident in Yemen.  Officials from two global all-cargo carriers said that submitting such  information to TSA would be feasible because they are already collecting  this data internally, but officials from two other all-cargo carriers stated  that reporting screening data to TSA would be challenging because of  staffing limitations or because such data may not be available. TSA  officials said that TSA does not require that all-cargo carriers submit  screening data because it has focused its efforts on collecting data from  passenger air carriers in support of meeting the 100 percent mandate.  TSA officials stated that TSA may consider opportunities to capture  additional inbound air cargo information, but has not yet weighed the  costs and benefits of doing so because it has focused its efforts on  establishing the ACAS pilot program, which DHS established to more  readily indentify high-risk cargo. The pilot program is a key effort to  identify high-risk cargo prior to aircraft departing from foreign airports, but  is not intended to provide TSA with screening data, which if collected and  verified, could provide additional assurance that all-cargo carriers are  complying with TSA’s enhanced screening requirements. To help TSA  better determine what actions are needed, if any, to ensure that all-cargo  carriers are complying with the agency’s enhanced screening  requirements, we recommended in May 2012 that DHS assess the costs  and benefits of requiring all-cargo carriers to report data on screening  conducted.actions to address it.
section_title: DHS and TSA Have Experienced Difficulties Establishing Acquisition Program Baselines, Schedules, and Cost Estimates for Checked Baggage Screening Systems
paragraphs: TSA’s Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) reports that 76  percent of the airports (337 of 446) the agency regulates for security have  a mix of in-line and stand-alone baggage screening configurations that  best meet airport needs (i.e., optimal systems). Our prior work on TSA’s  checked baggage screening program—EBSP—identified a number of  shortcomings in DHS and TSA’s process for establishing program  baselines, program schedules, and cost estimates.
Acquisition program baselines. We found that realistic acquisition  program baselines with stable requirements for cost, schedule, and  performance are among the factors that are important to successful  acquisitions delivering capabilities within cost and schedule. Further, we  reported in April 2009 that program performance metrics for cost and  schedule can provide useful indicators of the health of acquisition  programs and, when assessed regularly for changes and the reasons that  cause changes, such indicators can be valuable tools for improving  insight and oversight of individual programs as well as the total portfolio of  major acquisitions.program baseline is the contract between the program and departmental  oversight officials and must be established at program start to document  the program’s expected cost, deployment schedule, and technical  performance. By tracking and measuring actual program performance  against this baseline, management can be alerted to potential problems,  such as cost growth or changing requirements, and has the ability to take  corrective action.
According to DHS’s acquisition guidance, the  We reported in April 2012 that TSA has not had a DHS-approved  acquisition program baseline for EBSP since the program’s inception  more than 8 years ago. Further, DHS did not require TSA to complete  an acquisition program baseline until November 2008. TSA officials said  they have twice submitted an acquisition program baseline to DHS for  approval—first in November 2009 and again February 2011. However,  according to DHS officials TSA did not have a fully developed life cycle  cost estimate. In November 2011, DHS told TSA that it needed to revise  the life cycle cost estimates as well as its procurement and deployment  schedules to reflect budget constraints. DHS officials told us that they  could not approve the acquisition program baseline as written because  TSA’s estimates were significantly over budget. An approved baseline will  provide DHS with additional assurances that TSA’s approach is  appropriate and that the capabilities being pursued are worth the  expected costs. TSA officials stated that TSA is working with DHS to  amend the draft program baseline and plans to resubmit a revised life  cycle cost estimates with a revised acquisition program baseline by  December 31, 2012. As we reported, establishing and approving a  program baseline, as DHS and TSA plan to do for the EBSP, could help  DHS assess the program’s progress in meeting its goals and achieve  better program outcomes.
Schedules. In July 2011, we reported that TSA had established a  schedule for the acquisition of the explosives detection systems (EDS)  TSA deploys to screen checked baggage, but it did not fully comply with  leading practices, and TSA had not developed a plan to upgrade its EDS  fleet to meet the 2010 explosives detection requirements. We noted that  some of TSA’s approximately 2,200 deployed systems met 2005  explosive requirements while the remainder met 1998 explosive detection  requirements.system acquisition, such as TSA’s EDS acquisition, depends in part on  having a reliable schedule that identifies when the program’s set of work  activities and milestone events will occur, amongst other things. We  reported that the schedule for the EDS acquisition is not reliable because  it does not include a timeline to deploy EDS or plans to procure EDS to  meet subsequent phases of explosive detection requirements. We stated  that developing a reliable schedule would help TSA better monitor and  oversee the progress of the EDS acquisition. DHS concurred with the  recommendation to develop and maintain a schedule for the entire EBSP  in accordance with the leading practices we identified for preparing a  schedule. DHS commented that TSA had already begun working with key  stakeholders to develop and define requirements for a schedule and to  ensure that the schedule aligns with the leading practices. In April 2012,   Leading practices state that the success of a large-scale  TSA stated that it had secured contractor resources to support  development of an integrated master schedule in accordance with our  and industry best practices, and that it anticipated completion of this  schedule by September 2013.
Cost estimates. In April 2012, we reported that TSA’s methods for  developing life cycle cost estimates for the EBSP did not fully adhere to  best practices for developing these estimates. We reported in March  2009 that a high-quality, reliable cost estimation process provides a  sound basis for making accurate and well-informed decisions about  resource investments, budgets, assessments of progress, and  accountability for results and thus is critical to the success of a program.  We reported that TSA’s estimates partially met three characteristics and  minimally met one characteristic of a reliable cost estimate.  DHS  concurred with the recommendation that TSA ensure that its life cycle  cost estimates conform to cost estimating best practices, and identified  efforts underway to address it.
section_title: TSA Established a Process for Vetting Foreign Flight Students but Weaknesses Remain
paragraphs: As we reported in July 2012, TSA has worked with industry and other  stakeholders to enhance general aviation security, such as issuing  regulations and enhancing outreach and awareness, but there are  weaknesses in the agency’s process for vetting foreign flight student  applicants and in DHS’s process for identifying flight students who may  be in the country illegally. We recommended two actions that DHS and  TSA could take to address these concerns, with which DHS concurred.
Vetting foreign flight student applicants. Under AFSP, foreign  nationals seeking flight training in the United States undergo a TSA  security threat assessment before receiving flight training to determine  whether each applicant is a security threat to the United States.  According to TSA officials, when a foreign national applies to AFSP to  obtain flight training, TSA uses information submitted by the foreign  national—such as name, date of birth, and passport information—to  conduct a criminal history records check, a review of the Terrorist  Screening Database, and a review of the Department of Homeland  Security’s TECS system. According to TSA officials, most foreign  nationals taking training from a U.S. flight training provider will apply for a  Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman certificate (pilot’s license)  once their flight training is completed. Information obtained by FAA as  part of this application for certification is placed in the airmen registry.  From January 2006 through September 2011, 25,599 foreign nationals  had applied for FAA airman certificates, indicating they had completed  flight training. However, TSA computerized matching of FAA data  determined that some known number of foreign nationals did not match  with those in TSA’s database, raising questions as to whether they had  been vetted.
Since 2009, TSA has vetted all new and existing FAA airman certificate  holders against the Terrorist Screening Database on an ongoing basis,  which would include the foreign nationals identified through TSA’s  analysis. However, this vetting does not occur until after the foreign  national has obtained flight training. Thus, foreign nationals obtaining  flight training with the intent to do harm—such as three of the pilots and  leaders of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks—could have already  obtained the training needed to operate an aircraft before they received  any type of vetting. We recommended that TSA take steps to identify  any instances where foreign nationals receive FAA airman certificates  without first undergoing a TSA security threat assessment and examine  those instances so that TSA can identify the reasons for these  occurrences and strengthen controls to prevent future occurrences. DHS  concurred with this recommendation and stated that TSA signed a  memorandum of understanding with FAA in February 2012 to help  address this issue. The memorandum outlines a process for FAA to  provide certain data from its airmen registry on a monthly basis and  authorizes TSA to use the data to ensure flight training providers are  providing TSA with information to conduct background checks prior to  flight instruction. This is an important step toward addressing the first part  of our recommendation, provided that TSA uses the data to identify  instances where foreign nationals receive FAA airman certificates without  first undergoing a TSA security threat assessment, identifies reasons for  these occurrences, and strengthens controls to prevent future  occurrences, as we recommended.
Identifying flight students entering the country illegally. We also  reported that AFSP is not designed to determine whether a foreign flight  student entered the country legally; thus, a foreign national can be  approved for training through AFSP after entering the country illegally. A  March 2010 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)  investigation of a flight school led to the arrest of six such foreign  nationals, including one who had a commercial pilot’s license. As a result,  TSA and ICE jointly worked on vetting names of foreign students against  immigration databases, but had not specified desired outcomes and time  frames, or assigned individuals with responsibility for fully instituting the  program as of July 2012. Thus, this weakness still exists today. Having a  road map, with steps and time frames, and assigning individuals the  responsibility for fully instituting a pilot program could help TSA and ICE  better identify and prevent potential risk. We recommended that TSA and  ICE develop a plan, with time frames, and assign individuals with  responsibility and accountability for assessing the results of their pilot  program to check TSA AFSP data against information DHS has on  applicants’ admissibility status to help detect and identify violations by  foreign flight students, and institute that pilot program if it is found to be  effective. DHS concurred and stated that TSA will prepare a plan by  December 2012 to assess the results of the pilot program with ICE to  determine the lawful status of the active AFSP population. We believe  that these are positive actions that could help TSA address the  weaknesses identified in our report. We will continue to monitor TSA’s  progress on the proposed solutions as the agency proceeds.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson-Lee, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I look forward to  responding to any questions that you may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Stephen M. Lord at  (202) 512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony  are Steve Morris, Assistant Director, and Michelle Woods, Analyst in  Charge. Additional contributors include David M. Bruno, Glenn Davis,  Jessica Lucas Judy; Assistant Directors; Joel Aldape; Adam Hoffman;  Susanna Kuebler; Thomas Lombardi; Lara Miklozek; Linda Miller; Daniel  Rodriguez; and Douglas Sloane.
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