Homeland Security: An Overall Strategy Is Needed to Strengthen Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry
Published: 2013-05-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: International animal health authorities have stated that disease surveillance in livestock and poultry has as its main purpose the early detection of diseases and disease outbreaks. APHIS has worked closely with states and industry over the past decades to eradicate diseases by, for example, providing states with funding and guidance. But the disease landscape has changed, with rapid global movement of humans and animals, creating new threats. GAO was asked to review federal animal disease surveillance efforts. This report examines (1) USDAs new approach to disease surveillance in light of a changing disease landscape and challenges, if any, the agency faces with this approach and (2) the extent to which this approach is guided by a strategy with measurable goals and supports broader national biosurveillance efforts. GAO reviewed relevant presidential directives, laws, regulations, guidance, policies, documents, and strategic plans related to disease surveillance in animals; visited swine facilities; and interviewed federal, state, and industry veterinarians and other officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Under a new approach, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has begun broadening its previous disease-by-disease approach to disease surveillance to one in which the agency monitors the overall health of livestock and poultry and uses additional sources and types of data to better detect and control new or reemerging diseases. APHIS's first effort under its new approach is to monitor the health of the nation's swine herds and identify new sources and types of data on diseases in swine, among other things. In planning documents, APHIS officials have proposed collecting data from farms where swine are raised, markets where they are sold, slaughter facilities, and veterinary diagnostic laboratories, among other sites. For example, APHIS has been monitoring for the presence of pseudorabies--a viral disease of swine that may cause respiratory illness and death--at slaughter facilities, but under the new approach, it has proposed monitoring these facilities for a range of other diseases as well. Key challenges to carrying out this new approach are how best to obtain data from producers, who are concerned that health information about their herds and flocks be kept confidential, and how to obtain health data in sufficient quantity from some animals like feral swine. Resource constraints also present a challenge, according to agency and state officials, given the recent decrease in APHIS's budget of about 14 percent for fiscal years 2008 through 2013.
APHIS has a vision for its new approach but has not integrated that vision into an overall strategy with associated goals and performance measures that are aligned with the nation's larger biosurveillance efforts. The Government Performance and Results Act, as amended, requires federal agencies to develop performance plans that include goals and performance measures. GAO has previously reported that these requirements can also serve as leading practices for planning at lower levels within agencies, such as individual divisions or programs. Developing goals and measures helps an organization balance competing priorities, particularly if resources are constrained, and helps an agency assess progress toward intended results. APHIS has developed a number of planning documents related to the agency's capabilities in disease surveillance in livestock and poultry, which acknowledge that the agency plays an important role in safeguarding public and environmental health. Goals APHIS has identified in these documents, however, focus primarily on processes or activities and do not specifically address outcomes the agency seeks to accomplish or have associated performance measures. Moreover, none of the planning documents indicate how they individually or collectively support national homeland security efforts called for in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, which assigns several federal agencies, including USDA, responsibility for establishing a comprehensive and coordinated surveillance system to support early detection of biological threats, including infectious diseases. Agency officials said they plan to develop goals and measures for the new approach. Without integrating its vision into an overall strategy with goals and measures aligned with broader national homeland security efforts to detect biological threats, APHIS may not be ideally positioned to support national efforts to address the next threat to animal and human health.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that as APHIS develops goals and measures for its new approach, it integrate the agency's vision into an overall strategy guiding how this approach supports national homeland security efforts to enhance the detection of biological threats. In their comments, USDA concurred with GAO's recommendation, and the Department of Homeland Security described its commitment to disease surveillance efforts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The agricultural sector is a critical component of the nation’s  infrastructure. Threats to the sector may not only sicken animals used for  food but also seriously harm the economy and human health. A 2001  outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the United Kingdom, for example,  resulted in the slaughter of more than 4 million animals to contain the  disease, losses of over $5 billion to the food and agriculture sectors, and  comparable losses to the tourism industry. In addition, physical  boundaries have narrowed between expanding human populations,  wildlife, and commercial agriculture, and technological advances have  facilitated the rapid movement of humans, animals, and food products  around the world. As these boundaries have narrowed and these  technological advances have taken place, the landscape for animal and  human disease and its associated surveillance—that is, the process of  collecting, analyzing, and exchanging information related to cases of  infectious diseases—has also changed. In fact, the National Academies  report that nearly two-thirds of infectious diseases affecting humans result  from pathogens transmitted between animals and people, causing  diseases known as zoonoses. Under this changing disease landscape,  not only can the emergence of a single, highly contagious animal disease  bring sales of livestock and poultry to a standstill, but a pathogen that is  transmissible to humans who lack immunity can also have wide impact on  public health. The 2009 novel H1N1 influenza virus with origins in swine  is one example of a recent mutation of an influenza virus that affected  both human health and the pork industry, a vital part of U.S. agriculture.  Not only did the virus cause a worldwide influenza epidemic, or  pandemic, but it also led to substantial losses in pork sales when  consumers mistakenly believed they could become infected by eating  pork.
The Department of Homeland Security has defined biosurveillance as “the science and  practice of managing human, animal, plant, food, and environmental health-related data  and information for early warning of threats and hazards, early detection of events, and  rapid characterization of the event so that effective actions can be taken to mitigate  adverse health, social, and economic effects.” See Department of Health and Human  Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Biosurveillance Strategy  for Human Health, version 2.0 (Atlanta, Ga.: February 2010). Disease surveillance in  livestock and poultry is a component of biosurveillance.
USDA on disease surveillance for influenza, a zoonosis that infects  humans and some livestock and poultry.
Threats from biological agents, including zoonotic pathogens, highlight  the need for an effective agricultural defense system, including disease  surveillance in livestock and poultry. Animal disease surveillance consists  of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting animal health data to detect  diseases early, enable rapid reporting and response during disease  outbreaks, and control the spread of disease. As we reported in 2011,  however, federal efforts in this regard are still in development: no  centralized coordination effort is in place to oversee the federal agencies’  overall implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9.  We also reported that the agency within the Department of Homeland  Security designated to integrate national surveillance efforts does not  receive from its federal partner agencies the kind of expertise it has  identified as most critical for supporting its early-detection mission— particularly, data generated at the earliest stages of an event or  outbreak.
In this context, you asked us to review the federal government’s efforts to  conduct surveillance activities for animal diseases in livestock and  wildlife. This report examines (1) USDA’s new approach to disease  surveillance in livestock and poultry in light of a changing disease  landscape and challenges, if any, the agency faces with this approach  and (2) the extent to which this approach is guided by a strategy with  measurable goals and supports broader national biosurveillance efforts.
To address both these objectives, we reviewed presidential directives  regarding biosurveillance, biodefense, and homeland security,  specifically, Homeland Security Presidential Directives 7, 9, 10, and 21.We also reviewed USDA’s authorizing legislation, relevant regulations,  guidance, policy documents, and strategic and other plans for disease  surveillance in livestock and poultry, including the Animal Health  Protection Act and the federal traceability rule for livestock moving  between states. We interviewed officials from USDA and from the  Departments of Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security who  collectively have responsibilities for disease surveillance in livestock and  poultry, surveillance for influenza and other zoonotic diseases, research,  coordination of biosurveillance activities, and management of information  technology used to track data on livestock and poultry diseases. We also  reviewed USDA’s disease surveillance planning documents, leading  practices in strategic planning that we identified in prior work, and key  strategic planning documents regarding national biosurveillance from the  Departments of Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security. To  review the issue in depth, we focused on disease surveillance in swine.  We selected swine because they represent a significant portion of the  nation’s livestock and poultry industry and are susceptible to many  diseases of national concern, including some that can sicken humans. In  addition, USDA has initiated a comprehensive species surveillance  program for swine, its first for livestock and poultry.
To collect information on specific disease surveillance practices, we  selected four states for review: Colorado, Iowa, North Carolina, and  Texas. We selected these states to ensure that our review  (1) represented geographic variation in pork-producing regions;  (2) included states with large swine populations, as well as states with  comparatively smaller populations; and (3) represented a number of  potential data sources for disease surveillance in livestock and poultry,  such as livestock markets and veterinary diagnostic laboratories.  Moreover, because feral swine present a potential source of infection to  commercial food animal herds, we chose only states where feral swine  are present.nation’s commercial swine population. Because we did not select a  generalizable sample of states, the results from these four states cannot  be generalized to all states, but they can provide examples of disease  surveillance practices in the four states. Within our four selected states,  we obtained and reviewed state guidance on disease surveillance in  livestock and poultry; forms the states use to obtain livestock and poultry  health information for disease surveillance purposes; and strategic plans,  where available. We also interviewed federal and state animal, public  health, and veterinary laboratory authorities and pork producers or their  representatives within our selected states; we also visited a hobby farm, a  feral swine holding facility, and two livestock markets in most of these  states. In addition, we interviewed representatives of the American  Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians, the American  Association of Swine Veterinarians, the National Pork Board, and the  National Pork Producers Council. We reviewed funding from fiscal year  2007 through fiscal year 2013 for USDA programs supporting disease  surveillance in livestock and poultry, including funding to modernize  information technology systems. We also reviewed annual reports for  fiscal years 2010 through 2011 summarizing program data collected  through USDA’s Influenza in Swine Surveillance Program. These data  include the number of biological submissions tested and the biological  data analyzed. To assess the reliability of the financial data we analyzed,  we reviewed USDA’s agency financial reports for fiscal years 2009 to  2012 and relevant evaluations of USDA financial information by the  USDA Office of Inspector General. We also interviewed budget officials to  further confirm the data’s accuracy. We identified no material problems  with the accuracy of financial data reported by USDA. To assess the  reliability of the influenza program data, we interviewed USDA officials  familiar with how the data were collected, entered into the database, and  checked for accuracy. We determined that the financial and program data  were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
Together, these four states represent 46 percent of the  We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to May 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: According to international animal health authorities, disease surveillance  in livestock and poultry has as its main purpose the early detection of  diseases and disease outbreaks. It also plays an important role during  outbreaks, such as monitoring how fast a disease is spreading through  animal populations and in what direction. Disease surveillance is also  critical in determining how effective efforts have been in controlling and  eradicating disease from a particular area or animal population and in  recognizing when that disease no longer poses an immediate threat to  animal or human health. Further, surveillance supports international  trade, allowing officials to certify that animals are healthy and safe to  move across borders. Disease surveillance in livestock and poultry is  particularly important because billions of cattle, swine, poultry, and other  animals used for food are annually moved from place to place over long  distances throughout the food supply chain—from wherever producers  are located and then to feedlots and local, regional, and even overseas  markets and slaughterhouses. Thus, to prevent the spread of contagious  diseases and protect the welfare of healthy herds, animal health  authorities often restrict the movement of animals. Such restrictions can  lead, paradoxically, to the destruction of large numbers of uninfected  animals and substantial economic losses.
Federal, state, tribal, and industry entities share responsibility for carrying  out disease surveillance in livestock and poultry (see app. I). Under the  national animal health reporting system, APHIS typically works with states  to monitor, control, and eradicate certain animal diseases. According to  APHIS documents and state veterinary officials, such activities include,  for example, issuing guidance on how to identify and report particular  diseases of national concern, developing vaccination programs, and  providing additional staff to work alongside state investigators tracking  outbreaks of infectious diseases. To manage these reportable diseases,  APHIS has worked closely with the states and industry over the past  decades to eradicate them by, for example, providing states funding and  guidance. According to APHIS documents, the agency has made  significant gains in eradicating reportable diseases such as tuberculosis  and brucellosis, which have historically plagued American livestock. State  animal health officials work closely with industry and with state-operated  veterinary diagnostic laboratories to monitor and protect the health of  livestock and poultry within state boundaries, including regulating the  entry of livestock and poultry into their states. Veterinarians accredited  under APHIS’s National Veterinary Accreditation Program are directed to  report to APHIS the suspected presence of selected domestic and foreign  animal diseases that can cause significant economic, trade, or public  health consequences (see app. II for a list of such diseases in swine).
Some states also require veterinarians to directly report to state animal  health authorities the incidence of diseases that are not reportable  nationally.
Industry is an important source of health data on livestock and poultry,  privately maintaining that information and reporting it to state and federal  officials when a reportable disease is suspected. Veterinarians working  for livestock and poultry producers collect tissue and blood samples from  animals and send them to a veterinary laboratory for diagnosis; these  veterinarians are the first line of defense in disease surveillance, whether  for detecting diseases or monitoring a disease during an outbreak. The  laboratory returns test results confidentially to the veterinarian or person  submitting the sample, unless the test results indicate the presence of a  federal or state reportable disease, in which case those test results are  reported to appropriate federal or state authorities. When a veterinarian  suspects the presence of a foreign animal disease in a herd, the  veterinarian contacts state and federal animal health authorities to take a  sample and send it to APHIS’s National Veterinary Services Laboratories  to confirm the diagnosis (see fig. 1). If state and federal animal health  officials approve, a National Animal Health Laboratory Network laboratory  may conduct initial screening for certain foreign animal diseases. But a  sample is also sent to APHIS’s National Veterinary Services Laboratories  to confirm the diagnosis.
Contagious diseases with the potential to harm the economy and human  health may spread among livestock and poultry, and in some cases be  transmitted to humans, through various methods. For example, classical  swine fever may be transmitted from an infected swine to another  directly through nose-to-nose and sexual contact or indirectly through a  person or object, such as a farmhand’s clothing. Swine may also contract  the disease through exposure to or consumption of contaminated pork  products, which typically occurs when swine are fed uncooked garbage or  meat products from a source outside the United States. The classical  swine fever virus is known to survive in pork meat for up to 180 days.  Although this disease affects only swine, other diseases in swine have  the capacity to affect humans. For example, swine can become infected  not only with swine influenza viruses but with human and avian viruses as  well. According to recent influenza research, evidence exists that  influenza viruses can be transmitted through the air between swine and  humans and that either host can be contagious before showing symptoms  of illness. When a swine is infected with more than one influenza virus at  the same time, the viruses can exchange genetic material, thereby  creating a new influenza virus, which may vary in its virulence and  transmissibility between and within species (see app. III).
section_title: USDA’s APHIS Is Broadening Its Approach to Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry and Faces Challenges in Doing So
paragraphs: To better adapt to the changing landscape of human and animal diseases  (including the rapid global movement of humans, animals, and food  products), APHIS has begun to shift its disease-specific surveillance  approach to (1) monitor the overall health of livestock and poultry and  (2) improve its ability to analyze health information about livestock and  poultry. APHIS faces several challenges in carrying out this new  approach, including obtaining new data from current and additional  sources and determining how best to deploy declining resources, given  increasing fiscal constraints.
subsections: section_title: APHIS’s New Approach Monitors Overall Health of Livestock and Poultry and Seeks to Improve Collection and Analysis of Information
paragraphs: As funding for disease eradication programs changes, and the global  landscape of animal and human diseases produces new threats, APHIS  has since fiscal year 2012 begun broadening its previous disease-by- disease approach to one in which the agency monitors the overall health  of certain livestock and poultry species. APHIS’s intention is to examine  the nation’s livestock herds and poultry flocks in detail, using diverse  sources of data, to better detect, monitor, and control diseases that may  be new or reemerging, including domestic diseases of economic  importance. Before its new approach, APHIS directed its programs for  disease surveillance in livestock and poultry toward preventing the  introduction of certain foreign animal diseases and to monitoring,  detecting, and eradicating other reportable diseases already present in  domestic herds. Information about nonreportable diseases, including  diseases that were new or reemerging, was not always captured by the  agency’s disease surveillance efforts.
According to APHIS documentation, beginning in fiscal year 2010, the  agency proposed its first effort to broaden disease surveillance in  livestock and poultry: monitoring the health of the nation’s hog, or swine,  herds. This program—called Comprehensive and Integrated Swine  Surveillance—identifies new sources and types of data on diseases in  swine, among other things. Since fiscal year 2012, the agency has been  receiving funding on a species, or commodity, basis, rather than on a  disease-specific basis; thus, the agency’s swine health activities,  including surveillance, were provided dedicated funding for the first time  that year at $23 million. To begin addressing multiple and evolving  information needs about swine health under the program, the agency  plans to draw new data from sites where swine typically converge in large  numbers or where information on swine health can be easily collected. In  planning documents, APHIS officials said that they plan to collect data  from farms where swine are raised, markets where they are sold,  slaughter facilities, and veterinary diagnostic laboratories, among other  sites (see fig. 2). They also plan to collect data from feral swine, which  may harbor diseases transmissible to domestic herds. Many of these  sites are already monitored to some extent, but APHIS officials said they  intend to expand how the sites are used in the future under the program.  For example, APHIS has been monitoring for the presence of  pseudorabies at slaughter facilities, but it has proposed monitoring these  facilities for a range of other diseases as well, including classical swine  fever. According to agency officials, APHIS is also considering potential  new information sources, such as data that states collect on diseases of  regional concern, some of which fall outside the category of reportable  diseases. APHIS has begun to take some of its planned actions under  this program, but many of the planned actions require further coordination  and concurrence from industry and states before they can be  implemented.
In addition to making better use of existing data sources and identifying  new ones, APHIS and the Department of Homeland Security launched a  9-month pilot program designed to use volunteer veterinarians to assist in  detecting diseases early, including new and emerging diseases.  Scheduled to conclude in May 2013, according to Homeland Security  officials, this pilot program involves a number of participating private  veterinarians, working in a small area of West Texas and New Mexico,  who are using electronic tablets to record and submit to APHIS data on  syndromes they observe in livestock herds, that is, data on the collective  signs and symptoms of sickness that animals exhibit. According to a  statement of work for this program, such information has not been  systematically collected and reported before, and this pilot offers the  opportunity to gauge the usefulness of such information.
Under this new approach, APHIS also plans to improve its ability to  analyze information—collected from numerous sources for different  purposes and in different formats—on the overall health of livestock and  poultry, by standardizing how the information is reported and improving  how the data are linked electronically. Because data standards vary  greatly among APHIS’s numerous information systems, and within  individual systems, APHIS has limited ability to analyze and aggregate  information to generate a complete national picture of livestock and  poultry health. To address these limitations, APHIS in 2009 developed a  multiyear information technology plan to restructure and modernize how  the agency collects and manages information for detecting and  monitoring diseases in livestock and poultry, including new and emerging  disease threats. The technology plan’s ultimate goal is to develop a  centralized information repository containing health information about  livestock and poultry from the most relevant internal and external  databases and employing standardized data entry protocols.
The initial phase of this effort to improve efficiency and data analysis is  already under way. APHIS in January 2013 replaced its outdated Generic  Disease Database, which contained information on outbreaks of domestic  diseases, with a new database management system, called Surveillance  Collaboration Services, which establishes standardized data fields and  codes. APHIS also plans to electronically link this new database system  with, among others, its existing Emergency Management Response  System, which contains information derived from investigations of  suspected foreign animal diseases, and Laboratory Messaging Services,  which receives and records diagnostic test results for selected diseases  of national concern. Estimated at $5.4 million, the first phase of APHIS’s  technology modernization effort—the deployment of the Surveillance  Collaboration Services system—is scheduled to be completed 1 year  ahead of its original 2014 target date, APHIS officials said.
section_title: APHIS Faces Challenges Implementing Its New Approach
paragraphs: APHIS faces key challenges in carrying out this new approach to disease  surveillance in livestock and poultry, in particular, gathering data from  current and additional sources, such as from industry and from state  animal health authorities, and determining how best to deploy declining  resources.
Obtaining new data on livestock and poultry health from current and  additional sources is likely to be a challenge for various reasons,  including (1) industry concerns over the confidentiality of animal health  data and (2) the sufficiency of collected data.
APHIS’s ability to gather new data will likely be hindered by industry  concerns that some health information on livestock and poultry should be  kept confidential and not shared. For example, industry representatives  and state animal health authorities we spoke with said they would not be  willing to share information about the health of their herds beyond what is  required by federal regulation because the information, including  information on the incidence of influenza in swine, might be made public  and affect sales. These officials cited as an example a 2009 H1N1  influenza outbreak in humans, which was genetically linked to an  influenza virus found in swine and led to millions of dollars in lost sales to  the pork industry because people mistakenly believed they could become  ill from eating pork. Moreover, state animal health officials from one state  reported that their state laws prohibit them from releasing information they  collect on the health of their state’s livestock and poultry unless the  information is required to be reported by federal law to control an  immediate threat to overall animal or public health.
Moreover, APHIS may have difficulty obtaining complete data identifying  individual livestock and poultry and their locations. Generally, the states,  not the federal government, maintain animal identification and location  data, in part because of industry data confidentiality concerns, according  to APHIS documents. APHIS officials told us that most states will share  this information during animal disease outbreaks, but some do not  routinely share the information for surveillance purposes. This reluctance  to routinely share could affect the agency’s ability to generate a national  picture of diseased and at-risk animals and their locations—information  essential to effectively monitor and control livestock and poultry diseases,  including new and emerging diseases. In July 2007, we reported that, for  a number of reasons, APHIS faced serious challenges implementing a  comprehensive national animal identification system. In January 2013,  APHIS published a rule establishing national standards for identifying  animals and documenting their movement that, with some exceptions,  made it mandatory for livestock and poultry under federal regulation that  are moved across state lines to have official identification and  documentation. The new rule addresses some limitations of the old  system, giving states some discretion in administering the program,  including managing information required and maintained on animals  entering their borders.
The flexibility given to states with regard to how they maintain animal  identification information under the new rule also poses challenges for  APHIS to obtain information effectively and in a standardized manner. For  example, states may use APHIS’s approved types of animal identification,  including animal identification numbers, and approved official  documentation, such as the interstate certificate of veterinary inspection,  but they can also use alternative systems. An APHIS document on animal  disease traceability says that although states can use a number of animal  identification systems, they must follow certain standards, but states need  not abide by APHIS’s suggested standards for documentation. In  addition, states may track data in APHIS’s animal identification and  movement information systems or may maintain their own databases  instead, and these databases may not be compatible with APHIS’s  systems. According to APHIS officials, standards are being developed to  ensure future compatibility.
APHIS will likely face the challenge of gathering sufficient data to monitor  diseases, because agency officials and pork producers differ in their  views on how much collected information is enough to successfully  identify potential disease threats. For example, APHIS officials reported  that commercial producers voluntarily and anonymously shared nearly  9,400 swine samples with APHIS’s National Swine Influenza Virus  Surveillance Program in 2012, a 72 percent increase over the  5,460 samples submitted in 2011. But agency officials and pork  producers disagree somewhat about whether collected data are sufficient  to allow the program to successfully identify potential disease threats.  About 66 million swine are raised on 68,300 U.S. farms. Agency animal  and human health researchers have questioned whether enough swine  samples and information are being submitted to APHIS’s influenza  surveillance program. Influenza researchers also explained to us that  because the data are submitted anonymously and cannot be linked with a  particular farm or herd, they cannot be sure that the samples commercial  producers provide to APHIS are representative of the viruses currently  circulating domestically. Several pork producers, in contrast, told us they  believe that the data APHIS has collected have been sufficient.
APHIS also faces the challenge of obtaining sufficient data to monitor  serious diseases that could spread to domestic herds and people from  the nation’s sizable and widespread feral swine population. Federal and  state animal health officials and pork producers told us that feral swine  pose a significant risk because they carry diseases that have been  eradicated in domestic herds, such as brucellosis and pseudorabies,  which, if reintroduced, could hinder hog movement and trade. According  to APHIS documents, feral swine are also susceptible to contracting and  transmitting foreign animal diseases because they are highly mobile, at  times crossing the border with Mexico and eating out of landfills, where  they might encounter contaminated garbage. The introduction of a foreign  animal disease like classical swine fever could close export markets.  Feral swine are also carriers of zoonotic diseases, such as brucellosis  and influenza, which can infect humans and other species. Feral swine  are most likely to affect small backyard farms with little security, but they  may also attempt to infiltrate larger, more secure operations.
Unlike domestic herds, feral swine are not easily accessible to  veterinarians and wildlife biologists responsible for managing populations  and monitoring diseases, and, according to federal and state officials,  even when feral swine are located, they can be very difficult to capture. In  addition, the population is growing rapidly. According to APHIS data, feral  swine were present in 36 states as of 2010, their population distribution  and range having increased from 28 states in 2004 and 17 states in 1982  (see fig. 3). Officials from APHIS’s Wildlife Services told us that they have  been sampling approximately 3,000 feral swine per year and testing for  various diseases, including influenza, pseudorabies, brucellosis, and  classical swine fever. Nevertheless, given an estimated nationwide  population of 5 million feral swine, officials said that they would need to  test significantly more animals per year to accurately portray the extent of  diseases in this population.
Declining resources—funding constraints and a shortage of  veterinarians—also pose a challenge to broadening disease surveillance  and improving analysis of livestock and poultry health data, according to  APHIS officials.
Federal and state animal health officials told us that decreased funding to  USDA is a challenge to APHIS’s disease surveillance efforts in livestock  and poultry. According to agency documentation, the budget for APHIS  recently decreased by about 14 percent for fiscal years 2008 through  2013. As a result, APHIS has seen funding for key components of its  disease surveillance efforts decline as well, according to agency officials.  For example, funding for federal-state cooperative agreements for  monitoring animal health has decreased by 44 percent, from $46 million  in 2009 to $25 million in 2012. We previously reported that state officials  in agriculture and wildlife departments said that they depend largely or  completely on federal funds to support biosurveillance efforts and that  their capabilities to carry out disease surveillance and other  biosurveillance activities would be limited without funding from federal  grants and cooperative agreements. Funding for APHIS’s National  Wildlife Disease Surveillance and Emergency Response System,  responsible for disease surveillance in feral swine, has been reduced by  71 percent, or $16 million, from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2012.  Additionally, funding for other disease surveillance programs has declined  or remains uncertain. For example, the Department of Health and Human  Services provided a one-time $25.75 million in funding to APHIS in 2009  to extend the agency’s prevention and surveillance capabilities for  influenza virus in swine. Because of a recent increase in the number of  submitted samples from swine, however, APHIS officials project that  funding will run out by fiscal year 2015 or earlier. As a result, APHIS  officials said, the agency might not be able to continue to offer  stakeholders viral diagnostic testing or genetic sequencing services using  this funding. USDA officials told us they are uncertain whether future  funding will exist for these activities.
In addition, state officials participating in USDA’s National Animal Health  Laboratory Network have reported that insufficient and declining funding  is reducing their ability to effectively and rapidly identify, report, and  respond to an outbreak of a serious disease, such as foot-and-mouth  disease. For example, officials from member laboratories have reported  difficulties maintaining essential diagnostic personnel and expertise. The  network receives funding from APHIS for operational support, including  testing, equipment maintenance, training assays, and travel. APHIS and  USDA’s National Institute of Food and Agriculture also provide support for  infrastructure, including personnel and maintaining and developing  information technology. According to APHIS officials, funding from APHIS  to pay for testing for certain diseases has decreased even though overall  funding has increased somewhat since 2007. In addition, funding for  laboratory infrastructure provided by the National Institute for Food and  Agriculture has declined by 40 percent. Laboratory officials told us that  this drop forced some laboratories to cut their staffing levels, reducing the  number of highly trained personnel who can perform the biological tests  needed to rapidly identify, report, and respond to diseases. Member  laboratory officials also told us that working with an outdated National  Animal Health Laboratory Network information system limited the  efficiency with which data generated from laboratory testing can be  transmitted to APHIS.
According to federal and state officials, a decrease in the number of  APHIS field veterinarians has also reduced the agency’s ability to carry  out critical disease surveillance activities effectively. At the time of our  review, officials in each of the four states we visited reported a reduced  number of field veterinarians as a primary challenge to effective collection  of health data from livestock and poultry. Some officials explained that, in  particular, too few veterinarians affected veterinarians’ ability to stay in  frequent contact with farms, such as small farms having little biosecurity  and a high risk of their animals’ contracting serious diseases. For  example, officials in one state reported a vacant position for the state’s  primary APHIS field veterinarian. Another state official reported that even  as livestock and poultry imports have increased—with the number of  swine entering the state increasing on average by about 1 million per year  from 2002 to 2011—the number of field veterinarians responsible for  coordinating disease surveillance across 99 counties decreased from  11 in 2001 to 7 in 2012. Such declines are symptomatic of a more general  decline in the number of veterinarians, particularly livestock and poultry  veterinarians. In 2009, for example, we reported that four of the five key  agencies that employ veterinarians—USDA’s APHIS, Food Safety and  Inspection Service, and Agricultural Research Service and the Army— identified existing or potential shortages in the federal veterinary  workforce, which agencies have begun to address, including by  participating in the Office of Personnel Management’s veterinary medical  officer advisory council to address the shortage.
section_title: No Overall Strategy with Goals and Measures Guides APHIS’s New Approach to Animal Disease Surveillance
paragraphs: APHIS has a vision for its new approach but has not integrated that vision  into an overall strategy with associated goals and performance measures  aligned with the nation’s larger biosurveillance efforts. None of APHIS’s  planning documents clearly define (1) the goals the agency wants to  achieve in the long term with its new disease surveillance approach,  (2) how the agency intends to measure results, or (3) how APHIS’s  disease surveillance efforts support national biosurveillance efforts.
subsections: section_title: No Overall Disease Surveillance Strategy with Goals and Measures Ties APHIS’s Various Plans Together
paragraphs: APHIS has a number of planning documents that describe a new  strategic vision and mission for the primary division responsible for the  agency’s new disease surveillance approach. Nevertheless, the agency  has not integrated that vision into an overall strategy with associated  goals and measures supporting the nation’s larger biosurveillance efforts.  The Government Performance and Results Act, as amended, requires  federal agencies to develop performance plans that include measurable   We have previously reported that these requirements can also  goals.serve as leading practices for planning at lower levels within agencies,  such as individual divisions, programs, or initiatives.and performance measures helps an organization balance competing  priorities, particularly if resources are constrained, and helps an agency  assess progress toward intended results. Long-term strategic goals unify  an agency’s many efforts in a coordinated framework for achieving  results. Goals should correspond to the purposes set forth in the agency’s  mission statement, they should cover the major functions and operations  of an agency, and they should be measurable. Developing goals and  performance measures helps an organization address important  dimensions of program performance, balances competing priorities— especially if resources are declining or constrained—and shows progress  or contributions to intended results. Performance measures, which  typically have numerical targets, are important management tools that  help an agency identify the activities that work well and those that do not.  Without such performance measures, agencies cannot determine  whether the activities and programs they are carrying out are  accomplishing the goals they intend to achieve.
A number of APHIS planning documents (see app. IV for a list of selected  planning documents) describe a new strategic vision and mission for  APHIS’s Veterinary Services organization—the primary division  responsible for implementing the new disease surveillance approach.  Veterinary Services’ planning documents acknowledge that in preventing  and detecting diseases in livestock and poultry and protecting animal  health, the agency plays an important role in safeguarding public and  environmental health as well. The goals APHIS has identified in these  planning documents focus primarily on processes or activities but do not  specifically address outcomes the agency seeks to accomplish or have  associated performance measures. For example, the principal planning  document explaining the agency’s future vision and mission includes the  following goals: transforming the culture of the organization, investing in   These  technical infrastructure, and supporting readiness and response.goals describe what actions the agency intends to undertake but not what  outcomes these actions are intended to achieve or how the agency will  measure intended results.
Agency officials said that in the past, when APHIS focused its activities  primarily on selected reportable diseases, measuring success was  relatively straightforward: a primary performance measure of program  success was the extent to which specific diseases had been eradicated  and prevented from entering the United States or—in the case of  eradicated diseases—prevented from reemerging. For example, APHIS’s  animal disease programs have largely eradicated brucellosis in cattle and  brucellosis and pseudorabies in domestic commercial U.S. swine; in  addition, reentry of foot-and-mouth disease has been prevented: the  nation has been free of foot-and-mouth disease since 1929. Officials we  interviewed expressed concern, however, that traditional outcome  measures like these may no longer be valid when applied to newly  emerging diseases. For example, new influenza viruses, which may affect  human health, are already circulating in domestic livestock and mutate so  effectively that eradication is not considered possible.
The principal planning document for Veterinary Services establishes a  goal to enhance the health of the nation’s animals by “anticipating and  responding to new or emerging threats” but also states that the agency  must still develop an effective mechanism for evaluating such threats and  determining an appropriate response. Other, more-detailed Veterinary  Services planning documents primarily communicate the key steps and  obstacles to implementing a new approach to disease surveillance.  They define issues—such as the need to develop better relationships with  stakeholders—and identify potential ways of addressing these issues, but  they do not tie the issues to an outcome-based goal or offer performance  measures for gauging progress. In sum, none of these planning  documents provide APHIS with a clear road map or overall strategy, with  associated performance measures, for managing its new approach to  animal disease surveillance.
Without performance measures, APHIS cannot construct the necessary  relevant indicators of performance that ultimately reveal if the activities or  initiatives the agency is pursuing—such as the collection of influenza data  from swine—are the right ones and being carried out effectively. Given  that influenza researchers are unsure to what extent the data collected  from swine are sufficient or representative of the viruses circulating  domestically, measurable goals could better enable the agency to  demonstrate progress or success with the data they have already  collected or intend to collect. But without specific measures of the  outcomes APHIS intends to accomplish in following the behavior of novel  diseases, the agency cannot, among other things, assess the utility of the  data it is collecting or determine if it needs data sources other than those  it has already identified. Neither can APHIS weigh its activities against  one another to give higher priority to funding activities with the greatest  potential to benefit animal and human health. APHIS, state animal health  authorities, and publicly funded veterinary diagnostic laboratories all face  increasing constraints on resources, which has, according to agency  officials, impeded efforts to modernize information technology systems;  monitor herd health; and efficiently and effectively test samples for animal  diseases.
APHIS officials said that they recognize a need for adequate goals and  reliable performance measures focused on outcomes. Indeed, officials  said they have plans to develop goals and performance measures for  their new approach but that under increasing fiscal pressure—APHIS’s  budget decreased about 14 percent from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal  year 2013—they have focused first on streamlining operations, improving  efficiencies, and carrying out already-funded pilot disease surveillance  programs. For example, APHIS has proposed restructuring how business  units within Veterinary Services are organized across the services’ field  offices and headquarters and to modernize information technology  systems. According to veterinary officials, their proposed actions achieve  cost efficiencies over time, as well as support a broader approach to  monitoring the health of livestock and poultry. In addition, the deputy  administrator of Veterinary Services said, several new disease  surveillance initiatives—including the pilot program to collect animal  health data remotely in the field on mobile electronic devices and another  to collect and test samples submitted voluntarily by producers and  samples taken from swine at slaughter—can help determine both the  quality of, and ease of access to, new sources of disease surveillance  data. Once these initiatives and pilots have been implemented and  evaluated, he said, he believes APHIS will be better situated to develop  the goals and performance measures needed to determine the success of  their new and broader approach to animal disease surveillance. APHIS  officials did not provide a time frame for developing goals and measures.
These efforts would certainly help inform APHIS’s development of  meaningful goals and performance measures, but resource constraints— and the risk that the introduction of a new or reemerging disease may  substantially harm animal and human health—suggest it would be  prudent for APHIS to move forward quickly to develop performance  measures focused on outcomes to guide their disease surveillance  efforts. As the results of APHIS’s surveillance initiatives become clearer,  the agency can adjust its approach accordingly.
section_title: APHIS’s Plans Do Not Define Their Relationship with the Nation’s Biosurveillance Efforts
paragraphs: None of APHIS’s various plans indicate how they individually or  collectively support national homeland security efforts called for in  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, or additional biosurveillance  efforts that together make up a national policy to defend the nation’s food  and agricultural systems against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and  other emergencies. The goals cited in these APHIS planning documents  do not mention homeland security or tie an APHIS goal to a national  biosurveillance effort. On the one hand, APHIS, in collaboration with the  Department of Homeland Security’s National Center for Foreign Animal  and Zoonotic Disease Defense, has developed an Emergency Response  Support System (or “information dashboard”). This system aims to bring  together multiple potential sources of disease information on livestock  and poultry—from federal and state governments, producers, and current  research—into a single coordinated and integrated system to complement  the Department of Homeland Security’s broader effort to support a  national biosurveillance system. The Emergency Response Support  System was developed by the Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease  Center at Texas A&M University and funded with help from the  department. According to Disease Center officials, this information  dashboard is intended to provide APHIS and its stakeholders the ability to  quickly call up and display relevant sources of animal disease information  and to nationally map producers’ farms, disease outbreaks, and animal  movement, among other patterns, onto a computer monitor. On the other  hand, however, none of the planning documents we reviewed indicates  how this information dashboard is to align with or support broader  national-level biosurveillance efforts.
Similarly, the planning documents make no mention of coordinating with  other homeland security efforts to enhance disease surveillance in  livestock and poultry. For example, the Department of Homeland Security  has provided funding to develop tools for disease surveillance, such as an  assay that tests swine saliva for foreign animal diseases, which can test  samples from more than one animal at a time and may be faster and  easier than collecting tissue or other biological samples. Officials involved  in developing such diagnostic tools, however, told us that responsibilities  shared between APHIS and the department have sometimes complicated  development and use of such tools. As we have previously reported,  federal agencies can use their strategic and annual performance plans as  tools to drive collaboration with other agencies and partners and establish  complementary goals and strategies for achieving results. Thus, an  absence of shared measurable goals between APHIS and the  Department of Homeland Security may be compromising both agencies’  understanding of how their monitoring of animal health—coupled with  disease surveillance, control, and eradication efforts—complement  broader national biosurveillance goals. APHIS officials agreed that it is  important for the agency’s planning documents to show how the agency’s  efforts support national homeland security efforts to enhance the  detection of biological threats.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: APHIS has long carried out important work to protect the nation’s  livestock and poultry against economically devastating infectious  diseases and against the potential deadly effects of such diseases on  people. Foot-and-mouth disease has not infected cattle or swine in the  United States since 1929, and pseudorabies and brucellosis have been  virtually eradicated in commercial swine and cattle. The near elimination  of tuberculosis is considered one of the greatest animal and public health  achievements in the United States. Moreover, given the changing disease  landscape, APHIS has begun to craft a more comprehensive approach to  monitoring animal health—one no longer restricted to eradicating only  certain diseases. We commend the agency for its efforts (1) to develop a  vision for its new approach and planning documents for undertaking it and  (2) to collect better data from new and different sources and better  synthesize and analyze information to identify potentially harmful new  pathogens earlier. Nevertheless, APHIS has not to date developed goals  or performance measures for its new approach; agency officials said they  have plans to do so, but they did not provide a time frame. Even with its  efforts to date, however, without integrating the vision in its planning  documents into an overall strategy with associated goals and measures  that are aligned with broader national homeland security efforts to detect  biological threats, APHIS may not be ideally positioned to support  national efforts to address the next threat to animal and human health.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: As APHIS develops goals and measures for its new approach to disease  surveillance in livestock and poultry, we recommend that the Secretary of  Agriculture direct the APHIS Administrator to integrate the agency’s vision  into an overall strategy, with associated goals and measures, that guides  how APHIS’s new approach will support national homeland security  efforts to enhance the detection of biological threats.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the  Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Homeland  Security. USDA and the Department of Homeland Security provided  written comments, which are reproduced in appendixes VI and VII,  respectively; these agencies also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate. The Department of Health and Human  Services had no comments.
In its written comments, USDA concurred with our recommendation that  APHIS integrate the agency’s vision into an overall strategy that guides  how APHIS’s new approach will support national homeland security  efforts. USDA stated that APHIS will include better performance metrics  in its planning efforts and develop more explicit linkages between its  swine surveillance activities and other national homeland security efforts.
In its letter, the Department of Homeland Security thanked us for the  opportunity to review the draft report and noted that the department  supports developments at APHIS to advance disease surveillance in  animal and plant populations. The Department of Homeland Security also  stated that it remains committed to working with its many partners,  including those in the federal government, to better mitigate and defend  against dynamic threats and maximize the ability to respond to and  recover from attacks and disasters of all kinds.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Agriculture,  Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security; appropriate  congressional committees; and other interested parties. In addition, the  report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or garciadiazd@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix VIII.
section_title: Appendix I: Key Stakeholders in Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry
paragraphs: Table 1 lists the primary federal, state, and private-sector organizations or  groups that have a key role or stake in the surveillance of diseases in  livestock and poultry. The list includes animal health organizations,  human health organizations concerned with zoonotic diseases that might  be transmitted between livestock and poultry and humans, and those  organizations interested in monitoring diseases in livestock and poultry as  part of broader national biosurveillance efforts.
section_title: Appendix II: Status of Reportable Swine Diseases in the United States, 2011
paragraphs: Table 2 shows the status in the United States of swine diseases that are  to be reported to the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Animal and  Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) when they are confirmed to be  present in swine.
section_title: Appendix III: Creation of a Novel Human Influenza Virus in 2011
paragraphs: When influenza viruses reproduce, they can exchange gene segments in  a process known as reassortment—a genetic shuffling—that can create  new influenza viruses containing gene segments that may have  originated in different host animals. In 2011, the Centers for Disease  Control and Prevention (CDC) confirmed 12 cases of a novel influenza  virus called an H3N2 variant virus, and in 2012, 309 cases of this virus  were reported. The genetic makeup of this virus showed that it was  derived from (1) a virus that had been circulating in swine and (2) the  human H1N1 virus that caused the 2009 influenza pandemic. Thanks to  still earlier genetic shuffling, the gene segments in this novel 2011  influenza virus came from humans, birds, and swine, as illustrated in  figure 4.
section_title: Appendix IV: List of Selected APHIS Plans Related to Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry
section_title: Appendix V: Printable Interactive Graphics
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Agriculture
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Daniel Garcia-Diaz, (202) 512-3841 or garciadiazd@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Mary Denigan-Macauley  (Assistant Director), Kevin Bray, Ellen W. Chu, Kirsten Lauber, Dan  Royer, Kiki Theodoropoulos, Ginny Vanderlinde, and Karen Villafana  made key contributions to this report.