Force Structure: The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to Equip and Staff Modular Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Their Capabilities
Published: 2008-11-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Amid ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army embarked in 2004 on a plan to create a modular, brigade-based force that would be equally capable as its divisional predecessor in part because it would have advanced equipment and specialized personnel. GAO has previously reported that restructuring and rebuilding the Army will require billions of dollars for equipment and take years to complete. For this report, GAO assessed the extent to which the Army has (1) developed a plan to link funding with results and (2) evaluated its modular force designs. GAO analyzed Army equipment and personnel data, key Army reports, planning documents, performance metrics, testing plans, and funding requests. GAO also visited Army Training and Doctrine Command, including selected Army proponents and schools; Army Reserve Command; and the National Guard Bureau.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army will have established over 80 percent of its modular units by the end of 2008 but does not have a results-oriented plan with clear milestones in place to guide efforts to equip and staff those new units. The Army has been focused on equipping and staffing units to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, the equipment and personnel level of non-deployed units has been declining. The Army now anticipates that modular units will be equipped and staffed in 2019--more than a decade away--but has provided few details about what to expect in the interim. And while the Army projects that it will have enough equipment and personnel in the aggregate, its projections rely on uncertain assumptions related to restoring equipment used in current operations, as well as meeting recruiting and retention goals while simultaneously expanding the Army. Further, GAO's detailed analysis of Army data shows that the Army could face shortfalls of certain modern equipment. Such items are important because the success of the modular design rests in part on obtaining key enablers needed for modular units to function as planned, such as equipment to provide enhanced awareness of the battlefield. GAO has previously reported that the Army lacks a funding plan that includes interim measures for equipping and staffing the modular force, making it difficult to evaluate progress. Without a plan for equipment and staffing that links funding with results and provides milestones, the Army cannot assure decision makers when modular units will have the required equipment and staff in place to restore readiness. Finally, without this plan the Army risks cost growth and further timeline slippage in its efforts to transform to a more modular and capable force. The Army uses several approaches in testing unit designs and capabilities, but these efforts have not yielded a comprehensive assessment of modular forces. Testing the force is intended to determine whether modular units are capable of performing missions across the full spectrum of conflict. The Army has focused its testing efforts on combat units conducting ongoing counterinsurgency operations. However, gaps in the Army's testing could affect its forces' ability to deliver needed capabilities. First, the Army has not fully assessed the effectiveness of its support units because the doctrine that would define how modular support units will train, be sustained, and support the fight has not been completed. This doctrine provides a benchmark to measure the effectiveness of support units. Further, the Army has not assigned a focal point the responsibility for integrating assessments across activities, such as equipping and training. Second, the Army tested the capability of modular designs primarily unconstrained by resources, not at the level of personnel and equipment that the Army plans to provide units. Lacking an analysis of the capabilities of the modular force at levels that it plans to have, the Army will not be in a position to realistically assess whether the capabilities that it is fielding can perform mission requirements.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: During a period of continuing high demand for military capability, the  Army is undertaking a significant transformation of its organization and  force structure as well as an expansion of its force by more than 74,200  military personnel. One major initiative of this transformation—referred to  as Army modularity—is the redesign of units from a large division-based  structure to a brigade-based structure. An important difference between  the new modular brigade combat teams and the previous division-based  brigades is an increased capability to operate independently enabled by  embedded combat support functions such as military intelligence,  reconnaissance, and logistics. Although somewhat smaller in size than the  divisional brigades, the new modular brigades are envisioned to be just as  capable because they will have different equipment—including key  enablers such as advanced communications and surveillance equipment— and a broad mix of personnel. Continuing operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan led the Defense Department to expand the Army to help  reduce the stress on the force and meet increasing strategic demands. This  initiative, called Grow the Force, will increase equipment and personnel  needs, and we have reported that the full costs to restructure and rebuild  the Army are large but uncertain.
The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007  directed the Comptroller General to provide to congressional defense  committees an annual assessment, among other things, of the Army’s  progress equipping and staffing modular units in the active and reserve  components, progress by the Army in conducting further testing and  evaluation of the Army’s modular unit designs, and the use of funds by the  Army for equipping its modular units. In accordance with this mandate for  fiscal year 2008, we provided a briefing to your offices in March 2008 on  our preliminary observations. This report expands on the information  reported in those briefings and addresses in more detail the extent to  which the Army (1) has developed a comprehensive plan that links results  to investments with defined milestones and (2) has tested and evaluated  its modular force design.
To assess the Army’s plan to guide its efforts to equip and staff the  modular force, we analyzed relevant Army plans and reports to Congress  for equipping and staffing the modular force. We developed in conjunction  with the Army a means for analyzing key equipment and personnel  enablers of the modular force. Based on our review of Army modularity  studies and reports, we defined key enablers as those pieces of equipment  or personnel that are required for the organization to function as planned,  providing the modular design with equal or increased capabilities  compared with the previous divisional structure in areas such as a unit’s  firepower, survivability, and intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance. To  develop a preliminary list of key equipment and personnel enablers, we  reviewed key Army modularity reports and obtained official comments  from the Department of the Army and Army Training and Doctrine  Command (TRADOC), which is responsible for the design and evaluation  of modular units. We then submitted the preliminary list to the  Headquarters, Department of the Army, for official input and held  subsequent discussions with Army officials. Our identification and analysis  of fifteen key equipment enablers compares total Army (active, National  Guard, and Reserve) equipment authorizations and design requirements  for the operating and institutional forces with total Army on-hand  quantities in April 2007 with planned equipment deliveries and projected  equipment on hand in fiscal year 2012. Our identification and analysis of  nine key personnel enablers compares active Army personnel  authorizations and design requirements for the operating and institutional  forces with active Army on-hand personnel strength in April 2007 and  projected personnel strength for fiscal year 2012 (see app. I for details on  our analysis of key equipment and personnel enablers). The Army’s fiscal- year 2007 to 2012 equipment and personnel plans were the most recent  data available to us when we developed this analysis. The Army provided  updated data on the status of the Army’s equipment as compared to the  design requirement as of June 29, 2008. We did not assess the reliability of  this 2008 data. However, the 2008 data were generally consistent with the  data we analyzed in 2007. To assess the extent to which the Army has  tested and evaluated the design of the modular force, we examined  TRADOC’s modular force assessment process and plans to evaluate  modular combat and combat support unit designs. Although we did not  independently test the reliability of Army data electronically, we  determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report based on discussions with Army officials about the data quality  control procedures used to ensure the reliability of the relevant equipment  and personnel databases. We conducted this performance audit from April  2007 to September 2008 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and  perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The  scope and methodology used in the report are described in more detail in  appendix II.
We conducted this review as part of a continuing body of work related to  the Army’s transformation to the modular force. In December 2007, we  reported that the Army is making progress establishing modular units in  the active and reserve components but has not established sufficient  management controls to provide accountability for results for establishing  modular units and expanding the force. In response to that report, the  Secretary of Defense agreed with our recommendations to improve  management controls and develop a comprehensive Army strategy and  funding plan for staffing and equipping modular units. We also found that  while the Army is evaluating lessons learned from its ongoing  counterinsurgency operations, it lacks a comprehensive plan to determine  whether fielded modular unit designs meet the Army’s original goals for  modular units across the full spectrum of conflict. In January 2008, we  reported that the Army did not develop a transparent and comprehensive  funding plan for its estimated $70.2 billion Grow the Force initiative that  would allow decision makers to understand the full magnitude of the  funds needed and weigh competing defense priorities.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Army’s modular restructuring initiative began in 2004 as part of the  overall transformation of the Army and was informed by earlier Army  studies, such as the Striker Brigade Combat Team effort. The foundation  of the modular force is the modular brigade combat team. A primary goal  of the restructuring was to increase the number of available brigade  combat teams to meet operational requirements while maintaining combat  effectiveness that is equal to or better than previous division brigades.  Modular combat brigades have one of three standard designs—heavy  brigade, infantry brigade, or Stryker brigade. In addition, combat support  and combat service support formations have a common design that can be  tailored to meet varied demands of the combatant commanders. As  opposed to the Army’s legacy units, the standardized modular unit designs  are being implemented in the National Guard and Army Reserves with the  same organizational structure, equipment, and personnel requirements as  active duty units. The Army plans to have reconfigured its total force—to  include active and reserve components—into the modular design.
With the assistance of the Army, GAO identified the types of personnel and  equipment that will enable the brigade-based modular force to be as  capable as its predecessor, the division-based force. These key equipment  enablers are classified by category, such as tactical radios. Within each  category we identified the different equipment items that provide that  capability; for example, in the tactical radio category, there are 317  different types of equipment (see table 1).
We also classified key personnel enablers by category, such as  psychological operations, and within each category we examined specific  types of officer and enlisted skills. For example, within the psychological  operations category we identified psychological operations officers and  enlisted psychological operations specialists as key personnel enablers of  the modular force (see table 2).
As part of the redesign of the modular force, the Army is developing unit  blueprints that identify design requirements for equipment and personnel.  The design requirement, also known as the Objective Table of  Organization and Equipment or objective requirement, represents the  Army’s goal of a fully modernized level of equipment and staffing for each  type of modular unit and is unconstrained by resources. Because the  Army’s design requirements represent a future objective that is continually  updated and refined over time, the Army establishes an interim  requirement, known as the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment,  and authorizes equipment and personnel levels across the Army based on  its current inventory of equipment and personnel, planned procurement  timelines, and anticipated funding. The Army expects to use this modified  list of equipment and personnel for the foreseeable future to guide the  conversion of existing divisions to modular brigades. In sum, the design  requirement is the level that the Army would like each unit to have in the  long-term, whereas the authorized level is what the Army can afford in the  interim.
The Army also considered DOD’s strategic plan as it restructured to a  brigade-based force. For example, the Army’s Brigade Combat Team  designs were intended to be effective across the full spectrum of conflict,  including global war, major theater war, smaller scale contingencies,  insurgency/counter-insurgencies, and stability and support operations.  Full spectrum of conflict includes a span of threats ranging from low  intensity conflict, where the major threats are from ambush and  skirmishes carried out by insurgents, to high-intensity conflict, where an  enemy operates large numbers of armored vehicles and advanced  weapons. DOD’s most recent strategic plan, the 2006 Quadrennial  Defense Review, now refers to Army combat power in terms of brigade  combat teams rather than number of divisions, consistent with the Army’s  new structure. In addition, the Army will create a number of different  types of modular support units, and multifunctional and functional  support brigades, which will provide, for example, intelligence, logistics,  communications, and other types of important support capability to  brigade combat teams.
The Army has traditionally evaluated units’ designs and capabilities, such  as support units and support capability, across a number of domains or  areas: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and  facilities (DOTMLPF). Doctrine describes how DOD fights, trains, and  sustains it forces and is generally the starting point for assessing  capabilities. Organization refers to the design of units—how many and  what types of personnel and materiel (equipment) a unit needs to provide  a specific capability. Training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and  facilities are also important components in building and sustaining  capabilities. By looking across the domains, the Army can evaluate how  proposed changes in one area can affect other areas and the units’ overall  capability. For example, the Army may evaluate the effect of adding more  or different types of materiel or equipment on the capability of a unit to  determine whether such changes would require changes in a unit’s  doctrine, organization, or training requirements. TRADOC is responsible  for developing designs of modular units and evaluating whether modular  combat and support units will be capable of successfully conducting  operations across the full spectrum of conflict. Other organizations within  the Army have responsibilities for personnel, equipment, and facilities that  are also critical to building and maintaining the modular force.
The Secretary of Defense announced an initiative in January 2007— referred to as the Grow the Force initiative—to expand the size of the  Army by about 74,200 military personnel to meet increasing strategic  demands and to help reduce stress on the force. This planned expansion  includes building six additional active modular brigade combat teams and  additional modular support units, which will require a substantial increase  in funding for personnel, equipment, and infrastructure. In January 2007,  the Army estimated this expansion may require about $70.2 billion in  increased funding initially and a significant amount in annual funding to  sustain the expanded Army.
section_title: The Army Has Made Progress Establishing Modular Units but Does Not Have a Plan That Links Funding and Results to Guide Its Efforts to Equip and Staff the Modular Force
paragraphs: The Army is making progress establishing modular units, but does not  have a transparent results-oriented plan with clear milestones to guide  efforts to fully equip and staff the modular force. Although the Army has  extended the timeline from 2011 to 2019 for fully equipping the modular  force, it has not identified the total cost needed to achieve its revised  equipping goal. Our prior work has shown that successful transformation  initiatives have a plan that links overall results with funding needs. While  the Army projects that it will make progress toward its authorized  equipment and staffing goals, it is likely to face some significant shortfalls  by 2012 of modern equipment that is required for the modular force to  operate as originally designed. Further, the Army’s equipment and  personnel plans depend on some assumptions related to rehabilitating  equipment used in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and related to  recruitment and retention that may be uncertain, given the current pace of  operations. According to a key 2004 Army Task Force Modularity study,  the success of modular design rests in part on the availability of key  enablers that are required for modular brigade combat teams to function  as planned. Without providing a detailed plan for equipment and staffing  that links funding with results, the congressional decision makers will not  have information to track the Army’s progress toward equipping and  staffing its forces.
subsections: section_title: The Army Is Making Progress Restructuring the Modular Force but Is Forming Units with Shortages in Equipment and Personnel
paragraphs: The Army is making progress establishing modular units. In accordance  with Army strategy, including its expansion plans, the Army plans to have  converted 256 of 303 (84 percent) modular combat and support units  through the end of fiscal year 2008. Figure 1 shows the status of the  conversions for active, reserve, and National Guard combat and support  brigades.
As we reported in December 2007, however, modular units are being  established with shortfalls of some equipment and personnel. To meet  operational needs, the Army has allocated available equipment and  personnel to deployed and next-to-deploy units. As a result, although the  Army is converting units to modular unit designs, nondeployed units do  not have all the equipment or personnel needed for the new combat and  support brigades. Using a combination of regular and supplemental  appropriations, the Army has spent billions of dollars procuring and  repairing equipment in recent years. However, equipping deployed and  deploying forces has been the priority, and the amount of equipment left  for non-deployed forces has declined. In February 2008, the Chief of Staff  of the Army testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the  Army’s readiness is being consumed as fast as it can be built. The Army  has announced a plan to restore balance to the force by 2011, but it has  not detailed how it will achieve its goals of sustaining the force, preparing  for missions, resetting equipment, and transforming for the future.
section_title: The Army Has Not Linked Planned Investments with Interim Milestones
paragraphs: The Army has extended its estimate for when it can fully equip the  modular force from 2011 to 2019, but it still has not identified the total cost  or established interim milestones toward reaching its revised equipping  goal. Our prior work has shown that successful transformation initiatives  have a clear plan with interim milestones that links overall results with  funding needs. In our December 2007, report we recommended that the  Army develop a comprehensive strategy and funding plan as well as  measures of progress for equipping and staffing the modular force.  We  also recommended that the Secretary of the Army report this information  to Congress to assist in its oversight of Army plans. Even though the Army  agreed with our recommendations, it has not yet developed the  comprehensive strategy or measures of progress needed to enable  congressional oversight.
The Army’s current investment plan is depicted in its 5-year defense plan,  known as the future years defense program. However, this plan does not  provide details about the Army’s equipping and staffing plans to reach  goals that stretch until 2019. When developing its personnel or equipment  plans, the Army must consider a number of factors. First, the Army gives  priority to meeting the needs of deployed forces, and these requirements  depend on dynamic operational conditions. For example, the surge of  forces into Iraq in 2007 required the Army to equip and staff additional  units quickly. Second, the Army must consider the wear and tear of  ongoing operations on its equipment and make assumptions about how  much equipment currently in use can be repaired. Third, the Army must  determine how much equipment to buy to replace worn-out equipment  and modernize the force. Finally, the Army has to decide how to distribute  equipment and personnel across its remaining units within acceptable  levels of risk.
Army officials told us that they use internal tracking systems to plan  procurements of equipment and assess projected levels against  requirements; however, visibility outside the Army over the progress in  equipping and staffing the force is limited. The Army has not provided  congressional decision makers with this detailed information. The John  Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (hereafter  Public Law 109-364) requires the Secretary of the Army to include in a  report submitted annually with the President’s budget, among other things,  an assessment of the progress made during that fiscal year toward meeting  the overall requirements of the funding priorities for equipment related to  the modularity initiative as well as the requirements for repair and  recapitalization of equipment used in the Global War on Terrorism, and  reconstitution of equipment in prepositioned stocks. In its fiscal year  2008 report, the Army submitted a list of requested fiscal year-2009- funding amounts for selected equipment. However, the Army did not  provide comprehensive information that is necessary to determine the  progress it is making in equipping modular forces. Specifically, the Army’s  report did not include: (1) planned annual investments in acquisition and  reset for equipment beyond fiscal year 2009 and quantities that it expects  to procure or repair, (2) annual target levels for equipment and personnel,  (3) key assumptions underlying the Army’s plans, or (4) an assessment of  interim progress toward meeting overall Army requirements and the  impacts of shortfalls. While Public Law 109-364 does not expressly  delineate the level of detail the Army should submit in the progress  assessment included in its annual report, unless DOD provides information  that links requirements, funding requests, and planned procurements,  Congress may not have the best information on which to base funding  decisions.
section_title: Army Projects That It Will Meet Overall Equipment and Personnel Requirements but Faces Challenges in Meeting These Goals
paragraphs: The Army’s equipping and staffing projections indicate that the Army will  have enough equipment and personnel to meet aggregate equipping and  staffing requirements by 2012. However, our analysis of the Army’s  projections showed some potential shortfalls of modern equipment, and  its projections are based partly on the continued use of some older  equipment. For example, the Army projects that it will exceed its  authorized level of medium tactical vehicles by fiscal year 2012, but its  projections include continued use of more than 12,500 obsolete two-and- one-half-ton medium trucks that are not deployable overseas. As table 3  shows, our analysis of Army data found that when older equipment is  excluded, shortfalls are projected in selected types of modern equipment  within the key equipment categories. For example, our analysis showed  significant shortages projected for three systems that make up the tactical  internet: the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System and the Single  Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System. According to the 2004 Task  Force Modularity study, the full benefits of networking may not be  realized if only some elements of the force have the capability. Appendix I  contains a more complete discussion of our analysis, and findings.
The Army’s projections of when it will be able to fully equip and staff the  modular force are based on assumptions that will affect the actual  equipment and personnel available. Expanding the size of the Army,  rehabilitating equipment that has experienced wear and tear from  overseas operations, recruiting and retaining personnel, and competition  for increasingly scarce resources, each presents the Army challenges in  planning and implementation as described below.
Expanding the Army: The Army’s planned expansion includes building six  additional active modular brigade combat teams and additional modular  support brigades within its increased end strength of 74,200. Our prior  work on recruiting and retention as well as equipping modular units have  identified some potential difficulties that could arise in implementing an  increase in the size of the Army at a time when the services are supporting  ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, our prior work  has identified shortages in mid-level officers for a larger force.
Repair and restore deployed equipment: Equipment is currently  experiencing significant wear and tear in overseas operations, reducing  the equipment’s expected service life. It is uncertain whether it is  economically feasible to repair and restore equipment that has been  deployed overseas, also known as equipment reset, to preserve its service  life. An Army procurement official confirmed that the Army’s equipment  projections rest on some uncertain assumptions related to the ability to  reset the force.
Recruiting and retention of personnel: While the services have generally  met their recruiting and retention goals, several factors suggest that  challenges for recruitment and retention are likely to continue. For  instance, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified in February  2008 before the Senate Armed Services Committee that recruiters have  difficulty meeting their accession goals because of a decline in the  willingness of persons in a position of influence to encourage potential  recruits to enlist during a time of war. Another factor that DOD has  reported contributing to the Army’s recruiting challenges is that more than  half of today’s youth between the ages of 16 and 21 are not qualified to  serve in the military because they fail to meet the military’s entry  standards. Further, the Army has experienced decreased retention among  officers early in their careers and shortages within certain specialty areas  such as military intelligence (see app. I for a detailed analysis of the  Army’s projections for specific personnel that are critical to the modular  force).
Availability of personnel: A growing number of Army personnel are  unavailable for assignment because they are in training or are students, are  transiting between positions, or are in a “holding facility” due to medical,  disciplinary, or pre-separation reasons. Historically, about 13 percent of  the Army’s end-strength has been unavailable. However, the number of  service members who are unavailable now is likely to be greater because  the number of personnel unavailable due to war wounds has increased  over the past several years.
Availability of Funding: The Army’s ability to execute its equipment and  personnel plans rests on several assumptions related to future costs and  available funding. DOD has relied on a combination of regular  appropriations and supplemental funding to finance the transition to  modularity. How long supplemental funding will be available for this  purpose is unclear. We have previously reported that DOD tends to  understate future costs in its equipment plans by employing overly  optimistic planning assumptions in its budget formulations. A growing  governmentwide fiscal imbalance could limit growth in defense funding  and force choices among competing defense priorities, and rising costs for  acquisition programs could require DOD to reassess the types and  quantities of equipment it procures in the future. A senior Army official in  the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs stated that significant  increases in costs to procure equipment required for current operations,  such as armored vehicles, represents another factor that may lead the  Army to procure less equipment than expected. Moreover, personnel costs  are rising dramatically, and as the costs for military pay and benefits grow,  questions arise whether DOD has the right pay and compensation  strategies to cost-effectively sustain the total force in the future.
While Congress has provided substantial funding in response to DOD  requests, our analysis has shown the Army has not adequately  demonstrated to Congress how it intends to invest future funding to  procure the modern equipment and provide staff with critical skills that  will enable modular units to operate most effectively and when it can  expect all modular units to have the equipment and personnel they are  authorized. Decision makers may not be fully informed of the Army’s  equipment status because the Army has not developed a comprehensive  equipment and personnel plan that details the equipment the Army has in  its inventories as compared with the equipment required for units to  operate effectively in their modular designs and that sets milestones  against which to measure the Army’s progress equipping and staffing the  modular force with key enablers.
section_title: The Army Has Not Fully Evaluated the Capabilities of the Modular Force across the Full Spectrum of Conflict
paragraphs: The Army uses a variety of approaches in testing unit designs and  capabilities, but these efforts have not yielded a comprehensive evaluation  of modular forces. Testing the modular force is intended to determine  whether modular units are capable of performing potential missions  across the full spectrum of conflict—and therefore needs to be as realistic  as possible. Gaps in the Army’s testing of the modular support forces and  lack of a focal point for ensuring thorough testing of these forces could  result in less capable support forces than planned. First, the Army has not  fully assessed the effectiveness of its support units because it has not  completed the doctrine that would define how modular support units will  train, be sustained, and support the fight. Without this underpinning  doctrine, the Army does not have a basic framework upon which to  develop measures to assess the effectiveness of support units. Second, the  Army has been testing the capability of modular forces primarily at  unconstrained design levels, not the authorized level of personnel and  equipment units that the Army actually plans to provide. However, our  analysis found significant shortfalls in the Army’s projected equipment and  personnel when measured against design levels; as a result, this approach  may not realistically test the capabilities of units that will generally be  given less equipment and fewer personnel than called for in the design  level. To support ongoing operations, the Army has focused its testing and  evaluation efforts thus far on conducting ongoing counterinsurgency  operations. However, without testing that is realistic and includes support  forces across a full spectrum of potential conflict, the Army faces risks  associated with equipment and personnel shortfalls should another type of  conflict occur.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Doctrine for Support Units Hinders Testing of the Modular Force
paragraphs: The urgent need for modular combat units has caused the Army to place  its priority on assessing these critical units, but it has not completed  doctrine that would define how support units—which also have important  roles—will operate. Further, unlike its approach for assessing combat  units, TRADOC has not identified an organization responsible for  performing integrated assessments of its modular support forces. In  managing its transformation to the modular design, the Army has assessed  combat units across seven domains or areas—doctrine, organization,  training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). These  areas are interrelated—for example, adding more or different types of  materiel or equipment can change the capability of a unit that would need  to be reflected in the unit’s organization or doctrine. TRADOC has made  some changes in how its modular units operate based on lessons learned  in current operations.
The Army has stated that its transformation efforts will be based on the  underlying doctrine that defines how the Army trains, sustains, and fights.  Doctrine represents an approved guidebook that details how units are  expected to operate, how they will be organized, trained, and equipped to  perform their missions. Army officials stated that without doctrine it is  difficult to assess a unit because doctrine provides the standards by which  a unit is evaluated. Even though many support units have been converted  to modular designs, the Army has not yet completed the doctrine that is  basic to developing strategies to train and equip units. For example,  doctrine for logistics units had not been completed, and the Army did not  have a firm estimate for when it will be completed. Similarly, doctrine for  all military intelligence and signal units was incomplete, and military  intelligence officials were uncertain when this might be finalized. In 2005,  the Army Science Board cited the lack of completed doctrine for modular  support units as one issue that might limit effectiveness of the modular  force. These officials explained that the Army cannot be sure that unit  training is appropriate if doctrine is incomplete, because doctrine provides  the standards by which the Army assesses unit training. Without approved  doctrine, the Army cannot be assured that its efforts to assess and train  modular units are adequate.
Once doctrine is in place, the Army can evaluate support units across the  other domains of the DOTMLPF domains. In contrast to its approach for  combat units, however, the Army has not identified an organization  responsible to ensure that integrated assessments of its support units are  performed across the DOTMLPF domains that affect the unit’s capabilities.  For combat brigades, the Army has designated experienced officials  within TRADOC’s infantry and armor centers, called capabilities  managers, who act as focal points for evaluating combat unit designs and  coordinating comprehensive assessments of these units across the  DOTMLPF domains to determine how best to mitigate potential risks with  changes to doctrine and unit design, resolve training and equipping issues,  and incorporate lessons learned. By assigning responsibility and authority  for assessing forces to the capability managers, the Army has created a  focal point for evaluating unit capabilities that clarifies lines of  accountability and helps ensure that the designs of support units are fully  tested across the DOTMLPF domains. For example, the Stryker Brigade  Combat Team capability manager monitors the status of doctrine for  Stryker units and lessons learned from current operations and updates as  necessary doctrine and unit design as needed. Similarly, TRADOC  established a capability manager for the Infantry Brigade Combat Team  formation who, among other things, monitors the development of  assessments across the DOTMLPF domains to ensure these areas are  integrated and that the infantry unit design supports operational  requirements. For example, the commander of one infantry brigade  combat team stated that the infantry capability manager could help resolve  concerns regarding training and equipment issues before deploying units  to support the global war on terror. Without a responsible focal point to  ensure that assessments across the DOTMLPF domains are conducted in  an integrated fashion, the Army runs a risk that support units will not have  the capabilities needed to support the modular force.
section_title: The Army Has Not Comprehensively Tested the Modular Force Based on Authorized Equipment and Personnel Levels
paragraphs: TRADOC conducts computer simulations to test and evaluate the  capability of the modular force based on designed equipment and  personnel levels but does not perform these tests based on either  authorized or available equipment or personnel levels. According to the  Army, TRADOC assessed the modular force in 2004 based on the  resources, equipment, and personnel specified in the modular unit design,  not the authorized levels that would reflect the equipment and personnel  that the units will actually have. During this assessment process, TRADOC  identified some risks related to this modular transformation process and  identified enablers,  such as those we discussed earlier in this report, that  would be needed to mitigate these risks. For example, when TRADOC  used computer modeling tools to assess the combat capabilities of  modular combat units, it determined that there was a risk associated with  having two combat-focused, or maneuver, battalions in a modular combat  brigade, as opposed to the three maneuver battalions that made up a  combat brigade in the previous divisional structure. Based on this analysis,  the Army made adjustments in the design of the units, such as adding  battlespace awareness equipment such as unmanned aerial vehicles and  increasing the number of intelligence personnel, before accepting the  modular designs. However, the Army’s design represents an ideal future  objective that is unconstrained by resources.
Measured against the design level, the Army is projecting significant  shortfalls in a number of different equipment and personnel areas. Since  the Army accepted the modularity concept based on the design level, these  shortfalls could also affect the capabilities modular units can deliver to  combatant commanders. As table 4 shows, our analysis of selected key  enabler equipment projections against design requirements found that the  Army projects it will have less than half of the design requirement for  some key equipment, such as battle command equipment, fire-finder  radars, tactical and high frequency radios, and medium-wheeled vehicles.  (For details of this analysis, see table 7 in app. I.)
According to the Army, such enablers are critical to the modular force.  During the development of the new modular brigade combat team designs,  the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Army to develop designs that  would be “as capable as” the legacy designs the Army wanted to replace.  Working under Army TRADOC, in 2004, the Army Task Force Modularity  assessed several brigade combat team design alternatives and concluded  that selected key enablers largely determined the performance of each of  the alternatives. As a result, the Army made some changes to modular  unit blueprints and assumed that modern equipment—including advanced  battle command systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and top of the line  intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance equipment that provide a brigade  commander enhanced situational awareness—would be available for these  units. These changes were meant to mitigate the risks associated with  smaller but more numerous brigades; the Army created four modular  brigade combat teams out of three former divisional brigades and reduced  from three to two the number of battalions within a combat brigade. The  Army approved an initial brigade combat team design, which senior Army  leaders assessed as “good enough” for the Army’s modular restructuring.
Since the initial 2004 assessment of the modular brigades, the Army has  used a case-by-case review process to analyze specific shortfalls and  identify any needed risk mitigation strategies. These assessments have  been focused on supporting ongoing counterinsurgency operations.  However, because these assessments focus on a few specific shortfalls  and do not examine how all the equipment and staffing work together in  modular force across the full spectrum of conflict, it is unclear whether  the currently authorized personnel and equipment achieve the capability  that was originally envisioned.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Restructuring and modernizing the Army amid ongoing operations  presents a complex and growing challenge. To date, the Army has received  billions of dollars in regular and supplemental appropriations that have  helped to prepare deploying units, but these investments have not yet  translated into improved readiness for non-deployed units. As operations  have continued, the target date for rebuilding the Army has slipped  considerably and is now more than a decade away. We previously  recommended that the Army establish management controls to assess  progress in achieving its goal of fully equipping the modular force and  report this information to Congress, and the Army agreed. However, in its  2008 report to Congress, the information the Army provided focused  primarily on the 2009 budget year and did not include the detailed, year-by- year information that would represent the comprehensive management  controls that are needed to demonstrate progress in equipping and staffing  the modular force. Without detailed planning for results that includes  interim targets for equipping and staffing the modular force and clearly  links investments with goals for equipping and staffing modular units,  DOD and Congress will not have the information needed to fully assess the  Army’s progress or determine the impact of any shortfalls. Moreover,  without the information the Army needs to show progress toward its goals,  the Army could face difficulties competing for increasingly scarce  resources in the future and risks additional slippage in its timeline for  rebuilding the Army.
The Army’s transition to the modular design has provided flexibility in  supporting ongoing operations, but the effectiveness of the design across  the full range of potential conflicts and with potential shortfalls in key  equipment and personnel is still unknown. Understandably, the Army has  focused its evaluation efforts on combat brigades supporting ongoing  operations, although these are primarily counterinsurgency operations and  do not represent the full spectrum of potential conflicts. However,  although the integration of support forces with combat brigades is a key  factor to the success of the modular design, the underpinning doctrine for  modular support forces has yet to be completed. And, unlike its approach  for combat forces, the Army has not yet identified an organization or focal  point to be responsible for conducting integrated assessments of support  forces across the DOTMLPF domains. By conducting an assessment of the  total force against the full spectrum of requirements and identifying  capability gaps in combat and support units, the Army can identify options  that balance short-term needs with long-term risks. Lacking an analysis of  the capabilities of the modular force at authorized levels—which  represents what the Army actually plans to have—the Army will not be in  a position to realistically assess whether the capabilities that it is fielding  can perform mission requirements.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the Army’s focus on the relationship between investments and  results and the completeness of the information that the Army provides  Congress, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of  the Army take the following action:    Develop and report to Congress a results-oriented plan that provides  detailed information on the Army’s progress in providing the modular  force with key equipment and personnel enablers. The plan should show  actual status and planned milestones through 2019 for each type of key  equipment and personnel, including    goals for on-hand equipment and personnel levels at the end of each    projected on-hand equipment and personnel levels at the end of each  fiscal year, including planned annual investments and quantities of  equipment expected to be procured or repaired as well as key  assumptions underlying the Army’s plans; and    an assessment of interim progress toward meeting overall Army  requirements and the risks associated with any shortfalls.
To enhance the Army’s efforts to comprehensively assess modular designs  we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of  the Army to take the following three actions:    Develop a plan, including timelines, for completing doctrine for modular  support forces.
Establish an organizational focal point to ensure that integrated  assessments of modular support units’ designs are performed across the  DOTMLPF domains.
Assess the capabilities of the modular force based on the amount and type  of authorized equipment and personnel to identify capability shortfalls  between authorized and design levels and take steps to revise authorized  levels where appropriate.
section_title: Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In commenting on these recommendations, DOD either disagreed or  offered responses that we considered not to be fully responsive to the  intent of our recommendations. We are therefore elevating the following  matters for Congressional consideration.
Congress should consider amending section 323 of Public Law 109-364 to  require the Army to include in its statutorily required report on modularity  a results-oriented plan that provides (1) goals for on-hand equipment and  personnel levels at the end of each fiscal year; (2) projected on-hand  equipment and personnel levels at the end of each year, including planned  annual investments and quantities of equipment expected to be procured  or repaired, as well as key assumptions underlying the Army’s plans; and  (3) an assessment of interim progress toward meeting overall Army  requirements and the risks associated with any shortfalls.
To ensure that Congress is kept informed about the progress in  implementing modular designs across the Army’s operating forces and the  capabilities of the modular force and associated risks from personnel and  equipment shortfalls, it should consider revising section 323 Public Law  109-364 to require the Army to report on the status of its transition to  modularity to include assessments of (1)the status of development of  doctrine for how support forces will train, be sustained, and fight, (2)  capabilities of modular units with expected personnel and equipment and  risks associated with any shortfalls against required resources.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with one  recommendation, agreed with two recommendations, and partially agreed  with one recommendation. DOD disagreed with our recommendation to  report detailed information on the Army’s progress in equipping and  staffing the modular force. The department agreed with our  recommendations to develop a plan for completing doctrine for modular  support forces and establishing a focal point for assessing modular  support units’ designs. However, the department stated that its current  processes adequately address these issues. The department partially  agreed with our recommendation to assess the capabilities of the modular  force. However, DOD stated that the Army assesses the capabilities of the  force in many ways and that its current assessments are adequate and that  additional actions are not necessary. As discussed below, we continue to  believe that the actions we recommended are important to improve the  Army’s ability to identify gaps in personnel and equipment and target  investments to improve capabilities more efficiently as well to manage the  transition of support forces to modular designs and operations. Therefore,  we have raised these actions as matters for congressional consideration.
DOD stated that our first recommendation to develop and report to  Congress a results-oriented plan that provides detailed information on the  Army’s progress in providing the modular force with key equipment and  personnel enablers is not needed because the department’s budget, yearly  acquisition reporting, and congressionally required reporting provide  information on the status and plans for equipping and manning the force.  In addition, DOD stated that yearly goals and projections for on-hand  equipment and personnel are highly variable, given fluctuations attributed  to unit position in the Army Force Generation cycle, equipment repair and  reset plans, and planned modernization acquisitions. Although we agree  that the Army provides Congress with information on planning, budgeting,  and acquisitions systems, these systems do not constitute a coherent plan  that provides sufficient information on the agency’s progress in equipping  and staffing the modular force. Without the benefit of a clear plan and  milestones against which to assess progress, the Army cannot assure  Congress that it is on a path to restore readiness or when it will have the  equipment and personnel it needs. The Army has relied heavily on  supplemental funding to support its transition to modularity, and the Army  has placed its priority for equipping and staffing on deploying forces.  However, in light of pressures on the federal budget, the Army needs to  make clear how it will use the funding it requests, when the Army expects  to be able to fully resource its forces in accordance with its force  generation cycle and the extent to which improvements are being  achieved in the interim. Therefore, we have elevated this to a matter for  congressional consideration, suggesting that Congress consider directing  the Army to include in its annual report on modularity detailed  information on equipment and personnel levels, progress toward  equipment and staffing goals, and risks associated with any shortfalls.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of the Army  develop a plan, including timelines, for completing doctrine for modular  support forces but stated that its current assessments are adequate.  However, DOD’s response did not address two specific issues we raised:  (1) the doctrinal manuals for support forces are not complete and (2) no  plan with milestones for completing the manuals has been developed. In  its comments, DOD stated that it had published Field Manual 3-0,  Operations and that this manual included doctrine for modular support  forces. We agree that Field Manual FM 3-0 serves as broad-based direction  for all Army doctrine; however, it does not include specific modular  support force doctrine that defines how modular support units will train,  be sustained, and fight. As the report discusses, the Army’s Training and  Doctrine Command has published, in separate field manuals, doctrine for  each of the types of modular combat units that details how these units will  train, be sustained, and fight. Our report highlights the need for the  support-unit-specific doctrine to provide the standards by which support  unit training can be evaluated. Until the Army develops a plan to complete  such doctrine that includes a timeline and designates appropriate  authority and responsibility, it is not clear that priority will be placed on  this effort. We believe that the actions the department has taken do not  meet the intent of our recommendation to improve the assessment of  support forces and that our recommendation has merit. Therefore, we  have elevated this to a matter for congressional consideration, suggesting  that Congress consider requiring DOD to report on the Army’s progress in  developing specific doctrine for modular forces, including support forces,  in its annual report on Army modularity.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Army establish an  organizational focal point to ensure that integrated assessments of  modular support units’ designs are performed across the doctrine,  organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities  domains. However, in its written comments, the Army indicated that the  Deputy Chief of Staff is the focal point for organization, integration,  decision making, and execution of the spectrum of activities  encompassing requirements definition, force development, force  integration, force structure, combat development, training development,  resourcing, and privatization and that these activities included being the  focal point for integrated assessments of unit designs across the doctrine,  organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities  domains. However, our recommendation was not directed toward the  responsibilities or authorities of senior Army leadership. Rather, our  recommendation focuses more narrowly on the need to address the  current lack of integrated assessments of modular support units. Our  recommendation was intended to encourage as a best practice the Army’s  current strategy of appointing a focal point for ensuring integrated  assessments of modular combat units and to highlight how applying this  strategy could improve the integration of assessments for support units.  We recognize that there are a number of ways that the Army could address  the intent of this recommendation to improve integration of assessments  for support forces, so we have not elevated this as a matter for  congressional consideration at this time. However, we continue to believe  that employing the best practice of appointing a focal point for integration  would improve the Army’s ability to integrate assessments across domains  for each type of support unit.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to assess the capabilities  of the modular force based on the amount and type of authorized  equipment and personnel in order to identify capability shortfalls between  authorized and design levels and to revise authorized levels where  appropriate. In its comments, DOD stated that the Army assesses the  capabilities of the force in many ways and that modular brigades are  assessed based on the missions assigned and the ability to accomplish  these missions given personnel, training, and equipment available. Further,  DOD stated that the Army is currently assessing its capabilities and no  new direction is needed. We agree that the Army performs many types of  assessments of force capabilities. However, although the Army provided  us documentation of its assessments of modular combat force designs  with the level of equipment called for in the unit design, we found no  evidence that the Army has assessed the modular forces with the  equipment that these forces can realistically expect to have given the  personnel and equipment available. As our report discussed, we identified  significant shortfalls in the Army’s projected equipment and personnel  when measured against the design levels. Further, the Army has focused  its testing and evaluation efforts thus far on conducting ongoing  counterinsurgency operations. We continue to believe that until the Army  begins to test units with realistic personnel and equipment levels and  across the full spectrum of conflict, the Army faces risks associated with  shortfalls of key equipment should a different type of capability be needed  in future operations in a different kind of conflict. Therefore, we elevated  this to a matter for congressional consideration, suggesting that Congress  consider requiring an assessment of modular force capabilities and  associated risks at expected levels of personnel and equipment and across  the full spectrum of conflict.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretary of the Army. We  will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this  report will be available at no charge on the GAO web site at  http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this  report, please contact me at (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made  major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: List of Key Equipment and Personnel Enablers
paragraphs: For the 15 key equipment and the 9 key personnel enabler categories we  identified, each profile presents a general description of the equipment  item or functions of military personnel. We grouped key enablers into  broad equipment and personnel categories that include more specific  equipment items and military occupational specialties that are critical to  the modular force design. For example, tactical radios are a key equipment  enabler category that includes numerous equipment items, such as the  Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System, that may consist of  both older and more modern variants. Signals is a key personnel enabler  category that includes two enlisted occupational specialties (nodal  network operator/maintainer and satellite communication systems  operator/maintainer) and one officer (signal corps officer) occupational  specialty.
Our selection methodology generally required that equipment and  personnel be assigned to at least two types of modular units (brigade  combat teams, multifunctional support brigades, or functional support  brigades) to qualify as a key enabler. We excluded certain types of  equipment that are important to brigade combat teams, such as Abrams  and Bradley tanks, because they are present in both the new brigade  designs as well as the previous divisional structure. After we identified a  preliminary list of key enablers, we submitted this list to the Headquarters,  Department of the Army, for official input and held subsequent  discussions with Army officials. Based on our discussions, we developed  and submitted to the Department of the Army a final list of key equipment  and personnel enablers of the modular force that served as the basis for  our data request. An Army procurement official identified the specific  equipment line items associated with each of the key equipment enablers  and personnel officials verified that we had identified the appropriate  skills associated with these enablers.
subsections: section_title: Key Equipment Categories
paragraphs: The All-Source Analysis System is the Army’s primary intelligence  integration program, found at all Army echelons at battalion and higher  level organizations. This system is composed of a laptop and desktop  configuration that provides battlefield commanders with enhanced  situational awareness and timely intelligence on enemy force  deployments, capabilities, and potential courses of action. Our analysis  includes the four equipment items that encompass this system such as All  Source Analysis System: AN/TYQ-93. The Office of the Army Deputy Chief  of Staff for Programs stated that capabilities from this system will convert  into the Army Distributed Command Ground System, which is expected to  be fielded to active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve units  by the end of fiscal year 2010.
The Analysis and Control Element is a subsystem of the All Source  Analysis System that provides commanders above the brigade level with  intelligence processing, analysis, and dissemination capability. This  category includes eight different equipment items including the Analysis  and Control Element (ACE) AN/TYQ-89 which operates at the divisional  level.
Battle command systems enhance the ability of the commander to gain  information and make decisions through the use of technology, such as  Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,  Surveillance, and Reconnaissance equipment. Our analysis includes 95  equipment specific equipment items within this enabler category, such as  the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below and the Movement  Tracking System. The Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below  forms the principal digital command and control system for the Army at  brigade levels and below; it also connects platforms from lower-level units  through the Tactical Internet. The Movement Tracking System is a  tracking and communications satellite-based system that provides  situational awareness to combat support and combat service support  units. Army officials in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs  indicated that to mitigate the overall shortfall of battle command  equipment, the Army will retain older variants that are in oversupply until  new equipment is delivered. However, shortfalls in this category are  greater than the availability of older equipment.
The Fire Support Sensor System designates targets to enable ground and  air delivered precision strike capability. Our analysis includes six  equipment items for this enabler category, such as the Armored Knight  Fire Support Vehicle, the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle, and the Stryker  Fire Support Vehicle. For example, the Knight vehicle provides precision  strike capability by locating and designating targets for both ground and  air-delivered laser-guided ordnance and conventional munitions. Army  officials in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs indicated  that force structure changes are expected to reduce overall requirements  for this system, which would eliminate potential equipment shortages. The  officials also stated the Army plans to continue to modernize its fleet of  Fire Support Vehicles with upgrades and replacements of non-repairable  equipment.
Firefinder radar is specialized equipment that detects the location of  mortars, artillery, and short and long-range rockets through the use of  radar. Our analysis includes six equipment items for this enabler category,  such as the Firefinder AN/TPQ-36 that locates medium-range rockets. To  mitigate overall shortfalls of these radars, the Army will retain a surplus of  older radars until its modernization efforts replace existing equipment.
The Joint Network Node is the Army’s modernization of the tactical  communications network. This node provides high-speed, high-capacity  tactical network communications and data transport down to battalion  level, which supports command and control, intelligence, and logistics  communications. Our analysis includes 8 equipment items for this enabler  category, such as the Battalion Command Post which provides  communications at the battalion level. In June 2007, the Under Secretary  of Defense for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology approved a merger  of the Joint Network Node with the Warfight Information Network- Tactical system.
Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance  The Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System provides long range  target acquisition and far target location capabilities to armor and infantry  scouts enabling them to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance  operations outside of enemy fire. It is a component of the Fire Support  Sensor System, which provides target designation capability for fire  support teams. Our analysis includes 3 equipment items for this enabler  category, such as the Night Vision Sight Set and Long Range Scout  Surveillance System AN/TAS-8. Army officials in the Office of the Deputy  Chief of Staff for Programs stated that the Army plans to mitigate  shortages by using substitute items that can provide the same or similar  capabilities as the required item until the Army can procure the  modernized item.
High Frequency radios provide commanders with radios that provide  beyond the line of sight voice and data capability. Our analysis includes 17  equipment items for this enabler category, such as the High Frequency  Radio Set AN/PRC-150C man pack that is carried by soldiers. The Army’s  goal is to procure the Joint Tactical Radio System, which provides a  networking capability with multichannel, multiwaveform capabilities to  increase speed and reliability of service. Currently, the Army is using older  radios that it plans to replace; however, these older systems do not exist in  enough numbers to address these shortages.
Tactical radios provide the ability and flexibility for command and control  of combat forces on the battlefield and maintain contact with the lowest  level, the squad leader. Our analysis includes 317 equipment items for this  enabler category, such as the Enhanced Position and Location Reporting  System. The Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System radio  provides commanders with a secure combat net radio with voice and data  handling capability in support of Command and Control operations. The  Enhanced Position and Location Reporting System radio provides a  tactical Internet and communications capability. The Army’s goal is to  procure the Joint Tactical Radio System, which provides a networking  capability with multichannel, multiwaveform capabilities to increase  speed and reliability of service. In the near term, the Army maintains older  less capable radios such as earlier versions of the Single Channel Ground  and Airborne Radio System to meet its tactical radio requirements.
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles – Light  The family of light tactical wheeled vehicles consists of the High Mobility  Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, which is a light, mobile, four-wheel drive  vehicle. It has six configurations: troop carrier, armament carrier, shelter  carrier, ambulance, missile carrier, and scout vehicle. Our analysis  includes 43 equipment items for this enabler category such as the 1-1/4 ton  cargo and troop carrier. Current operations are placing a heavy burden on  these vehicles, and the Army has made numerous design and configuration  changes to these vehicles such as improving their armored protection.  Ultimately, the Army plans to replace this vehicle with the Joint Light  Tactical Vehicle that will be available in 2015.
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles – Medium  The family of medium tactical wheeled vehicles provides multipurpose  transportation such as re-supply and mobility assets for combat support  and combat service support units and includes cargo, tractor, van,  wrecker, and dump trucks. Our analysis includes 176 equipment items for  this enabler category; some of the older vehicles are 2-1/2 ton cargo  vehicles, while newer models are 5 ton trucks. The Army has a medium  vehicle modernization strategy that is scheduled to be completed in 2022.  Until then, the Army will use older trucks to meet its requirements.
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles – Heavy  The family of heavy wheeled tactical vehicles performs unit resupply for  combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Our analysis  includes 106 equipment items for this enabler category, such as Heavy  Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks, Palletized Load System trucks, Heavy  Equipment Transport, and Line Haul trucks. The Heavy Expanded Mobility  Tactical Trucks provides all-weather, rapidly deployable transport  capabilities for re-supply of combat vehicles and weapon systems. The  Palletized Loading System truck is a prime mover with a load handling  system. The Heavy Equipment Transport truck transports equipment such  as tanks, fighting and recovery vehicles, and self-propelled howitzers. Line  Haul trucks include the line haul tractor, light equipment transporter, and  dump trucks. To address the shortfall of these trucks, the Army uses older  equipment items that are authorized as substitute items.
The Trojan Spirit is an intelligence dissemination system that provides  high capacity satellite communications services at Top Secret and Special  Compartmented Information levels to tactical Army forces. Our analysis  includes 14 equipment items for this enabler category, such as the Trojan  Spirit Lite. Army officials in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for  Programs stated that the Army plans to modernize and upgrade Trojan  Spirit with current technology to prevent the obsolescence of this program  until the system is replaced by the Warfighter Information Network –  Tactical in the 2014-2021 timeframe.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle – Prophet  The Prophet unmanned aerial vehicle provides an all-weather, near-real- time view of an area of responsibility through the use of signals and  intelligence sensors. According to the Army, the Prophet provides the  brigade combat team commander with the intelligence capability to  visually display the battles space. Our analysis includes eight equipment  items for this enabler category including the Countermeasures Detection  System AN/MLQ-40. Army officials in the Office of the Deputy Chief of  Staff for Programs stated that the Army’s strategy to mitigate equipment  shortfalls is to maintain older equipment longer as substitutes until they  can be replaced.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle – Small  The small unmanned aerial vehicle provides reconnaissance, surveillance,  and target acquisition capabilities to ground commanders. Our analysis  includes 51 equipment items for this enabler category, such as the  Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System and the Raven  B. The Army has a shortfall for these items at the authorized and design  level, and the conversion to the modular force structure increased the  requirement for these vehicles. However, the Army does not have older  equipment to make up for these shortages.
Table 5 illustrates, by key equipment enabler category, the on hand or  available equipment at the authorized level for modular force units for the  total  Army—active and reserve components—in fiscal years 2007 and  2012. For example, the Army projects to have 100 percent of its authorized  equipment by 2012 in the Analysis and Control Element category, whereas  the Army had 21 percent of authorized levels in fiscal year 2007. In  contrast, the Army projects to have 67 percent of authorized levels of  small unmanned aerial vehicles in fiscal year 2012 —an improvement from  fiscal year 2007, when it had 34 percent of its authorized level.
Table 6 illustrates, by key equipment enabler category, the on hand or  available equipment at the design level for modular force units for the total  Army—active and reserve components—in fiscal year 2007. This data  includes an analysis at the aggregate level of all equipment on hand in a  category and the specific modern equipment required in the design.
Table 7 illustrates, by key equipment enabler category, the projected  available equipment at the design level for modular force units for the total  Army—active and reserve components—in fiscal year 2012. This data  includes an analysis at the aggregate level of all equipment projected on  hand in a category and the design equipment, which represents the  specific equipment items that are required in the design.
section_title: Key Personnel Enabler Categories
paragraphs: We identified nine key personnel enabler categories. Within a category, we  selected military occupational specialties that are critical to the modular  force design.
Ammunition personnel manage and maintain armament, missile and  electronic systems, conventional and nuclear munitions and warheads and  the detection, identification, rendering safe, recovery, or destruction of  hazardous munitions.
The Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer is responsible for operations  that include the location, rendering safe, removal, disposal, and salvage of  unexploded conventional, nuclear, biological, and chemical munitions.  Explosive ordnance officers are assigned to modular units such as the  headquarters units within a combat support brigade (maneuver  enhancement). The Army’s goal is to fill this occupational branch at 100  percent or higher. To meet staffing goals, the Army offers several  incentives to captains, such as choice of occupational branch, duty station,  civilian graduate education, military school or cash bonuses in exchange  for 3 additional years of obligated service. The Army also offers similar  options to pre-commissioned cadets in exchange for extending their initial  service obligations and bonuses to recruit active duty Air Force and Navy  officers to transfer to the Army.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialist (Enlisted)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialists locate, identify, render safe, and  dispose of conventional, biological, chemical or nuclear ordnance or  improvised explosive devices, weapons of mass destruction, and large  vehicle bombs. They also conduct intelligence gathering operations of  foreign ordnance. Explosive ordnance specialists are assigned to modular  units such as the headquarters units within a combat support brigade  (maneuver enhancement). The Army’s goal is to fill this occupational  specialty at 100 percent or higher. Current operations have increased the  need for explosive ordnance disposal specialists, a need which has led to a  shortfall for this occupational specialty. Shortages are also because a high  level of prerequisites needed for personnel to qualify for this specialty, a  high attrition rate experienced in training, and low retention of career  personnel due to competition from the private sector. To meet staffing  goals, the Army has given this specialty a high recruiting priority and  offers its second-highest enlistment bonus to new recruits and retention  bonuses to personnel who re-enlist. Personnel from overfilled  occupational specialties are also encouraged to convert to this one  without extending their service obligations, or they can receive a retention  bonus by re-enlisting.
Armor personnel direct, operate, and employ tanks, armored vehicles,  support infantry, and related equipment.
Cavalry Scout (Enlisted)
The cavalry scout leads, serves, or assists as a member of a scout unit in  reconnaissance, security, and other combat operations. More specifically,  the cavalry scout operates and maintains scout vehicles and weapons and  engages enemy armor with anti-armor weapons; serves as a member of  observation and listening posts; gathers and reports information on terrain  features and enemy strength; and collects data for the classification of  routes, tunnels and bridges. Calvary scouts are assigned to modular units  such as the headquarters units of battlefield surveillance brigades and the  special troop battalion and combined arms battalions of heavy brigade  teams. The Army’s goal is to fill this occupational specialty at 100 percent  or higher. To meet staffing goals, the Army offers enlistment bonuses to  new recruits and retention bonuses to personnel who re-enlist.
Artillery personnel provide fire support to Army units through the  employment of field artillery systems. These personnel control, direct and  perform technical firing operations, and coordinate the efforts of multiple  fire support assets.
Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator (Enlisted)
The field artillery Firefinder radar operator is responsible for operating or  providing leadership in the operation of field artillery radar systems.  Specific responsibilities include establishing and maintaining radio and  wire communications, operating and maintaining Firefinder radars, and  constructing fortifications and/or bunkers used during field artillery  operations. Field artillery Firefinder radar operators are assigned to  modular units such as the fires battalion of a fires brigade. The Army’s goal  is to fill this occupational specialty at 95 percent or higher. To  accommodate growth in staffing needs for field artillery Firefinder radar  operators, the Army has significantly increased its recruiting requirements  and training capacity. To meet staffing goals, the Army has given this  specialty a high recruiting priority and offers its second-highest enlistment  bonus for new recruits and retention bonuses for personnel who re-enlist.  Personnel from overfilled occupational specialties are also encouraged to  convert to this one without extending their service obligations, or they can  receive a retention bonus by re-enlisting.
Civil Affairs personnel support the commander’s relationship with civil  authorities, the local populace, nongovernmental organizations, and  international organizations. These personnel must possess critical skills  associated with a specific region of the world, foreign language expertise,  political-military awareness, and cross-cultural communications.
The civil affairs officer prepares economic, cultural, governmental and  special functional studies, assessments, and estimates. These personnel  also coordinate with, enhance, develop, establish, or control civil  infrastructure in operational areas to support friendly operations.  Additionally, they develop cross-cultural communicative and linguistic  skills that facilitate interpersonal relationships in a host country  environment. Civil affairs officers are assigned to modular units such as  the headquarters unit of the combat support brigade (maneuver  enhancement) and heavy brigade combat team. The Army’s goal is to fill  this occupational branch at 100 percent or higher. To meet staffing goals,  the Army offers several incentives to captains, such as choice of  occupational branch, duty station, civilian graduate education, military  school, or cash bonus in exchange for 3 additional years of obligated  service. The Army also offers similar options to pre-commissioned cadets  in exchange for extending their initial service obligations and bonuses to  recruit active duty Air Force and Navy officers to transfer to the Army.
Civil Affairs Specialist (Enlisted)
Civil affairs specialists identify critical requirements needed by local  citizens in combat or crisis situations. They also locate civil resources to  support military operations, mitigate non-combatant injury or incident,  minimize civilian interference with military operations, facilitate  humanitarian assistance activities, and establish and maintain  communication with civilian aid agencies and organizations. Civil affairs  specialists are assigned to modular units such as the headquarters unit of  the maneuver enhancement brigade and heavy brigade combat team. The  Army’s goal is to fill this occupational specialty at 100 percent or higher.  The Army only recruits personnel to fill this occupational specialty from  current servicemembers. To meet staffing goals, the Army offers retention  bonuses to personnel who re-enlist and critical skills retention bonuses  targeted to senior noncommissioned officers with 17 or more years of  service who remain on active duty.
Mechanical maintenance personnel perform repair functions on Army  weapons systems and equipment that support maneuver forces in their  preparation for and conduct of operations across the entire operational  spectrum.
Light-Wheel Vehicle Mechanic (Enlisted)
The Light-Wheel Vehicle Mechanic supervises and performs field,  intermediate, and depot-level maintenance and recovery operations on  light and heavy wheeled vehicles, associated trailers and material handling  equipment. Light-wheel vehicle mechanics are assigned to modular units  such as the forward support company within a fires brigade and the  brigade support battalion within an infantry brigade team. The Army’s goal  is to fill this occupational specialty at 95 percent or higher. To meet  staffing goals, the Army designated this specialty a high recruiting priority,  offers enlistment bonuses to new recruits and retention bonuses to  personnel who re-enlist. Personnel from overfilled occupational  specialties are also encouraged to convert to this one without extending  their service obligations, or they can receive a retention bonus by re- enlisting.
Military intelligence personnel provide commanders with all-source  intelligence assessments and estimates at the tactical, operations, and  strategic levels dealing with enemy capabilities, intentions, vulnerabilities,  effects of terrain and weather on operations, and predict enemy courses of  action. In particular, they collect intelligence assets; produce threat  estimates; ensure proper dissemination of intelligence information;  conduct interrogation operations of enemy prisoners of war; interpret  imagery; and perform counterintelligence operations.
Intelligence Analyst (Enlisted)
The intelligence analyst supervises, performs or coordinates the  collection, management, analysis, processing and dissemination of  strategic and tactical intelligence. Furthermore the intelligence analyst  processes incoming information, determines its significance and  reliability, and performs analyses to determine changes in enemy  capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action. Intelligence  analysts are assigned to modular units such as the headquarters unit of a  heavy brigade combat team and the military intelligence battalion of the  battlefield surveillance brigade. The Army’s goal is to fill this occupational  specialty at 95 percent or higher. The Army expects staffing needs for this  occupational specialty to increase due to the conversion to the modular  force. To meet staffing goals, the Army designated this specialty a high  recruiting priority, offers enlistment bonuses to new recruits, retention  bonuses to junior personnel who re-enlist and critical skills retention  bonuses to senior non-commissioned officers who remain on active duty.  Personnel from overfilled occupational specialties are also encouraged to  convert to this one without extending their service obligations, or they can  receive a retention bonus by re-enlisting.
Human Intelligence Collector (Enlisted)
Human intelligence collectors supervise and conduct interrogations and  debriefings in English and foreign languages and prepare and edit tactical  interrogation reports and intelligence information reports. Additionally,  they translate and use captured enemy documents and open source  foreign language publications in support of promoting peace, the  resolution of conflict and the deterrence of war. Human intelligence  collectors are assigned to modular units such as the headquarter unit of  heavy brigade combat teams and the military intelligence battalion of the  battlefield surveillance brigade. The Army’s goal is to fill this occupational  specialty at 100 percent or higher. The Army expects staffing needs for this  occupational specialty to increase because of conversion to the modular  force. However, the Army is challenged to increase training capacity for  this occupational specialty because of the need for a one-to-one student- teacher ratio. To meet staffing goals, the Army has temporarily suspended  foreign language requirements for this specialty, offers enlistment bonuses  to new recruits, retention bonuses to junior personnel who re-enlist and  critical skills retention bonuses to senior non-commissioned officers with  14 or more years of service who remain on active duty. Personnel from  overfilled occupational specialties are also encouraged to convert to this  one without extending their service obligations, or they can receive a  retention bonus by re-enlisting.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator (Enlisted)
The unmanned aerial vehicle operator supervises or operates unmanned  aerial vehicles, to include mission planning, mission sensor/payload  operations, launching, remotely piloting and recovering the aerial vehicle.  Unmanned aerial vehicle operators are assigned to modular units such as  the special troops battalion of heavy and infantry brigade combat teams.
The Army’s goal is to fill this occupational specialty at 95 percent or  higher. The Army expects staffing needs for this occupational specialty to  increase because of the conversion to the modular force. To meet staffing  goals, the Army offers enlistment bonuses for new recruits and retention  bonuses to personnel who re-enlist, and is increasing its training capacity  to meet increased staffing needs.
Psychological operations personnel plan, conduct, and evaluate operations  that convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to  influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the  behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals  throughout the entire spectrum of conflict.
This officer commands or serves on the staff of psychological operations  units. Specifically, these officers advise United States military and/or  civilian agencies on the use, planning, conduct, and evaluation of  psychological operations. Additionally, they inform and train foreign  governments and militaries on psychological operations. The Army’s goal  is to fill this occupational branch at 100 percent or higher. To meet staffing  goals, the Army offers several incentives to Captains, such as choice of  occupational branch, duty station, civilian graduate education, military  school, or cash bonus in exchange for 3 additional years of obligated  service. The Army also offers similar options to pre-commissioned cadets  in exchange for extending their initial service obligations and bonuses to  recruit active duty Air Force and Navy officers to transfer to the Army.
Psychological Operations Specialist (Enlisted)
The psychological operations specialist supervises, coordinates, and  participates in the analysis, planning, production, and dissemination of  tactical and strategic psychological operations. These personnel assist in  the collection and reporting of psychological operation data; assist in  analyzing and evaluating current intelligence to support psychological  operations; conduct research on intended psychological operation targets;  and assist in the delivery of psychological operations products.  Psychological operations specialists are assigned to modular units such as  the headquarters unit within brigade combat teams. The Army’s goal is to  fill this occupational specialty at 100 percent or higher. To meet staffing  goals, the Army has given this specialty a high recruiting priority, and  offers enlistment bonuses to new recruits and retention bonuses to  personnel who re-enlist. Personnel from overfilled occupational  specialties are also encouraged to convert to this one without extending  their service obligations, or they can receive a retention bonus by re- enlisting.
Signals personnel manage all facets of Army and designated Department of  Defense automated, electronic, and communication assets. More  specifically, Signal Corps personnel are involved in the planning, design,  engineering, operations, logistics, and evaluation of information systems  and networks.
This officer directs and manages the installation, operation, networking  and maintenance of signal equipment. Furthermore, the general signal  officer advises commanders and staffs on signal requirements, capabilities  and operations. Signal officers are assigned to modular units such as the  headquarters and support company units within heavy brigade combat  teams and the signal company within the battlefield surveillance brigade.  The Army’s goal is to fill this occupational branch at 100 percent or higher.  To meet staffing goals, the Army offers several incentives to captains, such  as choice of occupational branch, duty station, civilian graduate  education, military school, or cash bonus in exchange for 3 additional  years of obligated service. The Army also offers similar options to pre- commissioned cadets in exchange for extending their initial service  obligations and bonuses to recruit active duty Air Force and Navy officers  to transfer to the Army.
Nodal Network Systems Operator-Maintainer (Enlisted)
The nodal network systems operator-maintainer supervises, installs,  operates and performs field level maintenance on Internet protocol based  high-speed electronic nodal systems, such as the Joint Network Node;  integrated network control centers; network management facilities;  Communications Security devices; and other equipment associated with  network operations. These personnel also perform network management  functions in support of maintaining, troubleshooting and re-engineering of  nodal assets as needed in support of operational requirements. Nodal  network systems operator-maintainers are assigned to modular units such  as the signal company within a battlefield surveillance brigade and the  brigade support battalion within a heavy brigade combat team. The Army’s  goal is to fill this occupational specialty at 95 percent or higher. The Army  created this occupational specialty in part because of the conversion of  the modular force and is reclassifying personnel from the network  switching systems operator-maintainer specialty to this one. To meet  staffing goals, the Army offers enlistment bonuses to new recruits and  retention bonuses to personnel who re-enlist.
Satellite Communication Systems Operator-Maintainer (Enlisted)
The satellite communication systems operator-maintainer supervises,  installs, operates and maintains multichannel satellite communications  ground terminals, systems, networks and associated equipment. Satellite  communication systems operator-maintainer are assigned to modular  units such as the special troop battalion within an infantry brigade combat  team and the signal network support company within a fires brigade. The  Army’s goal is to fill this occupational specialty at 90 percent or higher. To  meet staffing goals, the Army offers its highest enlistment bonus to new  recruits, retention bonuses to personnel who re-enlist, and critical skills  retention bonuses for senior enlisted personnel who remain on active  duty.
Transportation personnel are responsible for the management of all facets  of transportation including the planning, operating, coordination, and  evaluation of all methods of transportation.
The general transportation officer functions as a logistical unit  commander or as a staff officer responsible for the functional planning,  coordination, procurement and control of the movement of materiel,  personnel or personal property on commercial and military transport; and  the coordination of all facets of transportation pertaining to water, air, and  land transport systems. General transportation officer are assigned to  modular units such as the headquarters unit of a sustainment brigade. The  Army’s goal is to fill this occupational branch at 100 percent or higher. To  meet staffing goals, the Army offers several incentives to captains, such as  choice of occupational branch, duty station, civilian graduate education,  military school, or cash bonus in exchange for 3 additional years of  obligated service. The Army also offers similar options to pre- commissioned cadets in exchange for extending their initial service  obligations and bonuses to recruit active duty Air Force and Navy officers  to transfer to the Army.
Motor Transport Operator (Enlisted)
The motor transport operator supervises or operates wheeled vehicles to  transport personnel and cargo in support of operational activities. Motor  transport operators are assigned to modular units such as the  headquarters unit of a sustainment brigade and the headquarters unit of a  maneuver enhancement brigade. The Army’s goal is to fill this  occupational specialty at 95 percent or higher. To meet staffing goals, the  Army has given this specialty a high recruiting priority, offers its highest  enlistment bonus to new recruits, retention bonuses to junior personnel  who re-enlist and critical skills retention bonuses for senior enlisted  personnel with 19 to 23 years of service who remain on active duty.  Personnel from overfilled occupational specialties are also encouraged to  convert to this one without extending their service obligations, or they can  receive a retention bonus by re-enlisting.
Table 8 illustrates the percentage of active component Army personnel on  hand or projected to be on hand at the authorized level in fiscal years 2007  and 2012 by key enlisted and officer career field enabler category.
Table 9 illustrates the percentage of active component Army personnel on  hand or projected to be on hand at the authorized level in fiscal year 2007  by key enabler enlisted and officer occupational specialty and rank.
Table 10 illustrates the percentage of active component Army personnel  available or projected to be available at the design level in fiscal years 2007  and 2012 by key enlisted and officer career field enabler category.
section_title: Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the Army’s plan to guide its efforts to equip and staff the  modular force, we obtained and analyzed relevant Army plans and reports  to Congress for equipping and staffing the modular force. Because the  Army lacks a mechanism to measure progress equipping and staffing the  modular force, we developed in conjunction with the Army an analysis of  key equipment and personnel enablers of the modular force. Based on our  review of key Army modularity studies and reports, we defined key  enablers as those pieces of equipment or personnel that are required for  the organization to function as planned, providing the modular design with  equal or increased capabilities to the previous divisional structure in areas  such as a unit’s firepower, survivability, and intelligence-surveillance- reconnaissance performance. To develop a preliminary list of key  equipment and personnel enablers, we reviewed key Army modularity  reports using this definition and received input from Army Training and  Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which is responsible for the design and  evaluation of modular units, and Army Combined Arms Support  Command. In addition, our selection methodology required that equipment  and personnel must be assigned to at least two types of modular units  (brigade combat teams, multifunctional support brigades, or functional  support brigades) to qualify as a key enabler. We excluded certain types of  equipment that are important to brigade combat teams, such as Abrams  and Bradley tanks, because they are present in both the new brigade  designs as well as the previous divisional structure. After we identified a  preliminary list of key enablers, we submitted the list to the Headquarters,  Department of the Army, for official input and held a follow-up discussion  with an Army official to discuss the Army’s responses. Based on our  analysis and this discussion, we developed a final list of key equipment  and personnel enablers of the modular force (See app. I for a list of key  equipment and personnel enablers of the modular force). An Army  procurement official identified the specific equipment line items  associated with each of the key equipment enablers. Our analysis of key  equipment enablers compares total Army (active, National Guard, and  Reserve) equipment design requirements and authorizations for the  operating and institutional forces against total Army on-hand quantities in  fiscal year 2007 and planned equipment deliveries by fiscal year 2012.  However, our analysis excludes planned procurements funded by  emergency supplemental requests for fiscal year 2008 because this data  had not been entered into the Army equipment databases at the time of  our request. Our analysis of key personnel enablers compares active Army  personnel design requirements and authorizations for the operating and  institutional forces against active Army on-hand personnel strength in  fiscal year 2007 and projected personnel strength for fiscal year 2012.   This analysis excludes about 13 percent of authorized end strength for the  modular force because of military personnel who are in the transient,  transfers, holdees, students category, according to Army personnel  officials. The Army’s fiscal year 2007 to 2012 equipment and personnel  plans were the most recent data available to us when we developed this  analysis. Data retrieved from Army databases reflect equipment levels as  of April 23, 2007, and personnel levels as of April 30, 2007. We shared the  data with Department of the Army officials and provided them an  opportunity to identify actions the Army intends to take to address  equipment and personnel shortfalls. To assess the reliability of relevant  Army equipment and personnel databases, we discussed data quality  control procedures with Army officials responsible for managing the  relevant equipment and personnel databases. Although we did not  independently test the data electronically, we determined the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. The Army provided  updated data on the status of the Army’s equipment as compared to the  design requirement as of June 29, 2008. We did not assess the reliability of  this 2008 data. However, the 2008 data were generally consistent with the  data we analyzed in 2007.
To assess the extent to which the Army has developed a comprehensive  plan to test and evaluate the design of the modular force, we analyzed  TRADOC’s modular force assessment process, including documents  related to the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership,  personnel, and facilities evaluations, and the use of modular force  observations teams and lessons learned from ongoing operations. We also  met with officials at TRADOC analysis centers and subject-matter experts  at Army proponents and centers, for example, the Signal Center, to  understand their efforts to develop and assess the design of the modular  force. Further, we visited the Future Force Integration Directorate and the  Army Evaluation Task Force at Fort Bliss to examine the Army approach  to assessing the future modular force. In addition, we also assessed the  Army’s plans to respond to recommendations from prior GAO work  related to the evaluation of the modular force across the full-spectrum of  conflict. Finally, we examined documents related to the combatant  commanders’ evaluation of the modular units assigned to the commands.
To assess the extent to which the Army has developed a comprehensive  and integrated plan to fund its transformation and expansion of the  modular force, we reviewed DOD’s fiscal years 2007 to 2009 base budget  requests and fiscal years 2007 and 2008 supplemental Global War on  Terror requests and met with Army budget officials. We also assessed the  Army’s plans to respond to recommendations from prior GAO work  related to Army modular force and Grow the Force funding plans.
We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review:    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology and  Logistics), Pentagon, Virginia    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Pentagon, Virginia    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness),    Office of the Director (Program Analysis and Evaluation), Pentagon,    Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, Resources,  and Assessment Directorate (J-8), Pentagon, Virginia   Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1), Pentagon, Virginia    Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (G-4), Pentagon, Virginia    Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (G-3/5/7),    Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (G-8), Pentagon, Virginia    Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost and  Economics, Pentagon, Virginia    Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve  Affairs, Pentagon, Virginia    Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Financial Management and  Comptroller, Pentagon, Virginia    Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management,    Army Budget Office, Pentagon, Virginia    U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia    National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia    U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia    U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia    U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Alexandria, Virginia    U.S. Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia    U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Michigan    U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia  -Army Capabilities Integration Center, Fort Monroe, Virginia    Future Force Integration Directorate, Fort Bliss, Texas  -Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Virginia  -Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas    Current Force Integration Directorate, Fort Leavenworth,  -Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  -TRADOC Analysis Centers: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; White Sands  Missile Range, New Mexico; Fort Lee, Virginia  -Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia  -Signals Center, Fort Gordon, Georgia  -Intelligence Center and Office Chief of Military Intelligence, Fort   Huachuca, Arizona  -U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia  -U.S. Army Signals School, Fort Gordon, Georgia  -U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona  -U.S. Army Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virginia    Congressional Budget Office, Washington, D.C.    Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2007 to September 2008  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Gwendolyn Jaffe, Assistant  Director; Margaret Morgan, Assistant Director; Kelly Baumgartner; Hillary  Benedict; Herbert Bowsher; Kurt Burgeson; Grace Coleman; Stephen  Faherty; Barbara Gannon; David Hubbell; Jim Melton; Steve Pruitt; Steven  Rabinowitz; Terry Richardson; Kathryn Smith; Karen Thornton; and J.  Andrew Walker made major contributions to this report.