Defense Acquisitions: Future Aerostat and Airship Investment Decisions Drive Oversight and Coordination Needs
Published: 2012-10-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Use of lighter-than-air platforms, such as aerostats, which are tethered to the ground, and airships, which are freeflying, could significantly improve U.S. ISR and communications capabilities, and move cargo more cheaply over long distances and to austere locations. DOD is spending about $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2012 to develop and acquire numerous aerostats and airships.
GAO was asked to determine (1) what key systems governmentwide are being developed and acquired, including funding, purpose, and status; (2) any technical challenges these key efforts may be facing; and (3) how effectively these key efforts are being overseen to ensure coordination, and identify any potential for duplication. To address these questions, GAO reviewed and analyzed documentation and interviewed a wide variety of DOD and civil agency officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO identified 15 key aerostat and airship efforts that were underway or had been initiated since 2007, and the Department of Defense (DOD) had or has primary responsibility for all of these efforts. None of the civil agency efforts met GAO's criteria for a key effort. Most of the aerostat and airship efforts have been fielded or completed, and are intended to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support. The estimated total funding of these efforts was almost $7 billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. However, funding estimates beyond fiscal year 2012 decline precipitously for aerostat and airship efforts under development, although there is an expectation that investment in the area will continue.
Three of the four aerostat and airship efforts under development, plus another airship development effort that was terminated in June 2012, have suffered from high acquisition risks because of significant technical challenges, such as overweight components, and difficulties with integration and software development, which, in turn, have driven up costs and delayed schedules.
DOD has provided limited oversight to ensure coordination of its aerostat and airship development and acquisition efforts. Consequently, these efforts have not been effectively integrated into strategic frameworks, such as investment plans and roadmaps. At the time of GAO's review, DOD did not have comprehensive information on all its efforts nor its entire investment in aerostats and airships. Additionally, DOD's coordination efforts have been limited to specific technical activities, as opposed to having a higher level authority to ensure coordination is effective. DOD has recently taken steps to bolster oversight, including the appointment of a senior official responsible for the oversight and coordination of airship-related programs. However, as of August 2012, DOD has not defined the details relating to the authority, scope, and responsibilities of this new position. Whether these steps are sufficient largely depends on the direction DOD intends to take with aerostat and airship programs. If it decides to continue investing in efforts, more steps may be needed to shape these investments.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD take actions based on the extent of its future investments in this area: (1) if investments are curtailed, ensure it has insight into all current and planned efforts in the short term; (2) if investments increase significantly, include the efforts in strategic frameworks to ensure visibility and coordination, guide innovation, and prioritize investments; and (3) ensure the roles and responsibilities of the senior official responsible for the oversight and coordination of airshiprelated programs are defined. DOD concurred with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Platforms that utilize lighter-than-air (LTA) technologies—such as  aerostats (buoyant craft tethered to the ground), and airships (buoyant  craft that are free-flying)—may hold the potential for significantly  increasing capabilities in the areas of persistent intelligence, surveillance,  and reconnaissance (ISR) and communications, as well as lowering the  costs of transporting cargo over long distances and to austere locations,  such as those without aircraft runways. The Department of Defense  (DOD) has embarked on a variety of efforts to develop and acquire LTA  platforms for these purposes. DOD’s investments in these platforms  totaled about $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2012. Additionally, other federal  agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), are  using or are considering using these platforms in conducting their  missions. However, the visibility into and progress of these efforts, as well  as how much they are being coordinated, has been unclear.
Because of the variety and number of aerostat and airship programs and  interest in the extent of coordination across programs and potential for  unnecessary duplication, you asked us to determine (1) what key aerostat  and airship systems across the government are being developed and  acquired, including funding, purpose, and status; (2) any technical  challenges these key efforts may be facing; and (3) how effectively these  key efforts are being overseen to ensure coordination, and identify any  potential for duplication.
To determine what key aerostat and airship systems across the federal  government are being developed and acquired, including funding, purpose,  and status of those systems, we reviewed documentation and interviewed  officials on the status and progress of aerostat and airship development  efforts in areas such as requirements, budgets, funding, costs, schedule,  contracting, technology maturation, and actual or planned operational  characteristics. In doing so, we developed an inventory of key airship and  aerostat development and acquisition efforts which enabled a comparison  of platform types, performance attributes, and costs. Based on funding data  we collected, we determined that our definition of “key aerostat and airship  systems being planned, developed, and acquired” includes two key criteria  (1) total funding of $1 million or more for fiscal years 2007 to 2012, and (2)  efforts to plan, develop, or acquire systems that include both a platform and  payload (such as sensors or cargo) capability. We analyzed documentation  and interviewed officials from various offices of the Secretary of Defense,  Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army, Navy, and Air Force; U.S. Central Command;  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; and Defense Logistics  Agency. We also analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from  civil agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, Department  of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, National Oceanic and  Atmospheric Administration, National Aeronautics and Space  Administration, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence. We did  not examine the development and utilization of LTA technologies outside of  the federal government.
To identify any technical challenges these key aerostat and airship efforts  may be facing, we analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from  the organizations mentioned above. We used the collected information to  assess any identified technical problems impacting the funding, cost,  schedule, and performance of airships and aerostats.
To determine how the various key aerostat and airship efforts are being  overseen to ensure coordination, and identify any potential for duplication,  we assessed aerostat and airship investments, acquisitions, capabilities,  and operations by analyzing documents and interviewing officials from the  organizations listed above, analyzing the inventory of key efforts  developed under our first objective, and reviewing prior GAO work for  relevant criteria. Specifically, we assessed oversight at the programmatic  and enterprise levels by reviewing organizational roles, responsibilities,  and authorities as they relate to aerostat and airship development,  acquisition, and operations efforts. We also determined the extent to  which plans and planning activities integrated aerostat and airship  development and acquisition efforts and capabilities within DOD.  Reviewed plans and planning activities included architectures, roadmaps,  investment plans, and requirements development. We also used the  information relating to various aspects of the development and acquisition  efforts, such as requirements, and actual or planned performance  attributes, to assess whether any of the efforts are potentially duplicative.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to October 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide reasonable basis for findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our scope  and methodology are provided in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: This report examines two types of LTA platforms: aerostats and airships.  Both use a lifting gas—most commonly helium—but an aerostat is tethered  to the ground while an airship is free moving. Aerostats lack a propulsion  mechanism and are connected to a mooring station on the ground by a  long cable called a tether. The tether, in addition to securing the aerostat to  one general area above the ground, usually provides power to the payload,  such as ISR sensors and communications equipment, and carries data  between the payload and ground control station. Airships, on the other  hand, are manned or unmanned, self-propelled vehicles that have  directional control. See figure 1 for an example of an aerostat system.
There are three basic types of airships: (1) non-rigid—which has no frame  and maintains its envelope (external structure) shape through the slightly  pressurized gas it contains; (2) semi-rigid—which also maintains its  shape through the slightly pressurized gas it contains, but also has a  structural keel along the bottom of the envelope to help distribute loads;  and (3) rigid—which has an internal rigid frame to maintain its shape and  to distribute lift and load weight. Blimps flying above sporting events are  commonly non-rigid airships, whereas the Hindenburg airship of the  1930s is an example of a rigid airship.
Airships can be further categorized by their shape—conventional or  hybrid. A conventional airship has an ellipsoidal shape reminiscent of  those that fly over sporting events. A hybrid airship combines the buoyant  lift of a lighter-than-air gas with the aerodynamic lift created by the shape  of the airship as it flies through the air. Shaped roughly like the cross- section of an aircraft wing, a hybrid airship can generate up to 30 percent  of its lift as it flies. Additional lift can be generated by directing the thrust  of on-board propulsion systems (called vectored thrust) downward.  Because of the additional sources of lift, hybrid airships theoretically can  take off in a heavier-than-air configuration. See figures 2 and 3 for  respective depictions of conventional and hybrid airships.
In the early to mid 1900s, and especially during World War II, the U.S.  Navy operated a variety of airships for maritime patrol and fleet  reconnaissance, including assistance in antisubmarine warfare.  Additionally, in the early 1930s, airships were used for commercial  transportation across the Atlantic Ocean. However, advances in fixed- wing aircraft design, capabilities, and availability, as well as in enemy  antiaircraft weaponry, led to a marked decline in the military and  commercial use of airships. For instance, the Navy disbanded its last  airship unit in 1962, and since then, the military use of airships for other  than research and development purposes essentially discontinued.
Since 1978, DOD has operated aerostats along the southern U.S. border  for counterdrug detection and monitoring. Additionally, civil government  agencies have used aerostats for a variety of purposes, such as  monitoring of environmental pollution, and atmospheric and climate  research. For example, since 2009, the Environmental Protection Agency  has used aerostats for the purpose of sampling air emissions from open  sources, such as prescribed forest burns. Additionally, the Department of  Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has used  small aerostats to collect wind data. Furthermore, the Department of  Homeland Security’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection is considering  using aerostats for its border security mission. The overall investment of  civil government agencies in LTA activities is small compared to that of  DOD. See appendix II for examples of civil agency aerostat activities.  While commercial use of airships has primarily been limited to sightseeing  and advertising, there has been interest in using airships for cargo  transportation to logistically austere locations, such as remote areas in  Alaska and Canada.
Several factors have increased DOD’s attention toward LTA platforms.  The lack of enemy air defense capabilities in recent military operations  has made threats to LTA platforms appear to be low, and the military’s  demand for persistent ISR has grown significantly. For example, DOD  plans to almost double the number of aerostats—from 66 to 125—in  Afghanistan for ISR in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. Also, growing budget  pressures have encouraged the study of potential solutions to military  problems, such as persistent ISR and heavy-lift cargo transportation,  which may reduce procurement and operations and maintenance costs.  For example, a 2008 Army Science Board study that compared fixed-wing  unmanned aircraft, space satellites, and LTA platforms for providing  persistent communications, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions,  concluded that airships offered great promise at being effective in  supporting these missions because of factors including ease of  reconfigurability, extended time on station, large payload capacity, and  lower cost.
LTA platforms face several significant operational hazards. For example,  weather phenomena such as high winds and lightning have posed the  highest threats to aerostats deployed by the military in Afghanistan.  Before the arrival of hazardous weather conditions, aerostat operations  must cease and the platform must be lowered and secured to the mooring  station to help prevent platform or payload damage. Additionally, high  winds can make airships hard to control and increase fuel consumption,  reducing on-station endurance. Furthermore, combat operations can  result in punctures in the fabric caused by bullets and other projectiles.  However, low helium pressure in the envelope (which is only slightly  higher than the surrounding atmospheric pressure) means small helium  leaks from bullet holes are typically slow and repairs can usually wait until  a normally scheduled maintenance period.
section_title: Most Key Aerostat and Airship Efforts Underway or Initiated Since 2007 Have Been Fielded or Completed
paragraphs: We identified 15 key aerostat and airship efforts that were underway or  had been initiated since 2007, and DOD had or has primary responsibility  for all of these efforts. Most of these efforts have been fielded,  completed, or terminated. Over the past 6 years, DOD’s overall  investment has increased, and the estimated total funding of these efforts  was almost $7 billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. However,  funding estimates for aerostat and airship efforts under development  beyond fiscal year 2012 decline significantly, although there is an  expectation that investment in the area will continue.
subsections: section_title: Status of 15 Efforts
paragraphs: Highlights on the 15 aerostat and airships efforts that were underway or  initiated since 2007 by DOD are presented in the table below—details of  each are provided in appendix III. Most of the aerostat and airship efforts  have been fielded or completed, and are intended to provide ISR support  or persistent surveillance, with on-station duration time typically greater  than fixed-wing unmanned aircraft.
DOD’s pursuit of aerostats and airships is mostly due to the ability of  these platforms to loiter for a longer period of time than fixed-wing  unmanned aircraft, which makes them very suitable for supporting the  ISR mission. The various ISR sensors used or planned for the aerostats  and airships in our review include: electro-optical cameras to conduct optical monitoring of the  electromagnetic spectrum from ultraviolet through far infrared; ground moving target indicator radars to detect, locate, and track  vehicles throughout a large area when they are moving slowly on or  just above the surface of land or water; unattended transient acoustic measurement and signature intelligence  systems that use sets of microphones to capture sounds that are  processed and analyzed to determine the direction of the points of  origin and impact of mortar launch; and  signals intelligence sensors to collect transmissions deriving from  communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation systems.
The aerostat and airship efforts we identified vary in terms of the time  they can operate on station in any single session. Their on-station  endurance time is typically greater than that of fixed-wing unmanned  aircraft. For example, the TARS aerostat is expected to stay on station for  6 days, whereas the LEMV airship is expected to stay on station for at  least 16 days. In contrast, tactical and theater-level fixed-wing unmanned  aircraft can stay on station from 6 hours for a Shadow aircraft, to 40 hours  for a Sky Warrior. The amount of time on station is greatly dependent on  how often the aerostats and airships need to be topped off with additional  helium, and in the case of most airships, how often they have to be  refueled.
section_title: DOD Has Invested Almost $7 Billion in Aerostats and Airships over the Past 6 Years
paragraphs: Over the past 6 years, overall total DOD investment in aerostat and  airship development, acquisition, and operations and maintenance has  increased, ranging from about $339 million in fiscal year 2007 to a high of  about $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2010, and about $1.3 billion in fiscal year  2012, as illustrated in figure 4. DOD has invested almost $7 billion from  fiscal years 2007 through 2012 on key aerostat and airship efforts in our  review. Moreover, aerostat-related investment—$5.8 billion—accounted  for more than 80 percent of the total. See appendix IV for additional  details on the reported funding for these efforts.
Over 90 percent of all estimated aerostat investment from fiscal years 2007  to 2012—almost $5.4 billion—is attributed to the development and  procurement of three aerostat programs—JLENS, PGSS, and PTDS.  Aerostat funding increased through fiscal year 2010 primarily because of  increased demand for PGSS and PTDS aerostats in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Most of the total estimated airship investment from fiscal years 2007 to  2012—approximately $1.1 billion—consists of research, development,  test, and evaluation (RDT&E) costs. Of this amount, over 90 percent of  the airship RDT&E investment—approximately $1 billion—is for the Blue  Devil Block 2, ISIS and LEMV development efforts. The major increase  depicted for fiscal year 2010 reflects an increase in RDT&E investment  due to the beginning of funding for the Blue Devil Block 2 and LEMV  development efforts, as well as a substantial increase for the ISIS  development effort the Air Force began funding.
section_title: Estimated Funding for Aerostats and Airships under Development Expected to Decline after Fiscal Year 2012
paragraphs: Estimated funding for JLENS, ISIS, LEMV, and Project Pelican—efforts  under development—is expected to decline significantly after fiscal year  2012, as illustrated in figure 5.
However, according to DOD officials, investment in this area is expected  to continue in the future. The aggregate funding for these four  development efforts declines from $473 million in fiscal year 2012, to $23  million in fiscal year 2016. Funding for JLENS, the development effort  with the highest estimated cost from fiscal years 2012 to 2016, drops from  $369 million in fiscal year 2012 to $187 million in fiscal year 2013, $92  million in fiscal year 2014, $31 million in fiscal year 2015, and $23 million  in fiscal year 2016. The original funding profile for JLENS showed  substantively higher amounts over this time period, but due to a recent  decision to reduce the number of JLENS aerostats that DOD intends to  procure from 16 to 2, the current funding profile reflects this significant  reduction in procurement. There are also investment uncertainties in the  near term for LEMV and ISIS. According to LEMV program officials, if the  first LEMV is successfully demonstrated in Afghanistan, then it may  transition to an acquisition program which would likely require additional  funding. Also, ISIS program officials do not yet know if ISIS will become a  program of record.
According to an official in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence, while DOD expects to continue funding airship and aerostat  efforts beyond fiscal year 2016, specific information regarding funding  amounts is not available at this time. Furthermore, we did not find any  current architectures, investment plans, or roadmaps that incorporated  aerostat and airship efforts to indicate DOD’s commitment to increase or  reduce its investment in this area.
section_title: Aerostat and Airship Efforts under Development Are Experiencing Technical Challenges
paragraphs: Three of the four aerostat and airship efforts under development, plus  another airship development effort that was terminated in June 2012,  have suffered from high acquisition risks because of significant technical  challenges, leading to cost overruns and schedule delays. Additionally,  DOD used the rapid acquisition process to acquire airships that had high  technical risks.
subsections: section_title: Aerostat and Airship Technical Challenges
paragraphs: JLENS has experienced schedule delays and a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost  breach, ISIS will not and LEMV did not meet their originally scheduled  launch dates and have experienced cost overruns, and Blue Devil Block 2  was terminated to avoid substantially increasing costs caused by  technical problems.
The Army initiated JLENS system development in August 2005.
JLENS consists of two large aerostats—over 240 feet in length—each  with a 7,000 pound payload capacity for cruise missile detection and  tracking. As we have previously reported, the program has  experienced design issues associated with the mobile mooring  transport vehicle, as well as schedule delays caused by  synchronization of JLENS with the Army’s Integrated Air and Missile  Defense program. JLENS was originally scheduled to enter  production in September 2010. However, that same month, an  aerostat accident resulted in the loss of one of the JLENS platforms.  The accident, as well as recent system integration challenges, led to a  decision to not procure production units. JLENS also incurred a critical  Nunn-McCurdy program acquisition unit cost breach with the  submission of the fiscal year 2013 President’s Budget due to a 100  percent reduction in planned procurement quantities—the program  previously planned to procure 16 aerostats. Now, the program is  scheduled to only acquire 2 aerostats using research and  development funding, and is not expected to enter the production  phase.
ISIS is a joint Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)  and Air Force science and technology effort initiated by DARPA in  2004. ISIS is to develop and demonstrate a radar sensor system that  is fully integrated into a stratospheric airship measuring 510 feet in  length and with a payload capacity of 6,600 pounds. ISIS has  experienced technical challenges stemming from subsystem  development and radar antennae panel manufacturing. Consequently,  earlier this year DARPA temporarily delayed airframe development  activities, and instead will mainly focus on radar risk reduction  activities. During this time period, the ISIS team will develop an airship  risk reduction plan and conduct limited airship activities. Based on the  radar and airship risk reduction studies, DARPA will reassess the  future plan for ISIS with the Air Force.
The Army initiated development efforts on LEMV in 2010. At over 300  feet in length and with a goal of carrying a 2,500 pound payload, LEMV  offers substantive potential ISR capabilities—if the program can meet  its performance objectives. LEMV’s deployment is behind schedule by  at least 10 months (about a 56 percent schedule increase) due to  issues with fabric production, getting foreign parts cleared through  customs, adverse weather conditions causing the evacuation of work  crews, and first-time integration and testing issues. Also, LEMV is about  12,000 pounds overweight because components, such as tail fins,  exceed weight thresholds. According to program officials, the increased  weight reduces the airship’s estimated on-station endurance at an  altitude of 20,000 feet from the required 21 days, to 4 to 5 days.  However, current plans call for operating the airship at a lower altitude  of 16,000 feet, which is expected to enable an on-station duration time  of 16 days with minimal impacts to operational effectiveness (other than  about a 24 percent reduction to on-station endurance). According to  program officials, the biggest risk to program development was the  ambitious 18-month initial development schedule (from June 2010 to  December 2011). The Army successfully launched and recovered  LEMV during its first flight in August 2012. The Army identified a fiscal  year 2012 funding shortfall of $21.3 million resulting from the need for  additional engineering and production support to mitigate and resolve  technical issues at the LEMV assembly facility.
The Air Force initiated development efforts on Blue Devil Block 2 in  2010. Much like LEMV, this effort was to deliver a large airship that  would carry a 2,500 pound payload in support of the ISR mission. The  length of the airship was 370 feet. Prior to its termination in June  2012, the Blue Devil Block 2 airship effort experienced significant  technical problems resulting in cost overruns and schedule delays.  According to an Air Force official, the Blue Devil Block 2 development  effort had a very aggressive development schedule because it was  intended to meet an urgent need for use in Afghanistan. Some of the  technical problems included the tail fins, which were overweight and  failed structural load design testing, rendering the airship not flyable.  Other technical problems included the flight control software which  experienced problems due to issues related to scaling—although the  software worked well with a much smaller scale version of the airship,  it did not work well with the much larger Blue Devil Block 2 airship.  The Air Force terminated the Blue Devil Block 2 airship effort in June  2012 due to the technical problems experienced with the airframe and  the need to avoid substantially increasing costs of the effort. For  example, the contractor estimated that the 1-year post-deployment  operations and maintenance costs would total $29 million, but the Air  Force’s cost estimate ranged between $100 and $120 million—an  estimate that was at least 245 percent higher than the contractor’s  estimate. According to an Air Force official, the contractor’s estimate  did not include costs such as for spare parts and repairs.
section_title: Some Rapid Acquisitions Took on Too Much Risk
paragraphs: We found that DOD used its rapid acquisition process to initiate two airship  efforts to quickly deliver warfighter capabilities, but significantly  underestimated the risks of meeting cost, schedule, and performance  goals. DOD has taken a number of steps to provide urgently needed  capabilities to the warfighter more quickly and to alleviate the challenges  associated with the traditional acquisition process for acquiring  capabilities. Some of these steps include quicker requirements validation  and reduced levels of oversight, including exemption from disciplined  analyses that help to ensure requirements are achievable within available  technologies, design, and other resources, and that programs have  adequate knowledge in hand before moving forward in the acquisition  process. The success of this accelerated acquisition process is predicated  on efforts that do not involve high development and acquisition risks, such  as limiting technology development by using mature technologies.  However, in the case of LEMV and Blue Devil Block 2, the risks of these  acquisitions were higher than usual for rapid acquisitions. Specifically:
The LEMV acquisition strategy was initially approved when  technologies were estimated to be at technology readiness levels 4  through 7. At the time, DOD’s acquisition guidance recommended a   DOD officials  technology readiness level 6 for product development.stated that they were willing to assume higher risk with the potential of  developing an asset that had much greater on-station endurance and  could provide capabilities on a single platform rather than on multiple  aircraft. They stated that the higher risk of the effort was justified  because there were multiple other efforts that were already providing  surveillance capabilities in theater. DOD officials stated that, at the  time the LEMV initiative was started, they expected the airship could  be scaled up from a commercially existing demonstration variant and  that the Army could meet the 18 month schedule to design, fabricate,  assemble, test, and deploy the system. However, as noted earlier,  LEMV experienced schedule delays of at least 10 months, largely  rooted in technical, design, and engineering problems in scaling up  the airship to the Army’s needs.
DOD also significantly underestimated the risk of the Blue Devil Block  2 development effort. The Secretary of Defense designated Blue Devil  Block 2 as an urgent need solution to eliminate combat capability  deficiencies that had resulted in combat fatalities. According to  program officials, it was thought that the Blue Devil Block 2 airship  would be a variant of commercially-available conventional airships  and therefore deemed the technologies associated with the platform  to be mature. However, the part of the program considered to be the  lowest risk—the airship platform—turned out to be a high risk  development effort. At the time of project cancelation, the Blue Devil  Block 2 airship was more than 10,000 pounds overweight, which  limited the airship’s estimated endurance. The weight issue  contributed to other design concerns, the tail fins were too heavy and  were damaged during testing, and the flight control software  experienced problems related to scaling to a larger airship. The Air  Force terminated the acquisition in June 2012.
The experience of these two programs under the urgent needs acquisition  process is not unique. We recently reported that urgent needs initiatives  that required technology development took longer after contract award to  field because of technical challenges and testing delays than initiatives  that involved mature technologies. Additionally, as reported in a 2009  Defense Science Board Task Force Study, squeezing new technology  development into an urgent timeframe creates risks for delays and  ultimately may not adequately address an existing capability gap.
section_title: DOD Has Provided Limited Oversight to Ensure Coordination of Its Aerostat and Airship Efforts
paragraphs: DOD has not provided effective oversight to ensure coordination of its  aerostat and airship development and acquisition efforts. Consequently,  these efforts have not been effectively integrated into strategic  frameworks, such as investment plans and roadmaps. At the time of our  review, DOD did not have comprehensive information on all its efforts nor  its entire investment in aerostats and airships. Additionally, DOD’s  coordination efforts have been limited to specific technical activities, as  opposed to having a higher level authority to ensure coordination is  effective. These shortcomings may have led to an instance of duplication,  which ended when one airship effort was terminated. DOD has recently  taken steps to bolster oversight. Whether these steps are sufficient  largely depends on the direction DOD intends to take with aerostat and  airship programs. If it decides to make significant future investments in  efforts, more steps may be needed to shape these investments.
subsections: section_title: Aerostat and Airship Capabilities Not Effectively Integrated into Strategic Frameworks
paragraphs: We have reported on the value of strategic planning for laying out goals  and objectives, suggesting actions for addressing those objectives,  allocating resources, identifying roles and responsibilities, and integrating  relevant parties.and airship capabilities into its strategic frameworks for future acquisitions  of unmanned or ISR systems. At the time of our review, DOD did not  have a reliable inventory of its aerostat and airship efforts, including  insight into its entire investment in aerostats and airships, or an office that  could discuss the status of all of these efforts. We found several  instances where aerostat and airship efforts were not well integrated into  recent strategic planning documents, such as investment plans and   However, DOD has not effectively integrated aerostat  roadmaps, which can help guide and prioritize DOD’s investments.example:
U.S. Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2010-2035—which  is to inform warfighting functional concepts, contribute to capabilities- based assessments, and assist in the development of resource- informed decisions on new technologies—mentions the concept of  LTA vehicles, but does not specify the potential contributions of  specific aerostats or airships.
DOD’s Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036— which is to address the recent surge in the use of unmanned systems  and describe a common vision for the continued integration of  unmanned systems into the DOD joint force structure—includes a  description of several aerostat and airship efforts underway, but it  does not specifically cover how or whether aerostats and airships  could contribute to DOD’s force structure.
Strategic frameworks and planning efforts can be essential to the  effective oversight of portfolios, especially when they consist of multiple  types of acquisitions in various stages of development, production,  fielding, and sustainment. Such planning can help ensure DOD has the  proper mix of platforms and a balanced investment portfolio among  technology development, acquisitions, production, and sustainment  activities, and thereby avoid unnecessary overlap in and duplication of  effort. Adding aerostats and airships to the mix of other investments  would add to the complexity of planning and oversight of relevant  portfolios, but doing so could help to make (1) determinations of how  aerostats and airships compare to other efforts and (2) effective trade-off  decisions based on their capabilities and costs.
section_title: Coordination Efforts Limited Mainly to Technical Collaboration
paragraphs: Since 2007, DOD significantly increased its investment in airship and  aerostat efforts, in large part to respond to the urgent warfighter ISR  needs in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to demonstrate LTA technologies  and deliver new capabilities. As a result, numerous organizations  throughout DOD have pursued aerostat and airship development and  acquisition efforts. For example, the Army oversees and manages the  GARP testbed, JLENS, LEMV, and some high altitude airship efforts; the  Air Force manages TARS; DARPA and the Air Force are responsible for  ISIS; the Navy undertook Star Light and is currently responsible for PGSS  and AAFL; and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Research and Engineering is responsible for Project Pelican. Given the  wide variety of efforts, DOD has taken some positive steps to coordinate  the various aerostat and airship development and acquisition efforts it has  underway. However, these efforts have mostly occurred at technical  levels where working groups, consisting of technologists from industry  and government, collaboratively address technical issues, as opposed to  having a higher level authority to ensure coordination is effective. DOD  officials identified various examples of these coordination efforts that have  taken place among the military services and departments:
The Army formed a working group in which the U.S. Navy Naval Air  Systems Command (which manages the PGSS program) participated  to develop plans to merge the PGSS and PTDS aerostat rapid fielding  initiatives into a Persistence Surveillance Systems-Tethered program  of record. This program of record transition is expected to occur in  2014 and should help to ensure effective coordination between the  efforts.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Ames  Research Center signed an interagency agreement in July 2011 with  the DOD Office of the Director of Defense Research and  Engineering’s Rapid Reaction Technology Office to develop a  prototype airship referred to as Project Pelican. Project Pelican is the  U.S. government’s only airship effort to demonstrate ballast-free  variable-buoyancy control technology through which the vehicle can  control its buoyancy (and therefore go up and down) without the use  of ballast and/or ground personnel and ropes. Both agencies agreed  to mitigate long-term technical risk by demonstrating this technology.  NASA is providing acquisition support services to DOD by overseeing  the contractor’s technical efforts and DOD is funding the effort.
The Air Force and DARPA are currently collaborating on the ISIS  project. A February 2009 memorandum of agreement between the Air  Force and DARPA outlines their respective roles, responsibilities, and  development objectives. The project involves developing a large radar  aperture that is integrated into the structure of a station-keeping  stratospheric airship supporting wide-area persistent surveillance,  tracking, and engagement of ground, maritime, air, and space targets.  DARPA is providing program management, technical direction,  security management, and contracting support. The Air Force is  providing resources for program management, demonstration efforts,  equipment, and base operations and support. Additionally, the project  has used lessons learned from the Army’s HALE-D project, as they  are both designed to operate at a high altitude. However, ISIS is  unique in that the radar system is integrated into the airship’s  platform—the radar is part of the airship structure.
LEMV coordination is occurring among various Army organizations  and military services and agencies. For example, the Army obtained  lessons learned and best practices for its development of LEMV by  leveraging the Navy’s AAFL program and the Army’s HALE-D effort,  and the Navy developed flight-to-ground operational procedures for  LEMV. Additionally, the Army has had informal coordination with the  Blue Devil Block 2 effort in the past. For example, originally both  airships had several diesel engine commonalities (they used the same  type of engine), and program officials shared challenges and solutions  they discovered as part of the process to modify the engines to meet  their respective requirements.
The Navy’s AAFL serves as a flying laboratory and risk reduction test- bed for sensors and other components and has assisted the Air Force  with its Blue Devil Block 2 airship development. In 2011, the Air Force  provided funding to the Navy to provide training to airship pilots to  qualify them to fly the Blue Devil Block 2 airship.
While these efforts indicate some military services and organizations are  sharing lessons learned and technical solutions, DOD may be able to  realize additional opportunities for coordination within the agency and  throughout the government. For example, DOD officials told us that  coordination between the LEMV and Blue Devil Block 2 projects and  opportunities to share lessons learned had been limited because of their  concurrent and accelerated development pace. Also, according to a U.S.  Central Command official, information sharing between the PTDS and  PGSS efforts has been limited, because the efforts are managed by  different services, in areas such as test reports and operational impacts  resulting from adverse weather. According to this official, better sharing  of information could help to inform solutions for making aerostats more  survivable. PGSS and PTDS program officials stated that the respective  programs have steadily increased information sharing (including daily  system status reports, aerostat incident reports, contracting information,  budgets, and training programs of instruction) and collaboration on  common aerostat issues (such as in-theater force protection for system  operators, helium supply priorities, aerostat safety and weather  information, and staff and crew tactical training).
section_title: Potential Duplication Ended with Termination of Airship Effort
paragraphs: The shortcomings in planning, insight, and collaboration may have made  some airship efforts susceptible to duplication. We identified two airship  development efforts—LEMV and Blue Devil Block 2—that were potentially  duplicative at the time of our review. However, the potential duplication  ended when the Air Force terminated the Blue Devil Block 2 program in  June 2012. Most of the desired capabilities for LEMV and Blue Devil  Block 2 were similar, as shown in table 3. According to DOD officials,  these two programs were expected to demonstrate ISR capabilities;  however, they are two different types of vehicles with different design  objectives. LEMV is a hybrid airship demonstration that is developing a  new platform and the Blue Devil Block 2 was a conventional airship that  was to place sensors on a mature commercial-based platform. However,  both were expected to have the capability to conduct ISR missions at low  altitude, and share other operational characteristics. For example, both  airships were to operate at the same operational altitude of 20,000 feet,  were expected to handle a payload weight capacity of 2,500 pounds, and  shared some of the same types of sensors. The two airship efforts also  were being developed concurrently and were expected to be deployed to  Afghanistan for testing and operations around the same time.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 directed the  Secretary of Defense to designate a senior official with principal  responsibility for DOD’s airship programs. In June 2012, the Deputy  Secretary of Defense designated the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Research and Engineering as the senior official who will be responsible  for the oversight and coordination of various airship-related programs  across DOD. The statutory direction and appointment of the senior official  are positive steps, but it is too early to assess the effectiveness of this  official’s authorities and responsibilities in integrating and overseeing  these activities. As of August 2012, the Office of the Assistant Secretary  of Defense for Research and Engineering was defining the details relating  to the authority, scope, and responsibilities of this new position. The  overarching direction by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in accordance  with the statutory mandate, provides the senior official with authority over  airship-related efforts. Because aerostat efforts respond to some of the  same warfighter requirements as airships, such as for persistent ISR, and  share some of the same technologies used in airship development efforts,  such as materials, design, and fabrication, common oversight of both  airships and aerostats could enable DOD to have better visibility over all  of its aerostat and airship efforts and help to ensure these efforts are  effectively overseen, planned, and coordinated.
While DOD’s overall investment in this area has totaled nearly $7 billion in  the past 6 years, near term funding estimates sharply decline beyond  fiscal year 2012 and the level of future investment beyond fiscal year  2016 is not known. Until DOD makes the decisions regarding its  investments in this area, the proper role of the senior oversight official will  not be known. If DOD decides to make significant future investments in  aerostat and airship capabilities, the senior official could play a key role in  shaping those investments. If no future investments are anticipated, the  role of the senior official may necessarily be focused more narrowly on  the systems that are fielded or already in development.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Aerostat and airship platforms are not a new concept, but they have  recently been embraced in DOD because of their potential to provide  continuous coverage capabilities quickly, especially in current military  operations. Consequently, numerous organizations throughout DOD have  pursued aerostat and airship development and acquisition efforts. DOD  quickly initiated some of the larger programs with an eye toward  leveraging commercial technologies and delivering capabilities to  warfighters quickly to support current operations. But this rush came with  high acquisition risk—particularly since there was a lack of knowledge  about the amount of modifications and technology development that was  required. Moreover, DOD’s limited oversight to ensure coordination of all  of these efforts has resulted in ineffective integration of capabilities into  broader strategic frameworks and limited investment knowledge and  collaboration, making them susceptible to duplication. The appointment of  the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering as the  senior official responsible for the oversight and coordination of various  airship-related programs is a positive step, but the role of the position  remains to be clearly defined. Yet, the future is uncertain; at this point, no  substantive investment is planned for aerostat and airship capabilities. If  significant future investment is planned, the senior official could play a  valuable role in shaping investments, ensuring they maximize return by  integrating them into broader plans so that their capabilities can be  leveraged and not unnecessarily duplicative.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To address shortcomings in oversight to improve coordination, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions  based on the extent of the department’s future investments in aerostats  and airships.
If DOD decides to curtail future investment, focus on ensuring that it  has an inventory and knowledge of all current and planned efforts in  the short term.
If DOD decides to significantly increase future investment, include  aerostat and airship capabilities in strategic frameworks to ensure  visibility into and coordination with relevant efforts, guide innovation,  and prioritize investments.
Ensure the roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Research and Engineering, as the senior official  responsible for the oversight and coordination of various airship- related programs, are defined and commensurate with the level of  future investment.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft copy of this report to DOD, DHS, and NASA for  comment. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred  with all three of our recommendations to address shortcomings in  oversight to improve coordination of aerostat and airship development  and acquisition efforts. DHS and NASA did not have formal comments on  the draft report. Additionally, DOD, DHS, and NASA provided technical  comments which were incorporated as appropriate.
DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix V.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, and the  Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at   (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are provided in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine what key aerostat and airship systems across the federal  government are being developed and acquired, including funding,  purpose, and status of these systems, we reviewed documentation and  interviewed officials on the status and progress of aerostat and airship  development efforts in areas such as requirements, funding, costs,  budgets, schedule, contracting, technology maturation, and actual or  planned operational characteristics. In doing so, we developed an  inventory of key airship and aerostat development and acquisition efforts  which enabled a comparison of platform types, performance attributes,  and costs. As part of identifying the universe of aerostat and airship  efforts in the federal government, we interviewed agency officials and  asked them about any knowledge they have regarding other systems that  may currently exist. We also conducted Federal Procurement Data  System—Next Generation (FPDS-NG) database and internet searches to  inform ourselves about existing efforts; the internet searches included  unclassified searches and background research. We corroborated and  confirmed the accuracy of the FPDS-NG and internet search information  with applicable agencies. Based on a review of funding data collected  from agencies that we contacted as well as from presidential budget  estimates and Selected Acquisition Reports as available, we determined  that our definition of “key aerostat and airship systems being planned,  developed, and acquired” includes two key criteria (1) total funding of $1  million or more from fiscal years 2007 to 2012, and (2) efforts to plan,  develop or acquire systems that include both a platform and payload  (such as sensors or cargo) capability. We analyzed documentation and  interviewed officials from various offices of the Secretary of Defense;  various offices within the Army, Navy, and Air Force; U.S. Central  Command; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; Defense  Logistics Agency; and offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We also  analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from civil agencies,  including the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy,  Environmental Protection Agency, National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and  Office of the Director of National Intelligence. We did not examine the  development and utilization of lighter-than-air (LTA) technologies outside  of the federal government.
To identify any technical challenges these key aerostat and airship efforts  may be facing, we analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from  the organizations mentioned above. We used the collected information to  assess any identified technical problems impacting the funding, cost,  schedule, and performance of airships and aerostats.
To determine how effectively the various key aerostat and airship efforts  are being overseen to ensure coordination, and identify any potential for  duplication, we assessed aerostat and airship investments, acquisitions,  capabilities, and operations by analyzing documents and interviewing  officials from the organizations listed above, analyzing the inventory of  key efforts developed under our first objective, and reviewing prior GAO  work for relevant criteria. Specifically, we assessed oversight at the  programmatic and enterprise levels by reviewing organizational roles,  responsibilities, and authorities as they relate to aerostat and airship  development, acquisition, and operations efforts. We also determined the  extent to which plans and planning activities integrated aerostat and  airship development and acquisition efforts and capabilities within the  Department of Defense (DOD). Reviewed plans and planning activities  included architectures, roadmaps, investment plans, and requirements  development. We also used the information relating to various aspects of  the development and acquisition efforts, such as requirements, and actual  or planned performance attributes, to assess whether any of the efforts  are potentially duplicative.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to October 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide reasonable basis for findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Examples of Civil Government Use of Aerostats
paragraphs: Appendix II: Examples of Civil Government  Use of Aerostats Purpose and status  The purpose of DOC’s NOAA aerostats is to collect wind data up to approximately 1,641  feet above the ground. NOAA procured the aerostats, ground station, and supporting  equipment in September 2011.
Over the past 20 years, DOE’s Office of Science has supported a national scientific user  facility called the Atmospheric Radiation Measurement Climate Research Facility, which  is a unique system for continuous observations, capturing fundamental data on  atmospheric radiation, cloud and aerosol properties. Since fiscal year 2010, DOE’s  Office of Science has funded the use of a contracted aerostat to support research  carried out through the Atmospheric Radiation Measurement Climate Research Facility.
In 2009 EPA developed a tethered, aerostat-lofted sampling package for the purpose of  sampling air emissions from open sources. Multiple aerostats have been purchased to  support increasing payloads. EPA’s program has been largely funded through a project  with DOD’s Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program to  characterize emissions from open burning and open detonation of military ordnance.  EPA will continue its emissions monitoring program using aerostats only if it can secure  additional funding. Otherwise, the program will cease to exist.
According to NASA, they occasionally fund research that deploys tethered balloons for  atmospheric and weather observations. Also, NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory  continues to use tethered balloons for climate research. NASA plans to continue funding  atmospheric and weather research using tethered balloons. For example, in fiscal year  2013, NASA plans to fund atmospheric and weather research that will use two tethered  balloons in Yen Bai, Vietnam. Furthermore, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center’s  Wallops Flight Facility owns and operates small commercially produced tethered blimps  (advertising type) within the restricted airspace over Wallops Island. These aerostat  systems are used for visibility markers during range operations and for lifting miniature  experimental instrument packages.
section_title: Appendix III: DOD Aerostat and Airship Development, Acquisition, and Operations Efforts
section_title: Appendix IV: Funding Calculations for Aerostats and Airships, Fiscal Years 2007 through 2016
subsections: section_title: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS) RDT&E
section_title: Rapid Aerostat Initial Development (RAID) Procurement
section_title: Effort Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) RDT&E
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Cristina T. Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; Ami Ballenger; Jenny Chanley;  Maria Durant; Arturo Holguín; Rich Horiuchi; Julia Kennon; Tim Persons;  Sylvia Schatz; Roxanna Sun; and Bob Swierczek.