Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections Help Enhance Security, but Oversight of These Efforts Can Be Strengthened
Published: 2007-05-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to evaluate the security of foreign airports and air carriers that service the United States are of great importance, particularly considering that flights bound for the United States from foreign countries continue to be targets of coordinated terrorist activity, as demonstrated by the alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot. For this review, GAO evaluated the results of foreign airport and air carrier evaluations; actions taken and assistance provided by TSA when security deficiencies were identified; TSA's oversight of its foreign airport and air carrier evaluation programs; and TSA's efforts to address challenges in conducting foreign airport and air carrier evaluations. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed foreign airport and air carrier evaluation results and interviewed TSA officials, foreign aviation security officials, and air carrier representatives.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Of the 128 foreign airports that TSA assessed during fiscal year 2005, TSA found that about 36 percent complied with all applicable security standards, while about 64 percent did not comply with at least one standard. The security deficiencies identified by TSA at two foreign airports were such that the Secretary of Homeland Security notified the public that the overall security at these airports was ineffective. Of the 529 overseas air carrier inspections conducted during fiscal year 2005, for about 71 percent, TSA did not identify any security violations, and for about 29 percent, TSA identified at least one security violation. TSA took enforcement action--warning letters, correction letters, or monetary fines--for about 18 percent of the air carrier security violations. TSA addressed most of the remaining 82 percent of security violations through on-site consultation. TSA assisted foreign officials and air carrier representatives in addressing identified deficiencies through on-site consultation, recommendations for security improvements, and referrals for training and technical assistance. However, TSA's oversight of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs could be strengthened. For example, TSA did not have adequate controls in place to track whether scheduled assessments and inspections were actually conducted, deferred, or canceled. TSA also did not always document foreign officials' progress in addressing security deficiencies identified by TSA. Further, TSA did not always track what enforcement actions were taken against air carriers with identified security deficiencies. TSA also did not have outcome-based performance measures to assess the impact of its assessment and inspection programs on the security of U.S.-bound flights. Without such controls, TSA may not have reasonable assurance that the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs are operating as intended. TSA is taking action to address challenges that have limited its ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, including a lack of available inspectors, concerns regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits by TSA and others, and host government concerns regarding sovereignty. In October 2006, TSA began implementing a risk-based approach to scheduling foreign airport assessments, which should allow TSA to focus its limited inspector resources on higher-risk airports. TSA is also exploring opportunities to conduct joint airport assessments with the European Commission and use the results of airport assessments conducted by the European Commission to potentially adjust the frequency of TSA airport visits.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Flights bound for the United States from foreign countries continue to be  targets of coordinated terrorist activity, as demonstrated in August 2006  when British officials uncovered an alleged terrorist plot to detonate liquid  explosives onboard multiple aircraft departing from the United Kingdom  for the United States. Similar terrorist activity was uncovered in December  2003 when U.S. intelligence officials identified terrorists’ intent on carrying  out attacks on U.S.-bound flights originating from foreign airports. Such  conditions highlight the continued need for the United States to  coordinate efforts with foreign governments to help ensure the security of  U.S.-bound flights. Given that there were more than 650,000 flights to the  United States from foreign locations during calendar year 2005, the  security of foreign airports and air carriers that service the United States is  integral to the security of U.S. commercial aviation.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the federal agency with  primary responsibility for securing the nation’s civil aviation system, has  several efforts under way with other nations to help ensure the security of  U.S.-bound flights. For example, TSA, through its foreign airport  assessment program, determines whether foreign airports that provide  service to the United States are maintaining and carrying out effective  security measures. Additionally, TSA, through its air carrier inspection  program, determines whether air carriers, U.S.-based or foreign, that  service the United States are complying with applicable security  requirements. According to TSA officials, the foreign airport assessment  and air carrier inspection programs enable TSA to inform the public about  foreign airports that do not maintain and carry out effective security  measures so that the public can make informed decisions when planning  their travel.
TSA assesses the effectiveness of security measures at foreign airports  using the aviation security standards and recommended practices adopted  by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). ICAO standards  and recommended practices address operational issues at an airport, such  as ensuring that passengers and baggage are properly screened and that  unauthorized individuals do not have access to restricted areas of an  airport. ICAO standards also address nonoperational issues, such as  ensuring that a foreign government has implemented a national civil  aviation security program for regulating security procedures at its airports  and ensuring that airport officials implementing security controls go  through background investigations, are appropriately trained, and are  certified according to a foreign government’s national civil aviation  security program. Member states have agreed to comply with ICAO  standards, and are strongly encouraged to comply with ICAO  recommended practices. While TSA is authorized under U.S. law to  conduct foreign airport assessments at intervals it considers necessary,  TSA may not perform an assessment of security measures at a foreign  airport without permission from the host government. TSA also conducts  security inspections of foreign and U.S.-based air carriers with service to  the United States from foreign countries to ensure compliance with  applicable security requirements, including those set forth in the air  carriers’ TSA-approved security programs. As of October 2006, there were  a total of 924 air carrier stations located in 268 airports around the world  that service the United States and that TSA may seek to inspect.
Considering the high volume of flights arriving in the United States from  foreign locations and the history of terrorist threats against commercial  aviation, TSA’s foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection  programs are important elements in ensuring the security of inbound  flights. Given the vulnerability of U.S.-bound flights to acts of terrorism,  this report addresses the following questions: (1) What were the results of  TSA’s fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessments and air carrier  inspections, and what actions were taken, if any, when TSA identified that  foreign airports and air carriers were not complying with security  standards? (2) How, if at all, did TSA assist foreign countries and air  carriers in addressing any deficiencies identified during foreign airport  assessments and air carrier inspections, and to what extent did TSA  provide oversight of its assessment and inspection efforts? (3) What  challenges, if any, affected TSA’s ability to conduct foreign airport  assessments and air carrier inspections, and what actions have TSA and  others taken to address these challenges? In April 2007, we issued a report  that contained sensitive security information regarding TSA’s foreign  airport assessments and air carrier inspections. This report provides the  results of our April 2007 report with the sensitive security information  removed.
To address these objectives, we obtained and reviewed TSA guidance for  conducting and reporting the results of foreign airport assessments and air  carrier inspections. We also obtained and analyzed the results of 128  foreign airport assessments and 529 air carrier inspections conducted by  TSA during fiscal year 2005 to determine the extent to which foreign  airports and air carriers operating overseas complied with aviation  security standards. We assessed the reliability of TSA’s air carrier  inspection data for fiscal year 2005 and concluded that the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. We also interviewed  TSA’s Office of Security Operations and its Transportation Sector Network  Management officials, both in headquarters and the field, who are  responsible for planning, coordinating, overseeing, and carrying out  foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, to obtain  information on TSA’s efforts to help foreign officials address airport  security deficiencies and TSA’s efforts to overcome challenges identified  by TSA officials in conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier  inspections. Additionally, we visited three European, three Asian, and one  other North American country where we met with host government  aviation security officials, air carrier representatives, airport officials,  aviation industry representatives, and TSA officials to obtain their  perspectives on TSA’s foreign airport assessment and air carrier  inspection programs. We also accompanied TSA officials during an airport  assessment and air carrier inspection at an airport in the Caribbean. In  addition, we interviewed 16 foreign aviation security officials stationed in  their countries’ embassies in Washington, D.C., to obtain their  perspectives on TSA’s foreign airport assessment and air carrier  inspection programs. However, information obtained from our interviews  with host government and aviation industry representatives cannot be  generalized beyond those contacted because we did not use a probability  sampling method to select these officials for interviews. We also  conducted phone interviews with four Federal Security Directors (FSD)  and seven TSA aviation security inspectors based in U.S. airports to  discuss their involvement in foreign airport assessments and air carrier  inspections. Information from these interviews cannot be generalized to all  FSDs in U.S. airports or to domestic inspectors who support foreign  airport assessments and air carrier inspections because we did not use a  probability sampling method to select these officials for interviews. We  also met with officials from ICAO, the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference  (APEC), the Association of European Airlines (AEA), the European  Commission, the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), and the  International Air Transport Association (IATA) regarding their  perspectives on TSA’s foreign airport assessment and air carrier  inspection programs and the process and standards they use, if any, to  conduct their own airport assessments. Additionally, we interviewed  officials from the Department of State, Department of Justice, Department  of Transportation, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency to learn  about the aviation security training and technical assistance they provide  to foreign governments.
We conducted our work from October 2005 through March 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. More  details about the scope and methodology of our work are contained in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DHS Responsibilities for Ensuring the Security of U.S.-Bound Flights from Foreign Countries
paragraphs: Shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress passed,  and the President signed into law, the Aviation and Transportation  Security Act, which established TSA and gave the agency responsibility for  securing all modes of transportation, including the nation’s civil aviation  system, which includes domestic and international commercial aviation  operations. In accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44907, TSA assesses the  effectiveness of security measures at foreign airports served by a U.S. air  carrier, from which a foreign air carrier serves the United States, that pose  a high risk of introducing danger to international air travel, and at other  airports deemed appropriate by the Secretary of Homeland Security. This  provision of law also identifies measures that the Secretary must take in  the event that he or she determines that an airport is not maintaining and  carrying out effective security measures based on TSA assessments. TSA  also conducts inspections of U.S. air carriers and foreign air carriers  servicing the United States from foreign airports pursuant to its authority  to ensure that air carriers certificated or permitted to operate to, from, or  within the United States meet applicable security requirements, including  those set forth in an air carrier’s TSA-approved security program.
The Secretary of DHS delegated to the Assistant Secretary of TSA the  responsibility for conducting foreign airport assessments but retained  responsibility for making the determination that a foreign airport does not  maintain and carry out effective security measures. Currently, TSA’s  Security Operations and Transportation Sector Network Management  divisions are jointly responsible for conducting foreign airport  assessments and air carrier inspections. Table 1 highlights the roles and  responsibilities of certain TSA positions within these divisions that are  responsible for implementing the foreign airport assessment and air  carrier inspection programs.
section_title: TSA’s Process for Assessing Aviation Security Measures at Foreign Airports
paragraphs: TSA conducts foreign airport assessments to determine the extent to  which foreign airports maintain and carry out effective security measures  in order to ensure the security of flights bound for the United States.  Specifically, TSA assesses foreign airports using 86 of the 106 aviation  security standards and recommended practices adopted by ICAO, a United  Nations organization representing nearly 190 countries. (See app. II for a  description of the 86 ICAO standards and recommended practices TSA  uses to assess security measures at foreign airports.) While TSA is  authorized under U.S. law to conduct foreign airport assessments at  intervals it considers necessary, TSA may not perform an assessment of  security measures at a foreign airport without permission from the host  government. During fiscal year 2005, TSA scheduled assessments by  categorizing airports into two groups. Category A airports—airports that  did not exhibit operational issues in the last two TSA assessments—were  assessed once every 3 years, while category B airports—airports that did  exhibit operational issues in either of the last two TSA assessments, or  were not previously assessed—were assessed annually. Based on  documentation provided by TSA, during fiscal year 2005, TSA assessed  aviation security measures in place at 128 foreign airports that participated  voluntarily in TSA’s Foreign Airport Assessment Program.
TSA’s assessments of foreign airports are conducted by a team of  inspectors, which generally includes one team leader and one team  member. According to TSA, it generally takes 3 to 7 days to complete a  foreign airport assessment. However, the amount of time required to  conduct an assessment varies based on several factors, including the size  of the airport, the number of air carrier station inspections to be  conducted at the airport, the threat level to civil aviation in the host  country, and the amount of time it takes inspectors to travel from the  international field office (IFO) to the airport where the assessment will  take place. An additional 2 weeks is required for inspectors to complete  the assessment report after they return to the IFO.
As shown in figure 1, regarding the process for conducting a foreign  airport assessment, before TSA can assess the security measures at a  foreign airport, the Transportation Security Administration Representative  (TSAR) must first obtain approval from the host government to allow TSA  to conduct an airport assessment and to schedule the date for an on-site  visit to the foreign airport. During the assessment, the team of inspectors  uses several methods to determine a foreign airport’s level of compliance  with international security standards, including conducting interviews  with airport officials, examining documents pertaining to the airport’s  security measures, and conducting a physical inspection of the airport. For  example, the inspectors are to examine the integrity of fences, lighting,  and locks by walking the grounds of the airport. Inspectors also make  observations regarding access control procedures, such as looking at  employee and vehicle identification methods in secure areas, as well as  monitoring passenger and baggage screening procedures in the airport. At  the close of an airport assessment, inspectors brief foreign airport and  government officials on the results of the assessment. TSA inspectors also  prepare a report summarizing their findings on the airport’s overall  security posture and security measures, which may contain  recommendations for corrective action and must be reviewed by the  TSAR, the IFO manager, and TSA headquarters officials.
If the inspectors report that an airport’s security measures do not meet  minimum international security standards, particularly critical standards,  such as those related to passenger and checked baggage screening and  access controls, TSA headquarters officials are to inform the Secretary of  Homeland Security. If the Secretary, based on TSA’s airport assessment  results, determines that a foreign airport does not maintain and carry out  effective security measures, he or she must, after advising the Secretary of  State, take secretarial action. Figure 2 describes in detail the types of  secretarial action the Secretary may take during such instances. There are  three basic types of secretarial action:    90-day action—The Secretary notifies foreign government officials  that they have 90 days to address security deficiencies that were  identified during the airport assessment and recommends steps  necessary to bring the security measures at the airport up to ICAO  standards.
Public notification—If, after 90 days, the Secretary finds that the  government has not brought security measures at the airport up to  ICAO standards, the Secretary notifies the general public that the  airport does not maintain and carry out effective security measures.
Modification to air carrier operations—If, after 90 days, the  Secretary finds that the government has not brought security measures  at the airport up to ICAO standards:    The Secretary may withhold, revoke, or prescribe conditions on the  operating authority of U.S.-based and foreign air carriers operating  at that airport, following consultation with appropriate host  government officials and air carrier representatives, and with the  approval of the Secretary of State.
The President may prohibit a U.S.-based or foreign air carrier from  providing transportation between the United States and any foreign  airport that is the subject of a secretarial determination.
Suspension of service— The Secretary, with approval of the Secretary  of State, shall suspend the right of any U.S.-based or foreign air carrier to  provide service to or from an airport if the Secretary determines that a  condition exists that threatens the safety or security of passengers,  aircraft, or crew traveling to or from the airport, and the public interest  requires an immediate suspension of transportation between the United  States and that airport.
section_title: TSA’s Process for Inspecting Air Carriers with Service to the United States from Foreign Airports
paragraphs: Along with conducting airport assessments, the same TSA inspection team  also conducts air carrier inspections when visiting a foreign airport to  ensure that air carriers are in compliance with TSA security  requirements. Both U.S. and foreign air carriers with service to the United  States are subject to inspection. As of February 2007, TSA guidance  required TSA to inspect each U.S. air carrier station once a year, except  for those airports in which TSA has determined to be an “extraordinary”  location, where inspections are to occur twice a year. Foreign air carriers  are to be inspected twice in a 3-year period at each foreign airport, except  in extraordinary locations, where they are to be inspected annually.  According to documentation provided by TSA, during fiscal year 2005, TSA  conducted 529 inspections of foreign and U.S. air carriers serving the  United States from foreign airports. When conducting inspections, TSA  inspectors examine compliance with applicable security requirements,  including TSA-approved security programs, emergency amendments to  the security programs, and security directives. Air carrier security  programs are based on the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program  for U.S.-based air carriers and the Model Security Program for foreign air  carriers, which serve as guidance for what an air carrier needs to include  in its own security program. The Aircraft Operator Standard Security  Program is designed to provide for the safety of passengers and their  belongings traveling on flights against acts of criminal violence, air piracy,  and the introduction of explosives, incendiaries, weapons, and other  prohibited items onboard an aircraft. Likewise, the Model Security  Program is designed to prevent prohibited items from being carried  aboard aircraft, prohibit unauthorized access to airplanes, ensure that  checked baggage is accepted only by an authorized carrier representative,  and ensure the proper handling of cargo to be loaded onto passenger  flights. When TSA determines that additional security measures are  necessary to respond to a threat assessment or to a specific threat against  civil aviation, TSA may issue a security directive or an emergency  amendment to an air carrier security program that sets forth additional  mandatory security requirements. Air carriers are required to comply  with each applicable security directive or emergency amendment issued  by TSA, along with the requirements already within their security  programs and any other requirements set forth in applicable law.  Appendix III provides additional information on security requirements for  U.S. and foreign air carriers serving the United States from foreign  airports.
Although U.S.-based and foreign air carriers are guided by different  standards within the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program and the  Model Security Program, inspections for both of these entities are similar.  As in the case of airport assessments, air carrier inspections are conducted  by a team of inspectors, which generally includes one team leader and one  team member. An inspection of an air carrier typically takes 1 or 2 days,  but can take longer depending on the extent of service by the air carrier.  Inspection teams may spend several days at a foreign airport inspecting air  carriers if there are multiple airlines serving the United States from that  location. During an inspection, inspectors are to review applicable security  manuals, procedures, and records; interview air carrier station personnel;  and observe air carrier employees processing passengers from at least one  flight from passenger check-in until the flight departs the gate to ensure  that the air carrier is in compliance with applicable requirements.  Inspectors evaluate a variety of security measures, such as passenger  processing including the use of No-Fly and Selectee lists, checked  baggage acceptance and control, aircraft security, and passenger  screening. Inspectors record inspection results into TSA’s Performance  and Results Information System (PARIS) system, a database containing  security compliance information on TSA-regulated entities. If an inspector  finds that an air carrier is violating any applicable security requirements,  additional steps are to be taken to record those specific violations and, in  some cases, pursue them with further investigation. Figure 3 provides an  overview of the air carrier inspection and documentation process,  including the options for what type of penalty, if any, should be imposed  on air carriers for identified security violations.
When an inspector identifies a violation of a security requirement, a record  of the violation is opened in PARIS. According to guidance issued by TSA  to inspectors, there are various enforcement tools available to address  instances of noncompliance discovered during an inspection:    On-the-spot counseling is generally to be used for noncompliance that  is minor and technical in nature, and can be remedied immediately at  the time it is discovered. When this course of action is taken, the  inspector notes that the noncompliance issue was closed with TSA  counseling in the finding record and no further action is required.
Administrative action is generally to be used for violations or alleged  violations that are unintentional, not the result of substantial disregard  for security, where there are no aggravating factors present, or first- time violations. An administrative action results in either a letter of  correction or a warning notice being issued to the air carrier.
Civil penalties in the form of fines are generally to be used in response  to cases involving egregious violations, gross negligence, or where  administrative action and counseling did not adequately resolve the  noncompliance. Fines can range between $2,500 and $25,000 based on  the severity of the violation. If the violation is severe enough, TSA may  also recommend revocation of the air carrier’s certification to fly into  the United States, but this action has not yet been taken by TSA.
If a violation is resolved with on-the-spot counseling, that fact is recorded  in the finding record of PARIS and the matter is closed. However, if the  inspector opts to pursue administrative action or a civil penalty against the  air carrier, an enforcement investigation record is opened, and an  investigation is conducted. Based on the investigation findings, the  inspector recommends either an administrative action or a civil penalty,  depending on the finding and the circumstances. If the investigation does  not provide evidence that a violation occurred, the matter is closed with  no action taken.
If the inspector makes a recommendation for an administrative action, the  supervisory inspector or IFO manager will typically review the  recommendation and, if appropriate, approve and issue the action. The  supervisory inspector may also recommend that the action be changed to  no action or to a civil penalty. In the case of the latter, the case will be  referred to the Office of Chief Counsel for further review.
In those cases where the inspector recommends that a civil penalty be  assessed on the air carrier, it is referred to the Office of Chief Counsel for  review. The office is responsible for ensuring that the action is legally  sufficient, and that the recommended fine is consistent with agency  guidelines. TSA’s Office of Chief Counsel makes the final determination  for any legal enforcement action. The office may approve the proposed  action or make a recommendation for other actions, including  administrative action or no action at all.
section_title: TSA Found That Some Foreign Airports and Air Carriers Complied with All Aviation Security Standards, and When Deemed Necessary, DHS and TSA Took Enforcement Action on Those That Did Not
paragraphs: Based on the results of TSA’s foreign airport assessments, during fiscal  year 2005, some foreign airports and air carriers complied with all relevant  aviation security standards, while others did not. The most common area  of noncompliance for foreign airports was related to quality control— mechanisms to assess and address security vulnerabilities at airports. The  Secretary of Homeland Security determined that the security deficiencies  at two foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 were so serious  that he subsequently notified the general public that these airports did not  meet international aviation security standards. In addition to assessing the  security measures implemented by the airport authority at foreign airports,  TSA also inspected the security measures put in place by air carriers at  foreign airports. When security deficiencies identified during air carrier  inspections could not be corrected or addressed immediately, TSA  inspectors recommended enforcement action. TSA officials stated that  while it is difficult to determine whether the assessment and inspection  results are generally positive or negative, the cumulative foreign airport  assessment and air carrier inspection results may be helpful in identifying  the aviation security training needs of foreign aviation security officials.  TSA does not have its own program through which aviation security  training and technical assistance are formally provided to foreign aviation  security officials. However, TSA officials stated that they could use the  results of TSA’s foreign airport assessments to refer foreign officials to  training and technical assistance programs offered by ICAO and several  other U.S. government agencies.
subsections: section_title: TSA Data Identified That More than One-Third of Foreign Airports Complied with All Relevant ICAO Standards during Fiscal Year 2005, and the Remaining Airports Had Security Deficiencies
paragraphs: Of the 128 foreign airports TSA assessed during fiscal year 2005, TSA data  show that at the completion of these assessments, 46 (about 36 percent)  complied with all ICAO standards reviewed by TSA, while 82 (about 64  percent) did not meet at least one ICAO standard reviewed by TSA. For  these 82 foreign airports, the average number of standards not met was  about 5, and the number of standards not met by an individual airport  ranged from 1 to 22. Foreign airports were most frequently not meeting  ICAO standards related to quality control. TSA data show that about 39  percent of foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not comply  with at least one ICAO quality control standard, which include  mechanisms to assess and address security vulnerabilities at airports. For  example, one airport did not meet an ICAO quality control standard  because it did not have a mechanism in place to ensure that airport  officials implementing security controls were appropriately trained and  able to effectively perform their duties. In another instance, an airport did  not comply with an ICAO quality control standard because, during its  previous two assessments, inspectors found that the airport did not  require or have records of background investigations conducted for  individuals implementing security controls at the airport. Another area in  which airports were not meeting ICAO quality control standards was the  absence of a program to ensure the quality and effectiveness of their  National Civil Aviation Security Program. TSA officials stated that quality  control deficiencies may be prevalent among foreign airports in part  because there is no international guidance available to aviation security  officials to help them develop effective quality control measures. However,  TSA officials stated that ICAO and other regional aviation security  organizations offer training courses to help aviation security officials  worldwide in developing effective quality control measures.
TSA data also identified that at the completion of the assessment, nearly  half of the foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not meet at  least one of the 17 ICAO standards that TSA characterized as “critical” to  aviation security. According to TSA, access control, screening of checked  baggage, and screening of passengers and their carry-on items are critical  aspects of aviation security because these measures are intended to  prevent terrorists from carrying dangerous items, such as weapons and  explosives, onto aircraft. TSA data identified that some foreign airports  assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not meet at least one access control  standard. TSA data also identified that some foreign airports did not meet  ICAO standards related to checked baggage screening. One of the baggage  screening deficiencies TSA identified involved foreign airports not taking  steps to prevent checked baggage from being tampered with after the  baggage had been screened, prior to the baggage being placed on the  aircraft. TSA data also identified that some foreign airports assessed  during fiscal year 2005 did not meet ICAO standards related to passenger  screening. One of the passenger-screening problems identified by TSA  involved screening personnel not resolving hand-held metal detector or  walk-through metal detector alarms to determine whether the individuals  being screened were carrying prohibited items.
section_title: The Secretary of Homeland Security Took Action against Foreign Airports That Did Not Maintain and Carry Out Effective Security Measures
paragraphs: Even if a foreign airport does not meet multiple aviation security  standards, including critical standards, TSA may determine that such  deficiencies do not warrant review by the Secretary of Homeland Security.  However, if TSA determines that secretarial action may be warranted and  the Secretary of Homeland Security, based on TSA’s assessment,  determines that a foreign airport does not maintain and carry out effective  security measures, he or she must take secretarial action. Since the  inception of DHS in March 2003, the Secretary of Homeland Security has  taken action against five foreign airports he determined were not  maintaining and carrying out effective security measures, four of which  received 90-day action letters. The Secretary notified the public of his  determination with respect to two of these airports—Port-au-Prince  Airport in Haiti and Bandara Ngurah Rai International Airport in Bali,  Indonesia—both of which were assessed during fiscal year 2005.
TSA officials told us that the decision to take secretarial action against an  airport is not based solely on the number and type of security deficiencies  identified during TSA airport assessments. Rather, the secretarial action  decision is based on the severity of the security deficiencies identified, as  well as past compliance history, threat information, and the capacity of the  host government to take corrective action. For example, there were other  foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 that did not comply with  about the same number and type of critical ICAO standards as the five  airports that received secretarial action. However, according to the former  Deputy Director of TSA’s Compliance Division, secretarial action was not  taken against these airports either because the security deficiencies were  determined to be not as severe, the host country officials were capable of  taking immediate corrective action to address the deficiencies, or TSA did  not perceive these airports to be in locations at high risk of terrorist  activity. Table 2 demonstrates how two foreign airports—one for which  secretarial action was taken and the other for which no secretarial action  was taken—have about the same number and types of critical deficiencies,  but differ in the severity of the deficiencies and their capability to take  immediate corrective action to address identified deficiencies.
According to TSA, secretarial actions are lifted when the Secretary, in part  based on TSA’s assessment of the airport, determines that the airport is  carrying out and maintaining effective security measures. TSA lifted the  secretarial action at Port-au-Prince airport in Haiti in July 2006, 19 months  after the public notification was issued. During this 19-month period, TSA  assisted Haitian officials in developing a national civil aviation security  plan and provided training on how to properly screen passengers and their  carry-on baggage. According to the former Deputy Director of TSA’s  Compliance Division, although TSA determined earlier during 2006 that all  of the security deficiencies at the airport had been addressed by Haitian  officials, based on specific intelligence information regarding threats to  the airport in Haiti, the Secretary delayed lifting the secretarial action until  July 2006. As of February 2007, the public notification for the airport in  Bali was still in place. TSA officials stated that they are in frequent contact  with Indonesian officials to discuss Indonesia’s progress in addressing  security deficiencies at the airport. TSA officials also stated that they are  awaiting Indonesian officials’ request for TSA to conduct an airport  assessment to determine whether the security deficiencies at the airport in  Bali have been addressed.
section_title: More than Two-Thirds of Fiscal Year 2005 Air Carrier Inspections Identified Compliance with All TSA Security Requirements, while the Remaining Inspections Identified Some Security Deficiencies
paragraphs: In addition to assessing the security measures implemented by the airport  authority at foreign airports, TSA also inspected the security measures put  in place by air carriers at foreign airports. According to air carrier  inspection data maintained by TSA, during fiscal year 2005, of the 529  inspections of air carriers operating out of foreign airports, there were 373  inspections (about 71 percent) for which the air carrier complied with all  TSA security requirements, and 156 inspections (about 29 percent) for  which the air carrier did not comply with at least one TSA security  requirement. For these 156 inspections, the average number of TSA  requirements not met was about 3, and the number of TSA requirements  not met by an individual inspected air carrier ranged from 1 to 18. The  total number of security requirements against which air carriers were  inspected generally ranged from about 20 to 80, depending on the location  of the foreign airport in which the air carrier operated, the extent of a  carrier’s operation at the airport, and whether the carrier was a U.S.-based  or foreign-based carrier. During fiscal year 2005 air carrier inspections,  TSA identified security deficiencies in several areas, including aircraft  security and passenger and checked baggage screening.
Because TSA has authority to regulate air carriers that provide service to  the United States from foreign airports, TSA inspected air carriers against  specific security requirements established by TSA and included in the air  carriers’ TSA-approved security programs. TSA officials told us that they  view operational security requirements for air carriers as critical—as  opposed to documentary requirements associated with the air carrier’s  approved security program—because these requirements are designed to  prevent terrorists from carrying weapons, explosives, or other dangerous  items onto aircraft.
section_title: TSA Took Enforcement Action against Some Air Carriers with Security Deficiencies That Could Not Be Addressed Immediately
paragraphs: When TSA inspectors identify deficiencies that cannot be corrected or  addressed immediately, the inspectors are to recommend enforcement  action. Based on data provided by TSA, TSA inspectors identified 419  violations (security deficiencies) as a result of the 156 air carrier  inspections conducted during fiscal year 2005 where TSA identified at  least one security deficiency. Data from TSA showed that 259 violations  (about 62 percent) were corrected or addressed immediately. TSA  inspectors submitted 76 violations (about 18 percent) for investigation  because the violations were considered serious enough to warrant an  enforcement action. TSA can impose three types of enforcement action  on air carriers that violate security requirements—a warning letter, a letter  of correction, or a monetary civil penalty. Based on information included  in TSA’s investigation module within PARIS, for the 47 investigations we  could link to fiscal year 2005 inspections, warning letters were issued in  26 cases, and letters of correction were issued in 14 cases. Fines ranging  from $18,000 to $25,000 were recommended in the 7 cases where  inspectors recommended civil penalties be imposed. Of those, fines  ranging from $4,000 to $15,000 were ultimately levied in 3 cases, in 1 case a  warning notice was issued instead of a civil penalty, and in 2 cases no  action was taken. As of December 2006, 1 case remained unresolved.
section_title: TSA Officials Cite Difficulties in Drawing Conclusions about Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Results
paragraphs: TSA officials stated that it is difficult to draw conclusions about the  cumulative foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection results— such as whether the results are generally positive or negative—because  the primary concern is not whether security deficiencies are identified.  Instead, TSA officials are more concerned about whether foreign countries  have the capability and willingness to address security deficiencies.  According to TSA, some foreign countries do not have the aviation  security expertise or financial resources to adequately address security  deficiencies. TSA officials also stated that some foreign countries do not  regard aviation security as a high priority, and therefore do not intend to  correct security deficiencies identified during TSA assessments. Further,  TSA officials stated that foreign officials’ capability and willingness also  influence the extent to which air carriers comply with security  requirements. Although TSA has not conducted its own analysis of foreign  airport assessment and air carrier inspection results, TSA officials stated  that our analysis of the results was consistent with their assumptions  regarding the most prominent security deficiencies identified at foreign  airports and among air carriers. Additionally, TSA officials stated that the  cumulative foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection results  may be helpful in identifying the aviation security training needs of foreign  aviation security officials. TSA does not have an internally funded program  in place that is specifically intended to provide aviation security training  and technical assistance to foreign aviation security officials. However,  TSA officials stated that they coordinate with other federal agencies, such  as the Department of State and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency,  to identify global and regional training needs and provide instructors for  the aviation security training courses these federal agencies offer to  foreign officials. (See app. IV for a description of the aviation security  training and technical assistance programs offered by U.S. government  agencies.) While TSA does not always determine which foreign countries  would receive aviation security training and technical assistance offered  by other federal agencies, TSA officials stated that they could use the  cumulative results of TSA’s foreign airport assessments to refer foreign  officials to these assistance programs.
section_title: TSA Assisted Foreign Officials and Air Carrier Representatives in Addressing Security Deficiencies, but Can Strengthen Oversight of the Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Programs
paragraphs: TSA used various methods to help foreign officials and air carrier  representatives address security deficiencies identified during TSA  assessments and inspections. However, opportunities remain for TSA to  enhance oversight of its foreign airport assessment and air carrier  inspection programs. To help foreign airport officials and host government  officials address security deficiencies identified during foreign airport  assessments, TSA inspectors provided on-site consultation to help address  security deficiencies in the short term, made recommendations for  addressing security deficiencies over the long term, and recommended  aviation security training and technical assistance opportunities for  foreign officials to help them meet ICAO standards. During fiscal year  2005, TSA resolved 259 of the 419 security deficiencies identified during  TSA inspections through on-site consultation. Additionally, TSA assigned  all U.S. air carriers and foreign air carriers to a principal security inspector  and international principal security inspector, respectively, to provide  counseling or clarification regarding TSA security requirements. Although  TSA has assisted foreign airport officials and air carrier representatives in  addressing security deficiencies, TSA did not track the status of scheduled  airport assessments and air carrier inspections, document foreign  governments’ progress in addressing security deficiencies at foreign  airports, track enforcement actions taken in response to air carrier  violations, and measure the impact of the foreign airport assessment and  air carrier inspection programs on security. Such information would have  provided TSA better assurance that the foreign airport assessment and air  carrier inspection programs are operating as intended.
subsections: section_title: TSA Assisted Foreign Officials in Addressing Security Deficiencies at Foreign Airports in Various Ways, and Foreign Officials Generally Viewed TSA’s Assistance as Beneficial
paragraphs: TSA officials stated that while the primary mission of the foreign airport  assessment program is to ensure the security of U.S.-bound flights by  assessing whether foreign airports are complying with ICAO standards, a  secondary mission of the program is to assist foreign officials in  addressing security deficiencies that TSA identified during its foreign  airport assessments. As part of the foreign airport assessment program,  TSA officials assisted foreign authorities in addressing security  deficiencies in various ways, including    providing on-site consultation to help airport officials or the host  government immediately address security deficiencies,    making recommendations to airport officials or the host government  for corrective action intended to help sustain security improvements,  and    helping to secure aviation security training and technical assistance for  foreign governments.
subsections: section_title: On-Site Consultation and Recommendations for Corrective Action
paragraphs: Based on our review of TSA foreign airport assessment reports, during  fiscal year 2005, TSA provided on-site consultation to help foreign officials  immediately address security deficiencies that were identified during  airport assessments and made recommendations to help foreign officials  sustain security improvements in the longer term. One type of security  deficiency identified during TSA’s fiscal year 2005 foreign airport  assessments involved a particular passenger checkpoint screening  function. As a short-term solution to this security deficiency, on at least  two occasions, TSA inspectors provided on-site training to instruct  screeners on proper passenger screening techniques. As a longer-term  solution, the assessment reports identify that in some cases, TSA  inspectors recommended that the airport conduct remedial training for  screeners and routinely test screeners who work at the passenger  checkpoint to determine if they are screening passengers correctly.  Another security deficiency identified at foreign airports during fiscal year  2005 related to the security of airport perimeters. After identifying this  deficiency, inspectors consulted with foreign airport officials who, in a  few cases, took immediate action to address the deficiency. According to  the assessment reports, in some cases, TSA inspectors recommended  measures that would help the airport sustain perimeter security in the  longer term. In cases when a short-term solution may not be feasible, TSA  inspectors may have only recommended longer-term corrective action. For  example, in some cases, TSA inspectors recommended that foreign airport  officials embark upon a longer-term construction project to address a  particular type of security deficiency.
section_title: Aviation Security Training and Technical Assistance
paragraphs: During fiscal year 2005, TSA also assisted foreign governments in securing  training and technical assistance provided by TSA and other U.S.  government agencies to help improve security at foreign airports,  particularly at airports in developing countries. For example, four of the  seven TSA Representatives—TSARs—-with whom we met said that they  had assisted foreign governments in obtaining training either through the  State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program or through the U.S.  Trade and Development Agency’s aviation security assistance programs.
The goals of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program are to (1) build the  capacity of foreign countries to fight terrorism; (2) establish security  relationships between U.S. and foreign officials to strengthen cooperative  anti-terrorism efforts; and (3) share modern, humane, and effective anti- terrorism techniques. The State Department addresses the capacity- building goal of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program by offering a  selection of 25 training courses to foreign officials, 1 of which focuses on  airport security. The State Department provided the airport security  course, which is taught by TSA instructors, to seven foreign countries  during fiscal year 2005—Bahamas, Barbados, Dominican Republic,  Kazakhstan, Philippines, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. The U.S. Trade  and Development Agency also provides aviation security training and  technical assistance to help achieve its goal of facilitating economic  growth and trade in developing countries. During fiscal year 2005, the U.S.  Trade and Development Agency provided aviation security training for  government officials in Haiti, Malaysia, and sub-Saharan Africa. During the  same year, the agency held regional workshops for various countries  worldwide on developing quality control programs. Government officials  from two of the five countries we visited identified the importance of  obtaining quality control training, particularly given that they have not yet  established their own quality control function. Appendix IV includes a  detailed description of aviation security training and technical assistance  provided to foreign officials by the State Department and the U.S. Trade  and Development Agency, as well as other U.S. government agencies.
section_title: Foreign Officials We Contacted Generally Viewed TSA’s Assistance as Beneficial
paragraphs: Government and airport officials from five of the seven foreign countries  we visited and officials from 5 of the 16 foreign embassies we visited  stated that TSA’s airport assessments and the resulting assistance  provided by TSA have helped strengthen airport security in their countries.  For example, officials from one country said that TSA assessments  enabled them to identify and address security deficiencies. Specifically,  officials stated that the government could not independently identify  security deficiencies because it did not have its own airport assessment  program—a condition that TSA officials told us exists in many countries.  Airport officials in another country stated that TSA’s airport assessments  and on-site assistance led to immediate improvements in the way in which  passengers were screened at their airport, particularly with regard to the  pat-down search procedure. Embassy officials representing another  country also stated that TSA’s assessments reinforce the results of other  assessments of their airports. In addition, these officials stated that they  appreciated the good rapport and cooperative relationships they have with  TSA inspection officials. Airport officials in another country we visited  stated that TSA assisted them in developing their aviation security  management program, and that the results of TSA’s assessments provided  them with examples of where they need to concentrate more efforts on  meeting ICAO standards. Government officials in this same country said  that the TSAR has helped them to comply with ICAO standards related to  the contents of a member state’s national aviation security program. At the  recommendation of the TSAR, these officials also planned to participate in  an aviation security workshop provided by the Organization of American  States, which they also felt would be beneficial in helping the government  formulate its national aviation security programs and associated security  regulations.
section_title: TSA Provided Assistance to Air Carriers That Did Not Comply with Applicable Security Requirements
paragraphs: In addition to assisting foreign officials in addressing security deficiencies  identified during airport assessments, TSA also assisted air carrier  representatives in addressing security deficiencies that were identified  during air carrier inspections. Of the 419 instances in which TSA  inspectors identified noncompliance with TSA security requirements  during fiscal year 2005, TSA data show 259 were resolved through  counseling—that is, the security deficiencies were resolved as a result of  on-site assistance or consultation provided by TSA. For example, during  one inspection, TSA observed that the security contractor employed by the  air carrier was not properly searching the aircraft cabin for suspicious,  dangerous, or deadly items prior to boarding. TSA instructed the  contractor to fully inspect those locations that were not searched  properly, and obtained assurance that the air carrier would provide  information to the contractors to ensure proper searches were conducted.  In another instance, inspectors identified a security deficiency related to  catering carts. The inspectors notified appropriate catering facility  officials, who stated that the security deficiency was highly unusual and  that it would not happen again. The inspectors also informed the air  carrier of the finding and recommended that during the carrier’s internal  audits, they ensure that catering carts are properly secured.
In addition to counseling provided by inspectors when deficiencies are  identified, TSA assigns each air carrier to either a PSI, for U.S.-based air  carriers, or an IPSI, for foreign air carriers with service to the United  States, to assist air carriers in complying with TSA security requirements.
Although PSIs and IPSIs do not participate in air carrier inspections, they  do receive the inspection results for the air carriers that they work with.  According to the three PSIs and four IPSIs with whom we met, PSIs and  IPSIs provide counsel to the air carriers and provide clarification when  necessary on TSA security requirements. For example, they provide air  carriers with clarification on the requirements contained in security  directives and emergency amendments issued by TSA. Several of the  foreign air carriers we met with told us that the IPSIs are generally  responsive to their requests. In other instances, when an air carrier cannot  comply with a TSA security requirement—such as when complying with a  TSA security requirement would cause the air carrier to violate a host  government security requirement—the air carrier will work with the IPSI  or PSI to develop alternative security procedures that are intended to  provide a level of security equivalent to the level of security provided by  TSA’s requirements, according to the PSIs and IPSIs with whom we met.  These alternative procedures are reviewed by the PSI or IPSI and then  approved by TSA headquarters officials.
section_title: Opportunities Exist for TSA to Strengthen Oversight of the Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Programs
paragraphs: TSA has several controls in place to ensure that the agency is  implementing the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection  programs as intended. However, there are opportunities for TSA to  improve its oversight of these programs to help ensure that the status and  disposition of scheduled foreign airports assessments and air carrier  inspections is documented and to assess the impact of the assessment and  inspection programs. Regarding the foreign airport assessment program,  TSA required inspectors and TSARs to follow standard operating  procedures when scheduling and conducting foreign airport assessments.  These procedures outline the process for coordinating with host  government officials to schedule assessments, conduct foreign airport  assessments, and report the results of the assessments. TSA also provided  inspectors with a job aide to help them ensure that all relevant ICAO  standards are addressed during an assessment. The job aide prompts  inspectors as to what specific information they should obtain to help  determine whether the foreign airport is meeting ICAO standards. For  example, in assessing measures related to passenger-screening  checkpoints, the job aide prompts the inspector to describe the means by  which the airport ensures there is no mixing or contact between screened  and unscreened passengers. In addition to the standard operating  procedures and the job aide, TSA requires inspectors to use a standard  format for reporting the results of foreign airport assessments and has  implemented a multilayered review process to help ensure that airport  assessment reports are complete and accurate.
With regard to the air carrier inspection program, TSA uses the automated  Performance and Results Information System to compile inspection  results. PARIS contains results of air carrier inspections conducted by TSA  at airports in the United States as well as inspections conducted at foreign  airports. For air carrier inspections conducted at foreign airports, a series  of prompts guides inspectors regarding what security standards U.S.  carriers and foreign carriers operating overseas must meet. PARIS also  includes a review process whereby completed inspection results can be  reviewed by a supervisory inspector before being approved for release  into the database.
While TSA has controls such as these in place for the foreign airport  assessment and air carrier inspection programs to ensure consistent  implementation and documentation, we identified four additional controls  that would strengthen TSA’s oversight of the foreign airport assessment  and air carrier inspection programs:  tracking the status of scheduled airport assessments and air carrier  inspections,    documenting foreign governments’ progress in addressing security  deficiencies,  tracking air carrier violations, and    measuring the impact of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier  inspection programs.
subsections: section_title: Additional Controls Are Needed to Track the Status of Scheduled Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections
paragraphs: TSA has established some controls for tracking the status of scheduled  airport assessments and air carrier inspections, but additional controls are  needed. TSA provided us with a list of foreign airport assessments that  were scheduled to take place during fiscal year 2005 and identified which  of the assessments were actually conducted and which assessments were  deferred or canceled. We compared the list of scheduled assessments  provided by TSA to the fiscal year 2005 airport assessment reports we  reviewed and identified several discrepancies. Specifically, there were 10  airport assessments that TSA identified as having been conducted, but  when we asked TSA officials to provide the reports for these assessments,  they could not, and later categorized these assessments as deferred or  canceled. Conversely, there was 1 airport assessment that TSA identified  as having been deferred, but according to the assessment reports we  reviewed, this assessment was actually conducted during fiscal year 2005.  There were also five foreign airports for which TSA provided us with the  fiscal year 2005 assessment report, but were not included on TSA’s list of  assessments scheduled for fiscal year 2005. Further, there were three  foreign airports listed under one IFO as having been deferred, whereas  these same airports were listed under another IFO as having been  canceled during fiscal year 2005. TSA also did not maintain accurate  information on the status of air carrier inspections scheduled for fiscal  year 2005. TSA provided us with a list of all air carrier inspections  conducted during fiscal year 2005. We compared the list to the results  contained in the PARIS database and found numerous inconsistencies.  Specifically, we identified 46 air carrier inspections at 18 airports that  were not included on TSA’s list, but were included in PARIS as having  been conducted during fiscal year 2005.
Federal standards for internal controls and associated guidance suggest  that agencies should document key decisions in a way that is complete  and accurate, and that allows decisions to be traced from initiation,  through processing, to after completion. TSA officials acknowledged that  they have not always maintained accurate and complete data on the status  of scheduled foreign airport assessments and air carrier assessments, in  part due to the lack of a central repository in which to maintain  assessment information and the lack of standardization in the way in  which each IFO manager maintains assessment information. Additionally,  IFOs had not always documented the reasons why assessments and  inspections were deferred or canceled. TSA officials stated that in August  2006 they began standardizing and refining the existing databases used by  IFO staff for tracking the status of foreign airport assessments and air  carrier inspections by including data elements such as the dates of  previous and planned assessments. TSA officials also stated that IFO staff  are now encouraged to identify the reasons why assessments and  inspections were deferred or canceled in the comment section of the  database. While TSA has made some improvements to the way in which it  tracks the status of scheduled foreign airport assessments and air carrier  inspections, there are opportunities for additional refinements to TSA’s  tracking system. For example, according to our review of TSA’s fiscal year  2007 foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection schedules, TSA  did not provide an explanation for why 13 of 34 foreign airport visits—that  is, either assessments or inspections—had not been conducted according  to schedule. TSA officials acknowledged that their assessment and  inspection tracking system is a work in progress and that they need to  make additional decisions regarding the tracking system, such as which  data elements to include. Without adequate controls in place for tracking  which scheduled assessments and inspections were actually conducted  and which were deferred or canceled, it may be difficult for TSA to ensure  that all scheduled airport assessments and air carrier inspections are  actually conducted.
section_title: TSA Did Not Consistently Document Foreign Governments’ Progress in Addressing Security Deficiencies
paragraphs: TSARs—the primary liaisons between the U.S. government and foreign  governments on transportation security issues—are responsible for  following up on progress made by foreign officials in addressing security  deficiencies identified during TSA assessments. Although the TSARs we  interviewed stated that they conducted such follow-up, the TSARs did not  consistently document the progress foreign governments had made in  addressing airport security deficiencies. We found 199 instances in the 128  fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessment reports we reviewed where it  was written that the TSAR would follow up or was recommended to  follow up on the progress made by foreign officials in addressing security  deficiencies identified during airport assessments. However, TSA may not  be able to determine whether TSARs had actually followed up on these  security deficiencies because TSARs did not consistently document their  follow-up activities. We interviewed 8 of the 20 TSARs stationed at  embassies throughout the world and one Senior Advisor and DHS attaché.  Six of those TSARs stated that they followed up on outstanding security  deficiencies in various ways, depending on the severity of the deficiency  and the confidence that the TSAR had in the host government’s ability to  correct the deficiency. For example, one TSAR told us that for less critical  security deficiencies, she may inquire about the foreign government’s  status in addressing the deficiency via electronic mail or telephone call.  On the other hand, for a critical deficiency, the TSAR said she may follow  up in person on the host government’s progress in addressing the  deficiency. However, another TSAR stated that she only follows up on the  foreign government’s progress in addressing national program issues. She  stated that she does not follow up on operational security deficiencies— such as screening of passengers and checked baggage—because she  believes this is the responsibility of the TSA inspection staff. While 4 of the  8 TSARs we interviewed told us that they were able to follow up on the  status of most or all security deficiencies within their area of  responsibility, not all of these TSARs reported the results of their follow- up to TSA inspection staff, in part because they were not required to do so.  In addition, TSARs stated that when they did document the results of their  follow-up, it was not done consistently. For example, follow-up results  were sometimes documented in weekly trip reports (generally electronic  mail messages) TSARs send to their immediate supervisor in TSA  headquarters or in action plans. In addition, these weekly reports did not  always contain information from the TSARs’ follow-up activities with host  government or airport officials. Federal standards for internal controls and  associated guidance suggest that agencies should document key activities  in such a way that maintains the relevance, value, and usefulness of these  activities to management in controlling operations and making decisions.  TSA headquarters officials acknowledged that it is important to  consistently document foreign governments’ status in addressing security  deficiencies identified during TSA assessments, because this information  could be helpful to TSA inspection staff when determining where to focus  their attention during future assessments. Additionally, documenting  foreign governments’ progress toward addressing deficiencies would  enable TSA to have current information on the security status of foreign  airports that service the United States. TSA established a working group in  September 2006 to explore how the results of TSAR follow-up should be  documented and used by TSA inspection staff. Because of the logistical  challenges of coordination among working group members who are  located around the world, TSA has not set a time frame for when the  working group is expected to complete its efforts.
section_title: TSA Did Not Adequately Maintain Information to Link Enforcement Actions with Specific Air Carrier Security Violations
paragraphs: TSA does not maintain air carrier inspection data in a way that would  enable the agency to determine what enforcement actions were taken in  response to identified security violations and thus could not readily  determine whether appropriate penalties, if any, were given to air carriers  that violated security requirements. We found two factors that contributed  to this situation. First, information on violations and findings was not  consistently recorded, and second, TSA does not link enforcement actions  to inspection findings. For example, when an inspector identifies a  violation during an inspection, that information is recorded in the  inspections database in PARIS and a record is to be opened in the findings  database. The findings database record includes information related to  the violation, including whether the violation was closed with counseling  or an investigation was opened. However, we found that information is not  maintained in a way that enables TSA to readily determine the  enforcement action that was taken in response to a particular violation.  For example, the findings database did not include information on the  action taken by TSA inspectors for all security violations that were  identified in the inspections database. Specifically, the inspections  database indicated that during fiscal year 2005, 419 air carrier violations  were identified during 156 inspections. However, the findings database  only identified the actions taken by TSA inspectors for 335 violations. On  further analysis we found that of the 156 inspections where violations  were identified, the number of violations for 79 (51 percent) of those  inspections were not properly recorded in the findings database. We  determined that for 66 inspections, the number of violations identified in  the findings database was less than the number of violations identified in  the inspections database. Therefore, there is no record of what action was  taken, if any, by TSA inspectors to address the additional violations  identified during these inspections. We also determined that for 13  inspections, the number of violations identified in the findings database  was greater than the number of violations identified in the inspections  database. Another reason TSA could not readily identify what enforcement  actions were taken in response to specific security violations was that TSA  often issued one enforcement action for multiple security violations,  where inspectors were not required to identify each individual violation  that was addressed by a particular enforcement action. Without being able  to readily identify what enforcement action was taken in response to  specific security violations, TSA has limited assurance that the inspected  air carriers received appropriate penalties, if deemed necessary, and that  identified security violations were resolved. TSA officials told us that they  are currently developing updates to PARIS that will automatically open a  finding each time a violation is recorded in the inspection database. By  doing so, this will require a link between a violation and the planned  course of action to resolve the violation. However, TSA has not  established a time frame for when these updates will be implemented.
section_title: TSA Did Not Have Outcome- Based Performance Measures to Assess the Impact of the Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Programs
paragraphs: TSA is taking steps to assess whether the goals of the foreign airport  assessment and air carrier inspection programs are being met, but  identified several concerns about doing so. As previously discussed, the  goal of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs  are to ensure the security of U.S.-bound flights by evaluating the extent to  which foreign governments and air carriers are complying with applicable  security requirements. The Government Performance and Results Act of  1993 requires executive branch departments to use performance measures  to assess progress toward meeting program goals and to help decision  makers assess program accomplishments and improve program  performance. Performance measures can be categorized either as outcome  measures, which describe the intended result of carrying out a program or  activity, or as output measures, which describe the level of activity that  will be provided over a period of time, or as efficiency measures, which  show the relationship between outcome or output of a program and the  resources used to implement program activities—inputs.
TSA developed the following output and efficiency measures to evaluate  its international aviation regulatory and enforcement efforts, which  include foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections:    percentage of countries with last-point-of-departure service to the  United States that are provided aviation security assistance at the  national or airport level,    percentage of countries that do not have last-point-of-departure service  to the United States that are provided aviation security assistance at  the national or airport level, and    average number of international inspections conducted annually per  inspector.
While output measures are useful in determining the number of foreign  countries for which TSA has provided aviation security assistance and the  rate at which such assistance is being provided, outcome-based measures  would be particularly useful because they could be used to determine the  extent to which TSA has helped to improve security at foreign airports  that service the United States. However, TSA officials identified several  challenges in developing outcome measures, particularly measures for the  foreign airport assessment program. TSA officials said that it is difficult to  develop meaningful outcome measures because TSA does not have control  over whether foreign authorities implement and meet ICAO standards.  Additionally, TSA officials stated that if the agency develops outcome  measures for the foreign airport assessment program, it would suggest  that TSA has control over whether foreign airports meet ICAO standards,  which these officials believe may give the appearance that TSA does not  respect the sovereignty of the countries it assesses. TSA officials further  stated that if foreign officials perceive that TSA has no regard for their  country’s sovereignty, foreign officials may prohibit TSA from conducting  assessments in their countries. We recognize that whether or not foreign  governments meet ICAO standards is not within TSA’s control and that  foreign officials’ concerns about sovereignty are important. However, TSA  officials have acknowledged that the assistance the agency provides and,  in rare cases, secretarial actions contribute to whether foreign  governments meet ICAO standards. Also, there is precedent within the  federal government for developing outcome-oriented performance  measures to evaluate efforts that are not within an agency’s control but  can be influenced by the agency. For example, the State Department  developed performance measures and targets for its Anti-Terrorism  Assistance Program to evaluate the agency’s impact on helping foreign  countries improve their anti-terrorism capabilities. Specifically, during  fiscal year 2006, the State Department set a performance target that two of  the six countries that received assistance through the Anti-Terrorism  Assistance Program would achieve a capability to effectively deter, detect,  and counter terrorist organizations and threats and sustain those  capabilities. Another performance target for the program that is beyond  the State Department’s control is for all 191 United Nations member states  to implement a particular United Nations resolution that requires all states  to take sweeping measures to combat terrorism.
TSA headquarters officials, including the Director of Compliance and Area  Directors, who oversee implementation of the foreign airport assessment  program, questioned whether it would be appropriate to measure  improvements made by foreign countries as a result of the assessment  program. They stated that the primary purpose of the foreign airport  assessment program is not to help foreign officials improve security at  their airports; rather, the primary purpose of the foreign airport  assessment program is to identify—not correct—security deficiencies at  foreign airports and inform the Secretary of Homeland Security of such  deficiencies. These officials also stated that the agency’s efforts to assist  foreign officials in addressing security deficiencies are voluntary and,  therefore, do not warrant performance measurement. Although TSA may  not be required to assist foreign officials in addressing security  deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments, TSA is in fact  using its inspector and TSAR resources to this end. Consistent with the  Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, developing  performance measures and associated targets, such as the percentage of  security deficiencies that were addressed as a result of TSA on-site  assistance and TSA recommendations for corrective action, would enable  TSA to evaluate the impact of its assistance on improving security at  foreign airports and be held more accountable for the way in which it uses  its resources. TSA could also evaluate the impact that secretarial actions  have on helping foreign airports address security deficiencies in order to  meet ICAO standards.
Another challenge faced by TSA officials in developing outcome-based  measures for the foreign airport assessment program is the lack of an  automated system to collect and compile assessment results. TSA officials  stated that in the absence of an automated system to input data and  information obtained from airport assessments, they do not have enough  resources to manually compile and analyze airport assessment data that  could be used to feed into outcome measures. Currently, TSA  headquarters maintains airport assessment reports either electronically or  in hard copy, which makes it difficult to conduct systematic analysis of  assessment results across foreign airports and over time to evaluate the  impact TSA’s airport assessment program has had on helping foreign  countries meet ICAO standards. TSA officials told us that $1 million was  budgeted to develop a secured, automated database—the Foreign Airport  Assessment Reporting System—to track airport assessment results.  However, TSA officials stated that the development of the Foreign Airport  Assessment Reporting System has been slow due to challenges TSA has  experienced in linking the existing electronic systems in which previous  airport assessment reports are stored with the new database. However,  upon completion of the Foreign Airport Assessment Reporting System,  which is scheduled for fiscal year 2008, TSA expects that the database will  enhance standardization of assessment reports as well as accessibility to  the results of previous foreign airport assessments. TSA also expects that  the Foreign Airport Assessment Reporting System will enable TSA to  conduct analysis of foreign airport assessment results.
As with the foreign airport assessment program, TSA has also not  developed outcome-based performance measures for its overseas air  carrier inspection program. However, TSA officials have begun to collect  and analyze data on air carrier inspections that could be used to measure  the impact of TSA’s inspection program on helping air carriers comply  with TSA security requirements. During fiscal year 2006, TSA officials who  manage PARIS began analyzing air carrier inspection results in an effort to  assist the agency in evaluating the impact that enforcement actions— including on-site counseling, administrative actions, and civil penalties— have had on ensuring air carrier compliance with TSA security  requirements. These officials plan to assess whether there is a relationship  between the severity of civil penalties and the reoccurrence of security  violations. The analysis that is being conducted by these officials is  consistent with our reviews of agency compliance inspection programs,  which have cited the need for evaluations of enforcement activities and  the effectiveness of using sanctions such as civil penalties to increase  compliance. However, while the TSA officials managing PARIS are  conducting such analysis of performance information, officials who  manage the air carrier inspection program did not intend to use the results  of this analysis to develop performance measures or to influence program  decisions. According to TSA officials, considering that overall compliance  rates are very high among air carriers, and the number of enforcement  actions taken by TSA is relatively low, there may not be enough data to  conduct meaningful analysis of the impact of enforcement actions. In  addition, TSA officials said that they were not convinced that air carrier  compliance is influenced by enforcement actions, especially since air  carriers are known to intentionally set aside funds when developing their  annual budgets in anticipation that they will be fined for some type of  security violation during the year. One TSA official stated that air carrier  compliance with TSA security requirements is not always within the air  carrier’s control and is largely influenced by the security measures in place  at the airport, as well as restrictions placed on air carriers by host  government laws and regulations. When analyzing the fiscal year 2005 air  carrier inspection results, we identified only one instance where  noncompliance due to a conflict between TSA requirements and host  government law resulted in an inspector requesting that enforcement  action be taken against the air carrier. However, TSA chose not to take  enforcement action against the air carrier and instead decided to work  with the host government to resolve the conflict. Despite the concerns  raised by TSA officials, using the analysis of air carrier inspection results  to develop performance measures, TSA managers may not be able to  identify which approaches for improving air carrier compliance are  working well and which approaches could be improved upon.
section_title: TSA Is Taking Action to Address Some Challenges That Have Limited Its Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections
paragraphs: TSA is taking action to address challenges—particularly the lack of  available inspectors and various host government concerns—that have  limited its ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier  inspections according to schedule. TSA has developed a risk-based  approach to scheduling foreign airport assessments, and is in the process  of developing a risk-based approach for scheduling air carrier inspections,  to enhance the agency’s ability to focus its limited inspector resources on  higher-risk airports. The risk-based scheduling approach is also expected  to reduce the number of visits TSA conducts at low-risk foreign airports,  which may help address some host governments’ concerns regarding the  resource burden that results from frequent airport assessments by TSA  and others. Harmonization—that is, mutual recognition and acceptance— of TSA, host government, and third party (e.g., European Commission)  aviation security standards and assessment and inspection processes may  also help TSA address host government concerns regarding resource  burden. Specifically, when the opportunity is available, TSA is considering  conducting joint assessments with some host governments or third parties,  such as the European Commission, which would reduce the number of  airport visits experienced by some countries. In addition to addressing  concerns regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a  result of frequent airport visits, TSA has taken steps to address some  country-specific challenges that have limited TSA’s ability to conduct  foreign airport visits.
subsections: section_title: TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance its Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections on Schedule, but Staffing Challenges Remain
paragraphs: Various challenges have affected TSA’s ability to maintain its schedule of  conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. The  ability to conduct these assessments and inspections as scheduled is  important, according to TSA officials, because foreign airport and air  carrier compliance with applicable security requirements may deteriorate  significantly between assessments. As time between visits increases, the  likelihood may also increase that security deficiencies at foreign airports  and among air carriers may arise and go undetected and unaddressed. TSA  officials also stated that conducting assessments and inspections on a  consistent basis helps to ensure that foreign countries continue to comply  with ICAO standards and are operating with effective security measures.  TSA data show that the agency deferred 90 of the 303 (about 30 percent)  foreign airport visits that were scheduled for fiscal year 2005, which  include both foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections.  According to TSA, these deferments resulted primarily from a lack of  available inspectors to conduct the assessments and inspections. Our  analysis identified that the reported shortage of available inspectors  reflected the fact that (1) the inspector staff available to conduct the  assessments and inspections was less than the number authorized at each  of TSA’s five IFOs at some point during fiscal year 2005 and (2) TSA  scheduled more foreign airport visits during the fiscal year than available  inspectors could complete.
TSA officials cited several reasons why the IFOs operated in fiscal year  2005 with fewer inspectors than had been budgeted. First, TSA officials  stated that due to State Department limitations on the number of  inspectors that can be staffed at IFOs overseas, TSA did not have the  budgeted number of inspectors on board to complete assessments and  inspections scheduled for fiscal year 2005. Second, TSA officials stated  that significant turnover among international inspectors and the  subsequent lengthy process for filling vacant inspector positions also  contributed to the lack of available inspectors. TSA officials attributed the  turnover of international inspectors to various factors, including TSA’s  policy that limits the term of international inspectors at overseas IFOs to 4  years, the lack of opportunities for career advancement when stationed at  an IFO, and unique difficulties inspectors experience when living and  working overseas, such as disruptions to family life. As of January 2007,  TSA officials did not have any specific efforts under way to help reduce  turnover of international inspectors. Further, TSA officials stated that it  takes an average of about 6 months to fill a vacant inspector position, due  to the lengthy process for vetting newly hired inspectors. Specifically,  once hired, international inspectors must be processed through the State  Department, which entails applying for and receiving medical clearances,  security clearances, a diplomatic passport, and visas. TSA officials stated  that expediting the process of filling vacant positions is largely outside of  TSA’s control. However, TSA assigned a headquarters official to oversee  this process to identify opportunities for accelerating it. Table 3 shows the  number of inspectors budgeted for and available at the IFOs each month  during fiscal year 2005.
Even if TSA had been operating at its budgeted inspector staffing level, the  agency may still have deferred some of the foreign airport assessments  and air carrier inspections scheduled for fiscal year 2005 because,  according to TSA officials, internal policy required them to schedule more  foreign airport visits than the budgeted number of inspectors could  reasonably have conducted. According to TSA officials, this internal policy  was developed by the Federal Aviation Administration, which was  responsible for conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier  inspections prior to TSA. TSA officials also stated that the Federal  Aviation Administration had more available inspectors to conduct  assessments and inspections than TSA. TSA officials stated that each  international inspector should reasonably be able to conduct between 8  and 12 foreign airport visits per year, depending on the amount of time  inspectors remain on site to assist foreign officials and air carrier  representatives in addressing security deficiencies that are identified  during assessments and inspections. However, according to data provided  by TSA, each of the 5 IFOs scheduled more than 12 foreign airport visits  per inspector for fiscal year 2005. Table 4 shows the average number of  foreign airport visits scheduled per international inspector for fiscal year  2005.
TSA officials acknowledged that for fiscal year 2005 they scheduled more  foreign airport visits than the budgeted level of inspectors could have  reasonably conducted. However, TSA has taken steps to compensate for  the shortage of international inspectors by utilizing domestic inspectors to  help complete the foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections  that were scheduled for fiscal year 2005. Specifically, domestic inspectors  were used to assist with about 34 percent of foreign airport assessments  and about 35 percent of air carrier inspections. However, despite the use  of domestic inspectors, TSA still had to defer foreign airport assessments  and air carrier inspections. TSA headquarters officials and IFO staff  further stated that the heavy reliance on domestic inspectors to conduct  foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections is not desirable  because domestic inspectors lack experience conducting assessments  using ICAO standards or inspecting foreign operations of air carriers, as  well as working in the international environment. Additionally, using  domestic inspectors sometimes presents challenges in planning and  coordinating foreign airport visits. Specifically, it can be difficult to obtain  clearance from the State Department and host government to allow  domestic inspectors to enter foreign countries because TSA may not  always be able to provide sufficient notice that domestic inspectors will be  participating in airport visits, particularly when the need for a domestic  inspector is determined on short notice. Moreover, according to TSA  officials, the availability of domestic inspectors may change unexpectedly  when they are needed to remain in the United States. TSA officials also  said that domestic inspectors may not be available for the entire 4-week  period that it takes to prepare for, conduct, and write reports for foreign  airport assessments and air carrier inspections. Last, TSA officials stated  that compared to international inspectors, some domestic inspectors are  not effective at taking notes while conducting observations at foreign  airports, nor are some domestic inspectors effective at preparing foreign  airport reports—specifically, their word choices for describing security  conditions at airports are not always sensitive to the concerns of foreign  officials. According to TSA officials, if foreign officials take offense at the  way in which TSA portrays the security deficiencies at their airports,  foreign officials may no longer allow TSA to conduct airport assessments  in their countries. TSA officials stated that they enhanced the notetaking  module for the training provided to personnel conducting assessments and  inspections overseas. However, for the reasons discussed above, TSA  international officials plan to lessen their reliance on domestic inspectors.
Risk-Based Approach  A risk-based approach entails consideration  of terrorist threats, vulnerability of potential  terrorist targets to those threats, and the  consequences of those threats being carried  out when deciding how to allocate resources  to defend against these threats. Risk-based,  priority-driven decisions can help inform  decision makers in allocating finite resources  to the areas of greatest need.
During October 2006, TSA began implementing a risk-based approach to  scheduling foreign airport assessments in order to focus its limited  inspector resources on higher- risk airports. Another potential benefit to  TSA’s new approach is that it may allow TSA to reduce its reliance on  domestic inspectors. The objectives of TSA’s risk-based scheduling  approach are to (1) determine the appropriate frequency of foreign airport  visits, and (2) identify the appropriate number of inspectors needed for  each IFO based on the deployment availability of inspectors, the risk- based priority of each location, and the number of visits required each  year.
Under the risk-based approach, when fully implemented, foreign airports  are categorized based on risk level, and depending on the category in  which they are placed, are scheduled to be assessed once a year, once  every 2 years, or once every 3 years. According to information provided by  TSA, under this approach, the number of foreign airport assessments  scheduled each year will decrease by about 38 percent (from 170 to 105  assessments). TSA officials stated that the reduction in the number of  annual foreign airport assessments will help enable inspectors to complete  foreign airport assessments according to schedule. Based on our analysis,  TSA’s risk-based approach for scheduling foreign airport assessments is  consistent with generally accepted risk management principles.
While it appears that this risk-based approach will reduce the number of  foreign airport assessments international inspectors are expected to  conduct in a year, it is too soon to determine the impact of this approach  on TSA’s ability to complete scheduled foreign airport visits—including  assessments and inspections—for two key reasons. First, TSA has not yet  finalized its risk-based approach to scheduling air carrier inspections. In  February 2007, TSA officials stated that the draft version of the risk-based  approach to scheduling air carrier inspections was being vetted through  the agency, but they do not expect the final version to be approved until  spring 2007. TSA officials stated that in developing the risk-based  approach for scheduling air carrier inspections, they determined that,  unlike the situation with airports, using previous inspection results was  not the best way to determine air carrier vulnerability. Rather, TSA  officials expect to use foreign airport assessment results to determine the  vulnerability of air carriers operating out of those airports, especially  considering that the security status of foreign airports influences TSA’s  decision to impose additional security requirements on air carriers  operating out of foreign airports.
In addition, it is uncertain how TSA’s upcoming audits of foreign repair  stations will affect the workload of international inspectors. In December  2003, Congress passed the Vision 100—Century of Aviation  Reauthorization Act (Vision 100), which mandated that TSA issue  regulations to ensure the security of foreign and domestic repair stations  and, in coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),  complete a security review and audit of foreign repair stations certified by  FAA within 18 months of issuing the regulations. Currently, there are  approximately 665 FAA-certified repair stations in foreign countries that  TSA is required to audit. Of these, 93 are deemed substantial with regard  to safety and security in that they perform work on the airframe, flight  controls, or propulsion systems. In addition, another 38 are located in  countries that, pursuant to Vision 100, TSA and FAA must give priority to  because they have been identified as posing the most significant security  risks. TSA plans to initiate security audits of the repair stations during  fiscal year 2007. Specifically, TSA expects to conduct 127 audits of foreign  repair stations during the initial year, focusing on those located in high- threat areas. According to TSA, the majority of repair stations deemed  substantial (65 of 93)—are located on or near foreign airports already  subject to assessment by TSA. TSA expects that it will take inspectors 3  days to complete initial audits if the foreign repair stations are collocated  with foreign airports being assessed, and 5 days to complete for stations  which are not collocated. According to TSA, the agency’s fiscal year 2006  funding levels were sufficient to allow for an additional 13 international  inspector positions, including a program manager position, to supplement  its current international inspector staff and help meet the requirement to  conduct foreign repair station security audits. As of January 2007, all 13  positions were filled, but TSA had not yet begun to conduct these audits.  Therefore, it is not yet known how these audits and additional inspector  positions will actually affect overall inspector workload or TSA’s ability to  complete its foreign assessments and inspections as scheduled.
section_title: Harmonization of Security Standards and Assessment and Inspection Processes Would Help TSA Address Host Government Concerns Regarding Resource Burdens
paragraphs: Harmonization of TSA, host government, and third party (e.g., European  Commission) security standards and the processes used to assess foreign  airports and air carriers would address concerns regarding the resource  burden placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits  conducted by TSA and others. Officials from 3 of the 7 foreign countries  we visited in March 2006, as well as officials representing the European  Commission—the executive arm of the European Union (which is  composed of 27 countries), stated that the frequency of airport  assessments and air carrier inspections conducted by TSA and others had  placed a significant resource burden on the host government. In addition,  a representative of the Association of European Airlines and IATA stated  that frequent security inspections by TSA, the host government, and other  countries, as well as safety inspections, including inspections conducted  by FAA, burdened the limited personnel resources available to air carriers.  Specifically, for each inspection, the air carrier must assign one of its  employees to escort the inspection team around the airport. (In general,  TSA officials must be accompanied by host government officials when  conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections because  TSA officials are not allowed to enter restricted areas of the airport  unescorted.) Belgian officials, for example, proposed to shorten TSA’s  fiscal year 2006 assessment of the airport in Brussels, stating that being  assessed by TSA, as well as ICAO, the European Commission, and the  European Civil Aviation Conference within a short span of time would  pose a significant resource burden on the Belgian aviation security  department. Host government officials in Germany raised concerns  regarding the resource burden placed on their aviation security  department due to the frequency of TSA visits. German officials said that  TSA scheduled 10 airport visits between January 2006 and September  2006, which German officials viewed as excessive. In addition to individual  European countries, the Director of Security for the Protection of Persons,  Goods, and Installations for the European Commission’s Directorate  General of Transport and Energy wrote a letter to the TSA Assistant  Secretary dated March 9, 2006, expressing concern about the frequency of  TSA airport assessments and air carrier inspections in Europe. The  Director suggested that TSA consider the high level of quality control  exercised within the European Union by the European Commission as  well as the European Union member states when determining the  frequency of airport assessment visits and that TSA and the European  Commission embark upon a joint effort to improve coordination of airport  visits to alleviate the resource burden placed on member states. TSA’s  risk-based approach for scheduling foreign airport assessments could help  address some host governments’ concerns regarding the resource burden  placed on them in part due to the frequency of airport assessments  conducted by TSA.
In addition to implementing a risk-based approach to scheduling, there are  other potential opportunities for TSA to address host country concerns  regarding the resource burden experienced as a result of frequent airport  visits. Industry representatives and some host government officials stated  that if TSA and other inspecting entities either conducted joint airport  assessments and air carrier inspections or used the results of each other’s  assessments and inspections in lieu of conducting their own, the frequency  of airport visits could be reduced, in turn reducing the resource burden  placed on host governments and air carriers. Airports Council  International officials we interviewed, who represent airport operators  worldwide, stated that if TSA and other inspecting entities were to  conduct joint assessments, the resource burden experienced by airport  operators would also be reduced. Moreover, officials from 2 of the 7  countries we visited suggested that TSA review the results of airport  assessments conducted by the host government or by third parties either  in lieu of conducting its own airport assessments or to target its  assessments on specific security standards. These officials said that by  doing this, TSA could reduce the length of the assessment period, thereby  reducing the resource burden placed on host government officials.
According to TSA, the agency must physically observe security operations  at foreign airports to determine whether airports are maintaining and  carrying out effective security measures in order to satisfy its statutory  mandate to conduct assessments of foreign airports. This interpretation  precludes TSA from relying solely on third party or host government  assessments to make this determination. However, TSA officials stated  that they may be able to use host government or third party assessments— provided that foreign officials make these assessments available to TSA— to help refine the agency’s risk-based approach to scheduling foreign  airport assessments, such that TSA would be able to focus its limited  inspection resources on foreign airports that pose the greatest security  risk to the United States. For example, instead of visiting a foreign airport  that TSA considers low risk once every 3 years, TSA, hypothetically, could  visit such airports once every 5 years, and review third party or host  government assessments between visits to help determine whether the  airport is maintaining and carrying out effective security measures. This  would enable TSA to reduce the number of visits to foreign airports, thus  addressing host government officials’ concerns regarding the resource  burden they experience as a result of frequent airport assessments.  However, three of the five IFO managers we interviewed said that the  option of using host government assessments is not currently available to  them because host governments in their areas of responsibility generally  do not have airport assessment programs in place. These IFO managers  said that even if host governments had assessment programs in place, they  would be cautious about using the assessment reports and conducting  joint assessments for one of two reasons: (1) TSA has not independently  evaluated the quality of the assessments conducted by host governments  and third parties or the quality of the inspectors conducting these  assessments, and (2) host governments and third party inspectors base  their assessments on different aviation security standards than TSA.  Similarly, foreign government officials and industry representatives have  cited differences in security standards as an impediment to conducting  joint assessments and using host government or third party assessments.
Harmonization  In the homeland security context,  “harmonization” is a broad term used to  describe countries’ efforts to coordinate their  security practices to enhance security and  increase efficiency by avoiding duplication of  effort. Harmonization efforts can include  countries’ mutually recognizing and  accepting each other’s existing practices— which could represent somewhat different  approaches to achieve the same outcome, as  well as working to develop uniform  standards.
TSA headquarters officials stated that harmonization of airport and air  carrier security standards and airport assessment and air carrier  inspection processes would make them less cautious about using other  assessment reports and conducting joint assessments. To this end, TSA  has taken steps toward harmonizing airport assessment processes and  some airport and air carrier security standards with the European  Commission. In May 2006, in responding to the European Commission’s  concerns regarding the frequency of TSA airport assessments and air  carrier inspections in Europe, the TSA Assistant Secretary suggested that  TSA and the European Commission develop working groups to address  these concerns. Further, in June 2006, TSA initiated efforts with the  European Commission that will enable each party to learn more about the  other party’s quality control programs. As part of these efforts, TSA and  the European Commission established six working groups. TSA and the  European Commission have not established firm time frames for when the  working groups are to complete their efforts. The objectives and the status  of the working groups are described in table 5.
In December 2006, the TSA Assistant Secretary stated that the agency had  primarily coordinated with the European Commission on harmonizing  aviation security standards because airports in the European Union  generally have a high level of security. The Assistant Secretary further  stated that TSA should not focus its inspector resources on foreign  airports that are known to have a high level of security, such as several  European airports; rather, TSA should focus its limited resources on  foreign airports that are known to be less secure. The Assistant Secretary  added that a number of options for better leveraging inspector resources  are being considered by one of the European Commission-TSA working  groups, including scheduling European Commission and TSA assessments  to overlap for 1 or 2 days to enable both parties to share their assessment  results, which could enable TSA to shorten the length of its assessments.  The Assistant Secretary also stated that TSA could eventually recognize  European Commission airport assessments as equivalent to those  conducted by TSA and have TSA inspectors shadow European  Commission assessment teams to periodically validate the results.  However, in January 2007, European Union member states reached  consensus that they would not share the results of European Commission  assessments of their airports with TSA until the following occur: (1) TSA  and the European Commission agree upon protocols for sharing sensitive  security information; (2) TSA inspectors shadow European Commission  inspectors on an assessment of a European airport, and European  Commission inspectors shadow TSA inspectors on an assessment of a U.S.  airport; and (3) TSA agrees to provide the European Commission with the  results of U.S. airport assessments. TSA and European Commission  officials stated that they expect information-sharing protocols to be  established and shadowing of airport assessments to take place during  spring 2007. TSA officials also stated that once the information-sharing  protocols are finalized, they would be willing to provide European Union  member states with the results of U.S. airport assessments.
Aviation industry representatives stated that in addition to facilitating joint  assessments and use of third party assessments, harmonization of aviation  security standards between countries would enhance the efficiency and  effectiveness of international aviation security efforts. For example, IATA  representatives we interviewed stated that they have met with TSA  officials about harmonizing the list of items prohibited onboard aircraft  with the European Commission. IATA officials stated that having different  security requirements to follow for different countries leads to confusion,  and perhaps noncompliance with security requirements, among air  carriers. The Chairman of the Security Committee for the Association of  European Airlines stated that there are numerous redundancies in the  international aviation security system that could be reduced through  harmonization, particularly with regard to screening transfer passengers— passengers who have a layover en route from their originating airport to  their destination airport. For example, for a passenger traveling from  Frankfurt to Chicago who has to change planes in New York, upon landing  in New York, the passenger must be rescreened and have his or her  checked baggage rescreened before boarding the flight for Chicago.  According to officials from various air carrier and airport operator  associations, the rescreening of transfer passengers is costly and is only  required because individual countries do not formally recognize each  other’s aviation security measures as providing an equivalent level of  security. Air carrier representatives also stated that because air carriers  must use their limited resources to implement redundant security  measures, they are not able to focus their resources on implementing  other security measures that may be more effective at preventing a  terrorist from carrying out an attack. The TSA Assistant Secretary agreed  that rescreening transfer passengers that originate from airports that have  a high level of security may be unnecessarily redundant. The Assistant  Secretary said that TSA plans to assess the effectiveness of the checked  baggage screening system commonly used at European airports to  determine if that system provides at least the same level of security as  TSA’s baggage screening system. However, TSA officials said that even if  the agency determines that the baggage screening system in place at  European airports provides an equivalent level of security, TSA would still  have to rescreen checked baggage for transfer passengers arriving from  Europe because the Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires  passengers and baggage on flights originating in the United States to be  screened by U.S. government employees. According to an attorney in  TSA’s Office of Chief Counsel, Congress would have to change the law in  order for TSA to discontinue the screening of transfer passengers.
TSA also made efforts to harmonize some aviation security measures with  other countries outside of the European Union. For example, TSA officials  worked with Canadian officials to develop a common set of security  requirements for air carriers that have flights between the United States  and Canada. Additionally, in response to the alleged August 2006 liquid  explosives terrorist plot, TSA initially banned all liquids, gels, and aerosols  from being carried through the checkpoint and, in September 2006, began  allowing passengers to carry on small, travel-size liquids and gels (3 fluid  ounces or less) using a single quart-size, clear plastic, zip-top bag. In an  effort to harmonize its liquid screening procedures with other countries, in  November 2006, TSA revised its procedures to allow 3.4 fluid ounces of  liquids, gels, and aerosols onboard aircraft, which is equivalent to 100  milliliters—the amount permitted by the 27 countries in the European  Union, as well as Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, and Iceland.  According to the Assistant Secretary of TSA, this means that  approximately half of the world’s air travelers will be governed by similar  measures with regard to this area of security. ICAO also adopted the  liquid, gels, and aerosol screening procedures implemented by TSA and  others as a recommended practice. As we reported in March 2007, DHS  has also taken steps toward harmonizing international air cargo security  practices. As part of this effort, TSA has worked through ICAO to develop  uniform international air cargo security standards.
section_title: TSA Is Taking Steps to Address Sovereignty Concerns Raised by Foreign Officials on a Case-by-Case Basis
paragraphs: In addition to concerns regarding the resource burden placed on host  governments as a result of frequent airport visits by TSA and others, TSA,  on a case-by-case basis, has also had to address host government concerns  regarding sovereignty—more specifically, concerns that TSA assessments  and inspections infringe upon a host government’s authority to regulate  airports and air carriers within its borders. According to TSA officials and  representatives of the European Commission, several foreign governments  have stated that they consider TSA’s foreign airport assessments as an  infringement on their sovereignty. For example, government officials in  one country have prevented TSA from assessing the security at their  airports and from inspecting non-U.S. air carriers because they do not  believe TSA has the authority to assess airports outside of the United  States and that the host government is the sole regulator of air carriers  that are based out of their country. Based on the results of air carrier  inspections provided to us by TSA, we found that during fiscal year 2005,  TSA conducted only one inspection of an air carrier that was based out of  this particular country. According to TSA, officials from this country  allowed TSA to conduct this particular inspection to accommodate TSA’s  request to inspect the security of air carriers that had flights originating in  Europe and arriving in Washington, D.C., during the January 2005 U.S.  presidential inauguration activities. We also found that TSA conducted  assessments of four airports in this particular country during fiscal year  2005. TSA officials said that they were able to conduct these assessments  under the guise of a TSA “visit” to—versus an “assessment” of—the  airport. TSA officials, however, stated that because officials from this  country do not believe TSA has the authority to assess the security at their  airports, these officials would not accept—neither orally nor in writing— the results of TSA airport assessments. TSA officials also stated that  officials from this country prohibited TSA inspectors from assessing  airport perimeter security as well as the contents of the country’s  individual airport security programs.
TSA officials identified that there are at least 3 additional countries that  raised concerns regarding sovereignty. According to TSA, officials from  one of these countries stated that they did not know of any international  requirements compelling them to allow TSA to assess their airport and  that TSA had too many internal flaws to assess airports in other countries.  In response to this country’s concerns, TSA sent a representative to meet  with the country’s Minister of Transportation. At the meeting, the Minister  granted TSA future access to the country’s airports for assessments after  being offered the opportunity to visit U.S. airports to observe security  measures. Additional countries, according to TSA, were concerned about  their sovereignty being violated and TSA gathering intelligence  information for the U.S. government through the airport assessment  program. TSA officials stated that when unique concerns arise in the  future, they will continue to work with countries on a case-by-case basis to  try to address their concerns.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives on  U.S.-bound flights from the United Kingdom illustrates the continuing  threat of international terrorism to commercial aviation and the  importance of TSA’s foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection  programs. As part of these programs, TSA has provided on-site  consultation and made recommendations to foreign officials on how to  resolve security deficiencies. In rare cases, DHS and TSA have taken more  aggressive action by notifying the traveling public that an airport does not  meet minimum international standards or issuing warning letters and  letters of correction to air carriers. While foreign government officials and  air carrier representatives acknowledged that TSA’s efforts have helped to  strengthen the security of U.S.-bound flights, there are several  opportunities for TSA to strengthen oversight of its foreign airport  assessment and air carrier inspection programs. First, although TSA has  made some efforts to improve its tracking of foreign airport assessments  and air carrier inspections, until additional controls are in place to track  the status of foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, such  as whether scheduled assessments and inspections were actually  conducted, TSA has limited assurance that all assessments and inspections  are accounted for and that appropriate action was taken for airports and  air carriers that did not comply with security standards. Second, while  TSA has helped to strengthen security at foreign airports by providing  assistance to foreign officials, because TSA does not consistently track  and document foreign officials’ progress in addressing security  deficiencies, it may be difficult for TSA to assess the impact of its efforts  on meeting program goals—to ensure that foreign airports and air carriers  servicing the United States are meeting, at a minimum, applicable ICAO  standards and TSA’s security requirements, respectively. Third, although  TSA has established some output performance measures and targets  related to the assessment and inspection programs, the current measures  do not enable TSA to draw particularly meaningful conclusions about the  impact of its foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection  programs on the security of U.S.-bound flights and how to most effectively  direct its improvement efforts.
TSA has faced several challenges in meeting the goals of its assessment  and inspection programs, including a lack of available staff and concerns  regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of  frequent airport visits conducted by TSA and others. TSA’s development of  a risk-based approach to scheduling airport assessments and air carrier  inspections is a step in the right direction to address host government  concerns and better leverage limited inspector resources. However, it is  too soon to determine the extent to which the risk-based approach will  help to improve TSA’s ability to complete scheduled foreign airport  assessments and air carrier inspections, and the extent to which the  approach will alleviate host government concerns regarding the frequency  of airport visits. The collaboration between TSA and the European  Commission regarding opportunities for conducting joint airport  assessments and sharing assessment results, as well as efforts to  harmonize aviation security standards—including those related to the  screening of liquids, gels, and aerosols—with the European Commission  and others, are key steps toward addressing host government concerns  regarding the resource burden that results from frequent assessments by  TSA and others. It will be important for TSA to continue working with  foreign officials to address their concerns, such as sovereignty issues, in  order to continue assessing the security at foreign airports that service the  United States.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help strengthen oversight of TSA’s foreign airport assessment and air  carrier inspection programs, in our April 2007 report that contained  sensitive security information, we recommended that the Secretary of the  Department of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for the  Transportation Security Administration to take the following five actions:    develop controls to track the status of scheduled foreign airport  assessments from initiation through completion, including the reasons  why assessments were deferred or canceled;    develop controls to track the status of scheduled air carrier inspections  from initiation through completion, including the reasons why  inspections were deferred or canceled, as well as the final disposition  of any investigations that result from air carrier inspections;    develop a standard process for tracking and documenting host  governments’ progress in addressing security deficiencies identified  during TSA airport assessments;    develop outcome-oriented performance measures to evaluate the  impact TSA assistance has on improving foreign airport compliance  with ICAO standards; and    develop outcome-oriented performance measures to evaluate the  impact TSA assistance and enforcement actions have on improving air  carrier compliance with TSA security requirements.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: On April 13, 2007, we received written comments on the draft report,  which are reproduced in full in appendix V.  DHS generally concurred with  the findings and recommendations in the report and stated that the  recommendations will help strengthen TSA’s oversight of foreign airport  assessments and air carrier inspections.
With regard to our recommendations that TSA develop controls to track  the status of scheduled airport assessments and air carrier inspections  from initiation through completion, including the reasons for any  deferments or cancellations, and the final disposition of investigations  related to air carrier inspections, DHS stated that TSA plans to enhance its  tracking system to include the reason for any deferment or cancellation of  an airport assessment or an air carrier inspection. The tracking system  also incorporates the risk-based methodology and criteria for scheduling  foreign airport assessments that TSA adopted in October 2006. Enhancing  the tracking system should provide TSA greater assurance that airport  assessments and air carrier inspections are conducted within applicable  time frames.  If properly implemented and monitored, this tracking system  should address the intent of our recommendation. Regarding the  disposition of investigations related to air carrier inspections, DHS stated  that TSA’s Office of Chief Counsel currently documents the final  disposition of investigations in PARIS, but TSA will enhance PARIS to  ensure that inspection activities are linked to investigations so that  comprehensive enforcement information is readily available. A clear link  between violations identified as a result of an inspection and the final  disposition of those violations is important for maintaining comprehensive  inspection and enforcement information. As we reported, TSA often  pursued one enforcement action in response to multiple violations, and  inspectors were not required to identify which violations were included in  the enforcement action. Without being able to readily identify what  enforcement action was taken in response to specific security violations,  TSA cannot readily ensure that air carriers receive appropriate penalties,  and that security violations are resolved.
Concerning our recommendation that TSA develop a standard process for  tracking and documenting host governments’ progress in addressing  security deficiencies identified during assessments, TSA stated that it is  currently developing a system whereby outstanding deficiencies identified  during an assessment will be tracked along with deficiency-specific  information, deadlines, and current status. TSA plans to archive this  information for future trend analysis and to provide a historical  understanding of each airport’s security posture. This effort, if properly  implemented, will provide additional relevant, useful information to TSA  in performing its oversight responsibilities.
TSA concurred with our recommendation that it develop outcome- oriented performance measures to evaluate the impact TSA assistance has  on improving foreign airport compliance with international security  standards, and on improving air carrier compliance with TSA security  requirements. TSA is considering several elements to include in the  performance measures, such as the number of assessments conducted,  corrective actions recommended, TSA assistance provided, and corrective  actions achieved. TSA indicated that its outcome-based performance  measures would be structured to recognize the collaborative nature of the  process, particularly where corrective action by a foreign government is  concerned. Such outcome-based performance measures, if properly  developed and utilized, will enable TSA to determine the impact of its  airport assessment program and assistance provided for improving  security at foreign airports.  Likewise, these types of measures can be  applied to air carrier inspections at foreign airports to determine he  impact that such inspections have on compliance, and to identify which  approaches to for improving air carrier compliance with security  requirements work well and which could be improved upon.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix VI. This report will also be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine efforts by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to  ensure the security of international aviation, and in particular flights  bound for the United States from other countries, we addressed the  following questions: (1) What were the results of TSA’s fiscal year 2005  foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, and what actions  were taken, if any, when TSA identified that foreign airports and air  carriers were not complying with security standards? (2) How, if at all, did  TSA assist foreign countries and air carriers in addressing any deficiencies  identified during foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections,  and to what extent did TSA provide oversight of its assessment and  inspection efforts? (3) What challenges, if any, affected TSA’s ability to  conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, and what  actions have TSA and others taken to address these challenges?
subsections: section_title: Results of Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections and Actions Taken by TSA in Response to Noncompliance
subsections: section_title: Foreign Airport Assessment Results
paragraphs: To determine the results of TSA’s foreign airport assessments we reviewed  128 fiscal year 2005 assessment reports, the most recent year for which  complete foreign airport assessment reports were available. To determine  the extent to which foreign airports complied with International Civil  Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards and recommended practices, we  looked at the following information contained in the reports:  (1) ICAO standards or recommended practices with which the airport did  not comply;  (2) whether issues of noncompliance were “old” (identified during the  previous assessment) or “new” (identified during the current  assessment);  (3) explanation of the problems that existed that caused the airport not to  comply with ICAO standards or recommended practices, and, if  provided, any actions taken by the host government to address the  problems;  (4) TSA’s recommendations for how the airport could correct security  deficiencies in order to meet ICAO standards or recommended  practices; and  (5) whether issues of noncompliance remained “open” (unresolved) or  “closed” (resolved) prior to the completion of the assessment.
We developed an electronic data collection instrument to capture  information from copies of the assessment reports. All data collection  instrument entries, with the exception of the problem descriptions and  recommendations, were verified to ensure they had been copied correctly  from the assessment reports. Considering that we only intended to discuss  the problem descriptions and the recommendations anecdotally, and given  the resources available to verify this information, we verified that the  problem descriptions and recommendations had been copied correctly for  a random sample of 20 assessment reports from fiscal year 2005.
We analyzed the data to determine the frequency with which foreign  airports complied with particular categories of ICAO standards and  recommended practices, such as passenger screening, checked baggage  screening, access controls, etc., and the number of airports that resolved  deficiencies upon completion of the assessment.
section_title: Air Carrier Inspection Results
paragraphs: To determine the results of TSA’s air carrier inspections, we obtained  inspection data from TSA’s Performance and Results Information System  (PARIS). For the purposes of our review, we analyzed the results of  inspections conducted in fiscal year 2005 to be consistent with the analysis  performed on the results of foreign airport assessments for fiscal year  2005.
TSA’s inspections database contained information on 529 air carrier  inspections at 145 foreign airports in 71 countries conducted by TSA  during fiscal year 2005. Specifically, the inspections database included the  date and location of the inspection, the inspected air carrier, the security  requirements being inspected, as well as the inspector’s determination as  to whether the air carrier was or was not in compliance with security  requirements. Prior to conducting any analysis, we assessed the reliability  of the inspection data by performing electronic testing for obvious errors  in accuracy and completeness. Our testing revealed a few errors, such as  inconsistencies in the names of individual air carriers or incorrectly  identifying the airport as the assessed entity rather than the air carrier. We  also found instances of inspections conducted at domestic airports that  were included in the data; those inspection records were removed. We  also interviewed agency officials familiar with the data, and worked with  them to resolve the data problems we identified. Based on our electronic  testing and discussions with agency officials, we found the data to be  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. For our analysis, we  also added additional information to the inspection records to include the  country where the inspection occurred, and whether the air carrier being  inspected was a U.S.-based air carrier or a foreign air carrier. Finally, to  facilitate our analysis, we grouped the security requirements being  inspected into several categories, such as aircraft security, cargo, checked  baggage, passenger and carry-on screening and special procedures.
section_title: Actions Taken by TSA when Foreign Airports and Air Carriers Did Not Comply with Security Requirements
paragraphs: To determine the actions taken by TSA when foreign airports did not  comply with ICAO standards and recommended practices, we reviewed  TSA’s Foreign Airport Assessment Program Standard Operating  Procedures (SOP). We also reviewed relevant statutory provisions that  identify specific actions to be taken by the Secretary of Homeland Security  when the Secretary determines that a foreign airport does not maintain  and carry-out effective security measures.
To determine the actions taken by TSA when air carriers did not comply  with TSA security requirements, we reviewed fiscal year 2005 information  from the findings and investigations databases in PARIS. As with the  inspection data, to facilitate our analysis, we included additional  information in the findings database, such as the country where the  inspection occurred, and whether the air carrier being inspected was a  U.S.-based air carrier or a foreign air carrier. Further, we grouped the  security requirements being inspected into several categories, such as  aircraft security, cargo, checked baggage, passenger and carry-on  screening, and special procedures.
To assess the reliability of the findings data, we performed electronic  testing for obvious errors and completeness and interviewed agency  officials knowledgeable about the data. We identified two issues of  concern during our reliability assessment. First, we found that the findings  database is not linked to the inspections database to allow for ready  determination of the actions taken by TSA in response to specific  deficiencies. Second, the findings database did not consistently include  accurate information on actions taken in response to findings. According  to TSA officials knowledgeable about the data, the findings database  should contain information on actions taken by TSA for each response of  “not in compliance” in the inspections database. However, we found that  in half of the inspections where deficiencies were identified, such  information was not properly recorded in the findings database.  Considering the amount of information excluded from the findings  database and that this information could not be readily provided by TSA,  we determined that the findings data were not sufficiently reliable for  conducting evaluative analysis of the actions taken by TSA when security  violations were identified during air carrier inspections. However, we  determined that the findings data were sufficiently reliable for conducting  descriptive analysis of TSA’s actions, while including appropriate  statements as to its reliability, and for anecdotal purposes.
To assess the reliability of the investigations data included in PARIS, we  conducted electronic testing and interviewed agency officials  knowledgeable about the data. We found that information in the  investigations database is not recorded in such a way that one can readily  determine which air carrier inspection, and in particular which specific  security violations identified, were the impetus behind a particular  investigation. TSA officials explained that inspectors are not required to  link an investigation to the inspection which it stemmed from. When we  performed our analysis, TSA officials were, however, able to provide links  to inspections for some of the investigations. For the remainder of the  investigations data, we attempted to make the link between inspections  and investigations by using information from the inspections database  such as the date when the investigation record was created and the  narrative fields, which in some cases identified whether the investigation  was a result of an inspection or some other offense, such as an air carrier  allowing a passenger on the No-Fly list to board a U.S.-bound flight. Our  analysis of actions taken by TSA when air carriers did not comply with  security requirements is, therefore, based on those investigations that we  were able to link to fiscal year 2005 inspection activity. We found these  data to be sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report.
For additional information on actions taken by TSA when foreign airports  and air carriers did not comply with security requirements, we interviewed  TSA headquarters and field officials in the Office of Security Operations— the division responsible for conducting foreign airport assessments and air  carrier inspections and making recommendations for corrective action— and the Transportation Security Network Management division—the unit  responsible for working with foreign officials to coordinate TSA foreign  airport visits and monitoring host government and air carrier progress in  addressing security deficiencies.
section_title: Assistance Provided by TSA to Address Security Deficiencies and Oversight of Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Efforts
subsections: section_title: Assistance Provided by TSA to Address Security Deficiencies
paragraphs: To identify actions taken by TSA to help foreign officials address security  deficiencies identified at foreign airports during the fiscal year 2005  airport assessments, we obtained and analyzed information from the fiscal  year 2005 foreign airport assessment reports. To obtain information on  TSA’s efforts to assist air carrier representatives in addressing identified  security deficiencies, we reviewed information in the findings and  investigations databases from TSA’s PARIS. As previously discussed, we  assessed the reliability of the findings and investigations data by  performing electronic testing for obvious errors in accuracy and  completeness, and interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the  data. While we identified errors during our reliability assessment, many of  which remained unresolved, we determined that the findings and  investigations data were sufficiently reliable for anecdotal descriptions of  the assistance TSA provided air carriers to help them address security  deficiencies.
To obtain additional information on actions taken by TSA to address  security deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments and air  carrier inspections, we interviewed TSA headquarters officials from the  Office of Security Operations and the Transportation Sector Network  Management division. We also made site visits to TSA’s five international  field offices (IFO) located in Los Angeles, Dallas, Miami, Frankfurt, and  Singapore, where we met with the IFO managers; international aviation  security inspectors, who conduct foreign airport assessments and air  carrier inspections; 10 of the 20 TSA Representatives (TSAR), who  schedule TSA airport visits and follow up on host governments’ progress  in addressing security deficiencies; and 4 of the 6 International Principal  Security Inspectors (IPSI), who are responsible for assisting foreign air  carriers in understanding and complying with TSA security requirements.  We also met with 3 of the 15 Principal Security Inspectors (PSI) located at  TSA headquarters that are responsible for helping U.S. air carriers  understand and comply with TSA security requirements. During each of  these interviews, we discussed these officials’ responsibilities related to  the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs,  including their role in assisting foreign officials and air carrier  representatives in correcting security deficiencies identified during  assessments and inspections. Information from our interviews with  government officials, members of the aviation industry, and TSA officials  and inspectors cannot be generalized beyond those that we spoke with  because we did not use statistical sampling techniques in selecting  individuals to interview. To obtain a greater understanding of the foreign  airport assessment and air carrier inspection processes, as well as the  assistance TSA provides, we accompanied a team of TSA inspectors and a  TSAR during the assessment of E.T. Joshua International Airport in  Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the inspection of  Caribbean Sun Airlines at that location. Moreover, we identified and met  with officials from other U.S. government agencies that assist foreign  officials in enhancing security at foreign airports. Specifically, we met with  officials from the Department of Justice, Department of State, Department  of Transportation, and the U.S. Trade and Development Administration.
section_title: Oversight of the Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Programs
paragraphs: To obtain information on the extent to which TSA provided oversight of its  assessment and inspection efforts, we reviewed the agency guidance for  each program. We also reviewed sections of the fiscal year 2005 foreign  airport assessment reports for completeness and general consistency with  TSA guidance for preparing assessment reports. In addition, we reviewed  the inspections, findings, and investigations databases in PARIS for  completeness and the ability to track air carrier inspection activity from  initiation through completion, including actions taken against air carriers  who did not comply with security requirements. We compared TSA’s  guidance and reporting mechanisms for the assessment and inspection  programs with federal standards for internal controls and associated  guidance. We also met with TSA headquarters officials, IFO managers,  TSARs, and aviation security inspectors to discuss the extent to which  they documented assessment and inspection activity from initiation  through completion and follow-up activity for unresolved security  deficiencies.
We obtained additional information on TSA’s oversight of the foreign  airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs, particularly with  regard to assessing the impact of these programs, by reviewing TSA’s  fiscal year 2006 Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART)  submissions. The Office of Management and Budget describes PART as a  diagnostic tool meant to provide a consistent approach to evaluating  federal programs as part of the executive budget formulation process.  PART includes information on an agency’s program goals and  performance measures used to assess whether program goals are being  met. We compared the program goals identified in TSA’s PART submission  with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), which  identifies requirements for the types of measures federal agencies should  use to assess the performance of their programs. We also interviewed TSA  headquarters and field officials to obtain their perspectives on appropriate  ways to assess the performance of the foreign airport assessment and air  carrier inspection programs.
section_title: Challenges That Affected TSA’s Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections and Actions Taken to Address those Challenges
paragraphs: To identify challenges that affected TSA’s ability to conduct foreign airport  assessments and air carrier inspections at foreign airports, we met with  TSA headquarters and field officials in the Office of Security Operations  and the Transport Sector Network Management division regarding their  efforts to obtain access to foreign airports to conduct assessments and  inspections. We also visited the embassies of 16 nations and the  Delegation of the European Commission in Washington, D.C., to obtain  perspectives of foreign transportation security officials on TSA’s airport  assessment and air carrier inspection program. In addition, we conducted  site visits to meet with aviation security officials in Belgium, Canada,  Germany, the Philippines, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Thailand, and  the United Kingdom to discuss their perspectives on TSA’s foreign airport  assessment and air carrier inspection activity. We selected these locations  because they met one or more of the following criteria: a relatively high  volume of passengers fly to the United States each year, TSA assigned a  relatively high threat ranking to the country, the country received aviation  security training or technical assistance from a U.S. government agency, or  a TSA international field office was located in the country. We also met  with individuals representing 11 air carriers, including both U.S. and  foreign airlines, to obtain their perspectives on TSA’s foreign airport  assessment and air carrier inspections programs. Additionally, we met  with officials from the European Commission, the European Civil Aviation  Commission, and ICAO to discuss similar efforts these organizations have  in place to ensure compliance with international aviation security  standards. Information from our interviews with foreign government  officials and members of the aviation industry cannot be generalized  beyond those that we spoke with because we did not use statistical  sampling techniques in selecting individuals to interview. We also  reviewed documentation associated with TSA’s risk-based methodology  for scheduling foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections,  which TSA intended to address some of the challenges in conducting  assessments and inspections, and compared the methodology to our risk  management guidance.
In addition, we interviewed 4 Federal Security Directors and 7 aviation  security inspectors stationed in the United States to discuss their support  of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs as  well as the impact, if any, that their involvement in these programs has had  on their operations at U.S. airports.
We conducted our work from October 2005 through March 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: International Civil Aviation Organization Standards and Recommended Practices Used by TSA to Conduct Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign Airport Assessments
section_title: Appendix III: TSA Security Requirements for U.S.-Based and Foreign Carriers Operating Out of Foreign Airports
subsections: section_title: Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program: U.S.- based Carriers
paragraphs: The aircraft operator standard security program (AOSSP) is designed to  provide for the safety of persons and property traveling on flights against  acts of criminal violence and air piracy, and the introduction of explosives,  incendiaries, weapons, and other prohibited items on board an aircraft.  TSA requires that each air carrier adopt and implement a security program  approved by TSA for scheduled passenger and public charter operations at  locations within the United States, from the United States to a non-U.S.  location, or from a non-U.S. location to the United States, and from a non- U.S. location to a non-U.S. location (for example, an intermediate stop  such as Singapore to Tokyo to the United States). The AOSSP developed  by TSA and used by U.S.-based carriers is divided into chapters and lays  out security requirements for operations. Table 6 summarizes  requirements applicable to flights operating from a non-U.S. location to  the United States.
section_title: Security Directives
paragraphs: When TSA determines that additional security measures are necessary to  respond to a threat assessment or to a specific threat against civil aviation,  TSA may issue a Security Directive setting forth mandatory measures.  Each air carrier required to have a TSA-approved security program must  comply with each Security Directive issued to it by TSA, within the time  frame prescribed in the Security Directive for compliance.
section_title: Model Security Program
paragraphs: TSA requires that the security program of a foreign air carrier provide  passengers a level of protection similar to the level of protection provided  by U.S. air carriers serving the same airports. The security program must  be designed to prevent or deter the carriage onboard airplanes of any  prohibited item, prohibit unauthorized access to airplanes, ensure that  checked baggage is accepted only by an authorized agent of the air carrier,  and ensure the proper handling of cargo and checked baggage to be  loaded onto passenger flights. In addition, carriers are requested to  provide an acceptable level of security for passengers by developing and  implementing procedures to prevent acts of unlawful interference.
TSA’s foreign air carrier model security program was prepared to assist  foreign airlines in complying with security requirements for operations  into and out of the United States. Table 7 summarizes requirements  applicable to foreign carriers’ flights operating from a non-U.S. location to  the United States.
section_title: Emergency Amendments
paragraphs: When TSA determines that additional security measures are necessary to  respond to an emergency requiring immediate action with respect to safety  in air transportation, it may issue an emergency amendment. An  emergency amendment mandates additional actions beyond those in the  air carrier’s security program. When TSA issues an emergency  amendment, it also issues a notice indicating the reasons for the  amendment to be adopted. Air carriers are required to comply with  emergency amendments immediately.
section_title: Appendix IV: U.S. Government Aviation Security Training and Technical Assistance Programs for Foreign Entities
subsections: section_title: Department of State: Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
subsections: section_title: Program Background
paragraphs: The State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program seeks to  provide partner countries the training, equipment, and technology they  need to combat terrorism and prosecute terrorists and terrorist  supporters. The Anti-Terrorism Assistance program was established in  1983.
section_title: Program Selection
subsections: section_title: Selection of Countries
paragraphs: Countries must meet at least one of the four following criteria to  participate in the ATA program:    The country or region must be categorized as having a critical or high  threat of terrorism and unable to protect U.S. facilities and personnel  within the country    There are important U.S. policy interests with the prospective country,  which may be supported through the provision of antiterrorism  assistance. For example, officials in one country received assistance  through the ATA program because they allowed the United States to  establish air bases in their country.
The prospective country must be served by a U.S. air carrier, or is the  last point of departure for flights to the United States.
The prospective country cannot be engaged in gross human rights  violations.
section_title: Determination of Type of Training
paragraphs: The State Department determines whether and what training and  assistance to provide countries based on needs assessments done by State  Department personnel along with a team of interagency subject matter  experts. The assessment team evaluates prospective program participants  using 25 Antiterrorism Critical Capabilities. Program officials stated that  the assessment is a snapshot of the country’s antiterrorism capabilities,  including equipment, personnel, and available training. ATA program  officials stated that the assessment includes a review at several levels,  including tactical capabilities (people and resources), operational  management capabilities (overall management and ability), and strategic  capabilities.
Two of the 25 capabilities reviewed during the needs assessments are  related to aviation security. Those are Airspace Security and Air Port of  Entry Security. The first is an assessment of how a country controls what  goes through its airspace. The second is an assessment of security at the  country’s main airport. According to program officials, when doing an  assessment, the ATA team will usually visit the busiest airport within the  country to examine the operational security of the airport and assesses  training provided to airport security management.
section_title: Program Assistance
paragraphs: The results of the needs assessments determine what type of assistance  the State Department will offer to countries participating in the ATA  program. The various types of training and assistance offered through the  program include crisis management and response, cyber-terrorism,  dignitary protection, bomb detection, border control, kidnap intervention  and hostage negotiation and rescue, response to incidents involving  weapons of mass destruction, counter terrorist finance, interdiction of  terrorist organizations, and airport security. During fiscal year 2005, 146  countries received antiterrorism training through the ATA program; 7  countries received training for aviation security.
The ATA program offers one course in aviation security, “Airport Security  Management.” This is a 1-week seminar that is generally taught in-country.  According to State Department officials, TSA employees teach the course.  State Department officials stated that this course helps countries to meet  internationally recognized aviation security standards established by  ICAO. State Department officials stated that while most countries’ officials  know about ICAO, and can obtain ICAO manuals and standards, many of  the countries do not have the resources or equipment to operationalize  ICAO standards. State Department officials stated that the ATA program  offers countries the resources to implement ICAO standards.
section_title: Recipient Countries
paragraphs: For fiscal year 2005, aviation security training was provided to 7 countries  through the ATA program, Philippines ($94,723), Kazakhstan ($98,200),  Bahamas ($95,000), Barbados ($45,900), Dominican Republic ($45,900),  Qatar ($98,046), and United Arab Emirates ($95,000).
section_title: Relationship to TSA
paragraphs: TSA employees teach in-country aviation security training to foreign  officials through the ATA program. In addition, ATA uses TSA staff as  subject matter experts when performing needs assessments.
section_title: U.S. Trade and Development Agency
subsections: section_title: Program Background
paragraphs: The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) works to advance  economic development and U.S. commercial interests in developing and  middle-income countries. The agency funds various forms of technical  assistance, training, and business workshops to support the development  of a modem infrastructure and a fair and open trading environment.  USTDA’s use of foreign assistance funds to support sound investment  policy and decision making in host countries is intended to create an  enabling environment for trade, investment, and sustainable economic  development. In carrying out its mission, USTDA gives emphasis to  economic sectors that may benefit from U.S. exports of goods and  services. For example, according to USTDA, the agency obligated  approximately 24 percent of its program funding in support of  transportation sector projects. More specifically, according to USTDA, 5.6  percent of the agency’s budget is obligated toward projects in the aviation  security sector. The general goals of USTDA’s work in the aviation security  field are to help foreign airports achieve “Category I” status (the FAA  classification for an airport that meets minimum safety standards, which  allows foreign air carriers to fly from their country of origin directly to the  United States), to help countries prepare to pass and adhere to ICAO  standards, and to offer training to increase aviation security.
section_title: Selection of Projects
paragraphs: According to USTDA, assistance projects and recipients are selected  within the framework of USTDA’s development and commercial mandate.  Generally, projects are not selected based strictly on security (i.e., not  selected based on threat) but on the likelihood of a country implementing  the recommended actions to obtain greater aviation safety and security.  USTDA projects are developed through consultations by USTDA staff and  U.S. and foreign embassies, foreign officials (public or private) that have  decision-making authority to implement the assistance project, or U.S.  industry officials that identify a need for assistance. According to USTDA,  when developing the project, the agency evaluates a number of factors,  including the priority the government places on the project and if the  entity has the technical capability to implement the project. According to  USTDA, this evaluation is conducted in order to ensure that U.S.  taxpayers’ dollars are wisely used on projects that will help strengthen a  foreign countries’ ability to transport passengers and goods to the United  States.
After an initial evaluation by USTDA staff, USTDA employs a technical  expert to conduct an independent evaluation of the proposed assistance  project. That technical evaluation can take two forms: a Desk Study or a  Definitional Mission. The Desk Study is completed for proposals where  sufficient information is provided that allows for a technical expert to  make an informed decision as to whether or not USTDA should fund the  project. If the project proposal does not contain sufficient detail to  evaluate without conducting a field site visit, USTDA then employs a small  business contractor—or consultant—to conduct a Definitional Mission,  which, according to USTDA, costs between $25,000 and $40,000. The  consultant undertaking the Definitional Mission takes 1 to 2 weeks to meet  with the stakeholders in the foreign country, including the potential grant  recipients, in order to review project ideas and generate additional project  opportunities. Upon return from the site visits, the consultant prepares a  report for USTDA on the findings of the Definitional Mission. According to  USTDA, consultants typically assess more than one proposed assistance  project at a time when in the field. To avoid conflicts of interest, the  consultant that undertakes the Definitional Mission is prohibited from  participating in any of the follow-on work, including the early investment  analysis or training recommended in the report.
section_title: Program Assistance
subsections: section_title: Early Investment Analysis
paragraphs: Early investment analysis is the main form of USTDA assistance.  According to USTDA, the cost of such assistance typically ranges from  $100,000 to $500,000. These technical assistance programs may take from  6 to 18 months to complete. The studies are undertaken by U.S. consulting  firms under a grant program and are intended to evaluate the technical,  financial, environmental, legal, and other critical aspects of infrastructure  development projects that are of interest to potential lenders and  investors. Host country project sponsors select the U.S. companies,  normally through open competitions.
section_title: Annex 17 Workshops
paragraphs: USTDA organizes Annex 17 workshops to help bring developing countries  into compliance with lCAO Annex 17. These workshops are designed to  give countries assistance before lCAO inspections so that they meet  minimum standards and pass inspections. According to USTDA, the  workshops suggest ways that relatively poor countries can meet ICAO  standards with a low level of technological sophistication. According to  USTDA, the workshops focus on enhancing training and improving human  resources related to aviation security.
section_title: Recipients
paragraphs: According to USTDA, for fiscal year 2005, the agency awarded Chile  ($359,000), Haiti ($150,000), Iraq ($243,000), Malaysia ($100,000), Tanzania  ($371,000), Ukraine ($625,000), West Africa Regional Training ($353,000)  and Worldwide Aviation Security training ($596,000) grant assistance in  the aviation security sector.
section_title: Participation by TSA
paragraphs: USTDA consults with TSA on an ongoing basis. USTDA used TSA  personnel as instructors for the Annex 17 workshops.
section_title: Department of Transportation—Safe Skies for Africa Program
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Department of Transportation (DOT) manages the Safe Skies for  Africa presidential initiative (Safe Skies), which started in 1998. Safe Skies  is a technical program that assists participating countries in meeting  international aviation safety and security standards. According to DOT  officials, Safe Skies is a small program with an annual budget— including  operating and administrative costs—between $1 million and $3 million.  According to DOT officials, approximately one-fourth of the Safe Skies  budget goes toward aviation security. Funding for Safe Skies is provided  by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID).
section_title: Selection of Participants
paragraphs: The original Safe Skies participants were selected in 1998 by an  interagency committee made up of Department of Defense, Department of  Transportation, State Department, and the U.S. Trade and Development  Agency. The committee held a series of meetings to consider priority lists  created by each agency, cables exchanged with U.S. embassies across sub- Saharan Africa, and responses to questionnaires sent to various states. The  committee selected countries that it believed had the highest likelihood of  successfully complying with international aviation safety and security  standards set by ICAO and requirements set by the Federal Aviation  Administration (FAA) and TSA. The committee also considered U.S. trade  interests and regional diversity issues. In the end, countries from across  sub-Saharan Africa were selected to participate in the program. Since 1998  only two countries have been added to the list of Safe Skies participants.
Both Uganda and Djibouti became Safe Skies countries after President  Bush announced the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative in 2003.
section_title: Program Assistance
subsections: section_title: General
paragraphs: All Safe Skies countries receive some degree of aid, with priority going to  those countries that demonstrate political will. DOT gauges political will  based on consultations with embassies and TSA and whether a country  implements recommended safety and security practices. The  Administration’s priorities are communicated through the State  Department. According to DOT, all participants except Zimbabwe have  had aviation security, safety, and air navigation surveys of their civil  aviation systems performed at their airports by U.S. government subject - matter experts.
section_title: Equipment
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, the State Department has provided $5 million in  additional resources for DOT to provide security equipment to Safe Skies  countries. DOT officials stated that they worked with their TSA (formerly  FAA security) colleagues to perform site visits to help agency officials  determine country-specific security equipment needs for the screening of  passengers and baggage.
section_title: Security Advisor
paragraphs: According to DOT, Safe Skies has an East Africa aviation security advisor  stationed in Nairobi, Kenya to provide direct advice and technical  assistance to Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in meeting ICAO  standards and to assist these states in addressing potential threats to civil  aviation.
section_title: Recipients
paragraphs: According to DOT, fiscal year 2005 recipients of Safe Skies assistance  were Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Kenya, Mali, Namibia,  Tanzania, and Uganda.
section_title: Collaboration with TSA
paragraphs: TSA and DOT responsibilities are laid out in a 2004 TSA-DOT  memorandum of agreement. Under this agreement, TSA provides advice,  technical assistance, and training through the TSA Enforcement Academy,  in addition to providing an aviation security advisor to Safe Skies. These  activities are funded by DOT, with funds that were appropriated to USAID  and transferred to DOT for the purposes of implementing Safe Skies. TSA  also works in partnership with DOT to prioritize recipient countries based  on need.
section_title: Department of State—Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs—Organization of American States Inter-American Committee against Terrorism
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)  of the Department of State has a program under way aimed at combating  alien smuggling and improving border security. The part of the program  relating to border security contains elements relating to maritime security  and airport security. These efforts are undertaken in cooperation with the  Organization of American States’ (OAS) Inter-American Committee against  Terrorism (CICTE). The INL-OAS efforts began with maritime security and  were broadened to include aviation security in 2003.
section_title: Selection of Participants
paragraphs: INL officials worked with CICTE officials to select the appropriate OAS  member countries to receive training. As of August 2006, the aviation  security effort under way was focused on Caribbean nations, and fiscal  year 2006 funding was also intended to provide funding for some Central  and South American nations. Roughly $264,000 was spent in 2004, $187,110  in 2005, and $236,610 in 2006 on aviation security.
section_title: Program Assistance
paragraphs: INL funds pay for aviation security training courses, and the courses are  taught by TSA officials. These training courses are aimed at helping  countries to develop national civil aviation security programs and other  essential plans based on the ICAO standards as well as crisis management.  INL funds were used to pay for national development workshops for  Caribbean countries. These workshops were taught by TSA staff who  spent 1 week in each Caribbean country. While in country, TSA  representatives reviewed the country’s security program, looked for  deficiencies within the security program, and attempted to build a  program that would resolve the deficiencies they identified. According to  OAS, participants in these workshops identified recommendations to  improve aviation security and combat terrorism and submitted the  recommendations to their respective governments. The workshops  addressed enhancements to the national security program, national  legislation, oversight, national security committees, and program approval  processes. According to OAS, in 2006, these workshops took place in  Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic, Grenada,  Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  According to OAS, starting in September 2006, this program began  functioning in Central America, where national development workshops  were planned to take place in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,  Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.
According to OAS, in addition to the national development workshops,  this program also offers a 5-day crisis management workshop for midlevel  to senior-level aviation management and other government officials. INL,  through CICTE, also funds aviation security courses that are taught by  ICAO instructors.
section_title: Recipient Countries
paragraphs: According to OAS, the recipient countries of CICTE-sponsored aviation  security training for calendar year 2006 were Antigua and Barbuda,  Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican  Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica,  Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.  Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad andTobago, and Uruguay.
section_title: TSA Participation
paragraphs: TSA officials are the instructors for the on-site workshops. CICTE  established an memorandum of agreement with TSA, and discussed the  best approach for helping OAS members develop a long-term international  aviation security program. CICTE and TSA decided that in-country, on-the- ground visits would be the best approach, since these allow CICTE and  TSA to see which problems are present.
section_title: Department of State—Western Hemisphere Affairs— Organization of American States— Inter-American Committee against Terrorism
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: According to OAS, during the fourth quarter of 2006, CICTE received grant  funding to provide aviation security training courses for the nine countries  that will host the 2007 Cricket World Cup.
section_title: Program Assistance
paragraphs: According to OAS, grant funding was used to support two aviation security  training courses—the Basic Security Training Course and the Aviation  Security Training Course. The Basic Security Training Course is a 7-day  course focused on improving aviation security screeners’ ability to detect  threat items using X-ray machines, metal detection portals, physical search  techniques, and explosive trace detection technologies.
According to OAS, the Aviation Security Training Course is a 9-day course  that addresses concepts and principles of managing aviation security  operations within the unique environment of an international airport.  Course content is also based on ICAO standards and recommended  practices and focused on the protection of passengers, crew, ground  personnel, the general public, the aircraft, and airport facilities. According  to OAS, practical exercises are used to reinforce classroom learning. This  course provided training to midlevel managers and supervisors who are  responsible for aviation security program planning, oversight, and  operations. According to OAS, TSA instructors train these officials in  identifying vulnerabilities at their airports, developing preventive  measures, and allocating resources to handle the flow of passengers while  maintaining adequate security.
section_title: Recipient Countries
paragraphs: The recipient countries for calendar year 2006 and the first half of 2007 are  Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, and  St. Lucia.
section_title: Department of Justice-International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) International Criminal Investigative  Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) aims to develop law enforcement  agencies and systems. Training is only one component of ICITAP’s holistic  approach to this mission. ICITAP has an ongoing relationship with the  Department of State to offer various types of training. Since 2000, ICITAP  facilitated Department of State-initiated aviation security training in Ghana  and the Dominican Republic, and conducted an assessment in Benin.
section_title: Selection of Participants
paragraphs: The Department of Justice’s involvement can begin when a foreign  government makes a request to the U.S. embassy for training to rectify  perceived weaknesses in aviation security. The embassy then collaborates  with DOJ to put together a proposal for action, which is then sent to the  Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law  Enforcement. INL attempts to obtain a country-specific appropriation for  the project, and alerts DOJ as to whether funding is available. According  to DOJ, INL sometimes targets certain countries for assistance and then  asks ICITAP to prepare proposals and budgets to support training  activities and technical assistance to improve law enforcement capacity in  the host countries.
section_title: Program Assistance
paragraphs: ICITAP assistance included on-site aviation security needs assessments,  with ICITAP serving as facilitator and current and former TSA (previously  FAA) employees performing the aviation security needs assessments. The  assessment was based on standards laid out in ICAO Annex 17. The  assessment attempted to broadly gauge the adequacy of the available  security systems and each country’s ability to manage the systems.
section_title: Recipients
paragraphs: As of February 2007, the most recent recipients are Benin ($79,500 in  2002), Ghana ($79,500 in 2002), and the Dominican Republic ($32,000 in  2003).
In 2003, as a result of information gathered from TSA’s foreign airport  assessment report, ICITAP provided drug interdiction training to customs  officials in Ghana stationed at the airport. According to DOJ, INL granted  $79,500 each to Ghana and Benin for the purpose of providing airport  security training.
section_title: TSA Participation
paragraphs: Former and current TSA officials have conducted needs assessments and  provided training to foreign officials through ICITAP.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Maria Strudwick, Assistant  Director; Amy Bernstein; Kristy Brown; Alisha Chugh; Emily Hanawalt;  Christopher Jones; Stanley Kostyla; Kyle Lamborn; Thomas Lombardi;  Jeremy Manion; and Linda Miller made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related Products
paragraphs: Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are  in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened. GAO-07-660. Washington,  D.C.: April 30, 2007.
Aviation Security: TSA's Change to its Prohibited Items List Has Not  Resulted in Any Reported Public Safety Incidents, but the Impact of the  Change on Screening Operations is Uncertain. GAO-07-623R.  Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2007.
Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Service Drive  Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and  Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved. GAO-07-634.  Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007.
Aviation Security: TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for  Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be  Systematically Reassessed. GAO-07-299. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007.
Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key  Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains. GAO-07-448T.  Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2007.
Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening  Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D.C.:   Jul. 28, 2006.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding  Uncertainties Remain. GAO-06-875T. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006.
Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the  Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program.   GAO-06-864T. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better  Management Controls Needed if Air Carriers Resume Interest in  Deploying Less than Lethal Weapons. GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.:   May 26, 2006.
Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked  Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington,  D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made  Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring  Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T.  Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private- Sector Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains. GAO-06-166.  Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006.
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely  Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s  Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from  Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.:   Nov. 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air  Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005.
Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority  of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.:  Sept. 23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training  Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed.   GAO-05-781. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not  Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight  Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps  to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.:   July 22, 2005.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of  Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.:   July 13, 2005.
Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement  Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.:  May 2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way,  but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed.  GAO-05-356. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.  Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial  Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.:  Feb.23, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize  Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: Feb.15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA’s Progress to Allow  Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services.   GAO-05-126. Washington, D.C.: Nov.19, 2004.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but  Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term  Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of  Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728.  Washington, D.C.: Jun. 4, 2004.
Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention Needed  to Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington, D.C.: May  28, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies.   GAO-04-785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to  Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519.  Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility  to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T. Washington, D.C.:  Apr. 22, 2004.
Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation  Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer- Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.:  Mar. 17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the  Transportation Security Administration’s Efforts to Secure Aerial  Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System  Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington,  D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing  Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington,  D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004.
The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a  Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development  Program. GAO-04-341R. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen  Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2003.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges  of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.  GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address  Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress  Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: Sept.  24, 2003.
Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, and the  Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security  Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address  Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: Jun. 30, 2003.
Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides  Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T.  Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2003.
Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover  Airports’ Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.:  Feb. 25, 2003.
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a  Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2003.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and  DOT’s Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10,  2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the  Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002.
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and  Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002.
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has  Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27.  Washington, D.C.: Oct.  15, 2002.
Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses  Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2, 2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces  Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.:  Jul. 25, 2002.
Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial  Pilots. GAO-02-822R.  Washington, D.C.: Jun. 28, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard  Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: Sept.  25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for  Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:  Sept. 21, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s  Efforts. GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve  Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.: Sept.  20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in  Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001.