DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk Designation
Published: 2005-06-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Threats to national security--such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and high-profile espionage cases--underscore the need for timely, high-quality determinations of who is eligible for a personnel security clearance which allows an individual to access classified information. The Department of Defense (DOD) needs an effective and efficient clearance program because it is responsible for about 2 million active clearances and provides clearances to more than 20 other executive agencies as well as the legislative branch. Despite these imperatives, DOD has for more than a decade experienced delays in completing hundreds of thousands of clearance requests and impediments to accurately estimating and eliminating its clearance backlog. In January 2005, GAO designated DOD's personnel security clearance program as a high-risk area. In February 2005, DOD transferred its personnel security investigative functions and about 1,800 positions to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), after 2 years of negotiation between the agencies. This testimony provides an update on the challenges that led to GAO's high-risk designation. It identifies both the positive steps that have been taken to address previously identified challenges and some of the remaining hurdles. GAO will continue to monitor this area.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While DOD has taken steps to address the problems that led to designating its clearance program as high risk, continuing challenges are found in each of the three stages of DOD's personnel security clearance process. Preinvestigation: To address previously identified problems in projecting clearance workload, DOD is identifying the military and civilian positions that require clearances. Identifying clearance requirements for contractor personnel is still in the planning phase. Another problem is the efficient submission of investigation requests. In the 2 years since DOD and OPM announced the transfer of DOD's investigative functions and personnel to OPM, the two agencies did not ensure the seamless submission of DOD requests to OPM. DOD is developing software to remedy this problem. Investigation: Delays in completing investigations are continuing. For February 2005, OPM--which now supplies an estimated 90 percent of the government's clearance investigations--reported that over 185,000 of its clearance investigations had exceeded timeliness goals. OPM's effort to add investigative staff is a positive step, but adding thousands of staff could result in continued timeliness problems and quality concerns as the staff gain experience. OPM's workload should decrease because of two recent initiatives: (1) eliminating a few of the investigative requirements for some reinvestigations of personnel updating their clearances and (2) requiring the acceptance of clearances and access granted to personnel moving from one agency to another. Adjudication: In the past, DOD had difficulty monitoring who had been adjudicated for clearances and when the clearances needed to be renewed. While the Joint Personnel Adjudication System has combined databases from DOD's 10 adjudicative facilities to enhance monitoring, wider consolidation of government databases may be required. The Director of OPM will need to integrate all federal agencies into a single governmentwide database in order to meet a requirement established in a recent law. As of September 30, 2003, DOD had a backlog of roughly 90,000 adjudications.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) personnel security clearance program. As you know, Mr. Chairman,  it is one of the 25 areas GAO has designated as high risk in our recent  report, High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO’s high-risk list focuses on those  major programs and operations that need urgent attention and  transformation in order to ensure that our national government functions  in the most economical, efficient, and effective manner possible. Also,  some federal programs and operations are designated high risk because of  their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.
Threats to our national security—such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist  attacks and high-profile espionage cases—underscore the need for timely,  high-quality determinations of who is eligible for a personnel security  clearance that will allow the individual access to classified information. An  increase in the operations and deployments of military personnel since  September 11, 2001, and the sensitive technology that military personnel,  government civilians, and contractors use are other factors suggesting the  need for an effective and efficient clearance program. Because of its size  and the many parts of the government affected by DOD’s personnel  security clearance program, an efficient and effective process is needed.  The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) is  responsible for the clearances issued to approximately 2 million personnel  and for coordinating and implementing DOD-wide policies related to  access to classified information. While most of those personnel are  servicemembers and DOD’s federal employees and contractor personnel,  OUSD(I) is also responsible for the clearances of contractors for more than  20 other federal agencies as well as for staff in the legislative branch of the  federal government.
Notwithstanding the critical mission of DOD and the size of its program,  our prior reviews for more than a decade have documented persistent  problems with DOD’s personnel security clearance program. (See the  reports listed at the end of this statement.) Since fiscal year 2000, DOD has  declared its personnel security clearance investigations program to be a  systemic weakness—a management control problem that affects more than  one DOD component and may jeopardize the department’s operations— under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982. In addition, an  October 2002 House Committee on Government Reform report  recommended to the Secretary of Defense to include DOD’s clearance  adjudication process (use of background investigative information to  determine eligibility for a clearance) as a material weakness. After noting  in our May 2004 report that DOD had dealt with the impediments to timely  clearances in a piecemeal fashion, we recommended that DOD develop and  implement an integrated, comprehensive management plan to eliminate the  backlog, reduce the delays in conducting investigations and determining  eligibility for security clearances, and overcome the impediments that  could allow such problems to recur. Although DOD partially concurred  with our recommendation, the department had not implemented such a  plan as of May 2005.
The longstanding delays in completing hundreds of thousands of clearance  requests and the impediments that hinder DOD’s ability to accurately  estimate and eliminate its clearance backlog led us to declare the program  a high-risk area in January 2005. Specifically, we found delays and  impediments in all three stages of DOD’s personnel security clearance  process shown in Figure 1. Shortly after we placed DOD’s clearance  program on our high-risk list, a major change in the program occurred. In  February 2005, DOD transferred its personnel security investigative  functions and about 1,800 investigative positions to the Office of Personnel  Management (OPM). Now, DOD obtains nearly all of its clearance  investigations from OPM. The Deputy Associate Director of OPM’s Center  for Investigations Services estimated that OPM is responsible for about 90  percent of the more than 650,000 investigations for security clearances  conducted in fiscal year 2004, in addition to nearly 842,000 public trust,  regulatory, and non-sensitive background investigations.
Today, I would like to provide the Subcommittee with an update on the  challenges that led to our designation of DOD’s personnel security  clearance program as a high-risk area. I will discuss both the positive steps  that have been taken to address previously identified concerns and some of  the remaining hurdles. My comments will be organized around the three  stages (preinvestigation, investigation, and adjudication) in DOD’s  personnel security clearance process.
My comments are based primarily on our completed work and our  institutional knowledge from our prior reviews of the clearance process at  DOD and other agencies. In addition, we used information from the  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and  perspectives and statistical data that DOD and OPM officials supplied  during interviews and in written documents gathered as part of our routine  monitoring of steps that had been taken to improve DOD’s personnel  security clearance program. We conducted our work in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards between February and  June 2005.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since 1997, all federal agencies have been subject to a common set of  personnel security investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines for  determining whether servicemembers, government employees, industry  personnel, and others are eligible to receive a security clearance.  Clearances allow personnel to access classified information categorized  into three levels: top secret, secret, and confidential. The expected  damage to national defense and foreign relations that unauthorized  disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause is “exceptionally grave  damage” for top secret information, “serious damage” for secret  information, and “damage” for confidential information. Individuals who  need access to classified information for extended periods of time are  required to periodically renew their clearance (a reinvestigation). The time frames for reinvestigations are 5 years for top secret clearances, 10 years  for secret clearances, and 15 years for confidential clearances.
In addition to requiring different time frames for renewal, the different  levels of clearances require that different types of background information  be gathered and used in making the adjudicative decision about whether an  individual is or is not eligible for a clearance (see table 1). Much of the  information for a secret or confidential clearance is gathered through  electronic files. The investigation for a top secret clearance requires the  information needed for the secret or confidential clearance as well as  additional data which are gathered through time-consuming tasks, such as  interviews with the subject of the investigation request, references in the  workplace, and neighbors. OPM officials estimated that the time required  to gather information to complete initial investigations for top secret  clearances is twice that needed for reinvestigations for top secret  clearances and 10 times as much as that needed for initial investigations or  reinvestigations for secret or confidential clearances. DOD estimated that  adjudicators’ reviews of the longer investigative reports for top secret  clearances also take three times as long as the reviews of investigative  reports for determining eligibility for secret or confidential clearances.  Moreover, if the clearance required for a position is upgraded from secret  to top secret, the investigation and adjudication would need to be  performed twice as often (every 5 years instead of every 10 years).
section_title: Progress and Continuing Challenges Found at Each Stage of DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Process
paragraphs: We found that DOD has taken steps to address challenges found at all three  stages of its personnel security clearance process, but many of the steps  have not yet resulted in implementations that fully address the challenges.  In the preinvestigation stage, DOD has begun decreasing the uncertainty in  its projections of how many and what levels of clearances are required by  identifying the clearances needed for military and civilian positions and  developing software that will result in electronic submissions of clearance  investigation requests to OPM. Regarding the second stage of the clearance  process, OPM has been hiring investigative staff to address past personnel  shortages and the resulting delays from having too few staff for the  investigative workload. Adding thousands of staff could, however, result in  continued timeliness problems as well as quality concerns until the staff  gain experience. Regarding the adjudication stage, DOD’s Joint Personnel  Adjudication System consolidated the databases for 10 DOD adjudication  facilities to enhance monitoring of adjudicative decisions and time frames  for renewing clearances, but a new law requires a governmentwide  clearance database.
subsections: section_title: Preinvestigation Steps Being Taken to Help DOD Identify Requirements for Clearances and Address Submission of Requests for Clearance Investigations
paragraphs: At this time, DOD is uncertain about the number and level of clearances  that it requires and has experienced problems submitting investigation  requests, but the department has begun addressing these problems. DOD’s  inability to accurately project such clearance requirements makes it  difficult to determine budgets and staffing needs. DOD is addressing this  problem by identifying the clearance needs for military and civilian  positions, but no military service had completed this task as of May 2005.  Similarly, in response to our May 2004 recommendation to improve the  projection of clearance requirements for industry personnel, DOD  indicated that it is developing a plan and computer software to have the  government’s contracting officers authorize the number of industry  personnel investigations required to perform the classified work on a given  contract and link the clearance investigations to the contract number.
Despite having 2 years between the time when OPM and DOD announced  an agreement for the transfer of DOD’s investigative functions and  personnel to OPM and when the transfer actually occurred, DOD cannot  make full use of OPM’s Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations  Processing (eQIP), the system used to submit materials required to start a  background investigation. To overcome this challenge to the prompt and  efficient submission of investigation requests, DOD is developing software  that will convert the department’s submissions into the eQIP format. Also,  OPM told us that about 11 percent of the February 2005 clearance  investigation requests submitted outside of eQIP were returned to the  requesting offices when missing or discrepant information could not be  obtained telephonically. Converting a DOD request for investigation into a  format that is compatible with OPM’s eQIP and obtaining missing or  corrected data to open an investigation delays the completion of the  clearance process. OPM does not monitor how many days elapse between  initial submissions and resubmissions of corrected material and, therefore,  does not include that time in its calculations of the average time required to  complete an investigation. Until DOD implements the software currently  being developed and fully determines its clearance requirements, the  department will continue to encounter problems determining budgets and  staff and minimizing the delays in completing the clearance process.
section_title: Delays Exist in Completing Investigations, but Recent Steps May Decrease the Delays
paragraphs: DOD and the rest of the government serviced by OPM are not receiving  completed investigations promptly, but recent initiatives may decrease  these delays. For February 2005, OPM told us that it had more than 185,000  investigations governmentwide that had taken longer than its goals for  closing cases: 120 days for initial investigations and 180 days for  reinvestigations. The current goals for completing a case allow more time  than did the DOD goals reported in our earlier work and, therefore,  comparison of the investigation backlog size that OPM reported in  February 2005 to the backlog size cited in our prior reviews would not  provide any meaningful information. The Intelligence Reform and  Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires that not later than December 17,  2006, and ending December 17, 2009, each authorized adjudicative agency  shall make a determination on at least 80 percent of all applicants for  personnel security clearances within an average of 120 days—90 days to  complete the investigation and 30 days to complete the adjudication—of receiving the security clearance application. Also, not later than February  15, 2006, and annually thereafter through 2011, a report on the progress  made during the preceding year toward meeting these goals is to be  supplied to appropriate congressional committees. Table 2 shows that,  across the government, standard service for both initial investigations and  reinvestigations for top secret clearances resulted in more than 1 year  elapsing, on average, between submitting the investigation requests and  closing the investigations. OPM does, however, permit agencies to request  priority (expedited) processing on a limited number of investigations, and  those investigations took less time to close. Table 2 also shows a difference  in the time required to close initial investigations and reinvestigations for  top secret clearances.
In February and May 2004, we reported that different risks are associated  with delays in completing initial investigations and reinvestigations.  Delays in completing initial personnel security clearances can have  negative impacts on the costs of performing classified work within or for  the U.S. government. For example, delays in clearing industry personnel  can affect the cost, timeliness, and quality of contractor performance on  defense contracts. Conversely, delays in completing reinvestigations may  lead to a heightened risk of national security breaches because the longer  individuals hold clearances, the more likely they are to be working with  critical information systems.
Our prior review noted that delays in completing personnel security  clearance investigations for DOD and other agencies have resulted, in part,  from a shortage of investigative staff. In February 2004, we noted that the  Deputy Associate Director of OPM’s Center for Investigations Services  estimated that OPM and DOD would need a total of roughly 8,000 full-time- equivalent investigative personnel to eliminate backlogs and deliver  investigations in a timely fashion to their customers. To reach its goal of  8,000, OPM must add and retain approximately 3,800 full-time equivalent  investigative staff, and retain all of the estimated 4,200 full-time-equivalent  staff that OPM and DOD had combined in December 2003. In our February  2004 report, we noted that OPM’s primary contractor was adding about 100  and losing about 70 investigators per month. If the high rate of turnover has  continued, the ability to grow investigative capacity could be difficult. In  addition, OPM could be left with a large number of investigative staff with  limited experience.
OPM’s Deputy Associate Director noted that the inexperience among  investigative staff results in investigations not being completed as quickly  as they might have been if the investigators were more experienced. The  OPM official also noted that the quality of the investigations is not where  she would like to see it. As we noted in our September 2004 testimony  before this subcommittee, OPM had continued to use its investigations  contractor to conduct personnel security clearance investigations on its  own employees even though we raised an internal control concern about  this practice during our 1996 review. OPM officials indicated that they  plan to use the government employees that were transferred from DOD to  address this concern.
In addition to adding staff, two other initiatives should decrease delays in  completing clearance investigations. A new DOD initiative—the phased  periodic reinvestigation (phased PR)—that we discussed in our May 2004  report can make more staff available and thereby decrease the workload  associated with some reinvestigations for top secret clearances. The  phased approach to periodic reinvestigations involves conducting a  reinvestigation in two phases; a more extensive reinvestigation would be  conducted only if potential security issues were identified in the initial  phase. Specifically, investigative staff would verify residency records and  conduct interviews of listed references, references developed during the  investigation, and individuals residing in the neighborhood only if potential  security issues were identified in other parts of the standard reinvestigation  process. The Defense Personnel Security Research Center showed that at  least 20 percent of the normal investigative effort could be saved with  almost no loss in identifying critical issues needed for adjudication. In  December 2004, the President approved the use of the phased PR for  personnel needing to renew their top secret clearances.
Another source of investigative, as well as adjudicative, workload  reduction may result from the recent reciprocity requirements contained in  the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Our May  2004 report noted that the lack of reciprocity (the acceptance of clearance  and access granted by another department, agency, or military service) was  cited as an obstacle that can cause contractor delays in filling positions and  starting work on government contracts. Under the new law, all security  clearance background investigations and determinations completed by an  authorized investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency shall be  accepted by all agencies.
section_title: Joint Personnel Adjudication System Consolidates DOD Adjudicative Data, but a New Law Requires Wider Consolidation
paragraphs: DOD’s Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) consolidated 10 DOD  adjudication databases to provide OUSD(I) with better monitoring of  adjudication-related problems, but a new law requires wider consolidation.  Past delays in implementing DOD’s JPAS greatly inhibited OUSD(I)’s ability  to monitor overdue reinvestigations and generate accurate estimates for  that portion of the backlog. In addition to correcting these problems,  implementation of much of JPAS has eliminated the need for DOD’s 10  adjudication facilities to maintain their own databases of adjudicative  information. This consolidation may also assist with a requirement in the  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Among other  things, the law requires that not later than December 17, 2005, the Director  of OPM shall, in cooperation with the heads of the certain other  government entities, establish and commence operating and maintaining a  single, integrated, secure database into which appropriate data relevant to  the granting, denial, and revocation of a security clearance or access  pertaining to military, civilian, or government contractor personnel shall be  entered from all authorized investigative and adjudicative agencies. OPM  officials stated that JPAS and OPM’s Clearance Verification System account  for over 90 percent of the government’s active security clearances and that  the remaining clearances are primarily housed in classified record systems  (e.g., the Central Intelligence Agency’s Scattered Castles) devoted to the  intelligence community.
Additionally, DOD may move closer toward the 9/11 Commission’s  recommendation of having a single government agency responsible for  providing and maintaining clearances by co-locating its 10 adjudication  facilities on a single military installation. The recent base realignment and  closure list includes a recommendation to co-locate all of DOD’s  adjudication facilities. While co-location—if it occurs—would not be the  same as consolidation, it might provide opportunities for greater  communication within DOD. However, the proposed co-location at Fort  Meade, Maryland, could also result in the loss of trained staff who might  choose not to relocate, such as some of the roughly 400 employees in the  Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office and the Defense Office of  Hearings and Appeals Personal Security Division in Columbus, Ohio.
In our February 2004 report, we noted that DOD had (1) as of September  30, 2003, a backlog of roughly 90,000 completed investigations that had not  been adjudicated within prescribed time limits, (2) no DOD-wide standard  for determining how quickly adjudications should be completed, and  (3) inadequate adjudicator staffing. Also at the time of our report, the DOD  Office of Inspector General was examining whether the Navy adjudicative  contracts led to contractors’ staff performing an inherently governmental  function—adjudication. Because of that examination, it was unclear  whether the Army and Air Force adjudication facilities would be able to use  similar contracting to eliminate their backlogs.
Although DOD concurred with our April 2001 recommendations for  improving its adjudicative process, it has not fully implemented any of the  recommendations as of May 2005. OUSD(I) reported the following progress  for those four recommendations. (Our recommendations appear in italics,  followed by a summary of DOD’s response and/or actions.)
Establish detailed documentation requirements to support  adjudication decisions. Use of JPAS will require greater documentation  on adverse information and possible factors to mitigate that  information, but this feature of JPAS has not been fully implemented.
Require that all DOD adjudicators use common explanatory guidance.
DOD has developed this guidance and is awaiting review by the  Personnel Security Working Group of Policy Coordinating Committee  for Records Access and Information Security Policy, an interagency  group.
Establish common adjudicator training requirements and develop  appropriate continuing education opportunities for all DOD  adjudicators. A work plan has been developed to establish an  adjudicator certification process, to be implemented in late 2005 or early  2006. The plan will include continuing education requirements.
Establish a common quality assurance program to be implemented by  officials in all DOD adjudication facilities and monitor compliance  through annual reporting. OUSD(I) indicates DOD is developing  criteria and a form to assess the quality of the investigations that DOD is  receiving. Also, in the future, cases are to be randomly selected from  JPAS and reviewed by a team of adjudicators from the various  adjudication facilities.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my  prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may  have at this time. In summary, Mr. Chairman, we will continue to monitor  this area as we do for all of the high-risk programs on our list. Much  remains to be done to bring lasting solutions to this high-risk area. As we  stated in our report, High-Risk Series: An Update, perseverance by the  administration in implementing GAO’s recommended solutions and  continued oversight and action by the Congress are both essential.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Individuals making key contributions to this statement include Alissa H.  Czyz, Jack E. Edwards, Julia C. Matta, and Mark A. Pross.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform  DOD Business Operations. GAO-05-629T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing,  but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention.  GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.
DOD’s High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires  Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T.  Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 2005.
Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11  Commission’s Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.:  September 14, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce  Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for  Industry Personnel. GAO-04-632. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to  Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for  Industry Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.
Security Clearances: FBI Has Enhanced Its Process for State and Local  Law Enforcement Officials. GAO-04-596. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2004.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its  Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332.  Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments  to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344.  Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2004.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges  of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce but Additional Actions Needed.  GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.
DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility  for Top Secret Security Clearances. GAO-01-465. Washington, D.C.:  April 18, 2001.
DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance  Reinvestigation Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246. Washington, D.C.:  September 20, 2000.
DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security  Clearance Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-00-215. Washington, D.C.:  August 24, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are  Being Addressed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-148. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations  Pose National Security Risks. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65. Washington, D.C.:  February 16, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations  Pose National Security Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-12. Washington, D.C.:  October 27, 1999.
Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to  Relinquish Its Authority to OPM. GAO/GGD-99-173. Washington, D.C.:  September 7, 1999.
Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History  Screening. GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999.
Executive Office of the President: Procedures for Acquiring Access to and  Safeguarding Intelligence Information. GAO/NSIAD-98-245. Washington,  D.C.: September 30, 1998.
Privatization of OPM’s Investigations Service. GAO/GGD-96-97R.  Washington, D.C.: August 22, 1996.
Cost Analysis: Privatizing OPM Investigations. GAO/GGD-96-121R.  Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1996.
Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the  Executive Office of the President. GAO/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.:  October 19, 1995.
Privatizing OPM Investigations: Perspectives on OPM’s Role in  Background Investigations. GAO/T-GGD-95-185. Washington, D.C.:  June 14, 1995.
Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating  Investigations and Adjudicative Functions. GAO/NSIAD-95-101.  Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995.
Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the  Clearance Process. GAO/NSIAD-95-21. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995.
Personnel Security Investigations. GAO/NSIAD-94-135R.  Washington, D.C.: March 4, 1994.
Nuclear Security: DOE’s Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance  Work Load. GAO/RCED-93-183. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 1993.
Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate Duplicative  Background Investigations. GAO/RCED-93-23. Washington, D.C.:  May 10, 1993.
Security Clearances: Due Process for Denials and Revocations by  Defense, Energy, and State. GAO/NSIAD-92-99. Washington, D.C.:  May 6, 1992.
DOD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not Provided  When Access Is Denied or Revoked. GAO/NSIAD-93-162. Washington, D.C.:  May 5, 1993.
Administrative Due Process: Denials and Revocations of Security  Clearances and Access to Special Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-14.  Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993.
Due Process: Procedures for Unfavorable Suitability and Security  Clearance Actions. GAO/NSIAD-90-97FS. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1990.
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