Urgent Warfighter Needs: Opportunities Exist to Expedite Development and Fielding of Joint Capabilities
Published: 2012-04-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: With the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has had to accelerate efforts to field capabilities addressing urgent warfighter needs, including joint needs affecting more than one service. GAO was asked to assess (1) how quickly capabilities responding to joint urgent operational needs have been developed and fielded and (2) what key practices enabled executing organizations to overcome challenges. To do this, GAO studied a sample of joint urgent operational needs including all urgent needs over $100 million approved from April 2008 through December 2010 and a random selection of smaller urgent needs. GAO analyzed data on key events and issues in the development and fielding of solutions and met with service and DOD officials responsible for validating, assigning, and executing joint urgent needs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: A majority of the initiatives GAO reviewed (26 of 30) met, or expected to meet, the Department of Defenses (DOD) expectation for fielding a capability in response to joint urgent operational needs within 2 years. However, performance in meeting schedule estimates varied, and more than half of the initiatives experienced schedule delays.
Initiatives leveraged three types of solutions: (1) off-the-shelf products, (2) modifications of off-the-shelf items to add capabilities, and (3) products requiring technology development. Off-the-shelf solutions should be fielded the quickest because existing products are being bought. However, while off-the-shelf solutions were fielded quickly once a contract was awarded, it took longer than the two other types to identify, fund, and contract for off-the-shelf solutions. In addition to the program offices that manage traditional acquisition programs, initiatives were also managed by research laboratories and engineering centers, such as the Army Research Laboratory or the Naval Surface Warfare Center. Program offices fielded solutions faster, in part, because program offices are experienced in the full range of acquisition activities. Also, laboratories and engineering centers depended on funding provided by other organizations and delays in receiving this funding affected the start of some initiatives.
Acquisition organizations employed various practices to overcome challenges affecting fielding of capabilities within short time frames. For example, although these practices could affect the prices paid, shorter times were associated with using existing contracts, awarding contracts without agreeing on contract terms (prices), or awarding contracts without competition. U.S. Central Command officials stated that they were not aware of all initiatives underway or the expected schedule for fielding capabilities and this could affect planning activities. In some cases, initiative decision memorandums were prepared that documented schedule estimates but such memorandums are not required for all initiatives. Also, some organizations were proactive in communicating with U.S. Central Command and this facilitated a clearer understanding of requirements and plans for fielding initiatives, but regular communication is not required.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD reduce the time spent on identifying and contracting for off-the-shelf solutions, devise methods for providing early funding to research laboratories and engineering centers, require that initiative decision memorandums be prepared for all initiatives, and require acquisition organizations to communicate with the Central Command and other combatant commands about plans for fielding capabilities. DOD concurred with these recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The dynamic nature of the enemy and tactical conditions encountered by  forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted the Department of Defense  (DOD) to rapidly acquire and field new capabilities as quickly as possible  in order to prevent mission failure or loss of life. Requests for newer  capabilities have included technology to detect improvised explosive  devices; sensors to provide increased situational awareness; and  command and control equipment to warn personnel of hazardous areas  and changing battlefield conditions. To accommodate the need for a rapid  response, DOD has had to look beyond the traditional acquisition  procedures and employ innovative techniques and methods to overcome  institutional challenges and improve efficiencies. Requests that address  the urgent needs of more than one service (joint urgent operational  needs) are validated by the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff (Joint Staff) and then shepherded into the acquisition process by the  Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC).
DOD reports that funding the fulfillment of joint and service-specific urgent  needs totaled at least $76.9 billion from fiscal years 2005 through 2010.  In 2009, a Defense Science Board report identified DOD’s funding  processes as a major institutional barrier to rapidly developing and  fielding new capability. Among other problems, our previous work has  shown that DOD has had difficulty translating needs into programs.
Urgent needs require a quick response time in order to deliver solutions  that can reduce casualties and improve mission success. This requires  that once urgent operational needs are validated, organizations are  quickly tasked to develop and field needed capabilities. In response to  your request, we assessed: 1) how quickly capabilities responding to joint  urgent operational needs have been developed and fielded and 2) what  practices enabled executing organizations to overcome challenges in the  development and fielding of joint urgent need solutions.
To conduct this review, we selected a sample of 28 joint urgent  operational needs from the population of 70 joint urgent needs that were  validated from April 2008 to December 2010. We selected all 14 joint  urgent needs with cost estimates greater than $100 million and randomly  selected 14 joint urgent needs from the remaining 56 joint needs that had  estimated costs of less than $100 million. Three joint urgent needs were  dropped from the sample—in one case because the urgent need was  terminated before it was assigned to a sponsor and in the other two cases  because knowledgeable officials were not accessible. We encountered  several instances in which multiple initiatives were pursued to address  one joint urgent need. Each initiative was responsible for developing a  capability and therefore the initiative became our unit of analysis. We  reviewed a total of 45 initiatives addressing 25 joint urgent needs. For  these initiatives, we collected and analyzed data on key events and  issues in executing initiatives. We met with acquisition officials  responsible for developing and fielding solutions, as well as officials from  the Joint Staff, JRAC, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat  Organization (JIEDDO), and other DOD officials responsible for validating  and assigning joint urgent needs to the military services and agencies for  leading joint efforts. Although the results presented in this report are  limited to the initiatives we analyzed and cannot be projected to all urgent  needs initiatives, they provide valuable insight on the length of time it  takes to develop and field initiatives and the factors that affect  development and fielding. (Additional details on our scope and  methodology are in app. I; the joint urgent needs we reviewed are  identified in app. II.)
Because of the emphasis on quickly responding to urgent needs, we  focused on the time taken to reach critical events such as tasking to an  organization, awarding a contract, and initial fielding of a capability. Data  were not available for all key events, in part because some initiatives  were not yet complete. Figure 1 shows the number of initiatives analyzed  based on availability of schedule data. This figure is used throughout the  report to indicate the data being discussed.
We conducted this performance audit between January 2011 and April  2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: To be validated as a joint urgent operational need, a requirement must be  joint in nature and, importantly, if not addressed immediately will seriously  endanger personnel or pose a major threat to ongoing operations. DOD  has taken a number of steps to provide urgently needed capabilities to  the warfighter more quickly and to alleviate the challenges associated  with the traditional acquisition process for acquiring capabilities.Office of the Secretary of Defense established JRAC in 2004 to help  overcome institutional barriers and provide timely, effective support to  meet the urgent materiel and logistics requirements that combatant  commanders deem operationally critical. In July 2005, the Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Instruction 3470.01 to establish policy and  procedures to facilitate the assessment, validation, sourcing, resourcing,  and fielding of urgent combatant command needs considered as life- or  combat mission-threatening, based on unforeseen requirements that  must be resolved quickly. Although not addressed in the July 2005  instruction, DOD officials stated that a criterion for validation was the  expectation that the capability gap could be addressed within 2 years.  Subsequently, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2011 provided that the acquisition process for fielding  capabilities in response to urgent operational needs is appropriate only  for capabilities that can be fielded within a period of 2 to 24 months.
Headquarters, Department of the Army regulation 71-9, Warfighting Capabilities  Determination (Dec. 28, 2009); Department of the Navy, Navy Urgent Needs Process  Implementation, OPNAV 4000, ASN (RD&A) (July 26, 2007); Air Force Instruction 10-601,  Operational Capability Requirements Development, July 12, 2010; and Marine Corps  Order 3900.17, The Marine Corps Urgent Needs Process and the Urgent Universal Need  Statement (Oct. 17, 2008). integration and development system to identify, assess, validate, and  prioritize joint military capability requirements.
In response to Section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, DOD is now in the process of  assessing its policies and processes for managing both joint and service- specific urgent needs. This review is intended to establish policy that will  be used to respond to urgent needs arising from future contingencies and  will consider improvements to the acquisition process for rapid fielding of  capabilities responding to urgent needs. In a February 2012 letter to the  Chairmen of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, the  Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics stated that additional policy options were under development to  address, among other elements, the need for more comprehensive policy  to govern the acquisition of capabilities to satisfy urgent needs. DOD  expects that the review of these policies will be complete by August 31,  2012.
The joint process begins when a need that is threatening to life or mission  success is identified and a request is submitted to the commander of U.S.  forces in a theater of operations, such as Iraq or Afghanistan. Once  approved, the request is submitted to the combatant command  headquarters, such as U.S. Central Command, for requests pertaining to  Iraq or Afghanistan.submitted to the Joint Staff where it is reviewed by a Functional  Capabilities Board. The board is responsible for determining whether the  urgent need addresses a capability gap that, if unmet, could threaten lives  or the success of a combat mission. If the need meets these criteria, the  board convenes a working group that collects additional information and  makes recommendations for the review, including whether the Joint Staff  Deputy Director for Requirements should validate the need. Once  validated, the joint need is sent to JRAC who assigns a military service or  agency as the sponsor. JIEDDO is generally the sponsor for joint urgent   If endorsed at this level, the joint urgent need is then  needs focused on countering improvised explosive devices. The sponsor  is responsible for tasking executing organizations to lead the  development and fielding of the capability, as well as providing oversight,  guidance, and in most cases, funding.
The major events throughout the joint urgent needs life cycle are  described in figure 2 for urgent needs originating from operations in Iraq  and Afghanistan. While the joint urgent needs process begins when a  request is submitted in theater, our analysis focused on the part of the  process beginning at validation of the need and ending with the fielding of  the first units of the capability in theater. From validation, the joint urgent  needs process consists of five key events.
section_title: Initiatives Generally Fielded within 2 Years, but More Than Half Experienced Delays
paragraphs: Twenty-six of the 30 initiatives met, or expected to meet, DOD’s  expectation for fielding capabilities within 2 years from validation, but the  remaining 4 initiatives took longer. Performance in meeting schedule  estimates varied, and more than half of the initiatives experienced  schedule delays. Most of the initiatives we reviewed, including all of those  that met fielding estimates, used solutions based on buying commercial  or government off-the-shelf items or modifying off-the-shelf items to add  capabilities. Those based on buying off-the-shelf items took longer in the  initial stages of the process, but were fielded more quickly after contract  award. The rate at which an initiative progressed through the process  also varied based on the type of organization responsible for executing  the initiative and the sponsor. The median time to progress through the  early stages of the process decreased from 2008 to 2010.
subsections: section_title: Most Initiatives Fielded or Are Expected to Field Capabilities within 2 Years
paragraphs: A number of initiatives have been fielded in a year or less, and most  initiatives (26 of 30) met, or expected to meet, the expectation for fielding  capabilities within 2 years, as shown in figure 3. The median time to initial  fielding of a capability was 13 months for fielded initiatives and an  estimated 19 months for initiatives not yet fielded. Overall, the 30  initiatives consisted of a range of urgent needs solutions, including  improvised explosive device disruptors and detectors, wide-area  surveillance systems, and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)  vehicles. Nine initiatives had not been fielded at the time of our review.  These nine initiatives ranged from systems that detect homemade  explosives to aerostat balloons that provide persistent surveillance  capability and to machine-based Afghani language translation  capabilities.
Eleven initiatives took 12 months or less to reach initial fielding. For  example, the MRAP Recovery Vehicle—a tow truck to retrieve disabled  vehicles—reached initial fielding within 6 months of validation. According  to program officials, this initiative benefited from existing relationships  built during the development of other MRAP vehicles, as well as support  from high-level stakeholders. One of the MRAP contractors anticipated  the need for such a capability and developed the wrecker so that it was  able to immediately respond to program office interest. Because of high- level support, approval for the acquisition was received even before the  requirement was formally validated. In another example, the Persistent  Ground Surveillance System, a system that provides surveillance and  reconnaissance capability, reached initial fielding within 7 months  because the program office had prior experience working in a rapid  prototype environment. Program officials also said that earlier efforts  enabled them to work with the vendor, become knowledgeable about the  system, and work with contracting personnel who were very responsive to  subsequent requests for the capability.
Four initiatives—two fielded and two not yet fielded—had actual or  estimated fielding times of 27 months or more. Various factors contributed  to the longer fielding times or estimates, depending on the initiative, as  shown in table 1.
Performance in meeting schedule estimates varied. Eleven of the  sampled initiatives met, or were on track to meet, estimated fielding  dates. However, 19 of the 30 sampled initiatives reported delays, and 12  of these initiatives exceeded their originally estimated fielding dates by at  least 3 months, as illustrated in figure 4. Officials attributed the delays to  some key issues that included the receipt of initial funding, awarding  contracts, and conducting test activities.
Initiatives that addressed joint urgent operational needs leveraged three  types of solutions: (1) off-the-shelf products, (2) modifications of off-the- shelf items to add capabilities, and (3) products that required  development of a technology. Off-the-shelf solutions should be fielded the  quickest because they are focused on buying already-existing products.  However, this was not the case for initiatives in our sample. Overall, off- the-shelf solutions in our sample tended to take somewhat longer to field  than other solution types, a median time of 13.5 months compared to 12  months for modifications of off-the-shelf products and 11 months for  technology development. Once a contract was awarded, off-the-shelf  solutions were fielded quickly. However, as shown in figure 5, off-the- shelf solutions took longer in the early stages of the process. The median  time to task, fund, and award a contract for off-the-shelf solutions was 9.5  months compared to 2 months for technology development solutions and  4 months for modified off-the-shelf solutions.
Off-the-shelf solutions took longer during the early phases, in part,  because they were less likely than other solution types to leverage  ongoing efforts and thus required additional time to identify, fund, and  contract for the solution. In contrast, other solution types—technology  development and modifications of existing systems—leveraged ongoing  efforts where solutions were at least partially developed. All 13 of the  modified off-the-shelf and technology development initiatives leveraged  efforts already underway before the sponsor tasked the urgent need to an  acquisition organization. In contrast, only three of the eight initiatives that  employed off-the-shelf solutions leveraged efforts underway prior to  tasking. Leveraging ongoing efforts allowed for shorter time frames  because it collapsed the time for identifying a solution and tasking an  organization to execute it. For example, officials for an initiative  developing a wide-area surveillance capability said they were within  weeks of delivering the first sensors (in response to a service request) at  the time the urgent need was validated. As a result, the solution was  identified quickly and the initiative moved swiftly through the early stages  of the process.
The experience of four initiatives further illustrated why off-the-shelf  initiatives in our sample took longer than other solution types early in the  joint urgent needs process. For these four initiatives, more than 9 months  elapsed from validation to the receipt of funding. The reasons for these  delays varied by initiative, as shown in table 2.
After contract award, however, initiatives that required technology  development or modification took longer to field as a result of technical  challenges and testing delays. Off-the-shelf solutions relied on mature  technologies and therefore could be fielded in a median time of 4 months  after contract award. This compared to a median time of 8 months for  initiatives modifying off-the-shelf products and 9 months for technology  development efforts. Three of the four fielded initiatives that developed  technology responded to the same urgent need for a wide-area  surveillance capability. Officials working on these initiatives highlighted  various issues that extended the fielding schedule subsequent to the  awarding of a contract, including technical challenges and delays related  to certification and accreditation of the solution.
Most of the fielded initiatives we reviewed, including all of those that met  fielding dates, used solutions based on off-the-shelf items in response to  joint urgent operational needs. Specifically, 17 of the 21 fielded initiatives  either employed off-the-shelf products or modified off-the-shelf items. As  figure 6 illustrates, the eight initiatives that met, or expected to meet,  schedule estimates for fielding a capability leveraged off-the-shelf items  or modified them to address the urgent need.
Joint urgent needs are executed by a broader range of organizations than  those typically responsible for managing acquisitions, as shown in figure  7. In addition to program offices that traditionally manage the acquisition  and fielding of weapon systems, engineering centers and science and  technology laboratories were tasked with executing initiatives.  Engineering centers such as the Naval Surface Warfare Center and the  Army Research, Development and Engineering Center typically provide  support to the program offices that manage acquisition programs.  Science and technology laboratories such as the Army Research  Laboratory conduct technology development and research in the physical,  engineering, and environmental sciences. In responding to urgent needs,  both engineering centers and science and technology laboratories  operate as reimbursable organizations, accepting project orders under  which they get reimbursed for the costs of performing services, sharing  knowledge, and conducting technical services.
Program offices fielded capabilities faster than reimbursable  organizations for the initiatives we reviewed, as shown in figure 8. The  ability of program offices to field capabilities more quickly is partly  explained by the expertise that these organizations have with the full  range of acquisition activities, including developing test plans, accessing  contract support, and planning for training and transportation. In addition,  reimbursable organizations have a different funding environment than  program offices in that they typically rely entirely on customer funding to  perform work. In contrast, program offices generally had greater flexibility  in terms of their funding sources, which was particularly beneficial when  funding delays occurred. Initiatives managed by reimbursable  organizations took longer to field a capability, in part, because they do not  have the same funding flexibilities as the program offices and they may  need additional time to fully understand other program management  processes.
The amount of time initiatives spent progressing through the urgent needs  process, particularly before tasking to an organization, also differed  depending on the sponsoring service or agency. As figure 9 shows, for  the sampled initiatives, JIEDDO took longer than other sponsors to task  an urgent need to an organization. The median amount of time sponsors,  excluding JIEDDO, took to task initiatives to organizations was 1 month.  In contrast, JIEDDO tasked its initiatives in a median time of 7 months.
JIEDDO, however, had a more deliberate process for identifying and  selecting a solution when one was uncertain, which helped explain why it  took longer to task initiatives to an organization. Officials noted that the  lead military service can quickly task urgent needs because an applicable  solution, as well as the acquisition organization with the relevant expertise  in developing it, is easily identifiable. However, according to DOD  officials, JIEDDO often addresses urgent need requests for which the  solution is ambiguous, therefore requiring greater effort to identify a  capability and executing organization. For instance, one of the joint needs  for which JIEDDO was the sponsor required development of a capability  allowing warfighters to detect homemade explosives from a distance.  According to officials, the urgent need solution was complex and required  evaluation of various sensors and platforms tailored for homemade  explosive detection. As a result, 7 months elapsed from when JRAC  assigned the validated urgent need to JIEDDO to the point when the  agency first tasked an organization with development of a solution. In the  interim, JIEDDO worked to evaluate and identify potential capabilities to  address the urgent need by forming a working group, writing a concept of  operations, and completing a proof of concept. In the case of most other  sponsors, the executing organization itself was responsible for activities  such as developing a concept of operations and assessing solutions,  officials said.
section_title: Initiatives Passed through Early Stages of the Process Faster in 2010 Than in 2008
paragraphs: Sampled initiatives validated in 2009 and 2010 were tasked and funded  more quickly than initiatives validated in 2008, suggesting overall  improvements in the earlier stages of the joint urgent needs process.  Specifically, urgent needs validated in 2008 took 5 months longer than  2009 initiatives and 7 months longer than 2010 initiatives to be tasked  and funded, as shown in figure 10.
DOD officials cited the establishment of a senior group of officials to  facilitate the joint urgent needs process as contributing to the reduction in  the median time in which initiatives progressed through the joint urgent  needs process since it was created. The deployment of additional forces  to Afghanistan in the fall of 2009 led to an increase in demand for urgent  need capabilities. Shortly after, in November 2009, DOD created the  Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Senior Integration Group to provide  oversight for all joint urgent operational needs related to counter- improvised explosive devices. DOD officials stated that the group has  been renamed the Senior Integration Group, which is responsible for  reviewing all validated joint urgent needs. The group, consisting of high- level DOD officials and agencies, meets every 3 weeks. According to  DOD officials, the Senior Integration Group has helped increase oversight  over the entire joint urgent operational needs process, and specifically  accelerated the identification and allotment of funds to urgent need  initiatives. In 2008, the median time initiatives spent from validation to the  receipt of funding for the initiative was 9 months; however, initiatives  validated in 2010 took no more than 1 month to receive funding during  this time period.
section_title: Acquisition Organizations Employed Varying Methods to Overcome Challenges
paragraphs: In developing and fielding solutions addressing joint urgent operational  needs, acquisition organizations faced common challenges that affected  their ability to deliver capabilities as quickly as possible. These challenges  included obtaining timely funding, addressing contracting requirements,  and agreeing on testing that should be accomplished. Officials highlighted  various practices—having early access to funds, receiving high-level  support, using flexibilities in the contracting process, leveraging  relationships, and communicating with the warfighter—that helped  overcome challenges during solution development and fielding.
subsections: section_title: Early Access to Funding Speeds Execution
paragraphs: About half of the sampled initiatives received funding within 1 month of  being tasked with an urgent need, but the remainder did not receive  funding for 2 months or more, as illustrated in figure 11.
For initiatives within our sample, the median length of time from when a  program office was tasked with an urgent need to when it received  funding was 1 month; the median length of time for all other types of  executing organizations, including engineering centers and science and  technology laboratories, was 3 months. The difference may be due, in  part, to the fact that some of these programs have access to budgeted  funds. For example, according to agency officials, the MRAP program has  an annual budget that provides the program with access to funding and  requires that DOD notify congressional committees 10 days before it  transfers these funds from the appropriation in the DOD and Full Year  Continuing Appropriation Act, 2011. Although other program offices did  not have such dedicated urgent needs funding, agency officials stated  that, in some instances, they were able to leverage budgeted funds, as  illustrated in the development of an unmanned cargo aircraft. This  initiative managed by a Navy program office focused on developing and  fielding an unmanned cargo capability to support forward operating bases  in Afghanistan. The program office reported that it was able to reprogram  funds from an alternate budget line when funding became a challenge.  The Navy official said funding was important to begin early activities— such as developing an acquisition plan—particularly since the program  had a 12-month deadline to deploy the capability.
Funding options were more limited for reimbursable organizations like  engineering centers and science and technology laboratories. These  types of organizations relied on customer funding and performed work in  response to orders placed by other organizations, such as traditional  program offices, that received appropriated funds. As a result, these  organizations reported funding challenges more frequently than other  organizations. Funding challenges were reported for 11 of 20 initiatives  managed by engineering centers or science and technology laboratories.  In contrast, 8 of the 25 remaining organizations in our sample reported  funding challenges. The urgent need for a special purpose X-ray machine  is one that experienced funding problems. The engineering center  manager for this initiative said that the initiative experienced a 6-month  delay due to 4 months in elapsed time to identify resources and 2 months  for administrative problems associated with the transfer of customer  funding at the end of the fiscal year.
While awaiting their major funding allotment early in the process, several  organizations had access to a small amount of funding or were able to  leverage existing resources to begin activities sooner. According to  agency officials, JIEDDO, unlike JRAC or other sponsors, has the  authority to provide up to $1 million in early or seed funding for  administrative and programmatic start-up prior to the initiative decision  memorandum authorizing funds for development or demonstrations.  Early funds can be used to support development of the acquisition  strategy, test and evaluation strategy, and other programmatic  documentation. Among the 45 initiatives in our sample, we identified eight  instances where JIEDDO had provided executing organizations with early  funding. In other instances, officials from executing organizations stated  that they were able to leverage existing “in-house” resources to begin to  research urgent needs solutions. However, officials noted that without  funding, even staff time is limited and planning activities are constrained,  particularly for reimbursable organizations.
Visibility by high-level stakeholders helped overcome funding challenges.  Initiatives that had the attention of high-level stakeholders (such as the  Secretary of Defense; the Senior Integration Group; JRAC; the  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Task Force; or JIEDDO)  experienced fewer delays in receiving their major funding allotment than  those initiatives that did not have such visibility. In one example, a  program office that was developing a wide-area surveillance capability  had requested additional funding to accelerate ongoing efforts and meet  the urgent need. When receipt of this funding was delayed, the Office of  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics  urged the Marine Corps to provide the program office with existing funds.  This allowed the program office to continue developing the capability until  its funding became available. Most notably, organizations that reported  having high-level visibility among more than one of these stakeholders  reported the fewest funding challenges. Executing organizations for only  2 of 11 initiatives that reported high-level visibility among more than one  stakeholder also reported having funding challenges. In contrast,  executing organizations for five of the six initiatives without high-level  visibility reported having funding challenges. DOD officials noted that the  establishment of the Senior Integration Group in 2011 has increased the  visibility of high-level stakeholders into the joint urgent needs process  and, more importantly, into urgent needs initiatives that may not normally  receive such attention. DOD and program officials also stated that having  high-level attention helped to prioritize and secure funding that otherwise  could have been difficult.
section_title: Initiatives Leveraged Flexibility in the Contracting Process
paragraphs: In March 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology and Logistics issued a memorandum reinforcing urgent  needs as DOD’s highest priority and encouraging the acquisition  community to use all available tools and authorities—including contracting  tools and authorities—to develop and field capabilities more quickly.  Initiatives we reviewed commonly used one or more contracting tools,  including use of existing contracts, undefinitized (unpriced) contracts, and  sole-source contracts.
Within our sample, 24 of the 38 initiatives leveraged existing contracts. As  illustrated in figure 12, the median time to contract award was 6 months  shorter for initiatives that used existing contracts.
A program manager noted that using existing contracts was  advantageous because the time traditionally taken to award a contract  can exceed 6 months, at least 25 percent of an executing organization’s  schedule if it is trying to field a capability in less than 2 years. Another  program official said that the use of existing contracts allowed the  program to save time in acquiring needed materials, parts, and equipment  since competing and awarding a new contract would have added time to  the overall effort.
For initiatives that used an undefinitized contract—a contract action  allowing contractors to begin work before reaching a final agreement on  contract terms, such as price—the median time to reach contract award  was 5 months shorter than those that did not, as shown in figure 13. As  we have previously reported, when a requirement needs to be met quickly  and there is insufficient time to use traditional contracting vehicles,  defense regulations permit the use of an undefinitized contract action.  These can be quickly initiated, but at a later date, the contract’s final price  and other terms must be agreed upon by the contractor and government,  a process known as definitizing the contract. The use of these contracting  vehicles increases the risk to the government until the contract has been  definitized. The MRAP program used undefinitized contracts for the three  initiatives we reviewed—the MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle, the MRAP  Recovery Vehicle, and the MRAP All-Terrain Ambulance. This allowed  the contractors to begin work immediately to meet aggressive schedule  targets while providing greater time to negotiate firm-fixed-price contracts.
Executing organizations for 30 initiatives in our sample reported that they  did not compete their contracts, and instead relied upon sole-source  contracts. Program officials reported that they used the unusual and  compelling urgency exception to full and open competition under FAR  6.302-2 associated with urgent operational needs to justify using sole- source contracts. As illustrated in figure 14, when contracts were  competed, initiatives took more time to reach contract award than those  that awarded sole-source contracts, although the reliance on sole-source  contracts may affect the price the government pays. In the case of the  MRAP program, however, officials relied on competition to incentivize  contractors to invest in and develop alternative solutions. Particularly  noteworthy was a contractor proposal to use underbody armor that  addressed the need for greater protection for MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles;  the solution was ultimately added to MRAP vehicles already in use, as  well as those in production.
Cooperative relationships with supporting organizations, such as those in  the test and logistics communities, enabled some initiatives to overcome  the difficulties associated with fielding capabilities quickly. Program  officials stated that approaching the test community early and establishing  working relationships with these organizations helped to make testing  more efficient. Officials from executing organizations noted that testing  performed on typical acquisition programs could not necessarily be  completed within rapid time frames. In one example, the testing  community requested 3-4 months to conduct tests on a capability, but the  schedule only allowed 8 weeks for testing. Officials stated that an  organization needs to involve the testing community early in the process  to create a feasible test strategy. In another case, officials stated that the  testing community was extremely cooperative and designed a test  strategy based on discussions that were held early in development.
Some officials told us that once the organization completed development  of the capability, they still faced challenges in obtaining approval to  deliver the capability to theater. According to agency officials, several  programs were required to obtain safety certification prior to deployment  to theater and some executing organizations experienced delays in  certification and accreditation of solutions.one initiative noted that 3 months passed after they had shipped a  capability to Afghanistan while it received various forms of accreditation  for the system’s components, such as the ground station, network, and  aircraft. This delay contributed to the 11 months spent from the time a  contract was awarded to when a fully operational capability was fielded.
For instance, officials from  Logistical challenges were also problematic, according to officials,  especially when their organization was not typically responsible for  shipping capabilities into theater. Organizations anticipated and overcame  logistics challenges by adapting the capability to facilitate shipping or by  partnering with other DOD agencies for transporting materials. For  example, one executing organization had special shipping requirements  for materials requiring cooled storage while in transit. Instead of  developing this capability on its own, the organization leveraged the  experience of an Army agency that had the requisite logistics experience  and knowledge. Officials for some initiatives stated that a list of best  practices, or a one-page checklist with requirements and security  information, would have made it easier for organizations to plan for these  tasks and avoid having to figure it out on their own.
Testing and other challenges were at times discussed in acquisition  strategies. For example, the acquisition strategy for the MRAP program  discussed the level of testing that would take place, logistics and  maintenance that would be provided, required facilities support, and  training for personnel. Acquisition plans for another initiative identified  important aspects of the joint urgent need that included the initiative’s  focus on increasing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  capabilities, and other expectations such as procurement quantities,  contractor support for procurement of commercial off-the-shelf  components and materials, testing, and the need for tailored logistics  support. JIEDDO requires that organizations prepare an acquisition  strategy within 30 days of tasking, therefore providing a vehicle to  address testing, logistics, and other challenges.
section_title: Communication with Combatant Command During Solution Development Improved Expectations
paragraphs: Officials we spoke with said that communication throughout the joint  urgent needs process—particularly between the acquisition community  and the combatant command officials in Iraq and Afghanistan and at  headquarters—aided in overcoming challenges related to the  development and fielding of solutions. While the Joint Staff worked to  define and clarify urgent needs requirements during validation, officials for  16 of the 45 initiatives in our sample stated that they had to work with  U.S. Central Command officials in theater and at headquarters to further  develop the requirements after they were tasked with the urgent need.  The median time to initial fielding of a capability was over 8 months  shorter for initiatives where officials worked with U.S. Central Command  on requirements, as illustrated in figure 15.
Officials noted that it is important that urgent needs statements allow  some flexibility for developing solutions so that acquisition organizations  can make use of all available technologies to meet the warfighter’s needs.  In some instances, communication that began with requirements  continued and supported fielding of the capability. For example, officials  developing a capability to detect improvised explosive devices worked  with officials in Afghanistan to clarify overly prescriptive requirements.  Program officials noted that strong communication between the program  and the warfighter was one of the most important factors that allowed  their organization to field a solution within 14 months.
Officials also stated that communication with officials in theater before  and after fielding a solution was important for overcoming challenges  related to integrating the capability into the unit. For example, when  solutions arrived in theater, problems could sometimes arise because the  receiving warfighter unit was not always the same unit that had originally  requested the capability. For 15 of the 45 initiatives we reviewed, officials  reported that they had encountered challenges with fielding their  capability due to units that rotated into and out of theater. They addressed  this by contacting commanders in advance of their deployment to inform  them of the fielding of the urgent needs solution and, in some instances,  offered training to their unit. In many instances, a representative from the  executing organization would also be in theater to assist receiving  warfighter units. The program manager from one organization traveled to  theater to help address any challenges associated with unit rotation and  fielding the capability. This official emphasized that this presence in  theater helped to overcome any challenges. While officials for 31  initiatives noted that their organization had, or planned to have, a  representative in theater to aid in the fielding and integration of a solution  into a unit, some officials noted that it was preferable to have a military  representative in theater rather than a civilian employee or contractor  because the former had higher visibility among the units.
The extent to which U.S. Central Command has knowledge of the  progress of urgent needs initiatives depends, in large part, on the initiative  of program officials in communicating such information. Officials at U.S.  Central Command headquarters stated that they were not always aware  of what solutions were being developed in response to joint urgent needs  or of the progress being made by executing organizations. JRAC and  JIEDDO largely rely on three databases to track urgent needs initiatives  and document progress. In these databases, information on specific  joint urgent needs, particularly those met by multiple initiatives, was often  unclear or incomplete, making it difficult to identify the initiatives  implemented in response to an urgent need. For example, not every  sponsor or executing organization provided a point of contact for its  initiative. JRAC officials explained that they solicit updates from executing  organizations and provide these updates to U.S. Central Command and  other groups—such as the Senior Integration Group—upon request.  Inconsistent documentation presented challenges in tracking the progress  of individual initiatives, as well as identifying points of contact for the  organizations responsible for meeting urgent needs.
Problems cited by U.S. Central Command officials in identifying what  initiatives were being developed in response to joint urgent needs were  consistent with difficulties we encountered in identifying initiatives  responding to the joint urgent needs in our sample. Officials from the Joint  Staff, JRAC, and JIEDDO compiled a list of initiatives that responded to  the joint urgent needs in our sample. For the urgent need addressing  personnel- and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, additional  initiatives were identified later. In another case—the urgent need  addressing wide-area surveillance—officials identified additional initiatives  that had not been identified previously.
Schedule estimates were not consistently available in databases used by  U.S. Central Command, JRAC, and JIEDDO. Schedule plans were at  times documented for meeting the joint urgent need more generally, but  estimates of when a specific initiative would be fielded were often unclear  or undocumented. Executing organizations for many initiatives (25 of 45)  estimated initial fielding dates after being tasked with the joint urgent  need, but not all organizations or sponsors formally documented schedule  estimates. In many instances, estimated fielding dates were  communicated in briefing slides or through informal means, such as e- mails.
For some initiatives, schedule estimates and expectations were  documented and communicated in an initiative decision memorandum. In  particular, an initiative decision memorandum was prepared for several  JIEDDO-sponsored initiatives, and JIEDDO currently requires that an  initiative decision memorandum be prepared for all JIEDDO-sponsored  initiatives; however, there is no requirement that applies to all initiatives.  The decision memorandums we reviewed generally included an  estimated schedule for fielding the capability and called for preparing an  acquisition strategy. Acquisition strategies we reviewed identified testing,  logistics, and other resources needed to support the development and  fielding of the capability and, according to officials, facilitated better  planning and disciplined management. Defense officials noted that the  initiative decision memorandum includes other important information such  as cost and funding estimates, schedule of funding, appropriation totals,  entry/exit criteria, and manpower implications. Furthermore, they stated  that the document captures performance and schedule changes,  establishes a formal agreement between the program manager and  JIEDDO, and documents the initiative’s life cycle from cradle to grave.
Officials at U.S. Central Command stated that having better  communication during development of a solution could help facilitate  planning activities and operational decisions that affect the warfighter.  JRAC and JIEDDO officials stated that although not required, they see  regular communication with the combatant command as important for all  initiatives.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: As DOD puts in place a policy for responding to future contingencies, it is  important to understand what worked well and correct what did not work  well in responding to urgent needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Several  practices have potential for facilitating a quick response to warfighter  needs. Off-the-shelf solutions should be fielded quickly, but doing so  requires reducing the time to decide on a solution, make funding  available, and award a contract. Creating and leveraging the enablers— early funding particularly for reimbursable organizations, use of  authorities to expedite the award of contracts, early involvement of  stakeholders including the warfighter—will help reduce response time.  Communicating with combatant command officials in theater and at  headquarters about requirements as well as challenges in integrating a  capability into warfighting units supported effective fielding, but there is no  requirement that this communication take place. Clearly communicating  what initiatives are being undertaken in response to urgent needs is  important to those who plan and make decisions about theater  operations. Initiative decision memorandums aided in communicating  schedule expectations for JIEDDO initiatives, and in some instances  acquisition strategies communicated risks and identified testing, logistical,  and other resources that needed to be brought to bear during  development and fielding of joint need solutions. But, there is no  requirement that an initiative decision memorandum be prepared for all  initiatives.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the process for responding to joint urgent operational needs,  we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four  actions:
Expedite fielding of off-the-shelf solutions by reducing the time it takes  to identify the solution and award a contract.
Devise methods for providing early funding to reimbursable  organizations tasked to execute joint urgent needs.
Require acquisition organizations to communicate with the combatant  commands, such as Central Command, regularly about progress in  executing initiatives and plans for fielding capabilities.
Require that an initiative decision memorandum be developed for all  initiatives that identifies the acquisition organization responsible for  the initiative, schedule estimates, and expectations for acquisition  strategies.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD concurred  with all four of our recommendations, saying that it would address these  recommendations as part of the assessment required by section 804 of  the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011.  DOD also provided technical comments that we incorporated in the final  report. Their comments can be found in appendix III of this report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; and the commanders for  the Special Operations Command and the U.S. Central Command. The  report also is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for   our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. Staff members making key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To review how the Department of Defense (DOD) has responded to  urgent needs, we identified 70 joint urgent operational needs that were  validated from April 1, 2008, to December 31, 2010. To create our  nongeneralizable sample of initiatives to review, we selected all 14 joint  urgent needs with cost estimates greater than $100 million and randomly  selected 7 counter-improvised explosive device urgent needs and 7 other  urgent needs from the remaining 56 urgent needs with cost estimates  less than $100 million, as illustrated in figure 16.
Three joint urgent needs were dropped from the sample—in one case  because the urgent need was terminated before it was assigned to a  sponsor and in the other two cases because knowledgeable officials were  not accessible. We encountered several instances in which multiple  initiatives were pursued to address one joint urgent need. As a result, we  reviewed a total of 45 initiatives addressing 25 joint urgent needs. We  collected the dates at which each initiative reached key events in the joint  urgent needs process, including: urgent need validation, assignment to a  sponsor, tasking to an executing organization, receipt of major funding  allotment, first contract award or modification, and initial fielding of the  capability. Moreover, the data available on initiatives varied, affecting the  number of initiatives included in specific analyses, as shown in figure 17.
To determine how quickly executing organizations developed and fielded  capabilities in response to joint urgent operational needs, we assessed  the extent to which executing organizations met the expectation to field  urgent capabilities within 2 years. We reviewed the date on which the  urgent need was validated, and identified either the actual or estimated  date for initial fielding of a capability. We also assessed the extent to  which executing organizations met their own schedule estimates by  collecting and reviewing their first estimate for fielding the capability and  their actual fielding date or most current estimate. We examined the time  initiatives with certain characteristics took to field capabilities. We  analyzed characteristics on each initiative including: the year the urgent  need was validated; the sponsor; the type of executing organization  tasked with the urgent need; whether the executing organization was  working on a similar capability; and the type of solution. To assess the  reliability of our data for this review, we compared information  communicated by officials with initiative documentation, such as decision  memorandums, briefing slides, and urgent need requests. We also  reviewed information available in the three databases DOD uses to track  joint urgent needs—the U.S. Central Command Requirements  Information Manager, which is maintained by U.S. Central Command; the  Knowledge Management/Decision Support tool, which is maintained by  the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Joint  Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Enterprise  Management System, which is maintained by JIEDDO. We determined  that the data we used were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this  report.
To identify key practices that enabled executing organizations to  overcome challenges in the development and fielding of joint urgent  needs solutions, we interviewed officials from each initiative and collected  data on the challenges that each executing organization encountered.  From these interviews, we identified common challenges that initiatives  faced—receiving funds and awarding contracts—that could potentially  affect the ability of an executing organization to field an urgent capability  rapidly. We analyzed how different factors, such as contracting options,  affected the time that it took initiatives to reach key events in the urgent  needs process. We also reviewed practices that executing organizations  employed to overcome these and other programmatic challenges. In  performing our work, we obtained documentation to corroborate  information provided by officials.
We interviewed officials from the Department of Defense, the Office of the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell  who are responsible for validating and assigning joint urgent needs to  military services and other agencies for execution. We also met with  officials from Functional Capabilities Boards who were responsible for  identifying possible solutions for the urgent needs within our sample. We  met with officials from JIEDDO, each military service (Army, Navy, Air  Force, and Marine Corps), U.S. Central Command, and Special  Operations Command, who were the sponsors responsible for identifying  funds and tasking executing organizations or the combatant command  that endorsed urgent needs statements.
We conducted this performance audit between January 2011 and April  2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Sample Joint Urgent Operational Needs and Executing Organizations
paragraphs: Appendix II: Sample Joint Urgent Operational  Needs and Executing Organizations Army, Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar Program Directorate  Army, Product Manager Improvised Explosive Device Defeat / Protect Force  Joint Project Office, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle  Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Task Force / Unmanned Aerial Systems Task  Force  Army Research Laboratory
Defense Information Systems Agency, Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services Division  Air Force, Director of Weather  Army, Program Manager, Biometrics Identity Management Agency
Naval Sea Systems Command, Asymmetric Systems Department  Joint Project Office, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle  Joint Project Office, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle  Army, Office of the Provost Marshal
Navy, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
Naval Air Systems Command, Special Surveillance Programs  Army, Project Manager Robotics and Unmanned Systems  Army, Armament Research Development and Engineering Center, Combating  Terrorism Technology Team  Army Space & Missile Defense Command / Army Forces Strategic Command
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Directed Energy Warfare Office  Army, Product Manager Improvised Explosive Device Defeat / Protect Force  Army, Project Manager, Distributed Common Ground System
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division  Air Force, Aeronautical Systems Center, Intelligence Surveillance and Surveillance,  Sensors  Army Corps of Engineers  Army, Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate  Army, Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office
Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division
Naval Air Systems Command, PMA-266  Executing organization
Department of Energy, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory  Army, Prototype Integration Facility  Air Force, Big Safari  Air Force Research Laboratory  Army, Communication-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center  Army, Project Manager Robotics and Unmanned Sensors  Army, Project Manager, Airborne Reconnaissance and Exploitation Systems  Army, Project Manager, Unmanned Aerial Systems  Army, Aviation Applied Technology Directorate
Naval Air Systems Command, Special Surveillance Programs
Navy, Wide Focal Plane Array Camera, Integrated Product Team  The names of some organizations are not listed because of sensitivity issues.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report were Karen Zuckerstein, Assistant Director;  James Ashley; Jenny Chanley; Laura Greifner; Melissa Hermes; Laura  Jezewski; John Ortiz; Sylvia Schatz; Ryan Stott; Roxanna Sun; and Gavin  Ugale.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Warfighter Support: DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes Need a More  Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential for Consolidation.  GAO-11-273. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2011.
Warfighter Support: Improvements to DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes  Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts to Meet Critical  Warfighter Needs. GAO-10-460. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2010.
Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and  Coordination of DOD’s Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts.  GAO-10-95. Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Rapid Acquisition of MRAP Vehicles.   GAO-10-155T. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2009.
Rapid Acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles.   GAO-08-884R. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008.