Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold
Published: 2006-03-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Polar-orbiting environmental satellites provide data and imagery that are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the environment. They are critical to long-term weather prediction, including advance forecasts of a hurricane's path and intensity. Our nation's current operational polar-orbiting environmental satellite program is a complex infrastructure that includes two satellite systems, supporting ground stations, and four central data processing centers. In the future, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is to combine the two current systems into a single, state-of-the-art environment-monitoring satellite system. NPOESS is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring though the year 2020. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have formed a tri-agency integrated program office to manage NPOESS. GAO was asked to determine the NPOESS program's current status and plans and to discuss considerations in moving the program forward.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The future direction of the NPOESS program--what will be delivered, at what cost, and by when--is currently on hold pending a decision on how to proceed. In recent years, the program has experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays, with cost estimates increasing to about $10 billion and launch delays approaching 3 years. These factors triggered the need for difficult decisions about the program's direction and capabilities. In mid-November 2005, GAO reported that the NPOESS executive committee expected to make a decision by December 2005 on the direction of the program. GAO noted the importance of making a decision quickly so that the program could proceed. However, in late November 2005, NPOESS cost growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold that requires DOD to certify the program to Congress. This placed any decision about future direction on hold until certification takes place in June 2006. In the meantime, the program office has implemented an interim plan to continue work on key sensors and other program elements using fiscal year 2006 funding. Following certification, a decision on future direction should be clear. Proceeding will require a new program baseline and renegotiated contracts--efforts that could take up to a year. As NPOESS undergoes the Defense certification process and important decisions are made on how the program is to proceed, there are several important considerations. First, NOAA and NASA representation in the DOD certification process is imperative. It will be important for these agencies to remain active players in the deliberation of options and the final decision on how to move the program forward. Second, continued indecision increases the risk of a gap in satellite coverage if the final satellite in the predecessor satellite series (the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites or POES) were to fail. Thus, once program direction is decided, it will be important to move quickly to adjust agency budgets and contracts. Third, continuing oversight of program and executive management is essential to avoid repeating past problems.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to  discuss our work on the planned National Polar-orbiting Operational  Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program. NPOESS is  expected to be a state-of-the-art environment-monitoring satellite  system that will replace two existing polar-orbiting environment  satellite systems. Polar-orbiting satellites provide data and imagery  that are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military  to map and monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and  the environment. The NPOESS program is considered critical to the  United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for  weather forecasting (including severe weather events such as  hurricanes) and global climate monitoring through the year 2020.  Three agencies share responsibility for NPOESS: the National  Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department  of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA). To manage the program, these agencies  established a tri-agency integrated program office. At your request,  we will discuss the program’s current status and plans, as well as  considerations in moving the program forward.
This statement builds on other work we have done on  environmental satellite programs over the last several years. An  overview of the approach we used to perform this work (our  objectives, scope, and methodology) is provided in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate  operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the  Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series,  managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  (NOAA) and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP),  managed by the Department of Defense (DOD). The satellites obtain  environmental data that are processed to provide graphical weather  images and specialized weather products and are the predominant  input to numerical weather prediction models. These models are a  primary tool for forecasting weather 3 or more days in advance,  including forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. The  models are used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so  that communities and emergency managers can help prevent and  mitigate their effects. Polar satellites also provide data used to  monitor environmental phenomena, such as ozone depletion and  drought conditions, as well as data sets that are used by researchers  for a variety of studies, such as climate monitoring.
Unlike geostationary satellites, which maintain a fixed position  above the earth, polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the earth  in an almost north-south orbit, providing global coverage of  conditions that affect the weather and climate. Each satellite makes  about 14 orbits a day. As the earth rotates beneath it, each satellite  views the entire earth’s surface twice a day. Currently, there are two  operational POES satellites and two operational DMSP satellites  that are positioned so that they can observe the earth in early  morning, mid-morning, and early afternoon polar orbits. Together,  they ensure that, for any region of the earth, the data provided to  users are generally no more than 6 hours old. Figure 1 illustrates the  current operational polar satellite configuration. Besides the four  operational satellites, six older satellites are in orbit that still collect  some data and are available to provide some limited backup to the  operational satellites should they degrade or fail. In the future, both  NOAA and DOD plan to continue to launch additional POES and  DMSP satellites every few years, with final launches scheduled for  2007 and 2011, respectively.
Each of the polar satellites carries a suite of sensors designed to  detect environmental data that are either reflected or emitted from  the earth, the atmosphere, and space. The satellites store these data  and then transmit them to NOAA and Air Force ground stations  when the satellites pass overhead. The ground stations then relay  the data via communications satellites to the appropriate  meteorological centers for processing. The satellites also broadcast  a subset of these data in real time to tactical receivers all over the  world.
Under a shared processing agreement among four satellite data  processing centers—NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite Data  and Information Service (NESDIS), the Air Force Weather Agency,  the Navy’s Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center,  and the Naval Oceanographic Office—different centers are  responsible for producing and distributing, via a shared network,  different environmental data sets, specialized weather and  oceanographic products, and weather prediction model outputs.   Each of the four processing centers is also responsible for  distributing the data to its respective users. For the DOD centers,  the users include regional meteorology and oceanography centers,  as well as meteorology and oceanography staff on military bases.  NESDIS forwards the data to NOAA’s National Weather Service for  distribution and use by government and commercial forecasters.  The processing centers also use the Internet to distribute data to the  general public. NESDIS is responsible for the long-term archiving of  data and derived products from POES and DMSP.
In addition to the infrastructure supporting satellite data processing  noted above, properly equipped field terminals that are within a  direct line of sight of the satellites can receive real-time data directly  from the polar-orbiting satellites. There are an estimated 150 such  field terminals operated by U.S. and foreign governments and  academia. Field terminals can be taken into areas with little or no  data communications infrastructure—such as on a battlefield or a  ship—and enable the receipt of weather data directly from the  polar-orbiting satellites. These terminals have their own software  and processing capability to decode and display a subset of the  satellite data to the user. Figure 2 depicts a generic data relay  pattern from the polar-orbiting satellites to the data processing  centers and field terminals.
subsections: section_title: NPOESS Overview
paragraphs: With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs  would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May  1994 Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to  converge the two satellite programs into a single satellite program  capable of satisfying both civilian and military requirements. The  converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United  States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather  forecasting and global climate monitoring through the year 2020. To  manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency  Integrated Program Office, located within NOAA.
Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain  activities. NOAA has overall program management responsibility for  the converged system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead  on the acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for  facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies  into the converged system. NOAA and DOD share the costs of  funding NPOESS, while NASA funds specific technology projects  and studies. Figure 3 depicts the organizations that make up the  Integrated Program Office and lists their responsibilities.
Current program acquisition plans call for the procurement and  launch of six NPOESS satellites over the life of the program, as well  as the integration of 13 instruments, consisting of 10 environmental  sensors and 3 subsystems. Together, the sensors are to receive and  transmit data on atmospheric, cloud cover, environmental, climate,  oceanographic, and solar-geophysical observations. The subsystems  are to support nonenvironmental search and rescue efforts, sensor  survivability, and environmental data collection activities.
According to the program office, 7 of the 13 planned NPOESS  instruments involve new technology development, whereas 6 others  are based on existing technologies. In addition, the program office  considers 4 of the sensors involving new technologies critical,  because they provide data for key weather products; these sensors  are shown in bold in table 1, which lists the planned instruments and  the state of technology on each.
In addition, the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), which is being  developed as a major risk reduction and climate data continuity  initiative, is a planned demonstration satellite to be launched several  years before the first NPOESS satellite is to be launched. It is  planned to host three of the four critical NPOESS sensors (the  visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS), the cross-track  infrared sounder, and the advanced technology microwave  sounder), as well as a noncritical sensor (the ozone mapper/profiler  suite). NPP will provide the program office and the processing  centers an early opportunity to work with the sensors, ground  control, and data processing systems. Specifically, this satellite is  expected to demonstrate the validity of about half of the NPOESS  environmental data records and about 93 percent of its data  processing load.
section_title: NPOESS Acquisition Strategy
paragraphs: NPOESS is a major system acquisition that consists of three key  phases: the concept and technology development phase, which  lasted from roughly 1995 to early 1997; the program definition and  risk reduction phase, which began in early 1997 and ended in August  2002; and the engineering and manufacturing development and  production phase, which began with the award of the development  and production contract in August 2002 and will continue through  the end of the program. Before the contract was awarded in 2002,  the life cycle cost for the program was estimated to be $6.5 billion  over the 24-year period from the inception of the program in 1995  through 2018. Shortly after the contract was awarded, the life cycle  cost estimate was estimated to be $7 billion.
When the NPOESS development contract was awarded, program  officials identified an anticipated schedule and funding stream for  the program. The schedule for launching the satellites was driven by  a requirement that the satellites be available to back up the final  POES and DMSP satellites should anything go wrong during the  planned launches of these satellites. In general, program officials  anticipate that roughly 1 out of every 10 satellites will fail either  during launch or during early operations after launch.
Early program milestones included (1) launching NPP by May 2006,  (2) having the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the final  POES satellite launch in March 2008, and (3) having the second  NPOESS satellite available to back up the final DMSP satellite  launch in October 2009. If the NPOESS satellites were not needed to  back up the final predecessor satellites, their anticipated launch  dates would have been April 2009 and June 2011, respectively.
section_title: NPOESS Has Experienced Continued Cost Increases and Schedule Delays
paragraphs: Over the past several years, the NPOESS program has experienced a  series of cost increases and schedule delays. In 2003, we reported  that changes in the NPOESS funding stream caused a delay in the  program’s schedule. Specifically, a DOD program official reported  that between 2001 and 2002 the agency experienced delays in  launching a DMSP satellite, causing delays in the expected launch  dates of another satellite. In late 2002, DOD shifted the expected  launch date for the final satellite from 2009 to 2010. As a result, the  department reduced funding for NPOESS by about $65 million  between fiscal years 2004 and 2007. According to program officials,  because NOAA is required to provide the same level of funding that  DOD provides, this change triggered a corresponding reduction in  funding by NOAA for those years. As a result of the reduced funding,  program officials were forced to make difficult decisions about what  to focus on first. The program office decided to keep NPP as close  to its original schedule as possible, because of its importance to the  eventual NPOESS development, and to shift some of the NPOESS  deliverables to later years. This shift affected the NPOESS  deployment schedule. To plan for this shift, the program office  developed a new program cost and schedule baseline.
After this new baseline was completed in 2004, we reported that the  program office increased the NPOESS cost estimate from about $7  billion to $8.1 billion, and delayed key milestones, including the  planned launch of the first NPOESS satellite—which was delayed by  7 months. The cost increases reflected changes to the NPOESS  contract as well as increased program management funds.  According to the program office, contract changes included  extension of the development schedule, increased sensor costs, and  additional funds needed for mitigating risks. Increased program  management funds were added for noncontract costs and  management reserves.
At that time, we also noted that other factors could further affect the  revised cost and schedule estimates. Specifically, the contractor was  not meeting expected cost and schedule targets on the new baseline  because of technical issues in the development of key sensors,  including the critical VIIRS sensor. Based on its performance  through May 2004, we estimated that the contractor would most  likely overrun its contract at completion in September 2011 by $500  million. In addition, we reported that risks associated with the  development of the critical sensors, integrated data processing  system, and algorithms, among other things, could contribute to  further cost increases and schedule slips.
Most recently, in our November 2005 testimony, we noted that  NPOESS schedules, costs, and trends had continued to worsen.  We  reported that over the past year, NPOESS cost increases and  schedule delays demonstrated worsening trends, and that there  were continuing problems in the development of a key sensor. We  further noted that contractor data showed that costs and schedules  were likely to continue to increase in the future. Our trend analysis  at the time showed that the contractor would most likely overrun  costs by $1.4 billion, resulting in a life cycle cost of about $9.7  billion, unless critical changes were made. We also noted that  program risks, particularly with the development of critical sensors,  could further increase NPOESS costs and delay schedules. At the  November hearing, program officials confirmed that the program’s  life cycle cost estimate would likely grow to $10 billion unless  critical changes were made to the program. Table 2 provides a  summary of recent growth in program cost estimates.
As for schedule changes, in November 2005, we noted that the  program office anticipated at least a 10-month delay in the launch of  the first satellite (totaling at least a 17-month delay from the time the  contract was awarded) and a 6-month delay in the launch of the  second satellite. A summary of those schedule changes is shown in  table 3. The effect of these delays is evident in the widening gap  between when the last POES satellite is expected to launch and  when the first NPOESS satellite could be available if needed as a  backup. This is significant because if the last POES satellite fails on  launch, it will be at least 3 years before the first NPOESS satellite  could be launched. During that time, critical weather and  environmental observations would be unavailable—and military and  civilian weather products and forecasts could be significantly  degraded.
Problems involving multiple levels of management—including  subcontractor, contractor, program office, and executive  leadership—played a role in bringing the NPOESS program to its  current state. For example, the VIIRS sensor development issues  were attributed, in part, to the subcontractor’s inadequate project  management. Specifically, after a series of technical problems,  internal review teams sent by the prime contractor and the program  office found that the subcontractor had deviated from a number of  contract, management, and policy directives set out by the main  office and that both management and process engineering were  inadequate. Neither the contractor nor the program office had  recognized the underlying problems in time to fix them. After these  issues were identified, the subcontractor’s management team was  replaced. Further, in January 2005, the NPOESS Executive  Committee (Excom) called for an independent review of the VIIRS   problems. This independent review, delivered in August 2005,  reported that the program management office did not have the  technical system engineering support it needed to effectively  manage the contractor, among other things. We also reported that  the involvement of NPOESS executive leadership had wavered from  frequent heavy involvement to occasional meetings with few  resulting decisions. Specifically, the Excom had met five times over  the preceding 2 years. Most of these meetings did not result in major  decisions, but rather triggered further analysis and review.
Sound management is critical to program success. In our reviews of  major acquisitions throughout the government, we have reported  that key factors determining a project’s ability to be delivered on  time, within budget, and with promised functionality include sound  program management, contractor oversight, risk identification and  escalation, and effective and timely executive level oversight. Given  the history of large cost increases and the factors that could further  affect NPOESS costs and schedules, we reported that continued  oversight, strong leadership, and timely decision making are more  critical than ever.
section_title: NPOESS Status and Plans: Decision on Program’s Future Direction on Hold, Interim Efforts Under Way
paragraphs: The future direction of the NPOESS program—what will be  delivered, at what cost, and by when—is currently on hold pending a  decision on how to proceed. Over the last few years, NPOESS has  experienced continued cost increases and schedule delays, requiring  difficult decisions about the program’s direction and capabilities.
In mid-November 2005, we reported that the NPOESS executive  committee expected to make a decision in December 2005 on the  direction of the program. This involved deciding among options  involving increased costs, delayed schedules, and reduced  functionality. We urged the committee to make a decision quickly so  that the program could proceed. However, in late November 2005,  NPOESS cost growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold  that requires the Department of Defense to certify the program to  Congress. This placed any decision about the future direction of the  program on hold until the certification takes place in June 2006.
In the meantime, the program office has implemented an interim  plan to continue work on key sensors and other program elements  using fiscal year 2006 funding. Following certification, a decision on  future direction should be clear. That will require developing a new  program baseline and renegotiating contracts—efforts that could  take up to a year.
subsections: section_title: Nunn-McCurdy Process Puts Program Direction on Hold
paragraphs: The Nunn-McCurdy Act requires DOD to take specific actions when  a major system acquisition exceeds certain cost thresholds. Key  provisions require the Secretary of Defense to notify Congress when  a major defense acquisition is expected to overrun its project  baseline by 15 percent or more, and to certify the program to  Congress when it is expected to overrun its baseline by 25 percent  or more. Certification is an assurance that   the program is essential to national security,   there are no alternatives to the program that will provide equal  or greater military capability at less cost,   the new estimates of the program’s cost are reasonable, and  the management structure for the program is adequate to  manage and control cost.
In August 2005, the NPOESS program office determined that it could  not execute its planned program within the constraints of its current  baseline and notified its executive committee. In turn, Congress was  notified that the program was expected to overrun its baseline by 15  percent. Subsequently, in late November 2005, it was determined  that at completion the final program cost would be greater than 25  percent over its baseline. At the beginning of January 2006, DOD  notified Congress that NPOESS was expected to overrun its baseline  by more than 25 percent and began the process of certifying the  program.
The Nunn-McCurdy Act pertains to Defense acquisitions, but  because NPOESS is a joint program, the certification process was  expanded to include input from NOAA and NASA. Specifically, the  Defense Acquisition Executive, who is responsible for the  certification process, invited the NPOESS executive committee  members to participate in the process, with principal stakeholders  from each NPOESS partner agency serving as intermediaries  between the executive committee members and working groups set  up to address each of the four certification elements. Additionally,  these working groups are made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA  personnel, as well as others (such as representatives of the NPOESS  senior user advisory group) as warranted.
As part of the certification process, DOD is evaluating options for  the future of the program. These options could include reducing the  number or function of NPOESS satellites, relying on European  satellites, increasing costs, delaying planned launch dates, or  canceling the program. According to Defense officials, a decision is  expected to be announced during the first week of June 2006.  However, the completion of the certification process does not end  the negotiations on this program. Any major cost changes will need  to be worked into the respective agencies’ budgets, and any major  program changes will need to be worked into a new baseline  describing what will be delivered by when and then negotiated with  the contractor. According to program office officials, a revised  baseline will likely take 6 to 12 months to develop and implement  from the time a decision is made.
section_title: Program Office Has Interim Efforts Under Way
paragraphs: The NPOESS Integrated Program Office has several initiatives under  way—both to improve its management of the program and to keep  NPOESS sensor development moving forward—as it waits for  completion of the Nunn-McCurdy process. To address concerns  about program management that we and others have raised, the  program office has  increased staffing of cost analysts and earned value management  experts to improve contractor and subcontractor oversight,   increased the presence of system engineers on sensor development  initiatives,    ●  developed a proposal for restructuring the program office and  overall satellite program to allow for clearer decision-making  authority and more timely decisions, and  ●  taken steps to improve communications among the program office,  tri-agency executives, and contractors.
These initiatives should help improve program management, but  they are not yet fully implemented—and will not guarantee success.  The proposed management changes still need to be approved,  funded, and implemented. Further, NPOESS development is  technically challenging. Thus, stringent oversight and risk  management will continue to be important throughout the life of the  project.
As for continuing sensor development, because any major changes  to the program will not be known until the certification process is  completed, the program office has implemented an interim plan to  continue work on key sensors and other program elements within  the fiscal year 2006 funding profile. Officials stated that they chose  work activities that would be needed regardless of the option  chosen for the future direction of the program.
Based on contractor-provided data, our analysis indicates that  NPOESS is making mixed progress against the fiscal year 2006  interim plan. Between October 2005 and January 2006, the  contractor outperformed its program cost and schedule targets and  completed some unplanned work. However, the contractor  continued to experience cost overruns on the development of its  critical sensors—VIIRS and CMIS. The primary cost drivers were the  extensive manpower beyond what was planned to resolve technical  issues.
The development of VIIRS is of particular importance because it is  to be demonstrated on the NPP satellite, which is currently  scheduled for launch in April 2008. While CMIS is not part of NPP,  its development is important because it is one of four critical  sensors providing data for key weather products. Over the past year,  work on CMIS was deferred in order to fund efforts to fix VIIRS and  to keep NPP on schedule.
In November, we reported that VIIRS was experiencing continued  problems dealing with the technical complexity of the ground  support equipment. VIIRS also experienced problems with the  development of the cryoradiator, excessive vibration of sensor  parts, and errors in the sensor’s solar calibration. Since November,  the program office has taken positive steps to contain these  technical risks. In particular, VIIRS now has a baseline plan for  serial development of the sensor design, an approach that is  intended to minimize rework. The program office also added  decision gates to provide management review and approval of  progress.
We also reported in November on the problems experienced on  CMIS. Specifically, CMIS continued to face technical challenges in  the design of the receivers, the sensor structure, and the antenna  calibration system. In addition, it experienced system reliability and  thermal issues, among other things. Since November, work has been  ongoing to simplify the CMIS design. These design changes are  intended to reduce the weight of the CMIS structure by moving  several subsystems from the instrument onto the spacecraft.  Additionally, the program office reported that the contractor has  demonstrated that a complex component of the CMIS receiver is  feasible.
While positive measures have been taken in the development of  both of these sensors, the program office continues to consider  VIIRS to be a high-risk initiative because of technical challenges that  it is facing. VIIRS is fast approaching a critical developmental  milestone that will determine the extent of progress made.  Specifically, a prototype is expected to begin thermal vacuum  testing in summer 2006. This testing will assess the stability of the  current sensor design. If the current design fails to meet its  performance metrics, VIIRS could be in danger of falling further  behind in cost and schedule. Program officials acknowledge that  CMIS requires a watchful eye, but note that there is more time  available to meet its development requirements. To the program  office’s credit, however, it is aware of these risks and is using its risk  management plans to help mitigate them.
section_title: Considerations in Moving the NPOESS Program Forward
paragraphs: As NPOESS undergoes the Nunn-McCurdy certification process and  important decisions are made on how the program is to proceed,  there are several important considerations.  ●  NOAA and NASA representation in the DOD Nunn-McCurdy  certification process is imperative. As a joint program, NPOESS is  expected to fulfill many military, civilian, and research requirements  for environmental data. Thus, it is important that all agency partners  have a voice in the DOD proceedings. As noted earlier, DOD has  included NOAA and NASA in its process—both in an executive  advisory capacity and on the teams working to address each of the  four certification requirements. Further, NOAA and NASA officials  reported that they believe that they are being effectively involved in  the certification process. However, because this is a DOD process  and decision, and because Defense requirements differ from NOAA  and NASA requirements, there is risk that the chosen alternative  could sacrifice NOAA and NASA requirements. It will be important  for NOAA and NASA to remain active players in the deliberation of  options and the final decision on how to move the program forward. ●  Indecision increases the risk of a gap in satellite data. The  potential for a gap in polar-orbiting satellite data is increasing with  every day of delay on the NPOESS program. Specifically, if th satellite in the predecessor satellite series (the Polar-orbiting  Operational Environmental Satellites or POES) were to fail, there  would be a gap in satellite coverage until the first NPOESS sat was launched and put into operation (see fig. 2).  Such a gap could  have a devastating effect on our national ability to forecast severe  weather events, such as those associated with future hurricane  seasons. Since a decision on how the NPOESS program is to  proceed is not expected until June 2006, and there will likely be  least another year while a new baseline is established and the contract modified, it is important that the departments move  expeditiously to fund their chosen program direction and to  implement contract changes.  arranted. Management problems at multiple levels— Continuing oversight of program and executive management is  w subcontractor, contractor, project office, and executive oversight— led to NPOESS recent cost and schedule overruns. As th e program  implements a new management structure and increased contractor  oversight, it will be important to measure and report on the progres of these changes so as to not repeat past problems. s  In summary, in November 2005, we reported that NPOESS was “a  program in crisis” because of technical problems on critical sensor escalating costs, poor management at multiple levels, and the lack  of a decision on how to proceed with the program. Today, the  program is still troubled, and its future direction is not yet know The program office and contractor are addressing problems on the  critical sensors and have adopted strategies that are expected to  reduce risks on these sensors. Additionally, the program office is  working to address management challenges by increasing program office skills and staffing, increasing contractor oversight, and  restructuring the program office to allow for more timely and  authoritative decisions. Further, the Nunn-McCurdy certificatio n in  June 2006 is expected to result in a firm decision on how to proceedn.  with the program. Over the next few months, it will be important for  all of the agency partners to have a voice in the final decision on  how to proceed. Once this decision is made, it will be important t move quickly to implement the decision in agency budgets and  contracts. Further, as the project continues, it will be critical to  ensure that the management issues of the past will not be repeated.
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any  questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.
section_title: Contact and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: If you have any questions regarding this testimony, please contact  David Powner at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov.  Individuals making contributions to this testimony include Colleen  Phillips (Assistant Director), Carol Cha, Barbara Collier, Neil  Doherty, Kathleen S. Lovett, and Karen Talley.
section_title: Appendix I. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to determine the National Polar-orbiting  Operational Environmental Satellite System’s (NPOESS) current  status and plans, and to discuss considerations in moving the  program forward. To accomplish these objectives, we focused our  review on the Integrated Program Office, the organization  responsible for the overall NPOESS program. We also interviewed  officials from the Department of Defense (DOD), the National  Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and NOAA’s  National Weather Service and National Environmental Satellite Data  and Information Service to determine plans for the program.
To identify schedule and cost changes related to NPOESS’s status  we reviewed program office data and interviewed program officials.  We compared changes in NPOESS cost and schedule estimates to  prior cost and schedule estimates as reported in our July 2002, July  2003, and November 2005 testimonies and in our September 2004  report.
To further analyze trends that could affect the program in fiscal year  2006, we assessed the prime contractor’s cost and schedule  performance. To make these assessments, we applied earned value  analysis techniques to data from the contractor earned value and  variance analysis reports. We compared the cost of work completed  with the budgeted costs for scheduled work during January 2006 to  show trends in cost and schedule performance against the interim  plan for fiscal year 2006.
NOAA and DOD officials generally agreed with the facts presented  in this statement and provided some technical corrections, which  we have incorporated. We performed our work at the Integrated  Program Office, DOD, NASA, and NOAA offices in the Washington,  D.C., metropolitan area, between February 2006 and March 2006, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
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