Ground Radar and Guided Munitions: Increased Oversight and Cooperation Can Help Avoid Duplication among the Services' Programs
Published: 2014-12-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Over the past five years, GAO has found potential overlap or duplication in DOD weapon system investments. Overlap occurs when multiple agencies or programs are engaged in similar activities. Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities. Senate Report 113-44 accompanying the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act mandated that GAO examine the military services' ground radar and air-to-ground precision guided munitions programs for potential duplication. Ground radars are sensors used to detect and track targets, and precision guided munitions are weapons intended to accurately engage and destroy enemy targets.
This report examines the extent to which potential overlap or duplication exists across the military services' (1) ground radar and (2) air-to-ground precision guided munitions programs. GAO analyzed program documentation on system performance requirements and capabilities and interviewed DOD officials about potential duplication.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Several of the Department of Defense's (DOD) active ground radar programs have overlapping performance requirements and two are potentially duplicative. In these instances, the military service pursued separate acquisition programs because other programs did not fully meet their performance requirements, among other reasons. Specifically, GAO found:
The Marine Corps' Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) Block I and the Air Force's Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar (3DELRR) have some overlapping key requirements, such as range, and are potentially duplicative. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which validates requirements for DOD's largest acquisition programs, did not find unnecessary redundancy, and Air Force officials stated that G/ATOR could not meet all of the 3DELRR's requirements.
The Army's AN/TPQ-53 Counterfire Radar and the Marine Corps' G/ATOR Block II have some overlapping requirements, but the AN/TPQ-53 does not meet certain key G/ATOR Block II requirements, therefore reducing the risk that the programs are duplicative. In this case, urgent operational needs and different acquisition approaches also led the Army and Marine Corps to establish separate acquisition programs.
As a result of reviews conducted by the JROC and DOD's Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), which develops guidance for analyzing alternative ways to fulfill capability needs, the Air Force made positive changes to the 3DELRR program, such as reducing some requirements to improve program affordability. CAPE also expanded the alternatives considered on acquisition programs to minimize potential duplication. DOD missed an opportunity to assess whether the capabilities of the AN/TPQ-53 and G/ATOR Block II were unnecessarily redundant. The JROC did not review the AN/TPQ-53 requirements because it was initially fielded to meet an urgent need and did not meet the dollar threshold to automatically trigger a review. However, the AN/TPQ-53 transitioned to the traditional, non-urgent needs acquisition process at which point the JROC could have reviewed it. Ensuring that the JROC and CAPE review new ground radar acquisitions could help DOD avoid duplication.
DOD's active air-to-ground precision guided munitions programs are not duplicative, but potential for duplication exists in the future. The active programs share some capabilities, but characteristics such as the aircraft that can launch them distinguish them from one another. To the extent that overlapping capabilities exist, DOD officials said these capabilities provided needed flexibility for military operations. Cooperation among the military services contributed to the current lack of duplication. GAO found one example of potential future duplication. Both the Army and the Navy plan to buy the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System through fiscal year 2015 to meet their guided rocket needs, but starting in fiscal year 2016, they may pursue separate, potentially duplicative, efforts. There are costs and benefits associated with both the Army and Navy's acquisition approaches; however, if the Army and Navy fulfill their guided rocket needs separately instead of cooperatively, it could result in the inefficient use of weapon system investment dollars and a loss of buying power.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: To address potential duplication, GAO recommends that DOD ensure that new ground radar acquisitions are reviewed by the JROC and CAPE and require the Army and Navy to jointly assess the possibility of using a single solution and a cooperative, preferably competitive, contracting strategy to meet their guided rocket needs. DOD partially agreed with GAO's first recommendation, but stated it should not be mandatory. GAO believes the recommendation remains valid as discussed in its report. DOD agreed with the second recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services spend over  $150 billion each year on the development and procurement of weapons  and other defense systems to fulfill their roles and missions. These  investment dollars are not always spent in the most efficient and effective  way. We have previously found potential overlap or duplication in DOD’s  electronic warfare, tactical wheeled vehicles, and unmanned aircraft  system investments, in which the military services pursued multiple  acquisition efforts to develop similar or the same capabilities. Several  factors contributed to the overlap or duplication, including the military  services generating unique system requirements that justify multiple  acquisitions to meet similar needs, the military services’ authority to  independently make resource allocation decisions that support their  respective requirements, and the department’s urgent needs processes— activities aimed at rapidly developing, equipping, and fielding solutions  and critical capabilities to the warfighter—which have led to multiple  entities responding to requests for similar capabilities.
In the Senate report 113-44 accompanying the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, the Senate Armed Services  Committee raised questions about potential duplication within DOD’s  ground radar and air-to-ground precision guided munitions programs and  directed DOD to provide briefings on each area. The report mandated  that we examine these programs for potential duplication. This report  examines the extent to which potential overlap or duplication exists  across the military services’ (1) ground radar and (2) air-to-ground  precision guided munitions programs.
To determine the extent of potential overlap or duplication across ground  radar and air-to-ground precision guided munitions programs, we  reviewed acquisition programs currently in development or production,  which we also refer to in this report as active programs. We reviewed and  analyzed documentation on system requirements, capabilities, and other  distinguishing factors to determine if potential overlap or duplication  exists. We interviewed DOD officials regarding any instances where we  identified potential overlap or duplication. We also reviewed DOD analysis  and interviewed DOD officials to identify instances in which DOD found  potential overlap or duplication during acquisition and requirements  reviews and what actions DOD took in response. Appendix I includes  additional details on our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2014 to December 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD and the military services invest in ground radars and air-to-ground  precision guided munitions. Ground radars are ground-based sensor  systems used by the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps to detect and  track a variety of targets. These radars perform missions such as air  surveillance, air defense, and counterfire target acquisition, among  others. Ground radars that can perform multiple missions one at a time  are called multi-role radars, and radars that can perform multiple missions  simultaneously are called multi-mission radars. We focused on ground  radars that perform the following missions, which are notionally depicted  in figure 1:
Air surveillance—search, detect, and track cruise missiles, fixed and  rotary wing aircraft, and unmanned aircraft systems.
Air defense—provide radar data that enables other weapon systems,  such as air and missile defense or aircraft, to take offensive or  defense actions against enemy cruise missiles, fixed and rotary wing  aircraft, and unmanned aircraft systems.
Counterfire target acquisition—detect and track enemy rockets,  artillery, and mortars to determine enemy firing positions and impact  areas for incoming fire.
The military services have several active ground radar acquisition  programs performing air surveillance, air defense, and counterfire target  acquisition missions. These programs and their missions are presented in  table 1. Appendix II provides additional information on the capabilities of  these radar programs.
The House Armed Services Committee has previously raised questions  about potential overlap in the ground radar area. For example, in 2012,  House report 112-479 accompanying the National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2013 noted overlap with the Army and Marine Corps  ground radar programs’ missions and encouraged the Army and Marine  Corps to collaborate and identify overlapping requirements and determine  if they could procure a single system rather than having each service  procuring and maintaining separate systems.
Air-to-ground precision guided munitions are weapons launched from  Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aircraft that are intended to  accurately engage and destroy enemy targets on the ground. These  munitions include missiles, guided rockets, and laser guided bombs.  Precision guided munitions contain a seeker, warhead, and fuze. The  seeker detects electromagnetic energy reflected from a target and  provides commands to a control system that guides the weapon to the  target. Different seekers provide targeting capabilities for different  environments, such as for clear weather only or all weather. Some  precision-guided munitions are made up of a guidance kit attached to an  unguided or “dumb” munition. Munitions are also made up of varying  warheads with different capabilities and weights that make them  optimized for different types of targets. The military services’ active air-to- ground precision guided munitions are presented in table 2.
DOD’s requirements and acquisition policies contain provisions to help  avoid redundancy and consider existing alternatives before starting new  acquisition programs. DOD’s Joint Capabilities Integration and  Development System (JCIDS) guidance states that when validating key  requirements documents, the chair of the group responsible for that  capability area is also certifying that the proposed requirements and  capabilities are not unnecessarily redundant to existing capabilities in the  joint force. In some cases, redundancy may be advisable for operational  reasons. The validation authority for a requirements document depends  on factors such as the potential dollar value of a program, and determines  the level of oversight a requirement document receives. The Joint  Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is the validation authority for  documents with a “JROC Interest” designation. A military service can be  the validation authority for lower level designations.
DOD’s Instruction 5000.02, which establishes policies for the  management of all acquisition programs, requires the military services to  complete an analysis of alternatives (AOA) to assess potential materiel  solutions, including existing and planned programs, which could satisfy  validated capability requirements. DOD’s Office of Cost Assessment and  Program Evaluation (CAPE) approves study guidance, which provides  direction on what the AOA must include, for acquisition category I  programs. Under DOD’s Interim Instruction 5000.02, which was effective  as of November 2013, CAPE also develops and approves study guidance  for programs for which the JROC is the validation authority, regardless of   It also states that the Milestone  the acquisition category of the program.
Decision Authority can designate non-major defense acquisition programs  as “special interest.” A “special interest” program is a program that meets  certain criteria, such as being a potential joint acquisition program, and as  a result, receives higher level oversight. The Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology serves as Milestone Decision  Authority for “special interest” programs.
section_title: Overlapping Performance Requirements and Potential Duplication Exist across Ground Radar Programs, but DOD Has Determined Any Redundancy Is Necessary
paragraphs: Our analysis of DOD’s active ground radar programs found evidence of  overlapping performance requirements and potential duplication in certain  mission areas. However, the JROC and Joint Staff have determined that  any redundancies across the programs they reviewed were necessary.  The JROC did not review one of the programs in our analysis. The  military services pursued separate ground radar acquisition programs for  several reasons: other programs did not fully meet their performance  requirements; the timelines for other programs did not align with their  needs; and they made different decisions on whether to pursue multi-role  or single role radars. DOD has taken steps to encourage collaboration in  the ground radar area by asking the services to consider joint acquisition  programs, developing joint requirements, and requiring the services to  include existing radar programs in their AOAs, with mixed success.
subsections: section_title: Ground Radar Programs for Air Surveillance and Air Defense Have Some Key Overlapping Requirements and Are Potentially Duplicative
paragraphs: Based on our analysis of program requirements documents, we found  that the Marine Corps’ Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) Block I  and Air Force’s Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar  (3DELRR) acquisition programs have some key overlapping requirements  and provide similar capabilities in their air surveillance and air defense  roles. However, the JROC ultimately determined that any redundancy  between requirements was necessary. During the JROC validation  process, the proposed performance requirements for the 3DELRR  program were reduced in several areas, including range. These  reductions brought the 3DELRR requirements closer to the G/ATOR  Block I requirements, thus increasing the extent of overlap across the  programs’ requirements and the risk of potential duplication. In other  areas, 3DELRR requirements still exceeded those for G/ATOR Block I.  The JROC validated the 3DELRR requirements document in 2013. The  JROC approved the latest G/ATOR Block I requirements document in  2012.
Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman also competed for this contract.
Air Force’s long-range radar requirements. According to Air Force  officials, each of these studies confirmed that no other existing radar  could meet all of the 3DELRR requirements, and supported the decision  to start a new development program. One of these studies was an AOA  update that considered reductions in the 3DELRR range requirements  and both studies considered the introduction of a more capable gallium   Our review  nitride semiconductor technology into the G/ATOR program.of these studies and a related CAPE analysis showed that G/ATOR could  be capable of meeting some key 3DELRR performance requirements. In  addition, a CAPE official, who reviews radar programs, stated the Air  Force could use about 90 percent of the work the Marine Corps has  already done to develop G/ATOR for 3DELRR and that additional  research and development would primarily be required to develop  software for the system.
section_title: Ground Radar Programs for Counterfire Target Acquisition Have Some Overlapping Requirements, but Other Factors Justified Separate Programs
paragraphs: Based on our analysis of program requirements documents, we found  that the Army’s AN/TPQ-53 Counterfire Radar and the Marine Corps’  G/ATOR Block II have some overlapping requirements. Both radar  systems detect, track, classify, and locate the origin of enemy projectiles,  including mortar, artillery, and rocket systems and are to replace existing  Army and Marine Corps Firefinder radars that perform counterfire target  acquisition missions. However, while many of the requirements overlap,  the AN/TPQ-53 does not meet the G/ATOR Block II detection range  requirements for multiple target types.
In addition to some unique requirements, urgent operational needs and  different acquisition approaches led the Army and Marine Corps to  establish separate acquisition programs for counterfire target acquisition  radars. The Army’s AN/TPQ-53 started in 2006 as an upgrade program to  increase the capabilities of existing radar to meet urgent needs that had  been identified in overseas operations. According to Army and Marine  Corps officials, the Army’s timeframes required it to field its new capability  before the G/ATOR development program would transition to production.  After the Army met its urgent needs with an initial procurement of  upgraded radars, the program continued through the traditional or non- urgent needs acquisition process and held a new production decision  review in 2012. However, by this point, the Army and the Marine Corps  had adopted different acquisition approaches for meeting their ground  radar needs. The Army moved from a strategy of developing one multi- mission radar for air surveillance, air defense, and counterfire target  acquisition to a strategy of buying the AN/TPQ-53 and upgrading other  radars as needed. The Marine Corps, on the other hand, is developing  G/ATOR as a multi-role and potentially a multi-mission radar. Despite  these different approaches, the Army and Marine Corps have cooperated  in certain areas related to these acquisitions. For example, according to  Army and Marine Corps officials, the Army and Marine Corps have  discussed using common software for the AN/TPQ-53 and G/ATOR Block  II counterfire target acquisition capabilities.
The JROC did not review whether the capabilities of the Army’s AN/TPQ- 53 and the Marine Corps’ G/ATOR Block II were unnecessarily redundant  or duplicative as part of the requirements validation process. The JROC  did not validate the Army’s AN/TPQ-53 performance requirements  because it was initially an urgent wartime need and did not meet  acquisition category I dollar thresholds. However, at the point the JROC  could have reviewed the AN/TPQ-53 requirements, the program had  transitioned to the more traditional acquisition process. Instead, the Joint  Staff delegated the validation authority for the AN/TPQ-53 requirements  to the Army, which validated them in 2010. The JROC had previously  validated the G/ATOR Block II requirements documents in 2005, prior to  the Army starting the AN/TPQ-53 program. Because the Joint Staff  delegated the validation authority for the AN/TPQ-53 to the Army, the  JROC may have missed an opportunity to review whether the capabilities  of the AN/TPQ-53 and G/ATOR Block II were unnecessarily redundant or  duplicative, or to encourage additional areas of cooperation between the  Army and the Marine Corps.
section_title: DOD Has Encouraged Collaboration on Ground Radars with Mixed Success
paragraphs: The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics and CAPE has taken steps to encourage the military  services to collaborate on ground radar programs with mixed success.  None of the efforts resulted in a joint acquisition program, primarily due to  service funding decisions, but they have led to the development of joint  requirements and broader analyses of acquisition alternatives. For  example:  In 2009, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics designated the Air Force’s 3DELRR program and the  TPS-59 Product Improvement Program for the Marine Corps’ long- range air surveillance radar as special interest programs and  encouraged both services to collaborate on a single system that  addressed their long-range radar requirements. According to Air  Force officials, this resulted in a 3DELRR requirements document that  was developed jointly, and which still shares many of the Marine  Corps’ requirements. The Marine Corps decided to discontinue the  TPS-59 Product Improvement Program due to budget constraints, but  DOD officials said that 3DELRR may still be able to meet the Marine  Corps’ needs when it eventually decides to replace the TPS-59  ground radar.
In 2009, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics designated G/ATOR as a special interest program, and  directed the Marine Corps to collaborate with the Joint Staff and Army  to work towards a joint capability to meet the services’ multi-mission  radar requirements. The Army later decided not to fund the Multi- Mission Radar and has instead pursued the AN/TPQ-53 radar and  other radar upgrades to meet its needs.
In 2011, CAPE issued AOA study guidance that required the Air Force  to update a prior 3DELRR AOA and consider a broader range of  alternatives, including other ground radar systems, such as G/ATOR.  Because 3DELRR was proposed to address Air Force and Marine  Corps long-range radar requirements, the study guidance required  Marine Corps participation in the development and review of the AOA.  The AOA concluded that a new radar program was the optimum  solution to meet 3DELRR requirements.
The Army is looking to upgrade the radar system that supports the  Patriot missile system. A CAPE official responsible for reviewing radar  programs said that CAPE is working with the Army to develop its AOA  study guidance for the radar upgrade effort and asked the Army to  include systems, such as 3DELRR and G/ATOR in the analysis.
section_title: Air-To-Ground Precision Guided Munitions Programs Are Not Duplicative, but Potential for Duplication in the Future Exists
paragraphs: Our analysis of DOD’s active air-to-ground precision guided munitions  found some munitions shared some capabilities, but after taking into  consideration characteristics such as the aircraft that can launch them,  we found the systems were not duplicative. To the extent overlapping  capabilities exist, DOD officials said these capabilities provided needed  flexibility for different military operations. However, there is potential for  future duplication in the Army’s and Navy’s air-to-ground guided rocket  acquisitions. While the Army and Navy have similar needs, the services’  potential procurement strategies could lead to them procuring the same  or very similar systems using different programs and contracts.
subsections: section_title: Air-to-Ground Munitions Are Not Duplicative and Any Overlapping Capabilities Provide Flexibility for Military Operations
paragraphs: Based on our analysis of the target sets of DOD’s air-to-ground precision  guided munitions, the seeker capabilities, the aircraft platforms that can  launch them, and cost, we did not find evidence that DOD’s capabilities in  this area were duplicative. Additionally, none of the DOD or military  service requirements and acquisition organizations we spoke to identified  unnecessary redundancy or duplication within air-to-ground precision  guided munitions. In general, DOD officials described the air-to-ground  precision guided munitions area as efficient in terms of the investments  DOD has made. Appendix III provides a comparison of air-to-ground  precision guided munition air platforms, seeker capabilities, and target  sets.
Our analysis of DOD’s active air-to-ground precision guided munitions  found evidence of overlapping target sets among the munitions, but  unique factors such as what type of aircraft a munition can be launched  from, the munition’s seeker capability in varying weather conditions, and  the cost of the munition for the desired effect clearly distinguish them from  one another. In addition, where some overlap was found, DOD officials  explained the overlap was necessary to provide flexibility for military  operations. We found three illustrative examples of how platform, seeker  capability, and the cost of the munition weigh into how air-to-ground  precision guided munitions are used and how their capabilities  complement one another:
Air-to-ground precision guided munitions are suitable for different  types of aircraft platforms, or behave differently when fired from  different types of platforms; therefore, the method of delivery, such as  from a fixed wing fighter aircraft versus a rotary wing helicopter  platform, can be critical to the operation. For example, the Joint Air-to- Ground Missile (JAGM) and the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) are  both missiles optimized to hit moving and stationary targets. When  JAGM replaces the Hellfire missile, it will, like Hellfire, be capable of  launching from rotary helicopters and unmanned aircraft systems,  whereas JSOW is a glide weapon with no motor, that must be  launched from bomber and fighter aircraft. The JSOW also has a  penetrating warhead that allows it to target deeply buried targets.
Differing seeker capabilities allow for flexibility in different operating  environments. An all weather seeker capability allows a munition to  reach its target regardless of weather conditions or other obscurants,  such as smoke. For example, the Direct Attack Moving Target  Capability was developed to hit moving targets, but it does not have  the all weather seeker capability that would allow it to hit all moving  targets in all weather conditions. The JAGM and the Small Diameter  Bomb II munitions will have the capability to address moving targets in  all weather conditions. This all-weather capability requires a more  expensive seeker technology.
The unit cost of precision guided munitions varies and may be a  determining factor in when they are used. For example, the Hellfire II  Romeo missile and Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II  (APKWS), which is a guided rocket, both have the ability to hit  unarmored and unhardened targets. However, the Hellfire II Romeo  costs approximately $93,000 per unit and is optimized to hit armored  and hardened targets, whereas the APKWS costs approximately  $31,000 per unit and is only optimized for unarmored and unhardened  targets. According to DOD officials, while the Hellfire II missile is  effective against both armored and unarmored targets, it could be  more optimal, depending on the range of the target, to use the smaller  and less expensive APKWS system against unarmored targets.
One of the reasons for the lack of duplication in air-to-ground precision  guided munitions programs is that the military services cooperated on  multiple systems and leveraged each other’s investments. Three of the  seven munitions programs we reviewed are joint development programs  between at least two of the military services. In other cases, the military  services procured each other’s munitions systems. For example, all of the  military services procure Hellfire missiles from the Army.
section_title: Duplication in Guided Rockets Procurements Could Occur in the Future
paragraphs: There is potential for future overlap or duplication in the Army’s and  Navy’s procurement of air-to-ground guided rockets, which could result in  DOD not fully leveraging its buying power. Specifically, both the Army and  Navy have validated requirements for air-to-ground guided rockets. The  general requirement is for a guidance kit that attaches to the existing  family of unguided Hydra-70 rockets. While the Army and Navy have  similar needs, the services’ current procurement strategies could lead to  them procuring the same or very similar systems using different programs  and contracts. APKWS is currently the only guided rocket system that has  been integrated and fully qualified for use on a DOD platform. Defense  contractors have developed other guided rocket systems, and there is at  least one other system that the Army is considering to meet its future  guided rocket needs.
Both the Army and the Navy plan to buy APKWS through fiscal year 2015  to meet their guided rocket needs, but starting in fiscal year 2016, they  may pursue separate, potentially duplicative, efforts to meet their  requirements. The Army plans to introduce competition for its Hydra-70  rocket guidance kit and consider other qualified systems besides  APKWS. DOD acquisition policy and Better Buying Power initiatives to  increase the efficiency of defense spending both emphasize the  importance of sustaining a competitive environment at every stage in the  acquisition process as a means to control and reduce cost.the Army is exploring various options to introduce competition for guided  rockets to include an option that requires the Hydra-70 rocket prime  contractor to competitively procure guidance kits and fully integrate them  with Hydra-70 before delivering complete systems to the Army, which is  different than the Navy’s current approach. Alternatively, the Army could  still jointly buy APKWS with the Navy. The Navy procures APKWS and  Hydra-70 separately and integrates the components themselves in order  to, among other things, allow for the flexibility to use the different  combinations of rocket components based on mission needs.
The Navy’s current contract for APKWS, which was awarded on a sole  source basis, expires in 2016. At that point, the Navy plans to negotiate  another sole source contract because it does not believe that introducing  competition to APKWS would be worth the investment of integrating and  qualifying another Hydra-70 guided rocket on Marine Corps’ H-1  helicopters.develop, integrate, and qualify APKWS on the H-1. According to the Army  program officials, introducing competition for the Hydra guidance kit could  reduce its current cost by as much as one-third. There are costs and  benefits associated with both the Army and Navy’s acquisition  approaches; however, if the Army and Navy fulfill their guided rocket  needs separately instead of through a single solution with a cooperative  contracting strategy, it could result in the inefficient use of weapon system  investment dollars and a loss of buying power.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD will likely be at some risk for overlap and duplication in its weapon  system acquisition programs, given the breadth and magnitude of its  investments. While some overlap and duplication may provide necessary  redundancy for military operations, in other cases, it is driven by the  military services generating unique system requirements that meet similar  needs, their authority to independently make resource allocation  decisions, and the timing of acquisition programs. The 3DELRR program  appears to be a case where the Air Force was focused on what made its  requirements unique, instead of looking for ways to leverage the Marine  Corps’ development program for G/ATOR. We found these programs to  be potentially duplicative.
DOD currently relies on its requirements and acquisition processes and  decision makers to ensure that capabilities and programs are not  unnecessarily redundant or duplicative. Its experiences with ground radar  programs suggest ways to make these processes more effective in the  future. For example, DOD may have missed an opportunity to review  whether the capabilities of the Army’s AN/TPQ-53 Counterfire Radar and  the Marine Corps’ G/ATOR Block II were unnecessarily redundant or  duplicative because the requirements document for the AN/TPQ-53 was  validated by the Army, rather than the JROC, which has a broader  perspective on DOD’s capability needs. In another case, DOD was better  positioned to encourage cooperation for Patriot radar upgrades. Because  CAPE had visibility into the program, it was able to shape the Army’s  AOA to make sure existing radars, such as 3DELRR and G/ATOR, were  considered.
There may be other opportunities for increased service cooperation to  meet future ground radar needs, but, in order for key decision makers  such as the JROC, CAPE, and the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to take advantage of them, it is  important for them to have insight into ground radar programs, including  upgrade programs and programs that do not meet the dollar thresholds  that trigger a “JROC Interest” designation and automatic review. A “JROC  Interest” designation provides the JROC the opportunity to review ground  radar performance requirements and capabilities for potential duplication  and CAPE with the opportunity to develop broad AOA guidance. This type  of visibility would put DOD in a better position to take the actions  necessary to make the most efficient use of its resources.
Unlike the ground radar programs we examined, most of the air-to-ground  precision guided munitions programs were already being developed and  procured jointly. This cooperation has helped DOD leverage its buying  power. As new areas of potential cooperation emerge, the services  should look to leverage those opportunities. Specifically, when the Army  revalidated its air-to-ground guided rocket requirement, it opened up the  possibility of cooperating with the Navy on jointly buying APKWS or  holding a competition to find a system that can meet both services’ needs  when the Navy’s current sole source contract expires in 2016. Either  option seems preferable to the Army and Navy potentially procuring the  same or similar systems to fill the same requirement under different  program and contracts, which could lead to duplicative procurement  activities in both services and a degradation in buying power.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that DOD take the following two actions:
To provide the JROC the opportunity to review all ground radar  programs for potential duplication and CAPE with the opportunity to  develop broad analysis of alternative guidance, the Vice Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff should direct the Joint Staff to assign all new  ground radar capability requirement documents with a Joint Staff  designation of “JROC Interest.”
To address potential overlap or duplication in the acquisition of Hydra- 70 rocket guidance kits, the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should require the Army and  Navy to assess whether a single solution and cooperative, preferably  competitive, contracting strategy offers the most cost effective way to  meet both services’ needs.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its  written comments, which are reprinted in full in appendix IV, DOD partially  concurred with our first recommendation and concurred with our second  recommendation. DOD also provided technical comments that were  incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to assign all new  ground radar capability requirement documents with a Joint Staff  designation of “JROC Interest.” DOD responded that although it is likely  that new ground radar capability would be given the Joint Staffing  Designator of "JROC Interest," the “JROC Interest” designation should  not be a required designation because it ignores the tiered Joint Staff  designation system process. DOD also noted that it would lessen the  impact and importance of the Functional Capabilities Boards and their  role to ensure minimization of duplication across the portfolio.
We acknowledge that the Joint Staff has a process for determining Joint  Staff designations and for minimizing duplication across portfolios.
However, as we point out in our report, DOD missed an opportunity to  review whether the capabilities of the Army’s AN/TPQ-53 Counterfire  Radar and the Marine Corps’ G/ATOR Block II were unnecessarily  redundant or duplicative because the requirements document for the  AN/TPQ-53 was given a lower-level designation. The way to ensure this  does not occur in the future is to make the “JROC Interest” designation  mandatory for all new ground radar programs. Hence, we still believe  without this designation for all new ground radar programs, the JROC and  CAPE may not have the opportunity to review programs that do not meet  the dollar threshold for an automatic “JROC Interest” designation and  may miss additional opportunities to encourage collaboration across the  military services.
DOD concurred with our second recommendation to require the Army and  Navy to assess whether a single solution and cooperative, preferably  competitive, contracting strategy offers the most cost effective way to  meet both services’ needs if both services continue to pursue the  acquisition of Hydra-70 rocket guidance kits. DOD noted that it has a  process to consider redundancies across the services’ programs, but it  was unclear what actions it planned to take to assess if the services could  use a single contracting strategy to meet its guided rocket needs. We  continue to believe that DOD should assess this option as part of its  consideration of potential redundancies.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Vice Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff; and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and  the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, this report also is  available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our    Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent of potential overlap or duplication across (1)  ground radar and (2) air-to-ground precision guided munitions programs,  we reviewed acquisition programs currently in development or production,  which does not include systems only being developed or produced for  foreign military sales. We reviewed and analyzed documentation on  system requirements, capabilities, and other distinguishing factors to  determine if potential overlap or duplication exists. We interviewed  Department of Defense (DOD) officials in the Joint Staff; Offices of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology, and Logistics  and Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; and the Army,  Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to discuss ground radar and air-to- ground precision guided munition programs as appropriate. We also  reviewed DOD analysis and interviewed DOD officials to identify  instances in which DOD found potential overlap or duplication during  acquisition and requirements reviews and what actions DOD took, if any,  in response to any identified potential overlap or duplication.
For ground radar programs, we reviewed the mission, acquisition life  cycle, and basic system characteristics of the military services’ active  ground radar programs, to determine which programs may have  overlapping or duplicative requirements and capabilities. We focused on  ground radar programs used in land operations with primarily air  surveillance, air defense, and counterfire target acquisition missions. Our  scope included two air surveillance and air defense ground radar  systems—the Air Force’s Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range  Radar (3DELRR) and the Marine Corps’ AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task  Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) Block I Radar—and two counterfire target  acquisition ground radar programs—the Army’s AN/TPQ-53 Counterfire  Radar and the Marine Corps’ AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR Block II. We excluded  the Army’s AN/TPQ-50, which is in production, from our analysis because  unlike the other radar system we reviewed, it is a lightweight, man  portable radar. We also excluded Sentinel and Patriot from our analysis  because these programs are fielded systems undergoing modification.  Within our scope, we compared the common Key Performance  Parameters (KPP) and Key System Attributes (KSA) found in the program  requirements documents across the radars primarily performing air  surveillance and air defense and counterfire target acquisition missions.  KPPs are the performance attributes of a system considered critical to the  development of an effective military capability. KSAs are the attributes or  characteristics considered to be essential, but not critical enough to be  designated a KPP. The KPPs and KSAs included range, probability of  detection, search volume, reliability, availability, maintainability, and  transportability/mobility, as appropriate.
For air-to-ground precision guided munitions, we reviewed the type,  acquisition life cycle, and select system characteristics of the military  services’ active air-to-ground precision guided munitions programs, to  determine which programs may have overlapping or duplicative  requirements and capabilities. We did not review munitions in certain  specialized categories, such as anti-ship, anti-radiation, ballistic, or cruise  missiles. Our scope included Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II  (APKWS), Direct Attack Moving Target Capability, Hellfire II Romeo  variant, Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM), Joint Standoff Weapon  (JSOW) C-1 variant, Maverick Laser variant, and Small Diameter Bomb II.  Within our scope, we conducted an analysis comparing the precision  guided munitions characteristics that we determined, in consultation with  DOD subject matter experts, were most critical to assessing the system’s  capabilities. Based on information we gathered and corroborated with the  military services, we compared munitions’ air platforms, unit cost, all  weather capability, and target sets: moving and stationary; armored and  unarmored; hardened and unhardened.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2014 to December 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Description of Active Ground Radar Programs
subsections: section_title: Service Army
paragraphs: Description of capabilities  Highly mobile ground based radar set that automatically detects,  classifies, tracks, and locates the point of origin of projectiles fired from  rocket, artillery and mortar systems. The radar provides increased range  and accuracy throughout a 90 degree search sector (stare mode) as well  as 360 degree coverage (rotating) for locating firing positions.
Three-Dimensional Expeditionary  Long-Range Radar (3DELRR)
Long-range, three-dimensional, ground-based radar for detecting,  identifying, tracking, and reporting aerial targets. Responds to operational  need to detect and report highly maneuverable, small radar cross section  targets to enable battlefield awareness.
AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task Oriented  Radar (G/ATOR)
Expeditionary, three-dimensional, high-mobility, short/medium range  multi-role radar designed to detect cruise missiles, air breathing targets,  rockets, mortars, and artillery.
Provides expeditionary, day/night, adverse weather radar coverage  and tracks aerial objects. Provides the baseline system for the Marine  Corps short and medium range radar requirement.
G/ATOR Ground Weapons Locating  Radar – Block II
Detects indirect fire from rockets, artillery, and mortar systems at  greater range and provides greater accuracy, classification and  deployability to support counterfire and counter battery missions.
The Marine Corps’ G/ATOR is a multi-role radar. The Marine Corps is using an incremental  approach to fielding G/ATOR capabilities. G/ATOR Block I is to develop the basic hardware for the  radar in all of its potential roles. G/ATOR Block II is to be a software upgrade to provide counterfire  target acquisition capabilities.
section_title: Appendix III: Comparison of Select Active Air-to-Ground Precision Guided Munitions Capabilities
paragraphs: JAGM is also expected to be used on unmanned aircraft systems, but this is not a threshold  requirement.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made  key contributions to this report: Ronald E. Schwenn, Assistant Director;  Danielle Greene; Laura Holliday; Heather Krause; John Krump; Zina  Merritt; Paige Muegenburg; Erin Preston; Sylvia Schatz; Roxanna Sun;  Hai Tran; and Oziel Trevino.