Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues
Published: 2004-09-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Over 335,000 reserve members have been involuntarily called to active duty since September 11, 2001, and the Department of Defense (DOD) expects future reserve usage to remain high. This report is the second in response to a request for GAO to review DOD's mobilization and demobilization process. This review specifically examined the extent to which (1) DOD's implementation of a key mobilization authority and personnel polices affect reserve force availability, (2) the Army was able to execute its mobilization and demobilization plans efficiently, and (3) DOD can manage the health of its mobilized reserve forces.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD's implementation of a key mobilization authority to involuntarily call up reserve component members and personnel policies greatly affects the numbers of reserve members available to fill requirements. Involuntary mobilizations are currently limited to a cumulative total of 24 months under DOD's implementation of the partial mobilization authority. Faced with some critical shortages, DOD changed a number of its personnel policies to increase force availability. However, these changes addressed immediate needs and did not take place within a strategic framework that linked human capital goals with DOD's organizational goals to fight the Global War on Terrorism. DOD was also considering a change in its implementation of the partial mobilization authority that would have expanded its pool of available personnel. This policy revision would have authorized mobilizations of up to 24 consecutive months without limiting the number of times personnel could be mobilized, and thus provide an essentially unlimited flow of forces. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it would retain its current cumulative approach, but DOD did not elaborate in its comments on how it expected to address its increased personnel requirements. The Army was not able to efficiently execute its mobilization and demobilization plans, because the plans contained outdated assumptions concerning the availability of facilities and support personnel. For example, plans assumed that active forces would be deployed abroad, thus vacating facilities when reserves were mobilizing and demobilizing but reserve forces were used earlier and active forces had often not vacated the facilities. As a result, some units were diverted away from their planned mobilization sites, and disparities in housing accommodations existed between active and reserve forces. Efficiency was also lost when short notice hampered coordination efforts among planners, support personnel, and mobilizing or demobilizing reserve forces. To address shortages in housing and other facilities, the Army has embarked on several construction and renovation projects without updating its planning assumptions regarding the availability of facilities. As a result, the Army risks spending money inefficiently on projects that may not be located where the need is greatest. Further, the Army has not taken a coordinated approach evaluating all the support costs associated with mobilization and demobilization at alternative sites in order to determine the most efficient options for the Global War on Terrorism. DOD's ability to effectively manage the health status of its reserve forces is limited because its centralized database has missing and incomplete health records and it has not maintained full visibility over reserve component members with medical problems. For example, the Marine Corps did not send pre-deployment health assessments to DOD's database as required, due to unclear guidance and a lack of compliance monitoring. The Air Force has visibility of involuntarily mobilized members with health problems, but lacks visibility of members with health problems who are on voluntary orders. As a result, some personnel had medical problems that had not been resolved for up to 18 months, but the full extent of this situation is unknown.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) currently cannot meet its global  commitments without sizeable participation from among its 1.2 million  National Guard and Reserve members. Since September 11, 2001, more  than 335,000 of DOD’s reserve component members have been  involuntarily called to active duty—almost 234,000 from the Army, almost  56,000 from the Air Force, over 24,000 from the Marine Corps and over  21,000 from the Navy. Furthermore, thousands of reserve component  members have volunteered for extended periods of active duty service,  according to DOD officials. During this period, the Army has had more  reserve component members mobilized than all the other services  combined. Much of the Army’s reserve component force has been  organized, trained, and resourced as a strategic reserve that would receive  personnel, training, and equipment as a later-deploying reserve force  rather than an operational force designed for continued overseas  deployments.
Reserve component members have been deployed around the world; some  helping to maintain peace and security at home while others serve on the  front lines in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans. According to DOD  figures, over 195,000 of the mobilized reserve component members had  been demobilized as of April 7, 2004. Since the pace of reserve operations  is expected to remain high due to the Global War on Terrorism stretching  indefinitely into the future, it is critical that the services mobilize and  demobilize their reserve forces as efficiently as possible. Furthermore,  DOD has recognized that the treatment of these servicemembers is one of  the keys to the retention of a quality force. In addition, the health and  treatment of Guard and Reserve members when mobilized have been the  subject of recent media reports and congressional hearings. Health data  are important to determine reservists’ deployability and to identify health  trends for servicemembers, which could assist in the early identification of  the causes of potential post-deployment health problems.
This is the second and final report responding to your Subcommittee’s  request that we review a wide range of issues related to mobilizations and  demobilizations. Our first report, issued in August 2003, focused on  reserve mobilization issues, including the mobilization approval process,  visibility over the process, and DOD’s limited use of the Individual Ready  Reserve. As agreed with your offices, this review specifically examined  the extent to which (1) DOD’s implementation of a key mobilization  authority to involuntarily call up reserve component members and DOD’s  personnel polices affect reserve component force availability, (2) the Army  was able to efficiently execute its mobilization and demobilization plans,  and (3) DOD can effectively manage the health status of its mobilized  reserve component members.
In addressing our objectives, we reviewed policies from the services and  the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in light of the various  mobilization authorities that are available to DOD and planned  deployment rotations. We also visited sites where the services conduct  mobilization and demobilization processing and interviewed responsible  officials at those sites. Although we visited sites for all the services, we  focused our review primarily on the Army’s mobilization and  demobilization processes, since more personnel from the Army have been  and are expected to be mobilized than from all the other services  combined. We analyzed personnel and facility data obtained during the  site visits and held meetings with military and civilian officials from OSD,  the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service headquarters, reserve component  headquarters, and support agencies. In addition, we examined the  collection and processing of pre- and post-deployment health assessment  information, and spoke to officials responsible for collecting and  reviewing health assessment information at the mobilization and  demobilization sites we visited. We also interviewed the officer in charge  of the organization responsible for maintaining DOD’s centralized health  assessment database, and obtained and analyzed information from the  database containing the health assessments of over 290,000 reserve  component members who were mobilized or demobilized from November  2001 through March 2004. We also interviewed reserve component  members with medical problems at the mobilization and demobilization  sites we visited, and interviewed hospital commanders and their staffs,  case managers and medical liaison officers, and officials from the service  Surgeons General offices. Finally, we tracked and analyzed trends in  service data concerning the numbers of personnel with medical problems,  their locations, and the elapsed time since they had been diagnosed with  their medical problems. Based on our review of databases we used, we  determined that the DOD-provided data were reliable for the purposes of  this report. We conducted our review from November 2003 through July  2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. A more thorough description of our scope and methodology is  provided in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing personnel and  equipment, activating or federalizing units and members of the National  Guard and Reserves for active duty, and bringing the armed forces to a  state of readiness for war or other national emergency. It is a complex  undertaking that requires constant and precise coordination between a  number of commands and officials. Mobilization usually begins when the  President invokes a mobilization authority and ends with the voluntary or  involuntary mobilization of an individual Reserve or National Guard  member. Demobilization is the process necessary to release from active  duty units and members of the National Guard and Reserve components  who were ordered to active duty under various legislative authorities.
Mobilization and demobilization times can vary from a matter of hours to  months depending on a number of factors. For example, many air reserve  component units are required to be available to mobilize within 72 hours  while Army National Guard brigades may require months of training as  part of their mobilizations. Reserve component members’ usage of accrued  leave can greatly affect demobilization times. Actual demobilization  processing typically takes a matter of days once the member arrives back  in the United States. However, since members earn 30 days of leave each  year, they could have up to 60 days of leave available to them at the end of  a 2-year mobilization.
subsections: section_title: Reserve Components and Categories
paragraphs: DOD has six reserve components: the Army Reserve, the Army National  Guard, the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Naval Reserve,  and the Marine Corps Reserve. Reserve forces can be divided into three  major categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired  Reserve. The Ready Reserve had approximately 1.2 million National Guard  and Reserve members at the end of fiscal year 2003, and its members were  the only reservists who were subject to involuntary mobilization under the  partial mobilization declared by President Bush on September 14, 2001.  Within the Ready Reserve, there are three subcategories: the Selected  Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the Inactive National  Guard. Members of all three subcategories are subject to mobilization  under a partial mobilization.
At the end of fiscal year 2003, DOD had 875,072 Selected Reserve  members. The Selected Reserve’s members included individual  mobilization augmentees—individuals who train regularly, for pay,  with active component units—as well as members who participate in  regular training as members of National Guard or Reserve units.
At the end of fiscal year 2003, DOD had 274,199 IRR members. During a  partial mobilization, these individuals—who were previously trained  during periods of active duty service—can be mobilized to fill  requirements. Each year, the services transfer thousands of personnel  who have completed the active duty or Selected Reserve portions of  their military contracts, but who have not reached the end of their  military service obligations, to the IRR. However, IRR members do not  participate in any regularly scheduled training, and they are not paid  for their membership in the IRR.
At the end of fiscal year 2003, the Inactive National Guard had 2,138  Army National Guard members. This subcategory contains individuals  who are temporarily unable to participate in regular training but who  wish to remain attached to their National Guard unit.
Appendix II contains additional information about end strengths within  the various reserve components and different categories.
section_title: Mobilization Authorities
paragraphs: Most reservists who were called to active duty for other than normal  training after September 11, 2001, were mobilized under one of the three  legislative authorities listed in table 1.
On September 14, 2001, President Bush declared that a national emergency  existed as a result of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York  City, New York, and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and he invoked 10  U.S.C. § 12302, which is commonly referred to as the “partial mobilization  authority.” On September 20, 2001, DOD issued mobilization guidance that,  among a host of other things, directed the services as a matter of policy to  specify in initial orders to Ready Reserve members that the period of  active duty service under 10 U.S.C. § 12302 would not exceed 12 months.  However, the guidance allowed the service secretaries to extend orders  for an additional 12 months or remobilize reserve component members  under the partial mobilization authority as long as an individual member’s  cumulative service did not exceed 24 months under 10 U.S.C. § 12302. It  further specified that “No member of the Ready Reserve called to  involuntary active duty under 10 U.S.C. 12302 in support of the effective  conduct of operations in response to the World Trade Center and  Pentagon attacks, shall serve on active duty in excess of 24 months under  that authority, including travel time to return the member to the residence  from which he or she left when called to active duty and use of accrued  leave.” The guidance also allowed the services to retain members on active  duty after they had served 24 or fewer months under 10 U.S.C. § 12302  with the member’s consent if additional orders were authorized under 10  U.S.C. § 12301(d).
section_title: Mobilization and Demobilization Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: Combatant commanders are principally responsible for the preparation  and implementation of operation plans that specify the necessary level of  mobilization of reserve component forces. The military services are the  primary executors of mobilization. At the direction of the Secretary of  Defense, the services prepare detailed mobilization plans to support the  operation plans and provide forces and logistical support to the combatant  commanders.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, who reports to the  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, is to provide  policy, programs, and guidance for the mobilization and demobilization of  the reserve components. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after  coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,  the secretaries of the military departments, and the commanders of the  Unified Combatant Commands, is to advise the Secretary of Defense on  the need to augment the active forces with members of the reserve  components. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also has  responsibility for recommending the period of service for units and  members of the reserve components ordered to active duty. The service  secretaries are to prepare plans for mobilization and demobilization and to  periodically review and test the plans to ensure the services’ capabilities to  mobilize reserve forces and to assimilate them effectively into the active  forces.
section_title: Reserve Component Approaches to Mobilization and Demobilization
paragraphs: Within the constraints of the existing mobilization authorities and DOD  guidance, the services have flexibility as to how, where, and when they  conduct mobilization and demobilization processing. Unit readiness also  affects time frames. For example, air reserve component units, which  must be ready to deploy on short notice, generally complete their  mobilization processing much quicker than Army units that have been  funded at low levels under the Army’s tiered readiness concept. However,  higher-priority units may take longer to complete demobilization  processing because, at the end of the processing, they must be ready to  deploy on short notice again.
The reserve components differ in their approaches to the mobilization and  demobilization processes. The Army and Navy use centralized approaches,  mobilizing and demobilizing their reserve component forces at a limited  number of locations. The Army utilizes 15 primary sites that it labels  “power projection platforms” and 12 secondary sites called “power  support platforms.” The Navy has 15 geographically dispersed Navy  Mobilization Processing Sites but is currently using only 5 of these sites  because of the relatively small numbers of personnel who are mobilizing  and demobilizing.
By contrast, the Air Force uses a decentralized approach, mobilizing and  demobilizing its reserve component members at their home stations—135  for the Air Force Reserve and 90 for the Air National Guard. The Marine  Corps uses a hybrid approach. It has five Mobilization Processing Centers  to centrally mobilize individual reservists and is currently using three of  these centers. However, the Marine Corps uses a decentralized approach  to mobilize its units. Selected Marine Corps Reserve units do most of their  mobilization processing at their home stations and then report to their  gaining commands, such as the First or Second Marine Expeditionary  Force located at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune, respectively.  Individuals usually demobilize at the same location where they mobilized  and units generally demobilize at Camp Pendleton or Camp Lejeune. See  appendix III for a listing of the services’ mobilization and demobilization  sites.
section_title: Service Usage of the Reserve Component since September 11, 2001
paragraphs: Figure 1 shows reserve component usage on a per capita basis since fiscal  year 1989 and demonstrates the dramatic increase in usage that occurred  after September 11, 2001. It shows that the ongoing usage—which includes  support to operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi  Freedom—exceeds the usage rates during the 1991 Persian Gulf War in  both length and magnitude.
While reserve component usage increased significantly after September  11, 2001, an equally important shift occurred at the end of 2002. Following  the events of September 11, 2001, the Air Force initially used the partial  mobilization authority more than the other services. However, service  usage shifted in 2002, and by the end of that year, the Army had more  reserve component members mobilized than all the other services  combined. Since that time, usage of the Army’s reserve component  members has continued to dominate DOD’s figures. On June 30, 2004, the  Army had about 131,000 reserve component members mobilized while the  Air Force had about 12,000, the Marine Corps about 9,000, and the Navy  about 3,000.
Under the current partial mobilization authority, DOD increased not only  the numbers of reserve component members that it mobilized, but also the  length of the members’ mobilizations. The average mobilization for  Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-91 was 156 days.  However, by December 31, 2003, the average mobilization for operations  Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom was 319 days, or  double the length of mobilizations for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. By  March 31, 2004, the average mobilization for the three ongoing operations  had increased to 342 days, and that figure is expected to continue to rise.
section_title: DOD’s Management of Reserve Component Health Issues
paragraphs: Section 1074f of Title 10, United States Code required that the Secretary of  Defense establish a system to assess the medical condition of members of  the armed forces (including members of the reserve components) who are  deployed outside of the United States, its territories, or its possessions as  part of a contingency operation or combat operation. It further required  that records be maintained in a centralized location to improve future  access to records and that the Secretary establish a quality assurance  program to evaluate the success of the system in ensuring that members  receive pre- and post-deployment medical examinations and that  recordkeeping requirements are met.
DOD policy requires that the services collect pre- and post-deployment  health information from their members and submit copies of the forms  that are used to collect this information to the Army Medical Surveillance  Activity (AMSA). Initially, deployment health assessments were required  for all active and reserve component personnel who were on troop  movements resulting from deployment orders of 30 continuous days or  greater to land-based locations outside the United States that did not have  permanent U.S. military medical treatment facilities. However, on October  25, 2001, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs updated  DOD’s policy and required deployment-related health assessments for all  reserve component personnel called to active duty for 30 days or more.  The policy specifically stated that the assessments were to be done  whether or not the personnel were deploying outside the United States.  Both assessments use a questionnaire designed to help military health care  providers in identifying health problems and providing needed medical  care. The pre-deployment health assessment is generally administered at  the service mobilization site or unit home station before deployment, and  the post-deployment health assessment is completed either in theater  before redeployment to the servicemember’s home unit or shortly after  redeployment.
On February 1, 2002, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued  updated deployment health surveillance procedures. Among other things,  these procedures specified that servicemembers must complete or  revalidate the health assessment within 30 days prior to deployment. The  procedures also stated that the original completed health assessment  forms were to be placed in the servicemember’s permanent medical record  and a copy “immediately forwarded to AMSA.”
Both the pre- and the post-deployment assessments were originally two- page forms, but on April 22, 2003, the post-deployment assessment was  expanded to four pages “in response to national interest in the health of  deployed personnel, combined with the timing and scope of current  deployments.” Both forms include demographic information about the  servicemember, member-provided information about the member’s  general health, and information about referrals that are issued when  service medical providers review the health assessments. The pre- deployment assessment also includes a final medical disposition that  shows whether the member was deployable or not, and the post- deployment assessment contains additional information about the location  where the member was deployed and things that the member might have  been exposed to during the deployment. Compared with the two-page  post-deployment form, the four-page form captures more-detailed  information on deployment locations, potentially hazardous exposures,  and medical symptoms the servicemember might have experienced. It also  asks a number of mental health questions. Examples of the forms can be  found in appendix V.
section_title: GAO’s Prior Report on DOD’s Mobilization Process
paragraphs: Our August 2003 report found the following:    DOD’s process to mobilize reservists after September 11, 2001, had to  be modified and contained numerous inefficiencies.
DOD did not have visibility over the entire mobilization process  primarily because it lacked adequate systems for tracking personnel  and other resources.
The services have used two primary approaches—predictable  operating cycles and formal advance notification—to provide time for  units and personnel to prepare for mobilizations and deployments.
Mobilizations were hampered because one-quarter of the Ready  Reserve was not readily available for mobilization or deployment. Over  70,000 reservists could not be mobilized because they had not  completed training requirements, and the services lacked information  needed to fully use the 300,000 previously trained IRR members.
We made a number of recommendations in our report to enhance the  efficiency of DOD’s reserve component mobilizations. DOD generally  concurred with the recommendations and has mobilization reengineering  efforts under way to make the process more efficient. The Army has also  taken steps to improve the information it maintains on IRR members.
section_title: Availability of Reserves Is Greatly Influenced by Mobilization Authorities and Personnel Policies
paragraphs: The availability of reserve component forces to meet future requirements  is greatly influenced by DOD’s implementation of the partial mobilization  authority and by the department’s personnel policies. Furthermore, many  of DOD’s policies that affect mobilized reserve component personnel were  implemented in a piecemeal manner, and were focused on the short-term  needs of the services and reserve component members rather than on  long-term requirements and predictability. The availability of reserve  component forces will continue to play an important role in the success of  DOD’s missions because requirements that increased significantly after  September 11, 2001, are expected to remain high for the foreseeable  future. As a result, there are early indicators that DOD may have trouble  meeting predictable troop deployment and recruiting goals for some  reserve components and occupational specialties.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Recent Use of Mobilization Authorities
paragraphs: On September 14, 2001, DOD broke with its previous pattern of invoking  successive authorities by invoking a partial mobilization authority without  a prior Presidential Reserve call-up. In addition, DOD was considering a  change in its implementation of the partial mobilization authority. The  manner in which DOD implements the mobilization authorities currently  available can result in either an essentially unlimited supply of forces or  running out of forces available for deployment, at least in the short term.
While DOD has consistently used two mobilization authorities to gain  involuntary access to its reserve component forces since 1990, the  methods of using the authorities has not remained constant. On August 22,  1990, the President invoked Title 10 U.S.C. Section 673b, allowing DOD to  mobilize Selected Reserve members for Operation Desert Shield. The  provision was then commonly referred to as the Presidential Selected  Reserve Call-up authority and is now called the Presidential Reserve Call- up authority. This authority limits involuntary mobilizations to not more  than 200,000 reserve component members at any one time, for not more  than 270 days, for any operational mission. On January 18, 1991, the  President invoked Title 10 U.S.C. Section 673, commonly referred to as the  “partial mobilization authority,” thus providing DOD with additional  authority to respond to the continued threat posed by Iraq’s invasion of  Kuwait. The partial mobilization authority limits involuntary  mobilizations to not more than 1 million reserve component members at  any one time, for not more than 24 consecutive months, during a time of  national emergency. During the years between Operation Desert Shield  and September 11, 2001, DOD invoked a number of separate mission- specific Presidential Reserve Call-ups for operations in Bosnia, Kosovo,  Southwest Asia, and Haiti. The department did not seek a partial  mobilization authority for any of these operations, and it continued to  view the partial mobilization authority as the second step in a series of  progressive measures to address escalating requirements during a time of  national emergency.
Unlike the progressive use of mobilization authorities following Iraq’s 1990  invasion of Kuwait, after the events of September 11, 2001, the President  invoked the partial mobilization authority without a prior Presidential  Reserve Call-up. Since the partial mobilization for the Global War on  Terrorism went into effect in 2001, DOD has used both the partial  mobilization authority and the Presidential Reserve Call-up authority to  involuntarily mobilize reserve component members for operations in the  Balkans.
The manner in which DOD implements the partial mobilization authority  affects the number of reserve component forces available for deployment.  When DOD issued its initial guidance concerning the partial mobilization  authority in 2001, it limited mobilization orders to 12 months but allowed  the service secretaries to extend the orders for an additional 12 months or  remobilize reserve component members, as long as an individual  member’s cumulative service under the partial mobilization authority did  not exceed 24 months. Under this cumulative implementation approach, it  is possible for DOD to run out of forces during an extended conflict such  as the long-term Global War on Terrorism. During our review, DOD was  already facing some critical personnel shortages. To expand its pool of  available personnel, DOD was considering a policy shift that would have  authorized mobilizations of up to 24 consecutive months under the partial  mobilization authority with no limit on cumulative months. Under the  considered approach, DOD would have been able to mobilize its forces for  less than 24 months; send them home; and then remobilize them, repeating  this cycle indefinitely and providing essentially an unlimited flow of  forces.
section_title: Piecemeal Policies Did Not Address Long-term Requirements or Predictability
paragraphs: Many of DOD’s policies that affect mobilized reserve component  personnel were implemented in a piecemeal manner and were not linked  within the context of a strategic framework to meet the organizational  goals. Overall, the policies reflected DOD’s past use of the reserve  components as a strategic force rather than DOD’s current use of the  reserve component as an operational force to respond to the increased  requirements of the Global War on Terrorism. Faced with some critical  shortages, the policies focused on the short-term needs of the services and  reserve component members rather than on long-term requirements and  predictability. This approach was necessary because the department had  not developed a strategic framework that identified DOD’s human capital  goals necessary to meet organizational requirements. Without a strategic  framework, OSD and the services made several changes to their personnel  policies to increase the availability of the reserve components for the  longer-term requirements of the Global War on Terrorism, and  predictability declined for reserve component members. Specifically,  reserve component members have faced uncertainties concerning the  likelihood of their mobilizations, the length of their service commitments,  the length of their overseas rotations, and the types of missions that they  would be asked to perform.
subsections: section_title: Volunteer and Individual Ready Reserve Policies
paragraphs: The partial mobilization authority allows DOD to involuntarily mobilize  members of the Ready Reserve, including the IRR; but after the President  invoked the partial mobilization authority on September 14, 2001, DOD  and service policies encouraged the use of volunteers and generally  discouraged the involuntary mobilization of IRR members. DOD officials  said that they could meet requirements without using the IRR and stated  that they wanted to focus involuntary mobilizations on the paid, rather  than unpaid members, of the reserve components. However, our August  2003 report documented the lack of predictability that resulted from the  volunteer and IRR policies. These policies were disruptive to the integrity  of Army units because there was a steady flow of personnel among units.  Personnel were transferred from nonmobilizing units to mobilizing units  that were short of personnel, and when the units that had supplied the  personnel were later mobilized, they in turn were short of personnel and  had to draw personnel from still other units. Despite the DOD and Army  reluctance to use the IRR, the Chief of the Army Reserve has advocated  using the IRR to cut down on the disruptive cross-leveling and individual  mobilizations that have been breaking Army units. From September 11,  2001 to May 15, 2004, the Army Reserve mobilized 110,000 of its reservists,  but more than 27,000 of these reservists were cross-leveled and mobilized  with units that they did not normally train with. Furthermore, because the  IRR makes up almost one-quarter of the Ready Reserve, policies that  discourage the use of the IRR will cause members of the Selected Reserve  to share greater exposures to the hazards associated with national security  and military requirements. Moreover, policies that discourage the use of  the IRR could cause DOD’s pool of available reserve component personnel  to shrink by more than 200,000 personnel.
Since our August 2003 report, Navy and Air Force officials have stated that  they still have not involuntarily mobilized any members of their IRRs. In  our August 2003 report, we noted that the Air Force’s reluctance to use  any of its more than 44,000 IRR members resulted in unfilled requirements  for more than 9,000 personnel to guard Air Force bases. However, the  Army National Guard agreed to provide personnel from its Selected  Reserve units to fill these requirements. Faced with critical personnel  shortages, the Army recently changed its policy and now plans to make  limited use of its IRR. To date, the Marine Corps has made the most  extensive use of its IRR, capitalizing on the willingness of many members  to voluntarily return to active duty.
section_title: Stop-Loss Policies
paragraphs: At various times since September 2001, all of the services have had “stop-  loss” policies in effect. These policies are short-term measures that  increase the availability of reserve component forces while decreasing  predictability for reserve component members who are prevented from  leaving the service at the end of their enlistment periods. Stop-loss policies  are often implemented to retain personnel in critical or high-use  occupational specialties. Appendix VI contains a summary of the services’  stop-loss policies that have been in effect since September 2001.
The only stop-loss policy in effect when we ended our review was an Army  policy that applied to units rather than individuals in critical occupations.
Under that policy, Army reserve component personnel were not permitted  to leave the service from the time their unit was alerted until 90 days after  the date when their unit was demobilized. Because many Army units  undergo several months of training after being mobilized but before being  deployed overseas for 12 months, stop-loss periods can reach 2 years or  more.
According to Army officials, a substantial number of reserve component  members have been affected by the changing stop-loss policies. As of June  30, 2004, the Army had over 130,000 reserve component members  mobilized and thousands more alerted or demobilized less than 90 days.  Because they have remaining service obligations, many of these reserve  component members would not have been eligible to leave the Army even  if stop-loss policies had not been in effect. However, from fiscal year 1993  through fiscal year 2001, Army National Guard annual attrition rates  exceeded 16 percent and Army Reserve rates exceeded 25 percent. Even a  16 percent attrition rate means that 20,800 of the mobilized 130,000 reserve  component soldiers would have left their reserve component each year. If  attrition rates exceed 16 percent or the thousands of personnel who are  alerted or who have been demobilized for less than 90 days are included,  the numbers of personnel affected by stop-loss policies would increase  even more. When the Army’s stop-loss policies are eventually lifted,  thousands of servicemembers could retire or leave the service all at once  and the Army’s reserve components could be confronted with a huge  increase in recruiting requirements.
section_title: Mobilization and Rotation Policies
paragraphs: Following DOD’s issuance of guidance concerning the length of  mobilizations in September 2001, the services initially limited most  mobilizations to 12 months, and most services maintained their existing  operational rotation policies to provide deployments of a predictable  length that are preceded and followed by standard maintenance and  training periods. However, the Air Force and the Army later increased the  length of their rotations, and the Army increased the length of its  mobilizations as well. These increases in the length of mobilizations and  rotations increased the availability of reserve component forces but  decreased predictability for individual reserve component members who  were mobilized and deployed under one set of policies but later extended  as a result of the policy changes.
The Air Force’s operational concept prior to September 2001, was based  on a rotation policy that made reserve component forces available for 3  out of every 15 months. After September 2001, the Air Force was not able  to solely rely on its normal rotations and had to involuntarily mobilize  large numbers of reserve component personnel. From September 11, 2001,  to March 31, 2004, the Air National Guard mobilized more than 31,000  personnel, and the Air Force Reserve mobilized more than 24,000  personnel. Although most Air Force mobilizations were for 12 months or  less, more than 10,000 air reserve component members had their  mobilization orders extended to 24 months. Most of these personnel were  in security-related occupations. Since September 2001, the Air Force has  not been able to return to its normal operating cycle, and in June 2004, the  Air Force Chief of Staff announced that Air Force rotations would be  increased to 4 months beginning in September 2004.
Before September 2001, the Army mobilized its reserve component forces  for up to 270 days under the Presidential Reserve Call-up authority, and it  deployed these troops overseas for rotations that lasted about 6 months.  When it began mobilizing forces under the partial mobilization authority in  September 2001, the Army generally mobilized troops for 12 months.  However, troops that were headed for duty in the Balkans continued to be  mobilized under the Presidential Reserve Call-up authority. When  worldwide requirements for both active and reserve component Army  troops increased, the Army changed its Balkan rotation schedules. These  schedules had been published years in advance to allow poorly resourced  Guard and Reserve units time to train and prepare for the deployments. As  a result of the changed schedules, some reserve component units did not  have adequate time to prepare and train for Balkan rotations and then  deploy for 6 months and still remain with the 270-day limit of the  Presidential Reserve Call-up authority. Therefore, the Army mobilized  some reserve component units under the partial mobilization authority so  that they could undergo longer training periods prior to deploying for 6  months under the Presidential Reserve Call-up authority. The Army’s  initial deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan were scheduled for 6 months,  just like the overseas rotations for the Balkans. Eventually, the Army  increased the length of its rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan to 12 months.  This increased the availability of reserve component forces, but it  decreased predictability for members who were mobilized and deployed  during the transition period when the policy changed. Because overseas  rotations were extended to 12 months and mobilization periods must  include mobilization and demobilization processing time, training time,  and time for the reserve component members to take any leave that they  earn, the change in rotation policy required a corresponding increase in  the length of mobilizations.
section_title: Cross-Training Policies
paragraphs: DOD has a number of training initiatives underway that will increase the  availability of its reserve component forces to meet immediate needs.  Servicemembers are receiving limited training—called “cross-training”— that enables them to perform missions that are outside their area of  expertise. In the Army, field artillery and air defense artillery units have  been trained to perform some military police duties. Air Force and Navy  personnel received additional training and are providing the Army with  additional transportation assets. DOD also has plans to permanently  convert thousands of positions from low-use career fields to stressed  career fields.
section_title: Early Indications That DOD May Have Trouble Meeting Its Rotation and Recruiting Goals Exist
paragraphs: While it remains to be seen how the uncertainty resulting from changing  personnel policies will affect recruiting, retention, and the long-term  viability of the reserve components, there are already indications that  some portions of the force are being stressed. For example, the Army  National Guard failed to meet its recruiting goal during 14 of 20 months  and ended fiscal year 2003 approximately 7,800 soldiers below its  recruiting goal. (Appendix VII contains additional information about  reserve component recruiting results.)
The Secretary of Defense established a force-planning metric to limit  involuntary mobilizations to “reasonable and sustainable rates” and has set  the metric for such mobilizations at 1 year out of every 6. However, on the  basis of current and projected usage, it appears that DOD may face  difficulties achieving its goal within the Army’s reserve components in the  near term. Since February 2003, the Army has continuously had between  20 and 29 percent of its Selected Reserve members mobilized. To  illustrate, even if the Army were to maintain the lower 20 percent  mobilization rate for Selected Reserve members, it would need to mobilize  one-fifth of its selected reserve members each year. DOD is aware that  certain portions of the force are used much more highly than others, and it  plans to address some of the imbalances by converting thousands of  positions from lower- demand specialties into higher-demand specialties.  However, these conversions will take place over several years and even  when the positions are converted, it may take some time to recruit and  train people for the new positions.
section_title: DOD Plans to Address Increased Personnel Requirements Are Unclear
paragraphs: It is unclear how DOD plans to address its longer-term personnel  requirements for the Global War on Terrorism, given its current  implementation of the partial mobilization authority. Requirements for  reserve component forces increased dramatically after September 11,  2001, and are expected to remain high for the foreseeable future. In the  initial months following September 11, 2001, the Air Force used the partial  mobilization authority more than the other services, and it reached its  peak with almost 38,000 reserve component members mobilized in April  2002. However, by July 2002, Army mobilizations surpassed those of the  Air Force, and since December 2002, the Army has had more reserve  component members mobilized than all the other services combined.  Although many of the members who have been called to active duty under  the partial mobilization authority have been demobilized, as of March 31,  2004, approximately 175,000 of DOD’s reserve component members were  still mobilized and serving on active duty. According to OASD/RA data,  about 40 percent of DOD’s Selected Reserve forces had been mobilized  from September 11, 2001, to March 31, 2004.
By June 30, 2004, the number of mobilized reserve component members  had dropped to about 155,000—consisting of about 131,000 members from  the Army, about 12,000 from the Air Force, about 9,000 from the Marine  Corps, and about 3,000 from the Navy. However, the number of mobilized  reserve component forces is projected to remain high for the foreseeable  future. DOD projects that over the next 3 to 5 years, it will continuously  have 100,000 to about 150,000 reserve component members mobilized, and  the Army National Guard and Army Reserve will continue to supply most  of these personnel.
While Army forces may face the greatest levels of involuntary  mobilizations over the next few years, all the reserve components have  career fields that have been highly stressed. For example, the Navy and  Marine Corps have mobilized 60 and 100 percent of their enlisted law  enforcement specialists and 48 and 100 percent of their intelligence  officers, respectively. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve  mobilized 64 and 93 percent of their enlisted law enforcement specialists  and 71 and 86 percent of their installation security personnel, respectively.
As noted earlier, during our review, DOD was considering changing its  implementation of the partial mobilization authority from its current  approach, which limits mobilizations to 24 cumulative months, to an  approach that would have limited mobilizations to 24 consecutive  months to expand its pool of available personnel. However, in  commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it would retain  its current cumulative implementation approach. Policies that limit  involuntary mobilizations on the basis of cumulative service make it  difficult for mobilization planners, who must keep track of prior  mobilizations in order to determine which forces are available to meet  future requirements. This can be particularly difficult now, when many  mobilizations involve individuals or small detachments rather than  complete units.
In June 2004, DOD noted that about 30,000 reserve members had  already been mobilized for 24 months. Under DOD’s cumulative  approach, these personnel will not be available to meet future  requirements. The shrinking pool of available personnel, along with the  lack of a strategic plan to clarify goals regarding the reserve  component force’s availability, will present the department with  additional short- and long-term challenges as it tries to fill requirements  for mobilized reserve component forces. In its comments on a draft of  our report, DOD did not elaborate on how it expected to address its  increased personnel requirements.
section_title: The Army Was Not Able to Efficiently Execute Its Mobilization and Demobilization Plans
paragraphs: The Army was not able to efficiently execute its mobilization and  demobilization plans, because mobilization and demobilization site  officials faced uncertainties concerning demands for facilities, turnover  among support personnel, and the arrival of reserve component forces.  The efficiency of the mobilization and demobilization process depends on  advanced planning and coordination. However, the Army’s planning  assumptions did not accurately portray the availability of installations and  personnel needed to fully accommodate the high number of mobilizations  and demobilizations. Moreover, officials did not always have adequate  notice to prepare for arriving troops. The Army has several initiatives  under way to improve facility and support personnel availability, but it has  not taken a coordinated approach to evaluate all the support costs  associated with mobilization and demobilization at alternative sites in  order to determine the most efficient options under the operating  environment for the Global War on Terrorism.
subsections: section_title: Advanced Planning and Coordination Are Key to Efficient Mobilizations and Demobilizations
paragraphs: The efficiency of the mobilization and demobilization processes depends  largely on advanced planning in the form of facility preparation and  coordination between installation planners, support personnel, and  arriving reserve component units or individuals. The Army attempts to  take the necessary planning steps to support efficient servicemember  mobilization and demobilization. For example, installations that are  responsible for mobilizing and demobilizing reserve component forces  attempt to contact units or personnel prior to their arrival, so that both the  reserve component forces and the supporting installations can be  prepared to meet the Army’s mobilization and demobilization  requirements. During these contacts, reserve component forces are told  what records, and equipment to bring to the mobilization and  demobilization sites and installation officials obtain information—such as  the number of arriving troops and the anticipated time of their arrival— that is necessary for them to efficiently prepare for the arrival of the  reserve component forces. With this information, the installations can plan  where they will house, feed, and train the troops; how they will transport  the troops around the installation and to their final destinations; and when  they will send the troops for medical and dental screenings and  administrative processing.
Army guidance, which states that units are to demobilize at the same  installation where they mobilized, can add to the efficiency of the  demobilization process. Efficiencies can be realized because many of  records created during the mobilization process or copies of the records  are kept at the installation and can be used to do advanced preparation  before the demobilizing unit arrives at the installation. Army officials told  us that since September 11, 2001, most units have demobilized at the same  installation where they mobilized, but there have been some exceptions.  For example, officials from the First U.S. Army told us that they had  mobilized a unit for Operation Iraqi Freedom at Fort Rucker, Alabama, and  were demobilizing the unit at Fort Benning, Georgia. They also told us that  troops who had mobilized at Fort Stewart, Georgia, were going to be  demobilizing at Fort Dix, New Jersey, after a deployment to Kosovo. To  accommodate shifts in demobilization sites, the new sites must, among  other things, obtain reserve component unit medical, dental, and  personnel records and must coordinate the return of individual equipment,  such as helmets, sleeping bags, packs, and canteens that were issued at  the original mobilization site. With adequate notice and planning,  alternate demobilization sites can demobilize reserve component units  without any major problems. However, officials at Fort Lewis,  Washington, told us that their support personnel had to reconstruct dental  records for 150 soldiers in an engineer unit that had originally mobilized at  Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Because the Army’s goal is to complete  demobilization processing within 5 days of a unit’s arrival at a  demobilization site, the Fort Lewis personnel were not able to wait for the  arrival of the dental records, which had been sent from Fort Leonard  Wood via routine mail rather than overnight delivery.
section_title: Army Planning Assumptions Were Not Accurate
paragraphs: The Army’s planning assumptions did not accurately portray the  availability of installations and personnel needed to fully accommodate  the high number of mobilizations and demobilizations. Specifically,  planning assumptions regarding the availability of facilities for  mobilization and demobilization were outdated, and did not anticipate the  availability of specially designed reserve component support units to  provide much of the medical, training, logistics, and processing support  needed to mobilize and demobilize reserve component units and  individuals.
subsections: section_title: Assumptions for Availability of Facilities Were Outdated
paragraphs: The Army’s planning assumptions regarding the availability of facilities for  mobilization and demobilization were outdated. Consequently,  installations sometimes lacked the support infrastructure needed to  accommodate both active and reserve component mobilizing and  demobilizing members in an equitable manner. The Army’s mobilization  and demobilization plans assumed that active forces would be deployed  abroad, thus vacating installations when reserve component forces were  mobilizing and often demobilizing. These assumptions are important  because they served as a basis to help the Army determine which  installations would have the necessary support facilities to serve as its  primary and secondary mobilization sites. Most of the Army’s primary  mobilization sites are installations that serve as home bases for large  active Army units. For example, three of the Army’s primary sites that we  visited—Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Stewart, Georgia; and Fort Hood,  Texas—are home to two active combat brigades, an active combat  division, and two active combat divisions, respectively, along with hosts of  other active forces. Fort Hood alone has about 42,000 active troops  assigned to the installation.
Under the Army’s plans, reserve component units were assigned  mobilization and demobilization sites so that units could plan in advance  for their mobilizations. Units often developed relationships with the  installations where they expected to mobilize and in many cases the units  trained at these installations. However, because active units had not  vacated many of the Army’s major mobilization sites as planned,  mobilizing reserve component forces were moved to sites where they had  not trained and where they had not developed any relationships that could  have increased the mobilizations’ efficiency. As a result, transportation  distances for personnel and equipment were increased, and extra  coordination was required with the mobilization sites and sometimes even  within units. For example, the 116th Cavalry Brigade from the Idaho Army  National Guard, which had planned to mobilize at Fort Lewis, Washington,  was mobilized at Fort Bliss, Texas, because, among other things, adequate  housing facilities were not available at Fort Lewis. Another Army National  Guard Brigade, which was mobilized at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, faced  increased coordination challenges because one of its battalions was  mobilized at Fort Drum, New York, and another at Fort Stewart, Georgia,  because of a lack of available facilities at Fort Bragg.
At mobilization and demobilization sites where active forces remained on  the installations while reserve component forces were mobilizing or  demobilizing, competing demands sometimes led to housing inequities for  the reserve members. For example, at the installations we visited, single  active component personnel who were permanently assigned to the  installation were generally housed in barracks where two to four people  shared a room, but mobilized reserve component personnel were often  housed in open-bay barracks. At some installations, reserve component  personnel were housed in tents, gymnasiums, or older buildings that were  designed for short training periods rather than mobilization periods that  could last several months. The presence of large active duty and reserve  contingents on the same installations at the same time also strained  training and medical facilities. Fort Hood officials said that the  scheduling and rescheduling of training ranges presented major challenges  during 2003 when the installation was preparing to deploy both its active  divisions and a large group of reserve component forces at the same time.  To address these facility challenges, the Army has begun a number of  housing and facility construction and renovation projects.
section_title: Assumptions Did Not Account for Long-term Needs for Reserve Component Support Personnel under a Partial Mobilization Authority
paragraphs: The Army did not anticipate that its reserve component units that support  mobilizations and demobilizations would be needed beyond 24 months  under a partial mobilization authority. When the Army created these units  to provide much of the medical, training, logistics, and processing support  to mobilizing and demobilizing units and individuals, it anticipated that the  need for these units would be commensurate with the mobilization  authority in place at the time. However, the Army is now facing support  requirements for a long-term Global War on Terrorism, while being limited  to involuntary mobilizations of not more than 24 cumulative months under  the department’s implementation of the partial mobilization authority.
The underlying assumptions of the Army’s mobilization and  demobilization plans were that (1) only a small portion of these reserve  component support personnel would be required to support the limited  mobilizations associated with a Presidential reserve call-up and (2) all of  the reserve component support personnel would be available for as long  as needed to support the large mobilizations for long periods that are  associated with full or total mobilizations. The Army’s plans called for  these support personnel to be among the first reserve component  members mobilized and the last demobilized. Army officials assumed that,  under a partial mobilization authority, these reserve component support  forces would be able to support large mobilizations and demobilizations,  or support mobilizations for long periods, but not large mobilizations for  long periods.
As a result of the large requirements for the Army’s reserve component  forces, many pieces of the reserve component support units were  mobilized for 12 months early in the Global War on Terrorism and then  later extended. Some support personnel were mobilized for 24 months  under the partial mobilization authority—which, under DOD’s current  implementation, limits involuntary mobilizations to 24 cumulative  months—and then sent home. However, many others agreed to stay on  active duty under voluntary mobilization orders after they had served 24  months under the partial mobilization authority. For example, from a 27- person support detachment that was mobilized for 12 months at Fort  Hood, in October 2001, 13 people were later extended for a full 2 years,  and 6 of these reserve component personnel accepted voluntary orders at  the end of their mobilizations. At Fort Lewis, two reserve component  support detachments—one with 59 personnel and the other with 17—were  mobilized in September 2001. Both detachments served on active duty for  2 full years. In July 2004, more than 1,100 reserve component support  personnel were on voluntary orders or mobilization extensions.
Even though some reserve component support personnel have voluntarily  extended their orders, the Army is facing a shortage of mobilization and  demobilization support personnel because the Global War on Terrorism is  lasting beyond the time when most reserve component support personnel  would reach their 24-month mobilization points. Consequently, the Army  has begun hiring civilian and contractor replacement personnel to provide  medical, training, logistics, and administrative support at its mobilization  and demobilization sites.
section_title: Installation Planning and Support Officials Sometimes Lacked Adequate Notice to Prepare for Arriving Troops
paragraphs: Planners and the installations that mobilize and demobilize reserve  component forces have not always had adequate notice to prepare for  arriving troops. Without advanced notice, officials at these sites are forced  to make last-minute adjustments that may result in the inefficient use of  installation facilities and support personnel. Our prior report highlighted  problems associated with the lack of advance notice in March 2003.  While officials at the installations we visited noted that the level of  advance notice had improved significantly for mobilizing troops, they still  faced some short-notice mobilizations. According to Army officials, the  Army is currently providing 30 days’ notice to all involuntarily mobilized  troops. However, as of May 2004 some units that are being mobilized  under the partial mobilization authority are still being mobilized with less  than 30 days advance notice. According to Army Reserve officials, each  member of these units signs a volunteer waiver stating that he or she  agrees to be mobilized with less than 30 days advance notice. Therefore,  the Army does not violate its policy concerning advance notice for  involuntary mobilizations.
Installation planning officials told us that they typically receive shorter  notice and less definitive information concerning the arrival of  demobilizing troops. Typically, when an installation mobilizes a reserve  component unit, the installation planner records the length of unit  mobilization orders. Depending on the length of unit mobilization orders  and the resulting time available for leave at the end of the orders,  installation planners begin to anticipate the return of the unit up to several  months before the unit’s orders expire. The planners said that they use a  variety of formal and informal means to try to ascertain the specific arrival  dates and times for demobilizing troops but that the arrival dates and  times are often uncertain right up until the time the troops arrive. This is  because their different sources of information sometimes provide  conflicting information.
The planners generally begin their search for information about units  returning to their installation using the automated systems within DOD’s  Joint Operations Planning and Execution System. A primary source of  information is the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).  Installation planning officials told us that the TPFDD is most valuable in  providing them with information on large units with orders that have not  changed and that return as complete units. However, the planners stated  that it is not uncommon for the TPFDD to be incorrect or outdated  because changes are constantly being made to redeployment schedules,  particularly for small units or individuals.
One source of such last-minute changes stems from changes in travel  arrangements. According to DOD officials, when there are empty seats  available on planes departing the theater of operations, small units are  often placed on the planes at the last minute to fill the empty seats.  However, these changes are not always captured in the TPFDD or DOD’s  other automated systems. For example, while we were visiting Fort Lewis,  planning officials were trying to determine which unit or units might be  returning to Fort Lewis to go through demobilization processing along  with the 502nd Transportation Company and 114th Chaplain detachment that  were scheduled to arrive on March 1, 2004. Neither the TPFDD nor the  other automated tracking systems that were available to planning officials  at Fort Lewis provided definitive answers. As a result of contacts through  informal channels, at 11:20 a.m. on March 1, 2004, Fort Lewis officials  thought that 21 people from the 854th Quartermaster Unit were going to  arrive at McChord Air Force Base—located adjacent to Fort Lewis, just  south of Tacoma, Washington—40 minutes later. Due to the lack of  reliable information, Fort Lewis officials could not finalize planning  arrangements. For example, because they did not know whether to expect  male or female soldiers, they could not finalize housing plans for the  soldiers. Nor did they know whether the unit was bringing weapons with  them or what types of weapons they might have, and thus transportation  personnel and personnel in the arms room at Fort Lewis were placed on  standby. A check with McChord officials at 11:50 a.m. revealed that there  were no inbound flights. At 3:53 p.m. Fort Lewis officials had confirmation  that the soldiers would be arriving at 9:35 p.m. and that there were 19  additional personnel from an unknown unit or units on the plane with the  21 soldiers from the 854th Quartermaster unit. By 4:12 p.m. on March 1,  2004, the Fort Lewis officials had canceled the scheduled demobilization  processing times for the 854th because information showed that the unit  would not arrive until 7:42 a.m. on the following day, March 2, 2004.  Planning officials had to make several other adjustments to planned  schedules before the Quartermaster unit finally arrived. Moreover, the  502nd Transportation Company and 114th Chaplain detachment, which had  been visible through DOD’s formal systems, also arrived later than the  expected March 1 date.
Sometimes, planning officials receive information from informal sources,  such as family members of deployed personnel. During our visit to Fort  Lewis, officials had begun tracking an inbound Army National Guard  military police unit on the basis of information received from an informal  information source. This unit became visible to the planning officials when  the wife of one of the soldiers, who also served as the unit’s family  readiness coordinator, notified the officials that her husband and 11 other  unit personnel had left Iraq, were in Germany, and were scheduled to fly to  Washington state on a commercial airliner the next day. The coordinator  also provided the Fort Lewis officials with the names and social security  numbers for all 12 returning soldiers. According to Fort Lewis officials, in  the past, 2 out of every 10 units have arrived at the site without  notification. The demobilization planning officials at Fort Lewis summed  up their visibility situation by stating, “Most valuable information on unit  redeployment is not official, rather it is word of mouth.”
Demobilization officials at other installations said that they also had good  visibility over large units that returned as planned but said that it was  difficult to plan for the arrival of small units and individuals. During our  visit to Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, 28 soldiers—a 9-soldier unit, and a 19- soldier unit—arrived at the site unexpectedly. In addition, officials at Fort  Hood said that they were able to track the evacuation of medical patients  from the theater to stabilization hospitals, such as the Walter Reed Army  Medical Center in Washington, D.C., or Brooke Army Medical Center in  Texas, but that they often lost visibility of the patients during the last leg  of their journey back to Fort Hood. They also said that visibility was  sometimes a problem for individual soldiers who had reached the end of  their enlistments or mobilization orders and were returning as individuals  on “freedom flights” because the automated tracking systems were  designed primarily to handle units and not individuals.
section_title: Army Facility Improvements Were Begun with Outdated Assumptions and Were Not Coordinated with Support Personnel Changes
paragraphs: Without updating its planning assumptions regarding the availability of  facilities for mobilization and demobilization, the Army has begun a  number of costly short- and long-term efforts to address facility and  support personnel shortfalls at individual mobilization and demobilization  sites. Furthermore, the Army has not taken a coordinated approach to  evaluate all the support costs associated with mobilization and  demobilization at alternative sites in order to determine the most efficient  options under the operating environment for the Global War on Terrorism.  The use of civilian and contractor personnel to provide mobilization and  demobilization support may not provide cost-effective alternatives to some  reserve component support personnel.
subsections: section_title: Facility Construction and Renovation Projects Are Not Based on Updated Planning Assumptions
paragraphs: To address housing and other facilities shortages at mobilization and  demobilization sites, the Army has embarked on a number of facility  construction and renovation projects without updating its planning  assumptions regarding the availability of facilities and personnel. As a  result, the Army risks spending money inefficiently on projects that may  not be located where the need is greatest. Until the Army updates its  planning assumptions, it cannot determine whether the current primary  and secondary mobilization sites are the best sites for future mobilizations  and demobilizations.
The Army has a variety of individual construction and renovation plans  under way. For example, Fort Hood has a $5.1 million project to renovate  its open-bay, cinder block barracks that have been used to house reserve  component soldiers at North Fort Hood. Fort Stewart has a similar project  under way to renovate National Guard barracks to current mobilization  standards. Fort Stewart has also submitted plans to build a new facility to  house its reserve component members with medical problems.
The Army also has developed a plan to construct several new buildings  that would be used to house active and reserve component soldiers who  are undergoing training. In addition, these facilities would be available for  use when reserve component units were mobilizing and demobilizing. This  project has not yet been funded or approved by Army leadership. However  possible sites for these buildings include Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort  Hood, Texas; Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Polk,  Louisiana; Fort Riley, Kansas; and Fort Stewart, Georgia. The construction  of some of these facilities could begin as early as 2006. However, a recent  GAO review found that DOD’s efforts to improve facility conditions are  likely to take longer than expected because of competing funding  pressures. The review also found that without periodic reassessments of  project prioritization, projects that are important to an installation’s ability  to accomplish its mission and improve servicemembers’ quality of life  could continually be deferred.
The Army also has plans to make greater use of one of its secondary  mobilization sites. The Army is planning to make greater use of Camp  Shelby, Mississippi, a secondary mobilization site that is owned by the  state of Mississippi. Because this site does not have active troops and has  a large housing capacity, the Army plans to use this site to relieve  immediate pressures on its primary mobilization sites. However, Camp  Shelby’s facilities are not new, and they are in need of repairs. Housing  units are made of cinder block, have no heating or air conditioning, and  were not designed for year-round accommodations. According to officials  from the U.S. Army Forces Command, Camp Shelby will require $22  million in federal funding for renovations.
section_title: Civilian and Contractor Personnel May Not Provide Cost-Effective Alternatives to Some Reserve Component Support Personnel
paragraphs: Key officials at the mobilization and demobilization sites we visited  expressed a number of concerns about the availability of civilian or  contractor personnel and the abilities of these personnel to provide  capable, flexible replacements for the reserve component support  personnel at a reasonable cost. In addition, the Army has not fully  analyzed the costs of hiring these civilian and contractor personnel at its  existing mobilization sites compared with the costs and feasibility of hiring  support personnel at an alternative set of mobilization and demobilization  sites.
At Fort Stewart, Georgia, officials said that there is a very small civilian  population in the area from which to draw replacement personnel. They  also noted that the rural nature of the area and lack of cultural amenities  makes it difficult to attract physicians and other highly paid specialists  who support the mobilization and demobilization process. Officials at Fort  Lewis had already replaced many of their medical support personnel at the  time of our visit but acknowledged that even with the large population of  the Seattle-Tacoma area to draw upon, they were still facing challenges in  the hiring of physician assistants and nurse practitioners. The commander  of the hospital at Fort Hood said that the hospital had issued a contract to  try to fill its nurse shortage, but the only result from the contract was that  civilian nurses at the hospital left the hospital to work for a contractor that  paid them more. Thus, the net result was that the hospital did not fill its  shortages, and it kept the same nurses but paid the contractor more for  their services.
Even when civilian or contractor personnel are available to replace  reserve component personnel, the replacements may not be able to  provide the same capability or flexibility as reserve component support  personnel. During our visit to Fort Hood, officials told us that over the past  10 years, the Army had repeatedly looked at the option of using civilian or  contractor medical evacuation teams to replace reserve component  support personnel. However, the option has not been adopted because the  civilians would not be able to fly into live-fire training areas or under  blackout conditions without costly Army flight training. Fort Lewis  officials raised similar concerns about the limited abilities of civilian  helicopter rescue teams during our prior review. In addition, officials at  mobilization and demobilization sites said that reserve component support  personnel provided them with great flexibility in dealing with the  unexpected arrival of mobilizing or demobilizing soldiers. Reserve  component personnel are technically available 24 hours per day, 7 days  per week. Therefore, processing could be scheduled for any hour and any  day without regard to overtime considerations. During our visits, we  observed several cases where civilian personnel left their processing sites  at the end of their scheduled workday but reserve component personnel  stayed until all processing was completed.
In addition to the civilian replacements for reserve component medical  support personnel, the Army is looking for replacements for the reserve  component personnel who performed administrative processing, logistic,  training, and other support functions within its garrison support units. The  Army’s Installation Management Agency (IMA) is working with the Army  Contracting Agency to develop short- and long-term replacement  solutions. The long-term solution is an “Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite  Quantity” contract that will allow installation commanders to place task  orders to hire or contract workers for particular support functions.  According to contracting officials, this contract will be awarded on or  about October 1, 2004. IMA is programmed to receive $238 million for this  contract in fiscal year 2005. By July 2004, IMA had received $56 million  and had allocated $48.4 million to 12 different mobilization sites to cover  the transition period until the long-term contract is in place. This interim  funding can be used to expand existing installation support contracts or to  hire temporary workers. In addition, the Army is also keeping over 1,100  reserve component members on active duty to help cover the transition  period.
section_title: Ability to Effectively Manage Health of Servicemembers Is Limited
paragraphs: DOD’s ability to effectively manage the health status of its reserve  component members is limited because (1) its centralized database has  missing and incomplete health records and (2) it has not maintained full  visibility over reserve component members with medical issues.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Centralized Database Has Missing and Incomplete Health Records
paragraphs: During our review of health data collected at AMSA, DOD’s central data  collection point, we found that the database had missing and incomplete  records. Not all of the required health information collected from reserve  component members had reached AMSA. Furthermore, only some of the  health assessment information that had reached AMSA had been entered  into the centralized database.
subsections: section_title: Required Health Assessments Have Not Reached DOD’s Assessment Collection Point
paragraphs: DOD policy guidance issued in October 2001 directed the services to  submit pre- and post-deployment health forms to AMSA, but not all of the  required health information collected from reserve component members  during their mobilization and demobilization processing has reached  DOD’s central collection activity at AMSA. Table 2 compares the number  of personnel who were mobilized from September 11, 2001, to March 30,  2004 with the number of pre-deployment health assessments submitted to  AMSA from November 1, 2001—the first month when health assessments  were required for all mobilizing and demobilizing reserve component  members—to March 31, 2004. The differences between the mobilization  numbers and the pre-deployment health assessment numbers provide  indications that assessment forms may be missing for members of all six  of DOD’s reserve components. However, because the mobilization and  health assessment data cover slightly different time periods and come  from different sources, we could not determine the exact extent of the  mismatch. When we investigated the cause of the large differences  between Marine Corps numbers, officials told us that the Marine Corps’  guidance did not require them to submit pre-deployment health  assessments to AMSA.
The officials cited guidance, in the form of two Marine Corps  administrative messages that directed responsible officials to submit post- deployment health assessments to AMSA. However, the administrative  messages neglect to direct the officials to submit pre-deployment health  assessments. Furthermore, no additional administrative messages have  addressed the requirement for pre-deployment assessments. As a result,  the AMSA database contained only 2,104 pre-deployment health  assessments but 11,499 post-deployment health assessments for Marine  Corps reservists.
Another possible reason why the Marine Corps has not submitted pre- deployment health assessments to AMSA is because the Marine Corps  lacks a mechanism for overseeing the submission of these forms. There is  no current Marine Corps requirement for tracking and reporting the  submission of theses forms in the Deployment Health Quality Assurance  program. In a March 12, 2004, memorandum to the Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Force Health Protection and Readiness, the  Marine Corps reported the number and percentage of post-deployment  health assessments that were completed but did not report any  information on pre-deployment assessments.
Officials at Camp Lejeune told us that they would begin submitting pre- deployment health assessments to AMSA after we raised the issue during a  site visit in 2004 and the issuance of subsequent Navy Department  guidance. Officials told us that the Marine Corps Medical Office had  drafted new guidance to address this requirement, but the guidance had  not been issued by the time we drafted our report in July 2004 and we  were not able to determine the cause of the delay or to verify that new  guidance would adequately address the submission of pre-deployment  health assessments.
Navy health assessment submissions to AMSA also appear to be  incomplete. According to Navy procedures, all mobilizing reservists are to  complete their pre-deployment health assessment at their local reserve  center before they report to their Navy Mobilization Processing Sites. In  such cases, the reserve center is required to send the reservists’ completed  pre-deployment health assessment forms to AMSA. Therefore, Navy data  collection is only done centrally at the Navy Mobilization Processing  Stations in limited cases when a reservist arrives without a completed pre- deployment health assessment. We did not visit any individual Navy  Reserve centers to verify the submission of pre-deployment health  assessments. We did review Navy Quality Assurance program guidance  and found that it does not address the submission of pre-deployment  health assessments. However, the guidance specifies that a 90 percent  submission rate is considered satisfactory for post-deployment health  assessments.
In September 2003, we reported similar findings for the active forces.  Specifically, we found that DOD did not maintain a complete, centralized  database of active servicemember health assessments and immunizations.  Following our 2003 review, DOD established a deployment health quality  assurance program to improve data collection and accuracy. The  department’s first annual report documenting issues relating to  deployment health assessments will not be available until February 2005,  and it is too early to determine the extent to which the new quality  assurance program will provide effective oversight to address data  submission problems from each of the services and their reserve  components.
While the services are not in complete compliance with the requirement to  submit pre- and post-deployment assessments to AMSA, the number of  assessments in the database has grown significantly. According to AMSA  officials, the database contained about 140,000 assessments at the end of  1999, and grew to about 1 million assessments by May 2003, and 1,960,125  by June 2004.
section_title: Data from Health Assessments Have Not Been Entered into DOD’s Centralized Database
paragraphs: Not all the records in the AMSA database contained complete information,  thus limiting the amount of meaningful analysis that can be conducted.  Health assessment database records sometimes did not include  information that could be used to identify the causes of various medical  problems. Nonetheless, the available data indicate that the overall pre- and  post-deployment health status of mobilized reserve component members  was good.
section_title: Some Database Records Missing Key Information
paragraphs: Records in the health assessment database sometimes did not include key  information or information that could be used to identify the causes of  various medical problems. For example, records were sometimes missing  information on the servicemember’s deployability and the specific types of  medical referrals that were given to members with referrals.
Almost 6 percent of the nearly 240,000 pre-deployment health assessments  we reviewed did not have the servicemember’s deployability status  recorded in the AMSA database. As shown in table 3, the missing data  ranged from less than 4 percent for the Army National Guard to almost 18  percent for the Naval Reserve.
For the remaining records with the deployability status recorded, 93  percent of the servicemembers were deployable. Nondeployable rates  ranged from less than 1 percent in the Air National Guard to more than 9  percent in the Army Reserve. Other data showed that most of the  nondeployable personnel had medical conditions that clearly made them  nondeployable, and which did not require medical referrals. According to  medical officials, some of these personnel, such as those who had suffered  multiple heart attacks, should have been discharged prior to the time that  they received their mobilization orders. Others had temporary conditions,  such as broken bones and pregnancies that did not warrant medical  discharges but made them nondeployable at the time of their assessment.
Detailed referral information could assist the services in determining and  addressing the factors that cause reserve component members to be  nondeployable; however, these data were often missing in AMSA’s  database. About 99 percent of the pre- and post-deployment assessments  we reviewed showed whether or not reserve component members had  been given a medical referral, but less than 44 percent of the records with  referrals contained detailed information about the type of referral that was  given to the member (eye, ear, cardiac, mental health, etc.).
One reason for the incomplete health assessment records we found at  AMSA at the time of our data draw in March 2004 is that some of the  health assessments were entered into AMSA’s database by hand.  According to the officer in charge of AMSA, records in the database with  detailed referral data had been submitted electronically rather than as  paper copies, which the installations are required to forward to the  centralized database. Generally, electronic data are sent to AMSA after  being collected in one of two different ways: (1) from applications that are  available at Army installations and over the Internet and (2) on stand-alone  laptop computers and hand-held personal digital assistant units, which  collect data in the theater and elsewhere. All electronic data are  transmitted to AMSA and updated immediately upon receipt. Because of  workload demands, when paper forms were received at AMSA, database  personnel captured only a data element indicating if a referral was needed,  not the specific type of referral indicated. In addition, when there was a  backlog of four page paper post-deployment health assessments to be  entered into the database, data entry personnel were entering only the first  and last pages of the form and not the middle two pages. Because of this,  at various times the data that have been collected from servicemembers  may not be available for analysis. However, as of June 2004, the officer in  charge of AMSA said that AMSA had no backlog of paper forms to be  entered into the centralized database and had 15 people working full-time  to process pre- and post-deployment health assessment forms.  Furthermore, he estimated that by the end of July 2004, they would be  caught up with the entries of the middle pages of the post-deployment  health assessments that had been skipped earlier. Still, there is a delay  between receipt of the form and its entry into the database. The AMSA  Chief said the paper forms take approximately 1 week for processing,  scanning, and entering data.
All of the reserve components have the capability to submit the health  assessments electronically, including detailed medical referral  information. Many Army and Air Force servicemember health assessments  are now transmitted electronically, and detailed information is captured  into the database from those forms. The Army has been sending electronic  health assessment data for active and reserve servicemembers to AMSA  since July 2003. Although the Army is capable of transmitting all of its  forms electronically, only about 52 percent of its forms submitted from  January 1, 2003, to May 3, 2004, had been submitted electronically. The Air  Force began sending electronic data to AMSA in June 2004. The Navy and  Marine Corps have established a working group that is currently  evaluating several options and developing an implementation plan.
DOD established a deployment health task force to make  recommendations by late April 2004 on completing all pre- and post- deployment health assessments electronically. However, the Deployment  Health Task Force is continuing its work to expedite and monitor progress  toward the electronic capture of deployment health assessment forms.  Even though electronic submission of the health assessment forms from  the mobilization and demobilization sites to AMSA’s centralized database  would expedite the inclusion of key data for meaningful analysis, increase  accuracy of the reported information, and lessen the burden of sites  forwarding paper copies and the likelihood of lost information, DOD has  not set a timeline for the services to electronically submit the health  assessment forms to the centralized database.
section_title: Available Data Show Reserve Component Members Self- Reported Health Is Good
paragraphs: Table 4 shows that 98 percent of the reserve component members  reported that they were in good to excellent health when they completed  their pre-deployment health assessments. The Army Reserve had the  lowest number—97  percent—of servicemembers considering themselves  in good to excellent health.
Table 4 also shows that the total referral rate that resulted from the pre- deployment health assessments was 5 percent but ranged from 1 percent  for the Air National Guard to 6 percent for the Army Reserve.
Table 5 shows that even after deployment, a high percentage of reserve  component members thought they were in good to excellent health.  However, a comparison of table 4 with table 5 shows that numbers had  generally declined from pre-deployment levels. In particular, the  percentage of personnel who rated their health as good to excellent  declined from 98 percent to 93 percent. The Army Reserve had the lowest  percentage of servicemembers who considered themselves in good to  excellent health during their post-deployment assessments—89 percent-- while the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve had the highest  percentage of servicemembers who considered themselves in good to  excellent health after deployment—98 percent.
Moreover, the percentage of medical referrals jumped to 21 percent on the  post-deployment health assessments. A comparison of tables 4 and 5  shows that the referral rate that resulted from post-deployment  assessments was quadruple the 5 percent referral rate from pre- deployment assessments. There were also differences between the  services, in that reserve component personnel from the Army and Marine  Corps received higher referral rates, as would be expected for ground  forces, than those in the Air Force and the Navy. The percentages ranged  from 8 percent for the Air National Guard to 30 percent for the Army  Reserve.
Table 6 shows that when reserve component members completed their  post-deployment health assessments, almost half of them chose the same  category to characterize their overall health as they had chosen on their  pre-deployment health assessment. The table shows that almost 14 percent  of the personnel who completed both pre- and post-deployment health  surveys believed that their health had improved enough to warrant  recharacterizations of their original assessments.
The table above also shows that 39 percent of the personnel who  completed both the pre- and post-deployment health surveys reported that  their health had declined between the assessments. Reserve component  personnel from the Army and Marine Corps experienced larger declines  than those of the Navy and Air Force.
section_title: DOD Could Not Maintain Visibility over Reserve Component Personnel on Active Duty with Medical Issues
paragraphs: Some of the services could not maintain visibility over reserve component  members with medical issues because they could not adequately track  those personnel, which contributed to problems for those personnel. In  the Army, the lack of tracking information for reserve component  personnel with medical issues contributed to problems for those  personnel. In the Army, the lack of visibility over reservists with medical  issues resulted in housing and pay problems for some personnel. The Air  Force has also lost visibility of some reservists with medical issues, which  has resulted in lengthy periods of time without resolution to their medical  issues.
Reserve component personnel who have been involuntarily mobilized,  along with members who are voluntarily serving on active duty, may  experience medical problems for a variety of reasons. Some are injured  during combat operations; others become injured or sick during the  course of their training or routine duties; and others have problems that  are identified during medical appointments, physicals, or health  assessments and other medical screenings. Our review focused on reserve  component members with medical problems that were expected to keep  them from being returned to full duty or from being demobilized within 30  days. This group contained reserve component members with a wide  variety of injuries and ailments. During our visits to mobilization and  demobilization sites, we spoke with reserve component members who had  suffered heart attacks or combat wounds, as well as to members with knee  and ankle injuries, diabetes, chronic back pain, and mental health  problems.
The services have used different policies and procedures to accommodate  involuntarily mobilized reserve component personnel who have long-term  medical problems. In some cases, the services have left the members on  their original mobilization orders and then extended those orders as  necessary. In other cases, the services have switched the members to  voluntary orders or offered the members the option to leave active duty  and have their medical conditions cared for through the Department of  Veterans Affairs.
subsections: section_title: Army
paragraphs: The dramatic increase in the use of the reserve components has led to a  dramatic increase in the numbers of reserve component members on  active duty with medical problems. For example, our analysis of data from  the more than 239,500 pre-deployment health assessments collected in the  AMSA database from November 2001 through March 2004 showed that  over 15,100 members, or almost 7 percent, were not deployable; almost  14,800 of these members came from the Army’s reserve components.  Prior to a change in Army policy in October 2003, personnel who were  mobilized and found to be non-deployable were kept on active duty until  (1) their medical problems had been resolved and they were returned to  full duty or (2) they had been referred to a medical board process and  discharged from the Army. (See appendix VIII for additional information  on the services’ medical evaluation boards.)
As a result of its October 2003 policy change, the Army was able to  demobilize personnel who were found to be nondeployable within the first  25 days of their mobilizations. This policy change helped to reduce the  inflow of reserve component personnel on active duty with medical  problems who were identified during the pre-deployment health-screening  process. However, the reserve component members who were already on  active duty with medical problems that had been identified during the pre- deployment health-screening process were not demobilized when the  policy changed. In addition, significant numbers of reserve component  personnel continued to experience medical problems as a result of injuries  or illnesses that occurred (1) after the members had been mobilized for 25  days and (2) as a result of problems that were identified during their post- deployment heath assessments. As a result, on July 14, 2004, the Army still  had over 4,000 reserve component personnel on active duty with medical  problems. Although Army officials said that the primary responsibility  that these soldiers had was to go to their medical treatment so they could  get well, many of the soldiers did not require daily medical treatment. As a  result, these soldiers often do other work ranging from temporary details  to maintain base facilities to longer-term jobs such as working at  mobilization processing sites or working as mechanics in installation  motor pools.
Initially, issues associated with the care of Army personnel with medical  problems were usually dealt with at the Army installation where the  servicemember was mobilized or demobilized and at nearby medical  treatment facilities. As the numbers of reserve component personnel with  medical problems increased, the Army found that it had difficulty  maintaining visibility of such personnel, resulting in some housing, pay,  and other problems for the personnel.
For example, at Fort Stewart, Georgia, reserve component soldiers with  medical problems were being housed in open-bay, cinder block barracks  that did not have heating or air conditioning. In addition, shower and  bathroom facilities were in separate, nearby buildings. These facilities  normally housed National Guard personnel during their 2-week annual  training periods. Following media attention to these conditions, the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issued a memorandum  that established housing standards for personnel with medical problems in  October 2003. During our visit to Fort Stewart, in November 2003 we  found that the soldiers with medical problems were being housed in  accordance with the updated standards, which required climate-controlled  quarters that included integrated bathroom facilities. The Army also  created a servicewide medical-status tracking system during the summer  of 2003. This system generates regular weekly reports on the numbers of  reserve component members on active duty with medical problems, their  locations, and the length of time that they have been receiving medical  care.
Following up on allegations in 2003 that medical treatment was taking too  long, and that soldiers were missing their scheduled medical  appointments, investigators at Fort Stewart also found that case  managers were needed to track the care of the soldiers with medical  problems and that a command structure was needed to manage the other  needs and duties of these personnel. At the time of our visit, Fort Stewart  had 15 case managers in place, and a new command and control structure  had been set up to manage the soldiers with medical problems. However,  officials told us that they still faced challenges with the management and  care of these soldiers because the group was so large. On November 19,  2003, there were 661 reserve component members with medical problems  at Fort Stewart; as of July 14, 2004, there were 349 members.
The lack of visibility and tracking also caused problems for members with  medical problems at Fort Lewis, Washington. Army procedures called for  reserve component members on involuntary mobilization orders to be  switched over to voluntary active duty medical extension orders after a  long-term medical problem had been identified. The administrative  process for issuing these active duty medical extensions was cumbersome,  and mechanisms were not in place to effectively track requests for these  extensions, which had to be submitted from the units with  servicemembers experiencing medical problems to a central office in the  Pentagon. When we visited Fort Lewis in March 2004, we found that  medical extension orders had expired for 19 of 84 personnel in the medical  hold unit. When a servicemember’s orders expire, the member’s pay stops  and the member’s dependents lose their health care coverage.  After our  visit to Fort Lewis, the Army changed its policy concerning active duty  medical extensions. On March 6, 2004, the Assistant Secretary of the Army  for Manpower and Reserve Affairs issued a policy that provides  installations with the ability to issue voluntary orders for up to 180 days  for reserve component members with medical problems without going  through the cumbersome active duty medical extension process. While the  authority to issue these voluntary orders has been delegated to the  installation level, the Army is still maintaining visibility over its reserve  component personnel with medical problems because these personnel are  assigned to units that must report their personnel numbers on a weekly  basis.
section_title: Air Force
paragraphs: In the Air Force, a lack of central visibility of some reserve component  personnel with medical problems who are serving on active duty has  resulted in delayed resolution to their medical problems. The Air Force  does have central visibility over reserve component personnel with  medical problems who remain on their original mobilization orders or  receive extensions to those orders. However, the Air Force also allows  personnel with medical problems to switch over to voluntary orders.  These orders are issued by the Air Force’s major commands. The Air  Force can track the number of orders issued and the number of days  covered by these orders, but it does not have a mechanism in place to  track the numbers of personnel who have medical problems and are  serving under these orders. As with many of the reserve component  personnel in the Army’s medical hold and holdover units, many of the air  reserve component personnel with medical problems are still able to  perform significant amounts of work while undergoing their medical  treatment or medical discharge processing.
While the reservists experiencing medical problems who we interviewed  did not identify any difficulties with their housing or their orders, they did  identify problems with the amount of time it was taking to resolve their  medical issues, much like the problems identified at Fort Stewart prior to  the deployment of case managers to that location. At one of the sites we  visited, an Air Force reservist told us that he had been in a medical status  on voluntary orders for 18 months and did not expect resolution of his  case anytime soon. The extent to which such a problem is commonplace is  unknown, given the inability of the Air Force to track such personnel.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: As the Global War on Terrorism is entering its fourth year, DOD officials  have made it clear that they do not expect the war to end anytime soon.  Furthermore, indications exist that certain components and occupational  specialties are being stressed and the long-term impact of this stress on  recruiting and retention is unknown. Moreover, although DOD has a  number of rebalancing efforts under way, these efforts will take years to  implement. Because this war is expected to last a long time and requires  far greater reserve component personnel resources than any of the smaller  operations of the previous two decades, DOD can no longer afford policies  that are developed piecemeal to maximize short-term benefits and must  have an integrated set of policies that address both the long-term  requirements for reserve component forces and individual reserve  component members’ needs for predictability.
For example, service rotation polices are directly tied to other personnel  policies such as policies concerning the use of the IRR, and the extent of  cross training. Policies to fully utilize the IRR would increase the pool of  available servicemembers and would thus decrease the length of time each  member would need to be deployed based on a static requirement.  Policies that encourage the use of cross-training for lesser-utilized units  could also increase the pool of available servicemembers and decrease the  length of rotations. Until DOD addresses its personnel policies within the  context of an overall strategic framework, it will not have clear visibility  over the forces that are available to meet future requirements. In addition,  it will be unable to provide reserve component members with clear  expectations of their military obligations and the increased predictability,  which DOD has recognized as a key factor in retaining reserve component  members who are seeking to successfully balance their military  commitments with family and civilian employment obligations.
The Army’s mobilization and demobilization plans contained outdated  assumptions about the location of active duty forces during reserve  mobilizations and demobilizations. As a result, facilities were not always  available to equitably support active and reserve component forces that  were collocated on bases that serve as mobilization and demobilization  sites. Until the Army updates the assumptions in its mobilization and  demobilization plans and therefore recognizes that active and reserve  component forces are likely to need simultaneous support at Army  installations within the United States, it may not be able to adequately  address the support needs of both its active and reserve component  forces. The Army has a number of uncoordinated efforts under way to  correct the facility infrastructure shortage that has developed. However,  these projects are being conducted without considering the long-term  requirements and associated costs. In addition, when the Army created  medical, training, logistics, and administrative support units that relied  heavily on reserve component members, it did not anticipate that it would  have to support long-term mobilization requirements for a Global War on  Terrorism under a partial mobilization authority. As a result, the reserve  component force cannot continue to support mobilizations as DOD  currently implements the partial mobilization authority and the Army is  now planning to rely on civilians and contractors. However, the Army has  not determined the costs and availability of these civilian and contractor  personnel. Until the Army makes these determinations, it cannot plan to  conduct future mobilizations and demobilizations in the most efficient  manner.
DOD’s ability to effectively manage the health status of reserve component  members has been hampered by a lack of complete information and the  inability to track servicemembers with health issues. For example, the  AMSA database does not contain a large number of health assessment  records for the Marine Corps and lacks complete information from some  of the health assessment records that were submitted to the database in a  nonelectronic format. Consequently, the deployability status and related  health problems of some reserve component members were not  discoverable. Until the Marine Corps addresses its data submission  problems with updated guidance and a mechanism to oversee the  submission of health assessments to the centralized database and until  DOD establishes a timeline for the military departments to submit health  assessments electronically, DOD and the services will continue to face  difficulties in determining and addressing the factors that cause reserve  component members to be nondeployable. Moreover, until the Air Force  develops a mechanism to track its reserve component members who are  on voluntary active duty orders with health problems, it cannot determine  whether these personnel are having their health problems addressed in a  timely manner. Furthermore, the treatment of the nation’s reserve  component members who have served their country and experienced  medical problems while on active duty is an important issue for DOD to  address. Until DOD gains visibility over the status of all of its reserve  component personnel on active duty with medical problems, it cannot  effectively oversee their situations and deploy, demobilize, or discharge  them.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary  of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in concert with the service  secretaries and Joint Staff, to take the following two actions:    develop a strategic framework that sets human capital goals  concerning the availability of its reserve component forces to meet the  longer-term requirements of the Global War on Terrorism under  various mobilization authorities and  identify personnel policies that should be linked within the context of  the strategic framework.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army to take, within the context of establishing DOD’s strategic  framework for force availability, the following two actions:    update mobilization and demobilization planning assumptions to  reflect the new operating environment for the Global War on  Terrorism—long-term requirements for mobilization and  demobilization support facilities and personnel and the likelihood that  active forces will continue to rotate through U.S. bases while reserve  component forces are mobilizing and demobilizing and    develop a coordinated approach to evaluate all the support costs  associated with mobilization and demobilization at alternative sites— including both facility (construction, renovation, and maintenance) and  support personnel (reserve component, civilian, contractor, or a  combination) costs—to determine the most efficient options; and then  update the list of primary and secondary mobilization and  demobilization sites as necessary.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four  actions:    direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to issue updated  mobilization guidance that specifically lists the requirement to submit  pre-deployment health assessments to AMSA,    direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to establish a mechanism  for overseeing submission of pre- and post-deployment assessments to  the centralized database,    direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in  concert with the service secretaries, to set a timeline for the military  departments to electronically submit pre-and post-deployment heath  assessments,    direct the Secretary of the Air Force to develop a mechanism for  tracking reserve component members who are on voluntary active duty  orders with medical problems.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred  with our recommendations. The Department specifically concurred with  our recommendations to (1) update Army mobilization and demobilization  planning assumptions to reflect the new operating environment for the  Global War on Terrorism; (2) develop a coordinated approach to evaluate  all the support costs associated with Army mobilizations and  demobilizations at alternative sites—including both facility and support  personnel costs—to determine the most efficient options, and then update  the list of primary and secondary mobilization and demobilization sites as  necessary; (3) issue updated Marine Corps mobilization guidance that  specifically lists the requirement to submit pre-deployment health  assessments to AMSA; (4) set a timeline for the military departments to  electronically submit pre- and post-deployment heath assessments; and (5)  develop a mechanism for tracking Air Force reserve component members  who are on voluntary active duty orders with medical problems.
DOD partially concurred with our other three recommendations. In  partially concurring with our recommendation concerning the  development of a strategic framework, DOD stated that it has a strategic  framework for setting human capital goals, which was established through  its December 2002 comprehensive review of active and reserve force mix,  its January 2004 force rebalancing report, and other planning and  budgeting guidance. However, DOD agreed that it should review and, as  appropriate, update its strategic framework. Although the documents cited  by DOD lay some of the groundwork needed to develop a strategic  framework, these documents do not specifically address how DOD will  integrate and align its personnel policies, such as its stop-loss and IRR  policies, to maximize its efficient usage of reserve component personnel to  meet its overall organizational goals.
In partially concurring with our recommendation to identify personnel  policies that should be linked within the context of a strategic framework,  DOD stated that its September 20, 2001, personnel and pay policy and its  July 19, 2002, addendum established personnel policies associated with its  strategic framework. DOD also stated that the department should review,  and as appropriate, update these policies. We agree that the Office of the  Secretary of Defense has issued personnel policies and various guidance  and reports concerning its reserve components. However, the policies  cited by DOD pre-date the 2002 comprehensive review and 2004 force  rebalancing report that were cited as part of the department’s strategic  framework. The strategic framework should be established prior to the  creation of personnel policies. We continue to believe that DOD’s policies  were implemented in a piecemeal manner and focused on short-term  needs. For example, our report details service changes to policies  concerning the use of the IRR, mobilization lengths, deployment lengths,  and service obligations.
In partially concurring with our recommendation concerning oversight of  the Marine Corps’ pre- and post-deployment health assessments, DOD  stated that system improvements are ongoing and that electronic  submission of pre- and post-deployment health assessments is possible  and highly desirable but may not be practical for every Marine Corps  deployment. However, our recommendation was directed at oversight of  health assessments regardless of how the assessments are submitted—in  paper or electronic form. We continue to believe that the Marine Corps  needs to establish a mechanism for overseeing the submission of its pre-  and post-deployment health assessments. The other services have  established such mechanisms as part of their quality assurance programs.
Finally, in commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that after  reviewing its implementation of the partial mobilization authority, it  decided to retain its “24-cumulative month” policy. DOD noted that it had  identified significant problems with changing to a 24-consecutive-month  approach but did not elaborate on those problems. The final decision  concerning the implementation of the partial mobilization authority was  not made until after our review ended, and the decision was counter to the  decision expected by senior personnel we met with during the course of  our review.  As noted in our report, with a 24-cumulative-month  interpretation of the partial mobilization authority, DOD risks running out  of forces available for deployment, at least in the short term. Regardless of  DOD’s interpretation of the partial mobilization authority, the department  needs to have a strategic framework to maximize the availability of its  reserve component forces. For example, usage of the more than 250,000  IRR members can affect rotation policies because the use of these  reservists would increase the size of the pool from which to draw  mobilized reservists. Therefore, without a strategic framework setting  human capital goals, how DOD will continue to meet its large  requirements for the Global War on Terrorism remains to be seen. We  have modified our report to recognize the decision that DOD made  regarding its implementation of the partial mobilization authority.
DOD’s comments on our recommendations are included in this report in  appendix IX. DOD also provided other relevant comments on portions of  the draft report and technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of  the Marine Corps; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the  Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at  no charge on the GAO Web site at http:www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov or Brenda S. Farrell,  Assistant Director, at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Others making  significant contributions to this report are included in appendix X.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine how the Department of Defense’s (DOD) implementation of  the partial mobilization authority and its personnel polices affect reserve  component force availability, we reviewed and analyzed the mobilization  authorities that are available under current law, along with personnel  policies from the services and Office of the Secretary of Defense. We also  collected and analyzed data on DOD’s historical usage of the reserve  components and its usage of these forces since September 11, 2001. We  analyzed usage trends since the 1991 Persian Gulf War and compared  usage rates across services, reserve components, and occupational  specialties. We also reviewed DOD documents that addressed the  projected future use of reserve component forces and plans to mitigate the  high usage of forces within certain occupational specialties. We analyzed  the structure of the reserve component forces and evaluated the effects of  utilizing or excluding members of the Individual Ready Reserve from  involuntary call-ups. We discussed the implementation of mobilization  authorities and the effects of various personnel policies with responsible  officials from the    Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.;    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Washington, D.C.;    Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs,    U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia;    Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia;    Commandant, Marine Corps (Manpower, Plans, and Policy), Quantico  Marine Corps Base, Virginia; and    U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia.
During our visits to mobilization and demobilization sites, we also  interviewed reserve component members concerning the length of their  mobilizations, deployments, and service commitments.
To determine how efficiently the Army executed its mobilization and  demobilization plans, we interviewed senior and key mobilization officials  involved with the mobilization and demobilization processes to document  their roles and responsibilities and collect data about the processes. We  visited selected sites where the Army conducts mobilization and  demobilization processing. At those sites, we observed mobilization and  demobilization processing and interviewed responsible Army officials as  well as soldiers being processed for mobilization and demobilization at  those sites. We collected and analyzed cost data for facility renovation and  construction projects. We also collected and analyzed available cost  information on the contracts to replace reserve component members with  civilian and contractor personnel. Finally, we documented problems that  the installations had tracking the arrival of mobilizing and demobilizing  troops though their automated systems. We visited five mobilization and  demobilization sites. These sites included four installations that supported  both active and reserve component troops and one site that supported  only reserve component troops. Four of the sites were among the largest  in terms of the numbers of reserve component members mobilized and  demobilized. One was among the smallest. Specifically we visited the  following sites:    Fort Stewart, Georgia;    Fort Hood, Texas;    Fort McCoy, Wisconsin;    Fort Lewis, Washington; and    Fort McPherson, Georgia.
We also interviewed Army officials from the following locations:    U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia;    First U.S. Army, Fort Gillem, Georgia;    Fifth U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas;    Army Installation Management Activity, Arlington, Virginia; and    Army Contracting Agency, Fort McPherson, Georgia.
As requested, we also visited sites where the other services conducted  mobilization and demobilization processing, but we did not report on the  efficiency of the other services’ processes because the numbers of reserve  component members who were mobilizing and demobilizing through these  sites were insufficient for us to draw any conclusions about the services’  processes. Specifically, we interviewed responsible officials and observed  ongoing mobilizations and demobilizations at the following sites:    Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia;    Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base, North Carolina;    Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Georgia;    Dover Air Force Base, Delaware; and    Navy Mobilization Processing Site Norfolk, Virginia.
At some of the demobilization locations, we observed reservists receiving  medical, legal, and family support briefings, and interviewed some  individuals who had been demobilized, including some on medical  extensions. We also walked through and compared facilities used to house  active and reserve component personnel, specifically focusing on the  facilities used to house personnel with medical problems. We interviewed  appropriate officials about facility capacities, and gathered and analyzed  information about facility renovations and new construction projects. We  obtained and reviewed additional documentation such as mobilization  orders, activation checklists, and demobilization processing checklists. We  also collected and analyzed reserve component mobilization data,  flowcharts, reports, plans, directives, manuals, instructions, and  administrative guidance. We reviewed relevant GAO reports and contacted  other audit and research organizations regarding their work in the area.  We reviewed congressional testimony by Navy officials in which they  described steps planned by the Navy to improve its demobilization  process, and we followed up on the status of those planned steps with  officials at the Navy Mobilization Processing Site Norfolk, Virginia.
To examine the extent to which DOD can effectively manage the health  status of its mobilized reserve component members, we collected and  analyzed data from a variety of sources throughout DOD. We tracked  weekly data from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Reserve Affairs (OASD/RA), which showed the numbers of Army, Navy,  Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel on medical extensions, and the  numbers of Army personnel in medical statuses. We also collected,  tracked, and analyzed data from the Army’s Office of the Surgeon General.  These data showed the numbers of reserve component personnel in  medical statuses by installation and by time spent in a medical status. We  also reviewed the Army’s projected medical status numbers, the Army’s  plans to mitigate future problems, and reports on the lessons that were  learned from the medical-related problems that occurred at Fort Stewart  during 2003. We also obtained and analyzed information from the Office of  the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Health Protection and  Readiness, Deployment Health Support Directorate. We collected and  reviewed the services’ medical instructions, memoranda, and policies. In  addition, we interviewed personnel responsible for the processing,  reviewing, and collection of the deployment health assessments at the  mobilization and demobilization sites visited. We compared information  about the services’ medical and physical evaluation board processes. We  discussed these medical issues with responsible officials from    Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,    U.S. Army Medical Department, Army Medical Command, Washington,    U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia;    First U.S. Army, Fort Gillem, Georgia;    Fifth U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas;    U.S. Army Medical Command, Fort Sam Houston, Texas;    Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C.;    Winn Army Community Hospital, Fort Stewart, Georgia;    Darnall Army Community Hospital, Fort Hood, Texas;    Madigan Army Medical Center, Fort Lewis, Washington;    Fort McCoy, Wisconsin;    Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia;    Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base, North Carolina;    Navy Mobilization Processing Site, Norfolk, Virginia;    Headquarters, United States Air Force Military Policy Division,    Air National Guard, Washington, D.C.;    Air Force Medical Operations Agency, Washington, D.C.; and    Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Georgia.
We also interviewed reserve component members who were in medical  status at the mobilization and demobilization sites visited. We interviewed  hospital commanders and their staff, case managers, medical liaison  officers, and officials from the services’ Surgeons General Offices.
We interviewed the Chief of the Army Medical Surveillance Activity  (AMSA). We discussed the information in the consolidated health  assessment database and obtained selected data from all the reserve  component member pre- and post-deployment health assessments that  were completed from October 25, 2001—when assessments became  mandatory for all mobilized reserve component members through March  2004. The data we obtained contained health assessment records for  290,641 reserve component members. For 122,603 members, we obtained  only pre-deployment health assessments, for 51,047 members we obtained  only post-deployment health assessments, and for 116,991 members we  obtained both pre-and post-deployment health assessments. We analyzed  the data that we obtained to determine referral, deployability, and  exposure rates. We also analyzed data on the self-reported general health  of the reserve component members and compared the data from pre- deployment assessments with the data from post-deployment assessments.  We also analyzed the month-by-month flow of forms to the AMSA to see if  the services had been submitting the forms as required. We compared  elapsed times between pre- and post-deployment assessments. We  conducted cross tabulations of the data to identify relationships between  various variables such as the overall health status, deployability, and  referral variables. All of our analyses compared data across the reserve  components to look for differences or trends.
We assessed the reliability of reserve component mobilization,  demobilization, and general usage data supplied by OASD/RA by (1)  reviewing existing information about the data and the systems that  produced them and (2) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about  the data. We also compared the data with data supplied to us by the  services. Our assessment of the AMSA data was even more rigorous and  included the electronic testing of relevant data elements, and discussions  with knowledgeable officials about not only the procedures for collecting  the data but also the procedures for coding the data. As a result of our  assessments, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report.
We conducted our review from November 2003 through July 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: National Guard and Reserve End Strength Figures
paragraphs: Tables 7 and 8 show information about the Ready Reserve and its  subcategories. Table 7 shows that the strength of the Ready Reserve has  declined steadily from fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 2003, but the strength  of the Selected Reserve remained fairly steady from fiscal year 1998 to  fiscal year 2003 after declining by more than 170,000 personnel from fiscal  year 1993 to fiscal year 1998. The Selected Reserve is the portion of the  Ready Reserve that participates in regular training. Table 8 shows the  relative sizes of the reserve components at the end of fiscal year 2003. The  Army’s reserve components are larger than those of the other services and  are expected to remain so for the foreseeable future.
section_title: Appendix III: Service Mobilization and Demobilization Installations
subsections: section_title: Army
subsections: section_title: Power Projection Platforms
paragraphs: Fort Carson, Colorado.  Fort Benning, Georgia.  Fort Stewart, Georgia.  Fort Riley, Kansas.  Fort Campbell, Kentucky.  Fort Polk, Louisiana.  Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  Fort Dix, New Jersey.  Fort Drum, New York.  Fort Sill, Oklahoma.  Fort Bliss, Texas.  Fort Hood, Texas.  Fort Eustis, Virginia.  Fort Lewis, Washington.  Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.
section_title: Power Support Platforms
paragraphs: Fort Rucker, Alabama.  Fort Huachuca, Arizona.  Camp Roberts, California.  Gowen Field, Idaho.  Camp Atterbury, Indiana.  Fort Knox, Kentucky.  Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.  Camp Shelby, Mississippi.  Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.  Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico.  Fort Jackson, South Carolina.  Fort Lee, Virginia.
section_title: Navy
paragraphs: Navy Mobilization Processing Site New London, Connecticut.  Navy Mobilization Processing Site Seattle, Washington.  Navy Mobilization Processing Site Gulfport, Mississippi.  Navy Mobilization Processing Site Jacksonville, Florida.  Navy Mobilization Processing Site Norfolk, Virginia.  Navy Mobilization Processing Site Pensacola, Florida.  Navy Mobilization Processing Site Port Hueneme, California.  Navy Mobilization Processing Site Washington, D.C.  Navy Mobilization Processing Site Memphis, Tennessee.  Navy Mobilization Processing Site London, United Kingdom.  Navy Mobilization Processing Site Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Navy Mobilization Processing Site San Diego, California.  Navy Mobilization Processing Site Great Lakes, Illinois.  Navy Mobilization Processing Site Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.  Navy Mobilization Processing Site Camp Pendleton, California.
section_title: Marine Corps
paragraphs: Camp Pendleton, California (Used to mobilize and demobilize units and  individuals for worldwide usage).
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (Used to mobilize and demobilize units and  individuals for worldwide usage).
Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia (Primarily used to mobilize and  demobilize individual reservists for duty in the Washington, D.C. Metro  area).
Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California.
Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina.
section_title: Air Force
subsections: section_title: United States Air Force Reserve Sites
paragraphs: Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.  Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas.  Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona.  Luke Air Force Base, Arizona.  Beale Air Force Base, California.  March Air Reserve Base, California.  Travis Air Force Base, California.  Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.  Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado.  Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado.  Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.  Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.  Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida.  MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.
Patrick Air Force Base, Florida.  Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Georgia.  Robins Air Force Base, Georgia.  Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.  Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.  Grissom Air Reserve Base, Indiana.  McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas.  Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana.  New Orleans Air Reserve Station, Louisiana.  Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts.  Westover Air Reserve Base, Massachusetts.  Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.  Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan.  Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport Air Reserve Station,  Minnesota.  Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri.  Columbus Air Force Base, Mississippi.  Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi.  Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina.  Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina.  Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.  McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey.  Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico.  Fort Hamilton, New York.  Niagara Falls International Airport Air Reserve Station, New York.  Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.  Youngstown Air Reserve Station, Ohio.  Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.  Portland International Airport, Oregon.  Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania.  Willow Grove Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania.  Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina.  Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina.  Brooks Air Force Base, Texas.  Fort Worth Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base, Texas.  Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.  Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas.  Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.  Hill Air Force Base, Utah.  Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.  Norfolk Naval Air Station, Virginia.  Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington.
McChord Air Force Base, Washington.  General Mitchell Air Reserve Base, Wisconsin.
section_title: Air National Guard Sites
paragraphs: Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska.  Kulis Air National Guard Base, Alaska.  Birmingham International Airport, Alabama.  Montgomery Regional Airport, Alabama.  Fort Smith Regional Airport, Arkansas.  Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas.  Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, Arizona.  Tucson International Airport, Arizona.  Channel Islands Air National Guard Station, California.  Fresno Air Terminal, California.  March Air Reserve Base, California.  Moffett Federal Airfield, California.  Buckley Air Force Base, Colorado.  Bradley Air National Guard Base, Connecticut.  New Castle County Airport, Delaware.  Jacksonville International Airport, Florida.  Robins Air Force Base, Georgia.  Savannah International Airport, Georgia.  Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.  Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.  Des Moines International Airport, Iowa.  Sioux City Airport, Iowa.  Gowen Field, Idaho.  Greater Peoria Airport, Illinois.  Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.  Springfield Capital Airport, Illinois.  Fort Wayne International Airport, Indiana.  Terre Haute International Airport, Indiana.  Forbes Field, Kansas.  McConnel Air Force Base, Kansas.  Standiford Field, Kentucky.  New Orleans Naval Air Station, Louisiana.  Barnes Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts.  Otis Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts.  Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.  Martin State Airport, Maryland.  Bangor International Airport, Maine.  Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan.  W.K. Kellog Airport, Michigan.
Duluth Air National Guard International Airport, Minnesota.  Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport, Minnesota.  Lambert-Saint Louis International Airport, Missouri.  Rosecrans Memorial Airport, Missouri.  Jackson International Airport, Mississippi.  Key Field, Mississippi.  Great Falls International Airport, Montana.  Charlotte-Douglas International Airport, North Carolina.  Hector International Airport, North Dakota.  Lincoln Municipal Airport, Nebraska.  Pease Air National Guard Base, New Hampshire.  Atlantic City Municipal Airport, New Jersey.  McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey.  Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico.  Reno Cannon International Airport, Nevada.  F.S. Gabreski Airport, New York.  Hancock Field, New York.  Niagara Falls International Airport, New York.  Stewart Air National Guard Base, New York.  Stratton Air National Guard Base, New York.  Mansfield Lahm Airport, Ohio.  Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, Ohio.  Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport, Ohio.  Toledo Express Airport, Ohio.  Tulsa International Airport, Oklahoma.  Will Rogers Air National Guard Base, Oklahoma.  Klamath Falls International Airport, Oregon.  Portland International Airport, Oregon.  Harrisburg International Airport, Pennsylvania.  Pittsburgh International Airport, Pennsylvania.  Willow Grove Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania.  Luis Munoz Marin International Airport, Puerto Rico.  Quonset State Airport, Rhode Island.  McEntire Air National Guard Station, South Carolina.  Joe Foss Field, South Dakota.  McGhee Tyson Air National Guard Base, Tennessee.  Memphis International Airport, Tennessee.  Nashville International Airport, Tennessee.  Ellington Field, Texas.  Fort Worth Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base, Texas.  Kelly Air Force Base, Texas.  Salt Lake City International Airport, Utah.  Richmond International Airport, Virginia.  Burlington International Airport, Vermont.
Camp Murray, Washington.  Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington.  General B. Mitchell Air National Guard Base, Wisconsin.  Truax Field, Wisconsin.  Eastern West Virginia Regional Airport, West Virginia.  Yeager Air National Guard Airport, West Virginia.  Cheyenne Air National Guard, Wyoming.
section_title: Appendix IV: Differences between Demobilization and Periodic Physicals for Reserve Component Members
section_title: Appendix V: Pre- and Post-Deployment Health Assessment Forms
section_title: Appendix VI: Service Stop-Loss Policies since September 11, 2001
paragraphs: On September 14, 2001, the Secretary of Defense delegated his stop-loss  authority to the service secretaries. This authority allows the services to  retain both active and reserve component members on active duty beyond  the end of their obligated service. Reserve component members who are  affected by the order generally cannot retire or leave the service until  authorized by competent authority. Each of the services has exercised its  stop-loss authority on different occasions and for different military  occupational specialties.
subsections: section_title: Army
paragraphs: The Army issued a stop-loss message on December 4, 2001, imposing stop- loss on several active component skill-based specialties. As the needs of  the Army changed, the number of occupational specialties expanded and  then contracted, and included the reserve components as well as the  Army’s active forces. The Army ended its specialty-based stop-loss on  November 13, 2003. The Army’s current stop-loss policy, which affects  active and reserve component forces, is unit-based rather than  occupational specialty driven. Significant stop-loss policy changes that  affected the Army’s reserve component forces are listed below.
January 2002. The stop-loss policy already in effect for the active  component is expanded to include soldiers in the Ready Reserve.  Soldiers with 23 different occupational specialties, including special  forces, civil affairs, psychological operations, certain aviation  categories, mortuary affairs, and maintenance are affected.
February 2002. The Army expands its stop-loss policy for the active  and reserve components, adding 38 occupational specialties to the  stop-loss program. The new categories include military police, military  intelligence specialties and technicians, comptrollers, foreign area  officers (Eurasia, Middle East/North Africa), contract and industrial  management, additional aviator specialties, criminal investigators, and  linguists.
June 2002. The Army expands and retracts its stop-loss policy for the  active and reserve components. New occupational specialties affected  include information operations, strategic intelligence, various field  artillery and air defense specialties, explosive ordnance disposal, and  unmanned aerial vehicle operators. Soldiers in the foreign area officer  (Eurasia) and select intelligence specialties were released from the  stop-loss policy.
November 2002. Army ends skill-based stop-loss policy for the Ready  Reserve and Guard forces. The new stop-loss policy is unit based,  beginning when the unit is alerted until 90 days after the end of the  unit’s mobilization.
February 2003. Army expands stop-loss to include active component  units identified for deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
November 2003. Army again issues unit stop-loss for active forces,  and cancels occupational specialty stop losses that had been issued  since February 2003. (There were several stop-loss changes issued  between February 2003 and November 2003 but these changes were  focused on active forces.) The unit stop-loss policies for reserve  component forces have remained continuously in effect since they  were instituted in 2002.
section_title: Navy
paragraphs: The Navy exercised its stop-loss authority on September 28, 2001, by  imposing stop-loss on several occupational specialties. Unlike the Army,  the Navy’s initial stop-loss policy affected both active and reserve  component forces. The Navy’s significant stop-loss policy changes are  listed below.
September 2001. The Navy issues a stop-loss policy for a variety of  officer and enlisted occupational specialties, and subspecialties to  include personnel in special operations/special warfare, security, law  enforcement, cryptology, and explosive ordnance disposal as well as  selected physicians, nurses, and linguists.
March 2002. The Navy modifies its existing stop-loss policy, adding  new specialties and removing others. After the changes, selected  linguists and personnel in security, law enforcement, and cryptology  were subject to the stop-loss restriction.
August 2002. The Navy ends its stop-loss policy.
section_title: Air Force
paragraphs: The Air Force exercises its stop-loss authority on September 22, 2001, by  imposing a servicewide stop-loss on all Air Force personnel. Unlike the  Army, the Air Force’s initial policy affected active, reserve, and Air  National Guard members. The Air Force’s significant stop-loss policy  changes are listed below.
September 2001. The Air Force implements a servicewide, stop-loss  policy.
January 2002. The Air Force releases 64 occupational specialties from  the general stop-loss. Specialties that still fall under the limitations of  the stop-loss policy include selected pilots, navigators, intelligence  specialists, weather specialists, security personnel, engineers,  communications specialists, selected health care providers, lawyers,  chaplains, aircrew operators, aircrew protection personnel, command  and control specialists, fuel handlers, logisticians and supply  specialists, selected maintenance providers, and investigators.
June 2002. The Air Force exempts additional occupational specialties  from the general stop-loss. Specialties that remain under the limitations  of the stop-loss policy include selected pilots, navigators, security  personnel, aircrew operators, command and control specialists,  intelligence specialists, aircrew protection, and fuel handlers.
March 2003. The Air Force announces that effective May 2, 2003, stop- loss will be expanded to cover a total of 99 occupational specialties.  Specialties that are affected by the stop-loss policy include selected  pilots, navigators, command and control specialists, intelligence  specialists, security personnel, engineers, selected health care  providers, investigators, aircrew operators, aircrew protection  personnel, communications specialists, logisticians and supply  specialists, and fuel handlers.
May 2003. The Air Force modifies its stop-loss policy, releasing about  half of the previously selected occupational specialties. The list of  specialties still affected by the stop-loss includes selected pilots,  navigators, intelligence specialists, security forces, special  investigators, aircrew operators, fuel handlers, and maintenance  personnel.
June 2003. The Air Force ends its stop-loss policy.
section_title: Marine Corps
paragraphs: The Marine Corps exercised its stop-loss authority for selective active and  reserve Marines in January 2002. Specific policies varied as to their  applicability to active and reserve forces; however, expansion of stop-loss  policy eventually covered all Marines. The Marine Corps’ significant stop- loss policy changes are listed below.
January 2002. The Marine Corps implements a specific stop-loss  authority for Marines with C-130 specialties to assist in Operation  Enduring Freedom. This stop-loss authority includes Marines in the  reserve component.
January 2003. The Marine Corps implements a general stop-loss  policy for all Marines, regardless of component. Marine Corps  reservists cannot be extended beyond the completion of 24 cumulative  months of activated service. Furthermore, the first general officer in a  Marine’s chain of command can exempt Marines from the stop-loss  policy.
May 2003. The Marine Corps lifts its stop-loss policy.
section_title: Appendix VII: Reserve Component Recruiting Results, Fiscal Year 1993-2004
paragraphs: The services use recruiting and retention strategies together to achieve  their programmed end strengths. If retention is better than expected in a  particular year, then the reserve components may achieve their desired  end strengths without achieving their recruiting goals. While the services  can effectively meet their yearly programmed end strengths through a  wide range of recruiting and retention combinations, long-term  overreliance on either recruiting or retention can eventually cause  negative impacts for a service or service component.
A service or component that repeatedly misses its recruiting goals will  need to retain a higher-than-planned percentage of its personnel each year.  This will eventually lead to a force that is out of balance. Either too many  people will be promoted and the component will end up with too many  senior personnel and not enough junior personnel or promotion rates will  decline. Decreased promotion rates tend to lead to increased attrition  rates, which would lead to end strength problems if a component were  already having problems meeting its recruiting goals.
Appendix VI showed that the services have employed a variety of stop-loss  policies since September 11, 2001. Because these policies artificially  inflate retention rates, recruiting figures rather than retention or end  strength figures may be the best indicator of whether or not the  components will face difficulties meeting their future programmed end  strengths. Table 10 shows historical recruiting results. It shows that all the  reserve components met their recruiting goals in fiscal year 2002. But it  shows that the Army National Guard fell far short of its goal in fiscal year  2003 and was falling far short of its fiscal year 2004 monthly goals through  May of 2004. This dramatic drop in recruiting results occurred as the Army  was significantly increasing its involuntary mobilizations of Army National  Guard combat forces. The improving job market in the United States may  make it even more difficult for the Army National Guard to achieve its  recruiting objectives over the next few years.
section_title: Appendix VIII: Service Medical and Physical Evaluation Board Processes
subsections: section_title: Disabilities Evaluation System
paragraphs: DOD’s Physical Disabilities Evaluation System consists of four main  elements:  1.  medical evaluation by Medical Evaluation Boards (MEBs),  2.  physical disability evaluation by Physical Evaluation Boards (PEBs) to  3.  servicemember counseling, and  4.  final disposition by appropriate personnel authorities.
Figure 2 shows the steps of the disabilities evaluation system, which will  eventually lead to one of two outcomes. Servicemembers will either be  returned to duty or they will be discharged from their military service.  Members who are discharged sometimes, but not always, receive disability  compensation.
Continuing to receive care throughout process Reserve component personnel who have been involuntarily mobilized,  along with members who are voluntarily serving on active duty, may end  up with medical problems for a variety or reasons. Some are injured  during combat operations; others become injured or sick during the  course of their training or routine duties; and others have problems that  are identified during medical appointments, physicals, or medical  screenings. Servicemembers on active duty or in the Ready Reserve are  eligible for referral into the Disability Evaluation System when they are  unable to reasonably perform the military duties of their office, grade,  rank, or rating as a result of a diagnosed medical condition.
Servicemembers who have been diagnosed with medical conditions that  may render them unfit for military service enter into medical treatment  programs.
The initial stage of the process, when medical professionals are  diagnosising servicemembers’ problems, determining courses of  treatment, and evaluating the effectiveness of the ongoing treatments is  often the most time-consuming portion of the medical process. According  to service officials, this initial phase is intentionally long to give  servicemembers a good chance to get well and return to full duty. If,  however, the servicemembers have not returned to full duty within 1 year  of their diagnoses or if prior to a year they reach a point where they have  achieved the maximum recovery expected, and additional treatment is not  expected to materially affect their condition, their medical status and duty  limitations will be documented and referred to a MEB.
The MEB documents full clinical information on all medical conditions  and states whether each condition is cause for referral into the Disability  Evaluation System. The duty-related impairment MEB package should  include a medical history; records from physical examinations; records of  medical tests and their results; and documentation of medical and surgical  consultations, diagnoses, treatments and prognoses. If the servicemember  meets retention standards, the disability processing ends with the MEB. If  the MEB concludes that the servicemembers do not meet retention  standards, the members’ cases are referred to the PEB to determine fitness  for duty and possible entitlement to benefits.
The first step in the PEB process is referral of the cases to informal PEBs  that review documents from the MEB and other administrative documents  without the presence of the servicemember. The informal PEB then issues  its initial findings and recommendations. If servicemembers are found to  be fit for duty, the disability processing ends with the informal PEB. If  servicemembers are found to be unfit for duty, they may request to  personally appear before the PEB during formal PEB hearings.  Servicemembers who do not agree with the decisions of the Formal PEB  have an additional opportunity to appeal the decisions.
When a physician initiates an MEB, the processing time should normally  not exceed 30 days from the date the MEB report is initiated to the date it  is received by the PEB. For cases where reserve component members are  referred for solely a fitness determination on a non-duty-related condition,  processing time for conducting an MEB or physical examination should  not exceed 90 days. And when the PEB receives the MEB or physical  examination report, the processing time to the date of the final disposition  of the reviewing authority should normally be no more than 40 days.
All servicemembers who enter the Disability Evaluation System receive  counseling. Counselors inform the servicemembers of the sequence and  nature of the steps in the process, statutory and regulatory rights, the  effects of findings and recommendations, and the servicemember’s  recourse in the case of an unfavorable finding.
It is not within the mission of the military departments to retain members  on active duty or in the Ready Reserve to provide prolonged, definitive  medical care when it is unlikely the member will return to full military  duty. Servicemembers should be referred into the Disability Evaluation  System as soon as the probability that they will be unable to return to full  duty is ascertained and optimal medical treatment benefits have been  reached.
section_title: Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above Kenneth F. Daniell, Michael J.  Ferren, Christopher R. Forys, Jim Melton, Kenneth E. Patton, Gary W.  Phillips, Jennifer R. Popovic, Sharon L. Reid, Irene A. Robertson, Nicole  Volchko, and Robert K. Wild also made significant contributions to the  report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Military Pay: Army Reserve Soldiers Mobilized to Active Duty  Experienced Significant Pay Problems. GAO-04-990T. Washington, D.C.:  July 20, 2004.
Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas  and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T.  Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2004.
Defense Infrastructure: Long-term Challenges in Managing the Military  Construction Program. GAO-04-288. Washington, D.C.: February 24, 2004.
Military Pay: Army National Guard Personnel Mobilized to Active Duty  Experienced Significant Pay Problems. GAO-04-413T. Washington, D.C.:  January 28, 2004.
Military Pay: Army National Guard Personnel Mobilized to Active Duty  Experienced Significant Pay Problems. GAO-04-89. Washington, D.C.:  November 13, 2003.
Defense Health Care: Quality Assurance Process Needed to Improve  Force Health Protection and Surveillance. GAO-03-1041. Washington,  D.C.: September 19, 2003.
Military Personnel: DOD Needs More Data to Address Financial and  Health Care Issues Affecting Reservists. GAO-03-1004. Washington, D.C.:  September 10, 2003.
Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of  Mobilizations for Reserve Forces. GAO-03-921. Washington, D.C.: August  21, 2003.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for  Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003.
Defense Health Care: Army Has Not Consistently Assessed the Health  Status of Early-Deploying Reservists. GAO-03-997T. Washington, D.C.:  July 9, 2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Management  Processes Needed to Improve Condition and Reduce Costs of Guard and  Reserve Facilities. GAO-03-516. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.
Homeland Defense: Preliminary Observations on How Overseas and  Domestic Missions Impact DOD Forces. GAO-03-677T. Washington, D.C.:  April 29, 2003.
Defense Health Care: Army Needs to Assess the Health Status of All  Early-Deploying Reservists. GAO-03-437. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2003.
Military Treatment Facilities: Eligibility Follow-up at Wilford Hall Air  Force Medical Center. GAO-03-402R. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2003.
Military Personnel: Preliminary Observations Related to Income,  Benefits, and Employer Support for Reservists during Mobilizations.  GAO-03-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2003.
Military Personnel: Preliminary Observations Related to Income,  Benefits, and Employer Support for Reservists during  Mobilizations. GAO-03-573T. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2003.
Defense Health Care: Most Reservists Have Civilian Health Coverage but  More Assistance Is Needed When TRICARE Is Used. GAO-02-829.  Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2002.
Reserve Forces: DOD Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations between  Reservists and Their Employers. GAO-02-608. Washington, D.C.: June 13,  2002.
Wartime Medical Care: DOD Is Addressing Capability Shortfalls, but  Challenges Remain. GAO/NSIAD-96-224. Washington, D.C.: September 25,  1996.
Reserve Forces: DOD Policies Do Not Ensure That Personnel Meet  Medical and Physical Fitness Standards. GAO/NSIAD-94-36. Washington,  D.C.: March 23, 1994.
Defense Health Care: Physical Exams and Dental Care Following the  Persian Gulf War. GAO/HRD-93-5. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 1992.
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