Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance Process
Published: 2008-05-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 1974, GAO has examined personnel security clearance processes and acquired a historical view of key factors to consider in reform efforts. GAO placed the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel security clearance program, which represents 80 percent of federal government clearances, on its high-risk list in 2005 due to long-standing problems. These problems include incomplete investigative reports from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the agency primarily responsible for providing clearance investigation services; the granting of some clearances by DOD adjudicators even when required data were missing from the investigative reports used to make such determinations; and delays in completing clearance processing. Delays can lead to a heightened risk of disclosure of classified information, additional costs and delays in completing related contracts, and problems retaining qualified personnel. DOD has reported on these continuing delays. However, there has been recent high-level governmentwide attention to improving the process, including establishing a team to develop a reformed federal government security clearance process. This statement addresses four key factors that should be considered in personnel security clearance reforms. This statement draws on GAO's past work, which included reviews of clearance-related documents and interviews of senior officials at DOD and OPM.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Efforts to reform personnel security clearance processes should consider, among other things, the following four key factors: (1) a strong requirements determination process, (2) quality in all clearance processes, (3) metrics to provide a fuller picture of clearance processes, and (4) long-term funding requirements of security clearance reform. In February 2008, GAO noted that a sound requirements process is important because requesting a clearance for a position in which it will not be needed, or in which a lower-level clearance would be sufficient, will increase both costs and investigative workload unnecessarily. For example, the cost of obtaining and maintaining a top secret clearance for 10 years is approximately 30 times greater than the cost of obtaining and maintaining a secret clearance for the same period. Also, changing a position's clearance level from secret to top secret increases the investigative workload for that position about 20-fold. Building quality throughout the clearance process could promote positive outcomes, including more reciprocity governmentwide. However, agencies have paid little attention to this factor despite GAO's 2006 recommendation to place more emphasis on quality. For example, the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) February 2007 report on security clearances documented quality with a single metric in only one of the six phases of the process. Further, OMB did not discuss the development or existence of any metric measuring the level of quality in security clearance processes or products in its February 2008 report. Concerns about the quality of investigative and adjudicative work underlie the continued reluctance of agencies to accept clearances issued by other agencies; thus, government resources may be used to conduct duplicative investigations and adjudications. Federal agencies' efforts to monitor clearance processes emphasize timeliness, but additional metrics should be developed to provide a fuller picture of the performance of the clearance process. GAO has highlighted a variety of metrics in its reports (e.g., completeness of investigative reports, staff's and customers' perceptions of the process, and the adequacy of internal controls), all of which could add value in monitoring clearance processes. The emphasis on timeliness is due in part to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which provides guidelines for the speed of completing clearances and requires annual reporting of that information to Congress. Providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements to implement changes to security clearance processes could enable more-informed congressional oversight. Reform efforts should identify long-term funding requirements to implement proposed changes, so that decision makers can compare and prioritize alternate reform proposals in times of fiscal constraints. The absence of long-term funding requirements to implement reforms would limit decision makers'--in the executive and legislative branches--ability to carry out their budgetary development and oversight functions.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss reforming the  federal government’s personnel security clearance process. Since 1974, we  have been examining personnel security clearance processes to assist  Congress. Through scores of reports and testimonies, we have acquired  broad institutional knowledge that gives us a historical view of key factors  that should be considered in clearance reform efforts. A list of our related  GAO products is provided at the end of this statement. Specifically, we  have testified on clearance-related issues in four prior hearings that this  Subcommittee has held since January 2005, when we first placed the  Department of Defense’s (DOD) personnel security clearance program— which represents about 80 percent of the security clearances adjudicated  by the federal government—on our list of high-risk government programs  and operations.
We placed DOD’s personnel security clearance program on our high-risk  list in 2005 and again in 2007 because of a variety of long-standing  problems in the program. Some of those problems included (1) incomplete  investigative reports from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the  agency that supplies about 90 percent of all federal clearance  investigations, including those for DOD; (2) the granting of some  clearances by DOD adjudicators even though required data were missing  from the investigative reports used to make such determinations; and (3)  long-standing delays in completing clearances. We have recently initiated  additional work to examine the timeliness and quality of personnel  security clearances in DOD. This work will help determine whether DOD’s  personnel security clearance program should remain on our 2009 high-risk  list.
In February 2008, we testified that DOD’s August 2007 report to Congress  noted continuing problems with delayed processing of industry personnel  security clearances. We testified that the time required to process  clearances continues to exceed time requirements established by the  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. This law  currently requires adjudicative agencies to make a determination on at  least 80 percent of all applications for a security clearance within an  average of 120 days after the date of receipt of the application, with no  longer than 90 days allotted for the investigation and 30 days allotted for  the adjudication. DOD’s August 2007 congressionally-mandated report on  clearances for industry personnel described continuing delays in the  processing of clearances. For example, during the first 6 months of fiscal  year 2007, the end-to-end processing of initial top secret clearances took  an average of 276 days; renewal of top secret clearances, 335 days; and all  secret clearances, 208 days. Moreover, DOD’s February 2008  congressionally-mandated report on clearance investigations for industry  personnel noted that problems persist. Specifically, during the second half  of fiscal year 2007, DOD reported that the end-to-end processing of initial  top secret clearances averaged 311 days, renewal of top secret clearances  averaged 444 days, and both initial and renewal of secret and confidential  clearances averaged 229 days.
Problems in the clearance program can negatively affect national security.  For example, delays reviewing security clearances for personnel who are  already doing classified work can lead to a heightened risk of disclosure of  classified information. In contrast, delays in providing initial security  clearances for previously noncleared personnel can result in other  negative consequences, such as additional costs and delays in completing  national security-related contracts, lost-opportunity costs, and problems  retaining the best qualified personnel.
While delays continue in completing the end-to-end processing of security  clearances, recent high-level governmentwide attention has been focused  on improving the clearance process. For example, we previously reported  that the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Deputy Director for  Management has led efforts to improve governmentwide security  clearance processes since June 2005. In addition, in June 2007, the OMB  Deputy Director—in collaboration with the Director of National  Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence— established the Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team (hereafter  referred to as the Joint Reform Team). The Joint Reform Team was  established to develop a reformed federal government security clearance  process. On February 5, 2008, the President issued a memorandum that  called for aggressive reform efforts of the security clearance process,  acknowledged the work being performed by the Joint Reform Team, and  directed that the team submit to the President an initial reform plan no  later than April 30, 2008. As directed, the Joint Reform Team submitted a  plan to the President on April 30, 2008, which presents the proposed  design of a transformed hiring and clearing process.
The reformed security clearance process developed by the Joint Reform  Team would be applicable not only to DOD but across the federal  government including the intelligence community. In February, we  testified before this subcommittee about areas in which we could support  the intelligence committees and community on oversight of management  reforms, including the security clearance process. Recently, we received  two requests from the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select  Committee on Intelligence to review security clearance programs in the  intelligence community. Specifically, we have been asked to assess (1) the  Joint Reform Team’s reform efforts and (2) the timeliness and quality of  personnel security clearances in the intelligence community.
For this testimony, you asked that we identify key factors that should be  considered in personnel security clearance reform efforts. My statement  today draws on our prior work on clearance processes since 2004, which  included reviews of clearance-related documents and interviews of senior  officials at DOD and OPM, which has the primary responsibility for  providing clearance investigation services to DOD. Our work was  performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions, based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence we obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Military servicemembers, federal workers, and industry personnel must  generally obtain security clearances to gain access to classified  information. The three clearance level categories are: top secret, secret,  and confidential. The level of classification denotes the degree of  protection required for information and the amount of damage that  unauthorized disclosure could reasonably cause to national security. The  degree of expected damage that unauthorized disclosure could reasonably  be expected to cause is “exceptionally grave damage” for top secret  information, “serious damage” for secret information, and “damage” for  confidential information.
DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has  responsibility for determining eligibility for clearances for  servicemembers, DOD civilian employees, and industry personnel  performing work for DOD and 23 other federal agencies, as well as  employees in the federal legislative branch. That responsibility includes  obtaining background investigations, primarily through OPM. Within DOD,  government employees use the information in OPM-provided investigative  reports to determine clearance eligibility of clearance subjects. DOD’s  program maintains approximately 2.5 million clearances.
Although our high-risk designation covers only DOD’s program, our  reports have documented clearance-related problems affecting other  agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). For  example, our October 2007 report on state and local information fusion  centers cited two clearance-related challenges: (1) the length of time  needed for state and local officials to receive clearances from the Federal  Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS, and (2) the reluctance of some  federal agencies—particularly DHS and FBI—to accept clearances issued  by other agencies (i.e., clearance reciprocity). Similarly, our April 2007  testimony on maritime security and selected aspects of the Security and  Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) identified the  challenge of obtaining clearances so that port security stakeholders could  share information through area committees or interagency operational  centers. The SAFE Port Act includes a specific provision requiring the  Secretary of Homeland Security to sponsor and expedite individuals  participating in interagency operational centers in gaining or maintaining  their security clearances.
Recent events affecting clearance programs across the federal government  include the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention  Act (IRTPA) of 2004 and the issuance of the June 2005 Executive Order  13381, “Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility for  Access to Classified National Security Information.” IRTPA included  milestones for reducing the time to complete clearances, general  specifications for a database on security clearances, and requirements for  reciprocity of clearances. The executive order stated, among other things,  that OMB was to ensure the effective implementation of policy regarding  appropriately uniform, centralized, efficient, effective, timely, and  reciprocal agency functions relating to determining eligibility for access to  classified national security information. Since 2005, OMB’s Deputy  Director for Management has taken several actions to improve the security  clearance process, including establishing an interagency working group to  improve the reciprocal acceptance of clearances issued by other agencies  and taking a lead role in preparing a November 2005 strategic plan to  improve personnel security clearance processes governmentwide.
section_title: Four Key Factors Should Be Considered in Efforts to Reform the Security Clearance Process
paragraphs: In our prior work, we identified four key factors that should be considered  to reform the security clearance process. These include (1) ensuring a  strong requirements-determination process, (2) building quality in all  clearance processes, (3) developing additional metrics to provide a fuller  picture of clearance processes, and (4) including long-term funding  requirements of security clearance reform.
subsections: section_title: Ensuring a Strong Requirements- Determination Process Can Help Manage Clearance Workloads and Costs
paragraphs: As we testified in February 2008, ensuring a strong requirements- determination process can help the government manage the workloads  and costs associated with the security clearance process. Requirements- determination in the clearance process begins with establishing whether a  position requires a clearance, and if so, at what level. We have previously  stated that any reform process should address whether the numbers and  levels of clearances are appropriate, since this initial stage in the clearance  process can affect workloads and costs in other clearance stages. While  having a large number of cleared personnel can give the military services,  agencies, and industry a great deal of flexibility when assigning personnel,  having unnecessary requirements for security clearances increases the  investigative and adjudicative workloads that are required to provide the  clearances and flexibility, and further taxes a clearance process that  already experiences delays in determining clearance eligibility. A change  in the level of clearances being requested also increases the investigative  and adjudicative workloads. For example, an increase in the proportion of  investigations at the top secret level increases workloads and costs  because top secret clearances must be renewed twice as often as secret  clearances (i.e., every 5 years versus every 10 years). In August 2006, OPM  estimated that approximately 60 total staff hours are needed for each  investigation for an initial top secret clearance and 6 total staff hours are  needed for each investigation to support a secret or confidential clearance.  The doubling of the frequency along with the increased effort to  investigate and adjudicate each top secret reinvestigation adds costs and  workload for the government.
Cost. For fiscal year 2008, OPM’s standard billing rate is $3,711 for an  investigation for an initial top secret clearance; $2,509 for an investigation  to renew a top secret clearance, and $202 for an investigation for a secret  clearance. The cost of obtaining and maintaining a top secret clearance for  10 years is approximately 30 times greater than the cost of obtaining and  maintaining a secret clearance for the same period. For example, an  individual getting a top secret clearance for the first time and keeping the  clearance for 10 years would cost the government a total of $6,220 in  current year dollars ($3,711 for the initial investigation and $2,509 for the  reinvestigation after the first 5 years). In contrast, an individual receiving a  secret clearance and maintaining it for 10 years would result in a total cost  to the government of $202 ($202 for the initial clearance that is good for 10  years).
Time/Workload. The workload is also affected by the scope of coverage in  the various types of investigations. Much of the information for a secret  clearance is gathered through electronic files. However, the investigation  for a top secret clearance requires the information needed for the secret  clearance as well as data gathered through time-consuming tasks such as  interviews with the subject of the investigation request, references in the  workplace, and neighbors. The investigative workload for a top secret  clearance increases about 20-fold compared to the workload for a secret  clearance, since (1) the average investigative report for a top secret  clearance takes about 10 times as many investigative staff hours as the  average investigative report for a secret clearance, and (2) the top secret  clearance must be renewed twice as often as the secret. Additionally, the  adjudicative workload increases about 4-fold. In 2007, DOD officials  estimated that it took about twice as long to review an investigative report  for a top secret clearance, which would need to be done twice as often as  for a secret clearance.
We are not suggesting that the numbers and levels of clearances are or are  not appropriate—only that any unnecessary requirements in this initial  phase use government resources that can be utilized for other purposes,  such as building additional quality into other clearance processes or  decreasing delays in clearance processing. Unless reforms ensure a strong  requirements-determination process is present, workload and costs may  be higher than necessary.
section_title: Building Quality in All Processes Could Promote Positive Outcomes Such as Greater Clearance Reciprocity
paragraphs: We have emphasized—since the late 1990s—a need to build more quality  and quality monitoring throughout the clearance process to promote  positive outcomes such as greater clearance reciprocity. In our November  2005 testimony on the previous governmentwide strategic plan to improve  the clearance process, we noted that the plan devoted little attention to  monitoring and improving the quality of the personnel security clearance  process, and that limited attention and reporting about quality continues.  In addition, when OMB issued its February 2007 annual report on security  clearances, it documented quality with a single metric in one of the six  phases of the security clearance process (i.e., requirements setting,  application submission, investigation, adjudication, appeal, and clearance  updating). OMB stated that overall, less than 1 percent of all completed  investigations are returned to OPM from the adjudicating agencies for  quality deficiencies. When OMB issued its February 2008 annual report on  security clearances, it did not discuss the percentage of completed  investigations that are returned to OPM or the development or existence  of any other metric measuring the level of quality in security clearance  processes or products.
We have also reported that it is problematic to equate the quality of  investigations with the percentage of investigations that are returned by  requesting agencies due to incomplete case files. For example, in October  1999 and again in our November 2005 evaluation of the governmentwide  strategic plan, we stated that the number of investigations returned for  rework is not by itself a valid indicator of quality because adjudication  officials said they were reluctant to return incomplete investigations as  they anticipated this would lead to further delays. As part of our  September 2006 report, we examined a different aspect of quality—the  completeness of documentation in investigative and adjudicative reports.  We found that OPM provided some incomplete investigative reports to  DOD adjudicators, which the adjudicators then used to determine top  secret clearance eligibility. In addition, DOD adjudicators granted  clearance eligibility without requesting additional information for any of  the incomplete investigative reports and did not document that they  considered some adjudicative guidelines when adverse information was  present in some reports. In our September 2006 report, we recommended  that regardless of whether the metric on investigations returned for  rework continues to be used, OMB’s Deputy Director for Management  should require OPM and DOD to develop and report metrics on  investigative and adjudicative completeness and other measures of quality.  In his comments to our report, OMB’s Deputy Director for Management  did not take exception to this recommendation. We are currently  reviewing the timeliness and quality of DOD personnel security clearances  in ongoing work and plan to review any actions taken by OMB with regard  to this recommendation.
In September 2006, we also reported that while eliminating delays in  clearance processes is an important goal, the government cannot afford to  achieve that goal at the expense of quality. We additionally reported that  the lack of full reciprocity of clearances is an outgrowth of agencies’  concerns that other agencies may have granted clearances based on  inadequate investigations and adjudications. An interagency working  group, the Security Clearance Oversight Steering Committee, noted that  agencies are reluctant to be accountable for poor quality investigations or  adjudications conducted by other agencies or organizations. To achieve  fuller reciprocity, clearance-granting agencies need to have confidence in  the quality of the clearance process. Without full documentation of  investigative actions, information obtained, and adjudicative decisions,  agencies could continue to require duplicative investigations and  adjudications.
It will be important for any reform process to incorporate both quality and  quality monitoring and reporting throughout the clearance process. In  their absence, reciprocity concerns will continue to exist and Congress  will not have sufficient information to perform its oversight function.
section_title: Government Clearance Metrics Emphasize Timeliness Measurement, but Additional Metrics Could Provide a Fuller Picture of Clearance Processes
paragraphs: As we testified in February 2008, reform efforts should also consider  metrics beyond timeliness to evaluate the clearance processes and  procedures and to provide a more complete picture of the performance of  a reformed clearance process. Prior GAO reports as well as inspector  general reports identify a wide variety of methods and metrics that  program evaluators have used to examine clearance processes and  programs. For example, our 1999 report on security clearance  investigations used multiple methods to examine numerous issues that  included    documentation missing from investigative reports;   investigator training (courses, course content, and number of trainees);   investigators’ perceptions about the process;    customer perceptions about the investigations; and  internal controls to protect against fraud, waste, abuse, and  mismanagement.
Much of the recent quantitative information provided on clearances has  dealt with how much time it takes for the end-to-end processing of  clearances (and related measures such as the numbers of various types of  investigative and adjudicative reports generated); however, there is less  quantitative information on other aspects of the clearance process such as  the metrics listed above. In February 2008, we noted that including these  additional metrics could add value in monitoring clearance processes and  provide a more complete picture of the performance of a reformed  clearance process. In our November 2005 testimony, we noted that a  previous government plan to improve the clearance process placed an  emphasis on monitoring the timeliness of clearances governmentwide, but  that plan detailed few of the other elements that a comprehensive strategic  plan might contain.
An underlying factor that places emphasis on timeliness is the Intelligence  Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Among other  things, IRTPA established specific timeliness guidelines to be phased in  over 5 years. The act states that, in the initial period that ends in 2009,  each authorized adjudicative agency shall make a determination on at  least 80 percent of all applications for personnel security clearances  within an average of 120 days after the receipt of the application for a  security clearance by an authorized investigative agency. This 120-day  period includes no more than 90 days to complete the investigative phase  of the clearance review and a period of not longer than 30 days to  complete the adjudicative phase of the clearance review. By December 17,  2009, the act will require that adjudicative agencies make a determination  on at least 90 percent of all applications for a security clearance within an  average of 60 days after the date of receipt of the application, including no  more than 40 days for the investigation and 20 days for the adjudication.  Moreover, IRTPA also includes a requirement for a designated agency  (currently OMB) to provide information on, among other things, the  timeliness of security clearance determinations in annual reports to  Congress through 2011, as OMB did most recently in February 2008. While  timeliness is important, other metrics are also needed to evaluate a  reformed clearance process.
section_title: Long-Term Funding Requirements Information Could Enable More- Informed Congressional Oversight of Security Clearance Reform
paragraphs: In February 2008, we recommended that the Joint Reform Team also  provide Congress with long-term funding requirements as it develops plans  to reform the security clearance process. We have previously reported that  DOD has not provided Congress with long-term funding needs for industry  personnel security clearances. In February 2008, we reported that in its  August 2007 report to Congress, DOD provided funding requirements  information that described its immediate needs for its industry personnel  security program, but it did not include information about the program’s  long-term funding needs. Specifically, DOD’s August 2007 required report  on clearances for industry personnel provided less than 2 years of data on  funding requirements. In its report, DOD identified its immediate needs by  submitting an annualized projected cost of $178.2 million for fiscal year  2007 and a projected funding need of approximately $300 million for fiscal  year 2008. However, the report did not include information on (1) the  funding requirements for fiscal year 2009 and beyond even though the  survey used to develop the funding requirements asked contractors about  their clearance needs through 2010 and (2) the tens of millions of dollars  that the Defense Security Service Director testified before Congress in  May 2007 were necessary to maintain the infrastructure supporting the  industry personnel security clearance program.
As noted in our February 2008 report, limiting or excluding funding  information in security clearance reports for Congress and the executive  branch reduces the utility of those reports in developing and overseeing  budgets for reform. In addition, the long-term funding requirements to  implement changes to security clearance processes are also needed to  enable the executive branch to compare and prioritize alternative  proposals for reforming the clearance processes especially as the nation’s  fiscal imbalances constrain federal funding. Without information on long- term funding requirements, both Congress and the executive branch will  not have sufficient information to perform their budget oversight and  development functions.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: We are encouraged that the Joint Reform Team issued an initial plan to  develop a reformed federal government security clearance process. As the  Joint Reform Team develops its reform initiatives, we encourage the team  to consider the four factors highlighted in my statement today. As much  remains to be done before a new system can be designed and  implemented, we look forward to evaluating the Joint Reform Team’s  efforts to assist Congress in its oversight.
Chairman Akaka and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my  prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may  have at this time.
section_title: Contact and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at  (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this  testimony are David E. Moser, Assistant Director; Renee S. Brown; Shvetal  Khanna; James P. Klein; Caryn Kuebler; Ron La Due Lake; Gregory  Marchand; and Brian D. Pegram.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform  Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.: February  27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts  to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. GAO-08-470T.  Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable  More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.:  February 13, 2008.
Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some  Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.  GAO-08-35. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Defense Business Transformation: A Full-time Chief Management  Officer with a Term Appointment Is Needed at DOD to Maintain  Continuity of Effort and Achieve Sustainable Success. GAO-08-132T.  Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation  Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17,  2007.
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port  Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January  2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to  Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington, D.C.:  September 28, 2006.
Managing Sensitive Information: DOD Can More Effectively Reduce the  Risk of Classification Errors. GAO-06-706. Washington, D.C.: June 30,  2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record  Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security  Clearance Process. GAO-06-693R. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances  for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments  Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2006.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance  Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process.  GAO-06-323R. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain. GAO-06- 233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
Defense Management: Better Review Needed of Program Protection  Issues Associated with Manufacturing Presidential Helicopters. GAO-06- 71SU. Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2005.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance  Program. GAO-05-988R. Washington, D.C.: August 19, 2005.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Ensure Its Oversight of Contractors  under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient. GAO-05-681. Washington, D.C.: July  15, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles  Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk  Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
DOD’s High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires  Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T.  Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January  2005.
Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11  Commission’s Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.:  September 14, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce  Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for  Industry Personnel. GAO-04-632. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to  Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for  Industry Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its  Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332.  Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to  Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344. Washington,  D.C.: February 9, 2004.
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