Homeland Security: Civil Air Patrol Involved in Certain Missions, but DHS Should Assess the Benefits of Further Involvement
Published: 2012-11-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Homeland security partnerships may grow increasingly important as fiscal constraints provide impetus for federal agencies to look to partners for mission support. One partner is CAP, a congressionally chartered, federally funded, nonprofit corporation with approximately 61,000 volunteer members that can function as the auxiliary of the U.S. Air Force. CAP conducts missions throughout the United States, including counterdrug, disaster relief, and search and rescue, using mostly single-engine aircraft. The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2012 DHS appropriations act directed that GAO study the functions and capabilities of CAP to support homeland security missions. In response to the mandate, this report addresses (1) the extent to which CAP has been used to perform homeland security missions to date at the local, state, and federal levels, and (2) the factors that should be considered in determining CAP's ability to support additional homeland security missions and the extent to which DHS has assessed CAP's capabilities and resources to accomplish such missions. GAO reviewed laws and guidance; analyzed fiscal year 2011 CAP flight data; and interviewed officials from DHS, the Air Force, CAP, and a nongeneralizable sample of 10 of 52 state-level CAP wings.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Civil Air Patrol (CAP) has performed certain homeland security missions for federal, state, and local customers, but devotes the majority of its flying hours to training and youth programs. Several of CAP's mission areas fit within the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) definition of homeland security, as found in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (QHSR)--a strategic framework for homeland security. For example, CAP disaster assistance and air defense activities relate to the QHSR mission areas of ensuring resilience to disasters and preventing terrorism and enhancing security, respectively. CAP has performed some of these activities in support of DHS components, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Coast Guard, as well as state and local governments. For example, CAP has provided disaster imagery to FEMA, performed certain border reconnaissance for CBP, and assisted the Coast Guard in providing air support during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. CAP has also performed homeland security-related activities for other customers, such as the U.S. Air Force. For example, 9 of the 10 CAP wings GAO spoke with had participated in military readiness exercises where CAP aircraft provided mock targets for military interceptor aircraft or ground-based radar. CAP's participation in homeland security activities accounted for approximately 9 percent of its fiscal year 2011 flying hours, but the majority of its flying hours (approximately 63 percent) were devoted to training and flying orientation, with the remaining devoted to other activities such as counterdrug and maintenance.
Several factors affect CAP's ability to support homeland security missions, and DHS and its components have not yet assessed how CAP could be used to perform certain homeland security missions. These factors--including legal parameters, mission funding, existing capabilities, and capacity--were issues cited by the DHS components and Air Force and CAP officials GAO contacted that could affect CAP's suitability for additional homeland security missions. For example, as an Air Force auxiliary, CAP is subject to laws and regulations governing the use of the military in support of law enforcement, which, among other things, allow CAP to conduct aerial surveillance in certain situations, but preclude its participation in the interdiction of vehicles, vessels, or aircraft. Similarly, while CAP's existing operational capabilities--aircraft and vehicles, personnel, and technology--position it well to support certain homeland security missions, they also limit its suitability for others. For example, FEMA officials cited the role of CAP imagery in providing useful situational awareness during the initial stages of some past natural disasters, while, in contrast, officials from CBP and the Coast Guard noted limitations such as inadequate imagery capabilities and insufficient detection technology. Although the components we contacted provided varying opinions regarding CAP's suitability for certain homeland security activities, DHS has not assessed CAP's capabilities and resources or determined the extent to which CAP could be used to support future homeland security activities. By assessing the ability of CAP to provide additional homeland security capabilities in a budget-constrained environment, DHS in coordination with the Air Force could position itself to better understand, and potentially utilize, another resource to accomplish its homeland security missions.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DHS, in coordination with the Air Force, cost-effectively assess the extent to which CAP can further assist DHS with future homeland security missions. DHS concurred with the recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The events of September 11, 2001, emphasized the concept of homeland  security as a shared responsibility across a variety of federal, state, local,  and private entities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—in its  2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (QHSR)—specified  five homeland security mission areas: (1) preventing terrorism and  enhancing security, (2) securing and managing our borders, (3) enforcing  and administering our immigration laws, (4) safeguarding and securing  cyberspace, and (5) ensuring resilience to disasters. The QHSR report  highlights the importance of partnerships among federal, state, local,  tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private sector entities in  accomplishing these missions, and, more broadly, in ensuring the safety  and security of America and the American population. Such partnerships  may assume increasing importance as fiscal constraints provide impetus  for federal agencies to look to community partners to provide more  support for homeland security activities.
The Civil Air Patrol (CAP) is a congressionally chartered, private,  nonprofit corporation that functions as an auxiliary to the United States Air  Force when providing support to a federal agency. In fiscal year 2012,  Congress appropriated approximately $38 million to fund CAP. CAP’s  membership includes approximately 61,000 volunteer members spread  across 52 wings located in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and  Puerto Rico. Using mostly single-engine aircraft, CAP conducts a variety  of missions in support of federal, state, local, and nongovernmental  entities, including search and rescue, counterdrug, disaster relief, air  defense training, and communications support, among others. The  conference report accompanying the DHS appropriations act for fiscal  year 2012 directed GAO to study and report on the functions and  capabilities of CAP to support homeland security missions.to this mandate, this report addresses  1)  the extent to which CAP has been used to perform certain  homeland security missions to date at the local, state, and federal  levels, and  2)  the factors that should be considered in determining CAP’s ability  to support additional homeland security missions and the extent to  which DHS has assessed CAP’s capabilities and resources to  accomplish such missions.
To determine the extent that CAP has been used to perform homeland  security missions, we analyzed CAP flight hours to determine the number  and type of homeland security missions conducted by CAP based on the  five homeland security missions outlined by DHS’s QHSR. Specifically,  we analyzed flight data from fiscal year 2011, as the most recent full year  of flight data available at the time of our review, and spoke with CAP wing  officials regarding their participation in missions over the last few years to  determine any trends in CAP’s participation in homeland security  missions for federal, state, and local customers. To assess the reliability  of these data, we spoke with CAP officials to gain an understanding of the  processes and databases used to collect and record flight data and to  understand existing quality control procedures and known limitations. For  the purposes of our report, we found these data to be sufficiently reliable.  We also interviewed officials from DHS and its components, CAP  headquarters, 10 out of 52 CAP wings, and the U.S. Air Force. We  selected the 10 CAP wings based on their involvement in homeland  security activities in the National Capital Region, along the border, and in  disaster-prone areas. While these interviews are not generalizeable to all  CAP wings across the country, they provided a range of perspectives  related to CAP operations and homeland security missions. Finally, we  also interviewed officials from the Department of Justice’s Drug  Enforcement Administration to discuss CAP’s role in counterdrug  operations as well as their views on CAP’s effectiveness during these  missions.
To determine the factors that should be considered in determining CAP’s  ability to support additional homeland security missions, and the extent to  which DHS and its components have assessed the capabilities and  resources of CAP to accomplish such missions, we reviewed pertinent  laws, regulations, and internal CAP guidance for any restrictions on  CAP’s activities, as well as selected mission paperwork and current and  past agreements between CAP and other organizations to identify  common parameters for CAP operations. In addition, we interviewed CAP  and Air Force officials regarding any specific mission approval criteria and  funding requirements, and analyzed flight data to determine any trends  that might reflect on CAP’s capacity to assume additional missions.  Further, we interviewed DHS components regarding their past  experiences with CAP during homeland security-type operations, their  overall assessment of CAP’s performance during these operations, and  their willingness to continue to use CAP for these missions based on past  experiences. We also interviewed DHS and component officials to identify  any assessments DHS or its components have conducted related to  CAP’s role in homeland security. Specifically, we spoke with officials from  DHS’s Office of Policy, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the  Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Coast Guard  to discuss their experiences and relationships with CAP as well as their  views on expanding CAP’s role in other homeland security missions. We  also interviewed Air Force and CAP officials and reviewed relevant  documentation to identify past or ongoing efforts to develop formal  agreements between CAP and DHS related to future homeland security  assistance. We compared DHS’s efforts to assess CAP’s capabilities and  resources with our past work on effective collaboration and on conducting  assessments to determine the extent to which DHS had assessed CAP  as a potential homeland security partner.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2012 through  November 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DHS’s Mission
paragraphs: In early 2010, DHS defined its mission and strategy for responding to  homeland security threats. The result of this effort was the completion of  the QHSR report––a strategic framework to guide the activities of  participants in homeland security toward a common goal. One of the key  themes of the QHSR report is the importance of sharing homeland  security responsibilities across a variety of actors including federal, state,  local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private sector entities.  Emphasizing this shared responsibility, the QHSR report notes that in  some areas—such as border security or immigration management—DHS  possesses unique capabilities and responsibilities that are not likely to be found elsewhere. However, in other areas, such as critical infrastructure  protection or emergency management, DHS mainly provides leadership  and stewardship because the capabilities for these areas are often found  at the state and local levels.
section_title: History and Administrative Structure of CAP
paragraphs: In December 1941, CAP was established out of the desire of civil airmen  of the country to be mobilized with their equipment in the common  defense of the Nation. Under the jurisdiction of the Army’s Air Forces,  CAP pilots were active during World War II, performing border patrol,  search and rescue, and emergency transport, among other missions. In  1946, CAP was established as a federally chartered organization. In  1948, shortly after the Air Force was established, CAP was designated as  the civilian auxiliary of the Air Force, and later, in October 2000, CAP  was designated as the volunteer civilian auxiliary of the Air Force when  CAP provides services to any department or agency in any branch of the  federal government.cadet programs, and emergency services.
CAP has three missions: aerospace education,  As a nonprofit organization, CAP has a unique relationship with the Air  Force, which may use CAP’s services to fulfill its noncombat programs  and missions. The Secretary of the Air Force governs the conduct of CAP  when it is operating as the auxiliary of the Air Force and prescribes  regulations governing the conduct of CAP. CAP is embedded in the Air  Force’s command structure under the Air Education and Training  Command. provides technical advice to ensure flying safety, ensures that CAP’s  federal funds are used appropriately, and provides building space, among  other things. CAP also has its own administrative structure governed by  a volunteer national commander, national vice-commander, and an 11  member Board of Governors. A paid chief operating officer manages  CAP’s headquarters at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama.
The Air Force’s Air Education and Training Command provides basic military training,  initial and advanced technical training, flight training, and professional military and degree- granting professional education.
However, the chief operating officer has no command authority over the  volunteers and assets spread throughout the United States.
section_title: Field Organization and Resources of CAP
paragraphs: CAP is divided into eight geographic regions consisting of 52 state wings  (the 50 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia). Each state wing  is divided into smaller squadrons, of which there are approximately 1,500  nationwide. CAP has more than 61,000 members divided between cadet  (26,725) and adult (34,693) members. According to CAP officials, of the  adult members, there are approximately 3,000 active mission pilots.Nonpilot adult members contribute to the organization in various ways,  serving as crew members, administering wing operations, and managing  cadet programs, among other things. CAP has 550 single-engine aircraft,  42 gliders, and 960 vehicles. Figure 1 depicts a CAP aircraft.
The majority of CAP’s operating budget comes from funds included in the  Department of Defense’s appropriation and designated by Congress for  CAP. CAP is included in the Air Force’s internal budgeting process and  submits each year a financial plan to the Air Force for consideration.  CAP’s financial plan is reviewed and adjusted by both the Air Education  and Training Command and Air Force headquarters. According to an Air  Force official involved with CAP’s budget submission, the Air Force  attempts to ensure that CAP receives at least the same amount of  funding it had the previous year. However, CAP is competing against  other Air Force priorities in the normal Air Force budget development  process. Still, according to the Air Force official, CAP often receives  additional funding from Congress above the Air Force’s request. For  example, in fiscal year 2011, Congress provided an additional $4.2 million  of funding above the Air Force’s request. See table 1 for CAP’s  appropriations since fiscal year 2007.
The funds in table 1 are used to reimburse CAP for some Air Force- assigned missions, cover the costs associated with maintenance, and  fund aircraft and other procurement, including vehicles. For example,  these funds cover mission costs associated with some Air Force- assigned missions, such as air intercept exercises and counterdrug  activities. CAP also receives mission reimbursement from other federal,  state, and local agencies. For example, in fiscal year 2011, FEMA  reimbursed CAP approximately $155,000 for a variety of disaster-related  missions. In addition, CAP receives funding from other sources  throughout the course of the year, including state appropriations,  membership dues, and member contributions. In fiscal year 2011, CAP  received approximately $3.2 million in appropriations from 37 states.  State funding is sometimes earmarked for a specific state activity, such  as disaster response. CAP also received in fiscal year 2011 $3,076,925 in  membership dues.
CAP can conduct missions either as an auxiliary of the Air Force or in its  corporate status. Approximately 75 percent of CAP’s missions are  conducted in Air Force auxiliary status. While all missions in support of  federal agencies must be conducted in its Air Force auxiliary status, CAP  may conduct missions in its corporate status on behalf of state and local  agencies and nongovernmental organizations. CAP pilots are not  afforded federal protections when they fly in corporate status.
All requests for CAP operational missions––with the exception of  corporate missions and those for Alaska and Hawaii––are coordinated  through CAP’s National Operations Center and approved by 1st Air  Force. Agencies requesting CAP support contact the CAP National  Operations Center with a formal request for support. The National  Operations Center works with the requesting agency and the CAP wing to  develop an operations plan, budget, and funding documents for the  mission. These are then forwarded to 1st Air Force, which conducts legal,  funding, operations, and risk management reviews to ensure that the  mission meets CAP requirements. Once these reviews are complete, the  Air Force can approve the mission and CAP can task its wings with the  assignment. CAP corporate missions undergo a similar review process— wherein legal, funding, and risk reviews are conducted—but are not  routed through the Air Force for approval.
section_title: CAP Has Performed Certain Homeland Security Missions for Federal, State, and Local Customers
paragraphs: Our review of fiscal year 2011 CAP flight hour data and discussions with  officials from 10 CAP wings show that CAP has performed missions that  fit within three of the five QHSR homeland security mission areas: (1)  preventing terrorism and enhancing security, (2) securing and managing  borders, and (3) disaster response. CAP missions related to these  areas have accounted for 9 percent of CAP’s flying hours; however, CAP  has devoted the majority of its flying hours (approximately 63 percent) to  training for these and other missions and cadet and Reserve Officer  Training Corps flying orientations. The remaining 28 percent of CAP’s  missions consisted chiefly of assistance to law enforcement for domestic  drug interdiction activities, such as marijuana crop identification, and  maintenance-related flights.
subsections: section_title: Air Force Auxiliary Missions Include Some Homeland Security Activities, but Consist Primarily of Training and Flight Orientation
paragraphs: CAP flight hour data for fiscal year 2011 show that CAP participated in a  variety of homeland security activities, but that a majority of the  organization’s Air Force-assigned flying time was devoted to training and  flying orientation for cadets and Reserve Officer Training Corps members.  Specifically, CAP devoted about 63 percent (46,132 hours) of its total Air  Force-assigned mission flying hours to training and flying orientations.Of the remaining 37 percent of Air Force-assigned flight hours, 9 percent  (6,575 hours) were dedicated to homeland security-related missions. For  example, CAP reported 2,583 Air Force-assigned hours devoted to air  defense, which includes CAP’s participation in the Department of  Defense’s low-flying aircraft readiness exercises and exercises for  training military pilots to intercept low-flying aircraft. These missions relate  to the homeland security mission area of preventing terrorism and  enhancing security. CAP also devoted 2,314 Air Force-assigned flight  hours to defense support to civilian authorities/disaster relief,  corresponding to the homeland security mission area of ensuring  resilience to disasters. Figure 2 provides a breakdown of CAP fiscal year  2011 flight hours by mission.
CAP headquarters and officials from all 10 CAP wings we spoke with  generally concurred that the fiscal year 2011 flight hours are reflective of  their activities in recent years—that is, training and cadet activities have  accounted for the majority of their missions. CAP intends for its training  and pilot certification missions to prepare its pilots and other volunteers to  perform homeland security-related missions. In addition, CAP wing  officials told us that they have modified training schedules to  accommodate the demand for real-world missions when they have  occurred—including those related to homeland security—and will  continue to do so in the future.
section_title: All 10 Select CAP Wings Performed Homeland Security Missions for Federal, State, and Local Customers
paragraphs: Officials from all 10 CAP wings we spoke with said their wings had  performed missions related to at least one of the three QHSR mission  areas covered by CAP for a variety of federal, state, and local customers.  For example, 9 of the 10 wings had contributed to preventing terrorism  and enhancing security by participating in military readiness exercises  where CAP aircraft acted as mock targets for airborne interceptors or  ground-based radar. In most cases CAP aircraft acted as slow-moving,  potentially hostile targets that were identified, tracked, and escorted by  active-duty, reserve or state Air National Guard radar or airborne fighters.  Figure 3 shows examples of these and other homeland security missions  conducted by the 10 CAP wings during fiscal years 2007 through 2012.
As part of efforts to secure and manage the nation’s borders, 3 of the 4  CAP wings shown in figure 3 that share a land border with Mexico or  Canada were involved in various reconnaissance activities for federal  customers that included flights over border regions to identify suspicious  activity.conducted reconnaissance for suspicious persons and vehicles in the  Barry Goldwater Air Force Testing Range, which is located on the border  with Mexico. Similarly, Texas CAP officials stated that they had  conducted border reconnaissance missions in support of CBP operations  along the state’s border with Mexico. According to CBP officials, these  reconnaissance missions were for monitoring, detection, and reporting of  any suspicious border activity observed. New Mexico CAP officials stated  that they had not performed any specific border-related missions in recent  years, but that they were interested in doing so and in the process of  conducting outreach to potential federal, state, and local customers to  offer their services in this area.
For example, as shown in figure 3, the Arizona CAP wing  As part of efforts to ensure resilience to disasters, officials from 7 of the  10 CAP wings stated they had engaged in disaster assistance operations  for a variety of federal, state, and local customers. CAP wings provided  imaging technology for post storm damage assessments for the National  Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, FEMA, and state and  local emergency management officials. Two of the 7 CAP wings that  indicated involvement in disaster assistance also stated that they had  engaged in reconnaissance for wildfires in response to requests from  both federal and state officials.
Officials from all 10 of the wings we contacted also told us they have  provided support to local governments (i.e., counties and municipalities),  including search and rescue missions. While search and rescue does not  strictly fit within the QHSR homeland security mission areas, DHS has  noted that search and rescue activities are often intertwined with and  mutually supporting of homeland security activities.
section_title: Key Factors Affect CAP’s Ability to Support Homeland Security Missions; Assessment of CAP Capabilities and Resources Could Inform Decision- Making
paragraphs: There are several factors that may affect CAP’s ability to support existing  and emerging homeland security missions, including legal parameters,  mission funding and reimbursement, existing capabilities, and capacity.  While some of these factors were cited by the DHS components we  contacted as issues that could affect CAP’s suitability for additional  homeland security missions, neither DHS nor the components have  assessed how CAP could be used to perform certain homeland security  missions.
subsections: section_title: Several Factors May Affect CAP’s Ability to Support Homeland Security Missions
subsections: section_title: Legal Parameters Guide CAP’s Mission Involvement
paragraphs: As a volunteer auxiliary of the Air Force, CAP is subject to laws and  regulations governing the use of the military in support of law  enforcement and is thus limited in the types of support it can provide.  Specifically, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the Air Force and Army  from playing an active and direct role in civilian law enforcement except  where authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. However,  federal law authorizes the military—and by extension, CAP—to provide  limited support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. For  example, Department of Defense and CAP personnel made available to a  civilian law enforcement agency may conduct aerial reconnaissance, and  detect, monitor, and communicate on the movement of certain air, sea,  and surface traffic.
In providing support to civilian law enforcement agencies, CAP is  precluded from participating in the interdiction of vehicles, vessels, or  aircraft, or in search, seizure, arrest, apprehension, surveillance, pursuit,  or similar activity. and law enforcement officers in direct support of an ongoing mission, or  when hostilities are imminent. CBP officials told us that because of  these restrictions, CAP is unable to provide the type of support that is  necessary for some law enforcement activities. In addition, officials from  the Coast Guard noted concerns with CAP’s access to classified  information that may further limit the range of missions CAP can  support. According to Air Force officials, the approval process for law  enforcement support activities involving the monitoring of air, sea, or  surface traffic is lengthy, requiring consent from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense.standing agreements with law enforcement agencies could help enable  CAP to support such requests on shorter notice.
U.S. Air Force, Air Force Instruction 10-2701, Organization and Function of the Civil Air  Patrol (Jul. 2005, Incorporating Change 1, September 2006).
section_title: Additional Homeland Security Missions May Require Reimbursement
paragraphs: CAP’s ability to provide support is often contingent on its customers’  ability and willingness to pay CAP for its services—making the availability  of mission funding a key consideration in determining whether CAP can  support additional homeland security missions. Per Air Force guidance,  CAP ordinarily conducts missions on a cost-reimbursable basis. Typically,  any federal agency requesting CAP assistance through the Air Force  must certify that its request complies with the Economy Act, which  requires that requesting agencies have available the monies necessary to  cover the expense of the service being requested, among other things.  CAP’s reimbursement rate as of October 2012 was $160 per flying hour,  covering fuel and maintenance. According to CAP and Air Force  officials, formal agreements between CAP and requesting  organizations—such as those that exist between some CAP wings and  state-level entities—can expedite the approval process by identifying  funding mechanisms prior to CAP support.
While CAP typically requires reimbursement for its support activities,  some of CAP’s missions are financed through federally appropriated  funds. Some of these missions were identified by officials from CAP or  DHS components as areas in which CAP could provide further support.  For example, CAP has received since 2004 in its annual operations and  maintenance budget an allotment for counterdrug activities, and therefore  conducts many of its counterdrug missions at no expense to the  customer. Additionally, the Air Force funds through the CAP appropriation  a range of activities deemed to be of interest to the Air Force, including  inland search and rescue. According to CAP officials, CAP’s current  funding levels are sufficient to support these activities. However, an  increase in such unreimbursed activities could affect CAP’s ability to  respond to other missions supported by appropriated funds. For example,  CAP officials told us that, because of the counterdrug nexus, border  reconnaissance missions in support of CBP are also typically funded by  the CAP operations budget instead of reimbursed by the customer.  Consequently, an increase in such unreimbursed border reconnaissance  missions—which relate to the homeland security area of securing and  managing our borders—could diminish CAP’s ability to support other  unreimbursed activities, such as counterdrug activities for the Drug  Enforcement Administration and others.
According to CAP and DHS officials, CAP’s existing operational  capabilities—aircraft and vehicles, personnel, and technology—have  been sufficient to support certain homeland security missions, yet they  may not be suitable for other types of missions. Recognizing this, officials  from CAP headquarters told us that if DHS identified additional homeland  security missions for CAP, it might be necessary to pursue additional  resources or technologies.
According to CAP officials, the number and locations of CAP’s assets— which include 550 aircraft and 960 vehicles across 52 wings—could be  conducive to conducting additional homeland security missions, which  can originate at the local, state, and federal levels. CAP’s aircraft,  primarily consisting of Cessna 172s and 182s, are capable of performing  aerial reconnaissance and damage assessment, search and rescue  missions, and air intercept exercises. FEMA officials told us that because  CAP’s assets are geographically dispersed across the country, it has  proven to be a flexible and timely resource to capture imagery in the first  hours or days of an event. As an example, FEMA officials cited CAP’s  support of the agency’s operations in response to Hurricane Isaac in  2012, specifically stating that CAP’s imagery helped to establish  situational awareness. CAP’s vehicles are capable of light transport of  personnel and equipment, mobile communications, and ground damage  assessment. Many vehicles are also equipped with radios that are able to  communicate with CAP aircraft, which could enable a coordinated  approach to air and land missions. CAP and Air Force officials stated that  they would be open to repositioning aircraft and vehicles in order to meet  demands associated with an increased homeland security workload and  the needs of their customers.
CAP’s standardized fleet does have functional limitations. For example,  CAP’s single-engine aircraft have limited transport capacity. Additionally,  CAP guidance prohibits sustained flight at an altitude of less than 1,000  feet during the day or 2,000 feet at night. This limitation was also cited by  Coast Guard officials, who specifically stated that during the Deepwater  Horizon incident, CAP was unable to fly certain oil tracking missions  because of altitude restrictions. A Coast Guard official further noted that  the range of CAP’s aircraft was limited over water—with aircraft being  required to stay within gliding distance of shore. CAP officials told us,  however, that CAP aircraft are able to operate up to 50 nautical miles  from shore under normal conditions, and that this range can be extended  for special missions.
CAP officials stated that, since CAP is a volunteer organization, its  membership—consisting of 61,000 volunteers, including approximately  35,000 senior members and 11,000 crew members—constitutes its most  critical asset. According to CAP officials, CAP has standards and  qualifications for its member pilots and maintains online systems that  train, test, and track all aspects of crew qualifications. For example,  CAP’s mission pilots must possess a private pilot’s license with 200 flight  hours, and are required to complete training courses specific to search  and rescue and disaster response. Those performing specialized  missions are also subject to more stringent requirements. For example,  counterdrug mission pilots must (1) be qualified for emergency services  flights; (2) be current in a skill that has application to the counterdrug  program; (3) complete a national counterdrug orientation course and,  biennially, a refresher course; and (4) maintain a minimum of 20 hours of  participation in the program yearly. Many of CAP’s members have also  completed training in the National Incident Management System in order  to allow CAP personnel to integrate operationally with local, state, and  federal incident command structures. Officials from some of the  customer organizations we spoke with cited the professionalism of CAP’s  personnel as a factor contributing to their success during past operations.  For example, the Coast Guard Director of Air Operations during the  Deepwater Horizon oil spill told us that CAP personnel conducting high  profile shoreline and oil boom patrols were well-organized.
However, limitations in the quantity and expertise of mission pilots exist  that may hinder CAP’s ability to support some activities. For example,  CAP’s membership includes 3,000 mission pilots, representing  approximately 5 percent of total membership. Although CAP has in the  past demonstrated its ability to temporarily transfer pilots to support surge  missions—such as during the Deepwater Horizon incident—it could face  challenges in increasing its support to sustained, long-term homeland  security missions, particularly if those missions were to occur in areas  with few mission pilots. Officials from CAP headquarters pointed towards  their past successes in supporting surge missions, but they also  recognized that there could be challenges associated with frequently  moving pilots to meet mission demands since the pilots are volunteers.  Coast Guard officials we spoke with questioned whether CAP, because of  its volunteer status, would consistently have pilots available to respond  when needed and raised concerns that CAP pilots have limited expertise  in maritime situations and do not have water survival training—both of  which could be important requirements for many Coast Guard missions.  According to CAP officials, however, 521 CAP crew members have  completed water survival training consisting of classroom instruction and  a swim test.
CAP’s current technological capabilities in terms of imagery and  communications may both enable and limit its ability to support additional  homeland security operations. CAP currently has a variety of imagery and  communications technologies that can be used during some homeland  security operations to provide ground and airborne communications relay  and to capture geographically identifiable still-frame aerial imagery, and,  in some cases, full-motion video. CAP’s nationwide communications  capability includes high frequency and very high frequency AM and FM  fixed, mobile, and repeater systems capable of providing connectivity  during local, regional, and national events. CAP officials told us that these  capabilities have in the past proved essential in maintaining  communications during geographically dispersed operations. Table 2  depicts CAP’s imagery platforms.
According to officials at the DHS components with whom we spoke,  CAP’s existing technologies are sufficient to support some of the  homeland security activities we have previously discussed, such as  disaster assessment. Additionally, officials from CBP told us that CAP  technologies could help further with detection and monitoring along the  borders, providing radio relay in remote areas, and gaining situational  awareness in areas not currently supported by other air platforms.  However, officials from CBP and the Coast Guard also commented on  CAP’s limitations in the border and marine environments, citing  inadequate imagery capabilities, incompatible communications, and  insufficient detection technology. Specifically, officials from CBP  commented that CAP is incapable of providing a live video feed to its  customers, capturing nighttime imagery, providing a video downlink of  reconnaissance events, and transmitting information securely. These  same officials emphasized that other technologies not possessed by CAP  nationwide, including radar, forward-looking infrared cameras, and  change detection capabilities, are critical in the border environment.Coast Guard officials cited CAP’s inability to relay imagery in near-real  time and stated that its systems are not compatible with the Coast  Guard’s imagery or communications systems. As a result, the Coast  Guard has not coordinated with CAP regarding the expansion of CAP’s  role. Air Force and CAP officials recognized that CAP’s current  technology may not be suitable for certain missions and told us that if new  capabilities are needed to support additional homeland security missions,  requirements would be needed from DHS. CAP officials also noted that  1st Air Force has developed a requirement to modify or purchase 20  aircraft with capabilities including near-real time communications; video  and imagery transfer that is interoperable with federal, state, and local  responders; and sensors useful for locating distressed persons day or  night.
CAP’s daily operational tempo is the percentage of total possible missions being flown  based on the number of available aircraft and pilot availability. CAP’s goal is to have five  mission pilots per each available aircraft. CAP has not determined what level constitutes  its maximum operating capacity. enabled cell phones and locator beacons—to receive other assistance.  This shift has freed up additional time for CAP to conduct other missions.
Officials we spoke with from the Coast Guard expressed some concern  over relying on a volunteer organization like CAP because it does not  have the same readiness posture and response standards as the Coast  Guard. However, our discussions with these officials and the CAP wings  identified no instances in which CAP was unable to respond to a request,  or in which CAP was delayed in responding to a request because of a  shortage of pilots or other personnel. According to CAP officials, CAP has  also demonstrated an ability to surge in support of other agencies and to  perform continuous operations for a sustained period of time. For  example, CAP provided continuous support over 118 days during the  Deepwater Horizon incident. A Coast Guard official involved in this  operation corroborated CAP’s account of this operation, speaking highly  of its organization and ability to conduct missions. Also, while the Drug  Enforcement Administration is not a DHS component, officials from this  agency told us that they rely on CAP aerial communications and imagery  for approximately 2,500 counterdrug sorties per year and that they have  received positive feedback regarding CAP’s ability to conduct these  operations from their field agents. CAP officials stated that large  operations such as Deepwater Horizon do not necessarily affect CAP’s  ability to provide support in other areas throughout the year, but do  significantly reduce their operations and maintenance funds because  reimbursement does not cover these expenses. Further, while many of  CAP’s missions are preplanned, CAP and Air Force officials stated that  wings are tested biennially in a no-notice exercise, such as the  Department of Defense’s Ardent Sentry, to ensure that personnel can  assemble and deploy quickly to no-notice events.
section_title: DHS Has Not Assessed CAP’s Ability to Support Additional Homeland Security Missions
paragraphs: DHS has not assessed CAP’s capabilities and resources or determined  the extent to which CAP could be used to support future homeland  security activities. The DHS concept of homeland security, as articulated  in the QHSR, is that of a national enterprise, requiring the collective  efforts and shared responsibilities of federal, state, local,  nongovernmental, and private sector partners, among others. As we have  reported in the past, ensuring that capabilities are available for such  efforts requires effective planning and coordination in which capabilities  are realistically tested in order to identify and subsequently address  problems in partnership with relevant stakeholders. Additionally, we  have also reported that achieving results for the nation increasingly  requires collaboration among many different entities, and that because of  the nation’s long-range fiscal challenges, the federal government must  identify ways to deliver results more efficiently and in a way that is  consistent with its multiple demands and limited resources. However,  according to an official in the DHS Office of Policy, DHS has not  conducted a review to determine how CAP might be used by DHS or its  components, and DHS does not have a position on the use of CAP for  homeland security operations. Additionally, of the three DHS components  we contacted, only FEMA had taken steps to consider CAP’s suitability  for future homeland security activities and incorporate CAP in its  operational planning. Specifically, FEMA officials told us that they are  working with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to develop  requirements for CAP imagery and that they have included CAP in  several of their disaster planning annexes. According to these officials,  simple technological upgrades could improve FEMA’s ability to integrate  CAP’s imagery into its operations. The other two components we  contacted—CBP and the Coast Guard—had not assessed CAP’s ability  to support their operations, but expressed reservations about using CAP  for certain activities, as previously discussed.
Officials we spoke with from CAP and the Air Force expressed support for  FEMA’s efforts to develop imagery requirements for CAP. CAP officials  told us that they were optimistic that this effort would provide insight into  how CAP could better support its DHS customers. Similarly, Air Force  officials stated that, in order to determine whether CAP could support  additional DHS missions, DHS would first need to provide them with  requirements for missions and also obtain a good understanding of CAP’s  limitations—particularly in the area of support to law enforcement. To that  end, CAP and Air Force officials told us that they have performed  outreach to DHS, CBP, and FEMA in an effort to inform these potential  partners of their capabilities and establish formal agreements that would  define CAP’s role in providing support to such entities. By establishing  such relationships and assessing the ability of CAP to provide additional  homeland security capabilities, DHS, in coordination with the Air Force,  could position itself to better understand, and potentially utilize, another  resource to accomplish its homeland security missions.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DHS faces the difficult challenge of securing our homeland through a  wide range of missions from preventing terrorism, to securing our large  borders and shorelines, and planning for and responding to natural and  man-made disasters. Recognizing this challenge, DHS has emphasized  the importance of partnering with other federal, state, local, and private  entities to achieve its homeland security missions. Moreover, recent fiscal  constraints may compel federal agencies, such as DHS, to partner with  other organizations in order to accomplish their missions and achieve  their goals. CAP is one such potential partner, having performed various  missions since its inception in support of homeland security missions and  components. Several factors affect CAP’s ability to conduct these and  additional homeland security missions, including legal parameters,  mission funding and reimbursement, existing capabilities, and capacity. At  the same time, while some concerns exist among DHS components  about partnering with CAP, a cost-effective assessment of CAP’s  capabilities and resources, in coordination with the Air Force, could help  DHS to better identify whether CAP can assist with its future homeland  security missions.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which CAP might be able to further assist DHS  and its components in conducting homeland security missions, we  recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with  the Secretary of the Air Force, cost-effectively assess how CAP could be  used to accomplish certain homeland security missions based on the  factors described in this report, including legal parameters, mission  funding and reimbursement, capabilities, and operating capacity.
section_title: Agency Comments, Third-Party Views, and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS, CAP, and the Department of  Defense for review and comment. DHS concurred with our  recommendation, citing some challenges and constraints to the expanded  use of CAP for DHS missions as well as describing its plan to address our  recommendation. Specifically, DHS stated that its Office of the Chief  Financial Officer (Program Analysis and Evaluation Division), along with  components such as the Coast Guard will consider how DHS can make  efficient and effective use of CAP and other aviation capabilities. In  implementing our recommendation, it will be important for DHS to  consider all of the factors described in our report, including legal  parameters, mission funding and reimbursement, capabilities, and  operating capacity, as we recommended. This action would then address  the intent of our recommendation. DHS’s comments are reprinted in their  entirety in appendix I.
CAP also concurred with our recommendation, noting that it is prepared  to assist both DHS and the Air Force in assessing how it could be used to  support certain homeland security missions. CAP’s comments are  reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. The Department of Defense  elected to not provide written comments, but did—along with DHS and  CAP—provide technical comments that we incorporated into the report,  as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Secretary of Defense, CAP, appropriate congressional  committees, and other interested parties. This report is also available at  no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  either Carol Cha at (202) 512-4456 or chac@gao.gov or Brian Lepore at  (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Civil Air Patrol
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contacts named above, key contributors to this report  were Chris Currie, Assistant Director; Kimberly Seay, Assistant Director;  Chuck Bausell; Ryan D’Amore; Michele Fejfar; Mike Harmond; Tracey  King; and Dan Klabunde.