Operation Iraqi Freedom: Long-standing Problems Hampering Mail Delivery Need to Be Resolved
Published: 2004-04-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Mail is a morale booster for troops fighting overseas and for their families at home. More than 65 million pounds of letters and parcels were delivered to troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and problems with prompt and reliable mail delivery surfaced early in the conflict. Congress and the White House forwarded more than 300 inquiries about mail delivery problems to military postal officials. GAO was directed to review mail delivery to troops stationed in the Middle East. In this report, GAO assesses (1) the timeliness of mail delivery to and from troops in Operation Iraqi Freedom, (2) how mail delivery issues and problems during this operation compared with those experienced during Operations Desert Shield/Storm in 1991, and (3) efforts to identify actions to resolve problems in establishing mail operations for future contingencies.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The timeliness of mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom cannot be accurately assessed because the Department of Defense (DOD) does not have a reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. In general, DOD's transit time and test letter data show that mail delivery fell within the current wartime standard of 12 to 18 days. However, the methodology used to calculate transit times significantly understated actual delivery times. In the absence of reliable data, GAO conducted discussion groups with a non-representative sample of 127 service members who served in-theater. More than half reported they were dissatisfied with mail delivery, underscoring the negative impact it can have on troop morale. Despite differences in operational theaters and efforts by DOD postal planners to incorporate Operations Desert Shield/Storm experiences into planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, postal operations faced many of the same problems: difficulty with conducting joint-service mail operations; postal personnel who were inadequately trained and initially scarce owing to late deployments; and inadequate postal facilities, equipment, and transportation. The operations plan created for joint-service mail delivery contained certain assumptions key to its success but led to unforeseen consequences or did not occur. Also, plans for a Joint Postal Center were not fully put in place. One lesson learned from 1991 was carried out with success during Operation Iraqi Freedom: mail was transported overseas by dedicated contractor airlifts rather than by military. DOD has not officially tasked any entity to resolve the long-standing postal problems experienced during contingency operations. Moreover, the Military Postal Service Agency does not have the authority to ensure that these problems are addressed jointly. This agency and the military services, however, have taken some steps toward tackling these issues.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: On March 19, 2003, coalition forces led by the United States began  Operation Iraqi Freedom. The operation required a high level of  coordination and planning, especially in the area of support for the war  fighting troops. One such area of support—and a necessary component in  the maintenance of service members’ morale—was postal operations.  Effective postal operations are important to both the troops stationed in  theater and for their families and friends at home. Even though alternative  methods of communicating, such as the Internet and mobile phones,  became available to some troops and their families for the first time during  Operation Iraqi Freedom, the mail remained the main form of  communication and the delivery of goods.
More than 65 million pounds of letters and parcels were delivered to U.S.  Central Command’s contingency area of responsibility during calendar  year 2003. U.S. Central Command is the combatant command for  Operation Iraqi Freedom. The largest amount moved in a single month was  April 2003, when over 11 million pounds of mail was delivered. This  represents an average of just over 377,000 pounds per day−the equivalent  of about forty 40-foot-long trailers full of mail.
Problems with the prompt and reliable delivery of mail to troops during  Operation Iraqi Freedom surfaced during the first months of the conflict  and continued throughout. From February 23, 2003, through November 3,  2003, Congress and the White House forwarded to military postal officials  more than 300 inquiries concerned with the delivery of mail to and from  troops stationed in theater. The majority of these inquiries dealt with the  failure of troops to receive mail sent by their families and friends and with  other criticisms of the postal operations. The volume of inquiries served as  an indication that postal operations serving Operation Iraqi Freedom were  experiencing problems.
The Department of Defense (DOD) Appropriations Act, 2004, and also the  Senate Report to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2004, directed that we review mail delivery to troops stationed in the  Middle East and compare delivery efficiency issues from Operation Desert  Storm with those of Operation Iraqi Freedom. As agreed with your offices,  in this report we assess (1) the timeliness of mail delivery to and from  troops stationed in the Gulf Region, (2) how mail delivery issues and  problems experienced during Operation Iraqi Freedom compare with  those during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, and (3) efforts to identify  actions to resolve problems for future contingencies.
To address these objectives, we obtained and reviewed DOD guidance for  military postal operations. We collected, analyzed, and assessed the  reliability of transit time data. We interviewed DOD and Joint Staff  officials in charge of developing policy for postal operations and key  postal officials stationed at various postal agencies in the United States,  Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain about their views on the implementation of  postal operations. We conducted discussion groups with a  non-representative sample of 127 soldiers and marines serving in  Operation Iraqi Freedom to obtain their opinions on the quality of mail  service during the conflict. We conducted our review from August 2003  through March 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Further information on our scope and methodology  appears in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 created the independent U.S. Postal  Service and authorized it to make arrangements with DOD regarding the  performance of military postal services. Each military service managed its  own mail program until 1980, when DOD and the U.S. Postal Service  entered into an agreement for the joint provision of postal services for all  branches of the armed forces. The agreement created the Military Postal  Service Agency, which acts as an extension of the U.S. Postal Service  beyond the boundaries of U.S. sovereignty and must provide full postal  services, as nearly as practicable, for all DOD personnel overseas where  there is no U.S. Postal Service available. The Military Postal Service  Agency is DOD’s single manager for military postal functions. Although  this joint service agency is organizationally located under the Army  Adjutant General and depends on the Army for funding and staffing, the  Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics) is  responsible for the agency’s policies and oversight.
In October 2002, several months prior to U.S. and coalition troops crossing  the border into Iraq, a joint planning conference was held at U.S. Central  Command—the designated combatant command for Operation Iraqi  Freedom. The U.S. Central Command hosted the conference, bringing  together postal officials from all four military components, as well as the  U.S. Postal Service and the Military Postal Service Agency. The conference  led to the creation of a U.S. Central Command postal operating plan that  assigned roles and responsibilities for all joint postal operations during the  impending contingency.
The DOD doctrine for joint military operations states that postal support  for any contingency is coordinated by the combatant command in the  region. The combatant commander appoints a single-service postal  manager to direct, implement, and manage all postal operations in the  joint theater. Since the Gulf War in 1991, the single-service manager for  postal operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility has  been the Air Force’s 82nd Computer Support Squadron, currently assigned  to the Air Force’s Air Combat Command. However, U.S. Central Command  has the overriding responsibility for all operations in theater, including  postal operations.
The movement of mail from the Unites States to troops in the Iraqi theater  follows several complex logistical steps. Letters and parcels with military  addresses destined to Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain are sent to one of four  International Mail GatewaysNew York, San Francisco, Chicago and  Miamifor processing. According to Military Postal Service Agency data,  90 percent of all letters and parcels for Operation Iraqi Freedom were  processed through New York. The U.S. Postal Service delivers letters to  the International Service Center at John F. Kennedy Airport, in New York;  parcels are delivered to the Postal Service’s International and Bulk Mail  Center in New Jersey. After the letters and parcels are sorted, they are  then packaged, placed into containers, and then transferred to Newark  International Airport in New Jersey where they are loaded onto airplanes  for transport to the Iraqi theater. Unlike during Operations Desert  Shield/Storm, where military planes operated by the Military Airlift  Command transported much of the mail, a dedicated contractor aircraft  carried mail during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
During the next stage of mail movement, the mail planes fly to aerial mail  terminals colocated at the international airports in Kuwait and Bahrain.  Once landed, local airport ground handlers offload the mail containers  from the planes and take them to an Air Force Mail Control Activity  located at the airport, where the mail is staged for ground transportation.  In Bahrain, mail for service members stationed in Iraq is processed at the  U.S. Air Force Mail Control Activity; mail for service members located in  Bahrain or aboard ships is processed at the U.S. Fleet Mail Center. For  troops stationed in Iraq, mail is transferred onto a contracted cargo plane  and flown directly into Iraq. In Kuwait, all mail is processed at the Joint  Military Mail Terminal. Figure 1 illustrates two different examples of how  military mail flows from the Newark International Airport into the Iraqi  theater.
The Joint Military Mail Terminal, which handles the bulk of the letters and  parcels entering the Iraqi theater, sorts the mail and arranges for its  transportation—either by land or by air—to the various regions occupied  by U.S. troops. Mail must be delivered to the unit level, designated by ZIP  codes provided by the Military Postal Service Agency, before it can be  distributed to individual service members. Figure 2 illustrates postal  operations and a backlog of mail in February 2003 at the Joint Military  Mail Terminal in Kuwait.
According to the Military Postal Service Agency, more than 65 million  pounds of letters and parcels were delivered to U.S. Central Command’s  contingency area of responsibility during calendar year 2003 at a cost of  nearly $150 million. The largest amount moved in a single month was April  2003, when over 11 million pounds of mail were delivered. This represents  an average of just over 377,000 pounds per daythe equivalent of about  forty 40-foot-long trailers full of mail. Figure 3 illustrates a convoy of  trucks carrying 40-foot trailers of mail leaving the Kuwait Joint Military  Mail Terminal.
section_title: Timeliness of Mail Delivery Cannot Be Accurately Determined
paragraphs: The timeliness of mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi  Freedom cannot be accurately determined because DOD does not have a  reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. Data collected by  military postal units using the Transit Time Information Standard System  for Military Mail indicate that average delivery times met the Army  wartime standard of 12 to 18 days. However, the methodology used to  calculate and report these times consistently masks the actual time it  takes for service members to receive mail, thus significantly understating  actual delivery times. Test letters sent to individuals at military post  offices also have produced unreliable data because many test letters were  never returned, and letters were sent only to individuals located at military  post offices. Military postal officials acknowledge that mail delivery to  troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom was not timely. In addition,  more than half of the 127 soldiers and marines we talked with during  informal meetings at their home bases in the United States said they were  dissatisfied with the timeliness of mail delivery while they were deployed.  Morale suffered, as mail from home was many service members’ only link  with friends and families.
subsections: section_title: DOD Reported That Average Postal Transit Times Met Wartime Standard, but Methodology to Calculate It Is Flawed
paragraphs: The Army’s wartime standard for first class mail delivery is 12 to 18 days  from the point of origin to the individual service member. According to our  analysis of data reported by the Transit Time Information Standard System  for Military Mail, average postal transit times for letters and parcels sent  to the Iraqi theater ranged from 11 to 14 days from February through  September 2003. (See fig. 4.) These times represent the time it takes for a  letter or parcel to go from its point of origin (a stateside post office) to a  service member’s designated military post office, where he or she picks up  mail.
However, on the basis of our analysis, we found that the methodology  used to calculate and report transit times significantly understates the  actual time it takes for a service member to receive mail. According to  Transit Time Information Standard System for Military Mail guidance,  transit times should be reported by postal units in theater on the basis of a  random sample of all incoming letters and all incoming packages arriving  at military post offices in the Iraqi theater. The samples are then divided  into three categories according to the date of the U.S. postmark: postmark  less than 10 days old, postmark 11 to 15 days old, and postmark over 16  days old. Each of these three categories is given a weight value of 10, 15,  and 16, respectively, which represent the break points of each category.  The sample size (number of letters or packages sampled) in each category  is then multiplied by the weight value and averaged to get the reported  transit time. Consequently, regardless of the sample size or the actual  number of days the items spent in transit, the resulting average will always  be from 10 to 16 days. For example, a piece of mail that spent 100 days in  transit would be counted in the same category and weighted the same as  one that only took 16 days. Similarly, a piece of mail that spent 4 days in  transit would be counted in the same category as one that took 10, and  again weighted the same. (See table 1 for an example of how this  methodology is used to calculate transit times.)
This methodology is even less viable when one considers that during the  peak of wartime operations, all mail destined for Iraq was held at the joint  military mail terminal in Kuwait for 23 days (late March through mid-April)  because of the rapid pace of troop movements. However, this 23-day hold  on mail is not reflected in the transit time data, as the “weighted average”  methodology masks the calculation, thus significantly understating actual  transit time.
Officials at the Military Postal Service Agency and at the Army’s 3rd  Personnel Commandthe Army entity providing in-theater postal support  during Operation Iraqi Freedomcould not provide documentation that  described this methodology. We reviewed the Transit Time Information  Standard System for Military Mail guidance, the standard that explains and  prescribes how military postal activities collect mail transit time data, and  could not find any mention of this particular methodology. Only 3rd  Personnel Command, the source of the transit time data, was aware that  the transit times were being reported in this manner. According to a 3rd  Personnel Command official, it had always been done this way. We  discussed the methodology with Military Postal Service Agency officials.  While they acknowledge that the Transit Time Information Standard  System is the official tracking system, they were not aware that this  particular methodology was being employed, and moreover could not tell  us why it was being used.
section_title: Test Letter Data Showed Mail Delivery Met Standard, but Information Is Incomplete
paragraphs: In order to collect transit times on retrograde mail (which the Transit Time  Information Standard System for Military Mail does not collect) as well as  prograde mail, the Military Postal Service Agency sent test letters to  individuals located at military post offices within the contingency area of  responsibility. The letters contained instructions asking the recipient to  mark the date received and then return them through the military postal  system. The test letter data—derived from letters sent by the Military  Postal Service Agency from February through September 2003—indicate  that, on average, prograde transit times met the Army standard of 12 to   18 days during all but 1 month. The only exception was April 2003, when  average transit time peaked at 19 days. (See fig. 5.) However, this average  obscures the fact that nearly 25 percent of the test letters took more than  18 days to be delivered to the Iraqi theater. Retrograde test letters were  not as timely, failing to meet the 12- to 18-day standard during 2 months.
In addition, the Military Postal Service Agency initially only sent test  letters to individuals at military post offices in Kuwait and Bahrain. It was  not until August 2003 that test letters were sent to locations in Iraq as well.  Therefore, the aforementioned 23-day hold on mail bound for units in Iraq  would not have affected transit time data as reported by test letters.
Information based on test letters sent to individuals located at military  post offices is not a complete measure of transit times because many  letters were never returned. Between February and September 2003, the  Military Postal Service Agency sent more than 1,700 test letters to service  members at military post offices in various locations in Kuwait, Bahrain,  and Iraq. Based on our analysis of the agency’s data, we found that only 59  percent (1,028) of the letters were returned. In addition, of the more than  700 letters that failed to return, we determined that 25 percent had been  sent to individuals located at post offices in or near the northern Iraqi  cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. However, only one letter from each of these  locations was ever returned out of about 180 letters mailed. Unfortunately,  there is no way of telling whether or not these or any of the other  unreturned test letters were ever actually received.
There are other drawbacks with this test letters approach. For example, it  does not accurately measure the transit time from point of origin to the  individual service member. Test letters were addressed only to individuals  located at military post offices, and not to service members located in  forward-deployed combat units. It could take several additional days for  service members deployed elsewhere to receive mail from such locations.  Also, this approach used only letters, not parcels, and parcels comprised  the bulk of mail sent into the theater.
section_title: Service Members Express Dissatisfaction with Mail Service
paragraphs: In the absence of reliable data to describe timeliness, we held discussions  with a non-representative sample of 127 soldiers and marines who served  in theater, and who were selected prior to our visits to Fort Stewart,  Georgia, and Camp Pendleton, California. Almost 60 percent of these  service members indicated that they were dissatisfied with the timeliness  of mail delivery. Nearly half said that, after arriving in theater, they waited  more than 4 weeks to get their mail, and many commented that some mail  took as long as 4 months to work its way through the system. When asked,  about half the troops we interviewed also indicated that they were not  aware of command decisions to purposefully halt mail service. In addition,  nearly 80 percent said that they were aware of mail that was sent to them  but that they did not receive while they were deployed. In many cases, this  mail was finally received after the service members returned to their home  stations. Clearly, the non-receipt of mail became a concern for friends and  family back home.
Many service members told us that they did not receive certain pieces of  mail until they returned to their stateside home installations. For example,  starting in June 2003, Camp Pendleton, California, received about 100,000  pounds of military mail that had been returned undelivered and unopened  to the U.S. Postal Service gateway in New Yorkat a cost of about  $93,000. Upon receipt in New York, the mail was sent by rail to the U.S.  Postal Service gateway in San Francisco and then put in trailers and  trucked to Camp Pendleton. Extra space considerations were needed in  order to accommodate the returned mail, including two tents staged  outside of the main post office for overflow. Many of the returned  packages were damaged and rewrap procedures had to be established in  order to try and control packages that were all but destroyed from being  mishandled or handled too often. (See fig. 6.) Postal officials at Camp  Pendleton did not clear out and deliver all of this returned mail for the  better part of 3 months, or until the latter part of August 2003.
According to soldiers we interviewed, one of the issues that hampered  mail delivery was changing deployment information. Mail delivery to the  Army’s 3rd Infantry Division was stopped when word was received that  the division was about to redeploy. When this plan changed and the  division did not redeploy, mail started to flow again. The division was told  several times that it would be redeployed and then it did not; each time,  when deployment was thought to be imminent, mail delivery was stopped.  This created a backlog. When the 3rd Infantry Division finally did  redeploy, the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division stayed behind and  was assigned to the 1st Armored Division. But this information was not  disseminated, and the 1st Brigade received no more mail while in theater.
section_title: Many Problems Identified in Operations Desert Shield/Storm Continued to Hamper Mail Delivery in Operation Iraqi Freedom
paragraphs: Despite differences in operational theaters and an effort by postal planners  to consider experiences from Operations Desert Shield/Storm in planning  for Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of the same problems continued to  hamper postal operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. These  problems include (1) difficulty with implementing joint-service postal  operations, (2) postal personnel who were inadequately trained and  initially scarce because of late deployments, and (3) inadequate postal  facilities, material-handling equipment, and transportation assets to handle  mail surge.
During January 1991, at the height of Operations Desert Shield/Storm,  more than 500,000 U.S. troops supported a ground war that lasted a little  more than 4 days. These troops were concentrated in camps located in  Kuwait and Saudi Arabia near the borders of Kuwait and Iraq. In contrast,  Operation Iraqi Freedom involved about half the number of troops (about  250,000), dispersed over a larger geographical area (all of Kuwait and  Iraq), and involved a ground war that lasted about 42 days. This greater  dispersion of troops for a longer period of time increased the logistical  requirements for delivering the mail. Additionally, although the ground  war for Operation Iraqi Freedom is officially over, there is an ongoing  requirement to provide timely and efficient postal support for a large  number of personnel still in theater, fighting the global war on terrorism.
subsections: section_title: Implementation of Joint Postal Operations Fell Short
paragraphs: Several key planning assumptions used in the creation of U.S. Central  Command’s postal plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom proved problematic.  The embargo on Any Service Member mail produced unintended negative  results; mail restrictions for the first 30 days in theater were never  enacted; and the volume of mail was grossly underestimated. Table 2  summarizes these key assumptions, the actions taken, and the  consequences of those actions.
Because Any Service Member mail caused delays in the delivery of other  personal mail and stressed the logistical system during Operations Desert  Shield/Storm, postal plans for Operation Iraqi Freedom placed an embargo  on this type of mail. Defense officials also discontinued Any Service  Member mail for security reasons following the Anthrax scares of 2001.  During Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Any Service Member mail acted as  a morale booster because it provided mail to troops who might not have  received mail otherwise. From an operations standpoint, this mail could  be separated and set aside until individually addressed mail had been  processed. However, the volume of Any Service Member mail taxed  transportation and storage capabilities. In order to prevent similar  problems during Operation Iraqi Freedom, planners placed an embargo on  Any Service Member mail. Despite this, individuals and organizations  sending mail developed “workarounds” that overwhelmed the postal  system and contributed to a slowdown in service. Instead of addressing  mail to “Any Service Member,” senders addressed their letters and parcels  to specific individuals, enclosing a request that they share the mail with  other troops. Because this mail was addressed to specific individuals,  postal personnel had to treat it as regular mail and could not separate it  and set it aside for later processing. These “workarounds” added to the  workload at every stage in the mail delivery process. For example, when  we visited the Joint Military Postal Activity in San Francisco, California,  we observed one of these “workaround” shipments. It consisted of  approximately 40 boxes, each weighing about 8 to10 pounds. They were all  addressed to the same recipient and came from a charitable service  organization. This one shipment required its own handcart and almost one- quarter of an airline-shipping container.
A second key assumption that did not have the intended result involved  mail restrictions. Drawing from the lessons learned from Operations  Desert Shield/Storm, postal planners for Operation Iraqi Freedom assumed  that mail would be restricted to personal first-class letters or sound/video  recordings that weighed 13 ounces or less for the first 30 days of  operations. At the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Military Postal  Service Agency and Army postal officials in theater asked that these  restrictions be imposed. However, U.S. Central Command officials did not  approve the request because, according the U.S. Central Command postal  planner, they believed that a sufficient appropriate postal infrastructure  was in place to handle the mail. As a result, the mail continued to flow into  theater, overtaxing the limited mail handlers and facilities in place and  creating huge backlogs of mail.
Underestimating the volume of mail was the third planning assumption  that created problems for the mail system. Postal planners in Operation  Iraqi Freedom assumed that the volume of mail per person would be less  than it actually was. They estimated that there would be from 0.5 and 1.5  pounds of first class mail per person per day based on data from previous  contingency operations. Instead, military officials estimate that the initial  surge of mail averaged closer to 5 pounds per day, overburdening the  developing mail system.  According to the Military Postal Service Agency  and Air Force Postal Policy and Operations officials we interviewed, of the  total volume of mail shipped, more than 80 percent consisted of parcels  and the rest consisted of flat mail. The mail volume per soldier was much  higher than that seen in Operations Desert Shield/Storm. For example,  mail volume reached a monthly peak of 10 million pounds in Operations  Desert Shield/Storm for about 500,000 troops compared with a monthly  peak of 11 million pounds in Operation Iraqi Freedom for half as many  troops. Consequently, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the necessary  facilities and manpower needed to move this higher volume of mail were  not initially available in theater.
subsections: section_title: Coordination of Joint Postal Operations Fell Short
paragraphs: In addition to problematic postal planning assumptions, the single service  manager concept was not enacted to ensure the management of joint  postal operations. In both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operations Desert  Shield/Storm, the single-service manager concept did not perform as  planned. The single-service manager is assigned by the combatant  commander to be the manager and point of contact on all postal issues in  the area of responsibility. The single-service manager is normally  appointed from one of the military components, generally the component  with the most postal resources in theater. During Operations Desert  Shield/Storm, the single-service manager was the same for both the  peacetime and the contingency areas of responsibility. According to  lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield/Storm, the use of the  peacetime single-service manager was unsuccessful because of a lack of  coordination and cooperation between the components.
To overcome this problem, U.S. Central Command, through its operations  plan, directed the establishment of a Joint Postal Center−to be manned by  representatives from all components−to oversee all mail operations in the  contingency area and assume the duties and responsibilities of the single- service manager. The operations plan states that a Joint Postal Center be  established and that the peacetime single-service manager for the area of  responsibility    provide postal personnel, resources, and equipment to support the Joint  Postal Center as required;    continue to oversee military postal operations in the area of responsibility  not in the contingency area; and  relinquish policy and oversight responsibilities of postal operations in the  contingency area of responsibility to the Joint Postal Center once it is  operational.
U.S. Central Command postal officials told us that neither the Joint Postal  Center nor the single-service manager performed according to the  approved plan or as expected. The Joint Postal Center did not fully assume  the role of the in-theater single-service manager, as it arrived late in  theater, was not supported by all of the components, and was  undermanned. In the interim, the peacetime single-service manager for  U.S. Central Command did not have adequate personnel to assume the role  for the contingency area of responsibility. According to representatives  from the designated single-service manager, they were unable to provide  full-time staff in theater and could not adequately manage operations from  their home station in the United States. By the time the Joint Postal  Center’s personnel began arriving in theater in February 2003, the different  components had already been receiving large quantities of mail and had  established their own postal operations. In January 2003 the Commander  of the Army’s 3rd Personnel Command assumed responsibility for postal  operations supporting the combined land forces (Army and Marines) and  was making decisions that affected the flow of mail for the theater, a  responsibility the Army was not resourced to assume.
section_title: Postal Personnel Inadequately Trained and Initially Scarce Owing to Late Deployments
paragraphs: In both Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom,  postal units lacked sufficient training. According to lessons learned from  Operations Desert Shield/Storm military postal operations need to be  staffed with trained personnel who are familiar with postal operations and  the movement of mail. Similar problems surfaced during Operation Iraqi  Freedom. Military postal officials told us that Army postal personnel  arriving in theater were largely untrained in establishing and managing  military postal operations, as they are traditionally not tasked for this type  of duty. Usually, Army postal personnel are tasked to support the daily  operations of military post offices.
However, even this type of training was lacking. Officials attributed this  lack of training to a number of different factors. One factor is that most of  the Army’s postal units are made up of Army Reserve soldiers, who do not  have an opportunity to train in postal facilities during peacetime. This is  because there are no military post offices in the United States.  Subsequently, if a reserve unit wants to train in a military post office they  have to deploy overseas for their annual training. The second factor is that  active duty Army postal personnel do not have an opportunity to conduct  realistic postal operations during routine training exercises. The third  factor is that, unlike the other services, the active duty Army does not have  a postal career track. This means that, even if active duty soldiers have  attended postal training, they may never work in a postal position.
Moreover, during both Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Iraqi  Freedom, postal units were initially scarce because of late deployments.
Units should have deployed early enough to establish an adequate postal  infrastructure in advance of the mail. During Operation Iraqi Freedom,  despite plans to deploy Army postal units early, they arrived in theater  after most combat troops. Military postal officials told us that other units  had a higher priority for airlift into the Iraqi theater. The Operations Plan  specified that postal personnel needed to handle mail would deploy within  the first 10 days of the build-up for the contingency. Even though some  troops mobilized according to the original plan, our analysis of data  received from the Army’s 3rd Personnel Command shows that some of  these troops were delayed at their mobilization stations up to 130 days  (with the average delay being 69 days) before deploying. (See fig. 7.)  Postal units did not begin arriving into theater until March 2003.  Consequently, early mail operations were conducted with insufficient  postal troops to carry out the mission. This decision ultimately affected  the timely establishment of postal operations.
section_title: Postal Operations Hampered by Inadequate Facilities, Equipment, and Transportation
paragraphs: Inadequate postal facilities hampered postal operations in theater during  both Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. As the  theater grew during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, the facilities proved  to be inadequate, and additional aerial mail terminals had to be established  in various parts of Saudi Arabia to handle the increasing volume of mail.  Although some military postal facilities set up to serve troops during and  after Operations Desert Shield/Storm were still in operation in Kuwait and  Bahrain, these facilities were inadequate to service the influx of 250,000  troops, which began arriving in January 2003. Key postal infrastructure  elements were needed to receive the increased volume of mail and  establish a joint mail terminal in Kuwait.
At the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Fleet Mail Center in  Bahrain processed mail for all the services even though it did not have the  staff or equipment to handle the surge in volume. Because of the increased  workload, it took about 5 to 7 extra days for the mail to be delivered. As  the theater matured, a joint military mail terminal had to be established in  Kuwait to relieve the Fleet Mail Center of Army and Air Force mail and to  augment existing postal facilities at Camp Doha in Kuwait. Postal officials  told us that even with this additional facility, the biggest hindrance to  processing mail was a lack of sufficient workspace. In addition, as troops  began to occupy parts of Iraq in the spring of 2003, additional mail  facilities and transportation assets were set up to handle incoming and  outgoing mail in Baghdad and other cities and towns in Iraq.
The lack of heavy material-handling equipment during the early stages of  both conflicts also hampered the processing of mail. Lessons learned from  Operations Desert Shield/Storm recommended that modern material- handling equipment be provided to postal units. Operation Iraqi Freedom  postal officials also underscored the need to have modern and varied types  of material-handling equipment, such as fork lifts and rough terrain cargo  handlers available to support postal facilities. (See fig. 8.) Postal workers  did not have such equipment in the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom,  so they had to manually break down the containers and sort thousands of  pounds of mail per day by hand, adding to the time it took to process the  mail for delivery. According to military postal officials, units did not have  these types of heavy equipment because either their tables of organization  and equipment were not updated to reflect the need, or if updated, were  not properly resourced.
In addition to a lack of heavy material-handling equipment, postal units did  not have the appropriate postal equipment and supplies to perform routine  operations. In lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield/Storm, postal  officials recommended that postal units regularly review their equipment  and supply needs and assemble prepackaged “kits” for contingency postal  operations. They also recommended that, at the earliest indication of a  contingency, an advance team of postal experts deploy into theater to  determine what postal equipment and supplies are required. Despite these  recommendations, postal units continued to arrive in theater inadequately  equipped to conduct postal operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Postal officials at all levels told us that the lists of authorized postal  equipment, such as meters and scales, were outdated and did not reflect  the correct types or quantities of equipment needed for modern postal  operations. In addition, many deployed units did not have access to the  full suite of communications equipment, such as secure radios, cellular  and satellite telephones, and “landlines” for their facilities. As a result,  postal units were unable to coordinate mail pick-up and truck mail  convoys, and communicate with other units.
Moving mail once it got into theater was a challenge because postal units  were not equipped with vehicles to transport the mail. The operations plan  for Operation Iraqi Freedom made no special provisions for ground  transportation of mail. It assumed that mail would use existing  commercial trucks supplemented by military trucks as needed. Postal  units at all levels of command (e.g., company through corps) had to  compete with other units for vehicles or contract for trucks through local  sources. Military postal officials stated that, during Operation Iraqi  Freedom, trucks were scarce in theater and carrying mostly ammunition,  water, and food. In order to minimize delays in mail delivery, postal  officials in January 2003 arranged with a U.S. government contractor to  provide 72 trucks and drivers to deliver the mail from the Joint Military  Mail Terminal to military post offices in Kuwait and Iraq.  Although it took  the contractor several more months to obtain all the trucks, this action  was a great help, according to U.S. Central Command postal units serving  in theater at that time.
section_title: Air Transportation Was Improved Based on Lessons Learned
paragraphs: As a result of lessons learned from the first Gulf conflict, the Military  Postal Service Agency did implement one strategy during Operation Iraqi  Freedom that proved to be successful. At the beginning of Operations  Desert Shield/Storm, mail was initially transported overseas by  commercial airlines. Because commercial U.S. carriers reduced the  number of flights into Saudi Arabia, postal officials decided to switch  exclusively to dedicated military flights to transport mail from the United  States to the theater. Similarly, at the beginning of Operation Iraqi  Freedom, mail backlogs occurred with existing commercial air service.  However, in contrast to Operations Desert Shield/Storm, military postal  officials decided to continue using commercial airlines but arranged with  the U.S. Postal Service to contract for dedicated postal flights from the  United States to Bahrain and Kuwait. According to Military Postal Service  Agency officials, this resulted in much more reliable air delivery of mail to  the theater.
section_title: Various Military Postal Units Have Identified Solutions to Postal Problems, but No Mechanism Is in Place to Ensure Their Consolidation and Resolution
paragraphs: Although military postal officials and others have begun to identify  solutions to some of the long-standing postal problems seen again during  Operation Iraqi Freedom, no single entity has been officially tasked to  resolve these issues. Despite early efforts made by the Military Postal  Service Agency in this regard, this agency does not have the authority to  ensure that these problems are jointly addressed and resolved prior to the  next military contingency.
The identification of solutions to long-standing postal problems has begun  in a piecemeal fashion. At this time, no single entity has officially been  designated to collect and consolidate solutions to long-standing mail  delivery problems. After past contingencies, the Joint Staff’s Joint Center  for Lessons Learned gathered and consolidated the lessons learned and  made them available to the field. We spoke to representatives of the  military Joint Center for Operational Analysis, formerly the Joint Center  for Lessons Learned, to determine if this process would apply to Operation  Iraqi Freedom and they informed us that military postal operations have  not been identified as an issue area for lessons learned and they do not  anticipate that postal operations will become one. Several individual  members of entities such as the U.S. Army Reserve Command, U.S. Central  Command, and the Coalition Forces Land Component Command have  prepared memoranda outlining issues and lessons learned for postal  operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
We summarized the memoranda, after action reports and comments  regarding solutions to postal problems that we collected during our  meetings with dozens of key military postal officials. Key military postal  officials emphasized that these postal issues must be addressed to avoid a  repetition of the same postal problems in future contingencies. These  issues represent many long-standing problems that can be directly traced  back to Operations Desert Shield/Storm. The issues identified include the  following:  improve joint postal planning and ensure the execution of the postal  operations plan;    anticipate the levels of support and types of activities needed, and deploy  postal units early to reduce or eliminate backlogs during the build-up;    update tables of organization and equipment for postal units to reflect  what they actually need in terms of people and equipment to conduct  postal operations;    develop peacetime training programs to prepare postal units for the  missions they will be required to perform during contingency operations;  and  review the command and control of postal units to determine if the postal  function is in the right place and whether one organization should be  responsible to both develop and execute policy.
In October 2003 the Military Postal Service Agency hosted a joint postal  conference to discuss postal problems with dozens of key postal  participants in Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is currently in the process of  developing a final report that will outline plans to resolve issues in the  areas of organization, supplies, planning, training, transportation, “Any  Service Member” mail, routing and labeling, and transit time data  collection. Although the agency has taken this initiative, it has limited  authority and cannot direct the services to jointly address the problems,  according to the Executive Director of the Military Postal Service Agency.  Military Postal Service Agency officials describe their role as primarily the  single point of contact between the military and the U.S. Postal Service.
Service components and the Military Postal Service Agency have taken  some initial steps in employing alternative mail delivery and tracking  systems. For example, the Marine Corps is currently testing an electronic  mail system for getting mail delivered to forward deployed troops. In  addition, the Military Postal Service Agency has taken steps to solve a  long-standing problem regarding transit time data. The agency has  developed a mail bar-coding system that could be used to more accurately  track the transit time, but it has not yet been successfully deployed for use  by ground troops because of connectivity problems. The Military Origin  Destination Information System, modeled after the system that the U.S.  Postal Service employs, can be used to track transit times of bags of letters  and small packages as well as larger parcels. By bar coding these items  and scanning them prior to mailing, and then scanning them once they  reach their destination, transit times can be easily calculated. According to  officials from the Military Postal Service Agency, the Navy is currently  using this system with some success. However, the system requires a  certain level of connectivity with the Internet, which troops in the field  lacked during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Wireless networks may be  necessary in order to connect all military post offices to the Internet,  which has not been practical on the battlefield. In addition, this system  shares a shortcoming with the test letters in that transit times are not  tracked to the level of the individual service member.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The timely delivery of mail to troops overseas involved in contingency  operations is an important mechanism to boost morale among service  members and their families and friends. Without taking action to resolve  the identified issues in planning, building, and operating a joint postal  system, mail delivery will continue to suffer in future contingency  operations as witnessed by the repetition of delayed mail delivery from  one Gulf war to the next. Emphasis needs to be placed on establishing  joint postal responsibilities and the subsequent execution of those duties.  Past experience has shown that postal operations have not received  command attention or been designated a priority. Establishing the needs  for postal operations early in the process and dedicating the appropriate  resources is crucial for providing the timely and efficient delivery of mail.  While our work focused only on Operation Iraqi Freedom, we believe  many of these same lessons apply to other combatant commands and  theaters of operation as well.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Without clear and accurate data to measure the timeliness of mail to U.S.  troops overseas during contingency operations, no meaningful assessment  can be made on the quality of mail service. Therefore, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense  (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) to work with the Army Adjutant  General to improve the quality of transit time data for postal operations by  implementing a system that will accurately track, calculate, and report  postal transit times.
In the absence of a clear plan for resolving recurring postal problems  during contingency operations, we recommend that the Under Secretary  of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) designate, direct, and  authorize an appropriate DOD agency, unit, or command to determine  what long-standing postal issues need to be resolved, and to develop a  specific course of action and timetable for their resolution, including  appropriate follow-up to ensure that the problems have been fixed.  Specifically, these actions should address the issues highlighted in this  report, such as the following:    strengthen the joint postal planning function and specify a body to ensure  the implementation of postal operations in theater;    deploy properly trained and equipped postal troops into theater prior to  the mail build-up; and    dedicate adequate postal facilities, heavy equipment, and transportation  assets for postal operations.
An important part of addressing these long-standing problems is to share  the results of these lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom with all  of the combatant commands to ensure that future contingencies do not  repeat these problems.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it fully  concurred with our recommendations and has already initiated certain  actions.  In response to our first recommendation, DOD has directed the  Military Postal Service Agency to implement an automated system that will  accurately track, calculate, and report postal transit times all the way to  troop delivery.  In addition, the Military Postal Service Agency is also  reviewing manual transit time collection and reporting methods for use  when automated collection is not possible.  In response to our second  recommendation, the Military Postal Service Agency will facilitate and  track the corrective actions taken by the Unified Commands, services,  service components, and the Military Postal Service Agency, itself, in  response to the recommendations developed in the Joint Services After  Action Report produced at the Joint Service Postal Conference held in  October 2003.  DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix  II.  DOD also provided a number of technical and clarifying comments,  which we have incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Executive Director of the  Military Postal Service Agency; and the Director, Office of Management  and Budget. We will make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (757) 552-8100.  Key contributors to this report were Laura Durland, Karen Kemper, David  Keefer, Timothy Burke, Ann Borseth, Madelon Savaides, and Nancy  Benco.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address overall issues of military mail delivery to and from the Gulf  region and determine responsibilities for mail service, we obtained and  reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance and operations plans for  mail delivery to troops serving in a contingency area, and specifically  during Operation Iraqi Freedom. We then met with officials from the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics); Joint Staff for Manpower and Personnel; and U.S. Central  Command to discuss these policies. Our review focused on postal  operations as they applied to U.S. troops deployed to the countries of  Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq during the buildup for Operation Iraqi Freedom,  the operation itself, and the ongoing military operations in Iraq (January  through December 2003).
To address the issue of the timeliness of mail service to and from troops  serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom, we collected, analyzed, and assessed  the reliability of transit time data from the Army’s 3rd Personnel  Command and the Military Postal Service Agency. We discussed the data  with military postal officials to ensure that we were interpreting it  correctly, especially the methodology used to report transit times from the  Transit Time Information Standard System for Military Mail. Within our  analysis, we determined that the majority of transit time data we received  was for Army mail. Some data were from the Air Force and Marine Corps,  but they were not separated out. We did not collect transit time data from  the Navy, as their postal operations run separate from and independent of  the others. Some data required sorting in order to eliminate irrelevant  data elements and to be able to display them on a monthly basis. To  determine the effect that the timeliness of mail service had on troops  serving in the contingency area, we designed a data collection instrument  and then conducted discussion groups with and collected data from a non- representative sample of 127 officers and enlisted personnel—91 from the  Army’s 3rd Infantry Division (stationed at Fort Stewart, Georgia) and 36  from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (stationed at Camp Pendleton,  California). The data collected from this non-representative sample cannot  be projected for the entire universe of troops deployed. At each location,  the GAO “point of contact” selected a non-representative sample of  military personnel who had recently returned from a deployment in  support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The sample size (127) is simply the  total number of the soldiers and marines who were available to meet with  us during our visits. We summarized the data we collected from the  soldiers and marines, determined percentages of individual responses for  each question, and gathered their personal accounts regarding mail  delivery problems.
To address how mail issues and problems experienced during Operation  Iraqi Freedom compare with those experienced during Operations Desert  Shield/Storm, we obtained and analyzed lessons learned from the first  Persian Gulf War and compared these with any available reports prepared  by the various offices and commands we visited regarding the postal  problems experienced during Operation Iraqi Freedom. We met with  numerous officials and personnel from the U.S. Army Reserve Command,  the Military Postal Service Agency, the U.S. Postal Service, U.S. Central  Command, the Army’s 3rd Personnel Command, U.S. Army Central  Command, Air Force Air Combat Command, U.S. Marine Corps, Joint  Military Mail Terminal in Kuwait, Fleet Mail Center in Bahrain, and Joint  Military Mail Terminal in Iraq to discuss the similarities and differences of  the postal problems still being encountered and what actions had been  taken to resolve any previously identified problems.
To assess efforts to resolve military postal problems for future  contingencies, we collected any available after action reports and plans for  addressing military postal problems. We attended the Joint Postal  Conference—hosted by the Military Postal Service Agency in October  2003—which addressed postal problems encountered during Operation  Iraqi Freedom. During the conference, we spoke with military postal  officials who had direct responsibility for various aspects of mail delivery  to and from the Iraqi theater, and collected pertinent documentation. We  summarized information regarding key postal issues that must be  addressed to avoid their repetition in the future. We spoke with officials at  the Joint Forces Command who are in charge of collecting lessons learned  for Operation Iraqi Freedom. We also spoke with the Army Adjutant  General in charge of the Military Postal Service Agency to assess the  agency’s plans for taking actions to mitigate those problems. We then met  with a key official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)the responsible body for  military postal policy and oversightto discuss our findings and to  determine what entity is accountable for resolving these issues.
We conducted our review from August 2003 through March 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense