Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Risk-Informed Covert Assessments and Oversight of Corrective Actions Could Strengthen Capabilities at the Border
Published: 2014-09-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Preventing terrorists from smuggling nuclear or radiological materials into the United States is a top national priority. To address this threat, DHS has deployed radiation detection equipment and trained staff to use it. CBP conducts covert operations to test capabilities for detecting and interdicting nuclear and radiological materials at air, land, and sea ports of entry into the United States as well as checkpoints. GAO was asked to review CBP's covert testing operations. This report assesses the extent to which (1) CBP covert operations assess capabilities at air, land, and sea ports and checkpoints to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border and (2) CBP reports its covert operations results and provides oversight to ensure that corrective actions are implemented. GAO analyzed documents, such as test summaries, directives, and planning and guidance papers and interviewed DHS, CBP, and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2014. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) covert operations provide limited assessment of capabilities to detect and interdict the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials into the United States. DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD) conducted 144 covert operations at 86 locations from fiscal years 2006 through 2013, selecting its locations from a total of 655 U.S. air, land, and sea port facilities; checkpoints; and certain international locations. These operations allowed OFTD to assess capabilities for detecting and interdicting—or intercepting—nuclear and radiological materials at locations tested. Results showed differences in the rate of success for interdicting smuggled nuclear and radiological materials across facility types. CBP had a $1 million budget for covert operations of various activities—including nuclear and radiological testing—covering fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and DHS policy requires that components with limited resources make risk-informed decisions. However, CBP testing does not inform capabilities across all border locations, and CBP has not conducted a risk assessment that could inform and prioritize the locations, materials, and technologies to be tested through covert operations. Given limited resources, assessing risk to prioritize the most dangerous materials, most vulnerable locations, and most critical equipment for testing through covert operations, DHS could better inform its decisions on how to expend its limited resources effectively, consistent with the department's risk management policies.
OFTD has not issued reports annually as planned on covert operation results and recommendations, limiting CBP oversight for improving capabilities to detect and interdict smuggling at the border. OFTD has issued three reports on the results of its covert operations at U.S. ports of entry since 2007. However, OFTD officials stated that because of resource constraints, reports have not been timely and do not include the results of covert tests conducted at checkpoints. Furthermore, OFTD tracks the status of corrective actions taken to address recommendations in these reports; however, CBP does not track corrective actions identified from their individual covert operations that were not included in these reports. Establishing appropriate time frames for reporting of covert operations results and addressing barriers to meeting these time frames would help enhance CBP's accountability for its covert testing operations. Further, developing a mechanism to track whether ports of entry and checkpoints have implemented corrective actions could help inform management decision making on the need for further investments in equipment or personnel training to protect U.S. borders.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DHS inform priorities for covert operations by using an assessment of risk, determining time frames for reporting results, addressing barriers for meeting time frames, and developing a mechanism to track corrective actions. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The threat that terrorists could smuggle nuclear and radiological materials  into the United States for use in developing weapons of mass destruction  or other nefarious purposes will endure into the foreseeable future. U.S.  efforts to counter such threats are considered a top national priority, and  the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007  provided the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with responsibility  for ensuring that equipment and technologies necessary to detect these  threats are integrated, as appropriate, with other border security  systems. Since 1995, DHS has invested billions of dollars in equipment  and technology, as well as related training for DHS personnel, to better  ensure detection and interdiction of smuggled nuclear and radiological  materials. DHS efforts to determine the effectiveness of its border- screening activities include covert operations, whereby teams of agency  personnel secretly attempt to smuggle nuclear and radiological materials  at U.S. locations where DHS personnel screen for radiation.
DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has primary  responsibility for securing the border against threats to the nation. CBP’s  Office of Field Operations (OFO) scans passengers and cargo traveling  across the border through U.S. air, land, and sea ports of entry to detect  and interdict smuggled contraband—including illicit nuclear and  radiological materials. CBP’s U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) conducts non- intrusive inspections for immigration purposes at checkpoints located on  roads leading from the border into the United States. CBP’s Operational  Field Testing Division (OFTD), under the Office of Internal Affairs,  conducts covert operations to test capabilities for detecting and  interdicting nuclear and radiological materials at ports of entry and  checkpoints, with some support provided by DHS’s Domestic Nuclear  Detection Office (DNDO). DNDO has a mission to lead national efforts to  counter the risk of nuclear terrorism against the United States by making  efforts to continuously improve capabilities to deter, detect, respond to,  and determine the origin of attacks, in coordination with domestic and  international partners. DNDO’s mission also includes working with  interagency and DHS partners to develop a Global Nuclear Detection  Architecture (GNDA) Strategic Plan and the DHS GNDA Implementation  Plan. The GNDA is a strategy involving an integrated system of radiation  detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear  smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United  States—and the DHS GNDA Implementation Plan identifies specific DHS- led programs and activities that support the mission, goals, and  responsibilities discussed in the GNDA Strategic Plan.
In response to the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006  (SAFE Port Act), OFTD conducted covert operations to assess the  capability to detect and interdict smuggling of nuclear and radiological  material at the nation’s 22 busiest seaports from fiscal years 2007  through 2008. After the completion of these covert operations in 2009, the DHS GNDA Implementation Plan directed CBP and DNDO to conduct  a minimum of one joint covert operation at the border each year to test  the processes in place to detect and respond to nuclear and radiological  materials being smuggled into the United States. However, CBP  determined that additional testing was needed at the border and  developed processes to conduct additional covert operations. According  to OFTD officials, CBP has conducted these self-initiated activities using  its own budget resources.
You asked us to review DHS covert testing efforts at the U.S. border,  including ports of entry and checkpoints. We assessed the extent to  which (1) CBP covert operations assess capabilities at air, land, and sea  ports and checkpoints to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological  materials smuggled across the border and (2) CBP reports its covert  operations results and provides oversight to ensure that corrective actions  are implemented.
This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we  provided to you. DHS determined that some of the information in the prior  report was Sensitive Security Information and For Official Use Only and  must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits  sensitive information about CBP covert operations, including the results of  covert operations as well as DHS’s radiological and nuclear detection  capabilities at U.S. air, land, and sea ports of entry and checkpoints.  Although the information provided in this report is more limited in scope, it  addresses the same questions as the sensitive report. Also, the overall  methodology used for both reports is the same.
To determine the extent to which CBP covert operations provide the  information necessary to assess capabilities to detect and interdict  nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border, we  collected and analyzed documentary and testimonial evidence from  CBP’s OFTD, which directed and conducted such operations, and DNDO,  which assisted with some of CBP’s covert operations. Specifically, we  reviewed planning documents, and covert operations test summaries and  reports showing the number, location, and results of covert operations  conducted at U.S. air, land, and sea ports of entry and checkpoints from  the first year such operations were conducted from fiscal year 2006  through fiscal year 2013. We interviewed OFTD officials conducting these  operations and DNDO officials from the Red Team and Net Assessments  Directorate to discuss the methodology used to select the number and  location of covert operations, and assessed the extent to which such  methodology incorporated DHS’s May 2010 Policy for Integrated Risk  Management. We also reviewed documents outlining roles,  responsibilities, and funding for transborder covert operations, such as  the DHS GNDA Implementation Plan, and DNDO and CBP budget  documents and congressional budget requests. We also conducted a  statistical analysis to determine the number of sampled covert operations  in order to generalize results to the OFTD universe of 655 sites— including ports of entry and checkpoints, assuming a random selection  from the OFTD universe of 655 sites. In conducting this analysis, we  assumed a confidence level of 95 percent and a margin of error of no  more than 10 percentage points.
To determine the extent to which CBP reports its covert operations  results, and provides oversight to ensure that corrective actions are  implemented, we reviewed documents and conducted interviews  regarding the processes used to report and track these activities.  Specifically, we obtained reports on the results of covert operations and  compared them against OFTD policy and guidance. We also analyzed  OFTD test summaries and reports to determine the findings and  recommendations resulting from covert operations. We then interviewed  officials from CBP, OFO, and USBP to determine processes used to  report these findings, develop recommendations, and track the status of  corrective actions.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 to July 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Concerns about the threats posed by nuclear smuggling initially focused  on nuclear materials originating from the former Soviet Union. As a result,  the first major initiatives to address these threats concentrated on  deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the  former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe. In the United  States, the U.S. Customs Service began providing its inspectors with  portable radiation detection devices in 1998. After September 11, 2001,  the agency expanded its efforts to include the deployment of radiation  portal monitors (RPM)—large-scale radiation detectors that can be used  to screen vehicles and cargo. The U.S. Customs Service was transferred  to DHS in fiscal year 2003, and the border inspection functions of the U.S.  Customs Service, including radiation detection, became the responsibility  of CBP. Accordingly, deploying radiation detection equipment at the U.S.  border is part of DHS’s strategy for addressing the threat of nuclear and  radiological terrorism. In April 2005, the President issued a directive  establishing DNDO within DHS and giving DNDO responsibility, among  other things, to enhance and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to  detect nuclear and radiological materials. From 1995 through 2013, CBP  invested over $2.5 billion to acquire, deploy, and maintain radiation  detection equipment; provide training; and conduct both overt and covert  tests of this equipment to assess the equipment’s effectiveness. OFTD’s  budget for covert operations was $1 million for fiscal years 2009 through  2013 to test CBP capabilities in several areas, including radiation and  nuclear detection.
subsections: section_title: Risks Associated with Nuclear and Radiological Materials
paragraphs: A terrorist’s use of either an improvised nuclear device (IND) or a  radiological dispersal device (RDD)—could have devastating  consequences, including not only loss of life but also enormous  psychological and economic impacts. An IND is a crude nuclear bomb  made with highly enriched uranium or plutonium, generally referred to as  special nuclear materials (SNM). It would create an explosion producing  extreme heat, powerful shockwaves, and intense radiation that would be  immediately lethal to individuals within miles of the explosion, as well as   An RDD—frequently  radioactive fallout over thousands of square miles.referred to as a dirty bomb—would disperse radioactive materials into the  environment through a conventional explosive or through other means.  Depending on the type of RDD, the area contaminated could be as small  as part of a building or a city block or as large as several square miles.  Hundreds of individuals might be killed or injured from the RDD explosion  or face the risk of later developing cancer because of exposure to  radiation and radioactive contamination.
section_title: Agency Responsibilities for Combating Nuclear Smuggling
paragraphs: Federal agencies that have a role in combating nuclear smuggling are  responsible for implementing their own programs per the GNDA. The  GNDA is composed of programs run by U.S. agencies including CBP, the  Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Energy as well as  partnerships with local, state, tribal, and territorial governments; the  private sector; and international partners. The programs are designed to  encounter, detect, characterize, and report on radiological and nuclear  material that is out of regulatory control. DNDO serves as the primary  entity in the United States to develop GNDA-related programs and  initiatives, and improve radiological and nuclear detection capabilities. In  addition, DNDO coordinates the GNDA’s efforts with other federal  agencies, and assists DHS agencies with both implementing the domestic  portion of the GNDA and also acquiring radiation detection equipment.
CBP’s OFO is responsible for implementing scanning procedures to  detect smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials at 328 ports of  entry composed of airports, seaports, and designated land ports of entry  throughout the United States plus selected locations overseas. CBP’s  USBP is responsible for implementing screening procedures at 35  permanent checkpoints generally located between 25 and 100 miles from  the border. Figure 1 displays the locations of air, land, and sea ports of  entry and permanent checkpoints across the nation.specific information about each location.)
Move mouse over state names to see the breakdown of ports of entry. For a noninteractive version, see app. I.
N.Dak.
Minn.
Vt.
S.Dak.
Wis.
N.H.
N.Y.
Mass.
Wyo.
Mich.
R.I.
Nebr.
Pa.
Conn.
N.J.
Ill.
Ind.
Colo.
W.Va.
Del. Md.
Kans.
Mo.
Va.
D.C.
Ky.
N.C.
Tenn.
Okla.
N.Mex.
Ark.
S.C.
Miss.
Ala.
Ga.
La.
Tex.
Fla.
OFTD is responsible for conducting covert operations at U.S. ports of  entry and checkpoints to test the capabilities for detecting and interdicting  nuclear and radiological materials smuggled into the United States, as  well as testing capabilities in foreign locations. In selecting sites for covert  operations, OFTD considers a universe of 655 sites. These sites include  the 477 facilities at the 328 ports of entry, 35 permanent checkpoints, as  well as 143 sites consisting of domestic user fee airports and express  consignment carrier facility airports as well as preclearance locations and  Container Security Initiative (CSI) ports in foreign locations.
section_title: CBP Screening Process for Nuclear and Radiological Materials
paragraphs: The technology, policies, and procedures to detect and interdict nuclear  and radiological material smuggled across the border differ across ports  of entry and checkpoints, but consist of four similar functions: (1) the  ability to detect radiation, (2) the ability to locate the radiation source, (3)  the ability to identify the radiation source, and (4) the ability to contact  Laboratories and Scientific Services (LSS) and transmit data as needed  when additional adjudication is required.vehicles or containers entering the United States must pass through  RPMs that can detect the presence of neutron-and gamma-emitting  radioactive material. As we have previously reported, different radioactive  materials emit varying types of radiation, and although sources of neutron  radiation are less common than gamma radiation, neutron radiation is  emitted from some materials that are used to make nuclear weapons.  Thus, RPMs and other tools that can detect neutron radiation are   At land and sea ports of entry,  particularly important for national security purposes, including securing  our borders. RPMs detect the presence of radioactive material, which can  include plutonium, kitty litter, or granite. If an RPM detects the presence  of radioactive material in a scanned container or vehicle, the responding  CBP officer is to utilize a device called a radiation isotope identification  device (RIID) to identify the radiation source. For some sources, such as  industrial radioactive sources, CBP officers must contact the CBP LSS  staff to verify the type of source material in question and, if necessary,  verify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee and shipper  information through the National Law Enforcement Communications  Center.
CBP officials reported that CBP officers and USBP agents in checkpoint  and air ports of entry locations generally rely on devices called personal  radiation detectors (PRD) to protect the health and safety of agency  personnel. These devices detect elevated levels of radiation. Aside from  relying on different equipment to detect radiological materials, CBP  officers at air ports of entry and USBP agents at checkpoints follow  procedures outlined in CBP’s Radiation Detection Standard Operating   In keeping  Procedures Directive, used at sea and land ports of entry.with these procedures, if a PRD alerts a CBP officer or USBP agent to the  presence of radiation, the officer or agent uses RIID technology to identify  the radioactive material. See figures 2, 3, and 4 for photographs of RPM,  RIID, and PRD technology.
CBP uses covert operations to test and evaluate whether the systems in  place are working as designed to detect and interdict nuclear and  radiological smuggling. These operations include an assessment of  whether the equipment and technology are working according to  specification, the policies and procedures for radiation handling and  inspection are adequate to cover various smuggling scenarios, and the  extent to which CBP personnel comply with established policies and  procedures to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material  smuggled across the border. According to CBP documents, results of  covert operations can identify the need for changes in how technology is  used to detect nuclear and radiological material, agency policies or  procedures, or personnel training to ensure that interdiction programs are  working most effectively. Steps used in conducting a covert operation  are discussed in appendix II.
OFTD limits covert operations to the ports of entry and checkpoints where  equipment and personnel are permanently placed. According to OFTD  officials, CBP does not conduct covert operations outside of the system’s  current capabilities, or to test the system’s known vulnerabilities. For  example, CBP does not conduct covert operations beyond the technical  capabilities and specifications of the RPMs, RIIDs, and PRDs. CBP  conducts such tests of equipment capabilities using overt operations.
section_title: Covert Operations Provide Limited Assessments of Capabilities to Detect and Interdict Smuggled Nuclear and Radiological Materials
subsections: section_title: Covert Operations Assessed Detection and Interdiction Capabilities at Certain Locations and Showed Varying Rates of Success
paragraphs: OFTD conducted 144 covert operations at air, land, and sea ports of  entry, checkpoints, and other sites to assess capabilities to detect and  interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border  between fiscal years 2006 and 2013, as shown in table 1.OFTD’s covert operations were conducted using radiological materials;  however, OFTD officials said they conducted one or two tests using  special nuclear material surrogates—radiation test sources with  characteristics similar to those of SNM—each year.
section_title: Covert Operations May Not Sufficiently Account for the Most Critical Nuclear Materials, Potential High- Risk Locations, or Key Nuclear and Radiological Detection Technology
paragraphs: CBP has not conducted a risk assessment that could inform the decision- making process for prioritizing the materials, locations, and technologies  to be tested through covert operations. DHS policy requires that  components with limited resources make risk-informed decisions.  However, OFTD’s covert operations may not sufficiently account for using  nuclear materials that pose the highest risk to the country, testing  capabilities in higher-risk border locations, or testing in locations that use  key GNDA detection technologies. Specifically:
The extent to which OFTD’s covert operations use varying source  materials is limited. Our review found that OFTD may not give  sufficient priority to testing detection capabilities for the most  dangerous materials. According to the CBP officials, OFTD has  both gamma and neutron radiation sources available; however,  DNDO has a broader variety of sources that CBP uses when  conducting covert operations with DNDO once or twice a year.
The locations selected for covert testing may not be sufficiently  taken into account. For example, as shown above in table 1, 45 of  144 OFTD covert operations, or 31 percent of all such operations,  were conducted at checkpoints. While checkpoints are an  important component in the nation’s border security infrastructure,  they constitute only about 5 percent (35 of 655) of total locations,  and checkpoints are generally situated from 25 to 100 miles from  the border.
CBP use of key detection technologies may not be sufficiently  taken into account. CBP uses a mix of technologies across facility  types and locations that can reflect significant differences in  capabilities and federal investment. However, CBP’s methodology  for choosing locations was not clearly linked to these differences  in capability and federal investment.
DHS’s May 2010 Policy for Integrated Risk Management states that  components should use risk information and analysis to inform decision  making, and we previously reported on the importance of using risk  assessments to determine the most pressing security needs and  developing strategies to address them. Moreover, CBP’s fiscal year  2009 through fiscal year 2014 strategic plan requires that programs use a  risk-based approach to detect and prevent the entry of hazardous  materials, goods, and instruments of terror into the United States, and  OFTD’s documented site selection process states that they should  consider available intelligence reports and risk assessments.
CBP’s January 2013 Integrated Planning Guidance (IPG) for Fiscal Year  2015 through Fiscal Year 2019 included recommendations that CBP  integrate risk analysis into all decision making, including a risk  assessment for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.  CBP has not yet taken steps toward conducting such a risk assessment  or integrating existing risk assessments into its covert testing decisions.Specifically, the IPG included recommendations that CBP conduct an in- depth risk and vulnerability assessment by mode and region to clearly  identify the future threats that CBP will be facing to better align resources  with priorities. According to OFTD, OFO, and USBP officials, they do not  currently have risk assessments that could be used to help inform covert  testing decisions. A DNDO official stated that DNDO has previously  assessed the risks of nuclear and radiological smuggling through various  entry points to the United States, pursuant to DNDO’s responsibilities  under the GNDA. DNDO officials told us that they would share  information they have with CBP; however CBP officials stated that  DNDO’s information may not be applicable for OFTD’s risk-based site  selection process.
Conducting a risk assessment that identifies priorities among nuclear and  radiological materials, locations, and technology to evaluate under its  covert testing program could help enable CBP to target the program’s  efforts to maximize the return on the limited resources available.  Moreover, a risk assessment could help CBP determine the extent to  which its tests should use varying source materials, including SNM or its  surrogates. A risk assessment could also help inform whether OFTD  should direct more covert operations at certain locations and types of  facilities based on the technologies and resources—including RPMs,  RIIDs, and trained personnel—deployed at these facilities. By using a risk  assessment to inform its decisions on how to prioritize covert operations,  CBP would be better positioned to assess the strength of its cross-border  capabilities for protecting against the smuggling of nuclear and  radiological materials into the country. A risk assessment is particularly  important given OFTD’s limited resources, as the number of covert  operations OFTD is able to conduct is not sufficient to be statistically  representative.
section_title: CBP Could Report More Consistently on Covert Operation Results and Provide Greater Oversight of Corrective Actions
subsections: section_title: OFTD Covert Test Reports Have Not Been Timely and Have Not Encompassed All Locations where Operations Were Conducted
paragraphs: OFTD issued periodic reports on the results of its covert operations but  has not met its goal for reporting these results on an annual basis for all  locations where operations were conducted. According to a document on  OFTD’s policies and procedures for follow-up on covert testing, an OFTD  goal is to compile and analyze its findings from covert operations at the  end of each fiscal year to determine whether results show trends and  systemic weaknesses. To communicate these findings, OFTD’s policy  states that its goal is to issue reports to CBP management that include a  discussion of the findings and the recommendations necessary to  address the identified deficiencies. OFTD has issued three periodic  reports that summarize results from covert operations testing capabilities  to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological materials smuggled across  the border ports of entry: (1) the Summary Report of OFTD Seaport  Assessments for fiscal years 2007 through 2008; (2) the Comprehensive  Report on Radiation Testing, which summarized the results of covert  operations conducted at air, land, and sea ports of entry from fiscal years  2009 through 2011; and (3) the Comprehensive Report on Radiation  Testing, which summarized the results of covert operations conducted at  air, land, and sea ports of entry from fiscal years 2012 and 2013. OFTD  officials stated that while their intention is produce comprehensive reports  on an annual basis, they have been unable to do so because of resource  constraints.
OFTD officials stated that they have not yet issued a report on results of  covert operations conducted at checkpoints and are in the process of  developing the report recommendations. OFTD began covert operations  to test capabilities at checkpoints in fiscal year 2009, but did not include  results of checkpoint covert operations in its Comprehensive Report on  Radiation Testing. OFTD officials said that they provided three briefings  to CBP senior management, including the Office of Border Patrol (OBP)  in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 on preliminary findings and  recommendations resulting from covert operations at checkpoints  conducted from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. OFTD officials said they  plan to issue a comprehensive report for checkpoint covert operations for  fiscal years 2009 through 2013 by the end of December 2014.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  program managers are to receive operational information to help them  determine whether they are meeting strategic and performance plans,  and that pertinent information is to be identified, captured, and distributed  to the right people in sufficient detail, in the right form, and at the  appropriate time to enable them to carry out duties and responsibilities  efficiently and effectively. Further, these internal controls help managers  achieve program objectives by ensuring they receive information on a  timely basis to allow effective monitoring, enhancing their ability to  address weaknesses.
Timely reporting of weaknesses identified by covert operations could help  CBP management provide timely and necessary oversight to OFO and  USBP and appropriately address high-priority border vulnerabilities.  According an OFTD document describing its procedures, these reports  are important because they often generate requests for high-level  discussions led by the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner with the  heads of operational offices. According to OFTD officials, their periodic  briefings on covert testing resulted in management changes at USBP.  USBP, for example, took action after OFTD’s January 2013 briefing to  correct deficiencies that had first been identified in covert operations  conducted in 2009. These actions included direction to USBP field  management on the importance of USBP agents’ compliance with agency  policy and procedures for wearing and using PRDs. In addition, because  of continued findings of capability weaknesses at checkpoints over the  last 5 years, USBP took action to implement an OFTD recommendation  to institute its own covert operation program to test capabilities for   CBP action to determine  detecting radiological and nuclear smuggling.appropriate time frames for comprehensive reports and ensure they are  issued would provide CBP, OFO, and USBP with information to  strengthen oversight and improve program operations in detecting and  interdicting transborder nuclear and radiological threats. Further,  providing timely reports on results of covert operations could help ensure  awareness among management and personnel at ports of entry and  checkpoints about potential areas of weakness and corrective actions  used at other facilities to address these weaknesses across the United  States.
section_title: CBP Has Provided Limited Oversight to Ensure Implementation of Corrective Actions
paragraphs: OFTD tracks some corrective actions taken by CBP components to  address weaknesses identified by covert operations, but not others. For  example, OFTD tracks the status of corrective actions taken by OFO  management to address recommendations included in its comprehensive  reports resulting from covert operations. However, OFTD does not track  the status of corrective actions taken by OFO at ports of entry to address  weaknesses identified in covert operations that are not individually cited  in these reports. Additionally, OFTD does not track the status of  corrective actions taken by USBP to address the weaknesses identified  through covert operations at checkpoints.
OFTD officials told us that in order to develop the recommendations  issued in the Comprehensive Reports on Radiation Testing, they  reviewed the test summaries from all covert operations at air, land, and  sea ports of entry and used their judgment to develop recommendations  to address capability weaknesses related to equipment, technology, and  personnel compliance with policies and procedures in the CBP radiation  detection directive. The fiscal years 2009 to 2011 comprehensive report  summarizes results from 43 covert operations conducted at air, land, and  sea ports of entry, and the fiscal years 2012 and 2013 report summarizes  results from 26 covert operations. The two comprehensive reports span a  5-year time period, and both identify several of the same issues: (1) CBP  officers’ noncompliance with radiation detection policies and procedures,  (2) radiation detection equipment not always functioning as designed, and  (3) CBP officer error primarily due to the lack of training. Our assessment  of OFTD’s fiscal year 2012 and 2013 report found that it provides CBP  senior management with a more detailed analysis of covert operation  results, including reasons why test sources were not interdicted, than  previous reports.
OFTD developed five recommendations to OFO management for  addressing selected weaknesses identified from covert operations  conducted from fiscal years 2009 through 2011. Specifically, in the  Comprehensive Report on Radiation Testing, for fiscal years 2009  through 2011, OFTD recommended the following:  1.  CBP officers follow policies and procedures on radiation detection as  required by CBP Directive 5290-015A, entitled U.S. CBP Radiation  Detection Program Directive.  2.  All primary officers have PRDs as required.  3.  RIID docking stations be made available wherever needed or  required.  4.  CBP officers receive training required to perform their assigned  functions.  5.  Speed limits should be enforced as required.
OFTD officials stated that as of May 2014, OFO had implemented four of  these five recommendations. OFTD officials told us that OFO is  continuing to take action and to address the recommendation that all  primary officers have PRDs as required. OFO officials stated that they are  conducting training and checks during fiscal year 2014 to ensure that the  PRD policy is being followed and plan to close the recommendation by  procuring additional PRDs for officers by fiscal year 2015.officials further stated that they will keep this recommendation open until  OFTD verifies that PRDs have been deployed in the field and that officers  are using the PRDs at primary inspection points. The verification process  will include spot checks of a random sample of air, land, and sea ports of  entry throughout fiscal year 2014.
OFTD developed nine recommendations to OFO management for  addressing selected weaknesses identified from covert operations from  fiscal years 2012 and 2013. response to the nine recommendations identified in the April 2014  Comprehensive Report on Radiation Testing were not yet available for  our review, but that OFO is taking steps to address these  recommendations.
Specific details related to the nine recommendations were removed for the purposes of  this public report because DHS considered them to be For Official Use Only. radiation detection procedure, or if the weakness was related to the  failure of a procedure affecting overall port operations. Corrective actions  would be tailored by the port manager accordingly to address the  underlying cause of the weakness. OFO and USBP officials stated that  while they have a process in place to address weaknesses identified  during OFTD covert operations, they were unable to provide us with  complete information about corrective actions that were taken to address  the results of the covert operations because they do not fully track them.  OFTD officials also informed us that OFTD does not track information  about corrective actions taken by OFO and USBP because doing so is  outside of OFTD’s responsibilities.
Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government states that  agencies can enhance their ability to address weaknesses by establishing  policies and procedures for ensuring that the findings of audits and  reviews are promptly resolved, and ensure that ongoing monitoring  occurs. Establishing a process for CBP to ensure that OFO and USBP  implement corrective actions for individual ports of entry and at  checkpoints could help provide CBP with reasonable assurances that  radiation detection and interdiction weaknesses indentified at the port of  entry and checkpoints are addressed and security is consistently  improving. Without an overall mechanism for addressing weaknesses  identified, CBP does not have the oversight capabilities necessary to hold  officials at ports of entry and checkpoints accountable for managing  program operations to detect and interdict transborder nuclear and  radiological threats.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Preventing nuclear and radiological materials from illegally entering the  United States through ports of entry and checkpoints is a complex and  challenging process that involves significant resources, including  specialized radiological and nuclear detection equipment, detailed  policies and procedures, and training for a large number of border  protection personnel. The United States has invested billions of dollars to  detect and interdict smuggled nuclear and radiological materials at U.S.  ports of entry and checkpoints, and CBP reports multiple benefits of its  covert operations that can identify the need for changes in how  technology is used to detect nuclear and radiological material, agency  policies or procedures, or personnel training to ensure that interdiction  programs are working most effectively. Given the limited resources  directed toward covert operations testing of U.S. detection and  interdiction capabilities, it is essential that DHS make risk-informed  decisions to enhance its ability to assess the success of these  investments. By assessing risk to prioritize the most dangerous materials,  most vulnerable locations, and most critical equipment for testing through  covert operations, DHS could better inform its decisions on how to  expend its limited resources effectively, consistent with the department’s  risk management policies. In addition, establishing appropriate reporting  time frames of covert operations results, and developing a mechanism to  track whether ports of entry and checkpoints have implemented corrective  actions, could help CBP ensure accountability and inform management  decision making on the need for further investments or actions to protect  U.S. borders from these potential consequences.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Actions
paragraphs: To help ensure that resources for covert operations provide reasonable  assurance that efforts to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological  material smuggled across the border are working as intended and  appropriately targeting the most critical materials, locations, and detection  technologies, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security  conduct or use a risk assessment to inform the department’s priorities— related to such decisions as test locations, materials, and equipment—for  covert operations at U.S. checkpoints and ports of entry in air, land, and  sea environments.
To help ensure that CBP has the information necessary to provide  oversight and accountability for implementing corrective actions to  address weaknesses identified by covert operations we recommend that  the Commissioner of CBP: determine time frames for OFTD reporting of covert operation results  and status of corrective actions necessary to timely address border  security weaknesses and work with OFTD to address any barriers to  meeting these time frames, and develop a mechanism to track the corrective actions taken to address  all weaknesses identified through covert operations at the ports of  entry and checkpoints.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS for  review and comment. On July 11, 2014, DHS provided written comments  and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We  provided a draft of this report with redacted sensitive information to DHS  for a sensitivity review. On September 12, 2014, DHS approved the draft  for public release and reissued its written comments, which are  reproduced in full in appendix V, and additional technical comments,  which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS concurred with all three of  our recommendations and discussed action to address them. Specifically:
We recommended that the Secretary conduct or use a risk  assessment to inform DHS’s priorities—related to such decisions  as test locations, materials, and equipment—for covert operations  at U.S. checkpoints and ports of entry in air, land, and sea  environments. DHS concurred and stated that with input from  stakeholders, CBP will formulate a process for conducting and  using information from risk assessments and that the pending  realignment of OFTD with the Office of Intelligence and  Investigative Liaison (OIIL) will facilitate collaboration. DHS has  not yet established an estimated completion date for these  activities. If implemented effectively, these actions should meet  the intent of our recommendation
We recommended that the Commissioner of CBP determine time  frames for OFTD reporting of covert operation results and status  of corrective actions necessary to timely address border security  weaknesses and work with OFTD to address any barriers to  meeting these time frames. DHS concurred and stated it would  develop new policies and procedures that establish strict timelines  for reporting results of all testing in all locations, report results  within established time frames, and routinely and timely publish  comprehensive annual reports. DHS estimated these actions  would be completed by April 30, 2015. If implemented and  monitored effectively, these actions should meet the intent of our  recommendation.
We recommended that the Commissioner of CBP develop a  mechanism to track the corrective actions taken to address all  weaknesses identified through covert operations at the ports of  entry and checkpoints. DHS concurred and stated that OFTD will  collaborate with all CBP operational offices to develop a  mechanism to monitor the status of corrective actions taken by all  operational offices as a result of OFTD’s covert testing. DHS  stated that OIIL will have the primary responsibility for monitoring  the status of corrective action. DHS estimated these actions would  be completed by December 31, 2014. If implemented and  monitored effectively, these actions should meet the intent of our  recommendation.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 25 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees and to the Secretary of Homeland Security; In  addition, this report will be made publicly available at no extra charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have further questions about this report, please contact David C.  Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov or David C. Trimble at  (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Ports of Entry and Permanent Checkpoints within the United States and Its Territories as of January 2014
paragraphs: Information in this appendix is also presented in figure 1. Table 2 includes  328 ports of entry and 35 permanent checkpoints. However, some of the  328 ports of entry have one or more facilities, such as airports, sea ports,  or land ports. For example, the Brownsville, Texas, port of entry includes  air, land, and sea ports, and the San Diego port of entry includes both air  and sea ports. Accounting for each air, land, and sea port separately, the  map actually includes 477 facilities (241 airports, 110 land ports, and 126  sea ports) and 35 permanent checkpoints for a total of 512 locations.  These are indicated in the map under their respective locations within  each state or territory.
section_title: Appendix II: U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD) Steps for Conducting a Covert Operation
paragraphs: 1.  CBP provides no notice to the port of entry or checkpoint officials in  advance of the operation.  2.  A CBP official inserts the radiological source into a cargo container, a  vehicle, or personal luggage.3.  An actor attempts to smuggle a hidden radiological or nuclear source  material through a port of entry or checkpoint by hiding the source  material in a vehicle, cargo, or luggage and attempting to enter the  country with it.  4.  The operation is recorded using a variety of surveillance equipment.
CBP officials observe the test and take notes.  5.  After the covert test is complete, OFTD officials interview the CBP  officers or U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents involved in the operation  and discuss test results with them, explaining what went well and  what areas are in need of improvement.  6.  Within 24 hours, OFTD officials prepare a one-page summary of the  covert test.  7.  OFTD officials provide a copy of the summary to the Office of Field  Operations (OFO) or USBP management and conduct an out-brief the  day after the operation.
section_title: Appendix III: Number of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Covert Operations Conducted at Ports of Entry and Checkpoints, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013
paragraphs: Information in this appendix is also presented in figure 5. Table 3 lists, for  each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and selected territories,  the number of covert operations conducted by Customs and Border  Protection’s (CBP) Operational Field Testing Division at (1) air ports of  entry, (2) land ports of entry, (3) sea ports of entry, (4) checkpoints, and  (5) totals by state or territory.
section_title: Appendix IV: U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Postcovert Operation Feedback Process
paragraphs: The process for informing the ports of entry and checkpoints of the results  of covert tests includes the following:
Upon the conclusion of a covert test, Operational Field Testing  Division (OFTD) personnel will immediately complete a written test  highlights using information associated with the test that includes their  own observations from the test; interviews of involved officers, agents,  and applicable supervisors; and other relevant documents.
OFTD will disseminate the written test highlights to local port of entry  or sector (checkpoint) management—Director of Field Operations or  Sector Chief and headquarters senior management—Commissioner,  Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioners, Chief of U.S.  Border Protection (USBP), and Executive Directors.
OFTD provides an oral debrief the day after a covert test to local  senior management informing them of OFTD’s findings and best  practices.
OFTD then prepares a written test summary that contains more  details than a test highlights for dissemination via e-mail to local  management and headquarters senior management. The test  summary will also describe the specific test scenario used during the  covert operation. The test summary is provided to local port of entry,  sector, and senior headquarters management within several days of a  test.
Local operational offices will develop corrective action plans to  address weaknesses and vulnerabilities identified and noted during  the debrief and in the written summary.
Office of Field Operations (OFO) and USBP will determine whether  there should be changes to national policies and procedures as a  result of its covert tests. These may include additional operational unit  policy and procedural changes, policy memos, or directives that are  disseminated across the United States. OFTD may also adjust test  protocols based on test findings.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individuals named above, Lacinda Ayers, Assistant  Director; Ned Woodward, Assistant Director; Nima Patel Edwards; Justin  S. Fisher; R. Scott Fletcher; Robert T. Grace; Eric D. Hauswirth; Susan  Hsu; Tracey King; Stanley J. Kostyla; and Brian J. Lipman made  significant contributions to the work.