Federal Facility Security: Staffing Approaches Used by Selected Agencies
Published: 2011-06-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Federal Protective Service (FPS) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provides security and law enforcement services to over 9,000 federal facilities through its federal and contract security workforce. Over the years, GAO has made numerous recommendations to address significant weaknesses in FPS's oversight and management of its security workforce. Legislation has been introduced that would, among other things, have FPS examine the effectiveness of relying more on federal employees for security. As requested, this report examines: (1) nine federal agencies' approaches for staffing their security workforces; (2) federal and private sector representatives' views on the benefits and challenges of using contract and in-house security staff; and (3) lessons that FPS can learn from federal agencies that have changed their security staffing approaches. GAO reviewed agency documents and conducted interviews with representatives from federal agencies and private sector firms selected based on the use of security guards and experience in changing a security workforce, among other criteria. The selected agencies and private sector firms are a nonprobability sample, and the information we obtained is not generalizable.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Eight of the nine selected federal agencies reported using a combination of contract and in-house facility security positions, and the distribution of their security staff varies significantly. Contract security staff are primarily used for routine access control functions, while in-house staff, such as federal security guards and inspectors, tend to perform a variety of security functions, such as patrol and risk assessment. Selected agency officials cited facility risk level and cost, among others, as factors considered when staffing a security workforce. Federal agencies used various types of security staff-- even at high-risk facilities--for protection. As a high-profile law enforcement agency, the Department of Justice uses armed contract security guards with prior law enforcement experience to protect its high-risk facilities. Federal and private sector representatives reported that contract and in-house security staff offer benefits and challenges for agencies to weigh when making staffing decisions. The two primary reported benefits of contract security staff were (1) potential cost savings and (2) flexibility to increase or reduce staff size. Conversely, these two issues were commonly cited as challenges in using in-house security staff. The reported benefits for in-house security staff were greater control to select qualified security staff and develop them to meet organizational needs. Early planning to determine security staffing needs and sufficient oversight were cited as key lessons learned when changing staffing approaches. For example, Smithsonian Institution had time to conduct risk-based assessments, which helped it decide to use contract staff only at lower-risk posts. Other agencies' experiences, as well as FPS's experience in transitioning to an inspector-based workforce, suggest that changing FPS's staffing approach could prove challenging. Early planning could help FPS address some of those challenges in the event a transition is desired or mandated, and sufficient oversight and management of its workforce will be critical to providing effective security. GAO provided the nine agencies with a draft of this report for comment. In response, agencies provided technical comments that were incorporated where appropriate.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Protecting federal facilities and their occupants from terrorist attacks and  other violent acts remains a daunting challenge for federal agencies.  Agencies face potential workplace violence, unauthorized access, and  terrorism, among other facility security threats, and employ security  personnel who perform a key role in helping to protect against such  threats. Responsibilities for federal facility security are dispersed among  multiple federal agencies. Several agencies, including the Departments of  Defense (DOD), Justice (DOJ), and Veterans Affairs (VA), are responsible  for securing some of their own facilities. However, the Department of  Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) is the  primary federal agency that is responsible for securing and protecting  approximately 9,000 federal facilities nationwide that are under the  control and custody of the General Services Administration (GSA).  Through its federal and contract security workforce, FPS provides facility  security services that include law enforcement, security, and emergency  response. In recent years, our work has identified significant weaknesses  in FPS’s oversight and management of its security workforce, including  the failures to ensure that its contract security guards maintain required  training and certifications and to annually evaluate security guard  performance. Such oversight gaps have raised questions about FPS’s  reliance on a contract workforce.
Congress has begun to explore alternative approaches for staffing FPS’s  facility security workforce. Legislation has been introduced that would,  among other things, reclassify and change the job functions of FPS’s  federal security employees and require FPS to examine the effectiveness  of using federal employees to staff the contract security guard positions at  the highest-risk federal facilities. In light of your interest in staffing  approaches for facility security workforces, this report examines: (1)  selected federal agencies’ approaches in staffing their facility security  workforces; (2) federal agency and private sector representatives’ views  on the benefits and challenges of using contract or in-house security  staffing approaches; and (3) lessons that FPS can learn from other federal  agencies that have changed their security staffing approaches.
To gather information addressing all of these issues, we reviewed agency  documents and conducted interviews with the following nine federal  agencies:    Transportation Security Administration (TSA);    Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA);    U.S. Marshals Service (USMS);    DOJ’s Justice Protective Service (JPS);    Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian); and    Veterans Health Administration (VHA).
We selected these agencies based on several criteria, including dispersed  geographic location of facilities, facility security staff presence, a need to  balance public access and security at facilities, and experience in changing  the approach used to staff their facility security workforce, among other  factors. We reviewed selected federal agencies’ documents and data on the  facility security workforce staffing approaches used, including the salary  costs for federal facility security employees and the responsibilities  performed by those employees and contract security personnel. To ensure  the accuracy of the staffing data collected, we provided each federal  agency with data on the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees  for security-related positions in the Office of Personnel Management’s  (OPM) Central Personnel Data File (CPDF) for that agency. We asked each  agency to review its CPDF data and provide updated figures for fiscal year  2010 for the information requested. We assessed the CPDF data and found  it to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also gathered views and  information on the benefits and challenges for facility security staffing  approaches, including the use of contract or in-house security staff, from  representatives of the nine selected federal agencies and three private  sector industries: (1) commercial real estate; (2) entertainment, including  gaming and theme parks; and (3) hospitals. The industries were selected  using the previously stated criteria for selecting federal agencies. We  selected a total of 10 companies and associations within these industries  for interviews. Because the selected organizations are a nonprobability  sample, the information we obtained are not generalizable. To determine  lessons that FPS can learn from other federal agencies that have changed  their security staffing approaches, we reviewed agency documents and  conducted semistructured interviews with officials from the four selected  agencies that had undergone a workforce transition (Air Force, Army,  Smithsonian, and TSA). In addition, we reviewed our previous reports and  industry literature regarding staffing a security workforce. See appendix I  for more detailed information on our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 through June 2011 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The general purpose of facility security is to protect people, property, and  the facility itself by deterring, detecting, and responding to potentially  criminal and dangerous acts and people. Threats to facility security may  include theft, unauthorized access, natural disasters, and terrorism, among  others. An organization’s need to balance security with open and public  access can make facility security more challenging, including at facilities  such as medical centers, commercial office buildings, and gaming  facilities. Organizations’ efforts to provide facility security are more  extensive than simply assigning an individual to “stand guard.” Key  functions of facility security generally include facility access, patrol and  law enforcement, and security management (see table 1).
As part of facility security management, organizations conduct risk  assessments—or facility security assessments—that include identifying  threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to determine overall risk and  what means, or countermeasures, are best suited to secure the facility.  Organizations use a variety of countermeasures to provide facility security,  including the use of security equipment, building-design specifications,  and security personnel. Nonmilitary federal facilities are categorized into  five facility security risk levels that are based on five factors: mission  criticality, symbolism, facility population, facility size, and threat to tenant  agencies. Private companies make individual determinations on how they  want to mitigate facility security risks and must ensure their security  workforces meet the specific needs of their industry. For example,  security guards in the hospital industry protect employees, patients,  visitors, and hospital equipment, and also may provide specialized  assistance to ensure the safety of people with particular medical needs.
To carry out facility security functions, organizations may rely on in-house  security personnel; for federal agencies, those personnel are classified into  several specific general schedule (GS) job series. Federal guidance  provides broad parameters for the duties associated with each job position  within its assigned OPM job series, but each agency is able to further  refine its specific position descriptions within those parameters. The  following provides the five job series used for the security personnel at the  agencies we reviewed and a summary of the key security duties associated  with each job series according to OPM guidance:    GS-0085 Security Guard—generally performs protective services work  involving guarding, protecting, and controlling access to federal facilities;   GS-0083 Police—generally performs law enforcement work involving  protecting the peace, investigating crimes, and arresting violators;   GS-0080 Security Administration—generally performs or manages facility  security work involving developing risk assessments, implementing  security procedures, and overseeing security staff;   GS-1811 Criminal Investigation—generally performs or supervises work  involving planning and conducting investigations related to violations of  federal laws; and    GS-1802 Compliance Inspection—generally performs work involving  conducting inspections to ensure compliance with federal laws (e.g.,  inspection of airline passengers and baggage).
In addition to in-house facility security personnel, organizations may also  use contract security personnel to secure their facilities. Organizations  generally contract for a certain number of hours of security service to be  fulfilled by contracting companies, rather than specifying the number of  contract security personnel. Contracting companies recruit, hire, train,  and pay their own security staff and typically charge an organization an  hourly rate for their services. Titles for these contract security personnel  may vary by organization. For example, FPS calls them protective security  officers, while the Army more simply calls them contract security guards.
In the federal government, DHS is designated under the Homeland  Security Act of 2002 as the primary agency authorized to enforce federal  laws and regulations aimed at protecting federal facilities and persons on  the property. Within DHS, FPS is the security provider for GSA-owned or - controlled facilities. FPS’s federal workforce consists of about 675 law  enforcement security officers (LESO), also known as inspectors, who are  responsible for law enforcement and security duties, including: patrolling  building perimeters, responding to incidents, completing risk assessments  for buildings, recommending security countermeasures, and overseeing  the contract security workforce. FPS also relies on about 14,000 contract  security guards to control access, operate security equipment, observe the  environment for suspicious activity, and respond to emergency situations  involving the safety and security of the facility. We previously identified  several vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the oversight of both FPS’s  federal and contract workforces, and FPS is currently undertaking efforts  to address these weaknesses and improve management of its security  workforce. In addition to FPS, other federal agencies are responsible for  securing and protecting their own facilities. Table 2 shows the facilities  protected by the other agencies included in our review.
section_title: Most Selected Federal Agencies Use a Combination of In- house and Contract Security Positions to Meet Their Individual Facility Security Requirements
subsections: section_title: Selected Federal Agencies Generally Use In-house Staff to Perform a Wide Range of Security Functions, While Contract Security Guards Typically Perform Routine Access Control
paragraphs: Eight of the nine federal agencies selected for our review currently use a  combination of both in-house and contract security personnel to secure  their facilities, and the distribution of in-house and contract staff vary  significantly (see fig. 1). VHA almost exclusively uses federal employees to  secure its hospitals. Three of the selected agencies have statutory  requirements that determine their use of federal and contract staff: the  Army, Air Force, and TSA. DOD is generally prohibited from entering into  a contract for the performance of firefighting or security guard functions  at any military installation or facility. However, Congress authorized DOD  to temporarily use contract security staff in fiscal year 2003 to address  increased security needs at its facilities when numerous DOD employees  were deployed overseas, but DOD is now required to discontinue the  temporary use of contract security guards at the end of fiscal year 2012.
TSA’s composition of mostly federal security employees, or airport  passenger screeners, was dictated when the agency was created in the  Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001. Others among our  selected agencies generally have the discretion to determine the extent to  which they use in-house staff or contract the facility security functions out  to private contractors. For instance, PFPA primarily uses federal police  officers to secure the Pentagon—a facility with a high risk for terrorist  attack—and contract security guards to secure its lower-risk facilities.
Federal agencies reported using a variety of in-house security positions  (see table 3); however, one or two key positions may account for the  majority of the agency’s in-house security staff. For example, while the  Smithsonian reported that it uses four different types of federal security  positions, almost 90 percent of its security employees are federal security  guards.
Agency officials reported that their in-house security staffs collectively  perform a broader range of facility security functions than their contract  staff. In-house security administration staff, police officers, and security  guards, among others, perform a wide range of security functions. The  most common security functions that in-house staff performed are law  enforcement, post inspections, and risk assessments (see fig. 2). In  contrast, seven of the eight agencies currently using contract security  personnel reported their contract staff generally perform routine facility  access control functions, including visitor screening and control center  operations. FPS reported that its contract security guards performed a  wider range of tasks, including some patrol and response duties. Officials  from other agencies reported using contract security guards for what they  consider to be lower-risk security posts, such as those providing visitor  assistance. According to Air Force officials, their decisions of where to use  contract staff are not predicated on facility or post risk levels, but on  where staff are needed to replace deployed military personnel.
Depending on the functions that are performed, each security position,  whether in-house or contracted, generally has different training  requirements that are specified by each individual agency’s needs.  Training for federal and military police officers is generally more extensive  than that required for federal and military security guards—two commonly  used in-house security positions. While federal police officers receive  training at a police academy, a federal law enforcement training facility, or  a DOD-agency training facility, training for federal security guards is  currently dictated by each agency’s individual needs. For example, Air  Force officials told us that Air Force police officers receive 5 weeks of  training and can perform all the job functions of security guards, in  addition to broader law enforcement functions, while Air Force security  guards receive 2 weeks of training to perform a more limited set of  functions focused on facility access. Currently, no federal  governmentwide training standards exist for contract security guards to  work in federal facilities. Consequently, training requirements for  contract security staff vary depending on the agency, as well as possible  state requirements. Agencies specify in their contract statements of work  the functions that contract staff are expected to perform, as well as the  qualifications that are required for the staff. For instance, in addition to  basic security training provided by the contractor, FPS contract security  guards are required to have 16 hours of FPS-provided training, including  certification on X-ray and magnetometer equipment, while the Air Force’s  contract security guards receive 40 hours of government-provided training  specific to the installation in which they are assigned.
section_title: Federal Agencies’ Individual Security Needs and Costs Largely Drive the Makeup of Their Facility Security Workforce
paragraphs: Selected agency officials told us that their decisions about staffing facility  security functions—whether it be deciding between using in-house or  contract staff or deciding the most appropriate type of in-house staff—are  driven by multiple factors, such as their individual facility security  requirements and costs. Federal facilities nationwide differ in their facility  type, size, location, occupant mission, and risk level, among other factors.  As we have previously reported, and security officials corroborated, there  is no widely accepted formula to determine the size and makeup of a  security workforce and no standard model can be applied for staffing  because the risk level and specific building needs may differ. While some  federal agencies may use in-house staff to secure their high-risk facilities,  other agencies, such as JPS or USMS, may use contract security guards to  protect their high-risk facilities. Over the years, we have advocated the use  of a comprehensive risk management approach that links threats and  vulnerabilities to resource requirements and allocations to address  potential security threats.
According to security officials from selected agencies, staffing for specific  security positions is based on factors such as the risk level and specific  needs of the facilities that are being protected. Staffing needs dictate the  qualifications that agencies set for either their in-house or contract staff.  For instance, FPS requires a high-school diploma, among other things, for  its contract security guards; however, it does not require a law  enforcement background or previous law enforcement experience. In  contrast, PFPA requires some of its contract security guards to have,  among other things, a secret-level security clearance, because of their  potential access to sensitive materials. Examples of factors considered by  agency security officials in reaching their security staffing decisions  include the following:    Smithsonian reported primarily using federal security guards to control  access, operate security equipment, and patrol the perimeter of its  facilities where the security risks are higher. Contract security guards are  used to assist and advise visitors within the interior of museums, where  security risks are lower because visitors are screened when granted access  to the building.
JPS security officials stated that the high-profile nature of the law  enforcement and justice mission of DOJ draws increased attention to its  facilities and poses increased or additional security threats, such as  protests and other potential harm. It uses armed contract security guards,  all of whom have prior law enforcement experience and are highly trained  and deputized as Special Deputy U.S. Marshals.
VHA facilities face security risks due to their open campuses at diverse  locations. VA officials explained they rely on locally conducted risk  assessments to determine their facilities’ security response. At some of its  medical facilities located in rural locations, ready access to local law  enforcement services may be limited; at several of its large urban VHA  facilities, local law enforcement agencies generally do not provide basic  police services on federal facilities. As a result, VA primarily uses  uniformed federal police officers to provide facility security and law  enforcement functions.
Security officials also cited cost as another factor that was considered in  staffing their workforces. We previously found that security officials from  federal agencies cited budget considerations in making law enforcement  and facility security staffing decisions. The base salary costs of  government security positions vary depending on the experience and  qualifications of the individual employee. Among our selected federal  agencies, in-house security positions vary in base pay from an average of  about $37,000 for security guards to nearly $90,000 for criminal  investigators (see table 4). We found that an agency may hire entry-level  employees into a GS-3 or GS-4 position, while experienced employees  ranged up to the GS-15 grade level, particularly for security positions  requiring higher levels of responsibilities or qualifications. With respect  to contract security staff, the specific functions to be performed and the  hourly rate associated with each position are established within a contract  statement of work. One federal official told us that using a combined  federal and contract workforce distributed based on functional areas and  risks could make sense from a cost perspective. For example, a cost- effective model may be to have a high-level federal security or law  enforcement officer present at facilities to oversee contract security  guards assigned to perform certain limited facility access control  functions.
section_title: Cited Benefits of Contract Security Staff Are Potential Cost Savings and Personnel Flexibility, While In-house Security Staff Are Viewed as Offering Increased Control over Staff Selection and Development
paragraphs: Representatives of the nine federal agencies and ten private sector  organizations with whom we spoke identified several issues that present  either benefits or challenges for using contract and in-house security staff,  as identified in table 5. In our analysis of the benefits and challenges  identified for both in-house and contract security staff, we found that both  workforce staffing approaches offer advantages and disadvantages. As  indicated previously, eight of the nine federal agencies in our review use  both in-house and contract security staff. If staffing is well managed,  agencies may achieve the benefits of either staffing approach.
Cost. Private sector and federal agency representatives identified potential  for cost savings as a benefit of using contract staff over in-house security  staff. Such potential cost savings were based on several factors identified  by representatives: (1) an in-house staffing model requires organizations to  have more employees on board to staff posts than may be required under a  contract model in which security is procured hourly; (2) a contract  workforce may offer savings in employee compensation costs, including  health and retirement benefits; and (3) contract security costs are fixed  within the contract, which may reduce the risk of budget fluctuations.
First, contract security staff are typically procured based on the hours of  service provided and not by the number of staff who are used by the  contractor to provide such services. Several federal officials reported that  agencies that use in-house security workforces must have more security  staff available than the equivalent hours required to fill the same security  posts through a contract workforce to cover time when staff are away  from their posts, such as for training or leave. For example, and as  discussed later, Smithsonian officials reported it uses contract security  guards at lower-risk areas of its facilities which has enabled it to staff five  posts with contract security guards for the same cost as three posts staffed  with federal security guards. In addition, the use of an in-house security  workforce increases the number of FTEs an agency must recruit, train,  schedule, and manage, and adds to the in-house administrative  responsibilities and associated costs that could otherwise be handled by a  contractor. However, Army officials reported that an Army analysis for  fiscal year 2009 showed that while contract security guards would have  offered savings over in-house security guards in the first 2 years of an in- sourcing decision, in-house security guards would be more cost effective  over time as start-up costs for training, equipment, and uniforms are  reduced. They noted it had sufficient administrative capacity to absorb the  increased workload without additional administrative staff.
Second, federal agency and private sector representatives told us that a  contract security workforce offers savings in employee compensation  costs, including health and retirement benefits. With a contract security  workforce, the contractor is responsible for providing health or retirement  benefits to its workforce, rather than the organization procuring the  service. Several federal and private sector representatives reported that  the benefits offered by contractors may be of lesser value than those  offered in the federal sector, where employee benefits represent a  significant portion of an employee’s compensation. OPM reported that for  fiscal year 2010, the cost factor for federal employee health benefits was  about $5,900 per enrolled employee. Retirement benefits for employees  covered under the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) are  about 14 percent of a regular civilian employee’s salary and as much as 30  percent of a federal law enforcement officer’s salary. An executive from  one private sector hospital that had recently transitioned to a contract  security workforce estimated that the hospital saved about 36 percent  annually by using a contract security workforce rather than an in-house  one, with much of this savings coming from no longer having to pay for  health, retirement, and other benefits. In addition, several representatives  also reported that contract security staff are often paid less than in-house  security staff. According to May 2009 data from the Department of Labor,  Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the national average annual wage for a  contract security guard was $24,450—about 30 percent less than the  national average annual wage of $36,410 paid to security guards employed  by the federal executive branch in that year. However, federal and private  sector representatives also noted that offering lower wages and benefits to  security personnel could present challenges in assembling a qualified  security workforce, which could present security risks. As such, several  representatives noted that, in using a contract security workforce, it is  important to establish minimum wage and training requirements within  the contract.
A third benefit of using a contract security workforce is the ability to  predict and manage security costs since the costs of the services provided  are fixed by the contract. For example, in using an in-house security  workforce, increasing security coverage or covering for workforce  absences could require the use of overtime hours, which may be costly.  Five of the federal agencies in our review reported they budgeted overtime  costs for facility security staff for fiscal year 2010, with one agency  reporting it budgeted about $1,600 for each facility security staff in that  year. Overtime costs for staff absences may not be applicable with a  contract security workforce because contractors are responsible for  staffing each post under the terms of the contract. An executive from a  private sector hospital that uses a contract security workforce reported  that the hospital knows its security costs for the life of the contract,  including costs defined in the contract for procuring additional security  guard hours, if needed.
Given the significant fiscal challenges currently facing the federal  government, the reported cost savings offered by a contract security staff  may be of particular interest to federal agencies. However, as we have  previously reported, in the federal procurement system today, there is  common recognition that a cost-only focus does not necessarily deliver  the best quality or performance for the government or the taxpayers.  Thus, while cost is always a factor, and often an important one, it is not  the only factor that needs to be considered.
Personnel flexibility. Representatives also reported personnel flexibility  as a benefit of using contract security staff, including the flexibility to  adjust and deploy security staff levels to meet immediate needs. According  to FPS officials, its security contracts include a requirement that the  contractor maintain a reserve force with a recommended capacity of at  least 10 percent to provide additional security guard hours as needed. For  example, FPS provides contract security guards to the Federal Emergency  Management Agency to support its emergency-response efforts. FPS also  provided additional security guard service hours to the Internal Revenue  Service in response to an attack on an agency facility in Austin, Texas, in  2010. FPS contractors may employ part-time personnel so they have  sufficient numbers to draw upon in the event of a temporary surge in  security guard needs, according to FPS officials. In the private sector,  executives representing gaming and theme-park industries reported that,  while their organizations primarily rely upon an in-house security staff for  day-to-day security, both industries call upon contractors to surge their  workforce size to address security risks for New Year’s Eve celebrations  or other events that attract large crowds, such as concerts.
Using a contract security workforce may also reduce some in-house  human capital administrative duties, such as recruiting security staff and  addressing performance issues. Several federal agency officials reported  that the use of an in-house security workforce presents personnel  responsibility challenges, such as increased administrative functions for  recruiting and hiring new staff, managing annual or sick leave, planning  work shifts, and other duties. We have previously reported that the federal  hiring process can be lengthy and complex and is often an impediment to  the agencies, managers, and applicants it is designed to serve. This  governmentwide hiring challenge also applies to the hiring of in-house  security staff. For example, officials with one federal agency reported that  its personnel center was taking from 99 to 120 days to recruit and hire new  security staff. With a contract workforce, recruitment, hiring, and other  administrative responsibilities are the responsibility of the contractor, and  the contractor is obligated to provide the hours of service contracted for,  regardless of the challenges it might face in doing so. Several federal  agency and private sector representatives also reported that contract  security staff offer greater flexibility to quickly address poor security  guard performance issues than in-house staff. Although representatives we  interviewed did not cite specific poor performance issues among in-house  staff, several reported that poor performing contract staff can be quickly  removed from a client’s site, which is not generally the case for in-house  staff. It is generally more complex and time consuming to address poor  performing in-house staff, and the process for federal employees may  include performance reviews and appeals.
While using contract staff can reduce personnel responsibilities in some  areas, we have previously reported that it is important for federal agencies  to have systems in place to oversee and manage the performance of  contract and in-house security staff. In prior work, we have noted that it is  critical that agencies implement performance management systems that  help their security staff maximize their full potential, while also providing  agencies with the necessary information to reward top performers and  deal with poor performers, among other things. We have also noted that  it is important to monitor contractor performance to ensure that the terms  of the contract are met. Contractor performance evaluations may include  daily oversight activities, such as post inspections, or annual reviews to  ensure that a contractor is meeting all training, certification, and suitability  requirements. Private sector executives who we interviewed told us that  the performance of contract and in-house security guards can be  monitored through various means, including customer service surveys,  officer performance scenario tests and observations, security guard  attendance, and other data. We previously reported that federal agencies  can develop effective performance management systems by implementing  a set of key practices that apply to agencies’ management of in-house as  well as contract security workforces. Implementing performance  management practices requires effort across an organization and is a  critical ingredient to ensure the performance of either an in-house or  contract workforce model.
Staff selection. Representatives from both federal agencies and private  sector organizations reported that in-house security staff offer increased  control over security staff selection—an important benefit to ensure a  qualified security workforce. Representatives from several organizations  favored selecting their own staff when they considered the facility or post  high risk or when the impact from a security breach could pose a high risk  of loss to the organization. In using a contract security workforce,  individual staff selection decisions are generally made by the contractor  and not by the organization in which the staff are placed. Although  security staff qualifications may be defined in the contract, several  officials reported that reduced control over security staff selection can  result in a less-qualified workforce. For example, PFPA officials reported  that by using an in-house security workforce, it can control the selection  process to ensure the highest caliber officers are hired to protect the  Pentagon, a high-risk facility for terrorist attack. In the private sector,  executives representing two large gaming corporations reported that their  industry primarily uses in-house security staff rather than contract staff to  help ensure that large amounts of cash circulating on the gaming floor are  secure from theft. Casinos conduct background investigations on all  employees, and executives reported that having control of the checks,  rather than relying on a contractor to vet officers, ensures their  thoroughness before officers are placed in sensitive security positions.  Similarly, private sector executives reported concerns with ensuring that  thorough security guard background investigations were conducted and  state certifications were kept up-to-date by contractors.
Staff development. Several private sector and federal agency  representatives reported that having in-house security staff allows for  greater control over the training and development that security guards  receive to tailor staff skills to meet organizational needs. Although  specialized training can be costly and time consuming, executives from  two private sector firms and a federal agency told us they make training  investments for their in-house staff, in part, because they tend to be longer  tenured than contract officers. For example, private sector hospital  executives reported that most hospitals use in-house security staff who  receive training in crisis intervention, infection control, emergency  preparedness, and other issues. VHA officials reported that having in- house security staff is preferable to contract staff because it can ensure  the workforce receives specific training to meet professional standards.  VHA facilities are accredited by the Joint Commission, an organization  that accredits health care facilities by maintaining specific standards, such  as managing security risks. According to VHA officials, it is easier to  maintain the standards with in-house employees rather than relying on  contractors whose training requirements are different. According to  officials, VHA police officers are considered to be part of the patient-care  team, trained to provide security in the VHA psychological and behavioral  health centers. VHA officers receive basic training at VHA’s own law  enforcement training center, which costs the agency approximately $7,800  per officer; VHA also provides facility-specific training and management- level supervisory courses.
Staff retention. Representatives we interviewed commonly cited staff  retention as a benefit of having in-house security staff. In general, federal  agency and private sector representatives reported retaining security staff  was as an important element in building an experienced workforce that is  familiar with the facility and loyal to the organization they are charged to  protect. Representatives from several private sector organizations  reported that turnover rates—or the percentage of individuals leaving an  organization per year—were considered to be higher for contract security  guards than those of in-house security staff. Several private sector and  federal agency representatives reported that their organization’s in-house  security staff turnover rates ranged from 10 to 35 percent; contractor  turnover rates were generally considered to be much higher among the  officials we interviewed. Two private sector executives further noted that  higher security guard turnover can result in an inconsistent security  workforce that may not be as familiar with the organization and the  facilities they are assigned to protect.
Although private sector representatives generally considered staff  retention to be a benefit of in-house staff over contract staff, officials from  five of the nine federal agencies we interviewed reported that their  agencies had experienced some staff retention challenges. Some federal  officials noted that staff retention can be more difficult in certain  geographic locations where the federal government and contractors may  be competing for qualified staff. Reported challenges included retaining  newly hired and trained federal officers who tended to move to higher  paying positions within the federal system. VHA and Smithsonian officials  indicated that their respective agencies had experienced turnover rates for  their in-house security workforces of approximately 10 and 13 percent per  year, respectively. Although such turnover rates were lower than the  reported turnover rates for contract staff, attrition can be costly because  agencies expend upfront costs to recruit, conduct background  investigations, and train new staff. Furthermore, federal officials also  noted that delays in the federal hiring process can exacerbate staff  retention challenges, as attritions may not be quickly replaced by new  hires. The Smithsonian, for example, determined that, in many cases,  federal security guards hired at the GS-5 level were leaving for other  agencies that hired their security guards at the GS-6 level. To address its  staff retention issues, Smithsonian conducted a thorough staffing analysis  that evaluated security risks and needs at each post within 19 museum  properties in the Washington, D.C., and New York, New York, areas. It  developed a staffing plan that promoted some GS-5 level security guards to  GS-6, with those in-house security guards posted at higher-risk facility  entrance posts. Smithsonian also procured a contractor to fill 70 lower- risk posts in building interiors that were previously staffed by federal  security guards. In doing so, Smithsonian officials reported the agency has  addressed its staff retention challenges and restructured its security  workforce.
section_title: Need for Upfront Planning in Determining Security and Staffing Needs and Better Oversight of Workforce Were Key Lessons Learned When Changing Staffing Approach
subsections: section_title: Assessing and Determining Security and Staffing Needs Was Cited as a Key Lesson Learned When Changing a Security Workforce
paragraphs: Officials from the four selected federal agencies (Air Force, Army,  Smithsonian, and TSA) that had undergone a workforce transition cited  upfront planning in assessing facility security and staffing needs, including  administrative support and training requirements, as a key lesson learned  in facilitating a security workforce transition. These officials reported that  changing their staffing approach was a challenging undertaking and  upfront planning to assess and identify facility security and staffing  requirements was critical to a successful transition. Officials further noted  that this planning should also include an assessment of the organization’s  administrative and training capabilities that are necessary to support the  security workforce. We have previously reported that assessing and  determining facility security and staffing needs is a key practice and  element in a risk management approach for allocating resources in facility  protection.
Officials from the Smithsonian, which voluntarily changed its staffing  approach, told us that conducting detailed security and staffing needs  assessments based on risk management helped the transition to its current  approach of using both federal and contract security guards. Until  recently, the Smithsonian had primarily used federal security guards to  protect its 19 museum facilities and assets. Faced with an increasing  turnover rate of its federal security workforce, budget constraints, and the  need to increase security presence at its facilities, Smithsonian officials  told us they developed the current staffing strategy after drawing on  several staffing analyses undertaken over the years. Components of the  multiple facility security and staffing needs assessments included an  examination of job functions of the security guards, security needs and  risk level of each facility, and actual staffing needs for each post by shift.  The agency also looked at post needs in terms of post hours required by  shift, rather than the number of people (i.e., FTEs) required to staff the  post. From these analyses, the agency determined that it could change its  staffing approach and reduce costs for some low-risk posts by using a  contract workforce and eliminating some posts. Since 2009, the  Smithsonian has used contract staff, who are generally posted at lower- risk interior areas of some buildings to monitor collections, while  continuing to use federal security guards at higher-risk areas, such as the  museum entrance lobbies to screen visitors.
By contrast, the Army and Air Force were temporarily allowed to change  their staffing approaches, and TSA was required to use an in-house  security force when the agency was created. Officials from these  agencies stated that, in hindsight, they believe their workforce transitions  would have benefited from more upfront planning, including assessing  their security and staffing needs. For instance, in 2006, the Army assessed  its staffing and post needs and requirements, including determining the  baseline service hours needed at each security post, after transitioning  from a federal workforce to a contract one in 2002. The Army had  originally replaced its in-house staff with contract staff on a one-to-one  staff exchange without assessing its security and staffing needs at its  military installations and posts. This resulted in what we and its officials  later determined were higher-than-necessary contract costs. Army  officials told us that a facility security and staffing needs analysis was not  conducted in 2002, when it was originally allowed to change its workforce,  because of the relatively short time frame it had for its workforce  transition.
Some officials also underscored the importance of assessing the agency’s  administrative infrastructure—including its information technology,  financial systems, and human capital management—to identify  administrative and training requirements and capacities, and to ensure the  agency is capable of supporting a change in its staffing approach. TSA  officials told us that the agency spent about $60 to $70 million to change  and transfer data into a new financial system to manage its federal  workforce. Because TSA had to transition airport screeners from a  contract workforce hired by the airlines to a federal employee workforce  within 1 year, it initially adopted the Department of Transportation’s  (DOT) financial and human resources system. However, DOT’s system  was not originally equipped or intended to take on a large influx of federal  employees, and it proved difficult to use, according to TSA officials. TSA  officials told us that, given their initial time constraints, the agency did not  have the time and opportunity to plan and assess whether the system had  the capacity to handle the increased federal workforce.
These agencies’ experiences indicate that taking the time and conducting  an assessment of facility security and staffing needs prior to any security  workforce transitions, should such a transition be mandated or desired by  FPS, would likely prove beneficial. FPS has recently taken some actions  to assess its staffing needs based on risks, but the outcomes of these  efforts are yet to be determined. For instance, FPS has developed federal  workforce requirements and has incorporated workload data and facility  risk as part of its workforce analysis. However, a final workforce analysis  plan is under executive review with OMB; and, as the details of the plan  are not yet known, it is unclear whether or the extent to which it will  include an assessment of the types and numbers of security positions  needed, as well as associated job functions, roles, and responsibilities.  Additionally, FPS is in the process of developing a Risk Assessment  Management Program (RAMP) system, which among other things, is  designed to improve its ability to manage security at federal facilities and  allocate resources based on risks. While these efforts may help provide a  foundation for assessing its security and staffing needs, it is uncertain how  much FPS could use them to assess and identify other staffing approaches  and options that would be beneficial and financially feasible for protecting  federal facilities. When changing their staffing approaches, other  agencies found it helpful to assess security needs and risk level of each  facility, identify specific job functions of its workforce, and link actual  security and staffing needs for each post and facility.
Additionally, an administrative and support capability assessment may be  particularly important if FPS were to transition to primarily using federal  employees to staff the current contract security guard positions because,  as noted earlier, the agency’s hiring, personnel, and administrative  responsibilities would increase. As we previously reported, it is important  for agencies to be well equipped to recruit and retain security  professionals; our literature review also indicated that whether the  security staff are in house or contract, the employee selection and training  process is critical. When transitioning to an all-inspector staff, FPS  experienced delays in its hiring and training process when Congress  mandated it to increase the number of federal law enforcement  employees, which affected the agency’s ability to bring staff on board and  train them in a timely manner. If a change in workforce approach  involved hiring a large number of new federal employees, it could  particularly stretch FPS’s existing administrative and support functions.  Determining whether its training needs could be met through the Federal  Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), which currently provides  training for new FPS hires and continues to experience backlogs, or  through another entity would appear to be the type of assessment that  could lay the groundwork for a smoother transition.
Finally, TSA officials further commented that a pilot program to phase in  staffing changes could help in planning and assessing security and staffing  needs. Legislation has recently been introduced in Congress calling for the  implementation of a pilot program to examine the effectiveness of using  federal employees to staff the current contract security guard positions at  selected higher-risk federal facilities. Pilot programs allow for an  alternative staffing approach to be vigorously evaluated, shared  systematically with others, and adjusted, as appropriate, before it receives  wider application. We previously reported that when conducting pilot  programs, agencies should develop sound evaluation plans before program  implementation—as part of the design of the pilot program itself—to  increase confidence in the results and facilitate decision making about  broader applications of the pilot program. The lack of a documented  evaluation plan for the pilot program increases the likelihood that an  agency will not collect appropriate or sufficient data, which limits  understanding of the pilot program’s results.
section_title: Determining the Appropriate Level of Oversight and Management of Workforce Was Cited as Another Lesson Learned
paragraphs: Selected federal officials also cited the need to determine the appropriate  level of oversight and management of its workforce as another lesson in  adopting a new workforce approach. In the case of the Army, officials  cited the importance of determining at the outset the appropriate level of  government oversight needed over its contract staff. In its contracts  awarded in 2006, the Army established additional oversight requirements  and mechanisms, including developing specific quality assurance plans  and requiring full-time contracting officer technical representatives to  perform two detailed inspections every 6 months. This was based on the  recognition that government oversight requirements in its earlier contract  were insufficient. As we previously reported, if the process is well  managed, either an in-house or contract approach to staffing a security  workforce can result in a uniform security workforce that provides  effective security.
As noted earlier, managing and overseeing more than 14,000 contract  security guards has proven challenging for FPS, and efforts to implement  our recommendations to monitor contractors’ and contract guards’  performance are still under way. For instance, FPS has begun requiring  its inspectors to complete two contract security guard inspections a week  at level IV federal facilities, and is in the process of providing additional  training to its contract security guards. We believe it is important for FPS  to continue taking steps to improve its oversight and management of its  contract security guards. Changing the makeup of its contract security  guard force to an in-house security workforce would continue to require  the need for management and oversight. Some federal officials indicated  that oversight and management of a federal workforce is just as important  in staffing a security workforce. For instance, Army officials indicated that  the job functions of a federal security guard would be no different than  those functions performed by contract staff; the agency would have to  manage its workforce and have the same expectations and security  responsibilities performed. We previously reported that FPS lacks a  human capital plan to oversee and manage its federal workforce and  recommended it develop a strategic human capital plan. In 2011, we  reported that human capital management of the federal workforce  continues to be a high-risk issue area in the federal government and it is  essential for agencies to ensure they have the talent and skill mix needed  to address current and emerging human capital challenges. Going  forward, in the event FPS looks to change its staffing approach, it will be  important to have a strategic human capital plan in place to help manage  and guide its current and future workforce planning efforts.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to GSA, Smithsonian, VA, and the  Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice in order to  obtain comments from the nine agencies we studied. GSA and DOJ had no  comments. Smithsonian, VA, DOD, and DHS provided technical comments  that we incorporated where appropriate. DHS also provided written  comments that are reprinted in appendix II.
As agreed upon with your office, unless you publicly announce the  contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days  from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to  appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland  Security, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions concerning this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major  contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report examines approaches used by selected federal agencies in  staffing federal facility security workforces. Specifically, the objectives of  this report were to identify (1) approaches used by selected federal  agencies in staffing their facility security workforces; (2) federal agency  and private sector representatives’ views on the benefits and challenges of  using contract or in-house security staffing approaches; and (3) lessons  that the Federal Protective Service (FPS) can learn from other federal  agencies that have changed their security staffing approaches. To provide  information on each of these objectives, we reviewed previous GAO  reports and industry literature on staffing security workforces and  selected a nonprobability sample of federal agencies and private sector  companies for our review. Because the selected organizations are a  nonprobability sample, the information we obtained are not generalizable.  Our selection criteria included: dispersed location of physical facilities and  security guard presence, need to balance public access and security at  facilities, use of a federally or in-house employed and/or contract security  workforce, experience in changing the approach used to staff security  positions, and recommendations by security industry experts.
Based on these criteria we selected nine federal agencies and three private  sector industries for our review. The selected federal agencies were: (1)  FPS, (2) Transportation Security Administration (TSA), (3) U.S. Army  (Army), (4) Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA), (5) U.S. Air Force  (Air Force), (6) U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), (7) Department of Justice,  Justice Protective Service (JPS), (8) Smithsonian Institution  (Smithsonian), and (9) Veterans Health Administration (VHA). To gather a  range of perspectives from the private sector, we selected three industries:  (1) commercial real estate; (2) entertainment, including gaming operations  and theme parks; and (3) hospitals. We selected a total of ten companies  and associations within these industries from which we interviewed  representatives to gather information to research the objectives described  below.
To identify approaches used by selected federal agencies in staffing their  facility security workforces, we reviewed federal agency documents and  data on facility workforce staffing approaches used and conducted  interviews with agency officials. We developed, pretested, and had a  security expert review a data collection instrument that asked the nine  selected federal agencies four questions to gather information about their  facility security workforces:  1.  the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) facility security staff  employed by the agency in fiscal year 2010 within several Office of  Personnel Management (OPM) job series, including police (GS-0083),  security guards (GS-0085), and security administration (GS-0080),  among others; 2.  the primary responsibilities, or job functions, performed by each of the  different types of facility security positions employed by each agency  in fiscal year 2010; 3.  the estimated costs per person for training, recruitment, and  equipment for facility security personnel in fiscal year 2010;  4.  the estimated fiscal year 2010 budget for overtime salary costs for  facility security personnel; and 5.  the total number of contract facility security staff hours provided in  fiscal year 2010.
To ensure the accuracy of the staffing data collected from the federal  agencies, we provided each federal agency with data on the number of  FTE employees for security-related positions in OPM’s Central Personnel  Data File (CPDF) as of September 2010—the most current available data  at the time of our review. We asked each agency to review and verify its  CPDF data and provide updated figures for the information requested. We  e-mailed this data collection instrument to the audit liaisons at each of the  agencies, who then forwarded the instrument to the appropriate officials  to provide responses. We contacted agencies, as necessary, to clarify any  questions we had on the information provided. We received completed  data collection instruments from eight of nine agencies. PFPA did not  provide the requested information, but agency officials provided estimated  numbers of facility security position types and contract staff. We  previously reported that governmentwide data from CPDF for the key  variables reported in this report—agency and pay plan or grade—were 96  percent or more accurate. We determined that the information from  OPM’s CPDF reported here is sufficiently reliable for our needs. To  determine the distribution of in-house and contract security workforce, we  used the number of FTE federal employees and the total number of  contract hours procured in fiscal year 2010 that were provided by eight of  the nine agencies in the data collection instruments. For PFPA, we used  estimated data provided by the agency officials for the number of FTE  federal employees and the estimated number of contract staff employed in  2010. We used 1,760 work hours in a year to convert the total number of  contract hours in fiscal year 2010 into FTEs. While agencies may use  different work hours to convert contract hours to FTE, we used 1,760  work hours in a year, which was used by FPS for a typical federal  employee, and included estimated time for annual and sick leave that may  be used in a year.
To describe federal agency and private sector representatives’ views on  the benefits and challenges of using contract or in-house facility security  staffing approaches, we conducted semistructured interviews with  officials from each selected federal agency and with executives from ten  companies and associations within three private sector industries: (1)  commercial real estate, (2) entertainment (including gaming and theme  parks), and (3) hospitals. In those interviews, we asked federal agency  officials and private sector executives open-ended questions to identify the  specific benefits and challenges presented in the use of in-house and  contract security workforces. To determine the prevalence of the specific  benefits and challenges cited, we completed a content analysis of the  interviews. We reviewed the responses to open-ended questions and  identified a total of six categories that represented the benefits or  challenges for the use of in-house or contract security workforces. We  developed a codebook that defined each of the six categories which were  cost, personnel issues—which included separate codes for personnel  flexibility and personnel responsibilities—staff selection, staff  development, staff retention, and contract management. An analyst  reviewed each response and assigned a code, then a second analyst  reviewed each assigned code. If the two analysts disagreed on any of the  assigned codes, the two analysts discussed any differences in the coding  until a consensus was reached. We then removed any duplicate  responses—instances in which a respondent identified the same benefit or  challenge more than once for either in-house or contract security  workforces—to ensure that only sole benefits and challenges reported by  federal agency officials or private sector executives were reported in our  analysis. Finally, we analyzed the coded responses to determine how many  federal officials and private sector executives reported each benefit and  challenge for using in-house and contract security workforces.
To determine lessons that FPS can learn from other federal agencies that  have changed their security staffing approaches, we selected four agencies  that had undergone workforce transitions. The selected agencies were the  Army, Air Force, TSA, and Smithsonian. We reviewed agency documents  and conducted semistructured interviews with agency officials on the  lessons learned in changing and staffing their security workforces. To  determine how these lessons may apply to FPS, we reviewed relevant  literature from academic and professional organizations and information  from prior GAO and agency Inspector General reports, and compared the  information collected from each agency with various efforts undertaken  by FPS to address its workforce staffing needs. We also interviewed FPS  officials regarding an internal preliminary staffing analysis on potential  changes to its staffing approach.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 through June 2011 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Maria Edelstein, Assistant  Director; Matt Barranca; Brian Chung; David Hooper; Delwen Jones;  Jennifer Kim; and Kelly Rubin made key contributions to this report.