Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges
Published: 2004-04-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: As a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and launch of the Global War on Terrorism, the National Guard has experienced the largest activation of its forces since World War II. The Guard consists of 350,000 Army Guard soldiers and 107,000 Air Guard members. With its unique dual status, it performs state missions under the governor and federal missions at home and overseas under the President. Since September 11, the Guard's missions have expanded, raising concerns about its ability to simultaneously perform all of these functions. The Department of Defense (DOD) funds the Army Guard for partial readiness to accomplish mission requirements assuming that there will be time to supply additional personnel and equipment in an extended conflict. In contrast, the Air Guard is funded to be an operational reserve ready on short notice. Today's testimony addresses GAO's observations on (1) the extent and purpose of the National Guard's use since September 11, (2) the effects of that use on Guard forces' readiness for future missions, and (3) the challenges that DOD, the states, and Congress face in organizing and equipping the Guard to support both overseas and homeland missions.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: With the high pace of operations since September 11, more than 51 percent of Army Guard members and 31 percent of Air Guard members have been activated to meet new homeland and overseas demands. The Army Guard has experienced significant difficulties in responding to these extensive and ongoing requirements because much of it was funded and equipped as a later-deploying reserve force rather than an operational force designed for continued overseas deployments. Moreover, units with certain specialties--military police, transportation, and combat arms--have been in high demand, resulting in lengthy and repeated deployments. To ease critical shortages, 27 Army Guard units were retrained as military police from other specialties such as field artillery. The Air Guard, although less affected by the high pace because it is funded to deploy quickly, has also seen significant use for Iraq combat operations and homeland security missions. While the number of activated Air Guard personnel has decreased over the past year, some personnel were activated outside their normal rotational schedules and tour lengths have been extended. In addition, some units have been assigned new homeland missions such as flying combat air patrols and providing radar coverage over the United States. While the high use of the National Guard since September 11 has led to declining war-fighting readiness of non-deployed Army and Air Guard units, the decline is most significant for the Army Guard. To meet wartime needs, the Army Guard has had to take personnel and equipment from units that had not been activated to ready others for deployment. For example, the Army Guard has initiated over 71,000 transfers to fill personnel shortages in deploying units and transferred about 22,000 pieces of equipment from nondeploying units to ready units deploying to Iraq. The Air Guard's readiness has also declined because the high pace of operations created maintenance challenges for its aging aircraft and limited training opportunities. Because DOD has not fully defined requirements, readiness standards, and readiness measures for the homeland security missions it will lead or support, the Guard's preparedness specifically for homeland security missions is unknown. However, states are concerned that continuing deployments reduce the Guard's preparedness and availability for all its homeland security and natural disaster missions. DOD, the states, and Congress face near- and long-term challenges readying and funding National Guard units for overseas and domestic missions in the Global War on Terrorism. Enhancing the near-term readiness of Army Guard units will be difficult because the Army Guard is still operating with peacetime funding. In the long term, the Army Guard's ability to restructure its forces to meet the requirements of the new security environment will depend on whether it is given adequate resources and funding priority. Finally, DOD will need to consider how to balance Army and Air Guard forces needed for both homeland and overseas security requirements.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our observations on the  challenges the National Guard faces in activating over 213,000 members,  the largest activation of its forces since World War II. National Guard  members are supporting military operations around the world—they are  fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan and maintaining the peace in the  Balkans—side by side with their active duty counterparts, facing the same  dangers and making the same sacrifices. As you know, the National Guard  consists of the Army National Guard, with 350,000 soldiers, and the Air  National Guard, with about 107,000 Air Guard personnel. With its unique  dual status, the Guard performs state missions under the command of the  state’s governor and federal missions—at home and overseas—under  command of the President. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001,  the Guard’s traditional role has been expanded to include new tasks, both  domestically and overseas. This mission expansion has raised concerns  about the Guard’s ability to perform all of these missions successfully  within its existing resources.
As you requested, my statement today focuses on the use of the National  Guard since September 11 and on the Guard’s preparedness to perform  both overseas and domestic missions. We will publish a final report on  these issues later this year. My remarks today are based on the work we  have completed to date with respect to (1) the extent and purpose of the  National Guard’s use since the September 11 attacks, (2) the effects of that  use on the Guard’s readiness for future missions, and (3) the challenges  that the Department of Defense (DOD), the states, and Congress face in  organizing and equipping the Guard to be able to support both overseas  and homeland security missions.
To assess these issues, we analyzed data on National Guard utilization and  readiness since September 11. We interviewed officials in the Departments  of Defense, the Army, the Air Force, and the National Guard Bureau and  supplemented this information with visits to Army and Air Force  commands and Army mobilization stations. We also developed case  studies of recent federal and state National Guard operations in four states  – Georgia, New Jersey, Oregon, and Texas. In each of these states, we  visited the Adjutant General and the National Guard headquarters, as well  as Army and Air National Guard units that had been or will be involved in  domestic or overseas missions. We identified future challenges based on  our analysis of the Guard’s current status and discussions with National  Guard officials. We conducted our review in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards between April 2003 and April  2004.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The National Guard, comprised of the Army and Air National Guard, has a  unique dual mission that consists of both federal and state roles. In their  federal status, the Army and Air National Guard are part of the Army and  Air Force’s reserve components, along with the Army Reserve and the Air  Force Reserve, respectively. In their federal status, Guard units are  deployed to Bosnia and Kosovo for stabilization operations and to  Afghanistan and Iraq in the war on terrorism. The National Guard can be  activated under a variety of legal authorities that differ in terms of  duration, mission types, command structure, and funding source. The  National Guard may be activated under state law to provide critical  infrastructure protection or respond to state emergencies under control of  the governor and paid for with state funds. The Guard can also be  involuntarily activated under federal law for federal domestic or overseas  missions. Title 10 of the United States Code, which is the section that  prescribes the use of the Armed Services while in federal service, gives the  President authority to activate reservists for various periods of time.  Following the terrorist attacks, the President declared a national  emergency on September 14, 2001, whereby reservists can be activated for  up to 2 years. Title 10 provisions also enable Guard members to volunteer  for service. In addition, the Guard can be activated under Title 32 U.S.C. by  which Guard forces remain under the control of the state governor but  receive federal funding.
The National Guard is composed primarily of Guard members who serve  on a part-time basis, usually 1 weekend a month and 2 weeks a year for  annual training. In addition, both the Army and Air National Guard have  some full-time personnel who enhance readiness by assisting unit  commanders in administrative, training, and maintenance tasks. Overall,  the Army National Guard has about 350,000 members and makes up more  than one-half of the total Army’s ground combat forces and one-third of its  support forces, such as military police and transportation units. The Army  National Guard has units in more than 3,000 armories and bases in all 50  states and 4 U.S. territories. As a part of the Army, much of the Army  National Guard has been organized, trained, and resourced as a strategic  reserve that would receive personnel, training, and equipment as a follow- on force to augment active Army units in an extended conflict. The Air  National Guard has about 107,000 Air Guard personnel that make up 20  percent of the total Air Force with 88 flying units and 579 mission support  units located at more than 170 installations nationwide. The Air National  Guard has been integrated with the Air Force’s active and reserve  component and resourced as a part of its operational force.
After September 11, 2001, the Guard’s homeland missions were expanded  to include activities that it had not previously undertaken, such as  guarding airports and critical infrastructure, that are known as homeland  security missions. Homeland security is a broad term that encompasses  efforts to reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism and prevent terrorist  attacks as well as respond to an attack that might occur. The Guard can  be tasked with homeland security missions under the state governors or,  when activated, by DOD under command of the president. DOD refers to  its contributions to the overall homeland security effort as “homeland  defense.” Homeland defense activities include military missions conducted  within the United States that DOD conducts under extraordinary  circumstances with support, as needed, by other agencies. Flying combat  air patrols over U.S. cities and guarding military installations are examples  of these activities. DOD will also support civilian authorities to provide  quick response or capabilities that other agencies do not have. The U.S.  Northern Command provides command and control for DOD’s homeland  defense missions and coordinates DOD’s support to civil authorities for  homeland security missions. U.S. Northern Command would take a  leading role in homeland defense missions including land, air, aerospace,  and maritime defense operations.
section_title: Army and Air National Guard Have Participated in Multiple Missions and Experienced High Activations for Overseas and Homeland Security Operations
paragraphs: Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, nearly half of the National  Guard’s members have been alerted or activated to meet the multiple  federal requirements at home and abroad arising out of the Global War on  Terrorism. Specifically, over 51 percent of Army Guard personnel and 31  percent of Air Guard personnel have been alerted or activated for  homeland security or overseas missions. Although largely programmed  and funded as a later deploying strategic reserve, the Army Guard has  taken on extensive and ongoing overseas missions. Moreover, Army Guard  units with high-demand specialties have faced extended and repeated  deployments. To compensate, the Army Guard is retraining units to fill  high-demand capabilities. The Army Guard has also taken on expanded  homeland missions, such as providing security for critical infrastructure,  Air Force installations, and U.S. borders. In addition, the Air Guard has  taken on new homeland defense missions, notably combat air patrols over  U.S. cities, and about one-third of its members were activated between  September 2001 and March 2004. As figure 1 shows, about 102,500 Army  and Air National Guard members—the vast majority of whom are Army  Guard members—were on active duty as of March 2004 to support the  National Guard’s ongoing participation in operations under federal  authority.
subsections: section_title: High Use and Expanded Missions of Army Guard Signify Change from Strategic Reserve Force to Operational Force
paragraphs: The high level of Army Guard forces needed for federal missions for the  foreseeable future represents a fundamental change from the Guard’s  planned role as a strategic reserve force that would have additional time to  train following the onset of war to an operational force that has had to  respond quickly. The number of Army Guard members activated for  federal missions more than quadrupled from about 5,500 in the days  before the September 11 attacks to about 23,000 in the first month after  the attacks because Army Guard forces were called on to perform an array  of new federal homeland security missions. As figure 2 shows, by the end  of March 2004, about 97,000 Army Guard members were activated for  overseas warfighting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, peacekeeping  operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, or federally funded homeland defense  missions such as guarding Air Force bases. This equates to more than one  quarter of the Army Guard’s force. In addition, Army Guard members have  experienced lengthy deployments. For example, as of February 2004, over  57,000 soldiers (about 16 percent of the Army Guard) had been away from  home for more than 220 days in the past year. DOD reports that the steady  state for the next 3 to 5 years will require a total of about 100,000 to  150,000 reserve personnel to support on-going operations, and that many  of these personnel will come from the Army Guard and Reserve. DOD also  expects that mobilizations of up to 1 year or more will be the norm for  reserve component members during the next 3 to 5 years.
In addition to its overall high use, particular specialties within the Army  National Guard have been used extensively and at rates that DOD reports  cannot be sustained for long durations. DOD has reported that using more  than 17 percent of the personnel in a career field annually indicates an  unsustainably high pace of operations in the career field and we believe  could indicate a need for additional capability. However, as figure 3  shows, usage rates for personnel in some Army Guard career fields  exceeded 50 percent in the last 2-1/2 years. Capabilities key to both  overseas and homeland missions such as military police, transportation,  and combat units are among those experiencing a high pace of operations.
In particular, 92 percent of military police units have deployed during this  time period, with 18 percent deployed more than once. Army Guard forces  that are frequently called on by state governors to respond to state needs  such as natural disasters have also been affected by current operational  demands—about 70 percent of the enhanced brigades and separate  battalions and 75 percent of the Guard’s divisional combat battalions have  been deployed at some point since September 11 and, when deployed,  were not available for state needs.
The Army National Guard is being adapted for expanded missions both at  home and overseas and has been used in different configurations than  DOD war planners had anticipated. In all four of our case study states,  Guard officials reported that their units were adapted and personnel were  trained for previously unanticipated homeland tasks, such as guarding  airports and Air Force bases in the United States. As of March 31, 2004,  about 5,500 Army Guard soldiers were still guarding Air Force bases in the  United States. In our case study states, Army Guard units reported  responding to specific needs in support of governors and federal  authorities. For example:    The New Jersey Army Guard provided security for bridges, tunnels, and  nuclear power plants for the state governor during 2003 and continues  to provide security at two nuclear power plants.
The Oregon Army Guard provided security at federal installations, such  as the Umatilla Chemical Depot and Ft. Lewis, Washington, during 2002  and 2003.
The Texas Army Guard performed border security assisting U.S.
Customs agents from October 2001 to November 2002 and provided  security at Air Force installations and state nuclear power plants from  October 2001 to October 2002.
In Georgia, Army Guard personnel provided airport security almost  immediately after September 11 and were still guarding Army bases  and Air Force facilities at the time of our visit in December 2003.
Army National Guard units were also adapted for overseas missions to  increase the supply of high-demand specialties, meet new operational  requirements, and fill personnel shortages in deploying units. For example,  to avoid critical shortages of military police units, 27 Army National Guard  units, containing over 7,000 personnel, were converted from other  specialties such as field artillery to military police units, some of which  have already deployed to Iraq to perform missions such as convoy  security. In total, more than 34,000 soldiers deployed with new units that  were tailored to provide specific capabilities needed as a result of the new  security environment.
section_title: Significant Use of Air Guard Occurred for Iraq Combat Operations and Homeland Defense Missions, but Number of Activated Personnel Has Decreased
paragraphs: The Air National Guard has also faced expanded roles and high utilization  since September 11, 2001. As figure 1 shows, Air Guard activations  increased in the fall of 2001 to support both homeland security activities  and operations in Afghanistan and declined in 2002. Air Guard activations  increased again in the spring of 2003 at the beginning of operations in Iraq  but have since declined to about 7,500 as of March 2004. The effects of the  increased operations have not been as severe on the Air National Guard as  on the Army Guard because the Air Guard is structured and funded to be a  ready operational force. The Air Force, using an Air and Space  Expeditionary Force concept, divides its forces into 10 groups, each  containing a mix of active, Guard, and reserve forces, and operates on a  standard 15-month rotational cycle. The Air Guard often uses volunteers to  fill rotational requirements, rather than activating large units, for missions.  Because the Air National Guard is structured to deploy in small units and  is funded to achieve readiness levels comparable to the active Air Force,  these small units can deploy within 72 hours after being alerted.
Since the terrorist attacks on the homeland, the Air National Guard has  been called on to perform new missions such as flying combat air patrols  and providing radar coverage for the continental United States. Units in  the states we visited played key roles in homeland defense missions. For  example:    The 177th Fighter Wing in New Jersey, which is strategically located  near major cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore,  and Washington, D.C., took on the additional mission of flying combat  air patrols over these cities. Through early November 2003, the 177th  had flown 1,458 combat air patrol missions.
The 147th Fighter Wing in Texas flew a total of 284 combat air patrol  missions over New York City and Washington, D.C., between  December 2001 and March 2002. Since September 11, the unit has also  flown combat air patrols over Houston, the Gulf Coast, and in support  of special events such as the Super Bowl and the Winter Olympics.
Like the Army Guard, the Air Guard is also experiencing a higher demand  for particular specialties with some specialties used at rates DOD reports  cannot be sustained over time. As figure 4 shows, among career fields  with more than 500 personnel, 86 percent of tanker pilots, 84 percent of  security personnel, and 81 percent of flight engineers have deployed at  least once since September 2001. Further, about 10,000 Air Guard  members have been deployed for more than 220 days in the past year and  about 6,400 of those have been deployed for more than 401 days in the last  2 years.
To meet the requirements of both its domestic and overseas missions, Air  Guard officials said they added personnel to planned rotation cycles by  activating some units earlier than planned and extending their duty tours.  And, except for some high-demand specialties, the Air Guard returned to  its usual rotation schedule in March 2004.
section_title: Readiness of Non- deployed National Guard Units Has Declined, but Decline Is Most Significant for the Army Guard
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, the extensive use of both the Army and Air  National Guard in recent operations has resulted in a steady decline in the  warfighting readiness of non-deployed units. The greatest negative impact  has been on the Army National Guard because it is not structured or  funded to meet the demands of recent operations. The extensive transfers  of personnel and equipment needed to prepare lower resourced Army  Guard units to meet wartime deployment standards have eroded the  readiness levels of the remaining Army Guard force. Certain Air Guard  personnel specialties and equipment are also facing continued stress due  to the ongoing pace of operations and aging aircraft. The effect of this  readiness decline on the Guard’s ability to perform homeland security  missions is unknown because DOD has not completed its efforts to define  requirements and readiness standards and measures for the homeland  defense missions it would lead or the civil missions is would support.  Some state officials we spoke with voiced concern about the preparedness  of their Guard units for recurring state emergencies or new homeland  security missions given the level of the Guard’s ongoing support to  overseas operations.
subsections: section_title: Extensive Personnel and Equipment Transfers to Deploying Units Erode Preparedness of Remaining Army Guard Units
paragraphs: Preparation of deploying Army Guard units to meet the theater  commanders’ requirements for recent overseas operations has resulted in  extensive transfers of both personnel and equipment that degraded the  readiness of remaining units. For the Army Guard, DOD provides units  with varying levels of personnel, training, equipment, and full-time support  based on how quickly they are expected to be used. For example, DOD  aims to provide certain types of Guard units, such as early deploying  support and Special Forces units, all the personnel and equipment they  require to undertake their wartime missions. Other forces, such as most  combat brigades and divisions which are expected to deploy later, are  authorized fewer personnel and less equipment than they need to meet  their wartime missions.
The Army’s goal is to provide the Guard’s enhanced brigades, the most  ready of its combat forces, about 85 percent of the personnel and 90  percent of the equipment they need to deploy. However, we found that the  two enhanced separate brigades activated in support of operations in Iraq  needed 2,100 additional soldiers, about one-fourth of their required  personnel, to meet deployment requirements. Combat divisions are  authorized only 65 percent of the personnel and equipment they need, and  it could take months before they are ready to deploy. Moreover, soldiers  must be qualified in their military specialties by attending required training  and meeting training standards to be ready to deploy, but as of March  2004, only 68 percent of the Guard’s required personnel were qualified in  their specialty. Guard members may not be qualified because they have  not been able to attend training when it is scheduled. Since September 11,  2001, the Army National Guard has initiated over 71,000 transfers of  personnel from one unit to another to enhance the readiness of deploying  units.
In addition to personnel shortfalls, most Army Guard units are not  provided all the equipment they need for their wartime requirements.  Moreover, the equipment they have is often older than that of the active  Army and in many cases does not meet the warfighting commander’s  requirements because it is not compatible with the active Army’s newer  equipment. For example, many Army Guard units have radios that cannot  communicate with new communications systems and old trucks for which  the active Army does not stock spare parts. Units deploying in support of  operations in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 needed about 22,000 pieces of  equipment—including night vision goggles, machine guns, trucks,  decontamination apparel, and radios—to meet deployment requirements.  The Army National Guard filled these shortages by transferring equipment  from other units. In fact, between December 2002 and March 2004, Army  Guard units in every state and territory supplied equipment to three  deploying enhanced brigades. Initially the Guard managed transfers so  that many units shared the burden of losing equipment and could remain  at their planned readiness levels. For example, the enhanced separate  brigade we visited in Georgia transferred machine guns, night vision  goggles, and global positioning systems to deploying units, but officials  said that the unit maintained its readiness rating because the equipment  was not deemed critical or taken in quantities that degraded the unit’s  overall readiness level. However, in November 2003, the Director of the  Army National Guard directed that personnel and equipment be  transferred to deploying units, even if that meant degrading the readiness  of remaining units, a strategy that may not be sustainable over the long  term. By 2004, deployments and existing shortages left the remaining Army  Guard units without about 33 percent of the critical equipment they need.  In New Jersey, officials told us that some units had less than 65 percent of  their wartime equipment requirements and reported critical shortages of  spare parts, utility trucks, night vision goggles, and pistols.
section_title: High Usage and Aging Equipment Eroding Air National Guard Readiness
paragraphs: Air National Guard units have also experienced difficulty in maintaining  their warfighting readiness while conducting overseas and homeland  defense missions and reported overall declines in readiness. The Air Force  and Air Guard attribute these readiness declines to the high pace of  operations and problems associated with aging aircraft.
Many Air Guard units use aging aircraft, and the high pace of operations  has been a training and maintenance challenge. For example,    An airlift wing we visited in Georgia operates aging C-130 transport  planes. Although officials said that in peacetime the wing planned for  2,900 flying hours annually for training, it had flown over 13,000 hours  for operations and training in 2003. This high pace of operations made  it difficult for the unit to continue to perform its warfighting training  requirements for tasks, such as tactical formation flying, thus lowering  its readiness ratings. In addition, officials said that in recent  deployments to Iraq, the unit’s aging aircraft and the harsh operating  environment presented a maintenance challenge, as evidenced by the  need to replace 11 turbine engines and 20 propellers to keep the 8  aircraft operational.
Since September 11, 2001, fighter wings that we visited in New Jersey,  Texas, and Oregon have been directed to dedicate some aircraft to  domestic combat air patrol missions. This has reduced the number of  aircraft available for air crews to use for other warfighting mission  training. To meet training requirements, the units have had to fly the  remaining aircraft more hours than planned, which has created  scheduling and maintenance problems. Officials were concerned about  the long-term effects of the continued high pace of operations on their  ability to support both missions.
section_title: DOD Has Not Fully Defined Mission Requirements or Readiness Standards and Measures for All Its Homeland Security Missions, and Some States Have Concerns about Preparedness and Availability of Guard Units
paragraphs: It is difficult to assess the Guard’s preparedness for the full range of  homeland security missions because requirements for these missions are  not yet well defined. Moreover, DOD has not yet established readiness  standards and measures for homeland defense or civil support missions.  DOD generally organizes, trains, and equips the National Guard for only  the federal missions it leads. DOD’s U.S. Northern Command, which is  charged with planning, organizing, and executing DOD-led homeland  defense and with supporting homeland security missions led by civilian  authorities, has not yet finalized its plans that would identify forces and  resources for the homeland missions it may lead or support. In some  cases, Northern Command is awaiting further guidance from the Office of  the Secretary of Defense. As a result, National Guard forces that may have  to take on homeland security missions are not organized, trained, or  equipped specifically for these missions. Without specific requirements  and plans that clarify the types of skills and equipment needed for these  missions, it is not possible to measure the readiness of forces specifically  for these missions.
To address some potential homeland security needs, DOD began  establishing weapons of mass destruction civil support teams as  authorized by Presidential Directive and Congress in fiscal year 1999.  These teams, which are comprised of 22 full-time personnel, are  maintained at the highest readiness levels and can rapidly respond to  support civil authorities in an event involving a weapon of mass  destruction. Their role is to assist local officials in determining the nature  of the attack, provide medical and technical advice, and help to identify  follow-on federal and state assets that might be needed. Congress has now  authorized at least one team for each state and territory. Currently, 32  teams are fully operational with the remaining 23 estimated to be  operational by 2007. These teams are unique because they are federally  funded and trained but perform their mission under the command and  control of the state governor.
Individual state Guards have also begun to develop plans and organize  their Guard forces for some homeland security tasks that might be  conducted under the authority of the governor. However, these efforts  vary from state to state. For example, in our case study states,    Georgia officials told us they were in the process of identifying critical  infrastructure sites in the state and assigning quick reaction forces to  protect them.
New Jersey has assigned ready-reaction forces to protect key sites in  each of 3 geographic regions.
Oregon has identified some of the critical infrastructure that must be  protected and annually identifies those National Guard units that will  be assigned to perform rapid response force tasks.
Historically, Guard forces could perform state missions using the skills  and equipment they were provided for their federal missions. However,  mobilized and deployed personnel and their equipment are not available  for states to use for either new homeland security missions, such as  responding to increased terrorist threats, or recurring natural disasters,  such as floods or forest fires. As figure 5 shows, 15 states currently have 40  percent or more of their Army Guard soldiers mobilized or deployed.  While Air Guard units are not used as extensively for state missions as  those of the Army Guard, as figure 6 shows, as many as one-third of Air  Guard units were alerted or deployed from some states as of March 2004.  None of the four states we visited had developed a state system for  measuring the preparedness of its forces for homeland security missions,  and officials in all four states we visited raised varying concerns about  homeland security preparedness. For example:    New Jersey units that responded to a terrorist threat alert in December  2003 reported that they lacked some essential equipment such as  humvees, night vision equipment, cold weather gear, chemical  protective suits, and nerve agent antidote. The state paid for some  essential equipment for its forces during this time on an emergency  basis. In addition, at the time of our visit, New Jersey was preparing to  deploy large numbers of its state Guard personnel overseas and was  determining how it would respond to another such terrorist threat after  almost 60 percent of its forces are deployed.
Georgia officials told us that hosting the 2004 International Economic  Summit of Eight Industrialized Nations in June 2004 will increase  Georgia’s requirements for security missions such as aerial  reconnaissance and surveillance at a time when its Army Guard  aviation units may be deployed overseas.
In 2002 the state of Oregon called up more than 1,400 Army Guard  soldiers to respond to one of the worst forest fire seasons in a century.  Oregon officials stated that because many of its forces and equipment  are currently deployed and the state has only limited engineering  capability left, it would not be able to provide the same level of support  as it did in the 2002 season.
All of the aviation assets Texas would need to fight fires and all of its  military police were deployed at the time of our visit. However, Texas  officials said that they were able to meet their homeland security  needs, even at the height of its Guard’s overseas deployments, because  its largest Army Guard unit had not been fully deployed and, as a large  state, it had ample state emergency response capability.
Some Guard officials noted that their states’ Guards had not received  additional federal funding to take on homeland security missions, even as  personnel and equipment that could be needed for these missions are  being deployed overseas. Guard officials also said that the states have  limited budgets and that homeland security requirements compete with  other needs, although the states have funded some homeland security  activities, such as guarding critical infrastructure, and purchased some  equipment. Further, state officials said the Guard is not generally eligible  for funding from the Department of Homeland Security because its grants  are limited to “first responders” such as police or firefighters.
Most states have entered into mutual assistance agreements that may  provide access to another state’s National Guard forces in times of need.  These agreements are typically used to access additional forces for natural  disaster response. However, states may withhold their forces if the forces  are needed in their home state. For example, according to New Jersey  officials, their state faces an elevated terrorist threat due to its proximity  to New York City. However, they do not have a fully operational weapons  of mass destruction civil support team in New Jersey. The officials said  they requested access to another state’s team on three occasions. On two  occasions, the request was not granted because officials in the team’s  home state determined that it was needed at home. When New Jersey  made a third request, in response to a specific and credible terrorist threat,  access was approved.
section_title: Readying and Resourcing National Guard Units for Overseas and Domestic Missions Presents Significant Near- and Long- Term Challenges
paragraphs: Our work has shown that DOD, the states, and Congress face significant  near- and long-term challenges to readying and resourcing National Guard  units for overseas and domestic missions in the Global War on Terrorism.  These challenges include first, enhancing the near-term preparedness of  Army Guard units that may be mobilized for overseas operations within  the next few years. These improvements may be difficult to realize  because the Army National Guard is still operating at peacetime funding  levels despite declining readiness. Second, in the longer term, the Guard’s  ability to successfully organize for its missions in the new strategic  environment will depend on whether adequate resources are identified for  these efforts and whether DOD’s readiness and funding policies are  consistent with the Army Guard’s expected high utilization for the  foreseeable future. However, the National Guard does not have complete  control of all the restructuring and resourcing decisions that will affect its  mission preparedness. Finally, in addition to restructuring and funding to  be ready for the Guard’s federal mission, DOD must consider how to  balance homeland and overseas requirements.
section_title: The Guard Will Be Challenged in the Near- Term to Enhance the Readiness of Army Guard Units for Future Overseas Rotations
paragraphs: The high pace of recent operations has left Army National Guard units less  prepared for future overseas operations and in need of additional trained  personnel and essential equipment. In the near term, the National Guard  must continue to provide units capable of performing challenging overseas  missions. For example, the Army Guard has alerted 33,000 troops for  deployment in support of operations in Iraq in 2005. Moreover, while  future deployment figures for operations in Afghanistan had not been  announced as of March 2004, 16,500 Army Guard soldiers are currently  deployed to support these operations.
The National Guard has attempted, where possible, to activate units that  have not been recently deployed to minimize the hardship on personnel.  However, some of these units have supplied personnel and equipment to  previously deploying units, exacerbating existing shortfalls and interfering  with the units’ ability to maintain their previous level of readiness. In  addition, the continuing need for some skills may require the Guard to re- activate units that have only recently returned from deployment.  Furthermore, the readiness of the equipment belonging to returning units  is presently unknown. However, past experience with prolonged desert  operations has shown that equipment may need extensive maintenance  and not be available for training purposes. In addition, some redeployed  units left equipment behind for other deploying units and will need  replacement equipment. Because so many personnel and so much  equipment have been taken from those units not yet deployed, improving  their readiness may become increasingly difficult. In the long term, DOD’s  approach of transferring people and equipment does not appear to be  sustainable.
The early alert of some units required for overseas operations may help  identify readiness problems earlier and enable the Guard to take actions to  improve unit readiness. For example, Guard officials indicated that certain  actions, such as sending higher numbers of personnel to school to become  qualified in their specialties, could improve readiness. However,  complicating the Army Guard’s efforts to improve the preparedness of its  units is the fact that the Army has not provided the Guard additional  funding for equipment and training to support its new operational  missions. The Army Guard has not received any wartime supplemental  funding in fiscal year 2004 to address the equipment shortfalls caused by  the stress of recent operations in units that might be needed in future  operations.
section_title: Long-Term Initiatives to Restructure Army National Guard Face Implementation Challenges
paragraphs: DOD has a number of efforts to restructure the National Guard to improve  its ability to perform federal missions in the new strategic environment,  although these are long-term efforts that have not been fully funded in  DOD’s budget and detailed implementation plans have not yet been  developed. For example, DOD plans to alleviate the high pace of  operations of reserve units by increasing the availability of certain high- demand units and rebalancing the skills in the active and reserve forces.  Other DOD-wide initiatives to use its forces more efficiently include  moving military personnel out of activities that can be performed by  civilians or contractors and into high-demand specialties and taking  advantage of technological advances to reduce personnel needs.
The Army plans to restructure its forces, including National Guard units,  into modular units that can be tailored for specific needs. After  restructuring, the Army Guard would have 34 fully manned brigades,  instead of its current 15 enhanced brigades, 2 separate brigades, and 21  brigades in 8 divisions that are not fully manned. The Army plans to begin  restructuring active units immediately, but, according to National Guard  officials, it has not established the time frame and funding for the  conversion of Army Guard units.
As the Army Guard is being restructured over the long-term, the Army’s  current resourcing policy, which provides most Guard units with fewer  personnel and less equipment than they need for their wartime missions,  may need to be reevaluated given the Army Guard’s operational role at  home and overseas in the Global War on Terrorism.
For example, one Army Guard initiative would address its long-standing  problem of having insufficient full-time personnel to support its units. Full- time Guard members enhance unit readiness by performing tasks such as  monitoring member readiness; recruiting and training personnel; and  maintaining supplies, equipment, and aircraft. Without sufficient full-time  personnel, these tasks, which are critical to unit readiness, suffer. The  Army Guard was authorized only 59 percent of its full-time manning  requirement in fiscal year 2003, as compared to the Air Guard’s full-time  manning of 100 percent of its requirement. The Army Guard plans to  increase full-time manning gradually to an average of about 71 percent by  2012, if funding is provided. However, there are no plans to increase full- time manning to 100 percent of the Guard’s requirements.
section_title: Restructuring Efforts Should Consider Balance between Overseas and Domestic Requirements
paragraphs: Efforts to restructure the National Guard are focused on its primary  federal mission and do not address the individual state Guard’s critical  role in homeland security. As noted earlier, DOD planning and resourcing  for National Guard units has assumed that homeland security tasks can be  accomplished with the personnel and equipment supplied for the wartime  mission. However, in the new security environment, the assumption that  Guard units can perform their domestic missions with personnel and  equipment trained for overseas missions needs is questionable. The U.S.  Northern Command, which is responsible for DOD-led efforts to defend  the homeland, has not completed its efforts to identify all the forces and  capabilities needed for homeland defense or homeland security.
In the future, the National Guard would like to adopt a rotational  deployment model that would maintain at least 50 percent of a state’s  Guard force available for the use of state officials to perform domestic  missions. In addition to assuring the ready availability of personnel, the  Guard would like to be able to provide each state with capabilities that  could be used for homeland security such as transportation, medical,  aviation, engineering, and military police, among others. Although  providing the variety of assets for state use has been a Guard goal, not  every state has all these capabilities at this time. Further, DOD’s plans to  rebalance the active and reserve forces are based on the general goal of  deploying individuals no more than 1 year over a 6-year period. However,  overseas commitments may challenge the Guard’s ability to meet these  goals. Moreover, the Guard will have to work with state officials to  balance the mix of capabilities among the state Guards.
As homeland security requirements are identified, DOD, the states, and  Congress may also need to evaluate the need for some specialties or  additional equipment or capabilities. The National Guard is providing  some training and specialized equipment, such as decontamination  equipment, for homeland security missions. At a total cost of about $9  million for equipment, the National Guard is creating 12 enhanced  response forces to augment its civil support teams who are tasked and  trained to respond if weapons of mass destruction are used. Each Guard  team will have responsibility for 1 of 12 geographic regions in the United  States. When fully implemented, these enhanced response forces will have  the medical, decontamination, engineering, and security forces required to  respond to a mass destruction event. However, these units will retain  overseas missions and could be deployed overseas.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while the high pace of operations has caused  some difficulties for the Air Guard and the Army Guard, the Army Guard’s  efforts to ready units to deploy by taking trained personnel and critical  equipment from other units has created urgent personnel and equipment  shortages in units that have not yet been deployed. Unless replacement  equipment and personnel are identified, the Army Guard will have to  continue to take personnel and equipment from one unit to ready another,  which means that the units called in the future will likely be even less  ready. The extensive use of Guard forces and eroding readiness of the non- deployed units suggest a comprehensive reassessment of the Army  Guard’s current structure and resourcing assumptions may be needed.  Furthermore, while homeland security requirements have not been  defined, equipment and personnel may not be available to the states when  they are needed because they have been deployed overseas. Moreover, the  Guard may have difficulty ensuring that each state has access to units with  key specialized capabilities—such as engineering or medical assets— needed for homeland security and other domestic missions. The National  Guard has a number of initiatives to address the mismatch between the  Army Guard’s tasks and the priority it has received for personnel, training,  and equipment. Most initiatives are long-term in nature, such as  reorganizing units, and face implementation challenges, including the need  for funding. However, unless DOD, Congress, and the states work closely  to address these challenges, Guard units may continue to experience a  high pace of operations and declining readiness that could affect their  ability to meet future requirements both at home and overseas.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond  to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have.
For more information regarding this testimony, please call me, at (202)  512-4402. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include:  Margaret Morgan, Suzanne Wren, Jacquelyn Randolph, V. Malvern  Saavedra, Daniel Omahen, Barbara Gannon, Tina Morgan, James Lewis, M.  Jane Hunt, Jennifer Popovic, Jay Smale, and Kenneth Patton.
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