Defense Management: DOD Needs to Improve Future Assessments of Roles and Missions
Published: 2014-07-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD is one of the largest organizations in the world, with its budget representing over half of the U.S. federal government's discretionary spending. According to DOD, the global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges. Congress requires DOD to assess and report on its roles and missions every 4 years. In July 2012, DOD submitted its most recent Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review report.
In June 2013, GAO was mandated to review DOD's process for conducting the latest Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD developed a sufficiently detailed report and conducted a comprehensive process for assessing roles and missions. GAO compared DOD's July 2012 report with the statutory requirements for the assessment, and compared DOD's assessment process with key principles derived from a broad selection of principles GAO and other federal agencies have identified.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense's (DOD) July 2012 submission to Congress following its most recent Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review did not provide sufficiently detailed information about most of the statutorily required elements of the assessment. Specifically, DOD's July 2012 submission included the results of a 2011 review that led to the January 2012 release of a new strategic guidance document (hereinafter referred to as the Defense Strategic Guidance) as well as the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review report. Although DOD is not statutorily required to report on all elements of the assessment, the submission that it provided to Congress was lacking key information. A key principle for information quality indicates that information presented to Congress should be clear and sufficiently detailed; however, neither the Defense Strategic Guidance nor the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review included sufficiently detailed information about certain key elements of the roles and missions assessment. For example, while the submitted documents identify the core missions of the armed services and provide some information on capabilities associated with these missions, neither document provides other information required by the roles and missions assessment—including identifying the DOD components responsible for providing the identified core competencies and capabilities and identifying plans for addressing any unnecessary duplication or capability gaps.
DOD's process for assessing roles and missions missed key principles associated with effective and comprehensive assessments. Specifically, DOD limited its process to leveraging the prior review that resulted in the Defense Strategic Guidance; by doing so its process did not include the following:
A planned approach : DOD did not develop or document a planned approach that included the principles or assumptions used to inform the assessment.
Internal stakeholder involvement: DOD included limited internal stakeholder involvement. For example, DOD gave the armed services a limited opportunity to review the draft prior to its release.
Identification and involvement of external stakeholders : DOD obtained limited input from relevant external stakeholders, such as Congress, on the specific guidance and direction they expected of the roles and missions assessment.
Time frames : DOD did not develop a schedule to gauge progress for conducting the assessment and completing the report, which may have contributed to the report being provided to Congress over 5 months late.
DOD officials stated that the primary reason that they did not perform a separate roles and missions review is that the statutory requirements were duplicative of other reviews and processes, such as the Defense Strategic Guidance. However, by not conducting a comprehensive assessment, DOD missed an opportunity to conduct a department-wide examination of roles and missions. Instead, by relying on processes established for other purposes, DOD has limited assurance that it has fully identified all possible cost savings that can be achieved through the elimination of unnecessary duplication and that it has positioned itself to report clear and sufficient information about the statutorily required assessment to Congress.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that, in conducting future assessments of roles and missions, DOD develop a comprehensive process that includes a planned approach, involvement of key internal and external stakeholder involvement, and time frames. DOD partially concurred, stating that it had leveraged other processes. GAO maintains that the roles and missions report was insufficiently detailed and continues to believe the recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) is one of the largest and most  complex organizations in the world, and its budget represents over half of  the entire U.S. federal government’s discretionary spending. DOD stated  in Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense  (hereinafter referred to as the Defense Strategic Guidance) that the global  security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges  and opportunities. These include those resulting from geopolitical  changes, changes in modern warfare, and changes in the fiscal  environment. It is important, therefore, that DOD make decisions  strategically regarding its missions and associated competencies and  capabilities, and assign and clarify to its components their roles and  responsibilities while avoiding unnecessary duplication.
10 U.S.C. §118b.
DOD an opportunity to identify core competencies and capabilities,  including human capital and acquisition needs, and to clearly assign  responsibility for these competencies and capabilities across the  department. By routinely reviewing its roles and missions, DOD is better  suited to support the development of key strategy and policy guidance, as  found in the Defense Strategic Guidance and the Quadrennial Defense  Review, and to keep DOD implementing directives that formally establish  the roles of DOD components current.
GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-263 (Washington, D.C.: January 2001). outcomes by pursuing an integrated portfolio management approach to  weapon system investments. We found that, although the armed  services fight together on the battlefield as a joint force, they identify  needs and allocate resources separately, using fragmented decision- making processes that do not allow for an integrated portfolio  management approach, potentially resulting in capability gaps or  unnecessary duplication. Further, we have found that DOD can reduce  unnecessary duplication, overlap, and fragmentation in its programs and  operations, thereby potentially achieving cost savings.
A comprehensive assessment of DOD’s roles and missions is intended to  clarify responsibilities for providing key capabilities, identify areas of  unnecessary duplication, and identify opportunities for reducing waste in  a time of constrained defense budgets. However, Congress has raised  concerns with both of the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review  submissions that DOD has issued to date. DOD provided its first  submission in January 2009, which the House Armed Services  Committee found was lacking in completeness. Specifically, the  committee urged the Secretary of Defense to take a more comprehensive  approach, instead of focusing only on the department’s planned  investments to meet asymmetric challenges. In July 2012, DOD provided  its second submission. In the House Armed Services Committee’s  report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2014, the committee stated that the 2012 Quadrennial Roles and  Missions Review submission also did not meet expectations and was  late. The committee stated in the report that the submission identified  only the missions of the armed services, one of six required elements of  the roles and missions assessment.
The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying its bill for  the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated us  to review the Secretary of Defense’s process for conducting the 2012  Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. This report evaluates the extent to which DOD developed a sufficiently detailed report and  conducted a comprehensive process for assessing roles and missions.
To evaluate the extent to which DOD developed a sufficiently detailed  report and conducted a comprehensive process for assessing roles and  missions, we reviewed DOD’s final submission for the Quadrennial Roles  and Missions Review, which included the Quadrennial Roles and  Missions Review report and the Defense Strategic Guidance, and we  reviewed the specific processes DOD used to conduct the assessment  that preceded it. For our review of DOD’s submission, three GAO  analysts independently compared DOD’s July 2012 submission for the  Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review with the statutory requirements  for the assessment. A fourth analyst reviewed the results of these  independent comparisons to confirm that consensus had been reached  by the other analysts. In addition, we used this kind of methodology to  compare the information in DOD’s submission with the key principle that  the information be sufficiently detailed when reporting information for use  by Congress and other decision makers, which we derived from GAO and  DOD guidance. For additional context, these analysts also  independently conducted a similar analysis of DOD’s 2009 Quadrennial  Roles and Missions Review report. For our review of DOD’s specific  processes, we compared DOD’s processes for the assessment with key  principles for conducting similar reviews, which we derived from a broad  selection of principles GAO has previously established, and other federal agency guidance related to conducting department-wide assessments.Specifically, we distilled the key principles from relevant guidance from  the Office of Management and Budget for conducting strategic reviews  and plans and from DOD for providing high-quality information; desirable  characteristics for developing an effective national strategy; guidance for  conducting studies; and relevant principles for reporting on and  conducting other types of assessments such as risk and cost  assessments. Of the documents we reviewed, the principles we chose  were found in multiple documents and were applicable to comprehensive  assessments such as the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. We  discussed these principles with DOD officials, who agreed they were  reasonable to use to evaluate the assessment process. We also  interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Policy, Office of Director of Administration and Management, Department  of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, and  U.S. Marine Corps about the process that DOD used for the most recent  Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, the extent to which DOD’s  process for conducting and reporting on the review was comprehensive,  and any thoughts on how future reviews might be improved based on  lessons learned from the most recent review. Finally, we interviewed eight  defense experts selected on the basis of their prior involvement with the  Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review and authorship of recent  publications about the roles and missions of the armed services. While  their views are not generalizable, we obtained the experts’ perspectives  on how future reviews might be improved.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2013 to July 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Every 4 years, DOD is required to conduct and report on a  comprehensive assessment—the Quadrennial Roles and Missions  Review—of the roles and missions of the armed services and the core  competencies and capabilities of DOD to perform and support such roles  and missions. Specifically, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to  conduct an independent military assessment of the roles and missions of  the armed forces, assignment of functions among the armed services,  and any recommendations regarding issues that need to be addressed.  The Secretary of Defense is then to identify  the core mission areas of the armed services;  the core competencies and capabilities associated with these mission  areas;  the DOD component responsible for providing the identified core  competency or capability; any gaps in the ability of the component to provide the competency or any unnecessary duplication of competencies or capabilities between a plan for addressing any gaps or unnecessary duplication.
The Secretary is then to submit a report on this Quadrennial Roles and  Missions Review following the review and not later than the submission of  the President’s budget for the next fiscal year; however, the statutory  reporting requirement does not explicitly require that all required elements  of the assessment be reported.
The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review that resulted in the July  2012 submission occurred amid a series of strategy and policy reviews  that DOD has undertaken over the past 5 years. Some of these reviews  resulted in specific strategy documents, such as the National Security  Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and  National Security Space Strategy. DOD is also required to conduct two reviews on a regular basis that relate to the Quadrennial Roles and  Missions Review: the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Biennial  Review of DOD Agencies and Field Activities. The timing requirements for  the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review and the Quadrennial  Defense Review result in each Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review  occurring 2 years before and 2 years after a Quadrennial Defense  Review. In December 2010, DOD also reissued its internal DOD Directive  5100.01, which establishes the functions of DOD and its major  components, and, in September 2011, released an update of the Unified  Command Plan, which allocates responsibilities among the combatant  commands. In addition to these recurring strategy reviews,  comprehensive assessments, and updates to DOD guidance, DOD has  recently completed two other reviews: the Defense Strategic Guidance,  which identified the strategic interests of the United States, and the  Strategic Choices Management Review, initiated by the Secretary of  Defense in 2013 to inform DOD’s planning for declining future budgets.
The Defense Strategic Guidance, released in January 2012, was directed  by the President to identify the strategic interests of the United States.  The document states that it was an assessment of the defense strategy  prompted by the changing geopolitical environment and fiscal pressures.  The Defense Strategic Guidance was developed by senior officials from  DOD—including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff,  the armed services, and the combatant commands—and the White  House. The document outlines security challenges the United States  faces and is intended to guide the development of the Joint Force through  2020 and during a period of anticipated fiscal constraints. The Defense  Strategic Guidance identified 10 primary missions of the armed forces, as  well as several principles to guide the force and program development  necessary to achieve these missions. For more information about the  Defense Strategic Guidance and other selected strategy and planning  documents, see appendix I.
section_title: DOD Did Not Provide Sufficiently Detailed Information in Its Report to Congress or Conduct a Comprehensive Process for Assessing Roles and Missions
subsections: section_title: DOD Did Not Provide Sufficiently Detailed Information to Congress
paragraphs: In July 2012, DOD submitted the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review  report, together with the Defense Strategic Guidance, to Congress to  meet the statutory reporting requirement; however, DOD’s submission did  not provide sufficiently detailed information about most of the statutorily  required elements of the assessment. Although the statute does not  require DOD to report on all elements of the roles and missions  assessment, a key principle for information quality indicates that  information presented to Congress should be clear and sufficiently  detailed.armed services and some information about core capabilities, but did not,   Specifically, we found that DOD provided the missions of the  for any of the 10 missions, clearly identify the components within the  department responsible for providing the core competencies and  capabilities, or identify any plans to address any capability gaps or  unnecessary duplication.
The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review report identifies missions of  the armed services and provides information about capabilities and  previously identified areas of duplication. The report restates the 10  missions of the armed forces identified in the Defense Strategic  Guidance, and identifies some protected capabilities and investments  needed to carry out each of the missions. For example, the report  restates DOD’s mission to project power despite anti-access / area denial  challenges. It then lists five key enhancements and protected  capabilities associated with this mission: enhance electronic warfare,  develop a new penetrating bomber, protect the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter  program, sustain undersea dominance and enhance capabilities, and  develop and enhance preferred munitions capabilities. Additionally, the  report also mentioned some previously identified areas of duplication and  actions that were subsequently taken, such as eliminating redundancy in  intelligence organizations, or proceeding with previous plans to eliminate  organizations that performed duplicative functions or outlived their original  purpose: the report notes the consolidation of specialized intelligence  offices across DOD into two Defense Intelligence Agency task forces  focused on counterterrorism and terrorism finance. Finally, the report also  provides specific information about Information Operations as well as  detention and interrogation, both of which were required to be included in   Prior to the submission to  this Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review.Congress, senior DOD leadership—including the Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Force Development, the DOD General Counsel,  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Under Secretary of  Defense (Comptroller), Director of Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation, Director of the Joint Staff, Under Secretary of the Navy,  Secretary of the Army, and Secretary of the Air Force—internally  concurred that the submission met the statutory requirement according to  a tracking sheet used by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Policy.
While the submission identifies core missions for the armed services and  provides some information about capabilities and competencies needed  for those missions, it does not provide sufficiently detailed information  about other statutorily required elements of the roles and missions  assessment. In our review of the report, we found that DOD did not, for  any of the 10 missions, clearly identify the components within the  department responsible for providing the core competencies and  capabilities, or identify any plans to address any capability gaps or  unnecessary duplication. For example:
The submission does not provide clear and sufficiently detailed  information on which component or components are responsible for  enhancing electronic warfare capabilities, which is identified by DOD  as one of the key capabilities needed to project power despite anti- access / area denial challenges. In our prior work, we have found that  DOD needed to strengthen its management and oversight of  electronic warfare programs and activities, reduce overlap, and  improve its return on its multibillion-dollar acquisition investments.  DOD has acknowledged that it faces ongoing challenges in  determining whether the current level of investment is optimally  matched with the existing capability gaps.does not provide sufficiently detailed information of its approach to  assign responsibilities, close potential gaps, or eliminate unnecessary  duplication.
The submission also does not provide clear and sufficiently detailed  information on which components are responsible for enhancing  airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities,  which are required for counterterrorism and irregular warfare  missions. In our prior work, we have found that ineffective acquisition  practices and collaboration efforts in the DOD unmanned aircraft  systems portfolio creates overlap and the potential for duplication  among a number of current programs and systems. Similarly, we  have noted that opportunities exist to avoid unnecessary  redundancies and maximize the efficient use of intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. However, DOD’s  submission does not clarify responsibilities among the Air Force,  Army, or Navy for developing these capabilities.
This is the second time that DOD did not provide sufficiently detailed  information to Congress following its roles and missions assessment. In  the first Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report submitted to  Congress in 2009, DOD identified the core missions of the department  and identified the DOD Joint Capabilities Areas as the core competencies  for the department. However, the report did not provide details for all elements required of the assessment. For example, the report did not  provide core competencies and capabilities—including identifying  responsible organizations—for each of the missions; instead the report  provided some capability information for only specific focus areas within  some of these missions. Despite the limited information contained in the  2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, the department  used that first review to inform changes later made in DOD Directive  5100.01, which establishes functions of the department and its major  components. However, as a result of not providing clear, sufficiently  detailed, and relevant information in the most recent submission, DOD did  not provide Congress comprehensive information about roles,  responsibilities, and needed capabilities and competencies that Congress  was seeking.
section_title: DOD Did Not Conduct a Comprehensive Process for the Roles and Missions Assessment
paragraphs: DOD did not conduct a comprehensive process for the roles and missions  assessment. Instead DOD limited its approach to leveraging the results of  another review, conducted in 2011, that resulted in the January 2012  release of the Defense Strategic Guidance. However, this earlier review  was not intended to assess all elements the statute required of the roles  and missions review and, as a result, by relying on it DOD does not have  the assurance that its resulting assessment was comprehensive. We  recognize that there were some benefits to this approach, as the Defense  Strategic Guidance did identify primary missions of the armed services,  which were then provided as the core missions required for the  Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. In addition, the Defense  Strategic Guidance provided several principles to guide the force and  program development necessary to achieve these missions. The Defense  Strategic Guidance also became the basis for completing the most recent  Quadrennial Defense Review. However, neither DOD’s review for  preparing the Defense Strategic Guidance nor the Quadrennial Roles and  Missions Review itself clearly identified the components within the  department that are responsible for providing the core competencies and  capabilities needed to address each of the primary missions, or plans for  addressing any capability gaps or unnecessary duplication.
Further, by using such an approach for preparing the roles and missions  assessment, DOD did not document and follow key principles for  conducting an effective and comprehensive assessment.principles include (1) developing and documenting a planned approach,  including the principles or assumptions that will inform the assessment,  which addresses all statutory requirements; (2) involving key internal  stakeholders; (3) identifying and seeking input from appropriate external  stakeholders; and (4) establishing time frames with milestones for  conducting the assessment and completing the report.
Planned approach: DOD did not develop and document its planned  approach, including the principles or assumptions used to inform and  address all statutory requirements of the assessment. Specifically, it did not document in its approach how it was going to address the  statutory requirements related to the identification of components  responsible for providing the core competencies and capabilities, any  gaps, or any unnecessary duplication. A documented, planned  approach provides a framework for understanding the strategic  direction and the assumptions used to identify, analyze, assess, and  address the statutory requirements of the assessment.
Internal stakeholder involvement: The involvement of key internal  stakeholders was limited. As part of a comprehensive process, the  involvement of key internal stakeholders helps ensure that the  information obtained during the review is complete. According to  officials from the armed services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, officials from those offices had  a limited role in the development and review of the roles and missions  assessment. For example, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  did not conduct an independent assessment of the roles and missions  assessment prior to the broader, department-wide assessment.
According to officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and  Joint Staff, this decision was made because the Joint Chiefs of Staff  had provided substantial input to, and had endorsed, the recently  completed Defense Strategic Guidance. According to Joint Staff  officials, the Chairman had agreed with the approach proposed by the  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to rely on the review that  resulted in the Defense Strategic Guidance as the primary basis for  the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. The Joint Staff reviewed  the submission prepared by the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Policy and the Chairman then cosigned the submission  with the Secretary of Defense. The armed services had limited  responsibility for participating in the preparation of the roles and  missions submission, and were given a limited opportunity to review  and provide comment on DOD’s draft submission before it was  submitted to Congress. In addition, officials from the Office of the  Director of Administration and Management—responsible for the  biennial review of DOD agencies and field activities where additional  efficiencies may be identified—told us they sought an opportunity to  participate in the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review process,  but were not included in the review. According to an official from the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, internal  stakeholder involvement was incorporated from the prior, senior-level  review that resulted in the Defense Strategic Guidance. However, the  Office of the Director of Administration and Management was not  involved in that prior review. By not considering ways to build more  opportunity for stakeholder input, DOD was not well-positioned to  obtain and incorporate input from across the armed services,  agencies, offices, and commands within the department.
Identification and involvement of appropriate external stakeholders:  DOD had limited input from appropriate external stakeholders, such  as Congress and federal agencies, with related national security  goals. Input from Congress could have provided more specific  guidance and direction for what it expected of the roles and missions  assessment. According to DOD officials, they briefly discussed the  assessment with some congressional staff early in the process. In  addition, the 2012 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review report did  provide specific information about Information Operations as well as  detention and interrogation, as requested by Congress. This  information was collected in addition to information leveraged from the  review for the Defense Strategic Guidance. However, DOD officials  told us that they would benefit from additional clarification of  Congress’s expectations when performing subsequent roles and  missions assessments. For example, these officials noted that it  would be helpful if Congress highlighted which specific roles and  responsibilities areas were of concern so that more detailed  information might be provided about these areas in the next report.  According to a DOD official, the White House was involved with the  review for the Defense Strategic Guidance, but consultation with  interagency partners was limited and occurred late in the process.  While other federal agency partners were not involved with the latest  Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review assessment, the  involvement of other federal agency partners—such as the  Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, and Office of  the Director of National Intelligence—provides an opportunity to enlist  their ideas, expertise, and assistance related to strategic objectives  that are not solely the responsibility of DOD—such as homeland  security and homeland defense. In assessing the capabilities and  competencies, but not obtaining input from appropriate external  stakeholders, DOD did not have additional support and input for the  assessment of its roles and missions, or input as to what these  stakeholders expected as an outcome of the assessment.
Time frames: DOD did not develop a schedule to gauge progress for  conducting the assessment and completing the report. Developing a  schedule with time frames is useful to keep the overall review on track  to meet deadlines and to produce a final product. However, aside  from tracking the final review of the report in tracking sheets used by  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Joint Staff,  DOD did not have planning documents that outlined specific time  frames with milestones associated with conducting the assessment— including time allotted for conducting the assessment itself, soliciting  input from internal and external stakeholders, and drafting the report  prior to circulation for final review. The lack of such a schedule may  have been a contributing factor to the delay in DOD’s submission. The  report was required to be submitted to the congressional defense  committees no later than the date in which the President’s budget  request for the next fiscal year was provided to Congress, which was  February 13, 2012; however, the report was submitted on July 20,  2012.
DOD’s approach for the latest Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review  also differed from the department’s approach for preparing the 2009  Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. For the 2009 effort, DOD  developed and documented guidance in a “terms of reference” that  included, among other things, a methodological approach, time frames  with deliverables, and a list of offices within DOD responsible for  conducting portions of the assessment. However, no similar document  was developed for the 2012 roles and missions assessment. According to  officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the  2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review occurred before DOD had  to address the challenges of the current fiscal climate, and as a result  there might have been more interest in conducting the review. In contrast,  in preparing the 2012 roles and missions review, the officials told us that  senior DOD leadership had recently considered these difficult issues in  preparing the Defense Strategic Guidance, and so preferred to rely on  those recent discussions rather than conduct a separate review.
According to DOD officials, the primary reason that they did not perform a  separate effort to examine roles and missions is that the statutory  assessment and reporting requirements of the Quadrennial Roles and  Missions Review are largely duplicative of the review conducted for the  Defense Strategic Guidance, as well as other reviews and processes.  DOD officials stated that identifying core missions as well as core  competencies and capabilities is also mirrored in the requirements for the  Quadrennial Defense Review. Additionally, according to DOD officials,  the annual budget process is designed to identify and assign capabilities  within each service’s budget request, eliminate capability and capacity  gaps, and eliminate unnecessary duplication among DOD components.  However, by not conducting a specific, comprehensive roles and missions  assessment, DOD missed an opportunity to examine these issues  through a broad, department-wide approach, rather than through  processes established for other purposes.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Strategic assessments of the roles, missions, and needed competencies  and capabilities within DOD—whether conducted through the  Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review or some other strategic-level,  department-wide assessment—can be used to inform the department and  strengthen congressional oversight. Given the complex security  challenges and increased fiscal pressures that the department faces,  such assessments are important to help the department prioritize human  capital and other investment needs across the many components within  the department. Without a comprehensive roles and missions  assessment, documented in a sufficiently detailed report, DOD missed an  opportunity to lay the groundwork for the Quadrennial Defense Review  and other department-wide reviews, allocate responsibilities among the  many components within DOD, prioritize key capabilities and  competencies, inform the department’s investments and budget requests,  identify any unnecessary duplication resulting in cost savings through  increased efficiency and effectiveness, and aid congressional oversight. A  comprehensive process that outlined a planned approach for addressing  all statutory requirements of the roles and missions assessment; involved  key internal stakeholders; offered an opportunity for key external  stakeholders, such as Congress, to provide input regarding the  department’s approach; and set clear time frames to gauge progress for  the assessment, would have helped provide DOD with reasonable  assurance that its resulting assessment of roles and missions was  comprehensive and that DOD was positioned to provide such a  sufficiently detailed report to Congress.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To assist DOD in conducting any future comprehensive assessments of  roles and missions that reflect appropriate statutory requirements, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive  process that includes a planned approach, including the principles or assumptions used to  inform the assessment, that addresses all statutory requirements;  the involvement of key DOD stakeholders, such as the armed  services, Joint Staff, and other officials within the department; an opportunity to identify and involve appropriate external  stakeholders, to provide input to inform the assessment; and  time frames with milestones for conducting the assessment and for  reporting on its results.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with  the report’s recommendation to develop a comprehensive process to  assist in conducting future assessments of roles and missions. DOD’s  comments are summarized below and reprinted in appendix II.
In its comments, DOD agreed that it is important to make strategy-driven  decisions regarding its missions and associated competencies and  capabilities, and to assign and clarify to its components their roles and  responsibilities. DOD noted that, in the context of dynamic strategic and  budgetary circumstances and increasing fiscal uncertainty, the  department leveraged its strategic planning and annual budget  processes, which resulted in the release of the 2012 Defense Strategic  Guidance and associated mission, capability, and force structure priorities  to inform and address the 2012 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review.  Specifically, DOD commented on the four recommended principles of a  comprehensive process:
Regarding a planned approach, the department stated that it  determined that using other, ongoing strategic planning efforts to  complete the roles and missions assessment met the review’s  statutory requirement. As noted in the report, there were some  benefits to DOD’s taking advantage of other processes. However,  DOD did not document its approach for identifying the components  within the department responsible for providing the core competencies  and capabilities, or identify any capability gaps or unnecessary  duplication. A documented, planned approach provides a framework  for understanding the strategic direction and the assumptions used to  identify, analyze, assess, and address the statutory requirements of  the assessment.
Regarding DOD stakeholders, the department stated that the  processes it used did include the involvement of key DOD  stakeholders, but acknowledged that formally documenting the  process for obtaining stakeholder input would have clarified the role of  the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Documenting the decision  regarding the Chairman’s role would have provided some clarification;  however, as noted in the report, it is also important to obtain and  document input from all key internal stakeholders—including the  armed services, agencies, offices, and commands within the  department.
Regarding external stakeholders, the department stated that it did  seek limited additional clarification from Congress prior to conducting  the roles and missions assessment, but did not seek formal input to  the assessment from other federal agencies because it relied on the  external stakeholder input obtained during the development of the  Defense Strategic Guidance. However, during the course of our  review, a DOD official told us there was limited involvement from other  federal agency partners during the review for the Defense Strategic  Guidance. As noted in the report, not obtaining input from appropriate  external stakeholders—such as the Department of State, Department  of Homeland Security, and Office of the Director of National  Intelligence—when assessing the capabilities and competencies  hindered DOD from having the additional support for the assessment  of its roles and missions.
Regarding time frames and milestones, the department stated that the  development of time frames just for the roles and missions  assessment would have been largely duplicative of existing time  frames for other efforts, including the development of the Defense  Strategic Guidance and the annual budget process. However,  developing a schedule with time frames would have been useful to  keep the roles and missions assessment on track and aid the  department in submitting its report by the statutory deadline.
Developing a comprehensive process for its roles and missions  assessment—a process that outlined the department’s planned approach  for addressing all statutory requirements, involved key internal  stakeholders, offered an opportunity for Congress and other key external  stakeholders to provide input, and set clear time frames to gauge  progress for the assessment—would have helped provide DOD with  reasonable assurance that its resulting assessment was comprehensive.  The department’s approach resulted in a report that was insufficiently  detailed, therefore, we continue to believe the recommendation is valid to  guide future roles and missions reviews.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense  for Policy; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Secretaries of the  Army, of the Navy, and of the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine  Corps; DOD’s Director of Administration and Management; and the  Director of the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, this report  is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3489 or PendletonJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Related Strategic Reviews and Other Selected Strategic and Planning Documents
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) is required to regularly assess and  report on its roles and missions in the Quadrennial Roles and Missions  Review. The most recently completed Quadrennial Roles and Missions  Review occurred amid a series of strategy and policy reviews that DOD  has undertaken over the past 6 years, including the first Quadrennial   Figure 1 provides a  Roles and Missions Review conducted in 2009.timeline of the issuance of select DOD strategic-level reports and other  documents that contain roles and missions-related information.
The National Defense Strategy provides the foundation and strategic  framework for much of the department’s strategic guidance. Specifically,  it addresses how the military services plan to fight and win America’s  wars and describes how DOD plans to support the objectives outlined in  the President’s National Security Strategy. It also provides a framework  for other DOD strategic guidance related to deliberate planning, force  development, and intelligence. Further, the National Defense Strategy  informs the National Military Strategy and describes plans to support the  objectives outlined in the President’s National Security Strategy.
By law, DOD is required to conduct the Quadrennial Defense Review  every 4 years to determine and express the nation’s defense strategy and  establish a defense program for the next 20 years. The review is to  comprise a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy,  force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget  planning, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the  United States. The Quadrennial Defense Review also includes an  evaluation by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff of the military’s ability to successfully execute its missions.  The latest Quadrennial Defense Review was issued in March 2014.addition to these strategic reviews conducted at DOD, both the  Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State released  strategic reviews that provide a strategic framework to guide the activities   In  to secure the homeland and to provide a blueprint for diplomatic and  development efforts.
The Ballistic Missile Defense Review, released in February 2010, is a  review conducted pursuant to guidance from the President and the  Secretary of Defense, while also addressing the statutory requirement to  assess U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy. This review  evaluated the threats posed by ballistic missiles and developed a missile  defense posture to address current and future challenges. Specifically,  this review sought to align U.S. missile defense posture with near-term  regional missile threats and sustain the ability to defend the homeland  against limited long-range missile attack.
The Nuclear Posture Review is a statutorily mandated review that  establishes U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities and force posture  for the next 5 to 10 years.April 2010 and provided a roadmap for implementing the President’s  policy for reducing nuclear risks to the United States and the international  community. Specifically, the 2010 report identified long-term  modernization goals and requirements, including sustaining a safe,  secure, and effective nuclear arsenal through the life extension of existing  nuclear weapons; increasing investments to rebuild and modernize the  nation’s nuclear infrastructure; and strengthening the science, technology,  and engineering base.
The latest review was released by DOD in  The National Security Strategy describes and discusses the worldwide  interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to its  national security and calls for a range of actions to implement the  strategy.President in May 2010, addressed, among other things, how the United  States would strengthen its global leadership position; disrupt, dismantle,  and defeat al Qaeda; and achieve economic recovery at home and  abroad. This strategy also emphasized the need for a whole-of- government approach with interagency engagement to ensure the  security of the American people and the protection of American interests.  The National Security Strategy is to be used to inform the National  Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy.
The most recent National Security Strategy, released by the  DOD Directive 5100.01 established the functions of the department and  its major components. DOD reissued the directive in 2010 after the first  Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review included what DOD describes  as a thorough review of the directive. DOD updated the prior directive to  incorporate emerging responsibilities in areas such as special operations  and cyberspace operations and reflect other changes in the department’s  organization over the preceding decade.
The Space Posture Review is a statutorily mandated review of U.S.  national security space policy and objectives, conducted jointly by the   Through  Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence.coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, DOD  released the National Security Space Strategy in January 2011. The  strategy is derived from principles and goals found in the National Space  Policy and builds on the strategic approach laid out in the National  Security Strategy. Specifically, the strategy’s stated objectives for national  space security include strengthening safety, stability, and security in  space; maintaining and enhancing the strategic national security  advantages afforded to the United States by space; and engaging the  space industrial base that supports U.S. national security.
National Military Strategy and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan  The National Military Strategy and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan,  along with other strategic documents, provide DOD with guidance and  instruction on military policy, strategy, plans, forces and resource  requirements and allocations essential to successful execution of the  National Security Strategy and other Presidential Directives. Specifically,  the National Military Strategy, last issued in 2011, provides focus for  military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives from  which the service chiefs and combatant commanders identify desired  capabilities and against which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  assesses risk. This strategy defines the national military objectives,  describes how to accomplish these objectives, and addresses the military  capabilities required to execute the strategy. The Secretary of Defense’s  National Defense Strategy informs the National Military Strategy, which is  developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the  Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is to provide guidance to the combatant  commanders, the chiefs of the military services, and other DOD agencies  to accomplish tasks and missions based on current capabilities. It also is  to serve as the link between other strategic guidance and the joint  operation planning activities.
Biennial Review of DOD Agencies and Field Activities  By law, DOD is required to conduct a review every 2 years of the services  and supplies that each DOD agency and field activity provides.Office of the Director of Administration and Management in the Office of  the Secretary of Defense has led this biennial review. The goals are to  determine whether DOD needs each of these agencies and activities, or  whether it is more effective, economical, or efficient for the armed  services to assume the responsibilities. However, unlike the Quadrennial  Roles and Missions Review, which assesses the roles of all DOD  components, the biennial review focuses on DOD agencies and field  activities. The Secretary of Defense recently directed that the biennial  review should also include an assessment of the offices within the Office   The  of the Secretary of Defense. DOD issued the latest report on this  biennial review in April 2013.
The Unified Command Plan provides guidance to combatant  commanders and establishes their missions, responsibilities, force  structure, geographic area of responsibility, and other attributes. Section  161 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code tasks the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff to conduct a review of the plan not less often than every 2 years and  submit recommended changes to the President through the Secretary of  Defense. The Unified Command Plan was last updated in 2011.
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century  Defense  The Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century  Defense report (also referred to as the Defense Strategic Guidance),  released in January 2012, was directed by the President to identify the  strategic interests of the United States. The document states that it was  an assessment of the defense strategy prompted by the changing  geopolitical environment and fiscal pressures. The Defense Strategic  Guidance was developed by senior officials from DOD—including the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the armed services,  and the combatant commands—and the White House. The document  outlines security challenges the United States faces and is intended to  guide the development of the Joint Force through 2020 and during a  period of anticipated fiscal constraints. The Defense Strategic Guidance  identified 10 primary missions of the armed forces:  counter terrorism and irregular warfare; deter and defeat aggression; project power despite anti-access / area denial challenges;counter weapons of mass destruction; operate effectively in cyberspace and space; maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; defend the Homeland and provide support to civil authorities; provide a stabilizing presence;  conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations; and  conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations.
It also identified several principles to guide the force and program  development necessary to achieve these missions. For example, it noted  the need for the department to continue to reduce costs through reducing  the rate of growth of manpower costs, and the identification of additional  efficiencies.
In March 2013, the Secretary of Defense directed the completion of a  Strategic Choices Management Review. The Strategic Choices  Management Review was to examine the potential effect of additional,  anticipated budget reductions on the department and develop options for  performing the missions in the Defense Strategic Guidance. Specifically,  the review was to inform how the department would allocate resources  when executing its fiscal year 2014 budget and preparing its fiscal year  2015 through fiscal year 2019 budget plans. According to the Secretary of  Defense, the purpose of the Strategic Choices Management Review was  to understand the effect of further budget reductions on the department  and develop options to deal with these additional reductions. The  Secretary of Defense further emphasized that producing a detailed  budget blueprint was not the purpose of this review.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Margaret Morgan and Kevin L. O’Neill, Assistant Directors; Tracy  Abdo; Darreisha M. Bates; Elizabeth Curda; Leia Dickerson; Gina Flacco;  Brent Helt; Mae Jones; Amie Lesser; Travis Masters; Judy McCloskey;  Terry Richardson; and Sabrina Streagle.