Public Transit: Federal and Transit Agencies Taking Steps to Build Transit Systems' Resilience but Face Challenges
Published: 2014-12-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Public transit systems, which receive funding from the federal government, are vulnerable to catastrophic events, as demonstrated by the impact Hurricane Sandy and other events have had on transit systems. These events highlight our reliance on transit systems for access to jobs, medical care, and other services, as well as the cost of recovering from these events. For instance, of the $50.5 billion Congress appropriated to help communities devastated by Sandy, $10.9 billion was provided for disaster relief to public transit agencies. Building resilience—the ability to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the risk of catastrophic events—is one strategy to help limit the nation's fiscal exposure to catastrophic events.
GAO was asked to review transit system resilience to catastrophic events. This report examines (1) how DHS and DOT help transit agencies make their systems resilient; (2) actions selected transit agencies take to make their systems resilient; and (3) challenges transit agencies face with making their systems resilient. GAO examined documentation and interviewed officials from DHS and DOT, and officials from nine transit and five emergency management agencies.GAO selected a non-generalizable sample of agencies in five locations, chosen for transit ridership volume and variation in geography, types of risks, and transit modes.
GAO did not make any recommendations in this report. DHS and DOT provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Transportation (DOT) provide funding and other support to transit agencies to help make their systems resilient to catastrophic events. DHS focuses on emergency management and security, and provides funding through its hazard-mitigation, transit-security, and other grant programs. DOT's Federal Transit Administration (FTA) provides support through formula and discretionary-funding programs for transit capital-investment projects and for improving and maintaining existing systems. Both DHS and DOT provide transit agencies with technical assistance, such as for security programs or climate-change adaptation efforts.
Transit agencies that GAO selected identified a number of actions they are taking to help make their systems more resilient, including performing risk assessments and developing plans, such as emergency operations plans. These agencies also take actions, such as building redundant assets or facilities, to ensure the continuity of operations of the agencies' systems. Further, transit agencies have changed their infrastructure to mitigate the potential impact of disasters on their assets. For example, as shown in the figure below, one agency elevated vents and curbs to minimize water flowing into the subway.
Although all transit agencies GAO selected are taking resilience-building actions, officials GAO interviewed said that transit agencies face challenges with placing priorities on resilience and with certain aspects of some grant programs. In particular, officials from DHS, DOT, and transit agencies GAO selected explained that it is difficult for transit agencies to place priority on resilience activities because managers may be reluctant to focus on resilience and resilience activities compete with other priorities for funding. Federal, transit-agency, and emergency-management officials also cited challenges related to some aspects of federal grants that have made it difficult for transit agencies to, among other things, incorporate resilience into disaster recovery efforts and make regional transit-networks resilient. DHS, DOT, and some transit agencies are taking some actions to address these challenges, such as developing tools to help management prioritize resilience activities.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In recent years, the federal government, in addition to the over $10 billion  that the Department of Transportation (DOT) provides annually to transit  agencies for their systems, has provided billions of dollars to help transit  agencies recover from catastrophic events, such as Hurricane Sandy.
For example, $10.9 billion of the $50.5 billion Congress appropriated to  help communities devastated by Hurricane Sandy was provided to help  affected public transit agencies repair and make their transit facilities   resilient to future disasters. In addition to the financial impact, loss of  transit services, and damage of related infrastructure can have negative  effects on a community by impeding access to jobs, medical care,  education, shopping, and other services. For example, recent severe  weather events, such as major winter storms in Massachusetts and  landslides in Washington State, temporarily shut down transit systems in  these areas. Further, these types of weather-related events can be  expected to increase. According to the United States Global Change  Research Program, the impacts and costs of weather disasters are likely  to increase in significance as such events become more common and  intense due to climate change. Transit systems’ vulnerability results, in  part, from their open nature, the large geographic areas they cover, and  the critical transportation service they provide millions of people.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DOT, and the over 2,000  public transit agencies across the country play a role in minimizing transit  systems’ vulnerabilities to catastrophic events and helping ensure that  transit agencies are resilient to all types of hazards caused by nature and  people. Resilience is the capability to prepare for, respond to, recover  from, and mitigate the risk of catastrophic events. We previously have  recommended building resilience—such as taking actions to mitigate  vulnerabilities to severe weather events—as one strategy to help limit the  nation’s fiscal exposure as a result of catastrophic events. In addition, we  identified challenges to building resilience, including (1) communities  balancing the need to invest in hazard mitigation with other economic  development goals and (2) the clarity of information needed to inform risk- based decision making.public transit agencies are resilient to catastrophic events.
Such challenges may affect the extent to which  Given the importance of public transit agencies and their vulnerability to  adverse weather and other catastrophic events that disrupt transit  services and damage transit infrastructure and investments, you asked us  to identify how public transit agencies make their systems resilient to  catastrophic events. This report examines (1) how DHS and DOT help  transit agencies make their systems resilient to catastrophic events; (2)  actions selected transit agencies take to make their systems resilient; and  (3) challenges transit agencies face with making their systems resilient to  such events. Our review focuses on all-hazard catastrophic events; that  is, those caused either by nature (e.g., hurricanes, flooding, fires) or by  humans (e.g., security events, including terrorism).
To determine the activities DHS and DOT take to help transit agencies  make their systems more resilient to catastrophic events, we reviewed  and analyzed documentation from the two federal agencies on their  relevant programs, requirements, guidance, policies, and technical  assistance. We also interviewed officials from these two agencies. To  identify actions selected transit agencies take to make their systems more  resilient, we reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from nine  transit agencies and five local emergency management offices in five  metropolitan areas: Los Angeles Region, California; Miami, Florida;  Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Seattle/Puget Sound Region, Washington;  and Washington, D.C. These areas are among the 10 largest  metropolitan areas in terms of transit ridership and were selected to  obtain variation in geography, types of risks, and transit modes. In each  metropolitan area, we selected transit agencies that had relatively high  ridership and were located in the selected city itself or provided service to  the city. The nine transit agencies, which we visited, are listed below.
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Los  Angeles Region, California);
Orange County Transportation Authority (Los Angeles Region,
Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink) (Los Angeles  Region, California);
Miami-Dade Transit (Miami, Florida);
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA)  (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania);
Washington State Ferries (Seattle/Puget Sound Region, Washington);
King County Metro Transit (Seattle/Puget Sound Region,
Sound Transit (Seattle/Puget Sound Region, Washington); and
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)  (Washington, D.C.).
While the information we obtained from the five metropolitan areas is not  generalizable to transit systems nationwide, the selected areas have  some of the larger transit systems in terms of ridership. To identify  challenges transit agencies face with making their systems resilient to  catastrophic events, we interviewed officials from DOT, DHS, the nine  transit agencies, five emergency management offices, and four  researchers knowledgeable in transit systems, emergency management,  or federal transportation programs. We analyzed the information gained  from these interviews to identify the most frequently cited challenges.  Appendix I describes our objectives, scope, and methodology in greater  detail.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2013 through  December 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In response to the risks posed by man-made and natural disasters, such  as acts of terrorism and severe weather, over the past decade the federal  government has emphasized the need to improve the resilience of the  nation’s critical infrastructure through various national policies (see table  1). These policies—which focus on critical infrastructure, national  preparedness, and climate change or weather-related events—address  resilience in the context of homeland security (e.g., terrorism) and natural  disasters. The federal government has targeted 16 critical infrastructure  areas for resilience-building policies. Transportation infrastructure, which  includes public transit systems, is one of these areas.
Actions that can help transit agencies prepare for, respond to, recover  from, and mitigate the risk of catastrophic events can contribute to transit  system resilience. These actions can be taken before, during, and after  an event (see fig. 1). For example, transit agencies can develop plans to  help them prepare for a catastrophic event before it occurs, and can  repair transit infrastructure after an event so that the infrastructure can  better withstand similar events in the future.
In large part, the actions for resilience-building efforts noted in figure 1  occur at the local level and are specific to the needs, scope, and risks of  the transit systems, factoring in state and local priorities. However, the  Stafford Act of 1988, as amended, mandated a role for the federal  government in assisting state and local governments to carry out their  responsibilities to alleviate the damage from disasters. Today, federal  agencies—DHS and DOT, in particular—share federal oversight of and  assistance for critical infrastructure, including transit systems. Moreover,  DHS and DOT are the federal agencies responsible under the National  Infrastructure Protection Plan for promoting national resilience-related  polices in public transit systems. DHS has primary responsibility for  transportation security and emergency preparedness and response.  DHS’s Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the primary federal  agency overseeing security matters for public transit systems and  provides technical assistance to transit agencies to augment their system  security. DHS’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has  responsibility for administering the public transportation-security grant  provisions of the 9-11 Act and is the lead federal agency responsible for  building the nation’s capability to prepare for and respond to all-hazards  catastrophic events. Transit agencies can apply to FEMA for grants for  emergency planning, response, recovery, and mitigation efforts—either  directly or through their states, depending on the type of grant. DOT’s  Federal Transit Administration (FTA) provides funds to help develop new  transit systems and improve, maintain, and operate existing systems; and  provides technical assistance as needed to transit systems. As specified  by law, FTA’s programs for funding transit systems operate as either  formula or discretionary grants for certain types of capital or operating  expenses. As discussed below, until recently FTA did not have funds  authorized specifically for resilience or disaster assistance for transit  systems.
section_title: DHS and DOT Assistance Can Contribute to Transit System Resilience; However, Some Limitations Exist
subsections: section_title: DHS Assistance Focuses on Security and Emergency Management
paragraphs: Created to strengthen the security of the nation’s transportation systems,  TSA sets priorities for protecting and evaluating the security of public  transit systems. FEMA, as the federal agency responsible for emergency  management, has certain grant programs that provide funds that may be  used for transit systems’ resilience-related activities both before and after  catastrophic events. As noted by DHS and transit officials, some changes  in funding levels and timing of grant availability can limit transit agency  and local use of federal assistance.
According to DHS officials, TSA employs a risk-based strategy to  determine security risks on public transit systems. DHS maintains a Top  Transit Asset List (TTAL) to identify critical infrastructure assets that are  vital to the continuity of major transit systems and whose destruction  would be detrimental to the region and even the nation. TSA uses the  TTAL to help target technical assistance, and FEMA uses it to allocate  transit security grants to reduce risks associated with major transit  systems, especially in large metropolitan areas.
As part of its risk-based approach, TSA conducts 30 to 34 Baseline  Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) reviews of public transit  agencies per year, which support transit agency resilience in several  ways.effectiveness of transit agencies’ security and emergency response  programs and to identify existing security guidelines and requirements  and security gaps so the evaluated transit agency can prioritize actions to  address vulnerabilities to enhance security. Officials from DHS and transit  agencies we visited said that the BASE reviews are an effective tool to  assess a transit agency’s security program. According to DHS officials,  DHS also uses the results of the BASE reviews in the selection process  for Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) grants; the TSGP is discussed  further below. Furthermore, TSA disseminates best practices, identified in  part through the BASE program, among regional and national transit  agencies, emergency management agencies, and state agencies, which  can help make transit systems more resilient. These best practices  include, for example, incorporating resilience into capital project design.  Moreover, DHS has stated that, as critical infrastructure is built and  refurbished, those involved in making design decisions should consider  the most effective ways to prepare for threats and hazards, mitigate  vulnerabilities, and minimize consequences.
Sections 1405 and 1406 of the Implementing Regulations of the 9/11 Commission Act  of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266, 402 (2007), codified at 6 U.S.C. § 1134 and 6  U.S.C. § 1135, respectively. weaknesses in security, such as in emergency response planning and  employee training. Transit agencies that receive TSGP grants are  required by FEMA policy to use their grants within 2 years of receiving  them, although transit agencies may request an extension through a  formal request to FEMA that describes why an extension is needed.
TSGP funds for public transit peaked in fiscal year 2009 at almost $500  million, but were at or below $90 million in each of the past 3 fiscal years.   See figure 2 for the annual TSGP amounts awarded for public transit  from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2014—the current year. Later in  this report, we discuss the challenges experienced by transit agencies  related to the timing of these grant funds. To determine which transit  agencies receive TSGP funds, a panel of officials from different DHS  agencies, including FEMA and TSA, rank and score proposed projects  based on, among other things, whether agencies have assets listed in the  TTAL and their BASE results.
FEMA also administers a Port Security Grant Program, designed to  directly support maritime transportation-infrastructure security activities,  such as improvement of port-wide maritime security-risk management,  maritime security-training exercises, and maritime security-mitigation  protocols that support port recovery and resilience capabilities. According  to DHS officials, ferry systems that are awarded these funds cannot also  apply for TSGP funds for the same project.
In addition to the TSGP and Port Security Grant Program, transit  agencies are eligible for the Homeland Security Grant Program. These  grants, such as the Urban Areas Security Initiative, are aimed at helping  metropolitan areas build and sustain national preparedness. However,  transit agencies cannot apply directly for these funds. State  Administrative Agencies apply for these grants on behalf of the state and  its subgrantees, including transit agencies and other local entities seeking  such funds.
FEMA’s disaster- and hazard-mitigation grant programs can also be used  for helping make transit systems resilient. Public Assistance, typically the  largest of these programs, focuses on immediate post-disaster recovery  efforts and its grants can be used for removing debris, implementing  emergency protective measures, and repairing or replacing damaged  public equipment or facilities. Public Assistance funds also may be used  for hazard mitigation measures to damaged infrastructure to reduce the  likelihood of future damage. According to FEMA officials, transit agencies  are also eligible for three FEMA mitigation grant programs—Hazard  Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM)  Program, and Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) Program—that primarily  fund weather-related resilience efforts, such as implementing flood control  measures or protection from the effects of earthquakes. Transit agencies  in the wake of recent disasters have used mitigation funds to support  resilience projects.
While FEMA’s mitigation grant programs can help transit agencies carry  out resilience-type projects, we identified two limitations transit agencies  face in trying to obtain such funds. First, to obtain FEMA funding, transit  agencies must apply through their state government as opposed to  applying directly to the federal government. Thus, transit agencies are  competing with other state and local organizations, including non-transit- related organizations such as housing organizations and public utilities,  for FEMA funds. Second, FEMA officials noted that because various  FEMA grants and other federal funds to aid recovery and resilience  building after a catastrophic event have different regulations and  timeframes, it could be difficult for the grant recipients to coordinate the  use of these funds for resilience efforts.transit agencies and others indicate arise from competing priorities and  the timing of federal grants in more detail later in the report.
section_title: DOT Focuses on Transit Funding and Technical Assistance
paragraphs: DOT provides funding and technical assistance to transit agencies to  improve their resilience. DOT requires that transit agencies with light rail,  heavy rail, or other rail “fixed-guideway systems” have hazard and  emergency management programs, and develop security plans.discussed above, actions that help transit agencies prepare for  catastrophic events, such as developing plans, can help build transit  system resilience.
subsections: section_title: FTA Formula and Discretionary Funds
paragraphs: FTA provides financial assistance through various formula and  discretionary programs for transit capital-investment projects and for  improving and maintaining existing systems. All of these programs,  except for the new Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program  (ERP), allow but do not provide specifically for improvements for transit  systems’ resilience to catastrophic events. However, according to FTA  officials, activities to build resilience in transit systems are eligible capital  expenses under these programs. For example, a transit agency could use  Section 5339—Bus and Bus Facilities Program fundsfacility on higher land to make it less vulnerable to floods. to build a new bus  FTA grantees are responsible for managing their programs in accordance  with federal requirements, and FTA is responsible for ensuring that  grantees follow federal statutory and administrative requirements. While  FTA does not require transit agencies’ use of such grants for resilience  projects, FTA officials said that one way to ensure that transit agencies  practice resilience is the grant requirement funded assets in good operating order for the duration of their “useful life”  or expected period of service. FTA may require that transit agencies  refund FTA for the portion of an FTA-paid asset if that asset does not last  the minimal life cycle for that asset. FTA officials stated that this  requirement could incentivize transit agencies to take actions that could  contribute to system resilience. For example, the useful life requirement  could encourage transit agencies to adopt improved asset management  practices, which also improve the resilience of transit assets. However,  in cases of disasters, FTA can waive this requirement. FTA waived this  requirement for the buses that were destroyed by Hurricane Katrina and  thus were taken out of service before reaching their minimum useful life.  FTA officials further told us that, as permitted under the Stafford Act, FTA  waived the remaining useful life for property damaged or destroyed by  Hurricane Sandy.
In addition to federal requirements, FTA officials told us that local building  codes and current industry design standards could help transit agencies  build resilience. For instance, according to transit officials we spoke with  in California, California’s stringent seismic codes enable transit systems  to build to better withstand earthquakes. Research has shown that design  improvements have resulted in stronger, more resilient transit vehicles  that can better withstand terrorist attacks.
section_title: FTA Emergency and Disaster- Related Fund
paragraphs: FTA Circular 5010.1D, Grant Management Requirements, (Nov. 1, 2008). things, capital projects to protect, repair, reconstruct, or replace  equipment and facilities of public transportation systems that the DOT  Secretary determines are in danger of suffering serious damage, or have  suffered serious damage, as a result of an emergency. A transit agency  can apply directly for these grants without having to go through its state  government (as required for most FEMA grants). Under the FTA ERP,  damaged or threatened transit equipment and facilities can be repaired as  well as made more resilient to current and future conditions and risks.  Further, operating costs to cover evacuation activities, rescue operations,  and temporary transit services are also eligible uses of the FTA ERP.  While similar to the Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) ERP for  highway facilities, the FTA ERP has not received funding on an ongoing  basis, which could limit some transit agencies’ ability to respond  immediately after a disaster. The FHWA ERP is authorized to obligate a  specific amount annually to be paid from the Highway Trust Fund,  supplemented by appropriations from the General Fund of the U.S.  Treasury, on an as-needed basis. While MAP-21 authorized the FTA  ERP, Congress, to date, has not provided annual appropriations for the  program. The Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, however, provided a  one-time appropriation of $10.9 billion for FTA’s ERP for recovery, relief,  and resilience efforts in areas affected by Hurricane Sandy., Table 2  shows how FTA allocated the ERP funds.
The only appropriation that the FTA ERP has received to date is for public   Since Sandy, there have  transit in areas affected by Hurricane Sandy.been other catastrophic weather-related events, such as mudslides and  heavy snow storms. However, Congress did not appropriate ERP funds  for those events. If Congress does not appropriate ERP funds for a  specific event, transit agencies can still apply through their states for  FEMA’s assistance and mitigation programs or use their FTA’s formula  funds. As we discuss below, FTA and transit agency officials told us that  demand for limited funds makes it difficult for transit agencies to prioritize  actions for building resilience versus other, more immediate needs, such  as maintaining and operating existing assets.
section_title: FTA Technical Assistance Related to Climate Change
paragraphs: The  impacts. DOT expects to issue these projects’ final reports in fall 2014.  These reports can be a tool, highlighting practices that transit agencies  could adopt for their systems. The reports are intended to inform climate  change efforts of participating transit agencies and provide information on  the efforts’ applicability to other transit agencies. In addition, in 2011, FTA  issued a study, Flooded Bus Barns and Buckled Rails, which it has  disseminated to the nation’s transit agencies. This study focused on how  transit agencies could incorporate climate change adaptation into their  systems and activities—such as asset management systems, planning,  and emergency response—and provided examples of strategies. In 2011  and 2012, FTA offered workshops for transit agencies on how they can  adapt their transit systems so that they are more resilient to the long-term  effects of climate change. Further, FTA has held training sessions and  workshops for transit agencies to share lessons learned and best  practices.
FTA has also funded the Transportation Research Board (TRB) to  undertake a research project entitled Improving the Resiliency of Transit  Systems Threatened by Natural Disaster. Objectives include reviewing  current research and developing guidelines, strategies and tools for public  transit agencies to make their systems more resilient to natural disasters  and climatic events. TRB plans to issue all this work by mid-2016.
section_title: Other FTA Guidance, Technical Assistance, and Proposed Rulemaking
paragraphs: In addition to workshops, webinars, and other workgroups sponsored by  the American Public Transportation Associations, FTA has held as part of  the Climate Change Adaptation initiative, FTA provides guidance and  training that can aid transit agencies in preparing for, responding to and  mitigating the potential impact of disasters, thereby improving their  systems’ resilience to such disasters. For example,
Built-in Redundancy: FTA encourages transit agencies to “build in”  redundancy in, among other things, infrastructure, communications,  and power supplies. Redundancy of assets and operations within a  transit system may help a system respond to catastrophic events by  allowing transit agencies to fall back to secondary options rather than  ceasing service if a portion of the system is damaged during a  disaster.
Mutual Aid Agreements: FTA recommends—in its guidance—that  transit agencies develop mutual aid agreements or memorandums of  understanding (MOU) with other relevant organizations and agencies  in the same or adjoining communities or areas to, among other things,  formalize and authorize assistance during emergencies, so that they  can quickly recover and resume operations following a disaster.
Capital investment decision making: MAP-21 develop a transit asset- management system that would, in part,  assist transit agencies in prioritizing rehabilitation and replacement  investments. These rehabilitation and replacement projects may help  transit agencies mitigate the impacts of catastrophic events by  incorporating strategies such as elevating assets above flood levels.  FTA’s October 2013 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on a  national transit asset-management system would require transit  agencies to, among other things, develop transit asset- management  plans to help them make these investment decisions. In a 2013  report, we found that asset management planning is a leading  practice that can help transit agencies plan and prioritize replacement  and rehabilitation investments.
Pub. L. No. 112-141,126 Stat. 405 (2012) authorized surface transportation programs  through fiscal year 2014. Legislation was enacted in August 2014 extending surface  transportation programs and funding through May 31, 2015, for programs authorized  under MAP-21. Highway and Transportation Funding Act, Pub. L. No. 113-159, 128 Stat.  1839 (2014.
section_title: Selected Transit Agencies Take a Variety of Actions to Make Their Transit Systems Resilient
paragraphs: Officials from eight of the nine transit agencies we visited told us that they  would consider their transit systems to be resilient if they can resist or  minimize damage, continue operations, or resume operations quickly, if  an emergency were to occur. The transit agencies also identified a  number of actions that help improve their systems’ resilience, including  actions that help them prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate  the impacts of emergencies and catastrophic events. These actions  include, but are not limited to, developing plans, performing risk  assessments, ensuring the continuity of transit system operations, and  mitigating the impact of catastrophic events on physical assets.
subsections: section_title: Transit Agencies Develop Plans and Perform Risk Assessments
paragraphs: All nine transit agencies have developed plans to help make their  systems resilient to catastrophic events. In general, plans can help transit  agencies prepare for, respond to, and recover from for catastrophic  events should they occur. The plans from the transit agencies that we  reviewed can generally be categorized as those that address all-hazards  or those that address a specific hazard relevant for transit agencies’  locations (see table 3). Transit agencies typically have multiple plans,  some of which are described in the table below.
All nine transit agencies perform assessments to identify risks to their  transit systems so that they can make informed decisions to mitigate the  risks and improve resilience. For example, Philadelphia’s SEPTA  performs a six-stage risk assessment on all of its transit stations. As a  part of this assessment, SEPTA police determine the overall rating of  stations based on threats, vulnerabilities, and the value of the station to  the overall transit system. The agency then develops countermeasure  reports that provide recommendations to address identified risks. In  addition to developing recommendations to address risks, officials from  some transit agencies explained that they use the risk assessments to,  among other things, inform the types of training and drills the agencies  conduct, or guide their investment decision-making. For example, officials  from Seattle/Puget Sound Region’s Washington State Ferries told us that  one risk area they identified based on a risk assessment of vessels and  terminals was that many employees and passengers could sustain  injuries during an emergency. As a result, the agency held training to  address this risk. Officials from the Los Angeles County Metropolitan  Transportation Authority told us they conducted risk assessments to  identify areas susceptible to mudslides and as a result, decided to fund  the building of retaining walls and fences to stop debris from falling on to  the rights-of-way in those areas. Further, based on their risk  assessments, officials from Seattle/Puget Sound Region’s King County  Metro Transit and the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation  Authority told us that they identified security risks to their transit tunnels  and, as a result, funded actions to enhance security in those tunnels.
In certain instances, transit agencies may not be able to implement  solutions to address identified risks because, according to transit officials,  funding may be limited, the public or labor unions may disapprove of the  suggested solution, or the suggested solution may be cost prohibitive. In  such situations, some officials from agencies said that they temporarily  accept the risk until better or more cost-effective alternatives are  available, or use existing solutions, to address the risks. For example, an  official from Miami-Dade Transit explained that when funding is not  available to address security risks, the agency’s security program  supervisors work with facilities maintenance staff to determine whether  corrective measures could be addressed during facilities maintenance  work.
section_title: Transit Agencies Take Actions to Help Ensure the Continuity of Transit Systems and to Mitigate the Impact of Catastrophic Events on Physical Assets
paragraphs: In addition to developing plans and performing risk assessments, all nine  transit agencies showed us or told us about redundant facilities or transit  assets to help ensure continuity of transit service if a portion of their  systems or facilities is damaged during catastrophic events. For example:
Six transit agencies have built, are building, or have requested  funding to build backup command, control, or communications centers  to direct transit operations in case the main center is affected by a  catastrophic event. Some of these centers are mobile in nature so that  they can change their location as needed. In general, redundant or  backup centers provide transit agencies the ability to dispatch trains  and buses should the main centers be unable to do so. See Fig. 3.
Los Angeles area’s Orange County Transportation Authority uses  buses powered by natural gas to provide bus service, but this agency  also maintains a small contingency fleet of diesel-powered buses in  ready condition that can be placed into service immediately in an  emergency. An official from this agency said that this diesel-powered  fleet is a critical resource: if a major earthquake, for example,  interrupts the delivery of natural gas to his location, the diesel buses  could become the only emergency transportation resource capable of  being refueled and providing bus service.
Seattle/Puget Sound Region’s Washington State Ferries has ferry  terminals that are susceptible to damage during an earthquake. As  such, to ensure that ferry service can continue in the event of an  emergency, this agency has built terminals with more than one berth  to increase the chances that at least one berth will remain functional  to some level following a major earthquake. See figure 4 for a terminal  with three redundant berths. In addition to redundant berths at any  given terminal, Washington State Ferries also has additional terminals  that could be used should all the berths at a terminal be unusable. An  official from Washington State Ferries said that ensuring the continuity  of service for the ferries is important in his region because the ferry  system could experience an increase in the number of users while the  road systems are being repaired.
All nine transit agencies provided us with information about, or told us  about, their efforts to coordinate with other local or regional agencies to,  for example, help prepare for, respond to, and recover from catastrophic  events and to help ensure that their systems can resume or continue  operations if such events were to occur. We found transit agencies that  have, as FTA suggests, formal agreements with other transit or  transportation agencies to facilitate the coordination, and other transit  agencies that participate in local or regional transit coordination groups.  For example, the Seattle/Puget Sound region’s King County Metro Transit  has a memorandum of understanding with the City of Seattle’s  Department of Transportation which defines and coordinates the actions  each agency will take during snow events (such as providing certain bus  services and removing snow on roads). Additionally, two transit agencies  we visited in the Los Angeles region have a formal agreement with other  transit agencies in California that describes how transit agencies in the  state will, in an emergency, receive and provide mutual assistance to  each other in the form of personnel, services, and equipment so that  transit systems can continue to operate. Separately, officials from  Philadelphia’s SEPTA told us that while they do not have a formal  agreement with other local transit agencies, they participate in a regional  transit working group to, among other things, address common security- related issues, coordinate drills and training, and efficiently administer  and procure certain security equipment and other services.
While we did not assess the effectiveness of the selected transit  agencies’ coordination efforts with other state and local agencies, our July  2009 report on disaster assistance stated that stakeholders faced  obstacles with coordination and collaboration after the 2005 Gulf Coast  hurricanes. Based on our review of five past disasters, we found that  collaborative practices could help communities recover and rebuild from  catastrophic events. Accordingly, we recommended that FEMA  establish a mechanism for sharing information and best practices focused  on disaster recovery, including practices that promote effective  collaboration. In September 2013, we found that FEMA had implemented  this recommendation.
In addition, eight transit agencies we visited showed or told us about  changes they have made to their physical infrastructure to mitigate the  impacts of catastrophic events on their transit systems. For example:
Miami-Dade Transit made changes to better protect its electrified third  rail and reduce damage and replacement costs. This transit agency  uses cover boards to protect the electrified third rail that supply power  to its trains. Officials from this transit agency told us that hurricane  winds ripped off cover boards in some places, damage that prompted  them to look for better solutions to protect the third rail. As a result,  officials installed newly designed cover boards that allow winds to flow  through the cover, rather than catch the wind—thus allowing the cover  boards and the third rail to better withstand hurricane winds (see fig.  5.)
Philadelphia’s SEPTA changed its roadside curbs and subway vents  to reduce subway flooding. Flooding is one of the key risks to this  transit agency’s rail system. Officials explained that subway flooding  occurs, in part, because water accumulates near roadside curbs that  have deteriorated, thus allowing water to enter vents that provide air  to the underground train system. To remedy the problem, the transit  agency raised curbs or vents throughout the city to minimize water  flow into the vents (see fig. 6). Prior to implementing this renovation,  the transit agency had previously relied on a strategy of covering  vents susceptible to flooding with plywood and sand bags in advance  of large storms, but this process was labor intensive and dependent  on how much time was available before a storm.
section_title: Transit Agencies Face Challenges in Placing Priority on Resilience and with Certain Aspects of Some Federal Grants
paragraphs: Officials from DOT, DHS, transit agencies and emergency management  offices we visited stated that transit agencies face challenges related to  placing priority on resilience and some aspects of certain grant programs  that can help make transit systems resilient. These challenges were the  most frequently cited challenges across the agencies we reviewed.
DOT, DHS, and some transit agencies have taken or are taking some  actions to address identified challenges.
subsections: section_title: Placing Priority on Resilience May Be Challenging
paragraphs: Officials from DOT, DHS, and the transit agencies and emergency  management offices we visited identified a variety of challenges that  make it difficult for transit agencies to place priority on resilience activities.
First, officials from DOT and DHS told us that resilience may not be a  priority for transit agency managers. These managers may not make  resilience a priority because it is difficult for them to make the case for  resilience projects and because catastrophic events occur infrequently.  As far back as June 1998, we reported that state and local governments  might be reluctant to take actions that improve resilience to natural  hazards because, among other reasons, decision-makers may not have  complete or accurate information on the extent to which averted losses  could exceed the increased cost of resilience actions.comprehensive and reliable data to make decisions about cost-benefit  tradeoffs continues to be difficult. FTA has developed a tool to help transit  agencies in Sandy-affected areas evaluate the cost-effectiveness of  resilience projects in reducing the vulnerabilities of both an asset and of  the public transportation system to future disasters. This information on  cost-effectiveness was among the factors FTA used to help it determine  which resilience projects would receive ERP funds. Additionally, three  transit researchers whom we interviewed agreed that it can be  challenging to convince management that preparing transit systems for  future catastrophic events should be a priority; they further explained that  this is because such events may not happen or may happen infrequently.
Second, officials from four transit agencies we visited as well as DOT,  and DHS indicated that resilience activities compete with other priorities  for funding.
Competing with other transit agency priorities: Resilience activities  may compete with other transit agency priorities—such as those that  address systems operations —for funding. For example, an official  from Seattle/Puget Sound Region’s Washington State Ferries  explained that because his transit system lost a critical source of  funding—the state’s motor-vehicle excise tax—the agency needed to  direct its existing funding sources to operating and construction costs,  which left little room for resilience-related activities, such as building  redundant systems. Officials from Philadelphia’s SEPTA told us that  they sometimes have to prioritize funding to address federal  requirements—such as a requirement to install positive train control  on railroads used to transport commuters, inter-city rail passengers, or  hazardous materials—which limits the funding that is available for  other agency activities such as those that help make their system  resilient.
Competing with other state priorities: In 1998, 2007, and 2014, we  found that state and local governments might be reluctant to invest in  resilience-building activities—such as hazard mitigation—because  leaders may be concerned that these activities will detract from  economic development goals that may be a higher priority for  communities. According to a FEMA official, transit systems have not  been high priority in states’ applications for FEMA mitigation grants,  such as the HMGP, in part because states tend to focus on other  priorities that are of interest to communities. The FEMA official told us,  for example, that after Hurricane Sandy, a state prioritized HMGP  grants for residential housing rather than for transit. An official from an  emergency management office said that these competing priorities  may limit the funding provided to transit agencies and affect their  ability to undertake activities that could help make their systems  resilient.
Third, officials from seven transit agencies and four emergency- management offices said that federal funds are not always available for  transit systems’ resilience and limits their ability to undertake activities  that could help make their systems resilient. Officials from some of these  transit agencies said that federal funds are not always available to help  them make their systems resilient to catastrophic events, particularly  natural disasters, before they occur. For example, as discussed earlier,  ERP funds are currently available only after an event occurs and only if  Congress provides an appropriation specific to the event. Furthermore,  according to officials from one transit agency and two emergency  management offices, federal funds provided after a disaster to improve  resilience to future disasters are limited. An official from the transit agency  said that funding is limited because federal funds provided after a  disaster, other than through the ERP, are largely focused on recovery and  not mitigation or other activities that can be used to address resilience. An  official from one of the two emergency management offices said that  following a disaster, state or local funding may not be readily available to  cover the federal cost sharing requirements applicable to federally funded  projects, thus preventing them from receiving the federal funds. In  addition, officials from some of the transit agencies said that funding for  the TSGP, a grant program that helps transit agencies improve their  systems’ resilience to security risks, is sporadic and difficult to obtain or  has declined. As discussed earlier, TSGP funds for public transit peaked  in fiscal year 2009 at almost $500 million; but were at or below $90 million  in each of the past 3 fiscal years. Miami-Dade Transit officials said that  the lack of TSGP funding has made it difficult to obtain funding to  implement security upgrades at facilities, and officials from Seattle/Puget  Sound Region’s King County Metro Transit said the decline has made it  difficult to obtain funds to maintain implemented security solutions. The  four transit researchers we spoke with agreed that the availability of funds  for resilience is a challenge for transit agencies. Two of these transit  researchers further explained that funding resilience activities is  especially challenging for smaller transit agencies or agencies that do not  have enough funding from fare box revenue to address their operating  costs.
Making choices about how to prioritize activities given finite resources is  not a new or unique dilemma for transit agencies. In March 2006, we  found that while transit agencies that operate rail systems may use FTA  financial assistance for security activities, such as upgrading security  technologies, they must balance and prioritize such investments in  security against other competing needs. about how to prioritize activities, which involves the consideration of  trade-offs, is similar to the process that other organizations, including  Congress and federal agencies, must go through when confronted with  funding requests that have merit, but exceed the amount of available  funding.interviewed are considering actions to assist transit agencies place  priority on resilience activities.
GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and Risk Can  Help Guide Security Efforts, GAO-06-557T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2006).
Philadelphia’s SEPTA and FTA are considering some actions that could  help place priorities on resilience activities within their agency:
While participating in an FTA-funded climate-change adaptation- assessment pilot program, officials from SEPTA found, that one  strategy that could help ensure that the agency addresses resilience  across a range of weather events is to incorporate assets’ climate  change vulnerabilities in SEPTA’s asset management program. The  2013 report that summarized the results of the pilot program  concluded that if this vulnerability information is included in an asset  management program, decision-makers can use this information to  help them determine how to address those issues in future  maintenance or new construction investments. This agency has  incorporated elements of this strategy into its asset management  program.
FTA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on an asset  management system, as discussed earlier, and is considering  whether risk analyses, among other things, should be included in  transit agencies’ asset management plans to help transit agencies  make investment and other decisions. While the proposed rulemaking does not specifically refer to transit system resilience,  consideration of a transit system’s risk during investment prioritization  decisions could help minimize those risks and thus improve the  resilience of a system.
section_title: Some Federal Grant Program Requirements Pose Challenges for Use of Federal Funds for Resilience
paragraphs: Transit agency, emergency management, and federal officials also cited  challenges specifically related to some aspects of federal grants,  challenges that have affected how or the extent to which transit system  resilience is addressed. These challenges are discussed below.
Incorporating resilience into disaster recovery: Officials from  emergency management offices in Miami-Dade County and  Philadelphia as well as officials from Philadelphia’s SEPTA and a  FEMA official, identified challenges with incorporating mitigation  activities into disaster recovery due to the difficulty of coordinating  available funding streams. As discussed above, mitigation is one  action that can contribute to resilience. After a presidentially declared  major disaster or emergency, an affected state can request funds  from FEMA’s Public Assistance grant program for response and  recovery efforts, such as for repairing or replacing disaster-damaged  transportation infrastructure. However, an official from one of the  emergency management offices said that because federal and state  processes for distributing federal funds that can be used for mitigation  (i.e., FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program funds) takes time,  transit agencies may not be able to use these funds during their  recovery efforts, such as those that occur with the help of the Public  Assistance grants. Further, an official from another emergency  management office said that hazard mitigation grants become  available after much of the rebuilding is under way or complete. Given  the different timelines for the Public Assistance and Hazard Mitigation  Grants, opportunities to incorporate resilience into projects occurring  during the recovery stages of a disaster can be missed. Determining  when agencies should focus on resilience and recovery can be  difficult. In March 2010, we found that state and local governments  might not have the capacity to focus on recovery soon after a  disaster. We have ongoing work to evaluate select efforts to  facilitate resilience as part of the Sandy recovery effort. We plan to  issue a report on these efforts in 2015.
Decreased focus on regional resilience. Officials from Philadelphia’s  SEPTA, the Los Angeles area’s Orange County Transportation  Authority, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation  Authority, and one emergency management office said that changes  with FEMA’s TSGP grant program has affected efforts to improve  regional resilience. In fiscal year 2011, DHS revised its policy for the  TSGP grant program from one where the funds were allocated to  high-risk regions and given to transit agencies in those regions using  a collaborative process to a nationally competitive grant program  where all transit agencies nationwide competed for the funds. When  grants were regionally allocated, transit agencies were required to  work together to determine how best to request and allocate TSGP  funds for their region. According to officials from two transit agencies,  such collaboration with other transit agencies in their region is  important because a city’s transit network is often comprised of transit  systems run by multiple transit agencies. However, when the grant  program became competitive, officials from three transit agencies and  one emergency-management office said that transit agencies had less  incentive to collaborate with other transit agencies in their region  because all the agencies were competing for the same pool of TSGP  funds. FEMA officials told us that the grant program still encourages  regional collaboration because such collaboration is a criterion for  determining grant distributions. Furthermore, one emergency- management office said that changes with another FEMA grant  program—the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program— also potentially limited regional coordination. In fiscal year 2012, the  Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program—which was  used to support regional all-hazard planning for catastrophic events— was discontinued as it was no longer funded. According to FEMA  officials, this grant program enabled agencies, including transit  agencies, in a region to coordinate their preparedness and planning  efforts with other agencies in their region. However, officials from the  emergency management office told us that the discontinuance of the  grant program may limit transit agency coordination and cooperation  that existed under the grant as agencies compete with one another for  other FEMA preparedness grants. Despite transit agencies’  decreased incentive to coordinate with other transit agencies, we  found—as we discuss earlier—that transit agencies continue to  coordinate with other transit agencies through formal agreements or  by participating in local or regional transit coordination groups.
Short period of performance to address resilience of certain assets: In  fiscal year 2012, DHS changed the period of performance for the  TSGP grants from 3 to 4 years— depending on the type of project—to  2 years. According to DHS officials, DHS took this action to  encourage transit agencies to use their grants quickly. Officials from  Philadelphia’s SEPTA told us that DHS’s requirement that transit  agencies complete projects funded by TSGP grants in 2 years makes  it challenging for their agency to undertake projects that address  resilience. Specifically, these officials explained that because of  DHS’s emphasis on completing projects within 2 years, transit  agencies cannot fully address the resilience of the assets needing  greater attention because projects related to these assets generally  take longer than 2 years to complete. According to DHS officials,  based on a review of seven transit agencies, the length of time for  completing transit security projects that require construction ranged  from about 2.5 to about 5 years, depending on the type of project.
Transit agencies may request an extension to the 2-year period of  performance; however, according to DHS guidance on the grants,  such extensions are only given under exceptional circumstances,  such as if a natural disaster or other major event were to occur or if  complex environmental reviews cannot be completed within the time  frame. A DHS official told us that his agency recognizes the 2-year  performance period to be a challenge for transit agencies and said  that DHS is working with transit agencies and Congress to find the  right balance between getting funding deployed versus the length of  time it takes to complete more complex projects. The extent of this  challenge may differ depending on each agency’s system. For  example, a transit researcher we spoke to said that in general, shorter  performance periods are typically not a problem for transit agencies  that primarily have bus fleets because projects associated with buses  do not take as long to complete as rail projects.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: One of the goals of public transit systems, post-disaster, is to resume  operations as quickly as possible. After catastrophic events, a system can  take days, weeks, or months to fully recover and rebuild. In the past 13  years, the vulnerability of transit systems to catastrophic events has been  repeatedly demonstrated as these events, particularly extreme weather  events, have occurred more frequently. Such events are expected to  increase going forward. Given that catastrophic events can be  challenging to predict, transit agencies find themselves in the difficult  situation of trying to balance the needs of daily operations with preparing  for such events. There is a constant need to balance the immediate  needs with the “what-if” needs as decision-makers prioritize use of their  finite resources. The role of the federal government in providing  resilience-related assistance to transit agencies may fluctuate, depending  on the catastrophic events and the related authority and appropriations  Congress provides to DOT and DHS. While it is not possible to make a  transit system completely immune to catastrophic events, continued  efforts by all parties to place priority on and improve resilience through  preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation can help our nation’s  transit systems potentially better withstand and recover from such events  and reduce their human and economic impacts.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided DHS and DOT with a draft of this report for review and  comment.  DHS and DOT provided technical comments, which we  incorporated in the report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Homeland  Security, and other interested parties.  In addition, the report is available  at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or WiseD@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report examines (1) how DOT and DHS help transit agencies make  their systems resilient to catastrophic events; (2) actions selected transit  agencies take to make their systems resilient; and (3) challenges transit  agencies face with making their systems resilient to such events.  Catastrophic events are those that result in extraordinary levels of mass  casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population,  infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or  government functions. Our review focuses on catastrophic events caused  either by nature (e.g., hurricanes, flooding, fires) or by humans (e.g.,  security events, including terrorism). Transit modes included in our review  include rail transit (light-rail, heavy rail, commuter rail), bus, and ferry  systems.
To determine the activities DOT and DHS take to help transit agencies  make their systems resilient to catastrophic events, we reviewed and  analyzed documentation from the two federal agencies on their relevant  funding programs, requirements, guidance, policies, and technical  assistance. We also interviewed officials from these two agencies. In  addition, we reviewed funding data from DHS for the Transit Security  Grant Program from fiscal years 2005 through 2014 and assessed the  reliability of the data by interviewing agency officials. We determined that  the data were reliable for the purposes of describing the amount of  funding awarded for public transit. Also, to understand the federal  government’s overall approach to addressing resilience, we reviewed  Executive Orders, Presidential Policy Directives, Homeland Security  Presidential Directives, and national policy statements or plans for  national critical infrastructure protection and climate change adaptation.  Furthermore, we interviewed officials from transit agencies and  emergency management offices in five metropolitan areas for their  observations on DOT and DHS assistance. The five selected areas and  the criteria we used to select them are described below.
To identify actions selected transit agencies take to make their systems  resilient, we reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from nine  transit agencies and five local emergency management offices in five  metropolitan areas (see table 4). The five selected areas are Los Angeles, California; Miami, Florida; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;  Seattle/Puget Sound Region, Washington; and Washington, D.C. We  selected the five metropolitan areas because they (1) are located in  different geographic areas and have the potential exposure to different  types of weather- and non-weather related risks (e.g., hurricanes,  earthquakes, terrorism), (2) have varying types of transit modes (light-rail,  heavy rail, commuter rail, bus, and ferry), and (3) are among the 10  largest metropolitan areas in terms of transit ridership. While we did not  interview all transit agencies in each metropolitan area, we selected those  that had relatively high transit ridership, were located in the city, or  provided service to the city. While the information we obtained from the  five areas is not generalizable to transit systems nationwide, the selected  areas have some of the larger transit systems in terms of ridership. When  we report the number of agencies that took a particular action to make  their systems resilient, this does not necessarily mean that the remaining  agencies did not also take those actions. It means that those agencies did  not discuss those actions in documents provided to us or during the  course of our interviews.
To identify challenges transit agencies face with making their systems  resilient to catastrophic events, we asked officials from DOT, DHS, the  nine transit agencies, and five emergency management offices to identify  challenges. Officials identified challenges when we explicitly asked them  to identify them or during the course of our discussion. We analyzed the  information gained from these officials to identify the most frequently cited  challenges. The most frequently cited challenges were those that were  cited by four or more transit agencies (about half of the transit agencies  selected), two or more emergency management offices (about half of the  emergency management offices selected), or both DOT and DHS. When  we report the number of agencies that identified a particular challenge,  this does not necessarily mean that the remaining agencies did not also  experience the challenge. It means that those stakeholders did not raise  the challenge during the course of our interviews. We also interviewed  four researchers knowledgeable in transit systems, emergency  management, or federal transportation programs to further understand  the challenges transit agencies face. We identified these researchers  based on our review of transportation research institutes and  recommendations from officials we interviewed.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2013 through  December 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report include  Catherine Colwell, Assistant Director; Melissa Bodeau; Martha Chow;  Roshni Davé; Peter DelToro; Lorraine Ettaro; Kathryn Godfrey; David  Hooper; and Owen Starlin.