Special Operations Forces: Management Actions Are Needed to Effectively Integrate Marine Corps Forces into the U.S. Special Operations Command
Published: 2007-09-05T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has relied on special operations forces to conduct military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and to perform other tasks such as training foreign military forces. To meet the demand for these forces, DOD established a Marine Corps service component under the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to integrate Marine Corps forces. Under the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the Marine Corps special operations command has identified its force structure requirements, (2) the Marine Corps has developed a strategic human capital approach to manage personnel in its special operations command, and (3) USSOCOM has determined whether Marine Corps training programs are preparing its forces for assigned missions. GAO performed its work with the Marine Corps and USSOCOM and analyzed DOD plans for this new command.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While the Marine Corps has made progress in establishing its special operations command (Command), the Command has not yet fully identified the force structure needed to perform its assigned missions. DOD developed initial force structure plans to establish the Command; however, it did not use critical practices of strategic planning, such as the alignment of activities and resources and the involvement of stakeholders in decision-making processes when developing these plans. As a result of limitations in the strategic planning process, the Command has identified several force structure challenges that will likely affect the Command's ability to perform its full range of responsibilities, and is working to revise its force structure. Although preliminary steps have been taken, the Marine Corps has not developed a strategic human capital approach to manage the critical skills and competencies required of personnel in its special operations command. While the Command has identified some skills needed to perform special operations missions, it has not conducted a comprehensive analysis to determine all of the critical skills and incremental training required of personnel in its special operations forces units. These analyses are critical to the Marine Corps' efforts to develop a strategic human capital approach for the management of personnel in its special operations forces units. Without the benefit of these analyses, the Marine Corps has developed an interim policy to assign some personnel to special operations forces units for extended tour lengths to account for the additional training and skills; however, the policy is inconsistent with the Command's goal for the permanent assignment of some personnel within the special operations community. Until the Command completes an analysis to identify and document the critical skills and competencies needed by its future workforce to perform its full range of special operations missions, the Marine Corps will not have a sound basis for developing or evaluating alternative strategic human capital approaches for managing personnel assigned to its special operations forces units. USSOCOM does not have a sound basis for determining whether the Command's training programs are preparing units for their missions because it has not established common training standards for many special operations skills and it has not formally evaluated whether these programs prepare units to be fully interoperable with other special operations forces. The Command is providing training to its forces that is based on training programs for conventional units that were assigned some special operations missions prior to the Command's activation and incorporates the training that USSOCOM's other service components provide to their forces. However, USSOCOM has not validated that the training for Marine Corps forces prepares them to be fully interoperable with DOD's other special operations forces. Without an evaluation, USSOCOM cannot demonstrate the needed assurances that Marine Corps forces are fully interoperable with its other forces, which may jeopardize the success of future joint missions.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 1987, the Department of Defense (DOD) established the U.S. Special  Operations Command (USSOCOM) with a primary mission to provide  trained and combat-ready special operations forces to the department’s  geographic combatant commanders. These forces differ from  conventional forces in that they are specially organized, trained, and  equipped to conduct operations in hostile or politically sensitive  environments and they employ military capabilities that are not present in  conventional military forces. Subsequent to its activation, USSOCOM  assumed operational control of existing units from the Army, Navy, and  Air Force. However, the Marine Corps did not assign any of its forces to  USSOCOM, citing a need to retain the flexibility needed to perform its  missions. Instead, the Marine Corps created a program to deploy forces to  the geographic combatant commands that were trained to perform some  special operations missions.
With the onset of the war on terrorism, DOD has greatly expanded the role  of USSOCOM. As part of its strategy for this war, the department has  relied on special operations forces to conduct military operations in the  ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, special operations  forces have performed other types of military tasks, such as training and  advising foreign military forces in a number of countries around the world,  in order to build the capabilities of partner nations to combat terrorists  more effectively within their own borders. To meet these commitments,  special operations forces have experienced a substantial increase in  deployments. For example, we reported in July 2006 that from fiscal year  2000 through fiscal year 2005, the average weekly number of special  operations forces personnel who deployed to the department’s geographic  combatant commands increased by 64 percent. DOD recognizes that it  needs additional special operations forces to defeat terrorist networks and  has sought to increase the number of these forces. One department  initiative to increase the number of special operations forces has been to  integrate Marine Corps forces into USSOCOM. In 2005, the Secretary of  Defense requested that the Marine Corps and USSOCOM develop plans to  establish a Marine Corps service component to integrate Marine Corps  forces within the special operations community. In October 2005, the  Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of a Marine Corps  special operations command (Command) as a service component to  USSOCOM.
The Marine Corps activated its special operations command in February  2006, and in August 2006 began deploying special operations forces units  to conduct missions for the geographic combatant commanders. On the  basis of initial department guidance, the Marine Corps special operations  command will be comprised of approximately 2,600 Marines and Navy  personnel to train foreign military forces and conduct other special  operations missions. According to current plans, the Command will be  fully operationally capable by the end of fiscal year 2008. At DOD’s  request, the Congress has provided the Marine Corps and USSOCOM with  regular and supplemental appropriations in fiscal years 2006 and 2007  totaling $509.5 million (excluding military personnel costs) to establish the  Marine Corps special operations command. In addition, the Marine Corps  and USSOCOM have projected funding needs for the Command totaling  $907.8 million for fiscal years 2008 through 2013.
While USSOCOM is responsible for monitoring the status of its personnel,  it does not have authority over personnel management issues such as  recruiting, retention, or the assignment of servicemembers in special  operations forces units. Instead, personnel management is the  responsibility of each military service, and each service handles those  responsibilities differently. For example, the Marine Corps is assigning  personnel to its special operations command from a variety of career  fields, such as reconnaissance and intelligence, and plans to rotate these  personnel between special operations forces units and conventional force  units. This policy is in contrast to the management of some special  operations forces personnel in the other military services. The Army, for  example, has established separate career fields for Special Forces and  Civil Affairs soldiers and in fiscal year 2007, the Navy established a  separate career field for SEALs. Once assigned to the Command,  personnel will be provided with additional training for the skills that are  required to perform special operations missions. In general, the Marine  Corps will retain the responsibility for providing training for basic Marine  Corps skills to personnel who are assigned to its special operations forces  units. USSOCOM, through its Marine Corps service component command,  is responsible for providing training for special operations-unique skills to  Marine Corps personnel in these units.
We prepared this report under the Comptroller General’s authority to  conduct evaluations on his own initiative. Our objective was to evaluate  DOD’s efforts to establish a Marine Corps special operations command.  Specifically, we assessed the extent to which (1) the Marine Corps special  operations command has identified the force structure needed to perform  its mission, (2) the Marine Corps has developed a strategic human capital  approach to manage the critical skills and competencies required of  personnel in its special operations command, and (3) USSOCOM has  determined whether Marine Corps special operations forces training  programs are preparing these forces for assigned missions.
To assess the extent to which the Marine Corps special operations  command has identified the force structure needed to perform its mission,  we identified and reviewed reports related to the department’s efforts to  increase the size of special operations forces by integrating Marine Corps  forces into USSOCOM. We analyzed available internal DOD  documentation such as briefings, guidance, and memoranda that identified  DOD’s plans and time frames for establishing the Marine Corps special  operations command. We discussed DOD’s decision-making processes for  developing force structure plans for the new Command with officials from  the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Staff; Headquarters,  Marine Corps; USSOCOM; and the geographic combatant commands. We  also reviewed documents and interviewed officials with the Marine Corps  special operations command to determine the force structure challenges  the Command has identified and the plans that are being developed to  revise its force structure. To assess the extent to which the Marine Corps  has developed a strategic human capital approach to manage the critical  skills and competencies required of personnel in its special operations  forces units, we analyzed relevant Marine Corps policies for assigning  personnel to conventional force units and to special operations forces  units. We conducted interviews with officials from Headquarters, Marine  Corps, who are responsible for managing personnel assigned to the Marine  Corps special operations command. To better understand the unique  personnel needs of the Marine Corps special operations command, we  interviewed officials from the Command to discuss the specialized skills  and training that are required by personnel who are assigned to special  operations forces units to perform the Command’s assigned missions. To  assess the extent to which USSOCOM has determined whether Marine  Corps special operations forces training programs are preparing these  forces for assigned missions, we examined relevant laws and DOD  doctrine related to the responsibilities of the Marine Corps and USSOCOM  for training special operations forces personnel. We reviewed available  documents that detail training programs for Marine Corps special  operations forces. We collected and analyzed documents related to  USSOCOM’s evaluations of Marine Corps special operations forces  training, and we discussed the efforts that have been taken by the Marine  Corps special operations command and USSOCOM to assess the  effectiveness of these training programs. Our assessment of data reliability  concluded that the data used to support this review were sufficiently  reliable to answer our objectives. We conducted our review from August  2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. A more detailed discussion of our scope and  methodology is contained in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 1986, the President signed a joint resolution of Congress that directed  the Secretary of Defense to establish a unified combatant command for  special operations forces. In April 1987, the Secretary of Defense  established USSOCOM with the mission to provide trained and combat- ready special operations forces to DOD’s geographic combatant  commands. Since 2003, DOD has further expanded the role of USSOCOM  to include greater responsibility for planning and leading the department’s  efforts in the war on terrorism. In addition to training, organizing,  equipping, and deploying combat-ready special operations forces to the  geographic combatant commands, USSOCOM has the mission to lead,  plan, synchronize, and, as directed, execute global operations against  terrorist networks.
subsections: section_title: Tasks and Missions of Special Operations Forces
paragraphs: DOD doctrine describes the characteristics of special operations forces,  and provides joint force commanders with the guidance and information  necessary to identify, nominate, and select missions appropriate for  special operations forces. According to doctrine, special operations  forces perform two types of activities: special operations forces perform  tasks that no other forces in DOD conduct, and they perform tasks that  other DOD forces conduct but do so according to a unique set of  conditions and standards. In particular, special operations forces are  specifically organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish nine core  tasks, which represent the collective capabilities of all special operations  forces rather than those of any one unit. Table 1 defines these core tasks.
section_title: Prior Actions Taken to Integrate Marine Corps Forces into USSOCOM
paragraphs: Since 1987, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have taken several steps to  expand the relationship between the two organizations. For example,  beginning in 1993, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM established a working  group to discuss efforts to improve communication, cooperation, and  interoperability. These efforts received a renewed emphasis with the onset  of the war on terrorism. In 2002, the Secretary of Defense requested the  military services to increase their support to USSOCOM. In 2003, the  Marine Corps established a specially trained and equipped unit as a  concept to demonstrate the Marine Corps’ ability to conduct special  operations missions under the operational control of USSOCOM. This unit  deployed to Iraq in April 2004 to perform selected special operations  missions. The Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of a  Marine Corps service component to USSOCOM in October 2005. In  February 2006, the Marine Corps activated its special operations  command. Since August 2006, the Marine Corps special operations  command has deployed its forces to perform special operations missions  to support the geographic combatant commanders’ requirements. Figure 1  provides a timeline.
section_title: Organization of Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command
paragraphs: The Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command is the Marine  Corps service component to USSOCOM. The Command is headquartered  on Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The Marine Corps  special operations command has five major subordinate units. These units  include two Marine Special Operations Battalions, the Marine Special  Operations Advisor Group, the Marine Special Operations Support  Group, and the Marine Special Operations School. Table 2 provides a  description of each unit.
By fiscal year 2011, the Command will be authorized 2,516 personnel— 2,483 military personnel and 33 civilians. With the exception of one Marine  Corps reserve position, all of the authorized military personnel will be  drawn from the military services’ active components. The Marine Corps  special operations component will be the smallest service component  under USSOCOM. The other military services’ special operations  components include the following.
The Army component is the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.
Army special operations forces include Special Forces, Rangers, Special  Operations Aviation, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units.
The Navy component is the Naval Special Warfare Command. Naval  Special Warfare forces include SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle  Teams, and Special Boat Teams.
The Air Force component is the Air Force Special Operations Command.
Air Force special operations forces include fixed and rotary wing aviation  squadrons, a combat aviation advisory squadron, special tactics  squadrons, and an unmanned aerial vehicle squadron.
Figure 2 shows the number of military personnel positions in fiscal year  2007 authorized for DOD’s special operations forces in the active  component and reserve component. The authorizations include positions  in special operations forces warfighter units, support units, and  headquarters units such as USSOCOM and its service component  commands.
section_title: Funding for the Marine Corps Special Operations Command
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have requested  baseline and supplemental funding for the Marine Corps special  operations command. In fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM  received $109.3 million in supplemental funds to establish the Marine  Corps special operations command. In fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps  and USSOCOM received an additional $368.2 million in baseline funds for  the Command, and $32 million in supplemental funding. As shown in table  3, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have projected military construction,  operation and maintenance, and procurement funding for the Command  for fiscal years 2008 through 2013.
section_title: Although Some Progress Made in Establishing Marine Corps Special Operations Command, Force Structure Needed to Perform Its Missions Has Not Been Fully Identified
paragraphs: Although the Marine Corps has made progress in establishing its special  operations command, the Command has not fully identified the force  structure needed to enable it to perform its assigned missions. The Marine  Corps has taken several steps to establish its special operations command,  such as activating the Command’s headquarters, establishing Marine Corps  special operations forces units, and deploying these units to conduct  special operations missions; however, DOD did not use critical practices  of effective strategic planning when developing the initial force structure  plans for the Command. As a result of limitations in the strategic planning  process, the Marine Corps special operations command has identified  several force structure challenges that will likely affect the Command’s  ability to perform its full range of responsibilities, and is working to revise  its force structure to address these challenges.
subsections: section_title: Steps Taken to Establish Marine Corps Special Operations Command, but Initial Force Structure Plans Were Not Developed Using Critical Practices of Effective Strategic Planning
paragraphs: The Marine Corps has taken several steps to establish the Marine Corps  special operations command. For example, the Marine Corps has activated  the headquarters of its special operations command, established some of  its special operations forces units—including 4 special operations  companies and 12 foreign military training teams to date—and deployed  these units to conduct special operations missions. However, the initial  force structure plans for the Command were not developed using critical  practices of effective strategic planning. According to officials from the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM, and the Marine Corps, the  Secretary of Defense directed that the Marine Corps establish a special  operations command to meet the growing demand for special operations  forces in the war on terrorism. The Secretary of Defense, with input from  the Marine Corps, determined that 2,516 personnel was an appropriate size  for the Command based on the assumptions that the Command was to be  staffed within the existing Marine Corps end-strength, and the  establishment of the Command could not significantly affect the Marine  Corps budget. Marine Corps planners then based the composition and  number of Marine Corps special operations forces units on existing units  within the service that had trained to perform similar missions in the past.  For example, Marine Corps officials told us that the force structure plans  for its special operations companies were modeled after a Maritime  Special Purpose Force, which had previously trained to conduct some  special operations missions for conventional Marine Corps units.  Additionally, Marine Corps officials told us the initial force structure plan  to establish nine special operations companies was based on the need to  accommodate the deployment schedule of its Marine Expeditionary Units.  The initial force structure plan also included the transfer of the Foreign  Military Training Unit from the conventional force to its special operations  command. Using this existing force structure, the Marine Corps planned to  establish 24 foreign military training teams under its special operations  command.
DOD did not fully incorporate critical practices of effective strategic  planning when it developed these initial force structure plans for the  Marine Corps special operations command. We have previously reported  that strategic planning is important to ensure that an organization’s  activities support its strategic goals. Effective planning principles, such as  those embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993  and used by leading organizations, require federal agencies to set strategic  goals and develop strategic plans to accomplish those goals. Our prior  work has identified several critical practices for effective strategic  planning, including the alignment of activities and resources to meet  organizational missions and stakeholder involvement. Our prior work has  shown that leading organizations recognize that an organization’s  activities, core processes, and resources must be aligned to support its  mission and help it achieve its goals. Organizations should assess the  extent to which their programs and activities contribute to meeting their  mission and desired outcomes. In addition, successful organizations base  their strategic planning, to a large extent, on the interests and expectations  of their stakeholders. Stakeholder involvement is important to help  agencies ensure that their efforts and resources are targeted at the highest  priorities. Just as important, involving stakeholders in strategic planning  efforts can help create a basic understanding among the stakeholders of  the competing demands that confront most agencies, the limited resources  available to them, and how those demands and resources require careful  and continuous balancing.
However, in our review of the planning process that preceded the  establishment of the Marine Corps special operations command, we found  the Command’s activities and resources were not fully aligned with the  organization’s mission. For example, although the alignment of activities  and resources to meet organizational missions, a critical practice of  effective strategic planning, should include an analysis of the number of  personnel required for an organization to accomplish its missions, Marine  Corps officials stated that the size of the Marine Corps special operations  command (2,516 personnel) was not determined through an analysis of the  Command’s assigned missions. Specifically, neither the Office of the  Secretary of Defense nor the Marine Corps conducted a comprehensive,  data-driven analysis to determine the number of personnel needed to meet  the Marine Corps special operations command’s mission requirements that  directly tied the number of personnel authorized for the Command with its  assigned missions. USSOCOM did not provide official mission guidance to  the Marine Corps until October 2006, almost 1 year after the Command’s  personnel authorizations had been determined. In the absence of specific  guidance, Marine Corps planners did not conduct a comprehensive, data- driven analysis to determine the number of personnel needed to meet the  Marine Corps special operations command’s full range of mission  requirements. Our prior work has shown that valid and reliable data on the  number of employees required to meet an agency’s needs are critical  because human capital shortfalls can threaten an agency’s ability to  perform its missions efficiently and effectively.
The alignment of activities and resources should also include an analysis  of the number and composition of Marine Corps special operations forces  units. However, the Marine Corps did not determine the number and  composition of its special operations forces units based on specific  guidance from USSOCOM. Although the Marine Corps special operations  command was established as the Marine Corps service component under  USSOCOM, USSOCOM did not provide guidance to Marine Corps planners  on the full range of missions assigned to the Command, or on the number  of special operations forces that the Marine Corps needed to provide. Both  USSOCOM and Marine Corps officials reported that USSOCOM provided  only informal guidance to Marine Corps planners on the core tasks that  would be assigned to Marine Corps special operations forces units.  According to Marine Corps officials involved in the planning for the  Marine Corps special operations command, the informal guidance did not  prioritize the core tasks to focus Marine Corps planning efforts, and the  guidance did not identify the required capacity for specific capabilities  within the Command.
The official guidance that USSOCOM provided to the Marine Corps special  operations command in October 2006 contained a complete list of  missions the Command would be expected to perform. However, the  guidance did not prioritize these missions to focus the Command’s  planning efforts. Additionally, the guidance did not establish milestones  and benchmarks that the Command could use to determine when, and to  what level of proficiency, Marine Corps special operations forces units  should be able to perform all of their assigned missions. In the absence of  specific guidance, Marine Corps officials told us the initial force structure  plan to establish nine special operations companies was not based on a  USSOCOM requirement for the number of these companies. Moreover,  while the decision to transfer the foreign military training teams to the  Marine Corps special operations command met the Command’s mission to  provide USSOCOM with a foreign internal defense capability, the decision  on the number of teams needed by the Command to meet USSOCOM’s  mission requirements was left to the Marine Corps. Marine Corps officials  also told us that in the absence of clear guidance on the required capacity  for support personnel within the Command, Marine Corps planners  prioritized the assignment of personnel in warfighter positions in special  operations forces units over positions in support units. Specifically,  because planners were basing the Command’s force structure decisions on  the personnel limit established by DOD, the Marine Corps exchanged  positions related to support functions within the Command for positions  in its warfighter units. Support functions such as vehicle maintenance,  motor transportation, intelligence operations, communication support,  and engineering support provide important and necessary support to  Marine Corps special operations forces units, as well as other special  operations forces units in USSOCOM’s other service components.
Furthermore, we found a lack of involvement by some key stakeholders in  the establishment of the Marine Corps special operations command. For  example, the special operations components with the department’s  geographic combatant commands—which are responsible for  commanding special operations forces around the world—were not  involved in the process to establish the Marine Corps special operations  command or in the decisions to target the service’s resources to their  highest priorities and mission requirements. Officials with the U.S. Pacific  Command’s special operations command who are responsible for  functions such as operations and planning told us they provided little input  into the planning process to help determine how Marine Corps special  operations forces units should be organized and what capabilities were  needed in these units to meet the mission requirements of the geographic  combatant commands. Similarly, officials from the U.S. Central  Command’s special operations command who were responsible for  operations and planning in that command told us they were not included  in the planning process that preceded the establishment of the Marine  Corps special operations command. In particular, officials told us they  were not involved in the decisions regarding the types of missions that  Marine Corps special operations forces units would need to perform,  although as we noted in our July 2006 report on special operations forces  deployment trends, 85 percent of all fiscal year 2005 special operations  forces deployments were to the U.S. Central Command’s area of  responsibility.
section_title: Limitations in Strategic Planning Process Led to Force Structure Challenges, although Plans Are Being Revised to Address These Challenges
paragraphs: The Marine Corps special operations command has identified several force  structure challenges that stem from limitations in DOD’s strategic planning  process that will likely affect its ability to perform its full range of  responsibilities, and the Command is revising its force structure plans to  address these challenges. For example, the Command has determined that  the number and composition of its special operations forces units are not  aligned with the Command’s mission requirements. In particular, the  Command has identified shortages in positions such as authorized  intelligence personnel, which will affect the Command’s ability to  simultaneously provide intelligence support to Marine Corps special  operations forces and USSOCOM. Moreover, according to Marine Corps  special operations command officials, the limited number of personnel  available to perform support functions will prevent the Command from  effectively performing all of its mission requirements. To illustrate this  point, Marine Corps special operations command officials told us that the  initial force structure plans for the Command call for less than one  support person available for every person assigned to a warfighter  position. According to Command officials, this ratio is less than what  would be expected for a command of similar size and assigned missions.  Officials said an expected ratio for a command such as theirs would be at  least two support personnel to one warfighter, and therefore their goal is  to adjust the force structure to meet this ratio.
In addition, Marine Corps special operations command officials reported  that the number of positions authorized for support personnel will also  affect the Command’s ability to meet its responsibilities to organize, train,  and equip Marine Corps special operations forces. Officials stated the  number of personnel assigned to its command elements, such as the  headquarters and the staffs of the subordinate units, is insufficient to  effectively accomplish these responsibilities. Current force structure plans  authorize approximately 780 military personnel and 33 civilian personnel  for the Command’s headquarters and the staffs of its major subordinate  units.
At the time of our work, the Marine Corps special operations command  was developing several proposals to significantly revise its force structure  to address the challenges stemming from the limitations in the planning  process and to better align the Command to meet USSOCOM’s mission  guidance. These revisions would adjust the number and size of the  Command’s warfighter units to better meet mission requirements.  Additionally, if approved, some of the positions made available through  the revisions could be used to remedy shortfalls in personnel who perform  support functions such as personnel management, training, logistics,  intelligence, and budget-related activities. Command officials told us these  proposals would likely mitigate many of the challenges that have resulted  from the lack of a comprehensive strategic planning process, but they  acknowledged that many of the decisions that are needed to implement  the force structure changes will be made by Headquarters, Marine Corps.  In order to move forward with its proposals, the Command is working to  complete several analyses of the personnel and funding requirements that  are tied to these proposed force structure changes. It has set milestones  for when these analyses should be completed in order to determine  whether any additional funding or personnel would be required. However,  the Command expects to be able to implement these proposals within the  funding levels already identified and planned for future fiscal years. Until  the analyses are completed, the Command will be unable to determine  whether the approved plans for its personnel and funding should be  adjusted in order for the Command to perform all of its assigned missions.
section_title: Although Preliminary Steps Have Been Taken, the Marine Corps Has Not Developed a Strategic Human Capital Approach to Manage the Critical Skills And Competencies Required of Personnel in Its Special Operations Command
paragraphs: Although preliminary steps have been taken, the Marine Corps has not  developed a strategic human capital approach to manage the critical skills  and competencies required of personnel in its special operations  command. While the Marine Corps special operations command has  identified some skills that are needed to perform special operations  missions, it has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of the critical  skills and incremental training required of personnel in its special  operations forces units. Such analyses are critical to the Marine Corps’  efforts to develop a strategic human capital approach for the management  of personnel in its special operations forces units. Without the benefit of  these analyses, the Marine Corps has developed an interim policy to assign  some personnel to special operations forces units for extended tour  lengths to account for the additional training and skills needed by these  personnel. However, this interim policy is inconsistent with the Marine  Corps special operations command’s goal for the permanent assignment of  some personnel within the special operations community.
subsections: section_title: While Some Personnel Requirements Have Been Identified, Marine Corps Special Operations Command Has Not Fully Identified the Critical Skills and Competencies Required of Its Personnel
paragraphs: While the Marine Corps special operations command has identified some  critical skills and competencies that are needed to perform special  operations missions, it has not fully identified these requirements because  it has not yet conducted a comprehensive analysis to determine all the  critical skills and additional training required of personnel in its units. We  have previously reported that strategic human capital planning is essential  to federal agencies’ efforts to transform their organizations to meet the  challenges of the 21st century. Generally, strategic human capital planning  addresses two needs: (1) aligning an agency’s human capital program with  its current and emerging mission and programmatic goals, and                  (2) developing long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, motivating,  and retaining staff to achieve programmatic goals. Our prior work has  shown that the analysis of critical skill and competency gaps between  current and future workforce needs is an important step in strategic  human capital planning. We have also reported that it is essential that  long-term strategies include implementation goals and timelines to  demonstrate that progress is being made.
As part of the effort to identify these critical skills, the Marine Special  Operations School is developing a training course that will provide  baseline training to newly assigned personnel to prepare them for  positions in warfighter units. For example, the Command plans to provide  these personnel with training on advanced survival skills and foreign  language in order to prepare them to perform special operations missions.  However, the Marine Corps special operations command has not fully  identified and documented the critical skills and training that are required  for personnel to effectively perform special operations missions, and that  build on the skills that are developed in conventional Marine Corps units.  Officials told us the Command had not yet identified the full range of  training that will be provided in this course in order to establish a  minimum level of special operations skills for the Command’s warfighters.  Additionally, the Marine Corps special operations command has not fully  identified the advanced skills and training necessary to support some of  the Command’s more complex special operations missions, such as  counterterrorism, information operations, and unconventional warfare.  While the Marine Corps special operations command has established a  time frame for when it wants to conduct the training course under  development, it has not set milestones for when it will complete its  analysis of the critical skills and competencies required of its personnel.
Moreover, the Marine Corps special operations command has not yet fully  determined which positions should be filled by specially trained personnel  who are strategically managed to meet the Command’s missions. Officials  told us there is broad agreement within the Command that personnel  assigned to operational positions in its warfighter units require specialized  training in critical skills needed to perform special operations missions,  and should therefore be strategically managed to meet the Command’s  mission requirements. These personnel include enlisted reconnaissance  and communications Marines assigned to the Marine Special Operations  Battalions and infantry Marines assigned to the Marine Special Operations  Advisor Group, as well as some officers assigned to these units. At the  time of our review, however, we found that the Command had not yet  determined which additional positions should also be filled by personnel  who are strategically managed. In particular, we were told by officials  from the Command’s headquarters that a determination has not yet been  made as to whether personnel who deploy with warfighter units to provide  critical combat support, such as intelligence personnel, require specialized  skills and training that are incremental to the training provided in  conventional force units. For example, officials have not yet decided  whether intelligence personnel should attend the initial training course  that is under development. However, the Marine Special Operations  School plans to provide these personnel with specialized intelligence  training to enable them to support certain sensitive special operations  missions in support of deploying units. Officials acknowledge that until the  Command determines the extent to which support personnel require  specialized skills and training to perform their missions, the Command  cannot fully identify which positions should be filled by personnel who are  strategically managed.
section_title: Marine Corps Has Developed an Interim Policy to Manage Personnel in Its Special Operations Command, but It Lacks Consensus on a Strategic Human Capital Approach
paragraphs: To address the personnel needs of the Marine Corps special operations  command, Headquarters, Marine Corps, has established an interim policy  that provides for extended assignments of some personnel in special  operations forces units; however, the absence of a comprehensive analysis  of the critical skills and training required of personnel in special  operations forces units has contributed to a lack of consensus within the  Marine Corps on a strategic human capital approach to manage these  personnel. The extended assignments apply to Marines who are beyond  their first term of enlistment, which is typically 3 to 5 years, and who are  assigned to one of the Marine Corps special operations command’s  warfighter, training, or intelligence units. The policy directs that these  personnel will be assigned to the Command for 48 months, in part, to  account for the additional training provided to personnel in these units.
According to officials at Headquarters, Marine Corps, and the Marine  Corps special operations command, the 48-month assignment policy is  designed to retain designated personnel within special operations forces  units long enough to complete at least two deployments. All other Marines  will be assigned to the Command for approximately 36 months, which is a  typical tour length for Marines in conventional force units.
The interim policy also addresses a concern that personnel assigned to  special operations forces units will have opportunities for career  progression. In general, Marines are managed according to established  career progression models for their respective career fields. These career  progression models identify the experiences, skills, and professional  military education necessary for personnel to be competitive for  promotion to the next grade. For example, as personnel are promoted to a  higher grade, they are typically placed in positions with increased  responsibilities that are consistent with their career progression models in  order to remain competitive for further promotion. The Marine Corps has  not established a separate career field for special operations forces  personnel; instead, the Marine Corps is assigning personnel from a variety  of career fields, such as reconnaissance, to its special operations forces  units. However, the current structure of the Marine Corps special  operations command cannot support long-term assignments of personnel  within the Command, in some cases, due to limited opportunities for  progression into positions with increased responsibilities. For example,  our analysis of the Marine Corps special operations command’s force  structure shows that the Command is authorized 76 percent fewer  reconnaissance positions for personnel in the grade of E-7 as compared to  the number of reconnaissance positions for personnel in the grade of E-6.  The Marine Corps has established targets for the promotion of  reconnaissance personnel to the grade of E-7 after they have spent  approximately 5 years in the grade of E-6. As a result, many  reconnaissance personnel who are promoted to E-7 while assigned to a  special operations forces unit will need to be reassigned to the  conventional force in order to move into an E-7 position and remain  competitive for further promotion.
The interim policy is also consistent with the approved plan to increase  the authorized end-strength of the Marine Corps. In January 2007, the  President approved plans to increase the active duty end-strength of the  Marine Corps from 179,000 in fiscal year 2006 to 202,000 by fiscal year  2011. This plan includes growth in the number and size of conventional  force units and is intended to reduce the stress on frequently deployed  units, such as intelligence units, by achieving a 1 to 2 deployment to home  station ratio for these units. Marine Corps officials associated with units  that will be affected by these increases, such as reconnaissance and  intelligence units, told us that the rotation of personnel from Marine Corps  special operations units back into the conventional force is important to  help ensure that conventional force units are staffed with experienced and  mature personnel. For example, our analysis of Marine Corps data shows  that by fiscal year 2009, the Marine Corps will increase the servicewide  requirement for enlisted counterintelligence/human intelligence personnel  by 50 percent above fiscal year 2006 levels. Although the Marine Corps is  adjusting its accession, training, and retention strategies to meet the  increased requirement for enlisted counterintelligence/human intelligence  personnel, officials stated the rotation of these experienced personnel  from the Marine Corps special operations command back into the  conventional force can help meet the increased personnel needs of  conventional intelligence units, while also ensuring that conventional  force units have an understanding of special operations tactics,  techniques, and procedures. Additionally, officials told us the rotation of  personnel from special operations forces units to conventional force units  supports the Marine Corps’ process for prioritizing the assignment of  personnel to units that are preparing for deployments to Iraq and other  war on terrorism requirements.
Notwithstanding the intended outcome of the interim policy, Marine Corps  special operations command officials told us that the policy might impact  the Command’s ability to prepare its forces to conduct the full range of its  assigned missions and that the policy is inconsistent with the Command’s  stated goal for the permanent assignment of personnel in its special  operations forces units. In congressional testimony, the Commander of the  Marine Corps special operations command specified his goal to develop a  personnel management strategy that would retain some personnel within  the special operations community for the duration of their careers.  Officials from the Command told us that a substantial investment of time  and resources is required to train personnel in special operations forces  units on the critical skills needed to perform special operations missions.  For example, Marine Corps special operations forces personnel will  receive in-depth training to develop foreign language proficiency and  cultural awareness, which is consistent with DOD’s requirement to  increase the capacity of special operations forces to perform more  demanding and specialized tasks during long-duration, indirect, and  clandestine operations in politically sensitive environments. However,  these officials believe that the Command’s ability to develop and sustain  these skills over time will be hampered if its special operations forces  units experience high personnel turnover. In addition, according to  USSOCOM doctrine, personnel must be assigned to a special operations  forces unit for at least 4 years in order to be fully trained in some  advanced special operations skills. Consequently, officials from the  Command have determined that limited duration assignments would  challenge the Command’s ability to develop the capability to conduct more  complex special operations core tasks, and to retain fully trained  personnel long enough to use their skills during deployments. The Marine  Corps special operations command has determined that to achieve its goal  of permanent personnel assignments within the special operations  community, it requires a separate career field for its warfighter personnel.  According to officials from the Command, a separate career field would  allow the Marine Corps to manage these personnel based on a career  progression model that reflects the experiences, skills, and professional  military education that are relevant to special operations missions.  Moreover, according to officials from the Command, the establishment of  a special operations forces career field would allow the Marine Corps to  develop and sustain a population of trained and qualified personnel, while  providing the Command and USSOCOM with a more appropriate return on  the investment in training personnel to perform special operations  missions.
The Command’s goal for the permanent assignment of some special  operations forces personnel is also consistent with USSOCOM’s current  and projected needs for special operations forces personnel. USSOCOM  has identified the retention of experienced personnel who possess  specialized skills and training as a key component in its strategy to support  the war on terrorism. In its vision of how special operations forces will  meet long-term national strategic and military objectives, USSOCOM has  identified the need for a comprehensive special operations forces career  management system to facilitate the progression of these personnel  through increasing levels of responsibility within the special operations  community. In addition, senior USSOCOM officials have expressed  support for an assignment policy that allows Marine Corps personnel to  remain within the special operations community for the duration of their  careers.
Headquarters, Marine Corps, plans to review its interim policy for  assigning personnel to its special operations command annually to  determine whether it meets the mission requirements of the Command.  Additionally, the Commandant of the Marine Corps recently directed  Headquarters, Marine Corps, to study the assignment policies for  personnel in certain Army special operations forces units who rotate  between conventional Army units and special operations forces units.  According to a Headquarters, Marine Corps, official, one purpose of this  study is to evaluate whether a similar management strategy may be  applied to personnel in Marine Corps special operations forces units.  Notwithstanding these efforts, officials with Headquarters, Marine Corps,  and the Marine Corps special operations command acknowledge that the  analysis of the critical skills and training required of personnel in the  Command’s special operations forces units is a necessary step in the  development of a strategic human capital approach to the management of  these personnel. Until the Marine Corps special operations command  completes a comprehensive analysis to identify and document the critical  skills and additional training needed by its future workforce to perform  the Command’s full range of assigned special operations missions, the  Marine Corps will not have a sound basis for developing or evaluating  alternative strategic human capital approaches for the management of  personnel assigned to its special operations forces units.
section_title: USSOCOM Does Not Have a Sound Basis for Determining Whether Marine Corps Special Operations Forces Training Programs Prepare Units for Missions
paragraphs: USSOCOM does not have a sound basis for determining whether Marine  Corps special operations forces training programs are preparing units for  their missions because it has not established common training standards  for many special operations skills and it has not formally evaluated  whether these programs will prepare units to be fully interoperable with  DOD’s other special operations forces. The Marine Corps special  operations command has provided training for its forces that is based on  training that was provided to conventional units that were assigned some  special operations missions prior to the activation of the Command, and  by selectively incorporating the training that USSOCOM’s other service  components provide to their forces. However, USSOCOM has not formally  validated that the training used to prepare Marine Corps special  operations forces meets special operations standards and is effective in  training Marine Corps special operations forces to be fully interoperable  with the department’s other special operations forces.
subsections: section_title: Marine Corps Special Operations Command Has Implemented Programs to Train Personnel to Perform Special Operations Missions
paragraphs: The Marine Corps special operations command has taken several actions  to implement programs to fulfill its responsibility for training personnel to  perform special operations missions. For example, the Command operates  the Marine Special Operations School, which has recently finalized plans  for a training pipeline to initially screen all of the Marines and Sailors  identified for assignment to the Command to determine their suitability for  such assignments. Once the initial screening is completed, personnel who  volunteer for assignments in one of the Command’s warfighter units— such as the Marine Special Operations Battalions and the Marine Special  Operations Advisor Group—will undergo an additional assessment that  measures mental and physical qualifications. As indicated by the  Command’s plans, personnel who successfully complete this assessment  will be provided with additional baseline special operations training prior  to being assigned to one of the Command’s warfighter units.
The Marine Special Operations School also provides training to personnel  in special operations companies. This training consists of both classroom  instruction and the practical application of specialized skills. For example,  the school has provided training to personnel in skills such as precision  shooting, close quarters battle, and special reconnaissance techniques. In  addition, the school’s instructors conduct exercises to train the special  operations companies on the unit’s tactics, techniques, and procedures, as  well as predeployment training events, to certify the companies are  capable of performing the primary special operations missions assigned to  these units.
The Command’s Marine Special Operations Advisor Group has also  developed a comprehensive training program designed to build the  individual and collective skills required to perform the unit’s mission to  provide military training and advisor support to foreign forces. The  program includes individual training for skills such as light infantry tactics  and cultural and language training, as well as training for advanced skills  in functional areas such as communications, intelligence, and medical  training. The training program culminates with a capstone training event  that evaluates the proficiency of personnel in mission-essential skills. The  training event is used as a means of certifying that these units are trained  to perform their assigned missions.
In addition, Marine Corps special operations companies and Marine  Special Operations Advisor Group teams conduct unit training to prepare  for the missions that will be performed during deployments. According to  officials with these units, this training is tailored to prepare personnel for  the specific tasks that will likely be performed during the deployment. For  example, officials stated that unit training may include enhanced language  and cultural awareness training for specific countries and training in  environmental terrains where these units will be deployed.
Marine Corps special operations forces have used conventional Marine  Corps training standards to prepare personnel and units to conduct some  special operations missions. Officials with the Marine Corps special  operations command and its subordinate units told us that its special  operations forces units have trained personnel in some skills based on the  training programs for conventional units that were assigned some special  operations missions prior to the activation of the Command. For example,  according to Marine Corps policy, the service formerly deployed specially  organized, trained, and equipped forces as part of the Marine  Expeditionary Units that were capable of conducting some special  operations missions, such as direct action operations. Officials with the  Marine Corps special operations command and the Marine Corps Special  Operations Battalions told us that the special operations companies have  been provided with training for skills such as urban sniper, specialized  demolitions, and dynamic assault that is based largely on the training and  standards for these skills that were established for conventional Marine  Corps forces.
For other skills, Marine Corps special operations forces personnel have  reviewed and incorporated the training plans that USSOCOM’s Army,  Navy, and Air Force service components use to prepare their special  operations forces. Marine Corps special operations command officials told  us that conventional Marine Corps units are not typically trained in many  of the advanced skills required to perform some special operations  missions, such as counterterrorism and unconventional warfare. To  develop programs to train personnel on the skills required to perform  these and other special operations missions, Marine Corps special  operations forces have incorporated the training and standards from the  training publications of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the  Naval Special Warfare Command, and the Air Force Special Operations  Command. However, according to a senior USSOCOM official, Marine  Corps special operations forces have had the discretion to select the  standards to use when training forces to perform special operations skills.
During our review, we met with servicemembers who had recently  completed deployments with Marine Corps special operations forces units  as well as with servicemembers who were preparing for planned  deployments. In general, these servicemembers told us that they believed  they were adequately trained and prepared to perform their assigned  missions. Team leaders with the Marine Special Operations Advisor  Group, for example, stated that they received sufficient guidance to  properly plan and execute special operations missions during deployments  to train and advise foreign military forces. However, at the time of our  work, the Marine Corps special operations companies that participated in  the first deployments of these units had not yet completed their  deployments. As a result, we were unable to discuss whether the training  that was provided was adequate to fully meet their mission requirements.
section_title: USSOCOM Has Not Formally Validated That Marine Corps Training Meets Special Operations Forces Standards and Prepares Forces to Be Fully Interoperable with Other Forces
paragraphs: USSOCOM has not formally validated that the training used to prepare  Marine Corps forces meets special operations standards and prepares  forces to be fully interoperable with the department’s other special  operations forces. The Marine Corps special operations command has  made progress in developing and implementing training programs for  Marine Corps special operations forces. However, the Command has not  used common training standards for special operations skills because  USSOCOM has not developed common training standards for many skills,  although work to establish common standards is ongoing. USSOCOM  officials stated the headquarters and the service components are working  to develop common training standards, where appropriate, because  USSOCOM recognizes that the service-specific training conducted for  advanced special operations skills may not optimize opportunities for  commonality, jointness, or efficiency. In addition, USSOCOM officials told  us that common training standards would further promote  departmentwide interoperability goals, address potential safety concerns,  and provide greater assurances to future joint force commanders that  special operations forces are trained to similar standards.
Our prior work has shown that the lack of commonality in training  standards for joint operations creates potentially hazardous conditions on  the battlefield. For example, we reported in 2003 that the military services  and the special operations community did not use common standards to  train personnel to control air support of ground forces. In particular, we  found that the standards for these personnel in special operations units  differed among the Army, Navy, and Air Force because personnel were  required to meet their service-specific training requirements, which led to  hesitation by commanders in Afghanistan to employ some special  operations forces personnel to direct air support of ground forces. In  2005, USSOCOM established minimum standards for training, qualifying,  evaluating, and certifying special operations forces personnel who control  air support of ground forces.
USSOCOM formalized a process in 2006 to establish and validate common  training standards for special operations skills. As part of this process,  USSOCOM established a working group comprised of representatives from  USSOCOM and each service component to determine the baseline tasks  that define the training standard and the service component training  requirements for special operations skills. According to a USSOCOM  official, the working group first identified the common training  requirements and standards for the skills of military free fall and combat  dive. In addition, USSOCOM and its service components are working  incrementally to identify common training standards for other special  operations skills, such as the training required for personnel assigned to  combined joint special operations task forces. However, officials with  USSOCOM and the Marine Corps special operations command told us the  process to establish common training standards for applicable special  operations skills will likely take a considerable amount of time to  complete due to the number of advanced special operations skills and the  challenge of building consensus among the service components on what  constitutes a common training standard.
Furthermore, USSOCOM has not formally validated whether the training  used to prepare Marine Corps forces meets special operations standards  and prepares forces to be fully interoperable with the department’s other  special operations forces. USSOCOM has taken some limited steps to  evaluate the training provided to Marine Corps special operations forces.  In November 2006, for example, USSOCOM representatives attended a  training exercise on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton for a Marine  special operations company that was preparing for an upcoming  deployment. In addition, USSOCOM representatives observed training  exercises in February 2007 for Marine Special Operations Advisor Group  teams that were preparing to deploy. A USSOCOM official told us that the  purpose of these evaluations was to observe some of the planned training  tasks and focus on areas where USSOCOM could assist the Marine Corps  special operations command in future training exercises. However,  USSOCOM has not formally assessed the training programs used by the  Marine Corps special operations command to prepare its forces for  deployments, despite the fact that USSOCOM is responsible for evaluating  the effectiveness of all training programs and ensuring the interoperability  of all of DOD’s special operations forces. Our review of the reports  prepared for USSOCOM leadership and provided to Marine Corps  personnel showed that they did not contain a formal evaluation of the  training content and they did not provide an assessment of the standards  used during the training to determine whether the training was in  accordance with special operations forces standards.
Officials with the Marine Corps special operations command and its  subordinate units told us that USSOCOM has not been extensively  involved in the development of Marine Corps special operations forces  training programs and the performance standards used to train Marine  Corps special operations forces. In addition, USSOCOM officials told us  that a formal assessment of Marine Corps training programs has not  occurred, and will likely not occur, because the management of the Marine  Corps special operations command’s training programs is, like the other  service components, a responsibility delegated to the Marine Corps  component commander. These officials told us the service component  commander has the primary responsibility for establishing training  programs and certifying that special operations forces are capable of  performing special operations missions prior to deployments. In addition,  a USSOCOM official stated that any training-related issues affecting the  readiness of special operations forces are identified in readiness reports  and are discussed during monthly meetings between senior USSOCOM  leadership and the service component commanders. However, without  common training standards for special operations skills or a formal  validation of the training used to prepare Marine Corps special operations  forces for planned deployments in the near term, USSOCOM cannot  demonstrate the needed assurances to the geographic combatant  commanders that Marine Corps special operations forces are trained to  special operations forces standards and that these forces meet  departmentwide interoperability goals for special operations forces,  thereby potentially affecting the success of future joint operations.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Since activating a Marine Corps component to USSOCOM, the Marine  Corps has made considerable progress integrating into the special  operations force structure, and several Marine Corps units have  successfully completed deployments to train foreign military forces—a  key focus area in DOD’s strategy for the war on terrorism. The Marine  Corps has also taken an initial step to meet the unique personnel needs of  its special operations command. However, it does not have complete  information on all of the critical skills and additional training required of  its personnel in special operations forces units. This information would  enable the Marine Corps to assess the effectiveness of its human capital  planning to date and build consensus on the development of alternative  approaches for the management of its personnel assigned to special  operations forces units. Until the Marine Corps develops a strategic human  capital approach that is based on an analysis of the critical skills and  training required of personnel in Marine Corps special operations forces  units, it may be unable to align its personnel with the Marine Corps special  operations command’s actual workforce requirements, which could  jeopardize the long-term success of this new Command.
The Marine Corps special operations command faces an additional  challenge in training its forces to special operations forces standards and  meeting DOD interoperability goals because USSOCOM has not yet  established common training standards for many advanced skills. In the  absence of common training standards, the Marine Corps special  operations command is training its newly established special operations  forces units in some skills that were not previously trained in conventional  Marine Corps units. Unless USSOCOM validates that the training currently  being used to prepare Marine Corps special operations forces is effective  and meets DOD’s interoperability goals, it will be unable to ensure that  Marine Corps special operations forces are interoperable with other  special operations forces in the department, thereby potentially affecting  the success of future joint operations.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To facilitate the development of a strategic human capital approach for the  management of personnel assigned to the Marine Corps special operations  command and to validate that Marine Corps special operations forces are  trained to be fully interoperable with DOD’s other special operations  forces, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following  two actions.
Direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to direct the Commander,  Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, to conduct an  analysis of the critical skills and competencies required of personnel in  Marine Corps special operations forces units and establish milestones  for conducting this analysis. This analysis should be used to assess the  effectiveness of current assignment policies and to develop a strategic  human capital approach for the management of these personnel.
Direct the Commander, USSOCOM, to establish a framework for  evaluating Marine Corps special operations forces training programs,  including their content and standards, to ensure the programs are  sufficient to prepare Marine Corps forces to be fully interoperable with  DOD’s other special operations forces.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred  with our recommendations and noted that actions consistent with the  recommendations are underway. DOD’s comments are reprinted in  appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated into the report as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the  Commandant of the Marine Corps to direct the Commander, Marine Corps  Forces Special Operations Command, to establish milestones for  conducting an analysis of the critical skills and competencies required in  Marine Corps special operations forces units and, once completed, use  this analysis to assess the effectiveness of current assignment policies and  develop a strategic human capital approach for the management of these  personnel. DOD stated that the Marine Corps special operations command  is currently conducting a detailed analysis of the critical skills and  competencies required to conduct the missions assigned to the Command.  The department further noted that the Command will also fully develop  mission-essential task lists, and individual and collective training  standards in order to clearly state the requirements for training and  personnel. DOD also stated that USSOCOM is providing assistance so that  these processes are integrated with USSOCOM’s development of the Joint  Training System, which is mandated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff. We believe these are important steps if fully implemented. We note,  however, DOD’s response does not address the issue of milestones and  gives no indication when the ongoing analysis will be completed. We  believe milestones are important because they serve as a means of holding  people accountable. Furthermore, DOD did not address the need for the  Marine Corps to use the analysis being conducted by the Command to  assess the effectiveness of the current assignment policy. Without such an  assessment, neither the Marine Corps nor DOD will have needed  assurances that the current Marine Corps policy for assigning personnel to  its special operations command is providing DOD with an appropriate  return on the investment the department is making to train Marine Corps  special operations forces personnel. Moreover, without a strategic human  capital approach that is based on the comprehensive analysis of the  critical skills and training required of its special operations forces  personnel, the Marine Corps may be unable to effectively align its  personnel with the Marine Corps special operations command’s workforce  requirements.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the  Commander, USSOCOM, to establish a framework for evaluating Marine  Corps special operations forces training programs to ensure the programs  are sufficient to prepare Marine Corps forces to be fully interoperable with  DOD’s other special operations forces. DOD stated that USSOCOM is  currently implementing the Joint Training System that is mandated by the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01D. According to  DOD, the Joint Training System will provide the framework for USSOCOM  to evaluate component training programs to ensure special operations  forces operational capabilities are achieved. DOD also stated that  Headquarters, USSOCOM, established the Training Standards and  Requirements Integrated Process Team to complement the Joint Training  System, which is focusing on standardizing training for individual skills  across USSOCOM, and ensuring increased efficiency and interoperability.  DOD stated that USSOCOM delegates many authorities to its service  component commanders, including training their service-provided forces.  DOD further stated that the Marine Corps special operations command has  established the Marine Corps Special Operations School, which is tasked  with evaluating all unit training programs to assess their combat capability  and interoperability with special operations forces. While we agree that  implementing the Joint Training System and standardizing training  through the integrated process team will help ensure the interoperability  of Marine Corps special operations forces, according to USSOCOM  officials, these efforts will likely take several years to complete. We  continue to believe that in the near term, USSOCOM needs to evaluate the  Marine Corps special operations forces training programs that are  currently being conducted. While the Marine Corps has trained its  conventional forces in skills related to the special operations forces’ core  tasks of direct action and special reconnaissance, it has not traditionally  trained its forces in other special operations forces core tasks, such as  unconventional warfare. For this reason, it is incumbent on USSOCOM to  validate the ongoing training to ensure these new Marine Corps special  operations forces units are adequately prepared to perform all of their  assigned missions and are interoperable with DOD’s other special  operations forces.
We are sending a copy of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the  Commander, United States Special Operations Command. We will also  make copies available to other interested parties upon request. In addition,  this report will be made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions about this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which the Marine Corps special operations  command (Command) has identified the force structure needed to  perform its mission, we identified and reviewed Department of Defense  (DOD) reports related to the department’s efforts to increase the size of  special operations forces by integrating Marine Corps forces into the U.S.  Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). These documents included the  2002 Special Operations Forces Realignment Study, the 2006 Operational  Availability Study, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the  2006 Unified Command Plan. We analyzed available internal DOD  documentation such as briefings, guidance, and memoranda that identified  DOD’s plans and time frames for establishing the Marine Corps special  operations command. We discussed with officials at DOD organizations  the processes that DOD utilized to determine and implement the plans for  the new Command. These organizations include, but are not limited to, the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; the Joint Staff, Force  Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate; Marine Corps Plans,  Policies, and Operations; Marine Corps Combat Development Command;  and Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs. We also interviewed  officials with USSOCOM and the special operations components of the  U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command to determine the role of  these commands in the decision-making processes. We reviewed prior  GAO reports and the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993  that discuss key elements of effective strategic planning. We interviewed  officials from the Marine Corps special operations command to determine  the status of the Command’s efforts to activate Marine Corps special  operations forces units and discussed the challenges the Command has  identified that may affect the Command’s ability to meet its full range of  responsibilities. We analyzed documents that describe the Marine Corps  special operations command’s proposals to readjust its force structure to  overcome its identified challenges. We discussed the status of these  proposals with officials from the Marine Corps special operations  command and Headquarters, Marine Corps. However, at the time of our  review, the Marine Corps special operations command had not finalized  decisions on proposed changes to its force structure and concepts of  employment for its special operations forces units. As a result, we were  unable to assess the extent to which any proposed changes to the  Command’s force structure would mitigate identified challenges and  specified personnel shortfalls.
To assess the extent to which the Marine Corps has determined a strategic  human capital approach to manage the critical skills and competencies  required of personnel in its special operations command, we examined  relevant Marine Corps policies for assigning personnel to conventional  force units and the service’s interim policy for assigning personnel to  special operations forces units. We interviewed officials from the Marine  Corps special operations command and Headquarters, Marine Corps, to  discuss the service’s career progression models for personnel assigned to  Marine Corps special operations forces units. We also reviewed DOD plans  to increase the active duty end-strength of the Marine Corps, and  interviewed officials from Headquarters, Marine Corps, to discuss the  service’s strategy to meet the personnel needs of its special operations  forces units and its conventional force units. We analyzed the Marine  Corps special operations command’s planned force structure and  interviewed officials with Headquarters, Marine Corps, and the Marine  Corps special operations command to determine the challenges the Marine  Corps may face in developing a long-term plan to assign personnel to its  special operations forces units. To better understand the unique personnel  needs of the Marine Corps special operations command, we interviewed  officials from the Command to discuss the specialized skills and training  that are required by personnel who are assigned to special operations  forces units to perform the Command’s assigned missions. We reviewed  available documentation on the current and proposed training plans that  identify the critical skills and training that will be provided to Marine  Corps special operations forces personnel, and we interviewed officials  with the Command to discuss the status of their efforts to fully identify all  special operations critical skills and training requirements. We reviewed  congressional testimony by the Commander of the Marine Corps special  operations command and relevant Command planning documents to  identify the Marine Corps special operations command’s goal for a human  capital plan that supports its assigned missions. We examined USSOCOM  annual reports and strategic planning documents relevant to the Marine  Corps special operations command, and interviewed USSOCOM officials  to discuss the management of special operations forces personnel. We also  reviewed our past reports that discuss effective strategies for workforce  planning.
To assess the extent to which USSOCOM has determined whether Marine  Corps special operations training programs are preparing these forces for  assigned missions, we examined relevant laws and DOD doctrine related  to the responsibilities of the Marine Corps and USSOCOM for training  special operations forces personnel. We analyzed Marine Corps special  operations command and USSOCOM training guidance for special  operations forces. We examined USSOCOM documents related to the  processes in place to establish common training standards for advanced  special operations skills, and interviewed officials to discuss the status of  USSOCOM’s efforts to establish common training standards for special  operations skills. We examined available documents that detail training  programs for Marine Corps special operations forces. We interviewed  officials from the Marine Corps special operations command and  USSOCOM to discuss the processes used to identify and select training  standards for special operations skills. We collected and analyzed  documents related to USSOCOM’s evaluations of Marine Corps special  operations forces training, and we discussed the efforts that have been  taken by the Marine Corps special operations command and USSOCOM to  assess the effectiveness of these training programs. We conducted our  work from August 2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Using our assessment of data  reliability, we concluded that the data used to support this review were  sufficiently reliable to answer our objectives. We interviewed the source of  these data to determine how data accuracy was ensured, and we discussed  their data collection methods, standard operating procedures, and other  internal control measures.
We interviewed officials and obtained documentation at the following  locations:    Office of the Secretary of Defense    Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and    Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J8   U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Combat Development Command)    U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Installations and Logistics  Department)
U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Intelligence Department)    U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Plans, Policies, and Operations)    U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Programs and Resources)    U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Training and Education Command)
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Carole Coffey, Assistant Director;  Renee Brown; Jason Jackson; David Malkin; Karen Thornton; and Matthew  Ullengren also made key contributions to this report.