Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs Additional Knowledge as it Embarks on a New Approach for Transformational Satellite Communications System
Published: 2006-05-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) wants to create a networked force where soldiers and systems are able to operate together seamlessly. To help facilitate this transformation, DOD began the Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) program in January 2004. We reported in 2003 that TSAT was about to begin without sufficiently mature technology. In this report, at your request, we followed up with an assessment of (1) how the TSAT program is progressing, and (2) whether the program is using an acquisition approach that will provide the knowledge needed to enter product development.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense is not meeting original cost, schedule, and performance goals established for the TSAT program. When the program was initiated in 2004, DOD estimated TSAT's total acquisition cost to be $15.5 billion and that it would launch the first satellite in April 2011. TSAT's current formal cost estimate is nearly $16 billion and the initial launch date has slipped to September 2014--a delay of over three years. Furthermore, while the performance goal of the full five-satellite constellation has not changed, the initial delivery of capability will be less than what DOD originally planned. After DOD established initial goals for TSAT, Congress twice reduced the program's funding due to concerns about technology maturity and the aggressiveness of the acquisition schedule. DOD developed the initial goals before it had sufficient knowledge about critical TSAT technologies. DOD is taking positive steps to lower risk in the TSAT program so it can enter the product development phase with greater chance of success. However, as DOD prepares to implement a new incremental development approach for the program, it faces gaps in knowledge that could hamper its success. An incremental development will mean reduced capabilities in the initial satellites and more advanced capabilities in the remaining satellites. Given this change, it will be important for DOD to update requirements in coordination with the TSAT user community. While senior DOD officials have agreed to these reduced capabilities to get the first satellite launched in 2014, DOD has yet to reevaluate its investment in TSAT in light of other DOD investments using the knowledge it has now gained. Using this new knowledge, DOD could be in a better position to set more realistic goals, before entering product development.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) is seeking to transform its  The Department of Defense (DOD) is seeking to transform its  communication systems to achieve a networked force where soldiers and  communication systems to achieve a networked force where soldiers and  systems are able to operate together seamlessly. To help facilitate this  systems are able to operate together seamlessly. To help facilitate this  transformation, DOD started a new program in January 2004—the  transformation, DOD started a new program in January 2004—the  Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT)—with an  Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT)—with an  estimated cost of $15.5 billion. Plans call for TSAT to serve as the  estimated cost of $15.5 billion. Plans call for TSAT to serve as the  backbone for DOD’s future communications system and to provide critical  backbone for DOD’s future communications system and to provide critical  support to weapons systems. A key role envisioned for TSAT is to transfer  support to weapons systems. A key role envisioned for TSAT is to transfer  information from DOD’s planned ground-based Global Information Grid  information from DOD’s planned ground-based Global Information Grid  (GIG), a complex set of programs and initiatives intended to provide users  (GIG), a complex set of programs and initiatives intended to provide users  with an Internet-like capability for sharing information among military and  with an Internet-like capability for sharing information among military and  national security users around the world. Through the use of advanced  national security users around the world. Through the use of advanced  technologies, TSAT is slated to transfer higher volumes of information to  technologies, TSAT is slated to transfer higher volumes of information to  users at a faster rate than current systems, and allow interface with other  users at a faster rate than current systems, and allow interface with other  U.S. national security agencies’ satellite-based communications.  U.S. national security agencies’ satellite-based communications.
At your request, we followed up our earlier work and assessed (1) the  At your request, we followed up our earlier work and assessed (1) the  TSAT program’s progress toward its cost, schedule, and performance  TSAT program’s progress toward its cost, schedule, and performance  goals, and (2) whether the program’s acquisition approach will provide the  goals, and (2) whether the program’s acquisition approach will provide the  knowledge needed to enter product development.  knowledge needed to enter product development.
To conduct our work, we interviewed DOD officials in the National  To conduct our work, we interviewed DOD officials in the National  Security Space Office, Office of the Director for Program Analysis and  Security Space Office, Office of the Director for Program Analysis and  Evaluation, Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Space and  Evaluation, Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Space and  Missile Systems Center, and officials from the Massachusetts Institute of  Missile Systems Center, and officials from the Massachusetts Institute of  Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory and the Aerospace Corporation. We  Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory and the Aerospace Corporation. We  reviewed and analyzed DOD documents related to capabilities, schedule,  reviewed and analyzed DOD documents related to capabilities, schedule,  funding, and technology development efforts, and GAO studies that  discuss acquisition problems and associated challenges, including our  decade long body of work on best practices in weapon system  development. We conducted our review from August 2005 to March 2006  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. For  more on our scope and methodology, see appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Present and evolving threats highlight the need to design, operate, and  defend military communication networks to ensure continuity of joint  operations. However, current systems lack the connectivity, capacity,  interoperability, control, adaptability, availability, and coverage to support  military action. To address these shortcomings, DOD is moving toward  network-centric communication systems to facilitate critical  communication. A key system in this concept is TSAT—one of DOD’s most  complex and expensive space programs involving the integration of  multiple, complex technologies never before integrated in a single space  system.
As early as 2001, DOD had developed a new Transformation  Communications Architecture (TCA) to guide the implementation of  emerging communications technologies. The TCA is an element of a  broader global information network or grid, DOD’s overarching vision to  provide authorized users with a secure and interconnected information  environment. The performance parameters for the GIG define the  fundamental requirements for the systems to be interconnected through  the TCA. The TCA is designed to realize the benefits of an Internet  protocol (IP) environment, as it will provide instant accessibility to the  military and intelligence communities. The goal of the TCA is to provide  accessibility to all users while removing communications constraints  related to capacity, control, and responsiveness. It is composed of  elements in ground stations, aboard tactical vehicles, and in space.
TSAT is the space-based network component of the TCA that is expected  to provide survivable, jam-resistant, global, secure, and general purpose  radio frequency and laser cross-links with air and other space systems.  Some of the satellite technologies TSAT will employ have been evolving  for over 25 years. TSAT is building on these heritage technologies in three  primary areas: onboard signal processing for protection and connectivity,  networking, and space laser communication. Through these advanced  technologies, TSAT will improve communications to DOD, intelligence  community, and homeland defense users by transmitting large amounts of  data at a faster rate. Further, TSAT is designed to vastly improve satellite  communications by extending the GIG to users without ground  connections and making it possible for users to travel with small terminals  and communicate while on the move.
The TSAT system will consist of a five-satellite constellation (with a sixth  satellite for backup), the TSAT satellite operations element (TSOE) which  includes a primary TSAT satellite operations center (TSOC) for on-orbit  satellite control, a backup TSOC, and a set of transportable units, a TSAT  Mission Operations System (TMOS) to provide network management, and  ground gateways (see fig. 1).
DOD has awarded four TSAT contracts through separate bidding  processes. In 2003 DOD awarded a contract to Booz Allen Hamilton for  overall systems engineering and integration. DOD also awarded two  separate contracts to competing contractor teams—Lockheed Martin  Space Systems/Northrop Grumman Space Technology and Boeing Satellite  Systems—to conduct risk reduction efforts and present development plans  for the TSAT satellites. DOD expects to award a contract to one of these  contractor teams in 2007 to design and build the satellites. Finally, in  January 2006 DOD awarded a $2 billion contract to Lockheed Martin  Integrated Systems and Solutions to develop TMOS and the overall  network architecture. This network development contractor is responsible  for negotiating the interfaces between the TSAT network and the space  segment, user terminals, and other external networks.
Recently, DOD changed the TSAT acquisition strategy to an incremental  development approach. This approach establishes time-phased  development of new products in increments. The first increment  incorporates technology that is already mature or can be matured quickly.  As new technologies become mature, they are incorporated into  subsequent increments so that the product’s capability evolves over time.  This approach also reduces risks by introducing less new content and  technology into a design and development effort, an approach intended to  enable developers to deliver a series of interim capabilities to the  customer more quickly. As such, incremental development is considered a  best practice for successful DOD and commercial development programs  because it allows these programs to make cost and schedule estimates  that are based on mature technologies. Recognizing the benefits of  evolving space systems, DOD included the incremental development of  space systems in its revised National Security Space acquisition policy.
section_title: DOD Not Meeting Original TSAT Goals
paragraphs: DOD is not meeting its original cost, schedule, and performance goals for  the TSAT program. TSAT’s cost has increased by over $420 million, the  planned launch date for the first satellite has slipped more than 3 years,  and the satellites will be less capable than originally planned. Since DOD  established initial goals for the program, Congress has twice reduced the  program’s annual budget and directed DOD to spend more time  developing and proving critical technologies. DOD developed the initial  goals with limited knowledge, when almost all of the critical technologies  had yet to be proven to work as intended.  As a result, the goals were  developed without a high level of reliability.
subsections: section_title: Initial Goals for TSAT Were Based on Limited Knowledge
paragraphs: When DOD started the TSAT program in January 2004, it estimated the  total acquisition cost to be about $15.5 billion. TSAT’s acquisition cost had  increased to nearly $16 billion by the end of 2004. DOD also originally  scheduled critical design review (CDR) for April 2008 and the first TSAT  satellite launch in April 2011. CDR is now scheduled for September 2010  and the first launch in September 2014—delays of approximately 29 and 41  months, respectively. In addition, DOD recently changed its TSAT  acquisition strategy to an incremental approach by deciding to build the  first two satellites with fewer capabilities and delaying the more advanced  capabilities for the later satellites in the program. While the initial two  satellites will not perform as originally planned, the full five-satellite  system will still meet the original user requirements, according to program  officials.
According to program officials, the original goals for TSAT have been  revised several times as a result of reductions in program funding. After  DOD set its initial goals for TSAT, Congress twice funded the program at  levels below DOD’s request (in fiscal years 2005 and 2006) because of  concerns about the state of technical maturity for key subsystems and an  aggressive schedule for acquisition. During this time, Congress also  directed the program to focus on the challenges of integrating the  technologies needed for the system. Figure 2 shows the changes to key  milestones dates in TSAT’s acquisition schedules. The program recently  was directed to develop a new total acquisition cost estimate at a higher  level of confidence—which could further increase the amount of funding  requested in the near term for the program. However, as of April 2006,  DOD had yet to develop this new estimate.
When DOD established initial goals for the TSAT program, it lacked  sufficient knowledge about key critical technologies. Our past work has  shown that a knowledge-based model leads to better acquisition  outcomes. This model can be broken down into three cumulative  knowledge points for technology maturity, design maturity, and  production maturity. At the first knowledge point, a match is made  between a customer’s requirements and the product developer’s available  resources in terms of technical knowledge, time, money, and capacity. We  have also reported that starting a complex program like TSAT with  immature technologies can lead to poor program performance and  outcomes.
In early December 2003, we reported that the Air Force would have  difficulty establishing goals when starting the TSAT program because  critical technologies were underdeveloped and early design studies had  not been started. At that time, we recommended that the Air Force delay  the start of the TSAT program until technologies had been demonstrated  to be at an acceptable level of maturity and to consider alternative  investments to TSAT. One month later DOD started the program with only  one of the seven critical technologies mature, and could not have known  with any certainty what resources would be needed to eventually meet  users’ requirements, despite having confidence in its technology  development schedule.
For the TSAT program, the Next Generation Processor Router (NGPR)  and laser communications are the highest-risk areas. Program officials  reported that three of the critical technologies in the NGPR are involved  with the transmission of data: (1) packet processing payloads, (2) dynamic  bandwidth and resource allocation (DBRA), and (3) protected bandwidth  efficient modulation using high data rates. The use of these Internet-like  processes will provide unprecedented connectivity for all TSAT users by  moving from an older circuit-based network (similar to telephone) to the  newer IP-based network (similar to the Internet). Additionally, DOD  continues to develop the technologies that are needed for laser  communications. Table 1 identifies the level of maturity of TSAT critical  technologies at program start and their expected maturity dates.
To minimize the potential for technology development problems after the  start of product development, DOD uses an analytical tool to assess  technology maturity. This tool associates technology readiness levels  (TRL) with different levels of demonstrated performance, ranging from  paper studies to actual application of the technology in its final form. For  TSAT, the space segment contractors are using a series of events to  demonstrate and integrate the critical technologies into subsystems and  then testing to determine the extent the components function properly  together. The maturity levels of the critical technologies for TSAT  currently range from TRL 5 to 6, with the remaining technologies needing  integration testing to demonstrate maturity. (See app. VI for a description  of the TRL levels.)
According to program officials, these technologies will be demonstrated at  TRL 6 when key integration tests are completed in fiscal year 2007. The  two main tests facing the program are the second series of integration  testing on the Next Generation Processor Router and Optical Standards  Validation Suite (NGPR-2 and OSVS-2). Program officials said that the  program is using these independent tests to reduce risk by uncovering  technical problems before awarding the space segment contract for the  design and assembly of the satellites. The results of the tests are to be  assessed at the second interim program review before DOD makes a  decision to enter the product development phase of the program. At the  time of this report, results from the first series of integration tests were  unavailable.
section_title: DOD Taking Steps to Lower Program Risk but Additional Knowledge Needed Before Product Development
paragraphs: DOD is taking positive steps to lower TSAT program risk, but additional  knowledge is needed before entering product development. DOD is  separating its technology development efforts from product development,  continuing to conduct program reviews before making key decisions,  reducing program complexity by staggering the awards on its ground and  space segment contracts, and incorporating knowledge-based metrics in  software development. Additionally, DOD is reducing risks in technology  development efforts by leveraging decades of knowledge on heritage  systems and using independent integration tests to demonstrate the  maturity of critical technologies. Despite these efforts, DOD faces gaps in  knowledge that could hamper successful outcomes. As DOD implements  an incremental approach for the TSAT program, it has yet to justify the  TSAT investment in light of other DOD investments using the knowledge it  has now gained.
subsections: section_title: Efforts Under-Way Reduce Program Risk
paragraphs: DOD is reducing TSAT program risk in the following ways:
Separating technology and product development—DOD is separating  technology development from product development and plans to prove  that all critical technologies will work as intended before the TSAT  program enters product development in 2007. In the past, DOD has not  successfully implemented acquisition best practices in its space  programs to reduce risks and increase the likelihood of better  outcomes, particularly in some of its larger and more complex  programs. We previously reported that DOD could curb its tendency to  over-promise the capabilities of a new system and to rely on immature  technologies in part by separating technology development from  product development (system integration and system demonstration).According to program officials, the TSAT program will not start  building the TSAT system until all critical technologies needed for the  system to satisfy user requirements are mature, ensuring a clear  demarcation between the two phases of system development. This  approach better enables decision makers to determine if a match exists  between TSAT requirements and available resources (time, technology,  capacity, and funding).
Conducting program reviews—DOD plans to continue conducting  reviews of the TSAT program at key milestones to reduce program risk.  DOD’s space acquisition policy requires that program managers hold  milestone reviews or independent program assessments as a program  is nearing key decision points. Following this guidance, the TSAT  program’s acquisition schedule requires the program manager to assess  program knowledge at specific points. The next major milestone is  scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007, when the program  will hold an interim program review to assess the program’s readiness  to proceed into the product development phase. Importantly, this  review will include an assessment of the maturity levels of the critical  technologies. Part of this review will involve the use of independent  cost estimators as a way to develop an unbiased, consistent, and  objective total cost estimate for the program.
Reducing ground and space segment complexity—DOD has lessened  the likelihood of problems in development by reducing the complexity  of the program. Specifically, according to program officials, the  contract for ground-based network operations was awarded before the  space segment contract so that the competing space segment  contractors could work toward a stable and more mature network  design. In January 2006, DOD awarded a TMOS contract worth $2  billion to Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems and Solutions to start  developing the overall network architecture and TMOS. Awarding this  contract first will allow the competing space contractors to focus their  satellite designs on a single architecture and mission operations  system, thereby reducing program complexity.
Incorporating software best-practices—Our review of the  development plans for the software-intensive TMOS segment that is to  interface with other networks like the GIG shows that DOD is also  incorporating best practices in this area to mitigate program risks. Our  previous work has identified and reported on three fundamental  management strategies that are best practices for software  development: (1) implementing an evolutionary approach, (2) following  disciplined development processes, and (3) collecting and analyzing  meaningful metrics to measure progress. First, the evolutionary  approach includes setting requirements, establishing a stable design,  writing code, and testing. Second, successful acquisitions require that  developers demonstrate they have acquired the right knowledge before  proceeding to the next development phase. Finally, metrics such as  costs, schedule, size of a project, performance requirements, testing,  defects, and quality provide evidence that the developer has acquired  appropriate knowledge in moving from one phase to another. Although  DOD’s software acquisition plans may incorporate these best practices,  the potential for cost and schedule increases because of unforeseen  software complexity is inherent in the development of a large quantity  of software, as is needed for TSAT. To manage this risk, program  officials stated that extensive and fully funded mitigation plans are in  place and that the network contractor will be held to the best practices  through program oversight and reporting.
section_title: Heritage Technologies and Independent Tests Reduce Program Risk
paragraphs: To reduce risk while developing the critical technologies for TSAT, DOD is  leveraging decades of existing knowledge from heritage systems. For  TSAT to be successful, DOD will have to integrate technologies that have  been proven to work in other space systems, but now must be integrated  into a single communication system. Officials at MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory,  who are responsible for the independent testing and verification of TSAT  technologies, stated that there are no fundamental discoveries or  breakthroughs involved with developing TSAT. Rather, the enabling  technologies build upon architectures and technologies developed across  decades of space programs or experiments. However, officials at the  Aerospace Corporation who are working closely with the TSAT program  stated that there are risks involved in using heritage technologies— primarily integration risks—because the technologies must still be tested  and evaluated to determine if they will work together as intended. The  three main TSAT enabling technologies are onboard signal processing,  networking, and laser communications. See table 2 below for a list of the  critical technologies and a description of their purposes.
TSAT is building upon the onboard signal processing developments in  military satellite communications that started in the mid-1970s. These  developments initially focused on providing highly robust  communications, but over time have evolved to increased capacity and  bandwidth, as well as enhanced efficiency. For example, the Lincoln  Experimental Satellites (LES) 8 and 9, Milstar I and II, and Advanced  Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system have verified the onboard  processing capabilities that will be used in TSAT.
According to officials at the Lincoln Laboratory, much of the required  technology for the network services for TSAT comes directly from the  ground-based Internet. Further, TSAT is building on the successful  achievements of previous space programs like DOD’s Milstar and AEHF  satellites, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA)  Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS), and the  Spaceway and Astrolink satellites from the commercial sector. In addition  to space-based signal processing, the TSAT satellites will use packet  routing in space, faster data transmission, and Internet-like data  transmission formats to produce the networking capability to extend  worldwide network services to the user.
TSAT will use high-rate laser communications to connect TSAT satellites  into a global network and to provide readout from other space- and air- borne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (SISR/AISR) assets.  According to Lincoln Laboratory officials, many of the needed  components for TSAT’s laser communications are versions from  commercial optical networking. A series of three systems developed by  Lincoln Laboratory (Lincoln Experimental Satellites (LES) 8 and 9, Laser  Intersatellite Transmission Experiment (LITE) and LITE-2, and GeoLITE)  have and continue to demonstrate laser capabilities needed for TSAT.  Moreover, recent programs like Lincoln Laboratory’s Airborne Lasercom  Experiment (ALEX) are providing knowledge about how TSAT’s laser  communications can be used to support AISR assets, and DOD’s Airborne  Laser (ABL) is helping scientist to characterize certain limits of laser  capabilities in atmospheric conditions, according to the officials.  Appendixes III through V further highlight the history of the technology  heritage being applied to TSAT.
section_title: Remaining Gaps in Knowledge Could Hamper Successful Outcomes
paragraphs: Despite these positive steps to lower program risks, DOD faces gaps in  knowledge, as it begins to implement its new development approach, that  could impede TSAT’s success. In 2006, DOD directed the program to  follow an incremental development approach, changing the contents of  the program. Under this approach, the program will deliver less capability  in the first two satellites, and then more advanced capabilities as  technologies mature and are incorporated into the remaining satellites.  DOD has not fully assessed the value of the TSAT investment in light of  major changes to the program.
Historically, many new development programs in DOD have sought to  quickly gain the latest capabilities, but because the technologies were not  mature enough to make such leaps, programs were often in development  for years while engineers continued to develop and mature the needed  technologies. This increased both the time and cost required to develop  the systems. An incremental approach, on the other hand, reduces risks by  introducing less new content and technology into a design and  development effort. The incremental approach for TSAT allows more time  for the development of higher-performing capabilities, thereby potentially  increasing the level of confidence in the launch date of the first satellite,  planned for 2014. High-level DOD officials have agreed to these reduced  capabilities up front, so the TSAT program now plans to deliver satellites  that meet user requirements in an evolutionary manner.
Notwithstanding the approval for the revised TSAT program from senior  DOD officials, DOD has yet to justify the TSAT investment in light of other  DOD investments using the knowledge it has now gained on cost,  schedule, and initial capabilities to be delivered. For example, TSAT’s cost  estimate has increased and the initial satellites will be less capable than  originally expected. Furthermore, it is imperative, given the recent  changes to the program, that DOD work with the TSAT user community to  update requirements to ensure the timely delivery of promised capabilities.  Finally, it does not appear that DOD has completely addressed all the  unknowns concerning the relationship between TSAT and two of DOD’s  other expensive and complex systems, namely the GIG and Space Radar.  For example, work still remains in finalizing the requirements for these  systems and understanding how the incrementally developed TSAT will  satisfy the needs.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD has taken action to put itself in position to prove out critical  technologies before initiating satellite development—an approach not  typically seen in DOD’s space programs. DOD has taken further action to  reduce program risk by changing to an incremental development  approach. While this approach will reduce the capability of the first two  satellites, it is a positive step in reducing program risk because the  program will gain additional technical knowledge before integrating the  more advanced technologies into the satellites. Even though DOD is taking  such positive steps, TSAT is still expected to be one of the most ambitious,  expensive, and complex space systems ever built. TSAT is being designed  to transform military communication using Internet-like and laser  capabilities—key integrations risks. Other weapon systems are to  interface with it and will be highly dependent on it for their own success.  While DOD is planning to undertake new systems, such as TSAT, broader  analyses of the nation’s fiscal future indicate that spending for weapon  systems may need to be reduced, rather than increased, given the  constrained fiscal environment.  Given these challenges and fiscal  realities, it is prudent for DOD to reexamine the value and progress of  TSAT before committing to building the full constellation of  communication satellites.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve DOD’s transition to transformational communications by  gaining the additional knowledge it needs before TSAT enters product  development, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Under Secretary of the Air Force to take the following four actions:
Reassess the value of TSAT in the broader context of other DOD  investments, using updated knowledge on likely cost, schedule,  technology, and initial capability;
Update requirements in coordination with the TSAT user community;
Prove that all critical technologies will work as intended; and
Establish new cost, schedule, and performance goals for the program  once the above knowledge has been gained.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD  concurred with our recommendations and provided detail comments,  which we have incorporated where appropriate. DOD’s letter is reprinted  as appendix II.
We plan to provide copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretary of the Air Force, and interested congressional committees. We  will also provide copies to others on request. In addition, the report will be  available on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors to the report are Arthur Gallegos,  Assistant Director, Tony Beckham, Noah B. Bleicher, G. Martin Campbell,  Sharron Candon, Claire Cyrnak, Maria Durant, and Hai V. Tran.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the Department of Defense’s (DOD) progress toward achieving  cost, schedule and performance goals for the Transformational Satellite  Communications System (TSAT), we collected and reviewed (1) budget  and expenditure plans, (2) acquisition planning documents, and (3)  technology and readiness information to determine if the program was  meeting its original goals. We compared changes in cost and schedule to  original estimates and evaluated DOD’s plans for maturing the critical  technologies against best practice standards to determine if they will  sufficiently mature when DOD plans to start product development. We  discussed this information with DOD officials in the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Crystal City,  Virginia; National Security Space Office, Chantilly, Virginia; Space and  Missiles Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, California; and with  officials at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln  Laboratory, Boston, Massachusetts; and the Aerospace Corporation, El  Segundo, California.
To determine if the TSAT program is using an acquisition approach that  will provide the knowledge it needs to proceed to product development,  we collected and reviewed documents that described the TSAT program’s  plans to build knowledge and to mitigate risks. We reviewed detailed  documents related to capabilities, schedule, funding, and technology  development for the revised acquisition strategy. We considered DOD’s  current knowledge-building activities against DOD and GAO studies that  discuss acquisition problems and associated challenges with acquisition  programs—including work on best practices in weapon system  development that we have conducted over the past decade. We analyzed  the extent to which the TSAT program is using a knowledge-based  approach to technology and product development. To do this, we focused  on the whether the new acquisition approach will meet user requirements  and match those needs to resources. We discussed DOD plans and efforts  to meet user’s needs with DOD officials in the Military Satellite  Communication Joint Program Office, Los Angeles Air Force Base,  California; Directorate of Space Acquisition, Office of the Under Secretary  of the Air Force, Arlington, Virginia; and Office of the Assistant Secretary  of Defense (Networks and Information Integration), Arlington, Virginia.
We performed our work from August 2005 through March 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: Onboard Signal Processing Technology Heritage
subsections: section_title: Lincoln Experimental Satellites (LES) 8 and 9
paragraphs: First satellites to use onboard signal processing,  spread spectrum techniques (frequency hopping)  to demonstrate protected military satellite  communications, and radio frequency (RF)  crosslink capability.
Onboard signal processing;  spread spectrum satellite  communications; and satellite-to- satellite crosslinks.
Built by MIT Lincoln Laboratory and hosted on the  operational FLTSATCOM satellites 7 and 8 (built  by TRW). These packages provided the first  satellite communications at extremely high  frequency (EHF) on the uplink and super high  frequency (SHF) on the downlink.
Multichannel onboard signal  processing; EHF/SHF spread  spectrum satellite  communications; and onboard  control for circuit switching.
Satellites provided the first strategic/tactical  operational satellite using the EHF/SHF. Satellites  also provided narrower spot beam coverage and  electronically agile beam coverage to provide  enhanced service to small, dispersed user  terminals.
Combined strategic/tactical  service at EHF, narrow beam  antenna coverage, electronically  steered antenna coverage; and  intersatellite crosslinks.
Satellites provided enhanced capacity and  protection through the addition of a medium data  rate (MDR) payload through narrow spot beam  antennas. Satellite capacity was more than 10  times greater than Milstar I.
Extension of EHF waveform to  higher rates. improved protection  via active antenna discrimination  (nulling).
Advanced EHF (AEHF)
The Advanced EHF (AEHF) system provides a  further increase in the capability of EHF satellite  communications by increasing both the total  satellite throughput by another factor of 10 and by  increasing the data rate available to individual  terminals. The extended data rate (XDR)  waveform supports data rates from 75 to  8,192,000 bytes per second for individual  terminals.
Binary bandwidth efficient  waveforms for EHF, improved  support for small terminals, and  onboard processing technologies  for increased satellite throughput.
section_title: Appendix IV: Networking Technology Heritage
paragraphs: The Milstar satellites were the first  satellite payloads to use onboard  processing and onboard switching of  user signals. The AEHF system further  developed space-based signal  processing technology, providing more  capacity and higher data rates.
NASA Advanced  Communications Technology  Satellite (ACTS)
This satellite produced many important  studies of networking protocol behavior  (such as Transmission Control  Protocol/Internet Protocol: TCP/IP) in a  combined space and terrestrial  environment.
Provided performance  measurements for IP, and increased  the class payload processing rate to  more than 100 megabytes per  second.
These are the first satellites designed to  perform packet switching in space. The  Astrolink system was never launched  because of a sudden market downturn in  the telecommunications industry.  However, the first payload was  essentially completed before market  conditions caused cancellation of the  deployment. The first Spaceway satellite  is now onorbit and operational, and  launch of the second is planned in the  near future.
Lessons include how to build packet  processing and routing hardware  and software for use in space in the  gigabytes per second data rate  class.
section_title: Appendix V: Lasercom Technology Heritage
subsections: section_title: Lincoln Experimental Satellites (LES) 8 and 9
paragraphs: The LES-8/9 satellites built by Lincoln  Laboratory in the mid-1970’s were originally  slated to use lasercom crosslinks. The  development of these crosslinks was impaired  by the lack of an industry base for the  necessary optical components and was  abandoned in favor of RF links.
Development of a fiber-based  architecture, and use of space- qualified commercial fiber-optic  components.
The LITE lasercom terminal developed by  Lincoln Laboratory was able to capitalize on  commercial parts to leverage its large-scale  production processes. In the early 1990s, as  commercial fiber optic components became  available, the LITE-2 terminal was developed.  It used a new fiber-based architecture with  remote optics. The ability to remote the  telescope and other free space optics from the  High Power Optical Amplifier and modem  dramatically simplifies spacecraft integration.
Telescope, optical module, fiber- based high power optical  amplifier, modem, and high-rate  lasercom.
Built in the late 1990’s by Lincoln Laboratory  and flown aboard a Northrop-Grumman (TRW)  satellite. The GeoLITE experiment (launched in  2001) used the fiber-based architecture  developed under the LITE-2 program. The  lasercom payload continues to send telemetry  from critical subsystems that provide insight  into the lifetime of optical components in space.
Same as in LITE and LITE-2,  demonstrating all of the  capabilities needed for the TSAT  mission.
Airborne Lasercom Experiment  (ALEX)
ALEX, built by Lincoln Laboratory, successfully  demonstrated the capabilities necessary for air- space lasercom.
While ALEX focused on the  airborne terminal, it demonstrated  an understanding of the channel  that is relevant to TSAT lasercom  AISR support.
Airborne Laser (ABL) program  The ABL program has performed numerous  experiments characterizing the propagation of  optical wavefronts through various airborne  environments. These data are relevant to the  TSAT Air-Space link.
Atmospheric and airborne  platform boundary  characterizations.
section_title: Appendix VI: Technology Readiness Levels
paragraphs: Appendix VI: Technology Readiness Levels  Lowest level of technology readiness.  Scientific research begins to be translated  into applied research and development.  Examples might include paper studies of a  technology’s basic properties.
None (Paper studies and  analysis)
Invention begins. Once basic principles are  observed, practical applications can be  invented. The application is speculative  and there is no proof or detailed analysis to  support the assumption. Examples are still  limited to paper studies.
None (Paper studies and  analysis)
Active research and development is  initiated. This includes analytical studies  and laboratory studies to physically  validate analytical predictions of separate  elements of the technology. Examples  include components that are not yet  integrated or representative.
Analytical studies and  demonstration of nonscale  individual components  (pieces of subsystem).
Basic technological components are  integrated to establish that the pieces will  work together. This is relatively “low  fidelity” compared to the eventual system.  Examples include integration of “ad hoc”  hardware in a laboratory.
Low fidelity breadboard.  Integration of nonscale  components to show pieces  will work together. Not fully  functional or form or fit but  representative of technically  feasible approach suitable for  flight articles.
Fidelity of breadboard technology  increases significantly. The basic  Technological components are integrated  with reasonably realistic supporting  elements so that the technology can be  tested in a simulated environment.  Examples include “high fidelity” laboratory  integration of components.
High fidelity breadboard.  Functionally equivalent but  not necessarily form and/or fit  (size weight, materials, etc.).  Should be approaching  appropriate scale. May  include integration of several  components with reasonably  realistic support elements/  subsystems to demonstrate  functionality.
Lab demonstrating  functionality but not  form and fit. May  include flight  demonstrating  breadboard in  surrogate aircraft.  Technology ready    for detailed design  studies.
Prototype—Should be very  close to form, fit and function.  Probably includes the  integration of many new  components and  demonstration or  limited/ restricted  flight demonstration for a  relevant  environment. environment. needed to demonstrate full  functionality of the  subsystem. well defined.
Prototype near or at planned operational  system. Represents a major step up from  TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of an  actual system prototype in an operational  environment, such as in an aircraft, vehicle  or space. Examples include testing the  prototype in a test bed aircraft.
Prototype. Should be form, fit  and function integrated with  other key supporting  elements/ subsystems to  demonstrate full functionality  of subsystem.
Flight  demonstration in  representative  operational  environment such  as flying test bed or  demonstrator aircraft. Technology  is well  substantiated with  test data.
Technology has been proven to work in its  final form and under expected conditions.  In almost all cases, this TRL represents the  end of true system development. Examples  include developmental test and evaluation  of the system in its intended weapon  system to determine if it meets design  specifications.
Actual application of the technology in its  final form and under mission conditions,  such as those encountered in operational  test and evaluation. In almost all cases,  this is the end of the last “bug fixing”  aspects of true system development.  Examples include using the system under  operational mission conditions.