Aviation Competition: Regional Jet Service Yet to Reach Many Small Communities
Published: 2001-02-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The increasing numbers of regional jets (RJ) in operation have provided U.S. air carriers with opportunities to serve new and existing markets. With predominantly 50-seat aircraft, the carriers have initiated service to many large and medium-large communities but have provided less service to smaller communities. Service to small communities--to which the airlines now mostly operate turboprop aircraft--continues to be an important concern, because of the uncertainty about whether those markets may generate enough passenger traffic and revenue to be financially viable to sustain RJ operations. Eventually, smaller RJs may let carriers serve those smaller communities economically. Other questions also emerge about the impact of how the carriers will use their RJs. For example, the airlines could restrict capacity in a market by reducing service with larger mainline jets but increasing the number of RJ flights in a way that may inhibit entry by new competitors, allowing the airlines to charge fares higher than might exist in a more competitive market. Additionally, the growth in RJs has clearly contributed to an increasing problem with congestion, particularly in some locations like New York's LaGuardia Airport. But how the expected growth in RJs may continue to contribute to congestion and delay remains to be seen. Depending on how events unfold in the near future, these and other potential impacts of the airlines' RJ strategies may warrant continued oversight.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Many aviation experts view U.S. airlines’ growing use of small “regional  jets” as a revolutionary development that is significantly changing the  aviation marketplace. Because jets are generally faster, quieter, smoother,  and perceived to be safer than turboprop aircraft, the public tends to prefer  travel by jet. Additionally, because regional jets (typically seating between  32 and 70 passengers) tend to have lower operating costs than larger  “mainline” jets (e.g., the Boeing 737, which may seat 110 passengers or  more), expectations rose that air carriers would provide regional jet  service to smaller communities that could not profitably support mainline  service. And because regional jets can fly farther than turboprop aircraft,  their use holds the potential for small communities to obtain new service  on longer routes to more distant airports—thereby perhaps offering new  service options to those small communities. The Wendell H. Ford Aviation  Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21) further fueled  small communities’ expectations of improved air service through specific  provisions that eased certain restrictions at New York’s LaGuardia Airport  to encourage air carriers to serve smaller communities with regional jets.
To address your concerns about air service to smaller communities, we  examined how U.S. air carriers are using regional jets and what issues  surround the carriers’ abilities to use these aircraft. Our work focused on  the following three questions:  What is the status of regional jet deployment in the United States, and  how has this service evolved?
What factors have affected the airlines’ decisions in deploying regional  jets?
What effects have regional jets had on air traffic and airport congestion,  according to published studies and experts in the field?
To determine the status of the airlines’ regional jet service, we analyzed  historical airline service data, as well as current airline schedule  information. Our analysis excluded those carriers that do not have regional  affiliates that operate regional jets. We defined regional jets as newer jet  aircraft that have been placed into service since 1993 and are designed to  seat 70 or fewer passengers. In addition, our analysis included only those  markets that had a minimum of 20 monthly regional jet departures—the  equivalent of 1 departure per business day. To determine the factors that  have affected the airlines’ deployment of regional jets, we interviewed  airline and industry officials and reviewed airline, government, and  consultant documents. To ascertain industry experts’ views on the effects  of regional jets on air traffic and airport congestion, we reviewed studies  and consulted with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and industry  officials. We conducted our work from March 2000 to February 2001 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Additional information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix  I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Regional jets (RJ) carry fewer passengers than mainline jets but generally  travel at similar speeds, cruise at similar altitudes, and require runways of  about the same length as mainline jets. The most common RJ models in  service today are 50-passenger aircraft—the Bombardier CRJ100 and  CRJ200 and the Embraer ERJ-145. Most RJs have a maximum flight range  between 900 and 1,700 nautical miles. (See app. II for more detailed  information about these aircraft.)
Most RJs are operated by regional affiliates of major airlines rather than by  the major airlines themselves. The relationship between the major carrier  and the regional carrier can take several forms. Some relationships are  contractual; for example, United Airlines (United) contracts with Atlantic  Coast Airlines to fly passengers to and from United’s hub at Washington  Dulles International Airport. By contrast, other carriers own all or some of  their regional affiliates. For example, American Airlines (American) and  Continental Airlines (Continental) own many of the carriers that operate  for their regional affiliates, American Eagle and Continental Express.  Likewise, Delta Air Lines (Delta) purchased two of its regional affiliates,  Comair and Atlantic Southeast Airlines, in 1999. Major carriers may also  purchase a partial interest in a regional carrier, as Northwest Airlines  (Northwest) has done with Mesaba Airlines.
RJs are part of a U.S. air transportation structure dominated by “hub-and- spoke” networks. Since the deregulation of U.S. commercial aviation in  1978, nearly all major carriers have developed such networks. Airline  officials state that by bringing passengers from a large number of cities to  one central location and redistributing these passengers to their intended  destinations, an airline’s fleet can serve more cities than it could through  direct “point-to-point” service. Airline networks generally have several hub  cities. For example, Northwest has hubs in Minneapolis, Detroit, and  Memphis, and American has hubs in Chicago, Dallas, and Miami.
section_title: Rapid Growth of RJs Has Primarily Increased Service to Larger Cities
paragraphs: With hundreds of aircraft in operation, the airlines were providing RJ  service to 157 cities and 482 city-pair markets in October 2000. Seventy- four percent of the cities receiving this service were large and medium- sized; only 8 percent were small, with populations under 100,000. Air  carriers have placed almost 60 percent of their RJ service in markets they  were already serving (“existing markets”) and have expanded their  networks by instituting RJ service in markets that they previously were not  serving (“new markets”). Much of the service to existing markets  supplemented or replaced mainline jet service that the carriers provided in  these markets. The airlines chose to establish new service at cities that  either were beyond the practical operating range of turboprop aircraft or  were perhaps too small to be profitably served by mainline jets, according  to airline officials. However, the airlines have ordered hundreds more  aircraft, many of which are smaller or larger than the predominantly 50- seat RJs currently in service. In the future, with these aircraft of varying  size, the airlines may adjust their RJ deployment strategies to provide  service in markets of varying size.
subsections: section_title: Number of RJs in Operation Has Increased Significantly
paragraphs: As of October 2000, major U.S. passenger airlines and their regional  affiliates had deployed almost 500 RJs. This represents a significant  increase in RJ aircraft since 1997, when only 89 RJs were in service. Of the  486 RJs in U.S. domestic service in the fourth quarter of 2000, 86 percent  were 50-seat Bombardier or Embraer aircraft. The remaining RJs were 32-  or 37-seat Fairchild or Embraer RJs, both of which began commercial  operations in the United States in 1999.
The number of RJs that each carrier operates varies widely. For example,  Delta operates 168 RJs—more than any other major U.S. passenger carrier,  largely because of its relationship with Comair (the first regional airline to  purchase and begin operating RJs extensively). Other major airlines whose  regional affiliates have deployed relatively large numbers of RJs are  Continental (92) and American (83). Figure 1 shows the number of RJs  operated by major airlines as of October 2000 and the size of their RJ fleet  compared with that of their total jet fleet.
Just as the number of RJs in service has increased since 1997, so has the  number of RJ departures. For example, in May 1997, there were 12,364  scheduled RJ departures, compared with 93,606 scheduled RJ departures in  October 2000—an increase of 735 percent in 3-½ years. On average, each RJ  in October 2000 made more than six departures per day. By comparison,  overall mainline jet departures amounted to 492,331 in May 1997 and  537,697 in September 2000—a 9-percent increase.
section_title: RJs Serve 157 Cities, Few of Which Are Small
paragraphs: Although RJs are flying throughout the United States, about two-thirds of  the cities with RJ service are located east of the Mississippi River. Figure 2  shows the location of the cities served by RJs as of October 2000. Industry  experts believed that this geographic distribution can be explained by  differences in population densities and distances between cities that made  RJ service well suited for these markets. See appendix III for more detailed  information on the U.S. cities with RJ service as of October 2000.
Of the 157 cities served by RJs as of October 2000, only 13 (or 8 percent)  were small cities—those with populations under 100,000. Five carriers— Delta, Continental, American, Northwest, and America West—provide RJ  service to those cities. However, only three of these small cities (White  Plains, New York; Traverse City, Michigan; and Bozeman, Montana) have RJ  service from more than one air carrier. Figure 3 shows the distribution of  cities that had received RJ service as of October 2000.
Large and medium-sized cities have received the vast majority of RJ  service. The airlines generally introduced RJ service in larger cities before  expanding it to smaller cities. For example, of the cities gaining RJ service  in or before 1997, 69 (or 79 percent) were cities that had populations over  250,000 while only 8 (9 percent) were small cities. This deployment  pattern—in which airlines have decided to serve larger cities rather than  small cities with RJs—remained consistent between 1997 and 2000. Only  five additional small cities received RJ service between 1998 and October  2000. Larger cities also more often received RJ service from more than one  carrier. Of the 157 cities that received RJ service, 94 received service from  multiple carriers. Moreover, 77 of those 94 cities had populations of 250,000  or more.
The growth in the number of cities that have received RJ service has been  slowing since 1997. Of the 157 cities that were served by RJs in October  2000, 86 had begun to receive their service in or before 1997. Since then,  however, air carriers initiated service to 34 cities in 1998, 22 cities in 1999,  and 15 cities in 2000. Figure 4 shows the decreasing number of new cities  served by RJs over time and further indicates that most of these cities are  not small.
section_title: RJ Service Has Been Split Between New and Existing Markets
paragraphs: As the total number of cities served by RJs has grown over time, so has the  number of city pairs (or markets). As of October 2000, RJs were serving 482  markets. Of these 482 markets, we examined the 432 that received RJ  service between January 1997 and October 2000. Air carriers were already  serving the majority of these markets with turboprops or mainline jets  before they introduced RJs. However, air carriers also used RJs to expand  their networks by flying to cities they had not previously served.
Almost 60 percent of the 432 markets were existing markets—that is, they  were already receiving either mainline jet or turboprop service from the RJ  carrier before it added the RJ operations. Specifically, RJs supplemented  existing mainline jet and/or turboprop service in about 36 percent of the  markets and replaced mainline jet or turboprop service in 24 percent of the  markets. The remaining 41 percent were new markets that had not received  service from that RJ carrier for at least 1 year before the carrier introduced  RJ operations. Figure 5 breaks down the changes in types of service for the  432 RJ markets that have received RJ service since January 1997.
section_title: Adding RJ Service to Existing Markets Improved Service Options
paragraphs: Adding RJ operations to existing markets gave RJ carriers opportunities to  change their levels of service in various ways. For instance, a carrier could  upgrade its service by replacing or supplementing its existing turboprop  service with RJs, because jet service is considered to be of higher quality  than turboprop service. In other markets, airline officials told us, adding  RJs allowed them to “right size” their existing mainline jet service. In other  words, the air carrier replaced its existing mainline jet service (which  might have been carrying relatively few passengers) with RJs, whose  seating capacity better matched the existing passenger traffic.
When air carriers added RJ service to existing markets, they adjusted the  total seating capacity. For example, in eight markets where RJs replaced  mainline jets between January and October 2000, the carriers decreased  the total seating capacity. In five markets, the carriers increased the total  seating capacity, even though they “downgraded” these markets to smaller- sized jets. By contrast, in markets where carriers replaced turboprops with  RJs, they decreased the total seating capacity in one while increasing it in  another nine. As a result, with RJs, the airlines have been able to maintain  jet service (albeit with smaller aircraft) but have more often decreased the  total seating capacity; where they have upgraded service from turboprop to  jet aircraft, they have more often increased total capacity. According to  airline officials, both approaches were consistent with the carriers’  competitive service goals.
To date, carriers have seldom completely replaced turboprop service with  RJ service. This has occurred in only 11 percent of the markets that have  received RJ service since January 1997. The carriers continue to fly  turboprops in some markets for two fundamental reasons. First,  communities served by turboprops are often located within a few hundred  miles of a hub airport, and carriers may continue to fly turboprops there  because they are generally less expensive to operate on shorter routes than  are RJs. Second, those communities also tend to be smaller, and they  generate less passenger traffic—especially high-fare business traffic—than  larger markets. Consequently, barring other considerations, if alternative  markets that may generate more revenue are available, carriers will not  deploy their RJs into smaller markets. Industry experts agreed that few  turboprop aircraft had been replaced by RJs. So long as major U.S. carriers  have turboprops in their fleets, they will use those aircraft as cost- and  revenue-efficiently as possible.
section_title: RJs Have Allowed Airlines to Serve New Markets and Expand Their Networks
paragraphs: When carriers initiated RJ service in new markets (41 percent of the  markets served by RJs), these new city pairs generally were more distant  from each other than the city pairs that the carrier had previously served.  According to information from airline officials, these new markets typically  provided opportunities for the carrier to serve cities that previously were  beyond the practical operating range of its turboprop aircraft. For example,  in 1999, American initiated RJ service to Grand Rapids, Michigan, from its  hub in Dallas (a distance of 931 miles), whereas previously it had served  this city only with turboprops from its closer hub in Chicago (a distance of  137 miles). With an RJ—capable of flying farther than a turboprop— American could add this city pair as a new market and expand its network.  The average distance (stage length) for all new markets receiving RJ  service between 1997 and October 2000 was 563 miles—a distance well  beyond the 350-mile range that many view as the practical limit for  turboprop service. In other cases, industry officials indicated that airlines  saw opportunities to provide RJ service in markets that were unlikely to  have generated enough passenger traffic (and revenue) to support  profitable mainline jet service.
Providing RJ service to these new, more distant markets thus expanded a  carrier’s network size or “footprint.” One result of this expansion is more  overlap among the different carriers’ networks. Figure 6 illustrates how  using longer-range RJs instead of turboprops creates greater network  overlap and effectively expands consumers’ choices in some cities. For  example, in 1998, Continental initiated RJ service between its Houston hub  and Greenville/Spartanburg, South Carolina—a distance of 838 miles.  Similarly, United began service in 1999 between Denver and Fargo—a  distance of 627 miles. Each of these new markets was too far from those  particular hub airports to serve with turboprops and not big enough to  serve with mainline jets. The new RJ service increased the flight  opportunities for these communities because, for example, until  Continental began flying into Greenville/Spartanburg, service to that  location was generally provided only by Delta, Northwest, and US Airways.  Likewise, Fargo was served only by Northwest until United began RJ  service there.
According to industry officials, expanding airline networks to include new  cities also created opportunities for carriers to increase the number of  passengers coming onto their networks—a key competitive goal for them.  It is unclear whether RJs stimulate passenger traffic. Some industry  observers believe that RJs increase passenger traffic because travelers who  are unwilling to fly on turboprop aircraft will use RJs. Others believe that  when RJ service is offered, passengers only switch to the carrier operating  RJs and away from the carriers operating turboprops.
The airlines have seldom used their RJs to provide direct service between  spoke cities. As of October 2000, 82 percent of the major carriers’  scheduled RJ flights connected a hub and a spoke city. An additional 14  percent of the RJ flights were between a spoke city and a major airport that  is not considered a hub, such as LaGuardia. Only 4 percent of RJ flights  were directly between spoke cities. For example, since 1998, Continental  has begun RJ service from its Houston and Cleveland hubs to 75 U.S. spoke  cities while offering spoke-to-spoke service only among 5 cities. Compared  with Continental’s RJ deployment pattern, American’s is less “hub  intensive”—flying RJs in 52 markets through its hubs in Chicago and Dallas  while providing spoke-to-spoke service in 11 cities. Airline officials have  said that because many smaller cities tend not to have enough passenger  traffic to justify direct service between them, their airline can better and  more profitably serve small communities by aggregating passengers from  many small cities into one hub location and distributing them from there.
section_title: RJ Deployment Is Expected to Grow, but Future Patterns Are Unknown
paragraphs: U.S. carriers expect to continue the rapid expansion of their RJ fleets. As of  January 2001, 1,255 RJs of varying types and sizes had been ordered and  1,010 were on option. These orders are scheduled to be delivered to the  airlines between the fourth quarter of 2000 and 2006. (See app. II for  additional information on orders and options.)
Whether the aircraft deployment trends seen so far will continue is  unknown. One key reason is that the RJs that are to be placed into service  over the next few years differ in size: some are smaller and some are larger  than the current models. At one end of the market, carriers have recently  begun to place smaller RJs into commercial service. Instead of carrying 50  passengers, these models—such as the Embraer ERJ-135 and the Fairchild  Dornier 328Jet—carry 37 and 32 passengers, respectively. Additionally,  Embraer is developing a 44-seat RJ, the ERJ-140, which is slated to enter  service in the first quarter of 2001. However, so few of these aircraft have  been put into service to date that it is difficult to characterize the markets  where they are used. As of October 2000, carriers had ordered 304 of these  smaller RJs and held options for 114 more.
At the other end of the RJ market, manufacturers are developing 70-seat  RJs. By the end of 2000, U.S. carriers had placed orders for 112 and held  options for 218 70-seat CRJ700s that are to begin commercial service in  2001. Embraer’s ERJ-170 and Fairchild Dornier’s 728Jet are scheduled to  enter service in 2002 and 2003, respectively. However, since none of these  larger aircraft are now in service in the U.S., it is unclear how each will  affect air service to small and medium-sized communities.
The possible effect of these developments on air carriers’ continued use of  turboprops is also unknown. The three carriers with the largest number of  RJs—Delta, Continental, and American—are planning to eliminate all  turboprop aircraft from some or all of their regional operations. Some  industry officials told us that the airlines may reevaluate their service to  some smaller communities because the higher cost of operating RJs over  short distances—relative to turboprops—may make some markets that are  relatively close to carriers’ hubs less profitable. One industry report  concluded that with some airlines converting to all-RJ fleets, some markets  currently served by turboprops could possibly lose all service from their  current carriers if the airlines deem the markets to be unprofitable for RJs.  However, other analyses indicated that turboprop service, while  decreasing, would not be completely eliminated in the foreseeable future.
section_title: RJ Deployment Decisions Are Profit Driven but Also Affected by Labor Agreements and Other Factors
paragraphs: The carriers’ decisions about where to deploy RJs are primarily profit  driven, but according to airline officials, other factors, including pilot labor  agreements, have influenced their acquisition and deployment decisions.  The goal of profit maximization is common among the carriers we  interviewed, but the other factors, such as their labor agreements, reflect  each carrier’s circumstances. According to industry officials, these  agreements greatly restrict the ability of some carriers to acquire and use  RJs but give other carriers wide latitude to do so. Airline officials said that  these agreements—together with other carrier-specific factors, such as the  location of the carrier’s hubs in relation to major population centers— affected their RJ deployment strategies.
subsections: section_title: Need to Maximize Profit Generally Drives RJ Deployment
paragraphs: Without exception, officials with the airlines we contacted told us that the  primary factor influencing the airlines’ decisions about where to deploy  their RJs is the need to maximize profits. The airlines use sophisticated  models to help them select potential markets. These models rely on  detailed data to estimate whether certain markets can be served profitably.  They take into account such considerations as estimated passenger traffic,  the carrier’s operating costs, and competition in the market (including the  type of aircraft competitors used, the number of daily flights they  scheduled, and the fares charged).
Industry officials told us that the number and type of passengers that an  airline is likely to carry is the cornerstone of its model. A key element to the  airline’s profit estimates is the availability of high-yield passenger traffic  (e.g., business travelers who are more likely to pay higher airfares than  leisure travelers) in a particular market. Because some smaller  communities may not generate enough of this high-yield business traffic,  carriers may not have begun RJ service there yet.
Aircraft operating costs—another key factor affecting profits—also  determine whether an airline serves a market. While RJs are less costly to  purchase than mainline jets, they are generally costlier than turboprops  ($22 million for a CRJ200 versus $14.3 million for a 50-seat Q300 Dash 8  turboprop). Furthermore, crew and fuel costs combined, which tend to be  the highest-cost elements for both RJs and mainline jets, are generally  higher for RJs than for turboprops. Aircraft operating costs generally  decrease (on a per-seat-mile basis) as the distance flown in a given market  (the “stage length”) increases. According to data from Bombardier,  operating costs are higher for its CRJ than for its Q300 for stage lengths up  to about 380 miles but are lower for longer stage lengths. That is, RJs are  less cost-efficient to operate on shorter-range flights than turboprops. As a  result, the revenue requirements that a carrier must meet to operate a route  profitably will vary with the stage length and the type of aircraft operated.
section_title: Pilot Labor Agreements Affect RJ Use
paragraphs: According to industry officials, pilot labor agreements have influenced past  RJ deployments. However, as other agreements have been ratified more  recently, the potential effect of some aspects of these labor issues appears  to be waning for most carriers.
In past labor negotiations, pilots and airline officials have agreed to  restrictions on the number and/or size of the RJs the carriers’ affiliates can  operate. Mainline pilots see these restrictions as job protection  mechanisms because they ensure that a carrier cannot replace mainline  flights operated by its own pilots with RJ flights operated by a regional  affiliate’s pilots. These restrictions may be negotiated into the portion of  the labor contract generally referred to as the “scope clause.”
RJ-related scope clause provisions differ from carrier to carrier (see table  1). For example, the 1998 labor agreement between Continental and its  pilots generally did not limit the number of RJs that Continental’s affiliates  could fly, but it did restrict the size of the aircraft to a maximum of 59 seats.  The contract between American and its pilot union also limits the seating  capacity of the RJs that American Eagle can operate. By contrast,  Northwest’s RJ-related scope provisions basically limit the carrier’s RJ fleet  to a certain portion of its overall fleet.
RJ-related scope provisions in mainline pilot contracts continue to be a  part of recent and ongoing negotiations between carriers and pilots. Scope  clause agreements adopted in recent negotiations have generally allowed  for significant increases in the number, but not in the seating capacity, of  the RJs that a carrier can operate with pilots not on that carrier’s seniority  list. For example, the agreements between United and US Airways and  their respective pilot unions have increased the number of aircraft the  carriers can deploy. United’s limit increased from about 65 to about 300,  and US Airways’ limit rose from 35 to 70. As of January 2001, America West  and Delta were renegotiating contracts or contract extensions with their  pilots, and in each case, the new agreement could alter the scope clause  provisions.
American and Continental intend to begin renegotiating the contracts with  their pilot unions in 2001. For example, American and its pilot union plan to  begin contract negotiations in June 2001. This agreement followed the  union’s September 2000 rejection of a proposed contract extension that,  among other things, would have increased the number of 50-seat RJs that  American Eagle pilots could fly, but would have given mainline pilots the  right to fly 70-seat RJs. According to former union leaders, the union’s  membership rejected the proposed contract extension not because of the  scope provisions, but because the pay increase proposed by American was  not high enough compared with the increase that pilots at United had  secured in a contract negotiated in August 2000.
section_title: Other Factors May Affect RJ Deployment Decisions
paragraphs: Another factor that may affect a carrier’s RJ deployment decisions is the  carrier’s position in the manufacturing queue. The three primary RJ  manufacturers—Bombardier, Embraer, and Fairchild Dornier—all have  substantial backlogs of RJ aircraft orders and options. As of late 2000/early  2001, the manufacturers had not delivered 61 percent of U.S. carriers’ total  outstanding orders for RJs (including 50 percent of the orders for 50-seat  RJs). According to Bombardier, a new order for a CRJ200 would take at  least 24 months to be filled. A Delta official said that its early RJ order gave  Delta a competitive advantage because it is ahead of many other airlines in  the manufacturing queue. A US Airways official confirmed the importance  of a carrier’s place in the RJ manufacturing queue by telling us that, other  things being equal, US Airways would probably order RJs from the  manufacturer that could deliver them most quickly.
One carrier employed a different strategy to improve its place in the  manufacturing queue and acquire RJs sooner than originally planned. In  June 2000, Horizon Air (the sister company of Alaska Airlines) swapped  CRJ700 delivery positions with American to get these planes sooner than  originally contracted. This agreement will allow Horizon to take possession  of its first 14 CRJ700s by October 2001, well ahead of the original 2002-2003  schedule.
Whether a carrier’s hubs can accommodate increased aircraft arrivals and  departures and how close these hubs are to target markets are also  considerations that could influence a carrier’s RJ deployment strategy. For  example, although Continental’s Newark hub is relatively close to a large  number of potential markets for Continental’s RJ operations, the airport’s  high rate of delays and physical constraints limit its capacity to expand.  Continental officials told us that the airline might be forced to completely  abandon its RJ operations at Newark to protect its mainline service there  and to shift many of its RJ operations to its Cleveland hub, which has  neither the physical constraints nor the problems with congestion and  delay found at Newark. Similarly, the geographic location of some hubs  may limit the number of potentially profitable spoke cities—even with the  added range of RJs. For example, compared with hubs in some eastern or  midwestern cities, America West’s Phoenix hub is located near fewer large  cities that could be attractive RJ markets. On the other hand, Delta has  developed an RJ hub in Cincinnati (in conjunction with its mainline  operation there), and Northwest has begun to build a similar operation at  Memphis. According to FAA officials, both of those airports are relatively  uncongested and are within RJ operating distance of large numbers of  potential RJ markets.
section_title: Responses of Two Carriers to Factors Affecting RJ Deployment Produced Different Results
paragraphs: The experiences of Delta and US Airways illustrate how the various factors  influencing RJ deployment have affected their ability to deploy RJs and  their strategies for doing so. The two carriers differ greatly in the size of  their current RJ fleets and thus adopted markedly different strategies for  using RJs to compete in various markets. Table 2 summarizes the  differences in these carriers’ RJ deployment positions.
Operating within the parameters of its labor contract, Delta has deployed  more RJs than any other carrier, greatly expanding its network between  1993 and 2000. Its relationship with Comair—once an independently owned  airline operating as a code-sharing partner with Delta out of Cincinnati— facilitated this expansion. Comair was the first U.S. regional carrier to  deploy RJs widely. By 1996, it and two other Delta affiliates were operating  48 RJs—the only ones in service in the United States at the time. As of  October 2000, Delta’s affiliates were operating 168 RJs. These aircraft  served 178 U.S. markets, 76 percent of which included Delta’s hubs in  Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dallas, and Salt Lake City (see fig. 7). Delta’s 1996 labor  contract contained no scope clause restrictions on the number of RJs Delta  could operate. Additionally, the location of its hubs in Cincinnati and  Atlanta, which are within range of numerous profitable markets, has given  it a tremendous opportunity to expand RJ service to additional spoke  cities.
In part because of limitations in its pilot scope clause, US Airways has been  slower to acquire and has deployed far fewer RJs than Delta. As of October  2000, US Airways operated 30 RJs that are owned by its code-sharing  partners Chautauqua and Mesa airlines. These jets were serving 41 markets  out of locations such as Boston, Charlotte, New York (LaGuardia),  Philadelphia, and Reagan National (see fig. 8). US Airways officials said  that the airline’s management was aware that competitors were using RJs  to make inroads into US Airways’ network when the airline renegotiated its  pilot contract in 1997, but was unsuccessful in negotiating for more liberal  RJ rights with its pilot union. Because of the relatively slow development of  its RJ fleet, US Airways has tried to defend its markets by offering more  turboprop flights in the hope that more frequent turboprop service could  compete favorably against other carriers’ less frequent RJ service. At  LaGuardia, in particular, US Airways is trying to counter a large influx of  RJs from carriers such as Delta.
section_title: Experts Believe That RJ Growth Has Increased Congestion, but Extent Is Unclear
paragraphs: There is consensus among the studies we reviewed and the industry  experts we interviewed that RJs have contributed to congestion in our  national airspace, but there is less agreement about the nature or extent of  these effects. The experts we spoke with agreed that the growing number  of RJs was increasing congestion at already crowded hub airports, but they  varied in their views on whether specific characteristics of these jets, such  as their cruising speed or climbing ability relative to that of mainline jets,  were having a compounding effect.
subsections: section_title: Few Studies Identify RJs’ Role in Airspace Congestion
paragraphs: To date, only one comprehensive study has focused on how RJs may  affect congestion in the United States. Issued in 1999 by the MITRE  Corporation, the study focused primarily on congestion in en route  airspace and secondarily on airport congestion and infrastructure  concerns. A January 2000 update to the MITRE study estimated that if the  current scope clause limitations remained unchanged, up to 1,100 RJs  would be in service in the continental United States by the end of 2003 (an  increase from the 800 RJs estimated in the original 1999 study). The key  study we reviewed estimated a 31-percent (compounded yearly) increase in  RJ traffic between February 1998 and December 2003, compared with  FAA’s forecasted 3-percent (compounded yearly) increase in mainline jet  traffic for the same time period. This is equivalent to an increase of about  4,000 RJ flights per day over a 70-month period compared with an increase  of about 3,000 mainline jet flights per day over the same time period.
MITRE’s study generally concluded that the rapid growth of RJs operating  in U.S. airspace is likely to contribute to increased congestion in different  areas of the national airspace system. However, RJs represent an emerging  technology (compared to turboprops) that is allowing airlines to change  their service approaches and is increasing the competition between their  respective hubs for spoke-city traffic. As a result, the effects that RJs will  have on the structure and operations of the air transportation industry will  become clear only over time. Key points in the study include the following:  Currently, RJs fly mostly where airspace is already congested—at high  altitudes traditionally used by mainline jets, not at the lower altitudes  typically used by turboprops. Because the number of aircraft operating  at higher altitudes is increasing, congestion at high altitudes is likely to  worsen.
RJs perform similarly to older narrow-body jet aircraft (e.g., Boeing  737s) except that they climb at a slower rate. Thus, transition airspace  (used for climbing and descending) may become more congested and  include more types of aircraft (although MITRE did not specifically  include an analysis of transition airspace in its investigation).
Increased air traffic from RJs would create the highest levels of  congestion in the northeastern United States. There is no reasonable  way for air traffic to avoid this congested airspace, and congestion in  this region is expected to be a major concern by 2003.
Competition for passenger traffic onto different airline networks may  provide an opportunity to shift some traffic from badly congested hubs  to other locations, but the overall change in traffic patterns is unclear as  yet.
New runway capacity is predicted to relieve potential airport congestion  in some hub locations by 2003. These locations include Detroit/Wayne  County, Houston (Bush Intercontinental), and Minneapolis/St. Paul.  However, other hub airports with high RJ traffic are not likely to have  new runways by 2003. Similarly, other hub airports that have runways  unsuitable for RJs (i.e., those that are long enough for turboprops but  too short for RJs) are not likely to have those runways lengthened by  2003.
section_title: Industry Experts’ Opinions Supported Many of the Study’s Conclusions
paragraphs: Our discussions with a cross section of aviation industry experts  consistently confirmed many of the key issues identified in the MITRE  study. Among the experts’ key points were the following:  Increased number of RJs inevitably affects congestion. The industry  experts repeatedly expressed concern about the impact of adding so  many aircraft so quickly to airspace whose capacity is already  constrained. Because hundreds of new aircraft have been added to  already congested airspace while comparatively few turboprops have  been taken out of service, many of the experts believed it was inevitable  that congestion and delays would increase. They also noted that with  many more RJs on order, congestion and delays are not likely to  diminish in the near future. The number of daily RJ flights further  contributes to crowded skies.
RJs are flying into already congested airports. Industry experts also  stated that the effect of such a large infusion of aircraft was exacerbated  because these new aircraft were usually flying into already congested  airports. For example, after the enactment of AIR-21, air carriers filed  requests to add more than 600 new flights per day at New York’s  LaGuardia Airport—an increase of more than 50 percent in the number  of daily flights at what is considered to be one of the nation’s most  congested airports. The vast majority of those flight requests were for  RJ service. While action by FAA has since limited airport operations  (take-offs and landings) to a maximum of 75 per hour (allowing a total  increase of approximately 159 operations per day), the air carriers’  desire to serve this airport with RJs remains high. In October 2000, RJ  carriers had 120 daily departures scheduled from LaGuardia.
Effect of RJ flight characteristics is unclear. The experts we spoke with  varied widely in their views on how or whether RJs’ operating or flight  characteristics contributed significantly to congestion. Some believed  that transition airspace was a problem area while others were more  concerned about situations that might occur at cruise altitude when  faster mainline jets—especially large, widebody aircraft—overtook  slower RJs. Others believe that these different opinions reflect the lack  of a common understanding about how most RJs operate. Many also  thought that the congestion problems were not solely related to RJs’  operations or characteristics. Rather, congestion was associated more  broadly with constraints at individual airports—such as unique design  features (e.g., runway lengths) or particular air traffic control  procedures. For example, Dallas air traffic officials had some concerns  about fitting RJs into departure patterns and arrival sequences under  certain conditions.
According to data provided by industry experts, the characteristics of  RJs and mainline jets may differ somewhat during certain flight phases,  but RJ cruise speeds are highly compatible with those of older, narrow- body mainline jets. This information was generally confirmed by other  experts’ experiences. For example, when operating in transition  airspace, some RJs do not climb out at the same rate as some other  aircraft. According to air traffic officials, this can cause congestion and  delay by forcing other, faster jets to “stack up” behind the slower RJs.  One facility has addressed this issue by restricting RJs to lower altitudes  on departure and allowing other, larger jets to climb faster above the  RJs. Other air traffic control officials believed that the RJs’ cruise  speeds were compatible with those of other jets and did not find that  managing RJs posed any special challenge during this flight phase.
Congestion at high altitudes is also a concern because RJs are designed  to fly at the same altitudes as mainline jets. As their numbers grow, RJs  are increasingly competing for airspace that is already frequented by  many other aircraft, whereas turboprop aircraft typically fly in lower,  less congested airspace. According to FAA, this problem seems to be  particularly acute in the Northeast corridor, where air traffic is  particularly heavy.
Runway space may become more of a problem with more RJs. RJs  generally cannot use the shorter commuter runways that turboprops  typically use, but instead require the same longer runways that mainline  jets use. This is problematic in locations where runway space is already  at a premium. For example, at Washington’s Reagan National Airport,  only one of three runways is long enough to routinely accommodate  most jet aircraft. FAA and airport officials observed that the use of this  longest runway is increasing because regional airlines are replacing  traditional turboprop aircraft, which can use the shorter runways, with  RJs, which must use the longest runway. Some experts suggested that  this infrastructure constraint could become an even greater concern as  more and more RJs are deployed and increasingly compete with  mainline jets for limited runway space. This is significant because few  airports have additional runways under development, and according to  an FAA official, the time needed to add a new runway can be between 5  and 10 years.
section_title: Some Interim Solutions Have Been Developed to Ease Congestion and Delays, but the Industry Is Concerned About Developing Long-term Solutions
paragraphs: Given the projected growth in the fleet of RJs and the capacity constraints  of the current airspace system, industry experts agreed on the need for  crafting solutions. Some interim solutions that have been implemented or  are under consideration include the following:  Low-Altitude Alternative Departure Routes. This procedure allows an  aircraft to depart in certain situations—such as when higher altitudes  are congested—provided that the aircraft initially flies at a lower  altitude. As a result, aircraft are more often able to depart on time, but  they incur higher fuel costs by flying at lower altitudes. This procedure  involves RJs as well as other aircraft. Industry officials told us that the  airlines are generally willing to make this trade-off to maintain their  schedules.
Tactical Altitude Assignment Program. Under this pilot program, set to  begin officially in February 2001, certain short stage lengths between  city pairs are identified as low-altitude routes, and aircraft are allowed  to depart on these routes with potentially less delay provided that they  fly the entire route at the predetermined, lower-than-optimum altitude.  Because the program is voluntary, carriers can decide whether they  want to incur extra fuel costs to maintain their schedules. Many of the  selected city pairs included in this program are RJ routes, although this  program is not specifically directed toward RJs, according to an FAA  official.
Trade association representatives generally supported these and other  efforts to mitigate congestion, but expressed concern about initiatives that  specifically targeted regional aircraft. They believed that solutions to  congestion should be based on an aircraft’s operating and performance  characteristics, not on its type. They believed that equal access to the air  traffic control system and national airspace was important to the carriers  flying RJs and, in particular, to their passengers.
The experts we interviewed agreed that interim solutions are important,  given the projected growth in air traffic. In addition, these experts pointed  to the need for action on larger, long-standing issues. They said that air  traffic may not be able to grow as projected unless some of those needs  (e.g., for enhancements to airport infrastructure and improvements to the  air traffic control system) are addressed.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The increasing numbers of RJs in operation have provided U.S. air carriers  with opportunities to serve new and existing markets. As we have noted,  with predominantly 50-seat aircraft, the carriers have initiated service to  many large and medium-large communities but have provided less service  to smaller communities. Service to small communities—to which the  airlines now mostly operate turboprop aircraft—continues to be an  important concern, because of the uncertainty about whether those  markets may generate enough passenger traffic and revenue to be  financially viable to sustain RJ operations. Eventually, smaller RJs (i.e., 32-  or 37-seat aircraft) may let carriers serve those smaller communities  economically.
Other questions also emerge about the impact of how the carriers will use  their RJs. For example, the airlines could restrict capacity in a market by  reducing service with larger mainline jets but increasing the number of RJ  flights in a way that may inhibit entry by new competitors, allowing the  airlines to charge fares higher than might exist in a more competitive  market. Additionally, the growth in RJs has clearly contributed to an  increasing problem with congestion, particularly in some locations like  New York’s LaGuardia Airport. But how the expected growth in RJs may  continue to contribute to congestion and delay remains to be seen.  Depending on how events unfold in the near future, these and other  potential impacts of the airlines’ RJ strategies may warrant continued  oversight.
section_title: Comments
paragraphs: We provided representatives from the eight carriers whose regional  affiliates or code-sharing partners operate RJs (America West, American,  Continental, Delta, Northwest, TWA, United, and US Airways) with draft  copies of the sections of the report describing RJ deployment information  and other factual descriptions of their historical and existing RJ service. We  also provided draft copies of report sections to the Department of  Transportation (DOT) and other interested parties, such as the Air Line  Pilots Association, Allied Pilots Association, Regional Airline Association,  Horizon Air, and the three RJ manufacturers—Bombardier, Embraer, and  Fairchild Dornier. Representatives of the airlines and officials from DOT  and the various industry groups offered technical comments, which we  incorporated into the report as appropriate.
As arranged with your office, we plan no further distribution of this report  until 30 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will provide copies  to the Honorable Norman Mineta, Secretary of Transportation; the  Honorable Jane Garvey, FAA Administrator; major U.S. airlines; the Air  Line Pilots Association; the Allied Pilots Association; the Regional Airline  Association; the RJ manufacturers; and other interested parties. We will  also send copies to others upon request.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me or  Steve Martin at (202) 512-2834. Other key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report examined how U.S. air carriers are using regional jets and what  issues surround the carriers’ abilities to use these aircraft. Our work  focused on three questions: (1) What is the status of regional jet  deployment in the United States and how has this service evolved since  1997? (2) What factors have affected the airlines’ decisions in deploying  regional jets? (3) What effect have regional jets had on air traffic and  airport congestion, according to published studies and experts in the field?
To determine the current status of regional jet (RJ) deployment within the  United States, we first needed to define this class of aircraft. There is no  uniformly accepted definition of an RJ either in the industry or in federal  laws and regulations. For example, the Wendell H. Ford Aviation  Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, P.L. 106-181 (AIR-21),  variously defines an RJ as having a maximum seating capacity of “not less  than 30 nor more than 75” (sec. 210) or “less than 71” (sec. 231). Within the  industry, the term “regional jet” is sometimes used to describe larger  aircraft, such as the Fokker F-100 (100 seats) and Boeing 717 (106 seats),  and older-technology aircraft, such as the Fokker F-28 (69 seats) and BAe  146-100 (70-82 seats). In this report, we defined RJs as newer aircraft that  have been placed into service since 1993 and are designed to seat 70 or  fewer passengers.
We generally limited our analyses of RJ deployment to major network air  carriers: America West Airlines, American Airlines, Continental Airlines,  Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, Trans World Airlines, United Airlines,  and US Airways. We excluded Alaska Airlines, Southwest Airlines, and  American Trans Air because they or their regional affiliates do not operate  RJs (as defined above).
To determine where those carriers operated their RJs, we analyzed  historical data on airline traffic and current data on airline schedules. To  obtain historical airline traffic data, we contracted with BACK Aviation  Solutions (BACK), an aviation consulting firm, which obtains operational  and financial information submitted by all U.S. airlines to the Department  of Transportation (DOT). These data include the Origin and Destination  Survey (O&D), based on a 10-percent sample of tickets containing itinerary  and pricing information; T-100 on-flight data; and 298C T-1 data, which  supplement the T-100 data with data on commuter and small certified air  carriers. BACK makes certain adjustments to these data, such as correcting  recognized deficiencies in the air carriers’ O&D data submissions, when  these submissions have not met DOT’s standard of 95-percent accuracy. To  determine the carriers’ scheduled use of RJs, we analyzed airline flight  schedule information that we purchased from the Kiehl Hendrickson  Group, an aviation consulting firm. We did not independently assess the  reliability of the data we purchased from either BACK or the Kiehl  Hendrickson Group. Finally, to determine the size of communities that  have received or are scheduled to receive RJ service, we obtained  information on the populations of metropolitan statistical areas from the  U.S. Bureau of the Census. We used the latest available Census data, which  at the time we did our work were estimates for 1998. We used the Bureau’s  definitions to assign each city to one of four population levels: “Small  cities” are those with populations of less than 100,000. “Medium cities” are  those with populations between 100,000 and 249,999. “Medium-large cities”  are those with populations between 250,000 and 999,999. “Large cities” are  those with populations of 1 million or more.
We determined the total number of cities to which airlines operated RJs, as  well as the total number of markets. In the airline industry, markets are  generally defined in terms of service between a point of origin and a point  of destination. Thus, a market is often, but not always, defined as a city  pair. Some cities, however, are served by more than one airport. In our  counts of the number of markets served by RJs, we adopted the definition  of a market as a city pair and included all airports that served a  metropolitan area as serving that city. Thus, for example, in locations such  as Chicago, we counted RJ service from some other city to both O’Hare  International and Midway airports as RJ service to the Chicago market. The  total number of markets served is greater than the number of cities because  many spoke cities receive service from more than one airline—through  different hubs. Competing airline networks and hubs create multiple  markets. To eliminate markets that might receive less service than one  flight per day for business days, we included only those that had a  minimum of 20 RJ departures in October 2000. The definitions we used in  our analysis are generally consistent with those used by other industry  experts.
As part of our effort to determine the status of RJ deployments, we also  determined how the type of service provided by carriers changed over  time. Prior research had established six main categories for how service in  markets may change with the introduction of RJs: establishment of new  markets, mainline jet replacement, mainline jet supplement, turboprop  replacement, turboprop supplement, and both mainline jet and turboprop  supplement. Table 3 shows how each of those categories is defined.
Using these same categories, we examined RJ deployment in city-pair  markets where carriers introduced RJs between January 1997 and October  2000, and those RJs were still scheduled for service in October 2000.
To determine what factors have affected airlines’ deployment of RJs, we  interviewed officials from aircraft manufacturers, pilot unions, major  airlines, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as well as industry  experts and consultants. We interviewed airline officials to determine what  criteria and processes they use in making deployment decisions. These  officials also helped us understand the airlines’ perspectives in pilot  contract negotiations. Union officials provided the labor perspective on  scope issues, as well as data on the airlines’ uses of RJs. We interviewed  FAA officials to determine whether infrastructure issues (e.g., airport  runways and capacity) might have played a role in the airlines’ deployment  of RJs. Industry experts and consultants provided a third perspective on RJ  deployment and pilot labor issues. In addition, we reviewed studies and  documents provided by these officials, as well as documents and studies  obtained through literature and Internet searches.
To determine the effect of RJs on congestion, we reviewed the limited  number of available studies and consulted with a wide range of industry  officials. To develop a list of relevant, comprehensive reports on RJs and  congestion, we conducted a literature search and contacted industry  officials. To identify industry experts, we relied on the recommendations of  many knowledgeable industry officials. We interviewed officials from  various sources, including the airlines, FAA (both headquarters staff and air  traffic controllers in certain field locations), aviation industry consulting  firms, and industry trade associations.
We conducted our work from March 2000 through February 2001 in  Washington, D.C.; Seattle, Washington; and Dallas and Houston, Texas, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Regional Jets: Manufacturers, Characteristics, and Demand
paragraphs: The regional jets (RJ) primarily in service in the United States are  manufactured by three companies: Bombardier, Embraer, and Fairchild  Dornier. Bombardier, a Canadian company, was the first to enter the U.S.  market in 1993 with its 50-seat Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ). Embraer,  which is headquartered in Brazil, entered the U.S. market in 1997 with its  50-seat ERJ-145 and in 1999 with its ERJ-135. Embraer is also developing  the 44-seat ERJ-140. This plane is slated to enter service in the first quarter  of 2001. Fairchild Dornier, which is based in Germany, first entered the  market in 1999 with its 328Jet, the first 32-seat jet. Each of these companies  also manufactures turboprops and is developing 70-seat RJs. These 70-seat  aircraft are scheduled to go into service within the next 3 years. Table 4  lists some operating characteristics of these RJs. Figures 9 through 15 are  photographs of the Bombardier, Embraer, and Fairchild Dornier RJs that  are either now in service or proposed for U.S. commercial service.
These manufacturers have significant backlogs for U.S. orders. For  example, Bombardier has not yet delivered 47 percent of the U.S. orders for  its 50-seat CRJ. Embraer has not yet delivered 54 percent of the U.S. orders  for its 50-seat ERJ and 51 percent of the U.S. orders for its ERJ-135.  Fairchild Dornier has not delivered 69 percent of the U.S. orders for its  328Jet. Table 5 presents the number of orders, options, and deliveries,  together with the backlog for each aircraft type.
To address their backlogs, Bombardier and Embraer planned to increase  production of their aircraft. Bombardier planned to increase its CRJ100/200  production from 9.5 per month to 12.5 per month in the fall of 2001. This  will allow the company to produce 135 aircraft in 2001-2002 and 150 aircraft  in 2002-2003. Bombardier is building a new plant at Montreal’s Mirabel  airport to handle the final assembly of the CRJ700 as well as of the CRJ900  (a planned 86- to 90-seat jet). Embraer also planned to increase production  of its RJs. The company expected to deliver 150 RJs in 2000 and nearly 200  in 2001.
section_title: U.S. Cities With Regional Jet Service as of October 2000
paragraphs: Airline and year RJ service started DL (1997), CO (1998), US (1999)
DL (1999)
HP (1998), CO (2000)
DL (1997), US (1998), CO (1999), AA (2000), HP (2000)
DL (1998), CO (2000), NW (2000)
DL (1997), CO (1998), US (1998), NW (2000)
AA (1998), DL (1998), UA (1998), CO (1999), HP (1999)
DL (1997), AA (1998), CO (1998), NW (1998), US (1998), TW (2000)
DL (1997), AA (1998), CO (1998), NW (1998), UA (2000)
DL (1997), AA (1998), HP (1998), UA (1999), US (2000)
AA (1998), CO (1998), NW (1999), DL (2000)
UA (1999)
DL (1997), NW (1998)
DL (2000)
DL (1997), AA (1999), NW (1999), US (1999), CO (2000)
DL (1997), CO (1998), NW (1999), AA (2000), UA (2000), US (2000)
CO (1998), HP (2000)
CO (1998), DL (1998), AA (1999)
DL (1997), AA (1998), CO (1998), UA (1998), US (1999)
UA (1998), CO (1999), DL (1999)
DL (1997), CO (1999)
DL (1997), HP (1999)
DL (1998), CO (1999)
DL (1997), AA (1999), CO (1999), NW (2000)
DL (1997)
CO (1999), AA (2000)
DL (1997), AA (1998), CO (1998), US (1998), UA (2000)
DL (1997), CO (1998), NW (1998)
DL (1997), CO (1998), UA (1998), US (1999), AA (2000), NW (2000)
DL (1997)
DL (1997), CO (1998), HP (1998), AA (1999), UA (1999), US (1999)
AA (2000), CO (2000), DL (2000), UA (2000)
AA (2000), CO (2000), DL (2000), UA (2000)
DL (1997)
Airline and year RJ service started DL (1997), CO (2000)
DL (1997), HP (1998), US (1998), CO (1999), AA (2000)
HP (1997)
DL (1997), CO (1998), NW (1998), AA (1999)
DL (1997)
CO (1999), DL (2000), UA (2000)
DL (1997), CO (1998), UA (1998), US (1998)
DL (1997), US (1999), CO (2000), NW (2000)
DL (1997)
DL (1999)
DL (1997)
DL (1997), CO (1998), US (1998), NW (1999), TW (2000)
CO (2000)
DL (1997), UA (1998), US (1998), CO (1999), HP (1999)
DL (1997), UA (2000)
CO (1999), UA (1999)
DL (1997)
DL (1997)
DL (1997), UA (1999), NW (2000)
HP (1999)
AA (1999), CO (1999), NW (2000)
DL (1997), US (1998), CO (1999), NW (2000), UA (2000)
DL (1997)
CO (1999)
UA (1998), CO (1999), DL (1999), US (1999), NW (2000), TW (2000)
DL (1998), UA (1998), US (1998)
DL (1997), AA (2000), NW (2000)
DL (1997), CO (1999), HP (1999)
DL (1997), CO (1998), UA (1999), US (1999)
CO (1998), DL (1999), AA (2000)
DL (1997), AA (1998), CO (1998), NW (1998), US (1999), TW (2000)
DL (1999)
DL (1997), HP (1997), AA (1998), NW (1998)
CO (1999), HP (1999)
HP (1999)
DL (1997), AA (2000)
Airline and year RJ service started DL (1998)
AA (1998), DL (1999), NW (1999), TW (2000)
NW (2000)
DL (1999)
DL (1997), AA (2000), NW (2000), UA (2000)
HP (1997), DL (1998), UA (2000)
DL (1997), CO (1998), UA (1998), AA (1999), NW (2000), TW (2000), US (2000)
DL (1997), NW (2000)
DL (1997), NW (1999)
DL (1997), US (1998), AA (1999), CO (1999), NW (2000)
DL (1997), UA (1999), NW (2000), TW (2000)
DL (1997), NW (1998), AA (1999), UA (2000)
DL (1997), NW (1998), AA (1999), CO (1999), US (1999)
CO (1998)
DL (1998)
DL (1997), NW (1998)
DL (1997), US (1998), CO (2000), UA (2000)
DL (1997), CO (1998), US (1999), UA (2000)
DL (1997)
DL (1998), AA (1999), UA (1999), CO (2000)
DL (1999)
CO (1998), DL (1999), UA (1999), NW (2000)
HP (1999)
AA (1998)
DL (1998)
DL (1997), AA (1999), CO (1999)
CO (2000), NW (2000)
AA (1999), UA (1999), TW (2000)
DL (2000)
DL (1997), AA (2000), CO (2000), US (2000)
NW (2000)
HP (1997)
DL (1999)
CO (1998), UA (1998), DL (1999), US (1999), AA (2000)
AA (1998), TW (2000)
DL (1997), NW (1998), AA (2000)
UA (1998), AA (2000), NW (2000)
Airline and year RJ service started DL (1997)
DL (1997)
DL (1997), AA (2000)
HP (1999)
DL (1997), NW (2000), UA (2000)
DL (1997), CO (1998), HP (1999), NW (2000)
DL (1997), UA (1998)
DL (2000)
DL (1997), NW (1998), AA (2000)
AA (1998)
CO (1998), DL (2000)
DL (1997)
DL (1997), UA (1999)
AA (2000), NW (2000)
CO (1998), UA (1999), US (1999), DL (2000)
DL (1997), AA (1998), NW (1998)
AA (2000)
DL (1998)
DL (2000)
AA (1998), NW (1998)
NW (1999), UA (1999)
AA (2000)
DL (1997)
DL (1998)
DL (1998), NW (1998), AA (2000), UA (2000)
NW (1998), AA (2000)
TW (2000)
CO (1998), AA (2000), DL (2000)
DL (1997), CO (1999)
DL (1997), CO (1999)
DL (1997)
DL (1997)
UA (1998), CO (2000), DL (2000)
DL (1997), UA (1998)
NW (2000)
UA (1999)
Airline and year RJ service started DL (1997)
DL (1999)
DL (1999)
DL (1997), UA (2000)
DL (1997)
DL (1997)
HP (1999)
NW (1997)
CO (2000)
DL (1997)
DL (1998)
DL (1997)
DL (1997)
AA (1999), NW (1999)
DL (1997), CO (1998), NW (2000)
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Dawn Hoff, David Hooper, Joseph Kile,  Sara Ann Moessbauer, Tim Schindler, Stan Stenersen, and Pamela Vines  made key contributions to this report.
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section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, or Abuse in Federal Programs
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