Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing
Published: 2005-09-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: GAO reported in October 2002 that the visa process needed to be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and recommended that the Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agencies, (1) develop a clear policy on the role of national security in the visa process, (2) create more comprehensive guidance on how consular officers should screen against potential terrorists, (3) fundamentally reassess staffing requirements, and (4) revamp and expand consular training. This report examines State's and other agencies' progress in implementing changes to the visa process since 2002, in the areas of policy and guidance; consular resources, including staffing and training; and information sharing.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of State (State), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other agencies have taken many steps to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. Led by the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, consular officers have received clear guidance on the importance of national security. We observed that consular officers at eight posts, including those of interest to antiterrorism efforts, regard security as their top priority, while recognizing the importance of facilitating legitimate travel. State has also increased hiring of consular officers, targeted recruitment of foreign language speakers, revamped consular training with a focus on counterterrorism, and increased resources to combat visa fraud. Further, intelligence and law enforcement agencies have shared more information for consular officers' use in conducting name checks on visa applicants. Additional issues require attention. For example, State has not consistently updated the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs Manual to reflect recent policy changes. Consular officers we interviewed also said that guidance is needed on DHS staff's roles and responsibilities overseas. Actions are also needed to ensure that State has sufficient experienced staff with the necessary language skills at key consular posts. In particular, staffing shortages at the supervisory level place a burden on new officers. In February 2005, we found that the visa sections in critical posts in Saudi Arabia and Egypt were staffed with first-tour officers and no permanent midlevel visa chiefs to provide guidance. Further improvements in training and fraud prevention are also needed, and additional information from FBI criminal history files would allow consular officers to help facilitate efficient visa adjudication.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: All 19 of the September 11, 2001, terrorist hijackers were issued a  nonimmigrant visa, which is a U.S. travel document that foreign citizens  must generally obtain before entering the country temporarily for  business, tourism, or other reasons. In deciding to approve or deny a visa  application, Department of State (State) consular officers are on the front  line of defense in protecting the United States against potential terrorists  and others whose entry would likely be harmful to U.S. national interests.  Consular officers must balance this security responsibility against the  need to facilitate legitimate travel. In October 2002, we identified  shortcomings and made recommendations on State’s policy on the role of  national security in the visa process, procedures for addressing heightened  border security concerns, staffing, and counterterrorism training of  consular officers. Similarly, staff of the National Commission on Terrorist  Attacks Upon the United States, or the 9-11 Commission, reported that  while there were efforts to enhance border security prior to September 11,  no agency of the U.S. government at that time thought of the visa process  as an antiterrorism tool. Indeed, the 9-11 Commission staff reported that  consular officers were not trained to screen for terrorists.
Given the widespread congressional interest in ensuring that visa  operations are a tool to prevent those who might pose a threat from  obtaining a visa, we reviewed the changes that State, the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), and other agencies have made since our 2002  report to address potential vulnerabilities in the visa process, and  determined whether additional vulnerabilities remain. To assess agencies’  progress in implementing changes to the visa process since 2002, we  reviewed changes in visa policy and guidance; consular resources,  including staffing and training; and the extent to which U.S. agencies share  information with visa adjudicators. In addition, we conducted structured  interviews with visa chiefs and other consular affairs staff from 25 posts  overseas, either via telephone or in person, on issues related to visa policy  and consular resources, among others. We observed visa operations and  interviewed U.S. government officials at 8 U.S. consular posts in seven  countries—Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Spain, Saudi Arabia, and  the United Kingdom. We chose these countries because they are of interest  to antiterrorism efforts. In Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials from  State, DHS, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). We conducted  our work from August 2004 through August 2005, in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards (see app. I for more  information on our scope and methodology).
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, is the primary  body of law governing immigration and visa operations. The Homeland  Security Act of 2002 generally grants DHS exclusive authority to issue  regulations on, administer, and enforce the Immigration and Nationality  Act and all other immigration and nationality laws relating to the functions  of U.S. consular officers in connection with the granting or denial of visas.  As we reported in July 2005, the act also authorizes DHS, among other  things, to assign employees to any consular post to review individual visa  applications and provide expert advice and training to consular officers  regarding specific security threats related to the visa process. A  subsequent September 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between  State and DHS further outlines the responsibilities of each agency with  respect to visa issuance. DHS is responsible for establishing visa policy,  reviewing implementation of the policy, and providing additional  direction. State manages the visa process, as well as the consular corps  and its functions at 211 visa-issuing posts overseas. In addition, State  provides guidance, in consultation with DHS, to consular officers  regarding visa policies and procedures. In technical comments on a draft  of this report, State emphasized that the Secretary of State has the lead  role with respect to foreign policy-related visa issues.
Several agencies stationed at U.S. embassies and consulates can assist  consular officers and support the visa adjudication process. On a formal  basis, all embassy sections and agencies involved in security, law  enforcement, and intelligence activities are expected to participate in the  congressionally mandated “Visas Viper” terrorist reporting program. This  program is primarily administered through a Visas Viper Committee at  each overseas post and chaired by the deputy chief of mission or the post’s  principal officer. The committees meet at least monthly to share  information on known or suspected terrorists and determine whether such  information should be sent to Washington, D.C., for potential inclusion on  watch lists. Interagency information sharing at post can also occur on an  informal basis. For example, overseas FBI officials can assist consular  officers when questions about an applicant’s potential criminal history  arise during adjudication. Additionally, DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration  and Customs Enforcement have responsibility for some immigration and  border security programs overseas, and consular officers may seek advice  from these officials on issues such as DHS procedures at U.S. ports of  entry.
The process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains  several steps, including documentation reviews, in-person interviews,  collection of biometrics (fingerprints), and cross-referencing an  applicant’s name against the Consular Lookout and Support System  (CLASS)  (see fig. 1).
In 2002, we recommended actions to strengthen the visa process as an  antiterrorism tool, including    establishing a clear policy on the priority attached to addressing  national security concerns through the visa process;    creating more comprehensive, risk-based guidelines and standards on  how consular officers should use the visa process as a screen against  potential terrorists;    performing a fundamental reassessment of staffing and language skill  requirements for visa operations; and  revamping and expanding consular training courses to place more  emphasis on detecting potential terrorists.
section_title: Visa Process Strengthened, and Further Actions Would Support Ongoing Improvements
paragraphs: Since our 2002 report, State, DHS, and other agencies have taken  numerous steps to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool and  increase its overall efficiency and effectiveness. In particular, the Assistant  Secretary in the Bureau of Consular Affairs has taken a leadership role in  implementing changes to the visa process and promoting the use of the  process as a screen against potential terrorists. However, additional  actions could enhance the visa process. State has increased and clarified  visa policies and guidance, but additional steps are needed to ensure these  changes are implemented. Additionally, State has increased resources to  strengthen the visa process, including hiring additional consular officers,  targeting recruitment, and expanding training efforts; however, staffing  limitations remain a concern, posts seek further training, and other gaps  remain. Lastly, while interagency information-sharing efforts have  increased, consular officers do not have direct access to detailed  information from the FBI’s criminal history records, which would help  facilitate the approval of visas for legitimate travelers. Figure 2  summarizes the steps taken to improve the visa process since 2002 and  areas that require additional management attention.
subsections: section_title: Visa Policies, Procedures, and Guidance Enhanced, but Additional Steps Needed to Ensure They Are Implemented
paragraphs: We reported in October 2002 that consular officers held differing views on  balancing the need for national security and customer service in the visa  process. In addition, State had not issued comprehensive policy guidance  to posts regarding how consular officers should react to the heightened  border security concerns following the September 11 attacks. Since our  report, State implemented several changes to address these issues, and  consular officials stated that our 2002 report and its recommendations  provided a framework for these changes. For example, in February 2003,  Consular Affairs issued guidance identifying national security as the first  priority of the visa process. Consular officers we interviewed said the  guidance was generally clear, and officers at all eight posts we visited  viewed security as the most critical element of the visa process. In  addition, Consular Affairs identified certain areas where additional  guidance was needed to improve visa procedures. For example, State has  issued more than 80 standard operating procedures, in consultation with  DHS, to inform consular officers on issues such as    citizens of countries requiring special clearance requirements and other    annotating visas with current and historical information about a visa  applicant to assist immigration inspectors at ports of entry.
To reinforce standard operating procedures and internal controls, State  created Consular Management Assistance Teams that conduct  management reviews of consular sections worldwide. These teams  comprise Consular Affairs officials, diplomatic security officials, and DHS  officials, and they report directly to the Assistant Secretary for Consular  Affairs. According to State, as of June 2005, the teams have completed 81  field visits and have provided guidance to posts on standard operating  procedures, as well as other areas where consular services could become  more efficient. In addition, State has regional consular officer positions  overseas, through which five experienced officers serve as regional  officers to 56 posts in Europe, Near East, and Africa. These officers  provide support and guidance to less-experienced officers in small  consular sections at neighboring posts where, in many instances, there are  no other officers at post with recent consular experience.
Despite these improvements, some consular officers we interviewed  stated that it has been difficult to synthesize and consistently apply all of  the changes to the visa process. The guidance provided to consular  officers in the field is voluminous and can change rapidly, according to  consular officials. The Consular Affairs Bureau may notify its officers  overseas of policy changes through cables, postings on its internal Web  site, and informal communications. However, the bureau has not  consistently updated the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs  Manual—State’s central Internet resource for all regulations, policies, and  guidance—to reflect these changes. Throughout 2005, the bureau updated  several portions of the manual, but, as of June 2005, some sections had not  been updated since October 2004, such as policies on consular duties,  clearances at post, and the submission of fingerprints to the FBI for visa  applications. Consular officials also stated that they are overhauling the  standard operating procedures to eliminate those that are obsolete and  incorporate current requirements into the manual. While the Consular  Affairs Bureau’s internal Web site contains all of the standard operating  procedures, it also links to out-of-date sections in the manual, which do  not yet incorporate all updated procedures. As a result, there is no single,  reliable source for current information. The visa chief at one post in Africa  told us that while the additional guidance from Consular Affairs has been a  positive step, consular officers should not have to go back to paper files to  locate it. Some posts we visited had developed their own methods—such  as creating standard operating procedure reference books and holding  weekly staff meetings to discuss all new policies—to help ensure that all  consular officers were applying the new procedures consistently and  appropriately. The consular section in London, for example, created a  post-specific internal Web site to post guidance for consular officers.  According to State officials, in August 2004, Consular Affairs developed a  classified Web site to post additional guidance that is accessible to all  consular officers, but only 48 percent of visa chiefs we interviewed  reported having used the Web site.
Consular officers also indicated that additional guidance is needed on  certain interagency protocols. Specifically, 15 out of 25 visa chiefs we  interviewed reported that additional guidance would be helpful regarding  the interaction between the Bureau of Consular Affairs and DHS. For  example, DHS personnel stationed overseas work on a variety of  immigration and border security activities and largely serve in a regional  capacity. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services staff, for instance,  have regional offices in Rome, Bangkok, and Mexico City that can assist  consular officers in surrounding posts. However, DHS has not provided  guidance to consular officers regarding the roles and geographic  responsibilities of its personnel. In addition, consular officers at several  posts told us it is difficult to identify points of contact at DHS’s overseas  offices when questions arise on issues such as immigration violation  records in CLASS. Further, consular officers at all posts we reviewed  stated they would like additional information on DHS procedures at the  ports of entry into the United States, such as guidance on how to resolve  cases in which visa holders have been denied entry to the United States.  For example, detailed information on the reason why a visa holder was not  allowed into the United States—the person was recently placed on a  watch list, for example—is not automatically transferred to CLASS. A  senior consular official stated that State and DHS are working to create a  link between consular and border inspectors’ databases that would allow  the transfer of data, including transcripts of interviews at ports of entry.
section_title: Resources for Visa Function Increased, but Staffing Shortages and Other Gaps Remain a Concern
paragraphs: In 2002, we found that at some posts the demand for visas, combined with  increased workload per visa applicant, exceeded the available staff. As a  result, we recommended that State perform a fundamental reassessment  of staffing requirements for visa operations. We continue to see the need  for such an assessment. While State has been able to hire more entry-level  officers in recent years, we found that more than one-quarter of State’s  midlevel consular positions were either vacant or filled by an entry-level  officer. In addition, consular headquarters officials may not have  accurate statistics on wait times for visa interviews from which to allocate  resources effectively, and visa applicants may be using inaccurate wait- time information when planning their travel to the United States. State has  also increased its targeted recruitment of foreign language proficient  officers, but gaps remain. Further, State has expanded its training efforts,  but additional training would further benefit consular officers. Moreover,  State has strengthened its fraud prevention efforts, but has not developed  systematic criteria to identify high-fraud posts. Finally, State has increased  funding to improve consular facilities, but many posts’ facilities remain  inadequate.
subsections: section_title: State Has Hired More Consular Officers, but Has Not Assessed Overall Resource Needs
paragraphs: Since 2002, State has received funding to address ongoing staffing  shortfalls, but we continue to see the need for a fundamental reassessment  of resource needs worldwide. Through the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative  and other sources, State has increased the number of Foreign Service  officer consular positions by 364, from 1,037 in fiscal year 2002 to 1,401 in  fiscal year 2005. Moreover, human resource officials anticipate that many  officers hired under the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative will begin to reach  promotion eligibility for midlevel positions within the next two years.  However, as we previously reported in 2003, the overall shortage of  midlevel Foreign Service officers would remain until approximately 2013.  As of April 30, 2005, we found that 26 percent of midlevel consular  positions were either vacant or filled by an entry-level officer (see fig. 3).  In addition, almost three-quarters of the vacant positions were at the FS-03  level—midlevel officers who generally supervise entry-level staff—which  consular officials attribute to low hiring levels prior to the Diplomatic  Readiness Initiative and the necessary expansion of entry-level positions  to accommodate increasing workload requirements after September 11,  2001.
Senior (44)
Vacant (58)
Midlevel (478)
Staffed with entry-level officers (65)
Staffed by at least  midlevel officers (355)
Entry-level (879)
During our February 2005 visits to Riyadh, Jeddah, and Cairo, we observed  that the consular sections were staffed with entry-level officers on their  first assignment with no permanent midlevel visa chief to provide  supervision and guidance. Although these posts had other mid- or senior- level consular officers, their availability on visa issues was limited because  of their additional responsibilities. For example, the head of the visa  section in Jeddah was responsible for managing the entire section, as well  as services for American citizens due to a midlevel vacancy in that  position. At the time of our visit, the Riyadh Embassy did not have a  midlevel visa chief. Similarly, in Cairo, there was no permanent midlevel  supervisor between the winter of 2004 and the summer of 2005, and  Consular Affairs used five temporary staff on a rotating basis during this  period to serve in this capacity. Entry-level officers we spoke with stated  that due to the constant turnover, the temporary supervisors were unable  to assist them adequately. At the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, entry-level  officers expressed concern about the lack of a midlevel supervisor.  Officers in Jeddah stated that they relied on the guidance they received  from the DHS visa security officer assigned to the post. However, as of  July 2005, visa security officers are stationed only at consular posts in  Saudi Arabia—not at any of the other 209 visa-issuing posts overseas.
If the Consular Affairs Bureau identifies a need for additional staff in  headquarters or overseas, it may request that the Human Resources  Bureau establish new positions.  In addition, posts can also describe their  needs for additional positions through their consular package—a report  submitted annually to the Consular Affairs Bureau that details workload  statistics and staffing requirements, among other things. For example, in  December 2004, during the course of our work, the consular section in  Riyadh reported to Washington that there was an immediate need to  create a midlevel visa chief position at post, and consular officials worked  with human resource officials to create this position, which according to  State officials, will be filled by summer 2005.
However, the current assignment process does not guarantee that all  authorized positions will be filled, particularly at hardship posts.  Historically, State has rarely directed its employees to serve in locations  for which they have not bid on a position, including hardship posts or  locations of strategic importance to the United States, due to concerns  that such staff may be more apt to have poor morale or be less  productive. Due to State’s decision to not force assignments, along with  the limited amount of midlevel officers available to apply for them,  important positions may remain vacant.
According to a deputy assistant secretary for human resources, Consular  Affairs can prioritize those positions that require immediate staffing to  ensure that officers are assigned to fill critical staffing gaps. For example,  Consular Affairs could choose not to advertise certain positions of lesser  priority during an annual assignment cycle. However, senior Consular  Affairs officials acknowledged that they rarely do this. According to these  officials, Consular Affairs does not have direct control over the filling of all  consular positions and can often face resistance from regional bureaus  and chiefs of mission overseas who do not want vacancies at their posts.  Thus, as we have previously reported, certain high-priority positions may  not be filled if Foreign Service officers do not bid on them.
section_title: Increased Consular Workload Exacerbates Staffing Shortages
paragraphs: Additions to consular workload since the September 11 attacks have  exacerbated State’s resource constraints. Both Congress and State have  initiated a series of changes since our 2002 report to increase the security  of border security policies and procedures, which have added to the  complexity of consular officers’ workload. These changes include the  following:    Consular officers are no longer able to routinely waive interviews; as of  August 2003, waivers for visa applicant interviews are limited to a few  categories, such as the elderly, diplomats, and young children.
As of October 2004, consular officers are required to scan foreign  nationals’ right and left index fingers and clear the fingerprints through  the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System before an  applicant can receive a visa.
Some responsibilities previously delegated to Foreign Service  nationals and consular associates have been transferred to consular  officers. For example, as of September 30, 2005, consular associates  will no longer be authorized to adjudicate visas.
Due to the new interview requirements and screening procedures, as well  as potential staffing shortages, applicants may face extensive wait times  for visa interviews at some consular posts overseas. According to consular  officials, in general, State considers that posts with consistent wait times  for visa interview appointments of 30 days or longer may signal a resource  or management problem. However, reliable data that could determine the  extent to which posts face long delays are not available. To monitor posts’  progress in achieving this goal, according to consular headquarters  officials, State requires that posts report, on a weekly basis, the wait times  for applicant interviews to allow officials to monitor posts’ workload.  State’s data showed that between November 2004 and May 2005, 63 posts  reported wait times of 30 or more days in at least one month; at 13 posts,  the wait times were in excess of 30 days for the entire 6-month period. As  of July 2004, these data are posted on State’s Web site so that applicants  will have the information when applying for a visa. However, posts are  often late to report these data, according to consular officials. Indeed, our  analysis of State’s data on wait times revealed significant numbers of posts  that did not report on a weekly basis during this 6-month period.  Therefore, the data are not sufficiently reliable to fully determine how  many posts have wait times in excess of 30 days. Consular headquarters  officials may not have accurate workload statistics from which to allocate  resources effectively, and visa applicants may be using inaccurate wait- time information when planning their travel to the United States. For  example, there could be additional posts with 30-day or more wait times  that have not reported these data to Consular Affairs.
section_title: Targeted Recruitment Has Increased Number of Foreign Language Proficient Officers, but Gaps Remain
paragraphs: In our 2002 report, we found that not all consular officers were proficient  enough in their post’s language to hold interviews with applicants. In 2003,  we reported that State had not filled all of its positions requiring foreign  language skills. We noted that a lack of staff with foreign language skills  had weakened the fight against international terrorism and resulted in less  effective representation of U.S. interests overseas. In addition, we  reported that some entry-level officers did not meet the minimum language  proficiency requirements of the positions in countries of strategic  importance to the United States. In response, State has created programs  to better target its recruitment of Foreign Service officers who speak  critical languages. For example, in March 2004, State created the “Critical  Needs Language Program,” which increases the opportunities for  appointment to the Foreign Service for new hires proficient in Arabic,  Chinese, Indic, Korean, Russian, or Turkic, and who have passed the  Foreign Service Exam. From March 2004 through May 2005, 172 of the  564 Foreign Service officers hired were proficient in one of these  languages.
Despite these improvements, language gaps still exist. As of April 30, 2005,  State reported that about 14 percent of consular-coned Foreign Service  officers in language-designated positions did not meet language  requirements for their assigned position. Our interviews with visa chiefs at  25 posts identified 8 posts with at least one consular officer who did not  meet the designated language proficiency requirements for their position.  To increase the proficiency of Foreign Service officers, State supports  post-specific language programs, among others. According to language  training officials, the department allocated $1.2 million in fiscal year 2004  for these programs, which teach a new language or enhance the language  of the participant. Twenty-three of the 25 posts we contacted offer a  language-training program at post. State has also developed training  modules for specific languages that include technical vocabulary that  might be beneficial to consular officers.
section_title: Consular Training Expanded, and Additional Courses and Information Sharing Would Further Benefit Consular Officers
paragraphs: In 2002, we reported that training for new consular officers was focused  on detecting intending immigrants through the visa process, with little  training given on detecting possible terrorists. In addition, we found that  consular officers wanted more training in how to interview applicants  more effectively for the purposes of detecting possible terrorists. Since  our report, State has revamped and expanded consular training at the  Foreign Service Institute to enhance visa security. Table 1 outlines  additions to consular training.
Training efforts have been bolstered by contributions from law  enforcement and intelligence agencies and DHS, as well as by improved  information sharing. For example, as part of the basic consular training  course, consular officers receive a counterterrorism briefing by the  Central Intelligence Agency. Additionally, the Homeland Security Act of  2002 granted DHS the authority to develop homeland security training  programs for consular officers, and the Memorandum of Understanding  between State and DHS outlined DHS’s participation in this training. Since  2003, DHS has contributed to several aspects of the consular training  program. For example,  for the basic consular course, DHS has funded a presentation to  consular officers by former 9/11 Commission staffers;    officials from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services provide  training at State’s course for fraud prevention managers; and    DHS officials have accompanied consular officials at regional  leadership conferences for consular managers overseas.
In July 2003, State issued guidance to chiefs of mission regarding consular  training at posts, and encouraged the regular exchange of information  between consular sections and relevant agencies on fraud and law  enforcement issues, as well as security trends that may impact consular  work. However, additional training could further assist consular officers.  For example, despite guidance from the Consular Affairs Bureau, 12 of the  25 visa chiefs we interviewed reported that the embassy did not offer post- specific training. In addition, all of the posts we contacted reported that  additional training on terrorist travel trends would be helpful, with 16  posts responding that such training would be extremely helpful. For  example, the visa chief at a consular post in the Middle East said that an  in-depth class that trains officers to better identify high-risk applicants  based on specific intelligence information would be helpful. Consular  officials in Washington, D.C., acknowledged that this type of training  would be useful, but noted that it requires support from chiefs of mission  and other agency officials overseas. Some posts also reported that  additional post-specific briefings on counterterrorism techniques and  fraud prevention would be helpful. State is currently developing distance- learning courses in the areas of fraud prevention and disruption of  terrorist mobility, which, once implemented, will be available to consular  officers worldwide. Given that some terrorists make use of fraudulent  documents, training in these subjects is useful for helping consular  officers detect terrorists and criminals applying for visas.
section_title: Inconsistent Information Sharing at Posts
paragraphs: Although Consular Affairs has advised chiefs of mission to encourage  interagency information sharing, we found that information sharing at  posts between the consular section and the law enforcement and  intelligence communities varied. While we found that some posts had  frequent communications, others had little or no communication. For  example, at one post, we noted frequent communication and proactive  information sharing between the consular section, law enforcement, and  intelligence communities. Consular officials told us that this cooperation  strengthened the visa process at this post. During our visit to another post,  the consular section requested regular counterterrorism briefings from  intelligence officials, who conducted the first such formal briefing in  March 2005 following our visit. The Consul General stated that these  briefings will become a standard practice at the post. At another post we  reviewed, however, consular officials stated that they were concerned  about the lack of communication between their section and law  enforcement and intelligence officials, despite repeated inquiries for  guidance in areas such as watch list records in CLASS.
section_title: State Strengthened Fraud Prevention Programs, but Efforts to Establish Systematic Criteria to Identify High Visa Fraud Posts Have Not Been Completed
paragraphs: As the 9-11 Commission staff highlighted, the September 11 terrorists were  able to obtain U.S. visas through fraudulent means. For example,  according to the 9-11 Commission staff report on terrorist travel, two  hijackers used passports that had been manipulated in a fraudulent  manner to obtain visas to the United States. State has taken several steps  to increase its focus on preventing and detecting fraud in the visa process.  For example, by 2004, State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security had deployed  25 visa fraud investigators to U.S. embassies and consulates. In addition,  State’s Office of Fraud Prevention Programs has developed several ways  for consular officers in the field to learn about fraud prevention, including    developing an Internet-based “E-room,” with more than 500 members,  that serves as a discussion group for consular officers, as well as a  place to post cables and lessons learned from prior fraud cases;    publishing fraud prevention newsletters; and   assigning liaison officers to work with consular sections worldwide on  fraud prevention.
However, until recently, the department has not used a systematic process  to identify consular posts with the highest degree of visa fraud. According  to State officials, fraud rankings for consular posts have not been based on  an objective analysis using standardized criteria, but have been self- reported by each post. Therefore, according to the Director of the Office of  Fraud Prevention Programs, State’s fraud rankings were not a quantifiable  assessment of posts’ actual fraud conditions. As a result, previous  resources for fraud prevention may not have been allocated to posts with  the highest need, including the 25 visa fraud investigators assigned  overseas in 2004.
In response to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of  2004, State is now developing systematic criteria to identify high-fraud  posts. The act mandates that State identify the posts experiencing the  greatest frequency of visa fraud and place in those posts at least one full- time anti-fraud specialist. The presence of full-time fraud officers at high- fraud posts is particularly important given that entry-level officers may  serve as fraud prevention managers on a part-time basis, in addition to  their other responsibilities. Moreover, of the 25 posts we reviewed, only 2  had full-time fraud prevention managers, and 10 visa chiefs reported that  their fraud prevention managers had not yet received training specific to  these duties. In June 2005, the Office of Fraud Prevention Programs was  awaiting final approval of its reassessment of posts’ fraud levels using  weighted criteria such as  refusal rates for certain classes of visas;    DHS data on visa holders who applied for permanent residence once in  the United States on a temporary tourist or business visa; and    State’s threat assessments for the post.
Consular Affairs is also developing a fraud prevention computer program  that will allow State to quantify and analyze fraud workload data,  according to the Fraud Prevention Programs director.
subsections: section_title: Increased Funding to Improve Consular Facilities, but Many Posts Remain Inadequate
paragraphs: State’s Bureau of Overseas Building Operations is responsible for  managing the department’s property overseas, including the rehabilitation  of existing facilities and the construction of new embassies and  consulates. In March 2003, we reported that working conditions at many  U.S. embassies and consulates were inferior and unsafe. In particular, we  found that the primary office building at more than half of the posts did  not meet certain fire/life safety standards, and at least 96 posts had  reported serious overcrowding. Despite increased funding to improve  consular facilities, needs remain. Many of the new requirements in the visa  adjudication process, such as the increased interview requirements and  the collection of applicants’ fingerprints, have strained consular facilities.  Indeed, many visa chiefs we interviewed reported problems with their  facilities. For example, 14 of 25 rated the consular workspace at their post  as below average, and 40 percent reported that applicants’ waiting rooms  were below average. In addition, due to overcrowded waiting rooms at  four of the eight posts we visited, we observed visa applicants waiting for  their interviews outside or in adjacent hallways. A senior consular official  acknowledged that many consular facilities are located in run-down  buildings with insufficient adjudicating windows and waiting rooms. In  fiscal year 2003, Congress directed the Overseas Building Operations  Bureau to begin a 3-year Consular Workspace Improvement Initiative to  improve the overall working environment for consular officers. In fiscal  years 2003 and 2004, State obligated $10.2 million to 79 workspace  improvement projects at 68 posts. State officials currently plan to fund up  to $18.1 million for fiscal year 2005. Improvement projects ranged from  adding more interview windows to increase visa processing in Seoul to a  complete consular section reconfiguration in London. However, according  to a senior consular official, these funds are being used to provide  temporary solutions at posts that may require a new embassy, as part of  State’s multibillion-dollar embassy construction program.
section_title: Number of Intelligence and Law Enforcement Records in CLASS Increased, but Additional Information Would Help Facilitate Legitimate Travel
paragraphs: The September 11 attacks highlighted the need for comprehensive  information sharing. In January 2005, GAO identified effective  information sharing to secure the homeland as a high-risk area of the U.S.  government because the federal government still faces formidable  challenges sharing information among stakeholders in an appropriate and  timely manner to minimize risk. With cooperation from other federal  agencies, State has increased the amount of information available to  consular officers in CLASS. Name-check records from the intelligence  community have increased fivefold from 48,000 in September 2001 to  approximately 260,000 in June 2005, according to consular officials.  Moreover, consular officials told us that, as of the fall of 2004, CLASS  contained approximately 8 million records from the FBI. In addition, State  has developed more efficient methods of acquiring certain data from law  enforcement databases. For example, State established a direct computer  link with the FBI to send descriptive information from the FBI’s National  Crime Information Center (NCIC) to CLASS on a daily basis.
While the additional records in CLASS have helped consular officers  detect those who might seek to harm the United States, many consular  officers we interviewed stated that the increased volume of records and  lack of access to other detailed information can lead to visa-processing  delays for applicants. In particular, consular officers do not have direct  access to detailed information in criminal history records. Section 403 of  the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 directs the Attorney General and the FBI  to provide State with access to extracts of certain files containing  descriptive information for the purpose of determining whether a visa  applicant has a criminal history record contained in the NCIC Interstate  Identification Index (or Index). The USA PATRIOT Act also states that  access to an extract does not entitle consular officers to obtain the full  contents of the corresponding records. In accordance with this mandate,  the FBI stated that the bureau provides to CLASS extracts that contain all  available biographical information, such as the date of birth and height of  the person with the criminal record. However, when conducting a CLASS  name check, consular officers told us that they are not able to conclusively  determine whether an FBI file matches a visa applicant because the  extracts lack sufficient biographical information. Moreover, the FBI stated  that, in accordance with section 403, the extracts do not contain details  such as charges and dispositions of cases, which are necessary to  determine if the applicant might be ineligible for a visa. For example, the  information in CLASS does not distinguish between a conviction for a  crime such as kidnapping or drug possession, or an acquittal on a charge  of driving while intoxicated.
Consular officers, therefore, must fingerprint applicants who have a  potential match in the Index for positive identification in the FBI records;  if there is a match, they can then ascertain whether the information  contained in the criminal record would make the applicant ineligible for a  visa. In fiscal year 2004, of the more than 40,000 sets of fingerprints  consular officers sent to the FBI for verification, about 29 percent were  positive matches between the applicant and a criminal record in the Index.  State officials we spoke with estimated that of those applicants who were  positively identified by fingerprints, only about 10 percent were denied a  visa based on the criminal history record information provided by the FBI.  Moreover, fingerprinted applicants are charged an additional $85  processing fee and, as of the spring of 2005, must wait an estimated 4 to 8  weeks for a response from Washington, D.C., before adjudication can  proceed. According to FBI and State officials, the processing delays are  due to inefficiencies in the way the fingerprints are sent to the FBI for  processing (see fig. 4).
To facilitate more efficient fingerprint processing, State and the FBI are  implementing an electronic fingerprint system whereby consular officers  will scan the applicants’ fingerprints at post and submit them directly into  the FBI’s database if there is a potential match in CLASS. FBI and State  officials told us that posts would be notified if the record in question  matched the applicant within 24 hours. However, thousands of visa  applicants could still face wait times and additional fingerprinting fees that  they would otherwise not have incurred because consular officers do not  have enough information at the time of the interview to determine if the  records in CLASS match the applicants.
There are several options that the FBI and State have discussed to help  ensure that consular officers can facilitate legitimate travel; however, each  would require legislative changes and the agencies would need to weigh  the associated trade-offs inherent in each option. These options include  the following:    Consular officials told us that access to additional information in a  criminal history file, such as the charge and disposition of a case,  would allow their officers to determine which crimes are serious  enough to require a positive fingerprint match prior to adjudication.  However, FBI officials noted that there are some technical limitations  on extracting specific pieces of data from the criminal history records  in the Index.
To avoid some of the technical limitations associated with the Index,  FBI officials stated that it would be easier to provide the full criminal  history records to consular officers for the purpose of visa  adjudication. However, these officials told us that assurances would  need to be in place to prevent misuse of the information, given its  sensitive nature. Indeed, State and the FBI have already negotiated a  Memorandum of Understanding aimed at protecting the information  passed to CLASS. Consular officials indicated that their officers may  need access only to the criminal charge and disposition of the case to  adjudicate a visa case more efficiently.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The visa process presents a balance between facilitating legitimate travel  and identifying those who entry into the United States might be harmful to  U.S. national interests. Since our 2002 report, State, in coordination with  other agencies, has made substantial improvements to the visa process to  strengthen it as a tool to prevent terrorists and others who might pose a  threat from entering our country. However, given the large responsibility  placed on consular officers, particularly entry-level officers, it is critical  that State continue to improve the tools, guidance, and training necessary  for them to be effective. In particular, State’s assignment system is not  effectively meeting the staffing needs of its consular posts. A rigorous  assessment of staffing priorities is needed for State to achieve its goal of  having the right people in the right place with the right skills, especially at  critical posts of national security concern. Additionally, while visa policies  and procedures have been updated and enhanced, these changes must be  more clearly communicated to all consular staff to ensure they are  consistently and properly applied. Action is also needed at the interagency  level to encourage interactions between consular sections, law  enforcement officials, and other security officials at post to increase  information sharing on terrorism issues relevant to the visa process.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making seven recommendations to further strengthen the visa  process. These recommendations are being directed to the Secretary of  State, who is generally responsible for visa operations, and to the  Secretary of Homeland Security, who is generally responsible for visa  policy.
To further clarify current visa policies and procedures, we recommend  that  the Secretary of State update the Foreign Affairs Manual on a regular  basis to incorporate all changes in visa policies and procedures; and  the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary  of State, develop additional guidance on the relationship between DHS  and State in the visa process, including the roles and responsibilities of  DHS personnel overseas who assist consular sections and DHS’s  procedures at points of entry.
To ensure consular sections have the necessary tools to enhance national  security and promote legitimate travel, we also recommend that the  Secretary of State    develop a comprehensive plan to address vulnerabilities in consular  staffing worldwide, including an analysis of staffing requirements and  shortages, foreign language proficiency requirements, and fraud  prevention needs, among other things—the plan should systematically  determine priority positions that must be filled worldwide based on the  relative strategic importance of posts and positions and realistic  assumptions of available staff resources;  report to Congress, within 1 year of this report, on the implementation  of this plan;    ensure that consular chiefs update interview wait-time data on a  in consultation with law enforcement and intelligence agencies, further  expand consular training in terrorist travel trends, post-specific  counterterrorism techniques, and fraud prevention, either at the  Foreign Service Institute or at overseas posts.
To ensure that consular officers have access to all relevant information on  known or suspected terrorists, we recommend that the Secretary of State,  in consultation with appropriate agencies,  further encourage interactions between consular sections, law  enforcement officials, and other security officials at post to increase  information sharing with consular officers on terrorism issues relevant  to the visa process, including regional or post-specific terrorism trends,  either through the Visas Viper process, or other similar interagency  mechanisms.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: As GAO has reported, information is a crucial tool in fighting terrorism,  and the timely dissemination of that information is critical to maintaining  the security of our nation. Although State and the FBI have taken steps to  increase the amount of information available to consular officers in the  visa process, further information from criminal history files would help  facilitate visa adjudication for legitimate travelers. Thus, Congress may  wish to require that the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of  Investigation develop and report on a plan that details  the additional information from criminal history records that should be  made available to visa adjudicators;    how the FBI proposes to provide this additional information to State; the potential concerns associated with increased access to this  information such as technology limitations and privacy concerns, and  how the agencies propose to mitigate these concerns; and    any legislative changes that may be necessary to facilitate the exchange  of this information between the FBI and State.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: State, DHS, and the Department of Justice provided written comments on  a draft of this report (see apps. II, III, and IV, respectively).
State noted that the report is a fair and balanced evaluation of the  improvements made in the visa process since our 2002 report. State agreed  with most of our conclusions, and indicated that it is taking action to  implement the majority of our recommendations. For example, the  department indicated that it is revising consular guidance located in the  Foreign Affairs Manual and standard operating procedures, and is  working with DHS to clarify guidance on the roles and responsibilities of  various DHS personnel overseas. In addition, State agreed that additional  training would be beneficial for consular officers, and stated that it intends  to provide further guidance to overseas posts about the importance of  interactions between consular officers and law enforcement and  intelligence officials at post. With regard to the matter for congressional  consideration, State agreed to work with the FBI to determine how  additional information from the FBI might be shared with visa  adjudicators.
State disagreed with our recommendation that it prepare a comprehensive  plan to address vulnerabilities in consular staffing. State argued that it  already had such a plan. Moreover, State claimed that it appreciates that  priority positions must be filled worldwide based on the relative strategic  importance of posts and positions. While State argued that every visa  consular officer is serving a strategic function, the department identified  one post, Embassy Baghdad, as a clear example of a priority post. Further,  State acknowledged that it has fewer midlevel consular officers than it  needs. We continue to believe it is incumbent on the department to  conduct a worldwide analysis to identify high-priority posts and positions,  such as supervisory consular positions in posts with high-risk applicant  pools or those with high workloads and long wait times for applicant  interviews. As we note in our report, at the time of our work, the midlevel  visa chief positions in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and Cairo, Egypt,  were not filled with permanent midlevel officers. This was a serious  deficiency given that the visa sections were staffed with officers on their  first tour. Although State noted that it anticipated addressing this shortage  of midlevel consular officers before 2013, it did not indicate when that gap  would be filled. Moreover, State’s bidding and assignment process does  not guarantee that the positions of highest priority will always be filled  with qualified officers. Therefore, a further assessment is needed to ensure  that State has the right people in the right posts with the necessary skill  levels. State’s comments are reprinted in appendix II, along with its  summary of improvements to the visa process since September 11, 2001.  In addition, State provided technical comments on a draft of this report,  which we have incorporated, as appropriate.
DHS concurred that, in consultation with State, it needed to develop  additional guidance on the relationship between DHS and State in the visa  process, and agreed to provide that guidance to all overseas posts. DHS  also indicated that it would work to ensure that all posts understand the  roles and responsibilities of DHS personnel conducting visa security  functions, as well as DHS procedures at ports of entry.
The Department of Justice did not comment on the matter for  congressional consideration in our report. The department provided  additional information on other actions it is taking, in collaboration with  State and DHS, to improve interagency information sharing. In particular,  the department detailed U.S. government efforts to integrate various  databases aimed at providing fast access to biometrically-verified criminal  history record information for visa adjudication and immigration  purposes, which it stated would increase the accuracy and reliability of  criminal history record checks. The Department of Justice also provided  technical comments on a draft of this report, which we have incorporated,  as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and  Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and other interested Members  of Congress. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To review the changes to the visa process since 2002, we analyzed  consular policies and procedures; resources that support consular  functions; and the types of information on known or suspected terrorists  that are used to screen visa applicants. For example, we reviewed the 1952  Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended; the Homeland Security Act  of 2002; and other related legislation. In addition, we examined State’s  Foreign Affairs Manual and consular standard operating procedures, and  analyzed consular workload and staffing data. We also attended several  consular training courses, including those on analytical interviewing  techniques, advanced name checking, and fraud prevention, conducted at  State’s George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center. In  Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials from State’s Bureaus of  Consular Affairs and Human Resources. We also spoke with officials from  the Department of Homeland Security’s Border and Transportation  Security Directorate, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and  Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as well as officials from the  Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, D.C., and West Virginia.
We visited U.S. consular posts in seven countries—Egypt, Indonesia,  Malaysia, Morocco, Spain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom. During  these visits, we observed visa operations and interviewed consular staff  and embassy management about visa adjudication policies, procedures,  and resources. In addition, we spoke with officials from other U.S.  agencies that assist consular officers in the visa adjudication process.
We also administered 25 structured interviews between January and April  2005 regarding the impact of State’s changes to policies and guidance,  staffing, training, resources, and interagency coordination on the visa  process The interviews were conducted in-person and by telephone with  visa chiefs and other consular affairs staff in overseas posts. We selected  posts that were of interest to antiterrorism efforts or received a large  number of third-country national applications from countries of interest to  antiterrorism efforts: Abu Dhabi, Beirut, Brussels, Cairo, Casablanca,  Damascus, Dubai, Frankfurt, Islamabad, Jakarta, Jeddah, Jerusalem, Kuala  Lumpur, Lagos, London, Madrid, Mexico City, Muscat, Nairobi, Paris,  Riyadh, Rome, Sana’a, Tunis, and Toronto. The responses to the structured  interviews are not intended to be representative of all posts.
The structured interview contained open- and close-ended questions about  staffing, policy guidance, screening procedures, training, workload,  facilities, foreign language proficiency, fraud prevention, and the impact of  changes to the visa process since September 11, 2001. We developed the  interview questions based on our review of the documentation and data  listed above. We also pretested the interview with four current and former  visa chiefs to ensure that the questions were clear and could be answered.  We modified the interview questions on the basis of the pretest results and  an internal expert technical review. We provided the visa chiefs and other  consular officials with the questions in advance to allow them time to  gather any data necessary for the interview. We also conducted follow-up  discussions with each of the posts for more detailed information about  staffing.
To assess the reliability of State’s human capital data on consular staffing  and officers’ foreign language proficiency, we queried human capital  officials at State and examined the data electronically. We determined that  the data were sufficiently reliable to report on consular staffing and  language proficiency data from fiscal year 2002 through April 2005.
To determine the reliability of State’s data on wait times for applicant  interviews, we reviewed the department’s procedures for capturing these  data, interviewed the officials in Washington who monitor and use these  data, and examined the data electronically. We analyzed interview wait  times for applicants applying for visas for temporary business or tourism  purposes, but not for other types of visas, including student visas.  Specifically, we queried the database to show the (1) consular post, (2)  date of last entry, and (3) reported wait time for all visa-issuing posts from  October 2004 through March 2005. We performed independent checks of  these data during our structured interviews with 25 consular posts, as well  as our visits to 8 posts overseas. We found missing data throughout the 6- month period because posts were not reporting each week. Based on our  analysis, we determined that the data were not sufficiently reliable to  determine the exact magnitude of the problem because the exact number  of posts with a 30-day or more wait could not be determined. Consular  officials who manage consular sections overseas acknowledged that many  posts are not reporting on a weekly basis. We conducted our work from  August 2004 through August 2005, in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, John Brummet, Assistant  Director, and Joseph Carney, Daniel Chen, Etana Finkler, Kathryn  Hartsburg, Amanda Miller, John F. Miller, and Mary Moutsos made key  contributions to this report.