Department of Energy: Actions Needed to Improve DOE and NNSA Oversight of Management and Operating Contractors
Published: 2015-06-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: A 2005 DOE policy required the department's M&O contractors to implement assurance systems to drive continuous improvement through contractor self-assessment and effective federal oversight. A policy change in 2011 sought to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of DOE oversight programs by leveraging the contractor-generated information from CAS to reduce hands-on oversight, when appropriate. Also, in 2011, NNSA developed a framework for overseeing its M&O contractors, including a three-pronged evaluation for determining how and when to use information from CAS by evaluating the risk of contractors' activities, contractor's past performance, and the maturity of their CAS. Recent security and safety incidents at DOE and NNSA sites, including a 2014 nuclear waste accident, have caused some to question the extent to which information from CAS can be relied on for overseeing M&O contractors.
This testimony discusses NNSA's policy and procedures for implementing the framework, including its use of information from CAS and its process for evaluating oversight effectiveness. Based mainly on GAO's May 2015 report ( GAO-15-216 ), it also discusses preliminary observations from ongoing work related to the 2014 accident for which GAO is analyzing NNSA and DOE policies and guidance on oversight and accident investigation reports completed by DOE and others
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In May 2015, GAO found that the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) had not fully established policy or guidance for using information from contractor assurance systems (CAS) to conduct oversight of management and operating (M&O) contractors. NNSA did not provide comprehensive guidance to agency officials on how to conduct assessments required by its oversight framework. In particular, NNSA did not provide guidance for assessing the maturity of contractors' CAS to determine whether information from these systems is sufficiently reliable for oversight purposes. As a result, NNSA cannot ensure that it is appropriately relying on information from CAS in overseeing these contractors. NNSA agreed with GAO's recommendation to establish a comprehensive oversight policy, including for assessments to determine how to use information from CAS for oversight.
In the absence of headquarters level policy or guidance, GAO found in May 2015 that NNSA field offices established their own procedures for determining appropriate oversight approaches, but these procedures were not always complete, and they differed. For example, five of NNSA's seven field offices reported having complete procedures for assessing CAS maturity, but these procedures described different processes and rating scales for conducting such assessments, which could affect the consistency of how field offices determine oversight approaches. NNSA agreed with GAO's recommendation for field offices to develop new or modify existing procedures consistent with new headquarters policy.
NNSA's 2011 policy included a process for validating the effectiveness of field offices' oversight approaches, including the extent to which their approaches appropriately used information from CAS, but GAO found in May 2015 that NNSA discontinued this process after determining that it had not been effective. Discontinuing this process without replacing it eliminated NNSA's internal control for ensuring the effectiveness and consistency of oversight approaches. NNSA agreed with GAO's recommendation to reestablish such a process.
Preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work to evaluate the 2014 nuclear waste accident at DOE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico parallel GAO's findings on NNSA's framework for contractor oversight. For example, DOE's accident investigation board reported that the NNSA field office responsible for overseeing waste packaging and processing overrelied on contractor-generated information from CAS instead of directly conducting assessments and that the decision to do so was inconsistent with a 2011 NNSA review, which concluded the contractor's CAS was still maturing.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO made several recommendations in its May 2015 report with which NNSA concurred and for which it plans to take action.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the policy framework  the Department of Energy (DOE) and its National Nuclear Security  Administration (NNSA) have put in place to oversee management and  operating (M&O) contractors. M&O contracts, as recognized in the  Federal Acquisition Regulation, are characterized by, among other things,  the close relationship between the government and the contractor for  conducting work of a long-term and continuing nature and requiring high  levels of expertise and continuity of operations and personnel. These  contractors apply their scientific, technical, and management expertise to  manage and operate government-owned sites. Eight such laboratory,  production plant, and testing sites are overseen by NNSA—collectively  known as the nuclear security enterprise—to achieve its missions,  including maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s  nuclear weapons stockpile and modernizing its supporting infrastructure.  NNSA maintains seven field offices that are responsible for providing day- to-day oversight of the activities at each site. DOE offices other than  NNSA also oversee M&O contractors that manage and operate  government-owned sites and similarly have colocated federal field offices.  One such site is the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New  Mexico—the nation’s only deep geologic repository for the permanent  disposal of certain defense-related nuclear waste—which is overseen by  DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM). DOE established EM  in 1989 in part to address management challenges in DOE’s stewardship  of its nuclear cleanup mission, and NNSA was established by Congress  in 2000, in part to correct long-standing management challenges and  security breakdowns in DOE’s stewardship of its nuclear security mission.
Since the early 1990s when we first designated DOE’s program and  contract management as an area at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and  mismanagement, we have reported on DOE’s management and  oversight challenges, particularly with respect to how DOE strikes a  balance between relying on its contractors to identify and address  performance deficiencies versus conducting hands-on oversight activities,  such as through inspections or performance testing. For example, in  1993, we reported that DOE’s approach was to give contractors that  managed and operated federal facilities wide leeway in their activities  under a philosophy of “least interference” but that DOE had been  criticized by Congress and others for allowing contractors to dominate  DOE’s activities while eluding management and financial oversight. In  contrast, in 2009, we reported that NNSA had plans to provide technical  training to certain federal oversight officials in an effort to rely less on  contractor-generated performance information and more on independent  federal expertise to test and recognize performance.
In our recently released report, we evaluated DOE’s and NNSA’s  framework for overseeing M&O contractors, which has been in place  since 2011. This DOE and NNSA framework describes an oversight  approach that is tailored to take into account the risk and hazard of  operations, as well as the maturity and operational performance of the  contractor’s programs and assurance systems. The oversight framework  requires that contractors develop contractor assurance systems (CAS),  management systems and processes designed and used by M&O  contractors to oversee their own performance and self-identify and correct  potential problems. Further, this framework was viewed as an opportunity  to gain efficiencies in the conduct of oversight by leveraging information  from CAS, when appropriate, allowing federal oversight resources to be  prioritized where most needed. Recent safety and security incidents at  DOE and NNSA sites—such as a February 2014 radiological release at  WIPP—have caused some to question the extent to which information  from CAS can be relied on for overseeing M&O contractors.
My testimony is primarily based on our May 2015 report that was recently  released and preliminary observations from our ongoing work. I will  discuss deficiencies identified in our issued report on (1) NNSA’ s policy  for implementing the DOE oversight framework, including for using  information from CAS; (2) NNSA field office oversight procedures for  implementing the oversight framework, including for using information  from CAS; and (3) NNSA’s process for evaluating oversight effectiveness.  To conduct our work on NNSA’s implementation of the oversight  framework, including for using information from CAS, we surveyed all  seven NNSA field offices and analyzed key policies and guidance on  DOE’s and NNSA’s use of information from CAS. More details on our  scope and methodology can be found in the full report. In addition, I will  provide preliminary observations from our ongoing work that includes  examining NNSA’s and DOE’s processes for oversight of WIPP. To  conduct this work, we are analyzing NNSA and DOE policies and  guidance on oversight and accident investigation reports completed by  DOE and others. The work upon which this statement is based was  conducted, or is being conducted, in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since 2000, we have identified problems ranging from significant cost and  schedule overruns on major projects to ineffective oversight of safety and  security at NNSA and EM sites, indicating that DOE and NNSA continue  to face challenges in ensuring the effectiveness of their oversight efforts.  Examples, in chronological order, of the problems on which we have  reported and where ineffective oversight was identified as a cause include  the following:    2004: a suspension—or stand-down—of operations at one NNSA  laboratory to address systemic safety and security concerns identified  after an undergraduate student was partially blinded in a laser  accident and two classified computer disks were reported missing;    2006: the discovery of a large number of classified documents and  electronic files that had been unlawfully removed from an NNSA  laboratory as a result of a drug raid on a private residence;    2007: nearly 60 serious accidents or near misses including worker  exposure to radiation, inhalation of toxic vapors, and electrical shocks  at three nuclear weapons laboratories from 2000 through 2007;    2008: the identification of significant protective force weaknesses (i.e.,  13 specific deficiencies) during an independent physical security  evaluation of an NNSA laboratory that included a force-on-force  exercise to simulate an attack on a sensitive facility;    2012: 11 public hearings held since 2002 to address concerns about  DOE’s safety practices by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety  Board—an independent executive branch agency created by  Congress to independently assess safety conditions and operations at  defense nuclear facilities at DOE’s sites, including NNSA and EM;    2012: a serious security breach at an NNSA production plant—the Y- 12 National Security Complex (Y-12) near Oak Ridge, Tennessee—in  which three trespassers gained access to the protected area directly  adjacent to one of the nation’s most critically important nuclear  weapon-related facilities before being interrupted by the security  measures in place, resulting in the identification of multiple and  unprecedented security system failures; and    2014: operations were shut down at WIPP following an underground  fire involving a vehicle and, 9 days later, an unrelated radiological  event occurred when a nuclear waste container breached  underground at WIPP, contaminating a portion of the WIPP facility  and releasing a small amount of contamination into the environment.
DOE and NNSA policies and orders concerning oversight of M&O  contractors have evolved over time and now require that each DOE M&O  contractor—including those overseen by NNSA and EM—have a CAS. In  April 2002, in an internal memorandum, DOE outlined an approach for  improving contract performance and promoting greater contractor  accountability by, among other things, moving from an oversight  approach focused on compliance with requirements contained in DOE  orders and directives to relying on contractor management information  provided through CAS to establish accountability and drive improvement.  In 2005, DOE issued DOE Policy 226.1, Department of Energy Oversight  Policy, and followed it with an associated implementing order requiring  that assurance systems be implemented by DOE M&O contractors,  among others, to encompass all aspects of the activities designed to  identify deficiencies and opportunities for improvement. The focus of this  DOE policy and order was to drive continuous improvement through  contractor self-assurance and effective federal oversight. In March 2010,  the Deputy Secretary of Energy announced a reform effort to revise  DOE’s safety and security directives and modify the department’s  oversight approach to “provide contractors with the flexibility to tailor and  implement safety without excessive federal oversight or overly  prescriptive departmental requirements.” In the memorandum announcing  this effort, the Deputy Secretary noted that oversight of contractors’  activities at DOE and NNSA sites had become excessive and that  burdensome safety requirements were affecting the productivity of work  at DOE’s sites. The memorandum stated that reducing this burden on  contractors would lead to measurable productivity improvement. In  February 2011, NNSA issued a policy (NAP-21) with the purpose of  providing further direction to NNSA officials and M&O contractors about  the framework for the oversight model. Later in 2011, DOE issued Policy  and Order 226.1B, which updated DOE’s oversight policy. While the  previous DOE oversight policy and order were focused on driving  continuous improvement, the 2011 versions—which are still in use—focus  on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of DOE oversight programs  by leveraging the processes and outcomes of CAS to reduce direct,  hands-on oversight, when appropriate. Under the oversight framework,  federal overseers are to continue to give additional oversight emphasis to  high-hazard and high-risk operations, but where it can be determined that  risk is lower and contractor-generated information in CAS is reliable,  federal oversight can rely more on information from CAS.
NAP-21, which similarly focuses on the oversight efficiencies that can be  gained by appropriately leveraging information from CAS, specifically  applies to NNSA and its M&O contractors and elaborates on the more  general DOE oversight policy and order by (1) developing an approach  for federal officials to use in determining the appropriate mix of oversight  activities for different contractor-performed functions and (2) by  establishing a process by which NNSA would affirm the effectiveness of  both CAS implementation by the contractor and the federal oversight  approach at each site in the nuclear security enterprise.
First, NAP-21 describes a spectrum of approaches that can be employed  by NNSA officials to oversee M&O contractors. On one side of the  spectrum is “transaction-based oversight,” or direct, hands-on oversight  activities to test or observe contractors’ performance through such  mechanisms as on-site reviews, facility inspections, and other actions that  involve direct evaluation of contractor activities. On the other side of the  spectrum is “systems-based oversight,” where federal overseers rely on  contractors’ processes and information from their CAS. NAP-21 calls for  NNSA to use a mix of systems-based and transaction-based oversight  approaches in overseeing contractors’ performance and provides a  framework for determining the appropriate mix of these approaches  based on the results of a three-pronged evaluation: (1) a risk assessment  that analyzes the likelihood that an event will occur that adversely affects  the achievement of mission or program objectives or harms human health  or the environment; (2) a CAS maturity assessment that establishes the  level of confidence NNSA officials have in the adequacy of performance  information developed by the contractor and the ability of the contractor to  effectively identify and address performance weaknesses; and (3) an  assessment that considers the contractors’ prior performance for a  specific activity. NNSA’s oversight framework allows for the oversight for  any particular activity to range from primarily transaction-based oversight  to primarily systems-based, or anywhere in between based on the  outcome of these three assessments. Figure 1 shows the factors—as  described in NAP-21—that should be considered by NNSA officials in  determining an appropriate oversight approach. NAP-21 anticipates that,  over time, as contractors’ CAS mature, NNSA officials will use  transaction-based oversight primarily for areas of highest risk and hazard,  and systems-based oversight for lower risk and hazard activities where  they can rely more heavily on a contractor’s CAS.
Second, NAP-21 includes a process, known as “affirmation,” designed for  a federal assessment review team—composed of staff from NNSA  program offices and field offices—to review each field office’s mix of  oversight approaches and practices, as well as implementation of each  M&O contractor’s CAS. The goal of the review is to affirm that each  contractor has a fully implemented and reliable CAS and that each field  office’s approach to oversight is appropriate. According to senior agency  officials, these affirmation reviews were envisioned as a crucial element in  ensuring the effectiveness of NNSA’s overall approach to contractor  oversight across the nuclear security enterprise.
In addition, as the nation’s only permanent disposal site for certain types  of defense nuclear waste, key nuclear weapons missions depend on the  availability of DOE’s WIPP in order to continue their own operations.  WIPP’s operations were suspended in February 2014 following the  underground vehicle fire and unrelated radiological event. In April 2015,  DOE formally determined that the nuclear waste container that breached  resulting in the radiological event at WIPP was packaged at NNSA’s Los  Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). At the time of the 2014 incident at  WIPP, waste packaging operations at LANL, were overseen by NNSA’s  Los Alamos Field Office in coordination with EM’s CBFO,  which  provided additional verification by certifying packaged radioactive waste  containers to ensure they met criteria set by CBFO for disposal in WIPP.   At WIPP itself, oversight of the M&O contractor is led by EM through  the CBFO.
section_title: NNSA Has Not Fully Established Policy or Guidance for Using Information from CAS to Conduct Contractor Oversight
paragraphs: In our May 2015 report, we found that NNSA has not fully established  policy or guidance to support determining appropriate approaches to  overseeing its M&O contractors, including for using information from CAS.  Specifically, we found that NNSA does not have complete policy or  guidance to support the assessments NAP-21 requires for determining an  effective approach to overseeing M&O contractors at each site. NAP-21  outlines the three-pronged evaluation framework NNSA officials are  responsible to carry out in determining an appropriate mix of oversight  approaches based on assessments of risk, CAS maturity, and past  performance. However, NAP-21 does not provide detailed or  comprehensive guidance to NNSA officials on how to conduct these  assessments, and NNSA headquarters has not issued any additional  guidance for this purpose. We found that DOE and NNSA have some  policies and guidance that are relevant to conducting risk assessments  for security and safety and, in some cases, for large construction projects.  We did not, however, identify any headquarters-level policy or guidance  for assessing CAS maturity, for assessing contractors’ past performance  to inform an oversight approach, or for assessing risk in other areas.  Without such policy or guidance, NNSA officials responsible for  conducting assessments may do so inconsistently, and thus treat similar  risks differently. Further, we found that NNSA did not complete a chapter  of NAP-21, which appears in the policy’s table of contents with the title  Requirements Analysis Process, but the corresponding page in the  document simply notes that the details of the chapter would be developed  at a later date. NNSA officials told us the content of this chapter was  intended to establish a process for NNSA to identify requirements in DOE  and NNSA orders and directives essential to support safe and effective  mission accomplishment and that this identification could assist M&O  contractors in identifying key performance measures that could be  tracked in CAS to help contractors ensure their compliance with  requirements.
As a result of our findings, we recommended that NNSA establish  comprehensive oversight polices including for using information from CAS  to conduct oversight of M&O contractors and describing how to conduct  assessment of risk, CAS maturity, and the level of the contractor’s past  performance in determining an appropriate oversight approach. NNSA  concurred with our recommendation and stated that it will cancel NAP-21  and instead issue a new corporate policy that will form a comprehensive  framework for CAS in the context of ensuring safe, secure, and high- quality mission delivery. NNSA estimated it will complete this policy by  September 30, 2015.
section_title: NNSA’s Field Offices Developed Procedures for Determining Appropriate Oversight Approaches, but the Procedures Are Not Always Complete and Differ
paragraphs: In the absence of sufficiently detailed and comprehensive guidance from  NNSA headquarters for determining an appropriate mix of oversight  approaches, NNSA field offices responsible for day-to-day oversight of  M&O contractors reported developing their own procedures for this  purpose. As described in our May 2015 report, these officials reported  that their field office procedures for assessing risk were complete, but that  their procedures for assessing CAS maturity and past performance in  determining an appropriate oversight approach were not always  complete. In addition, we found substantial differences among the  procedures field offices had that may affect NNSA’s ability to ensure  consistent oversight of its contractors. For example, the five field offices  that reported having complete procedures for assessing CAS maturity  used different processes and scales for rating maturity. While each of  these procedures may be effective for each field office’s purposes, these  differences could affect the consistency with which NNSA’s field offices  are determining an appropriate mix of oversight approaches across the  nuclear security enterprise. We recommended that NNSA work with field  office managers to establish field office procedures consistent with  headquarters policy and guidance to support assessment practices for  determining appropriate oversight approaches. NNSA concurred with our  recommendation and stated that field offices will develop new or modify  existing procedures, as appropriate, to support the new requirements and  estimated the completion date for these activities is September 2016.
Furthermore, field office officials have raised concerns that staffing levels  and the mix of staff skills may not be adequate to conduct appropriate  oversight in the near future and that this may result in overreliance on  information from CAS without the ability to ensure that this information is  sufficiently reliable. For example, in response to our survey of field offices  conducted for our May 2015 report, six of NNSA’s seven field offices  responded that having fewer staff to implement NAP-21’s approach to  oversight is a challenge. Furthermore, five of seven field offices noted that  not having certain subject matter experts is a challenge for oversight that  could be exacerbated in the future as senior field office staff are expected  to become retirement eligible. In a January 2013 report to DOE’s Federal  Technical Capability Panel, one field office reported that its staffing levels  were less than the number required to perform the oversight identified as  necessary. This field office noted that staffing shortages were offset  through support from other offices and increased reliance on contractor- generated information from CAS. The 2013 report did not indicate if the  field office’s increased reliance on information from CAS for oversight was  supported by the field office’s analysis of the risk of the activity, the  maturity level of the contractor’s CAS, and contractor performance in the  area. We found that NNSA has not assessed whether it has sufficient,  qualified personnel to implement the oversight framework described in  NAP-21.
We recommended that NNSA assess staffing needs to determine  whether it has sufficient qualified personnel to conduct oversight activities  consistent with comprehensive polices and guidance, including use of  information for CAS. NNSA concurred with our recommendation and  stated that it will assess staffing needs by December 2016, to allow for  field level policies and procedures to be considered in the development of  the staffing strategy.
section_title: NNSA Discontinued the Process for Headquarters Review of Field Offices’ Oversight Approaches
paragraphs: We also found that NNSA headquarters discontinued affirmation reviews  (the process established by NAP-21 for reviewing the effectiveness of  contractors’ CAS implementation and field offices’ oversight approaches)  effectively eliminating the primary internal control activity that NAP-21  included for the agency to evaluate oversight effectiveness across the  nuclear security enterprise. Prior to discontinuing this process, NNSA  conducted affirmation reviews at three sites—Sandia National  Laboratories, the Nevada National Security Site, and the Y-12 National  Security Complex—and all three reviews resulted in affirmations of the  effective implementation of the contractor’s CAS and of the federal  oversight approach. However, following the 2012 security incident at Y- 12—which occurred after NNSA affirmed the implementation and  reliability of the contractor’s CAS and the effectiveness of the Y-12 field  office’s mix of oversight approaches—NNSA discontinued its affirmation  review process. According to NNSA officials, after investigating the root  causes for the security lapse at Y-12, NNSA determined that its  affirmation reviews focused too heavily on affirming that a CAS existed  and covered the five required attributes of a CAS as outlined in NAP-21.  According to NNSA officials, the affirmation reviews did not focus enough  on evaluating the effectiveness of either the contractor’s CAS or the field  office’s approach to determining the appropriate mix of systems- and  transaction-based oversight.
After discontinuing the affirmation reviews, NNSA initiated an Oversight  Improvement Project to focus on evaluating the effectiveness of  contractors’ CAS and field offices’ oversight approaches. However, a  senior NNSA official told us the project was never completed, and NNSA  has not developed another process in lieu of affirmation reviews.  Discontinuing affirmation reviews without replacing them with another  form of validation eliminates the internal control activity in NAP-21 to  provide NNSA with assurance of oversight effectiveness across the  nuclear security enterprise. Further, continuing a process to review the  effectiveness of oversight approaches would have provided information  allowing for oversight practices to be compared across field offices and  for differences among them to be evaluated. According to NNSA  headquarters and field officials, there is no current mechanism for this to  occur.
We recommended that NNSA reestablish a process for reviewing the  effectiveness of field offices’ oversight approaches, including their  determinations for how and when to use information from CAS. NNSA  concurred with our recommendation and stated that its new corporate  policy and guidance will outline such an approach for validating the  effectiveness of the field office oversight activities and estimated the  completion for the effort to be March 2016.
section_title: Preliminary Observations from Ongoing Work on DOE’s Processes for Oversight of WIPP
paragraphs: Our preliminary observations on NNSA’s oversight of waste packaging  activities at LANL parallel two of the findings from our recently released  May 2015 report. Our preliminary observations are based on our review  of specific sections of DOE’s Phase II accident investigation board report  on the radiological release.    First, with regard to our finding that NNSA has not fully established  policies or guidance for using information from CAS to conduct  oversight of M&O contractors, the accident investigation board report  on WIPP found that NNSA’s Los Alamos Field Office was overreliant  on CAS for environmental compliance oversight. The accident  investigation board report also found that the field office did not  adequately conduct transactional assessments of the contractor in  areas such as environmental compliance and operations of the LANL  facility where the TRU waste container that breached was processed  and packaged. According to the accident investigation board report,  the NNSA field office’s overreliance on the contractor-generated  information in CAS was not consistent with a 2011 NNSA review that  observed CAS was still maturing and that a strong NNSA field office  oversight presence should continue. Moreover, the accident  investigation board identified specific deficiencies in CAS such as  inadequate contractor self-assessments regarding waste processing  and packaging and concluded that CAS was not effective in  identifying weaknesses that contributed to the incident. Under the  oversight framework, determining that a CAS is not fully mature would  result in a heavier reliance on transactions-based approaches to  overseeing LANL’s waste packaging operations.    Second, with respect to our finding that NNSA field office officials  have raised concerns that staffing levels and the mix of staff skills  may not be adequate to conduct appropriate oversight—which may  result in overreliance on information from CAS—according to the  accident investigation board report on WIPP Los Alamos Field Office  officials attributed their overreliance on the information in CAS for  environmental compliance oversight to a lack of resources to directly  perform this oversight. The report also found that the field office did  not have senior technical expertise, such as organic chemistry  expertise, necessary for conducting adequate technical reviews  related to the contractor’s processing of the TRU wastes, which were  the source of the radiological release at WIPP.
Our preliminary observations on DOE’s processes for overseeing the  contractor responsible for managing and operating WIPP indicate that EM  has not outlined an EM-specific policy framework for its field office  officials to use in establishing and implementing effective oversight  programs beyond the 2011 DOE oversight policy and order. However  incomplete, NNSA developed NAP-21 in an effort to elaborate on DOE’s  policy and order by providing an NNSA-specific oversight policy  framework that included a three-pronged evaluation framework for  determining an appropriate oversight approach. EM headquarters officials  told us that EM does not provide its field offices supplemental EM-specific  policy or other formal direction on how to use the broad DOE oversight  order but encourages them to use DOE’s oversight guide focused on  nuclear safety that provides suggested, not mandatory, approaches to  designing and implementing field office oversight programs.  For  example, this guide describes site-specific conditions that field offices  should consider in establishing oversight priorities and allocating  oversight resources, including consideration of the types of nuclear  facilities and their hazards and the status and effectiveness of the  contractor’s CAS. At this point in our ongoing review, we are not aware  of examples of direction provided to EM field offices to oversee M&O  contractors’ performance in areas other than nuclear safety, such as  business operations or safeguards and security. EM headquarters  officials told us that EM provides field offices with evaluation guides that  they can use to develop their evaluations of specific elements of a  contractor’s nuclear facility safety program, such as the WIPP’s M&O  contractor’s CAS. We have not yet evaluated the DOE oversight guide,  EM’s reliance on it, or the evaluation guides EM has developed for its  field offices, but we will do so as we complete our work.
In conclusion, GAO has reported for years on the management  challenges DOE faces, as well as specific safety and security incident  such as the recent accident at WIPP. DOE’s management and oversight  reform efforts have sought to address the conditions underlying safety  and security failures, but recent events at WIPP show that more work is  needed. Our recently released report concludes that NNSA does not have  complete standards against which to measure whether oversight  approaches are effective, including how information from CAS is being  used for oversight. This is because NNSA does not have complete policy  or guidance to implement the oversight framework and has discontinued  its reviews intended to evaluate the effectiveness of field offices’ oversight  approaches; also, in the absence of headquarters policy or guidance, its  field offices have developed procedures that are not fully complete and  differ. As a result, NNSA runs the risk of not using its oversight resources  effectively, either by underutilizing information from CAS and missing  opportunities for efficiency, or by overrelying on information from CAS  and possibly missing contractor performance issues that put safety,  security, or mission accomplishment at risk. With respect to the recent  events at WIPP, these issues concern DOE as well.
Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you or your staff members have any questions concerning this  testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or bawdena@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Other individuals  who made key contributions include David Trimble, Director; Daniel  Feehan, Assistant Director; David Bennett; Richard Burkard; John  Delicath; Brian M. Friedman; Carly Gerbig; Christopher Pacheco; Eli  Lewine; Rebecca Shea; Rajneesh Verma; and Kiki Theodoropoulos.
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