Whistleblower Protection: DOD Has Improved Oversight for Reprisal Investigations but Can Take Additional Actions to Standardize Process and Reporting
Published: 2016-09-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Whistleblowers play an important role in safeguarding the federal government against waste, fraud, and abuse, and their willingness to come forward can contribute to improvements in government operations. However, whistleblowers also risk reprisal, such as demotion, reassignment, and firing.
This testimony discusses DODIG's progress in (1) taking actions to track and report on the timeliness of military whistleblower reprisal investigations, and (2) strengthening its oversight of the military services' whistleblower reprisal investigations.
GAO's statement is based primarily on information from May 2015 and February 2012 GAO reports on military whistleblower reprisal investigations. For those reports, GAO examined laws, regulations, and DOD guidance; conducted detailed file reviews using representative samples of cases closed in fiscal year 2013 and between January 2009 and March 2011; analyzed DODIG and military service data for cases closed in fiscal years 2013 and 2014; and interviewed DOD officials. GAO also determined what actions DOD had taken through August 2016 in response to recommendations made in the 2015 and 2012 reports.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DODIG) has taken actions to improve its tracking of the timeliness of military whistleblower reprisal investigations in response to recommendations that GAO made in 2012 and 2015. For example, in 2012 and 2015, GAO found that DOD was not meeting its internal requirement to complete whistleblower reprisal investigations within 180 days, with cases closed in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 averaging 526 days. In response, DODIG—which is responsible for both conducting investigations and overseeing investigations conducted by the military services—took steps to better track and analyze timeliness data by developing a guide to help ensure the accurate tracking of case processing time and by updating its case management system in April 2016 to include new investigation milestones. Because these actions were not taken until 2016, it is too early to determine if timeliness has improved since GAO last reported on the status. Similarly, in 2015, GAO found that DOD had not met the statutory requirement to notify servicemembers within 180-days about delays in their investigations for about half of the reprisal investigations closed in fiscal year 2013. In response, DODIG developed an automated tool in its case management system to flag cases approaching 180 days. However, DODIG continues to not regularly report to Congress on the timeliness of military whistleblower reprisal investigations as GAO recommended in 2012. On August 31, 2016, a senior DODIG official stated that DODIG will implement this recommendation by reporting timeliness information to Congress biannually.
DODIG has strengthened its oversight of military service reprisal investigations in response to recommendations GAO made in 2012 and 2015 by establishing processes and developing guidance for overseeing investigations, among other things. For example, in 2015, GAO found that DODIG did not have a process for documenting whether investigations were independent and were conducted by someone outside the military service chain of command. In response, DODIG directed the service IGs to certify investigators' independence for oversight reviews. GAO also found in 2015 that DODIG had provided limited guidance to investigators using its case management system, limiting its utility as a real-time management system, as intended. In response, DODIG issued a system guide and a data entry guide, which provide key information on how to work with and maintain system data. However, in 2015 GAO also found that DODIG and the military service IGs used different terms in their guidance to investigators, hindering DODIG oversight of case completeness. GAO recommended that DOD direct the military service IGs to follow standardized investigation stages and issue related guidance. DODIG officials stated in August 2016 that they are working with the services to standardize investigation stages and that DODIG is willing to work with the Secretary of Defense to issue such direction. Separately, GAO found in 2012 that unreliable data on corrective actions taken in response to substantiated reprisal cases was hampering oversight and recommended that DOD regularly report to Congress on the frequency and type of corrective actions taken in response to substantiated reprisal claims. DODIG reports some corrective actions in its semiannual report to Congress, but does not include all relevant corrective actions or outstanding corrective action recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: DOD implemented 15 of the 18 recommendations GAO made to improve and track investigation timeliness and strengthen oversight of the military services' investigations, and is considering steps to implement the remaining three regarding standardized investigations and reporting to Congress.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity today to discuss the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) progress on improving its whistleblower reprisal  program for military servicemembers. Whistleblowers play an important  role in safeguarding the federal government against waste, fraud, and  abuse, and their willingness to come forward can contribute to  improvements in government operations. However, whistleblowers also  risk reprisal, such as demotion, reassignment, and firing. According to the  2014 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey, 18 percent of DOD employees  surveyed did not feel they could disclose a suspected violation of any law,  rule, or regulation without fear of reprisal.
In 1988, Congress enacted the Military Whistleblower Protection Act to  provide protections from reprisal for servicemembers who report  wrongdoing within DOD. Under this law’s implementing directive, military  servicemembers may submit reprisal complaints to DOD’s Office of  Inspector General (DODIG) or to a military service Inspector General (IG).  DODIG can conduct an investigation into a military reprisal complaint or  refer the investigation to the appropriate military service IG, but DODIG  has the final responsibility for approving the results of all investigations.  The majority of DODIG’s investigation workload for military reprisal cases  is related to oversight reviews of investigations conducted by the military  service IGs. According to a senior DODIG official at the time of our last  review in May 2015, DODIG referred most military whistleblower reprisal  cases to the service IGs for investigation, but retained cases that are high  profile or involve (1) issues such as sexual assault, (2) senior officers,  and (3) members from different services or a joint base or command.
Our prior work has found that DODIG’s oversight of the military  whistleblower reprisal program has faced challenges. For example, in  February 2012 and May 2015, we reported, among other things, that the  DODIG was not consistently or accurately recording key dates to track  the length of investigations, did not report the timeliness of its  investigations to Congress, had outdated guidance about the  investigation process, and had not established performance metrics to  ensure the quality of its investigations. We made 18 recommendations to  DOD to improve the timeliness of military whistleblower reprisal  investigations, as well as to improve the investigation and oversight  processes, among other things. DOD concurred with all of these  recommendations.
I will focus my remarks today on DODIG’s progress in (1) taking actions  to track and report on the timeliness of military whistleblower reprisal  investigations and (2) strengthening its oversight of the military services’  military whistleblower reprisal investigations.
My testimony is based primarily on the reports that we issued on military  whistleblower reprisal investigations in May 2015 and February 2012. For  those reports, we examined laws, regulations, and DOD guidance;  conducted detailed file reviews using representative samples of cases  closed in fiscal year 2013 and between January 1, 2009 and March 31,  2011; analyzed DODIG and military service IG data for cases closed in  fiscal years 2013 and 2014; and interviewed officials from DODIG and the  military service IGs, among other things. Additional details on our scope  and methodology can be found in the two issued reports. For this  testimony, we also followed up with DODIG officials to determine what  actions they had taken through August 2016 in response to our 18  recommendations. The work on which this testimony is based was  performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Taken Actions to Track the Timeliness of Military Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations but Continues to Not Regularly Report on Timeliness to Congress
paragraphs: DODIG has taken a number of actions to improve its tracking of the  timeliness of military whistleblower reprisal investigations, including  developing an automated tool to address statutory notification  requirements. However, DODIG does not regularly report to Congress on  the timeliness of military whistleblower reprisal investigations.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Made Progress in Tracking the Timeliness of Investigations
paragraphs: In both 2012 and 2015, we found that DOD was not meeting its internal  timeliness requirements for completing military whistleblower reprisal  investigations within 180 days. Specifically, in 2012 we found that despite  undertaking efforts to improve timeliness—such as changing its process  for taking in complaints—DOD took a mean of 451 days to process  cases, and that its efforts to improve case processing times were  hindered by unreliable and incomplete data on timeliness. Further, in  2015 we found that DOD’s average investigation time for cases closed in  fiscal years 2013 and 2014 was 526 days, almost three times DOD’s  internal completion requirement of 180 days. DOD Directive 7050.06,  which implements 10 U.S.C. § 1034 and establishes DOD policy, states  that DODIG shall issue a whistleblower reprisal investigation report within  180 days of the receipt of the allegation of reprisal.
To improve the timeliness of military whistleblower reprisal investigations,  we recommended in February 2012 that DOD (1) implement procedures  to track and report data on its case processing timeliness and (2) track  and analyze timeliness data to identify reforms that could aid in  processing cases within 180-day time frame. DOD concurred and  subsequently took several actions to implement these recommendations.  For example, in December 2012 DODIG began implementing a case  management system to collect key dates to track the timeliness of  DODIG’s investigative phases and in March 2016 issued a case  management system guide that established procedures to help ensure  accurate and complete recording and consistent tracking of case  processing time. Further, DODIG took steps to track and analyze  timeliness data that could aid in processing cases within the 180-day  timeframe by compiling quarterly timeliness metrics starting in fiscal year  2014, and by updating its case management system in April 2016 to  include additional investigation milestones. Because some of these  actions were not taken until 2016, it is too early to determine whether  timeliness has improved since we last reported on the status.
section_title: DOD Recently Developed an Automated Tool to Address Statutory Notification Requirements
paragraphs: In both our 2012 and 2015 reports, we found that DOD generally did not  meet statutory requirements for notifying servicemembers within 180 days  about delays in investigations. According to 10 U.S.C. § 1034 if, during  the course of an investigation, an IG determines that it is not possible to  submit the report of investigation to the Secretary of Defense and the  service Secretary within 180 days after the receipt of the allegation, the  IG shall provide to the Secretary of Defense, the service Secretary  concerned, and the servicemember making the allegation a notice of that  determination including the reasons why the report may not be submitted  within that time and an estimate of the date when the report will be  submitted. In 2012, we found that neither the DODIG nor military service  IGs had been making the required notifications. During that review,  DODIG changed its practice and started reporting this information in  October 2011 and identified steps in an action plan to help ensure that it  and the military service IGs followed the statutory reporting requirements.
During our 2015 review, DODIG officials stated that they had taken  additional steps to help ensure they met the statutory notification  requirement. For example, DODIG assigned an oversight investigator to  remind the service IGs to send the required letters and developed a  mechanism in DODIG’s case management system to indicate which  cases were older than 180 days. However, during our 2015 review, we  again found that DOD had not sent the required letters to notify  servicemembers about delays in their investigations in about half of  reprisal investigations closed in fiscal year 2013; that the median  notification time for servicemembers receiving the required letter was  about 353 days after the servicemember filed the complaint; and that the  letters that DOD had sent, on average, had significantly underestimated  the date by which the investigation would be competed.
Consequently, we recommended in our 2015 report that DOD develop an  automated tool to help ensure compliance with the statutory 180-day  notification requirement by providing servicemembers with accurate  information regarding the status of their reprisal investigations within 180  days of receipt of an allegation of reprisal. DOD concurred with this  recommendation and in April 2016, launched an automated tool within its  case management system to help ensure compliance with the statutory  180-day notification requirement, instead of relying on its manual  reconciliation process. Specifically, the case management system now  has an alert that provides the age of the case and the date by which the  notification letter must be transmitted to the required parties. This tool is  to help provide assurance that servicemembers are being notified of the  status of their reprisal investigations.
section_title: Timeliness Information Is Still Not Regularly Reported to Congress
paragraphs: In 2012, we found that although DODIG is required to keep Congress fully  and currently informed through, among other things, its semiannual  reports to Congress, DODIG was not including in these reports  information on military whistleblower case processing time, including (1)  statutorily required notifications of delays in the investigations or (2) those  exceeding DODIG’s internal 180-day completion requirement. The  semiannual report to Congress is required to include information on fraud,  abuses, and deficiencies related to the administration of programs and  operations managed or financed by DOD, but DOD interpreted this  requirement as not applying to the military whistleblower reprisal  program. Because Congress is the primary oversight body for DODIG,  we recommended that DOD regularly report to Congress on the  timeliness of military whistleblower reprisal investigations, including those  exceeding the 180-day timeframe. DOD concurred with our  recommendation. On August 31, 2016, the DOD Principal Deputy  Inspector General performing the duties of the DOD Inspector General  stated that the office will implement this recommendation by regularly  reporting timeliness information to Congress on a biannual basis. We  believe that if this action is taken, it will fully implement our  recommendation, provide Congress with enhanced visibility over the  status of military whistleblower reprisal investigations, and thereby  improve decisionmakers’ ability to effectively oversee the military  whistleblower reprisal program.
section_title: DOD Strengthened Its Oversight of Military Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations, but Additional Actions Are Needed
subsections: section_title: DOD Established Processes and Developed Guidance to Strengthen Its Oversight of Military Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
paragraphs: In 2012 and 2015, we found that DODIG’s oversight of military  whistleblower reprisal investigations conducted by the military services  was hampered by insufficient processes, including performance metrics;  guidance; and plans. DOD subsequently took steps to strengthen its  oversight of military whistleblower reprisal investigations conducted by the  military services by establishing processes and developing guidance for  overseeing these investigations—along with a plan to expand its case  management system to the services.
subsections: section_title: Processes
paragraphs: In 2012, we found that DODIG lacked reliable data on the corrective  actions taken in response to substantiated whistleblower reprisal cases,  thus limiting the visibility and oversight DOD and Congress have of the  final portion of the military whistleblower reprisal process. DOD Directive  7050.06 directs the Secretaries of the military departments and the heads  of the other DOD components to take corrective action based on IG  reports of investigations of military whistleblower reprisal allegations and  to notify DODIG of the actions taken within 10 working days. Further,  DODIG requires that the service IGs report back to DODIG on command  actions taken against the individual alleged to have reprised against a  whistleblower, according to officials from these organizations. However, in  2012 we found that DODIG had not been maintaining reliable information  on command actions needed to oversee this process. Specifically, for 40  percent of all substantiated cases that DODIG closed from October 1,  2005, through March 31, 2011, the database that DODIG used during that  period did not contain information on the command actions taken.
As a result, we recommended in our 2012 report that DOD (1) establish  standardized corrective action reporting requirements, and (2)  consistently track and regularly reconcile data regarding corrective  actions. DOD addressed these recommendations by issuing an update to  its military whistleblower directive in April 2015 that required standardized  corrective action reporting requirements by the services. DODIG also  issued additional guidance in its March 2016 investigations manual  requiring that investigators populate data fields for corrective actions and  remedies. Finally, DODIG provided us with a report in April 2016 detailing  its tracking of corrective actions taken in response to substantiated  reprisal cases between October 2011 and January 2016.
In 2012, we also found that DODIG had not yet fully established  performance metrics for ensuring the timeliness and quality of  whistleblower reprisal investigations but was taking steps to establish  timeliness metrics that focused on investigation processing time. Federal  internal control standards state that metrics are important for identifying  and setting appropriate incentives for achieving goals while complying  with law, regulations, and ethical standards. Further, we found in our  previous work that metrics on both timeliness and quality—such as  completeness of investigative reports and the adequacy of internal  controls—can enhance the ability of organizations to provide assurance  that they are exercising all of the appropriate safeguards for federal  programs. During our 2012 review, DODIG officials stated that they  recognized the importance of both timeliness and quality metrics and that  they planned to develop quality metrics as part of their effort to improve  case management and outcomes. They further noted that quality metrics  could include measuring whether interviews are completed and  documented and whether conclusions made about the case are fully  supported by evidence. To assist DOD in improving oversight of the  whistleblower reprisal program, we recommended in our 2012 report that  DOD develop and implement performance metrics to ensure the quality  and effectiveness of the investigative process, such as ensuring that the  casefiles contain evidence sufficient to support the conclusions.
DOD concurred with our recommendation and in 2014 fully developed  timeliness metrics, along with some performance metrics to assess the  completeness of a sample of (1) DODIG-conducted whistleblower reprisal  investigations and (2) DODIG oversight reviews of the military services  whistleblower reprisal investigations. For example, now DODIG is to  complete internal control checklists for investigations it conducts and  oversight worksheets for investigations conducted by the military services  to determine whether casefiles are compliant with internal policy and best  practices. On a quarterly basis, DODIG is to draw a sample of the  checklists and oversight worksheets for cases closed by DODIG and the  military service IGs and compare these checklists to the quality metrics  that it developed. According to DODIG officials, these metrics were  briefed to the DOD Inspector General in fiscal year 2014. DODIG officials  stated in July 2016 that they continued to conduct quality assurance  reviews and collect associated metrics in fiscal year 2015, but that they  have not briefed these metrics to the DOD Inspector General since fiscal  year 2014 and that changes to the metrics briefings are forthcoming per  direction from the DOD Inspector General and Principal Deputy Inspector  General. DODIG did not provide information on the nature of these  changes. While we believe that DODIG’s actions should help oversee the  quality of investigations, we will continue to work with the DODIG and  monitor its progress in implementing and communicating these  performance metrics during our ongoing review assessing whistleblower  reprisal investigation processes for DOD civilian employees and  contractors. Further, we also believe that until the military services follow  standardized investigation stages, as discussed later in this statement, it  will be difficult for the DODIG to consistently measure the quality of the  services’ military whistleblower reprisal investigations.
Separately, in 2015, we found that DODIG and the service IGs had  processes for investigators to recuse themselves from investigations, but  there was no process for investigators to document whether the  investigation they conducted was independent and outside the chain of  command. Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency  standards state that in all matters relating to investigative work, the  investigative organization must be free, both in fact and appearance, from  impairments to independence. Further, guidance for documenting  independence is included in generally accepted government auditing  standards, which can provide guidance to service IGs as a best practice  on how to document decisions regarding independence when conducting  reprisal investigations.
At the time of our 2015 review, DODIG officials stated that their recusal  policies for investigators, their decentralized investigation structure, and  their removal of the investigator from the chain of command adequately  addressed independence issues and that no further documentation of  independence was needed. However, during the case file review we  conducted for our 2015 report, we identified oversight worksheets on  which DODIG oversight investigators had noted potential impairments to  investigator objectivity in the report of investigation. For example, one  oversight worksheet stated that the report gave the appearance of service  investigator bias, and another oversight worksheet stated that the  investigator was not outside the chain of command, as is statutorily  required. DODIG approved these cases without documenting how it had  reconciled these case deficiencies. As a result, in our 2015 report we  recommended that DOD develop and implement a process for military  service investigators to document whether the investigation was  independent and outside the chain of command and direct the service IGs  to provide such documentation for review during the oversight process.  DOD concurred with this recommendation and issued a memorandum in  June 2015 that informed service IGs that DODIG would look for  certification of an investigator’s independence during its oversight  reviews. Concurrently, DODIG also directed the service IGs to provide  such documentation.
section_title: Guidance
paragraphs: In 2012, we found that DODIG was updating its guidance related to the  whistleblower program but that the updates had not yet been formalized  and that the guidance that existed at that time was inconsistently  followed. According to the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity  and Efficiency’s quality standards for investigations, organizations should  establish appropriate written investigative policies and procedures  through handbooks, manuals, directives, or similar mechanisms to  facilitate due professional care in meeting program requirements. Further,  guidance should be regularly evaluated to help ensure that it is still  appropriate and working as intended. However, in 2012 we found, among  other things, that DODIG’s primary investigative guide distributed to  investigators conducting whistleblower reprisal investigations had not  been updated since 1996 and did not reflect some investigative  processes that were current in 2012. Additionally, because guidance  related to key provisions of the investigative process was unclear, it was  being interpreted and implemented differently by the service IGs. As a  result, we recommended in our 2012 report that DODIG update its  whistleblower reprisal investigative guidance and ensure that it is  consistently followed, including clarifying reporting requirements,  responsibilities, and terminology. DOD concurred with this  recommendation and in October 2014 released a guide of best practices  for conducting military reprisal investigations and in April 2015 updated  Directive 7050.06 on military whistleblower protection, which established  policies and assigned responsibilities for military whistleblower protection  and defined key terminology.
Separately, in 2015 we found that DODIG had provided limited guidance  to users of its case management system on how to populate case  information into the system. The case management system, in use since  December 2012, was to serve as a real-time complaint tracking and  investigative management tool for investigators. DOD’s fiscal year 2014  performance plan for oversight investigators notes that investigators  should ensure that the case management system reflects current, real- time information on case activity. This intent aligns with Council of the  Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency’s quality standards for  investigations, which state that accurate processing of information is  essential to the mission of an investigative organization and that this  begins with the orderly, systematic, accurate, and secure maintenance of  a management information system. However, based on our file review of  a sample of 124 cases closed in fiscal year 2013, we found that DODIG  investigators were not using the case management system for real-time  case management. Specifically, we estimated that DODIG personnel  uploaded key case documents to the system after DODIG had closed the  case in 77 percent of cases in fiscal year 2013. Among other things,  these documents included reports of investigation, oversight worksheets,  and 180-day notification letters regarding delays in completing  investigations. Additionally, we estimated that for 83 percent of cases  closed in fiscal year 2013, DODIG staff had made changes to case  variables in the case management system at least 3 months after case  closure.
DODIG officials stated in 2015 that they planned to further develop a  manual for the case management system that was in draft form along  with internal desk aides, but that they did not plan to issue additional  internal guidance for DODIG staff on the case management system  because they believed that the existing guidance was sufficient. However,  DODIG’s draft manual did not instruct users on how to access the  system, troubleshoot errors, or monitor caseloads. As a result, in our  2015 report we recommended that DOD issue additional guidance to  investigators on how to use the case management system as a real-time  management tool. DOD concurred with this recommendation and in  March 2016 issued a case management system user guide and in July  2016, a data entry guide. Collectively, these guides provide users with  key information on how to work with and maintain data in the case  management system.
section_title: Case Management System Plan
paragraphs: In 2015, we found that each military service IG conducted and monitored  the status of military whistleblower reprisal investigations in a different  case management system and that DODIG did not have complete  visibility over service investigations from complaint receipt to investigation  determination. Further, we found that DODIG did not have knowledge of  the real-time status of service-conducted investigations and was unable  to anticipate when service IGs would send completed reports of  investigation for DODIG review. DODIG is required to review all service  IG determinations in military reprisal investigations in addition to its  responsibility for conducting investigations of some military reprisal  complaints, and DOD Directive 7050.06 requires that service IGs notify  DODIG of reprisal complaints within 10 days of the receipt of a complaint.  However, our analysis indicated that DODIG’s case management system  did not have records of at least 22 percent of service investigations both  open as of September 30, 2014, and closed in fiscal years 2013 and  2014. Further, based on our file review, we estimated that there was no  evidence of the required service notification in 30 percent of the cases  closed in fiscal year 2013. We concluded that without a common system  to share data, DODIG’s oversight of the timeliness of service  investigations and visibility of its own future workload was limited.
At the time of our 2015 review, DOD was taking steps to improve its  visibility into service investigations, including by expanding its case  management system to the military services. DODIG officials stated that  they had created a working group comprising representatives from each  of the service IGs to facilitate the expansion and that they planned a  complete rollout to the service IGs by the end of fiscal year 2016.  However, DODIG did not have an implementation plan for the expansion  and had not yet taken steps to develop one. Project management plans  should include a scope—to describe major deliverables, assumptions,  and project constraints—project requirements, schedules, costs, and  stakeholder roles and responsibilities and communication techniques,  among other things. Given DOD’s stated plans to expand the case  management system to the service IGs by the end of fiscal year 2016, we  recommended in our 2015 report that DOD develop an implementation  plan that addresses the needs of DODIG and the service IGs and defines  project goals, schedules, costs, stakeholder roles and responsibilities,  and stakeholder communication techniques. DOD concurred with this  recommendation and subsequently developed a plan in April 2016, in  coordination with the military services, which included the elements we  recommended for a plan to expand its case management system into an  enterprise system. This plan states that the enterprise case management  system will launch between February 2018 and May 2018 and notes that  the project budget between fiscal years 2017 and 2021 is approximately  $25.3 million.
section_title: Additional Actions Are Needed to Further Strengthen Oversight of Military Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
paragraphs: Although DODIG has taken several important actions, additional actions  are still needed to further strengthen the capacity of DODIG and the  Congress to oversee military whistleblower reprisal investigations. These  actions include standardizing the investigation process and reporting  corrective action information to Congress.
subsections: section_title: Standardized Investigation Stages
paragraphs: In 2015, we found that the DODIG and the military service IGs use  different terms in their guidance to refer to their investigations, thus  hindering DODIG’s ability to consistently classify and assess the  completeness of cases during its oversight reviews. For example, we  found that in the absence of standardized investigation stages, DODIG  investigators had miscoded approximately 43 percent of the cases that  DODIG had closed in fiscal year 2013 as full investigations, based on our  estimate, when these investigations were instead preliminary inquiries as  indicated in the services’ reports of investigation. The Council of the  Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency’s quality standards for  investigations state that to facilitate due professional care, organizations  should establish written investigative policies and procedures that are  revised regularly according to evolving laws, regulations, and executive  orders. DODIG took an important step to improve its guidance by issuing  an updated reprisal investigation guide for military reprisal investigations  for both DODIG and service IG investigators in October 2014. However,  the guide states that it describes best practices for conducting military  reprisal intakes and investigations and DODIG officials told us that the  guide does not explicitly direct the services to follow DODIG’s preferred  investigation process and stages. These officials further stated that they  have no role in the development of service IG regulations.
To improve the military whistleblower reprisal investigation process and  oversight of such investigations, in our 2015 report we recommended that  the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the DODIG, direct the  military services to follow standardized investigation stages and issue  guidance clarifying how the stages are defined. DOD concurred with this  recommendation and subsequently updated its guide in June 2015.  However, this guide is still characterized as describing best practices and  does not direct the services to follow standardized investigation stages.  We note that 10 U.S.C. § 1034 provides the authority for the Secretary of  Defense to prescribe regulations to carry out the section. Also, DOD  Directive 7050.06 assigns DODIG the responsibility to provide oversight  of the military whistleblower reprisal program for the department. DODIG  officials noted in August 2016 that they are currently working with the  military services through an established working group to standardize the  investigation stages as an interim measure. The DOD Principal Deputy  Inspector General performing the duties of the DOD Inspector General  also indicated in August 2016 that the office is willing to coordinate with  the Secretary of Defense to issue authoritative direction to the services to  standardize the investigation stages, but that this will take time.
section_title: Reporting on Corrective Actions
paragraphs: As previously mentioned, we found in 2012 that DOD lacked reliable data  on the corrective actions taken in response to substantiated whistleblower  reprisal cases, thus limiting the visibility and oversight that DOD and  Congress have of the final portion of the military whistleblower reprisal  process. We also noted in 2012 that a 2009 Department of Justice review  recommended that the results of investigations that substantiate  allegations of reprisal be publicized as a way to heighten awareness  within the services of the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, to  potentially deter future incidents of reprisal, and to possibly encourage  other reprisal victims to come forward. While the DODIG cannot directly  take corrective action in response to a substantiated case per DOD  Directive 7050.06, it is the focal point for DOD’s military whistleblower  reprisal program and is well positioned to collect and monitor data  regarding program outcomes. Further, DODIG officials stated in 2012  that because DODIG is the focal point, it is important for it to have  visibility and information of all military whistleblower reprisal activities, not  only to provide oversight but also to provide a central place within the  department where internal and external stakeholders can obtain  information.
In addition to the recommendations we made regarding establishing  corrective action reporting requirements and regularly tracking these data,  we also recommended in our 2012 report that DOD regularly report to  Congress on the frequency and type of corrective actions taken in  response to substantiated reprisal claims. We noted that DOD could do  so, for example, through its semiannual reports to Congress. DOD  concurred with that recommendation and has since included examples in  its semiannual reports to Congress of corrective actions taken by the  military services for substantiated cases but not a comprehensive list of  all corrective actions taken. However, in following up on actions that  DODIG has taken regarding this recommendation in August 2016,  DODIG officials stated that the corrective actions listed in its semiannual  reports to Congress included all corrective actions taken during the 6  month reporting period, but that the reports incorrectly identified these  actions as examples. DODIG provided us corrective action information to  compare with the corrective actions reported in DODIG’s December 2015  and March 2016 semiannual reports to Congress for those reporting  periods. We identified some key differences. Specifically, we identified  corrective actions in the information provided to us by DODIG that were  not published in the December and March reports to Congress and  identified discrepancies in the types of corrective action contained in the  reports and in the information that DODIG provided. As a result, we  believe that DODIG’s two most recent semiannual reports to Congress  did not include the frequency and type of all corrective actions reported  during those reporting periods.
Relatedly, we also noted in August 2016 that DODIG’s semiannual  reports did not include other information needed to convey the frequency  and type of corrective actions. Specifically, DODIG officials stated in  August 2016 that their case management system would require additional  capability in order to produce a list of substantiated allegations that do not  have associated corrective actions, which would indicate which corrective  action recommendations are outstanding. Further, these officials stated  that publishing information showing the status of all DODIG corrective  action recommendations—not just actions that were taken during a  particular reporting period—could be misleading because the military  services sometimes take actions that are different than those  recommended by DODIG and that may not result from reprisal  investigations. However, as noted in the 2009 Department of Justice  review, publicizing the results of investigations that substantiate  allegations of reprisal may help to deter future incidents of reprisal and  encourage other whistleblowers to come forward. Without including  information on (1) all corrective actions taken during a reporting period,  (2) outstanding corrective action recommendations, and (3) actions taken  by the services that are different than those recommended by DODIG, we  believe that DODIG’s current method of reporting does not fully address  our recommendation to report to Congress on the frequency and type of  corrective action taken in response to substantiated claims. Moreover, it  does not meet the requirement to keep Congress fully and currently  informed on the progress of implementing corrective actions through,  among other things, its semiannual reports to Congress. We therefore  continue to believe that without such information, Congress will be  hindered in its ability to provide oversight of the corrective action portion  of the military whistleblower reprisal program.
In summary, DOD has taken actions to implement 15 of the 18  recommendations that we made to address the military whistleblower  reprisal timeliness and oversight challenges we identified in our 2012 and  2015 reports. These efforts constitute progress toward improving the  DODIG’s ability to accurately track the timeliness of military whistleblower  reprisal investigations and increase the DODIG’s ability to effectively  oversee the department’s military whistleblower reprisal program. Fully  implementing the remaining 3 recommendations would further strengthen  DODIG’s capacity to assess the quality of military whistleblower reprisal  investigations and enhance Congress’ visibility into the timeliness of  investigations as well as into the corrective actions taken for  substantiated allegations. We have ongoing work that will help to both  monitor the actions taken by DODIG to improve its oversight of military  reprisal investigations and provide additional insight on the DODIG’s  ability to conduct timely and quality reprisal investigations for DOD’s  civilian and contractor employees.
Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I look forward to  answering any questions that you might have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you or your staff have any questions about this statement, please  contact Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and  Management at (202) 512-3604 or FarrellB@gao.gov, or Lori Atkinson,  Assistant Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (404) 679- 1852 or AtkinsonL@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony  are Tracy Barnes, Sara Cradic, Ryan D’Amore, Taylor Hadfield, and Mike  Silver.
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