Defense Technologies: DOD's Critical Technologies Lists Rarely Inform Export Control and Other Policy Decisions
Published: 2006-07-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Major acquisitions in the Department of Defense's (DOD) force transformation rely on maintaining technological superiority to ensure U.S. military dominance. Failure to identify and protect critical technologies makes U.S. military assets vulnerable to cloning, neutralization, or other action that degrades current and anticipated capabilities. To help minimize these risks, DOD's Militarily Critical Technologies Program developed and periodically updates two lists of technologies--the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) and the Developing Science and Technologies List (DSTL). While the lists are primarily intended to inform U.S. export control decisions, they can also inform counterintelligence activities, research plans, and technology protection programs, making MCTL and DSTL fundamental resources for security decisions. To ensure these lists are informative, GAO assessed the Militarily Critical Technologies Program's process for updating the MCTL and DSTL and determined how the lists are used to inform export control and DOD policy decisions.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Militarily Critical Technologies Program's process for updating the MCTL and DSTL has generated lists that are of questionable value. To update the lists, working groups of experts from government, industry, and academia identify militarily critical technologies. However, participation in the working groups is voluntary, and some experts choose not to participate or do not participate fully. Validation of the updates--a critical check to ensure the lists are complete and accurate--also provides little assurance that the lists are of value. More than one-third of the reviewers acknowledged they do not have the technical expertise necessary to validate the updates, and one-quarter did not review the lists. The lists are also out of date. Although a stated program goal calls for all 20 sections of the lists to be completely updated at least every 4 years, about half of the sections on the MCTL--including technologies related to weapons, communications, and biological warfare--have not been updated for 10 years. The DSTL is also out of date; almost half of the sections have not been updated in the past 5 years. With the limited value of the MCTL and DSTL, agencies tend to rely on other information sources to inform export control and DOD policy decisions. According to DOD and Department of Commerce export control officials, the MCTL is too broad, difficult to use, and out of date to inform export control proposals or export licensing decisions. Concerned about the MCTL's accuracy and reliability, the Air Force instructed its personnel not to use the MCTL. The DSTL is also seldom used--in part because some DOD components were not aware of the list. For those components that were aware of the DSTL, some found it only marginally useful because it too is out of date. Several DOD components have developed their own efforts to track global technologies. For example, the Army established international technology centers dedicated to identifying international cooperative opportunities as well as to maintain knowledge of foreign research efforts to avoid technological surprises for the warfighter.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Technological advantage is fundamental to U.S. military dominance in  Technological advantage is fundamental to U.S. military dominance in  21st-century warfare. Major acquisitions in the Department of Defense’s  21st-century warfare. Major acquisitions in the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) ongoing force transformation—including manned and unmanned  (DOD) ongoing force transformation—including manned and unmanned  aircraft systems, networkcentric communications systems, and air and  aircraft systems, networkcentric communications systems, and air and  ground weapons—rely on maintaining technological superiority. Failure to  ground weapons—rely on maintaining technological superiority. Failure to  identify and protect critical technologies makes U.S. military assets  identify and protect critical technologies makes U.S. military assets  vulnerable to cloning, neutralization, or other action that degrades current  vulnerable to cloning, neutralization, or other action that degrades current  and anticipated capabilities.  and anticipated capabilities.
To help minimize these risks, DOD’s Militarily Critical Technologies  To help minimize these risks, DOD’s Militarily Critical Technologies  Program developed and periodically updates two lists of technologies— Program developed and periodically updates two lists of technologies— the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) and the Developing  the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) and the Developing  Science and Technologies List (DSTL)—each consisting of 20 sections.  Science and Technologies List (DSTL)—each consisting of 20 sections.  These lists are primarily intended to inform U.S. export control decisions,  These lists are primarily intended to inform U.S. export control decisions,  but can also help inform counterintelligence activities, research plans, and  but can also help inform counterintelligence activities, research plans, and  technology protection programs. As such, the MCTL and DSTL are  technology protection programs. As such, the MCTL and DSTL are  considered fundamental to identifying technologies critical to national  considered fundamental to identifying technologies critical to national  security that can help inform decisions to ensure U.S. technological  security that can help inform decisions to ensure U.S. technological  advantage for the warfighter.  advantage for the warfighter.
Redefined national security threats, rapid technological advances, and  Redefined national security threats, rapid technological advances, and  increasing efforts by adversaries to gain access to U.S. military weapon  increasing efforts by adversaries to gain access to U.S. military weapon  system technology heighten the need to identify and protect militarily  system technology heighten the need to identify and protect militarily  critical technologies. Given the importance of the MCTL and DSTL, you  critical technologies. Given the importance of the MCTL and DSTL, you  asked us to (1) assess the Militarily Critical Technologies Program’s  asked us to (1) assess the Militarily Critical Technologies Program’s  process for updating the MCTL and DSTL and (2) determine how the lists  process for updating the MCTL and DSTL and (2) determine how the lists  are used to inform export control and DOD policy decisions.  are used to inform export control and DOD policy decisions.
To assess how the lists are updated, we met with officials from the  To assess how the lists are updated, we met with officials from the  Militarily Critical Technologies Program and the Institute for Defense  Militarily Critical Technologies Program and the Institute for Defense  Analyses—the contractor that develops list updates—and also reviewed  Analyses—the contractor that develops list updates—and also reviewed  relevant program guidance, directives, and applicable statutory provisions.  relevant program guidance, directives, and applicable statutory provisions.  Using program guidance, we evaluated how the last five section updates to  Using program guidance, we evaluated how the last five section updates to  the MCTL and DSTL were conducted. We identified 20 DOD components  responsible for validating updates prior to issuance and interviewed 19.  We compared when sections of the MCTL and DSTL were last updated  over the past 10 years with stated program goals for updating the lists. We  identified intended uses of the MCTL and DSTL through interviews with  program officials and review of program documents and applicable law.  To determine how the lists are used, we interviewed officials from various  DOD organizations within the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Policy, military services, several combatant  commands, Defense Intelligence Agency, as well as officials from the  Department of Commerce. In addition, we identified other mechanisms  DOD has used to identify critical technologies and determined how these  efforts are coordinated with the MCTL and DSTL process. We conducted  our work from October 2005 to June 2006 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD considers maintaining military superiority a key priority and has  established an agencywide policy to treat defense-related technology as a  valuable, limited national security resource that should be invested in and  protected to pursue national security objectives. Many DOD organizations  and other federal agencies have a need to know what is militarily critical  to assist in planning program activities related to technology and to help  inform decision making. Within DOD specifically, knowledge about  militarily critical technologies is needed for such activities as    consideration of anti-tamper protection of critical technologies on  defense systems,    counterproliferation programs and activities, and  research and development planning.
Similarly, other federal agencies depend on DOD to identify militarily  critical technologies. For example, the Departments of Commerce and  State rely in part on DOD’s input on what is militarily critical to inform  export control decisions. The Federal Bureau of Investigation also needs  to be aware of DOD-identified critical technologies to determine which  technologies need protection from being acquired or exploited by foreign  intelligence collection efforts.
In response to the Export Administration Act of 1979, which governs the  exports of items with both military and civilian applications, DOD  established the Militarily Critical Technologies Program in 1980 to  periodically identify and assess technologies that are critical to retaining  dominance for the warfighter. The Militarily Critical Technologies  Program produces a restricted and a public version of both the MCTL and  the DSTL. DOD has contracted with the Institute for Defense Analyses, a  federally funded research and development center, since the inception of  the program to furnish scientific and technical support in developing and  maintaining the lists. The MCTL covers technologies that are of concern in  the near term, while the DSTL covers those in the longer term. (See fig. 1  for comparison of the lists.) Program oversight is provided by DOD’s  Office of International Technology Security. Over the past 5 years, DOD  has provided approximately $2 million annually to support the Militarily  Critical Technologies Program.
The lists are divided into 20 technology sections (see fig. 2), and each  section is developed and updated by a technology working group led by a  chair and cochair and composed of experts. Each working group identifies  militarily critical technologies and the parameters at which they are  critical, based on definitions of what is militarily critical established by the  Export Administration Act. Each working group is responsible for one  MCTL and one DSTL section covering the same topic, such as aeronautics  technology. The Institute for Defense Analyses has established broad  guidance for the chairperson of the technology working groups to use  regarding the update process. This guidance in part indicates that working  groups should consist of experts from government, industry, and academia  and that they should reach consensus on what is critical.
section_title: DOD’s Updates of the MCTL and DSTL Produces Lists of Limited Value
paragraphs: In updating the MCTL and DSTL, the technology working groups face  several challenges, including identifying and engaging experts in the  process and interpreting the definition of militarily critical. These  challenges increase the importance of DOD’s validation process—a critical  check to ensuring the lists are complete and accurate. However, this  process is not adequate to provide this assurance. At the same time, the  lists are significantly out of date. As a result, the lists are of questionable  value.
subsections: section_title: Validation Process Provides Little Assurance That Lists Are Complete and Accurate
paragraphs: Working group chairs face two key challenges in identifying and selecting  experts to participate in the technology working groups that update the  MCTL and DSTL. First, participation in the working groups is voluntary,  and according to several chairs we spoke with, engaging the experts— including those employed by DOD—can be challenging since some  selected experts participate only informally or are unable to participate at  all because of competing work priorities. Second, according to DOD and  Institute for Defense Analyses officials, it is challenging to determine the  parameter at which a particular technology becomes militarily critical and  is therefore subject to interpretation by the working group. One chair  defines “militarily critical” for the working group, while others rely on the  individual interpretations and judgments of the working group members.
These inherent challenges in the process place greater importance on the  need to validate the lists. To ensure the lists are complete and accurate,  DOD components review and validate the working groups’ updates—  a process DOD program officials consider a critical check of the working  groups’ efforts. Figure 3 lists the DOD reviewers.
However, we found a number of weaknesses in this critical check. First,  reviewers are unclear about how to validate proposed updates or what  factors to consider when reviewing proposed updates. For example, one  reviewer indicated that the purpose of the MCTL is to inform decisions on  technologies that may need to be export controlled, but was unsure  whether the review should validate that the technologies in proposed  updates need to be controlled or whether to ensure that parameters of  technologies listed are accurate. Reviewers stated that they are not  informed as to what is added, deleted, or otherwise changed from one  update to the next. Without instruction or information on the updates,  validation of the changes to the lists may be little more than a reviewer’s  guess. Two reviewers were unsure how to interpret “militarily critical”  when reviewing the proposed updates and therefore did not know how to  comment. In addition, no guidance is provided to reviewers on factors to  consider during the validation process.
Second, the reviewers may not have the technical knowledge to validate  the updates. Eight reviewers stated they or their organizations lack the  necessary expertise to determine whether the lists were complete or  accurate. Program officials stated they do not currently have a process to  determine whether they have the proper reviewers or if these reviewers  are adequately validating proposed updates.
Finally, program officials assume concurrence with the lists if reviewers  have not provided feedback within 30 days. According to program  officials, the process is working well because reviewers seldom provide  feedback or comments on proposed MCTL or DSTL updates. However,  one-quarter of the reviewers did not review the lists. Specifically, five  reviewers told us that they receive MCTL and DSTL updates but do not  comment on them. In addition, according to our analysis of the last five  updates to the MCTL and DSTL, eight reviewers have provided comments  to at least one update.
section_title: MCTL and DSTL Lack Currency
paragraphs: A Militarily Critical Technologies Program goal is to completely update the  MCTL and DSTL at least every 4 years by updating about 5 sections of  each list every year. According to program officials, this goal was set to  keep the lists as current as possible within budget limitations. However,  this goal has not been met. The Institute for Defense Analyses produced  only one update of the MCTL in fiscal year 2004 and four updates in fiscal  year 2005 (see table 1). Furthermore, 9 of 20 MCTL sections have not been  updated since 1996—the last time the MCTL was completely updated.
The DSTL is also out of date. The institute did not update any sections in  fiscal year 2004 and produced only one update in fiscal year 2005. Over the  past 5 years, only half of the DSTL sections have been updated (see   table 2).
Program officials explained that delays were in part the result of internal  disruptions to the program due to frequent changes in senior leadership,  but were unable to provide information on how they monitor or measure  whether goals for updating the lists are being met. Regardless, program  officials stated they are satisfied with how the process for updating the  lists is working and noted that the lists are available on the Web site for  public comment. In 2005, program officials held forums to obtain feedback  from list users and participants in the technology working groups about  the process for updating the lists. In response to user feedback expressing  concern about the process, program officials developed an action plan that  in part called for an independent assessment of the MCTL and DSTL  process for updating the lists, which was not completed. Instead, a  program official began an internal review, concluding that problems  stemmed from funding constraints and a lack of senior DOD leadership to  support the program.
section_title: Agencies Tend to Rely on Information Other than the MCTL and DSTL to Support Decisions about Critical Technologies
paragraphs: While the MCTL was created to help determine items that need to be  controlled, the list has generally not been used to inform export control  and DOD policy decisions. Several DOD components have developed their  own efforts to catalog critical technologies to meet their needs. The DSTL  is also seldom used and may be eclipsed by more extensive DOD efforts.
subsections: section_title: MCTL Rarely Informs Export Control or DOD Policy Decisions
paragraphs: A number of DOD components, including the armed services, as well as  the Department of Commerce, do not rely on the MCTL to inform export  control or DOD policy decisions. While the MCTL is expected to inform  review of export license applications or export control decisions, the  Defense Technology Security Administration—which represents DOD on  export control decisions—does not use the MCTL for export licensing  decisions or to inform DOD’s input to U.S. government export control  proposals that are considered by the multilateral export control regime  known as the Wassenaar Arrangement. Instead, the Defense Technology  Security Administration relies on other sources of information, including  technology-specific information from subject matter experts associated  with the Institute for Defense Analyses, who may also participate in MCTL  updates. According to Defense Technology Security Administration  officials, the MCTL is too broad, out of date, and difficult to navigate to be  an effective tool for informing export licensing decisions or export control  proposals.
Officials from the key export control regulatory agencies agreed that the  MCTL lacks the specificity and currency needed for export control  decisions. These have been long-standing issues. In 1982, we reported that  the Departments of Commerce and State and private industry were  concerned that the MCTL was not specific enough to be useful as a  practical daily guide for export control decisions. Presently, Commerce  officials expressed additional concerns that because of delays in updating  sections of the MCTL, the list contains items that they have already  determined need not be controlled or limited. Further, the chair for the  Militarily Critical Technologies Program’s electronics technical working  group acknowledged that microprocessors are included as militarily  critical on the MCTL at parameters no longer controlled on Commerce’s  control list. Because of the lack of specificity and lack of currency,  Commerce officials told us that they do not use the MCTL to inform items  to control. Instead, they rely on the judgment of the Defense Technology  Security Administration.
The military services also seldom use the MCTL when reviewing export  license applications. In 1996, the Air Force issued guidance instructing  personnel not to use the MCTL to inform export control and other  decisions. This guidance, which is still in effect today, specifically  prohibits the Air Force’s export control specialists, intelligence analysts,  investigators, system security engineers, operations security officers, and  public affairs officers from using the MCTL to inform export decisions or  to determine the importance of military-related technologies. The  guidance further states that because the MCTL is out of date, its utility is  substantially limited and it may only serve as a desk reference or  dictionary to obtain a description of a particular dual-use technology.  While Navy officials responsible for export control decisions stated that  the MCTL occasionally serves as the starting point to inform decisions,  they rely on their own export licensing databases for export control  policy. In addition, a senior Navy official stated that even though extensive  time and effort go into the development and maintenance of the MCTL, the  list does not provide significant value. Navy officials also noted that the  MCTL is out of date and raised concerns regarding its accuracy. The Army  Director of Policy for Security Cooperation, Resources, and Exports  similarly stated the MCTL is inappropriate for being used to inform export  control decisions because the lists are too component- and material- focused and do not list specific systems.
As with export control decisions, we found that the MCTL is seldom used  to inform various DOD policy decisions, including those related to  identifying and protecting critical technology on weapon systems,  counterintelligence efforts related to critical technologies, and programs  reporting on the protection of the defense industrial base. For example,  DOD officials stated that they do not directly use the MCTL to inform  decisions related to determining whether to use anti-tamper protections.  Yet the MCTL is intended to be a primary resource in DOD’s process for  identifying critical technologies in defense systems that may require anti- tamper protections to discourage or delay reverse engineering. While  officials stated that the MCTL is a starting point to select critical  technologies for protection, the MCTL’s limitations—including the fact  that it is out of date and does not incorporate previously identified critical  technologies or anti-tamper decisions—led the anti-tamper executive  agent to develop a more comprehensive tool for identifying and tracking  critical technologies that may need anti-tamper protection.
The MCTL is intended to be used as a reference for counterintelligence  initiatives throughout the DOD intelligence community.  Counterintelligence program officials need to know what technologies are  critical and which ones are being targeted through foreign intelligence  collection activities. Some counterintelligence entities, including the  Defense Intelligence Agency and Army Counterintelligence, indicated that  the MCTL informs decisions about technologies that should be examined  to ensure that each military service protects them in a consistent manner,  but have found limitations in using the list. For example, officials from  Army Counterintelligence stated that the MCTL is not current enough to  inform decisions needed to help the military services consistently track  and protect their current technologies. Due to the difficulties in using the  MCTL, the Army has developed a program to identify technologies that are  critical to individual Army acquisition programs. Defense Intelligence  Agency officials stated that the taxonomy of the MCTL technology  categories is useful. However, officials have found that some MCTL  sections must be augmented with more current critical technology  information to help inform decisions. Outside of DOD counterintelligence  activities, Militarily Critical Technologies Program officials stated that  they are entering into an agreement with the Federal Bureau of  Investigation to provide support to the bureau’s critical national assets  program.
The MCTL is also intended to inform decisions made by the Committee on  Foreign Investment in the United States, an interagency committee  responsible for reviewing foreign acquisitions of U.S.-based companies to  determine whether the proposed acquisition could pose a threat to  national security. DOD, which is a member of the committee, provides  input through its Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for  Industrial Policy on decisions related to proposed transactions that may  involve technologies critical to DOD interests. According to a DOD official,  the MCTL is not used to inform these decisions. Instead, DOD relies on  input from technical experts in the Directorate for Defense Research and  Engineering, who may use the MCTL as one of their many sources of  information.
In addition, DOD Industrial Policy officials have created a Defense  Industrial Base Capabilities Study Series, which in part identifies critical  technologies and companies that produce them to help inform DOD input  to Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States decisions as well  as other DOD policy decisions. The Defense Industrial Base Capabilities  Study Series was completed in June 2005 and lists over 1,400 critical  technologies. The study series notes that it includes examples of critical  technologies that the MCTL should consider incorporating. However,  Militarily Critical Technologies Program officials said that the series uses a  different definition of critical technology and has not coordinated the  MCTL and the series’ lists of critical technologies.
section_title: DSTL Is Seldom Used and May Be Eclipsed by More Extensive Efforts
paragraphs: Many DOD officials we spoke with were either not aware of the DSTL or  seldom used it. For example, officials from the Office of Naval Research  and the Naval Research Labs were unaware of the DSTL. Officials from the  Army’s Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and  Technology/Chief Scientist, who were aware of the existence of the DSTL,  stated that the DSTL is not useful for informing science and technology  decisions because it is overly broad, its taxonomy does not align with  Army Research and Technology taxonomy, and its assessments are rarely  in consonance with Army Research and Technology subject matter  experts.  Furthermore, the Army’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for  Research and Technology/Chief Scientist maintains sufficient in-house  expertise for all required program planning activities and does not require  the DSTL to complete mission requirements. In addition, Defense  Advanced Research Projects Agency officials indicated that the DSTL has  limited applicability to the agency’s research efforts.
The DSTL is intended to forecast worldwide technology capabilities that  could threaten U.S. technological superiority or surprise warfighters in  theater as well as to assist DOD science and technology planning.  However, the Defense Technology Security Administration has developed  a “Top Ten Technologies” list that identifies emerging technologies.  According to Defense Technology Security Administration officials, the  Top Ten list is designed to help DOD identify paradigm-shifting  technologies on or approaching the horizon to provide a basis for defense  proposals on how these technologies should be controlled and to inform  decisions on how these technologies might benefit the military. In  addition, officials who represent the military services and DOD research  and development components have established more extensive efforts to  aid science planning and track developing and future technologies. For  example, both the Army and the Navy maintain offices and technology  centers worldwide to monitor and assess research efforts of foreign  governments and industries to both inform science and technology  planning and identify rapidly evolving or breakthrough technologies. Army  officials explained that the Army’s science and technology research  activities, with a fiscal year 2005 annual budget of approximately   $1.7 billion, have more expertise to comprehensibly track all areas of  developing global technology than the Militarily Critical Technologies  Program, which has an average annual budget of $2 million.
At the same time, the Directorate for Defense Research and Engineering  has developed a Global Technology Knowledge Base, which incorporates  the DSTL along with other information provided by the military services.  Like the DSTL, the Global Technology Knowledge Base is intended to  serve as a broad-based evaluation of foreign technology and an assessment  of foreign technology development efforts to assist in the planning of  DOD’s science and technology efforts and offers insight into potential  collaboration opportunities with foreign entities or utilization of foreign  technologies. Although the knowledge base incorporates DSTL  information, a Directorate for Defense Research and Engineering official  responsible for the knowledge base told us that the DSTL’s value to the  database is limited because of currency and reliability issues.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD has widespread requirements to know what critical technologies are  needed to ensure a technological edge for the warfighter. These  requirements demand that DOD leadership develop a solid framework for  identifying the technologies that will guide critical decisions on what to  control and protect. Relying on militarily critical technology lists that are  of questionable value is risky—especially in an environment of rapid  technological change and redefined national security threats. Without  clear and current information on what items are militarily critical, many  DOD components have developed their own mechanisms for identifying  and tracking critical technologies. While these separate efforts may satisfy  parochial concerns, they do not ensure an effective approach for  identifying and coordinating information on critical technologies needed  to inform decisions on how to protect U.S. security interests.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Given the need of numerous programs to know what is militarily critical,  we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director for  Defense Research and Engineering to determine users’ requirements and  on the basis of those requirements, reassess and clearly define the MCTL’s  purpose.  If the purpose deviates from its original intent to inform export  control decisions, DOD should seek necessary legislative relief.
To ensure that users’ requirements are met, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Director for Defense Research and  Engineering, in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to    examine existing efforts within the department to catalog critical  technologies and determine best practices for identifying  technologies;    using these best practices, develop an approach that best meets  user requirements in a timely manner;    on the basis of the new approach, identify duplicative efforts, if any;  ensure the efficient use of resources; and determine what level of  funding is appropriate;    develop an implementation plan for the approach, including  timelines for execution and implementing guidance or directives;  and    establish an oversight mechanism to ensure that user needs are met.
Given the more expansive existing efforts in DOD to track global science  and technology efforts, we also recommend that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Director for Defense Research and Engineering to determine the  utility of continuing to maintain the DSTL.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD and Commerce. DOD concurred  with our recommendations. However, it does not plan to take any action  beyond what it had already completed or planned to do. DOD asserts that  the International Technology Security’s 2005 action plan, developed prior  to our review, addresses most of our seven recommendations.  DOD also  maintains that the MCTL is the only list that assesses technologies from an  export control viewpoint.
DOD’s comments do not recognize that identifying militarily critical  technologies serves multiple interests and that many DOD organizations  and other federal agencies have a need to know what is militarily critical.  Our findings show that shortcomings in the program have led to products  that are not adequately validated as well as too broad and out of date to  satisfy users’ needs.  DOD’s action plan, which in part discussed steps to  meet users’ requirements, was limited.  For example, DOD, in the  development of the plan, did not include Defense Technology Security  Administration or the Department of Commerce—-two key agencies that  program products are intended to inform for export control decisions.   Further, DOD does not see the possibilities of how examining efforts in  the department to catalogue critical technologies and determine best  practices could benefit the program. By leveraging knowledge and  potential best practices from other efforts, DOD would have an  opportunity to take a strategic approach to identify and coordinate  information on critical technologies that satisfy users’ needs. Therefore,  DOD will need to take additional steps to implement our  recommendations.
DOD’s letter is reprinted in appendix I. We incorporated DOD technical  comments as appropriate. Commerce did not provide formal comments  but submitted one technical comment, which we addressed.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess how the lists are updated, we met with officials from the  Militarily Critical Technologies Program and the Institute for Defense  Analyses and reviewed relevant program documents, task orders,  guidance, directives, and applicable statutory provisions. Using program  guidance and documents, we evaluated how the last five updates to the  MCTL and DSTL were conducted. Specifically, we reviewed program  information on the number and types of experts used to conduct the  updates. We interviewed technology working group chairs responsible for  10 MCTL and DSTL sections to determine how experts are engaged in the  process for identifying critical technologies as well as how the definition  of “militarily critical” is applied to specific technology areas. We identified  20 DOD components responsible for validating updates prior to issuance.  We interviewed officials from 19 of the 20 components and determined  how they reviewed and validated the updates. We also compared MCTL  and DSTL updates over the past 10 years with program-stated goals for  updating the lists.
To determine how the lists are used, we first identified the uses of the  MCTL and DSTL through interviews with program officials and review of  program documents and applicable statutory provisions. We discussed  uses of the lists with officials from the Office of Industrial Policy, Defense  Technology Security Administration, military services, Executive Agent for  Anti-tamper, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Security Service,  Missile Defense Agency, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense  Threat Reduction Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Forces Command,  Special Operations Command, Strategic Command, and Transportation  Command, Defense Directorate for Research and Engineering’s Office of  International Programs and Science and Technology, Defense Logistics  Agency, Pentagon Force Protection Agency, Defense Contract  Management Agency, Office of Special Operations and Low Intensity  Conflict, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, as well as officials  from the Departments of Commerce and Homeland Security. In addition,  through interviews with some of these organizations and review of  documents they provided, we identified other mechanisms DOD has used  to identify critical technologies and determined how these efforts are  coordinated with the MCTL and DSTL update process.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, as well as the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and  Homeland Security; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and  the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In addition,  this report will be made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or calvaresibarra@gao.gov if you or  your staff have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Agency Comments
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Anne-Marie Lasowski, Assistant  Director; Noah Bleicher; Andrew Edelson; W. William Russell IV; Karen  Sloan; Hai Tran; and Joseph Zamoyta made key contributions to   this report.
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Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Ensure Its Oversight of Contractors  under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient. GAO-05-681. Washington D.C.:   July 15, 2005.
Defense Trade: Arms Export Control Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies  in the Post-9/11 Security Environment. GAO-05-468R. Washington, D.C.:  April 7, 2005.
Defense Trade: Arms Export Control System in the Post- 9/11Environment. GAO-05-234. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Better Support Program Managers’  Implementation of Anti-Tamper Protection. GAO-04-302. Washington,  D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export  Control Regimes. GAO-03-43. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2002.
Export Controls: Processes for Determining Proper Control of Defense- Related Items Need Improvement. GAO-02-996. Washington, D.C.:  September 20, 2002.
Defense Trade: Mitigating National Security Concerns under   Exon-Florio Could Be Improved. GAO-02-736. Washington, D.C.:  September 12, 2002.
Export Controls: Department of Commerce Controls over Transfers of  Technology to Foreign Nationals Need Improvement. GAO-02-972.  Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2002.
Export Controls: More Thorough Analysis Needed to Justify Changes in  High Performance Computer Controls. GAO-02-892. Washington, D.C.:  August 2, 2002.
Export Controls: Issues to Consider in Authorizing a New Export  Administration Act.  GAO-02-468T. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2002.
Export Controls: Clarification of Jurisdiction for Missile Technology  Items Needed. GAO-02-120. Washington, D.C.: October 9, 2001.