Afghanistan Security: Corrective Actions Are Needed to Address Serious Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National Security Forces
Published: 2009-02-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony discusses the GAO report on accountability for small arms and light weapons that the United States has obtained and provided or intends to provide to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)--the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. Given the unstable security conditions in Afghanistan, the risk of loss and theft of these weapons is significant, which makes this hearing particularly timely. This testimony today focuses on (1) the types and quantities of weapons the Department of Defense (Defense) has obtained for ANSF, (2) whether Defense can account for the weapons it obtained for ANSF, and (3) the extent to which ANSF can properly safeguard and account for its weapons and other sensitive equipment.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: During fiscal years 2002 through 2008, the United States spent approximately $16.5 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police forces in order to transfer responsibility for the security of Afghanistan from the international community to the Afghan government. As part of this effort, Defense--through the U.S. Army and Navy--purchased over 242,000 small arms and light weapons, at a cost of about $120 million. These weapons include rifles, pistols, shotguns, machine guns, mortars, and launchers for grenades, rockets, and missiles. In addition, CSTC-A has reported that 21 other countries provided about 135,000 weapons for ANSF between June 2002 and June 2008, which they have valued at about $103 million. This brings the total number of weapons Defense reported obtaining for ANSF to over 375,000. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in Kabul, which is a joint service, coalition organization under the command and control of Defense's U.S. Central Command is primarily responsible for training and equipping ANSF.3 As part of that responsibility, CSTC-A receives and stores weapons provided by the United States and other international donors and distributes them to ANSF units. In addition, CSTC-A is responsible for monitoring the use of U.S.-procured weapons and other sensitive equipment.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here to discuss the report GAO is releasing publicly  today on accountability for small arms and light weapons that the United  States has obtained and provided or intends to provide to the Afghan  National Security Forces (ANSF)—the Afghan National Army and the  Afghan National Police. Given the unstable security conditions in  Afghanistan, the risk of loss and theft of these weapons is significant,  which makes this hearing particularly timely.
My testimony today focuses on (1) the types and quantities of weapons the  Department of Defense (Defense) has obtained for ANSF, (2) whether  Defense can account for the weapons it obtained for ANSF, and (3) the  extent to which ANSF can properly safeguard and account for its weapons  and other sensitive equipment.
subsections: section_title: Defense Has Obtained Weapons for ANSF through U.S. Procurement and International Donations
paragraphs: During fiscal years 2002 through 2008, the United States spent  approximately $16.5 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police  forces in order to transfer responsibility for the security of Afghanistan  from the international community to the Afghan government. As part of  this effort, Defense—through the U.S. Army and Navy—purchased over  242,000 small arms and light weapons, at a cost of about $120 million. As  illustrated in figure 1, these weapons include rifles, pistols, shotguns,  machine guns, mortars, and launchers for grenades, rockets, and missiles.
In addition, CSTC-A has reported that 21 other countries provided about  135,000 weapons for ANSF between June 2002 and June 2008, which they  have valued at about $103 million. This brings the total number of  weapons Defense reported obtaining for ANSF to over 375,000.
The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in  Kabul, which is a joint service, coalition organization under the command  and control of Defense’s U.S. Central Command is primarily responsible  for training and equipping ANSF. As part of that responsibility, CSTC-A  receives and stores weapons provided by the United States and other  international donors and distributes them to ANSF units. In addition,  CSTC-A is responsible for monitoring the use of U.S.-procured weapons  and other sensitive equipment.
section_title: Defense Could Not Fully Account for Weapons
paragraphs: Lapses in weapons accountability occurred throughout the supply chain,  including when weapons were obtained, transported to Afghanistan, and  stored at two central depots in Kabul. Defense has accountability  procedures for its own weapons, including (1) serial number registration  and reporting and (2) 100 percent physical inventories of weapons stored  in depots at least annually. However, Defense failed to provide clear  guidance to U.S. personnel regarding what accountability procedures  applied when handling weapons obtained for the ANSF.
We found that the U.S. Army and CSTC-A did not maintain complete  records for an estimated 87,000—or about 36 percent—of the 242,000  weapons Defense procured and shipped to Afghanistan for ANSF.  Specifically:    For about 46,000 weapons, the Army could not provide us serial numbers  to uniquely identify each weapon provided, which made it impossible for  us to determine their location or disposition.
For about 41,000 weapons with serial numbers recorded, CSTC-A did not  have any records of their location or disposition.
Furthermore, CSTC-A did not maintain reliable records, including serial  numbers, for any of the 135,000 weapons it reported obtaining from  international donors from June 2002 through June 2008.
Although weapons were in Defense’s control and custody until they were  issued to ANSF units, accountability was compromised during  transportation and storage. Organizations involved in the transport of U.S.- procured weapons into Kabul by air did not communicate adequately to  ensure that accountability was maintained over weapons during transport.  In addition, CSTC-A did not maintain complete and accurate inventory  records for weapons at the central storage depots and allowed poor  security to persist. Until July 2008, CSTC-A did not track all weapons at  the depots by serial number and conduct routine physical inventories.  Without such regular inventories, it is difficult for CSTC-A to maintain  accountability for weapons at the depots and detect weapons losses.  Moreover, CSTC-A could not identify and respond to incidents of actual or  potential compromise, including suspected pilferage, due to poor security  and unreliable data systems. Illustrating the importance of physical  inventories, less than 1 month after completing its first full weapons  inventory, CSTC-A officials identified the theft of 47 pistols intended for  ANSF.
During our review, Defense indicated that it would begin recording serial  numbers for all weapons it obtains for ANSF, and CSTC-A established  procedures to track weapons by serial number in Afghanistan. It also  began conducting physical inventories of the weapons stored at the  central depots. However, CSTC-A officials stated that their continued  implementation of these new accountability procedures was not  guaranteed, considering staffing constraints and other factors.
section_title: ANSF Cannot Fully Safeguard and Account for Weapons
paragraphs: Despite CSTC-A training efforts, ANSF units cannot fully safeguard and  account for weapons, placing weapons CSTC-A has provided to ANSF at  serious risk of theft or loss. In February 2008, CSTC-A acknowledged that  it was issuing equipment to Afghan National Police units before providing  training on accountability practices and ensuring that effective controls  were in place. Recognizing the need for weapons accountability in ANSF  units, Defense and State deployed hundreds of U.S. trainers and mentors  to, among other things, help the Afghan army and police establish  equipment accountability practices. In June 2008, Defense reported to  Congress that it was CSTC-A’s policy not to issue equipment to ANSF  without verifying that appropriate supply and accountability procedures  are in place. While CSTC-A has established a system for assessing the  logistics capacity of ANSF units, it has not consistently assessed or  verified ANSF’s ability to properly account for weapons and other  equipment.
Contractors serving as mentors have reported major ANSF accountability  weaknesses. Although these reports did not address accountability  capacities in a consistent manner that would allow a systematic or  comprehensive assessment of all units, they highlighted the following  common problems relating to weapons accountability.
Lack of functioning property book operations. Many Afghan army and  police units did not properly maintain property books, which are  fundamental tools used to establish equipment accountability and are  required by Afghan ministerial decrees.
Illiteracy. Widespread illiteracy among Afghan army and police personnel  substantially impaired equipment accountability. For example, a mentor  noted that illiteracy in one Afghan National Army corps was directly  interfering with the ability of supply section personnel to implement  property accountability processes and procedures, despite repeated  training efforts.
Poor security. Some Afghan National Police units did not have facilities  adequate to ensure the physical security of weapons and protect them  against theft in a high-risk environment. In a northern province, for  example, a contractor reported that the arms room of one police district  office was behind a wooden door that had only a miniature padlock, and  that this represented the same austere conditions as in the other districts.
Unclear guidance. Afghan government logistics policies were not always  clear to Afghan army and police property managers. Approved Ministry of  Interior policies outlining material accountability procedures were not  widely disseminated, and many police logistics officers did not recognize  any of the logistical policies as rule. Additionally, a mentor to the Afghan  National Army told us that despite new Ministry of Defense decrees on  accountability, logistics officers often carried out property accountability  functions using Soviet-style accounting methods and that the Ministry was  still auditing army accounts against those defunct standards.
Corruption. Reports of alleged theft and unauthorized resale of weapons  are common, including one case in which an Afghan police battalion  commander in one province was allegedly selling weapons to enemy  forces.
Desertion. Desertion in the Afghan National Police has also resulted in the  loss of weapons. For example, contractors reported that Afghan Border  Police officers at one province checkpoint deserted to ally themselves  with enemy forces and took all their weapons and two vehicles with them.
In July 2007, Defense began issuing night vision devices to the Afghan  National Army. These devices are considered dangerous to the public and  U.S. forces in the wrong hands, and Defense guidance calls for intensive  monitoring of their use, including tracking by serial number. However, we  found that CSTC-A did not begin monitoring the use of these sensitive  devices until October 2008—about 15 months after issuing them. Defense  and CSTC-A attributed the limited monitoring of these devices to a number  of factors, including a shortage of security assistance staff and expertise at  CSTC-A, exacerbated by frequent CSTC-A staff rotations. After we brought  this to CSTC-A’s attention, it conducted an inventory and reported in  December 2008 that all but 10 of the 2,410 night vision devices issued had  been accounted for.
We previously reported that Defense cited significant shortfalls in the  number of trainers and mentors as the primary impediment to advancing  the capabilities of ANSF. According to CSTC-A officials, as of December  2008, CSTC-A had only 64 percent of the nearly 6,700 personnel it required  to perform its overall mission, including only about half of the over 4,000  personnel needed to mentor ANSF units.
In summary, we have serious concerns about the accountability for  weapons that Defense obtained for ANSF through U.S. procurements and  international donations. First, we estimate that Defense did not  systematically track over half of the weapons intended for ANSF. This was  primarily due to staffing shortages and Defense’s failure to establish clear  accountability procedures for these weapons while they were still in U.S.  custody and control. Second, ANSF units could not fully safeguard and  account for weapons Defense has issued to them, despite accountability  training provided by both Defense and State. Poor security and corruption  in Afghanistan, unclear guidance from Afghan ministries, and a shortage of  trainers and mentors to help ensure that appropriate accountability  procedures are implemented have reportedly contributed to this situation.
In the report we are releasing today we make several recommendations to  help improve accountability for weapons and other sensitive equipment  that the United States provided to ANSF. In particular, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense (1) establish clear accountability procedures for  weapons while they are in the control and custody of the United States,  including tracking all weapons by serial number and conducting routine  physical inventories; (2) direct CSTC-A to specifically assess and verify  each ANSF unit’s capacity to safeguard and account for weapons and  other sensitive equipment before providing such equipment, unless a  specific waiver or exception is granted; and (3) devote adequate resources  to CSTC-A’s effort to train, mentor, and assess ANSF in equipment  accountability matters.
In commenting on a draft of our report, Defense concurred with our  recommendations and has begun to take corrective action.
In January 2009, Defense directed the Defense Security Cooperation  Agency to lead an effort to establish a weapons registration and  monitoring system in Afghanistan, consistent with controls mandated by  Congress for weapons provided to Iraq. If Defense follows through on this  plan and, in addition, clearly requires routine inventories of weapons in  U.S. custody and control, our concern about the lack of clear  accountability procedures will be largely addressed.
According to Defense, trainers and mentors are assessing the ability of  ANSF units to safeguard and account for weapons. For the Afghan  National Army, mentors are providing oversight at all levels of command  of those units receiving weapons. For the Afghan National Police, most  weapons are issued to units that have received instruction on equipment  accountability as part of newly implemented training programs. We note  that at the time of our review, ANSF unit assessments did not  systematically address each unit’s capacity to safeguard and account for  weapons in its possession. We also note that Defense has cited significant  shortfalls in the number of personnel required to train and mentor ANSF  units. Unless these matters are addressed, we are not confident the  shortcomings we reported will be adequately addressed.
Defense also indicated that it is looking into ways of addressing the  staffing shortfalls that hamper CSTC-A’s efforts to train, mentor, and  assess ANSF in equipment accountability matters. However, Defense did  not state how or when additional staffing would be provided.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my  prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address our objectives, we reviewed documentation and interviewed  officials from Defense, U.S. Central Command, CSTC-A, and the U.S. Army  and Navy. On the basis of records provided to us, we compiled detailed  information on weapons reported as shipped to CSTC-A in Afghanistan by  the United States and other countries from June 2002 through June 2008.  We traveled to Afghanistan in August 2008 to examine records and meet  with officials at CSTC-A headquarters, visit the two central depots where  the weapons provided for ANSF are stored, and meet with staff at an  Afghan National Army unit that had received weapons. While in  Afghanistan, we attempted to determine the location or disposition of a  sample of weapons. Our sample was drawn randomly from a population of  195,671 U.S.-procured weapons shipped to Afghanistan for which Defense  was able to provide serial numbers. We used the results of our sampling to  reach general conclusions about CSTC-A’s ability to account for weapons  purchased by the United States for ANSF. We also discussed equipment  accountability with cognizant officials from the Afghan Ministries of  Defense and Interior, the U.S. Embassy, and contractors involved in  building ANSF’s capacity to account for and manage its weapons  inventory.
We performed our work from November 2007 through January 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Charles Michael  Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
Albert H. Huntington III, Assistant Director; James Michels; Emily  Rachman; Mattias Fenton; and Mary Moutsos made key contributions in  preparing this statement.
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