Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process
Published: 2003-06-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing the entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported in October 2002 that the Department of State had revoked visas of certain persons after it learned they might be suspected terrorists, raising concerns that some of these individuals may have entered the United States before or after State's action. Congressional requesters asked GAO to (1) assess the effectiveness of the visa revocation process and (2) identify the policies and procedures of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that govern their respective actions in the process.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Our analysis shows that the visa revocation process was not being fully utilized as an antiterrorism tool. The visa revocation process broke down when information on individuals with revoked visas was not shared between State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement offices. It broke down even further when individuals had already entered the United States prior to revocation. INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. In our review of 240 visa revocations, we found that (1) appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always receive notifications of all the revocations; (2) names were not consistently posted to the agencies' watch lists of suspected terrorists; (3) 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds had entered the United States and may still remain; and (4) INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. These weaknesses resulted from the U.S. government's limited policy guidance on the process. None of the agencies have specific, written policies on using the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here to discuss the report we are issuing today on the  need for new policies and procedures to fill gaps in the visa revocation  process. As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, in the National Strategy for  Homeland Security the President said that the U.S. government has no  more important mission than protecting the homeland from future  terrorist attacks. Our report calls for new policies and procedures to  ensure that when the Department of State revokes a visa because of  terrorism concerns, homeland security and law enforcement agencies that  protect our country are promptly notified of this information and take  appropriate action. Since the September 11 attacks, State’s Bureau of  Consular Affairs has been receiving an increased volume of information  from the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and other  sources on suspected terrorists. In some cases, the department decided to  revoke visas of certain individuals when it received potentially derogatory  information on them after issuing the visas. This issue was raised in our  October 2002 report on strengthening the visa process as an antiterrorism  tool. In that report, we found that the State Department had revoked the  visas of certain individuals after learning that they might be suspected  terrorists, raising concerns that some of these people may have entered  the United States before or after their visas were revoked.
At your request, Mr. Chairman, and that of Senator Grassley, we evaluated  how the visa revocation process is being used as an antiterrorism tool. We  (1) assessed the effectiveness of the visa revocation process, specifically  (a) the steps State took to notify appropriate units within the Immigration  and Naturalization Service (INS), which is now part of the Department of  Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of  revocations and the procedures used by the three agencies to post  lookouts on these revocations to their terrorist watch lists;  (b) whether  any of the individuals whose visas had been revoked were able to enter the  United States before or after the revocation; and (c) the actions taken by  INS and the FBI to investigate; locate; and, where appropriate, clear,  remove, or prosecute the individuals who did enter the United States and  may still remain here after their visas have been revoked; and (2)  determined the policies and procedures of the State Department, INS, and  the FBI that govern their respective actions in the visa revocation process.  Our work focused on all 240 of State’s visa revocations on terrorism  grounds from September 11, 2001, through December 31, 2002.
subsections: section_title: Weaknesses in Notification and Watch List Procedures
paragraphs: In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found examples where  information on visa revocations did not flow between the State  Department and appropriate units overseas and within INS and the FBI.  State Department officials from the Visa Office told us that when they  revoke a visa in Washington, they are supposed to take the following  steps: (1) notify consular officers at all overseas posts that the individual is  a suspected terrorist by entering a lookout on the person into State’s  watch list, the Consular Lookout and Support System, known as CLASS;  (2) notify the INS Lookout Unit via a faxed copy of the revocation  certificate so that the unit can enter the individual into its watch list and  notify officials at ports of entry; and (3) notify the issuing post via cable so  that the post can attempt to contact the individual to physically cancel his  visa. Information-only copies of these cables are also sent to INS’s and  FBI’s main communications enters. State officials told us they rely on INS  and FBI internal distribution mechanisms to ensure that these cables are  routed to appropriate units within the agencies.
Figure 1 demonstrates gaps that we identified in the flow of information  from State to INS and the FBI, and within these agencies, as well as the  resulting inconsistencies in the posting of lookouts to the agencies’  respective watch lists.
The top arrow in the diagram shows the extent of communication on visa  revocations between the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs  and State’s overseas consular posts. We found that State had not  consistently followed its informal policy of entering a lookout into its  CLASS lookout system at the time of the revocation. State officials said  that they post lookouts on individuals with revoked visas in CLASS so that,  if the individual attempts to get a new visa, consular officers at overseas  posts will know that the applicant has had a previous visa revoked and  that a security advisory opinion on the individual is required before issuing  a new visa. Without a lookout, it is possible that a new visa could be issued  without additional security screening. We reviewed CLASS records on all  240 individuals whose visas were revoked and found that the State  Department did not post lookouts within a 2-week period of the revocation  on 64 of these individuals.
The second arrow depicts the information flow on revocations between  State and the INS Lookout Unit, which is the inspections unit that posts  lookouts on INS’s watch list to prevent terrorists (and other inadmissible  aliens) from entering the United States. Officials from the INS Lookout  Unit told us they had not received any notice of the revocations from State  in 43 of the 240 cases. In another 47 cases, the INS Lookout Unit received  the revocation notice only via a cable; however, these cables took, on  average, 12 days to reach the Lookout Unit, although in one case it took 29  days. An official from the INS communications center told us that, because  State’s cables were marked “information only,” they were routed through  the Inspections division first, which was then supposed to forward them to  the Lookout Unit. He told us that if the cables had been marked as “action”  or “urgent,” they would have been sent immediately to the Lookout Unit.  In cases where the INS Lookout Unit could document that it received a  notification, it generally posted information on these revocations in its  lookout database within one day of receiving the notice. When it did not  receive notification, it could not post information on these individuals in  its lookout database, precluding INS inspectors at ports of entry from  knowing that these individuals had had their visas revoked.
The third arrow on the diagram shows the communication between State  and INS’s National Security Unit that is responsible for investigations. This  broken arrow shows that the State Department did not send copies of the  faxed revocation certificates or cables to the unit. Further, in cases where  the INS Lookout Unit received the revocation notification from State, INS  Lookout Unit officials said that they did not routinely check to see  whether these individuals had already entered the United States or notify  investigators in the National Security Unit of the visa revocations. Without  this notification, the National Security Unit would have no independent  basis to begin an investigation. In May 2003, an official from the Lookout  Unit said that her unit recently established a procedure in which, upon  receiving notification of a revocation, she will query the Interagency  Border Inspection System to determine if the individual recently entered  the country. She will then give this information to investigators in the  National Security Unit, which is now part of the Bureau of Immigration  and Customs Enforcement.
The bottom arrow on the diagram shows the information flow on visa  revocations from State to the FBI’s Counterterrorism units. We found that  that these units did not consistently receive information on visa  revocations. FBI officials said that the agency’s main communications  center received the notifications but the officials could not confirm if the  notifications were then distributed internally to the appropriate  investigative units at the FBI or to the agency’s watch list unit, known as  the Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit. The Department of Justice said that  to add a person to its watch list, additional information must be provided  to the FBI, such as the person’s full name, complete date of birth, physical  descriptors, and watch list-specific classification information. The  revocation notifications did not include most of this information.
section_title: Individuals with Revoked Visas May Be in the United States
paragraphs: Our analysis shows that thirty individuals with revoked visas have entered  the United States and may still remain in the country. Twenty-nine of these  individuals entered before State revoked their visas. An additional person  who may still be in the country entered after his visa was revoked. INS  inspectors allowed at least three other people to enter the country even  though their visas had already been revoked, largely due to breakdowns in  the notification system. These three people have left the country.
Despite these problems, we noted cases where the visa revocation process  prevented possible terrorists from entering the country or cleared  individuals whose visas had been revoked. For example, INS inspectors  successfully prevented at least 14 of the 240 individuals from entering the  country because the INS watch list included information on the revocation  action or had other lookouts on them. In addition, State records showed  that a small number of people reapplied for a new visa after the  revocation. State used the visa issuance process to fully screen these  individuals and determined that they did not pose a security threat.
section_title: INS and the FBI Did Not Routinely Take Action on Individuals with Revoked Visas Who Had Entered the United States
paragraphs: The INS and the FBI did not routinely attempt to investigate or locate any  of the individuals whose visas were revoked and who may be in the  country.
Due to congressional interest in specific cases, INS investigators located  four of the persons in the United States but did not attempt to locate other  revoked visa holders who may have entered the country. INS officials told  us that they generally do not investigate these cases because it would be  challenging to remove these individuals unless they were in violation of  their immigration status even if the agency could locate them. A visa  revocation by itself is not a stated grounds for removal under the  Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Investigators from INS’s National  Security Unit said they could investigate individuals to determine if they  were violating the terms of their admission, for example by overstaying the  amount of time they were granted to remain in the United States, but they  believed that under the INA, the visa revocation itself does not affect the  alien’s legal status in the United States—even though the revocation was  for terrorism reasons. They and other Homeland Security officials raised a  number of legal issues associated with removing an individual from the  country after the person’s visa has been revoked. Our report discusses  these issues in detail.
FBI officials told us that they did not routinely attempt to investigate and  locate individuals with revoked visas who may have entered the United  States. They said that State’s method of notifying them did not clearly  indicate that visas had been revoked because the visa holder may pose  terrorism concerns. Further, the notifications were sent as “information  only” and did not request specific follow-up action by the FBI. Moreover,  State did not attempt to make other contact with the FBI that would  indicate any urgency in the matter.
section_title: Systemic Weaknesses Were the Result of Limited Guidance on Visa Revocation Process
paragraphs: The weaknesses I have outlined above resulted from the U.S. government’s  limited policy guidance on the visa revocation process. Our analysis  indicates that the U.S. government has no specific policy on the use of visa  revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written procedures to guide  State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa revocations on terrorism  grounds. State and INS have written procedures that guide some types of  visa revocations; however, neither they nor the FBI has written internal  procedures for notifying their appropriate personnel to take specific  actions on visas revoked by State Department headquarters officials, as  was the case for all the revoked visas covered in our review. While State  and INS officials told us they use the visa revocation process to prevent  suspected terrorists from entering the United States, neither they nor FBI  officials had policies or procedures that covered investigating, locating,  and taking appropriate action in cases where the visa holder had already  entered the country.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the visa process could be an important tool  to keep potential terrorists from entering the United States. Ideally,  information on suspected terrorists would reach the State Department  before it decides to issue a visa. However, there will always be some cases  when the information arrives too late and State has already issued a visa.  Revoking a visa can mitigate this problem, but only if State promptly  notifies appropriate border control and law enforcement agencies and if  these agencies act quickly to (1) notify border control agents and  immigration inspectors to deny entry to persons with a revoked visa, and  (2) investigate persons with revoked visas who have entered the country.  Currently there are major gaps in the notification and investigation  processes. One reason for this is that there are no specific written policies  and procedures on how notification of a visa revocation should take place  and what agencies should do when they are notified. As a result, there is  heightened risk that suspected terrorists could enter the country with a  revoked visa or be allowed to remain after their visa is revoked without  undergoing investigation or monitoring.
State has emphasized that it revoked the visas as a precautionary measure  and that the 240 persons are not necessarily terrorists or suspected  terrorists. State cited the uncertain nature of the information it receives  from the intelligence and law enforcement communities on which it must  base its decision to revoke an individual’s visa. We recognize that the visas  were revoked as a precautionary measure and that the persons whose  visas were revoked may not be terrorists. However, the State Department  determined that there was enough derogatory information to revoke visas  for these persons because of terrorism concerns. Our recommendations,  which are discussed below, are designed to ensure that persons whose  visas have been revoked because of potential terrorism concerns be  denied entry to the United States and those who may already be in the  United States be investigated to determine if they pose a security threat.
To remedy the systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process, we are  recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security, who is now  responsible for issuing regulations and administering and enforcing  provisions of U.S. immigration law relating to visa issuance, work in  conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to:    develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa  revocation process to ensure that notification of visa revocations for  suspected terrorists and relevant supporting information are transmitted  from State to immigration and law enforcement agencies, and their  respective inspection and investigation units, in a timely manner;   develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law enforcement  agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals whose visas  have been revoked for terrorism concerns and who remain in the United  States after revocation; and   determine if any persons with visas revoked on terrorism grounds are in  the United States and, if so, whether they pose a security threat.
In commenting on our report, Homeland Security agreed that the visa  revocation process should be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool. State  and Justice did not comment on our recommendations.
I would be happy to answer any questions you or other members of the  subcommittee may have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford or John  Brummet at (202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to this  testimony included Judy McCloskey, Kate Brentzel, Mary Moutsos, and  Janey Cohen.
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