DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed to Further Improve the Clearance Process
Published: 2009-05-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) personnel security clearance program has been on GAO's high-risk list since 2005, due to delays in the process and incomplete documentation. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducts most of DOD's clearance investigations, which DOD adjudicators use to make clearance decisions. The Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) chairs a Performance Accountability Council that is responsible for reforming the clearance process. Conducted under the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO's report addresses the (1) reporting on timeliness for DOD clearances, (2) documentation completeness for making initial top-secret clearance decisions for DOD personnel, and (3) reporting on the quality of the clearance process. To assess these issues, GAO analyzed data on most DOD clearances granted in fiscal year 2008, randomly sampled and analyzed 100 OPM investigative reports and DOD adjudicative files for clearances granted in July 2008, and analyzed 2006-09 executive branch annual clearance reports.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD and OPM met statutory timeliness requirements for personnel security clearances in fiscal year 2008, but the executive branch's 2009 required report to Congress did not reflect the full range of time to make all initial clearance decisions. Currently, 80 percent of initial clearance decisions are to be made within 120 days, on average, and by December 2009, a plan is to be implemented in which, to the extent practical, 90 percent of initial clearance decisions are made within 60 days, on average. Under both requirements, the executive branch can exclude the slowest percent, and then report on an average of the remaining clearances. The most recent report stated that the average time to complete the fastest 90 percent of initial clearances for military and DOD civilians in fiscal year 2008 was 124 days, on average. However, without taking averages or excluding the slowest clearances, GAO analyzed 100 percent of initial clearances granted in 2008 and found that 39 percent still took more than 120 days. The absence of comprehensive reporting limits full visibility over the timeliness of initial clearance decisions. With respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports and some DOD adjudicative files. GAO independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that adjudicators used to make clearance decisions were missing required documentation, and the documentation most often missing was employment verification. Although DOD leadership asserted that adjudicators follow a risk-managed approach, DOD has not issued formal guidance clarifying if and under what circumstances adjudicators can adjudicate incomplete investigative reports. For DOD adjudicative files, GAO estimated that 22 percent were missing required documentation of the rationale for granting clearances to applicants with security concerns, and the documentation most often missing was related to foreign influence. Neither OPM nor DOD measures the completeness of its investigative reports or adjudicative files. As a result, both are limited in their ability to explain the extent or the reasons why some documents are incomplete. Incomplete documentation may lead to increases in both the time needed to complete the clearance process and in overall process costs and may reduce the assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent DOD from granting clearances to untrustworthy individuals. The executive branch's annual reports to Congress on the personnel security clearance process have provided decision makers with limited data on quality. The 2009 report did not provide any data on quality but, unlike previous reports, identified quality metrics that the executive branch proposes to collect. GAO has stated that timeliness alone does not provide a complete picture of the clearance process and emphasized that attention to quality could increase reciprocity--accepting another federal entity's clearances. The executive branch, though not required to include information on quality in its annual reports, has latitude to report appropriate information and has missed opportunities to make the clearance process transparent to Congress.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) granted eligibility  for initial or renewal security clearances to more than 630,000 applicants  who were military, DOD civilian, or private industry personnel working on  DOD contracts. Clearances potentially give these applicants access to  information that, if improperly disclosed, could, in some cases, cause  exceptionally grave damage to national security. Long-standing delays in  the clearance process led us to designate DOD’s personnel security  clearance process as a high-risk area in 2005. That designation continued  in 2007 and 2009, when we identified continued delays in the clearance  process and additional concerns with clearance documentation.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA)  established, among other things, milestones for reducing the time to  complete initial clearances. IRTPA currently requires that DOD and other  agencies that adjudicate security clearances make a decision on at least 80  percent of initial clearance applications within 120 days, on average,  measured from the receipt date of an individual’s completed application to  the date when an agency makes the adjudication decision. Further, IRTPA  calls for the executive branch to implement a plan by December 17, 2009,  under which, to the extent practical, at least 90 percent of decisions are  made on applications for an initial personnel security clearance within 60  days, on average. IRTPA also requires the executive branch to provide a  report to Congress, by February 15 of each year, on the progress made  during the preceding year toward meeting IRTPA’s requirements for  security clearances, including the length of time agencies take to complete  investigations and adjudications, a discussion of impediments to the  functioning of IRTPA’s requirements, and any other information or  recommendations the executive branch considers appropriate.
Multiple executive branch agencies are responsible for different phases in  the federal government’s personnel security clearance process. With  respect to DOD’s personnel security clearance process, DOD is  responsible for determining which military, DOD civilian, and private  industry personnel working on DOD contracts require access to classified  information and must apply for a security clearance and undergo an  investigation. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), in turn,  conducts these investigations for DOD. OPM investigators—often  contractors—use federal investigative standards and OPM internal  guidance as criteria for collecting background information on applicants.  Federal guidelines require that DOD adjudicators use the information  contained in the resulting investigative reports to determine whether an  applicant is eligible for a personnel security clearance, and DOD  regulation also requires that DOD adjudicators document their rationale  for determining clearance eligibility. In June 2007, a Joint Reform Team— currently consisting of DOD, the Office of the Director of National  Intelligence (ODNI), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and  OPM—was established, in part, to enable DOD and other agencies to  achieve IRTPA timeliness goals and improve the processes related to the  granting of security clearances. OMB officials have expressed concerns  about the ability of the government to meet the 2009 IRTPA timeliness  requirements. In June 2008, Executive Order 13467 established a  governmentwide governance structure, including a Performance  Accountability Council chaired by the Deputy Director for Management at  OMB that is responsible for driving the implementation and oversight of  these reform efforts.
Under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on  his own initiative, and in the context of the Joint Reform Team’s clearance  reform efforts and the issues we identified in our High-Risk Series, we  evaluated the security clearance process at DOD. Specifically, we  addressed the following questions regarding security clearances for  military, DOD civilian personnel, and private industry personnel working  on DOD contracts: (1) How complete are the timeliness data that the  executive branch reported for clearances granted in fiscal year 2008?   (2) How complete is the documentation of investigations and  adjudications for initial top secret security clearances favorably  adjudicated within DOD? (3) To what extent did executive branch  reporting to Congress from 2006 through 2009 on DOD and other federal  agencies include information on quality in the security clearance process?
To determine the completeness of the timeliness data that the executive  branch reported for DOD clearances granted in fiscal year 2008, we  reviewed the requirements specified in IRTPA, conducted an independent  analysis of the timeliness of DOD personnel security clearances in fiscal  year 2008, and analyzed the timeliness data contained in the executive  branch’s 2009 report to Congress on clearances granted in fiscal year 2008.  In our independent analysis, we measured the timeliness of nearly 450,000  initial clearances and more than 180,000 clearance renewals at the  confidential, secret, and top secret levels that were adjudicated in fiscal  year 2008. These nearly 630,000 clearances account for more than 93  percent of DOD personnel security clearances adjudicated in fiscal year  2008. We conducted electronic testing on the data we used in our  independent analysis and compared values in DOD’s and OPM’s electronic  databases with the data contained in the original clearance files. We found  that the data we used were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report. To determine the completeness of both investigation and  adjudication documentation for initial top secret security clearances  favorably adjudicated within DOD, we independently and randomly  selected and reviewed a generalizable sample of 100 OPM-provided  investigative reports and associated DOD adjudicative files for clearances  granted to military, DOD civilian, and private industry personnel working  on DOD contracts in July 2008 by the central adjudication facilities of the  U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force. We limited our focus to initial  top secret clearances because (1) we have identified documentation  problems with this clearance level in previous work; (2) investigators  gather the most information for investigations for top secret clearances;  and (3) individuals granted top secret clearances have access to  information that, if improperly disclosed, could cause exceptionally grave  damage to national security. Using a standardized instrument, we  compared the documentation in the OPM-provided investigative reports  with the requirements outlined in federal investigative standards and OPM  internal guidance. Similarly, we used a standardized instrument to  compare the documentation in the DOD adjudicative files with federal  adjudicative guidelines and DOD regulation. Based on the results of this  review, we developed statistical estimates for about 3,500 clearances  granted in July 2008 by these central adjudication facilities. We also  interviewed key OPM officials at the Federal Investigative Services  Division and spoke separately with a random sample of OPM federal and  contract investigators. In addition, we interviewed key leadership officials  and DOD adjudicators at DOD’s three central adjudication facilities. To  assess the extent to which the executive branch’s reporting to Congress on  DOD and other federal agencies included information on quality in the  security clearance process, we analyzed annual reports to Congress on  personnel security clearances submitted between 2006 and 2009.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2008 through May 2009  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains a detailed  description of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Security clearances are required for access to certain national security  information, which may be classified at one of three levels: confidential,  secret, and top secret. The level of classification denotes the degree of  protection required for information and the amount of damage that  unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to national  security. Unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause  (1) “damage,” in the case of confidential information; (2) “serious  damage,” in the case of secret information; and (3) “exceptionally grave  damage,” in the case of top secret information.
subsections: section_title: The Six Phases of DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Process
paragraphs: To ensure the trustworthiness and reliability of personnel in positions with  access to classified information, DOD relies on a multiphased personnel  security clearance process. DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Intelligence has responsibility for developing and overseeing  DOD’s process for determining eligibility for clearances for military and  DOD civilian personnel and private industry personnel working on DOD  contracts. That process includes obtaining background investigations,  primarily through OPM’s Federal Investigative Services Division. Figure 1  shows the progression of the six phases involved in determining whether  to grant an applicant a clearance.
If, during the requirements setting phase, DOD determines that a position  requires a clearance, in the application submission phase a security officer  (1) requests an investigation of the individual filling that position;   (2) forwards a personnel security questionnaire (standard form 86) using  OPM’s Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP)  system or a paper copy of the standard form 86 to the individual to  complete; (3) reviews the completed questionnaire; and (4) sends the  questionnaire and supporting documentation, such as fingerprints, to  OPM. After the application is submitted, DOD security officers often grant  interim clearances to the applicants to enable them to access classified  information while awaiting the completion of the clearance process. DOD  grants interim clearances on a more limited evaluation on the basis of  electronic checks of national records, credit checks, and checks of current  personnel and security records at applicants’ current duty stations.
In the investigation phase, OPM or one of its contractors uses federal  investigative standards and OPM’s internal guidance to conduct and  document the investigation of the applicant. The scope of information  gathered in an investigation depends on the level of clearance needed and  whether an investigation for an initial clearance or a reinvestigation for a  clearance renewal is being conducted. For example, the federal standards  require that investigators collect information from national agencies such  as the Federal Bureau of Investigation for all initial and renewal  clearances. However, the federal standards require investigators to  corroborate education and interview educational sources, as appropriate,  only in investigations supporting top secret initial clearances. In appendix  II, we list the information required for each clearance level and for initial  and renewal clearances. OPM’s internal guidance includes both OPM’s  product table and the July 2007 investigator’s handbook. The product table  lists the investigative items OPM will include based on the type of  clearance investigation to be conducted, and the handbook outlines the  policies, procedures, and guidance to which all persons performing  investigative work under the authority of OPM must adhere.
For an investigation for a confidential or secret clearance, investigators  gather much of the information electronically. For an investigation for a  top secret clearance, investigators gather additional information through  more time-consuming efforts such as traveling to conduct in-person  interviews to corroborate information about an applicant’s employment  and education. In 2009, OPM estimated that approximately 6-10 labor  hours were needed for each investigation for a secret or confidential  clearance and 50-60 labor hours were needed for the investigation for an  initial top secret clearance. After the investigation is complete, OPM  provides the resulting investigative report to the appropriate DOD  adjudication facility.
In the adjudication phase, DOD adjudicators at one of DOD’s central  adjudication facilities use the information from the investigative report to  determine whether an applicant is eligible for a security clearance. To  make clearance eligibility decisions, federal requirements specify that  adjudicators consider guidelines in 13 specific areas that elicit information  about (1) conduct that could raise security concerns and (2) factors that  could allay those security concerns, even when serious, and permit  granting a clearance. For example, under the foreign influence guideline,  a connection to a foreign person or government is a condition that could  raise a security concern. One factor that could allay this security concern  is if the connection to a foreign person or government is established while  the applicant conducted business on behalf of the U.S. government. These  guidelines are listed in appendix III. Once adjudicators render the decision  to approve, deny, or revoke eligibility for a security clearance,  adjudicators are required by DOD regulation to document the rationale  behind the decision in DOD’s Joint Personnel Adjudication System.  Typically, adjudicators notify the applicant’s employer of the decision.
The final clearance renewal phase takes place for individuals who have  been previously granted and already hold a clearance. Renewals for  holders of confidential and secret clearances take place every 15 and 10  years, respectively, and renewals for top secret clearances take place  every 5 years. To grant a renewal clearance, OPM or one of its contractors  conducts and documents a reinvestigation of the clearance holder, which  also is based on federal investigative standards and OPM’s internal  guidance. DOD adjudicators then use the same decision-making processes  to determine whether a clearance holder is eligible for a clearance renewal  using the adjudicative guidelines.
DOD adjudication facilities and their appeal boards are authorized to  grant, deny, or revoke security clearance eligibility. Individuals who are  denied a clearance or have their clearance eligibility revoked may appeal  these decisions to the relevant Personnel Security Appeals Board. The  appeals process may involve any individual or organization that could  provide information relevant to an applicant’s security clearance decision  (e.g., adjudication facilities, employer, and investigative agency). The time  to complete the appeals process varies from weeks to years.
section_title: Governmentwide Personnel Security Clearance Reform Efforts
paragraphs: Recent steps taken to reform security clearance processes include the  formation of the Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team (Joint Reform  Team) in June 2007. The Joint Reform Team was formed, in part, to  address IRTPA’s requirements that the executive branch implement a plan  by December 17, 2009, under which, to the extent practical, at least 90  percent of initial clearances investigations and adjudications are  completed within 60 days, on average. DOD and OMB officials have noted  that the existing personnel security clearance system is unlikely to allow  DOD and other agencies to meet these requirements and that clearance  process reforms are necessary to meet them. Agencies included in this  governmentwide reform effort are the Office of the Director of National  Intelligence, DOD, OMB, and OPM. The Joint Reform Team submitted an  initial reform plan to the President on April 30, 2008. The plan proposed a  new process for determining clearance eligibility that departs from the  current system in a number of ways, including the use of a more  sophisticated electronic application, a more flexible investigation process,  and the establishment of ongoing evaluation procedures between formal  clearance investigations.
The President’s June 30, 2008, executive order was another recent step  taken to reform the security clearance process and included the formation  of the Performance Accountability Council in June 2008. The President’s  order directed, among other things, that executive branch policies and  procedures be aligned and use consistent standards, to the extent  possible, for investigating and adjudicating whether an individual is   (1) suitable for government employment, (2) fit to be a contract employee,  or (3) eligible for access to classified information. The council is  accountable to the President to achieve reform goals, consistent with the  order, and also oversees newly designated Security and Suitability  Executive Agents. The order designates the Deputy Director for  Management at OMB as the chair of the council and grants the chair the  authority to designate officials from additional agencies to serve as  members.
section_title: Prior GAO Work on Personnel Security Clearances
paragraphs: Since placing DOD’s program on our high-risk list in 2005, we have issued  a number of reports and testified at several hearings on personnel security  clearance issues. Most recently, in December 2008, we issued a report of  our preliminary observations about timeliness and quality. We also  testified in 2008 on key factors for reforming the security clearance  program, the clearance process for industry personnel, and joint reform  efforts to improve the governmentwide clearance process.
section_title: DOD and OPM Met 2008 Timeliness Requirements, but the Executive Branch’s 2009 Report Did Not Reflect the Full Range of Clearance Timeliness
paragraphs: IRTPA currently requires that the executive branch report annually on the  progress made during the preceding year toward meeting the act’s  timeliness requirements for clearances and that clearance decisions on at  least 80 percent of initial clearances be made within 120 days, on average.  IRTPA also requires that a plan be implemented by December 2009 under  which, to the extent practical, 90 percent of initial clearance decisions be  made within 60 days, on average. Furthermore, IRTPA provides the  executive branch broad discretion to report on any additional information  it considers appropriate.
Accordingly, the executive branch’s 2009 report presented an average of  the fastest 90 percent of initial clearance decisions and, in so doing, began  to anticipate IRTPA’s December 2009 requirements. The report stated that  the average time for completing the fastest 90 percent of initial clearances  for military and DOD civilians in fiscal year 2008 was 124 days. The report  also stated that the average time for completing the fastest 90 percent of  initial clearances for private industry personnel working on DOD contracts  in fiscal year 2008 was 129 days. To determine whether DOD and OPM  met IRTPA’s current timeliness requirement that clearance decisions on at  least 80 percent of initial clearances be made within 120 days, on average,  we conducted an independent analysis and took an average of the fastest  80 percent of 450,000 initial DOD clearances including military and DOD  civilians, or private industry personnel working on DOD contracts  completed in fiscal year 2008. These clearances were completed in an  average of 87 days. In fact, our independent analysis revealed that DOD  and OPM completed the fastest 47 percent of initial clearances in 90 days  or fewer.
The executive branch’s 2009 report presented an average as its only metric  and excluded the slowest 10 percent of initial clearances from the  timeliness calculation. The average the executive branch reported can be  used to assess the extent to which DOD and other agencies are positioned  to meet IRPTA’s December 2009 timeliness requirements. However,  because the average is the sole metric presented for timeliness and  because the slowest 10 percent of the data is excluded, the report does not  communicate the full range of time it took OPM and DOD to complete the  clearances.
We analyzed 100 percent of 450,000 initial DOD clearances completed in  fiscal year 2008 to identify the full range of time to complete these  clearances. To conduct this analysis, we did not average the data or  exclude any portion of the fiscal year 2008 initial clearances from our  calculations. In addition, we examined the percentage of initial clearances  that took more than 300 days and 120 days to complete, respectively. Our  analysis revealed that 11 percent of the initial clearance eligibility  decisions took more than 300 days to complete and that 39 percent took  more than 120 days to complete (see fig. 2).
Our analysis also revealed that 33 percent of decisions for initial  confidential and secret clearances and 61 percent of decisions for initial  top secret clearances took more than 120 days to complete (see table 1).
Further, the executive branch’s report also did not reflect the full range of  time that DOD and OPM took to complete top secret clearance renewals in  fiscal year 2008 because the report (1) again relied on an average as the  key metric for renewal timeliness and (2) excluded information on the  slowest 10 percent of renewals from that average. IRTPA does not specify  timeliness requirements for clearance renewals, nor does it require the  executive branch to include information about renewals in its annual  report. While the report included timeliness data for top secret renewal  clearance decisions, it did not present timeliness data for confidential and  secret level renewal clearance decisions.
Finally, the report did not provide information on the reasons for delays in  the personnel security clearance process. In our own analysis of DOD  clearance timeliness, we found that delays in the process to complete  secret and top secret clearances occurred in both the investigation and the  adjudication phases. Reasons for delays in the investigation phase,  according to OPM officials and investigators and OPM contract  investigators we interviewed, included (1) delays in obtaining records  from third-party sources such as law enforcement entities, (2) the  overseas deployment of individuals who are the subjects of clearance  investigations, (3) incomplete personnel security questionnaires, and   (4) OPM report formatting requirements and software tools. Reasons for  delays in the adjudication phase, according to the leadership and  adjudicators of central adjudication facilities we interviewed, included   (1) incomplete investigative reports, (2) the format of the OPM-provided  investigative reports, and (3) commands that are slow to provide  additional information related to the individual seeking the clearance.
By focusing on the extent to which DOD and other agencies are meeting  IRTPA’s timeliness requirements, the executive branch’s 2009 IRTPA- required report to Congress was not fully transparent about the extent of,  and reasons for, delays in the process. The absence of comprehensive  reporting on clearance timeliness limits congressional decision makers’  ability to thoroughly evaluate, and identify with precision, where and why  delays continue to exist within DOD’s personnel security clearance  process.
section_title: Investigation and Adjudication Documentation Was Incomplete for Favorably Adjudicated Initial Top Secret Clearances
subsections: section_title: Documentation in Most of the OPM-Provided Investigative Reports Was Incomplete
paragraphs: Based on our independent analysis, we estimated that 87 percent of the  investigative reports for about 3,500 initial top secret clearances—which  were favorably adjudicated—were missing at least one type of  documentation required by federal investigative standards and OPM’s   internal guidance. We categorized an investigative item as incomplete if  the investigative report did not contain the required documentation for  that item as prescribed in the federal investigative standards and OPM’s  internal guidance. To the extent possible, we counted an item as complete  if the report included documentation of an investigator’s unsuccessful  attempt to gather the required information (documentation known as an  investigator’s note). However, the most notable exception to this approach  relates to the presence of documentation regarding interviews of the  applicant. OPM officials told us that an interview with the applicant is an  important element of a clearance investigation because the applicant is a  key source of information. Since the interview with the applicant cannot  be replaced by another information source, we counted that investigative  item as incomplete even though the report may have documented  unsuccessful attempts to interview the applicant.
We did not make evaluative judgments about the importance of one  missing investigative item over another during our review because the  federal investigative standards do not assign a level of importance to each  investigative requirement. When we explained how we measured the  completeness of an investigative item to officials at OPM’s Federal  Investigative Services Division, they told us that gathering all of the  information required by the federal investigative standards does not  necessarily indicate a quality investigation. They also told us that an  investigative report that includes all of the items required by the federal  investigative standards does not equate to having obtained the right or  best sources of information about an applicant.
As shown in figure 3, the investigative reports most frequently did not  contain (1) verification of all of the applicant’s employments, (2)  information from the required number of social references for the  applicant, and (3) complete security forms.  We also estimated that 12  percent of the 3,500 investigative reports did not contain a personal  subject interview. Officials from OPM’s Federal Investigative Services  Division’s Quality Management and Training Group reviewed eight of the  investigative reports we reviewed and agreed with some but not all of the  items we had identified as missing in the reports. Nonetheless, OPM  officials concurred with our assessment that documentation for at least  one item required by federal investigative standards or OPM’s internal  guidance was missing in each of the eight investigative reports.
The following examples illustrate some of the types of documentation  missing from the investigative reports we reviewed:    Documentation for employment and social references. One investigative  report did not have required documentation of a record verifying the  applicant’s current employment at another federal government agency.  Even though the investigative standards require two references that the  investigator finds on his or her own rather than references the applicant  identifies, the report contained documentation from only one investigator- developed reference with social knowledge about the applicant.
Documentation for education, employment, and social references. Another  investigative report did not have documentation of a record review at an  educational institution the applicant attended. The investigative report  also did not contain documentation from the required number of  corroborating individuals to verify the applicant’s period of unemployment  and did not contain documentation of an inquiry with a former employer  where the applicant’s employment had been terminated. Finally, the report  contained interview documentation from only one required investigator- developed reference with social knowledge about the applicant.
In addition to reviewing reports that were missing required investigative  items, we observed that some investigative reports contained information  that raised at least one issue of a security concern regarding the  applicant’s actions but did not contain additional documentation to  resolve this issue. Federal standards state that investigations may be  expanded as necessary to resolve issues. The following example shows an  investigative area that lacked the documentation needed to resolve an  issue.
A personal conduct issue was unresolved. In one investigative report we  reviewed, an interview with the former spouse revealed that the applicant  had contact with and tried to provide financial assistance to illegal  immigrants. There was no other documentation in the investigative report  indicating that the alleged association with illegal immigrants was  investigated further, nor did the existing documentation in the  investigative report resolve this issue.
When we reviewed this example with officials at OPM’s Federal  Investigative Services Division’s Quality Management and Training Group,  they agreed that the investigator(s) should have conducted a special  interview with the applicant to resolve the issue.
section_title: OPM Does Not Assess the Level of Completeness of Investigative Reports or the Reasons for Incompleteness
paragraphs: OPM does not measure the extent to which its investigative reports meet  federal investigative standards. While OPM does not assess its reports for  completeness, it does conduct report reviews that make judgments of,  among other things, whether an investigative report is sufficient to enable  an adjudicator to make a clearance decision. When making judgments,  OPM report reviewers consider the federal investigative standards as well  as the unique aspects of each investigation. For example, federal  investigative standards require an interview of the applicant, and OPM  report reviewers consider whether an applicant is available for that  interview in instances in which that applicant is deployed to a remote  location. While OPM reviews its own investigative reports, these reviews  are not data-driven measures of the frequency with which investigative  reports meet federal investigative standards. By not measuring the  completeness of investigative reports using the federal investigative  standards, OPM is limited in its ability to explain the extent to which  incomplete reports exist and reasons why some reports are incomplete.
section_title: DOD Adjudicators Accept Incomplete Investigative Reports
paragraphs: DOD adjudicators made their clearance decisions based on incomplete  investigative reports. Although there is no specific requirement that DOD  adjudicators make their decisions based on complete reports, officials at  one DOD adjudication facility told us that their adjudicators are trained to  assume OPM-provided investigative reports will be incomplete. At another  adjudication facility, officials said that they encourage the adjudicators to  send back as few investigative reports to OPM as possible and to find  work-arounds instead. At a third adjudication facility, DOD adjudicators  told us that they try to avoid sending investigative reports back to OPM  due to time and cost considerations.
DOD has not issued formal guidance clarifying if and under what  circumstances adjudicators can adjudicate incomplete investigative  reports, although DOD adjudicators follow a risk-managed approach when  granting security clearances. In the written response to a similar point we  made in our December 2008 report, that DOD adjudicators based  clearance decisions on incomplete investigative reports, the Under  Secretary of Defense for Intelligence stated that DOD assumes a risk- managed approach in order to ensure critical operational mission  positions are filled in a timely manner. He expressed confidence in the  risk-managed approach, even when clearance decisions are based on  investigative reports that are incomplete. Further, he stated that the risk- managed approach includes a process of gathering preliminary  information to mitigate risk, such as a review of local security and  personnel files. However, because DOD has not articulated in policy when  it is appropriate for adjudicators to accept incomplete investigative  reports, it cannot be certain that adjudicators are basing their decisions to  accept and adjudicate from these reports on a uniform risk tolerance  standard that is acceptable to DOD.
section_title: Documentation in Some DOD Adjudicative Files Was Incomplete
paragraphs: We estimated that 22 percent of the adjudicative files for about 3,500  initial top secret clearances that were favorably adjudicated had  incomplete documentation. Specifically, DOD adjudicators did not  document that they considered adjudicative guidelines in instances where  the investigative report contained significant derogatory information that  raises a potential security concern, as required under DOD regulation.  When an applicant’s investigation has a potential security concern, the  regulation requires that a record of the rationale underlying the decision  be kept in the adjudicative file. According to DOD officials, this record of  rationale should include identification of the applicable adjudicative  guidelines—criteria covering 13 areas of security concerns used to  determine an applicant’s clearance eligibility—and the associated  mitigating factors. In our analysis, we did not evaluate the merit of the  DOD adjudicators’ decisions to grant clearances. Instead, we assessed  only whether the documentation for each required rationale was complete.  DOD adjudicative files were most often missing documentation for  adjudicative guidelines in instances in which the applicants had foreign  influence, financial considerations, and criminal conduct security  concerns, as shown in figure 4.
The following examples from our analysis illustrate our findings.  Adjudicators must take into account 13 federal adjudicative guidelines  when assessing whether investigative reports contain evidence of potential  security concerns. In these examples, potential security concerns were  documented in the investigative report. However, we did not observe  required documentation that the DOD adjudicator had used the  appropriate adjudicative guideline to make the decision to grant these  clearances.
Consideration of the foreign influence and financial guidelines were  incorrect or missing. In one case, documentation included three  testimonial statements given by two coworkers and one supervisor, all of  whom had recent knowledge about the applicant, stating that the applicant  was in a romantic relationship with a woman who resided overseas at the  time of the investigation. However, these three individuals provided  differing information regarding the woman’s nationality. Although the  adjudicative file documented foreign influence as a security concern, the  documentation in the file erroneously cited information not present in the  investigative report as the mitigating factor for the security concern.  Additionally, while the investigation documentation indicated that half of  the applicant’s accounts were in collection status, the required  consideration of the financial guideline was not documented.
Consideration of the personal conduct guideline was missing. In one case,  the applicant’s investigative report documented a history of unreliability  and unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations. The investigative  report documented absences without leave from two branches of the  military and dereliction of duty. Although this behavior is consistent with  the security concerns laid out under the federal adjudicative guideline for  personal conduct, required consideration of the personal conduct  guideline was not documented.
We shared our findings on eight adjudicative files with DOD adjudication  facility leadership and select adjudicators. They agreed with our findings  in six of the adjudicative files, including the two examples we just  described. We revised our analysis of the findings with which the DOD  adjudication facility leadership and select adjudicators did not agree, and  this revision is reflected in our estimate.
section_title: DOD Does Not Assess the Level of Completeness in Adjudicative Files or the Reasons for Incompleteness
paragraphs: DOD does not measure the extent to which its adjudicative files meet the  guidelines required by DOD regulation. While DOD does not assess the  level of completeness in its files, DOD does conduct reviews that make  judgments of, among other things, whether the adjudicator made the  appropriate decision based on the adjudicative guidelines. While DOD is  providing an independent judgment of its own adjudicative decisions,  these reviews are not data-driven measures of the frequency with which  adjudicative files meet DOD’s regulation to document the rationale  underlying the decision. By not measuring the completeness of  adjudicative files departmentwide, DOD is limited in its ability to explain  the extent to which incomplete files exist and reasons why some files are  incomplete.
section_title: Incomplete Investigation and Adjudication Documentation Negatively Affects the Clearance Process
paragraphs: Incomplete OPM-provided investigative reports lead to delays and increase  the cost of DOD’s personnel security clearance process. DOD adjudication  facility leadership told us that at times they perform limited investigative  work—such as obtaining bankruptcy records—to comply with  investigative standards to fill the gaps in information they have received.  Conducting investigative work at this point in the process increases the  amount of time and labor costs required to make an adjudicative  determination. Further, incomplete adjudication documentation may  introduce risk in the clearance renewal phase of the clearance process.  Some DOD adjudicators and adjudication facility leadership raised  concerns that incomplete initial adjudicative files can negatively affect  their ability to identify trends when they adjudicate clearance renewals.  Incomplete documentation in the clearance process may reduce the  assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent DOD from  granting clearances to untrustworthy individuals. Officials from DOD and  OPM told us, however, that reforms currently under consideration by the  Joint Reform Team might begin to remedy these concerns.
section_title: Executive Branch Reports on the Personnel Security Clearance Process Contain Limited Information on Quality
paragraphs: Past executive branch IRTPA-required reports to Congress on the  personnel security clearance process have provided congressional  decision makers with limited information on quality in the process. For  example, the 2006 and 2008 reports did not mention the existence or  development of any quality measures for the personnel security clearance  process at DOD or other federal agencies. In contrast, the 2007 report  included one quality measure—the frequency with which adjudicating  agencies returned OPM’s investigative reports due to quality deficiencies.  According to this report, overall, less than 1 percent of all completed  investigations were returned to OPM from the adjudicating agencies for  this reason. However, we have repeatedly reported since the late 1990s  that this measure, by itself, is an unreliable quality indicator because  adjudication officials told us that they were reluctant to return incomplete  investigative reports because of their perception that returning the reports  would result in delays in the clearance process. DOD adjudication  leadership and adjudicators alike told us that they continue to be reluctant  to return incomplete investigative reports for the same reason.
While the 2009 report does not contain data on quality, it proposes two  measures of investigative report quality and plans to measure adjudicative  quality. The report states that information on investigative and  adjudicative quality will be collected and briefly describes how the  investigative and adjudicative performance measures will be reported  within the executive branch. It also describes proposed initial measures of  reciprocity for personnel security clearances—that is, a federal entity’s  acceptance of a clearance granted by another department, agency, or  military service. Finally, the report states that a first step to improve  quality is to properly train and certify individuals conducting investigative  and adjudicative work and outlines actions to identify core competencies  and training curricula.
Previously we have pointed out that an emphasis on timeliness in the  clearance process alone does not provide a complete picture of the  process. In prior reports and testimonies, we have emphasized the  importance of ensuring quality in all phases of the process. In our 1999 and  2006 reports, for example, we measured quality in the process in a number  of ways which identified factors beyond timeliness. In 1999 we assessed  the adequacy of investigator training by determining the number of  training courses offered to investigators and the course attendance rates.  We also obtained investigators’ viewpoints about the investigative process  by surveying them about the manageability of their workload, adequacy of  their training, the clarity of policy guidance, the manner of conducting  investigations, and the frequency with which their investigations were  returned for additional work. Moreover, in 2006, we determined the  completeness of clearance documentation by comparing investigative  reports to the federal standards and also compared adjudicative files to  federal adjudicative guidelines.
Since the passage of IRTPA, quality has become more important because  reciprocity is also a key element of the act. As we have previously noted,  one challenge to reciprocity has been the reluctance of some federal  agencies to accept clearances issued by other agencies due to concerns  about quality. The reluctance of federal agencies to accept clearances  already granted leads, in turn, to reduced efficiency and greater costs.
While IRTPA contains no requirement for the executive branch to report  any information on quality, the act provides the executive branch broad  latitude to include any appropriate information in its reports. Without  reporting to Congress on quality in the clearance process, the  government’s ability to provide assurances that it is exercising all of the  appropriate safeguards when granting clearances is limited. Moreover,  because the executive branch has not fully addressed quality in its IRTPA- required reports to Congress, it has missed opportunities to provide  congressional decision makers with full transparency over the clearance  process.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The fact that OPM and DOD are currently meeting IRTPA timeliness  requirements represents significant and noteworthy progress. IRTPA  allows the executive branch to calculate timeliness by averaging a portion  of the initial clearance decisions, and the executive branch has opted to  present this average in its annual reports. However, because the executive  branch report presents an average of only a portion of the initial clearance  decisions, Congress does not have comprehensive information about the  remaining delays that continue to exist or, importantly, about the reasons  for their occurrence that could help ascertain if corrective actions to  accelerate clearance decisions are possible. Further, while OPM and DOD  have been meeting their timeliness requirements, they have been doing so  by relying on investigative reports and adjudicative files that are  incomplete, according to both agencies’ own standards, bringing into  question whether these agencies are in the best position to provide  assurances that they have implemented all appropriate safeguards. Finally,  the executive branch has not been reporting on quality in the clearance  process, further impeding the ability of decision makers to carry out  effective oversight.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making five recommendations to OMB, OPM, and DOD.
To provide more comprehensive information about personnel security  clearance timeliness, which would aid the ongoing personnel security  clearance reform efforts, we recommend that the OMB Deputy Director  for Management, in the capacity as the Chair of the Performance  Accountability Council, include appropriate statistics that describe the full  range of the time required to complete all initial clearance applications in  the executive branch’s IRTPA-required annual reports.
To improve the completeness of future investigation documentation, we  recommend that the Director of OPM direct the Associate Director of  OPM’s Federal Investigative Services Division to measure the frequency  with which its investigative reports meet federal investigative standards,  so that the executive branch can identify the factors leading to incomplete  reports and include the results of such measurement in the annual IRTPA- required report to Congress on clearances.
To improve the completeness of future adjudication documentation, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of  Defense for Intelligence to measure the frequency with which adjudicative  files meet the requirements of DOD regulation, so that the executive  branch can identify the factors leading to incomplete files and include the  results of such measurement in the annual IRTPA-required report to  Congress on clearances.
To improve DOD’s adjudication process, we are recommending that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence to issue guidance that clarifies when adjudicators may use  incomplete investigative reports as the basis for granting clearances.
To provide more transparency in future versions of the IRTPA-required  annual report to Congress on personnel security clearances, we  recommend that OMB’s Deputy Director for Management, in the capacity  as the Chair of the Performance Accountability Council, include metrics  on quality.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of our report to OMB, DOD, and OPM. In response to  this draft, we received oral comments from OMB. Also, we received  written comments from DOD and OPM and reprinted them in their entirety  in appendices IV and V, respectively.
subsections: section_title: Office of Management and Budget
paragraphs: In its oral comments, OMB concurred with both of our recommendations  to that agency, commenting that it recognized the need for more reporting  on timeliness and quality. In addition, OMB described some steps that the  Performance Accountability Council is taking to address our  recommendations. In response to our recommendation that OMB include  appropriate statistics that describe the full range of the time required to  complete all initial clearance applications in the executive branch’s  IRTPA-required annual reports, OMB underscored the importance of  reporting on the full range of time to complete all initial clearances. OMB  stated that the Performance Accountability Council is developing  measures to account, more comprehensively, for the time it takes to  complete the end-to-end clearance process. In response to our  recommendation that OMB provide more transparency in future versions  of the IRTPA-required annual report to Congress by including metrics on  quality, OMB emphasized that it is important to provide Congress more  transparency about quality in the clearance process. OMB stated that the  Performance Accountability Council is developing metrics to measure  quality in the clearance process.
section_title: Department of Defense
paragraphs: In its written comments, DOD concurred with both of the  recommendations we made to the department. DOD also described  specific steps it expects to implement later this year to address the  recommendations.
In response to our recommendation that DOD measure the frequency with  which adjudicative files meet the requirements of DOD regulation, DOD  emphasized that both adjudicative and investigative quality are important  to the department. DOD also stated that it has developed tools to assess  not only the quality of its adjudicative files, but also OPM’s investigative  reports, adding that DOD will implement its investigative quality tool by  the end of June 2009 and its adjudicative quality tool by the end of  calendar year 2009. DOD stated that it would use its investigative quality  tool, the Rapid Assessment of Incomplete Security Evaluations (RAISE),  to assess investigative quality and completeness by systematically  collecting and reporting specific information about the scope, issues, and  utility of all deficient investigative cases. DOD indicated that it would use  its adjudicative quality tool, the Review of Adjudication Documentation  Accuracy and Rationales (RADAR), to gather specific information about  adjudicative processes at DOD adjudication facilities and assess the  quality of adjudicated cases.
In response to our recommendation that DOD issue guidance clarifying  when adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports as the basis  for granting clearances, DOD stated that it intends to issue this guidance  by the end of fiscal year 2009. DOD also stated its intention to issue  additional guidance, also by the end of fiscal year 2009, that outlines  standards that adjudicators will be required to follow when they document  their rationale for granting clearances to applicants with security issues  documented in an otherwise incomplete investigative report.
section_title: Office of Personnel Management
paragraphs: In its written comments, OPM did not indicate whether it concurred with  the one recommendation we made to that agency to measure the  frequency with which its investigative reports meet federal investigative  standards but did provide detailed responses to each of our three findings.  Also, OPM highlighted improvements it has made in reducing delays in the  clearance investigations process since DOD transferred this function to  OPM in 2005. OPM commented that it took a critical program in disarray  and turned it around under very challenging conditions. As we reported in  December 2008, we agree that OMB, DOD, and OPM have jointly made  significant progress and met IRTPA’s timeliness requirements for initial  clearances completed in fiscal year 2008. We also stated in our draft report  that the fact that OPM and DOD are currently meeting IRTPA timeliness  requirements represents significant and noteworthy progress.  Nevertheless, we continue to believe that measuring the frequency with  which OPM’s investigative reports meet federal investigative standards  would enable the executive branch to identify the factors leading to  incomplete reports and that including the results of such measurement in  the annual IRTPA-required report to Congress on clearances would  improve the completeness of future investigation documentation. Our  response to OPM’s comments follows.
As we previously stated, our first finding addressed that IRTPA-required  annual reports to Congress did not provide comprehensive timeliness  data, and OMB, to whom our recommendation was directed, concurred  with our recommendation to provide these data. OPM also provided  comments on this finding and focused its remarks on the timeliness and  reporting requirements in IRTPA and on the clearance timeliness data that  it collects and reports to Congress outside of the annual report required by  IRTPA. OPM’s comments on this topic and our responses follow.
OPM stated that the executive branch report to Congress was tailored to  address the timeliness requirements of IRTPA. IRTPA currently requires  that 80 percent of initial clearance decisions are to be made within 120  days, on average. We agree that it is important to report statistics that aid  congressional decision makers in assessing whether DOD and OPM are  meeting the current requirements of IRTPA. However, in its 2009 report,  the executive branch did not provide data to address IRTPA’s current  requirement. Instead, it reported an average of the time to complete the  fastest 90 percent of initial clearances.
OPM stated that the goal for national performance of clearance timeliness  was established for the average timeliness of the fastest 80 percent of  clearances. However, IRTPA does not specify that the fastest 80 percent of  clearances be completed within an average of 120 days, only that 80  percent be completed under such time requirements. In its 2009 report, the  executive branch chose to report an average of the fastest clearances in its  reports, excluding the slowest percentage of clearances and averaging  what remained. While this may be a reasonable approach, we continue to  believe that by not including additional data on the full range of time to  make clearance decisions, the executive branch’s report was not fully  transparent about the extent of any remaining delays in the process.
OPM commented that the framers of IRTPA specified that up to 20 percent  of clearances, until December 2009, and up to 10 percent of clearances  thereafter would not be subject to the statute’s timeliness and reporting  requirements. While we agree that OPM’s comment correctly summarizes  IRTPA’s timeliness requirements, we disagree with OPM’s characterization  of IRTPA’s reporting requirements. In fact, IRTPA does not specify that 20  or 10 percent of clearances are not subject to the act’s reporting  requirements. Instead, IRTPA requires that each report the executive  branch provides to Congress include the periods of time required by the  authorized investigative agencies and authorized adjudicative agencies for  conducting investigations, adjudicating cases, and granting clearances.
OPM also stated that delays for the 10 to 20 percent of cases that are not  reported are typically due to the presence of serious issues that require  further, extensive investigation or the absence of a required third party  record. While this may be the case, it is not possible to assess this  assertion based on the information contained in the annual IRTPA- required report to Congress. The report does not contain information  about the reasons for the delays in the clearances that were excluded from  the statistics presented in the report because the report did not present  information on the full range of time to complete all initial clearances in  the annual IRTPA-required report.
OPM also stated that it periodically collects additional data on the  clearance process that it reports to Congress. We are aware that OPM  periodically collects and reports data on the clearance process. However,  the reports that OPM has shared with us contain the same limitation in the  presentation of clearance timeliness information that are found in the  executive branch’s annual IRTPA-required report. For example, in its  National Oversight Report, OPM includes an average of the end-to-end  time to complete 100 percent of DOD clearances. However, by relying on  an average and not including additional, more comprehensive analysis that  describes the full range of the time required to complete all initial  clearances such as the analysis we included in our finding on this topic,  this report also does not provide full visibility over clearance timeliness.  In addition, OPM commented that it would not be accurate to assert that it  has limited visibility over the security clearance and investigation process  because it periodically collects data on the clearance process that it  reports to Congress. We did not comment on OPM’s visibility over the  clearance or investigation process in this, or any other, finding. Instead,  we indicated that the executive branch’s 2009 IRTPA-required report to  Congress did not provide congressional decision makers with full visibility  of clearance timeliness because the report did not include additional data  on the full range of time to make all initial clearance decisions. As we  state, the result of this approach is that the report limits congressional  decision makers’ ability to thoroughly evaluate, and identify with  precision, where and why delays continue to exist within DOD’s personnel  security clearance process. As a result, we continue to believe that our  recommendation that OMB include appropriate statistics that describe the  full range of the time required to complete all initial clearances in the  executive branch’s IRTPA-required annual reports has merit.
Our second finding addressed the lack of complete documentation in  OPM’s investigative reports and DOD’s adjudicative files. We  recommended that OPM measure the frequency with which its  investigative reports meet federal investigative standards and that DOD  measure the frequency with which its adjudicative files meet DOD  regulation. As we previously stated, DOD concurred with our  recommendations to it based on this finding. OPM, while not stating  whether it agreed with our recommendation to it, did raise several  concerns. Specifically, OPM’s response focused on the methodology we  used to assess the completeness of documentation in its investigative  reports. OPM’s comments on our methodology and resulting findings and  our responses follow.
OPM stated that, under established procedures, investigators often make  decisions on the appropriate sources of information needed to attest to an  applicant’s activities, character, and conduct when sources of information  specified in the federal investigative standards are uncooperative or  otherwise unavailable. Further, OPM asserted that our methodology did  not appear to take into account the judgment OPM’s investigators exercise  or the availability of sources of information and cited, as an example, that  in three of the investigative reports we shared with OPM, the applicants  were unavailable because they were on a military deployment. We  disagree with OPM’s assertion. As we explain in our report, we categorized  an investigative item as incomplete if the investigative report did not  contain the required documentation as prescribed in the federal  investigative standards and OPM’s internal guidance. We also explained  that, to the extent possible, we counted an item as complete if the report  included documentation of an investigator’s unsuccessful attempt to  gather the required information. Further, we stated in our report that the  most notable exception to this approach related to documentation of  interviews of the applicant because as OPM officials told us the applicant  is a key source of information. Also, the interview with the applicant  cannot be replaced by another information source. Therefore, as we  describe in our report, we counted the interview investigative item as  incomplete even though unsuccessful attempts to interview the applicant  may have been documented. However, we included in our report an  explanation that the missing interviews in the investigative reports we  reviewed were the result of the applicants’ deployment.
OPM stated that we did not make evaluative judgments about the  importance of one missing investigative item over another even though  investigators and adjudicators routinely make such judgments. We agree  that, as we disclosed in our report, we did not make evaluative judgments  during our review because the federal investigative standards do not  assign a level of importance to each investigative requirement.
OPM stated that in its review of our analysis of eight of the investigative  reports we shared with its staff, it did not fully agree with our assessment  of what we identified as missing documentation. OPM also stated its  ability to respond to our assessment on documentation completeness was  greatly limited since we did not provide all of the investigative reports  where we found incomplete documentation to OPM officials so that they  could review our work and provide an accompanying explanation. Finally,  OPM asserted that its review of the limited sample provided casts doubt  on our findings. It is true that OPM officials did not fully agree with our  assessment of documentation completeness, but OPM officials did  acknowledge that some required documentation was in fact missing in  each of the eight reports we voluntarily shared in order to strengthen our  methodology, as we explained in our report. After the OPM officials’  review, we incorporated their feedback into our methodology and  adjusted some of our findings, which were reflected in the results we  presented in our draft report. We intentionally shared a subset of the  investigative reports, and the results of our analysis of those reports with  OPM to validate our findings. We also internally conducted a separate and  independent second review of a subset of the 100 investigative reports we  analyzed by comparing information in the investigative reports against the  federal investigative standards. To be as transparent as possible, we  shared our methodology with OPM throughout its development and while  implementing our data collection. Specifically, when we developed an  instrument to measure documentation of the completeness of OPM’s  investigative reports, we shared this instrument with OPM officials, among  others, and refined it by integrating their feedback. Additionally, we  received and incorporated clarification from OPM on our instrument on an  ongoing basis while we used the instrument to collect data. We believe our  collaboration with OPM during our data collection, combined with the fact  that OPM officials did agree that some documentation was missing in all of  the reports we shared with them, should negate any doubts OPM has  about our findings.
OPM stated the current federal investigative standards recognize that  information about an applicant may be obtained through alternative  information sources and provides for departing from the standards when  necessary. We disagree with OPM’s characterization of the investigative  standards. When we reviewed the current federal investigative standards,  we found no provision for such deviations from the requirements. Rather,  the standards permit agencies to use lawful investigative procedures in  addition to the requirements to expand investigations and resolve issues,  as necessary.
OPM stated that, on the one hand, it is possible to meet all of the  documentation requirements specified by federal investigative standards  and guidelines yet still have an investigation that is not sufficiently  thorough, while on the other hand, have a thorough investigation in which  required documentation of a single neighborhood or employment  reference could be incomplete. OPM officials made a similar point to us  during the course of our work, and we included this statement in our  report. However, we also reported that DOD adjudicators told us that at  times they perform limited investigative work to fill the gaps in  information they have received in OPM-provided investigative reports to  comply with investigative standards. This investigative work then  increased the amount of time and labor costs required to make an  adjudicative determination. As we explained in our report, basing  clearance decisions on incomplete documentation that has not fully  adhered to federal investigative standards may reduce the assurance that  appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent DOD from granting  clearances to untrustworthy individuals.
OPM stated that procedures are being developed to better focus  investigative resources on the most productive sources of information for  each applicant and that the end result of this work will be a more effective  and efficient investigative process that ensures quality and promotes  reciprocity. While we are encouraged by OPM’s planned actions, we were  unable to assess these efforts as they are still under development.
Our third finding addressed the lack of discussion of quality in the  clearance process in IRTPA-required annual reports to Congress, and  OMB, to whom our recommendation was addressed, concurred with our  recommendation and emphasized the importance of providing Congress  with more transparency about quality in the process. OPM also provided  comments on this finding, stating that the quality of the investigative and  adjudicative processes is the most critical performance expectation for  OPM and the clearance-granting agencies. OPM further stated that,  because much of the information used in the clearance process is  subjective, it is challenging to measure quality, although it also identified  five quality metrics that it stated are a focus of the agency. However, none  of the metrics OPM cited were included in any of the IRTPA-required  reports the executive branch has provided to Congress since 2006. As we  stated in our report, the executive branch’s previous IRTPA-required  reports have contained limited information on quality. As a result, the  executive branch has missed opportunities to provide congressional  decision makers with full transparency over the clearance process. OPM  indicated in its comments that additional quality metrics are being  developed and that it is testing a quality review form that gives agencies  the ability to report problems with an investigation to OPM. OPM further  stated that information collected from this form will be included in quality  information reported to Congress. We believe these are positive steps and,  if implemented, would help address concerns we described in this finding.  OPM’s comments on our findings on executive branch reporting of  clearance quality and our responses follow.
OPM cited, as an example of its attention to quality, a metric it referred to  as the content sufficiency to support suitability actions. In its description  of this metric, OPM stated that the metric indicates whether the  information collected supports an unfavorable federal employment  suitability determination that is formally appealed. Suitability  investigations are used to determine whether individuals are eligible for  federal employment. OPM did not specify how this metric would pertain to  the quality of investigations to support granting personnel security  clearances.  In discussing plans for future quality metrics that the executive branch  proposed in its 2009 IRTPA-required report to Congress, OPM stated that  we expressed concerns about these new metrics before they were tested  and implemented. We expressed no concerns about new metrics proposed  in the executive branch’s report. However, we did express concerns about  an existing metric discussed in the executive branch’s report. This metric  refers to the frequency with which adjudicating agencies returned OPM’s  investigative reports due to quality deficiencies. As we noted, we have  repeatedly reported since the late 1990s that this measure, by itself, is an  unreliable quality indicator because, in our previous work, adjudication  officials told us that they were reluctant to return incomplete investigative  reports because of their perception that returning the reports would result  in delays in the clearance process. While we conducted the work for this  report, both DOD adjudication leadership and adjudicators told us that  they continue to be reluctant to return incomplete investigative reports for  the same reason.
OPM further stated that we based our concerns about the frequency with  which adjudicating agencies returned OPM’s investigative reports due to  quality deficiencies on anecdotal information that agencies may not want  to return investigations to OPM because of their perception that this will  delay case processing. OPM further stated that it may be a mistake to  credit our concerns because OPM had improved clearance investigation  timeliness. OPM’s characterization of the information in our report as  anecdotal is not accurate because we systematically collected key  testimonial evidence from knowledgeable officials at each of the central  adjudication facilities. These knowledgeable officials included leadership  and adjudicators in positions of knowledge about the clearance process.  As we reported, these key officials told us that they continue to be  reluctant to return incomplete investigative reports to OPM because they  anticipate delays in the process.
We are sending copies of this report to the Director of the Office of  Management and Budget, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the  Office of Personnel Management. In addition, the report will be available  at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your  staff have any questions on the information discussed in this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the completeness of the timeliness data that the executive  branch reported for clearances granted in fiscal year 2008 for the  Department of Defense (DOD), we reviewed Title III of the Intelligence  Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), measured the  timeliness of nearly 630,000 clearances completed in fiscal year 2008 for  military, DOD civilian, and industry personnel, and analyzed the executive  branch 2009 annual report to Congress required by IRTPA. The nearly  630,000 clearances accounted for more than 93 percent of all clearance  decisions by DOD adjudicators for nonintelligence community personnel  in fiscal year 2008. IRTPA requires the executive branch to provide an  annual report to Congress by February 15 of each year that includes,  among other things, information on the progress made during the  preceding year toward meeting IRTPA’s timeliness requirements. We  reviewed the executive branch’s 2009 IRTPA-required report to Congress,  which fulfills IRTPA’s requirement. We obtained fiscal year 2008 clearance  timeliness records from two databases—the Office of Personnel  Management’s (OPM) Personnel Investigations Processing System, which  maintains background investigation records, and DOD’s Joint Personnel  Adjudication System, which maintains records on clearance adjudications.  We then linked the records from the DOD and OPM databases using the  unique case identification numbers assigned to each DOD clearance  record to develop the universe of clearances. We measured the timeliness  (from the date of the receipt of the completed application to the final  adjudication date) for nearly 450,000 initial and more than 180,000 renewal  confidential, secret, and top secret clearances adjudicated by the central  adjudication facilities of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and the  Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office. We assessed the reliability of  the data from DOD’s and OPM’s databases by comparing values in the  electronic databases to 100 randomly selected original clearance  investigative files we obtained from the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air  Force central adjudication facilities for July 2008, reviewing existing  information about the data and the system that produced them, and  interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We  determined these data were sufficiently reliable for purposes of our audit.  We then used our timeliness analyses to assess the timeliness data in the  executive branch’s 2009 IRTPA-required report.
To determine the completeness of clearance documentation for initial top  secret security clearances adjudicated favorably within DOD, we  evaluated investigation and adjudication documentation for initial top  secret clearances for military, DOD civilian, and private industry personnel  working on DOD contracts. We focused on initial top secret clearances for  three reasons: (1) we have identified documentation problems with this  clearance level in previous work; (2) investigators gather the most  information for investigations for top secret clearances; and (3)  individuals with top secret clearances have access to information that, if  improperly disclosed, could cause exceptionally grave damage to national  security. We independently selected a stratified random probability sample  of 100 OPM investigative reports and associated DOD adjudicative files  from the population of 3,993 applications that were identified as  clearances that were favorably adjudicated in July 2008 by the central  adjudication facilities of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force.  With this sample, each clearance in the population had a known  probability of being selected. We stratified the population of clearances  into three groups by the adjudication facilities. Each clearance selected  was subsequently weighted in the analysis to account statistically for all  the clearances in the population. We estimated that the total number of  clearances DOD granted in July 2008 was 3,500 (+/-300). For this  population, we produced statistical estimates that have a margin of error  of plus or minus 10 percent or less at the 95 percent confidence level.
For our analysis of investigative reports, we reviewed the criteria for  conducting and documenting investigations outlined in federal  investigative standards, OPM’s product table, OPM’s July 2007  investigator’s handbook, and an analytical tool developed by DOD’s  Defense Personnel Security Research Center. Based on this criteria  review, we developed an instrument to measure the completeness of  OPM’s investigative reports, refined this instrument by integrating  feedback from staff at OPM’s Federal Investigative Services Division and  DOD’s Defense Personnel Security Research Center, and pretested this  instrument for 2 weeks at a DOD adjudication facility by having  adjudicators use this instrument to assess investigative reports they  reviewed during the course of their work. On an ongoing basis, we  received and incorporated clarification from OPM. For each investigative  report, we compared information in the report against OPM criteria. We  then conducted a separate and independent review of a subset of the  sample. Voluntarily and to strengthen our methodological approach, we  shared the results of the completed reviews for eight investigative reports  with experts from OPM’s Federal Investigative Services Division’s Quality  Management and Training Group, which conducts quality reviews of  investigative reports, and we incorporated their feedback into our  methodology and adjusted some of our findings.
For our analysis of adjudication documentation, we reviewed the criteria  for conducting and documenting adjudications outlined in federal  adjudicative guidelines, DOD Regulation 5200.2-R, DOD Personnel  Security Program, and an analytical tool developed by DOD’s Defense  Personnel Security Research Center. Based on this review, we developed a  separate instrument to measure the completeness of DOD’s adjudicative  files and refined this instrument by integrating feedback from staff at  DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and  Defense Personnel Security Research Center. For each adjudicative file,  two experienced and trained adjudicators, who adjudicate GAO  clearances, compared the information in the file against DOD criteria. The  GAO adjudicators then conducted an independent review of a subset of  the adjudicative file sample. We also shared our observations for eight  adjudicative files with DOD adjudication facility leadership and 10 DOD  adjudicators with varying levels of professional experience and made  necessary adjustments based on their feedback.
To assess the extent to which the executive branch included information  on quality in the security clearance process in its 2006-09 reports on  security clearances for DOD and other federal agencies, we analyzed the  reporting requirements contained in IRTPA. Additionally, we reviewed  previously issued GAO clearance-related reports and testimonies that  identified quality measures and their potential utility. Finally, we evaluated  the information presented in the executive branch’s annual IRTPA- required reports issued to Congress in 2006 through 2009.
Throughout this review, we interviewed executive branch officials and  contractors about the clearance process, evaluated additional policies and  reports they provided to us, and discussed with them factors that  contributed to incomplete clearance documentation. The executive branch  organizations and groups are listed in table 2.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2008 through May 2009  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: The Federal Investigative Standards Used in the Investigation Phase of the Personnel Security Clearance Process
paragraphs: In the investigation phase, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) or  one of its contractors uses up to 14 federal investigative standards and the  OPM’s internal guidance to conduct and document the investigation of the  applicant. The scope of information gathered in an investigation depends  on what level of clearance is needed and whether an investigation for an  initial clearance or a reinvestigation for a clearance renewal is being  conducted. For example, the federal investigative standards require that  investigators collect information from national agencies such as the  Federal Bureau of Investigation for all initial and renewal clearances.  However, the standards require investigators to corroborate education by  interviewing sources, as appropriate, only in investigations supporting top  secret initial clearances. Table 3 lists the information required by the  federal investigative standards for each clearance level and for initial and  renewal clearances.
section_title: Appendix III: Federal Adjudicative Guidelines Used in the Adjudication Phase of the Personnel Security Clearance Process
paragraphs: In the adjudication phase, Department of Defense (DOD) adjudicators at  one of DOD’s central adjudication facilities use the information from the  investigative report to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a  security clearance. To make clearance eligibility decisions, federal and  DOD requirements specify that adjudicators consider federal adjudicative  guidelines in 13 specific areas that elicit information about (1) conduct  that could raise security concerns and (2) factors that could allay those  security concerns, even when serious, and permit granting a clearance.  For example, under the foreign influence guideline, a connection to a  foreign person or government is a condition that could raise a security  concern. One factor that could allay this security concern is if the  connection to a foreign person or government is established while the  applicant conducted business on behalf of the U.S. government. Following  are the 13 specific areas of the federal adjudicative guidelines:  (1) allegiance to the United States;  (2) foreign influence, such as having a family member who is a citizen of a  foreign country;  (3) foreign preference, such as performing military service for a foreign  country;  (4) sexual behavior;  (5) personal conduct, such as deliberately concealing or falsifying relevant  facts when completing a security questionnaire;  (6) financial considerations;  (7) alcohol consumption;  (8) drug involvement;  (9) psychological conditions, such as emotional, mental, and personality  disorders;  (10) criminal conduct;  (11) security violations, such as deliberate or negligent disclosure of  classified information;  (12) outside activities, such as providing service to or being employed by a  foreign country; and  (13) misuse of information technology systems, such as unauthorized use  of an information technology system.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Office of Personnel Management
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report were David E. Moser, Assistant Director;  James D. Ashley; Catherine Gelb; Mae Jones; Shvetal Khanna; James P.  Klein; Caryn E. Kuebler; Ronald La Due Lake; Dolores McGhee; Gregory A.  Marchand; and Thomas R. Predmore.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January  2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations about Timeliness  and Quality. GAO-09-261R. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2008.
Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint  Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility  Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Questions for the Record Regarding Security  Clearance Reform. GAO-08-965R. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance  Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.
Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s  Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement. GAO-08-551T.  Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions for the Record Related to the  Quality and Timeliness of Clearances. GAO-08-580R. Washington, D.C.:  March 25, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform  Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.: February  27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts  to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. GAO-08-470T.  Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable  More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.:  February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation  Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17,  2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to  Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington, D.C.:  September 28, 2006.