Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts
Published: 2012-10-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DHS and DOJ have responsibility for training state and local law enforcement and community members on how to defend against violent extremism--ideologically motivated violence to further political goals. Community members and advocacy organizations have raised concerns about the quality of some CVE-related training that DOJ and DHS provide or fund. As requested, GAO examined (1)the extent to which DHS and DOJ have identified and communicated topics that CVE-related training should address to their components and state and local partners, (2) any concerns raised by state and local partners who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by DHS or DOJ, and (3) actions DHS and DOJ have taken to improve the quality of CVE-related training. GAO reviewed relevant documents, such as training participant feedback forms and DHS and DOJ guidance; and interviewed relevant officials from DHS and DOJ components. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2012. Information that the FBI deemed sensitive has been redacted.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified and is communicating to its components and state and local partners topics that the training on countering violent extremism (CVE) it provides or funds should cover; in contrast, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has not identified what topics should be covered in its CVE-related training. According to a DHS official who leads DHS's CVE efforts, identifying topics has helped to provide a logical structure for DHS's CVE-related training efforts. According to DOJ officials, even though they have not specifically identified what topics should be covered in CVE-related training, they understand internally which of the department's training is CVE-related and contributes either directly or indirectly to the department's training responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. However, over the course of this review, the department generally relied upon the framework GAO developed for potential CVE-related training topics to determine which of its existing training was CVE-related. Further, because DOJ has not identified CVE-related training topics, DOJ components have had challenges in determining the extent to which their training efforts contribute to DOJ's responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. In addition, officials who participated in an interagency working group focusing on ensuring CVE-related training quality stated that the group found it challenging to catalogue federal CVE-related training because agencies' views differed as to what CVE-related training includes.
The majority of state and local participant feedback on training that DHS or DOJ provided or funded and that GAO identified as CVE-related was positive or neutral, but a minority of participants raised concerns about biased, inaccurate, or offensive material. DHS and DOJ collected feedback from 8,424 state and local participants in CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011, and 77--less than 1 percent--provided comments that expressed such concerns. According to DHS and DOJ officials, agencies used the feedback to make changes where appropriate. DOJ's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other components generally solicit feedback for more formal, curriculum-based training, but the FBI does not require this for activities such as presentations by guest speakers because the FBI does not consider this to be training. Similarly, DOJ's United States Attorneys' Offices (USAO) do not require feedback on presentations and similar efforts. Nevertheless, FBI field offices and USAOs covered about 39 percent (approximately 9,900) of all participants in DOJ CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 through these less formal methods, yet only 4 of 21 FBI field offices and 15 of 39 USAOs chose to solicit feedback on such methods. GAO has previously reported that agencies need to develop systematic evaluation processes in order to obtain accurate information about the benefits of their training. Soliciting feedback for less formal efforts on a more consistent basis could help these agencies ensure their quality.
DOJ and DHS have undertaken reviews and developed guidance to help improve the quality of CVE-related training. For example, in September 2011, the DOJ Deputy Attorney General directed all DOJ components and USAOs to review all of their training materials, including those related to CVE, to ensure they are consistent with DOJ standards. In addition, in October 2011, DHS issued guidance that covers best practices for CVE-related training and informs recipients of DHS grants who use the funding for training involving CVE on how to ensure high-quality training. Since the departments' reviews and efforts to implement the guidance they have developed are relatively new, it is too soon to determine their effectiveness.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOJ identify and communicate principal CVE-related training topics and that FBI field offices and USAOs consider soliciting feedback more consistently. DOJ agreed that it should more consistently solicit feedback, but disagreed that it should identify CVE training topics because DOJ does not have primary responsibility for CVE-related training, among other things. GAO believes this recommendation remains valid as discussed further in this report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: State and local law enforcement and homeland security officials, in  partnership with local community members, are the first line of defense  against the evolving threat posed by violent extremism—ideologically  motivated violence to further political goals. In recent history, the United  States has faced violent extremist plots by neo-Nazis and other anti- Semitic hate groups, racial supremacists, and international and domestic  terrorist groups. These events included the 2009 shooting at Fort Hood in  Texas, the 2010 attempted bombing at Times Square in New York City,  and the 2011 attempt by a white supremacist to injure participants of a  Martin Luther King, Jr., Day parade with an explosive device in the state  of Washington. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, al Qaeda  and its affiliates and adherents, as well as other extremists, have inspired  or directed an expanded range of plots and attacks in the United States.  For example, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and  Responses to Terrorism, using open sources, developed a database with  information on 210 violent Islamic extremists known to have radicalized in  North America from 1989 through 2011 to the point of supporting  violence. Of these individuals, 80 percent began their radicalization after  the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent Global War on  Terrorism. The United States government identifies al Qaeda as the  preeminent terrorist threat to the country, and the Executive Office of the  President has emphasized that the prevalence of particular violent  extremist ideologies changes over time and new threats will undoubtedly  arise in the future. Accordingly, the United States government must  ensure that its approach to countering violent extremism (CVE) is flexible  enough to address a variety of current and possible future threats,  whether they are posed by al Qaeda or other groups.
Given the critical role state and local law enforcement officers play in  CVE, it is important that they receive high-quality CVE-related training.  The Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ) have  responsibility for executing several programs and activities related to  CVE, some of which include providing or funding CVE-related training for  state and local law enforcement officers or community members who  partner with law enforcement. However, some community members and  advocacy organizations have raised concerns about the quality of CVE- related training, including training that DHS and DOJ provide or fund. In  particular, letters that individuals and advocacy organizations submitted to  DHS and DOJ have indicated anecdotally that some of the individuals  who provide training to state and local law enforcement agencies and  community members misunderstand the ideology of violent Islamist  extremism and cast aspersions on the vast majority of Muslim Americans  who pose no threat to the United States. According to the implementation  plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the  United States (CVE national strategy), the instances of federally  sponsored or funded CVE and counterterrorism training that used  offensive and inaccurate information underscored a need to improve  CVE-related training and develop standards for such training. Further,  according to the CVE national strategy, misinformation about the threat  and dynamics of radicalization to violence can harm security by sending  local stakeholders in the wrong direction and unnecessarily creating  tensions with potential community partners.
You requested that we assess DHS and DOJ efforts to ensure the quality  of violent extremism training that the departments provide or fund for  state and local partners. Specifically, we addressed the following  questions:
To what extent have DHS and DOJ identified and communicated  topics that CVE-related training addresses to their components and  state and local partners?
What, if any, concerns have been raised by state and local partners  who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by  DHS and DOJ?
What actions, if any, have DHS and DOJ taken to improve the quality  of CVE-related training?
This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we  provided to you. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) determined  that some of the information in the prior report was For Official Use Only  and Law Enforcement Sensitive, which must be protected from public  disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive information about CVE- related training that the FBI provided, including associated costs, and the  results of a review that the FBI undertook to assess the quality of its  counterterrorism training materials, some of which included CVE-related  content. Although the information provided in this report is more limited in  scope, it addresses the same questions as the sensitive report. Also, the  overall methodology used for both reports is the same.
To address our objectives, we met with DHS and DOJ officials to  determine how the departments define and communicate CVE-related  training topics, and which departmental training programs were relevant  to our review. We analyzed this information to assess the extent to which  the departments’ efforts allow them to demonstrate fulfillment of their  CVE-related training responsibilities under the CVE national strategy.  During these initial interviews, DHS and DOJ officials expressed difficulty  in responding to our request for CVE-related training materials, in part  because agency officials were not clear on which training should be  considered CVE-related. Therefore, for the purposes of this review, we  developed a framework for what constitutes CVE-related training. This  framework identifies three distinct content areas CVE-related training  likely addresses: (1) radicalization, (2) cultural competency, and (3)  community engagement. We discuss these content areas in greater detail  later in this report. We solicited feedback on this framework from DHS  and DOJ. DHS officials generally agreed with the content areas we  identified, and we incorporated feedback DHS provided, as appropriate.  DOJ officials stated that they view the framework as reasonable for the  purpose of our review. We focused generally on training provided in fiscal  years 2010 and 2011 because “countering violent extremism” is a  relatively nascent term. In addition, we focused on training provided to  state and local entities because the CVE national strategy identifies CVE- related training for these entities as a major component of the national  CVE approach.
For the purpose of this review, we considered training to include  instruction, presentations, or briefings. We asked DHS and DOJ  components to identify CVE-related offices and programs that would be  appropriate to include in the scope of our review utilizing the framework  for CVE-related training that we developed. We also asked DHS and DOJ  to identify and provide all materials for any training that DHS and DOJ  provided or funded through grant programs for state and local entities,  including law enforcement officers and community members, that  agencies assumed to be CVE-related based on our framework. We  considered the training to be CVE-related if all or a portion of it addressed  one or more of the three content areas. For training that we determined  was CVE-related, we requested information on the approximate number  and type of participants that attended each training and the estimated  cost of providing the training. In addition, in July 2012, GAO conducted a  web-based survey of training points of contact within 51 state  administrative agencies regarding the clarity of guidance DHS provides to  recipients of grant funds that can be used for CVE-related training. Of  the 51 state administrative agencies to which we sent a survey, 30  responded for an overall response rate of 59 percent. On the basis of a  comparison of the geographic regions and state populations of state  administrative agencies that did and did not respond to our survey, we  concluded that the experiences of state administrative agencies from  some of the larger states may not be captured in our survey results.  Nevertheless, the survey results provide insight into the level of clarity  about DHS CVE guidance among grantees.
To obtain participant perspectives about CVE-related training, two  analysts independently reviewed 8,424 evaluations completed by  participants of six DHS and DOJ training programs that were CVE-related  according to our framework to identify and categorize any complaints or  concerns about this training. To identify complaints or concerns that were  submitted to the agencies outside of course evaluations, we asked DHS  and DOJ to identify concerns that were submitted to them in writing,  conducted keyword searches of LexisNexis and Google, and interviewed  representatives, including leaders, of advocacy groups that raised the  concerns we identified through our searches. We also interviewed DHS  and DOJ officials who oversee these training programs to obtain their  perspectives on any concerns or complaints that were raised about the  CVE-related training and to learn about any actions agencies took in  response to these incidents.
To address what actions DHS and DOJ have taken to improve the overall  quality of CVE-related training, we reviewed relevant documents,  including recently released guidance and best practices for training that  DHS, DOJ, and the FBI developed. We also analyzed the  counterterrorism training materials that were CVE-related according to  our framework that the FBI determined were inappropriate as a result of  its internal review, which the FBI undertook to identify and purge  potentially objectionable training materials. This analysis enabled us to  better understand the review results with regard to training materials that  were CVE-related according to our framework, and provided context for  the quality assurance steps the FBI has taken in response to the review.  The FBI considers the methodology it used to conduct its internal review  and our analysis of the training materials that the FBI considered  objectionable to be For Official Use Only; therefore, we did not include  that information in this report.  In addition, we interviewed DHS and DOJ  officials and inquired about guidance agencies adhere to when vetting or  reviewing training materials and instructors, as well as other actions they  have taken to ensure CVE-related training quality. Appendix I contains  additional details on our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2011 through October  2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The past decade has seen an increasing emphasis in the United States  on the role of state and local entities in the fight against violent  extremism. More recently, in August 2011, the White House issued the  nation’s first CVE strategy, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent  Extremism in the United States, and in December 2011, it issued an  implementation plan for the CVE national strategy. The strategy  leverages existing programs and structures in order to counter  radicalization that leads to violence, rather than creating new programs  and funding streams. The strategy highlights three major areas of  activity: (1) enhancing engagement with and support to local communities  that violent extremists may target, (2) building government and law  enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism, and (3)  countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting U.S. ideals. The  strategy also identifies the provision of training to federal, state, and local  entities as a major component of the national CVE approach, and the  implementation plan notes that the federal government will enhance CVE- related training offered to federal, state, and local agencies. The  implementation plan states that this is necessary because of “a small  number of instances of federally-sponsored or funded CVE and  counterterrorism training that used offensive and inaccurate information.”  Accordingly, one of the objectives of the implementation plan is to  improve the development and use of standardized training with rigorous  curricula that imparts information about violent extremism, improves  cultural competency, and conveys best practices and lessons for effective  community engagement and partnerships.
The implementation plan designates federal departments, agencies, and  components as leaders and partners regarding certain aspects of CVE,  and DHS and DOJ have principal roles in implementing the CVE national  strategy. Table 1 identifies the primary federal departments and agencies  with CVE-related responsibilities and their respective missions. Other  agencies involved in implementing the strategy include the Departments  of the Treasury, Education, and Commerce, among others.
section_title: DHS Has Identified CVE-Related Training Topics but DOJ Has Not, Making It Difficult for DOJ to Demonstrate How It Is Meeting Its CVE Responsibilities
paragraphs: The CVE national strategy implementation plan assigns both DHS and  DOJ responsibility for supporting national CVE-related training efforts and  emphasizes the importance of collaboration among federal, state, local,  and tribal government agencies in order to achieve the goals of the  strategy. In order for DHS and DOJ components to determine the extent  to which they are fulfilling departmental CVE-related responsibilities, they  must be able to identify which of the training they conduct is CVE-related,  which requires that they understand what constitutes CVE-related  training. The DHS Counterterrorism Working Group, the entity  responsible for leading DHS’s CVE efforts under the direction of the  Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator, has identified topics to be  addressed in CVE-related training that DHS develops, provides, or funds.  The group has also undertaken efforts to communicate these topics to  other DHS components, state and local law enforcement officials, and  grant recipients who may allocate DHS funding for CVE-related training  within their states. DHS’s communication efforts have helped DHS  components and state and local partners to better understand what  constitutes CVE-related training, but some DHS grantees who responded  to our survey reported that they were not clear as to what topics should  be addressed in CVE-related training, and most indicated that it would be  helpful for DHS to provide additional information or guidance on topics  covered under CVE. DHS plans to undertake additional communication  efforts with these grantees to educate them about the principal topics  CVE-related training addresses. In contrast, DOJ has not identified topics  it considers as CVE-related training. Consequently, DOJ is unable to  demonstrate how it is meeting its CVE responsibilities under the CVE  national strategy.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Identified Principal CVE-Related Training Topics and Made Efforts to Communicate Them
paragraphs: In February 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security tasked the  Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) with developing  recommendations regarding how DHS can better support community- based efforts to combat violent extremism domestically, focusing on the  issues of training, information sharing, and the adoption of community- oriented law enforcement approaches. The council established the  HSAC CVE Working Group to carry out this tasking, and the working  group issued its findings in summer 2010. The HSAC CVE Working  Group determined that CVE-related training should focus on (1) improving  the capacity of law enforcement and other government personnel to  communicate and collaborate with individuals from diverse religious,  ethnic, and racial communities, and (2) promoting understanding of the  threats facing a local community and recognizing behavior and indicators  associated with those threats. The DHS Counterterrorism Working Group  subsequently determined that, in order to support implementation of the  CVE national strategy and the HSAC CVE Working Group findings, CVE- related training should address the following: violent extremism (e.g., the  threat it poses), cultural demystification (e.g., education on culture and  religion), community partnerships (e.g., how to build them), and  community policing efforts (e.g., how to apply community policing efforts  to CVE). According to the DHS Principal Deputy Counterterrorism  Coordinator, identifying these topics helped to provide a logical structure  for DHS’s CVE-related training–related efforts.
The Counterterrorism Working Group has undertaken efforts to  communicate these topics to DHS components that contribute to DHS  CVE-related training. Toward the beginning of our review officials from  DHS components that contributed to training in fiscal years 2010 and  2011 that was CVE-related according to our framework cited lack of  clarity regarding what topics CVE-related training is to address; however,  by August 2012, the components reported that the topics were clear, a  fact that they attributed to these communications efforts. The  Counterterrorism Working Group communicated CVE-related training  topics to relevant DHS components during weekly meetings as well as by  involving the components in the development of new CVE-related  training. For example, the Counterterrorism Working Group has invited  relevant components to participate in workshops on CVE-related training,  provided them with briefings and updates on its CVE-related training  development efforts, and included them in review of draft CVE curricula.  According to Counterterrorism Working Group officials, the group led a  series of meetings with these components to communicate and review  the content of multiple CVE-related trainings the group is working to  develop. According to officials from relevant DHS components, these  communication efforts have helped to clarify topics CVE-related training  addresses. For example, according to the official that leads CVE-related  training that the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties provides,  reviewing the CVE curricula under development involves ensuring that  training topics are clear and well understood. In addition, according to the  S&T official who oversees research on CVE that is to inform CVE-related  training content, DHS officials have clearly communicated topics that  CVE-related training is to include during weekly meetings that the  Counterterrorism Working Group leads involving all DHS CVE Working  Group members.
The Counterterrorism Working Group also communicated with state and  local partners and associations that DHS collaborates with to achieve  national CVE goals regarding DHS’s CVE-related training topics. For  example, according to the director of a state police academy and a police  department lieutenant, the Counterterrorism Working Group has  consistently consulted with them in developing training modules  addressing CVE topics. The Counterterrorism Working Group is also  collaborating to develop and implement CVE-related training curricula  with the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC), the National Consortium  for Advanced Policing (NCAP), and the International Association of Chiefs  of Police (IACP). As reported by the official who oversees CVE-related  training that the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties provides,  such collaboration inherently entails discussion of topics CVE-related  training is to address.
section_title: DHS Is Undertaking Additional Communication to Help Ensure Grantees Fund CVE-Related Training That Is Consistent with the Goals of the CVE National Strategy
paragraphs: DHS’s communication efforts have helped DHS components and state  and local partners to better understand what constitutes CVE-related  training, but our review indicates that some state administrative agency  representatives are not clear about the principal topics CVE-related  training addresses, making it difficult for them to determine what CVE- related training best supports national CVE efforts. According to officials  from FEMA, which administers DHS grant funding, the agency has  increased grant funding available for CVE-related training because the  Secretary of Homeland Security has identified CVE efforts as a priority for  the department. In particular, in fiscal year 2011, FEMA began to allow  state and local entities to use funds awarded through the Homeland  Security Grant Program for CVE-related training. Further, in fiscal year  2012, FEMA explicitly stated in its Homeland Security Grant Program  funding announcement that grantees could use program funds for CVE- related training, and retroactively allowed recipients to use program funds  from prior years for CVE activities. In July 2012, we surveyed the 51  training points of contact within state administrative agencies—which are  responsible for managing Homeland Security Grant Program funds that  DHS awards—about the extent to which they understand what is meant  by CVE training. Of the 30 training points of contact who responded to our  survey, 11 indicated that they were not at all clear or were somewhat  clear on what is meant by CVE-related training. Further, 26 agreed or  strongly agreed that it would be helpful for DHS to provide additional  information or guidance on topics covered under CVE. As long as FEMA  continues to make grant funding available for CVE-related training, but  grantees do not have an understanding of what topics CVE-related  training should address, it will be difficult for grantees to determine what  training best supports the national CVE objective of improving CVE- related training and use funds appropriately toward those efforts.
DHS Counterterrorism Working Group officials stated that the group had  made efforts to communicate CVE-related training topics to state  administrative agencies, but in light of our survey results, the group plans  to expand its efforts. In winter 2011, the Principal Deputy  Counterterrorism Coordinator, who leads DHS CVE efforts, participated in  a conference call with State Homeland Security Program advisers and  staff who administer DHS grants that can be used for CVE-related  training, during which this official highlighted DHS’s CVE-related training  efforts and associated guidance. Nonetheless, according to the Principal  Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator, some training points of contact  may not be aware of what topics CVE-related training should address  because the working group’s coordination efforts have focused on state  and local representatives who administer law enforcement training  programs (e.g., at police academies), not state administrative agencies.  The Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator also emphasized that  DHS has focused its efforts on developing high-quality CVE-related  training that state and local entities can readily access and that FEMA will  pre approve as eligible for DHS grant funding. As a result, according to  this official, grantees will rarely have to independently identify appropriate  CVE-related training to fund or undertake steps to ensure the quality of  CVE-related training they fund.
Nevertheless, the Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator agreed  that our survey results revealed that it is important for DHS to undertake  additional efforts to educate state administrative agency officials on the  principal topics CVE-related training addresses. To that end, in August  2012, the Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator held an  additional meeting with more than 100 state administrative agency  representatives and other federal, state, and local officials, during which  the Coordinator provided information on DHS CVE-related training  development efforts and the content of DHS’s CVE-related training,  among other things. In addition, in August 2012, DHS, in partnership with  the FBI, launched an online portal for a select group of law enforcement  training partners that is intended to provide federal, state, local, tribal,  territorial, and correctional law enforcement with access to CVE-related  training materials. DHS aims to broaden access to the portal to trainers  nationwide by the end of September 2012. Further, the Principal Deputy  Counterterrorism Coordinator stated that the Counterterrorism Working  Group is developing an outreach strategy for communicating with state  and local entities about DHS’s CVE-related training efforts. Given the  recency of these efforts, we are not able to assess their effectiveness as  part of our review. However, they are positive steps that should contribute  to educating state administrative agency representatives about CVE  topics, and thereby help them to fund CVE-related training that is  consistent with the goals of the CVE national strategy.
section_title: DOJ Has Not Identified CVE-Related Training Topics, Which Could Preclude DOJ from Demonstrating How It Is Implementing the CVE National Strategy
paragraphs: As with DHS, the CVE national strategy implementation plan has  identified DOJ, including the FBI, as among the federal departments and  agencies responsible for conducting CVE-related training. However, DOJ  has not yet identified topics that should be covered in its CVE-related  training. In addition, DOJ has not generally identified which of its existing  training could be categorized as CVE-related training, thus limiting DOJ’s  ability to demonstrate how it is fulfilling its training responsibilities under  the CVE national strategy.
According to senior DOJ officials, even though the department has not  identified CVE-related training topics, they understand internally which of  the department’s training is CVE-related and contributes either directly or  indirectly to the department’s training responsibilities under the CVE  national strategy.  However, because DOJ has not identified what  constitutes CVE-related training, CVE-related efforts undertaken at the  direction of the President’s National Security Staff have been hindered,  according to DHS officials who participated in an Interagency Policy  Committee Working Group on Law Enforcement Training Regarding  Domestic Radicalization and CVE. This group, which is chaired by DHS  and NCTC, was formed at the direction of the President’s National  Security Staff to identify and coordinate CVE-related training that federal  agencies deliver or fund. The group’s principal objective was twofold: (1)  to determine how agencies are currently developing training and (2) to  identify options for ensuring that the Intelligence Community’s current  analysis of radicalization informs training for federal, state, local, and  tribal officials, and that customers of this type of training receive high- quality training and information consistent with U.S. government  analysis. As part of this effort, the Interagency Policy Committee  Working Group on Law Enforcement Training Regarding Domestic  Radicalization and CVE endeavored to create an inventory of CVE- related training that the federal government offers. However, according to  DHS officials that participated in the working group, members who led this  effort found it challenging to do so because agencies’ views differed as to  what CVE-related training includes when providing information on their  training. More specifically, according to one DHS official, some  components found it difficult to differentiate between counterterrorism and  CVE-related training, and trying to categorize training that was not  developed for CVE purposes but that can benefit CVE can be confusing.  We observed this problem firsthand during our review when the DOJ  components that the department identified as potentially relevant to our  work, including the FBI, Executive Office for United States Attorneys, and  Office of Community Oriented Policing Services could not readily respond  to our requests for information about CVE-related training they provide or  fund. According to these officials, they found it difficult to respond to our  requests because DOJ has not established a definition for “CVE” or  “CVE-related training,” and therefore they were not sure what constitutes  CVE-related training.acknowledged that training that BJA funds under the State and Local  Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) program could be considered CVE- related training, but they also acknowledged that what constitutes CVE- related training was not clear, in part because CVE is a relatively new  term. The other DOJ components, however, relied upon a framework that  we developed for the purpose of this review to determine which of their  existing training was CVE-related.
The Community Relations Service is DOJ’s “peacemaker” for community conflicts and  tensions arising from differences of race, color, and national origin. It is dedicated to  assisting state and local units of government, private and public organizations, and  community groups with preventing and resolving racial and ethnic tensions, incidents, and  civil disorders, and in restoring racial stability and harmony. According to DOJ, pursuant to  the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, the Community  Relations Service also works with communities to develop strategies to prevent and  respond more effectively to alleged violent hate crimes committed on the basis of race,  color, national origin, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, or disability. See  generally Pub. L. No. 111-84, Div. E, 123 Stat. 2190, 2835 (2009). See also 18 U.S.C.   § 249. and explicitly emphasize the importance of community engagement in  CVE efforts while recognizing that such engagement should focus on a  full range of community concerns, and not just on issues such as national  security. Further, the implementation plan has assigned DOJ  responsibility for supporting national CVE-related training efforts.  However, because DOJ has not identified what topics it thinks should be  addressed by CVE-related training, it is difficult to identify which of DOJ’s  current training is related to CVE—either directly or indirectly, which also  makes it difficult to determine whether and how DOJ is fulfilling its training  responsibilities per the CVE national strategy.
If departments are unclear regarding what constitutes CVE-related  training, they will also have difficulty accounting for their CVE-related  training responsibilities. By not identifying and communicating CVE- related training topics to its components, DOJ is not able to demonstrate  how it is fulfilling its CVE-related training responsibilities and ensure that it  is carrying out its responsibilities as established in the CVE national  strategy implementation plan.
section_title: Few Participants Raised Concerns about DHS and DOJ CVE-Related Training, but the FBI and USAOs Could Help Ensure Quality of Training by More Consistently Soliciting Feedback
paragraphs: Less than 1 percent of state and local participants in CVE-related training  that DHS and DOJ provided or funded who provided feedback to the  departments expressed concerns about information included in the  course materials or that instructors presented during training. In addition,  while DOJ generally solicits feedback from all participants for programs  that provide formal, curriculum-based CVE-related training, the FBI and  USAOs do not always solicit feedback for programs that provide less  formal CVE-related training (e.g., presentations by guest speakers), even  though such training was provided to about 9,900 participants in fiscal  years 2010 and 2011. Finally, apart from the training participants, some  individuals and advocacy organizations have raised concerns about DHS  and DOJ CVE-related training.
As previously discussed, because DHS and DOJ components were  unclear regarding what constitutes CVE-related training, for the purposes  of conducting this review, we developed a framework for determining  which training may be CVE-related. Our framework identifies training as  CVE-related if it addressed one or more of the following three content  areas: (1) radicalization, (2) cultural competency, and (3) community  engagement.
DHS Counterterrorism Working Group officials generally agreed with the  content areas we identified, and we incorporated feedback the group  provided, as appropriate. DOJ officials stated that they view the  framework as reasonable for the purpose of our review. However, as  previously discussed, DOJ officials do not think it is appropriate for DOJ  to identify topics as addressed in CVE-related training.
We applied our framework to identify CVE-related training DOJ and DHS  components provided to state and local entities during fiscal years 2010  and 2011. Figure 1 presents the DOJ and DHS programs that provided  the CVE-related training we identified, and appendix III provides more  detailed information about the training, including the number of  participants and associated costs.
The majority of participant feedback on CVE-related training that DHS  and DOJ provided or funded during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 was  positive or neutral; a minority of participants expressed concerns about  information included in course materials or that instructors presented.  DHS and DOJ collected and retained feedback forms from 8,424 of the  more than 28,000 participants—including state, local, and tribal law  enforcement officials, prison officials, and community members—of  training they provided or funded in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 that was  CVE-related according to our framework. We analyzed all of these  evaluations and found that the vast majority of participants submitted  comments about the training that were positive or neutral. For example,  participants commented that the courses were among the most  challenging they had taken, that the instructors were professional and  knowledgeable, or that the course materials were well assembled. In  addition, participants stated that the training was informative with regard  to the threat posed by, and how to best counter, violent extremists or  provided a valuable overview of an extremist group. In another instance,  a participant stated that the course was helpful in understanding the  beliefs and concerns of a particular community. Some participants also  said that the training would be worthwhile to provide to a broader  audience, that they intended to share what they learned with colleagues,  or that they would like to see the course length expanded. We also  identified 77 participant evaluations—less than 1 percent—that included  comments that expressed concern of any sort. For example, we identified  concerns that a training was too politically correct, as well as concerns  that a training was one-sided, with regard to issues of religion and culture.  The concerns the participants expressed fell into the following three  categories:  1.  The course information or instruction was politically or culturally  biased (54 evaluations). For example, participant comments that fell  into this category were that the instructor had a liberal bias, and other  comments were that the instructor too often relayed his or her  personal views.  2.  The course information or instruction was offensive (12 evaluations).
For example, one concern raised in this category was that an  instructor presented Islam in a negative manner, whereas another  concern was that a guest presenter spoke disrespectfully about the  United States.  3.  The course information was inaccurate (11 evaluations). For example,  comments that fell into this category raised concern that an instructor  provided misinformation about dressing norms for Middle Eastern  women and that an instructor cited incorrect information about a  criminal case discussed during the class.
The concerns that were raised varied across different training providers  and, although few, most of the concerns stemmed from the evaluation  records documenting feedback from DOJ SLATT Program and FBI  National Joint Terrorism Task Force Program participants. See appendix  IV for additional details on the types of concerns by training provider.
DOJ and DHS officials who oversee these training programs indicated  that they review the feedback participants provide and assess if it  warrants action. However, these officials stated that determining how to  respond to feedback can be difficult when the feedback is subjective or  not actionable. For example, the SLATT Program Director stated that if a  comment simply says “one-sided information,” he cannot take action on it  because he does not know which side the person is referring to or what  the person thinks should be changed. However, if there is a trend in clear  feedback participants provided, he will take action. Further, according to  SLATT and Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties officials, perceptions  regarding what is biased vary by audience and even by the participants  within a given audience. Therefore, DHS and DOJ officials stated that  they take action to address participant feedback on a case-by-case basis,  as they and their staff deem appropriate. For example, the SLATT  Director explained that there is no specific threshold to determine whether  a participant’s comment warrants further action, but generally, if a similar  concern has been submitted by multiple participants, over multiple  courses, SLATT officials will review the substance of the comment and  devise a plan to correct the issue. For example, the SLATT Director noted  that in response to a comment that a course title did not reflect the  material taught in the course, he suggested a change to the title.
subsections: section_title: More Consistently Soliciting Feedback on Informal CVE-Related Training Could Provide Information to Help Ensure Its Quality
paragraphs: Most of the CVE-related training that DHS and DOJ components provided  was formal, classroom-based or curriculum-based training, and the  components generally solicited participant feedback for this type of  training, which we describe above. In addition, two DOJ components— FBI and USAOs—also provided informal CVE-related training consisting  of briefings and presentations at workshops, conferences, and other  venues to about 9,900 participants in fiscal years 2010 and 2011.  However, these components did not consistently solicit participant  feedback for this type of training, which makes it difficult for them to  assess the quality of the training, determine whether the training is  achieving expected outcomes, and make changes where appropriate.
According to FBI officials, training that the FBI centrally administers— including that provided under the National Academy and National Joint  Terrorism Task Force programs—is to adhere to the Kirkpatrick model to  help ensure its quality. The standards this model prescribes require the  solicitation of student feedback. As a result, the FBI collects feedback  through evaluations on the formal, classroom-based courses it provides  through its National Academy. The FBI does not require entities providing  informal training, such as briefings and presentations during outreach, to  solicit feedback. Specifically, officials from the FBI’s Office of Public  Affairs told us that the bureau does not solicit feedback on presentations,  briefings, or its Citizens’ Academy and Community Relations Executive  Seminar Training (CREST) outreach programs because doing so is not  required, and the officials noted that the FBI does not classify these  programs and activities as training. Officials also noted that some field  offices, which administer the programs, do solicit feedback from  participants although they are not required to do so. For example, 4 of 21  FBI field offices that provided Citizens’ Academy training that was CVE- related according to our framework collected evaluations. However, none  of the 3 FBI field offices that provided CREST training or the 5 FBI field  offices that provided other training that was CVE-related according to our  framework solicited feedback from course participants. Similarly, USAOs  are not required to obtain feedback from recipients of training that their  individual offices provide. According to Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys  officials, USAOs do not typically solicit feedback from participants on the  presentations that our framework identified as CVE-related that they  provide in their districts, particularly with respect to threat-related briefings  for law enforcement officials that are intended to address a particular area  of concern for that region at a particular time. Under these circumstances,  according to these officials, feedback may be less useful than it would be  for curriculum-based trainings, because the presentation is less likely to  be repeated for many different audiences. We identified 39 USAOs that  provided or facilitated training that was CVE-related according to our  framework, excluding training that was facilitated by a USAO, but  provided by another federal entity (such as SLATT). Out of these 39  USAOs, 15 collected feedback from CVE-related training participants.
We have previously reported that evaluating training is important and that  agencies need to develop systematic evaluation processes in order to   We obtain accurate information about the benefits of their training. recognize the distinction between formal training programs and less  formal training, such as presentations. However, the CREST and  Citizens’ Academy programs, other FBI field office initiatives, and USAOs  collectively trained about 39 percent (about 9,900) of all training  participants in DOJ CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and  2011. Soliciting feedback on informal training could help the FBI and  USAOs obtain valuable information for determining the extent to which  these programs are yielding desired outcomes (e.g., whether the FBI’s  Citizens’ Academy is projecting a positive image of the FBI in the  communities it serves) as well as complying with the CVE national  strategy. Such feedback could also be obtained without incurring  significant costs. According to officials at a FBI field office that distributes  feedback forms and the DHS official who oversees the Office for Civil  Rights and Civil Liberties CVE-related training, agencies can solicit  feedback from training participants at minimal cost (e.g., the paper on  which the form is distributed and the employee time associated with  reviewing the forms), feedback is critical to ensure the training is  communicating its intended messages effectively, and soliciting feedback  is a worthwhile undertaking given the significant time and resources their  offices invest in providing CVE-related training.
section_title: Some Individuals and Advocacy Organizations Have Raised Some Concerns about CVE- Related Training
paragraphs: In addition to the concerns we identified in participant evaluations,  individuals and advocacy organizations submitted at least six letters of  complaint to DHS, DOJ, the Executive Office of the President, and other  federal government entities regarding 18 alleged incidents of biased CVE  and counterterrorism training that DHS or DOJ provided or funded during  fiscal years 2010 and 2011. Representatives of the advocacy  organizations that submitted the letters generally did not participate in the  training that generated these concerns. Rather, their concerns were  derived from information reported in the media and individuals who  attended a training session and expressed concern about the training to  the organizations. We determined that 7 of the alleged incidents  described in five of the letters were relevant to this review because they  pertained to CVE-related training provided to state and local officials and  community members, not training that was exclusively provided to federal  officials. The 7 incidents described in these letters, some of which the  media initially reported, articulated similar concerns as those identified in  the participant evaluations we reviewed. That is, the allegations made in  the letters raised concerns that course information and instructors were  biased, offensive, or inaccurate. Table 2 summarizes the concerns raised  in these five letters and the agency’s perspectives about the concerns.
section_title: DOJ Has Undertaken Reviews and DHS and DOJ Have Developed Guidance to Improve Training Quality
paragraphs: Although the number of concerns and complaints raised about CVE- related training may have been small, according to DHS and DOJ  officials, the departments have generally considered the complaints as  serious issues that warranted action to better ensure the quality of future  training, particularly given the negative effects that such incidents can  have on the departments’ reputations and trust with the communities they  serve. For example, according to the DHS Principal Deputy  Counterterrorism Coordinator, developing CVE-related training is a  priority for the department because inappropriate and inaccurate training  undermines community partnerships that are critical to preventing crime  and negatively impacts efforts of law enforcement to identify legitimate  behaviors and indicators of violent extremism. DOJ has undertaken  quality reviews of existing training materials that are CVE-related  according to our framework, and both DOJ and DHS have developed  guidance for CVE-related training and developed other quality assurance  mechanisms for this training.
subsections: section_title: DOJ Components Have Undertaken Reviews of CVE-Related Training
paragraphs: DOJ components have conducted or are currently conducting internal  reviews of their training materials, including those with topics that our  framework identified as related to CVE, in an effort to identify and purge  potentially objectionable materials.
In September 2011, the FBI launched a review of all FBI counterterrorism  training materials, including materials that were CVE-related according to  our framework. This review included approximately 160,000 pages of  training materials, and the FBI determined that less than one percent of  the pages contained factually inaccurate or imprecise information or used  stereotypes.
The Office of the Deputy Attorney General has also ordered a  departmentwide review of training materials. Unlike the FBI’s internal  review, which focused on counterterrorism training materials, a  memorandum issued by the Deputy Attorney General to heads of DOJ  components and U.S. Attorneys in September 2011 directed them to  carefully review all training material and presentations that their personnel  provided. The memorandum stated components particularly should  review training related to combating terrorism, CVE, and other subjects  that may relate to ongoing outreach efforts in Arab, Muslim, Sikh, South  Asian, and other communities. The purpose of the review was to ensure  that the material and information presented are consistent with DOJ  standards, goals, and instructions. Officials from the four DOJ  components that we identified as having provided or funded CVE-related  training reported that their components have completed, or intend to  complete, the review the Deputy Attorney General ordered. According to  DOJ officials, as of August 2012, some components are still reviewing  relevant materials and the Deputy Attorney General asked components to  provide any questionable training materials to the Deputy Attorney  General’s office. DOJ officials also told us that each DOJ component is  to make its own determination on what materials are appropriate, but that  components are to review all training materials, even if the components  do not have specific plans to present the materials in the future.
section_title: DHS and DOJ Have Developed Guidance Intended to Avoid Future Incidences of Biased or Otherwise Inappropriate Training
paragraphs: DHS, DOJ, and the FBI have developed guidance to avoid future  incidences or allegations of biased or otherwise inappropriate training. In  October 2011, the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties issued  Countering Violent Extremism Training Guidance & Best Practices (DHS  CVE Guidance), which acknowledges that it is important for law  enforcement personnel to be appropriately trained in understanding and  detecting ideologically motivated criminal behavior and in working with  communities and local law enforcement to counter domestic violent  extremism.accurate, based on current intelligence, and include cultural competency  training. To this end, its goals are to help ensure that (1) trainers are  experts and well regarded; (2) training is sensitive to constitutional values;  (3) training facilitates further dialogue and learning; (4) training adheres to  government standards and efforts; and (5) training and objectives are  appropriately tailored, focused, and supported. The guidance provides  best practices for federal, state, and local officials organizing CVE,  cultural awareness, or counterterrorism training to adhere to in support of  these goals. Best practices include reviewing a prospective trainer’s  résumé; reviewing the training program to ensure that it uses examples to  demonstrate that terrorists and violent extremists vary in ethnicity, race,  gender, and religion; and reaching out to sponsors of existing government  training efforts for input.
The DHS CVE guidance states that training must be  Following the release of DHS’s CVE Guidance, FEMA issued an  information bulletin to its state, local, and private sector partners and  grantees to emphasize the importance of ensuring that all CVE-related  training is consistent with DHS and U.S. government policy.referenced the DHS CVE Guidance and stated, among other things, that  grant-funded training should avoid the use of hostile, stereotypical, or  factually inaccurate information about Muslims and Islam or any  community. The bulletin also emphasized the importance of community  engagement and interaction to promote communities as part of the  solution. According to FEMA officials, if a grantee were to provide CVE- related training and not follow the DHS CVE guidance, DHS may require  that the grantee repay any grant funds that were spent on the training.  However, several DHS grantees indicated that they would not necessarily  know when to apply the best practices for ensuring the quality of CVE- related training described in the informational bulletin. Specifically, of the  30 Homeland Security Grant Program training points of contact who  responded to our survey, 18 said that they were not at all clear or only  somewhat clear about when to apply the principles in the FEMA bulletin.  In addition, 20 said that topics that may be covered during CVE-related  training are not at all clear or only somewhat clear in the bulletin. As a  result, these grantees could have difficulty in determining when to apply  the principles. As previously discussed, the additional efforts DHS is  undertaking to educate state administrative agency officials on the  principal topics CVE-related training addresses could further enable the  officials to fund training that supports the CVE national strategy. These  survey results indicate that such educational efforts should help grantees  more readily identify topics that may be covered during CVE-related  training, and thus more appropriately apply DHS CVE-related training  quality assurance guidance.
DHS is also developing additional mechanisms to ensure the quality of  CVE-related training. Specifically, Counterterrorism Working Group  officials told us that in June 2012 DHS established a CVE-related training  Working Group within the department to develop a framework to (1)  ensure that training DHS components provide meets DHS and the U.S.  government’s CVE standards; (2) ensure that grantees using grant funds  for training utilize certified trainers; and (3) disseminate DHS training  through agency partners, such as the International Association of Chiefs  of Police. In July 2012, this working group proposed recommendations for  meeting these goals in a memorandum to the DHS Deputy  Counterterrorism Coordinator. For example, the group recommended that  the department establish and maintain a database of certified CVE  instructors and appoint a CVE program coordinator to oversee the  instructor vetting and training process. According to Counterterrorism  Working Group officials, DHS is working on plans to implement these  recommendations. As these recommendations were made recently and  DHS has just decided to implement them, it is too early to assess any  quality assurance impact they will have on CVE-related training.
DOJ also developed guidance applicable to all training, including CVE- related training, conducted or funded by DOJ to help ensure its quality.  DOJ formed a working group on training issues chaired by its Civil Rights  Division within the Attorney General’s Arab-Muslim Engagement Advisory  Group. The working group developed the DOJ training principles to  guide DOJ’s training and to ensure that all communities that DOJ serves  are respected. In March 2012, the Deputy Attorney General issued a  memorandum for DOJ heads of components and USAOs outlining  guiding principles to which all training that DOJ conducted or funded must  adhere. Specifically, it stated that (1) training must be consistent with the  U.S. Constitution and DOJ values; (2) the content of training and training  materials must be accurate, appropriately tailored, and focused; (3)  trainers must be well qualified in the subject area and skilled in presenting  it; (4) trainers must demonstrate the highest standards of professionalism;  and (5) training must meet department standards.
Also in March 2012, the FBI published The FBI’s Guiding Principles  Touchstone Document on Training. This document is intended to be  consistent with the March 2012 Deputy Attorney General guidance, but  elaborates on each training principle outlined in the document. The FBI’s  guidance states that training must (1) conform to constitutional principles  and adhere to the FBI’s core values; (2) be tailored to the intended  audience, focused to ensure message clarity, and supported with the  appropriate course materials; and (3) be reviewed, and trainers must be  knowledgeable of applicable subject material.
DOJ officials also told us that the department’s guiding principles are  meant to memorialize department training standards and values and are  the group’s first step for ongoing work to ensure the quality of future  counterterrorism and CVE-related training. Although developing these  principles marks an important first step, we were unable to assess the  extent to which they can help ensure the quality of CVE-related training  moving forward because the review is ongoing and DOJ officials are in  the process of planning additional efforts.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Providing high-quality and balanced CVE-related training is a difficult task  given the complexity and sensitivities surrounding the phenomenon of  violent extremism. However, misinformation about the threat and  dynamics of radicalization to violence can harm security efforts by  unnecessarily creating tensions with potential community partners. The  CVE national strategy implementation plan commits the federal  government, including DHS and DOJ, to supporting state and local  partners in their efforts to prevent violent extremism by providing CVE- related training. By identifying and communicating CVE-related training  topics, DOJ could better demonstrate the extent to which it is fulfilling  departmental CVE-related responsibilities as established in the  implementation plan for the CVE national strategy. In addition, by  proactively soliciting feedback from participants in informal CVE-related  training on a more consistent basis, FBI field offices and USAOs could  more effectively obtain information on the strengths and weaknesses of  their presentations and briefings, and thus better ensure their quality.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better enable DOJ to demonstrate the extent to which it is fulfilling its  CVE-related training responsibilities, we recommend that the Deputy  Attorney General identify principal topics that encompass CVE-related  training—including training that is directly related to CVE or that has  ancillary benefits for CVE—and communicate the topics to DOJ  components.
To obtain valuable information for determining the extent to which CVE- related programs are yielding the desired outcomes and complying with  the CVE national strategy, we recommend that the Deputy Attorney  General direct USAOs and the Director of the FBI’s Office of Public  Affairs direct FBI field offices to consider soliciting feedback more  consistently from participants in informal training, such as presentations  and briefings, that covers the type of information addressed in the CVE  national strategy.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS, DOJ,  ODNI, and DOD for their review and comment. We received written  comments from DHS and DOJ, which are reproduced in full in  appendixes V and VI, respectively.  DHS generally agreed with the  findings in its comments, and DOJ agreed with one of the  recommendations in this report, but disagreed with the other  recommendation. ODNI and DOD did not provide written comments on  the draft report. However, ODNI provided technical comments, as did  DHS and DOJ, which we incorporated throughout the report as  appropriate.
In its written comments, DHS noted that the report recognizes DHS’s  efforts to develop and improve the quality of CVE training and identified  additional efforts that the department is taking to improve communication  with its various CVE stakeholders and to implement the priorities outlined  in its framework for vetting CVE training. For example, DHS stated that it  will be hosting a CVE train-the-trainer workshop in September 2012, and  identifying trainers on its online CVE training portal who meet the  standards included in DHS’s training guidance and best practices. DHS  also stated that it remains committed to improving and expanding its  development of CVE resources and providing information about those  resources to state and local partners.
DOJ stated that it generally agrees with the recommendation that the  Deputy Attorney General and the Director of FBI’s Office of Public Affairs  direct USAOs and FBI field offices to consider soliciting feedback more  consistently from participants in informal training that covers the type of  information addressed in the CVE national strategy. The department  stated that it will develop a plan of action that describes how USAOs and  FBI field offices will implement this recommendation. Developing such a  plan should address the intent of our recommendations.
DOJ, however, disagreed with the recommendation that the Deputy  Attorney General identify principal topics that encompass CVE-related  training and communicate those topics to DOJ components. According to  DOJ, the CVE national strategy implementation plan assigns DOJ,  through its USAOs, primary responsibility for expanding the scope of  engagement and outreach events and initiatives that may have direct or  indirect benefits for CVE; however, the plan does not assign the  department primary responsibility for developing specific CVE-related  training. We recognize that DOJ is not the lead agency for the subsection  of the implementation plan related to the development of standardized  CVE training; however, the CVE implementation plan nonetheless  assigns DOJ as a lead or partner agency for other CVE training-related  activities. For example, the implementation plan states that the FBI will  lead the development of CVE-specific education modules and that DOJ  will colead (1) the expansion of briefings about violent extremism for state  and local law enforcement and government, and (2) the expansion of  briefing efforts to raise community awareness about the threat of  radicalization to violence. In addition, the implementation plan directs the  FBI to develop a CVE Coordination Office, and according to the FBI, that  office is in the process of developing CVE-related training. Given that  DOJ has been identified as a lead or partner agency for several training  related activities identified in the implementation plan, identifying CVE  training topics could help DOJ demonstrate the extent to which it is  fulfilling its responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. Identifying  CVE training topics could also help the FBI determine what issues it  should be addressing in the training that its CVE Coordination Office is  developing, and assist the department in being able to publicly account  for the CVE-related training that the department provides or funds.
DOJ also stated in its comments that the draft report recommended that  DOJ redefine its cultural competency training and community outreach  efforts (which may have benefits for CVE) as “CVE.” DOJ then stated that  redefining these efforts as such would be imprecise and potentially  counterproductive, and that labeling these efforts as CVE would suggest  that they are driven by security efforts, when they are not. To clarify, the  report does not include a recommendation that DOJ redefine or label its  cultural competency training and community outreach efforts as CVE.  Although we included these topics in the framework we used to identify  potentially CVE-related training for the purpose of this review, the  recommendation was that DOJ identify principal topics that encompass  CVE-related training and communicate such topics to DOJ components.  We defer to the department to determine which topics are appropriate to  cover in its CVE-related training.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees. We will also send copies to the Secretary of  Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and  the Director of National Intelligence. In addition, this report will be made  publicly available at no extra charge on the GAO Website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: This report answers the following questions:  1.  To what extent have the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and  the Department of Justice (DOJ) identified and communicated topics  that countering violent extremism-related (CVE-related) training  addresses to their components and state and local partners?  2.  What, if any, concerns have been raised by state and local partners  who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by  DHS and DOJ?  3.  What actions, if any, have DHS and DOJ taken to improve the quality  of CVE-related training?
To determine the extent to which DHS and DOJ identified and  communicated topics that should be addressed by CVE-related training,  we met with officials from both departments to discuss how they define  CVE-related training, which departmental training programs were relevant  to our review, and how the departments communicated principal CVE- related training topics to relevant components and state and local  partners. We then analyzed this information to assess the extent to which  the departments’ efforts allow them to demonstrate fulfillment of their  CVE-related training responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. We  also met with officials from the Department of Defense (DOD) and Office  of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) who possess knowledge  about CVE-related training and who are involved in interagency efforts  related to CVE. More specifically, we met with officials from the  components and offices listed in table 3.
To obtain additional views on CVE-related training provided or funded by  DHS or DOJ, we interviewed representatives from nine state and local  law enforcement agencies and law enforcement representative  organizations involved with federal CVE-related training efforts. They  included the Minneapolis Police Department, the Los Angeles Police  Department, the Las Vegas Sheriff’s Department, the Arkansas State  Police Program, the Dearborn Police Department, the National Sheriff’s  Association, the Major City Chief’s Association, the International  Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, and the National  Consortium for Advanced Policing. We selected these agencies and  organizations based on their involvement with CVE-related training efforts  and the extent to which they collaborate with DHS or DOJ on CVE-related  training. While the views of these entities do not represent the views of all  agencies and organizations involved in CVE-related training, these  entities were able to offer helpful perspectives for the purpose of this  review. We also interviewed individuals with expertise in CVE, such as  academic researchers who have published on CVE-related topics and  researchers from organizations that study CVE-related topics, to obtain  their views on topics CVE-related training should address and identify  potential training programs to include in our review. They included  individuals from the Georgetown University Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal  Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, the RAND Corporation, the  Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the International Centre for the  Study of Radicalisation, and the National Consortium for the Study of  Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. We selected these individuals  based on the depth of their experience with, and knowledge of, CVE; the  relevance of their publications; referrals from other practitioners; and to  develop a sample that represented various sectors (e.g., academic,  advocacy, etc.). They provided valuable insight even though the  perspectives they offered are not generalizable.
The state administrative agencies that we surveyed are responsible for managing DHS  grant awards to states and the District of Columbia that are eligible for CVE-related  training and ensuring that grant recipients comply with grant requirements. such as California and Texas, did not. As a result, the experiences of  state administrative agencies from some of the larger states may not be  captured in our survey results. Nevertheless, the survey results provide  insights into the level of clarity about DHS CVE-related guidance for other  grantees.
To obtain a better understanding of the departments’ CVE-related training  responsibilities, we requested information from DOJ and DHS on the  approximate number and type of participants that attended training we  determined was CVE-related and the estimated cost. We provide  additional details on how we classified training as CVE-related below. We  assessed the reliability of the training data provided by interviewing  agency officials familiar with the data to learn more about the processes  used to collect, record, and analyze the data. For example, we found that  several training providers collected information on the number and type of  participants through sign-in sheets. We used these data to approximate  the dollar amount spent by agencies on CVE-related training in appendix  III. As described above, we determined that the data were sufficiently  reliable for showing general trends in attendance and spending, but some  agencies either did not record participant data, and thus could not provide  them; did not record participant figures and provided estimates of  attendance based on the instructor’s recall; or recorded participant  figures, but not the participants’ places of employment, so they could not  specify how many of the attendees were from state and local versus  federal entities. We noted these instances in our report.
subsections: section_title: Identifying CVE-Related Training
paragraphs: During our initial interviews with DHS and DOJ, officials expressed  difficulty in responding to our request for CVE-related training materials,  in part because agency officials were not clear on which training should  be considered CVE-related. To facilitate our request for course materials  for CVE-related training, we developed a framework to classify training as  CVE-related based on our review and analysis of information from the  following sources: (1) federal strategies related to violent extremism, such  as Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United  States and its associated implementation plan;reports, or strategies that address CVE-related training topics such as  DHS’s CVE-related training Guidance and Best Practices; and (3)  perspectives provided by individuals with CVE expertise. Specifically, we  conducted a content analysis of our transcripts of interviews with experts  and CVE-related documents to determine the current understanding of  the content areas covered by CVE-related training and the knowledge  state and local officials should possess or principles they should  understand to effectively carry out CVE efforts. We then analyzed this  information to identify similar themes and principles across the sources  and grouped them together into three distinct content areas CVE-related  training likely addresses:   (2) DHS and DOJ plans,  1.  Radicalization addresses approaches that are based on research and  accurate information to understanding the threat radicalization poses,  how individuals may become radicalized, how individuals seek to  radicalize Americans (threat of violent extremist recruitment),  behaviors exhibited by radicalized individuals, or what works to  prevent radicalization that results in violence.  2.  Cultural competency seeks to enhance state and local law  enforcement’s understanding of culture or religion, and civil rights and  civil liberties, or their ability to distinguish, using information driven  and standardized approaches, between violent extremism and legal  behavior.  3.  Community engagement addresses ways to build effective community  partnerships, such as through outreach, and community capacity for  the purpose of, among other things, mitigating threats posed by  violent extremism.
We solicited feedback on this framework from DHS and DOJ. DHS  Counterterrorism Working Group officials generally agreed with the  content areas we identified, and we incorporated feedback the group  provided, as appropriate. DOJ officials stated that they view the  framework as reasonable for the purpose of our review. For this review,  we considered CVE-related training to include instruction, presentations,  briefings, or related outreach efforts conducted, sponsored, promoted, or  otherwise supported by DOJ, DHS, or a respective component, to help  state, local, or tribal entities related to the three aforementioned content  areas.
We asked DHS and DOJ to identify and provide all course materials for  any courses that they provided or funded during fiscal years 2010 and  2011 through grant programs for state and local entities, including law  enforcement officers and community members, assumed to be CVE- related based on GAO’s framework. We focused generally on training  provided in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 because “countering violent  extremism” is a relatively nascent term. In addition, we focused on  training provided to state and local entities because the CVE national  strategy emphasizes the importance of providing CVE-related training to  these entities. While the FBI identified its National Academy as providing  training that could be considered CVE-related, it did not identify any of its  other programs as germane to our review. However, complaint letters  raised concerns about FBI training that was CVE-related according to our  framework that was provided through two other FBI programs— the  Citizens’ Academy and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force. We  assessed some of the training provided through these programs and  determined the training to be CVE-related according to our framework. In  addition, the FBI’s internal review of counterterrorism training, which  included the FBI programs within the scope of our review, assessed the  training materials against criteria for CVE-related training, thereby  suggesting that these programs may have provided training that was  CVE-related. Accordingly, we requested course materials on these  programs, as well as the Community Relations Executive Seminar  Training Program, which is an abbreviated version of the Citizens’  Academy.
We received approximately 290 presentations, briefings, and course  materials from two components within DHS and four within DOJ. In some  cases, DHS and DOJ offices provided us only with course abstracts or  agendas instead of the full presentations or course materials because (1)  they contracted the training with an outside provider and did not retain all  of the associated training materials or (2) the training materials were  particularly voluminous and, on the basis of discussions with the offices,  we agreed that the course abstracts or agendas would enable us to  sufficiently determine the relevancy of the training to our review. In those  cases, we determined CVE-relevancy based on the agenda or abstract  alone. We reviewed these training materials to assess whether each of  the individual courses, presentations, briefings, and other training-related  activities undertaken or funded by DHS and DOJ agencies addressed  one or more of the three content areas described above. If they  addressed any of these content areas, we considered them CVE-related,  even if the primary focus of the materials was not CVE-related. To ensure  consistency in our analysis, two analysts independently reviewed the  materials for each training and recorded their assessment of whether the  training addressed each content area. Any discrepancies in the initial  determinations were then discussed and reconciled.
section_title: Identifying Concerns about CVE-Related Training
paragraphs: To determine what concerns, if any, participants raised about CVE- related training, we reviewed course evaluations completed by  participants of CVE-related training offered by DHS I&A, DHS Office for  Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, DOJ BJA, and the FBI, and identified  complaints or concerns about CVE-related training made formally in  writing. We limited our analysis to training that was provided or funded by  DHS or DOJ during fiscal years 2010 or 2011 and provided to a state or  local entity (e.g., police department, community group, or fusion center).  Two analysts independently reviewed 8,424 course evaluations from six  training programs to consistently determine which ones included  concerns or complaints. The analysts also assessed the nature of the  concerns and complaints and assigned each complaint to one of three  categories: (1) politically or culturally biased, (2) offensive, or (3)  inaccurate. Where there were discrepancies between the analysts, they  were resolved through supervisory review.
To identify formally submitted or documented complaints or concerns  participants expressed, we asked DHS and DOJ to identify those  submitted in writing to DHS or DOJ, or articulated to DHS or DOJ through  other means but subsequently documented by the agency, from fiscal  years 2010 through 2011. We also conducted keyword searches using  LexisNexis and Google to identify concerns that were raised by either  individuals or advocacy groups that were submitted in writing to DHS or  DOJ. In addition, we interviewed representatives, including leaders, of  select advocacy groups that raised concerns about CVE-related training  to identify what concerns and complaints, if any, they submitted in writing  to DHS or DOJ on behalf of training participants. The advocacy and civil  liberties organizations we interviewed included the American Civil  Liberties Union, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the  Council on American Islamic Relations, and the Muslim Public Affairs  Council. We selected these organizations based on their leadership in  raising concerns we identified (e.g., by virtue of being the primary  signatories) and upon the recommendation of other advocacy groups.  These interviews also enabled us to confirm or obtain additional views on  the formally documented complaints DHS or DOJ provided. Through  these approaches, we identified a total of six letters of complaint  regarding 18 alleged incidents of biased CVE and counterterrorism  training that DHS or DOJ provided or funded during fiscal years 2010 and  2011. Given that the scope of this review is limited to CVE-related training  provided to state and local officials and community members, and not  training that is exclusively provided to federal officials, we determined that  7 of the alleged incidents described in five of the letters were relevant to  this review. We also interviewed relevant DHS and DOJ officials to obtain  their perspectives on the concerns raised in the written complaints and  information on any actions agencies took in response to these incidents.
section_title: Identifying DHS and DOJ Efforts to Improve the Quality of CVE-Related Training
paragraphs: To address what actions, if any, DHS and DOJ have taken overall to  improve the quality of CVE-related training, we interviewed DHS and DOJ  officials responsible for providing or funding CVE-related training to  inquire about any current or pending guidance, whether documented or  undocumented, they adhere to when vetting training materials and  instructors and other actions they have taken to ensure the quality of  CVE-related training. We reviewed relevant DHS and DOJ documents  including recently released guidance and best practices for training that  DHS, DOJ, and the FBI developed. We also analyzed FBI and DOJ data  from training reviews and information on how DHS and DOJ review and  vet training curricula and instructors. Specifically, we analyzed the  counterterrorism training materials that the FBI determined were  inappropriate as a result of its internal review, which the FBI undertook to  identify and purge potentially objectionable training materials. This  analysis enabled us to better understand the review results with regard to  training materials that were CVE-related under our framework, and  provided context for the quality assurance steps FBI has taken in  response to the review. To focus our analysis on training materials  included in the FBI’s review that were CVE-related, one analyst assessed  which of these training materials were CVE-related, according to our  framework, and if the materials were CVE-related, the analyst entered the  FBI’s observations and additional data about that training into a data  collection form. A second analyst then reviewed these results. When  there was disagreement, the two reviewers discussed the material,  reached agreement, and modified the entries as necessary to ensure  concurrence regarding which of the training materials included in the  FBI’s review were germane to our review. The FBI considers the  methodology it used to conduct its internal review and our analysis of the  training materials that the FBI considered objectionable to be For Official  Use Only; therefore, we did not include that information in this report.
In addition, we conducted a site visit in San Diego, California, in January  2012, where DHS hosted a pilot of a CVE-related course under  development. During the site visit, we observed the pilot training, and  interviewed DHS officials who were sponsoring the training and local  agencies that had developed and delivered the course curriculum. On the  basis of the information we collected, we evaluated DHS’s adherence to  its own CVE-related training guidance. We also assessed DHS and DOJ  guidance and actions related to guidance provided by departmental  leadership, such as DOJ training guidance issued to its components.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2011 through October  2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: CVE-Related Training the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice Are Developing
paragraphs: DHS is currently working with its components and relevant state and local  entities to develop and implement CVE-focused training for state and  local law enforcement officers, state police academy recruits, correctional  facility officers, and new federal law enforcement officers. DHS’s Principal  Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator, who heads the department’s CVE  efforts, has testified that developing CVE-related training is a priority for  the department because inappropriate or inaccurate training undermines  community partnerships and negatively affects efforts of law enforcement  to identify legitimate behaviors and indicators of violent extremism. DHS  has determined that CVE-related training should address: violent  extremism (e.g., the threat it poses), cultural demystification (e.g.,  education on culture and religion), community partnerships (e.g., how to  build them), and community policing efforts (e.g., how to apply community  policing efforts to CVE). Accordingly, the DHS Counterterrorism Working  Group, which is overseen by the Principal Deputy Counterterrorism  Coordinator, is developing training that addresses these topics. These  trainings include the following:
A continuing education CVE curriculum for frontline and executive  state and local law enforcement that DHS is developing with the Los  Angeles Police Department, Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC),  and the National Consortium for Advanced Policing (NCAP). DHS hosted a first pilot for this course in San Diego, California, in January  2012 that 45 state and local law enforcement officials attended. The  pilot consisted of 3 days of classroom instruction and student  participation activities. According to Counterterrorism Working Group  officials, DHS held a second pilot in the National Capital Region in  July 2012, and a third pilot in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in August 2012.  In July 2012, DHS also presented the curriculum at a CVE conference  it hosted in Washington, D.C., and according to Counterterrorism  Working Group officials, the department is working to enhance the  curriculum based on feedback that conference attendees provided.  MCC has passed a motion to adopt the curriculum, which DHS aims  to implement in collaboration with state and local partners in 2013.
CVE-related training modules for state police academies, which DHS  is developing in collaboration with the International Association of  Chiefs of Police (IACP). These training modules will be 1 to 2 hours  in length, and are intended for police recruits. DHS plans for police  academies to introduce the modules into their training and to make  them available online for police recruits by the end of 2012.
A CVE awareness training for correctional facility, probation, and  patrol officers at the state and local levels that DHS is working to  develop in collaboration with the Bureau of Prisons, the FBI National  Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the Interagency Threat Assessment  Coordination Group. Counterterrorism Working Group officials reported that DHS completed pilots for this training in Maryland in  March 2012 and in California in July 2012. FEMA is also developing a  curriculum for rural correctional facility management.
Further, according to DHS officials, the Federal Law Enforcement  Training Center has finalized a CVE-related training course that it  integrated into its existing training for recruits. In February 2012, DHS  hosted a symposium on the curriculum, and as of July 2012, FLETC had  taught the curriculum to about 190 students. In addition, according to  DHS officials, FLETC is also in the process of integrating aspects of the  DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberty’s cultural competency  training, which is described in detail in appendix III, into all new CVE  curriculum and training efforts.
Within DOJ, the FBI is also developing CVE-related training. The CVE  national strategy implementation plan tasks FBI with establishing a CVE  Coordination Office that will, as part of its activities, coordinate with the  National Task Force on CVE-specific education and awareness  modules. According to FBI officials, the FBI established a CVE office in  January 2012, and as of August 2012, had assigned staff to the office and  was in the process of developing CVE-related training modules. In  particular, the CVE Office developed and presented a CVE-related  training module to FBI public affairs specialists and community outreach  coordinators and specialists in FBI field offices from April through August,  2012, according to FBI officials. FBI officials also reported that the CVE  Office is collaborating with the FBI Counterterrorism Division to develop a  CVE-related training module for FBI special agents and mid- and senior- level managers that it plans to complete in December 2012 and  implement in early 2013.
section_title: Appendix III: CVE-Related Training Provided or Funded during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011
paragraphs: DOJ and DHS components provided training that was CVE-related  according to our framework to more than 28,000 state and local entities,  including law enforcement officials, fusion center personnel, and  community members, during fiscal years 2010 and 2011. That is, DOJ  and DHS components provided training, including courses, briefings,  presentations, and workshops, that addressed one or more of the three  CVE-related training topical areas we identified: (1) the phenomenon of  violent extremism and the threat posed by radicalization that leads to  violence; (2) cultural competency and how to distinguish between criminal  and constitutionally protected cultural and religious behaviors; and (3)  how to build effective community partnerships to, among other things,  mitigate threats posed by violent extremism. The majority of these  trainings did not have the term “CVE” in their titles, a fact that DOJ and  DHS officials attributed to CVE being a relatively new concept, or that the  trainings had been developed for purposes other than CVE. Nonetheless,  they provided some instruction on at least one of the three CVE-related  training topics we identified, and thus are considered CVE-related for the  purpose of this review. Although the CVE-related trainings that DOJ and  DHS provided collectively addressed all three CVE-related training topics,  the trainings more frequently addressed the phenomenon of violent  extremism and cultural competency than community engagement. The  specific topics addressed by each training DOJ and DHS components  provided during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 are described in the tables  that follow. In addition, the DOJ grant-funded State and Local Anti- Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program provided CVE-related training to  approximately 11,000 state and local law enforcement officials.
subsections: section_title: CVE-Related Training That DOJ Components Provided
paragraphs: Within DOJ, the FBI, CRS, and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAO) provided  CVE-related training directly to state and local entities during fiscal years  2010 and 2011. In total, these entities provided CVE-related training to  more than 15,000 state and local law enforcement and community  members. More specifically, the FBI National Academy, the FBI National  Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) Program, select FBI field offices,  CRS, and about half of USAOs (48 of 93 offices) provided CVE-related  training to law enforcement. In addition, the FBI’s Citizens’ Academy and  Community Relations Executive Seminar Training (CREST) outreach  programs provided CVE-related training to community members. Tables  4, 5, and 6 provide more detailed information on these programs and  trainings.
Although we determined that CRS provided CVE-related training  according to our framework, CRS officials emphasized that the service’s  mission does not include any national security, counterterrorism, or CVE- related training efforts. CRS works with communities to help address  tension associated with allegations of discrimination on the basis of race,  color, or national origin. CRS also works with communities to develop  strategies to prevent and respond more effectively to alleged violent hate  crimes on the basis of race, color, national origin, gender, gender identity,  sexual orientation, religion, or disability. According to CRS officials,  through its work preventing hate crimes, CRS helps develop relationships  among Arab, Muslim, and Sikh communities who may be targeted for  hate violence by violent extremists, including supremacists, and other  community members, as well as local government and law enforcement  officials. As a result, CRS does not conduct activities or programs with the  express goal of CVE, but recognizes that its ability to help promote  dialogue and develop strong relationships to create a sense of inclusion  in communities may have ancillary CVE benefits in preventing violent  extremism.
Within DHS, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Institute and I&A  provided CVE-related training to approximately 3,410 state and local  intelligence and law enforcement officials during fiscal years 2010 and  2011. This training consisted of two classroom-based courses that the  Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Institute provided on about 40  occasions; one CVE-focused workshop that the I&A State and Local  Program Office hosted; and 17 briefings that the I&A Homegrown Violent  Extremism Branch (HVEB) provided in coordination with the FBI and  NCTC at fusion centers and fusion center conferences. Table 7 provides  more detailed information on each of these trainings.
DOJ and DHS also administered four grant programs during fiscal years  2010 and 2011 that provided funding for which CVE-related training was  an eligible expense: (1) the DOJ Community Policing Development (CPD)  Program, (2) the DOJ Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant  (JAG) Program, (3) the DHS Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP),  and (4) the DOJ SLATT Program. We reviewed grant documentation for  CPD grant projects that DOJ identified as potentially CVE-related and  determined that they were not used to pay for training that was CVE- related according to our framework. Information DHS and DOJ collect on  grant projects funded through the HSGP and JAG programs suggests  that minimal, if any, funds from these programs were used for CVE- related training purposes; however, the level of detail in the information  the departments collect from HSGP and JAG grantees is not sufficient to  reliably and conclusively make this determination. In fiscal years 2010  and 2011, SLATT provided CVE-related training to approximately 11,000  state and local officials. Additional details regarding this training are  provided in table 8.
section_title: Appendix IV: Types of Concerns Raised about DHS and DOJ CVE-Related Training
paragraphs: Table 9 presents a summary of the 77 state and local participant  concerns that we identified during our review of course evaluation forms  that DHS and DOJ provided to us.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Justice
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Kristy N. Brown, Assistant  Director, and Taylor Matheson, Analyst-In-Charge, managed this  assignment. Melissa Bogar and Lerone Reid made significant  contributions to this report. Gustavo Crosetto, Pamela Davidson, Richard,  Eiserman, Eric Hauswirth, Thomas Lombardi, Linda Miller, Jan  Montgomery, and Anthony Pordes also provided valuable assistance.