U.S. Asylum System: Significant Variation Existed in Asylum Outcomes across Immigration Courts and Judges
Published: 2008-09-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Each year, tens of thousands of people who have been persecuted or fear persecution in their home countries apply for asylum in the United States. Immigration judges (IJ) from the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) decide whether to grant or deny asylum to aliens in removal proceedings. Those denied asylum may appeal their case to EOIR's Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). GAO was asked to assess the variability of IJ rulings, and the effects of policy changes related to appeals and claims. This report addresses: (1) factors affecting variability in asylum outcomes; (2) EOIR actions to assist applicants and IJs; (3) effects associated with procedural changes at the BIA; and (4) effects of the requirement that asylum seekers apply within 1 year of entering the country. GAO analyzed DOJ asylum data for fiscal years 1995 through mid-2007, visited 5 immigration courts in 3 cities, including those with 3 of the top 4 asylum caseloads; observed asylum hearings; and interviewed key officials. Results of the visits provided additional information but were not projectable.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In the 19 immigration courts that handled almost 90 percent of asylum cases from October 1994 through April 2007, nine factors affected variability in asylum outcomes: (1) filed affirmatively (originally with DHS at his/her own initiative) or defensively (with DOJ, if in removal proceedings); (2) applicant's nationality; (3) time period of the asylum decision; (4) representation; (5) applied within 1 year of entry to the United States; (6) claimed dependents on the application; (7) had ever been detained (defensive cases only); (8) gender of the immigration judge and (9) length of experience as an immigration judge. After statistically controlling for these factors, disparities across immigration courts and judges existed. For example, affirmative applicants in San Francisco were still 12 times more likely than those in Atlanta to be granted asylum. Further, in 14 of 19 immigration courts for affirmative cases, and 13 of 19 for defensive cases, applicants were at least 4 times more likely to be granted asylum if their cases were decided by the judge with the highest versus the lowest likelihood of granting asylum in that court. EOIR expanded its programs designed to assist applicants with obtaining representation and has attempted to improve the capabilities of some IJs. EOIR has conducted two grant rate studies and was using information on IJs with unusually high or low grant rates, together with other indicators of IJ performance, to identify IJs who might benefit from additional training and supervision. However, EOIR lacked the expertise to statistically control for factors that could affect asylum outcomes, and this limited the completeness, accuracy, and usefulness of grant rate information. Without such information, to be used in conjunction with other performance indicators, EOIR's ability to identify IJs who may need additional training and supervision was hindered. EOIR assigned some IJ supervisors to field locations to improve oversight of immigration courts, but EOIR has not determined how many supervisors it needs to effectively supervise IJs and has not provided supervisors with guidance on how to carry out their supervisory role. Following streamlining (procedural changes) at the BIA in March 2002, BIA's appeals backlog decreased, as did the number of decisions favoring asylum seekers. Such decisions were more than 50 percent lower in the 4 years after streamlining compared to 4 years prior. The authority to affirm the IJ's' decisions without writing an opinion was used in 44 percent of BIA's asylum decisions. In June 2008, EOIR proposed regulatory changes to the streamlining rules, but it is too soon to tell how they will affect appeals outcomes. Data limitations prevented GAO from determining the (1) effect of the 1-year rule on fraudulent applications and denials and (2) resources adjudicators have spent addressing related issues. EOIR lacked measures of fraud, data on whether the 1-year rule was the basis for asylum denials, and records of time spent addressing such issues. Congress would need to direct EOIR to develop a cost-effective method of collecting data to determine the effect of the rule.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Globally, the total number of refugees reached an estimated 11.4 million  people at the end of 2007, of whom tens of thousands from over 100  countries came to the United States to apply for asylum. U.S. immigration  law provides that non-citizens who are in this country—regardless of  whether they entered legally or illegally—may be granted humanitarian  protection in the form of asylum if they demonstrate that they cannot  return to their home country because they have a well-founded fear of  persecution.
Those who seek to apply for asylum generally go through an affirmative or  defensive asylum process. Affirmative applications are voluntarily initiated  by the applicants themselves, and their cases are reviewed by an asylum  officer from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Affirmative  applicants generally receive either a grant, a notice of intent to deny, or, if  they do not have lawful immigration status, a referral to immigration court  for removal proceedings and a second review of their claim. Defensive  applications are filed by applicants against whom removal proceedings  have been initiated, and their cases are presented to an immigration judge  from the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration  Review (EOIR). The accuracy of an asylum decision is critical because of  the decision’s potential impact on the safety of the asylum seeker and the  security of our nation. An incorrect denial may result in an applicant  being returned to a country where he or she had been persecuted or where  future persecution might occur. At the other extreme, an incorrect  approval of an asylum application may allow a terrorist to remain in the  United States, a concern that was heightened by the attacks of September  11, 2001.
Given the potential consequences of asylum decisions, it is important to  ensure that the asylum system is not misused and that asylum decisions  are being made consistently and fairly. Among other things, the REAL ID  Act of 2005 was a legislative effort to provide consistent standards for  adjudicating asylum applications and to limit fraud. Several recently  published reports have documented the existence of wide disparities in  asylum decisions within and across particular asylum offices and  immigration courts for cases brought by applicants from the same  nationalities and during the same general time periods. These reports  have raised concerns that adjudicators may not be evaluating asylum  claims in a consistent or fair manner.
Concerns have also been raised by Congress and immigration advocates  about the effects of various policy changes intended to expedite asylum  appeals and reduce fraudulent asylum claims. In 2002, DOJ attempted to  address a large backlog of asylum appeals at EOIR’s Board of Immigration  Appeals (BIA) by streamlining certain appeals procedures with the goal of  improving timeliness and efficiency. This has prompted questions about  whether streamlined procedures have affected the ability of applicants  appealing immigration judges’ decisions to get a fair hearing and to obtain  a well-reasoned opinion from the BIA. Further, the Illegal Immigration  Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 included a provision  requiring asylum seekers to apply within the first year of entering the  country. While the 1 year requirement was intended to discourage asylum  fraud, Congress and other stakeholders have raised questions about  whether the resources expended on adjudicating the rule outweigh its  effectiveness in deterring fraud, and about the numbers of people who  were persecuted or tortured who may be denied the benefits of asylum  because of the rule. In response to your interest in these issues, this  report addresses the following objectives:    What factors have affected variability in asylum outcomes in EOIR’s  immigration courts?
What actions has EOIR taken to assist applicants in obtaining  representation and immigration judges in rendering asylum decisions,  and how, if at all, could they be improved?
What changes in asylum backlogs and outcomes occurred following the  streamlining of appeals procedures at the BIA?
What information exists on the effects of the 1-year rule on reducing  fraudulent asylum applications and preventing applicants from being  granted asylum, and what resources have been expended in  adjudicating it?
To address the first objective, we analyzed data from EOIR on all  decisions rendered by immigration judges from October 1, 1994, through  April 30, 2007, that involved asylum seekers from the 20 countries that  produced the most asylum cases and the 19 immigration courts that  handled the largest numbers of asylum cases. Each of the 20 countries and  19 immigration courts contributed a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800  defensive asylum cases to our analyses. The combination of countries and  immigration courts yielded more than 198,000 cases for our analyses and  constituted 66 percent of all asylum cases decided during the 12 ½ year  period. We used EOIR’s case management database to identify  immigration court proceedings where an immigration judge had made a  decision to grant or deny an applicant’s asylum claim. We statistically  controlled for the effects of a number of asylum applicant and immigration  judge characteristics that were potentially related to asylum outcomes in  order to determine whether the likelihood that an immigration judge  would grant or deny an asylum application could be statistically attributed  to those characteristics. In examining potential differences in asylum  outcomes across immigration courts, we analyzed the following seven  factors available in the EOIR immigration court proceedings data: (1) filed  affirmatively or defensively; (2) the nationality of the applicant; (3) the  time period in which the asylum decision was made; (4) whether the  applicant had representation; (5) filed the application within 1 year of  entry to the United States; (6) claimed dependents on the asylum  application; and (7) had ever been detained (defensive cases only).  In  examining potential differences in asylum decisions across immigration  judges, we analyzed an additional nine factors available from EOIR  immigration court proceedings and biographical data, and the Office of  Personnel Management’s Central Personnel Data File. These included  immigration judges’ (1) age, (2) caseload size, (3) gender, (4) length of  experience as an immigration judge, (5) race/ethnicity, (6) veteran status,  (7) prior government immigration experience, (8) prior experience doing  immigration work for a nonprofit organization, and (9) the presidential   administration under which the judges were appointed. Our analyses did  not control for factors related to the merits of asylum claims because such  data were not available. Further, our findings on asylum outcomes cannot  be generalized beyond the 20 countries and 19 immigration courts  included in our analysis. We assessed the reliability of the data used in our  analyses through electronic testing, analyzing related database  documentation, and working with agency officials to reconcile  discrepancies between the data and documentation that we received. We  found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We also interviewed officials from EOIR’s Office of the Chief Immigration  Judge and visited five immigration courts in three cities containing three  of the four immigration courts with the highest asylum caseloads. At these  immigration courts, we interviewed immigration judges with varying  asylum grant rates, court administrators, DHS trial attorneys with varying  levels of experience handling cases in the immigration courts, members of  the private bar who represented asylum applicants in immigration court,  and immigration advocates and pro bono legal providers. We also  observed proceedings at each immigration court, including hearings on  asylum cases, to enhance our understanding of the role of immigration  judges. Because we selected nonprobability samples of immigration courts  and stakeholders associated with these immigration courts, the  information we obtained at these locations may not be generalized either  within the immigration courts or to all immigration courts nationwide.  However, the information we obtained at these locations provided us with  a perspective on circumstances associated with asylum proceedings.
For the second objective, we reviewed the Attorney General’s 2006  reforms directed to the immigration courts and information from EOIR  regarding its implementation of the reforms. Regarding initiatives designed  to assist applicants, we reviewed agency guidance on facilitating pro bono  programs and evaluation reports on EOIR’s Legal Orientation and BIA’s  pro bono programs. We also interviewed the EOIR official responsible for  coordinating these programs. Regarding actions to assist immigration  judges in adjudicating asylum cases, we reviewed agency guidance  regarding processing asylum cases and preparing decisions and orders,  training materials for immigration judges, and the legal examination  administered to new immigration judges. We also interviewed EOIR’s  Assistant Chief Immigration Judges (ACIJ) for Conduct and  Professionalism and for Training, and cognizant officials knowledgeable  about EOIR’s studies of immigration judge grant rates.
For the third objective, regarding changes in the asylum backlog and  asylum outcomes following the streamlining of adjudication procedures at  the BIA, we obtained and analyzed data from EOIR on the size of the  pending asylum appeals caseload at the BIA for fiscal years 1995 through  2007, and the results of the BIA’s decisions on appeals from immigration  judge decisions for the period from October 1, 1997, through September  30, 2006. We assessed the reliability of the data used in our analyses by  performing electronic testing, analyzing related database documentation,  and working with agency officials to reconcile any discrepancies in the  data and found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report. We did not use EOIR data on the number of board members at the  BIA who were involved in deciding asylum appeals prior to fiscal year  2004 because of concerns regarding the reliability of the field in those  years. We also interviewed federal circuit court judges in the two circuits  handling the largest number of petitions for review of BIA decisions (the  2nd and 9th Circuits), and officials in DOJ’s Office of Immigration  Litigation (OIL) and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of  New York who defend the Department of Justice in appeals of BIA  decisions to the federal courts.
Regarding the fourth objective, we reviewed the applicable law and  regulations and discussed their impact on agency resources and applicants  with the same immigration judges, attorneys, and members of advocacy  groups whom we had selected to interview regarding our first objective.  We also added questions about immigration judges’ views of the 1-year  rule to a Web-based survey of immigration judges that was being  conducted as part of another GAO review, and obtained a 77 percent  response rate.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2005 through  September 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I  contains more details about our data analysis, survey, and site visit  methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Asylum is a form of humanitarian protection that provides refuge for  individuals who are unable or unwilling to return to their home countries  because they were persecuted or have a well-founded fear of persecution  on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social  group, or political opinion. It is an immigration benefit that enables such  individuals to remain in the United States and apply for lawful permanent  residence 1 year after receiving the grant of asylum. Responsibility for  adjudicating asylum applications is shared between U.S. Citizen and  Immigration Services (USCIS) in DHS and EOIR in DOJ. Asylum officers in  8 USCIS Asylum Offices and immigration judges in 54 immigration courts  within EOIR’s Office of the Chief Immigration Judge adjudicate asylum  and other cases. In fiscal year 2008, the Asylum Division received about  $61 million from USCIS fee-based funding and EOIR received about $238  million from congressional appropriations for its entire operation, of  which asylum adjudications are part.
There are two main avenues for applying for asylum in the United States:  Affirmative asylum process: DHS’s asylum adjudication process  involves affirmative asylum claims—that is, claims that are made at  the initiative of aliens who are in the country either legally or  illegally and who file directly with USCIS. Asylum officers are to  conduct non-adversarial interviews in which they verify the  applicant’s identity, determine whether the applicant is eligible for  asylum, and evaluate the credibility of the applicant’s asylum  claim. The asylum officer may (1) grant asylum, (2) deny asylum to  applicants who are in legal status and issue a Notice of Intent to  Deny, or (3) refer applicants not in legal status to the immigration  court for a de novo review of their claim by an immigration judge.  Upon referral to the immigration court, the applicant is placed in  removal proceedings.
Defensive asylum process: Defensive claims are those that are first  filed after removal proceedings have been initiated against an alien.  An alien making a defensive claim may have been placed in  removal proceedings after having been stopped at the border  without proper documentation, identified as being in the United  States illegally, or identified as deportable on one or more grounds,  such as certain kinds of criminal convictions.
Immigration judges hear affirmative asylum claims referred to them by  asylum officers, as well as defensive claims first raised before them.  Adjudication of asylum claims in immigration court is adversarial in that  aliens appear before EOIR immigration judges to defend themselves from  removal from the United States. Immigration judges hear testimony given  during direct and cross-examinations and review the evidence submitted.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Assistant Chief Counsels  (also known as ICE trial attorneys) represent DHS in these proceedings.  Figure 1 illustrates the steps involved in the immigration proceedings  process for affirmative and defensive claims.
As shown in figure 1, EOIR’s asylum process generally consists of the  following steps. The applicant is to appear before an immigration judge for  an initial, or master calendar, hearing, during which the immigration judge  is to, among other things, (a) ensure that the applicant understands the  contents of the charging document, or Notice to Appear, (b) provide the  applicant with information on available free of charge or low-cost legal  representation in the area, and (c) schedule a subsequent date to hear the  merits of the asylum claim and requests for other alternative forms of  relief from persecution or torture, including withholding of removal and  protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Prior to the  merits hearing, both the ICE trial attorney and the applicant or his or her  representative must submit applications, exhibits, motions, a witness list,  and criminal history to the immigration court. At the merits hearing, where  EOIR is to provide interpreters when necessary, parties present the case  before the immigration judge by generally making opening statements,  presenting witnesses who are subject to cross examination and evidence  to the immigration judge, and making closing statements. The immigration  judge may participate in the questioning of the applicant and other  witnesses. At the end of the hearing, the immigration judge generally  issues an oral decision that should include a statement of facts that were  found to be true, the substantive law and the application of the law to the  facts, what factors were considered, and what weight was given to the  evidence presented (including the credibility of witnesses).
EOIR’s asylum adjudication process can result in one of the following  outcomes for applicants and their qualifying dependents:  Grant of asylum: Immigration judges may grant asylum to  applicants, enabling them to remain in the United States  indefinitely, unless DOJ terminates asylum. Asylees are eligible to  apply for certain benefits, such as an Employment Authorization  Document, a Social Security card, medical and employment  assistance, lawful permanent residence, and ultimately citizenship.  Within 2 years of being granted asylum, asylees can also petition  for a spouse or child to obtain derivative asylum status.
Withholding of removal prohibits removal if the applicant’s life or freedom would be  threatened because of persecution. Generally, individuals apply for asylum and withholding  of removal at the same time, but only the immigration judge can grant withholding of  removal. The applicant must demonstrate that it is “more likely than not” that he or she  would be persecuted if returned to the country of origin, a higher standard than the  “reasonable possibility” standard for asylum. Protection under regulations implementing  the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading  Treatment or Punishment (CAT) is another form of relief for individuals fearing torture. As  with withholding of removal based on persecution, the applicant must establish that it is  “more likely than not” that he or she would be tortured if returned to the country of origin.
Denial of asylum: Immigration judges may deny asylum to  applicants and order them to be removed from the United States  unless they qualify for another form of relief, s such as withholding  or deferral of removal. However, these other forms of relief do not  include all of the benefits of asylum, such as the ability to apply for  permanent resident status and bring family members to the United  States. In some cases, in lieu of an order of removal, immigration  judges may grant voluntary departure.
Case closure: Immigration judges may close a case without making  a decision on the asylum application if, for example, applicants  request moving their case from one immigration court to another  or withdraw or abandon their application for asylum .
If either the applicant or ICE disagrees with the immigration judge’s  decision, either party may appeal the decision to the BIA within 30 days.  The BIA is the highest administrative adjudicatory body for immigration  decisions within DOJ, and its members hear appeals of decisions rendered  by immigration judges and by DHS District Directors in a wide variety of  proceedings. If the BIA’s decision is adverse to the applicant, he or she  may, within 30 days of the decision, file a petition for review of the  decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals with jurisdiction over the  immigration court in which the decision was made.
subsections: section_title: EOIR’s Asylum Caseload and Staffing
paragraphs: Voluntary departure allows otherwise removable aliens to depart the United States at  their own expense. They may be barred from reentering the United States for up to 10 years  and be subject to civil and criminal penalties if they fail to depart or reenter without proper  authorization.
Generally, the BIA decides appeals by reviewing the record and documents submitted by  the parties, as opposed to conducting courtroom proceedings.
If DHS disagrees with BIA’s ruling, in rare instances, the case may be referred to the  Attorney General for review.
2002, to 251 in fiscal year 2007. During fiscal years 2002 through 2007, the  BIA received 217,162 appeals of immigration judge decisions, of which 64  percent were appeals by applicants or by DHS in cases where an asylum  application had been filed with the immigration court.
section_title: Hiring of Immigration Judges
paragraphs: According to EOIR, as of May 2008 there were 216 immigration judges on board in the 54  immigration courts, 13 judges who had been hired and were undergoing training, and 19  judges who were at various stages of the background investigation, interview and selection  processes.   5 C.F.R. § 6.3(a) allows the head of an agency to fill excepted service positions by  appointment of persons without civil service eligibility or competitive status. Schedule A  positions are “positions other than those of a confidential or policy determining character”  and are considered career positions. The authority to appoint an immigration judge is  vested in the Attorney General pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4).
For direct appointments, the applicants are referred to EOIR from the deputy attorney  general, who exercises the attorney general’s appointment authority. The Office of the  Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ) confirms the qualifications, and usually interviews the  applicant.
The applicant must have a law degree and be duly licensed and authorized to practice  law as an attorney under the laws of a state, territory, or the District of Columbia: be a  United States Citizen; and have a minimum of 7 years relevant post-bar admission legal  experience at the time the application is submitted, with 1 year experience equivalent to  the GS-15 level in the federal service. According to EOIR, DOJ looks for experience in at  least three of the following areas: substantial litigation experience, preferably in a high- volume context; knowledge of immigration laws and procedure; experience handling  complex legal issues; experience conducting administrative hearings; or knowledge of  judicial practices and procedures.
According to EOIR, from October 1993 through October 2007, three sitting  Attorneys General directly appointed 26 immigration judges—19 were  directly appointed by Alberto Gonzales, 4 by John Ashcroft, and 3 by Janet  Reno. These three Attorneys General also appointed 181 immigration  judges pursuant to an open announcement in which applicants competed  for a vacant immigration judge position. An additional eight EOIR  personnel who were not originally hired as immigration judges were  identified by EOIR to fill immigration judge vacancies on EOIR’s  recommendation.
section_title: Immigration Judge Training
paragraphs: According to EOIR, since 1997, training for newly hired immigration  judges has included attendance at a weeklong basic training session at the  National Judicial College (NJC). The NJC training has included courses on  immigration court procedure, immigration law, ethics, caseload  management, and stress management. The training is delivered in a  workshop format, and incorporates lecture instruction, small group  exercises, and immigration court hearing demonstrations. In addition to  this training, immigration judges complete 2 weeks of observations in their  home immigration court and 2 weeks of observations and holding hearings  in a training immigration court. According to EOIR, new immigration  judges are also assigned mentors in both their home and observation  immigration courts to guide their learning during the training. They are to  remain their mentors throughout the probationary period. As of December  31, 2006, all newly appointed immigration judges have been required to  pass an examination testing familiarity with key principles of immigration  law and complete a set of mock-hearing and oral decision exercises before  beginning to adjudicate matters.
For both new and veteran immigration judges, EOIR has convened an  annual training conference, which includes lectures and presentations  covering topics such as immigration law and procedure, ethics, religious  freedom, disparities in asylum adjudications, and forensic analysis.  Because of budget constraints, a virtual conference that included recorded  presentations was offered in place of the in-person conference in fiscal  years 2004, 2005, and 2008.
Additionally, according to EOIR, immigration judges have access to a  variety of reference tools such as the Immigration Judge Benchbook,  which includes information on substantive law, sample decisions, and  forms; and EOIR’s virtual law library, which has current publications and  reference documents on immigration law, immigration procedure,  international law, and country conditions and provides case summaries  distributed electronically on a weekly basis. In October 2007, EOIR  launched the Immigration Law Advisor that provides a monthly analysis of  statutory, regulatory, and case law developments.
section_title: Free Legal Services Available to Aliens in Removal Proceedings
paragraphs: Under U.S. immigration law, aliens in removal proceedings may be  represented by an attorney at no expense to the government. Aliens must  either find and pay for counsel or secure free representation. Since April  2003, EOIR has administered the Legal Orientation Program (LOP), a  court-based legal education program for detained non-citizens in  immigration court proceedings.
The LOP seeks to educate detained persons in removal proceedings so  they can make more informed decisions, thus increasing efficiencies in the  immigration court and detention processes. The program offers individual  and group orientation sessions; self-help workshops, and referrals to pro  bono attorneys. In fiscal year 2008, $3.8 million was authorized for the  program, and LOP presentations were offered at 12 sites. In May 2008, the  Vera Institute of Justice reported that participation in the LOP was  associated with faster immigration court processing times for aliens who  were detained and more favorable case outcomes for aliens who  represented themselves in removal hearings.
EOIR’s BIA Pro Bono Project assists several nongovernment organizations  in their efforts to link volunteer legal representatives nationwide with  aliens, most of whom are detained, who have immigration cases on appeal  to the BIA and cannot afford legal representation. The project seeks to  remove traditional obstacles private attorneys face in identifying, locating,  and communicating with unrepresented aliens by providing EOIR case  tracking and summary information to facilitate the initial contact.
8 U.S.C. § 1362.
Nina Siulc, Zhifen Cheng, Arnold Song and Olga Byrne, Vera Institute of Justice, Legal  Orientation Program Evaluation and Performance Outcome Measurement Report, Phase  II, a report prepared at the request of the Department of Justice, Executive Office for  Immigration Review, May 2008. The evaluation combined statistical analysis of  administrative data with interviews with LOP stakeholders.
EOIR also maintains a list of organizations and attorneys deemed qualified  to provide free legal services to indigent individuals. EOIR is required by  regulation to update the list not less than quarterly and to provide the list  to all aliens in immigration proceedings.
section_title: BIA Procedures were Streamlined to Address an Increasing Backlog of Appeals
paragraphs: Historically, with a few exceptions, the BIA adjudicated its appeals in  panels of three BIA members, which generally issued full written decisions  explaining the order in each case. Because of an increasing number of  appeals filed with the BIA and an increasing backlog of pending cases,  DOJ began in 1999 to implement procedural changes at the BIA to better  manage its docket. These regulatory changes, referred to as “streamlining”  or “restructuring,” occurred in phases. Changes starting in October 1999  and continuing through February 2002 authorized single Board members  to affirm an immigration judge’s decision (in certain categories of cases  other than asylum appeals) without writing an opinion (referred to as  “affirmances without opinion,” or AWO orders). On March 15, 2002, the  Chairman of the BIA authorized cases involving appeals of asylum cases,  withholding, and CAT applications to be decided by single members using  affirmances without opinion (AWO). Until then, these matters had been  handled by panels of three BIA members, and the panels had issued full  written decisions explaining their reasoning. The Attorney General issued  a final rule on August 26, 2002, that codified these changes in regulation  and made other changes to BIA’s structure and procedures. For all cases  before the BIA, including asylum cases, the rule made single member  decisions the default procedure.
64 Fed. Reg. 56,135 (Oct. 18, 1999). An AWO decision contains two sentences prescribed  by regulation, without any additional language or explanation about the reasons for the  affirmance. The sentences state, “the Board affirms, without opinion, the decision below.  The decision below is, therefore, the final agency determination.”   67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002). The rule became effective on September 25, 2002.
BIA had grown too large and unwieldy to reach consensus on individual  cases and resolve complex legal questions effectively.
According to DOJ, the regulation was intended, at least in part, to improve  the timeliness and efficiency of BIA’s review. Specifically, the Attorney  General stressed four objectives: (1) eliminate the current backlog of  pending cases, (2) eliminate unwarranted delays in the adjudication of  administrative appeals, (3) utilize BIA resources more efficiently, and (4)  allow more resources for difficult or controversial cases that may warrant  the issuance of precedent decisions.
section_title: Asylum Applicants Must File for Asylum within 1 Year of Entry
paragraphs: Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of  1996 and its implementing regulations, individuals seeking asylum after  April 1, 1998, are generally required to apply within the first year of  entering the United States. Specifically, the applicant must demonstrate by  clear and convincing evidence during an interview with an asylum officer  or during a removal proceeding in front of an immigration judge that the  application has been filed within 1 year after the date of the applicant’s  last arrival in the country. The time limit or “1-year rule” was intended to  minimize fraudulent asylum applications and to encourage applicants who  have illegally entered the country to present themselves without delay to  the authorities.
The statute allows exceptions to the 1-year rule to the extent the applicant  demonstrates changed circumstances materially affecting eligibility or  extraordinary circumstances relating to the filing delay. Changed  circumstances generally include changes in conditions in the applicant’s  country of nationality, changes in the applicant’s circumstances, including  changes in applicable law or changes in dependency status. Extraordinary  circumstances affecting the filing delay may include serious illness or  mental or physical disability, including any effects of persecution or  violent harm suffered in the past; legal disability, such as for those  applicants who are unaccompanied minors; ineffective assistance of  counsel; or death or serious illness or incapacity of the applicant’s legal  representative, among a nonexhaustive list specified in the regulations.
If asylum officers are unable to establish whether or not applicants have met the 1 year  time limit, they are required to refer the cases to the immigration court, where the entirety  of the application will be reviewed by the immigration judge.
Applicants who cannot demonstrate that their application was filed within  1 year after arrival in the United States and are not eligible for an  exception to the bar, may be eligible for relief from persecution through  withholding of removal because of persecution or withholding or  protection under the Convention Against Torture. However, as discussed  earlier, the standard of proof for withholding and CAT is higher than for  asylum, and the benefits are more limited.
section_title: Various Factors Were Associated with Differences in the Likelihood of Being Granted Asylum in Immigration Courts
paragraphs: Our analyses included all asylum cases decided between October 1, 1994, and April 30,  2007, that involved asylum seekers from the 20 countries that produced the most asylum  cases and the 19 courts that handled a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive  asylum cases. The 20 countries and 19 courts represented more than 198,000 cases, or 66  percent of all asylum cases decided during this period. Except where noted, our analyses  included all immigration judges in all 19 immigration courts. In descriptively analyzing  differences across immigration courts, we focused on immigration courts that heard 50 or  more cases from a particular country. In analyzing differences in asylum decisions across  immigration judges, we excluded those immigration judges who heard fewer than 50  affirmative cases in our analyses of affirmative asylum decisions and fewer than 50  defensive cases in our analyses of defensive asylum decisions and excluded cases heard by  immigration judges other than in their primary court, in order to simplify the presentation  and avoid reaching inappropriate conclusions that can occur when calculations are based  on small numbers of cases. judge and (2) the length of experience as an immigration judge. The  seven factors that did not significantly affect applicants’ likelihood of  being granted asylum were the following characteristics of immigration  judges: (1) age, (2) caseload size, (3) race/ethnicity, (4) veteran status, (5)  prior government immigration experience, (6) prior experience doing  immigration work for a nonprofit organization, and (7) the presidential  administration under which the judges were appointed.
subsections: section_title: Likelihood of Being Granted Asylum Varied across Immigration Courts
subsections: section_title: Differences in Grant Rates Were Sizable across Immigration Courts
paragraphs: The likelihood of being granted asylum differed for affirmative and  defensive cases and varied depending on the immigration court in which  the case was heard. Overall, the grant rate for affirmative cases (37  percent) was significantly higher than the grant rate for defensive cases  (26 percent). The affirmative asylum grant rate ranged from 6 percent in  Atlanta to 54 percent in New York City. The grant rate for defensive cases  ranged from 7 percent in Atlanta to 35 percent in San Francisco and New  York City. (See fig. 2 and a detailed discussion of these differences in  appendix II).
Several recent studies have also used EOIR data to examine asylum decisions by  immigration judges and other adjudicators. We summarize this prior research in appendix  IV. Our work overlaps with these earlier studies, although we analyze data that cover a  longer period of time; are more recent; include both defensive and affirmative cases; cover  a broader range of asylum producing countries; and provide information on in absentia  cases as well as those in which applicants appeared for their asylum hearing. In contrast to  previous studies of asylum decisions, we use multivariate statistical models that take  account of potentially confounding factors and possible correlations within and between  judges to estimate immigration court and judge differences.
Unless otherwise noted, the analysis results presented in this section excluded cases that  were denied in absentia, or denied when the asylum seeker failed to appear before the  immigration judge. In appendix II (tables 8 though 11), we provide information on cases  that were denied in absentia as well as cases that were granted and denied when the  asylum seeker did appear before the judge.
section_title: Likelihood of Being Granted Asylum Differed Significantly across Immigration Courts Even After the Effects of Other Factors Were Controlled
paragraphs: The likelihood of being granted asylum differed considerably across  immigration courts, even after we statistically controlled simultaneously  for the effects of a number of factors. For example, we found that relative  to Atlanta, affirmative asylum applicants in San Francisco were about 12  times more likely to be granted asylum, applicants in New York were  about 10 times more likely to be granted asylum, and applicants in Dallas  and Houston were about 7 times more likely to be granted asylum.  Defensive applicants in these cities were also more likely to be granted  asylum than in Atlanta, with the likelihood being about 15 times greater in  San Francisco, 8 times greater in New York, and about 4 times greater in  Dallas and Houston. In these analyses we controlled for applicants’  nationality; the time period in which their case was decided; and whether  they had representation, claimed dependents, filed within 1 year of entry,  and, among defensive cases, if they were ever detained. (See tables 13 and  14 in app. II for the likelihood of applicants being granted asylum in each  of the 19 immigration courts.)
Data limitations prevented us from controlling for other factors that could  have contributed to variability in case outcomes. Although we were able to  control some factors related to the merits of asylum cases (such as  nationality and whether the applicant appeared for the asylum hearing),  we did not statistically control for the underlying facts and merits of the  cases being decided because data were not available. This is because  asylum decisions require a determination of applicant credibility, often  without corroborating evidence, and immigration judges generally do not,  and are not required to, document each factor (such as applicants’  demeanor while testifying) that went into their overall assessment of  credibility. It would be difficult and burdensome for them to do so.  Therefore, we were not in a position determine the extent to which such  factors accounted for the pronounced differences that we found in the  likelihood of applicants being granted asylum across immigration courts  and judges. Nonetheless, these multivariate analyses can increase the  understanding of variability in asylum decisions because our statistical  controls help account for differences among immigration judges and  applicants and enable comparisons to be made across immigration courts  and judges.
In the following sections, we examine the effects of each of the factors  that we were able to control in our statistical analyses.
section_title: Likelihood of Being Granted Asylum Varied by Nationality
paragraphs: Just as the likelihood of being granted asylum varied across immigration  courts, it also varied by nationality. The grant rate for affirmative cases  exceeded 50 percent for asylum seekers from some countries, including  Albania, China, Ethiopia, Iran, Russia, Somalia, and Yugoslavia (see fig. 3).  For other countries, including El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and  Mexico, it was lower than 10 percent. Similarly, while about 50 percent of  asylum seekers in defensive cases from Iran and Ethiopia were granted  asylum and almost 60 percent of such cases from Somalia were granted  asylum, the same was true of 13 percent or less defensive asylum cases  from El Salvador, Honduras and Indonesia.
The likelihood of being granted asylum also differed considerably across  the 20 nationalities, even after we statistically controlled simultaneously  for the effects of the immigration court the case was heard in; the time  period in which the case was decided; and whether applicants had  representation, claimed dependents, filed within 1 year of entry, and,  among defensive cases, if they were ever detained. For example, among  affirmative asylum applicants, the likelihood of being granted asylum after  controlling for these factors was about 1.5 times greater if the applicant  was from Russia than Albania, about 3 times greater if the applicant was  from Somalia than Nigeria; and about 4 times greater if the applicant was  from Iran than Bangladesh or India. Differences in the extent to which  applicants from various countries are granted or denied asylum in the  United States is not surprising in light of the differences that exist among  countries’ political climates and human rights records. (See tables 13 and  14 in app. II for full information on the likelihood of affirmative and  defensive cases being granted asylum for the 20 nationalities we  examined.)
section_title: Likelihood of Being Granted Asylum Has Increased over Time
paragraphs: Grant rates generally increased from fiscal year 1995 to fiscal year 2007  (see fig. 4). This was the case for both affirmative and defensive  applicants, although grant rates for affirmative applicants increased  substantially more than they did for defensive applicants. The grant rates  for defensive applicants did not change substantially during the period  from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2005, and grant rates for  affirmative applicants did not change substantially during the period from  fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2005. Beginning in fiscal year 1998,  affirmative asylum applications were more likely to be granted than  defensive asylum applications, while the opposite was true in the 3 fiscal  years for which we had data prior to that time.
In the mid 1990s, the Asylum Division implemented major reforms that decoupled  employment authorization from asylum requests to discourage applicants with fraudulent  asylum claims from applying for asylum solely to obtain a work authorization, and the  Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 added a requirement  that the identity of all asylum applicants be checked against records or databases  maintained by the Attorney General and Secretaries of State and later Homeland Security  to determine if an applicant is ineligible to apply for or be granted asylum. that lack merit may have been among the reasons for the increase in  asylum grants over time.
section_title: Representation Was Associated with Greater Likelihood of Being Granted Asylum
paragraphs: For both affirmative and defensive cases, having representation was  associated with more than a three-fold increase in the asylum grant rate  compared to those without representation. The grant rate for affirmative  applicants with representation was 39 percent, compared to 12 percent for  those without representation. For defensive cases, the grant rate for  applicants with representation was 27 percent, compared to 8 percent  without.
Representation generally doubled the likelihood of affirmative and  defensive cases being granted asylum, after we controlled for the effects of  the immigration court the case was heard in; the applicant’s nationality;  the time period in which the decision was made; and whether the  applicant claimed dependents, filed within 1 year of entry, and, among  defensive cases, if the applicant was ever detained. According to EOIR  officials, there could be several explanations for why representation can  increase the likelihood of applicants being granted asylum. For example,  officials said that attorneys can help applicants present their case more  effectively because asylum law is complicated and applicants face cultural  barriers; and attorneys can make better decisions about the viability of a  case, so claims that are not likely to be granted won’t go forward.
section_title: Filing Application within 1 Year of Entry Was Associated with Greater Likelihood of Being Granted Asylum
paragraphs: Just as having representation was associated with a greater likelihood of  being granted asylum, so was filing an application within 1 year of entry to  the United States. Affirmative applicants who filed their asylum  application within 1 year of entry to the United States had a grant rate of  42 percent, compared with 26 percent of those who did not file within 1  year. The grant rate for defensive applicants was 29 percent among those  who filed within 1 year of entry, and 22 percent among those who did not.
Filing within 1 year of entry increased the likelihood of affirmative and  defensive cases being granted asylum by 40 percent and 30 percent,  respectively, after we controlled for the effects of the immigration court in  which the case was heard; the applicant’s nationality; the time period in  which the decision was made; and whether the applicant had  representation, claimed dependents, and, among defensive cases, if the  applicant was ever detained. Since those who fail to apply for asylum  within 1 year of entry are generally barred from receiving asylum, the  positive association between filing within 1 year and immigration judges  granting asylum is understandable.
section_title: Claiming Dependents on the Asylum Application Was Associated with Greater Likelihood of Being Granted Asylum
paragraphs: For both affirmative and defensive cases, the grant rate for those who  claimed dependents on their asylum application was higher than for those  who did not. Among affirmative applicants, 43 percent of those who  claimed dependents were granted asylum, compared to 36 percent of  those who did not. Among defensive applicants, the grant rate was 37  percent for those who claimed dependents and 25 percent for those who  did not.
The positive association between asylum grants and claiming dependents  persisted after we controlled for the effects of the immigration court in  which the case was heard; the applicant’s nationality; the time period in  which the decision was made; and whether the applicant had  representation, filed within 1 year of entry, and, among defensive cases, if  the applicant was ever detained. The likelihood of being granted asylum  was roughly 50 percent greater for affirmative cases, and roughly 80  percent greater for defensive cases, when the asylum applicant claimed  dependents on the asylum application. While we do not know why  applicants with dependents were more likely to be granted asylum, those  who came to their hearings with a spouse or dependent children may have  appeared to adjudicators to have more sympathetic cases than applicants  who appeared alone.
In a later section of this report, we discuss the unavailability of EOIR data to assess  whether applicants’ failure to apply for asylum within 1 year of entry to the United States  was a basis for their being denied asylum. However, EOIR maintains a limited amount of  data on the date of aliens’ entry into the US and the date of the initial asylum application,  and we used those data for this multivariate analysis. Of the 190,476 cases on which this  analysis was based, data on whether the alien applied for asylum within 1 year of entry  were missing in 9,051 of the 124,972 affirmative cases and 15,885 of the 65,504 defensive  cases.
section_title: Defensive Applicants Who Had Been Detained Had Lower Likelihood of Being Granted Asylum Than Defensive Applicants Who Had Not Been Detained
paragraphs: Asylum results differed depending on whether the data were tabulated  using grant rates or analyzed using statistical controls for the effects of  other outcome-related factors. In terms of grant rates, there was little  difference in the grant rates of defensive cases who had and had not been  detained. The grant rate for applicants who had been detained was 25  percent, compared to 27 percent for those who had not been detained.
However, when we controlled for the effects of the immigration court the  case was heard in; the applicant’s nationality; the time period in which the  decision was made; and whether the applicant had representation, filed  within 1 year of entry, or claimed dependents on the asylum application,  we found that those who had been detained were about two-thirds as  likely to be granted asylum as those who had not been detained. According  to EOIR officials, the category of applicants who had been detained may  contain a higher percentage of criminal applicants, who may be statutorily  ineligible to be granted asylum. Additionally, detained applicants may have  more difficulty obtaining evidence in support of their claims. We did not  examine the effects of detention in affirmative cases, as very few of the  affirmative applicants, who are generally free to live in the United States  pending the completion of their claims, were detained during their  removal hearings.
section_title: Likelihood of Being Granted Asylum Differed across Immigration Judges
paragraphs: Immigration judges varied considerably in the asylum decisions they  rendered, both across and within immigration courts, and in both  affirmative and defensive cases. Grant rates for the immigration judges in  our review ranged between 2 percent and 93 percent for affirmative cases,  and between 2 percent and 72 percent for defensive cases. Our analysis  was based on 196 immigration judges who heard more than 50 affirmative  or defensive asylum cases from one or more of the 20 nationalities  between October 1, 1994, and April 30, 2007. The asylum caseload of these  196 immigration judges consisted of more than three-quarters of all  affirmative cases and nearly 90 percent of all defensive cases from the 19  different immigration courts we considered. (See fig. 5, below, and tables  17 and 18 in app. III, for the grant and denial rates of all the immigration  judges included in our review.)
We examined the data to determine if variability in grant rates across  immigration judges was at least partly because of the fact that different  immigration courts have proportionately different numbers of cases from  different countries. We found that even within immigration courts, there  were pronounced differences in grant rates across immigration judges.  This was the case even though asylum and other immigration cases were  reportedly assigned to immigration judges largely at random. For example,  grant rates for affirmative cases ranged between 19 percent and 61 percent  in Arlington, Va., 8 percent and 55 percent in Boston, 2 percent and 72  percent in Miami, and 3 percent and 93 percent in New York City (see fig.  5). The variation across immigration judges in many of the remaining  courts was similarly large. For defensive cases, there was also large  variability in the grant rates of immigration judges within the same  immigration court, but the difference between the highest and lowest  granting immigration judge within each immigration court was somewhat  lower than for affirmative cases (see app. III, fig. 13).
The likelihood of being granted asylum differed considerably across  immigration judges within the same immigration court even after we  statistically controlled simultaneously for the effects of applicants’  nationality; the time period in which their case was decided; and whether  they had representation, claimed dependents, filed within 1 year of entry,  and, among defensive cases, if they were ever detained. For example, in  the New York immigration court, the likelihood of an affirmative applicant  being granted asylum was 420 times greater if the applicant’s case were  handled by the immigration judge who had the highest likelihood of  granting asylum than if the applicant’s case were handled by the  immigration judge who had the lowest likelihood in that immigration  court. If we consider the two immigration judges at the highest and lowest  ends of the granting spectrum to be outliers, and instead compare  immigration judges who were second highest and second lowest, the  disparity was still great. The likelihood of being granted asylum in New  York was 122 times greater for applicants whose cases were decided by  the immigration judge with the second highest versus the second lowest  likelihood of granting asylum. Even when we compared the third highest  and third lowest asylum granting immigration judges in New York,  applicants were still 35 times more likely to be granted asylum by the  former than the latter. For defensive cases in New York, the likelihood of  being granted asylum was 93 times greater for applicants whose cases  were decided by the immigration judge with the highest versus the lowest  likelihood of granting asylum in the immigration court. (Table 2 below  provides information on the extent to which the likelihood of being  granted asylum varied within the same immigration court; and the last  column of tables 17 and 18 in app. III shows the likelihood of being  granted asylum by each immigration judge in each immigration court, after  controlling for the effects of other factors.) As can be determined from  table 2, in 14 out of 19 immigration courts for affirmative cases, and in 13  out of 19 immigration courts for defensive cases, the likelihood of being  granted asylum was at least 4 times as great for applicants whose cases  were decided by the immigration judge with the highest versus lowest  grant rate in the immigration court. For example, an affirmative applicant  whose case was assigned to the immigration judge most likely to grant  asylum in Arlington, Va., had a likelihood (or odds ratio) of being granted  asylum that was nearly 6 times as great as an applicant whose case was  assigned to the immigration judge least likely to grant asylum in the  Arlington immigration court. In a later section of this report, we discuss  recent initiatives by EOIR to provide training, mentoring, and supervision  to immigration judges whose performance EOIR has determined needs  improvement, using indicators such as asylum grant rates of the  immigration judges, complaints filed about immigration judge  performance, and reversals and remands from the BIA.
In a separate set of analyses, after statistically controlling for claimant and  immigration judge characteristics, immigration judges’ gender and length  of experience as an immigration judge were associated with the likelihood  of being granted asylum; while age, race/ethnicity, veteran status, prior  government immigration experience, prior experience doing immigration  work for a nonprofit organization, caseload size, and the presidential  administration under which judges were appointed were not. These results  are detailed in appendix III, tables 19 and 20, and related text.
With respect to gender differences, male immigration judges’ grant rate  was lower than that of females for both affirmative and defensive asylum  cases. We found that after statistically controlling for 14 factors, male  immigration judges were about 60 percent as likely as female immigration  judges to grant asylum in both affirmative cases and defensive cases. The  14 factors that we controlled statistically in this analysis were immigration  judge’s age, caseload size, length of service, race/ethnicity, veteran status,  prior government immigration experience, prior experience doing  immigration work for a non-profit organization, the presidential  administration under which the immigration judge was appointed,  applicant’s nationality, whether the applicant was represented, time period  when the case was decided, and if the applicant had claimed dependents  on the asylum application, filed within 1 year of entry, and, among  defensive cases, if the applicant was ever detained.
With respect to length of service, immigration judges with less than 3 ½  years of experience had a lower affirmative grant rate than those with 3 ½  to 10 years of experience, or those with 10 or more years of experience as  an immigration judge. For defensive cases, immigration judges with 10 or  more years of experience had the highest grant rate. After we statistically  controlled for the effects of the same 14 factors as in our analysis of  gender differences, we found that net of these other factors, immigration  judges with 3 ½ to 10 years of experience were more likely than less  experienced immigration judges to grant asylum in affirmative cases, by a  factor of 1.25. In other words, controlling for the effects of the other  factors, these immigration judges were 25 percent more likely to grant  asylum than those with less experience. Immigration judges with more  than 10 years of experience were also somewhat more likely than the least  experienced immigration judges to grant asylum, but the difference was  not statistically significant. Immigration judges’ experience level was not  significantly associated with outcomes in defensive asylum cases.
None of the other immigration judge characteristics had significant effects  on the likelihood of being granted asylum. This suggests that the  immigration judge characteristics for which we had data were not  sufficient to account for the large differences in the likelihood of being  granted asylum across individual judges.
subsections: section_title: Immigration Judges within the Same Immigration Courts Hearing Asylum Claims from Applicants of the Same Nationality Varied in Likelihood of Granting Asylum, but Immigration Judges’ Characteristics Did Not Generally Affect Differences in Outcome
paragraphs: In our final set of analyses, we continued to find substantial disparities in  the likelihood of being granted asylum even when we looked at cases that  shared certain characteristics—that is, the cases of asylum applicants of  the same nationality who appeared before immigration judges in the same  immigration court. Our analyses focused on the likelihood of being  granted asylum in four country-immigration court combinations for  affirmative cases (China in New York, China in Los Angeles, Haiti in  Miami, and India in San Francisco), and two country-immigration court  combinations for defensive cases (China in New York, and Haiti in  Miami). The results of these analyses are summarized in table 21 in  appendix III.
Many and often most of the immigration judges in the same immigration  court differed significantly in their likelihood of granting asylum to  applicants of the same nationality when compared to the immigration  judge who represented the average likelihood of granting asylum in that  immigration court (the “average immigration judge”). This was the case  both before and after we statistically controlled for the effects of five  claimant characteristics (representation, claimed one or more dependents  on application, filed for asylum within 1 year of entry to the United States,  time period in which application was filed, and, among defensive cases, if  the applicant was ever detained). In the four immigration courts where we  examined affirmative asylum cases and statistically controlled for the five  claimant characteristics, we found that that between 34 percent of  immigration judges handling cases from China in Los Angeles and 84  percent of immigration judges handling cases from China in New York had  a likelihood of granting asylum that differed significantly from that of the  average immigration judge in the same immigration court. In the two  immigration courts where we examined defensive asylum cases and  statistically controlled for claimant characteristics, we found that in both,  approximately 40 percent of immigration judges differed significantly from  the average immigration judge in the same immigration court in their  likelihood of granting asylum.
We selected these country-immigration court combinations because they had a  sufficiently large number of immigration judges rendering a sufficiently large number of  decisions to produce reliable estimates in our logistic regression analyses. dependents significantly increased the likelihood of being granted asylum  in five of the six immigration court-country combinations, while having  representation and applying for asylum within 1 year of entry to the United  States significantly increased the likelihood of being granted asylum in  four of the six combinations. Further, the likelihood of being granted  asylum significantly increased over time for both affirmative and defensive  Chinese applicants in New York, but significantly decreased for affirmative  Chinese applicants in Los Angeles.
Noteworthy, also, is the absence of consistent effects of immigration judge  characteristics. With some exceptions, we generally found that the  following factors did not have statistically significant effects on the  likelihood of being granted asylum: immigration judges’ age,  race/ethnicity, veteran status, prior government immigration experience,  or prior experience doing immigration work for a nonprofit organization.
section_title: EOIR Has Taken Actions to Assist Applicants and Immigration Judges in the Asylum Process, but Some Actions to Identify Immigration Judges with Training Needs Were Limited, and the Resources and Guidance Needed to Ensure Effective Supervision Had Not Been Determined EOIR Has Taken Actions to Expand Its Pro Bono Programs
paragraphs: EOIR has taken actions to improve its assistance to aliens in removal  proceedings by, among other things, expanding programs to help aliens  obtain representation, improving accuracy in EOIR’s list of free legal  service providers, and drafting proposed regulations to promote the  availability of free and low-cost legal services. EOIR has also taken actions  to identify and improve the performance of immigration judges who may  need supervisory attention. EOIR conducted studies of immigration  judges’ grant rates, but did not statistically control for factors that can  affect asylum outcomes. EOIR said it was using information on which  immigration judges had unusually high or low asylum grant rates, in  conjunction with other indicators of performance, to identify immigration  judges in need of greater supervision, and has taken steps to increase  training and make mentoring available for all immigration judges.  However, EOIR’s analyses of immigration judges’ decisions did not  statistically control for a number of factors that affected those decisions,  and EOIR has not determined the ACIJ resources and guidance needed to  ensure that immigration judges are effectively supervised.
EOIR has taken several actions to improve its assistance to aliens in  removal proceedings, including expanding its Legal Orientation Program  (LOP), improving the accuracy of its list of free legal providers, drafting  proposed regulations to help promote the availability of free and low-cost  legal services, and issuing a policy memorandum to facilitate pro bono  representation in removal proceedings. The LOP is an initiative designed  to improve efficiency in immigration courts and assist adult detained  aliens in removal proceedings by helping them understand their legal  rights and how to access potential counsel.
EOIR expanded its LOP in response to an August 2006 directive from the  Attorney General to improve and expand pro bono services. Pursuant to  the Attorney General’s directive, EOIR increased its cadre of LOP sites  from 6 to 13, although 2 sites were subsequently discontinued in 2007 and  1 additional site was added that year. In March 2008, EOIR stated that  because of an increase in funding for LOP in fiscal year 2008 (from $2  million to $3.76 million), it expected to establish new programs at 6 to 10  additional sites by the end of calendar year 2008 and to determine by  September 1, 2008, at which current sites program services would be  increased. In May 2008, an EOIR-funded evaluation of the outcomes and  performance of the LOP reported that from January 1 through December  31, 2006, unrepresented asylum applicants were more likely to be granted  asylum in immigration court when they received such LOP-provided  services as individual orientations and self-help workshops, in addition to  the initial group orientation that nearly all LOP participants receive.  According to the Vera Institute of Justice, asylum applicants who received  any of these additional services were granted asylum 9.4 percent of the  time, versus 2.4 percent for those LOP participants who attended group  orientations alone. The evaluation also reported increases from 2002 (6  months before the program began) to 2005 in representation rates for  individuals with applications for relief—including asylum—in sites with  LOP programs, compared to sites without programs. GAO did not assess  the reliability of the data used by Vera in its analyses.
Immigration law provides that aliens in immigration proceedings shall have the privilege  of being represented at no expense to the government by counsel selected by the alien and  authorized to practice.
The San Pedro, Calif., site was discontinued in November, 2007, because of ICE’s  decision to temporarily close the facility. EOIR chose not to renew the contract task order  for the LOP program at the Laredo, Tex. facility, because of a significant reduction in the  number of detained aliens in EOIR removal proceedings at the facility. The San Diego,  Calif., ICE detention facility at Otay Mesa was added in fiscal year 2007.
Siulc et al, Legal Orientation Program Evaluation, 63.
EOIR has also taken actions to improve the accuracy of its list of eligible  free legal service providers, and has drafted proposed regulations to  strengthen the requirements for attorneys and organizations wishing to be  placed on this list. According to EOIR, all individuals in immigration  proceedings are to be provided a copy of the “List of Free Legal Service  Providers,” maintained by the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge. The  list was created with the intent to increase opportunities for indigent  aliens to obtain free legal counsel, and contains the names of attorneys,  bar associations, and certain non-profit organizations who are willing to  provide free legal services to indigent individuals in immigration  proceedings. In 2005, EOIR audited the Free Legal Service Providers list  for accuracy and eliminated providers that it determined were no longer  providing pro bono services. In March 2008, EOIR stated that it had  increased its monitoring of entities on the list and had acted to remove the  names of attorneys and organizations that have not met the list’s  requirements. Furthermore, as a result of the Attorney General’s directive  to improve and expand pro bono programs, EOIR has drafted two  proposed regulations which it says will ensure the integrity and promote  the availability of free and low-cost legal services. As of September 2008,  these draft proposed regulations were under review with DOJ’s Office of  Legal Policy. The first is to strengthen the requirements for entities and  individuals wishing to be placed on the “Free Legal Service Providers” list.  The second is to strengthen the process for recognizing and accrediting  organizations and individuals charging only nominal fees for providing  immigration services and wishing to be placed on EOIR’s Recognition and  Accreditation Roster, which appears on EOIR’s Web site. EOIR’s Pro Bono  Coordinator stated that this regulation would take longer to develop, as it  requires joint rule-making with DHS’s USCIS and ICE.
EOIR issued a policy memorandum to the immigration courts in March  2008, which listed guidelines and best practices for facilitating pro bono  representation in removal hearings—including such activities as  appointing a liaison immigration judge to coordinate with local pro bono  providers, and encouraging immigration judges to be flexible in scheduling  hearings that involve pro bono providers who may require additional time  to recruit and train representatives. The memorandum also listed  guidelines for tracking pro bono cases in EOIR’s case management  database. EOIR stated that tracking appearances by pro bono counsel will  enable it, among other things, to better monitor the number of pro bono  cases handled by entities on the “Free Legal Service Providers” list and  verify genuine pro bono representation. EOIR officials stated that EOIR  planned to review how successfully immigration judges and immigration  court personnel were tracking pro bono cases at the summer 2008 meeting  of the committee set up to implement the Attorney General’s directive  regarding pro bono representation.
subsections: section_title: EOIR Has Sought to Identify Immigration Judges Needing Supervisory Attention and Improve Their Performance, but EOIR’s Analyses of Immigration Judge Decisions Were Limited, As Were the ACIJ Resources and Guidance Available to Supervise Immigration Judges
paragraphs: EOIR has taken several actions to identify immigration judges who may  need supervisory attention and has designed mechanisms to improve the  performance of those judges. Beginning in 2006, partially in response to a  directive from the Attorney General that EOIR identify immigration judges  in need of additional training or supervision, EOIR’s Office of the Chief  Immigration Judge conducted two internal studies to determine asylum  grant rates across all immigration judges. However, these studies did not  statistically control for the effects of a number of factors that could affect  the asylum outcome. This statistical procedure would have increased the  completeness, accuracy, and usefulness of comparing asylum decisions  across immigration courts and judges. EOIR said it was using information  reflecting which immigration judges had unusually high or low asylum  grant rates, in conjunction with other indicators of performance, to  identify immigration judges in need of greater supervision. EOIR has also  taken actions to improve training for immigration judges and has  developed a mentor directory to encourage immigration judges to share  best practices. However, there are relatively few ACIJs available to  supervise many geographically dispersed immigration judges, and EOIR  did not provide explicit guidance to ACIJs on the elements of effective  supervision of immigration judges.
subsections: section_title: EOIR Conducted Studies of Immigration Judges’ Grant Rates, but the Usefulness of the Results Was Limited Because Factors Affecting Asylum Outcomes Were Not Statistically Controlled
paragraphs: EOIR conducted two studies of the asylum grant rates of its immigration  judges, but neither study used statistical controls to examine the effects on  grant rates of factors associated with asylum outcomes. EOIR stated that  in 2006, its Office of the Chief Immigration Judge conducted a study to  determine the grant rates for all immigration judges who made any asylum  decision from fiscal years 2001 through 2006. EOIR conducted a follow-up  study in June 2008, which updated the immigration judge grant rate  information through the end of fiscal year 2007. EOIR said it did not run  statistical analyses on the data, nor use the results of the 2006 study to  identify immigration judges whose grant rates could be considered to be  outliers. EOIR officials also said that immigration judges’ supervisors—the  ACIJs—had not been informed of the study’s results as of May 2008  because EOIR had not decided the value of the grant rate information. In  contrast, EOIR’s June 2008 grant rate study determined the asylum grant  and denial rate for each immigration judge and identified those deemed to  be outliers—that is, according to EOIR, immigration judges who were  among the top 16 percent of asylum granters and the top 16 percent of  asylum deniers. Pursuant to the 2008 grant rate study, ACIJs were  provided information on those immigration judges under their supervision  whose grant or denial rates were among the top 16 percent of immigration  judges in their local immigration court and nationally.
In rank ordering immigration judges based on the results of our multivariate analysis, the  factors that we simultaneous statistically controlled for were applicants’ nationality; the  time period in which their case was decided; and whether applicants had representation,  claimed dependents, filed within 1 year of entry, and, among defensive cases, if applicants  were ever detained. immigration judge who ranked as the 171st highest granter before other  factors were statistically controlled, and the 67th highest granter after.
In conducting its grant rate studies, EOIR attempted to take some factors  into account such as whether the applicant was detained or had not  appeared for the merits hearing. However, EOIR’s grant rate studies did  not take into account available data on the characteristics of asylum  seekers (such as, nationality and representation) and immigration judges  (such as gender and length of experience) that are statistically related to  immigration judges’ decisions to grant or deny asylum. The relationship  between these characteristics and variability in asylum decisions by  immigration judges across and within immigration courts can be  determined using a multivariate statistical analysis. While generally  accepted statistical practices include the use of multivariate analyses to  statistically control for various factors that may affect outcomes when  data on such factors are available, EOIR’s studies did not statistically  control for such factors. According to EOIR, (1) it does not have a trained  statistician on staff who could analyze its data using such sophisticated  statistical controls, and (2) its ability to obtain statistical expertise would  depend on the availability of funding. While we recognize that EOIR does  not currently have the expertise to conduct multivariate statistical  analyses, without doing so, the completeness, accuracy, and usefulness of  EOIR’s grant rate studies are limited, and EOIR is hindered in its efforts to  have the information it seeks to help it identify immigration judges who  require additional training and supervision. The results of our statistical  analyses could help EOIR, on an interim basis, further its understanding of  immigration judges’ asylum decisions.
EOIR duly noted that caution must be exercised when evaluating  disparities in asylum grants because the asylum process is complex,  asylum decisions can be affected by factors unrelated to the underlying  merits of the case (such as compliance with the 1-year filing deadline), and  each case is unique and cannot be directly compared with other cases. As  noted earlier, EOIR said it was using information on which immigration  judges had unusually high or low asylum grant rates, in conjunction with  other indicators of performance (such as reversal rates for legal error), to  identify immigration judges in need of greater supervision. Further, EOIR  said it was improving training for immigration judges and developing a  program to encourage immigration judges to share best practices.
section_title: Relatively Few ACIJs Were Tasked with Overseeing Many Immigration Judges, and Had Little Guidance to Help Assure Effective Supervision
paragraphs: In 2006, as part of an effort to increase management and oversight of  immigration courts, EOIR reassigned a number of ACIJs from  headquarters to immigration courts in field locations; however, insofar as  ACIJs’ being a key component of this effort, EOIR’s ability to achieve its  goal was hindered by limitations in both the availability of ACIJ resources  and guidance to ensure that immigration judges were effectively  supervised. EOIR’s deployment of supervisors to field locations was a pilot  program undertaken in response to the results of the Attorney General’s  2006 review of the performance of immigration courts. This review was  prompted by complaints from litigants and federal circuit courts, among  others, about issues relating to the caliber of immigration judges’ legal  work and their treatment of aliens appearing before them.
EOIR had an additional ACIJ who was not supervising any immigration judges.
The 6 ACIJs deployed to immigration courts in the field were located in San Diego, Calif.;  San Francisco, Calif.; Los Angeles, Calif.; Miami, Fla.; San Antonio, Tex.; and New York,  N.Y.
In addition to supervising immigration judges, the four headquarters ACIJs serve as focal  points for the following areas: training and education; conduct and professionalism; the  Institutional Hearing Program; and DHS and the Legal Orientation Program. judges, and it has not provided ACIJs with guidance on how to carry out  their supervisory role. Doing so would put EOIR in a better position to  monitor immigration judge performance and take appropriate action to  correct or prevent immigration judge performance issues that may arise.
Officials at EOIR said that they depend on the judgment of its ACIJs to  help identify and address the mentoring, training, and peer observation  needs of immigration judges and that asylum grant rate is only one of  several factors that may alert EOIR management to concerns about the  performance of immigration judges and the potential need for ameliorative  action. These officials further noted that information on remands and  reversals of immigration judge decisions, and complaints from a wide  variety of sources were also of great importance in identifying the need for  ameliorative action.
EOIR has a position description for its ACIJs that generically states that  the role of the ACIJ is to manage and coordinate immigration judge  activities and supervise the administrative operations of the adjudications  program. It tasks ACIJs with a range of duties pertaining to legal, policy,  operational, and human capital matters, including managing immigration  judge activities. EOIR also has written performance appraisal standards  for ACIJs’ handling of people and workforce issues. However, these  standards make brief and general reference to supervision in  characterizing the behaviors that ACIJs are to demonstrate in order to  obtain an outstanding, excellent, or successful rating on their handling of  people and workforce issues. For example, to obtain a successful rating,  ACIJs are to take actions such as training, discipline, and performance  improvement plans to correct poor immigration judge performance. More  detailed guidance did not exist regarding how ACIJs are to carry out their  supervisory role, such as how to develop familiarity with the performance  of the numerous, geographically dispersed immigration judges who were  assigned to them, how they are to allocate their time between supervising  immigration judges and handling their own caseload or operational duties,  and how ACIJs are to use information on immigration judges’ asylum grant  rates in combination with other performance information they may  collect.
According to a headquarters ACIJ, immigration courts are all different and  the supervisory role of the ACIJs depends on their location, caseload, the  immigration judges they supervise, and their relationship with the private  bar. Further, according to EOIR, as of May 2008, DOJ had not yet  determined whether or for how long the field ACIJ pilot program should  continue. While the circumstances of immigration judges may differ and  while it is uncertain if the ACIJ pilot program will be temporary or  permanent, ACIJs are nonetheless tasked with supervising immigration  judges. Internal control standards call for federal agencies to design  controls to assure that continuous supervision occurs to help ensure the  effective management of the agencies’ workforce. Given the ratio of ACIJs  to immigration judges, the geographic distance between them in many  cases, and the additional operational or adjudicative duties that consume  the time of ACIJs, ensuring effective management through supervision  cannot be easy to achieve. Providing more explicit guidance regarding the  supervision ACIJs are to provide immigration judges, including how they  are to use information on immigration judges’ asylum grant rates in  combination with other performance information they may collect, could  put ACIJs in a better position to supervise immigration judges and take  appropriate action to correct or prevent performance issues that may  arise.
Additionally, EOIR began to implement a performance appraisal system for members of  the BIA in July 2008.
The Attorney General’s recommendations for reforming immigration courts, including for  improving training for immigration judges, and the Board of Immigration Appeals, were  issued the previous month, in August 2006. multiple immigration judges within the same immigration court over the  course of the week, either in their own immigration court location or at a  training court. According to EOIR officials, an attempt has been made to  improve training for all immigration judges, and not just for those  identified as needing ameliorative attention. EOIR officials said EOIR  expanded its training for newly hired immigration judges in September  2006 by extending the time immigration judges are to observe hearings  from 1 week to 4 weeks. In addition to the new immigration judge training  program, EOIR also holds an annual immigration judge conference. This  conference is a week-long training that includes lectures and  presentations. Although immigration judges generally attended this  conference in person, it was canceled in fiscal years 2003 through 2005  and again in 2008 as a result of budget constraints. A virtual conference  that included recorded presentations was offered in place of the in-person  conference in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and EOIR officials told us in that  a virtual conference, including one day devoted to asylum issues, was  offered in August 2008. The virtual conference included interactive  computer-based training addressing asylum issues before the immigration  courts and a multimedia presentation emphasizing the importance and  impact of immigration judge asylum decisions. According to EOIR,  immigration judges’ supervisors were instructed to organize time for each  immigration judge to observe colleagues in immigration court prior to the  virtual conference. EOIR officials stated that EOIR will assess the  effectiveness of peer observation during the August training.
EOIR reported it has also developed a mentor directory to take advantage  of the pool of expertise among the immigration judges, providing a list of  immigration judges with expertise willing to serve as mentors to their  colleagues on specific areas of immigration law and procedure. The  mentors are to be available for consultation at any time, and supervisors  may use the directory to identify resources to help sharpen immigration  judges’ legal skills. The mentor directory was made available to all  immigration judges on-line in April 2008 through the Immigration Judge  Benchbook.
section_title: BIA Streamlining Was Associated with a Reduction in BIA’s Backlog and Fewer Outcomes Favorable to Asylum Seekers
paragraphs: The streamlining of BIA’s administrative procedures was associated with a  pronounced decrease in the overall backlog of appeals pending at the BIA,  including asylum appeals, and in the number of BIA decisions favorable to  asylum seekers. Pursuant to the BIA’s March 2002 streamlining changes  in which cases involving asylum claims could, for the first time, be decided  by a single BIA member and without a written opinion, there was a  marked increase in the number of asylum decisions rendered by the BIA,  coupled with a reduction in the average amount of time that asylum  appeals were on the BIA docket. BIA decisions favorable to asylum  applicants were more than 50 percent lower in the 4 years following the  2002 changes, a period during which BIA members made substantial use of  the authority to affirm immigration judge decisions without writing an  opinion (AWO). EOIR proposed regulations in 2008 allowing for more  written opinions and expanding the criteria for referring appeals to three- member panels, but it is too soon to tell how these procedures will affect  asylum appeals outcomes.
subsections: section_title: BIA’s Backlog of Cases Decreased after Streamlining
paragraphs: DOJ realized its objective of reducing the BIA’s overall backlog of cases,  including asylum cases, by streamlining BIA’s procedures for handling  immigration appeals. During each of fiscal years 1995 through 2000, the  annual number of cases completed at the BIA was generally lower than the  number of cases received, driving up the appeals backlog to a peak of over  58,000 cases in fiscal year 2000 (see fig. 6). With the implementation of  BIA’s initial streamlining in late fiscal year 2000—which applied to a  number of categories of appeals other than asylum, withholding, or   CAT—BIA’s overall backlog of cases began to decrease. In fiscal year  2002, when DOJ authorized the inclusion of asylum, withholding, and CAT  appeals in the category of cases subject to streamlining procedures and  made single member review the primary mode of BIA decision-making, the  overall BIA backlog decreased further and was at its lowest level in 12  years in fiscal year 2006, with approximately 26,100 pending appeals,  before increasing slightly in fiscal year 2007 to about 27,700 pending  appeals.
BIA streamlining was authorized by regulation in October 1999, implemented for certain  categories of appeals in September 2000, and expanded to apply specifically to asylum,  withholding and CAT appeals in March 2002.
section_title: BIA Decisions Favoring Asylum Applicants Decreased, and Decisions by Single BIA Members Were Less Favorable to Asylum Applicants than Decisions by Three- Member Panels
subsections: section_title: BIA Decisions Favoring Aliens Appealing Asylum Decisions Decreased Following the March 2002 Streamlining
paragraphs: BIA decisions favoring the alien in asylum appeals decreased following the  2002 streamlining. Although there were limitations in the data maintained  by EOIR, we were able to derive general estimates of the change in  outcomes for asylum applicants that were associated with the 2002  streamlining by merging EOIR data on decisions made by immigration  judges with EOIR data on the results of appeals of these decisions to the  BIA. BIA decisions favoring the alien in asylum appeals—including  granting asylum, dismissing an appeal by DHS of an immigration judge’s  grant of relief through asylum, or remanding the case to the immigration  judge—decreased following the 2002 streamlining, from 21 percent in the  period from October 1, 1997, through March 14, 2002, to 10 percent in the  period from March 15, 2002, through September 30, 2006. In addition, the  percentage of BIA decisions granting the alien relief in the form of  voluntary departure from the United States also decreased following the  2002 streamlining, from 25 percent to 17 percent. BIA decisions that  favored DHS (dismissing an applicant’s appeal of an immigration judge’s  asylum denial) remained constant, at 27 percent in the periods before and  after streamlining. Appeals by aliens and DHS represented 97 percent and  3 percent, respectively, of BIA’s asylum appeals caseload from October  1997 to September 2006. BIA members used their authority to issue AWOs  in 44 percent of the asylum cases they reviewed—35 percent without a  grant of voluntary departure (with 98 percent of these resulting in removal  orders)--and 9 percent resulting in grants of voluntary departure (see fig.  9). Overall, 78 percent of AWOs issued by the BIA after streamlining  resulted in removal orders.
EOIR does not track in its data system the specific legal issues underlying an alien’s or  DHS’s appeal of an immigration judge decision to the BIA, nor the BIA’s decision on each  of the issues raised in the appeal. The methods we used to merge the EOIR data sources  and to categorize the BIA decision outcomes are described in appendix I.
Voluntary departure allows an otherwise-removable alien to depart the United States at  his or her own personal expense and return to his or her home country or another country  if the individual can secure an entry there.
Post-Streamlining:  3/15/02 – 9/30/06 (11,667) (37,957) (10,063) (25,385) (7,629) (29,954) (7,280) (19,671) (4,038) (8,003) (2,783) (5,714) (956) (5,689) (402) (1,048) (10,711) (32,268) (9,661) (24,337) (124) (175) (2,491) (3,271) (11,543) (37,782) (7,572) (22,114)
section_title: Single Member BIA Decisions Were Associated with Less Favorable Outcomes for Asylum Applicants than Three- Member Panel Decisions
paragraphs: Of all BIA decisions in asylum appeals from fiscal years 2004 through 2006,  92 percent of decisions were made by single BIA members, of which 7  percent of these favored the alien. (See table 4.) In contrast, 8 percent of  decisions were made by panels, with 52 percent of these decisions  favoring the alien. Although the percent of appeals favoring the alien  increased significantly over this time period both for single-member  decisions and three-member panel decisions, the increase in favorable  decisions made by three-member panels was significantly greater and  doubled during that period.
Only 4 percent of defensive applicants in our analysis had dependents.
EOIR officials stated that in fiscal year 2004 EOIR began maintaining reliable data  regarding whether the appeal was decided by a single member or a three-member panel.
Percentage  (number) of  decisions  favorable  to alien  (number)
Percentage  (number) of  decisions  favorable to alien (number)
Percentage  (number) of  decisions  favorable  to alien  (number)
Percentage  (number) of  decisions  favorable to alien (497) (793) (432) (804) (591) (2,923) (1,520) (742) (10,055) (721) (9,042) (812) (32,388) (2,275)
section_title: EOIR Has Been Making Additional Changes to the BIA Adjudication Process as a Result of the Attorney General’s Review
paragraphs: Following a 2006 review of the immigration courts and the BIA, the  Attorney General directed EOIR to undertake regulatory changes to the  streamlining rules with the intent of improving BIA adjudicatory  procedures. In June 2008, EOIR published proposed regulations for  comment in the Federal Register. The regulations are intended to codify  the discretion that BIA members have in deciding whether to write  opinions or issue AWOs. BIA officials told us that the BIA believed it  always had this discretion under the 2002 streamlining regulations and had  already begun to issue more written opinions. The regulations also  propose to expand the criteria for the referral of appeals to three-member  panels, allowing a single BIA member to refer a case to a three-member  panel when the case presents a particularly complex, novel, or unusual  legal or factual issue.
73 Fed. Reg. 34,654 (June 18, 2008).   71 Fed. Reg. 70,855 (Dec. 7, 2006).   73 Fed. Reg. 33,875 (June 16, 2008). implement the Attorney General’s directives encouraging the increased  use of one-member written opinions and three-member panel decisions.  Between December 2006 and May 2008, the number of permanent  members did not exceed nine members, although EOIR stated that the BIA  has used between two and five temporary members at any one time to  help manage the caseload on a temporary basis. In May 2008, the BIA had  8 members, and the Attorney General appointed 5 new members, bringing  the total number to 13. It is too soon to tell how these regulatory changes  might affect outcomes for asylum appellants.
section_title: Data Limitations Precluded Determining the Effects of the 1-Year Rule and the Resources Expended Adjudicating It
paragraphs: Data limitations prevented us from determining the effects of the 1-year  rule and the resources spent adjudicating it. EOIR does not collect data  that would enable us to determine the effects of the 1-year rule on the  filing of fraudulent asylum applications or on immigration judge decisions  to deny asylum because of it. DHS and DOJ do not maintain records on  how much time asylum officers, immigration judges, and DHS attorneys  spend addressing issues related to the rule.
subsections: section_title: Data Were Not Available to Assess the Effects of the 1- Year Rule on Fraudulent Applications and Denials
paragraphs: We could not determine the effects of the 1-year rule on the filing of  fraudulent asylum applications or on immigration judge decisions to deny  asylum because data were not available to conduct such analyses.  Currently, EOIR does not collect data related to the effect of the 1-year  rule on asylum decisions and applicants because, according to agency  officials, EOIR’s mission of fair and prompt adjudication of immigration  proceedings has not required its staff to track data on the legal basis for  the decisions. Therefore, it remains unknown what impact the 1 year filing  deadline may have had on asylum fraud or the extent to which this  deadline may have prevented asylum seekers with a well-founded fear of  persecution from being granted asylum.
It is difficult to assess the effect of the 1-year rule on reducing fraud  because good measures of deterring fraudulent behavior are not available,  and the presence of fraud is generally difficult to identify and prove. In  contrast, it was difficult to assess the effect of the 1-year rule on asylum  denials because EOIR does not maintain automated data on the reasons  underlying immigration judge decisions. DHS does maintain data on  whether the affirmative asylum cases it decides are referred to  immigration court because of the 1-year rule. However, the data do not  shed light on whether the 1-year rule was the only reason for referring a  case to immigration court or whether it was one of several possible  reasons.
DHS data show that from fiscal years 1999 through 2006, asylum officers  referred about 64,000 cases to immigration court based at least in part on  the 1-year rule. During this period, cases referred by asylum officers to  immigration court based on the 1-year rule, as a percent of total cases  interviewed and referred by asylum officers, peaked in fiscal years 2001  through 2003 at around 43 to 45 percent, as shown in table 5.
However, the total number of cases referred by asylum officers to  immigration judges constitutes only a portion of all the asylum cases in  which the 1-year rule was adjudicated in the immigration courts. In the  absence of EOIR data, our 2007 survey asked immigration judges to  estimate the frequency and outcomes of their asylum cases that involved  the 1-year rule during the past year. Nearly all (98 percent) of the  respondents said the 1-year issue (questions about the date of entry or  eligibility for exceptions to the rule) had to be resolved in at least some of  the asylum cases they adjudicated, including 55 percent who said the rule  was an issue in about one-half or more of their cases. Further, 85 percent  of the respondents said they denied asylum in some of the cases they had  heard in the past year (including 12 percent who said they had denied  asylum in about one-half or more of their cases) because they found that  the applicant was ineligible because of the 1-year rule.
section_title: Data Were Not Available to Determine the Amount of Resources Expended In Adjudicating the 1-Year Rule
paragraphs: We could not determine the amount of resources spent adjudicating  asylum cases related to the 1-year rule because DHS and DOJ do not  maintain records on how much time asylum officers, immigration judges,  and DHS attorneys spend addressing issues related to the rule. We asked  immigration judges in our 2007 nationwide survey to provide estimates of  the average amount of time they spent adjudicating the 1-year rule, and  these ranged from less than 30 minutes to more than 2 hours. The majority  of survey respondents (79 percent) said that adjudicating the rule took less  than an hour; 15 percent, between 1 hour and less than 2 hours; 2.5  percent, 2 hours or more.
Immigrant advocates have argued that it is important to have data on how  many applicants are denied asylum based on the 1-year rule because such  applicants may have a well-founded fear of persecution, as do asylees, but  they must meet a higher standard to remain in the United States; that is, to  be granted a “withholding from removal.”
As opposed to the requirement that the applicants demonstrate a “reasonable possibility”  of persecution to be granted asylum, applicants must demonstrate that persecution is  “more likely than not” to be granted a withholding from removal (see fn. 16).
If the Congress believes it is important for EOIR to begin collecting data  on the impact of the 1-year rule on asylum decisions, the applicants, and  their dependents, it would need to direct EOIR to develop a cost effective  method for carrying this effort out. For such data collection activities to  result in useful data, Congress would have to direct EOIR to develop  mechanisms to directly capture the key elements underlying an  immigration judge’s decision, so that analysts would be able to identify  those instances in which the 1-year rule was the determinative basis in the  decision.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: We found large differences in asylum decisions among immigration judges.  Our analysis used more comprehensive statistical procedures, examined a  longer period of time, and had data on more potential explanatory factors  than the analyses reported in EOIR’s grant rate studies. Because data were  not available on the facts, evidence, and testimony presented in each  asylum case, nor on immigration judges’ rationale for deciding whether to  grant or deny a case, we could not measure the effect of case merits on  case outcomes. However, the size of the disparities in asylum grant rates  creates a perception of unfairness in the asylum adjudication process  within the immigration court system.
We commend EOIR for taking actions to collect information on the  variation of asylum outcomes across immigration judges and to attempt to  integrate that information into its oversight of immigration judges.  However, we believe that EOIR’s grant rate studies have weaknesses that  limit their ability to identify immigration judges who have unusually high  or low rates in the granting of asylum. Although EOIR has attempted to  take into account a few of the factors that may be associated with  variation in asylum grant rates among immigration judges, we believe that  the statistical methods we applied to EOIR’s data provide a more  complete, accurate, and useful picture of asylum rulings for the  immigration judges included in our analysis. Without statistically  controlling for factors that could affect asylum decisions, including  variations in the types of cases immigration judges adjudicate, some of the  immigration judges who EOIR’s grant rate studies determined to be  unusually high granters and deniers of asylum may actually be less  extreme than they appear, while others who do not appear to be outliers  may actually be more extreme after statistical adjustment. Consequently,  some immigration judges identified as needing supervisory assistance and  attention when EOIR uses its grant rate results in combination with other  performance indicators may sometimes not be the same individuals who  are identified once certain factors associated with asylum decisions are  taken into account. We recognize that decisions about whether and which  immigration judges’ skills need improvement should not depend entirely  on statistical disparities in asylum decisions, as there are other indicators  (including high remand and reversal rates) that should be taken into  account in making such decisions. Nevertheless, we believe that the  information we produced, in conjunction with other indicators of  immigration judge performance that EOIR is collecting and considers to  be important, would put EOIR in a better position to identify immigration  judges who would benefit from supervisory attention and assistance.
While the information we produced through our analyses can be useful to  EOIR for a limited amount of time, it represents an analysis of immigration  judges’ decisions during a 12 ½ year period ending in April 2007. As time  goes on, there will be turnover in immigration judges, changes in country  conditions that will prompt changes in the composition of applicants  seeking asylum in this country, and possibly other unanticipated changes  that could affect variability in asylum outcomes. Periodic updates using  the types of multivariate analyses that we did would provide EOIR with a  more complete, accurate, and useful picture of immigration judge decision  making over time than the current approach. These analyses would also  facilitate EOIR’s goal of using data on grants and denials, in combination  with other information about immigration judges, to identify those whose  skills may need to be improved through training or other means. We  recognize that EOIR currently does not have the expertise or the budget to  perform sophisticated statistical analyses and that acquiring the expertise  would involve some cost. We believe that such an effort should be  considered, however, because ensuring both the reality and perception of  fairness in the asylum system is a worthwhile goal.
With regard to supervision, EOIR has made efforts to improve oversight  and management of the immigration courts by redeploying some ACIJs  from headquarters to field locations. However, EOIR has not determined  how many ACIJs it needs to effectively supervise immigration judges, and  it has not provided ACIJs with guidance on how to carry out their  supervisory role. We believe that building blocks of an effective  management system involve allocating the right number of resources and  delineating the responsibilities of individuals tasked with carrying out  supervisory functions. Doing so would put EOIR in a better position to  monitor immigration judge performance and take appropriate action to  correct or prevent immigration judge performance issues that may arise.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To address disparities in asylum outcomes that may be unwarranted and  to facilitate EOIR’s goal of identifying immigration judges who may benefit  from supplemental efforts to improve their performance, we recommend  that EOIR’s Chief Immigration Judge take the following two actions:    Utilize the information from our multivariate statistical analyses to  identify which immigration judges remained many times more or less  likely to grant asylum than others, after accounting for claimant and  immigration judge characteristics.
Identify and examine cost-effective options (e.g., developing an in- house capability or hiring a private contractor) for acquiring the  expertise needed to perform periodic multivariate statistical analyses  of immigration judges’ asylum decisions.
In addition, to more fully respond to the Attorney General’s directive to  strengthen management and oversight of immigration courts, we  recommend that EOIR’s Chief Immigration Judge    develop a plan for supervisory immigration judges, to include an  assessment of the resources and guidance needed to ensure that  immigration judges receive effective supervision.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We requested comments on a draft of this report from DOJ and DHS. DOJ  and DHS did not provide official written comments to include in our  report. However, on September 11, 2008, EOIR’s liaison stated that EOIR  agreed with our recommendations. EOIR also provided technical  comments, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate. In an  email received on September 19, 2008, DHS's liaison stated that DHS had  no comments on the report.
We are sending copies of this report to the interested congressional  committees, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security.  We will also provide copies to others on request. In addition, the report  will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. For further  information about this report, please contact Richard M. Stana, Director,  GAO Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-8777 or at  stanar@gao.gov. GAO staff members who were major contributors to this  report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our reporting objectives were to (1) identify what factors affected the  variability in asylum outcomes in immigration courts; (2) identify what  actions DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has taken  to assist applicants in obtaining legal representation and immigration  judges in rendering asylum decisions, and how, if at all, these actions  could be improved; (3) determine what changes in asylum backlogs and  outcomes occurred following the streamlining of appeals procedures at  the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA); and (4) identify what information  existed on the effects of the 1-year rule on reducing fraudulent asylum  applications and preventing applicants from being granted asylum and  what resources have been expended in adjudicating it.
To address the first and third objectives, we obtained and analyzed over 12  years of EOIR data on asylum outcomes in the immigration courts and at  the BIA. Our methods for obtaining and analyzing these data are described  below. Prior to developing and analyzing the EOIR data, we assessed the  reliability of each data source and used only the data that we found to be  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. The actions we took to  reach this conclusion are described in detail below.
To address our fourth objective, we also surveyed from May through July  2007 the 207 immigration judges who had been in their positions since at  least September 30, 2006, and elicited responses from them regarding the  challenges they faced in adjudicating the 1-year rule. In addition, we  obtained from DHS data on the number of applicants referred to  immigration court from the Asylum Division in fiscal years 1999 through  2007, and the percentage of referrals for which the 1-year rule was the  stated reason for referral.
To address all four of our objectives, we also analyzed research on factors  affecting asylum outcomes; reviewed DOJ documents covering asylum  policies and procedures; interviewed agency officials at headquarters and  in the field; and visited three of the four largest immigration courts in the  country, ranked in terms of asylum decisions in fiscal year 2006—New  York City, Los Angeles, and San Francisco—and two smaller immigration  courts handling large percentages of cases of aliens in detention—Varick  Street in New York City, and San Pedro, Calif.—where we spoke with  immigration judges, court administrators, attorneys representing asylum  applicants and for DHS, and representatives of immigrant advocacy  groups. We also observed removal hearings. Because we selected  nonprobablity samples of immigration courts and stakeholders associated  with these immigration courts, the information we obtained at these  locations may not be generalized either within the immigration courts or  to all immigration courts nationwide. However, the information we  obtained at these locations provided us with a perspective on  circumstances associated with asylum proceedings.
subsections: section_title: Factors Affecting Variability in Asylum Outcomes in Immigration Court
subsections: section_title: Analysis of Data on Immigration Judge Decisions
paragraphs: We used logistic regression multivariate statistical models to examine all  decisions rendered by immigration judges from October 1, 1994, through  April 30, 2007, that involved asylum seekers from the 20 countries that  produced the most asylum cases and the 19 immigration courts that  handled the largest numbers of asylum cases. Each of the 20 countries and  19 immigration courts contributed a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800  defensive asylum cases to our analyses. The results of our analysis cannot  be generalized to asylum seekers from other countries or to other  immigration courts. Our statistical models are described in more detail in  appendixes II and III.
To compile the data for analysis, we (1) obtained from EOIR, records of all  immigration court proceedings that occurred during the period covered by  the study, (2) selected those records where the immigration judge made  the first decision on the asylum application (eliminating decisions  rendered following appeals), (3) selected only the records for “lead”  applicants (eliminating duplicate decisions for a spouse and dependent  children), and (4) selected the immigration courts and countries that  contributed a minimum of 800 cases. We then (5) obtained biographical  information from EOIR on those immigration judges who had served  during the time period of the study, and (6) merged these data with the  EOIR proceedings data to produce a combined dataset for analysis that  contained proceedings records with information on the characteristics of  the applicants, the immigration judges, the immigration courts, and the  decision rendered on the applicants’ asylum applications.
Because we were interested in those proceedings in which the  immigration judge made an asylum decision without any review or  direction from the BIA, we limited our analysis data set to only those  proceedings with records that included the first decision on the merits of  the asylum case made by an immigration judge.
section_title: Data on Immigration Judge Characteristics
paragraphs: EOIR provided us biographical information, including prior employment  history and prior immigration court assignments, for 284 of the 295  immigration judges who had made asylum decisions during the period of  our study. We obtained additional biographical information on four  immigration judges by conducting searches on the Internet and confirmed  the accuracy of this additional information with EOIR. We obtained data  on immigration judges’ race/ethnicity, gender, age, and veteran status from  the Office of Personnel Management’s database on federal civilian  personnel, the Central Personnel Data File (CPDF). Table 6 below lists the  variables used in our analysis and the source of the data.
section_title: Data Analysis
paragraphs: The likelihood of a grant of asylum was the dependent variable in most of  our analyses. To measure the effect of factors that could explain the  variability in asylum outcomes, we modeled the effect of claimant,  immigration judge, and immigration court characteristics on case  outcome. We conducted separate analyses for affirmative and defensive  cases in our sample to control for characteristics shared by cases in each  of those groups that could affect case outcomes, such as whether the  asylum application had already been reviewed by an asylum officer. Data  limitations prevented us from controlling for factors other than those  listed in table 6 that could have contributed to variability in case  outcomes. The models we used are described in more detail in appendixes  II and III.
section_title: Reliability of the Immigration Court and Immigration Judge Data
paragraphs: Prior to developing our database, we assessed the reliability of the EOIR  data and the immigration judges’ biographical data. To assess the  reliability of the EOIR data, we (1) performed electronic testing for  obvious errors in accuracy and completeness; (2) analyzed related  documentation, including EOIR’s Automated Nationwide System for  Immigration Review (ANSIR) Field User Manual, and ANSIR Court  Administrators Handbook, a 2002 KPMG study of the reliability of  selected EOIR fields, and published research reports that made use of the  EOIR data; and (3) worked with agency officials to identify any data  problems. When we found apparent discrepancies (such as fields  containing what appeared to be erroneous data), we brought them to the  agency’s attention and worked with agency officials and data experts to  understand the data. We assessed the reliability of the immigration judge  biographical data by checking a selection of fields in our database against  information contained in the CPDF. Where direct comparison of the data  was not possible, we brought data that appeared to be erroneous to  EOIR’s attention, and updated our records where appropriate. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our  report.
section_title: Agency Interviews and Site Visits
paragraphs: To gain a better understanding of factors affecting asylum adjudications  and the reliability and validity of EOIR data on asylum adjudications, we  interviewed EOIR headquarters officials responsible for overseeing the  immigration courts, including the Chief Immigration Judge and Deputy  Chief Immigration Judges; and the Assistant Director of EOIR’s Office of  Planning, Analysis and Technology, which is responsible for EOIR’s  information technology, program evaluation, statistical analysis, and  reporting activities.
To obtain an overview of and perspectives on the asylum process, we  visited five immigration courts in three cities—Los Angeles and San Pedro  in Los Angeles, Calif.; New York City and Varick Street in New York, NY;  and San Francisco, Calif. These immigration courts handled 43 percent of  all asylum cases decided in fiscal year 2006, and consisted of two  immigration courts that handled large percentages of detained cases (San  Pedro and Varick Street), and three immigration courts that handled  primarily non-detained cases (Los Angeles, New York City, and San  Francisco). In each immigration court, we observed immigration  proceedings, which included initial master calendar and merit hearings on  asylum cases. We conducted semi-structured interviews with the ACIJ  with responsibility for the immigration courts we visited. In addition, we  interviewed a total of 22 immigration judges representing a range of grant  rates in the five immigration courts. To further our understanding,  including how cases are allocated to immigration judges and how data on  immigration proceedings are recorded in EOIR’s case management  system, we interviewed the court administrator of each of the five  immigration courts we visited. In the three cities, we also interviewed (1)  seven ICE Assistant Chief Counsels (known as ICE trial attorneys) with  varying levels of experience prosecuting asylum cases in the five  immigration courts. We also interviewed the Deputy Chief Counsels in the  Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco immigration courts; (2) six  members of the private bar who represented asylum applicants in  immigration court proceedings; and (3) groups of immigration advocates  and pro bono providers, totaling 25 participants across the three cities.  Because we selected nonprobability samples of immigration courts and  stakeholders associated with these courts, the information we obtained at  these locations may not be generalized either within immigration courts or  to all immigration courts nationwide. However, the information we  obtained at these locations provided us with a perspective on  circumstances associated with asylum proceedings.
section_title: EOIR Actions to Assist Applicants and Immigration Judges
paragraphs: To identify what actions EOIR has taken to assist applicants and  immigration judges in the asylum process and how, if at all, these actions  could be improved, we reviewed the Attorney General’s 2006 directives to  institute reforms in the immigration courts and BIA, and obtained  information from EOIR regarding its implementation of the directives.  Regarding initiatives designed to assist applicants, we reviewed the Vera  Institute of Justice’s evaluation of EOIR’s Legal Orientation Program and  the BIA’s evaluation of its pro bono program as well as the Office of Chief  Immigration Judge’s “Guidelines for Facilitating Pro Bono Legal  Services.” Regarding actions to assist immigration judges in adjudicating  asylum cases, we reviewed EOIR’s Operating Policy and Procedure  Memorandums on Asylum Request Processing, and Immigration Judges  Decisions and Immigration Judge Orders, among others; training materials  for new immigration judges, including the agenda and materials from  EOIR’s 2007 annual Immigration Judges Training conference; the  Immigration Judge Benchbook, and the legal examination administered to  new immigration judges. We also interviewed EOIR’s ACIJ for Conduct  and Professionalism and ACIJ for Training as well as the coordinator for  EOIR’s Legal Orientation and Pro Bono Program, regarding the  implementation of the Attorney General’s 2006 directives. To obtain  information on EOIR’s studies of immigration judge grant rates, we  interviewed knowledgeable EOIR officials, and obtained documentation  on the data queries EOIR conducted to determine the grant rates.
section_title: Did the Asylum Backlog and Asylum Outcomes Change Following BIA Streamlining?
subsections: section_title: Analysis of Changes in the BIA Backlog
paragraphs: To examine what changes in asylum backlogs and outcomes occurred at  the BIA following the streamlining changes implemented in March 2002,  we (1) obtained from EOIR records of all appeals of immigration judge  decisions received or completed between October 1, 1994, and September  30, 2007, and (3) selected only those records pertaining to lead applicants.  For each fiscal year from 1995 through 2007, we computed the “pending  caseload” as the number of appeals received during the current fiscal year  or any prior fiscal year that had not been completed by the end of the  current fiscal year. We repeated this analysis for those appeals involving  aliens who had filed an asylum application in immigration court.
section_title: Analysis of Changes in Outcomes for Asylum Applicants
paragraphs: To determine if the proportion of decisions favorable to the asylum  applicant changed following the March 2002 streamlining, we merged the  BIA appeals records with the immigration proceedings records compiled  for objective 1 and conducted a series of descriptive analyses comparing  the outcomes of BIA decisions before and after the streamlined  procedures took effect.
For our analysis of appeals outcomes, we limited our analysis data set to  appeals (1) pertaining to lead applicants who had filed an asylum  application in immigration court and (2) involving immigration judge  decisions in removal, deportation, and exclusion hearings (what the BIA  refers to as “Case Appeals”) rather than other kinds of appeals arising  from immigration judge proceedings. These appeals accounted for 58  percent of all decisions stemming from appeals of immigration judge  proceedings during fiscal year 2007. We matched the resulting set of BIA  records with the database of immigration judge asylum decisions  developed for objective 1. If more than one BIA case appeal record was  associated with a single immigration judge decision, we selected the case  appeal that occurred first in order to eliminate BIA decisions that resulted  from a remand order from the U.S. courts of appeals.
We examined BIA decisions for fiscal years 1998 through 2006. We chose  this time period because the starting point for our immigration judge data  was October 1994, and a BIA appeal could take an average of 1 to 2 years  to complete. We did not examine BIA decisions from fiscal year 2007  because we did not have immigration judge data for the full fiscal year.
To examine asylum appeals that BIA decided on the merits of the case, we  analyzed only those cases where the appeal had been filed in a timely  fashion, within 30 days of the decision rendered by the immigration judge.  We selected only cases that involved applicants who had filed for asylum,  rather than other forms of relief, to help ensure that the immigration  judge’s asylum decision was likely a central focus of the appeal.
In order to correctly categorize whether the BIA decision favored the alien  or DHS, we had numerous meetings with EOIR officials and data  specialists regarding the meaning of EOIR’s codes for decisions rendered  by the BIA. EOIR stated that its data system did not capture the specific  issue on appeal to the BIA, and thus it would be difficult to determine  whether some BIA decisions favored the alien or the DHS without  examining the actual record of appeal. In other cases, according to EOIR,  the decision could be identified as favoring the alien or DHS, if the  decision field were examined simultaneously with other data elements,  including the party that had filed the appeal and the decision of the  immigration judge on the asylum application. In those cases where it was  not possible to determine from the EOIR data if the decision favored the  alien or DHS, we coded the BIA decision as neither favoring the alien nor  favoring DHS (such as in the case of an Affirmance without Opinion  without a grant of Voluntary Departure). In those cases, we looked further  to determine whether a formal order of removal had been entered by the  BIA. Our coding scheme is detailed in table 7, below.
section_title: Reliability of Data on BIA Appeals
paragraphs: We assessed the reliability of the EOIR’s data on BIA asylum appeals  decisions by (1) performing electronic testing for obvious errors in  accuracy and completeness; (2) analyzing related documentation,  including a 2002 KPMG study of the reliability of selected EOIR fields and  published research reports that made use of the data sources; and (3)  working closely with agency officials to identify any data problems. When  we found apparent discrepancies (such as fields containing what appeared  to be erroneous data) we brought them to the agency’s attention and  worked with it to understand the discrepancies before conducting our  analyses. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of our report.
section_title: Reliability of Data on Panel versus Single- Member BIA Decisions
paragraphs: We examined the outcomes of appeals that were decided by single BIA  members and by panels of three members. Based on our analysis of the  field indexing who made the decision and further discussions with EOIR  data specialists, we determined that the reliability of the field indexing  single versus panel decisions was unknown for years prior to fiscal year  2004 and was most reliable since fiscal year 2004, because of extensive  training provided to the BIA staff. Thus, we examined outcomes for fiscal  years 2004 through 2006.
section_title: Document Review and Interviews with Agency Officials
paragraphs: To gain a better understanding of the procedural changes in adjudication  procedures that have occurred at the BIA since 1999 (referred to as  “Streamlining”), we reviewed the streamlining regulations;  memorandums issued by the BIA Chairman between November 2000 and  August 2002 expanding the categories of appeals for which streamlined  procedures were authorized; two independent assessments of the 1999  and 2002 procedural changes; and an analysis of the association between  the change in procedures at the BIA and the increase in petitions for  review of these decisions in the U.S. courts of appeal. We also  interviewed the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the BIA; officials from  DOJ’s Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL), which handles and  coordinates all federal court litigation arising under the Immigration and  Nationality Act, including petitions for review in the federal courts; and  Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the Southern District of New York. Until  recently, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York  handled all alien petitions for review in the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of  Appeals. We also interviewed seven federal appeals court judges who were  available and agreed to meet with us in the two circuits handling the  largest number of petitions for review of BIA decisions (the 2nd and 9th  circuits).
section_title: Information on the 1- Year Rule
paragraphs: To address issues regarding the effects of the 1-year rule and resources  expended adjudicating it, we added questions about immigration judges’  views of the 1-year rule to a Web-based survey of immigration judges that  was being conducted as part of another GAO review. The survey was  sent to all immigration judges identified as having been in their position  since at least September 30, 2006—a total of 207 immigration judges. GAO  social science survey specialists along with GAO staff knowledgeable  about asylum adjudications developed the survey instrument. We sent a  draft of the survey to EOIR officials and ACIJs for preliminary review to  ensure that our questions were clear and unambiguous and used clear  terminology and appropriate response options, and that the survey was  comprehensive and unbiased. We also asked for and received comments  from National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) representatives  on the draft immigration judge survey. We considered comments and  suggestions from all parties and made revisions where we thought  warranted. We conducted telephone pretests of the survey with three  immigration judges in three different immigration courts to ensure that the  questions were clear and concise, and refined the instrument based on  feedback we received. The survey, which was conducted between May 30  and July 29, 2007, resulted in a response rate of 77 percent. In analyzing  the survey data, we generated descriptive statistics on the close-ended  survey responses and had two GAO analysts review all of the open-ended  responses.
To review information on how many cases were referred to the  immigration courts by DHS asylum officers, we obtained data from  USCIS’s Asylum Division. To assess the reliability of these data, we  reviewed existing information about the Asylum Division’s data systems  and reviewed the data for obvious errors in accuracy or completeness. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for presenting overall  trends in 1-year rule referrals. We did not report data for fiscal year 2007  because we were unable to verify these data with the data from another  Asylum Division report.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2005 through  September 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Differences in Asylum Grant Rates across Immigration Courts
paragraphs: In this appendix, we present descriptive information on how immigration  judge decisions differed for affirmative and defensive cases as a function  of the asylum seeker’s nationality, the immigration court, and time period  the asylum case was heard in, and whether the asylum seeker was  represented, had dependents, and applied for asylum within a year of  entering the country. For defensive cases, we further considered whether  the asylum seeker had ever been detained. We also provide statistical  results from logistic regression models that estimated the effects of these  different factors to determine whether differences in decisions across  immigration courts persisted after these other factors were controlled.
Our analyses included all asylum cases decided from October 1, 1994,  through April 30, 2007, that involved asylum seekers from the 20 countries  that produced the most asylum cases and the 19 immigration courts that  handled the largest numbers of asylum cases. Each of the 20 countries and  19 immigration courts contributed a minimum of 800 asylum cases to our  analyses. The 20 countries represented 73 percent of all asylum cases that  were decided during this period, and the 19 immigration courts  represented 87 percent of all asylum cases. This combination of countries  and immigration courts yielded slightly more than 198,000 cases for our  analyses, which constituted 66 percent of all asylum cases decided during  this period. We excluded roughly 4 percent of these cases because they  had missing data on one or more of the variables we used in our analyses.
subsections: section_title: Overall Grant and Denial Rates
paragraphs: Table 8 shows the numbers and percentages of affirmative and defensive  asylum cases across the countries and immigration courts analyzed that  were granted and denied, with the denied cases broken out separately  according to whether or not the asylum decision was made in absentia  (that is, the asylum seeker failed to appear before the immigration judge).  Asylum denials were far more frequent than grants, with immigration  judges granting less than 30 percent of either affirmative or defensive  asylum cases. They granted asylum in a somewhat higher percentage of  affirmative cases (29.8 percent) than defensive cases (24.7 percent). The  percentage of affirmative cases denied because the asylum seeker was in  absentia was much higher for affirmative cases (19.0 percent) than for  defensive cases (3.8 percent).
section_title: Grant and Denial Rates by Immigration Court
paragraphs: Table 9 shows, separately for affirmative and defensive cases, differences  in the percentages of cases granted and denied across the 19 different  courts in our analysis. The percentage of affirmative cases that were  granted asylum ranged from 2.4 percent in Atlanta to 47.6 percent in New  York. The percentage of defensive cases that were granted asylum ranged  from 6.7 percent in Atlanta to 34.6 percent in San Francisco. The  percentages of cases denied because of the asylum seeker’s being in  absentia also varied markedly across the 19 courts, especially for  affirmative cases where the numbers of in absentia cases were larger. In  Los Angeles and Atlanta, 46.3 percent and 61.5 percent of affirmative  asylum cases, respectively, were denied as a result of the asylum seeker’s  being in absentia, while the same was true of only roughly 1 percent of the  affirmative cases in Orlando, San Francisco, and Seattle.
section_title: Grant and Denial Rates by Nationality
paragraphs: We examined whether the sizable differences in the percentage of cases  granted and denied asylum across immigration courts may be because the  fact that immigration courts differ in the types of cases they handle,  particularly in terms of differences in asylum seekers’ nationality. Table 10  shows the different grant rates for asylum seekers from different  countries, again for affirmative and defensive cases separately. While the  percentage of affirmative cases granted asylum equaled or exceeded 50  percent for asylum seekers from some countries—including Albania,  China, Ethiopia, Iran, Russia, and Yugoslavia—it was lower than 10  percent for asylum seekers from other countries, including El Salvador,  Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico. Pronounced differences in the  percentage of cases granted asylum across countries are evident for  defensive cases, as well. Nearly half or more than half of the asylum  seekers in defensive cases from Ethiopia, Iran, and Somalia were granted  asylum, while the same was true of only about 10 percent, or less than 10  percent, of the asylum seekers in defensive cases from El Salvador,  Honduras, and Indonesia. Among affirmative cases, there are also sizable  differences in the percentages denied because of asylum seekers’ being in  absentia. For example, fully two-thirds of such cases from Mexico were  denied, but only 2 or 3 percent of the cases involving Colombians or  Haitians were denied with the claimant in absentia.
section_title: Grant and Denial Rates by Claimant Characteristics
paragraphs: Table 11 presents information, separately for affirmative and defensive  asylum cases, on how grant rates differed across different claimant  characteristics. For example, the percentage of affirmative and defensive  cases that were granted asylum increased over time. The top panel of table  11 shows the percentages of cases granted and denied in three different  periods. The three periods cover the interval (1) from the beginning of our  data series on October 1, 1994, until March 30, 1997, the day prior to the  implementation date for Immigration Reform and Immigrant  Responsibility Act of 1996; (2) from April 1, 1997, through September 10,  2001; and (3) from September 11, 2001, through the final day in our data  series on April 30, 2007. The percentage of affirmative cases that were  granted asylum increased from 9.5 percent in the first period, to 26.8  percent in the second period, to 41.8 percent in the third. The percentage  of defensive cases that were granted asylum increased from 15.3 percent  in the first period to 26.0 percent in the second period and 28.6 percent in  the third. For affirmative cases in particular, denials resulting from  claimants’ being in absentia decreased considerably over the three periods  from 44.0 percent in the first period, to 22.7 percent in the second, and to  4.3 percent in the third. Case outcome also differed as a function of  whether claimants were represented, had dependents, or filed their claims   within 1 year of entering the country. For affirmative cases, (1) 36.8  percent of claimants who were represented were granted asylum,  compared to 4.0 percent who were not represented; (2) 40.2 percent of the  claimants with dependents were granted asylum, compared with 28.4  percent of the claimants without dependents; and (3) 36.5 percent of  claimants who applied for asylum within 1 year of entering the country  were granted asylum, compared to 18.4 percent who applied more than 1year later. nounced  differences, for claimants in defensive cases. For defensive cases, we also  considered whether there were differences between those who had and  had not been detained, but as the bottom panel of table 13 shows, those  differences were very small (24.1 percent versus 25.4 percent).
section_title: Grant and Denial Rates by Country and Immigration Court
paragraphs: To get a general sense of whether the seemingly large disparities in asylum  outcomes across immigration courts were associated with the fact that  different immigration courts handled different numbers of cases from the  20 countries we considered, we first looked at how, for claimants from the  same country, decisions differed depending on which immigration court  handled their case. In doing so, we restricted our analysis to immigration  courts that handled 50 or more affirmative cases and 50 or more defensive  cases from a given country, both to simplify our results and to avoid giving  too much weight to differences in percentages that were based on very  small numbers of cases. Table 12 shows the percentages granted and  denied when the cases denied in absentia are excluded. When looking at  differences in grant rates for the same country across immigration courts,  we excluded cases denied in absentia because the denial of in absentia  cases involves no judicial discretion.
Table 12 shows the percentages granted and denied across immigration  courts, for both affirmative and defensive cases, for cases from the 20  countries. While grant rates for affirmative cases were similar for a few  countries, such as Bangladesh and Iran, there were large differences in  grant rates across immigration courts for most countries. For example, 12  percent of Chinese asylum seekers in affirmative cases were granted  asylum in Atlanta, while 75 percent were granted asylum in Orlando.  Similarly, less than 1 percent of Guatemalans in affirmative cases were  granted asylum in Atlanta, while slightly more than 30 percent were  granted asylum in San Francisco. Claimants in affirmative cases from  many other countries show markedly different percentages granted across  the various immigration courts they came into. The percentages granted in  such cases range from 21 percent to 68 percent for Albanians, from 14  percent to 69 percent for Colombians, and from 14 percent to 77 percent  for Ethiopians. For many countries, the percentage of defensive cases that  were granted asylum varied similarly depending upon the immigration  court they came into.
section_title: Logistic Regression Results: Odds of Being Granted Asylum
paragraphs: One of the difficulties with interpreting the results shown in Table 12,  above, is that there are so many comparisons that can be made and that  these three-way cross-classifications (e.g., immigration court by asylum  decision by country) do not take into account the other characteristics of  the claimants that, as we showed in Table 11, can affect asylum decisions;  namely, the period in which the cases were heard, whether the asylum  seekers were represented, whether they had dependents, whether they  applied for asylum within a year of entering the country, and whether,  among those whose cases were defensive, they had ever been detained. An  alternative approach to assessing the variability in granting asylum across  immigration courts is to use logistic regression models, which allow us to  estimate the differences across immigration courts in a multivariate  context, or while controlling statistically (and simultaneously) for the  effects of these other factors. In tables 13 and 14, we show the results of  fitting logistic regression models to the data for affirmative and defensive  cases respectively, in both cases after excluding those cases that were in  absentia.
Before describing the results of the multivariate regression models, we  first note one fundamental difference between them and our foregoing  results, which is that in logistic regression models we use odds and odds  ratios, rather than percentages and percentage differences, to compare  countries (or differences by period, between cases represented, and so  on). The odds themselves are fairly straightforward and can, when we are  looking at the effect of one factor at a time on the likelihood of cases being  granted asylum, be calculated directly from the percentages granted. To  estimate the differences across immigration courts, for example, we can  calculate the odds on cases’ being granted in each immigration court,  which is simply the percentage granted divided by the percentage not  granted. In the case of the Atlanta immigration court, the odds on being  granted would be 6.1/93.9 = 0.07 (see table 13). This odds has a  straightforward interpretation, and indicates that 0.07 cases were granted  for every 1 case that was not, or that 7 cases were granted for every 100  that were not. The odds on being granted can be similarly calculated and  interpreted for the other immigration courts, and at the bottom of Tables  13 and 14, we also show the odds on cases’ being granted across  categories of the other factors as well (i.e., period, representation, etc.).
To compare immigration courts or different categories of the other  variables, we choose one immigration court or one category of the other  variables as a referent category, and calculate odds ratios that indicate  how different the odds are for other immigration courts or other  categories versus that one. In assessing immigration courts, we arbitrarily  chose Denver as the referent category. As shown in columns 4 and 5 in  table 13, by dividing, for example, the odds on being granted asylum in  Atlanta (0.07) and the same odds in Baltimore (0.90) by the odds in Denver  (0.51), we find that the odds on granting asylum (in affirmative cases) are  lower in Atlanta than in Denver, by a factor of 0.13, but higher in Baltimore  than in Denver, by a factor of 1.79. Without adjusting for the effects of  immigration court, nationality, time period, representation, dependents,  timeliness of application, and detention status, this means that for  affirmative cases, the odds on asylum being granted in Baltimore were  about 14 times greater than in Atlanta (1.79 unadjusted odds ratio in  Baltimore divided by .13 unadjusted odds ratio in Atlanta, which are  shown in column 5 in table 13).
The full set of “unadjusted” odds ratios comparing all immigration courts  with Denver are given in column 5 of table 13 for affirmative cases, and  column 5 of table 13 for defensive cases. These unadjusted odds ratios  indicate the differences in the odds on being granted asylum across the  various categories of the different factors, when factors are considered  one at a time. Tables 13 and 14 also show unadjusted odds ratios  comparing differences across countries, periods, representation  categories, dependents categories, entry-to-application categories and, in  table 16, categories that indicate whether the applicants for asylum in  defensive cases had ever been detained.
When considering one factor at a time, these unadjusted odds ratios can  be directly calculated from the percentages granted and denied across the  categories of each factor. However, when we want to consider the effects  of the different factors simultaneously—that is, to estimate differences  across immigration courts after taking account of which countries the  asylum seekers came from, when their case was heard, whether they were  represented, etc., we use multivariate logistic regression models which  involve an iterative statistical estimation procedure to obtain a net effect  estimate for each factor. These are referred to as “adjusted odds ratios,”  shown in column 6 of tables 13 and 14.
The adjusted odds ratios tell us that even after adjusting for the sizable  differences in the odds on asylum’s being granted across countries, across  the different periods, and across categories of representation, dependents,  entry-to-application time, and whether ever detained (for defensive cases  only), there remain sizable differences across immigration courts. That is,  even after we take account of the effects of all these other factors and  how, for example, immigration courts differ in terms of the asylum  seekers’ nationalities and when asylum seekers’ cases were heard, we find  sizable differences across immigration courts in the odds on granting  asylum. After controlling for all of these factors, the net effect was that in  comparison with Denver, the likelihood of affirmative cases’ being granted  asylum was 2.15 times greater in San Francisco, half as likely in  Bloomington, and less than one-fifth as likely in Atlanta. This implies that,  for affirmative cases, the odds on asylum’s being granted were about 4  times greater in San Francisco than in Bloomington (2.15 adjusted odds  ratio in San Francisco divided by .5 adjusted odds ratio in Bloomington,  which are shown in column 6 of table 13), and almost 13 times greater in  San Francisco than in Atlanta (2.15 odds ratio in San Francisco divided by  .17 odds ratio in Atlanta), even after the other differences in claimant  characteristics, including where they came from, were controlled. Other  large differences are implied by these adjusted odds ratios, for both  affirmative and defensive cases. The adjusted odds comparing each  immigration court with every other immigration court are shown in table  15 (for affirmative cases) and table 16 (for defensive cases).
While controlling for these other factors sometimes alters the relative  likelihoods in granting asylum across the different immigration courts, it  does not diminish the overall finding that there are substantial differences  across immigration courts. Figures 11 and 12 show the odds ratios (with  their 95 percent confidence intervals) that indicate how much different the  odds on granting asylum were across immigration courts before and after  adjusting for the other factors, for affirmative and defensive cases  respectively. Figure 11 shows that for affirmative decisions, even after  adjustments, three immigration courts (Orlando, San Francisco, and New  York) had significantly higher odds than the referent immigration court  (Denver), by factors ranging from roughly 1.6 to 2.2. Four other  immigration courts (Atlanta, Detroit, Bloomington, and San Diego) had  significantly lower odds of granting asylum than the Denver immigration  court, by factors ranging from 0.2 to 0.6. This implies that all of the former  three immigration courts had significantly higher odds of granting asylum  than the latter four immigration courts, by factors ranging from roughly 3  to 13. Figure 12 shows fairly similar disparities across immigration courts  for defensive decisions, with the Orlando, San Francisco, and New York  courts again being significantly more likely and the Atlanta, Detroit, and  Bloomington (but not San Diego) courts being significantly less likely than  other courts to grant asylum.
section_title: Appendix III: Differences in Asylum Grant Rates across Immigration Judges
paragraphs: In this appendix, we present information on how asylum decisions differed  across immigration judges. First, we look at all immigration judges across  the 19 immigration courts in our study who heard 50 or more affirmative  or defensive cases in their primary immigration court. Then, we look at  how decisions were affected by characteristics of the different  immigration judges. And finally we look at selected immigration courts by  country combinations to see how sizable differences were when different  immigration judges heard cases involving applicants for the same country  in the same immigration court. In the immigration court by country  analyses, we limited the analysis to immigration judges who saw 20 or  more affirmative and defensive cases. In these analyses, the immigration  judges were not necessarily in their primary court.
subsections: section_title: Logistic Regression Analyses of Grant and Denial Rates for Immigration Judges from the Same Immigration Courts Handling Asylum Cases from the Same Countries
paragraphs: In our final set of analyses, we focused on asylum outcomes in six country-  immigration court combinations (1) affirmative Chinese cases in New  York, (2) affirmative Chinese cases in Los Angeles, (3) affirmative Haitian  case in Miami, (4) affirmative Indian cases in San Francisco, (5) defensive  Chinese cases in New York, and (6) defensive Haitian cases in Miami. We  selected these country- immigration court combinations because they had  a sufficiently large number of immigration judges rendering a sufficiently  large number of decisions to produce reliable estimates in our logistic  regression analyses. We examined differences across immigration judges  within the same immigration court in judges’ likelihood of granting asylum  to applicants of the same nationality. Because the number of immigration  judges in these analyses ranged from only 25 to 47, we looked at the effect  of immigration judge characteristics one at a time, while controlling for  the full set of claimant characteristics. The results of these analyses are  summarized in table 21, below. Immigration judges used in the analysis  had seen at least 20 cases during this time period, and we excluded  immigration judges who had all grants or all denials.
Many and often most of the immigration judges in the same immigration  court differed significantly in their likelihood of granting asylum to  applicants from the same nationality when compared to the immigration  judge who represented the average likelihood of granting asylum in that  immigration court (the “average immigration judge”). This was the case  both before and after we statistically controlled for the effects of five  claimant characteristics (represented, claimed one or more dependents on  application, filed for asylum within 1 year of entry to the United States,  time period in which application was filed, ever detained). When the  effects of these 5 factors were accounted for, it was still the case that  relative to the grant rate of the “average immigration judge” who ruled on  similar cases in each immigration court, the grant rates of many  immigration judges in the same immigration court were significantly  different (either in the direction of having grant rates that were  significantly higher or lower than that of the average immigration judge).  Specifically,  the decisions of 77 percent of immigration judges in New York differed  significantly from that of the average immigration judge for affirmative  applicants from China,  the decisions of 55 percent of immigration judges in Los Angeles  differed significantly from that of the average immigration judge for  affirmative applicants from China.  the decisions of 70 percent of immigration judges in Miami differed  significantly from that of the average immigration judge for affirmative  applicants from Haiti,  the decisions of 79 percent of immigration judges in San Francisco  differed significantly from that of the average immigration judge for  affirmative applicants from India,  the decisions of 41 percent of immigration judges in New York differed  significantly from that of the average immigration judge for defensive  applicants from China, and  the decisions of 39 percent of immigration judges in Miami differed  significantly from that of the average immigration judge for defensive  applicants from Haiti.
We found that certain claimant and immigration judge characteristics did  not have significant effects on asylum outcomes for the nationalities  examined within the same immigration court, while others did.  Specifically, after simultaneously controlling for the effects of the other  factors, we found that for the six specific immigration court/nationality  combinations in our analysis, asylum outcomes were generally not  significantly affected by    whether or not an immigration judge had previous experience doing  immigration work for a nonprofit organization;    whether or not an immigration judge had previous immigration  the immigration judge’s gender (except for Haitians in Miami, where  both affirmative and defensive applicants were 30 percent as likely to  be granted asylum if the immigration judge was male rather than  female);    The immigration judge’s race/ethnicity (except for Chinese in Los  Angeles and Haitians in Miami, where affirmative applicants were more  than twice as likely to be granted asylum if the immigration judge was  white, nonHispanic rather than other race/ethnicity);  the immigration judge’s veteran status (except for Haitians in Miami,  where defensive applicants were 40 percent as likely to be granted  asylum if the immigration judge was a veteran);    whether the immigration judge was appointed during a Democratic or  Republican presidential administration (except for Chinese in New  York, where affirmative applicants were more than twice as likely to be  granted asylum, and defensive applicants were almost 3 times as likely  to be granted asylum by immigration judges who were appointed  during a Republican presidential administration); or  the age of the immigration judge (except for Haitians in Miami where  affirmative applicants were nearly twice as likely to be granted asylum  by older rather than younger immigration judges).
In contrast, certain characteristics did have significant effects on asylum  outcomes, and we found the size of these effects in the six immigration  court/nationality combinations to be similar to those found across all  immigration judges and all immigration courts. Specifically, asylum grants  were generally significantly higher when the following circumstances were  present:    Applicants were represented. This was the case in five of the six  immigration court/nationality combinations we examined. For  example, representation was associated with a six-fold increase in  asylum grants for affirmative applicants from India who filed their  cases in San Francisco and a two-fold increase in asylum grants for  affirmative applicants from China who filed their cases in Los Angeles,  as well as defensive applicants from Haiti who filed their case in Miami.  Only affirmative Chinese applicants in New York failed to gain  significantly more grants of asylum when represented.
Applicants claimed one or more dependents on the asylum application.
This was the case in five of the six immigration court/nationality  combinations we examined. For example, claiming dependents was  associated with nearly a fourfold increase in asylum grants for  defensive applicants from China who filed their cases in New York  City; and a twofold increase in asylum grants for affirmative applicants  from China who filed their cases in New York or Los Angeles, as well  as affirmative applicants from Haiti who filed their case in Miami. Of  the six, only defensive Haitian applicants in Miami failed to obtain  significantly more grants of asylum when claiming one or more  dependents on the asylum application.
Results for other characteristics were mixed. For example, immigration  judges who handled 65 cases or more at the time of the hearing were in  some instances more likely, and in others less likely to grant asylum than  those who handled less than 30 cases at the time of the hearing.
Immigration judges in Miami who handled affirmative and defensive  Haitian cases, were only 60 percent as likely to grant asylum if their  caseload size was 65 or more rather than less than 30.
section_title: Appendix IV: Prior Research on Factors Affecting Asylum Decisions
paragraphs: Several recent studies have used EOIR administrative data to examine  asylum decisions by immigration judges and other adjudicators and have  concluded that asylum decisions varied significantly across immigration  judges, and immigration courts, for both affirmative and defensive  applicants from a variety of countries of origin. Of these, three studies  attempted to statistically control for differences among cases by looking at  “similarly situated” applicants. These studies cross-tabulated adjudicators’  asylum grant rates with one or two other factors, such as applicants of the  same nationality in the same immigration court or applicants of the same  nationality who were also represented by counsel. Two studies attempted  to correlate adjudicators’ grant rates with other factors, such as the gender  of the adjudicator or his or her prior employment experience.
Two studies published in 2006 and 2007 by Syracuse University’s  Transactional Records Analysis Clearinghouse examined decisions by  immigration judges who decided at least 100 asylum cases during the  period covering fiscal years 1995 to 2005 and 2001 to 2006, respectively.  Each study reported that there was substantial variation in asylum grant  rates across judges in many of the nation’s immigration courts and for  applicants from a wide range of countries of origin.
A study published in 2007 by researchers at Temple and Georgetown  universities found substantial variation in asylum decisions made by  asylum officers, immigration judges, and federal appeals court judges. To  examine adjudicator decisions in “similarly situated” cases, the  researchers selected applicants from 15 “Asylee Producing Countries” that  produced at least 500 cases before the Asylum Office or immigration court  during fiscal year 2004 and a national grant rate of at least 30 percent in  either of these venues. The study defined “substantial variation” as  deviations by individual adjudicators in asylum offices, immigration  courts, or federal courts of more than 50 percent from that venue’s  average. Among other things, the study found that more than 25 percent  of the immigration judges in the three largest immigration courts had  asylum grant rates that deviated from their own immigration court’s  average asylum grant rate by more than 50 percent. The study also found  that female immigration judges were more likely to grant asylum than  male immigration judges, and immigration judges who came from private  law practices, often representing aliens, were more likely to grant asylum  than immigration judges who previously worked for the government.  These findings were similar to those of the San Jose Mercury News, which  in 2000 reported on its analysis of asylum decisions made between 1995  and 1999.
A 2005 report by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom  examined a subset of immigration judge decisions for defensive asylum  applicants who were apprehended when they attempted to enter the  country illegally at or between ports of entry. Using a nonrepresentative  sample of 14 immigration courts, the study analyzed variation in asylum  grant rates across immigration judges for fiscal years 2000 to 2003. The  study found statistically significant variations in the asylum decisions of  immigration judges in the same immigration court. The study did not  examine other factors that could contribute to variability in asylum  decisions such as the nationality of the applicants or characteristics of the  immigration judges.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Richard M. Stana, (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov.
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Evi Rezmovic, Assistant Director,  and Tom Jessor, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. Douglas  Sloane, Lisa Mirel, Grant Mallie, and David Alexander made significant  contributions to the study’s design, methodology, and data analysis. Yvette  Gutierrez-Thomas, Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt, Odi Cuero, and Bari Bendell  contributed to numerous aspects of the work. Frances Cook and Jan  Montgomery provided legal support; Lara Kaskie and Debbie Sebastian  provided assistance with report preparation; Lori Weiss and Tracey Cross  provided expertise on Asylum Division issues; Travis Broussard provided  assistance in compiling immigration judge biographical data; Orlando  Copeland provided technical support for graphics presentations; Karen  Burke and Tina Cheng developed the report graphics; and Anna Maria  Ortiz verified the results of our statistical analyses.