Budget Process: Extending Budget Controls
Published: 2002-04-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The events of September 11 imposed new demands on the federal budget, while pent-up demands from years of fighting deficits remain. In the past, GAO has suggested four broad principles for a budget process. That process should (1) provide information on the long-term impact of decisions, both macro--linking fiscal policy to the long-term economic outlook--and micro--providing recognition of the long-term spending implications of government commitments; (2) provide information and focus on important macro trade-offs--e.g., between investment and consumption; (3) provide information to make informed trade-offs between missions and between the different policy tools of government; and (4) be enforceable, provide for control and accountability, and be transparent, using clear, consistent definitions. New rules and goals will be necessary to ensure fiscal discipline and to focus on long term implications of decisions. The federal government still needs a decision-making framework to evaluate choices between today's and future needs. Amending the current Budget Enforcement Act without setting realistic caps and addressing mandatory programs is unlikely to be successful because the original act used limited actions to achieve a balanced budget. A budget process appropriate for the early 21st century needs a broader framework for thinking about near- and long-term fiscal goals.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: It is a pleasure to join you today as you think about how to extend and  adapt the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) regime.  The discretionary  spending limits and pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) mechanism established by  BEA will expire this year.
Last summer when I appeared before this Committee, we were discussing  what kind of process and controls made sense in a time of surplus.  Today—for a variety of reasons—we face a different outlook.  The events  of September 11 impose a new set of demands on the federal budget.  At  the same time, the pent-up demands kept in abeyance during years of  fighting deficits remain.  The question before you is what kind of process  and controls will permit Congress and the president to respond to the  needs of today while keeping in mind the need to deal with the budgetary  challenges looming over the horizon.
Later in this statement I will talk about some particular elements and ideas  that have been proposed for adapting and extending budget enforcement  mechanisms.  Before doing that, however, I would like to step back and  talk a bit about what a budget process can and cannot do.
A budget process can surface important issues; it can seek to focus the  debate on the important choices.  But it is not a substitute for substantive  debate—no process can force agreement where one does not exist.
We ask a great deal of our budget process.  We use it to determine  aggregate fiscal policy and to allocate resources across different claims.  We use it to drive program management.  In the context of the Government  Performance and Results Act, we turn to the budget to tell us something  about the cost of obtaining a given level of results.
BEA, when first developed and later when it was extended, was a process  established to enforce a previously reached substantive agreement.  Last  year, given 10-year projections showing fairly sizable surpluses, there was a  good deal of discussion about how much of the surplus should be spent (or  used for a tax cut) and how much of it should be used for debt reduction.  At that time, Congress and the president seemed to have reached a tacit  agreement that the Social Security surplus should be used for debt  reduction.  While this did not eliminate disagreements about tax or  spending policy, it did provide a fiscal target to replace  “zero deficit” or  “balanced budget.” It set the outside parameters for the budget debate.
As I have testified before, the budget represents the decisions made about a  large number of often conflicting objectives that citizens want the  government to address. We should not be surprised that it generates  controversy.  As BEA expires, you face a wealth of options and choices.  I  appreciate the invitation to talk about some of these today.  Some of these  points are discussed more fully in the BEA compliance report that we did  last year at your request, Mr. Chairman.
subsections: section_title: Principles for a Budget Process
paragraphs: In the past, we have suggested four broad principles or criteria for a budget  process. A process should provide information about the long-term impact of decisions, both  macro—linking fiscal policy to the long-term economic outlook—and  micro—providing recognition of the long-term spending implications of  government commitments; provide information and be structured to focus on important macro  trade-offs—e.g., between investment and consumption; provide information necessary to make informed trade-offs between  missions (or national needs) and between the different policy tools of  government (such as tax provisions, grants, and credit programs); and be enforceable, provide for control and accountability, and be  transparent, using clear, consistent definitions.
The lack of adherence to the original BEA spending constraints in recent  years and the expiration of BEA suggest that now may be an opportune  time to think about the direction and purpose of our nation’s fiscal policy.  The surpluses that many worked hard to achieve—with help from the  economy—not only strengthened the economy for the longer term but also  put us in a stronger position to respond to the events of September 11 and  to the economic slowdown than would otherwise have been the case.  Going forward, the nation’s commitment to surpluses will be tested:  a  return to surplus will require sustained discipline and difficult choices. It  will be important for Congress and the president to take a hard look at  competing claims on the federal fisc. A fundamental review of existing  programs and operations can create much needed fiscal flexibility to  address emerging needs by weeding out programs that have proven to be  outdated, poorly targeted, or inefficient in their design and management.  Last October, you and your Senate counterparts called for a return to  budget surplus as a fiscal goal. This remains an important fiscal goal, but  achieving it will not be easy. Much as the near-term projections have  changed in a year, it is important to remember that even last year the long- term picture did not look rosy. These long-term fiscal challenges argued for  continuation of some fiscal restraint even in the face of a decade of  projected surpluses.  The events of September 11 reminded us of the  benefits fiscal flexibility provides to our nation’s capacity to respond to  urgent and newly emergent needs.  However, as the comptroller general  has pointed out, absent substantive changes in entitlement programs for  the elderly, in the long term there will be virtually no room for any other  federal spending priorities—persistent deficits and escalating debt will  overwhelm the budget.While the near-term outlook has changed, the long- term pressures have not. These long-term budget challenges driven by  demographic trends also serve to emphasize the importance of the first  principle cited above—the need to bring a long-term perspective to bear on  budget debates.
There is a broad consensus among observers and analysts who focus on the  budget both that BEA has constrained spending and that continuation of  some restraint is necessary both in times when near-term deficits are  accepted and when we achieve surpluses. These views have been  articulated by commentators ranging from Federal Reserve Chairman Alan  Greenspan to former CBO Director Robert Reischauer, the Concord  Coalition, and President Bush. Discussions on the future of the budget  process have primarily focused on revamping the current budget process  rather than establishing a new one from scratch.
Where the discussion focuses on specific control devices, the two most  frequently discussed are:(1) extending the discretionary spending caps and  (2) extending the PAYGO mechanism.
section_title: Recent History of Budget Enforcement Rules
paragraphs: The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (Title XIII of P.L. 101-508) was  designed to constrain future budgetary actions by Congress and the  president.  It took a different tack on fiscal restraint than earlier efforts,  which had focused on annual deficit targets in order to balance the budget.Rather than force agreement where there was none, BEA was designed to  enforce a previously reached agreement on the amount of discretionary  spending and the budget neutrality of revenue and mandatory spending  legislation.  The law was extended twice.
While there is widespread agreement among observers and analysts of the  budget that BEA served for much of the decade as an effective restraint on  spending, there is also widespread agreement that BEA control  mechanisms were stretched so far in the last few years that they no longer  served as an effective restraint.  In part, recurring budget surpluses  undermined the acceptance of the spending caps and PAYGO enforcement.
Figure 1 illustrates the growing lack of adherence to the original  discretionary spending caps since the advent of surpluses in 1998.  The  figure shows the original budget authority caps as established in 1990 and  as extended in 1993 and 1997, adjustments made to the caps, and the level  of actually enacted appropriations for fiscal years 1991 through 2002. As we  reported in our last three compliance reports, the amounts designated as  emergency spending for fiscal years 1999 and 2000—$34.4 billion and  $30.8 billion respectively—were significantly higher than in most past  years. In addition to the larger than normal amounts, emergency  appropriations in both 1999 and 2000 were used for a broader range of  purposes than in most prior years.
Emergency spending designations have not been the only route to spending  above the discretionary spending caps.  For fiscal year 2001 Congress took  a different approach—one that also highlights the declining effectiveness  of the BEA discretionary spending limits.  The Foreign Operations  Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-429) raised the 2001 budget authority cap by  $95.9 billion, a level assumed to be sufficient to cover all enacted and  anticipated appropriations. Also, in January 2001, CBO reported that  advance appropriations, obligation and payment delays, and specific  legislative direction for scorekeeping had been used to boost discretionary  spending while allowing technical compliance with the limits. In 2002,  Congress once again raised spending limits to cover enacted  appropriations.  The Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental  Appropriations Act for 2002 adjusted the budget authority caps upward by  $134.5 billion.
Nor has PAYGO enforcement been exempt from implementation  challenges.  The consolidated appropriations acts for both fiscal years 2000  and 2001 mandated that OMB change the PAYGO scorecard balance to  zero.  In fiscal year 2002, a similar instruction in the Department of Defense  and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act eliminated $130.3 billion  in costs from the PAYGO scorecard.  Both OMB and CBO estimated that  without the instructions to change the scorecard, sequestrations would  have been required in both 2001 and 2002.
section_title: Extending Caps on Discretionary Spending
paragraphs: BEA distinguished between spending controlled by the appropriations  process—“discretionary spending”—and that which flowed directly from  authorizing legislation—“direct spending,” sometimes called “mandatory.”  Caps were placed on discretionary spending—and Congress’ compliance  with the caps was relatively easy to measure because discretionary  spending totals flow directly from legislative actions (i.e., appropriations  laws).
As I noted above, there has been broad consensus that, although the caps  have been adjusted, they did serve to constrain appropriations. This  consensus, combined with the belief that continuing some restraints is  important, has led many to propose that some form of cap structure be  continued as a way of limiting discretionary appropriations.  However, the  actions discussed above have also led many to note that caps can only  work if they are realistic; while caps can work if they are tighter than some  may like, they are unlikely to hold if they are seen as totally unreasonable  or unrealistic.  If they are set at levels viewed as reasonable (even if not  desirable) by those who must comply with them, spending limits can be  used to force choices.  In the near term, limits on discretionary spending  may be an important tool to prompt reexamination of existing programs as  well as new proposals.
Some have proposed changes in the structure of the caps by limiting them  to caps on budget authority.  Outlays are controlled by and flow from  budget authority—although at different rates depending on the nature of  the program.  Some argue that the existence of both budget authority and  outlay caps has encouraged provisions such as “delayed obligations” to be  adopted not for programmatic reasons but as a way of juggling the two  caps.  The existence of two caps may also encourage moving budget  authority from rapid spend out to slower spend out programs, thus pushing  more outlays to the future and creating problems in complying with outlay  caps in later years.  Extending only the budget authority cap would  eliminate the incentive for such actions and focus decisions on that which  Congress is intended to control—budget authority, which itself controls  outlays. This would be consistent with the original design of BEA. The  obvious advantage to focusing decisions on budget authority rather than  outlays is that Congress would not spend its time trying to control the  timing of outlays.
However, eliminating the outlay cap would raise several issues—chief  among them being how to address the control of transportation programs  for which no budget authority cap currently exists, and the use of advance  appropriations to skirt budget authority caps.  However, agreements about  these issues could be reached—this is not a case where implementation  difficulties need derail an idea.  For example, the fiscal year 2002 budget  proposed a revision to the scorekeeping rule on advance appropriations so  that generally they would be scored in the year of enactment.  Such a  scoring rule change could eliminate the practice of using advance  appropriations to skirt the caps. The 2002 Congressional Budget Resolution  took another tack; it capped advance appropriations at the amount  advanced in the previous year.  This year the Administration proposed that  total advance appropriations continue to be capped in 2003 and the  president’s budget assumed that all advance appropriations would be  frozen except for those that it said should be reduced or eliminated for  programmatic reasons.
There are other issues in the design of any new caps. For example, for how  long should caps be established? What categories should be established  within or in lieu of an overall cap? While the original BEA envisioned three  categories (Defense, International Affairs, and Domestic), over time  categories were combined and new categories were created. At one time or  another caps for Nondefense, Violent Crime Reduction, Highways, Mass  Transit and Conservation spending existed—many with different  expiration dates. Should these caps be ceilings, or should they—as is the  case for highways and conservation—provide for “guaranteed” levels of  funding? The selection of categories—and the design of the applicable  caps—is not trivial. Categories define the range of what is permissible. By  design they limit tradeoffs and so constrain both Congress and the  president.
Because caps are defined in specific dollar amounts, it is important to  address the question of when and for what reasons the caps should be  adjusted. This is critical for making the caps realistic. For example, without  some provision for emergencies, no caps can be successful. In the recent  past it appears that there has been some connection between how realistic  the caps are and how flexible the definition of emergency is.  As discussed  in both our 2000 and 2001 compliance reports, the amount and range of  spending considered as “emergency” has grown in recent years. There  have been a number of approaches suggested to balance the need to  respond to emergencies and the desire to avoid making the “emergency”  label an easy way to raise caps. The House Budget Resolution for fiscal  year 2002 (H. Con. Res. 83) established a reserve fund of $5.6 billion for  emergencies in place of the current practice of automatically increasing the  appropriate levels in the budget resolution for designated emergencies. It  also established two criteria for defining an emergency.  These criteria  require an emergency to be a situation (other than a threat to national  security) that (1) requires new budget authority to prevent the imminent  loss of life or property or in response to the loss of life or property and  (2) is unanticipated, meaning that the situation is sudden, urgent,  unforeseen, and temporary.
In the past others have proposed providing for more emergency spending  under any spending caps—either in the form of a reserve or in a greater  appropriation for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). If  such an approach were to be taken, the amounts for either the reserve or  the FEMA disaster relief account would need to be included when  determining the level of the caps. Some have proposed using a 5- or 10-year  rolling average of disaster/emergency spending as the appropriate reserve  amount. Adjustments to the caps would be limited to spending over and  above that reserve or appropriated level for extraordinary circumstances.  Since the events of September 11—and the necessary responses to it—  would undoubtedly qualify as such an “extraordinary circumstance,”  consideration of new approaches for “emergency” spending should  probably focus on what might be considered “more usual” emergencies.  It  has been suggested that with additional up-front appropriations or a  reserve, emergency spending adjustments could be disallowed.  No matter  what the provision, only the commitment of Congress and the president  can make any limit on cap adjustments for emergencies work. States have  used this reserve concept for emergencies, and their experiences indicate  that criteria for using emergency reserve funds may be useful in controlling  emergency spending. Agreements over the use of the reserve would also  need to be achieved at the federal level.
This discussion of issues in extending the BEA caps is not exhaustive.  Previously, we have reported on two other issues in particular—the scoring  of operating leases and the expansion of user fees as offsets to  discretionary spending.  I would like to touch briefly on these.
section_title: Miscellaneous Discretionary Challenges: Leases and User Fees
paragraphs: We have previously reported that existing scoring rules favor leasing when  compared to the cost of various other methods of acquiring assets.Currently, for asset purchases, budget authority for the entire acquisition  cost must be recorded in the budget up front, in the year that the asset  acquisition is approved.  In contrast, the scorekeeping rules for operating  leases often require that only the current year’s lease costs be recognized  and recorded in the budget.  This makes the operating lease appear less  costly from an annual budgetary perspective, and uses up less budget  authority under the cap.  Alternative scorekeeping rules could recognize  that many operating leases are used for long-term needs and should be  treated on the same basis as purchases. This would entail scoring up front  the present value of lease payments for long-term needs covering the same  time period used to analyze ownership options. The caps could be adjusted  appropriately to accommodate this change.  Most recently this issue has  arisen in authority provided to the Air Force to lease 100 Boeing aircraft to  be used as tankers for up to 10 years when the underlying need for such  aircraft is much longer—in fact, the need would likely encompass the  aircraft’s entire useful life.  Changing the scoring rule for leases would be in  part an attempt to have the rules recognize the long term need rather than  the technical structuring of the lease.
Many believe that one unfortunate side effect of the structure of BEA has  been an incentive to create revenues that can be categorized as “user fees”  and so offset discretionary spending—rather than be counted on the  PAYGO scorecard. The 1967 President’s Commission on Budget Concepts  recommended that receipts from activities which were essentially  governmental in nature, including regulation and general taxation, be  reported as receipts, and that receipts from business-type activities “offset  to the expenditures to which they relate.” However, these distinctions have  been blurred in practice. Ambiguous classifications combined with budget  rules that make certain designs most advantageous has led to a situation in  which there is pressure to treat fees from the public as offsets to  appropriations under BEA caps, regardless of whether the underlying  federal activity is business or governmental in nature. Consideration  should be given to whether it is possible to come up with and apply  consistent standards—especially if the discretionary caps are to be  redesigned.  The Administration has stated that it plans to monitor and  review the classification of user fees and other types of collections.
section_title: Extending and Refining PAYGO
paragraphs: The PAYGO requirement prevented legislation that lowered revenue,  created new mandatory programs, or otherwise increased direct spending  from increasing the deficit unless offset by other legislative actions. As long  as the unified budget was in deficit, the provisions of PAYGO—and its  application—were clear. During our few years of surpluses, questions were  raised about whether the prohibition on increasing the deficit also applied  to reducing the surplus. Although Congress and the executive branch both  concluded that PAYGO did apply in such a situation—and although the  question is moot currently, it would be worth clarifying the point if PAYGO  is extended.  Last year the Administration proposed—albeit implicitly—  special treatment for a tax cut. The 2002 budget stated that the president’s  tax plan and Medicare reforms were fully financed by the surplus and that  any other spending or tax legislation would need to be offset by reductions  in spending or increases in receipts.  Ultimately, the Department of Defense  and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 2002 eliminated the  need to offset any of the PAYGO legislation by resetting the 2001 and 2002  scorecard to zero.  While this action was undertaken for a number of  reasons, when surpluses return and Congress looks to create a PAYGO  process for a time of surplus, it might wish to consider the kinds of debt  targets we found in other nations. For example, it might wish to permit  increased direct spending or lower revenues as long as debt held by the  public is planned to be reduced by some set percentage or dollar amount.  Such a provision might prevent PAYGO from becoming as unrealistic as  overly tight caps on discretionary spending.  However, the design of such a  provision would be important—how would a debt reduction requirement  be specified?  How would it be measured?  What should be the relationship  between the amount of debt reduction required and the amount of surplus  reduction (i.e., tax cut or direct spending increase) permitted?  What, if any,  relationship should there be between this calculation and the discretionary  caps?
While PAYGO constrained the creation or legislative expansion of direct  spending programs and tax cuts, it accepted the existing provisions of law  as given.  It was not designed to trigger—and it did not trigger—any  examination of “the base.”  Cost increases in existing mandatory programs  are exempt from control under PAYGO and could be ignored.  However,  constraining legislative actions that increase the cost of entitlements and  mandatories is not enough.  GAO’s long-term budget simulations show that  as more and more of the baby boom generation enters retirement, spending  for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid will demand correspondingly  larger shares of federal revenues.  Assuming, for example, that last year’s  tax reductions are made permanent and discretionary spending keeps pace  with the economy, spending for net interest, Social Security, Medicare, and  Medicaid consumes nearly three-quarters of federal revenues by 2030,  leaving little room for other federal priorities, including defense and  education.
The budget process is the one place where we as a nation can conduct a  healthy debate about competing claims and new priorities.  However, such  a debate will be needlessly constrained if only new proposals and activities  are on the table.  A fundamental review of existing programs and  operations can create much-needed fiscal flexibility to address emerging  needs by weeding out programs that have proven to be outdated, poorly  targeted, or inefficient in their design and management.  It is always easier  to subject proposals for new activities or programs to greater scrutiny than  that given to existing ones.  It is easy to treat existing activities as “given”  and force new proposals to compete only with each other.  However, such  an approach would move us further from, rather than nearer to, budgetary  surpluses.
Previously we suggested some sort of “lookback” procedure to prompt a  reexamination of “the base” in entitlement programs. Under such a process  Congress could specify spending targets for PAYGO programs for several  years. The president could be required to report in his budget whether  these targets either had been exceeded in the prior year or were likely to be  exceeded in the current or budget years. He could then be required to  recommend whether any or all of this overage should be recouped—and if  so, to propose a way to do so. Congress could be required to act on the  president’s proposal.
While the current budget process contains a similar point of order against  worsening the financial condition of the Social Security trust funds, it  would be possible to link “tripwires” or “triggers” to measures related to  overall budgetary flexibility or to specific program measures.  For example,  if Congress were concerned about declining budgetary flexibility, it could  design a “tripwire” tied to the share of the budget devoted to mandatory  spending or to the share devoted to a major program.
Other variations of this type of “tripwire” approach have been suggested.  The 1999 Breaux-Frist proposal (S. 1895) for structural and substantive  changes to Medicare financing contained a new concept for measuring  “programmatic insolvency” and required congressional approval of  additional financing if that point was reached. Other specified actions  could be coupled with reaching a “tripwire,” such as requiring Congress or  the president to propose alternatives to address reforms. Or the  congressional budget process could be used to require Congress to deal  with unanticipated cost growth beyond a specified “tripwire” by  establishing a point of order against a budget resolution with a spending  path exceeding the specified amount. One example of a threshold might be  the percentage of gross domestic product devoted to Medicare. The  president would be brought into the process as it progressed because  changes to deal with the cost growth would require enactment of a law.
section_title: Improving the Recognition of Long- Term Commitments
paragraphs: In previous reports we have argued that the nation’s economic future  depends in large part upon today’s budget and investment decisions. In  fact, in recent years there has been increased recognition of the long-term  costs of Social Security and Medicare.
While these are the largest and most important long-term commitments—  and the ones that drive the long-term outlook—they are not the only ones  in the budget.  Even those programs too small to drive the long-term  outlook affect future budgetary flexibility.  For Congress, the president, and  the public to make informed decisions about these other programs, it is  important to understand their long-term cost implications.  A longer time  horizon is useful not only at the macro level but also at the micro-policy  level.  I am not suggesting that detailed budget estimates could be made for  all programs with long-term cost implications.  However, better  information on the long-term costs of commitments like employee pension  and health benefits and environmental cleanup could be made available.  New concepts and metrics may be useful. We developed them before for  credit programs and we need to be open to expanding them to cover some  other exposures.  I should note that the president’s fiscal year 2003 budget  has taken a step in this direction by proposing that funding be included in  agency budgets for the accruing costs of pensions and retiree health care  benefits.
The enactment of the Federal Credit Reform Act in 1990 represented a step  toward improving both the recognition of long-term costs and the ability to  compare different policy tools.  With this law, Congress and the executive  branch changed budgeting for loan and loan guarantee programs.  Prior to  Credit Reform, loan guarantees looked “free” in the budget.  Direct loans  looked like grant programs because the budget ignored loan repayments.  The shift to accrual budgeting for subsidy costs permitted comparison of  the costs of credit programs both to each other and to spending programs  in the budget.
Information should be more easily available to Congress and the president  about the long-term cost implications both of existing programs and new  proposals.  In 1997 we reported that the current cash-based budget  generally provides incomplete information on the costs of federal  insurance programs. The ultimate costs to the federal government may  not be apparent up front because of time lags between the extension of the  insurance, the receipt of premiums, and the payment of claims.  While there  are significant estimation and implementation challenges, accrual-based  budgeting has the potential to improve budgetary information and  incentives for these programs by providing more accurate and timely  recognition of the government’s costs and improving the information and  incentives for managing insurance costs.  This concept was proposed in the  Comprehensive Budget Process and Reform Act of 1999 (H.R. 853), which  would have shifted budgetary treatment of federal insurance programs  from a cash basis to an accrual basis.
There are other commitments for which the cash and obligation-based  budget does not adequately represent the extent of the federal  government’s commitment.  These include employee pension programs,  retiree health programs, and environmental clean-up costs.  While there are  various analytical and implementation challenges to including these costs  in budget totals, more could be done to provide information on the long- term cost implications of these programs to Congress, the president, and  the interested public.  We are continuing to analyze this issue.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: To affect decision making, the fiscal goals sought through a budget process  must be accepted as legitimate.  For many years the goal of “zero deficit”—  or the norm of budget balance—was accepted as the right goal for the  budget process.  In the absence of the zero deficit goal, policymakers need  an overall framework upon which a process and any targets can be based.  When the deficits turned to surpluses, there was discussion of goals framed  in terms of debt reduction or surpluses to be saved.  As difficult as selecting  a fiscal goal in times of surplus is, selecting one today may seem even more  difficult.  You must balance the need to respond not only to those demands  that existed last year—demands kept in abeyance during many years of  fighting deficits—but also demands imposed on us by the events of  September 11.  At the same time—in part because of the demographic tidal  wave looming over the horizon—the events of September 11 do not argue  for abandonment of all controls.
Whatever interim targets Congress and the president agree on, compliance  with budget process rules, in both form and spirit, is more likely if end  goals, interim targets, and enforcement boundaries are both accepted and  realistic.
Enforcement is more successful when it is tied to actions controlled by  Congress and the president.  Both the BEA spending caps and the PAYGO  enforcement rules were designed to hold Congress and the president  accountable for the costs of the laws enacted each session—not for costs  that could be attributed to economic changes or other factors.