Military Recruiting: Army National Guard Needs to Continue Monitoring, Collect Better Data, and Assess Incentives Programs
Published: 2015-11-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Recruiters are often referred to as the “face” of the ARNG. In the past, there have been allegations of recruiter misconduct and misuse of financial incentives, making it important for recruiters to ensure procedures are followed when working with applicants and that incentives to join the ARNG are awarded properly and effectively.
House Report 113-446 included a provision for GAO to review the ARNG's recruiting practices. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) ARNG has provided oversight of its recruiting process; (2) ARNG met its goals for recruiting, completion of initial military training, and initial term of service; and (3) OSD, Department of the Army, and ARNG have conducted oversight of ARNG's enlistment financial incentives programs. For this work, GAO reviewed DOD and ARNG recruiting policy and procedures and interviewed cognizant officials. GAO analyzed data on recruiting from FY2010 through FY2014, training from FY2011 through FY2014, and initial term of service for FY2015. GAO visited four states representing a range of size and locations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army National Guard (ARNG) has taken steps to increase oversight of its recruiting process primarily conducted by recruiters dispersed at the state-level but has not established a permanent program to monitor state-level recruiting activities. In June 2014, the ARNG created a Recruiting Standards Branch that has started to conduct inspections of state offices. The Recruiting Standards branch completed inspections in 16 states from October 2014 through July 2015 and found that 2 states did not achieve full compliance in their inspections. However, this is not a permanent program, and ARNG officials stated that they are using positions to staff it intended for use in other areas. The ARNG is seeking approval for permanent staff by early 2017 to continue its oversight. Continued monitoring of state-level recruiting activities, such as through a permanent recruiting standards branch, will be important to ARNG's oversight functions.
The ARNG had mixed results in meeting its overall recruiting goals and nearly met its goals for initial military training; however, the ARNG does not track whether soldiers are completing their initial term of service or military obligation. The ARNG met its recruiting goals in 2 of the 5 years from fiscal years (FY) 2010 through 2014. While the ARNG nearly met its goals for training completion from FY 2011 through 2014, GAO found that the ARNG does not have complete, consistent, and valid data on why soldiers do not complete training and when they separate during training. Without consistent, complete, and valid data, decision makers do not have information to determine why a higher number of soldiers are not completing training. The ARNG also does not track whether soldiers are completing their initial term of service. GAO's analysis shows that about 40 percent of enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG from FY 2001 through 2007 did not complete their initial term of service. Without tracking completion of initial term of service, ARNG officials cannot assess whether their programs are effective in meeting personnel requirements and do not have visibility to ensure the ARNG is maximizing its investment in its soldiers.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Department of the Army (Army), and ARNG have not fully conducted their oversight responsibilities of ARNG enlistment financial-incentives programs. OSD has not enforced a requirement that ARNG report incentives obligated through the ARNG incentives programs. Further, although Army and National Guard regulations require evaluations of the effectiveness of the ARNG financial incentives programs, the Army and ARNG have not evaluated and documented the effectiveness of the programs. Without evaluating and documenting the effectiveness of ARNG incentives programs, officials may not know whether changes are needed for effective use of incentives or they may determine that certain financial incentives are not needed. Moreover, the ARNG has not ensured that recruiters have an understanding of available financial incentives. Financial incentives are a tool available to recruiters and agency policy states that incentives are available to assist in meeting and sustaining readiness requirements and to assist in filling critical shortages. ARNG has not provided recruiters with training on using financial incentives. With additional training, recruiters could better understand when and how to offer financial incentives to fill critical positions.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends, among other things, that ARNG take actions to collect consistent, complete, and valid data on soldiers who do not complete training and initial term of service, and evaluate and document its incentives programs. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations but stated that it did not concur with the report due to GAO's depiction of waivers. GAO disagrees with DOD's characterization as discussed in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The nearly 15 years of deployment of U.S. troops in a wartime  environment has proved challenging for recruiting servicemembers for the  Department of Defense (DOD). At the height of Operations Enduring  Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Department of the Army and the  National Guard Bureau (NGB) allowed applicants with lower aptitude  scores or prior felony convictions to enlist in order to ensure that the Army  National Guard (ARNG) and Active Army could meet their respective  missions. However, since the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom and a  significant drawdown from Afghanistan, the Department of the Army and  NGB have issued guidance prohibiting approval of waivers for applicants  with prior criminal offenses, such as certain types of sexual offenses, as  well as increasing the applicant aptitude score standards. These changes  and other factors such as a less physically fit youth population have  reduced the pool of qualified applicants for the ARNG and make it more  difficult for recruiters to meet defined recruiting goals.
The ARNG primarily relies upon recruiters dispersed at the state-level to  conduct its recruiting process. Recruiters are often referred to as the  “face” of their respective military component. and any type of recruiter  misconduct could have significant implications for DOD. In the past, there  have been allegations of recruiter misconduct with applicants resulting in  negative perceptions about military service. This makes it important for  recruiters to ensure that proper procedures are followed when interacting  with applicants and that recruiters correctly assess applicant eligibility.  Further, the ARNG has had trouble in the past meeting its recruiting  goals, which inherently applies more pressure for recruiters to enlist  applicants. With the Army’s downsizing and the current fiscal  environment, including the Budget Control Act of 2011, DOD faces an  uncertain future where personnel decisions may prove even more  important and where there is particular need for effective measures such  as financial incentives to help the ARNG meet its recruiting mission and  readiness requirements.
House Report 113-446 accompanying a bill for the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for us to  review the ARNG’s recruiting practices and report to the defense  committees. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) the ARNG has  provided oversight of its recruiting process; (2) the ARNG met its goals for  recruiting, completion of initial military training, and completion of initial  term of service in recent years; and (3) the Office of the Secretary of  Defense (OSD), Department of the Army, and ARNG have conducted  their oversight responsibilities of the ARNG’s financial incentives  programs. Also, the House report included two additional provisions: (1) a  provision for us to assess the extent to which contracting vehicles used to  support ARNG recruiting were in compliance with DOD and Department  of the Army policies and regulations, and (2) a provision for us to assess  the numbers of individuals who complete basic and advanced individual  training and the average length of time between when a person enlists in  the ARNG and when the person completes initial military training. To  address the first of these two additional provisions, we reviewed findings  from and the status of recommendations by the U.S. Army Audit Agency  and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for  Procurement to improve contracting processes at NGB. A Deputy  Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement official determined that  this information is sensitive but unclassified so we provided a briefing in  October of 2015 separately to the committees. To address the second  provision, we have included results of our analyses in appendixes II, III,  IV, and V.
For our first objective, we obtained and reviewed DOD guidance  regarding ARNG oversight of its recruiting process and interviewed  officials from ARNG. To describe how states conduct oversight over the  recruiting process, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of four states  based on varying factors such as state ARNG assigned end-strength,  the total number of enlistments, and geographic locations. We selected  Texas and Pennsylvania as two states with a large-size ARNG end- strength, Virginia as a state with a medium-size end-strength, and Idaho  as a state with a small-size end-strength. We obtained and reviewed  applicable state and local recruiting and retention guidance and  interviewed recruiting officials at each of these four selected states. The  observations from these four selected states are not generalizable to all  states and territories but provide important insight into ARNG oversight of  its recruiting process.
For the second objective, we obtained aggregate recruiting data and  associated goals from the ARNG. We compared data on the ARNG’s  annual recruiting goals for enlistments with the number of enlistments in  the ARNG for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, respectively. We chose  fiscal year 2010 as the start date because our prior work discussed the  extent to which the ARNG met its recruiting goals from fiscal years 2000  through 2009. We chose fiscal year 2014 as the end date because it was  the most recently available data at the time of our review. To determine  the extent to which the ARNG met goals for completion of initial military  training, we compared the ARNG’s goals for completion of initial military  training with ARNG-reported completion rates for fiscal years 2011  through 2014. We were not able to assess the extent to which the ARNG  met its goals for completion of initial military training prior to fiscal year  2011 either because the goals were not available or the goals in place  were not comparable to the completion rates provided for fiscal years  2004 through 2014. We chose fiscal year 2014 as the end date because it  was the most recently available data at the time of our review. Lastly, to  determine the extent to which the ARNG met goals for completion of  initial term of service, we compared the ARNG’s fiscal year 2015 attrition  goal for completion of initial term of service with the ARNG’s completion  rate as of May 2015, which was the most recently available data. We  could not assess the extent to which the ARNG met goals prior to fiscal  year 2015 because ARNG officials stated that the goals have changed  over time and could not provide goals for previous fiscal years.
For our third objective, we obtained and analyzed relevant policy and  guidance documents to identify oversight responsibilities for ARNG  incentives programs. We interviewed officials from the ARNG to gain an  understanding of how incentives policies and guidance are being applied.  We interviewed officials from OSD, the Department of the Army, and the  ARNG about how they conduct oversight of ARNG incentives programs.  To gain an understanding of how incentives are being implemented  during recruiting and retention activities, we obtained and analyzed  applicable state and local incentive policies and interviewed recruiting and  retention officials from the four selected states.
Further, to assess the number of individuals who complete basic and  advanced individual training and the average length of time between  when a person enlists in the ARNG and when the person completes initial  military training, we obtained and analyzed record-level data on enlisted  soldiers. Appendix I provides additional information on our scope and  methodology. We elaborate on the results from our analysis in  appendixes II and III and provide additional analysis related to the length  of time soldiers who did not meet their initial term of service stayed in the  ARNG in appendix IV, and provide the reasons why soldiers left the  ARNG prior to completing their initial term of service in appendix V.
To assess the reliability of the data used in this report, we analyzed the  data for inconsistencies, incomplete data fields, and outliers. We also  reviewed relevant documentation about the data systems and guidance  provided to the states and territories on how to report recruiting and  retention data. We followed up with the ARNG to discuss limitations we  identified and requested revised data or made adjustments to our  analysis, when possible, to mitigate these limitations. We noted any  limitations in the report, where appropriate. We determined that the data  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing the extent to which  enlisted soldiers completed their initial military training; the length of time  it took for these soldiers to complete their initial military training and  become qualified for their military occupational specialty; the extent to  which enlisted soldiers completed their initial term of service; the length of  time enlisted soldiers who did not complete their initial term of service  served in the ARNG; and the reasons why enlisted soldiers who  graduated from their training but did not complete their initial term of  service left the ARNG. We identified some data limitations, which we  discuss in this report.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2014 to November  2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The ARNG performs both federal and state missions and is one of two  reserve components of the Department of the Army, the Army Reserve  being the other reserve component. The ARNG provides trained and  equipped units ready to (1) defend property and life to the 54 states and  territories and (2) respond to overseas combat missions, counterdrug  efforts, reconstruction missions, and more, as needed. The Secretary of  the Army is responsible for creating overarching policy and guidance for  all of components of the Army, including the ARNG. The Chief of NGB is,  among other responsibilities, the official channel of communication  between the Department of the Army and the 54 states and territories in  which the ARNG has personnel assigned, and is responsible for ensuring  that ARNG personnel are accessible, capable, and trained to protect the  homeland and to provide combat resources to the Army.
subsections: section_title: Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: NGB has issued guidance to ARNG personnel within the states and  territories for recruiting and retention, and the adjutants general of each  state are generally responsible for developing and implementing  programs or policies that are consistent with NGB guidance. The Chief  of NGB issued the National Guard regulation that is intended to integrate  all of the recruiting and retention programs, policies, and procedures  necessary for developing, implementing, and monitoring the ARNG  strength maintenance program in the states and territories. Appendix VI  shows selected instructions, regulations, and other criteria related to  recruiting and retention. Although the Director, ARNG, has overall  responsibility for maintaining policy and programs for the ARNG recruiting  programs, OSD requires certain recruiting-related reports to be submitted.  These include reports on the numbers of enlistment waivers, recruiting  resources, recruiting production data, and recruiter irregularities.
Each year, Congress, through the National Defense Authorization Act,  provides the ARNG with an overall authorized end-strength.  Subsequently, the Director, ARNG, develops a recruiting mission with a  goal of fully utilizing that overall authorized end-strength. The Director,  ARNG, provides individual end-strength goals and recruiting missions to  the adjutants general of the 54 states and territories. In order to help the  states and territories achieve state-level end-strength goals, the Chief of  NGB, through the ARNG Strength Maintenance Division, provides the  state-level ARNG in each of the 54 states and territories with funding,  personnel, guidance, and training. Further, financial incentives are  available in order to help personnel in the states and territories in meeting  and sustaining ARNG end-strength goals. Within the Department of the  Army, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel is responsible  for reviewing, monitoring, and evaluating the effectiveness of ARNG  incentives programs. The Director, ARNG, is responsible for exercising  staff supervision and management of financial incentives programs  pertaining to ARNG soldiers. Within the ARNG, the ARNG-Personnel  Programs, Resources, and Manpower Division (ARNG-HRM) is  responsible for developing budget requests for financial incentives,  developing and implementing policy, and conducting oversight. Within  each state and territory, the adjutant general is responsible for  development and implementation of the state strength maintenance  program and has a recruiting and retention battalion that manages  recruiting and retention personnel and day-to-day operations. ARNG  recruiters are assigned to a recruiting and retention battalion in the 54  states and territories, and each battalion commander issues an annual  mission for enlistment based on various factors with a goal of achieving  the state annual end-strength goal. Military Entrance Processing Stations  are responsible for testing and conducting physical examinations on  applicants prior to their joining a military component. At each Military  Entrance Processing Station, an ARNG Guidance Counselor is  responsible for processing ARNG applicants and ensuring that all  paperwork is complete and that the applicant meets eligibility standards.
In contrast to how active-Army recruiters are only responsible for  recruiting, ARNG recruiters are responsible for recruiting, retention, and  attrition for their assigned area of operations in their assigned state or  territory. To achieve the goal of fully utilizing the ARNG’s overall  authorized end-strength ceiling, the ARNG-HRM works with state-level  military personnel officers and recruiting and retention battalions in the 54  states and territories and adjusts annual recruiting and reenlistment  missions as necessary. Further, ARNG applicants generally are placed in  unit vacancies within a 50-mile radius of an applicant’s home. This  approach generally limits the pool of applicants to positions in close  proximity to the applicants’ homes, while active-Army applicants are not  limited to a specific geographic region and are recruited for positions  where available worldwide.
section_title: Prior GAO Work on DOD Recruiting Practices
paragraphs: Our prior work has reviewed military recruiting practices and made a  number of recommendations to address recruiting-related issues, such as  improving the use of financial incentives and oversight of recruiter  activities:  In November 2005, we reported that DOD lacked information on financial incentives provided for certain occupational specialties, making it difficult for the department to determine whether financial incentives were being targeted effectively. We recommended that the DOD components, including the ARNG, report all of their over- and underfilled occupational specialties, including the reasons why the occupational specialties are over- and underfilled, and to justify their use of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses provided to servicemembers in occupational specialties that have more personnel than authorized. In addition, we recommended that DOD develop a management plan to address recruiting and retention challenges. DOD partially concurred with our recommendations but did not implement them.
We reported in May 2009 that the Army had substantially increased its recruiters and funding for incentives, although it had not used existing research to identify and set bonuses at dollar amounts that are the most effective. We recommended that the Department of the Army take a number of steps to ensure cost-effective measures are taken, and DOD concurred with three recommendations and partially concurred with the fourth. DOD implemented one of our recommendations regarding building on currently available analysis to help set bonus amounts.
We reported in January 2010 that the military components were not consistently reporting cases of recruiter irregularities and that greater oversight by OSD was needed. We made four recommendations regarding increasing visibility and tracking of recruiter irregularities, and DOD concurred with all of the recommendations. DOD implemented three of our recommendations regarding clarifying, sharing, and tracking of recruiter irregularity data but did not implement our recommendation to include appropriate disclosures  concerning data limitations in recruiter irregularity reports.
We reported in July 2015 that Army reserve components did not  have complete, accurate, and timely information to report soldiers’  nonavailability rates and that multiple systems did not interface in a  way to allow for timely updates between all systems. We made four  recommendations regarding data reliability, and DOD concurred with  all of the recommendations.
Appendix VII identifies our recommendations from selected prior reports  and the status of DOD’s implementation.
section_title: The ARNG Has Recently Taken Steps to Increase Oversight of the Recruiting Process but Has Not Permanently Established a Program to Monitor State-Level Activities
paragraphs: The ARNG Strength Maintenance Division has recently taken steps to  increase oversight of how states and territories adhere to recruiting  policies and procedures; however, the ARNG Strength Maintenance  Division has not permanently established the Recruiting Standards  Branch to ensure ongoing monitoring of state-level recruiting activities.  The ARNG Strength Maintenance Division and the selected states we  visited conduct reviews of a portion of packets from recruits. Additionally,  in June 2014, the ARNG Strength Maintenance Division began a pilot  effort through its Recruiting Standards Branch to conduct inspections to  help provide oversight of state-level recruiting activities, but the branch  has not been permanently established to ensure ongoing monitoring.
subsections: section_title: The ARNG and Selected States Have Recently Taken Steps to Provide Oversight by Reviewing Selected Enlistment Packages to Address Errors or Recruiting Irregularities
paragraphs: ARNG Strength Maintenance Division and selected state officials stated  that steps have recently been taken to provide oversight over enlistment  packets at the national and state levels. ARNG Strength Maintenance  Division officials stated that a portion of their oversight of the recruiting  process includes a review of selected enlistment packages at the national  level to help identify any errors in paperwork and any irregularities  involving recruiters. Officials stated that, since fiscal year 2010, the ARNG  Strength Maintenance Division has conducted reviews of 10 percent of  packets from enlistees and soldiers starting military training. ARNG  Strength Maintenance Division officials stated that they review every  document within the selected packets and maintain electronic records of  the results. In addition, officials stated that if there are deficiencies  identified in the review, the ARNG Strength Maintenance Division sends a  training team to help correct them and to provide retraining for staff as  necessary.
According to National Guard regulation, state-level recruiting officials  are to conduct quality checks over enlistments. At the four selected states  we visited, there were multiple reviews of packets for enlistments, and  officials stated that these reviews are intended to help minimize errors  and recruiter irregularities. According to National Guard regulation,  recruiters are responsible for initial prescreening of the applicant, which  involves a background review, an initial determination of physical  eligibility, and a review of prior education, among other things. In the four  selected states that we visited, recruiters use checklists to screen  applicants and submit applicant packets to their respective supervisors for  review prior to the packets going to Military Entrance Processing Stations  where an applicant is tested, examined, and processed for enlistment into  the ARNG. In the four selected states we visited, recruiting personnel had  to electronically submit enlistment packets to the Military Entrance  Processing Station a minimum of 48 to 72 hours before each applicant  arrived at the Military Entrance Processing Station for processing.
According to National Guard regulation and the ARNG’s Military Entrance  Processing Station Operations Guide, each Military Entrance Processing  Station is to be assigned guidance counselors who are responsible for  quality-control checks designed to help prevent entry of anyone not  qualified for the ARNG. The regulation and guide state that the Military  Entrance Processing Station guidance counselors are responsible for  reviewing all applicants’ enlistment packets submitted by recruiters for the  ARNG. The Military Entrance Processing Station guidance counselor’s  primary role, according to National Guard regulation, is to ensure that all  qualified persons applying for ARNG enlistment complete the process,  that applicants obtain a reservation for training, if necessary, and that  incentive agreements are valid, among other things. ARNG Strength  Maintenance Division officials noted that three regional managers  oversee the guidance counselors at the Military Entrance Processing  Stations and help ensure that the guidance counselors at each station are  following applicable policy and guidance. Also, applicants must complete  a test, called the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery, to determine  the applicant’s qualification for enlistment, and a Military Entrance  Processing Station physician conducts a medical examination to  determine whether the applicant meets physical health standards. When  the applicant has met the qualifications for military enlistment, the  guidance counselor conducts another check of the paperwork, and the  applicant signs an enlistment contract and is sworn into the ARNG.
section_title: The ARNG Has a Pilot Effort to Help Provide Oversight of States’ Recruiting Activities but Has Not Permanently Established a Program to Ensure Ongoing Monitoring
paragraphs: In June 2014, the ARNG Strength Maintenance Division began a pilot  effort through its Recruiting Standards Branch to help provide oversight  over state-level recruiting activities, but the branch has not been  permanently established to ensure ongoing monitoring. Officials from the  ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch stated that the branch was  established in response to GAO’s findings in a prior report and a  Department of the Army Inspector General’s report. Specifically, in  January 2010, we found that the ARNG’s data on recruiter irregularities— or, wrongdoings on the part of recruiters—were incomplete and  recommended that DOD take actions to increase visibility and track  recruiter-irregularities. DOD concurred with our recommendations and  took steps to clarify, share, and track recruiter irregularity data. Later, in  February 2012, the Department of the Army Inspector General found  errors in processing enlistment packages and recommended that the  ARNG create an entity to provide oversight of recruiting standards.
In response, the ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch was established as  a pilot program and completed its first official inspection in October 2014.  As of July 16, 2015 this office had completed inspections in 16 states. An  ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch official stated that the goal is to  complete at least 12 state inspections each year. The ARNG Recruiting  Standards Branch uses a four-tiered standard scale for compliance and  reporting. Each inspection results in one of four ratings: Non-Compliant,  Pending Compliance, Full Compliance, or a Program of Excellence  Award; the excellence award is the highest rating. The state inspections  include a review of state-level recruiting procedures and programs to  determine compliance with overarching guidance and a review of  accession packages to determine compliance with eligibility standards  and policy. Following each inspection, the ARNG Recruiting Standards  Branch requires states and territories to submit corrective-action plans to  address any identified deficiencies, which an official stated are used in  subsequent re-inspections to demonstrate state efforts to resolve the  deficiencies. Nine of the 16 states inspected as of July 16, 2015 had  submitted their respective corrective-action plans to address any  deficiencies identified during their inspection, regardless of the inspection  rating. The Recruiting Standards Branch plans to conduct a re- inspection of each state or territory that does not meet at least the Full  Compliance standard. The ARNG Strength Maintenance Division Chief is  informed of the inspection results, and results are included in a newsletter  sent to all states and territories.
According to an ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch official, the  inspections program can be effective even though ARNG does not have  direct chain-of-command authority over the states and territories. The  official stated that the state inspections and any associated corrective- action plans can help ARNG recruiters to comply with policy. This official  cited the Army Inspector General inspection, which recommended the  creation of a recruiting standards entity, as a sign of leadership’s support.  The official noted that although there is no direct chain-of-command  authority, state officials to date have participated in the inspections. An  ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch official stated that if a state is  unwilling to participate in the inspections process, the ARNG’s Chief of  Staff will work with the respective state’s or territory’s Chief of Staff.
ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials stated that the inspections  to date have been helpful in determining whether states and territories are  in compliance with guidance and current policy. Of the 16 states  inspected as of July 2015, 2 received a rating of Program of Excellence,  12 received a rating of Full Compliance, and 2 received a rating of  Pending Compliance on their inspections. ARNG Strength Maintenance  Division officials stated that the findings from the inspections conducted to  date, along with the issues identified in our January 2010 report and the  February 2012 Department of the Army Inspector General report noted  above, highlight the continued need for the ARNG Recruiting Standards  Branch to conduct inspections. However, the ARNG Recruiting Standards  Branch remains in a pilot phase and is working to seek approval for  permanent staff by the Director, ARNG, and subsequently the  Department of the Army. The approval for permanent staff may not take  place until early 2017. ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials  stated that they believe that continued oversight of state recruiting  activities is important and that currently they are using positions for the  ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch that are intended for use in other  areas. Officials stated that the ability to permanently assign individuals to  the ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch is very important in the ARNG’s  ability to continue to exercise its oversight role. The Director, ARNG, has  overall responsibility for maintaining policy and programs for the ARNG  recruiting programs, and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government states that agencies should have control activities in place  for ensuring that management’s directives are carried out. Without  permanently establishing an entity, such as the ARNG Recruiting  Standards Branch or other entity, to conduct inspections of state-level  recruiting activities, the Director, ARNG may be limited in its ability to  ensure that ARNG policies and procedures are being properly  implemented by the states.
section_title: The ARNG Has Had Mixed Results in Meeting Goals for Recruiting and Nearly Met Goals for Completing Training, but Does Not Track Completion of Initial Term of Service
paragraphs: The ARNG had mixed results in meeting its overall recruiting goals and  nearly met its goals for initial military training; however, the ARNG does  not track whether soldiers are completing their initial term of service or  military obligation. The ARNG met its recruiting goals in two of the five  years from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Further, from fiscal years  2011 through 2014, the ARNG nearly met its goals for completion of initial  military training, but we found that the ARNG does not have consistent,  complete, and valid data on why soldiers do not complete training and  when soldiers separate during the training process. We also found that  while the ARNG sets and tracks goals to keep the loss of soldiers in their  initial term below a maximum percentage, the ARNG does not track  whether ARNG soldiers who join in a given fiscal year complete their  initial term of service. Finally, ARNG Strength Maintenance Division has  not periodically estimated the full cost of recruiting and training soldiers  who do not complete their initial term of service.
subsections: section_title: From Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014, ARNG Met Overall Recruiting Goals in Only 2 Years but Generally Fully Utilized End-Strength Authorizations
paragraphs: ARNG data show that from fiscal years 2010 through 2014 the ARNG met  its annual overall recruiting goals in 2 of the 5 years but stated that the  purpose of the recruiting goals is to fully utilize the authorized end- strength in the National Defense Authorization Act, which data show the  ARNG nearly met or slightly exceeded over this time period. ARNG  Strength Maintenance Division officials stated that, in addition to  recruiting goals, managing losses and setting goals for reenlistments play  key roles in the ARNG’s ability to meet its goal of fully utilizing its  authorized end-strength.
ARNG manages its end-strength, in part, by setting goals for each state  and territory to recruit a certain number of individuals to enlist in the  ARNG. GAO’s leading practices in strategic human-capital  management and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government states that agencies should establish goals and monitor the  extent to which they are met. Prior GAO work has shown that  historically the ARNG has had mixed results in meeting its recruiting  goals. Specifically, in November 2005, we reported that the ARNG  exceeded its annual recruiting goals from fiscal years 2000 through 2002  but fell short of its goals in fiscal years 2003 through 2005, achieving only  80 percent of its goal in 2005. In May 2009, we reported that the ARNG  made progress in meeting its annual recruiting goals since fiscal year  2005, meeting more than 95 percent of its goal in both fiscal years 2006  and 2007 and exceeding its goal in fiscal year 2008. We then noted in a  January 2010 report that the ARNG met its recruiting goal in fiscal year  2009. Our analysis for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 is consistent with  this historical trend as ARNG only met its recruiting goals in 2 of the 5  years. Officials stated that the purpose of the state and territory goals for  recruiting is to fully utilize the ARNG’s authorized end-strength. Table 1  shows the extent to which the ARNG met annual recruiting goals as  compared to the end-strength authorized by the National Defense  Authorization Acts from fiscal years 2010 through 2014, as reported by  ARNG.
ARNG-Personnel Programs, Resources, and Manpower Division (ARNG- HRM) officials stated that ARNG’s recruiting goals have generally  decreased from fiscal years 2010 through 2014, in part because the  ARNG’s authorized end-strength also decreased over this time period.  The President is permitted by section 123a of Title 10 of the United States  Code to waive the NDAA end-strength limitations under certain  circumstances. Pursuant to a delegation of that authority, the Army  granted the ARNG a waiver to exceed the NDAA authorized end-strength  in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. However, the officials stated that the  waiver was no longer granted in fiscal years 2012 through 2014, thus  requiring the ARNG to stay below the authorized end-strength and to  reduce its annual recruiting goals.
While the ARNG met its recruiting goals in only 2 of the 5 years from  fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the ARNG achieved or nearly achieved  its goal of fully utilizing its authorized end-strength in all of the years as  shown in table 1. When setting goals for the states and territories, the  ARNG emphasizes that attrition management has a significant effect on  the ARNG’s ability to utilize its authorized end-strength and that, in  addition to setting recruiting goals, the ARNG meets its end-strength by  setting goals for managing losses and retaining existing personnel. Since  fiscal year 2009, the ARNG has established annual goals for the states  and territories to reenlist a certain number of individuals nearing the end  of their term of service. ARNG data showed that it either exceeded or  nearly exceeded its reenlistment goal in 4 of the 5 years from fiscal years  2010 through 2014. Table 2 shows the extent to which the ARNG met  reenlistment goals from fiscal years 2010 through 2014.
ARNG-HRM officials stated that the ARNG has increased its reenlistment  goal over time because the number of individuals who joined the ARNG  greatly increased from fiscal years 2006 through 2009, in part, due to the  Grow the Force initiative. The officials stated that the increased number  of soldiers who joined during this time period became eligible to reenlist  from fiscal years 2012 through 2014, thus increasing the population of  soldiers eligible for reenlistment. ARNG Strength Maintenance Division  officials noted that the ARNG achieved a lower percentage of its  reenlistment goal in fiscal year 2013 because ARNG wanted to  emphasize reenlistments in this year and set a more aggressive goal in  comparison to other years. For example, in fiscal year 2012, the ARNG  set a goal to reenlist 48,446 soldiers out of an eligible population of  125,785 soldiers, while in fiscal year 2013 set a goal to reenlist 59,233  soldiers out of an eligible population of 121,624 soldiers.
section_title: The ARNG Nearly Met Goals for Completing Initial Military Training but Does Not Have Consistent, Complete, and Valid Data on Why and When Soldiers Do Not Complete Training
paragraphs: The ARNG nearly met its goals for completion of initial military training  from fiscal years 2011 to 2014; however, we identified inconsistencies in  how states recorded reasons that soldiers did not complete their training  and found that available Army training data does not provide the ARNG  with complete data on the timing of when soldiers leave during the  training process. Further, while the ARNG uses an internal database to  collect information on why soldiers do not complete training and when  they separate during the training process, ARNG officials stated that they  could not determine whether the data were valid.
subsections: section_title: Goals for Completing Training Nearly Met
paragraphs: The ARNG nearly met its goals for completion of initial military training,  which includes basic and advanced individual training, from fiscal years  2011 through 2014. From fiscal years 2011 through 2014, the ARNG set  a goal of at least 84 percent and achieved a completion rate of  approximately 81 to 82 percent in each of those years. The ARNG sets  and tracks several goals that focus on states’ and territories’ ability to  prepare their recruits to attend initial military training. One such goal is  based on the percentage of soldiers who completed initial military training  (both basic and advanced) compared to the number of soldiers who  began training and did or did not complete training for a rolling time period  covering the past 12 months. By law members of the ARNG that have not  completed the minimum training required to deploy within 24 months must  be discharged. ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials stated  that they have not separately set a goal for the extent to which soldiers  complete basic training because the ARNG is primarily concerned with  soldiers completing both basic and advanced training to become qualified  for their military occupation. Table 3 shows the ARNG’s goal for  completion of initial military training, when available, and ARNG  completion rates from fiscal years 2011 through 2014.
The percentage of ARNG soldiers who completed their initial military  training has generally increased annually from about 70 percent in fiscal  year 2004 to about 81 percent in fiscal year 2014. ARNG Strength  Maintenance Division officials attributed the improvements in completion  of training largely to the ARNG Recruit Sustainment Program, which  began in fiscal year 2005. The purpose of the ARNG Recruit Sustainment  Program is to increase the likelihood that ARNG soldiers will complete  initial military training by ensuring that recruits are mentally prepared and  physically fit prior to attending training. The program aims to provide  recruits with realistic training that is similar to the first 3 weeks of basic  training. In addition, recruiters stated that the ARNG Recruit Sustainment  Program allows the ARNG to maintain contact with recruits while they  wait to attend training and to monitor their conduct and educational  progress to help ensure they stay eligible to join. For states or territories  that struggle to meet ARNG’s goal for training completion, ARNG  Strength Maintenance Division officials stated that they share best  practices from states that are meeting or exceeding ARNG’s goal or send  out ARNG mobile training teams to the states or territories to help  address challenges.
section_title: Inconsistent Reporting by Selected States and Incomplete and Invalid Data on Soldiers Who Do Not Complete Training
paragraphs: We identified inconsistencies in how the four selected states we visited  recorded reasons that soldiers did not complete their initial military  training. ARNG regulation and guidance require states and territories to  report the reasons why soldiers leave the ARNG in the ARNG personnel  database of record known as the Standard Installation/Division Personnel  System (SIDPERS). Although not generalizable to all states and  territories, we found that states we reviewed varied in whether they  selected only a general category in the system about the timing of a  soldier leaving initial training versus selecting a category noting the  specific reason each soldier left training prior to completion. When  soldiers leave training prior to completion, officials from states and  territories are to select the reason why the soldier left the ARNG from a  list of over 100 pre-predetermined categories, such as alcohol or other  drug abuse or medically unfit at the time of appointment. In interviews  with officials from the four selected states that we visited, officials  provided different responses about how they select a category regarding  why soldiers left the ARNG before basic or during basic or advanced  training. For example, one official stated that he selected general  categories about timing, such as if a soldier left before attending basic  training or left during basic or advanced training; however, that state’s  officials did not select a category that specified the reason why the soldier  left the ARNG. In contrast, officials in another state stated they have  selected 13 categories about specific reasons and use the general  categories about timing for soldiers that left before basic training or during  basic or advanced training from April 2014 through March 2015. Table 4  below shows the contrasts in how these two state officials chose general  or specific categories regarding soldiers leaving training.
Further, we found that available Army training data do not provide the  ARNG with complete data on the timing of when soldiers leave during the  training process. According to GAO’s leading practices on strategic  human-capital management, reliable data help enable an agency’s  decision makers to evaluate the success of their human-capital  approaches and to identify opportunities for enhancing agency results.  The Army’s training system of record known as the Army Training  Requirements and Resources System contains soldiers’ training records,  including the dates soldiers completed basic training and advanced  training. However, we found that this system was missing completion  dates from basic training for a significant number of soldiers who should  have had dates listed. Specifically, we found that of the 134,293 non- prior-service enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG from fiscal years  2010 through 2014 and completed their initial military training as of April  15, 2015, 36,644—or 27 percent—were missing basic training completion  dates. ARNG-HRM officials attributed this missing information, in part, to  data on the soldiers who attended basic and advanced training at the  same training site—referred to as One Station Unit Training, leading the  school to only record one date for completion of both basic and advanced  training. ARNG-HRM officials stated that they use the information on  basic training completion in the Army system to track whether recruits are  completing basic training but that they understood there were data  limitations due to the missing information in the system. The level of  incompleteness in the data for basic training completion, however, raises  concerns about whether ARNG can use this system to determine the  timing of when soldiers left during their initial military training. Further, we  found that when the One Station Unit Training sites report discharges  from training, the reports do not indicate whether the soldiers were  discharged during basic training or advanced training. According to a  fiscal year 2014 discharge report for the Army training schools, of the  3,352 soldiers who were discharged from training sites, 1,037 soldiers— or 31 percent—were discharged from a One Station Unit Training site. As  a result, the ARNG would not have visibility into whether these soldiers  were discharged during basic training or advanced training.
ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials acknowledged that the  databases of record for ARNG personnel and Army training data do not  offer the level of detail they need to determine the reasons why soldiers  left before or during initial military training or when soldiers separated  during the training process. ARNG Strength Maintenance Division and  ARNG-HRM officials stated that they were aware that there could be  inconsistencies in how states and territories select the category to  describe the reason why soldiers left the ARNG before or during training.  The officials attributed the inconsistency in part to the availability of the  general categories in SIDPERS for soldiers who leave before beginning  basic training or prior to completion of advanced training. ARNG-HRM  officials noted that the 54 states and territories each enter the information  into SIDPERS, which likely result in inconsistencies in data entry across  the states. Further, as noted above, the system of record for data on  soldiers’ training records is the Army Training Requirements and  Resources System, and the system of record for data on why soldiers  leave the ARNG is SIDPERS, rather than one centralized data source. In  July 2015, we reported that multiple data systems used to track soldier  availability data did not interface in a way to allow for timely updates  between all systems to ensure the relevance and value of the data that  management uses to make soldier availability-related decisions. We  recommended that the Secretary of the Army develop and implement  ways that the Army reserve components can facilitate timely updates of  availability data between all data systems through the current system  interfaces to improve the relevance and value of the data that  management is using to make soldier availability-related decisions, and  DOD concurred with our recommendation.
Recognizing the gap in information on why soldiers did not complete  training and the timing of when they separated during the training  process, ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials stated that they  started to collect this information in fiscal year 2010 by modifying a  management tool—known as the Vulcan Recruit Sustainment Program  Database—used to track recruits while they are in the training process.  ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials emphasized that the  database is an internal management tool and not a database of record  and is therefore generally not used to report information outside of ARNG.  According to the officials, the ARNG modified the tool to capture when a  soldier separated during the training process, such as before basic  training, during basic training, or during advanced training, as well as the  reason for the loss. The officials stated that while the categories for  reasons are similar to those in SIDPERS, ARNG removed the two  general categories for separating before or during initial military training to  require the states and territories to select the specific reason why the  soldier left the ARNG. ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials  stated that they did not modify SIDPERS to capture this information  because the Army is in the process of transitioning to an Army-wide  personnel database, the Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army.  The officials stated that they have not been allowed to make changes to  SIDPERS since at least 2007 in anticipation of the new system. In  February 2015, we reported that the full deployment of the Integrated  Personnel and Pay System-Army is not expected until April 2020, and  that the Army had not developed any portion of the system as of  November 2014.
As part of a broader review of the ARNG Recruit Sustainment Program, in  September 2008 the U.S. Army Audit Agency reported that the Vulcan  database sometimes did not provide accurate and timely data for Recruit  Sustainment Program managers. The U.S. Army Audit Agency found  that the Vulcan database provided useful information, but its effectiveness  was limited because program managers at the state level sometimes did  not update or use the system as the preferred management tool.  According to the report, the program managers did not use the Vulcan  database because it did not provide information that the states needed to  monitor recruit status, the database was not user-friendly, and the ARNG  did not routinely provide formal training to users. The U.S. Army Audit  Agency concluded that the data in the Vulcan system were not reliable for  making sound management decisions and made four recommendations  to address the issues identified, including developing and providing  routine formal training to Vulcan users and ensuring that state ARNG  organizations use the Vulcan database to manage the Recruit  Sustainment Program and not locally developed systems. The ARNG  agreed with the report’s recommendations and, according to ARNG  Strength Maintenance Division officials, the ARNG has taken steps that  are intended to address the report’s recommendations. For example,  ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials stated that states’ use of  the Vulcan database is continuously managed by means of daily reviews  and validated during the branch leadership’s accreditation process.  Further, ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials stated that, since  the U.S. Army Audit Agency audit, the ARNG instituted the role of training  liaison officers who act as liaisons to the Active component training  facilities in order to manage ARNG recruits at training as well as  contracted administrative support for the Recruiting Sustainment  Program. According to ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials,  both the training liaison officers and Recruit Sustainment Program  contract support staff now play a role in maintaining information in the  Vulcan database. In July 2015, the U.S. Army Audit Agency started a  follow-on review of the ARNG Recruit Sustainment Program, which  includes reexamining the Vulcan database and evaluating the measures  that the ARNG has taken to address the deficiencies described in the  September 2008 report.
The ARNG’s personnel database of record, SIDPERS, and the Army’s  database of record on training, the Army Training Requirements and  Resources System, do not provide ARNG with full visibility into why  soldiers do not complete initial military training and when they separate  during the training process. Further, while ARNG has modified its internal  Vulcan database to capture this information, ARNG-HRM officials stated  that they could not determine the information to be valid because  inputting the information is voluntary, and the Vulcan database is not the  database of record on losses from the ARNG. According to GAO’s  leading practices on strategic human-capital management, a critical  success factor is using consistent, complete, and valid data to determine  key performance objectives and goals. The Director, ARNG, has overall  responsibility for maintaining policy and programs for the ARNG recruiting  programs, and ARNG-HRM officials stated that they use the data on  reasons why individuals left the ARNG to develop policies to help retain  soldiers. Without consistent data about specific reasons soldiers left the  ARNG before or during training in the ARNG database of record, officials  will continue to be limited in their ability to identify actual reasons for  separation. Further, without complete information on when soldiers  separate during the training process, ARNG cannot know the extent to  which soldiers are leaving during basic or advanced training. Such  limitations hinder the Director, ARNG’s ability to develop policies and  programs intended to help create an environment in which a higher  number of soldiers complete training.
section_title: ARNG Does Not Track Whether Soldiers Complete Their Initial Term of Service and Has Not Periodically Estimated the Costs to Recruit and Train a Soldier
subsections: section_title: Completion of Initial Term of Service Is Not Tracked
paragraphs: ARNG Strength Maintenance Division does not track whether ARNG  soldiers complete their initial term of service. When individuals join the  ARNG, they sign a contract to actively serve in the ARNG for a specified  amount of time, which varies by soldier. For example, while a non-prior- service enlisted soldier must enlist in the ARNG for a total military service  obligation of 8 years, a portion of the 8 years can be active service in the  ARNG with the balance being in the Individual Ready Reserve. On an  ongoing basis, the ARNG Strength Maintenance Division tracks initial- term attrition rates—the number of soldiers in their initial term who leave  the ARNG during a given period compared to the average number of  soldiers who were serving in their initial term over that same period—with  the goal of keeping attrition below an established maximum rate. For the  purposes of tracking initial-term attrition rates, the ARNG does not track  all enlisted soldiers who join, but defines soldiers in their initial term as  enlisted soldiers who have completed initial military training and have  less than 6 years in service. ARNG Strength Maintenance Division  officials stated that they establish the goal based on the ARNG’s historical  performance and that the metric is adjusted over time to encourage  incremental improvement. ARNG officials have established an attrition  goal of a percentage of less than or equal to 12 percent for soldiers  leaving during their initial term of service, and as of May 2015 the ARNG  had an attrition rate of 8.1 percent. According to the ARNG, managing  attrition has a significant effect on the ARNG’s ability to achieve its end- strength goal, and ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials stated  that they track initial-term losses in this way because it helps states and  territories manage their respective end-strengths by better anticipating  future losses and the ARNG can include the most recent enlistments in its  analysis for initial-term losses.
While the ARNG’s calculation of the initial-term attrition rate provides  ARNG Strength Maintenance Division with some information that helps  officials manage end-strength, the ARNG Strength Maintenance Division  does not regularly track whether all soldiers who join in a given fiscal year  ultimately complete their initial term of service. We obtained data on  enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG from fiscal years 2001 through  2007, and analyzed whether they ultimately completed their initial term of  service; we found that about 40 percent of these soldiers did not complete  their initial term of service (see table 5).
According to GAO’s leading practices on strategic human-capital  management, valid data help enable an agency’s decision makers to  evaluate the success of their human-capital approaches and to identify  opportunities for enhancing agency results. ARNG Strength  Maintenance Division officials stated that there could be some  advantages to tracking the extent to which soldiers complete their initial  term of service by those who join in a given fiscal year, but it may be  viewed as redundant reporting given that the ARNG already tracks  attrition rates for initial-term soldiers. Further, ARNG Strength  Maintenance Division officials stated that tracking soldiers from the date  of their enlistment to their final completion is a complex task. However,  regularly tracking the extent to which soldiers who join the ARNG in a  fiscal year and complete their initial term of service can help the ARNG  understand what human-capital decisions may have led to certain trends  in data. For example, ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials  stated that multiple factors may have contributed to 40 percent of soldiers  we identified as not completing their initial term of service from fiscal  years 2001 through 2007. The officials noted that this time period was at  the height of the troop surge in Iraq, where many of the quality metrics  were loosened across the Army in order to meet expanded end-strengths.  As noted above, the officials stated that the Recruit Sustainment  Program, the program to which they attribute higher completion rates for  initial military training since fiscal year 2005, was not in full force until the  latter part of this time period. Further, tracking completion by soldiers who  join in a given fiscal year can help the ARNG identify the points in time  during soldiers’ enlistments when they are more likely to separate from  the ARNG. Without the ARNG regularly tracking the extent to which  soldiers complete their initial term of service and understanding trends in  the data, officials do not have full visibility into the effect the ARNG’s  programs and initiatives have in helping states meet their strength and  readiness requirements.
section_title: Costs to Recruit and Train a Soldier Are Not Estimated
paragraphs: In addition to not tracking the extent to which soldiers are not completing  their initial term of service, the ARNG had not estimated the total costs to  recruit and train an ARNG soldier. In response to our review, ARNG  Strength Maintenance Division officials estimated that in fiscal year 2014,  it cost the ARNG approximately $62,000 to recruit and train an ARNG  soldier for those soldiers who attended basic training and advanced  training at separate training sites or approximately $51,000 for soldiers  who attended basic training and advanced training at the same training  site. According to officials, a portion of these estimates includes the  salary paid to the soldier while in training but also includes enlistment  incentives and the administrative costs to process the soldiers, among  other things. ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials stated,  however, that the estimate includes costs other than those that support  recruiting, such as resources used to manage attrition and retain  personnel and that additional analysis is needed to further refine this  estimate. For active-duty soldiers in the Army Active Component, the  Army has estimated that recruiting and training cost about $72,000 per  soldier who attended basic training and advanced training at separate  training sites or about $54,000 for soldiers who attended basic training  and advanced training at the same training site in fiscal year 2014.
As mentioned above, the ARNG has recruited about 190,000 soldiers  from fiscal years 2011 through 2014, and not all of these individuals  completed initial military training. However, ARNG Strength Maintenance  Division had not estimated the ARNG’s costs for recruiting and training  soldiers, and officials stated they would have to frequently update the  calculation because the associated costs change over time. While we  recognize costs for recruiting and training a soldier can change over time,  it is important for the ARNG to periodically estimate these costs, such as  during an annual budget cycle or other time period as appropriate,  because it would better enable the ARNG to know how it is spending its  resources. According to GAO’s leading practices on strategic human- capital management, agencies should have valid data for determining  whether they are maximizing their human-capital investments and that  data gathered are kept current. Without periodically estimating the cost  to recruit and train an ARNG soldier, ARNG Strength Maintenance  Division does not know the extent of its investment in soldiers and the  potential loss of investment when soldiers do not complete training or  their initial term of service. Having this information could be particularly  important in light of our analysis above showing that about 40 percent of  soldiers who joined from fiscal years 2001 through 2007 did not complete  their initial term of service.
section_title: ARNG Has Not Ensured That Recruiters Understand Financial Incentives, and OSD, Army and ARNG Have Not Conducted Oversight of ARNG’s Financial Incentives Programs
paragraphs: The ARNG has some internal controls for processing its financial  incentives but has not ensured that recruiting officials understand  available financial incentives to fill critical military positions, and OSD, the  Department of the Army, and ARNG-HRM have not exercised all of their  oversight responsibilities for ARNG financial incentives programs. OSD  has not monitored the costs associated with ARNG incentives programs,  which the services are required to report by DOD instruction. In addition,  the Department of the Army and ARNG-HRM have not evaluated and  documented an evaluation of the effectiveness of the financial incentives.  Department of the Army and National Guard regulations require the  Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel  and ARNG-HRM to evaluate the effectiveness of the financial incentives  programs.
subsections: section_title: The ARNG Has Implemented Some Internal Controls for Processing Its Financial Incentives
paragraphs: The ARNG has a system of internal controls to help monitor compliance  with financial incentives contracts. Beginning in fiscal year 2012, ARNG- HRM implemented the Guard Incentive Management System (GIMS) to  help establish internal controls when awarding financial incentives and  processing incentives payments. The management system was  implemented in response to a 2010 study that a contractor conducted  for the ARNG, which found deficiencies in quality controls for its previous  incentives processing system. For example, the study found that it was  not clear how many people had access to or how frequently they used the  incentives system. Further, the 2010 study found that the previous system  did not capture all requests for payments, creating the inability to  accurately manage the funding for the programs, and found that the  system did not monitor and validate that a soldier remained qualified to  receive an incentive.
Financial incentives are to be awarded and monitored within GIMS, which  (1) establishes control by setting user levels and limitations on  transactions that users are able to complete regarding incentives; (2)  monitors a soldier’s compliance with his or her incentives contract, and  can change the incentive payments to an on-hold status and withhold  payments until violations can be addressed (if at all); and (3) processes  and releases payment notifications per the contract schedule, assuming  the soldier’s incentive payment is not flagged as in on-hold status. Some  controls within GIMS are similar to control activities suggested by the  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, which states  that attributes to internal control activities include dividing key duties and  responsibilities among different people in order to reduce the risk of error,  waste, or fraud.
ARNG officials at all four selected states we visited said that GIMS  reduces the possibility that soldiers are awarded incentives that are not in  accordance with regulation. For example, the state-level incentives  manager has the responsibility to monitor incentives awarded within his or  her respective state and only officials within the incentives managers’  office have the authority to review and approve incentives actions, while  the Military Entrance Processing Station guidance counselor is  responsible for issuing incentives to a soldier. Officials stated that GIMS  does not allow for individuals to perform duties outside of their  responsibility, which greatly reduces the risk of fraud and improper  incentives activities. Further, officials at all four selected states we visited  said that GIMS greatly reduces the possibility that soldiers are awarded  incentives or receive incentives payments if they do not meet the  requirements for the respective incentive. For example, officials stated  that soldiers cannot receive additional incentive payments until the soldier  passes his or her physical training test. Officials stated that in order to  receive a payment, GIMS requires the soldier’s commander to verify that  the soldier has passed the most recent test. If the soldier has not passed  the most recent physical training test, GIMS will flag the soldier as  ineligible for receiving payment.
section_title: The ARNG Has Not Ensured That Recruiters Have an Understanding of Available Financial Incentives
paragraphs: GIMS utilizes an algorithm that considers factors such as unit fill rate and  time until deployment that determines which positions, when filled,  provide the applicant with incentives. The algorithm also determines the  amount of the financial incentive that the applicant will receive if the  applicant meets the eligibility requirements for that position. Recruiters  access the information in GIMS to determine whether an available  position has an incentive attached. According to the ARNG’s financial  incentives policy, positions are assigned an incentive tier level  corresponding to how critical the position is. For example, a position  scored as a tier level 1 is considered most critical and has the greatest  amount of incentives, while a position scored as a tier level 7 is  considered not critical and does not have any incentives. Further,  according to the policy, recruiting and retention financial incentives are  intended to assist in filling critical shortages. The policy also states that  ARNG-HRM is to develop and implement policy for ARNG incentives  programs and that the Chief of NGB, through the ARNG Strength  Maintenance Division, is responsible for developing strength maintenance  guidance, programs, and training.
ARNG officials from all of the four selected states that we visited stated  that they did not understand which vacant ARNG positions were  considered critical and had incentives attached. These state recruiting  officials stated that because they did not understand which positions were  considered critical and had a financial incentive attached, it was difficult to  utilize financial incentives as a recruiting tool. For example, during our  review the algorithm within GIMS was initially being updated on a daily  basis and officials stated that the constant change was a contributing  factor in making it very difficult to understand which positions have a  financial incentive. ARNG-HRM officials stated that, based on feedback,  the algorithm was changed in January 2015 and was now being updated  on a monthly basis instead of a daily basis. However, ARNG-HRM  officials stated that the algorithm change to being updated on a monthly  basis confused state-level recruiting personnel as to how positions that  become vacant within the month are considered for criticality and  incentives between the monthly updates. ARNG-HRM officials stated that  there are tools, such as a search function, within GIMS for state recruiting  personnel that would assist in understanding which positions are  considered critical and have an incentive. However, officials stated that  the tools are not being fully utilized, which is another contributing factor in  not understanding which positions have a financial incentive.
Part of the reason for confusion is that the ARNG Strength Maintenance  Division and ARNG-HRM has not provided recruiters with training to help  enable them to effectively use financial incentives to fill critical positions.  The ARNG’s training curriculum instructs recruiters to identify the  motivator for each applicant and to use that motivator as leverage to gain  the applicant’s commitment to join the ARNG. For example, some  applicants may be motivated to join the ARNG in order to gain certain job  skills or family tradition of service in the ARNG. Recruiters we interviewed  stated that they are trained to persuade applicants to join the ARNG  based on areas other than financial incentives, such as service to country  and skills training, but the training did not teach recruiters how to use  financial incentives to fill critical positions. While officials maintain that  recruiters should primarily utilize motivators to gain the applicant’s  commitment to join the ARNG, ARNG Strength Maintenance Division and  ARNG-HRM officials stated that additional training for recruiters on how to  utilize tools to understand which positions have incentives may help in  more effective use of financial incentives. Financial incentives are a tool  available to recruiters, and ARNG incentives policy states that the  incentives assist leadership in meeting and sustaining ARNG readiness  requirements and provides incentives to assist in filling critical shortages.  Incentives are to be implemented in those situations where other less  costly methods have proven inadequate or ineffective in supporting unit  and skill staffing requirements. Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government states that it is necessary to provide personnel  with the right training and tools, among other items, to ensure operational  success. Without providing recruiters with training on how to utilize  available tools, such as use of financial incentives to fill positions,  recruiters may not have an understanding of which military positions are  considered critical and are not best positioned to utilize available financial  incentives to fill these positions.
section_title: OSD Has Not Monitored the Amounts of Financial Incentives Obligated through ARNG Incentives Programs
paragraphs: OSD has not monitored the amounts of incentives obligated through the  ARNG incentives programs. A DOD instruction requires the tracking and  reporting of recruiting resources throughout DOD, including the obligation  of incentives to, among other things, help ensure that DOD is using the  most efficient and cost-effective processes in the recruitment of new  personnel. For example, these reports must contain information on the  amount of obligations on college-fund contributions, enlistment bonuses,  and student loan repayments, among other recruiting costs. According to  the instruction, the information collected through the required reports is  intended to help formulate policy guidance and oversight and ensure  mission success. OSD has collected information on recruiting resources  for the Active components through these reports, but OSD officials stated  that the information does not include the amounts obligated through the  incentives programs in the National Guard and Reserve components. The  requirement for the National Guard and Reserve components to report  this information to OSD has been in effect since at least 1991, but officials  stated that turnover in staff and office reorganizations that began  sometime after 2004 resulted in OSD no longer collecting and reviewing  the information. In response to our review, in July 2015 the officials stated  that OSD has plans to include information on the amounts of incentives  obligated from the National Guard and Reserve components in the next  reporting cycle of October 2015 and in future reports. Without information  on the amounts obligated through National Guard- and Reserve- component incentives programs, OSD cannot effectively develop policies  and guidance to help ensure that recruiting resources are used efficiently  and in a cost-effective manner throughout DOD.
section_title: The Department of the Army and the ARNG Have Not Evaluated and Documented the Effectiveness of the ARNG’s Financial Incentives Programs
paragraphs: The Department of the Army has reviewed and approved the ARNG’s  financial incentives policy and has recently issued a directive that  expands its oversight; however, the Department of the Army and ARNG- HRM have not evaluated and documented the effectiveness of the  financial incentives programs in achieving overall objectives. The ARNG  obligated about $836 million in financial incentives from fiscal years 2012  through 2014, which includes enlistment bonuses, student loan  repayment, and reenlistment bonuses, among other incentives. The  amount obligated for ARNG incentives programs decreased over this time  period, from $348 million in fiscal year 2012 to $206 million in fiscal year  2014. ARNG officials noted that obligations related to ARNG financial  incentives programs decreased over this time period because of  budgetary constraints. According to Department of the a Army  regulation, the Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of  Staff for Personnel has responsibility for conducting a semiannual review  of the financial incentives program. Further, in September 2015 the  Secretary of the Army issued a directive that requires all new accession  incentives created by Department of the Army components, including the  ARNG, to be reviewed and approved by the Department of the Army. In  addition, the directive requires all Department of the Army components to  submit all current incentives programs for Department of the Army review  and approval. A Department of the Army official stated that it meets its  review requirement by ensuring that ARNG financial incentives policy  complies with applicable laws and Army regulations. The official stated  that if the ARNG determines that no midyear updates are necessary, then  the Department of the Army does not conduct an additional review of  ARNG incentives policy.
As previously noted, the ARNG Strength Maintenance Division and  ARNG-HRM have not ensured that recruiting officials receive training and  understand available financial incentives to fill critical military positions,  and ARNG-HRM officials stated that they are aware that there is some  confusion at the state level over which positions are considered critical. In  November 2005, we reported that of the 1,500 enlisted occupational  specialties across DOD, 19 percent were consistently overfilled and 41  percent were consistently underfilled from fiscal years 2000 through  2005. Moreover, we found that active-duty components provided  bonuses to servicemembers in consistently overfilled occupational  specialties. We recommended that DOD require its 10 components to  report annually on all (not just critical) over- and underfilled occupational  specialties; provide an analysis of why occupational specialties are over-  and underfilled; and report annually on and justify their use of enlistment  and reenlistment bonuses provided to servicemembers in occupational  specialties that exceed their authorized personnel levels. DOD partially  concurred with our recommendation, stating that it has visibility over skills  deemed most critical for retention and that our definition for over- and  underfilled specialties was unreasonably strict. Our recommendation was  not implemented.
Our current review found that in the ARNG, incentives are not always  being used to fill military occupational specialties that are consistently  below authorized levels and that incentives are being sometimes used for  military occupational specialties that are consistently above approved  levels. Specifically, we found that there were several military occupational  specialties that were consistently below 80 percent of approved rates  from fiscal year 2012 though fiscal year 2014. These military occupational  specialties were in areas including electronic warfare, explosives  ordnance disposal, and special forces, which have all been identified as  important to DOD. For example, data provided by ARNG showed that  while one special forces military occupational specialty was only at 70,  66, and 69 percent filled from fiscal years 2012 through 2014,  respectively, only 14 contracts containing incentives were approved for  individuals in these occupational specialties during that time frame.  ARNG officials stated that, depending on the demographics of a given  area in close proximity to a unit and the requirements to fill positions  within a particular unit, it may be difficult to find applicants who meet the  qualifications of an available position. Further, data provided by the  ARNG also showed that some military occupational specialties were  consistently filled over approved levels yet hundreds of contracts  containing incentives were approved for individuals in these positions  from fiscal years 2012 through 2014. For example, one supply military  occupational specialty was at 118, 116, and 113 percent of authorized  levels from fiscal year 2012 through 2014, respectively, and yet over 880  contracts containing incentives for these positions were awarded during  that time frame. Officials stated that incentives can be awarded to  positions even when the national authorized level is above 100 percent if,  for example, the unit or state-level fill rates are low.
Furthermore, the Department of the Army and ARNG-HRM have not  exercised their oversight responsibilities to evaluate and document the  effectiveness of the ARNG’s financial incentives program in achieving  overall objectives. A Department of the Army official stated that he  believed that it was not the role of Department of the Army to monitor and  evaluate the effectiveness of the ARNG’s financial incentives program,  and that he believed that it was the ARNG-HRM’s responsibility to do so.  According to ARNG-HRM officials, the effectiveness of the incentive  programs is evaluated on a regular basis. However, ARNG-HRM officials  have not documented results of any evaluations or documented that their  current financial incentives programs are meeting overall objectives.  Department of the Army and National Guard regulations state that the  Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel  and ARNG-HRM, respectively, will monitor and evaluate the effectiveness  of the ARNG financial incentives program in achieving overall objectives.  A National Guard regulation states that ARNG incentives serve as  extraordinary measures to assist the ARNG in meeting and sustaining  personnel requirements, help meet quality and skill-match objectives,  stabilize the ARNG through longer service commitments, assist in filling  critical skill shortages, and support deploying and high-priority units.  However, Department of the Army and ARNG-HRM officials have not  documented that the ARNG incentives programs are meeting the goals  listed in the National Guard regulation.
Moreover, recruiting officials at all of the four selected states we visited  stated that there are cases where applicants enlist in the ARNG for  nonfinancial reasons, such as service to country, and have still been  awarded financial incentives. Without the Department of the Army and  ARNG-HRM evaluating and documenting the effectiveness of ARNG  incentives programs in meeting its goals and documenting the results,  they may not know whether incentives are being used effectively to meet  and sustain program goals and whether incentives are being awarded to  fill critical occupational specialties.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In light of the Department of the Army’s downsizing and ongoing fiscal  uncertainty, and given the importance of the ARNG to help meet Army  missions, it is critical for the ARNG to oversee its recruiting process and  to maximize its return on investment it incurs with recruits. In response to  findings from our prior work as well as others, the ARNG has taken steps  to increase its oversight of the recruiting process. However, the Recruiting  Standards Branch, which has played a key role in ARNG oversight of  state-level recruiting activities, is in a pilot phase awaiting approval and is  not permanently established. In addition to continued attention on  oversight, the ARNG must have relevant, timely information that provides  visibility over a soldier’s career, including the recruiting process and  training for his or her military occupation, through the soldier’s completion  of his or her initial term of service. While the ARNG has increased its  percentage of soldiers who complete initial military training, available data  do not provide the ARNG with full visibility into when or why a soldier  does not complete initial military training or may not be reliable. Further,  the ARNG’s approach to tracking soldiers does not include whether  soldiers who join in a given fiscal year complete their initial term of  service. Moreover, the ARNG has not periodically estimated the total cost  to recruit and train a soldier. Such information could be useful to decision  makers to help understand the return on investment in recruiting and  training a soldier. Although the ARNG implemented a new financial  incentives system in fiscal year 2012, the ARNG has not provided training  to help ensure that recruiters understand what financial incentives are  available to help fill critical positions. Moreover, OSD, the Department of  the Army, and the ARNG have not fully conducted their oversight  responsibilities of ARNG incentives programs. Though the National Guard  and Reserve components are required to provide information on their  incentives programs, OSD has not enforced the requirement since around  2004, and while the Department of the Army and ARNG are required to  assess the effectiveness of the ARNG financial incentives programs, they  have not evaluated or documented their assessments of the programs.  Given the number of occupations that are not at full strength and given  the current constrained fiscal environment, it is critically important for  DOD to know that incentives are being obligated effectively and that they  are achieving the goal of helping to fill critical positions.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of the Army take the following six  actions:
To aid ARNG officials in conducting their oversight of the states and  territories, direct the Director, ARNG, to establish a permanent  program for monitoring state-level recruiting activities either by  extending the Recruiting Standards Branch or establishing some other  similar program.
To aid ARNG officials in understanding the effectiveness of efforts to  meet force requirements, direct the Director, ARNG, to do the  following:
Take steps to help ensure that the ARNG collects consistent,  complete, and valid data on the specific reasons why soldiers do  not complete initial military training and when these soldiers  separate from the ARNG during the training process. Such steps  could include modifying SIDPERS to capture this information or if  unable to modify SIDPERS, taking actions to ensure that  information collected in the Vulcan Recruit Sustainment Program  database is valid.
Regularly track whether ARNG soldiers who join in a given fiscal  year complete their initial term of service.
Periodically estimate, such as on an annual basis or other time  period as appropriate, the total cost of recruiting and initial training  for a soldier who joins the ARNG.
To help ARNG officials in using financial incentives to fill critical  positions as required by Army and National Guard regulation, direct  the Director, ARNG, to provide recruiters with training to better enable  the use of available financial incentives.
To help determine whether ARNG officials are effectively using  financial incentives, in conjunction with the Director, ARNG, exercise  their oversight responsibilities by evaluating and documenting the  effectiveness of ARNG’s incentives program in meeting its goals. The  evaluation should also determine whether incentives are being  effectively awarded in military occupational specialties that have been  under or over authorized levels, and whether changes are needed to  effectively use existing incentives.
Given that the reporting of information related to the amounts of  incentives obligated has been a requirement but not carried out in recent  years, we recommend that the Office of the Secretary of Defense take the  following action in order to ensure continued reporting in the future:
Enforce its requirement for the National Guard and Reserve  Component to submit information on the amounts of incentives  obligated and incorporate the required information in the recruiting  resources reports.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its  written comments, DOD concurred with all seven of our  recommendations, but stated that it did not concur with our report due to  our description of recruiting policies that were in place during the last  nearly 15 years of war. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix VIII.  DOD also provided technical comments that we considered and  incorporated as appropriate.
Regarding its statement that the department does not concur with our  report, DOD stated that we portray both Army and ARNG recruiting efforts  as being targeted at sexual offenders and that we assert that during  hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan that both the Army and ARNG made  standard practice of issuing enlistment waivers for convicted sexual  offenders. We disagree with that assertion. In our report, we describe the  recruiting policies that were in place during a difficult time for military  recruiting and have since changed. Further, in the technical comments  provided to us, DOD stated that “At the height of Operations Enduring  Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Department of the Army and the  National Guard Bureau (NGB) accepted lower quality applicants (lower  aptitude scores and moral waivers) and offered significantly higher  incentives in order to ensure that the Army National Guard (ARNG) and  Active Army could meet their respective missions, achieve end strength  goals and provide ready units to combatant commanders.” DOD also  provided additional context regarding factors that have made the  recruiting environment increasingly more challenging. Based on DOD’s  technical comments, we have added context to our final report regarding  our description of the Army and ARNG’s past recruiting efforts.   Specifically, our report now states that, “since the end of Operation Iraqi  Freedom and a significant drawdown from Afghanistan, the Department  of the Army and NGB have issued guidance prohibiting approval of  waivers for applicants with prior criminal offenses such as certain types of  sexual offenses, as well as increasing the applicant aptitude score  standards. These changes and other factors such as a less physically fit  youth population have reduced the pool of qualified applicants for the  ARNG and make it more difficult for recruiters to meet defined recruiting  goals.” In April 2012, the Director of Military Personnel Management  issued a memorandum entitled Suspension of Enlistment Waivers, which  stated that in an effort to reinforce and ensure compliance with Office of  the Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) policy issued  in 2009, the “enlistment or commissioning of any individual with a  conviction or adverse adjudication for a felony or misdemeanor sexual  offense is prohibited and no waivers are authorized.” The memorandum  also suspends enlistment waivers in areas of major misconduct, positive  drug/alcohol tests at military entrance processing stations, and  misconduct or juvenile major misconduct for drug use, possession, or  drug paraphernalia, to include marijuana.
DOD agreed in its comments that not enlisting individuals with felony  issues does shrink the pool of eligible recruits but stated that the  accession mission for the ARNG has not been in jeopardy. However, as  we note in this report, while ARNG met end-strength goals from fiscal  years 2010 through 2014, the ARNG met overall recruiting goals in only 2  of the 5 years. We noted in our report that several factors have reduced  the pool of qualified recruits, all while end-strength goals have remained  constant. This in itself makes it inherently more difficult for recruiters to  meet defined recruiting goals. Further, officials we interviewed during this  engagement stated that their reduced ability to process waivers for  certain law violations has made meeting the recruiting mission more  difficult. We also note in our report that in June 2008 OSD issued a  Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-018 – Enlistment Waivers, which  established policy and provided guidance regarding enlistment waivers  for applicants for the Military Services and provided standardized  terminology for the tracking and reporting of waiver data to be  implemented in fiscal year 2009. According to OSD officials, waiver data  prior to fiscal year 2009 is inconsistent and unreliable.
With regard to our seven recommendations, DOD concurred with all of  them and described actions it plans to take to implement them.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army, the  Chief, NGB; and the Director, ARNG. In addition, this report will be  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3604 or at farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IX.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of our review were to evaluate the extent to which (1) the  Army National Guard (ARNG) has provided oversight of its recruiting  process; (2) the ARNG met its goals for recruiting, completion of initial  military training, and completion of initial term of service in recent  years; and (3) the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Department  of the Army, and ARNG have conducted their oversight responsibilities of  the ARNG’s financial incentives programs. Also, House Report 113-446  accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2015 included two additional provisions: 1) a provision for us to  assess the extent to which contracting vehicles used to support ARNG  recruiting were in compliance with Department of Defense (DOD) and  Department of the Army policies and regulations, and 2) a provision for us  to assess the numbers of individuals who complete basic and advanced  individual training and the average length of time between when a person  enlists in the ARNG and when the person completes initial military  training. To address the first of the two additional provisions, we reviewed  findings from and the status of recommendations by the U.S. Army Audit  Agency and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for  Procurement to improve contracting processes at the National Guard  Bureau (NGB). A Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for  Procurement official determined that this information is sensitive but  unclassified so we provided this information separately to the committees.  To address the second provision, we included results of our analyses in  appendixes II, III, IV, and V.
To describe the steps the ARNG has taken to provide oversight of the  ARNG recruiting process, we obtained and reviewed guidance and policy  documents regarding oversight of recruiter activities and interviewed  officials from the ARNG. Although not generalizable to all states and  territories, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of four states based on  factors such as size, the total number of accessions, and geographic  locations to understand and describe how states conduct oversight. We  selected Texas and Pennsylvania as two states with a large-size ARNG  end-strength, Virginia as a state with a medium-size end-strength, and  Idaho as a state with a small-size end-strength. We obtained and  reviewed applicable state and local recruiting and retention policy  documents and interviewed recruiting and retention officials at each of  these four selected states. The observations from these four selected  states are not generalizable to all states and territories but provide  important insight into ARNG oversight of its recruiting process.
To determine the extent to which the ARNG met goals for recruiting,  completion of initial military training, and completion of initial term of  service, we obtained aggregate recruiting data and associated goals from  the ARNG. We compared data on the ARNG’s annual recruiting goals for  enlistments to the number of enlistments in the ARNG for fiscal years  2010 through 2014, respectively. We chose fiscal year 2010 as the start  date because our prior work discussed the extent to which the ARNG met  its recruiting goals from fiscal years 2000 through 2009. We chose fiscal  year 2014 as the end date because it was the most recently available  data at the time of our review. In addition, we compared ARNG’s goals for  completion of initial military training to ARNG-reported completion rates in  fiscal years 2011 through 2014. We could not assess the extent to which  ARNG met its goal for completion of initial military training in fiscal years  prior to 2011 because the goals in place for those years were not  available or not comparable to the completion rates provided by the  ARNG. We tried to analyze data on the reasons why soldiers did not  complete their initial military training and when these soldiers separated  during the training process; however, we found that states inconsistently  recorded the reasons why soldiers left before beginning or prior to  completion of training and that training data did not provide full visibility  into when soldiers separated during the training process, as we discuss in  greater detail in the report. Lastly, we compared ARNG’s fiscal year 2015  attrition goal for soldiers nearing the end of their initial term to the ARNG’s  initial term attrition rate as of May 2015, which was the most recently  available data at the time of our review. We could not assess the extent to  which the ARNG met goals prior to fiscal year 2015 because ARNG  officials stated that the goals have changed over time and could not  provide goals for previous fiscal years. In addition to analyzing available  data, we interviewed ARNG officials and officials from the four states we  visited for their perspectives on trends and issues we identified in  analyzing the data.
To determine the extent to which OSD, the Department of the Army, and  the ARNG have conducted oversight of the ARNG’s incentives programs,  we obtained and analyzed relevant policy and guidance documents to  identify oversight responsibilities for ARNG incentives programs. We  interviewed officials from the ARNG to gain an understanding of how  incentives policies and guidance are being applied. We interviewed  officials from OSD, Department of the Army, and the ARNG to gain an  understanding of how OSD, the Department of the Army, and the ARNG  conduct oversight of ARNG incentives programs. To gain an  understanding of how incentives are being implemented during recruiting  and retention activities, we obtained and analyzed applicable state and  local incentives policies and interviewed recruiting and retention officials  from our four selected states. Although not generalizable to all states and  territories, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of four states based on  factors such as size, the total number of accessions, and geographic  locations to understand and describe how states are implementing and  utilizing incentives programs in the recruiting process.
Further, to assess the number of individuals who complete basic and  advanced individual training and the average length of time between  when a person enlists in the ARNG and when the person completes initial  military training, we obtained and analyzed data on enlisted soldiers to  determine the extent to which they completed their initial military training.  We elaborate on the results from our analysis in appendixes II and III and  we provide additional analysis related to the length of time soldiers who  did not meet their initial term of service stayed in the ARNG in appendix  IV and the reasons why soldiers left the ARNG prior to completing their  initial term of service in appendix V. We analyzed data from 365,431 non- prior-service enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG from fiscal years  2004 through 2013 to determine the extent to which they completed their  initial military training. We also calculated the length of time it took non- prior-service, non-split-option soldiers who enlisted during this time  period to complete their initial military training and become qualified for  their military occupational specialty. In addition, we analyzed data from  380,736 enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG from fiscal years 2001  through 2007 to determine whether they completed their initial term of  service. For those soldiers who joined during this time period but did not  complete their initial term of service, we analyzed the length of time they  stayed in the ARNG and the reasons for their separation. Because states  inconsistently recorded the reason for soldiers who left the ARNG before  completing training, we could only analyze the reasons for soldiers who  completed training but left before the end of their initial term of service.
To assess the reliability of the data used in this report, we analyzed the  data for inconsistencies, incomplete data fields, and outliers. We also  reviewed relevant documentation about the data systems and guidance  provided to the states and territories on how to report recruiting and  retention data. We followed up with the ARNG to discuss limitations we  identified and requested revised data or made adjustments to our  analysis, when possible, to mitigate these limitations. We noted any  limitations in the report, where appropriate. Except in the case of reasons  why soldiers left the ARNG before completing their military training and  data on when soldiers separated during the training process, we found  that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining (1)  the extent to which enlisted soldiers completed their initial military  training; (2) the length of time it took these soldiers to complete their initial  military training and become qualified for their military occupational  specialty; (3) the extent to which enlisted soldiers completed their initial  term of service; (4) the length of time enlisted soldiers who did not  complete their initial term of service served in the ARNG; and (5) the  reasons why enlisted soldiers who graduated from their training but did  not complete their initial term of service left the ARNG.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2014 to November  2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Completion of Initial Military Training by Non-Prior Service Enlisted Soldiers
paragraphs: For individuals who joined the Army National Guard (ARNG) within a  given fiscal year, we analyzed whether they completed their initial military  training and found that the percentage of ARNG soldiers who completed  their training generally increased annually from 63.7 percent in fiscal year  2004 to 80.5 percent in fiscal year 2013. ARNG Strength Maintenance  Division officials attributed the improvements in completion of training  largely to the Recruit Sustainment Program, which began in fiscal year  2005. The purpose of the Recruit Sustainment Program is to increase the  likelihood that ARNG soldiers will graduate initial military training by  ensuring that recruits are mentally prepared and physically fit prior to  attending training. The program aims to provide recruits with realistic  training that is similar to the first 3 weeks of basic training. In addition,  recruiters stated that the Recruit Sustainment Program allows the ARNG  to maintain contact with recruits while they wait to attend training and to  monitor their conduct and educational progress to help ensure they stay  eligible to join. Table 6 shows our analysis of the extent to which non- prior-service enlisted individuals who joined the ARNG from fiscal years  2004 through 2013 completed their initial military training.
section_title: Appendix III: Average Length of Time for Enlisted Soldiers to Qualify for Their Military Occupations
paragraphs: The average length of time for non-prior-service enlisted soldiers who  joined the Army National Guard (ARNG) from fiscal years 2004 through  2013 to complete initial military training and become qualified for their  military occupation for the top 15 military occupational specialties varied  from 254 to 357 days. See table 7.  .
section_title: Appendix IV: Length of Time Enlisted Soldiers Who Left Before Their Initial Term Served in the Army National Guard
paragraphs: Enlisted soldiers who joined the Army National Guard (ARNG) from fiscal  years 2001 through 2007 and did not complete their initial term of service  typically left within the first 2 years of joining the ARNG. Figure 1 shows  the length of time enlisted soldiers who joined from fiscal years 2001  through 2007 and did not complete their initial term of service stayed in  the ARNG.
section_title: Appendix V: Reasons Why Enlisted Soldiers Did Not Complete Their Initial Term
paragraphs: We also analyzed the reasons why soldiers did not complete their initial  term of service and found that soldiers left for a variety of reasons.  Figure 2 shows the reasons why soldiers did not complete their initial  term of service for those who joined from fiscal years 2001 through 2007.
section_title: Appendix VI: Department of Defense (DOD), Department of the Army, and Army National Guard (ARNG) Policies and Procedures Related to Recruiting and Retention
paragraphs: Description   Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides  procedures regarding the tracking and reporting of various  recruiting-related data (including the tracking and  reporting of enlistment waivers and tracking and reporting  of recruiter irregularities).
Establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for  qualitative distribution of manpower accessions, and  defines certain DOD quality measures for accessions.
Governs eligibility criteria, policies, and procedures for  enlistment and processing of persons into the Regular  Army, the Army Reserve, and the ARNG, among other  things.
Dictates the different types of enlistment or accession  programs for enlisted, officers, and warrant officers.
Provides information on medical fitness standards for  induction, enlistment, appointment, retention, and related  policies and procedures.
Establishes a single reference for incentives authorized  within the ARNG and Army Reserve and establishes  responsibilities for Department of the Army regarding  incentives within the ARNG and Army Reserve.
Integrates all of the recruiting and retention programs,  policies, and procedures necessary for developing,  implementing, and monitoring a successful strength  maintenance program at the state or territory level.
Governs policies and procedures for the administration of  the ARNG SRIP Programs.
section_title: Appendix VII: Recommendations from Selected Prior GAO Work on Military Recruiting and the Status of Their Implementation
subsections: section_title: Report issuance date November 17, 2005
paragraphs: Recommendation  To provide greater understanding of the recruiting and  retention issues and improve the department’s  oversight for these issues, the Secretary of Defense  should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness, in concert with the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, to  require the 10 components to report annually on all  (not just critical) over- and underfilled occupational  specialties, provide an analysis of why occupational  specialties are over- and underfilled, and report  annually on and justify their use of enlistment and  reenlistment bonuses provided to servicemembers in  occupational specialties that exceed their authorized  personnel levels.
To provide greater understanding of the recruiting and  retention issues and improve the department’s  oversight for these issues, the Secretary of Defense  should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness, in concert with the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, to  develop a management action plan that will help the  components to identify and address the root causes of  their recruiting and retention challenges.
Should the Army decide to offer incentives to officers  in the future, the Secretary of Defense should direct  the Secretary of the Army to build on currently  available analyses that will enable the Army, with the  direction and assistance of the Secretary of Defense,  to set cost-effective bonus amounts and other  incentives.
To enable the most efficient use of recruiting  resources, the Secretary of Defense should direct the  Secretary of the Army to collect data on the cost- effectiveness of the Army’s conduct waiver polices— including costs associated with the waiver review and  approval process and with future separations of  soldiers with conduct waivers for adverse reasons— and use these data to inform the Army’s waiver  policies.
To enhance its existing processes to recruit and retain  sufficient numbers of enlisted personnel and to avoid  making excessive payments to achieve desired  results, the Secretary of Defense should direct the  Secretary of the Army to build on currently available  analyses that will enable the Army to set cost-effective  enlistment and reenlistment bonuses.
section_title: Report title
paragraphs: Recommendation  To enable the Army to make informed decisions  regarding the management of its officer corps over  time, the Secretary of Defense should direct the  Secretary of the Army to track—and if necessary  correct—any effects that its actions to alleviate  shortages may have on the officer corps, particularly in  cases in which the Army has deviated from  benchmarks established in the Defense Officer  Personnel Management Act.
The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries  of the Army and Navy to identify mechanisms for the  regular sharing of the recruiter irregularity data  throughout all levels of command.
The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to  complete and issue the instruction on tracking and  reporting data on recruiter irregularities to clarify the  requirements for the types of recruiter irregularities to  be reported and the placement of recruiter irregularity  cases and actions taken into reporting categories.
The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to  direct the relevant offices within the National Guard  Bureau to adjust their reporting procedures in ways  that will provide transparency in the data reported to  OSD and any limitations on the data.
The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to  include the appropriate disclosures concerning data  limitations in the recruiter irregularity reports that OSD  produces on the basis of the National Guard data for  the Congress and others.
section_title: Appendix VIII: Comments from Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Vincent Balloon, Assistant  Director; Amie Lesser; Richard Powelson; Terry Richardson; Christine  San; Jared Sippel; Norris “Traye” Smith; Sabrina Streagle; Elizabeth Van  Velzen, and Michael Willems made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Military Recruiting: Clarified Reporting Requirements and Increased  Transparency Could Strengthen Oversight over Recruiter Irregularities.  GAO-10-254. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2010.
Military Personnel: Army Needs to Focus on Cost-Effective Use of  Financial Incentives and Quality Standards in Managing Force Growth.  GAO-09-256. Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2009.
Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted  Personnel Recruitment and Retention Challenges. GAO-06-134.  Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2005.
Military Attrition: DOD Needs to Better Analyze Reasons for Separation  and Improve Recruiting Systems. GAO/T-NSIAD-98-117. Washington,  D.C.: March 12, 1998.
Military Recruiting: DOD Could Improve Its Recruiter Selection and  Incentive Systems. GAO/NSIAD-98-58. Washington, D.C.: January 30,  1998.
Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted  Personnel. GAO/NSIAD-97-39. Washington, D.C.: January 6, 1997.