Vehicle Safety Inspections: Improved DOT Communication Could Better Inform State Programs
Published: 2015-08-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2013, an estimated 5.7-million vehicle crashes resulted in approximately 32,700 fatalities and over 2.3-million injuries. One of NHTSA's guidelines to help states optimize the effectiveness of highway safety programs recommends that each state have a program to periodically inspect all registered vehicles to reduce the number of vehicles with conditions that may contribute to crashes or increase the severity of crashes.
GAO was asked to review these state programs and NHTSA's assistance to states. This report assesses: 1) what is known about the safety benefits and costs of operating state vehicle safety inspection programs, 2) challenges that states have faced in operating these programs, and 3) actions NHTSA could take to assist states with these programs. GAO analyzed NHTSA 2009—2013 data and state data for crash trends related to vehicle component failure; reviewed studies that analyzed relationships between safety inspections and outcomes; and interviewed officials in 15 states that have inspection programs. GAO also interviewed officials in 5 states that eliminated their programs since 1990, NHTSA officials, and representatives from safety groups and automotive industry groups.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: According to officials GAO interviewed from 15 state vehicle safety inspection programs, these programs enhance vehicle safety; however, the benefits and costs of such programs are difficult to quantify. State officials told GAO that inspections help identify vehicles with safety problems and result in repair or removal of unsafe vehicles from the roads. For example, Pennsylvania state data show that in 2014, more than 529,000 vehicles (about 20 percent of vehicles in the state) failed inspection and then underwent repairs to pass. Nationwide, however, estimates derived from data collected by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) show that vehicle component failure is a factor in about 2 to 7 percent of crashes. Given this relatively small percentage as well as other factors—such as implementation or increased enforcement of state traffic safety laws—that could influence crash rates, it is difficult to determine the effect of inspection programs based on crash data. Studies GAO reviewed and GAO's analysis of state data examined the effect of inspection programs on crash rates related to vehicle component failure, but showed no clear influence. Finally, many states do not directly track the costs of operating safety inspection programs because costs may be comingled with other inspection programs, such as emissions.
State safety inspection program officials GAO interviewed primarily cited the oversight of inspection activities and paper-based data systems as challenges they have faced in operating vehicle safety inspection programs. For example, officials in 11 of the 15 states with programs GAO interviewed cited oversight efforts as a challenge, including ensuring that private inspection stations were conducting inspections consistent with program requirements, and officials in 4 of the 15 states also said that paper-based data systems can hinder oversight efforts. To address challenges, some states have taken actions such as implementing more stringent program rules and exploring the development of electronic data systems. Other states have eliminated their inspection programs altogether.
Program officials in all 15 states said that additional information from NHTSA—for example, information related to new vehicle safety technologies—would help in operating their programs. However, there is no designated channel for communication between NHTSA and program officials. Several state officials noted that they would like more information on new technologies such as light-emitting diode (LED) brake lights. State officials also said that it is not clear whether or how to inspect new safety technologies, such as tire pressure monitoring systems, required by NHTSA for new vehicles. Without information, states have implemented different inspection pass-fail criteria or chosen not to include new technologies in their inspections, potentially reducing the safety benefit of their programs. NHTSA officials told GAO they have adopted a hands-off approach to state vehicle inspection programs because the agency devotes its resources primarily to areas that contribute more heavily to crashes, such as driver behavior. However, consistent with NHTSA's mission to assist states in implementing traffic safety programs, improving communication with state officials on vehicle safety issues could help these officials in operating their inspection programs.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: DOT should establish a communication channel with states to convey relevant information to state safety inspection officials and respond to their questions. DOT officials reviewed this report and agreed with GAO's recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Driving is one of the riskiest activities in which average Americans  engage. In 2013, an estimated 5.7 million motor vehicle crashes resulted  in approximately 32,700 fatalities and over 2.3 million injuries. The  Department of Transportation’s (DOT) National Highway Traffic Safety  Administration (NHTSA) was established in 1970 with a mission to save  lives, prevent injuries, and reduce the economic costs that result from  such crashes. As part of this mission, NHTSA supports state efforts to  improve traffic safety and issues guidelines to help states optimize the  effectiveness of highway safety programs at the state and local level. One  of these guidelines recommends that each state have a program for  periodic inspection of all registered vehicles to reduce the number of  vehicles with existing or potential conditions that may contribute to  crashes or increase the severity of crashes that do occur. Between 1967  and 1976, DOT could withhold a percentage of federal-aid highway funds  apportioned to a state that did not implement a periodic motor vehicle  inspection program; the mid 1970’s was the high-water mark for these  programs, with 31 states and the District of Columbia implementing  programs. Since 1976, after legislation limited NHTSA’s authority to  withhold federal-aid highway funding, the number of states with programs  has declined. As of July 2015, we found 16 states with periodic inspection  programs. You asked us to review state motor vehicle inspection  programs and NHTSA’s role in assisting these programs.
This report  assesses: 1) what is known about the safety benefits and costs of  operating state vehicle safety inspection programs, 2) any challenges that  states have faced in operating these programs, and 3) any actions  NHTSA could take to assist states with these programs.
For this assessment, we conducted a literature search for studies that  analyzed relationships between safety inspections and outcomes, such  as crash rates, vehicle component failure, and a vehicle fleet’s age. We  limited our literature search to articles and reports published after 1990— the last time that GAO conducted a comprehensive literature review on  this topic. We identified six studies published from 1992 through 2013  that were relevant to the research objective on the safety benefits and  costs of operating state vehicle safety inspection programs and four  studies relevant to the research objective on challenges that states face  that were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We analyzed  data for crashes related to vehicle component failure in two states before  and after program elimination in each of those states and analyzed  national data for crash trends related to vehicle component failure using  data for 2009—2013 from NHTSA’s National Automotive Sampling  System General Estimates System (NASS-GES). For each of the data  sets, we analyzed the data for possible errors, interviewed relevant  officials, and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report. We reviewed federal and state policy and  program documents related to inspection programs. We also reviewed  federal and state statutes, regulations, and guidelines. We reviewed  Executive Order 13563 on Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,  which provides principles that agencies should follow in establishing  regulations. We compared these documents to NHTSA’s actions related  to state vehicle safety inspection programs. We conducted interviews with  officials in 15 of the 16 states that currently have a safety inspection  program using a structured set of interview questions. We also  interviewed officials in five of six jurisdictions (four states and Washington  DC) that eliminated their state vehicle safety inspection program since  1990,automotive industry groups. Some states require vehicle inspections that  do not fall under the periodic motor vehicle inspection guideline and are  therefore not reviewed in this report. For example, states may have  required emissions inspections or safety inspections for specific types of  vehicles, such as vehicles for-hire, commercial vehicles, and school  buses. In some states emissions testing and safety inspections are  administered as one inspection program; when this approach is the case,  emissions information was incidentally reviewed and noted in this report.  See appendix I for more information on our scope and methodology. See  appendix II for a list of all of the states that have had a vehicle safety  inspection program.
NHTSA officials, and representatives from safety groups and  We conducted this performance audit from November 2014 through  August 2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: NHTSA’s mission is to prevent motor vehicle crashes and reduce injuries,  fatalities, and economic losses associated with these crashes. To carry  out this mission, NHTSA conducts a range of safety-related activities,  including: providing guidance and other assistance to states to help address  setting vehicle safety standards;  investigating possible safety defects and taking steps to help ensure  that products meet safety standards and are not defective (through  recalls if necessary);  collecting and analyzing data on crashes; and  traffic safety issues, such as drunk driving and distracted driving.
NHTSA also develops uniform guidelines for states’ highway safety  programs. In the past, these guidelines were referred to as standards,  and if a state failed to implement these standards, DOT could withhold a  percentage of federal-aid highway funds apportioned to the state. As  shown in figure 1, this authority changed in 1976 when legislation limited  NHTSA’s authority to withhold apportioned funds. Since that change,  states have been able to choose whether or not to follow the guidelines in  developing their highway safety programs.
NHTSA’s guideline on state motor vehicle inspection programs, included  in its Uniform Guidelines for State Highway Safety Programs,  recommends that states should have a program for periodic inspection of  all registered vehicles to reduce the number of vehicles with existing or  potential conditions that may contribute to crashes or increase the  severity of crashes that do occur, and should require the owner to correct  such conditions. We found that 16 states operate periodic motor vehicle  inspection programs. See figure 2 below. These states develop the  specific rules that govern their programs. For example, 11 of the 16 states  with inspection programs require an annual vehicle safety inspection,  three states require a biennial inspection, and two states require time  frames other than annual or biennial. Further, some states allow certain  vehicles to be exempted from the safety inspections, such as newer  model vehicles (up to 5 years from the model year) or vehicles at least 25  years old and registered as historical vehicles. Some states couple the  safety inspection with emissions inspections.
Vehicle safety inspection programs are administered by the state motor  vehicle administration, department of transportation, or law enforcement  agency, and in all of the states, except Delaware, state-licensed private  inspection stations perform the inspections. The number of these private  inspection stations per state ranges from around 295 (Rhode Island) to  17,000 (Pennsylvania). With a few exceptions, states do not limit the  number of private inspection stations that may participate in the safety   However,  inspection program; it is typically a market-driven process.states require these inspection stations to obtain certification or licenses  from the state. Delaware operates four state-run safety inspection sites.  The fees charged to vehicle owners for safety inspections are mostly set  by the state, though five states allow a market-driven fee which is set by  individual inspection stations. State officials we spoke with provided  information on the fees collected from drivers at the time of inspection.  These fees ranged from $0 (Delaware) to $55 (Rhode Island, but this  includes an emissions inspection).
In addition to the guideline for states on periodic motor vehicle inspection,  NHTSA has issued Vehicle In Use Inspection Standards, which set  inspection criteria for several vehicle systems.system standards for brakes (hydraulic, vacuum, air, electric and service  brakes), steering, suspension, tires, and wheel assemblies. For example,  the standards specify that tread on a tire shall not be less than two thirty– seconds (2/32”) of an inch deep and provides an inspection procedure for  examining the tire for this depth. These minimum standards apply to all  states that choose to implement a vehicle safety inspection program.  However, states with programs include more vehicle systems in their  inspections than are specified in the standards. For systems not covered  by these standards, each state determines what will constitute a passed  or failed component. Examples of other systems generally incorporated  into state vehicle safety inspections are lighting (such as headlights,  brake lights, and turn signals), seatbelts, horns, windshields, wiper blades  and the vehicle’s undercarriage.
section_title: Impact of Safety Inspections on Vehicle Safety Is Unclear as Benefits and Costs Are Difficult to Quantify
subsections: section_title: Officials in States with Vehicle Safety Inspection Programs Said Their Programs Enhance Vehicle Safety
paragraphs: According to officials in 15 states with existing vehicle safety inspection  programs whom we interviewed, these programs help improve the  condition of vehicles; these officials point to data on the number of failed  inspections as evidence of the safety benefit of these programs. Officials  whom we interviewed from all 15 states said their programs help identify  vehicles with safety problems and remove these unsafe vehicles from the  roadways or compel owners to make repairs that otherwise might not be  performed. Most of these states (12 of 15) collect data on the number of  vehicles that fail inspection—the failure rate—and officials from 9 of these  states cited their failure rate data to demonstrate the effectiveness of their  programs. For example, Pennsylvania officials provided 2014 data  showing that more than 529,000 vehicles (about 20 percent of the state’s  2.7-million registered vehicles) underwent repairs in order to pass  inspection after initially failing. Virginia officials told us they believed that  their state’s roadways were safer because their program identified safety  problems in over 1.4 million—or 19 percent—of the state’s 7.5-million  vehicles, in 2014. According to Virginia officials, 700,000 of those vehicles  were rejected for brake-related issues such as worn, contaminated, or  defective linings or drums, disc pads, or disc rotors. Safety problems most  frequently found in other states in 2014 included: problems with glass,  which resulted in 47,172 failed inspections in Utah; malfunctioning brake  lights, which resulted in more than 13,000 failed inspections in Delaware;  and tire deficiencies, which resulted in almost 6,000 failed inspections in  Rhode Island.
Additionally, officials in three states said that vehicle safety inspections  are valuable because the average age of passenger vehicles is  increasing and, in some areas, weather conditions and roadway  treatments such as salt may contribute to vehicle deterioration. For  example, Rhode Island officials stated that their inspection program is  necessary in part because the state’s snow and icy weather requires road  treatments that can corrode a vehicle’s chassis, steel brake lines,  suspension, steering linkages, and ball joints. Further, these officials said  that their inspection program is important because vehicles are staying in  service longer—with some cars accruing more than 300,000 miles— exposing vehicle systems to more use and risk of developing safety  issues. DOT data show that the average age of passenger vehicles has  consistently increased from 1995 to 2013, from an average age of 8.4 to  11.4 years. Similarly, Vermont and West Virginia officials told us that their  states’ snow and associated road treatments, coupled with rough terrain  and poor roadways, increase vehicle deterioration. They said that their  programs mitigate seasonal weather challenges by reducing the number  of unsafe cars in use.
section_title: Research Examining Effect on Crash Rates is Inconclusive, in Part Due to Limited Data
paragraphs: Despite the consensus among the state inspection program officials we  interviewed that these programs improve vehicle condition, research  remains inconclusive about the effect of safety inspection programs on  crash rates. There is little recent empirical research on the relationship  between vehicle safety inspection programs and whether these programs  reduce crash rates. What is available has generally been unable to  establish any causal relationship.on vehicle safety inspection programs in 1990, there have been three  econometric studies conducted examining the relationship between  vehicle inspections and crashes in the U.S. and three studies examining  these programs in other countries. Among the three studies of U.S.  vehicle inspection programs, none were able to establish a statistically  significant effect of safety inspection programs on crashes involving either  fatalities or injuries. Specifically, the studies examined crash rates in all  50 states and did not find statistically significant differences in crash rates  in states with inspection programs compared to those without.  International studies have also not been able to establish a link between   Since GAO last conducted a review  safety inspection programs and crash rates involving either fatalities or  injuries. For example, only one study suggested that safety inspections  potentially reduce the likelihood of crashes, but noted the magnitude of  the reduction could not be clearly established.information on each of the studies.
See appendix III for more  While our literature review did not yield any studies establishing that  vehicle safety inspections reduce crashes, this does not necessarily  demonstrate that inspections do not have such an effect. Nationwide  studies involving crashes related to vehicle component failure are  hindered, in part, due to a lack of nationwide crash data. There is no  comprehensive database for all police reported crashes in the United  States. NHTSA maintains two data sources that capture some vehicle  crash incidents related to component failure. NHTSA’s Fatality Analysis  Reporting System (FARS) is a census of all fatal traffic crashes in the  United States that provides uniformly coded, national data on police- reported fatalities, and contains information on crashes in which vehicle  component failure was noted, but is limited to crashes involving fatalities.  NASS-GES is a nationally representative sample of police-reported motor  vehicle traffic crashes, which is also uniformly coded and contains  information on crashes in which vehicle component failure was noted in  the police report. However, the sample is not set up to be representative  at the state level; therefore, it cannot be used to compare states with and  without safety inspection programs. Some researchers have used FARS  in their analyses in order to perform state-by-state comparisons, but  detecting the effect of inspection programs on crash rates is difficult  because few crashes involve fatalities, and relatively few of those fatal  crashes are noted in police reports as having vehicle component failure  as a potential contributing factor.
According to our analysis of NHTSA’s NASS-GES crash data from 2009  through 2013, crashes with noted vehicle component failure constituted  around 2 percent of all crashes nationwide. We also found that the three  most common failures were related to 1) tires, 2) brakes, and 3) steering.  These categories make up the majority of failures reported with the next  biggest category being “other.” (See fig. 3.) These components are  inspected as part of all state inspection programs.
In addition to looking at NASS-GES data, we attempted to examine crash  rates before and after the elimination of safety inspection programs in four  states and D.C., but were able to get sufficient crash data for two of these  states, New Jersey and Oklahoma.vehicle component failure were generally between 2 and 3 percent of all  crashes and varied little from year to year, even after the elimination of  the inspection programs. We also calculated the crash rate—controlling  for vehicle miles traveled—and found that the rate did not significantly  change for either state. However, this analysis does not provide sufficient   In both cases, crashes involving  evidence to conclude that inspection programs did not have an effect on  crash rates because additional factors—such as implementation or  increased enforcement of traffic safety laws—could influence crash rates.
The number of crashes related to vehicle component failure may also be  generally underreported. Some literature and safety advocate  organizations we spoke with noted that police officers filling out accident  reports often do not have the time and resources to conduct a thorough  vehicle check to determine if a vehicle component failure contributed to  the crash. Other factors, such as driver behavior, may be more easily  ascertained. For a 2008 NHTSA crash causation survey, researchers  conducted thorough investigations of over 5,000 crashes over a 2-year  period (2005—2007) to determine factors that contributed to the  crashes. While this study did not identify vehicle component failure as  necessarily the cause of the accident, vehicle component failures were  found to be present in 6.8% of crashes. The crash causation survey  utilized a more comprehensive mechanical examination of the vehicle(s)  involved in crashes than the police accident reports used as the data  collection instrument for the NASS-GES crash data. The results of the  crash causation survey suggest that the percentage of crashes related to  vehicle component failure is higher than the estimates produced by the  NASS-GES because of the more detailed analysis of the vehicles  involved in the crashes.
section_title: States Generally Do Not Directly Track Costs of Operating Safety Inspection Programs
paragraphs: States with vehicle safety inspection programs generally do not directly  track the costs of managing and overseeing such programs. Officials from  8 of the 15 states with vehicle safety inspection programs we interviewed  told us they do not track the cost of their vehicle inspection program.  Officials from several of these states explained that costs for the  inspection program cannot be broken out, because the costs for operating  the inspection program are co-mingled with other programs or activities.  For example, in New York, North Carolina, and Vermont, officials told us  the staff who oversee the safety inspection programs also perform  oversight of the emissions testing program, motorcycles or heavy-duty  vehicles inspections, or have other state DOT duties. Consequently, the  administrative costs for programs and activities were co-mingled.  Similarly, officials from seven states reported tracking their program  costs, but several of them also acknowledged some cost estimates  included costs from other programs, since inspection program staff and  overhead may be multi-tasked for other related programs.
Funding for vehicle safety inspection programs comes from general state  funding or through fees related to safety inspections. States typically  receive some of the fee charged to drivers for safety inspections, while  the remainder is retained by the inspection station. As explained by state  officials, generally the amount that goes to the state is between $0 and $5  per inspection, though some states receive greater amounts with the  most being $33.25. In some cases, states generate revenue by selling  inspection stickers to the stations that conduct the inspection; these  stickers are used to indicate that a vehicle has passed the inspection.  States may also collect fees at the time of vehicle registration. These  revenue sources may go to the state’s general fund, to other funds or  departments (such as a highway maintenance fund), or to the larger  programmatic department (state patrol or department of transportation),  before being allocated to the inspection program. No state reported using  federal funds to support its inspection program. NHTSA officials also said  that no state had ever applied to use federal funding for a safety  inspection program.
section_title: State Challenges Include Oversight and Paper-Based Data Systems
paragraphs: Officials in the 15 states we spoke with primarily cited oversight and  paper-based data systems as challenges they have faced when operating  their vehicle safety inspection programs.
Eleven of 15 states cited oversight efforts as a challenge. Oversight  efforts involve addressing or preventing fraudulent behavior and  ensuring that private inspection stations perform inspections in  compliance with program requirements. To conduct oversight, states  with private inspection stations generally perform some combination  of routine, random, and covert audits. Because the inspection station  is a private entity, states do not have direct control over how  inspections are performed. For example, one state official said it can  be a challenge to ensure that stations do not attempt to make  unneeded repairs for profitable gain, while officials in a second state  said it was a challenge to ensure that stations do not intentionally  pass vehicles that should have failed the inspection. Officials in a third  state explained that it is challenging to ensure thoroughness and  quality of the inspection because doing so is a labor-intensive  process. Similarly, officials in four of the five states that we spoke with  that had eliminated programs told us that oversight efforts were also a  challenge for them in operating their programs. For example, officials  in one state told us that inspection stations were able to make more  money by providing other automotive services and believed the safety  inspections were not as profitable. Consequently, some inspection  station mechanics issued inspection stickers without properly  conducting inspections. In addition, some states cited challenges with  inadequate staffing resources for oversight efforts. For example,  officials from four states mentioned that they had relatively few state  auditors to oversee their safety inspection programs. According to  officials in one state, oversight can be a particular problem because  private inspection stations can span thousands of miles, and it can be  difficult to retain qualified state personnel if state wages are relatively  low.
Four of 15 states cited their paper-based data systems as a  challenge. Paper-based inspection data systems can be inefficient  and, according to some state officials, can limit states’ ability to  monitor their programs. Generally, in a paper-based data system,  private inspection stations record inspection results on paper forms  rather than into an electronic database. Officials in one state said they  would like an electronic database because inspection station results  would be more quickly shared with the state, resulting in better  program monitoring. These officials said they would first need to  ensure that the benefits of an electronic database outweigh the costs  and was a viable solution before requiring inspection stations to use it.  Officials in another state physically scan and enter paper-based data  received from inspection stations into the state’s database, a process  that they said is time consuming. To help manage the state’s data- entry work flow, officials limit the number of safety inspections that  inspection stations may conduct in a single day. These officials said  that the lack of Internet access at some of the inspection stations in  the state made it difficult to require the use of an electronic inspection  database. Other states with paper-based systems do not collect  statewide inspection data, preventing the state from analyzing data  and determining, for example, the number of vehicles that fail  inspections in a given year. Officials from one of these states cited a  lack of funds as a major impediment to creating an electronic data  system, and an official from the other state told us they were  preparing a request for proposals to develop an electronic database.
Other Challenges: State officials mentioned additional challenges,  including state legislatures’ attempts to eliminate or alter programs  (two states) and customer service challenges or general public  irritation with the program (two states). For example, officials in two  states told us they either relaxed or eliminated some non-safety  related standards (such as using certain tools to check headlight aim)  or exempted newer-model vehicles from safety inspections as a  compromise with state legislatures to continue their programs. With  regard to customer service challenges, officials in two states told us it  was challenging for them to deal with customers who complained  when their vehicle failed the inspection, had to be re-inspected, or  they endured long wait times.
Literature that we reviewed and other stakeholders whom we interviewed,  including representatives from safety groups, vehicle manufacturer  industry groups, and DOT officials, also cited challenges that states face  in operating their programs. Four studies cited oversight challenges. For  example, a 1999 study noted that inspectors can either intentionally or  unintentionally fail to report safety problems—sometimes to minimize the  level of trouble to customers and increase the number of inspections  performed. A 2008 state study found that one of the major criticisms of  safety inspection programs is the difficulty that one state had in ensuring  the quality and uniformity of inspections. The study stated that a  thorough inspection, if performed to state regulations, should take  between 15 and 30 minutes, according to program managers and  industry representatives. However, according to the study, safety  inspections in this state were taking 5 minutes, on average, raising  questions about whether consumers’ vehicles were receiving thorough  inspections. In addition, four stakeholders told us that state legislatures’  attempts to eliminate states’ programs either were or may be a challenge  for states. Also, three stakeholders told us that public frustration  associated with what the public perceives as unneeded repairs or the  personal inconvenience vehicle owners feel when having to get their  vehicles inspected either were or may be challenges for states.
Some states have taken action to address their challenges, including  implementing more stringent program rules, preparing manpower studies,  and developing electronic database systems. Officials in one state told us  that in 2012, they implemented stricter program rules for inspection  stations to follow in an attempt to reduce fraudulent behavior (specifically,  issuing stickers for vehicles that should have failed the inspection). In  addition, officials in a second state said they recently added requirements  that inspection station mechanics use fingerprint scanners for proper  identification before performing inspections. To address challenges with  staffing resources, officials in a third state told us they completed a  manpower study to better identify the resources needed to operate their  program. An official in another state told us that state officials were  currently developing a request for proposals to create an electronic  database system to replace its paper-based system.
While some states have tried various ways to address their program  challenges, other states have eliminated their vehicle safety inspection  programs altogether. Since we last reported on vehicle safety inspections  in 1990, five states and the District of Columbia have dropped their  programs, some citing a lack of evidence proving the program’s  effectiveness or saving financial resources as reasons. For example:  In 2001, an Oklahoma Senate Press Release stated there was no  evidence that vehicle safety inspection programs resulted in  decreased highway accidents or injuries statewide and that  eliminating the program would save Oklahomans $12 million.
In 2009, the District of Columbia eliminated its safety inspection  program primarily because there was no available data to show that  the program was beneficial, according to a District official. For  example, a District official told us that an analysis of crash data before  the program was eliminated showed that the majority of vehicle  accidents resulted from driver behavior, not from vehicular mechanical  failure.
In 2010 when New Jersey eliminated its program, the New Jersey  Motor Vehicle Commission Chief Administrator announced that with a  lack of conclusive data on program effectiveness and with the current  (2010) fiscal crisis, New Jersey could not justify the program’s  expense, and that dropping the program would yield an estimated  annual savings of $17 million.
section_title: NHTSA Could Improve Communications with States
paragraphs: Officials in all 15 states with inspection programs that we spoke with told  us that additional guidance and information from NHTSA would help in  operating their programs. The majority of state officials (11 of 15) would  like more guidance in the area of new vehicle safety technologies in order  to determine how and whether new technologies should be incorporated  into their inspection programs. The example most frequently cited by  state officials was light-emitting diode (LED) brake lights. LED brake lights  have multiple “light-emitting diodes” that contribute to the visibility of the  light. See figure 4 below for a diagram of an LED light. The number of  LEDs in a light can vary, depending on the vehicle manufacturer or  model. According to state officials, they do not know how many diodes, if  any, could malfunction before the light is considered unsafe, making it  difficult for them to set pass or fail criteria for LED lights. Since brake  lighting is critical to alert other drivers to changing conditions, it is  important for states with inspection programs to have criteria to judge  whether lights are working sufficiently well. Officials in three states also  noted that such criteria are important because failing a car on the basis of  individual diodes being out can result in a costly repair for consumers  ranging from a few hundred to several thousand dollars, depending on  the vehicle.
State officials provided a range of criteria they have chosen to use for  LED brake lights:
50% of the diodes must function to pass inspection (5 states),
70% must function (1 state),
100% must function (3 states), and not yet specifically addressed in the inspection program (1 state).
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108: Lamps, reflective devices, and  associated equipment, 49 C.F.R. § 571.108.
NHTSA could sponsor research in the area of LED brake lighting as it has  done in the past that might be helpful to states.
Further, officials in two states said that they are concerned about how  their programs may be impacted by new autonomous vehicle  technologies. Officials did not state specific concerns, but said that with  new advanced vehicle technologies coming on the market, it is not clear  how or what they should be inspecting. We have previously reported that  automobile manufacturers have begun to equip some newly  manufactured vehicles with sensor-based crash avoidance and  autonomous technologies intended to prevent accidents.officials from these two states noted that such technologies may add a  new layer to their inspection programs if the state decides the  technologies need to be included in inspections.
State officials in eight states with safety programs we interviewed also  said that additional information from NHTSA on new safety technologies  required by the agency’s safety standards for vehicle manufacturers  would help them in operating their inspection programs. These state  officials told us they generally track new vehicle safety standards  implemented by NHTSA, but it is not always clear to program officials  whether or how new standards might be incorporated into their inspection  programs. Two recent vehicle standards cited by state officials were the  requirements for tire-pressure monitoring systems (three state officials)  and back-up cameras (two state officials). Specifically, these states would like guidance on whether they should check to see that these  technologies are functioning correctly for vehicles that were manufactured  with the technologies. Officials in one state told us that their state required  the tire-pressure monitoring system to work and then eliminated that  requirement because the system often malfunctioned and the inspectors  could readily check whether the tires are properly inflated and holding air.  A 2013 study contracted by NHTSA to gather information for updating  inspection standards found “State directors welcomed the suggestion  that, when NHTSA issues a new regulation, the rulemaking be  accompanied by guidance on how to inspect a vehicle to ensure that the  required equipment is still functioning.” However, the last update to the  standards was in 1979, thus technologies that have been developed  since that time—such as anti-lock brake systems—are not included.  NHTSA officials told us that the determination of whether or how to  include new vehicle safety technologies in inspection programs should be  made by the states.
Further, NHTSA conducts research that could be useful to states with  inspection programs, but state officials may not be aware of this  information. For example, in April 2015, NHTSA issued the results of a  defect investigation on brake lines, which recommended to consumers  who drive vehicles from model year 2007 and earlier and live in cold- weather states to have a qualified mechanic inspect brake lines and other  components under the vehicle at least twice a year, which is more  frequent than the most strict state inspection requirements. Although the  recommendation was not directed at state inspection officials, this  information could help state inspection officials identify such problems  during their inspections. However, NHTSA did not disseminate this  information directly to states with inspection programs. According to  officials from the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators  (AAMVA)—the national group representing motor vehicle and law  enforcement agencies, which administer safety inspection programs in  states—they would share this type of information from NHTSA with their  members. However, the AAMVA officials were not aware of this study.  According to NHTSA officials, NHTSA issues press releases to the media  and stakeholders on a regular distribution list, but AAMVA is not currently  on this distribution list.
According to NHTSA officials, there are no NHTSA staff designated to  answer questions related to state inspection programs or disseminate  relevant information to program officials because agency resources are  currently focused on areas that have a greater impact on crash rates,  such as driver behavior. NHTSA officials also noted that current evidence  on vehicle safety inspection programs does not warrant a more  prescriptive approach and that state officials should make determinations  on what is most effective for their individual programs. Considering the  variation among state programs and state needs it seems appropriate for  states to determine much of their vehicle safety inspection program’s  structures. However, state vehicle safety inspection program officials  sometimes have questions about incorporating new technologies in their  programs. Given that NHTSA has a guideline recommending that states  implement vehicle inspection programs and that the agency’s mission  includes assisting states with traffic safety programs, it is reasonable that  state officials would look to NHTSA for guidance when these questions  arise. While NHTSA does not dedicate staff to vehicle inspection issues,  the agency has a broad range of vehicle technical experts in various parts  of the organization who are knowledgeable about related issues. For  example, NHTSA officials said the agency currently has 20 engineers  who work on Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards that are relevant to  vehicle inspection guidelines, along with 10 support professionals, such  as economists and lawyers. Although NHTSA could update or produce  additional regulation, Executive Order 13563 states that agencies  should be identifying and assessing available alternatives to regulation  including providing information upon which choices can be made.  Establishing a communication channel, such as by designating a point of  contact, could provide information transfer between knowledgeable  NHTSA staff and state vehicle inspection program officials, and could  help state inspection program officials operate their programs more  effectively. Once established, such a channel would not necessarily  require extensive NHTSA resources. For example, NHTSA could  leverage the communication channel that AAMVA currently has with  states, or set up a web-based forum through which state officials can ask  questions, receive information from NHTSA, and share information with  other states on how they are addressing new vehicle technologies and  standards in their programs.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While the benefits and costs of state vehicle inspection programs are  difficult to quantify, state program officials we spoke to are confident that  their programs improve vehicle safety, despite the challenges they face in  operating the programs. However, some state officials told us they  sometimes have questions about new technologies and other issues  related to vehicle safety, and have not been able to get clear answers  from NHTSA. With no recent federal guidance, state officials have  implemented different criteria or chosen not to include new technologies  in their inspection programs, potentially reducing the safety benefits of  their inspection program. Further, NHTSA’s work in the areas of Federal  Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and defects investigation touches on  vehicle component and safety information that could be useful to state  vehicle safety inspection program officials, but this information is not  being provided directly to these officials nor to the national group that  represents these officials. NHTSA’s decision to not devote significant  resources to state vehicle inspection programs is consistent with research  showing that vehicle component failures are a relatively minor contributor  to traffic crashes. However, establishing a communication channel to  answer questions from state officials and convey information could assist  states in improving their vehicle safety inspection programs. To minimize  resources needed to establish and maintain a communication channel,  NHTSA could potentially create a web-based forum to share information  and respond to questions and collaborate with AAMVA to disseminate  information to state officials.
section_title: Recommendation
paragraphs: To improve assistance to states in regard to the periodic motor vehicle  inspection guideline, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the  Administrator of NHTSA to establish and maintain a communication  channel with states to convey relevant information related to vehicle  inspections and respond to questions from state safety inspection  program officials.
section_title: Agency Comments and our Response
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment. DOT  provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix V. In its  written comments, DOT stated that NHTSA agreed with our  recommendation, and supports our conclusion that establishing a  communication channel with state vehicle safety inspection program  officials would be beneficial.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, and the Secretary of Transportation. This report will also be  available at no charge on the GAO website http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: We conducted a review of state motor vehicle inspection programs and  National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s role in assisting these  programs. This report assesses: 1) what is known about the safety  benefits and costs of operating state vehicle safety inspection programs,  2) any challenges states have faced in operating these programs, and 3)  any actions NHTSA could take to assist states with these programs.
To identify what is known about the costs and safety benefits of state  vehicle inspection programs, we conducted a literature search for studies  that analyzed relationships between safety inspections and outcomes,  such as crash rates, vehicle component failures, and vehicle fleet age.  We limited our literature search to those articles and reports published  since 1990—the last time GAO conducted a comprehensive literature  review. We identified existing studies from peer-reviewed journals,  government reports, trade publications, and conference papers based on  searches of various databases, such as ProQuest, Academic OneFile,  and Transportation Research International Documentation. Search  parameters included studies across the United States and in other  countries. We also conducted interviews with organizations that assist  states with traffic safety efforts and asked them to recommend additional  research. The literature review parameters and interviews resulted in 185  abstracts or studies. Of these, we determined that 29 studies appeared to  be relevant—eliminating, for example, studies that focused on emissions  inspections. We assessed the relevance and methodological quality of  the selected studies by performing an initial review of the findings (here  we eliminated any studies based on data from before 1980), and then  performed an independent assessment of the study’s methodology. After  these reviews, we determined that 6 studies published from 1992 through  2013 were sufficiently reliable for the research objective on the safety  benefits and costs of operating state vehicle safety inspection programs  (see appendix III) and 4 studies were sufficiently reliable for the research  objective on any challenges that states face in operating these programs.
To determine what is known about safety benefits of state vehicle  inspections, we also analyzed crash data. Because of known data  limitations raised in the studies we reviewed during the literature search,  we attempted to compare crash rates related to vehicle component failure  before and after program elimination in states that eliminated their  inspection program since 1990. Six states fit this criterion: South Carolina  (1995), Arkansas (1998), Oklahoma (2001), Washington D.C., (2009),  New Jersey (2010), and Mississippi (2015). Because Mississippi dropped  its program during the course of our assessment, we did not do a before  and after comparison. For the other five states, we attempted to collect  data on the number of crashes recorded in the state and the number of  crashes recorded with vehicle component failures 5 years before and 5  years after program elimination. We were only able to obtain this data for  two of the five states: Oklahoma and New Jersey. For Oklahoma we were  able to obtain data for 1995-2013. We focused on the five years before  and after 2001 when the program was eliminated to see if there was a  difference in trend. Because New Jersey eliminated its program in 2010,  we were not able to get 5 years of crash data after the program was  eliminated. For New Jersey we reviewed data from 2005 to 2013. We  also analyzed national level crash data from NHTSA’s National  Automotive Sampling System General Estimates System (NASS-GES)  for the years 2009-2013. NASS-GES consists of data collected from an  annual sample of about 50,000 police accident reports and is statically  weighted to be a nationally representative of all police-reported crashes  that occur in the United States each year. We analyzed this data to  determine the estimated number of total crashes with vehicle factors  nationwide as well as the specific vehicle component failures that were  reported, such as issues with brakes, tires, and steering. We express our  confidence in the precision of estimates as 95 percent confidence  intervals. This is the interval that would contain the actual population  values for 95 percent of the NASS-GES samples that NHTSA could have  drawn. Because of the sample design used to collect GES, we are limited  to reporting trends on a national level and could not use this data to look  at individual state trends. For each of these data sets, we interviewed  relevant officials and analyzed the data for possible errors. We  determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  estimating the number of reported crashes that occur with vehicle  component failures.
To determine challenges states faced in operating their inspection  programs and what actions, if any, NHTSA could take to assist states with  their vehicle safety inspection programs, we reviewed federal and state  policy and program documents related to inspection programs. We  reviewed federal statutes, regulations, guidelines, and guidance  documents, state laws authorizing safety inspection programs, state  program reports, state officials’ testimony before their state legislators  and state inspection guidance and manuals. We observed safety  inspections in Delaware at a state-run inspection station and in Virginia at  a privately owned and operated inspection station. In selecting these sites  we worked with state officials to identify an inspection station where we  could view an actual inspection take place. We conducted structured  interviews with officials in 15 of the 16 states that currently have a safety  inspection program. We attempted multiple times to speak with the one  remaining state—New Hampshire—but were unsuccessful. We also  interviewed state officials in five of six jurisdictions (four states and the  District of Columbia) that eliminated their programs since 1990. South  Carolina eliminated its program in 1995 and did not have any officials  knowledgeable about the program. We also interviewed NHTSA officials,  researchers at Carnegie Mellon University, and representatives from the  American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, safety groups  (Center for Auto Safety and Public Citizen), and automotive industry  groups (Automotive Service Association, Auto Care Association, and  Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association).
section_title: Appendix II: List of States that Have Required Vehicle Safety Inspections, 1929-2015
subsections: section_title: States Currently Requiring Annual Safety Inspections State
section_title: Appendix III: Studies Reviewed that Examine Vehicle Inspections and Crash Rates
paragraphs: Article   Sutter, David and Poitras, Marc  (2002). The Political Economy of  Automobile Safety Inspections.  Public Choice, 133 (3-4), 367-387.
Methodology  Regression analysis using 1981-1993  panel data of 50 states.
Conclusions  Unable to establish a statistically  significant effect of vehicle  inspection program on fatalities  or injury rates.
Merrell, David, Poitras, Marc, and  Sutter, Daniel (1999). The  Effectiveness of Vehicle Safety  Inspections: An Analysis Using  Panel Data. Southern Economic  Journal, 65 (3), 571-583.
Regression analysis using 1981-1993  panel data of 50 states.
Unable to establish a statistically  significant effect of vehicle  inspection program on fatalities  or injury rates.
Holdstock, J., Hagarty, D., &  Zalinger, D. (1994). Review of a  mandatory vehicle inspection  program. Project report.
Regression analysis using 1990-1991  data for 50 states, District of Columbia,  and 10 Canadian provinces.
Unable to establish a statistically  significant effect of vehicle  inspection program on fatalities  or injury rates.
Keall, M. D., & Newstead, S.  (2013). An evaluation of costs and  benefits of a vehicle periodic  inspection scheme with six- monthly inspections compared to  annual inspections. Accident  Analysis & Prevention, 58, 81-87.
Regression analysis using merged New  Zealand crash data (2004-2009),  licensing data (2003-2008), and  inspection data (2003-2009).
Going from annual to biannual  inspections may reduce  likelihood of crashes (8%) and  the prevalence of vehicle defects  (13.5%), but the wide confidence  interval for the drop in crash rate  (0.4–15%) indicated  considerable statistical  uncertainty.
Christensen, Peter and Elvik, Rune  (2007). Effects on Accidents of  Periodic Motor Vehicle Inspection  in Norway. Accident Analysis and  Prevention 39, 47-52.
Observational study using insurance data  and 1998-2002 inspection data in  Norway.
Inspections improved the  technical condition of inspected  cars, but did not have a  statistically significant effect on  crash rates.  The study’s findings suggested  that following inspections, the  accident rate of inspected cars  did not decline, but rather  showed a weak tendency to  increase.
Fosser, Stein (1992). An  Experimental Evaluation of the  Effects of Periodic Motor Vehicle  Inspection on Accident Rates.  Accident Analysis and Prevention  24 (6), 599-612.
Experimental design over 4 years (1986- 1990) in Norway.
Inspection improved the  technical condition of inspected  cars, but the differences found in  technical condition had no  influence on accident rates.
section_title: Appendix IV: Estimated Number of Crashes Listed with Vehicle Component Failure 2009- 2013 with Lower and Upper Bound 95% Confidence Intervals (CI)
paragraphs: Appendix IV: Estimated Number of Crashes  Listed with Vehicle Component Failure 2009- 2013 with Lower and Upper Bound 95%  Confidence Intervals (CI)
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Transportation
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Sara Vermillion (Assistant  Director), Carl Barden, Namita Bhatia Sabharwal, Timothy Bober, Melissa  Bodeau, Jennifer Clayborne, Leia Dickerson, Amanda Miller, Sara Ann  Moessbauer, Josh Ormond, Cheryl Peterson, Oliver Richard, Stephen  Sanford, Amy Suntoke, Friendly Vang-Johnson, Michelle Weathers, and  Jade Winfree made key contributions to this report.