NASA Human Space Exploration: Opportunity Nears to Reassess Launch Vehicle and Ground Systems Cost and Schedule
Published: 2016-07-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: NASA is in the midst of developing systems needed to support deep-space exploration by humans. SLS will be NASA's first exploration-class launch vehicle in over 40 years to propel astronauts and cargo beyond low-Earth orbit. The EGS program is developing systems and infrastructure to support both SLS and the crew capsule, known as Orion. Together, the first planned SLS flight, the ground systems for that effort, and the first two Orion flights are estimated to cost almost $23 billion. In July 2015, GAO found that SLS's limited cost and schedule reserves were placing the program at increased risk of being unable to deliver the launch vehicle on time and within budget.
The House Committee on Appropriations report accompanying H.R. 2578 included a provision for GAO to assess the acquisition progress of the SLS, EGS, and Orion programs. This report assesses the extent to which (1) SLS has made progress meeting cost and schedule commitments, and (2) EGS has made progress in completing modifications to key facilities and equipment. To do this work, GAO examined the results of design reviews, contractor data, and other relevant program documentation, and interviewed relevant officials. GAO plans to report separately on the Orion program in July 2016.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) new launch vehicle, the Space Launch System (SLS), has resolved some technical issues and matured its design since GAO's July 2015 report, but pressure remains on the program's limited cost and schedule reserves. This pressure, in turn, threatens its committed November 2018 launch readiness goal. The program has made progress in resolving some technical issues—for example, a major alignment problem with the welding tool for the core stage (SLS's structural backbone and fuel tank) was corrected. Nonetheless, SLS development faces known risks moving forward. While such risks are not unusual for large-scale programs, the program's approach to managing them may increase pressure on the limited reserves. For example, the SLS program has not positioned itself well to provide accurate assessments of core stage progress—including forecasting impending schedule delays, cost overruns, and anticipated costs at completion—because at the time of our review it did not anticipate having the baseline to support full reporting on the core stage contract until summer 2016—some 4.5 years after NASA awarded the contract. Further, unforeseen technical challenges are likely to arise once the program reaches its next phase, final integration for SLS and integration of SLS with its related Orion and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) human spaceflight programs. Any such unexpected challenges are likely to place further pressure on SLS cost and schedule reserves. The figure below shows key events in SLS and EGS launch readiness schedules.
The EGS program is making progress in modifying selected facilities and equipment to support SLS and Orion, but is encountering technical challenges that require time and money to address. Like SLS, the program has reduced cost and schedule reserves, which threatens its committed November 2018 launch readiness goal. Modifications to two main components—the Vehicle Assembly Building, where the SLS is assembled, and the Mobile Launcher, the vehicle used to bring SLS to the launch pad—have already cost more and taken longer than expected as has development of EGS software. In June 2016, after all the systems necessary to support the first flight test are expected to have a stable design, NASA plans to start an integrated design review to demonstrate that the integrated systems will perform as expected. NASA guidance indicates that this type of review should also evaluate whether mission requirements are being met with acceptable risk within cost and schedule constraints. NASA officials stated that this review will have limited discussion of cost and schedule. Proceeding ahead without reassessing resources, however, could result in the EGS or SLS program exhausting limited resources to maintain pace toward an optimistic November 2018 launch readiness date.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that NASA should reevaluate cost and schedule reserves as part of its integrated design review for the first flight test in order to maximize all remaining cost and schedule reserves. NASA concurred with GAO's recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the  midst of developing systems needed to support deep space exploration  by humans. This exploration requires the capability to transport crew and  large masses of cargo beyond low Earth orbit. To provide that capability,  the Space Launch System (SLS) program is developing NASA’s first  exploration-class launch vehicle in over 40 years and the Orion Multi- Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion) program is developing the Orion crew  capsule to launch astronauts using the SLS. The Exploration Ground  Systems (EGS) program is developing systems and infrastructure to  support assembly, test, and launch of SLS and Orion. The three  programs together are estimated to cost almost $23 billion to demonstrate  initial capabilities that encompass the first planned SLS flight, the ground  systems for that effort, and the first two Orion flights. This amount  represents a significant portion of NASA’s planned development budget  for major projects over the next several years.
NASA’s efforts to develop and build space systems have not been without  trial. For the past 25 years, GAO has designated NASA Acquisition  Management as a high-risk area due to the agency’s struggles with poor  cost estimation, weak oversight, and risk underestimation. GAO’s work  has shown that NASA projects, while producing ground-breaking  research and advancing our understanding of the universe, tend to cost  more and take longer to develop than planned and are often approved  without evidence of a sound business case. In 2014, we found that the  agency continues to make progress toward reducing risk on many of its  major projects, but translating such progress to larger, more complex  projects such as SLS and EGS will be especially important in an era of  constrained budgets and competing priorities. The House Committee on  Appropriations report accompanying H.R. 2578 includes a provision for  GAO to review acquisition progress of NASA’s human exploration  programs including Orion, SLS, and EGS. Specifically, for this review, we  examined the extent to which (1) the SLS program has made progress  meeting cost and schedule commitments; and (2) the EGS program has  made progress in completing modifications to key components and  ground support equipment at Kennedy Space Center. We plan to report  separately in July 2016 on the Orion program. In addition, a bill on the  National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act for 2016  and 2017, which has not yet been enacted, included language related to  GAO reporting on the extent to which ground systems acquired in support  of SLS are focused directly on that program. Appendix I includes  information related to this matter.
To assess the progress of the SLS program, we compared current  program status with NASA’s cost and schedule baselines for executing  the SLS program’s first flight test, Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1), which  NASA plans to be ready for no later than November 2018. We reviewed  top program and element-level risks as identified by NASA; analyzed the  results of the SLS July 2015 critical design review to determine what  efforts present the highest risk to program cost and schedule; and  analyzed monthly earned value management reports to identify the  largest impacts on cost and schedule. In addition, we assessed SLS  design maturity against established knowledge-based best practice  standards. We compared the status of flight software development efforts  and progress against NASA’s planned release schedule and reviewed the  metrics NASA is using to assess software development status. To assess  the progress of modifications to key components of the EGS program, we  identified the Vehicle Assembly Building, Mobile Launcher, and software  as key EGS components for our review because they are among the top  program risks or the most expensive projects within EGS. To evaluate the  progress made in preparing these components and software to support  the EM-1 test flight, we reviewed program plans and compared them to  program status to assess whether EGS components and software were  progressing as expected, critical design review documents to determine  design maturity, quarterly program status reviews to identify risks, budget  information to assess development costs, and contractor progress reports  to identify any issues contractors faced that could impact cost and  schedule. We also evaluated the program’s integrated master schedule  against the GAO’s best acquisition practices for scheduling in order to  assess the validity of the EGS program’s critical path. Additionally, to  determine the extent to which major ground system components at  Kennedy Space Center directly support the SLS and Orion programs, we  reviewed NASA budget and accounting data and interviewed agency  officials. For more information on our scope and methodology, see  appendix II.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2015 to July 2016  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of  2010 directed NASA to, among another things, develop a Space Launch  System as a follow-on to the Space Shuttle and prepare infrastructure at  Kennedy Space Center to enable processing and launch of the Space  Launch System as a key component in expanding human presence  beyond low-Earth orbit. To fulfill this direction, NASA formally established  the SLS program in 2011. The agency plans to develop three  progressively more capable SLS launch vehicles, complemented by  Orion, to transport humans and cargo into space. The first version of the  SLS that NASA is developing is a 70-metric ton (mt) launch vehicle  known as Block I.
In accordance with direction contained in the NASA Authorization Act of  2010, NASA’s acquisition approach for building the initial variant of the  SLS is predicated on the use of legacy systems, designs, and contracts  from the Space Shuttle and its intended successor Constellation program,  which was terminated in 2010 due to factors that included cost and  schedule growth. Figure 1 provides details about the heritage of each  SLS hardware element and its source as well as identifying the major  portions of the Orion crew vehicle.
NASA plans to use heritage hardware and new designs as follows:
RS-25 engines remaining from the Space Shuttle program to provide  power for up to four flights of the SLS,  five-segment solid rocket boosters that were developed under the  now-canceled Constellation program to provide thrust during the initial  minutes of SLS flight, a cryogenic rocket stage used on United Launch Alliance’s Delta IV  launch vehicle modified to operate as the Interim Cryogenic  Propulsion Stage (ICPS) to provide in-space power for SLS during  EM-1, a new core stage, which functions as the SLS’s fuel tank and  structural backbone, derived from the Shuttle’s external tank and Ares  I upper stage from the Constellation program, a new launch vehicle stage adaptor to attach and integrate the ICPS  to the core stage; and a new multi-purpose crew vehicle stage adaptor to attach and  integrate the SLS with the Orion vehicle.
NASA has committed to be ready to conduct one test flight, EM-1, of the  Block I vehicle no later than November 2018. During EM-1, the Block I  vehicle is scheduled to launch an uncrewed Orion to a distant orbit some  70,000 kilometers beyond the moon. All three programs—SLS, Orion,  and EGS—must be ready on or before this launch readiness date to  support this test flight.
NASA also intends to build 105- and 130-mt launch vehicles, known  respectively as Block IB and Block II, which it expects to use as the  backbone of manned spaceflight for decades. NASA anticipates using  the Block IB vehicles for destinations such as near-Earth asteroids and  Lagrange points and the Block II vehicles for eventual Mars missions.  When complete, the 130-mt vehicle is expected to have more launch  capability than the Saturn V vehicle, which was used for Apollo missions,  and be significantly more capable than any recent or current launch  vehicle.
To enable processing and launch of the SLS and Orion, NASA  established the Ground Systems Development and Operations program  in 2012 at Kennedy Space Center. The Ground Systems Development  and Operations program consists of the 21st Century Space Launch  Complex Initiative and the EGS program. NASA created the 21st Century  Space Launch Complex Initiative prior to the establishment of the SLS  and Orion programs as a way for Kennedy Space Center to continue to  make infrastructure improvements to benefit multiple users in the  absence of an ongoing major human exploration program. The EGS  program was established to renovate parts of Kennedy Space Center to  prepare for SLS and Orion. The program consists of nine major  components: the Vehicle Assembly Building, Mobile Launcher, Software,  Launch Pad 39B, Crawler-Transporter, Launch Equipment Test Facility,  Spacecraft Offline Processing, Launch Vehicle Offline Processing, and  Landing and Recovery. See figure 2 for pictures of the Mobile Launcher,  Vehicle Assembly Building, Launch Pad 39B, and Crawler-Transporter,  and appendix III for a description of the nine EGS components.
As the SLS and Orion programs began development, NASA shifted focus  away from the 21st Century Space Launch Complex Initiative to the EGS  program. For example, in fiscal year 2011, Congress appropriated NASA  $142.8 million for the 21st Century Space Launch Complex Initiative and  this declined to $39 million in fiscal year 2013, which was a year after  EGS began receiving funding. Further, in the fiscal year 2017 president’s  budget request, NASA requested $12 million to support the 21st Century  Space Launch Complex Initiative.
subsections: section_title: Space Systems and Acquisition Best Practices
paragraphs: Space launch vehicle development efforts are high risk from technical and  programmatic perspectives. The technical risk is inherent for a variety of  reasons, including the environment in which launch vehicles operate,  complexity of technologies and designs, and limited room for error in the  fabrication and integration process. Managing the development process is  complex for reasons that go well beyond technology and design. For  instance, at the strategic level, because launch vehicle programs can  span many years and be very costly, programs can face difficulties  securing and sustaining funding commitments and support. At the  program level, if the lines of communication between engineers,  managers, and senior leaders are not clear, risks that pose significant  threats could go unrecognized and unmitigated. If there are pressures to  deliver a capability within a short period of time, programs may be  incentivized to overlap development and production activities or delete  tests, which could result in late discovery of significant technical problems  that require more money and ultimately much more time to address. For  these reasons, it is imperative that launch vehicle development efforts  adopt disciplined practices and lessons learned from past programs.
Best practices for acquisition programs indicate that establishing  baselines that match cost and schedule resources to requirements and  rationally balancing cost, schedule, and performance are key steps in  establishing a successful acquisition program. Our work has also shown  that validating this match before committing resources to development  helps to mitigate the risks inherent in complex acquisition programs such  as SLS and EGS. We have reported that within NASA’s acquisition life  cycle, resources should be matched to requirements at key decision point  (KDP)-C, the review that commits the program to formal cost and  schedule baselines and marks the transition from the formulation phase  into the implementation phase. Best practices for acquisition programs  also indicate that about midway through development, the product’s  design should be stable and demonstrate that it is capable of meeting  performance requirements. The critical design review is the vehicle for  making this determination. These programmatic milestones are called out  relative to NASA’s acquisition life-cycle in figure 3 below.
NASA approved EM-1 cost and schedule baselines for the SLS program  in August 2014 and the EGS program in September 2014, following the  completion of each program’s respective KDP-C review. The agency  baseline commitment for the SLS program is at the 70 percent confidence  level and the agency baseline commitment for the EGS program is at the  80 percent confidence level, which are both in line with NASA’s  acquisition policies (see table 1). The confidence level is a probabilistic  analysis that provides assurance to stakeholders that programs will meet  cost and schedule targets.
In addition to the committed cost and launch readiness dates, both  programs are working towards internal goals of earlier launch readiness  dates and lower costs. NASA considers the time between the programs’  internal goals and their committed launch readiness dates as funded  schedule reserve, which is extra time, with the money to pay for it, in the  program’s overall schedule in the event that there are delays or  unforeseen problems. In July 2015, we found that the SLS program’s  internal goal for launch readiness for EM-1 had slipped from December  2017 to July 2018. This reduced the program’s schedule reserve from  eleven months to four months. In May 2016, the SLS program further  delayed its internal goal for launch readiness from July 2018 to  September 2018, reducing program schedule reserve to two months.  EGS’s internal goal for launch readiness for EM-1 is September 2018,  meaning the program currently has two months of funded schedule  reserve.
section_title: SLS Has Resolved Some Technical Issues and Matured Its Design, but Pressure Remains on Reduced Cost and Schedule Reserves
paragraphs: The SLS program has made solid progress in resolving some technical  issues and maturing the SLS design, but the program’s management of  known risks as well as the program’s upcoming integration and test phase  puts pressure on the program’s reduced cost and schedule reserves. This  pressure threatens the program’s committed November 2018 launch  readiness goal. The SLS program has made progress in resolving some  technical issues that we previously reported on. For example, prime  contractor officials for the core stage stated that they had implemented all  corrective actions necessary to repair a problem with the stage’s tooling.  Further, the program met its design goals by demonstrating the program’s  design was stable enough to warrant continuation. As the program  continues with final design and fabrication, the program faces known  risks. Such risks are not unusual for large-scale programs, especially  human exploration programs, but the program’s management of these  risks may increase pressure on reduced cost and schedule reserves. For  example, the SLS program has not positioned itself well to provide  accurate assessments of progress with the core stage—including  forecasting impending schedule delays, cost overruns, and estimates of  anticipated costs at completion—because, at the time of our review,  NASA did not have a performance measurement baseline necessary to  support full earned value management reporting on the core stage  contract. Finally, unforeseen technical challenges are likely to arise once  the program reaches its next phase, final integration for SLS and  integration of SLS with its related Orion and EGS human spaceflight  programs that will likely place further pressure on cost and schedule  reserves.
subsections: section_title: SLS Program Has Made Progress Resolving Some Technical Issues and Maturing Design
paragraphs: The SLS program has made solid technical progress developing its  primary elements, but at times, the progress has had associated cost  increases or schedule delays. Examples of this development progress— and the unexpected difficulties encountered achieving that progress— include the following:
Core stage. In November 2015, prime contractor officials for the core  stage stated that they had implemented all corrective actions  necessary to repair a subcontractor’s improper installation of the  welding tool used to manufacture the 212-foot-tall stage. These  actions were necessary because, as we reported in July 2015, NASA  officials told us that they would have prevented production of the core  stage. As we reported in March 2016, identifying and implementing  the corrective actions was the major contributor to a decrease in the  program’s schedule reserves from 11 months to 4 months. In  addition to resolving the tooling’s misalignment, the SLS program is  making progress with fabricating test articles for core stage  component testing, constructing new test stands where those  components will be subjected to structural testing, and modifying an  existing test stand to support hot-fire testing of the assembled core  stage. SLS program officials stated that they have also made  progress fabricating the EM-1 flight engine section.
RS-25 engines. In 2015, the program successfully tested RS-25  developmental engines and in March 2016 performed hot-fire testing  of a flight engine. According to NASA officials, these tests  demonstrated the engine could be operated under the conditions it will  encounter when integrated into SLS. The program also began  production of the new engine controller, which directs the RS-25  engines during flight. The contractor, however, is forecasting a  potential cost overrun of $113 million on the engine contract, largely  due to overruns stemming from developing the controller. According  to NASA officials, however, the potential overrun has not affected the  overall program cost or schedule. The factors that contributed to the  overrun include higher than expected parts costs, resolving anomalies  discovered in developmental test, and increasing staffing levels at the  subcontractor to meet schedule demands. NASA officials indicated  that the controller design has been tested in development and the  controller’s qualification testing is front-loaded to drive out problems  early in the test sequence; however, the new controller will not  complete all testing before engine deliveries begin. According to  NASA, if that testing uncovers the need for modifications to the  controller, engines already delivered may have to be brought back  from the flight line so that modifications can be implemented.
Solid Rocket Boosters. The program completed the first qualification  test of a fully assembled booster in March 2015. Prior X-ray  examination of a booster segment had revealed the presence of  unexpected unbonds between the solid rocket propellant, the  propellant liner, and the new asbestos-free insulation of the solid  rocket boosters that could have potentially caused an explosion.  Resolving the unbond issue contributed to a delay of 20 months in  full-scale qualification testing and, according to NASA officials, the  contractor’s forecast of a potential $129 million cost variance on the  contract did not affect the overall program cost or schedule. The  program is planning to complete a second qualification test of a fully  assembled booster sometime between May and July 2016, which  NASA officials anticipate will further confirm resolution of the unbond  issue.
ICPS. In October 2015, the SLS program completed work on the test  version of the ICPS. Additionally, in December 2015 the SLS program  began construction of the ICPS liquid oxygen tank, which will provide  liquid oxygen to help power the ICPS.
In addition, the program as a whole met best acquisition practices design  goals by releasing approximately 92 percent of design drawings for the  program-level Critical Design Review (CDR) in July 2015. Because the  CDR is the time in a project’s life cycle when the integrity of a project’s  design and its ability to meet mission requirements are assessed, it is  important that a project’s design is stable enough to warrant continuation  with design and fabrication, which is evidenced by release of 90 percent  of design drawings at CDR. A stable design allows projects to “freeze” the  design and minimize changes prior to beginning the fabrication of  hardware. It also helps to avoid re-engineering and rework efforts due to  design changes that can be costly to the project in terms of time and  funding.
section_title: SLS Program’s Management of Known Risks Could Increase Pressure on Already Reduced Cost and Schedule Reserves
paragraphs: As the program continues with final design and fabrication, the program  faces known risks. Such risks are not unusual for large-scale programs,  especially human exploration programs which are inherently complex and  difficult. The program’s management of these risks, however, may  increase pressure on already reduced cost and schedule reserves.
Although the program is making progress resolving some technical  challenges with the core stage, the core stage development schedule  remains aggressive and any additional delays will threaten the SLS  program’s readiness for its internal goal of launch readiness by  September 2018. As of May 2016, the core stage development effort had  approximately 50 days of schedule margin—or time within the schedule  where activities can be delayed before affecting a key milestone, which  for the core stage is delivery to Kennedy Space Center to begin  integrated operations with the Orion and EGS programs. Figure 4 shows  the approximately 50 days of core stage schedule margin as well as the 2  months of SLS program schedule reserve.
In addition, because the core stage is the SLS program’s critical path— the path of longest duration through the sequence of activities that  determines the program’s earliest completion date—any delay in its  development reduces schedule reserve for the whole program. And with  only 2 months of schedule reserve remaining between the program’s  internal goal and committed launch readiness date of November 2018,  any reduction in program reserves threatens the committed launch  readiness date.
As of April 2016, the SLS program was tracking core stage risks,  including late component delivery and concerns about application of the  thermal protection system that provides heat shielding, which could  require the program to use some of the core stage’s margin. Further, the  SLS Standing Review Board—an independent NASA team responsible  for reviewing SLS at each major program milestone—found in a 2015  report that it was unlikely the core stage would be able to support the SLS  program’s committed date for launch readiness. The Board cited several  factors for its finding, including a steep learning curve for the handling and alignment of such a large  the potential for human access issues to avionics and propulsion  plumbing once the stage is assembled, and  that the green run test—the culminating test of core stage  development where the actual EM-1 core stage flight article will be  integrated with the cluster of four RS-25 engines and fired for 500  seconds under simulated flight conditions—carries risks because it is  the first time the four RS-25 engines cluster will be fired, the first time  the integrated engine and core stage auxiliary power units will be  tested in flight-like conditions, and the first time flight and ground  software will be used in an integrated flight vehicle. Green run test  activities are currently scheduled to begin in October 2017.
Boeing and SLS program officials stated that they are working to  establish additional margin within the core stage schedule, but whether  the core stage stays on schedule is largely dependent on the success of  the green run test. Boeing officials told us that they originally had margin  in their schedule for a second green run test if needed, but that it was  removed due to the tight schedule. NASA officials acknowledged that this  schedule existed; however, they also stated that the contingency test was  considered “unauthorized work” for the contractor and the program  baseline only calls for one test. Further, NASA officials stated that if the  test is not successful, then a re-test may have to occur. Additionally they  stated that under current plans, any time required to conduct a re-test  would have to come from program schedule margin or reserve. As a  result, if the program uncovers unexpected performance issues during  green run testing, maintaining the core stage schedule—and thus the  program schedule—may prove difficult.
The SLS program has also not positioned itself well to provide accurate  assessments of progress with the core stage because it has never had a  performance measurement baseline for the core stage that is necessary  to support full earned value management reporting. Earned value, or the  planned cost of completed work and work in progress, can provide  accurate assessments of project progress, produce early warning signs of  impending schedule delays and cost overruns, and provide unbiased  estimates of anticipated costs at completion. The use of earned value  management, which integrates the project scope of work with cost,  schedule, and performance elements for optimum project planning and  control, is advocated by both GAO’s best practices for cost estimating  and NASA’s own guidance. According to a SLS program official, when  the program and contractor conducted its integrated baseline review—a  joint assessment of the performance measurement baseline by the  government and contractor—the program realized the contractor’s plans  assumed synergies between the core stage and exploration upper stage  efforts that would produce cost savings for the contractor but NASA did  not have the funding to begin this work under the same time frames  identified by the contractor. A SLS program official told us that NASA  asked Boeing to start replanning activities with a proposal that removed  the exploration upper stage development from this contract action. In May  2016, NASA and Boeing signed the contract replan—with a cost increase  of approximately $1 billion, from about $4.2 billion to about $5.2 billion.  However, according to program officials it will probably be summer 2016  before the program receives contractor earned value management data  derived from the new performance measurement baseline—some 4.5  years after contract award. Without this information, the program has  been in a poor position to understand the extent to which technical  challenges with the core stage are having schedule implications or the  extent to which they may require reaching into the program’s cost  reserves. The latter is of concern because as we found in July 2015,  NASA maintains low cost reserves for this program—about $50 million  per year—because program officials stated it has been necessary to  sustain a flat funding profile for SLS as compared to other programs.  Further, at SLS’s KDP-C, NASA approved the program to proceed with  cost reserves of less than 2 percent leading to launch readiness, even  though requirements for Marshall Space Flight Center—the NASA center  with responsibility for the SLS program—indicate that standard cost  reserves for launch vehicle programs should be 20 percent at KDP-C.
In addition to cost and schedule pressures stemming from the core stage,  development of the flight software—the software that controls the first  phase of SLS flight from liftoff through booster separation and up to main  engine cut off—may require more time than the SLS program anticipates  because the program made a decision to defer its most rigorous testing  until software development nears completion. SLS software developers  have been testing flight software at the end of each of the first five  primary SLS software releases, with the scope of testing in each release  isolated to the set of requirements for that respective release. They plan  to perform the most rigorous testing of the software when the  development reaches the release that will be used for flight qualification  testing, beginning in March 2016, which will include testing against the  most comprehensive set of requirements at that point. The deferral of the  most rigorous testing until the flight qualification release, however, means  that the program’s understanding of the defects to this point may not be  as complete as it believes. This may, in turn, delay completion of software  development while the program takes the time necessary to resolve  defects. As we found in a September 2015 report assessing a Veterans  Benefits Administration software-based processing system, successful  system testing includes appropriately identifying and handling defects that  are discovered during testing. In addition, we found that outstanding  defects can delay the release of functionality to end users, denying them  the benefit of features. The program has allotted one future contingency  release at the end of the software effort for defect repairs, but delaying  the discovery of defects increases the risk that potential problems will  remain undiscovered until the point when few cost or schedule reserves  are available to correct deficiencies.
section_title: Systems Integration and Testing for EM-1 May Add Even More Pressure to the Already Reduced Cost and Schedule Reserves
paragraphs: Even if the development phase does not consume any additional cost and  schedule reserves, the SLS program’s EM-1 integration and test phase  may require those resources. Our prior work has shown that this period  often reveals unforeseen challenges leading to cost growth and schedule  delays. Likewise, although superseded through revision, NASA program  management guidance from 2010 states that integration and testing are  among the periods of peak spending, when schedule delays are most  costly, and that programs should maintain sufficient reserves to address  issues encountered during that time, and unknown risks can be managed  only by maintaining sufficient reserves. Compounding this already risky  time period is that the threat to SLS program reserves is two-fold because  SLS EM-1 launch readiness involves in essence two integration efforts.  The first integration effort is to assemble SLS as a launch vehicle and the  second is a cross-program integration effort, which means integrating  SLS, Orion, and EGS to achieve launch readiness in 2018.
Integrated launch readiness for EM-1 is dependent on the success of the  individual SLS, Orion, and EGS integration efforts. If delays materialize  during individual systems integration and testing, for example, there could  be a cascading effect of cross-program problems. Booster component  shelf life provides a good illustration of this point. According to program  officials, there is a limit on the amount of time the SLS boosters may  remain in a stacked configuration that, if exceeded, would necessitate  destacking and replacement of limited-life items. Program officials told us  that NASA will review these limited-life items prior to stacking the  integrated vehicle, but if launch is delayed longer than limited-life time  frames allow, NASA would have to disassemble SLS from Orion back in  the Vehicle Assembly Building. Such an effort could have broad cost and  schedule impacts across the three programs.
NASA’s Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, which  oversees development of the SLS, EGS, and Orion programs, plans to  conduct a “build-to-synchronization” review in summer 2016 to  demonstrate that the integrated launch vehicle, crew vehicle, and ground  systems will perform as expected to meet EM-1 objectives. Human  Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate officials told us that there  is no existing NASA guidance to direct what the build-to-synchronization  review should entail, but that they are tailoring requirements, with agency  leadership concurrence, from NASA program management guidance for  critical design review. According to these officials, the review will serve  essentially as an EM-1 integration critical design review for the programs.  According to NASA program management requirements, a critical design  review for a NASA program would not only evaluate the integrated  design, but also evaluate whether it meets mission requirements with  appropriate margins and acceptable risk within cost and schedule  constraints. As of March 2016, officials leading the planning efforts for  the build-to-synchronization review told us that they were currently  working on developing the terms of reference—which include review  objectives and success criteria—but that they anticipate only limited  discussion of cost and schedule because the review will focus first and  foremost on the hardware and software design maturity of the three  programs. Understanding the technical scope required for EM-1  integrated readiness, however, goes hand-in-hand with knowledge about  how much money and time the individual programs will require to achieve  that readiness. By foregoing a re-evaluation of cost and schedule  reserves at the time it assesses technical scope for EM-1, especially in  light of known pressures on the SLS program’s reserves, NASA risks  missing an opportunity to reevaluate whether sufficient resources are  available to respond to unforeseen challenges during the integration and  testing phase.
Beyond EM-1, the SLS program continues to face technical as well as  cost and schedule risks. For example, for Exploration Mission 2 (EM-2),  the program will be transitioning from the ICPS in-space propulsion  element to an exploration upper stage providing both ascent performance  and in-space capability. NASA had intended to use the ICPS for EM-2,  which is planned to launch a crewed Orion vehicle beyond the moon to  further test performance. However, the ICPS is not certified to support  crewed flight and NASA estimated it would have to spend at least $150  million on that effort to fly a crewed mission. The Explanatory Statement  to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, while not law, prohibited  the use of NASA funds to human-rate the ICPS. In addition, as part of the  fiscal year 2016 NASA Exploration appropriation, Congress provided that  no less than $85 million of the appropriations should be used for the  development of a new exploration upper stage necessary to build the  Block IB vehicle for deployment on EM-2. NASA officials told us that the  agency intends to have the exploration upper stage complete for EM-2.  They also stated that they are currently developing a test plan, which  includes examining the risk of performing only ground testing of the  exploration upper stage because current plans do not allow for a separate  flight test of the stage prior to EM-2.
section_title: The EGS Program Is Making Progress Completing Modifications, but Technical Challenges Are Consuming Cost and Schedule Reserves
paragraphs: The EGS program is maturing selected systems, but the program is  encountering technical challenges that require both time and money to fix.  Further, the program has reduced cost and schedule reserves remaining  to address risks if they come to fruition. This pressure threatens the  program’s committed November 2018 launch readiness goal. Program  management has identified the Vehicle Assembly Building and Mobile  Launcher as projects along the critical path and software as a high risk  component of the EGS program. All three of these projects have  experienced delays and the Vehicle Assembly Building and Mobile  Launcher have no schedule margin remaining to overcome any future  technical challenges. As a result, any future delays would have to be  accommodated by using the overall program’s schedule reserve. The  program’s schedule reserve, however, has been reduced over time and  now has 2 months of reserve remaining. Further, the program is operating  with reduced cost reserves to address any future construction and  software risks. These reserves will likely be tested further once the  program begins integration with SLS and Orion, as delays in any one  program can have a cascading effect.
subsections: section_title: Selected EGS Systems Are Maturing, but the Program Has Encountered Technical Challenges Leading to the Systems Having Little or No Schedule Margin Remaining
subsections: section_title: The Vehicle Assembly Building Has No Schedule Margin Remaining to Meet EGS’s Internal Schedule Goal
paragraphs: The Vehicle Assembly Building was built in 1966 as a facility to assemble  the Apollo program’s Saturn V moon rocket, and part of the building is  being refurbished by the EGS program to accommodate SLS and Orion.  Updating the building is a large undertaking as it includes removing about  150 miles of Apollo-era cabling, improving the elevators, upgrading  cranes, and incorporating fire safety improvements. EGS officials stated  that the age of the building adds even more challenges, such as dealing  with outdated building drawings and uncertain field conditions. The most  significant of the Vehicle Assembly Building projects is the fabrication and  installation of 10 new platforms which will allow access to the integrated  SLS and Orion vehicles during final assembly. See figure 5 for a  photograph of the Vehicle Assembly Building and an illustration of the  building’s platforms.
Complications with the Vehicle Assembly Building’s platform design and  installation have required an additional $16 million to resolve—funding  which the EGS program used from program reserves and the launch pad  project, a project that has development remaining. Additionally, the  project has exhausted its schedule margin, and any additional delays  would have to be addressed through the use of program level schedule  reserves. During testing, NASA observed that the test platform could not  roll out properly and the program was forced to modify the design of the  platforms midway through construction. Resolution of these design issues  involved modifying key mechanical components and installing shims to  properly align the platform during rollout. Program officials said that this  issue has been addressed and is being implemented on all nine  subsequent platforms. NASA is prepared to install additional shimming  during platform installation if necessary. NASA’s interim assessment of  the design contractor for the platforms highlighted numerous quality  issues during design; however, NASA officials ultimately found the design  product at an acceptable level of quality with cost and schedule  requirements having been met.
Additionally, in December 2015, the first platform was installed in the  Vehicle Assembly Building, but was removed shortly thereafter because  of an installation issue. According to agency officials, the platform “flexed”  slightly when it was lifted via crane for installation due to the weight of the  platform in relation to the lifting points. This flexing kept the platform from  fitting as designed on the bracket that allows the platforms to be moved to  different elevations. The program has designed and fabricated an  installation tool to prevent the platform from flexing when it is lifted for  installation. EGS officials estimate that, if platform design challenges  continue, they could delay the completion of the Vehicle Assembly  Building by up to 3 months, which would affect the EGS program’s  schedule overall. For example, construction on the building’s platforms is  slated to end immediately before the Mobile Launcher is moved into the  Vehicle Assembly Building; officials said there is no margin for additional  delays on the building if it is to be ready for the Mobile Launcher in time. If  additional delays materialize with the Vehicle Assembly Building, the  program would need to reduce its overall schedule reserve.
section_title: The Mobile Launcher Has No Schedule Margin Remaining and Has Consolidated Future Schedule Activities to Meet Program’s Goals
paragraphs: The Mobile Launcher was originally developed as part of the  Constellation program, but was never used because of the program’s  cancellation in 2010. After the cancellation, EGS began modifying the  Mobile Launcher to support what is now SLS. The EGS program is  modifying the Mobile Launcher to support the assembly, testing,  prelaunch check-out and servicing of the SLS rocket, as well as to  transfer SLS and Orion to the launch pad and provide the platform from  which they will launch. According to EGS officials, the Mobile Launcher is  the most complex EGS component because it contains more than 900  pieces of ground support equipment needed to support SLS and Orion.  Ground support equipment includes subsystems for propellant and gases,  electronic control systems, communication systems, and access  platforms. Figure 6 is a photograph of the Mobile Launcher.
The EGS program has experienced delays and design challenges with  the Mobile Launcher and has no project-level schedule margin remaining  in order to meet the program’s internal goals for operations and launch  readiness. Any additional delays would have to be addressed through the  use of program level schedule reserves. The EGS program has  completed all major structural changes to the Mobile Launcher, such as  adding reinforcements to the Mobile Launcher’s structure to  accommodate SLS height and weight, but the program must still complete  the design and installation of the ground support equipment and the nine  umbilicals that connect the Mobile Launcher directly to the SLS and  Orion. The program has experienced design challenges and late  hardware deliveries with two of these umbilicals:  the ICPS umbilical, which supplies power, fuel, and cooling between  the SLS upper stage and the Mobile Launcher, and  the tail service mast umbilical, which provides liquid hydrogen and  oxygen to SLS during launch.
Further, there have been ground support equipment and umbilical design  changes both during and after the Mobile Launcher’s design phase  because of vehicle requirement changes from SLS and Orion. EGS used  nearly 22 percent of its schedule margin to accommodate these changes.
Additionally, requirement changes during and after ground support  equipment subsystems’ design have led to the Mobile Launcher’s ground  support equipment being designed concurrently with its installation. The  program has identified a program risk that conducting these activities  concurrently could lead to a potential cost increase of up to $10 million  and schedule delays of up to 8 months. The Mobile Launcher project  plans to begin its project-level verification and validation before  installation of the ground support equipment and umbilicals are complete  because the project has no schedule margin remaining. Officials  acknowledged that conducting the mobile launcher’s verification and  validation concurrent with ground support equipment systems and  umbilicals installation increases risk because of uncertainties regarding  how systems not yet installed may affect the systems already installed.  EGS officials indicated that these concurrent installations and verification  and validation meets all program test objectives and enables the Mobile  Launcher effort to stay on schedule to support the program’s internal  launch readiness date.
section_title: Interdependencies with SLS and Orion Have Increased Delays and Risk to EGS’s Software Development Efforts
paragraphs: EGS’s software development efforts—Spaceport Command and Control  System (SCCS) and Ground Flight Application Software (GFAS)—are  behind schedule as compared to program plans. The development efforts  face challenges that include the need for requirements-related information  from the SLS and Orion programs. EGS is developing these two software  systems concurrently—SCCS is to operate and monitor ground  equipment needed to launch and communicate with the integrated SLS  and Orion vehicles, and GFAS is to interface with flight systems and  ground crews. EGS software was immature at the program’s Critical  Design Review, and EGS’s Standing Review Board considers the  program’s software development effort the highest risk area. The  Standing Review Board found in February 2016 that the SCCS and GFAS  developments are currently underperforming, are understaffed, and are  waiting on requirements definition from the two flight element programs.  SCCS and GFAS’s completion are dependent on the SLS and Orion also  finishing work on schedule; however, because SCCS and GFAS are  among the last EGS activities scheduled to finish prior to integrated  operations, delays in their completion could force a delay in the program’s  committed November 2018 launch readiness date.
SCCS Architecture: SCCS development is behind its planned software  release schedule. Program officials attributed the delays, in part, to  requirements maturing late from SLS and Orion. For example, according  to EGS officials, there were initially supposed to be two content drops,  wherein additional functionality is added, for the last two versions of  SCCS. However, as of the program’s critical design review in late 2015,  the two drops had evolved into six content drops. Program officials stated  that the evolution from two drops to six enables content to be released in  an as-needed phased approach to meet stakeholders’ needs and utilize  resources in a more efficient manner. In March 2016, the NASA Office of  the Inspector General reported that SCCS is more than a year behind  schedule and significantly over cost, and that, because of cost and timing  pressures, several planned software capabilities have been deferred,  including the ability to automatically detect the root cause of specific  equipment and system failures. The Office of Inspector General  concluded that these issues largely result from unanticipated complexity  in the way NASA has approached SCCS’s development. Likewise,  program officials told us that developers initially expected ground  systems, Orion, and SLS to require a total of 300,000 compact unique  identifiers, or information fields. However, these officials said that  because EGS is developing software as Orion and SLS are developed,  complete information on how many information fields were necessary for  each program was unavailable at the beginning of the development effort.  SCCS officials have identified a risk that there may be a need for more  than 300,000 total information fields, which could degrade the software  system’s performance and result in cost and schedule overruns.
As the program’s Standing Review Board concluded, much of EGS’s  software development work is heavily dependent on the final  requirements of the SLS and Orion programs, both of which are still in  development. Program officials indicated that, as all three programs have  developed and EGS has received more information about the  requirements of SLS, Orion, and ground systems, SCCS’s complexity has  increased. To address the added complexity, the EGS program increased  its workforce, but the overall schedule is challenged by hiring difficulties in  a highly competitive environment. The EGS program is using the same  developers to develop content for multiple phased deliveries, and the next  content drop has been threatened by the developers’ delayed transition  from prior drops.
GFAS Application Software: GFAS development is facing challenges  because necessary operational requirements from SLS and Orion are not  yet available. GFAS officials told us that they were optimistic in their  planning regarding the availability of requirements from SLS and Orion to  support software development. For example, EGS officials said that they  expected more mature information about operational requirements to  come out of the Orion and SLS CDRs than what they received. In  September 2015, after EGS officials did not receive early information as  they had anticipated, the program conducted a schedule replan and said  they planned to hire more staff to reduce the risk to the program. GFAS is  currently planning on delivering their last content drop in February 2018,  after the program has begun integrated operations with SLS and Orion.  Figure 7 illustrates the GFAS content drop schedule with EGS’s schedule  milestones.
The EGS program has identified two program risks that development of  GFAS could be delayed by a combined maximum of up to 9 months and  costs could increase by up to $3.2 million combined because it is  dependent in part on SCCS development progress. According to the  program’s Standing Review Board, the risk is that the necessary software  will not be available when needed to meet EGS critical milestones and  could affect the agency’s November 2018 launch readiness commitment  date.
section_title: EGS Program Overall Has Limited Cost and Schedule Reserves Remaining
paragraphs: Overall, the EGS program is operating with limited cost reserves to  address any future construction and software risks. The EGS program is  operating in fiscal year 2016 with cost reserves of about $13 million, or  about 3 percent of its fiscal year 2016 budget. Program budget  documents indicate that the program expects its cost reserve posture to  improve to 13 percent and 9 percent in fiscal years 2017 and 2018 and to  level out at around 5 percent in subsequent years. Kennedy Space  Center, which manages the EGS program, does not have guidance for  cost reserves. However, other NASA centers, such as the Goddard  Space Flight Center—the NASA center with responsibility for managing  other complex NASA programs such as the James Webb Space  Telescope—have requirements for the level of both cost and schedule  reserves that projects must have in place at KDP-C. At KDP-C,  Goddard flight projects are required to have cost reserves of 25 percent  or more through operational readiness. At EGS’s KDP-C, however, the  program had cost reserves of only 4 percent leading to launch readiness.
According to EGS’s Standing Review Board in 2016, the remaining cost  risks to EGS are greater than the program’s current reserve balance. Our  analysis of the maximum potential impact of Mobile Launcher and Vehicle  Assembly Building cost risks on EGS cost reserves support this  assessment. For example, based on the program’s February 2016 risk  assessment, the EGS program could see maximum cost increases of $10  million for the Mobile Launcher and $11 million for the Vehicle Assembly  Building, which is almost double the program’s fiscal year 2016 reserve.  Although these cost increases may not occur in only one fiscal year and  could be less than the maximum value, they could still impact the  program if the planned reserves are either not available as expected or  are not sufficient to cover needs.
The EGS program is also operating with reduced schedule reserves to  address future construction and software issues. At the time NASA  established EGS’s agency baseline commitment, the program had 5  months of funded schedule reserve between its internal planning date  (June 2018) and its committed launch readiness date (November 2018).  The program is now internally planning to a launch readiness date of  September 2018, which reduces the program’s schedule reserve to 2  months. However, the EGS program must be ready well in advance of  this launch readiness date in order to integrate SLS and Orion at the  Kennedy Space Center and the program plans to be ready to begin  integrated operations with SLS in January 2018. EGS has 3 months of  margin before the start of integrated operations, and 1 additional month of  margin before its internal goal for launch. See figure 8 for a timeline of  EGS’s lifecycle relative to SLS for EM-1.
Moving forward, relying on the critical path to determine available  reserves may prove problematic because the program’s scheduling  practices are fairly limited. The EGS program identifies its critical path as  including the Vehicle Assembly Building and the Mobile Launcher in  program quarterly management reports, but we were not able to replicate  this critical path. Our analysis of the EGS critical path identified  inconsistencies between the critical path identified by the software used  to create and maintain the program’s integrated master schedule and the  critical path called out in the program’s quarterly management reports.  Our best practices for scheduling indicate that a program’s integrated  master schedule should identify the program’s critical path rather than  critical activities being selectively chosen based on what management  has determined to be important. Establishing a valid critical path is  necessary for examining the effects of any activities slipping along this  path. Based on our limited review, the critical path in the program’s  integrated master schedule does not match the critical path in the  program’s quarterly management reports. EGS program management  acknowledged that the two paths did not match, and indicated that they  intentionally do not rely solely on the scheduling software’s generated  critical path because it includes non-EGS development activities, such as  SLS and Orion flight hardware deliveries. We plan to further research the  inconsistencies we identified as part of planned future work on NASA’s  human exploration systems.
Integration of EGS with the SLS and Orion programs will be reviewed by  the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate at the build- to-synchronization review in summer 2016. As with the SLS program, the  same holds true for EGS that integrated flight readiness for EM-1 is  dependent on the technical and programmatic stability of all three human  spaceflight programs—EGS, SLS and Orion. Further, threats to the  margin and schedule reserve for EGS can occur from delays within the  program or delays within the Orion and SLS programs. In particular, if the  SLS core stage delivery date to Kennedy Space Center slips beyond the  March 2018 date depicted in the above figure, NASA will have less time  for integrated operations and that will ultimately threaten the launch  readiness date of November 2018.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: NASA established the SLS and EGS programs to support deep space  exploration by humans, but the ability to launch its first exploration  mission with these programs by the committed date of November 2018 is  threatened. In some cases, the threat comes from technical challenges  that are not unusual for large-scale projects, but may take more time and  money than the program has reserves to address. In other cases, NASA’s  approach to dealing with the known risks is exacerbating the challenges.  For example, in some cases the SLS program has not positioned itself  well to accurately forecast and proactively manage potential schedule  delays and cost overruns, which in turn, may ultimately lead to cost and  schedule growth that could stretch the program beyond its committed  baseline. An opportunity is nearing in NASA’s upcoming build-to- synchronization process to not only determine whether the integrated  launch vehicle, crew vehicle, and ground systems will perform as  expected to meet EM-1 objectives, but to also revisit whether cost and  schedule reserves are sufficient. Given the mission of the EM-1 test flight,  NASA does not have to meet a specific schedule window for its launch  date as it often does with planetary missions. As a result, NASA is in the  position of being able to make an informed decision about what is a  realistic launch readiness date. By not re-evaluating the cost and  schedule reserves, both programs may continue to make decisions that  result in reduced knowledge to meet a schedule that is not realistic. Until  such a re-evaluation occurs, the American public and Congress, who are  the beneficiaries of NASA’s technological advances, will not have a clear  picture of the time and money needed to support these efforts.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order to ensure available cost and schedule margins are sufficient to  meet the synchronized goals for launch readiness and related activities,  we recommend the NASA administrator direct the Human Exploration and  Operations Mission Directorate as it finalizes its schedule and plans for  EM-1 during the planned build-to-synchronization review to re-evaluate  SLS and EGS cost and schedule reserves based on results of the  integrated design review in order take advantage of all available time  resources and maximize the benefit of available cost reserves, and to  verify that the November 2018 launch readiness date remains feasible.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to NASA for review and comment. Its  written comments are reprinted in appendix IV of this report.
NASA concurred with our recommendation to re-evaluate SLS and EGS  cost and schedule reserves based on results of the build-to- synchronization review, but stated that further direction from the  Administrator to the program is not necessary, as this activity is already  underway. We are encouraged that since our discussions with the  program regarding the scope of the build-to-synchronization review, and  providing NASA with a draft of this report for comment, the agency has  incorporated plans to address the processes and capabilities in place to  continue managing the enterprise within cost and schedule constraints,  including available margins, as part of the build-to-synchronization review  and that the SLS management agreement to EM-1 is being updated to  align with program and enterprise execution plans. To further satisfy our  recommendation’s intent, we anticipate that NASA’s actions could  encompass a full examination of the integrated schedule for the  programs, to help ensure that an individual program does not anticipate  using limited reserves to meet the planned launch readiness date, if the  November 2018 date is not feasible for all the programs. NASA stated  that the results of its build-to-synchronization review will be reported to  the NASA Program Management Council by November 30, 2016.
NASA also provided technical comments on the draft report, which we  incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to NASA’s Administrator and to  appropriate congressional committees. In addition, the report is available  at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report ,  please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Exploration Ground Systems Components beyond the Space Launch System and Orion
paragraphs: According to Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) officials, the program  does not track how EGS investments could benefit users beyond the  Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion, but we found that the majority of  EGS funds are being used to develop major components that will be  exclusively used by SLS and Orion or require some modification to be  used by another user. We found that EGS components fall into three  categories:  components that could be used for users beyond SLS and Orion with  no modifications, providing they are not in use by SLS and Orion;  components that could be used with some modification; and  components that are solely for SLS and Orion.
For example, the Mobile Launcher has nine umbilicals and, according to  EGS officials, over 900 pieces of ground support equipment to support  SLS and Orion. According to National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA) officials, while the steel structure and platform of  the Mobile Launcher could be used for another user, that user would have  to meet weight limits of the structure and would need to design and install  entirely new specialized equipment. Five components—among them, the  Vehicle Assembly Building, Crawler-Transporter, and the Multi-Payload  Processing Facility (part of Spacecraft Offline Processing)—have  received funding from the 21st Century Space Launch Complex Initiative,  which focuses on modernizing the infrastructure to support multiple users  at Kennedy, in addition to EGS funding. These components can, with  some or no modifications, be used by other users. The Crawler- Transporter, for example, has been upgraded by EGS in order to support  the combined weight of the Mobile Launcher, SLS, and Orion, but  according to EGS officials could be used by any user to transport  equipment as long as the equipment was within the Crawler-Transporter’s  carrying capacity.
The majority of EGS funds obligated to date are to develop components  that require some modifications or will be exclusively used by SLS and  Orion. See table 2 for allocation of Ground Systems Development and  Operations (GSDO) funding between EGS and 21st Century Space  Launch Complex Initiative.
As seen in the above table and its accompanying notes, from fiscal year  2012, when the EGS program started, to fiscal year 2015, the EGS  program obligated $1,495.4 million to develop components for SLS and  Orion. In the same years, $49.8 million from the 21st Century Space  Launch Complex Initiative was used for some EGS components that may  benefit users beyond SLS and Orion.
section_title: Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which the Space Launch System (SLS) program  made progress in meeting cost and schedule commitments, we compared  current program status with National Aeronautics and Space  Administration’s (NASA) cost and schedule baselines for executing  Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1) in 2018. We reviewed top SLS program and  element-level risks as identified by NASA; analyzed the results of the SLS  July 2015 critical design review to determine what software and hardware  efforts present the highest risk to program cost and schedule; and  reviewed monthly earned value management reports to identify the  largest impacts on cost and schedule. In addition, we assessed SLS  design production maturity against established knowledge-based, best  practice standards. We compared the status of flight software  development efforts and progress against NASA’s planned release  schedule and reviewed the metrics NASA is using to assess software  development status. During the course of our review, we examined other  program documents that included program plans, quarterly program  status review reports, assessments of SLS preliminary and critical design  reviews by the NASA Standing Review Board that reviewed the  program’s status at preliminary and critical design review independent  from the program; and an assessment of the flight software development  by a NASA Independent Verification and Validation team that reviewed  software development status independent from the SLS program. We met  with the SLS program, element-level and flight software officials at  Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala.; representatives from the  core stage contractor, Boeing, in Huntsville, Ala.; and officials from the  Standing Review Board and the Independent Verification and Validation  teams, which are composed of members from various NASA locations.
To assess the extent to which the Exploration Ground Systems (EGS)  program has made progress in completing modifications to key  components and ground support equipment at Kennedy Space Center,  we identified EGS’s major components by reviewing program plans,  critical design review documents, quarterly program status review  documents, and budget materials. We identified the Vehicle Assembly  Building, Mobile Launcher, and software as key construction and  development efforts for our review because they are among the top  program risks or the most expensive EGS projects. We observed EGS  components during a site visit to Kennedy Space Center and discussed  modification of the components with NASA officials. To evaluate the  progress made in preparing these components and software to support  the EM-1 test flight, we reviewed program plans and compared them to  program status to assess whether EGS components and software were  progressing as expected, critical design review documents to determine  design maturity, quarterly program status reviews to identify risks, budget  information to assess development costs, and contractor progress reports  to identify any issues contractors faced that could impact cost and  schedule. We also reviewed NASA’s Standing Review Board assessment  from EGS’s preliminary and critical design reviews. We also evaluated the  program’s integrated master schedule against the GAO’s best acquisition  practices for scheduling in order to assess the validity of the EGS  program’s critical path. Additionally, to determine the extent to which  major ground system components at Kennedy Space Center directly  support the SLS and Orion programs, we reviewed NASA budget and  accounting data and interviewed agency officials.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2015 to July 2016  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Major Components of Exploration Ground Systems
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Cristina T. Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Molly W. Traci (Assistant  Director), Michael Armes, Matt Bader, Nabajyoti Barkakati, John  Bauckman, Erin Cohen, Juana Collymore, Tana Davis, Juli Digate,  Jennifer Echard, Laura Greifner, Jason Lee, Sylvia Schatz, Roxanna Sun,  and John S. Warren, Jr. made key contributions to this report.