Information Sharing: Agencies Could Better Coordinate to Reduce Overlap in Field-Based Activities
Published: 2013-04-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Federal agencies and state and local governments have established field-based entities (e.g., centers and task forces) nationwide that share terrorism-related information, among other things. GAO was asked to assess these entities. This report addresses (1) the extent to which these entities are distinct, fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative; (2) the extent to which DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP hold entities accountable for coordinating and have assessed coordination opportunities; and (3) how, if at all, DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP incorporate information on the results entities achieve when making funding decisions. GAO analyzed entities' missions, activities, and coordination efforts in eight selected urban areas that range in geographic dispersion and risk. Although not generalizable, this analysis provided insights. This is a public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in March 2013. Information the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) deemed sensitive has been redacted.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Five types of field-based information-sharing entities are supported, in part, by the federal government--Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Field Intelligence Groups, Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) centers, state and major urban area fusion centers, and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Investigative Support Centers--and have distinct missions, roles, and responsibilities. However, GAO identified 91 instances of overlap in some analytical activities--such as producing intelligence reports--and 32 instances of overlap in investigative support activities, such as identifying links between criminal organizations. These entities conducted similar activities within the same mission area, such as counterterrorism, for similar customers, such as federal or state agencies. This can lead to benefits, such as the corroboration of information, but may also burden customers with redundant information. GAO also found that RISS centers and HIDTAs operate three different systems that duplicate the same function--identifying when different law enforcement entities may be conducting a similar enforcement action, such as a raid at the same location, to ensure officer safety--resulting in some inefficiencies. RISS and HIDTA have taken steps to connect two of the systems, but HIDTA does not have target time frames to connect the third system. A commitment to time frames would help reduce risks to officer safety and potentially lessen the burden on law enforcement agencies that are currently using multiple systems.
Agencies have neither held entities accountable for coordinating nor assessed opportunities for further enhancing coordination to help reduce the potential for overlap and achieve efficiencies. The Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS), and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)--the federal agencies that oversee or provide support to the five types of field-based entities-- acknowledged that entities working together and sharing information is important, but they do not hold the entities accountable for such coordination. A mechanism that enables agencies to monitor the results of coordination efforts could encourage more coordination, help reduce any unnecessary overlap and leverage resources. Officials in the eight urban areas said that practices such as having representatives from other agencies on governance boards and colocating entities where possible enhanced coordination, information sharing, and efficiencies--in their view, reducing the potential of unnecessary overlap. Federal agencies have not assessed the extent to which such practices could be further implemented and, therefore, may be missing opportunities to maximize benefits. The Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE)--which manages efforts to enhance sharing governmentwide--has not reported on specific coordination efforts across the entities. Including agencies' assessment progress in the annual reports to the Congress would enhance accountability.
The agencies collect information on entities' results, but vary in the extent to which they consider the results when they make decisions about future funding. For example, agencies may consider other factors--such as risk and threats--rather than results, or funding decisions may be determined by state grant recipients or set in part by statutory or other requirements.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that ONDCP work with HIDTA officials to establish time frames to connect systems; DHS, DOJ, and ONDCP develop measures to hold entities accountable for coordination and assess opportunities to enhance coordination; and the PM-ISE report on the results of the agencies efforts to assess coordination. DHS, ONDCP, and the PM-ISE concurred. DOJ generally agreed with the intent of the recommendations, but disagreed with their underlying premises that DOJ was not already taking such actions. GAO believes these actions do not fully address the recommendations as discussed further in this report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Sustaining a national information-sharing capability to efficiently and  effectively gather, analyze, and disseminate law enforcement, public  safety, and terrorism-related information is critical to our nation’s efforts to  combat criminal and terrorist threats. Over the past three decades,  federal agencies and state and local governments have established a  number of entities (e.g., units, centers, and task forces) nationwide that  may—in all or in part—collect, process, analyze, or disseminate  information in support of law enforcement and counterterrorism-related  efforts. The federal government—specifically, the Department of Justice  (DOJ), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Office of  National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)—operates or, through grant  funding or personnel, supports five types of these field-based information- sharing entities. Specifically, these include the following:
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), which are funded and  managed by DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), aim to  prevent, preempt, deter, and investigate terrorism and related  activities affecting the United States as well as to apprehend  terrorists.
Field Intelligence Groups (FIG), which are part of the FBI, support  FBI investigations through the collection and analysis of intelligence  that is used to create a variety of analytical products and share these  products with the FBI’s law enforcement and intelligence partners  when applicable to those partners’ missions.
Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) centers, which are  funded through grants administered by DOJ’s Bureau of Justice  Assistance (BJA), support regional law enforcement, public safety,  and homeland security efforts to, among other things, combat major  crimes and terrorist activity, and promote officer safety by linking  federal, state, local, and tribal criminal justice agencies through  secure communications and providing information-sharing resources  and analytical and investigative support.
State and major urban area fusion centers (fusion centers), which  are funded through a variety of federal and state sources, including in  part through DHS and DOJ grants, are state and locally-owned and  operated to serve as intermediaries for sharing terrorism and other  threat-related information between the federal government and state,  local, tribal, territorial, and private sector homeland security partners.
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Investigative  Support Centers, which are funded through grants administered by  ONDCP, aim to support the disruption and dismantlement of drug- trafficking and money-laundering organizations through the prevention  or mitigation of associated criminal activity. HIDTA program resources  may also be used to assist law enforcement agencies in investigations  and activities related to terrorism and the prevention of terrorism.
Given that more than one federal agency is involved in supporting the  efforts of these five types of field-based entities, you asked us to examine  the entities’ activities, coordination, and funding. This report addresses (1)  the extent to which these field-based entities are distinct, fragmented,  overlapping, or potentially duplicative; (2) the extent to which DOJ, DHS,  and ONDCP hold these entities accountable for coordination and have  assessed opportunities for coordination to reduce overlap and duplication  and what practices, if any, select entities have reported using to  coordinate and achieve efficiencies; and (3) how, if at all, DOJ, DHS, and  ONDCP incorporate information they collect on the results that these  field-based entities achieve when making funding decisions for them.
This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we  provided to you. The FBI deemed some of the information in the prior  report as For Official Use Only (FOUO) in the context of the report.  Therefore, this report omits the locations of the eight urban areas  included in our review. The information provided in this report addresses  the same questions as the sensitive report. Also, the overall methodology  used for both reports is the same.
To address the first objective, we analyzed agency documentation  relevant to the authorities, missions, activities, and customers of the five  types of entities, including strategies and annual reports. We analyzed  2011 DHS data on the missions, governance, and capabilities of fusion  centers and interviewed DHS officials responsible for collecting these  data, and we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our  purposes. We also interviewed officials responsible for overseeing the  programs from the federal agencies supporting the entities, specifically  DOJ’s FBI and BJA, DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A),  and ONDCP’s HIDTA program, to obtain information on how the entities  were carrying out their missions in the field, the types of services and  activities the entities performed, and customers of the entities’ services.  Further, we selected eight urban areas for review where one of each of  the five types of entities was either physically located or had jurisdiction,  and to reflect a range of factors, including variation in risk based on DOJ’s  25 Cities Project, colocation of the entities, and geographic dispersion.  We obtained funding and personnel data for fiscal year 2011 for each of  the fusion centers, RISS centers, and HIDTA Investigative Support  Centers in the eight urban areas in our review from fusion centers, BJA,  and ONDCP, respectively.
We interviewed fusion center, BJA, and ONDCP officials responsible for  collecting the data to discuss the data they provided, and we determined  that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. In addition, within  each urban area, we collected documents, such as annual reports, and  interviewed management officials responsible for the entity’s operations  to identify its mission, activities, and customers. Additionally, within each  urban area, we interviewed officials from either a state or a local law  enforcement agency that received information from one or more of the  entities in the area (i.e., a customer) to assess their satisfaction with the  quantity, quality, and timeliness of the information shared. We did not  determine the frequency or extent to which a particular customer agency  received information from an entity. Rather, we selected the law  enforcement agencies to include those that could receive products and  services from the five types of information-sharing entities in our review.  In total, we conducted interviews with officials from 37 entities and eight  law enforcement agencies across our eight urban areas. While the  information obtained from these interviews cannot be generalized to all of  the entities or all law enforcement agencies nationwide, the interviews  provided insight into the types of activities each entity conducts and  customer perspectives about information received from these entities,  respectively.
To assess potential fragmentation, overlap, and duplication within each  urban area, we collected each entity’s description of its activities and the  associated mission areas and customers for which these activities are  conducted.  We provided the entities with our summary of the information  we collected to review for accuracy, and incorporated technical comments  as appropriate. We applied criteria from our prior work on fragmentation,  overlap, and duplication across the federal government to determine if  any activities were conducted in the same or similar mission areas for the  same or similar customers within each urban area.
To address the second objective and to identify efforts underway to  improve coordination and information sharing among the entities and the  federal agencies, including participation in interagency groups such as  the Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee (ISA  IPC) within the Executive Office of the President, we analyzed  documentation—including the 2007 National Strategy for Information  Sharing and the 2011 and 2012 reports to Congress on federal efforts to  implement an Information Sharing Environment (ISE). We also included  questions about coordination efforts, information sharing, and forums for  collaboration in our interviews with entity officials in the eight urban areas  and analyzed practices that officials identified as promoting coordination  and enhancing information sharing. We also interviewed the Program  Manager, who is responsible for overseeing implementation of and  managing the ISE, as well as officials from the FBI, BJA, DHS I&A, and  ONDCP with responsibility for overseeing or providing support to the  entities. We compared these efforts against criteria in standard practices  for program management and in our prior work related to federal  collaboration to determine the extent to which agencies have  implemented such efforts. To assess the extent to which the agencies  hold the entities accountable for coordinating with each other and to  determine the extent to which coordination with other field-based entities  is assessed, we analyzed the types of information, such as performance  metrics, the entities provide the agencies regarding coordination and  interviewed officials who are responsible for overseeing the entities’  information-sharing efforts.
To address the third objective, we analyzed agency and entity  documentation, such as information on fiscal year 2011 spending, to  identify the amount of funding the FBI, BJA, DHS, and ONDCP have  dedicated to support the entities. Additionally, we analyzed funding data  reported by fusion centers to the National Fusion Center Association. To  assess the reliability of the data, we interviewed FBI, BJA, DHS, and  ONDCP officials responsible for the entity’s operations, as well as  National Fusion Center Association officials, to discuss the funding data  they provided, and we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable  for our purposes. To determine the types of information the agencies  collect on the results and contributions of the entities, we analyzed  performance management and grant guidance. We also interviewed  officials who are responsible for overseeing or providing support to the  entities about how the agencies provide funding or make funding  available to the entities and what factors, if any, are considered when  making decisions about future funding.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to April 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Information Sharing Environment and Role of the Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee
paragraphs: Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of  2004 (Intelligence Reform Act), as amended, required the President to  take action to facilitate the sharing of terrorism-related information by  creating an information-sharing environment. In April 2005, the  President designated a Program Manager—a position situated within the  Office of the Director of National Intelligence—to, among other things,  plan for, oversee implementation of, and manage the ISE. Consistent with  the Intelligence Reform Act, the Program Manager intends for the ISE to  provide the means for sharing terrorism-related information in a manner  that—to the greatest extent practicable—ensures a decentralized,  distributed, and coordinated environment that builds upon existing  systems and leverages ongoing efforts. The Program Manager is to  submit annual reports to Congress, as required by the Intelligence  Reform Act, on the state of the ISE and information sharing across the  federal government. Among other things, the reports examine the extent  to which the ISE is being implemented by agencies that possess or use  terrorism-related information, operate systems within the ISE, or  otherwise participate in the ISE. For example, the 2012 ISE annual report  to Congress describes how agencies have fared against established  performance measures and highlights accomplishments, including  examples of progress toward information-sharing goals.
DOJ and DHS are among the ISE mission partners, that is, the bureaus  and agencies of federal, state, local, and tribal governments; the private  sector; and foreign governments that contribute to the nation’s homeland  security and counterterrorism missions. ONDCP is involved in the ISE  through its coordination with DHS regarding efforts to enhance  partnerships between HIDTA Investigative Support Centers and fusion  centers.
In July 2009, the administration established the ISA IPC to, among other  things, identify future information-sharing priorities. With representation  of participating ISE agencies and communities, the ISA IPC is responsible  for advising the President and Program Manager in developing policies,  procedures, guidelines, roles, and standards necessary to establish,  implement, and maintain the ISE. The ISA IPC formally charters  on coordinating federal support to fusion centers by providing guidance  and standards for how federal resources are applied to help ensure  information sharing between and among fusion centers and all levels of  subcommittees, including a Fusion Center Sub‐Committee that focuses  government. This sub‐committee is cochaired by the FBI and DHS, and  includes members from, among others, BJA and ONDCP, as well as a  representative from the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, which  is made up of members representing law enforcement and homeland  security agencies from all levels of government and is an advocate for  state, local, and tribal law enforcement.
section_title: Our Work on Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication
paragraphs: In 2010, we were directed to identify programs, agencies, offices, and  initiatives with duplicative goals and activities within departments and  government-wide and report annually to Congress. In March 2011 and  February 2012, we issued our first two annual reports to Congress in  response to this requirement. The annual reports describe areas in  which we found evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication among  federal programs. Using the framework we established in these reports,  we used the following definitions for the purpose of assessing field-based  information-sharing entities:
Fragmentation occurs when more than one federal agency (or more  than one organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad  area of national interest.
Overlap occurs when multiple programs have similar goals, engage in  similar activities or strategies to achieve those goals, or target similar  beneficiaries. Overlap may result from statutory or other limitations  beyond the agency’s control.
Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are  engaging in the same activities or providing the same services to the  same beneficiaries.
section_title: Field-Based Entities Have Distinct Missions, but Can Conduct Overlapping Activities
paragraphs: In general, while the five types of field-based entities in our review were  established under different authorities, each type of entity may engage in  the sharing of information. In addition, while these entities also have  distinct missions, roles, and responsibilities, we identified overlap in  various analytical activities. For example, for the eight urban areas in our  review, we identified overlap in how entities produce and disseminate  intelligence reports. We also identified overlap in how entities provide  investigative support activities and services, such as providing tactical  analysis, which entities conducted in the same mission area for similar  customers in the eight urban areas in our review. Additionally, RISS  centers and HIDTAs both operate systems with functions to ensure law  enforcement officers are not conducting a similar type of enforcement  action or investigating the same target, and HIDTAs can improve efforts  to reduce risks to law enforcement officers’ safety.
subsections: section_title: Field-Based Entities Were Established under Different Authorities and May Engage in Counterterrorism-Related Efforts
paragraphs: The five types of field-based entities in our review were established under  different authorities and by, or with support from, different agencies at  different times over the past three decades. However, each type of entity  may engage in counterterrorism-related efforts and terrorism-related  information sharing. Terrorism-related information, for example, has no  single source and is derived by gathering, fusing, analyzing, and  evaluating relevant information from all levels of government. This  information can be used by federal, state, local, and tribal government  organizations for multiple purposes, including supporting activities to  prevent terrorist attacks. Since it involves the efforts of several federal  agencies, terrorism-related information sharing is by definition fragmented  and can produce unique perspectives when information from multiple  sources is combined. However, this fragmentation can be  disadvantageous if activities are not coordinated, as well as if  opportunities to leverage resources across entities are not fully  exploited.
Specifically, RISS centers and HIDTAs have been in existence since  before the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and  focus primarily on combating criminal conspiracies or drug-trafficking  organizations; however, both are also authorized to dedicate resources to  engage in or support counterterrorism-related efforts. For example, the  RISS program, which originated in 1974 and is administered by BJA,  supports the ability of federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement  member agencies to identify, target, arrest, and prosecute criminal  conspirators. There are six RISS centers, and each focuses on all  crimes, which may include efforts on activities and conspiracies related to  terrorism. Similarly, the HIDTA program was established in 1988 and is  a federally funded program administered by ONDCP that brings together  federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies into task forces that  conduct investigations of drug-trafficking organizations in designated  areas. The HIDTA program is focused on counternarcotics; however,  HIDTA program resources may be used to assist law enforcement  agencies in investigations and activities related to terrorism and the  prevention of terrorism. There are 28 HIDTAs, and each has an  Investigative Support Center that serves to support the HIDTA program  by providing analytical case support, promoting officer safety, preparing  and issuing drug threat assessments, and developing and disseminating  intelligence products.
The other three types of entities—JTTFs, FIGs and fusion centers—were  generally established, or in the case of JTTFs expanded, after September  11, 2001, to more effectively address the threat of terrorism, among other  things. Specifically, the FBI increased the number of JTTFs and  established FIGs. JTTFs, which consist of FBI special agents, as well as  federal, state, and local task force officers (TFO), pursue leads, gather  evidence, respond to threats and incidents, make arrests, provide security  for special events, conduct training, and gather intelligence related to  threats, among other counterterrorism-related activities. Since  September 2001, the number of JTTFs has increased from 35 to 103. In  addition, the FBI established the first FIG in 2003 to coordinate, manage,  and execute all of the functions of the intelligence cycle, including  collection, analysis, production, and dissemination, for the FBI in the field.  FIGs are teams of FBI intelligence analysts, special agents, language  analysts, and financial analysts, among others, working in each of the 56  FBI field offices to analyze information from cases in their field office and  share intelligence locally and nationally.
Similarly, after the September 2001 attacks, state and local governments  began to establish fusion centers. They did so in part to serve as  intermediaries within states and localities for the gathering, receipt,  analysis, and sharing of threat-related information between the federal  government and state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners,  and to fill gaps in information sharing that the federal government alone  could not address. As defined by the Implementing Recommendations of  the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, a fusion center is “a collaborative effort  of two or more federal, state, local, or tribal government agencies that  combines resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing  the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend,  and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.” As of January 2013, 77  fusion centers were located in states and major urban areas throughout  the country. While fusion centers are owned and operated by state and  local agencies, the federal government encourages fusion centers to  become interconnected with one another and the federal government in a  national network capable of sharing terrorism-related information. Further,  the federal government supports centers through deployed personnel,  security clearances, connectivity to federal systems, and grant funding,  among other things. More information about each of these types of  entities is included in appendix I.
In total, as of January 2013, 268 units of the five types of field-based  entities were located throughout the United States, as shown in figure 1.  In fiscal year 2011, federal agencies provided an estimated 72 full-time  personnel to support fusion centers or HIDTA Investigative Support  Centers in the eight urban areas we reviewed. RISS centers do not have  any full-time federal personnel. In fiscal year 2011, federal agencies  provided an estimated $64.6 million to support RISS centers, fusion  centers, and HIDTA Investigative Support Centers in the eight urban  areas.
The five types of field-based entities have distinct missions, as shown in  table 1, as well as distinct roles and responsibilities, which are generally  consistent with their missions.
For example, consistent with its mission to detect and investigate  terrorists and terrorist groups and prevent them from carrying out terrorist  acts directed against the United States, JTTFs, among these entities, are  solely responsible for conducting counterterrorism investigations. RISS  centers and HIDTA Investigative Support Centers both have missions,  roles, and responsibilities that include supporting investigations. However,  RISS centers focus on all crimes and support law enforcement agencies  and officers from the beginning of an investigation to the prosecution and  conviction of criminals. HIDTA Investigative Support Centers, on the other  hand, focus on narcotics-related matters and support the HIDTA drug  task force initiatives in their respective areas in the identification,  targeting, arrest, and prosecution of key members of criminal drug  organizations. FIGs and fusion centers both gather, analyze, and  disseminate intelligence. However, consistent with their mission, FIGs are  responsible for serving as the FBI’s intermediary for information sharing  and collaboration among the FBI; the U.S. intelligence community; fusion  centers; and other federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement,  government, and private sector entities. Fusion centers, which are state  or locally owned and operated, conduct these activities to serve as state  and local intermediaries for information sharing and collaboration among  the national network of fusion centers, and other federal, state, local, and  tribal law enforcement; government; and private sector entities. In  general, the purpose of fusion centers is to improve information sharing  within their states or localities, and between state and local agencies and  the federal government to help prevent terrorism or other threats. Indeed,  the National Strategy for Information Sharing states that fusion centers  “will serve as the primary focal points within the state and local  environment for the receipt and sharing of terrorism-related information.”  However, the missions of individual fusion centers vary to meet the  specific state and local needs of their jurisdictions. The strategy also  states that it recognizes the sovereignty of state and local governments  and understands that fusion centers are owned and managed by state  and local governments.
section_title: Some Entities Conduct Overlapping Analytical and Investigative Support Activities and Services in Selected Urban Areas
paragraphs: In carrying out their respective missions, roles, and responsibilities,  entities in the eight urban areas in our review conducted activities that  overlap. That is, the entities may conduct similar analytical or  investigative support activities or services in support of similar goals in the  same mission areas (e.g., all crimes, counterterrorism, and  counternarcotics) for similar customers (e.g., federal, state, and local  agencies). Across the eight urban areas, 34 of the 37 field-based  entities we reviewed conducted an analytical or investigative support  activity that overlapped with that of another entity. Overlap in these  activities can lead to benefits, such as validating information for  customers, or inefficiencies, such as burdening customers who use  resources to sort through redundant information.
As shown in figure 2, in each of the eight urban areas in our review, we  identified instances of overlap in analytical activities and services  conducted by field-based entities for similar customers in the same  mission area.
First, looking across mission areas and entities, we identified more  instances of overlap in analytical activities and services being conducted  in the mission areas of all crimes and counterterrorism compared with the  mission area of counternarcotics. Specifically, out of the 91 instances of  overlap—in which more than one type of entity in the same urban area  conducted the same analytical activity or service for similar customers in  the same mission area—41 were in the mission area of all crimes, and 33  were in the mission area of counterterrorism compared with 17 that were  in the mission area of counternarcotics. We also identified more instances  of overlap involving a fusion center and a FIG compared with the other  three types of entities. Out of the 91 instances of overlap, 88 involved a  fusion center, 59 involved a FIG, and 54 involved both a fusion center and  a FIG. For example, in the one urban area, the fusion center and FIG  both produced all-crimes analytical products, threat and risk  assessments, and criminal bulletins and publications, as well as  disseminated all-crimes information, for federal, state, and local  customers.
Second, we identified more instances of overlap in the category of  dissemination compared with other analytical activities and services. For  example, in five of the eight urban areas, the fusion center, RISS center,  and FIG disseminated information in the mission area of all crimes for  federal, state, and local customers. In addition, in seven of the eight  urban areas, the fusion center and FIG both disseminated information in  the mission area of counterterrorism. For example, according to officials  at one local law enforcement agency, the fusion center and the FIG in  their area both produce and disseminate counterterrorism analytical  products, such as “Terrorism Indicators” or “Possible High Value Targets.”
The broad missions of fusion centers as state and local entities increase  the potential for overlap in analytical activities and services. One  explanation for the overlap in activities conducted in the all-crimes  mission area is that fusion centers conduct activities related to a range of  criminal activity in addition to terrorism-related information sharing.  Officials from 7 of the 10 fusion centers that we interviewed in our eight  urban areas reported that their fusion centers were initially established  with an all-crimes mission, and officials from the other 3 fusion centers  reported that they expanded the missions of their centers to include all  crimes. Officials from all 3 of these fusion centers explained that they  expanded the missions of their fusion centers to include all crimes  because of the nexus, or link, of many crimes to terrorist-related activity.  In addition, officials from all 3 of these fusion centers explained that they  also expanded their missions in an effort to better serve state and local  customers. This is consistent with nationwide information. According to  data collected by DHS as of 2011, 63 of 72 fusion centers reported that  the fusion center’s mission included all crimes, and 54 of 72 fusion  centers reported that the center’s mission included counterterrorism.  Five fusion centers reported that their mission was exclusively related to  counterterrorism. In addition, the overlap in counterterrorism, as well as  the overlap between fusion centers and FIGs, can be explained by fusion  centers’ unique role as state and local entities. As previously mentioned,  fusion centers and FIGs both, among other things, analyze and  disseminate intelligence. However, fusion centers generally conduct  these activities to serve as state and local intermediaries, while FIGs  generally conduct these activities to serve as the FBI and U.S.  intelligence community intermediaries. Thus, while both types of entities  may conduct similar analytical activities and services, they are doing so  for different purposes. For example, officials from all 10 of the fusion  centers that we interviewed explained that their analysts infuse state or  local perspectives with information that they receive from federal partners  to provide customers with relevant context.
Overlap in analytical activities and services can be beneficial, for  example, by increasing entities’ focus on sharing information, validating  information, or allowing for competing or complementary analysis;  however, it can also lead to inefficiencies, such as burdening customers  with redundant information. Officials from six of the seven state and local  law enforcement customer agencies we interviewed stated that when  entities have information, they feel the need to share it through the  production of analytical products and dissemination of information. For  example, an official from one local law enforcement agency explained  that the benefit of entities disseminating information is that they are  ensuring that information gets to those that need it. Additionally, officials  from all seven of these agencies said that they expect to get all available  information to make decisions to protect the citizens in their jurisdiction.  Moreover, officials from three of the seven customer agencies we  interviewed stated that receiving similar information from more than one  entity enables them to validate and corroborate information. Further,  officials from DHS and BJA noted benefits of competing or  complementary analytical products. For example, different entities may  draw different conclusions from the same or similar data given their  unique missions and differing customers, perspectives, or jurisdictions.
However, while officials from all seven state and local law enforcement  customer agencies had varying preferences regarding the frequency and  amount of information they receive from entities, officials from four of  these agencies stated that receiving redundant information is  burdensome. For example, an official from one local law enforcement  agency stated that when entities forward original products, criminal  bulletins, and publications without coordinating them, this leads to law  enforcement leadership getting inundated with redundant information.  This has led him to devote time to developing processes to ensure that  his e-mail inbox does not reach capacity, because then he would not be  able to receive additional e-mails that may contain important information.  Entity officials in the eight urban areas in our review provided examples of  efforts they have taken to coordinate products, among other things, that  have helped to address instances of unnecessary overlap, which we  discuss later in this report.
As shown in figure 3, we also identified instances of overlap in  investigative support activities and services conducted by entities for  similar customers in the same mission area.
First, looking across mission areas and types of entities, we identified  more instances of overlap in investigative support activities and services  being conducted in the mission area of all crimes compared with the  mission areas of counterterrorism and counternarcotics. Specifically, out  of the 32 instances of overlap—in which more than one type of entity in  the same urban area conducted the same investigative support activity or  service for similar customers in the same mission area—25 were in the  mission area of all crimes. Additionally, more instances of overlap  involved a RISS center and fusion center compared with the other three  entities. Out of the 32 instances of overlap, 27 involved a RISS center, 23  involved a fusion center, and 18 involved both a RISS center and a fusion  center. For example, in one urban area, the RISS center and fusion  center both conducted tactical analysis, target deconfliction, and event  deconfliction in the mission area of all crimes for federal, state, and local  customers. The RISS center and fusion center in this urban area also  both provided equipment and money loans in the mission area of all  crimes for state and local customers.
Second, looking at investigative support activities and services, we  identified more instances of overlap in tactical analysis, such as link  analysis or telephone toll analysis, compared with other investigative  support activities and services. Specifically, in seven of the eight urban  areas, the RISS center and fusion center both conducted tactical analysis  in the mission area of all crimes. In four of these seven urban areas, the  RISS center and fusion center conducted all-crimes tactical analysis for  federal, state, and local customers. In another two of these urban areas,  the RISS center and fusion center conducted the activity for state and  local customers. In the remaining urban area, the RISS center and fusion  center conducted the activity for federal customers. For example, while  officials from the RISS center in one urban area acknowledged that other  entities, including the fusion center, in their urban area also conducted all- crimes tactical analysis, they stated that they have an active and close  working relationship with these other entities. Specifically, to coordinate  all-crimes tactical analysis, the RISS center’s Field Service Coordinator  attends bimonthly regional intelligence meetings alongside  representatives from the other entities, and provides technology to and  receives training from the fusion center. Entity officials cited efforts they  have taken to coordinate and address unnecessary overlap, which we  discuss later in this report.
section_title: Efforts to Make Systems That Deconflict Operations Interoperable Could Reduce Risks to Officer Safety and Inefficiencies
paragraphs: RISS centers and HIDTAs operate duplicative deconfliction systems— that is, systems that aim to ensure law enforcement officers are not  conducting enforcement actions at the same time in the same place or  investigating the same target—which could pose risks to officer safety  and lead to inefficiencies. RISS and HIDTA officials have taken steps to  connect target deconfliction systems—those that inform agencies when  they are investigating the same individuals, weapons, vehicles, or  businesses—and two of three event deconfliction systems. However,  HIDTA officials have not finalized plans to make the remaining event  deconfliction system interoperable with the other two systems, which  could further reduce risks to officer safety and lessen the burden on law  enforcement agencies that are currently using multiple systems to notify  agencies when they are conducting conflicting enforcement actions.
Specifically, the RISS and HIDTA programs operate three separate  systems that have (1) event deconfliction functions to determine when  multiple federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies are conducting  enforcement actions (e.g., raids, undercover operations, or surveillances)  in proximity to one another during a specified time period, or (2) target  deconfliction functions, which determine if multiple law enforcement  agencies are investigating, for example, the same person, vehicle,  weapon, or business. In 2009, RISS developed RISSafe to provide event  deconfliction to its members and those not being served by another  system. Individual HIDTAs have used the Secure Automated Fast Event  Tracking Network (SAFETNet) system, which has had event deconfliction  functions, among other functions, since 2001 to help ensure officer safety.  In 2009, the HIDTA program introduced deconfliction features into the  Case Explorer system that differed from SAFETNet by providing a free  service that is tied to its performance management process. Table 2  provides details about the features of these three systems.
Law enforcement officers generally enter events into a deconfliction  system electronically or by calling a watch center. Individuals operating a  watch center plot the location of the event on a map and notify the officer  for whom contact information is available in the system of other officers  who have entered conflicting events into the same system. When events  are not deconflicted, officer safety can be at risk. For example, HIDTA  officials responsible for operating Case Explorer stated that, as a result of  not deconflicting an undercover operation, an undercover officer was shot  and killed by other law enforcement officers because the other officers did  not know that an undercover officer was close to them. In addition, HIDTA  and RISS officials described instances when officers did not deconflict  drug busts, which led to undercover officers from different agencies  drawing guns on one another thinking the other officers were drug  dealers. The officials added that, had the events been deconflicted, the  officers would have been aware of one another’s presence.
However, RISS and HIDTA officials said that the use of more than one  system with deconfliction functions increases the possibility of events not  being coordinated because users have entered an event into only one  system but not all of the systems. As shown in figure 4, law enforcement  agencies in 12 states use more than one system to deconflict events.  RISS and HIDTA officials stated that all of the systems are open to law  enforcement agencies, and law enforcement agencies may choose one  over the other based on preference, experience, or their affiliation with a  particular RISS center or HIDTA. Duplicative event deconfliction systems  may also lead to inefficiencies. For example, according to RISS officials,  law enforcement agencies have expressed frustration in having their staff  spend time entering information into multiple systems to ensure that their  investigations are not conflicting with those of other agencies. These  RISS officials also noted that the agencies could be jeopardizing officer  safety if they choose to enter information into one system when more  than one is available.
RISS and HIDTA officials have already taken steps to reduce duplication  in target deconfliction systems; however, these steps do not address the  duplicative event deconfliction systems. Recognizing that target  deconfliction can increase efficiency by connecting officers who may be  working on the same or related cases, RISS centers and HIDTAs, along  with the Drug Enforcement Administration, the International Justice and  Public Safety Network and the National Alliance of State Drug  Enforcement Agencies developed a National Virtual Pointer System  (NVPS). The system connects existing investigative target deconfliction  databases and notifies federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement  agencies participating in NVPS when an active investigative target they  are investigating is also being investigated by another participant. NVPS  facilitates target deconfliction and, as of March 2013, interoperability with  existing event deconfliction systems is not being pursued.
In September 2012, RISS and HIDTA officials signed a memorandum of  understanding to coordinate efforts to make two of the three duplicative  event deconfliction systems—RISSafe and Case Explorer—interoperable;  however, the memorandum of understanding did not include SAFETNet.  RISS and HIDTA officials stated that interoperability will be completely  effective only with participation from all three systems, and risks to officer  safety could remain with one system missing from the effort. The  memorandum of understanding did not include SAFETNet because the  13 HIDTAs that operate the system and the contractor that provides  support stated that they were going to first continue their ongoing efforts  to make revisions to the target deconfliction function of SAFETNet— intended to link the users of this function—before they would consider  changes to the event deconfliction function. RISS and HIDTA officials  said that they chose to move forward with the memorandum of  understanding and their efforts to make two of the systems interoperable  with the intent of trying to integrate SAFETNet at a later date. While RISS  and HIDTA officials noted that they had been discussing these issues  since early 2012, they stated that the memorandum is a first step and was  signed to demonstrate their recognition of the importance of officer safety,  the need to coordinate operational and investigative efforts, and the need  to leverage usage of proven systems and programs. RISS and HIDTA  officials stated that they tested the software that would allow the two  systems to be interoperable in December 2012 and expected to complete  the effort in 2013.
RISS and HIDTA officials stated that the HIDTAs that operate SAFETNet  have expressed interest in making SAFETNet interoperable with the other  two systems once SAFETNet users are linked. However, according to  RISS officials, SAFETNet officials have not provided a target time frame  for when they would finish linking SAFETNet users and have stated that  this effort needs to be completed before they can commit to joining  RISSafe and Case Explorer. Identifying milestones and time frames is  consistent with best practices for program management. We have also  reported that ensuring that all relevant participants are included is a key  factor to the successful implementation of collaborative efforts. The  effort to make the deconfliction systems interoperable, thus far, has not  fully addressed these considerations. SAFETNet officials recognize the  need for interoperability; however, milestones and time frames for  completing the actions needed to link SAFETNet users and then join  efforts to make the three systems interoperable would help to ensure that  all parties involved accomplish their goals in a defined period of time. This  could help achieve interoperability of all three event deconfliction  systems, prevent delays in efforts to maximize the efficiency of the  systems, and ensure the safety of officers by preventing incidents in the  field.
section_title: Federal Agencies Do Not Hold Entities Accountable for Coordinating and Have Not Assessed Coordination Mechanisms to Help Reduce the Potential for Overlap
paragraphs: DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP acknowledge the importance of the entities  working together and sharing information; however, they do not hold the  entities accountable for coordinating with one another. A mechanism that  holds entities accountable for coordination and enables agencies to  monitor and evaluate the results of their efforts, such as performance  metrics related to coordination, could help provide the agencies with  information on the effectiveness of coordination among field-based  entities and help reduce any unnecessary overlap in entities’ efforts.  Officials in the eight selected urban areas we reviewed cited the inclusion  of partners on governance boards and field-based entities’ physical or  virtual colocation as two practices that helped to enhance coordination,  information sharing, and efficiencies—in their view, reducing the potential  for unnecessary overlap and duplication in their analytical and  investigative support activities. DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP have not fully  assessed the extent to which such practices could be applied nationwide  to increase the benefits already being realized in some urban areas.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Do Not Take Steps to Hold Entities Accountable for Coordination, Limiting Efforts to Reduce Overlap and Duplication
paragraphs: DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP have processes in place to collect and measure  information on the capabilities or performance of the entities in  information sharing, but do not specifically hold field-based entities  accountable for coordinating with one another. Accordingly, coordination  is not a specific expectation in the entities’ performance management  systems, and agencies do not track or measure the extent to which  entities in urban areas are coordinating to leverage resources,  collaborate, and reduce overlap. For example, according to FBI officials,  the FBI has several performance metrics that hold JTTFs and FIGs  accountable for sharing information, but none specific to coordinating with  other field-based entities in their urban areas. RISS centers report  performance indicators to BJA, such as the number of officers with  access to their systems and the number of products and services  provided in a given year, but these measures do not address coordination  with other entities. DHS I&A officials stated that they are currently  developing a set of performance measures to help determine how  effectively the centers are meeting certain targets by collecting  information on fusion centers’ coordination with other fusion centers;  however, whether the measures will collect information related to the  centers’ coordination with other field-based information-sharing entities  has not yet been determined. HIDTA Investigative Support Centers also  have a performance measurement program that holds them accountable  for referring leads to other HIDTAs and other agencies, but the program  does not include measures about the HIDTA’s ability to coordinate with  other entities.
As members of the ISA IPC Fusion Center Subcommittee, participating  senior officials from DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP have established  coordination as a goal and have worked together to share and  standardize practices, such as developing criteria for allocating resources  to fusion centers, but have not established a mechanism to monitor,  evaluate, and report results to ensure that entities are coordinating with  each other. Coordination can reduce unnecessary overlap to ensure  that the activities and products of the entities complement rather than  duplicate those of other entities. Further, officials from the FBI, BJA, DHS,  and ONDCP each stated that coordination among the entities is essential  in accomplishing individual missions. However, these officials told us that  they ultimately rely on the leadership of their respective field-based  entities to ensure that successful coordination is occurring because the  leaders in the field-based entities are most familiar with the other  stakeholders and issues in their areas, and are best suited to develop  working relationships with each other. For example, the FBI special  agent-in-charge at each field office is expected to reach out to law  enforcement and private sector stakeholders and potential partners in  their respective areas. However, officials at 22 of the 37 entities stated  that successful coordination depends most on personal relationships and  can be disrupted when new leadership takes over at an entity.  Specifically, they noted that the potential for overlap and duplication can  increase when new leaders assume they understand the roles and  activities of the other entities. Establishing a mechanism to measure  coordination would hold entities accountable for working with other  entities and help to reduce overlap. Officials at 20 of 37 entities stated  that measuring and monitoring coordination could alleviate the process of  starting over when new personnel take over at a partner entity and ensure  that maintaining coordinated efforts is a priority.
We have previously reported that high-performing organizations use their  performance management systems to strengthen accountability for  results, specifically by placing greater emphasis on fostering the  necessary coordination both within and across organizational boundaries  to achieve results. Individual accountability for collaborative efforts can  be reinforced through performance management systems by identifying  competencies related to collaboration and setting performance  expectations for collaboration. Incorporating performance metrics that  emphasize collaboration and coordination with partners can benefit  multiagency efforts. These efforts are further enhanced when  mechanisms are developed to monitor, evaluate, and report on the results  of the collaborative effort. A mechanism that holds field-based entities  accountable for coordinating with each other and enables agencies to  monitor and evaluate these efforts could help DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP,  working through the ISA IPC, to provide agencies with information about  the effectiveness of coordination among field-based entities and provide  additional incentives for personnel in the field to strengthen coordination  efforts.
section_title: Officials in Eight Selected Urban Areas Identified Two Practices That Enhanced Coordination and Helped Reduce Unnecessary Overlap and Duplication
paragraphs: Officials at each of the 37 entities in the eight urban areas we reviewed  described how practices such as serving on one another’s governance  boards or, in some cases, colocating with other entities allowed or could  allow them to achieve certain benefits. These include better  understanding the missions and activities of the other entities,  coordinating the production of analytical products, and sharing resources  such as subject matter experts. In their view, this helped to increase  coordination, leverage resources, and avoid or reduce the negative  effects of unnecessary overlap and duplication in their analytical, tactical,  and dissemination activities.
Twenty-seven of the 37 entities had a governance board that was  responsible for the management of the entity. Specifically, these boards  were responsible for managing the operations of the entities, promoting  information sharing, developing standards, and overcoming obstacles to  sharing information across levels of government. Officials from each of  the 10 entities with at least one member of another entity on their  governance board said they were able to better understand each others’  missions, more readily identify areas of overlap, and share resources,  which enhanced coordination. For example, officials from a RISS center  stated that serving as a member of a JTTF board allowed the center to  detail an analyst to the task force. The JTTF benefitted because the RISS  analyst showed it the types of support the RISS center can provide, and  the RISS center benefited because the analyst acquired training on  counterterrorism investigations that could be taken back to the center.
Officials that had members from other entities on their boards as well as  those who did not stated that participating on each others’ boards  facilitated or could facilitate the ability to readily identify overlapping  activities. For example, participants on these boards were able to  determine when similar analytical products from more than one entity  were being produced and avoid overlap and duplication by deciding to  produce a collaborative product or share resources, such as data  systems. In one urban area, the governance board of a fusion center  included members from the JTTF and the FIG. Center officials stated that  having these entities represented on the board helped the JTTF and FIG  better understand the mission of the fusion center. With this increased  understanding, both sides looked at how they could use each other’s  agents, analysts, and subject matter experts as resources. Officials from  9 other entities stated that governance board participation from the other  entities allowed them to adopt a regionalized approach that incorporated  the expertise of all parties in developing strategies that avoided  unnecessary overlap and duplication of activities. For example, activities  such as preparing threat assessments for major events became  collaborative efforts with roles and responsibilities discussed and agreed  upon at governance board meetings.
Officials in the eight urban areas in our review also reported that varying  degrees of colocation helped them to avoid unnecessary overlap through  the coordination of analytical and tactical activities and sharing of  resources, such as analysts with a particular area of expertise. Entities in  the eight urban areas used various models of colocation including  combining entities, sharing physical space, operating within shared  networks, and having federal personnel colocated at the entity. As  examples, officials from two colocated entities in our review stated that  colocating and combining, as well as creating shared information spaces  in a virtual environment, allowed them to share information more  efficiently, develop more sophisticated products, and increase  coordinated and collaborative efforts. Physical colocation allowed for  increased efficiencies as the overhead cost of operating the entities, such  as facilities, supplies, and utilities, was shared.
Officials at entities that were not colocated recognized the benefits of  colocation and agreed that, under the right circumstances, colocation  could increase the effectiveness of coordination and efficiencies. In one  urban area, a fusion center and a HIDTA Investigative Support Center  combined their locations, staff, and activities. While funding sources for  the two sides were distinct, the staff worked across the fusion center and  HIDTA and were able to shift their focus onto the prioritized mission  needs of the center. For example, during a national sporting event, staff  that usually focused on counternarcotics helped in monitoring potential  non-drug-related threats to the area. In another urban area, entities  operated separately but were physically located within the same building,  making communication and collaboration more convenient. At entities we  visited in three urban areas, staff used computer systems to create  virtually colocated environments, which allowed partners to have a  presence in a shared data and communications system while operating  from their own physical space. For example, one fusion center has  established a virtual information-sharing system in which federal, state,  and local law enforcement and non-law enforcement partners can post  and retrieve information related to suspicious activities, security concerns,  and security-related information that affects the entire urban area or  region. According to fusion center officials, this approach was useful in  areas where partner agencies’ jurisdictions covered a large geographic  area, since law enforcement agents could participate virtually in a fusion  center or HIDTA while being physically located in a different area.
In addition to citing these models of colocation, officials in each of the 10  fusion centers in our review stated that colocating federal personnel, such  as FBI special agents or DHS intelligence officers, with fusion centers  was a practice that benefits, or could benefit, their centers. We present  these officials’ perspectives on the benefits of having deployed federal  personnel in their centers as well as the status of FBI and DHS personnel  deployed to fusion centers in appendix II.
section_title: Agencies Have Not Assessed Practices That Enhance Coordination to Help Identify Additional Opportunities to Coordinate and Reduce Overlap
paragraphs: DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP have not assessed the extent to which practices  that could enhance coordination and help reduce unnecessary overlap  and duplication in activities—such as participation on governance boards  and colocation—could be applied more comprehensively nationwide  across these field-based entities. Activities such as participation on  governance boards and colocation are consistent with practices and  mechanisms that we have previously reported federal agencies have  used to implement interagency collaborative efforts, as well as with  guidance provided to the entities by DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP. For  example, we reported that colocation can be a mechanism that can  facilitate collaboration between agencies. Further, guidance for fusion  centers states that governance structures should include representatives  from the federal government in at least an advisory capacity and should  also include local representatives from the FBI (i.e., the JTTF and FIG)  and components of DHS, such as the U.S. Coast Guard. According to the  guidance, the governance structures should also consider including or  coordinating with HIDTAs as appropriate to the center’s mission and  location. The FBI also directs its field offices to emphasize the importance  of representation in fusion centers by ensuring FBI executive  management’s participation on fusion center governance boards and  advisory councils. Additionally, HIDTAs are directed and guided by  executive boards comprising an equal number of federal and nonfederal  (i.e., state, local, and tribal) law enforcement leaders.
However, entities nationwide do not all use practices such as governance  boards and colocation. Specifically, according to survey data collected by  DHS I&A, 11 of 72 fusion centers do not have governance boards, and  not all entities with governance boards include members of the other  entities. For example, of the 37 entities in our review, 27 had governance  boards and 10 included members from other entities. Entities’ experience  with governance boards demonstrates that providing increased  participation from entities on one another’s governance boards could  foster more effective collaboration. Additionally, while officials from each  of the entities in the urban areas in our review expressed the benefits of  colocation, they stated that agencies had not fully explored opportunities  to engage in the various forms of colocation. For example, 16 fusion  centers are colocated with JTTFs, and six JTTFs and four FIGs are also  colocated with HIDTA Investigative Support Centers. While the focus of  HIDTAs is counternarcotics, five of seven HIDTA directors stated that  colocation with JTTFs and FIGs has strengthened, or would strengthen,  their ability to share information, build databases, provide training  opportunities, deconflict targets, and exchange best practices. Therefore,  agencies may have additional opportunities to apply these types of  practices.
DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP have begun to take some steps to discuss these  issues. For example, the Fusion Center Sub‐Committee of the ISA IPC  brought its members and others together to discuss how to establish  stronger partnerships between fusion centers and HIDTAs, and to further  define the operational roles, responsibilities, and relationships among  these entities. As a result of this meeting, participating fusion center and  HIDTA officials determined that, under the right circumstances, the  colocation or integration of fusion centers and HIDTA Investigative  Support Centers may bring significant benefits, but this should not be  advocated as a universal approach because it may not be practical in all  cases. According to agency officials present at the meeting, while the  participation of entities on each others’ boards and colocation were  discussed as potentially beneficial practices, the subcommittee did not  explore the extent to which these or other coordination practices could  benefit additional entities across the nation. The subcommittee also did  not identify characteristics of locations that promote successful colocation  or specific locations where colocation could benefit the entities. Rather,  the intent was to provide a forum to share practices, and the  subcommittee did not have a plan to implement or promote specific  practices nor to further assess their greater applicability.
According to the Program Management Institute’s Standard for Program  Management, organizations should determine the value of a project’s  benefits, such as an assessment of participation on governance boards or  collocation, identify the interdependency of benefits in different programs,  and assign responsibilities and accountability for the realization of those  benefits. An assessment of participation on governance boards and the  colocation of these entities in specific geographic areas, as well as other  practices that could enhance coordination and reduce unnecessary  overlap, could better position DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP, working through  the ISA IPC, to assist the entities. Such an assessment could identify  characteristics that make these practices successful, inform whether  additional governance boards or colocated entities should be pursued, or  determine whether other opportunities to leverage resources and  increase cost efficiencies and operational capabilities exist.
Further, as required by the Intelligence Reform Act, the Program Manager  is to submit annual reports to Congress. Accordingly, the Program  Manager has reported on the benefits and importance of promoting  partnerships and developing standards and has highlighted progress and  successes, such as implementing privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties  protections and strengthening cybersecurity in the annual reports to  Congress on implementing the ISE. These reports, however, have not  included information about specific coordination efforts across these five  types of entities. According to the Program Manager, past reports have  focused on broader issues such as strengthening the safeguarding of  terrorism-related information, but including information on specific  coordination efforts among the five types of field-based entities in future  reports would provide beneficial information to the information-sharing  environment. We have previously reported that defining and articulating a  common outcome; developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and  report on results; and reinforcing agency accountability for collaborative  efforts through agency plans and reports can help enhance and sustain  coordinated efforts among agencies. The inclusion of the results of such  an assessment conducted by DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP—including any  additional coordination practices identified, efficiencies realized, or  actions planned—in the ISE annual report to Congress could help the  Program Manager hold agencies accountable for completing the  assessment and disseminate its results to further enhance collaborative  efforts and efficiencies across agencies.
section_title: Agencies Collect Information on the Results Entities Achieve, but Vary in How They Consider Such Data when Making Decisions about Future Funding
paragraphs: FBI, BJA, DHS, and ONDCP collect information on the results that JTTFs,  FIGs, RISS centers, fusion centers and HIDTA Investigative Support  Centers achieve. Although some of these agencies consider the results  when they make decisions about future funding, others consider different  factors—such as risk and threats—rather than results, or do not directly  make decisions about future funding.
subsections: section_title: The FBI Uses Data on JTTFs and FIGs to Evaluate Performance, but Determines Funding Levels Based on Relative Threats and Risks in a Region
paragraphs: According to FBI officials, the FBI gathers information on the results that  JTTFs and FIGs achieve through annual field office reports and other  performance reviews. Specifically, each field office is subject to  semiannual performance reviews and submits an annual report in order  for the FBI to assess how well each field office identifies and addresses  threats in its area. According to FBI officials, the reviews and annual field  office report contain data on established performance measures for the  FIG and all investigative programs, including counterterrorism task forces  such as the JTTFs. For example, the FBI tracks FIG results, such as the  number of strategic intelligence reports produced and requests for  information received, and collects various case-related results from  JTTFs, including the number of investigations conducted and information  sources developed.
FBI officials responsible for the oversight of the JTTFs and FIGs stated  that the reviews are primarily used to report and assess field office  performance. They also reported that the FBI allocates funding and  resources to its field offices based primarily on the prevalence of risks  and threats within a region. The FBI funding that supports all resources  for the FIGs and the JTTFs is congressionally appropriated and scored to  the National Intelligence Program. Uses of these funds, for example,  include the salaries of FBI special agents that serve on the JTTF through  allocations to FBI field offices, as well as other JTTF operational costs,  including rental of office space, information technology requirements, and  support for participating state and local TFOs, including vehicles and  overtime pay.
section_title: BJA Gathers Information on RISS Centers’ Results for Grant Oversight and Considers Centers’ Work in Approving Funding Allocations to Centers
paragraphs: Consistent with RISS program grant guidance, in conducting grant  oversight, BJA collects information on various results that each RISS  center achieves. According to RISS and BJA officials, BJA collects  information quarterly on results that member agencies achieve that can  be attributed to the products and assistance they receive from RISS  centers, including the number of resulting arrests and the value of  narcotics, currency, and property seizures during investigations that RISS  centers supported. For example, according to the quarterly reports, in  2011, law enforcement agencies used RISS services on cases that  resulted in more than 5,000 arrests and $43 million in narcotics, currency,  and property seizures. BJA also collects other data on RISS centers,  such as the number of state and local law enforcement agencies that are  members of each center and the number of analytical products each  center developed. According to BJA officials responsible for overseeing  the RISS program, the agency collects information on RISS centers’  results to fulfill grant management requirements.
BJA officials stated that RISS center directors use information regarding  the needs of the state and local law enforcement agencies that are  members of each center when making recommendations to BJA about  funding for individual centers, and the agency considers each center’s  work when approving final funding decisions. According to BJA officials  that administer the grant program, BJA provides RISS directors with the  total funding amount available for the RISS program, and RISS directors  unanimously recommend funding amounts for each RISS center. RISS  center directors covering the urban areas in our review reported that they  consider multiple factors when deciding how much funding to  recommend, such as each center’s geographic coverage, the size of its  member agencies, and the types of services the center provides to its  members. According to BJA officials, BJA reviews the recommendations  to ensure that they are consistent with the work submitted for the centers  in previous grant cycles and that each center has submitted all financial  and progress reports required by the grant. These officials added that, on  the basis of this review, BJA makes a final funding decision.
section_title: DHS Collects Data on Fusion Center Capabilities and Has Efforts Under Way to Gather Data on Performance
paragraphs: Annually, DHS I&A collects information on the progress fusion centers  have made in meeting baseline capabilities—a defined set of standards  developed by DHS and DOJ, in conjunction with fusion centers, that  centers should achieve to be considered capable of performing basic  functions in the national information-sharing network. Among the  baseline capability information that DHS I&A collects and tracks are four  critical capabilities—including a center’s ability to analyze threat  information and disseminate intelligence products to stakeholders—as  well as other capabilities, such as the ability to protect individuals’ privacy,  civil rights, and civil liberties. For example, in reporting on fusion centers’  progress in achieving the four critical capabilities, in 2011 DHS reported  that at least 75 percent of fusion centers, or 54 centers, had approved  plans, policies, or standard operating procedures for each of the critical  capabilities.
DHS provides grants to individual states and urban areas that can be  used to support fusion centers. Starting with fiscal year 2011, DHS  modified requirements in the Homeland Security Grant Program  (HSGP)—which is administered through the Federal Emergency  Management Agency (FEMA) and provides funding that states and local  jurisdictions can use to support fusion centers—to state that any federal  funds centers receive must be used to fill gaps in critical capabilities  identified through its annual assessment process. Further, DHS I&A and  FEMA required that fusion center applicants identify the corresponding  baseline capability they will address in their proposals to state grant  recipients for portions of federal grant funding. To strengthen the  coordinated use of grant funds, DHS also required that HSGP funds that  are used to support intelligence or fusion-related activities (e.g.,  intelligence units) are integrated or coordinated with the respective state  or local fusion center.
DHS has also recognized the need to develop performance measures to  capture data that demonstrate the value of the national network of fusion  centers in support of national information-sharing and homeland security  goals. In September 2010, we recommended that DHS define steps to  develop and implement a set of standard performance measures for  fusion centers to show the results that the centers are achieving and the  value they are adding to federal information-sharing efforts. According to  DHS I&A officials, DHS, in coordination with fusion center directors and  other federal partners, has identified an initial set of five performance  measures, including the number of products that two or more fusion  centers jointly produce and the number of requests for information from  other fusion centers that are addressed. Further, according to these  officials, the agency is leading efforts to define more measures during  2013 and plans to work with FEMA to identify potential ways to  incorporate performance-reporting requirements into the HSGP process.
section_title: ONDCP Collects Data on How Well Centers Are Meeting Performance Targets, and HIDTAs Use These Data when Making Funding Decisions
paragraphs: ONDCP has established a performance management process that  requires HIDTAs to submit, among other results, five measures  specifically related to HIDTA Investigative Support Center performance  that serve, in part, as the basis for future funding decisions. These  measures include (1) the number of cases in which the center provided  analytical support and (2) satisfaction ratings from stakeholders of the  support provided and strategic intelligence products disseminated by the  center. As part of ONDCP’s performance management process, each  HIDTA executive board annually sets target goals for each of these  measures. ONDCP officials stated that both they and the HIDTA  executive boards review the performance measure results to ensure that  Investigative Support Centers meet their goals, the boards also consider  these results when deciding the amount of future funding to dedicate to  the center. In addition to results, HIDTA executive boards consider other  factors, such as the expected needs of its members and availability of  staff, when determining the level of funding that initiatives, including  Investigative Support Centers, will receive. For example, ONDCP  officials stated that in cases where center performance was less than  expected, HIDTAs could provide ONDCP with an appropriate explanation  regarding the variance in performance allowing for appropriate decisions  to be made in the budget approval process.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The efforts of JTTFs, FIGs, RISS centers, fusion centers, and HIDTA  Investigative Support Centers to gather, analyze, and disseminate law  enforcement, public safety, and terrorism-related information are essential  for our nation’s homeland security. Similarities in their activities and  customers can provide benefits through competing or complementary  analysis and corroboration of reports. However, these similarities could  also lead to unnecessary overlap and duplication that reduce the  effectiveness of their activities and create inefficiencies. For example,  HIDTAs and RISS centers both have systems with deconfliction functions  that can save the lives of officers by preventing conflicting operations.  However, the lack of interoperability requires officers, in some cases, to  input their events into the three systems with duplicative functions, which,  if not done, increases the likelihood of risks to officers and inefficiencies.  Agencies recognize the need for the systems to be interoperable and  have some efforts under way to make them so. However, articulating time  frames for the completion of these efforts would help ensure their  success. Further, with multiple entities supporting investigations through  tactical and analytical support, the coordination of similar activities can  create opportunities to leverage resources and reduce the potential for  unnecessary overlap or inefficiencies. DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP do not  hold field-based entities accountable for coordinating with each other, nor  do they assess opportunities for additional coordination. With a  mechanism to track and evaluate how field-based entities are working  together, agencies can identify successful coordination practices and  where those practices can be implemented. Obtaining insight into how  well coordination is working can help agencies ensure that field-based  entities are maximizing opportunities to reduce overlap, collaborate, and  leverage resources. In addition, officials from each of the entities stated  that practices such as participating on one another’s governance boards  and various forms of colocation help them understand other entities’ roles  and create such opportunities. However, agencies have not fully explored  the extent to which these and other practices can be applied nationwide  across the five types of field-based entities and may be missing  opportunities to share facilities and resources, better meet customer  needs with collaborative products, and achieve benefits through  increased interaction. Further, by identifying characteristics that make  these practices successful and assessing geographic areas in which they  can be applied, agencies can expand their use.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Recognizing that agencies are taking steps to ensure that two of the three  systems officers use to deconflict their law enforcement actions are  interoperable, we recommend that the Director of ONDCP work with the  appropriate HIDTA officials to develop milestones and time frames for  actions needed to make the third system, SAFETNet, interoperable in  order to prevent unnecessary delays in reducing risks to officer safety and  lessening the burden on law enforcement agencies that are currently  using multiple systems.
To promote coordination as a practice to help avoid overlap, we  recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney  General, and the Director of ONDCP work through the ISA IPC or  otherwise collaborate to develop a mechanism, such as performance  metrics related to coordination, that will allow them to hold field-based  information-sharing entities accountable for coordinating with each other  and monitor and evaluate the coordination results achieved.
To help identify where agencies and the field-based entities they support  could apply coordination mechanisms to enhance information sharing and  reduce inefficiencies resulting from overlap, we recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of  ONDCP work through the ISA IPC or otherwise collaborate to identify  characteristics of entities and assess specific geographic areas in which  practices that could enhance coordination and reduce unnecessary  overlap, such as cross-entity participation on governance boards and  colocation of entities, could be further applied. The results of this  assessment could be used by the agencies to provide recommendations  or guidance to the entities to create coordinated governance boards or  colocate entities, which can result in increased efficiencies through  shared facilities and resources and reduced overlap through coordinated  or collaborative products, activities, and services.
To help ensure that an assessment of practices that could enhance  coordination and reduce unnecessary overlap is shared and used to  further enhance collaboration and efficiencies across agencies, we  recommend that the Program Manager, with input from the ISA IPC  collaborating agencies, report in the ISE annual report to Congress the  results of the assessment, including any additional coordination practices  identified, efficiencies realized, or actions planned.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS, DOJ,  ONDCP, and the Program Manager for the ISE for review and comment.  DHS and DOJ provided written comments: Comments from DHS are  reprinted with sensitive information omitted in appendix III, and comments  from DOJ are reprinted in full in appendix IV. DHS concurred with the two  recommendations that apply to it and reported steps it was taking to  address them. In written comments, DOJ stated that the department  generally agreed with the goal or intent of the two recommendations  made to it; however, it did not concur with the premises underlying the  two recommendations. ONDCP and the Program Manager for the ISE did  not provide written comments on the draft report. However, in an e-mail  dated March 8, 2013, ONDCP General Counsel concurred with the three  recommendations made to it, and in oral comments obtained on March 7,  2013, the Program Manager concurred with the fourth recommendation.
With respect to the second recommendation to collaborate to develop a  mechanism to hold field-based information-sharing entities accountable  for coordinating with each other, DHS concurred and stated that each  agency should develop mechanisms appropriate to its respective  missions in order to effectively oversee the field activities for which it is  responsible or, in the case of state and local fusion centers, the activities  with which they coordinate. DHS stated that it has included two measures  in the 2012 Fusion Center Assessment that respectively measure the  number of Suspicious Activity Reports submitted by fusion centers that  result in an FBI investigation and the number of fusion center analytical  products authored by two or more fusion centers. While we agree that  both measures do hold fusion centers accountable for coordinating a  specific information sharing activity, they do not fully address the  recommendation to hold centers accountable for coordinating activities  and services with each of the other entities in an effort to look for  additional ways to limit any overlap and better leverage resources. As the  report recognizes, to this end, DHS I&A is developing additional  performance measures for the Fiscal Year 2013 Fusion Center  Assessment, expected to begin in August 2013, that will explore the  degree to which fusion centers collaborate with other field-based  information-sharing entities and with federal partners to develop analytic  products. Since DHS is developing the measures and expects to  complete this action in August 2013, it is too soon to know what specific  measures DHS will include and whether they will fully address the intent  of the recommendation.
DOJ, in its letter, stated that it generally agreed with the goal of the  second recommendation to develop a mechanism to hold field-based  information-sharing entities accountable for coordinating with each other,  but that it did not concur that the department was not already actively  promoting coordination. For example, officials stated that DOJ has  participated in summits with other agencies, including DHS, in an ongoing  dialogue on efficient and effective coordination of information sharing in  the field. While these efforts are positive steps for sharing information and  coordinating to improve sharing, the efforts do not fully address the  recommendation to develop a mechanism for accountability and  monitoring coordination across all five entities included in the review. We  maintain that such a mechanism that specifically and directly holds field- based entities accountable for coordinating with one another could add  valuable context to the type of dialogue DOJ describes while encouraging  entities to maintain working relationships when new leadership is  assigned and engage in coordination activities, such as leveraging  resources, to avoid unnecessary overlap.
With respect to the third recommendation to collaborate and assess  where successful coordination practices could be further applied, DHS  concurred and stated that it supported working through the ISA IPC, since  its work includes the identification and implementation of best practices  and operational improvements in the sharing of information. DHS added  that it has collected information on the other entities’ participation on  fusion center governance boards, as well as the colocation of these  entities to ensure that the fusion centers benefit from the perspective of  their stakeholders and partners. This is a positive step in gaining insights  into identifying fusion centers where these and other practices can be  applied. With similar input from DOJ and ONDCP, an assessment of this  information could allow the agencies to identify where it might be  appropriate to apply these and other practices across entities. It is too  soon to know how DHS will use the information it has collected in  collaboration with the other agencies, but DHS stated it will work with us  to define specific and measurable outcomes in response to the  recommendation.
In its letter, DOJ stated that it agreed with the general intent of the third  recommendation to collaborate and assess where successful  coordination practices could be further applied, but did not concur with the  premise that the department does not already routinely seek to identify  potential efficiency gains and that colocation is something that should be  a goal in and of itself. DOJ stated that it does encourage entities to  explore efficiencies that can be gained by, for example, cross-entity  participation or colocation in circumstances where appropriate and  efficient. However, DOJ stated that what is appropriate and efficient is  highly dependent on local circumstances, and a one-size-fits-all approach  will not work because of variation in the entities, regions, and laws under  which they operate. We agree, and the report states that colocation  should not be advocated as a universal approach because it may not be  practical in all cases. Accordingly, the recommendation calls for the  agencies that operate or otherwise support these entities to collectively  assess opportunities to enhance coordination through whatever effective  means they identify.
Additionally, DOJ stated that a comparison of the FIGs and JTTFs with  the other entities overgeneralizes their activities since they are  operational while the others are analytical. Similarly, DHS stated that the  comparison of FIGs with fusion centers overgeneralizes the unique nature  of the entities’ products and their intended recipients. The report outlines  the distinct missions, authorities, roles, and responsibilities of each of the  entities, noting the JTTFs’ unique role in conducting counterterrorism  investigations. Further, we acknowledge that entities serve as  intermediaries to different customers, while each has a broader role in  sharing information with its partners as appropriate. DOJ’s letter also  commented on the generalizeability of our analysis. We selected eight  urban areas to explore activities conducted and coordination mechanisms  across the five entities in its review. On the basis of our analysis, we  identified instances of reported overlap in activities and also examples of  where coordination was working well across the entities. The report states  that the results from the eight urban areas are not generalizeable, and  thus we made recommendations for agencies to assess practices that we  identified that were working well, as well as other coordination practices,  to identify additional opportunities nationwide to coordinate and reduce  any unnecessary overlap in entities’ activities.
DHS and DOJ also provided technical comments, which we incorporated  as appropriate.
We are providing copies of this report to the Attorney General, the  Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of ONDCP, the Program  Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, and interested  congressional committees. The report is also available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any  questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or  larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Additional Information about Entities Included in Our Review
paragraphs: This appendix provides an overview of each of the five types of field- based information-sharing entities included in our review.
subsections: section_title: Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Program
paragraphs: The RISS program, which originated in 1974, supports the ability of local,  state, federal, and tribal law enforcement member agencies to identify,  target, arrest, and prosecute criminal conspirators. The program, which  the Bureau of Justice (BJA) administers, consists of six multistate  regional information analysis centers that offer services—including  information and intelligence sharing, investigative and case support, and  officer safety and deconfliction—to member agencies in their respective  regions. RISS centers serve member agencies in all 50 states, U.S.  territories, Canada, England, Australia, and New Zealand. RISS centers  focus on all crimes; however, they also may focus their efforts on  activities and conspiracies related to terrorism.
section_title: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program
paragraphs: Established in 1988, the HIDTA program is a federally funded program  administered by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) that  brings together federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies into  task forces that conduct investigations of drug-trafficking organizations in  designated areas. Before designating an area as a HIDTA, the Director  of ONDCP must consider the extent to which the area is a significant  center of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or  distribution; state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have  committed resources to respond to the drug-trafficking problem in the  area, thereby indicating a determination to respond aggressively to the  problem; drug-related activities in the area are having a significant  harmful impact in the area and in other areas of the country; and a  significant increase in allocation of federal resources is necessary to  respond adequately to drug-related activities in the area. As of March  2013, ONDCP had designated 28 HIDTAs.
A statutory purpose of the HIDTA program is to reduce drug trafficking  and drug production through information sharing. Thus, among other  initiatives, every HIDTA has an Investigative Support Center that serves  to support all of the investigation and interdiction initiatives in the HIDTA  by providing analytical case support, deconfliction, issuing drug threat  assessments, and developing and disseminating intelligence products.  There are 32 HIDTA Investigative Support Centers—1 in 27 of the 28  HIDTAs, in addition to the Southwest Border HIDTA, which has a center  for each of its five regions. The HIDTA program is focused on  counternarcotics; however, HIDTA program resources may be used to  assist law enforcement agencies in investigations and activities related to  terrorism and the prevention of terrorism.
section_title: FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF)
paragraphs: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) established the first JTTF in  1980 in its New York City field office after recognizing the value of the  task force concept—which it began using in the prior year to jointly  investigate bank robberies with the New York City Police Department— and subsequently applied the concept to counterterrorism. The FBI  continued to expand the terrorism task force concept to field offices after  September 2001, increasing the number of JTTFs from 35 to 103. The  FBI has 56 field offices (also called divisions) centrally located in major  metropolitan areas across the United States and Puerto Rico. Within field  offices, there are a total of about 400 resident agencies located in smaller  cities and towns. Each JTTF is housed in an FBI field office or resident  agency.
JTTFs, which consist of FBI special agents, as well as federal, state, and  local task force officers (TFO), pursue leads, gather evidence, respond to  threats and incidents, make arrests, provide security for special events,  conduct training, and gather intelligence related to threats, among other  counterterrorism-related activities. According to the 2012 Information  Sharing Environment (ISE) annual report to Congress, JTTFs are  dedicated to sharing information among their partners to investigate  terrorism and coordinate counterterrorism efforts.
section_title: FBI Field Intelligence Groups (FIG)
paragraphs: The FBI established the first FIG in 2003 to coordinate, manage, and  execute all of the functions of the intelligence cycle, including collection,  analysis, production, and dissemination, for the FBI in the field. FIGs are  teams of FBI intelligence analysts, special agents, language analysts, and  financial analysts, among others, working in each of the 56 FBI field  offices to analyze information from cases in their field offices and share  intelligence locally and nationally.
section_title: Fusion Centers
paragraphs: After the September 2001 attacks, state and local governments began to  establish fusion centers, in part to serve as intermediaries within states  and localities for the gathering, receipt, analysis, and sharing of threat- related information among the federal government and state, local, tribal,  territorial and private sector partners, and to fill gaps in information  sharing that the federal government alone could not address. As defined  by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of  2007, a fusion center is “a collaborative effort of two or more federal,  state, local, or tribal government agencies that combines resources,  expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing the ability of such  agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to  criminal or terrorist activity.” As of January 2013, there are 77 fusion  centers located in states and major urban areas throughout the country.
section_title: Appendix II: Federal Deployment of Personnel to Fusion Centers
paragraphs: This appendix provides information about the deployment of federal  personnel, specifically FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  personnel, to fusion centers.
Officials from each of the 10 fusion centers in our review stated that  colocating federal personnel at fusion centers was a practice that  benefits, or could benefit, their center. The FBI and DHS deploy  personnel such as special agents, intelligence officers, and reports  officers to fusion centers to perform a number of duties ranging from the  collection of intelligence to training state and local counterparts.
According to officials from each of the 10 fusion centers, colocating  representatives from the FBI and DHS allowed or could allow fusion  center products and services to incorporate more information from these  agencies, ensuring consistency in content and format with information  being released from those agencies. Fusion center officials in each of the  urban areas noted that, while not all of the fusion centers have dedicated  DHS or FBI staff, having an on-site presence at fusion centers facilitates  collaborative products between the agencies and the fusion centers. For  example, officials in 8 of the 10 fusion centers reported that their analysts  worked with the FBI to develop joint products ranging from threat  assessments associated with major events to guides on identifying  tattoos and terminology used by extremist groups. Additionally, officials in  each of the 10 fusion centers said that the presence of FBI and DHS  personnel allows or could allow fusion centers to have products reviewed  and checked against federal sources before they are disseminated,  preventing duplicative or erroneous information from reaching  stakeholders. In one urban area, an FBI analyst stated that the review  process improved the quality and relevance of the fusion centers’  products. For example, before the review process was in place, the FBI  received some outdated and incorrect information from the local fusion  center. In one case, they recognized the information in a threat bulletin  because they had determined it to be a nonthreat 2 years prior. Both the  FIG and the fusion center officials in this urban area stated that errors  such as this have not occurred since the FBI has had a presence in the  fusion center.
Officials in all 10 of the fusion centers also stated that an important  benefit of having FBI or DHS personnel at the center is access to  classified information systems such as the Federal Bureau of  Investigation Network (FBINet), which is the FBI’s primary network  system for communicating Secret information, including intelligence  pertaining to national security, and DHS’s Homeland Secure Data  Network (HSDN), which is a classified network for DHS, its components,  and other partners. According to FBI officials, policies on FBINet access  require the presence of FBI personnel, and according to the FBI, the  network allows deployed FBI personnel to more fully collaborate with  fusion center personnel by providing them with Secret information,  including investigative case files and intelligence pertaining to national  security. Officials in one urban area that did not have FBI personnel at  their fusion center stated that not having access to FBINet limited their  ability to access classified information. In another urban area, the fusion  center director stated that access to FBINet was limited to when the part- time FBI agent deployed to the center was in the office. The fusion center  director stated that the arrangement reduced the effectiveness of having  access to the system because the information is needed when events  occur. For example, if a crime was committed, it may take a day or more  to access FBI information on the suspect. Fusion center officials stated  that while access to HSDN does not require the presence of DHS  personnel, navigating the system with DHS personnel on site allows them  to find information more quickly and provides them with a better sense of  the information that is available.
DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A) and the FBI have  initiatives underway to deploy personnel to fusion centers. For example,  the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007  require that DHS, in coordination with fusion center officials, assign DHS  officers and intelligence analysts to fusion centers. DHS I&A has an  initiative to deploy intelligence officers to each of the fusion centers.  Similarly, the FBI, in its 2011 Information Sharing Report highlighted the  importance of the coordination of information sharing among FBI field  offices, their FIGs, and the fusion centers. The FBI identified the JTTFs  as the principals for operational-level coordination with fusion centers.  FBI field offices plan to designate at least one experienced intelligence  analyst to fusion centers depending on the extent to which a center has,  among other criteria, a focus on counterterrorism and the ability to house  secure systems such as FBINet. DHS and FBI officials stated that they  are continuing to work toward these goals. In 2012, DHS had 164  personnel deployed to fusion centers, including 98 from DHS I&A. The  FBI had 95 personnel deployed to 59 fusion centers, with 47 embedded  full-time in 29 fusion centers and 48 working on a part-time basis. As  centers become more mature, and as resources allow, both DHS and the  FBI plan to increase the number of personnel deployed to centers and  introduce personnel in those centers that currently do not have federal  staff.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Mary Catherine Hult, Assistant  Director; Kevin Heinz; Justine Lazaro; Christine Ramos; Yanina Golburt  Samuels; Katherine Davis; Eric Hauswirth; Tom Lombardi; and Amanda  Miller made significant contributions to the work.