Diplomatic Security: Options for Locating a Consolidated Training Facility
Published: 2015-10-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: State has been in the process of looking for a site suitable for its DS training facility for more than a decade. In 2011, State and GSA identified Fort Pickett as the preferred site for FASTC and began to develop plans to consolidate DS training there. In 2013, OMB directed State to work with the Department of Homeland Security to assess the viability of using FLETC to accommodate DS’s training. In November 2013, FLETC submitted a business case to OMB indicating that it could meet DS’s requirements. However, FLETC officials said that they had incomplete information regarding the requirements for DS’s training facility. Following this assessment, DS, FLETC, and OMB could not agree on a path forward.
In April 2014, the administration reaffirmed the selection of Fort Pickett for FASTC, and State and GSA began implementing their plan to construct FASTC. State and GSA have obligated about $71 million to date on FASTC at Fort Pickett. In May 2015, GSA purchased land and in June 2015 awarded a contract for the initial phase of construction of FASTC, although the date construction is to begin has not yet been finalized.
This testimony is based on GAO’s September 2015 report, Diplomatic Security: Options for Locating a Consolidated Training Facility ( GAO-15-808R ).Concerned by the considerable variation in the cost estimates for FASTC and FLETC, members of Congress requested that GAO provide further information on both the requirements and costs of DS training. As in its September 2015 report, GAO examined (1) key site requirements critical to the provision of DS training and the extent to which the FASTC and FLETC proposals meet these requirements and (2) the estimated capital and recurring costs of these proposals and the extent to which the capital cost estimates conform to leading practices for reliable cost estimates.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In its September 2015 report ( GAO-15-808R ), GAO evaluated four Department of State (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) requirements that GAO determined were critical in the selection of a site for a training facility and found that Fort Pickett, near Blackstone, Virginia, fully met all four while the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) campus in Glynco, Georgia, did not fully meet any. For example, building the Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) at Fort Pickett would enable DS to consolidate at one location 10 of the 12 hard-skills training venues currently in seven states. FLETC can accommodate many of these venues on its campus but would have to conduct some exercises at a Marine Corps training facility about 30 miles away. GAO also found that Fort Pickett is available for nighttime training, which DS conducts over about 190 nights per year, while at FLETC there may be some limitations on nighttime training. GAO also determined that the Fort Pickett site held advantages in terms of proximity to Washington, D.C., and exclusivity of use, two requirements highlighted in reports stemming from the Benghazi Accountability Review Board.
State and the General Services Administration (GSA) initially planned to consolidate hard-skills (e.g., firearms, driving, and explosives) and soft-skills (e.g., classroom-based training in counterintelligence, cybersecurity, and law) training at FASTC for an estimated cost of $925 million. State subsequently reduced the scope of its plans to exclude soft-skills training, decreasing the estimated cost to $413 million. FLETC officials said that they did not have complete information regarding State’s reduced-scope plan for FASTC and were unable to develop a comparable cost estimate. Instead, these officials said, they subtracted the costs of some facilities from FLETC’s original full-scope estimate of $272 million to arrive at a reduced-scope estimate of $243 million. FLETC has not refined its cost estimate since the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) notified it that the administration had selected the FASTC proposal in April 2014. GAO found that neither the FASTC nor the FLETC estimate for capital costs fully meets best practices. The FASTC estimate fully or substantially meets three of the four characteristics—comprehensive, well documented, and accurate—and partially meets one characteristic—credible—of reliable cost estimates; the FLETC estimate partially meets three characteristics—comprehensive, well-documented, and accurate—and minimally meets one characteristic—credible.
GAO projected the recurring costs of sending students to training at each location, including travel, lodging, meals and incidental expenses, and compensation for time spent traveling. GAO projected these costs over 10, 25, and 50 years in three different scenarios for both the FASTC and FLETC proposals. GAO estimates that the costs of sending students to FASTC over 10 years will be $43 million to $121 million less, in net present value, than sending students to FLETC. The difference in student costs between FASTC and FLETC increases over time, from between $122 million and $323 million less for FASTC after 25 years, to between $309 and $736 million after 50 years. Lower costs of sending students by bus to Fort Pickett in Virginia compared with flying them to FLETC in Georgia account for the largest amount of these projected differences.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making any recommendations in this testimony.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the Department of  State (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s (DS) efforts to locate a  consolidated training facility. State has been in the process of looking for  a site suitable for its DS training facility for more than a decade. In 2011,  we reported that the lack of a consolidated training facility was a  significant challenge to carrying out DS’s mission. DS currently provides  training at 12 contracted and leased sites in seven states, which DS  officials believe is inefficient and more costly than a consolidated facility  would be.
In 2011, State and the General Services Administration (GSA) identified  Fort Pickett near Blackstone, Virginia, as the preferred site for a DS  training facility, known as the Foreign Affairs Security Training Center  (FASTC). The initial 2012 master plan for FASTC would have  consolidated training in hard skills (e.g., firearms, driving, and explosives)  and soft skills (e.g., classroom-based training in counterintelligence,  cybersecurity, and law) at Fort Pickett for an estimated cost of $925  million. In 2013, State reduced the scope of FASTC to exclude facilities  for soft-skills training and life support functions, such as dormitories and a  cafeteria, ultimately decreasing the estimated cost of the current proposal  to $413 million. Also in 2013, the Office of Management and Budget  (OMB) directed State to work with the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) to assess the viability of using the Federal Law Enforcement  Training Centers (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia, to accommodate DS’s  training. In November 2013, FLETC submitted a business case to OMB  indicating that it could meet DS’s requirements, including soft-skills  training, for an estimated cost of $272 million. Following this assessment,  DS, FLETC, and OMB could not agree on a path forward.
Ultimately, OMB deferred to State on the decision of where to locate its  training facility. In April 2014, the Administration reaffirmed the selection  of Fort Pickett for FASTC. To date, State and GSA have obligated about  $71 million of the estimated $413 million in capital costs toward FASTC at  Fort Pickett, including for the purchase of land in May 2015.
My testimony summarizes our September 2015 report on the FASTC and  FLETC proposals for accommodating DS training. Like that report, this  testimony discusses (1) key site requirements critical to providing DS  training and the extent to which the FASTC and FLETC proposals meet  these requirements and (2) the estimated capital and recurring costs of  these proposals and the extent to which the capital cost estimates  conform to leading practices for reliable cost estimates.
For our September 2015 report, we reviewed documents on the  requirements for DS’s training facility and proposals to meet these  requirements from State, DHS, and GSA. We also reviewed the Benghazi  Accountability Review Board (ARB) report and reports by two panels  established as a result of recommendations by the ARB, including the  Independent Panel on Best Practices. We conducted site visits to Fort  Pickett, FLETC, and three of DS’s current training venues, interviewed  officials at State, FLETC, GSA, and OMB about the proposals, and spoke  with officials from agencies that DS identified as its training partners,  including the Marine Security Guards, Naval Special Warfare Command,  U.S. Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Central  Intelligence Agency. We focused on four requirements of the center that  our analysis indicated were critical to providing basic and advanced DS  training courses. While we assessed the need for these site requirements  to accommodate DS’s existing and planned training, we did not assess  whether specific DS training courses are necessary to accomplish DS’s  mission of providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of  U.S. foreign policy. We did, however, confirm that DS currently conducts  and plans to continue to conduct training that includes elements such as  nighttime training, long-range firearms, and heavy explosives. We  identified the number of courses and students that use these elements,  as well as the projected number of such courses at the future training  center. We observed a training exercise that involved several of these  elements. We also asked DS officials to explain why the elements were  necessary and, to the extent possible, reviewed actual examples of  incidents overseas that supported DS’s identified need for specific  training elements. In some cases, we discussed these elements with DS’s  identified training partners as well as with FLETC.
To assess the cost estimates for each proposal, we reviewed the  September 2014 capital cost estimate for FASTC and the November  2013 capital cost estimate for FLETC. We evaluated whether each cost  estimate was generated according to best practices outlined in GAO’s  Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. We reviewed data provided by  State, GSA, and FLETC regarding their cost estimation practices. We  also interviewed State, GSA, FLETC, and contractor staff responsible for  preparing the FASTC and FLETC cost estimates. We reviewed cost data  provided by State, FLETC, and GSA to determine the recurring  operations and maintenance, recapitalization investment, and staffing and  associated costs for each proposal. We also developed three scenarios to  estimate the costs of sending students to each location, including costs  for travel, lodging, meals and incidental expenses, and compensatory  time for travel. We discussed assumptions regarding these costs with  State, FLETC, and OMB officials and subsequently developed our own  assumptions using several data sources. We provided our assumptions to  State and FLETC for review and confirmation, and we revised our  assumptions based on their comments where appropriate. Additional  details on our scope and methodology can be found in our September  2015 report.
We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DS currently provides training in hard skills to a diverse student  population. DS provides security familiarization training for Foreign  Service and other civilian personnel and their families. It also provides  advanced courses for DS agents, such as the High Threat Operations  Course, an intensive 10-week course designed to provide agents with  specialized training in a variety of tasks, including leadership, weapons,  small unit tactics, air operations, and movement security procedures  needed to operate in high-threat, high-risk posts. In addition, through the  Antiterrorism Assistance program, DS provides training to foreign security  personnel in areas such as crisis response, explosive incident  countermeasures, post-blast investigations, and armored vehicle driving.  DS has expanded its training over the last decade, and following the 2012  attack on the U.S. Special Mission compound in Benghazi, Libya, the  independent ARB recommended further security training for DS agents  and all other Foreign Service personnel.
In June 2015, DS projected that it would train nearly 6,300 students in  hard skills in fiscal year 2015, compared to 3,500 students in 2007. DS  estimates that it will provide more than 9,000 students with over 20,000  weeks of training per year once its training facility is fully operational.
section_title: Fort Pickett Fully Meets DS’s Requirements While FLETC Does Not
paragraphs: For our September 2015 report, we analyzed four of DS’s requirements  that we determined were critical in the selection of a site for DS’s training  facility and found that Fort Pickett fully met all four while FLETC did not  fully meet any.
Consolidation. Building FASTC at Fort Pickett would enable DS to  consolidate at one location 10 of the 12 widely scattered hard-skills  training venues it is currently using. FLETC can accommodate many  of these venues on its Glynco campus but would have to conduct  some exercises, such as training in long-range weapons and heavy  explosives, as well as some nighttime exercises, at the Townsend  Bombing Range, a Marine Corps training facility about 30 miles from  Glynco. FLETC did not include costs for using this facility in its 2013  proposal.
Proximity to Washington, D.C. The Independent Panel on Best  Practices, established as a result of the Benghazi ARB,  recommended a consolidated training center, located in proximity to  State’s Washington, D.C., headquarters, given State’s reliance on  military units and other government agencies located nearby. Fort  Pickett is located about 160 miles from Washington, D.C., or nearly 3  hours by car one way, compared to FLETC, which is approximately  640 miles from Washington, D.C., or 5 to 6 hours by airplane one  way. Over 90 partner organizations conduct training at FLETC;  however, DS’s primary training partners, including the Marine Corps’  Security Augmentation Unit and its Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team,  are based in Virginia, and an official responsible for Marine Security  Guard training told us that the cost of transporting personnel and  equipment to and from FLETC would be prohibitive.
Exclusivity of use. The Independent Panel on Best Practices  “strongly endorsed” State’s efforts to develop a training facility that it  could control, noting that agencies such as the Federal Bureau of  Investigation, the U.S. Secret Service, and the Drug Enforcement  Administration have adopted such a policy as a best practice. At Fort  Pickett, DS would control its training venues and have the flexibility to  implement scheduling changes to respond to rapidly evolving security  situations overseas. FLETC stated that DS would be assured of  priority scheduling, but not exclusive use, for those facilities that would  be built for DS and provided a detailed plan showing the facilities  currently available and those that would be constructed for DS.  FLETC officials stated that when DS was not using facilities prioritized  for its use, other federal, state, and local agencies would be allowed  to train at and benefit from the facilities.
24/7 availability. DS conducts training during hours of darkness on  about 190 days per year, including 140 nights that involve loud noises  such as gunfire and small explosions. We found that Fort Pickett,  which covers about 42,000 acres and is set in a rural area, is  available for nighttime training. FLETC, which is adjacent to the town  of Brunswick, Georgia, does not conduct certain types of training at  night, and FLETC officials told us that exercises there currently end by  10:00 p.m. According to FLETC officials, DS could conduct such  nighttime exercises at the Townsend Bombing Range.
section_title: Capital Cost Estimates for the FASTC and FLETC Proposals Are Unreliable
paragraphs: In our September 2015 report, we found that neither the FASTC nor the  FLETC estimate for capital costs fully meets best practices for reliable  cost estimates. The FASTC estimate fully or substantially meets three of  the four characteristics—comprehensive, well documented, and  accurate—and partially meets one characteristic of reliable cost  estimates—credible; the FLETC estimate partially or minimally meets all  four characteristics (see table 1). FLETC officials noted that their  estimate was prepared in a short period of time based on incomplete  information regarding State’s requirements; more complete information  would have enabled them to develop a more comprehensive estimate.  Our assessment of the reliability of these cost estimates focused on the  processes used to develop the estimates rather than estimates  themselves, enabling us to make a more direct comparison of their  reliability.
In September 2014, State and GSA estimated that acquisition and  construction costs for the reduced-scope plan for FASTC would be $413  million. FLETC’s November 2013 proposal included a cost estimate  comparable to the full-scope plan for FASTC; however, FLETC officials  said that because they did not have complete information regarding the  reduced-scope plan for FASTC, they were unable to develop a  comparable cost estimate. For example, these officials said that State did  not tell them which venues had been removed from the plan and that they  were unaware of some of DS’s training exercises. These officials said that  they subtracted the costs of some facilities from the FLETC full-scope  estimate to arrive at a reduced-scope estimate of $243 million. FLETC  has not refined its cost estimate since OMB notified it that the  administration had selected the FASTC proposal in April 2014.
In addition to capital costs for acquisition and construction of a DS  training center, the analysis in our September 2015 report included  projections for recurring costs for operations and maintenance (O&M) and  for recapitalization investment—the costs of replacing broken systems  and equipment. Our analysis also included recurring staffing and  associated costs for each proposal. Using data provided by State, GSA,  and FLETC, we projected these costs over 10, 25, and 50 years. We  projected the capital and recurring O&M, recapitalization investment, and  staffing costs to be $201 million more, in net present value, for FASTC  over 10 years, $266 million more for FASTC over 25 years, and $372  million more for FASTC over 50 years (see table 2).
Finally, the government is expected to incur costs of sending students to  training. These recurring student costs include travel, lodging, meals and  incidental expenses, and compensation for time spent traveling. We  projected these costs over 10, 25, and 50 years in three different  scenarios for both the FASTC and FLETC proposals. We estimated that  the costs of sending students to FASTC over 10 years would be $43  million to $121 million less, in net present value, than sending students to  FLETC. The difference in student costs between FASTC and FLETC  increases over time, from between $122 million and $323 million less for  FASTC after 25 years, to between $309 and $736 million after 50 years  (see table 3).
Chairman Perdue, Ranking Member Kaine, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please  contact Michael J. Courts, Director, International Affairs and Trade, at  (202) 512-8980 or courtsm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony  are Thomas Costa (Assistant Director), Robert Ball (Analyst-in-Charge),  Brian Bothwell, Juaná Collymore, David Dayton, Grace Lui, Manuel  Valverde, and Nancy Zearfoss.
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