Disaster Recovery: Selected Themes for Effective Long-Term Recovery
Published: 2012-06-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The many challenges and difficulties experienced in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and other catastrophes have led to considerable reflection on what lessons might be learned regarding disaster recovery. Congress has recognized the importance of improving the way our nation approaches disaster recovery by including in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 the requirement that FEMA develop a National Disaster Recovery Strategy. The administration has also placed a greater focus on recovery, as demonstrated by its development of the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) with the goal of helping federal agencies and others to more-effectively organize in order to promote recovery.
GAO was asked to testify on themes from its previous work on disaster recovery that may assist the subcommittee in its oversight of disaster-recovery issues.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: From 2008 to 2010, GAO produced a body of work on disaster recovery, including reviews of the Federal Emergency Management Agencys (FEMA) Long-Term Community Recovery efforts, recovery lessons based on past experiences at home and abroad, the use of Community Development Block Grants and Public Assistance grants and the operation of the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding (OFC). Among other things, this work highlighted themes that are important to successful disaster recovery efforts. Three of these key themes are: (1) the need for clearly defined recovery roles and responsibilities; (2) the importance of effective coordination and collaboration among recovery stakeholders; and (3) the value of periodic evaluation of, and reporting on, recovery progress.
When recovering from a major disaster, having clearly defined and well-understood roles and responsibilities is a critical first step in coordinating and implementing the responsibilities of the various parties involved in the long-term recovery process. These roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of government must be clearly defined, communicated, and understood in order to be effective. GAOs previous work provides numerous examples of the challenges that result when this does not take place and, conversely, illustrations of benefits that can occur when it does. For example, GAOs 2009 review of the OFC found confusion and disagreements among key recovery stakeholders as well as with the Federal Coordinator himself regarding the offices appropriate scope and function. This confusion, accompanied by the lack of clear decision-making authority on the part of OFC, may have ultimately slowed down the resolution of some recovery problems.
Recovery from a major disaster is a long, complex process that involves an extensive group of participants both across the federal government and at the state and local level. At least 14 federal departments and agencies are responsible for administering dozens of recovery-related programs, many of which rely heavily on active participation by state and local government for their implementation. Because these parties are dependent on each other to accomplish recovery goals, effective coordination and collaboration is essential. GAOs past work has explored this issue in considerable detail. For example, in the wake of the 2008 Midwest floods, federal, state, and local officials said that FEMAs facilitation of regular interagency meetings to coordinate federal and state partners helped to identify and effectively leverage recovery resources, as well as identify coordination problems and other concerns.
Finally, the collaboration between recovery partners can be enhanced by periodically evaluating and reporting on what worked, what can be improved, and what progress is still needed to address long-term recovery goals. This last step will assist decision makers, clients, and stakeholders to obtain the feedback needed to improve both the policy and operational effectiveness of recovery efforts. For example, after a 1995 earthquake, the city of Kobe, Japan and the surrounding region held periodic external reviews over a span of 10 years on the progress made toward achieving recovery goals. As a result, the city of Kobe gained insight into unintended consequences of how it relocated elderly earthquake victims, which subsequently led to a change in policy.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: In multiple reports between 2008 and 2010, we made several recommendations to FEMA and others addressing recovery challenges involving coordination, communication, and information sharing, among other topics. The NDRF is directly responsive to several of the recommendations contained in these reports. However, it will require the successful implementation of this framework in order to ultimately resolve these issues.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today some key themes  from GAO’s previous work on long-term recovery after disasters. In  contrast to the response phase, which takes place in the immediate  aftermath of a disaster and focuses on essential lifesaving activities,  recovery is a much longer process that can last years or sometimes  decades where attention shifts to restoring both the individual and the  community, including the redevelopment of damaged areas. The many  recovery challenges experienced after Hurricane Katrina affected the Gulf  Coast in 2005—including difficulties with coordination, communication,  and the loss of attention and focus—during the long recovery process,  have led to considerable reflection on what lessons might be learned in  how we, as a nation, approach disaster recovery. Congress has  recognized the importance of improving the way our nation approaches  disaster recovery by including in the Post-Katrina Emergency  Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) the requirement that the  Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) develop a National  Disaster Recovery Strategy.
We also have seen the administration place a greater focus on the issue  of recovery, as demonstrated by its development of—for the first time  ever—a National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) with the goal of  helping federal agencies and others to more effectively organize in order  to promote recovery. This effort represents a welcomed emphasis on  thinking seriously about the challenges and possibilities presented by the  disaster-recovery process, and the NDRF generally represents a step in  the right direction. Yet challenges in this area remain. As the recently  issued 2012 National Preparedness Report points out, states and  territories ranked core capabilities related to disaster recovery among the  lowest of all the areas assessed.
With this in mind, and as agreed with the subcommittee, my testimony  today will focus on three themes drawn from our previous work on  disaster recovery that may prove useful in the subcommittee’s ongoing  oversight of disaster-recovery issues. These themes are (1) the need for  clearly defined recovery roles and responsibilities; (2) the importance of  effective coordination and collaboration among recovery stakeholders;  and (3) the value of periodic evaluation of, and reporting on, recovery  progress.
My statement is largely based on a body of work that we have developed  on the topic of disaster recovery that dates from 2008 to 2010. These  include our March 2010 review of FEMA’s Long-Term Community  Recovery Branch (LTCR) in providing and coordinating assistance to  support long-term recovery; a July 2009 report that identified recovery  lessons based on past experiences at home and abroad; an April 2009  examination of the use Community Development Block Grants on the  Gulf Coast; an April 2009 overview of the Office of the Federal  Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding (OFC); as well as our December  2008 examination of FEMA’s Public Assistance Grant program. These  reports contain multiple recommendations to FEMA and others aimed at  addressing recovery challenges involving coordination, communication  and information sharing, among others. The NDRF is directly responsive  to several of the recommendations contained in these reports; however it  will require the successful implelemtion of this framework in order to  ultimately resolve these issues. More complete information on our scope  and methodology, findings, and recommendations is available in each  published report.
We conducted these reviews in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Clearly Defining Recovery Roles and Responsibilities Is a Critical First Step for Effective Recovery
paragraphs: When recovering from a disaster, having clearly defined and well  understood roles and responsibilities is a critical first step in coordinating  and implementing the responsibilities of the various parties involved in the  long-term recovery process. Roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority  at all levels of government must be clearly defined, communicated, and  understood in order to be effective. Our previous work provides examples  of the challenges that result when this does not take place, and  conversely, illustrations of benefits that can occur when it does, which I  describe below.
Our 2009 review of the operations of the Office of the Federal Coordinator  (OFC) for Gulf Coast Rebuilding found confusion and disagreements  among key recovery stakeholders as well as with the Federal Coordinator  himself regarding the office’s appropriate scope and function. According  to OFC and officials from several state and local governments located on  the Gulf Coast, one of the functions of the office was to work to resolve  problems and obstacles in the recovery process by directly intervening in  program-specific matters such as FEMA’s Public Assistance Grant  program. However, FEMA believed that such actions were outside the  scope of a coordination office, and instead viewed OFC’s proper role as  being responsible for broad cross-agency concerns, such as alleviating  inconsistencies across federal programs or looking for program gaps.  This confusion, accompanied by the lack of clear decision-making  authority on the part of OFC, may have ultimately slowed down the  resolution of recovery problems in some cases by increasing the number  of meetings and the amount of paperwork involved.
GAO-10-404. reasons cited for this were differing interpretations of FEMA’s mission and  authorities and varying interpretations of LTCR’s mission by Federal  Coordinating Officers. A senior FEMA official told us that, based on his  experience, Federal Coordinating Officers generally believe that FEMA’s  long-term recovery mission is primarily to work with the states  immediately after a disaster to develop a long-term recovery plan. Under  this view, assisting states and local communities with coordinating federal  assistance to implement their recovery plans is not the responsibility of  staff working under ESF-14, but rather that of regional staff or other  FEMA recovery officials who remain in the disaster area. However, FEMA  regional staff sometimes did not take on this role. As a result, in some  cases, such as in Texas after Hurricane Ike, state and local officials found  that they were left without federal coordination and planning assistance  during a critical period in the recovery process.
An effective way to avoid conflicts and misunderstandings regarding the  roles and responsibilities of the many entities involved in the disaster  recovery process is to clearly delineate them ahead of time through  planning. On the state and local level, we found several examples of  jurisdictions that used predisaster recovery plans to do this. For example,  in 1987, several years before the Northridge Earthquake hit in 1994, the  City of Los Angeles created a Recovery and Reconstruction Plan that  clearly identified the roles and responsibilities of key officials involved in  recovery. Specifically, the plan identified which city departments have  responsibility for implementing predetermined activities before and after a  disaster in several functional categories, including residential,  commercial, industrial rehabilitation, and economic recovery. To be most  helpful, such a plan must be more than simply paper instructions, rather it  is a dynamic and inclusive process that is brought to life by periodic  exercises. Long-term recovery planning exercises held by the City of Los  Angeles brought police and fire officials together to engage in role-playing  exercises in which they assumed the responsibilities of recovery officials.  For example, a public safety officer played the role of a building inspector  responsible for issuing building permits after an earthquake. A city official  at the time of the earthquake told us that such exercises were an  important part of developing relationships among stakeholders and  ensuring city staff understood their postdisaster roles and responsibilities.  According to a federally-funded evaluation of this plan, the contacts  established during the planning process facilitated recovery after the  Northridge earthquake. Communities in other areas including San  Francisco, California, and Palm Beach, Florida, have taken action to  develop recovery plans prior to a disaster that identify roles and  responsibilities for recovery.
FEMA has taken steps to more-clearly define the roles and  responsibilities of federal, state, and nongovernmental partners in the  NDRF that was finalized in September 2011. The NDRF explicitly  acknowledges that clearly defined roles and responsibilities form a  foundation for unity of effort among all recovery partners to jointly identify  opportunities, foster partnerships, and optimize resources. Toward this  end, the framework has a section devoted to describing the roles and  responsibilities for a range of participants in the recovery process  including federal, state, tribal, and local governments, the private and  nonprofit sectors, as well as individuals and households.
The NDRF also created the position of Federal Disaster Recovery  Coordinator (FDRC) and established a process for involving this official in  coordinating federal recovery assistance during various phases of  recovery to help ensure that state and local needs are met, including  extending this assistance beyond the closeout of federal disaster- response activities. Further, the NDRF provides clearer criteria regarding  when and how recovery stakeholders become engaged in the process. It  identifies the entities that will be involved in the decision-making process  as well as the factors or criteria they will consider. In these ways, the  NDRF provides the groundwork for addressing challenges identified in  our previous work and thus represents a positive step forward, but still  requires additional details regarding implementation.
section_title: Coordination and Collaboration among Stakeholders Facilitates Successful Recovery
paragraphs: Recovery from a major disaster is a long, complex process that involves  an extensive group of participants both across the federal government  and at the state and local level. At least 14 federal departments and  agencies are responsible for administering dozens of recovery-related  programs, many of which rely heavily on active participation by state and  local government for their implementation. Because of this, and the fact  that under federal law, states and localities have the lead in disaster  recovery, the capacity of state and local governments to act effectively  directly affects how well communities recover after a major disaster.  Therefore, effective coordination and collaboration both within the federal  community as well as with state and local partners is critical. Our past  work has explored this issue in considerable detail. Today, I would like to  briefly focus on three of the ways the federal government has sought to  improve coordination and collaboration in order to facilitate disaster  recovery.
First, the federal government has worked to foster coordination by  bringing federal and state stakeholders together collectively and by  working one-on-one to identify and resolve recovery challenges. For  example, in the wake of the 2008 Midwest floods, FEMA’s LTCR branch  held biweekly meetings in Iowa with federal and state agencies, such as  the Small Business Administration, the Departments of Housing and  Urban Development, Labor, Agriculture, Commerce, and Transportation,  and the Environmental Protection Agency; the state counterparts to these  agencies; state finance offices; and others. According to officials we  spoke with, these meetings provided a forum to identify and leverage  federal and state resources to support disaster recovery, as well as  discuss potential coordination challenges such as gaps in funding or other  long-term recovery concerns. Similarly, following the 2005 Gulf Coast  hurricanes, OFC also worked to coordinate across agencies and with  state and local partners, and address conflicts. Toward this end, OFC  sponsored “workout sessions” focused on specific recovery topics and  invited state and local agencies to address coordination challenges, and  developed detailed matrices of the agreements reached, tasks to be  performed, and stakeholders responsible for implementation.
Second, in addition to coordination at the federal level, we have  previously reported on the federal government’s efforts to work with state  and local governments to help them take advantage of all available  disaster assistance and achieve long-term recovery goals. For example, in the wake of the 2008 Midwest floods, LTCR provided technical  assistance to affected communities by conducting or facilitating recovery  assessments to identify the long-term effects of the disaster, providing  staff to advise the communities on steps to take as they developed  recovery plans, creating planning tools that the communities used to  guide their planning activities, and hosting workshops to discuss and  share recovery-planning lessons, among other things. In addition LTCR  helped communities to prioritize their potential long-term recovery  projects and identify potential sources of funding.
Third, collaboration between federal, state, and local recovery partners in  jointly administering disaster-assistance programs is also improved by  effectively sharing information. For example, in Mississippi after Hurricane  Katrina, federal, state, and local officials adopted strategies that helped to  facilitate the sharing of information on specific Public Assistance Grant  projects. Following the disaster, FEMA’s Mississippi Transitional  Recovery Office and the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency  were located in the same office complex in Biloxi, Mississippi, and  officials from these agencies were also positioned together throughout the  state. They reported that this colocation had multiple benefits for  information sharing and exchange, including the timely sharing of critical  documents and facilitation of daily meetings on project-development  issues. In addition to colocating, FEMA and Mississippi state officials  used Public Assistance Grant funding to secure an online accounting  system that made operational documents associated with projects readily  available to all parties. As a result, FEMA and the state had immediate  access to key documents that helped them to make project-approval  decisions, thereby improving collaboration.
Improving coordination and collaboration is one of the key objectives of  the NDRF, and the framework contains several strategies to do so. One  of these involves the creation of the position of Federal Disaster Recovery  Coordinator (FDRC). The FDRC is assigned the responsibility and  authority to facilitate the coordination of information and activities among  the federal agencies whose programs, technical assistance, and  expertise are relevant to recovery, within the framework of the Recovery  Support Strategy. In large-scale disasters and catastrophic incidents, the  NDRF also states that the FDRC will take over as the lead from the  Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), when the FCO demobilizes, to  continue management of federal recovery resources, for those incidents  that require continued significant interagency disaster-recovery  coordination. The NDRF also introduces the concept of recovery  coordinators at the state/tribal and local level that will work with the FDRC  to facilitate coordination across levels of government. Along with  establishing the position of the FDRC, the NDRF creates six Recovery  Support Functions (RSF) to facilitate coordination and collaboration  among the many different players involved in recovery. The NDRF also  outlines ways to improve collaboration between federal, state, and local  communities in developing recovery plans. The framework states that  federal officials should provide timely, accurate, and accessible  information to the public and manage such expectations in coordination  with local, state, tribal, and other stakeholders. However, the NDRF  currently does not provide the details for how to do this.
section_title: Periodic Evaluation and Reporting of Recovery Progress Is Key
paragraphs: Periodic reporting on organizational activities can help decision makers,  clients, and stakeholders obtain feedback for improving both policy and  operational effectiveness of recovery efforts. Although “after action  reports” often are a standard feature of response operations, they are  less common in the recovery context. The City of Kobe, Japan, and  Hyogo prefecture (the larger governmental unit, similar to a county, that  covers the city’s surrounding region) both provide examples of how  evaluation and reporting can be effectively incorporated into community  and regional recovery. They established a process through which  government officials, community members, and recovery experts worked  together to assess the recovery progress and recommend improvements.
Hyogo prefecture and the City of Kobe created a system of periodic  assessments of recovery in the wake of their 1995 earthquake. Both  governments designed a two-phase approach to evaluating the progress  they have made toward recovery, the first taking place about 5 years after  the earthquake and the second about 10 years afterward. This design  allowed for both a short- and longer-term assessment of the recovery.  Although the Hyogo and Kobe governments funded these evaluations,  neither prefecture nor city employees were directly involved in conducting  these assessments; rather they used external staff to perform the  reviews. Hyogo prefecture invited domestic and international disaster- recovery experts to serve on its evaluation panels, while the City of Kobe  staffed its reviews with members of local community groups.
These evaluations focused on the goals established in the recovery plans  approved by the national government 6 months after the earthquake.  They enabled policymakers to measure the progress made by various  stakeholders in achieving recovery goals, identify needed changes to  existing policies, and learn lessons for future disasters. The panels  examined several broad recovery topics—including health, industry,  employment, and urban development—which resulted in many  recommendations to improve recovery from the Kobe earthquake.
For example, as a result of its 10-year evaluation, Hyogo prefecture  gained insight into the unintended consequences of its policies regarding  the relocation of victims, an insight that subsequently led to policy  revisions. After the earthquake, the prefecture gave priority to the  relocation of elderly victims and grouped them together in special-care  residences located outside the city. While this policy ensured that this  vulnerable population received housing quickly, it also had the unintended  effect of isolating the relocated seniors, who were removed from their  communities. In fact, the verification committee attributed the untimely  deaths of some seniors to this housing arrangement. After learning of this  finding, the prefecture built new types of residential housing that offer  comprehensive lifestyle support for seniors. In addition, for future  disasters the prefecture plans to develop a system to track displaced  populations as they move from temporary to permanent housing to help  maintain better contact with victims.
While the NDRF does briefly address the issue of measures and metrics,  the document emphasizes neither this concept nor the potential value of  regular evaluations as the recovery process moves forward.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Disaster recovery can be a long, complex, and expensive process  involving a large number of federal, state, and local parties. This makes it  especially important to have clearly defined roles that are well understood  by all participants. Because these parties often depend on each other to  accomplish recovery goals, effective coordination and collaboration is  essential. Experience shows us that successful collaborative relationships  are not built overnight. Such coordination requires building effective  relationships among participants before, during, and after a disaster  occurs. Since such collaboration often must continue for years, it can be  enhanced by periodically looking back to evaluate what worked, what can  be improved, and what progress is still needed. Clearly defining roles and  responsibilities, effective coordination, and evaluation are critical  ingredients in going beyond a recovery framework to a useful  implementation plan. While the creation of the NDRF is a significant step,  the implementation of this broad framework will be a key to determining  its ultimate success.
Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond  to any questions you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For information about this testimony, please contact Stanley J.  Czerwinski, Director, Strategic Issues, at (202) 512-6806 or  czerwinskis@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this  statement. Major contributors to this testimony include Peter Del Toro,  Assistant Director, and Latesha Love.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.