Military Personnel: Personnel and Cost Data Associated with Implementing DOD's Homosexual Conduct Policy
Published: 2011-01-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: From fiscal years 1994 through 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) separated over 13,000 active military servicemembers under its homosexual conduct policy. These separations represent about 0.37 percent of the 3.6 million members separated for all reasons, including expiration of terms of service and retirement. In 2005, GAO reported on the number of separated servicemembers under DOD's homosexual conduct policy who held critical skills and the costs associated with administering the policy from fiscal years 1994 through 2003. GAO was asked to examine data from fiscal years 2004 through 2009 to determine (1) the extent to which the policy has resulted in the separation of servicemembers with skills in critical occupations and important foreign languages and (2) the services' costs for certain activities associated with administering the policy. GAO obtained and analyzed DOD personnel and cost data; examined DOD regulations and policy documents; and conducted interviews with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Defense Manpower Data Center, and each of the military services. GAO provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD did not have any comments on the report.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: According to GAO's analysis of Defense Manpower Data Center data, 3,664 servicemembers were separated under DOD's homosexual conduct policy from fiscal years 2004 through 2009. Of the 3,664 separations, 1,458 of these separated servicemembers held a critical occupation or an important foreign language skill as determined by GAO and the services. More specifically, 1,442 (39 percent) of the servicemembers separated under the policy held critical occupations, such as infantryman and security forces, while 23 (less than 1 percent) of the servicemembers held skills in an important foreign language, such as Arabic or Spanish. Seven separated servicemembers held both a critical occupation and an important foreign language skill. However, the number of separated servicemembers with critical occupations could be an underestimation because of a number of factors. For example, the Air Force provided the occupations eligible for enlistment bonuses from fiscal years 2006 through 2009, but could not provide this information for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 because the Air Force's data were incomplete. Using available DOD cost data, GAO calculated that it cost DOD about $193.3 million ($52,800 per separation) in constant fiscal year 2009 dollars to separate and replace the 3,664 servicemembers separated under the homosexual conduct policy. This $193.3 million comprises $185.6 million in replacement costs and $7.7 million in administrative costs. The cost to recruit and train replacements amounted to about $185.6 million. In calculating these costs, GAO included variable costs, such as recruiting bonuses, and excluded fixed costs, such as salaries and buildings, to the extent possible because according to service officials there would likely be no significant increase in fixed costs when recruiting and training a relatively small number of replacement personnel. Each of the services tracks and maintains data in different ways, which in some cases affected their ability to provide GAO with only variable costs. For example, while the Army and Air Force could disaggregate variable and fixed recruiting and training costs, the Navy could not disaggregate variable and fixed recruiting and training costs, and the Marine Corps could not disaggregate variable and fixed training costs. To the extent that recruiting and training cost data provided by the services contain fixed costs, this is an overestimation of replacement costs. Administrative costs amounted to about $7.7 million and include costs associated with certain legal activities, such as board hearings, and nonlegal activities, such as processing separation paperwork. The Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps provided GAO with administrative cost estimates; however, Navy officials explained that changes in separation processes from fiscal years 2004 through 2009 prevented them from providing an accurate administrative cost estimate in time for the data to be included in GAO's analyses. Because the Navy did not provide these data, GAO's calculation is an underestimation of DOD's likely total administrative costs. Because of data limitations, GAO was unable to determine the extent of the overestimation of the replacement costs, the underestimation of the administrative costs, or the resulting net impact on GAO's total calculations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 1993, Congress enacted a law setting out the policy concerning  homosexuality in the armed forces. This statute states that “the presence  in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to  engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high  standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are  the essence of military capability.” The law requires servicemembers to be  separated from the armed forces, under regulations prescribed by the  Secretary of Defense, if they meet certain criteria set forth in the law.  From fiscal years 1994 through 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD)  separated over 13,000 active duty military servicemembers under the  homosexual conduct policy. These separations represent approximately  0.37 percent of the 3.6 million servicemembers separated for all reasons  during this period. (For more information on total separations from fiscal  years 2004 through 2009, see app. II.)
In 2005, we reported on the number of separated servicemembers who  held skills in critical occupations and important foreign languages at the  time of separation and the costs associated with administering DOD’s  homosexual conduct policy for the period covering fiscal years 1994  through 2003. You asked us to examine data from fiscal years 2004  through 2009. Specifically, this report provides information on (1) the  extent to which servicemembers with skills in critical occupations and  important foreign languages were separated under the policy and   (2) the services’ costs for certain activities associated with administering  the policy (i.e., recruiting and training replacements of separated  servicemembers and administrative processes associated with separating  servicemembers).
In conducting this audit, we obtained data from the Defense Manpower  Data Center (DMDC)  and each of the military services on active duty  separations under the homosexual conduct policy across all of the service  components—the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy—for the  period covering fiscal years 2004 through 2009. We also obtained the total  number of Reserve and National Guard component servicemembers  separated under the policy during the same period of time. (See app. III.)  However, we did not include separated Reserve and National Guard  servicemembers in our analysis because according to DMDC, DOD only  collects data on separations for homosexual conduct for the active duty  members of the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy. We determined  that the data provided by DOD and the services were sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of presenting separations, personnel information for  separated servicemembers, and costs associated with administering the  homosexual conduct policy. These data were current as of November 30,  2010.
To determine the extent to which servicemembers with skills in critical  occupations and important foreign languages were separated under DOD’s  homosexual conduct policy, we obtained data from DMDC on the  occupational specialties and foreign languages of the enlisted  servicemembers and officers separated under the policy. We interviewed  officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel  and Readiness and the offices within the services that are responsible for  managing occupational specialties, determining foreign language  requirements, and administering bonus programs to identify critical  occupations and important foreign languages. Based on these discussions,  we and the services determined for the purposes of this report that an  occupation was “critical” if a financial incentive was provided under the  enlistment, reenlistment, and retention bonus programs or if it was  included in service-specific critical occupations lists. We also relied on  the services to designate the critical occupations that they considered to  be intelligence related. Through our interviews, we and the services  determined for the purposes of this report that a foreign language was  “important” if a financial incentive was provided under the foreign  language proficiency bonus program. Using these criteria, we analyzed  separation data to determine the number of servicemembers who held  critical occupations and were proficient in important foreign languages at  the time of their separation.
To calculate the costs associated with administering DOD’s homosexual  conduct policy, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and offices within the  active services that are responsible for personnel policy, recruitment and  training budgets, servicemember pay and benefits, separation processing,  legal affairs, and discharge reviews to identify the cost of recruiting and  training through initial occupational training of the replacements of  servicemembers separated under the policy and the administrative costs  of processing the separations of servicemembers under the policy. To  determine replacement costs, we obtained and analyzed recruiting and  training cost data from each of the services. To the extent possible, we  used variable costs and excluded fixed costs to calculate the services’  costs to recruit and train replacements because, given the magnitude of  DOD’s overall forces, there would likely be no significant increase in fixed  costs (e.g., instructor salaries) when replacing a relatively small number of  personnel (i.e., approximately 400 to 700 servicemembers per year). We  analyzed these data to calculate the costs of recruiting and training  through initial occupational training for the replacements of  servicemembers separated under the policy. To the extent that recruiting  and training cost data provided by the services contain fixed costs, this  would result in an overestimation of replacement costs. To determine  administrative costs, we asked the military services to provide data on the  key tasks and personnel associated with the separation process, such as  paralegal work, attorneys’ and pastoral counseling of servicemembers, and  commanders’ inquiries. We analyzed data on these tasks and personnel,  along with military pay rates, to calculate the administrative costs of  processing the separations of servicemembers separated under the policy.  The Navy explained that it was not able to provide this information  because changes in separation processes from fiscal years 2004 through  2009 prevented Navy officials from providing an accurate administrative  cost estimate in time for the data to be included in our analyses. Because  the Navy was not able to provide this information, our calculation is an  underestimation of DOD’s likely total administrative costs. We were  unable to determine the extent of the overestimation of replacement costs,  the underestimation of administrative costs, or the resulting net impact on  our calculations.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 through January  2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A detailed discussion of  our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Homosexuality and the Military
paragraphs: In November 1993, Congress enacted a law concerning homosexual  conduct in the armed forces and required the Secretary of Defense to  prescribe regulations to implement that policy. Following the enactment  of the law, DOD issued its implementing guidance, including Department  of Defense Instruction 1304.26, Qualification Standards for Enlistment,  Appointment, and Induction. Under that instruction, applicants for  enlistment, appointment, or induction shall not be asked or required to  reveal their sexual orientation, nor shall they be asked to reveal whether  they have engaged in homosexual conduct, unless independent evidence is  received indicating that an applicant engaged in such conduct or the  applicant volunteers a statement that he or she is homosexual or bisexual,  or words to that effect. This is generally referred to as the “Don’t Ask,  Don’t Tell” policy. In exchange for the services’ silence (“don’t ask”) about  a person’s homosexuality prior to induction, gay and lesbian  servicemembers, as a condition of continued service, agree to silence  (“don’t tell”) about this aspect of their lives.
section_title: Separations for Homosexual Conduct from Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009
paragraphs: According to our analysis of DMDC data, 3,664 active duty  servicemembers were separated under the homosexual conduct policy  from fiscal years 2004 through 2009. (See table 1.) This figure represents  servicemembers who were on active duty at the time of their separation,  including members of the Reserve or National Guard components of the  military services who were on active duty for 31 or more consecutive days  before their dates of separation. These servicemembers are included in the  figure because according to DMDC, a servicemember in the Reserves or  National Guard who was separated after at least 31 consecutive days of  active duty service is considered to be an active duty separation.
Of the 3,664 servicemembers separated from fiscal years 2004 through  2009, DOD granted “honorable” separations to 2,084 members (57  percent), “general (under honorable conditions)” separations to 369  servicemembers (10 percent), and “under other than honorable  conditions” separations to 95 servicemembers (3 percent). DOD  classified the separation of 2 servicemembers (less than 1 percent) as “bad  conduct,” which is a type of punitive separation applicable to enlisted  personnel only. DOD also granted “uncharacterized” or entry-level  separations to 1,037 servicemembers (28 percent), and classified 77  separations (2 percent) as “unknown or not applicable” for  servicemembers separated under the policy.
The following figures present demographic breakdowns for separated  servicemembers. Figure 1 shows the percentage of servicemembers  separated under DOD’s homosexual conduct policy from fiscal years 2004  through 2009 by race, and figure 2 shows other demographic information  for these servicemembers, including rank, length of service upon  separation, gender, and military branch.
section_title: Differences between the Current and Previous GAO Report
paragraphs: In 2005, we reported on the number of servicemembers separated under  the policy who held skills in critical occupations and important foreign  languages and the costs of recruiting and training replacements for  servicemembers separated under the homosexual conduct policy for the  period covering fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2003. However, the  information in the 2005 report cannot be compared to the information in  this report for two reasons. First, for this report, we asked the services to  provide the most current and complete guidance to help us determine  criteria for describing critical occupations and important foreign  languages. The services provided enlistment bonus lists, critical skills  retention bonus lists, service-specific critical occupations lists, and foreign  language proficiency bonus lists. We have added these criteria in order to  provide a more comprehensive picture of how the services described  critical occupations and important foreign languages from fiscal years  2004 through 2009. Second, in 2005, the services were unable to provide us  with the training costs of Marine Corps personnel, the training costs of  the medical professionals for each of the services, and the recruiting and  training costs of each service’s officers. For the current report, the Marine  Corps provided data on the cost to train its personnel; the services  provided data on the cost to train medical professionals; and the Air  Force, Navy, and Marine Corps provided data on the cost of recruiting  officers. The Army was not able to provide data on the cost of officer  recruiting in time for the data to be included in our analyses. The Army,  Air Force, and Marine Corps provided data on the cost of training officers.  However, we did not include the cost of training Navy officers because the  Navy provided data that were not specific to the occupational specialties  of the separated officers. In order to be consistent with our methodology  of calculating training cost calculations that are specific to the  occupational specialties of separated servicemembers, we did not include  the incomplete Navy data. In addition, in 2005, DOD was not able to  provide us with information on the administrative costs of separating  servicemembers under the homosexual conduct policy. For the current  report, the Air Force, the Army, and the Marine Corps provided us with  this information. The Navy explained that it was not able to provide this  information because changes in separation processes from fiscal years  2004 through 2009 prevented Navy officials from providing an accurate  administrative cost estimate in time for the data to be included in our  analyses. The analyses in this report were current as of November 30,  2010. As a result, the personnel and cost data provided in the 2005 report  are not comparable to the information provided in this report.
section_title: Some Servicemembers Separated under the Homosexual Conduct Policy Held Skills in Critical Occupations or Important Foreign Languages
paragraphs: Based on our analysis of DMDC data, 3,664 servicemembers were  separated under the homosexual conduct policy from fiscal years 2004  through 2009, and based on our analysis of information provided by the  services, 1,458 (40 percent) of these servicemembers held skills in a  critical occupation, an important foreign language, or both, as determined  by us and the services. Servicemembers with critical occupations and  important foreign language skills are not necessarily mutually exclusive  groups because some critical occupations, such as cryptologic linguists  and interrogators, require an important foreign language skill. According  to our analysis, 7 servicemembers held a critical occupation and also held  an important foreign language skill.
subsections: section_title: Data on Servicemembers Separated under the Homosexual Conduct Policy Who Held Skills in Critical Occupations
paragraphs: Based on our analysis of DMDC data, of the 3,664 servicemembers who  were discharged under the homosexual conduct policy from fiscal years  2004 through 2009, 1,442 (39 percent) of them held skills in critical  occupations. Based on interviews with service officials, we and the  services determined for the purposes of this report that an occupation was  “critical” if it received a bonus under DOD’s Enlistment Bonus program,  Accession Bonus for New Officers in Critical Skills program, Selective  Reenlistment Bonus program, or Critical Skills Retention Bonus program.  These bonus programs provide monetary incentives to individuals to help  the services maintain adequate numbers of personnel in designated critical  occupations. We also used service-specific critical occupations lists to  determine critical occupations, such as the Air Force Stressed Career  Fields List, the Marine Top Ten Critical Occupations List, and the list of  occupations deemed critical under the Marine 202K Sustainment Plan.  Table 2 shows, by service, a breakdown of the 1,442 servicemembers who  held critical occupations and were separated from fiscal years 2004  through 2009.
The reported number of separated Navy and Air Force servicemembers  who held skills in critical occupations could be an underestimation. The  Navy was not able to provide the information necessary to determine  whether separated Navy servicemembers held occupations on the  enlistment bonus lists because of the manner in which the Navy assigns  occupational specialties to its recruits. Also, while the Navy does offer  accession bonuses to new officers, Navy officials could not determine  which bonuses were offered during the fiscal years of our study. Thus, we  could not include any Navy occupations that were eligible for Accession  Bonuses for New Officers in Critical Skills. While the Air Force was able to  provide the occupational specialties eligible for enlistment bonuses from  fiscal years 2006 through 2009, it was unable to provide the occupational  specialties eligible for enlistment bonuses in fiscal years 2004 and 2005  because Air Force data were incomplete.
Of the total population separated under the policy, 625 servicemembers  (17 percent) were separated with less than 3 months of military service,  394 servicemembers (11 percent) were separated within 3 to 6 months of  military service, 657 servicemembers (18 percent) were separated within 6  months to 1 year of military service, 706 servicemembers (19 percent)  were separated within 1 to 2 years of military service, and 1,282  servicemembers (35 percent) were separated with 2 years or more of  military service. We analyzed the lengths of service for the 1,442  servicemembers separated under the homosexual conduct policy who  held skills in critical occupations from fiscal years 2004 through 2009.  Figure 3 shows the amount of time served prior to separation by  servicemembers who held skills in critical occupations. (For more detailed  information on the length of service of servicemembers separated under  the homosexual conduct policy who held skills in critical occupations, see  table 18 in app. IV.)
Of the 1,442 separated servicemembers who held skills in critical  occupations, 148 (10 percent) of them held skills in intelligence-related  critical occupations. The services reviewed the critical occupations held  by the servicemembers separated under the homosexual conduct policy  and designated the critical occupations that they deemed to be intelligence  related. Examples of intelligence-related critical occupations include  human intelligence collector, cryptologic technician (interpretive),  intelligence specialist, and airborne cryptologic language analyst. Table 3  shows a breakdown, by service, of the 148 separated servicemembers who  held intelligence-related critical occupations during the 6-year period.
Of those separated who held skills in critical occupations, 1,425 were  enlisted servicemembers and 17 were officers. Separated servicemembers  with critical occupations served an average of 22 months, which is about  26 months less than the typical initial service contract of most enlistees  and the typical officer-commissioning contract. As shown in table 4, the  most common critical occupations held by separated servicemembers  across all services were infantryman and military police. (See table 17 in  app. IV for a more detailed list, by service, of the most common  occupations held by separated servicemembers.)
section_title: Data on Servicemembers Separated under the Homosexual Conduct Policy Who Held Important Foreign Language Skills
paragraphs: Based on our analysis of DMDC data, of the 3,664 servicemembers  separated for homosexual conduct from fiscal years 2004 through 2009, 23  (less than 1 percent) of them held skills in an important foreign language.  Based on interviews, we and the services determined for the purposes of  this report that a language was “important” if a financial incentive was  provided under the Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB) program.  This bonus program provides incentives for the acquisition, maintenance,  and enhancement of foreign language skills at a particular proficiency  level. The FLPB is used to increase strategic language capability  throughout DOD by (1) encouraging servicemembers with foreign  language proficiency to self-identify and sustain proficiency; (2) providing  servicemembers an incentive to acquire foreign language skills, improve  foreign language skills, or both; (3) providing servicemembers whose  military specialty requires a foreign language with an incentive to expand  their proficiency to other foreign languages and dialects; and (4) creating a  cadre of language professionals operating at the highest levels of  proficiency. Table 5 shows a breakdown across all services of the 23  servicemembers who held important foreign language skills and were  separated under the homosexual conduct policy during the 6-year period.
Of the 23 servicemembers separated who held skills in an important  foreign language, 22 were enlisted servicemembers and 1 was an officer.  Separated servicemembers with an important foreign language skill served  an average of 26 months, which is about 22 months less than the typical  initial service contract of most enlistees and the typical officer- commissioning contract. To assess listening, reading, and speaking  proficiencies, DOD uses an 11-point scale that represents the degree of  competence in the language in which a member possesses the highest  proficiency. The scale includes numeric values of 00 (no proficiency), 06  (memorized proficiency), 10 (elementary proficiency), 16 (elementary  proficiency plus), 20 (limited working proficiency), 26 (limited working  proficiency plus), 30 (general professional proficiency), 36 (general  professional proficiency plus), 40 (advanced professional proficiency), 46  (advanced professional proficiency plus), and 50 (functionally native  proficiency). To receive the FLPB, servicemembers must attain a  minimum of 20/20 or higher on the scale in any two modalities (listening,  reading, or speaking). As shown in table 6, the most common important  language skills held by separated servicemembers were Arabic and  Spanish.
Of the total population separated under the policy, 625 servicemembers  (17 percent) were separated with less than 3 months of military service,  394 servicemembers (11 percent) were separated within 3 to 6 months of  military service, 657 servicemembers (18 percent) were separated within 6  months to 1 year of military service, 706 servicemembers (19 percent)  were separated within 1 to 2 years of military service, and 1,282  servicemembers (35 percent) were separated with 2 years or more of  military service. We analyzed the lengths of service for the 23  servicemembers separated under the homosexual conduct policy who  held skills in important foreign languages from fiscal years 2004 through  2009. Figure 4 shows the amount of time served prior to separation by  servicemembers who held skills in important foreign languages. (For more  detailed information on the length of service of servicemembers separated  under the homosexual conduct policy who held skills in important foreign  languages, see table 19 in app. IV.)
section_title: Certain Costs Associated with Administering DOD’s Homosexual Conduct Policy Can Be Calculated
paragraphs: Using available DOD cost data, we calculated that it cost DOD  approximately $193.3 million ($52,800 per separation) in constant fiscal  year 2009 dollars to separate and replace the 3,664 servicemembers  separated under the homosexual conduct policy from fiscal years 2004  through 2009. This figure represents about $185.6 million in recruiting and  training costs for replacing servicemembers separated under the policy  and about $7.7 million in certain administrative costs for which we were  able to obtain data. (See fig. 5 for the services’ cost of administering DOD’s  homosexual conduct policy.) In calculating the services’ costs to recruit  and train replacements, we used variable costs and excluded fixed costs to  the extent possible because, according to service officials, there would  likely be no significant increase in fixed costs when recruiting and training  a relatively small number of replacement personnel. For example, in fiscal  year 2009, the Army separated 195 servicemembers under the homosexual  conduct policy. This means that in fiscal year 2009, the Army would have  needed to recruit 195 replacements. In that same year, the Army recruited  about 70,000 soldiers. Thus, in order to replace the 195 separated  servicemembers in fiscal year 2009, the Army would have needed to  recruit .003 percent more soldiers than it would have otherwise recruited.  According to Army officials, because this .003 percent of additional  recruiting represents such a small portion of total recruiting, there would  likely be no need to increase recruiting infrastructure or hire more  recruiting personnel. Because the services do not use “fixed costs” and  “variable costs” as categories in their recruiting and training budgets, we  provided each service with a common set of criteria to define these terms,  and asked each service to determine the fixed and variable components of  their cost data and provide us with variable costs. However, each of the  services tracks and maintains data in different ways, which in some cases  affected their ability to provide us with only variable costs. For example,  while the Army and Air Force were able to provide us with variable  recruiting and training costs, the Navy was not able to provide variable  recruiting and training costs, and the Marine Corps was not able to provide  variable training costs. In these cases, Navy and Marine Corps officials  explained that they were not able to provide data with only variable costs  because of the way their services track these data. While the Navy and  Marine Corps track the total budgets of recruiting and training commands  and individual courses, they do not track individual cost elements of these  totals. For this reason, they were not able to determine the fixed and  variable components of their cost data. To the extent that recruiting and  training cost data provided by the services contain fixed costs, this would  result in an overestimation of replacement costs. To calculate the  administrative cost of carrying out separations, we asked the services to  identify the legal and nonlegal processes associated with the separation  process and requested data on personnel involved in carrying out these  tasks. Using these data and military pay rates, we calculated  administrative costs. While the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps  provided us with this information, the Navy did not provide data on the  legal and nonlegal processes associated with carrying out separations. The  Navy explained that it was not able to provide this information because  changes in separation processes from fiscal years 2004 through 2009  prevented Navy officials from providing an accurate administrative cost  estimate in time for the data to be included in our analyses. Because the  Navy did not provide data on administrative costs, our calculation of these  costs is an underestimation of DOD’s likely total administrative costs. ($6,490.4) ($50.1) ($66.6) ($14,056.9) ($10,502.) ($2,901.2) ($21,290.5) ($90,.7)
The Air Force provided a single cost that included recruiting and training costs combined.
subsections: section_title: Cost to Recruit and Train Replacements for Separations under the Policy from Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009
paragraphs: All of the services were able to provide data related to the cost to recruit  and train servicemembers. Based on these data, we calculated that it cost  DOD about $185.6 million in constant fiscal year 2009 dollars to recruit  and train replacements for the 3,664 servicemembers separated under the  homosexual conduct policy from fiscal years 2004 through 2009. Our  calculation includes the cost to the services to recruit a new  servicemember, provide him or her with basic training, and graduate the  servicemember from initial skills training in the occupational specialty in  which a servicemember had been separated. Our calculation of  replacement costs concludes with the end of initial skills training because,  according to each of the military services, this is the point in a  servicemember’s career at which he or she is considered minimally  qualified to perform required tasks within a separated servicemember’s  occupational specialty. To the extent possible, we included variable  recruiting and training costs in our calculations, such as recruiting  bonuses and consumable supplies used by trainees, and excluded fixed  costs, such as the cost of recruiting and training infrastructure or recruiter  and instructor salaries. This approach was taken because there would  likely be no significant increase in fixed costs when recruiting and training  a relatively small number of replacement personnel. As shown in table 7,  our calculations for the services’ replacement costs amount to about   $19.4 million for the Air Force, $39.4 million for the Army, $22.0 million for  the Marine Corps, and $104.9 million for the Navy. The Navy recruiting and  training cost calculation is larger than the other services’ calculations  because according to Navy officials, the Navy recruiting and training cost  data contain both fixed and variable costs.
The services were able to provide data related to the cost to recruit  replacement servicemembers. We calculated that from fiscal year 2004  through 2009, it cost DOD about $25.2 million in constant fiscal year 2009  dollars to recruit replacements for servicemembers separated under the  homosexual conduct policy. This calculation represents about 14 percent  of the total calculated replacement cost associated with separating  servicemembers under DOD’s homosexual conduct policy. Recruiting  costs include, but are not limited to, the costs associated with enlistment  bonuses; recruit travel; and recruiting support, such as the processing of a  recruit’s paperwork. As shown in table 8, the Navy’s cost to recruit  replacements was the largest among the services because, according to  Navy officials, the Navy included both fixed and variable costs in its  recruiting estimates. According to Army and Marine Corps officials, the  recruiting cost data provided by the Army and Marine Corps consist of  variable costs. In addition, while the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps  provided data on the cost of recruiting officers, the Army was not able to  provide data on the cost of recruiting officers in time for the data to be  included in our analyses. The Air Force could not provide disaggregated  recruiting and training costs and instead provided a replacement cost  estimate that combines variable recruiting and training costs.
The services were able to provide data related to the cost to train  replacement servicemembers through initial occupational training. We  calculated that from fiscal year 2004 through 2009, it cost DOD about  $141.0 million in constant fiscal year 2009 dollars to train replacements for  servicemembers separated under the homosexual conduct policy. This  calculation represents about 76 percent of the total calculated  replacement cost associated with separating servicemembers under DOD’s  homosexual conduct policy. Costs associated with basic training and  initial skills training include, but are not limited to, clothing and  equipment, supplies, student travel, administration of courses of  instruction, replacement servicemembers’ salaries and benefits during  training, and overhead costs associated with training centers.
As shown in table 9, there is variation in the size of our calculations of the  services’ cost to train replacement servicemembers. For example, the  Navy’s cost to train replacements was the largest among the services  because the Navy included both fixed and variable costs in its training  estimates. Although the Marine Corps included fixed and variable costs in  its training estimates, the Navy separated over twice as many  servicemembers as the Marine Corps. Moreover, according to the Marine  Corps, a significant proportion of its servicemembers’ training is carried  out by other services. However, the Marine Corps does not track the cost  of training it receives from the other services and therefore could not  provide us with comprehensive data on the cost to train Marine Corps  personnel. Marine Corps officials explained that the other services that  train Marine Corps servicemembers may contribute up to 60 percent of the  total cost of training in the occupational specialties held by Marine Corps  servicemembers separated under the policy from fiscal years 2004 through  2009. As can be seen in table 9, the Air Force is not included because it  could not provide disaggregated recruiting and training costs and instead  provided a replacement cost estimate that combines variable recruiting  and training costs. While the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps provided  data on the cost of training officers, we did not include the cost of training  Navy officers because the Navy provided data that were not specific to the  occupational specialties of the separated officers. In order to be consistent  with our methodology of calculating training cost calculations that are  specific to the occupational specialties of separated servicemembers, we  did not include the incomplete Navy data.
To the extent that recruiting and training cost data provided by the  services contain fixed costs, this would result in an overestimation of  replacement costs. However, we were not able to determine the extent of  the replacement cost overestimation.
section_title: Administrative Costs Could Be Estimated from Data Provided by Three of the Services
paragraphs: The Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps were able to provide estimates on  the administrative costs associated with separating servicemembers under  DOD’s homosexual conduct policy. The Navy explained that it was not  able to provide this information because changes in separation processes  from fiscal years 2004 through 2009 prevented Navy officials from  providing an accurate administrative cost estimate in time for the data to  be included in our analyses. Using the estimates of the Air Force, Army,  and Marine Corps, we calculated that from fiscal years 2004 through 2009,  it cost DOD about $7.7 million in constant fiscal year 2009 dollars to  separate 2,751 servicemembers from the three services under DOD’s  homosexual conduct policy. As shown in table 10, our calculation of the  services’ administrative costs for implementing the homosexual conduct  policy includes two types of costs: legal and nonlegal. Legal administrative  costs amounted to about $2.5 million (33 percent) of the total  administrative cost, while nonlegal administrative costs amounted to  about $5.2 million (67 percent) of the total administrative cost.
Legal administrative costs involve the costs associated with the services’  review of homosexual conduct cases. According to the services, the legal  costs include paralegal work, attorneys’ counseling of servicemembers,  and board hearings. With the exception of the Navy, the services were able  to identify approximately 3,700 cases associated with DOD’s homosexual  conduct policy from fiscal years 2004 through 2009. These cases include  board cases (cases in which a service board and legal officials reviewed a  case), nonboard cases (cases in which legal officials reviewed a case, but  it was not reviewed by a service board), and unsubstantiated cases (cases  in which legal officials reviewed a case, but the case did not result in a  separation). Table 11 shows the legal administrative costs by military  service and types of cases for the 6-year period.
According to the services, the nonlegal costs include commanders’  inquiries, pastoral counseling of servicemembers, and the processing of  separation paperwork. As shown in table 12, these activities occur at  successive levels of command within and outside of the servicemember’s  unit.
Because the Navy was not able to provide data on administrative costs in  time for the data to be included in our analyses, our calculation of these  costs is an underestimation of DOD’s likely total administrative costs. We  were not able to determine the extent of the administrative cost  underestimation.
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD  did not have any comments on the report.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, the  Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the  Director, Office of Management and Budget. The report also is available at  no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-5257 or merrittz@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In conducting our review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD)  homosexual conduct policy, the scope of our work included active duty  separations under the homosexual conduct policy across all of the service  components—the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy—for the  period covering fiscal years 2004 through 2009. We also obtained the total  number of Reserve and National Guard servicemembers separated under  the policy during the same period of time. However, we did not include  Reserve and National Guard servicemembers in our analysis because  according to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), DOD only  collects data on separations for homosexual conduct for the active duty  members of the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy. According to an  official with DMDC, the official tracking of separations for homosexual  conduct began in 1997, at which time it was decided to include only active  duty servicemembers. Data on servicemembers separated under DOD’s  homosexual conduct policy were obtained from DMDC and each of the  military services and are current as of November 30, 2010.
subsections: section_title: Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which servicemembers with skills in critical  occupations were separated under DOD’s homosexual conduct policy, we  obtained data from DMDC on the occupational specialties held by the  servicemembers separated under the policy from fiscal years 2004 through  2009. We interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the offices within the services  that are responsible for managing occupational specialties and  administering bonus programs. Based on interviews, we and the services  determined for the purposes of this report that an occupation was  “critical” if a financial incentive was provided under any of the enlistment,  reenlistment, or retention bonus programs under Department of Defense  Instruction 1304.29. This instruction prescribes procedures with regard to  Enlistment Bonuses (monetary incentives provided to individuals enlisting  in a military service for a period of time and, if applicable, in a specific  military skill experiencing critical shortages); Selective Reenlistment  Bonuses (monetary incentives provided to individuals to maintain  adequate numbers of enlisted personnel in critical skills needed to sustain  the career force); Critical Skills Retention Bonuses (monetary incentives  provided to individuals to maintain adequate numbers of officers or  enlisted personnel with designated critical skills needed to sustain the  career force); and Accession Bonuses for New Officers in Critical Skills  (monetary incentives to individuals who accept commissions or  appointments as an officer and serve on active duty in a military service in  a skill the service has designated a critical officer skill). However, the  Navy was not able to provide the information necessary to determine  whether separated Navy servicemembers held occupations on the  enlistment bonus lists because of the manner in which the Navy assigns  occupational specialties to its recruits. Also, while the Navy does offer  accession bonuses to new officers, Navy officials could not determine  which bonuses were offered under Department of Defense Instruction  1304.29 or during the fiscal years of our study. Thus, we could not include  any Navy occupations that were eligible for Accession Bonuses for New  Officers in Critical Skills. The reported number of separated Navy  servicemembers who held skills in critical occupations would be an  underestimation. While the Air Force was able to provide the occupational  specialties eligible for enlistment bonuses from fiscal years 2006 through  2009, the Air Force was unable to provide the occupational specialties  eligible for enlistment bonuses in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 because the  Air Force’s data were incomplete. Thus, the reported number of separated  Air Force servicemembers who held skills in critical occupations would be  underestimated. We used the Army’s Top 25 Priority Occupations Lists in  lieu of the Army’s Enlistment Bonus lists because the Army noted that the  occupations on the Top 25 Priority Occupations Lists better represent the  Army’s critical occupations for enlistment. We also included occupations  found on additional lists that the services used to describe critical  occupations for certain fiscal years during the period of our review,  including the Air Force Stressed Career Fields List (fiscal years 2008 and  2009), the Marine Top Ten Critical Occupations List (fiscal years 2004  through 2009), and the list of occupations deemed critical under the  Marine 202K Sustainment Plan (fiscal years 2007 through 2009). We then  compared the occupations of the separated servicemembers to our lists of  critical occupations, by fiscal year. To assess the number of  servicemembers separated under DOD’s homosexual conduct policy who  held skills in intelligence-related critical occupations, we asked the  services to analyze the critical occupations held by the servicemembers  separated under the homosexual conduct policy and designate the critical  occupations that the services deemed intelligence related.
To determine the extent to which servicemembers with skills in important  foreign languages were separated under DOD’s homosexual conduct  policy, we obtained data from DMDC on the foreign language information  (i.e., foreign language, proficiency score, date of proficiency certification,  and year of separation) of each enlisted servicemember and officer  separated under the policy during the period of our review. We  interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness and the offices within the services that are  responsible for determining foreign language requirements and  administering bonus programs. Based on interviews, we and the services  determined for the purposes of this report that a language was “important”  if a financial incentive was provided under the Foreign Language  Proficiency Bonus (FLPB) program. The FLPB provides a monetary  incentive for the acquisition, maintenance, and enhancement of foreign  language skills at or above proficiency levels required for occupational  and functional performance. The FLPB is used to increase strategic  language capability by (1) encouraging servicemembers with foreign  language proficiency to self-identify and sustain proficiency; (2) providing  servicemembers an incentive to acquire foreign language skills, improve  foreign language skills, or both; (3) providing servicemembers whose  military specialties require a foreign language with an incentive to expand  their proficiency to other foreign languages and dialects; and (4) creating a  cadre of language professionals operating at the highest levels of  proficiency. To ensure that we considered the most comprehensive set of  critical languages skills for each service, we also used additional lists that  the services utilized to describe these language skills. Specifically, from  fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2005, each of the services used its own  specific list to determine which languages would qualify a servicemember  to receive an FLPB. Subsequently, in January of fiscal year 2006, the  Defense Language Office published its first annual Strategic Language List  (SLL). In the SLL, DOD prioritizes languages for which (1) DOD has  current and projected requirements, (2) training and testing will be  provided, (3) incentives will be applied, and (4) other resources will be  allocated. The SLL does not preclude the services from providing  incentives for other languages for which they may have requirements.  Therefore, from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2009, each service  created its own SLL based on both the DOD-wide SLL and the service’s  specific language capabilities and requirements. Since fiscal year 2006, the  services have each used their own SLLs to determine the languages for  which their servicemembers would receive FLPBs. To assess the number  of servicemembers separated under DOD’s homosexual conduct policy  who held an important foreign language skill, we identified each  servicemember with language skills, determined whether the languages  qualified for FLPB in the year of the servicemember’s separation, reviewed  the servicemember’s proficiency scores in those languages to determine  whether the servicemember met the minimum requirements, and  determined whether the servicemember’s annual proficiency certification  was within 12 months of separation.
To calculate certain costs associated with administering DOD’s  homosexual conduct policy, we determined both the cost of recruiting and  training through initial occupational training of the replacements of  separated servicemembers and the services’ administrative costs incurred  when separating servicemembers under the policy. We determined that a  replacement cost methodology is the most appropriate approach, and it  allows us to produce the most accurate calculation based on the nature of  the data provided by the services. The replacement cost methodology  allows us to calculate the cost to the services to recruit a new  servicemember, provide him or her with basic training, and graduate the  servicemember from initial skills training in the occupational specialty in  which a servicemember had been separated. Our calculation of  replacement costs concludes with the end of initial skills training since,  according to each of the military services, this is the point in a  servicemember’s career at which he or she is considered minimally  qualified to perform required tasks within a separated servicemember’s  occupational specialty.
To calculate the recruiting and training costs associated with replacing  servicemembers separated under DOD’s homosexual conduct policy, we  collected recruiting and training cost data from the services. To the extent  possible, we used variable costs and excluded fixed costs to calculate the  services’ costs to recruit and train replacements. Because the services do  not use “fixed costs” and “variable costs” as categories in their recruiting  and training budgets, we provided each service with a common set of  criteria to define these terms and asked each service to determine the  fixed and variable components of its cost data. Each of the services tracks  and maintains data in different ways, which in some cases affected their  ability to provide us with only variable costs. In regard to recruiting cost  data, the Army and Marine Corps were able to provide data that according  to officials consist of only variable costs. However, according to Navy  officials, the Navy was not able to fully disaggregate fixed and variable  costs, and so our Navy recruiting calculations include some fixed costs.  The Army was not able to provide data on the cost of officer recruiting in  time for the data to be included in our analyses. In regard to training cost  data, the Navy and Marine Corps were not able to fully disaggregate fixed  and variable costs. The Army and Air Force were able to provide training  data, according to officials, that consist of only variable costs. To the  extent that any data provided by the services contain fixed costs, this  would result in an overestimation of calculated costs. However, we were  not able to determine the exact extent of this overestimation. We reviewed  the methodology and data used by the services to develop their cost  estimate data for recruiting and training, and determined that they were  reliable for our purposes of calculating replacement costs.
Recruiting costs: To calculate the recruiting costs associated with  replacing servicemembers separated under DOD’s homosexual  conduct policy, we collected fiscal year data from the Army, Marine  Corps, and Navy for the average cost to recruit active duty enlisted  servicemembers and officers. We interviewed service officials who  are knowledgeable about their services’ recruiting costs and request variable cost data for certain tasks involved in the recruiting of  servicemembers. The services’ recruiting costs include, but are not  limited to, the costs associated with enlistment bonuses; recruit travel;  and recruiting support, such as the processing of a recruit’s  paperwork. The Army provided data on the average variable cost to  recruit one enlisted servicemember in each fiscal year but did not  provide data on officer recruiting in time for the data to be included in  our analyses. Marine Corps officials explained that the Marine Corps  provided data on the average variable cost to recruit enlisted  servicemembers, as well as the average variable cost to recruit officers  in each fiscal year. According to Navy officials, the Navy was not able  to fully disaggregate fixed and variable costs, and so our Navy  recruiting calculations include some fixed costs. We multiplied each of  these averages by the number of separated servicemembers for each  service to calculate a fiscal year total. Finally, we converted these  fiscal year totals to fiscal year 2009 dollars and summed our  calculations for each fiscal year within each service. These figures  represent the total cost of recruiting replacements for separated  servicemembers in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. The Air Force  provided recruiting costs as part of an overall figure that includes both   Using these overall figures, we followed  training and recruiting costs. the same approach described above.
Training cost: These costs include compensation costs and other  costs.
Compensation costs: Using service-specific training course  lengths and DOD data on military compensation, we calculated the  amount of pay and benefits received by replacement  servicemembers during training. We interviewed service officials  who are knowledgeable about their services’ compensation  procedures and requested data on the amounts of pay and benefits  received by servicemembers. To calculate the cost of  compensation for one enlisted servicemember or officer in the  Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, we first multiplied fiscal year  weekly compensation data provided by the services by the  standard number of weeks spent in each service’s basic training.  The Navy provided fiscal year compensation data for the entire  length of basic training. For occupational specialty training, we  multiplied the weekly compensation rate by the length of initial  skills training for each relevant occupation for all three of these  services. To address occupations for which data on training length  were not available, we used averages for the length of basic and  initial skills training for that service’s separated occupations in that  fiscal year. Next, we converted all calculations into fiscal year 2009  dollars, and then summed our calculations for each fiscal year  within each service. These figures represent the total  compensation received during basic training and occupational  specialty training for separated servicemembers in each service.  The Air Force includes the value of pay and benefits provided to  servicemembers in its overall recruiting and training cost estimate.
Other training costs: To calculate other training costs associated  with replacing servicemembers separated under DOD’s  homosexual conduct policy, we collected fiscal year data from the  Army, Marine Corps, and Navy for the costs to complete each  service’s basic training program and the initial skills training of the  specific occupational specialties contained within each service’s  group of separated servicemembers. We interviewed service  officials who are knowledgeable about their services’ training  procedures and requested cost data for the training of  servicemembers. The costs associated with basic training and  initial skills training include, but are not limited to, clothing and  equipment, supplies, student travel, administration of courses of  instruction, and overhead associated with training centers. We  determined the length of each service’s basic training and asked  each service to provide the average variable cost for basic training  in the fiscal year a servicemember was separated. We also asked  the services to identify the average length of each initial skills  course and provide the average variable cost for an individual  servicemember to finish the initial skills training for each relevant  occupational specialty. According to data provided by the services,  the cost and length of training servicemembers in different  occupational specialties can vary widely. By using training cost  data that are specific to occupational specialties of the separated  servicemembers, we produced the most accurate calculation  possible, based on available data. To calculate the cost of training,  we multiplied the average basic and occupational training costs by  the number of servicemembers who held that occupation in the  year of their separation. Based on our requests, the services  supplied cost estimate data for the cost of basic training and of  training for each relevant occupational specialty for which they  had data. If there were occupations for which data were missing or  unavailable, we calculated an overall average training cost for  relevant occupations for the service and the fiscal year in which we  were missing data. We then used that average as the training cost  for the separated servicemembers, and followed the approach  described above. Finally, we converted these fiscal year totals to  fiscal year 2009 dollars and summed our calculations for each  fiscal year within each service. These figures represent the total  cost of training replacements for separated servicemembers in  each service. The Air Force provided variable training cost data as  part of an overall figure that includes both training and recruiting  costs.
To calculate the administrative cost of carrying out separations, we asked  the services to identify the legal and nonlegal processes associated with  the separations process. According to the services, the legal processes  may include paralegal work, attorneys’ counseling of servicemembers, and  board hearings. According to the services, the nonlegal costs may include  commanders’ inquiries, pastoral counseling of servicemembers, and the  processing of separation paperwork. To collect information on the types  of costs the services incur when separating servicemembers, we  interviewed and gathered data from service officials who are  knowledgeable about their services’ separations procedures and requested  cost data for certain tasks involved in the separation of servicemembers  and on the personnel involved in carrying them out. Using these data and  military pay rates, we calculated administrative costs. While the Air Force,  Army, and Marine Corps provided us with this information, the Navy did  not provide data on the legal and nonlegal processes associated with  carrying out separations. Navy officials explained that changes in  separation processes from fiscal years 2004 through 2009 prevented them  from providing data on the personnel involved in carrying out key tasks in  time for the data to be included in our analyses. Because the Navy did not  provide data on administrative costs, our calculation of these costs is an  underestimation of DOD’s likely total administrative costs. For legal and  nonlegal administrative costs, we asked the Air Force, Army, and Marine  Corps to provide a list of the tasks carried out during separation of a  servicemember under DOD’s homosexual conduct policy, identify the  positions of officials involved in carrying out these tasks, estimate the  average amount of time required for each task, and identify the rank and  years of service of the type of official who would typically carry out the  task. With this information, we multiplied the time it typically takes to  complete a task by the hourly pay rate of the official who typically  performs the task, using the salary information from DOD’s pay tables for  fiscal year 2009, which are in fiscal year 2009 dollars. We repeated this  type of calculation for each task on a service’s list of tasks performed  during a separation. Next, we summed the cost of each of these tasks to  calculate a service’s total per-case administrative cost of processing this  type of separation. Finally, we multiplied this cost by the number of  separated servicemembers in each fiscal year to calculate each service’s  total administrative cost of separating servicemembers under DOD’s  homosexual conduct policy. For legal administrative costs, we calculated  these costs for the three different types of homosexual conduct cases that  a service processes: board cases, nonboard cases, and unsubstantiated  cases. For nonlegal administrative costs, we calculated costs for the three  levels of command at which a service typically processes homosexual  conduct separations: company or flight, battalion and above or squadron  and above, and outside of the separated servicemember’s chain of  command. Finally, we summed each of the three service’s costs to  calculate per-service totals for legal and nonlegal administrative costs over  the 6-year period of our study. The analyses in this report were current as  of November 30, 2010.
To calculate DOD’s total cost to replace the 3,664 servicemembers  separated under DOD’s homosexual conduct policy, we summed the total  recruiting and training costs from each service in order to calculate a  single, DOD-wide calculation of the cost to recruit and train replacements  for the servicemembers separated from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year  2009. We added this total to the administrative total to determine the  overall total cost to DOD of implementing the homosexual conduct policy  during this period. We were unable to determine the extent of the  overestimation of replacement costs, the underestimation of the  administrative costs, or the resulting net impact on our calculation of the  overall total cost.
We assessed the reliability of all data provided by DOD and the services  for each of our objectives by (1) reviewing existing information about the  data and the systems that produced them and (2) interviewing agency  officials knowledgeable about the data to determine the steps taken to  ensure the accuracy and completeness of the data. We assessed the  reliability of DMDC’s Active Duty Personnel Transaction Fiscal Year End  DADT Files, Active Duty Personnel Master End Strength Fiscal Year End  Files and Monthly Files, and Active Duty Language Fiscal Year End Files  by (1) performing electronic testing of the required data elements,   (2) reviewing existing information about the data and the system that  produced them, and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about  the data. In addition, we assessed the reliability of the services’ cost data  by (1) reviewing existing information about the data and the systems that  produced them and (2) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about  the data. We determined that the data sets were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of presenting separations, personnel information for separated  servicemembers, and costs associated with administering the homosexual  conduct policy.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 through January  2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: General Information on Separated Servicemembers
paragraphs: As shown in table 13, DOD separated a total of approximately 1.2 million  servicemembers for all reasons, including voluntary reasons, from fiscal  years 2004 through 2009. Of the approximately 1.2 million servicemembers  separated by the services, the services granted “honorable” separations to  about 74 percent, “general” separations to about 6 percent, “under other  than honorable” separations to about 5 percent, “dishonorable dismissal”  separations to less than 1 percent, “bad conduct” separations to about 1  percent, and “uncharacterized” separations to about 10 percent. About 4  percent of the separations were classified “unknown or not applicable.”
Tables 14 and 15 show separations for known reasons for enlisted  servicemembers and officers, by number of separations and per fiscal  year.
section_title: Appendix III: Data on Reserve and National Guard Servicemembers Separated under the Homosexual Conduct Policy
paragraphs: According to our analysis of DMDC data, 577 Reserve and National Guard  servicemembers were separated under the homosexual conduct policy  from fiscal years 2004 through 2009. (See table 16.) The Reserve and  National Guard separations represent about 14 percent of the total  population of active, reserve, and guard servicemembers separated under  the homosexual conduct policy.
section_title: Appendix IV: Information on Critical Occupations and Important Foreign Languages for Servicemembers Separated under DOD’s Homosexual Conduct Policy
subsections: section_title: Most Common Occupations Held by Servicemembers
paragraphs: Table 17 lists the most common occupations held by separated  servicemembers, by service, from fiscal years 2004 through 2009.
section_title: Lengths of Service of Separated Servicemembers Who Held Skills in Critical Occupations
paragraphs: Approximately 472 servicemembers (33 percent) separated under the  homosexual conduct policy who held skills in critical occupations were  separated after 2 years or more of service, as shown in table 18.
section_title: Lengths of Service of Separated Servicemembers Who Held Skills in Important Foreign Languages
paragraphs: Approximately 11 servicemembers (48 percent) separated under the  homosexual conduct policy who held skills in important foreign languages  were separated after 2 years or more of service, as shown in table 19.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Elizabeth C. McNally, Assistant Director; Clarine S. Allen; Christina  E. Bruff; Grace A. Coleman; K. Nicole Harms; Grant M. Mallie; Charles W.  Perdue; Steven R. Putansu; Terry L. Richardson; Amie M. Steele;  Christopher W. Turner; Jack B. Wang; Erik S. Wilkins-McKee; and  Kimberly Y. Young.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Military Training: DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better Inventory  and Requirements Data to Guide Development of Language Skills and  Regional Proficiency. GAO-09-568. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2009.
Defense Management: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s Plans for  Developing Language and Cultural Awareness Capabilities.   GAO-09-176R. Washington, D.C.: November 25, 2008.
Military Personnel: Evaluation Methods Linked to Anticipated Outcomes  Needed to Inform Decisions on Army Recruitment Incentives.   GAO-08-1037R. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2008.
Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army’s Emerging  Officer Accession and Retention Challenges. GAO-07-224. Washington,  D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Differing Scope and Methodology in GAO and University of California  Reports Account for Variations in Cost Estimates for Homosexual  Conduct Policy. GAO-06-909R. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2006.
Military Personnel: Preliminary Observations on Recruiting and  Retention Issues within the U.S. Armed Forces. GAO-05-419T.  Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.
Military Personnel: Financial Costs and Loss of Critical Skills Due to  DOD’s Homosexual Conduct Policy Cannot Be Completely Estimated.  GAO-05-299. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.
Military Personnel: Observations Related to Reserve Compensation,  Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, and Mail Delivery to Deployed Troops.  GAO-04-582T. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2004.
Military Personnel: DOD Needs More Effective Controls to Better Assess  the Progress of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program. GAO-04-86.  Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2003.
Military Personnel: Management and Oversight of Selective  Reenlistment Bonus Program Needs Improvement. GAO-03-149.  Washington, D.C.: November 25, 2002.
Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct  Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls. GAO-02-375. Washington, D.C.:  January 31, 2002.
Military Personnel: Perceptions of Retention-Critical Personnel Are  Similar to Those of Other Enlisted Personnel. GAO-01-785. Washington,  D.C.: June 28, 2001.
Military Attrition: Better Data, Coupled with Policy Changes, Could  Help the Services Reduce Early Separations. GAO/NSIAD-98-213.  Washington, D.C.: September 15, 1998.
DOD Training: Many DOD Linguists Do Not Meet Minimum Proficiency  Standards. GAO/NSIAD-94-191. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 1994.
Homosexuals in the Military: Policies and Practices of Foreign  Countries. GAO/NSIAD-93-215. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 1993.
Defense Force Management: DOD’s Policy on Homosexuality.  GAO/NSIAD-92-98. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 1992.
Defense Force Management: Statistics Related to DOD’s Policy on  Homosexuality. GAO/NSIAD-92-98S. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 1992.