Border Security: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key Southwest Border Technology Programs
Published: 2011-03-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens, contraband, terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, is a long-term challenge. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) launched the Secure Border Initiative network (SBInet)--a program which was to provide the Border Patrol, within DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), with the tools to detect breaches and make agent deployment decisions by installing surveillance systems along the border. Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology is DHS's new plan to deploy a mix of technology to protect the border. This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing work conducted for the House Committee on Homeland Security and provides preliminary observations on (1) the status of SBInet and user views on its usefulness, and (2) the Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan and associated costs. GAO reviewed planning, budget, and system documents, observed operations along the southwest border, and interviewed DHS officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In January 2011, the Secretary of Homeland Security directed CBP to end the SBInet program as originally conceived because it did not meet cost-effectiveness and viability standards, and to instead focus on developing terrain- and population-based solutions utilizing existing, proven technology, such as camera-based surveillance systems, for each border region. According to DHS, the Secretary's decision on SBInet was informed by (1) an independent analysis of alternatives (AOA) to determine the program's cost-effectiveness; (2) a series of operational tests and evaluations by the U.S. Army's Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) to determine its operational effectiveness and suitability; and (3) an operational assessment by the Border Patrol to provide user input. The Secretary also stated that while the Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan should include elements of the former SBInet program where appropriate, she did not intend for DHS to use the current contract to procure any technology systems under the new plan, but rather would solicit competitive bids. SBInet's current surveillance capability continues to be used in Arizona. Specifically, there are 15 sensor towers (with cameras and radar) and 10 communication towers (which transmit the sensor signals to computer consoles for monitoring), currently deployed in the Border Patrol's Tucson Sector. In addition, on the basis of user feedback, the Border Patrol considers the current SBInet capability to be useful, including providing continuous surveillance in border areas where none existed before and enhancing agent safety when responding to potential threats. There are certain shortcomings including coverage gaps and radar performance limitations in adverse weather. The Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan is to incorporate a mix of technology, including an Integrated Fixed Tower surveillance system similar to that used in the current SBInet capability, beginning with high-risk areas in Arizona. But, due to a number of reasons, the cost-effectiveness and operational effectiveness and suitability of the Integrated Fixed Tower system is not yet clear. First, the AOA cited a range of uncertainties, and it is not clear how the AOA analyses and conclusions were factored into planning and budget decisions regarding the optimal mix of technology deployments in Arizona. Second, the ATEC independent analyses were not complete at the time of the Secretary's decision, thus any results on SBInet's operational effectiveness and suitability could not inform the decisions to proceed with the Integrated Fixed Tower system. The President's fiscal year 2012 budget request calls for $242 million to fund three of five future deployments of the Integrated Fixed Tower systems in Arizona, although, depending on funding, the earliest DHS expects the deployments to begin is March 2013 with completion anticipated by 2015 or later. Consistent with its intent to solicit competitive bids, CBP has initiated a new acquisition cycle, asking industry for information about the commercial availability of the Integrated Fixed Tower system. GAO will continue to assess this issue and report the final results later this year.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement but has made prior recommendations to strengthen SBInet. While DHS generally agreed most information in this statement, it did not agree with GAO's observations on the AOA and the potential usefulness of ATEC's analyses. GAO continues to believe its observations are valid. DHS also provided technical comments which were incorporated, as appropriate.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of the Department of  Homeland Security’s (DHS) key technology programs for the southwest  border. The Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) technology  program was intended to provide the Office of Border Patrol (Border  Patrol) within DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with  integrated imagery and related tools and information to detect security  breaches and make agent deployment decisions by placing surveillance  systems along U.S. borders, beginning with the southwest border with  Mexico. Since fiscal year 2006, DHS has received about $4.4 billion in  appropriations for SBI, of which it has allocated about $1.5 billion for  SBInet and $2.9 billion for fencing and other tactical infrastructure along  the southwest border. In January 2010, DHS initiated an internal  assessment of the SBInet program and, as discussed below, in January  2011 the Secretary of Homeland Security announced her decision to end  the program as originally conceived because it did not meet cost- effectiveness and viability standards and proceed with a new technology  program to secure the nation’s land borders.
The department’s new technology deployment plan is called Alternative  (Southwest) Border Technology. Under this plan, DHS is to deploy a mix  of technologies, including Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) ,  Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS), and hand-held equipment for use by  Border Patrol agents. It also is to include a new Integrated Fixed Tower  system, similar to that currently being used in SBInet, which is slated for  deployment along the border where the Border Patrol deems it  appropriate beginning with five high-risk areas in Arizona at an estimated  cost of $570 million.
The Border Patrol is the federal agency with primary responsibility for  securing the border between the U.S. ports of entry. CBP has divided  geographic responsibility for southwest border miles among nine Border  Patrol sectors. Within CBP, the Office of Technology Innovation and  Acquisition (OTIA) has been responsible for overseeing the SBInet  program. DHS reports that the southwest border continues to be  especially vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity, including the  smuggling of humans and illegal narcotics. CBP reported spending about  $3 billion to support the Border Patrol’s efforts on the southwest border in  fiscal year 2010, and Border Patrol reported apprehending over 445,000  illegal entries and seizing over 2.4 million pounds of marijuana.
My statement today is based on preliminary observations and analyses  from our ongoing work regarding these programs and activities for the  House Committee on Homeland Security. We plan to issue a final report  on this work later this year. As requested, my testimony will cover the  following issues:  1.  the status of the SBInet program and user views on the usefulness of  2.  the Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan and costs  associated with these plans.
To conduct our work, we reviewed our prior reports on the SBInet  program, analyzed documents such as system descriptions, acquisition  plans and proposals, budget requests and justifications, cost-effectiveness  and system-effectiveness and -suitability plans and analyses. Further, we  observed various types of technology operating at command centers at the  Tucson Sector and its Tucson, Ajo, and Nogales stations. Also, we  interviewed relevant DHS (Border Patrol, OTIA) and prime contractor  officials about matters such as the decision to end the SBInet program, its  implications for the future of the program, cost-effectiveness and  operational effectiveness and suitability analyses, and budget requests. We  selected the Tucson, Ajo, and Nogales stations because they are located in  high-risk areas along the Arizona border with Mexico and also because the  Border Patrol has deployed various types of surveillance technology in  these areas, including SBInet. We did our work for this statement from  December 2010 to March 2011. We are not making any new  recommendations in this statement but we have made prior  recommendations to strengthen the SBInet program. While DHS generally  agreed with the approach and status described in this statement, it did not  agree with our observations on the AOA and the potential usefulness of  ATEC’s analyses to inform future technology deployment decisions. GAO  continues to believe its observations are valid and will address these  issues as our study proceeds. DHS also provided technical comments  which were incorporated, as appropriate.
We are conducting our ongoing work in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we  plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to  provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions, based on our audit  objectives.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Ended the SBInet Program But Not the Contract or Key Technology Capability Which Users Consider Useful
paragraphs: After an internal assessment initiated in January 2010, the Secretary of  Homeland Security announced in January 2011 that she had directed CBP  to end the SBInet program as originally conceived. According to DHS, the  Secretary’s decision was informed by an independent analysis of cost- effectiveness, a series of operational tests and evaluations, and Border  Patrol input. The prime contractor is to continue limited performance  under the SBInet contract using a 1-year option for SBInet operations and  maintenance services in Arizona beginning on April 1, 2011, with a  possible 6-month extension. Further, according to CBP and the contractor,  following a March 2010 decision by the Secretary halting further  deployment of SBInet beyond the Tucson and Ajo Border Patrol stations,  no additional SBInet deployments are expected.
In addition, the Secretary’s decision to end the SBInet program limited  Block 1 deployments to the Tucson and Ajo stations in the Tucson Sector,  but did not affect the current SBInet Block 1 capability, which was  developed based on updated requirements from the Border Patrol. The  Block 1 capability consists of 15 sensor towers (with day/night cameras  and radar) and 10 communication towers, which transmit surveillance  signals to the Common Operating Pictures (COP) at station command  centers. This capability remains deployed and operational in Arizona, as  part of the Border Patrol Tucson Sector’s overall technology portfolio.  According to contractor and Border Patrol officials, there were several  original SBInet concepts that were not included in the Block 1 capability  due to early design/cost trade-offs and Border Patrol agent feedback that  they did not need them to perform their mission. Also, certain elements  proved technically difficult and costly to include in the Block 1 capability.  For example, the concepts to integrate transmissions from RVSS and MSS  units into the COP, transmitting COP images into agents’ laptops in their  vehicles and tracking Border Patrol agent deployments on the geographic  display were not included.
subsections: section_title: OTIA and Border Patrol Consider Current SBInet Capability Useful
paragraphs: OTIA and Border Patrol officials told us that the SBInet program’s Block 1  capability has been useful since being deployed in February 2010 at the  Tucson station and August 2010 at the Ajo station. For example, a shift  commander at the Tucson station described the capability as considerably  better than the technology that was available at the sector prior to the  SBInet deployment. Further, according to COP operators in Tucson, the  current SBInet sensor package is responsive to key mission requirements  by giving them the capability to achieve persistent wide-area surveillance  and situational awareness.
Officials at Border Patrol headquarters stated that the Block 1 capability  gave them a capability they did not have before. These officials also stated  that, most importantly, the Block 1 capability helped them achieve  persistent surveillance and situational awareness to enable an appropriate  response to border intrusions and choose the location of interdiction,  which they described as a tactical advantage. They also noted that the  height of the towers allows for additional surveillance into terrain and  brush thereby allowing the Border Patrol to shift personnel to gap areas  where surveillance does not exist.
Other examples of system usefulness offered by Border Patrol officials  included a centralized point of data integration (through the COP),  increased probability of arrest upon detection (by controlling the point of  interdiction by means of camera and radar), improved agent safety when  responding to potential threats, verification of whether a ground-sensor  indicated a threat or not, efficiency and effectiveness in directing agent  responses, and a tiered deployment of technology. For example, at the Ajo  Station, a Border Patrol official explained that tiered deployment included  mobile technology units that are positioned at the border line, and Block 1  sensor towers that are deployed off the line where they can monitor  intruders who might have eluded interdiction at the border.
The Secretary’s January 2011 announcement also stated that the SBInet  capability had generated some advances in technology that had improved  Border Patrol agents’ ability to detect, identify, track, deter, and respond  to threats along the border. It further stated that the new border  technology deployment plan would also include, where deemed  appropriate by the Border Patrol, elements of the now-ended SBInet  program that have proven successful.
On the basis of limited data, the operational availability of deployed  SBInet components has been consistent with the relevant requirement that  expects SBInet to be operationally available 85 percent of the time.  According to prime contractor operations and maintenance statistics for a  1-week period in January 2011, SBInet in the Tucson and Ajo Stations was  operational over 96 percent of the time. According to the contractor’s  logistics manager who oversees the operation and maintenance of SBInet,  since the deployment is relatively recent, a full year’s worth of data would  be needed to make conclusive determinations about long-term operational  reliability and identify areas of persistent problems. The times that SBInet  was not available were due primarily to camera malfunctions and power  failures.
According to Border Patrol and prime contractor officials, the SBInet  Block 1 capability is receiving new features from the contractor in  response to ongoing user input and feedback. These features include  adding an “eye-safe” laser target illuminator (the eye-safe feature  minimizes the potential for injury to a person exposed to the laser), adding  a “standby” mode to the radar (wherein scanning is suspended until  needed), and integrating the next-generation unattended ground sensors  into the COP. However, this applies only to new sensors intended for  Block 1—the Border Patrol has not selected a vendor for next-generation  sensors for elsewhere along the border and outside of SBInet.
The usefulness of SBInet’s Block 1 capability notwithstanding, OTIA and  Border Patrol officials told us that it has certain shortcomings. These  shortcomings include not having the mobility to respond to shifts in risk,  facing terrain coverage (line-of-sight) gaps, some of which are mitigated  through other technologies, and performing poorly in adverse weather.  Further, according to OTIA, the SBInet capability as configured by the  prime contractor is a proprietary and not an open architecture. Thus, it is  unable to incorporate, for example, next-generation radar and cameras  without significant integration work and cost.
In addition, the SBInet capability has been costly to deploy and maintain.  Specifically, the total task-order cost for the Block 1 deployment in  Arizona was about $164 million. The operations and maintenance costs for  the deployment are estimated to be up to about $1.5 million per month, or  about $18 million per year.
section_title: Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology Is Slated for Deployment, but Cost- and Operational Effectiveness and Suitability of the Integrated Fixed Tower System Are Not Yet Clear
paragraphs: DHS is implementing a new approach for acquiring and deploying border  security technology called “Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology”  to replace the SBInet program. As part of this approach DHS is to deploy a  mix of technologies, including RVSS, MSS, and hand-held equipment for  use by Border Patrol agents. It also is to include a new Integrated Fixed  Tower system that is slated for deployment along the border where the  Border Patrol deems it appropriate, beginning with five high-risk areas in  Arizona at an estimated cost of $570 million. While other elements of the  plan may be deployed sooner, the deployment schedule for the Integrated  Fixed Towers envisioned by OTIA and the Border Patrol is planned to  begin in 2013, depending on funding availability. This plan suggests that  OTIA and the Border Patrol have determined that the Integrated Fixed  Tower system is a cost-effective solution in certain locations. However,  due to the questions we have about how the Analysis of Alternatives  (AOA)  analyses and conclusions were factored into planning and budget  decisions, the basis for DHS’s technology deployment plan is not yet clear.  Further, the results of independent analyses were not complete at the time  of the Secretary’s decision to end the SBInet program, thus any results on  SBInet’s operational effectiveness could not inform the decisions to  proceed with a possibly similar Integrated Fixed Tower system.
subsections: section_title: DHS Implementing Broader Border-Security Technology Approach to Include Deploying a New Integrated Fixed Tower System
paragraphs: According to the Border Patrol, its operational assessment for Arizona  calls for deploying Integrated Fixed Tower systems to five high-threat  areas in the state, beginning with the Nogales, Douglas, and Casa Grande  Stations as part of this approach. These deployments will include 52  sensor towers, which is less than the 91 sensor towers envisioned under  the original SBInet deployment plan. Border Patrol officials explained that  they reviewed the contractor’s original analysis of where to put the towers  and determined that other solutions, such as RVSSs and MSSs, were more  appropriate due to terrain and other factors such as population density.
According to OTIA and Border Patrol officials, depending on the  availability of funding, the deployments of the Integrated Fixed Tower  system component of the Arizona technology plan are expected to begin  around March 2013 and be completed by the end of 2015 (or possibly early  2016), with other sector deployments sequentially following the Arizona  sector. OTIA estimates that the entire Integrated Fixed Tower system  acquisition for Arizona would cost about $570 million, including funding  for design and development, equipment procurement, production and  deployment, systems engineering and program management, and a  national operations center. In this regard, the President’s fiscal year 2012  DHS budget request for BSFIT calls for $242 million to fund the first three  Integrated Fixed Tower system deployments for Arizona, which include 36  sensor towers.
Border Patrol officials told us that the existing SBInet capability and the  requested Integrated Fixed Tower systems are intended to form the  “baseline or backbone” of its evolving technology portfolio, where  appropriate in high-risk areas in Arizona, with some exceptions. For  example, in the urban areas of the Douglas and Naco Stations, RVSS units  would likely be considered the backbone because they are better suited  for populated areas where SBInet’s radar capability is not as effective. A  Border Patrol official said that Integrated Fixed Tower systems could be  an important technology component in additional areas along the  southwest border, but that the agency had not yet made those  determinations, pending the outcome of forthcoming operational  assessments.
section_title: DHS Has Initiated Actions to Acquire an Integrated Fixed Tower System Capability
paragraphs: In one of its first actions following the Secretary of Homeland Security’s  announcement to end SBInet, DHS issued a Request for Information (RFI)  in January 2011 to industry regarding the commercial availability of  surveillance systems based on the Integrated Fixed Tower system concept,  consistent with its stated intent to acquire future border technologies in its  new plan through full and open competitions. OTIA and Border Patrol  officials explained that the RFI would engender competition and better  options for the government, in terms of finding out about state-of-the-art  industry capabilities and obtaining feedback on requirements to help  refine them. However, they expect similar benefits in terms of capability,  performance, and cost that such competition would yield, as compared to  the SBInet Block 1 capability. For example, OTIA and Border Patrol  officials acknowledged that the surveillance system sought by the RFI is  essentially the same as the one deployed in Block 1 in terms of expected  capability and performance in meeting operational and effectiveness  requirements.
In February 2011, DHS conducted an “Industry Day” to provide potential  vendors with a better understanding of Border Patrol’s technology needs  on the southwest border and collect information about potential  capabilities. During the session, DHS provided information on potential  procurements for Integrated Fixed Tower systems and a range of other  surveillance technology, such as RVSS and unattended ground sensors.
Following its information-collection activities, should DHS decide to move  forward with requests for proposal for various types of technology,  including the Integrated Fixed Tower system, these actions should be  timed in such a way as to make maximum use of the results from the cost- effectiveness analyses discussed below. While the initial deployment  actions will be in Arizona, it is envisioned that the contracts could be used  to deploy technology anywhere on the southwest border. However, to  accomplish this, DHS will need to ensure that the requirements specified  in the request for proposal are sufficient for deployment not just in  Arizona but throughout the border.
section_title: Use of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for the Integrated Fixed Tower System Raises Questions
paragraphs: According to OTIA and Border Patrol officials, the Secretary’s decision on  the future of SBInet and the Integrated Fixed Tower system was informed  by an AOA that analyzed the cost-effectiveness of four options—mobile  (e.g., MSS), fixed (Integrated Fixed Towers), agent (e.g., hand-held  equipment), and aviation (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles). On the basis of our  review of available information about the AOA to date, there are several  areas that raise questions about how the AOA results were used to inform  Border Patrol judgments about moving forward with technology  deployments, including the Integrated Fixed Tower system. As we  continue our work for the committee, we plan to examine each of the  following areas in detail to obtain additional insights into DHS’s decision  making regarding the cost-effectiveness of a range of border technology  options. Specifically,  It is not clear how DHS used the AOA results to determine the  appropriate technology plans for Arizona. For instance, the AOA  identified uncertainties in costs and effectiveness of the four  technology alternatives in each of the four geographic analysis areas,  meaning that there was no clear-cut cost-effective technology  alternative for any of the analysis areas. Yet, the AOA observed that a  fixed tower alternative may represent the most effective choice only in  certain circumstances.
Because of the need to complete the first phase of the AOA in 6 weeks,  the AOA was limited in its scope. For instance, the AOA did not  consider the combination of technology approaches in the same  geographic area and did not consider technology solutions, such as  RVSS units. Urban areas were outside the scope of the AOA. Hence, it  is unclear how DHS made decisions for proposed technology  deployments in such areas. Further, the first AOA did not examine as  an alternative the use of only existing Border Patrol equipment and  agents without the addition of any new technology approaches. The  AOA should have assessed the technology approaches based on the  incremental effectiveness provided above the baseline technology  assets in the geographic areas evaluated. According to study officials,  the omission of a baseline alternative was corrected in the second AOA  and did not change the conclusions of the first AOA.
A more robust AOA could result in conclusions that differ not just in  the Border Patrol sectors yet to be evaluated in future AOAs, but also  in the Tucson and Yuma sectors considered in the first AOA. While the  primary purpose of the second phase of the AOA was to expand the  analysis to three additional Border Patrol sectors (San Diego, El Paso,  and Rio Grande Valley), being able to conduct the analysis over several  months allowed the study team more time to consider additional  measures of effectiveness and technology options. DHS plans to  conduct another AOA that would cover the remainder of the southwest  border. According to study officials, while the potential for different  results existed, the results from the second AOA did not significantly  affect the findings from the first AOA.
Further, we have questions about how the AOA analyses and conclusions  were factored into planning and budget decisions regarding the optimal  mix of technology deployments in Arizona. Specifically, according to OTIA  and Border Patrol officials, the AOA was used to develop the Arizona  technology deployment plan and related procurement plans and to provide  cost data to be used for the Border Patrol’s operational assessment and  the fiscal year 2012 budget request for Integrated Fixed Tower systems.  However, because AOA results were somewhat inconclusive, it is not yet  clear to us the basis for including three of the four alternatives in the  manner prescribed in the budget request (the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  alternative was not). For a program of this importance and cost, the  process used to assess and select technology needs to be transparent. The  uncertainties noted above raise questions about the decisions that  informed the budget formulation process. We have not yet examined the  Border Patrol’s operational assessment to determine how the results of the  AOA were considered in developing technology deployment planning in  Arizona and, in turn, the fiscal year 2012 budget request.
section_title: Independent Evaluation of Test Results to Determine Operational Effectiveness and Suitability Not Yet Completed
paragraphs: The Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) was to independently  test SBInet’s Block 1 capability and evaluate the results to determine its  operational effectiveness and suitability (i.e., the extent to which the  system fits it its operational environment and is useful to Border Patrol to  meet the agency’s mission). Because the Integrated Fixed Tower system  could be similar to the sensor towers and COP used in SBInet Block 1, the  ATEC could inform DHS’s decision about moving forward with technology  deployments. However, the testing and evaluation was not complete at the  time DHS reached its decision regarding the future of SBInet or requested  fiscal year 2012 funding to deploy the new Integrated Fixed Tower  systems, as discussed earlier. An initial briefing on the emerging results  from the testing was provided to DHS on March 2, 2011, with a final report  due sometime in April 2011.
As our work proceeds, we will further address the questions raised about  the AOA process, the test and evaluation results, and CBP’s proposed new  acquisition strategy. We will also continue to assess the status of the  SBInet program in light of the Secretary’s decision and the actions  emanating from this decision.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  respond to any questions you may have.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Richard M. Stana at  (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement  included Seto J. Bagdoyan, Charles W. Bausell, Jr., Courtney Catanzarite,  Justin Dunleavy, Christine Hanson, Michael Harmond, Richard Hung,  Robert Rivas, and Ronald Salo.
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