Environmental Satellites: Improvements Needed in NOAA's Mitigation Strategies as It Prepares for Potential Satellite Coverage Gaps
Published: 2015-02-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: NOAA is procuring the next generation of polar and geostationary weather satellites to replace aging satellites that are approaching the end of their useful lives. Both new sets of satellites will provide critical weather forecasting data over the next two decades. GAO has reported that gaps in polar satellite coverage and in backup coverage for geostationary satellites are likely in the near future. Given the criticality of satellite data to weather forecasts, concerns that problems and delays on the new satellite acquisition programs will result in gaps in the continuity of critical satellite data, and the impact of such gaps on the health and safety of the U.S. population, GAO added mitigating weather satellite gaps to its High-Risk List in 2013 and it remains on the 2015 update to the High-Risk List.
GAO was asked to testify on two recently released reports on NOAA's satellite programs, specifically on (1) the JPSS program's status, the potential for a gap and mitigation alternatives, and contingency plans, and (2) the GOESR program's status, potential for a gap, and contingency plans.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) $11.3 billion Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program has recently completed significant development activities and remains within its cost and schedule baselines; however, recent cost growth on key components is likely unsustainable, and schedule delays could increase the potential for a near-term satellite data gap. In addition, while the program has reduced its estimate for a near-term gap in the afternoon orbit, its gap assessment was based on incomplete data. A gap in satellite data may occur earlier and last longer than NOAA anticipates. The figure below depicts a possible 11-month gap, in which the current satellite lasts its full expected 5-year life (until October 2016) and the next satellite is launched in March 2017 and undergoes on-orbit testing until September 2017.
Multiple alternatives to prevent or reduce the impact of a gap exist. Key options for reducing the impact of a near-term gap include extending legacy satellites, obtaining additional observations such as data from aircraft, advancing data assimilation and a global forecast model, and increasing high performance computing capacity. While NOAA has improved its contingency plan by identifying mitigation strategies and specific activities, the agency's plan has shortfalls such as not assessing the cost and impact of available alternatives. In addition, NOAA has not yet prioritized mitigation projects most likely to address a gap, and key mitigation projects have been delayed. Until the agency addresses these shortfalls, the agency will have less assurance that it is prepared to deal with a near-term gap in polar satellite coverage.
NOAA's $10.8 billion Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) program has also made major progress on its first satellite. However, the program has continued to experience delays in major milestones and has not efficiently closed defects on selected components, both of which could increase the risk of a launch delay. As the GOES-R program approaches its expected launch date of March 2016, it faces a potential gap of more than a year during which an on-orbit backup satellite would not be available. Specifically, there could be no backup from April 2015 (when an operational satellite is expected to reach its end-of-life) through September 2016 (after GOES-R completes its post-launch test period). Any delay to the GOES-R launch date would extend the length of time without a backup satellite and, if an operational satellite were to experience a problem during that time, there could be a gap in GOES coverage. NOAA has improved its plan to mitigate gaps in satellite coverage, but it does not yet include steps for mitigating a delayed launch.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: In its recently issued reports, GAO recommended that NOAA update its polar data gap assessment, address shortfalls in both its polar and geostationary contingency plans, and prioritize mitigation projects most likely to address a gap in polar satellite coverage. NOAA concurred with GAO's recommendations and identified steps it is taking to implement them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on two  satellite program acquisitions within the Department of Commerce’s  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Both the Joint  Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and the Geostationary Operational  Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R) programs are meant to  replace current operational satellite programs, and both are considered  critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data  required for weather forecasting.
As requested, this statement summarizes our two recent reports on (1)  the JPSS program’s status, key risks and risk mitigation alternatives, and  contingency planning, and (2) the GOES-R program’s status, testing  plans and procedures, and contingency planning. In preparing this  testimony, we relied on the work supporting those reports. They each  contain a detailed overview of our objectives, scope, and methodology,  including the steps we took to assess the reliability of cost and schedule  data. As noted in those reports, we found that cost and schedule data for  both the JPSS and GOES-R programs were sufficiently reliable for our  purposes.
All of our work for the reports was performed in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that  we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to  provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, the United States has used polar-orbiting and  geostationary satellites to observe the earth and its land, ocean,  atmosphere, and space environments. Polar-orbiting satellites constantly  circle the earth in a nearly north-south orbit, providing global coverage of  conditions that affect the weather and climate. As the earth rotates  beneath it, each polar-orbiting satellite views the entire earth’s surface  twice a day. In contrast, geostationary satellites maintain a fixed position  relative to the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in space.
Both types of satellites provide a valuable perspective of the environment  and allow observations in areas that may be otherwise unreachable.  Used in combination with ground, sea, and airborne observing systems,  satellites have become an indispensable part of monitoring and  forecasting weather and climate. For example, polar-orbiting satellites  provide the data that go into numerical weather prediction models, which  are a primary tool for forecasting weather days in advance—including  forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. Geostationary satellites  provide the graphical images used to identify current weather patterns  and provide short-term warning. These weather products and models are  used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so that  communities and emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate its  effects.
Federal agencies are currently planning and executing major satellite  acquisition programs to replace existing polar and geostationary satellite  systems that are nearing the end of their expected life spans. However,  these programs have troubled legacies of cost increases, missed  milestones, technical problems, and management challenges that have  resulted in reduced functionality and major delays to planned launch  dates over time. We and others—including an independent review team  reporting to the Department of Commerce and its Inspector General— have raised concerns that problems and delays with environmental  satellite acquisition programs will result in gaps in the continuity of critical  satellite data used in weather forecasts and warnings.
According to officials at NOAA, a polar satellite data gap would result in  less accurate and timely weather forecasts and warnings of extreme  events, such as hurricanes, storm surges, and floods. Such degradation  in forecasts and warnings would place lives, property, and our nation’s  critical infrastructures in danger. The importance of having such data  available was highlighted in 2012 by the advance warnings of the path,  timing, and intensity of Superstorm Sandy. Given the criticality of satellite  data to weather forecasts, concerns that problems and delays on the new  satellite acquisition programs will result in gaps in the continuity of critical  satellite data, and the impact of such gaps on the health and safety of the  U.S. population, we concluded that the potential gap in weather satellite  data is a high-risk area. We added this area to our High-Risk List in 2013  and it remains on the 2015 update to the High-Risk List that was issued  yesterday.
subsections: section_title: Overview of the JPSS Program
paragraphs: For over 40 years, the United States has operated two separate  operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar- orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite series, which is managed by  NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), which  is managed by the Air Force. Currently, there is one operational Polar- orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (called the Suomi National  Polar-orbiting Partnership, or S-NPP) and two operational DMSP  satellites that are positioned so that they cross the equator in the early  morning, midmorning, and early afternoon. In addition, the government  relies on data from a European satellite, called the Meteorological  Operational satellite, or Metop.operational polar satellite constellation.
section_title: Overview of the GOES-R Program
paragraphs: In addition to the polar-orbiting satellites, NOAA operates GOES as a  two-satellite geostationary satellite system that is primarily focused on the  United States (see figure 2). The GOES-R series is the next generation of  satellites that NOAA is planning; the satellites are planned to replace  existing weather satellites, the first of which is due to reach the end of its  useful life in 2015. The ability of the satellites to provide broad,  continuously updated coverage of atmospheric conditions over land and  oceans is important to NOAA’s weather forecasting operations.
NOAA is responsible for GOES-R program funding and overall mission  success, and has implemented an integrated program management  structure with NASA for the GOES-R program. Within the program office,  there are two project offices that manage key components of the GOES-R  system. NOAA has delegated responsibility to NASA to manage the Flight  Project Office, including awarding and managing the spacecraft contract  and delivering flight-ready instruments to the spacecraft. The Ground  Project Office, managed by NOAA, oversees the Core Ground System  contract and satellite data product development and distribution.
The program estimates that the development for all four satellites in the  GOES-R series will cost $10.9 billion through 2036. In 2013, NOAA  announced that it would delay the launch of the GOES-R and S satellites  from October 2015 and February 2017 to March 2016 and May 2017,  respectively. These are the current anticipated launch dates of the first  two GOES-R satellites; the last satellite in the series is planned for launch  in 2024.
In September 2010, we recommended that NOAA develop and document  continuity plans for the operation of geostationary satellites that include  the implementation procedures, resources, staff roles, and time tables  needed to transition to a single satellite, a foreign satellite, or other  solution. In September 2011, the GOES-R program provided a draft plan  documenting a strategy for conducting operations if there were only a  single operational satellite.
GAO, Geostationary Weather Satellites: Progress Made, but Weaknesses in Scheduling,  Contingency Planning, and Communicating with Users Need to Be Addressed,  GAO-13-597, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2013). on the potential impact of a satellite failure and identifying timelines for  implementing mitigation solutions. We subsequently assessed NOAA’s  progress in implementing this recommendation in our December 2014  report and will discuss our results at today’s hearing.
section_title: The JPSS Program Has Completed Significant Development Activities and Is Meeting Cost and Schedule Baselines, but Faces a Potential Near-term Data Gap That Mitigation Options are Unlikely to Fully Address
paragraphs: The JPSS program has recently completed significant development  activities. For example, the program completed a major development  milestone—the critical design review for the JPSS-1 mission—in April  2014. This is a significant accomplishment because the review affirms  that the satellite design is appropriately mature to continue with  development. Furthermore, NOAA is currently developing JPSS within its  cost and schedule baselines.
However, while JPSS development is still within its overall life cycle cost  baseline, key components have experienced cost growth. Between July  2013 and July 2014, the total program cost estimate increased by $222  million (or 2 percent). More than half of this increase was for three  instruments. Program officials cited multiple reasons for these cost  increases, including technical issues, additional testing, and the purchase  of new parts. If JPSS costs were to continue to grow at this rate, the  program could end up costing $2 billion more than expected by 2025.  Therefore, moving forward, it will be important for NOAA and NASA  managers to aggressively monitor and control components that are  threatening to exceed their expected costs.
Also, while the launch date of the JPSS-1 satellite has not yet been  affected, key components, such as the satellite’s major instruments, have  encountered delays in development and testing. Figure 3 compares key  planned completion dates for the JPSS-1 spacecraft and its instruments  from July 2013 to their actual or planned completion dates as of July  2014.
JPSS program officials provided multiple reasons for the schedule  changes, including technical issues the Advanced Technology Microwave  Sounder (ATMS) instrument experienced during testing, a schedule  adjustment to align with NOAA’s geostationary satellite acquisition, and  the October 2013 government shutdown. These delays have caused a  reduction in schedule margin prior to the JPSS-1 satellite integration and  testing phase.
Further, because of the technical issues experienced on ATMS, the  instrument has now become the critical path for the entire JPSS-1  mission and only 1 month of schedule reserve remains until its expected  delivery in March 2015. It will be important for NOAA and NASA  managers to quickly resolve the instrument’s technical issues before it  becomes a more serious threat to the mission schedule and launch date.
subsections: section_title: NOAA Anticipates a Polar Satellite Data Gap, but Its Estimate May Prove Too Optimistic
paragraphs: In October 2013, the JPSS program office reported that a gap between  the S-NPP satellite and the JPSS-1 satellite in the afternoon orbit could  be as short as 3 months, which is 15 months less than NOAA estimated  in 2012. However, we believe that this estimate is likely too optimistic.  There are several reasons why this potential gap could occur sooner and  last longer than NOAA currently anticipates.
Inconsistent launch date plans: The program’s analysis that  JPSS-1 will be operational by June 2017 is inconsistent with NOAA’s  launch date commitment of March 2017, given that the program office  estimates 6 months for on-orbit checkout and calibration/validation  before the satellite data are operational.
Unproven predictions about the on-orbit checkout and validation  phase: The on-orbit checkout and calibration/validation phase could  take longer than the program’s estimated 6 months if there are issues  with the instruments or ground systems. Also, additional algorithm  work may be needed after the satellite launches, which could extend  the validation time frame.
Exclusion of a key risk: The JPSS program’s gap assessment does  not factor in the potential for satellite failures from space debris that  are too small to be tracked and avoided. Thus, the S-NPP mission  could end earlier than its 5-year design life, resulting in a gap period  that occurs sooner and lasts longer than expected.
As a result, a gap in polar satellite data may occur earlier and last longer  than NOAA anticipates. In one scenario, S-NPP would last its full  expected 5-year life (to October 2016), and JPSS-1 would launch as soon  as possible (in March 2017) and undergo on-orbit testing for 6 months as  predicted by the JPSS program office (until September 2017). In that  case, the data gap would extend 11 months. Any problems encountered  with JPSS-1 development resulting in launch delays, launch problems, or  delays in the planned 6-month on-orbit test period could extend the gap  period to as much as 5 years and 8 months. Figure 4 depicts possible  gap scenarios.
NOAA officials acknowledge that the gap assessment has several  limitations and stated that they plan to update it. Until NOAA updates its  gap assessment to include more accurate assumptions and key risks, the  agency risks making decisions based on a limited understanding of the  potential timing and length of a gap.
section_title: Multiple Alternatives Exist for Mitigating a Satellite Data Gap
paragraphs: Experts within and outside of NOAA identified almost 40 alternatives for  mitigating potential gaps in polar satellite data, which offer a variety of  benefits and challenges. The alternatives can be separated into two  general categories. The first category includes actions to prevent or limit a  potential gap by providing JPSS-like capabilities. The second category  includes actions that could reduce the impact of a potential gap by (a)  extending and expanding the use of current data sources with capabilities  similar to the JPSS program; (b) enhancing modeling and data  assimilation; (c) developing new data sources; or (d) exploring  opportunities with foreign and domestic partners.
While all of the alternatives have trade-offs, several alternatives may  represent the best known options for reducing the impact of a gap:
Extending legacy satellites, continuing to obtain data from European  midmorning satellites, and ensuring legacy and European satellites’  data quality remains acceptable;
Obtaining additional observations of radio occultation
Advancing 4-dimensional data assimilation and the next generation  global forecast model to make more efficient use of data still available  and produce improved techniques for evaluating data; Increasing high-performance computing capacity, a key factor for  enabling greater resolution in existing and future models, which drives  the pace of development for assimilation of data that could further  improve NOAA’s models.
section_title: NOAA Improved its Polar Satellite Contingency Plan, but Delays Limit the Effectiveness of Key Mitigation Activities, and Mitigation Activities Have Not Been Prioritized
paragraphs: Government and industry best practices call for the development of  contingency plans to maintain an organization’s essential functions in the  case of an adverse event. NOAA developed its original polar satellite  gap contingency plan in October 2012. We reported in September 2013  that NOAA had not yet selected the strategies from its plan to be  implemented, or developed procedures and actions to implement the  selected strategies and made a recommendation to address these  shortfalls.
In February 2014, NOAA updated its polar satellite gap contingency plan.  NOAA made several improvements in this update, such as including  additional alternatives that experts identified, and accounting for  additional gap scenarios. However, additional work remains for NOAA’s  contingency plan to fully address government and industry best practices  for contingency planning. Until NOAA fully addresses key elements to  improve its contingency plan, it may not be sufficiently prepared to  mitigate potential gaps in polar satellite coverage.
NOAA has also experienced challenges in implementing key activities  outlined in the plan. Among a list of available alternatives, NOAA  identified 21 mitigation projects that are to be implemented in order to  address the potential for satellite data gaps in the afternoon polar orbit.  NOAA has demonstrated progress by implementing initial activities on  these gap mitigation projects.
However, NOAA has experienced delays in executing other key activities.  For example:
A planned upgrade to the National Weather Service’s operational  high-performance computing capacity was to occur by December  2014. According to NOAA officials, an interim upgrade is planned to  occur in February 2015, with the full upgrade expected to be  completed by July 2016.
NOAA does not plan to complete observing system experiments that  are to supplement its numerical weather prediction models in the  absence of afternoon polar-orbiting satellite data until 4 months later  than planned.
Multiple projects have been affected by a major shortfall in the  availability of high-performance computing for research and  development efforts during fiscal year 2014.
Because a potential near-term data gap could occur sooner and last  longer than expected, NOAA’s ongoing gap mitigation efforts are  becoming even more critical. According to Office of Management and  Budget guidance, projects that require extensive development work  before they can be put into operation are inherently risky and should be  prioritized by comparing their costs and outcomes to other projects within  a portfolio.
However, the agency has not prioritized or accelerated activities most  likely to address a gap because it has been focused on implementing  many different initiatives to see which ones will have the most impact.  NOAA officials stated that further prioritization among mitigation activities  was not warranted because the activities were fully funded and were not  dependent on the completion of other activities. We disagree. There are  dependencies among projects that would benefit from prioritization. While  it makes sense to investigate multiple mitigation options, unless NOAA  assesses the activities that have the most promise and accelerates those  activities, it may not be sufficiently prepared to mitigate near-term data  gaps.
section_title: The GOES-R Program Has Made Development Progress, but Faces Schedule Risks and a Potential Coverage Gap, and Challenges Remain in Mitigation Planning
paragraphs: After spending 10 years and just over $5 billion, the GOES-R program  has completed important steps in developing its first satellite, and has  entered the integration and test phase of development for the satellite.  While the GOES-R program is making progress, it has experienced  recent and continuing schedule delays.
As we have previously reported, problems experienced during the  integration and test phase often lead to cost and schedule growth. In  2013, we reported that technical issues on both the flight and ground  projects had the potential to cause further delays to the program  schedule. By the time of our latest report, in December 2014, these and  all other major milestones have been further delayed by 5 to 8 months.  The GOES-R program cited multiple reasons for these recent delays,  including challenges in completing software deliverables and completing  communication testing for the spacecraft. In addition to these  intermediate delays, NOAA moved the launch commitment date of the  first GOES-R satellite to March 2016.
Further, the program’s actions to mitigate schedule delays introduce  some risks, and could therefore increase the amount of the delay. For  example, the program attempted to mitigate delays by performing system  development while concurrently working on detailed planning. In addition,  the program has responded to prior delays by eliminating selected  repetitive tests and moving to a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week spacecraft  integration testing schedule. We have previously reported that  overlapping planning and development activities and compressing test  schedules are activities that increase the risk of further delays because  there would be little time to resolve any issues that arise.
A key element of a successful test phase is appropriately identifying and  handling any defects or anomalies that are discovered during testing.  While the GOES-R program has sound defect management policies in  place and is actively performing defect management activities, there are  several areas in which defect management policies and practices are  inconsistent. Among the shortfalls are a number of cross-cutting themes,  including in performing and recording information pertinent to individual  defects, and in reporting and tracking defect information.
The GOES-R program has also not efficiently closed defects on selected  components. Specifically, data for the GOES ground system shows that  500 defects remained open as of September 2014. Defect data for the  spacecraft show that it is also taking an increasing amount of time to  close hardware-related defects. Until the program addresses shortfalls in  defect management and reduces the number of open defects, it may not  have a complete picture of remaining issues and faces an increased risk  of further delays to the GOES-R launch date.
The program is now reaching a point where additional delays in starting  end-to-end testing could begin to adversely affect its schedule. As of  August 2014, program officials could not rule out the possibility of further  delays in the committed launch date.
subsections: section_title: GOES-R Faces a Gap in Backup Satellite Coverage
paragraphs: GOES satellite data are considered a mission-essential function because  of their criticality to weather observations and forecasts. Because of the  importance of GOES satellite data, NOAA’s policy is to have two  operational satellites and one backup satellite in orbit at all times.  However, NOAA is facing a period of up to 17 months when it will not  have a backup satellite in orbit. Specifically, in April 2015, NOAA expects  to retire one of its operational satellites (GOES-13) and to move its  backup satellite (GOES-14) into operation. Thus, the agency will have  only two operational satellites in orbit—and no backup satellite—until  GOES-R is launched and completes an estimated 6-month post-launch  test period. Figure 5 shows the potential gap in backup coverage, based  on the launch and decommission dates of GOES satellites.
During the time when no back-up satellite would be available, there is a  greater risk that NOAA would need to either rely on older satellites that  are beyond their expected operational lives and may not be fully  functional, rely on a foreign satellite, or operate with only a single  operational satellite. Due in part to the risks mentioned above, NOAA is  also facing an increased risk of further delays to the March 2016 GOES-R  launch date. Any delay to the GOES-R launch date would extend the time  without a backup to more than 17 months.
section_title: The GOES-R Satellite Contingency Plan Shows Improvement, but Continues to Lack Details in Key Areas
paragraphs: Government and industry best practices call for the development of  contingency plans to maintain an organization’s essential functions—such  as GOES satellite data—in the case of an adverse event. In September  2013, we reported on weaknesses in the contingency plans for NOAA’s  geostationary satellites. NOAA has improved its plan to mitigate gaps in  satellite coverage. In February 2014, NOAA released a new satellite  contingency plan in response to these recommendations. This plan  improved upon many, but not all, of the best practices. Specifically, the  plan improved in six areas and stayed the same in four areas.
GOES-R program officials stated that it is not feasible to include  strategies to prevent delays in launch of the first GOES-R satellite in the  contingency plan, because such strategies are not static. While actively  managing the program to avoid a delay is critical, it is also important that  NOAA management and the GOES-R program consider and document  feasible alternatives for avoiding or limiting such a launch delay. Until  NOAA addresses the remaining shortfalls in its GOES-R gap mitigation  plan, the agency cannot be assured that it is exploring all alternatives or  that it is able to effectively prepare to receive GOES information in the  event of a failure.
section_title: Implementation of Recommendations Should Help Mitigate Program Risks
paragraphs: Both the JPSS and GOES-R programs continue to carry risks of future  launch delays and potential gaps in satellite coverage; implementing the  recommendations in our December 2014 reports should help mitigate  those risks. In the JPSS report released in December, we recommended,  among other things, that NOAA update the JPSS program’s assessment of potential polar satellite  data gaps to include more accurate assumptions about launch dates  and the length of the data calibration period, as well as key risks such  as the potential effect of space debris on JPSS and other polar  satellites expected lifetimes;  revise its existing contingency plan to address shortfalls noted in the  2014 report, such as identifying DOD’s and Japan’s plans to continue  weather satellite observations, including recovery time objectives for  key products, completing the contingency plan with selected  strategies, and establishing a schedule with meaningful timelines and  linkages among mitigation activities; and investigate ways to prioritize mitigation projects with the greatest  potential benefit to weather forecasting in the event of a gap in JPSS  satellite data.
In the GOES report released in December, we recommended that NOAA,  among other things, add information to the GOES satellite contingency plan on steps  planned or underway to mitigate potential launch delays.
For both reports, NOAA agreed with our recommendations and identified  steps it plans to take to implement them. Specifically, with regard to the  JPSS report, NOAA stated that it will make the necessary changes to its  gap mitigation report and establish a process to prioritize mitigation  projects. With regard to the GOES report, NOAA stated that it would add  information to the GOES satellite contingency plan on steps planned or  underway to mitigate potential launch delays.
In summary, NOAA has made progress on both the JPSS and GOES-R  programs, but key challenges remain before the new satellites are  launched and operational, and it is important that the agency take action  to ensure that potential near-term gaps in satellite data are minimized or  mitigated.
On the JPSS program, NOAA has recently completed significant  development activities and is working to launch its next polar-orbiting  environmental satellite as soon as possible. However, the program  continues to face increasing costs and schedule delays on key  components. Further, the program’s estimate of a 3-month potential gap  in satellite data may be overly optimistic because it was based on  inconsistent and unproven assumptions and did not account for key risks.  NOAA has made improvements to its polar satellite gap contingency plan,  but has experienced delays in executing key mitigation activities, and has  not prioritized or accelerated activities most likely to address a gap.
On the GOES-R program, progress in moving through integration and  testing has been accompanied by challenges in maintaining its schedule  on major milestones and controlling costs for key components. Further  schedule delays could affect the committed launch date of the first GOES  satellite. NOAA could experience a gap in satellite data coverage if  GOES-R is delayed further and one of the two remaining operational  satellites experiences a problem. NOAA has made improvements to its  geostationary satellite contingency plan, but the plan still does not  sufficiently address mitigation options for a launch delay.
Faced with an anticipated gap in the polar satellite program and a  potential gap in backup coverage on the geostationary satellite program,  NOAA has taken steps to study alternatives, establish mitigation plans,  and improve its satellite contingency plans. However, these plans do not  yet sufficiently address options to mitigate such gaps. Until NOAA  prioritizes mitigation activities with the greatest potential to reduce the  impact of gaps in weather forecasting, it may not be sufficiently prepared  to mitigate them.
Chairman Bridenstine, Ranking Member Bonamici, Chairman Loudermilk,  Ranking Member Beyer, and Members of the Subcommittees, this  completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any  questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, please  contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov.  Other key contributors include Colleen Phillips (assistant director),  Alexander Anderegg, Christopher Businsky, Shaun Byrnes, Kara Lovett  Epperson, Rebecca Eyler, Nancy Glover, Franklin Jackson, Nicole Jarvis,  Joshua Leiling, James MacAulay, Lee McCracken, Karl Seifert, Kate  Sharkey, and Shawn Ward.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.