Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues
Published: 2002-07-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in the United Kingdom decisively illustrated the devastation that this highly contagious animal disease can cause to a nation's economy. By the time the disease was eradicated, the United Kingdom had slaughtered more than 4 million animals and sustained losses of $5 billion in the food and agricultural sectors, as well as comparable losses to its tourism industry. Before 2001, the United Kingdom had been FMD-free for almost 34 years. Following the outbreak, the country was generally barred from participating in the international trade of live animals and animal products that could transmit the virus. The United States has adequate processes for obtaining information on foreign FMD outbreaks and providing the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and others with this information, but it lacks adequate processes for sharing this information with the Customs Service. The United States receives information on FMD outbreaks from USDA officials stationed abroad, international agricultural and animal health organizations, and foreign governments. These officials collect a wide array of agricultural and animal health information about the countries and regions in which they are stationed, which ensures that the United States has timely access to information on foreign FMD outbreaks. However, USDA's processes for disseminating information on foreign FMD outbreaks are uneven. U.S. measures to prevent the introduction of FMD are comparable to those used by other countries and have kept the United States free of the the disease for 75 years. Nevertheless, because of the nature of the disease and the risk inherent in the ever-increasing volume of international travel and trade, U.S. livestock remains vulnerable to the disease. USDA has a two-pronged approach to prevent FMD from reaching U.S. livestock. USDA tries to keep FMD as far as possible from U.S. borders by helping other countries control and eradicate the disease. USDA has developed and implemented specific preventive measures at ports of entry to ensure that international cargo, animals, passengers, and mail do not bring the disease into the United States. In the event of an FMD outbreak, the United States will face several challenges in mounting an effective and quick response, although USDA and many states have developed and tested emergency animal disease response plans.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: As requested, we are reporting on the United States’ ability to prevent the introduction of foot and  mouth disease.  This report contains recommendations to the U.S. Department of Agriculture on the  need to develop a process to expeditiously communicate information on foreign disease outbreaks to  the Customs Service, improve some of the preventive measures used in the United States, and  develop plans and timetables to address any outstanding issues that could impede a U.S. response.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further  distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to other  appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Agriculture; the Commissioner of Customs;  and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.  We will also make copies available to others  upon request.  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call me at (202) 512-3841. Key  contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.
subsections: section_title: Introduction
paragraphs: Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is one of the most devastating viral animal  diseases affecting cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle and swine, and has  occurred in most countries of the world at some point during the last  century.  Although the disease has no human-health implications, it can  have enormous economic and social consequences, as recent outbreaks in  the United Kingdom and Taiwan have demonstrated.  These consequences  occur because the international community values products from countries  that are FMD-free and generally restricts international trade in FMD- susceptible products from countries affected by an outbreak.  Most FMD- affected countries, therefore, take whatever measures necessary to regain  their FMD-free status as quickly as possible.  In the United States, the U.S.  Department of Agriculture (USDA) has primary responsibility for  protecting domestic livestock from animal diseases such as FMD.  The U.S.  Customs Service supports USDA in these efforts.
subsections: section_title: FMD Is a Highly Contagious Animal Disease
paragraphs: FMD—a highly contagious viral disease affecting primarily cloven-hoofed  animals, such as cattle, sheep, swine, and goats—has 7 types and over 80  subtypes.  Immunity to, or vaccination for, one type of the virus does not  protect animals against infection from the other types.  FMD-infected  animals usually develop blister-like lesions in the mouth, on the tongue and  lips, on the teats, or between the hooves, which causes them to salivate  excessively or become lame.  Other symptoms include fever, reduced feed  consumption, and abortions.  Cattle and pigs are very sensitive to the virus  and show symptoms of the disease after a short incubation period of 3 to 5  days.  The incubation period in sheep is considerably longer, about 10 to 14  days, and the clinical signs of the disease are usually mild and may be  masked by other conventional conditions, thereby allowing the disease to  go unnoticed.  The mortality rate for nonadult animals infected with FMD  varies and depends on the species and strain of the virus; in contrast, adult  animals usually recover once the disease has run its course.  However,  because the disease leaves them severely debilitated, meat-producing  animals do not normally regain their lost weight for many months, and  dairy cows seldom produce milk at their former rate.  The disease therefore  can cause severe losses in the production of meat and milk.
The FMD virus is easily transmitted and spreads rapidly.  Prior to and  during the appearance of clinical signs, infected animals release the virus  into the environment through respiration, milk, semen, blood, saliva, and  feces.  The virus may become airborne and spread quickly if pigs become  infected because pigs prolifically produce and excrete large amounts of the  virus into the air.  Animals, people, or materials that are exposed to the  virus can also spread FMD by bringing it into contact with susceptible  animals.  For example, the virus can spread when susceptible animals  come in contact with contaminated  animal products, such as meat, milk, hides, skins, and manure;  transport vehicles and equipment;  clothes or shoes worn by people; and  hay, feedstuffs, or veterinary biologics.
The FMD virus has a remarkable capability for remaining viable for long  periods of time in a variety of animate and inanimate objects.  For example,  the virus can persist in the human nasal passages for up to 36 hours,  manure for 1 to 24 weeks, fodder for 1 month, and on shoes for 9 to 14  weeks.  The ability of the virus to persist in the environment and other  products depends on the temperature and potential of hydrogen (pH)  conditions.  Generally, the virus can survive freezing but cannot survive at  temperatures above 50° Celsius (122° Farenheit) and at pH levels of less  than 6, or greater than 9.  Table 1 shows the various lengths of time that the  FMD virus can survive in some selected products.
FMD can be confused with several similar but less harmful animal diseases  that also produce blisters and cause animals to salivate, such as vesicular  stomatitis, bovine viral diarrhea, and foot rot.  Two foreign swine diseases  are also clinically identical to FMD—swine vesicular disease and vesicular  exanthema of swine.  The only way to distinguish between FMD and these  other diseases is through laboratory analyses of fluid or tissue samples.   FMD is also sometimes confused with mad cow disease or bovine  spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).  BSE is a fatal, neuro-degenerative  disease found in cattle in 23 countries around the world.  Cattle contract  the disease through animal feed that contains protein derived from the  remains of diseased animals.  Scientists generally believe that an equally  fatal disease in humans—known as variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease—is  linked to eating beef from cattle with BSE.  However, unlike mad cow  disease, FMD has no known human health implications.
section_title: Incidence of FMD Worldwide Is Extensive
paragraphs: FMD is present in about 60 percent of the countries in the world and  endemic in many countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and South  America.  The relatively few areas that are considered free of FMD include  North and Central America, Australia, New Zealand, and the Caribbean.   Figure 1 shows the presence of FMD worldwide for the period 1992  through 2002.
In 2000 and 2001, over 40 countries reported outbreaks of FMD, and during  the first 5 months of 2002, five countries reported outbreaks.  The spread of  certain strains of the virus also demonstrates how quickly it is spreading  throughout the world.  For example, the FMD virus serotype O, known as  the Pan-Asia strain, was first identified in northern India in 1990 and was  subsequently found in Nepal in 1993.  It then spread westward into Saudi  Arabia during 1994 and, subsequently, throughout the Near East and into  Europe (Thrace region of Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece) in 1996.  The Pan- Asia strain was also found in Bangladesh in 1996 and in Bhutan in 1998.  In  1999 it was reported in mainland China and then detected in Taiwan.  By  late 1999 and in 2000, it had reached most of Southeast Asia.  Most recently,  the Pan-Asia strain was found in the Republic of Korea, Japan, the  Primorsky Territory of the Russian Federation, and Mongolia (areas free  from FMD since 1934, 1908, 1964, and 1973, respectively).  The Pan-Asia  strain is also responsible for the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United  Kingdom that subsequently spread to France, Ireland, and the Netherlands.   Figure 2 shows the incidence of four types of FMD virus worldwide,  including the type O Pan-Asia strain.
In North America, the last outbreaks of FMD for the United States, Canada,  and Mexico occurred in 1929, 1952, and 1953, respectively.  The United  States has worked closely with both Canada and Mexico to eradicate FMD  from North America.
section_title: International Community Has Guidelines to Control and Eradicate FMD
paragraphs: The Office International des Epizooties (OIE)—an intergovernmental  organization created in January 1924 by an international agreement signed  by 28 countries—was established to guarantee the transparency of  information on the animal disease status of member countries.  In addition,  OIE collects and analyzes veterinary scientific information and  disseminates it to member countries, provides expertise and promotes  international solidarity for the control of animal diseases, and guarantees  the sanitary safety of world trade by developing rules for international  trade in animals and animal products.  In May 2001, OIE had 158 member  countries.
OIE classifies member countries (or certain zones within these countries)  as being FMD-free with or without vaccination if they meet certain criteria  detailed in the OIE International Animal Health Code.  For example, to  obtain FMD-free status without vaccination, a member country should (1) have a record of prompt animal disease reporting; (2) send a  declaration that it has been FMD-free and has not used vaccination for 1  year; (3) present evidence that it has an effective system of surveillance;  (4) implement regulatory measures for the prevention and control of FMD;  and (5) provide evidence that no vaccinated animals have been imported  into the country, since such animals can become the source of future  infections.  Similarly, to obtain FMD-free-with-vaccination status, a country  should (1) have a record for prompt animal disease reporting, (2) send a  declaration that there have been no outbreaks of FMD for 2 years,  (3) provide evidence that the country has effective surveillance systems  and has implemented necessary regulatory measures to prevent and  control FMD, (4) provide proof that routine vaccinations are carried out  and that the vaccines comply with OIE standards, and (5) have an intensive  and frequent system to detect any viral activity.
When FMD occurs in an FMD-free country or zone where vaccination is not  practiced, the affected country must reapply after the outbreak to regain its  FMD-free-without-vaccination status from OIE.  OIE standards require a  country to wait until 3 months after the last reported case of FMD when a  “stamping out approach” (immediate slaughter of diseased and exposed  animals with no vaccination) is used to eradicate the disease before the  country can apply for reinstatement of its FMD-free status.  As part of this  process, surveillance results of laboratory-screening tests (serological  surveillance results) must be provided to OIE to prove that the disease has  been eradicated.  If vaccination was used to control the outbreak, then the  country must wait until 3 months after the last vaccinated animal is  slaughtered and serological surveillance results prove that the disease has  been eradicated before reapplying for FMD-free status.
The international community generally places a high value on products  from countries that are FMD-free without vaccination.  Such countries can  export both live animals and animal products easily to other FMD-free  countries.  In contrast, countries that have an FMD-free-with-vaccination  status are restricted to trading animal products that can be treated to  ensure that the virus is inactivated.  As a result, most countries that are  FMD-free without vaccination resort to a stamping out process to eradicate  the disease if an outbreak occurs.  The United Kingdom and Taiwan  followed this process in 2001 and 1997, respectively.  Similarly, if an  outbreak were to occur in the United States, the current U.S. policy  requires all infected and exposed animals to be immediately slaughtered  and disposed of by incineration, burial, or rendering.
In recent years, the international community has been encouraging the  acceptance of regionalization policies for international trade.   Regionalization involves declaring one or more areas of a country FMD- free while other areas are responding to an outbreak.  Under a  regionalization policy, in the event of an FMD outbreak in the United  States, even if one state or area was infected, the nation as a whole might  not lose its FMD-free status, and trade restrictions might not be enforced  on all of our FMD-susceptible products.
section_title: An FMD Outbreak Can Cost Billions of Dollars
paragraphs: An FMD outbreak could cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars in both  direct and indirect costs.  Direct costs to the government would include the  costs of disease control and eradication, such as the maintenance of animal  movement controls, control areas, and intensified border inspections; the  destruction and disposal of infected animals; vaccines; and compensation  to producers for the costs of disease containment.  However, government  compensation programs may not cover 100 percent of producers’ costs.  As  a result, direct costs would also occur for disinfection and for the value of  any slaughtered animals not subject to government compensation.   According to recent U.K. government estimates, the direct costs for control  and eradication of the 2001 outbreak was about $4 billion.  According to  several estimates, the direct costs of controlling and eradicating a U.S.  outbreak of FMD could range up to $24 billion in current dollars,  depending, among other things, on the extent of the outbreak and the  control strategy employed.
The value of lost export sales in the event of an FMD outbreak would  represent a significant portion of the total direct costs to the U.S. economy.   According to USDA officials, a single case of FMD in the United States  would cause our trading partners to prohibit U.S. exports of live animals  and animal products.  This ban could result in losses of between $6 billion  and $10 billion a year while the United States eradicated the disease and  until it regained disease-free status.  These losses may be mitigated to some  extent by increased domestic sales of meat from disease-free portions of  the United States that may otherwise have been exported.  However, USDA  officials believe that many people in the United States would refuse to eat  meat during an FMD outbreak, thus the offset probably would be minimal.
Indirect costs of an FMD outbreak would include those costs affecting  consumers, ancillary agricultural industries, and other sectors of the  economy.  For example, if large numbers of animals are destroyed as part  of a control and eradication effort, then ancillary industries such as meat- processing facilities and feed suppliers are likely to lose revenue.   Furthermore, an FMD outbreak would result in adverse effects such as  unemployment, loss of income (to the extent that government  compensation does not fully reimburse producers), and decreased  economic activity, which could ripple through other sectors of the  economy as well.  For example, the loss of agricultural income could result  in reduced sales of consumer goods.  In the United Kingdom, according to  government estimates, the 2001 outbreak resulted in losses to the tourism  industry of over $5 billion that were comparable to the losses sustained by  the food and agriculture sector.
In addition, not only may consumers have to pay higher prices for the  remaining supply of animal products affected by an FMD outbreak, but the  price of substitutes is likely to rise, as well.  For example, as the price of  FMD-free meat increases, some consumers are likely to buy poultry or  other meat substitutes, thus causing the prices of these substitute products  to rise.  However, the higher prices that consumers pay for substitutes do  not result in a net cost to the economy because these higher prices result in  increased revenues for poultry producers and others.
section_title: Social Impacts of an Outbreak Can Be Significant
paragraphs: An FMD outbreak can have significant social impacts, such as enormous  psychological damage, especially on families and localities directly  affected by the outbreak, as the U.K. experience in 2001 illustrates.  For  example, in May 2001, the Welsh Institute of Rural Health found that  individuals affected by the FMD outbreak experienced a range of  symptoms, including tearfulness, lack of sleep, loss of appetite, increased  anger, irritability, and general depression.  An increase in marital discord  was also noted.  One general practioner reported that 50 percent of his  patients affected by the FMD outbreak required antidepressant drugs.    Some farming families even sent their children away from home during the  outbreak rather than have them witness the slaughter and disposal of the  family’s livestock.
Consumer confidence in the safety of the U.K. food supply was also  adversely affected by the outbreak.  A survey by the United Kingdom’s  Institute of Grocery Distribution determined that because of the FMD and  mad cow disease outbreaks, many consumers in the United Kingdom now  consider meat and dairy products to be unsafe.  As a result, these  consumers have changed their grocery-buying habits.
An outbreak also significantly disrupts daily life.  Normally busy livestock  producers suddenly had almost nothing to do because their animals had  been destroyed and their properties were quarantined.  According to one  study of the effects of FMD on farm life in the Cumbria area of the United  Kingdom, most farming households had to curb their usual daily activities,  and only the most essential movements on and off the farms were  permitted.  Lost income caused stress to families because they had to cut  back on their household expenditures and some had to renegotiate loans.   The study notes that the enforced isolation caused by the quarantines  added to the tensions and stresses already being experienced by both  adults and children.
section_title: USDA Is Responsible for Protecting U.S. Livestock From FMD and Other Animal Diseases
paragraphs: Within USDA, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has  the lead responsibility for protecting the nation’s livestock from foreign  animal diseases, which are diseases not native to the United States as well  as those thought to have been eradicated.  Assisting APHIS in this endeavor  are USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service, the Food Safety and Inspection  Service, and the Homeland Security Council.
Within APHIS, several groups share responsibility for protecting U.S.  livestock from the incursion of foreign animal diseases such as FMD:    International Services.  Working with its counterpart organizations in  foreign countries, this group seeks to reduce the international spread of  animal and poultry diseases.  Its goal is to protect U.S. livestock and  poultry by reducing risk abroad through disease-management strategies  provided to exporting countries before they send their animals and  products to the United States.
Veterinary Services.  To protect and improve the health, quality, and  marketability of our nation's animals, animal products, and veterinary  biologics, this group seeks to prevent, control, and/or eliminate animal  diseases, and monitor and promote animal health and productivity.  This  group administers laws and regulations on importing animals and  animal products, including embryos and semen, to ensure that imports  are free from certain disease agents.  In addition, Veterinary Services  provides training for state and private veterinarians on foreign animal  diseases of concern and provides animal disease diagnostic and  surveillance testing.  Veterinary Services has primary responsibility for  inspecting and ensuring the safety of live animal and animal product  imports to the United States. Within Veterinary Services, the Emergency  Programs unit coordinates efforts to prepare for and respond to animal  disease outbreaks, including FMD, and in the fall of 2001, published a  draft plan for responding to an FMD outbreak.  It employs veterinarians  trained to detect and respond to an FMD outbreak.  Emergency  Programs also provides federal and state veterinarians and others with  training on foreign animal diseases.
Plant Protection and Quarantine.  Inspectors in this group are USDA’s  primary presence at 144 of the 301 ports of entry in the United States, as  well as 8 foreign ports.  According to USDA, inspectors are present at all  major ports of entry, and staffing is based on risk assessments and  supplemented with tools such as detector dogs, X-rays, and hand-held  remote-sensing equipment.  USDA inspectors screen and physically  inspect animal products and other cargo arriving by air, sea, or land, as  well as international passengers and their luggage arriving via air, sea, or  land border crossings.  Most notably, the beagles in Plant Protection and  Quarantine’s Beagle Brigade sniff travelers' luggage for prohibited fruits,  plants, and meat that could harbor harmful plant and animal pests and  diseases.   According to USDA, by the end of this year, it will have  increased the number of dog teams to 123, which is double the level  available 2 years ago.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that by the end of this  year, APHIS will also have increased the number of its safeguarding  personnel to approximately 3,870—an increase of 50 percent over its fiscal  year 2000 staffing levels.  Moreover, USDA told us that it has hired 18  additional veterinarians who are conducting port-of-entry reviews, working  with state counterparts, and providing technical guidance and training on  working with and handling animal products and byproducts and  international garbage that could pose a threat of foreign animal diseases.
In addition, USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) operates programs  designed to build new markets and improve the competitive position of  U.S. agriculture in the global marketplace.  FAS is responsible for USDA’s  overseas activities, such as market development, international trade  agreements and negotiations, and the collection and analysis of statistics  and market information.  FAS supports U.S. agricultural interests through  its network of agricultural counselors, attachés, and trade officers  stationed in many foreign countries.  FAS officials primarily deal with  agricultural trade issues and meet with host government and industry  officials to discuss and facilitate agricultural trade.
USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has primary  responsibility for ensuring the safety of imported and domestic meat and  meat products meant for human consumption.  FSIS stations inspectors at  ports of entry to conduct sampling and inspection functions on imported  meat products.  FSIS also has responsibility for approving countries that  are eligible to export meat products to the United States.  In fulfilling this  responsibility, FSIS conducts periodic reviews of eligible countries.   According to USDA, FSIS’s inspection of livestock before slaughter is an  important surveillance tool for detecting the presence of FMD in the United  States.
Finally, USDA’s Homeland Security Council is responsible for leading and  coordinating USDA’s activities to plan for and manage agriculture-related  crises as well as emergency programs.  This council serves as USDA’s  primary contact with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and  facilitates coordination with other federal agencies, state and local  governments, and private-sector organizations.
section_title: U.S. Customs Service Supports USDA’s Efforts at Ports of Entry
paragraphs: The U.S. Customs Service (Customs) is the nation’s primary enforcement  agency for preventing the entry of a number of potentially harmful  products into the United States, including FMD-contaminated products.  In  addition to their Customs responsibilities to ensure that proper duties or  tariffs are paid on imported products, Customs inspectors work to enforce  the regulations of about 40 federal agencies, such as those of USDA.   Customs inspectors review paperwork, such as manifests and bills of  lading, and physically inspect cargo and international passengers and their  luggage.  Customs has inspectors stationed at all 301 ports of entry  throughout the United States, including international airports and seaports  and land border crossings along the Canadian and Mexican borders.   Customs also has inspectors at some foreign locations, such as the  international airport in Toronto, Canada, where they perform preclearance  inspections of passengers and their luggage prior to entry into the United  States.  Customs inspectors also examine international mail and packages  arriving in the United States at the 14 facilities handling mail of foreign  origin.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Senator Tom Daschle asked us to determine whether (1) U.S. processes to  obtain and disseminate information on foreign FMD outbreaks are  adequate and timely, (2) U.S. measures for preventing FMD from entering  the country are effective and comparable with those of other selected  countries, and (3) the United States could respond quickly and effectively  to an outbreak of FMD if it were to occur.
To address the first question, we obtained and reviewed relevant  documents, and we interviewed USDA and Customs officials.  In particular,  we reviewed the adequacy and timeliness of the information obtained and  disseminated by USDA after the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United  Kingdom.
For the second question, we reviewed relevant legislation, regulations, and  other USDA documents.  We also interviewed USDA, Customs, and state  officials.  To observe the preventive measures for international cargo, we  visited three large seaports in Elizabeth, New Jersey; Baltimore, Maryland;  and Houston, Texas.  To observe the preventive measures for international  mail, we visited international mail-processing facilities in New Jersey and  Virginia and one international express package carrier in Kentucky.   To  observe the preventive measures for live animals imported through  U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican land ports of entry, we visited the Sarnia,  Ontario, and Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, border crossings.  To observe the  preventive measures for international passengers, we visited Dulles  International Airport, and obtained information on the preclearance  procedures used to process international passengers entering the United  States via Canada at the international airport in Toronto, Canada.  We also  gathered information on how garbage from international carriers is  handled at airports and seaports.  In addition, we visited two nearby county  and two state fairs in Maryland and Virginia to observe how USDA’s  guidance for biosecurity measures to prevent the spread of disease at U.S.  livestock and agricultural shows was implemented.
As a result of the heightened level of security at airports after September  11, 2001, and because our review was largely conducted after the U.K.  outbreak had ended, we were unable to implement a portion of the review  as originally planned.  In particular, we were unable to survey passengers  who were returning to the United States from the United Kingdom, during  the outbreak, at the airport after they left the passenger-processing area.   Instead, we surveyed by telephone 60 passengers who visited the United  Kingdom during the time of the outbreak (Mar. through Sept. 2001).  We  asked them to recall various aspects of their return trip and the processing  they underwent at U.S. airports.  These results cannot be generalized and  represent only the experiences of the people whom we surveyed.  In  addition, because we asked people to recall events after the passage of  4 to 6 months, their recollections of certain events and processes might not  have been as clear as they would have been immediately upon arrival.
Furthermore, to respond to our second question, we compared the  preventive measures used by Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom  with those used by the United States.  We selected Canada and Mexico for  our review because the ability of the United States to protect its livestock  from FMD also depends on the ability of our neighbors to prevent the  disease; according to USDA officials, if any of the three countries has an  FMD outbreak, the other two are also likely to have an outbreak.  We  included the United Kingdom in our analysis because it is a major U.S.  trading partner and because of its recent experience with FMD.  To obtain  information on the preventive measures used by Canada and Mexico, we  visited these two countries, met with federal officials, and obtained and  reviewed relevant documents.  While in Canada and Mexico, we visited  airports, seaports, international mail-processing facilities, and border  crossings to observe the preventive measures used by these countries.  To  obtain information on the United Kingdom’s preventive measures, we  reviewed and summarized legislation and regulations for the European  Union and the United Kingdom, as well as other publicly available  documents.  To ensure the accuracy and completeness of our information,  we shared the summaries that we prepared on the preventive measures  used by the three countries with officials in these countries and asked for  their review and comments.  The information on these foreign countries’  preventive measures does not reflect our independent legal analysis.
Finally, for our third question, we reviewed federal and state emergency  response plans as well as other key documents and federal legislation and  regulations.  We interviewed USDA officials, industry representatives, and  state officials.  We also interviewed a group of selected veterinarians and  animal health technicians who were part of the U.S. contingent that  supported the United Kingdom’s response efforts in 2001 to obtain their  perspectives on U.S. preparedness and observations on lessons learned  from the U.K. outbreak.  We interviewed the state veterinarian in six states  that are major U.S. livestock producers to obtain their perspective on their  state’s preparedness efforts as well as the overall U.S. ability to respond to  an outbreak if it were to occur.  We also attended a USDA training session  and a conference organized by the Western States Livestock Health  Association that included information on U.S. preparedness and response  to an FMD outbreak.
We provided USDA and Customs with a draft of this report for review and  comment.  The written comments we received from USDA are presented in  appendix V, and those we received from Customs, in appendix VI.  In  addition, we received technical comments from USDA that we have  incorporated throughout the report as appropriate.
We conducted our work from August 2001 through May 2002 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks, but Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved
paragraphs: USDA relies on a wide variety of sources to obtain information on  outbreaks of FMD overseas.  Its sources include APHIS and FAS staff  stationed abroad, official notifications from international trade or animal  health organizations, and notifications from affected countries.  But USDA’s  dissemination of this information is more problematic because it has no  formal process—detailed procedures and protocols—for sharing  information on foreign FMD outbreaks with Customs, which provides the  first line of defense against potentially contaminated products entering U.S.  ports.  USDA does, however, share the information it develops with  agencies within the department, states, public and private veterinarians,  industry groups, and the public through various methods, including E- mails, postings to USDA’s Internet site, telephone calls, and media alerts.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
paragraphs: U.S. measures to prevent an FMD outbreak—control and eradication  overseas and the port of entry screening of livestock, animal products, and  passengers—have been successful since 1929.  Nevertheless, the United  States remains vulnerable to an FMD outbreak because of the nature of the  virus, the many pathways by which it can come into the country, and the  growing magnitude and volume of both legal and illegal passengers and  cargo entering the country.  Other countries face similar challenges in  protecting their livestock from FMD and use preventive measures that are  comparable to those the United States uses.  However, the United States  could also build on the experiences of other countries to improve its  preventive measures.
subsections: section_title: USDA’s Efforts to Control and Eradicate FMD in Other Countries Help Reduce the Risk to U.S. Livestock
paragraphs: As a first line of defense to safeguarding U.S. animal resources against the  introduction of pests and diseases, USDA helps prevent, control, and  eradicate agricultural health threats where they originate outside the  United States.  By helping other nations eradicate or control these  outbreaks, USDA reduces the risk of agricultural pests and diseases  reaching U.S. borders.
In North America, U.S. efforts to eradicate and control FMD have largely  focused on Mexico, because of our shared border and the possible threat of  the FMD virus’s moving overland from South America, where the disease is  endemic in some countries.  USDA has staff located in Mexico working  with the Mexico-United States Commission for the Prevention of Foot and  Mouth Disease and Other Exotic Animal Diseases.  The commission,  formed in 1947 as a combined U.S.-Mexican effort to eradicate FMD from  Mexico, built Mexico’s animal health infrastructure and successfully  eradicated FMD from Mexico in 1954.  Today, USDA and Mexican  veterinarians work together, through the activities of the commission, to  provide disease surveillance, diagnostic testing, and training for Mexico to  ensure that the country remains FMD-free.  According to USDA officials in  Mexico, the United States initially covered about 80 percent of the costs for  the joint program; however, as the Mexican government assumed greater  responsibility for the program, the U.S. share has decreased to about  20 percent.  In fiscal year 2001, USDA provided about $160,000 in funding  for the commission’s activities.  According to USDA officials, this funding  supports the commission’s high-security laboratory in Mexico City by  providing training, supplies, and equipment.
In addition, for over 30 years, the United States has held regular meetings  on animal health issues with the governments of Canada and Mexico to  harmonize North America’s import requirements and, more recently, to  coordinate preventive actions and emergency response activities in the  event of an FMD outbreak.  For example, in 2000, the three countries held  joint exercises—known as the Tripartite Exercise 2000—to test their FMD  communication and response plans, and to assess their response systems.   As a result of this exercise, the three governments signed a memorandum  of understanding to formally establish the North American Animal Health  Committee.  This committee represents animal health issues for the North  American Free Trade Agreement and seeks to harmonize live animal and  animal product import requirements for North America.  The committee  will also plan emergency response activities and perform joint test  exercises to ensure that all three countries remain prepared to respond to  an FMD outbreak.
The United States also supports efforts to establish FMD-control zones in  Central and South America.  For example, to help alert countries in Central  and North America about the potential incursion of FMD from South  America, USDA has established cooperative programs with Panama and  Colombia.  In Panama, USDA supports the U.S.-Panama Cooperative  Program for the Prevention of Foot and Mouth Disease, which maintains  the Darien Gap area of Panama free from FMD and other foreign animal  diseases.  This program conducts field surveillance at high-risk border  points and annual training, analyzes technical data, and improves the  infrastructure.  The program also provides support for the Investigative  Laboratory for Vesicular Disease, which provides bio-containment,  diagnostic, and detection capabilities for vesicular and other foreign animal  diseases in Central America.
Through the Colombian program, USDA helps maintain an FMD-free  barrier along the Colombia-Panama border.  This barrier serves as the  "first line of defense" for preventing the spread of FMD northward into  Central America, Mexico, and the United States, which are all FMD-free.   Until FMD is eradicated from South America, USDA believes that  maintaining this barrier will prevent the disease’s northward spread.  USDA  provides technical assistance and half of the funding for the program.
As part of its disease exclusion activities for the region, USDA also has  cooperative agreements with all the other Central American countries to  support joint monitoring and surveillance activities, including field  investigations and the collection of laboratory samples for FMD and other  foreign animal diseases. Through these agreements, USDA helps transfer  surveillance and detection technologies to these countries.
When FMD strikes other nations—as it did recently, for example, in  Argentina and the United Kingdom—the United States may assist in  controlling and eradicating the disease.  For example, a total of 327 U.S.  animal health professionals, including over 300 veterinarians, helped  eradicate the 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom.  The Americans came  from USDA, other federal agencies, and state governments.  Beginning in  March 2001, they traveled to the United Kingdom, generally in groups that  averaged about 10 per week, and assisted with the response for about a  month.  At the peak of the outbreak during March and April, about 100 U.S.  animal health professionals were assisting in the U.K. response.  The U.S.  responders with whom we spoke participated in surveillance activities,  such as collecting blood samples, and epidemiology tasks, such as tracking  and predicting the path of new disease outbreaks.  They also issued permits  and licenses to move animals and products such as silage.  By providing  such assistance, the United States not only helps ensure that the disease is  eradicated quickly, but also helps reduce the potential for FMD-infected  products to arrive at U.S. ports of entry.
section_title: Despite U.S. Preventive Measures at Ports of Entry, Vulnerability to FMD Remains
paragraphs: Preventive measures at U.S. borders provide the second line of defense  against the incursion of FMD into the United States.  USDA has identified  several key pathways by which the FMD-virus could enter the United  States.   To respond to the risk posed by these pathways, USDA  implemented measures designed to ensure that animals, products,  passengers, and equipment arriving at U.S. borders are free of the virus and  do not pose a risk to U.S. livestock.   However, some level of risk is inherent  in international trade and travel, and no set of measures can ever  completely eliminate the possibility that FMD will enter the country.   Moreover, because FMD is a hardy virus and the level of inspection  resources cannot keep pace with the increasing volume and magnitude of  cargo and passengers, both legal and illegal, that continue to enter the  country, the United States remains vulnerable to an outbreak.
subsections: section_title: The United States Has Implemented Preventive Measures for Key Pathways
paragraphs: The FMD virus could enter the United States through a number of key  pathways: live animal imports, imports of animal and other products,  international passengers and their luggage, garbage from international  carriers, international mail, and military personnel and equipment  returning from overseas.  For each of these pathways, USDA has developed  and implemented specific preventive measures described below.
Live animal imports.  The United States allows imported livestock, such  as swine, cattle, and sheep, only from preapproved countries that USDA  judges to be free of FMD and other diseases of concern.  For example, in  April 2002, USDA recognized 49 countries or geographical regions as free  of FMD.  (See app. I.)  Generally, live animals can be imported only through  designated ports of entry, the majority of which are located along U.S.  borders shared with Canada and Mexico, and three others located on the  east and west coasts.  Most live cattle imports into the United States  originate from Canada and Mexico; live hog imports, from Canada; and live  lamb imports, from Australia and New Zealand.  Livestock exported to the  United States must be accompanied by a U.S. import permit and a health  certificate from an official government veterinarian in the country of origin.   The health certificate states that the animals have been in the exporting  country for at least 60 days prior to shipment and are free of other diseases  of concern.  Generally, animals arriving from countries other than Canada  and Mexico may be quarantined.  Zoological ruminants and swine from  FMD-affected countries are permitted into the United States but must be  processed through USDA’s New York Animal Import Center.
Animal and other product imports.  Thousands of animal and other  products that could be contaminated with the FMD virus could potentially  enter the United States during the course of normal international trade.   These products include animal products meant for human consumption,  such as meat and dairy products; nonfood animal products, such as hides,  skins, casings, and animal extracts; as well as nonanimal products, such as  farm equipment, hay, and straw.  USDA regulates the importation of this  diverse range of products to help minimize the risk of introducing FMD into  the United States.
USDA implements different import rules for FMD-free and FMD-affected  countries.  Generally, for countries free of FMD and other diseases of  concern, USDA imposes few restrictions on animal product imports.  For  FMD-affected countries, USDA prohibits the importation of all susceptible  products shipped 3 weeks prior to the date of official notification of the  outbreak.  This prohibition remains in effect until USDA reassesses the  disease status of the affected country and determines the level of trade that  can resume.  USDA allows imports of animal and other products from  FMD-affected countries only if they meet certain requirements.  These  requirements vary for different kinds of products, as follows:   Animal products meant for human consumption.  Generally fresh,  chilled, or frozen meat from cattle, sheep, and pigs, and fresh milk are  prohibited from FMD-affected countries.  However, processed meat and  dairy products are allowed from FMD-affected countries if they meet  certain requirements.  For example, meat products can be imported  from FMD-affected countries only if (1) the country and meat  processing plants have been deemed eligible to export meat products to  the United States by FSIS and (2) the processing plants also meet  APHIS’s meat-processing standards.  The APHIS standards ensure that  meat products from these countries are not contaminated with the FMD  virus, and require that the products be processed in a manner that will  inactivate the virus.  For example, they must be fully cooked, dry cured,  or canned and shelf-stable, with all bones removed.  Moreover, a U.S.  import permit and an official veterinary health certificate from the  country of origin must accompany certain meat shipments.  Similarly,  most dairy products from FMD-affected countries must meet APHIS’s  requirements to ensure that they do not pose a risk of FMD’s  introduction.  For example, milk products that are in a concentrated  liquid form and are shelf-stable without refrigeration are allowed from  FMD-affected countries.  Some dairy products, such as condensed milk  require a U.S. import permit, while others, such as yogurt and butter are  unrestricted and do not require a permit.
Nonfood animal products.  A variety of nonfood animal products are  allowed from FMD-affected countries if they have been properly treated  to inactivate the virus; however, a U.S. import permit may be required.   For example, tanned hides, leather, and fully finished mounted animal  trophies can be imported into the United States from FMD-affected  countries.
Other products.  USDA does not allow imports of grass, hay, or straw  used for feeding, bedding, or other purposes from FMD-affected  countries.  However, used farm equipment is allowed with a certificate  from the exporting country stating that the equipment has been steam  cleaned.  APHIS officials inspect farm equipment at U.S. ports of entry  to ensure that it is free from dirt and soil.  If dirt and soil are found, then  inspectors will determine whether they can be adequately washed with  detergent and disinfected at an appropriate location before granting  approval for entry into the United States.
All animal and other products arriving at U.S. ports of entry, whether from  FMD-free or FMD-affected countries, are subject to inspection by U.S.  federal inspectors.  Customs officials, who review the documents  accompanying the shipments, either electronically or on paper, provide the  first level of inspection for these shipments.  On the basis of this review,  Customs is authorized to either release the shipments into commerce or  hold them for USDA inspection.  USDA provides Customs with a list of  products to be flagged for inspection by APHIS.  APHIS inspectors ensure  that all the necessary documents accompanying the shipment, such as  import permits and official health certificates, are complete and ensure  that the shipments match their manifest.  In some instances, APHIS  inspectors will inspect the shipping containers to check their contents.    After APHIS completes its inspection, the shipment may proceed to FSIS  and/or the Food and Drug Administration for further inspection, depending  on which agency regulates the safety of these products for human health  issues, or may proceed to Customs for release into commerce.  According  to USDA, FSIS inspectors at ports of entry visually examine all shipments  of products under FSIS’s jurisdiction and randomly select some for more  in-depth examination.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA noted that it has primary  inspection responsibility for agricultural cargo and manifests at those ports  staffed with USDA inspectors.  To ensure that these shipments continue to  be referred to USDA for inspection, the department said that it is working  with Customs and other federal agencies to develop an automated targeting  system, which will serve as an electronic interface among federal agencies  to identify and automatically segregate high-risk plant cargo and track  imported animals and animal products.
International passengers.  International passengers who may have been in  contact with the FMD virus, either through contact with infected animals  or materials such as soil and manure, or who bring potentially  contaminated products into the country may also transmit the virus to the  United States.  USDA provides the following FMD-prevention information  and types of scrutiny for international passengers in an effort to reduce the  risk associated with this pathway:  USDA requests airlines to make in-flight announcements on  international flights; at ports of entry, it places warning signs and it plays  prerecorded announcements about how international passengers can  assist in keeping FMD out of the United States.
International passengers must fill out a U.S. Customs declaration form  that asks if they are bringing any animal or plant products into the  country and if, while traveling abroad, they visited a farm or were in  contact with animals.  Passengers responding affirmatively to these  questions are sent by Customs officials to a USDA inspection area at the  port of entry for further processing.  USDA officials may x-ray and  inspect the contents of the passengers’ baggage; ask them additional  questions; confiscate any prohibited items, such as meat and dairy  products; and clean and disinfect their shoes.
USDA’s Beagle Brigade and inspectors generally rove the baggage claim  areas at major ports of entry to help identify passengers and their  luggage that may be carrying prohibited food items.  USDA inspectors  look not only for suspicious packages, such as bulky, misshapen, and  leaking containers, but also question passengers about their travels to  determine whether they present a greater risk of disease transmission.   If the dogs or the inspectors identify such passengers, these passengers  are referred to the USDA inspection area for further processing.
After the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom, according to the  international passengers we surveyed, some of these measures were not  consistently implemented.  For example, some passengers told us that the  airlines they traveled on did not make any in-flight announcements about  FMD.  Other passengers told us that even though their Customs declaration  form indicated that they had been in contact with animals or visited a farm  while in the United Kingdom, they were not referred by officials to the  USDA inspection area at the airport for further processing or they had to  request USDA personnel at the airports to examine and disinfect the shoes  that they wore while they were in FMD-affected areas in the United  Kingdom.
Garbage from international carriers.  Garbage from international carriers,  such as airplanes and ships, can also transmit the FMD virus into the  United States if the garbage contains food items contaminated with the  virus.  Therefore, USDA has developed guidelines to ensure that garbage  from international carriers is properly handled and disposed of so that it  does not present a risk to U.S. livestock.  For example, USDA inspectors  supervise the removal of all international garbage from airplanes and ships.   This garbage must be transported in leak-proof containers and must be  disposed of properly, such as by incineration or sterilization, and  subsequent burial at a landfill.  USDA has compliance agreements with  catering firms and cleaners that outline the proper handling and approved  disposal methods for international garbage.  Before a compliance  agreement is signed, APHIS officials will, among other things, review the  application; visit the handling, processing, or disposal facilities; observe the  operation of any equipment to determine its adequacy for handling  garbage; and certify and approve the garbage cookers and sterilizers to be  used to process international garbage.  USDA also monitors firms operating  under these compliance agreements to ensure that they abide by the  conditions stated in the agreement.
International mail.  Prohibited animal products that could transmit the  FMD virus may also be sent through international mail and courier services  to U.S. residents.  As a result, international mail packages entering the  United States are subject to inspection by Customs and USDA officials.   Customs generally reviews the declaration form on the packages and either  visually inspects or x-rays them as part of its responsibility to screen  international mail for illegal and prohibited items, such as contraband and  drugs.  At USDA’s request, Customs can also screen international packages  for prohibited animal products, such as meat and dairy products from  FMD-affected countries.  Customs sets aside packages that appear to  contain such items for USDA’s inspection.  USDA officials will review the  declaration forms and may x-ray or open these packages for physical  inspection.  If the item in the package is a permissible product, the officials  will reseal the package and release it for delivery; otherwise it will be  confiscated and destroyed.  In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA  noted that mail from high-risk countries is more thoroughly scrutinized on  the basis of pathway analysis.
Military personnel and equipment.  Because U.S. military forces are  deployed throughout the world, troops and military equipment returning to  the United States could introduce FMD and other diseases into the country.   As a result, USDA provides support for the military and helps oversee the  reentry of military cargo, personnel, equipment, and personal property to  reduce the risk of introducing diseases into the United States.  For  example, military personnel must declare all agricultural items they are  bringing back to the United States and identify whether they have been on  farms or in contact with animals while abroad.  Their clothing and gear  should also be cleaned and washed before reentering the country.   Similarly, all military rolling stock, such as humvees, trucks, weapons  systems, and tanks, as well as other used military gear, such as canvas  tents, must be thoroughly cleaned before reentry.  Pallets, wooden crates,  and other military equipment must be free of soil, manure, and debris.   Military equipment used to eradicate animal diseases overseas, such as  FMD, is not allowed reentry.  For small-scale operations, the military must  notify USDA at least 7 days in advance of arrival at a U.S. port of entry.   USDA will determine if appropriate cleaning facilities are available at the  first port of entry, and all items will be held at this port for inspection.  If  approved cleaning facilities are not available or if the equipment is  contaminated to an extent that prevents cleaning, USDA will refuse to  allow reentry.  Large-scale operations require a 30-day notification.
section_title: United States Remains Vulnerable to FMD
paragraphs: The United States has not had an outbreak of FMD since 1929, and some  USDA officials and animal health experts believe that this healthy  condition of U.S. livestock is directly related to the effectiveness of U.S.  measures to prevent the incursion of the disease.  However, these and other  experts agree that the nation remains vulnerable to an FMD outbreak for  the following reasons:    FMD is a highly contagious and hardy virus that remains viable for long  periods of time.
FMD can be carried and transmitted by a variety of animate and  inanimate items.  Although the key pathways described earlier pose  varying levels of risk to U.S. livestock, according to USDA, it could take  only one contaminated product to come into contact with one  susceptible U.S. animal to start a nationwide outbreak.
The magnitude and volume of international passengers, mail, and  products entering the United States creates an enormous challenge for  USDA and other federal inspection agencies.  As a result, most  inspections at ports of entry are restricted to paper reviews of manifests  supported by a limited number of judgmentally selected samples for  physical inspection.  For example, in fiscal year 2001, over 470 million  international passengers and pedestrians arrived at U.S. ports of entry;  of these, USDA inspected about 102 million.  According to APHIS  officials, about 30 percent of the items seized from passengers at  airports were prohibited animal products or by-products.  Table 3  provides information on the volume/numbers of passengers, vehicles,  and cargo entering the United States and the level of APHIS’s  inspections for fiscal year 2001.  Similarly, the volume of international  mail entering the United States makes it difficult for APHIS and  Customs to adequately screen incoming parcels for FMD-susceptible  products.  For example, APHIS inspectors at the international mail  facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey, told us that about 30,000 international  parcels pass through their check point every day.  This volume of mail  provides the inspectors approximately 3 seconds per parcel to judge  whether the package might contain FMD-susceptible products.   Moreover, mail is processed at the facility during the day and night to  keep up with the volume of international mail arriving daily.  However,  APHIS inspectors are present only during the day shifts and detector  dogs are available for only 1 to 2 days per week.  Although Customs’  inspectors screen packages for FMD-susceptible products during the  time when APHIS inspectors are not available, both APHIS and Customs  inspectors told us that the process is less effective than having an APHIS  inspector on site.  Nonetheless, according to APHIS’s Assistant Director  for Port Operations, even doubling or tripling the agency’s inspection  resources would not significantly reduce the FMD risk from overseas  entries because the percentage of passengers, vehicles, and cargo  receiving a physical inspection is likely to continue to be relatively low.
Moreover, most U.S. preventive measures are not designed to intercept  illegal entries of products or passengers that may harbor the FMD virus.
According to USDA, the volume of illegal agricultural products entering  the United States is growing, and contraband meat products entering the  country is the single most important risk for the introduction of FMD.  In  addition, illegal shipments of products from countries other than the  stated point of origin and illegal immigrants also pose significant risks.   USDA and Customs annually confiscate thousands of contraband and  prohibited products at U.S. ports of entry.  For example, in fiscal year  2001, USDA seized 313,231 shipments of prohibited meat/poultry and  animal by-products.  According to USDA officials, these seizures are  only a small portion of the contraband entering the United States.  To  respond to the growing threat from illegal entries, USDA recently  created the Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance program.   Program officials collaborate with several federal, state, and private  organizations to ensure compliance with U.S. agriculture import laws at  ports of entry.
section_title: U.S. Preventive Measures Are Comparable to Those Used by Other Countries
paragraphs: U.S. preventive measures for FMD are comparable to the measures used by  Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom for four key pathways included  in this review:  livestock imports, animal product imports, international  mail, and garbage from international carriers.  The pathway that presented  the most significant area of difference concerned the measures used to  process international passengers entering these countries.  (Detailed  information on the preventive measures used by Canada, Mexico, and the  United Kingdom are provided in appendixes II through IV of this report.)
Generally, U.S. preventive measures were similar to those used by the other  three countries for the following four pathways:  Imported livestock.  The three countries allow imports of livestock only  from approved countries that are FMD-free.  Generally, these live  animals must be imported through predetermined inspection ports that  have adequate facilities available to quarantine the animals, if necessary.   In addition, the countries require import permits and health certificates  to accompany the livestock shipments unless the animals are imported  directly for slaughter.  Of the three countries, Mexico requires an official  government veterinarian to (1) preinspect animals imported from  countries other than the United States in their country of origin before  they are loaded for transport to Mexico and (2) accompany the  shipment and monitor the health status of the animals while they are in  transit.
Imported animal products.  The countries generally allow animal  product imports only from countries that they consider FMD-free and  that meet their specific animal health and food safety standards.  The  countries also allow certain animal product imports from FMD-affected  countries if they originate from a preapproved establishment and are  processed in a manner that would inactivate the virus.  For example,  meat products that are fully cooked and canned and are shelf-stable can  be imported from FMD-affected countries, but unprocessed products,  such as fresh, chilled, or frozen meat, and untreated milk, are not  allowed.  In addition, all imported animal product shipments are subject  to review and may be selected for physical inspection when they arrive  at the port of entry in each of the countries.
International mail.  The countries handle international mail in a similar  manner, which includes a review of the documentation detailing the  sender, country of origin, and contents of the package.  Only packages  considered suspect, for example, because they do not include required  information, are from high-risk countries, or have been sent by repeat  offenders, are selected and opened for further inspection.  Canada uses  x-ray technology to help identify packages containing prohibited items,  and Mexican officials told us that all international packages arriving  from FMD-affected countries are opened and inspected for prohibited  items.
Garbage from international carriers.  The countries’ federal agencies  responsible for protecting animal health supervise the containment,  transportation, and processing of garbage from international carriers.  They generally dispose of international garbage by incineration or under  certain conditions by burial at federally approved sites.  For example, in  Canada, international garbage can be buried at approved sites located at  least half a kilometer from any premise with livestock and/or poultry  and must be immediately covered by 1.8 meters (approx. 5.5 feet) of  local refuse and/or other standard covering material.  At the time of our  review, none of the countries allowed domestic animals to be fed  international garbage from airlines or ships.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA noted that the United  Kingdom faces greater risk than the United States because it is a member of  the European Union, which includes, and provides for trade among,  countries that are FMD-free as well as some that are not.
The United States differed from Canada and Mexico in the measures used  to prevent FMD from entering the country via international passengers.   Specifically, we noted the following three areas of difference:  Use of signs at ports of entry.  While Canada, Mexico, and the United  States all posted special signs at ports of entry to alert international  passengers to the dangers of FMD, the U.S. signs were smaller and less  visible in comparison with the signs used by the other two countries.   For example, the Canadian signs were over 6 feet tall and warned  passengers in large, bold letters in both English and French about FMD.   Similarly, in Mexico the signs were also over 6 feet tall, included  pictures, and colored text in English or Spanish.  In contrast, the first  U.S. signs were 1-by-1 foot and included relatively small-sized text on a  white background that was difficult to read and did not easily convey  the importance of the message.  According to USDA officials, these  signs were subsequently replaced with larger signs (3-by-3 feet) that  included a colored graphic and larger-sized text.  While larger, we  observed at one U.S. international airport that the new signs were  placed at a considerable distance from arriving passengers.  These signs  were placed on easels on top of the baggage carousels and therefore  were several feet above eye level.  In contrast, we observed that the  signs in Canada and Mexico were placed in more easily visible locations  that were in greater proximity to the passengers.  According to  agriculture officials in all three countries, they are limited in their ability  to place signs at ports of entry because they have to negotiate the size  and placement with the port authorities.  As a result, they are not always  able to use the most effective signs or locations.  Figures 3 and 4 show  the signs that were used in the United States and Canada and Mexico.
Modified declaration forms.  In 2001, both Canada and Mexico made  changes to the declaration forms they use to process international  passengers upon arrival.  For example, after the U.K. outbreak in 2001,  Canada reworded its declaration form to provide examples of food  products of concern, such as dairy products.  Similarly, Mexico  developed a separate form that passengers coming from FMD-affected  countries must complete, and it asks clear, detailed agriculture-related  questions.  In contrast, the United States did not make any changes to its  declaration form in 2001, and some of the international passengers we  contacted considered the agriculture-related question on the form  ineffective and unclear.  A senior APHIS official told us that USDA was  aware that the question on the form was confusing and ambiguous to  travelers.  This official said that most of the confusion arises because  the question on the form consolidates three questions into one.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that it has  recently worked with Customs to revise the agricultural question on the  Customs declaration form.  The form now includes two agriculture- related questions that USDA believes will be more easily understood by  travelers and will yield better information to the department to help  focus its inspection efforts.  The new form is currently being distributed  throughout the country. Because USDA’s actions address our concerns,  we have deleted our recommendation on this issue from this report.   (See table 4 for a comparison of the agriculture-related questions on the  prior and revised U.S. declaration forms.)
Use of disinfectant mats.  As a precaution, both Canada and Mexico  developed guidelines requiring all international passengers arriving at  airports and seaports to walk over disinfectant mats when entering the  country.  However, according to USDA officials, the United States chose  not to use disinfectant mats because USDA research found that the  disinfectant in the mat would become ineffective after a certain number  of uses and may begin to harbor the virus, thus contaminating shoes that  were otherwise clean.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The United States has had significant success in keeping the nation’s  livestock FMD-free since 1929.  To some extent, the success of this effort is  directly related to the effectiveness of U.S. preventive measures both  abroad and at the nation’s borders.  However, because of the extensive  presence of FMD worldwide and because the magnitude and volume of  international cargo and travel continue to expand, the nation’s vulnerability  to an introduction of FMD remains high.  The steps that other nations have  taken to reduce the risk of FMD—such as signs to alert international  passengers—could help improve USDA’s efforts to protect U.S. livestock.   While we recognize that there is an additional cost to preparing new, larger,  and more noticeable signs, we believe that, given the significant economic  costs of an FMD outbreak to the nation, these costs are justified if they can  help improve our preventive measures.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help improve the effectiveness of U.S. measures to prevent the  introduction of FMD by international passengers, we recommend that the  Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator, APHIS, to develop more  effective signage about FMD for ports of entry.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: In its comments on a draft of this report, USDA stated that it is in the  process of developing new signage for ports of entry that will be larger and  more mobile than the ones that we observed during the course of our work.
section_title: Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
paragraphs: If FMD enters the United States despite USDA’s preventive measures, the  nation’s ability to identify, control, contain, and eradicate the disease  quickly and effectively becomes paramount.  Recognizing the importance  of an effective response and the necessity to prepare before an outbreak  occurs, USDA and most states have developed emergency response plans  that establish a framework for the key elements necessary for a rapid and  successful U.S. response and eradication program.  Many of these plans  have, to some extent, been tested by federal and state agencies to  determine their effectiveness.  However, planning and testing exercises  have also identified several challenges that could ultimately impede an  effective and timely U.S. response if they are not resolved before an FMD  outbreak occurs.
subsections: section_title: The Federal Government and Many States Have Developed and Tested Emergency Response Plans
paragraphs: Planning for a coordinated response to emergencies, including outbreaks  of animal disease, is occurring at both the federal and state levels.   Furthermore, both the federal government and many states have tested and  revised their plans in response to the results of these tests.
subsections: section_title: Federal and State Governments Have Developed Emergency Response Plans
paragraphs: At the federal level, 26 federal agencies and the American Red Cross signed  the federal response plan in April 1999, which is intended to guide the  federal response to national emergencies and augment state response  efforts.  Under this plan, the Federal Emergency Management Agency  (FEMA) is designated as the coordinating agency and is responsible for  providing expertise in emergency communications, command and control,  and public affairs.  In the event of an FMD outbreak, FEMA would  designate USDA as the lead agency and work closely with the department  to coordinate the support of other federal agencies to respond to the  outbreak.  For example, under the plan, Customs would “lock down” ports  of entry; the Department of Defense would provide personnel, equipment,  and transport; the Environmental Protection Agency would provide  technical support on the disposal of animal carcasses; the National Park  Service would guide the response if wildlife become infected; and other  agencies would provide additional support.
To supplement the federal response plan and provide specific guidelines  for an animal disease emergency, such as implementing quarantines of  infected premises and disposing of animal carcasses, APHIS, USDA’s  Homeland Security Council, and FEMA are taking the lead in developing a  federal plan specifically for responding to an FMD or other highly  contagious outbreak of an animal disease.  The draft plan calls for the  involvement of more than 20 agencies and describes the authorities,  policies, situations, planning assumptions, concept of operations, and  federal agency resources that will provide the framework for an integrated  local, state, and federal response.
At the state level, many states have developed an animal disease  component for their state’s emergency management plans.  According to  the National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS),  in January 2000, only about half the states and U.S. territories had  developed animal health emergency response plans.  At that time,  NAHEMS recommended that each state develop a plan for responding to  animal health emergencies that links to their state’s emergency  management plan and includes information on the following key elements:  Animal health surveillance and detection systems.
Control and eradication procedures.
Communication between key partners.
Involvement of emergency management officials.
Collaboration between state and federal emergency responders.
Involvement of state and federal animal health officials in responding to  natural disasters.
According to NAHEMS, in its 2001 annual report dated March 2002, the  number of states and U.S. territories with animal disease emergency plans  had increased to 46, of which 45 had included the plan as part of their  state’s emergency management plan, and 30 indicated that their plan  included all of the elements listed above.
section_title: Federal and State Agencies Have Tested Their Emergency Response Plans
paragraphs: To ensure the efficacy and completeness of their plans, the federal  government and many of the states have conducted “tabletop” and  functional exercises.  Tabletop exercises bring together key decision  makers in a relatively stress-free setting to  discuss the contingencies and logistics of a hypothetical disease   evaluate plans, policies, and procedures; and  resolve questions of coordination and responsibility.
The setting is relatively stress-free because there is no time limit to resolve  the hypothetical outbreak.  In contrast, functional exercises simulate an  emergency in the most realistic way possible, without moving people or  equipment.  It is a stressful, real-time exercise in which people apply  emergency response functions to a hypothetical scenario.  According to  one APHIS official, functional exercises are best described as “dress  rehearsals” for actual emergencies.
The federal government has held both tabletop and functional exercises, as  described below:  To ensure that the federal FMD emergency response plan is  comprehensive and well coordinated, USDA conducted a tabletop  exercise in 2001.  In this exercise, USDA developed a scenario involving  a modest, limited FMD outbreak in the United States and obtained the  views of 21 federal agencies and the American Red Cross on how they  could support the federal response to an FMD outbreak.  USDA used  this information to revise its draft national FMD response plan.
The federal government held a functional exercise in 2000—the  Tripartite Exercise 2000—to test the plans, policies, and procedures that  would guide the emergency response to a multifocal FMD outbreak in  North America.  The test focused on communication between the  various entities involved in an outbreak and the use of vaccines by  Canada, Mexico, and the United States.  The test resulted in many  recommendations to improve the three countries’ abilities to (1) communicate effectively, (2) provide program support, and (3) use  vaccines.  According to the final report, the recommendations, if  implemented, will improve North America’s overall response capacity.
The three countries have established working groups tasked with  responding to these recommendations.
Similarly, as of 2001, about 26 states had periodically conducted various  kinds of exercises to test state responses to an FMD or other animal  disease outbreak, according to NAHEMS.  For example, in June 2001, the  Texas Animal Health Commission, in conjunction with the Texas Division  of Emergency Management within the Texas Department of Public Safety,  conducted a 4-day modified functional exercise of the state’s draft FMD  response plan and engaged 23 federal, state, academic, and private entities  in the exercise.  The exercise was designed to test participants’ abilities to  control the simulated outbreak, find and deliver indemnity funds, and  streamline the decision-making processes.  Overall, the exercise  determined that better communication and coordination could improve the  speed and effectiveness of the state’s response.  It also identified areas of  ambiguity in the plan that left participants without clear directions at  crucial times during the exercise.  According to state officials, the plan was  revised as a result of the exercise, and according to the Executive Director  of the Texas Animal Health Commission, more exercises are necessary to  continuously improve the plan.  However, the state veterinarian also said  that he does not believe that adequate resources are available either at the  federal or state level for such activities.
section_title: Serious Challenges to an Effective U.S. Response Are Yet to Be Resolved
paragraphs: As the U.K. experience has demonstrated, responding to an FMD outbreak  can tax a nation’s fiscal, scientific, and human resources.  If a similar  outbreak were to occur in the United States, the nation would face a wide  spectrum of challenges that can hamper an effective and rapid response:   (1) the need for rapid disease identification and reporting; (2) effective  communication, coordination, and cooperation between federal, state, and  local responders; (3) an adequate response infrastructure, including  equipment, personnel, and laboratory capacity; and (4) clear animal  identification, indemnification, and disposal policies.  While USDA has  made some progress in addressing some of these issues, significant work  remains.
subsections: section_title: Rapid Disease Identification and Reporting
paragraphs: The rapid identification and reporting of an FMD incident is key to  mounting a timely response.  However, a timely response depends on  livestock producers’ and private veterinarians’ quickly identifying and  reporting suspicious symptoms to state and federal officials.  If they do not  do so, FMD could become out of control before the federal and state  governments could initiate any action.  For example, within the first few  days of the outbreak in the United Kingdom, before the first reports of FMD  reached British officials, infected animals were criss-crossing the country  in hundreds of separate movements, putting other livestock at risk.  The  main geographical spread of the disease occurred before any suspicion that  the disease was present in the country.  In contrast, in France, county  officials quickly identified diseased animals from the United Kingdom, and  were able to slaughter them quickly and avoid a large-scale outbreak.  As a  result, France sustained minimal animal losses and was declared FMD-free  within months, while it took the United Kingdom almost a year to eradicate  the disease and regain its FMD-free status.
Several federal and state animal health officials with whom we spoke were  concerned about how quickly disease identification and reporting would  actually occur in the United States.  They told us that livestock producers  or veterinarians may not readily identify FMD because (1) the disease  presents symptoms that are similar to other less-serious diseases, (2) FMD  and other foreign animal diseases are not usually included in veterinary  school curricula, and (3) many veterinarians may never have seen FMD- infected animals.  Furthermore, livestock producers and veterinarians may  not report the disease because they are not aware of the reporting process  or may not realize the criticality of prompt reporting.
According to USDA officials, the U.K. outbreak helped raise general  awareness among state officials, private veterinarians, and livestock  producers about the risks and potential of an FMD outbreak in the United  States.  An indication of this increased awareness is the doubling of foreign  animal disease investigations from about 400 in 2000 to more than 800 in  2001.  In addition, federal and state officials told us that the U.K. outbreak  led to greater awareness of the need to have trained diagnosticians for  foreign animal diseases in the field.  In recent years, more field  veterinarians have attended foreign animal disease training at USDA’s Plum  Island facility.
Nevertheless, as described in chapter 2, USDA intensified its efforts to  increase public and industry awareness about FMD after the U.K. outbreak  in 2001.  As part of these efforts, USDA also addressed industry and animal  health associations, and sponsored workshops, conferences, and  informational telecasts for federal, state, and local officials, and others.  In  addition, the state governments also supported and supplemented USDA’s  informational efforts.  Despite USDA and state efforts to flood the livestock  industry with information about the risks of FMD during 2001, the  challenge to USDA will be to maintain this heightened awareness about  FMD, now that the immediate risk from the U.K. outbreak has subsided.
section_title: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication
paragraphs: Cooperation, coordination, and communication between federal, state, and  local agencies, private veterinarians, and livestock producers are essential  for an effective FMD response.  Recent planning efforts and test exercises  have helped start the process of establishing greater coordination and  improving the level of cooperation and communication between all levels.   According to a USDA official, for example, USDA’s recent planning efforts  to develop a national FMD response plan brought together officials from a  variety of federal agencies to consider the implications of an FMD outbreak  to their areas of responsibility and helped them develop ways in which they  could support a federal response.
Moreover, efforts to improve communication, cooperation, and  coordination are beginning to transcend state boundaries.  In 2001, 26 U.S.  states/territories reported to NAHEMS that they were part of a group of  states that had agreed to support each other in preparing for and  responding to animal health emergencies.  For example, according to  Midwestern state officials, they are now beginning to address regional  coordination and cooperation issues.  In May 2002, seven Midwestern  states met in Iowa for a planning conference to discuss a coordinated  response plan for the region.
While these planning and testing efforts have improved the level of  communication, coordination, and cooperation, they have also identified  areas that need considerable attention.  For example, although the  Tripartite Exercise of 2000 identified generally good communication and  cooperation between government and industry participants, it also  identified the need for the following actions:  Improve the technology used to ensure an uninterrupted flow of  information.
Develop written agreements between national animal health and  industry officials to ensure a continued high level of communication  even when players change.
Have federal and state counterparts work together to develop  collaborative relationships that will improve communications during an  actual outbreak.
We also found that cooperation and communication between federal and  state officials varied by state.  For example, while some state officials  indicated that they had excellent working relationships with their federal  counterpart located in the state, others told us that cooperation and  communication were limited.  According to one APHIS field veterinarian,  the level of cooperation and communication depends to a large extent on  the personalities of the people involved and therefore such variance is to be  expected.  While the development of written agreements as suggested by  the Tripartite exercise report and NAHEMS could help alleviate this  problem, as of 2001, only about 32 U.S. states/territories had such  agreements or other documents that detailed the respective roles of federal  and state officials.
To help improve cooperation, coordination, and communication, USDA  officials told us that they are working with organizations such as the  National Emergency Management Association to help states with their  animal-emergency-planning efforts.  In addition, USDA awarded 38 grants  totaling $1.8 million in 2001 to state agencies, tribal nations, and emergency  management organizations.  According to USDA, this funding was to be  used for training, equipment, and emergency-preparedness exercises.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that in late May 2002,  it announced that it would be making more than $43 million available as  grants to the states for strengthening homeland security preparedness.  Of  this $43 million, $14 million is to help states meet the national standards of  emergency preparedness established by NAHEMS.  Moreover, USDA stated  that it is working with FEMA to develop a framework for a comprehensive  communications plan to address a foreign animal disease outbreak.  The  plan will help better ensure the timely dissemination of information to  critical audiences, including federal agencies, states, and industries.
section_title: Adequate Response Infrastructure
paragraphs: An effective response to an FMD outbreak requires an effective  infrastructure, including a national emergency management control and  command center, technical and other personnel, transportation and  disposal equipment, and laboratory facilities and testing capacity.
To ensure that a U.S. response to an FMD outbreak is properly coordinated  and adequately controlled, USDA has established an Emergency  Management Operations Center at its Riverdale, Maryland, location.  In the  event of an outbreak, USDA will activate this center to coordinate day-to- day activities during an FMD response and notify U.S. trading partners of  the status of the outbreak.  According to USDA’s draft FMD response plan,  APHIS will set up the Joint Information Center—collocated with the  Emergency Management Operations Center—to serve as the primary  source of public information about the response and will coordinate with  other federal and state information centers.
In addition, as the U.K. outbreak illustrated, responding to an FMD  outbreak requires extensive personnel resources.  These include persons  who can provide (1) specialized animal disease support for testing and  diagnosis, epidemiology, vaccination, slaughter, and carcass disposal; (2)  biohazard response support for controlling animals’ movement and  decontaminating infected and exposed premises, equipment, and  personnel; and (3) general logistics support for sheltering and feeding  responders; the transportation, movement, and positioning of equipment  and supplies; and general law enforcement.  During the 2001 outbreak, the  U.K. government had to request specialized animal disease support from  several countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, and New  Zealand; hire thousands of private contractors to provide slaughter and  decontamination support; and use military personnel to provide general  logistical support.  According to a U.K. government working paper issued  in March 2002, during the peak of the outbreak, more than 7,000 civil  servants, 2,000 veterinarians, and 2,000 armed forces personnel were  involved in the response—making it a bigger and more complex logistical  exercise than the United Kingdom’s involvement in the Gulf War.
A recent test exercise in Iowa indicates that the personnel requirements to  respond to an FMD outbreak in the United States would also be  enormous—approaching 50,000 people to support a response.  More  specifically, according to APHIS estimates, the United States would be at  least 1,200 veterinarians short of the required 2,000 to 3,000 specially  trained veterinarians needed to respond to an animal health emergency.   APHIS officials told us that while state and private veterinarians could help  make up some of this difference, without appropriate training, their help  would be of limited use.
To address the personnel challenges posed by an FMD outbreak, USDA has  undertaken several efforts.  By partnering with FEMA and other emergency  management organizations, USDA will be able to leverage these agencies’  resources to help provide many of the general logistical support activities.   Similarly, USDA has established a memorandum of understanding with the  Department of Defense to provide military personnel and equipment to  support a response effort.  In addition, APHIS has implemented an  Emergency Veterinarian Officer Program to increase the number of  veterinarians available to assist in an animal health emergency.  The  program trains federal, state, and private veterinarians to handle  emergency situations.  As of December 2001, APHIS had trained 276  emergency veterinarian officers, 145 of whom participated in responding to  the U.K. outbreak.  Moreover, USDA has trained 520 veterinarians across  the country as foreign animal disease diagnosticians, and they may be  called upon to provide specialized animal health support in the event of an  outbreak.  Finally, according to APHIS officials, USDA has informal  arrangements with the United Kingdom and other countries to provide the  United States with veterinary support.  More formally, Australia, Canada,  New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom are currently  drafting a memorandum of understanding that would allow the five  countries to share veterinary resources in the event of an animal health  emergency.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA also indicated that it has  created a National Animal Health Reserve Corps, composed of private  veterinarians from around the country who would be willing to assist  APHIS veterinarians in field and laboratory operations during a foreign  animal disease situation.  According to USDA, to date, more than 275  private veterinarians have signed on to this corps and the department is  continuing its efforts to recruit more members.  This corps will supplement  the personnel drawn from states, and other federal agencies and  organizations.
A response infrastructure also requires a diagnostic laboratory system that  is capable of handling the volume of testing and analysis necessary in the  event of an outbreak.  For example, from February through December  2001, the United Kingdom’s Pirbright Laboratory, that country’s primary  reference laboratory, tested 15,000 samples for the presence of the FMD  virus and performed 1 million monitoring tests to ensure that the disease  had been eradicated.  Nationwide, a total of 2.75 million samples were  tested as part of the response to the outbreak.  Despite this level of testing,  according to U.S. veterinarians returning from the United Kingdom, the  United Kingdom had unmet needs for laboratory assistance.
In the United States, USDA’s Plum Island facility—the primary laboratory in  the United States that is authorized to test suspected FMD samples—would  be quickly overwhelmed in the event of an FMD outbreak, according to  many federal and state officials with whom we spoke.  Recognizing this  potential problem, the National Association of State Departments of  Agriculture recently recommended that the United States develop a  national strategy for animal health diagnostic laboratory services that  would include USDA’s Plum Island facility and its National Veterinary  Services Laboratories at Ames, Iowa, as well as state and university  laboratories.  Currently, state diagnostic laboratories have no formal role in  a foreign animal disease response.  In addition, the Director of the Plum  Island facility stated that the nation needs to look beyond Plum Island for  laboratory support in the event of a large-scale FMD outbreak.  He  suggested that off-site noncentralized testing, using noninfectious material  (tests that do not use the live virus), should be considered with backup  testing support provided by Plum Island.  APHIS officials told us that while  the idea of a regional laboratory structure has merit, several issues would  have to be addressed before such a structure could be implemented.  For  example, laboratory personnel would have to undergo continuous training  and certification, and facilities would have to be renovated and maintained  to provide state of the art capabilities.  This would require a significant  commitment of resources.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that as part of its  efforts to strengthen homeland security preparedness, it is providing state  and university cooperators with $20.6 million to establish a network of  diagnostic laboratories dispersed strategically throughout the country.   This network will permit the rapid and accurate diagnosis of animal disease  threats.  Moreover, USDA stated that earlier this year it allocated $177  million to make improvements at key locations, including its diagnostic and  research facilities in Ames, Iowa, and Plum Island, and that $15.3 million  was allocated to USDA’s Agricultural Research Service to improve rapid  detection technology for FMD as well as other animal diseases.
section_title: Animal Identification, Disposal, and Indemnification Policies
paragraphs: The effectiveness of a U.S. response to an FMD outbreak will require an  animal identification and tracking system to allow responders to identify,  control, and slaughter infected and exposed animals as well as clear animal  disposal and indemnification policies.  The 2002 farm bill, addresses  animal disposal and indemnification issues by providing the Secretary of  Agriculture with broad authority to hold, seize, treat, or destroy any animal,  as well as to limit interstate livestock movement as part of USDA’s efforts  to prevent the spread of any livestock disease or pest.  The Secretary may  also take measures to detect, control, or eradicate any pest or disease of  livestock, as needed.  In addition, the farm bill requires the Secretary to  compensate owners on the basis of the fair market value of destroyed  animals and related materials.  USDA is currently trying to develop specific  guidance on how these authorities will be implemented.
Many epidemiologists believe that in the event of an FMD outbreak,  successfully tracing affected animal movements within 24 hours is  essential if the response is to be effective.  However, the United States  generally does not require animal identification, nor does it have a system  for tracking animal movements.  As a result, according to a USDA official,  in the event of an FMD outbreak, USDA would likely have to rely on sales  records to track animal movements, which could take days, or weeks,  depending on the accuracy of record-keeping and producer/seller  cooperation.
The longer it takes to identify animals and track their movements from  premise to premise, the more difficult it becomes to contain the outbreak.   USDA officials told us that, depending on where the outbreak is first  identified, it may be relatively easy or extremely difficult to trace.  For  example, if only one farm were infected and animals had not recently been  moved on or off the premises, no tracing of live animals would be  necessary.  However, if the outbreak first appeared in a major market or  feedlot where hundreds of animals move in and out on almost a daily basis,  tracing would be very difficult and time-consuming.
Recognizing the importance of an animal identification and tracking  system, USDA began planning such a system 3 years ago, according to the  Director of the National Animal Identification initiative.  However, the  industry resisted the concept because of the costs involved and the  potential for the unauthorized disclosure of proprietary information.  The  Director noted that the events of September 11, 2001, as well as  technological advances appear to be reducing the level of industry  opposition to a national animal identification system.  For example, this  official told us that the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association recently  indicated some support for such a system.  However, the following issues  will need to be resolved before a national system can be developed and  implemented:    The responsibility for funding the system.
The type of technology that should be employed—strictly visual,  electronic, or some combination.
The amount of information that should be included on each animal’s  identification tag or electronic-tracking device.
The persons able to access this information.
The information that should be shared with other federal departments  and agencies.
At what point on the farm-to-table continuum should identification end?
In addition, during an FMD outbreak in the United States, the disposal of  carcasses could become a significant challenge because of the potential  number of animals that may have to be slaughtered.  For example, during  the U.K. outbreak, over 4 million animals, primarily sheep, were  slaughtered for controlling the disease.  According to USDA estimates, if  the United States had an outbreak of comparable magnitude (affecting  about 8 percent of the livestock population), over 13 million animals would  be affected, and most of them would be cattle and hogs.  Generally,  disposal can occur by burial, incineration, or rendering.  In the United  States, according to USDA’s draft FMD response plan, burial would be the  preferred method of disposal when conditions make it practical.  The plan  states that burial is the fastest, easiest, and most economical method of  disposal.  When burial is not feasible, the plan recommends incineration as  the alternative means of disposal even though USDA recognizes that  incineration is both difficult and expensive.  According to a USDA  veterinarian who helped during the U.K. outbreak, a 200-meter funeral pyre  was used to incinerate 400 cows or 1,200 sheep or 1,600 pigs.   Such a pyre  required 1,000 railway ties, 8 tons of kindling, 400 wooden pallets, 4 tons of  straw, 200 tons of coal, and 1,000 liters of diesel fuel.  In addition, heavy  equipment, such as bulldozers and a team of about 18 to 20 people, was  needed to construct the pyre.  Figures 5 and 6 show burial pits and  incineration pyres used in the United Kingdom to dispose of slaughtered  animals.
According to the federal and state officials we spoke with, each of these  disposal methods presents significant implementation challenges that have  not yet been fully considered.  For example, burial poses such challenges  as the potential to contaminate groundwater, the need to identify burial  sites and obtain appropriate federal and state permits and clearances in  advance, and the potential to spread the disease if animals have to be  transported to an off-farm burial site.  For incineration, the incineration  site has to be accessible to large equipment, and yet has to be sufficiently  away from public view to minimize negative public reaction to the sight of  large burning pyres.  In addition, incineration could not only affect air  quality but also may be ineffective because if not constructed properly, the  pyres may not generate sufficient temperatures to completely incinerate  the carcasses.  According to a USDA veterinarian, in the United Kingdom  the pyres generally burned for about 9 to 10 days before all of the carcasses  were incinerated.  Similarly, rendering poses challenges because  transporting carcasses to rendering plants increases the risk of spreading  the disease, and additional cleaning and disinfecting procedures would be  needed at the rendering facility.  Some U.S. veterinarians returning from the  United Kingdom told us that during the outbreak, the United Kingdom  faced many of these disposal challenges and they were concerned that the  United States might not have devoted enough attention to deciding how it  would address these or similar disposal issues.  According to APHIS  officials, USDA is currently creating digital maps of the whole country to  help identify appropriate burial and incineration locations.  In addition,  USDA is trying to determine alternative uses of carcasses, such as safely  converting the meat into food, and using vaccinations to limit the number  of animals slaughtered and thus requiring disposal.
Finally, clear indemnification and compensation criteria are needed to  ensure producer cooperation to slaughter and dispose of infected and  exposed livestock during an outbreak.  During the U.K. outbreak, the  government agency responsible for responding to the outbreak  experienced delays in slaughtering animals because of farmers’ resistance  and legal challenges.  According to state and livestock association officials,  indemnification would be a significant issue—one that could hamper a  rapid response in the United States.
USDA published a proposed rule on May 1, 2002, amending the indemnity  provisions for its FMD-related regulations.  This proposed rule clarifies  how USDA will determine the value of animals and materials affected by an  FMD outbreak and how indemnity payments will be made to claimants.   USDA developed this proposed rule because it was concerned that  potential delays to an FMD eradication program in the United States might  occur because of producers’ perceptions that they might not be adequately  compensated for the fair market value of destroyed animals, products, and  materials as well as cleaning and disinfecting costs.  Under the proposed  rule, the federal government would pay 100 percent of the costs for the  purchase, destruction, and disposition of animals if they become infected  with FMD, as well as for materials contaminated with FMD and the  cleaning and disinfection of affected premises, according to USDA.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA agreed that animal  identification, carcass disposal, and indemnity are all absolutely vital areas  that have to be addressed before any major outbreak of disease.  In this  regard, USDA stated that it is working closely with the agricultural  industries to provide forums for a national dialogue on the issue of a  national identification plan for American livestock.  The ultimate objective  is to establish a national identification plan that provides the essential  elements to improve emergency response and meet future needs.  USDA  further stated that it is investing in other options for disposing of carcasses  on a large scale.  Finally, USDA stated that it has extended the comment  period from July 1 to July 31, 2002, for its proposed regulations that address  how decisions regarding indemnity payments will be made in the event of  an FMD outbreak.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: If an outbreak of FMD in the United States rages out of control, it could  ultimately cost tens of billions of dollars and the destruction of millions of  animals.  To avoid such catastrophic consequences, the disease must be  stamped out quickly.  Although the federal government and state  governments have made significant progress in developing and testing  emergency response plans for an animal disease outbreak, such as FMD,  significant issues remain unresolved.  These unresolved issues could  present major impediments to an effective and timely response if not  addressed before an outbreak occurs.  While USDA currently has several  ongoing efforts to resolve many of these issues, the department has not  established specific time frames for the completion of these efforts.  We  believe it is critical that adequate management attention and resources be  made available to ensure that these issues are resolved expeditiously.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that the United States is well positioned to respond effectively to  an animal disease outbreak such as FMD, we recommend that the  Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of APHIS to develop a  plan, which should include interim milestones and completion dates, for  addressing the various unresolved issues that could challenge an effective  U.S. response.