Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police
Published: 2005-03-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since the fall of the former Iraq regime in April 2003, the multinational force has been working to develop Iraqi military and police forces capable of maintaining security. To support this effort, the United States provided about $5.8 billion in 2003-04 to develop Iraq's security capability. In February 2005, the president requested a supplemental appropriation with an additional $5.7 billion to accelerate the development of Iraqi military and police forces. GAO provides preliminary observations on (1) the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces; (2) the data on the status of forces, and (3) challenges that the Multi-National Force in Iraq faces in transferring security missions to these forces. To prepare this statement, GAO used unclassified reports, status updates, security plans, and other documents from the Departments of Defense and State. GAO also used testimonies and other statements for the record from officials such as the Secretary of Defense. In addition, GAO visited the Iraqi police training facility in Jordan.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Multinational Force in Iraq has developed and begun to implement a strategy to transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi military and police forces. This strategy would allow a gradual drawdown of its forces based on the multinational force neutralizing the insurgency and developing Iraqi military and police services that can independently maintain security. U.S. government agencies do not report reliable data on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped. As of March 2005, the State Department reported that about 82,000 police forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and about 62,000 military forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense have been trained and equipped. However, the reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable because the Ministry of Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting from the police forces around the country. The data does not exclude police absent from duty. Further, the departments of State and Defense no longer report on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are equipped with their required weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and body armor. The insurgency in Iraq has intensified since June 2003, making it difficult to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. From that time through January 2005, insurgent attacks grew in number, complexity, and intensity. At the same time, the multinational force has faced four key challenges in increasing the capability of Iraqi forces: (1) training, equipping, and sustaining a changing force structure; (2) developing a system for measuring the readiness and capability of Iraqi forces; (3) building loyalty and leadership throughout the Iraqi chain of command; and (4) developing a police force that upholds the rule of law in a hostile environment. The multinational force is taking steps to address these challenges, such as developing a system to assess unit readiness and embedding US forces within Iraqi units. However, without reliable reporting data, a more capable Iraqi force, and stronger Iraqi leadership, the Department of Defense faces difficulties in implementing its strategy to draw down U.S. forces from Iraq.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss challenges in transferring security  responsibilities from the multinational force to the Iraqi military and  police forces. In April 2005, we will issue a classified report to the  Congress that provides additional analysis on this subject.
The former Iraqi regime fell in April 2003, and the United Nations  recognized an interim administration—the Coalition Provisional Authority.   On May 23, 2003, the Authority dissolved the military and paramilitary  organizations of the former Iraqi regime and announced plans to create a  new national self-defense capability for Iraq. In June 2004, the Authority  transferred sovereignty to an interim government. At the time of Iraq’s  January 2005 elections, more than 159,000 U.S. forces and 24,500 coalition  forces were operating throughout Iraq.
As of March 2005, the United States has made available about $5.8 billion  to develop Iraq’s security capability. In February 2005, the President  requested a supplemental appropriation for Iraq, Afghanistan, and other  purposes that included an additional $5.7 billion to accelerate the  development of Iraqi security forces.
Today, I will provide preliminary observations on (1) the strategy for  transferring  security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces,   (2) data on the status of Iraqi forces, and (3) challenges the Multi-National  Force in Iraq (MNF-I) faces in transferring security missions to these  forces.
This statement only includes unclassified information. (See appendix I for  details on our scope and methodology.) We conducted work for this  statement in February and March 2005 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), established in May 2003, was  the U.N.-recognized coalition authority led by the United States and the  United Kingdom that was responsible for the temporary governance of  Iraq.  In May 2003, the CPA dissolved the military organizations of the  former regime and began the process of creating or reestablishing new  Iraqi security forces, including the police and new Iraqi army.  Over time,  multinational force commanders assumed responsibility for recruiting and  training some Iraqi defense and police forces in their areas of  responsibility. On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to a sovereign  Iraqi interim government, the CPA officially dissolved, and Iraq’s  transitional period began.  Under Iraq’s transitional law, the transitional  period covers the interim government phase and the transitional  government period, which is scheduled to end by December 31, 2005.
The multinational force (MNF-I) has the authority to take all necessary  measures to contribute to security and stability in Iraq during this process,  working in partnership with the Iraqi government to reach agreement on  security and policy issues. A May 2004 national security presidential  directive required the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to direct all  U.S. government efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi security forces.   The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, which operates  under MNF-I, now leads coalition efforts to train, equip, and organize Iraqi  security forces.
section_title: MNF-I Plan for Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Forces
paragraphs: In October 2003, the multinational force outlined a four-phased plan for  transferring security missions to Iraqi security forces. The four phases  were (1) mutual support, where the multinational force establishes  conditions for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces; (2)  transition to local control, where Iraqi forces in a local area assume  responsibility for security; (3) transition to regional control, where Iraqi  forces are responsible for larger regions; and (4) transition to strategic  over watch, where Iraqi forces on a national level are capable of  maintaining a secure environment against internal and external threats,  with broad monitoring from the multinational force. The plan’s objective  was to allow a gradual drawdown of coalition forces first in conjunction  with the neutralization of Iraq’s insurgency and second with the  development of Iraqi forces capable of securing their country.
Citing the growing capability of Iraqi security forces, MNF-I attempted to  quickly shift responsibilities to them in February 2004 but did not succeed  in this effort. In March 2004, Iraqi security forces numbered about 203,000,  including about 76,000 police, 78,000 facilities protection officers, and  about 38,000 in the civilian defense corps. Police and military units  performed poorly during an escalation of insurgent attacks against the  coalition in April 2004.  According to a July 2004 executive branch report  to Congress, many Iraqi security forces around the country collapsed  during this uprising.  Some Iraqi forces fought alongside coalition forces.   Other units abandoned their posts and responsibilities and in some cases  assisted the insurgency.
A number of problems contributed to the collapse of Iraqi security forces.   MNF-I identified problems in training and equipping them as among the  reasons for their poor performance.  Training of police and some defense  forces was not uniform and varied widely across Iraq.  MNF-I’s  commanders had the leeway to institute their own versions of the  transitional police curriculum, and the training for some defense forces  did not prepare them to fight against well-armed insurgents.  Further,  according to the CPA Director of Police, when Iraqi police voluntarily  returned to duty in May 2003, CPA initially provided limited training and  did not thoroughly vet the personnel to get them on the streets quickly.  Many police who were hired remain untrained and unvetted, according to  Department of Defense (DOD) officials.
MNF-I completed a campaign plan during summer 2004 that elaborated  and refined the original strategy for transferring security responsibilities to  Iraqi forces at the local, regional, and then national levels. Further details  on this campaign plan are classified.
On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed  Services Committee that Iraqi security forces were growing in capability  but were not yet ready to take on the insurgency without the presence,  help, mentoring, and assistance of MNF-I. He cited a mixed performance  record for the Iraqi security forces during the previous 11 months. The  commander further testified that focused training and mentoring of Iraqi  Intervention Forces, Iraqi Special Operations Forces, and National Guard  forces contributed to successful coalition operations in places such as  Najaf and Kufa during August 2004 and Fallujah during November 2004,  and during the January 2005 elections.  On the other hand, he also cited  instances of poor performance by the police in western Baghdad from  August through October 2004 and Mosul during November 2004.
section_title: Data on Iraqi Security Forces Has Limitations
paragraphs: U.S. government data does not provide reliable information on the status  of Iraqi military and police forces. According to a March 2005 State  Department report, as of February 28, 2005, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense  had 59,695 operational troops, or roughly two thirds of the total required.  The Ministry of Interior had 82,072 trained and equipped officers on duty,  or almost half of the total required. Table 1 shows status of Iraqi forces  under the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
MNF-I’s goal is to train and equip a total of about 271,000 Iraqi security  forces by July 2006. However, the numbers of security forces, as reported  in table 1, are limited in providing accurate and complete information on  the status of Iraqi forces. Specifically:
The reported number of security forces overstates the number actually  serving. Ministry of Interior reports, for example, include police who  are absent without leave in its totals. Ministry of Defense reports  exclude the absent military personnel from its totals. According to  DOD officials, the number of absentees is probably in the tens of  thousands.
The reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable.  According to a  senior official from the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, MNF-I does not  know how many Iraqi police are on duty at any given point because the  Ministry of Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting  from police stations across Iraq.
The Departments of Defense and State do not provide additional  information on the extent to which trained Iraqi security forces have  their necessary equipment. As recently as September 2004, State issued  unclassified reports with detailed information on the number of  weapons, vehicles, communication equipment, and body amour  required by each security force compared to the amount received.  State had also provided weekly unclassified updates on the number of  personnel trained in each unit.
In addition, the total number of Iraqi security forces includes forces with  varying missions and training levels.  Not all units are designed to be  capable of fighting the insurgency. For example, the police service, which  numbers about 55,000 of Iraq’s 141,000 personnel who have received  training, has a civilian law enforcement function.  As of mid-December  2004, paramilitary training for a high-threat hostile environment was not  part of the curriculum for new recruits. The missions of other units, such  as the Ministry of Defense’s commando battalion and the Ministry of  Interior’s Emergency Response Unit, focus on combating terrorism.  Required training for both forces includes counterterrorism. Table 2  provides information on the types of military and police units, their  missions, and their training.
section_title: Challenges to Transferring Security Missions to Iraqi Control
paragraphs: The multinational force’s security transition plan depends on neutralizing  the insurgent threat and increasing Iraqi security capability.  The insurgent  threat has increased since June 2003, as insurgent attacks have grown in  number, sophistication, and complexity.  At the same time, MNF-I and the  Iraqi government confront difficulties to building Iraqi security forces that  are capable of effectively combating the insurgency.  These include  programming effective support for a changing force structure, assessing  progress in developing capable forces without a system for measuring  their readiness, developing leadership and loyalty throughout the Iraqi  chain of command, and developing police who abide by the rule of law in a  hostile environment.
subsections: section_title: The Insurgency Has Intensified
paragraphs: According to senior military officials, the insurgency in Iraq—particularly  the Sunni insurgency—has grown in number, complexity, and intensity  over the past 18 months. On February 3, 2005, the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the  insurgency in Iraq had built up slowly during the first year, then became  very intense from summer 2004 through January 2005. Figure 1 provides  Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) data showing these trends in enemy  initiated attacks against the coalition, its Iraqi partners, and infrastructure.  Overall attacks peaked in August 2004 due to a rise in violence in Sunni- dominated regions and an uprising by the Mahdi Army, a Shi’a insurgent  group led by radical Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.  Although the November  2004 and January 2005 numbers were slightly lower than those for August,  it is significant that almost all of the attacks in these 2 months took place  in Sunni-majority areas, whereas the August attacks took place  countrywide.  MNF-I is the primary target of the attacks, but the number of  attacks against Iraqi civilians and security forces increased significantly  during January 2005. On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told  the Senate Armed Services Committee that more Iraqi security forces than  Americans have died in action against insurgents since June 2004.
Insurgents have demonstrated their ability to increase attacks around key  events, according to the DIA Director’s February 2005 statement before  the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. For example, attacks spiked  in April and May 2004, the months before the transfer of power to the Iraqi  interim government; in November 2004 due to a rise in violence in Sunni- dominated areas during Ramadan and MNF-I’s operation against  insurgents in Fallujah; and in January 2005 before the Iraqi elections. The  DIA Director testified that attacks on Iraq’s election day reached about  300, double the previous 1 day high of about 150 during last year’s  Ramadan. About 80 percent of all attacks occurred in Sunni-dominated  central Iraq, with the Kurdish north and Shia south remaining relatively  calm.
In February and March 2004, the DIA Director and CENTCOM Commander  presented their views of the nature of the insurgency to the Senate Select  Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee,  respectively. According to these officials, the core of the insurgency  consists of Sunni Arabs, dominated by Ba’athist and former regime  elements.  Shi’a militant groups, such as those associated with the radical  Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, remain a threat to the political process.   Following the latest round of fighting last August and September, DIA  concluded that al-Sadr’s forces were re-arming, re-organizing, and training,  with al-Sadr keeping his options open to employ his forces. Jihadists have  been responsible for many high-profile attacks that have a  disproportionate impact, although their activity accounts for only a  fraction of the overall violence.  Foreign fighters comprise a small  component of the insurgency and a very small percentage of all detainees.   DIA believes that insurgents’ infiltration and subversion of emerging  government institutions, security, and intelligence services will be a major  problem for the new government.
In late October 2004, according to a CENTCOM document, MNF-I  estimated the overall size of active enemy forces at about 20,000.  The  estimate consisted of about 10,000 former regime members; about 3,000  members of al Sadr’s forces; about 1,000 in the al-Zarqawi terrorist  network; and about 5,000 criminals, religious extremists, and their  supporters. In February and March 2005, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs  of Staff and the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services  Committee that it is difficult to develop an accurate estimate of the  number of insurgents. The CENTCOM commander explained that the  number of insurgent fighters, supporters, and sympathizers can rise and  fall depending on the politics, problems, and major offensive operations in  a given area. He also acknowledged that gaps exist in the intelligence  concerning the broader insurgency, particularly in the area of human  intelligence.
The CENTCOM commander and MNF-I commanding general recently  cited Iraq’s January 2005 elections as an important step toward Iraqi  sovereignty and security but cautioned against possible violence in the  future. In March 2005, the MNF-I commanding general stated that the  insurgency has sufficient ammunition, weapons, money, and people to  maintain about 50 to 60 attacks per day in the Sunni areas. The CENTCOM  Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the upcoming  processes of writing an Iraqi constitution and forming a new government  could trigger more violence, as the former regime elements in the  insurgency seek a return to power. The MNF-I commanding general stated  that a combination of political, military, economic, and communications  efforts will ultimately defeat the insurgency.
section_title: Challenges to Increasing the Capability of Iraqi Security Forces
paragraphs: On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed  Services Committee that Iraqi security forces are not yet ready to take on  the insurgency without the presence, help, mentoring, and assistance of  MNF-I.   MNF-I has faced four key challenges in helping Iraq develop  security forces capable of combating the insurgency or conducting law  enforcement duties in a hostile environment.   These key challenges are  (1) training, equipping, and sustaining a changing force structure;   (2) determining progress in developing capable forces without a system  for measuring their readiness; (3) developing loyalty and leadership  throughout the Iraqi chain of command; and (4) developing police capable  of democratic law enforcement in a hostile environment.
subsections: section_title: Iraqi Security Force Structure Is Constantly Changing
paragraphs: The Iraqi security force structure has constantly changed in response to  the growing insurgency. This makes it difficult to provide effective  support—the training, equipping, and sustaining of Iraqi forces. DOD  defines force structure as the numbers, size, and composition of units that  comprise defense forces. Some changes to the Iraqi force structure have  resulted from a Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq analysis  of needed Iraqi security capabilities during summer 2004 and reported in  October 2004. The Iraqi government has made other changes to forces  under the Ministries of Defense and Interior to allow them to better  respond to the increased threat. According to a February 2005 DOD  budget document, MNF-I and the Iraqi government plan to increase the  force structure over the next year.
According to the October report, a number of enhancements in Iraqi force  capabilities and infrastructure were critically needed to meet the current  threat environment. Based on this review, the MNF-I Commander decided  to increase the size of the Iraqi Police Service from 90,000 to 135,000  personnel; the Iraqi National Guard by 20 battalions to 62 battalions; and  the Department of Border Enforcement from 16,000 to 32,000 border  officers.  The review also supported in the creation of the Civil  Intervention Force, which consists of nine specialized Public Order  Battalions and two Special Police Regiments under the Ministry of  Interior. This force is designed to provide a national level, high-end, rapid  response capability to counter large-scale civil disobedience and  insurgency activities.
Over the past year, the Iraqi government has created, merged, and  expanded Iraqi security forces under the Ministries of Defense and  Interior.  For example, according to a DOD official, the Iraqi Army Chief of  Staff created the Iraqi Intervention Force in April 2004 in response to the  unwillingness of a regular Army battalion to fight Iraqi insurgents in  Fallujah.  This intervention force will be comprised of nine battalions and  is the counter-insurgency wing of the Iraqi Army.  According to Iraq’s  national security strategy, the Iraqi government decided to increase the  Iraqi Army from 100,000 soldiers to 150,000 personnel by the end of this  year and extend the time required to complete their training from July  2005 to December 2005.  The government planned to form this larger army  by including the Iraqi National Guard and accelerating the training and  recruitment of new troops.  In addition, in late 2004, the Ministry of  Interior added the Mechanized Police Brigade, a paramilitary, counter- insurgency unit that will consist of three battalions that will deploy to  high-risk areas.  It also created the paramilitary, army-type Special Police  Commando brigades.
According to DOD document supporting the February 2005 supplemental  request, the Iraqi government planned to add a number of additional  military elements, primarily support units, to the force structure over the  next year.  These include logistics units at the division level and below, a  mechanized division, and a brigade each for signals, military police,  engineering, and logistics.
section_title: System for Measuring Iraqi Readiness Has Not Been Developed
paragraphs: MNF-I officials stated that, as of March 2005, MNF-I and the Iraqi  government do not yet have a system in place to assess the readiness of  Iraq’s various security forces to accomplish their assigned missions and  tasks. However, in early 2005, the commanding general of the Multi- National Security Transition Command-Iraq said that MNF-I had begun  work on a system to assess Iraqi capabilities. MNF-I plans to develop a  rating system along the lines of the U.S. military readiness reporting  system. According to the commanding general of the Multi-National  Security Transition Command-Iraq, this system most likely would have  Iraqi brigade commanders evaluating such things as the training readiness  of their units, their personnel field, and their equipping levels.  They also  would provide a subjective judgment of the units’ readiness. The  commanding general said that this rating system would take time to  implement.
It is unclear at this time whether the system under development would  provide adequate measures for determining the capability of Iraqi police.   Because the police have a civilian law enforcement function rather than a  military or paramilitary role in combating the insurgency, MNF-I may have  to develop a separate system for determining police readiness.
section_title: Developing an Effective Iraqi Chain of Command
paragraphs: On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed  Services Committee that the establishment of an effective Iraqi chain of  command is a critical factor in determining when Iraqi security forces will  be capable of taking the lead in fighting the counterinsurgency. The  CENTCOM Commander added that the Iraqi chain of command must be  loyal and capable, take orders from the Iraqi head of state through the  lawful chain of command, and fight to serve the Iraqi people. MNF-I faces  several challenges in helping to develop an effective chain of command,  including questionable loyalty among some Iraqi security forces, poor  leadership in Iraqi units, and the destabilizing influence of militias outside  the control of the Iraqi government.
The executive branch reported in July 2004 that some Iraqi security forces  had turned to fight with insurgents during the spring uprising. In October  2004, in response to questions we submitted, CENTCOM officials indicated  that it is difficult to determine with any certainty the true level of insurgent  infiltration within Iraqi security forces.  Recent reports indicate that some  Iraqi security personnel continue to cooperate with insurgents. For  example, a February 2005 report cited instances of insurgent infiltration of  Iraqi police forces. Police manning a checkpoint in one area were  reporting convoy movements by mobile telephone to local terrorists.  Police in another area were infiltrated by former regime elements.
In February 2005 press briefings, the Secretary of Defense and the  commanding general of the Multi-National Security Transition Command- Iraq cited the leadership of Iraqi security forces as a critical element in  developing Iraqi forces capable of combating insurgents. MNF-I officials  indicated that they plan to expand the use of military transition teams to  support Iraqi units. These teams would help train the units and  headquarters and accompany them into combat. On March 1, 2005, the  CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that  there is broad, general agreement that MNF-I must do more to train,  advise, mentor, and help Iraqi security forces.  CENTCOM has requested  an additional 1,487 troops to support these efforts and must have the  continued support of the new Iraqi government.
The continued existence of militias outside the control of Iraq’s central  government also presents a major challenge to developing an effective  chain of command.  In late May 2004, the CPA developed a transition and  reintegration strategy for disbanding or controlling militias that existed  prior to the transfer of power to the Iraqi interim government. Detailed  information on the current status of militias in Iraq is classified. However,  the CENTCOM Commander acknowledged the continued existence of  older militias and the recent creation of new militias. He said that their  presence will ultimately be destabilizing unless they are strictly controlled,  come under government supervision, and are not allowed to operate  independently.
section_title: Developing a Police Force in a Hostile Environment
paragraphs: MNF-I’s efforts to develop a police force that abides by and upholds the  rule of law while operating in a hostile environment have been difficult.   U.S. police trainers in Jordan told us in mid-December 2004 that Iraqi  police were trained and equipped to do community policing in a  permissive security environment. Thus, Iraqi police were not prepared to  withstand the insurgent attacks that they have faced over the past year and  a half. According to the State Department’s Country Report on Human  Rights Practices for 2004, more than 1,500 Iraqi police have been killed  between April 2003 and December 2004. To address this weakness, MNF-I  and the Iraqi government report taking steps to better prepare some police  to operate during an insurgency. In a December 2004 press briefing, the  MNF-I Commander stated that MNF-I was moving to add paramilitary-type  skills to the police training program to improve some units’ ability to  operate in a counterinsurgency environment. U.S. police trainers in Jordan  told us that the curriculum was being revised to provide police  paramilitary capabilities. In addition, according to the Iraq’s national  security strategy, the Iraqi government is in the process of upgrading  security measures at police stations throughout the country.
According to State’s 2004 human rights report, police have operated in a  hostile environment. Attacks by insurgents and foreign terrorists have  resulted in killings, kidnappings, violence, and torture. Bombings,  executions, killings of government officials, shootings, and intimidation  were a daily occurrence throughout all regions and sectors of society.  The  report also states that members of the Ministry of Interior’s security forces  committed numerous, serious human rights abuses. For example, in early  December 2004, the Basrah police reported that the Internal Affairs Unit  was involved in the killings of 10 members of the Baath Party and the  killings of a mother and daughter accused of prostitution. The report  further states that, according to Human Rights Watch, torture and ill  treatment of detainees by the police was commonplace. Additionally, the  report states that corruption continued to be a problem.  The Iraq  Commission for Public Integrity was investigating cases of police abuse  involving unlawful arrests, beatings, and theft of valuables from the homes  of persons detained.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: The multinational force has been working to transfer full security  responsibilities for the country to the Iraqi military and police. However,  the multinational force and Iraq face the challenges of an intense  insurgency, a changing Iraqi force structure, the lack of a system to  measure military and police readiness, an Iraqi leadership and chain of  command in its infancy, and a police force that finds it difficult to uphold  the rule of law in a hostile environment. MNF-I recognizes these  challenges and is moving to address them so it can begin to reduce its  presence in Iraq and draw down its troops. Of particular note is MNF-I’s  effort to develop a system to assess unit readiness and to embed MNFI-I  transition teams into units to mentor Iraqis.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to  answer any questions you or the other Subcommittee members may have.
section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information, please contact Joseph A. Christoff on (202) 512- 8979.  Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony were  Lynn Cothern, Mattias Fenton, Laura Helm, Judy McCloskey, Tet  Miyabara, Michael Rohrback, and Audrey Solis.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We provided preliminary observations on 1) the strategy for transferring  security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces, 2) the data on  the status of the forces, and 3) challenges the Multi.  National Force in Iraq  (MNF-I) faces in transferring security missions to these forces.  We  conducted our review for this statement during February and March 2005  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.   We used only unclassified information for this statement  To examine the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi  forces, we focused on the 2003 security transition concept plan.  We  obtained and reviewed the transition plan and related documents and  interviewed officials from the Coalition Provisional Authority and the  Departments of State and Defense.  Our work on this issue is described in  June 2004 GAO report entitled Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security,  Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues (GAO-04-902R).  To  update information on the transition concept, we reviewed statements for  the record from the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)  Commander and the MNF-I commanding general on the campaign plan  and on the capability and recent performance of Iraqi security forces.  These statements focused on Iraqi security forces’ ability to perform  against the insurgency, as well as the training and mentoring of forces that  contributed to successful operations.
To determine the data on Iraqi security forces, we reviewed unclassified  Department of State status reports from June 2004 to March 2005 that  provided information about the number of troops by the Ministries of  Defense and Interior.  We interviewed State and Department of Defense  (DOD) officials about the number of Iraqi police on duty and the structure  of the Iraqi police forces.  To identify the type of training the Iraqi security  forces receive, we reviewed and organized data and information from the  Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.  We also visited the  Jordan International Police Training Center in Amman, Jordan to  determine the training security forces receive.  This approach allowed us  to verify that Iraqi security forces have varying missions and training levels  and not all are designed to be capable of fighting the insurgency.
To discuss the insurgency in Iraq, we reviewed statements for the record  from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Defense  Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the CENTCOM Commander on the status  of the insurgency.  We obtained data and reports from DIA on the number  of reported incidents from June 2003 through February 2005.  We obtained  written responses from CENTCOM on the strength and composition of the  insurgency.  To address the challenges to increasing the capability of Iraqi  security forces, we reviewed statements for the record by the CENTCOM  Commander, the MNF-I commanding general, and DOD officials.  We also  examined the Iraqi National Security Strategy, funding documents from  the Office of Management and Budget and State Department, and the fiscal  year 2005 Supplemental Request of the President.  We obtained and  reviewed further breakdowns of briefings on the supplemental request.  To  identify challenges in developing the Iraqi police force, we interviewed  police trainers in Jordan and reviewed the State Department’s Country  Report on Human Rights Practices for 2004.
We obtained comments on a draft of this statement from State and DOD,  including CENTCOM.  All generally agreed with our statement and  provided technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further  permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or  other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to  reproduce this material separately.