Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management: Approaches Used by Foreign Countries May Provide Useful Lessons for Managing U.S. Radioactive Waste
Published: 2007-03-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: GAO has reported on limitations in the management of U.S. low-level radioactive waste (LLRW). LLRW ranges from very low-activity to higher-activity waste. To identify potential approaches to overcome these limitations, GAO was asked to examine the extent to which other countries have (1) LLRW inventory databases, (2) timely removal of higher-activity LLRW from waste generator sites, (3) disposition options for all LLRW, and (4) requirements that LLRW generators have financial reserves to cover waste disposition costs, as well as any other approaches that might improve U.S. LLRW management. GAO primarily relied on a survey of 18 countries representing leading LLRW generators to identify their management approaches and to compare them with U.S. survey results and with approaches suggested by LLRW generators, disposal operators, and regulators in the United States.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Academic, industrial, medical, utility, and government entities in the United States, particularly the Department of Energy (DOE), disposed of at least 15 million cubic feet of LLRW in 2005. This waste includes debris, rubble, soils, paper, liquid, metals, and clothing that have been exposed to radioactivity or contaminated with radioactive material, and sealed radiological sources that are no longer useful for industrial or other applications (disused). Other countries that have nuclear reactor units and use radioactive materials in other ways manage the residual LLRW in some ways that are different than in the United States. Of the countries surveyed, GAO found that most countries indicated they have national radioactive waste inventory databases that include information on all waste generators, waste types, storage locations, and disused sealed radiological sources, and that they use them to forecast future disposal capacity needs. Most countries indicated they facilitate the timely removal of higher-activity LLRW, essentially disused sealed radiological sources, from generator sites to enhance safety and security, including requiring the return of a disused source to a source supplier. Most countries indicated they have disposal options for lower-activity LLRW, central storage options for higher-activity LLRW, and alternative disposal options for very low-level radioactive waste that in most cases does not require an exemption review by a nuclear regulatory authority. Half the countries indicated they impose financial assurance requirements on all waste generators to cover disposition costs, and most of these countries also use other approaches to reduce government costs to recover higher-activity LLRW, such as requiring a disposal fee at the time that a sealed radiological source is purchased. GAO also found that most countries surveyed use national radioactive waste plans to guide the management of their radioactive wastes. Many representatives from LLRW generators, disposal operators, regulators, and others told GAO that the application of similar approaches to those used by other countries might improve the management of U.S. radioactive waste.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Academic, industrial, medical, utility, and government entities in the  United States, particularly the Department of Energy (DOE)— commercially disposed of at least 15-million cubic feet of low-level  radioactive waste (LLRW) in 2005.  LLRW substantially includes debris,  rubble, and contaminated soils from facility decommissioning and site  cleanup, as well as items such as rags, paper, liquid, glass, metal  components, resins, filters, and protective clothing that have been  exposed to radioactivity or contaminated with radioactive material.  In  addition, LLRW includes sealed radiological sources that are no longer  used (disused) for their authorized use in agriculture, education, industry,  medicine, and research applications.  Sealed radiological sources contain  radioactive material encapsulated, or sealed in metal to prevent its  dispersal. At the present time, commercial disposal options are available  for almost all LLRW in the United States. However, during the mid-1990s  there was a period of time when a disposal facility was not available for  some LLRW, and most waste generators are now facing the prospect of  another disposal shortage in 2008 if the state of South Carolina restricts  access as planned to a key LLRW disposal facility. The Nuclear Regulatory  Commission (NRC) considers future disposal costs and availability to be  uncertain. The uncertainties surrounding disposal costs and availability  and other limitations in LLRW management are taking on even greater  significance as the United States embarks on developing new nuclear  power plants, which would eventually create even more LLRW. Moreover,  according to NRC, many non-utility generators of LLRW do not have the  physical or financial capability to effectively manage disposal shortages  and may have to curtail beneficial uses of radioactive material.
The principal federal legislation governing the disposal of LLRW is the  Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, as amended. The LLRW Policy  Act, among other things, assigns to the states and the federal government  responsibility for providing disposal availability for LLRW. NRC has  divided the radioactive waste covered by the act into categories of  increasing levels of hazard, beginning with class A, followed by B, C, and  greater-than-class C (GTCC) waste, although there is no statutory upper  limit or lower limit for the level of radioactivity required to declare a  material to be LLRW. In addition, the act required DOE to provide  technical assistance to the states, establish a computerized database to  assist the states and DOE in monitoring the management of LLRW, and to  report annually to the Congress on the management of LLRW by the states.   However, DOE no longer receives specific appropriations to provide  technical assistance—except for some funding to maintain a database of  LLRW disposed at commercial facilities—and its reporting requirements  terminated effective May 2000. NRC—or when authorized an Agreement  State—is responsible for licensing LLRW disposal facilities. In addition,  NRC is responsible for overseeing and regulating all nuclear power plants,  and for promulgating rules governing the safe and secure use of nuclear  materials. The Agreement States must adopt and implement requirements  that are compatible with NRC’s standards.
The LLRW Policy Act promotes greater LLRW disposal capacity on a  regional basis and more equitably distributes responsibility for managing  this waste among the 50 states. As an incentive for states to manage LLRW  on a regional basis, the Congress consented to the formation of interstate  agreements, known as compacts, and granted compact member states the  authority to refuse to accept LLRW from other compacts or unaffiliated  states. There are currently three licensed commercial LLRW disposal  facilities, each operating under different access and licensing restrictions,  and none developed under the regional compact structure as authorized in  the LLRW Policy Act. One of these disposal facilities is in Clive, Utah, and  it accepts almost all the nation’s class A waste. Another commercial LLRW  disposal facility is in Barnwell, South Carolina, and it accepts almost all of  the nation’s class B and C waste. The third commercial disposal facility is  in Richland, Washington, and it receives class A, B, and C waste from the  11 states of the Rocky Mountain and Northwest LLRW Compacts. DOE is  currently studying the feasibility of disposal options for GTCC waste.
GAO has reported on limitations in the management of U.S. LLRW. We  have examined the contents of the LLRW commercial disposal inventory  and national source tracking system databases; safety and security of  stored class B, C, and GTCC waste; availability of LLRW disposition  options; and issues facing DOE’s ability to recoup costs for the recovery of  disused sealed radiological sources. More specifically, we reported in 2004  on the scope and reliability of U.S. LLRW inventory information and found  that DOE’s commercial LLRW disposal database (1) did not contain data  on all disposed LLRW, (2) did not capture information on LLRW that is  produced and stored at waste generator sites, and (3) had data  inaccuracies. We also found that the then proposed national source  tracking system database would not have captured almost all the disused  commercial sources that DOE had recovered from licensees. International  authorities consider disused sealed radiological sources held in local  storage at user premises waiting for disposal or return to manufacturer to  be at greatest risk of becoming an orphan source.
We also reported on the safety and security of storing class B, C, and  GTCC waste at non-utility waste generator sites, such as industrials,  medical and non-DOE governmental users of nuclear material. We found  that NRC does not place general time limits on local storage of any LLRW  nor does it require waste generators to return their disused sealed  radiological sources to a source supplier.  However, NRC explained that  its existing licensing and inspection programs are adequate to ensure the  safety and security of stored LLRW.  Nevertheless, we also found that  adding additional information on the storage of disused sealed radiological  sources to the then proposed national source tracking system would assist  DOE’s ongoing source recovery program to remove these sources from  waste generator sites. We also reported on the adequacy of LLRW  disposition options and found that greater federal oversight was needed to  monitor LLRW storage and disposal conditions in light of uncertainties  surrounding future disposal availability for class B and C waste. Finally,  we commented on the lack of financial mechanisms for DOE to recoup the  costs of recovering, storing, and disposing of thousands of disused sealed  radiological sources from their holders who in some cases do not have  capacity to store or dispose of them. We found that NRC did not require all  non-utility waste generators, particularly those possessing sealed  radiological sources, to ensure that funds are available to cover future  LLRW disposition costs.
NRC and DOE accepted many of the recommendations made in these GAO  reports and they have taken other actions to improve the management of  LLRW. Other actions include a current strategic assessment of NRC’s  regulation of LLRW that is intended to identify and prioritize staff  activities. According to NRC officials, this assessment will consider the  recommendations made in GAO reports and other recent reports including  those from an NRC chaired task force on radiation source protection and  security, the NRC Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, and the National  Research Council.We were informed this assessment currently lacks a  systematic review of approaches taken by other countries to manage their  LLRW. DOE is also designing a complex-wide strategy to optimize the  disposition of its low-level waste and mixed low-level waste. Appendix I  contains a more detailed discussion of GAO findings and agency actions  on LLRW management.
Given our past reports on LLRW management and NRC and DOE  responses to our recommendations, you asked us to identify approaches  taken by other countries to manage their LLRW, and whether any of these  approaches might be applicable in the United States. Specifically, you  asked us to determine the extent to which other countries have: (1)  comprehensive national LLRW inventory databases, (2) timely removal of  higher-activity LLRW in storage at waste generator sites, (3) disposition  options for all LLRW, and (4) requirements to assure that non-utility LLRW  generators have adequate financial reserves to cover all waste disposition  costs. We also agreed to report on any other approaches that we identified  in the course of our work that might support improvement in the  management of LLRW in the United States.
To conduct our work, we primarily relied on the results of a survey of 20  foreign countries representing the leading generators of LLRW, reviews of  reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the  Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), and interviews with representatives from  U.S. LLRW stakeholder groups. These countries, along with the United  States, account for 85 percent of the world’s installed nuclear power plant  capacity. While countries generate similar radioactive waste, there is  variation in the way they classify this waste. Our survey relied on the  suggested IAEA waste classification scheme that defines two categories of  LLRW, short-lived low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (lower- activity LLRW) and long-lived low- and intermediate-level radioactive  waste (higher-activity LLRW). The IAEA is also considering adding  another class of radioactive waste—very low-level radioactive waste— which some countries already use in managing LLRW. Eighteen of the 20  foreign countries responded to our survey to identify their use of  management approaches to address our four research objectives.NRC  collaborated with DOE and other LLRW stakeholder groups to complete a  U.S. response to our survey. In addition, we visited LLRW facilities and  interviewed officials in France, Japan, and Sweden. We chose these  countries because of their extensive experience with nuclear power  generation and with constructing and operating LLRW disposal facilities.  We also interviewed representatives of U.S. LLRW stakeholder groups  regarding their knowledge of approaches used in other countries and their  opinions on new approaches that might help improve LLRW management  in this country. For the most part, these representatives provided little  awareness of approaches used in other countries. Those interviewed  represented federal and state nuclear regulatory authorities, commercial  LLRW disposal operators, state LLRW compact commissions, and other  groups. As not all representatives provided a response to questions about  each LLRW management issue, our content analysis of the interviews  captures opinions from only those representatives that responded to each  issue. We also reviewed a variety of documents provided to us by these  representatives. We identified and assessed the reliability of various waste  inventory databases in an attempt to describe the volume and location of  LLRW in the United States. We determined that these data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. We conducted our  review between September 2005 and February 2007 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed  description of our scope and methodology is provided in appendix II.  Appendix III provides the response of the United States to the survey of  LLRW management approaches.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The 30 countries in the world that generate electricity from 435 nuclear  power reactor units face the need to manage the radioactive wastes that  are generated from these units as well as the waste generated by non- utility users of nuclear materials.  The United States is a large generator of  radioactive waste with its 104 nuclear power reactors and thousands of  radioactive material licensees. These countries, including the United  States, contribute to and are guided by advice from international  organizations on approaches to manage radioactive materials. The  principal international organizations are IAEA and NEA. For example,  countries may voluntarily use IAEA standards to demonstrate  implementation of the obligations set forth in the Joint Convention on the  Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste  Management, which the United States has signed. According to IAEA, the  Joint Convention recognizes and reinforces the internationally held view  that radioactive waste management is an issue of national concern, but  that the development, implementation, and maintenance of national  programs for radioactive waste management must be carried out with due  regard to internationally-endorsed criteria and standards. Moreover, for  contracting parties to various international safety conventions, IAEA  standards provide a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective  fulfillment of their obligations. One example of these criteria and  standards is the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of  Radioactive Sources. This code, which the United States has agreed to  work toward implementing, is intended to guide countries in developing  and harmonizing policies, laws, and regulations pertaining to sealed  radiological sources. The code states, among other things, that the nuclear  regulatory authority in each country should establish a national registry of  radioactive sources to track the possession of these sources. At a  minimum, the code recommends that the nuclear regulatory authority in  each country include sources in categories 1 and 2 of the five source  categories defined by IAEA. These two categories contain sources with the  highest level of radioactivity. However, the code suggests that the nuclear  regulatory authorities also give appropriate attention to sources in the  other three categories, as they would pose health and security risks when  aggregated in harmful quantities.
IAEA has also put forth suggested guidance on a general system for  classifying radioactive waste to facilitate communication and information  exchange among countries. In general, U.S. class A, B, and most of class C  waste would fall into IAEA’s category of short-lived low- and intermediate- level radioactive waste (lower-activity waste), and the remaining 25  percent of class C waste and all of GTCC waste would be within IAEA’s  long-lived low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste category (higher- activity waste). IAEA acknowledges that spent or disused sealed  radiological sources are not considered waste in certain countries, such as  the United States, but considers that the safe management of such sources  is achieved by compliance with the requirements for managing radioactive  waste. Table 1 provides a description of the suggested IAEA radioactive  waste classification scheme.  exempt waste, (2) very short-lived waste, (3) very low-level waste, (4) low- level waste, (5) intermediate-level waste, and (6) high-level waste. The  very low-level waste category might be considered the lower spectrum of  class A waste, and include materials with very limited radioactivity, such  as contaminated soil and rubble from decommissioned power plants.
Finally, IAEA issued a Safety Standard guide in 2005 regarding the  management of waste from the use of radioactive material in medicine,  industry, agriculture, research and education. IAEA stated that a national  strategy for the management of radioactive waste should be developed in  accordance with the safety objectives and principles. A strategy is  necessary in order to define the infrastructure and the means to be  adopted for the management of radioactive waste. IAEA stated that a key  element in the strategy is the extent to which national and regional waste  management facilities are developed rather than managing the waste at a  number of locations where it arises.
section_title: Comprehensive National LLRW Inventory Databases Are Widely Used to Track and Manage LLRW
paragraphs: Most countries we surveyed use comprehensive national radioactive waste  inventory databases to assist in the management of LLRW. Thirteen  countries indicated that their inventory databases typically contained  information on all waste types—10 of which specifically inventoried very  low-level radioactive waste—the storage of waste at generator sites,  including disused sealed radiological sources, and all waste generator  types in their countries. In addition, 15 countries indicated that they take  steps to increase the reliability of the information collected by ensuring its  completeness, accuracy, and timeliness. Almost all countries use these  databases to track the location and quantities of radioactive waste to  forecast future disposal capacity needs. Most of the U.S. LLRW  stakeholder group representatives who responded to this issue generally  supported the usefulness of developing comprehensive national LLRW  inventory databases. The NRC chaired task force also commented on the  need to evaluate including more source categories in the national source  tracking system.
subsections: section_title: Most Countries Have Comprehensive National Radioactive Waste Inventory Databases
paragraphs: Thirteen of the 18 countries are considered to have comprehensive  national radioactive waste inventory databases that typically contain  information on a wide range of waste types, locations of stored waste,  waste generators, and the possession of sealed radiological sources.  Almost all countries (17/18) indicated that their inventory databases  include short-lived low- and intermediate-level waste as well as long-lived  intermediate-level waste. In addition, 10 countries indicated that their  inventories also include very low-level radioactive waste, 13 include long- lived low-level waste, and 14 include high-level waste. All 17 countries that  have national radioactive waste inventory databases indicated that they  capture waste data from all generators in their countries, which could  include academic, government, industrial, medical, and nuclear reactor  sources of LLRW. In regard to tracking the location of waste, 14 countries  indicated that their radioactive waste inventory databases capture waste  in storage at generator sites. For example, France indicated that its  national radioactive waste inventory database records the types of  radioactive waste located at all waste generator sites, central storage, and  disposal sites.
The countries in our survey also maintain national registries of sealed  radiological sources, including those in use, storage or disuse. Most  countries indicated in their survey responses that their national  radiological source registries go beyond the minimum of category 1 and 2  suggested in the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of  Radioactive Sources. Fourteen of 18 countries indicated that their national  source registries include all category 1, 2, and 3 sources, and nine of these  countries also include category 4 and 5 sources. The nine countries with  comprehensive source registries were Denmark, Finland, France,  Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Slovak Republic, and Switzerland. While the  survey did not seek information on the number of sources in a country, the  countries with comprehensive source registries include those that may  have a relatively small number of sources to track, such as Denmark, to  those countries that have much larger numbers to track, such as France  and Japan. Figure 1 summarizes the comprehensiveness of the national  radioactive waste inventory databases in the countries we surveyed.
section_title: Countries Take Steps to Ensure Reliability of Information in Their Inventory Databases
paragraphs: The countries in our survey try to increase the reliability of their  radioactive waste inventory databases by taking steps to ensure that the  information collected is complete, accurate, and timely. Almost all  countries (15/18) indicated that they have at least one control in place to  verify the completeness and accuracy of information in their national  radioactive waste inventories. These controls include periodic inspections  of the waste at generator sites, checking generator waste inventory data  submissions against past and projected waste from the generator, and  periodic audits of the waste inventory records maintained by the  generator. For example, in the United Kingdom, the information provided  by LLRW waste generators is reviewed and checked for consistency with  previous inventory information and against similar types of waste.  Moreover, independent assessments are undertaken to provide upper- bound estimates of total radioactivity of the waste at generator sites. The  waste generators are also required to obtain a letter of compliance to  package their waste before final waste processing. At the time the letter of  compliance is issued, the waste data is reviewed, and if found insufficient,  the waste generator may be subject to a further audit.
Although almost all countries (17/18) have a national authority or waste  management organization responsible for maintaining their national  radioactive waste inventory databases, countries varied in how  information is transmitted to the entity managing the inventory and the  frequency of information submission. Currently, only 2 of the 18 countries  require the submission of waste data through a secure website. The most  common methods for data submission were use of e-mail, standard mail,  fax, and by phone. Most of the countries (12/18) indicated that their  national radioactive waste inventory databases receive data from waste  generators annually or more frequently. Survey results indicated that  inventory updates every 6 months or less are obtained from waste  generators in Denmark, Mexico, Norway, Slovak Republic, Spain, and  Switzerland. Figure 2 summarizes the approaches used in the countries  surveyed to manage their national radioactive waste inventory databases.
section_title: Countries Use Inventory Databases to Track and Manage LLRW
paragraphs: Sixteen of the 18 countries in our survey indicated that they use their  national radioactive waste inventory databases to forecast waste volumes,  plan for disposal capacity, and track the location of disused sealed  radiological sources. Thirteen countries indicated that they publicize  information from their national radioactive waste inventory databases on  what is stored and disposed of to gain community acceptance for siting  these facilities. Sixteen of the countries indicated that they keep records of  the location and status and use of sources in their national source  registries. Figure 3 shows the responses for each country.
section_title: Domestic Experts Support Need for More Comprehensive LLRW Inventory Databases
paragraphs: Most representatives of domestic LLRW stakeholder groups who  responded in interviews to this issue (19/25) supported the need to  establish a more comprehensive national radioactive waste inventory  database in the United States. Over half of these representatives  commented that such an inventory would allow LLRW stakeholders to  forecast waste volumes and to plan for future disposal capacity  requirements. However, some representatives felt that a more  comprehensive national radioactive waste inventory database would not  be necessary. For example, one representative argued that the cost- effectiveness of adding more reporting requirements to include the storage  of class B and C waste might not be justified given the small quantities of  this waste that are generated each year.
A recent report of the interagency Radiation Source Protection and  Security Task Force, chaired by NRC, addressed the scope of the current  national source tracking system, which currently tracks the possession of  category 1 and 2 sources. The task force suggested that NRC conduct a  comprehensive analysis of category 3 sources for possible inclusion in the  National Source Tracking System. The task force found that category 3  and lower-activity sources comprise a major portion of those sources  voluntarily identified as surplus, excess, or unwanted in the commercial  sector. Moreover, the task force found that the U.S. metal recycle industry  claims that category 3 sources are those more commonly misplaced or  abandoned by industry, resulting in potential contamination of the metal  recycling process with operational and financial impacts.
section_title: Methods for Promptly Removing Higher- Activity LLRW from Waste Generator Sites Are Widely Used to Reduce Safety and Security Risks
paragraphs: Fourteen of the 18 countries we surveyed use methods to promptly  remove higher-activity LLRW from generating sites in order to reduce  safety and security risks. These countries both encourage and enforce the  timely removal of disused sealed radiological sources to prevent the  uncontrolled exposure of workers and the public to radiation. Some of  these countries also place general time limits on the storage of these  sources at generator sites. To facilitate the removal of higher-activity  LLRW, almost all countries surveyed require that sealed radiological  sources be returned to their suppliers when they are no longer in use.  Most of these countries also have established orphan source recovery  programs to collect sealed radiological sources that have been abandoned  or lost. Some U.S. stakeholder group representatives who responded to  this issue and the recent report from the NRC chaired task force generally  supported the need to evaluate methods that could be used to facilitate the  removal of higher-activity LLRW, essentially disused sealed radiological  sources, from non-utility waste generator sites.
subsections: section_title: Most Countries Encourage and Enforce the Prompt Removal of Higher-Activity LLRW from Generator Sites
paragraphs: Most countries we surveyed (14/18) indicated that their nuclear regulatory  authority encourages the removal of higher-activity LLRW, essentially  disused sealed radiological sources, from generator sites, and half of the  countries enforce the prompt removal of these sources. Some of the  countries that require the prompt removal of these sources also place time  limits on how long LLRW can remain in storage at waste generator sites.  Seven countries indicated that they limit the amount of time that LLRW  can remain in storage at non-utility waste generator sites, and four other  countries impose time limits only when waste generators have a disposal  option for the waste. For example, in Sweden, depending on the facility,  waste generators can only hold disused sealed radiological sources for 6  months to a year and a half, and any other LLRW intended for storage at a  waste generator site for more than 2 years must be registered with the  national regulatory authority.
section_title: Most Countries Use a Variety of Approaches to Facilitate the Removal of Higher-Activity LLRW from Generator Sites
paragraphs: Almost all countries we surveyed (15/18) indicated that they require that  sealed radiological sources be returned to their source supplier or to a  central storage facility when they are no longer in use. The general support  for this LLRW management approach might be attributable to international  guidance on managing sources. All countries in our survey have agreed to  follow the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of  Radioactive Sources, which recommends that nuclear regulatory  authorities attach clear and unambiguous conditions on the use of  sources, including, where applicable, agreements regarding the return of  disused sources to a supplier. In addition, the Council of the European  Union Directive 2003/122 states that all member countries must establish  requirements that a holder of a sealed radiological source return the  source to the supplier, place it in a recognized installation, or transfer it to  another authorized holder without undue delay after termination of the  use, unless otherwise agreed by the nuclear regulatory authority. For  example, in France, the supplier of sealed radiological sources is  responsible for the sources it sells. Once the purchaser of a source ceases  to use it, the holder must immediately return it to the supplier who is  responsible for accepting it unconditionally. Until the source user can  prove that the source has been returned to a supplier, the user retains  responsibility for it. Only three countries, two of which are non-European  Union member countries, indicated that they do not currently impose this  regulation on source holders.
Most countries we surveyed (11/18) indicated that they have government  programs to recover higher-activity sources that are not under regulatory  control (orphan sources). Once again, there is international guidance in  this area. The IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of  Radioactive Sources recommends that nuclear regulatory authorities  establish provisions to recover and restore appropriate control over  orphan sources. Moreover, the Council of the European Union also  recognized that despite the existence of an appropriate regulatory  framework to control these higher-activity sources, they still may be  abandoned or lost. Council Directive 2003/122 states that all member  countries shall ensure that their nuclear regulatory authorities are  prepared to or have assigned responsibilities for recovering orphan  sources. This directive also states that the nuclear regulatory authorities in  these countries shall be notified of any changes in the situation of a higher- activity source, such as its location and use, and to register these changes.  Nine countries, including three non-European Union countries, indicated  that holders of sealed radiological sources are required to notify the  nuclear regulatory authority when a source has become disused, and most  countries (14/18) indicated that their authority verifies this information by  periodically inspecting the storage of disused sources at user sites. Eleven  countries indicated that a government entity is given responsibility for  managing an orphan source recovery program; 3 countries give this  responsibility to a non-governmental entity. For example in Japan, the  Japan Radioisotope Association is responsible for recovering and storing  sealed radiological sources and other radioisotopes from users of these  radioactive materials. The association, regulated by the Ministry of  Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology—the Japanese  ministry responsible for regulating medical uses of radioisotopes—is  funded through fees collected by users of these materials. Figure 4  provides a summary of the methods used by countries in our survey to  facilitate the prompt removal LLRW, particularly disused sealed  radiological sources from waste generator sites.
section_title: Domestic Experts Support Need to Evaluate Methods for Facilitating the Removal of Higher-Activity LLRW from Waste Generator Sites
paragraphs: The representatives from domestic LLRW stakeholder groups who  responded in interviews to this issue generally agreed that the United  States should consider exploring methods for promptly removing higher- activity LLRW from waste generator sites. Eleven of 27 representatives  supported imposing time limits on storing higher-activity LLRW at non- utility waste generator sites, but not for radioactive wastes that are  allowed to decay in storage within a reasonable amount of time. For  example, several representatives suggested that LLRW generators should  be treated the same as generators of hazardous waste. The generators of  large quantities of hazardous waste are required to remove waste from  their sites within 90 days, unless they receive authorization for long-term  storage of this waste. However, other representatives were not in favor of  establishing time limits for waste storage, for the most part because of  uncertainties surrounding disposal availability in the United States. Some  of the representatives noted that placing time limits on the storage of  higher-activity LLRW could only be justified if it posed a safety and  security risk. In this respect, almost all representatives (25/26) suggested  that having a requirement that disused sealed radiological sources be  returned to their source supplier would be an effective way to promote  more timely removal of these sources from waste generator sites.
The NRC chaired task force reported that while existing measures to  ensure the safety and security of higher-activity sealed radiological  sources are adequate, the current disposal system is prompting some users  into long-term storage of their disused sources and otherwise creating  significant disincentives for properly disposing of these sources. The  report noted that the lack of a legal disposal pathway or the high costs of  disposal due to the lack of alternative disposal options will perpetuate this  situation until the disposal system changes. The task force report  suggested that the U.S. government should encourage suppliers to provide  arrangements for the return of disused sources. The task force noted that  holding a source in storage longer than 24 months usually indicates the  lack of a strategy to use or dispose of the source. As a result, the task force  suggested that NRC consider a new requirement for licensees to review  and document the reasons for storing higher-activity sources for longer  than 24 months. Moreover, the task force suggested that once disposal  options are available for GTCC waste (equivalent to long-lived  intermediate-level waste), NRC should also consider requiring a maximum  time limit on long-term storage of disused sealed radiological sources that  would be considered GTCC waste when packaged for disposal.
section_title: Central Storage and Alternative Disposal Options Are Widely Used to Facilitate Management of LLRW
paragraphs: Ten of the 18 countries we surveyed have disposal options for lower- activity LLRW and 6 have plans to build such facilities. While only 3  countries indicated that they have a disposal option for higher-activity  LLRW, 14 reported that they have central storage facilities for this waste.  Moreover, 13 countries indicated that they have clearance or unrestricted  removal of very low-level radioactive waste from regulatory control as  LLRW and eight countries indicated that they have disposal options for  this waste. The U.S. LLRW stakeholder group representatives who  responded to this issue were split on the need for central storage options  for higher-activity LLRW when a disposal option is not available, but most  of them supported exempting very low-level radioactive waste from  regulatory control as LLRW. The NRC chaired task force and other reports  have commented on the need to reexamine the disposal options for LLRW.
subsections: section_title: About Half the Countries Make Disposal Options Available for Most Lower- Activity LLRW
paragraphs: About half of the countries in our survey indicated that they currently have  a disposal option for lower-activity LLRW, but few have a disposal option  for higher-activity LLRW. Ten of 18 countries indicated that they have  disposal options available for lower-activity LLRW, and 10 have reported  plans to build new or additional disposal facilities for lower-activity LLRW.  While only 3 countries indicated that they currently have a disposal option  for higher-activity LLRW, 14 have reported plans to develop a disposal  facility for such waste.
Other countries have made a variety of organizations responsible for  providing and operating the existing or planned disposal facilities,  including national regulatory authorities, nuclear utility organizations, and  commercial waste management companies. In the 10 countries that have  disposal facilities for lower-activity LLRW, only 2 indicated that a national  organization is responsible for both providing and operating this disposal  facility. The other eight countries indicated that these responsibilities were  given to other combinations that sometimes included nuclear utilities and  commercial waste management companies. In the 14 countries that are  planning to build disposal facilities for higher-activity LLRW, 6 indicated  that a national organization would be responsible for providing and  operating the future disposal facility and 3 indicated that it would be  another organization. The other countries indicated either a mix of  responsibilities or they did not respond to the question. For example, the  Netherlands has reported that it has decided to delay a final decision on  developing a disposal facility and instead construct an engineered surface  storage facility with sufficient capacity for all radioactive waste generated  in a period of at least 100 years. However, if a disposal facility is ever  constructed, this country indicated in its survey that its nuclear regulatory  authority would be responsible for providing the facility and a national  waste management organization would be responsible for operating it. In  regard to the cost of disposal, half of the countries indicated that disposal  fees are currently or anticipated to be set nationally, based on waste type.  Two countries indicated that such fees are currently based on negotiations  with disposal operators according to waste type. Mexico indicated use of  both a national fee schedule and negotiated fees. Figure 5 provides a  summary of LLRW disposal availability and management responsibilities  across the countries in our survey.
section_title: Most Countries Have Central Storage for LLRW Lacking a Disposal Option
paragraphs: Most countries we surveyed currently have interim or long-term central  storage options for some LLRW. Thirteen countries reported that they  have central storage options available for lower-activity LLRW. Six  countries reported that they have both disposal and some central storage  options for this waste. Fourteen countries reported that they have central  storage options for higher-activity LLRW, sometimes at large waste  production sites as in France. For the most part, these countries do not  have a disposal option for higher-activity LLRW, although Norway  indicated that it had disposal and interim storage options for the long- lived, intermediate-level waste. Figure 6 provides a summary of the central  storage options available in the countries we surveyed.
section_title: Most Countries Make Alternative Disposal Options Available for Very Low-Level Radioactive Waste
paragraphs: Most countries provide alternative disposal options for very low-level  radioactive waste either by removing such waste from regulatory control  as LLRW or providing special disposal arrangements. Almost all countries  (15/18) indicated that their nuclear regulatory authorities exempt this  waste from regulatory control as nuclear material, thus allowing  alternative disposal options for the waste. The countries use various  approaches to remove very low-level radioactive waste from regulatory  control as LLRW, including general exemption, case-by-case exemption,  and clearance. The most frequently cited approach used by the countries  was exemption (15/18), followed by clearance (13/18), and then case-by- case exemption (11/18). For example, according to a May 2005 updated  nuclear development report submitted by Japan to the NEA, Japan  followed IAEA guidance to amend its “Law for the Regulations of Nuclear  Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Rectors” to introduce a  clearance system for materials, such as scrap metals and concrete used in  nuclear installations. Half the countries in our survey indicated that they  use all three management approaches.
Some countries in our survey indicated that they have alternative disposal  options for very low-level radioactive waste. These options included  disposal at municipal landfills, nuclear power plants, and in special  facilities for such waste. Eight countries indicated that they have disposal  options for very low-level radioactive waste. For example, in Sweden, this  radioactive material is cleared for unrestricted use or disposal as  conventional non-radioactive waste. Sweden reported that, in 2004,  approximately 660 tons of very low-level radioactive waste was cleared for  disposal at municipal landfills and approximately 550 tons of melted scrap  metal was cleared for recycling. In contrast, France does not have a  clearance threshold below which radioactive waste is no longer  considered a radioactive hazard. Instead, France uses a case-by-case  exemption process to allow for the disposal of very low-level radioactive  waste in a special repository that was commissioned in 2003. The French  government reported that this facility represents another essential  component of France’s overall system for radioactive waste management  and that it will accommodate most of the waste resulting from the  decommissioning and dismantling of facilities in which radioactive  substances have been used. Figure 7 provides a summary of the disposal  options and exemption methods used by countries in our survey for  managing very low-level radioactive waste.
section_title: Domestic Experts Support Need to Examine Alternative Disposition Options for Some LLRW
paragraphs: The representatives of domestic LLRW stakeholder groups who responded  in interviews to this issue as well as findings reported by some groups  generally supported the need to evaluate alternative disposition options  for some LLRW. In regard to developing central storage options for higher- activity LLRW when a disposal option is not available, the representatives  were split in their support. Those in favor (13/27) noted that having a  central storage option would encourage the efficient and timely removal of  higher-activity LLRW from waste generator sites. For example, one  representative commented that facilities such as hospitals, academic  institutions, and some industries may have limited on-site storage space,  restrictions placed on waste storage time in their license, or possession  limits for radioactive material, which would need to account for the  radioactivity in the stored waste. Those opposed (14/27) to developing  central storage options for LLRW generally rejected this approach as an  unnecessary step prior to disposing of the waste—a step they also saw as  potentially increasing safety and security risks. For example, one  representative commented that developing central storage for LLRW that  does to have a disposal option would only detract from finding an ultimate  disposal solution.
The representatives from LLRW stakeholder groups were more supportive  of the need for NRC to adopt a clearance rule in lieu of the current case- by-case exemption process for allowing very low-level radioactive waste  to be removed from regulation as LLRW. Most representatives (19/25) who  responded in interviews to this issue commented that a clearance rule  would promote more rapid removal of very low-level radioactive waste  from waste-generating sites or in some cases negate the need for the on- site removal of this type of radioactive waste. They also suggested that this  action would expedite the cost-effective disposal of this waste by reducing  administrative burdens, lowering disposal costs, and saving space in  licensed LLRW disposal facilities for higher-activity LLRW. For example,  one representative commented that knowing up front what type of  radioactive waste would not require nuclear regulatory authority review  prior to disposition could reduce the need to plan for storage space,  shipment, and disposal of such waste as LLRW. Another representative  commented that a clearance rule would provide a clear and consistent  exemption for very low-level radioactive waste across the Agreement  States and non-Agreement States. Several representatives supported the  adoption of a clearance rule, but cautioned that public resistance and  other factors have impeded previous NRC attempts to adopt this  approach. Some representatives contended that exempting very low-level  radioactive waste from disposal as LLRW might prompt LLRW disposal  operators to increase the cost of disposing of the other LLRW to  compensate for the lost revenue from no longer receiving large quantities  of very low-level radioactive waste.
The NRC chaired task force report concluded that a number of challenges  are associated with disposing of all categories of commercial sealed  radiological sources because of the limited number of available disposal  facilities, the lack of options to dispose of all types of radioactive waste,  and the high cost of disposal. The task force found that commercial LLRW  disposal has evolved from an essentially free-market system to a much  more constrained and costly system today. However, the task force did not  identify any immediate security concerns related to the higher-activity  sources under review because licensees are required to safely and securely  store these sources, and DOE has a program to recover sealed radiological  sources that represent a threat to public heath, safety, and security.  Nevertheless, the task force noted that because of uneven implementation  of the LLRW Policy Act, several issues affect the disposal of higher-activity  sources, such as the possible closure of the South Carolina LLRW disposal  facility to non-compact member states. The task force recommended that  the U.S. government evaluate the waste disposal options as outlined in the  2004 and 2005 GAO reports addressing this issue.
The recent National Research Council report on Improving the  Regulation and Management of Low-Activity Radioactive Wastes also  commented on disposal options for low-activity waste (very low-level  radioactive waste). The report noted that the United States could benefit  from greater consideration of standards and practices developed  internationally to institute risk-based management of very low-level  radioactive waste.  The report noted that European Commission and IAEA  standards already provide guidelines for wastes that pose insignificant  risks to be cleared or exempted from control as radioactive material. The  report recommended that the United States give greater consideration to  the international consensus standards surrounding alternative disposition  options for very low-level radioactive, including disposal with other non- hazardous wastes, or disposal in special facilities suitable for such waste.  The report did not conclude, however, that exemption or clearance should  necessarily imply the free release of this waste into general commerce.
Finally, NRC’s Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste similarly  commented on the need to examine alternative options for the disposition  of some LLRW. The committee’s December 2005 white paper referred to  previous recommendations the committee made to NRC with respect to  concerns about the interim storage of LLRW at waste generator sites. The  committee found that no evidence exists that on-site storage of waste can  be safe and secure over the expected life of the waste and that the  proliferation of on-site storage at waste generator sites across the country  will only increase the probability of an adverse event. The white paper also  discusses past initiatives by NRC to examine regulations governing future  development of assured isolation facilities (central storage facilities) for  LLRW. The committee found that only one Agreement State, Ohio, had  such regulations as of the end of 2005. The committee report noted that in  January 2004, the Commissioners directed NRC staff to defer action on the  development of an assured isolation rule, but to annually review the need  for further action in this area.
section_title: Financial Assurance Requirements and Other Approaches Are Used by Most Countries to Reduce Government LLRW Recovery Costs
paragraphs: Nine of the 18 countries we surveyed indicated that their nuclear  regulatory authorities require all non-utility LLRW generators to have  sufficient financial assurances to cover the removal of radioactive waste  from their sites. In addition, seven countries use other financial assurance  approaches to ensure that the government is reimbursed for any sealed  radiological sources that it may need to recover from non-utility LLRW  generators. More than half of the representatives from U.S. LLRW  stakeholder groups who responded to this issue and statements in the  recent report from the NRC chaired task force indicated some need to  improve the financial assurance structure for some LLRW generators. The  task force report suggested that NRC evaluate some approaches that are  similar to those used in some other countries to ensure that radioactive  material users have financial reserves to cover waste disposition costs.
subsections: section_title: Half of the Countries Require All Non-Utility LLRW Generators to Meet Financial Assurance Requirements
paragraphs: Half of the countries we surveyed indicated that they require all non-utility  LLRW generators to set aside sufficient financial reserves to cover waste  disposition costs. These countries more often provide disposal options for  lower-activity LLRW and generally provide central storage for higher- activity LLRW. In addition, three countries indicated that they have plans  to impose financial assurance requirements on all non-utility LLRW  generators. For example, Japan indicated that it planned to develop these  requirements, but could not predict when they would be implemented.
section_title: Some Countries Use Other Financial Approaches to Reduce Government Orphan Source Recovery Costs
paragraphs: Some countries have taken approaches to reduce the potential  government costs of recovering orphan sealed radiological sources that  are no longer under regulatory control. The Council of the European  Union Directive 2003/122 states that all member countries must organize  campaigns to recover orphan sources left behind by past activities, and  suggests campaigns include financial participation by member countries in  the costs of recovering, managing, and disposing of these sources, as well  as in the review of records on the sealed radiological sources being used at  research institutes, material testing institutes, and hospitals. This directive  also requires that member countries ensure establishment of a system of  financial assurance requirements or other equivalent means of reimbursing  the government for its costs in recovering orphan sources. As a means to  reimburse the government for orphan source recovery costs, 5 countries in  our survey indicated that users of sealed radiological sources have  established common funds to pay the LLRW disposition costs by source  users. Moreover, 2 countries indicated that sealed radiological source  recovery funds have been established by source suppliers to cover similar  disposition costs for these companies. For example, in France, the  association of source suppliers and manufacturers contribute to a  common fund to reimburse the government for recovering sealed  radiological sources from any supplier or manufacturer that is unable to  disposition them. In cases where the supplier cannot be identified, the  government is reimbursed by an insurance system implemented by the  source manufacturers. In addition, France indicated on its survey that  under the new radiation protection regulations consideration is being  given to examining the benefits of adding financial guarantees to this  system. Nine countries indicated that they either require a disposal fee at  the time that a source is purchased or are planning to impose such a fee to  ensure that funds are available to reimburse government for the costs of  recovering orphan sources. Figure 8 provides a summary of the financial  approaches used by the countries in our survey to reduce government  costs of recovering LLRW.
section_title: Domestic Experts Support the Need to Evaluate Financial Assurance Approaches
paragraphs: The potential usefulness of financial assurance approaches that were  identified through our survey was reflected in interviews with domestic  LLRW stakeholder group representatives. More than half of the  representatives (8/14) who responded to this issue in interviews  commented on the need to improve the financial assurance structure for  LLRW generators in the United States. These representatives suggested  approaches to improve financial assurances, such as new rulemaking by  NRC, periodic updating of the level of financial assurance requirements for  LLRW generators, and providing a mechanism for small businesses that  cannot self-guarantee financial assurance to otherwise provide this  assurance. In addition, some of the representatives (5/16) supported the  imposition of a disposal fee at the time of source purchase to help  promote a more cost-effective disposal system and more predictable  disposal costs for source users. For example, one representative noted  that imposing such a fee has merit, but obtaining a commitment or  obligation to pay the disposal fee would be an important first step.
The NRC chaired task force found that sealed radiological source users  are moving disused sources into prolonged storage because they are not  required to have financial assurance to cover the disposal costs or  otherwise appropriately dispositioning their disused sources. The report  reiterated the concern that prolonged storage of disused sources can lead  to possible misuse, abandonment, loss, or theft. Further, the task force  found that the cost of source disposal can often be high, prompting the  holders of disused sources to delay disposal either by choice or economic  necessity. The task force identified three options to improve financial  assurance coverage that were in many ways similar to approaches used to  varying extents in other countries. The first option is to broaden NRC  financial assurance requirements to include those entities that have lower  thresholds of radioactive materials. This option would ensure that  adequate funds are set aside by these entities to cover their waste  disposition costs. However, the task force found that this action alone  would not cover government costs of recovering orphan sources or  sources for which there is no responsible or financially capable party.  Thus, two other options were proposed that include (1) assessing a  source-specific surcharge at the time of source acquisition or throughout a  source’s service life to pay the costs of disposal, and (2) assessing a  universal disposal surcharge on all licensees of radioactive material (not  limited to sealed radiological source holders) to cover waste disposition  costs. The task force recommended that NRC evaluate these alternative  financial assurance options and include the impacts on the regulated  community, implementation approaches, and the involvement of  stakeholders.
section_title: National Radioactive Waste Management Plans Are Considered Important for Managing LLRW
paragraphs: We also found that 12 of the 18 countries surveyed rely on national  radioactive waste management plans to guide the management of their  radioactive wastes. Several of these plans required the management of  radioactive waste from a national perspective and specified one  administrative entity as responsible for coordinating their development. In  addition, there was often a requirement in the plans for periodic public  reporting of LLRW conditions. While the usefulness of such a plan was not  sought through a question in the survey or specifically raised in interviews  with U.S. LLRW stakeholder group representatives, most of the  representatives and recent reports on LLRW management mentioned the  need to evaluate alternative ways to manage LLRW in the United States.
subsections: section_title: Many Countries Have Developed Radioactive Waste Management Plans That Are National in Scope and Formulated by One Administrative Entity
paragraphs: At least 12 of the 18 countries in our survey have national radioactive  waste management plans or draft plans to guide the management of this  material. The 12 countries included Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,  Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and  the United Kingdom. While the other countries may also have such plans,  we did not ask whether they had one in our survey. We identified the 12  countries with management plans through a review of recent IAEA and  NEA country reports. The management plans from France, Germany, and  Spain contain strategies to address all radioactive waste types. They are  formulated by either a national level ministry or national waste  management organization, often through consultation with other  stakeholder groups. The management plans are approved by the  parliament, with in some cases requirements for periodic reporting of  waste management conditions back to the governing body.
subsections: section_title: France
paragraphs: In 2003, the national nuclear regulatory authority of France formulated a  national plan for the management of radioactive waste and reusable  material. The development of this plan involved many stakeholders,  including the national waste management organization, waste producers,  elected representatives, and professional associations. According to the  2006 Program Act on the Sustainable Management of Radioactive  Materials and Wastes, the national management plan will evaluate existing  management approaches for radioactive materials and waste, identify  foreseeable needs for storage or disposal facilities and the time frame for  storage as well as assess the management approaches for radioactive  wastes that do not yet have a path to disposal. The Program Act also states  that the national plan for managing radioactive materials and wastes will  be updated and reported to the parliament by the nuclear regulatory  authority every 3 years.
section_title: Germany
paragraphs: According to a 2006 update report to NEA on the status of German  radioactive waste management, in late 2001 Germany amended its Atomic  Energy Act to request that the Federal Ministry for the Environment  prepare and submit a national waste management plan. At the same time it  amended this act, the parliament decided to phase out the use of nuclear  energy for commercial electricity generation. According to the report, the  draft plan, which is expected to be approved by parliament in 2007,  addresses the strategic management of all radioactive waste, provides an  inventory of existing radioactive waste, forecasts further waste  production, delineates waste management planning for the next few years,  and contains recommendations and required actions. The national  radioactive waste inventory, for the first time, captures all types of  radioactive waste, including high-level waste, waste from research,  medicine, and industry; decommissioning waste from nuclear power  plants; and uranium mine and mill tailing waste. Until a final disposal site  in a deep geologic formation is available for all radioactive waste, the plan  calls for the German federal states to construct and operate regional  interim storage facilities for all non-utility waste generators, and requires  nuclear power plants to provide interim on-site waste storage.
section_title: Spain
paragraphs: In 2006, Spain adopted its sixth general radioactive waste plan. This plan  replaces the previous plan enacted 7 years ago. As stated in the plan, this  document contemplates the strategies, the necessary actions, and the  technical solutions to be developed in the short-, medium-, and long-term  to ensure the adequate management of radioactive waste, the dismantling  and decommissioning of nuclear and radioactive facilities, and related  activities, including the economic and financial measures required to carry  them out. Further, this document states that this plan is the basic  reference document that clearly and concisely addresses all the strategies  and actions to be undertaken in Spain with regard to the different fields of  radioactive waste management and the dismantling of facilities, along with  a corresponding study of economic and financial conditions. The plan,  among other components, presents the data related to radioactive waste  generation, programs for removal, the capacity of disposal facilities as well  as costs and revenues. Every 4 years or whenever requested by the  cognizant ministry, the national waste management organization develops  a new radioactive waste management plan, which is submitted to  government and then reported to the parliament. The national waste  management organization, a state-owned company established in 1984, has  been given the responsibility for radioactive waste management and  decommissioning of nuclear facilities. In addition to this action, the  national waste management organization must draw up an annual report  describing the actions taken during the previous financial year and any  incremental revisions that need to be made to the general radioactive  waste plan.
section_title: Domestic Experts Support Need to Evaluate the U.S. LLRW Management System
paragraphs: There was general agreement among the representatives from the LLRW  stakeholder groups that the management of LLRW in the United States  needs improvement. Most of the representatives who responded to  questions associated with this issue (22/29) suggested that the time is right  to explore alternative approaches to make the LLRW disposal system more  predictable (reliable) and stable (cost-effective). Many of the  representatives cited the proposed closure of the South Carolina disposal  facility to non-compact waste generators as the reason to explore these  alternatives approaches. However, one representative cautioned that while  the present disposal system in the United States is not what was  envisioned in the LLRW Policy Act, it is an alternative that has generally  provided disposal availability to most waste generators. As we did not  directly ask the representatives about the need for a national radioactive  waste management plan at the time of the interviews, we have no basis to  tabulate their reaction to this specific LLRW management approach.
The National Research Council of the National Academies recently  reported on improving the regulation and management of low-activity  waste in the context of the U.S. LLRW management system. The report  recommended that regulatory agencies develop integrated strategies to  implement risk-informed regulation for very low-level radioactive waste.  According to the report, such a strategy would require continued  integration and coordination among the regulatory agencies, including  NRC, DOE, the Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Defense,  and other federal and state agencies. Moreover, the report recommended  that government agencies continue to explore ways to improve their  efforts to gather knowledge and opinions of stakeholders, particularly  public stakeholders. While the report did not go so far as to recommend  the establishment of a national radioactive waste management plan, it did  find that the current patchwork of regulations is complex and  inconsistent—leading in some instances to inefficient management  practices and possibly to increased overall risk in the system.
Finally, in May 2006, the NRC Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste  agreed to examine issues surrounding the shortcomings in the national  LLRW management system. The committee solicited industry and  stakeholder views regarding the future role of NRC in the area of  commercial LLRW management, noting that NRC staff is updating its  LLRW strategic plan following NRC-directed program reductions. In an  August 2006 letter to the NRC Commissioners, the committee  recommended that an examination be undertaken of how NRC and the  Agreement States are preparing to regulate potential increases in the  storage of class B and C waste if and when the LLRW disposal facility in  South Carolina closes to waste generators in non-compact states and no  alternative options become available. While the committee did not call for  developing a national radioactive waste management plan, it seemed to  suggest the need for contingency planning in the context of a strategic  approach to NRC’s involvement in LLRW management.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The 18 countries surveyed rely on a wide variety of approaches to manage  their LLRW. However, the extent to which each country uses these LLRW  management approaches varied across the surveyed countries. Based on  previous GAO reports, other pertinent reports, and responses to GAO’s  survey, it appears that the United States relies on these approaches to a  lesser degree or not at all. In some cases, NRC has already evaluated the  merits of implementing some of these approaches and rejected them or is  in the process of evaluating the usefulness of a few other approaches.  Comments from representatives of U.S. LLRW stakeholders groups as well  as statements and recommendations in recent reports related to LLRW  management indicate that the application of approaches similar to those  used in other countries may improve the management of U.S. radioactive  waste. The management approaches identified in this report include  methods to improve the:  1.  Comprehensiveness and usefulness of national radioactive waste  inventory all types of radioactive waste by volume, location and  generator type;  inventory the possession and status of use of sealed radiological  sources in more than category 1 and 2;    designate a national authority to manage the radioactive waste  take steps to verify the completeness and accuracy of these  databases;  require waste generators to submit waste inventory information to  the national authority at least once a year; and    use the radioactive waste inventory databases to forecast future  waste volumes, and to inform the public on volumes of waste at  central storage and disposal facilities.  2.  Prompt removal of higher-activity LLRW, primarily disused sealed  radiological sources from waste generator sites    establish on-site storage time limits for non-utility waste generators,  at least when disposal options are available; and  implement other methods to facilitate the removal disused sealed  radiological sources, such as requiring time limits on the use of  sources, return of disused sources to a supplier, and users to notify  the nuclear regulatory authority when the source becomes disused.  3.  Disposition options for all LLRW    provide disposal options for all LLRW or central storage options for  higher-activity LLRW produced by non-utility waste generators if a  disposal option is not available; and    provide alternative disposal options for very low-level radioactive  waste by either removing this waste from review by the nuclear  regulatory authority as LLRW, or providing special disposal options  for this waste.  4.  Financial assurance requirements on all waste generators to reduce  require that all non-utility LLRW generators have sufficient financial  reserves to disposition their radioactive waste; and  implement methods to ensure that funds are available to reimburse  government for any costs to recover and disposition radioactive  materials, including requiring the establishment of insurance funds  for entities that receive disused sources back from their users, and a  disposal fee upon purchase of any sealed radiological sources.
In addition to the survey results, we also identified another management  approach used in most countries—national radioactive waste management  plans—that also might provide lessons for managing U.S. radioactive  waste. IAEA guidance supports the development of a national strategy to  define the infrastructure and the means to be adopted for the management  of radioactive waste. Currently, the United States does not have a national  radioactive waste management plan and does not have a single federal  agency or other organization responsible for coordinating LLRW  stakeholder groups to develop such a plan. Such a plan for the United  State could integrate the various radioactive waste management programs  that reside at the federal and state levels into a single source document. A  national plan could assist those interested in radioactive waste  management to identify waste quantities and locations, plan for future  storage and disposal development, uncover research and development  opportunities, and assess the need for regulatory or legislative actions. For  example, there are no national contingency plan, other than allowing  LLRW storage at waste generator sites, to address the impending closure  of a key LLRW disposal facility. The availability of a national plan and  periodic reporting on waste conditions might also provide the Congress  and the public with a more accessible means to monitor the management  of radioactive waste and provide a mechanism to build greater public trust  in the management of these wastes in the United States.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: In order to improve the management of LLRW in the United States and  address a potential shortfall of disposal availability for higher-activity  LLRW in 2008 and other management concerns, we recommend that the  Chairman of NRC and the Secretary of Energy evaluate and report back to  the Congress within 1 year on the usefulness to the United States of:    Adopting the LLRW management approaches used in the countries  discussed in this report, and the steps and any authorities necessary for  their implementation, if deemed appropriate.
Developing a U.S. radioactive waste management plan, and the potential  costs, steps, and any authorities necessary to develop such a plan, if  deemed appropriate.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of our report to NRC, DOE, and the State Department  for their review and comment.  The State Department did not comment on  the draft report. NRC and DOE generally agreed with the  recommendations in our draft report, but raised a number of issues  regarding their implementation. Specifically, they suggested other means  through which they could report the results of their evaluations to  Congress and they questioned the benefits of developing a national  radioactive waste management plan.  While we recognize the long- standing experience and international leadership of NRC and DOE in the  field of radioactive materials, the intent of our report is to discuss the  approaches used in other countries.  Based on our findings, we are  recommending that NRC and DOE collaborate in reviewing, and in some  cases perhaps reconsidering, the management approaches identified on  pages 36-37 of this report for their potential usefulness in the United  States. We believe the Congress would benefit from a collaborative  evaluation or reevaluation of these approaches to ensure that the best  management approaches are used in the United States.
NRC stated that it has already evaluated many of the LLRW management  approaches and is in the process of evaluating some others as part of a  strategic assessment of its LLRW program to ensure that NRC’s regulatory  framework will continue to ensure the safe management of LLRW.   Further, NRC stated that it prefers to evaluate LLRW management  approaches through ongoing efforts and to report on these evaluations in  its annual letter to the Congress that addresses progress in completing  actions in response to recommendations in multiple GAO reports. NRC  also raised some concerns about our recommendation to evaluate and  report on the development of a national radioactive waste management  plan in specific comments accompanying its letter. While NRC did not  disagree with this recommendation, it pointed out that the costs to  develop a U.S. radioactive waste management plan would be significant  and the benefits unclear, particularly given the complex composition of  the current U.S. system.  NRC noted that legislative changes would likely  be needed before the development of a plan could substantially improve  the U.S. system.
DOE stated that it regards the report as a useful comparison of U.S. LLRW  programs with comparable international programs. DOE accepted the  recommendation to evaluate the international approaches summarized in  our report, but did not agree that a report to the Congress is necessary at  this time. DOE offered to brief the Congress on the status of its radioactive  waste management efforts if asked to do so. Regarding the development of  a national radioactive waste management plan, DOE stated that a single  document synthesizing the activities of numerous agencies and entities  involved in radioactive waste management would facilitate understanding  of these complex programs. However, DOE commented that it is  concerned that development of such a document would provide limited  utility to the actual implementation of these strategies yet would require  diversion of significant resources from actual waste management efforts.   Moreover, DOE suggested that the U.S. Second National Report for the  Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the  Safety of Radioactive Waste Management provides a summary of the  existing national waste management strategies, issues, and progress.
We recognized in our report that NRC has evaluated some of the LLRW  management approaches in the past and is currently evaluating some  others. We also found that many of the U.S. LLRW stakeholder  representatives that we interviewed and some recent U.S. LLRW  management reports generally supported the reevaluation, if not use of  many of the management approaches identified in our report. We believe  that the Congress would benefit from a consolidated report that contains  the evaluations of these LLRW management approaches as they apply to  the U.S. situation. In regard to reporting, we do not take issue with how  the agencies might collaborate together and with other LLRW stakeholder  groups on reporting back to the Congress on these management  approaches as long as the evaluations are comprehensive.
We acknowledge the concerns of NRC and DOE regarding our draft  recommendation to evaluate and report on the development of a national  radioactive waste management plan. We have revised this  recommendation to clarify that the agencies need to evaluate and report  on the usefulness of such a plan and conduct further analysis if deemed  appropriate. We still conclude that the use of a national radioactive waste  management plan in most other countries in our survey and our own  assessment of its potential benefits, as reflected on pages 37-38 of this  report, indicates to us that there is value in further evaluating this  management approach. In addition, in our view, the U.S. national report to  the Joint Convention provides useful information on radioactive waste  management, but the waste inventory information in this report is not  comprehensive and the document does not contain strategies to guide the  management of radioactive waste. The letters from NRC and DOE, along  with our responses to their specific comments are contained in appendix  VI and VII, respectively.
We will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees as well as to the Chairman of NRC and the Secretary of  Energy. We will make copies available to others upon request. In addition,  the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3841 or at aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff members that made contributions to this report  are listed in appendix VIII.
section_title: Appendix I: Recent GAO Findings and Agency Actions on LLRW Management
paragraphs: GAO reports have addressed various aspects of low-level radioactive  waste (LLRW) management in the United States. We reported in 2004 on  the scope and reliability of national LLRW inventory information and  found that the Department of Energy (DOE)’s commercial LLRW disposal  database did not contain data on all disposed LLRW, did not capture  information on LLRW that is produced and stored at waste generator sites,  and had data inaccuracies. We recommended that DOE take steps to  correct internal control weaknesses and shortcomings in the usefulness  and reliability of this database, which DOE claims it has for the most part  accomplished. More recently, we reviewed the U.S. report to the Joint  Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of  Radioactive Waste Management, which commits the United States to,  among other things, report on its national inventory of radioactive waste,  but does not prescribe how this should be done or the level of reporting  detail regarding the location and quantities of LLRW. The U.S. report  includes the location and quantities of DOE’s radioactive waste in storage  and disposal as well as the commercially-generated LLRW that has been  disposed of, but less comprehensive coverage of the location and  quantities of non-DOE LLRW in storage around the country. The response  of the United States to the GAO survey highlighted some gaps in the U.S.  radioactive waste inventory. The United States is also committed through  its signing of the Joint Convention to take steps to ensure the safe  possession, remanufacture, or disposal of disused sealed radiological  sources. One step in this direction is the establishment of a national  radioactive source registry in support of the IAEA Code of Conduct for the  Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. We recommended in our  2005 report that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and DOE, in  collaboration with the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task  Force, evaluate and report on how its source registry (National Source  Tracking System) could be designed and implemented to improve DOE’s  ability to identify and track sources that may need DOE recovery and  disposal. We found that 98.5 percent of the disused sealed radiological  sources that DOE had recovered as of June 2005 would not have been  included in the National Source Tracking System. NRC’s final rule on this  source tracking system stipulates the tracking of only category 1 and 2  sources, although NRC indicated that additional sources could be added  through subsequent rulemaking. NRC has no plans to monitor the status  of sealed radiological source use in this tracking system. However,  according to NRC officials, the online version of the tracking system will  allow licensees to voluntarily provide information on whether a source has  been put in storage and will no longer be used. Appendix IV contains an  assessment of what is known about the volume and location of LLRW in  the United States.
In regard to the safety and security of stored class B, C, and GTCC waste,  we reported in 2004 about the possible increase in the storage of this  higher-activity LLRW at generator sites because, among other reasons,  generators may decide to store their waste on-site because of high  disposal costs. While NRC does not place time limits on the storage of  LLRW, NRC claims that its licensing and inspection programs for waste  generators provide assurance that stored LLRW will remain safe and  secure. Moreover, NRC contends that with the exception of disused sealed  radiological sources, LLRW does not present an attractive target for  adversaries. In regard to the safety and security of sealed radiological  sources, NRC reported that it has conducted vulnerability assessments,  imposed new security measures on those licensees that possess category 1  and 2 sources, and it is reviewing the adequacy of its guidance for long- term LLRW storage as well as possible updates to this guidance. NRC  officials informed us that the new security measures also apply to  licensees who possess aggregations of category 3 or lesser-activity source  categories that would meet or exceed the category 2 radioactivity  threshold. In addition, they told us that NRC requires the timely removal of  radioactive material as part of the decommissioning process. Nevertheless,  the response of the United States to the GAO survey indicated that NRC  does not enforce the removal of disused sealed radiological sources from  licensees that generate this waste or require them to return their disused  sources to the source supplier. As we reported in 2005, NRC works with  DOE to identify disused sealed radiological sources at user sites that  should be recovered because they pose a safety and security risk. The  Conference on Radiation Control Program Directors also provides a  clearinghouse service for users to disposition their disused sources. We  noted, however, that the lack of information to track the number and  status of sealed radiological sources that may require recovery and  disposal in the future limits DOE’s ability to effectively plan and budget for  its recovery and disposal efforts and to monitor the performance of its  source recovery program.
We also reported on LLRW disposal options in the United States, which  are affected by federal and state nuclear regulatory authorities,  commercial LLRW disposal operators, and LLRW compact commissions.  We found in our 2004 report that there appears to be sufficient disposal  capacity for class A, B, C waste, but uncertain future access to a disposal  facility for class B and C waste. In our 2005 report, we found that there  was some central storage for GTCC waste, essentially for disused sealed  radiological sources recovered by DOE, but no disposal availability. These  reports and others have commented on the many factors affecting the  predictability of disposal availability and disposal costs. For example, NRC  and the Agreement State regulators are involved in granting the approval  of LLRW disposal facilities and the classes of waste that can be accepted.  They also have discretion, on a case-by-case basis, to exempt very low- level radioactive waste from regulation as LLRW, thus providing waste  generators with more disposal options for this waste. According to NRC  officials, approvals for waste generators in states under its jurisdiction  have been granted for small quantities of waste—averaging about 2 per  year over the past 6 years—however, no comparable information is  available on the 34 Agreement States. NRC officials also told us that the  agency has attempted to improve the transparency of this process for a  number of stated reasons, including the anticipation that there will be  large amounts of this waste from nuclear power plant decommissioning.  NRC has evaluated and decided to defer action on a rule that would  exempt very low-level radioactive waste from having to go through  regulatory review as LLRW. The LLRW compact commissions can also  affect the predictability of the disposal system because they have  discretion to restrict access to disposal facilities as well as to charge  variable disposal fees based not only on waste type but the type of  generator. Likewise, commercial disposal facility operators can affect the  predictability of the disposal system. For example, the operator of the  disposal facility that accepts almost all of the class A waste charges  variable disposal fees based on the generator of the waste. Waste  generators, such as DOE and nuclear power plants, which dispose of large  volumes of class A waste, can negotiate lower disposal fees per volume of  waste than generators that dispose of much smaller quantities of this  waste. Appendix V contains a discussion of the type of waste and waste  generators that would be affected by reduced access to the South Carolina  disposal facility. For example, of the 671 waste generators that sent  disused sealed radiological sources to the South Carolina disposal facility  between 2001 and 2005, only 70 would be allowed to do so after mid-2008.
In our 2005 report we commented on the limitations on DOE’s ability to  recoup its costs for recovering disused sealed radiological sources from  non-utility waste generators. The response of the United States to the GAO  survey indicated that not all non-utility waste generators, particularly  those possessing sealed radiological sources, are currently required to  ensure that funds are available to cover future LLRW disposition costs.  NRC officials told us that they are revising the financial assurance  regulations aimed at addressing sites that permanently cease radiological  operations without adequate funds to complete decommissioning. The  revised regulations are intended to address problems with funding large,  complex sites that may include extensive soil and groundwater  contamination. The disposal of disused sealed radiological sources is not  part of this rulemaking. For non-Agreement States, NRC officials indicated  that about 5 to 10 small businesses possessing sealed radiological sources  go bankrupt each year. However, NRC officials informed us that they have  no information on the annual number of bankruptcies in the 34 Agreement  States. In cases where waste generators do not have the funds to cover the  cost of removing, centrally storing, or disposing of their higher-activity  disused sealed radiological sources, the U.S. government has covered  these costs. One of NRC’s performance goals is to reduce the potential for  unnecessary federal government funding to clean up sites if licensees go  bankrupt and have insufficient financial reserve to cover these costs.  According to NRC officials, the potential expansion of the financial  assurance requirements for its licensees will ensure that they can meet  their responsibilities to cover the cost to disposition a broad range of  radioactive materials, including sealed radiological sources. NRC officials  note that this initiative may also help reduce the cost of DOE’s program to  recover disused sealed radiological sources. Nevertheless, DOE officials  told us that the department has no basis to charge waste generators to  recover and store disused sealed radiological sources that would generally  constitute GTCC waste when disposed of because there is presently no  disposal option for this waste and thus no basis to determine a service fee  schedule. In our 2005 report, we recommended that NRC and DOE  evaluate mechanisms to reduce government costs of recovering, storing  and disposing of higher-activity LLRW. The response of the United States  to the GAO survey indicated that NRC does not require a disposal fee at  the time of purchase or require that source users and suppliers contribute  to a recovery fund.
Finally, in reviewing the U.S. report to the Joint Convention on the Safety  of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste  Management, prepared by DOE in cooperation with other federal agencies,  we noted that while the report describes existing national policies and  practices for managing radioactive waste, it does not constitute a national  radioactive waste management plan. However, the Joint Convention does  not mention the need for such a plan and there is no requirement in U.S.  legislation for a federal agency to prepare a plan. While the LLRW Policy  Act required DOE to report to the Congress annually on national LLRW  conditions, the provision, which terminated effective May 2000, it did not  require a national radioactive waste management plan. DOE officials have,  however, provided us with a draft copy of the department’s strategy to  optimize the disposition of DOE low-level and mixed low-level radioactive  waste. Similarly, NRC officials told us that their responsibilities to oversee  the use, storage and disposal of radioactive materials do not include  development of a national radioactive waste management plan. However,  NRC officials informed us that in light of new challenges, influences, and  issues facing LLRW management today, they are currently conducting a  strategic assessment that will identify and prioritize staff activities to  ensure a stable, reliable, and adaptable regulatory framework for effective  LLRW management.
section_title: Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In our review, we examined the extent to which foreign countries have   (1) comprehensive national LLRW inventory databases, (2) timely removal  of higher-activity LLRW in storage at waste generator sites, (3) disposition  options for all LLRW, and (4) requirements to assure that LLRW  generators have adequate financial reserves to cover all waste disposition  costs. We also examined another management area that surfaced during  our review pertaining to the use of national radioactive waste management  plans. Our examination primarily relied on a survey of radioactive waste  management officials in countries, along with the United States that  account for 85 percent of the world’s installed nuclear power plant  capacity. To better understand the context of managing LLRW in other  countries, we also spoke with radioactive waste management officials and  visited disposal facilities in France, Japan, and Sweden. To describe the  status of LLRW management in the United States, we obtained responses  from NRC to the same questionnaire sent to other countries, interviewed  NRC and DOE officials as well as representatives from a wide range of  domestic LLRW stakeholder groups, and reviewed past GAO reports and  other pertinent documents.
Specifically, we developed, pretested, and sent out questionnaires to 20  countries to identify foreign experiences in managing LLRW. The  countries included Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,  Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands,  Norway, Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and  United Kingdom. These countries, along with the United States, are  represented on the NEA Radioactive Waste Management Committee. The  questionnaire contained 32 questions and potential answers that were  distributed across the four areas of LLRW management under review.  Respondents were also given an opportunity to specify other responses  not listed and to provide additional comments on most of the questions.  Appendix II provides the questionnaire and the responses from the United  States. To increase the potential response rate to the survey, we attended a  March 2006 meeting of the NEA Radioactive Waste Management  Committee in Paris, France, to discuss our interests in surveying the  representatives of foreign countries who attended the meeting. While at  this meeting, we also reviewed a draft questionnaire with representatives  from the NEA and IAEA. We further reviewed the draft questionnaire with  radioactive waste management officials that we met with in France and  Sweden. Several e-mail messages were sent to all 20 countries prior to  administering the survey in order to confirm the appropriate country  official to receive the questionnaire and to encourage each of them to  participate in the survey. All but two countries, the Czech Republic and  South Korea, responded to our survey (a 90-percent survey response rate).  For the most part, we accepted the responses provided by each country;  however, in a few cases we contacted country officials to clarify their  responses to some questions, and we took other steps to ensure more  complete responses to all questions. We then tabulated frequencies for  each question across the countries.
We made site visits to France, Japan, and Sweden to speak directly with  representatives from the nuclear regulatory authority, waste management  organization, and waste generators about LLRW management in their  country. These countries were selected because they are large generators  of radioactive waste and they represent both European Union and non- European Union member countries on the NEA Radioactive Waste  Management Committee. We sent out questions in advance of our  meetings with these representatives and we used our time with them to  obtain a better understanding of why different management approaches  were taken and the experiences of stakeholder groups with them.
We identified and examined foreign country and international documents  addressing the management of radioactive waste to supplement the  information we obtained from our survey. These documents included  radioactive waste management reports that countries are required to  submit to IAEA under international agreements, national radioactive waste  management reports and updates prepared for the NEA Radioactive Waste  Management Committee, and information that we obtained during our  visits to the three countries. For example, we used these documents to  describe the extent to which countries use central storage facilities for  LLRW, formulate radioactive waste management plans, and apply specific  management approaches. In some instances, we used these documents to  check the responses provided by countries on their questionnaire.
We interviewed NRC and DOE officials and representatives from a diverse  group of domestic LLRW stakeholders to describe the current LLRW  management situation in the United States and to identify approaches that  might be applied to improve the management of LLRW corresponding to  our four research objectives. The interviewees represented nuclear  regulators at the federal and state levels; LLRW disposal operators;  advisory groups including the Conference on Radiation Control Program  Directors, Department of Defense’s Low-Level Radioactive Waste  Executive Agent, National Research Council of the National Academies,  and NRC Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste; pertinent associations,  including the Council on Radionuclides and Radiopharmaceuticals, the  Health Physics Society, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum, and the  Nuclear Energy Institute; and private consultancies. The Health Physics  Society is a scientific and professional organization whose 6,000 members  specialize in occupational and environmental radiation safety, and the  Nuclear Energy Institute represents all nuclear power plant operators. We  conducted a content analysis of 33 domestic interviews; coding responses  as either agreeing, not agreeing, or not responding to a common set of  questions addressed in each interview (respondents are shown in table 2).  These responses were then quantified for statistical analysis. In addition to  interviews based on a standard list of questions, in the course of our  review we also conducted informational interviews with the Energy Policy  Research Institute, Army Corps of Engineers, Exelon Nuclear, and  program officials at DOE. Moreover, we reviewed several pertinent  reports, including a report of the NRC chaired Radioactive Source  Protection and Security Task Force, a report from National Research  Council, and a report of the NRC Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste.  The formation of the interagency NRC chaired task force and periodic  reporting requirements were mandated in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
Finally, we examined LLRW inventory data from several sources to  estimate the volumes, types, locations, and generators of LLRW in the  United States and what is now received at the LLRW disposal facility in  South Carolina from non-compact member states. For the most part, we  relied on data from DOE’s Manifest Information Management System and  from the U.S. report to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel  Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. We  determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  this report. Our assessment of what is known about the location and  volume of LLRW in the United States is covered in appendix III. The status  of class B and C waste disposal in the United States, as well as the impact  of closing the South Carolina disposal facility to non-compact member  states, slated for 2008, is contained in appendix V.
We conducted our review between September 2005 and February 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix III: Survey of LLRW Management Approaches: Response from United States
section_title: Appendix IV: Volume and Location of LLRW in the United States
paragraphs: The United States is required under international agreement to prepare a  national report on the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste  management that includes an inventory of radioactive waste in the  country. Even though the DOE has taken lead responsibility for preparing  this inventory, there is no designated agency responsible for managing a  national LLRW inventory database. The reported information includes data  from DOE’s own radioactive waste inventory, as well as publicly available  information that is compiled from a variety of sources, including DOE’s  Manifest Information Management System containing information from  the three LLRW disposal operators, EIA spent fuel database, Broker and  Processor database, and other sources. While DOE can report on the  radioactive waste it has in storage or has disposed of, there is limited  information on the storage of waste at non-DOE sites. DOE has reported  some LLRW storage at waste brokers and processor sites, and the GTCC  waste stored at commercial nuclear power plants. NRC and Agreement  State radioactive materials licensees are supposed to maintain records of  the nuclear material that they possess, but information on the status of use  of these materials, particularly disused sealed radiological sources, is not  centrally collected. The Electric Power and Research Institute collects  proprietary data from nuclear power plant operators on the annual  generation of LLRW, but not on the storage of all LLRW, which is  constantly changing. The institute estimates that an average plant  generates about 12,000 cubic feet of LLRW each year.
The following tables provide some information on non-DOE and DOE  radioactive waste volumes and locations. DOE classifies its radioactive  waste somewhat differently than waste generated by NRC and Agreement  State licensees. DOE reports four classes of radioactive waste, not  including mixed waste, that include high-level waste, transuranic waste,  low-level waste, and 11(e)(2) byproduct material. DOE’s low-level waste  category and transuranic waste would clearly fall within the NRC waste  classification scheme. Low-level waste would be generally categorized as  class A, B, or C waste, and transuranic waste would be categorized as  greater-than-class C waste. DOE’s 11(e)(2) byproduct material is a special  category of radioactive waste.
According to NRC officials, 11(e)(2) byproduct materials and other types  of radioactive waste exists in the United States but are not considered  LLRW under NRC regulations. The National Research Council of the  National Academies has reported that the principal origin of uranium and  thorium ore processing waste comes from the recovery of this material for  DOE or civilian nuclear applications. Typical examples include mining and  mill tailings, process residues, soils and contaminated equipment. Similar  waste comes from naturally occurring and technologically enhanced  naturally occurring radioactive materials. The principal origins of these  materials are from the recovery and processing of mineral resources not  related to nuclear applications, and municipal water treatment. Examples  of these materials include commercial ore mining residues, phosphate  mining and fertilizers, scale and sludge from oil and gas production, water  treatment filters, resins, and other sludge. There are large volumes of these  wastes, but limited information on the actual quantities that remain at sites  around the United States.
section_title: Appendix V: Status of Class B and C Waste Disposal and Potential Effects of Reduced Access to South Carolina Disposal Facility
paragraphs: Limiting waste generator access to the LLRW disposal facility in South  Carolina to only the three compact member states by mid-2008 will require  waste generators to store their class B and C waste until another disposal  option becomes available. We reported in June 2004 that 99 percent of the  class B and C waste disposed in this country went to the Barnwell, South  Carolina, disposal facility, the only option available to waste generators in  39 states. Generators in the 11 other states have access to the LLRW  disposal facility in Richland, Washington. In total the class B and C waste  that is disposed at both of these facilities amounts to slightly less than 0.5  percent of all LLRW that was disposed of commercially in the United  States between 1999 and 2003.
We conducted a further analysis of data in the DOE managed Manifest  Information Management System for 2001 to 2005 for the waste generators  that use the two disposal facilities that can accept class B and C waste  (Barnwell, South Carolina, and Richland, Washington), and the types and  quantities of waste disposed at these facilities during this time period. In  order to compare the waste types disposed as these two facilities, we had  to come up with a categorization scheme that captured the different types  of class B and C waste. For the purpose of our analysis, we consolidated  these waste types into groups as shown in the table 9.
Table 10 shows the volume and activity of the class B and C waste that  was disposed between 2001 and 2005 by waste type group. Filters, filter  media, and resins contributed the greatest volume of waste (44 percent of  total disposed volume), but only about 3 percent of total disposed activity.  Equipment and materials, by contrast, contributed only about 28 percent  of the total disposed volume but accounted for 86 percent of the disposed  activity. According to a nuclear industry official, contaminated equipment  and material is highly radioactive and will need to be stored on-site similar  to spent fuel rods, if there is no disposal option for this type of waste.
Table 11 shows the number of generators of a particular waste type  distributed across the generator types. No total is provided for the number  of different generator types because in some cases one generator may be  disposing of different types of waste. Providing a total by generator type  would result in an over count of the total number of generators.
Table 12 shows that the volume of class B and C waste ranges from year to  year across the waste generator types. The average volume of class B and  C waste between 2001 and 2005 was about 28,800 cubic feet.
The next two tables provide a distribution of class B and C waste (both  volume and activity) disposed at Richland and Barnwell from 2001 to 2005  by waste generator type. Table 13 shows that utilities contributed the  about 92 percent of the volume and 91 percent of the activity of class B  and C waste disposed at Richland and Barnwell from 2001 to 2005. Table  14 shows the distribution of class B and C waste across generator types  excluding utility generators. In this table, industry disposed of about 55  percent of class B and C waste, which amounted to about 44 percent of the  total activity. Government, on the other hand, contributed about 39  percent of the volume, but about 56 percent of the activity.
Table 15 shows the total volume and activity of class B and C waste, by  compact, that was disposed of at both Richland and Barnwell from 2001 to  2005. The last two columns show the percent contribution that each  compact made to total volume and activity of disposed class B and C  waste at Richland and Barnwell from 2001 to 2005. If Barnwell closed to  non-compact states and the current pattern of disposal remained the same,  waste generators in these states would accumulate over 100,000 cubic feet  of class B and C waste over a 5-year period.
Table 16 summarizes one way to show the affects of eliminating access to  waste generators in 36 states that will not have disposal access for class B  and C waste in 2008 because they are not affiliated with the Atlantic,  Northwest or Rocky Mountain Compacts. Using the past 5 years of  disposal data as an indicator, the closing of Barnwell to these generators  would affect 73 percent of the disposed volume and about 90 percent of  the disposed activity. Almost all of the remaining volume going to  Barnwell would come from the Atlantic LLRW Compact.
Another way to illustrate the affects of eliminating access to the Barnwell  disposal facility is the number of waste generators that would no longer  have a place to dispose of their disused, sealed radiological sources and  would thus have to store these sources on-site. Table 17 shows the  compacts where these generators are located.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Our Response
paragraphs: NRC provided 14 specific comments about our report accompanying its  letter. Our response to each comment follows. 1.  We acknowledge that our past reports have not found the lack of a  national radioactive waste management plan as a limitation in the  management of LLRW in the United Sates. Nevertheless, in the course  of conducting our study, we found that most countries in our survey  use national radioactive waste management plans to guide the  management of these wastes.  Our report discussed the LLRW Policy  Act, but not to extent that we have in previous GAO reports, and we  agree with NRC that the act has not achieved its desired outcome of  establishing regional disposal facilities for LLRW.  NRC’s suggestion  that legislative changes would likely be needed before the  development of a national radioactive waste management plan could  substantially improve the U.S. system is in line with our  recommendation to evaluate the steps involved in developing such a  plan. Finally, we considered NRC’s concerns about the potential costs  and unclear benefits of developing a national radioactive waste  management plan and observe that an evaluation of these concerns  would be better placed in the report we recommended that NRC and  DOE prepare for the Congress.   2.  We believe that the complexity of the U.S. LLRW management system  should provide a further rationale for evaluating the usefulness of  developing a national radioactive waste management plan that could  integrate the various radioactive waste management programs that  reside at the federal and state levels into a single source document.  3.  While the LLRW stakeholder group representatives that we  interviewed did not identify a need to develop a national radioactive  waste management plan, we believe that their support for the need to  evaluate alternative ways to manage LLRW in the United States is  consistent with our recommendation to evaluate the usefulness of  developing such a plan. We acknowledge that much of the information  on radioactive waste management is already available from a variety of  sources.  We concluded on pages 37-38 of our report that a national  radioactive waste management plan could help integrate these  activities into a single source document.   4.  We concur with NRC that in some instances an integrated approach by  federal and state authorities is needed to make progress toward  improvement in the U.S. system.  In our view, one way to bring  stakeholders together to discuss ways to improve radioactive waste  management would be in the context of developing a national  radioactive waste management plan.  NRC and DOE can decide the  most appropriate means to evaluate the usefulness of developing such  a plan and who should participate in the process.   5.  As our report notes, we reviewed the national reports to the Joint  Convention of the countries surveyed and other international reports  addressing each country.  For the most part, our survey was designed  to collect information that was not available in these existing reports.  6.  We commented in our report on the agencies’ engagements in  international information exchanges regarding radioactive waste  management practices.  We also observe that NRC and DOE  encouraged us to collect information on the LLRW management  approaches used in other countries, as this information was not readily  available from other sources.    7.  In our view, the LLRW management approaches identified in this  report should help direct NRC’s strategic assessment of its LLRW  program.  Moreover, NRC should include in its report to Congress the  results of any previous and ongoing evaluations of the LLRW  approaches that we cited in our report.  8.  We provided the response of the United States to the survey in  appendix III of our report.  9.  We commented on NRC’s evaluation of and decision on a rule to  facilitate the disposition of certain solid materials with no, or very  small amounts of residual radioactivity (very low-level radioactive  waste) in appendix I of our report. We observe that NRC’s current  position on this issue contrasts with the management practices of most  other countries and differs from the opinions we obtained from most  LLRW stakeholder representatives.    10. We identified some of the current gaps in financial assurance  requirements for those licensed to use radioactive materials in the  United States in appendix I of our report. We also pointed out in our  report that there is no national database on those licensees that move  into bankruptcy and cannot afford to disposition their sealed  radiological sources.  Our report identified approaches used in some  other countries to reduce the government cost to recover and  disposition these disused sources.  11. Interpretation of terms is always an issue with questionnaires.  We  pretested the questionnaire in two other countries and with  international experts to identify problematic terms.  We attempted to  use terms that are generally understood internationally by referring to  NEA and IAEA technical guidance, and reports from other countries.  12. We revised our report to clarify this point. 13. We revised our report to clarify this point. 14. The purpose of our report was to determine the extent to which other  countries use LLRW management approaches in areas that GAO has  identified as needing some improvement.  We did not attempt to  identify approaches other countries use to increase the safe use of  radioactive materials.
The Chairman, Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, provided 6 specific  comments about our report with the NRC letter.  Our response to each  comment follows.   1.  While the totality of the various federal and state programs addressing  LLRW management may be comprehensive when aggregated, we view  this collection of programs as not representing a national radioactive  waste management plan.  We identified some potential benefits of such  a plan on pages 37-38 of this report.   2.  We referred to the Advisory Committee’s 2006 letter in our report, but  the final report of the advisory committee was not available when we  sent the draft copy of our report to the NRC. We have added a  reference to the final version of the advisory committee report in our  report. 3.  We point out that a third of the countries in our survey are not  members of the European Union.  Our survey found that most  countries take a national perspective to the management of LLRW;  however, those entities that are responsible for providing and  operating LLRW disposal and storage facilities are not always  government agencies.  For example, the LLRW system in Japan relies  primarily on nuclear utility companies, operating under stringent  government regulation, to construct and operate radioactive waste  treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.  4.  We reviewed country reports, including those provided to NEA, IAEA,  and the Joint Convention, as a check on and supplement to the  information that we obtained directly from the 18 countries in our  survey.  5.  We did not recommend in our report that the United States needs to  exempt certain radioactive wastes from regulation.  Our report  identifies LLRW management practices in other countries, and the  level of support for these approaches among representatives from  LLRW stakeholder groups and in some recent LLRW management  reports. We commented on NRC’s evaluation of a rule to exempt very  level radioactive waste from regulation as LLRW in appendix I.   6.  We provided the response of the United States to the survey in  appendix III of our report.
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Energy and Our Response
paragraphs: DOE provided 10 specific comments about our report in accompanying its  draft letter.  Our response to each comment follows.  1.  We have revised the title of our report. 2.  Our report discussed previous actions by the agencies to respond to  our recommendations and to evaluate some of the LLRW management  approaches that are similar to those identified as in use in other  countries.  This discussion is in appendix I of our report.  In our view,  the fact that some of these LLRW management approaches have  already been evaluated by NRC and DOE does not lessen the need for  their inclusion in a report to the Congress. 3.  We revised the draft recommendation to more clearly reflect the need  to evaluate and report on the usefulness of developing a national  radioactive waste management plan and to conduct further analysis if  deemed appropriate. Our views on the potential usefulness of such a  plan are provided on pages 37-38 of this report.   4.  We revised our second recommendation to clarify this point.   5.  The purpose of our report was to identify the extent to which other  countries use approaches to address four areas of U.S. LLRW  management that we identified in previous reports as having some  limitations.  We did not recommend adopting any of the approaches  identified as in use on other countries, only to evaluate and report to  the Congress on their usefulness to improve management of this waste  in the United States.  6.  In our view, assigning responsibility for waste disposal in the LLRW  Policy Act is not synonymous with establishing a national radioactive  waste management plan.  We revised our recommendation to clarify  that NRC and DOE need to evaluate and report on the usefulness of  developing such a plan. We did not suggest how the agencies should  conduct this evaluation or which entities should participate in the  evaluation process.    7.  We did not attempt to provide a detailed discussion of how market  forces operate in the United States in the disposition of commercial  LLRW in our report.  This level of discussion was not an objective of  our report.  Our previous reports have described the conditions  surrounding the management of LLRW in the United States.      8.  Our report associates disused sealed sources with higher-activity  LLRW, as this is, for the most part, international practice.  Our report  further states that a holder of a disused source can return it to a  supplier, place it in a recognized installation (central storage or  disposal facility), or transfer it to another authorized holder when it is  no longer wanted.  9.  We cannot comment on this DOE observation, as the department  provided no specific information to substantiate this claim. We believe  that our characterization of the findings and recommendations of the  task force report are accurate.  Moreover, we referenced a previous  2005 GAO report that provides more information on the origin and  purpose of the radiation source protection and security task force.   Our intent in referring to the task force and other recent reports was to  point out that these reports suggested and recommended approaches  that were similar to what other countries indicated in our survey that  they use.  10. We agree with DOE that not all storage of radioactive waste is unsafe.  Our report referred to international experts that claim that the storage  of disused sealed radiological sources at user sites poses a greater risk  of being lost from regulatory control.
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841 or at aloisee@gao.gov.
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Daniel Feehan, Assistant Director,  and Kevin Bray, John Delicath, Doreen Feldman, Bart Fischer, Peter  Grana, Susan Iott, Erin Lanier, Thomas Laetz, and Amanda Miller made  key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Future Waste Volumes and Disposal  Options Are Uncertain. GAO-04-1097T. Washington, D.C.: September 30,  2004.
Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Disposal Availability Adequate in the  Short Term, but Oversight Needed to Identify Any Future Shortfalls.  GAO-04-604. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2004.
Low-Level Radioactive Wastes: States Are Not Developing Disposal  Facilities. GAO/RCED-99-238. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 1999.
Nuclear Regulation: Better Oversight Needed to Ensure Accumulation of  Funds to Decommission Nuclear Power Plants. GAO/RCED-99-75.  Washington, D.C.: May 3, 1999.
Radioactive Waste: Answers to Questions Related to the Proposed  Ward Valley Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility. GAO/RCED- 98-40R. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 1998.
Radioactive Waste: Interior’s Continuing Review of the Proposed  Transfer of the Ward Valley Waste Site. GAO/RCED-97-184. Washington,  D.C.: July 15, 1997.
Radioactive Waste: Status of Commercial Low-Level Waste Facilities.  GAO/RCED-95-67. Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1995.
Radioactive Waste: EPA Standards Delayed by Low Priority and  Coordination Problems. GAO/RCED-93-126. Washington, D.C.: June 3,  1993.
Nuclear Waste: Connecticut’s First Site Selection Process for a Disposal  Facility. GAO/RCED-93-81. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 1993.
Nebraska Low-Level Waste. GAO/RCED-93-47R. Washington, D.C.:  October 14, 1992.
Nuclear Waste: New York’s Adherence to Site Selection Procedures Is  Unclear. GAO/RCED-92-172. Washington, D.C.: August 11, 1992.
Connecticut Low-Level Waste. GAO/RCED-92-137R. Washington, D.C.:  March 17, 1992.
Nuclear Waste: Slow Progress Developing Low-Level Radioactive Waste  Disposal Facilities. GAO/RCED-92-61. Washington, D.C.: January 10, 1992.
Nuclear Waste: Extensive Process to Site Low-Level Waste Disposal  Facility in Nebraska. GAO/RCED-91-149. Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1991.
Regional Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Sites—Progress Being  Made, But New Sites Will Probably Not Be Ready by 1986.   GAO/RCED-83-48. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 1983.
Hazards of Past Low-Level Radioactive Waste Ocean Dumping Have  Been Overemphasized. GAO/EMD-82-9. Washington, D.C.: October 21,  1981.
Existing Nuclear Sites Can Be Used for New Powerplants and Nuclear  Waste Storage. GAO/EMD-80-67. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 1980.
The Problem of Disposing of Nuclear Low-Level Waste: Where Do We Go  From Here? GAO/EMD-80-68. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 1980.
Legal Authority of a State Governor to Impose Limitations on the Use of  a Licensed, Privately Owned, Low-Level Nuclear Waste Burial Facility.  GAO-B-194786. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 1979.
The Nation’s Nuclear Waste—Proposals for Organization and Siting.  GAO/EMD-79-77. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 1979.
Need for Greater Regulatory Oversight of Commercial Low-Level  Radioactive Waste. GAO/EMD-78-101, Washington, D.C.: August 16, 1978.
Major Unresolved Issues Preventing a Timely Resolution to Radioactive  Waste Disposal. GAO/EMD-78-94. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 1978.
Nuclear Energy’s Dilemma: Disposing of Hazardous Radioactive Waste  Safely. GAO-103414. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 1977.
Nuclear Energy’s Dilemma: Disposing of Hazardous Radioactive Waste  Safely. GAO/EMD-77-41. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 1977.
Institutional and Jurisdictional Issues in Nuclear Waste Management.  GAO-102168. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 1977.
Improvements Needed in the Land Disposal of Radioactive Wastes—A  Problem of Centuries. GAO/RED-76-54. Washington, D.C.: January 12,  1976.
subsections: section_title: Management of Sealed Radiological Sources
paragraphs: Border Security: Investigations Successfully Transported Radioactive  Sources Across Our Nation’s Borders at Selected Locations.   GAO-06-545R. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Nuclear Security: DOE Needs Better Information to Guide Its Expanded  Recovery of Sealed Radiological Sources. GAO-05-967. Washington, D.C.:  September 22, 2005.
Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security  of Sealed Radioactive Sources. GAO-03-804. Washington, D.C.: August 6,  2003.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to  Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening. GAO-03-638.  Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Actions Needed to Ensure Continued  Recovery of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources. GAO-03-483.  Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2003.