Elections: Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents Challenges
Published: 2004-05-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The technology used to cast and count votes is one aspect of the multifaceted U.S. election process. GAO examined voting technology, among other things, in a series of reports that it issued in 2001 following the problems encountered in the 2000 election. In October 2002, the Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act, which, among other things, established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to assist in the administration of federal elections. The act also established a program to provide funds to states to replace older punch card and lever machine voting equipment. As this older voting equipment has been replaced with newer electronic voting systems over the last 2 years, concerns have been raised about the vulnerabilities associated with certain electronic voting systems. Among other things, GAO's testimony focuses on attributes on which electronic voting systems can be assessed, as well as design and implementation factors affecting their performance. GAO also describes the immediate and longer term challenges confronting local jurisdictions in using any type of voting equipment, particularly electronic voting systems.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: An electronic voting system, like other automated information systems, can be judged on several bases, including how well its design provides for security, accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency, as well as its cost. For example, direct recording electronic systems offer advantages in ease of use because they can have features that accommodate voters with various disabilities, and they protect against common voter errors, such as overvoting (voting for more candidates than is permissible); a disadvantage of such systems is their capital cost and frequent lack of an independent paper audit trail. Advantages of optical scan voting equipment (another type of electronic voting system) include capital cost and the enhanced security associated with having a paper audit trail; disadvantages include lower ease of use, such as their limited ability to accommodate voters with disabilities. One important determinant of voting system performance is how it is designed and developed, including the testing that determines whether the developed system performs as designed. In the design and development process, a critical factor is the quality of the specified system requirements as embodied in applicable standards or guidance. For voting technology, these voluntary standards have historically been problematic; the EAC has now been given responsibility for voting system guidelines, and it intends to update them. The EAC also intends to strengthen the process for testing voting system hardware and software. A second determinant of performance is how the system is implemented. In implementing a system, it is critical to have people with the requisite knowledge and skills to operate it according to well-defined and understood processes. The EAC also intends to focus on these people and process factors in its role of assisting in the administration of elections. In the upcoming 2004 national election and beyond, the challenges confronting local jurisdictions in using electronic voting systems are similar to those facing any technology user. These challenges include both immediate and more long term challenges.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on  electronic voting systems. In light of concerns associated with the  voting systems used in the 2000 election, we produced a series of  reports, issued in 2001, in which we examined virtually every aspect  of the election process, including types of voting technology. As we  reported in 2001, the particular technology used to cast and count  votes is a critical part of this process, but it is only one facet of a  multifaceted election process. Other facets include the people who  implement and use the technology and the processes that govern its  implementation, among which are the standards used to define the  characteristics and performance of the technology. Accordingly, we  recognized that no voting technology, however well designed, can  be a magic bullet that will solve all the problems that can arise in the  election process. At the same time, we also recognized that if not  properly managed, this one facet of the election process can  significantly undermine the integrity of the whole.
As requested, my testimony today will focus on electronic voting  systems, and in doing so I will address (1) the role of these systems  within the larger election process, (2) attributes that can be used to  examine these systems’ capabilities, (3) the importance of both  system design and implementation to the performance of these  systems, and (4) the challenges confronting local jurisdictions in  using any type of voting equipment, particularly electronic voting  systems.
In preparing for this testimony, we drew extensively from our  published work on the election process. We augmented this work  with reviews of more recent studies of electronic voting systems  and other relevant documents. In addition, we interviewed  commissioners of the newly appointed Election Assistance  Commission (EAC) regarding its efforts to date and its plans, and  we attended EAC and other commission hearings on electronic  voting systems. Our follow-up work was performed from February  2004 to May 2004 in Washington, D.C. All the work on which this  testimony is based was performed in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Following the 2000 national elections, we performed a  comprehensive series of reviews covering our nation’s election  process, in which we identified a number of challenges. These  reviews culminated in a capping report that summarized this work  and provided the Congress with a framework for considering  options for election administration reform. Our reports and  framework were among the resources that the Congress drew on in  enacting the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, which  provided guidance for fundamental election administration reform.  Among other things, the act authorizes $3.86 billion in funding over  several fiscal years for programs to replace punch card and  mechanical lever voting equipment, improve election  administration, improve accessibility, train poll workers, and  perform research and pilot studies. It also created the EAC to  oversee the election administration reform process. Since the act’s  passage, a number of voting jurisdictions have replaced their older  voting equipment with direct recording electronic systems. At the  same time, concerns have been raised about the use of these  systems; some critics have suggested, for example, that the security  associated with the systems is not sufficient to ensure the integrity  of the election process. In January 2004, the EAC began operations.  On May 5, 2004, it held a public hearing to receive information on  the use, security, and reliability of electronic voting devices. The  hearing included panels of technology and standards experts,  vendors of voting systems, state and local election administrators,  and citizen advocacy groups. A major topic of the hearing was the  security and reliability of touchscreen electronic voting systems.
subsections: section_title: GAO Work Following the 2000 Elections Provided a Framework for Election Administration Reform
paragraphs: At the request of congressional leaders, committees, and members,  we conducted an extensive body of work in the wake of the 2000  elections, which culminated in seven reports addressing a range of  election-related topics.
First, we reviewed the constitutional framework for the  administration of elections, as well as major federal statutes enacted  in this area. We reported that the constitutional framework for  elections includes both state and federal roles. States are  responsible for the administration of both their own elections and  federal elections, but the Congress has enacted laws in several  major areas of the voting process, including the timing of federal  elections, voter registration, and absentee voting requirements.  Congressional authority to legislate in this area derives from various  constitutional sources, depending upon the type of election. For  federal elections, the Congress has constitutional authority over  both congressional and presidential elections.
Second, we examined voting assistance for military and overseas  voters. We reported that although tools are available for such  voters, many potential voters were unaware of them, and many  military and overseas voters believed it was challenging to  understand and comply with state requirements and local  procedures for absentee voting. In addition, although information  was not readily available on the precise number of military and  overseas absentee votes that were disqualified in the 2000 general  election and the reasons for disqualification, we found through a  national telephone survey that almost two-thirds of the disqualified  absentee ballots were rejected because of lateness or errors in  completion of the envelope or form accompanying the ballot. We  recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and State improve  (1) the clarity and completeness of service guidance, (2) voter  education and outreach programs, (3) oversight and evaluation of  voting assistance efforts, and (4) sharing of best practices. The  Departments of Defense and State agreed with our overall findings  and recommendations, and as of May 2004, the recommendations  had largely been implemented.
Third, we investigated whether minorities and disadvantaged voters  were more likely to have their votes not counted because the voting  method they used was less reliable than that of affluent white  voters. According to our results, the state in which counties were  located had more effect on the number of uncounted presidential  votes than did counties’ demographic characteristics or voting  method. State differences accounted for 26 percent of the total  variation in uncounted presidential votes across counties. County  demographic characteristics accounted for 16 percent of the  variation (counties with higher percentages of minority residents  tended to have higher percentages of uncounted presidential votes,  while counties with higher percentages of younger and more  educated residents tended to have lower percentages of uncounted  presidential votes), and voting equipment accounted for 2 percent of  the variation.
Fourth, in a review of voting accessibility for voters with  disabilities, we found that all states had provisions addressing  voting by people with disabilities, but these provisions varied  greatly. Federal law requires that voters with disabilities have  access to polling places for federal elections, with some  exceptions. All states provided for one or more alternative voting  methods or accommodations intended to facilitate voting by people  with disabilities. In addition, states and localities had made several  efforts to improve voting accessibility for voters with disabilities,  such as modifying polling places, acquiring new voting equipment,  and expanding voting options, but state and county election officials  surveyed cited various challenges to improving access. We  concluded that given the limited availability of accessible polling  places, other options that could allow more voters with disabilities  to vote at a polling place on election day include reassigning them to  other, more accessible polling places or creating accessible  superprecincts in which voters from more than one precinct could  all vote in the same building.
Fifth, we reported on the status and use of voting equipment  standards developed by the Federal Election Commission (FEC).  These standards define minimum functional and performance  requirements, as well as minimum life-cycle management processes  for voting equipment developers to follow, such as quality  assurance. At the time of our review, no federal agency had explicit  statutory responsibility for developing the standards; however, the  FEC developed voluntary standards for computer-based systems in  1990, and the Congress provided funding for this effort. Similarly,  no federal agency was responsible for testing voting systems against  the federal standards. Instead, the National Association of State  Election Directors accredited independent test authorities to test  voting systems against the standards. We noted, however, that the  FEC standards had not been updated since 1990 and were  consequently out of date. We suggested that the Congress consider  assigning explicit federal authority, responsibility, and  accountability for the standards, including their proactive and  continuous update and maintenance; we also suggested that the  Congress consider what, if any, federal role is appropriate regarding  implementation of the standards, including the accreditation of  independent test authorities and the qualification of voting systems.  Both of these matters were addressed in the Help America Vote Act  of 2002, which, among other things, set up the EAC to take  responsibility for voluntary voting system guidelines. We also made  recommendations to the FEC aimed at improving the guidelines.  Before the EAC became operational, the FEC continued to update  and maintain the guidelines, issuing a new version in 2002.
Sixth, we issued a report on election activities and challenges across  the nation. In this report, we described the operations and  challenges associated with each stage of the election process,  including voter registration; absentee and early voting; election day  administration; and vote counts, certification, and recounts. The  report also provided analyses on issues associated with voting  systems that were used in the November 2000 elections and the  potential use of the Internet for voting. Among other things, we  pointed out that each of the major stages of an election depends on  the effective interaction of people (the election officials and voters),  processes (or internal controls), and technology (registration  systems, election management systems, and voting systems). We  also enumerated the challenges facing election officials at all stages  of the election process.
Finally, we issued a capping report that included a framework for  evaluating election administration reform proposals. Among other  things, we observed that the constitutional and operational division  of federal and state authority to conduct elections had resulted in  great variability in the ways that elections are administered in the  United States. We concluded that given the diversity and  decentralized nature of election administration, careful  consideration needed to be given to the degree of flexibility and the  planned time frames for implementing new initiatives. We also  concluded that in order for election administration reform to be  effective, reform proposals must address all major parts of our  election system—its people, processes, and technology—which are  interconnected and significantly affect the election process. And  finally, we provided an analytical framework for the Congress to  consider in deciding on changes to the overall election process.
section_title: The Help America Vote Act Was Enacted to Strengthen the Overall Election Process
paragraphs: Enacted by the Congress in October 2002, the Help America Vote  Act of 2002 addressed a range of election issues, including the lack  of explicit federal (statutory) responsibility for developing and  maintaining standards for electronic voting systems and for testing  voting systems against standards.
With the far-reaching goal of improving the election process in every  state, the act affects nearly every aspect of the voting process, from  voting technology to provisional ballots, and from voter registration  to poll worker training. In particular, the act established a program  to provide funds to states to replace punch card and lever machine  voting equipment, established the EAC to assist in the  administration of federal elections and provide assistance with the  administration of certain federal election laws and programs, and  established minimum election administration standards for the  states and units of local government that are responsible for the  administration of federal elections. In January 2004, the  Congressional Research Service reported that disbursements to  states for the replacement of older equipment and election  administration improvements totaled $649.5 million.
The act specifically tasked the EAC to serve as a national  clearinghouse and resource for compiling election information and  reviewing election procedures; for example, it is to conduct periodic  studies of election administration issues to promote methods of  voting and administration that are most convenient, accessible, and  easy to use for all voters. Other examples of EAC responsibilities  include  ●  developing and adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, and  maintaining information on the experiences of states in  implementing the guidelines and operating voting systems;  ●  testing, certifying, decertifying, and recertifying voting system  hardware and software through accredited laboratories;  ●  making payments to states to help them improve elections in the  areas of voting systems standards, provisional voting and voting  information requirements, and computerized statewide voter  registration lists; and   ●  making grants for research on voting technology improvements.
According to the act, reporting to the EAC will be the Technical  Guidelines Development Committee, which will make  recommendations on voluntary voting system guidelines. The  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will provide  technical support to the development committee, and the NIST  Director will serve as its chairman.
In December 2003, the EAC commissioners were appointed, and the  EAC began operations in January 2004. According to the  commission chairman, the EAC’s fiscal year 2004 budget is $1.2  million, and its near-term plans focus on complying with  requirements established in HAVA, including issuing a report to the  Congress on the status of election administration reform. The  commission’s longer term plans include a focus on developing best  practices that can be shared across the election community,  updating the voluntary voting system guidelines, and improving the  process for independent testing of voting systems. Commissioners  also told us that current operations are constrained by a lack of  persons in key staff positions, including the Executive Director,  General Counsel, and Inspector General.
section_title: Electronic Voting Systems Fall into Two Primary Categories
paragraphs: In the United States today, most votes are cast and counted by one  of two types of electronic voting systems: optical scan and direct  recording electronic (DRE). For a small minority of registered  voters (about 1 percent in the 2000 elections), votes are cast and  counted manually on paper ballots. Two older voting technologies  were also used in the 2000 elections: punch card equipment (used by  31 percent of registered voters in 2000) and mechanical lever voting  machines (used by 17 percent of voters in 2000). These equipment  types are being replaced as required by provisions established in  HAVA.
Optical scan voting systems use electronic technology to tabulate  paper ballots. Although optical scan technology has been in use for  decades for such tasks as scoring standardized tests, it was not  applied to voting until the 1980s. In 2000, about 31 percent of  registered voters voted on optical scan systems.
For voting, an optical scan system is made up of computer-readable  ballots, appropriate marking devices, privacy booths, and a  computerized tabulation device. The ballot, which can be of various  sizes, lists the names of the candidates and the issues. Voters record  their choices using an appropriate writing instrument to fill in boxes  or ovals, or to complete an arrow next to the candidate’s name or  the issue. The ballot includes a space for write-ins to be placed  directly on the ballot.
Optical scan ballots are tabulated by optical-mark-recognition  equipment (see fig. 1), which counts the ballots by sensing or  reading the marks on the ballot. Ballots can be counted at the  polling place—this is referred to as precinct-count optical scan—or  at a central location. If ballots are counted at the polling place,  voters or election officials put the ballots into the tabulation  equipment, which tallies the votes; these tallies can be captured in  removable storage media that are transported to a central tally  location, or they can be electronically transmitted from the polling  place to the central tally location. If ballots are centrally counted,  voters drop ballots into sealed boxes, and election officials transfer  the sealed boxes to the central location after the polls close, where  election officials run the ballots through the tabulation equipment.
Software instructs the tabulation equipment to assign each vote (i.e.,  to assign valid marks on the ballot to the proper candidate or issue).  In addition to identifying the particular contests and candidates, the  software can be configured to capture, for example, straight party  voting and vote-for-no-more-than-N contests. Precinct-based optical  scanners can also be programmed to detect overvotes (where the  voter votes for two candidates for one office, for example,  invalidating the vote) and undervotes (where the voter does not vote  for all contests or issues on the ballot) and to take some action in  response (rejecting the ballot, for instance). In addition, optical scan  systems often use vote-tally software to tally the vote totals from  one or more vote tabulation devices.
If election officials program precinct-based optical scan systems to  detect and reject overvotes and undervotes, voters can fix their  mistakes before leaving the polling place. However, if voters are  unwilling or unable to correct their ballots, a poll worker can  manually override the program and accept the ballot, even though it  has been overvoted or undervoted. If ballots are tabulated centrally,  voters do not have the opportunity to correct mistakes that may  have been made.
First introduced in the 1970s, DREs capture votes electronically,  without the use of paper ballots. In the 2000 election, about 12  percent of voters used this type of technology.
DREs come in two basic types, pushbutton or touchscreen, the  pushbutton being the older technology; during the 2000 elections,  pushbutton DREs were the most prevalent of the two types. The two  types vary considerably in appearance (see fig. 2). Pushbutton DREs  are larger and heavier than touchscreens.
Pushbutton and touchscreen units also differ significantly in the way  they present ballots to the voter. With the pushbutton, all ballot  information is presented on a single “full-face” ballot. For example,  a ballot may have 50 buttons on a 3 by 3 foot ballot, with a candidate  or issue next to each button. In contrast, touchscreen DREs display  the ballot information on an electronic display screen. For both  pushbutton and touchscreen types, the ballot information is  programmed onto an electronic storage medium, which is then  uploaded to the machine. For touchscreens, ballot information can  be displayed in color and can incorporate pictures of the candidates.  Because the ballot space on a touchscreen is much smaller than on  a pushbutton machine, voters who use touchscreens must page  through the ballot information. Both touchscreen and pushbutton  DREs can accommodate multilingual ballots.
Despite the differences, the two types have some similarities, such  as how the voter interacts with the voting equipment. For  pushbuttons, voters press a button next to the candidate or issue,  which then lights up to indicate the selection. Similarly, voters using  touchscreens make their selections by touching the screen next to  the candidate or issue, which is then highlighted. When voters are  finished making their selections on a touchscreen or a pushbutton  DRE, they cast their votes by pressing a final “vote” button or  screen. Until they hit this final button or screen, voters can change  their selections. Both types allow voters to write in candidates.  While most DREs allow voters to type write-ins on a keyboard, some  pushbutton types require voters to write the name on paper tape  that is part of the device.
Although DREs do not use paper ballots, they do retain permanent  electronic images of all the ballots, which can be stored on various  media, including internal hard disk drives, flash cards, or memory  cartridges. According to vendors, these ballot images, which can be  printed, can be used for auditing and recounts.
Some of the newer DREs use smart card technology as a security  feature. Smart cards are plastic devices—about the size of a credit  card—that use integrated circuit chips to store and process data,  much like a computer. Smart cards are generally used as a means to  open polls and to authorize voter access to ballots. For instance,  smart cards on some DREs store program data on the election and  are used to help set up the equipment; during setup, election  workers verify that the card received is for the proper election.
Other DREs are programmed to automatically activate when the  voter inserts a smart card; the card brings up the correct ballot onto  the screen. In general, the interface with the voter is very similar to  that of an automatic teller machine.
Like optical scan devices, DREs require the use of software to  program the various ballot styles and tally the votes, which is  generally done through the use of memory cartridges or other  media. The software is used to generate ballots for each precinct  within the voting jurisdiction, which includes defining the ballot  layout, identifying the contests in each precinct, and assigning  candidates to contests. The software is also used to configure any  special options, such as straight party voting and vote-for-no-more-  than-N contests. In addition, for pushbutton types, the software  assigns the buttons to particular candidates and, for touchscreens,  the software defines the size and location on the screen where the  voter makes the selection. Vote-tally software is often used to tally  the vote totals from one or more units.
DREs offer various configurations for tallying the votes. Some  contain removable storage media that can be taken from the voting  device and transported to a central location to be tallied. Others can  be configured to electronically transmit the vote totals from the  polling place to a central tally location.
DREs are designed not to allow overvotes; for example, if a voter  selects a second choice in a two-way race, the first choice is  deselected. In addition to this standard feature, different types offer  a variety of options, including many aimed at voters with  disabilities, that jurisdictions may choose to purchase. In our 2001  work, we cited the following features as being offered in some  models of DRE:  ●  A “no-vote” option. This option helps avoid unintentional  undervotes. This provides the voter with the option to select “no  vote (or abstain)” on the display screen if the voter does not want to  vote on a particular contest or issue.  ●  A “review” feature. This feature requires voters to review each page  of the ballot before pressing the button to cast the vote.  ●  Visual enhancements. Visual enhancements include color  highlighting of ballot choices, candidate pictures, etc.  ●  Accommodations for voters with disabilities. Examples of options  for voters who are blind include Braille keyboards and audio  interfaces. At least one vendor reported that its DRE  accommodates voters with neurological disabilities by offering head  movement switches and “sip and puff” plug-ins. Another option is  voice recognition capability, which allows voters to make selections  orally.  ●  An option to recover spoiled ballots. This feature allows voters to  recast their votes after their original ballots are cast. For this option,  every DRE at the poll site would be connected to a local area  network. A poll official would void the original “spoiled” ballot  through the administrative workstation that is also connected to the  local area network. The voter could then cast another ballot.  ●  An option to provide printed receipts. In this case, the voter would  receive a paper printout or ballot when the vote is cast. This feature  is intended to provide voters and/or election officials with an  opportunity to check what is printed against what is recorded and  displayed. It is envisioned that procedures would be in place to  retrieve the paper receipts from the voters so that they could not be  used for vote selling. Some DREs also have an infrared “presence  sensor” that is used to control the receipt printer in the event the  voter is allowed to keep the paper receipt; if the voter leaves  without taking the receipt, the receipt is pulled back into the printer.
section_title: Expanded Use of Electronic Voting Systems Has Raised Concerns
paragraphs: As older voting equipment has been replaced with newer electronic  voting systems over the last 2 years, the debate has shifted from  hanging chads and butterfly ballots to vulnerabilities associated  with DREs. Problems with these devices in recent elections have  arisen in various states. For example:  ●  Six DRE units used in two North Carolina counties lost 436 ballots  cast in early voting for the 2002 general election because of a  software problem, according to a February 9, 2004, report in Wired  News. The manufacturer said that problems with the firmware of its  touchscreen machines led to the lost ballots. The state was trying  out the machines in early voting to determine if it wanted to switch  from the optical scan machines it already owned to the new  touchscreen systems.   ●  According to a January 2004 report in Wired News, blank ballots  were recorded for 134 voters who signed in and cast ballots in  Broward County, Florida. These votes represented about 1.3 percent  of the more than 10,000 people who voted in the race for a state  house representative.  ●  USA Today reported that four California counties suffered from  problems with DREs in a March 2004 election, including miscounted  ballots, delayed polling place openings, and incorrect ballots. In San  Diego County, about one-third of the county’s polling places did not  open on time because of battery problems caused by a faulty power  switch.
Additionally, questions are being raised about the security of DREs.  Critics suggest that their use could compromise the integrity of the  election process and that these devices need auditing mechanisms,  such as receipt printers that would provide a paper audit trail and  allow voters to confirm their choices. Among these critics are  computer scientists, citizens groups, and legislators.
For example, computer scientists from Johns Hopkins and Rice  Universities released a security analysis of software from a DRE of a  major vendor, concluding that the code had serious security flaws  that could permit tampering. Other computer scientists, while  agreeing that the code contained security flaws, criticized the study  for not recognizing how standard election procedures can mitigate  these weaknesses. Following the Johns Hopkins and Rice study,  Maryland contracted with both SAIC and RABA Technologies to  study the same DRE equipment. The SAIC study found that the  equipment, as implemented in Maryland, poses a security risk.  Similarly, RABA identified vulnerabilities associated with the  equipment. An earlier Caltech/MIT study noted that despite  security strengths of the election process in the United States ,  current trends in electronic voting are weakening those strengths  and introducing risks; according to this study, properly designed and  implemented electronic voting systems could actually improve,  rather than diminish, security.
Citizen advocacy groups are also taking action. For example,  according to an April 21, 2004, press release from the Campaign for  Verifiable Voting in Maryland, the group filed a lawsuit against the  Maryland State Board of Elections to force election officials to  decertify the DRE machines used in Maryland until the  manufacturer remedies security vulnerabilities and institutes a  paper audit trail.
Legislators and other officials are also responding to the issues. In at  least 20 states, according to the Associated Press, legislation has  been introduced requiring a paper record of every vote cast.  Following the problems in California described above, the California  Secretary of State banned the use of more than 14,000 touchscreen  DREs and conditionally decertified 28,000 others. According to a  New York Times article, he also recommended that the state  Attorney General consider taking civil and criminal action against  the manufacturer for “fraudulent actions.” The decision followed the  recommendations of the state’s Voting Systems and Procedures  Panel, which urged the Secretary of State to prohibit the four  counties that experienced difficulties from using their touchscreen  units in the November 2004 election, according to an Associated  Press article. The panel reported that the manufacturer did not  obtain federal approval of the model used in the four affected  counties and installed software that had not been approved by the  Secretary of State. It also noted that problems with the systems  prevented an unspecified number of voters from casting ballots. In  addition, two California state senators have drafted a bill to prohibit  the use of any DRE voting system without a paper trail in the 2004  general election; they planned to introduce the bill if the Secretary  of State did not act.
section_title: Despite Their Vital Role, Voting Systems Are Only One Aspect of the Larger Election Process
paragraphs: Electronic voting systems represent one of many important  components in the overall election process. This process is made up  of several stages, with each stage consisting of key people, process,  and technology variables. Many levels of government are involved,  including over 10,000 jurisdictions with widely varying  characteristics.
In the U.S. election process, all levels of government share  responsibility. At the federal level, the Congress has authority under  the Constitution to regulate presidential and congressional elections  and to enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory practices  in all elections—federal, state, and local. It has passed legislation  affecting the administration of state elections that addresses voter  registration, absentee voting, accessibility provisions for the  elderly and handicapped, and prohibitions against discriminatory  practices. The Congress does not have general constitutional  authority over the administration of state and local elections.
At the state level, the states are responsible for the administration of  both their own elections and federal elections. States regulate the  election process, including, for example, adoption of voluntary  voting system guidelines, testing of voting systems, ballot access,  registration procedures, absentee voting requirements,  establishment of voting places, provision of election day workers,  and counting and certification of the vote. In fact, the U.S. election  process can be seen as an assemblage of 51 somewhat distinct  election systems—those of the 50 states and the District of  Columbia.
Further, although election policy and procedures are legislated  primarily at the state level, states typically have decentralized this  process so that the details of administering elections are carried out  at the city or county levels, and voting is done at the local level. As  we reported in 2001, local election jurisdictions number more than  10,000, and their size varies enormously—from a rural county with  about 200 voters to a large urban county such as Los Angeles  County, where the total number of registered voters for the 2000  elections exceeded the registered voter totals in 41 states.
The size of a voting jurisdiction significantly affects the complexity  of planning and conducting the election, as well as the method used  to cast and count votes. In our 2001 work, we quoted the chief  election official in a very large voting jurisdiction: “the logistics of  preparing and delivering voting supplies and equipment to the  county’s 4,963 voting precincts, recruiting and training 25,000  election day poll workers, preparing and mailing tens of thousands  of absentee ballot packets daily and later signature verifying,  opening and sorting 521,180 absentee ballots, and finally, counting  2.7 million ballots is extremely challenging.”
The specific nature of these challenges is affected by the voting  technology that the jurisdiction uses. For example, jurisdictions  using DRE systems may need to manage the electronic transmission  of votes or vote counts; jurisdictions using optical scan technology  need to manage the paper ballots that this technology reads and  tabulates. Jurisdictions using optical scan technology may also need  to manage electronic transmissions if votes are counted at various  locations and totals are electronically transmitted to a central tally  point.
Another variable is the diversity of languages within a jurisdiction.  In November 2000, Los Angeles County, for instance, provided  ballots in Spanish, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, Japanese, and  Tagalog, as well as English. No matter what technology is used,  jurisdictions may need to provide ballot translations; however, the  logistics of printing paper materials in a range of languages, as  would be required for optical scan technology, is different from the  logistics of programming translations into DRE units.
Some states do have statewide election systems so that every voting  jurisdiction uses similar processes and equipment, but others do  not. For instance, we reported in 2001 that in Pennsylvania, local  election officials told us that there were 67 counties and  consequently 67 different ways of handling elections. In some  states, state law prescribes the use of common voting technology  throughout the state, while in other states local election officials  generally choose the voting technology to be used in their precincts,  often from a list of state-certified options.
Whatever the jurisdiction and its specific characteristics,  administering an election is a year-round activity, involving varying  sets of people to carry out processes at different stages. These  stages generally consist of the following:  ●  Voter registration. Among other things, local election officials  register eligible voters and maintain voter registration lists,  including updates to registrants’ information and deletions of the  names of registrants who are no longer eligible to vote.  ●  Absentee and early voting. This type of voting allows eligible  persons to vote in person or by mail before election day. Election  officials must design ballots and other systems to permit this type of  voting, as well as educating voters on how to vote by these methods.  ●  The conduct of an election. Election administration includes  preparation before election day, such as local election officials  arranging for polling places, recruiting and training poll workers,  designing ballots, and preparing and testing voting equipment for  use in casting and tabulating votes, as well as election day activities,  such as opening and closing polling places and assisting voters to  cast votes.  ●  Vote counting. At this stage, election officials tabulate the cast  ballots; determine whether and how to count ballots that cannot be  read by the vote counting equipment; certify the final vote counts;  and perform recounts, if required.
As shown in figure 3, each stage of an election involves people,  processes, and technology.
Electronic voting systems are primarily involved in the last two  stages, during which votes are cast and counted. However, the type  of system that a jurisdiction uses may affect earlier stages. For  example, in a jurisdiction that uses optical scan systems, paper  ballots like those used on election day may be mailed in the  absentee voting stage. On the other hand, a jurisdiction that uses  DRE technology would have to make a different provision for  absentee voting.
section_title: Electronic Voting Systems’ Performance Can Be Judged on Several Attributes
paragraphs: Although the current debate concerning electronic voting systems  primarily relates to security, other factors affecting election  administration are also relevant in evaluating these systems.  Ensuring the security of elections is essential to public confidence  and election integrity, but officials choosing a voting system must  also consider other performance factors, such as accuracy, ease of  use, and efficiency, as well as cost. Accuracy refers to how  frequently the equipment completely and correctly records and  counts votes; ease of use refers to how understandable and  accessible the equipment is to a diverse group of voters and to  election workers; and efficiency refers to how quickly a given vote  can be cast and counted. Finally, equipment’s life-cycle cost versus  benefits is an overriding practical consideration.
In conducting elections, officials must be able to assure the public  that the confidentiality of the ballot is maintained and fraud  prevented. In providing this assurance, the people, processes, and  technology involved in the election system all play a role: the  security procedures and practices that jurisdictions implement, the  security awareness and training of the election workers who  execute them, and the security features provided by the systems.
Election officials are responsible for establishing and managing  privacy and security procedures to protect against threats to the  integrity of elections. These security threats include potential  modification or loss of electronic voting data; loss, theft, or  modification of physical ballots; and unauthorized access to  software and electronic equipment. Physical access controls are  required for securing voting equipment, vote tabulation equipment,  and ballots; software access controls (such as passwords and  firewalls) are required to limit the number of people who can  access and operate voting devices, election management software,  and vote tabulation software. In addition, election processes are  designed to ensure privacy by protecting the confidentiality of the  vote: physical screens are used around voting stations, and poll  workers are present to prevent voters from being watched or  coerced while voting.
Examples of security controls that are embedded in the technology  include the following:  ●  Access controls. Election workers may have to enter user names and  passwords to access voting systems and software, so that only  authorized users can make modifications. On election day, voters  may need to provide a smart card or token to DRE units.  ●  Encryption. To protect the confidentiality of the vote, DREs use  encryption technology to scramble the votes cast so that the votes  are not stored in the same order in which they were cast. In  addition, if vote totals are electronically transmitted, encryption is  used to protect the vote count from compromise by scrambling it  before it is transmitted over telephone wires and unscrambling it  once it is received.  ●  Physical controls. Hardware locks and seals protect against  unauthorized access to the voting device once it has been prepared  for the election (e.g., once the vote counter is reset, the unit is  tested, and ballots are prepared).  ●  Audit trails. Audit trails provide documentary evidence to recreate  election day activity, such as the number of ballots cast (by each  ballot configuration or type) and candidate vote totals for each  contest. Audit trails are used for verification purposes, particularly  in the event that a recount is demanded. With optical scan systems,  the paper ballots provide an audit trail. Since not all DREs provide a  paper record of the votes, election officials may rely on the  information that is collected by the DRE’s electronic memory. Part  of the debate over the assurance of integrity that DREs provide  revolves around the reliability of this information.  ●  Redundant storage. Redundant storage media in DREs provide  backup storage of votes cast or vote counts to facilitate recovery of  voter data in the event of power or system failure.
The particular features offered by DRE and optical scan equipment  differ by vendor make and model as well as the nature of the  technology. DREs generally offer most of the features, but there is  debate about the adequacy of the access controls and the audit trails  that this technology provides. If DREs use tokens or smart cards to  authenticate voters, these tokens must also be physically protected  and may require software security protection. For optical scan  systems, redundant storage media may not be required, but software  and physical access controls may be associated with tabulation  equipment and software, and if vote tallies are transmitted  electronically, encryption may also be used. In addition, since these  systems use paper ballots, the audit trail is clearer, but physical  access to ballots after they are cast must be controlled. The physical  and process controls used to protect paper ballots include ballot  boxes as well as the procedures implemented to protect the boxes if  they need to be transported, to tabulate ballots, and to store counted  ballots for later auditing and possible recounts.
Ensuring that votes are accurately recorded and tallied is an  essential attribute of any voting equipment. Without such assurance,  both voter confidence in the election and the integrity and  legitimacy of the outcome of the election are at risk. The importance  of an accurate vote count increases with the closeness of the  election. Both optical scan and DRE systems are claimed to be  highly accurate. In 2001, our vendor survey showed virtually no  differences in vendor representations of the accuracy of DRE and  optical scan voting equipment, measured in terms of how accurately  the equipment counted recorded votes. Vendors of optical scan  equipment reported accuracy rates of between 99 and 100 percent,  with vendors of DREs reporting 100 percent accuracy.
As we reported in 2001, although 96 percent of local election  jurisdictions were satisfied with the performance of their voting  equipment during the 2000 election, according to our mail survey,  only about 48 percent of jurisdictions nationwide collected data on  the accuracy of their voting equipment for the election. Further, it  was unclear whether jurisdictions actually had meaningful  performance data. Of those local election jurisdictions that we  visited that stated that their voting equipment was 100 percent  accurate, none was able to provide actual data to substantiate these  statements. Similarly, according to our mail survey, only about 51  percent of jurisdictions collected data on undervotes, and about 47  percent collected data on overvotes for the November 2000  election.
Although voting equipment may be designed to count votes as  recorded with 100 percent accuracy, how frequently the equipment  counts votes as intended by voters is a function not only of  equipment design, but also of the interaction of people and  processes. These people and process factors include whether, for  example,  technicians have followed proper procedures in testing and  maintaining the system,  ●  voters followed proper procedures when using the system,  ●  election officials have provided voters with understandable  procedures to follow, and  ●  poll workers properly instructed and guided voters.
As indicated earlier, various kinds of errors can lead to voter  intentions not being captured when ballots are counted. Avoiding or  compensating for these errors may involve solutions based on  technology, processes, or both. For example, DREs are designed to  prevent overvoting; however, overvoting can also be prevented by a  procedure to check optical scan ballots for overvotes before the  voter leaves the polls, which can be accomplished by a precinct- based tabulator or by other means.
Like accuracy, ease of use (or user friendliness) largely depends on  how voters interact with the voting system, physically and  intellectually. This interaction, commonly referred to as the  human/machine interface, is a function of the system design, the  processes established for its use, and user education and training.  Among other things, how well jurisdictions design ballots and  educate voters on the use of voting equipment affects how easy  voters find the system to use. In the 2000 elections, for example,  ballots for some optical scan systems were printed on both sides, so  that some voters failed to vote one of the sides. This risk could be  mitigated by clear ballot design and by explicit instructions, whether  provided by poll workers or voter education materials. Thus, ease of  use affects accuracy (i.e., whether the voter’s intent is captured),  and it can also affect the efficiency of the voting process (confused  voters take longer to vote).
Accessibility to diverse types of voters, including those with  disabilities, is a further aspect of ease of use. As described earlier,  DREs offer more options for voters with disabilities, as they can be  equipped with a number of aids to voters with disabilities. However,  these options increase the expense of the units, and not all  jurisdictions are likely to opt for them. Instead of technological  solutions, jurisdictions may establish special processes for voters  with disabilities, such as allowing them to be assisted to cast their  votes; this workaround can, however, affect the confidentiality of  the vote.
Efficiency—the speed of casting and tallying votes—is an important  consideration for jurisdictions not only because it influences voter  waiting time and thus potentially voter turnout, but also because it  affects the number of voting systems that a jurisdiction needs to  acquire and maintain, and thus the cost.
Efficiency can be measured in terms of the number of people that  the equipment can accommodate within a given time, how quickly  the equipment can count votes, and the length of time that voters  need to wait. With DREs, the vote casting and counting functions  are virtually inseparable, because the ballot is embedded in the  voting equipment. Accordingly, for DREs efficiency is generally  measured in terms of the number of voters that each machine  accommodates on election day. In 2001, vendors reported that the  number of voters accommodated per DRE ranges from 200 to 1,000  voters per system per election day.
With optical scan systems, in contrast, vote casting and counting are  separate activities, since the ballot is a separate medium—a sheet of  paper or a computer card—which once completed is put into the  vote tabulator. As a result, the efficiency of optical scan equipment  is generally measured in terms of the speed of count (i.e., how  quickly the equipment counts the votes on completed ballots).  Complicating this measurement is the fact that efficiency differs  depending on whether central-count or precinct-based tabulators  are used. Central-count equipment generally counts more ballots per  hour because it is used to count the ballots for an entire jurisdiction,  rather than an individual polling site. For central-count optical scan  equipment, 10 vendors reported speed of count ranges from 9,000 to  24,000 ballots per hour. For precinct-count optical scan equipment,  vendors generally did not provide specific speed of count data, but  they stated that one machine is generally used per polling site.
Generalizations about the effect of technology on wait times are  difficult. In 2001, our mail survey found that 84 percent of  jurisdictions nationwide were satisfied with the amount of voter  wait time at the polling place during the November 2000 election,  but that 13 percent of jurisdictions considered long lines at the  polling places to be a major problem. However, we estimated that  only 10 percent of jurisdictions nationwide collected information on  the average amount of time that it took voters to vote. We were told  by some jurisdictions that the length of time voters must wait is  affected by ballots that include many races and issues. Some  jurisdictions reported that their ballots were so long that it took  voters a long time in the voting booth to read them and vote. As a  result, lines backed up, and some voters had to wait for over an hour  to cast their votes. Officials in one jurisdiction said that their voters  experienced long wait times in part because redistricting caused  confusion among voters, who often turned up at the wrong polling  places. As these examples show, the voting system used is not  always a major factor in voter wait times. However, processes that  do depend on the system may affect the time that a voter must  spend voting. For example, in precincts that use precinct-level  counting technology for optical scan ballots, voters may place their  ballots in the automatic feed slot of the tabulator. This process can  add to voting time if the tabulator is designed to reject ballots that  are undervoted, overvoted, or damaged, and the voter is given the  opportunity to correct the ballot.
Generally, buying DRE units is more expensive than buying optical  scan systems. For a broad picture, consider the comparison that we  made in 2001 of the costs of purchasing new voting equipment for  local election jurisdictions based on three types of equipment:  central-count optical scan equipment, precinct-count optical scan  equipment, and touchscreen DRE units. Based on equipment cost  information available in August 2001, we estimated that purchasing  optical scan equipment that counted ballots at a central location  would cost about $191 million. Purchasing an optical scan counter  for each precinct that could notify voters of errors on their ballots  would cost about $1.3 billion. Purchasing touchscreen DRE units for  each precinct, including at least one unit per precinct that could  accommodate blind, deaf, and paraplegic voters, would cost about  $3 billion.
For a given jurisdiction, the particular cost involved will depend on  the requirements of the jurisdiction, as well as the particular  equipment chosen. Voting equipment costs vary among types of  voting equipment and among different manufacturers and models of  the same type of equipment. For example, in 2001, DRE touchscreen  unit costs ranged from $575 to $4,500. Similarly, unit costs for  precinct-count optical scan equipment ranged from $4,500 to $7,500.  Among other things, these differences can be attributed to  differences in what is included in the unit cost as well as differences  in the characteristics of the equipment.
In addition to the equipment unit cost, an additional cost for  jurisdictions is the software that operates the equipment, prepares  the ballots, and tallies the votes (and in some cases, prepares the  election results reports). Our vendor survey showed that although  some vendors included the software cost in the unit cost of the  voting equipment, most priced the software separately. Software  costs for DRE and optical scan equipment could run as high as  $300,000 per jurisdiction. The higher costs were generally for the  more sophisticated software associated with election management  systems. Because the software generally supported numerous  equipment units, the software unit cost varied depending on the  number of units purchased or the size of the jurisdiction.
Other factors affecting the acquisition cost of voting equipment are  the number and types of peripherals required. In general, DREs  require more peripherals than do optical scan systems, which adds  to their expense. For example, some DREs require smart cards,  smart card readers, memory cartridges and cartridge readers,  administrative workstations, and plug-in devices (for increasing  accessibility for voters with disabilities). Touchscreen DREs may  also offer options that affect the cost of the equipment, such as  color versus black and white screens. In addition, most DREs and all  optical scan units require voting booths, and most DREs and some  precinct-based optical scan tabulators offer options for modems.  Precinct-based optical scan tabulators also require ballot boxes to  capture the ballots after they are scanned.
Once jurisdictions acquire the voting equipment, they must also  incur the cost to operate and maintain it, which can vary  considerably. For example, in 2001, jurisdictions that used DREs  reported a range of costs from about $2,000 to $27,000. Similarly,  most jurisdictions that used optical scan equipment reported that  operations and maintenance costs ranged from about $1,300 to  $90,000. The higher ends of these cost ranges generally related to  the larger jurisdictions. In fact, one large jurisdiction that used  optical scan equipment reported that its operating costs were  $545,000. In addition, the jurisdictions reported that these costs  generally included software licensing and upgrades, maintenance  contracts with vendors, equipment replacement parts, and supply  costs.
For decisions on whether to invest in new voting equipment, both  initial capital costs (i.e., cost to acquire the equipment) and long- term support costs (i.e., operation and maintenance costs) are  relevant. Moreover, these collective costs (i.e., life-cycle costs) need  to be viewed in the context of the benefits the equipment will  provide over its useful life. It is advisable to link these benefits  directly to the performance characteristics of the equipment and the  needs of the jurisdiction.
section_title: Electronic Voting System Performance Depends on System Design and Implementation
paragraphs: The performance of any information technology system, including  electronic voting systems, is heavily influenced by a number of  factors, not the least of which is the quality of the system’s design  and the effectiveness with which the system is implemented in an  operational setting. System design and implementation, in turn, are  a function of such things as how well the system’s requirements are  defined, how well the system is tested, and how well the people that  operate and use the system understand and follow the procedures  that govern their interaction with it. Our work in 2001 raised  concerns about the FEC’s voting system standards, and showed that  practices relative to testing and implementation of voting systems  varied across states and local jurisdictions.
subsections: section_title: Voting Systems Should Be Designed, Built, and Tested against Well-Defined Standards
paragraphs: Like that of any information technology product, the design of a  voting system starts with the explicit definition of what the system  is to do and how well it is to do it. These requirements are then  translated into design specifications that are used to develop the  system. Organizations such as the Department of Defense and the  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers have developed  guidelines for various types of systems requirements and for the  processes that are important to managing the development of any  system throughout its life cycle. These guidelines address types of  product requirements (e.g., functional and performance), as well as  documentation and process requirements governing the production  of the system.
In the case of voting systems, the FEC had assumed responsibility  for issuing standards that embodied these requirements, a  responsibility that HAVA has since assigned to the EAC. The FEC  standards are nevertheless still the operative standards until the  EAC updates them. These FEC-issued standards apply to system  hardware, software, firmware, and documentation, and they span  prevoting, voting, and postvoting activities. They also address,  for example, requirements relating to system security; system  accuracy and integrity; system auditability; system storage and  maintenance; and data retention and transportation. In addition to  these standards, some states and local jurisdictions have specified  their own voting system requirements.
In 2001, we cited a number of problems with the FEC-issued voting  system standards, including missing elements of the standards.  Accordingly, we made recommendations to improve the standards.  Subsequently, the FEC approved the revised voting system  standards on April 30, 2002. According to EAC commissioners with  whom we spoke, the commission has inherited the FEC standards,  but it plans to work with NIST to revise and strengthen them.
To ensure that systems are designed and built in conformance with  applicable standards, our work in 2001 found that three levels of  tests are generally performed: qualification tests, certification tests,  and acceptance tests. For voting systems, the FEC-issued standards  called for qualification testing to be performed by independent  testing authorities. According to the standards, this testing is to  ensure that voting systems comply with both the FEC standards and  the systems’ own design specifications. State standards define  certification tests, which the states generally perform to determine  how well the systems conform to individual state laws,  requirements, and practice. Finally, state and local standards define  acceptance testing, performed by the local jurisdictions procuring  the voting systems. This testing is to determine whether the  equipment, as delivered and installed, satisfies all the jurisdiction’s  functional and performance requirements. Beyond these levels of  testing, jurisdictions also perform routine maintenance and  diagnostic activities to further ensure proper system performance  on election day.
Our 2001 work found that the majority of states (38) had adopted  the FEC standards then in place, and thus these states required that  the voting systems used in their jurisdictions passed qualification  testing. In addition, we reported that qualified voting equipment  had been used in about 49 percent (±7 percentage points) of  jurisdictions nationwide that used DREs and about 46 percent (±7  percentage points) of jurisdictions nationwide that used optical scan  technology. However, about 46 percent (±5 percentage points)  reported that they did not know whether their equipment had been  qualified.
As we reported in 2001, 45 states and the District of Columbia told  us that they had certification testing programs, and we estimate  from our mail survey that about 90 percent of jurisdictions used  state-certified voting equipment in the 2000 national election. In  addition, we reported that most of the jurisdictions that had recently  bought new voting equipment had conducted some form of  acceptance testing. However, the processes and steps performed  and the people who performed them varied. For example, in one  jurisdiction that purchased DREs, election officials stated that  testing consisted of a visual inspection, power-up, opening of polls,  activation and verification of ballots, and closing of polls. In  contrast, officials in another jurisdiction stated that they relied  entirely on the vendor to test their DREs. In jurisdictions that used  optical scan equipment, acceptance testing generally consisted of  running decks of test cards. For example, officials from one  jurisdiction stated that they tested each unit with the assistance of  the vendor using a vendor-supplied test deck.
Our 2001 work found that the processes and people involved in  routine system maintenance, diagnostic, and pre-election day  checkout activities varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For  example, about 90 percent of jurisdictions nationwide using DRE  and optical scan technology had performed routine or  manufacturer-suggested maintenance and checkout before the 2000  national election. However, our visits to 27 local election  jurisdictions revealed variations in the frequency with which  jurisdictions performed such routine maintenance. For example,  some performed maintenance right before an election, while others  performed maintenance regularly throughout the year. For example,  officials in one jurisdiction that used DREs stated that they tested  the batteries monthly.
section_title: Voting Systems Should Be Properly Implemented
paragraphs: Proper implementation of voting systems is a matter of people  knowing how to carry out appropriately designed processes to  ensure that the technology performs as intended in an operational  setting. According to the EAC commissioners, one of their areas of  focus will be election administration processes and the people who  carry out these processes. Examples include ballot preparation,  voter education, recruiting and training poll workers, setting up the  polls, running the election, and counting the votes.
Ballot preparation. Whether ballots are electronic or paper, they  need to be designed in a way that promotes voter understanding  when they are actually used. Designing both optical scan and DRE  ballots requires consideration of the different types of human  interaction entailed and the application of some human factors  expertise. For DREs, programming skills need to be applied to  create the ballot and enter the ballot information onto an electronic  storage medium, which is then uploaded to the unit. For optical scan  systems, paper ballots need to be designed and printed in specified  numbers for distribution to polling places; they may also be used for  absentee balloting, usually in combination with printed mailing  envelopes. Electronic “ballots” in DRE units do not require  distribution separate from the distribution of the voting equipment  itself; however, the use of DREs means that a separate technique is  necessary for absentee ballots—generally paper ballots. Thus, the  use of these units generally requires a mixed election system.
Voter education. Implementation of any voting method requires that  voters understand how to vote—that is, what conventions are  followed. For optical scan systems, voters need to understand how  to mark the ballots, they need to know what kinds of marker (type  of pen or pencil) can be used, they need to be informed if a ballot  must be marked on both sides, and so on. For DRE systems, voters  need to understand how to select candidates or issues and  understand that their votes are not cast until the cast vote button is  pressed; for touchscreens, they need to know how to navigate the  various screens presented to them.
Voters also need to understand the procedure for write-in votes. In  2001, one jurisdiction had an almost 5 percent overvote rate because  voters did not understand the purpose of the ballot section  permitting write-in votes. Voters selected a candidate on the ballot  and then wrote the candidate’s name in the write-in section of the  ballot, thus overvoting and spoiling the ballot. In addition to voter  education, how the system is programmed to operate can also  address this issue. For example, precinct-count optical scan  equipment can be programmed to return a voter’s ballot if the ballot  is overvoted or undervoted and allow the voter to make changes.
Poll worker recruitment and training. Poll workers need  implementation training. They need to be trained not only in how to  assist voters to use the voting system, but also in how to use the  technology for the tasks poll workers need to perform. These tasks  can vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. When more  sophisticated voting systems are used at polling sites, jurisdictions  may find it challenging to find poll workers with the skills to  implement and use newer technologies. In 2001, we quoted one  election official who said that “it is increasingly difficult to find folks  to work for $6 an hour. We are relying on older retired persons— many who can’t/won’t keep up with changes in the technology or  laws. Many of our workers are 70+.”
Setting up the polls. Proper setup of polling places raises a number  of implementation issues related to the people, processes, and  technology involved. For DREs, the need for appropriate power  outlets and possibly network connections limits the sites that can be  used as polling places. In addition, setting up, initializing, and  sometimes networking DRE units are technically challenging tasks.  Technicians and vendor representatives may be needed to perform  these tasks or to assist poll workers with them. In addition, with  DREs, computer security issues come into play that are different  from those associated with the paper and pencil tools that voters  use in optical scan systems. Besides the units themselves, many  DRE systems use cards or tokens that must be physically secured.  With optical scan equipment, the ballots must be physically secured.  Further, if precinct-based tabulation is used with an optical scan  system, the tabulation equipment must be protected from  tampering.
Running the election. Many implementation issues associated with  running the election are associated with the interaction of voters  with the technology. Although both DREs and optical scan systems  are based on technologies that most voters will have encountered  before, general familiarity is not enough to avoid voter errors. With  optical scan, voter errors are generally related to improperly marked  ballots: the wrong marking device, stray marks, too many marks  (overvotes), and so on. As described already, DRE equipment is  designed to minimize voter error (by preventing overvotes, for  example), but problems can also occur with this voting method. For  example, many DREs require the voter to push a cast vote button to  record the vote. However, some voters forget to push this button  and leave the polling place without doing so. Similarly, after  pressing the final cast vote button, voters cannot alter their votes. In  some cases, this button may be pressed by mistake—for example, a  small child being held by a parent may knock or kick the final vote  button before the parent has completed the ballot.
The technology is not the only factor determining the outcome in  these situations, as different jurisdictions have different rules and  processes concerning such problems. In 2001, we reported that  when voters forgot to press the cast vote button, one jurisdiction  required that an election official reach under the voting booth  curtain and push the cast vote button without looking at the ballot.  However, another jurisdiction required that an election official  invalidate the ballot and reset the machine for a new voter.
Counting the votes. Finally, implementation of the processes for  counting votes is affected both by the technology used and by local  requirements. With DREs, votes are collected within each unit.  Some contain removable storage media that can be taken from the  voting unit and transported to a central location to be tallied. Others  can be configured to electronically transmit the vote totals from the  polling place to a central tally location. As described earlier, optical  scan systems also vary in the way votes are counted, depending on  whether precinct-based or centralized tabulation equipment is used.  For optical scan systems, officials follow state and local regulations  and processes to determine whether and how to count ballots that  cannot be read by the tabulation equipment. Counting such ballots  may involve decisions on how to judge voter intent, which are also  generally governed by state and local regulations and processes.
In addition, depending on the type of voting technology used, ways  to perform recounts may differ. For optical scan devices, recounts  can be both automatic and manual; as in the original vote counting,  officials make decisions on counting ballots that cannot be read by  the tabulation equipment and on voter intent. With DREs there is no  separate paper ballot or record of the voter’s intention, and  therefore election officials rely on the information recorded in the  machine’s memory: that is, permanent (read only) electronic images  of each of the “marked” ballots. The assurance that these images are  an accurate record of the vote depends on several things, including  the proper implementation of the processes involved in designing,  maintaining, setting up, and using the technology.
section_title: Jurisdictions Face Immediate and Longer Term Challenges in Leveraging Voting Technologies
paragraphs: In 2001, we identified four key challenges confronting local  jurisdictions in effectively using and replacing voting technologies.  These challenges are not dissimilar to those faced by any  organization seeking to leverage modern technology to support  mission operations. The first two challenges are particularly  relevant in the near term, as jurisdictions look to position  themselves for this year’s national elections. The latter two are more  relevant to jurisdictions’ strategic acquisition and use of modern  voting systems.
subsections: section_title: Ensuring that Necessary Security, Testing, and Maintenance Activities Are Performed
paragraphs: Maximizing the performance of the voting systems that jurisdictions  have and plan to use in November 2004 means taking proactive  steps between now and then to best ensure that systems perform as  intended. These steps include activities aimed at securing, testing,  and maintaining these systems. We reported in 2001 that although  the vast majority of jurisdictions performed security, testing, and  maintenance activities in one form or another, the extent and nature  of these activities varied among jurisdictions and depended on the  availability of resources (financial and human capital) committed to  them. The challenge facing all voting jurisdictions will be to ensure  that these activities are fully and properly performed.
section_title: Managing the People, Processes, and Technology as Components of the Overall Process
paragraphs: As previously discussed in this testimony, jurisdictions need to  manage the triad of people, processes, and technology as  interrelated and interdependent parts of the total voting process.  Given the amount of time that remains between now and the  November 2004 elections, jurisdictions’ voting system performance  is more likely to be influenced by improvements in poll worker  system operation training, voter education about system use, and  vote casting procedures than by changes to the systems  themselves. The challenge for voting jurisdictions is thus to ensure  that these people and process issues are dealt with effectively.
section_title: Having Reliable System Performance Measures and Objective Data
paragraphs: Reliable measures and objective data are needed for jurisdictions to  know whether the technology being used is meeting the needs of the  user communities (both the voters and the officials who administer  the elections). In 2001, we reported that the vast majority of  jurisdictions were satisfied with the performance of their respective  technologies in the November 2000 elections. However, this  satisfaction was mostly based not on objective data measuring  performance, but rather on the subjective impressions of election  officials. Although these impressions should not be discounted,  informed decisionmaking on voting technology investment requires  more objective data. The challenge for jurisdictions is to define  measures and begin collecting data so that they can definitely know  how their systems are performing.
section_title: Ensuring That Technology Cost Is Commensurate with Benefits
paragraphs: Jurisdictions must be able to ensure that the technology will provide  benefits over its useful life that are commensurate with life-cycle  costs (acquisition as well as operations and maintenance) and that  these collective costs are affordable and sustainable. In 2001, we  reported that the technology type and configuration that  jurisdictions employed varied depending on each jurisdiction’s  unique circumstances, such as size and resource constraints, and  that reliable data on life-cycle costs and benefits were not available.  The challenge for jurisdictions is to view and treat voting systems as  capital investments and to manage them as such, including basing  decisions on technology investments on reliable analyses of  quantitative and qualitative return on investment.
In closing, I would like to say again that electronic voting systems  are an undeniably critical link in the overall election chain. While  this link alone cannot make an election, it can break one. The  concerns being surfaced by electronic voting system experts and  others highlight the potential for problems in the upcoming 2004  national elections if the challenges that we cited in 2001 and  reiterate in this testimony are not effectively addressed. Although  the EAC only recently began operations and is not yet at full  strength, it has no choice but to hit the ground running to ensure  that jurisdictions and voters are educated and well-informed about  the proper implementation and use of electronic voting systems, and  to ensure that jurisdictions take the appropriate steps—related to  people, process, and technology—that are needed regarding  security, testing, and maintenance. More strategically, the EAC  needs to consider strengthening the voluntary voting system  guidelines and the testing associated with enforcing these  guidelines. Critical to the commission’s ability to do this will be the  adequacy of resources at its disposal and the degree of cooperation  it receives from entities at all levels of government.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to  answer any questions that you or other Members of the  Subcommittee may have at this time.
section_title: Contact and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For further information, please contact Randolph C. Hite at (202)  512-6256 or by e-mail at hiter@gao.gov. Other key contributors to  this testimony were Barbara S. Collier, Richard B. Hung, John M.  Ortiz, Jr., Maria J. Santos, and Linda R. Watson.
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