Explosive Ordnance Disposal: DOD Needs Better Resource Planning and Joint Guidance to Manage the Capability
Published: 2013-04-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD has relied heavily on the critical skills and capabilities of EOD forces to counter the threat from improvised explosive devices on battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan. The House Armed Services Committee directed DOD to submit a report on EOD force structure planning and directed GAO to review DOD's force structure plan. DOD's report provided little detail. GAO examined to what extent (1) DOD and the services have addressed increased demands for the EOD capability and identified funding to meet future requirements; and (2) DOD has developed guidance for employing the EOD capability effectively in joint operations. GAO evaluated DOD's report and EOD guidance; analyzed data on EOD missions, personnel, and funding; and interviewed DOD and service officials to gain perspectives from EOD personnel and managers.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) forces grew over the past 10 years to meet wartime and other needs, but the Department of Defense (DOD) does not have the data needed to develop a funding strategy to support future EOD force plans. To meet increased demands for EOD personnel, the services increased their EOD forces from about 3,600 personnel in 2002 to about 6,200 in 2012. Anticipating that the need for EOD will continue as forces withdraw from ongoing operations, the services intend to maintain their larger size. The Navy and Air Force have data on the baseline costs for some or all of their EOD activities, but the Army and Marine Corps do not have complete data on spending for EOD activities. Therefore, DOD does not have complete data on service spending on EOD activities needed to determine the costs of its current EOD capability and to provide a basis for future joint planning. Until all the services have complete information on spending, service and DOD leadership will be unable to effectively identify resource needs, weigh priorities, and assess budget trade-offs.
EOD forces from all four services have worked together in Iraq and Afghanistan and the services have developed guidance on tactics and procedures for EOD forces, but challenges persist because DOD has not institutionalized joint EOD doctrine through a joint publication. Joint doctrine facilitates planning for operations and establishes a link between what must be accomplished and the capabilities for doing so. DOD studies have noted commanders' limited awareness of EOD capabilities during combat operations, and EOD personnel reported challenges they attributed to non-EOD forces' lack of understanding of EOD operations. Several DOD organizations have responsibilities for some EOD functions, but no entity has been designated as the focal point for joint EOD doctrine. Joint doctrine could help leaders identify EOD capability requirements and better position combatant commanders in their use of EOD forces in future operations. Joint doctrine that is developed and approved as authoritative guidance would enhance the EOD forces' ability to operate in an effective manner, and would better position the services to identify capability gaps in meeting service, joint, and interagency requirements; to invest in priority needs; and to mitigate risks.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: To better enable DOD to plan for funding EOD mission requirements and enhance future use of EOD forces in joint combat operations, GAO recommends that DOD direct (1) the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to collect data on current Army and Marine Corps EOD funding, and (2) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint EOD doctrine that would guide combatant commanders' planning and clarify joint operational roles and responsibilities. In oral comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has relied heavily on the critical skills  and capabilities of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel from  each of the four military services to counter threats from improvised  explosive devices (IED), a significant cause of fatalities among U.S.  troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. EOD personnel have extensive training in  the detection, identification, on-site evaluation, making safe, recovery,  and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. EOD forces’  capabilities in countering the IED threat—including collecting and  evaluating captured explosive-related enemy materiel from the devices— have made these forces integral to successful joint military operations.  However, the high demand for the EOD capability has resulted in  personnel experiencing numerous deployments. In addition to their  function in countering IEDs, EOD personnel are responsible for a wide  range of other missions, such as clearing unexploded ordnance from  training ranges; providing defense support to civil authorities; and  assisting the U.S. Secret Service and Department of State with the  protection of the President and other high-ranking government officials.
In House Report 112-78, which accompanied a House bill for the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, the House Armed  Services Committee directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report  on Explosive Ordnance Disposal force structure planning to the  congressional defense committees by March 1, 2012. Further, the  committee directed GAO to review DOD’s force structure plan and to  report our findings to the congressional defense committees. We  reviewed and evaluated the DOD report on EOD force structure directed  by the committee, and in July 2012 we briefed the House Armed Services  Committee staff on our observations of DOD’s force structure plan. We  found that DOD’s classified one-page EOD report provided limited detail  or context about the status of the department’s EOD force or plans for  future EOD capability requirements. Also, we found that DOD had not  established a new consolidated budget justification display that fully  identified the services’ baseline EOD budgets, as directed by the House  Armed Services Committee.
In order to provide additional information on the status of DOD’s EOD  forces and identify baseline EOD budgets, we gathered and analyzed  data on EOD forces’ support for joint operations and the services’ plans to  support future EOD requirements. We reviewed and analyzed prior DOD  reports on the EOD force, collected available data on personnel  and on  budgets, and interviewed cognizant officials from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense and the services. In addition, we conducted 28  group discussion sessions with EOD personnel to obtain their  perspectives on the EOD capability. Specifically, we examined the extent  to which (1) DOD and the services have addressed increased demands  for the EOD capability and identified funding to meet anticipated future  requirements; and (2) DOD has developed guidance for employing the  EOD capability effectively in joint operations.
For the purposes of this report, we obtained data only for active duty EOD forces. These  forces comprise the majority of EOD personnel. mission requirements. To determine the extent to which DOD and the  services have identified funding to resource EOD forces to meet  anticipated future requirements, we collected and analyzed available  EOD funding data from each of the services for the past 3 fiscal years.
To determine the extent to which DOD has developed guidance for  employing the EOD capability effectively in joint operations, we reviewed  existing service, multi-service, and joint DOD regulations and doctrine;  reviewed and analyzed prior DOD reports’ findings about doctrine; and  determined whether associated recommendations had been  implemented. We interviewed key DOD EOD officials to ascertain the  extent to which DOD has comprehensive joint EOD guidance.  Additionally, we met with officials from selected EOD units in all four  military services and conducted group discussions with EOD-qualified  team members, team leaders, senior enlisted personnel, and officers to  obtain their perspectives on issues related to military service-specific  missions, joint combat operations, training, equipment, and operational  tempo. A more detailed description of our scope and methodology can be  found in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 through April 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: As depicted in figure 1 below, the services maintain highly trained EOD  personnel responsible for eliminating explosive hazards in support of a  range of events, from major combat operations and contingency  operations overseas to range clearance to protecting designated persons,  such as the President of the United States. The services’ EOD forces are  dispersed worldwide to meet combatant commanders’ requirements.  Units may be deployed together or organized into smaller teams, as  missions require. EOD technicians generally work in two- or three-person  teams to identify and disarm ordnance.
section_title: EOD Forces Grew to Meet Wartime and Other Demands, but DOD Does Not Have Data Needed to Develop Funding Strategy to Support Future EOD Force Plans
paragraphs: To meet increased demands for EOD personnel, the services increased  the size of their EOD forces. Based on available data, we determined that  the services grew from about 3,600 personnel in 2002 to about 6,200 in  2012—an almost 72 percent increase. The services anticipate that even  as forces withdraw from recent operations the need for EOD forces will  continue, so they intend to maintain their larger size. However, the  respective services’ abilities to identify and track spending on EOD  activities vary, so DOD does not have complete information on EOD  spending. The House Armed Services Committee directed DOD to  establish a consolidated budget justification display fully identifying the  services’ baseline EOD budgets, but DOD has not done so. Without  complete EOD spending information, the services and DOD may have  difficulty in justifying the future EOD force structure, and in informing  future funding plans and trade-offs among competing priorities.
subsections: section_title: Services Increased Numbers of EOD Personnel to Meet Demand for the Capability
paragraphs: Over the past decade of military operations, the services all took actions  to increase their EOD capabilities. As figure 3 shows, the Army more than  doubled its EOD forces, with the largest increases occurring after fiscal  year 2006. The Marine Corps and the Navy increased their EOD forces  by approximately 77 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The Air Force  increased its EOD forces by approximately 36 percent. The services  anticipate maintaining EOD personnel numbers at the 2012 level at least  through the next 5 years, as is also shown in figure 3, although final  decisions on EOD force size and structure will depend on future DOD  budgets. According to DOD EOD officials, the time required to train  qualified EOD personnel is lengthy; therefore, EOD is not a capability that  can be built up quickly.
Meeting the demands for EOD forces in combat operations has  negatively affected EOD units’ personnel and ability to train for other  missions. Each of the services met the combatant commanders’ high  demand for EOD personnel by deploying EOD units and assuming risks  as other EOD missions and training activities were left unfulfilled. For  example, according to service officials, the services assumed some risks  in some mission areas such as countering sea mines, clearing  unexploded ordnance on training ranges, and providing defense support  to civil authorities. EOD personnel who participated in our group  discussions said they experienced multiple deployments and limited time  at home, maintaining a pace that was exacerbated by time spent away  from home in training and in support of the U.S. Secret Service and  Department of State in the protection of important officials. (Appendix II  summarizes, in greater detail, the operational and personnel issues  raised by EOD personnel who participated in group discussions we held.)
As the services begin turning their focus away from training for  deployments to Afghanistan to counter IEDs, officials from across the  services and DOD officials noted that the services will need to retain the  current EOD size so that they can expand training for their core missions  and prepare for future requirements. For example, according to Navy  officials, Navy EOD personnel will re-emphasize skills—such as diving— that are needed for their core missions. EOD forces will also be assigned  to traditional missions to fill gaps in capabilities that came about when  EOD forces were deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. For example,  according to DOD officials, EOD personnel will be available to combatant  commanders for humanitarian demining, irregular warfare, and building  international partner capacity activities. Also, according to Army officials,  Army EOD forces will be available to respond more quickly to incidents  involving unexploded military ordnance found in local communities. In  addition, EOD forces will continue to provide support to the Very  Important Persons Protection Support Activity’s mission of ensuring the  safety of federal officials, such as the President, as they travel. In fiscal  year 2012, the services provided more than 473,000 hours of support to  this activity; as a presidential election year, 2012 required greater than  the annual average of about 300,000 hours provided from fiscal years  2007 through 2011.
DOD officials expect EOD capabilities to continue to be in demand by  combatant commanders for the foreseeable future. For example, officials  believe that the IED threat is likely to persist given its low cost and high  accessibility to non-state adversaries. In addition, based on the primary   the services  missions highlighted in DOD’s current strategic guidance,anticipate continued requirements for EOD capabilities. For example,  EOD capabilities are expected to be needed for several missions  including, among others: (1) countering terrorism and irregular warfare;  (2) countering anti-access/area denial measures, including mining; (3)  countering weapons of mass destruction; and (4) providing support to civil  authorities. The mission of countering anti-access/area denial measures,  in particular, will require Navy EOD forces to train to counter anti-access  measures that use sea mines and to clear explosive obstacles in sea  lines of communication. Also, Air Force EOD forces will be expected to  train to support recovery operations to keep air bases and runways clear  of unexploded ordnance. All the services’ EOD forces will need to  continue to train for homeland missions of providing support to civil  authorities. In addition, EOD forces’ ability to conduct humanitarian  demining activities can support combatant commanders’ efforts to help  build relationships with other countries, according to DOD officials.
section_title: Lack of Full Visibility into EOD Funding Complicates Planning for Resources to Meet Future Requirements
paragraphs: The mission of the Joint IED Defeat Organization is to lead, advocate, and coordinate  all DOD actions in support of the combatant commanders’ and their respective joint task  forces’ efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. A primary role for the  organization is to provide funding and assistance to rapidly develop, acquire, and field  counter-IED solutions. were complete and accurate. The Army regulation on EOD assigns  responsibility for monitoring funding for the Army EOD program to the  Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training (G-3/5/7).  Officials in that office, however, told us they do not have access to  complete funding information because funding for EOD activities is  spread across multiple programs, functions, or organizations. Officials  who oversee the EOD program told us they would like to have funding  data to assist in managing and prioritizing the Army’s EOD operations,  but they have no plans currently to collect it.
The Marine Corps EOD program officials could readily provide us with  procurement funding information, but not with comprehensive  information on funding that could have come from other funding  accounts, such as military personnel and operation and maintenance.
Officials in the office of the Navy EOD program resource sponsor  could provide funding information because the Navy has a dedicated  EOD program element code and it tracks funding for the EOD  capability separately on a continuous basis to enable it to manage its  own capability.
Officials in the Air Force EOD program oversight organization could  provide funding information on operating, maintaining, and procuring  equipment and other items for the Air Force EOD force that it  compiles and uses to manage the Air Force EOD program. However,  it could not readily provide information on military personnel because,  according to officials, personnel are accounted for across more than  30 program elements. Starting in fiscal year 2013, the Air Force  began to use a dedicated EOD program element code to enable  better identification of current EOD spending and to provide  justification for the EOD capability in future budget requests.
The services anticipate maintaining their currently authorized EOD  personnel levels.
However, planning for the future EOD capability may  be hampered by DOD’s lack of visibility into the current costs of EOD  capabilities across the services. According to officials from each service,  overseas contingency operations funding has been used to provide  equipment and training to EOD forces for the past several years, such as  that shown in figure 4 below. In the future these costs will have to be  funded from regular appropriations, and to compete with other service  priorities. For example, the services received EOD robots and mine  resistant ambush-protected vehicles from overseas contingency  operations funding. Should EOD units need to continue to use the  equipment in the future or to acquire similar such equipment, maintaining  and procuring it may have to be funded through regular appropriations.  Overseas contingency operations funding also provided advanced  homemade explosive, forensic, and medical training opportunities that  EOD technicians in our discussion groups thought were valuable to their  missions and their safety.
Service officials expressed concerns to us about the adequacy of future  funding for their EOD forces after overseas contingency operations  funding is phased out, but the extent to which the services have  identifiable funding plans for future EOD activities varied. The Navy and  Air Force now have program element codes that enable service officials  to identify and evaluate the appropriate level of spending on their EOD  capabilities. However, the Army’s and Marine Corps’ lack of complete  data on the costs of their current EOD forces negatively affects their  efforts to develop viable funding plans for supporting their EOD capability  into the future. Until the services have information on current spending as  well as justification for their future funding needs, service and DOD  leadership will be unable to effectively identify resource needs, weigh  priorities, and assess budget trade-offs within anticipated declining  resources. Moreover, the lack of visibility into current spending and future  funding plans may impede DOD’s ability to provide Congress with  information needed to facilitate its oversight.
section_title: EOD Forces Have Worked Together in Joint Operations, but DOD Has Not Developed Joint EOD Doctrine to Guide Effective Employment of the Capability
paragraphs: EOD forces have operated jointly in Iraq and Afghanistan to fulfill  battlefield requirements, and the services have jointly developed  guidance on tactics, techniques, and procedures for EOD forces, but  DOD has not fully institutionalized the guidance through joint EOD  doctrine in the form of a Joint Publication. According to DOD, the purpose  of joint doctrine is to enhance the operational effectiveness of U.S. joint  forces. It is written for those such as the services, among other  recipients, who prepare and train forces for carrying out joint operations.  Joint doctrine facilitates planning for and execution of operations, and it  establishes a link between what must be accomplished and the  capabilities for doing so by providing information on how joint forces can  achieve military strategic and operational objectives in support of national  strategic objectives. According to service EOD officials, joint doctrine also  provides standardized terminology. EOD personnel and officials told us,  however, that they had encountered repeated challenges—such as a lack  of planning for EOD capabilities as well as variations among the services’  procedures—during joint combat operations. A key reason for the  services’ challenges is the absence of a consistent understanding of EOD  operations, including expectations for how forces should plan operations  and work together. The services are disadvantaged with respect to EOD  capabilities, knowledge, and use because DOD has not developed joint  doctrine in the form of a Joint Publication.
subsections: section_title: The Services Use Common EOD Operational Guidance, but Challenges Persist in Operating Jointly
paragraphs: In 2001, DOD’s Air Land Sea Application Center  published multi- service guidance outlining a set of EOD tactics, techniques, and  procedures for employing EOD forces jointly in a range of military  operations. The guidance, which was updated in 2005 and 2011,  applies to leaders, planners, and EOD personnel and provides  information that can help them understand each military service’s  capabilities. The multi-service guidance, as updated, has been in place  for more than a decade, but challenges in joint EOD combat operations  have continued, as prior DOD studies on EOD capabilities have reported.  One study described EOD forces’ efforts to work jointly as being  “somewhat ad hoc” and noted that culture, technique, and language  differences among the military services caused challenges in working  together. Another study reported on some combat unit commanders’  limited awareness of EOD capabilities during overseas combat  operations. For example, in some instances Army combat unit  commanders did not understand the differences between the capabilities  of EOD personnel who are trained to safely disarm ordnance and the  capabilities of Army combat engineers, some of whom have limited  training on disposing of select unexploded ordnance. As a result, some  combat engineers, who are not trained to safely disarm ordnance,  destroyed ordnance caches, resulting in improper handling of some of the  ordnance caches and creating a more dangerous site containing debris  as well as potentially unexploded ordnance.
EOD personnel we spoke with reported experiencing similar challenges  during recent deployments in support of joint combat operations, and as  the observations recorded below indicate, they attributed these  challenges to a lack of understanding of EOD operations on the part of  non-EOD forces. EOD personnel indicated the following:
Commanders of combat units did not always take into account  differences among the military services’ EOD forces. For  example, Marine Corps EOD personnel commented that their EOD  standard operating procedures include conducting dismounted  patrols, while at one time the Army’s EOD personnel were not allowed  to dismount from vehicles to conduct EOD operations. These Marine  Corps personnel stated that Marine Corps commanders were unsure  how to work with Army EOD forces supporting Marine units. Similarly,  Air Force personnel said they were not trained to dismount to search  for explosives, as Marine Corps commanders expected them to be.
Non-EOD personnel in combat units did not always understand  EOD protocols or capabilities. For example, Army EOD personnel  cited an instance in which a non-EOD officer at a forward operating  base picked up post-blast fragments of an improvised explosive  device at a blast site, thus disturbing the site and contaminating  potential forensic evidence. Other examples include commanders not  securing sites where unexploded improvised explosive devices were  found, and non-EOD personnel tampering with unexploded devices in  an attempt to deactivate them before EOD personnel arrived.
Requests for EOD support did not always take into account  differences in how the various services’ EOD forces are  organized. For example, an Army EOD Company contains  approximately 40 people, while a Navy EOD Mobile Platoon has 8  people. According to Navy EOD personnel, battlefield commanders  they supported sometimes received a smaller EOD force than was  needed and expected, or conversely, sometimes received a larger  force, which would require more logistical support than planned.
We found that pertinent Navy and Air Force regulations only briefly  mention joint EOD operations, and they refer to the multi-service  guidance as a source for more detailed information. However, the Army’s  and Marine Corps’ regulations do not discuss joint EOD operations in  detail or refer to the multi-service guidance. A DOD study assessing the  joint EOD capability reported that this multi-service guidance was not  widely used by combatant commands.officials, this multi-service guidance is not as authoritative to the services   In addition, according to DOD  and combatant commands as a Joint Publication, and is generally not  used by the services to develop force requirements.
section_title: DOD Does Not Have Joint Doctrine in the Form of a Joint Publication to Provide Authoritative Doctrinal Guidance for Joint EOD Operations
paragraphs: Prior DOD studies have highlighted the need for joint doctrine on EOD  operations and noted that current guidance is insufficient, but the Joint  Staff has not published joint doctrine for EOD operations. We found that  several DOD doctrinal joint publications refer to EOD activities, but most  references are limited, recognizing the need for EOD but not providing  additional guidance as to how such capabilities should apply to  operations. EOD is briefly mentioned or discussed in greater detail in 30  unclassified or for official use only doctrinal joint publications. For  example, the role of EOD is briefly mentioned in joint doctrine about  operations such as antiterrorism, foreign humanitarian assistance, and  evacuating noncombatants. The EOD role is more fully discussed in joint  doctrine about countering the improvised explosive device threat, joint  engineer operations, and addressing obstacles—such as unexploded  ordnance and sea mines—that could be encountered by joint forces in a  range of military operations. According to a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs  of Staff manual on joint doctrine development, part of the development  philosophy for joint doctrine is that it continues to evolve as the United  States Armed Forces adapt to meet national security challenges.  However, none of these joint publications addresses the full range of  EOD capabilities and potential activities. As previous assessments of  DOD’s joint EOD capabilities have reported, the lack of joint EOD-specific  doctrine limits EOD forces’ and planners’ ability to identify and mitigate  capability gaps.
According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual, joint  doctrine projects must be formally sponsored by a service chief, a  combatant commander, or a director of a Joint Staff directorate. A key  reason why joint EOD doctrine has not been developed is that no entity  has been made accountable for following through on recommendations  and sponsoring EOD doctrine, to include stakeholder coordination, for  development of joint guidance. Although several organizations have  responsibilities for some EOD functions, no one entity has been  designated as the focal point on joint doctrine or operational issues. For  example, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and  Low Intensity Conflict, as the Office of the Secretary of Defense  proponent for EOD, is charged with developing, coordinating, and  overseeing the implementation of DOD policy for EOD technology and  training, but that official is not involved with oversight of joint doctrine or  operational issues. Similarly, the joint EOD Program Board, chaired by a  flag officer designated by the Secretary of the Navy and comprising  general officer representation from the other services, is generally  focused on joint common EOD technology and training issues. One DOD  EOD study, which according to a Joint Staff official was initiated by a  former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended among  other things that the Joint Staff sponsor the development of joint EOD  doctrine. However, during DOD’s review process that recommendation  was sent back to the Joint Staff for reconsideration, where, according to a  Joint Staff official, the matter was dropped and never presented to senior  leaders.
Having joint guidance, such as joint doctrine, could put combatant  commanders in a better position to make decisions about using EOD  forces in future operations. In addition, joint EOD doctrine could provide a  basis for planning and identifying capability requirements for future  operations. Having joint doctrine that is developed and approved by the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as authoritative guidance would  enhance DOD’s EOD forces’ ability to operate in an effective manner and  better position the military services to identify capability gaps in meeting  service, joint, and interagency requirements; to invest in priority needs;  and to mitigate risks.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: As IEDs became a significant threat to U.S. forces in Iraq and  Afghanistan, EOD emerged as a critical capability, and over the past  decade, the services increased the size of their EOD forces. Growing the  EOD capability takes time because of the highly technical training  required and the additional experience needed to become proficient in  handling dangerous unexploded ordnance. Looking toward the future,  DOD and the services believe that broad demand for this capability will  continue. Growth of the EOD forces until now has been funded in part by  overseas contingency operations dollars, but these funds are likely to  decrease as operations in Afghanistan diminish. A major challenge facing  the EOD community, especially the Army and Marine Corps, is the lack of  complete information to clearly show the resources it will take to sustain  their larger force levels. Further, DOD does not have good visibility into  service spending on EOD forces. Without comprehensive information on  the costs of the services’ EOD forces, senior service and DOD leaders  are not well positioned to justify the current EOD force structure or to  ensure that funding goes to priorities in accordance with strategic  guidance. In addition, the absence of comprehensive information limits  DOD’s ability to respond to congressional requests for budget information  and may continue to hamper Congress’ oversight of the health and  viability of the EOD force.
Although EOD forces from each of the services have deployed together to  support recent ground operations, attention to EOD as a joint capability  has been limited. Differences among the services’ procedures complicate  joint force planning and operations, and there is little common  understanding of the EOD capability outside of the EOD force. The lack of  understanding of EOD capabilities among those battlefield commanders  has caused them challenges in providing the right capabilities to  maximize the effectiveness of operations to protect U.S. forces and to  collect information to defeat the networks of insurgents using IEDs  against U.S. forces. A number of publications refer to EOD and its  capabilities for specific functions, but none provides clear and complete  guidance for integrating the activities of EOD forces with other combat  activities and maximizing the capabilities that EOD forces provide. In  addition, no entity has followed through on previous recommendations to  sponsor and advocate for developing joint EOD doctrine. With joint  doctrine that specifies the role of EOD in joint operations and provides a  consistent lexicon for joint planning, EOD participation in joint operations  could be more efficient and effective. In addition, with joint doctrine  regarding future requirements for the joint EOD capability, the services  will have more complete information to inform their force structure  planning and provide adequately trained and experienced forces to meet  future requirements.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two  actions:
To improve the Army’s and Marine Corps’ ability to ensure adequate  support of their EOD forces within expected budgets, direct the  Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to collect data on costs  associated with supporting their current EOD forces.
To enhance the future employment of EOD forces in joint combat  operations, direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop  joint EOD doctrine that would guide combatant commanders’ planning  and clarify joint operational roles and responsibilities.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Defense for  comment. An official from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict provided oral comments  on the draft indicating that DOD concurred with our report and both of our  recommendations.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations  and Low Intensity Conflict; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the  Director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization.  This report will also be available at no charge on our website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me on (404) 679-1816 or PendletonJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: The scope of our review on Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) forces  included the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the  military services, including select EOD units from each service, and other  DOD organizations that utilized or impacted EOD forces.
We obtained relevant documentation and interviewed key officials from  the following offices:
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations  J34 – Deputy Directorate for Antiterrorism/Homeland Defense;  J5 – Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate; and  J8 – Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate;
Department of the Army
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations, Plans, and  Training) EOD & Render Safe Procedures Branch;
U.S. Army Ordnance Corps Explosive Ordnance Disposal  Directorate, Fort Lee, Virginia;
20th Support Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland;
52nd Ordnance Group (EOD), Fort Campbell, Kentucky;
49th EOD Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky;
723rd EOD Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and
788th EOD Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky;
Department of the Navy
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Expeditionary Combat
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, Joint Expeditionary Base  Little Creek-Fort Story, Virginia;
EOD Group One, Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, California;
EOD Mobile Unit One, Naval Base Point Loma, California,
EOD Mobile Unit Three, Naval Amphibious Base
EOD Mobile Unit Eleven, Imperial Beach, California,
EOD Training and Evaluation Unit One, Naval Base Point
EOD Expeditionary Support Unit One, Naval Amphibious  Base Coronado, California, and
Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit One, Naval Amphibious  Base Coronado, California;
Executive Manager of EOD Technology and Training, Washington,  D.C.
Naval EOD Technology Division, Naval Support Facility Indian
Naval School EOD, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida;
Center for EOD and Diving, Naval Support Activity Panama City,
EOD Occupational Field Sponsor, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
1st EOD Company, Camp Pendleton, California;
3rd EOD Company, Okinawa, Japan; and
EOD Personnel Supporting the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine  Corps Air Station Miramar, California;
Department of the Air Force
EOD Program Directorate;
Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency, Tyndall Air Force Base,
96th Civil Engineering Squadron EOD Flight, Eglin Air Force  Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization,  Arlington, Virginia; and
U.S. Northern Command Joint Force Headquarters, National Capitol  Region, Joint EOD – Very Important Persons Protection Support  Activity, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
To determine the extent to which DOD and the services addressed  increased demands for the EOD capability, we collected and analyzed  data and descriptions from each of the four services’ EOD forces on their  traditional military service EOD missions, including the total number of  hours dedicated to support the Very Important Persons Protection  Support Activity. After receiving the data showing the total number of  hours dedicated to support this activity, we reviewed the data and  interviewed the U.S. Northern Command official who provided them to  assess the data’s reliability. Based on these actions, we determined that  these data were sufficiently reliable to include the amount of hours of  support EOD personnel provided to this activity. We also requested data  on the organizational structure of EOD forces from each of the services;  operational tempo of EOD units and the authorized numbers of EOD  officers and enlisted personnel within each service from fiscal year 2002  through fiscal year 2012; as well as projected manpower needs through  fiscal year 2017. After receiving the authorized EOD personnel data, as  identified by the services, we interviewed service officials who had  provided it and other subject matter experts to assess the reliability of the  data. Based on our review of the personnel data provided and our  interviews, we determined that the personnel data were sufficiently  reliable to describe growth in numbers of EOD personnel. Additionally, we  interviewed key cognizant DOD officials with responsibility for EOD  activities across the department—including from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, each of the military services, selected support  commands, and units—to gain their perspectives on the operational  tempo of EOD forces, use of joint EOD forces for recent EOD combat  missions and challenges, and expected future EOD mission  requirements.
To determine the extent to which DOD and the services have identified  funding to resource EOD forces to meet anticipated future requirements,  we collected and analyzed available EOD funding data from each of the  services for fiscal years 2010 through 2012. We requested that the  services provide EOD funding data from the base and overseas  contingency operations budgets for specific funding accounts, including  military personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; and  research, development, test, and evaluation. Also, we requested that the  services identify funding, if any, received from the Joint IED Defeat  Organization, or other sources. The comprehensiveness of the data  provided by each of the military services varied. After receiving the  funding data, we interviewed service officials who had provided them to  assess the reliability of the data. Based on our review of the funding data  provided and our interviews, we determined that the funding data were  incomplete, potentially inaccurate, and not sufficiently reliable to establish  a baseline level of DOD’s EOD spending.
To determine the extent to which DOD has developed guidance for  employing the EOD capability effectively in joint operations, we  systematically analyzed 75 unclassified and for official use only  documents of existing joint DOD doctrine (Joint Publications) to identify  the inclusion of EOD functions. One GAO analyst conducted this analysis,  coding the information and entering it into a separate record, and another  GAO analyst verified the information for accuracy. All disagreements  were resolved by a third GAO analyst. The analysts then tallied the total  number of joint DOD doctrinal documents in which EOD functions were  included. In addition, we reviewed and analyzed prior DOD reports’  findings about doctrine and examined whether associated  recommendations had been implemented. Specifically, we reviewed an  EOD report from the Joint Staff and an EOD report analyzing  transforming the joint EOD force. We also reviewed guidance on EOD  activities from the services, including multi-service tactics, techniques,  and procedures guidance. Additionally, we interviewed key EOD officials  across DOD to ascertain the extent to which DOD has comprehensive  joint EOD guidance and, if so, any potential benefits joint guidance has  provided. Moreover, we discussed with DOD and service officials how  EOD has been integrated jointly across DOD in areas such as joint  operations and the joint training and equipping of EOD forces.
Finally, we met with EOD leadership and personnel from selected EOD  units in all four military services and conducted 28 group discussions with  EOD-qualified team members, team leaders, senior enlisted personnel,  and officers to obtain their perspectives on issues related to military  service-specific EOD missions, joint combat operations, training,  equipment, and operational tempo. We used these data to provide  illustrative examples throughout this report. A detailed discussion of how  we conducted those group discussions follows, and more details of the  themes from the group discussions can be found in appendix II. The  group discussions included EOD-qualified personnel from the following  military units:  52nd Ordnance Group (EOD), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
49th EOD Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky;
723rd EOD Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and
788th EOD Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
EOD Group One, Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, California
EOD Mobile Unit One, Naval Base Point Loma, California;
EOD Mobile Unit Three, Naval Amphibious Base Coronado,
EOD Mobile Unit Eleven, Imperial Beach, California.
1st EOD Company, Camp Pendleton, California;
3rd EOD Company, Okinawa, Japan; and
EOD Personnel Supporting the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine  Corps Air Station Miramar, California.
96th EOD Flight Civil Engineering Squadron EOD Flight, Eglin Air  Force Base, Florida.
We selected EOD units to visit based on information from the services for  units that had recent deployment experience as well as the ability to  provide sufficient quantities of EOD-qualified personnel who would be  available to participate in our group discussions.
Our overall objective in using the group discussion approach was to  obtain insight and perspectives from EOD personnel on training,  equipment, operational tempo, joint military operations, and military  service-specific responsibilities. Group discussions, which are similar in  nature and intent to focus groups, involve structured small group  discussions designed to obtain in-depth information about specific issues.  The information obtained is such that it cannot easily be obtained from a  set of individual interviews. From each location, we requested that each  military service provide up to 10 volunteers to participate in our group  discussions. We also conducted group discussions separated by rank  and position. Specifically, we conducted separate group discussions that  were comprised of officers, senior enlisted personnel, team leaders, and  team members. At one location, two group discussions included both  officers and senior enlisted personnel, and two other group discussions  included all available EOD personnel assigned to those particular units.  The number of participants per group discussion ranged from 2 to 12.  Discussions were held in a semi-structured manner, led by a moderator  who followed a standardized list of questions. The group discussions  were documented by one or two analysts at each location. Group  discussions were conducted between August 2012 and October 2012.
subsections: section_title: Composition of the Discussion Groups
paragraphs: We conducted 28 group discussions with EOD-qualified junior enlisted,  noncommissioned officer, warrant officer, and commissioned officer  personnel from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. During  each discussion, we asked participants to complete a voluntary  questionnaire that provided us with supplemental information about each  person’s EOD background, including:
Rank;
EOD qualification level (Basic, Senior, or Master Badge level);
Number of deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan;
Support provided to or received from another military service; and
Support to the Very Important Persons Protection Support Activity.
This information provided by participants helped us to ensure that we  obtained a wide range of perspectives from qualified EOD personnel with  a variety of EOD-related experiences. In total, we met with 188 EOD  personnel. Table 1 below shows the composition of our various  discussion groups.
We performed content analysis of our group discussion sessions in order  to identify the themes that emerged during the sessions and to  summarize participant statements regarding EOD experiences and  perceptions. Specifically, at the conclusion of all our group discussion  sessions, we reviewed responses from the discussion groups and created  a list of themes. We then reviewed the comments from each of the 28  group discussions and assigned comments to the appropriate themes.  One GAO analyst conducted this analysis and a different GAO analyst  checked the information for accuracy. Any discrepancies in the  assignment of the comments to themes were resolved through discussion  by the analysts. The information gathered during our group discussions  with EOD personnel represents the responses of only the EOD enlisted  and officer personnel present in our 28 group discussions and it is not  projectable to other EOD personnel.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to April 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Themes from the Group Discussions
paragraphs: In group discussions, we asked EOD personnel for their perspectives on  what is working well and what needs improvement with regard to military  service-specific missions, joint combat operations, training, equipment,  and operational tempo. We analyzed participants’ responses to identify  the most common themes, which are summarized below.
EOD Organizational Alignment and Career Path: Some participants  from each military service raised concerns about where EOD is aligned  within their respective military service. Some also noted issues with  career paths for EOD-qualified officers. For example, Army, Marine  Corps, and Air Force personnel expressed concerns about EOD  alignment under the Ordnance Corps (Army) or Engineers (Marine Corps  and Air Force). They perceived these alignments as hampering EOD  forces’ influence for resourcing and operations. Additionally, Army officers  reported that officer career paths are of concern because the EOD  specialty is a technical area that is not the same as others in their  organization. For example, the Army EOD officer career path is within the  Logistics Branch of the Army, and all EOD officers are expected to have  logistic skills; however, an Army officer noted that learning about  managing fuel farms has nothing to do with EOD. Conversely, Navy  participants viewed the officer career path as generally positive and noted  that enabling an officer to stay within EOD for his or her entire career was  beneficial to the EOD force.
Training: Participants in the majority of the group discussions said they  felt positive about the training they received, and almost all of our group  discussion participants reported that they wanted more training or more  time for training. Some group discussion participants reported concerns  about not being able to train with the same types of equipment, such as  robots, as they would be using when deployed. Both Army and Marine  Corps personnel expressed the desire for more training in homemade  explosives and casualty care. Additionally, Army and Navy personnel  reported that they needed additional access to training ranges. Army  participants at Fort Campbell noted that access to training ranges is  difficult to provide because there are not enough training ranges for all  EOD companies to train at their installation. Likewise, Navy personnel in  the San Diego area noted that they have issues accessing training  ranges, particularly for exercises involving demolition.
Frequency of deployments: Participants in our discussions expressed  mixed opinions regarding operational tempo. Some EOD personnel felt  that the high pace of deployments and other missions put stress on EOD  personnel and their families. For example, some personnel felt that EOD  team leaders are getting burned out because they are always away from  home. In addition, some personnel said that to cover missions clearing  training ranges they had to turn down annual leave or cancel doctors’  appointments because of staffing shortages. Also, some personnel noted  that during their 12 months home between overseas deployments they  are often away from their families because of the need to attend training  or sometimes to travel in support of the Very Important Persons  Protection Support Activity. Some personnel liked a high operational  tempo and voiced concerns about having too much down time as  operational tempo slows.
Support to Very Important Persons Protection Support Activity:  Participants in many of our group discussions noted that the time they  spent in support of the Very Important Persons Protection Support Activity  exacerbated their high operational tempo, and some raised the concern  that these missions are not an effective use of EOD skills. EOD personnel  reported that these missions had a negative effect on EOD personnel and  their families by taking them away from home too often. Further, they  noted that to support these missions they missed training for overseas  missions. Moreover, some participants said that the Very Important  Persons Protection Support Activity missions were not a good use of the  EOD skill set or did not use EOD to its full potential because EOD  personnel are asked only to identify potentially explosive hazards but are  not allowed to disarm anything that is found.
Funding for Training EOD Units: Some participants in our group  discussions reported concerns about the adequacy of funding for EOD  training. For example, some Army EOD personnel said that they  sometimes had to buy materials needed for training aides, such as  electrical tape and electronic parts. Moreover, Army and Marine Corps  personnel reported that specialized training, such as post-blast analysis  or homemade explosive courses, is expensive, which limits the number of  people who can take the training. In particular, Marine Corps personnel  expressed concerns that money for training might be scaled back in the  future.
Incentive and Special Duty Assignment Pays: Participants in our  discussion groups noted that incentive pay, special duty assignment pay,  and retention bonuses are important to EOD personnel, and that  availability of such pays is a factor in retaining EOD personnel, but that  availability of incentives varied across the military services. Some  participants from the Marine Corps raised issues regarding incentive pay,  special duty assignment pay, and retention bonuses. Marine Corps  personnel stated that, unlike the other military services, the Marine Corps  does not provide any additional pays or bonuses for EOD, and they felt  that not receiving these types of pay like the other services constituted an  issue of equity.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Margaret G. Morgan, Assistant  Director; Tarik Carter; Simon Hirschfeld; Shvetal Khanna; James  Krustapentus; James E. Lloyd III; Michael Shaughnessy; Michael Silver;  Amie Steele; Tristan T. To; Cheryl Weissman; and Sam Wilson made key  contributions to this report.