Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve Enclaves
Published: 2003-06-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: While four previous base closure rounds have afforded the Department of Defense (DOD) the opportunity to divest itself of unneeded property, it has, at the same time, retained more than 350,000 acres and nearly 20 million square feet of facilities on enclaves at closed or realigned bases for use by the reserve components. In view of the upcoming 2005 base closure round, GAO undertook this review to ascertain if opportunities exist to improve the decision-making processes used to establish reserve enclaves. Specifically, GAO determined to what extent (1)specific infrastructure needs for reserve enclaves were identified as part of base realignment and closure decision making and (2) estimated costs to operate and maintain enclaves were considered in deriving net estimated savings for realigning or closing bases.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The specific infrastructure needed for many DOD reserve enclaves created under the previous base realignment and closure process was generally not identified until after a defense base closure commission had rendered its recommendations. While the Army generally decided it wanted much of the available training land for its enclaves before the time of the commission's decision making during the 1995 closure round, time constraints precluded the Army from fully identifying specific training acreages and facilities until later. Subsequently, in some instances the Army created enclaves that were nearly as large as the bases that were being closed. In contrast, the infrastructure needed for Air Force reserve enclaves was more defined during the decision-making process. Moreover, DOD's enclave-planning processes generally did not include a cross-service analysis of military activities that may have benefited by their inclusion in a nearby enclave. The Army did not include estimated costs to operate and maintain its reserve enclaves in deriving net estimated base realignment or closure savings during the decision-making process, but the Air Force apparently did so in forming its enclaves. GAO's analysis showed that the Army overestimated savings and underestimated the time required to recoup initial investment costs to either realign or close those bases with proposed enclaves. However, these original cost omissions have not materially affected DOD's recent estimate of $6.6 billion in annual recurring savings from the previous closure rounds because the Army subsequently updated its estimates in its budget submissions to reflect expected enclave costs.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 1988, the Department of Defense (DOD) has undergone four rounds  of base realignments and closures and has reportedly reduced its base  infrastructure by about 20 percent, saving billions of dollars in the process.  While the closure process has afforded DOD the opportunity to divest  itself of property it no longer needed to meet its national security  requirements, it has, at the same time, retained more than 350,000 acres of  land and nearly 20 million square feet of facilities, typically referred to as  enclaves, on closed or realigned bases for use by the reserve components.  Most of the larger enclaves were established during the 1995 round of base  closures and are now managed by either the Army National Guard or Army  Reserve rather than the active component.
We prepared this report under our basic legislative responsibilities as  authorized by 31 U.S.C. § 717 and are providing it to you because of  your responsibilities in the upcoming base closure round authorized for  2005. In view of this round, we undertook this review to ascertain if  opportunities exist to improve the planning and decision-making  processes that were used to establish reserve enclaves in the previous  closure rounds. Specifically, our objectives were to determine to what  extent (1) specific infrastructure needs (e.g., needs for acreage and  facilities) for reserve enclaves were identified as part of base realignment  and closure decision making in previous closure rounds and (2) estimated  costs to operate and maintain enclaves were considered in deriving the net  estimated savings for realigning or closing bases.
In performing our work, we focused our attention on the processes used  by the department to define infrastructure needs for major reserve  enclaves for the Army in the 1995 round and for the Air Force in the earlier  rounds. We did not validate the need for any of the department’s enclaves  nor the specific infrastructure needs for those enclaves. Of the 10 major  reserve enclaves created during the previous closure rounds, 7 are within  the Army and 3 are within the Air Force. Neither the Navy nor the Marines  have formed a major enclave (see app. I for a brief description of DOD’s  major reserve component enclaves). We visited five major Army  enclaves—Fort Hunter Liggett, California; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas;  Fort Pickett, Virginia; Fort McClellan, Alabama; and Fort Indiantown Gap,  Pennsylvania—that were created during the 1995 closure round and  account for nearly 90 percent, or more than 310,000 acres, of DOD’s total  major reserve component enclave acreage. We also visited two of three  major Air Force enclaves at Grissom Air Reserve Base in Indiana (a 1991  round action) and March Air Reserve Base in California (a 1993 round  action). We also visited a smaller Air Force enclave at Rickenbacker Air  National Guard Base in Ohio (a 1991 round action) to gain a perspective  on Air Guard enclave formation processes. Our review efforts were  constrained by the limited availability of officials (owing to the passage of  time) who had participated in previous rounds of base closure  decision making and the general lack of planning documentation  regarding enclave infrastructure needs and estimated costs.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: To enable DOD to more readily close unneeded bases and realign others  to meet its national security requirements, the Congress enacted base  realignment and closure (BRAC) legislation that instituted base closure  rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. A special commission established for  the 1988 round made recommendations to the Committees on Armed  Services of the Senate and House of Representatives. For the remaining  rounds, special BRAC commissions were set up to recommend specific  base realignments and closures to the President, who in turn sent the  commissions’ recommendations with his approval to the Congress. The  four commissions generated nearly 500 recommendations—on 97 major  base closures and hundreds of realignments and smaller closures.
As a result of the BRAC process, DOD has reported that it reduced its  infrastructure by about 20 percent; has transferred over half of the  approximately 511,000 acres of unneeded property to other federal and  nonfederal users and continues work on transferring the remainder; and  generated about $16.7 billion in estimated savings through fiscal year  2001, with an estimated $6.6 billion in annual recurring savings expected  thereafter. We and others who have conducted reviews of BRAC savings  have found that the DOD’s savings are substantial, although imprecise,  and should be viewed as rough approximations of the likely savings.  Under the property disposal process, unneeded DOD BRAC property is  initially made available to other federal agencies for their use. After  the federal screening process has taken place, remaining property is  generally provided to state and local governments for public benefit and  economic development purposes. In other cases, DOD has publicly sold its  unneeded property.
Under the decision-making processes during the last 3 BRAC rounds,  DOD assessed its bases or activities for closure or realignment using  an established set of eight criteria covering a broad range of military,  fiscal, environmental, and other considerations. DOD subsequently  forwarded its recommended list of proposed realignments and closures  to the BRAC Commission for its consideration in recommending specific  realignments and closure actions. Although military value considerations  such as mission requirements and impact on operational readiness were  critical evaluation factors, potential costs and savings, along with  estimated payback periods associated with proposed closure or  realignment actions were also important factors in the assessment  process. To assist with the financial aspects of proposed actions, DOD  and the BRAC Commissions used a quantitative analytical model,  frequently referred to as the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA),  to provide decision makers with a relative assessment of the potential  costs, estimated savings, and payback periods of proposed alternative  realignment or closure actions. Although the COBRA model was not  designed to produce budget-quality financial data, it was useful in  providing a relative financial comparison among potential alternative  proposed base actions. DOD generally provided improved financial data  for each of the services in its annual BRAC budget submission to the  Congress following a BRAC Commission’s recommendations.
The four previous BRAC Commissions recommended 27 actions in  which either a reserve enclave or similar reserve presence was to be  formed at a base that was to be realigned or closed (see app. II). In many  instances, these actions were relatively minor in that they involved only  several acres, but in other cases the actions involved creating enclaves  with large acreages and millions of square feet of facilities under reserve  component management to conduct training for not only the reserve  component but also the active component as well. Figure 1 shows the  locations of DOD’s 10 major (i.e., sites exceeding 500 acres) reserve  component enclaves established under the previous BRAC rounds.
As shown in figure 1, the Army has 7 enclave locations; all of these  enclaves, with the exception of Fort Devens (a 1991 round action),  were created during the 1995 round. The Air Force has the remaining  3 enclaves: Air Reserve—Grissom Air Reserve Base (a 1991 round action);  Homestead Air Reserve Base (a 1993 round action); and March Air Reserve  Base (a 1993 round action). Neither the Navy nor the Marines created any  major enclaves.
section_title: Infrastructure Needs of Many Enclaves Not Identified Until after BRAC Decision Making
paragraphs: Many of DOD’s specific enclave infrastructure needs were not identified  until after the commission for a BRAC round held its deliberations and  had rendered its recommendations. Although the Army’s enclave planning  process—particularly for the 1995 BRAC round—began before the  issuance of commission recommendations, specificity of needed  infrastructure was not defined until after the recommendations were  finalized. The subsequent size of several of these enclaves was much  greater than seemingly reflected in commission recommendations that  called for minimum essential facilities and land for reserve use. On the  other hand, the Air Force’s planning process was reportedly further along  and enclave needs were better defined at the time the commission made  its recommendations. In addition, DOD’s enclave-planning processes  generally did not include a cross-service analysis of the needs of military  activities or activities in the vicinity of a realigning or closing base with  a proposed enclave. As a result, the commission often held deliberations  without the benefit of some critical information, such as the extent of the  enclave infrastructure needed to support training and potential  opportunities to achieve benefits by collocating nearby reserve  components on enclave property.
subsections: section_title: Army Enclave Infrastructure Needs Not As Well Defined As Those of the Air Force during BRAC Decision Making
paragraphs: While the Army’s enclave planning process for the 1995 round began  previous to completion of the BRAC Commission’s deliberations, specific  enclave infrastructure needs were not identified until after commission  recommendations had been issued on July 1, 1995. Army officials told us  that it was recognized early in the process that the Army wanted to retain  the majority of existing training land at some of its bases slated for closure  or realignment that also served as reserve component maneuver training  locations, but time constraints precluded the Army from fully identifying  specific enclave needs before the commission completed decision-making.  According to a 1999 DOD report on the effect of base closures on future  mobilization options, the retention of much of the Army maneuver training  acreage at the enclave locations served not only to meet current training  needs but also could serve, if necessary, as future maneuver bases with  new construction or renovation of existing facilities for an increased force  structure. In testimony before the commission, the Army had indicated  that much of the training land should be retained, but the Army was less  specific on the size and facility needs (i.e., in total square footage) for  the enclaves. Most facility needs fall within the enclaves’ primary  infrastructure (or cantonment area) necessary to operate and maintain  the enclaves.
The Army formed an officer-level committee—a “Council of Colonels”— that reviewed reserve component enclave proposals but did not approve  them for higher-level reviews until July 7, 1995—about 1 week after the  BRAC Commission had issued its recommendations. Following the  Council of Colonels’ approval, a General Officer Steering Committee  worked with the Army reserve components to refine the infrastructure  needs for the enclaves, needs that the steering committee approved  (except for Fort Hunter Liggett) in October 1995–-more than 3 months  following the 1995 BRAC Commission’s recommendations.
Although Army approval for most of its enclaves’ infrastructure needs  occurred in late 1995, the number of acres and facilities for some  installations changed as various implementation plans took effect to  establish the enclaves. Changes occurred as a result of Army decisions and  community reuse plans for property disposed of by the department, as  illustrated in the following examples.
At Fort Hunter Liggett, the number of facilities to be retained in the  enclave increased over time based on an Army decision to retain some of  the family housing (40 units); morale, welfare, and recreation facilities  (9 facilities) and other training-related facilities (3 barracks and  2 classrooms) that had originally been excluded from the enclave.
At Fort McClellan, the expected cantonment area decreased considerably  from an initial proposal of about 10,000 acres (excluding about 22,200  training-range acres) to about 286 acres in response to concerns raised by  the local community.
The Air Force’s enclave infrastructure needs were reportedly more defined  than those of the Army at the time of commission deliberation and  decision making. Air Force officials told us that the base evaluation  process for the 1991 and 1993 rounds—the rounds when the Air Force’s  major reserve enclaves were created—included a detailed analysis of  the infrastructure needed for the enclaves, including enclave size,  identification of required facilities, and expected costs to operate and  maintain its proposed enclaves prior to commission consideration of its  proposals. These officials did note that some revisions in the sizing of the  enclaves and associated enclave boundaries were minor and have  occurred over time as plans were further defined, but stated that these  changes did not materially affect enclave costs. Although documentation  on the initial plans was not available (due to the passage of time), we were  able to document some enclave revisions made after the issuance of the  BRAC Commissions’ recommendations as follows:    At March Air Reserve Base, the Air Force made at least 3 sets of revisions  to its enclave size which now encompasses 2,359 acres. These revisions  were relatively minor in scope, such as one revision that expanded the  boundaries by about 38 acres to provide a clear zone for flight operations.
At Grissom Air Reserve Base, the Air Force has made one revision—an  exchange of about 70 acres with the local redevelopment authority—to  its enclave configuration, which now encompasses 1,380 acres. In  addition, base officials are negotiating with the redevelopment authority  for acquisition of a small parcel to improve force protection at the  enclave’s main gate.
At Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, the Guard made several  revisions prior to reaching its current 168-acre enclave, including  the transfer of 3.5 acres of unneeded property to the local redevelopment  authority after the Guard relocated its fuel tanks for force protection  reasons.
The degree of specificity in a commission’s recommendation language for  proposed enclaves varied between the Army and the Air Force. In general,  the recommendation language for the Army’s 1995 round enclaves was  based largely on the Army’s proposed language, specifying that the bases  were to be closed, except that minimum essential ranges, facilities, and  training areas be retained for reserve component use. In contrast, for  Army and Air Force enclaves created in earlier rounds, the  recommendation language was more precise—even specifying specific  acreages to be retained in some cases.
Acting on the authority contained in the commissions’ recommendations,  the Army and Air Force created enclaves that varied widely in size  (i.e., from several acres to more than 164,000 acres). Table 1 provides a  comparison of the reported size and number of facilities of pre-BRAC  bases with those of post-BRAC enclaves for DOD’s 10 major enclaves.
As shown in table 1, the vast majority—nearly 90 percent—of the  pre-BRAC land has been retained for the major reserve enclaves with  most enclaves residing in Army maneuver training sites (e.g., Forts Hunter  Liggett, Chaffee, Pickett, and Indiantown Gap). While the management of  these Army enclaves has generally shifted from the active to the reserve  component, the training missions at these Army bases have remained,  although the extent of use has decreased slightly in some instances and  increased in others (see app. I). On the other hand, the Air Force enclaves  are generally much smaller in acreage than those of the Army due in large  part to the departure of active Air Force organizations and associated  missions from the former bases. While the Army retained much of the  pre-BRAC acreage, it generally made greater reductions in the amount of  square footage for its enclave facilities. Many of these reductions were  due in part to the demolition of older unusable facilities built during  World War II, and the transfer of other facilities (such as family housing  activities once required for the departing active personnel) to local  redevelopment authorities. At Fort Indiantown Gap, for example, the  Army has reportedly demolished 349 facilities since the Army National  Guard assumed control of the base in 1998. As shown in table 1, the Air  Force significantly reduced the amount of its facilities’ square footage for  2 of its 3 major enclaves.
While the language of the 1995 BRAC Commission recommendations  regarding enclaves allowed the Army to form several enclaves of  considerable size, these enclaves are considerably larger than one might  expect from the language, which provided for minimum essential land and  facilities for reserve component use. In this regard, the Army’s Office of  the Judge Advocate General questioned proposed enclave plans during the  planning process. For example, the Judge Advocate General questioned  Fort Indiantown Gap and Fort Hunter Liggett enclave plans, calling for  retention of essentially the entire former base while the commission’s  recommendation would suggest smaller enclaves comprising a section of  the base. Nonetheless, the Army approved the implementation plans based  on mission needs. Having more complete information regarding expected  enclave infrastructure would have provided previous commissions with an  opportunity to draft more precise recommendation language, if they chose  to do so, and produce decisions having greater clarity on enclave  infrastructure and expected costs and savings from the closure and  realignment actions.
section_title: Enclave Planning Analyses Generally Did Not Consider Cross-Service Needs
paragraphs: DOD generally did not consider cross-service needs of nearby military  activities in planning for many of its reserve enclaves, although their  inclusion may have been beneficial in terms of potential for increased cost  savings, force protection, or training reasons. While some other reserve  activities have subsequently relocated on either enclaves created as part of  the closure decision or later on former base property after it was acquired  by local redevelopment authorities, those relocations outside enclave  boundaries have not necessarily been ideal for either DOD or the  communities surrounding the enclaves. Ideally, enclave planning analyses  would involve an integrated cross-service approach to forming enclaves  and enable DOD to maximize its opportunities for achieving operational,  economic, and security benefits while, at the same time, providing for the  interests of affected communities surrounding realigning or closing bases.
Officials at several Air Force bases we visited told us that while other  service and federal government organizations that had already resided  on the former bases may have been included in the enclaves, military  activities of other services in the local area were not generally considered  for possible inclusion in the proposed enclaves. These officials told us that  these activities were either not approached for consideration or were not  considered due to service interests to minimize the size and relative costs  to operate and maintain the enclaves.
Following the formation of the enclaves, some additional reserve activities  have since relocated on either enclave or former base property. Some  have occupied available facilities on enclaves as tenants and are afforded  various benefits such as reduced operating costs, training enhancements,  or increased force protection. For example, a Navy Reserve training  center, originally based in South Bend, Indiana, moved its operations to an  available facility at Grissom Air Reserve Base in August 2002 because the  activity could not meet force protection requirements at its previous  facilities in South Bend. After the move, the commander of the activity  told us that his personnel have experienced enhanced training  opportunities since they can now work closely with other military  activities on “hands-on” duties during weekend reserve drills. This  opportunity has led, in turn, to his assessment that both his recruiting  efforts and readiness have improved.
On the other hand, the relocation of some activities to the former base,  or those remaining on the former property outside the confines of the  enclave, has resulted in a less-than-ideal situation for both the department  and the communities surrounding the former base. For example, at the  former March Air Force Base in California, other service activities from  the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Navy Reserve and Marine Corps  Reserve reside outside the enclave boundaries in a non-contiguous  arrangement. This situation, combined with the enclave itself and other  enclave “islands” established on the former base, has resulted in a  “checkerboard” effect, as shown in figure 2, of various military-occupied  property interspersed with community property on the former base.
Further, some of the activities located outside the enclave boundaries  have incurred expenses to erect security fences, as shown in figure 3, for  force protection purposes. These fences are in addition to the fence that  surrounds the main enclave area.
Local redevelopment authority officials told us that a combination of  factors (including the dispersion of military property on the former base  along with the separate unsightly security fences) has made it very  difficult to market the remaining property.
In its April 16, 2003, policy guidance memorandum for the 2005  BRAC round, DOD recognizes the benefits of the joint use of facilities.  The memorandum instructs the services to evaluate opportunities to  consolidate or relocate active and reserve components on any enclave of  realigning and closing bases where such relocations make operational and  economic sense. If the services adhere to this guidance in the upcoming  round, we believe it will not only benefit DOD but also will mitigate any  potential adverse effects, such as the checkerboard base layout at the  former March Air Force Base, on community redevelopment efforts.
section_title: Many Initial Base Savings Estimates Did Not Account for Projected Enclave Costs
paragraphs: The estimated costs to operate and maintain the infrastructure for many  of the Army enclaves were not considered in calculating savings estimates  for bases with proposed enclaves during the decision-making process.  As a result, estimated realignment or closure costs and payback periods  were understated and estimated savings were overstated for those  specific bases. The Army subsequently updated its savings estimates in  its succeeding annual budget submissions to reflect estimated costs to  operate and maintain many of its enclaves. On the other hand, Air Force  officials told us that its estimated base closure savings were partially  offset by expected enclave costs, but documentation was insufficient to  demonstrate this statement. Because estimated costs and savings are an  important consideration in the closure and realignment decision-making  process and may impact specific commission recommendations, it is  important that estimates provided to the commission be as complete and  accurate as possible for its deliberations.
subsections: section_title: Army Enclave Costs Were Not Generally Considered in BRAC Decision-Making Process
paragraphs: During the 1995 BRAC decision-making process, estimated savings for  most 1995-round bases where Army enclaves were established did not  reflect estimated costs to operate and maintain the enclaves. The Army  Audit Agency reported in 1997 that about $28 million in estimated annual  costs to operate and maintain four major Army enclaves, as shown in  table 2, were not considered in the bases’ estimated savings calculations.
Enclave costs are only one of many costs that may be incurred by DOD in  closing or realigning an entire base. For example, other costs include  expenditures for movement of personnel and supplies to other locations  and military construction for facilities receiving missions from a realigning  base. The extent of all costs incurred have a direct bearing on the  estimated savings and payback periods associated with a particular  closure or realignment. Table 3 provides the results of the Army Audit  Agency’s review (which factored in all costs) of the estimated savings and  payback periods for the realignment or closure of the same Army bases  shown in table 2 where enclaves were created. As shown in table 3, the  commission’s annual savings’ estimates were overstated and the payback  periods were underestimated for these particular bases.
Our analysis showed that the omission of enclave costs significantly  affected the initial estimates of savings and payback periods at all  locations except Fort McClellan as shown in table 3. For example, the  omission of $6.8 million in enclave costs at Fort Chaffee (see table 2)  accounted for more than 50 percent of the $12 million in estimated  reduced annual recurring savings at that location. Further, the enclave  cost omissions were instrumental in increasing Fort Chaffee’s estimated  payback period from 1 year to 18 years. On the other hand, at  Fort McClellan, estimates on costs other than those associated with the  enclave had a greater impact on the resulting estimated annual recurring  savings and payback periods.
Although it is unknown whether the enclave cost omissions or any other  similar omissions would have caused the 1995 BRAC Commission to revise  its recommendations for these installations, it is important to have cost  and savings estimates that are as complete and accurate as possible in  order to provide a commission with a better basis to make informed  judgments during its deliberative process.
Although the Army omitted enclave operation and maintenance costs  from its savings calculations for most of its 1995 actions during the initial  phases of the BRAC process, it subsequently updated many of these  savings estimates in its annual budget submissions to the Congress. In our  April 2002 report on previous-round BRAC actions, we noted that even  though DOD had not routinely updated its BRAC base savings estimates  over time because it does not maintain an accounting system that tracks  savings, the Army had made the most savings updates of all the services in  recent years. According to Army officials, the Army Audit Agency report  provided a basis for the Army to update the annual BRAC budget  submissions and adjust the savings estimates at the installations reviewed.  As a result, the previous estimated cost omissions have not materially  affected the department’s estimate of $6.6 billion in annual recurring  savings across all previous round BRAC actions due to the fact that the  savings estimates for these locations have been updated to reflect many  enclave costs in subsequent annual budget submissions.
Because of the passage of time and the lack of supporting documentation,  we were unable to document whether the Air Force had considered  enclave costs in deriving its savings estimates for the former air bases we  visited at Grissom in Indiana (a 1991 round action), March in California  (a 1993 round action), and Rickenbacker in Ohio (a 1991 round action).  Air Force Reserve Command officials, however, told us that estimated  costs to operate and maintain their enclaves were considered in  calculating savings estimates for these base actions. Officials at the bases  we visited were unaware of the cost and savings estimates that were  established for their bases during the BRAC decision-making process.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: With an upcoming round of base realignments and closures approaching  in 2005, it is important that the new Defense Base Closure and  Realignment Commission have information that is as complete and  accurate as possible on DOD-proposed realignment and closure actions in  order to make informed judgments during its deliberations. Previous  round actions indicate that, in several cases, a commission lacked key  information (e.g., about the projected needs of an enclave infrastructure  and estimated costs to operate and maintain an enclave) because DOD had  not fully identified specific infrastructure needs until after the commission  had issued its recommendations. Without the benefit of more complete  data during the deliberative process, the commission subsequently issued  recommendation language that permitted the Army to form reserve  enclaves that are considerably larger than one might expect based on the  commission’s language concerning minimum essential land and facilities  for reserve component use. In addition, because DOD did not adequately  consider cross-service requirements of various military activities located  in the vicinity of its proposed enclaves and did not include them in the  enclaves, it may have lost the opportunity to achieve several benefits to  obtain savings, enhance training and readiness, and increase force  protection for these activities. DOD has recently issued policy guidance  as part of the 2005 closure round that, if implemented, should address  cross-service requirements and the potential to relocate activities on  future enclaves where relocation makes operational and economic sense.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: As part of the new base realignment and closure round scheduled for 2005,  we recommend that you establish provisions to ensure that data provided  to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission clearly specify  the (1) infrastructure (e.g., acreage and total square footage of facilities)  needed for any proposed reserve enclaves and (2) estimated costs to  operate and maintain such enclaves.
As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit  a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to the  Senate Committee on Government Affairs and the House Committee on  Government Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A  written statement must also be sent to the House and Senate Committees  on Appropriations with the agency’s first request for appropriations made  more than 60 days after the date of this report.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Reserve Affairs concurred with our recommendations. The  department’s response indicated that it would work to resolve the  issues addressed in our report, recognizing the need for improved planning  for reserve enclaves as part of BRAC decision making and include  improvements in selecting facilities to be retained, identifying costs of  operation, and assessing impacts on BRAC costs and savings. DOD’s  comments are included in appendix III of this report.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We prepared this report under our basic legislative responsibilities as  authorized by 31 U.S.C. § 717. We performed our work at, and met with  officials from, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve  Affairs, the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, the headquarters  of the Army Reserve Command and Air Force Reserve Command, and  Army and Air Force BRAC offices. We also visited and met with officials  from several reserve component enclave locations, including the Army’s  Fort Pickett, Virginia; Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; Fort Chaffee,  Arkansas; Fort McClellan, Alabama; and Fort Hunter Liggett, California;  as well as the Air Force’s March Air Reserve Base, California; Grissom  Air Reserve Base, Indiana; and Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base,  Ohio. We also contacted select officials who had participated in the  1995 BRAC round decision-making process to discuss their views on  establishing enclaves on closed or realigned bases. Our efforts regarding  previous-round enclave planning were hindered by the passage of time,  the lack of selected critical planning documentation, and the general  unavailability of key officials who had participated in the process.
To determine whether enclave infrastructure needs had been identified  prior to BRAC Commission decision making, we first identified the scope  of reserve enclaves by examining BRAC Commission reports from the four  previous rounds and DOD data regarding those enclave locations. To the  extent possible, we reviewed available documentation and compared  process development timelines with the various commission reporting  dates to determine the extent of enclave planning completed before a  commission’s issuance of specific BRAC recommendations. We examined  available commission hearings from the 1995 round to ascertain the  extent of commission discussion regarding proposed enclaves. We also  interviewed officials at most of the major enclave locations as well as at  the major command level to discuss their understanding of the enclave  planning process and associated timelines employed in the previous  rounds. We also discussed with these officials any previous planning  actions or actions currently underway to relocate various reserve activities  or organizations to enclave locations.
To determine whether projected costs to operate and maintain reserve  enclaves were considered in deriving estimated savings during the  BRAC decision-making process, we reviewed available cost and savings  estimation documentation derived from DOD’s COBRA model to ascertain  if estimated savings were offset by projected enclave costs. We reviewed  Army Audit Agency BRAC reports issued in 1997 on costs and savings  estimates at various BRAC locations, including some enclave sites.  Further, we analyzed how omitted enclave costs affected estimated annual  recurring savings and payback periods at selected Army bases. We also  discussed cost and savings estimates with Army and Air Force BRAC  office officials as well as officials at bases we visited. However, as in our  other efforts, we were generally constrained in our efforts by the general  unavailability of knowledgeable officials on specific enclave data and  adequate supporting documentation. We also examined recent annual  BRAC budget submissions to the Congress to ascertain if savings  estimates at the major enclave locations had been updated over time.
In performing this review, we used the same accounting records and  financial reports DOD and reserve components use to manage their  facilities. We did not independently determine the reliability of the  reported financial and real property information. However, in our recent  audit of the federal government’s financial statements, including DOD’s  and the reserve components’ statements, we questioned the reliability of  reported financial information because not all obligations and  expenditures are recorded to specific financial accounts. In addition, we  did not validate infrastructure needs for DOD enclaves.
We conducted our work from July 2002 through April 2003 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of the Army,  Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director,  Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional  committees and members. In addition, the report is available to others  upon request and can be accessed at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  www.gao.gov.
Please contact me on (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any  questions regarding this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: General Description of Major Reserve Component Enclaves (Pre-BRAC and Post-BRAC)
paragraphs: Appendix I: General Description of Major  Reserve Component Enclaves (Pre-BRAC and  Post-BRAC)
BRAC recommendation  Realign Fort Hunter Liggett by  relocating the Army Test and  Experimentation Center missions and  functions to Fort Bliss, Texas. Retain  minimum essential facilities and  training area as an enclave to support  the reserve component.
Utilization    Prior to BRAC 1995, the Army Reserve  managed the base, assuming control of the  property in December 1994 from the active  Army.  In September 1997, the base became a  sub-installation of the Army Reserve’s  Fort McCoy. The training man days have  increased by about 55 percent since 1998.
Close Fort Chaffee except for minimum  essential ranges, facilities, and training  areas required for a reserve  component training enclave for  individual and annual training.
Prior to BRAC 1995, the active Army  managed the base. The reserve components  had the majority of training man days  (75 percent) while the active component  had 24 percent; the remaining training was  devoted to non-DOD personnel.  In October 1997, base management  transferred to the Arkansas National Guard.  Overall training has decreased 51 percent  with reserve component training being down  59 percent.
Close Fort Pickett except minimum  essential ranges, facilities, and training  areas as a reserve component training  enclave to permit the conduct of  individual and annual training.
Prior to BRAC 1995, the Army Reserve  managed the base. The reserve components  had the majority of the training man days  (62 percent) while the active component  had 37 percent; the remaining training was  devoted to non-DOD personnel.  In October 1997, base management  transferred to the Virginia National Guard.  Overall training has increased by 6 percent.
Realign Fort Dix by replacing the active  component garrison with an Army  Reserve garrison. In addition, it  provided for retention of minimum  essential ranges, facilities, and training  areas as an enclave required for  reserve component training.
Prior to BRAC 1995, the active Army  managed the base. The reserve components  had the majority of training man days  (72 percent) while the active component  had 8 percent; the remaining training was  devoted to non-DOD personnel.  In October 1997, base management  transferred to the Army Reserve. Overall  training has increased 8 percent.
Close Fort Indiantown Gap, except  minimum essential ranges, facilities  and training areas as a reserve  component training enclave to permit  the conduct of individual and annual  training.
Prior to BRAC 1995, the active Army  managed the base. The reserve components  had the majority of training man days  (85 percent) while the active component  had 3 percent; the remaining training was  devoted to non-DOD personnel.  In October 1998, base management  transferred to the Pennsylvania National  Guard. Overall training has increased by  about 7 percent.
Utilization    Prior to BRAC 1995, the active Army  managed the base.   In May 1999, base management transferred  to the Alabama National Guard. Overall  training has increased 75 percent.
BRAC recommendation  Close Fort McClellan, except minimum  essential land and facilities for a  reserve component enclave and  minimum essential facilities, as  necessary, to provide auxiliary support  to the chemical demilitarization  operation at Anniston Army Depot,  Alabama.  Close Fort Devens. Retain 4600 acres  and those facilities necessary for  reserve component training  requirements.
Prior to BRAC 1991, the active Army  managed the base.   In March 1996, base management  transferred to the Army Reserve as a  sub-installation of Fort Dix.
Realign March Air Force Base. The  445th Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve,  452nd Air Refueling Wing, 163rd  Reconnaissance Group, the Air Force  Audit Agency and the Media Center will  remain and the base will convert to a  reserve base.
Prior to BRAC 1993, the active Air Force  managed the base, with major activities  being the 452nd Air Refueling Wing, 445th  Airlift Wing and the 452nd Air Mobility Wing,  163rd Air Refueling Wing.   In April 1996, base management transferred  to the Air Force Reserve with major activities  being the 63rd Air Refueling Wing and the  144th Fighter Wing as well as tenants such as  U.S. Customs.
Close Grissom Air Force Base and  transfer assigned KC-135 aircraft to the  Air reserve components.
Prior to BRAC 1991, the active Air Force  managed the base with major activities being  the 434th Air Refueling Wing and several Air  Force Reserve units.  In 1994, base management transferred to  the Air Force Reserve. Grissom Air Reserve  Base houses the 434th Air Refueling Wing as  well as other tenants such as the Navy  Reserve.
Realign Homestead Air Force Base.  The 482d F-16 Fighter Wing and the  301st Rescue Squadron and the North  American Air Defense Alert activity will  remain in a cantonment area.
Prior to BRAC 1991, the active Air Force  managed the base, with major activities  being the 482nd Fighter Wing and the 301st  Rescue Squadron.  In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew destroyed  most of the base. After the base was rebuilt  and management transferred to the Air  Force Reserve, operations were reinstated  with major activities being the 482nd Fighter  Wing and the NORAD Air Defense Alert  activity.
section_title: Appendix II: Reserve Enclaves Created under Previous BRAC Rounds
subsections: section_title: Bases With Enclaves Fort Douglas, Utah Fort Sheridan, Ill. Hamilton Army Airfield, Calif. Mather Air Force Base, Calif. Pease Air Force Base, N.H. Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind. Fort Devens, Mass. Grissom Air Force Base, Ind. Sacramento Army Depot, Calif. Griffiss Air Force Base, N.Y. Homestead Air Force Base, Fla. March Air Force Base, Calif. Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, Ohio Camp Kilmer, N.J. Camp Pedricktown, N.J. Fitzsimmons Medical Center, Colo. Fort Chaffee, Ark. Fort Dix, N.J. Fort Hamilton, N.Y. Fort Hunter Liggett, Calif. Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa. Fort McClellan, Ala. Fort Missoula, Mont. Fort Pickett, Va. Fort Ritchie, Md. Fort Totten, N.Y. Oakland Army Base, Calif.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Julie Chamberlain, Shawn  Flowers, Richard Meeks, Maria-Alaina Rambus, James Reifsnyder,  Donna Weiss, and Susan Woodward made key contributions to this report.