Capitol Hill Anthrax Incident: EPA's Cleanup Was Successful; Opportunities Exist to Enhance Contract Oversight
Published: 2003-06-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In September and October 2001, the first cases of anthrax bioterrorism occurred in the United States when letters containing anthrax were mailed to congressional leaders and members of the news media. As the cleanup of the Capitol Hill anthrax site progressed, EPA's estimates of the cleanup costs steadily rose. GAO was asked to describe (1) the costs EPA incurred to conduct the cleanup and how it was funded, (2) the extent to which EPA awarded the cleanup contracts competitively, (3) EPA's oversight of the contractors' work and any suggested changes to EPA's contracting practices, and (4) the extent to which EPA agreed to indemnify contractors against liability for potential damages related to the cleanup.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: EPA spent about $27 million on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup, using funds from its Superfund program. From the outset, many uncertainties were associated with the cleanup effort, including how to remove anthrax from buildings. EPA revised its November 2001 estimate of $5 million several times during the cleanup as the nature and extent of the contamination became fully known and the solutions to remove and properly dispose of the anthrax were agreed upon and carried out. To conduct the cleanup, EPA relied extensively on the existing competitively awarded Superfund contracts it routinely uses to address threats posed by the release of hazardous substances. Specifically, about 80 percent of the contract costs were incurred under 10 of EPA's existing Superfund contracts. EPA dedicated significant resources to overseeing the many contractors working on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup--including about 50 staff from nine regional offices experienced in leading and overseeing emergency environmental cleanups. Most often, these staff ensured that the contractors were on site and performing assigned tasks efficiently. EPA also assigned an administrative specialist to ensure that contract charges were accurate and reasonable. EPA's assessment of its emergency responses to the anthrax incidents, which focused on or included the Capitol Hill site, concluded that, overall, the agency had used its contracts effectively but that it could improve some areas of its contracting support. In addition, GAO's review of the Capitol Hill cleanup revealed inconsistencies in EPA's cost oversight practices among regions. For example, EPA uses a computerized system for tracking contractor costs for hazardous substance removal contracts, but regions use the system inconsistently for the technical assessment contracts also used during emergency responses. Consistent use of the system would likely improve the quality of EPA's nationwide contract data and enhance EPA's oversight capabilities. EPA agreed to indemnify two contractors with key roles in the fumigation of the Hart Senate Office Building with chlorine dioxide gas against liability that could have resulted if a third party had been injured by the contractors' release of a harmful substance, including anthrax.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Anthrax is a naturally occurring bacterium that causes acute infectious  disease and is potentially fatal. As you know, in September and October  2001, the first cases of anthrax bioterrorism occurred in the United States  when letters containing a powdered form of anthrax were mailed to  members of the news media and congressional leaders. On October 15,  2001, one of these letters, addressed to the former Majority Leader of the  U. S. Senate, was opened in the Hart Senate Office Building in Washington,  D.C. The letter had contaminated several congressional and other  buildings along the mail delivery route and elsewhere, and approximately  30 congressional employees tested positive for anthrax exposure soon  after. The Hart Senate Office Building is a 10-million-cubic-foot building  that houses the offices and staffs of 50 senators. As a result of the anthrax  contamination, the Hart Building and several others on Capitol Hill were  closed.
In consultation with the leadership of the Congress, the U.S. Capitol Police  Board—which oversees the security of the Capitol complex—established  a team led by an independent “incident commander” to coordinate the  response to the anthrax incident among several federal and local agencies.   The team determined that the congressional offices should be  decontaminated and reopened as expeditiously as possible so that the  operations of the legislative branch would not be impeded. The  Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which removes hazardous  substances under its Superfund program, had a significant role in the  cleanup.
As the cleanup of the Capitol Hill anthrax site progressed, EPA’s estimates  of its cost steadily increased. Consequently, you asked us to examine  several aspects of EPA’s cleanup. This report describes (1) the costs EPA  incurred to conduct the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup and how the costs  were funded, (2) the extent to which EPA awarded the anthrax cleanup  contracts competitively, (3) EPA’s oversight of the work performed by  contractors and any suggested changes to EPA’s contracting processes,  and (4) the extent to which EPA agreed to indemnify contractors against  liability for potential damages related to the cleanup.
To conduct our work, we sought contracting documentation relevant to  the anthrax cleanup from EPA. However, delays in receiving much of this  documentation considerably extended the time necessary to complete our  work. Factors contributing to the delay included the need to negotiate and  then to implement a process established by the Capitol Police Board and  EPA to address their respective concerns. The Capitol Police Board was  concerned that the EPA documents might contain sensitive security  information, and EPA thought that the documents might contain  confidential business information that it was not authorized to release to  the Capitol Police Board. As the first step in the process, EPA established  a reading room for GAO staff to preliminarily review the documents. After  this review, EPA screened the documents for confidential business  information and gave them, with certain information redacted, to the  Capitol Police Board so it could screen for security issues and redact  sensitive information. After the EPA and Capitol Police Board reviews,  which took more than 3 months, the documents were given to us. In part  because of delays in obtaining this contracting information, we surveyed  63 EPA personnel the agency had identified as having provided contractor  oversight for the cleanup to obtain information on their oversight roles.  We received survey responses from 56 people, a response rate of 89  percent. Our scope and methodology for this review are presented at the  end of this report.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Capitol Hill anthrax incident occurred a month after the terrorist  attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, while EPA and other  federal agencies were continuing to respond to these attacks. The Capitol  Police Board, which governs the U.S. Capitol Police Force, led the anthrax  cleanup at the Capitol Hill site. Consisting at the time of our review of the  House and Senate Sergeants-at-Arms and the Architect of the Capitol, the  Board oversees the security of members of the Congress and the Capitol  buildings, such as the congressional office buildings. The federal entities  involved in the cleanup—including EPA, the Federal Emergency  Management Agency, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the  U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of the Army—reported to an  incident commander who was appointed by the Capitol Police Board to  make decisions on the day-to-day activities of the cleanup. The period  from October 20, 2001, to November 13, 2001, is characterized as the  emergency phase, which focused on identifying the extent of anthrax  contamination; this was followed by the remedial, or cleanup, phase.
Reporting to the Capitol Police Board’s incident commander, EPA  managed the decontamination aspects of the cleanup. EPA’s activities at  the Capitol Hill site included    working with other agencies and entities to evaluate the effectiveness  of potential disinfectants and cleanup technologies,   isolating areas to prevent the spread of contamination,    sampling to determine and confirm the extent of contamination (see  fig. 1),   removing critical items for special decontamination procedures, and    cleaning up the contaminated areas and disposing of decontaminated  items.
At the Capitol Hill site, EPA sampled both surfaces and air in the buildings  for the presence of anthrax, using three types of surface samples (wet  swabs and wipes for nonporous surfaces and high efficiency particulate  arresting (HEPA) vacuuming for porous materials) and four types of air  samples. Four methods were used to remove anthrax found in  congressional buildings: fumigating with chlorine dioxide gas, an  antimicrobial pesticide; disinfecting with a liquid form of chlorine dioxide;  disinfecting with Sandia foam; and using HEPA vacuuming (see fig. 2).  During the cleanup, chlorine dioxide gas was identified as the best  available fumigant for decontaminating parts of the Hart Senate Office  Building, as well as for fumigating mail and packages. EPA oversaw the  use of chlorine dioxide gas during three fumigation events in the Hart  building.
In addition, contractors removed items from congressional offices that  were critical to congressional operations or personal effects of  significance. These items were bagged, tagged, and moved for off-site  decontamination. Approximately 3,250 bags of critical items were  transported to a company in Richmond, Virginia, for decontamination  treatment using ethylene oxide. Approximately 4,000 packages and other  mail were collected from the mail rooms in congressional office buildings  and also transported off site for decontamination using chlorine dioxide  gas. In addition, drums of mail were sent to a facility in Lima, Ohio, for  irradiation treatment.
The Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup site included 26 buildings, most of them  located in or near the Capitol Hill area of Washington, D.C. The buildings  that required testing for anthrax contamination included congressional  and judicial buildings; mail facilities; and other nearby buildings, such as  the Library of Congress. Initial sampling was conducted along the route  traveled by the letter opened in the Hart Building by tracing the route back  to the Dirksen Senate Office Building (where the mail for the Senate is  processed), to the P Street Warehouse (a restricted mail inspection facility  overseen by the Capitol Police where congressional mail is inspected), and  finally to the Brentwood postal facility (the U.S. Postal Service mail  processing and distribution center for Washington, D.C.).
Samples from 7 of the 26 buildings were found to contain anthrax, which  required that these 7 undergo more thorough sampling, followed by  decontamination, and followed then by resampling to confirm that the  anthrax had been eradicated. In total, approximately 10,000 samples were  taken at the Capitol Hill site, about half of them from locations in the Hart  Senate Office Building. EPA advised the Capitol Police Board’s incident  commander about the extent to which buildings needed to be cleaned to  make them safe. EPA, along with the Centers for Disease Control and  Prevention, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, the  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, and other relevant  authorities, determined that the cleanup standard that would be fully  protective of public health and the environment was “no detectable, viable  anthrax spores.” The seven buildings that required decontamination were  the Dirksen, Hart, and Russell Senate Office Buildings; the Ford and  Longworth House Office Buildings; the U.S. Supreme Court Building; and  the P Street Warehouse. Six of the seven buildings were cleared for  reentry by the end of January 2002. The P Street Warehouse was cleared  for reentry in March 2002. According to the lead EPA on-scene  coordinator, no one became sick as a result of exposure to anthrax or  chemical agents used during decontamination.
EPA performed its work on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup under its  Superfund program pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental  Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the National Oil  and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). Provisions  of CERCLA, as amended, promote a coordinated federal, state, and local  response to mitigate situations at sites that may pose an imminent and  substantial threat to public health or the environment. The NCP is the  federal government’s blueprint for responding to both oil spills and  hazardous substance releases. It requires that an on-scene coordinator  manage the federal response at the scene of a discharge of oil or a release  of a hazardous substance that poses a threat to public health or the  environment. The on-scene coordinator coordinates all federal efforts  with, and provides support and information to, local, state, and regional  response communities. Depending on where an incident occurs, the on- scene coordinator may be either an EPA or U.S. Coast Guard employee.  EPA’s Superfund work typically involves using agency personnel and  contractors from 1 of 10 EPA regions located throughout the country that  have experience with the hazardous substances involved in the incident  and the methods required to remove them.
Removal actions are generally short-term, relatively inexpensive responses  to releases or threats of releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or  contaminants that pose a danger to human health, welfare, or the  environment. CERCLA generally limits the cost of a removal action to   $2 million and the duration to 1 year. However, CERCLA exempts certain  removal actions from these limitations, such as when continued response  is required immediately to prevent, limit, or mitigate an emergency. EPA  approved an emergency exemption to the $2-million statutory limit for the  Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup on November 5, 2001.
Typically, EPA provides one on-scene coordinator for a removal site to  perform an initial assessment of the cleanup work needed, monitor the  more detailed technical assessment and cleanup work being performed by  EPA personnel and one or two contractors, and evaluate the results.  However, the Capitol Hill site response was different from most hazardous  materials emergency responses in its size and complexity, the nature of  the contamination, and the requirement that the closed congressional  buildings be reopened as soon as possible. As a result, EPA had to use a  large number of on-scene coordinators, major contracts, and other federal  agencies for assistance. In this case, EPA’s Mid-Atlantic Regional Office  (Region III) provided the lead on-scene coordinator, who led the agency’s  cleanup efforts. Region III, along with eight other regions, also provided  about 50 other on-scene coordinators. Further, unlike most EPA cleanups,  the lead on-scene coordinator was not in charge of the overall operations  but instead reported to the incident commander, who in turn reported to  the Capitol Police Board and House and Senate leaders.
A substantial portion of the cleanup work at the Capitol Hill site was  performed from October 2001 through January 2002, with most of the  remaining work finished by April 2002. However, some additional costs  have been incurred, and EPA personnel continued to work on activities  related to the cleanup after April 2002. For example, the final disposal of  items used at the cleanup continued after the buildings had been  reopened. In addition, EPA conducted several internal reviews to identify  lessons learned from this experience to help the agency prepare for  responses to other potential biological or chemical weapons attacks.
section_title: EPA Spent About $27 Million of its Superfund Money to Clean Up the Capitol Hill Anthrax Site
paragraphs: According to EPA, the agency expended about $27 million on the Capitol  Hill anthrax cleanup, using Superfund program funding. Through fiscal  year 2002 supplemental appropriations acts, the Congress provided EPA  with additional funding for activities related to terrorism, and EPA  allocated about $23 million of these funds to reimburse the Superfund  program for expenditures associated with the Capitol Hill anthrax  cleanup. Overall, EPA dedicated what it describes as unprecedented  resources—contract staff and EPA personnel—to accomplish the cleanup  of the anthrax site safely and effectively. Ninety-three percent of the $27  million in costs were incurred primarily by EPA contractors who, among  other things, conducted technical assessments and performed the  decontamination tasks at the various Capitol Hill sites; the remaining 7  percent of costs were incurred by EPA personnel, largely for planning and  overseeing the work of the contractors in accordance with the direction  provided by the Capitol Police Board.
Over the course of the cleanup, EPA revised its cost estimates several  times as the nature and extent of the contamination became fully known  and the solutions for removing and properly disposing of the anthrax were  agreed upon and carried out. EPA’s various cost estimates covered the  contracts and government agreements and generally do not include the  payroll and travel costs associated with EPA personnel assigned to the  Capitol Hill site. In November 2001, EPA increased its initial estimate for  the cleanup to $5 million—more than doubling the initial statutory limit of  $2 million. EPA revised its estimate for the cleanup five more times to  continue work necessary to control and mitigate the threat of release of  anthrax to the environment and to properly dispose of pollutants and  contaminants from the site. The last revision—an increase from $25  million to $28 million—occurred in June 2002. (See table 1.)
EPA adjusted its projections during the course of the cleanup as a result of  a number of factors generally related to the uniqueness of the situation— the first use of anthrax as a terrorist weapon in this country. EPA had not  addressed anthrax contamination in buildings previously and protocols for  responding to contamination by anthrax or other biological agents did not  exist. In addition, some scientific and technical information needed to  properly plan and conduct the anthrax cleanup was not readily available;  and EPA did not, at that time, have registered antimicrobial agents  approved for use against anthrax. Also, EPA had not compared the costs  of candidate decontamination methods. Further, much was—and still is— unknown about the properties of lab-produced anthrax such as that used  in this incident, which led to uncertainties about the health risks posed by  the contamination and how it could spread. As a result, EPA and  contractors had to develop plans for decontaminating large areas within  buildings with limited practical knowledge; search for decontamination  methods; assess their likely efficacy; implement them; and, at times, repeat  the process if the methods did not work. Finally, EPA was one of a  number of participants in the decisions made about the work to be done,  the timing of the work, and the resources needed; it was not the primary  decision maker as it would be in a typical Superfund cleanup.
As EPA and contractor staff were beginning their work at the Capitol Hill  anthrax site, the limitations of existing knowledge about the health risks  associated with anthrax—such as what amount of exposure could cause  illness or death—were becoming more clear. That the Capitol Hill site was  potentially riskier than initially believed became evident when workers in  the postal facilities where anthrax-laced letters were processed became ill;  two of them subsequently died of inhalation anthrax. The scientific and  medical information initially available to EPA and other agencies indicated  that workers in postal facilities were not at risk of infection. Further, an  elderly Connecticut woman—who may have been exposed to mail that  had been contaminated with anthrax—died from anthrax inhalation, and a  New York woman whose exposure to anthrax could not be linked to any  mail or mail facilities also died.
To accomplish the cleanup safely in the midst of significant scientific and  technical uncertainty and changing information about how anthrax  spreads, EPA called on about 150 of its staff in headquarters and the  regions, incurring agency payroll and travel costs of $1.9 million—payroll  costs amounted to $1.3 million and travel costs to about $600,000.  According to our analysis of EPA’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer  records, the majority of payroll and travel costs were incurred by on-scene  coordinators from EPA’s regions who were overseeing and assisting on  the cleanup. Further, EPA employed 27 contractors and obtained further  support from three government agencies at a total cost of about $25  million to provide assessment and cleanup services. These costs are  discussed in the next section.
Because of the magnitude and urgency of the health threat and the high  priority placed on reopening the congressional buildings as soon as  possible to mitigate disruptions to the functioning of the federal  government, the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup conducted by EPA and other  federal agencies was accomplished fairly quickly, with the majority of  contaminated buildings opened for business in about 3 months. Without  the emphasis on reopening the buildings, for example, the cleanup site  likely would not have been operated around the clock, 24/7, for months. In  contrast, testing and decontamination of some buildings at other sites  have taken much longer. For example, fumigation of the Brentwood postal  facility was completed in March 2003, and this facility had not reopened as  of May 2003. In addition, a news media building in Boca Raton, Florida,  where the first letter containing anthrax was received in September 2001,  remained closed as of May 2003.
section_title: EPA Competitively Awarded Most Major Contracts Used in the Anthrax Cleanup
paragraphs: Almost all of the cleanup expenses–81 percent—paid to EPA’s 27  contractors and 3 government agencies were incurred under competitively  awarded contracts.  For example, $20.3 million of the approximately $25  million total expenditures under contracts and government agreements  were incurred under 10 existing, competitively awarded contracts that  EPA routinely uses under the Superfund program to respond to releases or  the threat of releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants  that may present imminent and substantial danger to the public health or  welfare. Most of the contracts that were not competitively awarded cost  less than $200,000 and provided supplies and technical services. For  additional assistance, EPA also entered into agreements with two federal  agencies and one state agency. (See fig. 3.)
subsections: section_title: Competitively Awarded Superfund Contracts
paragraphs: When responding to a release of hazardous substances, EPA first relies on  its existing Superfund contracts. The Competition in Contracting Act of  1984 generally requires contracting agencies to obtain full and open  competition through the use of competitive procedures, the dual purposes  of which are to ensure that procurements are open to all responsible  sources and to provide the government with the opportunity to receive fair  and reasonable prices. In order to respond to emergencies involving  releases of hazardous substances quickly, EPA issues competitively  awarded multiyear Superfund contracts so that contractors with the  necessary expertise are available on short notice when needed. The 10  EPA regions each negotiate and manage these Superfund contracts for  work in their geographic area.
EPA generally uses two types of contracts in an emergency response:  technical contracts provide technical assistance for EPA’s site  assessment and removal activities, and  removal contracts provide emergency, time-critical removal services.
EPA used 10 existing, competitively awarded Superfund contracts for  most of the technical assessment and anthrax removal at the Capitol Hill  site: 4 technical contracts, 4 removal contracts, 2 other contracts that  provided specific technical services and support; and issued 2 additional  contracts for security services and supplies that were competitively  awarded. (See table 2.) The 10 existing contracts had been in place for up  to 4 years when the anthrax incident occurred. While EPA’s Region III  issued the Superfund contracts that incurred the most costs for the Capitol  Hill anthrax cleanup, contracts from other regions were also used to  augment Region III contracting resources. The 10 existing Superfund  contracts accounted for $20.3 million—or about 80 percent—of the total  contract and government agreement costs for the Capitol Hill cleanup.
The four EPA technical contracts for the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup,  among other things, provided decontamination plans and sampled for  anthrax in buildings. According to an EPA contracting official in Region  III, technical contracts typically account for about 10 percent of total  contract costs at a cleanup site. However, technical contracts costs for the  Capitol Hill site totaled about $7 million—or about 28 percent of the total  contract costs.
The four EPA removal contracts for the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup  provided personnel, equipment, and materials to remove items from the  site for safekeeping, decontaminate areas where anthrax was found, and  dispose of contaminated items. These removal contracts also provided  equipment and personnel to conduct sampling because of the large  amount of samples that were required and the short time frames involved.  The four EPA removal contract costs totaled about $10 million.
The other existing EPA contracts provided either specific technical  services or support. One contract, which provides engineering and  analytical services to EPA, monitored the air to ensure that potentially  harmful decontamination chemicals were not released outside the area in  which they were being used. Another contract, typically used for long-term  Superfund cleanups known as remedial cleanups, provided additional  technical support, including sampling analysis and data evaluation at the  site. These two contracts totaled $3 million.
section_title: Noncompetitively Awarded Contracts
paragraphs: Federal contracting laws that generally require EPA to use a competitive  bidding process permit some exceptions to this requirement, including  emergency situations where there is an unusual or compelling urgency for  obtaining the necessary supplies or services. On this basis, in November  2001, EPA’s Office of Acquisition Management gave the EPA contracting  officers the authority to enter into contracts for the Capitol Hill anthrax  site without using the normal competitive bidding process. Overall, EPA  used 15 noncompetitively awarded contracts—that is, sole-source  contracts—for supplies and for technical, removal, and laboratory services  to support the cleanup of the Capitol Hill anthrax site. As shown in table 3,  costs for three of the sole-source contracts exceeded $200,000, and many  of them were for considerably less.
The largest noncompetitive contract used for the cleanup was with  Kemron Environmental Services, Inc. Kemron provided EPA with HEPA  vacuuming services, one of the four methods used to remove anthrax at  the Capitol Hill site. EPA obtained the services of Kemron under the GSA  federal supply schedule, relying on GSA’s determination that the prices  offered under the GSA contract were fair and reasonable. The second  largest noncompetitive contract was with the removal contractor  HMHTTC Response Team, which provided additional workers in  December 2001 to relieve the removal contractors who had worked at the  site since October. The other sole-source contract over $200,000 was with  Southwest Research Institute, a laboratory that analyzed spore strips used  to test for anthrax after the decontamination efforts. This particular  laboratory was selected because it was familiar with the protocol  developed by the technical consultant who developed the spore strips. In  addition, according to EPA officials, the lab could handle the quantity of  spore strips the cleanup generated, it promised a quick turnaround time,  and the fee was reasonable.
The other noncompetitively awarded contracts used at the Capitol Hill site  were for supplies needed for the contractors working at the site, such as  respirators, air quality meters, and sampling kits, and for technical and  removal and laboratory services. For example, one technical contractor,  U.S. Art Company, Inc., provided advice regarding the removal and  decontamination of art objects in the Capitol Hill buildings.
Appendix I provides details on the tasks performed under the  competitively and noncompetitively awarded contracts.
section_title: Agreements with Government Agencies
paragraphs: EPA obtained further support through two federal interagency agreements  and one state agreement. EPA amended an existing interagency agreement  with the U.S. Coast Guard to respond quickly to the Capitol Hill anthrax  contamination. The U.S. Coast Guard National Strike Force provided  tactical entry teams, specialized equipment, management support, and a  deputy to the incident commander during the emergency phase of the  cleanup. EPA also entered into a new interagency agreement with the U.S.  Department of the Army for waste incineration services at Fort Detrick,  Maryland. In addition, EPA used the State of Maryland Department of the  Environment to review work plans and help coordinate EPA’s removal and  disposal of anthrax. (See table 4.)
section_title: EPA Devoted Extensive Resources to Overseeing Contractors’ Work, yet Some Contracting Changes Would Better Support EPA Cleanups
paragraphs: EPA dedicated significant staff resources to overseeing the many  contractors working on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup. Specifically,  about 50 EPA staff ensured the contractors were on site and performing  assigned tasks appropriately. In addition, EPA assigned an administrative  specialist to ensure contract charges were accurate and reasonable. After  the cleanup, EPA assessed its response to the Capitol Hill anthrax incident  and concluded that, overall, it had effectively used its contracting  resources. However, EPA also identified ways it could improve contract  support for potential future emergency responses. Moreover, our review of  the Capitol Hill anthrax incident revealed inconsistencies in oversight  practices that could affect the quality of EPA’s contract cost oversight,  such as the extent to which regions use the computerized cost-tracking  system, the extent to which they assign dedicated administrative  specialists to cleanup sites to oversee costs, and regions’ varying  approaches to reviewing cost reports for technical contracts.
subsections: section_title: Staff Oversaw Contractors’ Work to Ensure It Was Appropriate and Charges Were Accurate and Reasonable
paragraphs: EPA used emergency technical assessment and hazardous substance  removal contractors to conduct the cleanup and dedicated significant staff  resources to overseeing their work. Reporting to the Capitol Police Board,  EPA staff provided extensive technical expertise in anthrax detection and  removal to ensure that the Capitol Hill cleanup protected public health and  the environment. In all, according to EPA’s Office of the Chief Financial  Officer’s payroll list, about 150 EPA staff participated in the anthrax  cleanup, including about 50 staff from nine regional offices who are  experienced in leading and overseeing emergency environmental cleanup  operations—the on-scene coordinators—and several staff from EPA’s  Environmental Response Team who also have experience in emergency  cleanup operations.
The on-scene coordinators oversaw, and sometimes assisted with, the  work of the contractors during shifts that ran 24 hours a day, 7 days a  week, for about 3 months. Fifty-six EPA staff whose responsibilities at the  Capitol Hill site included overseeing contractors responded to our survey  about the oversight activities they performed. They reported that their  tasks varied but that the task they most frequently carried out was  overseeing contractors. Specifically, the EPA respondents to our survey  spent, on average,    53 percent of their time overseeing contractors;   18 percent researching and developing technical plans;   13 percent coordinating with other federal agencies on the  administration of the cleanup; and    14 percent on “other activities,” such as conducting pilot studies for the  decontamination effort, sampling for anthrax, and organizing and  administering cleanup activities.
The EPA staff who reported overseeing contractors spent, on average, 54  percent of their time observing contractors to ensure they were on site and  working on assigned tasks efficiently. These staff also spent, on average,  17 percent of their time reviewing the results of contractors’ work, and 8  percent of their time preparing daily or weekly work plans. Less  frequently, staff who reported oversight activities also monitored delivery  and quality of supplies, reviewed cost documents, and approved hours  worked by contract personnel.
While EPA staff who reviewed cost documents spent, on average, 3  percent of their time reviewing cost documents, one person—a site  administrative officer—spent 100 percent of his time reviewing cost  documents. As discussed in the following section, Region III generally uses  site administrative officers to review both technical and removal contract  costs in detail and to document these reviews before the on-scene  coordinator reviews and approves them, thereby easing the cost-review  workload of on-scene coordinators and allowing them to focus more on  other cleanup management tasks and issues.
At the Capitol Hill anthrax site, the site administrative officer reviewed the  daily charges for four of the six removal contracts, which represented  about 41 percent of the total contract costs. These reviews involved  verifying the hours the contractor staff worked by comparing the hours  billed with the hours recorded in sign-in sheets; reviewing travel costs to  ensure they were within federal guidelines and reviewing other  expenditures of contractor staff, such as telephone charges to ensure they  were allowable. The review work papers provide documentation of the  cost reviews performed.
According to EPA officials, the technical contractors did not have  sufficient staff on site to provide daily cost reports, and the site  administrative officer, therefore, did not review the daily costs of the  technical contracts at the Capitol Hill site. EPA requires reviews of the  monthly cost reports from technical contractors before they are approved  for payment by project officers in the regions; the reviews are generally  performed by the on-scene coordinator at the site. However, we could not  determine the extent to which the costs of the largest technical contract,  which was managed by Region III, were reviewed by on-scene  coordinators at the Capitol Hill site because the project officer responsible  had retired, and EPA staff could not locate any documentation of reviews  that had been requested or performed. As discussed further below, Region  III implemented a new review process in 2002 that requires such  documentation.
section_title: EPA’s Assessments of Its Response to the Capitol Hill Anthrax Incident Identified Contracting Issues, Which EPA Is Addressing
paragraphs: EPA conducted four assessments that either focused on or included the  Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup; the reports resulting from each follow:    Regional Lessons Learned from the Capitol Hill Anthrax Response,    60-Day Counter-Terrorism Contracting Assessment Final Report,    Federal On-Scene Coordinator’s After Action Report for the Capitol  Hill Site, August 2002; and    Challenges Faced During the Environmental Protection Agency’s  Response to Anthrax and Recommendations for Enhancing Response  Capabilities: A Lessons Learned Report, September 2002.
One of these reviews, the 60-day counter-terrorism contracting assessment  report, focused exclusively on the capability of EPA’s existing emergency  response contracting network to respond to terrorist incidents, while the  other three addressed a range of issues, such as operations and  management, communications and coordination, health and safety, and  the resources available to EPA. The overarching purpose of the four  reviews was to derive lessons learned from EPA’s responses to the  anthrax incidents in order to improve the agency’s ability to handle the  kind of threats associated with large terrorist incidents. In this regard,  while EPA concluded the cleanup was a success because the anthrax on  Capitol Hill was removed efficiently and safely in the face of numerous  and unprecedented challenges, the reports include a wide range of  recommendations aimed at improving EPA’s response capabilities.  Regarding contracting, the four reviews found that the agency’s emergency  response contracting network met the response and procurement needs at  the Capitol Hill site, but they also identified suggestions or  recommendations for EPA to improve contract support for potential  future responses. The lessons learned and recommendations included in  the counter-terrorism contracting assessment report generally address the  contracting issues that were identified in the broader reviews as well.
The counter-terrorism contracting assessment report developed 13  recommendations, 9 of which it identified as the most urgent. These high- priority recommendations include the following:    Facilitate counter-terrorism equipment acquisition and maintenance by  compiling a national vendor database of sources of counter-terrorism  equipment, supplies, and services.
Create a strike team of headquarters and regional contracting officers  and project officers that will be available for deployment 24/7 in the  event of an emergency to assist with emergency procurement needs.
Increase the administrative support provided to on-scene coordinators  during a major terrorism-related response by, for example, providing  staff to review daily cost reports, review invoices, and process on-site  paperwork.
According to its April 21, 2003, status report of emergency response  contracting activities, EPA has completed or is currently taking steps to  address the contracting recommendations in the counter-terrorism  contracting report. Regarding the three recommendations discussed  above, EPA has done the following:    EPA has developed counter-terrorism equipment warehouse contracts  for most of its regions.
EPA developed a final draft document on establishing a national  contract support team and released it within EPA for review on April  18, 2003.
The workgroup addressing the need for administrative support for on- scene coordinators is working on a list of specific administrative  support tasks that are required.
The next section of this report discusses some other areas in which EPA’s  contracting oversight might be improved that we identified during our  review of the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup.
section_title: Certain Oversight Practices That Could Enhance EPA’s Oversight Are Used in Some, but Not All, Regions
paragraphs: As a result of the convergence of EPA staff from nine of its regions at the  Capitol Hill site, regional differences in contractor oversight were  highlighted. Three oversight differences concern contract cost data and  the review of these costs. First, regions vary in the way they use a  computerized contract cost-tracking system called the Removal Cost  Management System. All regions use the system for removal contracts;  however, some regions also use it for some technical contracts also used  at cleanup sites. Second, some regions require that invoice reviews be  documented before payments are made; other regions have no such  requirement. Third, regarding cost reviews, some regions hire  administrative specialists to conduct detailed daily on-site reviews of  contract costs in support of the on-scene coordinator, while others only  rely on the on-scene coordinator to both manage cleanups and review and  approve the contract costs.
subsections: section_title: Computerized Cost-Tracking System
paragraphs: In 1988, to better support Superfund program management, EPA  developed a computerized cost-tracking system for cleanups so the agency  could obtain consistent documentation from contractors at all sites in a  timely and efficient manner. Specific anticipated benefits included timely  tracking of total costs to ensure that cleanup projects would not exceed  authorized amounts, more efficient invoice verification, and the ability to  develop more accurate cost estimates for cleanups. The tracking system  provides up-to-date cost information organized under the main categories  of “personnel,” “equipment,” and “other field costs;” the system further  breaks “other field costs” into such subcategories as materials and  supplies, travel, lodging, per diem, and subcontracts. Thus, to the extent  that regions require contractors to input daily contract costs into the  system, EPA can readily monitor total costs as well as individual cost  categories on a daily basis. Daily cost information supports oversight  better than monthly information because it allows timely, on-site reviews  of costs that can uncover inefficient or excessive use of labor and  equipment.
While a 1989 memorandum requiring the use of the tracking system  indicated that all site costs were to be input into the system, generally only  the costs associated with removal contracts are entered daily into the  system. For example, on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup, the  expenditures ($10.2 million) for the four multi-year removal contracts  were input into the system, but the expenditures ($7 million) for the four  multi-year technical contracts were not. According to EPA officials, part of  the rationale for inputting removal contract costs into the system is that  the type of contract used—“time and materials” contracts—requires more  oversight than some other contract types, such as fixed-price contracts.  That is, the removal contracts provide for specific labor rates but do not  specify the number of hours that may be applied under the contracts.   Most of the technical contracts currently used by the regions are cost  reimbursement contracts and a few are fixed-priced contracts.  Further,  the fixed-priced contracts used by the regions will include a cost  reimbursement portion that may cover activities such as contractor travel  and subcontracts, according to a Region III contract official.  For example,  the cost reimbursement portion of one of the fixed-price technical  contracts used for the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup was substantial—about  half of the contract cost of $4.4 million was invoiced under the cost  reimbursement portion, according to a Region III contract official.  As  with work performed on a time-and-materials basis, cost-reimbursement  work requires appropriate surveillance during performance to provide  reasonable assurance that efficient methods and effective cost controls  are used.  In addition, the technical contracts support work at numerous  cleanup sites, and EPA also needs to track site-specific costs as well as  total contract costs. However, because EPA does not consistently use the  contractor cost-tracking system to track the costs incurred under its  technical contracts, complete and consistent cost data on specific cleanup  sites are not readily available.
Although EPA generally does not use the tracking system for technical  contract costs, individual on-scene coordinators in some regions have  required that these costs, as well as others, such as those incurred by state  and federal agencies, be entered into the system. According to two such  on-scene coordinators with whom we spoke, a key benefit of using the  tracking system is that it gives them timely information on costs which  helps them oversee and manage the work. According to an environmental  engineer with EPA’s Environmental Response Team, the benefits of using  the tracking system for all of the contracts would include having  consistent cost data about each cleanup site in one place, thereby enabling  the agency to quickly respond to the numerous site-specific questions  frequently asked by EPA management, the Congress, the Office of  Management and Budget, the Federal Emergency Management Agency,  and others. For example, using the tracking system one can quickly break  out the expenditures into individual cost categories. The four Capitol Hill  contracts entered into the tracking system include, in the aggregate,  personnel costs of $2.8 million, lodging costs of $1.6 million, and per diem  costs of $0.6 million. Using the tracking system, analyses of contract cost  categories can be performed on individual contracts and individual sites.  However, because technical contracts generally are not included in the  tracking system, information on individual cost categories for the entire  cleanup is incomplete.
section_title: Documentation of Invoice Reviews
paragraphs: EPA’s Contracts Management Manual describes responsibilities and  procedures for processing contractors’ invoices. Contract invoices are to  be reviewed thoroughly for cost reasonableness and to be processed in a  timely manner. While the guidance may be tailored to specific contracts  and the use of checklists is optional, EPA’s policy requires documentation  to show that the appropriate reviews have been performed. The manual  defines the roles of the various staff involved in reviewing and approving  invoices. Among the key personnel in this process are the EPA staff who  oversee the actual contract work—primarily on-scene coordinators in the  case of the Capitol Hill anthrax site—and the project officer. In general,  the staff who oversee the work are responsible for reviewing individual  contract costs for reasonableness and informing the project officers of any  problems with the costs, such as excess hours charged. The project  officers are responsible for reviewing contract invoices for payment and  completing and submitting invoice approval forms to EPA’s financial  management center for payment. The contract invoices for the removal  and technical contracts are typically highly detailed and presented in  varying formats.
Invoice reviews for removal contracts are generally more standardized  across EPA than the invoice reviews for the technical contracts. Regions  use varying invoice review approaches for the technical contracts. For  example, beginning in November 2002, EPA Region III established a new  process for reviewing invoices of technical contracts: the relevant EPA  staff who oversaw or are overseeing the work at the sites receive monthly  site-specific invoices from contractors, and the EPA staff are required to  provide a written statement to the EPA project officer either indicating  agreement with the costs or identifying questions about them. Region III  revised its invoice review process after a new project officer with prior  auditing experience was hired. This individual proposed the change to  better ensure that invoices were reviewed by the on-site person familiar  with the work that was performed—such as the on-scene coordinator— and that the review was documented before invoices were paid. Similarly,  Regions V and IX send forms requiring responses to questions about the  invoices, along with the monthly invoices, and require the work  assignment managers overseeing the contract work to return the  completed forms to the project officers.
However, before this change, and during the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup,  Region III did not require written certification of invoice reviews. Region  III’s earlier approach is similar to the one currently used in Region IV,  where the project officer sends monthly invoices to the EPA work  assignment managers for review and asks them to respond if they have  concerns. Lacking a response from an EPA work assignment manager, the  project officer approves the invoice for payment after a specified date. In  these cases, the agency does not have documentation of the appropriate  invoice reviews by the EPA staff who oversaw the contract work. Another  variation is used in Region X: the project officer approves the monthly  invoices without providing the EPA work assignment manager the  opportunity to review them for reasonableness. As a result, the review is  performed by an individual who did not oversee the work rather than by  on-site staff who know the specifics of the work performed.
section_title: Dedicated Administrative Specialists to Review Costs
paragraphs: EPA’s on-scene coordinators generally are responsible for managing all  aspects of emergency environmental cleanups: organizing, directing, and  documenting cleanup actions. Specific tasks include conducting field  investigations, monitoring on-scene activities, and overseeing the cleanup  actions. The on-scene coordinator is also the individual with primary  responsibility for ensuring that cleanup costs are managed and tracked as  the cleanup progresses. The cost reviews that are required to ensure that  EPA approves only reasonable and allowable costs are detailed and time- consuming. An EPA cost management principle for the Superfund  program is that costs can be managed and documented most effectively  from the cleanup site as they occur. However, EPA’s Removal Cost  Management Manual recognizes that the demands on the on-scene  coordinator’s time and attention are great and that, therefore, some cost  management responsibilities have to be delegated to other on-site or off- site personnel.
To address this workload issue, Region III established an administrative  position to provide on-site cost management support to its on-scene  coordinators. As discussed earlier, one of Region III’s site administrative  officers worked on site at the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup, supporting  the lead on-scene coordinator essentially full-time from October 2001  through April 2002 and part-time for several more months. As a result, the  daily costs for four removal contracts were examined, contractor hours  were traced back to sign-in sheets, and equipment deliveries and uses  confirmed. The lead on-scene coordinator could not have conducted these  detailed cost reviews because of other demands, and the other on-scene  coordinators on site (many of whom were assigned to the site for only  several weeks) also were involved overseeing the work being performed  and would not have been able to conduct timely, detailed cost reviews.
Also, as discussed above, one of the lessons EPA learned from its  assessments of its responses to the recent terrorist attacks, including the  anthrax incidents, is that the agency needs to provide more administrative  support to its on-scene coordinators who are responding to threats  associated with terrorist incidents. The 60-Day Counter-Terrorism  Contracting Assessment Final Report specifically said that on-scene  coordinators need increased support to review daily cost reports and  invoices and to process paperwork on-site.  Although EPA’s Region III  provides cost management support to its on-scene coordinators on a  routine basis, most of the regions do not have positions dedicated to assist  on-scene coordinators with their cost management responsibilities and,  therefore, do not have trained support staff readily available to augment  large or complex emergency cleanup efforts. Region III, which was  responsible for the contracting for the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup, has  three such positions and was able to provide a site administrative officer  to perform detailed cost reviews of removal contracts at the Capitol Hill  site. Region II also has three similar positions. Five other regions we  contacted do not have a similar position.
section_title: EPA Negotiated Indemnification Agreements with Two Contractors to Address Their Liability Concerns
paragraphs: People in or near the contaminated Capitol Hill buildings could have been  harmed by anthrax that was not successfully removed or by a release of  the chemicals used to decontaminate the buildings. For example, the  decontaminant used in the fumigation cleanup method—chlorine dioxide  gas—may irritate the respiratory tract at low concentrations and is fatal at  high concentrations. In many cases, contractors can obtain pollution  liability insurance to cover harm to third parties that may arise from  cleanup activities; in other cases, the cost of such insurance may be  prohibitive. In the case of the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup, two  contractors with key roles in the fumigation of the Hart Senate Office  Building informed EPA that they were not able to obtain such insurance at  a reasonable cost, and they requested indemnification. As discussed  below, EPA agreed to provide the indemnification authorized by CERCLA  to the two contractors, protecting them from the financial liability that  could result if a third party were injured by the contractors’ release of a  harmful substance, including anthrax.
For example, numerous uncertainties about the use of chlorine dioxide  gas for this task existed, and IT Corporation—which was tasked to  fumigate the Hart office building using chlorine dioxide gas—would not  start removal procedures without receiving indemnification from EPA  against liability for damages. According to EPA officials, chlorine dioxide  had not been used previously for removing anthrax or for fumigating such  a large area. After EPA determined that IT Corporation and three of its  subcontractors supplying the fumigation chemicals and technologies had  diligently sought insurance and none was available at a reasonable price,  in November 2001, the agency agreed to provide them with  indemnification. Specifically, EPA agreed to compensate IT Corporation  and its three subcontractors up to $90 million if they were deemed liable  for damages caused by a negligent release of a hazardous substance,  pollutant, or contaminant, including but not limited to anthrax and  chlorine dioxide. According to EPA officials, the negotiations for the  indemnification agreement were completed in about 4 weeks. The  indemnification does not cover liability for intentional misconduct or  gross negligence. It appears that the cleanup was handled without harmful  incidents occurring. According to EPA officials, neither IT Corporation nor  the subcontractors have sought compensation under the indemnification  agreement.
In December 2001, after the agreement with IT Corporation was in place,  another contractor supporting the fumigation requested and obtained  indemnification. CDM Federal Programs Corporation (CDM), whose  responsibilities included placing the materials to test for the presence of  anthrax during fumigation, received indemnification terms similar to those  granted IT Corporation but with significantly lower compensation  amounts. Specifically, EPA agreed to compensate CDM up to $1 million if  it were deemed liable for damages caused by a negligent release of a  hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant, including but not limited  to anthrax. This indemnification also does not extend to liability arising  from intentional misconduct or gross negligence. Negotiations for this  agreement built on the previously negotiated agreement with IT  Corporation, and, according to EPA officials, were accomplished in about  a week. CDM was already working at the site when it requested  indemnification and continued to work while the negotiations were in  process.
Although IT Corporation required that an indemnification agreement be in  place before it would begin the decontamination of the Hart building, the  cleanup itself was not delayed because other issues needed to be resolved  before IT Corporation started the fumigation process. For example, tests  had to be conducted and then reviewed by EPA, the Capitol Police Board,  and others to confirm that chlorine dioxide had the antimicrobial  properties to effectively destroy anthrax. By the time open issues were  resolved and the decontamination could begin, EPA had reached its  agreement with IT Corporation and its subcontractors. However, in other  emergency cleanups, such negotiations could delay the start of  decontamination work. In this regard, EPA has concluded that in the  future, a more expedient way to indemnify contractors for emergency  situations such as anthrax incidents needs to be in place to prevent delays.  In fact, two of the EPA reviews of its responses to the anthrax incidents  recommended that EPA take steps to expand contractor liability  indemnification to address counter-terrorism response activities. Once  Subtitle G of the recently enacted Homeland Security Act of 2002 is fully  implemented, agency officials believe that their emergency response  contractors will face little or no legal liability to injured third parties if the  contractors use qualified antiterrorism technologies previously approved  by the Secretary of Homeland Security. According to an EPA official, if  this act had been in effect at the time of the anthrax cleanup, and the  Department of Homeland Security had approved the chlorine dioxide  technology, the contractor would not have needed any indemnification  protection.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In about 3 months and without harm to emergency response workers or  congressional staff, EPA, the Capitol Police Board, and others planned and  successfully conducted the first cleanup of office buildings contaminated  by a lethal form of anthrax that had caused several deaths elsewhere.  Moreover, EPA has taken the initiative to study its response actions to  better prepare itself for other emergency cleanups, including other  potential terrorism attacks, and has identified areas in which it could  improve. Despite the success of the cleanup, our review identified certain  inconsistencies in EPA’s contractor cost oversight that may affect its  quality. First, regarding tracking contract costs, because few regions use  the cost-tracking system for technical as well as removal contracts, EPA  does not have readily accessible, consistent contracting data on its  cleanup sites. One result of this lack is that the agency was unable to  readily respond to your questions about the costs of this cleanup,  including the categories of expenditures—how much was spent on  personnel, travel, equipment, and so on. In addition, EPA has less  assurance that it is providing effective, consistent oversight of its  contracts. Second, because EPA has not ensured that all of its regions  document the reviews of contractor invoices conducted by cognizant on- site officials, the agency’s ability to ensure that contractors’ charges are  accurate and reasonable is lessened. Finally, on-scene coordinators face  many competing demands; therefore, their reviews of costs may be less  timely than those that can be provided by a specialist working on site to  support the on-scene coordinators’ cost reviews. Such administrative  support could provide EPA with better assurance that its payments to  contractors are appropriately reviewed and adjusted on a routine basis. It  could also be readily called upon to conduct these cost reviews during  large and complex emergency cleanups, such as those that may stem from  terrorism.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance its ability to ensure that the agency is providing effective and  efficient contractor oversight, we recommend that the Administrator of  EPA direct the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response to require  the regions to track and monitor both technical and removal contract  cost data in the agency’s computerized cost-tracking system and  the on-site staff who are responsible for reviewing contractor cleanup  costs to certify that they have done so before the costs are approved  for payment.
In addition, we recommend that the Administrator direct the Office of  Solid Waste and Emergency Response to examine whether more or all of  the regions should hire specialists—either EPA or contractor staff—to  support the on-scene coordinators by providing timely, detailed reviews of  contract costs.  If EPA uses contractor staff for this purpose, the agency  will need to provide appropriate contract oversight and ensure that  potential conflicts of interest are identified and mitigated.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Response
paragraphs: We provided copies of our draft report to EPA for review and comment. In  commenting on the draft, the Director of the Contract Management Center  in the Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, Office of Solid Waste  and Emergency Response, agreed to (1) consider adding the technical  contracts to the computerized cost-tracking system as the agency awards  the next round of these multiyear contracts and (2) ensure all regions  coordinate with on-site staff for invoice reviews prior to approval.  The  Director also said that EPA is currently examining providing additional  administrative support at cleanup sites and is considering using contractor  support when in-house positions are not available.
One of the considerations the Director of the Contract Management Center  cited regarding the inclusion of the technical contracts in the cost-tracking  system is that reengineering the system to fit the different types of  technical contracts that EPA uses might involve a considerable expense  for the agency.  Further, while she acknowledged that the cost tracking  system may be particularly applicable when the technical contractors are  involved in removal (cleanup) activities, she said the additional cost of  using the system may not be justified in some cases, such as for finite  work performed under a negotiated work plan or a fixed level of effort.   However, we believe reengineering costs may not be a barrier to using the  system for both technical and removal contracts.  Specifically, the system  is already being used to track the costs of some of EPA’s technical  contracts. Further, an EPA environmental engineer with extensive  experience working with the tracking system told us that changes to the  system would not be required to add technical contracts.  In addition,  effective oversight of both time-and-materials work and cost- reimbursement work is essential to ensure costs are reasonable and  accurate.  However, currently the tracking system is used to support the  on-site review of the time-and-materials work done under the removal  contracts but not for the contract-reimbursement work done under the  technical contracts. We believe that the existing tracking system offers  EPA an economical vehicle for enhancing both its contracting data and its  contractor oversight by including the technical contracts in the cost  tracking system as was envisioned when the system was developed.
Regarding our recommendation that the on-site staff responsible for  reviewing contractor invoices certify that they have done so before the  costs are approved for payment, the Director agreed to require all EPA  regions to coordinate their invoice reviews with the on-site staff before  approving invoices for payment.  If EPA requires the reviewers in all the  regions to certify their invoice reviews—as we recommend and as some  EPA regions currently do—the agency will be fully responsive to our  recommendation.  Such a requirement will provide greater assurance that  the invoices EPA approves are accurate and reasonable.
EPA told us that it is currently examining the issue of additional  administrative support at cleanup sites by either EPA staff or contractors,  and we have revised our recommendation to take into account concerns  that would arise if EPA delegated its contract cost review function to  contractors.
EPA agreed that the information the report provides on the  indemnification agreements that the agency negotiated with two  contractors is accurate but suggested that the report also discuss the  limitations of the indemnification that EPA can provide under CERCLA.   As our report accurately addresses the extent to which EPA agreed to  indemnify contractors against liability for potential damages related to the  cleanup, we believe that a broader discussion of indemnification issues is  not necessary.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the costs to EPA of removing anthrax from the Capitol Hill  site, we obtained and reviewed cost information from the agency’s Office  of the Chief Financial Officer. We discussed cleanup estimates and  contract costs for the Capitol Hill anthrax site with EPA financial and  contract staff. We also obtained detailed cost information on four of EPA’s  removal contracts that was available from EPA’s Removal Cost  Management System, the database that tracks costs by site and cost  categories. We were not able to obtain this level of detailed cost  information for all contractors because EPA does not use this database for  all the contractors who work at cleanup sites. To determine how EPA’s  costs for the cleanup were funded, we reviewed relevant EPA financial  documentation and appropriations legislation that reimbursed the  agency’s Superfund program for expenditures associated with the  resources used on the cleanup. We did not validate or verify these data.
To determine the extent to which the contracts used at the Capitol Hill  anthrax site were competitively awarded, we reviewed EPA regional  contract documents and discussed the competitive contract process EPA  used with agency contract officials. We obtained and reviewed EPA  noncompetitively awarded contract documents and the regulations that  the agency is required to follow to justify awarding such contracts. We  reviewed contracts and agency reports to identify the roles and tasks of  the contractors that participated in the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup and  discussed specific contract roles and tasks with EPA officials who were  responsible for the cleanup.
To describe the extent to which EPA oversaw contractors’ work on the  Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup to ensure it was done appropriately and the  charges were reasonable, we interviewed Region III contract officials and  the site administrative officer who oversaw four contracts during the  cleanup. We also examined documentation of the oversight provided by  reviewing Capitol Hill site contracting files. We reviewed documentation  of, and talked with agency officials about, the current contract oversight  practices EPA uses, including staff responsibilities for cost oversight and  the use of the contractor cost tracking system. In addition, in part because  of delays in obtaining contract information, we surveyed the 63 EPA  personnel whom the agency identified as having provided contractor  oversight to obtain information on their roles in overseeing the  contractors’ cleanup work for the Capitol Hill anthrax site. Using a Web- based survey, we received responses from 56 individuals, a response rate  of 89 percent. We also interviewed nine EPA personnel who the survey  identified as having spent considerable time at the cleanup site performing  contract oversight. In addition, we reviewed four EPA assessments that  either focused on or included the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup and that  identified contract oversight issues and recommendations. We obtained  information on actions EPA has taken or is taking to respond to the  recommendations addressing contracting issues.
To describe EPA’s indemnification of contractors against liability for  potential damages, we reviewed CERCLA provisions and EPA guidance  governing indemnity authority, as well as contract modifications regarding  indemnification that EPA made to two contracts used for the Capitol Hill  anthrax cleanup. We also discussed with EPA officials how the  indemnification process affected the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup.
We conducted our review from June 2002 through May 2003 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 14 days after the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Administrator of EPA and other interested parties. We will make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at  no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-3841.  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Contract Tasks and Roles
paragraphs: Prepare buildings for decontamination. Conduct and support decontamination  operations, including fumigation with chlorine dioxide gas. Decontaminate  interior surfaces of buildings, other structures, cars, and other vessels. Provide  for collection, containment, and transportation and disposal of contaminated  materials from the site operations.
Provide support to EPA sampling teams and other federal responders, including  response technicians, to assist with decontamination activities.
Provide the on-scene coordinator and incident commander fumigation design  procedures, including details on fumigant delivery; concentration; operating  conditions, such as temperature and humidity; fumigant containment and  recovery; and monitoring of parameters. Provide detailed design for delivery of  fumigant, equipment requirements and specifications, flow schematics, and  detailed schedules and operating procedures to use during fumigation. Provide  a chlorine dioxide specialist to assist EPA in overseeing the fumigation setup.
Provide technical support to the on-scene coordinator in developing chronology  of events at the site, including researching various files, documents, and  logbooks in order to develop a comprehensive report.
Monitor and assist with the oversight of the chlorine dioxide fumigation process.  Assist with health and safety matters at the site, conduct sampling, assist and  oversee off-gassing, inventory, and return items being treated.
Support the on-scene coordinator in conducting presentations and briefings  related to post-treatment and design of chlorine dioxide use in the heating,  ventilation, and air-conditioning system.
Sample a small number of critical items (plastic, leather, and polyester) for  ethylene oxide and its derivations to determine how the ethylene oxide and its  derivatives are maintained in the materials and off-gas over time.
Provide decontamination services and other direct support to sampling teams.  Decontaminate interior surfaces of buildings, other structures, and interior and  exterior surfaces of cars and other vessels identified by the on-scene  coordinator. Collect all expended cleaning agents and materials for treatment  and/or disposal.
Provide decontamination facilities and services for response personnel and  their equipment. Inventory items—segregating clean and contaminated  materials and salvageable and expendable items—and provide documentation  of inventoried items.
Propose a decontamination strategy for critical items (including personal items  such as photographs, framed diplomas, and equipment). Decontaminate critical  and salvageable items from the Capitol Complex, including setting up work  zones for items to be decontaminated and for personnel decontamination.
Return property after decontamination.
Provide contamination reduction and isolation facilities and operations that  improve and ensure safe access to contaminated areas and items and   prevent further spread of contamination.
Provide personnel and equipment, including portable decontamination   facility. Collect expended cleaning agents and materials for treatment   and/or disposal. Dispose of materials or items that could not be  decontaminated.
Oversee preparation, handling, placement, and collection of spore strips used  during fumigation with chlorine dioxide gas and ethylene oxide gas. Develop a  procedure for spore strip emplacement; removal; and critical item tagging,  tracking, and shipping.
Provide sampling such as swipe and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA)  vacuum (including efforts to collect, prepare, and ship samples), item  decontamination, and minor remediation work.
Support critical item degassing activities in Beltsville, Maryland. Maintain critical  item inventories and coordinate the release and return of critical items to  congressional staffers.
Support chlorine dioxide decontamination of congressional mail packages.
Develop various documents/plans to be used during the response activities  (e.g., standard operating procedures for sampling, decontamination, source  reduction). Provide reconnaissance, photo documentation, and sampling of  congressional office buildings.
Provide technical support for the selection and implementation of  decontamination procedures; building-specific plan development for anthrax  remediation, including sampling plans, isolation plans, decontamination plans,  and item recovery plans; and sampling support for anthrax analysis using   HEPA and wipe sampling techniques; perform oversight of removal crews.  Provide swab and HEPA sampling and decontamination support.
Provide bag-and-tag operations of critical and salvageable items in  congressional office buildings. Provide air monitoring operations during   chlorine dioxide fumigation operations.
Develop sampling and decontamination plans, sample labels and chain-of- custodies, and maps to support sampling activities and to track sampling  results.
Perform sampling, monitoring, and decontamination of areas in the Capitol Hill  complex. Conduct sampling tracking and handling activities, including preparing  samples for shipping.
Compile and review background data and organize site documentation files.
Provide technical support to the operations section and support to the EPA  Mobile Lab.
Assist in monitoring temperature and relative humidity inside office buildings  and in monitoring chlorine dioxide, chlorine, wind speed and direction,  temperature and relative humidity in surrounding area.
Assist with development and evaluation of anthrax fumigation procedures using  spore strips in a test facility and train other contractors in the handling and  placement of spore strips in the office building.
Provide ambient air monitoring for chlorine dioxide using tape meters and a  portable meteorological tower to document that no chlorine dioxide is being  emitted from the treatment area. Provide on-site assistance to ensure that  spore strip sampling is being conducted properly and that data management is  being performed accurately and completely.
Assist in the removal of items from the contaminated office suites in the  congressional office buildings, including removal of contaminated office  furniture, office equipment, and carpet. Construct isolation chambers,  decontamination chambers, and other related structures.
Provide sampling for anthrax in the Capitol Hill complex.
Provide security personnel to staff the single entrance/exit and to patrol  perimeter of the storage location used for property removed from U.S. Senate  offices during the cleanup to ensure that no unauthorized personnel enter the  work area and assure that property items are not removed from the work area  without approval of EPA.
Provide Porta Count plus respirator fit tester.
Perform air sampling and perform HEPA vacuuming services.
Remove critical items and documents, spray affected areas with chlorine  dioxide, and perform cleaning and breakdown of work zones.
Assist EPA in the evaluation of possible remediation of the heating,   ventilation, and air-conditioning system, including evaluation of affected   areas, and construction of critical barriers inside the ductwork to isolate affected  areas from uncontaminated areas. After fumigation of the affected heating,  ventilation, and air conditioning system, provide confirmatory sampling support,  interior duct sampling, additional cleaning of the system (including post- fumigation scrub down inside the ducts), and removal of duct insulation.
Perform cleanup activities, including construction and removal of isolation  barriers, HEPA vacuuming operations, and application of liquid chlorine dioxide.
Provide 24-hour support for decontamination and rescue operations at the  Capitol Hill anthrax site.
Provide analysis of spore strips placed in various locations during cleanup  operations. Receive and perform daily observations of thousands of spore  strips.
Participate in and support program plan development relating to spore   sterilization technologies for remediation of federal facilities.
Develop experimental and field test plans and methodologies for  characterization/modeling spore killing processes and kinetics and factors that  affect the efficacy of spore killing in field-scale applications.
Establish laboratory systems for the measurement of gas phase sporicidal   effects at federal office and mail facilities. Provide laboratory analytical support   for measurement of gas phase sporicidal effects. Develop experimental and   test plans and methodologies for assessing and validating spore killing   processes.
Determine the concentrations of chlorine dioxide needed to decontaminate   anthrax on Capitol Hill. Prepare 31,500 test strips containing a bacillus similar  to anthrax and send to Capitol Hill. The exposed strips will be sent to labs and   results then will be sent to the University of California, Berkeley, to be included  in a consolidated final report.
Maintain sample management system software in a private, secure  environment on the Internet. Provide EPA personnel and designated contractor  personnel secure, controlled access to the database. This system could  generate a large variety of reports to address particular questions about  sampling results.
Provide consulting services to EPA on-scene coordinator in environmental  remediation of anthrax-contaminated buildings in the Capitol Hill complex.   Support includes data interpretation of the spore strips used to test the efficacy   of the kill of anthrax, data validation, review of documents, assistance in   document preparation, and report writing. Coordinate efforts with the University  of California, Berkeley.
Provide equipment that includes biopaks, facemasks, oxygen cylinders, gel   tubes, foam scrubbers, coolant canister foam, flow restrictors, and biopak   service and retrofit kits.
Provide Sandia foam and backpack dispensing units.
Provide respirators with battery and cartridge.
Provide air purifying respirators.
Provide engineering support during the assessment of the feasibility and   design of the systems for fumigating air handling return system.
Provide training on proper procedures for handling, packaging, and  decontaminating artifacts (paintings, sculptures, and other art forms) from the   Hart Senate Office Building.
Provide self-contained breathing apparatus system.
Provide indoor air quality meter.
Provide anthrax detection kits.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Heather Balent, Greg Carroll, Nancy  Crothers, Richard Johnson, and Susan Lawes made key contributions to  this report.