Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening
Published: 2003-05-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Sealed radioactive sources, radioactive material encapsulated in stainless steel or other metal, are used worldwide in medicine, industry, and research. These sealed sources pose a threat to national security because terrorists could use them to make "dirty bombs." GAO was asked to determine (1) the number of sealed sources worldwide and how many have been reported lost, stolen, or abandoned; (2) the controls, both legislative and regulatory, used by countries that possess sealed sources; and (3) the assistance provided by the Department of Energy (DOE) and other U.S. federal agencies to strengthen other countries' control over sealed sources and the extent to which these efforts are believed to be effectively implemented.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The precise number of sealed sources in use is unknown because many countries do not systematically account for them. However, nearly 10 million sealed sources exist in the United States and the 49 countries responding to a GAO survey. There is also limited information about the number of sealed sources that have been lost, stolen, or abandoned, but it is estimated to be in the thousands worldwide. Many of the most vulnerable sealed sources that could pose a security risk are located in the countries of the former Soviet Union. All of the 49 countries that responded to GAO's survey reported that they have established legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources. However, nuclear safety and security experts from DOE, the Departments of State and Defense, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the European Commission told GAO that countries' controls over sealed sources vary greatly and are weakest among less developed countries. In fiscal year 2002, DOE established a program focusing on improving the security of sealed sources in the former Soviet Union and has started to fund security upgrades in Russia and other former Soviet countries. The Departments of Defense and State and NRC also have programs to help countries strengthen controls over sealed sources. DOE plans to expand its program to other countries and regions in 2003 and is developing a plan to guide its efforts. However, the department has not fully coordinated its efforts with NRC and the Department of State to ensure that a government-wide strategy is established. In addition, as of January 2003, the majority of DOE's program expenditures totaling $8.9 million were spent by DOE's national laboratories in the United States.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, U.S. and international nuclear safety and  security experts have raised concerns that terrorists could obtain  radioactive material used in medicine, research, agriculture, and industry  to construct a radiological dispersion device, or “dirty bomb.”  This  radioactive material is encapsulated, or sealed, in metal, such as stainless  steel, titanium, or platinum, to prevent its dispersal and is commonly called  a sealed radioactive source.  These sealed sources are used throughout the  United States and other countries in equipment designed to, among other  things, diagnose and treat illnesses, preserve food, detect flaws and other  failures in pipeline welds, and determine the moisture content of soil.   Depending on their use, sealed sources contain different types of  radioactive material, such as strontium-90, cobalt-60, cesium-137,  plutonium-238, and plutonium-239.  If these sealed sources fell into the  hands of terrorists, they could use them to produce a simple and crude, but  potentially dangerous, weapon by packaging explosives, such as dynamite,  with the radioactive material, which would be dispersed when the bomb  went off.  Depending on the type, amount, and form (powder or solid), the  dispersed radioactive material could cause radiation sickness for people  nearby and produce serious economic costs and psychological and social  disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent cleanup of the  contaminated area.
Given the concerns about the security of sealed sources worldwide, you  asked us to determine, to the extent possible (1) the number of sealed  sources worldwide and how many are reported lost, stolen, or abandoned;  (2) the controls, both legislative and regulatory, used by countries that  possess sealed sources; and (3) the assistance provided by the Department  of Energy (DOE) and other U.S. federal agencies to strengthen other  countries’ control over sealed sources and the extent to which these efforts  are believed to be effectively implemented.  To address these objectives,  we distributed a survey to 127 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  member states to determine, among other things, how countries control  sealed sources.  Appendix I presents our scope and methodology,   appendix II presents the results of the survey, and appendix III contains a  list of the countries we sent the survey to, including those that responded  to it.  We also met with or had discussions with officials from several  countries to learn more about how they regulate and control sealed sources  and met with officials from international organizations, such as IAEA and  the European Commission, to obtain their views on the problem of  uncontrolled sealed sources.  A forthcoming report will address controls  over sealed sources in the United States.  We conducted our review from  May 2002 through May 2003 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: becquerels. materials decays over time at various rates.  The term “half-life” is used to  indicate the period during which the radioactivity decreases by half as a  result of decay.
Usually, radioactive material with high radioactivity is placed in a sealed  container to prevent leakage of the material itself.  Because of the varied  characteristics of the radioactive material—physical structure (metal,  ceramic, or powder), activity level, half-life, and type of radiation emitted,  some materials pose a greater risk to people, property, and the  environment than others.  According to IAEA,  the level of protection  provided to users of the radioactive material should be commensurate with  the safety and security risks that it presents if improperly used.  For  example, radioactive materials used for certain diagnostic purposes have  low levels of activity and do not present a significant safety or security risk.   However, powerful sealed sources, such as those used in radiotherapy  (cancer treatment) that use cobalt-60, cesium-137, or iridium-192, could  pose a greater threat to the public and the environment and would also  pose a potentially more significant security risk, particularly if acquired to  produce a dirty bomb.
The small size, portability, and potential value of sealed sources make them  vulnerable to misuse, improper disposal, and theft.  According to IAEA,  illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear material, including sealed  sources, has increased worldwide in recent years:  IAEA reported 272 cases  of illicit trafficking in these sources from 1993 to the end of 2002.  (See   app. IV for more information about illicit trafficking incidents.)  While no  dirty bombs have been detonated, in the mid-1990s Chechen separatists  placed a canister containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park.  Although the  device was not detonated and no radioactive material was dispersed, the  incident demonstrated that terrorists have the capability and willingness to  use sealed sources as weapons of terror.
U.S. and international experts have noted that some accidents involving  sealed sources can provide a measure of understanding of what the  possible impacts of a dirty bomb might be.  In 1987, an accident involving a  cesium-137 sealed source in Brazil killed four people, injured many more,  and caused about $36 million in damages to the local economy.  This  accident had such an enormous psychological impact on the local  population that the atomic symbol was added to the region’s flag as a  lasting reminder of the accident’s consequences.  Appendix V contains  more information about worldwide accidents involving sealed sources.
section_title: The Number of Sealed Sources in Use and Lost, Stolen, or Abandoned Worldwide Is Unknown
paragraphs: The precise number of sealed sources that is in use worldwide is unknown  because many countries do not systematically account for them.  The lack  of a full accounting of sealed sources makes it equally difficult to determine  the number that has been lost, stolen, or abandoned—referred to as  “orphan sources.”  Orphan sources, which are estimated to number in the  thousands worldwide, are considered by U.S. and international officials to  pose significant health, safety, and security risks because they are outside  of regulatory control.  According to U.S. and international safety and  security experts, one of the most urgent problems is locating and securing  orphan sources in the former Soviet Union because they pose a significant  security risk.
subsections: section_title: The Number of Sealed Sources in Use Worldwide Is Unknown Because Countries Do Not Systematically Account for Them
paragraphs: The number of sealed sources in use worldwide is unknown, but some  estimates are available.  According to IAEA, millions of sealed radioactive  sources have been distributed worldwide over the past 50 years.   Approximately 2 million licensed sealed sources are in use in the United  States, according to the NRC.  In addition, according to the European  Commission, approximately 500,000 sealed sources have been supplied to  operators in the 15 member states of the European Union, of which about  110,000 are currently in use.  The European Commission also estimated in  1999 that approximately 840,000 sealed sources exist in Russia, although  Russian officials believe the total number is significantly higher.
The 49 countries that responded to our survey reported a total of about   7.8 million sealed sources that are in use within their countries.  These  sealed sources are used in various applications, such as industrial  radiography and therapeutic medicine.  Table 1 summarizes the responses  received from the countries surveyed regarding the number of sealed  sources in use and their major applications.
Several factors contribute to the lack of comprehensive information about  the number of sealed sources worldwide.  According to IAEA, many  countries do not maintain accurate or complete inventories of sealed  sources in use or registries of users of sources.  In response to our survey,  28 of the 49 countries said they had an inventory of sealed sources.  In  addition, 17 countries said they were in the process of developing an  inventory.  However, several countries that reported they had inventories  indicated that the number of sources was estimated rather than actual.  A  few countries, including a European nation, indicated that they did not  have the resources necessary to develop a national registry of sources and  users.
An additional factor contributing to countries’ limited or incomplete  inventories is that sealed sources have been imported and exported by  distributors and governments without consistent monitoring or tracking by  the suppliers, the recipients of the sources, or the appropriate regulatory  authority.  Appendix VI provides information on the major producers of  sealed sources worldwide.
The Chairman of NRC noted in March 2003 that international commerce in  these sources is extensive and that existing controls on imports and  exports are minimal.  For example, most U.S.-origin sealed sources are  exported under a general license.  This means that in most instances,  sealed sources are exported without NRC knowing the type, amount, or  activity level of the sources, or their destination.  (See app. VII for more  information about NRC’s export regulations.)
Sealed sources have also been distributed worldwide by a variety of means  other than commercial trade without adequate monitoring and oversight.   As a result, the sealed sources have not always been properly accounted  for and accurately inventoried.  For example, sealed sources have been   (1) distributed by corporations working in developing countries without  formal clearance from or approval by the recipient country’s regulatory  authority, (2) donated by medical practitioners and nonprofit  organizations, and (3) provided through international technical  cooperation programs.  IAEA has reported that international  corporations—such as oil companies—have brought sealed sources used  in oil exploration into developing countries.  In some cases, there was no  competent authority in the country to register or license the sealed  sources, and existing national rules were regarded as too complicated or  difficult for the corporations to follow.  One African country reported in  response to our survey that its inventory of sealed sources was incomplete  because foreign construction companies had not notified the country’s  regulatory authority when it imported sealed sources.
According to IAEA, medical practitioners have brought sealed sources into  developing countries for the purpose of establishing health clinics and  hospitals and a number of sources were not properly accounted for.  IAEA  reported that hospitals in many developed countries donated large  amounts of surplus radium-226 to hospitals in developing countries in the  1960s.  One African country responding to our survey noted that according  to old records, radium had been imported into the country but could not be  located.  Nonprofit organizations have also provided medical equipment  using sealed sources to foreign countries.  For example, the American  International Health Alliance, operating under a series of cooperative  agreements with USAID and DOE, has donated medical supplies,  pharmaceuticals, and equipment, including those containing sealed  sources, to countries in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern  Europe since 1992. According to an official from the American  International Health Alliance, DOD also donated medical equipment  containing sealed sources from field facilities to several countries in the  former Soviet Union under the auspices of Operation Provide Hope.  Since  1992, over 500 airlift deliveries by DOD to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,  Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan occurred, but the exact  number of sealed source devices donated is unknown.
IAEA has supplied sealed sources to many countries through its technical  cooperation program.  In 1991, IAEA estimated that it had provided many  developing countries with 565 sources since 1957.  IAEA officials told us  that IAEA had provided developing member states with over 1,000 devices  containing sealed sources since 1996.  Most of these sealed sources are not  considered a security risk by IAEA because of their low radioactivity.   However, officials did note that about 125 of the 1,000 devices contained  sources that could pose security risks if acquired by terrorists.  These  include (1) teletherapy machines with cobalt-60 sources of activity  between 5,000 and 7,000 curies, (2) brachytherapy machines with cesium- 137 sources of activity between 0.5 and 1 curie and iridium-192 sources of   10 curies, (3) irradiators with cobalt-60 sources with activity in the range of  12,000 to 200,000 curies, and (4) calibrators with activity around 4,000  curies.  IAEA officials said that they were uncertain, however, the extent to  which the sealed sources have been included in countries’ inventories.
While it is the responsibility of each country—and not IAEA—to maintain  accurate inventories of the sources, IAEA has encouraged many of its  member states to establish and/or strengthen their radiation and waste  safety infrastructures via the model project program.  In addition, IAEA  policy does not allow for the approval of any technical cooperation  projects involving the use of significant sealed sources unless the member  state in question has, among other things, an effective regulatory  framework that includes a system of notification, authorization, and  control of sealed sources together with an inventory of sources.  IAEA’s  model project program is discussed on pages  22 and 23 of this report.
DOE has provided countries with sealed sources under the Atoms for  Peace Program.  According to a March 2002 DOE Inspector General report,  Accounting for Sealed Sources of Nuclear Material Provided to Foreign  Countries, DOE could not fully account for sealed sources loaned to  foreign countries and no longer maintained an accounting and tracking  system for sealed sources.  The report noted that DOE and its predecessor  agencies provided 33 countries, including Iran, Pakistan, India, Malaysia,  and Vietnam, with 536 sealed sources, which contained plutonium, from  the 1950s through the 1970s.  Initially, these materials were loaned to  foreign facilities, and the U.S. government maintained ownership.   However, in the 1960s, the U.S. government began transferring ownership  through direct sale or donation, but it still retained title to much of the  sealed sources provided to foreign entities.  The report concluded that   (1) the oversight of sealed sources was inadequate and that inaccurate  inventory records limit DOE’s ability to protect nuclear materials from loss,  theft, or other diversion, and (2) DOE should work with IAEA to establish  adequate regulatory oversight of sealed sources in foreign countries.  In its  response to the report, DOE stated that it is not the current policy of the  U.S. government to track sealed sources once they are in the control of  foreign entities and that to track loaned sealed sources would require a  change in policy and international agreements.
section_title: Limited Information Exists about the Number of Lost, Stolen, or Abandoned Sealed Sources
paragraphs: Because many countries cannot account for their sealed sources, there is  limited information on the number of sealed sources that are lost, stolen, or  abandoned—referred to as “orphan sources.”  According to the Director  General of IAEA, orphan sources are a widespread phenomenon, and 34 of  the 49 countries responding to our survey indicated that orphan sources  pose problems in their country.  In the European Union, up to 70 sealed  sources are lost among its member states annually. According to NRC,  about 250 sealed sources or devices are lost or stolen in the United States  annually, but the majority of the sources have been recovered.  NRC said  that the European Union does not report sources as being lost unless they  are at a certain activity level that exceeds the NRC threshold for tracking  purposes.  As a result, NRC typically reports a greater number of lost sealed  sources than the European Union does.
The problem of orphan sources is most significant in the countries of the  former Soviet Union, where the collapse of the centralized Soviet  government structure over a decade ago led to a loss of records and  regulatory oversight over sealed sources.  According to Russia’s nuclear  regulatory agency, Gosatomnadzor, 51 sealed sources were reported lost in  2002 and 245 were lost in 2000.  No information was made available to us  for 2001.  In the Republic of Georgia, over 280 orphan sources have been  recovered since the mid-1990s.  Survey respondents reported that 612  sources had been lost or stolen since 1995.  Of the 612 reported orphan  sources, 254 had not yet been recovered.  Table 2 summarizes the number  of lost, stolen, and recovered sources reported.
Thirty-five of the 49 countries we surveyed indicated that they had an  organized process to search for orphan sources, and several of these  countries listed one or more organizations that are responsible for  removing the sources once they have been found.  However, the remaining  14 countries, spread across different regions, reported that they did not  have a similar process to search for orphaned sources.  Four of the 14  countries were located in Africa.
Six countries indicated that there were disincentives to finding orphaned  sources.  In particular, they noted that an individual who reports finding a  source might be held responsible for paying for its disposal.  Russian  officials told us that facilities possessing sealed sources that are no longer  used are responsible for disposal costs.  The disposal fees are very high  and, as a result, the users are reluctant to notify authorities about them and  frequently opt to dispose of them illegally.
section_title: Certain Lost, Stolen, or Abandoned Sealed Sources Pose a Significant Security Risk
paragraphs: According to U.S. and international safety and security experts, among the  most urgent problems are the security risks posed by the approximately  1,000 radioisotope thermoelectric generators located in the former Soviet  Union.  These generators were designed to provide electric power and are  ideally suited for remote locations to power navigational facilities, such as  lighthouses, radio beacons, and meteorological stations.  Each has activity  levels ranging from 40,000 to 150,000 curies of strontium-90—similar to the  amount of strontium-90 released from the Chernobyl accident in 1986.   These generators pose a security risk because they may not be adequately  protected or secured.  An international effort was initiated about 2 years  ago to recover and secure these generators in remote locations in the  Republic of Georgia.  Although the exact number of generators in Georgia  is unknown, IAEA and Georgian officials told us that at least six generators  have been recovered.
We met with the Russian organization that developed the radioisotope  thermoelectric generators—the Russian National Technical Physics and  Automation Research Institute.  Institute officials told us that the  generators pose a serious security and safety threat and should all be taken  out of service.  They noted that the units have a design service life of 10 to  15 years and that no repair or maintenance has been done on any of these  units since 1991.  However, Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM)  officials said that the generators are technically sound and should not be  completely removed from service without adequate replacement power.   MINATOM officials said they are considering extending the life of the  generators in order to keep them in service significantly longer than  originally planned.  Table 3 shows the estimated number of radioisotope  thermoelectric generators located in the countries of the former Soviet  Union.
There have been numerous attempts to steal the sealed sources from these  generators.  For example, in recent years there have been six attempts to  disassemble the generators in Kazakhstan and a number of similar events  in Georgia and Russia.  Some of the strontium-90 sealed sources from the  generators have been found in residential areas.  In a few instances, people  who have stolen the sealed sources have used them for heating and  cooking, and officials have speculated that the metal shielding might have  been used to make bullets.  In 2001, three woodsmen in Georgia who found  the strontium-90 sealed source from an abandoned and dismantled  generator used it as a heat source and suffered severe radiation burns.   IAEA and DOE officials told us that other devices containing sealed  sources, such as seed irradiators that were used in the former Soviet Union,  pose significant security risks.  Seed irradiators were mounted on trucks  and used to irradiate seeds in order to kill fungus and inhibit germination.   According to IAEA and DOE, each irradiator has activity levels of over  1,000 curies of cesium-137 in powdery form (cesium chloride).
IAEA’s Director of the Division of Radiation and Waste Safety told us that  no one knows the total number of orphan sources or their location in the  former Soviet Union.  IAEA is continuously obtaining new information  about previously unknown devices using sealed sources.  This makes it  extremely difficult for the agency to develop strategies to locate and  recover these sources in a systematic way.  The Director also told us that  the problem of orphan sources is not unique to the former Soviet Union and  that similar problems exist in other parts of the world.
section_title: Countries Have Established Legislative and Regulatory Controls over Sealed Sources, but Adequacy of Controls Varies
paragraphs: All of the countries responding to our survey said they have established  legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources.  However, U.S. and  international nuclear safety and security experts told us that controls  placed on radioactive sources vary greatly between countries and focus  primarily on protecting public health and safety and not on securing sealed  sources from theft or destructive use.  According to IAEA, as many as 110  countries worldwide do not have adequate controls over sealed sources  and the agency has established a program to help 88 countries upgrade  their regulatory infrastructures.
subsections: section_title: Countries Responding to Our Survey Reported That They Have Established Controls over Sealed Sources
paragraphs: All of the countries that responded to our survey reported that they have  established legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources. The  countries that responded to our survey identified various controls over  sealed sources, including  (1) licensing and inspection; (2) tracking the  import and export of sources; (3) maintaining national registries of  sources’ users; (4) maintaining national inventories of sources;   (5) searching for and recovering lost, stolen, or abandoned sources;   (6) securing sources; and (7) regulating their safe transport.  According to  IAEA, controls over sealed sources are based on countries’ development of  a framework of laws and regulations. Twenty-five of the 49 countries  reported that they had established a strong legislative framework to control  sealed sources and most of these same countries indicated that they had a  strong regulatory framework as well.  Several countries characterized their  legislative or regulatory framework as weak.  The countries that reported  having a strong legislative or regulatory framework were spread across  many regions, including the former Soviet Union, Europe, Africa, and the  South Pacific.  Countries reporting that they had weak or nonexistent  regulatory frameworks were located primarily in the former Soviet Union,  the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and South America.
Countries reported using various guidelines to develop their laws or  regulations that serve as the basis for controls over sealed sources.  Forty- four of the 49 countries said they used either one or both IAEA guidelines— (1) the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing  Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources and (2) the Code of  Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.  Twelve of the  countries responding to our survey indicated that they base their regulatory  controls, in part, on European Union regulations.  European Commission  officials told us that efforts are under way to strengthen controls over  sealed sources, including harmonizing measures among member states for  the recovery of orphan sources.  These efforts began prior to September 11,  2001, in response to accidents where orphan sources were melted with  scrap metal, resulting in significant economic damages.  In 2002, the  commission adopted a proposed directive to improve controls over sealed  sources that emit large amounts of radiation.  The proposal urges that  necessary measures be taken to protect public health from orphan source  exposure.  More recently, a commission committee proposed that users of  radioactive sources in the European Union be charged a refundable deposit  before acquiring sealed sources.
All of the countries responding to our survey identified one or more  organizations responsible for regulating sealed sources.  Forty-five of the  49 countries reported that regulatory organizations inspect facilities where  sealed sources are stored or in use.  Regarding enforcement, three  countries failed to list any actions that inspectors could take to ensure  compliance with laws and regulations.  Many of the countries identified  more than one enforcement mechanism available, including levying fines,  suspending or terminating licenses, and closing a facility.  Enforcement  mechanisms, however, are not always used.  Representatives from one  European country—that did not respond to our survey but discussed these  matters with us—told us that imposed fines tend to be so low that many  users of sealed sources may find it cheaper to pay the fines rather than  comply with the regulations.
All of the countries responding to our survey reported that users of sealed  sources are required to secure radioactive materials in their possession.  In  addition, 39 of the respondents reported that they had facilities to store  disused sources.  However, only 18 countries indicated that they have a  facility to permanently dispose of the sealed sources.  Those countries that  did not have any storage facilities were primarily located in Africa.   Representatives from four former Soviet Union countries told us that the  absence of secure storage poses a serious security problem, and an official  from the Republic of Georgia told us that a well-protected centralized  storage facility was urgently needed.
All but four of the countries responding to our survey said they had  regulations covering the safe transport of sealed sources.  The countries  that did not have such regulations were located in Africa, South America,  and the Middle East.  Although Russia did not respond to our survey,  Russian officials told us that they were concerned about moving sealed  sources safely and securely.  They said that sources that were no longer  being used are moved great distances by trucks and are vulnerable to theft  because the operators of the vehicles must stop to rest or lose  communications owing to the remoteness of the locations where they are  traveling.
section_title: Countries’ Controls over Sealed Sources Vary and Are Weakest among Developing Countries
paragraphs: Nuclear safety and security experts from the Departments of Energy, State,  and Defense; NRC; IAEA; and the European Commission told us that  controls placed on sealed sources vary greatly between countries and have  focused primarily on protecting public health and safety and not on  securing the sources from potential terrorists threats.  According to IAEA,  as many as 110 countries worldwide lack the regulatory infrastructure to  adequately protect or control sealed sources.  Many of these countries are  considered less developed and are confronted with social, political, and  economic problems that divert attention from imposing controls on the  many thousands of radioactive sources used in hospitals, research  facilities, industries, or universities.  In many cases, these countries’  regulatory organizations have a limited number of trained personnel.  In the  absence of regulatory controls, radioactive sources have been inadequately  protected or secured; little or no attention has been paid to export or  import controls of sources; and there has been a lack of basic record  keeping.  IAEA’s Director of the Division of Radiation and Waste Safety told  us that many countries also lack the commitment or political will to  exercise controls over sealed sources.
In March 2003 over 700 delegates from more than 120 countries met in  Vienna, Austria, to participate in an international conference on the  security of radioactive sources.  The conference, sponsored by the  governments of the United States and the Russian Federation, emphasized  that all users of sealed sources share a responsibility for managing them in  a safe and secure manner and that the manufacturers of sources and  regulators have important roles to play.  The conference also noted that  high-risk radioactive sources that are not under secure and regulated  control, including orphan sources, raise serious security and safety  concerns.  U.S. and international experts are in the process of developing a  systematic approach to identifying the highest-risk sources.  In 2000 IAEA  established a categorization of sealed sources to, among other things,  determine the level of oversight that should be applied to the safety and  security of a particular type of source.  In response to growing concerns  about sealed sources being used as a terror weapon, IAEA has revised the  categorization.  The categorization, which is still in draft, provides a  relative numerical ranking of sealed sources and practices for which they  are used.  Appendix VIII provides more information about the conference,  and appendix IX contains additional details about IAEA’s revised  categorization of sources.
section_title: IAEA Has Implemented a Program to Help Many Countries Improve Regulatory Controls
paragraphs: In 1994 IAEA established a model project program to enhance countries’  regulatory infrastructure.  This program is available to any IAEA member  state upon request.  (See app. X for a list of countries participating in the  program.)  The program has expanded and includes 88 countries.  As of  December 2002, IAEA had spent $27.7 million to help these countries.   Each country’s progress is measured through five milestones, including the  establishment of a regulatory framework.
The five milestones are (1) the establishment of a regulatory framework, (2) the  establishment of occupational exposure control, (3) the establishment of medical exposure  control, (4) the establishment of public exposure control, and (5) the establishment of  emergency preparedness and response capabilities. without adequate controls.  These officials are concerned that without  appropriate regulatory oversight, sources in these countries pose a  particularly serious threat because they are not adequately protected.
Officials from the Department of State, IAEA, and the European  Commission told us that France has implemented a system for controlling  sealed sources that could serve as a model for other countries, including  many developing nations.  France’s system requires distributors of sealed  sources to assume financial responsibility for recovering and disposing of  these sources at the end of their 10-year life.  According to French officials,  this system has significantly reduced the number of orphan sources.   France’s system for controlling sources is discussed in more detail in  appendix XI.
section_title: DOE Has a Program to Help Other Countries Secure Sealed Sources, but Strengthened Coordination and Planning Are Needed
paragraphs: DOE has the primary U.S. government responsibility for helping other  countries strengthen controls over sealed sources.  Since fiscal year 2002,  DOE has received $36.9 million to, among other things, secure sources at  several large nuclear waste repositories in Russia and other countries of  the former Soviet Union.  Other U.S. federal agencies, including the  Departments of Defense and State, and NRC have efforts under way to help  countries strengthen controls over sealed sources as well.  DOE’s initial  efforts to secure sealed sources have lacked adequate planning and  coordination, and the majority of program expenditures have been in the  United States.  According to DOE officials, efforts are under way to  improve the management of the program, including the development of a  plan and better coordination with other agencies.
subsections: section_title: DOE Is Leading the U.S. Effort to Help Other Countries Secure Sealed Sources
paragraphs: DOE is leading U.S. government efforts to help other countries strengthen  controls over sealed sources.  DOE’s effort is part of the overall U.S.  national strategy to reduce the risk that terrorist groups could use these  materials in a dirty bomb attack against the United States.  A congressional  report instructs DOE to use a portion of its fiscal year 2002 supplemental  appropriation to address the threat posed by dirty bombs.  In response to  the congressional requirement, the National Nuclear Security  Administration’s Office of International Material Protection and  Cooperation established the Radiological Threat Reduction program in  January 2002, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in fiscal year 2002,  and received an additional $16.3 million appropriation in fiscal year 2003.   The program is expected to receive an additional $22 million in  supplemental appropriations in fiscal year 2003, including $5 million to  secure nuclear material in Iraq.
Initially, DOE evaluated the threat to national security from radioactive  materials and determined that sealed sources pose a greater threat than  other radioactive materials, such as radioactive waste and nuclear fuel,  because of their availability; radioactivity; and other physical  characteristics, such as half-life.  DOE did further studies of the dirty bomb  threat, including (1) narrowing the list of sealed sources that are a high  priority because of their characteristics and availability, (2) analyzing  possible scenarios in which a radiological dispersion device could be used,  and (3) determining what the economic consequences of a dirty bomb  attack in the United States would be.  The former assistant deputy  administrator of the Office of International Material Protection and  Cooperation told us that it would be impossible to secure all sealed sources  but that by determining which sources pose the greatest risk, DOE could  prioritize its efforts.
DOE has focused on securing sealed sources in the countries of the former  Soviet Union because DOE officials have determined that is where the  greatest number of vulnerable sealed sources is located.  In April 2002 the  Radiological Threat Reduction program initiated its first security upgrade  project at the Moscow Radon, a regional facility involved with collecting,  transporting, processing, and disposing of sealed sources and low- and  intermediate-level radioactive waste.  There are 35 Radon facilities in the  former Soviet Union, but the Moscow Radon is by far the largest and  collects almost 80 percent of the institutional, industrial, and medical  radioactive wastes in Russia from almost 2,000 enterprises in the city of  Moscow, the Moscow region, and nine neighboring regions.  During our  visit to the Moscow Radon in October 2002, Radon officials showed us the  building for which most of the DOE-funded upgrades are planned. (See   fig. 4.)  Planned upgrades at the site include surveillance cameras, motion  detectors, vehicles, building upgrades, and a security facility where guards  can monitor the building where most high-activity sources are stored.   Although there have been no known attempts at theft of materials at the  site, Radon officials told us that upgrades are needed because existing  security is inadequate.
The program has also secured sealed sources in Uzbekistan and the  Republic of Georgia.  In Uzbekistan, DOE has funded security upgrades at  research and irradiation facilities and the construction of a national  repository for sealed sources, and plans to fund increased physical security  upgrades at a dozen regional cancer treatment facilities.  In the Republic of  Georgia, DOE funded security upgrades at a facility where radioisotope  thermoelectric generators and other high-activity sealed sources are  stored.  Upgrades in both countries included bricking up windows;  reinforcing doors; improving or replacing roofs; upgrading storage vaults;  installing motion detectors and alarm systems; and other low-cost,   “low-tech” measures.  Figure 5 shows an example of the security upgrades  funded by DOE.
In June 2002 DOE launched two additional efforts—a bilateral initiative  with MINATOM to secure sealed sources at Russian facilities identified by  MINATOM, and a Tripartite Initiative with MINATOM and IAEA.  The  objective of the Tripartite Initiative is to improve the security of sealed  sources in former Soviet states by developing inventories of sealed  sources, locating the sealed sources, recovering the sealed sources, storing  recovered sealed sources in a secure manner, and disposing of the sources.
Ultimately, DOE hopes that Russia will play a key role in recovering sealed  sources in other former Soviet states because many of these sealed sources  were manufactured in and distributed from Russia.  In July 2002 MINATOM  provided DOE with a number of priority projects for funding in Russia.   These projects included recovering and securing radioisotope  thermoelectric generators, and recovering orphan sources at 45 sites in  Russia.  According to DOE, the sites will be prioritized according to the  type and activity level of the radioactive material present.
DOE has completed site assessments at four Radon sites in Russia.   Upgrades at these facilities are expected to be completed by the end of  fiscal year 2004.  A key criterion for deciding if the site requires upgrades is  an inventory of the sealed sources stored there—if the inventory includes  sealed sources that DOE has determined to be high risk, security upgrades  will be implemented.
Under the Tripartite Initiative, 19 additional Radon sites in other former  Soviet states will be assessed.  These Radon sites are located in Armenia,  Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania,  Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  DOE also  plans to perform site assessments and security upgrades at medical,  industrial, and research facilities throughout the former Soviet Union,  similar to those done in Uzbekistan and Georgia.  DOE, IAEA, and  MINATOM officials visited Moldova in the fall of 2002 to conduct a physical  security evaluation, implement the upgrades at the Moldova Radon, and  identify other sites where further work is needed to improve security.  DOE  and IAEA officials conducted a similar trip to Tajikistan in December 2002.   Work in both countries is expected to be complete in the summer of 2003,  and DOE plans to initiate projects in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the Baltics, and  possibly Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan in fiscal year 2003.
In March 2003 the Secretary of Energy announced a new initiative to  broaden the Tripartite Initiative to other countries needing assistance to  secure high-risk vulnerable sources.  The emphasis of the expanded  initiative will be on developing countries outside of the former Soviet  Union.  As part of this expanded effort, DOE expects to initiate work in  Serbia and Indonesia this year.
Finally, DOE also has a program designed to strengthen other countries’  controls over sealed sources managed by the Office of International  Nuclear Safety within the National Nuclear Security Administration.  The  office is working with IAEA, other international organizations, NRC, and  the State Department to develop a management program for sealed  sources.  The purpose of this program is to protect the health and safety of  the public and people who work with sealed sources by developing  literature and training programs.  The program also contributed assistance  for the international effort to recover orphan sources in the Republic of  Georgia, including providing technical assistance, detection and personnel  protection equipment, training, and software.  In Armenia, this program is  providing training, equipment, and other technical assistance to enhance  the safety and security of sealed sources.  As of September 30, 2002, DOE  had spent about $330,000 for these activities.
section_title: DOD, State, and NRC Also Have Programs to Strengthen Other Countries’ Controls over Sealed Sources
paragraphs: DOD, through its Cooperative Threat Reduction program, is helping  Kazakhstan to inventory, secure, and dispose of about 2,000 sealed sources,  primarily cesium-137 and cobalt-60, from an out-of-service industrial  facility, and identify other facilities with sealed sources.  The manager of  the program told us that although sealed sources are not traditionally  considered to be weapons of mass destruction, DOD undertook this project  because the Kazakhstan government asked for assistance and the quantity  and types of sealed sources posed a security threat.  The program began in  fiscal year 2001, prior to the establishment of DOE’s program to secure  sealed sources, and DOD does not expect to engage in any further projects  to secure sources in the former Soviet Union countries.  The $1.7 million  project is expected to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2003.
The State Department is also funding various projects to strengthen  controls.  For example, State provided IAEA with $1 million in fiscal year  2002 to support the agency’s projects related to the safety and security of  radioactive sources.  Additionally, State allocated $120,000 in fiscal year  2002 from the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund for a pilot project  to develop and improve radiation safety programs in developing countries,  including controls over sealed sources.  The project was initially developed  by the Health Physics Society and proposed by State’s Office of the Senior  Coordinator for Nuclear Safety.  Health Physics Society members volunteer  their time, and State Department funding is used for travel, per diem, the  cost of shipping donated equipment to the host countries, and evaluation of  the project—about $3,000 spent to date.  Four countries—Costa Rica,  Ecuador, Jamaica, and Panama—were chosen for the pilot; however, work  has been initiated in only two countries.  The project was recently  reactivated after a suspension of several months because of State  Department concerns about program management, security, and liability  issues.
The State Department has also contracted with Sandia National Laboratory  for a $100,000 study to assess the current laws and procedures governing  intercountry transfers of sealed sources.  Specifically, the study is looking  at six countries that are either major exporters or importers of sealed  sources and will provide information on, among other things, the number  of sources that is imported and exported, and whether exporters are  required to verify whether the countries they are exporting to have controls  in place to ensure the safety and security of sealed sources.
In addition, NRC has a program to strengthen controls that focuses on  Armenia.  NRC has spent $62,000 in Freedom Support Act funds transferred  from USAID to assist Armenia.  Initially, NRC will help Armenia develop a  registry of sealed sources, including identifying the information required;  develop the database; and help Armenia gather, assess, develop, and verify  existing data on sources.  Currently, Armenian regulations on sealed  sources and other radioactive materials are spread across different  ministries and departments, and many have not been changed since the fall  of the Soviet Union.  NRC plans to assist Armenia with reviewing existing  regulations and developing consolidated regulations on, among other  things, licensing and inspections of radioactive sources, which will apply  governmentwide and meet international standards.  In addition, NRC  provided Russia and Ukraine with guidance and training on the licensing  and regulation of sealed sources in the mid-1990s.  NRC has also started  working with Canada and Mexico to share information about controls over  sealed sources in each country and improve cross-border controls and has  provided cost-free experts to help IAEA update its Categorization of  Radioactive Sources and Code of Conduct.
Finally, DOE and State are providing funds to support IAEA efforts to  strengthen controls over sealed sources.  DOE and State have pledged a  total of $8.2 million—67 percent of the total $12.2 million pledged—to  IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund.  This fund was established after the  terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in conjunction with IAEA’s action  plan to improve nuclear security worldwide.  The State Department has  directed $1 million of its contribution specifically toward activities to  improve the controls over sealed sources, and DOE’s $3 million  contribution is entirely directed to these efforts.  Planned activities to  improve the security of sealed sources in member states include, among  other things, enhancing ongoing activities to improve controls of sealed  sources; developing standards, guidelines, and recommendations on the  security of radioactive sources; establishing security standards for the  transport of radioactive material; and locating and securing orphan  sources.
Table 4 summarizes the amounts that the Departments of Energy, State,  and Defense, and NRC have received, obligated, and spent to help other  countries strengthen their controls over sealed sources as of January 31,  2003.
section_title: DOE Efforts Have Not Been Well Planned and Coordinated with Those of Other U.S. Agencies
paragraphs: DOE is in the process of developing a plan to guide its efforts to help other  countries secure sealed sources.  According to DOE officials, initial  attempts to develop a plan were stopped in May 2002 because the former  administrator of the Office of International Material Protection and  Cooperation felt that the program needed to show tangible results quickly.   In the absence of a plan, DOE officials told us that the program has  modeled its work in Russia on previous DOE projects to secure fissile  materials in Russia through its Material Protection, Control, and  Accounting program.  The director of the program told us that while the  initial approach to securing sealed sources in Russia—focusing on  improving physical security at Radon sites—was a good idea, it hindered  DOE from setting priorities among other sites in Russia.  He further noted  that the program is now focusing on improving the security of the most  vulnerable high-risk sources first.
DOE officials told us that they recognize that the development of a plan is  essential.  DOE’s draft plan has established short- and long-term program  elements, including consolidating and securing dangerous materials in  vulnerable locations; leveraging critical partnerships, such as continuing to  work with IAEA on key efforts such as the model projects program and the  code of conduct; and continuing to help countries detect smuggled  radioactive materials through its Second Line of Defense program.  In  addition to the plan, DOE officials said they are also developing a more  detailed action plan; radioactivity thresholds for vulnerable high-risk  radioactive materials; and guidelines for describing the actions that should  be taken by DOE when sources are found to exceed those radioactivity  thresholds.  As part of its overall effort, DOE officials told us that more  detailed planning and analysis will be needed to, among other things,   (1) determine which countries present the greatest security risk and most  urgently require assistance, (2) identify future funding requirements, and  (3) develop performance measures to gauge program success.
Despite these recent initiatives to improve program planning, officials from  Gosatomnadzor, the Russian agency responsible for regulating sealed  sources in use at almost 8,000 facilities in Russia, told us that beyond an  initial meeting, DOE had not consulted with them in the selection or  prioritization of sites for physical security upgrades.  In particular,  Gosatomnadzor officials were surprised that DOE was focusing so much  attention on improving security at the Radon facilities in Russia where they  believed the probability that sealed sources will be stolen is low.  They said  that it would be preferable to begin securing sealed sources from other  vulnerable sites near Moscow, for example, out-of-service irradiation and  research facilities.  A systematic approach is required to assess needs,  identify priorities, and develop a comprehensive approach to securing  sealed sources.  In their view, DOE’s initial approach had the potential to be  superficial.
DOE officials told us that they are now working more closely with  Gosatomnadzor.  In a March 31, 2003, letter from DOE’s Acting Deputy  Assistant Secretary for International Material Protection and Cooperation  to Gosatomnadzor’s First Deputy Chairman, the DOE official noted the  need for regulatory oversight of the Russian radiological industry and  suggested that a proposal be formulated jointly with NRC to work  cooperatively in this area.
DOE is also seeking to improve planning and coordination of the Tripartite  Initiative.  According to an IAEA official, DOE coordinated its efforts with  IAEA and Russia on the Moldova visit that contributed to a successful start  of the Tripartite Initiative.  The participants jointly developed and  implemented a common approach for securing some vulnerable sealed  sources, and arrangements were made to construct a facility to store these  sources.  However, the IAEA official told us that the Tajikistan assessment  was not well coordinated.  He noted that DOE was not flexible in  scheduling the preliminary assessment visit and that Russia did not  participate in the visit.  Because of the timing of the visit, IAEA’s  representative to the Tripartite Initiative was unable to participate in the  visit, however, an official from IAEA’s Department of Technical  Cooperation did accompany the DOE team.
DOE officials told us that they were unable to make changes to their  existing itinerary because they would have incurred significant delays if  travel dates were changed due to country clearance restrictions for U.S.  government travel in Tajikistan.  Furthermore, they noted that because of  the different roles that DOE, MINATOM, and IAEA play under the Tripartite  Initiative, it is not necessary that representatives of each organization be  present on each visit.  As currently envisioned, the Russian and IAEA  participants will act as an advance team, gathering information about  which sealed sources exist in a given country and their current level of  vulnerability.  Subsequently, the U.S. team will visit the country and  negotiate contracts to improve security at the vulnerable sites.
IAEA’s official also told us that, overall, the Tripartite Initiative has not been  well planned.  Initial efforts have been ad-hoc, and a more systematic  approach is needed as the program continues.  He said that improved  planning is essential particularly because the Tripartite Initiative will be  used as a model to guide future efforts as the program expands worldwide.   DOE officials agreed that improved coordination is needed.  DOE,  MINATOM, and IAEA are working to finalize a “Terms of Reference”  document that defines the objectives, scope, roles, operational framework,  and procedures to be followed for implementing projects under the  Initiative.  Furthermore, preliminary schedules for missions to several  countries have been jointly developed through August 2003.
Department of State and NRC officials told us that DOE has not fully  coordinated its efforts with their agencies, although they noted that efforts  were recently under way to improve coordination.  These officials told us  that DOE needs their input to ensure that a comprehensive  governmentwide strategy is taken to, among other things, leverage  program resources, maximize available expertise, avoid possible  duplication of effort, and help ensure long-term success.  DOE has not  systematically undertaken the kind of comprehensive planning that would  foster better coordination with the other agencies and could also lead to  better coordination with other countries’ nuclear organizations.  For  example, DOE did not adequately consult NRC or State when developing  the Radiological Threat Reduction program or developing the Tripartite  Initiative with MINATOM and IAEA.  Officials from NRC and the State  Department expressed interest in sharing information and working with  DOE to plan and execute the Radiological Threat Reduction program, but  told us that there had been limited information sharing between agencies.
Both NRC and the State Department have extensive experience in nuclear  regulatory and safety-related issues in the former Soviet Union.  NRC has  received approximately $50 million from fiscal year 1991 through fiscal  year 2002 to support regulatory strengthening efforts in the countries of  central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  These efforts  have included training other countries’ regulators in all aspects of licensing  and inspection procedures, advising on how to establish a legal basis for  nuclear regulations, and developing a control and accounting system for  nuclear materials.  The State Department’s Office of the Senior Coordinator  for Nuclear Safety, which was established about 10 years ago, provides  overall policy guidance for efforts to improve the safety of Soviet-designed  nuclear power reactors.  Since then, the office’s mandate has expanded to  include the safety of other foreign civilian nuclear facilities, including  research reactors and waste facilities.  In addition, State Department  officials said that more recently, State has been leading U.S. negotiations to  revise IAEA’s Code of Conduct and leading consultations within the U.S.  government with large exporters of sealed sources to strengthen export  controls on international transfers of them.
Several officials also told us that DOE was focusing too narrowly on rapid  physical security upgrades and not taking into account long-term needs to  develop better regulatory infrastructures in host countries.  These officials  also said that a coordinated, targeted effort to identify and secure the most  vulnerable and high-risk sealed sources could eliminate the greatest risks,  and that developing regulatory frameworks in host countries would  significantly improve the safety and security of sealed sources.  DOE noted  that part of the program’s strategy is to support IAEA initiatives to leverage  resources of member states to improve the security of sealed sources in  their countries.  They are hoping to build on the work IAEA has done in this  area, particularly on the development of regulatory infrastructure.
section_title: The Majority of DOE’s Program Expenditures Have Been in the United States
paragraphs: DOE budgeted $20.6 million for the Radiological Threat Reduction program  in fiscal year 2002 and received an additional $16.3 million in fiscal year  2003.  DOE had spent about $8.9 million of the total $36.9 million received  as of January 31, 2003, including $3 million transferred to IAEA’s Nuclear  Security Fund.  Of the remaining $5.9 million in expenditures, 93 percent  was spent in the United States by DOE’s national laboratories for labor,  travel, equipment, and overhead.  Only $407,900 had been spent by the  national laboratories in the countries receiving assistance.  Table 5 shows  expenditures by the laboratories by component of cost as of January 31,  2003.
DOE officials cited several reasons why only a small percentage of the  funds allocated to the program since fiscal year 2002 had been spent as of  January 31, 2003, including the following:  The new program required significant start-up effort to assess the threat  posed by sealed sources, determine the potential impacts from the  detonation of a dirty bomb, and categorize and prioritize the types of  sources that pose the greatest security risk.
Difficulties and other unforeseen delays are frequently associated with  doing work in the former Soviet Union.  For example, the Russian  Ministry of Construction, which maintains the Radon sites in Russia,  raised concerns, after work had already started, that it had to authorize  any work performed at those sites.  Consequently, work was stopped at  the Radon sites for several months.  Initially, this Ministry had not been  consulted by DOE and MINATOM in discussions about performing work  at the Radon sites.
It took DOE a significant amount of time to establish appropriate  contacts in the countries of the former Soviet Union where DOE plans  to provide assistance.  While DOE has a long history of working with  Russia to secure fissile materials through its Material Protection,  Control, and Accounting program, DOE was required to identify and  work with a different set of organizations responsible for regulating  sealed sources.
DOE officials told us that expenditures in countries of the former Soviet  Union and other regions of the world are expected to increase as the  program evolves.  According to DOE, as the program matures security  upgrades will be followed by comprehensive and costly consolidation and  disposition activities, all of which will take place in foreign countries.  DOE  has requested an additional $36 million for the program in fiscal year 2004.
The director of the program said that the amount requested was an  estimate based on anticipated future funding requirements.  He expects  that the funds will be allocated for, among other things, continued work in  Russia, including securing large numbers of radioisotope thermoelectric  generators, additional contributions to IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund, and  expanded efforts to secure sources in countries outside of the former  Soviet Union.  The director also noted that plans to secure sources in other  parts of the world are still being developed and that DOE wants to ensure  that it has a sound basis for determining which countries to select for  assistance.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The attacks that occurred in September 2001 widened the array of potential  scenarios and challenges that U.S. decision makers must confront  concerning terrorist threats.  Sealed sources containing radioactive  material, which have many beneficial industrial, medical, and research  applications, must now be considered possible terrorist weapons.  These  sealed sources are in virtually every country of the world and are often  inadequately secured or accounted for.  The central question is, What can  the United States and the world community do to confront this problem,  given the likely vast and unknown number of sources that exist and  continue to be manufactured and distributed globally?
DOE appears to be well suited to help countries secure sealed sources  because of its long history in securing weapons grade material in the  former Soviet Union.  Further, DOE’s efforts to develop a plan to guide its  efforts is a step in the right direction.  However, additional planning and  detailed analyses will be needed to, among other things, systematically  identify and prioritize countries that require assistance, establish realistic  time frames and resources necessary to accomplish these tasks, and  develop meaningful performance measurements.  The elements of such a  plan assumed greater importance in light of the Secretary of Energy’s  recent announcement that DOE’s program will expand beyond the  countries of the former Soviet Union.  For this reason alone, it is imperative  that a comprehensive plan be established and implemented before  significant amounts of appropriated funds are spent to improve  international controls over sealed sources.  Regarding program  expenditures, we agree with DOE’s objective to maximize program  resources in the recipient countries.  To date, the national laboratories have  spent the majority of the program funds in United States and we believe  that this trend needs to be reversed as the program evolves.  We would  expect that in the future, a markedly smaller percentage of program funds  will be directed toward the national laboratories and the greatest  percentage will go to the countries that need the assistance to strengthen  controls over sealed sources.
We share the views of Department of State and NRC officials who  expressed their concerns that DOE was not adequately coordinating its  efforts with the other agencies.  The Department of State and NRC have a  long history of working on international nuclear safety issues, and their  expertise and insights would be valuable, we believe, in crafting an overall  governmentwide plan for strengthening controls over sealed sources.  In  particular, NRC has experience in working closely with many countries of  the former Soviet Union to develop and strengthen national regulatory  infrastructures.  Clearly, any long-term plan requires that countries have a  competent regulatory authority that can place appropriate levels of  controls on sealed sources.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Energy (working with the  Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration):  Develop a comprehensive program plan for helping other countries  secure sealed sources that includes (1) a unified set of program goals  and priorities, including a well-defined plan for meeting these goals in  the countries to be included; (2) program cost estimates; (3) time frames  for effectively spending program funds; (4) performance measures;   (5) ways to sustain upgrades to the facilities and equipment financed,  including cost estimates; and (6) an exit strategy for each country,  including a plan for transferring responsibilities to the host country for  building and equipment maintenance.  The plan should be flexible and  updated periodically to ensure that long-term efforts are sustainable.
Take the lead in developing a comprehensive governmentwide plan to  strengthen controls over other countries’ sealed sources.  The plan  should be developed in conjunction with the Secretaries of State,  Defense, and Homeland Security, and the Chairman of NRC.  In addition,  this plan should be coordinated with the International Atomic Energy  Agency to avoid overlap or duplication of effort.
Strengthen efforts to increase program expenditures in the countries  requiring the assistance.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, and the  Nuclear Regulatory Commission with draft copies of this report for their  review and comment.  We also provided IAEA with pertinent sections of  the report for review.  DOD had no comments on the draft report.  DOE’s,  State’s, and NRC’s written comments are presented as appendixes XII, XIII,  and XIV, respectively.  The three agencies and IAEA also provided technical  comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.
DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration agreed with our  recommendations that the program needs strengthening and noted that the  Secretary and the Administrator are actively involved with the international  community to address the security of other countries’ sealed sources.   However, DOE disagreed with our finding that it had not coordinated its  efforts with NRC and the Department of State to ensure that a  governmentwide strategy is established.  Further, DOE believes that it is  important to place the report’s findings in context since the program is in  its startup phase.  Regarding DOE’s point about coordination, we had been  told several times during the course of our review by NRC and State  Department officials that DOE had not systematically included these  agencies in the development of a comprehensive strategy to strengthen  other countries’ controls over sealed sources.  In fact, we raised this issue  with DOE program officials during our review and these officials  acknowledged that DOE needed to do a better job in coordinating its  program with other U.S. agencies.  Although NRC and State Department  officials told us that coordination has improved recently, they endorsed the  need for the development of a governmentwide strategy to ensure that they  fully participate in future U.S. efforts.  Regarding DOE’s concern about  putting the report’s findings in context, we noted in the draft report that the  program required a significant start-up effort to, among other things, assess  the threat posed by sealed sources, determine the potential impacts from  the detonation of a dirty bomb, and prioritize the types of sources that pose  the greatest threat.
State agreed with the facts presented in our report and noted that a  comprehensive approach to controlling sources will require a concerted  diplomatic effort that should be combined with the technical expertise  possessed by DOE in recovering and securing sealed sources in other  countries.  State said that it possesses a unique perspective that is crucial  to the success of the program and hoped that we would clarify our  recommendation to delineate between DOE’s technical programmatic  responsibilities and State’s overall diplomatic role in guiding international  strategies for securing radiation sources.  Regarding State’s point, we  acknowledge State’s responsibility to develop and implement international  strategies on behalf of the U.S. government.   However, we believe, as noted  in the report, that DOE is well suited to help other countries secure sealed  sources because of its long history in securing weapons grade material in  the former Soviet Union and that it should take the lead in developing a  comprehensive plan to strengthen controls of other countries’ sealed  sources.
NRC made several points.  First, NRC believed that our report should have  focused more attention on high-risk radioactive sources rather than on  radioactive sources of all types.  NRC stated that the vast majority of  radioactive sources in use in the United States and abroad are not useful to  a terrorist and that it has been working with DOE and IAEA to finalize  IAEA’s revised Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive  Sources and the revised Categorization of Sources.  In addition, NRC noted  that only a few of the radioactive sources that are lost or stolen in the  United States are high-risk and that a majority of the sources reported lost  or stolen involve small or short-lived sources which are not useful as a  radiological dispersion device.  Second, NRC identified various efforts that  it has undertaken to improve the security of high-risk sources in the United  States.  Third, NRC pointed out that we should consider including the  Department of Homeland Security in our recommendation that calls for the  development of a governmentwide plan to help other countries secure  sealed sources.
Regarding NRC’s comments, one of the objectives of our report was to  specifically determine the number of sealed sources worldwide, and we  believe that it is important to develop information, to the extent possible,  regarding the number of all sealed radioactive sources that are in use.  In  fact, IAEA has placed great emphasis, particularly among developing  countries, on the importance of developing and maintaining inventories of  sources for safety and security purposes.  As we noted in our report,  current IAEA policy does not allow for the approval of any Technical Co- operation project involving the use of significant radiation sources, unless  the member state in question, among other things, complies with the  requirements to maintain an effective regulatory framework that includes  an inventory of sources.
While we agree with NRC that the highest-risk sources present the greatest  concern as desirable material for a “dirty bomb,” other sealed radioactive  sources could also be used as a terrorist weapon.  No one can say with  certainty what the psychological, social, or economic costs of a dirty  bomb—regardless of the radioactive material used to construct it—would  be.   In addition, it is important to note that work by NRC, IAEA, and others  to characterize sources is still ongoing.
Regarding NRC’s comments about its activities to increase the security of  the highest-risk sources, we will address these matters in our forthcoming  report on U.S. efforts to strengthen controls over sealed sources in the  United States.  Finally, during the course of our review, no agency we met  with was aware of or told us of a role being played by the Department of  Homeland Security in securing sealed sources in other countries.  However,  we agree with NRC that it makes sense to coordinate the development of a  governmentwide plan for this activity with the Department of Homeland  Security and we have revised our recommendation to include the  department.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the  date of this letter.  We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of  Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the  Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the  Department of Homeland Security; the Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory  Commission; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and  interested congressional committees.  We will make copies available to  others upon request.  In addition, the report will be available at no charge  on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions concerning this report, I can be reached at   202-512-3841 or robinsonr@gao.gov.  Major contributors to this report are  included in appendix XV.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To answer our objectives related to (1) number of sealed sources  worldwide and how many sources are lost, stolen, or abandoned and (2)  the legislative and regulatory controls that countries that possess sealed  sources use, we distributed a questionnaire to 127 member countries of the  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including 3 countries whose  IAEA membership had been approved but had not yet taken effect at the  time of our survey.   We did not, however, survey all IAEA member states.   Specifically, we did not distribute questionnaires to Afghanistan, Cuba,  Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and the Holy See.  The State  Department recommended that we not correspond with the first eight  countries listed.  We determined from discussions with IAEA that the Holy  See did not have any sealed sources.  We did not include the United States  because it is being treated separately in another GAO report.
IAEA provided us with a list of the appropriate contacts for most of the  countries we planned to survey.  These officials were primarily from  member countries’ regulatory authorities.  We pretested the survey with the  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and with representatives from  Brazil, Poland, the United Kingdom, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.  After  revising the survey to reflect the comments of these officials, we  distributed it in December 2002 via E-mail and fax, and through countries’  embassies in Washington, D.C., and Vienna, Austria, where IAEA is located.   As a follow-up for nonrespondents, we also distributed questionnaires  directly to many countries’ representatives who were attending an  international conference in Vienna, Austria, on the security of radioactive  sources.  We also sent out periodic reminders to the countries from January  through March 2003 requesting their assistance to complete the survey in a  timely fashion.  We received responses from 49 IAEA member states (39  percent), including countries from Asia, North and South America, the  former Soviet Union, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.  According to  IAEA officials, the response rate was consistent with the rate it achieves  when it sends out similar types of questionnaires to member states.  In  addition we were told by IAEA officials and others that there is an inherent  difficulty associated with trying to obtain these types of data from  countries owing to the sensitive nature of some of the questions and  countries’ concerns about ensuring the confidentiality of their responses.   Our survey results were used without attempting to project the information  to the universe of IAEA members.  We did not assume that nonrespondent  countries would have had similar answers to our survey.  Regarding the  matter of confidentiality, we notified the countries that the results from the  survey would be reported in aggregate and that individual responses would  not be disclosed.
We supplemented the results obtained from the survey with interviews with  officials from several countries, including Brazil, France, Kazakhstan, the  Republic of Georgia, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan to learn  more about how they regulate and control sealed sources.  We also met  with officials from IAEA and the European Commission to obtain their  views on the security problems and challenges associated with sealed  sources.  In addition, we also interviewed and obtained pertinent  documents from officials of several U.S. government agencies, including  the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, and NRC.
We attended two DOE-sponsored conferences related to the security of  sealed sources.  The first conference, held in London, United Kingdom,  during September-October 2002, focused on international approaches to  nuclear and radiological security.  The second conference, which was held  in Vienna, Austria, in March 2003, focused on the security of radioactive  sources and was attended by representatives from more than 120  countries.
To determine what assistance has been provided by the United States to  other countries to strengthen their controls over sealed sources, we  obtained budget, obligation, and expenditure data from the four agencies  providing assistance—the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, and  NRC.  To assess how well the programs were being implemented, we  interviewed program officials from each agency and reviewed pertinent  documents, including agency plans as available.  We also obtained  information about these programs through interviews with representatives  of IAEA and officials from some of the countries receiving U.S. assistance.
Finally, we visited Russia to obtain a first-hand look at a waste facility that  contains sealed sources.  Specifically, we traveled to the Moscow Radon  site at Sergiyev Posad, located about 90 kilometers from Moscow.  While in  Russia we also interviewed officials from the Ministry of Atomic Energy,  the Ministry of Health, the Kurchatov Institute, Gosatomnadzor (Russia’s  nuclear regulatory organization), the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the  Russian National Technical Physics and Automation Research Institute.
We performed our review from May 2002 through May 2003 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries
paragraphs: This appendix presents a copy of the survey sent to 127 IAEA member  countries and the results of that survey.
section_title: List of Countries Surveyed by GAO and Responses
paragraphs: Table 6 lists all of the countries that we sent surveys to and identifies  whether or not they completed the survey when this report was being  written.
section_title: Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving Sealed Sources
paragraphs: This appendix provides information about the illicit trafficking in, or  smuggling of, radioactive material over the past decade and focuses  primarily on 17 incidents involving sealed radioactive sources.  There is  sketchy—and sometimes contradictory—information about many of these  cases for a number of reasons, including (1) many trafficking incidents are  never detected by authorities; (2) some may be known but not reported  because the country does not participate in IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking  Database program; (3) details about these incidents may be considered  sensitive by the countries where they occur; and (4) until recently,  trafficking of radioactive materials was not considered by U.S. and  international nonproliferation experts to be as great a concern as the  trafficking of weapons-grade nuclear material.  IAEA is encouraging  countries to provide more details about all trafficking incidents involving  radioactive materials so that better information can be developed and more  accurate assessments and analysis can be performed.
Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of illicit  trafficking in, or smuggling of, radioactive material worldwide, including  sealed sources.  According to IAEA, sealed sources, such as cesium-137,  cobalt-60, strontium-90, and iridium-192 are considered to pose the greatest  security risk.  In 1993, IAEA established a database to record incidents  involving illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials.  Seventy  countries, or about one-half of IAEA’s member states, currently participate  in the database.  As of December 31, 2002, IAEA listed 272 confirmed  incidents involving the illicit trafficking of radioactive materials, including  sealed sources.  According to IAEA, a confirmed incident is one in which  the information has been verified to IAEA through official points of contact  from the reporting country.  Of the 272 confirmed illicit trafficking  incidents reported by IAEA, there were 179 incidents with potentially high  risk sealed sources that pose the greatest security risks.  More than two- thirds of the 179 incidents involving these sources occurred after 1997.   Figure 6 depicts the frequency of reported international trafficking  incidents involving sealed sources since 1993.  Figure 7 provides  information on types of sealed sources and other radioactive materials  involved in international trafficking incidents.
subsections: section_title: Trafficking Incidents Involving Sealed Sources
paragraphs: Several observations can be made based on the incidents involving the  illicit trafficking of sealed sources.
The majority of the incidents involved deliberate intent to illegally  acquire, smuggle, or sell radioactive material.  Several other incidents  reported, however, do not reflect criminal intent but have resulted from,  among other things, the inadvertent transportation of contaminated  scrap metal.  The unregulated scrap metal industry throughout the  former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe poses potential security and  safety risks nonetheless because many radioactive sources are stolen  for the metal shielding, leaving the source exposed and potentially very  dangerous.
Since the mid-1990s, the trafficking of radioactive materials has  generally increased.  The increase in illicit trafficking cases may be due,  in part, to the increased reporting of these incidents by countries and/or  improved radiation detection systems placed at countries’ border  crossings.
From 1993 through 1998, trafficking incidents involving radioactive  material were primarily reported in Russia, Germany, and Estonia.  In  the past few years, there appears to have been an increase in trafficking  through Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania.
According to the illicit trafficking incidents reported by IAEA, high-risk  sealed sources are more likely to be trafficked than weapons-grade  fissile material, such as highly-enriched uranium.  This is because such  sources have numerous beneficial applications and are not as tightly  controlled as fissile materials.
IAEA and DOE officials told us that the actual number of trafficking cases  involving sealed sources is larger than what is currently being reported  because many trafficking incidents are never detected by authorities and  many countries are not always willing to share sensitive trafficking  information.  Another factor that affects the number of confirmed cases  reported is the credibility of the information.  According to DOE, a  significant amount of time and expertise is required to assess a particular  incident before it can be deemed credible.   Despite difficulties in drawing  conclusions from illicit trafficking data, the threat posed by illicit  trafficking is a real and growing problem.  The Director of IAEA’s Office of  Nuclear Security also told us that every reported case should be taken  seriously.  Furthermore, she noted that countries need to report their  smuggling incidents more systematically so that better assessments can be  performed.
Table 7 provides information about 17 significant cases of illicit trafficking  identified by IAEA and others since 1993.  A brief discussion of each case  follows the table.
section_title: Khohtla-Jarve, Estonia, 1993
paragraphs: This incident involved two men who worked as assistants to an “engine”  driver at a mineral fertilizer plant, which is located in Khohtla-Jarve,  Estonia.  The two men stole a device containing 2.8 grams of cesium-137  and were arrested.  According to available information, the suspects  intended to sell the cesium to an unspecified buyer.
section_title: Saarbrucken, Germany, 1993
paragraphs: In July 1993, German police recovered an unidentified amount of  strontium-90 that had been transported from Ukraine.  The material, which  was packed in small containers, was found by police from information  provided by Ukrainian security services.  Reportedly, the containers were  discovered in three plastic bags after Ukrainian police had told the German  police where to find them.  Police in Kiev, Ukraine, arrested 17 people in  connection with the operation.
section_title: Sofia, Bulgaria, 1994
paragraphs: In September 1994, following a 5-day undercover operation, Bulgarian  authorities arrested six Bulgarians and confiscated 19 containers of  radioactive substances, including  plutonium, cesium-137, strontium-90,  plutonium-beryllium sources, and thallium-204 that had been stolen from  the Izotop Enterprise near the capital, Sofia.  According to available  information, the theft was made possible by poor security at the laboratory.
section_title: Urechesti, Romania, 1994
paragraphs: In October 1994, Romanian authorities arrested three Moldovans, two  Jordanians, and two Romanians for trying to sell 7 kilograms of strontium  in a lead pipe.  One suspect, a former military officer, had smuggled the  strontium to Moldova.  The material was then passed to intermediaries in  the Romanian province of Transylvania, where it was offered to the  Jordanians for $400,000.
section_title: Tallinn, Estonia, 1995
paragraphs: In July 1995, Estonian security police arrested two Estonians who had  radium-226 in their car.  According to available information, it was thought  that the radium was smuggled into Estonia via middlemen in St.  Petersburg, Russia, indicating that more people were probably involved.
section_title: Moscow, Russia, 1995
paragraphs: In November 1995, acting on a tip, Russian television reporters discovered  a 32-kilogram container, containing cesium-137 and wrapped with  explosives, in a Moscow park.  According to available information,  Chechen separatists were responsible for this incident and had reportedly  obtained the radioactive material from either cancer-treatment equipment  or an instrument calibration device used in flaw detection equipment.  The  Chechens threatened to detonate the device if Russia decided to resume  combat operations in the region.
section_title: Kiev, Ukraine, 1998
paragraphs: In October 1998, a radiation health specialist at a German company that  consults on reactor safety was arrested by customs police at Kiev airport in  possession of a container of radioactive material from Chernobyl.   According to available information, a Russian scientist asked the health  specialist to take a metal container holding a small amount of radioactive  material out of the country for analysis.  Russian officials were unsure of  the exact type of material involved, but suspected it contained cesium,  strontium, and zirconium.
section_title: St. Petersburg, Russia, 1999
paragraphs: In July 1999 Russian law enforcement officials arrested two men who  attempted to sell 5 grams of californium-252.  One of those arrested, a  technician from Murmansk, was approached by a criminal group who  enlisted his help to procure californium-252.  The technician, who was  responsible for removing spent nuclear components from a nuclear- powered icebreaker, smuggled the radioactive material off the icebreaker.   Along with an accomplice, the technician packed the californium-252 into a  container filled with paraffin, which they placed within a canister of water.   After the initial offer from the criminal group fell through, the technician  and his accomplice traveled to St. Petersburg in search of another buyer,  where they were arrested.
section_title: Istanbul, Turkey, 1999
paragraphs: In a joint operation, the Istanbul Organized Crime and Arms Smuggling  Office and the National Intelligence Organization arrested five people, one  of whom was from the Republic of Georgia, as they tried to sell cesium-137  to policemen acting as buyers in Istanbul in August 1999.  The cesium,  which was in two separate steel tubes and weighed 49 grams, was  smuggled into Turkey from an unknown location.
section_title: Uzhgorod, Ukraine, 1999
paragraphs: In September 1999, a Russian citizen was arrested after police officers  discovered that he was carrying two containers of strontium-90.  The  material was discovered on the suspect during a document check by  Ukrainian police.  It is believed that the suspect was taking the radioactive  materials from Russia to Western Europe.  The suspect was in possession  of a number of forged documents, including a forged diplomatic  identification card.
Volgograd, Russia, 1999 In August 1999, Russian security police recovered six containers of cesium- 137, which were stolen from a Volgograd oil refinery in May 1998.  Earlier  efforts to locate the stolen containers, including the establishment of  checkpoints with radiation monitors on local roads, had proven fruitless.   According to reports, the thieves had hidden the stolen cesium containers  to avoid this police dragnet and hoped to sell the material after the search  for it had finally been abandoned.
Donetsk, Ukraine, 2000 In February 2000, A Ukrainian law enforcement unit confiscated 27  containers of strontium-90.  Five individuals were reportedly involved in  the illegal trafficking of this material.  The group allegedly tried to contact  foreign buyers, who were in fact members of the law enforcement unit.   The radioactive material was reportedly stolen from a military unit  deployed in the region and was stored in an apartment.  Reports stated that  the individuals were attempting to sell the 27 containers for $168,000.
section_title: Beshkoprik, Uzbekistan, 2000
paragraphs: In March 2000, Uzbekistan customs officers seized an Iranian-registered  truck on the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border about 20 kilometers from  Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, after discovering it contained highly  radioactive material.  Kazakhstan customs officials had cleared the truck  and issued a certificate indicating that it had passed radiation screening.   Uzbekistan officials determined that the level of gamma radiation emitted  by the cargo was 100 times over the acceptable level.  Uzbekistan customs  officials then returned the truck to their Kazakhstani counterparts.  The  destination listed on the truck’s manifest was Quetta, Pakistan, and some  reports speculated that the incident involved efforts to smuggle radioactive  material intended for use by terrorist groups to build a radiological  weapon.
section_title: Piatra Neamt City, Romania, 2000
paragraphs: In December 2000, five suspects were arrested while trying to sell   1 kilogram of radioactive material (strontium, plutonium, and cobalt), to  undercover police officers posing as prospective buyers of radioactive  material.  The suspects included a former officer of an antiorganized crime  police unit in Moldova and four Romanians who were bodyguards in charge  of protecting the shipments and who were responsible for organizing the  sale of the materials.
section_title: Thessaloniki, Greece, 2001
paragraphs: In January 2001, Greek law enforcement officials uncovered several  hundred metal “wafers” of commercially available alpha-emitting ionization  sources, containing a total of 3 grams of plutonium and americium.  The  cache was found buried in a forest 12 kilometers from Thessalonki.  The  sources were believed to be smuggled from Eastern Europe, and there was  speculation about organized criminal involvement in the smuggling of these  sources.  An investigation was launched, but to date, there have been no  publicly released results.
section_title: Minsk, Belarus, 2002
paragraphs: In January 2002, police in Minsk, Belarus, arrested two persons in  connection with an attempt to sell four sealed sources of strontium-90 that  one of the suspects had been storing in his apartment.  One of the suspects  had stolen the sources 4 years earlier during his military service, and the  other was arrested while trying to sell them.
section_title: Veliko Tarnova, Bulgaria, 2002
paragraphs: In May 2002, Bulgarian authorities seized 101 plutonium sources and an  americium-beryllium source from a vehicle near Veliko Tarnova.  The  sources were detected when police officers stopped a taxi with four  individuals during a routine inspection.  Thirty-nine of the plutonium  sources had certificates indicating that they had been manufactured in 1990  by Izotop-Moscow and had been ordered for a ferryboat station in Varna.   Because the 10-year guaranteed service life of the sources had expired, it is  possible that the sources were diverted after they had been removed from  service for disposal.
section_title: Information About Accidents Involving Sealed Sources
paragraphs: According to IAEA and the World Health Organization, there have been  more than 100 accidents involving sealed sources over the past 50 years.   Many of these accidents have been small and resulted in few injuries.  The  actual number of accidents worldwide is unknown because many countries  do not report or record such events.  This appendix describes 10 accidents  that occurred since the early 1980s.  Although these accidents were not the  result of malevolent actions, they are useful in gaining a better  understanding of the potential consequences following the loss of control  of sealed sources.
We have included, to the extent that it was available, information on the  economic impacts of the accidents.  The costs associated with lost  equipment, damage to property, and the disposal of radioactive waste can  be very significant.  The cost components associated with radiological  accidents include  medical treatment of exposed individuals;  radiation surveillance, including searching for lost sealed sources and   decontamination and dismantling of contaminated buildings and   loss of production capacity;  radioactive waste management and disposal;   monetary compensation to individuals who received excessive doses of   rebuilding or possible relocation costs; and  effects on international trade.
Nonmonetary impacts may include:  loss of public confidence and credibility in the government, and  public questions about all uses of ionizing radiation.
Table 8 provides information about 10 significant cases of accidents  identified by IAEA and the World Health Organization since 1983.  A brief  discussion of each case follows the table.
subsections: section_title: Juarez, Mexico, 1983
paragraphs: A teletherapy unit containing a cobalt-60 source was purchased and  imported by a Mexican hospital without compliance with existing import  requirements.  After the unit was stored for 6 years in a warehouse, its  scrap value attracted the attention of a maintenance technician.  The  technician dismantled the unit and removed the cylinder containing the  sources and other metal parts.  He then loaded them into a pickup truck,  drove to a junkyard, and sold the parts as scrap.  Before arriving at the  junkyard, he ruptured the sealed cobalt source, dispersing about 6,000 tiny  pellets of cobalt-60 in the truck bed.
When cranes moved the ruptured cylinder, the cobalt-60 pellets were  spread over the junkyard and mixed with other metal materials.   Consequently, pellets and pellet fragments were transferred to vehicles  used for transporting the scrap to various foundries.  The technician’s  pickup truck remained parked on the street for 40 days and was then  moved to another street, where it remained for an additional 10 days.  An  unknown number of people passed by the truck each day and children used  it as a play area.  It was later discovered that contaminated scrap metal  from the junkyard had been used to manufacture reinforcing rods and  metal table bases.  A truck transporting contaminated rods passed near a  DOE national laboratory, where radiation detectors indicated the presence  of radioactivity.  Two days later, the authorities ascertained the origin of the  contaminated rods.
U.S. and Mexican officials spent an estimated $34 million to track, recover,  and secure these radioactive products.  An extensive investigation showed  that 30,000 tables and 6,000 tons of reinforcing rods had been made from  the contaminated material.  In addition, 814 buildings were partly or  completely demolished because the radioactivity in the reinforcing rods  resulted in higher-than-acceptable levels of radiation.  The accident  exposed 4,000 people to radiation, and 80 people received significant  doses.  Table 9 provides a breakdown of the estimated costs associated  with the accident.
section_title: Morocco, 1984
paragraphs: In 1984, iridium-192 sources were being used to radiograph welds in a  fossil-fuel power plant under construction.  One of these sources dropped  to the ground from a radiography camera, where a passerby picked it up  and took it home.  The source was lost from March to June 1984 and, as a  result, eight persons died from overexposure to radiation.  In addition,  three others suffered severe injuries from overexposure that required  hospitalization.  It was initially assumed that the deaths were from  poisoning.  Only after the last family member died was it suspected that the  deaths might have been caused by radiation.
section_title: Goiania, Brazil, 1987
paragraphs: A private radiography institute moved to new premises and left behind a  cesium-137 teletherapy unit without notifying the licensing authority.   Because the building was partially demolished, the teletherapy unit was  unsecured.  Two people entered the building and removed the source  assembly.  They dismantled the source assembly at home and ruptured the  sealed source.  After the sealed source was ruptured, remnants of the  source assembly were sold for scrap to a junkyard owner.  He noticed that  the material had a blue glow in the dark.  Over a period of days, friends and  relatives came to witness the phenomenon.  Fragments of the source, the  size of rice grains, were distributed to several families.  Five days later, a  number of persons started to show gastrointestinal distress.
Because the sealed source contained cesium chloride, which is highly  soluble and easily dispersed, there was considerable contamination of the  environment, resulting in external irradiation and internal contamination of  several persons.  Some individuals suffered very high internal and external  contamination because of the way they had handled the cesium chloride  powder, such as rubbing it on their skin, eating with contaminated hands,  and handling various objects.  Consequently, four people died within 4  weeks of being hospitalized.  In total, 249 people were contaminated, and  112,000 people were screened for contamination.
The environment was also severely contaminated.  Eighty-five houses were  significantly contaminated, and 41 of these had to be evacuated.  The  decontamination process required the demolition of seven residences and  various other buildings and generated 3,500 cubic meters of radioactive  waste.
The accident had a great psychological impact on the whole region.  Many  people feared contamination, irradiation, and incurable diseases.  Over  8,000 persons requested monitoring for contamination in order to obtain  certificates stating that they were not contaminated.  These were needed  because operators of commercial airplanes and buses refused to allow  people from the region to board and hotels refused to register them. The  social and psychological impact of the accident was so great that an  outlying region to Goiania, where the waste repository was established, has  incorporated the trifoil symbol of radioactivity into the region’s flag.
Economically, there was discrimination against products from Goiania,  resulting in a 20 percent decrease in the sales of cattle, grains, and other  agricultural products from the region.  Tourism decreased virtually to zero  and the gross domestic product for the region decreased by 15 percent.  It  took 5 years for the gross domestic product to return to preaccident levels.   In total, the direct and indirect costs for emergency response and remedial  action are estimated to be $36 million.
section_title: Tammiku, Estonia, 1994
paragraphs: In October 1994 a sealed source that was discovered in scrap metal was  recovered and transferred to a radioactive waste repository under the  supervision of the national government.  Three brothers entered the  repository without authorization and removed a metal container enclosing  a cesium-137 source and the source fell out of the container.  One of the  men placed the source in his pocket and took it home.  The source  remained in the house for 27 days, resulting in the overexposure of five  individuals, including one fatality.  The sealed source was thought to be  part of a gamma irradiator, but none had ever been used or registered in  Estonia.  According to available information, it is possible that the source  was brought into Estonia from the Russian Federation with miscellaneous  scrap metals for export to Western Europe.
section_title: Gilan, Iran, 1996
paragraphs: At a combined cycle fossil fuel power plant in Iran, radiography equipment  with an iridium-192 sealed source was used to examine welds from a boiler.   At the end of the radiographer’s shift, the source became detached from its  drive cable and fell to the floor unnoticed.  Later, a worker moving thermal  insulation materials around the plant noticed a shiny, pencil-sized metal  object in a trench and put it in his pocket.  The source was in his chest  pocket for approximately two hours, resulting in a high radiation dose.  As  a result of this exposure, the worker had abnormal redness of the skin,  severe bone marrow depression, and an unusually extended radiation  injury requiring plastic surgery.
section_title: Lilo, Georgia, 1997
paragraphs: Eleven border frontier guards became ill owing to exposure from multiple  radioactive sources, including 12 cesium-137 sources, one cobalt-60 source,  and 200 radium-226 sources.  These sources were abandoned when the  military site was transferred from the Soviet Union to the Republic of  Georgia.  All individuals suffered from skin ulcerations and chronic  radiation sickness.  No deaths were associated with this accident.
section_title: Los Barrios, Spain, 1998
paragraphs: In May 1998, a cesium-137 source was accidentally melted at a stainless  steel factory.  As a result of the periodic maintenance and cleaning of the  filter system at the factory, the dust was removed, and much of it was sent  to two different factories several hundred kilometers from the factory.  The  dust was contaminated with cesium-137, and about 400 people were  monitored for contamination.  Measurements of a large number of water,  air, and soil samples were obtained from nearby towns and at locations  several hundred kilometers away.  Traces of cesium-137 were found but  considered negligible.  In countries outside of Spain, the environmental  impact was minimal.  The economic consequences of the accident,  including temporary suspension of factory operations, decontamination  operations, and management of the resulting radioactive waste, were  estimated to be over $25 million.
section_title: Yanango, Peru, 1999
paragraphs: In February 1999 an iridium-192 source fell out of a radiography camera  being used at a hydroelectric power plant.  Later that day, a welder picked  up the iridium-192 source and placed it in the right back pocket of his  trousers.  For the next several hours, the welder continued his work and  later took a minibus home with 15 other people onboard.  Once home, the  welder’s wife fed their 18-month-old child while she was sitting on the  welder’s trousers, and two other children were 2-3 meters from the iridium  source for approximately 2 hours.  The welder received extensive radiation  burns that required the amputation of his right leg.  The wife suffered  lesions on her lower back after her brief exposure to the sealed source.  No  radiation effects were reported for the children.
section_title: Samut Prakarn, Thailand, 2000
paragraphs: A company in Bangkok, Thailand, possessed several teletherapy devices  containing cobalt-60 without authorization from the Thailand Office of  Atomic Energy for Peace.  The teletherapy device was originally installed at  a hospital in Bangkok, Thailand, in 1969.  In 1981, a new source was  installed, and the hospital received no further maintenance from the  manufacturer of the teletherapy unit and source.  When the teletherapy unit  was removed from service in 1994, the maintenance contractor had gone  bankrupt and the manufacturer was no longer producing cobalt-60 units.   As a result, the hospital was left with the disused source to manage and  control.  Since the hospital did not have sufficient storage space, it sold the  device and source to a new supplier without the authorization of the  regulatory authority.  In 1999 the new supplier was notified that its lease of  the warehouse was to be terminated and relocated the device to a parking  lot that was owned by its parent company.
In the autumn of 1999, the company relocated the teletherapy devices to an  unsecured storage location without the authorization of the national  regulatory authority.  In late January 2000, several individuals obtained  access to the unsecured storage location and partially disassembled the  teletherapy device.  The individuals took the unit to a residence and  attempted to disassemble it further.
In early February 2000, two individuals took the disassembled device to a  junkyard in Samut Prakarn, Thailand, to segregate component metals and  sell them separately as scrap.  While a junkyard worker was disassembling  the device, the cobalt-60 source fell out of its housing unobserved by the  junkyard workers or the individuals.  By the middle of February 2000,  several of the people involved, including the finders of the source and  junkyard workers, had begun to feel ill and sought medical assistance.   Physicians at the hospital suspected the possibility of radiation exposure  and reported their suspicions to the regulatory authority.  Altogether, 10  people received high doses of radiation from the source. Three of those  people, all workers at the junkyard, died within 2 months of their exposure.
section_title: Lja, Georgia, 2001
paragraphs: In December 2001 three woodsmen found two heat-emanating metallic  containers near their campsite in a forest near the village of Lja in western  Georgia.  This village is in the  Abkhazia region of the Caucasus.  This  region is subject to political unrest and has sought its independence from  the Republic of Georgia.  As a result, during the past decade, the region has  been largely inaccessible to Georgian and international authorities.  The  woodsmen involved in the accident used the containers as a heat source  and experienced nausea, vomiting, and dizziness within hours of exposure  to the containers.  At a local hospital in Tbilisi, Georgia, the woodsmen  were diagnosed with radiation sickness and severe radiation burns, and at  least two of the three were in serious condition.  In February 2002, an  IAEA-sponsored search and recovery team found the containers and  discovered that each one was previously used in Soviet-era radioisotope  thermoelectric generators.
section_title: Information on Producers and Distributors of Radioactive Material
paragraphs: This appendix provides information about the major producers and  distributors of radioactive material used to manufacture sealed sources.   Six countries are the major suppliers of the radioactive material: Argentina,  Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Russia, and South Africa.  Canada is the  largest exporter of radioactive material and has provided over half of all  radioactive material used in medical applications worldwide.  Table 10 lists  the major producers and distributors of radioactive material used to  manufacture sealed sources.
section_title: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Policy on Exports of Sealed Sources
paragraphs: In most cases, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission grants a general license  for the export of sealed sources to all countries containing byproduct  material except certain proscribed countries: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North  Korea, and Sudan.  Byproduct material is (1) any radioactive material  (except special nuclear material) yielded in, or made radioactive by,  exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or using  special nuclear material (as in a reactor) and (2) the tailings, or wastes  produced by the extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from  ore.
According to NRC, limited quantities of sealed sources can also be  exported under a general license to “restricted” countries: Afghanistan,  Andorra, Angola, Burma, Djibouti, India, Israel, Oman, Pakistan, and Syria.   A general license, provided by regulation, grants authority to a person for  certain activities, in this case, the export of sealed sources, and is effective  without filing an application with NRC or the issuance of a licensing  document to the person or organization exporting the sealed source.  NRC  has placed most sealed sources for export under a general license for  several reasons, including the following: (1) subject to NRC or Agreement  State oversight, the United States is  responsible only for ensuring the safe  use and control of radioactive materials used to manufacture sealed  sources within U.S. territory; (2) foreign countries have the sovereign  responsibility for ensuring appropriate regulatory controls over radioactive  material, including such material imported from other countries; and   (3) control over radioactive material would not be enhanced by requiring  specific licenses for material exported from the United States.  A specific  license would not ensure that the exported materials would be subject to  controls and regulatory oversight in a foreign country because the license  does not ensure that the recipient country has adequate regulatory controls  over the material that is exported from the United States.  Under a specific  license, the export request must be reviewed and approved by NRC in  consultation with other appropriate agencies, including the Departments of  Commerce, State, Defense, and Energy.
NRC officials told us that they are required only to maintain a database of  exports of sealed sources that are issued under a specific license and  certain other exports of  concern, such as americium-241 and neptunium- 237. The United States, as a nuclear weapon state, has agreed to report all  exports of americium and neptunium to IAEA.  With regard to shipments of  sealed sources, NRC officials told us that the Department of Homeland  Security’s Bureau of Customs and Border Protection maintains a database  of all transactions, identified by tariff number, including those including  sealed sources that are exported under a general license.  However, these  officials also said that it would be very difficult for the Bureau of Customs  and Border Protection to track these specific shipments of sealed sources  because the information on manifests is general in nature.
NRC officials told us that they were not aware of any sealed sources that  were exported under a general license from the United States that have  been used for malicious purposes.  They noted that there have been  thousands of such exports, most of which involve material in forms or  quantities that pose minimal safety or health risks if properly used and  controlled.  However, there have been a few cases where lax local  regulatory oversight over high-risk materials resulted in instances where  sealed sources were eventually lost or improperly disposed of, resulting in  harmful exposure to individuals.
Specific licenses are required to export radioactive material in waste and  tritium for recovery and recycling purposes.  This is because a final NRC  rule (59 F.R. 48994), effective November 10, 1994, revoked the general  license for bulk tritium and alpha-emitting radionuclides having an alpha  half-life of 10 days or greater but less than 200 years to conform NRC’s  regulations to the export control guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers’  Group for nuclear-related, dual-use items.  Tritium and reactor-produced  alpha-emitting radionuclides are two commodities on the Nuclear  Suppliers’ Groups dual-use list whose exports are regulated by NRC.  In  addition, tritium and alpha-emitting radionucliedes are controlled by the  Nuclear Suppliers’ Group because of their potential application in the  production of weapons of mass destruction.
Another final rule on the import and export of radioactive material  (60 F.R. 37556), effective August 21, 1995, established specific licensing  requirements for the import and export of radioactive material in the form  of waste coming into or leaving the United States to conform with NRC’s  regulations to the guidelines of the IAEA Code of Practice on the  International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste.
In view of increased post-September 11 terrorism concerns, NRC is  considering changes to its general license provisions to improve controls  over exports.  Possible changes include (1) ensuring that the exporter  confirm that the customer in the foreign country is authorized by the  recipient country to possess the material; (2) requiring prior notification to  NRC for risk-significant shipments; and (3) as appropriate, providing  national or international source registries with data for risk-significant  shipments.  Changes under consideration are expected to be implemented  in fiscal year 2004 by orders with compensatory measures and in fiscal  years 2004-2005 by a rule change as part of a broader NRC plan to improve  controls over the imports and exports of sealed sources.  Other possible  and more restrictive controls for exports include a requirement for a  specific export license for high-risk material such as high-activity cobalt-60  sources or imposing a specific prohibition on such exports to countries  that do not have acceptable sealed source security, control, and  accountability requirements.  The United States is coordinating these  efforts with other countries that export sealed sources to ensure  consistent, adequate controls.  In addition, in conjunction with the change  of the national threat level to “orange” in March 2003, NRC issued a  security advisory to licensees concerning certain quantities of certain high- risk sources, which included exports and imports.
section_title: Results of the International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Sources
paragraphs: This appendix provides information concerning several key findings and  recommendations from the international conference on the security of  radioactive sources held in Vienna, Austria, in March 2003.  The conference  was sponsored by the governments of the United States and the Russian  Federation and hosted by the government of Austria.  It was organized by  IAEA in cooperation with the European Commission, the World Customs  Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, and the  European Police Office.  Over 700 delegates from more than 120 countries  attended the conference.
The conference produced key findings in the following areas:   (1) identifying, searching for, recovering, and securing high-risk radioactive  sources; (2) strengthening long-term control over radioactive sources;   (3) interdicting illicit trafficking; (4) planning the response to radiological  emergencies arising from the malevolent use of radioactive sources; and  (5) recognizing the role of the media/public education, communication, and  outreach.
Regarding identifying and searching for sources, the conference  encouraged countries to   develop and implement national action plans, on the basis of their own  specific conditions, for locating, searching for, recovering, and securing  high-risk radioactive sources;   accelerate the establishment of a coherent and transparent scheme for  the categorization of radioactive sources in order to provide for the  safety and security of sources; and   assist other countries, as appropriate, in identifying, searching for,  recovering, and securing high-risk sources.
Concerning strengthening long-term control over radioactive sources, the  conference encouraged countries to   formulate and implement national plans for the management of sources  throughout their life cycle;  develop, to the extent practical, standards for the design of sealed  sources and associated devices that are less suitable for malevolent use  (e.g., alternative technologies and less-dispersible forms of high-risk  sources); and  establish arrangements for the safe and secure disposal of disused high- risk sources, including the development of disposal facilities.
Regarding illicit trafficking, the conference recognized the need for greater  international efforts to detect and interdict the illicit trafficking of high-risk  sources and to take appropriate enforcement actions.  In support of this  objective, the conference encouraged countries to   further develop and strengthen measures to detect, interdict, and  respond to the illicit trafficking of high-risk radioactive sources;  deploy and widely use technologies for detecting high-risk radioactive  sources, with emphasis on ensuring the sustainability of monitoring and  detection equipment;  undertake further research on and development of detection  technologies for use at borders and elsewhere;  enhance cooperation between government agencies responsible for  preventing, detecting, and responding to illicit trafficking incidents,  especially in the fields of information sharing, communications, and  training;  pool resources through, for example, the sharing of monitoring and  detection equipment on common borders; and   continue support for and development of IAEA’s illicit trafficking  database.
The conference recommended that countries develop comprehensive plans  to prepare for and respond to radiological emergencies involving  radioactive sources.  In support of this recommendation, the conference  encouraged countries to, among other things,  enhance current national and international response arrangements,  taking into account the need to respond both proactively and reactively  to the new scenarios presented by the possibility of the malevolent use  of high-risk radioactive sources and   consider establishing mechanisms to facilitate effective coordination in  the event of a radiological emergency.
Finally, the conference recognized that the public’s understanding of the  nature and consequences of radiological emergencies will largely  determine how the public reacts to such emergencies.  As a result, the  conference encouraged countries to  conduct public outreach and awareness programs to foster a better  understanding of radiological threats and the appropriate response in  the event of a radiological emergency in order to minimize social and  economic disruption;  educate the public regarding the nature of radioactivity, the  consequences of the malevolent uses of high-risk radioactive sources,  and the procedures for mitigating those consequences in order to  reduce the psychological impact of radiological terrorism;  strengthen their education and training programs as a means to promote  confidence building within the public; and   assume greater responsibility for gaining the trust of the media and  informing them about the potential threat of radiological terrorism to  help ensure that the media will communicate information accurately in  a nonsensational manner to avoid fueling public fear and panic.
section_title: Information on IAEA’s Revised Categorization of Radioactive Sources
paragraphs: The purpose of IAEA’s Categorization of Radioactive Sources is to provide  a fundamental and internationally harmonized basis for risk-informed  decision making. The draft document provides a categorization for  radioactive sources used in industry, medicine, agriculture, research, and  education.  The principles of the categorization can be equally applied to  radioactive sources, such as radioisotope thermoelectric generators that  may be under military control.  The categorization does not apply to  radiation-generating devices such as X-ray machines and particle  accelerators, although it may be applied to radioactive sources produced  by, or used as, target material in such devices.  The revised categorization  divides sources into five categories, according to their potential to cause  harmful health effects, should the source not be managed safely and  securely.  The categories are defined as follows:  Category 1 sources are considered extremely dangerous.  If not safely  managed safely, the radioactive material would likely cause permanent  injury to a person who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it  for more than a few minutes.  It would probably be fatal to be close to  this amount of unshielded material for a period of a few minutes to an  hour.  Furthermore, the amount of radioactive material, if dispersed by  fire or explosion, could possibly—but would be unlikely to— permanently injure persons in the immediate vicinity or be life  threatening to them.  There would be little or no risk of immediate heath  effects to persons beyond a few hundred meters.  It would be highly  unlikely for a category 1 source to contaminate a public water supply to  dangerous levels, even if the radioactive material were highly soluble in  water.
Category 2 sources are also considered personally dangerous.  If not  safely managed or securely protected, the radioactive material could  cause permanent injury to a person who handled it or were otherwise in  contact with it for a short time (minutes to hours).  It could possibly be  fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a  period of hours to days.  The amount of radioactive material, if  dispersed by fire or explosion, could possibly—but would be very  unlikely to—permanently injure or be life threatening to persons in the  immediate vicinity.  It would be virtually impossible for a category 2  source to contaminate a public water supply to dangerous levels, even if  the radioactive material were highly soluble in water.
Category 3 sources are also considered to be dangerous.  If not safely  managed or securely protected, the radioactive material could cause  permanent injury to a person who handled it or were otherwise in  contact with it, for some hours.  It could possibly—although it is  unlikely—be fatal to be in close contact to this amount of unshielded  radioactive material for a period of days to weeks.  The amount of  radioactive material, if dispersed by fire or explosion, could possibly— but is extremely unlikely to—permanently injure or be life threatening  to persons in the immediate vicinity.  It would be virtually impossible for  a category 3 source to contaminate a public water supply to dangerous  levels, even if the radioactive material were highly soluble in water.
Category 4 sources are unlikely to be dangerous.  It is very unlikely that  anyone would be permanently injured by this amount of radioactive  material.  This amount of radioactive material, if dispersed by fire or  explosion, could not permanently injure persons.
Category 5 sources are not considered dangerous.  No one could be  permanently injured by this amount of radioactive material.   Furthermore, this amount of radioactive material, if dispersed by fire or  explosion, could not permanently injure persons.
IAEA has developed a list on the basis of practices (such as irradiators,  industrial radiography, and teletherapy) as part of its relative ranking of  sealed sources.   Examples of the most dangerous (category 1) include  radioisotope thermoelectric generators, sterilization and food preservation  facilities containing cobalt-60 or cesium-137, and medical equipment  containing cobalt-60.  The least dangerous (category 5) include low-dose- rate brachytherapy devices and lightning detectors containing americium- 241.
section_title: Countries Participating in IAEA’s Model Project Program
paragraphs: Table 11 provides a list of the countries participating in IAEA’s model  project program and the year they joined the program.
section_title: France’s System for Controlling Sealed Sources
paragraphs: French officials told us that their system for controlling sealed sources has  several key components, including stringent controls on the licensing and  tracking of the sources.  Distributors of devices containing sealed sources  must be authorized to market such devices and must send monthly  accounts of the movement of sources to the French government agency  responsible for regulating sealed sources.  End users must have a license  covering each site where the sources are used, and the maximum duration  of a license is 5 years.  For items such as smoke detectors, the end user is  not required to have a license, but the distributor must be licensed.   Approximately 30,000 sources in use in France are tracked by the  government, and there are nearly 5,000 licensees.  This number does not  include very small sources like iodine grains used for medical purposes  (there are about 80,000 such sources) and smoke detectors (for 400,000  buildings), which are exempt from licensing requirements for end users.
Sealed sources are subject to an annual inspection, and the end user pays  for the inspections.  The fee is a function of the number of sealed sources  owned by the licensee.  The inspection is designed to confirm that the  sealed sources are properly accounted for, adequately secured, and safely  used.  In order to renew a license, the licensing agency must be provided  with documentation of the annual inspections.  If the end user is not  inspected, it is subject to fines and may also be fined if the inspection  shows that it is not adequately protecting devices containing sealed  sources.  Fines are based on health and safety infractions—not security  violations—and the fines can be as high as about $15,000.
France has also established a system to control orphan sources that has  three main components.
End users are required to remove any source from service not more than  10 years after it was purchased.
The company supplying the source to the end user is required to include  disposal costs within the purchase price.
All other companies in the supply chain agree contractually to take back  the source after 10 years. guarantee is made either through an annual fee paid to an association of  source distributors or by providing France’s national waste management  agency with a deposit.  The association represents 99 percent of all  distributors of devices containing sealed sources in France.  About 50  distributors are members of the association.  Typically, the distributor  makes an initial deposit of about $1,000 and then pays an annual fee on the  basis of the total activity of sources it has distributed, the technology that  the sealed sources are used for, and the value of the source. French  officials responsible for administering the system told us that, initially,  distributors did not like it because of the excessive amount of paper work  involved.  However, companies now see the value of the system.
Distributors also have the option of contracting with France’s radioactive  waste management agency for disposal of the sources if they do not want  to join the association.  Typically, the smaller distributors who choose this  option do so because they may only supply one or two sources per year and  do not want to share the risk of joining the larger association, where costs  are spread among many distributors.   Distributors who choose this option  are required to deposit funds with the agency to guarantee that disposal  costs will be covered.  The deposit ranges from about $1,000 to several  thousand dollars.  When a source is returned, the agency returns the  deposit (less an administrative fee) to the distributor.  According to French  officials, only 1 percent of the distributors of sources in France use this  option because they believe it is more expensive than belonging to the  association, which spreads the financial risk among all of its members.  In  addition, the cost determined by the waste management agency is based on  the entire cost of disposal and takes into account inflation and other  economic factors.   To date, the waste management agency has not had to  use the fund to dispose of any disused sealed sources.  The agency has  always been able to locate a source’s manufacturer to take back the source  or find another manufacturer willing to accept it.
According to French officials, when the system was first put into place, it  posed a difficulty for distributors, who had to pass the cost of the financial  guarantee to the end user.  However, now that the system has been in place  for many years, the additional costs are accepted, and users are pleased not  to have to deal with disposing of the sources on their own.  We were told  that the process works well and has contributed to the reduction in the  number of lost, stolen, or abandoned sealed sources.  Currently, about one  sealed source per year is orphaned in France.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
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section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Kerry Dugan Hawranek, Preston  S. Heard, Glen Levis, Judy K. Pagano, Terry L. Richardson, and Rebecca  Shea also made key contributions to this report.
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