Operational Contract Support: Sustained DOD Leadership Needed to Better Prepare for Future Contingencies
Published: 2012-09-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD has relied heavily on contractors to support its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and is likely to continue to depend on contractors in future operations. For over 15 years, GAO has made recommendations intended to improve DOD's ability to manage and oversee operational contract support in deployed locations, which DOD has taken some actions to address. GAO has called for a cultural change within DOD to emphasize the importance of institutionalizing operational contract support across the department. As DOD's current efforts in Afghanistan draw closer to a conclusion and DOD turns its attention to other challenges, the department needs to guard against allowing the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan to be forgotten.
This testimony addresses three areas where sustained leadership is needed if DOD is to effectively prepare for the next contingency. These areas pertain to (1) planning for the use of operational contract support, (2) ensuring that DOD possesses the workforce needed to effectively manage and oversee contracts and contractors, and (3) improving DOD's ability to account for contracts and contractors.
This statement is drawn from GAO's broad body of work on DOD's efforts to plan for operational contract support and manage and account for contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan--including work reflected in GAO's February 2011 high-risk update, GAO's related testimonies, and GAO's recent reports on operational contract support and other contracting issues.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Future overseas contingencies are inherently uncertain, but effective planning for operational contract support can help reduce the risks posed by those uncertainties. The Department of Defense (DOD) has made an effort to emphasize the importance of operational contract support at the strategic level through new policy and guidance and ongoing efforts. For example, in January 2011, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum outlining actions and indicating a need to influence a cultural shift in how the department manages contracted support in a contingency environment. DOD has also recognized the need to translate strategic requirements into plans at the operational level, but GAO's past work has shown that DOD's progress in anticipating contractor support in sufficient detail in operation plans has been slow. As a result, DOD has risked not fully understanding the extent to which it will be relying on contractors to support combat operations and being unprepared to provide the necessary management and oversight of deployed contractor personnel. One way to help address this risk is to ensure military commanders and senior leaders are cognizant of the roles contractors have in supporting DOD's efforts and the role that military personnel have in managing and overseeing contractors. While DOD has taken steps to develop additional training, we have reported that commanders and senior leaders are not required to take these courses before assuming their contract management roles and responsibilities.
In contingencies, DOD relies on a wide range of individuals to play critical roles in defining requirements, overseeing contractors, and helping to ensure that the warfighter receives the goods and services needed in a timely manner. GAO and others have identified numerous instances in Iraq and Afghanistan where these individuals were in short supply, were not properly trained, or were not fully aware of their responsibilities. DOD leadership has recognized the need to rebuild, train, and support a highly qualified and knowledgeable acquisition workforce. While DOD has made some progress in growing the workforce, it continues to face challenges in its strategic planning efforts. Further, in March 2012, GAO reported that although DOD had taken steps to enhance training for oversight personnel, the department continued to experience challenges ensuring that it had a sufficient number of oversight personnel with the subject-matter expertise and training needed to perform their contract management and oversight duties in Afghanistan.
DOD's ability to effectively leverage operational contract support in contingency environments also depends on having appropriate tools to account for contracts and contractor personnel. These tools can provide information that DOD can use to help mitigate risks, including tracking which contracts DOD has awarded, where contractor personnel are located, and whether potential vendors or contractor personnel may pose a potential risk to U.S. interests. DOD has made efforts to develop such tools, but it is not certain that these efforts will result in long-term solutions. For example, while DOD has designated a system for tracking specific information on certain contracts and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, the department lacks reliable data sources to report on its contracts and contractor personnel. Without attention to improving the tools needed to effectively account for contracts and contractor personnel, DOD may continue to face challenges in future contingencies.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss how the Department of Defense  (DOD) can enhance its ability to effectively use contractors in future  contingencies. Over the past decade, DOD, along with other federal  agencies, has relied extensively on contractors for operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan. According to DOD, at the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom,  the number of contractor personnel exceeded the number of military  personnel in Iraq, and a similar situation is occurring in support of  Operation Enduring Freedom. For over 15 years, GAO has made  numerous recommendations intended to improve DOD’s ability to  manage and oversee operational contract support, which DOD has taken  some actions to address. While the operational contract support-related  challenges that GAO has identified are, in many respects, emblematic of  broader systemic issues that DOD faces, the significance and impact of  these challenges are heightened in a contingency environment. Since  1992, we have designated DOD contract management as a high-risk  area. In our February 2011 report on high-risk areas, we reported that  DOD needed to, among other things, ensure that its acquisition workforce  was sized, trained, and equipped to meet the department’s needs and  fully integrate operational contract support throughout the department  through education and predeployment training.
Given the longstanding and recurring nature of the issues we identified, in  June 2010 we called for a cultural change in DOD—one that emphasized  an awareness of operational contract support throughout all entities of the  department to help address the challenges faced in ongoing and future  contingency operations. a major undertaking for organizations, especially for an organization as  large and multi-faceted as DOD. Effecting a cultural change involves, for  example, developing and communicating a vision for the future,  neutralizing impediments to change, identifying stakeholders in the  change process, and promoting continued support from senior leaders.
GAO, Warfighter Support: Cultural Change Needed to Improve How DOD Plans for and  Manages Operational Contract Support, GAO-10-829T (Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2010).
Further, achieving a cultural change is time-consuming—efforts typically  take 5 or more years to fully implement. DOD appears to share our view  of needing to make fundamental changes in how it approaches the issue  of operational contract support. In January 2011, the Secretary of  Defense issued a memorandum in which he expressed concern about the  risks introduced by DOD’s current level of dependency on contractors and  the need to better plan for operational contract support in the future. The  Secretary outlined a number of actions and indicated a need to  institutionalize the changes necessary to influence a cultural shift in how  the department views, and accounts and plans for contracted support in a  contingency environment while the lessons learned from recent  operations are fresh.
In my statement today, I will highlight three interrelated areas of  operational contract support in which sustained leadership is needed if  DOD is to achieve meaningful change and effectively prepare for the next  contingency. These areas pertain to (1) planning for the use of  operational contract support, (2) ensuring that DOD possesses the  workforce needed to effectively manage and oversee contracts and  contractors, and (3) improving DOD’s ability to account for contracts and  contractors. My statement is based on our broad body of work on DOD’s  efforts to plan for operational contract support in Iraq and Afghanistan and  contract management issues—including work reflected in our February  2011 high-risk update, our related April 2011 and June 2010 testimonies,  and our recent reports on operational contract support and other  contracting issues. This work was conducted in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Planning for the Use of Operational Contract Support
paragraphs: Future overseas contingencies are inherently uncertain, but effective  planning—at both the strategic and operational levels—can help DOD  reduce the risks posed by those uncertainties. At a strategic level,  planning is an important element in a results-oriented framework; it can  help DOD clarify priorities and unify the department in pursuit of common  goals for operational contract support. Similarly, at an operational level,  effective planning can help better define contract support requirements to  avoid potential waste and abuse and facilitate the continuity of services.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, we previously reported that insufficient planning  for operational contract support may lead to shortages in contractor  personnel available to perform key functions, such as not having enough  personnel to maintain and repair mission essential vehicles and  equipment. Additionally, due in part to limited operational planning for  contracted support, we previously reported that DOD faced challenges  planning for certain aspects of contracting and contractor management in  Iraq during the drawdown.
DOD has recognized the need to improve its planning for operational  contract support. In addition to the Secretary’s January 2011  memorandum, DOD has communicated and emphasized the importance  of operational contract support at the strategic level through the issuance  of new policy and guidance and ongoing efforts. For example: In December 2011, DOD issued regulations establishing policy,  assigning responsibilities, and providing procedures for operational  contract support. The regulations were issued as an interim final rule  published in the Federal Register and as Department of Defense
According to DOD officials, in 2011, the department revised its  Guidance for Employment of the Force and the Joint Strategic  Capabilities Plan to emphasize contractor management, and it is  currently revising another core piece of guidance, Joint Publication 4- 10, to help further integrate operational contract support into planning  efforts.
In 2010, DOD established the Operational Contract Support  Functional Capability Integration Board, which is responsible for a  variety of tasks including conducting independent assessments and  analysis of operational contract support capabilities of the military;  advocating for operational contract support capability development in  a variety of venues; and establishing and assessing ways to improve  measures of performance, metrics, and processes for measuring  operational contract support readiness. This board is drafting an  Operational Contract Support Action Plan to outline steps the  department plans to take to close identified gaps in operational  contract support capabilities.
Operational Contract Support, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,807 (Dec. 29, 2011) (to be codified at 32  C.F.R. pt. 158); Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41, Operational Contract Support  (OCS) (Dec. 20, 2011). officials, most of the annexes that had been drafted at that time restated  broad language from existing DOD guidance on the use of contractors to  support deployed forces but included few details on the type of  contractors needed to execute a given plan. We also found shortcomings  in guidance for planners on how and when to develop contract support  annexes, which resulted in a mismatch of expectations between senior  DOD leadership and combatant command planners regarding the degree  to which Annex Ws would contain specific information on contract support  requirements.
Overall, we found that requiring consideration of potential contract  support requirements raised awareness of the importance of operational  contract support and led to some improvements in planning for contract  support. Nevertheless, we found that DOD still risked not fully  understanding the extent to which it would be relying on contractors to  support combat operations and being unprepared to provide the  necessary management and oversight of deployed contractor personnel.  One way to help address this risk is to ensure military commanders and  senior leaders are cognizant of the roles contractors have in supporting  DOD’s efforts, as well as the role that DOD military personnel have in  managing and overseeing contractors. In 2006 and again in 2012, we  recommended that operational contract support training, with a particular  emphasis on contingency operations, be included in professional military  education to ensure that all military personnel expected to perform  contract or contractor management duties, including commanders and  senior leaders, receive training prior to deployment. Military  commanders and senior leaders have used contractors to perform a  variety of services to help their units execute the mission, including life  support, security, and communications support. We previously found that  DOD officials in Afghanistan did not always receive training that  adequately prepared them for their contract management and oversight  duties, and according to DOD officials, the training did not necessarily  make them sufficiently capable for their particular assignments. Further,  contracting personnel have told us that commanders, particularly those in  combat units, do not perceive operational contract support as a warfighter  task. DOD has developed a program of instruction on contingency  acquisition to be taught at some of the military and senior staff colleges.  However, we have previously reported that commanders and senior  leaders are not required to take these courses before assuming their  contract management roles and responsibilities.
section_title: Ensuring That DOD Possesses the Workforce Needed to Effectively Manage and Oversee Contracts and Contractors
paragraphs: In contingencies, having the right people, with the right skills, in the right  numbers can make the difference between success and failure. These  individuals—whether acquisition professionals or non-acquisition  personnel, including military commanders—play critical roles in defining  requirements, managing and overseeing contracts and contractors, and  helping to ensure that the warfighter receives the goods and services  needed in a timely manner while serving to mitigate the risks of fraud,  waste, and abuse.
Our work, as well as the work of others in the accountability community,  has identified numerous instances in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere  where these individuals were in short supply, were not properly trained, or  were not fully aware of their responsibilities. For example, in 2010, we  found that DOD relied on contractors to support contract administration  functions in Iraq and Afghanistan, in part because of a shortage of  government personnel to perform these functions. In March 2012, we  reported that DOD oversight personnel in Afghanistan did not always  receive adequate training for their contract management duties, and that  DOD continued to lack a sufficient number of oversight personnel for  contracts in Afghanistan, which in some cases resulted in projects being  completed without sufficient government oversight and problems not  being identified until projects were already completed. Further, we have  found in the past that some commanders had to be advised by contract  oversight personnel that they had to provide certain support, such as  housing, force protection, and meals, to contractors.
DOD leadership has recognized the need to rebuild, train, and support a  highly qualified and knowledgeable acquisition workforce as a strategic  priority. This workforce, which was downsized considerably through the  1990s, has faced increases in the volume and complexity of work  because of increases in services contracting, ongoing contingency  operations, and other critical missions. We reported in June 2012 that,  according to DOD, the size of DOD’s civilian acquisition workforce  increased from 118,445 in fiscal year 2009 to about 135,981 in December  2011, a gain of 17,536. According to DOD officials, 5,855 individuals  were hired using the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund  with other growth attributed to hiring new staff using other funding  sources, moving contracted work to government employees through  insourcing, and reclassifying existing DOD staff as acquisition staff. For  example, DOD provided $321 million from the fund to help support  increasing the size of the Defense Contract Management Agency  (DCMA) and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), two key  contract oversight organizations. Last year, we reported that DCMA  officials identified a number of ways deployments of DCMA personnel in  support of contingencies—which more than tripled over the past 5  years—have affected the agency’s other missions, which include  providing contract administration services for DOD buying activities and  working directly with defense contractors to help ensure that goods and  services are delivered on time, at projected cost, and that they meet  performance requirements.years given its limited workforce and growing workload. DOD continues to  face challenges in strategic workforce planning for its acquisition  workforce. Further, DOD’s ability to effectively execute hiring and other  initiatives has been hindered by delays in the Defense Acquisition  Workforce Development Fund funding process and the absence of clear  guidance on the availability and use of related funds.
DCAA has also faced challenges in recent  Similarly, while DOD has recognized the important role that non- acquisition personnel—those outside the defense acquisition workforce— play in the acquisition process, DOD continues to face a number of  challenges in ensuring that these individuals are identified and have the  training and resources needed to perform their roles, in particular as  contracting officer’s representatives (CORs). CORs are generally military  or civilian DOD personnel that manage and oversee contracts and serve  as the liaisons between the contractor, the contracting officer, and the unit  receiving support or services. While the contracting officer is ultimately  responsible for ensuring that contractors meet the requirements set forth  in the contract, CORs serve as the eyes and ears of contracting officers.  However, earlier this year, we reported that DOD has experienced  challenges ensuring that (1) it has a sufficient number of CORs and (2)  the CORs have the subject-matter expertise and training needed to  perform their contract management and oversight duties, in particular for  construction projects. DOD has taken some actions to enhance training  programs to prepare CORs to manage and oversee contracts in  contingency operations. For example, DOD developed a new training  course for CORs, with a focus on contingency operations and developed  a more general certification program for CORs, including the contingency  operations course as a training requirement when it is applicable.  Continued attention in this area will help DOD ensure better contract  management and oversight in future contingencies.
section_title: Improving DOD’s Ability to Account for Contracts and Contractors
paragraphs: DOD’s ability to effectively leverage operational contract support in  contingency environments not only depends on having effective plans in  place and having a skilled acquisition and oversight workforce, but also  on having appropriate tools to account for contracts and contractor  personnel. These tools can provide information that DOD can use to help  mitigate risks associated with relying on contractors in contingency  environments, including tracking which contracts DOD has awarded,  where contractor personnel are located, and whether potential vendors or  contractor personnel may pose a risk to U.S. interests. Our prior work has  shown that a lack of complete and accurate information on contracts and  contractor personnel may inhibit planning, increase costs, and introduce  unnecessary risk in contingency environments. Our work has further  shown that DOD faced significant contract management challenges as a  result of not having the mechanisms or tools in place to obtain and track  such information at the start of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
DOD has made efforts to develop tools to improve its ability to account for  contracts and contractors, but it is not certain that these efforts will result  in long-term solutions that will be available at the start of future  contingencies. For example, in 2008, DOD designated the Synchronized  Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) as its system for  tracking specific information on certain contracts and associated  personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. While recent efforts have been made  to improve SPOT’s tracking of contractor personnel, in reports issued  annually since 2008, including in a report we plan to issue today, we have  consistently found that DOD has lacked reliable data and systems to  report on its contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Practical and technical challenges continue to affect SPOT’s ability to fully  track certain information about contracts and contractor personnel.  Additionally, DOD has experienced challenges in closing out contracts  partly due to the fact that the contracting organization that awarded the  majority of DOD’s contracts in Iraq lacked a contract writing and  management information system between 2003 and 2008. This  contributed to incomplete or inaccurate information that hindered  management oversight of contracting activities. Although the contracting  organization adopted an automated contract writing and management  information system in fiscal year 2009 that officials stated improved the  quality of data, DOD announced in October 2011 its goal to phase out the  use of this system in part because of challenges associated with  maintaining and updating it.
Similarly, we previously reported on limitations in DOD policies and  procedures related to vetting vendors and ensuring that contractor  personnel—particularly local nationals and third-country nationals—have  been screened. These policies and procedures can help ensure that DOD  will be able to take reasonable steps, in both current and future  contingencies, to minimize the risks to the military posed by contractor  personnel. DOD’s U.S. Central Command established a vetting cell in  2010 to vet non-U.S. vendors in Afghanistan to minimize the risk of  insurgents or criminal groups using contracts to fund their operations.  However, we reported in 2011 that DOD’s then-current approach for  selecting vendors to vet had gaps, such as not routinely vetting contracts  below a certain dollar threshold. We also reported in 2009 that the  system used in Iraq and Afghanistan to screen local and third-country  national contractor personnel by checking names and biometric data  relied primarily upon U.S.-based databases of criminal and terrorist  information, which may not be effective in screening foreign nationals who  have not lived in or traveled to the United States.
Without attention to improving the tools needed to effectively account for  contracts and contractor personnel, DOD may continue to face similar  challenges in future contingencies. Having the tools with the requisite  capabilities in place before the next contingency can help military and  acquisition officials properly plan for, manage, and oversee contracts and  contractors in future contingencies.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: For the past 10 years, DOD has focused its attention on contingency  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The challenges encountered in those  contingencies highlighted the need for better strategic and operational  planning when it comes to the use of operational contract support, as well  as to ensure that DOD’s workforce is sufficiently trained and staffed and  has the tools needed to effectively account for contracts and contractors.  As reflected in the Secretary’s January 2011 memorandum regarding  operational contract support, DOD leadership has recognized that it is  imperative for the department to learn from these experiences while they  are still fresh and to set forth a commitment to encourage cultural change  with respect to operational contract support throughout the department.  We agree. The challenge for DOD is to sustain this effort over the long  term, as effecting a cultural change is by no means easy and takes time.
It will take the sustained commitment by DOD leadership to ensure that  they continue down the path that they have set out for the department. As  DOD’s current efforts in Afghanistan draw closer to a conclusion and  DOD turns its attention to other challenges, DOD needs to guard against  allowing the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan to be forgotten. Focusing  on the areas my statement highlighted today will better position DOD to  effectively use contractors in future contingencies.
Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the  Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  answer any questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Timothy J.  DiNapoli at (202) 512-4841 or dinapolit@gao.gov. In addition, contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key  contributions to this testimony are Alissa Czyz, Assistant Director; Johana   Ayers; Rajiv D’Cruz; Melissa Hermes; Mae Jones; Anne McDonough- Hughes; Cary Russell; Michael Shaughnessy; Yong Song; and Alyssa  Weir.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: The following is a list of related products. For a full list of the most recent  publications related to Iraq and Afghanistan, see  http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/oif.html.
Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve Data on  Contracting but Need to Standardize Reporting. GAO-12-977R  (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2012).
Iraq and Afghanistan: State and DOD Should Ensure Interagency  Acquisitions Are Effectively Managed and Comply with Fiscal Law.  GAO-12-750 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2012).
Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions to Address Recommendations  by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.  GAO-12-854R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 1, 2012).
Defense Acquisition Workforce: Improved Processes, Guidance, and  Planning Needed to Enhance Use of Workforce Funds. GAO-12-747R  (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2012).
Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight Improvements  Needed in Afghanistan. GAO-12-290 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2012).
Acquisition Workforce: DOD’s Efforts to Rebuild Capacity Have Shown  Some Progress. GAO-12-232T (Washington, D.C.: Nov.16, 2011).
Defense Contract Management Agency: Amid Ongoing Efforts to Rebuild  Capacity, Several Factors Present Challenges in Meeting Its Missions.  GAO-12-83 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 3, 2011).
Defense Acquisition Workforce: Better Identification, Development, and  Oversight Needed for Personnel Involved in Acquiring Services.  GAO-11-892 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2011).
Contingency Contracting: Improved Planning and Management Oversight  Needed to Address Challenges with Closing Contracts. GAO-11-891  (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2011).
Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility,  Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role.  GAO-11-774 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2011).
Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully Account for  Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel.  GAO-11-886 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2011).
Operational Contract Support: Actions Needed to Address Contract  Oversight and Vetting of Non-U.S. Vendors in Afghanistan. GAO-11-771T  (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2011).
Afghanistan: U.S. Efforts to Vet Non-U.S. Vendors Need Improvement.  GAO-11-355 (Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2011).
Contingency Contracting: Observations on Actions Needed to Address  Systemic Challenges. GAO-11-580 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2011).
Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued  Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and  Associated Personnel. GAO-11-1 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2010).
Warfighter Support: Cultural Change Needed to Improve How DOD Plans  for and Manages Operational Contract Support. GAO-10-829T  (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2010).
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient  Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq. GAO-10-376  (Washington, D.C: Apr. 19, 2010).
Contingency Contracting: Improvements Needed in Management of  Contractors Supporting Contract and Grant Administration in Iraq and  Afghanistan. GAO-10-357 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2010).
Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using  Contractors to Support Future Military Operations. GAO-10-472  (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010).
Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Face Challenges in Tracking Contracts,  Grants, Cooperative Agreements, and Associated Personnel.  GAO-10-509T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2010).
Warfighter Support: Continued Actions Needed by DOD to Improve and  Institutionalize Contractor Support in Contingency Operations.  GAO-10-551T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2010).
Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face  Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and  Afghanistan. GAO-10-1 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2009).
Contingency Contract Management: DOD Needs to Develop and Finalize  Background Screening and Other Standards for Private Security  Contractors. GAO-09-351 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2009).
Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and  Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO-09-19 (Washington,  D.C.: Oct. 1, 2008).
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance  on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight.  GAO-08-572T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008).
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