Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed
Published: 2004-02-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In August 2000, the Defense Department's (DOD) Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), made 50 recommendations on a test program for a system to defeat long-range ballistic missile threats against the United States. DOD's Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans to begin fielding the system by September 2004. GAO examined (1) how MDA addressed DOT&E's recommendations and (2) what is known about the effectiveness of the system to be fielded by September 2004. GAO issued a classified report on this subject in June 2003. This unclassified, updated version reflects changes in MDA's test schedule.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: MDA is addressing most of DOT&E's recommendations on flight testing but will not complete many actions before September 2004. For example, DOT&E recommended removing flight test range limitations by adding more intercept regions and launch locations to add greater realism to its tests. MDA is expanding the test range infrastructure to add five intercept regions and target and interceptor launches out of new locations. By September 2004, one of the regions will be tested. MDA is generally not addressing DOT&E's proposals on ground testing. For example, although MDA had begun upgrading a ground facility to provide a realistic testing environment for the interceptor, MDA deferred testing at the facility to fund other priorities. Finally, MDA is addressing DOT&E's recommendations on discrimination--the system's ability to find an enemy warhead among decoys--by funding analysis programs. Predictions of how well the system will defeat long-range ballistic missiles are based on limited data. No component of the system to be fielded by September 2004 has been flight-tested in its deployed configuration. Significant uncertainties surround the capability to be fielded by September: MDA will not demonstrate in flight tests a critical radar called Cobra Dane before that date or conduct a system-level demonstration, and has yet to test its three-stage boosters as part of a planned intercept.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) within the Department of Defense  (DOD) is developing and testing components of the Ground-based  Midcourse Defense (GMD) element, which is intended to defeat long-range  ballistic missile threats in the midcourse phase of flight. When deployed,  GMD will include (1) space- and ground-based sensors to provide early  warning and tracking of missile launches; (2) ground- and sea-based radars  to identify and refine the tracks of threatening missiles (called reentry  vehicles) and associated objects; (3) ground-based interceptors, each  consisting of a three-stage booster and kill vehicle, to destroy enemy  missiles through “hit-to-kill” impacts outside the atmosphere; and (4) fire  control nodes for battle management and execution of the GMD mission.
In August 2000, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E),  submitted a report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics for consideration at DOD’s deployment  readiness review for the National Missile Defense system. The purpose of  the report was to provide an independent assessment of the system’s  potential operational effectiveness and suitability. Based on its assessment  of the system at that time and the adequacy of testing in the context of  deployment, it stated that test results supported a decision to continue  development but not deployment. In the report, DOT&E stated that the  current test program required augmentation and probably significant  funding increases to demonstrate an operationally effective system for  deployment. The report included a list of 50 detailed recommendations  regarding the test program. In September 2000, the President decided to  defer the deployment decision to the next administration, and MDA (then  named the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization) continued with  development of the system.
In January 2002, the Secretary of Defense refocused the ballistic missile  defense program into a broad-based research and development effort  managed by MDA. The new program follows a “capability-based approach”  and aims at developing layered defenses to intercept missiles in all phases  of flight. According to MDA, such an approach adds flexibility to the  acquisition process by permitting the development and testing of mature  technologies for the quick delivery of some capability. The new approach  also allows DOD to evolve and demonstrate additional improvements in  missile defense systems before committing to procurement and  operations. To this end, MDA is following a “block” approach, which  defines, develops, produces or acquires, and fields operational capability  in incremental blocks. Each block is designed to build capability into the  system by introducing new or improved technology. The first block— Block 2004—in this approach to offer a defensive capability builds upon  MDA’s Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Test Bed for conducting  more realistic testing of ballistic missile defense elements, of which GMD  is the centerpiece.
In December 2002, the President directed DOD to begin fielding  components of the ballistic missile defense system for operational use by  2004. That is, in addition to focusing resources on the development of the  BMDS Test Bed for developmental testing of missile defense elements, he  instructed MDA to build in an initial defensive capability that would  protect the United States against long-range missile attacks. The Secretary  of Defense stated that “…it would be a very preliminary, modest  capability.” DOD decided to begin fielding an initial capability by  September 2004.
Because of the significance of recommendations made by DOT&E during  DOD’s deployment readiness review and the decision by the President to  deploy an initial defensive capability, you asked us to examine (1) the  actions taken or planned by MDA that address the recommendations made  by DOT&E, and (2) what is known about the effectiveness and limitations  of the initial defensive capability to defeat long-range ballistic missiles in  the September 2004 time frame. The scope and methodology for our  review is included in appendix I.
We provided you with a classified report on this subject in June 2003. This  is an unclassified version of that report, which has also been updated as of  December 2003 to reflect changes in the GMD test program. In preparing  this unclassified version, we removed details on some of our findings after  an extensive declassification process. These details can be found in the  classified version of the report. The current version has been reviewed by  the DOD and approved for public release.
subsections: section_title: Missile Defense Agency Actions Taken or Planned to Address DOT&E Recommendations
paragraphs: The August 2000 DOT&E report summarized the progress, up to that date,  of the National Missile Defense program and the adequacy of testing in the  context of a deployment decision. At the time, the development program  revolved around a series of ground and flight tests and was to have  culminated in an initial operational capability by the end of fiscal year  2005. Formal test documentation called for a total of 16 integrated flight  tests (system-level intercept attempts) through 2004 with three additional  flight tests during Initial Operational Test and Evaluation during the 2005  fiscal year. DOT&E’s principal finding was that ground and flight tests  completed up to that time did not provide results of sufficient fidelity to  support a deployment decision. Indeed, when the deployment readiness  review was held, there had been two failed intercepts out of three  attempts. Furthermore, as stated in the DOT&E report, ground testing was  not adequate to yield credible estimates of GMD system performance.  DOT&E indicated that the current test program required augmentation and  probably significant funding increases to demonstrate an operationally  effective system for deployment. Accordingly, the report included a list of  detailed recommendations for enhancing the test program.
DOT&E made 50 specific, interrelated recommendations, which we  organized into the following four overarching categories: Flight Testing,  Ground Testing, Target Discrimination, and Programmatics. Although  DOT&E categorized discrimination-related recommendations under the  flight-testing and ground-testing categories, we created a separate  category because discrimination was of principal concern to DOT&E at  the time. DOD classified the full text of the recommendations. A detailed  assessment indicating whether actions have been initiated by MDA and  what their timing is relative to the September 2004 initial defensive  capability date can be found in our June 2003 classified report on this  subject. A summary of MDA actions to address the DOT&E  recommendations is provided below.
subsections: section_title: DOT&E Recommendations on Flight Testing
paragraphs: Integrated flight tests of the GMD element are demonstrations of system  performance during which an interceptor is launched to engage and  intercept a target reentry vehicle (mock warhead) above the atmosphere.
Many recommendations (20 of 50) in the DOT&E report pertain to aspects  of integrated flight testing, such as deficiencies in flight-test complexity,  operational realism, and artificialities. DOT&E’s concerns with the  composition of target suites in flight tests for testing discrimination are  discussed separately in the discrimination section of this report. DOT&E  reported that increasing the scope of flight testing was essential to stress  the limits of system design and to keep pace with system development.
MDA is taking actions that address many of the shortcomings in flight  testing DOT&E identified in its August 2000 report. Indeed, the  development of the BMDS Test Bed—the agency’s key instrument for  enhancing the existing test infrastructure to provide more realistic  testing—should go far in addressing these DOT&E recommendations over  the long term. Currently, flight tests are limited to target launches out of  Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and interceptor launches out of  Kwajalein Missile Range in the western Pacific. For enhancing the  capabilities of integrated flight testing, the test bed adds an interceptor  launch site at Vandenberg Air Force Base; target launch facilities at  Kodiak Launch Complex, Alaska; a GMD fire control node at Fort Greely,  Alaska; an upgraded early warning radar at Beale Air Force Base,  California; upgraded communication links among test bed components;  and test infrastructure to support five additional intercept regions. The  ship-based Aegis AN/SPY-1 radar is also available as a forward-deployed  asset for early target tracking. In addition, the design and construction of a  sea-based X-band radar, which would be positioned on a mobile platform  in the Pacific, has been funded by MDA and is scheduled to be available  for test bed utilization in late 2005. Other components of the BMDS Test  Bed such as the Cobra Dane radar in Shemya, Alaska, and interceptors at  Fort Greely will not actively participate in integrated flight tests at least  through September 2007.
subsections: section_title: Flight Test Complexity
paragraphs: Several August 2000 DOT&E recommendations call for integrated flight  testing with Category B engagements and scenarios with multiple  threatening reentry vehicles, both of which are expected to be common  during operational missions. In addition, the recommendations call for  integrated flight testing to be performed under increasingly difficult  conditions and to be made more challenging through, for example, testing  under various solar and weather conditions. Our analysis of the GMD test  program as it pertains to flight test complexity, based on the March 2003  Developmental Master Test Plan for the GMD element and related  program documentation, is summarized below.
Flight Test Complexity—Actions Taken or Planned. The GMD test  plan calls for Category B engagements beginning with Integrated Flight  Test 15 (IFT-15), scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2004.  Furthermore, it indicates that Category B engagements would be a  common occurrence of flight testing, because the weapon task plan  would be generated from Beale or Aegis radar data. According to MDA  officials, however, the decision to conduct future flight tests under  Category B engagements is currently under review; the resolution will  depend on the individual flight test scenario and the maturity of battle  management assets. The GMD Developmental Master Test Plan also shows  that an integrated flight test (designated IFT-22/23) in which two  interceptors are launched against two attacking reentry vehicles (multiple  simultaneous engagements) will be carried out in fiscal year 2007.
Flight Test Complexity—Actions Not Taken or Planned. Although  previous flight tests have been conducted under limited adverse  conditions (light rain), flight tests to assess the actual effects of severe  weather on system performance are not currently planned. According to  the program office, the verification of system performance in adverse  weather will be achieved through modeling and simulation grounded in  technical measurements and flight test data. Furthermore, a nighttime  engagement was attempted during IFT-10 (December 2002), but the failure  of the kill vehicle to separate from the surrogate booster precluded  collection of any applicable data.
section_title: Operational Realism
paragraphs: The recommendations on operational realism reflect limitations of the  current test range. Currently, intercept tests are constrained to a single  corridor and intercept region—target launches out of Vandenberg Air  Force Base and interceptor launches out of the Reagan Test Site. As a  result, flight-test engagement conditions are limited to those with low  closing velocities and short interceptor fly-out ranges. DOT&E called for  an expansion of engagement conditions and suggested adding more  intercept regions and launch locations to achieve new intercept  geometries, higher closing velocities, and longer ranges flown by the  interceptor during flight testing.
Operational Realism—Actions Taken or Planned. The expansion of  the test range in the Pacific with the development of the BMDS Test Bed  will have a significant impact on achieving operational realism in  integrated flight tests. The Block 2004 Test Bed adds five intercept regions,  target launches out of Kodiak Launch Complex, and interceptor launches  out of Vandenberg Air Force Base. The combination allows for flight tests  with new intercept geometries, additional crossing angles, higher closing  velocities, and longer ranges flown by the interceptor. For example, IFT-15  (fourth quarter of fiscal year 2004) will be conducted with a target launch  out of Kodiak, and IFT-17 (fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005) will be the  first test with an interceptor launched from Vandenberg.
Operational Realism—Caveats. The principal caveat to the associated  MDA actions addressing operational realism is timing. By September 2004,  one of the five new intercept regions, north of Reagan Test Site, will have  been exercised. The remaining new intercept regions will not be exercised  until after September 2004. For example, the two intercept regions off the  west coast of the United States will be used in IFT-17 (fourth quarter of  fiscal year 2005) and IFT-18 (fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005),  respectively. A fourth intercept point will be exercised in IFT-21 (third  quarter of fiscal year 2006). Finally, the fifth intercept point will be  exercised as part of the multiple simultaneous engagement to be  conducted in fiscal year 2007.
section_title: Artificialities
paragraphs: The DOT&E recommendations on flight test artificialities—such as the  removal of surrogates (test range assets emulating operational assets)— also reflect limitations of the current test range. The most artificial  surrogate noted in the August 2000 DOT&E Report was the placement of a  C-band transponder on the target reentry vehicle. The transponder was  essential for the execution of flight tests, because in conjunction with the  test range radar (designated FPQ-14), there were no other non-artificial  options available to track the reentry vehicle with sufficient accuracy for  executing the mission. DOT&E argued that this artificiality be phased out  and, in general, recommended the system utilized in integrated flight tests  be as functional and representative as possible.
Artificialities—Actions Taken or Planned. Use of the  transponder/FPQ-14 radar combination as a surrogate radar for midcourse  tracking is planned to be phased out. Indeed, IFT-15 (fourth quarter of  fiscal year 2004) would be the first test that does not use this surrogate for  mission execution. Rather, in integrated flight tests IFT-15 and beyond,  midcourse tracking of the target suite would be achieved through the use  of the Beale upgraded early warning radar or, pending ongoing analysis by  GMD, the Aegis SPY-1 radar. The eventual use of the sea-based X-band  radar beginning in late 2005 can also be used for midcourse tracking. The  removal of other surrogates is under way. For example, the short-range  surrogate interceptor booster, which has been used in all flight tests to  date, is scheduled to be replaced with two more operationally  representative boosters beginning with IFT-14 (third quarter of fiscal year  2004).
Artificialities—Actions Not Taken or Planned. The MDA is not  currently considering conducting flight tests under unrehearsed and  unscripted conditions.
section_title: Elimination of Flight Tests
paragraphs: Overall, the current DOT&E has looked favorably on MDA’s actions that  address its recommendations, because the GMD test infrastructure is  being significantly enhanced to allow for more flight test complexity,  operational realism, and artificialities. We noted, however, that since  DOT&E’s August 2000 assessment, MDA has reduced the extent of the  flight test program, as follows:    Integrated Flight Tests—Number of Cancellations. During the initial  planning phases of the revised test program, MDA considered conducting  four intercept attempts per year. But after considerable planning and  contract evaluations, MDA limited the flight test program to no more than  three intercept attempts per year because of overlapping test objectives  and funding constraints. Significantly, the previous GMD test program at  the time of the deployment readiness review called for a total of 19  integrated flight tests to be carried out through fiscal year 2005. The  current test program, however, now has a total of 12 integrated flight tests  through fiscal year 2005—because of the cancellation of IFT-11, 12, and 16,  and the conversion of IFT-13 to booster tests (IFT-13A and 13B). To date, 8  of the 12 have been completed under largely the same test conditions that  were critically assessed by DOT&E. In short, only two flight tests under  improved test conditions with more representative hardware are planned  to be conducted before September 2004, the time at which the initial  defensive capability is scheduled to become available.
Operational Testing—No Longer Required. The previous GMD test  program also called for operational testing—Initial Operational Test and  Evaluation—by the military services. Operational testing is a statutory  requirement for DOT&E to independently determine operational  effectiveness and suitability of a deployed system for use by the  warfighter. MDA does not plan to operationally test the Block 2004 GMD  element before it is available for initial defensive operations. The  September 2004 fielding is not connected with a full-rate production  decision that would clearly trigger statutory operational testing  requirements. Nonetheless, the Combined Test Force, a group of users and  developers, plans tests to incorporate both developmental and operational  test requirements in the test program.
section_title: DOT&E’S Recommendations on Ground Testing
paragraphs: The 13 ground testing recommendations formulated by DOT&E in its  August 2000 report are focused concerns encompassing four areas:  (1) realistic testing of kill vehicle functions in a Hardware-in-the-Loop  (HWIL) facility, (2) ground-based lethality testing, (3) development of the  system-level simulation known as the Lead System Integrator Integration  Distributed Simulation (LIDS), and (4) Operations in a Nuclear  Environment (OPINE) testing of kill vehicle components. In general,  DOT&E’s recommendations on ground testing are not being addressed.
subsections: section_title: Hardware-in-the-Loop Testing
paragraphs: A number of the August 2000 DOT&E ground testing recommendations  pertain to the hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle built by  Raytheon. For example, a test article is placed in an evacuated chamber to  simulate an exoatmospheric environment, and infrared radiation of a  simulated target scene is projected onto the kill vehicle’s sensors. DOT&E  recommended “that an innovative new approach needs to be taken  towards hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle, so that potential  design problems or discrimination challenges can be wrung out on the  ground in lieu of expensive flight tests.” DOT&E stated that, in order to  verify kill vehicle performance, kill vehicle testing should be executed  using actual unit hardware in a hardware-in-the-loop facility capable  of providing a realistic space environment and threat scene. MDA  had taken steps to proceed with the design and construction of a  hardware-in-the-loop laboratory at the Arnold Engineering Development  Center, Tullahoma, Tennessee. Although an initial test capability had been  planned for the 2004 time frame, testing at the Arnold Engineering facility  has been deferred beyond Block 2004 based on Test Bed funding  constraints. In response to a draft of this report, MDA stated that future  investments and test events at this facility are subject to MDA internal  management trade-offs among the numerous priorities associated with the  whole missile defense program portfolio.
section_title: Lethality Testing
paragraphs: DOT&E made recommendations in its August 2000 report for improving  GMD lethality testing—testing aimed at assessing a kill vehicle’s  effectiveness in destroying a reentry vehicle. Current test plans call for an  approach whereby ground-based experiments are conducted to collect  data to anchor simulations, which in turn are used to assess lethality  performance. Indeed, GMD expects to anchor such simulations from data  derived from improved “sled testing,” which uses full-scale targets in the  newly developed Holloman Air Force Base Hypersonic Upgrade Program  facility. However, there are no plans to conduct intercept flight tests of the  interceptor’s ability to destroy threat representative targets that fulfill the  Live Fire Test and Evaluation requirements. Rather, hit point information  is collected from actual intercept tests, which, in turn, is used as input to  simulations to determine whether the impact was lethal.
Another area of ground testing recommendations identified in the August  2000 DOT&E report concerned the development and use of system-level  digital simulations. During the time of the deployment readiness review,  the prime contractor’s principal tool for assessing system performance  over a broad range of scenarios was the end-to-end digital simulation  known as LIDS. Because the development of the simulation was behind  schedule and unavailable to support analyses of overall system  performance, DOT&E reported that results obtained from it should not be  used in making a deployment decision. DOT&E recommended that LIDS  capability be “evolved to a fully validated, high-fidelity simulation.” In  addition, DOT&E recommended that LIDS be made flexible enough to  permit independent use by test agencies. MDA disagrees with the  recommendations pertaining to LIDS. MDA views LIDS as one of many  tools to analyze performance aspects of the GMD element and does not  believe that LIDS needs to be developed to the level expected by DOT&E.  According to the agency, a baseline of models and simulations are  available that are intended to collectively support the entire range of  analysis required to verify the capabilities of the GMD elements.  Furthermore, MDA asserts the evolution of LIDS from Software Build 4 to  its current Software Build 6.1.0 has improved the flexibility of the system  to allow for sensitivity analyses by government users. According to MDA,  extensive analysis using LIDS has been conducted at the Joint National  Integration Center at Shriever Air Force Base, Colorado.
section_title: OPINE Testing
paragraphs: Finally, the remaining ground testing recommendations identified in the  August 2000 DOT&E report focus on OPINE testing, which refers to the  operation of individual GMD components in environments induced by  nuclear explosions. Details can be found in the classified version of this  report.
section_title: DOT&E Recommendations on Target Discrimination
paragraphs: Target discrimination is a critical function of a missile defense engagement  that requires the successful execution of a sequence of functions,  including target detection, target tracking, estimations of physical  characteristics of tracked objects, and data fusion. DOT&E had two  overarching concerns with the operational testing of the discrimination  function:    Capability against diverse threats. Fundamentally, successful target  discrimination requires that the defense be able to anticipate many  characteristics of the threat. DOT&E, therefore, was concerned that  discrimination algorithms may not be sufficiently robust to handle  unanticipated threat scenes.
The quality and quantity of information known prior to testing.
DOT&E was concerned that every physical property of target objects is  known with unrealistic accuracy in advance of flight tests.
Twelve of 50 recommendations in the August 2000 DOT&E report pertain  to the testing of the discrimination function. Specifically, DOT&E  recommended adding challenging yet unsophisticated countermeasures to  the target suites of integrated flight tests. DOT&E also recommended  integrating countermeasures developed by the Countermeasures Hands- On Program (CHOP) into target suites of integrated flight tests. Finally,  DOT&E recommended executing flight test events—either intercept  attempts or risk reduction flights—that have a “pop quiz” component with  respect to radar discrimination. Operationally, this type of flight test is  more representative of a true tactical engagement, because the exact  composition and type of countermeasures flown in an actual engagement  are generally unknown. Details can be found in the classified version of  this report.
Relative to the previous test program, MDA has substantially increased the  scope of work being done in discrimination. MDA is pursuing a block  approach that incrementally builds to a system-level discrimination  architecture that incorporates a network of sensors. The idea is to observe  the target suite throughout its trajectory using an array of ground- and  space-based sensors and to combine individual observations to formulate  a “discrimination solution.” MDA is also investing resources to study the  discrimination problem and, for example, is moving forward with flight  test events focused on radar discrimination and large analysis programs.
MDA has plans to conduct four Radar Certification Flights through fiscal  year 2006. These are non-intercept flight tests for comprehensively  characterizing the discrimination capability of the X-band radar and to  support the development of upgraded early warning radars. Furthermore,  these tests are expected to have a “pop quiz” component to examine radar  discrimination. MDA has not yet scheduled “pop quiz” testing in relation to  kill vehicle’s capability to perform target discrimination.
MDA initiated and continues to fund analysis programs for investigating  promising technical concepts to improve its capabilities against enemy  countermeasures. For example, one such program, Project Hercules, is  focused on the development and testing of discrimination algorithms and  draws on academic, government, and industry expertise. Details can be  found in the classified version of this report.
Despite MDA’s increased scope of work in the discrimination area,  as described above, the agency’s specific actions pertaining to  integrated flight testing only partially address the August 2000 DOT&E  recommendations. No intercept flight tests of the current test plan,  which goes through IFT-26 (fiscal year 2007), are planned to address  the challenge posed by an enemy’s use of unsophisticated but more  challenging countermeasures. Rather, agency officials told us that the  technical challenges posed by such countermeasures are being analyzed  and may be inserted into the flight test program at a later time.
section_title: DOT&E Recommendations on Programmatics
paragraphs: The remaining five recommendations from the August 2000 DOT&E report  pertain to concerns on programmatic issues, namely, adequacy of spares  in flight testing, and performance requirements. MDA has not provided for  adequate target or interceptor backups (hot spares) during flight tests.  MDA officials stated that additional target and interceptor spares can be  costly, but they are considering the issue. Even if implemented, MDA’s  actions that address the recommendations on spares would not have a  significant impact on the actual conduct of flight tests but would reduce  schedule risk.
When DOT&E made its recommendations in August 2000, the GMD  element was being developed according to operational requirements.  However, MDA is now following a fundamentally new acquisition  strategy—one that is capability-based with no formal operational  requirements developed by the services. Hence, MDA has no plans to  reexamine the reliability requirements. Nonetheless, the current test  program is addressing certain performance issues raised by DOT&E.  For example, the GMD program office is tracking the prime contractor’s  progress in meeting target discrimination goals.
section_title: Characterization of Initial Defensive Capability
paragraphs: Under the new acquisition strategy outlined by the Secretary of Defense in  his January 2002 memorandum, the ballistic missile defense program has  been refocused into a broad-based research and development effort  managed by MDA. The new program aims at developing layered defenses  to intercept missiles in all phases of flight and, if directed, to use  developmental prototypes and test assets to provide an early operational  capability. And, as stated above, system development is not subject to the  formal operational requirements developed by the Services.
On December 16, 2002, the President directed DOD to begin fielding the  first increment of the multi-element ballistic missile defense system in  2004. The Secretary of Defense stated the next day that “…it would be a  very preliminary, modest capability.” The initial defensive capability for  defending the United States against long-range missiles would be based on  the GMD element of the Test Bed and augmented with more interceptors  and external sensors, as follows:    GMD Element as part of the BMDS. The principal components  of the GMD element for defensive operations include a total of up to  10 interceptors sited at Fort Greely (6) and Vandenberg Air Force Base (4);  GMD fire control nodes at Fort Greely and Schriever Air Force Base for  battle management and execution; an upgraded Cobra Dane radar at  Eareckson Air Station; and an upgraded early warning radar at Beale Air  Force Base.
External Sensors. Existing sensors external to the GMD element would  also be available for defensive operations, including Defense Support  Program satellites for early warning of missile launches, and three  forward-deployed Aegis AN/SPY-1 radars on existing Navy destroyers for  early midcourse tracking.
The above assets comprise the initial configuration, which is scheduled  for fielding by the end of September 2004. The agency’s near-term  intention is to grow this capability by adding 10 interceptors at Fort  Greely, a sea-based X-band radar, and an upgraded early warning radar at  Fylingdales, England, by the end of 2005.
subsections: section_title: Uncertainties of the Initial Defensive Capability
paragraphs: MDA is moving forward, as directed by the President, with the fielding of  an initial defensive capability by the end of the 2004 fiscal year to protect  the United States from long-range missiles. MDA cannot at this time  formulate a credible assessment of system-level effectiveness, because  critical components like the Cobra Dane radar and interceptor boosters  have yet to be developed and tested in a flight test environment, and no  initial defensive capability is available for a system-level demonstration  and evaluation.
Cobra Dane Radar. The capabilities of the Cobra Dane radar will not be  demonstrated in flight testing before September 2004. It is an L-band  phased array radar located at Eareckson Air Station in Shemya, Alaska, at  the western end of the Aleutian chain. Its close proximity to Russia allows  it to perform its primary mission of collecting data on intercontinental  ballistic missile and submarine launched ballistic missile test launches to  the Kamchatka impact area. Since the Cobra Dane radar is currently being  used in a surveillance mode, it does not require real time communications  and data processing capabilities. After planned software and hardware  upgrades to be completed in fiscal year 2004, it will have the additional  mission to perform real-time acquisition and tracking, functions critical for  ballistic missile defense.
Interceptor Boosters. In July 1998, the GMD prime contractor (Boeing)  began developing a new three-stage booster for its ground-based  interceptor from commercial off-the-shelf components. The contractor  encountered difficulty, and by the time the booster was flight tested in  August 2001, it was already about 18 months behind schedule.  Subsequently, to reduce risk, MDA altered its strategy for acquiring a new  booster for the GMD interceptor. Development of the original booster was  transferred to Lockheed Martin, and MDA authorized the GMD prime  contractor to develop a second source for the booster by awarding a  subcontract to Orbital Sciences Corporation. Both contractors are  developing boosters for use in the September 2004 initial defensive  capability. The first demonstration of an operational booster in an  attempted intercept is scheduled for the third quarter of fiscal year 2004.
System-Level Testing. A system-level demonstration of the initial  defensive capability will not be conducted prior to September 2004. To  date, integrated flight tests have demonstrated basic functionality of a  representative ballistic missile defense system using surrogate and  prototype components, and have shown success in intercepting a mock  reentry vehicle in a developmental test environment. The first flight test  consisting of components closest to the configuration of the September  2004 initial defensive capability is IFT-14, which is currently scheduled for  the third quarter of fiscal year 2004. The test will incorporate Block 2004  prototypes of the interceptor booster and kill vehicle of the configuration  intended for operational use beginning in September 2004. In addition, the  first tactical build of the battle management software will be utilized in  IFT-14. However, interceptors will not be launched out of Fort Greeley in  IFT-14 and IFT-15 (the remaining integrated flight tests to be conducted  before September 2004).
In commenting on a draft of this report, MDA stated that while it cannot  address all technical concerns for the initial fielding, it has added the  following activities:    Enhanced producibility, quality, and reliability efforts.
Increased operational focus in the developmental program, e.g., military  utility and effectiveness assessments.
Expanded command and control, battle management, and operator  integration in BMDS testing to support fielding of initial defensive  capabilities in 2004.
MDA also stated that the results of these program decisions are intended  to provide a comprehensive program that demonstrates operational  effectiveness and military utility against credible threats in an operational  environment.
section_title: Effectiveness of September 2004 and December 2005 Initial Defensive Capability
paragraphs: System effectiveness is characterized in terms of the following four  performance metrics: (1) defended area, (2) launch area denied,  (3) probability of engagement success, and (4) raid size breakpoint.  Defended area is the portion of the United States protected against  long-range missile attacks and, as a metric, is usually reported relative to  a single threat country or region; launch area denied simply refers to the  collection of threat countries from which the United States is protected.  The probability of engagement success is the probability that all attacking  warheads are destroyed, derived from the probabilities associated with  missile defense functions like detection, discrimination, and hit-to-kill.  Finally, raid size breakpoint is the maximum number of warheads the  system can realistically defeat in a single engagement. This metric is highly  dependent on interceptor inventory.
A detailed discussion of GMD’s expected effectiveness is presented in the  classified June 2003 version of this report.
section_title: Other Factors Affecting System Performance
paragraphs: A notable limitation of the effectiveness of the September 2004 initial  defensive capability—and possibly the December 2005 capability— pertains to the inability of system radars to perform target discrimination.  Neither the Cobra Dane radar nor the upgraded early warning radar at  Beale is capable of performing rigorous discrimination, a function  achievable only by the X-band radar. Rather, both radars will utilize  common “target classification” software that enables them to classify  objects as threatening or non-threatening. For example, debris would be  classified as non-threatening, but objects like deployment buses and decoy  replicas would be classified as threatening. Accordingly, the system would  have to rely solely on the kill vehicle for a final target selection.
The assessment of kill vehicle discrimination is, therefore, critical for  understanding the capability of the deployed system, a point made in the  DOT&E report. Appropriately, the GMD prime contractor tracks the  discrimination capability of the kill vehicle as a technical performance  measure. The prime contractor’s December 2002 assessment rated the kill  vehicle discrimination performance as meeting expectations based on  analysis and simulation.
Lastly, measures of system suitability like availability and vulnerability— which complement system effectiveness—are important for characterizing  the initial defensive capability as a whole. MDA is aiming for full-time  operations but faces risks in achieving this goal. Details on system  availability and vulnerability are provided in our June 2003  classified report.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Since DOT&E issued its August 2000 report, DOD has altered its approach  to the acquisition of missile defense systems to one that follows a  “capability-based” strategy. The new approach allows MDA to evolve and  demonstrate additional improvements in missile defense systems before  committing to procurement and operations. MDA’s test program for all  missile defense elements, such as GMD, was also reoriented to focus on  the development and use of the BMDS Test Bed. Over time, the Test Bed  should facilitate testing that address many of DOT&E’s recommendations,  especially those pertaining to flight test realism, complexity, and  artificialities. However, most of the agency’s actions with respect to  DOT&E’s ground testing recommendations, namely, those pertaining to  comprehensive hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle have been  deferred. In addition, MDA is proceeding slowly with the flight testing  against certain countermeasures, which DOT&E noted are simple for an  enemy to implement. These unresolved concerns in the test program  warrant attention by DOT&E and the test community in general. Given the  importance of ground testing and discrimination testing for understanding  system effectiveness, decision makers in the Congress and Office of the  Secretary of Defense would benefit from having information on the  agency’s progress in these matters as they consider investments in  developing the ballistic missile defense system. As an independent office  that reviews DOD’s weapon system testing and the office that made the  recommendations discussed in this report, DOT&E would be in a good  position to provide such information to decision makers.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: As a means of providing decision makers with critical information when  investments in missile defense are considered, we recommend that  DOT&E report periodically, as it deems appropriate, on the status of  MDA’s actions taken or planned in response to the August 2000  recommendations. In its review, DOT&E should include information and  recommendations, as warranted, on MDA’s progress and planning (1) to  improve hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle, (2) to test kill  vehicle components in nuclear environments, and (3) to test the GMD  element’s capability to defeat likely and simple near-term  countermeasures during integrated flight tests. In the report, DOT&E can  advise the Director, MDA, on how the test program could be modified to  accommodate DOT&E’s long-standing concerns.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a classified draft version of this report, DOD agreed  with our recommendations. (See app. II for a reprinted version of DOD’s  comments.) However, DOD conveyed the following concerns:    The GMD test program as described in this report is no longer current.
It is difficult to reconcile the dated terms of reference of the original  DOT&E recommendations with the current program strategy and  structure.
The inherent robustness of the envisioned layered BMD System relative to  midcourse countermeasures is overlooked.
While the GMD test program has, indeed, been in a constant state of flux,  thus complicating our analysis, our report presents the latest, approved  test program information provided to us by MDA.
Despite alterations to the acquisition strategy and structure of the ballistic  missile defense system and its constituent elements, like GMD, we believe  most of the DOT&E recommendations are still relevant because the  technical challenges and uncertainty with developing, testing, and fielding  effective defensive capabilities, as identified in the August 2000 DOT&E  report, remain significant. For example, the DOT&E report issued in  February 2003, FY02 Assessment of the Missile Defense Agency Ballistic  Missile Defense System, continued to highlight the need for a  comprehensive hardware-in-the-loop capability to test the kill vehicle  under the stress of real physical phenomena and to test the kill vehicle’s  discrimination capability. We do recognize that a number of  recommendations for which no actions are currently planned, such as  those recommendations dealing with flight testing during Initial  Operational Test and Evaluation, are a direct result of MDA’s new  acquisition approach.
The department is correct in stating that we did not address the capability  of the envisioned ballistic missile defense system as a whole in defeating  midcourse countermeasures. However, we do note that a system-level  discrimination architecture would use a network of ground- and space- based sensors to formulate a “discrimination solution.” Also, given the  early stages of development of the envisioned layered system, including  boost-phase intercept, the value of this strategy has not been  demonstrated.
Although the department agreed that DOT&E should report periodically  on the status of MDA’s actions to address the August 2000 DOT&E  recommendations, it did not believe additional reporting is required to  track their resolution. The department pointed out that our  recommendation grants DOT&E discretionary reporting authority  where mandatory reporting already exists. We believe, however, the  recommendation is worded appropriately. Existing statutory reporting  requirements for DOT&E on the adequacy and sufficiency of the missile  defense test program do not require that the August 2000 DOT&E  recommendations be specifically addressed. We worded the  recommendation to highlight the areas we believe DOT&E should  address—hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle, testing of  kill vehicle components in nuclear environments, and testing the  GMD element’s capability to defeat likely and simple near-term  countermeasures—and to give DOT&E the discretion to address our  recommendation in the manner it deems appropriate. To present its  assessment, DOT&E could use existing or new reporting vehicles.
Finally, department comments pertaining to MDA actions on ground  testing are addressed in the body of this report.
As arranged with your staff, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from  its issue date. At that time, we plan to provide copies of this report to  interested congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the  Director, Missile Defense Agency. We will make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4841. The major contributors to this report were  Randy Zounes, Stan Lipscomb, Tana Davis, and Bill Graveline.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In examining the actions taken or planned by the MDA in response to the  DOT&E recommendations, we analyzed pertinent test documents, studies,  and reports. These include the (1) GMD Element Developmental Master  Test Plan (March 2003); (2) GMD System Element Reviews; (3) MDA  “immersion day” briefing; (4) MDA written responses to our questions  about MDA actions in response to the DOT&E recommendations;   (5) Secretary of Defense January 2002 Memorandum on Missile Defense  Program Direction; and (6) Independent Review Team (Welch panel)  Reports. In addition, MDA officials briefed us on GMD’s program status  and efforts to defeat enemy countermeasures. We also reviewed available  documentation on the schedule and purpose of the Test Bed. These  documents included studies on the enhanced test program restructure,  fiscal year 2003 budget justifications, and the request for the contract  proposal for the Block 2004 Test Bed.
To assess the effectiveness and limitations of the initial defensive  capability, we relied on the following MDA documentation: (1) GMD  System Element Review (January 2003); (2) BMDS Block 2004 Statement  of Goals; and (3) National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-23),  the President’s directive to begin fielding an initial capability. We also  identified uncertainties—based on the level of testing achieved to date—of  the potential capabilities of individual elements of the initial defensive  capability, such as the radars and interceptor boosters, as well as radar  capabilities to perform the discrimination function.
We conducted our work primarily at the MDA, located in Arlington,  Virginia, and the GMD Joint Program Office, located in Arlington, Virginia,  and Huntsville, Alabama.
We conducted our audit work for the June 2003 classified report, upon  which this unclassified version is based, from October 2001 to March 2003  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  However, reported dates of GMD flight test events given in this  unclassified version have been updated with the latest (December 2003)  GMD test schedules.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense