Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in Transforming Immigration Programs
Published: 2004-10-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumed responsibility for the immigration enforcement and services programs of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 2003. The three DHS bureaus with primary responsibility for immigration functions are U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This transfer creates a great opportunity for DHS to address long-standing management and operational problems within INS. The Homeland Security Act requires GAO to review the transfer of immigration functions to DHS. In response, this report assesses the status of (1) communication and coordination of roles and responsibilities, (2) integration of immigration and customs investigators in ICE, and (3) administrative services and systems in CBP, CIS, and ICE.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Most of the field officials with whom GAO spoke generally characterized communication and coordination with other DHS immigration programs in their geographic area as good or excellent. Other officials noted, that in some areas related to investigative techniques and other operations, unresolved issues regarding the roles and responsibilities of CBP, CIS, and ICE give rise to disagreements and confusion, with the potential for serious consequences. According to headquarters and field officials, some guidance has been made available to the field, and there are plans to provide more. Most ICE field officials GAO contacted said they have taken initial steps toward integrating the former immigration and customs investigators, such as establishing cross-training and pay parity. Most of these officials said, however, that additional important steps remained to be completed to fully integrate investigators. They reported that the lack of uniform policies and procedures for some ICE operations has caused confusion and hindered the creation of a new integrated culture. Headquarters officials said they were responding to these challenges. Officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE expressed confusion about a new shared services system for mission support when interviewed 3 to 4 months after the system was instituted. They also expressed frustration with problems they have encountered with travel, budget, and payroll systems, which are not a part of the shared services system. Additionally, the realignment of staff for shared services, along with other events, has resulted in some mission staff being assigned administrative work as a collateral duty, which may affect mission productivity. Key practices used by other public and private organizations that have undergone successful mergers and transformations may be helpful to DHS in addressing the challenges raised in this report and in transforming immigration enforcement and services. These key practices include establishing communication strategies to create shared expectations and involving employees to gain ownership for changes.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) and led to the most substantial reorganization  of the federal government since the 1940s. The duties and responsibilities  of several former agencies were transferred to DHS, including  responsibility for immigration enforcement and services. These functions  were transferred from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),  which was abolished in 2003. Transfer of the immigration functions  creates a great opportunity for DHS to successfully address long-standing  management and operational problems within INS that we have reported  over the years.
Our past work on transformations has shown that it is unrealistic to  expect DHS to have fully resolved these difficult and long-standing  problems after just one and a half years in operation. As we have  reported, successful organizational transformations can take 5 to 7 years  to implement, and the three DHS bureaus with primary responsibility for  immigration functions—U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S.  Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), and U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement (ICE)—are in the process of transformation as they  develop new ways of dealing with each other and managing their  performance. We have also reported that in the short term, the experience  of private sector mergers is that productivity and effectiveness, for  example, decline as attention is concentrated on critical and immediate  issues. Given the gravity of DHS’s mission, a focus on critical and  immediate issues is understandable. Nevertheless, because any failure by  DHS to effectively carry out its mission could expose the nation to very  serious consequences, it is important that DHS start immediately to take  advantage of its unique opportunity to transform immigration management  and program operations and provide the immigration enforcement and  services that the American people need.
The Homeland Security Act requires us to review the transfer of functions  from INS to DHS, and identify issues associated with the transition. This  report is intended to satisfy the requirements of the mandate. To help  formulate the objectives to respond to this mandate, we spoke with  immigration experts in the public and private sectors and representatives  of pro- and anti-immigration advocacy groups in the Washington, D.C.,  area, and reviewed prior reports that we and others have issued. From  these efforts, we identified three issues that, early in the transition,  appeared to represent significant management challenges and that we  believed related to a range of mission and mission support activities. Thus,  this report assesses the status of (1) communication and coordination  among immigration programs in DHS, (2) integration of immigration and  customs investigators in ICE, and (3) administrative services and systems  used following the transition into DHS. We did not assess program  performance or DHS’s overall response to long-standing problems in this  review. Additionally, our analysis was based on a snapshot in time,  primarily during the first half of fiscal year 2004, and it is possible our  results may be different if our interviews were conducted today.
In assessing the integration of immigration and customs investigators in  ICE, we briefly discuss the former U.S. Customs Service (Customs), which  transferred from the Department of the Treasury. Customs was  responsible for enforcing customs laws in regulating legitimate  commercial activity and for safeguarding U.S. borders against the illegal  entry of goods. Before September 11, 2001, Customs’ enforcement  activities focused primarily on preventing the smuggling of drugs into the  United States.
To address the objectives, we reviewed laws; CBP, CIS, and ICE transition  documents; policies; and other relevant documents. We also interviewed  officials at headquarters who were responsible for managing ICE’s  detention and removal, intelligence, and investigations programs; CIS’s  adjudications program; and CBP’s Border Patrol and inspections programs  between September 2003 and August 2004. We interviewed ICE, CIS, and  CBP officials responsible for developing plans for the transition in  September 2003. We interviewed officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE field  offices between December 2003 and March 2004 in the following cities:  Arlington, Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; New York, New York; Miami,  Florida; Detroit, Michigan; and San Diego, California, and with the U.S.
Border Patrol field offices in Miami, Detroit, and San Diego. We selected  these locations because of their geographic dispersion, their proximity to  major ports of entry, and the relative proximity of ICE, CBP, and CIS  offices to one another. In these locations, we talked with officials  responsible for inspections, the Border Patrol, and inspectors in CBP;  officials responsible for adjudications and adjudicators in CIS; and  managers, supervisory investigators, and investigators in ICE. Baltimore  and Arlington were used as preliminary site visits to form our interview  questions. In the remaining four cities and all remaining ICE field offices,  we used a structured interview to obtain information and opinions  relevant to our objectives from the two most senior ICE officials. In total,  this meant interviewing 49 SACs and ASACs in ICE’s field offices. Many of  these officials provided specific examples to help explain their arguments,  which we did not verify.
We conducted our review between August 2003 and August 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A  more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology appears in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The primary mission of DHS is, among other things, to prevent terrorist  attacks within the United States in the aftermath of the September 11,  2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The creation of  DHS brought together 22 agencies with responsibility for securing the  borders and coastal waters, transportation sector, ports, and critical  infrastructure (such as telecommunications systems), among other things.  In addition, DHS consolidated some nonsecurity agencies such as the  Federal Emergency Management Agency’s natural disaster response  functions and maritime safety and drug interdiction by the Coast Guard.  The creation of DHS was also intended to coordinate the sharing of  homeland security information and foster closer coordination with federal  agencies that were not incorporated into DHS, such as the Federal Bureau  of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of State.
Under INS, and now within DHS, immigration enforcement and service are  complex, multifaceted functions. Immigration enforcement includes,  among other things, patrolling 8,000 miles of international boundaries to  prevent illegal entry into the United States; inspecting over 500 million  travelers each year to determine their admissibility; apprehending,  detaining, and removing criminal and illegal aliens; disrupting and  dismantling organized smuggling of humans and contraband as well as  human trafficking; investigating and prosecuting those who engage in  benefit and document fraud; and enforcing compliance with programs  such as the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and  the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication Technology (US- VISIT). Immigration service includes providing services or benefits to  facilitate entry, residence, employment, and naturalization of legal  immigrants; processing millions of applications each year; making the  right adjudicative decision in approving or denying the applications; and  rendering decisions in a timely manner.
Some background about the long-standing management problems at INS is  useful to set the stage for the transformation task DHS inherited. In this  respect, over the years, we have written numerous reports that identified  management challenges INS experienced in its efforts to achieve both  effective immigration law enforcement and service delivery. In assuming  the responsibility for immigration enforcement and services, DHS inherits  many of these management challenges. For example, in 1997 we reported  that INS lacked clearly defined priorities and goals and that its  organizational structure was fragmented both programmatically and  geographically. Additionally, after a reorganization in 1994, field managers  still had difficulty determining whom to coordinate with, when to  coordinate, and how to communicate with one another because they were  unclear about headquarters offices’ responsibilities and authority. We also  reported that INS had not adequately defined the roles of its two key  enforcement programs—Border Patrol and investigations—which resulted  in overlapping responsibilities, inconsistent program implementation, and  ineffective use of resources. INS’s poor communication led to weaknesses  in policies and procedures. In later reports, we reported that broader  management challenges affected efforts to implement programs to control  the border, deter alien smuggling, reduce immigration benefit fraud,  reduce unauthorized alien employment, remove criminal aliens, and  manage the immigration benefit application workload and reduce the  backlog.
INS was abolished, effective in 2003, by the Homeland Security Act of  2002, and its functions were transferred to three agencies within the  Department of Homeland Security. INS’s Immigration Services Division,  responsible for processing applications for immigration benefits, was  placed in CIS, which reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of DHS. INS’s  interior enforcement programs—investigations, intelligence, and detention  and removal—were placed in ICE. Within ICE, investigators and  intelligence analysts from former INS and the U.S. Customs Service were  merged into the investigations and intelligence offices, while staff from  former INS’s detention and removal program were placed in the detention  and removal office. CBP incorporated inspectors from former INS,  Customs, and Agriculture and Plant Health Inspection Service, as well as  former INS’s Border Patrol agents. CBP and ICE both report to the  Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security, who in turn  reports to the Deputy Secretary of the DHS. See figure 1 for the  organizational position of immigration programs in DHS.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (Secretary)
CBP, CIS, and ICE each have a separate chain of command and field  structure. Under former INS, there were 33 district offices, each headed by  a district director, who had responsibility for adjudications, detention and  removal, inspections, intelligence, and investigations. In DHS, the  responsibilities of the 33 district offices under the former INS were  distributed among 33 CIS district offices, 27 Special Agent in Charge  investigations field offices, 22 detention and removal field offices, 20 CBP  offices for field operations (that oversee about 300 land, sea, and air ports  of entry), and 6 field intelligence units. The former INS’s 20 border patrol  sectors remained intact.
CBP brought together INS and Customs inspections programs that, prior  to the transition, largely worked side by side in many land ports of entry  around the country and that shared similar missions. CIS was a direct  transfer of the Immigration Services Division within INS, and the program  remained largely intact. In contrast, ICE is a patchwork of agencies and  programs that includes INS’s investigations and intelligence programs,  Customs’ investigations and intelligence programs, Customs’ air and  marine interdiction division, the Federal Protective Service, and the  Federal Air Marshals. In combining the investigations programs, ICE has  been tasked with merging INS investigators who specialized in  immigration enforcement (e.g., criminal aliens) with Customs investigators  who specialized in customs enforcement (e.g., drug smuggling). The  integration of INS and Customs investigators into a single investigative  program has involved blending of two vastly different workforces, each  with its own culture, policies, procedures, and mission priorities. Both  programs were in agencies with dual missions that prior to the merger had  differences in investigative priorities. For example, INS primarily looked  for illegal aliens and Customs primarily looked for illegal drugs. In  addition, INS investigators typically pursued administrative violations,  while Customs investigators typically pursued criminal violations.
section_title: Communication and Coordination Generally Considered Good or Excellent by Program Officials, yet Some Cite a Need for Clearer Guidance on Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: Most field officials with whom we spoke in CBP, CIS, and ICE  characterized communication and coordination with their local  counterparts as good or excellent. Officials also said that positive  relationships were primarily based on previous working relationships built  while the programs— particularly inspections, detention and removal, and  adjudications—were all within one agency, INS or Customs. About a  quarter of the officials we interviewed across the immigration programs in  CBP, CIS, and ICE also said that they would like a clearer understanding  of the roles and responsibilities of each program. Those ICE officials who  characterized communication and coordination as fair to poor attributed  the inability to resolve their problems to various reasons, depending on  the program; these included a lack of communication or conflicts in roles  with the Border Patrol and the intelligence program’s distance from, and  production of useful work for, the SAC offices. Near the end of our work,  some headquarters and field officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE told us efforts  were under way, and agreed upon, to clarify issues related to roles and  responsibilities that have arisen.
subsections: section_title: Most Officials Reported Positive Communication and Coordination among Programs
paragraphs: Communication among CBP, CIS, and ICE occurs at the headquarters and  field level in different ways. All three bureaus have liaisons at the  headquarters level. For example, ICE has liaisons to CBP and CIS that  serve as points of contact and facilitators in convening the appropriate  officials for discussions on cross-cutting issues, and ICE’s liaisons are to  contact those agencies’ liaisons should ICE initiate discussions. In the  field, officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE said they typically used meetings to  maintain contact with one another, although the frequency of meetings  varied—from not at all to bimonthly—and there are no requirements for  field officials to meet regularly. Officials who said that they met regularly  also said that they found these meetings to be useful in sharing  information and addressing issues that cut across programs.
Overall, most field officials we contacted who responded to this question  in CBP, CIS, and ICE characterized communication and coordination  among their programs as good or excellent. Most SACs and ASACs said  that communication and coordination with CBP’s inspections, CIS’s  adjudications, and ICE’s detention and removal programs were good or  excellent. On the other hand, about one-third of SACs and ASACs who  responded to this question believed that communication and coordination  with CBP’s Border Patrol and ICE’s intelligence programs were fair to  poor. Some officials said they expressed this view concerning  communication and coordination with the Border Patrol because there  were conflicts or overlaps in roles and responsibilities or a lack of  communication. SACs and ASACs who characterized communication and  coordination with ICE’s intelligence program as fair or poor said they did  so for such reasons as the intelligence office was not in close proximity to  the SAC office or they did not feel that intelligence analysts were  producing analyses useful to the SAC office. Table 1 presents the  responses by ICE’s SACs and ASACs regarding communication and  coordination with CBP, CIS, and other ICE programs.
Many SACs and ASACs indicated that their positive views of  communication and coordination with staff from other programs were  primarily based on previous working relationships built while the  programs were all in INS or Customs. In addition, officials we contacted in  CIS and CBP, and other officials in ICE, said that they also relied on  working relationships that existed before the transfer to facilitate  communication and coordination on cross-cutting issues. Those SACs and  ASACs who responded that they relied to a little or no extent on pre- existing working relationships said that they provided such a response  because they did not have a prior relationship to rely upon. In addition,  such informal means of maintaining communication and coordination  among program officials, while helpful, can be short-lived as personnel  retire or resign. For the long term, processes that provide a systematic way  of building and maintaining such relationships among program staff  provide better assurance of effective communication and coordination.
Providing guidance that outlines roles and responsibilities among the  programs is one way of helping to achieve systematic maintenance of such  relationships. In this respect, the headquarters offices for CBP, CIS, and  ICE have issued some guidance on roles and responsibilities of certain  aspects of the immigration programs. For example,    CBP and ICE issued general guidelines on each bureau’s roles and  responsibilities regarding how they would transfer the assets of  antismuggling investigators from the Border Patrol to ICE, and how they  would handle antismuggling investigations after the transfer of these  investigators to ICE. A memorandum jointly issued by CBP and ICE in  April 2004 for SACs and Border Patrol sector chiefs in field locations  outlined each program’s basic responsibilities. ICE would assume  responsibility for administrative support; funding of the antismuggling  investigators; and all investigations and complex cases such as  international in nature or related to organizations or national security. The  Border Patrol would have lead responsibility for cross-border and border- related interdiction activities, such as surveillance to interdict illegal  border crossings. According to CBP officials, the intent of the  memorandum was in part to provide each program with a basic  framework for working together.
CBP and CIS convened a working group to decide who would correct  mistakes on aliens’ arrival and departure forms. Several advocacy groups  argued in the months following the transfer that as a result of the dispersal  of immigration programs across DHS agencies, aliens entering the country  did not know who to go to if an error was made on their arrival/departure  form. The two bureaus agreed that an alien must seek an official in CBP to  correct a CBP mistake, and a CIS official to correct a CIS mistake.  Additionally, CBP and CIS agreed that if an alien seeking a correction  inquires at the wrong office, then that person is to be directed to the  appropriate authorities for making the correction. CBP and CIS officials  provided us with this policy in written memos dated March 31, 2004, and  March 30, 2004, respectively, that they said each bureau provided to its  staff.
CIS issued guidance to its field offices in December 2003 stating that its  Office of Fraud Detection and National Security is to serve as the focal  point and clearinghouse for requests from law enforcement agencies for  benefits or “cover” documents. The guidance outlined the procedures  that CIS is to use in responding to law enforcement agencies outside DHS  (for example, the FBI and Drug Enforcement Agency) that want to provide  benefits for aliens they have brought into the country as witnesses in a  criminal case or as informants.
section_title: Some Field Officials Expressed a Need for Additional Guidance on Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: Notwithstanding the above guidance, some officials we contacted across  CBP, CIS, and ICE said that they would like a clearer understanding of the  roles and responsibilities of each program. In addition, some difficulties  with coordination cannot be resolved locally or by pre-existing working  relationships because they reflect a lack of clarity in the programs’ roles  and responsibilities and impede communication and coordination between  them. For example, four SAC officials were unsure how the role of the  senior inspector, inherited from INS and now in CBP, would affect ICE  investigators’ roles in conducting investigations in the ports of entry.
CBP has stated that cases are not always referred to ICE by the senior  inspectors, and there is no CBP policy to refer such cases to ICE. This is  because some cases concern immigration violations related only to  attempted illegal entry at a port of entry and as such are CBP matters  regarding admissibility, not ICE interior enforcement matters. According  to CBP headquarters officials responsible for inspections, the bureau is  exploring the concept of expanding the senior inspector position to  address broader types of investigations rather than only immigration  matters, but the role of the senior inspector in relation to the role of ICE  investigators has not yet been determined.
Additional examples included problems (1) between ICE investigations  and CBP’s Border Patrol in negotiating controlled deliveries, (2) between  ICE investigations and CIS in the area of benefit fraud, and (3) among  CBP, CIS, and ICE in the area of issuing paroles to aliens.
subsections: section_title: Controlled Deliveries Have Reportedly Been Hampered by Communication and Coordination between Border Patrol and ICE
paragraphs: According to some of the field officials we contacted, how the Border  Patrol and ICE should communicate and coordinate with each other on  controlled deliveries had not been fully defined. An ICE official told us  that prior to the transition, this technique was used by both INS and  Customs agents and, while INS typically coordinated with the Border  Patrol, Customs agents, because they were often dealing with narcotics,  did not necessarily coordinate with INS unless the controlled delivery was  going through Border Patrol checkpoints. Based on what we were told,  since the transition, ICE and the Border Patrol have had conflicting  positions that hamper communication and coordination about controlled  deliveries. Border Patrol officials we contacted stated that their mission is  to prevent and detect illegal entry of persons or contraband between ports  of entry. Some ICE investigators we contacted said that they believe, on  the other hand, that in order to dismantle smuggling organizations—one of  ICE’s priorities—they need to do more than arrest the individual drivers or  couriers. We talked with ICE officials in one field office who told us that  there have been occasions when the Border Patrol deployed additional  agents to an area after learning that ICE intended to conduct a controlled  delivery. ICE investigators stated that this not only can hinder the  accomplishment of their mission but potentially puts ICE investigators at  risk. This is because Border Patrol agents can unsuspectingly encounter  an undercover ICE agent in the course of interdicting persons attempting  to cross the border, and if a gunfight ensues, the undercover ICE agent  risks revealing his or her identity to the smugglers, or the ICE and Border  Patrol agents risk injuring each other. A Border Patrol chief and deputy  chief we interviewed stated that if CBP headquarters issued a formal  memorandum stating that controlled deliveries by ICE were allowed, they  would be willing to coordinate with local ICE managers.
A Border Patrol official in headquarters told us that after the terrorist  attacks on September 11, former Customs investigators began to lead  operations on the border and between ports of entry, and saw their  program as having authority to conduct operations on the border. When  these investigators transitioned to ICE in March 2003, both agencies  eventually sought to clarify their roles and responsibilities concerning  controlled deliveries. The two bureaus formed a working group to do this  in April 2004.
An outcome of the working group discussions, according to CBP  headquarters officials, is that Border Patrol and ICE plan to issue guidance  in the form of a memorandum of understanding concerning the general  roles and responsibilities of their respective staffs for controlled  deliveries. This new guidance, according to the Border Patrol official in  headquarters who chaired the working group, is to state that all controlled  deliveries between ports of entry have to be approved by the local Border  Patrol chief, who will make a decision based on guidance from  headquarters. Additionally, according to this same official, the guidance  will state that the Border Patrol will have the responsibility, during  controlled deliveries, for inspections to ensure that there are no weapons  of mass destruction, for example, in vehicles or on persons in addition to  the known smuggled goods or persons. Officials told us the guidance will  also outline a process for grievances when local managers cannot agree.  Border Patrol officials said they did not have a date when the guidance  would be finalized, but that as of August 2004, a final draft was sent to  CBP’s Commissioner to be signed, after which ICE’s Assistant Secretary  would be given the draft for signature.
section_title: Focus of Benefit Fraud Investigations Reported as a Source of Disagreement among CIS and ICE Field Officials
paragraphs: At the time of our site visits, how ICE and CIS should communicate and  coordinate with each other in cases of suspected benefit fraud has not  been formally defined by either CIS or ICE headquarters, and the field  officials we contacted said that this has caused disagreement among CIS  and ICE field officials. The difficulty between CIS and ICE investigations  regarding benefit fraud is not new. We have noted in a past report that INS  had numerous problems related to its enforcement of benefit fraud,  including a lack of protocols for adjudicators and others in coordinating  benefit fraud and a lack of criteria for investigators in prioritizing benefit  fraud cases. Prior to the transition, INS had begun to place a priority on  investigating benefit fraud perpetrated by large-scale organizations or  persons of special interest, and this priority has continued under ICE. As a  result, some CIS field officials told us that ICE would not pursue single  cases of benefit fraud. ICE field officials who spoke on this issue cited a  lack of investigative resources as to why they could not respond in the  manner CIS wanted. For example, one ASAC acknowledged that CIS  depended on ICE to go forward with leads on benefit fraud but said that  his office could not commit large numbers of investigators to benefit fraud  until more investigators were cross-trained. An ASAC and group  supervisor in another office also cited the lack of investigators to address  benefit fraud and acknowledged that the vast majority of the CIS cases  referred to that ICE office we not investigated because of this lack of  resources.
According to CIS officials, adjudicators refer single cases of benefit fraud  to ICE, in part because they rely on ICE to conduct database checks on  systems CIS adjudicators cannot access. For example, ICE’s Treasury  Enforcement Communications System (TECS) may have information on  individuals that could help adjudicators determine whether to approve or  deny an application for benefits. However, CIS officials in three cities we  visited stated that the applicants’ files they send over to ICE are  sometimes kept without notification of whether an investigation was  initiated or not by ICE investigators for long periods of time. An ICE  official in headquarters responsible for managing benefit fraud explained  that SAC offices may investigate single cases of alleged fraud but the  extent to which that is done depends on the assessment of the SAC office’s  staff resources and the priorities of the local U.S. Attorney’s Office.  Without having information from ICE that might form the basis for  denying an application, CIS still has the responsibility to adjudicate the  application and instead may even approve applications or take other  temporary action when fraud is suspected. For example, in one office we  visited, CIS officials said that they had 154 cases of alleged benefit fraud  that they had referred to ICE since June 2003. They said they had not  received responses from ICE on the status of these cases or whether ICE  intended to investigate them. In the interim, CIS officials said, their office  could not close the cases and instead had been granting the suspect  applicants temporary employment authorization or advance parole. One  CIS manager and one ICE manager in the field indicated that while  dismantling large-scale smuggling rings is important, single cases of  benefit fraud can have national security implications. For example, a  person who is allowed to remain in the country as a result of committing  marriage fraud can become a naturalized citizen in 3 years and facilitate  the entry of other persons into the United States who could possibly pose  security risks. CIS and ICE officials in headquarters agreed that benefit  fraud was important to national security as well as the integrity of the  immigration process. CIS officials in three cities told us that ICE’s lack of  responsiveness to some CIS referrals for benefit fraud investigations  hindered their ability to meet their district and bureau goals for reducing  the backlog of applications.
While challenges were reported, there have been efforts by ICE and CIS to  address benefit fraud. After the transition, CIS created a Fraud Detection  and National Security office devoted to deterring fraud. ICE has  established Benefit Fraud Units composed of investigative assistants and  intelligence analysts who were working in CIS’s three regional offices and  in the three of the four CIS service centers (who were working in these  offices prior to the transition). CIS has Fraud Detection Units composed  of adjudications staff in its four service centers who process applications,  analyze applications to identify trends in fraud, and refer potential benefit  fraud cases to ICE. ICE investigative assistants and intelligence analysts,  in turn, are to refer cases to the local SAC investigations offices. Two CIS  offices we visited were referring potential benefit fraud cases through this  new process. Alternatively, in the other four offices we visited, CIS  adjudicators were directly referring benefit fraud cases to local ICE  investigators, who must determine whether to reject, postpone, or pursue  the cases.
Headquarters officials from CIS and ICE told us that the two bureaus were  planning to do more to address benefit fraud. These officials told us that  CIS and ICE are working on a memorandum of understanding that will  document the creation of standard protocols for adjudicators to refer and  investigators to accept, alleged cases of benefit fraud (including time  frames for ICE in responding to CIS) and for CIS and ICE to communicate  and coordinate in matters involving benefit fraud. Additionally, CIS  created a new fraud position description to address single cases of fraud,  and a CIS official told us that as of August 2004, the agency has hired 95 of  100 newly funded staff positions to work on benefit fraud and some of  these staff have completed one training course at the Federal Law  Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). In addition, while neither official  knew when the memo of understanding would be final, in the interim, CIS  and ICE have established time frames for SAC offices to review fraud  referrals for criminal investigation.
section_title: CBP, CIS, and ICE Lack Formal Guidance for Addressing Overlapping Responsibilities for Parole
paragraphs: CBP, CIS, and ICE have the authority to grant aliens parole—temporary  admission into the United States for such reasons as humanitarian  purposes, public benefit (e.g., participating in a legal proceeding for the  U.S. government), or for further inspection. A CIS official told us that the  authority to make decisions regarding parole, under former INS, rested  with the district director, who had responsibility for all of the immigration  programs. However, since the transition, CBP, CIS, and ICE had yet to  make formal the roles and responsibilities for each program regarding  who has authority to grant parole and when it is most appropriate for one  agency rather than the other to make decisions about a parole application.  Without this guidance on roles and responsibilities, CBP, CIS, and ICE  officials in local areas were making determinations as to how the parole  process will work. For example, in one city we visited, as a result of  monthly meetings, ICE investigations, CBP inspections, and CIS  coordinated a panel of representatives from their local offices to review  the applications or requests for parole and, depending on the facts of each  case, decided what program would make the decision for granting parole  to aliens. By contrast, in another city we visited, CBP and CIS were unsure  as to who had the authority to make decisions about parole. CBP officials  in headquarters who are responsible for inspections told us that the  current practice is that the bureau that has possession of the person  makes the decision about parole, and while there are ongoing discussions  among managers in the three bureaus regarding authority, there have not  been final decisions. In August 2004, CBP and ICE headquarters told us  that the two bureaus have now drafted protocols regarding parole and that  the completion of the protocols is contingent upon a decision by DHS on  the placement and funding of the Parole and Humanitarian Assistance  Branch.  In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS said that the issues  regarding parole operations have now been resolved.
section_title: Some Steps Taken and Some Steps Remain to be Completed in Integrating Immigration and Customs Investigators into ICE
paragraphs: SAC offices have taken initial steps toward integrating the former INS and  Customs investigative workforces. However, most SAC officials and  investigators we spoke with said that one or more steps that are important  for full integration remain to be completed. While officials in some SAC  offices said they have not received enough specific guidance, such as  performance measures from ICE headquarters on how to gauge their  progress in merging INS and Customs investigators, many of the ones we  contacted said there are some common initial steps SAC offices have  completed in integrating investigators. These include (1) assigning former  INS and Customs investigators to work together in mixed investigative  groups, (2) providing formal and on-the-job cross-training to investigators  so that former INS investigators can perform the functions of former  Customs investigators and vice versa, and (3) establishing pay parity for all  former INS investigators and supervising investigators. Many SAC officials  with whom we spoke also noted that several important steps to fully  integrate former INS and Customs investigators remain to be taken. These  include (1) co-locating former INS and Customs investigators so their  offices are in the same building, (2) establishing uniform ICE policies and  procedures, and (3) issuing symbols for ICE’s Office of Investigations that  identify all ICE investigators as being part of one agency. ICE headquarters  officials told us in August 2004 that efforts are under way to address all of  these steps.
subsections: section_title: Mixing Investigative Groups, Classroom-Based Cross-Training, and Pay Parity Are among the Initial Steps Reported in Integrating INS and Customs Investigators
paragraphs: Of the 49 SACs and ASACs who responded to our question, 27 stated that  investigators in their offices had been integrated to a great or moderate  extent; 15 said they had been integrated to some extent, and 3 said they  had been integrated to a little extent. SACs and ASACs who responded to  our question indicated they had generally maintained the investigative  focus that existed before the merger (e.g., groups continued focusing on  money laundering, strategic investigations, and benefit fraud) but had  mixed or intended to mix some of the former INS and Customs  investigators into these investigative groups. An ICE official in  headquarters said that the extent to which investigative groups would be  integrated has been left up to individual SACs, and the characteristics of  some geographic locations may make integration more difficult. Eleven  SACs said they were working toward having former INS and Customs  investigators work within mixed investigative groups. One SAC noted that  he did not want to integrate investigators and group supervisors until they  were formally cross-trained—training where former INS and Customs  investigators learn the laws and regulations of each other’s discipline from  experienced lawyers and trainers.
Ten of 49 SACs and ASACs we spoke with indicated that former INS and  Customs investigators in their offices were being assigned to work with  one another on a case-by-case basis, and two of these said mixing of  investigators in this way provided the investigators with opportunities to  learn each other’s discipline through on-the-job-training. Such  opportunities included having a joint duty roster where investigators from  each former discipline responded to a call for an investigation together  and having some investigators from former INS and Customs work in the  same investigative groups. Eleven of 49 SACs and ASACs we contacted  told us their offices had a joint duty roster such that investigators from  different former agencies responded to cases together and learned from  one another on the job. In one of the SAC offices, we were told that  investigators from the former INS and Customs respond together to calls  for investigations, but former Customs investigators process immigration- related cases and customs-related cases are processed by former INS  investigators so they can learn the policies and procedures of the other  discipline in a real-life setting.
SACs and ASACs we spoke with said that in addition to on-the-job training,  formal cross-training is key to eventually creating a unified workforce. ICE  headquarters issued a cross-training curriculum to all SAC offices in  January 2004 with a deadline for all investigators to complete cross- training by September 30, 2004. ICE headquarters officials did not set a  deadline for the completion of training for group supervisors or senior  managers, although these persons could choose to participate in the  investigator training.
ICE officials responsible for developing the cross-training curriculum  indicated that the intent of the cross-training was to ensure that all  investigators from the former agencies were prepared to address all  components of ICE’s mission. The investigators are to participate in 8 days  of classroom training, taught by investigators and attorneys, covering both  legal and operational issues of the other discipline. For example, former  INS investigators receive training in areas such as commercial fraud  investigations, financial investigations, trade compliance, and drug  smuggling, while former Customs investigators receive training in areas  such as determining citizenship, benefit and document fraud, initiation of  removals, and alien detention. Investigators must pass, with a score of 70  percent or higher, a series of nine written tests in order to be certified as  cross-trained. As of late August 2004, ICE headquarters reported that 2,175  out of approximately 5,400 former INS and Customs investigators had  taken and passed at least one of the nine exams, including 1,210 former  INS and Customs investigators who had fully completed cross-training. In  August 2004, ICE headquarters said that they still expected most  investigators to complete the cross-training and nine examinations by the  September 30, 2004, deadline.
ICE officials cited the achievement of pay parity between former INS and  Customs investigators as one of the successes of the merger. Prior to the  merger and for approximately a little more than a year after the transfer,  former INS investigators and their supervisors were paid at a lower grade  level than their counterparts from former Customs. Specifically, most  former INS investigators were paid at the GS-12 pay grade and most  former INS group supervisors were paid at the GS-13 grade; most former  Customs investigators were paid at the GS-13 grade and most former  Customs group supervisors were paid at the GS-14 grade. In our site visits  and during telephone interviews, many ICE officials, including most  former INS investigators, said that the lack of pay parity had affected  morale, made former INS investigators feel as if they were second class,  and made integrating the investigative groups more difficult as the former  INS investigators were doing the same work for less pay. In April 2004,  DHS approved an upgrade from GS-12 to GS-13 for the majority of former  INS investigators, and in June 2004 approved an upgrade from GS-13 to  GS-14 for the majority of former INS group supervisors. Investigators and  group supervisors we spoke with after pay parity went into effect said they  believed morale had increased since pay parity was implemented, and  former INS investigators felt they are now equal to their former Customs  counterparts.
section_title: Many Officials Stated That Important Steps to Fully Integrate Investigators Remain to Be Completed
paragraphs: Twenty-one SACs and ASACs we spoke with stated that other efforts  important to integration — such as co-locating all ICE investigators in a  given field location so they are in one building, establishing uniform  operational policies and procedures, and “branding” ICE’s Office of  Investigations with symbols that identify investigators as belonging to one  agency — have been delayed.
subsections: section_title: Complete Co-Location Has Not Yet Been Achieved
paragraphs: According to 19 of 49 SACs and ASACs we contacted, one of the obstacles  to integration has been the fact that numerous investigators from former  INS and Customs have continued to work in separate locations. Although  INS’s and Customs’ investigations programs were merged into ICE, former  INS investigators generally continued to work in former INS buildings, and  former Customs investigators generally continued to work in former  Customs buildings. Eight SACs and ASACs with whom we spoke noted  that the lack of co-location of former INS and Customs investigators  perpetuated the view among investigators that ICE is not yet integrated.  For example, 3 officials said that creating a unified organization is difficult  when members of a work group—8 to 12 investigators—are dispersed in  different offices, sometimes miles apart. Some SAC officials reported they  have moved some investigative groups, such as the benefit fraud and  criminal aliens, to the same buildings in an effort to better co-mingle  former INS and Customs investigators. Officials in some other locations  told us this has not been possible because of lack of space. Fourteen of 20  SACs we spoke with by phone noted that their offices have been unable to  co-locate former INS and Customs investigators because space in their  current buildings was limited and building leases were signed before the  transfer or because they could not secure additional funding from DHS to  lease new buildings before existing leases expire. An ICE headquarters  official said there are a few SAC offices that are completely co-located and  there are additional SAC offices that have submitted co-location plans to  ICE headquarters and requested additional space. This official also said  that ICE will begin to co-locate offices that have had Occupational Safety  and Health Administration violations or where leases will soon expire, and  the goal is to have all SAC offices co-located in the next 5 to 7 years. ICE  headquarters officials recently estimated that complete co-location  immediately would cost about $150 million.
section_title: Lack of Uniform Policies and Procedures for Some Operations Reportedly Causes Confusion and Hinders the Creation of a New Culture
paragraphs: Some officials told us that ICE has been slow to establish uniform  operational policies and procedures, causing confusion and some delay in  the creation of a new unified ICE culture. Policies and procedures on such  things as the use of firearms or the steps to take when investigators are  involved in car accidents while working in an official capacity vary  between former INS and Customs investigators. In the absence of uniform  policies and procedures, ICE headquarters officials said they directed SAC  offices to continue to use former policies from both INS and Customs,  applying the policy from the former agency to the agent from that agency.  SAC officials from some offices said they have created new local office  policies for all ICE investigators.
One SAC official said that a lack of unified operational policies and  procedures has in some cases resulted in confusion or the establishment  of local policies. Other SAC officials told us this can be problematic if  investigators working together are relying upon different policies and  procedures to carry out their investigative work. In one city, we were told  that two investigators—one from the former INS and one from the former  Customs—were involved in an auto accident. The former agencies had  different procedures for filing paperwork on an accident, and no one knew  which policy to follow. The SAC made a local decision to use the policy of  the driver’s former agency. In another city, the SAC decided to adopt a  former Customs policy concerning making an arrest at a residence.  Customs policy had called for a minimum of four investigators in making  an arrest, while INS did not have a policy on the minimum number of  investigators required for an arrest. The former INS investigators and  supervisors said they did not understand the rationale for this policy, given  the volume of arrests they typically had in a day. Officials in ICE  headquarters explained the rationale to us, stating that under INS  investigators often engaged in administrative arrests of individuals for  administrative crimes, such as visa overstays or document fraud. Under  ICE, they said investigators are often engaging in criminal law  enforcement arrests and possibly arresting more dangerous suspects. As a  matter of officer safety, ICE requires that investigators work in groups of  four when making an arrest. Knowing this rationale may have helped the  former INS staff avoid confusion over this change. Additionally, ICE  headquarters officials told us that the investigations program prioritized  the establishment of uniform policies, for example, focusing on a unified  policy for undercover operations. These headquarters officials also said  that, in the interim, SAC offices were instructed by ICE headquarters to  use the policy of the former agencies.
section_title: Pending Name Change Caused Delay in Creating a Unified ICE
paragraphs: After more than a year as ICE, field officials said that investigators and  managers were continuing to use their former agency badges and  credentials, and ICE headquarters officials had spent months waiting on a  request for a name change. Some SACs we spoke with said that at the  time we contacted them, ICE still did not have the public identifiers that  separate it from the former agencies of which it is composed. We were  told that incomplete branding of the agency with a unique logo has at  times contributed to frustration and embarrassment. Some of the former  INS investigators and managers we spoke with said that the delay in  branding ICE has held up the creation of a unified ICE agency.
According to officials at ICE headquarters, one element in the process of  establishing ICE is to brand it with a unique identity by creating badges,  raid jackets, business cards, and other identifying materials or symbols.  When DHS was created, INS staff were directed to retire all emblems and  paraphernalia. However, Customs was not given the same orders. In some  ICE offices, we observed Customs emblems and paraphernalia on display.  In another example of the divide between INS and Customs, in one city we  visited, former Customs investigators had created a mock-up of the new  ICE badge that they said was for former INS investigators, which referred  to the INS investigators as “Junior Officers” of the U.S. Customs Service.
During one site visit, a group of former INS investigators we spoke with  questioned why headquarters had been so slow to implement branding,  and one investigators said the branding should have been completed prior  to the transition or shortly thereafter. In another site visit, one investigator  said this lack of an identity has proven to be frustrating and embarrassing  when acting in an official capacity, such as testifying in court. One ASAC  we spoke with said that he tried to board a plane with his weapon and was  questioned by airline officials when he showed his INS badge to verify that  he was law enforcement. Airline officials said that INS had been abolished,  and the ASAC had to explain that ICE did not yet have its own badges. The  ASAC was eventually allowed to proceed but said he knew this problem  had plagued other investigators as well. In another example, an agent in  one city said that he went out and purchased his own ICE raid jacket  because he did not like having his authority questioned when he wore an  INS raid jacket.
Most of the decisions about branding were made at the DHS level, and  there are written guidelines for the use of the DHS seal and agency  signatures for such things as business cards, letterhead, and flags.  According to an official in ICE headquarters who is responsible for  branding, certain branding activities that are particular to ICE are in the  final stages. At the time of our interview in July 2004 and confirmed in  August 2004, ICE headquarters officials acknowledged the delay and said  that raid jackets were made available for purchase locally in January 2004,  badges will be issued beginning in September 2004, and uniforms were in  the final stages of production.
section_title: Many See Positive Aspects of the Transition
paragraphs: Many of those we spoke with from both the former INS and Customs  noted that there have been benefits to merging the INS and Customs  investigations programs. They noted that combining the expertise of  former INS and Customs investigators has provided expanded authority in  conducting investigations and could contribute to more thorough  investigations. Other SAC officials said that expanded authority has been  beneficial in investigating money laundering in alien smuggling cases and  going after the assets of foreign-born persons running prostitution rings as  they can now prosecute someone for multiple offenses. Four SACs and  ASACs said they expect the benefits to increase as cross-training is  completed and investigators more fully learn the expertise of the other  former agency.
Former INS investigators we spoke with also noted beneficial aspects of  the merger. Many of the former INS investigators we spoke with in our site  visits said they are now able to concentrate on investigative work rather  than services and they have received a pay increase to bring them up to  par with the former Customs investigators. In one location, former INS  investigators said that prior to the merger, the District Director would task  investigators to assist with naturalization exams or to fill guard duties at  district offices or ports of entry. In another location, former INS  investigators said they now have more employees to carry out missions.
section_title: Many Officials Expressed Difficulty Understanding Administrative Services
paragraphs: Although DHS has issued guidance via Email on how administrative  support shared services would function, several CBP, CIS, and ICE field  officials told us that they were confused about what constitutes shared  services, the processes for receiving services from a shared service  provider, and how many of the administrative staff in their offices would  be transferred to other offices. One official in headquarters told us in July  2004 that decisions about shared services were not completely resolved.  Additionally, officials in all three agencies cited problems with  administrative computer systems for travel, budget, and payroll— administrative functions that are handled by the individual bureaus and  are not a part of shared services. As a result of several problems and  changes that have occurred, according to officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE,  some field offices have assigned administrative duties to inspectors,  adjudicators or senior adjudications managers, or investigative staff  because the office needed additional administrative support.
In an attempt to provide more efficient administrative mission support  services, DHS is in the process of developing and implementing systems  and processes called “shared services.” DHS initiated the shared services  system in December 2003, making determinations about the realignment of  approximately 6,100 administrative positions. In January 2004, the  Undersecretaries for Management and Border and Transportation Security  and the heads of CBP, CIS, and ICE signed an agreement finalizing the  interbureau governance of shared services. In commenting on a draft of  this report, DHS said that the Department encountered delays in the  execution of service level agreement and resource allocation.
Consequently, the implementation phase did not begin until late in the  spring/summer of 2004. According a to DHS official, shared services is  intended to represent a new model for government on delivering and  managing administrative services.
DHS’s shared services system utilizes four different approaches in  providing and receiving services for CBP, CIS, and ICE staff. The shared  services system’s approaches are (1) each bureau provides its staff some  of its own services itself, (2) one bureau provides a certain service to staff  in all three bureaus, (3) one bureau provides a service to its own  workforce and staff in one other agency while the third bureau provides  that service for its own staff, and (4) each bureau provides selected  services to its own workforce as well as to selected staff in other bureaus.  For example, CBP is providing human resource management to its  workforce, in addition to workforces in CIS and ICE~. ICE is providing  training for supervisors in ICE, CIS, and CBP but handles equal  employment opportunity issues for only its own workforce, and CIS. CBP,  CIS, and ICE are each providing their own workforces with procurement,  budget, labor and employment relations, and professional development  training, among other services. According to DHS officials, the decisions  about which bureau would provide a certain service were made on the  basis of an assessment of such factors as each bureau’s adaptability to an  increased workload, level of modernization, and historical expertise with  each shared service. See figure 2 for a description of the services each  bureau is to provide under shared services.
subsections: section_title: Despite Communication about Recently Implemented Shared Services System, Officials Say Confusion Persists
paragraphs: A DHS briefing document and communication strategy indicated that  through such means as the bureau’s intranet, chain of command,  memorandums, fact sheets, and video broadcasts, DHS would  communicate the roles and responsibilities of CBP, CIS, and ICE for  providing shared services. DHS provided us evidence that it has used some  of these communication methods. However, a senior official at DHS told  us in June 2004 (6 months after the initiation of shared services) that  although a communication strategy was in place, communicating about  shared services to the field is a work in progress. This official also said  that it is the responsibility of the bureaus both receiving and providing  services to communicate information about shared services to the field  offices and staff. DHS officials also stated that the responsibilities of CBP,  CIS, and ICE under shared services are still under development. One  official who was involved in the formation of shared services told us that  DHS would like to change some administrative functions that the bureaus  currently handle for themselves—for example, procurement—into shared  services. Further, even though CBP was designated as the provider of  personnel services to CIS, the extent of that service is still in negotiation.
Field officials told us that numerous officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE were  uncertain about what constitutes shared services, the process for receiving  services from a shared service provider, and which administrative staff  would be re-aligned from their positions in local offices to work for  providers of shared services. In our telephone interviews with SACs and  ASACs, 33 of 40 said that their offices were experiencing problems with  shared services to a moderate or great extent. The 4 SACs and ASACs  who said they were experiencing problems to little or no extent provided  such reasons as not interacting with shared services providers or relying  on the staff who assisted them prior to the initiation of shared services in  December 2003.
Our meetings with field officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE indicated that  despite communication from DHS, field office officials varied in their  understanding about what constitutes shared services. For example, one  ASAC believed that shared services consisted of sharing resources, such  as buildings and computer technology, rather than having one bureau  provide a certain administrative service for the other two. Additionally, in  April 2004, approximately 3 to 4 months after the initiation of shared  services, four ICE officials and one CBP inspections official were not  aware that this occurred.
Officials in four of the six sites we visited were unsure about who  specifically to call or the process they were to use in obtaining a shared  service from CBP, CIS, or ICE. For example, after the person responsible  for facilities was transferred to ICE, an official in a CIS district office did  not know who to call for assistance with setting up vacant office space for  CIS staff who were being moved to that location. This official ultimately  learned that the process was not a shared service but was instead handled  within CIS. A SAC official in another office we visited said he and  administrative staff did not know how to obtain an authorization to repair  a vehicle that had been damaged in an accident in October 2003. The  officials initiated a purchase order request in November 2003 for services  to repair the vehicle and submitted it to ICE. However, under the shared  services system, CBP was designated responsibility for authorizing fleet  repairs for CBP, CIS, and ICE. The SAC official said that he and  administrative staff spent several months contacting multiple officials at  CBP offices and ICE headquarters about approval for the repair and how  to pay for it. In March 2004 the car was scheduled to be sold at an  auction. In late June 2004, CBP issued an informal policy, by Email to the  SAC office, for receiving approval for repairs and invited the SAC office to  resubmit a request (as it had been previously denied) if it had not already  sold the car. Before SAC officials were informed of this process, we were  told that the office paid approximately $1,000 for storage of the vehicle  and stopped saving the funds initially set aside for the repair.
In five of the six sites we visited, officials expressed uncertainty and  unmet expectations about which administrative staff in their offices would  be reassigned to shared services positions and transferred to other  programs or agencies. The decision about the reassignment of  administrative staff for shared services was made at the headquarters level  by a working group of CBP, CIS, and ICE officials and led by DHS. For  example, in one SAC office that we visited, approximately 50  administrative staff from former INS had been supporting CBP and CIS in  addition to ICE, and all but 1 were moved because of the realignment of  staff for shared services. Because the SAC had expected to retain 3 rather  than 1 of the 50 administrative staff, he assigned administrative work to  several investigators as a collateral duty. Administrative staff in one CBP  office for field operations that we visited had received e-mail messages  from CBP headquarters notifying them that, within a few days, they would  be transferred to another program or bureau. We were told that some  reassignments came as a surprise and involved moving from one office  building to another, but usually they were in the same general geographic  location.
ICE provided us with a written statement explaining that it, along with  CBP and CIS, could not begin delivering administrative services to one  another under shared services until “reimbursable agreements”—the  arrangement of costs and funding for a particular administrative service— were finalized. As such, this delayed notifications to administrative staff  about reassignments and affected the agencies’ ability to provide  information to the field.
section_title: Travel, Budget, and Other Computer System Problems Seen as Significant
paragraphs: Many officials we contacted in CBP, CIS, and ICE said that problems with  travel and budget, and computer systems have at times adversely affected  office operations. For example, because of problems with travel computer  systems, many officials in ICE’s SAC offices said that staff are not  receiving reimbursements. Thirty-two of 49 SACs and ASACs responding  to our question about shared services cited Travel Manager—ICE’s off-the- shelf computer system for processing travel requests and vouchers— and/or the Federal Financial Management System (FFMS)—the computer  system ICE SAC offices use to track their budgets—as significant  administrative problems. Additionally, CBP officials identified such  problems as cumbersome procedures for accessing data systems and the  lack of computer program updates to reflect changes on time and  attendance cards. In August 2004, headquarters officials told us they were  making efforts to resolve the problems by providing training, reducing  funding strings for Travel Manager, and reprogramming FFMS.
Twenty-six of 49 SACs and ASACs responding to our question about  shared services also discussed the problems they were having with Travel  Manager. ICE headquarters officials told us that Travel Manager is a new  system to the former Customs field staff in ICE’s investigations program. It  was used in the former INS’s headquarters and in some field offices prior  to the transfer. ICE headquarters officials told us that Travel Manager was  chosen because it could interface with ICE’s accounting system and  automate the process for managing travel documents. ICE investigations  officials in the field and headquarters told us that with Travel Manager, the  funding strings (codes that tell the system what account to charge and to  what program to attribute travel) have caused problems for staff in the  field and headquarters. ICE headquarters investigations officials estimated  that there are approximately 80,000 separate funding strings, each  approximately 48 characters long, from which field staff have to choose in  carrying out a transaction such as completing a travel voucher. They  explained that because the system is new to many staff and the funding  strings are not labeled so that the user can select words rather than a  string of numerical characters, some ICE staff may choose incorrect  funding strings, causing their vouchers to “disappear” in the system or be  routed to the wrong approving official. When this occurs, ICE  headquarters officials for investigations told us, neither the traveler nor  the approving official receives a notice that the voucher has failed to be  processed. Additionally, because ICE’s Travel Manager interfaces with its  Federal Financial Management System, if staff choose the wrong funding  string, the voucher may be routed to an account that does not have the  funds. If this happens, ICE officials said the system would reject the  voucher. As a result, they said that some ICE investigators and managers  have not received timely or accurate reimbursements for their travel.
According to some ICE field officials we contacted, when staff  inadvertently select the wrong funding string, it takes from several weeks  to months to process the voucher. A few officials said that when staff do  not receive timely reimbursements, they sometimes use their personal  funds to pay their government credit card bills. For example, one SAC said  that an agent in his office used personal funds to pay $15,000 for bills  incurred from business travel. Another SAC official said that not all  investigators are able to use their personal funds to pay for their business  travel expenses. One SAC said that he was waiting to be reimbursed for  $11,000 in travel bills that he had accrued on his government credit card.  Because he had not been reimbursed, he felt he was in danger of having  his government credit card revoked. These examples are to illustrate the  types of concerns reported to us. We did not verify the facts reported to us  or the circumstances surrounding these specific examples, e.g., whether  the problems were caused by the travel system, the individual, or both.
ICE headquarters investigations officials responsible for Travel Manager  said that they have made some changes to Travel Manager to aid ICE staff.  For example, they reduced the number of funding strings from the initial  800,000 to about 80,000, and added alphabetical codes to help facilitate the  use of the software. They also said they have suggested to an ICE group  working on finance issues that either the system or a staff member should  send notification to the approving official and traveler when vouchers  cannot be successfully processed. Officials responsible for all of ICE’s  financial management told us that the office responsible for mission  support for all of ICE had provided over 200 contacts in the field to assist  with Travel Manager, held a training conference, and provided training  opportunities in the field and in headquarters for staff regarding Travel  Manager. However, they recognized that 48-character numerical funding  strings are difficult to use. They also discussed additional reasons why  staff in the field were having problems with Travel Manager. First, because  ICE did not have a full accounting of its staff,  Travel Manager did not  recognize all of the staff and was unable to route all of the vouchers.  Second, many staff were unfamiliar with Travel Manager, so they did not  know how to determine whether their vouchers have been approved or  rejected. Third, in situations where staff did not travel for their home  program office, e.g., if an investigator was traveling on behalf of the  Federal Air Marshals, the travel documents could not be managed through  Travel Manager.
Twenty-two of 49 SACs and ASACs also discussed problems with FFMS,  but the problems were not as numerous as those with Travel Manager.  FFMS is a financial accounting system that allows the tracking of budget  expenditures and balances. It was previously used by INS and ICE chose  to adopt it, although DHS plans to transition to a new departmentwide  financial system. The problems with FFMS are new to former Customs  managers and administrative staff, but not necessarily new to former INS  staff who began using the software shortly before the transition. The SACs  and ASACs who stated that they had problems with FFMS said that it  mostly affected their ability to manage the office budgets. In response to  this problem, five SACs we contacted told us that they are tracking their  budgets manually, with some using Excel spreadsheets so they can know  how much they are spending from each budget area. One SAC said he is  using over 20 Excel spreadsheets to track the office budget, and another  bought an off-the-shelf budget software system to supplement FFMS. The  officials in ICE headquarters responsible for finance told us that the  limitations of FFMS were known, but FFMS was chosen after three studies  were conducted by independent consultants approving its use by ICE and  it was certified to meet auditing standards. Additionally, ICE officials in  headquarters responsible for finance said in June 2004 that they have  attempted to address field concerns by reprogramming FFMS to allow  SAC offices to track their budgets in the manner they were used to doing  in Customs and by providing weekly training to program officers in  headquarters.
CBP officials in inspections and Border Patrol in four of the six sites we  visited also told us they were having problems with administrative  computer systems and applications, mostly in the area of time and  attendance. Inspections officials cited problems with CBP’s computerized  time and attendance system, Customs Overtime Scheduling System  (COSS), and in some cases, inspections officials said they were not  accurately paid overtime. Officials we spoke with in CBP’s Border Patrol  also cited problems with COSS and overtime payments and added that in  some cases, staff were maintaining a manual record of actual time and  attendance but inputting into COSS only the 40 hours per week recognized  by COSS. CBP officials in Border Patrol headquarters acknowledged the  problems with COSS when we talked with them in June 2004. However, in  August 2004, CBP headquarters officials responsible for program  management of COSS told us that there were initial problems with  overtime payments for former INS staff that were attributed to errors in  the calculation of pay after transmission from COSS to the Department of  Agriculture for processing and the method the Border Patrol had used to  schedule hours worked, while under former INS. They said that all  problems with COSS had been resolved by January 1, 2004. We did not  verify whether or when specific problems were addressed or the actual  causes of the problems reported to us by Border Patrol and inspections  officials but did note a difference in the causes field officials mentioned  and the reasons provided by CBP headquarters officials.
section_title: Mission Staff Sometimes Assigned Administrative Work Full-Time or as Collateral Duty
paragraphs: One criticism we had of the former INS was that because of staffing  shortages, mission staff often had to assume administrative or other  functions as a collateral duty. One effect of assigning mission staff to  administrative work is that they are not spending all of their time on duties  needed to accomplish the program’s mission and thus are not reaching the  full potential of the program position. In our site visits, we found that this  continues to be a problem in some offices. Some officials we contacted in  CBP, CIS, and ICE said they had to use mission staff in this way because  they did not have enough administrative support to compensate for the  realignment of administrative staff to shared services, the addition of  mission personnel that have come as a result of mergers of some programs  in the transition, and hiring freezes. As a result, inspectors, adjudicators,  and investigators in some field offices were taking on administrative work  full-time or as a collateral duty:  In three of the six sites we visited, we found examples where CBP  inspectors were assigned to handle various administrative functions as a  collateral duty. For example, an inspector in one city was detailed to  resolving problems related to time and attendance and payroll for former  INS inspectors. In another city, supervisory inspectors were detailed to  perform scheduling duties normally performed by administrative staff.
In three of the six CIS district offices we visited, we found examples of  adjudicators or senior managers taking on administrative functions in  addition to their work as a collateral duty. In two district offices,  adjudicators were taking on such functions as managing office space and  monitoring the budget. In another city, the third highest manager in a  district office was assigned to handle personnel, procurement, and  vacancies rather than duties related specifically to managing the  adjudication of applications. Because these mission staff were spending  time on administrative functions, they were spending less time addressing  program missions such as reducing the backlog of applications.
In two of our six site visits and in telephone interviews, we learned that  ICE investigators are also taking on administrative functions as a collateral  duty. In one SAC office we visited, the SAC assigned 10 special  investigators, including 1 associate special agent in charge, 1 assistant  special agent in charge, 2 group supervisors, and 6 junior investigators, to  administrative duties. In our telephone interviews, we found examples  consistent with our site visits. For example, we were told that special  investigators in a subordinate office of one SAC office were assigned all of  the clerical work in addition to their normal duties when the office lost its  administrative support staff. Rather than assign administrative duties to  investigators, other SAC offices said they are converting unfilled agent  positions to administrative positions. For example, an official in one office  said he would have to convert unfilled agent positions to administrative  positions, and an official in another office gained an administrative staff  member from CBP by transferring (through a personnel action) one of its  staff vacancies to CBP.
section_title: Key Practices for Successful Mergers and Transformations
paragraphs: The challenges we identify in this report highlight the importance of using  the transition of immigration functions into DHS as an opportunity for  further addressing long-standing and new challenges through positive  transformation. We realize that carrying out this transformation will be no  easy or quickly realized task. In this regard, we and others have studied  the experiences of other public and private organizations that have  undergone successful mergers and transformations. In a July 2003 report,  we identified nine key practices that have consistently been found at the  center of successful mergers and transformations, as shown in figure 3.  This report was done to help federal agencies implement successful  transformations of their cultures, as well as help the new DHS merge its  various originating components into a unified department. Collectively, in  our view, these key practices and related implementation steps discussed  in our July 2003 report can help transform the sometimes diverse cultures  of DHS legacy agencies into a cohesive unit that fulfills its new mission,  meets current and emerging needs, maximizes performance, and ensures  accountability.
We did not perform an in-depth analysis comparing these key practices  with the transfer of immigration functions into DHS. Nonetheless, we  believe that all nine are important for DHS in its transformation of  immigration programs and noted two key practices that we think would be  particularly helpful as it addresses the challenges we identified in this  report. We realize that DHS has started using many of these nine practices  and, while we did not assess how well each of the practices has been  followed, we did identify certain parts of the two practices that we believe  would further assist DHS in its transformation efforts.
subsections: section_title: Establish a Communication Strategy to Create Shared Expectations and Report Related Progress
paragraphs: Creating an effective, ongoing communication strategy is essential to  implementing a merger or transformation. Communication is most  effective when done early, clearly, and often, and is downward, upward,  and lateral. Organizations must develop a comprehensive communication  strategy that reaches out to employees, customers, and stakeholders and  seeks to genuinely engage them in the merger and transformation process.  Implementation steps that accompany this key practice include  communicating early and often to build trust and understanding, ensuring  consistency of message, encouraging two-way communication, and  providing information to meet specific needs of employees.
DHS’s office responsible for shared services provided us with a  communication strategy dated May 2004 and a briefing, dated February  2004, outlining communication strategies, both with the objectives of  raising awareness and promoting understanding of shared services within  and outside of DHS. CBP told us that the agency has developed and  implemented a communications strategy and provided us with examples  of communications activities. Additionally, 22 of the 36 SACs and ASACs  responding to our question by telephone told us that concerning  communication, they received information from headquarters regarding  transition goals and milestones. In addition, a few of the SACs and ASACs  who responded that they had received transition information said that the  information was received through such means as e-mail, broadcast  messages, ICE’s intranet, and SAC conferences. These efforts, however, do  not appear to have been completely effective since, as previously  discussed, about a quarter of the officials we contacted in CBP, CIS, and  ICE wanted a clearer understanding of their roles and responsibilities with  other immigration programs.
section_title: Involve Employees to Obtain Their Ideas and Gain Their Ownership for the Transformation
paragraphs: A successful merger and transformation must involve employees and their  representatives from the beginning to gain their ownership of the changes  that are occurring in the organization. Employee involvement strengthens  the transformation process by including frontline perspectives and  experiences. Further, employee involvement helps to create the  opportunity to establish new networks and break down existing  organizational silos, increase employees’ understanding and acceptance of  organizational goals and objectives, and gain ownership of new policies  and procedures. Implementation steps that accompany this key practice  include using employee teams, involving employees in planning and  sharing performance information, incorporating employee feedback into  new policies and procedures, and delegating authority to appropriate  organizational levels.
In conducting our field work and in meetings with headquarters officials,  we did not identify any indication that the bureaus responsible for  immigration programs had formal mechanisms for obtaining periodic  feedback from field staff (other than the top manager in the office) about  how well the transition was occurring or their concerns or ideas for  improvement. In addition, several headquarters officials seemed  somewhat surprised by the concerns reported to us by field officials when  we discussed them in August 2004. On the other hand, while we did not  conduct an exhaustive search of employee involvement by all field staff,  our work did identify examples of such involvement. For example, we  found two instances where field officials had participated in working  groups held at headquarters regarding issues related to roles and  responsibilities. That is, the working group to outline roles and  responsibilities between the Border Patrol and ICE investigations involved  field managers, two of whom we interviewed. Additionally, we were told  that a meeting held in July 2004 involved CIS and ICE headquarters  managers, field staff, investigators, and adjudicators in discussions about  benefit fraud. Without a formal mechanism for obtaining employee  feedback, however, the bureaus run the risk of missing opportunities for  improvement and of allowing field-related problems to arise and continue  without adequate responses.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: With its critical roles in helping protect national security and enforcing  immigration laws, it is very important that INS’s integration into DHS and  its related transformation successfully address longstanding and new  management challenges. To accomplish this, DHS’s three immigration  bureaus are tasked with establishing clear communication and  coordination among one another and with the efficient and effective  integration of the roles and responsibilities of the former immigration and  customs investigative workforces, all while implementing a new system  for providing administrative services. In managing this transformation,  DHS is faced with not only the previous management challenges that beset  INS for years, but with new challenges that come with creating a new  department and managing diverse agencies. Notwithstanding this daunting  endeavor, the transformation provides DHS with a unique opportunity to  successfully address these inherited and new challenges and thus better  accomplish its important mission.
While DHS has started addressing many of the challenges and has  experienced some successes in its communication and coordination and  other efforts, the challenges and uncertainties reported by field officials  and discussed in this report show that these efforts have not been  sufficient to fully realize the potential benefits of this transformation. The  sentiment among the field officials within CBP, CIS, and ICE we contacted  demonstrates the importance of them having additional explanation and  guidance from DHS and the headquarters management of each of the  respective bureaus that delineates the (1) specific roles and  responsibilities for conducting uniform immigration program operations,  such as benefit fraud investigations, parole decisions, and controlled  deliveries and (2) processes and procedures for making the shared  services system work more efficiently. Without clear guidance, conflicts  that the programs have had prior to and after the transition will likely  persist and staff in the field will lack a complete road map for addressing  cross-cutting issues that may arise in the future, as well as the necessary  information to efficiently utilize the administrative services they need to  accomplish their mission.
Collectively, the nine key practices and related implementation steps that  we identified in our 2003 report can help DHS transform the diverse  cultures of former agencies into a cohesive unit that fulfills its new  mission, meets current and emerging needs, maximizes performance, and  ensures accountability. Specifically, while DHS efforts to incorporate the  key practices and implementation steps we discuss in this report into its  transformation plans should help address the challenges, in our view, a  communication strategy that obtains and considers employee feedback to  create shared expectations and gains their ownership in changes would  improve the likelihood of success in addressing the integration challenges.  We realize that carrying out a successful transformation is no easy or  quickly realized task and believe that this makes having a strategy that  fully incorporates these key practices all the more important.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: To assist DHS in successfully transforming its immigration related  programs and address the challenges discussed in this report, we  recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the heads of  CBP, CIS, and ICE, as appropriate, in consultation with the  Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security, to take the  following three actions.
First, the bureaus should create a mechanism for periodically obtaining  employee feedback on their ideas and concerns and consider this  feedback in its future transformation and communications strategies,  including assessing the challenges reported to us.
Second, the bureaus should provide additional specific guidance to field  managers and staff that establishes uniform policies and procedures on all  cross-cutting integration issues that affect operational effectiveness,  including specific descriptions of the roles and responsibilities of each  bureau and its staff in investigative techniques such as benefit fraud  investigations, parole decisions, and controlled deliveries.
Finally, the bureaus should provide additional detailed written guidance to  field managers and staff on the processes and procedures to follow for the  provision of shared administrative services.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: DHS provided written comments on a draft of this report, and these  comments are reprinted in appendix II. DHS said that, while there are  instances where contextual clarification is needed, it generally agreed with  our overall findings and recommendations and that our analysis would be  beneficial to the department.
DHS agreed with our recommendation that the bureaus–CBP, CIS, and  ICE–should create a mechanism for periodically obtaining employee  feedback. DHS commented that there have been accomplishments in this  area and provided examples for each of the three bureaus. The examples  include both existing and new efforts started since our field work,  including a contract by CBP in September 2004 for a professional services  firm to take periodic surveys of randomly sampled employees to measure  the effectiveness of communications. If effectively implemented, the new  efforts should provide the bureaus with additional employee ideas and  concerns to consider in its transformation and communication efforts.
Concerning our recommendation that the bureaus provide additional  specific guidance to the field on cross-cutting issues, DHS said that it has  provided clear and thorough guidance and uniform policies and  procedures in critical cross-cutting integration issues. It also said that the  transition challenges it faced were compounded because the overarching  priority was to accomplish all of the department’s missions. DHS said  there has been progress related to the consistency and delivery of  guidance on cross-cutting issues that should be acknowledged in the final  report. While we have not assessed the results of some of these examples  of progress, we considered them and added them to the report where  needed to add context. Further, we note that many of the examples DHS  provided of its progress were ongoing during our fieldwork and staff still  raised the concerns we report and said that more guidance on cross- cutting immigration issues is needed. Although these recent efforts, if  properly implemented could address some of the deficiencies we  identified, we believe that this feedback from field officials shows that  more attention is needed in this area to address uncertainties and  confusion about cross-cutting issues.
DHS agreed with our recommendation that the bureaus provide additional  guidance on the processes and procedures in providing shared services  but noted its concern about our discussion of communication problems  during the transition to shared services. DHS said that it used best  practices to develop a communication strategy and plan to realign various  administrative or support services into a shared services environment. It  said that it experienced delays in rolling out the shared services initiative,  so it is understandable that field managers lacked familiarity with certain  issues at the time of our interviews. However, DHS did not believe the  field managers views expressed in this report accurately portray the  initiative or the level of comprehension of the initiative. We commend  DHS for developing a communication strategy and plan for this initiative  but believe that the views expressed in this report do portray the level of  comprehension of the initiative by those officials at the time of our  interviews. The concerns they raised, along with additional feedback DHS  obtains in future employee surveys, should assist DHS in accomplishing  the goals of this initiative.
DHS also offered technical comments, which we considered and  incorporated where appropriate.
We plan to provide copies of this report to other appropriate committees,  the Secretary of DHS, and other interested parties. We will also make  copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If your  or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-8777. Key  contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Act —(P.L. 107-296, Sec. 477(d)(1)—mandated us  to review the transfer of functions from the Immigration and  Naturalization Service (INS) to the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) and identify issues associated with the transition. Our overall  objectives were to assess the status of (1) communication and  coordination among immigration programs in DHS field offices,   (2) integration of immigration and customs investigators in U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) field offices, and   (3) administrative services and systems used by DHS’s immigration  agencies’ field offices. We did not assess program performance or DHS’s  overall response to long-standing problems in this review. Additionally,  our analysis was based on a snapshot in time, primarily during fiscal year  2004, and it is possible our results would have been different if our  interviews had been conducted today.
To obtain information on our objectives, we reviewed laws; U.S.  Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) and ICE transition documents;  DHS, CIS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and ICE memos on  communicating and coordinating; DHS shared services implementation  plans; our past reports; and other relevant documents. We also spoke with  immigration experts in the public and private sectors, and with  representatives of pro- and anti-immigration advocacy groups in the  Washington, D.C., area. These included the American Immigration  Lawyers’ Association, the Arab-American Antidiscrimination Committee,  the Center for Immigration Studies, Electronic Data Systems Corporation  Inc., the Institute for the Study of International Migration, the Migration  Policy Institute, the National Immigration Forum, and the National Council  of La Raza.
We interviewed officials at DHS headquarters who were responsible for  managing ICE’s detention and removal, intelligence, and investigations  programs; CIS’s adjudications program; and CBP’s inspections and the  Border Patrol. We also interviewed ICE, CIS, and CBP officials responsible  for developing plans for the transition and officials in the former INS  Office of Statistics and Office for Policy and Planning.
We conducted structured interviews with officials in ICE’s special agent in  charge (SAC) offices, CIS’s district offices, and CBP’s offices for field  operations in 6 of the 27 cities that have SAC offices and with U.S. Border  Patrol sector headquarter offices in 3 of those 6 cities. The 6 cities we  visited were Arlington, Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; New York, New  York; Miami, Florida; Detroit, Michigan; and San Diego, California. Our  visits to Arlington and Baltimore were used as preliminary site visits to  design our interview questions. We selected these locations because of  their geographic dispersion; their proximity to ports of entry; and the  relative proximity of ICE, CBP, and CIS offices to one another.
In site visits to CBP’s Offices for field operations, we met with directors  for field operations, assistant directors for field operations, and, in some  cases, inspectors. In these interviews, we collected information and  documentation on (1) communication and coordination with ICE  investigations and other DHS components, (2) the role of ICE investigators  at the ports of entry, and (3) administrative services.
In site visits to CBP Border Patrol offices, we met with Border Patrol  sector chiefs, directors for administration, and administrative officers. In  these interviews, we collected information and documentation on   (1) communication and coordination with ICE investigations and other  immigration components, (2) the Border Patrol’s work on antismuggling,  and (3) administrative services.
In site visits to CIS offices, we met with district directors, assistant district  directors, as well as section chiefs. In these interviews, we collected  information and documentation on (1) communication and coordination  with ICE investigations and other immigration components, (2) benefit  fraud, and (3) administrative services.
In site visits to four ICE field offices, we used a structured interview  instrument to obtain information from the SAC and associate special  agents in charge (ASAC). In one location, we spoke with the two ASACs.  In all four visits, we also met with assistant special agents in charge and  administrative staff. In some locations, SACs and ASACs were in interim  positions until ICE made permanent appointments. In New York, Miami,  Detroit, and San Diego, we also conducted individual and group interviews  with investigators and supervising investigators from the former INS. In  these interviews, we collected information and documentation on   (1) ICE’s investigative mission and performance measures for the  program, (2), communication and coordination with other immigration  components in DHS, (3) communication and coordination with other  federal agencies, (4) integrating immigration and customs investigators,  and (5) administrative services.
We used our structured interview instrument to obtain information from  ICE’s SAC offices with telephone interviews with the two most senior  managers in the 21 ICE field offices we did not visit—20 SACs and 20  ASACs. We conducted these interviews between March and April of 2004  and made some follow-up calls in June 2004. In our telephone interviews  we asked about (1) ICE’s mission and performance measures;   (2) communication and coordination with CBP, CIS, and other ICE  programs; (3) communication and coordination with other federal  agencies; (4) integrating immigration and customs investigators; and   (5) administrative services. We did not speak with one SAC because he  was new to the position and did not believe he could provide us with  useful information. We had previously interviewed him as the ASAC in  another city. We did not speak with one ASAC because he, too, was new to  the position. In total, we spoke with 49 SACs and ASACs in person and by  telephone.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: David Alexander, Gabrielle Anderson, Leo Barbour, Carole Cimitile,  Randall Cole, Patricia Dalton, Katherine Davis, Nancy Finley, Larry  Harrell, Tahra Nichols, Rachel Seid, and Sarah Veale made key  contributions to this report.