Persian Gulf: Implementation Gaps Limit the Effectiveness of End-Use Monitoring and Human Rights Vetting for U.S. Military Equipment
Published: 2011-11-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The United States has authorized billions of dollars in arms sales and exports to six Persian Gulf countries--Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). However, regional tensions and civil conflicts have raised concerns about the security and use of arms sold or exported to these countries. The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) established end-use monitoring programs to ensure that these arms are used as intended. This report assesses the extent to which DOD and State (1) safeguard U.S. military technologies sold or exported to the Gulf countries, (2) provide similar or differing levels of protection for the same military technologies, and (3) vet recipients of U.S.-funded military training and equipment for potential human rights violations. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed laws and regulations, analyzed data and documentation, and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and the Gulf countries.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Gaps in implementation limit the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to safeguard military equipment sold or exported to the Persian Gulf. Under the Golden Sentry program, DOD did not document its efforts to verify host country security and accountability procedures for sensitive military equipment, and DOD personnel in five of six Gulf countries did not document their activities to monitor less sensitive items. Under its Blue Lantern program, State officials conducted postshipment checks without visiting end-users of U.S. military equipment in 10 of 13 cases GAO reviewed, and delays in requesting and conducting checks have prevented State from verifying receipt of some items. In addition, State closed post-shipment checks without receiving confirmation of receipt in 2 of 13 cases GAO reviewed. DOD and State both treat night vision devices (NVD) as a sensitive technology, but their end-use monitoring for these items varies markedly, leaving them prone to diversion. Man-portable NVDs sold through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) must be tracked by serial number, inventoried following delivery, and inventoried periodically thereafter. In contrast, State does not track NVDs by serial number or conduct regular inventories for NVDs exported through direct commercial sales (DCS). As a result, less advanced NVDs purchased through FMS have received more rigorous monitoring than more advanced NVDs purchased through DCS. In Saudi Arabia, DOD officials inventoried thousands of second-generation NVDs that were purchased through FMS in the early 1990s. Meanwhile, State approved licenses for the sale of thousands of advanced, third-generation NVDs to Saudi Arabia since 2005, which are subject to less rigorous end-use monitoring. State has conducted human rights vetting for hundreds of individuals and units that were nominated for U.S.-funded training in the Gulf countries, but has not conducted comparable vetting for anticipated recipients of about $188 million in U.S.-funded equipment for Bahrain and Oman. Such vetting is especially critical given Bahrain's use of its security forces to quell public demonstrations since Spring 2011. In November 2010, State established a new system for human rights vetting in the Gulf countries and has since vetted almost 800 individuals and units nominated for U.S.-funded training. However, recipients of equipment are not screened through this system. According to State, it does not vet recipients of equipment at the individual or unit level because the recipients are not generally known at the time that the assistance is approved, and State does not have procedures in place to conduct vetting later in the acquisition process. DOD and State should harmonize their end-use monitoring for NVDs and strengthen procedures to verify compliance with security and accountability requirements, among other things. Also, State should implement individual- and unit-level human rights vetting for recipients of equipment. DOD agreed with all of the recommendations. State agreed with two of the recommendations, but disagreed that it should develop guidance on the use and timing of site visits and closure of Blue Lantern cases. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid on the need for policies, procedures, and guidance.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Persian Gulf remains a region of significant national security concern  to the United States as Iran pursues nuclear weapons, the United States  continues to withdraw forces from Iraq, and political upheaval threatens  the stability of governments in the region. Regional tensions, civil  conflicts, and concerns about terrorist groups obtaining weapons have  raised questions about the security and use of military equipment  originating in the United States. From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, the  United States authorized billions of dollars in arms sales and arms  exports to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United  Arab Emirates (UAE) to promote national security and foreign policy  goals. Transfers to the UAE are of particular concern, as the UAE has  been cited by Congress as a transshipment point for illicit exports to Iran.  In 1996, Congress required that the President establish a program to  provide for the end-use monitoring of arms sales and exports. The  Department of Defense (DOD) operates its Golden Sentry program to  monitor arms sold through Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and the  Department of State (State) operates its Blue Lantern program to monitor  arms exported through direct commercial sales (DCS).
You asked us to review arms sales and arms exports to the Persian Gulf.  This is the second of two reports on the subject. Our first report found that  DOD and State did not consistently document how arms sales and arms  exports to the Gulf countries advanced U.S. foreign policy and national  security interests. In addition, we found that State’s database for  licensing defense exports did not enable reliable estimates of the total  value of authorized arms exports to the Gulf countries. The database  included an undetermined amount of authorizations to U.S. military units  stationed in those countries and counted some license values twice. In  comparison, we were able to determine that DOD-administered FMS  authorized $22 billion in arms sales to the Gulf countries from fiscal years  2005 through 2009.
This report assesses the extent to which DOD and State (1) safeguard  U.S. military technologies sold or exported to Gulf countries through their  end-use monitoring programs, (2) provide similar or differing levels of  protection for the same military technologies sold or exported, and (3) vet  recipients of military training and equipment for potential human rights  violations.
To address these objectives, we reviewed laws and regulations, analyzed  data and documentation related to DOD’s and State’s end-use monitoring  programs, and interviewed officials responsible for end-use monitoring  and human rights vetting in Washington, D.C., and the Gulf countries. We  reviewed and analyzed data and management reports from DOD’s  Security Cooperation Information Portal detailing the status of end-use  monitoring activities in the Gulf countries, and reviewed DOD  assessments evaluating compliance with end-use monitoring  requirements. We drew a nongeneralizable sample of 34 Blue Lantern  checks—including 25 checks selected randomly and 9 selected  judgmentally—and reviewed State cables associated with these checks.We also obtained and analyzed State export licensing data to identify  licenses for night vision devices (NVD) authorized for export to the Gulf  countries. To assess the extent of human rights vetting for recipients of  U.S. military equipment and training in the Gulf countries, we reviewed  State’s human rights vetting guidance, as well as data and documentation  on vetting. We conducted audit work in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, during  which we met with host country officials and observed end-use monitoring  checks for missiles and NVDs. We conducted phone interviews with U.S.  officials responsible for end-use monitoring and human rights vetting in  the countries that we did not visit—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2010 to November  2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides a  more detailed description of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Gulf Cooperation Council
paragraphs: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are key U.S.  allies in the Persian Gulf (see fig. 1). The countries are primarily governed  by longstanding ruling families under emirates and monarchies, and, with  the exception of Bahrain and Oman, each possesses large oil or gas  reserves. Together, these countries constitute the Gulf Cooperation  Council, which they established in 1981 as a means to coordinate on  security concerns, among other issues. The United States maintains  close security ties with the Gulf countries. For example, Saudi Arabia and  the UAE are two of the largest purchasers of U.S. arms in the world, the  U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain, and U.S. Central  Command operates its forward command facilities in Qatar. Moreover,  the United States has designated Bahrain and Kuwait as major non- NATO allies.
In the 1990s, the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and efforts to  promote greater coordination among the Gulf Cooperation Council states  was primarily aimed at containing conventional threats from Iraq and Iran.  More recently, U.S. security cooperation has focused on addressing  transnational terrorism and proliferation networks and confronting regional  security threats, in particular Iran. However, popular uprisings in the  Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the Arab world strained U.S. relations with  some Gulf Cooperation Council countries in 2011 and have drawn into  focus the tension between preserving existing security relationships and  promoting human rights. For example, human rights organizations and  other observers have noted that the government in Bahrain may have  violated human rights in its attempt to quell protests in February 2011 and  suppress dissent in their aftermath.
section_title: Laws Governing Arms Exports and Sales
paragraphs: The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA) authorizes the President to  control the sale or export of defense articles and services. The U.S.  government sells defense articles and services to foreign governments  and international organizations through FMS and authorizes the  commercial export of defense articles and services to foreign  governments and other entities through DCS. State has overall regulatory  responsibility for both FMS and DCS, but DOD’s Defense Security  Cooperation Agency (DSCA) administers FMS, and the individual military  departments implement the sale and delivery process for FMS.Directorate of Defense Trade Controls administers DCS by licensing  exports from U.S. companies to foreign entities.
The AECA, as amended, also requires end-use monitoring for the sale or  export of defense articles and services, and these responsibilities are  delegated to the same agencies that administer the programs. A 1988  amendment to the AECA required the President to develop standards for  identifying high-risk commercial exports for regular end-use monitoring.  In consultation with other agencies, State developed a list of standards  that may signal an illegal export or diversion, and therefore warrant end- use monitoring.
In 1996, Congress amended the AECA to require the  President to establish a program for monitoring the end-use of defense  articles and defense services sold, leased, or exported under the AECA,  including through FMS and DCS. The amendment specified that the  program should provide reasonable assurances that the recipient is  complying with restrictions imposed by the U.S. government on the use,  transfer, and security of the defense articles and defense services. DOD’s  DSCA administers the Golden Sentry program to monitor the end-use of  defense articles and defense services transferred through FMS, and  State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls administers the Blue  Lantern program to conduct end-use monitoring for defense articles and  defense services exported under DCS. U.S. officials located in the Gulf  countries conduct the monitoring for each program. DOD officials at  Security Cooperation Organizations conduct Golden Sentry end-use  monitoring and State officials at U.S. embassies conduct Blue Lantern  checks. Policies and procedures for the Golden Sentry and Blue Lantern  programs are outlined in DOD’s Security Assistance Management Manual  and State’s Blue Lantern Guidebook, respectively.
section_title: Restrictions on Security Assistance Based on Human Rights Concerns
paragraphs: A provision in the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended in 2008,  commonly referred to as the “Leahy Law,” prohibits the United States  from providing any assistance under the act or AECA to any unit of the  security forces of a foreign country if there is credible information that  such unit has committed gross violations of human rights. This law  applies to assistance provided through the International Military Education  and Training and Foreign Military Financing programs, among others.  From 1997 through 2007, this provision was included as an amendment  to State’s annual foreign operations appropriation bills. In 2008, the  Foreign Assistance Act was amended to make these restrictions  permanent. In addition, DOD’s annual appropriations bill contains a  similar “Leahy” provision that applies to DOD-funded training programs.  This provision prohibits any funding made available through DOD’s  appropriations bill from being used to train a unit of security forces or  foreign police forces if State provides to DOD credible evidence of gross  human rights violations by such unit. According to DOD policy, this  provision applies to Joint Combined Exchange Training and the  Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program—two training programs that  DOD has funded in the Persian Gulf countries.
The State and DOD Leahy provisions do not apply to training and  equipment purchased through FMS or DCS using host country funds.  These purchases are subject to a separate human rights provision, which  limits security assistance to countries whose governments engage in a  consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. According to  State, it reviews all arms sales and exports through FMS and DCS for  human rights concerns, among other things. State’s review process is  described in greater detail in our previous report on arms sales and arms  exports to the Gulf countries.
section_title: Implementation Gaps Limit the Effectiveness of U.S. Efforts to Safeguard Military Equipment in the Persian Gulf Countries
subsections: section_title: DOD Monitors Military Equipment Based on Lists of Sensitive Items, while State Monitors it Case-by- Case Based on Sensitivity and Other Risk Factors
subsections: section_title: DOD Conducts Two Levels of End-Use Monitoring and Periodic Compliance Visits
paragraphs: Under its Golden Sentry program, DOD conducts two levels of  monitoring—enhanced end-use monitoring and routine end-use  monitoring—based on a list of specific sensitive defense articles. DOD  conducts enhanced end-use monitoring for specifically identified sensitive  defense articles, services, and technologies. Letters of Offer and  Acceptance authorizing the sale of these items to countries in the  Persian Gulf and elsewhere may contain specialized notes or provisos  specifying that the purchaser must adhere to certain physical security and  accountability requirements. For example, specialized notes for  Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles require the purchaser to  conduct semiannual inventories by serial number and establish  procedures to provide a continuous accounting for the items. To verify  compliance with these provisos, DOD policy requires that it conduct serial  number inventories for items designated as requiring enhanced end-use  monitoring following delivery and at regular intervals thereafter. As of   July 2011, DOD had designated 16 defense articles that always require  enhanced end-use monitoring when sold though FMS. As of August 23,  2011, the Gulf countries have purchased 9 of these 16 defense articles,  including NVDs and various missiles (see table 1).
DOD conducts routine end-use monitoring for defense articles and  services sold through FMS that do not have any unique conditions  associated with their transfer. Routine end-use monitoring is conducted in  conjunction with other required security-related duties. For example, U.S.  officials might observe how a host country’s military is using U.S.  equipment when visiting a military installation on other business. Given  the large volume of defense articles transferred through FMS, DSCA  officials have instructed DOD personnel to concentrate routine end-use  monitoring efforts on a “watch list” of specific categories of items,  including battle tanks, artillery systems, fixed wing aircraft, and  helicopters. All other defense articles, such as uniforms, radios, and  canteens, are still subject to routine end-use monitoring, but receive a  lower priority.
In addition to enhanced and routine end-use monitoring, DOD conducts  periodic Compliance Assessment Visits to review and evaluate the  Security Cooperation Organizations’ and host nations’ overall end-use  monitoring compliance programs. A Compliance Assessment Visit  evaluates a country’s compliance with specific physical security and  accountability agreements, provisos, and other terms of sale. It may  include facility visits, records reviews, reviews of local security  procedures, and inventories of U.S. origin defense articles. As of  October 27, 2011, DOD has conducted a Compliance Assessment Visit in  each of the Gulf countries except for Qatar, which has not received any  defense articles requiring enhanced end-use monitoring except for  Communications Security Equipment (see table 2). In May 2009, we  reported that DOD did not have written guidance for selecting countries  for compliance visits and recommended that DOD create written guidance  that incorporated a risk-based approach.written guidelines for identifying countries to receive compliance visits in  its May/June 2011 End-Use Monitoring newsletter, and these guidelines  will be included in forthcoming revisions to the Security Assistance  Management Manual. These guidelines will be broad enough to take  various factors into consideration, including the political and military  stability of the region, the history of a country’s compliance with the  Golden Sentry program, and the makeup of a country’s inventory of  defense articles requiring enhanced end-use monitoring, among other  factors.
section_title: DOD’s and State’s End-Use Monitoring Varies Significantly for NVDs Purchased by Persian Gulf Countries
subsections: section_title: U.S. Government Considers NVDs to Be a Sensitive Military Technology Prone to Diversion
paragraphs: The U.S. government considers NVDs to be a sensitive military technology  that is vulnerable to diversion. According to DOD, control and security of  NVDs continues to be a major national security concern, and its policy is to  treat these systems as a valuable, limited, and sensitive national security  resource to be husbanded and invested in support of national security  objectives. NVDs provide U.S. forces a technological advantage by  facilitating the location, recognition, and defeat of opposing forces during  periods of low battlefield visibility, a capability also sought by terrorist  groups. Night vision technology may be incorporated into man-portable  devices, such as binoculars, weapons sights, and thermal imagers, or  devices mounted onto other platforms, including helicopters and unmanned  aerial systems. Figure 3 shows an example of a third-generation, head- mounted night vision goggle and a thermal imaging device, both of which  have been purchased by the Gulf countries.
The U.S. government has authorized the sale of NVDs to Gulf  governments through FMS and licensed exports of NVDs to private and  governmental entities in these countries through DCS. All requests for the  sale or export of NVDs are evaluated on a case-by-case basis and undergo  an interagency review, including a national security review by the Defense  Technology Security Administration. The decision to release NVD  technology to foreign end-users is based on the type of equipment, the  end-users’ ability and willingness to safeguard the equipment, and whether  the end-use is consistent with enhancing or maintaining U.S. national  security (e.g., assisting in antiterrorist or antipiracy operations). NVDs are  the only military technology the Gulf countries have purchased through  FMS and DCS that require enhanced end-use monitoring (i.e., delivery  verification and regular inventories) when purchased through FMS.
section_title: DOD Guidance Requires Tracking and Inventorying Man-Portable NVDs Purchased by Gulf Countries through FMS
paragraphs: Until a policy change that took effect on October 1, 2011, DOD guidance,  some of which was not documented, required that DOD conduct serial  number inventories of man-portable NVDs purchased by the Gulf  countries following delivery and at regular intervals thereafter. To facilitate  these inventories, DOD tracks man-portable NVDs by serial number in  the SCIP. According to data from the SCIP, the Gulf countries had  received 10,550 NVDs through FMS, as of August 23, 2011 (see fig. 4).  NVDs purchased by Saudi Arabia constituted almost 70 percent of the  total number of NVDs in the Persian Gulf countries purchased through  FMS.
Before October 1, 2011, DOD guidance required that personnel in the  Gulf countries conduct 100 percent serial number inventories for all NVDs  following delivery. According to the DSCA Program Manager for the  Golden Sentry program, DOD personnel in these countries were then  required to conduct inventories of 50 percent of all second-generation  NVDs annually (100 percent biannually) and 100 percent of all third- generation NVDs annually. However, the required frequency for these  inventories was not documented in formal DOD guidance. Instead, DSCA  could specify the required inventory frequency on a country-by-country  basis, and this requirement was subsequently reflected in the SCIP,  which DOD personnel in the Gulf countries use to plan and carry out their  inventories. On September 22, 2011, DOD issued a new policy,  effective October 1, 2011, which specified that NVDs sold through FMS to  non-NATO countries, including the Persian Gulf countries, would be  subject to a serial number inventory within 90 days of delivery, tracked by  serial number in the SCIP database, and inventoried annually thereafter.  However, the policy provided DSCA with discretion to modify the  established criteria based on risk assessments, record of compliance with  security and accountability measures, or reported end-use violations.  Accordingly, DSCA disseminated implementation guidelines through its  End-Use Monitoring newsletter which further refined the criteria for  conducting Golden Sentry inventories of man-portable NVDs. These  guidelines reflect a risk-based approach that stipulates differing  requirements based on the decade in which the items were purchased:
NVDs purchased before December 31, 1990. These NVDs will no  longer require regular serial number inventories or tracking through  enhanced end-use monitoring. Instead, they will be covered under  routine end-use monitoring.
NVDs purchased between January 1, 1991, and December 31, 2000.
DOD personnel will be required to establish a baseline count for these  NVDs and conduct at least one serial number inventory, after which  regular serial number inventories will no longer be required and the  NVDs will be covered under routine end-use monitoring.
NVDs purchased on or after January 1, 2001. The end-use monitoring  requirements will not change for these NVDs. They will still require  100 percent annual inventories and tracking in the SCIP by serial  number.
section_title: State Does Not Systematically Conduct End-Use Checks for or Track All NVDs in the Gulf Countries
paragraphs: We found that State did not conduct end-use checks on all NVD shipments  to Gulf countries from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. The Blue Lantern  Guidebook, which outlines State’s policies for the program, states that Blue  Lantern checks are selected based on perceived risk factors, one of which  is sensitive technologies, such as NVDs. According to the State official who  was in charge of the Blue Lantern program until August 2011, State  attempts to conduct end-use monitoring checks on all shipments of  complete NVD systems. He noted that this is not a formal policy  requirement, but rather an informal objective to more closely align State’s  practices with DOD’s. According to State, complete NVD systems include  night vision goggles, monoculars, and image intensifier tubes—the  technology that allows one to view images through the goggles or  monoculars. We reviewed State’s data on licenses for defense exports to  the Gulf countries and identified at least 34 licenses for 8,757 man-portable  NVDs that were exported to the Gulf countries from fiscal years 2005  through 2010, all of which included security and accountability provisos.  State conducted end-use checks on 9 of these 34 licenses, or about 26  percent of all such licenses. These checks covered 2,242 of the 8,757  NVDs exported to the Gulf countries during this period. In contrast to  DOD’s end-use monitoring for NVDs, from fiscal years 2005 through 2010,  State did not conduct postshipment checks for any NVDs authorized for  export to the Gulf countries more than once.
In addition, State has not conducted any end-use checks on man- portable, thermal imaging systems exported to the Gulf countries, as of  September 2011. According to U.S. Army night vision specialists, thermal  imaging technology enables warfighters to find and engage targets in  complete darkness, a capability that night vision goggles based on image  intensification technology do not have. From fiscal years 2005 through  2010, State approved 44 licenses authorizing the export of about 480  thermal imaging systems to the Gulf countries. These included 6 licenses  for 140 man-portable thermal imaging systems, which are more prone to  diversion. However, State did not conduct any end-use checks on these  sensitive items. In contrast, DOD subjects these systems under its  Golden Sentry program to enhanced end-use monitoring. According to  data from DOD’s end-use monitoring database, Bahrain purchased six  thermal imagers through FMS that DOD will track by serial number and  monitor regularly.
Furthermore, State does not systematically track or record by serial  number NVDs that the Gulf countries have purchased through DCS.  According to State, it can determine the number and location of NVDs  exported through DCS by analyzing data from its export licensing  database and shipping data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Automated  Export System database. If necessary, it can also obtain serial numbers  for NVDs purchased through DCS by contacting the U.S. exporter. For  example, we identified one instance in which State obtained serial  numbers from a U.S. exporter at the request of embassy personnel to  enable an inventory of NVDs in Saudi Arabia. However, unlike DOD,  State does not systematically compile this information. As a result, State  does not have ready access to serial-number specific information on the  total number of NVDs in the inventories of the Gulf countries, their  location, and their current disposition.
section_title: Less Advanced NVDs Purchased through FMS Have Received More Rigorous End-Use Monitoring than Advanced NVDs Purchased through DCS
paragraphs: As a result of DOD’s and State’s different approaches to end-use  monitoring, some less advanced, second-generation NVDs purchased by  the Gulf countries through FMS have received more rigorous end-use  monitoring than more advanced third-generation NVDs purchased  through DCS. In some Gulf countries, the NVDs purchased through FMS  and DCS are included in the inventory of the same end-user. According to  DSCA officials, DOD personnel in Saudi Arabia have been required to  track and conduct annual serial number inventories on half of the almost  6,000 second-generation NVDs purchased by Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of  Defense and Aviation and the Saudi Arabia National Guard through FMS  in the early 1990s. For example, DOD officials conducted their most  recent serial number inventory of the more than 4,000 NVDs in the Saudi  Arabia National Guard’s inventory in February and March 2011 by visiting  29 locations over a five-week period. Meanwhile, State has approved at  least 13 licenses for the sale of more than 11,000 advanced, third- generation NVDs to Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defense and Aviation  through DCS since 2005. However, because these NVDs were  purchased through DCS, they will be subject to less rigorous end-use  monitoring than the older, less-advanced NVDs purchased through FMS.
section_title: The UAE Has Not Provided a Required NVD Compliance Plan to DOD
paragraphs: DOD and State require entities in the Gulf countries that purchase NVDs  through FMS and DCS to meet comparable physical security and  accountability requirements. For example, DOD and State both require  the purchaser to secure the NVDs against loss, theft, or unauthorized  access. Both agencies also require that the purchaser conduct regular  inventories of the NVDs and make their records available to U.S.  government officials upon request. For NVDs purchased through FMS,  DOD also requires that the purchaser provide a written physical security  and accountability plan (NVD compliance plan) within 30 days of  acceptance of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance outlining how they will  comply with these requirements. However, as of August 18, 2011, the  UAE military had not provided an NVD compliance plan, despite having  purchased more than 300 NVDs through FMS since 2008. According to  DSCA, it raised this concern as part of a May 2010 Compliance  Assessment Visit in the UAE and again as recently as October 24, 2011.  DSCA officials stated that they would notify the UAE that if they do not  receive a signed NVD compliance plan by December 31, 2011, DSCA will  cease to recommend NVD sales to the UAE through FMS. DOD took  similar action towards Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defense and Aviation in  February 2011 because it had not furnished an NVD compliance plan. In  May 2011, the Ministry of Defense and Aviation provided a copy of its  compliance plan, and DOD subsequently resumed consideration of NVD  sales.
section_title: State Conducts Human Rights Vetting for Recipients of U.S.- Funded Training in Gulf Countries, but Does Not Conduct Comparable Vetting for Recipients of Equipment
subsections: section_title: State Conducts Human Rights Vetting for Individuals and Units Nominated for U.S.- Funded Training in the Gulf Countries
paragraphs: Data from State’s new vetting database indicate that State has conducted  human rights vetting for about 770 individuals and 12 units in the Gulf  countries that were nominated for U.S.-funded training. U.S. laws prohibit  certain types of assistance from being provided to any unit of the security  forces of a foreign country if there is credible evidence that such unit has  committed gross violations of human rights. In keeping with these laws  and State human rights policies, State’s policy is to vet security force  units and their commanders for unit training, and individual security force  members for individual training. DOD’s policy requires that all DOD- funded training events with foreign individuals and units be referred to  State for human rights vetting. State conducts the human rights vetting  process on behalf of DOD for DOD-funded programs.
The Gulf countries have received various types of U.S.-funded training  that is subject to State’s and DOD’s human rights laws. For example,  Bahrain and Oman received about $4.3 million in assistance through the  International Military Education and Training program in fiscal years 2009  and 2010 to send officers to U.S. war colleges and to receive English  language or other technical training in the United States. The same two  countries also received almost $2.5 million in Antiterrorism Assistance to  improve aviation security and responses to mass casualty events, among  other things. Over the same period, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and UAE  received about $2.4 million through the Export Control and Related  Border Security program, some of which funded training designed to help  customs officials and other enforcement agents identify controlled  commodities during inspections. Members of the security forces of the  Gulf countries have also participated in DOD-funded Joint Combined  Exchange Training exercises with U.S. special operations forces.
As shown in figure 5, State uses a multistep process for conducting  human rights vetting. The process begins at the U.S. embassy in the  home country of the unit or individual nominated for training when a  sponsoring office requests human rights vetting for security force units or  individuals that have been proposed for U.S.-funded training. Names are  first vetted by selected sections at the embassy by querying databases  frequently used by their offices and consulting other relevant sources.
For example, the consular section might search its internal database,  which includes information on individuals that have applied for U.S. visas  or may be ineligible for U.S. visas, and the Department of Homeland  Security might search its enforcement database, which includes  information on entities suspected of or involved in violating federal laws.  When vetting at post has been completed, the list of candidates for  training is transmitted to State headquarters in Washington, D.C., where  they undergo a second stage of screening by officials in the Bureau of  Near Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and  Labor. These officials consult intelligence databases and other classified  and unclassified sources. If no derogatory information is found, State  notifies the embassy that the candidates have been approved, and  training may proceed.
Under State’s policy, the political section is the only section at post required to conduct  vetting. Vetting by other sections is optional and varies from post to post. In the Gulf  countries, the number of sections that conducted vetting ranged from three in the UAE to  seven in Saudi Arabia.
section_title: State Does Not Conduct Individual- and Unit-Level Human Rights Vetting for Recipients of U.S.-Funded Equipment in the Persian Gulf
paragraphs: In contrast to its vetting process for recipients of training, State does not  conduct individual- or unit-level human rights vetting for recipients of U.S.- funded equipment in Gulf countries. U.S.-funded equipment provided  through certain programs is subject to the same human rights provisions  that apply to U.S.-funded training programs. State has conducted human  rights vetting for hundreds of individuals and units that received U.S.- funded training in the Gulf countries, but has not conducted comparable  vetting for the anticipated recipients of more than $188 million in U.S.- funded equipment for Bahrain and Oman. From fiscal years 2005 through  2010, Bahrain and Oman received about $148 million through the U.S.- funded Foreign Military Financing program to purchase military equipment  from the United States, including NVDs, missile systems, helicopters, and  small arms (see table 7). In addition, Bahrain was authorized to receive  equipment valued at about $40 million through the Excess Defense  Articles program. According to State officials, recipients of U.S.-funded  equipment would only be vetted if the same entities that received the  equipment also received U.S.-funded training.
According to State, vetting for the anticipated recipients of equipment  currently takes place through memos drafted by State and cleared by the  relevant regional bureaus at the time that funding is allocated for the  countries that will receive assistance. In these memos, State regional  bureaus confirm, in consultation with the respective embassies, that they  are not aware of credible evidence of gross human rights violations by  any units that might receive assistance under the funding authorization.  However, according to State, the exact items to be financed and the exact  units or individuals to receive the items are not generally known at the  time the funding is obligated, and may not be known until many months or  even years later. The official that oversees human rights vetting at State  said that the anticipated recipient of equipment listed in the funding  allocation memos is typically not a specific unit or individual, but rather a  much higher-level entity, such as the Ministry of Interior, in the country  slated to receive assistance.
State does not currently have procedures in place to conduct vetting later  in the acquisition process when the exact recipient unit or individual is  known. However, according to State, it is developing policy guidance and  identifying procedures to standardize the collection of timely information  on recipient units of equipment in order to conduct equipment vetting  through INVEST and improve the effectiveness of its vetting process. The  procedures will likely incorporate a two stage process. The first stage of  vetting would be initiated when State receives a formal request for  equipment. During this stage, the embassy, regional bureau, and the  Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor would sign off on a  memo similar to the current method of vetting for U.S.-funded equipment.  The second stage would occur near the end of the acquisition process  and before shipment of the equipment when the exact recipient of the  equipment is known. During this second stage, the unit scheduled to  receive the equipment would be vetted through INVEST, similar to vetting  for U.S.-funded training.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD and State established the Golden Sentry and Blue Lantern  programs, respectively, to provide reasonable assurance that arms sold  or licensed for export to foreign governments do not end up in the  possession of individuals or groups who pose a threat to the United  States or its allies. However, gaps in implementing these programs in the  Gulf countries may limit the ability of DOD and State to adequately  safeguard defense articles upon their arrival, storage, and eventual use in  those countries. For example, both DOD and State view NVDs as a  sensitive technology sought by terrorists, but their approaches to  monitoring NVDs varies widely. Paradoxically, more modern third- generation NVDs sold to Gulf countries through direct commercial sales  receive less rigorous end-use monitoring than older, less advanced NVDs  purchased through FMS. Gaps in implementing State’s Blue Lantern  monitoring program have resulted in State not physically verifying receipt  of some items or confirming some end-users’ compliance with license  conditions—even though State has identified the need for a postshipment  check—thus reducing confidence in the security of arms exported to  these entities. Also, the absence of DOD documentation of its efforts both  to verify host country security and accountability procedures for sensitive  military equipment and to monitor less sensitive items limits assurance  that equipment sold through FMS is being used as intended. Moreover,  DOD’s inability to obtain a required compliance plan from the UAE,  outlining its security and accountability procedures for more than 300  NVDs purchased since 2008, erodes confidence in the security of arms  sold to a country that has been used by illicit actors to transship sensitive  equipment. If the UAE does not provide a compliance plan, DOD could  consider not recommending further NVD sales through FMS.
State and DOD have developed policies to prevent U.S. assistance from  being used to provide training for units or individuals who have committed  gross violations of human rights. However, State’s absence of procedures  to conduct individual- and unit-level human rights vetting of recipients of  U.S.-funded equipment increases the risk that such equipment may  ultimately be used by violators of human rights. Given recent unrest in  some Gulf countries, this could result in U.S.-funded equipment being  misused to quell peaceful demonstrations.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To close gaps in the implementation of end-use monitoring programs in  the Gulf countries that may limit the ability of DOD and State to  adequately safeguard defense articles upon their arrival, storage, and  eventual use in those countries, we recommend that the Secretaries of  Defense and State take steps to harmonize their approaches to end-use  monitoring for NVDs to ensure that they receive equal levels of protection  regardless of how they are obtained by foreign recipients. Such steps  might include developing a plan or schedule for how and when each  department’s end-use monitoring approaches would be harmonized.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two  actions: develop guidance requiring DOD officials to document their efforts to  verify host country security and accountability procedures for sensitive  equipment and their activities to monitor less sensitive equipment, and obtain from the UAE government an NVD compliance plan, as  required under the conditions of sale through FMS, or develop an  appropriate response.
We further recommend that the Secretary of State take two actions to  issue policies and procedures that: provide guidance to Compliance Specialists regarding when to  request embassy personnel to conduct postshipment checks, and  when to close checks, and  stipulate that when postshipment checks are requested, U.S.  embassy personnel should conduct site visits to end-users to  physically verify compliance with conditions associated with an export  license.
To reduce the risk that U.S.-funded equipment may be used by violators  of human rights in the Gulf countries, we recommend that the Secretary  of State implement individual- and unit-level human rights vetting for  recipients of U.S.-funded equipment.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD and State for their review and  comment. Both DOD and State provided written comments, which we  have reprinted in appendixes II and III, respectively. DOD and State also  provided technical comments, which we incorporated in this report, as  appropriate.
DOD and State both agreed with our recommendation to take steps to  harmonize their approaches to end-use monitoring for NVDs. DOD stated  that it welcomed this recommendation and offered to provide any  assistance needed to State to provide consistent monitoring of sensitive  technology regardless of the method through which the transfer is made.  State said that it intends to increase the number of end-use checks on  NVDs that are comparable to those sold through FMS. However, State  noted that human resource constraints in Washington, D.C., and at its  embassies around the world will pose the greatest challenge to achieving  full harmonization. Accordingly, it plans to explore how existing DOD  resources in-country may be leveraged to support end-use monitoring for  sensitive items exported through DCS.
DOD agreed with our recommendation to develop guidance requiring its  personnel to document efforts to verify host country security and  accountability procedures for sensitive equipment and activities to monitor  less sensitive equipment. DOD noted that forthcoming revisions to the  Security Assistance Management Manual will include new requirements  that address this recommendation. DOD also agreed with our  recommendation that it obtain from the UAE government an NVD  compliance plan, as required under the conditions of sale through FMS,  or develop an appropriate response. DOD stated that it has continued to  work with the UAE to obtain the plan and, on October 24, 2011, met with  UAE officials to inform them that NVD exports through FMS may be  affected if the UAE Ministry of Defense does not provide an NVD  compliance plan by December 31, 2011.
State disagreed with our recommendation to issue policies and  procedures stipulating that U.S. embassy personnel conduct site visits to  end-users as part of requested postshipment checks. State said that we  misinterpreted data from certain cases to reach the conclusions that led  to this recommendation and that we based our conclusion on several  isolated examples of Blue Lantern checks conducted in the Gulf  countries. However, our recommendation is based on our finding that  when postshipment checks were requested, State inconsistently used site  visits to verify whether defense articles had been received by an end-user  and whether items were being used in accordance with the terms of their  licenses. We drew this conclusion by analyzing a sample of 13  postshipment checks which State requested for the Gulf countries from  fiscal years 2005 through 2010 and determining that U.S. embassy  officials conducted site visits to end-users for only 3 of these 13 checks.  Embassy officials did conduct site visits to private companies acting as  intermediaries in order to confirm that they were reliable recipients of U.S.  defense equipment in some cases, but the risk that U.S. equipment could  be lost or diverted is not limited to intermediaries. Separately, our report  cited specific examples of Blue Lantern checks to highlight State’s  inconsistent use of site visits. For example, embassy officials did not  conduct site visits to verify receipt and confirm compliance with license  conditions in the UAE, even though they were requested to do so in their  tasking from State, whereas they did in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In its  comments, State also noted that it accepts host government official  assurances that equipment was received and inventory control and  accounting systems were working in certain appropriate instances.  However, without conducting a site visit, State was not able to verify that  items were being used in accordance with the terms of their license, a key  objective of the Blue Lantern program. Therefore, we continue to believe  that our recommendation on the need for policies and procedures on  using site visits remains valid.
State also disagreed with our recommendation to provide guidance to its  Compliance Specialists on when to request embassy personnel to  conduct postshipment checks and when to close checks. We note that  our recommendation is not prescriptive and is designed to allow State  flexibility on when to request and close checks, but without losing the  opportunity to close them successfully. State commented that the Blue  Lantern checks cited in our report gave a misleading impression and led  to incorrect conclusions. Our report cited two instances when State could  not confirm receipt of NVDs or physically verify compliance with security  and accountability conditions for the recipients of these items because it  waited several years before requesting a check. In the first instance,  embassy officials in Qatar could not verify the location of a shipment of  NVDs, in part, because State waited three years after shipment to request  a check. State’s comments on this draft did not explain why State waited  three years to request this check. In the second instance, State  intentionally waited until after the second and last of two NVD shipments  to Saudi Arabia to request a check, at which point the items had been  issued to different units located throughout the country and were not  available for inventory. However, State offered no explanation for why it  waited 18 months after final export to request the check. As we noted in  the report, State lacks internal guidance that would help inform its  decision of when to conduct a postshipment check.
We continue to believe that State Compliance Specialists could benefit  from guidance on when to close Blue Lantern cases and, therefore, we  have not modified our recommendation. In our report, we also cite 2  examples of postshipment checks among the 13 we reviewed in which  State closed Blue Lantern cases as favorable before receiving  confirmation from embassy officials that the end-user had received the  items. In its written comments, State noted that in both of these cases  embassy officials confirmed the bona fides of the transactions. We have  added language to the report to reflect State’s comments. While this  statement is accurate, it misses our point. In both instances, State also  explicitly requested that embassy officials verify receipt of the items by  the end-user. Although embassy officials reported back to State that they  were not able to verify receipt by the end-user, State closed both cases  as favorable instead of leaving these cases open until embassy officials  could confirm receipt.
State agreed with our recommendation to implement individual- and unit- level human rights vetting for recipients of U.S.-funded equipment and  noted that it is already working on plans to improve human rights vetting  procedures with the aim of more effectively screening recipients of  equipment. According to State, this new approach will permit equipment  vetting to be conducted through INVEST much closer to the time of  delivery and should significantly improve effectiveness over the current  process, which relies on the information available when funding for  equipment is allocated, sometimes years before delivery.
We are sending copies of this report to relevant congressional  committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and other interested  parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-4347 or at yagerl@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) and the  Department of State (State) safeguard U.S. military technologies sold or  exported to Persian Gulf countries through their end-use monitoring  programs, we reviewed relevant laws and regulations, interviewed U.S. and  host country officials, and analyzed end-use monitoring and licensing data.  For DOD’s Golden Sentry end-use monitoring program, we reviewed  relevant program guidance in the Security Assistance Management Manual  and standard operating procedures used by the Security Cooperation  Organizations in the Gulf countries. We also reviewed reports summarizing  the findings from DOD’s Compliance Assessment Visits in the Gulf  countries. We interviewed and obtained documentation from U.S. officials  in the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Technology Security  Administration, and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). We also  interviewed officials representing military departments that implement  Foreign Military Sales (FMS), including the Navy International Programs  Office, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense  Exports and Cooperation, and the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of  the Air Force for International Affairs. We traveled to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,  and Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and interviewed U.S. officials  in the respective Security Cooperation Organizations responsible for  conducting end-use monitoring. We observed U.S. officials conducting end- use monitoring for night vision devices (NVD) and Advanced Medium  Range Air-to-Air Missiles in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, respectively. We  also interviewed host country officials in these two countries to discuss their  end-use monitoring procedures. We conducted phone interviews with U.S.  embassy officials responsible for Golden Sentry end-use monitoring in the  other four Gulf countries.
To determine the total number of defense articles requiring enhanced end- use monitoring in the Gulf countries and their inventory status, we obtained  and analyzed data from DOD’s end-use monitoring database—the Security  Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP). Specifically, the Defense Security  Cooperation Agency queried the SCIP to provide us with “Ad Hoc” reports  for each of the Gulf countries, which included information on the defense  articles purchased by each country; the date that these items were last  inventoried; and their “disposition status,” that is, the status of their  inventories. We cross referenced these data by comparing the total count  for each defense article in the “Ad Hoc” report to the “SCIP Quantity” in  each country’s Enhanced End-Use Monitoring Reconciliation Report, which  includes all the sensitive defense articles that have been purchased by the  Gulf countries and entered into the SCIP database, and were able to  confirm most quantities. As a result, we determined the SCIP data to be  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement. To determine the  total number of sensitive defense articles in the Gulf countries that require  enhanced end-use monitoring and the inventory status of these defense  articles, we collapsed the 12 “disposition status” categories into 4 new  categories—”observed or inventoried;” “not observed or inventoried;”  “disposed, demilitarized, or expended in training;” and “inventory loss.” We  excluded defense articles that had been purchased by the Gulf countries  but had not yet been delivered to these countries. Finally, we calculated the  number of defense articles that fell into each of these four categories.
For State’s Blue Lantern program, we reviewed relevant program  guidance, including State’s Blue Lantern Guidebook, and cables  associated with selected checks. We interviewed officials in State’s  Directorate of Defense Trade Controls who administer the Blue Lantern  program and review export licenses. We also interviewed U.S. embassy  officials in the Gulf countries that conduct Blue Lantern checks. We  traveled to Saudi Arabia and the UAE to interview Blue Lantern points of  contact and conducted phone interviews with embassy officials in the  other four Gulf countries. In Saudi Arabia, we observed a Blue Lantern  postshipment check for NVDs. We also interviewed host country officials  in Saudi Arabia and the UAE to discuss their end-use monitoring  procedures. We obtained information from State on “unfavorable” Blue  Lantern checks in the Gulf countries that were referred to enforcement  and we reviewed State’s Compliance Office Reports detailing  enforcement actions taken as a result of Blue Lantern checks. Finally, we  received a briefing from State officials on potential violations of the Arms  Export Control Act of 1976 involving the Gulf countries, which have been  communicated to Congress through section 3 reports.
To summarize the number and type of Blue Lantern checks conducted in  the Gulf countries, we obtained and analyzed data from State on checks  conducted in the Gulf countries from fiscal years 2005 through 2010.  These data included 23 checks classified as “no action,” in which U.S.  embassies were not tasked by State to conduct a check, and 8 checks  classified as “no response,” in which State either did not receive a  response from post or State deemed the response unsatisfactory. We  excluded these 31 checks from our analysis. To determine the reliability  of these data, we cross-referenced license numbers between State’s Blue  Lantern and licensing databases, and we used State cables to  corroborate various fields in the Blue Lantern database. We determined  that these data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To more closely  examine how State carries out Blue Lantern checks, we drew a  nongeneralizable sample of 34 Blue Lantern checks—including 25  selected randomly and 9 selected judgmentally—and requested State  cables for these checks. First, we selected a random sample of 25 checks  out of 77 that State initiated involving the Gulf countries during fiscal  years 2009 and 2010. We limited our sample to checks during these  years to increase the likelihood that the embassy officials who conducted  these checks would still be in their current positions, thereby enabling  further discussion about the specific details of the checks. We stratified  our sample by the results of the checks. Specifically, we sampled 100  percent of the “unverifiable” cases, 50 percent of the “unfavorable” cases,  25 percent of the “favorable” cases, and 25 percent of the “no action”  cases. Our random sample included both prelicense and postshipment  checks and included at least one case from each country. We also  judgmentally selected an additional six cases for our sample that involved  checks on NVDs that were conducted during fiscal years 2005 through  2010. We included checks on NVDs in our sample because they are a  sensitive military technology and are the only item sold through both FMS  and DCS to the Gulf countries that are on DOD’s list of items requiring  enhanced end-use monitoring. In addition, we judgmentally selected three  cases from fiscal years 2005 through 2010 that were designated by State  as priority level 2, or higher priority, Blue Lantern checks. Priority level 2  checks are based on more substantial indications that a violation of the  International Traffic in Arms Regulations may have occurred or will be  attempted. We requested both the cables from State to the embassy and  the embassy’s response cable to State for each of our sample cases.  State was unable to provide us with the cables for 11 of the 34 cases  because officials decided not to send a cable requesting the embassy to  conduct a Blue Lantern check in those cases. Our final sample included  23 cases—6 prelicense checks and 17 postshipment checks. Of those 17  postshipment checks, 4 involved checks on brokers, and were not  associated with verifying the delivery of specific items on a license. The  remaining 13 postshipment checks consisted of 8 we selected randomly  and 5 we selected judgmentally. We then analyzed and recorded  information about each case, including the subject of the check, the  commodity checked, the time it took post to conduct the check, license  conditions, whether or not site visits were requested and conducted,  inventories requested and conducted, and any follow-up that post  indicated was necessary.
To assess the extent to which DOD and State provide similar or differing  levels of protection for the same military technologies sold or exported to  the Gulf countries, we interviewed DOD and State officials in Washington,  D.C., and the Gulf countries, as well as host country officials in Saudi  Arabia and the UAE. This included the Defense Security Cooperation  Agency and State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, who oversee  end-use monitoring for NVDs purchased by the Gulf countries through  FMS and DCS, respectively, and the Defense Technology Security  Administration, which is responsible for setting policy and reviewing  requests for the sale or export of NVDs. We received a briefing on, and  practiced using various types of image intensification and thermal NVDs  at the Army’s Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate in Fort  Belvoir, Virginia. Additionally, we observed DOD and State officials  conduct a serial number inventory of NVDs in Saudi Arabia as part of a  Blue Lantern postshipment check. We reviewed DOD and State end-use  monitoring program guidance, DOD polices regarding the transfer and  end-use monitoring for NVDs, and NVD security and accountability  requirements included in DCS license provisos and FMS Letters of Offer  and Acceptance. We obtained and analyzed DOD end-use monitoring  data on the number of NVD systems subject to enhanced end-use  monitoring in the Gulf countries, and we reviewed Blue Lantern data and  cables associated with checks conducted on NVDs in these countries.
In order to identify export licenses for NVDs and determine the extent to  which State has conducted Blue Lantern postshipment checks on  shipments associated with these licenses, we requested State’s defense  exports licensing data for the Gulf countries from fiscal year 2005 through  May 2011. We checked the licensing data for duplicate records and  cross-referenced selected licenses for NVDs with information from the  Blue Lantern database and determined that these data were sufficiently  reliable for the purpose of identifying licenses for NVD exports to the Gulf  countries. To determine the universe of licenses for exports to the Gulf  countries that included NVD technology, we first conducted a key word  search on terms associated with NVD technology—including “image  intensifiers,” “thermals,” “night vision,” “infrared,” and “Forward Looking  Infrared (FLIR)” systems—in pertinent database fields. To ensure that we  captured all relevant licenses for NVD technology, we also manually  reviewed all licenses for exports to the Gulf countries that included U.S.  Munitions List Category XII(c) items—the category that includes NVD  technology. Next, we pared down our master list in several ways. First,  we limited our list to licenses that were approved from fiscal years 2005  through 2010 to maintain consistency with the Blue Lantern data we  received. Second, we limited the licenses to those with security and  accountability provisos for permanent export to the Gulf countries by  checking the relevant fields in State’s licensing data and then vetting the  list of licenses we developed with the Defense Technology Security  Administration to ensure that they all had security and accountability  provisos. Third, with the exception of image intensifier tubes, we excluded  licenses that were exclusively spare parts for NVD systems, rather than  full NVD systems. Finally, to make an appropriate comparison with NVDs  sold through FMS that are subject to enhanced end-use monitoring, we  further limited the DCS licenses to those that may be used as man- portable systems. We identified 45 licenses for nonthermal NVDs and 6  licenses for thermal imaging systems that met all of our criteria. We  shared our list of NVD licenses with the Army’s Night Vision and  Electronic Sensors Directorate to confirm that the licenses were all NVDs  and distinguish those that were man-portable from those that were  platform-mounted. We also provided our list to State in order to verify  whether shipments had been made on these licenses as of September 9,  2011. State verified that complete shipments had been made on 34 of the  45 licenses for man-portable NVDs authorized for export to the Gulf  countries.
To assess the extent to which DOD and State vet recipients of military  training and equipment for human rights concerns, we reviewed relevant  laws, including the “Leahy Law” in the Foreign Assistance Act and DOD’s  2011 appropriations bill, the most recent version of DOD’s “Leahy”  provision. We also reviewed DOD’s and State’s vetting policies and  procedures, including State’s Guide to the Vetting Process; State’s  International Vetting and Security Tracking (INVEST) User Guide; and  standard operating procedures used by the U.S. embassies in Kuwait,  Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to conduct vetting. We interviewed officials in  State’s Bureaus of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and Near  Eastern Affairs that oversee and conduct vetting, respectively, in  Washington, D.C., and U.S. embassy officials that conduct human rights  vetting in the Gulf countries. To determine the amounts of U.S.-funded  training and equipment provided to the Gulf countries that are subject to  human rights vetting, we reviewed State’s annual Congressional Budget  Justification documents, DOD’s and State’s jointly-developed Foreign  Military Training reports, and DOD data on the value of Excess Defense  Articles authorized for Bahrain. To determine the number of individuals and  units in the Gulf countries that have been vetted through INVEST, we  obtained data from State’s INVEST database. These data included  information on the type of training provided, the agency sponsoring the  training, the funding source, the event date, and the status of vetting,  among other things. We cross referenced these data with documentation of  vetting we obtained from U.S. embassies in Saudi Arabia and the UAE and  determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to describe the number  of individuals and units in the Gulf countries for which State had completed  human rights vetting. To determine State’s process for vetting recipients of  U.S.-funded equipment in the Gulf countries for human rights concerns, we  interviewed officials from State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and  Labor, and received written responses to questions from State’s Bureau of  Political-Military Affairs.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2010 to November  2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We did not recommend that State conduct a 100 percent check on all  NVD exports; rather, we recommended that State and DOD take steps  to harmonize their approaches to end-use monitoring for NVDs to  ensure that these sensitive items receive equal levels of protection  regardless of how they are obtained. Nonetheless, in DOD’s comments  on this draft it offered to provide any assistance needed to State to  ensure that sensitive items are appropriately monitored by both  agencies.     2.  State asserted that our report does not consider that the number and  type of NVDs sold through FMS may vary from those exported through  DCS. However, we accounted for this possible difference by limiting our  analysis to a comparison of State’s and DOD’s end-use monitoring for  man-portable NVDs—the primary focus of DOD’s end-use monitoring  for NVDs. Specifically, DOD conducts enhanced end-use monitoring  (i.e., delivery verification by serial number and regular follow-up serial  number inventories) for man-portable NVDs, whereas it conducts  routine end-use monitoring (i.e., observations in conjunction with other  duties) for platform-mounted NVDs, such as the larger infrared devices  cited by State. Accordingly, we did not recommend that State or DOD  conduct a 100 percent check on every NVD sale or export, but rather  that they harmonize their approaches to end-use monitoring for NVDs  to ensure equal protection for these sensitive items regardless of the  method of transfer.   3.  State asserted that our conclusion on State’s inconsistent use of site  visits is based on isolated Blue Lantern cases that give a misleading  impression. However, we drew our conclusion based on an analysis  of a sample of 13 postshipment checks that State requested in the  Gulf countries from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. We determined  that U.S. embassy officials conducted site visits to end-users for only  3 of these 13 checks. Separate from this analysis, we cited examples  in our report of instances in which State did and did not conduct site  visits to end-users to verify receipt and confirm compliance with  license conditions for sensitive defense articles. For example, we  noted two instances in which embassy officials in Saudi Arabia and  Qatar conducted site visits to end-users to verify receipt and confirm  compliance with license conditions. In contrast, we cited another  example to illustrate an instance when embassy officials in the UAE  did not conduct a site visit, as requested by State.         4.  State’s assertion that it did not request a site visit in this instance  differs from our documentary evidence. For this postshipment check,  State requested that embassy officials verify the serial numbers for a  shipment of NVDs and confirm that all of the devices were secure,  functional, and being used only for the purpose stated on the license.  Moreover, State explicitly asked in its tasking cable that embassy  officials conduct a site visit to gather and verify this information.  However, as State notes in its comments, embassy officials did not  conduct a site visit in this instance. Instead, the embassy received a  fax from the UAE Armed Forces 14 months after the check was  requested stating that all the items had been fully received. The fax  did not comment on whether the NVDs were being used in  accordance with the authorized end-use and license provisos.   5.  We cited this Blue Lantern check as an example of an instance in  which delays in requesting and conducting a check prevented State  from conducting a serial number inventory of a shipment of NVDs or  verifying that these items were being stored in secure facilities. State  said that it did not request a site visit because it was sufficiently  satisfied with assurances from the Saudi authorities that the items had  been received and were being used according to the provisions of the  export license. However, during our fieldwork in Saudi Arabia, we  accompanied an embassy official on the Blue Lantern check in which  he attempted to conduct a serial number inventory of the 766 NVDs  shipped on this license. However, the Saudi authorities informed the  embassy official that the devices had been issued to units located  throughout the country. As a result, he was unable to independently  verify that the NVDs had been received and were being used in  accordance with the provisions of their license. State further asserts  that it intentionally waited until final export before initiating the  postshipment check for these NVDs in order to make optimal use of  resources by conducting a single check to cover all of the items  exported. However, rather than initiate the check immediately  following final export, State waited an additional 18 months to conduct  the check (more than three years after the first of two shipments of  NVDs). State’s comments on this draft did not explain why State  waited 18 months after final export to conduct the check.  6.  While State’s written comments noted that, in both of these cases,  embassy officials confirmed the bona fides of the transactions, this  misses our point. We cited these two cases as examples of Blue  Lantern checks that were closed as favorable before receiving  confirmation that the end-user had received the items. In both of the  cases cited in our report, State explicitly requested in its tasking  cables that embassy officials verify receipt of the items by the end- user. Although embassy officials reported back to State that they were  not able to verify receipt by the end-user, State closed both cases as  favorable instead of leaving these cases open until embassy officials  could confirm receipt.   7.  We agree that officials from Embassy Abu Dhabi visited the  intermediary and confirmed the bona fides of this transaction.  However, State explicitly requested in its tasking cable that U.S.  officials verify receipt of the thermal imaging camera by the UAE  Armed Forces. In this instance, embassy officials were unable to  confirm receipt by the UAE Armed Forces because the camera was  still being held by the consignee. Rather than leave the Blue Lantern  case open until embassy officials could verify receipt, State closed the  case as favorable and did not request that Embassy Abu Dhabi  conduct any additional follow-up.    8.  We agree that officials from Embassy Muscat visited the intermediary  and confirmed the bona fides of the transaction. However, State  asked in its tasking cable that Embassy Muscat verify that the Royal  Court received the firearms. When Embassy Muscat notified State  that the firearms had not yet been received by the Royal Court, State  closed the case as favorable. It was not until later that State received  written confirmation from the Omani intermediary that it had received  the firearms and delivered them to the Royal Court.   9.  We agree and did not intend to imply that INVEST was implemented  only in the Persian Gulf countries. We revised the report to clarify that  INVEST was implemented worldwide in 2010 and 2011 to facilitate  human rights vetting.   10. We list the six Persian Gulf countries that are included in the scope of  this study in the Highlights page and on the first page of the report.  We do not believe any additional clarification is necessary.    11. While Bahrain is the only Gulf country included in the scope of this  study to have experienced ongoing public demonstrations, Oman and  Saudi Arabia have also experienced some degree of political unrest in  2011. We have modified the language in the report to clarify this  distinction.   12. We agree and have revised the report to refer more broadly to  Bahrain’s security forces, rather than Bahrain’s military.
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report were Joseph A. Christoff, Director (ret.);  Jeff Phillips, Assistant Director; Drew Lindsey, Analyst-in-Charge; Juan  Avila; Rachel Dunsmoor; and Adam Vogt. Martin de Alteriis, Justin Fisher,  and Mitchell Karpman provided assistance with design and methodology,  statistics, and data analysis, respectively. Ashley Alley provided legal  support, Etana Finkler and Jena Sinkfield provided graphics support, and  Sarah McGrath provided assistance in editing and report preparation.