Nuclear Cleanup of Rocky Flats: DOE Can Use Lessons Learned to Improve Oversight of Other Sites' Cleanup Activities
Published: 2006-07-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2001, when GAO reported on the cleanup of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Rocky Flats site, a former nuclear weapons production facility, the cleanup was behind schedule and over cost. In October 2005, the contractor declared that it had completed the cleanup much earlier and at less cost than DOE and the contractor had anticipated 5 years earlier. GAO was asked to determine the (1) factors that contributed to the cleanup's early completion, (2) remaining work and total costs, (3) measures to assess whether the cleanup achieved a level of protection of public health and environment consistent with the cleanup agreement, and (4) lessons the Rocky Flats cleanup may offer for other DOE cleanup projects.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Four factors contributed to the early completion of Rocky Flats' cleanup: (1) DOE's and the contractor's ability to overcome numerous challenges, (2) the use of an accelerated cleanup process, (3) site-specific characteristics that limited the scope of the contamination, and (4) the contractor's financial incentive to finish the work quickly and safely. Although the cleanup is complete, its sufficiency has not yet been ascertained; key steps remain before the planned Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge that will occupy the site can open to the public. For example, in about November 2006, the regulatory agencies--the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment--plan to issue their joint final decision on the sufficiency of the cleanup and any risk posed by residual contaminants. The total cost of the cleanup, since 1995, is about $10 billion in constant 2005 dollars. This cost includes contract costs of about $7.7 billion (including contractor fees of about $630 million), long-term stewardship and pension liabilities estimated at about $1.3 billion, and other costs of nearly $1 billion. Although numerous measures in place to assess the cleanup appear adequate to judge the sufficiency of the cleanup, DOE did not effectively carry out some aspects of its oversight responsibilities. Among the assessment measures are completion of the regulatory process, activities undertaken to verify remedial actions, and reviews by independent and federal entities. The regulatory agencies have approved the cleanup of 360 areas of known or suspected contamination at the site. Data supporting the cleanup of these areas form the basis of regulatory decisions regarding the cleanup's sufficiency. Accordingly, we reviewed the contractor's controls intended to ensure the quality of these data and found them to be robust. However, DOE lacked assurance that the controls were working as intended because it did not independently assess the quality of these key data. One official told us that DOE was involved daily in reviewing documents and discussed with the contractor any data quality issues that arose. DOE has identified and implemented at other sites some lessons from Rocky Flats, but DOE has not systematically tracked lessons learned at all of its cleanup sites, thus potentially losing the benefits of such lessons.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Once a bustling nuclear weapons production complex employing  thousands of workers, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Rocky Flats site,  near Denver, Colorado, is being transformed into a wildlife refuge that will  be managed by the Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service  (FWS). For about 40 years, the Rocky Flats plant produced plutonium  triggers, or “pits,” for nuclear weapons. That activity resulted in  radiological and chemical contamination of some of the site’s buildings,  soil, and water. Cleanup of the site began in 1995 under a contract between  DOE and Kaiser-Hill Company L.L.C., and included decontaminating and  demolishing several plutonium-processing buildings, one of which had  been labeled “the most dangerous building in America,” along with  hundreds of other contaminated buildings and structures. The cleanup  required the contractor to remove large volumes of nuclear material and  radioactive debris, and investigate and remediate as necessary  contamination at 360 individual hazardous substance sites that were  identified through historical records and extensive sampling and analysis at  the site in the early 1990s. In total, according to GAO’s calculations, the  amount of cleanup waste that had to be removed from the site was  equivalent to a 65-story building the length and width of a football field.
Cleanup of the site was conducted under the Rocky Flats Cleanup  Agreement, the legally binding agreement that provided the framework for  the cleanup effort. The cleanup agreement implements the provisions of  the applicable statutes, including the Comprehensive Environmental  Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended (CERCLA); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as  amended (RCRA); and the Colorado Hazardous Waste Act. The cleanup  agreement specified the roles of DOE and the two regulatory agencies for  the site:  the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Colorado  Department of Public Health and Environment (Colorado). Pursuant to the  cleanup agreement, EPA had lead regulatory authority over the cleanup of  the site’s buffer zone, which includes about 5,900 acres of undeveloped  land around the center of the site, while Colorado had lead regulatory  authority over the cleanup of the core industrial area—which includes  about 385 acres in the center of the site, where the plutonium-processing  activities occurred.
When GAO reported on the cleanup effort in February 2001, the project  was behind schedule and over cost. However, in October 2005, the  contractor declared that it had finished the physical cleanup of the site, as  defined in the contract (e.g., demolishing buildings and shipping  contaminated waste and soil off site), much earlier and at less cost than  DOE and the contractor had anticipated 5 years earlier. Although the  cleanup is complete, its sufficiency has not yet been ascertained. EPA’s and  Colorado’s joint final decision on the sufficiency of the cleanup and the  final remedy for the site is expected to be published around November  2006. With the exception of one pedestrian trail, most of the planned  wildlife refuge will not open until at least 5 years after the refuge is  established (depending on the availability of funding).
In this context, we determined the (1) factors that contributed to the  physical cleanup’s early completion; (2) work remaining to be done as well  as total project costs, including long-term costs; (3) measures in place to  assess whether the cleanup achieved a level of protection of public health  and environment consistent with the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement; and  (4) lessons the Rocky Flats project may hold for other DOE cleanup  projects.
In conducting our work, we visited the Rocky Flats site several times and  reviewed documents and data prepared by DOE, EPA, Colorado, FWS, the  contractor, and various scientific organizations. We reviewed and analyzed  agency and contractor documents on decontamination and demolition  accomplishments and techniques. We also analyzed documents related to  the cost-plus-incentive-fee contract, including contract negotiation  documents, the contract cost and fee structure, and contract modifications,  although we did not evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the contract. We  reviewed and analyzed cleanup verification strategies and results, and  reviewed the content of scientific analyses, including a study of how  actinides migrate through soil and water and an assessment of the public  health risk posed by contaminants remaining at the site, but did not  evaluate the science underlying them. In addition, because decisions about  the sufficiency of the cleanup have been and will be based on remediation  data, we assessed the soundness of the agencies’ and contractor’s  processes and procedures for ensuring the quality of these data. We also  reviewed the results of audits of the key laboratories used by the  contractor to analyze samples of radioactively contaminated soil.
For further review, we selected a nonprobability sample of four of Rocky  Flats’ 360 cleanup areas (including areas referred to as individual  hazardous substance sites, potential areas of concern, and under-building  contamination sites), using criteria such as the location of the cleanup area  and the severity of its contamination. For these four individual cleanup  areas—building 771, the 903 pad, the 903 lip area, and trench T-7—we  assessed the closeout reports and the data supporting them to determine  the extent to which the data collection and laboratory analyses adhered to  data quality standards and procedures. For example, we reviewed records  of laboratory analyses of contaminated soil samples from the areas, and  documents showing the extent to which the projects adhered to stated data  quality objectives. We did not evaluate the remedial data or laboratory  analyses themselves.
Further, to obtain citizen and local government views about community  input to the cleanup and the effect of various cleanup verification activities,  we surveyed 58 current and past members of the two local community  groups that served in an advisory capacity to DOE:  the Rocky Flats  Citizens Advisory Board and the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local  Governments. We also attended monthly meetings of these two groups. We  interviewed officials of DOE, EPA, Colorado, FWS, the contractor, and  various scientific organizations. We conducted our work in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards from March 2005  through May 2006. In September 2005, we briefed you and your staff and  reported on the preliminary results of our review.  Details on our  objectives, scope, and methodology are in appendix I; summary survey  results are in appendix II.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: For nearly 40 years, the Rocky Flats plant, located about 16 miles  northwest of downtown Denver, served as a nuclear weapons production  facility. Afterward, the site bore the scars of that role:  soil, groundwater,  surface water, and many of the buildings at the site were contaminated  with radioactive materials, such as plutonium and uranium; toxic metals,  such as beryllium; and hazardous chemicals, such as cleaning solvents and  degreasers. Accordingly, the site became one of DOE’s priorities for  environmental cleanup. While most of the approximately 6,300 acres that  make up the Rocky Flats site served through the years as an undeveloped  buffer zone, about one-half of a square mile (385 acres) in the center of the  site constituted the industrial area, where for decades, plutonium was  shaped into plutonium triggers or “pits” for use in nuclear weapons. About  one-fourth of the site’s more than 800 original structures (e.g., buildings  and storage tanks) were radiologically or chemically contaminated—some  severely so—by site operations over the years.
The site was cleaned up under the terms of a contract between DOE and  Kaiser-Hill. The first contract took effect July 1, 1995. In late 1999, DOE and  Kaiser-Hill negotiated a new contract, which took effect on February 1,  2000. The cleanup work was done predominantly by subcontractors, under  the contractor’s management.
The 2000 contract specified both the contractor’s and DOE’s  responsibilities. The contractor was responsible for processing, packaging,  and shipping off site all of Rocky Flats’ nuclear materials and radioactive  and hazardous wastes; cleaning up and demolishing more than 700  structures that remained on site in February 2000; and cleaning up the site’s  contaminated soil and groundwater. DOE was required to provide a variety  of services and items to support the project. Essentially, the contract  required DOE to arrange receiver sites for all the materials and wastes and  obtain the necessary certifications for the containers in which the materials  and wastes had to be packed and shipped. Many DOE sites played a  significant role in Rocky Flats’ cleanup and closure, especially those sites  that received materials or wastes from Rocky Flats, such as the Savannah  River Site in South Carolina, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New  Mexico, the Nevada Test Site, and the Hanford Site in Washington.
Much of the cleanup work at Rocky Flats was labor intensive and tedious.  Plutonium is dangerous to human health, even in minute quantities,  especially if inhaled or ingested. Accordingly, workers handling plutonium- contaminated materials and equipment had to wear cumbersome  protective suits with enclosed respiratory systems, and sometimes had to  wield heavy and ungainly tools. Also, the equipment being worked on had  to be enclosed within plastic or glass to prevent airborne contaminants  from reaching unprotected workers or surfaces. Figure 1 shows workers in  protective clothing cutting contaminated materials to fit shipping  containers.
section_title: Four Key Factors Contributed to Early Cleanup
paragraphs: Four key factors contributed to the early completion of the physical  cleanup of Rocky Flats: (1) DOE and the contractor overcame several  major challenges identified in GAO’s 2001 report on the Rocky Flats  cleanup, (2) DOE and the site’s regulatory agencies agreed to use an  accelerated process to clean up the site, (3) a number of site-specific  characteristics combined to limit the scope and complexity of the cleanup  effort, and (4) DOE offered the contractor $560 million in total incentive  fees to finish the cleanup ahead of schedule and under cost.
subsections: section_title: DOE and Contractor Overcame Previously Identified Cleanup Challenges
paragraphs: The first key factor that contributed to the early completion of the physical  cleanup of Rocky Flats was that DOE and the contractor resolved four of  the five major challenges we identified in our 2001 report. These challenges  included (1) completing the decontamination and demolition of the site’s  structures; (2) overcoming limitations on the available number of  transportation casks and on the loading capability for transuranic waste;  (3) identifying the overall scope of the cleanup project—specifically, the  extent of contamination, the eventual use of the site, and the level of  cleanup that eventual use would require; (4) getting the automated  plutonium-packaging system to reliably perform at the rate needed for  timely completion; and (5) preventing safety problems, which can result in  work shutdowns and delay cleanup work.
subsections: section_title: Completing Decontamination and Demolition of Structures
paragraphs: One major challenge DOE and the contractor overcame was completing the  decontamination and demolition of hundreds of structures at the site. At  the end of fiscal year 2000, the contractor had completed only about 10  percent of the predemolition work, which included activities such as  removing plutonium and other nuclear materials from furnaces, pipes, and  other locations within buildings; draining and removing plutonium- or  uranium-laden liquids or residues from process pipes and tanks;  dismantling plutonium-processing furnaces; stripping out contaminated  process pipelines; and cutting up and removing hundreds of contaminated  gloveboxes. Further, at the time of our 2001 report, the contractor had  demolished only 81 of the 802 structures that existed at the site when  cleanup began. That accomplishment equated to about 10 percent of the  total number of structures and only about 5 percent of the total square  footage. Remaining to be demolished at the end of fiscal year 2000 were 721  structures, encompassing about 3.4 million square feet.
DOE and the contractor overcame challenges to decontamination and  demolition primarily through innovation, as workers continuously sought  innovative cleanup technologies that would accomplish tasks more safely,  quickly, and cheaply. For example, the contractor found that it could  chemically decontaminate large pieces of equipment, such as tanks and gloveboxes, by wiping their surfaces with a liquid cerium nitrate solution.   By doing so, the contractor could reduce the contamination enough that  the contaminated object could be shipped as low-level radioactive waste  rather than transuranic waste, which requires a more costly shipping and  disposal process. The Rocky Flats buildings contained approximately 1,475  gloveboxes, ranging from shoe box size to the size of an entire room. By  reducing the level of contamination, the contractor could ship even large  gloveboxes whole, rather than having to cut them into pieces small enough  to fit into standard waste boxes used for shipping transuranic waste. Figure  2 shows workers using cerium nitrate to decontaminate a glovebox and  loading a dismantled, decontaminated glovebox into a container for  shipping.
The use of explosives in building demolition was another important time- saving demolition technique. Contractor officials said they had learned  lessons from another DOE site at which DOE had doubted the demolitions  experts and reduced the amount of explosives used, resulting in an  explosion that failed to bring the structure down. At Rocky Flats,  accordingly, the contractor and DOE brought in demolitions experts and,  while closely reviewing the demolition plans and overseeing the work, let  the experts’ opinions prevail. As a result, the use of explosives saved time  and money for the contractor and DOE. For example, in bringing down  building 881, one of the four original manufacturing facilities at Rocky  Flats, a contractor official estimated that the use of explosives saved about  4 months, and reduced risks to workers by removing hazards associated  with heavy equipment and the falling debris that typically results from their  use in lieu of explosives. After being completely decontaminated, building  881 was wired with explosives and, as shown in figure 3, collapsed into its  basement.
In addition to building 881, the contractor used explosives to bring down  smaller facilities, such as the guard and water towers, and to separate the  concrete from the rebar (the steel reinforcing bar) on the walls of building  886.
Additional information on decontamination and demolition activities at  Rocky Flats is contained in appendix III.
section_title: Overcoming Limitations on Shipping and Transportation Capabilities
paragraphs: A second challenge DOE and the contractor overcame was limitations on  the available number of transportation casks and on the loading capability  for transuranic waste. At the time of our 2001 report, the contractor’s  ability to ship the total volume of waste off site to DOE’s WIPP facility by  the target closure date was in doubt because of uncertainties about  whether DOE could obtain and provide the number of transportation casks  necessary to meet the contractor’s projected shipping schedule, especially  for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and because of uncertainties about whether  the three loading facilities (two of which were still under construction at  the time of our 2000 review) would be able to meet the shipping schedule  for the site’s peak shipping years. That shipping schedule had been  compressed by various events, including delays in the opening of WIPP.
DOE and the contractor overcame this challenge primarily through  cooperation and perseverance. Whenever a DOE site could not use a  shipping container as scheduled, WIPP would send the container to Rocky  Flats instead. Also, DOE headquarters maintained a high priority on Rocky  Flats throughout the cleanup and made sure that it received the  government-furnished services and items it needed. Figure 4 shows special  transportation casks used to transport transuranic waste.
Also, while buildings at Rocky Flats were being demolished, the contractor  built the two additional loading facilities, as previously mentioned, to  ensure that loading and shipping schedules could be supported. The new  facilities resolved the challenge of inadequate loading capability and  allowed the contractor to increase its transuranic waste-shipping capability  to 15 shipments a week.
section_title: Identifying the Overall Scope of the Cleanup
paragraphs: A third major challenge DOE and the contractor overcame was identifying  the overall scope of the cleanup—specifically, the extent of contamination,  the eventual use of the site, and the level of cleanup that eventual use  would require. At the time of our 2001 report, the postcleanup use of the  site—and, therefore, the level of cleanup required—was uncertain.  Moreover, the extent of soil contamination on the site and the depth and  degree of contamination under many of the former production buildings  was not fully understood, particularly in the former industrial area, because  parts of the site had not been fully sampled. Finally, at the time of our 2001  report, DOE, the regulatory agencies, and the community stakeholders had  not yet reached agreement on an appropriate level of soil cleanup, although  various studies were under way. These challenges were resolved through  congressional intervention and community collaboration.
Congressional action ended the uncertainty about the end use of the site  with passage of the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge Act of 2001  (Refuge Act). Knowing the site’s end use enabled DOE and the regulatory  agencies to then make assumptions about site users and their risk of  exposure to residual contamination. The risk posed to a person by  exposure to a contaminant is measured by a combination of the  contaminant’s toxicity, together with the frequency, pathway, and duration  of exposure. Thus, a more stringent cleanup level is required for a site that  will be used constantly, such as for residential purposes, than for a site that  will be used sporadically, such as for recreational purposes. Once the  Refuge Act was passed, DOE and the regulatory agencies assumed that the  principal site users would be wildlife refuge workers, who would spend  about 8 hours a day at the site (4 hours indoors and 4 hours outdoors), 250  days a year, for 18.7 years; and refuge visitors, who would spend about 2.5  hours a day at the site, 100 days a year, for 30 years (6 years as a child and  24 years as an adult). Soil cleanup levels could then be set at a level that  would protect both types of users.
DOE collaborated with the community in determining the level of  remediation the cleanup would achieve. Before passage of the Refuge Act,  the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement had specified an interim soil cleanup  level (action level) of 651 picocuries of plutonium per gram (pCi/g) of soil,  meaning that a soil cleanup action would be triggered by a soil sample indicating the existence of plutonium in excess of 651 pCi/g. This action  level was considered unacceptable by the two stakeholder community  groups: the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board and the Rocky Flats  Coalition of Local Governments; these groups argued for a much more  stringent action level. DOE funded a community-directed, independent  scientific assessment of soil action levels. This independent assessment  was overseen by a panel of community representatives. DOE also funded a  workshop, organized by the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board, featuring  experts who provided presentations on radiological assessments, risk  analyses, and various computer-modeling scenarios and assumptions.  Working with local governments and members of the public, DOE and the  regulatory agencies ultimately agreed on a soil action level of 50 picocuries  of plutonium per gram (pCi/g) of surface soil (i.e., the top 3 feet of soil),  meaning that a remedial action would be triggered by a soil sample  indicating the existence of plutonium in excess of 50 pCi/g. A plutonium  level of 50 pCi/g translates to a risk level of 1 in 500,000 (that is, this level of  contamination could result in one more case of cancer than otherwise  would have been expected in every 500,000 persons). DOE and the  regulatory agencies decided that, with a surface soil action level of 50  pCi/g, higher concentrations of plutonium in soil could remain at greater  depth. Accordingly, DOE and the regulatory agencies agreed to set an  action level of 3,000 pCi/g for depths of 3 to 6 feet below the surface,  depending on the extent of the contamination. Once a remedial action was  triggered, cleanup would continue until contamination greater than 1,000  pCi/g had been removed.
In addition to collaborating on decisions about soil cleanup levels,  community groups provided comments and advice on many other aspects  of the cleanup that influenced DOE’s decisions in some cases. Our survey  of the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board and the Rocky Flats Coalition  of Local Governments found that 21 of the 25 respondents were very or  somewhat satisfied with how DOE engaged the group in the cleanup  process. Also, 19 of the 25 respondents said they were very or somewhat  satisfied with how DOE used the group’s input. Nearly all (23 of 25) said  they believed the groups’ input had a very or somewhat positive effect on  the cleanup process.
section_title: Problems with Automated Plutonium-Packaging System
paragraphs: The unreliable functioning of the automated plutonium-packaging system  is the only one of the five challenges we identified in 2001 that DOE and the  contractor never fully resolved. It was only through persistence and “brute  force” that the packaging was finally completed in July 2003, more than a  year late and at least $50 million over budget. The system never worked  reliably, and many of the processes that were designed to be automated  had to be done manually. It required continuous maintenance and  modification, and broke down as many as two or three times a day,  requiring a “triage” repair team on call 24 hours a day. Nevertheless,  according to DOE officials, the pursuit of any alternative to the system  would probably have resulted in even greater cost and schedule delays.  Figure 5 shows GAO officials and staff being briefed on the glovebox line  behind the automated plutonium-packaging system; this glovebox line  handled the prepackaging of wet combustibles.
The final challenge that DOE and the contractor overcame was safety  problems, which can result in shutdowns and delay cleanup work. At the  time of our 2001 report, DOE was concerned about the number and  severity of safety violations that had occurred since the inception of the  2000 contract. In response to those concerns, the contractor developed a  comprehensive plan to improve its safety and compliance performance.
Although some safety incidents occurred after our 2001 report, the  contractor’s overall safety performance improved. In two key measures of  safety, for example, Rocky Flats’ performance was considerably better than  the average performance in the construction industry. One of these  measures is total recordable cases (TRC). Recordable cases, in general, are  any that require “more than a Band-Aid,TM” according to a contractor safety  official—for example, an injury that requires stitches, prescription  medication, or 1 or more days away from work. At Rocky Flats, the 12- month TRC rolling average at the end of 2004 was 0.9 per 100 full-time  workers. This was a significant improvement over the 7.6 rate that existed  at the site in July 1995, when Kaiser-Hill took over from the previous  contractor. By comparison, the TRC average in the construction industry  for calendar year 2004 was 6.4 per 100 full-time workers. The contractually  established limit for TRCs at Rocky Flats was a 12-month rolling average of  3.5 per 100 full-time workers. Using the other key measure of safety, lost  workdays, Rocky Flats also performed well. At the end of 2004, the site’s  12-month rolling average rate for lost workday cases was 0.2, much lower  than the site’s July 1995 rate of 4.6 and well below the construction industry  rate of 2.4 for calendar year 2004. The contractually established limit for  lost workdays at Rocky Flats was a 12-month rolling average rate of 2.0.
The contractor’s safety director reported that these safety improvements  were achieved through a combination of actions, including getting the  Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer, and other top  management officials involved; improving the work-planning process to  incorporate job-hazards analyses; involving the workers early in safety- planning and job-hazards analyses; holding first-line supervisors (i.e.,  foremen) responsible for informing workers of top management’s emphasis  on safety; and improving the training provided to workers. The site  developed a course, commonly known as Rocky Flats 101, that contained a  hands-on, simulated work environment in which workers learned how to  use ladders and various other tools in contaminated spaces. The course  was very effective, according to the safety director.
section_title: Accelerated Cleanup Process Allowed Faster, More Collaborative Work
paragraphs: The second key factor that contributed to the early completion of the  physical cleanup of Rocky Flats was the use of an accelerated cleanup  process. The Rocky Flats cleanup began in the late 1980s and early 1990s  with extensive characterization (sampling of soil, groundwater, surface  water, and air). But after several years of characterization, public  frustration was building at the lack of visible progress in cleaning up the  contamination at the site. According to DOE officials, the extensive  sampling that was done at the site in the late 1980s and early 1990s,  together with historical documents about the use and disposal of materials  and wastes, facilitated use of the accelerated process. Instead of  proceeding under the full CERCLA/RCRA process, the Rocky Flats Cleanup  Agreement authorized DOE to perform most of the cleanup through  removal actions. In a 1996 report, we recommended that DOE make greater  use of removal actions to increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of  cleanups. Under the accelerated process, cleanup actions, including soil  removal, occur early and throughout the process rather than at the end,  with confirmation sampling at each cleanup area to ensure that the  remediation was sufficient. DOE officials report that the accelerated  process allowed more timely removal of contaminants from the site.
The pace of work in reviewing and approving cleanup documents was  “frantic,” according to Colorado officials. Colorado, DOE, and the  contractor agreed on a “review template” of documents Colorado needed  to see for each building and area; the template allowed Colorado officials  to provide immediate review by working closely with the contractor.
Although the cleanup agreement specified that Colorado had 14 days (30  days in some cases) to review and provide comments on cleanup-related  documents, use of the review template shortened the review time  considerably. For example, the contractor would send draft documents to  Colorado officials, who would provide comments directly to the  contractor; the contractor then would respond by making corrections,  providing additional data or documents, or doing more work if necessary.  By working closely with the contractor along the way to resolve questions  or concerns, Colorado was able to respond quickly—sometimes on the  same day—to DOE’s faxed requests for official approval of cleanup-related  documents. Colorado officials pointed out that had they not been willing to  work in this way with the contractor, but had instead taken the 14 or 30  days provided for review and approval under the cleanup agreement, the  contractor would not have been able to complete the cleanup as early as it  did. (DOE noted that Colorado’s work with the contractor was not done  without DOE’s involvement; as mentioned throughout the report, the entire  process was collaborative.)
DOE, EPA, and Colorado agreed that the accelerated process and the  collaboration it fostered were essential to the cleanup’s early completion.  According to EPA and Colorado officials, their agencies had staff on site  “continuously,” working in the field with DOE and contractor staff to  discuss and observe cleanup operations, and requiring “real time” changes  as necessary. Throughout the process, the regulatory agencies were  intimately involved in reviewing data and otherwise contributing to the  development of studies, plans, and decision documents. As a result, the  “back end” of the review process was very streamlined, according to  contractor officials.
While the accelerated cleanup actions were under way, and as data from  the completed cleanup actions became available, DOE concurrently  conducted the remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS), which  summarizes site conditions at closure and evaluates necessary long-term  remedies, such as site monitoring. Based on all of the data collected at the  site, including the results of the individual accelerated cleanup actions and  the RI/FS, DOE will identify its preferred final remedy in the proposed plan,  which will be released for formal public comment once the final RI/FS has  been approved by EPA and Colorado. DOE shared the draft RI/FS with the  public and obtained EPA’s and Colorado’s comments on it; these comments  were considered during preparation of the final RI/FS. After considering  comments received on the proposed plan during a 60-day public comment  period, DOE will select and document its preferred remedy in the final  decision document. Once EPA and Colorado approve the final decision  document, it will serve as both the corrective action decision (under  RCRA) and the record of decision (under CERCLA).
section_title: Site-Specific Characteristics Aided Cleanup Effort
paragraphs: The third key factor that contributed to the early completion of the physical  cleanup of Rocky Flats was a confluence of circumstances—climatic,  geologic, chemical, structural and economic—that confined the scope and  complexity of the cleanup effort. Climatically and geologically, the semiarid  climate and the alluvial fan upon which the site is located contributed to  slow erosion of soils over time, thus inhibiting the off-site migration of  contaminants. The site also benefited from layers of shale and claystone— hundreds of feet thick in places—that prevented contamination from  seeping into the deep drinking-water aquifer that underlies part of the site.
Chemically, the cleanup was aided by the nature of the two key  contaminants—plutonium and americium, which are essentially insoluble  in water and, instead, tend to bind to soil and sediment particles, according  to a study undertaken in the late 1990s. At Rocky Flats, there is little  groundwater movement, and no groundwater was contaminated with  plutonium and americium. Instead, soil was the predominant  environmental medium requiring cleanup. Remediation of contaminated  soil generally consists of digging it up and shipping it to a disposal site, a  simpler task than remediating groundwater. The contaminants move  around the site, and potentially off site, by surface-soil erosion, wind, or  surface water. For example, westerly winds spread contaminated soil to  off-site lands east of Rocky Flats. In a 1997 combined corrective action  decision/record of decision about these lands, EPA and Colorado  determined that the lands did not pose an unacceptable or significant risk  to human health or the environment, notwithstanding the low levels of  plutonium and americium that existed in the soil—in portions of the  lands—from Rocky Flats activities.
Structurally, the robust construction of the plutonium-processing buildings,  with their thick concrete floors and walls, contained many leaks and spills  of radioactive and hazardous materials, thereby limiting the extent and  severity of contamination under the buildings. Building 371, for example,  was a complex, extremely strong, and rigid structure that was built to  withstand accidents such as earthquakes, tornadoes, winds, and fires. The  building was a partially buried structure of reinforced concrete with an  extensive foundation of concrete caissons up to 6 feet in diameter, drilled  into bedrock, and concrete wall and slab thicknesses beyond typical  industrial use and code requirements. Similarly, building 771 featured  concrete thicknesses ranging from 6.5 inches to more than 2 feet.
Finally, the local economy was a factor in the success of the cleanup,  according to Colorado officials. The local economy was not heavily  dependent on the cleanup project to provide jobs, so closing the site did  not meet large-scale community opposition.
section_title: DOE Provided the Contractor with a Financial Incentive to Finish Early and Under Cost
paragraphs: The fourth key factor that contributed to the early completion of the  physical cleanup of Rocky Flats involved certain features of the cleanup  contract, including a substantial financial incentive for the contractor to  finish the cleanup work ahead of schedule and below budget. The contract  provided for an incentive fee tied partly to schedule but predominantly to  cost. The contractor would earn the target fee of $340 million if it  completed its work between December 16, 2006, and March 31, 2007, at a  cost between $4 billion and $4.2 billion. If the contractor completed the  cleanup outside of these schedule and cost ranges, the fee would rise or fall  accordingly—to as much as $460 million for less costly, earlier completion,  or as little as $130 million for more costly, later completion. In 2003, when  officials saw that the contractor was confident of earning the maximum fee  and was no longer working aggressively to further shorten the completion  timeline or reduce costs, DOE approved a $100 million increase in the  maximum incentive fee. In the end, DOE awarded the contractor $49  million of the additional available fee, based on a reduction in the total  project cost of an additional $129 million.
DOE also encouraged the contractor to continue its practice of sharing  incentive fees among its workforce by offering employees financial  incentives to continue to work safely and generate ideas for ways to save  costs and time. In its initial contract bid for the 1995 contract for the Rocky  Flats cleanup, Kaiser-Hill committed to share 20 percent of its profits with  employees. The contractor’s president explained that incentives were  offered across the workforce, although the incentive type varied by work  group. Salaried employees were individually evaluated based on their  project and safety performance; the value of their incentive pay was based  on the final total project cost. For hourly employees, incentive pay was  determined though collective bargaining but was primarily based on  schedule performance. Steelworkers received an annual incentive bonus,  based on schedule performance; workers in the building trades received an  annual hourly increase, also based on schedule performance. The  contractor also had a safety incentive program that included spot cash  awards. Over the life of the project, the contractor distributed  approximately $100 million of company earnings (about 20 percent of its  $510 million incentive fee) to its workers, and DOE contributed an  additional $30 million that was used for incentive pay.
According to the contractor, financial incentives for early or under-budget  completion of a project are a powerful motivator; however, it is important  to note that the financial incentive offered at Rocky Flats was only one of  many factors contributing to the early completion of the cleanup. In GAO’s  experience, such incentives are not always this successful. As we reported  in December 2005, the Department of Defense has not fared well at using  incentive-fee contracts to improve cost-control behavior or meet program  goals. Specifically, about half of the 27 incentive-fee contracts included in  GAO’s review failed or were projected to fail to meet a key measure of  program success—completing the objective (i.e., delivering the product or  service specified by the contract) at or below the target price. Research on  incentive fees by GAO, Harvard University, and the RAND Corporation  going back decades has concluded that incentive fees do not consistently  motivate contractors to control cost.
Additionally, according to the contractor, enhanced workforce transition  benefits could be considered important to worker motivation and  productivity. Enhanced benefits included pension and post-retirement  medical benefits and outplacement services such as relocation and  education benefits.
Another unusual and critically important feature of the Rocky Flats  contract was consistent funding. An underlying premise of the contractor’s  ability to finish the job early and under budget was that a stable source of  funding would be provided throughout the cleanup. As part of the contract  negotiation process, DOE and the contractor assumed an annual funding  level of $657 million per year. Both DOE headquarters and Congress helped  each year to ensure that the site received a consistent funding level. The  contract also stipulated the services and items that the government would  provide, including making a number of shipping containers available and  arranging treatment and disposal sites for radioactive waste at the site. If  DOE did not meet its contractual obligation, it would be grounds for  changing the contract. In that way, DOE bore the liability for any role it had  in increasing contract costs.
section_title: Cleanup of Rocky Flats Is Complete at a Cost of about $10 Billion, but Key Steps Remain Before the Planned Wildlife Refuge Will Open
paragraphs: The physical cleanup at Rocky Flats is complete, at a total cost (including  long-term costs) of about $10 billion; however, several regulatory steps  remain before land can be transferred to the Department of the Interior for  establishment of the wildlife refuge planned for the site. After DOE issues  and considers public comments on its proposed plan, identifying its  preferred alternative for the site’s future monitoring and remediation, EPA  and Colorado will jointly determine whether any further cleanup is needed  at the site or whether the cleanup actions already taken are sufficient to  render the site safe for its intended purpose. A final decision by EPA and  Colorado is expected in late 2006. If they decide that no further action is  needed to remediate the site, EPA will delete portions of the site from the  CERCLA National Priorities List and certify that the cleanup and closure  of Rocky Flats has been completed; the Secretary of the Interior can then  accept administrative jurisdiction of designated lands and establish the  refuge, in accordance with the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge Act of  2001.
subsections: section_title: Regulatory Steps Remain Before the Site Can Open as a Wildlife Refuge
paragraphs: Although the contractor has finished the cleanup at Rocky Flats, DOE,  EPA, and Colorado must complete the remaining steps of the regulatory  process before Rocky Flats can be removed from the National Priorities  List. On October 13, 2005, the contractor declared that it had successfully  completed the Rocky Flats cleanup—more than 1 year before the target  cleanup completion date cited in the contract and more than 3 years before  the completion date the contractor thought likely in our 2001 report. aste eqivlent to  65-tory building the  length nd width of  football field,  inclding more thn 15,000 cubic meter  of trsunic nd other rdioctive waste,  more thn 500,000 cubic meter of  low-level nd other rdioctive waste,  more thn 800,000 cubic meter of  sanitry waste, nd more thn 4,300 cubic  meter of hrdousaste (ee fig. 6). installed covers at two landfills;  investigated and remediated, as necessary, 421 areas of known or  suspected contamination, including 360 cleanup areas such as individual  hazardous substance sites and contamination located under buildings;  and  installed three barriers and a seep collection system to treat  contaminated groundwater plumes; installed passive treatment systems  to protect surface water quality.
Figure 6 illustrates the equivalent amounts of waste removed and  contaminated water treated at Rocky Flats during the cleanup.
Figure 7 shows the site as it was in 1995, when the contractor began its  cleanup job, and on October 13, 2005, when the contractor declared its job  done.
The contract provided that when the contractor declared the cleanup  finished, DOE would have 90 days to either accept the project as complete  or provide the contractor with a list of items to address. In November 2005,  DOE provided the contractor with the final list. In December 2005, after  reviewing cleanup documentation, doing a final walk-through of the site,  and ensuring that the contractor had completed the remaining items, DOE  agreed that the contractor had fulfilled all of the cleanup actions specified  in the contract and the cleanup was complete.
The next steps include the review, revision, and final approval of the  remaining regulatory documents. Figure 8 shows the key steps in Rocky  Flats’ transition from a cleanup site to a wildlife refuge.
Those steps are as follows:  July 2006:  DOE expects to issue its proposed plan, specifying its  preference for future monitoring and remediation of the site from  among the following alternatives outlined in an RI/FS:  (1) no further  action, with monitoring; (2) monitoring plus both institutional and  physical controls; and (3) monitoring and both institutional and physical  controls, plus additional targeted removal of plutonium-contaminated  soil in an isolated area to reduce the excess cancer risk for wildlife  refuge workers from 1 in 500,000 to 1 in 1,000,000. The proposed plan  will also specify the area to be retained by DOE rather than transferred  to FWS. As agreed between DOE and the regulatory agencies, the plan  will be issued for a 60-day public comment period, which will include a  public hearing.
November 2006:  After considering public comments on the proposed  plan, EPA and Colorado expect to finalize and issue the final joint  decision document. The final decision document will specify what  additional cleanup, if any, is necessary at the site and what monitoring  and institutional and physical controls, if any, will be necessary. The  document will also include a “responsiveness summary” that responds  to questions from the public and other stakeholders on the proposed  plan.
December 2006:  EPA expects to certify that the cleanup is complete. It  may then remove portions of the site from the National Priorities List.
Early 2007:  DOE expects to transfer jurisdiction of the majority of the  site (approximately 5,400 acres) to FWS. The specific acreage to be  transferred will be specified in the final decision document and will be  contingent upon DOE’s purchasing privately owned “essential mineral  rights” (i.e., the right to mine sand and gravel) affecting about 700 acres.  Under the legislation authorizing DOE to purchase these essential  mineral rights, the refuge will not include land that is subject to sand  and gravel mining or is being actively mined by private parties. 2012 through 2022:  FWS expects to open public access trails and  facilities in the wildlife refuge, as described in the agency’s Final  Comprehensive Conservation Plan. FWS’s ability to implement its  conservation plan is contingent on funding availability. In the first year  following land transfer and refuge establishment, if funds are available,  FWS will open one 1.75-mile pedestrian trail, which will follow the  existing road to the Lindsay Ranch homestead site, which dates from the  early 1940s (see fig. 9).
Before opening other trails, FWS officials said they will concentrate on  restoring wildlife and plant habitat, controlling noxious weeds, removing  roads and culverts, and restoring the prairie grasslands. As funding  permits, between 2012 and 2022, they plan to phase in the remaining 15  miles of trail as well as other public-use facilities, such as parking lots, a  visitors’ kiosk, wildlife-viewing blinds, and scenic overlooks. Figure 10  depicts FWS’s plan for visitor use at the refuge, including about 16 miles of  trails, parking, and developed overlooks.
Even after the wildlife refuge opens, some stewardship activities will likely  continue at the site for an indeterminate time. For example, DOE will  maintain groundwater monitoring wells and treatment facilities as long as  necessary, subject to approval of the regulatory agencies. Additionally, as  required by CERCLA, DOE will review the site at least every 5 years to  determine whether remedies continue to be fully protective of human  health and the environment. DOE, EPA, and Colorado reviewed parts of the  site in 2002; the next review is scheduled for 2007.
Further, DOE negotiated an environmental covenant with Colorado for one  of the landfills at the site, called the Present Landfill. The purpose of this  covenant is to ensure protection of human health and the environment by  preventing intrusions into the landfill or damage to the various engineered  structures on adjoining lands and preventing exposure to hazardous  wastes. The covenant, which runs with the land in perpetuity, is binding on  DOE and all other interested parties (including persons using the land), as  well as their heirs and successors. Activities prohibited by the covenant  include digging, drilling, tilling, grading, and excavating, as well as any  activities that could damage or impair the proper functioning of the landfill  cap and runoff controls, the passive seep intercept and treatment system,  or the groundwater monitoring wells. According to a DOE official, DOE  and the state anticipate that the covenant for the Present Landfill will be  supplanted by a broader covenant for the DOE-retained lands; this broader  covenant will become effective with execution of the final decision  document (the combined corrective action decision/record of decision).
The long-term care of the site is a subject of continuing debate and, for  some, concern. The long-term condition and care of the site were the  concerns most mentioned by community group survey respondents. Of the  17 (of 25) survey respondents who said they had remaining concerns about  the cleanup, 15 mentioned concerns about what would happen at the site in  the future.
section_title: Rocky Flats Cleanup Cost about $10 Billion, Including Long-Term Costs
paragraphs: The total cost of the cleanup—about $10 billion—comprises costs incurred  from 1995 through 2005 and estimated long-term costs through about 2080.  Costs incurred to date include the following:   The 2000 closure contract cost DOE over $4.1 billion through October  2005—nearly half the total cost of cleanup through closure. This cost  includes the $510 million incentive fee that DOE paid the contractor.
The 1995 cleanup contract cost DOE nearly $3.6 billion through early  2000, including a $120 million fee to the contractor.
The cost of DOE’s Rocky Flats Field Office from fiscal year 1995 through  October 2005 was nearly $760 million. This cost included staff salaries,  site utilities, litigation support, regulatory oversight, and other  expenses.
The cost incurred by other DOE sites in support of the Rocky Flats  closure was approximately $138 million, for such activities as certifying  shipping containers, providing transportation for nuclear materials and  wastes, and receiving and storing Rocky Flats’ materials and wastes.
In addition, in January 2006, Congress authorized DOE to spend up to $10  million on the purchase of designated “essential mineral rights” at the  Rocky Flats site. The law provided that these mineral rights at the site can  be purchased only from willing sellers and that the cost must not exceed  fair market value. In January 2006, DOE shared the results of an appraisal  of the mineral rights with the three ownership groups at Rocky Flats. DOE  will meet with various natural resources trustees, including the  Department of the Interior, to determine how to facilitate the sale of the  designated essential mineral rights.
DOE anticipates that long-term costs will exceed $1.3 billion. The bulk of  these costs will be the cost to DOE for pensions and postretirement  benefits (primarily medical and life insurance coverage) for the  contractor’s Rocky Flats employees. These costs will likely exceed $1  billion, including about $822 million in medical benefits alone. DOE is liable  for such costs under the provisions of not only the 2000 contract, but also  previous site management contracts with Kaiser-Hill and its predecessors.  Postretirement benefits and pensions are part of the total allowable  compensation for DOE contractor employees, and DOE considers them to  be necessary to attract the most qualified employees. DOE Order 350.1  provides that when operations at a DOE facility are terminated and no  other work is to occur under the contract (as in the case of Rocky Flats),  pension and postretirement health benefit continuation will be provided by  DOE for those contractor employees who earned retirement benefits in  these plans. According to actuarial estimates prepared for DOE by a  consultant, payments for contractor employees at Rocky Flats will  continue until about 2064.
At Rocky Flats, 2,815 (43 percent) of 6,616 contractor employees were  eligible for postretirement benefits. These employees worked for either  the prime contractor (Kaiser-Hill) or one of its major subcontractors, and  retired between January 1, 1995, and December 31, 2005. The estimated  cost of over $1 billion does not include pensions and postretirement  benefits for employees who would have become eligible if the site had  closed on its original target closure date of December 31, 2006. When the  site closed more than a year ahead of schedule, the early closure date  preceded the eligibility date for full pensions and postretirement benefits of  34 employees, according to a contractor official.
Costs for the long-term stewardship of the site are estimated at $303  million. Long-term stewardship includes site surveillance and maintenance,  as well as management of site records and information systems. For many  decades to come, DOE will need to monitor environmental conditions at  the site and maintain the systems and structures that remain there (e.g.,  groundwater treatment systems, ponds and surface water control features,  and landfills). According to draft DOE guidance, surveillance and  maintenance refers to “all activities necessary to ensure protection of  human health and the environment following cleanup at a site, in  perpetuity.” Thus, while long-term stewardship costs are estimated through  about 2080, some costs will continue beyond that, depending on the extent  of stewardship needed.
Our 2001 report noted that the total cost could rise if any claims for  monetary damages were brought against DOE to compensate for injuries to  natural resources. Under CERCLA, federal, state, and Indian tribal officials  who have been designated as trustees can file claims for monetary damages  for injuries to natural resources (including wildlife, fish, and lakes)  resulting from releases of hazardous substances. Damages are usually for  injuries that were not rectified by the cleanup and are to be used to restore,  replace, or acquire equivalent resources. In a November 2005 report,  DOE’s Inspector General said that DOE had not yet conducted the required  Natural Resource Damage Assessment at Rocky Flats and that only the  completion of that assessment would determine whether additional costs  will be ultimately incurred.
But speculation about the potential cost of natural resource damage claims  at the site was laid to rest with passage of the 2006 National Defense  Authorization Act. Under the act, a natural resource damage liability claim  would be considered to be satisfied by the purchase of mineral rights for  $10 million, as authorized by the act, or the payment of the authorized $10  million to the natural resource trustees, or a combination of the two, for a  total payment of $10 million. Although DOE had agreed with the Inspector  General’s recommendation to immediately initiate the damage assessment,  the subsequent provisions of the Defense Authorization Act rendered the  damage assessment requirement moot.
section_title: Numerous Measures Were Taken to Assess the Cleanup’s Sufficiency, but DOE Could Improve Its Oversight of Data Quality and Clarify Its Verification Policy
paragraphs: Numerous measures were and are being taken to assess the sufficiency of  the cleanup; although these measures appear adequate, DOE did not carry  out some aspects of its oversight responsibilities. Cleanup assessment  measures include (1) the completion of the CERCLA and RCRA regulatory  process, (2) DOE’s verification of the contractor’s remediation of  radiologically contaminated soil, and (3) other reviews by federal agencies  and independent consultants. The first assessment measure—completion  of the CERCLA and RCRA regulatory review and approval process—relies  on remediation data collected throughout the cleanup. Our review showed  that the contractor appeared to have comprehensive quality controls for  data. Nevertheless, DOE did not independently review the quality of these  data. A DOE official said that, while he had no explanation for DOE’s not  conducting the required reviews, DOE officials’ day-to-day review of data  did enable them to detect data issues as they arose. The second assessment  measure—DOE’s verification of the contractor’s actions to remediate  radiologically contaminated surface soil—was not completed. DOE  decided to eliminate parts of the planned independent review of the  accuracy of contractor-conducted scans for remaining radiological  contamination because DOE officials decided that the likely results would  not justify the completion of an independent review. The third assessment  measure—outside reviews—included a consultant review that convinced  DOE to revise a key water management strategy at the site, and a federal  review that found no public health hazard for the communities surrounding  Rocky Flats.
subsections: section_title: DOE Did Not Independently Review the Quality of Cleanup Data Crucial to the Regulatory Process
paragraphs: DOE did not independently review the quality of the data obtained  throughout the cleanup—data crucial to the first assessment of the  cleanup’s sufficiency, the CERCLA and RCRA process. As discussed earlier,  the final steps of this regulatory process are still in progress, but much of  the process is complete. Key data were obtained through a four-step  process of remediating 360 individual areas at Rocky Flats, and EPA and  Colorado documented their approval of these cleanups in closeout reports,  giving DOE officials confidence that the site will meet the final cleanup  requirements. The closeout reports also include data on residual  contamination (i.e., the contamination that remains following completion  of the cleanup action). The residual contamination data were analyzed in a  draft comprehensive risk assessment that was part of the remedial  investigation/feasibility study, which determined that the site’s overall risk  falls within EPA’s acceptable risk range. Because the data from the  accelerated actions are crucial to the regulatory agencies’ final decision on  the sufficiency of the cleanup, we reviewed the controls in place to ensure  the quality of these data. We discussed these data quality policies and  procedures with DOE, EPA, Colorado, and contractor and subcontractor  officials and determined that, although the contractor’s data quality  controls appeared robust and comprehensive, DOE could improve its  oversight of them. Further, our review of several closeout documents  revealed that the policies and procedures were generally followed.
subsections: section_title: Soil Cleanup Actions Followed a Four-Step Process
paragraphs: At Rocky Flats, accelerated soil cleanup actions were generally completed  and approved through a four-step process. As of May 2006, EPA and  Colorado officials said they had approved the closeout reports on all 360  areas of known or suspected contamination at Rocky Flats and had  concluded that no further accelerated cleanup actions were necessary for  those areas. Closeout reports are the last step of a regulatory approach  that documented the accelerated cleanup actions taken, quantified  contaminants remaining after the cleanup actions were completed, and  documented whether the project goals had been met. The remediation of  each area of soil contamination at Rocky Flats followed a four-step  process:  characterization, contaminant remediation, confirmation  sampling, and clean fill and project documentation.
The first step—characterization—identified whether contamination had  occurred. The contractor had to design a sampling and analysis approach  for each specific cleanup area and receive DOE’s approval before  submitting the approach to the regulatory agencies for their review and approval. Once a potentially contaminated area was identified, the  contractor would propose one of several approaches to collect the  necessary samples. For example, the contractor might choose a standard  statistical sampling approach, which entails designing a sample grid  capable of identifying an elevated area of contamination with 90 percent  confidence, then applying that grid to the actual cleanup area. Sample  collection involved taking small scoops of dirt, which were analyzed in a  laboratory for a variety of contaminants such as metals, volatile organic  compounds, and radionuclides.
The second step—contaminant remediation—cleans up any contaminants  that characterization found to exceed acceptable levels. Again, the  contractor would prepare a remediation plan, based on a standardized  approach for removing soil, in consultation with EPA, Colorado, and  members of the public, for EPA and Colorado to approve. Once approval  was granted, the contractor could proceed with the actual cleanup.  Cleanup typically involved digging out the contaminated soil, packaging it,  and shipping it to a licensed treatment or disposal facility. The depth to  which soil was removed varied depending on the type and severity of  contamination. In some areas, less than a foot of soil needed to be  removed; in other areas, 20 feet of soil needed to be removed. The  contractor took samples throughout the remediation to identify when the  remediation goal had been met and could then move on to the third step.  According to officials of both EPA and Colorado, they frequently directed  their staff to observe the cleanup actions to ensure they were being  implemented as agreed. Colorado officials said that, while the frequency  and duration of their oversight varied by project, daily interaction and  observation by Colorado staff was typical.
The third step—confirmation sampling—required taking small scoops of  dirt from areas where the contractor believed remediation was complete,  and having them analyzed for the presence of previously identified  contaminants. The samples could be analyzed at an on-site laboratory or  sent off site, depending on the types of contaminants. If the laboratory  confirmed that the contaminants had been removed to an acceptable level,  the contractor could move on to the next step. If the laboratory results  showed an unacceptable level of contaminants, then additional soil would  be removed, followed by additional confirmation sampling. Additional soil  removal and sampling rarely occurred, however, because field  measurements and analyses were used to guide the remediation work  before the final confirmation samples were taken.
The fourth and final step—clean fill and project documentation—included  filling the excavated area and preparing a closeout report that documented  that the cleanup had met the stated goals and quantified any residual  contamination. The contractor generally filled the excavated area with  Rocky Flats alluvium, a mixture of sand, dirt, and gravel. Documentation of  residual contamination was important to the regulatory process because  these data were instrumental in completing the remedial investigation and  feasibility study, including the comprehensive risk assessment.  After  DOE approved the closeout report, it was delivered to the regulatory  agencies for final approval. The regulatory agencies’ approval meant that  the cleanup was sufficient and that no further accelerated action was  needed. This four-step remediation process is illustrated in figure 11.
Although soil remediation was the primary cleanup focus at Rocky Flats,  some groundwater required remediation for elevated levels of uranium,  nitrates, and volatile organic compounds. Three passive systems were  installed to treat the contaminants in the groundwater. At one former  waste-drum storage area, for example, remediation of a carbon  tetrachloride plume, along with other volatile organic compounds, involved  excavating about 700 cubic yards of contaminated soils, treating them  through thermal desorption, and then constructing a passive treatment  system that uses iron filings to cleanse contaminants from the  groundwater. Figure 12 shows the cleanup of a plume of carbon  tetrachloride and other volatile organic compounds (VOC) that originated  from a waste-drum storage area at Rocky Flats.
Because of the tendency of plutonium and americium particles to cling to  soil, a primary concern among stakeholders was the potential off-site  transport of soil contaminated with plutonium and americium via surface  water. Contaminated soil washes into ditches and streams when it rains or  snows. Accordingly, cleanup efforts have focused on the surface soils to  reduce the source of radionuclides that could be susceptible to erosion and  eventual transport off site via Walnut and Woman Creeks. Also, surface  water is managed and monitored both on site—through a series of holding  ponds—and at the points where it leaves the site. The ponds, which DOE  constructed decades ago to retain any major release during operations, are  used to ensure that water leaving the site meets all applicable water quality  standards. DOE operates the final pond in each series as a “batch and  release” system; that is, releases from those ponds occur only after water  sampling has confirmed that the water meets water quality standards. The  efficacy of the accelerated cleanup actions taken to protect water quality  will be evaluated in the remedial investigation/feasibility study. Figure 13  shows the terminal pond in one series.
The draft sitewide comprehensive risk assessment, one of several  documents that will contribute to the final regulatory decision on the  sufficiency of the Rocky Flats cleanup, concluded that the cumulative  remaining risk to human health and the environment at Rocky Flats is  acceptable. The draft comprehensive risk assessment—part of the larger  remedial investigation and feasibility study—concluded that the  cumulative risk to human health, after completion of the accelerated  cleanup actions, falls at the more protective end of EPA’s “excess cancer rate” risk range of between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 1,000,000. This is the range  that EPA considers to be adequately protective of human health.
As discussed previously, the Rocky Flats cleanup was designed so that any  residual contamination after completion of the accelerated cleanup actions  would be documented in closeout reports and subsequently analyzed in  accordance with the exposure assumptions in the sitewide comprehensive  risk assessment. The comprehensive risk assessment incorporated  approximately 2 million data records and examined both human and  ecological risk. Specific tasks included   identifying remaining contamination at Rocky Flats and determining  whether it can adversely affect humans, animals, or plants;  determining whether pathways exist whereby human or ecological  receptors may come into contact with these contaminants, for example,  through inhalation or ingestion of surface water;  assessing the contaminants’ potential effects, including cancer, on the  human and ecological receptors, where complete pathways exist; and  calculating the potential risk to the human and ecological receptors,  based on the pathways and the levels and toxicity of the contaminants.
The human health risk assessment calculated the risk that residual  contaminants posed to wildlife refuge workers and visitors. The  assessment identified five residual contaminants at the site that could  affect human health, including plutonium located adjacent to the most  contaminated precleanup areas of the site. The risk model assumed that  the primary pathways for plutonium were either through inhalation or  through skin contact. Based on assumptions about how frequently a  wildlife refuge worker would be exposed to residual plutonium at the site,  the model calculated an EPA acceptable risk of 1 in 500,000 excess cancers,  and an even lesser risk for a refuge visitor.
The ecological risk assessment estimated the risk that exposure to any  residual contaminants would pose to species of concern, including the  Preble’s Meadow jumping mouse, a protected species. After modeling risks  to selected terrestrial and aquatic species, the risk assessment concluded  that the residual contaminants at Rocky Flats do not represent a significant  risk of adverse ecological effects to these species.
Nearly all respondents to our community group survey expressed  confidence in the cleanup’s outcome. Specifically, 11 of 25 respondents said  they were very or extremely confident that the cleanup will be protective of  public health and the environment, and another 12 said they were  somewhat confident.
section_title: Rocky Flats Cleanup Data Quality Procedures Comprehensive, but DOE’s Oversight Was Lacking
paragraphs: One of the most important aspects of the cleanup process was ensuring the  validity of the data used to determine whether the site had been remediated  to the agreed-upon levels. However, DOE did not complete the independent  and management assessments required by the cleanup agreement to ensure  that these data quality controls were working as intended. We identified  four key data quality controls: establishing data quality objectives, using  data quality parameters, verifying and validating data, and auditing  laboratories that analyzed samples for Rocky Flats. Our review showed  that the contractor generally followed these data quality controls and  documented its compliance with them. Appendix IV contains additional  information on the four data quality controls and our review of the  contractor’s compliance with them.
Although the data quality controls the contractor had in place appeared to  be robust and comprehensive, DOE did not conduct independent  assessments to ensure that this was the case. Specifically, DOE did not  conduct the management and independent assessments called for by the  quality assurance project plan. A quality assurance project plan describes  the planning, implementation, and assessment procedures for a particular  project, as well as any specific quality assurance and quality control  activities. These independent assessments, according to DOE’s  Management Assessment and Independent Assessment Guide, are  intended to measure the adequacy of work performance, among other  things. Among the essential areas that should be assessed, according to the  guide, are data quality controls such as calibration controls, computer  software controls, and environmental management systems.
DOE’s failure to conduct independent assessments is particularly troubling  because of the importance of the cleanup and residual contamination data.  These data were not only the basis for EPA’s and Colorado’s approvals of  the accelerated cleanup actions, but also the foundation for EPA’s and  Colorado’s pending decisions about the overall sufficiency of the site’s  cleanup. Without independent assessments of the contractor’s data quality  control measures, DOE had no assurance that the controls were working as  intended. Also troubling was that EPA and Colorado—the regulatory  agencies that jointly approved the site’s quality assurance project plan and  are responsible for ensuring its implementation—were unfamiliar with  these assessment requirements. When we discussed with EPA officials  DOE’s failure to conduct independent or management assessments, they  acknowledged that their confidence in the data quality would have been  increased had DOE completed these assessments. A DOE official said he  had no explanation for DOE’s not conducting the required assessments,  other than that DOE officials had reviewed sampling and analysis plans,  remediation plans, and closeout reports, and discussed with the contractor  any data quality issues that arose.
Colorado officials said they reviewed the data and the controls provided by  the contractor, which is the state’s standard procedure for determining the  usability of data provided it, and that DOE’s failure to conduct assessments  of the data does not affect the decisions made by the state. Colorado noted  that it did not have significant issues with the data provided, and that any  data issues were resolved using the consultative process, including  bringing in experts to discuss and resolve specific issues. In addition,  Colorado said, it performed routine independent sampling and analysis of  water samples, as well as occasional building samples, which confirmed  the data results provided to the state. Accordingly, although DOE  assessments might have provided another check on data quality and  adequacy, the lack of these assessments had little adverse effect on the  quality or usability of the data and does not cloud the results or  appropriateness of the site’s cleanup.
section_title: DOE’s Planned Cleanup Verification Not Completed
paragraphs: The second assessment of the cleanup’s sufficiency—DOE’s planned  verification of the contractor’s remediation of radiologically contaminated  soil—was inconsistent and not completed as planned. DOE policy  currently requires radiological cleanup to be verified, but the policy is  unclear about how and why verification should be done. DOE’s planned  verification for the cleanup at Rocky Flats was twofold: First, DOE asked  the contractor to develop a final scanning and sampling plan, and second,  DOE asked its Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) to  develop a separate verification plan that included a review of contractor- conducted scans for remaining radiological contamination. However,  DOE chose not to complete several of the plan’s objectives, including part  of ORISE’s review. A DOE official said they had decided that these  activities would not provide sufficient additional information to justify  their completion, but he had no documentation to support this decision. As  a result, DOE lost the opportunity to independently verify the sufficiency of  several aspects of the cleanup.
The respondents to our community group survey had mixed views on the  degree to which the verification activities—in the aggregate—affected their  confidence in the site’s cleanup. Of the 21 (of 25) who provided responses,  13 said that the verification activities greatly or somewhat increased their  confidence in the site’s cleanup. Another 8 said the verification activities  had no effect or a negative effect on their confidence. The remaining four  said they either did not know or had no basis to judge.
subsections: section_title: DOE Policy Unclear on Application and Purpose of Verification
paragraphs: Although DOE has a general policy on radiological cleanup verification, its  guidance is unclear on how the policy applies and what the verification  goals are. In January 2001, the Secretary of Energy issued a memorandum  that contained guidance on the release of radiological property and  directed DOE field offices to “establish independent verification programs”  that “should be commensurate with the potential for contamination, as well  as the complexity and hazard.” Additional DOE guidance on verification is  found in other documents, including draft guidance called “Control and  Release of Property with Residual Radioactive Material;” this document  implements guidance for DOE Order 5400.5, which includes requirements for the release of radiologically contaminated property. The draft  guidance, which was approved for interim use, includes a section on  verification that states that “the DOE organization responsible for the  release of property should verify or provide for independent verification of  the radiological condition of the property before release.” However, the  draft neither contains specific guidance about verification techniques nor  specifies the goals of verification. Accordingly, it was little help to Rocky  Flats officials and may have contributed to the inconsistent  implementation of the verification plan.
Lacking clear guidance, DOE’s project manager at Rocky Flats said he took  a common sense approach that, in his view, fulfills the intent of DOE’s  policy by cleaning the site up through the CERCLA and RCRA process.  That is, he believes that the regulatory agencies’ approvals of the  radiological cleanup actions at the site constitute independent verification.  However, the official acknowledged that there is room for interpretation  and disagreement on this issue. Another area of confusion was what the  goals of the independent verification should be. At Rocky Flats, DOE  officials commissioned a cleanup verification plan that used a different  methodology than the one used to implement the cleanup. The result was  that while the cleanup verification confirmed that an area had met the  standards of the cleanup agreement, it also identified “hot spots” that  caused alarm among the public at the end of the 10-year cleanup. The  Rocky Flats manager stated that clear guidance on independent  verification would have been helpful, especially as to how it related to  CERCLA cleanups.
section_title: DOE Did Not Fully Implement Its Planned Verification or Explain Its Reasons for Not Doing So
paragraphs: Although DOE agreed to ORISE’s final verification plan, DOE did not fully  implement it and did not offer a public explanation for its decision.  Specifically, ORISE never completed two of its objectives—an assessment  of the aerial and ground-based scanning and an assessment of the  contractor’s investigations of the results of the aerial and targeted ground- based scans. According to a DOE official, DOE decided in mid-September  2005 that it needed to re-evaluate the need for ORISE’s work. DOE decided  that because the contractor’s aerial survey had failed to find any anomalies,  ORISE’s remaining work was unnecessary. DOE remained unsure about the  final outcome of the ground-based scanning but still decided not to ask  ORISE to complete the remaining objectives. A DOE official explained that  completing the work was not warranted, given the results of the aerial and  ground-based scanning. According to an ORISE official, DOE’s Rocky Flats  Project Office notified ORISE on November 11, 2005, that it would not be  asked to complete the remaining objectives. Additional information on  DOE’s independent verification is contained in appendix IV.
section_title: Independent Consultants and Other Federal Agencies Conducted Additional Cleanup Reviews, and Some Influenced DOE’s Final Cleanup Strategy
paragraphs: Reviews conducted by independent consultants and other federal agencies  commented on cleanup actions, and some reviews influenced the final  cleanup strategy, thereby providing additional assurance to DOE and the  regulatory agencies that their remedial decisions were correct.  Independent consultants, hired by local stakeholder organizations,  commented on several cleanup remedies, including surface and  groundwater cleanup actions and landfill remediation. Some of these  influenced the final cleanup; for example, a study on surface water  management called for a specific pond discharge strategy, with which DOE  concurred. On the other hand, DOE did not incorporate all comments and  suggestions made by independent contractors, such as recommendations  on how to close a landfill. Other federal agencies, including the Agency for  Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and FWS, also conducted studies,  one of which concluded that no health hazard existed for surrounding  communities. Another study is still under way.
subsections: section_title: Several Recommendations from Independent Consultants Were Incorporated into Site Remedies, but Disagreements and Concerns Remain
paragraphs: Independent consultants, hired by local communities or through the Rocky  Flats Coalition of Local Governments, conducted technical reviews of  cleanup actions and provided recommendations, some of which DOE  incorporated into its cleanup plan. The Rocky Flats Coalition of Local  Governments sponsored these independent reviews to assure the local  governments and the public that the cleanup would meet the regulatory  guidelines. Overall, members of the Coalition initiated four technical  reviews, which examined groundwater, surface water and pond  management, and landfill remediation. The Coalition hired a consultant to  comment on DOE’s independent verification process.
One instance in which DOE incorporated a recommendation from a  consultant involved surface water management. During Rocky Flats’  operational days, a series of ponds was constructed as part of a surface  water management system to ensure that no contaminated surface water left the site. As a safeguard to ensure that all water leaving the site meets  the state’s water quality standards, the water is tested prior to its release.  An independent consultant’s study raised the concern that DOE was  allowing one of the terminal ponds to fill to a high level, thereby  diminishing its ability to store large quantities of water should a heavy  rainfall occur. Such an event could result in water being released without  being tested. The independent review recommended that DOE maintain the  pond at a lower capacity as a precautionary strategy, and DOE concurred.  Another example was DOE’s concurrence with the Coalition consultant’s  recommendation that ORISE include in its verification plan a 100 percent  scan of certain areas to detect any residual contamination that might  exceed established cleanup levels.
However, several of the independent consultants’ reviews identified points  of contention with DOE’s ultimate cleanup approach. One area of  contention involved the landfill that had been used at Rocky Flats in the  1950s and 1960s. DOE’s characterization of the landfill suggested that  uranium and volatile organic compounds were present. DOE and the  regulatory agencies subsequently agreed to implement an accelerated  cleanup action that included buttressing the landfill to prevent the waste  from slumping into Woman Creek; regrading parts of the landfill, which is  located on a hillside, to prevent erosion; placing 2 feet of soil atop the  surface to isolate the contaminants; installing storm water management  berms to divert surface flows to perimeter channels; and seeding the entire  cover, buttress, and channels with native grass species. An independent  review disagreed with several aspects of this accelerated action, including  that it did not include a biointrusion layer; these layers inhibit the ability of  burrowing animals like mice and prairie dogs to bring contaminants up to  the surface, where people at the site might be exposed to them. DOE and  Colorado felt that a biointrusion layer was unnecessary because the  accelerated cleanup action met the legal requirements for landfill closure,  and the observed environmental conditions indicated that the landfill  posed only a minimal risk. EPA added that the issue of biointrusion was  examined during the remedy’s design, with the conclusion that the steep  slope (18 percent), combined with the native grass cover, would not be  attractive habitat for burrowing animals. In the end, a biointrusion layer  was not included in the landfill cover. Monitoring of Woman Creek and  wells will continue at locations both upgradient and downgradient of the  landfill to ensure that no contaminants are escaping from the landfill.
section_title: Other Federal Reviews Concluded Minimal Risk or Are Still Under Way
paragraphs: The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), part of  the Department of Health and Human Services, conducted a public health  assessment that concluded that Rocky Flats poses no health hazard.   Specifically, ATSDR concluded that the Rocky Flats data present a  consistent picture that local residents’ current and future exposures to  contaminants from Rocky Flats are below levels associated with adverse  health effects. ATSDR officials conducted their own data reliability tests on  the site’s data and concluded that the data were adequate to make public  health decisions. The officials then assessed the contaminant pathways at  Rocky Flats, including soil, air, and surface water and groundwater and  concluded that environmental contamination at Rocky Flats posed no  apparent public health hazard to surrounding communities. (However,  ATSDR did not evaluate the health implications for people within the  boundaries of Rocky Flats.)  ATSDR offered several recommendations on  how to ensure that the site’s contamination will not pose a future risk to  residents of surrounding communities, including continued monitoring of  surface water along the eastern boundary of the site and groundwater  wells. DOE is not required to officially respond to the ATSDR  recommendations, but reported that the recommendations had already  been included, or were under discussion with the regulatory agencies for  inclusion, in the postclosure monitoring and maintenance plans.
Additionally, as discussed previously, the 5-year reviews required by  CERCLA will continue to compile information about whether remedies at  the site continue to fully protect human health and the environment. The  first 5-year review, completed in 2002, included areas of the site for which  final decision documents (i.e., corrective action decisions/records of  decision) had been completed, as well as areas where accelerated cleanup  actions had been completed as of September 30, 2001. At that time, final  decision documents had been completed for two areas (the 881 hillside and  the off-site areas), and accelerated cleanup actions had been completed at  several areas. Among the completed accelerated actions were the removal  and, as necessary, treatment of contaminated debris and soil at several  trenches; the installation of three groundwater treatment systems; the  removal of contaminated sludge from solar evaporation ponds; and  emptying and treating the contents of six underground storage tanks. The  review concluded that the remedies for these two areas were protective  and that the accelerated actions had addressed immediate hazards and  were generally functioning as intended. The review of the off-site areas,  though not required under EPA guidance, was nonetheless conducted  because of the substantial public interest in those areas. The off-site areas  did not have a defined boundary, but rather referred to off-site  contamination emanating from Rocky Flats in general, including surface  contamination of lands to the east of the site, along with the Great Western  Reservoir, Standley Lake, and Mower Reservoir. The review concluded that  all calculated excess cancer risks in the entire unit were well within or  below EPA’s acceptable risk range of 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1,000,000.
Also, FWS sampled areas at Rocky Flats that are likely to become part of  the future wildlife refuge. Prior to any transfer of land management  authority to FWS, FWS typically surveys the property to identify any  potential hazardous substances that pose a threat to fish and wildlife. In  May 2006, consistent with its survey plan, FWS took 45 soil samples  (including four duplicate samples), mostly along proposed trails as  indicated in the Comprehensive Conservation Plan for the refuge. The  samples will be examined for a range of potential contaminants, including  metals, radionuclides, organics, and polychlorinated biphenyls, commonly  referred to as PCBs. FWS took an additional 12 vegetation samples  (including one duplicate sample), principally to ensure that any future  prescribed burns will be safe. An FWS official said that the results of the  laboratory analyses of the samples are due in early July, at an estimated  cost of $70,000. If the results identify contaminants that concern them,  FWS officials will notify DOE, EPA, and Colorado; the agencies will then  determine what steps would need to be taken.
section_title: DOE Implemented Some Lessons Learned at Rocky Flats but Has No Requirement to Ensure That Lessons Learned Are Implemented at Other Sites
paragraphs: Although DOE has identified and implemented at other cleanup sites some  lessons learned at Rocky Flats, DOE does not require applicable lessons  learned at one cleanup site to be implemented at others. The Rocky Flats  project offers many lessons about innovative techniques, risk- and cost- sharing contract provisions, accelerated cleanup processes, involvement of  community groups, oversight of contractor controls over data quality, and  cleanup verification processes. However, DOE has not developed a system  to ensure that all lessons are captured and implemented as appropriate at  other DOE sites. As a result, DOE may be missing valuable time- and cost- saving opportunities at other sites that are planning or undergoing cleanup.
subsections: section_title: DOE Identified Lessons from Rocky Flats and Assessed Their Applicability to Other Sites
paragraphs: DOE has gathered and disseminated to some other DOE sites numerous  lessons learned at Rocky Flats. These lessons included the following:    Clearly define government oversight of the contractor, and limit the  number of DOE personnel providing direction.
Conduct external reviews of the project baselines to build credibility  and provide objective recommendations for project improvement.
Use employee incentives to reward high-performing individuals.
Use a flexible project management approach that allows the contractor  to complete the project in the safest and most cost-effective manner.
Establish a clear “end state” vision and risk-based cleanup defined in  conjunction with specific future land/site use.
Develop and use an integrated project baseline schedule and budget.
Use government-furnished services and items to integrate and manage  the delivery of items not within the contractor’s control.
Implement new technology that significantly accelerates the schedule  and reduces total costs, such as techniques for reducing the number of  radioactive waste shipments off site for disposal.
In October 2002, DOE authorized a corporate review team to determine the  effectiveness of DOE cleanup efforts. In 2003, the team reviewed work  activities, management processes, and contract administration practices at  selected sites, and used a checklist of more than 50 lessons learned at  Rocky Flats to assess their applicability and potential benefits to each site.  The review team issued nine reports with findings and recommendations.  With the exception of one report, which was part of the preliminary review  effort, each report also included the team’s determination of whether the  lessons on the checklist applied to the sites, and the progress the sites had  made toward implementing applicable lessons learned.
section_title: DOE Lacks a System for Ensuring Continued Collection and Implementation of Lessons Learned at Its Cleanup Sites
paragraphs: During 2004 and 2005, DOE’s Office of Performance Assessment conducted  follow-up reviews of many of the sites the corporate review team had  reviewed earlier. These follow-up reviews, however, did not assess whether  the sites had implemented the lessons learned from Rocky Flats. According  to the DOE official responsible for tracking the status of these reviews,  DOE does not require sites to implement applicable lessons from Rocky  Flats (or from other cleanup sites). Instead, he said, each site is responsible  for tracking its implementation of these lessons. Although he said he  believes the sites are taking steps to implement those lessons and are  continuing to improve their systems for managing cleanup, he had no  documentation to support his conclusions.
DOE’s Office of Performance Assessment reviewed lessons learned at  Rocky Flats in the March 2004 and June 2005 Rocky Flats baseline  performance review reports. In the 2004 report, DOE noted that valuable  information and processes from Rocky Flats should be available to other  sites that are beginning the cleanup process. The report noted that DOE’s  Rocky Flats office had begun a program to archive project cost information  that could be used to prepare cost estimates for future contracts at other  sites, and recommended that the office develop a database that identifies  the number of personnel and time durations required to perform specific  cleanup tasks. According to the Rocky Flats DOE manager, the cost- archiving program continued to provide periodic information updates, and  provided the final download of project data to DOE’s Office of Engineering  and Construction Management in December 2005. The 2005 Rocky Flats  baseline performance review report included 30 additional lessons learned  at Rocky Flats. Among these were improved contract language that  established a close working relationship between DOE and the contractor,  made measurement of progress easier, and reduced the need for contract  changes; improved safety processes at the site; consolidated procurement  functions; and streamlined methods for handling and shipping radioactive  waste and disposing of excess property. One of the lessons identified in the  2005 report actually resulted from a request from another cleanup site. A  DOE official in the Office of Performance Assessment told us that officials  at DOE’s Office of Environmental Management visited Rocky Flats in 2005  to document lessons learned from the demolition of a plutonium- processing building. They visited Rocky Flats at the request of DOE  officials at the Savannah River site who were designing a similar facility  and sought information from the Rocky Flats demolition that might  improve the design of their building.
Although DOE has a database of environmental safety and health lessons, it  does not have a database of broader lessons learned across the DOE  complex. DOE has a nationwide database managed by the Society for  Effective Lessons Learned Sharing, a volunteer DOE organization  dedicated to identifying, sharing, and using lessons learned in order to  improve the safety, efficiency, and effectiveness of DOE work processes.  These lessons focus primarily on individual safety incidents and how to  prevent their recurrence. However, the database generally does not capture  lessons dealing with broader issues such as contract management, pricing,  and working with regulatory agencies. Consequently, DOE may not be  maximizing the use of valuable information that could save time and  money. “DOE Headquarters has a responsibility to assure that such lessons are being transferred  across sites with similar facilities. Sharing lessons learned needs aggressive attention;  without it valuable savings are lost and frustrations compounded. Lessons learned are  useful for mitigating risk and providing training material for project directors/managers.
The report also recommended that DOE proactively encourage the sharing  of lessons learned. According to a DOE headquarters official, a national  database of lessons learned from closure sites would allow DOE to  proactively share experiences that would benefit future closure operations.
section_title: Rocky Flats Offers Additional Lessons That May Be Applicable to Other DOE Sites
paragraphs: During our review, we gathered additional lessons learned at Rocky Flats  that could be useful for other DOE sites. These lessons include the  following:  Safety is a priority. According to DOE officials, this lesson was  reinforced throughout Rocky Flats’ cleanup. Early in the cleanup, DOE  officials recognized that a significant investment in hazard  identification, safety planning, and safety implementation (i.e., the  integrated safety management system) during the actual work would  ensure that the work was performed without unacceptable risks or  unnecessary delays. Later, DOE officials said they came to understand  that this focus on safety not only helped work progress, but also  facilitated efficiency by building trust and engaging the workforce.  Safety was both consistent with, and essential to, effective project  execution.
Performance-based contract incentives improve results.
According to DOE officials, the first contract they had with Kaiser-Hill  demonstrated that attaching incentives to clearly defined performance  measures vastly improved actual results. The 2000 contract took the  concept to the next level, providing large incentives to the contractor  and the workers to safely and compliantly complete the cleanup within  the target schedule and cost. The additional incentives for schedule and  cost savings resulted in closure more than a year ahead of schedule and  $530 million under budget. However, as previously noted, such  incentives are not always this successful, and the financial incentive  offered at Rocky Flats was only one of many factors contributing to the  cleanup’s early completion.
Take a consultative approach to cleanup decisions. As previously  discussed, the collaborative process was essential to the cleanup’s early  completion. According to DOE officials, the cleanup was successful  because all of the stakeholders were engaged in the process and  supportive of the ultimate goal. The input of numerous key figures,  including members of Congress, senior DOE managers, state and local  elected officials, and officials of federal and state regulatory agencies,  was actively solicited and ultimately met with the convergence of the  cleanup agreement, the contract, and the desired end state. DOE  officials said they communicated openly and often with stakeholders to  seek the best solutions, and they came to value input from formerly  dogmatic opponents. Moreover, Colorado, EPA, DOE, and the  contractor worked closely together on cleanup decisions from the  beginning through the end. As cleanup proceeded on an area, Colorado  had access to meetings and detailed information about the cleanup. In  the event that Colorado or EPA considered a particular activity to be  unsafe, the Rocky Flats cleanup agreement granted them the authority  to stop work.
Don’t let unresolved issues delay progress. DOE officials said that if  they had focused on what they could not do or delayed work until all  questions were answered, the project would not have been completed  and the target completion date would probably still be in question.  Colorado officials emphasized, however, that this does not mean that  work progressed without the appropriate approvals from Colorado and  EPA. It is Colorado’s understanding that the consultative process, with  all of its oversight and meetings to discuss activities and issues, ensured  that all issues were addressed and resolved in a timely manner before  activities occurred.
Obtain stable project funding. As discussed earlier, consistent  project funding was a key factor in the cleanup’s early completion.  According to DOE and EPA officials, congressional and departmental  commitment to stable funding over the life of the project aided  tremendously in project planning and execution. Also, the stable  funding helped in regulatory interactions and credibility with the  general public.
Involve the future site manager in remedial decisions. According  to FWS, when a former DOE site is considered for conversion to a  wildlife refuge, it is “vastly preferable” for FWS to be involved early in  the cleanup process and have a decision-making role. DOE officials  agreed and said they have actively involved FWS since passage of the  Refuge Act. According to DOE officials, FWS substantially influenced  cleanup decisions, even in areas of the site that will not become part of  the future refuge. For example, they said, FWS’s input effected a major  change in the cover design for the present landfill. Additionally, FWS  influenced the composition of the revegetation seed mixes sitewide and  the methods of protecting sensitive habitat and endangered species. But  DOE did not incorporate all of FWS’s suggestions, such as  characterizing and disposing of waste in the original landfill,  incorporating barriers around landfills to discourage intrusion by  burrowing animals, and using irrigation and soil amendment to enhance  the success of seeded native vegetation. According to DOE officials, the  two agencies’ different perspectives on cleanup methods highlight the  difficulty of coordination between two federal agencies that have  different missions. These difficulties can persist even when staff of the  two agencies are collocated and interact daily, as was the case at Rocky  Flats. In retrospect, DOE officials said, it would have been better to  recognize that difficulty early and obtain an executive–level consensus  on the vision for the outcome.
Be aware of potential beryllium contamination. According to a  senior contractor official, beryllium was “ubiquitous” at the site; it was  found even in containers of metals and oxides. In terms of worker  safety, beryllium was more of a predemolition challenge than other  contaminants because there is no effective way to monitor beryllium on  a real-time basis.
Question accepted technologies. The contractor was able to save  substantial money and time at Rocky Flats by questioning the usual  disposal and remediation processes. For example, the accepted practice  was that a glovebox or any part of one was, by definition, transuranic  waste. However, the contractor found a way to decontaminate  gloveboxes and dispose of them much more easily and less expensively  as low-level waste. According to a senior contractor official, this  particular technical lesson learned at Rocky Flats may be applicable to  DOE’s cleanup work at the Hanford site.
Contain contaminated water. According to an official with the  Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, lessons  learned at Rocky Flats included the importance of ensuring that there  are no underground drainage systems or conduits when large amounts  of water are used during a cleanup. This lesson stemmed from an  unfortunate experience in the cleanup of building 771, when water used  in decontamination efforts seeped into underground conduits that had  not been adequately plugged. The water flushed contaminants through  the conduits, resulting in elevated levels of americium in one series of  ponds at the site. This turned out to be an expensive lesson, as the  contractor had to bring in equipment and treat about 26 million gallons  of americium-contaminated water.
Although DOE captured and implemented at other sites some of the  lessons it learned at Rocky Flats, others risk being lost. For example,  contractor and DOE officials said that at Rocky Flats, and at other cleanup  sites, many lessons that could be gleaned from records and data will be lost  if not recorded, summarized, or otherwise captured and shared. According  to the Rocky Flats manager, an effort termed the “Legacy Project” was  begun in 2001 to start collecting the project knowledge and lessons before  the institutional memory was lost. This effort continued intermittently  through the summer of 2005, drawing upon record documents, working  papers, and personal experience. Also, DOE Rocky Flats officials said that  officials of DOE’s Legacy Management office in Grand Junction, Colorado,  had shared with them lessons learned from the Grand Junction office’s  experience working with the long-term management of sites formerly  contaminated by uranium mill tailings. According to the Rocky Flats  manager, these lessons will be brought to Rocky Flats as Legacy  Management executes its responsibilities for site management and  maintenance. As the mission scope of Legacy Management expands, it will  continue to carry experience from Rocky Flats to other sites that are  transferred to it for long-term care. Also, although DOE officials told us in  March 2005 that they were planning a workshop on lessons learned at  Rocky Flats in decontamination and demolition, that workshop has not  been held. According to the Rocky Flats manager, several technical assist  visits occurred with contractor and DOE personnel from sites in Idaho,  Ohio, and Washington. These visits were believed to be more focused and  efficient than a workshop format. At this time, a general workshop is not  planned; however, technical assist and assessment visits to facilitate the  sharing of lessons are continuing.
DOE officials at Rocky Flats have drafted the Rocky Flats Closure Legacy  report, a lengthy document that captures the 4-year effort of the Legacy  Project. It is currently at DOE headquarters for review and comment and is  expected to be released in June 2006.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Strong DOE oversight of data quality is important because accurate and  complete data are paramount to DOE’s, EPA’s, and Colorado’s decisions  about the sufficiency of the Rocky Flats cleanup. At Rocky Flats, DOE  placed undue reliance on the contractor to have appropriate data quality  controls, and did not complete the required management and independent  assessments of the data’s quality. Our review showed that the contractor at  Rocky Flats appeared to have comprehensive data quality controls, but this  does not negate DOE’s responsibility to independently monitor and assess  those controls throughout the cleanup. Also, although DOE policies call for  independent verification of cleanup results, the applicability of the policies  to cleanups conducted under CERCLA or RCRA is unclear. Lacking clear  and specific guidance on cleanup verification, DOE officials at Rocky Flats  undertook what they thought was a reasonable approach. However, DOE  did not complete all of the cleanup verification activities it had planned; it  also did not publicly explain its rationale for not doing so. As a result, DOE  lost a valuable opportunity to increase public awareness of, and confidence  in, the verification results. Ironically, although the verification activities  were undertaken to increase public confidence in the cleanup, the results  sparked additional questions from the public. Finally, although DOE has  implemented at other cleanup sites some of the lessons learned at Rocky  Flats, DOE does not require that lessons learned at one site be  implemented, where applicable, at other sites. As a result, DOE stands to  lose the benefits that such lessons have to offer.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve DOE’s oversight of cleanup activities, its conduct of cleanup  verification activities, and its monitoring of lessons learned at DOE cleanup  sites, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following three  actions:  Ensure that DOE independently assesses contractors’ controls over data  quality.
Clarify guidance on whether and how to conduct cleanup verification  activities.
Assess the costs and benefits of developing a method to track the  lessons learned from cleanup activities at DOE sites across the nation,  including methods for determining whether lessons are being applied at  applicable locations.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOE, Interior, EPA, Colorado, and  Kaiser-Hill for their review and comment. DOE, Interior, Colorado, and  Kaiser-Hill provided written comments (see apps. V, VI, VII, and VIII,  respectively). EPA did not provide official written comments but did  provide editorial and technical suggestions, as did the other agencies, that  we incorporated, as appropriate.
DOE commented that it found the report to be comprehensive, generally  thorough, clear, and well structured. DOE agreed that a robust and  effective lessons learned program would be beneficial and said it intends to  follow through and revitalize such a program within DOE’s Office of  Environmental Management. DOE reiterated the importance of teamwork  and agency support in accelerating the cleanup of the Rocky Flats site,  noting that the regulatory agencies, community groups, and local  government organizations worked tirelessly along with DOE and  contractor organizations to overcome obstacles. DOE also emphasized that  the high priority given the Rocky Flats cleanup within the DOE complex  and at the congressional level, together with the provision of level annual  funding, was critical to the success of the project.
DOE did not agree or disagree with our recommendations that it ensure  independent assessments of data quality and clarify its guidance on  cleanup verification. In its specific comments, however, DOE noted that  there is direction and guidance on independent verification and other  independent assessments, and referenced several documents that provide  such guidance. We were aware of these documents and had discussed  several of them with DOE officials at the Rocky Flats Project Office, who  said the documents were not helpful in guiding their decisions about  whether to conduct verification activities or how to ensure compatibility  between available verification strategies and the cleanup strategies  undertaken at the site.
In its specific comments, DOE also stated that there is an additional  regulatory step DOE must take before releasing the site to the Department  of the Interior, pursuant to the requirements of DOE Order 5400.5  governing the release of real property with residual radioactive material.  DOE suggested that we reference this regulatory requirement in the report  section dealing with additional steps to be taken. We did not adopt this  suggestion because our report’s discussion of regulatory steps focused on  those that remain to be taken by EPA and Colorado, the regulatory  agencies at the site. We do, however, reference DOE Order 5400.5 and its  draft implementing guidance in our discussion of cleanup verification  activities. We noted that the draft implementing guidance neither contains  specific guidance about verification techniques nor specifies the goals of  verification and, consequently, was little help to Rocky Flats officials and  may have contributed to the inconsistent implementation of the  verification plan.
The Department of the Interior generally agreed with the information that  pertains to the Fish and Wildlife Service. The department said that at this  point, it is unable to determine when Rocky Flats will be open to the public,  due to the uncertainty of the completion of the transfer of the site. We  incorporated the department’s suggestion that we focus on the transfer of  administrative jurisdiction from DOE to the department rather than  focusing on when the public may access the Rocky Flats National Wildlife  Refuge. Also, as the department suggested, we clarified the discussions of  actions EPA must take to facilitate the transfer and the acquisition of  privately owned mineral rights.
Colorado commented that the report provides an appropriate recognition  of issues and actions occurring during the remedial activities at Rocky  Flats. Colorado emphasized that it has been an integral participant in  Rocky Flats’ cleanup and closure; it provided continual in-depth regulatory  oversight of the investigative and remedial activities for both building  decontamination and demolition and environmental restoration. Colorado  cited the dedicated efforts of its staff, along with the consultative process,  as expediting completion of an accelerated cleanup that resulted in  significant cost savings for DOE and for U.S. taxpayers.
Kaiser-Hill commented that the report was thorough, well-written, and  accurate in its description of Kaiser-Hill’s role in the cleanup of Rocky  Flats. Kaiser-Hill agreed with the report’s focus on the contribution of  Kaiser-Hill’s workforce, and stated that the incentive contract played an  important role in the success of the cleanup project. Kaiser-Hill noted that  the success of the project was also due to the cooperative decision-making  process that evolved among DOE, Kaiser-Hill, EPA, Colorado, and local  communities, aided by a firm political commitment to accelerate the  cleanup.
Kaiser-Hill said it believes that the report’s calculation of the total cost of  the cleanup is misleading because it includes tangential costs such as  health and pension benefits, which alone add about $1 billion to the cost  reported. Kaiser-Hill noted that a significant portion of these benefit costs  were accrued by previous contractors. Kaiser-Hill acknowledged, however,  that such costs represent financial obligations to the taxpayer. For our  purposes, inclusion of these costs was necessary to report total costs of the  cleanup since 1995, including long-term costs.
Additionally, Kaiser-Hill commented that because the final disposition of  trench T-7 (the fourth individual cleanup project we reviewed in depth)  required only minimal cleanup, it was completed through the standard “no  further accelerated action” justification process. According to the  contractor, the justification documentation for such areas (those requiring  minimal cleanup) should include information on data quality and adequacy,  but not at the same level of detail as was required for other cleanup areas.  We recognize that areas closed out through the “no further accelerated  action” process may not necessitate the same level of data quality  documentation as other areas. Nevertheless, the Rocky Flats Cleanup  Agreement requires that the justification documentation for “no further  accelerated action” areas include information on data quality and usability.  The documentation we reviewed for trench T-7 did not include such  information.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Energy and the  Interior, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the  Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Public Health and  Environment, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Kaiser-Hill  Company, interested congressional committees, and other interested  parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IX.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our review objectives were to determine the (1) factors that contributed to  the early completion of the physical cleanup at Rocky Flats; (2) work  remaining as well as total project costs, including long-term costs; (3)  measures in place to assess whether the cleanup achieved a level of  protection of public health and environment consistent with the Rocky  Flats Cleanup Agreement; and (4) lessons the Rocky Flats project may hold  for other Department of Energy (DOE) cleanup projects.
In conducting our work, we visited the Rocky Flats site and reviewed  documents and data prepared by DOE, the Environmental Protection  Agency (EPA), the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment  (Colorado), the Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service  (FWS), the contractor, and various scientific organizations. We also  interviewed officials of these entities.
To determine the factors that contributed to the physical cleanup’s early  completion, we interviewed DOE, EPA, Colorado, and contractor officials  and reviewed agency and contractor documents on cleanup  accomplishments and techniques, project activity reports, and  decontamination and demolition accomplishments. Information on  innovative cleanup techniques is presented in appendix III.
To determine the work remaining as well as total project costs, including  long-term costs, we reviewed documents and data prepared by DOE, EPA,  Colorado, FWS, and the contractor, and interviewed officials of these  entities. We reviewed documents and discussed issues pertaining to the  cleanup requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,  Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended (CERCLA), and the  Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended (RCRA). We  also reviewed documents and discussed issues pertaining to the plans for  the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge, cost records and estimates, and  pension plan provisions. We also analyzed documents related to the cost- plus-incentive-fee contract, including contract negotiation documents, the  contract cost and fee structure, and contract modifications, but we did not  evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the contract.
To determine the measures in place to assess whether the cleanup would  achieve a level of protection of public health and environment consistent  with the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement, we reviewed documents and  discussed issues pertaining to cleanup verification strategies and results.  We also reviewed scientific analyses, such as a study of how contaminants  migrate through soil and water and an assessment of the public health risk  posed by contaminants remaining at the site. We reviewed the general  content of these analyses but did not evaluate the science underlying them.
In addition, because decisions about the sufficiency of the cleanup have  been and will be based on remediation data, we assessed the soundness of  the agencies’ and contractor’s processes and procedures for ensuring data  quality. We visited the subcontractor that performed data verification and  validation activities, and we reviewed the results of audits of the key  laboratories used by the contractor to analyze samples of radioactively  contaminated soil.
We also selected a nonprobability sample of four accelerated cleanup  actions, based on several criteria, including whether EPA or Colorado was  the lead regulatory agency and whether the contamination was in the  surface soil or under contaminated buildings. Because radionuclide  contamination was the primary concern at the site, we selected cleanup  actions of plutonium-contaminated soil. For each selected cleanup action,  we reviewed data quality controls pertaining to data quality objectives, data  quality parameters, and data verification and validation. We did not  evaluate the remedial data or analyses themselves. Information on our data  quality review results and details of DOE’s verification activities are  presented in appendix IV.
To determine the lessons the Rocky Flats project may hold for other DOE  cleanup projects, we reviewed information and interviewed officials of  DOE, EPA, FWS, Colorado, and the contractor about lessons learned at  Rocky Flats and other sites. We reviewed documents related to and reports  from DOE’s Society for Effective Lessons Learned Sharing database, and  we interviewed DOE officials involved in various efforts to capture and  disseminate lessons learned (from Rocky Flats and elsewhere throughout  the DOE complex).
Further, to obtain citizen views about issues such as community input to  the cleanup and the effect of various cleanup verification activities, we  attended monthly meetings of the two local community groups that served  in an advisory capacity to DOE: the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board  and the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments. We also surveyed  current and past members (and current staff) of these two groups to obtain  their opinions on questions such as how DOE engaged the groups in the  cleanup process, how DOE used the groups’ input, how satisfied or  dissatisfied they were with the cleanup’s results, and the degree to which  DOE’s cleanup verification activities affected their confidence in the  cleanup. We pretested the survey twice and revised the questions  accordingly. We documented the responses and verified 100 percent of the  documentation. Response rates and summary responses are presented in  appendix II.
We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards from March 2005 through May 2006.
section_title: GAO Survey Methodology, Response Rates, and Summary Responses
paragraphs: To obtain citizen and local government views on the Rocky Flats cleanup,  we surveyed current (as of December 2005) and past members and current  staff of the two local community groups that served in an advisory capacity  to DOE: the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board and the Rocky Flats  Coalition of Local Governments. The survey included questions about how  DOE engaged the groups in the cleanup process, how DOE used the  groups’ input, what level of confidence group members had in the cleanup’s  results, the degree to which DOE’s cleanup verification activities affected  their confidence in the cleanup, and any remaining concerns they might  have.
subsections: section_title: Survey Methodology
paragraphs: We designed the survey questions to elicit clear and unbiased responses.  We pretested the survey twice and revised questions accordingly. We  transferred the survey responses into a spreadsheet and the comments into  a narrative document; we then verified that 100 percent of the information  was transferred accurately from the individual surveys.
In total, we sent surveys to 58 members (current and past). We obtained  group members’ e-mail addresses (or mailing addresses, when e-mail  addresses were not available) from the directors of the Rocky Flats  Citizens Advisory Board (Advisory Board) and the Rocky Flats Coalition of  Local Governments (Coalition). After e-mailing the survey, we e-mailed two  reminder notices to encourage members to respond. Additionally, we  attended both groups’ January 2006 meetings and personally encouraged  members to submit their surveys.
Survey Response Rates We received a total of 25 responses, or 43 percent of the total surveys sent.
By subgroup, however (e.g., current members of one group, past members  of one group), response rates varied widely. For example, the response rate  for current members of the Advisory Board was 71 percent, whereas the  response rate for current members of the Coalition was 35 percent. Table 1  shows the response rates by subgroup and in total.
section_title: Summary Responses
paragraphs: Following is a summary of the survey responses, by question, along with  selected illustrative comments by respondents. Narrative responses are not  provided in their entirety because we did not wish to introduce a  perceptual bias. For some questions, that is, a majority of respondents  offered positive and concise comments, but one or two respondents  provided negative and lengthy comments. To present all of the comments in  their entirety would thus give an unfair perception of emphasis, at least by  sheer volume of narrative, to the negative minority and would diminish  (again by volume) the positive majority. Accordingly, we summarized the  comments to reflect the preponderance of responses, whether positive or  negative.
The summary responses begin with question 5, as questions 1 through 4  sought information about whether the respondent was a current or former  member of either the Advisory Board or the Coalition and about the length  of time the respondent had served as a member of the group. 5. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with how DOE engaged the   in the cleanup process?
Don’t know/no basis to judge 6. Please explain or provide examples of how DOE engaged the   in the cleanup process.
Comments from 6 of the 21 respondents who reported being “very  satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” (in response to question 5) included the  following:    “DOE actively engaged the Coalition and local communities in a variety  of ways. . .  provided opportunities for the Coalition to participate  in certain decision-making processes, provided  regular series of  technical meetings keeping Coalition staff informed on various  remediation activities,  . . . basically interacted with the Coalition  on an almost daily basis during the course of the site’s cleanup.”
DOE’s engagement “varied from one manager to another but was  generally good. More important, the CDPHE , EPA and  Kaiser-Hill consistently solicited the advice of the Board. In particular,  the Board was given access to draft documents and decisions while they   still being discussed. This permitted the Board to actively  participate in the decision process and influence the decision instead of  simply responding to a done deal.”
The “most important three items  board makeup, board decision- making process, and board meeting time. The members include a couple  of ex-nuclear submarine personnel, a couple of college professors, a  groundwater expert, a mining expert, peace activists, etc.; in addition,  the attendance and participation of DOE, regulators, cleanup  contractors, FWS, and the general public provides technical, emotional,  and general interest review on items. Board decisions require that all  agree on all formal Board decisions, which forces constructive give and  take in the decision making process. Meeting in the evening not only  permits the general public to attend, it also permits regulators, DOE,  contractors, FWS, etc., etc., to all attend and discuss items— may be  the only time they all get together and discuss some of the items. DOE  attends all  meetings, presents data on requested topics, answers  questions, and provides follow-up data as requested. We may not always  agree but at least we get the data out there and discuss the issues.  Operating as  federal board is very important.”  “I believe that the DOE did a good job in answering reasonable requests  from Board members.  did not always jump through every hoop  presented nor should they have. Some requests were unreasonable;  some would have been impossible, e.g., cleaning up soil to levels that  technology couldn’t accomplish.”
DOE “seemed to listen to the Board and take their recommendations  seriously, when it fit their plan. . . .”  “For the most part, DOE provided copies of documents for review and  comment and provided presentations on cleanup and closure issues and  decisions. But, the closer to completion the site became, the harder it  was to get documents in a timely fashion. As an example, we were  usually provided documents at the same time as the regulators, but at  the end we received them much later than the regulators. Legacy  Management  completely ignored the city’s input to LM’s Public  Involvement Plan.” 7. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with how the  input  was used by DOE?
Don’t know/no basis to judge 0 8. Please explain or provide examples of how the  input  was used by DOE.
Comments from 5 of the 16 respondents who reported being “somewhat  satisfied” (in response to question 7) included the following:  “The RSAL  issue was one on which the  DOE listened to the  and other public groups.”  “In some cases DOE added information to documents or adjusted  processes based on the Board’s input.”  “The Board’s concerns about the original soil action levels were met  with DOE’s agreement to fund the independent review.”  “Our input was used on a number of fronts—pond management,  ensuring  the site would not be a disposal site, and  strategy  for remediating the original landfill, to name  few. Most important is   revising the RFCA  to better  reflect community priorities. The reason I checked ‘somewhat satisfied’  instead of ‘very satisfied’ is that we could never get DOE to incorporate  stewardship planning into the cleanup process in a substantive manner.  For DOE and the regulators, stewardship was an afterthought that got  bucked to the end of the project and into regulatory closure space. We  are now at the end of the project and we are still left wondering how  DOE will address key questions concerning institutional controls.”  “In the Independent Verification process, the Coalition pushed, and the  DOE made some changes to their original proposal.” 9. Overall, what kind of effect, if any, do you believe the   input had on the cleanup process?
Neither negative nor positive effect Don’t know/no basis to judge 1 10. Please explain or provide examples of how the  input  affected the cleanup process.
Comments from 7 of the 23 respondents who believed that their group’s  input had a “very positive” or “somewhat positive” effect (in response to  question 9) included the following:  “Opposition of the  and other entities to the 651 pCi/g RSAL for  plutonium adopted for  in the 1996   resulted in DOE funding a citizen oversight panel to hire independent  scientific specialists to calculate radionuclide soil action levels (RSALs)  for the site. Out of this study came the recommendation that the  plutonium RSAL be reduced by 95% from 651 pCi/g to 35 pCi/g. While  DOE did not accept this recommendation, it did work with the  regulators to reduce the action level for  in surface soil (top  3 feet) from 651 to 50 pCi/g. DOE and the regulators, however, pushed a  tradeoff, in that in exchange for this better surface cleanup (top 3 feet)  the public would have to accept having larger quantities of plutonium  left in the subsurface environment—between 1000 and 7000 pCi/g at a  depth of 3 to 6 feet below the surface, with no limit on the concentration  allowed below 6 feet.”  “The Board has had an impact on all areas of the cleanup process . . .  from how the landfill caps were constructed, to the overall level of  cleanup, to how buildings were safely removed. . . .”  “I understand that in the beginning the Board had a tremendous impact  on the cleanup. Because of the Board and community members, the  surface soil cleanup levels were changed to be more conservative, from  651 pCi/g to 50 pCi/g. I feel  the Board had less of an influence later  in the process. However, because of the Board, DOE was aware that the  community was watching, and I believe the community got a better  cleanup because of that.”  “DOE solicited a large amount of input from the Coalition over the  course of the site’s cleanup. Although not all of the Coalition’s input was  incorporated into cleanup plans, a substantial amount of Coalition  positions were incorporated into the cleanup. As a result, local  community buy-in into the process was enhanced. DOE, Kaiser-Hill, the  regulators, and the Coalition were successful partners in the site’s  closure.”  “We were able to influence the level of cleanup. We were also able to get  more cleanup in areas like the 903 pad in exchange for leaving building  foundations in place—771 & 371.”  “By the Coalition engaging in depth on matters of technical feasibility,  schedule, cost, worker safety, D&D   design and implementation, contaminant control and monitoring, it  forced the DOE, regulators and Kaiser-Hill to focus and impart progress  and planning to the Coalition board and public.”  “The Coalition affected the cleanup on a number of levels. We were the  best supporters and the most effective critic. We helped maintain  congressional support for the project and held DOE, Kaiser-Hill and the  regulators accountable. We were central to determining the future use of  the site and to revising the cleanup priorities to better match the needs  of the community. We brought DOE to the table in a public forum which,  along principally with the , was central to  ensuring the dialogue remained open. We pushed for a free flow of  information.” 11. Please explain or provide examples of what, if anything, DOE  might have done differently to change the effect of the   input on the cleanup process.
Respondents offered a number of suggestions and comments, including the  following:  “The only change would be on the future monitoring of the site i.e., LSO   which has been completely  controlled by politics and not by DOE and the board. . . .”   “I always believed that if DOE had approached it more as a partnership  with their end customer the cleanup process would have been done  better.”  “ did continue with a very active public participation process to  address  and all aspects of the cleanup. However,  rather than doing this process via the  established in  1993 to advise DOE on the cleanup, DOE created a new body, the RFCA   Focus Group . . . The value of the  Focus Group was that it allowed more intense discussion of details than  was usually possible in a  meeting. But shifting the principal  discussion of the cleanup to the Focus Group . . . had the effect of  undermining and marginalizing the .”   “DOE could have engaged the Board better in terms of budgeting. We  were never asked to partner with the site in requesting funds for our  participation through the federal budget process. . . . We also will not be  funded for what we saw as a valuable project to develop risk  communication tools to help alleviate concerns about the residual  contamination at the site. We have heard from citizens who live near the  site that they are concerned that contamination has been left behind.  There is no way that these citizens are going to read and understand the  immense multi-volume Remedial Investigation study and  Comprehensive Risk Assessment. If there are any further water quality  exceedences, even if they are not life threatening, they are going to call  into question the protectiveness of the cleanup. DOE had better hope  this doesn’t happen, because they appear to have no plan or the tools to  address concerns that might be raised by the less knowledgeable in the  community.”  “DOE at times declined to allow members of the Board to observe  internal meetings between DOE, , and the regulators. This  made it more difficult for the Board to thoroughly understand the  technical details of a cleanup decision and respond in an educated way.“  “One recurring Coalition theme was the lack of long-term stewardship  considerations in remedial action planning and documents. Instead of  incorporating the long-term stewardship considerations into the  documents, it was left to post-physical closure documents. . . . The  Coalition position has always been that long-term stewardship planning  should be an integral part of the remedial activities and not relegated to  post-closure status.”  “As the clean up was underway in early 2005, DOE seemed to agree that  ORISE should conduct a [Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site  Investigation Manual, or MARSSIM]-based final clean up verification.  Since this approach was apparently not specified in the contract, Kaiser- Hill balked and DOE was left to fund an over-flight survey by a low flying  helicopter to, for PR  purposes, attempt to pick up  (detect) major hot spots. The overflight technology was not sufficiently  sensitive to detect exceedences of the clean up level. In addition due to  soil moisture and shielding in the industrial area, the overflight  detection approach was of little credible value. By omitting this final  verification Kaiser-Hill was able to ‘complete’ physical closure early and  collect an added 100 million dollar award.”
We now have a few questions about the results of the cleanup. As  you know, since 1995, when it was awarded the Rocky Flats cleanup  contract, Kaiser-Hill has decontaminated and demolished hundreds  of structures, installed groundwater treatment systems, and  removed contaminated soil, among other cleanup tasks specified by  the contract and the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement. 12. How confident, if at all, are you that the cleanup will be  protective of public health and the environment?
Don’t know/no basis to judge 13. Please explain or provide examples that illustrate your view.
Comments from 4 of the 11 respondents who were “extremely confident”  or “very confident” (in response to question 12) in the protective nature of  the cleanup included the following:  “I believe that phenomenal effort was very effective in cleaning up those  sites that needed remediation, e.g., the 903 Pad and uranium trenches.”   “I am personally confident that the government will retain possession of  the land and keep up the controls now in place so that visitors are safe  and protected. I am convinced we got the best cleanup possible for the  conditions, political climate, and money spent.”    “This process has been open and has benefited from intense public  oversight, talented and committed regulators (especially at CDPHE  ), and  independent reviews of key assumptions and decisions such as the  Actinide Migration Panel and the soil action level review. Further, the  surface water quality standards are extremely stringent and with rare  exception they are getting met. That increases my confidence.”   “The main reason I am extremely confident that the cleanup will be  protective of public health and the environment is because of the  tremendous amount of excellent oversight work provided by the  regulators (CDPHE and EPA). I can’t say enough of how impressed I am  with the technical staff of the regulatory agencies. They were  everywhere during the course of the cleanup, ensuring that the remedial  actions performed at the site were properly planned, implemented, and  executed.”
Comments from 4 of the 12 respondents who were “somewhat confident”  (in response to question 12) in the protective nature of the cleanup  included the following:  “We don’t know everything that is underground (e.g., landfills) and  might seep out—cleanup is probably the most cost-effective that could  be done . . .”  “I think most of the contamination has been removed. However, I am  concerned about isolated hot spots.”  “We were very disappointed that DOE changed course on the  verification of cleanup. We were led to believe that the verification  would be a MARSSIM based approach; what we really received was a  process that had never been used for verification purposes (the aerial  flyover); an ORISE review that was constrained by DOE and a limited  scope review.”  “I believe the majority of the buffer area will be very low risk to the  public. The ponds, the industrial area, the 903 pad, 903 lip and 903 wind  blown area could expose the unsuspecting public to a higher risk  depending on individual sensitivities even though the residual Pu   level is at or below 50 pCi/g.”
One of the 2 respondents who were “not very” or “not at all” confident (in  response to question 12) about the cleanup’s protectiveness said,  “I don’t believe that the cleanup was done to be protective of public  health and the environment. Otherwise, DOE would not have pursued  the wildlife preserve aspect. Basically, the wildlife preserve is an  “administrative” control to limit the future land use, limit public  exposure to the existing contamination at the site, and allowed DOE to  leave behind a lot of contamination.” 14. What, if anything, might have been done differently during the  cleanup that would have increased your confidence?
Respondents offered a number of suggestions and comments, including the  following:  “If the original landfill and the deep basements had been removed, my  confidence would be greatly increased. I do understand the reasons for  this not occurring.”  “A 100 percent scan of the DOE-retained lands would give me a  complete idea of what is out there. . . .”  “The implementation of our consultants’ recommendations and a  “TRUE” MARSSIM based final survey.”  “Only after the Focus Group had been meeting for a full year was it  finally made clear that the better cleanup sought by some participants  was not in the cards because decisions placing a cap on what could be  spent had already been made. To some of us involved in this enormously  time consuming process, this announcement revealed that the public  participation process was in large measure a sham. Some DOE  personnel insist that DOE had been open about the fiscal cap, but the  DOE official who made the announcement at the Focus Group later said  that its effect on the meeting was ‘like throwing a dead rat on the table.’”  “I really do not have any concern about the site per se. I am concerned  that the legal folderol . . . will continue forever.”  “Really we are relying on the best science known and so I am not sure  that anything could have been done better.”  “The verification could have been performed earlier so that it could have  been used as a tool in the cleanup.”  “With unlimited funds a total cleanup could have been accomplished— in our real world we have better than could have been expected. FWS  now needs the resources to convert the site.”  “DOE and the regulators should have required independent   based protocols to verify complete and comprehensive surface soil  clean up levels site wide. This should have been done by an independent  contractor.” 15. At this point in time, do you have any remaining concerns about  the cleanup? 16. Please provide examples or details of your remaining concerns.
Respondents offered a number of concerns, including the following:  “The underground “stuff”—landfills and basements. Who knows what,  when and how it might affect us in the future.”  “I am not certain how we will maintain control of  area for the  centuries needed given that we did not know for certain that all  contaminants were removed.”  “DOE needs to continue water quality monitoring on Woman Creek  permanently!”   “My remaining concerns with the cleanup have to do with how well the  revegetation and erosion control measures function in the next few  years. The site needs several good growing seasons to help re-establish  vegetation covering the remediated portions of the DOE-retained land.  Without adequate vegetative cover, erosion problems can arise which  could ultimately result in the mobilization of actinides from the surface  soil into surface water.”  “My concerns now lie in the importance of creating a robust  stewardship plan and assuring that monitoring will continue well into  the future as well as knowing that if we find that a remedy has failed the  DOE will do what it takes to address this failure.”   “I worry about the magnitude of the long-time stewardship  responsibilities. There are numerous examples at other sites of where  controls fail because governments forget that there are institutional  controls which carry with them use restrictions. How we will protect  Rocky Flats over the long-term remains somewhat of a mystery for me.”   “What will be done in the coming years, and by whom, to keep the public  out of the contaminated areas?”  “Plutonium and uranium take hundreds of thousands of years to decay.
Even in 100 years, the site can change sufficiently so that subsurface  contamination is exposed. Also, physical controls may well decay into  dust by the time the next century rolls around and institutional controls  could be forgotten. In the future, the site could be used for subsistence  farming. Who knows what will happen?  The uncertainty of the future  contributes the largest concern I have about the cleanup.”
In the summer of 2005, DOE arranged for a number of cleanup  verification activities, including Kaiser-Hill’s ground-based scans  along the boundaries of previously remediated areas where  contamination was once known to exist; Bechtel Nevada’s aerial  scan of the site; and the Oak Ridge Institute of Science and  Education’s (ORISE) sampling and ground-based scanning of the  903 pad and lip area. We would like your views on the overall  verification process, as well as your views on each of these three  specific verification activities. 17. How, if at all, did the overall verification process affect your  confidence in the site’s cleanup?
Neither increased nor diminished my confidence Don’t know/no basis to judge  4 18. Please explain or provide examples that illustrate how the  overall verification process affected your confidence in the site’s  cleanup.
Comments from 5 of the 13 respondents who believed that the overall  verification process “greatly increased” or “somewhat increased” their  confidence (in response to question 17) included the following:  “Although I felt there was a low probability of contamination being in  the buffer zone, given the level of suspicion and the recent publication  of several false and misleading books and articles I felt it was important.  This is a good time to state that although almost all the public fear  involved radiologic contamination, it is not the most hazardous.”    “Additional testing always adds to the vote of confidence.”   “The aerial scan was the most effective. The other parts of the  verification were too confusing for the majority of the community to  understand. When the hot spots were discovered in the 903 Pad Lip  Area, those of us more familiar with statistical sampling methodology  could understand that it was not that grave of a situation, but those who  read newspapers I am sure were not comforted.”   “ORISE, although paid by DOE, is an independent . As such, I  trust their results.”  “The targeted independent verification areas helped to assure my  confidence level but did not greatly increase it. I do think the  verification process was important to other board members and most of  all to the general public. It probably did very little or nothing to assure  already skeptical critics of the site cleanup.”
Comments from 2 of the 5 respondents who said the activities “neither  increased nor diminished” their confidence (in response to question 17)  included the following:  “I feel what was done was a waste of time and money and did not tell us  anything new.”   “Was glad it was in place, but didn’t give me 100% confidence.”
And of the 3 respondents who said the activities “somewhat diminished” or  “greatly diminished” their confidence in the cleanup (in response to  question 17), 1 said,  “It is by no means clear that the full site has ever been well  characterized. Former workers are known to say that unknown areas of  random dumping were never found by the characterizing methods used,  especially the . . . method that took a very limited number of samples in  relatively large areas and estimated the contamination in that area based  on this very limited sampling. Further, . . . the verification methods used  could not detect all hot spots or areas of unknown subsurface  contamination.”  19. How, if at all, did Kaiser-Hill’s targeted ground-based scanning  activities (using a high-purity germanium, or HPGe, detector  mounted on a tripod) affect your confidence in the site’s cleanup?
Neither increased nor diminished my confidence Don’t know/no basis to judge 20. Please explain or provide examples that illustrate how Kaiser- Hill’s targeted ground-based scanning activities affected your  confidence in the site’s cleanup.
Comments from 4 of the 11 respondents who said that Kaiser-Hill’s targeted  ground-based scanning activities “greatly increased” or “somewhat  increased” their confidence in the cleanup (in response to question 19)  included the following:  “It showed that there was basically no contamination above the cleanup  levels left on the site.”   “I felt that the areas surveyed had a low risk of contamination. While it  only somewhat increased my personal confidence I feel it was critical in  increasing the public confidence.”   “They targeted areas of concern and proved through testing that cleanup  levels had been achieved.”  “Showed that the area ‘covered’ by the scan met cleanup criteria.”
Comments from 2 of the 7 respondents who said the activities “neither  increased nor diminished” their confidence (in response to question 19)  included the following:   “There wasn’t enough sampling conducted, and the sampling should  have been conducted in more areas after remediation was done and  before backfill took place.”   “Kaiser-Hill’s scanning activities were part of the cleanup, not part of an  independent review. So, I have confidence in what they did, but the  question suggests that their scans would increase my confidence in their  work. Independent review would have increased my confidence.”
And of the 3 respondents who said the activities “somewhat diminished”  their confidence in the cleanup (in response to question 19), 1 said,  “DOE and  have continued to approach the cleanup  using methods designed to not find problems. An approach designed to  verify that no problem exists cannot be used to discover problems.”   21. How, if at all, did Bechtel Nevada’s aerial scan of the site (using  a helicopter-mounted array of sodium iodide detectors) affect your  confidence in the site’s cleanup?
Neither increased nor diminished my confidence Don’t know/no basis to judge 4 22. Please explain or provide examples that illustrate how Bechtel  Nevada’s aerial scan of the site affected your confidence in the  site’s cleanup.
Comments from 3 of the 9 respondents who said that Bechtel Nevada’s  aerial scan of the site “greatly increased” or “somewhat increased” their  confidence in the cleanup (in response to question 21) included the  following:  “The  addressed the entire site, not just where one  anticipated that contamination could exist.”   “The aerial scan just confirmed what DOE had been telling us all along.”  “Detection capabilities of aircraft scanners was not as sensitive as I  would have liked. System was designed to detect higher concentrations  of radionuclides than were expected at Rocky Flats.”
Comments from 2 of the 8 respondents who said the activities “neither  increased nor diminished” their confidence (in response to question 21)  included the following:  “While the technology, if properly applied, might have been sufficient,  the results were less than reliable because of ground moisture, shielding  in the industrial area by equipment, debris, etc., and over-lot grading,  which would have buried contamination. If properly applied, the aerial  scan could detect major hot spots but is not designed to detect small hot  spots that exceed the cleanup level. The aerial scan was more a public  relations ploy than a good science valid verification of site safety and  reliable cleanup.”    “a method that is suited for determining what has  happened in a Three Mile Island  Chernobyl type event, not to verify   an action did what it was supposed to do.”
And of the 4 respondents who said the activities “somewhat diminished” or  “greatly diminished” their confidence in the cleanup (in response to  question 21), 1 said,  “The  established for Rocky Flats set  standards for plutonium and other materials that may remain in place  according to depth. The aerial scan can only detect what is present on  the surface (not surface defined as the top three feet, but surface as  limited to a small fraction of this amount). Further, the aerial scan  detects hot spots only if they are quite large in extent and relatively high  in concentration. The aerial scan is a very valuable tool but also a very  limited one.” 23. How, if at all, did ORISE’s verification activities (e.g., soil  sampling and surface scans using sodium iodide “FIDLER”  scintillation detectors) affect your confidence in the site’s cleanup?
Neither increased nor diminished my confidence Don’t know/no basis to judge 24. Please explain or provide examples that illustrate how ORISE’s  verification activities affected your confidence in the site’s cleanup.
Comments from 6 of the 16 respondents who said that ORISE’s verification  activities “greatly increased” or “somewhat increased” their confidence in  the cleanup (in response to question 23) included the following:  “Unlike the two , the ORISE verification  was essential in verifying that  did in fact perform the work  they were being paid to do.”    “did find some hot spots that  then addressed, so a  second check did help to increase belief in  cleanup.”    “This is the verification activity that turned up the ‘hot spots’ which  were eventually remediated. I understand that according to the risk  assessment formulas that were developed and the averaging nature of  these formulas these ‘hot spots’ technically did not have to be  remediated. The decision to remediate these, however, was important to  help assure public confidence in the site cleanup.”  “The ORISE work ended up raising more questions and concerns by the  public. Also, we are left with the impression at the end that their work is  incomplete because DOE did not provide them with funding to do the  final review of the aerial survey. Also, trying to make MARSSIM fit into  what was needed to verify the cleanup at the site was just too difficult to  follow. . . . The ORISE work started out with great expectations, but  things just got too confusing at the end. For the average citizen, I don’t  think the verification made any difference at all.”    “The ORISE budget was very limited—about $250,000—and was not  sufficient to do an adequate job of site verification because the protocol  they had to follow was disjointed.”    “ORISE’S work showed that for the area they reviewed, the statistical  approach Kaiser-Hill used was valid. However, given that DOE limited  ORISE’s work it is hard to extrapolate their findings over a larger area of  the site. So, their work was of a limited value.”
Of the 2 respondents who said that the activities “neither increased nor  diminished” their confidence (in response to question 23), 1 said:  “The review became less and less than promised as time went by:  from  a MARSSIM-based approach, to an approach greatly restrained by DOE  as to what would be reviewed and how the review would be conducted.”
And of the 2 respondents who said that the activities “somewhat  diminished” their confidence in the cleanup (in response to question 23), 1  said,  “I believe the FIDLER device is a very good way to detect contamination  in the surface soil. But its use by ORISE again was limited to areas of  known contamination rather than to characterize portions of the site  that have not been adequately characterized.” 25. Do you have any additional comments you would like to  provide?
Among the respondents’ additional comments were the following:  “ provides the only forum that has provided for the public,  regulators, DOE, and contractor to discuss the issues and for everyone  to have an equal voice. Hope there is someplace in the future (for a  couple of years) for such activities to continue. The proposed LSO [long- term stewardship organization] appears to be a waste of government  funds—too large of a staff, restricted membership, and too little  technical expertise. . . .”  “I believe the lessons learned at Rocky Flats could be put to good use at  other sites, especially Hanford.”  “In the future on any similar rad contaminated sites, DOE  should require as a contractual condition that an independent  verification of the clean up be implemented using   principles. In the 903 pad area where a  sampling verification  was implemented—hot spots substantially exceeding 50 pCi/g were  found and picked up. It would seem reasonable to conclude that other  areas of the 903 pad and the industrial area would have similar  exceedences.”  “DOE, other state agencies, and communities should study what we did  at Rocky Flats because we were on the cutting edge of how to work  within the regulations but allow great latitude in engaging the  community and for remediating a complex nuclear site.”  “Standley Lake Cities still have serious concerns about Woman Creek’s  risk from  Woman Creek has no  terminal testing control pond!”  “ORISE should have been allowed to survey more of the area and to do  some surveying of the Buffer Zone.”
section_title: Additional Information on Decontamination and Demolition Activities at Rocky Flats
paragraphs: The contractor used a number of innovative techniques to accomplish  decontamination and demolition tasks at Rocky Flats. One of these, as  discussed in the report, was the use of a cerium nitrate solution to  decontaminate large pieces of equipment. Another innovative  decontaminating technique was the contractor’s use of InstaCoteTM to  encapsulate large surface-contaminated tanks and other equipment.  InstaCote is a polyurea plastic coating that was sprayed on equipment. The  InstaCote not only sealed in the contamination, but also served as the  shipping conveyance and disposal package. According to DOE officials, use  of the InstaCote saved “easily thousands of hours” and increased worker  safety, as it eliminated the difficult and dangerous job of cutting  contaminated equipment and packaging it for shipment. The InstaCote  could be used even with extremely large pieces of contaminated  equipment, such as a super-compacter used to reduce waste volume by  crushing drums containing radioactive waste and drums that were empty  but had formerly contained radioactive waste. Figure 14 shows the super- compacter before InstaCote was applied and with the InstaCote awaiting  transport to a disposal facility.
One of the most difficult decontaminating challenges DOE and the  contractor overcame was decontaminating concrete. When concrete  became contaminated with liquid radioactive waste (e.g., by spills during  nuclear material processing or waste disposal), the past practice was to fix  the contamination in place using sometimes several layers of an epoxy  paint. Before a building containing contaminated concrete could be  demolished, this paint had to be removed down to the base material, and  the base material had to be decontaminated. The contractor removed the  contaminated paint using various methods such as scabbling, shaving, or  hydolasing. Scabbling chipped away the first layer of the surface with a  pneumatic hammer; however, this option created dust and increased the  potential for the release of contaminants into the air. Shaving removed  layers of concrete with a machine, and was considered more efficient and  less hazardous than hydrolasing for decontaminating concrete surfaces  with deeper contamination. Hydrolasing, the preferred method for  removing paint and shallow surface contamination, involved blasting away  paint and the initial layer of the surface material with water, then self- containing the water and resulting debris. Figure 15 shows the hydrolase  system in use in building 886 at Rocky Flats, a former nuclear laboratory  known to have light contamination under painted surfaces.
But in some cases, according to a senior contractor official, contaminated  liquid had seeped so deeply into the concrete that it could not be removed  using any of these three methods. This was the case, for example, in the  “infinity room” (so called because the level of radioactive contamination in  the room was greater than instruments could measure) of building 771,  which had often been referred to as “the most dangerous building in  America.” When concrete was contaminated to the core, the only option  was to cut it out and remove it. The entire “infinity room” floor had to be  cut out and shipped as transuranic waste, as shown in figure 16.
In other cases, when the contaminated concrete was far underground (i.e.,  in building foundations), it was decontaminated to the lowest levels  reasonably achievable and left in place. DOE and the regulatory agencies  agreed to decontaminate and leave in place the foundations of buildings  371 and 771/774, and cover them with clean fill dirt. According to DOE and  contractor officials, leaving the foundations in place poses little risk to  human health and safety because the foundations and the soil around them  were decontaminated to specified levels before being covered. Also, they  said, leaving the foundations in place was safer for the workers at the site  than removing them, which would have required workers wearing  respiratory protection systems that constrain movement and visibility to  winch up massive, multiton pieces of concrete from a confined space. A  Colorado official said he had agreed to the decision to leave the  foundations in place after carefully considering the balance between the  potential future risk of exposure with the real and immediate risk of  worker safety.  In lieu of removal, the contractor treated the foundations  with a fixative to prevent contaminants from migrating during demolition  activities, then covered them with a cushion of sand and a layer of clean fill  dirt. According to DOE and contractor officials, plutonium should not  migrate out of the foundations, and if it does, it should not migrate beyond  the surrounding soil. This contention is supported by the results of the  actinide migration study, which concluded that fixed actinide  contamination does not readily move in the environment. Also, neither  humans nor wildlife would be exposed unless a future major excavation  activity were to take place.  However slight it may be, the potential risk to  human health and safety posed by leaving the foundations in place is the  reason that controls such as groundwater monitoring wells and treatment  systems will remain in place, according to Colorado officials.
Another innovative decontaminating and demolition strategy the  contractor developed in conjunction with DOE and the regulatory agencies  involved dividing the site into areas and completing most or all of the work  in one area—from building decontamination to demolition—so that  environmental remediation could begin in that area while decontamination  and demolition work was being done in the next area. This strategy enabled  the cleanup to proceed more quickly by allowing the earlier start of  environmental restoration work and by allowing workers more time to  address any unforeseen circumstances. The strategy also achieved  economies of scale, as site services—such as water, steam, and power— could be eliminated throughout an entire area, rather than on a building-by- building basis.
section_title: Additional Information on the Quality of Remediation Data at Rocky Flats and on DOE’s Planned and Actual Verification
paragraphs: This appendix presents additional information on our review of the  processes and procedures in place at Rocky Flats to evaluate the quality of  remediation data. It also presents additional information on DOE’s planned  and actual verification of the contractor’s cleanup work.
subsections: section_title: Information on Controls over Data Quality
paragraphs: A critical aspect of the cleanup process was ensuring the validity of the  data used to assess whether the site had been remediated to the agreed- upon levels. Accordingly, we reviewed the processes and procedures in  place to ensure data quality, and we identified four key controls: (1)  establishing data quality objectives, (2) using data quality parameters, (3)  verifying and validating data, and (4) auditing laboratories that analyzed  samples for Rocky Flats. Our review showed that, overall, the contractor  generally followed these data quality controls and clearly documented its  compliance with them for the four accelerated cleanup actions we  reviewed in depth. For these four cleanup actions—at building 771, the 903  pad, the 903 lip area, and trench T-7—we assessed the closeout reports and  the data supporting them to determine the extent to which the data  collection and laboratory analyses adhered to data quality standards and  procedures. We did not, however, evaluate the remedial data or laboratory  analyses themselves.
To assess the use of the first key control—establishing data quality  objectives—we identified the criteria documented in the Industrial Area  and Buffer Zone Sampling and Analysis Plan. We then reviewed the cleanup  project sampling plan addenda, remedial action plans, and cleanup project  closeout reports for each of the four projects to determine whether the  data quality objectives had been established and were considered during  the projects’ cleanup. To assess the use of the second control, we reviewed  the four projects’ closeout reports to verify that the data had been checked  against the data quality parameters in accordance with the criteria located  in both the Rocky Flats Implementation Guidance Document and the  Industrial Area and Buffer Zone Sampling and Analysis Plan. These  documents establish the guidelines for evaluating analytical data and  address the overall quality of the data quality control. We examined the  closeout reports for each of the four projects to ensure that the projects  met the criteria for the third control—data verification and validation. And  finally, to assess the use of the fourth control, we reviewed reports on  audits of laboratories that analyzed data for the site’s cleanup. Specifically,  we reviewed source documentation from audits conducted by DOE’s  consolidated audit program and DOE’s mixed analyte performance  evaluation program. We concentrated our review on laboratory audit  results relevant to detecting plutonium for the 3-year period during which  cleanup was under way for the four projects.
Establishing data quality objectives. DOE and the contractor  established data quality objectives to act as planning tools for collecting  data and for making decisions. The data quality objectives process is  specified in the site’s quality assurance project plan. The process is  intended to provide a systematic procedure for defining criteria for data  collection, including when and where to collect samples, what level of  decision error is tolerable, and how many samples to collect. In our review  of the four selected cleanup areas, we found general adherence to the data  quality objectives process. For three of the four projects we selected, we  verified that both the characterization and confirmation sampling were  planned according to the data quality objective process as defined in the  Industrial Area and Buffer Zone Sampling and Analysis Plan. Because the  fourth project required only minimal cleanup, it was completed through the  standard “no further accelerated action” justification process. According to  the contractor, the justification documentation for such areas (those  requiring minimal cleanup) should include information on data adequacy,  but not at the same level of detail as was required for other cleanup areas.  We recognize that areas closed out through the “no further accelerated  action” process may not necessitate the same level of data quality  documentation as other areas. Nevertheless, the Rocky Flats Cleanup  Agreement requires that the justification documentation for “no further  accelerated action” areas include information on data quality and usability.  The documentation we reviewed for trench T-7 did not include such  information.
Applying PARCC parameters. EPA’s policy requires it to apply data  quality parameters for precision, accuracy, representativeness,  completeness, and comparability—known as the PARCC parameters.  Because radionuclides were involved, an additional data quality  parameter—sensitivity—was used at Rocky Flats. These parameters  provided information to the contractor and the regulatory agencies about  the acceptability or utility of the data. For example, precision measures  whether using the same analytical technique will result in the same results  for a particular sample (i.e., analyzing the same sample twice and comparing the results). According to the sampling and analysis plan,  assessments of the data according to the PARCC parameters are  documented in the closeout reports for the accelerated cleanup actions  and, according to EPA officials, are checked through the verification and  validation process discussed next.  Our review of the four selected cleanup  areas indicated that the PARCC parameters were consistently applied. For  three of the four projects we selected, we verified that the data were  reviewed in accordance with each of the data quality parameters. The  fourth project required only minimal cleanup and was completed through  the standard “no further accelerated action” justification process for which  no formal data quality discussion was required.
Verifying and validating laboratory data. Data verification was  required for 100 percent of the laboratory data at Rocky Flats. Data  validation was required for 25 percent of the data, but because this  requirement pertained to the Rocky Flats site as a whole, the percentage of  data validated could vary considerably from one cleanup area to another.  Data verification is a review of a laboratory’s electronic data package  summary to evaluate the extent to which the laboratory met specified  quality control and reporting criteria. Data validation is a more in-depth  review that includes not only verifying the data, but also examining the raw  data and manually verifying calculations done by the laboratory. After a  laboratory analyzed samples, it sent the results to a subcontractor that  reviewed the data according to either the verification or the validation  criteria and assigned codes indicating the data’s quality. For example, one  code would be assigned to data for which no problems were observed,  whereas another code would be assigned to data that did not meet the  quality control requirements.
Our review of the closeout reports on the four cleanup projects we selected  indicated general adherence to the verification and validation  requirements. Specifically, for three of the four projects, at least 98 percent  of the overall data had been verified, and between 23 percent and 50  percent had been validated. The contractor provided several explanations  for why 100 percent of the data had not been verified. For example, at the  903 lip area, because a number of samples were collected close to the time  that the closeout report was submitted, verification and validation  occurred after the report was completed. Additionally, the large number of  samples collected in September 2004 (from the 903 lip area and other areas  around the site) overloaded the verification and validation staff. Most of  these records were verified or validated in late November or early  December 2004, and all had been verified or validated by early 2005,  according to the contractor.
Auditing laboratories. The 32 laboratories that analyzed samples  collected from Rocky Flats were required to undergo annual technical  audits to ensure the accuracy of their analytical results. Since 2000,  contractor officials said they have largely satisfied the audit requirement by  voluntarily participating in DOE’s consolidated audit program, with the  exception of one on-site laboratory that the contractor audited. A typical  DOE laboratory audit, according to the audit program manager, includes a  3-day visit to the laboratory by a team of five to six people.  DOE certifies  laboratory auditors in particular areas, including chemistry (e.g.,  radiochemistry or organic chemistry), and uses a standardized checklist to  verify that laboratory practices meet DOE standards. When auditors  identify problems, they can provide comments or issue priority I or priority  II findings. Priority I findings are the most severe; they represent a serious  breakdown in management controls that could render the laboratory  unacceptable for use or unfit to perform services for DOE. Laboratories  that receive priority I and II findings are required to develop and implement  corrective action plans, and the contractor’s policy stipulated that  laboratories receiving priority I findings could do no more work for Rocky  Flats until they had rectified the problem. Of the 118 audits conducted of  laboratories analyzing Rocky Flats cleanup samples, only 10 priority I  findings were issued, according to the subcontractor official responsible  for laboratory audits at Rocky Flats.
We reviewed the performance of the two primary laboratories that  analyzed confirmatory samples for plutonium 239 for the four selected  cleanup areas and found no areas of concern with the laboratories’ quality.  To limit our review, we focused on two performance criteria: (1) laboratory  audit findings from DOE’s consolidated audit program documents on alpha  spectroscopy, which is used to analyze confirmatory samples for  plutonium; and (2) results from DOE’s mixed analyte performance  evaluation program, which assesses a laboratory’s analytical abilities by  sending the laboratory a sample of a known quantity of a contaminant and  comparing the laboratory’s results with the actual quantity. Our review  showed that the audit findings for alpha spectroscopy resulted in one audit  observation. Our review of the second performance criteria of the tests of  the two laboratories’ analytic ability found that, from 2002 through 2004,  the two laboratories analyzed a combined total of 16 samples of plutonium  239, or alpha samples, and received acceptable test results in all but 3. Of  those 3 samples, 2 samples were considered acceptable but were off by 20  percent to 30 percent, and 1 sample was not acceptable.
section_title: Additional Information on DOE’s Planned and Actual Verification Activities
paragraphs: DOE revised two of the planned verification activities at Rocky Flats. First,  due to time and cost constraints, DOE reduced the scope of the  contractor’s planned scanning and sampling activities. Second, DOE  revised the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education’s (ORISE)  planned assessment of the contractor’s scans of the 903 lip area. The  revision incorporated an approach consistent with the Multi-Agency  Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM). The actual  verification activities conducted by both the contractor and ORISE  identified “hot spots” of radionuclide-contaminated soil; these hot spots  were subsequently remediated.
subsections: section_title: DOE Reduced Size and Scope of Scanning and Sampling Portion of Planned Verification
paragraphs: The first part of DOE’s cleanup verification effort—the contractor- conducted scanning and sampling—was reduced in scope due to time and  cost constraints. In September 2004, the Rocky Flats site manager  requested that the contractor develop a sitewide surface radiological  survey using the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation  Manual (MARSSIM). MARSSIM is the outcome of a joint effort by DOE,  EPA, the Department of Defense, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission  to develop uniform guidance for conducting final surveys to demonstrate  compliance with specified radiological cleanup levels. It recommends 100  percent scanning of areas most likely to be contaminated with  radionuclides.
Scanning can be conducted through use of devices known as high-purity  germanium (HPGe) detectors, as shown in figure 17, or sodium iodide  scintillation detectors, known as FIDLERs. These devices can scan entire  areas to determine whether certain radionuclides are present in a given  area.
This scanning approach had been used several times by ORISE at Rocky  Flats to demonstrate the sufficiency of radiological cleanup of buildings  prior to their demolition. However, according to the contractor, DOE had  limited experience using this approach to characterize surface soil and  sediment. In its October 2004 letter responding to DOE, the contractor  concluded that applying MARSSIM across the site would cost  approximately $7.5 million and would take 19 months after the site cleanup  had been completed. Further, the contractor said that implementing  MARSSIM at the site could constitute a “significant contract change,” and  could postpone completion of the cleanup. In essence, the difficulty was  that the MARSSIM approach was inconsistent with the cleanup strategy.  The approved site cleanup strategy was to remove contamination to a 90  percent confidence level, meaning confidence that at least 90 percent of the  contamination had been remediated to agreed-upon levels. In contrast,  MARSSIM, which was developed years after the Rocky Flats cleanup  strategy had been approved and begun, recommends applying a 100  percent verification strategy—that is, scanning areas most likely to contain  residual radionuclide contamination. Accordingly, MARSSIM was sure to  find “hot spots”—particularly at the 903 pad and lip area, the extent and  severity of which would then require investigation and potentially cleanup  action. Not having anticipated the implications of applying MARSSIM at the  site, in terms of both cost and schedule, DOE subsequently rejected that  approach.
In March 2005, the contractor proposed a less expensive, less time- consuming plan for demonstrating the cleanup’s compliance with the  cleanup agreement. The plan’s objectives were to verify, with reasonable  certainty, that no unknown areas of radiological contamination remained at  the site, that all remedial actions were complete, and that existing sampling  data remained valid. The verification approach included scanning,  sampling, and reviewing historical and existing data. Through such  activities, the contractor intended to increase DOE’s and the community  groups’ confidence that the cleanup objectives had been achieved. The plan  purported to exceed the guidance laid out in MARSSIM, although an ORISE  official refuted this claim. Further comments provided by a contractor  hired by the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments to provide input  on the process added to DOE’s concerns and resulted in DOE’s rejecting  the contractor’s sampling methodology.
The contractor’s final scanning and sampling plan, issued in May 2005,  included two actions to meet the verification objectives. First, the entire  site would be scanned with sodium iodide detectors affixed to a helicopter.  According to the contractor, the detectors would detect, within the top  several inches of surface soil, gamma rays indicating the existence of any  residual plutonium that exceeded 50 picocuries per gram of soil, over a range of 80 square meters—roughly the size of a two-car garage.  Figure 18  shows electrical poles that were felled to allow the helicopter to fly as low  as possible over the site and the aerial scan of the site for residual  plutonium in surface soil.
Of the 21 community group survey respondents who expressed an opinion  on the aerial scan, 9 said the scan greatly or somewhat increased their  confidence in the site’s cleanup. Another 8 said the scan neither increased  nor diminished their confidence, and the other 4 said the aerial scan greatly  or somewhat diminished their confidence in the site’s cleanup.
Another component of the contractor’s final plan was targeted ground- based scanning around the perimeter of previously remediated areas,  including the perimeter of the major plutonium buildings and the 903 lip  area. These scans were conducted with a high-purity germanium detector,  as described earlier. Of the 21 community group survey respondents who  expressed an opinion on the contractor’s ground-based scans, 11 said these  scans greatly or somewhat increased their confidence in the site’s cleanup.
Another 7 said the scans neither increased nor diminished their confidence,  and the other 3 said the ground-based scans greatly or somewhat  diminished their confidence in the site’s cleanup.
section_title: DOE Revised ORISE’s Portion of Planned Verification to Incorporate MARSSIM
paragraphs: The second part of DOE’s cleanup verification effort—ORISE’s review of  contractor-conducted scans for remaining radiological contamination— was revised to apply MARSSIM to the 903 lip area. ORISE’s initial plan did  not incorporate MARSSIM. However, the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local  Governments’ contractor suggested using MARSSIM at the 903 lip area  because it had been one of the most contaminated areas. ORISE’s proposed  final plan included assessing the performance of the contractor’s aerial and  targeted ground-based scanning and the adequacy and completeness of the  contractor’s closeout reports for the 903 lip area using MARSSIM.
section_title: Results of the Contractor’s Final Scanning and Sampling Cleanup Verification Plan and ORISE’s Independent Verification
paragraphs: Both the contractor’s and ORISE’s verifications identified radionuclide- contaminated soil. At a September 1, 2005, public meeting hosted by the  Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board, DOE and the contractor presented  the results of the contractor’s and ORISE’s verifications. DOE and the  contractor reported that the aerial scan had identified known areas of  radionuclide contamination, such as areas where contaminated soil was  stored pending its shipment off site. (The scan also identified an off-site  area, but subsequent investigation found no contamination there.)   However, the aerial scan did not achieve its projected sensitivity. Whereas  detection of 50 picocuries of plutonium per gram of soil over 80 square  meters was the criterion for success, according to the contractor’s final  plan, the scanner achieved this detection level for only 25 percent of the  site, owing to the moisture content in the ground and the altitude of the  helicopter’s flyover. They also reported that the contractor’s ground-based  scan found five areas on the perimeter of the 903 lip area that contained  contamination in excess of 50 picocuries per gram of soil, which were  subsequently remediated.
In addition, DOE and the contractor reported that ORISE’s MARSSIM  sampling had identified 13 “hot spots,” or areas with contamination above  the cleanup agreement’s action level of 50 picocuries of plutonium per  gram of soil. Contamination in these 13 hot spots ranged from 65 to 425  picocuries of plutonium per gram of soil. However, a DOE official said that  DOE would not remediate those areas because the regulatory agencies had  already approved the accelerated cleanup actions, and those actions had  been conducted in accordance with the cleanup methodology agreed to by  DOE and the regulatory agencies. The cleanup methodology required that  at least 90 percent of any given area be remediated to the required levels;  accordingly, there was a 10 percent chance that areas of elevated  contamination remained. Even though the cleanup had been conducted in  accordance with the approved methodology (which allowed for the chance  of such elevated contamination remaining), DOE’s initial refusal to  remediate the hot spots caused concern for the Rocky Flats Coalition of  Local Governments, according to the Coalition’s executive director. Within  2 weeks, after consulting with EPA and Colorado, DOE agreed to have the  contractor remediate the hot spots.
Overall, hundreds of samples were taken at the 903 pad and lip area,  including initial and confirmatory samples. Figure 19 shows  postremediation (confirmatory) samples taken by the contractor, as well as  verification samples taken by ORISE.
Although DOE had agreed to ORISE’s final independent verification plan,  DOE did not have ORISE fully implement the plan, and it did not publicly  explain its reasoning. Specifically, DOE did not have ORISE complete the  planned assessment of the aerial and ground-based scanning or the planned  assessment of the contractor’s investigations of the results of the aerial and  targeted ground-based scans. According to a DOE official, DOE decided  that the results of these remaining assessments would not justify their  completion, particularly because the aerial survey had failed to find any  anomalies.
Of the 20 community group survey respondents who expressed an opinion  on ORISE’s soil sampling and surface scans (using a FIDLER—a sodium  iodide scintillation detector), 16 said the scan greatly or somewhat  increased their confidence in the site’s cleanup. Another 2 said the scan  neither increased nor diminished their confidence, and the other 2 said the  aerial scan greatly or somewhat diminished their confidence in the site’s  cleanup.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: Comments from the Department of the Interior
section_title: Comments from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment
section_title: Comments from Kaiser-Hill Company L.L.C.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Dan Feehan, Assistant Director;  Keith Rhodes, GAO’s Chief Technologist; Claire Cyrnak; Glenn Fischer;  Tom Kingham; and Pam Tumler made significant contributions to this  report. Others who made important contributions included Kevin Bailey,  Michael Derr, Doreen Eng, Tom Denomme, Tim DiNapoli, Alison O’Neill,  Judy Pagano, Kim Raheb, and Omari Norman. Also, Brandon Haller,  Mehrzad Nadji, and Judy Pagano made important contributions to the  methodologies used in this report.