Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication and Oversight Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography System to Detect Nuclear Materials
Published: 2010-09-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is charged with developing and acquiring equipment to detect nuclear and radiological materials to support federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. Also within DHS, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has the lead for operating systems to detect nuclear and radiological materials entering the country at U.S. ports of entry. In 2005, DNDO began working on the cargo advanced automated radiography system (CAARS) intending that it be used by CBP to detect certain nuclear materials in vehicles and containers at U.S. ports of entry. However, in 2007 DNDO decided to cancel the acquisition phase of the program and convert it to a research and development program. GAO was asked to examine events that led to DNDO's decision to cancel the acquisition phase of the program and provide lessons learned from DNDO's experience. This statement is based on prior GAO reports from March 2006 through July 2010 and ongoing work reviewing DHS efforts to develop radiography technology. For ongoing work, GAO reviewed CAARS planning documents and interviewed DHS, DNDO, and CBP officials. GAO provided a draft of the information in this testimony to DHS and component agencies, which provided technical comments and which were incorporated as appropriate.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: From the start of the CAARS program in 2005 until DNDO cancelled the acquisition phase of the program in December 2007, DNDO pursued the acquisition and deployment of CAARS machines without fully understanding that they would not fit within existing primary inspection lanes at CBP ports of entry. This occurred because during the first year or more of the program DNDO and CBP had few discussions about operating requirements at ports of entry. When CBP and DNDO officials met, shortly before DNDO's decision to cancel the acquisition phase of the program, CBP officials said they made it clear to DNDO that they did not want the CAARS machines because they would not fit in primary inspections lanes and would slow down the flow of commerce through these lanes and cause significant delays. Also, the CAARS program was among numerous DHS acquisition programs about which GAO reported in 2008 that appropriate oversight was lacking. Further, the development of the CAARS algorithms (software)--a key part of the machine needed to identify shielded nuclear materials automatically--did not mature at a rapid enough pace to warrant acquisition and deployment. Also, the description of the progress of the CAARS program used to support funding requests in DNDO's budget justifications was misleading because it did not reflect the actual status of the program. For example, the fiscal years 2010 and 2011 DHS budget justifications both cited that an ongoing CAARS testing campaign would lead to a cost-benefit analysis. However, DNDO officials told GAO that when they cancelled the acquisition part of the program in 2007, they also decided not to conduct any associated cost benefit analysis. During recent discussions with DNDO officials, they agreed that the language in the budget justifications lacked clarity, and they have no plans to prepare a cost benefit analysis. Based on GAO's review of the CAARS program and its prior reports on DHS development and acquisition efforts, GAO identified lessons learned for DHS to consider in its continuing efforts to develop the next generation of radiography imaging technology. For example, GAO previously reported that agencies can enhance coordination by agreeing on roles and responsibilities. In this regard, a draft memorandum of agreement among DHS agencies that intends to clarify roles and responsibilities in developing technologies and help ensure effective coordination has not been finalized. Completing this memorandum could give DHS reasonable assurance that problems associated with the CAARS program do not recur. In discussions with senior officials from DHS, DNDO, CBP and S&T, they all agreed with the need for the memorandum and said that they intend to work toward finalizing the draft memorandum of agreement. Other lessons GAO identified include (1) engage in a robust departmental oversight review process (2) separate the research and development functions from acquisition functions (3) determine the technology readiness levels before moving forward to acquisition, and (4) rigorously test devices using actual agency operational tactics before making decisions on acquisition.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We appreciate the opportunity to provide a statement for the record on  efforts of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear  Detection Office (DNDO) to develop the cargo advanced automated  radiography system (CAARS) to strengthen DHS’s ability to prevent the  smuggling of nuclear materials into the United States. Preventing terrorists  from using radiological or nuclear materials to carry out an attack in the  United States is a top national priority. As we reported in January 2009, a  terrorist could try to smuggle nuclear materials into the United States in a  variety of ways, including hiding them in a car, train, private aircraft or  small vessel; sending them through the mail; carrying them in personal  luggage through an airport; walking them across the border; or concealing  them in maritime cargo containers in the global supply chain. Maritime  cargo containers are of particular concern because they can be filled  overseas at many different locations and are transported through complex  logistics networks before reaching U.S. ports. As a result, terrorists could  try to take advantage of such vulnerabilities by placing nuclear materials  into a container for shipment to the United States. U.S. government  officials believe that the likelihood of terrorists smuggling nuclear  materials into the United States in cargo containers is relatively low, but  criminals have long exploited containers for other illegal purposes, such as  smuggling weapons, people and illicit substances.
As we testified before this committee in June, DHS has made significant  progress over the past several years in both deploying radiation detection  equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo and conveyances  entering the United States through fixed land and sea ports of entry for  nuclear and radiological materials.  Moreover, DHS reports that while it  scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the United  States through land borders and major seaports, it has made less progress  scanning for radiation in other pathways into the United States such as  general aviation and small maritime craft.
DNDO is charged with developing, acquiring, and deploying equipment to  detect nuclear and radiological materials in order to support the efforts of  DHS and other federal agencies, such as the departments of Energy and  State, in combating nuclear smuggling. DNDO is also charged with  enhancing and coordinating federal, state, and local efforts to prevent  radiological and nuclear attacks. In doing this, DNDO is required to work  with other federal agencies to develop a global nuclear detection  architecture. To date, DHS has spent nearly $4 billion on various aspects  of the architecture but has not developed a strategic plan to guide its  efforts to develop and implement this architecture as we recommended in  2008. DNDO agreed with this recommendation but has not developed  such a plan.
Also within DHS, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has the lead for  deploying, operating, and maintaining systems to detect nuclear and  radiological materials entering the country through land borders, seaports,  and other ports of entry. CBP also has a broad mission to detect more  traditional contraband, such as drugs and guns; to prevent the inflow of  inadmissible aliens; and to conduct its operations in a way that does not  impede the flow of commerce. To detect nuclear materials, CBP, in  coordination with DNDO, has deployed over 1,400 radiation portal  monitors (RPM) at U.S. ports of entry. Most of the RPMs are installed in  primary inspection lanes through which nearly all traffic and shipping  containers must pass. These monitors alarm when they detect radiation  coming from a package, vehicle, or shipping container. CBP then conducts  further inspections at its secondary inspection locations to identify the  cause of the alarm and whether it is a reason for concern.
While these RPMs are sensitive and have been effective at detecting  radiation, they also have limitations. In particular, in May 2009 we  reported that RPMs are capable of detecting certain nuclear materials only  when these materials are unshielded or lightly shielded. In contrast,  advanced radiography can be used to detect dense material that may be  consistent with the presence of certain nuclear materials in vehicles and  cargo containers, and CBP already uses radiography to more closely  investigate the contents of a vehicle or cargo container that has been  selected for secondary inspection at a U.S. port of entry. However,  according to CBP officials, only a small percentage of vehicles or cargo  containers are subjected to secondary inspections.
DNDO began working on the CAARS program in 2005 with the intention  that through advanced radiography and improved algorithms (software),  CAARS would be used by CBP to automatically detect and identify highly  shielded nuclear material in vehicles and cargo containers in both primary  and secondary inspection lanes at U.S. ports of entry. Thus, through  CAARS, DNDO expected that CBP would be able to detect more heavily  shielded nuclear material in nearly all vehicles and cargo containers going  through primary inspection lanes, and therefore, close a gap in the nuclear  detection architecture. In September 2006, DNDO awarded a contract for  the CAARS program to research, develop, acquire, and deploy advanced  radiography imaging technology designed to detect highly shielded nuclear  material being smuggled through U.S. ports of entry. At that time, DNDO  expected the program could cost as much as $1.5 billion. However, in  December 2007, DNDO made what it called a “course correction,” by  canceling the program’s acquisition and deployment plans and  significantly reducing its scope. The CAARS program then became a  research and development program designed to demonstrate the potential  capability of the technology. As a result of this change, DNDO no longer  expected to deploy CAARS machines but instead opted to demonstrate the  maturity and promise of CAARS technology. As part of the CAARS  demonstration project, DNDO, with the assistance of scientists from the  Department of Energy’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL),  began testing the capabilities of CAARS’ prototypes in the fall of 2009 and  completed testing in March 2010. According to DNDO officials, DNDO  plans to report on the results of the tests and lay out a way forward  regarding the future application of CAARS radiography imaging by the end  of September 2010. Overall, from the inception of the program in 2005  until today, DNDO officials reported that the agency has spent about $113  million on the CAARS program.
Since the capabilities of radiography systems are an important part of  cargo security, you asked us to examine the history of the CAARS  program. Accordingly, this statement discusses events that led to the  course correction in the CAARS program, and provides potential lessons  learned from DNDO’s experience with the CAARS program. This  statement is based on prior reports and testimonies we issued from March  2006 through July 2010. Detailed information on our scope and  methodology for our prior work can be found in these reports. This  statement is also based on results from our ongoing work in response to  your request to review radiography systems within DHS.
As part of our ongoing review of radiography systems, specifically CAARS,  from March 2010 to September 2010 we analyzed key CAARS planning  documents developed in the early stages of program development, such as  the acquisition plan, program baseline, performance specifications, and  requests for proposals and reviewed subsequent CAARS documents that  reflect DNDO’s decision to scale back the program and removal of the  acquisition phase from CAARS contracts. We conducted interviews with  former and current CAARS program managers and other key officials  within DNDO, CBP, the DHS Science & Technology Directorate (S&T),  and the DHS Office of Policy. We also met with representatives from  contractors that were developing CAARS and consulted with subject  matter experts from LLNL involved in testing those contractors’ CAARS  prototypes. We provided a draft of the information in this testimony to  DHS and component agencies, which provided technical comments and  which we incorporated as appropriate. We conducted this work in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: DNDO Planned for the Acquisition and Deployment of CAARS without Fully Understanding that It Could Not Feasibly Operate in a U.S. Port Environment
paragraphs: From the start of the CAARS program in 2005 until the course correction  in December 2007, DNDO planned the acquisition and deployment of  CAARS machines without understanding that they would not fit within  existing primary inspection lanes at CBP ports of entry. This occurred  because during the first year or more of the program DNDO and CBP had  few discussions about operating requirements for primary inspection lanes  at ports of entry. In addition, the CAARS program was among numerous  acquisition programs about which we previously reported that appropriate  DHS oversight was lacking. Furthermore, the development of the CAARS  algorithms—a key part of the machine needed to identify shielded nuclear  materials automatically—did not mature at a rapid enough pace to warrant  acquisition and deployment. Moreover, the description of the progress of  the CAARS program used to support funding requests in DNDO’s budget  justifications for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 was misleading because it  did not reflect the actual status of the program.
subsections: section_title: Inadequate Communication
paragraphs: From the inception of the CAARS program until the decision in December  2007 to cancel acquisition of the program, DNDO and CBP had few, if any,  in-depth discussions about CBP’s requirements to be able to use  radiography in primary inspection lanes. According to DNDO officials,  they requested information from CBP on its user requirements for the  CAARS system, but CBP was slow to respond to these requests. DNDO  continued with its plans to develop CAARS machines because, according  to DNDO officials, at the time it was thought that a solution was urgently  needed to be able to detect shielded nuclear materials in primary  inspection lanes. In discussing this with senior CBP officials, they said that  DNDO officials did not attempt to meet with them during the beginning of  the CAARS program. When CBP and DNDO officials met, shortly before  the course correction, CBP officials said they made it clear to DNDO that  they did not want the CAARS machines because they would not fit in  primary inspections lanes and would slow down the flow of commerce  through these lanes and cause significant delays.
In our view, had CBP and DNDO officials met early in the development of  the program to discuss CBP’s needs and operational requirements, as  stated in DHS’s acquisition policy at the time, it is unlikely that DNDO  would have found reason to move forward with its plan to develop and  acquire CAARS technology. Nonetheless, in September 2006, DNDO  awarded contracts to three CAARS vendors. In December 2007, DNDO  decided to cancel the acquisition of CAARS and limit any further work to a  research and development effort. In recent joint discussions with CBP and  DNDO officials, they acknowledged that communication between the two  agencies could have been improved during the early part of the CAARS  program. They said they communicate much more routinely now and that,  in their view, it would be unlikely that the communication problems  associated with the CAARS program would reoccur.
section_title: Inadequate Oversight
paragraphs: DNDO did not follow DHS acquisition protocols for the CAARS program.  Specifically, in 2008, we reported that CAARS was among numerous major  DHS acquisition programs that did not have a mission needs statement—a  required DHS acquisition document that formally acknowledges that the  need for an acquisition is justified and supported. DHS policy also called  for programmatic reviews at key decision points and required certain  analytical documents. However, CAARS did not undergo annual  department level reviews as called for nor did DNDO program officials  obtain or prepare basic analytical documents. For example, one of these  documents, a concept of operations (CONOPS), was intended to  demonstrate how CBP would use CAARS machines in primary inspection  areas at the ports. However, as a result of inadequate communication and  collaboration between CBP and DNDO discussed earlier, no CONOPS was  developed during the early phase of the CAARS program. Ultimately,  according to DNDO officials, once DNDO made the decision to cancel the  acquisition portion of CAARS in December 2007, a CONOPS was no longer  required.
section_title: Immature Technology
paragraphs: According to DNDO officials, at the time of the inception of the CAARS  program, there was a widespread view within DNDO that something had  to be done to provide CBP with the capability to detect highly shielded  nuclear material in primary inspection lanes. DNDO officials  acknowledged that the agency decided to move forward with the CAARS  program despite the fact that automatic detection, a key feature of CAARS,  depended on the rapid development of algorithms that were  technologically immature. The algorithms are critical because they provide  the capability for CAARS to automatically detect highly shielded nuclear  material in primary inspection areas without the need for extensive  operator review and interpretation of an image—two factors that could  adversely affect CBP’s ability to avoid delays to the flow of commerce  along with its overall effectiveness in detecting highly shielded nuclear  material. Although algorithms supporting the CAARS technology were  technologically immature, DNDO created an aggressive production and  deployment schedule that was to begin in August 2008, the end of DNDO’s  planned 2-year development period for the CAARS program. At the time it  decided on this production milestone, DNDO officials said it was likely  that the algorithms would be developed in time to meet the start of  planned production. However, the technology did not develop as expected  and contributed to DNDO’s decision to cancel the acquisition phase of  CAARS.
section_title: Basis of CAARS Funding Requests
paragraphs: For fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011, DHS justified annual budget  requests to Congress by citing significant plans and accomplishments of  the CAARS program, including that CAARS technology development and  deployment was feasible, even though DNDO had made the decision in  December 2007 to cancel the acquisition of CAARS. For example, in its  fiscal year 2009 budget justification, DHS stated that a preliminary  DNDO/CBP CAARS production and deployment program had been  successfully developed and that CAARS machines would be developed  that would detect both contraband and shielded nuclear material with  little or no impact on CBP operations. The fiscal years 2010 and 2011 DHS  budget justifications both cited that an ongoing testing campaign would  lead to a cost benefit analysis, followed by rapid development of a  prototype that would lead to a pilot deployment at a CBP point of entry.  Furthermore, the fiscal year 2010 budget justification stated that while the  CAARS technology was less mature than originally estimated, successful  development was still feasible. However, DHS’s description and  assessment of the CAARS program in its budget justification did not  reflect the actual progress of the program. Specifically, DNDO officials  told us that when they made their course correction and cancelled the  acquisition part of the program in 2007, they also decided not to conduct a  cost benefit analysis because such analyses are generally needed to justify  going forward with acquisitions. In addition, DNDO completed CAARS  testing in March 2010; however, as of today, the final test results for two of  the three CAARS machines are not yet available. Currently, no CAARS  machines have been deployed. CAARS machines from various vendors  have either been disassembled or sit idle without being tested in a port  environment, and CBP is considering whether to allow DNDO to collect  operational data in a port environment. During recent discussions with  DNDO officials, they agreed that the language in the budget justifications  lacked clarity and stated that they are not planning to complete a cost  benefit analysis since such analyses are generally associated with  acquisition programs.
section_title: CAARS Offers Lessons Learned Regarding the Importance of Developing Requirements, Coordinating with Users, and Managing Acquisitions
paragraphs: Based on our review of the CAARS program and our reports on DNDO  efforts to develop an advanced RPM called the advanced spectroscopic  portal (ASP), we have identified lessons learned for DHS to consider in its  continuing efforts to develop the next generation of radiography imaging  technology.
subsections: section_title: Enhance Interagency Collaboration and Coordination
paragraphs: Despite the importance of coordinating crosscutting program efforts, we  have reported that weak coordination of those efforts has been a long- standing problem in the federal government and has proven to be difficult  to resolve. We have also reported that agencies can enhance and sustain  their collaborative efforts. One way we reported that agencies can  enhance coordination is to agree on roles and responsibilities and  establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies. As discussed, DNDO  did not coordinate and collaborate with CBP early in the development of  the CAARS program to identify CBP’s needs and requirements. According  to DHS budget documents, in fiscal year 2011, the responsibility for  research and development of advanced radiography will shift from DNDO to S&T. Leading up to this transition, there is confusion related to roles  and responsibilities among DNDO, S&T, and CBP. For example, DNDO  officials said they have requested permission from CBP to collect  operational data in a port environment on an enhanced radiography  machine. However, CBP officials stated that they had already purchased,  operationally tested, and deployed 11 of these machines in secondary  inspection areas. We recently discussed this issue at a joint meeting with  DNDO and CBP officials. CBP and DNDO officials agreed that there was  confusion over this issue, and both agencies agreed with the need to  collect operational data on this enhanced radiography machine, and CBP  has begun making arrangements to do so.
Also, S&T officials said that they are about to contract out for radiography  imaging technology for CBP that will improve imaging capabilities. DNDO  officials told us that S&T’s efforts will include development of radiography  capabilities to detect shielded nuclear material, while S&T officials told us  that this is not an area of their focus. As DHS transitions its research and  development of radiography, DHS officials said that a draft memorandum  of agreement intended to clarify roles and responsibilities for cooperation  and coordination among DNDO, CBP, and S&T has not been finalized.  Completing the memorandum of agreement to clarify roles and  responsibilities before proceeding with the research, development, and  deployment of radiography technology could give DHS reasonable  assurance that problems resulting from a lack of clearly defined roles and  responsibilities in the CAARS program do not recur. In discussions with  senior officials from DHS, DNDO, CBP and S&T, they all agreed with the  need for the memorandum and said that they intend to work toward  finalizing the draft memorandum of agreement.
section_title: Engage in a Robust Oversight Review Process
paragraphs: DNDO officials said that they were aware of the DHS draft management  directive in 2006 that was intended to guide management and oversight of  acquisition programs like CAARS but did not follow it. DHS policy officials  acknowledged that at the time CAARS was in its early stages, DHS was  continuing the process of organizing and unifying its many disparate  components and there was not strong oversight over its major programs,  including CAARS. Policy officials told us the oversight review process is  more robust today. However, we reported in June 2010 that DHS  acquisitions need further improvement and sustained management  attention.  For example, while DHS’ current management directive  includes more detailed guidance than the previous 2006 management  directive for programs to use in preparing key documentation to support  component and departmental decision making, it is not applied  consistently and most major programs have not been reviewed.
section_title: Separate Research and Development from Acquisition Functions
paragraphs: DNDO was simultaneously engaged in a research and development phase  while planning for an acquisition phase of the CAARS program. In this  regard, we have previously reported that separating technology  development from product development and acquisition is a best practice  that can help reduce costs and deliver a product on time and within budget  because separation of the technology development phase from production  in particular helps to ensure that (1) a sound business case is made for the  product, (2) product design is stable, and (3) production processes are  mature and the design is reliable.
section_title: Determine the Technology Readiness Levels Before Acquisition
paragraphs: At the time that the CAARS program was in its early stages, DHS and  DNDO did not have clearly defined ways to define and communicate the  maturity of technology leading to acquisition. We have previously reported  on the need for a disciplined and knowledge-based approach of assessing  technology maturity, such as using technology readiness levels. In that  report, we recommended that technologies need to reach a high readiness  level before an agency should make a commitment to production. DNDO  officials acknowledged that CAARS algorithm’s readiness level was not  high enough to warrant entering into the acquisition phase.
section_title: Rigorously Test Devices Using Actual Agency Operational Tactics
paragraphs: As we testified in June 2009 on DNDO’s testing of ASPs, a primary lesson  to be learned regarding testing is that the push to replace existing  equipment with the new portal monitors led to an ASP testing program  that lacked the necessary rigor. We reported that testing programs  designed to validate a product’s performance against increasing standards  for different stages in product development are a best practice for  acquisition strategies for new technologies and if properly implemented,  would provide rigor to DHS’s testing of other advanced technologies.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact Gene Aloise  at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov; or Stephen L. Caldwell at 202-512- 9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Dr. Timothy Persons (Chief Scientist), Ned  Woodward (Assistant Director), Mike Harmond, Jonathan Kucskar, Linda  Miller, Ron Salo, Kiki Theodoropoulos, and Franklyn Yao also made key  contributions to this testimony.
section_title: Appendix I: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port  Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not  Yet Completed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection Efforts or  Closed Identified Gaps, GAO-10-883T, Washington D.C.: June 30, 2010.
Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would  Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the  Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12.  Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2009.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from DHS Testing of  Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, GAO-09-804T,  Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2009.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced  Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show  Limits of the New Technology. GAO-09-655. Washington D.C.: May 21,  2009.
Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve  Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities. GAO-09-257.  Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2009,   Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Program to Procure and Deploy  Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors is Likely to Exceed the  Department’s Previous Cost Estimates. GAO-08-1108R. Washington, D.C.:  Sept. 22, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: CBP Works with International Entities to  Promote Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but  Challenges Remain. GAO-08-538. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 2008  Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were  Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. GAO-08-672.  Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.- Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has  Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges  Remain in Verifying Security Practices. GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.:  Apr. 25, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: Examination of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign  Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance  Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2008.
Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major Programs  Lack Appropriate Oversight. GAO-09-29. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 18, 2008).
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One  Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure  Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment.  GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation  of Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-454. Washington, D.C.:  Aug. 17, 2007.
International Trade: Persistent Weaknesses in the In-Bond Cargo System  Impede Customs and Border Protection’s Ability to Address Revenue,  Trade, and Security Concerns. GAO-07-561. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17,  2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Decision to Procure and Deploy  the Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment is Not Supported  by Its Cost-Benefit Analysis. GAO-07-581T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14,  2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the  National Laboratories’ Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in  Support of DNDO’s Testing and Development Program. GAO-07-347R.  Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support  the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors was Not Based  on Available Performance Data and Did not Fully Evaluate All the  Monitors’ Costs and Benefits. GAO-07-133R. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17,  2006.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of  Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T.  Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy  Radiation Detection Equipment in Other Countries and in the United  States. GAO-06-558T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying  Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns  Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006.
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