Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest Differences in Sector Performance
Published: 2005-07-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The U.S. Border Patrol, a component of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency, a part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), aims to apprehend persons who illegally enter the United States between official ports of entry, including potential terrorists, aliens, and contraband smugglers, thereby deterring or stopping illegal activity. The Patrol operates permanent and tactical (temporary) interior traffic checkpoints on major and secondary U.S. roads, mainly in the southwest border states where most illegal entries occur, as part of a multi-layer strategy to maximize detection and apprehension of illegal entrants. This report addresses (1) the role of interior checkpoints in the Patrol's strategy; (2) what is known about checkpoint costs and benefits; and (3) how checkpoints are evaluated and what performance measures indicate regarding their effectiveness.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Border Patrol operates 33 permanent traffic checkpoints in 8 of its 9 sectors in the southwest border states, supported by tactical checkpoints. While permanent checkpoints have the advantage of physical infrastructure, tactical ones have the mobility to block routes used to evade permanent ones and to respond to intelligence on illegal activity. A third type of checkpoint operates in the Tucson, Ariz., sector, where the Patrol has been legislatively prohibited from funding construction of checkpoints since fiscal year 1999. This restriction has prevented checkpoint construction. The Patrol also began closing or relocating checkpoints in the sector every 7 days at the instruction of congressional staff in June 2002, and was legislatively required to relocate checkpoints on the same schedule in FY 2003 and 2004, and an average of once every 14 days in FY 2005. Three of six checkpoints in the sector had to close for 7/14 days, as safety considerations made it too hazardous to relocate them. Local law enforcement and business and community leaders we interviewed from communities near interior traffic checkpoints said that benefits resulting from checkpoint operations included reductions in crime and vandalism. Although a few cited traffic delays, most were supportive of checkpoint operations. However, some others were concerned about the impact of the checkpoints on traffic congestion and quality of life in their communities. The Border Patrol does not routinely evaluate the effectiveness of checkpoint operations, or their costs. The Patrol includes limited traditional performance measures in its Performance and Annual Report, such as apprehensions and contraband seized. GAO developed an apprehension per agent work year measure to assess performance. The data suggest that the performance of the Tucson sector interior checkpoints dropped starting in FY 2002, and more in FY 2003, after the Border Patrol began relocating or closing them on a regular basis. Three other sectors we visited that did not have to relocate or close checkpoints experienced no comparable decrease in apprehensions per agent work year during the same time period. Other factors not measured or accounted for might also have contributed to these outcomes, but the Border Patrol's limited measures do not capture or assess them. A broader range of performance measures, when considered with other indicators, could be useful to CBP and the Congress as they consider ways to improve the effectiveness of interior traffic checkpoints and border security efforts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. Border Patrol, now part of the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency, has  as its primary mission the detection and apprehension of terrorists and  their weapons, and a traditional mission of preventing illegal aliens and  contraband smugglers from entering the United States, both at the land  borders between ports of entry and inside the United States.  According to  the Border Patrol, its operations are intended to apprehend illegal  entrants; deter potential illegal immigration, smuggling, or terrorism,  through such apprehensions; and present a high-profile presence along our  nation’s borders.  On the southwest border, where the majority of illegal  immigration into the United States occurs, the Border Patrol aims to  accomplish its mission through what it describes as an integrated,  multilayered border enforcement strategy.  Along the border, between  official ports of entry, are the first two layers, consisting of a first called  line watch and a second, called line patrol.  Together, these are where the  majority of the nation’s 10,800 U.S. Border Patrol agents are deployed,  with agents positioned along the border line or somewhat farther back but  still generally in visible proximity to the border, primarily in well-marked  four-wheel-drive vehicles, to maintain a high profile to deter, turn back, or  arrest anyone attempting to illegally enter the country.  The line patrol  layer consists of smaller contingents of agents deployed behind the line  watch units to provide direct support of the line watch units.  Given the  1,950-mile U.S.-Mexican border, the Border Patrol states that it does not  have the personnel to patrol all of it simultaneously and therefore  allocates personnel based on a combination of intelligence information  about potential threats from terrorists and contraband smugglers, as well  as on the estimated volume of illegal entries.  In addition, a third layer of  enforcement is composed of interior traffic checkpoints at which Border  Patrol agents monitor and stop vehicles at checkpoints—both permanent  and tactical (temporary)—on major U.S. highways and secondary roads  that are generally 25 to 75 miles inland from the border.  This permits them  to be far enough inland to detect and apprehend potential terrorists and  illegal aliens attempting to travel farther into the interior of the United  States after evading detection at the border, but that are close enough to  the border to potentially control access to major population centers.  The  permanent interior traffic checkpoints are locations that generally have  large, tollbooth-like structures at which agents may stop vehicles for visual  inspection, and to decide whether a more thorough inspection of the  vehicle and its occupants is warranted.  There are 33 such permanent  interior traffic checkpoints in the southwest border states, and one in  northern New York state.  The tactical checkpoints, the number and  location of which may change daily, respond to intelligence on changes in  illegal activity routes and generally consist of a few vehicles, portable  water tanks, traffic cones and signs, and a mobile trailer.  The permanent  checkpoints are intended to apprehend illegal entrants and contraband,  and through the perception of potential apprehension, to deter illegal  entrants from using major highways or roads.  Permanent checkpoints  have supporting infrastructure and procedures intended to reduce the  ability of illegal entrants from circumventing the checkpoints; these  include remote video surveillance, electronic sensors, and agent patrols.
With permanent checkpoints on major routes, the Border Patrol seeks to  cause illegal entrants to use less traveled secondary roads on which they  are more visible, and where less traffic permits stopping a much higher  percentage of transiting vehicles than on interstates, as well as questioning  vehicle occupants, adding to the costs of smuggling or transit time, as well  as to the likelihood of being detected and apprehended.
In addition to the use of agents to maintain surveillance along the border  between official ports of entry, and inland at the interior checkpoints, the  Border Patrol carries out its mission by responding to electronic sensor  alarms and aircraft sightings, interpreting and following tracks, and  patrolling in a wide variety of modes, including using horses, helicopters,  small aircraft, patrol boats, off-road all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and  mountain bikes.  These agents and their modes of operation are deployed  as an integrated strategy in which agents can be shifted daily among line  watch, line patrol, and interior checkpoint operations, as well as other  duties, to respond to changes detected in the tactics and routes of those  attempting to enter the United States illegally.
With the continued influx of illegal immigration along the U.S.-Mexican  border, contraband smuggling, and ongoing threats of terrorism and  weapons of mass destruction potentially entering the country, you  expressed interest about the operations of the Border Patrol’s permanent  and tactical traffic checkpoints in the southwest border states within the  context of overall border security.  To address your interests, this report  focuses on    how the Border Patrol uses permanent and tactical checkpoints in the  southwest border states as part of its strategy to detect and apprehend  potential terrorists, illegal immigrants, and contraband smugglers, and  to deter potential future violators through the likelihood of  apprehension, as well as to cause them to avoid permanent  checkpoints on major routes and take less traveled secondary roads on  which they would more likely be apprehended at tactical checkpoints;    what is known about the costs and benefits of interior traffic  checkpoint operations, including their impact on local law enforcement  and local communities, as well as in terms of the amount of contraband  seized and illegal entrants and potential terrorists apprehended; and    what data and performance measures are used by the Border Patrol to  evaluate interior traffic checkpoint operations, in terms of their overall  effectiveness in meeting agency mission goals and how might Border  Patrol data be used to develop additional measures of productivity and  effectiveness.
However, this report does not address some of the larger issues  surrounding illegal immigration into the United States, such as the  disparities in average daily wages between Mexico and the United States,  and the incentives created by these disparities for illegal immigration, as  well as the difficulties of neutralizing such disparities through work site  enforcement. We have elsewhere addressed some of these issues.  In  addition, although deterring illegal immigration through the likelihood of  detection and apprehension is a goal of the Border Patrol, we did not  attempt to measure the deterrent effect of the Border Patrol’s operations,  as this would have required, among other things, opinion surveys of  Mexican citizens and potential contraband smugglers.
To address these objectives, we reviewed Border Patrol documents,  reports, manuals, and guidance concerning border strategy and  checkpoint operations, as well as CBP’s annual performance reports.  We  interviewed Border Patrol officials at CBP headquarters in Washington,  DC.  We also interviewed Border Patrol sector headquarter officials and  observed operations at checkpoints in the San Diego, California; Tucson,  Arizona; Laredo, Texas; and McAllen, Texas, Border Patrol sectors.  (The  other 5 southwest border sectors are El Centro, California; Yuma, Arizona;  El Paso, Texas; Marfa, Texas; and Del Rio, Texas.  In addition to these 9  southwest sectors, the remainder of the country is divided into 11  additional sectors by the Border Patrol.)
The 4 sectors we visited were selected to provide a substantial range in the  size and types of interior checkpoint operations; estimated volume of  illegal annual immigration; volume of vehicular traffic transiting  checkpoints; topography and density of road networks; presence or  absence of large urban areas on or near the border, on both the U.S. and  Mexican sides; and types of checkpoints (permanent and tactical).  Since  we were unable to observe all operating conditions at all times, the  conditions we describe are therefore based on available documentation  and observations from our site visits only.  (See app. I for further  discussion of the range of conditions among these sectors.)
We also interviewed local law enforcement, business, and community  leaders in communities near interior traffic checkpoints with regard to the  impact of the checkpoints.  Because these places were selected using a  nonprobabilistic method, the results from our site visits cannot be  generalized to other locations and checkpoints.  To assess the reliability of  the Border Patrol’s data, we talked with agency officials at both  Washington, D.C., headquarters and at some Border Patrol stations in the  field about data quality control procedures, including methods by which  data are checked and reviewed internally for accuracy and consistency.  We determined that the Border Patrol utilizes processes and checks that  provide reasonable assurance that the data recorded on apprehensions,  work hours, and contraband seizures are accurate and sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of this report.  We conducted our work from September  2004 to May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.  Additional details on our scope and methodology can  be found in appendix I.  Detailed information on the four Border Patrol  sectors that we visited can be found in appendixes II through V.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, a component of the Department of  Homeland Security, has the primary responsibility for securing the  nation’s borders.  The U.S. Border Patrol is the uniformed enforcement  division of CBP responsible for border security between designated  official ports of entry into the country.  According to the Border Patrol, its  priority mission since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been  to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States  between official ports of entry.  In addition, the Border Patrol has a  traditional mission of preventing illegal aliens, smugglers, narcotics, and  other contraband from entering the country, as these activities directly  affect the safety and security of the United States.  Border Patrol agents  generally report to Border Patrol stations and substations in each of these  sectors at the start and end of their workdays; these stations function  much as police stations do for police personnel around the country.  The  number of stations and substations varies widely by sector.
The Border Patrol’s fiscal year 2005 budget was about $1.4 billion.  As of  March 2005, the Border Patrol had 10,817 agents nationwide; 6,129 (57  percent) were located in the 9 Border Patrol sectors along the southwest  border.  About 10 percent of the Border Patrol’s agents nationwide are  assigned to interior traffic checkpoints in the southwest border sectors,  according to the Border Patrol.
Permanent and tactical interior traffic checkpoints are generally located  on major and secondary roads, usually 25 to 75 miles inland from the  border.  These interior checkpoint locations are chosen by the Border  Patrol to maximize the likelihood that illegal entrants who have managed  to evade border defenses and patrols will have to pass through the  checkpoints in order to get to major U.S. population centers.  Although  tactical checkpoints are mobile and may move daily or weekly, as needed,  they must provide adequate advance notice to motorists that a checkpoint  has been set up and is in operation.  This is typically done by using orange  traffic cones and large, visible signs positioned in advance of the  checkpoint location.  Permanent checkpoints, by virtue of their  permanence and large traffic signs, meet these criteria for advance notice  and visibility.
Figure 1 shows the topography, interstate highways, and some major  secondary roads along the southwest border.
The legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Border Patrol  began implementing a strategy called Operation Hold-the-Line in 1993, to  incrementally increase control of the Southwest border in four phases by  making it so difficult and costly for aliens to attempt illegal entry that  fewer individuals would try.  The four-phased approach involved adding  resources along the Southwest border, starting with the areas that had the  highest known levels of illegal alien activity, which at that time were the  San Diego, California; El Paso, Texas; and McAllen, Texas, regions.  Although INS accomplished its goal of shifting illegal alien traffic away  from these areas, the shift was achieved at a cost to both illegal aliens and  INS.  In particular, rather than being deterred from attempting some  illegal entry, many aliens have instead risked injury and death by trying to  cross mountains, deserts, and rivers, primarily in Arizona and in particular  in the Tucson sector.  These conditions, which the Border Patrol said  continue to the present day, prompted INS and now CBP to warn aliens  about the dangers of crossing illegally, as well as to establish search-and- rescue units.
In effect, and contrary to the expectations of INS, the strategy led to a  significant increase in illegal immigration through the Tucson sector,  despite its topography and climate, as indirectly measured by total  apprehensions, which increased nearly sevenfold in this sector over the  period of fiscal years 1993 to 2000.  In contrast, during the same period,  total apprehensions for the eight other southwest sectors combined  decreased by about 28 percent.  The largest single decrease was in the San  Diego sector, where apprehensions fell by almost three-fourths over 1993-  2000.
Nationwide, Border Patrol apprehensions at all locations (including on the  border, near the border, and at interior checkpoints) of illegal aliens over  the last 4 years have varied from about 1.3 million in fiscal year 2001, to  955,000 in fiscal year 2002, 931,000 in fiscal year 2003, and over 1.1 million  in fiscal year 2004. Figure 2 shows the total annual apprehensions of illegal  immigrants at all locations in each of the 9 southwest Border Patrol  sectors reported for fiscal years 2001 to 2004.
As shown, the Tucson sector has had the largest numbers of  apprehensions since fiscal year 2001, which Border Patrol officials  attribute in part to the legacy INS’s strategy to deter illegal entry between  the official ports of entry in the sectors that had the highest estimated  illegal immigration in the early and mid-1990s, the San Diego, California,  and the Texas sectors of El Paso and McAllen.  It is apparent that in  recent years far more apprehensions of illegal aliens have occurred in the  Tucson sector than in the 8 other sectors.
When establishing checkpoints, the Border Patrol must take into account  court decisions ruling on the parameters of immigration officers’ authority  to conduct inquiries concerning illegal aliens.  The legal authority of  immigration officials to establish permanent checkpoints and stop vehicles  transiting through them has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in  United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.  The Supreme Court ruled that  government officials may stop vehicles at permanent interior checkpoints  for brief questioning of the driver and passengers without reasonable  suspicion.  The Court held that it was constitutional for the Border Patrol,  after routinely stopping or slowing automobiles at a permanent  checkpoint, to refer motorists selectively to a secondary inspection area  for questions about citizenship and immigration status on the basis of  criteria that would not sustain a roving patrol stop.  The Court  determined that the constitutional interests of motorists at these  checkpoints were not violated, for a number of reasons.  It found that the  checkpoints, with flashing lights and warning signs, provided advance  notice to motorists of an official roadblock that was applicable to all  motorists.  Motorists were not taken by surprise, as they knew, or could  find out, the location of the checkpoints.  Furthermore, the Court  concluded that the regular manner in which established checkpoints were  operated was visible evidence that the stops were duly authorized.
An organization that specializes in immigration issues has estimated that  the number of people who have successfully entered the United States  illegally has averaged roughly half a million per year since 1990 and that  the number of illegal aliens residing in the United States has grown in  recent years from about 8.4 million in April 2000 to about 11 million in  March 2005.
section_title: Permanent and Tactical Checkpoints Have Different but Complementary Roles in the Border Patrol Strategy
paragraphs: The Border Patrol uses permanent and tactical checkpoints in 8 of its 9  southwest sectors as part of a multilayered enforcement strategy to deter  and defend against potential terrorists and their weapons, contraband  smugglers, and persons who have entered the country illegally.  Corresponding to their different roles in the Border Patrol’s enforcement  strategy, permanent and tactical checkpoints have different capabilities.  Permanent checkpoints have the advantage of physical infrastructure,  which provides a wide range of logistical, communication, suspect  questioning and detention, and equipment deployment and storage  capabilities, as well as adequate shade and cages for canines.  Tactical  checkpoints have the advantage of mobility, which gives the Border Patrol  the capability to respond quickly to emerging trends, intelligence, or  national security threats.  According to the Border Patrol, permanent  checkpoints are most effective when supplemented by tactical  checkpoints, which are generally used on secondary roads to cut off  access to those seeking to evade permanent checkpoints on major  arteries.
This is not the case in the Tucson sector, where legislative language has  prohibited the construction of checkpoints since fiscal year 1999.  Moreover, starting in mid-2002, and through fiscal year 2004, the Border  Patrol relocated or closed checkpoints in the Tucson sector on a regular  basis, such as at least once every 7 days.  The result has been a sector of  nonpermanent checkpoints that lack the advantages of either permanent  or tactical checkpoints, and which the Border Patrol states have degraded  the Border Patrol’s ability to fulfill its mission in the Tucson sector.
subsections: section_title: Permanent and Tactical Checkpoints Each Have a Role in the Border Enforcement Strategy
paragraphs: The Border Patrol uses interior traffic checkpoints as a third layer of  defense and deterrence against potential terrorists and their weapons,  contraband smugglers, and persons who have entered the country illegally.  According to the Border Patrol, permanent and tactical checkpoints are  part of an integrated, multilayered enforcement strategy intended to  achieve two key law enforcement objectives: (1) to increase the likelihood  of detection and apprehension of illegal entrants of all types, and thereby  to deter other potential illegal entrants from attempting to enter the  country, who might otherwise believe that successfully crossing the  border would mean that there were no further barriers to them, and (2) to  deter illegal entrants from transiting through permanent checkpoints on  major roadways, through fear of detection, and thereby to cause them to  use less traveled secondary roads on which the Border Patrol is able to  stop all or almost all vehicles (because of much lower traffic volume),  making illegal entrants more visible and easier to detect and apprehend.
Procedures at both permanent and tactical checkpoints involve slowing or  stopping traffic as vehicles proceed through the checkpoint.  As traffic  slows, Border Patrol agents use visual cues and canines trained to locate  drugs and hidden persons to determine whether to wave the vehicle  through, or stop the vehicle, question the occupant(s), and determine  whether a more thorough secondary inspection is required.
subsections: section_title: Role of Permanent Checkpoints
paragraphs: Permanent checkpoints are placed at locations that are intended to  maximize the chances to detect illegal immigrants and smugglers who  have crossed the border illegally and who are seeking to reach large  population centers, such as Los Angeles, California, or Phoenix, Arizona.  Where possible, according to the Border Patrol, permanent checkpoints  are placed after several highways or roads join, so that anyone intending  to exit the area into the interior of the country must transit them.  Permanent checkpoints’ physical infrastructure gives them different  capabilities than tactical checkpoints.  For example, permanent  checkpoints facilities are equipped with technology and computers  connected to national law enforcement databases to help identify  suspects, research criminal histories, and cross check terrorist watch lists.  They also offer greater physical safety to those working at them, by virtue  of better signage, lighting, and larger shoulder areas to stand out of the  way of traffic, and many of them are paved and have protective concrete  barriers.  In addition, permanent checkpoints have supporting  infrastructure and procedures intended to reduce the ability of illegal  entrants from circumventing the checkpoints.  These include remote video  surveillance, electronic sensors, and agent patrols in the vicinity of the  checkpoints.
Among the resources that are generally found at permanent checkpoints  are:    Computers hardwired into national law enforcement databases, such  as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Integrated Automated  Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) system, to provide identity  checks.  Figure 3 shows a fingerprint reading machine at a permanent  checkpoint as it scans a fingerprint and then transmits the information  to a centralized database via high-speed communications primarily  available through a hardwired, secure line.
Electrical and water utilities    Permanent tollbooth-like structures that provide cover from the  weather, including shade for agents and canines    Buildings with room for processing and detention of persons suspected  of smuggling or other illegal activity    Permanent, large communication towers that permit radio  communication to other Border Patrol facilities and national law  enforcement authorities    Permanent lighting for night and poor weather conditions    Vehicle lifts to raise vehicles to inspect under them, and the area  required for the lifts, as shown in figure 6.
Tactical checkpoints are intended to supplement permanent ones by  monitoring and inspecting traffic on secondary roads that can be used to  evade the permanent checkpoints.  For example, the Temecula permanent  checkpoint in the San Diego sector maintains up to eight tactical  checkpoints to inspect vehicles traveling on back roads in the hills around  the permanent checkpoint on I-15.  Tactical checkpoints are intended to  be mobile and set up for short-term use only.  They are relocated by the  Border Patrol in order to respond to intelligence on changing patterns of  contraband smuggling and routes being used by illegal aliens.  According  to the Border Patrol, the combination of permanent and supplemental  tactical checkpoints is intended to both detect persons who have entered  the country illegally and to increase the chances of detecting and  apprehending contraband smugglers and illegal aliens who seek to avoid  permanent checkpoints and instead use less traveled routes.  On these less  traveled routes, with comparatively low traffic volume of as little as a few  hundred vehicles daily, the Border Patrol is able to stop every car and  closely observe the occupants, as well as question them.  This increases  the likelihood of detecting illegal entrants, while on heavily traveled  highways, only a small percentage of vehicles can be subjected to this  level of inspection, in order to avoid creating long traffic delays.
In contrast to the resources that are typically deployed at permanent  checkpoints, tactical ones, by virtue of their mobility, do not have large  fixed facilities or hardwired communications.  They do, however, offer the  element of flexibility, by virtue of their mobility.  Tactical checkpoints  generally consist of a few Border Patrol vehicles, used by agents to drive  to the location; orange cones to slow down and direct traffic; portable  water supply; a cage for canines (if deployed with the checkpoint);  portable rest facilities; and warning signs.  Some may also have portable  lighting, if operated at dusk or night.  If persons are detained at a tactical  checkpoint, some of the agents must leave the checkpoint to transport  them back to a Border Patrol station for positive identification.  Our  observations of tactical checkpoints showed that most equipment has to  be towed or carried to the checkpoint for it to operate, and then has to be  removed when it relocates.  According to the Border Patrol, this increases  wear and tear on the equipment and absorbs time to hitch up, tow, set up,  dismantle, and tow the equipment back to a Border Patrol station or to an  alternate tactical checkpoint.  Figure 7 shows a tactical checkpoint on  Sandia Creek road, in a rural area near Temecula, California, that was used  to supplement the permanent checkpoint on I-15.
While the changing locations of tactical checkpoints would appear to offer  the potential element of surprise, we were told by the Border Patrol that  the smugglers of aliens and contraband could use cell phones and  communications networks to alert confederates of the presence of  checkpoints within minutes of their being relocated.  The Border Patrol  provided us with information that confirmed that smugglers of aliens and  contraband observed some checkpoints and reported on their activities to  their confederates.  According to the Border Patrol, smugglers know  within minutes about the closure of a checkpoint.
section_title: Legislative Restrictions on the Tucson Sector
paragraphs: For fiscal years 1999-2004, annual appropriations acts made no funds  “available for the site acquisition, design, or construction” of any Border  Patrol checkpoint in the Tucson sector.  Since the Tucson sector had no  permanent checkpoints at the time the prohibition was first imposed, the  effect of this restriction was that no permanent checkpoints could be  planned or constructed in this sector.  According to the Border Patrol, it  used a combination of roving patrols and temporary checkpoints in the  sector that remained at the same location for long periods but did not have  permanent infrastructure.  This arrangement was adequate, the Border  Patrol stated, until the late 1990s, when the volume of illegal entrants into  the sector increased substantially as its overall strategy to greatly  reinforce the border in urbanized areas took effect in San Diego,  California; El Paso, Texas; and McAllen, Texas.
The fiscal year 2003 and 2004 Appropriations Acts also added a provision  requiring that the checkpoints in the Tucson sector be relocated “at least  once every 7 days in a manner designed to prevent persons subject to  inspection from predicting” their location.  Since permanent checkpoints  could not be built under these restrictions, and temporary ones had to be  relocated at least once every 7 days, the checkpoints functioned as  hybrids, or what we refer to as nonpermanent checkpoints that had  neither the advantages of the physical infrastructure typical of permanent  ones nor the flexibility of tactical checkpoints to respond to intelligence  information.  Such checkpoints do not have permanent infrastructure and  hence lack the multiplicity of capabilities typically associated with  permanent checkpoints in other sectors.  At the same time, they also do  not have tactical flexibility because they are generally kept at the same  locations, which have been chosen by the Border Patrol in part for both  safety and legal considerations.  The checkpoint locations need to have  adequate shoulder space on which to place the equipment needed to  maintain the checkpoint, such as a small trailer, water tanks, portable  lights and generators, as well as space to conduct secondary inspections of  vehicles ordered to pull over.  The locations also need to have sufficient  space to place signs in advance of the checkpoint to notify vehicles of the  checkpoint’s location (to comply with legal decisions) and cannot be  placed after or around sharp curves that might force vehicles to come to a  sudden stop upon notice of the checkpoint.  In addition, the checkpoint  locations are chosen by the Border Patrol to maximize the likelihood that  illegal entrants would have to transit through them in order to move  northward.  Depending on the criticality of their original location in terms  of road networks and smuggling routes, relocating these checkpoints can  reduce their effectiveness in monitoring vehicular traffic.  (See app. III, fig.  14, for a map of the sector and its checkpoints.)  To support these  nonpermanent checkpoints, the Tucson sector operates tactical  checkpoints periodically, as occurs in other sectors with permanent  checkpoints.
The fiscal year 2005 Appropriations Act limited the funding prohibition to  only construction, thus allowing the use of funds for site acquisition and  design.  Further, this act directed CBP to conduct a study of locations for  proposed permanent checkpoints within the Tucson sector.  In addition,  the 2005 Act changed the requirement to relocate checkpoints to “at least  an average of once every 14 days.”  According to the Border Patrol, the  phrase “an average” gave it more flexibility in determining checkpoint  operating schedules than the previous years’ requirement of “at least once  every 7 days.”  As a result, in fiscal year 2005, the Patrol operates the  checkpoint on I-19 for 14 days, closes it for 8 hours, and then reopens it for  14 days.  In addition, the Patrol has kept the checkpoint at the more  northern kilometer post (KP) 42 location, because, it stated, moving it  south to the KP 25 location every 7 days had permitted illegal immigrants  to wait until KP 42 closed, and to then move north.  At other checkpoints  in the Tucson sector, the Patrol has maintained varying opening and  closing schedules, which it stated were in conformity, in its view, with the  “average of once every 14 days” language.
However, as reported by the House Appropriations Committee, the fiscal  year 2006 appropriations bill would restore the 7-day relocation  requirement.  Also, it provides that no funds may be used for site  acquisition, design, or construction of permanent checkpoints in this  sector.
section_title: The Tucson Sector’s Nonpermanent Checkpoints Have Additional Limitations
paragraphs: Prior to the implementation of INS’s southwest border strategy in 1993, the  Tucson sector had a smaller volume of illegal alien traffic relative to the  San Diego and El Paso sectors, as indirectly measured by apprehensions.  In fiscal year 1993, the Tucson sector had less than one-fifth as many  apprehensions as the San Diego sector, and less than one-third those in the  El Paso sector.  As the strategy unfolded, the San Diego and El Paso  sectors became more difficult for illegal aliens to cross, while the volume  of illegal traffic in the Tucson sector increased nearly sevenfold over the  period of fiscal years 1993-2000, as measured indirectly by sectorwide  apprehensions.  This increase in illegal activity, as well as a general  increase in legitimate vehicular traffic, led the Border Patrol to consider a  more permanent presence for checkpoints in the Tucson sector, where it  had previously operated only tactical checkpoints, to provide the range of  facilities offered by permanent checkpoints.
The Border Patrol started implementing the 7-day relocation requirement  in June 2002, as noted above.  Patrol officials told us that where feasible,  taking safety and operational strategy into account, they alternated the  sites of nonpermanent checkpoints along the same route in the Tucson  sector.  The Border Patrol was able to establish nonpermanent  checkpoints among alternate sites on two such routes.  However, for 3 of  the 6 checkpoints in the sector, safety factors precluded use of other  locations on the same route, and the Border Patrol closed the checkpoints  for 7 days.  (One checkpoint of the 6 closes each night and is replaced with  roving vehicle patrols, because of the very sparse population of the region  in which it is located.)  The 7-day relocation rule was changed to “at least  an average of once every 14 days” in fiscal year 2005 appropriations  legislation.
The Border Patrol told us that it did not seek to evade compliance with the  intent of the relocation rule by opening an alternative checkpoint just a  short distance from the first one, or by closing for just a few hours.  It did  attempt to close and open for a few days at a time, they said, to try to  confuse illegal aliens and contraband smugglers.  However, officials stated  that this was not productive, as the smugglers monitored the checkpoint  activities so closely.  According to Border Patrol officials, the funding  prohibition on constructing checkpoints in the Tucson sector, in  combination with the mandated relocation on a regular basis, allows  smugglers and illegal aliens to further their entry into the United States  with reduced interdiction risk.  Table 1 shows the variations followed by  the Border Patrol in operating the nonpermanent checkpoints in the  Tucson sector.
According to Border Patrol officials, contraband smugglers and illegal  aliens typically wait until they learn from confederates that a checkpoint is  in the process of being relocated or has been closed, and then use this  downtime to further their illegal entry.  Border Patrol officials told us that  in today’s environment, they are up against increasingly sophisticated  smugglers who use radios, cell phones, global positioning systems, and  other high-technology equipment to watch agents’ movements and alert  each other when checkpoints are moved or closed.
On highway I-19, the interstate highway that runs from Nogales, Arizona,  on the border, directly north to Tucson, the Border Patrol alternated  between two locations for nonpermanent checkpoints, at KP 42 and at KP  25, at congressional staff instruction (for the last quarter of fiscal year  2002), and then in conformity with the legislative restrictions for fiscal  years 2003 and 2004.  When the northern one (KP 42) was open, however,  the Border Patrol told us that illegal aliens and smugglers who had made it  over the border then waited in communities south of it, but north of KP 25.   (See app. III, fig. 14 for a sector map that shows these locations.)  When  the checkpoint at KP 42 closed and moved down to KP 25, the illegal  entrants who waited north of KP 25 (but south of KP 42 while open) were  able to move with reduced interdiction risk, because there was no longer a  checkpoint north of them.  In fiscal year 2005, as noted above, the Border  Patrol has maintained the checkpoint at the more northern KP 42 location,  to reduce the potential for illegal entrants taking advantage of the  relocation that occurred in previous years. In addition, the checkpoint is  kept open for 14 days, then closed for 8 hours, and then reopened for 14  days.  The Border Patrol stated that it believes that this schedule conforms  to the fiscal year legislative language that requires that Tucson sector  checkpoints be relocated an average of at least once every 14 days.
Border Patrol officials told us that without the infrastructure typical of the  Patrol’s permanent checkpoints in others sectors, the Tucson sector  cannot perform the full range of enforcement functions.  For example,  without access to national databases, suspects detained at the sector’s  nonpermanent checkpoints cannot be readily identified and must be  transported by an agent or agents to a Border Patrol station with database  access, in order to determine if the persons should be detained.  Further,  the nonpermanent Tucson checkpoints lack paved, adequately large, level,  off-road shoulder areas to deploy vehicle lifts or VACIS trucks required to  examine underneath and inside vehicles.  According to the Border Patrol,  because detention facilities at these checkpoints are small rooms in  mobile trailers, with weak internal doors and locks, they can be  insufficient in size and security.  (See photo in fig. 8.)  Upon apprehension  of a suspect or suspects, Border Patrol agents from the checkpoint must  transport them to a station with adequate facilities for detention and  processing, as would be found at typical permanent checkpoints  elsewhere.  The Border Patrol stated that sending an agent or agents to a  station with suspects is an inefficient use of personnel and can cause the  nonpermanent checkpoint to close because of personnel shortages.
Figure 8 shows photographs of the nonpermanent checkpoint operated on  I-19 in the Tucson sector at KP 42, with limited facilities, located under an  overpass to provide shelter from sun and weather, and lacking a paved  shoulder for vehicles pulled over for further inspection.
section_title: Benefits and Costs of Traffic Checkpoints Are Difficult to Quantify, but Some Examples Are Available
paragraphs: Although total apprehensions and contraband seizure data are available  for interior checkpoints, some of the benefits—such as deterrence of  potential contraband smugglers or of persons contemplating illegal entry  into the United States—and costs of traffic checkpoints are difficult to  quantify because deterrence is difficult to measure and cost data are not  maintained separately by the Border Patrol for permanent or tactical  checkpoints.  Studies or reports on checkpoint benefits and costs have  also not been performed by the Border Patrol. Of the less quantifiable  benefits that can be described, we were told that intelligence debriefings  of apprehended aliens and smugglers testify to the deterrent effects of  interior checkpoints.  In addition, local citizens and community groups  with whom we met who live near or in the vicinity of interior checkpoints  are generally supportive.  However, this support is not universal.
subsections: section_title: Apprehensions and Drug Seizure Benefits
paragraphs: The most readily available data on the benefits of interior checkpoints are  the drug seizure and apprehension data recorded by the Border Patrol on a  daily basis at its checkpoints and stations.  In fiscal year 2004, for example,  the Border Patrol reported that the southwest interior checkpoints, which  were staffed by about 10 percent of Border Patrol agents in those sectors,  were responsible for 96,000 illegal alien apprehensions, or 8 percent of all  Border Patrol apprehensions, and for seizure of 418,102 pounds of  marijuana and 10,853 pounds of cocaine in fiscal year 2004, or about 31  percent of the marijuana and about 74 percent of the cocaine seized  nationally by the Border Patrol.
In addition to the benefits of seizing contraband, and mitigating the  smuggling of humans, there were at least six incidents reported to us  where individuals with suspected ties to terrorism were identified when  transiting a Border Patrol interior checkpoint and appropriate actions  were coordinated with the FBI.
section_title: Deterrence and Some Other Potential Benefits of Traffic Checkpoints are Difficult to Quantify
paragraphs: Intelligence debriefings of smugglers and illegal aliens and reports of  increased smuggling costs provide some evidence of checkpoints’  deterrent effect.  Information from debriefings suggests that interior  checkpoints deter some persons from attempting to go through them, and  also push them into rural areas that are more difficult to transit and where  they are more easily identifiable among a lower volume of traffic. In  addition, the presence of effective checkpoints can contribute to increased  smuggling costs, also possibly serving as a deterrent, according to the  Border Patrol.  In the San Diego sector, for example, we were told by the  Border Patrol that smuggling fees charged to Mexicans and others had  increased fivefold in recent years (to about $1,500 per person), because of  the perceived difficulty of breaching border defenses and of transiting  through interior checkpoints undetected.  It is difficult, however, to  separate out the contribution to deterring potential illegal entrants from  entering the United States of increases in smuggling fees that are due to  better line watch and line patrol border operations versus those cost  increases that could be attributed to vigilance at interior checkpoints.  (We  did not validate the Border Patrol’s statements with regard to increased  smuggling fees.)
Evidence for the deterrent effects of checkpoints was reported in a 1995  INS study which found that that smugglers and illegal aliens adjust their  transit routes because they are well aware when checkpoints are open and  closed.  The 1995 study reported on a test of interior checkpoint  operations in which the permanent checkpoint on I-5, near San Clemente,  California, was closed several times, in order to determine the impact of  the checkpoint on I-15, near Temecula, California.  The latter is located  inland on a parallel major north-south highway, and about as far north of  the border as the checkpoint on I-5.  (See app. II, fig. 10, for a map of this  sector that shows the location of these checkpoints.)  The study reported  that when the I-5, San Clemente checkpoint was closed, apprehensions at  the I-15 Temecula checkpoint fell sharply—there was a 50 percent decline  in 1 month.  According to the study, this demonstrated that illegal entrants  became aware of the closure and therefore chose the I-5 San Clemente  route with no checkpoint, while avoiding the I-15 Temecula route with an  operating checkpoint.  The Border Patrol told us that this demonstrated  the interdependence of various checkpoints operations and that illegal  entrants were, in fact, deterred from transiting routes with checkpoints  when unmonitored alternatives are available.  This study, however, did not  address whether the checkpoints completely deter any aliens from  entering the country.
As additional illustrations of the potential effects of interior checkpoints,  Temecula station officials described the following operations that in their  view appeared to confirm that illegal aliens had changed their intended  routes in order to avoid the checkpoints at Temecula and San Clemente:    San Diego sector intelligence analysts determined that illegal alien  smugglers were avoiding the permanent Border Patrol interior  checkpoints on the highways at San Clemente (I-5) and Temecula (I- 15).  Instead, they were taking a circuitous route from the San Diego  area to eastern California and western Arizona, and then turning north  on secondary highways without checkpoints to make their way to Los  Angeles.  In response to this intelligence, the Temecula station set up  an August 2004 3-day traffic observation operation along I-10 between  Los Angeles and Arizona.  During the operation, Border Patrol agents  stopped 30 suspect vehicles, and apprehended 134 illegal aliens.   Border Patrol officials confirmed the earlier intelligence that illegal  aliens were utilizing the I-10 route, without checkpoints, to avoid  checkpoints on I-5 and I-15.  The officials believe that this  demonstrated the effectiveness of the permanent I-5 and I-15 interior  checkpoints as deterrents that cause illegal entrants to seek out less  traveled, unmonitored alternative routes, even if longer in distance and  time required to reach major U.S. cities.
On May 3, 2004, three vans ran (transited without stopping despite  orders to do so) the Otay Mesa port of entry near San Diego, and two  vans proceeded north on I-15 (one was stopped near the port of entry).  Temecula station officials were alerted to the fleeing vans and were  notified that to avoid the checkpoint on I-15, the vans had turned onto a  secondary road that roughly paralleled the interstate. Four tactical  checkpoints were operating in the area, and the vans were stopped by  agents at two of these checkpoints.  A total of 48 illegal aliens were  arrested.  According to Temecula station officials, this incident showed  that (1) illegal alien smugglers know that the permanent checkpoints  such as the one on I-15 are to be avoided if possible, and (2) tactical  checkpoints on secondary roads are valuable and effective for  apprehending aliens attempting to circumvent checkpoints on major  highways.
Temecula station officials described another operation as an example  of checkpoint deterrence effectiveness.  On the basis of intelligence,  Temecula station intelligence analysts concluded that smugglers of  illegal aliens had altered their entry routes to avoid the significant  Border Patrol presence in the San Diego sector.  These altered entry  routes included the use of I-40 westbound to enter the greater Los  Angeles area; the Border Patrol did not have checkpoints or a constant  presence on westbound I-40. In response to this intelligence, the  Temecula station conducted a traffic observation operation with  multiple marked patrol vehicles on I-40 over a period of 3 days in  November 2004, to interdict alien smugglers using the westbound I-40  corridor to circumvent the permanent checkpoints on I-5 and I-15.  The  I-40 operation was conducted shortly after a Border Patrol I-10  operation with the expectation that smugglers would use I-40 to avoid  I-10.  The Border Patrol operation found 7 vehicles with 77 illegal  aliens.  Of these, 60 had entered the country east of the San Diego  sector, circumventing the I-5 and I-15 checkpoints.  According to  Temecula station officials, this confirmed that I-40 is a major smuggling  route and that the permanent checkpoints on I-5 and on I-15 serve as  deterrents to at least some illegal traffic, as intended.
section_title: Most Local Community Leaders We Contacted See Traffic Checkpoints as Benefiting their Communities
paragraphs: Local law enforcement, business, and community leaders near interior  traffic checkpoints in Temecula, California, in the San Diego sector, and  Nogales, Arizona, in the Tucson sector, that we interviewed told us that in  their view, the checkpoints and the presence of Border Patrol agents were  of considerable benefit to their communities.  However, in the small  community of Tubac, Arizona, we found local criticism of interior traffic  checkpoints.  Since we did not conduct a comprehensive survey of all  communities in the vicinity of all 33 permanent checkpoints in the  southwest border states, our findings are limited to the views of the local  citizens and law enforcement officials with whom we met in the  communities we visited, as well as statements by the Border Patrol with  regard to their relationships with local communities near checkpoints.  We  did not confirm the views expressed by these citizens and officials, as little  data were available relating directly to their statements.
Officials representing the city of Temecula, California, the Temecula  Police Department, and the Chamber of Commerce, for example, all said  that the nearby I-15 traffic checkpoint and Border Patrol presence benefit  their community.  The checkpoint has the second greatest average daily  volume of vehicular traffic among the Border Patrol’s checkpoints, with  about 122,000 vehicles passing through the checkpoint location daily.  City  and police officials said that having the checkpoint in operation means  that illegal aliens and drug smugglers are intercepted and taken off the  streets, reducing crime and vandalism.  One city official also said that  traffic problems with the checkpoint have been minimal, and that the city  has received very few calls complaining about the checkpoint and what  amount to minimal delays when the checkpoint is operating and checking  traffic.  The official said that the majority of the calls that the city received  were before September 11, 2001, and very few calls had been received  since then.  The President of the Temecula Chamber of Commerce  conducted an informal survey of member businesses, and only one  business mentioned that some employees said that the checkpoint  operations occasionally delayed their commute to or from work.  Overall,  the Chamber President concluded that the checkpoint is not a concern to  the community.
The Santa Cruz County Attorney from Nogales, Arizona, told us that the  Border Patrol and its checkpoints were among the best protections for  fighting illegal alien traffic and local crime, with a side benefit of detecting  drunk drivers on their way back from Mexico.  According to this official,  the I-19 checkpoint between Nogales and Tucson was a major benefit to  the community because it was saving lives, apprehending illegal aliens,  and arresting drug smugglers.  The official also stated that, in her opinion,  the checkpoints are effective in apprehending drug violators out of  proportion to the resources deployed at the checkpoints and voiced the  view that permanent checkpoints were better than tactical ones.
In contrast to the generally positive view of the benefits resulting from the  Border Patrol checkpoints from others that we interviewed, the president  of a local civic association from Tubac, Arizona (population 949), located  between Nogales and Tucson near the I-19 nonpermanent Tucson sector  checkpoint at KP 42, told us that he believed the checkpoint was  disruptive to the community and was not effective because illegal aliens  were circumventing the checkpoint and passing through the community.  He said that the checkpoint had affected home sales and housing values,  and that most local residents were strongly opposed to having a  permanent checkpoint built near them on I-19, because of fears about the  impact on traffic congestion and overall quality of life.  We were also told  by congressional staff that the overwhelming majority present at April and  July 2005 community meetings in Tubac had voiced opposition to the  possibility of a permanent checkpoint on I-19 near Tubac.
section_title: Traffic Congestion at Checkpoints Does Not Appear to Be a Large Problem but May Involve Some Costs
paragraphs: The Border Patrol Handbook states that checkpoint operations should be  suspended if there is “too much traffic congestion” and does not further  define this.  However, some sector checkpoints have more precise  guidance pertaining to a specific distance or length of time traffic will be  permitted to back up.  Agents said they know from experience the amount  of wait time that is created by how far back from the checkpoint the lines  of vehicles extend.  The maximum delays that we observed appeared not  to exceed the restrictions defined by the checkpoint guidance prepared by  certain sectors.  This was the case, for example, at I-5 near San Clemente,  which has the single greatest daily volume of traffic in the country (about  144,000 vehicles per day) among interior Border Patrol checkpoints, and at  I-15 near Temecula, the next highest, with about 122,000 vehicles daily.  At  the times we visited, at both locations, we observed that the agents  temporarily stopped checkpoint inspections when estimated delays  exceeded guidelines.  Traffic was then “flushed” and permitted to flow  through until there was no line of waiting vehicles. Screening operations  were then resumed.  We also observed during our visit to the San  Clemente checkpoint, traffic flow in the opposite southerly direction,  where there is no checkpoint, sometimes was heavier and slower than on  the side with the ongoing checkpoint operation.
Moreover, of the more than 400 statewide cameras maintained by the  California Department of Transportation to monitor traffic, none are at  either the Temecula or San Clemente checkpoints, according to the  department.  In response to our questions, the department stated that it  had not received reports in recent years on congestion or related problems  at either the I-5 or I-15 checkpoints, and it had not conducted studies of  the checkpoints.
We contacted several other organizations that monitor traffic congestion  as part of their work, such as the Automobile Club of Southern California,  and the California Highway Patrol, to ask if they had received complaints  about the San Clemente or Temecula checkpoints in California, or had  observed actual traffic backups at these checkpoints.  We also asked the  American Trucking Associations if it had received complaints from  commercial shippers about checkpoints in the southwestern states.  None  of these organizations cited complaints in recent years about these  checkpoints.
In addition, an official of an organization that promotes economic  development in Laredo, Texas, and who is active in monitoring the impact  on traffic of the checkpoint on I-35 north of Laredo, stated that traffic  delays were minimal even at the I-35 checkpoint, and that anyone living on  or near the border is familiar with the checkpoints as a fact of life.  He  believed that commercial truckers build in potential travel delays, which  are longer for commercial vehicles than for cars, into their cost of doing  business and transit times.  He noted that even during rush hours, he  believed that trucks did not wait more than an average of about 20 minutes  maximum, based on what he had observed in recent years.  Cars are  delayed considerably less, averaging perhaps a 5-minute delay in rush  hour, he stated.  We observed this checkpoint, and delays appeared not to  exceed 5 minutes at the time we visited, based on the time that it took for  cars at the back of the line to transit through the checkpoint.
At the tactical checkpoint on I-19 between Nogales and Tucson, Arizona,  we saw minor traffic backups of not more than about a half dozen vehicles  at any time over the course of about 1 hour.  We were told that this was  typical for this time of year; delays did not last more than 2 or 3 minutes  for vehicles transiting the checkpoint during our site visit.  However, the  Border Patrol also told us that when truck traffic is particularly heavy  during the spring harvest season, pulling trucks over to the side of the  road to inspect them can create backups that cause safety problems and  delays for the truck drivers.
We also observed traffic patterns at permanent checkpoints on I-35 north  of Laredo and on U.S. highway 281 at Falfurrias, Texas, both major  highways, and at a permanent checkpoint at Hebbronville, Texas, on a  secondary road between Falfurrias and Laredo.  Although traffic backups  occurred on occasion at these locations, we were told that they generally  did not last more than a few minutes, as additional agents or lanes are  added to reduce delays.  During our visit, Border Patrol agents appeared to  be monitoring the amount of traffic waiting in line, which caused less than  about 5 minutes’ wait time, and usually less.  Agents told us that if traffic  backs up, they add extra agents to the inspection lanes, and may open  additional lanes as well.  At some holiday periods, however, we were told  delays can reach 20 to 30 minutes.  The volume of traffic at the Texas  checkpoints we observed was much lower than that on I-5 and I-15 in  California, permitting what amounts to a near 100 percent check of  transiting vehicles, according to the Border Patrol.  This is feasible when  average daily traffic volume is about 13,700 vehicles, as is the case at the  Laredo, Texas, checkpoint, compared with more than 120,000 at I-15, near  Temecula, California, or over 140,000 at I-5, near San Clemente, California.
section_title: Costs of Operating Checkpoints are Not Routinely Maintained
paragraphs: Border Patrol officials told us that costs of operating the permanent and  tactical checkpoints are not routinely or systematically maintained or  reported because checkpoints are integral and interdependent parts of the  multilayered enforcement strategy.  As such, permanent and tactical  checkpoints are supported with facilities, personnel, equipment, and  canines, for example, and by their associated stations, which in turn are  supported by the sector as a whole.  Tactical checkpoints in particular are  often set up specifically to support the permanent ones, often on a  changing daily basis.  Agent manpower levels may also vary at both the  permanent and the tactical checkpoints, depending on how the Border  Patrol decides on a given day to best allocate personnel resources, in  response to traffic volume, intelligence on illegal entrant routes, and other  factors, such as weather.  For example, the permanent checkpoint at I-15  Temecula is supported by up to eight tactical checkpoints that are set up  as needed, based on intelligence data on illegal alien traffic on the sector’s  secondary roads.
The costs of one tactical checkpoint versus another are not readily  separable, except perhaps the personnel costs, and even then, those could  vary over a period of hours, according to Border Patrol officials.  A  question that the Border Patrol officials asked and which has no easy or  standard answer was “If an agent must transport arrested aliens or  smugglers to a station headquarters, should his/her salary be counted as  part of the roadside checkpoint, or the station headquarters support?”
Even considering these obstacles to checkpoint cost comparisons, we  asked Border Patrol officials whether they could supply us with individual  checkpoint operating costs to include facilities, equipment, personnel, and  any other costs.  Border Patrol officials queried the sectors and stations at  the locations we visited and asked whether cost data could be assembled.  The sectors and stations responded with what cost data they could locate,  but it was not possible to obtain similar data from each location, and the  data provided would not be reliable enough to present any meaningful  statistics concerning costs of operating interior traffic checkpoints.
section_title: The Lack of Systematic Evaluation Limits the Border Patrol’s Ability to Allocate Resources Based on Need
paragraphs: In reviewing Border Patrol reports, and in discussions with Border Patrol  officials, we found that the Border Patrol has not systematically evaluated  the effectiveness of interior checkpoint operations.  The Border Patrol  does gather and report traditional law enforcement data, including the  number of apprehensions, historical apprehension trends, and weight and  type of contraband seized, but could not provide us with reports or  analyses that assessed the performance of one sector compared to  another, or of interior checkpoints compared with line operations.  Thus,  the Border Patrol does not have analyses based on inputs (costs), such as  agent work years, divided into outputs, such as apprehensions or  contraband seized, that could help measure effectiveness or productivity  and that could therefore also be used in making decisions about how best  to allocate resources.  The Border Patrol stated that it has not evaluated  the effectiveness of its interior checkpoints largely because checkpoints  are part of a multilayered enforcement strategy and cannot be easily  separated for evaluation purposes.  Furthermore, officials stated that  because such outcomes as deterrence are difficult to measure (i.e.,  estimating how many crimes or illegal entries were deterred before they  happened), the Border Patrol has chosen to rely on the types of data cited  above to gauge effectiveness.
A key component to assessing unit operations is the development of  performance measures.  We have previously reported on the need for  federal agencies to develop performance measures of their programs and  to use such measures to improve their performance, as well as to be in  compliance with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993  (GPRA).  As we noted, under the act, “every major federal agency must  now ask itself some basic questions:  What is our mission? What are our  goals and how will we achieve them?  How can we measure our  performance?  How will we use that information to make improvements?  GPRA forces a shift in the focus of federal agencies—away from such  traditional concerns as staffing and activity levels and toward a single  overriding issue: results.  GPRA requires agencies to set goals, measure  performance, and report on their accomplishments.”
Organizations use performance measures to help demonstrate the level of  progress in achieving results, to inform decision makers, and to hold  managers accountable.  To better articulate a results orientation,  organizations create a set of performance goals and measures that address  important dimensions of program performance.  Establishing and using  performance measures for checkpoint operations and other strategy  components would allow the Border Patrol to help assess the comparative  success of each checkpoint in addressing program goals as well as  checkpoints generally in comparison with line and patrol operations.  A  comparison of the effectiveness of each sector, using performance  measures, would permit the Border Patrol to more meaningfully assess the  success of its overall strategy than does a count of total apprehensions or  contraband seizures.  Without knowing how much effort produced an  outcome—in this case, apprehensions or contraband seizures—it is  difficult to know if one sector or region is performing better than another  (on a per input basis).  With such knowledge, more effective management  strategies can be devised, if needed, to better allocate agency resources, in  conjunction with other data and information.
We acknowledge that developing performance measures applied to all  checkpoints can be challenging for the reasons stated by Border Patrol  officials.  Nevertheless, it is important that the Border Patrol develop  performance measures to gauge success in meeting strategic goals and  that these measures go beyond the traditional output data it currently uses  to indicate the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts.
subsections: section_title: Available Data Suggest That Legislative Restrictions on the Tucson Sector Reduced the Performance of Its Interior Checkpoints
paragraphs: Although the Border Patrol told us that the legislative restrictions on  funding for construction of checkpoints in the Tucson sector, combined  with the requirement to relocate checkpoints on a 7- or 14-day schedule,  had reduced their effectiveness, it did not have a data-based analysis to  support these statements.  It did have data, by sector, on apprehensions of  illegal entrants at interior checkpoints and for line watch/line patrol, as  well as for work hours charged at interior checkpoints and line watch/line  patrol.  (Agent work hour data have not been maintained by the Border  Patrol for tactical checkpoints versus permanent ones and were therefore  not available.)  To test the feasibility of developing additional measures of  performance that would address these concerns, we used Border Patrol  data to measure apprehensions per agent work year and cost of  apprehensions per agent work year.  Such measures might help to  determine if the available data support the Border Patrol’s statements on  the impact of the legislative restrictions on the Tucson sector’s interior  checkpoints effectiveness.
In applying the apprehension per agent work year measure, we compared  the performance of the Tucson sector interior checkpoints over the period  of fiscal years 2001-2004 with those of the interior checkpoints in the three  other sectors we visited.  We limited the comparison to these four sectors  because a considerable amount of the work hour data had to be collected  by the Border Patrol through data calls, which placed a time burden on  those collecting the data for us.  We examined the data starting with fiscal  year 2001, the last year for which the impact of the terror attacks of  September 11 were largely not felt on illegal immigration, through fiscal  year 2004, the last year for which data were available at the time of this  report.  Throughout this period as well, no funding had been permitted for  construction of checkpoints in the Tucson sector.
Our analysis of Border Patrol data suggest that, as measured in  apprehensions per agent work year, the restrictions in the Tucson sector  may have had a negative impact on the performance of its interior  checkpoints, starting at about the time the sector implemented direction  from congressional staff to relocate checkpoints every 7 days, in  comparison with the three other sectors we visited, where no comparable  decline in effectiveness occurred during the same time period.    According to the Border Patrol, its records show that it began relocating  the Tucson sector’s checkpoints every 7 days in June 2002, which meant  closing some of them, as explained previously.
Figure 9 shows the apprehensions per agent work year at interior  checkpoints for each of the four sectors we visited, for fiscal years 2001- 2004, and the apprehensions per agent work year for line patrol/line watch  along the border.
Figure 9 shows that apprehensions per agent work year at the Tucson  sector interior checkpoints fell 48 percent from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal  year 2002, when the 7-day relocation procedures were put into effect, with  about 4 months remaining in the fiscal year.  This was followed by a 77  percent decrease from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2003, when the 7-day  relocation requirement was in effect for the entire fiscal year.  The overall  decrease from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2003 was about 88 percent, in  the Tucson sector.  Apprehensions per agent work year rose from fiscal  year 2003 to fiscal year 2004, but the 2004 level was 77 percent below the  fiscal year 2001 level.  In contrast to these performance measures for the  Tucson sector interior checkpoints, apprehensions per agent work year  for same period at the interior checkpoints in the three other southwest  sectors (San Diego, California; Laredo, Texas; and McAllen, Texas) we  visited—that were not subject to the funding restrictions or the relocation  requirements—either stayed at about the same level over this period or  increased somewhat.
During fiscal year 2001 to 2002, when Tucson apprehensions per agent  work year fell 48 percent, apprehensions per agent work year fell less than  2 percent in the San Diego sector, decreased about 19 percent in the  Laredo sector, and decreased about 12 percent in the McAllen sector.  The  Border Patrol attributed the drop in apprehensions in these and other  sectors in this period to a general decrease in illegal border crossings after  September 11 but attributed the greater decline in the Tucson sector to   relocating the Tucson checkpoints on a regular 7-day basis, starting in  June 2002.  Border Patrol officials told us that they were not aware of any  other changes or factors that would have caused the reduction in Tucson  compared with other sectors other than the combination of the funding  restrictions and the 7-day relocation requirement.
Moreover, apprehensions per agent work year at interior checkpoints in  the Tucson sector fell by about 77 percent from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal  year 2003, while they either remained about the same or increased (more  than doubling in San Diego) in that period in the other three sectors.  In  the San Diego sector, interior checkpoint apprehensions per agent year  increased about 60 percent from 2003 to 2004 and were almost four times  the 2002 level (versus Tucson, where the 2004 level was 55 percent below  the 2002 level).  In the McAllen and Laredo sectors, there was almost no  difference in checkpoint apprehension rates between 2003 and 2004.  The  Border Patrol believes that the differences between the Tucson sector and  others with regard to interior checkpoint performance are in large part the  result of the requirement to relocate checkpoints every 7 days at that time.  Border Patrol officials stated that the smugglers can easily determine  when the tactical or nonpermanent checkpoints in any location must  relocate or close and are therefore able to evade them by waiting until  they move or close, and a potential vulnerability in border security has  been created.
It is important to note that we did not evaluate all the factors that might  have contributed to the differing performance results between Tucson  interior checkpoints and those in the other three sectors.  There could  have been other factors beyond the restrictions on construction of  checkpoints and the requirement to relocate every 7 days that affected  checkpoint performance, such as the unknown number of persons  attempting entry into a sector, varying topographic conditions and road  networks, and the fees charged by smugglers to smuggle illegal immigrants  into the United States.  Nevertheless, while there may have been other  factors that affected the performance of interior checkpoints in the four  sectors, the data in figure 9 should not be overlooked when considering  the results or impacts of policy or management directives.
In the second performance measure, we converted the apprehensions per  agent work year into costs of apprehensions per work year, or cost per  apprehension.  We then compared interior checkpoints cost per  apprehension (per work year) with costs per apprehension (per work  year) for line watch and line patrol operations.  We were unable to develop  costs per apprehension at permanent versus tactical checkpoints because  individual checkpoint cost data are not maintained by the Border Patrol.  In addition, this measure is based on agent labor costs at interior  checkpoints and line watch/line patrol and does not include overhead  costs, such as those for equipment, training, buildings, canines, and so  forth.  Converting the fiscal year 2004 apprehension data into cost per  apprehension (per work year), apprehensions in the San Diego sector at  the border (line watch/line patrol) cost $384 per apprehension, and about  $277 per apprehension at the interior checkpoints (both permanent and  tactical).  In the Tucson sector, for the same fiscal year, border  apprehensions cost $126 each per work year, and interior checkpoint  apprehensions cost $445 each.
These ranges of cost per apprehension (per work year) are not, however,  necessarily reflective of agents at one checkpoint or in one sector working  harder or more effectively than those in another sector and must be  considered in the context of the Border Patrol’s integrated, multilayered  strategy, which seeks to deter illegal entrants through the perceived risk of  apprehension.  Thus, a permanent checkpoint with a substantial  infrastructure may have many agents, such as at I-5 near San Clemente  (with about 100 agents assigned to the location) but may have  comparatively few apprehensions—because it has successfully deterred  potential illegal entrants.  In Temecula, California, agents are required to  monitor alternative routes through the hills around the I-15 permanent  checkpoint.  Again, many agents may be required, but few apprehensions  may occur, if illegal entrants are deterred to alternative routes, such as the  circuitous I-10 route previously described.  In contrast, a sector with many  illegal entrants, such as Tucson, may effect many apprehensions because  of the volume of illegal entrants, seemingly showing border cost per  apprehension to be much lower than in San Diego.  Yet the reality is that  the long-term legacy INS and now CBP strategy of closing off the easiest  routes (in San Diego, El Paso, and McAllen), has led to the high volume in  the Tucson sector.  Therefore, cost per apprehension or any other single  performance measure cannot be used without taking into account the  overall strategy.
While a performance measure such as cost per apprehension can provide  some information on cost-effectiveness, several additional caveats exist.  First, regarding the output measured in the denominator (i.e., the number  of apprehensions per agent work year, such as 191 for San Diego in fiscal  year 2004), some apprehensions may be considered more important to the  agency than others.  For instance, apprehending a drug smuggler or a  terrorist might be considered more important than apprehending an illegal  alien job seeker.  Second, regarding the cost of inputs measured in the  numerator (e.g., the $53,000 annual average agent nationwide salary),  numerous cost measures can exist.  The most easily applied is often the  variable cost of labor that is used above and which may require estimation.  Other input costs may exist but may be difficult to assign to a given  apprehension, since not only are indirect overhead costs involved (e.g.,  training, equipment, infrastructure, canines), but also such costs as the  differing salaries of multiple agents, if more than one was involved in the  apprehension; the time used up by each different agent; and the processing  costs, which can vary by suspect, depending on whether the person is  already in a national database or cannot be identified.
section_title: Additional Performance Measures Could Help Guide Management Decision Making
paragraphs: The two performance measures we developed would not alone fully assess  or explain relative success among sectors, and in developing performance  measures for checkpoints, a number of factors would need to be  considered.  For example, in comparing the apprehensions per agent work  year and cost per apprehension for the adjacent McAllen and Laredo  sectors, considerable differences appear, with McAllen checkpoints  apprehending far more illegal aliens per agent work year than Laredo.  Converted into cost per apprehension, these data show that for fiscal year  2004, in the Laredo sector, the cost per apprehension for line watch/line  patrol was $411, while the cost per apprehension at checkpoints was $930  each.  For McAllen, the cost per apprehension at line/patrol was $609,  while the cost at the checkpoints was $195 per apprehension.
Taken alone, and without additional information about conditions in these  sectors, these costs per apprehension are not necessarily a useful guide to  management decisions about resource allocation.  As Border Patrol  officials told us, several factors are believed to contribute to the  differences in apprehension patterns between McAllen and Laredo sectors.  These include the topography, availability of egress routes, staff  deployment, and varying expedited removal programs.  Further, the  McAllen sector includes two major Mexican cities adjacent to its border  with a combined population of about 2 million people and an  infrastructure that facilitates potential illegal entrants.  These factors  provide context to the analysis and underscore the importance of the  Border Patrol developing a range of performance measures that can  adequately account for differences among sectors and provide decision  makers with reliable indicators of success.
The usefulness of these measures notwithstanding, other performance  measures and relevant factors would also be useful in assessing the  effectiveness of checkpoints relative to other elements of the multilayered  strategy.  Some available information, beyond apprehensions and  contraband seized, could help the Border Patrol make more informed  decisions about where its operations are most effective and how best to  allocate resources to make needed improvements.  For example, the  Border Patrol could consider the cost of smuggling charged to illegal  immigrants as a measure of its overall effectiveness.  Additionally, the  Border Patrol could consider the number of apprehensions or contraband  seizures per the number of vehicles sent to secondary inspection as a  measure of effectiveness.  There are likely other measures that could use  existing or easily gathered data to help measure effectiveness across the  range of Border Patrol line watch, line patrol, and interior traffic  checkpoint activities.  These kinds of performance measures can aid in  making resource allocation decisions, provided again that such decisions  are made with reasonable knowledge of other conditions present in a  given sector or region.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: It is unlikely that either the first two lines of border defense, line watch  and line patrol, or the interior traffic checkpoints, another layer of  defense, will ever be 100 percent effective in catching all smugglers or  aliens illegally entering the United States.  This is the case given the 1,950  mile southwest border, the number of personnel and the cost required to  cover all of this area, the continuing sophistication of smugglers using  modern technology to observe and evade the Border Patrol’s enforcement  efforts, and the differences in wages, job opportunities, and perceived life  opportunities between Mexico and the United States.  However, the  Border Patrol’s interior traffic checkpoints—both permanent and  tactical—have distinct functions in its integrated, multilayered strategy  intended to detect and deter potential terrorists, illegal immigration, and  contraband smuggling into the United States.  While the permanent  checkpoints are the anchors of this part of the strategy, the tactical  checkpoints reinforce the permanent ones at those locations where  smugglers, illegal aliens, or terrorists can use secondary roads to avoid the  permanent checkpoints, and when intelligence can help direct  redeployment of tactical checkpoints to counter new infiltration routes.  Working in tandem, the interior checkpoints combine the high-technology  capabilities and detention, processing, and inspection facilities of the  permanent checkpoints with the element of flexibility that tactical  checkpoints can offer.
Trying to measure the effectiveness of its border enforcement deterrence  strategy has been a long-standing challenge for legacy INS and now CBP  and the Border Patrol.  As many illegal aliens and contraband smugglers  continue to evade the border defenses, the need to measure effectiveness  and allocate scarce resources grows in significance.  In its Performance  and Annual Report, CBP uses traditional law enforcement effectiveness  measures, such as numbers of apprehensions and contraband seizures to  describe the Border Patrol’s performance.  While these measures serve as  worthwhile indicators, the annual reports do not compare the  effectiveness of line watch and line patrol with the effectiveness of interior  traffic checkpoints.  These traditional measures also do not delineate the  performance of permanent, tactical, and nonpermanent checkpoints.  In  contrast, performance measures that take inputs and outputs into account,  such as agent work years divided by apprehensions, provide a basis for  helping make decisions about how best to allocate agency resources, in  conjunction with other information and data.  Such measures can also  help identify trends that might otherwise not be apparent using traditional  data, as shown by our analysis of the data on performance of the Tucson  sector nonpermanent interior checkpoints compared with the  performance of other sectors.  Apprehension data alone would not have  shown the trend of the decrease in apprehensions per agent work year  that occurred at the Tucson sector checkpoints, starting at about the same  time the 7-day relocation requirement went into effect, while no  comparable decrease occurred in the three other sectors without the  requirement.
Moreover, apprehensions per agent work year, and the cost per  apprehension, along with information on many other relevant factors,  could provide useful trend information on the relative cost efficiency of  these components of the multilayered enforcement strategy.  Other  measures of performance and effectiveness might also be developed using  existing or easily gathered information to assess checkpoint operations  and performance, as well as other border enforcement activities.  This  information could also be useful to the Congress as it considers ways to  improve the effectiveness of checkpoints and border security efforts.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better gauge the effects of border control efforts, we recommend that  the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection    develop additional performance measures for the Border Patrol for the  productivity and effectiveness of interior checkpoints, such as  apprehensions per agent work year and cost per apprehension, and  include in CBP’s Performance and Annual Report data and analysis  provided by the additional performance measures on the performance  of interior checkpoints and what might be done to improve their  effectiveness.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of  Homeland Security. In its response, DHS said the report is factually  correct, agreed with our recommendations, and stated that CBP is taking  steps to implement them.  With regard to our first recommendation, that  the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection develop  performance measures for the Border Patrol in addition to its traditional  ones, for the productivity and effectiveness of interior checkpoints, DHS  stated that CBP is in the process of developing such measures for the  Border Patrol for fiscal year 2006 and that one or more of the performance  measures will gauge the effectiveness of checkpoints.  DHS stated that  CBP will consider our suggestions when developing these measures.  With  regard to our second recommendation, that CBP include in its  Performance and Annual Report data and analysis provided by the  additional performance measures on the performance of interior  checkpoints, and what might be done to improve their effectiveness, DHS  stated that once the performance measures for fiscal year 2006 for the  Border Patrol are implemented and the data are tracked, CBP will publish  the information in its Performance and Annual Report.
DHS’s comments are reprinted in appendix VI.  DHS also offered technical  comments, which we considered and incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department of  Homeland Security and interested congressional committees. We will also  make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will  be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-8777 or StanaR@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address our objectives, we examined and analyzed Border Patrol  documents, reports, manuals, and guidance concerning border strategy  and checkpoint operations.  We interviewed cognizant Border Patrol  officials at Washington, D.C. headquarters, officials in four sector offices,  and personnel at selected permanent and tactical checkpoints. We visited  sector headquarters, stations, and interior traffic checkpoints in four  Border Patrol sectors—San Diego, California and Tucson, Arizona, and  two in southeastern Texas, Laredo and McAllen.  In total, we visited three  sector headquarter offices, seven stations, five permanent checkpoints,  and three tactical checkpoints.  Sector offices and interior checkpoints we  visited had one or more of the following characteristics:    offices that oversee permanent or tactical checkpoints, or both, to  obtain information about both types,    permanent, nonpermanent, and tactical checkpoints with high, medium  or low vehicular traffic volume,    permanent, nonpermanent, and tactical checkpoints with high, medium  or low estimated smuggling volume (either aliens or contraband, or  both), and    checkpoints that varied in terrain, with some situated with little  peripheral area to evade the checkpoint and others situated so that  patrols must be set up to prevent end runs.
We visited and observed operations at the following Border Patrol sectors,  which were selected to provide a range in type and size of operation:    Border Patrol stations and checkpoints in the Tucson, Arizona, sector  where only nonpermanent checkpoints are permitted under current  law, and because that sector has the most annual apprehensions of  illegal immigrants.  Also, we wanted to compare the operations of the  Tucson sector interior checkpoints with the operations of tactical and  permanent ones elsewhere.
Permanent and tactical checkpoints in the San Diego, California, sector  because it contains two permanent ones with high volume—Temecula  and San Clemente—and two requesters asked that these be included in  a broader study of the effectiveness of all interior traffic checkpoints.
Permanent checkpoints in Texas at Falfurrias and Hebbronville, and on  I-35, north of Laredo, as well as Border Patrol stations in Falfurrias and  Hebbronville.  The former is in the McAllen sector, while the latter is in  the Laredo sector.
Ports of entry at San Diego, California; Douglas, Arizona; and Laredo,  Texas.  We did so in order to better understand the differences  between the operations of these ports of entry at the international  border and the operations of the interior traffic checkpoints.
Via helicopter, we observed the terrain and Border Patrol activities along a  60-mile section of the international border, from San Diego inland and  along approximately 200 miles of the border in the Tucson sector, from  Ajo to Douglas, Arizona.
The four sectors we visited were selected to provide a substantial range in  the size and types of interior checkpoint operations; estimated volume of  illegal annual immigration; volume of vehicular traffic transiting  checkpoints; topography and density of road networks; presence or  absence of large urban areas on or near the border, both on the U.S. and  Mexican sides; and types of checkpoints (permanent, nonpermanent, and  tactical).  As we were told by the Border Patrol in deciding which sectors  and checkpoints to visit, and as we found during our site visits, these four  sectors contained a wide variety of operating conditions.  For example, the  San Diego sector’s permanent checkpoint near San Clemente on I-5 has  the highest volume of average daily vehicle traffic among the Border  Patrol’s 33 permanent checkpoints on the southwest border, while those  north of Laredo, Texas, and at Falfurrias, Texas, average daily traffic  volume about one-tenth that amount.  Some of the tactical checkpoints we  visited have average daily traffic volume that is only about one-hundredth  that of San Clemente/I-5—that is, 1,500 vehicles or less daily, according to  the Border Patrol and based on our observations during site visits.  Similarly, there were substantial variations in the estimated numbers of  illegal immigrants entering these sectors over the last several years, and  wide differences in topography, with some being comparatively  mountainous and others being comparatively flat.  The Laredo and  McAllen sectors have the Rio Grande as a natural barrier during the winter  months to illegal immigration, while the Tucson sector has a flat desert at  the border that is easily crossed.  Some sectors have permanent  checkpoints, such as at Temecula, California, that must be supplemented  with tactical checkpoints, because of substantial secondary road networks  around the permanent checkpoint.  Others, such as McAllen, have no  alternative secondary roads available to evade the permanent checkpoints  on the limited north-south highways.  Some sectors, such as San Diego and  Laredo, have large U.S. and Mexican urban areas on or very near the  international border, while others, such as Tucson, have only a few much  smaller cities on either side at the border.  In choosing these sectors,  which are located in three of the four southwest border states (California,  Arizona and Texas, but not New Mexico) we sought and found a wide  range of conditions that appear to reasonably represent the range of  operating conditions faced by the Border Patrol across the Southwest.  However, it is also the case that we were unable to observe all operating  conditions at all times and that the conditions we describe are therefore  based on available documentation and observations at our site visits only.
We also interviewed selected officials in communities near some of the  interior checkpoints, including local law enforcement and community  officials, selected community leaders, citizens, and owners of local  businesses.  These included the communities of Temecula, California;  Nogales, Arizona; Laredo, Texas, and the small town of Tubac, between  Nogales and Tucson, Arizona.  Because these places and persons were  selected using a nonprobabilistic method, the results from our site visits  cannot be generalized to other locations, checkpoints, local officials, or  citizens.
We contacted organizations that could be expected to monitor traffic  congestion as part of their work, including the Automobile Club of  Southern California, the American Trucking Associations, the California  Department of Transportation, and the California Highway Patrol.  We  asked these organizations for reports, studies, or information on traffic  congestion at selected interior traffic checkpoints we had visited, in  particular those with high daily vehicle volume.
To assess the reliability of the Border Patrol’s data on apprehensions,  contraband seizures, and work hours, we talked with agency officials at  both Washington, D.C., headquarters and some Border Patrol stations in  the field about data quality control procedures, including methods by  which data are checked and reviewed internally for accuracy and  consistency.  We also obtained and reviewed relevant documentation.  We  determined the data on apprehensions, contraband seizures, and work  hours were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.  However,  we agreed with Border Patrol officials that the data on costs of  checkpoints were not sufficiently reliable to be used.
To determine whether available Border Patrol data could be used to  measure the performance of interior checkpoints compared with the  performance of operations on the border (line patrol and line watch), both  within and among Border Patrol sectors, we developed two measures of  performance—apprehensions per agent work year and cost of  apprehensions per agent work year.  We chose to do this because the  Border Patrol uses only traditional law enforcement measures to report on  its performance, including apprehensions and amount and type of  contraband seized.  These are not assessed relative to the inputs (agent  labor, overhead costs) that went into achieving them and therefore do not  provide a guide on how to better allocate agency resources.
To develop our first performance measure, apprehensions per agent work  year, we obtained data from the Border Patrol for each of the four sectors  we visited on the total number of agent work hours recorded as charged  by agents who work at interior checkpoint operations, and for line watch  and line patrol.  (Line watch and line patrol operate very closely together  on the border, and data are not recorded separately for them by the  Border Patrol.)  We were unable to perform an apprehensions per agent  work year analysis for permanent or tactical checkpoints because data on  agent hours charged to individual checkpoints are not recorded.  That is,  while work records are kept for hours charged by agents at interior  checkpoints, the records do not distinguish between hours charged at  permanent checkpoints versus those charged to tactical checkpoints in the  same sector.
Using the data charged to interior checkpoints and line watch/line patrol  for each sector, we then divided these total hours by 2,080, which is the  total number of hours in a standard work year of 52 weeks, and 40 work  hours per week.  (The Border Patrol work year is the same as that of the  rest of the U.S. government.)  The total agent work hours at checkpoints in  a given sector, divided by 2,080, produced a data point that we called agent  work years.  Thus, if 2,080,000 hours were charged, the work year total  would have been 1,000 work years—2,080,000 divided by 2,080.
To calculate what we term apprehensions per agent work, we then took  the data we had obtained on the number of apprehensions that occurred at  interior checkpoints in each sector in a given fiscal year and divided that  number by the agent work year calculation.  For example, if 10,000  apprehensions occurred at interior checkpoints in a sector, and 2,000  agent work years had been recorded as having been worked at those  checkpoints, the apprehensions per agent work year were 5 (10,000  apprehensions divided by 2,000 work years).  Of course, this did not  include the work of support personnel that contribute indirectly to the  outcome of apprehensions.
Our second measure was cost per apprehension, with apprehension  actually being apprehension per work year, to control for the known input  of agent work years.
We chose this measure because a question that is frequently, if not almost  universally, asked about government programs, is, “What is known about  their cost effectiveness?”  One potential measure of such cost  effectiveness for the Border Patrol would be how much did it cost to  apprehend a single person in one sector, compared with other sectors?   While this measure and others should not be taken in isolation as further  guides to management decisions, knowledge of the basic costs of an  agency’s key outcomes (such as apprehensions of illegal entrants) per unit  of input (agent labor costs) can be part of the basis for improved  allocation of resources.  Of course, it would be even better if the full costs  of all the inputs were known, such as infrastructure overhead, but these  were not available.  Therefore, we used data that were available as a  method of illustrating how cost effectiveness measures could be more  fully developed by the Border Patrol.
To calculate cost per apprehension per agent work year, we divided the  outputs by the inputs—in this case, the data on apprehensions per work  year (e.g., 521 in Tucson in fiscal year 2001) divided by the average cost of  an agent work year in fiscal year 2004, which the Border Patrol stated was  $53,000, or the nationwide average for the GS-11, step 2, rank.  This was  described as the national average for Border Patrol agents; of course, it is  an average for all agents, and does not reflect variations in cost of living  adjustments, or for the true wider range of all Border Patrol salaries.  We  used the $53,000 average work year cost for all calculations for the period  covering fiscal years 2001-2004 and did not adjust the work year cost for  inflation.  Our goal was again to show what the approximate cost per  apprehension had been and how this measure could serve as a resource  allocation tool, along with other information and data.
We conducted our work from September 2004 to May 2005 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: San Diego Sector Profile
subsections: section_title: Geography of the Sector
paragraphs: The San Diego sector’s area of responsibility includes all of San Diego  County and substantial portions of Orange and Riverside counties in  California, covering more than 7,000 square miles and 60 miles of  international border with Mexico.  The San Diego sector encompasses  coastal beaches and expansive mesas to coastal and inland mountains,  rugged canyons, and high desert.  Over half of the border in this sector  consists of mountains, but there are also lesser amounts of rolling  brushland, urban hilly terrain, canyons, farmland, flat desert, and flat  urban terrain.  Directly to the south of San Diego lie the Mexican cities of  Tijuana and Tecate, Baja California—with a combined population of more  than 2 million.  For decades, this area was the preferred corridor for illegal  immigration because of the highly populated neighborhoods north and  south of the border.
section_title: Organizational Structure of the Sector
paragraphs: At the time of our September and December 2004 visits, the sector was  headed by a chief patrol agent, had seven Border Patrol stations, and 1,634  agents on duty.  The sector used four-wheel-drive vehicles, police sedans,  and vans to patrol between two parallel fences that were constructed  along the border, stretching about 16 miles inland from the Pacific Ocean.  In addition, the sector uses all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), helicopters,  mountain bikes, and horses to patrol border areas.  Seismic sensors are  also used to identify where smugglers and illegal aliens are attempting to  cross the border between the official ports of entry.
The sector has 4 permanent interior traffic checkpoints and up to 11  tactical checkpoints, which are operated on an as-needed basis (see fig.  10).  The two busiest permanent checkpoints in the sector are the ones  located (1) on northbound I-5, south of San Clemente, about 68 miles from  the border, and (2) on northbound I-15, near Temecula, also located about  68 miles from the border.
Most of the tactical checkpoints in the San Diego sector are operated by  the Temecula station, which can field up to 8 tactical checkpoints located  on a network of secondary state highways leading roughly northwest from  the eastern San Diego area toward Los Angeles, and paralleling or  intersecting the major I-15 interstate highway.  According to Border Patrol  officials, secondary roads make it possible for smugglers and illegal aliens  to try to circumvent the I-15 Temecula checkpoint by taking side roads,  unlike the San Clemente I-5 checkpoint, which has no surrounding  secondary roads.  Figure 10 shows the approximate location of the  permanent checkpoints, on I-5 (San Clemente) and on I-15 (Temecula), as  well as some of the approximate locations used for tactical checkpoints,  not all of which operate simultaneously.
De Luz Rd.
section_title: Overview of Checkpoint Operations
paragraphs: We observed that the operations and physical layout of the two permanent  checkpoints at San Clemente and Temecula were largely similar, and  although the local geography differs somewhat, both checkpoints are  situated at locations with high surrounding hills or other barriers (e.g., the  ocean at the I-5 checkpoint), making it difficult to simply drive around the  checkpoints.
The I-5 checkpoint south of San Clemente has four traffic lanes, and  Border Patrol agents stand between the lanes to screen traffic (see fig.   11).  Trucks pass through the adjoining weigh station, where they too are  screened.
The I-15 checkpoint near Temecula is similar to the one south of San  Clemente, in terms of the Border Patrol agents having to monitor multiple  lanes of traffic on a very busy highway.  A major difference is that  secondary roads south of the checkpoint offer alternative routes for  persons to try to evade the I-15 Temecula checkpoint.
According to Border Patrol officials, it is difficult for smugglers and illegal  aliens to avoid the San Clemente I-5 traffic checkpoint because it is  located in a physically constricted area between high hills on the right  (facing north) and the ocean on the left, with no readily accessible side  roads for miles prior to the checkpoint, because the Marine Corps’ Camp  Pendleton borders it on the east.  To circumvent the checkpoint,  smugglers and illegal aliens must either go through a state park, where  there are state park police, or through the hilly terrain of Camp Pendleton,  where there are military police, according to the Border Patrol officials.  Vehicles are observable for at least a mile south from cameras at the  checkpoint, so that those attempting to improperly enter Camp Pendleton  would be visible to the Border Patrol.
Figure 12 shows an aerial photo of the I-5 checkpoint, with the hills in  Camp Pendleton on the side of the checkpoint area to the upper right, and  the ocean to the lower left of the checkpoint, making evasions of the  checkpoint difficult.
As of November 2004, the San Clemente station was staffed with a patrol-  agent-in-charge and approximately 100 Border Patrol agents.  The  Temecula station was also staffed by a patrol-agent-in-charge and had  approximately 127 agents.
During our visit to the I-5 checkpoint, we observed agents performing  traffic checks (i.e., screening vehicles) by staffing positions on the  highway.  We observed two agents standing between the lanes of the  northbound I-5 traffic; each was responsible for screening vehicles that  approached him or her.
We were told that agents look for visual clues that could indicate drug or  alien smuggling, as occurred in an incident we observed.  During our visit,  an agent told us that on the basis of such visual clues, he sent a vehicle to  secondary inspection, where all passengers were later identified as illegal  aliens.
In another lane, closest to the center of the freeway, was a Pre-Enrolled  Access Lane (PAL) which permitted vehicles to use an electronic  transponder to move through more quickly than the normal traffic lanes.  (Obtaining a transponder requires passing a background investigation; San  Clemente is the only U.S. checkpoint with such a lane.)  However, an agent  was also positioned at the PAL lane, and during the period we were there,  a vehicle that attempted to go through it without a transponder was  ordered into secondary inspection, where it was determined that the  occupants were illegal aliens.
The I-5 checkpoint also performs checks on buses, which are to stop at the  checkpoint, and on trucks, which are to transit the adjoining weigh  station.  The Border Patrol also screens trucks at that point, at times using  the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) machines, which use  gamma-ray technology to examine the contents of vehicles.
At the checkpoints, all suspected smugglers or illegal aliens are  fingerprinted using the Automated Biometric Identification system and a  law enforcement check is run on their fingerprints through the FBI’s  Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS).  If  persons are determined to be undocumented aliens or are wanted for  other offenses, detention facilities are available at the checkpoints.
Border Patrol officials said that having the ability to perform fingerprint  and law enforcement checks at the checkpoints enables them to quickly  determine if detained persons are illegal aliens or have outstanding  criminal complaints pending against them.  Border Patrol officials told us  that they had been conducting a project to identify the numbers of illegal  aliens with criminal records that had been apprehended in areas around  the Temecula and San Clemente checkpoints.  For example, after  matching fingerprints with IAFIS during a 6-week period from August to  September 2004, they found that 157 illegal aliens with criminal records  had been apprehended by Temecula Border Patrol agents.  These illegal  aliens had criminal records that included assault, burglary, and  immigration offenses.  Overall, during the 6-week period, 28 percent of  Temecula’s and 22 percent of San Clemente’s apprehensions were illegal  aliens with criminal records.
section_title: Traffic Impact
paragraphs: The Border Patrol regards the I-5 and I-15 checkpoints as 24-hour  checkpoints, closing them generally only for safety reasons.  However, as  we observed when we visited the two checkpoints, heavy traffic volume  may preclude screening every northbound vehicle.  As noted above, the I-5  checkpoint south of San Clemente is the busiest interior traffic checkpoint  in the nation, with approximately 144,000 vehicles passing through daily,  while the Temecula I-15 checkpoint ranks second, with approximately  122,000 vehicles daily.  However, as we observed, and as San Clemente  and Temecula checkpoint officials told us, when traffic backs up, the  traffic checks are suspended and traffic is “flushed” through the  checkpoint.
Agents said that they know from experience how long a wait period traffic  backups are likely to produce, and that they keep a close watch on how  long the line has become.  During our visit, we observed that Border Patrol  agents monitored traffic and took action to avoid creating major traffic  delays at these checkpoints.
Since the Border Patrol agents may suspend their operations to avoid  creating lengthy traffic delays, actual time that the agents stand out on the  highway lanes and visually inspect traffic varies.  Checkpoint records  showed that at the I-5 checkpoint south of San Clemente, traffic was  screened only about 36 percent of the time in fiscal year 2004, a reduction  from about 57 percent in fiscal year 2003 and about 63 percent in fiscal  year 2002.  Temecula checkpoint traffic was screened only about 42  percent of the time in fiscal year 2004, down from about 63 percent of the  time in fiscal year 2003.  Border Patrol officials attributed these declines to  a combination of insufficient staffing levels at the stations and the need to  avoid imposing long traffic waits on the public.  According to Temecula  station officials at the time of our September 2004 visit, they had received  no complaints for at least several months about traffic delays.
section_title: Checkpoint Capabilities
paragraphs: We observed that the permanent checkpoints at San Clemente and  Temecula had a range of capabilities to monitor and inspect vehicles and  their occupants. These included    concrete side aprons off the highway to permit more intensive    cages and shade for canines,    surveillance cameras for monitoring activities at the checkpoint and    computers with hardline communications,    detention facilities for holding smugglers and illegal aliens, and    concrete side aprons with their own traffic lane to permit trucks to line  up for VACIS gamma-ray inspections.
section_title: Tactical Checkpoints Supplement Permanent Ones
paragraphs: In addition to manning the permanent checkpoints, the Border Patrol  routinely sets up tactical checkpoints to reduce the chances of persons  evading the permanent ones by using secondary roads.  In particular, the  Temecula checkpoint has eight locations where tactical checkpoints are  established as needed based on intelligence on illegal immigration or  related activity.  We observed a tactical checkpoint on Sandia Creek road,  south and west of the I-15 checkpoint, in a back hill rural area that had  little traffic, but where the secondary road network could allow for  evading checkpoints on the main highway (see fig. 13).  At this tactical  checkpoint, agents stopped each vehicle and talked to drivers and  passengers; in contrast, at permanent checkpoints with heavy traffic  volume, most vehicles are not stopped but are observed as they move  slowly through the checkpoint lanes.
section_title: Appendix III: Tucson Sector Profile
subsections: section_title: Geography and Organization of the Sector
paragraphs: The Tucson, Arizona, sector’s area of responsibility runs 261 miles along  the U.S.-Mexico border from New Mexico to the Yuma County, Arizona,  line; it is 90,530 square miles in area.  The sector encompasses national  parkland and parts of the Tohono O’odham Indian reservation, and its  environment is like that of much of the southwest border—the terrain is  inhospitable, consisting of mountains, flat desert, rolling brushland, and  canyons.  Summer temperatures can reach an average daily high of 100 to  110 degrees, and lack of shade for vast stretches of the border and inland  areas can pose severe health hazards to those attempting to walk across  the area.
Most of the border in this sector is delineated by cattle fences and border  markers, with little effective fencing of any kind, according to Border  Patrol officials.  Cattle fences can prevent cattle from crossing the border,  but they are not designed or intended to prevent people from doing so, as  they are essentially strands of wire with large gaps between them and are  easily pushed apart, according to the officials.  Agents patrol the border by  truck, aircraft, horseback, ATVs, and bicycles and on foot; maintain traffic  checkpoints along highways leading from border areas; and conduct  antismuggling investigations.
At the time of our October 2004 visit, the sector was headed by a chief  patrol agent and staffed by 2,100 Border Patrol agents deployed  throughout the sector from eight Border Patrol stations.
section_title: Overview of Sector Operations
paragraphs: Border Patrol operations in the Tucson sector have been the subject of  legislative direction since fiscal year 1999; this direction applied to no  other Border Patrol sector.  For fiscal years 1999-2004, annual  appropriations acts made no funds “available for the site acquisition,  design, or construction” of any Border Patrol checkpoint in the Tucson  sector.  Since the Tucson sector had no permanent checkpoints in fiscal  year 1999 (or before), the effect of this legislative language was that no  permanent checkpoints could be planned or constructed in this sector.
To comply with the congressional ban on funding for permanent  checkpoints, and the congressional requirement to relocate checkpoints  after a specified period of days, the Border Patrol told us that the sector  maintains what we term nonpermanent checkpoints that, when open, are  generally at the same locations, with the exception of one on I-19, from  June 2002 through fiscal year 2004, and another on state highway 83.  On I- 19, a major north-south interstate highway that runs from Nogales on the  border north to Tucson, about 70 miles away, nonpermanent checkpoints  were alternated between KP 42 and KP 25, 17 kilometers further south,  from June 2002 through the end of fiscal year 2004.  Starting in fiscal year  2005, the Border Patrol kept the checkpoint at the KP 42 location to  preclude illegal entrants from taking advantage of its being moved  southward to KP 25, as had regularly occurred.  The checkpoint is kept  open for 14 days, closed for 8 hours, then reopened for 14 days, and so  forth, according to the Border Patrol.  The Border Patrol states that it  believes that this schedule conforms to the fiscal year 2005 legislative  language requiring that Tucson sector checkpoints relocate “at least an  average of once every 14 days.”  Other checkpoints in the sector have been  opened and closed on varying schedules in fiscal year 2005, but those  schedules also conform to the law, according to the Border Patrol.  To  support these nonpermanent checkpoints, the Tucson sector operates  tactical checkpoints periodically, as occurs in other sectors with  permanent checkpoints.  The tactical checkpoints function the same way  as tactical ones in other sectors with permanent checkpoints.
Figure 14 shows the sector and the approximate locations at which  nonpermanent checkpoints may be located when open.
According to the Border Patrol, it also alternates among three sites for  checkpoints on state highway 83.  (The approximate locations are shown  as 83C MP54, 83C, and 82 in fig. 14).  Because of safety issues, the  nonpermanent checkpoints designated as SR 90, 80C and highway 191 do  not have alternative sites.  They are kept open for the legislatively  permitted length of time, and then closed, according to the Border Patrol.   Another checkpoint is open and closed about the same hours as a port of  entry south of it on the border.  However, the Border Patrol monitors  sector night traffic with various means, such as roving patrols; these are  sufficient, they told us, given the very light traffic in the sector at night.
section_title: Checkpoint Operations
paragraphs: We observed the operations of the nonpermanent checkpoint on I-19, the  north-south interstate highway that runs from Nogales on the border north  to Tucson, about 70 miles away.  According to Border Patrol officials, only  limited routes are available to circumvent the I-19 checkpoint, primarily by  driving or walking across countryside that can make smugglers or aliens  relatively visible, because of vehicles raising dust in their wake.  In fiscal  year 2003, an average of over 15,000 vehicles passed through the I-19  checkpoint daily, including many commercial trucks, especially during  produce season, according to the officials.
The I-19 nonpermanent checkpoint consisted of a trailer, portable  generators, water, and rest room facilities that were towed in; traffic  warning signs; and orange traffic cones to designate the checkpoint area  and to slow vehicles down to be inspected.  At the time of our visit, the I- 19 checkpoint was located next to an overpass to provide some protection  from the elements, since there was no canopy as is typically found at  permanent checkpoints we visited in other sectors.  Border Patrol officials  also said that only two locations along I-19 are appropriate for checkpoint  operations because of space and safety considerations.  From June 2002  through the end of fiscal year 2004, the I-19 checkpoint was alternated  between these two locations, at KP 42 and KP 25, relocating every 7 days.  During fiscal year 2005, the checkpoint location has been maintained only  at the northern location, as noted above, and is open for 14 days, then  closed for 8 hours, and then reopened for 14 days.
At the I-19 checkpoint locations, the Border Patrol has three lanes of  northbound traffic to screen—two highway lanes and an off-ramp.  The  operation, consisting of Border Patrol agents and canines, was run out of a  trailer, with a small detention room inside it, and a stand-alone computer  not connected externally.  There was no hardwired computer access to  databases to check fingerprints or to validate identities through other law  enforcement databases.  Therefore, according to Border Patrol agents,  they can process some reports on the computer but have to save  information to a diskette and take it back to the station for further  processing.  Similarly, processing and fingerprinting of suspects must wait  until the suspects are transported to a Border Patrol station with  hardwired computers.
During summer months, we were told, the temperature can reach about  130 degrees on the heated tarmac of the highway; as a result, canine  performance and endurance are limited.
According to the Border Patrol, equipment that must be relocated when  the I-19 and other checkpoints are moved includes a minimum of 3 light  generator plants; 1 generator; 1 portable toilet; 20-100 traffic cones; and 5  or more signs, showing “Stop,” “Checkpoint Ahead,” “Reduce Speed,” and  similar warnings.  In addition, the standard minimum deployment would  be one processing trailer and detention area, two or more marked vehicles  and a water trailer.
The I-19 checkpoint at KP 42 had little area off-road to conduct secondary  inspections, and that area consisted of dirt along the side of the highway.  Border Patrol officials told us that to comply with legislative restrictions,  they were unable to install anything that could be considered to create a  permanent infrastructure, such as water lines, electricity, buried  communication lines or towers, and buildings.  Figure 15 shows the I-19  nonpermanent checkpoint near KP 42.
section_title: Checkpoint on State Highway 85 Near Ajo, Arizona
paragraphs: We also observed the nonpermanent checkpoint on state highway 85, near  Ajo, Arizona.  According to Border Patrol officials, this checkpoint is  located just south of where state highways 85 and 86 merge, both coming  from the south, in order to ensure that all vehicles traveling north must go  through the checkpoint.  Only about 1,100 vehicles transit this checkpoint  daily, we were told.  As with the I-19 checkpoint, there were only limited  portable equipment capabilities at the Ajo checkpoint.  There was no  overpass to provide shade.  The Ajo checkpoint is shown in figure 16.
section_title: Appendix IV: Laredo Sector Profile
subsections: section_title: Geography of the Sector
paragraphs: The Laredo, Texas, Border Patrol sector covers 110,000 square miles, 116  counties or parts of counties extending north to the Oklahoma border, and  approximately 171 river miles of common border with Mexico.  The  sector’s eastern border is the McAllen sector, its southern border is the  Rio Grande, and its western border is the Del Rio sector.  The sector’s  international border represents about 10.6 percent of the southwest  border, and includes the International Falcon Reservoir, sometimes called  Falcon Lake, a 120-square-mile body of water that was formed by damming  the Rio Grande in 1953.  The southwestern side of the lake is controlled by  Mexico, the northeastern side by the United States, with the international  border running down an imaginary line through the middle.
The sector’s diverse economic base includes portions of the Rio Grande  Valley, with large, privately owned cattle ranches, other agribusiness, and  a large volume of goods from Mexico that are trucked through the Laredo  ports of entry into the United States, and which are then stored in  warehouses while awaiting inspection and transfer into trucks for  transport to the rest of the United States.  According to Border Patrol  officials, Laredo is one of the busiest commercial ports of entry in the  United States.  The sector landscape generally consists of rolling  brushland, reservoirs, farmland, and urban flatland, with the more rural  sections being fairly flat but also having dense undergrowth that can  impede persons such as smugglers or illegal aliens attempting to walk off- road, according to Border Patrol officials.
section_title: Organizational Structure of the Laredo Sector
paragraphs: At the time of our January 2005 visit, the sector was headed by a chief  patrol agent and staffed with 981 Border Patrol agents, deployed  throughout the sector from eight Border Patrol stations.  The sector had  ATVs, helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, and patrol boats; the last are used to  patrol the International Falcon Reservoir.  The patrol boats are not used  for Rio Grande patrol, but jet skis are used for swift water river rescues,  according to Border Patrol officials.  Approximately 80 canines are also  assigned to traffic screening operations at the sector’s checkpoints.
The sector has five permanent checkpoints that screen traffic 24 hours a  day, 7 days a week, generally closing only for safety reasons, and utilizes  up to six tactical checkpoints that are opened on an as-needed basis,  according to Border Patrol officials.  We visited two permanent  checkpoints in the sector, on two-lane state highway 351, in the vicinity of  Hebbronville, and on I-35, the major north-south interstate highway  leading to and from Laredo and San Antonio.  We also visited the  construction site of a new, replacement permanent checkpoint for the  existing one on I-35, about 10 miles north of the current location.  That  new checkpoint is scheduled to open in August 2005, according to Border  Patrol officials.
There are more secondary roads in the Laredo sector than in the  neighboring McAllen sector; as a result, the Border Patrol maintains more  permanent checkpoints and also utilizes tactical checkpoints. According  to Border Patrol officials, tactical checkpoints are used during certain  times of the year, depending on factors such as increases in traffic on  secondary roads, and local, state, or national events being conducted in  the area.  The sector’s permanent and tactical checkpoints are strategically  placed on roads and highways and at junctions that permit monitoring and  inspection of vehicles leaving the border area, according to the officials  (see fig. 17).
According to the Border Patrol, traffic checkpoint operations are generally  supported by local ranchers, who permit the Border Patrol to enter their  fenced property.  The ranchers also permit the Border Patrol to place  sensors at locations that could be favored by smugglers, according to  Border Patrol officials.
section_title: Checkpoint Operations
paragraphs: We observed the operations of two permanent checkpoints in the Laredo  sector; on I-35, about 15 miles north of Laredo, and another on state  highway 359 between Falfurrias in the McAllen sector and Laredo.  As was  the case with other checkpoints we visited in this and the McAllen sector,  the checkpoints had a tollbooth-like area with at least two traffic lanes,  one reserved for passenger cars and trucks, and the other for commercial  trucks and buses (see fig. 18).
At the time of our visit, the I-35 checkpoint was staffed with one  supervisor, six agents, and canines.  The facility consisted of a trailer that  contained IAFIS fingerprinting equipment, three holding areas for  apprehended illegal aliens, and video cameras (including infrared for  nighttime use) to monitor activities in and around the checkpoint.  Border  Patrol agents told us that I-35 vehicle traffic wait time has not been more  than 20 to 30 minutes, and generally takes place around 2:00 p.m.  We  observed a lift that could be used to inspect under vehicles, but did not  observe trucks being examined by gamma ray equipment.  We asked  whether VACIS equipment was available to screen trucks with gamma ray  as we had seen at other checkpoints, and the agents told us that VACIS  trucks were not permanently located at the checkpoint but are made  available periodically by the official port of entry if they are requested.
As was the case for checkpoints in the McAllen sector, those in the Laredo  sector are directed to inspect every vehicle that is proceeding northward,  according to Border Patrol officials.  Because there are few north-south  roads in the sector, an absence of secondary roads to go around the  checkpoints, and manageable volume of traffic, it is possible to screen all  vehicles transiting the checkpoints, according to Border Patrol officials.  As we observed, each vehicle was sniffed by a canine, and occupants were  questioned by a Border Patrol agent.  We were told that the agents are able  to process a vehicle on average in about 9 seconds.  The checkpoint at I-35  averages about 13,600 transiting vehicles daily, according to the Texas  Department of Transportation; of these, about 36 percent are trucks.
Border Patrol agents at the highway 359 checkpoint outside of  Hebbronville (see fig. 19) told us that they had recently apprehended a  number of “brush walkers,” illegal aliens who had been walking through  the brush surrounding the checkpoint to evade apprehension at the  checkpoint.  The agents said that smugglers will drop off a load of aliens  just short of the checkpoint so that they can attempt to walk around to a  point where they would be picked up again.  However, the agents said that  it is very difficult terrain to traverse, even along ranch and pipeline trails,  which are monitored by several means, including electronic surveillance.  The agents further stated that local ranchers are very supportive of the  Border Patrol activities in the area and have provided keys to their  ranches for access when intrusions are detected, or when the ranchers  themselves call to notify agents that suspected illegal aliens are on the  property.  Figures 19 and 20 show two checkpoints in the sector.
section_title: Checkpoint Capabilities
paragraphs: The Laredo checkpoints we observed had a wide range of capabilities to  screen vehicles and their occupants.  These included    permanent tollboth-like structures that provide cover from the  weather, including shade for agents and canines;  lifts to permit inspection of undersides of vehicles;    computers with hardwired communications and databases to permit  investigation into those detained;    detention facilities; and    concrete side aprons with their own traffic lanes to permit trucks to  line up with off highway room for inspections.
As noted, a new I-35 checkpoint is scheduled to open in August 2005,  about 10 miles north of the current location.  Border Patrol officials told  us that one major advantage of the new location is that it will not be within  sight of warehouses or other structures, which they said currently provide  cover for smugglers to observe the operations at the existing I-35  checkpoint.  The new checkpoint, which will cost about $12 million to  construct, will be able to accommodate six lanes of vehicles, with separate  lanes for passenger vehicles and trucks, along with a large area for  inspecting and unloading trucks, if necessary (see fig. 21).
section_title: Appendix V: McAllen Sector Profile
subsections: section_title: Geography of the Sector
paragraphs: The McAllen, Texas, Border Patrol sector covers 18,584 square miles, 19  counties, and approximately 316 river miles of common border with  Mexico.  According to Border Patrol officials, the sector’s area of  responsibility runs from the mouth of the Rio Grande at the Gulf of Mexico  to the Zapata/Starr county line, where it meets the Laredo sector.  The  sector’s international border represents about 9.4 percent of the southwest  border; its southern edge follows the Rio Grande through Brownsville,  emptying into the Gulf of Mexico.  Large parts of the sector, which  includes a portion of the Rio Grande Valley, are privately owned ranches,  including the well-known King Ranch, which is approximately 800,000  acres in size.
Although the land in the sector is fairly flat, it receives sufficient  precipitation to permit growth of dense sage, scrub brush, and cacti.  This  has created an inhospitable environment for persons such as smugglers or  illegal aliens attempting to walk off-road, as the brush is so thick that it  can actually block foot traffic or can severely injure persons trying to  negotiate it, according to Border Patrol officials.
section_title: Organizational Structure of the Sector
paragraphs: At the time of our February 2005 visit, the sector was headed by a chief  patrol agent and staffed with 1,465 Border Patrol agents, deployed  throughout the sector from nine Border Patrol stations.  The sector had  ATVs, helicopters, patrol boats, and fixed wing aircraft.  The sector also  utilizes bicycle patrols around the ports of entry and downtown areas, and  video monitors and electronic sensors placed along the border to detect  people or vehicles attempting to enter the country illegally.
Only two major north-south highways in the sector lead away from the  border: U.S. highways 281 and 77.  The Border Patrol has permanent  checkpoints on both, at Falfurrias and Sarita, respectively.  Both  checkpoints are approximately 80 miles inland from the international  border and are roughly parallel to each other, although about 25 miles  apart (see fig. 22).  Border Patrol officials told us that the combination of  only two north-south highways and the absence of secondary roads make  it unnecessary to establish tactical checkpoints in support of the  permanent ones.  The checkpoints at Falfurrias and Sarita cannot be easily  evaded by walking or driving around them, given the terrain, fenced  private ranches, detection sensors, and lack of secondary roads, Border  Patrol officials stated.
Much of the land near the Border Patrol checkpoints on U.S. highways 281  and 77 is private ranch land that is both heavily fenced and actively  patrolled by private security forces, according to Border Patrol officials.  As in the Laredo sector, checkpoint operations are supported by the local  ranchers, according to the Border Patrol, who permit the Border Patrol to  enter their fenced property to apprehend illegal entrants.
section_title: Checkpoint Operations
paragraphs: We observed the operations of the Falfurrias permanent checkpoint on  U.S. highway 281, a major north-south highway that runs from McAllen on  the border north toward San Antonio, Texas (see fig.  22).  This checkpoint  (and the one on U.S. highway 77, which we did not visit) had a tollbooth- like area with at least two traffic lanes, one reserved for passenger cars  and trucks, while the other is for commercial trucks and buses.  At both  checkpoints, Border Patrol agents are to stop and screen every vehicle  that is proceeding northward.  As we observed, each vehicle was sniffed  by a canine, and its occupants were questioned by a Border Patrol agent.   We also observed a bus being searched, after a canine got a “hit,”  indicating possible drugs.  The agents found three 30-pound packages of  marijuana in the engine compartment.
According to Border Patrol officials, the agents process a vehicle in about  9 seconds and average about 14,900 vehicles—about 40 percent trucks—a  day transiting the checkpoints.  This volume of traffic allows for agents to  stop and question occupants of each vehicle, compared with the 144,000  vehicles daily going through the California checkpoint on I-5 south of San  Clemente.
There is little need to use tactical checkpoints in support of the permanent  ones in the McAllen sector, according to Border Patrol officials, because a  lack of secondary roads and geography that is not easily traversed force  smugglers and illegal aliens to attempt to proceed through the checkpoints  on U.S. highways 281 and 77.  This situation is in contrast to the Tucson  and San Diego sector operations, where tactical checkpoints on secondary  roads are constantly being used to support the permanent checkpoints  because of the many different routes leading away from the border that  are available to smugglers and illegal aliens.
section_title: Checkpoint Capabilities
paragraphs: The permanent checkpoints on U.S. highways 281 and 77 had a wide range  of capabilities and facilities to screen vehicles and their occupants.  These  included    permanent tollbooth-like structures that provide cover from the  weather, including shade for agents and canines;  lifts to permit inspection of undersides of vehicles;    computers with hardwired communications and databases to provide    detention facilities; and    concrete side aprons away from main traffic lanes that permit trucks to  safely line up with sufficient room for a VACIS gamma-ray vehicle to  pass over and inspect them.
Figure 23 shows several photos of the checkpoint on U.S. highway 281,  near Falfurrias, Texas.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Leo Barbour, Katherine Davis,  Darryl W. Dutton, Ann H. Finley, Lemuel N. Jackson, James R. Russell, and  Jonathan R. Tumin made key contributions to this report.