Afghanistan: State and USAID Should Evaluate Actions Taken to Mitigate Effects of Attrition among Local Staff
Published: 2015-12-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Congress established an SIV program in 2009 for Afghan nationals with at least 1 year of U.S. government service, given the risk these employees face. Local staff at the U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan are key to implementing U.S. policies and programs because of their institutional knowledge, language skills, and local relationships. A high rate of Afghan staff resigning after receiving an SIV could diminish the U.S. government's capacity to carry out its mission. GAO was asked to review State's and USAID's efforts to mitigate the loss of Afghan staff.
GAO evaluated (1) SIV-related resignations, including how, if at all, State's and USAID's workforces in Afghanistan have been affected in recent years; (2) the actions, if any, State and USAID have taken to mitigate any effects related to attrition of Afghan staff, including SIV recipients; and (3) the extent to which State and USAID have evaluated mitigating actions related to the attrition of Afghan local staff, including SIV recipients. GAO analyzed data from 2010 to 2015, reviewed documents regarding the Afghan workforce, and interviewed State and USAID officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Resignations of Afghan local staff at the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) after receiving a special immigrant visa (SIV) reached their highest level in 2014, and have had varied effects on the agencies' institutional knowledge (fig.). Resignations increased as more Afghan staff began the SIV application process than in the initial years of the program, and as State addressed delays that had previously slowed visa issuances. Afghan staff resignations are likely to be lower in 2015 than in previous years based on the number of current staff that have initiated the SIV process. Based on GAO's assessment of changes to average tenure and grade level of Afghan staff from 2010 until June 2015, and insights from agency officials, the effects of SIV-related resignations on State's and USAID's institutional knowledge is varied. For example, average tenure among both agencies' Afghan workforces decreased slightly. In addition, embassy officials said that local staff attrition may affect some program coordination with the Afghan government. Nonetheless, despite this attrition, agency officials reported that they were successful in identifying qualified replacements to fill positions.
Agencies have taken a number of actions to mitigate the effects of Afghan staff attrition, including SIV-related resignations. For example, State and USAID temporarily transfer experienced local staff from other diplomatic missions to Afghanistan, and the agencies sometimes fill one position with two employees in anticipation of an SIV-related resignation. In addition, the agencies provide additional administrative support from Washington, D.C., beyond what is generally provided to other U.S. missions, and send U.S. personnel to Afghanistan on a temporary basis to fill staffing gaps caused by attrition.
State and USAID officials said that these agencies have not evaluated actions taken to mitigate the effects of Afghan staff attrition. Officials said agencies have not conducted such assessments because of resource constraints and the reactive nature of operations in such an unpredictable environment. Key principles of human capital management that GAO identified call for agencies to evaluate the contribution that such activities make toward achieving programmatic goals, including those related to the workforce. Without these assessments, it will be difficult for agencies to have information to determine the costs and benefits of actions taken and handle workforce-related needs in challenging environments in the future.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that State and USAID evaluate actions intended to mitigate the effects of Afghan local staff resignations. State and USAID agreed with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Local employees working for U.S. diplomatic missions overseas have  long been eligible to apply for a special immigrant visa (SIV) to the United  States if they have at least 15 years of faithful service to the U.S.  government and meet other requirements. In 2009, Congress  established a special immigrant visa program for Afghan nationals with at  least 1 year of service, because of the significant risk these employees  face working for the U.S. government. Afghan local staff at the U.S.  diplomatic mission in Afghanistan are key to implementing U.S. policies  and programs because of their institutional knowledge, language skills,  local relationships, and cultural understanding. At the same time, a high  number of Afghan staff resigning after receiving SIVs could diminish the  U.S. government’s capacity to carry out its mission, especially because of  short tours of duty by Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID) American personnel in Afghanistan.
You asked us to assess State’s and USAID’s efforts to mitigate the loss of  Afghan staff. In this report, we evaluated (1) SIV-related resignations,  including how, if at all, State’s and USAID’s workforces in Afghanistan  have been affected in recent years; (2) the actions, if any, State and  USAID have taken to mitigate any effects related to the attrition of Afghan  staff, including SIV recipients; and (3) the extent to which State and  USAID have evaluated mitigating actions related to the attrition of Afghan  staff, including SIV recipients.
Our review focused on State and USAID Afghan staff working in  Afghanistan. To assess SIV-related resignations and any effects on  agencies’ workforces, we analyzed data on the Afghan workforce for each  calendar year from 2010 through 2014, and for January to August 1,  2015. Specifically, we analyzed information on overall attrition among  Afghan staff, SIV-related resignations, tenure, and grade levels. We  analyzed data and interviewed knowledgeable officials to assess data  reliability, and determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for our  purposes. To assess actions agencies have taken to mitigate any effects  related to Afghan staff attrition, and agencies’ efforts to evaluate those  actions, we reviewed documents that included agency workforce plans,  staffing analyses, and descriptions of proposed or implemented actions  for addressing attrition among local staff. We also reviewed criteria for  key principles in strategic human capital management, and compared  agencies’ efforts against these key principles. For all objectives, we  interviewed State and USAID officials working in Washington, D.C., and  U.S. officials working in Afghanistan. See appendix I for more information  about our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2015 to December  2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Special Immigrant Visa Program for Afghan Nationals
paragraphs: All local staff who work for U.S. diplomatic missions overseas are eligible  to apply for an SIV that allows them to immigrate to the United States,  provided they meet certain conditions, such as having 15 years of  employment with the U.S. government abroad. Congress has enacted a  series of laws since 2006 to enable certain Afghan nationals who have  worked as translators or interpreters for the U.S. government in  Afghanistan to be eligible for SIVs. In 2009, Congress authorized Afghan  employees of the U.S. government in Afghanistan who meet certain  criteria to be eligible for SIVs.
The first of these SIV programs is permanent and provides SIVs to  eligible Afghans who have worked directly with the U.S. armed forces or  under chief of mission authority for at least 1 year as translators or  interpreters. A maximum of 50 SIVs are currently granted annually for  principal applicants, excluding their dependents, under this program. The  second program is temporary and was created through Section 602(b) of  the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 and provides SIVs to eligible  Afghans who worked for at least 1 year in Afghanistan for the U.S.  government, or for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),  who provided “faithful and valuable service” to the U.S. government or  ISAF that has been documented by a supervisor, and who have  experienced or are experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a  consequence of employment by the U.S. government. As the  Congressional Research Service has reported, the program initially  authorized no more than 1,500 principal applicants to be granted special  immigrant status annually for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013,  with a provision to carry forward any unused numbers from 1 fiscal year  to the next. Congress subsequently amended the program to authorize up  to 3,000 principal applicants for fiscal year 2014 with an additional 1,000  through the end of calendar year 2014, and up to 7,000 for fiscal years  2015, 2016, and 2017. If the numerical limitation is not reached in a  fiscal year, the balance of principal applicants who may be provided  special immigrant status carries over to the following fiscal year. Principal  applicants must apply to the chief of mission for special immigrant status  by December 31, 2016, and the authority to issue visas under this  program is scheduled to terminate on the date that such visas are  exhausted.
section_title: Numbers of Afghan SIV Recipients
paragraphs: Though this report focuses on Afghan SIV recipients who were employed  by State or USAID, Afghan nationals eligible for SIVs include current or  former employees of the Department of Defense, other U.S. government  agencies, and U.S.-funded contractors or implementing partners. More  than 70 percent of SIV recipients have worked as translators, mostly for  the U.S. military in Afghanistan. From fiscal years 2010 through 2012, 73  SIVs were issued to principal Afghan applicants. Issuances of SIVs  began accelerating in 2013, with 652 visas issued to principal applicants,  and the annual total of SIVs issued to principal Afghan applicants rose to  3,441 in 2014. As of August 28, 2015, 2,372 principal applicants had  applications pending in the initial stage of the SIV application process.  Applications for 2,873 principal applicants were undergoing administrative  processing, which is one of the final steps in the process. See figure 1 for  more information on the various steps in the SIV issuance process.
section_title: State and USAID Presence in Afghanistan
paragraphs: State and USAID rely on local staff to assist in accomplishing U.S.  diplomatic objectives and in implementing and monitoring U.S. assistance  programs in Afghanistan (see fig. 2). According to officials from State and  USAID, staffing conditions in Afghanistan include the frequent turnover  among American staff, who generally serve 1-year tours there and, as a  result, may have limited institutional knowledge about their roles.  Furthermore, the security situation in Afghanistan is dangerous and  unpredictable, a fact that creates challenges for the international  community and Afghan government to implement programs throughout  the country. For example, in June 2015, we found that local staff (1)  provide programmatic continuity, local knowledge, and language ability at  posts where American officers may have short or interrupted tours of  duty, and (2) often provide security and programmatic support in locations  where American officials cannot safely or easily travel. As of April 2015,  the U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan had 882 positions occupied by  Afghan staff and 502 positions occupied by direct hire American  personnel. Of that total, State and USAID combined had 869 positions  occupied by Afghan staff and 471 by Americans.
section_title: SIV-Related Resignations in Afghanistan Are Likely to Fall from 2014 Levels, and Have Had Varied Effects on State’s and USAID’s Institutional Knowledge
paragraphs: From 2010 to 2015, a total of 378 Afghan local staff resigned from their  positions at State and USAID in Afghanistan after receiving SIVs (see fig.  3). State and USAID had a high of 243 SIV-related resignations in 2014,  but the number of resignations will likely be lower in 2015 than in 2014,  based on both the number of such resignations as of August 2015 and  the number of Afghan staff who have currently completed an initial step in  the SIV application process. Furthermore, resignations have had varied  effects on institutional knowledge at State and USAID. Average tenure  among both agencies’ Afghan workforces decreased slightly. In addition,  embassy officials said that local staff attrition has affected some program  coordination with the Afghan government. Nonetheless, officials reported  that recruiting qualified applicants to replace those local staff has not  posed a problem.
subsections: section_title: Few State and No USAID Afghan Staff Resigned from 2010 through 2012 after Receiving an SIV
paragraphs: From 2010 through 2012, 6 State and no USAID Afghan staff resigned  after receiving an SIV. Prior to 2012, State and USAID issued relatively  few employment certification letters, which verify Afghan staff eligibility for  the SIV program. The employment certification letter is the first step in the  SIV application process; therefore the number of Afghan local staff  receiving SIVs will likely be smaller than the number of these letters  provided. State and USAID issued 6 letters in 2010 and 37 in 2011.  Additionally, agency officials have noted that SIV processing was  relatively slow during the early years of the program. State officials  acknowledged that, prior to 2013, as a result of delays in administrative  processing, relatively few SIVs were issued.
section_title: SIV-Related Resignations Reached Their Highest Level in 2014
paragraphs: In 2013, the number of SIV-related resignations began to increase  substantially and reached its highest level in 2014. A total of 81 State and  USAID Afghan local staff resigned after receiving SIVs in 2013, and 243  in 2014. In 2013 and 2014, State reported that SIV-related resignations  became the single largest cause of attrition among all Afghan local staff  employed at the Kabul embassy. From 2010 to 2012, security clearance  revocation had been the primary cause of attrition among Afghan staff.  The following factors may help explain the increase in SIV-related  resignations in 2013 and 2014.
In December 2013, changes to the law authorizing SIVs for Afghan  nationals altered eligibility requirements for the SIV program.  Previously, Afghan local staff who had experienced or were  experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a consequence of their  U.S. government employment qualified for the visa. While this  standard still applies, the 2013 amendment to the law allowed credible  sworn statements depicting dangerous country conditions to be a  factor in determining the threat to local staff. According to State  officials, this enabled all Afghans who met U.S. government  employment requirements to be considered eligible. State officials  noted that this change allowed the broad threat environment to be  used to consider individual cases, alleviating the need for applicants  to demonstrate any specific threat incident to determine eligibility.  State officials said that these changes helped speed up SIV  processing.  In fiscal year 2013, State dedicated additional resources to help  process SIVs at the Kabul embassy, including creating a position for a  U.S. direct hire at post to help administer and address accumulated  backlogs in the initial approval stage of the process, and four  additional staff positions.
The number of employment certification letters issued to Afghan staff  increased after 2011. In 2012, State and USAID issued 303 letters  (see fig. 4). Given, in part, visa-processing times, this increase in  employment certification letters would lead to an increase in SIV- related resignations beginning in 2013.
section_title: State and USAID Are Likely to See Fewer SIV- Related Resignations In 2015
paragraphs: State and USAID are likely to experience fewer SIV-related resignations  in 2015 than in 2014. From January to August 2015, a total of 48 Afghan  local staff resigned from State and USAID after receiving an SIV. State  officials indicated that it is difficult to determine whether SIV issuances for  the rest of the calendar year are expected to continue at the same pace  as in prior months. However, the number of employment certification  letters issued to State’s and USAID’s Afghan local staff have remained  lower than the high of 303 letters in 2012. State and USAID issued 174  letters in 2013, 178 in 2014, and 100 from January to August 2015.
State and USAID officials provided several explanations for why some  Afghan local staff may forgo the SIV program altogether. In 2014, as part  of a worldwide adjustment to salaries of local staff at U.S. diplomatic  missions, State raised salaries for all Afghan local staff by 45 percent.  State reported this salary increase has helped the embassy retain local  staff. Additionally, State and USAID officials stated that Afghan SIV  recipients who have relocated to the United States often face challenges  integrating and obtaining adequate work opportunities and have  communicated those challenges to Afghan staff employed at the embassy  in Afghanistan.
section_title: Afghan Staff Attrition, Including SIV-Related Resignations, Has Had Varied Effects on Agencies’ Institutional Knowledge
paragraphs: According to our assessment of changes to average tenure and grade  level of Afghan staff, Afghan staff attrition, including SIV-related  resignations, has had varied effects on State’s and USAID’s institutional  knowledge. The average tenure of each agency’s Afghan staff, one  measure of institutional knowledge, has decreased slightly since the SIV  program began, while average grade level, another measure, has  remained relatively stable. From 2010 to June 2015, average tenure  among both agencies’ Afghan workforces decreased slightly (see table  1). During this period, average tenure among State’s Afghan local staff  has decreased by less than 3 months, while average tenure among  USAID’S Afghan local staff has decreased by approximately 5 months.  Afghan staff attrition, including SIV-related resignations, has also had no  substantial effect on average grade levels among USAID’S Afghan local  staff. From 2010 to June 2015, the average grade level among USAID’s  local staff in Afghanistan has remained consistent over time at the level  that includes management and technical positions. Additionally, the grade  levels from which State and USAID had the most SIV-related resignations  differed from the grade levels that agency human resources officers  reported difficulty filling in 2013.
State and USAID officials also identified a number of other effects that  Afghan staff attrition, including SIV-related attrition, may have on  operations in Afghanistan. USAID officials noted that it can take several  years for local staff to build effective relationships with Afghan  government officials. When Afghan local staff resign, these contacts are  often lost, a result that may affect operations by slowing down program  coordination with the Afghan government.
Attrition can also affect program management. For example, State has  reported that experienced staffing in grants management is needed to  ensure accountability and proper oversight. Likewise, USAID officials said  that the ability of American staff to perform some aspects of the agency’s  work, such as program monitoring and evaluation, can be affected by  increased demands on their time caused by local staff attrition. Attrition  can lead to American supervisors’ taking on additional responsibilities that  they would not be expected to perform at other posts. For example, State  and USAID officials said that American personnel spend significant  amounts of time training and bringing replacement staff up to speed on  embassy processes and operations as a result of attrition. These officials  stated that these additional responsibilities can present challenges for  maintaining adequate management controls and program oversight in  some areas.
Attrition, including SIV-related attrition, may also affect the training and  productivity of Afghan local staff. State officials said that Afghan staff may  need up to 2 years to receive the necessary training and skills to perform  their jobs at a high level. However, the period of highest productivity can  be short because these staff are eligible to apply for an SIV after 1 year of  employment with the U.S. government. For example, according to USAID  officials, the agency invests in the training and certification process for  contracting officer representatives. When these Afghan staff resign,  USAID fills the vacancies and goes through the process of recertifying  replacement staff. Embassy managers have reported hesitation about  investing in training because they may not see an adequate return on  their investment. In July 2014, State’s Office of Inspector General  reported that, at that time, only one Afghan staff member in the  embassy’s Consular Affairs office had received supervisory or advanced  consular training, and none of the Afghan staff in the information  management section had received supervisory training.
section_title: Agencies Reported That They Have Successfully Identified Qualified Afghan Staff to Fill Vacancies
paragraphs: State and USAID reported they were successful in identifying qualified  replacements to fill vacancies for local staff positions. State officials  reported receiving applications from qualified candidates to staff all but  three vacancies from 2010 through 2014. State and USAID officials  provided several insights that may help explain the availability of qualified  Afghan workers. These officials stated that the U.S. government  drawdown and the reduction in civilian organizations’ staffing levels have  increased the availability of qualified applicants because fewer potential  applicants are now employed by the U.S. government and international  organizations. In addition, officials from both agencies report that the SIV  program is often perceived as a recruitment incentive for qualified  applicants. State officials said that some Afghans may be willing to take  comparable or even lower salaries to have the potential benefit of the SIV  program.
section_title: Agencies Have Taken Steps to Mitigate Attrition among Afghan Local Staff, Including SIV-Related Resignations
paragraphs: State and USAID have taken a number of actions to help mitigate the  effects of attrition among Afghan local staff, including local staff who  resigned their positions after receiving an SIV. State and USAID officials  said they conduct recruitment to fill positions that have been vacated as a  result of SIV-related resignations and for other reasons, such as dismissal  due to losing a security clearance. State and USAID officials said they  temporarily assign American personnel and local staff from other  diplomatic missions overseas to Afghanistan in order to fill staffing gaps  and provide experienced staff who can train and supervise Afghan staff.  USAID also assigns local staff from other diplomatic missions for longer- term assignments that can last up to several years. Both agencies’  headquarters have provided additional administrative support to their  missions in Afghanistan beyond what is generally provided to other  overseas missions. Both State and USAID are considering moving  additional functions from the U.S. embassy in Kabul to other diplomatic  missions in the region. State and USAID officials said they sometimes fill  one position with two employees in anticipation of an SIV-related  resignation. In 2014, as part of State’s worldwide effort to normalize  salaries for local staff, the embassy in Kabul raised salaries for all Afghan  local staff by 45 percent, and State and USAID officials said this has  helped to retain local staff.
subsections: section_title: Recruitment
paragraphs: Despite 243 resignations in 2014 as a result of receiving an SIV, State  and USAID officials said they were able to recruit and hire personnel to  replace those lost because of attrition. These officials stated they have to  constantly advertise and fill vacant positions within the local workforce as  a result of relatively high local staff attrition in Afghanistan, including SIV- related resignations. In 2014, State posted 219 job vacancy  announcements and received an average of 555 applications for each  vacancy announcement that was posted. From June 2014 through May  2015, State reported it had hired about 120 Afghan staff. USAID officials  reported they posted 130 vacancy announcements from April 2014 to  April 2015, and USAID officials said they have not had difficulty recruiting  qualified replacements.
State and USAID officials said that one of the biggest challenges to the  recruitment process is the amount of time needed to conduct security  screenings for new employees, and typically it may take 6 to 8 months to  fill a position. USAID officials said efforts have been made to shorten the  security screening process, and State human resources officials said the  embassy maintains a queue of qualified applicants in an effort to speed  up the hiring process. Similarly, USAID officials said they prescreen  applications in Washington, D.C., in order to alleviate some aspects of the  recruitment process for USAID in Afghanistan. In addition, USAID officials  said the agency streamlined its hiring strategies in 2014, and reduced the  amount of time to hire a new employee by 60 days, from 10 months to 8  months.
section_title: Temporary Assignments of Other Personnel to Kabul
paragraphs: State and USAID officials said they send U.S. direct hire employees to  Afghanistan on a temporary basis to fill staffing gaps caused by Afghan  staff attrition or to provide additional support to American personnel.  Temporarily assigned personnel may work for a few days or several  months. According to State and USAID officials, these employees can  help to supervise and train Afghan staff recently placed in new positions.  The number of these temporarily assigned personnel in Afghanistan  anytime varies by the needs of individual offices, as well as security  concerns and available housing and office space. The embassy at times  restricts these personnel from entering Afghanistan because of security  concerns, according to State officials. In fiscal year 2014, the embassy’s  Consular Affairs office received approximately 600 staff days’ worth of  temporary assignments from U.S. consular officers and local staff from  other diplomatic missions.
State and USAID officials also reported they recruit local staff from U.S.  missions in other countries, referred to as third country nationals (TCN),  to fill key positions at the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan. TCNs are  experienced State and USAID employees who have expertise in key  areas and are able to build capacity among Afghan staff and provide  training. According to State and USAID officials, TCNs tend to have a  high level of experience and are familiar with State and USAID policies  and procedures, and therefore can work more independently than newer  Afghan staff. According to USAID officials, USAID employs TCNs on a  short-term basis, typically 6 months, and also utilizes a TCN program  where local staff from other diplomatic missions work in Afghanistan for at  least 1 year with the option to renew. USAID had 34 TCNs supporting the  USAID mission as of September 2015. State also uses TCNs on a short- term basis, and has proposed a TCN program similar to the USAID  program, where local staff from other diplomatic missions work for 1 year  or longer in Afghanistan. State has identified 20 key positions for TCNs  that would provide the continuity, expertise, and training lacking in several  offices within the embassy.
State and USAID officials noted TCNs are more expensive for the mission  than Afghan staff because they receive higher salaries, incur travel  expenses associated with deployment to Afghanistan, and have other  benefits and costs not associated with Afghan staff. In addition, the  diplomatic missions from which TCNs are transferred have expressed  concerns regarding their own workforce needs. Short-term TCNs create  temporary vacancies at the diplomatic missions that send them, and  TCNs who accept long-term positions must resign their positions at their  current diplomatic missions, creating vacancies that must be filled.
section_title: Offshoring Support
paragraphs: State currently performs some administrative functions outside of  Afghanistan on behalf of the embassy in Kabul. For example, State  headquarters in Washington, D.C., performs financial and security in- processing functions for American personnel who are going to  Afghanistan. Officials said that these are functions usually performed at  an overseas mission. In addition, the embassy has started to conduct  procurements from the U.S. embassy in Amman, Jordan, and State’s  Regional Procurement Support Office in Frankfurt, Germany.
USAID’s Afghan Hands program supports the mission in Afghanistan with  20 available U.S. direct hire positions at USAID headquarters in  Washington, D.C. The Afghan Hands personnel work directly on USAID  programs and projects in Afghanistan, and provide management and  oversight to USAID implementing partners. According to USAID officials,  Afghan Hands personnel are expected to travel frequently to Afghanistan  for short-term assignments. As of May 2015, 17 of the positions were  filled, according to USAID officials. Many of the Afghan Hands personnel  have previously served at the USAID mission in Afghanistan and have  institutional knowledge of USAID programs and procedures in  Afghanistan. Afghan Hands personnel perform functions that are often  performed by American personnel or Afghan staff in Afghanistan.
State and USAID have proposed to offshore additional administrative  functions to other U.S. missions in the region. In August 2014, USAID  proposed to offshore 9 positions in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in order to  provide dedicated support for USAID’s financial management,  acquisitions, and the economic growth and infrastructure team. The  USAID proposal notes that Afghan staff attrition has created a continuous  need for training of newly hired Afghan employees, which could be  provided by offshore staff on temporary assignment in Afghanistan.  Furthermore, in this proposal, USAID estimated the total annual costs for  a fully staffed Afghanistan Support Team in Kazakhstan. According to  State officials, State is considering offshoring some procurement  functions to provide continuous support, similar to what is provided in  Amman, Jordan. However, State officials said that other diplomatic  missions may find it difficult to reassign their local staff to provide  functions for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan or may be limited in the  amount of available office space.
section_title: Double-Encumbering Afghan Staff Positions
paragraphs: According to State and USAID officials, these agencies sometimes  double-encumber positions when a local employee reports that he or she  is in the process of applying for an SIV. Double-encumbering occurs  when agencies fill one position with two employees in anticipation of an  SIV-related resignation. As of September 2015, State had 36 positions  that were double-encumbered, and USAID had 11 as of May 2015,  according to State and USAID officials. State and USAID officials  reported that the embassy allows for agencies to start recruiting for a  currently filled Afghan position when the Afghan staff person occupying  that position informs his or her supervisor that an application for an SIV  has been initiated. State and USAID officials said the employee  expecting to depart an embassy can train his or her replacement. State  officials said that sometimes this practice results in two employees filling  the same position if the original employee’s application is delayed or  rejected.
section_title: Salaries and Benefits
paragraphs: As previously mentioned, the U.S. mission in Afghanistan provided a 45  percent salary increase to all agencies’ Afghan staff in July 2014, as part  of State’s effort to raise the salaries of local staff worldwide to better  reflect the median wage rate of similar and comparable organizations.  State officials said the salary increase was part of a State effort to update  salaries at diplomatic missions worldwide, and was not in response to the  SIV program. However, State and USAID officials said higher salaries  help to recruit and retain well-qualified employees. Human resources  officials at the embassy in Kabul reported that the pay increase was a  strong incentive for Afghan staff to postpone SIV applications and remain  employed by the U.S. government.
The U.S. mission provides 25 percent additional compensation for local  staff in Afghanistan given the extra measures they may take to avoid or  endure terrorist threats or harassment. State provides local staff at  selected diplomatic missions additional compensation as a percentage of  their salary because of potential harassment or threats of violence related  to their U.S. government employment. In 2015, State designated 21  posts, including Afghanistan, as offering such allowances.
section_title: Officials Said Agencies Have Not Evaluated Efforts to Mitigate Effects of Afghan Staff Attrition
paragraphs: While State and USAID have made a number of efforts to mitigate the  effects of Afghan staff attrition, according to officials, agencies have not  formally evaluated the extent to which these actions have addressed  effects on the workforce or programs. Key principles of human capital  management call for agencies to evaluate the success of human capital  strategies, such as actions taken to mitigate attrition among staff, by  using performance measures to assess the extent to which these  activities contribute to achieving programmatic goals. An evaluation of  actions taken to mitigate effects related to local staff attrition can help  determine if an agency has effectively filled gaps in institutional  knowledge from attrition among Afghan staff, and identify reasons for any  performance shortfalls resulting from those gaps. Without such  evaluations, agencies will be limited in having information to determine  the costs, benefits, and relative effectiveness of actions taken. Further, in  August 2014, State’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) noted that mission  operations may be negatively affected without a programmatic approach  to addressing attrition among Afghan staff. State and USAID officials  have also noted that American personnel’s 1-year tours in Afghanistan  create challenges with institutional knowledge. Evaluations can provide  critical information to enable knowledge transfer among American staff in  Afghanistan and minimize duplication of efforts that have already proven  to be ineffective or resource intensive.
For example, agencies can measure whether actions such as hiring,  training, and retention have changed the skill level of the workforce or  affected the U.S. mission’s capabilities related to maintaining its overseas  presence in Afghanistan. In its draft proposal to employ TCNs in  Afghanistan, State noted that if the program were to proceed, the agency  would need to demonstrate the benefits associated with the employment  of TCNs and justify increased costs. However, in its proposal, State did  not identify any potential measurements to evaluate the benefits of using  TCNs or the additional costs that would be incurred to attract these  individuals to long-term positions in Afghanistan. USAID identified cost  information that could be utilized to evaluate human capital efforts in its  strategic staffing document for Afghanistan, which outlines a number of  proposals to potentially address staffing challenges there. The document  includes examples of resources required and cost analyses of some of  the proposals to mitigate the effects of attrition, such as the option to  offshore positions that may be vacated by Afghan staff to another  embassy in the region. However, USAID officials also said they were not  aware of any completed evaluations of actions taken related to mitigating  the effects of attrition.
State and USAID officials noted that agencies operate in a reactive state  and face resource constraints managing a large diplomatic mission in a  dangerous and unpredictable environment such as Afghanistan.  Accordingly, agencies may not fully document or evaluate certain efforts.  Key principles for human capital management note that evaluations of  human capital strategies may help agencies determine if they met human  capital goals and whether those strategies helped or hindered the  agencies from reaching their programmatic goals. While the State OIG  has reported that increased security risks in Afghanistan hinder  employees’ ability to assess programs, inadequacies with such  assessments can impair program performance. Nonetheless, State’s  evaluation policy calls for evaluations to improve programs, projects, and  management processes. USAID’s evaluation policy also notes that  though security concerns can pose challenges to conducting evaluations,  creative approaches can be utilized to measure achievements in such  environments.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Local staff are a vital component of the success of U.S. diplomatic  missions overseas. The U.S. mission in Afghanistan faces a number of  uncertainties and challenges that make the presence of its Afghan staff all  the more important, including an unpredictable security situation,  relatively short tours among U.S. personnel, and an evolving diplomatic  presence that relies on the U.S. military for security support. State and  USAID have taken a number of actions to mitigate the effects of Afghan  staff attrition, including SIV-related resignations, such as increasing  recruiting efforts and augmenting staff with experienced local staff from  other U.S. missions overseas. However, State and USAID have not  evaluated their actions to address the effects of Afghan staff attrition to  assess the costs or effectiveness of these actions. Information gained  from such evaluations could inform agencies’ workforce planning efforts,  including strategies related to hiring, training, and staff development and  could improve how agencies manage attrition of Afghan staff in the future,  whether because of SIVs or other reasons. Agencies could also share  information learned from these evaluations with one another, particularly  if an agency conducted evaluations on resource-intensive efforts to  mitigate the effects of attrition. For example, USAID has a program in  which third country nationals from U.S. missions in other countries are  employed for periods of 1 year or longer to help mitigate the effects of  attrition among local staff in Afghanistan—a practice that is more costly  than employing Afghan staff and one that can pose challenges for the  U.S. missions that send them. If USAID had evaluated its program,  USAID could have informed State’s assessment of a similar proposal.  Furthermore, without evaluation of mitigating actions that agencies have  previously undertaken, agencies may be unable to weigh the costs and  benefits of actions being implemented, and may be unable to identify the  strategies that are most effective for handling future workforce-related  needs in challenging environments.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better understand the costs and effectiveness of actions to mitigate  the effects of Afghan staff attrition, and to inform future workforce  planning efforts, we recommend that  the Secretary of State evaluate these actions, and  the Administrator of USAID evaluate these actions.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to State and  USAID. In written comments, summarized below and reproduced in  appendix II and III, respectively, State and USAID agreed with the  recommendation to evaluate actions to mitigate the effects of Afghan staff  attrition.
In its written comments, State agreed with the recommendation. State  noted that the Afghanistan SIV program has had considerable impact on  mission staffing levels and SIV-related resignations are currently the  largest contributing factor for increased attrition among local staff.   However, State wrote that many elements should be taken into  consideration when looking at sustaining a workforce capable of meeting  U.S. goals and objectives in Afghanistan. Further, State noted that  strategically approaching workforce planning is complicated by, among  other things, the unpredictable nature of events in a dangerous  environment. State said that it evaluates staffing levels as part of its  regular agency-wide review processes, and that a specific analysis of  actions taken to mitigate attrition among Afghan staff would be reactive in  nature and have minimal value added in a more complex staffing picture.   Nevertheless, as we note in this report, an evaluation of the relative costs  and effectiveness of specific actions taken to mitigate effects related to  local staff attrition could help determine if State has effectively filled gaps  in institutional knowledge from attrition among Afghan staff, and enable  knowledge transfer among American staff in Afghanistan.
In its written comments, USAID agreed with the recommendation. USAID  noted that it proactively tracks staffing levels in Afghanistan, and has  taken steps to develop and implement creative approaches to staffing.   For example, USAID said that, in addition to weekly and monthly staffing  reports, from January to October 2015 it conducted seven ad hoc  analyses regarding locally employed staff for internal and external  audiences. In addition, USAID said it regularly discusses staff retention  and recruitment and staffing mechanisms at strategic management  meetings. According to USAID, these meetings serve as a venue to  discuss, evaluate, and iterate strategies and other efforts to mitigate the  effects of local staff resignations. We will continue to work with USAID in  monitoring the implementation of the recommendation.
State and USAID also provided technical comments that we incorporated,  as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on  GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  Michael J. Courts at (202) 512-8980 or at courtsm@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Office of Public  Affairs can be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made  major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: In this report, we evaluated (1) special immigrant visa (SIV)-related  resignations, including how, if at all, the Department of State’s (State) and  U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) workforces in  Afghanistan have been affected in recent years; (2) the actions, if any,  State and USAID have taken to mitigate any effects related to the attrition  of Afghan staff, including SIV recipients; and (3) the extent to which State  and USAID have evaluated mitigating actions related to the attrition of  Afghan staff, including SIV recipients.
We interviewed agency officials at State and USAID in headquarters and  at the U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan, including consular officers,  human resource officers, USAID mission executive officers, and State  management officials to address all three objectives. We reviewed  background on the SIV program for Afghan nationals, including relevant  legislation and a report from the Congressional Research Service. In  order to provide background information on the SIV program for Afghan  nationals, we also utilized reports published by State and the Department  of Homeland Security on the SIV program for Afghan nationals, primarily  data on visa issuances and general processing times.
To assess SIV-related resignations, and how, if at all, State’s and  USAID’s workforces in Afghanistan have been affected by the  resignations of SIV recipients in recent years, we obtained and analyzed  data for each calendar year, 2010 through 2014, and for January to June  or August 1, 2015. We performed longitudinal analysis of the data in  order to identify the initial extent of SIV effects, significant trends or  changes over time, and any correlation between variables. We assessed  data on Afghan staff for the following categories: the number of SIV- related resignations at State and USAID, the number of employment  certification letters State and USAID issued to Afghan staff, average  tenure of State’s and USAID’s current staff, and average grade levels of  USAID’s current staff.
We analyzed data on SIV-related resignations related to the  special category of SIVs created by the Afghan Allies Protection  Act of 2009. State and USAID provided these data, which included  only Afghan staff who departed their positions after receiving an  SIV and did not include those who departed employment for other  reasons. These data were relevant to Afghan local staff but did not  include third country nationals or other staff working in  Afghanistan on a temporary duty basis. Agencies provided data  on start and end dates of employment for those Afghan staff who  resigned after receiving SIVs.
We utilized data on average tenure and grade level of Afghan  local staff as rough indicators of institutional knowledge. Both  agencies provided start and end dates of employment, from which  we calculated average tenure. While average tenure provides an  overall summary of yearly trends, a relatively small drop in  average tenure can be associated with a relatively larger increase  in the number of newly hired Afghan staff. Agency data  demonstrated this increase in the number of newly hired Afghan  staff. For example, in June 2015, USAID had 92 Afghan staff with  less than a year’s tenure, representing about 46 percent of the  agency’s local staff, compared with 65 in December 2012,  representing about 30 percent of the agency’s local staff. In  addition to calculating averages, we also calculated and examined  yearly median tenure levels and considered the distribution of  length of tenure. USAID provided staff grade levels but State  could not provide similar data for its Afghan staff. We analyzed  average tenure and grade level for a single-month slice of each  year within the scope of our analysis (i.e., May 2015 and  December for all other years). Accordingly, the data do not  represent all Afghan local staff who worked for State or USAID  over the course of any particular year. Average tenure rates were  also affected by local staff separating from mission employment  for reasons other than SIVs, such as retirements or terminations.  The data the agencies provided did not report whether newly hired  local staff had previously been agency employees and may  therefore understate the actual experience these staff brought to  their agencies.
We also utilized data related to recruitment of local staff from the 2010  through 2014 local compensation questionnaires for Afghanistan. This  annual questionnaire gathers input from all U.S. agencies at an overseas  mission across a range of topics related to the local workforce.
To assess the reliability of State’s and USAID’s data and responses to the  local compensation questionnaires, we interviewed knowledgeable  human resources officials from State in Kabul and solicited input from  both agencies on their internal controls, potential data vulnerabilities, and  any incidence of missing data. We determined the data to be sufficiently  reliable for our purposes.
To assess the actions, if any, State and USAID have taken to mitigate  any effects related to the attrition of Afghan staff, including SIV recipients,  we reviewed agency documents that described these efforts, including  any analyses agencies had undertaken.
To assess the extent to which State and USAID have evaluated mitigating  actions related to the attrition of Afghan staff, including SIV recipients, we  reviewed criteria for key principles in strategic human capital  management, State’s and USAID’s evaluation policies, and agency  documents that included workforce-related planning and analyses. We  also reviewed State’s August 2014 Office of Inspector General Inspection  of Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, for the recommendations it made to  address challenges associated with attrition in the Afghan workforce. We  compared State’s and USAID’s efforts against key principles in strategic  human capital management.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2015 to December  2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant  Director), Jon Fremont, Farhanaz Kermalli, and Owen Starlin made key  contributions to this report. Ashley Alley, Tina Cheng, Martin De Alteriis,  Katie Bernet, Karen Deans, Thomas Gilbert, and Michael Silver provided  additional support.