Maritime Security: Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security
Published: 2010-12-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Ferries are a vital component of the U.S. transportation system and 2008 data show that U.S. ferries carried more than 82 million passengers and over 25 million vehicles. Ferries are also potential targets for terrorism in the United States and have been terrorist targets overseas. GAO was asked to review ferry security, and this report addresses the extent to which (1) the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for maritime security, assessed risk in accordance with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) guidance and what risks it identified; and (2) federal agencies, ferry and facility operators, and law enforcement entities have taken actions to protect ferries and their facilities. GAO reviewed relevant requirements, analyzed 2006 through 2009 security operations data, interviewed federal and industry officials, and made observations at five domestic and one international locations with varying passenger volumes and relative risk profiles. Site visits provided information on security, but were not projectable to all ports. This is the public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2010. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Coast Guard assessed the risk--including threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences--to ferries in accordance with DHS guidance on risk assessment and, along with other maritime stakeholders, identified risks associated with explosive devices, among other things. Although in April 2010, Coast Guard intelligence officials stated that there have been no credible terrorist threats identified against ferries and their facilities in at least the last 12 months, maritime intelligence officials have identified the presence of terrorist groups with the capability of attacking a ferry. Many of the Coast Guard, ferry system and law enforcement officials GAO spoke with generally believe ferries are vulnerable to passenger- or vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, although not all ferry systems transport vehicles. The Coast Guard has also identified the potential consequences of an attack, which could include possible loss of life and negative economic effects. In April 2010, Coast Guard officials stated that the relative risk to ferries is increasing, as evidenced by attacks against land-based mass transit and other targets overseas. Federal agencies--including the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--ferry operators, and law enforcement entities report that they have taken various actions to enhance the security of ferries and facilities and have implemented related laws, regulations, and guidance, but the Coast Guard may be missing opportunities to enhance ferry security. Security measures taken by the Coast Guard have included providing a security presence on ferries during transit. Coast Guard officials also reported that they are revising regulations to improve ferry operator training and developing guidance on screening. Ferry operators' security actions have included developing and implementing security plans and screening vehicles and passengers, among other things. However, the Coast Guard had not evaluated and, if determined warranted, acted on all findings and recommendations resulting from five agency-contracted studies on ferry security completed in 2005 and 2006. Reports from these studies included several recommendations for standardizing and enhancing screening across ferry operators. Standards for internal control in the federal government state that agencies should ensure that findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved, and that managers take action to evaluate and resolve matters identified in these audits and reviews. As a result of our work on ferry security, in August 2010, Coast Guard officials stated they planned to review the reports. Taking action to address the recommendations in these reports, if determined warranted by the Coast Guard's evaluation, could enhance ferry security. Furthermore, Coast Guard documents from 2004 state that the agency should reassess vehicle screening requirements pending the completion of the ferry security reports or if the threat changes. However, no specific plans were in place to reassess these requirements. By taking action to reassess its screening requirements, the agency would be better positioned to determine if changes are warranted.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Commandant of the Coast Guard, after evaluating the completed studies on ferry security, reassess vehicle screening requirements and take further actions to enhance security, if determined warranted. DHS concurred with our recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Ferries are an important component of the U.S. transportation system, and  according to respondents to the 2008 National Census of Ferry Operators,  carried more than 82 million passengers and over 25 million vehicles.  Ferries are also potential targets for terrorism in the United States and  have been terrorist targets overseas. A 2005 Coast Guard study stated that  as part of the U.S. maritime transportation system, ferry operations are  potential terrorist targets, and according to a 2006 RAND Corporation  study, certain traits inherent to ferries make them especially attractive to  terrorist aggression. For example, the RAND study reported that attacks  on ferries are easy to execute, have the potential to kill many people, are  likely to capture significant media attention, and can be exploited to  visibly demonstrate a terrorist group’s salience and vibrancy. While these  fears have not been realized in the United States, ferries and their facilities  in the Philippines have repeatedly been targeted by terrorists. For  example, successful bombings on Philippine ferries killed or wounded at  least 130 people in 2004 and 2005. Attacks on ferries and their facilities  have continued, and in 2009 there were three more attempted bombings in  the Philippines. These attacks led the Transportation Security  Administration (TSA)—the lead U.S. federal agency for transportation  security—to report in 2009 that violent extremists around the Philippines  have the intent and capability to attack ferries or use them as a means of  conveyance to transport materials. Coast Guard and Navy intelligence  officials also stated that that the overall risk to ferries may be increasing  given the attempts in the Philippines and the attacks against land-based  mass transit and other soft targets overseas. Although not caused by a  terrorist attack, one of the greatest maritime disasters ever occurred in the  Philippines in 1987 when an overloaded ferry collided with a tanker and an  estimated 4,300 people died. Although the circumstances of this ferry  sinking may be different than those faced by ferries in the United States,  they illustrate that an attack on a crowded ferry could have dire  consequences. The U.S. Coast Guard, a component of the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency responsible for a  wide array of maritime safety and security activities, including those  involving ferries and their facilities under the Maritime Transportation  Security Act of 2002 (MTSA).
This report is the second of two reviewing the security of high capacity  passenger vessels—vessels capable of carrying 500 or more passengers.  The first report focused on cruise ship and cruise ship facility security and  was issued in April 2010. The report found that while governmental  agencies, cruise ship operators, and other maritime security stakeholders  have taken significant steps to protect against a possible terrorist attack,  the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—the federal agency  primarily responsible for border security—should consider obtaining  additional information about cruise ship passengers to enhance its  screening process. This report focuses on the security issues of high  capacity passenger ferries and their facilities. While we limited our review  to ferry systems that operate larger, high capacity passenger ferries, these  systems often also operate smaller ferries, and according to Coast Guard  officials, smaller ferries face similar security concerns.
You requested that we identify risks associated with ferries and their  facilities and the measures being taken to protect them. Specifically, this  report responds to the following questions:    To what extent has the U.S. Coast Guard assessed risk related to high  capacity passenger ferries and their facilities in accordance with DHS’s  guidance, and what are the identified risks?
To what extent have maritime security stakeholders taken actions to  mitigate the potential risks to high capacity passenger ferries and their  facilities, and to implement applicable federal laws, regulations, and  guidance; and what additional actions, if any, could enhance ferry  security?
This is the public version of the report we issued in October 2010 that  contained information related to risks to high capacity passenger ferries  and efforts made to secure these ferries from terrorist attacks. DHS  deemed specific details of ferries, the risks to ferries, and methods used by  the Coast Guard and others to secure ferries to be sensitive security  information, which must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore,  this report omits those details. Although information provided in this  report is more limited in scope, it addresses the same questions as the  previously issued report. Also, the overall methodology used for both  reports is the same. The conclusions and recommendations contained in  our October 2010 version of this report remain generally unchanged.
To determine the extent to which the Coast Guard assessed the risks to  ferries and their facilities in accordance with DHS’s guidance, and to  identify the risks associated with ferries and their facilities, we reviewed  relevant federal guidance on the use of risk management, including DHS’s  National Infrastructure Protection Plan. We also reviewed documents  describing the methodology and use of the Coast Guard’s primary risk  assessment tool—the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model. We analyzed  the elements of the Coast Guard’s risk analysis model process and  compared it to criteria from two components—risk assessment and  prioritization—of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the  document that articulates the risk management framework for DHS. We  also analyzed the nationwide results for 2009 of the risk analysis model to  determine the relative risks facing ferries and their facilities. In addition,  we interviewed Coast Guard headquarters personnel responsible for the  risk analysis model and Coast Guard Sector personnel responsible at the  local level to discuss the relative risks in their areas of responsibility.
In addition, we interviewed Coast Guard and U.S. Navy intelligence  personnel actively engaged in determining possible threats to ferries and  their facilities. We also interviewed Coast Guard, CBP, and U.S. Park  Police officials, as well as personnel from seven nonfederal law  enforcement agencies. The Coast Guard and CBP officials were those  responsible for ferry and ferry facility security at both the national level  and at the locations where we made site visits. Similarly, the law  enforcement personnel we met with represented jurisdictions covered in  our site visits where they provided security for ferries and their facilities.  We made these visits to a nonprobability sample of five domestic  locations. Ferry operations at these locations are overseen by five Coast  Guard Sectors. We selected these locations based on the number of  passengers carried by the ferry systems operating in these locations and  the relative risk associated with the ferry systems. We also selected  locations that had domestic and international ferries. While the  information we obtained from personnel at these locations cannot be  generalized across all U.S. ferry systems, it provided us with a perspective  on the risks to ferries and their facilities at the selected locations. While  their views may not represent the views of all high capacity passenger  ferry operators, these ferry systems represented about 70 percent of  passengers and about 80 percent of vehicles carried by U.S. ferry  operators that in 2008 reported that they had vessels in service capable of  carrying 500 or more passengers.
To determine the extent to which maritime security stakeholders— including federal agencies, ferry and ferry facility operators, and law  enforcement agencies—have taken actions to mitigate the potential risks  to ferries and their facilities and to implement applicable federal laws,  regulations, and guidance, we reviewed relevant federal legislation,  regulations, and guidance. These included pertinent provisions of MTSA,  as amended, including the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act  of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) amendments to MTSA; implementing  regulations—such as 33 CFR Parts 101, 102, 103, 104, and 105; the Coast  Guard’s Operation Neptune Shield operations order; Navigation and Vessel  Inspection Circulars; and Maritime Security Directives, respectively. We  analyzed data on the Coast Guard’s security performance in meeting  internal standards established for Operation Neptune Shield during 2009,  and on ferry and ferry facility operator’s security performance in meeting  requirements identified in Coast Guard regulations from 2006 to 2009. We  found these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose of providing  contextual or background information. To make this determination we  conducted interviews with knowledgeable agency officials and performed  data testing for missing data, outliers, and obvious errors. We also  interviewed federal officials from various agencies, including the Coast  Guard, CBP, and U.S. Park Police to discuss their actions to reduce risks  to ferries and their facilities. We observed security activities and  interviewed law enforcement personnel from seven nonfederal police  departments responsible for protecting ferries and their facilities from  terrorist attacks at the domestic locations we visited. As part of our  observations of security measures, we traveled aboard international and  domestic ferries at these locations. While our observations at these  locations cannot be generalized across all U.S. ports, they provided us  with a general overview and perspective on ferry and ferry facility security  at the selected locations. We also made a site visit to one foreign location  where a major high capacity ferry system operated to observe possible  security actions other than those used in the United States. Although this  location does not represent all international locations with high capacity  passenger ferry operators, we selected this location because Coast Guard  officials stated that this ferry system was similar to one of the larger  systems in the United States and would serve as a good comparison to U.S.  ferry systems. We also reviewed three Coast Guard-funded reports issued  in 2005 and 2006 on ferry security to determine what actions the reports  recommended that the Coast Guard take to help ensure ferry security. We  interviewed Coast Guard officials to determine what actions had been  taken in response to these reports. We also reviewed the scope and  methodology for these reports and determined they were sufficient for us  to rely on for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2009 to December  2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Ferries Transport Passengers and Vehicles
paragraphs: According to the 190 ferry operators responding to the 2008 National  Census of Ferry Operators, more than 82 million passengers and over 25  million vehicles were carried on their vessels in the United States. As  reported in 2008, the ferry systems that carried the most passengers and  vehicles in 2008 were the New York City Department of Transportation  Ferry Division (Staten Island Ferry) which carried 19 million passengers,  but no vehicles, and the Washington State Ferries that carried over 13  million passengers and almost 11 million vehicles. In addition, California,  Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and  Virginia all had ferry systems that carried over 1 million passengers. See  figure 1 for a map identifying the states where ferry systems operate  vessels that can carry 500 or more passengers, as well as the number of  passengers and vehicles carried by these systems. In addition to the ferries  that operate solely inside the United States, CBP identified 28 ferries that  sailed in 2009 to the United States from a port in Canada, Mexico, the  British Virgin Islands, or the Dominican Republic.
section_title: Many Stakeholders Involved in Securing Ferry Operations
paragraphs: Numerous organizations play a role in the security of ferries operating in  U.S. waters. Table 1 lists selected federal agencies and other stakeholders  together with examples of the ferry-related maritime security activities  that they conduct.
section_title: Maritime Security Actions Are Guided by a Legal and Regulatory Framework
paragraphs: International standards and national laws, regulations, and guidance direct  federal agencies and vessel and facility operators nationwide in their  security efforts (see table 2).
section_title: Risk Management Is Important for Maritime Security
paragraphs: DHS is required by statute to utilize risk management principles with  respect to various DHS functions. In 2006, DHS issued the National  Infrastructure Protection Plan, which is DHS’s base plan that guides how  DHS and other relevant stakeholders should use risk management  principles to prioritize protection activities in an integrated and  coordinated fashion. Updated in 2009, the National Infrastructure  Protection Plan requires that federal agencies use relative risk to inform  the selection of priorities and the continuous improvement of security  strategies and programs to protect people and critical infrastructure by  reducing the risk of acts of terrorism. The framework for the plan includes  six components: (1) set goals and objectives; (2) identify assets, systems,  and networks; (3) assess risk; (4) prioritize; (5) implement programs; and  (6) measure effectiveness.
In the assess risk component, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan  establishes baseline criteria for conducting risk assessments. According to  the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, risk assessments are a  qualitative or quantitative determination of the likelihood of an adverse  event occurring and are a critical element of the National Infrastructure  Protection Plan’s risk management framework. Risk assessments can also  help decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that  countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate  the potential effects of the risks. The National Infrastructure Protection  Plan also characterizes risk assessment as a function of three elements:    Threat: The likelihood that a particular asset, system, or network will  suffer an attack or an incident. In the context of risk associated with a  terrorist attack, the estimate of threat is based on the analysis of the  intent and the capability of an adversary; in the context of a natural  disaster or accident, the likelihood is based on the probability of  occurrence.
Vulnerability: The likelihood that a characteristic of, or flaw in, an  asset’s, system’s, or network’s design, location, security posture,  process, or operation renders it susceptible to destruction,  incapacitation, or exploitation by terrorist or other intentional acts,  mechanical failures, and natural hazards.
Consequence: The negative effects on public health and safety, the  economy, public confidence in institutions, and the functioning of  government, both direct and indirect, that can be expected if an asset,  system, or network is damaged, destroyed, or disrupted by a terrorist  attack, natural disaster, or other incident.
Information from the three elements that assess risk—threat, vulnerability,  and consequence—can lead to a risk characterization and provide input  for prioritizing security goals—the fourth component within the  framework. For example, MTSA requires the Coast Guard to prepare Area  Maritime Transportation Security Plans for ports around the United States.  These plans convey operational and physical security measures,  communications procedures, time frames for responding to security  threats, and other actions to direct the prevention of and response to a  security incident. In its regulations implementing MTSA, the Coast Guard  gave primary responsibility for creating the Area Maritime Security Plans  to the Captain of the Port, based on the Area Maritime Security  Assessment. Area Maritime Security Assessments examine the threats  and vulnerabilities to activities, operations, and infrastructure critical to a  port and the consequences of a successful terrorist attack on the critical  activities, operations, and infrastructure at the port. Under the regulations,  such assessments are to be risk-based, and should assess each potential  threat and the consequences and vulnerabilities for each combination of  targets and attack modes in the area. With the information supplied in the  assessment, the Area Maritime Security Plan is to identify, among other  things, the operational and physical security measures to be implemented  at Maritime Security Level 1 and those that, as risks increase, will enable  the area to progress to levels 2 and 3. According to the Coast Guard,  procedures and measures conveyed in Area Maritime Security Plans are  coordinated, communicated, and implemented by the Captain of the Port  with stakeholder communication assistance from Area Maritime Security  Committees, using existing agency command and control systems, and  when activated, unified incident management structures.
section_title: The Coast Guard Assessed Risk to Ferries and Their Facilities in Accordance with DHS’s Risk Assessment Guidance and Security Concerns Exist
subsections: section_title: The Coast Guard Adheres to Risk Assessment Guidance from DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan
paragraphs: The Coast Guard uses a tool known as the Maritime Security Risk Analysis  Model to assess risk to vessels and port infrastructure, including ferries  and ferry facilities, in accordance with the guidance from DHS’s National  Infrastructure Protection Plan. As we reported in April 2010, the Coast  Guard uses this analysis tool to help implement its strategy and  concentrate maritime security activities when and where relative risk is  believed to be the greatest. The model assesses the risk—threats,  vulnerabilities, and consequences—of a terrorist attack based on different  scenarios; that is, it combines potential targets with different means of  attack. Examples of a Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model scenario  related to ferries include those involving a suicide bomber or a boat  attack. Taking threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences into  consideration is the approach to assessing risk recommended by the  National Infrastructure Protection Plan. According to the Coast Guard, the  model’s underlying methodology is designed to capture the security risk  facing different types of targets, allowing comparison between different  targets and geographic areas at the local, regional, and national levels.  Also in accordance with guidance from the National Infrastructure  Protection Plan, the model is designed to support decision making for the  Coast Guard. At the national level, the model’s results are used for (1)  long-term strategic resource planning, (2) identifying capabilities needed  to combat future terrorist threats, and (3) identifying the highest-risk  scenarios and targets in the maritime domain. At the local level, the  Captain of the Port can use the model as a tactical planning tool, and it can  help to identify the highest-risk scenarios, allowing the Captain of the Port  to prioritize needs and better deploy security assets. As we reported in  March 2009, Intelligence Coordination Center officials stated that the  Coast Guard uses the model to inform allocation decisions, such as the  deployment of local resources and grants.
section_title: Although No Recent Threats Have Been Identified, Stakeholders Reported Security Concerns
paragraphs: Although there have been no recent, credible terrorist threats against  ferries and their facilities in the United States, stakeholders expressed  concerns about various types of attacks that, if successful, could have  significant consequences. Since the characteristics and operations of the  ferry systems vary widely, different operations and ferry system  components face different levels of threats with different probabilities of  occurrence. In April 2010, Coast Guard intelligence officials stated that  there have been no credible terrorist threats against ferries and their  facilities identified in at least the last 12 months, but noted the presence of  terrorist groups that have the capability to attack a ferry. Further, the lack  of a recent threat does not preclude the possibility of such an incident  occurring in the future. As reported both by the Coast Guard and RAND,  ferries have been terrorist targets in the past and are considered attractive  targets for terrorists. In 2006, the Transportation Research Board reported  that the same characteristics that make ferry systems desirable to  passengers—the wide extent of service and the popularity of use—also  make them potential targets and potential instruments of a terrorist act.  As we previously reported in 2007, security officials in the U.S.  government are concerned about the possibility of a future terrorist attack  in a U.S. port. For example, captured terrorist training manuals cite ports  as targets and instruct trainees to use covert means to obtain surveillance  information for use in attack planning. Terrorist leaders have also stated  their intent to attack infrastructure targets within the United States,  including ports, in an effort to cause physical and economic damage and  inflict mass casualties. In April 2010, Coast Guard intelligence officials also  stated that they have seen a gradual shift in terrorist tactics and  procedures overseas that had been seen in attacks against mass transit  and other soft targets—characteristics typically shared with ferry systems  as well.
section_title: Stakeholders Reported Various Security Concerns
paragraphs: Maritime security stakeholders reported various ferry-related security  concerns with the greatest concerns being improvised explosive device  attacks delivered via vehicles, passengers or small boats. Vehicle-borne  improvised explosive device concerns, for ferry operations that carry  vehicles, included concerns about devices carried in cars and trucks. Our  work from February 2009 supports the likely validity of this concern as  vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices were the most common tactic  used in truck and bus terrorist incidents abroad. However, not all ferry  systems allow vehicles on board. Coast Guard officials we interviewed  expressed concern about passenger-borne improvised explosive devices  on ferries as well—such as a passenger carrying a bomb in a backpack.  Determining passengers’ identities, through admissibility inspections, is  one type of action that CBP has taken to help mitigate concerns posed by  passengers boarding ferries that originate from Canada. Nonetheless,  according to CBP officials, CBP personnel do not know a person’s identity  until he or she arrives at the facility to board. However, Coast Guard  officials stated that ferry operators may see the same people over and over  again and can become familiar with the regular passengers. Maritime  security stakeholders also consider waterborne improvised explosive  devices to be a concern for ferries and their facilities. According to the  Coast Guard’s Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship, one  of the greatest risks associated with maritime scenarios is a direct attack  using a waterborne improvised explosive device, and a recurring attack  mode has been the use of small boats to carry out an attack.
Port security stakeholders we interviewed also reported other ferry- related security concerns—some of which were more port specific. For  example, international ferries pose an additional concern by providing a  possible transit for terrorists to enter the United States as exemplified by  the 1999 millennium bomber, who traveled to the United States on a ferry  from Canada and had planned to bomb the Los Angeles International  Airport. Port security stakeholders reported other security concerns  including criminal activity, such as drug or human smuggling, particular to  where their ferries transit.
section_title: A Successful Attack Could Have Significant Consequences
paragraphs: A successful attack on a ferry could affect the ship, its passengers, and the  U.S. economy. A successful attack could damage a ferry and the extent of  the loss of life would depend on the severity of the attack, according to  various studies. A 2006 RAND report stated that scenarios involving  significant damage could easily result in several hundred fatalities and the  greater the damage, the more likely it would be that the vessel would sink  resulting in a higher death toll.
A successful terrorist attack on a ferry system may also have an economic  impact. Coast Guard officials stated that an attack on a ferry could target a  lot of people at one time and shut down port operations, which could  ultimately have an economic ripple effect. Coast Guard officials differed in  their opinions, however, on whether a ferry attack would likely have a  national economic impact or if the economic impact would be more  localized, but agreed that it would depend on the scenario. Furthermore,  the reaction to an attack on a ferry could also affect the degree of the  economic impact. According to the Coast Guard and RAND, ferry transit is  largely a substitutable form of transportation for which passengers may  opt to use another form of transportation, such as a bridge, following an  attack, and, therefore, the economic impact of such an action may not  necessarily be significant. However, an attack on a ferry could also result  in additional funding spent on enhanced security measures. For example,  the 2004 attack against the SuperFerry 14 in the Philippines affected  perceived terrorist threat contingencies and was a central factor in  subsequent decisions to deploy sea marshals on all ships traveling in  Philippine waters as well as promulgate heightened surveillance,  investigation, arrest, and detention powers for the police and intelligence  services.
section_title: Stakeholders Have Implemented Ferry Security Measures, but the Coast Guard Has Not Acted on Other Identified Opportunities That May Enhance Security
paragraphs: To secure ferries and their facilities, responsible maritime security  stakeholders—including the Coast Guard, CBP, and TSA, as well as  owners and operators of ferries and their facilities—reported having taken  various actions to implement applicable federal maritime laws,  regulations, and guidance designed to help ensure the security of ferries  and their facilities.
subsections: section_title: The Coast Guard Reports That It Conducts Multiple Types of Security Activities
paragraphs: The Coast Guard seeks to mitigate risks to ferries and their facilities  through regulatory and operational activities. The Coast Guard’s  regulatory activity involves ferry and ferry facility inspections, conducted  by inspections teams who monitor compliance with operators’ security  plans. According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard conducts  inspections of ferries four times per year: the annual security inspection,  which may be combined with a safety inspection and typically occurs  when the ferry is out of service, and the quarterly inspections, which are  shorter in duration, and generally take place while the ferry remains in  service. During calendar years 2006 through 2009, the Coast Guard  reported conducting over 1,500 ferry inspections—about 670 of which  were for high capacity passenger ferries. Coast Guard officials stated that  although ferry operators are responsible for scheduling inspections as a  condition of their certification, the Coast Guard has a system in place to  notify the agency if a ferry’s certification has expired so that the Coast  Guard may act accordingly.
In addition to ferry vessel inspections, the Coast Guard reports that it  inspects MTSA-regulated maritime facilities, including ferry facilities, at  least two times a year in accordance with SAFE Port Act requirements.  One of these inspections must be unannounced. The Coast Guard reported  conducting between approximately 700 and 850 ferry facility inspections  each calendar year for the period 2006 through 2009. To track its  performance in completing inspections, Coast Guard officials stated they  have the ability to create a daily report to inform the Captain of the Port  when each facility in his or her area of responsibility is due for an  inspection. The report lists all MTSA-regulated facilities, shows the dates  on which the Coast Guard performed its last two required inspections, and  highlights any facilities that are coming due or are overdue for an  inspection. In addition, a quarterly reporting tool was developed for Coast  Guard district and headquarters officials to determine if facility inspection  requirements were being met.
The Coast Guard also reported that it conducts operational activities to  secure ferries, including conducting boat escorts of ferries, implementing  positive control measures—that is, stationing armed Coast Guard  personnel in key locations aboard a vessel to ensure that the operator  maintains control—and providing a security presence through various  actions. Operation Neptune Shield requires Coast Guard units to escort a  certain percentage of high capacity passenger vessels at each maritime  security threat level to protect against an external threat, such as a  waterborne improvised explosive device. The requirement is applicable  to all types of high capacity passenger vessels—cruise ships, ferries, and  excursion vessels—in a Sector’s area of responsibility, and is not specific  to ferries. According to Coast Guard data, although 16 of 28 Sectors with  high capacity passenger vessels operating in their area of responsibility  met or exceeded the number of required escorts in calendar year 2009, 12  did not meet their escort requirement. However, Coast Guard officials  reported that some of the Sectors that did not meet escort requirements  may not have had high capacity passenger ferries operating in their area of  responsibility, but instead may have had other high capacity passenger  vessels, such as cruise ships. Moreover, Operation Neptune Shield allows  the Captain of the Port the latitude to manage risk and shift resources to  other priorities when deemed necessary, for example, when resources are  not available to fulfill all missions simultaneously. Officials from one  Sector reported that its local law enforcement agency has a large presence  in the port, providing a presence on the ferries and protecting security  zones. See figure 2 for a depiction of Coast Guard units escorting ferries.
In addition to conducting escorts and positive control measures, the Coast  Guard provides a security presence through other activities, including  patrolling areas in which ferries operate using airborne, waterborne, and  shoreside assets. In addition, Coast Guard personnel may board docked  ferries for the purpose of providing a security presence once they are in  transit. For example, at one location we visited, we accompanied a Coast  Guard Vessel Boarding Security Team, which boarded the ferry and rode  for two consecutive trips to provide a security presence as part of its  regular patrol duties.
section_title: TSA Also Has a Role in Ferry and Ferry Facility Security
paragraphs: TSA supports ferry security by demonstrating a security presence,  providing training, and implementing pilot programs involving security  technologies. Providing a security presence, TSA’s Visible Intermodal  Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams are comprised of federal air  marshals, surface transportation security inspectors, transportation  security officers, behavior detection officers, and explosives detection  canine teams. In July 2010, TSA officials reported that they had deployed  VIPR teams to ferry systems 319 times since calendar year 2006. Law  enforcement officials in one location stated they had participated in one  VIPR operation each year from 2007 to 2009. In another location, the Coast  Guard Sector cited VIPR operations among other best practices for  ensuring the security of high capacity passenger ferries. In addition to its  security presence, TSA developed training courses to educate passenger  vessel employees on maritime security issues such as crowd control,  improvised explosive detection recognition, and hijacking procedures.  TSA also provides training through its Intermodal Security Training  Exercise Program, which allows maritime security stakeholders to  practice security exercises on ferries and provides training on explosive  devices. TSA also accepts maritime security stakeholders into its explosive  trace detection canine training program. Law enforcement officers  affiliated with a ferry system we visited reported they were among the first  ferry operators to be accepted into the TSA program, which has helped  them to integrate four canines into their security operation.
TSA also reported that it conducts pilot programs at transportation  systems, including ferry systems, through its Security Enhancement and  Capabilities Augmentation Program. TSA documents state that the  program gives TSA the opportunity to network with different ferry  operators across the United States, test emerging technologies, and  develop strategies that the agency can use to respond to specific threats  that arise from new intelligence or major events. TSA officials stated that  these pilots help to determine how technologies work in different  environments and in large-scale applications, and allow local agencies to  try the technologies. According to one ferry operator, as part of their  participation in TSA pilot programs, they provided feedback to TSA in  response to pilots that have been tested in their respective systems. TSA  officials also stated that the agency has visited approximately 12 passenger  vessel venues since 2003 to test technologies used in the screening of  passengers, baggage, and stores to be loaded on passenger vessels.  Although TSA does not track implementation of piloted screening  technologies, officials reported that five passenger facility operators, some  of which were ferry facility operators, have adopted new technologies as a  result of participating in a TSA pilot. See figure 3 for a photographic  depiction of a technology used to screen vehicles for explosives that TSA  piloted at a ferry system.
section_title: For International Ferries That Enter U.S. Ports, CBP Carries Out Several Activities
paragraphs: CBP reports that it conducts inspections on international ferries that  arrive in, or are bound for a U.S. port, and deploys radiation detection  technologies at international ferry crossings. In the United States, CBP  inspects passengers, bags, vehicles, and crew that disembark from  international ferries. Additionally, CBP officers based in Canada conduct  admissibility inspections of U.S.-bound ferry passengers. Furthermore, the  SAFE Port Act of 2006 required CBP to determine if it could expand its  international presence. Specifically, the act required CBP to seek to  develop a plan by February 2007 for the inspection of passengers and  vehicles before they board a vehicle-carrying ferry bound for the United  States. In 2009, CBP concluded that such actions would not be feasible,  and in a 2009 letter to Congress, listed conditions which would prevent the  agency from examining all persons seeking to enter the United States.  Finally, CBP uses radiation detectors called portal monitors to screen  vehicles inbound from Canada as they disembark in the United States.  CBP officials stated that beginning in March 2008, radiation portal  monitors were deployed to U.S. facilities that receive ferries inbound from  Canada. By October 2009, CBP officials reported that 11 radiation portal  monitors had been deployed, and in July 2010, officials reported that 4  additional devices were estimated to be deployed by 2013.
section_title: Ferry Operators Have Taken Action to Enhance Security and Their Ability to Meet Security Standards Has Been Measured through Inspections
paragraphs: Ferry and ferry facility operators develop and implement security  plans. Pursuant to the ISPS Code and its guidance, and Coast Guard’s  implementing MTSA regulations and guidance, like other regulated vessels  and facilities, ferry and ferry facility operators must develop and  implement security plans that address, among other things, concerns  identified in their security assessments. Security plans must be reviewed  and approved by the Coast Guard. Coast Guard officials stated that as part  of this process, the Captain of the Port determines whether a plan’s  security measures address the concerns identified in a ferry or ferry  facility’s security assessment. To address requirements in their security  plans, ferry operators we interviewed reported using measures such as  establishing a security presence that may be provided by either their own  law enforcement branches or state and local law enforcement agencies;  conducting security sweeps of the ferries; implementing access controls  such as cameras, posting signage advising of security procedures, and  installing proximity card door systems; and screening vehicles. See figure  4 for a photograph depicting security signage posted at a ferry facility.
Security methods varied across ferry operations. Ferry systems had a  range of methods for providing onboard security, though the frequency  and means they used varied across ferry systems. For example, at one  ferry system we visited, local law enforcement officers rode on all ferry  transits, while another ferry system had state law enforcement officers  ride on selected trips. Similarly, all of the ferry systems we visited  conducted screening operations to help protect against a passenger- or  vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, but their frequency and  screening methods also varied across systems. While the Coast Guard sets  the minimum screening requirements at each maritime security threat  level, Coast Guard guidance states that each ferry operator is permitted  to enact measures that protect passengers without unduly compromising  service to the community. Accordingly, operators may select the screening  method most appropriate for their respective operation and within their  resources, provided the Coast Guard deems the method sufficient to  mitigate security risks. On our site visits, we observed variation in  screening operations with respect to (a) the frequency of screening,   (b) the personnel involved in screening, and (c) the screening methods  used.
With respect to screening frequency, port security stakeholders with  screening responsibilities at five of the six ferry systems we interviewed  generally reported that they met the minimum screening requirement set  forth by the Coast Guard, and one ferry system reported that it screened  all passengers, bags, and crew. This operator noted that its screening  frequency was determined by the U.S. Park Police because the ferry  transits to a national park. According to the U.S. Park Police, this national  park is listed as the national icon that receives the greatest number of  threats. During our site visits, we also observed one system that did not  appear to be screening according to its standards, but we did not  determine any failure to meet minimum screening requirements.
Ferry and ferry facility operators utilize various personnel in their  screening operations. Federal regulations require personnel with specific  security responsibilities—such as screening—to have knowledge through  training or equivalent job experience in certain areas and require  operators to maintain personnel training records. Based on our site visits,  screening was performed by a variety of personnel in these locations,  including ferry crew members, contracted security screeners, and state or  local law enforcement.
Among the ferry systems we visited, canine and manual screening  methods were utilized. Additionally, one passenger-only ferry system we  visited screened passengers and baggage using walk-through metal  detectors and baggage belts. According to a Coast Guard report on ferry  security, canine screening provides a reliable and proven method for  detecting concealed explosives. The report also states that canines  provide advantages of superior mobility and the ability to follow a scent  directly to its source—citing that canines have a higher probability of  detection compared to manual, x-ray, and trace detection methods.  Finally, the report states that while manual screening is considered a  nontechnological screening option, it allows for higher passenger  throughput than other screening devices.
Screening operations differ by ferry system due to various factors,  including system characteristics, state laws, and resource availability.  System characteristics like passenger throughput influence the screening  method an operator may feasibly implement, as passenger processing  rates vary across technologies. For example, two ferry operators we  interviewed reported that certain screening technologies would not be  able to accommodate their high passenger throughput. Additionally, state  provisions, under certain circumstances, may limit the ability of security  personnel to perform certain screening methods. For example, state police  officers who perform canine screening at one ferry system we visited  reported that state case law generally prohibits them from opening a  vehicle trunk without the driver’s consent or a search warrant. However,  when a canine detects a potential threat associated with a vehicle and the  driver does not consent to trunk screening, officers notify the ferry  captain. Under the ferry system’s security procedures, anyone denying  such a screening will be prohibited from boarding, preventing a potential  risk from boarding the ferry. Furthermore, funding may also pose a  limiting factor in designing security operations. A 2005 Coast Guard report  on ferry screening indicates that costs vary across screening methods,  stating that canine screening is over three times more expensive than  manual screening. The report also notes that startup programs for two  canines and their handlers are estimated to cost $250,000. In July 2010,  one port security stakeholder we interviewed stated that in addition to  training costs, their four canine units cost $160,000 per year.
Coast Guard data show that while ferry security deficiency rates  varied compared to other vessel types, ferry facility deficiency  rates were generally lower compared to other facility types. Of the  nearly 700 inspections conducted on high capacity passenger ferries  during calendar years 2006 through 2009, the Coast Guard identified 48  deficiencies. Officials stated that overall, ferry security deficiencies were  generally no more severe than deficiencies cited for cargo vessels and  other passenger vessels. As shown in figure 5, among nine vessel types, the  relative ranking of security deficiency rates for ferries—including both  high capacity and smaller capacity passenger ferries—varied from 2006 to  2009.
Coast Guard officials stated that ferry security deficiencies were  commonly found in the following areas: security plan audits and  amendments; drills and exercises; records and documentation; and access  control procedures, including monitoring of secure and restricted areas.  Coast Guard officials at agency headquarters reported that operators were  particularly responsive to correcting deficiencies, because they  understood that deficiencies could lead the Coast Guard to remove a  vessel from service and interrupt operations.
With regard to ferry facilities, the Coast Guard identified nearly 1,300  deficiencies in conducting a total of nearly 3,200 ferry facility inspections  during calendar years 2006 through 2009. According to Coast Guard  officials, the majority of the deficiencies were related to (1) operations or  management issues, such as the failure of the security officers to properly  perform their duties related to required drills or personnel training and (2)  documentation issues such as the security officer failing to post security  signage, document security responsibilities, drills or training, or submit  security plan amendments. Coast Guard officials stated that compared to  other types of facilities, ferry facilities tended to have more security  requirements yet they generally outperformed other types of facilities in  meeting requirements. As shown in figure 6, ferry facilities generally had  the lowest deficiency rate compared to eight other facilities during the  period 2006 through 2009.
section_title: The Coast Guard May Be Missing Opportunities to Enhance Ferry Security
paragraphs: The Coast Guard has reported taking various actions to help secure  ferries, but may be missing opportunities to further enhance ferry security,  particularly with respect to enhancing screening measures because it has  not evaluated and, if determined warranted, acted on all of the findings  and recommendations from several ferry security reports completed in  2005 and 2006. In addition, the Coast Guard has not reassessed its vehicle  screening requirements since 2004.
section_title: The Coast Guard Has Not Evaluated and, if Determined Warranted, Acted on Report Findings and Recommendations
paragraphs: The Coast Guard spent $1.5 million on contracted studies related to ferry  security, but has not evaluated and, if determined warranted, taken action  to address all of the findings and recommendations from these studies  even though their results were issued in 2005 and 2006. Recognizing the  security risk posed by vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, the  Coast Guard, in consultation with various other entities, initiated five  studies to conduct more comprehensive research and development to  enhance security on ferries. According to Coast Guard documentation  from 2004, these studies were aimed at establishing a new benchmark for  ferry screening and enhancing the agency’s ability to focus on improving  security practices, screening technology, and identification of explosive  hazards. In addition, the document states that the Coast Guard should  convene an interagency working group with private sector representation  from the ferry industry to identify areas for improvement in the screening  process by discussing (a) previously implemented screening practices and  (b) information from the studies once they were completed. The five  studies resulted in three reports with key findings related to the screening  of vehicles boarding a ferry, and two of them made recommendations to  the Coast Guard.
The ferry security reports included several findings and recommendations.  Two of the reports included classified recommendations which can not be  discussed in our report. The third report, issued by ABSG Consulting in  April 2005, reported on the completed consequence studies that were  conducted and included classified findings on the potential consequences  of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, but no recommendations  resulted from this report. The objectives of the consequences studies were  to predict structural damage to the selected ferries from different charge  sizes, locations, and methods of attack.
The Coast Guard has not evaluated and, if determined warranted, taken  actions on the ferry security reports. Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government state that agencies should have policies and  procedures for ensuring that findings of audits and other reviews are  promptly resolved. The guidance further states that managers are to   (1) promptly evaluate findings from audits and other reviews, including  those showing deficiencies and recommendations reported by auditors  and others who evaluate agencies’ operations; (2) determine proper  actions in response to findings and recommendations from audits and  reviews; and (3) complete, within established time frames, all actions that  correct or otherwise resolve the matters brought to management’s  attention. Although Coast Guard program officials stated that the agency  does not have a process for addressing, responding to, or documenting  recommendations stemming from research and development studies, they  stated that once they receive a report they generally review its  recommendations and seek feedback from Coast Guard program  specialists and field units as well as industry stakeholders. After this,  Coast Guard officials stated that they work with port captains and industry  stakeholders to implement feasible security measures. Coast Guard  Research and Development officials we met with told us that after the  2005 National Ferry Security Study was issued, they communicated the  report findings to various entities, including the Coast Guard  Commandant, Area Maritime Security Committees, and stakeholders at the  ports included in the ferry study. In addition, a 2005 informational  memorandum to the Secretary of Homeland Security from the  Commandant indicated that the Coast Guard, in consultation with TSA and  the Office for Domestic Preparedness, planned to implement new security  measures to mitigate the risk of an improvised explosive device as a result  of the ferry security studies. However, in May 2010, Coast Guard program  officials stated that there were no current actions being taken to address  the findings and recommendations from the National Ferry Security Study.  Coast Guard officials explained that the ferry security reports were  released when the agency was undergoing an internal reorganization and  as a result the reports were not sent to the appropriate unit after the  reorganization—which they also believe is the likely reason for why no  further actions were taken to evaluate or address the reports’ findings and  recommendations.
In June 2010, Coast Guard program officials reported that they were taking  actions to improve ferry security through ongoing rulemaking and  guidance development efforts. Coast Guard officials stated that they were  in the process of revising the MTSA regulations, through which they would  amend security training for vessel and facility personnel—including ferry  screening personnel. Coast Guard officials stated that they began these  revisions in late 2006, but had to divert their attention to the  implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential  program in 2007, and thus, were delayed in developing the MTSA  regulation revisions. The Coast Guard plans to finalize the MTSA  regulatory revisions through the proposed rulemaking process. In  addition, Coast Guard officials stated that they have been developing a  Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular for about 2 years to provide  updated guidance for ferry screening. The guidance is intended to update  existing screening policies and assist owners or operators of ferries and  ferry facilities in the prevention of security incidents by developing and  implementing more effective passenger screening programs appropriate  for each maritime security threat level. Although the officials reported  these efforts initially began in about 2005 or 2006, they did not expect the  Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular to be published until fall 2010.  Coast Guard officials further reported that they plan to review the 2005  and 2006 reports to determine if additional changes should be  incorporated into their ongoing development of the Navigation and Vessel  Inspection Circular. However, officials stated that they could not delay the  publication of the MTSA regulatory revisions currently under  development, and thus, it was unlikely they would make any major ferry- related changes in this rulemaking as a result of reviewing the 2005 and  2006 reports. Furthermore, Coast Guard officials also informed us that  DHS is currently evaluating the feasibility of developing standards for  nonfederal canine programs. The Captain of the Port determines whether  the qualifications of the canine program used by screening personnel are  sufficient, as standards for private or nonfederal canine programs do not  exist as they do for federal canine programs.
Although these ongoing efforts may address some of the findings and  recommendations from the 2005 and 2006 reports, it is not evident that the  Coast Guard utilized the reports or their recommendations to inform the  agency’s decision making, as officials could not confirm whether the 2005  and 2006 reports were the catalyst for the agency’s actions. In addition,  Coast Guard officials confirmed that the ongoing actions will not address  all of the findings and recommendations from the reports. As a result of  our work on ferry security, in August 2010, Coast Guard officials stated  that they believe the ferry security reports can still provide valuable  information and they plan to begin evaluating the reports in fall 2010. After  conducting this evaluation of the reports and considering their  recommendations, the Coast Guard could be in a better position to  determine if additional actions could be taken to improve the security of  ferries and their facilities. Moreover, fully evaluating the study results  could assist the Coast Guard in determining if its current proposed actions  will address previously identified deficiencies.
section_title: The Coast Guard Has Not Reassessed Vehicle Screening Requirements in Accordance with Agency Guidance
paragraphs: Although agency documents have suggested that the Coast Guard reassess  its vehicle screening requirements for ferry operators, the Coast Guard has  not taken action to update these requirements since 2004. Along with  MTSA regulations pertaining to vehicle screening, the Coast Guard  established minimum screening requirements for vehicles boarding ferries  in a November 2003 Coast Guard maritime security directive. In  September 2004, the Coast Guard issued another maritime security  directive which increased minimum vehicle screening requirements for  high capacity passenger ferries, citing the use of a vehicle-borne  improvised explosive device by a terrorist as a primary concern for  ferries. The directive cited three factors that contributed to the decision  to increase vehicle screening requirements: (1) an increase in suspicious  activity in the preceding 2 years, (2) possible surveillance of ferry  operations during that same period, and (3) an anticipated increase in risk  associated with the January 2005 presidential inauguration. The directive  further stated that following the period of increased risk related to the  inauguration and the completion of the aforementioned studies on ferry  security, screening requirements would be reassessed. The directive also  called for the establishment of a workgroup to address the new screening  levels and develop a strategy to monitor vehicle screening effectiveness.  Lastly, a 2004 Coast Guard document on ferry screening stated that the  agency should monitor threats to ferries and continually reassess  screening requirements relative to specific threats.
Despite Coast Guard documents from 2004 stating that a reassessment of  the screening requirements should be conducted when the ferry security  studies were completed or if the threat were to change—both of which  have occurred—as of May 2010, Coast Guard officials stated that they had  not taken action to reassess and update the requirements since the 2004  security directive. Reviewing the screening requirements could provide the  Coast Guard with reasonable assurance that it is setting standards for  ferry operators that mitigate current threats to ferries and take into  account the needs of ferry operators in maintaining their operations.  Again, as a result of our work on ferry security, in August 2010, Coast  Guard officials stated that they intended to begin reviewing the ferry  security reports in fall 2010. According to one of these officials, although  the agency’s review of the ferry security reports could result in a change to  the vehicle screening requirements, the agency did not have a specific plan  to reassess the vehicle screening requirements.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Given the attractiveness of ferries as targets for terrorists and the  importance of ferry systems as a transportation mode, it is important that  maritime security stakeholders regularly assess risks and take action to  best ensure their security. Certainly, federal agencies and maritime  security stakeholders have implemented security measures to enhance  ferry system security, and in 2005, the Coast Guard recognized the need to  further enhance ferry system security. However, the Coast Guard’s  attention was then diverted to other agency priorities and thus the agency  did not proactively evaluate and take action, if determined appropriate, on  the findings and recommendations from the 2005 and 2006 ferry security  reports. The reports provide information for potentially improving the  detection of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and enhancing  security across the nation’s ferry systems, and in August 2010, Coast  Guard officials acknowledged the value of this information. Fully  assessing and considering these report findings and recommendations  could provide the Coast Guard with valuable information that could  augment ferry security. After evaluating the report findings and  recommendations, the Coast Guard could be in a better position to  determine what additional actions, if any, should be taken to enhance ferry  security.
In addition, although Coast Guard documentation from 2004 states that the  agency should reassess its vehicle screening requirements after the results  of the ferry security reports are issued or if the threat changes, it has not  yet taken action to do so. Taking action to reassess screening  requirements could provide the Coast Guard with key information to help  improve its vehicle screening requirements. Thus, the Coast Guard could  be in a better position to set standards for ferry operators that take into  consideration the needs of the ferry systems to maintain operations while  also protecting against current threats.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that the Coast Guard considers all known options for securing  the ferry transportation system and is not missing opportunities to  enhance ferry security, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast  Guard take the following two actions:  (1) after fully evaluating the findings and recommendations from the Coast  Guard’s 2005 and 2006 ferry security reports, take appropriate actions to  address the findings and recommendations identified in these reports; and  (2) upon review of the reports, ensure that vehicle screening requirements  are set at an appropriate level that considers both the risks to and  operating requirements of ferry systems, and when warranted, reassess  screening requirements for ferries and make changes as appropriate.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to the  Departments of Homeland Security, State, and Interior for their review and  comment. DHS did not provide official written comments to include in our  report. However, in an e-mail received on September 23, 2010, the DHS  liaison stated that DHS concurred with our recommendations. DHS  provided written technical comments, which we incorporated into the  report, as appropriate. The Departments of State and Interior responded  that they did not have any comments on the report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland  Security, the Interior, and State; and interested congressional committees  as appropriate. The report is also available at no charge on the GAO Web  site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix I.
section_title: Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director,  and Jonathan Bachman, analyst-in-charge, managed this assignment.  Tracey Cross and Christine Hanson made significant contributions to the  work. Stanley Kostyla assisted with design and methodology. Geoffrey  Hamilton provided legal support. Jessica Orr provided assistance in report  preparation. Josh Ormond and Lydia Araya developed the report’s  graphics.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port  Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.
Maritime Security: Varied Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship  Security, but Some Concerns Remain. GAO-10-400. Washington, D.C.:  April 9, 2010.
Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would  Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the  Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12.  Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009.
Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information,  but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. GAO-09-337.  Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2009.
Supply Chain Security: CBP Works with International Entities to  Promote Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but  Challenges Remain. GAO-08-538. Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2008.
Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were  Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. GAO-08-672.  Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.- Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has  Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges  Remain in Verifying Security Practices. GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.:  April 25, 2008.
Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct  Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program’s Staffing,  Practices, and Data. GAO-08-12. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign  Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance  Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2008.
Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in  Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity  Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One  Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure  Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment.  GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.
Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R.  Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in  Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: March  28, 2007.
Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on  a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification.  GAO-07-316. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2007.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery  Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.:  July 31, 2006.
Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts Are Improving.  GAO-06-933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of  Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T.  Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and  Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical  Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved.  GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, But Implementation and  Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2005.
Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment  Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection  Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information  Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention.  GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.
Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced  Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GAO-05-404.  Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2005.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective  Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.:  September 30, 2004.
Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and  Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System.  GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New  Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting  Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington,  D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target  Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington,  D.C.: December 16, 2003.
Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime  Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to  Address the Overseas Threat. GAO-03-165. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2003.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling.  GAO-02-989T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002.
Coast Guard: Vessel Identification System Development Needs to Be  Reassessed. GAO-02-477. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2002.