Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Fully Address Issues Affecting Protective Forces' Personnel Systems
Published: 2010-03-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks raised concerns about the security of Department of Energy (DOE) sites with weapons-grade nuclear material, known as Category I special nuclear material (SNM). To better protect these sites against attacks, DOE has sought to transform its protective forces protecting SNM into a Tactical Response Force (TRF) with training and capabilities similar to the U.S. military. This testimony is based on prior work and has been updated with additional information provided by protective forces' union officials. In a prior GAO report, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces' Personnel System Issues (GAO-10-275), GAO (1) analyzed information on the management, organization, staffing, training, and compensation of protective forces at DOE sites with Category I SNM; (2) examined the implementation of TRF; and (3) assessed DOE's two options to more uniformly manage protective forces; and (4) reported on DOE's progress in addressing protective force issues. DOE generally agreed with the recommendations in GAO's prior report that called for the agency to fully assess and implement, where feasible, measures identified by DOE's 2009 protective forces study group to enhance protective forces' career longevity and retirement options.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Over 2,300 contractor protective forces provide armed security for DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) at six sites that have long-term missions to store and process Category I SNM. DOE protective forces at each of these sites are covered under separate contracts and collective bargaining agreements between contractors and protective force unions. As a result, the management, organization, staffing, training and compensation--in terms of pay and benefits--of protective forces vary. Protective force contractors, unions, and DOE security officials are concerned that the implementation of TRF's more rigorous requirements and the current protective forces' personnel systems threaten the ability of protective forces--especially older members--to continue their careers until retirement age. These concerns, heightened by broader DOE efforts to manage postretirement and pension liabilities for its contractors that might have a negative impact on retirement eligibility and benefits for protective forces, contributed to a 44-day protective force strike at an important NNSA site in 2007. According to protective force union officials, the issues surrounding TRF implementation and retirement benefits are still unresolved and could lead to strikes at three sites with large numbers of protective forces when their collective bargaining agreements expire in 2012. Efforts to more uniformly manage protective forces have focused on either reforming the current contracting approach or creating a federal protective force (federalization). Either approach might provide for managing protective forces more uniformly and could result in effective security if well-managed. However, if protective forces were to be federalized under existing law, the current forces probably would not be eligible for enhanced retirement benefits and might face a loss of pay or even their jobs. Although DOE rejected federalization as an option in 2009, it recognized that the current contracting approach could be improved by greater standardization and by addressing personnel system issues. As a result, NNSA began a standardization initiative to centralize procurement of equipment, uniforms, and weapons to achieve cost savings. Under a separate initiative, a DOE study group developed a number of recommendations to enhance protective forces' career longevity and retirement options, but DOE has made limited progress to date in implementing these recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Energy’s  (DOE) contractor guards, also known as protective forces. My testimony is  based on our recently released report Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to  Address Protective Forces’ Personnel System Issues and recent  discussions with protective force union officials.
As you know, protective forces are a key component of security at  Department of Energy (DOE) sites with special nuclear material (SNM),  which the department considers its highest security risk. This material— including plutonium and highly enriched uranium—is considered to be  Category I when it is weapons grade and in specified forms (e.g., nuclear  weapons, nuclear weapons components, metals, and oxides) and  quantities. The risks associated with Category I SNM include theft and the  potential for sabotage through the use of a radioactive dispersal device,  also known as a “dirty bomb.” Currently, DOE and its National Nuclear  Security Administration (NNSA), an agency within DOE responsible for  the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile,  have six contractor-operated sites that possess—and will possess for the  foreseeable future—Category I SNM (sites with “enduring” missions).  The  six sites include four that NNSA is responsible for—the Los Alamos  National Laboratory, in Los Alamos, New Mexico; the Y-12 National  Security Complex (Y-12), in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; the Pantex Plant, near  Amarillo, Texas; and the Nevada Test Site, outside of Las Vegas, Nevada.  In addition, DOE’s Office of Environmental Management is responsible for  the Savannah River Site, near Aiken, South Carolina, and DOE’s Office of  Nuclear Energy is responsible for the Idaho National Laboratory, near  Idaho Falls, Idaho.
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE  embarked on a multifaceted effort to better secure its sites with Category I  SNM against a larger and more sophisticated terrorist threat by changing  policies, such as its Design Basis Threat (DBT)—a classified document  that specifies the potential size and capabilities of adversary forces that  the sites must defend against. Protective forces, which accounted for  slightly more than 50 percent of DOE’s $862 million for field security  funding in fiscal year 2008, also have been an important focus of DOE  security improvements. DOE has sought to improve the effectiveness of its  protective forces by deploying security technologies, such as sensors  capable of detecting adversaries at long ranges, and through the use of  advanced weaponry, such as belt-fed machine guns and grenade  launchers. In addition, DOE has sought to enhance protective forces’  tactical skills—the ability to move, shoot, and communicate in a combat  environment—through its Tactical Response Force (TRF) initiative.  Among other things, TRF revised the application of DOE’s existing  protective force categories to emphasize tactical skills and instituted more  rigorous weapons and physical fitness qualifications for many of DOE’s  protective forces.
However, protective force unions have been concerned that the planned  implementation of TRF—with its potentially more demanding  requirements—threatens the ability of protective forces to work until  retirement age. These concerns contributed to a 44-day protective force  strike at the Pantex Plant in 2007. The strike raised broader issues in DOE  and Congress about the continued suitability of DOE’s model for managing  its protective forces. Unionized protective forces can strike when their  collective bargaining agreements end, and strikes may create security  vulnerabilities at DOE’s sites with Category I SNM. In addition, DOE’s  practice of managing its protective forces through separate contracts at  each site could create disparities in protective force performance, pay, and  benefits. In 2009, a DOE protective forces study group, composed of DOE  and union representatives, made a number of recommendations that,  while maintaining contractor protective forces, may better balance  protective forces’ concerns over their careers with DOE’s need to provide  effective security and control costs.
In this context, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2008 directed us to report on the management of DOE’s protective forces  at its sites with Category I SNM. Among other things, we (1) analyzed  information on the management, organization, staffing, training and  compensation of protective forces; (2) examined the implementation of  TRF; (3) assessed DOE’s two options to more uniformly manage DOE  protective forces; and (4) reported on DOE’s progress in addressing  protective force issues. Our recent report Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to  Address Protective Forces’ Personnel System Issues presents the full  findings of our work and includes two recommendations to DOE to fully  assess and implement, where feasible, recommendations made by DOE’s  2009 protective forces study group. DOE generally agreed with these  recommendations.
To obtain information on DOE’s contractor protective forces, we visited  three of the sites with enduring Category I SNM missions—Pantex, the  Savannah River Site, and Los Alamos National Laboratory—because each  site represented one of the three different types of protective force  contracts currently in place. We also met with protective force  contractors, federal site office officials, and protective force union  representatives at these sites. We also distributed a data collection  instrument to protective force contractors and federal site office officials  at each of these sites and at the other three sites with enduring Category I  SNM missions—Y-12, the Nevada Test Site, and the Idaho National  Laboratory. From this instrument, we received site information about the  protective forces, the status of TRF and DBT implementations, views on  DOE options for managing the protective forces, and the reliability of site  data. Prior to this testimony, protective force union officials provided us  with updated information.
We conducted our work from April 2008 to March 2010 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards, which require us to  plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to  provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives.
subsections: section_title: Protective Forces Are Not Uniformly Managed, Organized, Staffed, Trained, or Compensated
paragraphs: Contractor protective forces—including 2,339 unionized officers and their  376 nonunionized supervisors—are not uniformly managed, organized,  staffed, trained, or compensated across the six DOE sites we reviewed.  For example, we found the following:    Three different types of protective force contracts are in use. These  contract types influence how protective force operations are overseen by  federal officials and how protective force operations are coordinated with  other site operations.
The size of sites’ protective forces ranges from 233 to 533 uniformed,  unionized officers, and the composition of these forces and their  associated duties and responsibilities vary based on their categorization.  Protective forces are divided into four categories:    Security Officer (SO): Responsible for unarmed security duties such as  checking for valid security badges. SOs represent about 5 percent of  total unionized protective forces.
Security Police Officer-I (SPO-I): Primarily responsible for protecting  fixed posts during combat. SPO-Is represent about 34 percent of total  unionized protective forces.
These types of contracts include (1) direct contracts between protective force contractors  and DOE or NNSA; (2) a component of management and operating (M&O) contracts  between M&O contractors and DOE or NNSA; and (3) subcontracts between an M&O  contractor and a protective force contractor.
SPO-II: Primarily responsible for mobile combat to prevent terrorists  from reaching their target but can also be assigned to fixed posts. SPO- IIs represent about 39 percent of total unionized protective forces.
SPO-III: Primarily responsible for mobile combat and special response  skills, such as those needed to recapture SNM (on site) and recover  SNM (off site) if terrorists succeed in acquiring it. SPO-IIIs are usually  organized into special response teams, and SPO-IIIs represent about 19  percent of total unionized protective forces.
Each protective force has uniformed, nonunionized supervisors, but the  duties, responsibilities, and ranks of these supervisors are generally site  specific and not detailed in DOE’s protective force policies.
DOE policy mandates certain protective force training but allows sites  some flexibility in implementation. For example, newly hired protective  forces must complete DOE’s Basic Security Police Officer Training class,  but these courses, offered by each of the sites we reviewed, range in  length from 9 to 16 weeks. In addition, we found that one site had largely  completed the implementation of most aspects of the TRF initiative, but  others are not expecting to do so until the end of fiscal year 2011.
Pay, based on the site and the category of protective forces, ranges from  nearly $19 per hour to over $26 per hour. Overtime pay, accrued in  different ways at the sites, and other premium pay, such as additional pay  for night shifts and holidays, may significantly increase protective force  pay.
While all employers contributed to active protective force members’  medical, dental, and life insurance benefits, they differed in the amount of  their contributions and in the retirement benefits they offered. In general,  new hires were offered defined contribution plans, such as a 401(k) plan,  that provides eventual retirement benefits that depend on the amount of  contributions by the employer or employee, as appropriate, as well as the  earnings and losses of the invested funds. At the time of our review, two  sites offered new hires defined benefit plans that promised retirees a  certain monthly payment at retirement. Two other sites had defined  benefit plans that covered protective force members hired before a  particular date but were not open to new hires.
We found two primary reasons for these differences. First, protective  forces at all six of the sites we reviewed operate under separate contracts  and collective bargaining agreements. Second, DOE has a long-standing  contracting approach of defining desired results and outcomes—such as  effective security—instead of detailed, prescriptive guidance on how to  achieve those outcomes. While creating some of the differences noted,  this approach, as we have previously reported, allows security to be  closely tailored to site- and mission-specific needs.
section_title: Tactical Response Force Implementation Has Raised Concerns about the Longevity of Protective Forces Careers
paragraphs: Since its inception in 2005, TRF has raised concerns in DOE security  organizations, among protective force contractors, and in protective force  unions about the ability of protective forces—especially older individuals  serving in protective forces—to continue meeting DOE’s weapons,  physical fitness, and medical qualifications. As we reported in 2005, some  site security officials recognized they would have to carefully craft career  transition plans for protective force officers who may not be able to meet  TRF standards. Adding to these concerns are DOE’s broader efforts to  manage its long-term postretirement and pension liabilities for its  contractors, which could have a negative impact on retirement eligibility  and benefits for protective forces. In 2006, DOE issued its Contractor  Pension and Medical Benefits Policy (Notice 351.1), which was designed  to limit DOE’s long-term pension and postretirement liabilities. A coalition  of protective force unions stated that this policy moved them in the  opposite direction from their desire for early and enhanced retirement  benefits.
Concerns over TRF implementation and DOE’s efforts to limit long-term  pension and postretirement liabilities contributed to a 44-day protective  force strike at the Pantex Plant in 2007. Initially, Pantex contractor  security officials designated all of the plant’s protective force positions as  having to meet a more demanding DOE combatant standard, a move that  could have disqualified a potentially sizable number of protective forces  from duty. Under the collective bargaining agreement that was eventually  negotiated in 2007, some protective forces were allowed to meet a less  demanding combatant standard. DOE has also rescinded its 2006  Contractor Pension and Medical Benefits Policy. However, according to  protective force union officials, failure to resolve issues surrounding TRF  implementation and retirement benefits could lead to strikes at three sites  with large numbers of protective forces—Pantex, the Savannah River Site,  and Y-12—when their collective bargaining agreements expire in 2012.
section_title: Either Improving the Existing Contractor Forces System or Creating a Federal Force Could Result in More Uniform Management of Protective Forces
paragraphs: To manage its protective forces more effectively and uniformly, over the  past decades DOE has considered two principal options—improving  elements of the existing contractor system or creating a federal protective  force. We identified five major criteria that DOE officials, protective force  contractors, and union officials have used to assess the advantages and  disadvantages of these options. Overall, in comparing these criteria  against the two principal options, we found that neither contractor nor  federal forces seems overwhelmingly superior, but each has offsetting  advantages and disadvantages. Either option could result in effective and  more uniform security if well-managed. However, we identified  transitional problems with converting the current protective force to a  federalized force.
When assessing whether to improve the existing contractor system or  federalize protective forces, DOE, protective force contractors, and union  officials have used the following five criteria:    A personnel system that supports force resizing and ensures high-quality  protective force members.
Greater standardization of protective forces across sites to more  consistently support high performance and ready transfer of personnel  between sites.
Better DOE management and oversight to ensure effective security.
Prevention or better management of protective force strikes.
Containment of the forces’ costs within expected budgets.
Evaluating the two principal options—maintaining the current security  force structure or federalizing the security force—against these criteria,  we found that if the forces are well-managed, either contractor or federal  forces could result in effective and more uniform security for several  reasons:    First, both options have offsetting advantages and disadvantages, with  neither option emerging as clearly superior. When compared with a  possible federalized protective force, a perceived advantage of a  contractor force is greater flexibility for hiring or terminating an employee  to resize the forces; a disadvantage is that a contractor force can strike. In  contrast, federalization could better allow protective forces to advance or  laterally transfer to other DOE sites to meet protective force members’  needs or DOE’s need to resize particular forces, something that is difficult  to do under the current contractor system.
Second, a key disadvantage of the current contractor system, such as  potential strikes for contractor forces, does not preclude effective  operations if the security force is well-managed. For instance, a 2009  memo signed by the NNSA administrator stated that NNSA had  demonstrated that it can effectively manage strikes through the use of  replacement protective forces.
Third, distinctions between the two options can be overstated by  comparing worst- and best-case scenarios, when similar conditions might  be realized under either option. For example, a union coalition advocates  federalization to get early and enhanced retirement benefits, which are  available for law enforcement officers and some other federal positions, to  ensure a young and vigorous workforce. However, such benefits might  also be provided to contractor protective forces.
Reliably estimating the costs to compare protective force options proved  difficult and precluded our detailed reporting on it. Since contractor and  federal forces could each have many possible permutations, choosing any  particular option to assess would be arbitrary. For example, a 2008 NNSA- sponsored study identified wide-ranging federalization options, such as  federalizing all or some SPO positions at some or all facilities or  reorganizing them under an existing or a new agency. In addition, DOE  would have to decide on the hypothetical options’ key cost factors before  it could reasonably compare costs. For example, when asked about some  key cost factors for federalization, an NNSA Service Center official said  that a detailed workforce analysis would be needed to decide whether  DOE would either continue to use the same number of SPOs with high  amounts of scheduled overtime or hire a larger number of SPOs who  would work fewer overtime hours. Also, the official said that until  management directs a particular work schedule for federalized protective  forces, there is no definitive answer to the applicable overtime rules, such  as whether overtime begins after 8 hours in a day. The amount of overtime  and the factors affecting it are crucial to a sound cost estimate because  overtime pay can now account for up to about 50 percent of pay for  worked hours.
section_title: Federalizing Protective Forces Could Create Difficulties Either under Current Laws or with Special Provisions for Enhanced Retirement Benefits
paragraphs: If protective forces were to be federalized under existing law, the current  forces probably would not be eligible for early and enhanced retirement  benefits and might face a loss of pay or even their jobs. For example:    According to officials at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and  NNSA’s Service Center, if contractor SPOs were federalized under  existing law, they would likely be placed into the federal security guard  (GS-0085) job series. Although a coalition of unions has sought  federalization to allow members to have early and enhanced retirement  benefits, which allows employees in certain federal jobs to retire at age 50  with 20 years of service, federal security guards are not eligible for these  benefits.
Our analysis indicated transitioning protective force members may receive  lower pay rates as federal security guards. Contractor force members  receive top pay rates that could not generally be matched under the likely  General Schedule pay grades.
If protective forces were federalized, OPM officials told us that current  members would not be guaranteed a federal job and would have to  compete for the new federal positions; thus, they risk not being hired.  Nonveteran protective force members are particularly at risk because  competition for federal security guard positions is restricted to those with  veterans’ preference, if they are available.
According to OPM officials, legislation would be required to provide  federal protective forces with early and enhanced retirement benefits  because their positions do not fit the current definition of law enforcement  officers that would trigger such benefits. However, if such legislation were  enacted, these benefits’ usual provisions could create hiring and  retirement difficulties for older force members. Older members might not  be rehired because agencies are typically authorized to set a maximum  age, often age 37, for entry into federal positions with early retirement. In  addition, even if there were a waiver from the maximum age of hire, older  protective forces members could not retire at age 50 because they would  have had to work 20 years to meet the federal service requirement for  “early” retirement benefits. These forces could retire earlier if they were  granted credit for their prior years of service under DOE and NNSA  contracts. However, OPM officials told us OPM would strongly oppose  federal retirement benefits being granted for previous years of contractor  service (retroactive benefits). According to these officials, these  retroactive benefits would be without precedent and would violate the  basic concept that service credit for retirement benefits is only available  for eligible employment at the time it was performed. Moreover,  retroactive benefits would create an unfunded liability for federal  retirement funds.
section_title: DOE Seeks to Address Protective Force Issues by Reforming Contractor Forces, but Progress Has Been Limited to Date
paragraphs: In a joint January 2009 memorandum, senior officials from NNSA and DOE  rejected the federalization of protective forces as an option and supported  the continued use of contracted protective forces—but with  improvements. They concluded that, among other things, the transition to  a federal force would be costly and would be likely to provide little, if any,  increase in security effectiveness. However, these officials recognized that  the current contractor system could be improved by addressing some of  the issues that federalization might have resolved. In particular, they  announced the pursuit of an initiative to better standardize protective  forces’ training and equipment. According to these officials, more  standardization serves to increase effectiveness, provide cost savings, and  facilitate better responses to potential work stoppages. In addition, in  March 2009, DOE commissioned a study group to recommend ways to  overcome the personnel system problems that might prevent protective  force members from working to a normal retirement age, such as 60 to 65,  and building reasonable retirement benefits.
In addition, NNSA established a Security Commodity Team to establish  standardized procurement processes and to identify and test security  equipment that can be used across sites. According to NNSA officials,  NNSA established a common mechanism in December 2009 for sites to  procure ammunition. In addition, to move toward more standardized  operations and a more centrally managed protective force program, NNSA  started a broad security review to identify possible improvements. As a  result, according to NNSA officials in January 2010, NNSA has developed a  draft standard for protective force operations, which is intended to clarify  both policy expectations and a consistent security approach that is both  effective and efficient.
For the personnel system initiative to enhance career longevity and  retirement options, in June 2009, the DOE-chartered study group made 29  recommendations that were generally designed to enable members to  reach a normal retirement age within the protective force, take another  job within DOE, or transition to a non-DOE career. The study group  identified 14 of its 29 career and retirement recommendations as involving  low- or no-cost actions that could conceivably be implemented quickly.  For example, some recommendations call for reviews to find ways to  maximize the number of armed and unarmed positions that SPOs can fill  when they can no longer meet their current combatant requirements.  Other recommendations focus on providing training and planning  assistance for retirement and job transitions. The study group also  recognized that a majority (15 out of 29) of its personnel system  recommendations, such as enhancing retirement plans to make them more  equivalent and portable across sites, may be difficult to implement largely  because of budget constraints.
Progress on the 29 recommendations had been limited at the time of our  review. When senior department officials were briefed on the personnel  system recommendations in late June 2009, they took them under  consideration for further action but immediately approved one  recommendation—to extend the life of the study group by forming a  standing committee. They directed the standing committee to develop  implementation strategies for actions that can be done in the near term  and, for recommendations requiring further analysis, additional funding, or  other significant actions, to serve as an advisory panel for senior  department officials. According to a DOE official in early December 2009,  NNSA and DOE were in varying stages of reviews to advance the other 28  recommendations. Later that month, NNSA addressed an aspect of one  recommendation about standardization, in part by formally standardizing  protective force uniforms. In the Conference Report for the fiscal year  2010 National Defense Authorization Act, the conferees directed the  Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear  Security Administration to develop a comprehensive DOE-wide plan to  identify and implement the recommendations of the study group.
In closing, while making changes to reflect the post-9/11 security  environment, DOE and its protective force contractors through their  collective bargaining agreements have not successfully aligned protective  force personnel systems—which affect career longevity, job transitions,  and retirement—with the increased physical and other demands of a more  paramilitary operation. Without better alignment, in our opinion, there is  greater potential for a strike at a site, as well as potential risk to site  security, when protective forces’ collective bargaining agreements expire.  In the event of a strike at one site, the differences in protective forces’  training and equipment make it difficult to readily provide reinforcements  from other sites. Even if strikes are avoided, the effectiveness of  protective forces may be reduced if tensions exist between labor and  management. These concerns have elevated the importance of finding the  most effective approach to maintaining protective force readiness,  including an approach that better aligns personnel systems and protective  force requirements. At the same time, DOE must consider its options for  managing protective forces in a period of budgetary constraints. With  these considerations in mind, DOE and NNSA have recognized that the  decentralized management of protective forces creates some inefficiencies  and that some systemic career and longevity issues are not being resolved  through actions at individual sites. NNSA’s standardization initiatives and  recommendations made by a DOE study group offer a step forward.  However, the possibility in 2012 of strikes at three of its highest risk sites  makes it imperative, as recommended by our report and directed by the  fiscal year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, that DOE soon  resolve the issues surrounding protective forces’ personnel system.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  respond to any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee  have.
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