Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions
Published: 2007-08-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) recent 4 year anniversary provides an opportunity to reflect on the progress DHS has made since its establishment. DHS began operations in March 2003 with the mission to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce vulnerabilities, minimize damages from attacks, and aid in recovery efforts. GAO has reported that the creation of DHS was an enormous management challenge and that the size, complexity, and importance of the effort made the challenge especially daunting and critical to the nation's security. Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions found that successful transformations of large organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take at least 5 to 7 years to achieve. GAO was asked to report on DHS's progress in implementing its mission and management areas and challenges DHS faces. This report also discusses key themes that have affected DHS's implementation efforts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: At the time of its creation in 2003 as one of the largest federal reorganizations in the last several decades, we designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as a high-risk area due to the magnitude of the challenges it confronted in areas vital to the physical and economic well being of the nation. After 4 years into its overall integration effort, DHS has attained some level of progress in all of its mission and management areas. The rate of progress, however, among these areas varies. Key underlying themes have affected DHS's implementation efforts, and will be essential for the department to address as it moves forward. These include management, risk management, information sharing, and partnerships and coordination. For example, while DHS has made progress in transforming its component agencies into a fully functioning department, it has not yet addressed key elements of the transformation process, such as developing a comprehensive strategy for agency transformation and ensuring that management systems and functions are integrated. This lack of a comprehensive strategy and integrated management systems and functions limits DHS's ability to carry out its homeland security responsibilities in an effective, risk-based way. DHS also has not yet fully adopted and applied a risk management approach in implementing its mission and management functions. Some DHS component agencies, such as the Transportation Security Administration and the Coast Guard, have taken steps to do so, but DHS has not yet taken sufficient actions to ensure that this approach is used departmentwide. In addition, DHS has taken steps to share information and coordinate with homeland security partners, but has faced difficulties in these partnership efforts, such as in ensuring that the private sector receives better information on potential threats. Given DHS's dominant role in securing the homeland, it is critical that the department's mission and management programs are operating as efficiently and effectively as possible. DHS has had to undertake these responsibilities while also working to transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet department--a difficult task for any organization. As DHS moves forward, it will be important for the department to continue to develop more measurable goals to guide implementation efforts and to enable better accountability of its progress toward achieving desired outcomes. It will also be important for DHS to continually reassess its mission and management goals, measures, and milestones to evaluate progress made, identify past and emerging obstacles, and examine alternatives to address those obstacles and effectively implement its missions.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently passed its 4 year  anniversary, and this anniversary provides an opportunity to reflect on the  progress it has made since its establishment, determine challenges the  department has faced in implementing its mission and management areas,  and identify issues that will be important for the department to address as  it moves forward. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS  began operations in March 2003 with missions that include preventing  terrorist attacks from occurring within the United States, reducing U.S.  vulnerability to terrorism, minimizing the damages from attacks that  occur, and helping the nation recover from any attacks. Over the past   4 years, the department has initiated and continued the implementation of  various policies and programs to address these missions as well as its  nonhomeland security functions. In particular, DHS has implemented  programs to secure the border and administer the immigration system;  strengthen the security of the transportation sector; and defend against,  prepare for, and respond to threats and disasters. DHS has also taken  actions to integrate its management functions and to transform its  component agencies into an effective cabinet department.
We have evaluated many of DHS’s programs and management functions  since the department’s establishment. We have issued over 400 products  on major departmental programs in the areas of border security and  immigration; transportation security; defense against, preparedness for,  and response to threats and disasters; and the department’s management  functions—including acquisition, financial, human capital, information  technology, and real property management. In November 2006, we  provided congressional leadership with a list of government programs,  functions, and activities that warrant further congressional oversight.  Among the issues included were border security and immigration  enforcement, security of transportation modes, preparedness and  response for catastrophic threats, and DHS implementation and  transformation. We have also reported on broad themes that have  underpinned DHS’s implementation efforts, including agency  transformation, strategic planning and results management, risk  management, information sharing, and partnerships and coordination. We  have made about 700 recommendations to DHS on ways to improve its  operations and address these key themes, such as to develop performance  measures and set milestones for key programs, allocate resources based  on assessments of risk, and develop and implement internal controls to  help ensure program effectiveness. DHS has implemented some of these  recommendations, taken actions to address others, and taken other steps  to strengthen its mission activities and facilitate management integration.  However, we have reported that the department still has much to do to  ensure that it conducts its missions efficiently and effectively while  simultaneously preparing to address future challenges that face the  department and the nation.
In 2003, we designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as  high-risk because it represented an enormous undertaking that would  require time to achieve in an effective and efficient manner. Additionally,  the components merged into DHS already faced a wide array of existing  challenges, and any DHS failure to effectively carry out its mission could  expose the nation to potentially serious consequences. The area has  remained on our high-risk list since 2003. Most recently, in our January  2007 high-risk update, we reported that although the department had made  some progress transforming its 22 agencies into an effective, integrated  organization, DHS had not yet developed a comprehensive management  integration strategy and its management systems and functions— especially related to acquisition, financial, human capital, and information  management—were not yet fully integrated and wholly operational. We  also noted that DHS faces a number of challenges to effectively carry out  its program activities and enhance partnerships with private and public  sector entities to leverage resources. We concluded that this array of  management and programmatic challenges continues to limit DHS’s ability  to fulfill its homeland security roles in an effective, risk-based way.  Furthermore, in 2005 we designated information sharing for homeland  security as high-risk, and in 2006 we identified the National Flood  Insurance Program as high-risk. In 2003 we expanded the scope of the  high-risk area involving federal information security, which was initially  designated as high-risk in 1997, to include the protection of the nation’s  computer-reliant critical infrastructure. We identified information sharing  for homeland security as high-risk because of the lack of strategic plans;  established processes, procedures, and mechanisms; and incentives for  sharing information. We identified the National Flood Insurance Program  as high-risk because it was highly unlikely that the program would  generate sufficient revenues to repay funds borrowed from the Treasury to  cover claims during catastrophic loss years and because of concerns  related to the program’s financial resources, compliance with mandatory  purchase requirements, and the costly impact of repetitive loss properties.  We expanded the scope of the federal information security high-risk area  to include the protection of the nation’s computer-reliant critical  infrastructure because, as the focal point of federal efforts, DHS had not  yet completely fulfilled any of its key responsibilities for enhancing cyber  security.
In designating the implementation and transformation of DHS as high-risk,  we noted that the creation of DHS was an enormous management  challenge. The size, complexity, and importance of the effort made the  challenge especially daunting and incomparably critical to the nation’s  security. We noted that building an effective department would require  consistent and sustained leadership from top management to ensure the  needed transformation of disparate agencies, programs, and missions into  an integrated organization. Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions,  undertaken before the creation of DHS, found that successful  transformations of large organizations, even those faced with less  strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take 5 to 7 years to achieve. We  reported that in successful transformations, organizations undergo a  change of their cultures to become more results-oriented, client- and  customer-oriented, and collaborative in nature. To successfully transform,  an organization must fundamentally reexamine its processes,  organizational structures, and management approaches. Organizational  changes such as these are complex and cannot be accomplished overnight.  In the case of DHS, it will likely take at least several more years for the  department to complete its transformation efforts. We also have  recommended that Congress continue to monitor whether it needs to  provide additional leadership authorities to the DHS Under Secretary for  Management or create a Chief Operating Officer/Chief Management  Officer position that could help elevate, integrate, and institutionalize  DHS’s management initiatives. The Implementing Recommendations of the  9/11 Commission Act of 2007, enacted in August 2007, designates the  Under Secretary for Management as the Chief Management Officer and  principal advisor on management-related matters to the Secretary. Under  the Act, the Under Secretary is responsible for developing a transition and  succession plan for the incoming Secretary and Under Secretary to guide  the transition of management functions to a new administration. The Act  further authorizes the incumbent Under Secretary as of November 8, 2008  (after the next presidential election), to remain in the position until a  successor is confirmed to ensure continuity in the management functions  of DHS.
You asked us to review our past work on DHS and provide an assessment  of DHS’s progress and challenges during its first 4 years. This report  addresses the following questions: (1) What progress has DHS made in  implementing key mission and core management functions since its  inception, and what challenges has the department faced in its  implementation efforts? (2) What key themes have affected DHS’s  implementation of its mission and management functions?
DHS’s major mission and management areas include border security;  immigration enforcement; immigration services; aviation security; surface  transportation security; maritime security; emergency preparedness and  response; critical infrastructure and key resources protection; science and  technology; and acquisition, financial, human capital, information  technology, and real property management. This report also identifies the  key cross-cutting themes that have affected the department’s efforts to  implement its mission and management areas. These key themes include  agency transformation, strategic planning and results management, risk  management, information sharing, and partnerships and coordination.
subsections: section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We primarily focused the performance expectations on DHS’s homeland  security-related functions. We generally did not identify performance  expectations related to DHS’s nonhomeland security functions, although  we did identify some performance expectations that relate to these  functions. We also did not apply a weight to the performance expectations  we developed for DHS, although qualitative differences between the  expectations exist. We recognize that these expectations are not time  bound, and DHS will take actions to satisfy these expectations over a  sustained period of time. Therefore, our assessment of DHS’s progress  relative to each performance expectation refers to the progress made by  the department during its first 4 years. Our assessment of DHS’s progress  relative to each performance expectation is not meant to imply that DHS  should have fully achieved the performance expectation by the end of its  fourth year.
To identify the performance expectations, we examined responsibilities  set for the department by Congress, the Administration, and department  leadership. In doing so, we reviewed homeland security-related legislation,  such as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,  the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Maritime Transportation Security  Act of 2002, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of  2002, and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. We also  reviewed DHS appropriations acts and accompanying conference reports  for fiscal years 2004 through 2006. We did not consider legislation enacted  since September 2006 in developing the performance expectations. To  identify goals and measures set by the Administration, we reviewed  relevant homeland security presidential directives and executive orders.  For the goals and measures set by the department, we analyzed the DHS  Strategic Plan, Performance Budget Overviews, Performance and  Accountability Reports, and component agencies’ strategic plans. For  management areas, we also examined effective practices identified in our  prior reports. We analyzed these documents to identify common or  similar responsibilities for DHS mission and management areas and  synthesized the responsibilities identified in the various documents to  develop performance expectations for DHS. We obtained and incorporated  feedback from our subject matter experts on these performance  expectations. We also provided the performance expectations to DHS for  review and incorporated DHS’s feedback.
Based primarily on our prior work and DHS IG work, as well as updated  information provided by DHS between March and June 2007, we examined  the extent to which DHS has taken actions to achieve the identified  performance expectations in each area and make a determination as to  whether DHS has achieved the key elements of each performance  expectation based on the criteria listed below:    Generally achieved: Our work has shown that DHS has taken  actions to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance  expectation but may not have satisfied all of the elements.
Generally not achieved: Our work has shown that DHS has not  yet taken actions to satisfy most of the key elements of the  performance expectation but may have taken steps to satisfy some of  the elements.
No assessment made: Neither we nor the DHS IG have completed  work and/or the information DHS provided did not enable us to clearly  assess DHS’s progress in achieving the performance expectation.  Therefore, we have no basis for making an assessment of the extent to  which DHS has taken actions to satisfy the performance expectation.
An assessment of “generally achieved” indicates that DHS has taken  sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation; however, an  assessment of “generally achieved” does not signify that no further action  is required of DHS or that functions covered by the expectation cannot be  further improved or enhanced. Conversely, “generally not achieved”  indicates that DHS has not yet taken actions to satisfy most elements of  the performance expectation. An assessment of “generally not achieved”  may be warranted even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to  satisfy some but not most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or  the DHS IG have not completed work upon which to base an assessment  of DHS actions to satisfy a performance expectation and/or the  information DHS provided did not enable us to clearly determine the  extent to which DHS has achieved the performance expectation, we  indicated “no assessment made.” We analyzed the extent of our work, the  DHS IG’s work, and DHS’s updated information and conferred with our  subject matter experts to determine whether the work and information  were sufficient for a making a determination of generally achieved or  generally not achieved.
Between March and June 2007, we obtained updated information from  DHS and met with program officials to discuss DHS’s efforts to implement  actions to achieve the performance expectations in each mission and  management area. We incorporated DHS’s additional information and  documentation into the report and, to the extent that DHS provided  documentation verifying its efforts, considered them in making our  assessments of DHS’s progress.
For each performance expectation, an analyst on our staff reviewed our  relevant work, DHS IG reports, and updated information and  documentation provided by DHS, including information received during  meetings with DHS officials. On the basis of this review, the analyst made  a determination that either DHS generally achieved the performance  expectation or generally did not achieve the performance expectation, or  the analyst identified that no determination could be made because  neither we nor the DHS IG had completed work and DHS did not provide  us with updated information and documentation. A second analyst then  reviewed each determination to reach concurrence on the assessment for  each performance expectation by reviewing the first analyst’s summary of  our reports, relevant DHS IG reports, and DHS’s updated information and  documentation. In cases when the first and second analyst disagreed, the  two analysts reviewed and discussed the assessments and relevant  documents to reach concurrence. Then, our subject matter experts  reviewed the summary of our reports, relevant DHS IG reports, and DHS’s  updated information and documentation to reach concurrence on the  assessment for each performance expectation.
To develop criteria for assessing DHS’s progress in each mission and  management area, we analyzed criteria used for ratings or assessments in  our prior work, in DHS IG reports, and in other reports and studies, such  as those conducted by the 9-11 Commission and the Century Foundation.  We also reviewed our past work in each mission and management area  and obtained feedback from our subject matter experts and DHS officials  on these criteria. Based on this analysis, we developed the following  criteria for assessing DHS’s progress in each mission and management  area:    Substantial progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve  more than 75 percent of the identified performance expectations.    Moderate progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve  more than 50 percent but 75 percent or less of the identified  performance expectations.    Modest progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve  more than 25 percent but 50 percent or less of the identified  performance expectations.    Limited progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve 25  percent or less of the identified performance expectations.
After making a determination as to whether DHS has generally achieved or  generally not achieved the identified performance expectations, we added  up the number of performance expectations that we determined DHS has  generally achieved. We divided this number by the total number of  performance expectations for each mission and management area,  excluding those performance expectations for which we could not make  an assessment. Based on the resulting percentage, we identified DHS’s  overall progress in each mission and management area, as (1) substantial  progress, (2) moderate progress, (3) modest progress, or (4) limited  progress. Our subject matter experts reviewed the overall assessments of  progress we identified for DHS in each mission and management area.
Our assessments of the progress made by DHS in each mission and  management area are based on the performance expectations we  identified. The assessments of progress do not reflect, nor are they  intended to reflect, the extent to which DHS’s actions have made the  nation more secure in each area. For example, in determining that DHS  has made modest progress in border security, we are not stating or  implying that the border is modestly more secure than it was prior to the  creation of DHS. In addition, we are not assessing DHS’s progress against  a baseline in each mission and management area. We also did not consider  DHS component agencies’ funding levels or the extent to which funding  levels have affected the department’s ability to carry out its missions.   We also did not consider the extent to which competing priorities and  resource demands have affected DHS’s progress in each mission and  management area relative to other areas, although competing priorities  and resource demands have clearly affected DHS’s progress in specific  areas.
In addition, because we and the DHS IG have completed varying degrees  of work (in terms of the amount and scope of reviews completed) for each  mission and management area, and because different DHS components  and offices provided us with different amounts and types of information,  our assessments of DHS’s progress in each mission and management area  reflect the information available for our review and analysis and are not  necessarily equally comprehensive across all 14 mission and management  areas. For example, as a result of the post-September 11, 2001, focus on  aviation, we have conducted more reviews of aviation security, and our  methodology identified a much larger number of related performance  expectations than for the department’s progress in surface transportation  security. Further, for some performance expectations, we were unable to  make an assessment of DHS’s progress because (1) we had not conducted  work in that area, (2) the DHS IG’s work in the area was also limited, and  (3) the supplemental information provided by DHS was insufficient to  form a basis for our analysis. Most notably, we were unable to make an  assessment for four performance expectations in the area of immigration  enforcement. This affected our overall assessment of DHS’s progress in  that area as there were fewer performance expectations to tally in  determining the overall level of progress.
We conducted our work for this report from September 2006 through July  2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
section_title: Background
paragraphs: In July 2002, President Bush issued the National Strategy for Homeland  Security. The strategy set forth overall objectives to prevent terrorist  attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to  terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from  attacks that may occur. The strategy set out a plan to improve homeland  security through the cooperation and partnering of federal, state, local,  and private sector organizations on an array of functions. The National  Strategy for Homeland Security specified a number of federal  departments, as well as nonfederal organizations, that have important  roles in securing the homeland. In terms of federal departments, DHS was  assigned a prominent role in implementing established homeland security  mission areas.
In November 2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was enacted into  law, creating DHS. This act defined the department’s missions to include  preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; reducing U.S.  vulnerability to terrorism; and minimizing the damages, and assisting in  the recovery from, attacks that occur within the United States. The act  also specified major responsibilities for the department, including to  analyze information and protect infrastructure; develop countermeasures  against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, and other emerging  terrorist threats; secure U.S. borders and transportation systems; and  organize emergency preparedness and response efforts.
DHS began operations in March 2003. Its establishment represented a  fusion of 22 federal agencies to coordinate and centralize the leadership of  many homeland security activities under a single department. According  to data provided to us by DHS, the department’s total budget authority was  about $39 billion in fiscal year 2004, about $108 billion in fiscal year 2005,  about $49 billion in fiscal year 2006, and about $45 billion in fiscal year  2007. The President’s fiscal year 2008 budget submission requests  approximately $46 billion for DHS. Table 15 provides information on  DHS’s budget authority, as reported by DHS, for each fiscal year from 2004  though 2007.
Since creating and issuing its first strategic plan, the department has  undergone several reorganizations. Most notably, in July 2005, DHS  announced the outcome of its Second-Stage Review, an internal study of  the department’s programs, policies, operations, and structures. As a  result of this review, the department realigned several component  agencies and functions. In particular, the Secretary of Homeland Security  established a Directorate of Policy to coordinate departmentwide policies,  regulations, and other initiatives and consolidated preparedness activities  in one directorate, the Directorate for Preparedness. In addition, the  Secretary established a new Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the  Office of Infrastructure Protection composed of analysts from the former  Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate. The Office  of Infrastructure Protection was placed in the Directorate for  Preparedness. The fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act provided for  the further reorganization of functions within the department by, in  particular, realigning DHS’s emergency preparedness and response  responsibilities.
In addition to these reorganizations, a variety of factors have affected  DHS’s efforts to implement its mission and management functions. These  factors include both domestic and international events, such as Hurricanes  Katrina and Rita, and major homeland security-related legislation. Figure 2  provides a timeline of key events that have affected DHS’s  implementation.
section_title: DHS Has Made Varying Levels of Progress in Implementing its Core Mission and Management Functions, but Has Faced Difficulties in Its Implementation Efforts
paragraphs: Based on the performance expectations we identified, DHS has made  progress in implementing its mission and management functions, but  various challenges have affected its efforts. Specifically, DHS has made  limited progress in the areas of emergency preparedness and response;  science and technology; and human capital and information technology  management. We found that DHS has made modest progress in the areas  of border security; immigration services; and acquisition and financial  management. We also found that DHS has made moderate progress in the  areas of immigration enforcement, aviation security, surface  transportation security; critical infrastructure and key resources  protection, and real property management, and that DHS has made  substantial progress in the area of maritime security.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Made Modest Progress in Border Security
paragraphs: The United States shares a 5,525 mile border with Canada and a 1,989 mile  border with Mexico, and all goods and people traveling to the United  States must be inspected at air, land, or sea ports of entry. In 2006, more  than 400 million legal entries were made to the United States—a majority  of all border crossings were at land border ports of entry. Within DHS,  CBP is the lead agency responsible for implementing the department’s  border security mission. Specifically, CBP’s two priority missions are   (1) detecting and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from  entering the United States, and (2) facilitating the orderly and efficient  flow of legitimate trade and travel. CBP’s supporting missions include  interdicting illegal drugs and other contraband; apprehending individuals  who are attempting to enter the United States illegally; inspecting inbound  and outbound people, vehicles, and cargo; enforcing laws of the United  States at the border; protecting U.S. agricultural and economic interests  from harmful pests and diseases; regulating and facilitating international  trade; collecting import duties; and enforcing U.S. trade laws. Within CBP,  the United States Border Patrol is responsible for border security between  designated official ports of entry, and CBP‘s Office of Field Operations  enforces trade, immigration, and agricultural laws and regulations by  securing the flow of people and goods into and out of the country, while  facilitating legitimate travel and trade at U.S. ports of entry.
As shown in table 16, we identified 12 performance expectations for DHS  in the area of border security and found that overall DHS has made modest  progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS  has generally achieved 5 of its performance expectations and has generally  not achieved 7 of its performance expectations.
Table 17 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has  made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the  area of border security and our assessment of whether DHS has taken  steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation  (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the  performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved).
section_title: DHS Has Made Moderate Progress in Immigration Enforcement
paragraphs: DHS is responsible for enforcing U.S. immigration laws. Immigration  enforcement includes apprehending, detaining, and removing criminal and  illegal aliens; disrupting and dismantling organized smuggling of humans  and contraband as well as human trafficking; investigating and  prosecuting those who engage in benefit and document fraud; blocking  and removing employers’ access to undocumented workers; and enforcing  compliance with programs to monitor visitors. Within DHS, ICE is  primarily responsible for immigration enforcement efforts. In particular,  ICE’s Office of Investigations is responsible for enforcing immigration and  customs laws and its Office of Detention and Removal Operations is  responsible for processing, detaining, and removing aliens subject to  removal from the United States.
As shown in table 18, we identified 16 performance expectations for DHS  in the area of immigration enforcement, and we found that overall DHS  has made moderate progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically,  we found that DHS has generally achieved 8 of the performance  expectations and has generally not achieved 4 other performance  expectations. For 4 performance expectations, we could not make an  assessment. In meeting its performance expectations, ICE faced budget  constraints that significantly affected its overall operations during fiscal  year 2004. For example, ICE was faced with a hiring freeze in fiscal year  2004 that affected its ability to recruit, hire, and train personnel. Over the  past 2 years, ICE has reported taking actions to strengthen its immigration  enforcement functions and has, for example, hired and trained additional  personnel to help fulfill the agency’s mission.
Table 19 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has  made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the  area of immigration enforcement and our assessment of whether DHS has  taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance  expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of  the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved).
section_title: DHS Has Made Modest Progress in Providing Immigration Services
paragraphs: USCIS is the agency within DHS that is responsible for processing millions  of immigration benefit applications received each year for various types of  immigration benefits, determining whether applicants are eligible to  receive immigration benefits, and detecting suspicious information and  evidence to refer for fraud investigation and possible sanctioning by other  DHS components or external agencies. USCIS processes applications for  about 50 types of immigration benefits with a goal of ensuring that  processing of benefits applications takes place within a 6 month time  frame. USCIS has introduced new initiatives to modernize business  practices and upgrade information technology infrastructure to transform  its current, paper-based data systems into a digital processing resource to  enhance customer service, prevent future backlogs of immigration benefit  applications, and improve efficiency with expanded electronic filing.
As shown in table 20, we identified 14 performance expectations for DHS  in the area of immigration services and found that overall DHS has made  modest progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we found that  DHS has generally achieved 5 performance expectations and has generally  not achieved 9 others.
Table 21 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has  made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the  area of immigration services and our assessment of whether DHS has  taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance  expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of  the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved).
section_title: DHS Has Made Moderate Progress in Securing the Aviation Sector
paragraphs: DHS has implemented a variety of programs to help secure the aviation  sector. Within the department, TSA is the primary agency with  responsibility for aviation security efforts. TSA was established in 2001  with the mission to protect the transportation network while also ensuring  the free movement of people and commerce. Since its inception, TSA has  focused much of its efforts on aviation security and has developed and  implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure commercial  aviation. For example, TSA has undertaken efforts to strengthen airport  security; provide and train a screening workforce; prescreen passengers  against terrorist watch lists; and screen passengers, baggage, and cargo.  TSA has implemented these efforts in part to meet numerous mandates for  strengthening aviation security placed on the agency following the  September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These mandates set priorities for the  agency and guided TSA’s initial efforts to enhance aviation security. In  addition to TSA, CBP, and DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate play  roles in securing commercial aviation. In particular, CBP has responsibility  for conducting passenger prescreening—or the matching of passenger  information against terrorist watch lists—for international flights  operating to or from the United States, as well as inspecting inbound air  cargo upon its arrival in the United States. The Science and Technology  Directorate is responsible for the research and development of aviation  security technologies.
As shown in table 22, we identified 24 performance expectations for DHS  in the area of aviation security, and we found that overall DHS has made  moderate progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we found  that DHS has generally achieved 17 performance expectations and has  generally not achieved 7 performance expectations.
Table 23 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has  made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the  area of aviation security and our assessment of whether DHS has taken  steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation  (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the  performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved).
section_title: DHS Has Made Moderate Progress in Securing Surface Transportation Modes
paragraphs: DHS has undertaken various initiatives to secure surface transportation  modes, and within the department, TSA is primarily responsible for  surface transportation security efforts. Since its creation following the  events of September 11, 2001, TSA has focused much of its efforts and  resources on meeting legislative mandates to strengthen commercial  aviation security. However, TSA has more recently placed additional focus  on securing surface modes of transportation, which includes establishing  security standards and conducting assessments and inspections of surface  transportation modes such as passenger and freight rail; mass transit;  highways, including commercial vehicles; and pipelines. Although TSA has  primary responsibility within the department for surface transportation  security, the responsibility for securing rail and other transportation  modes is shared among federal, state, and local governments and the  private sector. For example, with regard to passenger rail security, in  addition to TSA, DHS’s Office of Grant Programs provides grant funds to  rail operators and conducts risk assessments for passenger rail agencies.  Within the Department of Transportation, the Federal Transit  Administration and Federal Railroad Administration have responsibilities  for passenger rail safety and security. In addition, public and private  passenger rail operators are also responsible for securing their rail  systems.
As shown in table 24, we identified five performance expectations for DHS  in the area of surface transportation security, and we found that overall  DHS has made moderate progress in meeting those performance  expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved three  of these performance expectations and has generally not achieved two  others.
Table 25 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has  made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the  area of surface transportation security and our assessment of whether  DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the  performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to  satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not  achieved).
section_title: DHS Has Made Substantial Progress in Maritime Security
paragraphs: DHS has undertaken various programs to secure the maritime sector. In  general, these maritime security programs fall under one of three  areas⎯port and vessel security, maritime intelligence, and maritime  supply chain security. Within DHS, various component agencies are  responsible for maritime security efforts, including the Coast Guard, CBP,  TSA, and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. The Coast Guard is  responsible for port facility inspections and has lead responsibility in  coordinating maritime information sharing efforts. CBP is responsible for  addressing the threat posed by terrorist smuggling of weapons in  oceangoing containers. TSA is responsible for the implementation of the  transportation worker identification credential program. The Domestic  Nuclear Detection Office is responsible for acquiring and supporting the  deployment of radiation detection equipment, including portal monitors,  within the United States.
As shown in table 26, we identified 23 performance expectations for DHS  in the area of maritime security, and we found that overall DHS has made  substantial progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we found  that DHS has generally achieved 17 performance expectations and has  generally not achieved 4 others. For 2 performance expectations, we did  not make an assessment.
Table 27 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has  made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the  area of maritime security and our assessment of whether DHS has taken  steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation  (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the  performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved).
section_title: DHS Has Made Limited Progress in Its Emergency Preparedness and Response Efforts
paragraphs: Several federal legislative and executive provisions support preparation  for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster  Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) primarily  establishes the programs and processes for the federal government to  provide major disaster and emergency assistance to state, local, and tribal  governments; individuals; and qualified private nonprofit organizations.  FEMA, within DHS, has responsibility for administering the provisions of  the Stafford Act. FEMA’s emergency preparedness and response efforts  include programs that prepare to minimize the damage and recover from  terrorist attacks and disasters; help to plan, equip, train, and practice  needed skills of first responders; and consolidate federal response plans  and activities to build a national, coordinated system for incident  management. DHS’s emergency preparedness and response efforts have  been affected by DHS reorganizations and, in the wake of the 2005 Gulf  Coast hurricanes, reassessments of some initiatives, such as the National  Response Plan and its Catastrophic Incident Supplement. DHS is  undergoing its second reorganization of its emergency preparedness and  response programs in about 18 months. The first reorganization was  initiated by the Secretary of Homeland Security in the summer of 2005 and  created separate organizations within DHS responsible for preparedness  and for response and recovery. The second reorganization was required by  the fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act and largely took effect on  April 1, 2007.
As shown in table 28, we identified 24 performance expectations for DHS  in the area of emergency preparedness and response and found that  overall DHS has made limited progress in meeting those performance  expectations. In particular, we found that DHS has generally achieved 5  performance expectations and has generally not achieved 18 others. For 1  performance expectation, we did not make an assessment.
Table 29 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has  made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the  area of emergency preparedness and response and our assessment of  whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the  performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to  satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not  achieved).
section_title: DHS Has Made Moderate Progress in Strengthening the Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
paragraphs: Critical infrastructure are systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,  so vital to the United States that their incapacity or destruction would  have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic  security, and national public health or safety, or any combination of these  matters. Key resources are publicly or privately controlled resources  essential to minimal operations of the economy or government, including  individual targets whose destruction would not endanger vital systems but  could create a local disaster or profoundly damage the nation’s morale or  confidence. While the private sector owns approximately 85 percent of the  nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources, DHS has wide-ranging  responsibilities for leading and coordinating the overall national critical  infrastructure and key resources protection effort.
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan identifies 17 critical  infrastructure and key resources sectors:  agriculture and food;  banking and finance;  chemical;  commercial facilities;  commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste;  dams;  defense industrial base;  drinking water and water treatment systems;  emergency services;  energy;  government facilities;  information technology;  national monuments and icons;  postal and shipping;  public health and healthcare;  telecommunications; and  transportation systems.
DHS has overall responsibility for coordinating critical infrastructure and  key resources protection efforts. Within DHS, the Office of Infrastructure  Protection has been designated as the Sector-Specific Agency responsible  for the chemical; commercial facilities; dams; emergency services; and  commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sectors. TSA has been  designated as the Sector-Specific Agency for postal and shipping, and TSA  and the Coast Guard have been designated the Sector-Specific Agencies  for transportation systems. The Federal Protective Service within ICE has  been designated as the Sector-Specific Agency for government facilities.  The Office of Cyber Security and Telecommunications has been  designated the Sector-Specific Agency for Information Technology and  Telecommunications.
As shown in table 30, we identified seven performance expectations for  DHS in the area of critical infrastructure and key resources protection,  and we found that overall DHS has made moderate progress in meeting  those performance expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has  generally achieved four performance expectations and has generally not  achieved three others.
Table 31 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has  made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the  area of critical infrastructure and key resources protection and our  assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key  elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not  taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements  (generally not achieved).
section_title: DHS Has Made Limited Progress in the Area of Science and Technology
paragraphs: DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate was established to coordinate  the federal government’s civilian efforts to identify and develop  countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and other  emerging terrorist threats to our nation. To coordinate the national effort  to protect the United States from nuclear and radiological threats, in April  2005, the President directed the establishment of the Domestic Nuclear  Detection Office within DHS. The new office’s mission covers a broad  spectrum of responsibilities and activities, but is focused primarily on  providing a single accountable organization to develop a layered defense  system. This system is intended to integrate the federal government’s  nuclear detection, notification, and response systems. In addition, under  the directive, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is to acquire, develop,  and support the deployment of detection equipment in the United States,  as well as to coordinate the nation’s nuclear detection research and  development efforts.
As shown in table 32, we identified six performance expectations for DHS  in the area of science and technology, and we found that overall DHS has  made limited progress in meeting those performance expectations. In  particular, we found that DHS has generally achieved one performance  expectation and has generally not achieved five other performance  expectations.
Table 33 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has  made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the  area of science and technology and our assessment of whether DHS has  taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance  expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of  the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved).
section_title: DHS Has Made Modest Progress in Acquisition Management
paragraphs: Federal agencies use a variety of approaches and tools, including  contracts, to acquire goods and services needed to fulfill or support the  agencies’ missions. DHS has some of the most extensive acquisition needs  within the U.S. government. In fiscal year 2004, for example, the  department obligated $9.8 billion to acquire a wide range of goods and  services—such as information systems, new technologies, weapons,  aircraft, ships, and professional services. In fiscal year 2006, the  department reported that it obligated $15.6 billion to acquire a wide range  of goods and services. The DHS acquisitions portfolio is broad and  complex. For example, the department has purchased increasingly  sophisticated screening equipment for air passenger security; acquired  technologies to secure the nation’s borders; purchased trailers to meet the  housing needs of Hurricane Katrina victims; and is upgrading the Coast  Guard’s offshore fleet of surface and air assets. DHS has been working to  integrate the many acquisition processes and systems that the disparate  agencies and organizations brought with them when they merged into DHS  in 2003 while still addressing ongoing mission requirements and  emergency situations, such as responding to Hurricane Katrina.
As shown in table 34, we identified three performance expectations for  DHS in the area of acquisition management and found that overall DHS  has made modest progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we  found that DHS has generally achieved one and not achieved two of the  three performance expectations.
Table 35 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has  made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the  area of acquisition management and our assessment of whether DHS has  taken steps to  satisfy most of the key elements of the performance  expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of  the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved).
section_title: DHS Has Made Modest Progress in Financial Management
paragraphs: Effective financial management is a key element of financial  accountability. With its establishment by the Homeland Security Act of  2002, DHS inherited a myriad of redundant financial management systems  from 22 diverse agencies, along with about 100 resource management  systems and 30 reportable conditions identified in prior component  financial audits. Additionally, most of the 22 components that transferred  to DHS had not been subjected to significant financial statement audit  scrutiny prior to their transfer, so the extent to which additional  significant internal control deficiencies existed was unknown. DHS’s  Office of the Chief Financial Officer is responsible for functions, such as  budget, finance and accounting, strategic planning and evaluation, and  financial systems for the department. The Office of the Chief Financial  Officer is also charged with ongoing integration of these functions within  the department. For fiscal year 2006, DHS was again unable to obtain an  opinion on its financial statements, and numerous material internal  control weaknesses continued to be reported. DHS’s auditor had issued a  disclaimer of opinion on DHS’s fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005 financial  statements.
As shown in table 36, we identified seven performance expectations for  DHS in the area of financial management and found that overall DHS has  made modest progress meeting those performance expectations.  Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved two performance  expectations and has generally not achieved five others.
Table 37 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has  made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the  area of financial management and our assessment of whether DHS has  taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance  expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of  the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved).
section_title: DHS Has Made Limited Progress in Managing Human Capital
paragraphs: Key human capital management areas for all agencies, including DHS, are  pay, performance management, classification, labor relations, adverse  actions, employee appeals, and diversity management. Congress provided  DHS with significant flexibility to design a modern human capital  management system. DHS and the Office of Personnel Management jointly  released the final regulations on DHS’s new human capital system in  February 2005. The final regulations established a new human capital  system for DHS that was intended to ensure its ability to attract, retain,  and reward a workforce that is able to meet its critical mission. Further,  the human capital system provided for greater flexibility and  accountability in the way employees are to be paid, developed, evaluated,  afforded due process, and represented by labor organizations while  reflecting the principles of merit and fairness embodied in the statutory  merit systems principles. Although DHS intended to implement the new  personnel system in the summer of 2005, court decisions enjoined the  department from implementing certain labor management portions of it.  Since that time, DHS has taken actions to implement its human capital  system and issued its Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008 Human Capital  Operational Plan in April 2007.
As shown in table 38, we identified eight performance expectations for  DHS in the area of human capital management and found that overall DHS  has made limited progress in meeting those performance expectations.  Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved two performance  expectations and has generally not achieved six other expectations.
Table 39 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has  made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the  area of human capital management and our assessment of whether DHS  has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance  expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of  the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved).
section_title: DHS Has Made Limited Progress in Information Technology Management
paragraphs: DHS has undertaken efforts to establish and institutionalize the range of  information technology management controls and capabilities that our  research and past work have shown are fundamental to any organization’s  ability to use technology effectively to transform itself and accomplish  mission goals. Among these information technology management controls  and capabilities are  centralizing leadership for extending these disciplines throughout  the organization with an empowered Chief Information Officer,  having sufficient people with the right knowledge, skills, and  abilities to execute each of these areas now and in the future;  developing and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate  blueprint, as an authoritative frame of reference to guide and constrain  system investments;  defining and following a corporate process for informed decision  making by senior leadership about competing information technology  investment options;  applying system and software development and acquisition  discipline and rigor when defining, designing, developing, testing,  deploying, and maintaining systems; and  establishing a comprehensive, departmentwide information  security program to protect information and systems;  Despite its efforts over the last several years, the department has  significantly more to do before each of these management controls and  capabilities is fully in place and is integral to how each system investment  is managed.
As shown in table 40, we identified 13 performance expectations for DHS  in the area of information technology management and found that overall  DHS has made limited progress in meeting those expectations. In  particular, we found that DHS has generally achieved 2 performance  expectations and has generally not achieved 8 others. For 3 other  performance expectations, we did not make an assessment.
Table 41 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has  made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the  area of information technology management and our assessment of  whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the  performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to  satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not  achieved).
section_title: DHS Has Made Moderate Progress in Real Property Management
paragraphs: DHS has taken actions to implement its real property management  responsibilities. Key elements of real property management, as specified in  Executive Order 13327, “Federal Real Property Asset Management,”  include establishment of a Senior Real Property Officer, development of  an asset inventory, and development and implementation of an asset  management plan and performance measures. In June 2006, the Office of  Management and Budget upgraded DHS’s Real Property Asset  Management Score from red to yellow after DHS developed an approved  Asset Management Plan, developed a generally complete real property  data inventory, submitted this inventory for inclusion in the  governmentwide real property inventory database, and established  performance measures consistent with Federal Real Property Council  standards. DHS also designated a Senior Real Property Officer as directed  by Executive Order 13327.
As shown in table 42, we identified nine performance expectations for  DHS in the area of real property management and found that overall DHS  has made moderate progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically,  we found that DHS has generally achieved six of the expectations and has  generally not achieved three others. Our assessments for real property  management are based on a report on DHS’s real property management  released in June 2007.
Table 43 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has  made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the  area of real property management and our assessment of whether DHS has  taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance  expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of  the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved).
section_title: Cross-cutting Issues Have Hindered DHS’s Implementation Efforts
paragraphs: Our work has identified homeland security challenges that cut across  DHS’s mission and core management functions. These issues have  impeded the department’s progress since its inception and will continue as  DHS moves forward. While it is important that DHS continue to work to  strengthen each of its mission and core management functions, it is  equally important that these key issues be addressed from a  comprehensive, departmentwide perspective to help ensure that the  department has the structure and processes in place to effectively address  the threats and vulnerabilities that face the nation. These issues include:  (1) transforming and integrating DHS’s management functions; (2)  establishing baseline performance goals and measures and engaging in  effective strategic planning efforts; (3) applying and improving a risk  management approach for implementing missions and making resource  allocation decisions; (4) sharing information with key stakeholders; and  (5) coordinating and partnering with federal, state, local, and private  sector agencies. We have made numerous recommendations to DHS to  strengthen these efforts, and the department has made progress in  implementing some of these recommendations.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Not Yet Transformed Its Component Agencies into a Fully Functioning Department
paragraphs: DHS has faced a variety of difficulties in its efforts to transform into a fully  functioning department, and we have designated DHS implementation and  transformation as high-risk. We first designated DHS’s implementation and  transformation as high-risk in 2003 because 22 disparate agencies had to  transform into one department. Many of these individual agencies were  facing their own management and mission challenges. But most  importantly, the failure to effectively address DHS’s management  challenges and program risks could have serious consequences for our  homeland security as well as our economy. We kept DHS implementation  and transformation on the high-risk list in 2005 because serious  transformation challenges continued to hinder DHS’s success. Since then,  our and the DHS IG’s reports have documented DHS’s progress and  remaining challenges in transforming into an effective, integrated  organization. For example, in the management area, DHS has developed a  strategic plan, is working to integrate some management functions, and  has continued to form necessary partnerships to achieve mission success.  Despite these efforts, we reported that DHS implementation and  transformation remains on the 2007 high-risk list because numerous  management challenges remain, such as in the areas of acquisition,  financial, human capital, and information technology management. We  stated that the array of management and programmatic challenges  continues to limit DHS’s ability to carry out its roles under the National  Strategy for Homeland Security in an effective risk-based way.
We have recommended that agencies on the high-risk produce a corrective  action plan that defines the root causes of identified problems, identifies  effective solutions to those problems, and provides for substantially  completing corrective measures in the near term. Such a plan should  include performance metrics and milestones, as well as mechanisms to  monitor progress. In the spring of 2006, DHS provided us with a draft  corrective action plan that did not contain key elements we have identified  as necessary for an effective corrective action plan, including specific  actions to address identified objectives. As of May 2007, DHS had not  submitted a corrective action plan to the Office of Management and  Budget. According to the Office of Management and Budget, this is one of  the few high-risk areas that has not produced a final corrective action  plan.
Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions, undertaken before the  creation of DHS, found that successful transformations of large  organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than  DHS, can take at least 5 to 7 years to achieve. We reported that the  creation of DHS is an enormous management challenge and that DHS  faces a formidable task in its transformation efforts as it works to  integrate over 170,000 federal employees from 22 component agencies.  Each component agency brought differing missions, cultures, systems, and  procedures that the new department had to efficiently and effectively  integrate into a single, functioning unit. At the same time it weathers these  growing pains, DHS must still fulfill its various homeland security and  other missions.
To strengthen its transformation efforts, we recommended, and DHS  agreed, that it should develop an overarching management integration  strategy, and provide the then DHS Business Transformation Office with  the authority and responsibility to serve as a dedicated integration team  and also to help develop and implement the strategy. We reported that  although DHS has issued guidance and plans to assist management  integration on a function by function basis, it has not developed a plan that  clearly identifies the critical links that should occur across these  functions, the necessary timing to make these links occur, how these  interrelationships will occur, and who will drive and manage them. In  addition, although DHS had established a Business Transformation Office  that reported to the Under Secretary for Management to help monitor and  look for interdependencies among the individual functional management  integration efforts, that office was not responsible for leading and  managing the coordination and integration itself. We understand that the  Business Transformation Office has been recently eliminated. We have  suggested that Congress should continue to monitor whether it needs to  provide additional leadership authorities to the DHS Under Secretary for  Management, or create a Chief Operating Officer/Chief Management  Officer position which could help elevate, integrate, and institutionalize  DHS’s management initiatives. The Implementing Recommendations of the  9/11 Commission Act of 2007, enacted in August 2007, designates the  Under Secretary for Management as the Chief Management Officer and  principal advisor on management-related matters to the Secretary. Under  the Act, the Under Secretary is responsible for developing a transition and  succession plan for the incoming Secretary and Under Secretary to guide  the transition of management functions to a new administration. The Act  further authorizes the incumbent Under Secretary as of November 8, 2008  (after the next presidential election), to remain in the position until a  successor is confirmed to ensure continuity in the management functions  of DHS.
In addition, transparency plays an important role in helping to ensure  efficient and effective transformation efforts. With regard to DHS, we have  reported that DHS has not made its management or operational decisions  transparent enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively,  efficiently, and economically using the billions of dollars in funding it  receives annually. More specifically, in April 2007, we testified that we  have encountered access issues in numerous engagements, and the lengths  of delay have been both varied and significant and have affected our  ability to do our work in a timely manner. We reported that we have  experienced delays with DHS components that include CBP, ICE, FEMA,  and TSA on different types of work such as information sharing,  immigration, emergency preparedness in primary and secondary schools,  and accounting systems. The Secretary of DHS and the Under Secretary  for Management have stated their desire to work with us to resolve access  issues and to provide greater transparency. It will be important for DHS to  become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing  access to information on its programs and operations so that Congress,  GAO, and others can independently assess its efforts.
section_title: DHS Has Not Yet Developed Outcome-Based Measures to Assess Strategic Performance in Many Areas
paragraphs: DHS has not always implemented effective strategic planning efforts and  has not yet fully developed performance measures or put into place  structures to help ensure that the agency is managing for results. We have  identified strategic planning as one of the critical success factors for new  organizations. This is particularly true for DHS, given the breadth of its  responsibility and need to clearly identify how stakeholders’  responsibilities and activities align to address homeland security efforts.  The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 requires  that federal agencies consult with the Congress and key stakeholders to  assess their missions, long-term goals, strategies, and resources needed to  achieve their goals. It also requires that the agency include six key  components in its strategic plan: (1) a mission statement; (2) long-term  goals and objectives; (3) approaches (or strategies) to achieve the goals  and objectives; (4) a description of the relationship between annual and  long-term performance goals; (5) key factors that could significantly affect  achievement of the strategic goals; and (6) a description of how program  evaluations were used to establish or revise strategic goals. Other best  practices in strategic planning and results management that we have  identified include involving stakeholders in the strategic planning process,  continuously monitoring internal and external environments to anticipate  future challenges and avoid potential crises, holding managers  accountable for the results of their programs, and aligning program  performance measures and individual performance expectations at each  organizational level with agencywide goals and objectives.
DHS issued a departmentwide strategic plan in 2004 that addressed five of  six GPRA-required elements. The plan included a mission statement, long- term goals, strategies to achieve the goals, key external factors, and  program evaluations, but did not describe the relationship between annual  and long-term goals. The linkage between annual and long-term goals is  important for determining whether an agency has a clear sense of how it  will assess progress toward achieving the intended results of its long-term  goals. While DHS’s Performance Budget Overview and other documents  include a description of the relationship between annual and long-term  goals, not including this in the strategic plan made it more difficult for  DHS officials and stakeholders to identify how their roles and  responsibilities contributed to DHS’s mission. In addition, although DHS’s  planning documents described programs requiring stakeholder  coordination to effectively implement them, stakeholder involvement in  the planning process itself was limited. Given the many other  organizations at all levels of government and in the private sector whose  involvement is key to meeting homeland security goals, earlier and more  comprehensive stakeholder involvement in the planning process is  essential to the success of DHS’s planning efforts. Such involvement is  important to ensure that stakeholders help identify and agree on how their  daily operations and activities contribute to fulfilling DHS’s mission. To  make DHS a more results-oriented agency, we recommended that DHS’s  strategic planning process include direct consultation with external  stakeholders, that its next strategic plan include a description of the  relationship between annual performance goals and long-term goals, and  that the next strategic plan adopt additional good strategic planning  practices, such as ensuring that the strategic plan includes a timeline for  achieving long-terms goals and a description of the specific budgetary,  human capital, and other resources needed to achieve those goals.  According to DHS officials, the department is planning to issue an updated  strategic plan, but they did not provide a target time frame for when the  plan would be issued.
We have also reported on the importance of the development of outcome- based performance goals and measures as part of strategic planning and  results management efforts. Performance goals and measures are intended  to provide Congress and agency management with information to  systematically assess a program’s strengths, weaknesses, and  performance. A performance goal is the target level of performance  expressed as a tangible, measurable objective against which actual  achievement will be compared. A performance measure can be defined as  an indicator, statistic, or metric used to gauge program performance.  Outcome-oriented measures show results or outcomes related to an  initiative or program in terms of its effectiveness, efficiency, or impact.
A number of DHS’s programs lack outcome goals and measures, which  may hinder the department’s ability to effectively assess the results of  program efforts or fully assess whether the department is using resources  effectively and efficiently, especially given various agency priorities for  resources. In particular, we have reported that some of DHS’s components  have not developed adequate outcome-based performance measures or  comprehensive plans to monitor, assess, and independently evaluate the  effectiveness of their plans and performance. For example, in August 2005  we reported that ICE lacked outcome goals and measures for its worksite  enforcement program and recommended that the agency set specific time  frames for developing these goals and measures. In March 2006, we  reported that USCIS had not yet established performance goals and  measures to assess its benefit fraud activities, and we recommended that  they do so. Further, we have also reported that many of DHS’s border- related performance goals and measures are not fully defined or  adequately aligned with one another, and some performance targets are  not realistic. Yet, we have also recognized that DHS faces some inherent  difficulties in developing performance goals and measures to address its  unique mission and programs, such as in developing measures for the  effectiveness of its efforts to prevent and deter terrorist attacks.
section_title: DHS Has Not Fully Applied a Risk Management Approach in Implementing All Mission Areas
paragraphs: DHS has not fully adopted and applied a risk management approach in  implementing its mission and core management functions. Risk  management has been widely supported by the President and Congress as  a management approach for homeland security, and the Secretary of  Homeland Security has made it the centerpiece of departmental policy. We  have previously reported that defining an acceptable, achievable (within  constrained budgets) level of risk is an imperative to address current and  future threats. Many have pointed out, as did the Gilmore and 9/11  Commissions, that the nation will never be completely safe and total  security is an unachievable goal. Within its sphere of responsibility, DHS  cannot afford to protect everything against all possible threats. As a result,  DHS must make choices about how to allocate its scarce resources to  most effectively manage risk. A risk management approach can help DHS  make decisions systematically and is consistent with the National  Strategy for Homeland Security and DHS’s strategic plan, which have  called for the use of risk-based decisions to prioritize DHS’s resource  investments regarding homeland security related programs.
Several DHS component agencies have taken steps toward integrating  risk-based decision making into their decision making processes. For  example, the Coast Guard has taken actions to mitigate vulnerabilities and  enhance maritime security. Security plans for seaports, facilities, and  vessels have been developed based on assessments that identify their  vulnerabilities. In addition, the Coast Guard used a Maritime Security Risk  Assessment Model to prioritize risk according to a combination of possible  threat, consequence, and vulnerability scenarios. Under this approach,  seaport infrastructure that was determined to be both a critical asset and a  likely and vulnerable target would be a high priority for funding security  enhancements. By comparison, infrastructure that was vulnerable to  attack but not as critical or infrastructure that was very critical but already  well protected would be lower in priority. In the transportation area, TSA  has incorporated risk-based decision-making into number of its programs  and processes. For example, TSA has started to incorporate risk  management principles into securing air cargo, but has not conducted  assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities or critical assets (cargo facilities  and aircraft)—two crucial elements of a risk-based management approach  without which TSA may not be able to appropriately focus its resources on  the most critical security needs. TSA also completed an Air Cargo  Strategic Plan in November 2003 that outlined a threat-based risk  management approach to securing the nation’s air cargo transportation  system. However, TSA’s existing tools for assessing vulnerability have not  been adapted for use in conducting air cargo assessments, nor has TSA  established a schedule for when these tools would be ready for use.
Although some DHS components have taken steps to apply risk-based  decision making in implementing their mission functions, we also found  that other components have not always utilized such an approach. DHS  has not performed comprehensive risk assessments in transportation,  critical infrastructure, and the immigration and customs systems to guide  resource allocation decisions. For example, DHS has not fully utilized a  risk-based strategy to allocate resources among transportation sectors.  Although TSA has developed tools and processes to assess risk within and  across transportation modes, it has not fully implemented these efforts to  drive resource allocation decisions. We also recently identified concerns  about DHS’s use of risk management in distributing grants to states and  localities. For fiscal years 2006 and 2007, DHS has used risk assessments  to identify urban areas that faced the greatest potential risk, and were  therefore eligible to apply for the Urban Areas Security Initiative grant,  and based the amount of awards to all eligible areas primarily on the  outcomes of the risk assessment and a new effectiveness assessment.  Starting in fiscal year 2006, DHS made several changes to the grant  allocation process, including modifying its risk assessment methodology,  and introducing an assessment of the anticipated effectiveness of  investments. DHS combined the outcomes of these two assessments to  make funding decisions. However, we found that DHS had limited  knowledge of how changes to its risk assessment methods, such as adding  asset types and using additional or different data sources, affect its risk  estimates. As a result, DHS had a limited understanding of the effects of  the judgments made in estimating risk that influenced eligibility and  allocation outcomes for fiscal year 2006. DHS leadership could make more  informed policy decisions if it were provided with alternative risk  estimates and funding allocations resulting from analyses of varying data,  judgments, and assumptions. We also reported that DHS has not applied a  risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest in  specific capabilities for a catastrophic threat, and we recommended that it  do so.
In April 2007, DHS established the new Office of Risk Management and  Analysis to serve as the DHS Executive Agent for national-level risk  management analysis standards and metrics; develop a standardized  approach to risk; develop an approach to risk management to help DHS  leverage and integrate risk expertise across components and external  stakeholders; assess DHS risk performance to ensure programs are  measurably reducing risk; and communicating DHS risk management in a  manner that reinforces the risk-based approach. According to DHS, the  office’s activities are intended to develop a risk architecture, with  standardized methodologies for risk analysis and management, to assist in  the prioritization of risk reduction programs and to ensure that DHS  component risk programs are synchronized, integrated, and use a common  approach. Although this new office should help to coordinate risk  management planning and activities across the department, it is too early  to tell what effect this office will have on strengthening departmentwide  risk management activities.
section_title: Information Sharing Remains a Challenge for DHS
paragraphs: The federal government, including DHS, has made progress in developing  a framework to support a more unified effort to secure the homeland,  including information sharing. However, opportunities exist to enhance  the effectiveness of information sharing among federal agencies and with  state and local governments and private sector entities. As we reported in  August 2003, efforts to improve intelligence and information sharing  needed to be strengthened. In 2005, we designated information sharing for  homeland security as high-risk. We recently reported that the nation still  lacked an implemented set of governmentwide policies and processes for  sharing terrorism information, but has issued a strategy on how it will put  in place the overall framework, policies, and architecture for sharing with  all critical partners—actions that we and others have recommended. The  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required that  the President create an “information sharing environment” to facilitate the  sharing of terrorism information, yet this environment remains in the  planning stage. An implementation plan for the environment, which was  released on November 16, 2006, defines key tasks and milestones for  developing the information sharing environment, including identifying  barriers and ways to resolve them, as we recommended. We noted that  completing the information sharing environment is a complex task that  will take multiple years and long-term administration and congressional  support and oversight, and will pose cultural, operational, and technical  challenges that will require a collaborated response.
DHS has taken some steps to implement its information sharing  responsibilities. For example, DHS implemented a system to share  homeland security information. States and localities are also creating their  own information “fusion” centers, some with DHS support. DHS has  further implemented a program to protect sensitive information the  private sector provides it on security at critical infrastructure assets, such  as nuclear and chemical facilities. However, the DHS IG found that users  of the information system were confused with it and as a result did not  regularly use it; and DHS had not secured of the private sector’s trust that  the agency could adequately protect and effectively use the information  that sector provided.  These challenges will require longer-term actions to  resolve.  Our past work in the information sharing and warning areas has  highlighted a number of other challenges that need to be addressed. These  challenges include developing productive information sharing  relationships among the federal government, state and local governments,  and the private sector; and ensuring that the private sector receives better  information on potential threats.
section_title: DHS Has Faced Difficulties in Coordinating with Homeland Security Partners
paragraphs: In addition to providing federal leadership with respect to homeland  security, DHS also plays a large role in coordinating the activities of other  federal, state, local, private sector, and international stakeholders, but has  faced challenges in this regard. To secure the nation, DHS must form  effective and sustained partnerships between legacy component agencies  and also with a range of other entities, including other federal agencies,  state and local governments, the private and nonprofit sectors, and  international partners. We have reported that successful partnering and  coordination involves collaborating and consulting with stakeholders to  develop and agree on goals, strategies, and roles to achieve a common  purpose; identify resource needs; establish a means to operate across  agency boundaries, such as compatible procedures, measures, data, and  systems; and agree upon and document mechanisms to monitor, evaluate,  and report to the public on the results of joint efforts. We have found that  the appropriate homeland security roles and responsibilities within and  between the levels of government and with the private sector are evolving  and need to be clarified.
The implementation of the National Strategy for Homeland Security  further underscores the importance for DHS of partnering and  coordination. For example, 33 of the strategy’s 43 initiatives are required  to be implemented by 3 or more federal agencies and the National  Strategy identifies the private sector as a key homeland security partner. If  these entities do not effectively coordinate their implementation activities,  they may waste resources by creating ineffective and incompatible pieces  of a larger security program. For example, because the private sector  owns or operates 85 percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure, DHS  must partner with individual companies and sector organizations in order  to protect vital national infrastructure, such as the nation’s water supply,  transportation systems and chemical facilities. In October 2006 we  reported that all 17 critical infrastructure sectors established their  respective government councils, and nearly all sectors initiated their  voluntary private sector councils in response to the National  Infrastructure Protection Plan. The councils, among other things, are to  identify their most critical assets, assess the risks they face, and identify  protective measures, in sector-specific plans that comply with DHS’s  National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
DHS has taken other important actions in developing partnerships and  mechanisms for coordinating with homeland security partners. For  example, DHS formed the National Cyber Response Coordination Group  to coordinate the federal response to cyber incidents of national  significance. It is a forum of national security, law enforcement, defense,  intelligence, and other government agencies that coordinates  intragovernmental and public/private preparedness and response to and  recovery from national level cyber incidents and physical attacks that have  significant cyber consequences. In the area of maritime security, DHS has  also taken actions to partner with a variety of stakeholders. For example,  the Coast Guard reported to us that as of June 2006, 35 sector command  centers had been created and that these centers were the primary conduit  for daily collaboration and coordination between the Coast Guard and its  port partner agencies. We also found that through its Customs-Trade  Partnership Against Terrorism Program, CBP has worked in partnership  with private companies to review their supply chain security plans to  improve members’ overall security.
However, DHS has faced some challenges in developing other effective  partnerships and in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of various  homeland security stakeholders. For example, in February 2007 we  testified that because DHS has only limited authority to address security at  chemical facilities it must continue to work with the chemical industry to  ensure that it is assessing vulnerabilities and implementing security  measures. Also, while TSA has taken steps to collaborate with federal and  private sector stakeholders in the implementation of its Secure Flight  program, in 2006 we reported these stakeholders stated that TSA has not  provided them with the information they would need to support TSA’s  efforts as they move forward with the program. In addition, we reported in  September 2005 that TSA did not effectively involve private sector  stakeholders in its decision making process for developing security  standards for passenger rail assets We recommended, and DHS developed,  security standards that reflected industry best practices and could be  measured, monitored, and enforced by TSA rail inspectors and, if  appropriate, by rail asset owners. We have also made other  recommendations to DHS to help strengthen its partnership efforts in the  areas of transportation security and research and development.
Further, lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities caused DHS  difficulties in coordinating with its emergency preparedness and response  partners in responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example, the  Red Cross and FEMA had differing views about their roles and  responsibilities under the National Response Plan, which hampered efforts  to coordinate federal mass care assistance. Department of Labor and  FEMA officials also disagreed about which agency was responsible for  ensuring the safety and health of response and recovery workers. This  lack of clarity about each other’s roles and procedures resulted in delayed  implementation of the National Response Plan’s Worker Safety and Health  Support Annex. We recommended that DHS take steps to improve  partnering and coordination efforts as they relate to emergency  preparedness and response, including to seek input from the state and  local governments and private sector entities, such as the Red Cross, on  the development and implementation of key capabilities, including those  for interoperable communications.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Given the dominant role that DHS plays in securing the homeland, it is  critical that the department’s mission programs and management systems  and functions operate as efficiently and effectively as possible. In the more  than 4 years since its establishment, the department has taken important  actions to secure the border and the transportation sector and to defend  against, prepare for, and respond to threats and disasters. DHS has had to  undertake these critical missions while also working to transform itself  into a fully functioning cabinet department—a difficult undertaking for  any organization and one that can take, at a minimum, 5 to 7 years to  complete even under less daunting circumstances. At the same time, a  variety of factors, including Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, threats to and  attacks on transportation systems in other countries, and new  responsibilities and authorities provided by Congress have forced the  department to reassess its priorities and reallocate resources to address  key domestic and international events and to respond to emerging issues  and threats.
As it moves forward, DHS will continue to face the challenges that have  affected its operations thus far, including transforming into a high- performing, results-oriented agency; developing results-oriented goals and  measures to effectively assess performance; developing and implementing  a risk-based approach to guide resource decisions; and establishing  effective frameworks and mechanisms for sharing information and  coordinating with homeland security partners. DHS has undertaken efforts  to address these challenges but will need to give continued attention to  these efforts in order to efficiently and effectively identify and prioritize  mission and management needs, implement efforts to address those needs,  and allocate resources accordingly. Efforts to address these challenges  will be especially important over the next several years given the threat  environment and long-term fiscal imbalance facing the nation.
To address these challenges, DHS will need to continue its efforts to  develop a results-oriented mission and management framework to guide  implementation efforts and progress toward achieving desired outcomes.  In moving forward, it will also be important for DHS to routinely reassess  its mission and management goals, measures, and milestones to evaluate  progress made, identify past and emerging obstacles, and examine  alternatives to address those obstacles and effectively implement its  missions. We have made nearly 700 recommendations to DHS on  initiatives and reforms that would enhance its ability to implement its core  mission and management functions, including developing performance  goals and measures and setting milestones for key programs, making  resource allocation decisions based on risk assessments, and developing  and implementing internal controls to help ensure program effectiveness.  DHS has generally agreed with our prior recommendations.
Moreover, taking those actions that we have suggested for agencies on our  high-risk list provides a good road map for DHS as it works to further  develop management structures that, once in place, could help the  department more efficiently and effectively implement its mission and  management functions. To be removed from our high-risk list, agencies  first have to produce a corrective action plan that defines the root causes  of identified problems, identifies effective solutions to those problems,  and provides for substantially completing corrective measures in the near  term. Such a plan should include performance metrics and milestones, as  well as mechanisms to monitor progress. In the spring of 2006, DHS  provided us with a draft corrective action plan that did not contain key  elements we have identified as necessary for an effective corrective action  plan, including specific actions to address identified objectives, and this  plan has not yet been approved by the Office of Management and Budget.  Second, agencies must demonstrate significant progress in addressing the  problems identified in their corrective action plans. It will be important for  DHS to become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in  providing access to information on its programs and operations so that  Congress, GAO, and others can independently assess its efforts. Finally,  agencies, in particular top leadership, must demonstrate a commitment to  sustain initial improvements in their performance over the long term.  Although DHS leaders have expressed their intent to integrate legacy  agencies into the new department, they have not dedicated the resources  needed to oversee this effort.
A well-managed, high-performing Department of Homeland Security is  essential to meeting the significant homeland security challenges facing  the nation. As DHS continues to evolve, implement its programs, and  integrate its functions, we will continue to review its progress and  performance and provide information to Congress and the public on its  efforts.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We requested comments on this report from the Secretary of Homeland  Security. In comments dated July 20, 2007, and signed by the  Undersecretary for Management (reprinted in their entirety in appendix  II), DHS took issues with our methodology and disagreed with the  conclusions we reached for 42 of the 171 performance expectations  (specifically 41 of the 84 performance expectations where we assessed  DHS as not having achieved the expectation and 1 of the 9 performance  expectations for which we did not make an assessment). DHS also  provided technical comments, which we considered and incorporated  where appropriate.
DHS raised five general issues with our methodology. First, DHS believes  that we altered the criteria by which we would judge the department’s  progress in changing our terminology from “generally addressed” to  “generally achieved.” As we communicated to DHS, we did not change the  underlying assessment approach or evaluation criteria. Rather, we  changed the way that we characterized DHS’s progress for each  performance expectation. For example, our definition for “generally  addressed” and “generally achieved” did not change: “Our work has shown  that DHS has taken steps to effectively satisfy the key elements of the  performance expectation but may not have satisfied all of the elements.”  The change from “addressed” to “achieved” was not a change in  methodology, criteria, or standards but only a change in language to better  convey, in the context of results-oriented government, the legislative and  executive intent behind these performance expectations that DHS achieve  these expectations rather than merely begin to take steps that apply or are  relevant to them.
Second, DHS took issue with the binary standard we used to assess each  performance expectation. While we acknowledge the binary standard we  applied is not perfect, we believe it is appropriate for this review because  the administration generally has not established quantitative goals and  measures for the performance expectations in connection with the various  mission and management areas. Thus, we could not assess where along a  spectrum of progress DHS stood for individual performance expectations.  We chose the 2-step process for assessing DHS’s progress—using a binary  standard for individual performance expectations and a spectrum for  broad mission and management areas—and fully disclosed it to and  discussed it with DHS officials at the outset and throughout the review.
Third, DHS was concerned about how we defined our criteria for  assessing DHS’s progress in achieving each performance expectation and  an apparent shift of criteria we applied after the department supplied us  additional information and documents. With regard to how we defined our  criteria and the performance expectations, the key elements for the  expectations were inherent to each one, and we discussed these elements  in each assessment. Further, we did not shift our criteria. Rather we  employed a process by which we disclosed our preliminary analysis and  assessments to DHS, received and analyzed additional documents and  statements from DHS officials, and updated (and in many cases changed)  our preliminary assessments based on the additional inputs. This process  resulted in an improvement, a diminution, or no change in our assessment  of the applicable area. In some cases, we added language to clarify the  basis of our assessment after our review of the additional information DHS  provided.
Fourth, DHS raised concerns that we did not “normalize” the application  of our criteria by the many GAO analysts who had input to this review. Our  methodology involved significant input by these analysts because they  have had experience with the mission and management areas we were  evaluating and were knowledgeable about the programs, specific  performance expectations, activities, data, and results from each area. A  core team of GAO analysts and managers reviewed all the inputs from  these other GAO staff to ensure the consistent application of our  methodology, criteria, and analytical process. In addition, our quality  control process included detailed reviews of the facts included in this  report, as well as assurance that we followed GAO’s policies and generally  accepted government auditing standards.
Finally, DHS points out that we treated all performance expectations as if  they were of equal significance. In our scope and methodology section we  recognize that qualitative differences between the performance  expectations exist, but we did not apply a weight to the performance  expectations because congressional, departmental, and other  stakeholders’ views on the relative priority of each performance  expectation may be different and we did not believe it was appropriate to  substitute our judgment for theirs.
DHS disagreed with our assessment of 42 of the 171 performance  expectations—including 41 of the 84 performance expectations we  assessed as generally not achieved—contending that we did not fully take  account of all the actions it has taken relative to each expectation.  Specifically, DHS believes that we expected DHS to achieve an entire  expectation in cases where both DHS and we agree that ultimate  achievement will not be possible for several more years, such as in the  areas of border security and science and technology. This report provides  Congress and the public with an assessment of DHS’s progress as of July  2007 and does not reflect the extent to which DHS should have or could  have made more progress. We believe that it is appropriate, after pointing  out the expectation for a multiyear program and documenting the  activities DHS has actually accomplished to date, to reach a conclusion  about whether DHS had not implemented the program after 4 years.
DHS’s concern that we have not adequately used or interpreted additional  information it provided us, such as for performance expectations in the  areas of aviation security and emergency preparedness and response, has  little basis. We fully considered all information and documents DHS  provided and described how we applied this information in the assessment  portion of each performance expectation. In some cases DHS only  provided us with testimonial information regarding its actions to achieve  each performance expectation, but did not provide us with documentation  verifying these actions. In the absence of such documentation to support  DHS’s claims, we concluded that DHS had generally not achieved the  expectations. In other cases, the information and documents DHS  provided did not convince us that DHS had generally achieved the  performance expectation as stated or as we had interpreted it. In these  cases, we explain the basis for our conclusions in the “GAO Assessment  sections”.Further, in some cases the information and documents DHS  provided were not relevant to the specific performance expectation; in  these situations we did not discuss them in our assessment. In addition, in  some of its comments on individual performance expectations, DHS  referenced new information that it did not provide to us during our review.  In these cases we either explain our views on the information, or in one  case we have changed our conclusion to “no assessment made”.
Overall, we appreciate DHS’s concerns and recognize that in a broad- based endeavor such as this, some level of disagreement is inevitable,  especially at any given point in time.  However, we have been as  transparent as possible regarding our purpose, methodology, and  professional judgments. In table 44, we have summarized DHS’s comments  on the 42 performance expectations and our response to those comments.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents  of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the  date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Management  and Budget, and appropriate congressional committees. We will also make  copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions regarding this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777, or rabkinn@gao.gov. Contact points for each mission  and management area are listed in appendix I. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on this  last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Key GAO Contacts for DHS Mission and Management Areas
subsections: section_title: Border Security
section_title: Immigration Enforcement and Immigration Services
section_title: Aviation Security
section_title: Surface Transportation Security
section_title: Maritime Security
section_title: Emergency Preparedness and Response
section_title: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection
section_title: Science and Technology
section_title: Acquisition Management
section_title: Financial Management
section_title: Human Capital Management
section_title: Information Technology Management
section_title: Real Property Management
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Christopher Keisling, Assistant  Director; Jason Barnosky; Cathleen A. Berrick; Sharon Caudle;   Virginia Chanley; Michele Fejfar; Rebecca Gambler; Kathryn Godfrey;  Stephanie Hockman; Tracey King; Thomas Lombardi; Jan Montgomery;  Octavia Parks; and Sue Ramanathan made key contributions to this report.  Other contributors to this report included Eugene Aloise; John Bagnulo;  Mark Bird; Nancy Briggs; Kristy Brown; Stephen Caldwell; Frances Cook;  Stephen Donahue; Jeanette Espinola; Jess Ford; Amanda Gill; Mark  Goldstein; Ellen Grady; Samuel Hinojosa; Randolph Hite; Daniel Hoy; John  Hutton; William O. Jenkins, Jr.; Casey Keplinger; Kirk Kiester; Eileen  Larence; Leena Mathew; Kieran McCarthy; Tiffany Mostert; Shannin  O’Neill; Bonita Oden; David Powner; Jerry Seigler; Katherine Siggerud;  Richard Stana; Bernice Steinhardt; John Stephenson; Sarah Veale; John  Vocino; Gregory Wilshusen; Eugene Wisnoksi; and William T. Woods.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Homeland Security: Prospects For Biometric US-VISIT Exit Capability  Remain Unclear. GAO-07-1044T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2007.
Border Patrol: Costs and Challenges Related to Training New Agents.  GAO-07-997T. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2007.
Homeland Security: Information on Training New Border Patrol Agents.  GAO-07-540R. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Homeland Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Operational,  Technological, and Management Challenges. GAO-07-632T. Washington,  D.C.: March 20, 2007.
Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Planning and Management  Improvements Needed to Control Risks. GAO-07-504T. Washington, D.C.:  February 27, 2007.
Homeland Security: US-VISIT Has Not Fully Met Expectations and  Longstanding Program Management Challenges Need to Be Addressed.  GAO-07-499T. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2007.
Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better  Support Oversight and Accountability. GAO-07-309. Washington, D.C.:  February 15, 2007.
Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and  Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Adequately Defined and  Justified. GAO-07-278. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007.
Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and  Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-378T.  Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2007.
Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and  Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-248.  Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.
Department of Homeland Security and Department of State: Documents  Required for Travelers Departing From or Arriving in the United States  at Air Ports-of-Entry From Within the Western Hemisphere.   GAO-07-250R. Washington, DC: December 6, 2006.
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks  of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-1090T. Washington, D.C.: September  7, 2006.
Illegal Immigration: Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995;  Border Patrol’s Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated.  GAO-06-770. Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2006.
Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the  United States. GAO-06-976T. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2006.
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks  of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-854. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.
Process for Admitting Additional Countries into the Visa Waiver  Program. GAO-06-835R. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.
Intellectual Property: Initial Observations on the STOP Initiative and  U.S. Border Efforts to Reduce Piracy. GAO-06-1004T. Washington, D.C.:  July 26, 2006.
Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across  Our Nation’s Borders at Two Locations. GAO-06-940T. Washington, D.C.:  July 7, 2006.
Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across  Our Nation’s Borders at Two Locations. GAO-06-939T. Washington, D.C.:  July 5, 2006.
Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions  in the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs  Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection. GAO-06-751R.  Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006.
Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for Visitor and  Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened. GAO-06-404.  Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006.
Observations on Efforts to Implement the Western Hemisphere Travel  Initiative on the U.S. Border with Canada. GAO-06-741R. Washington,  D.C.: May 25, 2006.
Homeland Security: Management and Coordination Problems Increase  the Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Disease.   GAO-06-644. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2006.
Border Security: Reassessment of Consular Resource Requirements  Could Help Address Visa Delays. GAO-06-542T. Washington, D.C.:   April 4, 2006.
Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across  Our Nation’s Borders at Two Locations. GAO-06-583T. Washington, D.C.:  March 28, 2006.
Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported Radioactive  Sources Across Our Nation’s Borders at Selected Locations.   GAO-06-545R. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS’s  Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources. GAO-06-462T. Washington,  D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying  Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns  Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and  Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation  Detection Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.:  March 14, 2006.
Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border  Surveillance Technology Program. GAO-06-295. Washington, D.C.:  February 22, 2006.
Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key  Border Security Program Need to Be Implemented. GAO-06-296.  Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2006.
Homeland Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating,  but Management Improvements Are Still Needed. GAO-06-318T.  Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2006.
Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from  Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing. GAO-05-859.  Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2005.
Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and  Marine Assets. GAO-05-543. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 2005.
Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of  Department of Homeland Security’s Visa Security Program. GAO-05-801.  Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005.
Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest  Differences in Sector Performance. GAO-05-435. Washington, D.C.: July  22, 2005.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection  Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T.  Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Homeland Security: Performance of Foreign Student and Exchange  Visitor Information System Continues to Improve, But Issues Remain.   GAO-05-440T.  Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain  on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program.  GAO-05-202. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.
Border Security: Streamlined Visas Mantis Program Has Lowered  Burden on Foreign Science Students and Scholars, but Further  Refinements Needed. GAO-05-198. Washington, D.C.: February 18, 2005.
Border Security: Joint, Coordinated Actions by State and DHS Needed to  Guide Biometric Visas and Related Programs. GAO-04-1080T.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2004.
Border Security: State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on  Schedule, but Guidance Is Lagging. GAO-04-1001. Washington, D.C.:  September 9, 2004.
Border Security: Consular Identification Cards Accepted within United  States, but Consistent Federal Guidance Needed. GAO-04-881.  Washington, D.C.: August 24, 2004.
Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in  the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-04-795. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2004.
Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses   in the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-04-899T. Washington, D.C.:   July 13, 2004.
Border Security: Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their Strategies  and Operations on Federal Lands. GAO-04-590. Washington, D.C.:   June 16, 2004.
Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a  Layered Defense. GAO-04-82. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004.
Homeland Security: First Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status  Program Operating, but Improvements Needed. GAO-04-586. Washington,  D.C.: May 11, 2004.
Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation  Security Program Need to Be Addressed. GAO-04-569T. Washington, D.C.:  March 18, 2004.
Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to  Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars. GAO-04-443T.  Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2004.
Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to  Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars. GAO-04-371.  Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2004.
Homeland Security: Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered  Defense. GAO-04-170T. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2003.
Security: Counterfeit Identification Raises Homeland Security  Concerns. GAO-04-133T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2003.
Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation  Security Program Need to Be Addressed. GAO-03-1083. Washington, D.C.:  September 19, 2003.
Security: Counterfeit Identification and Identification Fraud Raise  Security Concerns. GAO-03-1147T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the  Inspections Process. GAO-03-1084R. Washington, D.C.: August 18, 2003.
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center: Capacity Planning and  Management Oversight Need Improvement. GAO-03-736. Washington,  D.C.: July 24, 2003.
Border Security: New Policies and Increased Interagency Coordination  Needed to Improve Visa Process. GAO-03-1013T. Washington, D.C.:   July 15, 2003.
Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps   in the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-03-908T. Washington, D.C.:   June 18, 2003.
Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps   in the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-03-798. Washington, D.C.:    June 18, 2003.
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland  Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation  Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.
Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States From Certain  Western Hemisphere Countries Not Detected. GAO-03-713T. Washington,  D.C.: May 13, 2003.
Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated  to Promote Better Integration and Sharing. GAO-03-322. Washington,  D.C.: April 15, 2003.
Border Security: Challenges in Implementing Border Technology.   GAO-03-546T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003.
subsections: section_title: Immigration Enforcement
paragraphs: Alien Detention Standards: Telephone Access Problems Were Pervasive at  Detention Facilities; Other Deficiencies Did Not Show a Pattern of  Noncompliance. GAO-07-875. Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007.
Employment Verification: Challenges Exist in Implementing a  Mandatory Electronic Verification System. GAO-07-924T. Washington,  D.C.: June 7, 2007.
Foreign Workers: Information on Selected Countries’ Experiences.   GAO-06-1055. Washington, D.C.: September 8, 2006.
Information Technology: Immigration and Customs Enforcement Is  Beginning to Address Infrastructure Modernization Program  Weaknesses, but Key Improvements Still Needed. GAO-06-823.  Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006.
Immigration Enforcement: Benefits and Limitations to Using Earnings  Data to Identify Unauthorized Work. GAO-06-814R. Washington, D.C.:  July 11, 2006.
Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment  Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts. GAO-06-895T.  Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2006.
Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions  in the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs  Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection. GAO-06-751R.  Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006.
Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS’s  Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources. GAO-06-462T. Washington,  D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Information Technology: Management Improvements Needed on  Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Infrastructure Modernization  Program. GAO-05-805. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2005.
Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment  Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts. GAO-05-813. Washington,  D.C.: August 31, 2005.
Combating Alien Smuggling: The Federal Response Can Be Improved.  GAO-05-892T.  Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005.
Combating Alien Smuggling: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Federal  Response. GAO-05-305. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2005.
Information on Certain Illegal Aliens Arrested in the United States.  GAO-05-646R. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2005.
Department of Homeland Security: Addressing Management Challenges  that Face Immigration Enforcement Agencies. GAO-05-664T. Washington,  D.C.: May 5, 2005.
Information on Criminal Aliens Incarcerated in Federal and State  Prisons and Local Jails. GAO-05-337R. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2005.
Homeland Security: Performance of Foreign Student and Exchange  Visitor Information System Continues to Improve, But Issues Remain.  GAO-05-440T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Alien Registration: Usefulness of a Nonimmigrant Alien Annual  Address Reporting Requirement Is Questionable. GAO-05-204.  Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.
Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in Transforming  Immigration Programs. GAO-05-81. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2004.
Immigration Enforcement: DHS Has Incorporated Immigration  Enforcement Objectives and Is Addressing Future Planning  Requirements. GAO-05-66. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2004.
Homeland Security: Performance of Information System to Monitor  Foreign Students and Exchange Visitors Has Improved, but Issues  Remain. GAO-04-690. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2004.
Investigations of Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering, and Other  Financial Crimes. GAO-04-464R. Washington, D.C.: February 20, 2004.
Combating Money Laundering: Opportunities Exist to Improve the  National Strategy. GAO-03-813. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2003.
section_title: Immigration Services
paragraphs: Department of Homeland Security: Adjustment of the Immigration and  Naturalization Benefit Application and Petition Fee Schedule.  GAO-07-946R. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2007.
Immigration Benefits: Sixteenth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee  Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-07-796R. Washington, D.C.:   April 27, 2007.
DHS Immigration Attorneys: Workload Analysis and Workforce  Planning Efforts Lack Data and Documentation. GAO-07-206.  Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2007.
Foreign Physicians: Data on Use of J-1 Visa Waivers Needed to Better  Address Physician Shortages. GAO-07-52. Washington, D.C.:   November 30, 2006.
Immigration Benefits: Fifteenth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee  Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-07-168R. Washington, D.C.:  November 9, 2006.
Immigration Benefits: Additional Efforts Needed to Help Ensure Alien  Files Are Located when Needed. GAO-07-85. Washington, D.C.:   October 27, 2006.
Estimating the Undocumented Population: A “Grouped Answers”  Approach to Surveying Foreign-Born Respondents. GAO-06-775.  Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006.
Executive Office for Immigration Review: Caseload Performance  Reporting Needs Improvement. GAO-06-771. Washington, D.C.:   August 11, 2006.
H-1B Visa Program: More Oversight by Labor Can Improve Compliance  with Program Requirements. GAO-06-901T. Washington, D.C.:   June 22, 2006.
H-1B Visa Program: Labor Could Improve Its Oversight and Increase  Information Sharing with Homeland Security. GAO-06-720. Washington,  D.C.: June 22, 2006.
Immigration Benefits: Circumstances under Which Petitioners’ Sex  Offenses May Be Disclosed to Beneficiaries. GAO-06-735. Washington,  D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Immigration Benefits: Fourteenth Report Required by the Haitian  Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-06-589R. Washington,  D.C.: April 21, 2006.
Information Technology: Near-Term Effort to Automate Paper-Based  Immigration Files Needs Planning Improvements. GAO-06-375.  Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.
International Remittances: Different Estimation Methodologies Produce  Different Results. GAO-06-210. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy  Could Enhance DHS’ Ability to Control Benefit Fraud. GAO-06-259.  Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2006.
Social Security Administration: Procedures for Issuing Numbers  and Benefits to the Foreign-Born. GAO-06-253T. Washington, D.C.:   March 2, 2006.
Immigration Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and  Ensure Quality of Adjudications. GAO-06-20. Washington, D.C.:  November 21, 2005.
Immigration Benefits: Thirteenth Report Required by the Haitian  Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-06-122R. Washington,  D.C.: October 21, 2005.
Taxpayer Information: Options Exist to Enable Data Sharing Between  IRS and USCIS but Each Presents Challenges. GAO-06-100. Washington,  D.C.: October 11, 2005.
Immigration Services: Better Contracting Practices Needed at Call  Centers. GAO-05-526. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
Immigration Benefits: Twelfth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee  Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-05-481R. Washington, D.C.:   April 14, 2005.
Immigrant Investors: Small Number of Participants Attributed to  Pending Regulations and Other Factors. GAO-05-256. Washington, D.C.:  April 1, 2005.
Immigration Benefits: Eleventh Report Required by the Haitian Refugee  Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-04-1030R. Washington, D.C.:  August 13, 2004.
Taxpayer Information: Data Sharing and Analysis May Enhance Tax  Compliance and Improve Immigration Eligibility Decisions.   GAO-04-972T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2004.
Illegal Alien Schoolchildren: Issues in Estimating State-by-State Costs.  GAO-04-733. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2004.
Undocumented Aliens: Questions Persist about Their Impact on  Hospitals’ Uncompensated Care Costs. GAO-04-472. Washington, D.C.:  May 21, 2004.
Immigration Application Fees: Current Fees Are Not Sufficient to Fund  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Operations. GAO-04-309R.  Washington, D.C.: January 5, 2004.
Immigration Benefits: Tenth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee  Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-04-189R. Washington, D.C.:  October 17, 2003.
Social Security Administration: Actions Taken to Strengthen Procedures  for Issuing Social Security Numbers to Noncitizens, but Some  Weaknesses Remain. GAO-04-12. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2003.
Social Security Numbers: Improved SSN Verification and Exchange of  States’ Driver Records Would Enhance Identity Verification. GAO-03-920.  Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2003.
H-1B Foreign Workers: Better Tracking Needed to Help Determine H-1B  Program’s Effects on U.S. Workforce. GAO-03-883. Washington, D.C.:  September 10, 2003.
Supplemental Security Income: SSA Could Enhance Its Ability to Detect  Residency Violations. GAO-03-724. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2003.
Immigration Benefits: Ninth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee  Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-03-681R. Washington, D.C.:   April 21, 2003.
section_title: Aviation Security
paragraphs: Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International Passenger  Prescreening Are Under Way, but Planning and Implementation Issues  Remain. GAO-07-346. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.
Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are  in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened. GAO-07-660. Washington,  D.C.: April 30, 2007.
Aviation Security: TSA’s Change to Its Prohibited Items List Has Not  Resulted in Any Reported Security Incidents, but the Impact of the  Change on Screening Operations Is Inconclusive. GAO-07-634R.  Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2007.
Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns Drive  Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and  Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved. GAO-07-634.  Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007.
Aviation Security: Cost Estimates Related to TSA Funding of Checked  Baggage Screening Systems at Los Angeles and Ontario Airports.   GAO-07-445. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Aviation Security: TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for  Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be  Systematically Reassessed. GAO-07-299. Washington, D.C.:   February 28, 2007.
Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key  Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains. GAO-07-448T.  Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007.
Transportation Security Administration: Oversight of Explosive  Detection Systems Maintenance Contracts Can Be Strengthened.   GAO-06-795. Washington D.C.: July 31, 2006.
Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening  Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D. C.:   July 28, 2006.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, but Funding  Uncertainties Remain. GAO-06-875T. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006.
Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the  Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program.   GAO-06-864T. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better  Management Controls Needed if Air Carriers Resume Interest in  Deploying Less-than-Lethal Weapons. GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.:   May 26, 2006.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made  Progress in Managing a Federal Workforce and Ensuring Security at  U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T. Washington, D.C.:  April 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked  Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington,  D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private- Sector Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains. GAO-06-166.  Washington, D. C.: March 31, 2006.
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely  Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s  Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from  Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.:  November 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air  Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2005.
Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority  of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.:  September 23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training  Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed.   GAO-05-781. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not  Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information during Secure Flight  Program Testing Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps   to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.:   July 22, 2005.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of  Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.:  July 13, 2005.
Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement  Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.:  May 2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way,  but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed.   GAO-05-356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.  Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Impact of Using  Commercial Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324.  Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Prioritize  Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA’s Progress to Allow  Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening. GAO-05-126.  Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but  Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term  Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of  Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728.  Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies.   GAO-04-785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Aviation Security: Private Security Screening Contractors Have Little  Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T.  Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer- Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.:  March 17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System  Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington,  D.C.: February 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System  Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington,  D.C.: February 12, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing  Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T.  Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen  Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges  of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.  GAO-04-242. Washington, D. C.: November 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address  Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress  Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.:  September 24, 2003.
Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, and the  Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Address Security  Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D. C.: April 1, 2003.
section_title: Surface Transportation Security
paragraphs: Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination  Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-583T.  Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2007.
Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination  Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-459T.  Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007.
Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination  Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-442T.  Washington, D.C.: February 6, 2007.
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Leadership Needed to Prioritize and  Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-225T. Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2007.
Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and  Risk Can Help Guide Security Efforts. GAO-06-557T. Washington, D.C.:  March 29, 2006.
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to  Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-06-181T. Washington, D.C.:  October 20, 2005.
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to  Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-05-851. Washington, D.C.:  September 9, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize  Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.
Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching and  Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management.   GAO-04-890. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004.
Surface Transportation: Many Factors Affect Investment Decisions.  GAO-04-744. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Rail Security: Some Actions Taken to Enhance Passenger and Freight  Rail Security, but Significant Challenges Remain. GAO-04-598T.  Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2004.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security  Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address  Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in Selecting  and Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments.   GAO-03-502. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2003.
Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail  Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed. GAO-03-435. Washington, D.C.:  April 30, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. New York City: April 1, 2003.
section_title: Maritime Security
paragraphs: Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R.  Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port  Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.
Transportation Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the  Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but  Challenges Remain. GAO-07-681T. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2007.
Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports   in Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.:  March 28, 2007.
Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Liquefied   Natural Gas Spill Need Clarification. GAO-07-633T. Washington, D.C.:  March 21, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Decision to Procure and Deploy  the Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not   Supported by Its Cost-Benefit Analysis. GAO-07-581T. Washington, D.C.:  March 14, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the  National Laboratories’ Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in  Support of DNDO’s Testing and Development Program. GAO-07-347R.  Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.
Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on  a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification.   GAO-07-316. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support  the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based  on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the  Monitors’ Costs and Benefits. GAO-07-133R. Washington, D.C.:   October 17, 2006.
Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges before  Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential  Program. GAO-06-982. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006.
Maritime Security: Information sharing Efforts Are Improving.   GAO-06-933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations and  Future Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of  Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T.  Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying  Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns  Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and  Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical  Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved.  GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and  Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2005.
Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment  Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection  Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information  Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention.  GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006  Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced  Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GAO-05-404.  Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport  Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.:  January 14, 2005.
Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime  Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.:  December 10, 2004.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective  Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.:  September 30, 2004.
Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and  Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System.  GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New  Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting  Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington,  D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Coast Guard: Relationship between Resources Used and Results Achieved  Needs to Be Clearer. GAO-04-432. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2004.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require  Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,  D.C.: July 25, 2003.
Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor  Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions. GAO-03-544T.  Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003.
section_title: Emergency Preparedness and Response
paragraphs: Preliminary Information on Rebuilding Efforts in the Gulf Coast.   GAO-07-809R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
Emergency Management: Most School Districts Have Developed  Emergency Management Plans, but Would Benefit from Additional  Federal Guidance. GAO-07-609. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2007.
Emergency Management: Status of School Districts’ Planning and  Preparedness. GAO-07-821T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare  for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address  Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-835T. Washington,  D.C: May 15, 2007.
First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications  Interoperability. GAO-07-301. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.
Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has  Limitations, and Development of a New Integrated System Will Be  Challenging. GAO-07-0411. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of  Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. GAO-07-300. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of  Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007.
Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to  Allocate Funds to Selected Urban Areas. GAO-07-381R. Washington, D.C.:  February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide  Federal Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to  Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139.  Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify  Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44.  Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006.
Homeland Security: Assessment of the National Capital Region Strategic  Plan. GAO-06-1096T. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the  Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions  Needed to Reduce Such Problems in the Future. GAO-06-1013.  Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and  Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,  D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery  Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.:  July 31, 2006.
Child Welfare: Federal Action Needed to Ensure States Have Plans to  Safeguard Children in the Child Welfare System Displaced by Disasters.  GAO-06-944. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.
Disaster Preparedness: Limitations in Federal Evacuation Assistance  for Health Facilities Should Be Addressed. GAO-06-826. Washington, D.C.:  July 20, 2006.
Purchase Cards: Control Weaknesses Leave DHS Highly Vulnerable to  Fraudulent, Improper, and Abusive Activity. GAO-06-957T. Washington,  D.C.: July 19, 2006.
Individual Disaster Assistance Programs: Framework for Fraud  Prevention, Detection, and Prosecution. GAO-06-954T. Washington, D.C.:  July 12, 2006.
Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:  FEMA’s Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant  Fraud and Abuse. GAO-06-655. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Improper and Potentially Fraudulent  Individual Assistance Payments Estimated to Be between $600 Million  and $1.4 Billion. GAO-06-844T. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red  Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712.  Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006.
U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State Partners Collaborate to  Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but Significant Challenges  Remain. GAO-06-519. Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2006.
Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of  Vulnerable Populations due to Hurricanes and Other Disasters.   GAO-06-790T. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2006.
Continuity of Operations: Selected Agencies Could Improve Planning for  Use of Alternate Facilities and Telework during Disruptions.   GAO-06-713. Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and  Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO-06-746T.  Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Improving Federal Contracting Practices in  Disaster Recovery Operations. GAO-06-714T. Washington, D.C.:   May 4, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster  Recovery Contracts. GAO-06-622T. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed  to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International  Assistance. GAO-06-460. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Homeland Security: The Status of Strategic Planning in the National  Capital Region. GAO-06-559T. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006.
Agency Management of Contractors Responding to Hurricanes Katrina  and Rita. GAO-06-461R. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:  March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges  Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,  D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:  FEMA’s Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant  Fraud and Abuse. GAO-06-403T. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2006.
Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO’s  Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to  Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.:   February 1, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance.   GAO-06-297T. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Preliminary Observations on Contracting  for Response and Recovery Efforts. GAO-06-246T. Washington, D.C.:  November 8, 2005.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Contracting for Response and Recovery  Efforts. GAO-06-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 2, 2005.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Oversight and Management of  the National Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-183T. Washington, D.C.  October 20, 2005.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges Facing the   National Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-174T. Washington, D.C.:  October 18, 2005.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Improvements Needed to  Enhance Oversight and Management of the National Flood Insurance  Program. GAO-06-119. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005.
Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nation’s Preparedness,  Response, and Recovery Activities. GAO-05-1053T. Washington, D.C.:  September 28, 2005.
Homeland Security: Managing First Responder Grants to Enhance  Emergency Preparedness in the National Capital Region. GAO-05-889T.  Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005.
Flood Map Modernization: Federal Emergency Management Agency’s  Implementation of a National Strategy. GAO-05-894T. Washington, D.C.:  July 12, 2005.
Homeland Security: DHS’s Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All- Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.:  July 11, 2005.
National Flood Insurance Program: Oversight of Policy Issuance and  Claims. GAO-05-532T. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2005.
Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs  and Efforts to Improve Accountability Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-530T.  Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2005.
Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs  Has Improved, but Challenges Remain. GAO-05-121. Washington, D.C.:  February 2, 2005.
Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental  Cooperation Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable  Communications. GAO-04-740. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004.
Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the  National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and  Performance Goals. GAO-04-433. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004.
Project SAFECOM: Key Cross-Agency Emergency Communications  Effort Requires Stronger Collaboration. GAO-04-494. Washington, D.C.:  April 16, 2004.
Flood Map Modernization: Program Strategy Shows Promise, but  Challenges Remain. GAO-04-417. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Continuity of Operations: Improved Planning Needed to Ensure  Delivery of Essential Government Services. GAO-04-160. Washington,  D.C.: February 27, 2004.
September 11: Overview of Federal Disaster Assistance to the New York  City Area. GAO-04-72. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2003.
Disaster Assistance: Information on FEMA’s Post 9/11 Public   Assistance to the New York City Area. GAO-03-926. Washington, D.C.:  August 29, 2003.
Flood Insurance: Challenges Facing the National Flood Insurance  Program. GAO-03-606T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
section_title: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection
paragraphs: Information Technology: Homeland Security Information Network  Needs to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local Initiatives.  GAO-07-822T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2007.
Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks Used to Support  Homeland Security Need to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and  Local Information sharing Initiatives. GAO-07-455. Washington, D.C.:  April 16, 2007.
DHS Multi-Agency Operation Centers Would Benefit from Taking  Further Steps to Enhance Collaboration and Coordination. GAO-07-686R.  Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2007.
Critical Infrastructure: Challenges Remain in Protecting Key Sectors.  GAO-07-626T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2007.
Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination  Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-583T.  Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide  Federal Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to  Allocate Funds to Selected Urban Areas. GAO-07-381R. Washington, D.C.:  February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at  24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies. GAO-07-89.  Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2006.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating Government  and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors’ Characteristics. GAO-07-39.  Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2006.
Information Security: Coordination of Federal Cyber Security Research  and Development. GAO-06-811. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Leadership Needed to Enhance  Cybersecurity. GAO-06-1087T. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and  Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,  D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS Is Addressing Security at Chemical Facilities,  but Additional Authority Is Needed. GAO-06-899T. Washington, D.C.:   June 21, 2006.
Internet Infrastructure: DHS Faces Challenges in Developing a   Joint Public/Private Recovery Plan. GAO-06-672. Washington, D.C.:   June 16, 2006.
Homeland Security: Guidance and Standards Are Needed for Measuring  the Effectiveness of Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts. GAO-06-612.  Washington, D.C: May 31, 2006.
Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More  Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical  Infrastructure Information. GAO-06-383. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2006.
Securing Wastewater Facilities: Utilities Have Made Important  Upgrades but Further Improvements to Key System Components May Be  Limited by Costs and Other Constraints. GAO-06-390. Washington, D.C.:  March 31, 2006.
Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish  Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but  Unclassified Information. GAO-06-385. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS Is Taking Steps to Enhance Security at  Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority Is Needed. GAO-06-150.  Washington, D.C.: January 27, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and  Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical  Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Addressing  Cybersecurity. GAO-05-827T. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2005.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security  Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities.   GAO-05-434. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Protection of Chemical and Water Infrastructure: Federal Requirements,  Actions of Selected Facilities, and Remaining Challenges. GAO-05-327.  Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Homeland Security: Much Is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a  Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain. GAO-05-214.  Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2005.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Improving Information Sharing with  Infrastructure Sectors. GAO-04-780. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2004.
Technology Assessment: Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure  Protection. GAO-04-321. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Establishing Effective Information  Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors. GAO-04-699T. Washington, D.C.:  April 21, 2004.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges and Efforts to Secure  Control Systems. GAO-04-628T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges and Efforts to Secure  Control Systems. GAO-04-354. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2004.
Posthearing Questions from the September 17, 2003, Hearing on  Implications of Power Blackouts for the Nation's Cybersecurity and  Critical Infrastructure Protection: The Electric Grid, Critical  Interdependencies, Vulnerabilities, and Readiness. GAO-04-300R.  Washington, D.C.: December 8, 2003.
Drinking Water: Experts' Views on How Future Federal Funding Can  Best Be Spent to Improve Security. GAO-04-29. Washington, D.C.: October  31, 2003.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Securing Control  Systems. GAO-04-140T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2003.
Information Security: Progress Made, But Challenges Remain to Protect  Federal Systems and the Nation's Critical Infrastructures. GAO-03-564T.  Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2003.
Homeland Security: Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical  Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness Is Unknown.   GAO-03-439. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2003.
section_title: Science and Technology
paragraphs: Department of Homeland Security: Science and Technology Directorate's  Expenditure Plan. GAO-07-868. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Decision to Procure and Deploy  the Next Generation of Detection Equipment Is Not Supported by Its  Cost-Benefit Analysis. GAO-07-581T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the  National Laboratories’ Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in  Support of DNDO’s Testing and Development Program. GAO-07-347R.  Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.
Homeland Security: DHS Needs to Improve Ethics-Related Management  Controls for the Science and Technology Directorate. GAO-06-206.  Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support  the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based  on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the  Monitors’ Costs and Benefits. GAO-07-133R. Washington, D.C.:   October 17, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear  and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response  Capabilities Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-1015. Washington, D.C.:  September 21, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying  Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns  Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and  Coordination Problem Challenge U.S. Effort to Provide Radiation  Detection Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.:  March 14, 2006.
Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching and  Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management.   GAO-04-890. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004.
Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE’s Laboratories for  Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Detection and Response  Technologies. GAO-04-653. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2004.
section_title: Acquisition Management
paragraphs: Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and  Management and Efforts to Address Them. GAO-07-874. Washington,  D.C.: June 18, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress and Challenges in  Implementing the Department’s Acquisition Oversight Plan. GAO-07-900.  Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges in Creating an  Effective Acquisition Organization. GAO-07-948T. Washington, D.C.:  June 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on the Department of Homeland  Security’s Acquisition Organization and on the Coast Guard’s  Deepwater Program. GAO-07-453T. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2007.
Interagency Contracting: Improved Guidance, Planning, and Oversight  Would Enable the Department of Homeland Security to Address Risks.  GAO-06-996. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and  Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,  D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition  Organization. GAO-06-1012T. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006.
Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts.  GAO-06-764. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2006.
Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Appear Sound, and Program  Management Has Improved, But Continued Monitoring Is Warranted.  GAO-06-546. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2006.
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater  Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges. GAO-05-651T.  Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Create  an Effective Acquisition Organization. GAO-05-179. Washington, D.C.:  March 29, 2005.
Homeland Security: Further Action Needed to Promote Successful Use of  Special DHS Acquisition Authority. GAO-05-136. Washington, D.C.:  December 15, 2004.
Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed.  GAO-04-695. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2004.
Contract Management: Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program Needs  Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight.   GAO-04-380. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004.
Contract Management: INS Contracting Weaknesses Need Attention from  the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-03-799. Washington, D.C.:  July 25, 2003.
section_title: Financial Management
paragraphs: Purchase Cards: Control Weaknesses Leave DHS Highly Vulnerable to  Fraudulent, Improper, and Abusive Activity. GAO-06-1117. Washington,  D.C.: September 28, 2006.
Internal Control: Analysis of Joint Study on Estimating the Costs and  Benefits of Rendering Opinions on Internal Control over Financial  Reporting in the Federal Environment. GAO-06-255R. Washington, D.C.:  September 6, 2006.
Financial Management: Challenges Continue in Meeting Requirements  of the Improper Payments Information Act. GAO-06-581T. Washington,  D.C.: April 5, 2006.
Financial Management Systems: DHS Has an Opportunity to  Incorporate Best Practices in Modernization Efforts. GAO-06-553T.  Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006.
Financial Management Systems: Additional Efforts Needed to Address  Key Causes of Modernization Failures. GAO-06-184. Washington, D.C.:  March 15, 2006.
Financial Management: Challenges Remain in Meeting Requirements of  the Improper Payments Information Act. GAO-06-482T. Washington,  D.C.: March 9, 2006.
CFO Act of 1990: Driving the Transformation of Federal Financial  Management. GAO-06-242T. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2005.
Financial Management: Achieving FFMIA Compliance Continues to  Challenge Agencies. GAO-05-881. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2005.
Financial Audit: The Department of Homeland Security’s Fiscal Year  2004 Management Representation Letter on Its Financial Statements.  GAO-05-600R. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005.
Financial Management: Challenges in Meeting Requirements of the  Improper Payments Information Act. GAO-05-417. Washington, D.C.:  March 31, 2005.
Financial Management: Effective Internal Control Is Key to  Accountability. GAO-05-321T. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2005.
Financial Management: Improved Financial Systems Are Key to FFMIA  Compliance. GAO-05-20. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2004  Financial Management: Department of Homeland Security Faces  Significant Financial Management Challenges. GAO-04-774. Washington,  D.C.: July 19, 2004.
Department of Homeland Security: Financial Management Challenges.  GAO-04-945T. Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2004.
Financial Management: Recurring Financial Systems Problems Hinder  FFMIA Compliance. GAO-04-209T. Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2003  Department of Homeland Security: Challenges and Steps in Establishing  Sound Financial Management. GAO-03-1134T. Washington, D.C.:  September 10, 2003.
section_title: Human Capital Management
paragraphs: Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing  the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.:  May 10, 2007.
Homeland Security: Information on Training New Border Patrol Agents.  GAO-07-540R. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing  the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.:  February 7, 2007.
Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to  Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations. GAO-07-139.  Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training  Important for Successful Transformation. GAO-05-888. Washington, D.C.:  September 23, 2005.
Human Capital: Observations on Final DHS Human Capital  Regulations. GAO-05-391T. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2005.
Human Capital: DHS Faces Challenges In Implementing Its New  Personnel System. GAO-04-790. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2004.
Human Capital: DHS Personnel System Design Effort Provides for  Collaboration and Employee Participation. GAO-03-1099. Washington,  D.C.: September 30, 2003.
section_title: Information Technology Management
paragraphs: Homeland Security: DHS Enterprise Architecture Continues to Evolve  but Improvements Needed. GAO-07-564. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2007.
Information Technology: DHS Needs to Fully Define and Implement  Policies and Procedures for Effectively Managing Investments.   GAO-07-424. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2007.
Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and  Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Adequately Defined and  Justified. GAO-07-278. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007.
Enterprise Architecture: Leadership Remains Key to Establishing and  Leveraging Architectures for Organizational Transformation.   GAO-06-831. Washington, D.C.: August 14, 2006.
Information Technology: Immigration and Customs Enforcement Is  Beginning to Address Infrastructure Modernization Program  Weaknesses, but Key Improvements Still Needed. GAO-06-823.  Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006.
Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated  Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing  Management Challenges and New Risks. GAO-06-580. Washington, D.C.:  May 31, 2006.
Homeland Security Progress Continues but Challenges Remain on  Department’s Management of Information Technology. GAO-06-598T.  Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006.
Information Technology: Management Improvements Needed on  Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Infrastructure Modernization  Program. GAO-05-805. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2005.
Information Security: Department of Homeland Security Needs to   Fully Implement Its Security Program. GAO-05-700. Washington, D.C:  June 17, 2005.
Information Security: Department of Homeland Security Faces  Challenges in Fulfilling Statutory Requirements. GAO-05-567T.  Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2005.
Information Technology: Customs Automated Commercial Environment  Program Progressing, but Need for Management Improvements  Continues. GAO-05-267. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005.
Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain  on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program.  GAO-05-202. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.
Department of Homeland Security: Formidable Information and  Technology Management Challenge Requires Institutional Approach.  GAO-04-702. Washington, D.C.: August 27, 2004.
Homeland Security: Efforts Under Way to Develop Enterprise  Architecture, but Much Work Remains. GAO-04-777. Washington, D.C.:  August 6, 2004.
Information Technology: Homeland Security Should Better Balance Need  for System Integration Strategy with Spending for New and Enhanced  Systems. GAO-04-509. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004.
Information Technology: Early Releases of Customs Trade System  Operating, but Pattern of Cost and Schedule Problems Needs to Be  Addressed. GAO-04-719. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2004.
Information Technology: OMB and Department of Homeland Security  Investment Reviews. GAO-04-323. Washington, D.C.: February 10, 2004.
Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation  Security Program Need to Be Addressed. GAO-03-1083. Washington, D.C.:  September 19, 2003.
Information Technology: A Framework for Assessing and Improving  Enterprise Architecture Management (Version 1.1). GAO-03-584G.  Washington, D.C.: April 2003.
section_title: Real Property Management
paragraphs: Federal Real Property: DHS Has Made Progress, but Additional Actions  Are Needed to Address Real Property Management and Security  Challenges. GAO-07-658. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2007.
section_title: General Reports
paragraphs: Homeland Security: Guidance from Operations Directorate Will  Enhance Collaboration among Departmental Operations Centers. GAO- 07-683T. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing  the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.:  May 10, 2007.
DHS Privacy Office: Progress Made but Challenges Remain in   Notifying and Reporting to the Public. GAO-07-522. Washington, D.C.:  April 27, 2007.
Transportation Security: DHS Efforts to Eliminate Redundant  Background Check Investigations, GAO-07-756. Washington, D.C.:  April 26, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Observations on GAO Access to  Information on Programs and Activities. GAO-07-700T. Washington,  D.C.: April 25, 2007.
DHS Multi-Agency Operation Centers Would Benefit from Taking  Further Steps to Enhance Collaboration and Coordination. GAO-07-686R.  Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2007.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide  Federal Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing  the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.:  February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing  the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-398T. Washington, D.C.:  February 6, 2007.
Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the  Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed  to Further Mitigate Security Risks. GAO-07-375. Washington, D.C.:  January 24, 2007.
Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects  on the Public. GAO-06-1031. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006.
Combating Terrorism: Determining and Reporting Federal Funding  Data. GAO-06-161. Washington, D.C.; January 17, 2006.
Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland Security  Management Challenges. GAO-05-573T. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005.
Results-Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS’s Planning Process  Would Enhance Usefulness and Accountability. GAO-05-300. Washington,  D.C.: March 31, 2005.
September 11: Recent Estimates of Fiscal Impact of 2001 Terrorist  Attack on New York. GAO-05-269. Washington, D.C.; March 30, 2005.
Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and Sustained  Approach Needed to Achieve Management Integration. GAO-05-139.  Washington, D.C.; March 16, 2005.
Homeland Security: Observations on the National Strategies Related to  Terrorism. GAO-04-1075T. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2004.
Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance  Emergency Preparedness. GAO-04-1009. Washington, D.C.:   September 15, 2004.
Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11  Commission’s Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.:  September 14, 2004.  9/11 Commission Report: Reorganization, Transformation, and  Information Sharing. GAO-04-1033T. Washington, D.C.: August 3, 2004.
The Chief Operating Officer Concept and its Potential Use as a Strategy  to Improve Management at the Department of Homeland Security.   GAO-04-876R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004.
Homeland Security: Communication Protocols and Risk  Communication Principles Can Assist in Refining the Advisory System.  GAO-04-682. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004.
Transfer of Budgetary Resources to the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS). GAO-04-329R. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2004.
Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally  Chartered Commissions and GAO. GAO-04-591. Washington, D.C.:   March 31, 2004.
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges,  and Key Management Issues. GAO-03-1165T. Washington, D.C.:  September 17, 2003.
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges,  and Key Management Issues. GAO-03-715T. Washington, D.C.:   May 8, 2003.