Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace
Published: 2009-01-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: According to U.S. intelligence, the threat to U.S airspace remains. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is to defend U.S. air space and the U.S. Air Force has 18 sites in the United States that conduct air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations. ASA operations support fighter aircraft in conducting homeland air defense operations. GAO examined the extent to which (1) NORAD has adopted a risk-based management approach to determine ASA operational requirements; (2) the Air Force has implemented ASA operations as a steady-state mission in accordance with Department of Defense (DOD), NORAD, and Air Force directives and guidance; (3) the Air Force assesses the readiness of units conducting ASA operations; and (4) the Air Force faces challenges in sustaining ASA operations for the future and what plans, if any, it has to address such challenges. GAO reviewed relevant ASA guidance, directives, and planning documents; and interviewed DOD officials, including the commanders of all 18 ASA sites.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Responding to individual requests from DOD, NORAD has done some assessments to determine ASA operational requirements. NORAD has not adopted a risk-based approach to determining ASA requirements, including routine risk assessments. Although GAO previously reported on the benefits to organizations that routinely do risk assessments to determine program requirements, NORAD does not conduct such assessments because DOD does not require NORAD to do so. However, such assessments could enhance NORAD's ability to determine and apply the appropriate levels and types of units, personnel, and aircraft for the ASA mission. The Air Force has not implemented ASA operations in accordance with DOD, NORAD, and Air Force directives and guidance, which instruct the Air Force to establish ASA as a steady-state (ongoing and indefinite) mission. The Air Force has not implemented the 140 actions it identified to establish ASA as a steady-state mission, which included integrating ASA operations into the Air Force's planning, programming, and funding cycle. The Air Force has instead been focused on other priorities, such as overseas military operations. While implementing ASA as a steady-state mission would not solve all of the challenges the units must address, it would help them mitigate some of the challenges associated with conducting both their ASA and warfighting missions. NORAD has partially assessed the readiness of ASA units; however the Air Force has not evaluated personnel, training, and quantity and quality of equipment. Readiness measures are designed to ensure that DOD forces are properly trained, equipped, and prepared to conduct their assigned missions. For example, while NORAD evaluated the extent to which aircraft were maintained for ASA operations and the units' ability to respond to an alert and to locate and intercept aircraft, it did not evaluate training. Because the Air Force has not implemented ASA as a steady-state mission or formally assigned the mission to the units, it does not assess ASA readiness. By assessing the readiness of units that consistently conduct ASA operations, DOD would be better assured that these units are organized, trained, and equipped to perform ASA operations. The Air Force faces two challenges to sustaining its ASA capabilities over the long term--(1) replacing or extending the service life of aging fighter aircraft and (2) replacing ASA units with equipment and trained personnel when they deploy. For example, if aircraft are not replaced by 2020, 11 of the 18 current air sovereignty alert sites could be without aircraft. The Air Force has not developed plans to mitigate these challenges because it has been focused on other priorities. Plans would provide the Air Force information that could assist it in ensuring the long-term sustainability of ASA operations and the capability of ASA units to protect U.S. airspace.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In the hours after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the North  American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)  engaged in efforts to  defend the air sovereignty of the United States against a new type of air  attack—one that was initiated from within our own borders. Although  federal agencies responsible for protecting domestic airspace have taken  measures to deter such attacks, the National Strategy for Aviation  Security, issued in March 2007, recognizes that air attacks are still a threat  to the United States and its people. U.S. intelligence agencies have also  stated that the threat to U.S air sovereignty remains.
The commander of NORAD is charged with the missions of aerospace  warning and aerospace control for North America. To accomplish these  missions, NORAD has fully fueled, fully armed aircraft and trained  personnel on alert 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, at 18 air sovereignty  alert (ASA) sites across the United States. The Air Force provides NORAD  with personnel and equipment for these operations including fighter  aircraft, which include F-15 and F-16 aircraft as shown in figures 1 and 2.
ASA units, which include both Air National Guard (ANG) and active duty  Air Force personnel, are dual tasked to conduct both expeditionary  missions and ASA operations. ASA operations consist of ground  operations that take place before fighter aircraft take off, including such  activities as maintaining the fighter aircraft. They also include those  activities that may take place after a unit receives an alert from NORAD  but before the aircraft are airborne. For example, pilots and maintenance  personnel may rush from their nearby lodging facility to the alert aircraft  facility, where maintenance personnel conduct final preparations while  the pilots sit in their aircraft awaiting further instruction (battle station).  Alternatively, pilots may taxi the aircraft to the end of the runway and  await further instruction (runway alert) or take off in response to the alert  (scramble).
Once aircraft take off, “alert” operations end and the operation becomes a  homeland defense air mission under Operation NOBLE EAGLE. When this  transition occurs, an ANG pilot converts from Title 32 status under the  command and control of the state governor to federal Title 10 status under  the command and control of NORAD. If warranted, NORAD can increase  personnel, aircraft, and the number of ASA sites based on changes in the  threat conditions. According to DOD documents, day-to-day, or steady- state, operations consist of the current personnel and aircraft at the 18  ASA sites scattered throughout the United States. This report focuses on  the 20 units at the 18 sites that were conducting these steady-state ASA  operations up through September 2008.
Given the importance of the capability to deter, detect, and destroy  airborne threats to the United States, it is important that the Air Force  address current and future requirements of the ASA mission to ensure its  long-term sustainability. This includes ASA units’ ability to ensure that  units conducting ASA operations are also able to train for and perform  their expeditionary missions. Further, the Air Force should ensure that it  has fighter aircraft available to conduct ASA operations, since the F-15s  and F-16s used for these operations are beginning to reach the end of their  useful service lives.
We have previously reported that one widely accepted method to  effectively determine requirements and manage risk for a mission or  operation is through a five-phase risk management approach. For  example, one phase of this approach is a risk assessment phase, which  includes evaluating threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences; another  phase includes evaluating alternatives based on different costs and other  factors.
In light of these issues, you asked that we review the management of ASA  operations. In conducting our review, we examined the extent to which (1)  NORAD has adopted a risk-based management approach to determine  ASA operational requirements; (2) the Air Force has implemented ASA  operations as a steady-state or ongoing and indefinite mission in  accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force directives and guidance;  (3) the Air Force assesses the readiness of units conducting ASA  operations; and (4) the Air Force faces challenges in sustaining ASA  operations for the future and what plans, if any, it has to address such  challenges.
To determine the extent to which NORAD has adopted a risk-based  management approach to determine ASA operational requirements, we  compared a widely accepted risk-based management framework to  assessments that NORAD conducted on ASA operations. To determine the  extent to which the Air Force has implemented ASA operations as a  steady-state mission, we reviewed NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance  regarding how ASA operations are to be managed. We also interviewed  DOD and Air Force officials and obtained ASA documents that contained  information about the management of ASA operations, including oversight  and funding of the operations. We then compared how the Air Force had  implemented ASA operations to NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance. To  determine the extent to which the Air Force assessed the readiness of  units performing ASA operations, we obtained and analyzed DOD  guidance and reviewed the readiness reports of all units that conduct ASA  operations. We reviewed the readiness reports and interviewed unit  officials and determined how well these reports reflected the extent to  which these units were organized, trained, and equipped to conduct ASA  operations. To determine the extent to which the Air Force faces  challenges in sustaining ASA operations for the future and what plans, if  any, it has to address such challenges, we interviewed DOD and Air Force  officials and obtained and reviewed DOD reports that identified challenges  the Air Force will face in sustaining future ASA operations. We also  interviewed DOD and Air Force officials and obtained their views on the  challenges they will face, and we requested any plans addressing these  challenges. We also conducted structured interviews with the  commanders of the 20 alert units located at all 18 ASA sites and asked  them to respond to a variety of questions regarding aspects of all four  objectives. We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 to  January 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional information on  our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Protecting U.S. airspace has changed over the years. During the Cold War,  DOD focused its air defense operations to protect U.S. airspace from air  threats originating from the former Soviet Union. Today, several DOD  organizations are involved in air defense and ASA operations, which have  expanded to include the defense of U.S. airspace from air threats  originating from within the United States. Because ASA operations are  considered the last line of defense against air threats, it is crucial for this  capability to be functioning.
subsections: section_title: History of ASA and Current Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: During the Cold War, NORAD positioned fighter aircraft across the United  States and Canada to protect North America from a strategic attack by  Soviet bombers. Alert fighter aircraft were manned by a dedicated force  that was not assigned to other missions, and aircraft were armed, fueled,  and ready at all times. As many as 5,800 aircraft were on alert in 1958, but  the number of aircraft diminished over the years, as did the number of  designated alert sites. By 1997 officials had suggested a “four corners”  defense, maintaining alert sites in Massachusetts, Oregon, California, and  Florida. By September 11, 2001, only 14 interceptor aircraft were sitting  alert in the United States.
According to DOD’s 2008 National Defense Strategy and its 2005 Strategy  for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, protecting the U.S. homeland  from direct attack is DOD’s highest priority. After the events of September  11, 2001, DOD initiated Operation NOBLE EAGLE, which shifted NORAD’s  responsibilities to include protecting U.S. airspace from air threats  originating from within the United States.
NORTHCOM is the military command responsible for executing DOD’s  homeland defense and civil support mission within its area of  responsibility—including the continental United States, Alaska, and  territorial waters. The commander of NORTHCOM also commands  NORAD. The NORAD commander is responsible for the command and  control of homeland air defense and delegates much of this command and  control function to one of its three regional commanders. Although  neither NORAD nor the Secretary of Defense specifies which military  service must provide fighter aircraft to conduct ASA operations, the Air  Force is currently providing 100 percent of the fighter aircraft. The Air  Force is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping Air Force  units. With regard to ASA operations, the Air Force has delegated the  responsibility of organizing, training, and equipping combat-ready forces  to its major commands. Specifically, Air Combat Command is responsible  for providing air defense forces to NORAD and Pacific Air Forces  Command is responsible for providing air defense forces to Hawaii. Alert  forces deployed in Alaska are provided by PACOM.  NORAD has  established a binational subcommand under the leadership of a general  officer who is responsible for both NORAD and PACOM activities.
The commander of First Air Force is also the commander of the  Continental NORAD Region and the Air Forces Northern Command. In  each of these capacities, the commander has different responsibilities with  regard to ASA operations. For example, as a numbered Air Force  commander (i.e., First Air Force), the commander has the responsibility of  ensuring the readiness of forces for air sovereignty and air defense of the  continental United States. As the commander of the Continental NORAD  Region, the commander is responsible for providing airspace surveillance  and control and directing all air sovereignty activities for the continental  United States. The role and responsibilities of being the commander of Air  Forces Northern Command include air component planning, execution,  and assessment of support to civil authorities (e.g., air operations during  hurricane recovery) and command of air forces in support of NORTHCOM  homeland defense missions. While the First Air Force, Continental  NORAD Region, and Air Forces Northern Command have these  responsibilities, the ASA units that conduct ASA operations are assigned  to different numbered Air Forces within the Air Force’s Air Combat  Command, Air Education and Training Command, or Pacific Air Force  Command for their expeditionary missions.
There are currently 20 units at 18 designated steady-state alert sites in the  United States, as shown in figure 3. The ANG provides the personnel and  equipment at 16 of the 18 ASA sites while the active duty Air Force  provides the personnel and equipment at the remaining 2 sites.
ANG units fulfilling different roles are potentially subject to different  authorities under the United States Code and state laws. ANG units  conduct ASA operations in a Title 32 status, meaning that they are under  the command and control of the governor of the state but federally funded.  However, pilots and aircraft of the same unit engage in an actual airborne  air defense operation in a Title 10 status, because they are performing a  federal mission under the command and control of NORAD. Active duty  units are always in a Title 10 status, but command and control of pilots  and aircraft conducting ASA operations passes from the local commander  to NORAD when performing air defense operations, as shown in figure 4.
Because ASA units are dual tasked for their expeditionary missions and  ASA operations, other units fill in to conduct ASA operations when an ASA  unit deploys. ANG units can, on their own, find replacements. Finding  replacement for a unit’s ASA operation can entail finding personnel and  aircraft from multiple units.
section_title: Risk-Based Management
paragraphs: GAO has previously reported that a risk-based management approach  helps policymakers make informed decisions and prioritize resource  investments. Risk-based management is a widely endorsed strategy for  helping decision makers make decisions about allocating finite resources  and taking action under conditions of uncertainty. We have previously  recommended a five-phase approach to risk-based management as shown  in table 1.
The framework should be considered a starting point, and the entire cycle  of risk-based management activities should be viewed as a goal. The  process is dynamic and new information can be entered at any phase. The  framework can be used to inform agency officials and decision makers of  the basic components of a risk-based management system or can be used  as a stand-alone guide. The risk-based management approach as outlined  above is designed to be flexible, in that the approach may be applied at  various organizational levels from a department or a multiagency  organization down to specific projects or operations such as ASA  operations.
As we previously reported, because there is no one uniformly accepted  approach to risk-based management, terms and activities may differ across  applications. In addition, any approach that omits the substance of the  steps may result in resources that are not targeted to the highest security  needs. We also reported that failing to monitor the implementation of  countermeasures, including those implemented by other agencies, may  result in a misallocation of resources. Similarly, failing to conduct routine  or periodic assessments of programs or operations could result in missed  opportunities to increase their efficiency and effectiveness.
section_title: NORAD Has Assessed ASA Operational Requirements but Not on a Routine Basis as Part of a Risk-Based Management Approach
paragraphs: We identified three NORAD assessments of ASA operations; however,  NORAD did not perform these assessments—or conduct other actions that  would be part of a risk-based management approach—on a routine basis.   According to our prior work, an ongoing risk-based management approach  is a best practice that enhances an organization’s decision making,  including determining operational requirements, and helps to guide the  use of limited resources. A critical phase of implementing a risk-based  management approach is the risk assessment phase, which helps decision  makers identify and evaluate potential risks facing key assets or missions  so that countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or  mitigate the effects of the risks. In addition to the risk assessment phase,  alternatives to current requirements are evaluated while considering cost  and other factors in the alternatives evaluation phase. Rather than  performing these assessments as part of an adopted comprehensive  management approach to manage risk or determine ASA operational  requirements, NORAD performed these assessments in response to  individual DOD leadership inquiries about ASA operations. While NORAD  is not required to conduct risk assessments on a routine basis, doing so  could allow it to enhance its ability to determine the appropriate level and  types of resources—including units, personnel, and aircraft—for ASA  operations.
In the first assessment we identified, after the terrorist attacks of  September 11, 2001, NORAD, in working with other U.S. government  agencies, developed a list of what it believed to be the most critical  locations and infrastructure across the United States requiring its  protection. We determined this assessment could be considered as part of  the risk assessment phase of the overall risk management approach in  which vulnerabilities and critical assets are evaluated. NORAD has not  reevaluated this list since it created it in 2001 even though according to  experts in the intelligence community, the type of threat has and continues  to evolve, and other U.S. agencies have taken a number of measures to  mitigate against aviation threats.
We identified a second assessment that NORAD conducted in 2005 that we  considered could be part of the alternatives evaluation phase in which  alternatives are considered. Specifically, NORAD’s air component—First  Air Force—provided input to the 2005 BRAC process regarding which  sites it would prefer to conduct ASA operations. First Air Force measured  how long it would take a fighter plane to respond to a threat over a  specific location—both from the current ASA site and from the proposed  alternative sites—and the level of risk that would be posed under each  alternative. After the BRAC decisions were made in 2005, First Air Force  assessed the impact of the commission’s decisions on ASA operations. For  example, the commission recommended that ASA operations at Selfridge,  Michigan, be transferred to Toledo, Ohio. First Air Force evaluated the  impact of response times to cover high population centers and  infrastructure in the area.
In the third assessment we identified, in 2006 the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, requested that NORAD and other commands evaluate costs and  identify measures to reduce Operation NOBLE EAGLE costs. We  considered this assessment could also be included in the alternatives  evaluation phase of a risk management approach. In this third assessment,  NORAD identified a number of classified actions that it could take to  reduce the cost of Operation NOBLE EAGLE but stated that in order to  continue to fully support the homeland air defense mission, it would be  necessary to maintain the current number of ASA sites based on proximity  to critical infrastructure. NORAD’s assessment included a risk-based  assessment of ASA requirements based on current and emerging threats.  The assessment also took into consideration aviation security  improvements that had been made by other federal entities since 2001, for  example, the Transportation Security Administration’s use of Federal Air  Marshals on selected flights. NORAD has not undertaken an assessment of  alternatives since 2006.
In prior work, we have reported that the goal of risk-based management is  to integrate systematic concern for risk into the existing cycle of agency  decision making and implementation. Adopting such a risk-based  management approach could help NORAD to better assess risk and  determine operational requirements by addressing vulnerabilities and by  presenting alternatives that could be implemented to address changing  conditions. Adopting a risk-based management approach to include  actions in all five phases, could also allow NORAD to evaluate the extent  to which previous threats have been mitigated by DOD or other  government agencies and to evaluate current and emerging threats to  determine which ones require the most urgent attention. Routine risk  assessments could help NORAD evaluate the extent to which current ASA  operational requirements—including the levels and types of sites, forces  and equipment, and contributions from other DOD and non-DOD  organizations—are needed to address threats as conditions change.  NORAD officials stated that it has not adopted a risk-based management  approach primarily because DOD does not require NORAD to use a risk- based management approach to determine ASA operational requirements.  The use of a risk-based management approach could help NORAD to  assure DOD, Congress, and others that it has considered risks in making  decisions about how to apply the level and types of capabilities and  resources needed to conduct the ASA mission in an increasingly  constrained fiscal environment. Air Force and NORAD officials  responsible for ASA operations acknowledged that an ongoing cycle of  risk-based management, including a routine risk assessment of ASA  operational requirements, would be beneficial to both the service and the  command.
section_title: The Air Force Has Not Implemented ASA Operations as a Steady-State Mission in Accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force Directives and Guidance
paragraphs: The Air Force has not implemented ASA operations as a steady-state  mission in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force directives and  guidance because it (1) has focused on other priorities and (2) believes  that ASA operational requirements, such as the number of sites, might be  decreased to pre-September 11, 2001, levels in the future. As a result, ASA  units have experienced difficulties in conducting ASA operations and  Congress and DOD lack cost visibility for decision making. Implementing  ASA operations as a steady-state mission may help to mitigate these  challenges. In addition, if ASA operations are not implemented as a steady- state mission, Congress and DOD leaders will not have visibility of costs  and other important information to make decisions for these homeland  defense operations.
subsections: section_title: The Air Force Does Not Operate ASA as a Steady- State Mission
paragraphs: Although its units are conducting ASA operations, the Air Force has not  implemented these operations as a steady-state mission in accordance  with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force directives and guidance. Specifically, in  August 2002 the Air Force convened a working group that issued guidance  for planning to establish permanent ASA sites in support of the mission in  support of homeland defense rather than continuing to establish sites on a  temporary basis, as it has since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  In addition, in response to a December 2002 NORAD declaration of a  steady-state air defense mission, the Air Force took further action in  February 2003 to establish ASA as a steady-state capability by issuing a  directive assigning specific functions and responsibilities to support the  mission. This directive identified 140 separate actions to be taken by Air  Force organizations to support the steady-state mission at all 18 ASA sites;  these actions included addressing personnel, equipment, funding, and  facility issues. For example, the directive required the Air Force Deputy  Chief of Staff for Personnel to ensure that ASA active personnel  requirements were included in the Air Force submission to the Future  Years Defense Program. This program is one of the principal tools used to  inform DOD senior leaders and Congress about resources planned to  support various programs, and reflects DOD decisions regarding allocation  of federal resources. The directive required the Air Force Major  Commands to develop the capability to report on the readiness of ASA  activities in DOD’s readiness system, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for  Personnel to work with the appropriate officials to limit adverse effects on  the careers of personnel affected by the steady-state mission. In addition,  it required the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations to  provide policy and programming guidance and staff necessary issues  through appropriate offices. Further, in December 2003, the Office of the  Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to assess and resource long- term ASA mission requirements in its submission for the 2006 through  2011 Future Years Defense Program.
Although NORAD, DOD, and the Air Force issued directives and guidance  to establish a steady-state ASA mission, the Air Force did not take the  steps needed to establish the mission. For example, although the Office of  the Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to program ASA  operations across the 6 years of its Future Years Defense Program  submission, the Air Force decided to program ASA operations in 2-year  increments. Air Force, NORAD, and NGB/ANG officials told us that this  decision has been the primary cause for the personnel difficulties ASA  units are experiencing. Headquarters Air Force officials told us that they  made this decision because they believed that the number of sites might  decrease to the pre-September 11, 2001, levels and placing ASA operations  across all 6 years would require the Air Force to offset another service  program. However, Air Force officials also acknowledged that they could  still have programmed it across the 6-year time frame since the Future  Years Defense Program is a planning tool that could be modified if the  number of sites were decreased in the future. In addition, the Air Force  did not fully fund ASA operations in the two previous 2-year programming  cycles. For example, the Air Force did not program for 122 of the 922 ANG  personnel (13 percent) identified as being needed to conduct ASA  operations for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 and did not program for 150 of  the 922 ANG personnel (16 percent) identified as being needed to conduct  ASA operations for fiscal years 2008 and 2009. As a result, the Air Force  had to use temporary funds and temporary orders to cover these  personnel shortfalls since they are necessary to conduct ASA operations.  According to headquarters Air Force officials, the Air Force focused on  other priorities, such as overseas military operations; furthermore, it  believed that future ASA operational requirements might be decreased to  pre-September 11, 2001, levels. These officials stated that the lack of  implementation was also attributable to a lack of clearly defined roles and  responsibilities in Air Force homeland defense documents, and a limited  corporate understanding of ASA operations and the units performing  them. Our analysis showed that none of the Air Force’s key homeland  defense documents—the Air Force homeland defense policy directive, the  Air Force homeland operations doctrine, and the Air Force homeland  defense concept of operations—fully defines the roles and responsibilities  for or accurately articulates the complexity of ASA operations. For  example, the Air Force’s homeland defense policy directive, which is  supposed to provide overarching guidance to enable the Air Force to  organize, train, and equip by applying the principles, capabilities, and  competencies of air and space power to homeland defense, does not  mention or define ASA operations or outline the roles and responsibilities  for managing these operations. In addition, the Air Force’s homeland  defense office, which was responsible for overseeing the implementation  of the homeland defense directive, lost its general officer, was downsized,  and organizationally realigned several times shortly after the directive was  issued.
section_title: Temporary Status of ASA Operations Creates Difficulties for Units and Hampers Cost Visibility and Oversight
paragraphs: Since the Air Force did not implement ASA operations in accordance with  NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance, at the time of our review ASA units  were experiencing a number of difficulties that challenged their ability to  perform both their expeditionary missions and ASA operations. The unit  commanders we interviewed identified funding, personnel, and dual  tasking of responsibilities as the top three factors affecting ASA  operations. Figure 5 depicts units’ responses regarding difficulties they  have experienced in conducting ASA operations. For example, during our  structured interviews, officials from 17 of the 20 units stated that  personnel issues were a moderate or great concern and that recruiting,  retention, and promotion limitations were the primary issues arising from  the 2-year programming for ASA operations. Commanders at the ASA sites  that we visited told us that they had lost some of their most experienced  personnel due to job instability caused by the manner in which ASA  operations are programmed. Similarly, commanders at 17 of the 20 units  stated that the Air Force treats ASA operations as temporary and has not  provided sufficient resources. This situation has resulted in an increase in  the unit’s administrative and support requirements. For example, units are  required to issue temporary orders for personnel as funds become  available. The need to issue such orders would not be necessary if the  operations were not treated as temporary. Thirteen of the 20 units  indicated that dual tasking—for their expeditionary mission and for ASA  operations—was a moderate or great concern and that the Air Force was  not adequately equipping units to conduct both missions. Headquarters Air  Force and NGB/ANG officials acknowledged the units’ difficulties in  conducting ASA operations.
Because the Air Force has not programmed for ASA operations in its  Future Years Defense Program submissions, the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, NORAD, and Congress lack visibility into the costs of these  operations. Implementing ASA operations as a steady-state mission may  help to mitigate these challenges. In addition, implementing ASA  operations as a steady-state mission would provide Congress and DOD  leaders cost visibility into ASA operations, which support DOD’s high- priority homeland defense mission.
section_title: Readiness of Units Performing ASA Operations is Partially Assessed by NORAD and PACOM but Not by the Air Force
paragraphs: DOD is to evaluate personnel, training, and quantity and quality of  equipment to determine the readiness of units to perform their missions.  NORAD and PACOM partially assessed the readiness of the units that  carry out ASA operations. For example, NORAD assessed the quantity and  quality of available fighter aircraft and the ability of the personnel to  respond to an alert on the day it conducted the assessment. However,  NORAD only assessed personnel on duty at the time of the inspection and  did not assess the extent to which all of the unit’s personnel that are  involved with ASA operations are trained to support and conduct these  operations. Moreover, the Air Force, as the force provider, did not  evaluate personnel, training, or the quantity and quality of equipment  needed and used for ASA operations because it has not formally assigned  the mission to the units.
NORAD conducts two separate assessments of ASA equipment (such as  the condition of the fighter aircraft) and operations (unit’s ability to  respond to different types of alerts). The first is a preasssessment  conducted by the Continental NORAD Region commander. This  preassessment evaluates the quality of alert aircraft, to include the overall  condition of the aircraft, and the units’ ability to respond to different air  sovereignty scenarios, such as intercepting various types of aircraft. This  preassessment is performed prior to the official ASA assessment that  NORAD headquarters conducts. For example, in a March 2008  preassessment, Continental NORAD Region evaluated the New Orleans  ASA site’s aircraft condition and the unit’s ability to respond to different  scenarios within specified time frames. In the second type of assessment,  NORAD officially evaluates, generally every 20 months, the sites using the  same factors as the preassessment. In the April 2008 official assessment of  the New Orleans ASA site, NORAD evaluated its ability to respond to  aircraft flown by pilots who had not filed flight plans and were not  responding to Air Force pilot signals to land. NORAD found that New  Orleans site personnel were able to perform ASA operations under this  and other scenarios. In examining these assessments, we observed that  NORAD did not evaluate and report the extent to which all of the unit’s  personnel involved with ASA operations are trained to support and  conduct these operations. PACOM conducts a similar assessment for the  ASA unit located at Hickham Air Force Base (AFB), Hawaii.  As a result,  these assessments do not reflect the complete readiness of the units that  conduct ASA operations.
The Air Force, as the force provider, is responsible for measuring  readiness for its missions by evaluating personnel, training, and quantity  and quality of equipment; however, it did not assess these factors specific  to ASA operations. NORAD officials stated training for ASA operations is  especially important given the differences in conducting wartime flight  operations overseas versus conducting ASA operations in the United  States. ASA commanders stated that ASA training includes specific tactics,  techniques, and procedures that are not always included during their  wartime training. As a result, they stated that many of the units have  constructed their own ASA training plans to ensure their personnel are  adequately trained to perform ASA operations. In addition, the Air Force  has not evaluated the number of personnel it needs for ASA operations;  however, NGB/ANG officials told us they are reviewing the number of  personnel the ANG needs to perform ASA operations. The officials told us  that they were uncertain as to when this assessment would be completed.
Our structured interviews with the commanders of units that conduct ASA  operations showed that they did not evaluate and report the personnel,  training, or quantity and quality of equipment to perform ASA operations  because the Air Force has not formally assigned ASA as a mission to the  units and it has not declared the operations as a steady-state mission.   Additionally, according to headquarters Air Force officials, the Air Force  has been focused on other priorities, such as overseas military operations  and it believed that ASA operational requirements, such as number of  sites, might be decreased to pre-September 11, 2001, levels. Formally  assigning ASA operations to the units would require the units to fully  assess their readiness—personnel, training, and quantity and quality of  equipment—to perform ASA operations. DOD officials told us that other  military services could perform ASA operations when circumstances  warrant. By assigning the mission to those units that consistently conduct  the mission—regardless of the services they represent—and assessing the  extent to which they have the personnel, training, and equipment to  conduct this mission, DOD would be better informed about the readiness  of ASA units.
section_title: ASA Operations Face Significant Challenges to Long-Term Sustainability, but the Air Force Has Not Developed Plans to Mitigate These Challenges
paragraphs: We identified two key challenges to sustaining ASA operations over the  long term. However, the Air Force does not have plans to manage or deal  with these key challenges. First, our analysis of Air Force documents and  statements from Air Force officials familiar with the service’s  recapitalization efforts indicates that even if aging aircraft are replaced  according to Air Force aircraft schedules, gaps in fighter aircraft at current  ASA sites will arise within the next 7 years. Specifically, by fiscal year  2020, 11 of the 18 current ASA sites could be without viable aircraft to  conduct ASA operations. Second, the Air Force must ensure that units  are available and ready to perform ASA operations and support units  receiving replacement aircraft, while simultaneously continuing to deploy  units for overseas operations. Currently, when ASA units are deployed, the  ANG must find units to replace them, which officials told us can be  difficult. While Air Force officials have acknowledged the challenges we  identified to the long-term sustainability of ASA operations, they have not  developed plans to address them because the service has been focused on  other priorities, such as overseas operations. Plans would provide the Air  Force with information that could assist it in its efforts to ensure long-term  sustainability of ASA operations and the capability of ASA units to protect  U.S. airspace.
subsections: section_title: Expected Retirements of Aging Aircraft Will Create a Challenge in Sustaining the ASA Mission
paragraphs: According to Air Force documents and personnel, many aircraft in the  service’s current inventory are the oldest in Air Force history, and the  older they get the more difficult and expensive they are to maintain.  According to NGB/ANG, F-15s and F-16s are aging aircraft that cost more  to maintain as they age. Of the 18 ASA sites, 12 are currently equipped with  F-16s, which will reach the end of their useful service lives between fiscal  years 2015 and 2020. One option is to replace the F-16s with either F-22s or  F-35s, both of which the Air Force is acquiring. However, according to the  current F-22 and F-35 fielding schedules, only 1 of the 12 units—Shaw  AFB, South Carolina—will receive the new aircraft before its fleet of F-16s  reaches the end of its useful service life. The House report accompanying  the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed the  Secretary of the Air Force, in consultation with the Chief of the National  Guard Bureau and the Secretary of Homeland Security, to conduct a study  on the feasibility and desirability of equipping certain ASA units with F- 35s. Although the House report directed the Air Force to submit the  results of its study to Congress by October 1, 2008, the Air Force had not  issued the study by that date, and we were unable to obtain a draft copy.
Another option for the Air Force is to replace the F-16s with some of the  more modern F-15 models. However, F-15s, like F-16s, are beginning to  reach the end of their useful service lives. Also, all F-15s, including those  flown by five ASA units, were grounded for 3 months in late 2007 and early  2008 after an F-15 broke apart during a normal flying operation in  November 2007. The Air Force found a structural problem in one of its F- 15 models and retired the aircraft that they found with structural  problems. The remaining F-15s returned to service by spring 2008, but Air  Combat Command officials told us that in light of the accident and  subsequent grounding they are concerned about the number of F-15s that  will be able to remain in service and meet the Air Force’s operational  needs up to their scheduled retirement date in 2025. When we discussed  this issue during the exit conference of our review, Air Force and  NGB/ANG officials acknowledged that the end of the F-15s’ useful service  lives could occur earlier than 2025 if the aircraft are increasingly used for  overseas deployments or other missions. During discussions for the fiscal  year 2010 programming cycle, the Air Force sought approval from the  Office of the Secretary of Defense to retire 137 F-15s and 177 F-16s earlier  than originally planned. Depending on when and where the Air Force  retires these F-15s, removing them from service early could further affect  the number of aircraft that will be available for units performing ASA  operations. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD indicated that  extending the service life of its F-15 and F-16 aircraft is also an option;  however, the Air Force has yet to determine the extent to which such  actions are viable.
Figure 6 shows the projected number of current ASA sites that may or may  not have viable aircraft to conduct ASA operations through 2032. As the  figure reflects, unless the Air Force modifies its current fielding schedules,  it will lack viable aircraft to conduct ASA operations at all 18 current ASA  sites after fiscal year 2015. The figure also shows that 2 of the current ASA  sites will not be equipped with viable aircraft and thus will be unable to  conduct ASA operations even after the Air Force fields all of its currently  planned F-22s and F-35s. This figure is based upon our analysis of  documentation on the expected service life of the F-15s and F-16s and the  Air Force’s fielding schedules for the F-22s and F-35s at the time of our  review, and certain assumptions we made in our analysis of these data.  Our intent was to determine whether the new aircraft would be available  before the F-15s and F-16s exceed their expected service life. See  appendix I for the full methodology of our analysis.
In addition, as aging aircraft are replaced, ASA units will have to suspend  their ASA operations to be trained and equipped to support the  replacement aircraft. In order to maintain ASA operations without  interruption, the Air Force will have to find another trained unit to  conduct ASA operations while the home unit is being trained and equipped  on the replacement aircraft. A NORAD official stated that the Air Force  will need to ensure that replacement units are trained in tactics,  techniques, and procedures that are unique to domestic air defense.
Air Combat Command officials responsible for providing fighter aircraft to  Air Force units acknowledged that there is a gap between the expected  end of the useful lives of aging aircraft and their replacement with next  generation fighter aircraft. Nonetheless, there are currently no plans to  address this gap in aircraft, at least as it relates to ASA operations.
section_title: Providing Personnel to Replace Deploying Personnel and Support Units Receiving Replacement Aircraft May Further Complicate Sustaining the ASA Mission
paragraphs: Providing personnel to replace deploying personnel is currently a  challenge and replacing those personnel as they transition to different  aircraft may further complicate sustaining the ASA mission. ASA units also  are called on to deploy overseas to conduct combat operations. In our  structured interviews, 17 of the 20 ASA unit commanders told us that their  units had deployed at least once since January 1, 2005. When an active  duty unit conducting ASA operations deploys, responsibility for ASA  operations is transferred to other personnel and aircraft on the same base.  For example, ASA commanders at Shaw AFB, South Carolina told us that  when their units are deployed overseas or are in training for their  expeditionary mission, they must leave some of their personnel and  equipment at home to conduct ASA operations. When an ANG unit  deploys, officials told us, its commander typically finds another ANG unit  to either cover its ASA responsibilities or provide substitute personnel and  equipment for its deployment. For example, the ASA unit at Andrews AFB,  Maryland which is responsible for protecting the National Capital Region,  deployed to Iraq in 2006. The unit’s commander asked commanders of  other ASA units to provide F-16s and personnel to help him meet his  deployment requirements, so that he could keep some of the unit’s aircraft  and personnel at Andrews AFB to conduct ASA operations in the National  Capital Region. After contacting multiple commanders, he was able to  both meet his deployment requirements and keep some of the unit’s F-16s  on alert for ASA operations. After considerable effort, substitutes were  ultimately found from 22 different units.
Although the number of units providing substitutes was not typical, other  ASA unit commanders told us that the process for finding replacements  can be inefficient and burdensome. While Air Force officials said that Air  Combat Command is responsible for finding replacements, there is no  consistent formal process for doing so. ASA units requiring replacements  to cover a deployment currently have two options available through Air  Combat Command—i.e., to either decline or accept the entire mission.  Unit commanders are reluctant to tell combatant commanders that their  units cannot fully deploy—or deploy at all—because they feel obligated to  fulfill their ASA responsibilities while also meeting their assigned  expeditionary responsibilities. Thus, ASA unit commanders have often  “volunteered” to find their own replacements, though they are not required  to do so. ASA unit commanders told us that it would be useful for the Air  Force to develop a process that allows unit commanders to turn over the  process of finding replacements to the appropriate Air Force organization  if it becomes too complicated for the unit to find a replacement using its  informal networks.
Although we did not identify any instances in which either deployment or  ASA requirements were not met, ASA unit commanders indicated that  finding replacements will continue to be a challenge as aircraft age—even  if overseas operations decrease. Fourteen of the 18 current ASA sites will  have to suspend ASA operations for a period of time between 2010 and  2020 as their aircraft reach the end of their useful service lives or they are  equipped with new fighter aircraft. For example, the ASA unit at Hickam  AFB, Hawaii, is scheduled to suspend ASA operations for 3 months in 2010  so that the unit can transition from F-15s to F-22s. During this 3-month  period, another unit will need to conduct ASA operations at the base. In  order to meet ASA requirements, the Air Force would have to provide a  trained ASA unit to remain on alert in Hawaii while also leaving aircraft  and personnel at its home station to both sit alert and train for its  expeditionary mission. For example, if the Duluth ASA unit sits alert at  Hickam AFB, Hawaii when the Hawaii ANG unit transitions to its new  fighter aircraft in fiscal year 2010, the Duluth ASA unit will still need to  maintain aircraft and personnel in Duluth, Minnesota, to conduct ASA  operations there while also training for its expeditionary mission. Officials  from another ASA site told us that the transition period for their unit could  be as long as 9 months to train on the replacement aircraft. The remaining  4 sites are currently equipped with F-15s and could have to suspend ASA  operations as F-15s reach the end of their expected viable service lives in  2025. If the Air Force does not adequately plan for this transition, most of  these units could have to suspend ASA operations at the same time during  this time frame. This situation could be similar and possibly worse than  late 2007 to early 2008, when 5 ASA units had to suspend ASA operations  when the Air Force grounded the entire F-15 fleet for 3 months. Air Force,  NORAD, and NGB/ANG officials told us that this situation created a  significant burden on ASA operations, including the need to have Canadian  fighter aircraft sit alert at a U.S. ASA site.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: Conducting routine risk assessments to determine ASA operational  requirements could help NORAD better determine the level and type of  capabilities and resources needed to support ASA operations. Also, if the  Air Force continues to treat ASA operations as a temporary mission and if  ASA mission, roles, and responsibilities are not clearly defined in the Air  Force’s homeland defense policy, doctrine, and guidance, ASA units may  continue to experience difficulties in conducting the ASA mission. Further,  if the Air Force, or other service if assigned, does not formally assign the  ASA mission to units performing ASA operations and ensure that the  readiness of units performing ASA operations is fully assessed—to include  training, personnel, equipment, and the ability to respond to an alert— opportunities may be lost to identify and resolve readiness issues. Unless  the Air Force addresses the two challenges we identified, the long-term  sustainability of ASA operations is questionable. For example, without  plans to address the issue of aging aircraft, by 2020, 11 of the 18 ASA units  may not have viable aircraft to perform ASA operations. Also, a method  that provides personnel to replace deploying personnel and to support  units receiving replacement aircraft—while allowing unit commanders the  flexibility to independently find such replacements—could provide ASA  units with a better tool to address this challenge.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of the  U.S. command element of NORAD to routinely conduct risk assessments  to determine ASA requirements, including the appropriate numbers of ASA  sites, personnel, and aircraft to support ASA operations.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the military services  with units that consistently conduct ASA operations to formally assign  ASA duties to these units and then ensure that the readiness of these units  is fully assessed, to include personnel, training, equipment, and ability to  respond to an alert.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Air Force to take the following five actions:    Establish a timetable to implement ASA as a steady-state mission.
Implement ASA as a steady-state mission according to NORAD, DOD, and  Air Force guidance by    updating and implementing the ASA program action directive;    updating the Air Force homeland defense policy, homeland operations  doctrine, and concept of operations to incorporate and define the roles  and responsibilities for ASA operations; and  incorporating the ASA mission within the Air Force submissions for  the 6-year Future Years Defense Program.
Develop and implement a plan to address any projected capability gaps in  ASA units due to the expected end of the useful service lives of their F-15s  and F-16s.
Develop and implement a formal method to replace deploying units that  still provides unit commanders flexibility to coordinate replacements.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report and these  comments are reprinted in appendix II.  DOD concurred with some of our  recommendations and partially concurred with others.
DOD stated that it partially concurred with our draft report  recommendation to employ a risk-based management approach. However,  DOD also stated that it believes that sufficient guidance and a long- standing risk-based process currently guide its decisions on ASA  operations and, therefore, it does not plan on taking any additional actions  until additional requirements are identified through its current process.  The process described in DOD’s response does not include a critical  component of a risk-based management approach—the use of routine risk  assessments that incorporate threat, vulnerability, and consequence, and  is used to develop scenarios and help inform actions that are best suited to  prevent an attack or mitigate vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack. As such,  we adjusted our recommendation to clarify the need to routinely conduct  a risk assessment specific to ASA operations. Specifically, we have revised  the recommendation to suggest that DOD routinely conduct risk  assessments to determine ASA requirements, including the appropriate  numbers of ASA sites, personnel, and aircraft to support ASA operations.  We believe that this clarification would be consistent with NORAD and Air  Force officials responsible for ASA operations, who told us that a routine  risk assessment that considers threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality  would be beneficial to enhance their ability to determine the appropriate  level and types of resources—including units, personnel, and aircraft—for  ASA operations. We also continue to believe our work shows that such  assessments would benefit DOD, Congress, and the National Guard  Bureau by clearly demonstrating the basis for future investments in ASA  operations.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to implement ASA as a steady- state mission, but its comments did not state whether the Air Force will  implement the ASA program action directive, nor did it address specific  actions to implement ASA as a steady-state mission—an important step in  helping to resolve ongoing difficulties that we identified in our report.  Rather, DOD’s response indicated that the Air Force would review and  update the ASA program action directive and other key policy documents  by the end of fiscal year 2009. DOD also commented that it plans to  identify, in the Future Years Defense Program, the impact of any changes  to future plans and resources. DOD also commented that it would include  a detailed budget display for the ASA mission to comply with §354 of the  Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.  However, since DOD did not include in its comments a time frame for  implementing ASA as a steady-state mission, including implementing the  ASA program action directive, we modified the recommendation to  suggest that the Secretary of Defense direct that the Secretary of the Air  Force establish a timetable for this purpose. DOD also commented that it  plans to review and update, as required, policy, operations, doctrine,  steady-state alert requirements, and concept of operations for the ASA  mission, pending a review of the Operation NOBLE EAGLE Execution  Order (EXORD). We acknowledge that the EXORD would impact ASA  operations. However, since (1) DOD did not provide a timeframe for these  different reviews and ASA units are currently experiencing difficulties  conducting ASA operations as discussed in this report and (2) the Air  Force could implement ASA operations as a steady-state mission without  changing the EXORD, we continue to believe the Air Force needs to  implement ASA as a steady-state mission.
DOD stated that it partially concurred with our recommendation that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to formally  assign ASA duties to units that consistently conduct ASA operations and  ensure their readiness is fully assessed. DOD commented that the  Secretary of Defense is furnishing clear direction through the EXORD,  which it says formally assigns supported and supporting roles to multiple  agencies. Further, DOD commented that the exclusive assignment of any  specific Air Force units and sites would appear to be inconsistent with the  flexibility and capabilities under the EXORD. Our original  recommendation did not suggest that DOD modify the EXORD to assign  the ASA mission exclusively to the Air Force; the EXORD does not replace  the mission document statements issued by services to their operational  units. Moreover, without a mission document statement and formal  assignment of the mission to units, ASA readiness will not be assessed.  DOD also commented that it wants to retain the flexibility to use military  services other than the Air Force to conduct ASA operations. We had  initially focused this recommendation on the Secretary of the Air Force  because, at the time of our review, the units conducting ASA operations  had historically been Air Force units. The intent of this recommendation is  to ensure that such missions are clearly assigned to performing units and  that readiness for these operations be fully assessed, regardless of which  service performs them. Therefore, we have modified our recommendation  to make it clearer that the Secretary of Defense should direct any of the  military services that have units consistently conducting ASA operations  to formally assign ASA duties to these units and ensure their readiness to  conduct ASA operations is fully assessed.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Air Force  develop and implement a plan to address fighter capability gaps in ASA  operational units that we identified based on our analysis of Air Force data  and plans. In its comments, DOD discussed the capabilities needed for the  broader, multiservice air defense mission, but did not clearly agree to  ensure the fighter gaps we identified would be addressed in Air Force  plans. Our recommendation is directed specifically at the issue of future  fighter aircraft capabilities for ASA operations, which are currently  conducted by the Air Force and the ANG. We continue to believe that our  evidence supports the need to address these capability gaps in Air Force  planning.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop a formal method to  include ASA unit commanders’ flexibility to replace deploying units. If the  ASA mission is formally assigned to the performing units, DOD’s plan  should be responsive to our recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and other  interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which North American Aerospace Defense  Command (NORAD) has adopted a risk-based management approach to  determine air sovereignty alert (ASA) operational requirements, we  reviewed prior GAO reports that recommended organizations use risk  assessments to manage risk and determine operational requirements. We  then interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force, and NORAD to  determine the extent to which NORAD was required to routinely conduct  such an assessment to determine ASA operational requirements. During  our discussions, we asked these officials if they routinely used risk  assessments to determine ASA requirements and how ASA requirements  were assessed. We obtained and reviewed their ASA assessments and  compared them to the elements used to conduct risk assessments.
In determining whether the Air Force had established ASA as a steady- state mission according to the Department of Defense (DOD), NORAD,  and Air Force guidance, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials  from a range of DOD organizations involved in conducting, managing, or  overseeing ASA activities and funding. (See tables 2 and 3 for a list of  organizations and units that we interviewed during this review.)  Specifically, we reviewed NORAD, DOD, and Air Force policy documents  and statements, and interviewed officials to determine guidance and  directives related to ASA operations, and whether the guidance and  directives had been fulfilled; reviewed documents and interviewed  officials to determine the steps taken to fulfill guidance and directives and  the causes for not fulfilling any specific actions listed in DOD guidance or  directives; conducted site visits to designated ASA sites; and interviewed  officials from every unit conducting ASA operations to determine what  impacts, if any, may have resulted from efforts to fulfill DOD guidance and  directives related to ASA operations.
To determine the extent to which the Air Force assesses the readiness of  units performing ASA operations, we analyzed Air Combat Command’s  Operational Readiness Inspections, the Continental NORAD Region  Command Alert Force Operational Assessments, Pacific Air Force’s Alert  Force Operational Assessments, and NORAD’s Fighter Alert Force  Evaluations and compared them to readiness requirements in DOD  guidance. From this comparison we determined the extent to which each  report reflected the units’ readiness to conduct ASA operations. We  formed conclusions as to the completeness of the readiness assessments  based on this comparison, and visited four ASA sites, interviewed 20 ASA  units, and met with the relevant Air National Guard (ANG) officials. We  also interviewed commanders from two sites that were scheduled to  conduct ASA operations after fiscal year 2008 due to DOD’s 2005 Base  Closure and Realignment process; however, since the two units were not  conducting ASA operations at the time of our discussion we did not  include their responses with those from the 20 units that were conducting  ASA operations at the time of our discussion. In general, we compared the  readiness requirements contained in DOD’s guidance with current  readiness assessments—graded and ungraded—used to evaluate the units  conducting ASA operations, and the overall effect, if any, these  assessments have had on the units’ ability to meet ASA operations  readiness requirements. We analyzed DOD guidance, interviews, and  readiness reports to determine if ASA operations readiness requirements  were being fully captured in one or more currently used readiness  assessments.
In identifying the challenges to the long-term sustainability of the Air  Force’s ASA operations and the extent to which the service had plans to  address these challenges, we reviewed documents and interviewed  officials from a range of DOD organizations involved in conducting,  managing, or overseeing ASA activities and funding. (See tables 2 and 3 for  a list of organizations and units that we interviewed during this review.)  Specifically, officials with whom we met and conducted structured  interviews identified a number of challenges that they believed could  affect the long-term sustainability of ASA operations. Based on these  discussions, we were able to identify those issues that were frequently  identified. We then reviewed NORAD, DOD, and Air Force documents  pertaining to these challenges. For example, in addition to discussions we  had with officials knowledgeable about the lifespan of the F-15s and F-16s,  we reviewed and analyzed documents that reflected the expected lifespan  of these aircraft. We assumed that units will cease to be viable in terms of  conducting the ASA mission half-way through the 3-year drawdown  period, at which time the ASA units will not have enough aircraft to fulfill  both their ASA and expeditionary missions. We then reviewed and  analyzed the Air Force’s F-22 and F-35 fielding schedules to determine  whether those aircraft would be available before the F-15s and F-16s  exceed their expected lifespan. The F-35 fielding schedule did not identify  the specific ANG bases that are expected to receive the F-35s, so for the  purposes of our analysis we assumed that the Air Force would provide the  F-35s to those sites conducting ASA operations before equipping ANG  units not conducting ASA operations. Air Force officials told us that a  fielding schedule reflects the projected fielding of equipment and that the  fielding dates could be postponed if the equipment is not developed  according to schedule. We also reviewed NORAD, DOD, and Air Force  documents and statements to determine which organizations or offices  were responsible for addressing these challenges and subsequently asked  each of these organizations or offices to provide us with plans that they  had developed to address these or any other challenges that could affect  the long-term sustainability of ASA operations.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
subsections: section_title: GAO’s Comment
paragraphs: 1.
The Department of Defense’s response further demonstrates the  lack of consistency and clarity of concepts, definitions, and terms  surrounding air sovereignty alert (ASA) we identified in our review  and highlights the need for a commonly understood definition of  ASA. As we discussed in our report and illustrated in Figure 4, and  as defined by the North American Aerospace Defense Command  and First Air Force, ASA operations are part of the broader air  defense mission; that is, they are the ground operations that take  place prior to a fighter aircraft lifting off in response to an alert, at  which point the operation becomes a homeland air defense  mission. However, the scope of our study was ASA operations, and  we did not address the broader air defense mission.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgements
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made  significant contributions to this report: Lorelei St. James (Assistant  Director), Tommy Baril, Cathleen Berrick, Victoria De Leon, Jane Ervin,  Carol Henn, Jennifer Huber, Susan Irving, Joanne Landesman, Gregory  Marchand, Terry Richardson, Bethann E. Ritter, and John E. Trubey.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but  Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other  Issues. GAO-08-251. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic  Equipment Requirements and Readiness. GAO-07-60. Washington, D.C.:  January 26, 2007.
Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted  Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed. GAO-05-928T.  Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2005.
Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas  and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T.  Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2004.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for  Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003.
subsections: section_title: Risk Management
paragraphs: Risk Management: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management  Principles in Homeland Security. GAO-08-904T. Washington, D.C.: June  25, 2008.
Highlights of a Forum Convened by the Comptroller General of the  United States: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principles in  Homeland Security. GAO-08-627SP. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2008.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide  Federal Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and  Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical  Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
section_title: Aviation Security and Transportation Security
paragraphs: Transportation Security: TSA Has Developed a Risk-Based Covert  Testing Program, but Could Better Mitigate Aviation Security  Vulnerabilities Identified Through Covert Tests. GAO-08-958.  Washington, D.C.: August 8, 2008.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has  Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security  Programs, but More Work Remains. GAO-08-1024T. Washington, D.C.:  July 24, 2008.
Transportation Security: Efforts to Strengthen Aviation and Surface  Transportation Security are Under Way, but Challenges Remain.  GAO-08-140T. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2007.
Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight  Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened.  GAO-07-891R. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007.
Critical Infrastructure: Challenges Remain in Protecting Key Sectors.  GAO-07-626T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2007.