Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations
Published: 2005-11-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: One of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy's priorities is to disrupt the illicit drug market. To this end, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security provide ships and aircraft to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs, primarily cocaine, shipped from South America through the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean--an area known as the transit zone. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) oversees the U.S. anti-drug strategy. The Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) directs most transit zone operations. We examined U.S. efforts to interdict maritime movements of cocaine. We analyzed the (1) changes in cocaine seizures and disruptions since calendar year 2000, (2) trends in interdiction assets provided since fiscal year 2000, (3) challenges to maintaining transit zone interdiction operations, and (4) performance measures the agencies use to assess their progress.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Cocaine seizures and disruptions in the transit zone have increased about 68 percent since calendar year 2000--from 117 metric tons in 2000 to 196 metric tons in 2004. About two-thirds of the disruptions were in the western Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean where the United States has most of its interdiction assets. JIATF-South and other cognizant officials attribute the increase to improved interagency cooperation and intelligence, the introduction of armed helicopters to stop go-fast boats, and increased cooperation from nations in the region. Since fiscal year 2000, the availability of assets--ships and aircraft--to disrupt drug trafficking in the transit zone have varied. On-station ship days peaked in fiscal year 2001 and flight hours peaked in 2002, but both have generally declined since then, primarily because the Department of Defense has provided fewer assets. Declines in Defense assets have been largely offset by the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and certain allied nations. Nevertheless, in recent years, JIATF-South has detected less than one-third of the "known and actionable" maritime illicit drug movements in the western Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean. Yet, once detected, over 80 percent of the drug movements were disrupted. Various factors pose challenges to maintaining the current level of transit zone interdiction operations. The reduced availability of the U.S. Navy's P-3 maritime patrol aircraft due to structural problems will degrade the U.S. capability to detect suspect maritime movements, readiness rates of older Coast Guard ships have declined since fiscal year 2000, and the surface radar system on the Coast Guard's long-range surveillance aircraft is often inoperable. Coast Guard and CBP officials also noted that they may not be able to sustain their level of assets in light of budget constraints and other homeland security priorities that may arise. These officials expressed concern that the long-term implications of likely declines in transit zone assets have not been addressed. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in achieving their goals. The Coast Guard's measures relate to reducing cocaine flow through the transit zone, CBP's planned measures are not specific to the transit zone, and Defense's planned measures focus on the number of disruptions of cocaine movements. But data that would help in assessing transit zone interdiction operations are problematic. For instance, in its assessment for 2004, ONDCP reported that between 325 metric tons and 675 metric tons of cocaine may be moving towards the United States. Such a wide range is not useful for assessing transit zone interdiction operations. In addition, data on U.S. drug usage are difficult to obtain and often cannot be generalized to the United States. In a 2001 report for ONDCP, the National Research Council made similar observations and recommended ways to improve the collection and analysis of illicit drug data, but ONDCP has not fully addressed them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The 2002 U.S. National Drug Control Strategy set two goals: (1) to lower the  rate of illicit drug use by 10 percent over 2 years among both youth and  adults and (2) to lower the rate by 25 percent over 5 years in the United  States. One of the strategy’s three priorities for achieving these goals is to  disrupt the illicit drug market in order to reduce the profitability of the drug  trade. To this end, during fiscal years 2000-2005, the United States has  provided more than $6 billion to Colombia and other countries in the  region for counternarcotics, alternative development, and judicial reform  efforts. In addition, the United States and certain allies have devoted  assets—ships and aircraft—to disrupt the flow of illicit narcotics, primarily  cocaine, shipped to the United States through a 6 million square mile area  known as the transit zone.
Between calendar years 2001 and 2004, the Office of National Drug Control  Policy (ONDCP) reported that cocaine production was reduced by almost one-third and seizures and disruptions of cocaine in the transit zone  increased by over 40 percent to almost 200 metric tons. Despite these  reported successes in disrupting cocaine trafficking, a study commissioned  by ONDCP indicates that the retail price of cocaine in the United States  continued to decline through the second quarter of 2003—the latest  available data—while retail purity remained relatively high, indicating that  the supply of cocaine had not been reduced. Further, a 2004 survey on  drug use estimated that the number of cocaine users in the United States  had remained roughly constant at about 2 million users from 2002 to 2004.  Other sources estimate the number of chronic and occasional cocaine  users may be as high as 6 million.
The Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) in Key West,  Florida, under the U.S. Southern Command, has primary responsibility for  U.S. detection and monitoring of drug trafficking activities in the transit  zone. The Coast Guard has primary operational control for most  interdiction operations. The Department of Defense (Defense) provides  maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, and ships; the Department of  Homeland Security (Homeland Security)—primarily, the Coast Guard and  the Bureau for Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—provides maritime  patrol aircraft, ships, and law enforcement assistance; and the Department  of Justice (Justice) provides prosecutorial and law enforcement assistance.  JIATF-South also receives some operational support from various  countries within the transit zone, and France, the Netherlands, and the  United Kingdom also provide air and maritime assistance in the eastern  Caribbean Sea.
To address your interest in U.S. drug interdiction operations in the transit  zone, we examined (1) the changes in the amounts of cocaine seized and  disrupted since calendar year 2000 and the factors that have contributed to  these changes, (2) trends in the assets provided by the United States and  other nations since fiscal year 2000 to support cocaine interdiction in the  transit zone, (3) the challenges facing these agencies in maintaining current  levels of transit zone interdiction operations, and (4) how the principal  agencies involved in interdiction operations assess their performance.
To address these objectives, we focused on cocaine because nearly all the  cocaine entering the United States comes from South America through the  transit zone. Furthermore, we focused on maritime movements of cocaine  through the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean because  the United States has positioned most of its interdiction assets in these  areas. We reviewed relevant planning and resource documents and related  reports. We also met with cognizant officials at Defense, Homeland  Security, and Justice in Washington, D.C.; law enforcement officers  involved in interdiction efforts based in Jacksonville, Miami, Tampa, and  Sarasota, Florida, and Nassau, Bahamas; and cognizant officials at JIATF- South in Key West, Florida. We obtained and analyzed data on (1) cocaine  seizures and disruptions for calendar years 2000 through 2004 provided by  the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, and (2) ship days and flight hours spent  on interdiction missions during fiscal years 2000-2005, provided by JIATF- South and JIATF-West. Through comparisons with similar data compiled by  the Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense, and discussions with JIATF-South and  JIATF-West officials primarily responsible for compiling the data, we  determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  this report. We performed our work from August 2004 through October  2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. (See appendix I for a more complete discussion of our scope  and methodology.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: ONDCP expects that disrupting the illicit drug market will reduce the  availability of illicit drugs, increase their cost, and, eventually, reduce the  rate of drug usage. To disrupt the cocaine market, the U.S. National Drug  Control Strategy calls for, among other things, seizing “enormous and  unsustainable” amounts of cocaine from traffickers. One part of the  strategy to disrupt the market focuses U.S. interdiction efforts on seizing  cocaine and other illicit drugs bound for the United States from South  America in the transit zone. The transit zone is a six million square mile  area that encompasses Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, the  Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean (see fig. 1). Typically, drug  traffickers use go-fast boats and fishing vessels to smuggle cocaine from  Colombia to Central America and Mexico en route to the United States. Go- fast boats are capable of traveling over 40 knots and are difficult to detect  in open water. Moreover, the go-fast boats often travel at night. When they  travel in daylight, the boats are often painted blue, or the crew can cover  the boat with a blue tarpaulin, thereby becoming virtually impossible to  see. Even when detected, go-fast boats can often outrun conventional ships  deployed in the transit zone.
The primary departments supporting interdiction operations in the transit  zone are Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security. Defense provides  surveillance aircraft, helicopters, and maritime vessels; Justice provides  prosecutorial and law enforcement assistance; and Homeland Security— primarily, the Coast Guard and CBP—provides surveillance aircraft,  maritime vessels, and law enforcement assistance. JIATF-South also  receives some operational support from various countries in the transit  zone; and France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom provide air and  maritime detection and monitoring assistance in the eastern Caribbean  Sea. Justice’s Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of  Investigation, and U.S. Attorney’s Office provide intelligence for operations  and investigate and prosecute drug traffickers. Other organizations help  guide and support interdiction efforts in the transit zone:   ONDCP oversees and coordinates implementation of the U.S. National  Drug Control Strategy and reviews department and agency budget  proposals for anti-drug programs, including interdiction efforts in the  transit zone.
The U.S. Interdiction Coordinator reports to the Director, ONDCP, and  provides strategic advice and oversight of U.S. agencies’ interdiction  efforts in the transit zone. It also manages the Consolidated  Counterdrug Database that records drug trafficking events, including  detections, seizures, and disruptions. The database is vetted quarterly by  members of the interagency counterdrug community to minimize  duplicate or questionable reported drug movements.
JIATF-South, under the U.S. Southern Command, is the primary  operations center and coordinator for detecting and monitoring suspect  air and maritime drug trafficking events in the transit zone. JIATF-South  includes representatives from Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, and  others; nations such as France, the Netherlands, and the United  Kingdom; and several nations in the transit and source zones.
The Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense do not routinely track funds obligated  and expended, ship days, or flight hours provided for drug interdiction in  the transit zone. However, during fiscal years 2000-2005, the United States  provided about $6.2 billion to support counternarcotics and related  programs in the source and transit zones (see table 1). In the source zone,  U.S. assistance supports eradication and interdiction efforts and related  programs for alternative development and judicial reform, primarily in  Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. In the transit zone, the United States provided  about $365 million in assistance—primarily to El Salvador, Guatemala,  Haiti, and Mexico —to support interdiction and other law enforcement  programs.
section_title: Several Factors Have Contributed to the Increase in Cocaine Seizures and Disruptions
paragraphs: Cocaine seizures and disruptions in the transit zone have increased over  two-thirds from calendar year 2000 to calendar year 2004. JIATF-South and  other cognizant agency officials pointed to a number of factors that  contributed to the increases, such as better intelligence on cocaine  movements that allow JIATF-South to target specific cocaine shipments;  the introduction of armed helicopters increasing the capability to interdict  cocaine shipments on go-fast boats; and increased cooperation from  nations in the region, which has led to more efficient use of resources.
subsections: section_title: Cocaine Seizures and Disruptions Have Increased
paragraphs: Cocaine seizures and disruptions have increased about 68 percent since  calendar year 2000. As shown in table 2, the United States and its allies  seized or disrupted 157 metric tons of cocaine in calendar year 2003 and  196 metric tons in 2004, a record amount. During this period, about two- thirds of all the cocaine seized or disrupted was in the eastern Pacific  Ocean and western Caribbean Sea, where according to JIATF-South  officials, the United States has positioned most of its ships and aircraft for  interdiction and other purposes.
section_title: Factors Contributing to Increases
paragraphs: Improved intelligence on cocaine shipments gained from law enforcement  operations has allowed JIATF-South to more often target suspected drug  shipments rather than searching wide expanses of the transit zone for  suspicious movements of boats and small aircraft. In addition, in calendar  year 2000, the Coast Guard began deploying armed helicopters, which has  greatly increased the U.S. capability to stop go-fast boats. Further, several  nations in the region have increased their cooperation with U.S. efforts  through bilateral maritime agreements, as well as agreements to allow the  United States to deploy and re-supply U.S. aircraft and ships on their  territory.
subsections: section_title: Better Intelligence
paragraphs: An interagency law enforcement investigation operation known as  “Panama Express” has increased the amount of intelligence on drug  trafficking activities. Panama Express is a multi-agency investigation that  was initiated in 1995 and is jointly managed by the Federal Bureau of  Investigation, DEA, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement but also  includes officials from several federal, state, and local law enforcement  agencies. The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Tampa, Florida, provides  prosecution support for all Panama Express investigations. According to  the U.S. Attorney’s office, Panama Express investigations have contributed  to the successful prosecution of around 700 individuals, and the seizure  and disruption of about 380 metric tons of cocaine since 2000 (or about 51  percent of all the cocaine seized and disrupted).
In addition, a JIATF-South official told us that, as of September 2005, 16  embassies and consulates throughout the region had tactical analysis  teams. These teams analyze information on drug trafficking activities and  provide the information to JIATF-South, DEA, and other operational  organizations for use in interdiction missions.
section_title: Armed Helicopters Have Been Added
paragraphs: Interdiction efforts have been strengthened by the addition of armed  helicopters. Beginning in calendar year 2000, the Coast Guard began  deploying MH-68A helicopters equipped with 7.62 millimeter machine guns  and 50 caliber sniper rifles from its base in Jacksonville, Florida. The  helicopters’ main value is their capability to pursue and stop go-fast boats,  which can travel over 40 knots—often outrunning U.S. and allied surface  ships. According to Coast Guard officials, since November 2002 the armed  helicopters have successfully stopped every go-fast boat that they have  engaged and contributed to 77 maritime drug interdictions and the seizure  of approximately 94 metric tons of cocaine.
In addition, the U.S. Navy plans to deploy armed helicopters to pursue and  stop go-fast boats in fiscal year 2006. According to Defense officials, these  helicopters will have specialized equipment similar to the Coast Guard  helicopters. According to the Coast Guard, it will have personnel on board  for law enforcement purposes.
section_title: Increased Cooperation from Nations in the Transit Zone
paragraphs: Since 2000, the number of countries in the transit zone that have signed all  or parts of bilateral maritime agreements increased from 21 to 25. These  agreements permit, among other things, ship boarding rights for U.S. law  enforcement officials and pursuit and entry into these countries’ territorial  waters to interdict drug traffickers. In addition, several countries have  agreed to additional provisions in the maritime agreements, in particular,  the International Maritime Interdiction Support Clause, which allows the  United States to fly suspected drug traffickers detained on U.S. ships  directly to the United States for prosecution. As a result, these surface  ships can resume patrols in the transit zone rather than transporting the  suspects directly to the United States, or waiting in a foreign port for the  suspects to be extradited. Coast Guard officials told us that, in many cases,  this saves up to a week of ship time. (See app. II for a list of countries that  have signed all or parts of the bilateral maritime agreements and the  interdiction support clause.)
Moreover, to offset the closing of Howard Air Force Base in Panama in  1999, the United States has reached agreements with other nations in the  region to station U.S. military and civilian aircraft. In return, the United  States has upgraded the facilities at these airbases. The facilities at Manta,  Ecuador; Comalapa, El Salvador; and Curacao are used by U.S. civilian and  military aircraft, while the facilities in Aruba; Liberia; Costa Rica; and  Panama are used by the Coast Guard and CBP. Access to these facilities  allows aircraft to spend more time monitoring and interdicting drug  trafficking activities and also allows them to range further west into the  Pacific Ocean.
section_title: Availability of Assets Provided for Interdiction Operations Have Varied Since Fiscal Year 2000
paragraphs: Overall, since fiscal year 2000, the availability of U.S. and allied assets  provided for detecting and disrupting drug trafficking activities in the  transit zone has varied. On-station ship days peaked in fiscal year 2001 and  flight hours peaked in fiscal year 2002, but both have declined since then,  primarily because Defense has provided fewer assets. Declines in Defense  assets in recent years were mostly offset by additional ship days and  aircraft hours provided by the Coast Guard, CBP, and allied nations.  However, the ship days and flight hours provided by the allied nations are  primarily in the eastern Caribbean Sea where the United States does not  usually conduct monitoring and detection activities. Nevertheless,  according to JIATF-South, it cannot detect many of the known maritime  cocaine movements reported in the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern  Pacific Ocean because it cannot get ships or aircraft to the suspected  movement in time.
subsections: section_title: On-Station Ship Days Generally Declined
paragraphs: Despite a rise in fiscal year 2001, the total number of ship days spent on  interdiction missions in the transit zone has generally decreased since  fiscal year 2000 from about 3,600 ship days to about 3,300 ship days (or  about 8 percent) in fiscal year 2005. U.S. Navy ship days declined from  about 1,980 in fiscal year 2000 to about 890 in fiscal year 2005. Defense  officials said that the Navy reduced its ship days because of other national  security concerns; in particular, the need to provide support for the armed  conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The reduction in U.S. Navy ship days was partly offset by increases in ship  days by the Coast Guard. After a decline to about 1,160 ship days in fiscal  year 2003 (compared to 1,330 days in 2002), the Coast Guard increased its  ship days to about 1,660 in 2004 and almost 1,700 in 2005—becoming the  primary provider of maritime surface vessels in the transit zone. Figure 2  illustrates the total on-station ship days in the transit zone by provider for  fiscal years 2000-2005.
section_title: On-Station Flight Hours Generally Declined in Recent Years
paragraphs: On-station flight hours for counternarcotics activities in the transit zone  increased about 35 percent between fiscal years 2000-2002—from about  10,500 hours to about 14,200—but have generally declined since then to  about 12,870 hours in 2005. Declines in the availability of Defense maritime  patrol aircraft over the period were offset by increased support from the  Coast Guard, CBP, and several allied nations—France, the Netherlands,  and the United Kingdom.
The Coast Guard’s on-station flight hours in the transit zone decreased  from about 2,440 in fiscal year 2000 to less than 1,300 hours in fiscal year  2002. According to Coast Guard officials, the decline was due, in part, to  resources being diverted to other Coast Guard missions. But the Coast  Guard has since increased its flight hours to over 2,780 hours in fiscal  year 2005.
CBP has increased its on-station flight hours for interdiction operations  in the transit zone since fiscal year 2000—from about 180 hours in fiscal  year 2000 to nearly 4,385 hours in fiscal year 2005. However, in fiscal  year 2003, its flight hours declined to about 2,040 due to the diversion of  resources for other homeland security missions.
Defense on-station flight hours for interdiction in the transit zone  gradually declined from about 6,860 in fiscal year 2000 to 6,500 in fiscal  year 2002, but declined more rapidly since then to about 2,940 flight  hours in fiscal year 2005. JIATF-South officials attribute the recent  declines primarily to the reduced availability of U.S. Navy P-3 maritime  patrol aircraft because of structural problems. In addition, U.S. Air  Force Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft were  diverted to support homeland security missions and the armed conflicts  in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Allied nations steadily increased their flight hours in support of  interdiction operations from about 1,000 hours in fiscal year 2000 to  4,070 hours in fiscal year 2004. However, in fiscal year 2005, the allies’  total hours declined to about 2,760. According to JIATF-South and U.S.  Interdiction Coordinator officials, most of the allies’ surveillance  operations are in the eastern Caribbean Sea where the United States  does not usually conduct interdiction operations.
Figure 3 illustrates the total on-station flight hours by provider for fiscal  years 2000-2005.
section_title: Increasing Number of Known Actionable Maritime Events Challenges JIATF- South’s Detection Capability
paragraphs: Since calendar year 2000, JIATF-South officials report that they had  information about more maritime drug movements than they could detect (make visual contact with). The number of “known actionable” maritime  events in the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean more  than doubled from 154 in 2000 to 330 in 2004. According to JIATF-South  officials, in many cases, the maritime event is too far away for available  ships and aircraft to go to the area and visually locate the suspected drug  movement. However, once JIATF-South locates a suspect movement, the  disruption rate has significantly increased since 2000—from less than 60  percent in 2000 and 2001 to over 80 percent in 2003 to 2005 (see table 3).
section_title: Challenges in Maintaining Interdiction Operations
paragraphs: While the United States has increased the number of seizures and  disruptions in the transit zone since 2000, the Coast Guard, CBP, and  Defense face several challenges in maintaining the current level of assets  provided for transit zone interdiction operations. JIATF-South officials  expressed concern that continued declines in U.S. on-station ship days and  on-station flight hours will limit their ability to monitor the transit zone and  detect illicit drug trafficking. Specifically, according to JIATF-South and  other Defense officials, the reduced availability of the U.S. Navy P-3  maritime patrol aircraft will degrade JIATF-South’s ability to detect  maritime movements. In addition, the readiness rates of older Coast Guard  ships, which support interdiction operations in the transit zone, have  declined since fiscal year 2000, and the surface radar system on its long- range surveillance aircraft is often inoperable. JIATF-South, Coast Guard,  CBP, and U.S. Interdiction Coordinator officials stated that, while some  short-term fixes have been made, the longer-term implications of the likely  continued declines in monitoring and interdiction assets for the transit  zone have not been addressed.
Moreover, in response to increases in cocaine seizures and disruptions,  drug traffickers have adjusted their tactics for transporting cocaine  through the transit zone. Finally, nations in the region lack the resources to  offset any decline in assets.
subsections: section_title: Declining Availability of P-3 Aircraft Will Degrade JIATF- South’s Maritime Detection Capability
paragraphs: According to cognizant officials with JIATF-South and U.S. Interdiction  Coordinator officials, compensating for the reduced availability of P-3  maritime patrol aircraft is the most critical challenge to the future success  of interdiction operations. According to these officials, because of its  longer range, the P-3 aircraft can monitor a much larger surface area than  other maritime patrol aircraft and can provide covert surveillance until  other assets arrive.
The availability of the P-3 aircraft has declined for several reasons. In fiscal  years 2000-2003, the U.S. Navy provided the majority of P-3 maritime patrol  flying hours in support of interdiction efforts—about 60 percent of the on- station flight hours (or over 3,900 hours per year). However, in fiscal year  2004, the Navy began limiting the use of its P-3 maritime patrol aircraft for  transit zone interdiction missions because of structural problems in its  wings and other worldwide commitments. Since fiscal year 2000, the  number of hours flown by U.S. Navy P-3s has decreased nearly 60 percent  to about 1,500 hours in fiscal year 2005. In addition, in December 2004, the  Netherlands removed the P-3 aircraft it used to fly interdiction missions in  the transit zone. According to the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, the P-3s  flown by the Netherlands were vital to interdiction efforts in the Caribbean  Sea, averaging over 1,300 flight hours per year—or about 20 percent of all  P-3 flight hours—during fiscal years 2000-2004. In April 2005, the  Netherlands began using the Fokker F-60, a shorter-range twin engine  aircraft, to fly interdiction missions; but, according to Defense officials,  these aircraft are less capable than the P-3.
To help compensate for the reduction in the P-3 availability, CBP has  increased its P-3 maritime patrol on-station flight hours in the transit  zone—from about 180 flight hours in fiscal year 2000 to over 4,300 hours in  2005. However, CBP officials told us that their aircraft cannot totally  compensate for the loss of the Navy’s and Netherlands’ P-3 flying hours.  Further, these officials are unsure how long CBP will be able to continue to  provide the additional flying hours, which has been more than its allotted  budget, because of other homeland security priorities.
Figure 4 illustrates the recent decline in P-3 flight hours.
In August 2004, the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator established a working  group to evaluate the problem of the reduction in maritime patrol aircraft  flying hours and identify possible solutions. The group identified several  possible alternatives, including:   redeploying AWACS to support an aerial interdiction program in   substituting other Defense aircraft for the Navy P-3s,   extending the amount of time aircraft are deployed to forward operating  locations throughout the region,   increasing the number of hours flown by the Coast Guard HC-130  surveillance aircraft in support of interdiction,   upgrading the sensors on existing aircraft to improve their capabilities,   deploying aircraft to locations closer to the suspected trafficking routes,   requesting additional funding to support the deployment of United  Kingdom maritime patrol aircraft in the transit zone.
According to JIATF-South officials, several of these proposals have been  implemented. AWACS have begun flying missions in support of the aerial  interdiction program in Colombia (also known as the “Air Bridge Denial”  program)—relieving CBP of much of this burden. The Coast Guard and  CBP have deployed aircraft to locations in Costa Rica and Ecuador, and the  Coast Guard has received funding to upgrade some of its detection and  monitoring equipment with improved sensors. Finally, Defense is providing  housing for United Kingdom aircrews (relieving them of the financial  burden) that provide surveillance in the Caribbean Sea while flying training  missions. But, JIATF-South, the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, and other  cognizant officials noted that the longer term prospect of further declines  in U.S. P-3 or other maritime patrol assets for interdiction operations has  not been addressed.
section_title: Readiness Rates for Aging Coast Guard Ships and Aircraft Have Declined
paragraphs: During fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the readiness rates of the Coast  Guard’s older ships and aircraft showed a general decline, although the  rates fluctuated from year to year. For example, ships used to monitor  drug trafficking activities and carry the helicopters that disable and stop  go-fast boats were below their target levels for time free of major  deficiencies or loss of at least one primary mission. Further, the percentage  of time that HC-130 surveillance aircraft were available to perform  missions was below the target level in fiscal year 2004, and the surface  radar system on the aircraft is subject to frequent failures. In some  instances, mission flight crews had to look out the windows of the aircraft  for targets because the radar systems were inoperable.
The Coast Guard has taken several actions to keep its assets operational.  These include establishing a compendium of information for making  decisions regarding maintenance and upgrades; performing more extensive  maintenance between deployments; and exploring strategies for  prioritizing the maintenance and capability enhancement projects needed  to provide more objective data on where to spend budget dollars and  enhance mission capabilities. However, these additional efforts, while  helpful in preventing a more rapid decline in the condition of existing  assets, are unlikely to solve the problem. For fiscal year 2004, the Coast  Guard’s estimated cost of deferred maintenance for these assets totaled  approximately $28 million.
section_title: Drug Traffickers Have Changed Tactics
paragraphs: Interdiction operations are further challenged by the changing tactics of  the drug traffickers. In the eastern Pacific Ocean, JIATF-South in recent  years has detected suspect fishing vessels and go-fast boats traveling  further south and about 300 miles southwest of the Galapagos Islands  before turning towards Central America and Mexico. This change in tactics  has greatly increased the ocean surface area that must be monitored and,  because of the distances to travel, has made it more difficult for U.S.  surface ships and aircraft to respond to suspected cocaine movements. In  addition:  Drug traffickers have begun using larger go-fast boats. In the past, go- fast boats typically transported 2 to 4 metric tons of cocaine, but some  are now capable of carrying up to 8 metric tons.
Drug traffickers in the eastern Pacific Ocean have increasingly used  vessels registered to countries, such as Ecuador and Mexico, with which  the United States has no maritime boarding agreements. The use of  these vessels complicates the process of boarding and searching for  illicit drugs.
Moreover, Ecuador has declared that its territorial waters extend 200 miles  from its coastline and around the Galapagos Islands (most nations,  including the United States set a 12-mile territorial limit). Although the  United States does not recognize Ecuador’s claim, U.S. ships and aircraft  generally do not enter this area for interdiction missions to avoid the  potentially politically sensitive issue of having to deal with the Government  of Ecuador.
section_title: Capability of Nations in the Transit Zone to Assist with Interdiction Is Limited
paragraphs: Although most nations in the transit zone—especially countries in Central  America and the eastern Caribbean Sea—cooperate with U.S. interdiction  efforts, JIATF-South and other officials told us that these countries lack the  capability and resources to compensate for any decline in U.S. and allies’  assets. Most countries in the transit zone are able to provide only a few  vessels or aircraft to intercept drug traffickers or lack secure  communications equipment needed to coordinate with U.S. law  enforcement counterparts during interdiction missions. Also, many of  these countries do not have a civilian law enforcement or military presence  in the coastal areas where drug traffickers work with local criminal  organizations to offload cocaine shipments and deliver them to the United  States. In addition, U.S. agencies are reluctant to work with law  enforcement officials in some countries because of widespread corruption.
From fiscal year 2000 through 2005, the United States provided about  $365 million in assistance to countries in the transit zone. Of this, Mexico  received approximately $115 million to support its efforts to eradicate  opium poppy and marijuana, and improve surveillance and intelligence  capabilities. The transit zone countries in Central America and the  Caribbean received the remainder, with most of this assistance for  programs to assist civilian law enforcement and military agencies in El  Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Panama.
Assistance provided to transit zone countries in Central America and the  Caribbean from State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law  Enforcement Affairs increased from approximately $18 million in fiscal  year 2000 to about $25 million in fiscal year 2002 but has since declined to  about $7 million in fiscal year 2005. A State official attributed the decline in  assistance to commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. State assistance has  been used for helicopter airlift support to Guatemala’s police  counternarcotics units and interceptor boats for the Bahamas, among other  things.
Assistance for transit zone countries in Central America and the Caribbean  provided through the Foreign Military Finance and International Military  Education and Training programs has increased from about $19 million in  fiscal year 2000 to about $36 million in fiscal year 2005. This assistance has  been used to train host country personnel and provide equipment such as  helicopters, spare parts, and fuel to support counternarcotics training and  missions.
section_title: Agencies’ Performance Measures Vary and Data for Assessing Performance Are Problematic
paragraphs: The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal  agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in achieving  their goals, and to communicate their results to the Congress. The act  requires agencies to set multiyear strategic goals in their strategic plans  and corresponding annual goals in their performance plans, measure  performance toward the achievement of those goals, and report on their  progress in their annual performance reports. These reports are intended  to provide important information to agency managers, policymakers, and  the public on what each agency accomplished with the resources it was  given. Moreover, the act calls for agencies to develop performance goals  that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable, and to establish  performance measures that adequately indicate progress toward achieving  those goals. Our previous work has noted that the lack of clear measurable  goals makes it difficult for program managers and staff to link their day-to- day efforts to achieving the agency’s intended mission.
When multiple agencies are involved in achieving the desired results, as  with transit zone interdiction operations, agencies should coordinate the  development of performance measures to ensure that they are  complementary. In the case of the transit zone, performance measures and  approaches for assessing transit zone operations vary among the Coast  Guard, CBP, and Defense. In addition, basic information about cocaine  production and trafficking and cocaine usage in the United States that  would help in assessing transit zone interdiction operations is problematic.  Further, ONDCP and other agencies involved have not fully addressed  recommendations for improving illicit drug data collection and analysis.
subsections: section_title: Transit Zone Performance Measures Vary
paragraphs: According to the 2005 U.S. National Drug Control Strategy update, the 2002  U.S. National Drug Control Strategy “clearly laid out a plan for accountable  results in achieving a single goal—reducing drug use.” Yet specific  measures of performance in the transit zone linking interdiction operations  to the Strategy’s priority of disrupting the illicit drug market were not  included in the 2002 strategy, nor subsequently developed across the  agencies in conjunction with ONDCP. The performance measures  developed by the Coast Guard, and the measures being developed by CBP  and Defense, vary in their emphasis and may not be helpful in assessing  progress in disrupting the illicit drug market.
The Coast Guard’s performance measures related to the transit zone set  specific goals to reduce the flow of cocaine. For fiscal year 2004, the  goal was to remove 15 percent of the cocaine flowing through the transit  zone; according to Coast Guard officials, the removal goal increases to  35 percent in 2011.
CBP is developing performance measures related to operational  readiness rates (a measure of its ability to respond when requested), but  these rates are not specific to the transit zone or to counternarcotics  activities and do not measure results.
Defense is developing performance measures that focus on the number  of disruptions of cocaine trafficking events, but it has not yet set any  targets or goals to assess its progress.
section_title: Data for Assessing Transit Zone Interdiction Operations and Drug Use in the United States Are Problematic
paragraphs: Data for assessing U.S. interdiction operations in the transit zone and  relating the results to the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy’s priority of  disrupting the illicit drug market and to its overall goal of reducing drug  usage in the United States are problematic. Specifically, the data for  estimating the cocaine flowing through the transit zone towards the United  States has been called into question, and data to demonstrate progress in  reducing drug use are difficult to obtain in ways that can be generalized to  the United States.
subsections: section_title: Annual Cocaine Flow Assessment Is Not Useful for Assessing Performance
paragraphs: The principal source of information about cocaine flow in the transit zone  is ONDCP’s Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM). The  IACM is prepared annually for ONDCP by an interagency group  representing departments and agencies involved in U.S. counternarcotics efforts. The assessment is intended to advise policymakers and resource  planners whose responsibilities involve detecting, monitoring, and  interdicting illicit drug shipments. It draws on other studies and several  datasets to estimate cocaine supply (that is, how much cocaine is produced  and available for export to the United States) and demand (that is, how  much cocaine is used in the United States and elsewhere). In the past, the  IACM’s estimates of cocaine supply were close to the estimated demand in  the United States and other world markets plus estimated losses in transit,  source, and arrival zones. But for calendar years 2003 and 2004, according  to the interagency group, the IACM’s estimate of the amount of cocaine  available for export was too low in relation to estimated U.S. and non-U.S.  demand for cocaine after taking into account seizures and disruptions.
The interagency assessment noted that the increasing difference between  supply and demand estimates may be the result of several different  scenarios, a combination of which points to potential shortfalls in some or  many of the data sets. For example:  Production and consumption estimates could be widely off the mark.
Production estimates are not designed to capture dynamic activities  such as eradication, replanting, or changing processing efficiencies.
Worldwide consumption estimates are several years old (for example,  the U.S. estimate was developed in 2002) and may not yet show the  effects of record eradication and interdiction efforts in recent years.
Time lags in estimating aspects inherent to the cocaine trade—including  price, purity, and demand—could delay the apparent effects and  documentation of a shortage.
As a result of the disparity between the estimated cocaine supply and  demand, the interagency group stated that a precise estimate of cocaine  flow was not possible for 2004, and that “a range of possible amounts was  more intellectually and analytically honest.” The group estimated that  between 325 and 675 metric tons of cocaine flowed towards the United  States in 2004, but such a wide range is not useful for assessing transit zone  interdiction efforts.
ONDCP and other interagency group officials agreed that the wide range  reflects the difficulty in obtaining specific information about the  production of cocaine and how it gets to the United States. According to  ONDCP, the Director of ONDCP has established a working group to identify  and, where possible, quantify the uncertainties with the IACM, and identify  ways to improve the data and reduce uncertainty.
section_title: Tracking Illicit Drug Use in the United States Is Difficult
paragraphs: ONDCP uses several surveys and databases to help it assess the availability  and rate of illicit drug use in the United States and changes in those  measures over time, but a variety of issues affect their reliability and  validity. According to several studies and ONDCP officials, a large portion  of major cocaine (and other drug) users are members of generally hard-to- survey populations, such as the homeless or incarcerated, and those who  are questioned about illicit drug use may be inclined to provide a socially  acceptable, and legal, response to survey questions. In addition, typical  survey response problems, such as low response rates and failure of  respondents to accurately recall past events, also apply.
Moreover, according to ONDCP officials, obtaining information from and  about persons engaged in an illegal activity is difficult at best, much of the  available information about illicit drug use cannot be generalized to the  United States, and the logistics of collecting meaningful data means that a  time lag will always exist between the data collection period and the time  when the data are available for public policy purposes. Thus, under the best  of circumstances, the effect of a drug policy change may take a number of  years to demonstrate.
Table 4 lists the primary sources of information ONDCP uses to track illicit  drug trends in the United States and highlights the latest date of data  collection, ONDCP’s primary purpose, and selected issues about the  information source. In some cases, the survey or database was designed for  other purposes and ONDCP officials have adapted it for their use.
section_title: ONDCP Has Not Fully Addressed Prior Recommendations for Improving Drug Data Collection and Analysis
paragraphs: In a 2001 report prepared for ONDCP, the National Research Council  concluded that the United States had neither the data systems nor the  research infrastructure needed to assess the effectiveness of drug control  enforcement policies. In particular, the Council highlighted the absence of  adequate, reliable data on illicit drug prices and use. The Council made  numerous recommendations to improve data collection and analysis— eight were addressed in full or in part to ONDCP. Regarding interdiction,  the Council recommended that research be done to address the following:   to what extent traffickers can limit the effect of interdiction operations  by shifting their routes and modes of transportation;   how the deterrent effects of supply-reduction programs can be  measured and the size of these effects; and  how quickly drug production and trafficking adapt to supply-reduction  activities, what happens to supply and price during the period of  adaptation, and how long the deterrent effects of supply-reduction  operations last before new supply sources emerge.
ONDCP officials told us these recommendations have not been fully  addressed. They noted that the illicit and secretive nature of the illicit drug  market precludes the systematic collection of cultivation, production, and  trafficking information. Furthermore, these officials emphasized that the  economics of cocaine production and trafficking may not follow typical  supply and demand relationships—profit margins likely remain high  despite record coca eradiation and cocaine interdiction efforts, and drug  traffickers can quickly react to changing interdiction tactics and  circumstances.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided over $6 billion for  counternarcotics and related programs in South and Central America and  throughout the transit zone, primarily to reduce the amount of illicit drugs  produced and transported to the United States. While the number of on- station ship days and on-station flight hours provided for monitoring and  interdiction operations in the transit zone has varied since 2000, they have  generally declined in recent years. JIATF-South, Coast Guard, and CBP  officials are concerned that the current level of operations cannot be  sustained. Defense on-station ship days and flight hours have already  declined due to operational priorities in other parts of the world, primarily  Afghanistan and Iraq, and structural limitations on the U.S. Navy’s primary  maritime patrol aircraft—the P-3. The reduced availability of P-3 maritime  patrol aircraft will degrade JIATF-South’s ability to detect and monitor go- fast boats and other vessels suspected of transporting illicit drugs. JIATF- South, Coast Guard, and CBP officials are concerned that this problem is  likely to worsen as budget constraints and other homeland security  priorities arise that limit the assets available for interdiction operations.
While some short-term fixes have been taken, the longer-term implications  of further declines in the availability of monitoring and interdiction assets  have not been addressed.
Developing performance measures—linking interdiction operations in the  transit zone to disrupting the illicit drug market, specifically the cocaine  market—is difficult. Nevertheless, the Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense, in  conjunction with ONDCP, should develop and coordinate performance  measures that more directly relate to transit zone operations. Data  compiled by the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator and vetted by the principal  agencies involved in transit zone interdiction efforts —data primarily  documenting detections of drug movements and seizures and disruptions  of illicit drugs—could serve as benchmarks for assessing progress until  data more directly related to disrupting the illicit drug market can be  developed.
Collecting relevant data to assess the effect of interdiction operations on  the cocaine market and drug usage in the United States is problematic.  Assessing how much cocaine is produced and moves towards the United  States is not easy—as the 2004 IACM demonstrates. Most other readily  available data on cocaine price, purity, and availability—indicators of U.S.  demand—cannot be generalized to the United States. More systematic  surveys on drug usage take time—sometimes several years—to complete.  Thus, a number of years is often needed to show the effect of a drug policy  change. The National Research Council reported similar issues in 2001.  However, until ONDCP and other cognizant agencies fully address the  Council’s recommendations, data to help assess U.S. drug usage will  remain problematic.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security  plan for the likely decline in the future availability of ships and aircraft for  transit zone interdiction operations and, specifically, determine how they  will compensate for the decline in P-3 maritime patrol aircraft availability.
We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security  develop and coordinate, in conjunction with the Director of ONDCP,  performance measures for transit zone interdiction operations that take  advantage of available drug interdiction data (such as detections, seizures,  and disruptions) to provide a basis for (1) assessing transit zone  interdiction performance and (2) deciding how to deploy increasingly  limited assets, such as the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft.
We also recommend that the Director of ONDCP address each of the  recommendations made by the National Research Council and report to the  Congress what departments and agencies need to take action, what  remains to be done, and when action is expected to be completed. In those  instances where ONDCP reports that action is not necessary, we  recommend that it document the reasons why.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: Defense, Homeland Security, and ONDCP provided written comments on a  draft of this report. See appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively. Justice and  State did not provide written comments. However, we discussed the draft  report with cognizant officials at each of the departments. Overall, the  departments and ONDCP stated that they generally concurred with the  recommendations that applied to them, but none detailed when and how  they will address them.
Defense and Homeland Security noted that they already have taken or are  in the process of taking appropriate action regarding planning for drug  interdiction asset requirements and developing relevant performance  measures.
Defense specifically noted that the U.S. Navy has developed a Fleet  Response Plan designed to transition from the P-3 to its replacement  aircraft—the Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft, which is scheduled to be  introduced into the fleet in fiscal year 2011. Defense added that it will  continue to coordinate with all maritime patrol asset providers in the  transit zone. Regarding performance measures, Defense stated that it  has appropriate mechanisms in place to assess its efforts. Yet, Defense  also noted that during the past year it has coordinated with its  commands to develop performance goals, measures, and targets for the  transit zone and continues to work with them as they prepare their  submissions. During the course of this engagement, cognizant Defense  officials stated on several occasions that they had not finalized  performance measures.
Homeland Security stated it develops asset requirements as part of an  interagency process where asset commitment is based on threat level  and the availability of funding. While it remains committed to “robust  support” of maritime transit zone interdiction efforts, unforeseen  events—Hurricane Katrina, for example—can affect asset availability.  Regarding performance measures, Homeland Security noted that as a  result of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,  it has undertaken an effort to develop and coordinate a performance  measurement system to better assess Homeland Security’s  counternarcotics’ activities, including transit zone interdiction  operations. Homeland Security did not state when it will complete this  effort.
ONDCP did not comment directly on interdiction asset availability, but  overall, ONDCP agreed that developing performance measures that link  interdiction operations to disrupting the cocaine market is difficult but  necessary, and stated that it will work with Defense and Homeland Security  within the framework of the Government Performance and Results Act to  develop appropriate measures.
Our recommendation regarding planning for the likely decline in  interdiction asset availability was intended to have Defense and Homeland  Security work together to address asset availability; in particular, the  decline in maritime patrol aircraft hours. However, the departments do not  address in their comments when or how their planning efforts have been  coordinated nor when their on-going efforts will be completed. We  continue to believe that such a coordinated planning effort is both  appropriate and necessary to ensure that the departments’ limited assets  are used in the most effective manner, and encourage the departments to  follow through with one another.
Concerning the National Research Council’s recommendations, ONDCP  did not specifically address our recommendation to report to Congress on  what actions have been taken or still need to be taken. Rather, ONDCP  referred to a 2001 study—Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Enforcement  Operations on Drug Smuggling, 1991-1999—that it published as one of  several steps it has taken to address the Council’s recommendations. We  note that the ONDCP study was published the same year the Council  published its report, and that it does not refer to the Council’s report or its  recommendations. The ONDCP study’s primary objective was to “measure  the impact of drug enforcement operations on the cocaine smuggling  industry.” Among other things and related to this report, the study  concludes that better data was available on what drug traffickers were  doing than on the activities of U.S. drug interdiction assets. According to  the study’s authors, “this was most notably the case with the interdiction  activities of the Department of Defense.” In addition, to address the  Council’s recommendations, ONDCP also noted that it has established two  operational priorities focused on (a) understanding the drug market and  (b) enhancing the data sets ONDCP relies on. These priorities were  initiated during the course of our engagement. According to ONDCP  officials, they have not been completed.
As we note in this report, collecting relevant data for assessing the effect of  interdiction operations on the cocaine market and U.S. illicit drug usage is  problematic. But more than three years after the National Research  Council’s report addressing the illicit drug data issue was finalized, ONDCP  cannot point to any specific action it has completed to address the  Council’s recommendations for improving the collection of illicit drug  trafficking and usage data. Given the importance of the illicit drug problem  and the on-going controversy in the United States about how best to  confront it, better data for evaluating alternative drug control policies is  paramount. We continue to urge ONDCP to follow up on the Council’s  findings and recommendations and take the steps necessary to address the  continuing shortcomings in its illicit drug data and report to Congress the  status of its efforts.
In commenting on the IACM, Homeland Security stated that the decision by  the interagency group to report a range for cocaine movement was a wise  one because it acknowledged the lack of precision inherent in the data that  is currently available. We agree, and did not intend to imply anything else.  We also agree with Homeland Security that greater efforts need to be made  to improve the methodology and integrity of data instruments in order to  gain a better and more useful understanding of drug production and  consumption.
Finally, all the departments and ONDCP provided additional information on  various aspects of their roles regarding drug interdiction in the transit zone.  Defense, in particular, emphasized that it is not authorized to conduct law  enforcement operations but can support them. In addition, all the  departments and ONDCP provided us technical comments and updates  that we have incorporated throughout the report, as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the  date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to  interested congressional committees and the Secretaries of Defense,  Homeland Security, Justice, and State, and the Director of ONDCP. We will  also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report  will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4268 or FordJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were Al Huntington,  Joe Carney, J.J. Marzullo, José Peña, and Jim Strus.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: Overall, to examine the status of U.S. interdiction assets and progress made  in disrupting drug trafficking in the transit zone, we focused on U.S. (1)  efforts to interdict cocaine because nearly all the cocaine entering the  United States comes from South America and (2) operations in the western  Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean because the United States has  positioned most of its interdiction assets in these areas. We also agreed  with the requesters to limit the scope of this engagement by examining U.S.  operations to interdict cocaine before it reaches intermediate staging  points in the Caribbean Sea, Central America, and Mexico on the way to the  United States. We further narrowed our examination to U.S. efforts to  detect and disrupt unscheduled maritime movements of cocaine— primarily go-fast boats, but also fishing and other types of ocean-going  vessels. Although drug traffickers use small aircraft to transport cocaine  and other drugs, the United States essentially relies on the law enforcement  authorities in the countries where they land to interdict them.
To track the changes in the amounts of cocaine seized and disrupted since  calendar year 2000, we relied on the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine  Movement (IACM). While the data sets used to prepare the IACM have been  called into question by the interagency group that prepares it, the IACM  data on cocaine seizures and disruptions are based on the Consolidated  Counterdrug Database, which is managed by the Office of the U.S.  Interdiction Coordinator. Beginning with 2004, the Coordinator’s Office  began using stricter rules to vet the data on drug movements, detections,  seizures, and disruptions in quarterly meetings with the interagency drug  community. The intent was to minimize duplicate or questionable reported  drug movements. According to the database manager, however, the more  careful review of the data did not materially affect the categorization or  number of maritime drug movements—our primary emphasis. Rather,  many suspect aircraft are no longer counted as drug movement events  unless corroborating information strongly suggests drugs were aboard the  aircraft. We observed a quarterly vetting session and discussed the process  for determining whether reported drug events can be “confirmed and  substantiated” based on intelligence and other sources with several  members of the interagency group that participate, including the Defense  Intelligence Agency (DIA); the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence, Crime  and Narcotics Center; the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the  Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South); the Coast Guard; and  Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Based on the foregoing, we  determined that the cocaine seizure and disruption data provided to us  were sufficiently reliable for describing and documenting trends in the  transit zone.
To determine the factors that have contributed to the changes in cocaine  seizures and disruptions, we reviewed the IACMs for calendar years 2000  through 2004. We discussed the observations made in the IACMs and  reported operational changes since 2000 with cognizant officials in the  Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the Department of  Defense’s (Defense) Office of Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, and  other members of the interagency counternarcotics community—namely,  DIA, the Crime and Narcotics Center, DEA, JIATF-South, and the U.S.  Interdiction Coordinator.
To analyze the trends in the assets provided by the United States and its  allies since fiscal year 2000 to support illicit drug interdiction in the transit  zone, we relied on data provided by JIATF-South and JIATF-West that  tabulates on-station ship days and flight hours spent on interdiction  missions by the provider and the type of ship or aircraft. Until fiscal year  2004, JIATF-West had responsibility for U.S. drug detection and monitoring  activities in the eastern Pacific Ocean off the coast of Mexico. We analyzed  data for fiscal years 2000 through 2005, although JIATF-West could not  provide information about on-station ship days for the first quarter of fiscal  year 2000 (September-December 1999). Compared to the first quarter of  2001, JIAFT-West’s contribution was about 5.4 percent of the total ship days  on station. To determine the reliability of the JIATF-South and JIATF-West  data, we discussed how the respective data was compiled with cognizant  officials and compared it to available—albeit, less specific—data from the  Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense. Through these efforts, we determined that  the data provided to us were sufficiently reliable for describing the trends  in asset availability during fiscal years 2000 through 2005.
To determine the challenges facing the departments and agencies in  maintaining current levels of transit zone interdiction operations, we  reviewed issues raised in the IACM and other department and agency  planning and budgeting documents. We discussed these matters with  cognizant law enforcement and military authorities at Defense, Department  of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and headquarters in  Washington, D.C. We also discussed operational challenges with   Coast Guard officials at their base in Jacksonville, Florida, where the  Coast Guard stations armed helicopters used in interdiction operations;   CBP officials at their base in Jacksonville, Florida, where CPB stations  P-3 maritime patrol aircraft used in interdiction operations;   DEA officials in Miami, Florida, and Nassau, Bahamas, who manage an  ongoing drug interdiction program in the waters around the Bahamas  called “Operation Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos;”
JIATF-South officials in Key West, Florida, including the Commander;  representatives from the Coast Guard, CBP, Defense, and other U.S.  agencies; as well as the liaison officers from France, the Netherlands,  and the United Kingdom; and  Justice officials with the U.S. Attorney’s offices in Tampa and Sarasota,  Florida, directly involved in the Panama Express operation.
To determine how the Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense assess their  performance, we met with cognizant officials in their respective planning  and budgeting offices and reviewed relevant reports and related  documents. Since only the Coast Guard had completed developing  performance measures, we relied on discussions with the key officials to  document what CBP and Defense were developing. To determine what data  are available for assessing transit zone performance, we met with the  principals involved in preparing the IACM. We discussed issues that have  arisen concerning cultivation and production estimates (primarily, officials  with the Crime and Narcotics Center and DEA), as well as interdiction  amounts (primarily, the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator’s Consolidated  Counterdrug Database manager). In addressing usage and demand  estimates in the United States, we asked ONDCP officials what they used to  measure progress against the National Drug Control Strategy’s goal of  reducing drug usage in the United States. These officials cited the data  sources we refer to in the body of the report (see table 4) and described  how they used the information. We also reviewed the scope and  methodology statements for each data source, and in the cases of the  National Survey on Drug Use and Health and Monitoring the Future, we  spoke with the current project directors to obtain their views.
section_title: Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements
paragraphs: The United States has signed Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement  agreements with 25 countries in the transit and source zones—three since  2000 after the United States closed its military installations in Panama.  According to Coast Guard officials, these agreements have improved  cooperation with nations in the region and increased U.S. and, in particular,  the Coast Guard’s capability to board suspect vessels and detain suspected  drug traffickers. These officials added that these agreements are one of the  primary reasons for increased interdictions of cocaine shipments in the  transit zone. These bilateral agreements typically have six provisions to  them. The United States and the countries negotiate each provision  separately, which means that some countries may agree to some provisions  and not others. The six parts provide for the following:  Shipboarding provisions allow U.S. agencies under certain conditions to  stop, board, and search suspicious vessels registered in that country  without having specific permission.
Shiprider provisions permit countries to place law enforcement officials  on another’s vessels.
Pursuit provisions allow U.S. law enforcement agencies, under very  limited circumstances, to pursue aircraft and vessels in a country’s  airspace and territorial waters. In particular, the provisions permit U.S.  law enforcement agencies to board and search a suspect vessel if the  country does not have a vessel or aircraft available to respond  immediately.
Entry-to-investigate provisions allow the U.S. law enforcement agencies,  under very limited circumstances, to enter a country’s airspace or  territorial waters to investigate aircraft or vessels suspected of illicit  drug trafficking. Specifically, the provisions permit U.S. law  enforcement agencies to board and search a suspect vessel if the  country does not have a vessel or aircraft available to respond  immediately.
Overflight provisions permit the U.S. law enforcement aircraft to fly  over the country’s territorial waters, with appropriate notice to the  country’s coastal authorities.
Relay order-to-land provisions allow U.S. law enforcement agencies to  relay an order to land from the host country to the suspect aircraft.
Moreover, an additional International Maritime Interdiction Support clause  permits U.S. law enforcement agencies, principally the Coast Guard, to  transport suspected drug traffickers through that country to the United  States for prosecution and provides for expedited access to that country’s  dockside facility to search suspect vessels. Since 2000, the United States  has entered into support clauses with eight additional countries.
The following table lists the law enforcement agreements, including the  international maritime interdiction support clause that the United States  has negotiated with countries in the transit and source zones.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix V