Foreign Assistance: U.S. Agencies Face Challenges to Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Food Aid
Published: 2007-03-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The United States is the largest provider of food aid in the world, accounting for over half of all global food aid supplies intended to alleviate hunger. Since the 2002 reauthorization of the Farm Bill, Congress has appropriated an average of $2 billion per year for U.S. food aid programs, which delivered an average of 4 million metric tons of agricultural commodities per year. Despite growing demand for food aid, rising business and transportation costs have contributed to a 43-percent decline in average tonnages delivered over the last 5 years. For the largest U.S. food aid program, these costs represent approximately 65 percent of total food aid expenditures, highlighting the need to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of food aid. To inform Congress as it reauthorizes the 2007 Farm Bill, GAO examined some key challenges to the (1) efficiency of delivery and (2) effective monitoring of U.S. food aid.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Multiple challenges combine to hinder the efficiency of delivery of U.S. food aid by reducing the amount, quality, and timeliness of food provided. These challenges include (1) funding and planning processes that increase delivery costs and lengthen time frames; (2) transportation contracting practices that create high levels of risk for ocean carriers, resulting in increased rates; (3) legal requirements that can result in the awarding of food aid contracts to more expensive service providers; and (4) inadequate coordination between U.S. agencies and food aid stakeholders in systematically addressing food delivery problems, such as spoilage. U.S. agencies have taken some steps to address timeliness concerns. USAID has been stocking or prepositioning food commodities domestically and abroad and USDA has implemented a new transportation bid process, but the long-term cost effectiveness of these initiatives has not yet been measured. Given limited food aid resources and increasing emergencies, ensuring that food reaches the most vulnerable populations--such as poor women who are pregnant or children who are malnourished--is critical to enhancing its effectiveness. However, USAID and USDA do not sufficiently monitor the effectiveness of food aid programs, particularly in recipient countries, due to limited staff, competing priorities, and restrictions in the use of food aid resources. For example, although USAID has some non-Title II-funded staff assigned to monitoring, it had only 23 Title II-funded staff assigned to missions and regional offices in just 10 countries to monitor programs costing about $1.7 billion in 55 countries in fiscal year 2006. As a result of such limitations, U.S. agencies may not be sufficiently accomplishing their goals of getting the right food to the right people at the right time.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss ways to improve the efficiency  and effectiveness of U.S. food aid. The United States is the largest provider  of food aid in the world, accounting for over half of all global food aid  supplies intended to alleviate hunger and support development in low- income countries. Since its last reauthorization of the Farm Bill in 2002,  Congress has appropriated an average of $2 billion per year in annual and  supplemental funding for U.S. international food aid programs, which  delivered an average of 4 million metric tons of agricultural commodities  per year. In 2006, U.S. food aid benefited over 70 million people through  emergency and development-focused programs. However, about 850  million people in the world are undernourished in 2007—a number that  has remained relatively unchanged since the early 1990s, according to  United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates.  Furthermore, the number of food and humanitarian emergencies has  doubled from an average of about 15 per year in the 1980s to more than 30  per year since 2000, due in large part to increasing conflicts and natural  disasters around the world. Despite growing demand for food aid, rising  transportation and business costs have contributed to a 43 percent decline  in average tonnages delivered over the last 5 years. For the largest U.S.  food aid program, Title II of the Food for Peace program, these costs now  account for approximately 65 percent of expenditures, highlighting the  need to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. food aid.
My testimony is based on a report that we expect to issue in April 2007.  Today, I will primarily focus on the need to improve the efficiency of  delivery of U.S. food aid. I will also focus on the importance of efforts to  monitor U.S. food aid programs in order to enhance their effectiveness. In  addition to these issues, our April report will address monetization,  assessments, targeting, and commodity quality and nutritional standards.
We conducted the work for the forthcoming report and this testimony  between April 2006 and March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted  U.S. government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Food aid comprises all food-supported interventions by foreign donors to  individuals or institutions within a country. It has helped to save millions  of lives and improve the nutritional status of the most vulnerable groups,  including women and children, in developing countries. Food aid is one  element of a broader global strategy to enhance food security by reducing  poverty and improving availability, access to, and use of food in low- income, less-developed countries. Donors provide food aid as both a  humanitarian response to address acute hunger in emergencies and as a  development-focused response to address chronic hunger. Large-scale  conflicts, poverty, weather calamities, and severe health-related problems  are among the underlying causes of both acute and chronic hunger.
subsections: section_title: Countries Provide Food Aid through In-Kind or Cash Donations, with the United States as the Largest Donor
paragraphs: Countries provide food aid through either in-kind donations or cash  donations for local procurement. In-kind food aid is food procured and  delivered to vulnerable populations, while cash donations are given to  implementing organizations for the purchase of food in local markets. U.S.  food aid programs are all in-kind, and no cash donations are allowed under  current legislation. However, the Administration has proposed legislation  to allow up to 25 percent of appropriated food aid funds for purchase of  commodities in locations closer to where they are needed. Other food aid  donors have also recently moved from providing less in-kind to more or all  cash donations for local, regional, or donor-market procurement. While  there are ongoing debates as to which form of assistance is more effective  and efficient, the largest international food aid organization, the World  Food Program (WFP), continues to accept both. The United States is both  the largest overall and in-kind provider of food aid, supplying over one-half  of all global food aid.
section_title: Most U.S. Food Aid Goes to Africa
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2006, the United States delivered food aid to over 50  countries, with about 78 percent of its funding allocations for in-kind food  donations going to Africa, 12 percent to Asia and the Near East, 9 percent  to Latin America, and 1 percent to Eurasia. Of the 78 percent of the food  aid funding going to Africa, 30 percent went to Sudan, 27 percent to the  Horn of Africa, 17 percent to Southern Africa, 14 percent to West Africa,  and 12 percent to Central Africa.
section_title: Emergencies Represent an Increasing Share of U.S. Food Aid
paragraphs: Food aid is used for both emergency and non-emergency purposes. Over  the last several years, the majority of U.S. food aid has shifted from a non- emergency to an emergency focus. In fiscal year 2005, the United States  directed approximately 80 percent or $1.6 billion of its $2.1 billion  expenditure for international food aid programs to emergencies. In  contrast, in fiscal year 2002, the United States directed approximately 40  percent or $678 million of its $1.7 billion food aid expenditure to  emergency programs (see fig. 1).
section_title: U.S. Food Aid Is Delivered Through Multiple Programs with Multiple Mandates
paragraphs: U.S. food aid is funded under four program authorities and delivered  through six programs administered by USAID and USDA, which serve a  range of objectives including humanitarian goals, economic assistance,  foreign policy, market development and international trade (see app. I).
The largest program, Public Law (P.L.) 480 Title II, is managed by USAID  and averaged approximately 74 percent of total in-kind food aid  allocations over the past 4 years, most of which funded emergency  programs (see fig. 2). In addition, P.L. 480, as amended, authorizes USAID  to preposition food aid both domestically and abroad with a cap on  storage expenses of $2 million per fiscal year.
U.S. food aid programs also have multiple legislative and regulatory  mandates that affect their operations. One mandate that governs U.S. food  aid transportation is cargo preference, which is designed to support a U.S.- flag commercial fleet for national defense purposes. Cargo preference  requires that 75 percent of the gross tonnage of all government-generated  cargo be transported on U.S.-flag vessels. A second transportation  mandate, known as the “Great Lakes Set Aside,” requires that up to 25  percent of Title II bagged food aid tonnage be allocated to Great Lakes  ports each month. Other mandates require that a minimum of 2.5 million  metric tons of food aid be provided through Title II programs, and that of  this amount, a “sub-minimum” of 1.825 million metric tons be provided for  non-emergency programs. (For a summary of congressional mandates for  P.L. 480, see app. I.)
section_title: Multiple U.S. Government Agencies and Stakeholders Participate in U.S. Food Aid Programs
paragraphs: U.S. food aid programs involve multiple U.S. government agencies and  stakeholders. For example, USAID and USDA administer the programs,  USDA’s Kansas City Commodity Office (KCCO) manages the purchase of  all commodities, and the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) of DOT  is involved in supporting their ocean transport on U.S. vessels. These and  other government agencies coordinate food aid programs through the  Food Assistance Policy Council, which oversees the Bill Emerson  Humanitarian Trust, an emergency food reserve. Other stakeholders  include donors, implementing organizations such as WFP and NGOs,  agricultural commodity groups, and the maritime industry. Some of these  stakeholders are members of the Food Aid Consultative Group, which is  led by USAID’s Office of Food for Peace and addresses issues concerning  the effectiveness of the regulations and procedures that govern food  assistance programs.
section_title: Multiple Challenges Hinder the Efficiency of Delivery of U.S. Food Aid
paragraphs: Multiple challenges reduce the efficiency of U.S. food aid, including  logistical constraints that impede food aid delivery and reduce the amount,  timeliness, and quality of food provided. While agencies have tried to  expedite food aid delivery in some cases, the majority of food aid program  expenditures is on logistics, and the delivery of food from vendor to village  is generally too time-consuming to be responsive in emergencies. Factors  that increase logistical inefficiencies include uncertain funding and  inadequate planning; transportation contracting practices that  disproportionately increase risks for ocean carriers (who then factor those  risks into freight rates); legal requirements; and inadequate coordination  to systematically track and respond to logistical problems, such as food  spoilage or contamination. While U.S. agencies are pursuing initiatives to  improve food aid logistics, such as prepositioning food commodities, their  long-term cost effectiveness has not yet been measured.
subsections: section_title: Food Aid Procurement and Transportation are Costly and Time-Consuming
paragraphs: Transportation costs represent a significant share of food aid  expenditures. For the largest U.S. food aid program (Title II),  approximately 65 percent of expenditures are on inland transportation (to  the U.S. port for export), ocean transportation, in-country delivery,  associated cargo handling costs, and administration. According to USAID,  these non-commodity expenditures have been rising in part due to the  increasing number of emergencies and the expensive nature of logistics in  such situations. To examine procurement costs (expenditures on  commodities and ocean transportation) for all U.S. food aid programs, we  obtained KCCO procurement data for fiscal years 2002 through 2006.  KCCO data also suggest that ocean transportation has been accounting for  a larger share of procurement costs with average freight rates rising from  $123 per metric ton in fiscal year 2002 to $171 per metric ton in fiscal year  2006 (see fig. 3). Further, U.S. food aid ocean transportation costs are  relatively expensive compared with those of some other donors. WFP  transports both U.S. and non-U.S. food aid worldwide at reported ocean  freight costs averaging around $100 per metric ton— representing less  than 20 percent of its total procurement costs. At current U.S. food aid  budget levels, every $10 per metric ton reduction in freight rates could  feed about 1.2 million more people during a typical hungry season.
Delivering U.S. food aid from vendor to village is also a relatively time- consuming task, requiring on average 4 to 6 months. Food aid purchasing  processes and example time frames are illustrated in figure 4. While KCCO  purchases food aid on a monthly basis, it allows implementing partners’  orders to accumulate for 1 month prior to purchase in order to buy in  scale. KCCO then purchases the commodities, receives transportation  offers, and awards transportation contracts over the following month.  Commodity vendors bag the food and ship it to a U.S. port for export  during the next 1 to 2 months. After an additional 40 to 50 days for ocean  transportation to Africa, for example, the food arrives at an overseas  port, where it is trucked or railroaded to the final distribution location  over the next few weeks. While agencies have tried to expedite food aid  delivery in some cases, the entire logistics process often lacks the  timeliness required to meet humanitarian needs in emergencies and may at  times result in food spoilage. Additionally, the largest tonnages of U.S.  food aid are purchased during the months of August and September.  Average tonnages purchased during the fourth quarter of the last 5 fiscal  years have exceeded those purchased during the second and third quarters  by more than 40 percent. Given a 6-month delivery window, these  tonnages do not arrive in country until the end of the peak hungry season  (from October through January in southern Africa, for example) in most  cases.
section_title: Various Factors Cause Inefficiencies in Food Aid Logistics
paragraphs: Food aid logistics are costly and time-consuming for a variety of reasons.  First, uncertain funding processes for emergencies can result in bunching  of food aid purchases, which increases food and transportation costs and  lengthens delivery time frames. Many experts, officials, and stakeholders  emphasized the need for improved logistical planning. Second,  transportation contracting practices—such as freight and payment terms,  claims processes and time penalties—further increase ocean freight rates  and contribute to delivery delays. A large percentage of the carriers we  interviewed strongly recommended taking actions to address these  contracting issues. Third, legal requirements such as cargo preference can  increase delivery costs. Although food aid agencies are reimbursed by  DOT for certain transportation expenditures, the sufficiency of  reimbursement levels varies. Fourth, when food delivery problems arise,  such as food spoilage or contamination, U.S. agencies and stakeholders  lack adequately coordinated mechanisms to systematically track and  respond to complaints.
subsections: section_title: Funding and Planning Processes Increase Costs and Lengthen Time Frames
paragraphs: Uncertain funding processes, combined with reactive and insufficiently  planned procurement, increase food aid delivery costs and time frames.  Food emergencies are increasingly common and now account for 80  percent of USAID program expenditures. To respond to sudden  emergencies—such as Afghanistan in 2002, Iraq in 2003, Sudan, Eritrea,  and Ethiopia in 2005, and Sudan and the Horn of Africa in 2006—U.S.  agencies largely rely on supplemental appropriations and the Bill Emerson  Humanitarian Trust (BEHT) to augment annual appropriations by up to a  quarter of their budget. Figure 5, for example, illustrates that USAID  supplemental appropriations have ranged from $270 million in fiscal year  2002 and $350 million in fiscal year 2006 to over $600 million in fiscal years  2003 and 2005. Agency officials and implementing partners told us that the  uncertainty of whether, when, and at what levels supplemental  appropriations would be forthcoming hampers their ability to plan both  emergency and non-emergency food aid programs on a consistent, long- term basis and to purchase food at the best price. Although USAID and  USDA instituted multi-year planning approaches in recent years, according  to agency officials, uncertain supplemental funding has caused them to  adjust or redirect funds from prior commitments.
Agencies and implementing organizations also face uncertainty about the  availability of Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust funds. As of January 2007,  the Emerson Trust held about $107.2 million in cash and about 915,350  metric tons of wheat valued at $133.9 million—a grain balance that could  support about two major emergencies based on an existing authority to  release up to 500,000 metric tons per fiscal year and another 500,000 of  commodities that could have been, but were not, released from previous  fiscal years. Although the Secretary of Agriculture and the USAID  Administrator have agreed that the $341 million combined value of  commodity and cash currently held in the trust is more than adequate to  cover expected usage over the period of the current authorization, the  authorization is scheduled to expire on September 30, 2007. Resources  have been drawn from the Emerson Trust on 12 occasions since 1984. For  example, in fiscal year 2005, $377 million from the trust was used to  procure 700,000 metric tons of commodities for Ethiopia, Eritrea, and  Sudan. However, experts and stakeholders with whom we met noted that  the trust lacks an effective replenishment mechanism—withdrawals from  the trust must be reimbursed by the procuring agency or by direct  appropriations for reimbursement, and legislation establishing the  Emerson Trust capped the annual replenishment at $20 million.
Inadequately planned food and transportation procurement reflects the  uncertainty of food aid funding. As previously discussed, KCCO purchases  the largest share of food aid tonnage during the last quarter of each fiscal  year. This “bunching” of procurement occurs in part because USDA  requires 6 months to approve programs and/or because funds for both  USDA and USAID programs may not be received until mid-fiscal year  (after OMB has approved budget apportionments for the agencies) or  through a supplemental appropriation. USAID officials stated that they  have reduced procurement bunching through improved cash flow  management. Although USAID has had more stable monthly purchases in  fiscal years 2004 and 2005, food aid procurement in total has not been  consistent enough to avoid the higher prices associated with bunching.  Higher food and transportation prices result from procurement bunching  as suppliers try to smooth earnings by charging higher prices during their  peak seasons and as food aid contracts must compete with commercial  demand that is seasonally high. According to KCCO data for fiscal years  2002 through 2006, average commodity and transportation prices were  each $12 to $14 per metric ton higher in the fourth quarter than in the first  quarter of each year. Procurement bunching also stresses KCCO  operations and can result in costly and time-consuming congestion for  ports, railways, and trucking companies.
While agencies face challenges to improving procurement planning given  the uncertain nature of supplemental funding in particular, stakeholders  and experts emphasized the importance of such efforts. For example, 11 of  the 14 ocean carriers we interviewed reported that reduced procurement  bunching could greatly reduce transportation costs. When asked about  bunching, agency officials, stakeholders and experts suggested the  following potential improvements:    Improved communication and coordination. KCCO and WFP  representatives suggested that USAID and USDA improve coordination of  purchases to reduce bunching. KCCO has also established a web-based  system for agencies and implementing organizations to enter up to several  years’ worth of commodity requests. However, implementing  organizations are currently only entering purchases for the next month.  Additionally, since the Food Aid Consultative Group (FACG) does not  include transportation stakeholders, DOT officials and ocean carriers  strongly recommended establishing a formal mechanism for improving  coordination and transportation planning.
Increased flexibility in procurement schedules. USAID expressed  interest in an additional time slot each month for food aid purchases.  Several ocean carriers expressed interest in shipping food according to  cargo availability rather than through pre-set shipping windows that begin  4 weeks and 6 weeks after each monthly purchase. Although KCCO has  established shipping windows to avoid port congestion, DOT  representatives believe that carriers should be able to manage their own  schedules within required delivery time frames.
Increased use of historical analysis. DOT representatives, experts, and  stakeholders emphasized that USAID and USDA should increase their use  of historical analysis and forecasting to improve procurement. USAID has  examined historical trends to devise budget proposals prepared 2 years in  advance, and it is now beginning to use this analysis to improve timing of  procurement.  However, neither USAID nor USDA has used historical  analysis to establish more efficient transportation practices, such as long- term agreements commonly used by DOD. Furthermore, WFP is now  using forecasting to improve purchasing patterns through advanced  financing but is unable to use this financing for U.S. food aid programs due  to legal and administrative constraints.
section_title: Transportation Contracting Practices Increase Delivery Costs and Contribute to Delays
paragraphs: Transportation contracting practices are a second factor contributing to  higher food aid costs. DOT officials, experts, and ocean carriers  emphasized that commercial transportation contracts include shared risk  between buyers, sellers, and ocean carriers. In food aid transportation  contracts, risks are disproportionately placed on ocean carriers,  discouraging participation and resulting in expensive freight rates.  Examples of costly contracting practices include:    Non-commercial and non-standardized freight terms. Food aid  contracts define freight terms differently than commercial contracts and  place increased liability on ocean carriers. For example, food aid  contracts hold ocean carriers responsible for logistical problems such as  improperly filled containers that may occur at the load port before they  arrive. Food aid contracts also hold ocean carriers responsible for  logistical problems such as truck delays or improper port documentation  that may occur at the discharge port after they arrive. Further, several  carriers reported that food aid contracts are not sufficiently standardized.  Although USAID and USDA created a standard contract for non-bulk  shipments, contracts for bulk shipments (which currently account for 63  percent of food aid tonnage delivered) have not yet been standardized. To  account for risks that are unknown or outside their control, carriers told  us that they charge higher freight rates.
Impractical time requirements. Food aid contracts may include  impractical time requirements, although agencies disagree on how  frequently this occurs. Although USAID officials review contract time  requirements and described them as reasonable, they also indicated that  transportation delays are a common result of poor carrier performance  and the diminishing number of ocean carriers participating in food aid  programs. Several implementing organizations also complained about  inadequate carrier performance. WFP representatives, for example,  provided several examples of ocean shipments in 2005 and 2006 that were  more than 20 days late. While acknowledging that transportation delays  occur, DOT officials indicated that some contracts include time  requirements that are impossible for carriers to meet. For example, one  carrier complained about a contract that required the same delivery date  for four different ports. When carriers do not meet time requirements, they  must pay costly penalties. Carriers reported that they review contracts in  advance and, where time requirements are deemed implausible, factor the  anticipated penalty into the freight rate. While agencies do not  systematically collect data on time requirements and penalties associated  with food aid contracts, DOT officials examined a subset of contracts from  December 2005 to September 2006 and estimated that 13 percent of them  included impractical time requirements. Assuming that the anticipated  penalties specified in the contracts analyzed were included in freight rates,  food aid costs may have increased by almost $2 million (monies that could  have been used to provide food to an additional 66,000 beneficiaries).
Lengthy claims processes. Lengthy processes for resolving  transportation disputes discourage both carriers and implementing  organizations from filing claims. According to KCCO officials, obtaining  needed documentation for a claim can require several years and disputed  claims must be resolved by the Department of Justice. USAID’s Inspector  General reported that inadequate and irregular review of claims by USAID  and USDA has also contributed to delayed resolution. Currently, KCCO  has over $6 million in open claims, some of which were filed prior to fiscal  year 2001. For ocean carriers, the process is burdensome and encourages  them to factor potential losses into freight rates rather than pursue claims.  Incentives for most implementing organizations are even weaker given  that monies recovered from claims reimburse the overall food aid budget  rather than the organization that experienced the loss. According to  KCCO and WFP officials, transportation claims are filed for less than 2  percent of cargo. However, several experts and implementing  organizations suggested that actual losses are likely higher. In 2003, KCCO  proposed a new administrative appeals process for ocean freight claims  that would establish a hearing officer within USDA and a 285-day  timeframe. While DOT and some carriers agreed that a faster process was  needed, DOT officials suggested that the process for claims review should  include hearing officers outside of USDA to ensure independent findings.  To date, KCCO’s proposed process has not been implemented.
Lengthy payment time frames and burdensome administration.  Payment of food aid contracts is slow and paperwork is insufficiently  streamlined. When carriers are not paid for several months, they incur  large interest costs that are factored into freight rates. While USDA now  provides freight payments within a few weeks, several ocean carriers  complained that USAID often requires 2 to 4 months to provide payment.  USDA freight payments are timelier due to a new electronic payment  system,  but USAID officials said this system is too expensive, so they are  considering other payment options. In addition, a few carriers suggested  that paperwork in general needs streamlining and modernization. The 2002  Farm Bill required both USDA and USAID to pursue streamlining  initiatives that the agencies are in the process of implementing. KCCO  officials indicated that they are updating food aid information technology  systems (to be in place in fiscal year 2009).
Through structured interviews, ocean carriers confirmed the cost impact  of food aid transportation contracting practices. For example, 9 (60  percent) and 14 (100 percent) of the carriers reported that “inefficient  claims processes” and “liabilities outside the carriers’ control” increase  costs, respectively. To quantify the impact, two carriers estimated that  non-standardized freight terms increase costs by 5 percent (about $8 per  metric ton) while another carrier suggested that slow payment increases  costs by 10 percent (about $15 per metric ton). Over 70 percent of the  carriers strongly recommended actions to address contracting practices.
section_title: Legal Requirements Can Increase Delivery Costs and Time Frames
paragraphs: Legal requirements governing food aid procurement are a third factor that  can increase delivery costs and time frames, with program impacts  dependent on the sufficiency of associated reimbursements. In awarding  contracts, KCCO must meet various procurement requirements such as  cargo preference and the Great Lakes Set Aside. Each requirement may  result in higher commodity and freight costs. Cargo preference laws, for  example, require 75 percent of food aid to be shipped on U.S.-flag carriers,  which are generally more expensive than foreign-flag carriers by an  amount that is known as the ocean freight differential (OFD). The total  annual value of this cost differential between U.S.- and foreign-flag  carriers averaged $134 million from fiscal years 2001 to 2005.  Additionally,  since only a relatively small percentage of cargo can be shipped on  foreign-flag vessels, agency and port officials believe that cargo preference  regulations discourage foreign-flag participation in the program and result  in delays when a U.S.-flag carrier is not available. DOT officials emphasize  that USAID and USDA receive reimbursements for most if not all of the  total OFD cost—DOT reimbursements varied from $126 million in fiscal  year 2002 to $153 million in fiscal year 2005.  However, USAID officials  expressed concern that the OFD calculations do not fully account for the  costs of cargo preference or the uncertainties regarding its application.  For example, OFD reimbursements do not account for the additional costs  of shipping on U.S.-flag vessels that are older than 24 years (approximately  half of these vessels) or shipments for which a foreign-flag vessel has not  submitted a bid. USAID officials estimate that the actual cost of cargo  preference in fiscal year 2003 exceeded the total OFD cost by about $50  million due to these factors. Finally, USAID and DOT officials have not yet  agreed on whether cargo preference applies to shipments from  prepositioning sites.
section_title: Inadequate Coordination Limits Agencies’ and Stakeholders’ Response to Food Delivery Problems
paragraphs: U.S. agencies and stakeholders do not coordinate adequately to respond to  food and delivery problems when they arise. USAID and USDA lack a  shared, coordinated system to systematically track and respond to food  quality complaints, and food aid working groups and forums are not  inclusive of all stakeholders. Food quality concerns have been long- standing issues provoking the concern of both food aid agencies and the  U.S. Congress. In 2003, for example, USAID’s Inspector General reported  some Ethiopian warehouses in poor condition, with rodent droppings near  torn bags of corn soy blend (CSB), rainwater seepage, pigeons flying into  one warehouse, and holes in the roof of another. Implementing  organizations we spoke with also frequently complained about receiving  heavily infested and contaminated cargo. For example, in Durban, South  Africa we saw 1,925 metric tons of heavily infested cornmeal that arrived  late in port because it had been erroneously shipped to the wrong  countries first. This food could have fed over 37,000 people. When food  arrives heavily infested, NGOs hire a surveyor to determine how much is  salvageable for human consumption or for use as animal feed, and destroy  what is deemed unfit.
When such food delivery problems arise, U.S. agencies and food aid  stakeholders face a variety of coordination challenges in addressing them.  For example:    KCCO, USDA and USAID have disparate quality complaint tracking  mechanisms that monitor different levels of information. As a result, they  are unable to determine the total quantity of and trends in food quality  problems. In addition, because implementing organizations track food  quality concerns differently, if at all, they cannot coordinate to share  concerns with each other and with U.S. government agencies. For  example, since WFP—which accounts for 60 percent of U.S. food aid  shipments—independently handles its own claims, KCCO officials are  unable to track the quality of food aid delivery program-wide. Agencies  and stakeholders have suggested that food quality tracking and  coordination could be improved if USAID and USDA shared the same  database and created an integrated food quality complaint reporting  system.
Agency country offices are often unclear about their roles in tracking food  quality, creating gaps in monitoring and reporting. For example, USAID  has found that some missions lack clarity on their responsibilities in  independently verifying claims stemming from food spoilage, often relying  on the implementing organization to research the circumstances  surrounding losses. One USAID country office also noted that rather than  tracking all food quality problems reported, it only recorded and tracked  commodity losses for which an official claim had been filed. Further, in  2004, the Inspector General for USAID found that USAID country offices  were not always adequately following up on commodity loss claims to  ensure that they were reviewed and resolved in a timely manner. To  improve food quality monitoring, agencies and stakeholders have  suggested updating regulations to include separate guidance for  complaints, as well as developing a secure website for all agencies and  their country offices to use to track both complaints and claims.
When food quality issues arise, there is no clear and coordinated process  for seeking assistance, creating costly delays in response. For example,  when WFP received 4,200 metric tons of maize in Angola in 2003 and  found a large quantity to be wet and moldy, it did not receive a timely  response from USAID officials on how to handle the problem. WFP  incurred $176,000 in costs in determining the safety of the remaining  cargo, but was later instructed by USAID to destroy the whole shipment.  WFP claims it lost over $640,000 in this case, including destruction costs  and the value of the commodity. Although KCCO established a hotline to  provide assistance on food quality complaints, KCCO officials stated that it  was discontinued because USDA and USAID officials wanted to receive  complaints directly, rather than from KCCO. Nevertheless, agencies and  stakeholders have suggested that providing a standard questionnaire to  implementing organizations would ensure more consistent reporting on  food quality issues.
section_title: While Agencies Have Taken Steps to Improve Efficiency, Their Costs and Benefits Have Not Yet Been Measured
paragraphs: To improve timeliness in food aid delivery, USAID has been prepositioning  commodities in two locations and KCCO is implementing a new  transportation bid process. Prepositioning enabled USAID to respond  more rapidly to the 2005 Asian tsunami emergency than would have been  otherwise possible. KCCO’s bid process is also expected to reduce  delivery time frames and ocean freight rates. However, the long-term cost  effectiveness of both initiatives has not yet been measured.
subsections: section_title: Prepositioning and Transportation Procurement Could Improve Timeliness
paragraphs: USAID has prepositioned food aid on a limited basis to improve timeliness  in delivery.
USAID has used warehouses in Lake Charles (Louisiana) since 2002 and  Dubai (United Arab Emirates) since 2004 to stock commodities in  preparation for food aid emergencies and it is now adding a third site in  Djibouti, East Africa. USAID has used prepositioned food to respond to  recent emergencies in Lebanon, Somalia, and Southeast Asia, among other  areas. Prepositioning is beneficial because it allows USAID to bypass  lengthy procurement processes and to reduce transportation timeframes.  USAID officials told us that diverting food aid cargo to the site of an  emergency before it reaches a prepositioning warehouse further reduces  response time and eliminates storage costs. When the 2005 Asian tsunami  struck, for example, USAID quickly provided 7,000 metric tons of food to  victims by diverting the carrier at sea, before it reached the Dubai  warehouse. According to USAID officials, prepositioning warehouses also  offer the opportunity to improve logistics when USAID is able to begin the  procurement process before an emergency occurs, or if it is able to  implement long-term agreements with ocean carriers for tonnage levels  that are more certain.
Despite its potential for improved timeliness, prepositioning has not yet  been studied in terms of its long-term cost effectiveness. Table 1 shows  that over fiscal years 2005 and 2006, USAID purchased about 200,000  metric tons of processed food for prepositioning (about 3 percent of total  food aid tonnage), diverted about 36,000 metric tons en route, and  incurred contract costs of about $1.5 million for food that reached the  warehouse (averaging around $10 per metric ton). In addition to contract  costs, ocean carriers generally charge higher freight rates for  prepositioned cargo to account for additional cargo loading or unloading,  additional days at port, and additional risk of damage associated with  cargo that has undergone extra handling. USAID officials have suggested  that average freight rates for prepositioned cargo could be $20 per metric  ton higher.
In addition to costs of prepositioning, agencies face several challenges to  their effective management of this program, including the following:    Food aid experts and stakeholders expressed mixed views on the  appropriateness of current prepositioning locations. Only 5 of the 14  ocean carriers we interviewed rated existing sites positively and most  indicated interest in alternative sites. KCCO officials and experts also  expressed concern with the quality of the Lake Charles warehouse and the  lack of ocean carriers providing service to that location. For example,  many carriers must move cargo by truck from Lake Charles to Houston  before shipping it, which adds as much as an extra 21 days for delivery.
Inadequate inventory management increases risk of cargo infestation.  KCCO and port officials suggested that USAID had not consistently  shipped older cargo out of the warehouses first. USAID officials  emphasized that inventory management has been improving but that  limited monitoring and evaluation funds constrain their oversight  capacity. For example, the current USAID official responsible for  overseeing the Lake Charles prepositioning stock was able to visit the site  only once in fiscal year 2006—at his own expense.
Agencies have had difficulties ensuring phytosanitary certification for  prepositioned food because they do not know the country of final  destination when they request phytosanitary certification from APHIS.  According to USDA, since prepositioned food is not imported directly  from a U.S. port, it requires either a U.S.-reissued phytosanitary certificate  or a foreign-issued phytosanitary certificate for re-export.   USDA officials  told us they do not think that it is appropriate to reissue these certificates,  as once a food aid shipment leaves the United States, they cannot make  any statements about the phytosanitary status of the commodities, which  may not meet the entry requirements of the country of destination.  USDA  officials are concerned that USAID will store commodities for a  considerable period of time during which their status may change, thus  making the certificate invalid.  Although USDA and USAID officials are  willing to let foreign government officials issue these certificates, U.S.  inspection officials remain concerned that the foreign officials might not  have the resources or be willing to recertify these commodities. Without  phytosanitary certificates, food aid shipments could be rejected, turned  away, or destroyed by recipient country governments.
Certain regulations applicable to food aid create challenges for improving  supply logistics. For example, food aid bags must include various  markings reflecting contract information, when the commodity should be  consumed, and whether the commodity is for sale or direct distribution.  Marking requirements vary by country (some require markings in local  language), making it difficult for USAID to divert cargo. Also, due to the  small quantity of total food aid tonnage (about 3 percent) allocated for the  prepositioning program, USAID is unable to use the program to  consistently purchase large quantities of food aid earlier in the fiscal year.
section_title: New Transportation Bid Process Could Reduce Procurement Time Frames
paragraphs: In addition to prepositioning, KCCO is implementing a new transportation  bid process to reduce procurement time frames and increase competition  between ocean carriers. In the prior two–step system, during a first  procurement round, commodity vendors bid on contracts and ocean  carriers indicated potential freight rates. Carriers provided actual rate bids  during a second procurement round, once the location of the commodity  vendor had been determined. In the new 1-step system, ocean carriers will  bid at the same time as commodity vendors. KCCO expects the new  system to cut 2 weeks from the procurement process and potentially  provide average annual savings of $25 million in reduced transportation  costs. KCCO also expects this new bid process will reduce cargo handling  costs as cargo loading becomes more consolidated. When asked about the  new system, many carriers reported uncertainty as to what its future  impact would be, while several expressed concern that USDA’s testing of  the system had not been sufficiently transparent.
section_title: Various Challenges Prevent Effective Monitoring of Food Aid
paragraphs: Despite the importance of ensuring the effective use of food aid to  alleviate hunger, U.S. agencies’ efforts to monitor food aid programs are  insufficient. Limited food aid resources make it important for donors and  implementers to ensure that food aid reaches the most vulnerable  populations, thereby enhancing its effectiveness. However, USAID and  USDA do not sufficiently monitor food aid programs, particularly in  recipient countries, due to limited staff, competing priorities, and legal  restrictions in use of food aid resources.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Agencies Do Not Sufficiently Monitor Food Aid Programs
paragraphs: Although USAID and USDA require implementing organizations to  regularly monitor and report on the use of food aid, these agencies have  undertaken limited field-level monitoring of food aid programs. Agency  inspectors general have reported that monitoring has not been regular and  systematic, and that in some cases intended recipients have not received  food aid or the number of recipients could not be verified. Our audit work  also indicates that monitoring has been insufficient due to various factors  including limited staff, competing priorities, and restrictions in use of food  aid resources.
USAID and USDA require NGOs and WFP to conduct regular monitoring  of food aid programs. USAID Title II guidance for multi-year programs  requires implementing organizations to provide a monitoring plan, which  includes information such as the percentage of the target population  reached, as well as mid-term and final evaluations of program impact.  USDA requires implementing organizations to report semi-annually on  commodity logistics and the use of food. According to WFP’s agreement  with the U.S. government, WFP field staff should undertake periodic  monitoring at food distribution sites to ensure that commodities are  distributed according to an agreed-upon plan. Additionally, WFP is to  provide annual reports for each of its U.S.-funded programs.
In addition to monitoring by implementing organizations, agency  monitoring is important to ensure targeting of food aid is adjusted to  changes in conditions as they occur, and to modify programs to improve  their effectiveness, according to USAID officials. However, various USAID  and USDA Inspectors General reports have cited problems with agencies’  monitoring of programs. For example, according to various USAID  Inspector General reports on non-emergency programs in 2003, while food  aid was generally delivered to intended recipients, USAID officials did not  conduct regular and systematic monitoring. One such assessment of  direct distribution programs in Madagascar, for example, noted that as a  result of insufficient and ad hoc site visits, USAID officials were unable to  detect an NGO reallocation of significant quantities of food aid to a  different district that, combined with late arrival of U.S. food aid, resulted  in severe shortages of food aid for recipients in a USAID-approved district.  The Inspector General’s assessment of food aid programs in Ghana stated  that the USAID mission’s annual report included data, such as number of  recipients, that were directly reported by implementing organizations  without any procedures to review the completeness and accuracy of this  information over a 3-year period. As a result, the Inspector General  concluded, the mission had no assurance as to the quality and accuracy of  this data.
subsections: section_title: Limited Staff Constrain Monitoring of Food Aid Programs in Recipient Countries
paragraphs: Limited staff and other demands in USAID missions and regional offices  have constrained their field-level monitoring of food aid programs. In  fiscal year 2006, although USAID has some non-Title II staff assigned to  monitoring, it had only 23 Title II-funded staff assigned to missions and  regional offices in just 10 countries to monitor programs costing about $1.7  billion in 55 countries. For example, USAID’s Zambia mission had only one  Title-II funded foreign-national and one U.S.-national staff to oversee $4.6  million in U.S. food aid funding in fiscal year 2006. Moreover, the U.S.- national staff only spent about one-third of his time on food aid activities  and two-thirds on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief  program.
USAID regional offices’ monitoring of food aid programs has also been  limited. These offices oversee programs in multiple countries, especially  where USAID missions lack human-resource capacity. For example,  USAID’s East Africa regional office, which is located in Kenya, is  responsible for oversight in 13 countries in East and Central Africa, of  which 6 had limited or no capacity to monitor food aid activities,  according to USAID officials. This regional office, rather than USAID’s  Kenya mission, provided monitoring staff to oversee about $100 million in  U.S. food aid to Kenya in fiscal year 2006. While officials from the  regional office reported that their program officers monitor food aid  programs, according to an implementing organization official we  interviewed, USAID officials visited the project site only 3 times in 1 year.  USAID officials told us that they may have multiple project sites in a  country and may monitor selected sites based on factors such as severity  of need and level of funding.  In another case, monitoring food aid  programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from the USAID  regional office had been difficult due to poor transportation and  communication infrastructure, according to USAID officials. Therefore,  USAID decided to station one full-time employee in the capital of the DRC  to monitor U.S. food aid programs that cost about $51 million in fiscal year  2006.
section_title: Limited Resources and Restrictions in Their Use Further Constrain Monitoring Efforts
paragraphs: Field-level monitoring is also constrained by limited resources and  restrictions in their use. Title II resources provide only part of the funding  for USAID’s food aid monitoring activities and there are legal restrictions  on the use of these funds for non-emergency programs. Other funds, such  as from the agency’s overall operations expense and development  assistance accounts, are also to be used for food aid activities such as  monitoring. However, these additional resources are limited due to  competing priorities and their use is based on agency-wide allocation  decisions, according to USAID officials. As a result, resources available to  hire food aid monitors are limited. For example, about 5 U.S.-national and  5 foreign-national staff are responsible for monitoring all food aid  programs in 7 countries in the Southern Africa region, according to a  USAID food aid regional coordinator. Moreover, because its operations  expense budget is limited and Title II funding only allows food monitors  for emergency programs, USAID relies significantly on Personal Services  Contractors (PSCs) —both U.S.-national and foreign-national hires—to  monitor and manage food aid programs in the field. For example, while  PSCs can use food aid project funds for travel, USAID’s General Schedule  staff cannot. Restrictions in the use of Title II resources for monitoring  non-emergency programs further reduce USAID’s monitoring of these  programs.
USDA administers a smaller proportion of food aid programs than USAID,  and its field-level monitoring of food aid programs is more limited than for  USAID-funded programs. In March 2006, USDA’s Inspector General  reported that USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) had not  implemented a number of recommendations made in a March 1999 report  on NGO monitoring. Furthermore, several NGOs informed GAO that the  quality of USDA oversight from Washington, D.C. is generally limited in  comparison to oversight by USAID. USDA has fewer overseas staff who  are usually focused on monitoring agricultural trade issues and foreign  market development. For example, the agency assigns a field attaché— with multiple responsibilities in addition to food aid monitoring—to U.S.  missions in some countries. However, FAS officials informed us that in  response to past USDA Inspector General and GAO recommendations, a  new monitoring and evaluation unit has been established recently with an  increased staffing level to monitor the semiannual reports, conduct site  visits, and evaluate programs.
Without adequate monitoring from U.S. agencies, food aid programs are  vulnerable to not effectively directing limited food aid resources to those  populations most in need. As a result, agencies may not be sufficiently  accomplishing their goals of getting the right food to the right people at  the right time.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To address these objectives, we analyzed food aid procurement and  transportation data provided by USDA’s KCCO and food aid budget data  provided by USDA, USAID and WFP. We determined that the food aid data  obtained was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We reviewed economic  literature on the implications of food aid on local markets and recent  reports, studies, and papers issued on U.S. and international food aid  programs. We conducted a structured interview of the 14 U.S.- and foreign- flag ocean carriers that transport over 80 percent of U.S. food aid  tonnages. We supplemented our structured interview evidence with  information from other ocean carriers and shipping experts. In  Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials from USAID, USDA, the  Departments of State (State), DOD, DOT, and the Office of Management  and Budget (OMB). We also met with a number of officials representing  NGOs that serve as implementing partners to USAID and USDA in carrying  out U.S. food aid programs overseas; freight forwarding companies; and  agricultural commodity groups. In Rome, we met with officials from the  U.S. Mission to the UN Agencies for Food and Agriculture, the UN World  Food Program headquarters, and FAO. We also conducted field work in  three countries that are recipients of food aid—Ethiopia, Kenya, and  Zambia—and met with officials from U.S. missions, implementing  organizations, and relevant host government agencies in these countries  and South Africa. We visited a port in Texas from which food is shipped;  two food destination ports in South Africa and Kenya; and two sites in  Louisiana and Dubai where U.S. food may be stocked prior to shipment to  destination ports. For the countries we visited, we also reviewed  numerous documents on U.S. food aid, including all the proposals that  USDA approved from 2002 to 2006 for the food aid programs it  administers, and approximately half of the proposals that USAID approved  from 2002 to 2006 for the food aid programs it administers. Finally, in  January 2007, we convened a roundtable of 15 experts and practitioners  including representatives from academia, think tanks, implementing  organizations, the maritime industry, and agricultural commodity groups  to further delineate, based on GAO’s initial work, some key challenges to  the efficient delivery and effective use of U.S. food aid and to explore  options for improvement. We took the roundtable participants’ views into  account as we finalized our analysis of these challenges and options. We  conducted our work between April 2006 and March 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted U.S. government auditing standards.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: U.S. international food aid programs have helped hundreds of millions of  people around the world survive and recover from crises since the  Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L. 480) was signed  into law in 1954. Nevertheless, in an environment of increasing  emergencies, tight budget constraints, and rising transportation and  business costs, U.S. agencies must explore ways to optimize the delivery  and use of food aid. U.S. agencies have taken some measures to enhance  their ability to respond to emergencies and streamline the myriad  processes involved in delivering food aid. However, opportunities for  further improvement in such areas as logistical planning and  transportation contracting remain. Moreover, inadequate coordination  among food aid stakeholders has hampered ongoing efforts to address  some of these logistical challenges. Finally, U.S. agencies’ lack of  monitoring leaves U.S. food aid programs vulnerable to wasting  increasingly limited resources, not putting them to their most effective  use, or not reaching the most vulnerable populations on a timely basis.
In a draft report that is under review by U.S. agencies, we recommend that  to improve the efficiency of U.S. food aid—in terms of amount, timeliness,  and quality—USDA, USAID, and DOT work together and with  stakeholders to  improve food aid logistical planning through cost-benefit analysis of  supply-management options, such as long-term transportation agreements  and prepositioning—including consideration of alternative methods, such  as those used by WFP;   modernize transportation contracting procedures to include, to the extent  possible, commercial principles of shared risks, streamlined  administration, and expedited payment and claims resolution;   seek to minimize the cost impact of cargo preference regulations on food  aid transportation expenditures by updating implementation and  reimbursement methodologies to account for new supply practices, such  as prepositioning, and potential costs associated with older vessels or  limited foreign-flag participation; and   establish a coordinated system for tracking and resolving food quality  complaints.
To optimize the effectiveness of food aid, we recommend that USAID and  USDA improve monitoring of food aid programs to ensure proper  management and implementation.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: USAID, USDA, and DOT provided oral comments on a draft of this  statement and we incorporated them as appropriate.  We also provided  DOD, State, FAO, and WFP an opportunity to offer technical comments  that we have incorporated as appropriate.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared  statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Should you have any questions about this testimony, please contact  Thomas Melito, Director, at (202) 512-9601 or MelitoT@gao.gov. Other  major contributors to this testimony were Phillip Thomas (Assistant  Director), Carol Bray, Ming Chen, Debbie Chung, Martin De Alteriis, Leah  DeWolf, Mark Dowling, Etana Finkler, Kristy Kennedy, Joy Labez, Kendall  Schaefer, and Mona Sehgal.
section_title: Appendix I: Program Authorities and Congressional Mandates
paragraphs: The United States has principally employed six programs to deliver food  aid: P.L. 480 Titles I, II, and III; Food for Progress; McGovern-Dole Food  for Education and Child Nutrition; and Section 416(b). Table 2 provides a  summary of these food aid programs by program authority.
In addition to these programs, resources for U.S. food aid can be provided  through other sources, which include the following:    International Disaster and Famine Assistance funds, designated for  famine prevention and relief, as well as mitigation of the effects of famine  by addressing its root causes. Over the past 3 years, USAID has  programmed $73.8 million in famine prevention funds. Most of these funds  have been programmed in the Horn of Africa, where USAID officials told  us that famine is now persistent. According to USAID officials, experience  thus far demonstrates that one of the advantages of these funds is that  they enable USAID to combine emergency responses with development  approaches to address the threat of famine. Approaches should be  innovative and catalytic, while providing flexibility in assisting famine- prone countries or regions. Famine prevention assistance funds should  generally be programmed for no more than 1 year and seek to achieve  significant and measurable results during that time period. Funding  decisions are made jointly by USAID’s regional bureaus and the Bureau for  Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian assistance, and are subject to OMB  concurrence and congressional consultations. In fiscal year 2006, USAID  programmed $19.8 million to address the chronic failure of the pastoralist  livelihood system in the Mandera Triangle—a large, arid region  encompassing parts of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya that was the  epicenter of that year’s hunger crisis in the Horn of Africa. In fiscal year  2005, USAID received $34.2 million in famine prevention funds for  activities in Ethiopia and six Great Lakes countries. The activities in  Ethiopia enabled USAID to intervene early enough in the 2005 drought  cycle to protect the livelihoods—as well as the lives—of pastoralist  populations in the Somali Region, which were not yet protected by  Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net program. In fiscal year 2004, the USAID  mission in Ethiopia received $19.8 million in famine prevention funds to  enhance and diversify the livelihoods of the chronically food insecure.
State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM),  which provides limited amounts of cash to WFP to purchase food locally  and globally in order to remedy shortages in refugee feeding pipeline  breaks. In these situations, PRM generally provides about 1 month’s worth  of refugee feeding needs—PRM will not usually provide funds unless  USAID’s resources have been exhausted. Funding from year to year varies.  In fiscal year 2006, PRM’s cash assistance to WFP to fund operations in 14  countries totaled about $15 million, including $1.45 million for  humanitarian air service. In addition, PRM also funds food aid and food  security programs for Burmese refugees in Thailand. In fiscal year 2006,  PRM provided $7 million in emergency supplemental funding to the  Thailand-Burma Border Consortium, most of which supported food- related programs. PRM officials told us that they coordinate efforts with  USAID as needed.
Table 3 lists congressional mandates for the P.L. 480 food aid programs  and the target for fiscal year 2006.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Darfur Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace Montoring Threatened by  i Ongoing Vioence and Operational Challenges,  D.C.: Nov. 9, 2006).
GAO-07-9. (Washington,  Darfur Crss: Deah Estmaes Demonstrate Severiy of Crisis, but Their  Accuracy and Credibility Could Be Enhanced, GAO-07-24. (Washington,  D.C.: Nov. 9, 2006).
Mar ime Security Feet: Many Factors Determine Impact o Potential  Limis on Food Aid Shpments, GAO-04-1065. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, i 2004).
Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to Agrculura Recovery Threaten Afghanistan’s Stability, GAO-03-607. (Washington, D.C.:  June 30, 2003).
Foreign Assistance: Susaned Efors Needed toHelp Southern Afrca  Recover from Food Criss, GAO-03-644. (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2003).
Food Aid: Experence o U.S. Programs Suggest Opportunites for  Improvement, GAO-02-801T. (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2002).
Foreign Assistance: Global Food for Educaion Initiative Faces Cha enges  for Successful Impementaton, GAO-02-328. (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, li 2002).
Foreign Assistance: U.S. Food Aid Program o Russa Had Weak nternal  Controls, GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-00-329. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2000).
Foreign Assistance: U.S. Bilatera Food Asssance to North Korea Had  Mxed Resuls, GAO/NSIAD-00-175. (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2000). ti Foreign Assistance: Donation of U.S. Planting Seed to Russia in 1999 Had  Weaknesses, GAO/NSIAD-00-91. (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2000).
Foreign Assistance: North Korean Constraints Lmt Food Aid Montorng,  GAO/T-NSIAD-00-47. (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1999).
Foreign Assistance: North Korea Resricts Food Aid Mon oring, GAO- NSIAD-00-35. (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 1999).
Food Security: Prepara ons for the 1996 World Food Summt,  GAO/NSIAD-97-44. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1996).  i Food Security: Factors That Could Afec Progress Toward Meeting World  Food Summi Goals, GAO/NSIAD-99-15. (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1999). t International Rea ons: Food Security n Afrca, GAO/T-NSIAD-96-217.  (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 1996).
Food Aid: Competng Goals and Requiremens Hnder Tile  Program  t Ilt Resu s, GAO/GGD-95-68. (Washington, D.C.: June 26, 1995).
Foreign Ad: Actions Taken to Improve Food Aid Management,  GAO/NSIAD-95-74. (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 1995).
Mar ime Indusry: Cargo Preference Laws Es mated Costs and Effecs,  GAO/RCED-95-34. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 1994).
Privae Voluntary Organzatons’ Role in Distrbutng Food Aid,  GAO/NSIAD-95-35. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 23, 1994).
Cargo Preerence Requirements: Objectives Not Met When Applied to  Food Aid Programs, GAO/GGD-94-215. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 1994)
Publc Law 480 Tite I: Economc and Market Deveopment Objectves No  Met, GAO/T-GGD-94-191. (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 3, 1994).
Mut ateral Assstance: Accountab ty for U.S. Contributons to the World  Food Program, GAO/ T-NSIAD-94-174. (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1994).
Foreign Assistance: Inadequate Accountab ty for U.S. Donations tothe World Food Program, GAO/NSIAD-94-29. (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28,  1994).
Foreign Assistance: U.S. Partcpa on n FAO’s Technica Cooperaton  Program, GAO/NSIAD-94-32. (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 11, 1994).
Food Aid: Management Improvements Are Needed to Achieve Program  Objectives, GAO/NSIAD-93-168. (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1993).
Cargo Preerence Requirements: Ther Impact on U.S. Food Aid Programs  and the U.S. Merchant Marine, GAO/NSIAD-90-174. (Washington, D.C.:  June 19, 1990).
Status Report on GAO’s Reviews on P.L. 480 Food Aid Programs, GAO/T- NSIAD-90-23. (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 21, 1990).
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