Military Training: Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations Training and Facilities Should Be Based on Sound Strategy and Requirements
Published: 2005-12-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD emphasizes the need for joint training to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint operations in urban terrain. It defines joint training as exercises involving the interaction of joint forces and/or joint staffs under a joint headquarters. To guide the services' plans to train forces for urban operations and construct related facilities, in May 2002, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed DOD to establish facility requirements and, in May 2005, the committee directed DOD to complete its efforts and provide a requirements baseline for measuring training capabilities within the services and across DOD by November 1, 2005. Due to DOD's focus on joint urban operations and congressional interest in synchronizing service training and facility plans, GAO, on the authority of the Comptroller General, reviewed the extent to which (1) DOD has developed a joint urban operations training strategy and related requirements, (2) exercises offer opportunities for joint urban operations training, and (3) DOD has incorporated lessons learned from ongoing operations into its training.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall joint strategy for urban operations training and related facility and training requirements. In response to congressional direction, Joint Forces Command, designated as DOD's executive agent for urban operations training, contracted for a study, completed in early 2005, to identify facility and training requirements. In May 2005, the Command began working with the services to review the study's results and to develop the detailed facility and training requirements needed to form the basis for a joint training strategy. While the draft strategy identifies some facility needs, as of October 2005, the Command and services have not reached consensus on the level or types of joint training exercises needed to prepare troops for urban operations. As a result, the Command has been unable to finalize the strategy or the facility and joint training requirements that will form the baseline for measuring capabilities within each service and across DOD. DOD officials told us they will not be able to deliver the required baseline on time and instead plan to provide criteria for the Congress to use in evaluating service facility plans. Until the Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations training and related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service training and facility plans, and related funding requests. Despite DOD's increasing emphasis on the importance of training for joint urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently exist for training that places troops from different services on the ground working under a joint headquarters. Joint and service doctrine both require forces to be prepared to operate jointly across the full range of military operations. Various factors account for the lack of joint training opportunities, such as the services' focus on service-specific skills, and the lack of an overall strategy requiring joint urban operations training, specific training requirements, and a formal mechanism to schedule joint training at service facilities. Without a strategy, defined requirements, and a joint scheduling mechanism, DOD cannot be assured that joint urban operations training will occur or that it will maximize the joint usage of training facilities. While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing operations into its training program, training and troop personnel GAO interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD's training goals is to train as it expects to fight. Based on feedback from ongoing operations, DOD has made several adjustments, including constructing urban structures, using civilian role players, and adding training on techniques to counter emerging enemy tactics. Persons GAO interviewed cited the need for more live-fire capability, larger numbers of role players, information gathering and cultural awareness training, and training with newly fielded equipment. While DOD plans more improvements, until it develops a strategy and specific requirements as discussed above, it lacks a solid basis to evaluate suggestions, and guide its improvement efforts and investment decisions.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the challenges  facing U.S. forces as they conduct military operations in urban  environments, typically referred to as urban operations. These challenges  include the presence of large numbers of noncombatants, a high density of  buildings that complicate the coordination of firing weapons, a diminished  effectiveness of communications equipment, and an increased ability of  insurgents or guerrilla fighters to conceal their whereabouts. Based on  ongoing operations, which often require U.S. forces to conduct urban  operations, military commanders have increasingly called for more training  in this area. In response, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military  services have begun placing a higher priority on urban operations training.  DOD has also increasingly emphasized the importance of joint training,  including exercises to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint urban  operations. DOD defines a joint exercise as the interaction of joint forces  or joint staffs conducted under a joint headquarters according to joint  doctrine that prepares forces/staffs to respond to operational  requirements. DOD has designated the Joint Forces Command as the  command responsible for joint training, and in particular, to act as the  executive agent, for urban operations training.
As the military services continue to develop plans for urban operations  training and to construct or upgrade training facilities, and submit related  funding requests, the Senate Armed Services Committee has directed DOD  to develop requirements to guide the services’ plans. Specifically, in May  2002, Senate Report 107-151, accompanying the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, directed DOD to establish facility  requirements and, in May 2005, Senate Report 109-69, accompanying the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, directed DOD to  complete its efforts and provide a requirements baseline for measuring  training capabilities within each service and across DOD by November 1,  2005. In the latter report, the Senate Armed Services Committee noted the  services will continue to address urban operations training requirements  and expend resources independently with minimal coordination and  cooperation until a comprehensive joint training plan and investment  strategy are approved and implemented within the department. In  response, the Joint Forces Command has been working with the military  services to develop an overall training strategy that addresses the need for  troops to train jointly for urban operations, and related facility and training  requirements. According to Joint Forces Command, this strategy and the  related requirements, once complete, is intended to satisfy the baseline  required by Senate Report 109-69.
Because of DOD’s focus on joint urban operations and congressional  interest in synchronizing service training and facility plans, we, on the  authority of the Comptroller General, reviewed the extent to which   (1) DOD has developed a joint urban operations training strategy and  related requirements, (2) exercises offer opportunities for joint urban  operations training, and (3) DOD has incorporated lessons learned from  ongoing operations into its training.
To address these objectives, we interviewed knowledgeable DOD officials,  and analyzed relevant documents including DOD training doctrine, the  draft urban operations training strategy, and the results of joint urban  operations working group meetings. Additionally, we visited several service  training installations and combat training centers in the United States as  well as overseas, observed exercises, and analyzed training documents to  identify the extent of joint participation in exercises and improvements  made to urban operations training as a result of lessons learned from  ongoing operations. We also conducted interviews with training personnel  and troops recently returned from Iraq and Afghanistan to obtain their  views on the type of urban operations training needed to realistically train  troops as they will fight. We determined that the data we analyzed were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review. We performed our work  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards from  January 2005 through September 2005. More details on our scope and  methodology are presented in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Half the world’s population lives in urban areas, and the trend towards  global urbanization is continuing. Within the last 40 years, the United States  military has conducted urban operations in locations such as Saigon, Hue,  Beirut, Panama City, Kuwait City, Mogadishu, and the villages of the  Balkans. Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the  trend towards urban operations and the many challenges they present U.S.  forces. Military planners recognize this trend and acknowledge the  likelihood that enemies will continue to draw U.S. forces into cities to  degrade U.S. military advantages. According to DOD, in the future, U.S.  forces will likely conduct military operations in urban areas, which are  characterized by multiple structures, numerous noncombatants, and  complex infrastructure. These areas are also political, cultural, and  economic centers, as well as hubs for transportation, information, and  manufacturing. Thus, the urban environment constrains many of the  advantages that U.S. forces currently enjoy in open environments,  increasing the risks of high casualties to friendly forces and  noncombatants, and extensive collateral damage. “The wars and the conflicts of the 21st century will not be fought by individual services.   Rather, they will be fought by joint forces, and more often than not, by combined forces.   Therefore, we will have to think, train, and exercise jointly and combined, because let there  be no doubt that is the way that we will fight.”
As part of its Training Transformation Program, DOD is attempting to  provide more of a joint context to its training. DOD defines a joint exercise  as the interaction of joint forces and/or joint staffs conducted under a joint  headquarters according to joint doctrine that prepares forces/staffs to  respond to operational requirements. To develop a stronger program of  joint training, DOD designated the Joint Forces Command as the joint  trainer for DOD to support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well  as senior commanders worldwide in meeting joint training objectives. In  2002, DOD published its Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations and,  recognizing the need to place a stronger emphasis on urban operations  training, assigned the role of joint urban operations executive agent for  training to Joint Forces Command. While the Office of the Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall responsibility for training  policies, Joint Forces Command, as DOD’s executive agent, is the “primary  DOD point of contact and proponent for joint urban operations doctrine,  training, and equipment,” and is to lead, coordinate, and integrate the  activities of the other DOD components on such matters. In this role, Joint  Forces Command has conducted experiments on concepts of operations  for joint urban operations and monitored lessons learned from ongoing  urban operations.
The training of U.S. forces for urban operations is primarily the  responsibility of the services. Both the Army and Marine Corps, the  services that conduct most urban operations, have developed fairly robust  urban operations training programs for their ground forces. Figure 1 shows  an Army training facility at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, with structures built  to train troops in conducting urban operations.
The services train ground forces for urban operations based on a building- block approach beginning with specialty-focused individual training at  their assigned installation, which normally focuses on individual basic  skills needed to successfully conduct operations in urban terrain. Then  they progress through collective training that sometimes includes other  services on a limited basis. Training ends with a culminating exercise at a  major training center, such as the Joint Readiness Training Center or  Twenty-Nine Palms, and is based on real-time scenarios that troops may  encounter in the urban environment. The Army and Marine Corps currently  have plans to construct new or upgrade existing facilities to support urban  operations training.
section_title: Consensus Has Not Been Reached on DOD’s Joint Urban Operations Training Strategy
paragraphs: Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall joint  strategy for urban operations training and related facility and training  requirements. In response to direction from the Senate Armed Services  Committee in May 2002, Joint Forces Command, designated as DOD’s  executive agent for urban operations training, contracted for a study,  completed in early 2005, to identify facility and training requirements. In  May 2005, the committee directed DOD to establish joint urban operations  facility requirements and a training requirements baseline by November 1,  2005. In May 2005, Joint Forces Command began working with the services  to review the study’s results and develop the detailed facility and training  requirements needed to form the basis for a joint training strategy. While  the services have identified some facility needs, Joint Forces Command  and service representatives have been unable to reach consensus on the  level or types of joint training necessary to prepare troops for urban  operations. As a result, Joint Forces Command has been unable to finalize  the strategy or the facility and joint training requirements that will form the  baseline for measuring capabilities within each service and across DOD.  DOD officials told us they will not be able to deliver the baseline as  required by November 1, 2005, and instead plan to provide criteria for the  Congress to use in evaluating service facility plans. Until Joint Forces  Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations training  and related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the  Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service facility and training  plans, and related funding requests.
subsections: section_title: DOD Directed to Develop Urban Operations Training and Facility Requirements
paragraphs: In the committee report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2003 National  Defense Authorization Act, the Senate Armed Services Committee  required a report by the Secretary of Defense that would establish  requirements for facilities that support urban operations training within  DOD. In response to the committee’s direction, the Office of the Secretary  of Defense and the joint urban operations executive agent, Joint Forces  Command, contracted for a study that would examine urban operations  training requirements and the resulting facilities that would be needed to  conduct the necessary training.
The study was completed in early 2005. According to DOD officials, while  the study results have helped to inform the process, the detailed training  and facility requirements contained in the study have not been formally  adopted because there was not enough agreement among the services as to  the usefulness or veracity of the identified urban operations training  requirements in that study. Consequently, in May 2005 Joint Forces  Command convened a working group to develop joint urban operations  training and facilities requirements on which to base a joint urban  operations training strategy.
In the committee report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006 National  Defense Authorization Act, the Senate Armed Services committee directed  DOD to complete its efforts to establish the requirements for facilities and  also directed it to establish, by November 1, 2005, a training requirements  baseline against which the ability to train for urban operations within the  services and across DOD could be measured. In the report, the committee  expressed concern that the services would otherwise continue to address  urban operations training requirements and expend resources  independently with minimal coordination and that a critical opportunity to  develop capabilities for joint training in urban operations was not being  effectively pursued. In response to congressional direction, Joint Forces  Command began working with the services to develop an overall strategy  for joint urban operations and related facility and training requirements.  According to DOD, this effort is intended to meet the congressional  directive for a requirements baseline.
section_title: Current Strategy Focuses on Need for Facilities
paragraphs: To date, the draft Joint Urban Operations Training Strategy, as currently  drafted, primarily focuses on the need to enhance training facilities to  accommodate larger, more realistic joint urban operations training events.  The current draft strategy’s focus is to identify the necessary locations for  joint urban operations training for two audiences: (1) troops executing  urban operations at the tactical level and (2) officers serving on the staffs  of commanders conducting urban operations. As envisioned, the troops  that execute the operations would undergo training that places members of  different services together to learn to operate together and to overcome  differences in standard practices, terms, and organizational cultures that  can limit the effectiveness of operations. The draft strategy also envisions  using three training range complexes comprised of existing training  facilities in the western, central, and eastern United States, as well as  improvements and expansions planned for some of these training facilities.
For its second audience, the strategy suggested building new facilities in  order to train staff officers in the skills associated with serving on a joint  staff of a commander conducting urban operations. According to DOD,  officers serving on a joint staff rarely receive significant and realistic  training for this complex role in which they are called upon to make  recommendations to the joint task force commander based on a myriad of  facts and assumptions in a limited time frame. The draft strategy notes that  many officers often spend more time in the course of their careers working  on command staffs than they do in command of troops. In order to  establish staff training, the strategy proposes building four new joint staff  training centers large enough to handle battalion or combatant-command- level staffs to replicate the sort of command and control arrangements and  joint staff processes they will encounter while serving as staff officers  under a joint force commander. According to a Joint Forces Command  official, these centers can provide adequate throughput for staff training if  used in conjunction with the current Joint Operations Centers in  Grafenwoehr, Germany, and at Joint Forces Command in Suffolk, Virginia.
section_title: Lack of Consensus on Joint Training Requirements Stalls Strategy
paragraphs: The services have identified their respective facility needs to support urban  operations training. However, the Joint Forces Command has not been able  to finalize a draft joint urban operations training strategy because  command officials and service representatives have not been able to agree  upon joint urban operations training requirements. Specifically, there is a  lack of agreement on the need for joint urban operations training events  that place significant numbers of troops from different services together in  urban settings. As Joint Forces Command officials continue to develop the  draft strategy, they have pledged to continue working with the services and  combatant commands to develop the joint urban operations training  requirements through the working group process. To date, Joint Forces  Command has provided only a very broad, overarching statement of the  tasks that are unique to or significantly challenged by urban environments,  with a focus on conducting joint urban operations at the operational level.
Representatives from the Army and Marine Corps in attendance at the  second session of the joint urban operations training strategy working  group in August 2005 repeatedly emphasized the need for more specifically  defined training requirements for joint urban operations before they could  evaluate the draft joint urban operations training strategy and assess their  services’ commitment to it. Given the key role the services and combatant  commands play in training forces—both troops on the ground and staff  personnel—consensus on joint urban operations training requirements is  necessary for the implementation of a joint urban operations training  strategy.
Because of the lack of consensus in the draft joint urban operations  training strategy and related requirements, DOD has not yet developed  joint training requirements to use as a baseline against which to measure  capabilities within and across the services. As a result, DOD officials told  us they will not be able to deliver the requirements baseline to the Congress  by the November 1, 2005, deadline. DOD officials stated that, instead, they  plan to provide a set of questions for the Congress to use as interim criteria  in considering service funding requests for urban operations training  facilities. These questions are intended to assist the Congress in evaluating  the potential for joint usage of proposed facilities. Until Joint Forces  Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations training  and related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the  Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service facility and training  plans, and related funding requests.
section_title: Despite DOD’s Goals, Few Opportunities Exist for Forces to Train Together for Joint Urban Operations
paragraphs: Despite DOD’s increasing emphasis on the importance of training for joint  urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently exist for  joint urban operations training that places troops from different services on  the ground working under a joint headquarters. Various factors account for  the lack of joint urban operations training, such as the services’ focus on  training service-specific skills, and the lack of an overall strategy requiring  joint urban operations training, specific joint urban operations training  requirements, and a formal mechanism for scheduling joint urban  operations training at service-owned facilities. Without a training strategy,  defined requirements, and a joint scheduling mechanism, DOD cannot be  assured that joint urban operations training will occur or that DOD will  maximize the joint usage of urban operations training facilities.
subsections: section_title: Few Urban Operations Training Opportunities Exist that Meet DOD’s Definition of Joint Training
paragraphs: DOD’s Joint Training Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  Instruction 3500.01B, defines a joint exercise as a joint military maneuver,  simulated wartime operation, or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff/combatant commander–designated event involving planning,  preparation, execution, and evaluation in which forces of two or more  services interact as joint forces and/or joint staffs and the event is  conducted based on approved joint doctrine that prepares joint forces or  staffs to respond to operational requirements established by the combatant  commander. Although there is often some level of jointness incorporated  into Marine Corps and Army urban operations training events, these efforts  fall short of DOD’s definition of a joint training event because they do not  include a joint headquarters and focus on service, rather than joint, training  objectives. Marine Corps officials said that the Marine Corps includes some  joint scenarios in its events and incorporates to some extent other service  participation in performing certain specialty roles, such as air-ground  coordination. The Army simulates some of the joint aspects of a battlefield  in its training as well, such as the joint command and control structures  troops are expected to encounter in theater, and it incorporates special  operations forces when possible. According to Joint Forces Command  officials, the Joint Operations Center at Joint Forces Command in Suffolk,  Virginia, and the Joint Multinational Training Center in Grafenwoehr,  Germany, are used to provide some officers with the type of joint staff  officer training called for in the draft strategy. We observed the Joint  Operations Center, which is used to provide officers with command and  control training, at the Joint Multinational Training Center. Officers we  spoke with stated that this was a great addition that increased the level of  joint urban operations training.
Although the services are taking these actions to increase jointness,  training exercises are still primarily focused on service-derived, rather than  joint, training objectives and for the most part do not include a joint  headquarters to command the exercise. For example, an Air Force  representative who was involved in supporting the Army’s Air Warrior II  training exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana, which was designed to prepare  troops for urban operations before they deployed, stated that the value of  the training was limited for the Air Force because the training was designed  around the accomplishment of Army training objectives. Additionally, an  Air Force representative in Germany experienced similar difficulties in  getting Air Force training objectives added to Army exercises.  Furthermore, the troops and training personnel we interviewed, many of  whom had recent operational experience in ongoing operations,  emphasized the importance of training jointly for urban operations in order  to maximize familiarity with the services’ respective ways of operating and  overall interoperability.
section_title: Several Factors Contribute to the Lack of Joint Urban Operations Training
paragraphs: One important factor contributing to the lack of joint urban operations  training is the services’ focus on service-specific skills training. The two  services that perform the bulk of urban operations training, the Army and  Marine Corps, are proactively working to ensure that their troops are  trained in the individual skills needed for operations in urban terrain.  Soldiers and Marines are exposed to individual urban tasks in their basic  training and specialty schools. The Army and Marine Corps primarily  concentrate their urban operations training on enhancing the capabilities  of individual soldiers and small units—primarily squads, platoons, and  companies. As noted in our June 2005 report, historically, service training  has focused on individual service competencies or mission-essential tasks,  with less emphasis on joint operations. While this has allowed the services  to meet their core training responsibilities, it has also contributed to the  problem of forces often entering combat without prior experience or  training in joint urban operations.
Second, in the absence of a joint urban operations training strategy, there is  currently no specific requirement for the services to train jointly for urban  operations. While it is not urban-specific, the DOD Directive 1322.18, which  advocates joint training, states: “To the maximum extent possible, the DOD  components shall conduct joint training in accredited events at certified  facilities, and shall synchronize schedules to integrate training events.”  However, the directive does not define what is meant by “to the maximum  extent possible” and therefore provides the services much leeway in how  much they participate in joint training. Absent a directive requiring the  services to train for joint urban operations tasks at a specified level and  specific joint urban operations training requirements, the services are  likely to continue to focus their training on service-specific skills and tasks  for which they are held accountable. As discussed earlier, Joint Forces  Command expects the joint urban operations training strategy it is  developing to include such requirements.
Lastly, the services own the facilities used to conduct urban operations  training and are currently using them primarily for service-specific training  requirements. While the services agree that joint urban operations training  is needed, there is no formal mechanism in place to ensure that joint  training requirements are incorporated into the different services’ training  schedules. Urban training that involves placing two or more battalions  together is usually reserved for the combat training centers and these  training centers are limited in throughput capacity. For example, the Joint  Readiness Training Center normally sponsors 10 training rotations per year  and is limited in its ability to expand the amount of rotations it can host per  year to increase joint usage. Even though Joint Forces Command is the  executive agent for joint urban operations, it does not have the authority to  direct the services or combatant commands to modify their training plans  to accommodate joint urban operations training. It is the Office of the  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness that has overall  authority over DOD training policies. Table 1 lists those facilities that can  currently support large joint urban operations training exercises and staff  officer training.
In a June 2002 report, we recommended that DOD create a database that  identifies all ranges available to the department and what they offer,  regardless of service ownership, so that commanders can schedule the best  available resources to provide required training. Without a mechanism to  schedule joint urban operations training at each other’s facilities, DOD  cannot be assured that joint urban operations training will occur or that  DOD will maximize the joint usage of urban operations training facilities.
section_title: While DOD Has Incorporated Lessons Learned, Troops and Training Personnel Suggested Further Training Enhancements
paragraphs: While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing  operations into its training program, training and troop personnel we  interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational  experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD’s training goals is to  train as it expects to fight. The services have been using both formal and  informal means to collect and disseminate lessons learned from ongoing  operations to be incorporated into their training events. Based on this  feedback, during the site visits we made, we observed that the services  have made many improvements in their urban operations training such as:  expanding and upgrading their urban training structures, using role players  to a greater extent to simulate the presence of urban populations, building  convoy operations training courses, and training troops in techniques to  counter emerging enemy tactics such as the use of improvised explosive  devices. Our discussions held with troops and training personnel revealed  additional items that they believed could further enhance training to better  reflect current operating conditions such as the need for additional live-fire  capability, adding larger numbers of role players and providing more  cultural awareness training to adequately prepare troops for the required  interaction with a large civilian populace once in theater, and training with  newly fielded equipment. While DOD plans additional improvements to  current training, until it develops a strategy and specific facility and  training requirements as discussed previously, it will lack a solid basis to  guide its improvement efforts.
subsections: section_title: The Services Use Both Formal and Informal Means to Collect and Disseminate Lessons Learned from Ongoing Operations
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps utilize both formal and informal means for  capturing and disseminating lessons learned. According to service officials,  to obtain information from ongoing operations, they send subject matter  experts into theater with deploying units and capture lessons learned from  troops returning from recent ongoing operations. Both services maintain  databases, which are used to disseminate lessons learned information  within and among the services. These databases include numerous lessons  learned related to ongoing urban operations. For example, the Marine  Corps database contains lessons learned on urban operations including  basic Arabic language training, information on convoy operations tactics,  and search techniques. Additionally, Joint Forces Command also sends  subject matter experts into theater and its Joint Center for Operational  Analysis maintains a database of lessons learned and helps facilitate the  sharing of joint lessons among the services. Both the Army and Marine  Corps formally disseminated the information collected through  publications such as handbooks, newsletters, and official Web sites. For  example, the Army’s Center for Lessons Learned issued a tactical convoy  operations handbook that was also used by the Marine Corps and the  Special Operations Command, according to Army Center for Lessons  Learned officials. Another formal method the Army uses to disseminate  information is the “smart card,” which is a compact card that easily fits in a  soldier’s pocket, thus providing quick access to information. The Army  recently issued a smart card that served as a guide for knowledge about  Iraqi culture.
The services also utilize informal mechanisms for capturing and  disseminating lessons learned. Officials we spoke with from the Army’s  Joint Multinational Training Center in Germany indicated that they rely  more heavily on informal mechanisms, such as electronic messages from  troops in the field and the “right seat/left seat” transition program. Under  this program, incoming commanders learn the latest urban tactics by  shadowing outbound individuals conducting urban operations. For  example, incoming company commanders shadow outgoing commanders  to learn about the intricacies of the local operating area and what practices  have proved useful in conducting missions. Further, training center  officials and troops we talked with indicated that they shared information  on ongoing operations via available DOD databases.
section_title: Integration of Lessons Learned Is Improving Urban Operations Training
paragraphs: The Army and the Marine Corps have recently made significant  improvements in urban operations training curriculum and facilities based  on lessons learned from ongoing operations and training events.  Specifically, these services have adjusted their training curriculum to place  greater emphasis on urban operations. While the Marine Corps introduced  its revised combined arms exercise and security and stabilization  operations training in 2003, it was not mandatory predeployment training  until the summer of 2005, according to Marine Corps officials. The Army  recently incorporated urban operations tasks into its Advanced Individual  Training Program to ensure that soldiers receive predeployment training on  warrior tasks and battle drills regardless of their occupational specialties,  according to officials from the Army’s Collective Training Directorate.  Further, in June 2004, the Army issued guidance stating that it intends to  provide all deploying brigade and battalion commanders and staff training  on urban stability and support operations through its Battle Command  Training Program.
At training sites in Germany we visited, we found that Army trainers  incorporated real-time scenarios from ongoing operations in their  exercises to provide troops with training that realistically reflects the urban  environment. For example, they incorporated Iraqi elections into the  mission rehearsal exercise in July 2005 in anticipation of the conditions  they would face once deployed. Other examples of curriculum changes that  services had made to provide troops with more of the skills necessary to  effectively face urban challenges included:  developing mobile training teams that deploy to training sites to provide  instruction to Marines on the handling of detainees at detention  operations;  placing more emphasis on search procedures related to dwellings,  caves, and vehicles to locate insurgents or weapons;  delivering training on how to respond to improvised explosive device   training troops on how to conduct convoy operations.
During our visits to training sites, we also observed that the facilities used  for urban operations training had been expanded and upgraded to more  closely reflect urban conditions troops can expect to face in current  operations. For example, we observed small towns that had been enhanced  to replicate urban terrain by including mosques, open markets, and flat- roofed dwellings. Figure 2 depicts Marines practicing raid procedures on  flat-top roofs to simulate the type of buildings they would encounter in  current urban operational environments.
Both services have populated these urban training facilities with role  players that portray government officials, tribal leaders, religious leaders,  and officials from interagency organizations. For example, the Joint  Multinational Training Center has increased the total number of civilian  role players to up to 600 participants, though not all are used in each  training event. Our discussions with soldiers who had returned from  operations in Iraq, however, stated that exercises need to include a larger  number of role players to more realistically represent the urban  environment. We noted that the Joint Readiness Training Center replicates  the media and incorporates nongovernmental organizations and civilian  role players in its training. Figure 3 shows an Army exercise that  incorporates civilian role players to simulate local inhabitants in a Middle  Eastern environment.
Furthermore, we observed that the Marine Corps and Army have included  newly built live-fire or simulated convoy courses in some of their urban  operations facilities. Those with live-fire courses are emphasizing the  importance of training troops on them at night and in adverse weather.  Figure 4 shows training on a live-fire convoy operations training course in  Germany. The services are also updating training to reflect changes to  enemy tactics such as the use of improvised explosive devices. We saw  incorporation of simulated improvised explosive devices at Fort Campbell,  Kentucky, and observed the newly developed training site for explosive  devices at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Germany.
In addition to recent improvements, the services are currently planning  further enhancements to existing training facilities. For instance, the  Marine Corps is requesting funds to construct a large-scale urban training  facility at Twenty-Nine Palms, California. The new facility will have up to  1,500 buildings, including live-fire capability, and outlying components such  as an airfield, port, and villages. According to Marine officials, the facility  will be large enough to accommodate joint training exercises with the  Army. It is also expected to provide a venue from which to experiment,  develop, and exercise joint/interagency urban operations with the Joint  National Training Capability. The Marine Corps also plans to add a night  driving course to pre-deployment training. Additionally, the Marines plan to  add shoot houses at Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, and Marine Corps  Base Quantico. Likewise, the Army is in the process of improving its  combat training centers by adding more buildings and instrumentation, and  its major installations by providing shoot houses, urban assault courses,  breach facilities, and combined arms collective training facilities. Army  officials at the Joint Multinational Training Center have initiated an effort  to enhance training through the development of an Expeditionary  Instrumentation System, which is a new mobile instrumentation capability  that provides feedback to the battalion at any training site that lacks  instrumentation. According to its developers, the mobile nature of the  system will also help alleviate capacity concerns throughout the Army,  turning any location into an instrumented range. See appendix II for a  description of major ongoing and planned urban operations training facility  enhancements.
section_title: Troops and Training Personnel Identified Further Training Enhancements That They Believe Would Better Reflect Current Operating Conditions
paragraphs: One of DOD’s training goals is to train as it expects to fight and discussions  held with troops and training personnel revealed additional items that they  believe could further enhance training to better reflect current operating  conditions. Personnel identified enhancements such as the need for  additional live-fire capability, adding more civilian role players in exercises  and providing additional information gathering and cultural awareness  training, and having newly fielded equipment available to train with at the  training centers.
subsections: section_title: Additional Live-Fire Training
paragraphs: The troops we spoke with stated that the live-fire training they received  prior to deployment was infrequent and did not sufficiently prepare them to  use their weapons in an urban setting. Training personnel at facilities we  visited stated that the facilities’ live-fire capability is limited due to  environmental issues and concerns about safety when training in urban  operations training sites with role players. In lieu of live-fire training, urban  operations facilities have simulated shooting drills, including video and  target instrumentation, to provide the experience of live-fire urban  operations.
section_title: More Role Players and Greater Emphasis on Cultural Awareness Training
paragraphs: Further, although we observed role players included in the training  exercises we visited, troops noted that more were needed and additional  cultural awareness training would be beneficial. They noted operating in an  urban environment, against an elusive enemy with the ability to hide among  the civilian population, requires troops to be able to work more closely  with local people, in many cases on an individual basis, to conduct stability  and support operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, and the  gathering of information. Troops we spoke with indicated that the number  of role players included in exercises is not sufficient to adequately prepare  them for the density and level of persistent contact that is typical of  noncombatants in the urban environment. In addition, troops and training  personnel we interviewed wanted the role players to more actively engage  the troops during the exercises to better replicate operational conditions.
The troops and trainers also indicated that more cultural awareness  training, which would include basic language training, would be helpful to  establish and maintain communication with local civilians so that they  could better interact with civilians and minimize civilian interference with  military operations. Currently, training exercises contain some level of  cultural awareness and civil affairs training by including role players that  interact with troops, and exercises that we observed emphasized the use of  translators when working with the local population. However, access to  translators in training is limited, and officials and troops agreed that  translators were not often available for everyday interaction with civilians  and so further training would be beneficial. Both the Marine Corps and  Army have taken steps to improve this training; the Marine Corps has  established an advanced cultural awareness center and according to an  Army official, the Army continually updates its cultural awareness training  to reflect conditions in current operations.
section_title: New Equipment Available for Training Prior to Deployment
paragraphs: Troops and training personnel identified a third area for further  enhancement: the ability to train with newly fielded equipment prior to  deployment. Troops we interviewed who had returned from ongoing  operations stated that there were several pieces of equipment that they  used in theater that had not been available to train with prior to  deployment. These items had been developed to help alleviate the  difficulties of conducting urban operations by addressing the adversaries’  tactics, such as improvised explosive devices, and the adversaries’ ability  to conceal themselves in an urban environment. According to training  personnel and DOD officials, limited production quantities and the need for  the items in theater to respond to rapidly changing operational  environments makes it difficult for the training centers to initially have the  items. Some examples of newly fielded equipment that are in limited supply  but DOD believes will improve troops’ ability to conduct urban operations  include the following.
Up-armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV).  These vehicles are not available at some training facilities and only the  soft-top HMMWVs were on hand for training exercises, according to  officials at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Hohenfels and  Twenty-Nine Palms. Traveling in the up-armored HMMWVs provides  greater protection from improvised explosive devices while maintaining  transport mobility for forces, civil affairs teams, and engineers operating  in urban areas. However, Army and Marine Corps officials and troops  that we interviewed stated that the up-armored HMMWVs used in  theater were top-heavy, difficult to maneuver, and required different  tactical procedures from the soft-top HMMWVs when used in combat.
The Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight. This gunsight is another piece  of equipment used in conducting urban operations that has been quickly  fielded into theater, but limited quantities prevented its use in training  prior to deployment. Officials stated that this item greatly enhanced  troops’ ability to precisely target long-distance hostile forces in all  lighting conditions, which is critical to an urban setting where lighting  plays a key role.
New improvised explosive device detection and disabling equipment.
These devices were not at some training facilities we visited, and some  troops noted that their absence hampered the troops’ use of the items in  theater because the instructions were difficult to understand. Officials  at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Joint Multinational Training  Center, and Camp Lejeune stated that more specific training on the use  of improvised explosive device detection equipment would facilitate its  use in theater.
Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below System, also known as  Blue Force Tracker. Blue Force Tracker is a satellite-based tracking and  communication system that gives an all-weather, near real-time picture  of the battlefield. Troops we interviewed stated that they were not  exposed to Blue Force Tracker in training, although it has been essential  in conducting urban operations in Iraq because of its ability to  distinguish friendly forces from adversaries.
Officials and troops agreed that exposure to these items before arriving in  theater would have better prepared them to operate in the urban  environment. Training center and other DOD officials stated that they  would like to see a greater priority given to placing high-demand items like  the ones mentioned at the training centers to increase the troops’ level of  exposure to this equipment before deployment. While DOD plans  additional improvements, until it develops a strategy and specific facility  and training requirements, it will lack a solid basis to evaluate suggestions  and make improvements and investment decisions.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD has continually emphasized the importance of joint training, including  to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint military operations in urban  environments. The inherent complexities of operating in urban  environments, DOD’s expectation that urban environments will play a  significant role in future military operations, and that most of these  operations will be conducted jointly, coupled with the combatant  commanders’ interest in ensuring U.S. forces are sufficiently prepared, are  significant incentives for Joint Forces Command and services to develop  and implement an overall joint training strategy and related requirements.  In addition, the fact that U.S. forces are currently involved in urban  operations adds a tangible sense of urgency for joint training.  Notwithstanding these incentives, current training exercises offer few  opportunities for U.S. forces to train jointly for urban operations. An  overall strategy requiring joint urban operations training and clearly  defined facility and training requirements, and a mechanism for scheduling  joint training at training facilities, would provide a framework to assign  accountability, synchronize the services’ training efforts to ensure they  include joint training, and maximize the joint usage of training facilities. In  the absence of this framework, DOD risks that the services will continue to  pursue their respective service-specific training and facility plans. Until  DOD develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations training and  related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress  will have a sound basis for evaluating service training and facility plans,  and related funding requests. To its credit, DOD and the services have  actively sought to incorporate lessons learned during ongoing operations  and made several adjustments to make the training environment more  reflective of operational conditions. To further enhance training, the troops  and training personnel we interviewed identified several additional  adjustments that they believed would further enhance urban operations  training. However, until DOD develops a strategy and related requirements,  it lacks a solid basis to evaluate suggestions, and make improvements and  investment decisions.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve DOD’s approach to joint urban operations training, we are  recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, Joint  Forces Command to:  Finalize development of the joint urban operations training strategy and  related requirements including joint training tasks and standards, level  and types of joint training exercises to be conducted, and facility needs.  Once established, we envision this framework would be used to guide  the review and approval of service training and facility plans, and to  guide efforts to make additional improvements to existing urban  operations training curriculum, including evaluating any suggestions  from training and troop personnel.
To increase opportunities for joint training and maximize the joint usage of  training facilities, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense   direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to  establish a mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations training at  major training centers to facilitate increased multiservice participation  in urban operations training.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our first  recommendation and did not concur with the second. DOD concurred with  our first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Commander, Joint Forces Command, to finalize development of the joint  urban operations training strategy and related requirements including joint  training tasks and standards, levels, and types of joint training exercises to  be conducted. DOD stated that current efforts, when completed, will  adequately address this recommendation without further direction from  the Secretary of Defense. DOD also noted its view that we seemed to blur  the distinction between what it characterized as two separate actions— Joint Forces Command’s efforts to develop a joint training strategy for  urban operations and DOD’s efforts to develop criteria for evaluating  service plans to construct training facilities. We note that efforts to develop  the joint strategy have been underway for some time and continue to  believe that the lack of consensus within DOD regarding the draft strategy  may delay the completion of this effort without further emphasis and  monitoring from the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, we believe that  the strategy and evaluation criteria should not be viewed as separate  actions, but rather must be clearly linked. As discussed in our report, until  Joint Forces Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban  operations training and related requirements, neither the Secretary of  Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service  facility and training plans, and related funding requests.
DOD did not concur with our second recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness to establish a mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations  training at major training centers to facilitate increased multiservice  participation in urban operations training. In its response, DOD stated that  it remains strongly committed to a decentralized training ranges and  facilities management solution in supporting the services’ Title 10  responsibilities. DOD also noted the Office of the Secretary of Defense is  providing planning support, oversight, and policy guidance to ensure all its  training resources support service, cross-service, and joint needs and goals.  DOD further stated that it is committed to maximizing system integration,  sharing of data, and facilitation of the services' scheduling processes to  better leverage all assets for the full benefit of military readiness. However,  we note that, to date, DOD has not given sufficient leadership attention to  ensuring necessary coordinated action among the services to accomplish  these goals. We believe the lack of progress is more an issue of leadership  to ensure coordinated action among the key stakeholders than an issue of  usurping the services’ Title 10 responsibilities. Our report shows that the  lack of a formal mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations training  at major training centers is one of the key factors accounting for the limited  number of joint urban operations training opportunities. Our  recommendation is intended to facilitate increased multiservice  participation in urban operations training events. Without focused  leadership efforts on the part of DOD to ensure coordinated action among  the services to establish a mechanism to schedule joint training, we believe  that DOD will perpetuate the current situation in which few exercises are  joint according to its definition. Therefore, we continue to believe our  recommendation has merit.
DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided  technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense,  Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), and the  Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will also make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at  no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-9619. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine DOD’s overall approach to training for urban operations, we  reviewed relevant DOD plans, policies, and guidance, and other  documentation related to urban operations training. We discussed urban  operations training with a variety of officials from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, service headquarters, Joint Forces Command,  operational units of the Army and Marine Corps, training organizations, and  other related organizations. Specifically, we did the following:  To determine the extent to which DOD has made progress in  establishing a strategy for joint urban operations training, we discussed  with officials at Joint Forces Command and the Office of the Secretary  of Defense the process and associated timelines for strategy  development and approval. We attended meetings of the joint urban  operations training working group and reviewed the draft strategy as it  evolved to monitor progress towards strategy development and gaining  buy-in from the services and combatant commanders. Further, we  analyzed DOD’s draft strategy and assessed to what extent it included  defined joint urban operations training requirements and identified who  needed to accomplish the requirements. Lastly, we reviewed legislation  pertaining to this issue and determined whether DOD’s draft strategy  would address the congressional directive that DOD establish joint  urban operations facility requirements and a training requirements  baseline by November 1, 2005.
To determine the extent to which current exercises provide  opportunities for joint urban operations training, we analyzed joint and  service urban operations training doctrine and policy to determine how  joint urban operations training exercises are defined, and the level of  joint training that is required by those documents. We interviewed  officials from Joint Forces Command and Office of the Secretary of  Defense to determine the number of joint urban operations training  exercises that have occurred this year. In addition, we interviewed  troops who had returned from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to  determine how much joint urban training they receiving before  deploying and how they felt the training prepared them for conducting  urban operations they took part in. Lastly, we interviewed service  trainers and observed some exercises to determine the level of joint  urban operations training incorporated into current training events.
To determine the extent to which DOD has incorporated lessons learned  into its urban operations training to reflect current operational  conditions, we observed Army and Marine Corps urban operations  training, reviewed changes made to course curriculum to incorporate  real-time scenarios troops could expect to encounter in theater,  discussed with officials from the Army and Marine Corps lessons  learned offices and training centers the means of collecting and  disseminating lessons learned, and obtained documentation on changes  made to training curriculum and facilities based on these lessons.  Further, we reviewed lessons learned publications and databases to  assess the type and amount of information dealing with urban  operations that are readily available to troops. Lastly, we interviewed  troops who had returned from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, many  of whom were readying for a second deployment, to assess how lessons  learned were shared in theater and the extent to which training had  been updated since their first deployment.
section_title: Major Ongoing and Planned Urban Operations Training Facility Enhancements
paragraphs: The shoot house is a single story, multiroom building with multiple points of entry  designed for individual, squad, and platoon live-fire training.
The urban assault course is a five-station training facility that is designed to train  individuals, squads, and platoons. It includes a two-story offense/defense building,  grenadier gunnery, an underground trainer, and two individual-through-platoon  task/technique training ranges.
The breach facility includes wall, door, and window breach locations and provides training  for individuals, teams, and squads in breaching techniques and procedures.
A complex of 20 - 26 buildings that provides combined arms collective training for platoon  and company situational exercises and battalion task force field training exercises.
Shoot houses and urban assault courses have limited video capture and targetry control  capability for enhanced safety monitoring and rapid training feedback (after action  reviews). Combined arms collective training facilities have limited exterior and interior  video, targetry control, and a more comprehensive after action review capability.
Installations plan to add structures (shanty towns) and debris (salvage cars) to the  combined arms collective training facility for increased realism. These are added at little  or no additional cost and require no sustainment. There is no dedicated funding for  additional buildings at this time.
The Army plans to have these structures at every Brigade Combat Team home station, at the Combat  Training Centers, and at installations identified as Power Projection Platforms and Power Support  Platforms as prioritized by the Army Campaign Plan and the Army Training and Doctrine Command.
subsections: section_title: Marine Corps
paragraphs: The Marine Corps is installing shoot houses to provide Marines with training on tactics,  techniques, and procedures involved with urban shooting. The shoot houses will be  installed at Camp Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Quantico Marine Corps bases.
The live-fire convoy operations range is designed to simulate and provide live-fire convoy  and counter-ambush training. The Marine Corps has installed a live-fire convoy range at  Twenty-Nine Palms and Camp Lejeune Marine Corps bases.
The non-live-fire urban operations training facilities are designed to support maneuver  training, basic urban skills training, and security and stability training for battalion-sized  units and below. The Marine Corps plans to install live-fire urban operations training  facilities at Twenty-Nine Palms and Camp Lejeune Marine Corps bases.
The live-fire urban operations training facility is designed to provide live-fire and  maneuver training for company-sized units and below. The Marine Corps plans to install  a live-fire urban operations training facility, consisting of 15 - 30 buildings, at Camp  Lejeune Marine Corps base.
Adding capability at training sites to capture and record training events and to use the  data for after action reviews, enabling the review of training events and the capture of  lessons learned.
Increasing the number of buildings at training sites to more realistically replicate the  urban environment where density of buildings complicates military maneuver.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Laura Durland, Assistant Director,  John Beauchamp, Jonathan Clark, Gina Ruidera, Susan Tindall, Cheryl A.  Weissman, and Tracy Whitaker made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Military Training: Some Improvements Have Been Made in DOD’s  Annual Training Range Reporting but It Still Fails to Fully Address  Congressional Requirements. GAO-06-29R. Washington, D.C.: October 25,  2005.
Military Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD’s Program to  Transform Joint Training. GAO-05-548. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing and  Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support. GAO-05-556.  Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005.
Military Training: Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to  Improve Conditions of Military Training Ranges. GAO-05-534.  Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to  Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat  Training Centers. GAO-05-8. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.
Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and  Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD’s Efforts to Transform  Military Capabilities. GAO-05-70. Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2004.
Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness  Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive  Planning. GAO-04-855. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 2004.
Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not Fully  Address Congressional Reporting Requirements. GAO-04-608.  Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage  Encroachment on Training Ranges. GAO-02-614. Washington, D.C.: June  11, 2002.
Military Capabilities: Focused Attention Needed to Prepare U.S. Forces  for Combat in Urban Areas. GAO/NSIAD-00-63NI. Washington, D.C.:  February 25, 2000.
Military Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid Past  Mistakes is Largely Untapped. GAO/NSIAD-95-152. Washington, D.C.:  August 9, 1995.