Rail Safety: Federal Railroad Administration Should Report on Risks to the Successful Implementation of Mandated Safety Technology
Published: 2010-12-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Positive train control (PTC) is a communications-based train control system designed to prevent some serious train accidents. Federal law requires passenger and major freight railroads to install PTC on most major routes by the end of 2015. Railroads must address other risks by implementing other technologies. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) oversees implementation of these technologies and must report to Congress in 2012 on progress in implementing PTC. As requested, this report discusses railroads' progress in developing PTC and the remaining steps to implement it, the benefits of and challenges in implementing other safety technologies, and the extent of FRA's efforts to fulfill the PTC mandate and encourage the implementation of other technologies. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed documents and interviewed FRA and rail industry officials. GAO also interviewed and surveyed rail experts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The four largest freight railroads and Amtrak have made progress in developing PTC and are preparing for implementation, but there is a potential for delays in completing the remaining sequence of steps to implement PTC in time for the 2015 deadline. For example, although railroads have worked with suppliers to develop some PTC components, the software needed to test and operate these components remains under development. As a result, it is uncertain whether components will be available when needed, which could create subsequent delays in testing and installing PTC equipment. Additionally, publicly funded commuter railroads may have difficulty in covering the $2 billion that PTC is estimated to cost them, which could create delays if funding for PTC is not available or require that railroads divert funding from other critical areas, such as maintenance. The uncertainties regarding when the remaining steps to implement PTC can be completed, as well as the related costs, raise the risk that railroads will not meet the implementation deadline, delaying the safety benefits of PTC. Additionally, other critical needs may go unmet if funding is diverted to pay for PTC. Other technologies hold promise for preventing or mitigating accidents that PTC would not address, but face implementation challenges. Experts identified technologies to improve track inspection, locomotives and other rail vehicles, and switches as having promise to provide additional safety. But challenges to implementing these technologies include their costs, uncertainty about their effectiveness, regulations that could create disincentives to using certain technologies, and lack of interoperability with existing systems and equipment. For example, electronically controlled pneumatic brakes are a promising technology to improve safety by slowing or stopping trains faster, but are expensive and not compatible with some common train operations. FRA has taken actions to fulfill the PTC mandate and has the opportunity to provide useful information on risks and mitigation strategies to Congress in its 2012 report. FRA has developed PTC regulations, hired new staff to monitor implementation of PTC, and created a grant program to provide funding to railroads. Going forward, as it monitors railroads' progress, FRA will have additional information for determining whether the risks previously discussed are significant enough to jeopardize successful implementation of PTC by the 2015 deadline. Prior GAO reports have noted that the identification of risks and strategies to mitigate them can help ensure the success of major projects. Including such information in FRA's 2012 report would help Congress determine whether additional actions are needed to ensure PTC is implemented successfully. Additionally, FRA's actions to encourage the implementation of other rail safety technologies align with some, but not all, best practices for such efforts. For example, FRA has followed the best practice of involving the industry early in developing new technologies, but it does not monitor the industry's use of technologies that it helped develop. Monitoring and reporting on the industry's adoption of new technologies could help the agency better demonstrate the results of its efforts.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation direct DOT's Administrator of FRA to (1) include in its 2012 report to Congress information about PTC implementation risks and strategies to mitigate them and (2) monitor and report on the adoption of other technologies supported by the agency's efforts. DOT reviewed a draft of this report, provided technical comments, and said it would consider the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Railroad accidents, which are mainly caused by human factors, track  defects, or equipment problems, pose safety risks to railroads and their  employees, passengers, and the public. Although railroad accidents have  generally decreased since 2000, several accidents since 2005 have raised  concerns about the potential for the most severe accidents to result in  significant casualties. Specifically, in January 2005, a freight train carrying  hazardous materials collided with a standing freight train in Graniteville,  South Carolina, resulting in the release of a toxic airborne chemical that  led to 9 deaths, 292 injuries, and the evacuation of 5,400 people. Then in  September 2008, a commuter train collided with a freight train in Los  Angeles, California, resulting in 25 deaths and 126 injuries. Both of these  accidents were caused by human factors.
In the wake of these accidents, the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008  required passenger and major freight railroads to implement positive train  control (PTC) on most major lines by the end of 2015. PTC is a system  designed to prevent accidents caused by human factors, including train-to- train collisions and derailments that result from trains exceeding safe  speeds. It is also designed to prevent incursions into work zones and  movement of trains through switches left in the wrong position. PTC  accomplishes this by establishing a communications-based network  linking trains to equipment along the track and centralized office locations  to provide information to a locomotive about its authority to proceed  along the track at a particular speed. If the train is going too fast or is  approaching a section of track that it should not enter—such as a section  of track occupied by another train or work crew—the locomotive  computer applies the brakes to slow or stop the train to prevent a  derailment due to speeding or a possible collision. The Department of  Transportation (DOT) has noted that the technology has the potential to  prevent the most catastrophic types of railroad accidents that result in  significant loss of life and property, including the accidents we have  previously discussed. The statute also calls for railroads to develop risk- based safety strategies that include a plan for implementing other rail  safety technologies and requires railroads to implement certain  technologies in areas that both lack train signaling systems and are not  required to have PTC installed.
DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) provides regulatory  oversight of the safety of U.S. railroads and is responsible for  implementing requirements of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008.  FRA’s research and development (R&D) program contributes to the  agency’s safety oversight by sponsoring and conducting research in  collaboration with industry and universities, including the development of  new rail safety technologies, and the agency’s safety oversight includes  efforts to promote the implementation of these technologies. In addition to  its safety oversight role, legislation enacted in recent years has  significantly expanded FRA’s role in the investment and oversight of the  development of intercity passenger rail, including high-speed passenger  rail.
Emphasizing the need to further improve the safety of the nation’s railroad  system, as called for in the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, you  asked us to examine new rail safety technologies under development and  what additional federal roles should be considered to encourage their  implementation. This report discusses (1) the progress railroads have  made in developing and implementing PTC and the remaining steps to  implement PTC systems, (2) the potential benefits of other rail safety  technologies under development as well as the challenges to implementing  them, and (3) the extent of FRA’s efforts to fulfill the PTC mandate and  encourage the implementation of other rail safety technologies.
To describe railroads’ progress in developing and implementing PTC, as  well as the remaining steps to implement PTC systems, we reviewed  documents and interviewed officials from the four largest freight railroads,  Amtrak, a selection of commuter railroads of different ridership levels and  geographic locations, a selection of railroad supply companies that are  major PTC suppliers or were recommended by others we interviewed, and  associations that represent railroads and suppliers about their progress in  developing and implementing PTC. To describe the potential benefits of  other rail safety technologies under development, as well as the challenges  to implementing them, we sought information from rail safety technology  experts and other rail industry stakeholders about their views of various  technologies currently under development. Specifically, based on our  initial research and interviews, we compiled a list of other rail safety  technologies currently under development in the United States. We refined  this list on the basis of input from DOT; the Association of American  Railroads (AAR); and the Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI),  an industry-operated, DOT-owned railroad research facility. With  assistance from the National Academies’ Transportation Research Board,  we identified a group of 20 rail safety technology experts that we  interviewed and then asked to complete a questionnaire about the  potential benefits of and challenges to implementing a number of rail  safety technologies under development. We analyzed the results of the  questionnaire to identify which technologies are the most promising on  the basis of the experts’ views of these technologies’ potential safety  benefits, their worth compared with the cost of additional R&D and  implementation, and their stage in product development. We also  interviewed officials from railroads, railroad associations, FRA, and the  DOT Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) about  the potential benefits and challenges of implementing other rail safety  technologies under development. To identify whether there were any  major differences with rail safety technologies under development in other  countries, we interviewed foreign representatives from railroad industry  associations, universities, and governments about the implementation of  rail safety technologies in European and Asian countries. To evaluate the  extent of FRA’s efforts to fulfill the PTC mandate and encourage the  implementation of other rail safety technologies, we obtained and  reviewed documents from and interviewed FRA officials responsible for  the agency’s rail safety technology R&D, safety regulatory efforts, and  efforts to fulfill the PTC mandate. We also interviewed rail experts and the  other stakeholders that we have previously mentioned about their views of  FRA’s efforts to fulfill the PTC mandate and encourage the implementation  of other technologies. See appendix I for a more detailed description of  our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to December  2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The U.S. railroad industry consists mostly of freight railroads but also  serves passengers. Freight railroads are divided into classes that are based  on revenue. Class I freight railroads earn the most revenue and generally  provide long-haul freight service, while the smaller freight railroads— those in Classes II and III—earn less revenue and generally haul freight  shorter distances. Amtrak provides intercity passenger rail service, while  commuter railroads serve passengers traveling within large metropolitan  areas. Freight railroads own most of the track in the United States, with a  notable exception being the Northeast Corridor between Washington,  D.C., and Boston, Massachusetts, which Amtrak predominantly owns.  Railroads grant usage rights to one another, and passenger trains share  track with freight railroads. While freight and passenger railroads share  many characteristics, there are also key differences in their composition  and scope (see table 1).
The railroad industry also includes companies that produce railroad  supplies, including locomotives, train cars, track, signal equipment, and  related components, and national associations that work with and  represent railroads. AAR, which primarily represents freight railroads  (including all seven Class I freight railroads), as well as Amtrak and some  other railroads, develops standards for the implementation of technology,  manages the implementation of industrywide technological programs, and  assesses the railroads’ needs for safety and technological development. It  also works to develop new technologies at TTCI near Pueblo, Colorado, an  FRA-owned railroad research facility operated by AAR through a contract.  The American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association represents  Class II and Class III freight railroads in legislative and regulatory matters.  The American Public Transportation Association represents commuter  railroads and develops standards for their use of technology.
The U.S. railroad environment consists of train vehicles (rolling stock) and  infrastructure, such as track, bridges and tunnels, switches and signals,  and centralized offices with dispatchers (see fig. 1).
Railroad accident rates have generally declined from 2000 to 2009. During  that time, human factors and problems with track were the leading causes  of rail accidents, according to our analysis of FRA data (see fig. 2). These  problems can lead to train derailments or collisions, which can result in  significant damage and loss of life. For example, the 2005 accident in  Graniteville, South Carolina, was attributed to a switch being left in the  wrong position, an example of human error, while the 2008 collision  between freight and passenger trains in the Chatsworth neighborhood of  Los Angeles, California, was the result of a commuter train going through  a red signal it should have stopped at, which was likely caused by human  error. Track-related causes of accidents include irregular track geometry,  which occurs when rail is misaligned or too far apart; breaks in the rail or  joints that connect rail segments; and damage to railroad bridges, among  other causes. Such defects can lead to train derailments.
Although the rate of accidents has decreased from 2000 through 2009,  injuries and fatalities have fluctuated, with the largest spikes being tied to  specific incidents. For example, injuries increased dramatically in 2002  due to one accident in North Dakota in which 1,441 people were injured  from a derailment caused by track problems that resulted in the release of  hazardous materials (see fig. 3). The number of fatalities per year from  2000 through 2009 ranged from a low of 4 in 2003 and 2009 to a high of   33 in 2005, the year of the accident in Graniteville, South Carolina, that   killed 9 people. The second-highest year for fatalities was 2008; that year,  there were 27 fatalities, including 25 fatalities from the accident in   Los Angeles, California.
In its role as federal regulator and overseer of railroad safety, FRA  prescribes and enforces railroad safety regulations and conducts R&D in  support of improved railroad safety and rail transportation policy. Within  the agency, FRA’s Office of Railroad Safety promulgates and enforces  railroad safety regulations, including requirements for track design and  inspection; signal and train control systems; grade-crossing warning  device systems; mechanical equipment, such as locomotives and freight  cars; and railroad operating practices. For example, FRA’s regulations for  track and equipment include detailed, prescriptive minimum requirements,  such as wheel safety requirements and formulas that determine the  maximum allowable speeds on curved track. In developing most of its  regulations, FRA seeks input from the railroad industry and other  organizations through its Railroad Safety Advisory Committee. FRA’s  Office of Research and Development sponsors and conducts R&D of new  rail safety technologies in support of FRA’s safety mission. This work  contributes information used to support FRA’s development of  regulations, standards, and best practices as well as encourages the  development and use of new safety technologies. FRA’s R&D work is done  collaboratively with industry and universities and is also supported by the  Volpe Center, which is DOT’s transportation research center in  Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Although its role has traditionally been that of a regulatory agency,  recently enacted laws have expanded FRA’s role in other areas. The  Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 authorized over  $3.7 billion for three federal programs for high-speed rail, intercity  passenger rail congestion, and capital grants, while the American  Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 appropriated $8 billion for these  three programs. By creating a significant grant-making role for funding  the development of high-speed passenger rail, these laws effectively  transformed what was essentially a rail safety organization to one that is  making multibillion-dollar investment choices while also carrying out its  safety mission. Regarding rail safety technologies, the Rail Safety  Improvement Act of 2008 directs FRA to oversee railroads’  implementation of PTC and other technologies. Specifically, the act  requires passenger and major freight railroads to implement PTC by the  end of 2015, with FRA playing a role as overseer of the industry’s  implementation through rulemaking and review of railroads’  implementation plans. The act also directs FRA to require railroads to  improve safety through the development of risk-reduction programs that  include plans for implementing new rail safety technologies and to create  a grant program to fund the deployment of rail safety technologies,  authorized at $50 million per fiscal year from 2009 through 2013   (see table 2).
PTC is a communication-based system designed to prevent some accidents  caused by human factors, including train-to-train collisions and  derailments caused by exceeding safe speeds. Such a system is also  designed to prevent incursions into work zones and movement of trains  through switches left in the wrong position. PTC achieves these  capabilities via communication with various components, namely  locomotive computers, devices along the track (known as wayside units),  and dispatch systems in centralized office locations (see fig. 4). New data  radios are being developed to enable wireless communication between  locomotives and wayside units. Centralized offices and locomotives have  access to a track database with information about track routes and other  data, including speed restrictions, track configuration and topography, and  the location of infrastructure such as switches and signals that indicate  places where a train’s speed may need to be enforced by PTC. Using this  information, locomotive computers can continuously calculate a train’s  safe speed. If the train exceeds that speed, the PTC system should enforce  braking as necessary. By preventing trains from entering a segment of  track occupied by another train or from moving through an improperly  aligned switch, PTC would prevent accidents such as those mentioned  above that occurred in Los Angeles, California, and Graniteville, South  Carolina. While the law does not require railroads to implement the same  PTC system, it does require that railroads’ PTC systems be interoperable,  which means that the components of different PTC systems must be able  to communicate with one another in a manner to provide for the seamless  movement of trains as they cross track owned by different railroads that  may have implemented different PTC systems.
Train control systems similar to PTC already exist in other countries. For  example, a system to automatically stop trains if a train operator fails to  stop a train at a stop signal has been widely used in Japan since the 1960s,  although this system has been upgraded over time to provide advanced  warning of the need to slow a train and automatically apply train brakes in  such situations. A more advanced system to continuously calculate a  train’s safe speed—similar to the capability that PTC is designed to  achieve—is being implemented on the country’s high-speed passenger rail  lines. In Europe, countries use various signal and train control systems,  presenting technical and logistical challenges for trains that travel  between countries. To establish interoperability among these systems, the  European Union has embarked on an effort to implement the European  Rail Traffic Management System, a common signaling and train control  system, as well as a radio communications network, that would overlay  countries’ existing signal and train control systems to establish  interoperability among them. Like PTC, this system relies on a  locomotive computer to calculate a train’s safe speed and enforce that  speed on the basis of certain information, such as a train’s movement  authority, the track speed limit, and the position of signals ahead of the  train.
In addition to the implementation plans outlined in the Rail Safety  Improvement Act of 2008, FRA’s subsequent PTC regulations also require  railroads to submit PTC development plans and PTC safety plans. These  three plans are related, and FRA requires different information for each of  them:    PTC development plan: To get approval for the type of PTC system a  railroad intends to install, the railroad must submit to FRA a plan  describing the PTC system the railroad intends to implement and the  railroad operations the PTC system will be used with. Following FRA’s  review of this plan, if approved, the agency would issue the system  described in the plan a “type approval,” which is a number assigned to a  particular PTC system indicating FRA agreement that the system could  fulfill the requirements of the PTC regulations.
PTC implementation plan: This plan describes the functional  requirements of the proposed PTC system, how the PTC system will  achieve interoperability between the host railroad (the railroad that owns  the track) and the tenant railroads (those railroads that operate on the  host’s track), how the PTC system will be installed first on track routes  with greater risk, the sequence and schedule for installing PTC on specific  track segments, and other information about PTC equipment to be  installed on rolling stock and along the track. The law required railroads to  submit these plans by April 16, 2010, and FRA to review and approve or  disapprove them within 90 days.
PTC safety plan: This plan must include information about planned  procedures for testing the system during and after installation, as well as  information about safety hazards and risks the system will address, among  other requirements. By approving a safety plan, FRA certifies a railroad’s  PTC system, which must happen before a railroad can operate a PTC  system in revenue service. FRA set no specific deadline for railroads to  submit this plan.
In its PTC rulemaking, FRA also included requirements for implementing  PTC on high-speed passenger rail lines, with trains operating at or above  90 miles per hour, that specify additional safety functions for PTC systems  installed for trains operating at these higher speeds. FRA’s High-Speed  Rail Safety Strategy, released in November 2009, acknowledges the  importance of implementing PTC for high-speed passenger rail operation  and also calls for the evaluation of other specific technologies to  determine their suitability for reducing risk for high-speed rail.
section_title: Railroad Industry Has Made Progress in Developing PTC, but Key Tasks Remain to Completing Implementation
subsections: section_title: Railroad Industry Has Made Progress in Developing PTC Components, and Railroads Are Preparing for Widespread Implementation
paragraphs: Amtrak and the four largest Class I freight railroads have led PTC  development efforts and most other railroads plan to implement PTC  systems developed by these railroads. Amtrak worked with suppliers to  develop PTC for the Northeast Corridor and began installation in 2000.  Since that time, Amtrak has made improvements to this system, and FRA  certified Amtrak’s PTC system on the Northeast Corridor in May 2010—the  first PTC system FRA certified under the PTC rules it issued in January  2010. Amtrak has also installed a different PTC system on a portion of  track in southern Michigan. The four largest Class I freight railroads have  identified suppliers of PTC technology and are working with these  suppliers to develop PTC components; however, they have not yet  installed PTC, except for some limited pilot installations. Although there  are differences between the PTC systems being installed by Amtrak and  those being installed by the freight railroads, they are designed to achieve  the same basic functions.
The PTC systems being developed by the four largest Class I freight  railroads differ from PTC systems that exist in other countries and on  some Amtrak routes. According to AAR officials, existing PTC systems  were designed specifically for passenger rail operations and would not  address the needs of the U.S. freight railroads. For example, the system  that Amtrak uses on the Northeast Corridor combines PTC speed  enforcement capabilities with an existing onboard system that provides  track status information, such as signal status, to the locomotive engineer.  Not all of the freight railroads currently use such an onboard track  information system, and such a system would not be feasible to use on  segments of track that lack signals, which accounts for about 13,000 miles  of track owned by Class I freight railroads that requires PTC. Additionally,  in developing new PTC systems, railroads must ensure that their systems  are interoperable among the many different railroads that plan to use  them. To achieve interoperability, the four largest Class I freight railroads  created the Interoperable Train Control Committee to develop system  specifications and standards for interoperability, including protocols for  how PTC components should function and communicate with each other  as part of an overall system. To achieve interoperability with the Class I  freight railroads’ systems, Amtrak will equip its locomotives that operate  on freight-owned track with PTC radios capable of operating on the same  frequencies as those used by the freight railroads.
Components of PTC systems being developed by Class I freight railroads  are in varying stages of development, with some components currently  being produced; however, these components cannot be used or fully  tested without software, which remains under development:    Wayside units: These units consist of devices installed at signals,  switches, and other locations along the track. The units will monitor the  status of signals and switches and communicate that information to   locomotives directly or through railroads’ centralized office systems.  Hardware for these units is currently available and being tested by  railroads.
Locomotive computers: These computers will provide centralized offices  information on the train’s location. Based on the status of upcoming  signals or switches—which will be communicated to the locomotive by  the wayside units—the locomotive computer will calculate the train’s  braking distance and enforce braking, if needed, to slow or stop a train to  comply with speed restrictions and ensure it does not enter a segment of  track occupied by another train or a work crew. Locomotive computers  are available for railroads to install on newer locomotives. However,  railroad associations told us that older locomotives that lack electronic  systems will have to be upgraded before such computers and other PTC  components can be installed on them.
Data radios: The freight railroads’ PTC systems require the use of new  data radios installed on locomotives and wayside units to enable PTC  communication. Prototype specifications for these radios are still under  development, and the railroad industry estimates that these radios will be  in production starting in early 2012. The four largest Class I freight  railroads share ownership in the company that is developing PTC data  radios and jointly purchased radio spectrum to enable PTC  communications.
For these components to operate as a system, PTC software is necessary  to perform all train control functions, including determining a train’s  location and calculating a train’s braking distance. Complete PTC systems  cannot be tested and implemented until software is finalized. PTC  software is still under development, and railroad industry officials told us  they expect it to be available sometime in 2011.
Forty-one railroads submitted their required PTC implementation plans to  FRA in 2010, comprising the 7 Class I freight railroads, 2 Class II freight  railroads, 9 Class III freight railroads, Amtrak, and 22 commuter  railroads. In these plans, railroads were required to provide information  about the extent to which they will implement PTC, provide a schedule for  progressive implementation, and prioritize implementation on the basis of  risk. Railroads have begun implementing PTC in some locations. Amtrak  has installed PTC on just over 200 miles of the 363 miles it owns along the  Northeast Corridor and plans to expand its system along the corridor and  its connections. It has also installed PTC on about 60 miles of track in  southern Michigan and will extend this system along the full 97 miles of  track it owns in that area. Class I freight railroads have selected the PTC  systems they intend to implement and have informed FRA of their  selections by submitting PTC development plans. Some freight railroads  and commuter railroads that operate on the Northeast Corridor are  already equipped with Amtrak’s PTC system. Commuter railroads that  connect with the corridor will equip their additional rail lines with this  system.
Other freight and commuter railroads that are required to implement PTC  have not yet begun implementation. Many of these commuter railroads  and Class II and Class III freight railroads plan to implement the same  systems being developed by the Class I freight railroads. As we have  previously stated, components for PTC systems being developed by the  Class I freight railroads are not yet available. Officials from the American  Public Transportation Association and the American Short Line and  Regional Railroad Association—which represent commuter railroads and  Class II and Class III freight railroads, respectively—told us that those  railroads are awaiting these components to begin installation of PTC.  While only a small number of Class II and Class III freight railroads are  required by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 to implement PTC on  their property, FRA regulations require some additional Class II and Class  III freight railroads to install PTC on their locomotives if they operate on  track equipped with PTC and share that track with passenger trains.
section_title: Key Steps Remain to Implement PTC by 2015, with a Potential for Delay
paragraphs: By law, the rail industry must complete development, testing, and full  implementation of PTC on most major routes within 5 years. Progress has  been made by railroads and suppliers in preparing to implement PTC, but  many actions must still be taken to achieve full implementation of PTC,  and they must be completed in a specific sequence (see fig. 5). Since PTC  implementation requires the completion of a specific sequence of steps,  any delay in one step could affect the entire implementation schedule,  potentially resulting in railroads missing the implementation deadline,  which would delay achieving the intended safety benefits of PTC.
As we have previously discussed, all PTC components for the Class I  freight railroads’ systems are not yet developed. In addition, the  development of PTC software and new data radios requires the  development of interoperability standards, which the four largest Class I  freight railroads and AAR have not yet finalized. Specifically, AAR  officials told us that the Interoperable Train Control Committee had  expected to complete all of these standards by July 2010, but as of August,  only 3 of the approximately 40 standards needed were ready. Furthermore,  AAR officials told us in September that although the committee continues  to make progress in developing these standards and has consolidated  some standards to cut down the total needed, it has not set a new date for  when it expects to complete this effort. AAR officials explained that delays  are due to the complexity and amount of work that must be completed.  FRA officials monitoring this effort told us in September that they do not  know when the standards will be completed, and that they have some  concerns about the potential for the delay in developing these standards to  impact railroads’ ability to procure PTC components in a timely manner.  FRA officials also said that although it is their understanding that the  remaining standards have been drafted and are undergoing industry  review, they expect this process to last at least through the first quarter of  calendar year 2011.
System complexity was a factor that led to delays in an earlier PTC  development effort. In 2001, FRA, Amtrak, the Union Pacific Railroad,  AAR, and the State of Illinois created the North American Joint Positive  Train Control Project, an objective of which was the development of  interoperable PTC standards. However, this objective was not achieved by  the time the project came to a close in 2006. Specifically, system testing  revealed that a significant amount of software development would be  required for the PTC system to be compatible with normal railroad  operations, which FRA concluded would require several additional years  to complete.
Railroads currently expect that key PTC components will be available by  2012, but there is uncertainty regarding whether this can be achieved,  given the delays in developing the interoperability standards and current  lack of software for PTC components. Any delays in component  development would consequently delay pilot installations for field testing.  The lack of developed components raises questions about the  technological maturity of the Class I freights’ PTC systems. If the railroad  industry is unable to develop fully functional components within the  expected time frame, it is possible that testing and installation of these  components could not be completed by the 2015 deadline. Our prior work  examining the development of military weapon systems has shown that  demonstrating a high level of maturity before allowing new technologies  into product development programs increases the chance for successful  implementation, and that, conversely, technologies that were included in a  product development program before they were mature later contributed  to cost increases and schedule delays.
Once PTC components are developed, railroads must test them in the field  to ensure that PTC systems function properly and that components of PTC  systems are able to communicate with each other regardless of railroad  ownership. Any problems that are identified during the field-testing  process will need to be addressed to ensure the PTC systems function as  required. AAR officials told us that PTC tests have only been conducted in  very controlled environments, as opposed to a truly operational  environment where the systems could experience stress. For example,  railroads must ensure that PTC systems provide reliable communication  among centralized offices, wayside units, and locomotives. However, it is  uncertain how well system communication will fare in densely populated  areas, such as Chicago, Illinois, where many railroads—both passenger  and freight—operate simultaneously. Furthermore, railroad industry  officials have expressed concern that all electrical components associated  with PTC contain inherent failure rates. Since PTC implementation  requires the installation of a large number of devices, the possibility of  failure must be addressed and railroads must ensure that any possible  failures do not negatively affect railroad safety or operational capacity.  Any problems identified during field testing, if they cannot be quickly  addressed, could contribute to missing the PTC implementation deadline.  Conversely, implementing an immature system to meet the deadline could  pose serious safety risks. After railroads complete PTC field tests, they  must submit safety plans to FRA for review, and FRA must certify PTC  systems before railroads can begin operating them in revenue service.
Given the extent to which railroads must implement PTC, installation will  require a considerable amount of work, since it will include the  installation of thousands of physical devices on both track and  locomotives. Class I freight railroads, for example, must implement PTC  on over 70,000 of the approximately 94,000 miles over which they operate,  which is about 75 percent of their network. The railroad industry  estimates that about 50,000 wayside units must be installed along track,  and data radios must be installed on each wayside unit. Class I freight  railroads also expect to install PTC computers and data radios on over  17,000 locomotives, which represent about 70 percent of their fleet that is  used for mainline operations. Additionally, commuter railroads must  install PTC on their vehicles, even if the railroads do not own track, which  FRA estimates will mean equipping about 4,100 vehicles. As we have  previously stated, PTC computers are available for installation on new  locomotives, but some older locomotives need to be upgraded first before  PTC can be installed. Officials at some Class I freight railroads and  commuter railroads have expressed concern that a limited number of  companies are currently responsible for supplying PTC components to  railroads, and that the availability of equipment could impact railroads’  ability to complete implementation on time. While rail supply companies  told us they expect to meet the demand for PTC components, some also  acknowledged that they may need to expand to do so.
Completing implementation will be costly for the railroad industry and  could make it difficult for commuter and smaller freight railroads to meet  the 2015 deadline. In 2009, FRA estimated that developing, purchasing,  installing, and maintaining PTC would likely cost railroads between   $9.5 billion and $13.1 billion. However, because these costs are still  uncertain, the agency acknowledged that costs could be as low as   $6.7 billion or as high as $22.5 billion. The large amount of equipment  needed to complete implementation before the deadline will create a  temporary increase in demand for suppliers. FRA has acknowledged that  having multiple railroads purchasing the same equipment at the same time  could cause the prices of PTC equipment to rise and, therefore, could raise  the overall cost of implementation.
Among passenger railroads, the cost of PTC could be especially  problematic. For example, Amtrak officials expressed concern about the  cost of PTC implementation on Amtrak routes supported with state  funding, since some states may not be able to fund the additional costs  associated with PTC implementation. Commuter railroads are publicly  funded, and some are facing funding shortfalls that are leading them to  increase fares or reduce service levels. In their implementation plans,  some commuter railroads stated that funding for current operations is  already at risk due to stress on their state funding partners, and officials  from other commuter railroads told us that they are unsure how they will  be able to pay for PTC implementation. The American Public  Transportation Association has estimated that PTC implementation will  cost the commuter railroad industry at least $2 billion. Although the cost  of implementation will be spread over a number of years, it could still  strain the budgets of some commuter railroads. For example, a transit  agency in San Diego, California, told us that implementing PTC for its  commuter railroad could cost as much as $60 million to $90 million, while  the annual capital budget for the agency, which also provides bus service,  is about $10 million. In its PTC implementation plan, this agency stated  that it did not have any significant approved funding available for  implementation, and that its funding plan assumed receipt of both federal  and state funding. Furthermore, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)  has estimated that commuter railroads face a $12.6 billion backlog to  attaining a state of good repair, indicating that these railroads must make  significant capital investments to improve the condition of their current  assets. The cost of PTC could further delay commuter railroads making  such investments.
Class II and Class III freight railroads may also have difficulty in paying for  PTC implementation. These freight railroads earn much less revenue  than Class I freight railroads, and officials from the American Short Line  and Regional Railroad Association expressed concern about the ability of  these railroads to cover the costs of PTC. Class II and Class III freight  railroads tend to have older equipment, for which the costs of PTC  installation will be higher since, as we have previously discussed, some  older locomotives will require electronic upgrades to enable the  installation of PTC components. According to officials at the American  Short Line and Regional Railroad Association, the cost of installing PTC on  some locomotives could exceed the total value of those locomotives. The  four Class II and Class III freight railroads that included a description of  implementation risks in their PTC implementation plans included cost as a  risk factor, with one railroad noting that paying for PTC will require it to  divert funding from its routine maintenance requirements. Even the larger  freight railroads acknowledged that paying for PTC could have  implications on their budgets. Specifically, officials from Class I freight  railroads and AAR have indicated that paying for PTC could result in the  diversion of funds from capital investments, such as capacity-improving  projects, and could impact their ability to invest in other safety  technologies.
The uncertainties that we discuss regarding when the remaining tasks to  implement PTC can be completed, as well as the cost of doing so, raise  certain risks to the successful completion of PTC by the deadline.  Potential delays in developing PTC components, software, and  interoperability standards, as well as delays that could occur during the  subsequent testing and implementation of PTC systems, raise the risk that  railroads will not meet the implementation deadline and that the safety  benefits of PTC will be delayed. Furthermore, the extent to which  commuter railroads and small freight railroads have difficulty in covering  the costs of PTC implementation raises the risk that these railroads could  miss the deadline if funding is not available or that other critical needs  may go unmet if money is diverted to pay for PTC. As we noted, commuter  railroads are already facing challenges in funding current operations, and   paying for PTC could impact the ability of these railroads, as well as  smaller freight railroads, to make the necessary investments in  maintenance.
section_title: Other Rail Safety Technologies Hold Promise for Preventing or Mitigating Collisions and Derailments, but Face Implementation Challenges
subsections: section_title: Rail Safety Technologies to Inspect Track, Improve or Monitor Rolling Stock, Protect Occupants, and Improve Switches Hold Promise for Addressing Key Causes of Accidents
paragraphs: While PTC addresses some accidents caused by human factors, other  technologies being developed can address other causes of accidents, such  as problems with track or equipment that account for a significant portion  of accidents and would not be addressed by PTC. According to experts  and other stakeholders from the railroad industry and government, a  number of rail safety technologies under development hold promise for  improving safety. In particular, some of these technologies may be  essential for addressing the safety of high-speed passenger rail or areas of  track that lack signals or PTC. We identified four broad categories of  technologies that current development efforts are focused in. Figure 6  shows where such technologies can be integrated into the existing rail  environment to improve safety.
Track inspection: New technologies have the potential to better inspect  track for cracks in the rail that could lead to breakage as well as measure  the track’s alignment to ensure that rails are laid at the proper angle and  distance apart. About one-third of rail accidents are caused by track  defects, such as broken or misaligned rail that could cause a train to  derail. Experts and other stakeholders noted that some of these  technologies have the potential to allow railroads to better manage track  risks by providing more accurate data about the size and nature of track  defects. Railroads could then monitor such defects over time and make  risk-based track maintenance decisions. Such technologies could be  particularly useful for high-speed passenger rail operations, since track  that carries high-speed trains must be maintained to a higher standard.
Switch improvement: These technologies address the problem of track  switches left in the wrong position, which could lead a train onto the  wrong track and cause an accident. Several experts observed that  technology to monitor and indicate the position of a switch would provide  particular benefit for sections of track that lack signals, and two experts  told us the technology would have prevented the 2005 accident in  Graniteville, South Carolina. This technology is among those that the Rail  Safety Improvement Act of 2008 suggests DOT include when prescribing  the development and implementation of rail safety technologies in areas of  track that lack signals or train control systems.
Rolling stock improvement and monitoring: New technologies to  improve the function or design of rail vehicles, as well as devices to  inspect them, can provide safety benefits by improving the safe operation  of trains and better identify when train components develop problems that  could cause an accident. For example, experts and other stakeholders  noted that technology to provide real-time monitoring of certain wheel  assembly components is an important technology for high-speed trains,  since overheating of these components can quickly lead to failure.  European officials from an association of rail supply companies told us  this technology is used for European high-speed passenger trains.
Occupant protection: Incorporating new designs into passenger rail  vehicles, such as crash energy management—a design concept that  incorporates parts designed to crumple under stress to absorb collision  energy to mitigate impact forces—represents a new way of thinking about  crashworthiness, which has traditionally involved designing vehicles with  hard exteriors to resist deformation. European rail officials told us this  technology is used in European passenger trains. FRA’s crashworthiness  regulations have included standards for incorporating crash energy  management into rail vehicles since 1999 and require crash energy  management for high-speed passenger trains operating up to 150 miles per  hour.
Among the technologies we examined, we identified some as being more  promising, based on experts’ views about the technologies’ potential to  improve safety, their worth in doing so compared with their additional  cost for development and implementation, and their being in a later stage  of product development (see table 3).
Regarding their stage in product development and implementation,  experts mostly viewed these technologies as having some deployment,  except for wayside detectors, which experts viewed as more widely  deployed; however, this may vary depending on the type of detector.
Some of these most promising technologies are also deployed in other  countries; however, differences in the nature of rail systems in those  countries as compared with the United States could mean that the benefits  of a particular technology may not be the same. As we have previously  discussed, the U.S. rail system consists mostly of freight railroads;  however, in Europe and Japan, passenger rail, including high-speed rail, is  more predominant. Such differences in the rail systems may lead to  differences in how new rail safety technologies are implemented. For  example, although foreign stakeholders told us that electronically  controlled pneumatic brakes are common on passenger trains in Europe,  they are not used on freight trains. Because European freight trains are  generally lighter and shorter than American freight trains, they can stop in  a shorter time and distance than longer, heavier American freight trains  can stop. Consequently, a European freight railroad would realize less  benefit from the improved stopping efficiency that this technology offers.  Additionally, unlike in the United States, there is not a significant amount  of European track miles that lack signals, so the challenge of addressing  safety for unsignaled areas with technologies such as switch position  monitors/indicators is generally not an issue. Additionally, philosophical  differences in approaches to railroad safety may affect how rail safety  technologies are implemented. Specifically, foreign rail officials and  academics with knowledge of rail practices in Europe and Japan, as well  as FRA officials, told us that safety efforts in Europe and Japan are driven  more by a desire to avoid accidents, rather than to mitigate their effects.
section_title: Cost, Uncertainty about Effectiveness, Regulations, and Lack of Interoperability Create Challenges to Implementing New Rail Safety Technologies
paragraphs: Experts and other stakeholders identified costs, uncertainty about  effectiveness, regulations, and lack of interoperability with existing  systems and equipment as key challenges to implementing new rail safety  technologies:    Cost: Most experts indicated that cost was a major challenge for  implementing rail safety technologies in all four technology categories,  including for some of the most promising technologies—specifically  electronically controlled pneumatic brakes, crash energy management,  and switch position monitors/indicators. Additionally, according to some  experts, other stakeholders, and FRA officials, because of the costs they  are incurring to implement PTC, railroads are not looking to spend capital  to implement other rail safety technologies. Commuter railroads and short  line railroads also lack the capital budgets to invest in new technologies.  Some experts and other stakeholders, as well as FRA officials, also told us  there is sometimes a disconnect between who would pay for a particular  technology and who would benefit from it. For example, one of the  experts and representatives from a railroad association we interviewed  told us that electronically controlled pneumatic brakes would most benefit  the railroads, while the cost of installing them would fall on the car owner,  which could be a shipping company and not a railroad.
Uncertainty about a technology’s effectiveness: Several of the experts and  other stakeholders we interviewed identified uncertainty about a  technology’s effectiveness as a key implementation challenge and noted  that proving the effectiveness of a new technology is critical to gaining its  acceptance for use by the industry. In particular, most experts noted that  uncertainty about effectiveness was a challenge to implementing several  of the track inspection and measurement technologies, presumably  because of their lack of maturity, since the experts also tended to indicate  that these technologies were in the early stages of development. The  reluctance by railroads to implement a technology due to cost is also  affected by uncertainty about a technology’s effectiveness. According to  FRA officials, railroads will not adopt a new technology unless they know  it will deliver a positive return on their investment.
Regulations: Experts and other stakeholders reported a disincentive  under current regulations to use new track inspection technologies.  Specifically, they were concerned that such technologies identify track  defects perceived as too insignificant to pose a safety risk, but which  nonetheless require remedial action under current regulations once such  defects are identified. Regulations were generally not cited by experts and  other stakeholders as a major challenge to implementing the other new  technologies.
Lack of interoperability with existing systems and equipment: Most  experts indicated in our questionnaire that lack of interoperability was a  major implementation challenge for electronically controlled pneumatic  brakes. Specifically, they told us that for such brakes to function  properly, all cars on a train would have to be equipped with them, which,  although practical for a passenger train or a train that does not exchange  cars with another train—such as a train that carries one type of cargo, like  coal—would not be practical for a mixed-freight train whose cars are  exchanged with other trains, which is common in rail operations.  Additionally, some stakeholders said that crash energy management is  difficult to retrofit into existing rolling stock. Experts did not agree that  lack of interoperability was a major challenge for the other technologies.
section_title: FRA Has Taken Actions to Fulfill the PTC Mandate and Promote Other Technologies, but Opportunities Exist to Inform Congress of Risks and Improve Monitoring
subsections: section_title: To Date, FRA Is Taking the Necessary Steps to Fulfill the PTC Mandate
paragraphs: To fulfill the PTC mandate, FRA (1) has developed regulations regarding  the implementation of PTC systems, (2) is monitoring PTC implementation  efforts, and (3) is managing funding programs to support PTC  implementation.
subsections: section_title: Development of Regulations
paragraphs: In January 2010, FRA issued final regulations on PTC implementation on  the basis of requirements in the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008.  These regulations were developed in collaboration with the railroad  industry and other stakeholders through FRA’s Railroad Safety Advisory  Committee. Among other things, the regulations describe the requirements  of a PTC system; require railroads to submit PTC development,  implementation, and safety plans and FRA to review and approve them;  require railroads to implement PTC by December 31, 2015; and establish a  schedule of civil penalties for violations.
section_title: Oversight of Railroads’ PTC Implementation Efforts
paragraphs: To oversee railroads’ progress in implementing PTC, FRA has provided  guidance and is monitoring implementation, including by reviewing  railroads’ PTC-related plans and directly observing railroads’ PTC-related  activities. Specifically, FRA has provided guidance to the railroad industry  on PTC implementation by speaking at industry conferences, meeting with  railroads to discuss PTC implementation plans, and providing railroads  with a template for drafting their PTC implementation plans. The Rail  Safety Improvement Act of 2008 and FRA’s regulations require the agency  to provide timely review and approval of PTC development,  implementation, and safety plans. FRA must review and approve PTC  development plans before railroads can submit their PTC safety plans,  receive PTC system certification from FRA, and begin operating PTC  systems (see fig. 7). FRA reviewed PTC implementation plans before  completing its review of all PTC development plans, since the  implementation plans had a review deadline set by statute, whereas  development plans did not. As of July 2010, FRA completed its first review  of all 41 of the PTC implementation plans railroads submitted. As of  December 3, 2010, according to FRA officials, 21 plans were fully  approved and 13 were provisionally approved. The remaining 7 plans were  disapproved; the agency returned these plans to railroads with requests to  make technical corrections or provide more detailed information and  resubmit them to FRA for subsequent approval.
FRA has since been reviewing PTC development plans. According to the  PTC final rule, FRA, to the extent practicable, will approve, approve with  conditions, or disapprove these plans within 60 days of receipt. In March  2010, three of the four largest Class I freight railroads jointly submitted a  PTC development plan. In a May 2010 letter to those railroads, FRA stated  it would not complete review of the plan within the 60-day time frame  specified in the final rule because agency personnel were needed to review  the large number of implementation plans FRA received, which had a  review deadline set by statute. FRA completed an initial review of the  development plan in July 2010 and sent a letter to the railroads asking  them to (1) revise the development plan and resubmit it after making some  corrections and (2) provide FRA with specific details on the magnitude of  the risk the delay in FRA’s review and approval of the development plan  would have on the timely implementation of PTC. FRA officials told us  they met with representatives from these railroads in August and October  2010 to discuss resolution of FRA’s remaining issues and concerns and are  working with the railroads on an ongoing basis to do so. Several experts  and other stakeholders told us that if development or implementation plan  approvals were delayed, railroads’ PTC implementation schedules could,  in turn, be delayed, possibly resulting in railroads not meeting the PTC  implementation deadline. In this specific case, the three Class I freight  railroads noted in a July 2010 letter to FRA that a delay in approving their  PTC development plan could delay PTC development and implementation  time frames. Other railroads could also be affected, since three other Class  I freight railroads, three smaller freight railroads, Amtrak, and nine  commuter railroads are relying on the approval of this plan, because they  are also implementing the same PTC system.
FRA plans to monitor railroads’ progress in implementing PTC by  requiring railroads to provide periodic information on implementation  progress and by directly observing railroads’ testing and implementation  of PTC. In its final PTC rule, FRA requires that railroads report annually on  the percentage of their trains that are PTC-equipped and operating on  PTC-equipped track. FRA officials told us that the intent of this reporting  is to monitor railroads’ implementation of PTC so that railroads gradually  implement this technology in the years leading to the 2015 deadline.  Members of the newly established PTC branch within FRA’s Office of  Safety will conduct further monitoring of PTC implementation. According  to FRA officials, these 11 new staff members in headquarters and regional  offices will monitor railroads’ work to verify the accuracy of information  in PTC track databases; observe testing conducted by railroads prior to  PTC system certification; and, if needed, advise railroads to conduct more  tests or different tests to establish that the PTC system complies with FRA  regulations. Additionally, FRA is required to report to Congress in 2012  on the progress railroads have made in implementing PTC.
section_title: Financial Assistance
paragraphs: FRA manages two funding programs to assist with PTC implementation.  First, as required by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, FRA  manages a grant program to fund the deployment of rail safety  technologies. This program is authorized to offer up to $50 million in  grants to railroads each year for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Congress  did not appropriate funding for this program in fiscal year 2009 and  provided $50 million in fiscal year 2010. The law stipulates that funding  under this program be prioritized for implementation of PTC over other  rail safety technologies. In November 2010, FRA awarded grants totaling  $50 million to seven projects for fiscal year 2010, six of which were related  to PTC, while the seventh was awarded for implementation of a risk  management system. FRA received 41 applications seeking over   $228 million in funding for the fiscal year 2010 grants. This grant program  is particularly popular, but its funding as authorized will cover only a small  portion of the estimated costs of PTC implementation, which FRA has  acknowledged could range from $6.7 billion to $22.5 billion. Second, FRA  also manages the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing  Program, which authorizes FRA to provide loans and loan guarantees up  to $35 billion ($7 billion of which is reserved for non-Class I freight  railroads). Funding awarded under this program may be used for several  purposes, including implementation of PTC and other rail safety  technologies, but can also be used for more general improvements to  infrastructure, including track, bridges, and rail yards. FRA staff told us  that as of September 2010, no railroads have applied to this loan program  for PTC implementation and speculated that the program’s requirement to  demonstrate creditworthiness may have deterred some railroads from  applying. It may also be too soon in the PTC implementation time frame  for most railroads to need loans, if they are not yet purchasing PTC  equipment. Officials from the American Short Line and Regional Railroad  Association told us that using these loans to pay for PTC would help  smaller freight railroads meet the implementation mandate.
In addition, FRA officials said that the agency is working with FTA to see  whether FTA could provide financial assistance to commuter railroads for  PTC implementation. FRA officials said that to provide this financial  assistance, FTA would need to seek additional funds in its annual budget  request to Congress. FTA did not request such funds for fiscal year 2011  and is currently developing its budget request for fiscal year 2012.
section_title: FRA Has an Opportunity to Identify and Report to Congress on PTC Implementation Risks and Potential Mitigation Actions
paragraphs: As we have previously discussed, there are uncertainties regarding when  the remaining tasks to implement PTC can be completed, which raise  certain risks to the successful completion of PTC by the 2015 deadline.  FRA officials told us they are aware of some of these risks, but they said  that it is too early to know whether they are significant enough to  jeopardize successful implementation by the 2015 deadline. However, as  FRA moves forward with monitoring railroads’ implementation of PTC,  the agency will have more information regarding the risks previously  discussed. In particular, the agency should have a clearer picture of  whether it is likely railroads will meet the 2015 implementation deadline  and what the associated implications would be. For example, by the time  FRA reports to Congress in 2012 on PTC implementation progress, it will  be clearer whether the state of PTC component maturity poses a risk to  timely implementation, since the railroad industry currently expects  components will be available by 2012. Additionally, the cost to implement  PTC should be more certain, and therefore it will be clearer whether  problems in financing PTC—particularly for commuter and smaller freight  railroads—could lead to delays or whether the costs of PTC could result in  other operational needs, such as maintenance, going unmet due to the  diversion of funds to pay for PTC.
Our past work has shown that the early identification of risks and  strategies to mitigate them can help avoid negative outcomes for the  implementation of large-scale projects. For example, our 2004 report  examining an Amtrak project to improve the Northeast Corridor noted  that early identification and assessment of problems would allow for  prompt intervention, increasing the likelihood that corrective action could  be taken to get the project back on track. Furthermore, for our work  examining the transition from analog to digital television broadcasting, we  pointed out how such efforts are particularly crucial when the  implementation of a large-scale project relies on private organizations to  achieve public benefits. Such is the case with the implementation of PTC,  which was mandated for reasons of public safety but is largely the  responsibility of railroads to accomplish. FRA’s 2012 report to Congress  presents the agency with an opportunity to inform Congress of the  likelihood that railroads will meet the 2015 implementation deadline, as  well as potential implementation risks and strategies to address them.  Such information would help Congress determine whether the railroad  industry is on track to successfully implement PTC by 2015 or whether  there are major risks associated with this effort that require intervention  by Congress, FRA, railroads, or other stakeholders. FRA officials told us  they have not yet determined what information will go in their report.
section_title: FRA Has Taken Some Actions to Encourage the Implementation of Other Technologies, but Does Not Fully Use Best Practices
paragraphs: In keeping with its mission of promoting safety throughout the national  railroad system, FRA has taken a number of actions to encourage the use  of rail safety technologies other than PTC—such as electronically  controlled pneumatic brakes or switch position monitors/indicators—by  (1) collaborating with industry on R&D efforts, (2) supporting  demonstration and pilot projects, (3) analyzing technology costs related to  benefits, and (4) issuing or revising regulations.
subsections: section_title: Collaboration with Industry on R&D
paragraphs: FRA has worked with members of the railroad industry—through the  Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, AAR, and TTCI—to prioritize and  select technologies to be included in FRA’s R&D program. FRA and AAR  collaborate extensively on R&D projects at TTCI, a DOT-owned, AAR- operated research facility. Additionally, FRA’s Office of Research and  Development may select a railroad partner when beginning a new R&D  project. For example, FRA partnered with one of the largest Class I freight  railroads to demonstrate a new technology that measures the interaction  between rail cars and the track—known as vehicle/track interaction  technology. According to a senior FRA official, these devices are now  widely deployed, and FRA continues to study ways to model vehicle/track  interaction. Each year, FRA also presents information about its completed  and ongoing R&D projects to the Transportation Research Board—a body  that includes railroad industry representatives—which then conducts an  evaluation of FRA’s R&D program. Additionally, the Rail Safety  Improvement Act of 2008 called for FRA to develop a railroad safety  strategy, which the agency issued in 2010 with its fiscal year 2011 budget  request. Although this plan does not include any efforts to encourage  implementation of specific rail safety technologies, it does state that FRA’s  Office of Research and Development has expanded its use of grants and  partnerships with railroads and suppliers to improve stakeholder  participation in its R&D and support the demonstration of results as soon  as possible.
section_title: Support of Demonstration and Pilot Projects
paragraphs: FRA has conducted and provides support for a number of demonstration  and pilot projects that examine technologies aimed at improving rail safety  and help to demonstrate to railroads the effectiveness of these  technologies. According to FRA staff, the agency has put a focus on  funding technology demonstration projects and has a cooperative  agreement with AAR to do this work. Based on our review of FRA’s list of  143 current R&D projects for fiscal year 2010, 49 of these projects appear  to involve demonstrations of new technologies or existing technologies  used in new ways to improve safety. For example, there is a current  demonstration project examining the use of electronically controlled  pneumatic brakes. Past demonstration projects have examined a variety of  rail safety technologies, including devices that measure track—known as  gage restraint measurement systems—vehicle/track interaction  technology and automated inspection devices. Additionally, an FRA risk- reduction grant program supports several ongoing pilot projects with  railroads, two of which are examining technologies aimed at continuously  testing track to collect data on the track’s performance as well as to  identify defects. FRA produces summary reports of some of its R&D  efforts and publishes these reports on its Web site.
section_title: Analysis of Technology Costs and Benefits
paragraphs: FRA has taken recent actions to analyze the potential costs and benefits to  railroads of implementing new rail safety technologies. When issuing the  final rule on electronically controlled pneumatic brakes, FRA conducted a  cost-benefit analysis and included this information in the rule.  Additionally, FRA analyzed potential return on investments for  vehicle/track interaction technology to demonstrate to freight railroads  potential cost-savings that could be achieved from implementing this  technology by preventing derailments and reducing the need for  emergency repairs or slow speed orders on sections of track with  defective rail. FRA staff noted that railroads generally will not adopt a new  technology unless it can be demonstrated to have a positive return on  investment within 1 to 2 years. FRA staff also noted that because the  agency demonstrated a positive return on investment for a new  vehicle/track interaction system, a major Class I freight railroad adopted  the technology.
section_title: Issuance and Revision of Regulations
paragraphs: FRA has also issued or revised regulations and is planning further  regulatory changes in an attempt to encourage the use of new rail safety  technologies. For example:    FRA issued final regulations promoting the use of electronically controlled  pneumatic brakes in October 2008. The regulations create an incentive  for installing this technology by allowing railroads that install these brakes  and comply with the regulations to conduct less frequent brake  inspections, thereby decreasing the railroads’ inspection costs and  potentially allowing for more frequent train operations. Prior to the  establishment of these regulations, railroads were not permitted to use  these specialized braking systems without first applying for an exemption  from existing FRA regulations. FRA will provide an exemption from  existing regulations on a case-by-case basis to railroads that seek such  approval. For example, before PTC was required by law, FRA issued  regulatory exemptions and eventually established regulations promoting  the use of PTC. FRA has also issued regulatory exemptions allowing for  the use of unmanned track inspection machines to monitor track  conditions and crash energy management designs in passenger rail  vehicles.
FRA is currently working with the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee to  revise its track inspection regulations, which, according to some experts  and stakeholders we spoke with, create a disincentive for railroads to  implement new track inspection technologies. As previously discussed,  current FRA regulations generally require railroads to take remedial  action, such as limiting train speeds or replacing track, when a track  defect is found. Stakeholders we spoke with noted that using newer track  inspection technologies would detect a greater number of small, relatively  minor defects that pose little to no safety risk, along with more significant  defects. However, stakeholders stated that FRA’s current track inspection  regulations could create a situation in which railroads using newer  inspection technologies might find more small defects than they could  practically examine and fix in a timely manner, and could be held liable for  identifying defects they did not quickly repair. To account for these newer  technologies, FRA staff said they are considering changes to the remedial  actions railroads must take in response to identified rail defects. FRA  expects to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking on this and other  changes to its track inspection regulations in the spring of 2011.  Additionally, pursuant to its safety strategy for high-speed rail, FRA  officials said they are considering revisions to FRA’s passenger vehicle  regulations to encourage the implementation of technologies that monitor  the condition of rail vehicles, although the agency has not yet identified  these specific requirements.
The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 also requires FRA to take action  in two specific ways to encourage the use of rail safety technologies in  addition to PTC. First, the act requires FRA to prescribe standards,  regulations, guidance, or orders by October 2009 for railroads to  implement rail safety technologies in areas of track without signals or  PTC. FRA officials began this effort in September 2010 by proposing that  the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee establish a task force to develop a  proposed rule. This proposal was accepted; however, the task force will  delay meeting until representatives serving on another task force involved  in PTC issues are available. FRA staff stated that the agency has delayed  meeting the October 2009 requirement because FRA gave priority to the  PTC rulemaking. Second, by October 2012, FRA must develop regulations  requiring Class I freight railroads, Amtrak, commuter railroads, and other  railroads that FRA determines have an inadequate safety record to develop  a risk-reduction program that includes a technology implementation plan  describing railroads’ efforts to implement new rail safety technologies.  FRA issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking on December 8,  2010,  seeking comment on the possible requirements of this program.
The National Academies’ Transportation Research Board has identified a  number of best practices for encouraging the implementation of new  technologies. Of these best practices, those most applicable to FRA’s  efforts fall into four key areas:    Early involvement of users: Involving potential users of a technology  early on in its development, such as seeking information from users about  their needs and enlisting their assistance, can help ensure that products  developed respond to users’ requirements.
Demonstrating technology effectiveness: Agency efforts aimed at  demonstrating the effectiveness of a technology can help other potential  users decide whether to implement the technology. Activities that can help  to demonstrate a technology’s effectiveness include supporting  demonstrations or pilot projects and conducting cost/benefit or similar  analyses.
Offering incentives: Activities to provide financial assistance and efforts  to revise regulations to create other incentives can help encourage the  implementation of new technologies.
Monitoring and reporting on technology adoption: Careful monitoring of  the acceptance, adoption, refinement, and satisfaction among users of the  technologies being promoted can provide lessons learned about agency  efforts to encourage technology implementation. Reporting this  information can help demonstrate program results and build support for  the agency’s efforts.
The actions we previously discussed that FRA has taken to encourage the  implementation of rail safety technologies align with most of these  practices and help to address some of the implementation challenges  experts identified, including uncertainty about technology effectiveness  and regulatory disincentives. Specifically, FRA’s collaboration with the  railroad industry in its R&D efforts involves potential technology users  early and helps to ensure its efforts address industry needs while also  expediting the potential adoption of new technologies. FRA’s sponsorship  of demonstration and pilot projects and its analyses of technology costs  and benefits help to demonstrate the effectiveness of new technologies.  FRA’s current efforts to revise some track inspection regulations may  address the disincentives in these regulations that discourage railroads  from implementing new inspection technologies. Additionally, FRA has a  grant program to provide funding for implementing new rail safety  technologies, although, at present, the program has been prioritized for  PTC and is not being used to fund implementation of other types of rail  safety technologies.
Although FRA has taken actions that align to most of the best practices  previously identified, the agency lacks a method to effectively monitor  implementation of new rail safety technologies that would allow it to  better demonstrate the results of its efforts. Specifically, FRA officials  stated that the agency does not have a method to track the extent to which  the railroad industry implements technologies that FRA’s R&D efforts  contributed to developing. FRA staff said they have some information  about the use of such new technologies, but this information is not  comprehensive. For example, FRA officials said they would be aware of a  railroad adopting a new safety technology if the railroad is required to  seek regulatory exemption from FRA for its use. Our past work looking at  the R&D program of DOT’s Office of Pipeline Safety—now within the  Department’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration— has shown that agencies that monitor and report on industry adoption of  technologies supported by the agency’s R&D efforts can better assess the  effectiveness of those R&D efforts. Specifically, the Pipeline and  Hazardous Materials Safety Administration monitors and reports on its  Web site the number of technologies supported by the agency’s R&D  efforts that have been commercialized. Without a similar method to  monitor and report on the adoption of technologies supported by FRA’s  R&D efforts, the agency lacks information it could use to refine future  R&D efforts or help demonstrate the results of its R&D program, an  important consideration because FRA is currently in the process of  updating its R&D strategic plan. FRA’s last R&D strategic plan included  the goal to expedite widespread deployment of new technologies that have  the potential for significant improvement in track safety—a goal for which  information about the industry’s adoption of new technologies could be  useful for demonstrating results.
Additionally, 15 of the 20 experts we spoke with indicated that FRA could  do more to encourage technology implementation and suggested actions  that align with the Transportation Research Board’s best practices.  Specifically, 3 experts said that FRA should conduct more demonstration  or pilot projects, and 4 experts said that FRA should do more to identify  the costs and benefits of implementing new technologies—actions that  align with the best practice of demonstrating technology effectiveness.  Also, 8 experts said that FRA should offer more financial assistance, and 6  experts said that the agency should revise its regulations to provide  incentives for the introduction of new technologies—actions that align  with the best practice of offering incentives. While additional use of the  best practices identified by the Transportation Research Board could  better encourage the implementation of rail safety technologies, we are  not making a recommendation at this time because FRA has other efforts  that it needs to give priority to, such as overseeing investment in high- speed passenger rail and reforming its hours of service regulations.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Although the safety of U.S. rail continues to improve, recent railroad  accidents prompted the enactment of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of  2008, including the requirement to implement PTC. Other recently enacted  laws indicate significant interest in expanding passenger rail services,  particularly high-speed passenger services, which will change the nature  of the mode and introduce new safety risks. The strategic development  and implementation of PTC and other new rail safety technologies can  help FRA and the industry address these risks while ensuring that rail  remains a safe form of transportation.
The railroad industry is making progress in developing and implementing  PTC, but much remains to be accomplished to develop, test, and install  fully functional PTC systems in time to meet the 2015 implementation  deadline. At present, it is unclear whether various issues—such as the lack  of mature PTC components and the cost of implementation, particularly to  commuter and smaller freight railroads—could result in railroads missing  this deadline or lead to other operational impacts for railroads. However,  the PTC implementation deadline is still 5 years away, so it is too soon to  determine for certain whether the industry will be able to meet it. This  timing presents an opportunity to look ahead at what risks lie in wait that  could jeopardize successful implementation and identify potential  strategies to address them, rather than wait and see what problems  develop and were not addressed. FRA will have the chance to publicly  identify such risks, as well as potential ways Congress, the agency, or  other stakeholders could address them, when it reports to Congress on  PTC implementation progress in 2012. Identifying and mitigating risks  sooner, rather than later, would better ensure a reliable PTC system can be  fully implemented to provide the intended safety benefits of this  technology without resulting in unintended consequences.
While recent laws have expanded FRA’s role, its mission to promote safety  remains a core responsibility. Much focus has been placed on  implementing PTC to address accidents caused by human factors, but  technologies besides PTC hold promise for improving safety by addressing  other accident causes, such as problems with track or equipment. While  FRA has employed several key best practices for encouraging the use of  new technologies, employing a method to monitor and report on the  industry’s adoption of new technologies that FRA was involved in  developing could provide useful information for demonstrating the results  of its R&D program and refining future efforts. Importantly, such efforts  could help the agency better fulfill its mission to promote safety  throughout the national rail network.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation take the following  two actions:    To support the effective identification and mitigation of risks to the  successful fulfillment of PTC requirements by 2015, direct the  Administrator of FRA to include in FRA’s 2012 report to Congress an  analysis of the likelihood that railroads will meet the PTC implementation  deadline;  the risks to successful implementation of PTC; and actions Congress, railroads, or other stakeholders can take to mitigate  risks to successful PTC implementation.
To better encourage the implementation of rail safety technologies other  than PTC, direct the Administrator of FRA to develop and implement a  method for monitoring and reporting information on the adoption of  technologies supported by FRA’s R&D efforts.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for  review and comment. DOT provided technical clarifications, which we  incorporated into the report as appropriate. DOT also said that it would  consider our recommendations. We also provided a draft of this report to  Amtrak for its review and comment. Amtrak provided a technical  comment, which we incorporated.
As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents  of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days  from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report  to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of  Transportation, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions on this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Contact information and key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report discusses (1) the progress railroads have made in developing  and implementing positive train control (PTC) and the remaining steps to  implement PTC systems; (2) the potential benefits of other rail safety  technologies under development as well as the challenges to implementing  them; and (3) the extent of the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA)  efforts to fulfill the PTC mandate and encourage the implementation of  other rail safety technologies.
To obtain information about railroads’ progress in developing and  implementing PTC and the steps remaining to implement PTC, we  interviewed representatives of the four largest Class I freight railroads  (BNSF Railway, CSX Corporation, Norfolk Southern, and Union Pacific);  Amtrak; five selected commuter railroads (Massachusetts Bay  Transportation Authority (Boston, Massachusetts), Metra (Chicago,  Illinois), North County Transit District (San Diego, California), Tri-Rail  (Miami and Fort Lauderdale, Florida), and Virginia Railway Express  (Washington, D.C.)); selected rail supply companies (ENSCO,  MeteorComm, and Ansaldo); railroad industry associations (the  Association of American Railroads (AAR), the American Short Line and  Regional Railroad Association, and the Railway Supply Institute); and  FRA. We selected the commuter railroads to represent a range of  geographic locations and levels of ridership, while selecting railroads that  had relationships with all four of the largest Class I railroads and included  a mix of railroads that both owned and leased track. We selected the  railroad supply companies on the basis of recommendations from railroad  industry associations and railroads and included all of the major suppliers  for key components of the freight railroads’ PTC systems. We reviewed  PTC development and implementation requirements in the Rail Safety  Improvement Act of 2008 and FRA regulations. We also reviewed PTC  implementation plans that Class I freight railroads and Amtrak submitted  to FRA. In addition, we visited and met with officials at the Transportation  Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI), near Pueblo, Colorado, where some PTC  components are being tested.
To obtain information about the benefits of other rail safety technologies  under development, as well as the challenges to implementing them, we  compiled a list of rail safety technologies currently under development in  the United States on the basis of interviews with railroads, railroad  associations, FRA, and the Department of Transportation’s Volpe National  Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center). We organized these  technologies into four categories and refined this list during the course of  our work as we obtained additional information from other stakeholders.  We sought periodic feedback on the list from FRA, the Volpe Center, AAR,  and TTCI. We limited the scope of these technologies to those that would  prevent or mitigate train-to-train collisions and derailments and excluded  technologies that addressed other risks or that experts indicated were  widely deployed and therefore no longer under development.
We identified, with assistance from the National Academies’  Transportation Research Board, a group of 20 rail safety technology  experts from railroads, rail suppliers, federal agencies, labor  organizations, and universities (see app. II for a list of these experts). We  interviewed these experts about their knowledge of the benefits of the rail  safety technologies within the scope of this engagement, as well as their  views on the challenges to implementing them, and surveyed them with a  standardized assessment tool seeking information about the benefits,  maturity, and implementation challenges of all the technologies in our  scope. We received completed assessments from 19 of the 20 experts   (see app. III for complete assessment results). Based on the rail safety  technology experts’ responses to our questionnaire, we identified some  technologies as being more promising than others. In our questionnaire,  we asked experts about their views of these technologies’ potential to  improve safety, the value of funding additional research and development  (R&D) and implementation, and the technologies’ current stages of  product development. For the purposes of this analysis, we defined a  technology as being more promising if it has a higher potential to improve  safety, is most worth additional R&D and implementation costs, and is in a  later stage of development, which presumably would mean it could be  implemented sooner than a technology that is in an earlier development  stage. By assigning values to the experts’ responses, we determined which  of the technologies in our scope most satisfied these three criteria—in  other words, which technologies the experts viewed as having the most  potential to improve safety, being most worth additional costs, and being  in the later stages of product development. We also interviewed  government officials, railroad industry representatives, and academics  from the European Union, Japan, and Taiwan about rail safety  technologies implemented in other countries, seeking insights about  potential differences in implementation. We identified these stakeholders  on the basis of input from FRA, the Volpe Center, the Transportation  Research Board, and suggestions from foreign officials.
To obtain information about the extent of FRA’s efforts to fulfill the PTC  mandate and encourage the implementation of other rail safety  technologies, we reviewed documentation obtained from FRA officials— including information on R&D projects, technology pilots, guidance,  strategic planning, and technology implementation grants—and  interviewed FRA officials responsible for the agency’s rail safety  technology R&D, safety regulatory efforts, and efforts to meet the PTC  mandate. We also reviewed FRA’s requirements in the Rail Safety  Improvement Act of 2008 and related FRA regulations to fulfill the PTC  mandate and encourage the implementation of other rail safety  technologies. Additionally, we interviewed the experts and other railroad  industry stakeholders that we have previously named about their views on  FRA’s efforts to fulfill the PTC mandate and encourage the implementation  of other rail safety technologies. We focused our review on FRA efforts  related to the implementation of these technologies and did not attempt to  comprehensively review FRA’s R&D program. We identified best practices  for encouraging the implementation of new technologies by reviewing  reports from the National Academies’ Transportation Research Board and  prior GAO reports.
section_title: Appendix II: List of Rail Safety Technology Experts
section_title: Appendix III: Detailed Results of Experts’ Assessment of Rail Safety Technologies
paragraphs: Following is the tool used to assess experts’ views about rail safety  technologies under development, complete with detailed results. We do  not include the responses for open-ended questions.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, non- partisan agency that assists Congress in evaluating federal programs.
We are interested in your expert professional opinions on a number of  technologies for potentially improving railroad safety. We have identified  the technologies included in this assessment tool through our first round  of interviews with you, other experts and stakeholders, and a review of  available literature. These technologies are separated into four categories  – Remote Control and Switches, Rolling Stock and Condition Monitoring,  Occupant Protection, and Track Inspection and Measurement.
For the purposes of this review, we have limited our scope to reviewing  only those technologies that would potentially increase safety by  preventing or mitigating train-to-train collisions and derailments.
We ask that you please assess the technologies across several factors,  providing comments where appropriate. In addition, we are also interested  in your thoughts about possible actions that the U.S. Department of  Transportation could take to encourage the implementation of new  technologies. Lastly, we are interested in your opinion on the extent to  which specific issues may pose a challenge to implementing positive train  control by the December 31, 2015 deadline.
Instructions for Completing This Tool  You can answer most of the questions easily by checking boxes or filling in  blanks. A few questions request short narrative answers. Please note that  these blanks will expand to fit your answer.
Please use your mouse to navigate throughout the document by clicking  on the field or check box you wish to fill in. Do not use the “Tab” or  “Enter” keys as doing so may cause formatting problems.
To select or deselect a check box, simply click or double click on the box.
To assist us, we ask that you complete and return this document by June  15, 2010. Please return the completed survey by e-mail. Simply save this  file to your computer desktop or hard drive and attach it to your e-mail.
Thanks in advance for taking the time to share your expertise with GAO. If  you have any questions about this tool, please contact us. You may direct  questions to Andrew Huddleston, Senior Analyst.
Thank you for your help.
subsections: section_title: Part 1: Remote Control and Switch Technologies
paragraphs: In this section we refer to Remote Control and Switch Technologies.  Please use the following descriptions as a guide when thinking about these  specific technologies.
SKIP TO PART 2 (QUESTION #10)   SKIP TO PART 2 (QUESTION #10)   CONTINUE TO QUESTION #2   CONTINUE TO QUESTION #2   CONTINUE TO QUESTION #2  2.  How much potential, if any, does further development and  implementation of the following remote control and switch  technologies have for improving rail safety?
3.  Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and  likely research and development (R&D) costs—regardless of  funding source—do you believe further R&D of the following  remote control and switch technologies would be worth the  investment?
4.  Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and  likely implementation costs—regardless of funding source—do you  believe the procurement, operation, and maintenance of the  following remote control and switch technologies would be worth  the investment?
5.  At what product development stage are the following remote  control and switch technologies in the United States?
6.  How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of remote-control locomotives?
7.  How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of remote-control switches?
8.  How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of switch position monitors/indicators?
9.  What other challenges, if any, that are not listed above impede  the implementation of remote control and switch technologies in  the United States?
section_title: Part 2: Rolling Stock and Condition Monitoring Technologies
paragraphs: In this section we refer to Rolling Stock and Condition Monitoring  Technologies. Please use the following descriptions as a guide when  thinking about these specific technologies.
Systems installed on rail cars that continuously monitor mechanical  components including bearing temperature, bearing and wheel  defects, and longitudinal impacts  Condition monitoring systems installed along tracks that can identify  defects in various rolling stock components as trains drive by. For  example, acoustic bearing detectors, wheel impact load detectors,  truck performance detectors, cracked wheel detectors, wheel profile  measurement.
10. How would you rate your overall level of knowledge of  increasing railroad safety through the development and use of the  following rolling stock and condition monitoring technologies?
SKIP TO PART 3 (QUESTION #21)   SKIP TO PART 3 (QUESTION #21)   CONTINUE TO QUESTION #11   CONTINUE TO QUESTION #11   CONTINUE TO QUESTION #11  11. How much potential, if any, does further development and  implementation of the following rolling stock and condition  monitoring technologies have for improving rail safety?
Rolling stock and  condition monitoring  technology  b.
12. Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and  likely research and development (R&D) costs—regardless of  funding source—do you believe further R&D of the following  rolling stock and condition monitoring technologies would be  worth the investment?
Rolling stock and condition monitoring  technology  b.
13. Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and  likely implementation costs—regardless of funding source—do you  believe the procurement, operation, and maintenance of the  following rolling stock and condition monitoring technologies  would be worth the investment?
Rolling stock and condition monitoring  technology  b.
14. At what product development stage are the following rolling  stock and condition monitoring technologies in the United States?
15. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of electronically controlled pneumatic  brakes?
16. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of improved design of tank cars and other  hazardous material cars?
17. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of high performance wheel steels?
18. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of on-board condition monitoring systems?
19. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of wayside detectors?
20. What other challenges, if any, that are not listed above impede  the implementation of rolling stock and condition monitoring  technologies in the United States?
section_title: Part 3: Occupant Protection Technologies
paragraphs: In this section we refer to Occupant Protection Technologies. Please use  the following descriptions as a guide when thinking about these specific  technologies.
Rail car designs with crumple zones that  absorb energy from a collision in order to  maintain occupant volume and reduce  secondary impact velocities  b.
21. How would you rate your overall level of knowledge of  increasing railroad safety through the development and use of the  following occupant protection technologies?
SKIP TO PART 4 (QUESTION #29)  SKIP TO PART 4 (QUESTION #29)  CONTINUE TO QUESTION #22  CONTINUE TO QUESTION #22  CONTINUE TO QUESTION #22  22. How much potential, if any, does further development and  implementation of the following occupant protection technologies  have for improving rail safety? a.  Crash energy  management  b.
23. Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and  likely research and development (R&D) costs—regardless of  funding source—do you believe further R&D of the following  occupant protection technologies would be worth the investment? a.  Crash energy management  b.
24. Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and  likely implementation costs—regardless of funding source—do you  believe the procurement, operation, and maintenance of the  following occupant protection technologies would be worth the  investment? a.  Crash energy management  b.
25. At what product development stage are the following occupant  protection technologies in the United States?
26. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of crash energy management?
27. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of improved design of interior passenger  car fixtures?
28. What other challenges, if any, that are not listed above impede  the implementation of occupant protection technologies in the  United States?
section_title: Part 4: Track Inspection and Measurement Technologies
paragraphs: In this section we refer to Track Inspection and Measurement  Technologies. Please use the following descriptions as a guide when  thinking about these specific technologies.
29. How would you rate your overall level of knowledge of  increasing railroad safety through the development and use of the  following track inspection and measurement technologies?
SKIP TO PART 5 (QUESTION #44)   SKIP TO PART 5 (QUESTION #44)   CONTINUE TO QUESTION #30   CONTINUE TO QUESTION #30   CONTINUE TO QUESTION #30  30. How much potential, if any, does further development and  implementation of the following track inspection and measurement  technologies have for improving rail safety?
Track inspection and  measurement technology  c.  Ultrasonic phased array rail  e.  Portable ride quality meters h.
31. Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and  likely research and development (R&D) costs—regardless of  funding source—do you believe further R&D of the following track  inspection and measurement technologies would be worth the  investment?
32. Considering the potential for additional safety benefits and  likely implementation costs—regardless of funding source—do you  believe the procurement, operation, and maintenance of the  following track inspection and measurement technologies would be  worth the investment?
33. At what product development stage are the following track  inspection and measurement technologies in the United States?
34. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of machine vision-based automated track  inspection?
35. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of laser-based non-contact ultrasonic rail  inspection?
36. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of ultrasonic phased array rail defect  imaging?
37. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of rail longitudinal stress detection  systems?
38. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of portable ride quality meters?
39. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of autonomous track measurement  systems?
40. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of track modulus measurement systems?
41. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of intrusion detection systems?
42. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  for the implementation of bridge integrity monitoring systems?
43. What other challenges, if any, that are not listed above impede  the implementation of track inspection and measurement  technologies in the United States?
section_title: Part 5: Government Actions
paragraphs: 44. What further actions, if any, could the U.S. Department of  Transportation take to encourage the implementation of new rail  safety technologies?
section_title: Part 6: Positive Train Control
paragraphs: SKIP TO QUESTION #49   SKIP TO QUESTION #49   CONTINUE TO QUESTION #46   CONTINUE TO QUESTION #46   CONTINUE TO QUESTION #46  46. How much of a challenge, if any, do the following issues present  to meeting the December 31, 2015 deadline for implementing  positive train control (PTC)? a.  Achieving interoperability among  b.  Refining braking algorithms  c.  Acquisition of adequate spectrum  in the 220 MHz frequency,  specifically in dense, metropolitan  areas  d.  Development of new high  e.  Technological maturity of other  f.  Ability of suppliers to meet  demand for PTC products  g.  Cost to larger railroads (Amtrak  and Class I freights)  h.  Cost to smaller railroads (short  lines, regionals, commuters) i.
47. What other issues, if any, that are not listed above may present  a challenge to meeting the December 31, 2015 deadline for  implementing positive train control?  48. What further actions, if any, could the U.S. Department of  Transportation take to facilitate the implementation of positive  train control in order to meet the December 31, 2015 deadline?
section_title: Part 7: Additional Comments
paragraphs: 49. What other comments, if any, do you have about the topics  covered in this assessment tool?
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Judy Guilliams-Tapia, Assistant  Director; Amy Abramowitz; Katie Berman; Matthew Butler; Aglae Cantave;  Bess Eisenstadt; Colin Fallon; Kathy Gilhooly; Andrew Huddleston; Sara  Ann Moessbauer; Josh Ormond; Daniel Paepke; Madhav Panwar; and  Terry Richardson made key contributions to this report.