DOD Task Force For Business and Stability Operations: Actions Needed to Establish Project Management Guidelines and Enhance Information Sharing
Published: 2011-07-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and others are involved in economic development activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. In June 2006, DOD established the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (Task Force) to support its related efforts. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011 required that DOD, State, and USAID jointly develop a plan to transition Task Force activities to State, with a focus on potentially transitioning activities to USAID. Under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct work on his own initiative and with additional congressional direction, GAO identified (1) factors to consider in planning any transition of Task Force activities and (2) the extent to which the Task Force established guidance to manage its activities and has shared information with other federal agencies. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed multiple agency officials in Washington, D.C., Iraq, and Afghanistan.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As of June 2011, DOD, State, and USAID officials were discussing options for transitioning Task Force activities and preparing a response to the fiscal year 2011 NDAA requirements. Based on interviews with senior officials and a review of available data, GAO identified five factors to consider in planning for any transition of Task Force activities to USAID, which generally relate to how these agencies conduct their respective activities. First, although both the Task Force and USAID work to promote economic development, they generally take different approaches. The Task Force is a small, flat, flexible organization that generally conducts short-term initiatives, while USAID is a large agency that conducts short- and long-term projects. USAID officials noted that in addition to other activities, it focuses on efforts to improve the environment for investments whereas the Task Force focuses on brokering specific investment deals. Second, as part of DOD, Task Force employees are not subject to the same movement restrictions as USAID employees and have greater flexibility to visit project sites and access to military assets. Third, funding and staffing plans would need to be developed. For example, USAID's fiscal year 2011 budget and 2012 budget request did not take into account any needs to support Task Force activities. Fourth, while both agencies facilitate private sector investment, the nature and focus of their interactions with investors differ. For example, the Task Force actively identifies potential U.S. and non-U.S. investors and arranges meetings and provides logistical support for them, whereas USAID typically sponsors conferences to provide opportunities for prospective investors to share information. Given these differences, State and USAID officials agreed that the same type of private investment activities conducted by the Task Force may not continue at USAID. Last, the timing of a transition and impact on U.S. objectives will need to be considered. DOD, State, and USAID officials noted that because Task Force activities are important to supporting the U.S. goal of attracting investors, a transition in the near term may negatively impact these efforts. While DOD and the Task Force have provided high-level direction for Task Force activities, the Task Force has not developed written project management guidance to be used by its personnel in managing Task Force projects. Such guidance could include important elements, such as project selection criteria, requirements to establish metrics, and monitoring and evaluation processes. As a result, the Task Force does not have the framework needed to ensure a standard operating approach, accountability, and consistent project management. The Task Force has generally focused its information-sharing efforts on senior officials in Afghanistan whereas efforts at the project management level have been more ad hoc. Mechanisms such as working groups exist for agencies involved in development activities to share information. However, the Task Force does not routinely participate, and DOD, State, and USAID have not identified how best to integrate the Task Force to share information on its activities. As a result, the U.S. government may not be positioned to fully leverage and coordinate its respective capabilities and efforts in support of achieving U.S. goals.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Task Force develop written project management guidance and that DOD, State, and USAID develop an approach to integrate the Task Force into information-sharing mechanisms. DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation. The three agencies generally concurred with the second.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: U.S. federal agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD), the  Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID), are involved in stabilization, reconstruction, and  development efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In June 2006, as part of its  counterinsurgency strategy, DOD created the Task Force for Business  and Stability Operations (Task Force) to support economic stabilization  efforts in Iraq. In July 2009, the Task Force also began to operate in  Afghanistan. From fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011, the Task  Force received about $753 million for its activities. Officials in DOD, State,  and USAID have questioned whether the Task Force and its capabilities  should continue to reside in DOD or be transitioned to another federal  agency, such as USAID. To that end, the Ike Skelton National Defense  Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011 required, among other  things, that State, DOD, and USAID jointly develop a plan to transition the  activities of the Task Force in Afghanistan to State, with the focus on  potentially transitioning activities to USAID.
We began a review of Task Force management and information-sharing  activities under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United  States to conduct work on his own initiative. The Joint Explanatory  Statement accompanying the fiscal year 2011 NDAA recognized GAO’s  ongoing review and directed GAO to include some additional information  in its report. This report (1) identifies factors to be considered in planning  any transfer of Task Force capabilities to USAID and (2) evaluates the  extent to which the Task Force had established guidance for its personnel  to manage its activities and shared information about its activities with  other U.S. civilian agencies. In our discussion of factors, we included  information on the relationship between Task Force activities and the U.S.  Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan.
For our review, we reviewed documentation and interviewed key officials  at DOD, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce,  State, the Department of the Treasury, and USAID in headquarters  locations and at the U.S. embassies and military commands in Iraq and  Afghanistan. To identify factors to consider in planning any transition of  Task Force capabilities to USAID, we interviewed cognizant DOD, State,  and USAID senior-level policy officials. Specifically, we obtained their  views on the respective capabilities and operational approaches of the  Task Force and USAID and reviewed relevant and available  documentation. To evaluate the extent to which the Task Force had  established guidance to manage its activities, we reviewed documents  describing the Task Force’s operating approach, projects, and activities;  performance goals and measures; as well as budget submissions and  security protocols. We compared this information to requirements for  documentation contained in GAO’s internal control standards and prior  work related to management and evaluation. To evaluate the extent to  which the Task Force had shared information with other civilian federal  agencies involved with economic stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, we  reviewed DOD guidance, such as DOD Instruction 3000.05, as well as  National Security Presidential Directive 44, to determine coordination  requirements. We also interviewed agency officials and analyzed  documents from multiple agencies to identify the types of information  shared and any processes used to share information. We focused this  portion of our review on information-sharing practices in Afghanistan  because the Task Force ceased its operations in Iraq in January 2011.  More detailed information on our scope and methodology can be found in  appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2010 through July  2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense created the Task Force for  Business and Stability Operations. Its initial focus was to improve DOD’s  contracting processes as a means to increase the number of DOD  contracts awarded to Iraqi firms and therefore help to develop businesses  and create jobs. Soon thereafter, the Task Force’s scope of operations  expanded to include efforts intended to restart Iraqi state-owned factories,  attract foreign investment, improve private banking, and revitalize Iraq’s  agriculture and energy sectors. For Iraqi state-owned factories, the Task  Force procured spare parts, production equipment, and raw materials and  provided training to employees. Additionally, the Task Force reported that  it established temporary office space to provide accommodation for  companies seeking to invest and establish a permanent presence in Iraq.  To improve banking in Iraq, the Task Force reported that it helped  establish capacity to transfer funds electronically.
In July 2009, the Task Force began shifting its focus to Afghanistan at the  request of the International Security Assistance Force, U.S. Central  Command, and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. Task Force officials and  subject matter experts conducted a 3-month assessment to develop a  strategy and plan for activities in Afghanistan. As a result, they identified  several areas of the Afghan economy that they believed were viable for  investment, such as minerals, indigenous industries, and agriculture.  According to Task Force documentation, the Task Force completed a  project in December 2010 with the Afghanistan government to rehabilitate  an oil well to demonstrate the commercial feasibility of oil production in  Afghanistan. It also has several activities ongoing in other areas, such as  assisting the Afghan Ministry of Mines with collecting and collating  geological data with the U.S. Geological Survey to complete tender  packages for investment, building carpet finishing facilities to allow  domestically finished carpets to be sold through an international outlet,  and planning to construct agricultural colleges at Afghan universities that  will serve farmers and agribusiness. In addition, the Task Force has  ongoing activities in banking and finance, energy, software industry  development, and information and communication technology  development in Afghanistan.
The Task Force uses a variety of approaches to conduct its work,  including arranging visits for U.S. and non-U.S. investors to meet with  business leaders and undertaking specific development projects that  could involve building facilities or conducting assessments to identify  potential opportunities. To implement its projects, the Task Force may  use contractors to build facilities or provide assistance to host  government ministries or organizations. While the Task Force undertakes  some projects by itself, in other cases it works with other organizations,  for example USAID, State, or other DOD organizations. In these cases,  the Task Force may provide support to other agencies or complete a  portion of a project. For example, the Task Force has worked with USAID  on the rehabilitation and electrification of a cement plant in Parwan. As of  June 2011, the Task Force consists of 51 government employees and 28  subject matter experts from private firms.
Since its inception, the Task Force has received funds from a variety of  sources, including the Army’s Operations and Maintenance appropriation  account, the Iraq Freedom Fund, and the Office of the Secretary of  Defense’s Emergency and Extraordinary Expense Fund. In January  2011, Congress passed the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011, which authorized  the Task Force to use up to $150 million of operations and maintenance  funds available to the Army for overseas contingency operations for its  activities in Afghanistan. Table 1 shows the funding available for the Task  Force from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011.
The NDAA for fiscal year 2011 required that State, DOD, and USAID  jointly develop a plan to transition the activities of the Task Force to State,  with a focus on potentially transitioning activities to USAID. The plan,  which was to be submitted to Congress at the same time as the  President’s fiscal year 2012 budget, was to describe (1) the Task Force’s  activities in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2011; (2) the Task Force’s activities  in fiscal year 2011 that USAID will continue in fiscal year 2012, including  those activities that may be merged with similar USAID efforts; (3) any of  the Task Force’s fiscal year 2011 activities that USAID will not continue  and the reasons; and (4) those actions that may be necessary to  transition Task Force activities that will be continued by USAID in fiscal  year 2012. The NDAA also required the President, acting through the  Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, to submit a report on an  economic strategy for Afghanistan by July 6, 2011. Furthermore, the  NDAA required the Secretary of Defense to submit a report describing the  Task Force’s activities and how these activities support the long-term  stabilization of Afghanistan by October 31, 2011.
section_title: Factors to Consider in Planning Any Transition of Task Force Capabilities from DOD to USAID
paragraphs: The fiscal year 2011 NDAA required that State, DOD, and USAID jointly  develop a plan to transition the activities of the Task Force in Afghanistan  to State. As of June 2011, the plan had not been submitted. Officials from  DOD, State, and USAID told us that they are continuing to discuss the  options for and timing of any transition and developing a response to  satisfy the requirement for a plan in the fiscal year 2011 NDAA. According  to USAID officials, to plan for any transition, they would need detailed  information about the Task Force activities, such as project objectives,  timelines, costs, contracting, and actual results. To identify factors to  consider in planning for any transition of Task Force capabilities from  DOD to USAID, we interviewed DOD, State, and USAID senior-level  policy officials in Afghanistan and Washington, D.C. We obtained their  views on the respective capabilities and operational approaches of the  Task Force and USAID and reviewed relevant and available  documentation. As a result, we identified five factors to consider in  planning for any transition, which generally relate to how these agencies  conduct their respective activities.
Approaches to economic development. Although we identified some  overlap in the roles of the Task Force and USAID, since both entities  work to promote economic development in Afghanistan, they generally  take different approaches to achieve their goals. In particular, USAID  officials noted that in addition to other activities, USAID focuses more  broadly on efforts to improve the environment for investments whereas  the Task Force focuses on brokering specific investment deals.  Specifically, the Task Force was designed to be a small, flat, flexible  organization that generally conducts short-term initiatives in various  sectors of the Afghan economy. For example, the Task Force is building a  raisin processing facility in Kandahar to process raisins for export. It also  facilitated meetings for Sweet Dried Fruit, the largest U.S. importer of  raisins, to purchase Afghan raisins for the U.S. market. USAID is a larger  development agency operating in many sectors ranging from  infrastructure construction to capacity building as well as promotion of  private sector development, both in the short and long term. For example,  USAID worked with ministries to develop public administration and  management capacity to foster government reform and establish the  conditions for economic development. In addition, USAID generally  focuses on both small and large infrastructure projects, ranging from  small health clinics to agricultural colleges to roads and power plants.  Furthermore, in some cases, USAID and the Task Force work in the  same sectors of Afghanistan, but U.S. development officials in  Afghanistan do not consider Task Force projects to be duplicative of  USAID efforts. For example, USAID officials noted that USAID and the  Task Force are both involved in the Afghan mining sector. USAID is  focused on improving the regulatory policies to promote mining sector  development and attract private sector investment through conferences,  while the Task Force is focused on collecting and collating mining data  with the U.S. Geological Survey, developing detailed investment  proposals, and identifying and attracting investors.
Freedom of movement. According to USAID, State, and DOD officials,  Task Force employees have greater freedom of movement than USAID  employees because the Task Force employees operate outside of Chief  of Mission authority and therefore are not required to follow the security  protocols of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul’s Regional Security Officer. In  addition, the Task Force maintains its own security detail and is a DOD  entity. As a result, Task Force employees have an increased ability to  directly implement and oversee its projects, greater access to military  assets, and flexibility to host potential investors. USAID employees  operate under Chief of Mission authority and are subject to more  restrictions on their movements. As GAO has previously reported,  movement restrictions affect the ability of USAID employees to directly  implement and oversee USAID’s projects. USAID headquarters officials  noted that USAID uses implementing partners to carry out some of its  projects and that they operate outside Chief of Mission authority. Senior  State headquarters and USAID and State embassy officials said that  lessening restrictions on USAID movement would require an exemption  from the Regional Security Officer’s policy by the Ambassador and  State’s Under Secretary for Management and would be challenging in the  current security environment in Afghanistan. Furthermore, given the  location and security requirements related to some of the Task Force’s  work, such as mining, a memorandum of understanding between USAID  and DOD might be necessary to provide USAID employees greater  access to military security and transportation assets if Task Force  activities are transitioned to USAID.
USAID funding and staffing. USAID’s fiscal year 2011 budget and fiscal  year 2012 budget request did not take into account any needs to support  Task Force activities. However, USAID headquarters officials noted that if  a transition were to occur they have flexibility to reprogram funds to  accommodate the Task Force projects selected for transition. To continue  Task Force activities, senior-level embassy and USAID officials in  Afghanistan also identified potential staffing challenges. For example, the  Task Force consists of individuals with private sector expertise and  business contacts who have agreed to live and work under the Task  Force’s current security arrangement in Afghanistan (e.g., outside Chief  of Mission authority) and are comfortable with the way the Task Force  operates. According to USAID officials, many of its employees also have  private sector experience and business contacts, but they live and work  under a different security arrangement (e.g., under Chief of Mission  authority). Embassy personnel stated that because of differences in the  way the two agencies approach their activities, it may prove challenging  for USAID to attract employees with the same expertise to broker  investment deals as currently exists within the Task Force.
Facilitating private investment in Afghanistan. While both USAID and the  Task Force facilitate private investment, the nature and focus of their  interactions with investors differ. For example, the Task Force identifies  and provides direct logistical and consultative support to U.S. and non- U.S. potential investors. Such support includes advising companies on  investment opportunities, arranging access to Afghan business leaders  and officials, and providing temporary housing, transportation, and office  space while investors evaluate opportunities and set up their own  operations. The Task Force has hosted major international corporations  and investors in Afghanistan, including Citibank, IBM, JP Morgan, Sweet  Dried Fruit, Case New Holland, and Harrods of London. With respect to  facilitating private investment, USAID typically hosts conferences that are  designed to attract businesses or share information. Given their  differences in approach, interaction with investors, and flexibility to move  around, as previously discussed, senior USAID and State officials in  Afghanistan agreed that these investment activities currently conducted  by the Task Force may not continue if a transition to USAID occurs.
Timing of transition and linkage to U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. Task  Force activities in Afghanistan are intended to support objectives  associated with the revised U.S Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign  Plan for Support to Afghanistan. The plan has several objectives  associated with U.S. goals and with the International Security Assistance  Force’s lines of operations, including “Advancing Livelihoods and  Sustainable Jobs.” Under this objective, the United States seeks to  increase the productivity of small and medium-sized enterprises and  promote domestic and foreign private sector investment in Afghanistan  into 2012. Because the Task Force is involved in various efforts to spur  private investment, senior-level DOD, State, and USAID officials in  Afghanistan have stated that a transition in the near term may negatively  impact these efforts, which are deemed essential for the transition of U.S.  forces out of Afghanistan.
section_title: The Task Force Has Not Documented Specific Guidelines for Managing Activities, and Its Information-Sharing Efforts in Afghanistan Are Focused on Senior-Level Officials and Are Not Integrated into Existing Mechanisms
paragraphs: To guide Task Force activities, DOD’s senior leadership and the Task  Force Director have provided high-level, general direction to Task Force  activities; however, the Task Force has not developed written guidance to  be used by its personnel in managing Task Force projects. In addition,  while interagency information-sharing mechanisms exist in Afghanistan,  the Task Force does not routinely participate in these mechanisms, nor  have DOD, State, and USAID determined how to integrate the Task  Force into these information-sharing efforts.
subsections: section_title: The Task Force Lacks Formal Written Guidance to Manage Its Activities
paragraphs: DOD’s senior leadership and the Task Force Director have provided high- level, general direction for Task Force activities, such as broad goals, an  operating philosophy, and management practices. However, the Task  Force has not developed written guidance to be used by its personnel in  managing Task Force projects. Such guidance could include elements  such as project selection criteria, requirements to establish project  metrics, monitoring and evaluation processes, and the type of project  information that should be collected and documented.
DOD and the Task Force have issued various memorandums that have  broadly guided the Task Force’s activities. For example, the Task Force’s  mission and goals were established through three memorandums issued  by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Defense over the  time period from 2006 to 2010. The June 2006 memorandum stated, for  example, that the Task Force was to accelerate DOD’s stabilization and  reconstruction operations through economic development activities in Iraq  and Afghanistan. Additionally, in December 2009, the Director of the Task  Force issued a management memorandum outlining the Task Force’s  operational model, which mentioned that the Task Force has been  successful because it is designed to flexibly respond to the dynamic  operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan while combat operations  were ongoing and emphasized the necessity of field-based project  management.
Task Force officials stated that they use various practices to manage  activities, such as holding periodic internal management meetings to  review plans and monitor project implementation. In addition, we found  that Task Force officials also maintain some project information. Based  on our discussion with Task Force officials and our review of Task Force  documentation, we confirmed that some of the information contained in  the project files included project descriptions, goals, objectives and  metrics, contract information, and financial information. We found that the  level of detail on the project information maintained by the Task Force  varied, such as for data on cost, status, and metrics. For example, the  Task Force’s project files on its factory restart efforts in Iraq included  detailed information such as cost and project status, and such data were  updated periodically. In contrast, project files on the Task Force’s project  documentation on its agricultural assessment activities contained related  final reports, but the documentation did not contain information on cost  and only one report contained schedule information. Furthermore, the  Task Force’s electronic fund transfer assistance center in Iraq tracked  metrics such as the number of problems reported and the causes of the  problems. In contrast, Task Force project documentation on its private  investment facilitation efforts in Iraq did not have clearly defined metrics.
Neither DOD memorandums nor the Director’s memorandum describing  the Task Force’s operational model outline specific guidelines for project  management, such as project selection criteria, requirements to establish  project metrics, monitoring and evaluation processes, or how program  managers should maintain project information. Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government requires agencies to document  guidance to help manage agency activities but allows agencies to tailor  control activities. According to the standards, written guidance that  directs project management is an integral part of an agency’s planning,  implementing, reviewing, and accountability for stewardship of  government resources and achieving effective results. We also note that  two assessments of the Task Force’s activities have identified a need for  project guidance. First, in 2009, the Task Force appointed an assessment  team to evaluate its activities to restart state-owned factories in Iraq. This  assessment team stated, among other things, that the lack of project  documentation made it difficult to gain a clear understanding of the Task  Force’s operating environment. In addition, the assessment team noted  that the Task Force should consider developing standard processes and  procedures for internal controls and a standard repository for project  reporting. Second, the Task Force conducted an internal assessment and  released the findings in February 2009, which noted that basic  managerial structure and processes were lacking to ensure continuity of  operations and that it would issue new guidelines for operational  management. According to Task Force officials, the December 2009  memorandum outlining the Task Force’s operational philosophy was  issued in response to this internal review. However, it did not contain  specific management guidelines, and no other guidance has been issued.
Senior Task Force officials told us that they have recognized the need to  establish project management guidance; however, they stated that taking  this action was not a priority because at times the future of the Task  Force was uncertain. For example, from late 2008 through March 2009, it  was unclear whether the Task Force would be reauthorized by the  Secretary of Defense to continue activities in Iraq. As a result, a large  number of Task Force staff left the organization, and when the Task  Force was reauthorized in March 2009, senior Task Force officials stated  that it only had three permanent staff members and had to recruit  additional staff. During the time of organizational uncertainty, members of  the Task Force were focused on completing projects in Iraq and were not,  according to Task Force officials, focused on developing and  documenting guidance and policies.
section_title: Task Force Information- Sharing Efforts Are Focused on Senior-Level Officials in Afghanistan and Not Formally Integrated into Existing Coordination Mechanisms
paragraphs: DOD Instruction 3000.05 states that integrated civilian and military efforts  are essential to conducting successful stability operations and requires  DOD and its components to collaborate with other U.S. government  agencies, among other organizations, involved with the planning,  preparation, and conduct of stability operations. The 2010 DOD Task  Force memorandum also requires it to coordinate with relevant U.S.  government agencies for executing assignments in theater, as  appropriate. In addition, according to the DOD Joint Publication on  counterinsurgency operations, coordination and/or integration of military  efforts with other governmental or nongovernmental efforts to achieve a  whole of government approach is essential for successful  counterinsurgency operations, which include stabilization efforts to foster  economic stability and development.
The Task Force has generally focused its information-sharing efforts on  the senior U.S. official level in Afghanistan. According to Task Force  officials, they regularly brief senior-level U.S. military and civilian officials,  such as the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force  and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, the Ambassador to Afghanistan, and the  Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, on the activities  and projects of the Task Force in Afghanistan. Senior Task Force officials  stated that they have also shared information on their activities and  projects with the USAID Mission Director and the Coordinating Director of  Development and Economic Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul,  Afghanistan.
While the Task Force regularly shares information with senior leaders, its  information sharing at the project management level in Afghanistan has  been more ad hoc. Several civilian development officials in Afghanistan  expressed concerns about the inconsistency of information sharing by the  Task Force. For example, according to USAID officials in Afghanistan  information sharing between USAID and the Task Force has generally  been limited and irregular. However, development officials also stated  that coordination with the Task Force was generally better on joint  projects, such as on a cement factory revitalization project in Parwan  province. Task Force officials agreed that information sharing below the  senior level is on an ad hoc basis and noted that they expected senior  leaders they briefed to share information from the Task Force with  appropriate staff within their own organizations. Task Force officials  believe that they have interacted frequently below the senior level but  acknowledged that there have been gaps in the Task Force’s information  sharing and improvements could be made.
While mechanisms such as interagency working groups exist in  Afghanistan for agencies involved in development activities to share  information, the Task Force does not routinely participate in these  mechanisms nor have DOD, State, and USAID determined how to  integrate the Task Force into these information-sharing efforts. The Task  Force has been required to more formally share information on its  projects and activities through other processes in the past, but these  processes were either onetime requirements or are no longer applicable.  For example, the NDAA for fiscal year 2011 required the Task Force to  obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of State for its planned fiscal year  2011 projects in Afghanistan. State officials said that the concurrence  process generally improved the visibility of Task Force activities in  Afghanistan. The Task Force was also required to share information on  its activities and projects in Afghanistan as part of the Commander’s  Emergency Response Program (CERP). The Task Force used the  program to implement some of its fiscal year 2010 projects in Afghanistan  and had to meet the program’s requirements, which included a review  process that involved USAID and U.S. military officials. However,  pursuant to the NDAA for fiscal year 2011, the Task Force is no longer  able to use CERP to implement its projects. Currently, a number of  interagency working groups have been established to share information  regarding various aspects of development. For example, there are  interagency working groups directed by the Coordinating Director of  Development and Economic Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul that are  involved with development in Afghanistan. For example, the Economic  and Financial Policy Working Group is responsible for implementing the  U.S. economic growth strategy for Afghanistan. Embassy, USAID, and  Task Force officials have stated that the Task Force does not regularly  attend the working group’s biweekly meetings. Another mechanism  mentioned in our prior work is the Combined Information Data Network  Exchange used by the U.S. military to track CERP projects. This  database included information on CERP projects; an unclassified version  of the database is accessible by USAID and other organizations.
However, agency officials have not agreed on the most appropriate  mechanisms to use and the level of participation for the Task Force.
Senior embassy officials stated that improved information sharing by the  Task Force would help with unity of effort and that a mechanism to  facilitate information sharing would be useful. Development officials have  also noted the importance of improving information sharing by the Task  Force to ensure that all U.S. government development projects in  Afghanistan are coordinated to support the U.S. economic strategy.  Furthermore, our prior work has highlighted the need to improve  information sharing between agencies working on development in  Afghanistan, particularly USAID and DOD, to improve coordination.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Strengthening the Afghan economy through stabilization and  development assistance efforts is critical to the counterinsurgency  strategy and a key part of the U.S. Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign  Plan for Support to Afghanistan. To support U.S. goals in Afghanistan,  DOD’s Task Force and USAID both undertake efforts that promote  economic development, including facilitating private sector investment.  While the two organizations are similarly focused on stabilizing and  developing Afghanistan’s economy, some differences exist in the way  they carry out their projects and activities. Therefore, factors such as their  respective approaches to economic development, ability to move around,  and the types of activities they undertake to identify investment  opportunities and interact with potential U.S. and non-U.S. investors are  important considerations in planning for any transition.
Written guidance is a key element that can help agencies manage their  activities and establish internal controls. Without formally defined project  management guidance, the Task Force does not have the framework  needed to ensure a standard operating approach and consistent project  management. In addition, the absence of such guidance makes it more  difficult to ensure accountability among its employees, minimize the  potential for waste and abuse, monitor and evaluate project effectiveness,  and ensure a smooth transition as personnel join or leave the Task Force.  Finally, whereas the Task Force, like other agencies operating in  Afghanistan, has projects and activities that focus on economic  development, improving efforts to share information could identify  opportunities for synergy and to avoid duplication. Without an agreed- upon approach to more fully integrate the Task Force into existing  information-sharing mechanisms in Afghanistan, DOD, State, USAID, and  other agencies will not be in a position to fully leverage and coordinate  their respective capabilities and efforts in support of achieving U.S.  economic development goals.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure effective project management, oversight, and accountability,  we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Task Force to  develop written guidance that documents, as appropriate, its  management processes and practices, including elements such as  criteria for project selection, requirements for establishing metrics and  project documentation, and project monitoring and evaluation processes.
To improve information sharing among the Task Force and other federal  agencies involved with stabilization and economic development efforts in  Afghanistan, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense in consultation  with the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID determine the  most appropriate mechanism for integrating Task Force participation.  Such mechanisms could include formalizing the process previously used  to obtain State concurrence on Task Force projects, participating in  appropriate working groups in Afghanistan, and/or including Task Force  project and activity information in existing databases.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the DOD, State, and USAID. DOD  and USAID provided written comments, which are reprinted in  appendixes II and III, respectively. State provided oral comments on the  draft. DOD and USAID also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated where appropriate.
In its comments, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that  the Secretary of Defense direct the Task Force to develop written  guidance that documents, as appropriate, its management processes and  practices. DOD stated that it encourages this practice and noted that the  Secretary of Defense has issued the necessary directives and  instructions to DOD components, including the Task Force, on the  development of project management guidelines. DOD further stated that  the Task Force is reviewing its program management processes and will  consider how to implement our recommendation, to the extent  practicable. Both DOD and State concurred with our recommendation that  the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State and  the Administrator of USAID determine the most appropriate mechanism  for integrating Task Force participation in information-sharing efforts in  Afghanistan. DOD stated that it has reached agreement with the senior  leadership of State and USAID to enhance coordination and information  sharing of Task Force activities. According to a Task Force official, the  details of this agreement are being finalized and will be discussed in the  forthcoming response to the fiscal year 2011 NDAA requirements. State  noted that we had adequately captured the need for increased  coordination, communication, and information sharing.
In its comments, USAID expressed its view that overall the report  contained inaccuracies and misrepresentations that need to be corrected.  USAID also made several statements regarding the objectives of our  report. Specifically, USAID asserted that our report addressed the issue  of whether Task Force activities should continue to reside in DOD or be  transferred to another agency. USAID further noted that the report makes  no recommendation as to a transfer of activities, but believed our  recommendation to strengthen internal Task Force procedures and  processes seemed to acknowledge the continued existence of the Task  Force, and our reluctance to recommend consolidation of Task Force  activities stems from a lack of understanding of how USAID operates. It  believed this lack of understanding was reflected in our discussion of the  five factors to be considered in planning for any transition. Specifically,  USAID cited our discussion of the differing approaches of the Task Force  and USAID to economic development, stating that our report describes  USAID as focusing on improving the environment for investments while  the Task Force focuses on brokering specific investment deals. USAID  stated that it does not focus only on improving the environment for  investments, noting that it has one project with this goal and several  projects that focus on other areas of investment, including brokering  specific deals. In addition, USAID stated that our report notes that the  Task Force has an advantage over USAID because it has greater  flexibility to visit project sites and access to the military. USAID noted that  both USAID and the Task Force use contractors to implement projects,  who have different and fewer security and movement restrictions than  U.S. government employees. It specifically stated that USAID-employed  Afghans and contractors can access all areas.
We disagree that our report contains inaccuracies and  misrepresentations, and believe that USAID has mischaracterized the  intent of our work. Our objectives, as stated in the report, were to identify  factors that should be considered in planning for any potential transition of  Task Force capabilities to USAID. We did not evaluate whether such a  transfer should occur, and therefore make no recommendation to that  effect. We disagree that our recommendation regarding the need for the  Task Force to develop project management guidelines suggests the  continued existence of the Task Force. Rather, such a framework will be  necessary regardless of whether the Task Force continues to reside in  DOD or transfers to another agency. We also disagree with USAID’s  description of certain information in our report. Specifically, with respect to  USAID’s approach to economic development, our report does not state  that USAID only focuses on improving the environment for investment.  Rather, we specifically discuss that USAID operates in many sectors in  Afghanistan ranging from infrastructure construction to capacity building  as well as promotion of private sector development, both in the short and  long term. In particular, we note that USAID activities include sponsoring  conferences where prospective investors have the opportunity to gather  information about potential investment opportunities. Finally, we do not  pass judgment on whether the Task Force has an advantage over USAID  with respect to freedom of movement, but rather point out the conditions  under which employees of the two agencies conduct their activities, such  as whether they are subject to Chief of Mission authority. We also  specifically discuss that USAID uses contractors to help implement its  projects, and that these contractors have access to project sites. In light  of USAID’s comments, we have clarified the report text to more clearly  identify the instances in which we are referring to direct employees  compared to contractors.
USAID also commented on our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Administrator  of USAID determine the most appropriate mechanism for integrating Task  Force participation in information-sharing efforts in Afghanistan.  Specifically, it agreed with the need for more and more effective  information sharing but believed that our recommendation fell short of  addressing the need for full integration of stabilization and development  activities across the federal government. USAID noted that information  sharing is not enough if the U.S. government is to efficiently plan,  manage, and integrate multiple development projects from different  agencies in overlapping sectors or ministries. It emphasized that active  senior management direction and support from the Task Force, along  with State and USAID, are required for effective integration of planning  and project execution, and that consolidation of Task Force and USAID  activities would go even further to ensure that activities are fully  integrated and that gaps or duplication do not occur. In particular, USAID  proposed that we expand our recommendation on information sharing to  require that the Task Force’s project portfolio management become more  institutionalized and integrated into State and USAID planning and project  reporting processes.
We agree with USAID’s comments regarding the need for greater  integration of U.S. activities, and believe that our recommendation  supported by other information contained in our report specifically  conveys this intent. In particular, our conclusions state that without an  agreed-upon approach to more fully integrate the Task Force into existing  information-sharing mechanisms in Afghanistan, DOD, State, USAID, and  other agencies will not be in a position to fully leverage and coordinate  their respective capabilities and efforts in support of achieving U.S.  economic development goals. We also note that in presenting our  recommendation, we identify various options for DOD, State, and USAID  to consider for achieving better information sharing and integration,  including formalizing the process used to obtain State concurrence on  Task Force activities. We note that this process, when used in the past,  has involved both State and USAID review of Task Force activities.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretary of State, and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for  International Development. The report also is available at no charge on  the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report  are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We began our review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Task Force  for Business and Stability Operations (Task Force) under the authority of  the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct work on his own  initiative. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Ike Skelton  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 recognized  GAO’s ongoing review and directed GAO to include some additional  information in its report. This report (1) identifies factors to consider in  planning any transition of Task Force capabilities to the U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID) and (2) evaluates the extent to which  the Task Force had established guidance to manage its activities and  shared information with other U.S. civilian agencies. In our discussion of  factors, we included information on the relationship between Task Force  activities and the U.S. Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for  Support to Afghanistan.
To identify factors to consider in planning any transfer of Task Force  capabilities to USAID, we interviewed cognizant DOD, Department of  State (State), and USAID senior-level policy officials, including officials at  the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. At the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, we  interviewed the Coordinating Director for Development and Economic  Affairs and officials in the Economic Section, including the Economic  Counselor; the Interagency Agriculture Team; and the Civilian-Military  Plans and Assessments Team. We also interviewed USAID officials in  Afghanistan, including the Mission Director in Afghanistan and officials in  the Office of Economic Growth and Governance; the Office of  Infrastructure, Engineering, and Energy; and the Stabilization Unit. During  our interviews, we specifically obtained these officials’ views on the  respective capabilities and operational approaches of the Task Force and  USAID and reviewed relevant and available documentation. To determine  how the Task Force activities support the U.S. Integrated Civilian-Military  Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan, we reviewed the 2009 and  2011 versions of the plan, as appropriate, to determine what campaign  objectives Task Force activities support and interviewed relevant agency  officials in both Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan.
To evaluate the extent to which the Task Force has established guidance  to manage its activities, we reviewed documentation describing the Task  Force’s operating approach, projects and activities, performance goals  and measures, and budget submissions and security protocols. We  compared this information to requirements for documentation contained in  our internal control standards and prior work related to management and  evaluation. To evaluate the extent to which the Task Force shared  information on its activities with other civilian agencies involved with  economic stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, we reviewed DOD guidance,  such as DOD Instruction 3000.05, and National Security Presidential  Direction 44, to determine coordination requirements. We also  interviewed officials from DOD, State, USAID, and the U.S. embassies in  Baghdad and Kabul to identify the types of information shared and any  processes used to share information. We focused this portion of our  review on the information-sharing activities and practices in Afghanistan  because the Task Force ceased its operations in Iraq in January 2011.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2010 through July  2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Carole Coffey, Assistant Director;  Johana Ayers; Carolynn Cavanaugh; Burns Chamberlain; Nicole Harms;  Mae Jones; Anne McDonough-Hughes; Jamilah Moon; Marcus Oliver;  Michael Pose; and Michael Rohrback made key contributions to this  report.