Intelligence Reform: GAO Can Assist the Congress and the Intelligence Community on Management Reform Initiatives
Published: 2008-02-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: For decades, GAO has assisted Congress in its oversight role and helped federal departments and agencies with disparate missions to improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of their operations. GAO's work provides important insight on matters such as best practices to be shared and benchmarked and how government and nongovernmental partners can become better aligned to achieve important outcomes for the nation. In addition, GAO provides Congress with foresight by highlighting the long-term implications of today's decisions and identifying key trends and emerging challenges facing our nation before they reach crisis proportions. For this hearing, GAO was asked to (1) highlight governmentwide issues where it has made a major contribution to oversight and could assist the intelligence and other congressional committees in their oversight of the Intelligence Community, and (2) comment on the potential impact on GAO's access to perform audit work on personnel security clearances if the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) were to assume management of this issue from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Given historical challenges to GAO's ability to audit the Intelligence Community's programs and activities, this testimony also discusses GAO's views on Senate bill S. 82, known as the Intelligence Community Audit Act of 2007.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO has considerable experience in addressing governmentwide management challenges, including such areas as human capital, acquisition, information technology, strategic planning, organizational alignment, and financial and knowledge management, and has identified many opportunities to improve agencies' economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, and the need for interagency collaboration in addressing 21st century challenges. For example, over the years, GAO has addressed the human capital issues, such as acquiring, developing, and retaining talent; strategic workforce planning; building results-oriented cultures; pay for performance; contractors in the workforce; and personnel security clearances, which affect all federal agencies, including the Intelligence Community. Furthermore, GAO identified delays and other impediments in the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel security clearance program, which also maintains clearances for intelligence agencies within DOD. GAO designated human capital transformation and personnel security clearances as high-risk areas. GAO also recently issued reports addressing Intelligence Community-related management issues, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; space acquisitions; and the space acquisition workforce. If ODNI were to assume management responsibilities over security clearances across the federal government, GAO's ability to continue monitoring this area and provide Congress information for its oversight role could be adversely affected. In 2006, OMB's Deputy Director for Management suggested that OMB's oversight role of the governmentwide security clearance process might be transferred to the ODNI. GAO has established and maintained a relatively positive working relationship with the ODNI, but limitations on GAO's ability to perform meaningful audit and evaluation work persist. While GAO has the legal authority to audit the personnel security clearance area, if the ODNI were to assume management responsibilities over this issue, then it may be prudent to incorporate some legislative provision to reinforce GAO's access to information needed to conduct such audits and reviews. GAO supports S. 82 and believes that if it is enacted, the agency would be well-positioned to assist Congress in oversight of Intelligence Community management reforms. S. 82 would reaffirm GAO's existing statutory authority to audit and evaluate financial transactions, programs, and activities of elements of the Intelligence Community, and to access records necessary for such audits and evaluations. GAO has clear audit and access authority with respect to elements of the Intelligence Community, subject to a few limited exceptions. However, for many years, the executive branch has not provided GAO the level of cooperation needed to conduct meaningful reviews of elements of the Intelligence Community. This issue has taken on new prominence and is of greater concern in the post-9/11 context, especially since the ODNI's responsibilities extend well beyond traditional intelligence activities. The reaffirmation provisions in the bill should help to ensure that GAO's audit and access authorities are not misconstrued in the future.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here before you today to address how GAO could assist  Congress and the Intelligence Community. You asked that I discuss how  GAO’s expertise and capacity to perform program reviews of key  governmentwide issues, as well as some recent work we have done related  to intelligence activities, could be useful in assisting congressional  oversight of Intelligence Community management reforms under  consideration. Second, as requested, I will comment on the potential  impact on GAO’s ability to perform audit work on personnel security  clearances if the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)  were to assume management of this issue from the Office of Management  and Budget (OMB). Finally, given historical challenges to GAO’s ability to  audit the Intelligence Community’s programs and activities, I would like to  discuss GAO’s views on Senate bill S. 82, known as the Intelligence  Community Audit Act of 2007. My comments today are based primarily on  GAO’s completed work and on our institutional knowledge, drawn from  our prior reviews at the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal  agencies of human capital management, personnel security clearances,  and other areas that directly affect the Intelligence Community, as well as  on publicly available reports. (See the list of related GAO products at the  end of this statement.)
First, GAO has assisted Congress for decades in its oversight role and  helped federal departments and agencies with disparate missions to  improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of their operations. In  addition, GAO’s work also provides important insight and foresight to  complement the work we have performed for Congress for many years. A  number of the governmentwide management challenges we have  addressed, such as human capital transformation, acquisition, information  technology, strategic planning, organizational alignment, financial and  knowledge management, and personnel security clearances, affect most  federal agencies, including those within the Intelligence Community.  Moreover, we have designated some of these areas as high-risk for the  federal government. Human capital transformation and personnel security  clearances also have been repeatedly identified as areas of weakness  within the Intelligence Community by others, including the Subcommittee  on Oversight, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; the  Congressional Research Service; and independent commissions.  Specifically, strategic human capital transformation and related  management reforms; DOD’s new pay-for-performance system, known as  the National Security Personnel System (NSPS); contractors in the  workforce; and personnel security clearances are among the serious  challenges going forward. We also have recently completed work on  several management issues that are directly related to the Intelligence  Community, and we have the capabilities to further support the  intelligence and other appropriate congressional committees with their  oversight needs. Specifically, we have performed in-depth reviews and  issued reports on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)  systems requirements, operations, and acquisitions; on space acquisitions;  and on the space acquisition workforce—issues that are current and  critical within the Intelligence Community. For the most part, DOD has  agreed with our findings and recommendations. In addition, GAO’s highly  qualified and experienced staff—including its analysts, auditors, lawyers,  and methodologists—and secure facilities position us to perform intensive  reviews to assess the transformation and related management reforms  under consideration within the Intelligence Community, especially in  connection with human capital and acquisition and contracting-related  issues.
Second, if the ODNI assumes management of governmentwide personnel  security clearances, then GAO’s ability to continue to review personnel  security clearances could be impaired unless greater cooperation is  forthcoming from the Intelligence Community. Although we have  established and maintained a relatively positive working relationship with  the ODNI, limitations on our ability to perform meaningful audit and  evaluation work persist. The ODNI might assume management  responsibilities for the security clearance process in the event that either  of two potential changes were to occur. First, in 2006, OMB’s Deputy  Director for Management suggested that the agency’s oversight role of the  governmentwide security clearance process might be transferred to the  ODNI. Alternatively, the ODNI could assume leadership, to some extent,  over implementation of a new security clearance process. A team  established by the Director of National Intelligence, the Under Secretary of  Defense for Intelligence, and OMB’s Deputy Director for Management is  developing a proposed security clearance process that could be  implemented governmentwide. If ODNI were to assume leadership or  oversight responsibilities for governmentwide personnel security  clearances, then it might be prudent to incorporate some legislative  provision to reinforce GAO’s access to the information needed to conduct  audits and reviews in the personnel security clearance area.
Third, with the support of Congress and S. 82, GAO would be well- positioned to provide the intelligence and other appropriate congressional  committees with an independent, fact-based evaluation of Intelligence  Community management reform initiatives. S. 82, if enacted, would amend  title 31 of the United States Code to reaffirm GAO’s authority to audit and  evaluate financial transactions, programs, and activities of the Intelligence  Community. The bill also would provide that GAO may conduct an audit or  evaluation of intelligence sources and methods or covert actions only  upon the request of the intelligence committees or congressional majority  or minority leaders. It also would provide that GAO perform such work  and use agency documents in space provided by the audited agencies. We  support this bill and believe that if it is enacted, GAO would be well- positioned to assist Congress with its oversight functions relating to the  Intelligence Community. The reaffirmation provisions in the bill should  also help to ensure that GAO’s audit and access authorities are not  misconstrued in the future.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: GAO’s Authority to Review Intelligence Community Programs
paragraphs: Generally, we have broad authority to evaluate agency programs and  investigate matters related to the receipt, disbursement, and use of public  money. To carry out our audit responsibilities, we have a statutory right of  access to agency records. Specifically, federal agencies are required to  provide us information about their duties, powers, activities, organization,  and financial transactions. In concert with our statutory audit and  evaluation authority, this provision gives GAO a broad right of access to  agency records, including records of the Intelligence Community, subject  to a few limited exceptions. GAO’s access statute authorizes enforcement  of GAO’s access rights through a series of steps specified in the statute,  including the filing of a civil action to compel production of records in  federal district court. However, GAO may not bring an action to enforce its  statutory right of access to a record relating to activities that the President  designates as foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities.
GAO’s statutory authorities permit us to evaluate a wide range of activities  in the Intelligence Community, including the management and  administrative functions that intelligence agencies, such as the Central  Intelligence Agency (CIA), have in common with all federal agencies.  However, since 1988, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has maintained that  Congress intended the intelligence committees to be the exclusive means  of oversight, effectively precluding oversight by us. In our 2001 testimony  about GAO’s access to information on CIA programs and activities, we  noted that in 1994 the CIA Director sought to further limit our audit work  of intelligence programs, including those at DOD. In 2006, the ODNI  agreed with DOJ’s 1988 position, stating that the review of intelligence  activities is beyond GAO’s purview. While we strongly disagree with DOJ  and the ODNI’s view, we foresee no major change in limits on our access  without substantial support from Congress—the requestor of the vast  majority of our work. Congressional impetus for change would have to  include the support of the intelligence committees, which have generally  not requested GAO reviews or evaluations of CIA’s or other intelligence  agencies’ activities for many years. With support, however, we could  evaluate some of the basic management functions that we now evaluate  throughout other parts of the federal government, such as human capital,  acquisition, information technology, strategic planning, organizational  alignment, and financial and knowledge management.
section_title: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
paragraphs: As this Subcommittee is well aware, the Intelligence Reform and  Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) established the Director of  National Intelligence to serve as the head of the Intelligence Community;  act as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council,  and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to  national security; and oversee and direct the implementation of the  National Intelligence Program. Since its inception, the ODNI has  undertaken a number of initiatives, including the development of both 100-  and 500-day plans for integration and collaboration. One of the core  initiatives of these plans is to modernize the security clearance process  across the Intelligence Community and at the national level, where other  federal agencies, including DOD, OMB, and Office of Personnel  Management (OPM) are also engaged.
Among other things, IRTPA also directed the President to select a single  department, agency, or element of the executive branch to be responsible  for day-to-day oversight of the government’s security clearance process.  In June 2005, the President issued an executive order that assigned OMB  responsibility for ensuring the effective implementation of a policy that  directs agency functions related to determinations of personnel eligibility  for access to classified information be uniform, centralized, efficient,  effective, timely, and reciprocal. In its new capacity, OMB assigned the  responsibility for the day-to-day supervision and monitoring of security  clearance investigations, as well as for tracking the results of individual  agency-performed adjudications, to OPM. With respect to (1) personnel  employed or working under a contract for an element of the Intelligence  Community and (2) security clearance investigations and adjudications for  Sensitive Compartmented Information, OMB assigned the responsibility  for supervision and monitoring of security clearance investigations and  tracking adjudications to the ODNI. In May 2006, OMB’s Deputy Director  for Management stated during a congressional hearing that the agency’s  oversight role in improving the governmentwide clearance process might  eventually be turned over to the ODNI.
section_title: GAO Experience in Governmentwide Human Capital Issues and Other Management Areas Can Assist Congress and the Intelligence Community on Management Reforms
paragraphs: For decades, we have assisted Congress in its oversight role and helped  agencies with disparate missions to improve the economy, effectiveness,  and efficiency of their operations and the need for interagency  collaboration in addressing 21st century challenges, and we could assist the  intelligence and other appropriate congressional committees in their  oversight of the Intelligence Community as well. Our work also provides  important insight on matters such as best practices to be shared and  benchmarked and how government and its nongovernmental partners can  become better aligned to achieve important outcomes for the nation. In  addition, GAO provides Congress with foresight by highlighting the long- term implications of today’s decisions and identifying key trends and  emerging challenges facing our nation before they reach crisis  proportions. For the purpose of this hearing, I will discuss our extensive  experience in addressing governmentwide human capital issues and other  management issues that can assist the intelligence and other appropriate  congressional committees in their oversight of Intelligence Community  transformation and related management reforms.
subsections: section_title: Human Capital Transformation and Management Are Governmentwide High- Risk Issues also Affecting the Intelligence Community
paragraphs: GAO has identified a number of human capital transformation and  management issues over the years, such as acquisition, information  technology, strategic planning, organizational alignment, financial and  knowledge management, and personnel security clearances, as cross- cutting, governmentwide issues that affect most federal agencies,  including those within the Intelligence Community. Human capital  transformation and management issues have also been repeatedly  identified as areas of weakness within the Intelligence Community by  other organizations, including the Subcommittee on Oversight, House  Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; the Congressional Research  Service; and independent commissions, such as the 9/11 Commission and  Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. Moreover, the ODNI has  acknowledged that Intelligence Community agencies face some of the  governmentwide challenges that we have identified, including integration  and collaboration within the Intelligence Community workforce and  inefficiencies and reciprocity of personnel security clearances.  Significant issues affecting the Intelligence Community include strategic  human capital transformation and reform issues, DOD’s new pay-for- performance management system called NSPS, the extent to which  agencies rely on, oversee, and manage their contractor workforce, and  personnel security clearances. In fact, we have identified some of these  programs and operations as high-risk areas due to a range of management  challenges.
subsections: section_title: Strategic Human Capital Transformation and Related Management Reforms across the Government
paragraphs: GAO and others have reported that the Intelligence Community faces a  wide range of human capital challenges, including those dealing with  recruiting and retaining a high-quality diverse workforce, implementation  of a modernized performance management system, knowledge and skill  gaps, integration and collaboration, and succession planning. Our  extensive work on government transformation distinctly positions us to  assist the intelligence and other appropriate congressional committees to  oversee the Intelligence Community’s efforts to address these human  capital challenges as well as to inform congressional decision making on  management issues. Our work on governmentwide strategic human capital  management is aimed at transforming federal agencies into results- oriented, high-performing organizations. Transformation is necessary  because the federal government is facing new and more complex  challenges than ever before, and agencies must re-examine what they do  and how they do it in order to meet those challenges. Central to this effort  are modern, effective, economical, and efficient human capital practices,  policies, and procedures integrated with agencies’ mission and program  goals.
In 2001, we added strategic human capital management to the list of  governmentwide high-risk areas because of the long-standing lack of a  consistent strategic approach for marshaling, managing, and maintaining  the human capital needed to maximize government performance and  ensure its accountability. Although the federal government made progress  in addressing these issues in the years that followed, we found that more  can be done in four key areas: (1) top leadership in agencies must provide  the attention needed to address human capital and related organizational  transformation issues; (2) agencies’ human capital planning efforts need to  be fully integrated with mission and program goals; (3) agencies need to  enhance their efforts to acquire, develop, and retain talent; and (4)  organizational cultures need to promote high performance and  accountability.
section_title: NSPS Is a Key Example of GAO’s Programmatic Review of Human Capital Transformation Challenges
paragraphs: Based on our experience in addressing agencies’ performance  management challenges, we are uniquely positioned to help Congress  evaluate such issues within the Intelligence Community, including the  development and implementation of its pay-for-performance personnel  management system. As an example of our experience in this area, I  would like to highlight our work on DOD’s new civilian personnel  management system—the NSPS—which has provided Congress with  insight on DOD’s proposal, design, and implementation of this system. The  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 provided DOD  with authority to establish a new framework of rules, regulations, and  processes to govern how the almost 700,000 defense employees are hired,  compensated, promoted, and disciplined. Congress provided these  authorities in response to DOD’s position that the inflexibility of the  federal personnel systems was one of the most important constraints to  the department’s ability to attract, retain, reward, and develop a civilian  workforce to meet the national security mission of the 21st century.
Prior to the enactment of the NSPS legislation in 2003, we raised a number  of critical issues about the proposed system in a series of testimonies  before three congressional committees. Since then, we have provided  congressional committees with insight on DOD’s process to design its new  personnel management system, the extent to which DOD’s process reflects  key practices for successful transformation, the need for internal controls  and transparency of funding, and the most significant challenges facing  DOD in implementing NSPS.
Most important, we have noted in testimonies and reports that DOD and  other federal agencies must ensure that they have the necessary  institutional infrastructure in place before implementing major human  capital reform efforts, such as NSPS. This institutional infrastructure  includes, at a minimum, a human capital planning process that integrates  the agency’s human capital policies, strategies, and programs with its  program goals, mission, and desired outcomes; the capabilities to  effectively develop and implement a new human capital system; and the  existence of a modern, effective, and credible performance management  system that includes adequate safeguards to ensure a fair, effective,  nondiscriminatory, and credible implementation of the new system. While  GAO strongly supports human capital reform in the federal government,  how it is done, when it is done, and the basis upon which it is done can  make all the difference in whether such efforts are successful.
section_title: Contractor Workforce in Government Is an Emerging Governmentwide Issue also Acknowledged as a Challenge for the Intelligence Community
paragraphs: An additional major issue of growing concern, both within and outside the  Intelligence Community, deals with the type of work that is being  performed by contractors, the need to determine the appropriate mix of  government and contractor employees to meet mission needs, and the  adequacy of oversight and accountability of contractors. These are areas  where we also are well-positioned to provide additional support to the  intelligence committees. While there are benefits to using contractors to  perform services for the government—such as increased flexibility in  fulfilling immediate needs—GAO and others have raised concerns about  the federal government’s increasing reliance on contractor services. A  key concern is the risk associated with contractors providing services that  closely support inherently governmental functions. Inherently  governmental functions require the exercise of discretion in applying  government authority and/or in making decisions for the government; as  such, they should be performed by government employees, not  contractors. In 2007, I testified before the Senate Committee on  Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that the proper role of  contractors in providing services to the government was the topic of some  debate. I would like to reiterate that, in general, I believe there is a need  to focus greater attention on which functions and activities should be  contracted out and which should not, to review and reconsider the current  independence and conflict-of-interest rules relating to contractors, and to  identify the factors that prompt the government to use contractors in  circumstances where the proper choice might be the use of civil servants  or military personnel. Similarly, it is important that the federal government  maintain an accountable and capable workforce, responsible for strategic  planning and management of individual programs and contracts.
In a September 2007 report, we identified a number of concerns regarding  the risk associated with contractors providing services that closely  support inherently governmental functions. For example, an increasing  reliance on contractors to perform services for core government activities  challenges the capacity of federal officials to supervise and evaluate the  performance of these activities. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  provides agencies examples of inherently governmental functions that  should not be performed by contractors. For example, the direction and  control of intelligence and counter-intelligence operations are listed as  inherently governmental functions. Yet in 2006, the Director of National  Intelligence reported that the Intelligence Community finds itself in  competition with its contractors for employees and is left with no choice  but to use contractors for work that may be “borderline inherently  governmental.” Unless the federal government, including Intelligence  Community agencies, pays the needed attention to the types of functions  and activities performed by contractors, agencies run the risk of losing  accountability and control over mission-related decisions.
section_title: Personnel Security Clearances Continue to Experience Delays and Impediments
paragraphs: For more than 3 decades, GAO’s reviews of personnel security clearances  have identified delays and other impediments in DOD’s personnel security  clearance program, which maintains about 2.5 million clearances,  including clearances for intelligence agencies within DOD. These long- standing problems resulted in our adding the DOD personnel security  clearance program to our high-risk list in January 2005. One important  outgrowth of this designation has been the level of congressional oversight  from this Subcommittee, as well as some progress.
In the past few years, several positive changes have been made to DOD— as well as governmentwide—clearance processes because of increased  congressional oversight, recommendations from our work, and new  legislative and executive requirements. One of OMB’s efforts to improve  the security clearance process involved taking a lead in preparing a  November 2005 strategic plan to improve personnel security clearance  processes governmentwide. In its February 2007 and 2008 annual IRTPA- mandated reports to Congress, OMB noted additional improvements that  had been made to the security clearance process governmentwide. For  example, OMB had issued standards for reciprocity (an agency’s  acceptance of a clearance issued by another agency), OPM had increased  its investigative workforce, and DOD and other agencies had dramatically  increased their use of OPM’s Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations  Processing system to reduce the time required to get a clearance by 2 to 3  weeks. Further, the Director of National Intelligence, the Under Secretary  of Defense for Intelligence, and OMB’s Deputy Director for Management  established a team, the Joint Security Clearance Process Reform Team, to  improve the security clearance process. The team is to develop a  transformed, modernized, and reciprocal security clearance process that is  supposed to be universally applicable to DOD, the Intelligence  Community, and other federal agencies. The extent to which this new  process will be implemented governmentwide, or whether leadership of  the new system will be assigned to the ODNI, however, remains uncertain.
Any attempts to reform the current security clearance process, regardless  of which agency or organization undertakes the effort, should include  some key factors. Specifically, current and future efforts to reform  personnel security clearance processes should consider, among other  things, determining whether clearances are required for positions,  incorporating more quality control throughout the clearance processes to  supplement current emphases on timeliness, establishing metrics for  assessing all aspects of clearance processes, and providing Congress with  the long-term funding requirements of security clearance reform.
Although we have not worked with the entire Intelligence Community as  part of our body of work on security clearances, we have worked with  DOD intelligence agencies. For example, in the period from 1998 through  2001, we reviewed National Security Agency clearance investigative  reports and Defense Intelligence Agency adjudicative reports. Similarly,  our February 2004 report examined information about adjudicative  backlogs DOD-wide and the situation in those two intelligence agencies.  Importantly, since 1974, we have been examining personnel security  clearances mostly on behalf of Congress and some on behalf of this  Subcommittee. Through scores of reports and testimonies, we have  acquired broad institutional knowledge that gives us a historical view of  key factors that should be considered in clearance reform efforts. We are  well positioned to assist Congress in its oversight of this very important  area.
section_title: Recent GAO Reviews of Intelligence-Related Programs and Activities
paragraphs: In addition to our work on human capital transformation and personnel  security clearance issues, our recent work has also addressed  management issues—such as ISR systems, space acquisitions, and the  space acquisition workforce—that directly affect the Intelligence  Community and illustrate our ability to further support the intelligence  and other appropriate congressional committees in their oversight roles.  GAO’s highly qualified and experienced staff—including its analysts,  auditors, lawyers, and methodologists—and secure facilities position us to  perform intensive reviews that could be useful in assessing the  transformation and related management reforms under consideration  within the Intelligence Community, especially in connection with human  capital and acquisition and contracting-related issues. GAO personnel who  might perform work relating to the Intelligence Community have  qualifications, skills, expertise, clearances and accesses, and experience  across the federal government, in the national security arena, and across  disciplines. For example, GAO methodologists have expertise in designing  and executing appropriate methodological approaches that help us  develop recommendations to improve government operations. Our  attorneys advise GAO’s analysts, issue external legal decisions and legal  opinions, and prepare testimony, legislation, and reports on subjects  reflecting the range of government activity. This legal work, for example,  involves subjects such as information technology, international affairs and  trade, foreign military sales, health and disability law, and education and  labor law. GAO also already has personnel with appropriate clearances  and accesses. I would like to highlight a couple of examples of GAO’s  work to demonstrate our expertise and capacity to perform intensive  reviews in intelligence-related matters.
subsections: section_title: GAO’s Work Addressing ISR Requirements, Operations, and Acquisitions Identified Opportunities for Improvement
paragraphs: In the past year, we have testified and issued reports addressing DOD’s  ISR systems, including unmanned aircraft systems. The term “ISR”  encompasses multiple activities related to the planning and operation of  sensors and assets that collect, process, and disseminate data in support  of current and future military operations. Intelligence data can take many  forms, including optical, radar, or infrared images, or electronic signals. In  April 2007, we testified that DOD has taken some important first steps to  formulate a strategy for improving the integration of future ISR  requirements, including the development of an ISR Integration Roadmap  and designating ISR as a test case for its joint capability portfolio  management concept. We also testified that opportunities exist for  different services to collaborate on the development of similar weapon  systems as a means for creating a more efficient and affordable way of  providing new capabilities to the warfighter. As part of another review of  ISR programs, we found that nearly all of the systems in development we  examined had experienced some cost or schedule growth. As part of our  work, we selected 20 major airborne ISR programs and obtained  information on current or projected operational capabilities, acquisition  plans, cost estimates, schedules, and estimated budgets. We analyzed the  data to determine whether pairs of similar systems shared common  operating concepts, capabilities, physical configurations, or primary  contractors. We reviewed acquisition plans for programs in development  to determine whether they had established sound business cases or, if not,  where the business case was weak. We reviewed cost and schedule  estimates to determine whether they had increased and, where possible,  identified reasons for the increases. Based on our research and findings,  we recommended that DOD develop and implement an integrated  enterprise-level investment strategy, as well as report to the congressional  defense committees the results of ISR studies underway and identify  specific plans and actions it intends to take to achieve greater jointness in  ISR programs. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations.
We have also performed in-depth reviews of individual space programs  that are shared with the Intelligence Community. For example, in recent  years we have examined the Space Radar program, which is expected to  be one of the most complex and expensive satellite developments ever. We  reported that while the program was adopting best practices in technology  development, its schedule estimates may be overly optimistic and its  overall affordability for DOD, which was parternering with the Intelligence  Community, was questionable. Our concerns were cited by the Senate  Select Committee on Intelligence in its discussion of reasons for reducing  funding for Space Radar.
section_title: GAO’s Work on the Space Acquisition Workforce Recommended Management Improvements
paragraphs: Our work on the space acquisition workforce is another example of in- depth programmatic reviews we have been able to perform addressing  intelligence-related matters. In a September 2006 report, we identified a  variety of management issues dealing with Air Force space personnel.  This is a critical issue because the Air Force provides over 90 percent of  the space personnel to DOD, including the National Reconnaissance Office  (NRO). We found that the Air Force has done needs assessments on  certain segments of its space workforce, but it has not done an integrated,  zero-based needs assessment of its space acquisition workforce. In the  absence of an integrated, zero-based needs assessment of its space  acquisition workforce and a career field specialty, the Air Force cannot  ensure that it has enough space acquisition personnel or personnel who  are technically proficient to meet national security space needs—including  those in the Intelligence Community. As a part of this work, we collected  and analyzed Air Force personnel data in specific specialty codes related  to space acquisition and tracked their career assignments, training, and  progression, including those assigned to the NRO. For example, we  collected and analyzed data on space acquisition positions and personnel  from multiple locations, and conducted discussion groups about topics  including education and prior experience with junior and midgrade  officers at the Space and Missile Systems Center in California. We made  recommendations to DOD to take actions to better manage its limited pool  of space acquisition personnel, and DOD generally agreed with our  findings and recommendations.
section_title: GAO’s Access to Perform Audit Work Could be Affected If the ODNI Assumes Management of Personnel Security Clearances
paragraphs: Our ability to continue monitoring security clearance-related problems in  DOD as well as other parts of the federal government and to provide  Congress with information for its oversight role could be adversely  affected if the ODNI assumes management responsibility over this area.  First, in 2006, OMB’s Deputy Director for Management has suggested that  the agency’s oversight role of the governmentwide security clearance  process might be transferred to the ODNI. Alternatively, the ODNI could  assume leadership, to some extent, of a new security clearance process  that is intended for governmentwide implementation by a team established  by the Director of National Intelligence, the Under Secretary of Defense  for Intelligence, and OMB’s Deputy Director for Management. While we  have the legal authority to audit the personnel security clearance area if its  oversight is moved to the ODNI or if the Joint Security Clearance Process  Reform Team’s proposed process is implemented governmentwide, we  could face difficulties in gaining the cooperation we need to access the  information.
Although we have established and maintained a relatively positive working  relationship with the ODNI, limitations on our ability to perform  meaningful audit and evaluation work persist. Specifically, we routinely  request and receive substantive threat briefings and copies of finished  intelligence products prepared under the ODNI, and we meet with officials  from the ODNI and obtain information about some of their activities. We  also receive the ODNI agency comments and security reviews on most of  our draft reports, as appropriate. However, since some members of the  Intelligence Community have taken the position that the congressional  intelligence committees have exclusive oversight authority, we do not  audit or evaluate any programs or activities of the ODNI, nor are we able  to verify or corroborate factual briefings or information provided. This  resistance to providing us access to information has taken on new  prominence and is of greater concern in the post-9/11 context, especially  since the Director of National Intelligence has been assigned  responsibilities addressing issues that extend well beyond traditional  intelligence activities. For example, the ODNI and the National  Counterterrorism Center refused to provide us security-related cost data  for the 2006 Olympic Winter Games in Turin, Italy, although we were  provided this type of data in prior reviews of the Olympic Games.
If we continue to experience limitation on the types and amounts of  information we can obtain from the Intelligence Community, then GAO  may not be able to provide Congress with an independent, fact-based  evaluation of the new security clearance process during its development  and, later, its implementation. Either of these actions could occur without  legislation. If the ODNI were to take leadership or oversight  responsibilities for governmentwide personnel security clearances, it  might be prudent to incorporate some legislative provision to reinforce  GAO’s access to the information needed to conduct audits and reviews in  the personnel security clearance area.
section_title: GAO Comments on the Intelligence Community Audit Act of 2007
paragraphs: Finally, GAO supports S. 82 and we would be well-positioned to provide  Congress with an independent, fact-based evaluation of Intelligence  Community management reform initiatives with the support of Congress  and S. 82. Specifically, S. 82 would, if enacted, reaffirm GAO’s authority,  under existing statutory provisions, to audit and evaluate financial  transactions, programs, and activities of elements of the Intelligence  Community, and to access records necessary for such audits and  evaluations. GAO has clear audit and access authority with respect to  elements of the Intelligence Community, subject to a few limited  exceptions. However, since 1988, DOJ and some members of the  Intelligence Community have questioned GAO’s authority in this area. In  addition, for many years, the executive branch has not provided GAO with  the level of cooperation needed to conduct meaningful reviews of  elements of the Intelligence Community. As previously noted, this issue  has taken on new prominence and is of greater concern in the post-9/11  context, especially since the Director of National Intelligence has been  assigned responsibilities addressing issues that extend well beyond  traditional intelligence activities, such as information sharing. The  implications of executive branch resistance to GAO’s work in the  intelligence area were highlighted when the ODNI refused to comment on  GAO’s March 2006 report involving the government’s information-sharing  efforts, maintaining that DOJ had “previously advised” that “the review of  intelligence activities is beyond the GAO’s purview.” We strongly disagree  with this view. GAO has broad statutory authorities to audit and evaluate  agency financial transactions, programs, and activities, and these  authorities apply to reviews of elements of the Intelligence Community.
Importantly, S. 82, in reaffirming GAO’s authorities, recognizes that GAO  may conduct reviews, requested by relevant committees of jurisdiction, of  matters relating to the management and administration of elements of the  Intelligence Community in areas such as strategic planning, financial  management, information technology, human capital, knowledge  management, information sharing, organizational transformation and  management reforms, and collaboration practices. In recognition of the  heightened level of sensitivity of audits and evaluations relating to  intelligence sources and methods or covert actions, this bill would restrict  GAO audits and evaluations of intelligence sources and methods or covert  actions to those requested by the intelligence committees or congressional  majority or minority leaders. In addition, in the context of reviews relating  to intelligence sources and methods or covert actions, the bill contains  several information security-related provisions. The bill includes, for  example, provisions (1) requiring GAO to perform our work and use  agency documents in facilities provided by the audited agencies; (2)  requiring GAO to establish, after consultation with the Select Committee  on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on  Intelligence of the House of Representatives, procedures to protect such  classified and other sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure;  and (3) limiting GAO’s reporting of results of such audits and evaluations  strictly to the original requester, the Director of National Intelligence, and  the head of the relevant element of the Intelligence Community. In our  view, Congress should consider amending the bill language to include the  intelligence committees in these reporting provisions when the  congressional leadership is the original requester.
The reaffirmation provisions in the bill should help to ensure that GAO’s  audit and access authorities are not misconstrued in the future. One  particularly helpful provision in this regard is the proposed new section  3523a(e) of title 31, specifying that no “provision of law shall be construed  as restricting or limiting the authority of the Comptroller General to audit  and evaluate, or obtain access to the records of, elements of the  intelligence community absent specific statutory language restricting or  limiting such audits, evaluations, or access to records.” This provision  makes clear that, unless otherwise specified by law, GAO has the right to  evaluate and access the records of elements of the Intelligence Community  pursuant to its authorities in title 31 of the United States Code.
Chairman Akaka, Senator Voinovich, and Members of the Subcommittee,  this concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to respond to any  questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at  this time.
section_title: Contact and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Davi M.  D’Agostino, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, at (202) 512- 5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this  testimony are Mark A. Pross, Assistant Director; Tommy Baril; Cristina T.
Chaplain; Jack E. Edwards; Brenda S. Farrell; Robert N. Goldenkoff; John  P. Hutton; Julia C. Matta; Erika A. Prochaska; John Van Schaik; Sarah E.  Veale; and Cheryl A. Weissman.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: GAO Strategic Plan 2007-2012. GAO-07-1SP. Washington, D.C.: March  2007.
High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January  2007.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and  Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. GAO-06-15. Washington,  D.C.: October 21, 2005.
Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform  DOD Business Operations. GAO-05-629T. Washington, D.C.: April 28,  2005.
DOD’s High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires  Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T.  Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January  2005.
Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and  Organizational Transformations. GAO-03-669. Washington, D.C.: July 2,  2003.
subsections: section_title: Human Capital
paragraphs: Human Capital: Federal Workforce Challenges in the 21st Century.   GAO-07-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2007.
Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11  Commission’s Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.:  September 14, 2004.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges  of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce but Additional Actions Needed.  GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.
High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-03-120.  Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
section_title: National Security Personnel System
paragraphs: Human Capital: DOD Needs Better Internal Controls and Visibility over  Costs for Implementing Its National Security Personnel System.   GAO-07-851. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2007.
Human Capital: Observations on Final Regulations for DOD’s National  Security Personnel System. GAO-06-227T. Washington, D.C.: November  17, 2005.
Human Capital: DOD’s National Security Personnel System Faces  Implementation Challenges. GAO-05-730. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005.
section_title: Contracting Workforce in Government
paragraphs: Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and Other  Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Oversight and Management of  Contractors in Future Operations. GAO-08-436T. Washington,  D.C.: January 24, 2008.
Federal-Aid Highways: Increased Reliance on Contractors Can Pose  Oversight Challenges for Federal and State Officials. GAO-08-198.  Washington, D.C.: January 8, 2008.
Department of Homeland Security: Improved Assessment and Oversight  Needed to Manage Risk of Contracting for Selected Services. GAO-07-990.  Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2007.
Federal Acquisitions and Contracting: Systemic Challenges Need  Attention. GAO-07-1098T. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management and Oversight Needed to  Better Control DOD’s Acquisition of Services. GAO-07-832T. Washington,  D.C.: May 10, 2007.
section_title: Security Clearances
paragraphs: Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform the  Security Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable  More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.:  February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation  Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17,  2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances  for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain.   GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles  Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk  Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to  Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344. Washington,  D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004.
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