Nuclear Security: NRC and DHS Need to Take Additional Steps to Better Track and Detect Radioactive Materials
Published: 2008-06-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Concerns have grown that terrorists could use radioactive materials and sealed sources (materials sealed in a capsule) to build a "dirty bomb"-- a device using conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material. In 2003, GAO found weaknesses in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) radioactive materials licensing process and made recommendations for improvement. For this report, GAO assesses (1) the progress NRC has made in implementing the 2003 recommendations, (2) other steps NRC has taken to improve its ability to track radioactive materials, (3) Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) ability to detect radioactive materials at land ports of entry, and (4) CBP's ability to verify that such materials are appropriately licensed prior to entering the United States. To perform this work, GAO assessed documents and interviewed NRC and CBP officials in headquarters and in several field locations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NRC has implemented three of the six recommendations in GAO's 2003 report on the security of radioactive sources. It has worked with the 35 states to which it ceded primary authority to regulate radioactive materials and sources and others to (1) identify sealed sources of greatest concern, (2) enhance requirements to secure radioactive sources, and (3) ensure security requirements are implemented. In contrast, NRC has made limited progress toward implementing recommendations to (1) modify its process for issuing licenses to ensure that radioactive materials cannot be purchased by those with no legitimate need for them, (2) determine how to effectively mitigate the potential psychological effects of malicious use of such materials, and (3) examine whether certain radioactive sources should be subject to more stringent regulations. Beyond acting on GAO's recommendations, NRC has also taken four steps to improve its ability to monitor and track radioactive materials. First, NRC created an interim national database to monitor the licensed sealed sources containing materials that pose the greatest risk of being used in a dirty bomb. Second, NRC is developing a National Source Tracking System to replace the interim database and provide more comprehensive, frequently updated information on potentially dangerous sources. However, this system has been delayed by 18 months and is not expected to be fully operational until January 2009. Third, NRC is also developing a Web-based licensing system that will include more comprehensive information on all sources and materials that require NRC or state approval to possess. Finally, NRC is developing a license verification system that will draw information from the other new systems to enable officials and vendors to verify that those seeking to bring these radioactive materials into the country or purchase them are licensed to do so. However, these systems are more than 3 years behind schedule and may not include the licensing information, initially at least, on radioactive materials regulated by agreement states--which represent over 80 percent of all U.S. licenses for such materials. The delays in the deployment and full development of these systems are especially consequential because NRC has identified their deployment as key to improving the control and accountability of radioactive materials. While CBP has a comprehensive system in place to detect radioactive materials entering the United States at land borders, some equipment that is used to protect CBP officers is in short supply. Specifically, vehicles, cargo, and people entering the United States at most ports of entry along the Canadian and Mexican borders are scanned for radioactive materials with radiation detection equipment capable of detecting very small amounts of radiation. However we found that personal radiation detectors are not available to all officers who need them. Moreover, while CBP has systems in place to verify the legitimacy of radioactive materials licenses, it has not effectively communicated to officers at the borders when they must contact officials to verify the license for a given sealed source. Consequently, some CPB officers are not following current guidance, and some potentially dangerous radioactive materials have entered the country without license verification.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Radioactive sealed sources, which are commonly used throughout the  world for a variety of purposes, are radioactive materials sealed in a  capsule or permanently bonded in a solid form. These sealed sources are  used in medicine and in the oil and gas, electric power, construction, and  food industries. For example, devices containing radioactive sealed  sources are used to diagnose and treat millions of patients each year,  sterilize items such as medical instruments and food, and detect flaws in  the metal welds in pipelines. Currently, about 2 million sealed sources are  licensed for use in the United States. Since terrorists attacked the United  States in 2001, concerns have grown that they could obtain and use sealed  sources to build a “dirty bomb”—a type of radiological dispersal device  (RDD) that uses conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material.
The consequences of detonating an RDD depend on the amount and type  of radioactive material used and the size and characteristics of the area in  which the material is dispersed. In many scenarios, an RDD would cause  few deaths or injuries, but significant economic effects could result. In  particular, the affected area would need to be decontaminated and people  who work or live in the affected area might not return to their homes or  businesses for an extended period of time because they fear the  consequences. Generally, the smaller or more confined the area in which a  given amount of radioactive material is dispersed, the more severe the  consequences. Accordingly, depending upon the circumstances, even  small amounts of material can be potentially dangerous. For example, a  relatively small quantity of a particular material dispersed over many city  blocks could be disruptive and result in an evacuation while first  responders assessed the extent of the contamination and determined the  need for a cleanup. In this case, the small quantity of this material might  not cause immediate health effects or require significant cleanup, but it  could result in economic and psychological consequences if people were  temporarily evacuated from their businesses and homes. However, the  same small quantity of the same material dispersed in a more confined  setting, such as a restaurant or enclosed subway station, would also result  in an evacuation and would prevent people from returning to the affected  area until a more extensive cleanup could be completed. Moreover, those  exposed to radiation under this scenario could experience radiation  sickness, with symptoms that include nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. If  exposure is extended, the result can be permanent injury or death. Finally,  larger amounts of this same radioactive material spread over a larger area  could produce more significant consequences. (For further discussion of  the potential effects of an RDD, see app. I.)
Until 2001, oversight of radioactive sealed sources in the United States  largely focused on ensuring that such sources were licensed as required  and used and stored safely. In the years after 2001, security concerns  surrounding radioactive sealed sources received greater attention  nationally and internationally. For example, in May 2003, the Nuclear  Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Energy (DOE),  relying in part on a 2002 study by Sandia National Laboratories that,  among other things, identified several radionuclides—the particular types  of radioactive material used in sealed sources—that are most commonly  used in the United States and that pose the greatest risk of being used by  terrorists to make an RDD. Also that year, the International Atomic  Energy Agency (IAEA) published a system for ranking quantities of  individual radionuclides into one of five categories on the basis of their  potential to harm human health. Under IAEA’s system, a given  radionuclide is considered “dangerous” when gathered in close proximity  to people in sufficient quantity to cause direct human health effects. A  category 1 quantity of a given radionuclide, the most dangerous, is defined  as an amount 1,000 times or more than the amount necessary to cause  permanent human injury; a category 2 quantity is defined as an amount at  least 10 times but less than 1,000 times the amount necessary to cause  permanent human injury. A category 3 quantity of a given radionuclide is  defined as at least the minimum amount, but less than 10 times the  amount, sufficient to cause permanent injury. Category 4 and 5 quantities  of radioactive materials are unlikely to cause permanent injury. In  September 2003, the United States and other nations endorsed IAEA’s  Code of Conduct, which sets forth basic principles and guidance to  promote the safe and secure use of sealed sources containing sufficient  quantities of radioactive material to be categorized as dangerous. The  Code of Conduct applies to categories 1, 2, and 3—all of which are  potentially dangerous to human health and could, if not properly  controlled, cause permanent injuries or death to a person who handled it  or who was otherwise in contact with it.
How dangerous any given type of radioactive material is depends on its  activity level, or intensity; how long exposure lasts; and the way in which  the body is exposed to it—via inhalation, ingestion, or external exposure.  The different types of radiation—including alpha, beta, gamma, and  neutron—also vary in how easy or difficult they are to block, or shield, and  this variation, in turn, affects the threat to health that a particular type of  radiation poses. Depending on the intensity and length and manner of  exposure, health effects range from death, to severe injury, to the  development of cancer, to no discernable damage. For example, alpha  radiation poses little threat to human health from external exposure but  poses considerable health risks if inhaled or ingested. Gamma radiation is  more penetrating and, if not properly shielded, can cause injury or death  through external exposure. Although sources of neutron radiation are less  common, neutron radiation is emitted from some materials that are used  to make nuclear weapons. Thus, tools that can detect neutron radiation  are particularly important for national security purposes, such as securing  our borders.
An underlying goal of federal and state regulation of radioactive materials  is to protect people from health effects caused by exposure to harmful  levels of radiation. The Atomic Energy Act gives NRC primary  responsibility for regulating most domestic industrial, medical, and  research uses of radioactive materials to protect public health and safety.  The act authorizes NRC to relinquish primary regulatory authority over  radioactive materials to states (called “agreement” states) that agree to  meet certain conditions. To date, NRC has relinquished authority to 35  states to grant licenses to possess and use radioactive materials and sealed  sources and conduct regular inspections of licensees to enforce  compliance. NRC and numerous state governments license, monitor, track,  and require security for radioactive materials in order to protect both  workers and members of the general public from exposure to hazardous  levels of radiation generated by the activities of their licensees. Given this  mandate to regulate the radioactive material covered by their licenses,  NRC and state regulators focus on the dangers posed by day-to-day  occupational exposure to radiation and the direct health effects from  industrial accidents. NRC periodically evaluates its own regulatory  program and evaluates each agreement state’s program for compatibility  with NRC regulations.
NRC and agreement states issue two types of licenses to authorize the  possession of radioactive materials: specific licenses and general licenses.  Specific licenses are issued for devices that contain relatively larger  radioactive sealed sources. These devices, such as medical equipment  used to treat cancer, cameras used for industrial radiography, and  moisture and density gauges used in construction, generally require  training to be used safely and may also need to be properly secured to  avoid misuse. Organizations or individuals wanting to obtain a specific  license must submit an application and gain the approval of either NRC or  an agreement state. In contrast, devices approved for use under general  license, such as luminous exit signs, normally contain relatively small  radioactive sources. Such devices are designed with inherent radiation  safety features, are widely commercially available, and do not require NRC  or agreement state approval to possess. Of the approximately 22,000  specific materials licenses in the United States, NRC administers about  3,750, and the agreement states administer the rest.
Other federal agencies’ responsibilities related to regulation of radioactive  materials are focused on protecting the general public from exposure to  harmful levels of radiation (the Environmental Protection Agency),  establishing emergency response procedures (the Department of  Homeland Security), or preventing the illicit import of such materials  (Customs and Border Protection, a component of the Department of  Homeland Security). For example, the Environmental Protection Agency  (EPA) is responsible for developing and implementing standards for  protecting the general public from, among other things, radiation from  contaminated air, water, and soil—whether this contamination is the by- product of industrial activities or occurred as a result of an accidental or  deliberate release of radioactive materials. EPA sets cleanup standards for  areas contaminated by radiation that consider the direct health effects and  the risks posed by very long-term exposure to even very low levels of  radiation, which has the potential to increase the risk of developing cancer  in the future. EPA is also responsible for establishing a comprehensive set  of guidelines for use by local, state, and federal emergency services  personnel and other first responders in the event of a release of  radioactive material—such as that caused by an industrial accident or an  RDD. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) incorporates the  radiation exposure thresholds, established primarily by EPA, into their  guidance document, Application of Protective Action Guides for  Radiological Dispersal Device and Improvised Nuclear Device Incidents.  EPA’s more general guidelines identify steps that should be taken to  respond to and mitigate the effects of various types of radiological  incidents—whether they are industrial accidents or terrorist attacks.  Finally, DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for  preventing the smuggling of radioactive materials into the United States.
In August 2003, we reported that (1) the number of radioactive sealed  sources in the United States was unknown because NRC and agreement  states tracked licenses, which can be issued for more than one source,  rather than individual sealed sources; (2) despite concerns about the need  for heightened security of radioactive sources, NRC had only recently  issued requirements to improve the security of a relatively small number  of the very largest sealed sources, used for irradiating food or medical  supplies, leaving many others without increased security; and (3) there  were potential security weaknesses in NRC and agreement state licensing  processes. We made several recommendations to correct these problems,  including that NRC (1) collaborate with agreement states to identify the  types, amount, and availability of the highest-risk radioactive sources and  the associated health and economic consequences of their malicious use;  (2) re-examine its licensing procedures and requirements; and (3) work  with states to devise and implement additional security measures,  including performance measures to make sure any new measures are  effective. In addition, we reported in March 2006 that, among other things,  CBP did not have access to NRC or agreement state licensing data, making  it difficult for officers at U.S. ports of entry to verify the legitimacy of  shipments of radioactive sealed sources or materials. Accordingly, we  recommended that CBP and NRC develop a capacity to provide CBP  border personnel with information needed to help determine if radioactive  sealed source shipments are legitimate, including NRC licensing data. We  also conducted two undercover operations to test CBP’s and NRC’s ability  to prevent those with malicious intent from obtaining radioactive sources  or from smuggling them into the United States. In March 2006, we reported  on an undercover operation in which we used forged NRC documents to  transport category 5 radioactive sources across the northern and southern  borders of the United States, underscoring CBP’s inability to verify the  legitimacy of radioactive sources entering the United States. In March  2007, using the name of a fictitious business, we obtained a radioactive  materials license from NRC, which we altered and then used to obtain  commitments from private companies to purchase dangerous quantities of  radioactive sources. We did this only a few months after NRC had issued  guidance designed to prevent those with no legitimate need to possess  radioactive sources from acquiring a license.
In this context, this report assesses (1) the progress NRC has made in  implementing the recommendations in our August 2003 report, (2) other  steps NRC has taken to improve its ability to monitor and track radioactive  materials, (3) CBP’s ability to detect radioactive materials at ports of entry  on the northern and southern borders, and (4) CBP’s ability to verify that  such materials are appropriately licensed before they are allowed to enter  the United States.
To assess the progress NRC has made in implementing the  recommendations in our August 2003 report, we reviewed NRC’s periodic  reports to the Congress on the status of these recommendations, reviewed  the relevant policy and procedural changes undertaken since the report  was issued, and interviewed NRC officials about the status of our  recommendations and actions taken and steps planned to implement  them. We also spoke to various state regulators of radioactive sources and  materials. We attended two annual meetings of the Organization of  Agreement States and interviewed each of the board members to obtain  their perspectives on NRC’s implementation of the recommendations on  issues affecting states. We also obtained documents and interviewed  several experts at Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories in  Albuquerque and Los Alamos, New Mexico, respectively, and Lawrence  Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California, about the risks  posed by RDDs. In addition, we met with officials from the National  Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Global Threat Reduction, who  are working on a classified, comprehensive analysis of the potential social  and economic costs of various RDD scenarios. Finally, we obtained  documents and interviewed officials from EPA about their responsibilities  for developing and implementing standards for protecting the general  public from radiation in contaminated air, water, and soil.
To assess other steps NRC has taken to improve its ability to monitor and  track radioactive materials, we obtained documentation about the  capabilities, operations, and reliability of the NRC databases currently in  operation and those in various stages of development. We also interviewed  senior NRC database managers responsible for running or developing  these systems.
To assess CBP’s ability to detect and verify the legitimacy of radioactive  sealed sources and materials before they are allowed to enter the United  States, we gathered documentation on the capabilities and operations of  DHS’s National Targeting Center, toured the facility, and interviewed the  center’s director. We gathered documents and interviewed CBP officials,  including port directors and CBP line officers, during visits to a  nonprobability sample of several ports of entry on both the Canadian and  Mexican borders. In addition, we gathered documentation about the  operations of four other ports of entry and interviewed the principal CBP  officials responsible for running these land border crossings. We selected  these ports of entry because of their geographic locations and sizes, as  well as the estimated volume of entries into the United States of both  passengers and cargo (general and radioactive materials) at these  locations. We also gathered information about the technical capabilities of  the radiation detection equipment used by CBP officers. Finally, we  interviewed officers of the Organization of Agreement States and other  state officials to obtain the states’ perspectives on their collaboration with  NRC and DHS. We conducted this performance audit from August 2006 to  May 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: NRC Has Implemented Three of the Six Recommendations from GAO’s 2003 Report
paragraphs: Since 2003, NRC has worked with agreement states and others to identify  the radioactive materials that pose the greatest risk of being used to make  an RDD, established additional security measures for these materials, and  taken steps to ensure the increased security measures are effectively  implemented. However, NRC has not successfully corrected the  weaknesses in its radioactive materials licensing processes. Further, NRC  has taken limited steps to determine how to effectively mitigate the  potential psychological effects of an RDD. Finally, NRC has not yet  decided whether certain radioactive sources need stronger licensing  requirements.
subsections: section_title: NRC Has Worked with the States and Others to Identify Radioactive Sources That Pose the Greatest Risk of Being Used to Make an RDD
paragraphs: An NRC and DOE working group had established a tentative list of  radioactive materials under NRC license and DOE control and the  quantities at which they pose the greatest risk. However, according to  agreement states representatives, the agreement states were not directly  involved in creating this list prior to the release of our August 2003 report.  Our report recommended that the Chairman of NRC collaborate with the  agreement states on this list, which NRC did before the list was finalized in  August 2005. Specifically, in July 2002, the chairman of the NRC and the  Secretary of Energy established a working group to identify radioactive  materials according to the relative risk they posed of being used by  terrorists to make an RDD. The working group assessed the relative  hazards of various radioactive isotopes, taking into consideration both the  nature of the materials (their potential threat to human health) and their  attractiveness for use in an RDD (their half-lives, the quantities in which  such materials are typically found, the level of protection typically  surrounding them, and the ease with which they might be dispersed). The  working group completed its initial study in November 2002 and issued a  final report in May 2003. During this period, NRC, DOE, and other U.S.  government entities were also negotiating with other countries under the  auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to create a  single international threshold quantity at which nations adopting IAEA’s  Code of Conduct would agree to take measures to more closely track and  consider increased security measures to protect radionuclides of concern.  NRC also consulted with agreement states on this issue. In the end, it was  agreed in September 2003 that the threshold for increased concern—that  is, the quantities at which various radionuclides become subject to more  stringent security—should be category 2 quantities.
After our August 2003 recommendation that NRC consult with the  agreement states on this list, NRC officials formally provided it to  agreement state officials for their review. The agreement states agreed  with the list and the thresholds developed by the IAEA and participating  countries (see table 1).
section_title: NRC and Agreement States Have Established Additional Security Requirements and Taken Steps to Ensure Their Implementation
paragraphs: NRC also implemented our recommendations to (1) determine how  agreement state and nonagreement state officials could participate in the  development and implementation of additional security measures for  radionuclides of concern and (2) include performance criteria for  assessing NRC’s and agreement states’ implementation of these additional  security requirements in periodic evaluations of both NRC and agreement  state effectiveness. First, NRC worked with agreement states to devise and  implement several additional security measures—called “increased  controls” —to protect category 2 or greater quantities of radionuclides of  concern from theft, diversion, and other unauthorized access. In late 2003,  NRC and state officials, some of whom were also officers of the  Organization of Agreement States or Conference of Radiation Control  Program Directors (an organization that includes both agreement and  nonagreement states), established several working groups to facilitate the  participation of state officials and their organizations in developing and  implementing additional security measures for certain radioactive sources  and materials. Several state officials, including a former chair of the  Organization of Agreement States (OAS), told us that these working  groups functioned in a highly collaborative and deliberative manner.  Another OAS official told us that the fact that so many agreement state  officials have been willing to volunteer to serve in working groups, and  that NRC has been willing to provide some financial support for state  officials’ involvement, is a testament to the importance that both NRC and  agreement states placed on federal-state collaboration. NRC and  agreement states officially issued requirements for the increased controls  in December 2005. The purposes of the increased controls, according to  NRC, are to reduce the risk of unauthorized use of radioactive materials  and to aid the prompt detection and assessment of and response to any  such attempt. Increased controls include such measures as 24-hour  surveillance, multiple layers of physical security, and measures to ensure  the immediate notification of local law enforcement agencies in the event  of any actual or suspected breach in security. For example, increased  controls on medical sources require some sources to be kept in heavily  secured rooms with limited access (see fig. 1).
According to NRC, all increased controls were to be fully implemented by  June 2006. Some licensees with the highest-risk sources were inspected by  June 2007, while all increased controls must be fully inspected by June  2009. NRC regional offices and agreement state regulators are also  currently in the process of reaching out to licensees to help ensure they  will be able to meet the June 2009 deadline and have already performed  preliminary increased controls inspections on approximately 1,100 of the  1,700 licensees subject to the new controls (see table 2).
Agreement state officials told us that they have already prevented at least  one attempted theft of an industrial radiography source typically used to  inspect metal parts and welds for defects. The would-be thieves broke in  to an area protected by an alarm system that had been recently installed  by the licensee to comply with the new requirement mandating the  capacity to monitor, detect, and respond quickly with local law  enforcement in the event of any unauthorized access. This new alarm  system immediately notified local law enforcement authorities, who  responded in time to prevent the criminals from obtaining an iridium-192  radiography source—a potent gamma emitter that could cause extensive  radiation burns if handled improperly.
NRC and agreement states have also collaborated in establishing criteria  for assessing the implementation of increased controls and integrated  these criteria into NRC’s existing oversight program, the Integrated  Materials Performance Evaluation Program (IMPEP). In March 2006,  NRC established performance criteria devised in working groups with  agreement state officials for evaluating the implementation of increased  controls. Under each of the existing performance categories—staffing and  training, the technical quality of inspections, licensing actions, incident  and allegation activities, and the overall status of the materials inspection  program—NRC added additional performance criteria. For example, NRC  regional and agreement state programs are now evaluated on whether they  have established a system to readily identify new licensees that should be  subject to increased controls and to determine whether sensitive licensee  information is being securely maintained. Although not all NRC regional  and agreement states’ radioactive materials programs have been evaluated  on their implementation of the increased controls, 22 of the 35 agreement  states and one of the three NRC regional offices with responsibilities for  regulating such materials have to date had aspects of their implementation  of increased controls at least partially assessed in this manner. Moreover,  agreement state officials familiar with this revised performance evaluation  process told us that the new criteria were effective and valid measures of  the implementation of the increased controls.
section_title: Weaknesses Persist in NRC’s Materials Licensing Process
paragraphs: To increase the security of radioactive materials and sealed sources and  better ensure that they are used as intended, we recommended in 2003  that NRC modify its process for issuing specific licenses to ensure that  such sources cannot be purchased before NRC has verified, through  inspection or other means, that the materials and sources will be used as  intended. In December 2006, NRC issued new prelicensing guidance to  help NRC and agreement state licensing officials to make a risk-based  determination of whether an applicant for a license to possess an amount  of radioactive material or source sufficient to require a specific (rather  than a general) license should have to undergo some sort of verification  before being granted a license. This guidance asked two screening  questions: (1) whether “the applicant is an entity or a licensee transferring  control to an entity that has never had a license or is unknown” and (2)  whether the applicant is seeking category 2 or greater quantities of one or  more of the 16 radionuclides of concern and has not already been licensed  to possess materials subject to a security order or additional requirements  for increased controls. If the applicant answers yes to either question,  according to the guidance, the license examiner should consider whether  it is necessary to take any of the steps on a 12-item checklist. For example,  one checklist item suggests doing an Internet search on the name of the  applicant; another suggests conducting a site visit to the stated place of  business. In spring 2007, however, our investigators, posed as first-time  radioactive materials license applicants for devices containing sources  large enough to require specific licenses, and therefore subject to the extra  scrutiny from the 12-item checklist, they were able to obtain a materials  license from NRC, even though an Internet search or a prelicensing site  visit would have revealed the application to be based on false claims.  After being notified of the results of our undercover investigation in June,  NRC stopped issuing specific licenses for radioactive materials and  sources until it could develop and issue “supplemental interim  prelicensing guidance.” This supplemental guidance, issued 12 days after  NRC stopped issuing specific licenses, requires a first-time licensee to pass  a site visit inspection at the applicant’s place of business or appear at an  NRC regional office for a face-to-face meeting with a license application  reviewer and satisfy this official that the radioactive materials will be used  as intended. Applicants would not be subject to these requirements if they  already have an established regulatory relationship with NRC or an  agreement state and meet other specific criteria.
In September 2007, NRC announced in a public briefing that it had  developed a comprehensive plan for resolving all the vulnerabilities in its  radioactive materials licensing processes. NRC announced plans to do  several things to help make its program more secure, including the  following.
Establish a panel of independent external reviewers to study NRC’s  materials licensing program vulnerabilities, with particular scrutiny of its  “good faith assumptions” about applicants. This panel presented a number  of observations and recommendations to NRC in March 2008.
Reconstitute the NRC and agreement state prelicensing working group to  develop solutions to vulnerabilities associated with verification,  counterfeiting, and general licenses.
Establish a new materials program working group that would review the  results of an independent external review and comprehensively assess the  entire materials licensing program, including NRC’s evaluation of state  programs.
Leverage the capabilities of new databases currently under development— the National Source Tracking System and Web-based licensing.  To assure themselves that other radioactive materials licenses had not  been issued to fraudulent individuals, NRC also undertook a retrospective  review of a sampling of licenses to verify their legitimacy. NRC officials  stated that these reviews uncovered no other incidences of fraud. We  think all of these actions are useful steps toward closing the long-standing  vulnerabilities in NRC materials licensing processes, but it is too early to  evaluate whether these steps will be successful.
section_title: NRC Has Taken No Significant Actions to Mitigate the Potential Psychological Effects of an RDD
paragraphs: In addition to recommending that NRC work with agreement states and  others to identify and better secure the radioactive sources that pose the  greatest risk of being used to make an RDD, we also recommended that  NRC determine how to effectively mitigate the potential psychological  effects of malicious use of radioactive materials. Since we issued our 2003  report, DHS issued the National Response Plan in December of 2004 to  establish a comprehensive all-hazards approach to domestic incident  management. The National Response Plan, revised and reissued as the  National Response Framework in January 2008, details how federal  agencies and others should coordinate to ensure an efficient and effective  nationwide response to a broad spectrum of domestic incidents, including  those involving the malicious use of radioactive materials. Under the  National Response Framework, where a radiological incident involves  facilities or materials licensed by the NRC or agreement states, NRC either  coordinates federal response activities or assists DHS in doing so,  depending on the scope of the incident. In our view, such coordination  should include taking actions to determine how to effectively mitigate all  the effects of such an RDD—including psychological effects.
However, NRC has not implemented this recommendation because,  according to NRC officials, NRC has only a very limited role to play in  mitigating the psychological effects that may occur in the aftermath of an  RDD event unless the amount of radioactive materials released is  sufficient to cause “prompt fatalities”—that is, fatalities directly caused by  exposure to radioactive materials. Accordingly, NRC has identified and  taken limited steps that it sees as consistent with its prescribed role.  Specifically, NRC points to its participation in the interagency Radiation  Source Protection and Security Task Force Public Education Working  Group with DHS, DOE, agreement and nonagreement states, and others to  design a coordinated public education campaign to, among other things,  reduce public fears of radioactivity and diminish the impact of a terrorist  attack using radioactive materials. This working group issued a draft  public education action plan in December 2007 and provided an update on  its efforts on May 15, 2008. NRC is also a member of and has provided  input to a Health Physics Society working group that is putting together a  program to educate the public about radiation and help counteract  unfounded or irrational fears.
Despite these activities, in our view, NRC’s response to our  recommendation is inadequate. Over 4 years after we made our  recommendation, NRC has not yet determined how to effectively mitigate  the potential psychological effects of the malicious use of radioactive  materials. Moreover, according to existing EPA protective action  guidelines, the amount of radioactive material needed to cause “prompt  fatalities”—the threshold at which NRC accepts having a significant role— is significantly greater than would be necessary to cause contaminated  areas to be evacuated, a threshold at which psychological effects could  reasonably be expected to occur. According to NRC officials, unless the  prompt fatalities threshold is met, NRC believes its job is to provide the  public with prompt, complete information about the effects of any release  of radiation involving material the agency regulates and, to the extent it is  relevant, to inform the public about the NRC regulations or guidance that  may be relevant as a result. Beyond participating in an interagency task  force working group, providing any additional information that may be  needed is, according to NRC, the responsibility of others (federal, state, or  local officials, etc.). This approach is consistent with NRC’s view that its  primary responsibility is to regulate “inside the fence, inside licensee- controlled areas.” “Outside the fence,” NRC views its role as assisting  those federal agencies that have primary responsibility, namely DHS, DOE,  and others and making sure that its licensees comply with these agencies’  legitimate concerns.
section_title: NRC Has Not Yet Decided Whether Certain Radioactive Sources Need Stronger Licensing Requirements
paragraphs: In light of growing concerns about the potential malicious use of  radioactive sealed sources, and to better secure generally licensed devices  containing such sources, we recommended that NRC, in consultation with  agreement states, re-examine whether certain radioactive sources should  be regulated through specific licenses rather than general licenses.  According to NRC, by November 2007 it had gathered the necessary  information about generally licensed devices containing relatively larger  radioactive sources (the largest category 4 sources or higher) to decide  whether changes should be made. NRC and agreement state officials are  currently analyzing the data and conferring in working groups and,  according to NRC officials, initiated a rulemaking process in September  2007. Given the complexity and range of the issue and the solutions to be  considered, NRC officials estimate the formal rulemaking process will take  approximately 2 years, depending on what form a new rule takes. Rules  that require states to make statutory changes typically take longer to  implement. NRC officials stressed that it is impossible to predict what  form a final rule would take. The various options—for example, a lower  activity cap for general licenses; specific licensing requirements for  particular radionuclides regardless of activity; or the development of a  new, more streamlined specific license—will continue to be a subject of  discussion among federal and state radioactive materials regulators until a  decision has been reached. If a revised rule is finalized by September 2009,  agreement states could have up to an additional 3 years to fully implement  any changes—meaning that any rule change may not be fully implemented  until the fall of 2012.
section_title: NRC Has Improved Its Ability to Monitor and Track Radioactive Sealed Sources, but New Systems Have Been Delayed
paragraphs: NRC has developed an interim database that can monitor and track the  more dangerous, category 1 and 2 radioactive sealed sources. However,  two additional systems—one to track radioactive sealed sources and one  to track licenses—have been repeatedly delayed. A third system under  development will draw on information in both of these systems to provide  regulators and vendors with the ability to verify that those seeking to  purchase radioactive sources are licensed to do so.
subsections: section_title: NRC Created an Interim National Database to Better Monitor the More Dangerous Radioactive Sealed Sources
paragraphs: NRC established the interim database in October 2003 to provide NRC and  agreement states a stop-gap means of more closely monitoring the  potentially more dangerous sources until the new National Source  Tracking System (NSTS) could be completed. This database is called  “interim” because it is intended to be a temporary measure for  implementing a quick, practical response to the recommendation in the  May 2003 DOE–NRC report on RDDs that the U.S. government develop a  database of sources at greatest risk of being used to make an RDD. The  interim database currently records information about category 1 and 2  radioactive sealed sources licensed by both NRC and agreement states.  For a given source, the interim database records the radionuclide; the  quantity (activity); the licensee address; and the make, model, and serial  number (where available) of the registered source. Although participation  is voluntary, NRC successfully persuaded agreement states to provide data  on their licensees for inclusion in the interim database, and as a result, the  database includes information from 99 percent of all licensees. Originally,  the database was intended to be a one-time snapshot of what radioactive  materials existed in the United States during fiscal year 2004. However,  NRC began to update the database annually as it became apparent that the  development and launch of the NSTS would take longer than expected.  The result is an annual snapshot of information about radioactive sources  as they were at one point during a given year, not a system that tracks the  current location of sources. The information for any given source in the  database is, at any given time, 0 to 12 months old.
It is important to note that the licensee address listed in the interim  database may simply be the address for the licensee’s administrative  offices—that is, the place where the company officials responsible for  dealing with NRC or state regulators have offices—and not necessarily the  address of the physical location of the material. A licensee may be allowed  to store radioactive materials in several locations throughout one or more  states but still provide only a single administrative address for reporting  purposes in the interim database. NRC and agreement states check the  completeness and accuracy of this inventory of source locations during  routine inspections of licensees.
section_title: New Systems to Track Radioactive Sealed Sources and Licenses Have Limitations and Have Been Repeatedly Delayed
paragraphs: The completion and implementation of the major new systems NRC is  developing to help it better track, and ultimately help secure, radioactive  sealed sources have been delayed repeatedly. The impetus for the creation  of the NSTS was a recommendation in the May 2003 DOE-NRC report on  RDDs that radionuclides identified as being at greatest risk of use by  terrorists to make an RDD be nationally tracked. The Energy Policy Act of  2005 required the establishment of a mandatory tracking system. The  NSTS is also consistent with the United States’ endorsement of the IAEA  Code of Conduct, which recommends that nations establish a national  source registry to include, at a minimum, category 1 and 2 sources of  radionuclides of concern.
The NSTS will initially track category 1 and 2 sources of the 20  radionuclides that NRC has determined are sufficiently attractive for use  in an RDD or for other malicious purposes that warrant national tracking.  The 20 radionuclides include the 16 radionuclides of concern plus four  additional radionuclides: actinium-227, polonium-210, and thorium-228 and  -229. In April 2008, NRC proposed a rule to expand the NSTS to include  all category 3 sources and the largest category 4 sources (at or about one- tenth of the activity threshold for category 3). Although the NSTS was  originally supposed to be operational in mid-2007, difficulties in  developing the system have led NRC to postpone the launch of the NSTS  multiple times. NRC’s current estimate for the launch of the NSTS  (tracking category 1 and 2 sources) is January 31, 2009. NRC estimates the  expansion of the NSTS will be implemented by March 2010.
According to NRC, the NSTS will initially be populated by the data from  the interim database. However, unlike the interim database, the NSTS will  not be an annual snapshot of source inventories. The NSTS will be a  transaction-based system that will track each major step that each tracked  radioactive source takes within the United States, from “cradle to grave.”  That is, licensees will be responsible for recording the manufacture,  shipment, arrival, and disposal of all licensed and tracked category 1 and 2  radioactive sources. More specifically, the NSTS will include the  radionuclide, quantity (activity), manufacturer, manufacture date, model  number, serial number, and site address. The licensee will have until the  close of the next business day after a transaction takes place to enter it  into the system. As a result, the location of all such sources will be  accounted for and more closely tracked than in the interim database.  While some sources may be moved temporarily to different sites, any time  that the source changes its “home base,” the transaction must be  registered through the NSTS. In this way, the data in the system should be  kept up-to-date.
For security reasons, access to the information in the NSTS will be on a  need-to-know basis. Licensees will have access to information about their  sources, agreement state officials will have access to information about  licensees and sources in their state, and only selected NRC officials will  have access to the entire system.
While the NSTS is designed to track larger and potentially more dangerous  radioactive sealed sources, NRC’s Web-based licensing system is being  developed to provide quick access to up-to-date information on all NRC  specific licenses for radioactive materials and sources in all five IAEA  categories. In its technical comments on a draft of this report, NRC told us  that it is developing a third system—a license verification system—which,  once operational, will draw on the information in NSTS and the Web-based  licensing system which will provide regulators and vendors of radioactive  sources with an easily accessible ability to verify that those seeking to  purchase nationally tracked sources are licensed to do so. Taken together,  these systems will include detailed information about what licensees are  allowed to possess and, importantly, whether a prospective licensee  seeking to purchase additional sealed sources is authorized to possess the  additional types and quantities. For example, an individual from a  construction company wanting to purchase a piece of equipment  containing a radioactive sealed source must demonstrate to the vendor  that the company is licensed to possess such a source. Once all three  systems are operational, the vendor could easily verify that the company is  legitimately licensed to purchase a given piece of equipment containing  the particular sealed source. Although the Web-based licensing system was  originally supposed to be deployed in 2005, it is now estimated be  completed no earlier than the late summer of 2010. Moreover, the Web- based licensing system may not initially include any information on  radioactive materials licenses issued by agreement states—which  represent over 80 percent of all U.S. licenses for these materials. NRC  officials told us that they are currently working with agreement states to  determine the most efficient means of including agreement state data in  the Web-based licensing system. Finally, NRC has only recently begun  developing its new license verification system and has not yet established  firm completion dates. However, NRC officials told us that they expect it  to be complete by the time that the Web-based licensing is launched.
The delays in the development of both the NSTS and the Web-based  licensing system are especially consequential because NRC officials, both  commissioners and staff, have identified the deployment of these systems  as key to improving the control and accountability of radioactive materials  in the United States. More specifically, in NRC’s September 2007 public  hearing addressing the weaknesses that we uncovered in NRC’s materials  licensing program, the commissioners said that an expanded NSTS  including category 3 and perhaps the largest category 4 sources, a Web- based licensing system including agreement state data, and some means  for making relevant information in both of these systems available to  vendors and officials at ports of entry, would be a secure and effective  means of verifying that those seeking to obtain radioactive materials, or  enter the United States with licensable quantities of radioactive materials  or sources, were doing so for legitimate purposes.
section_title: CBP Has a Comprehensive System for Detecting Radiation at Ports of Entry on the Northern and Southern Borders
paragraphs: CBP has a comprehensive, layered system for detecting and identifying  radioactive materials as they enter the United States at land ports of  entry—whether they are in the form of industrial sources, raw materials,  trace amounts of radiation found in such common products as ceramics or  bananas, or radionuclides left in the human body in the aftermath of  medical procedures. However, some equipment that is used to protect  CBP officers is in short supply.
subsections: section_title: CBP’s Radiation Portal Monitors Scan Most Vehicle, Cargo, and Passenger Traffic Entering the United States
paragraphs: According to CBP, over 90 percent of the personally owned vehicles  entering the United States at land ports of entry pass through radiation  portal monitors. Portal monitors are very sensitive and can detect even  the very small amounts of radiation. All vehicles must pass through the  monitors at every port of entry that deploys them. Any vehicle triggering a  portal monitor alarm is referred to a secondary screening area, where it is  sent through a second portal monitor to confirm (or disconfirm) the  original alarm. Whether the second portal monitor confirms the alarm or  not, the vehicle, the driver, any passengers, and any cargo are scanned by  a CBP officer with a hand-held radiation isotope identification device  (RIID). The RIID can detect very small amounts of radiation and also  identify many of the most commonly used radionuclides by name and  activity level. CBP keeps detailed records on the cause of each alarm and  its resolution and sends them to a central location for archiving. All portal  monitor alarms must be resolved—that is, CBP officers must investigate  each alarm until they are convinced that the vehicle, occupants, and any  cargo pose no threat and, if radioactive materials are found, that the  vehicle occupants appear to have a legitimate reason to possess and  transport them—before the vehicle, driver, and any passengers can be  allowed to enter the United States.
The vast majority of portal monitor alarms are resolved by CBP officers at  the border using the information available to them directly from portal  monitor and RIID scans, documents provided by shippers and passengers,  and the explanations of the travelers (commercial and passenger vehicle  drivers and passengers) for why they are carrying radioactive materials,  whatever the amount or form. When CBP officers cannot resolve the  radiation alarm with information available to them at the border, they are  required to contact technical experts at CBP’s National Targeting Center  for assistance. These experts offer scientific expertise to help CBP officers  interpret and use the portal monitor and RIID data and will also verify  whether any radioactive sources have been properly licensed by checking  NRC and agreement state licensing data. Figures 2 and 3 show vehicles  lining up and passing through portal monitors at ports of entry. Figure 4  shows an inspection area and a truck-sized portal monitor on the southern  border.
Most of the CBP officers we spoke with at the ports of entry we visited  told us they had never or rarely felt it necessary to contact the National  Targeting Center for assistance, but they all stated that they would not  hesitate to do so if they encountered anything out of the ordinary or if they  thought something might pose any threat to national security. Those CBP  officers who told us they had contacted the center for assistance were  very pleased with the timely and practical help they received.
section_title: Some Radiation Detection Equipment Is in Short Supply
paragraphs: Finally, we found that personal radiation detectors—an important  component of the suite of radiation detection equipment at the borders— are in short supply. Unlike portal monitors and RIIDs, personal radiation  detectors are not designed to be used as screening tools for radioactive  materials. Instead, they are designed to alert the individual wearer when  he or she is being exposed to unusually high levels of radiation, permitting  CBP officers to take protective measures if needed.  While most CBP  officers dealing with the public in frontline positions are equipped with  personal radiation detectors, some are not. According to CBP officials, the  agency lacks sufficient resources to purchase the approximately 1,500  personal radiation detectors it needs to provide one for each officer at the  border who currently needs one. In fact, during our visit to one port of  entry, we found that some officers in frontline positions at the border did  not have a personal radiation detector. Moreover, CBP has no money  currently in the budget to acquire the approximately 2,000 additional  personal radiation detectors it would require to equip the new officers it  plans to hire—leaving a shortfall of about 3,500 personal radiation  detectors. CBP headquarters officials are aware of the shortage of  personal radiation detectors and they hope to procure enough of them for  each officer who needs one. However, they acknowledged that, in doing  so, they have to consider competing priorities at the border, and also  whether emerging technologies may provide a more effective solution.
section_title: CBP Guidance on When to Verify Licenses for Radioactive Materials Entering the United States Was Not Communicated to the Field
paragraphs: In December 2003, CBP issued a radiation detection program directive that  contained, among other things, the requirement that CBP officers at the  border contact the National Targeting Center for assistance under certain  circumstances when radiation is detected.  Under the directive, even large  shipments of radioactive materials can be admitted without a CBP officer  contacting the National Targeting Center to verify whether the materials  are legitimately licensed. The radiation detection program directive was  scheduled for review in December 2006, but CBP officials told us that this  review was delayed pending the resolution of unrelated matters regarding  the CBP’s right to search property for radioactive materials between ports  of entry.
In response to our March 2006 reports assessing the progress DHS has  made deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry and  detailing how our investigators used fake documents to bring licensable  quantities of industrial radioactive sources into the United States  respectively, CBP revised its policy. Specifically, in May 2006, CBP issued  a memorandum that officials told us tightened security by requiring CBP  officers to contact the center to verify the legitimacy of a license or obtain  technical assistance whenever they detect more than incidental, trace  amounts of radiation, such as that found in ceramics and bananas or in  people who have recently undergone a medical treatment using  radionuclides. This memorandum, according to headquarters officials, was  intended to communicate to officers at the border that they should verify  the legitimacy of radioactive materials because CBP officers at a port of  entry cannot determine whether a licensee or shipper is authentic without  the assistance of the National Targeting Center.
This updated guidance, however, was not effectively communicated to  officers at the border. Specifically, we asked border officials at the several  ports of entry we visited and the four others we interviewed on the  telephone about the current guidance they use for regulating the flow of  radioactive materials across borders. All either provided us copies of the  2003 radiation detection program directive or confirmed it was current  and operative, and some gave us versions of the directive that were port- specific, and therefore, more detailed. Only one port of entry provided us  with guidance reflecting the May 2006 memorandum and its requirement  that CBP officers contact the National Targeting Center to verify the  legitimacy of all licensable quantities of radioactive materials crossing the  border. Moreover, officials at all these ports of entry told us that they  contact the National Targeting Center for technical assistance when they  need it; officials at only one port of entry told us they would call solely to  verify whether radioactive materials are appropriately licensed. Officials  representing a few other ports of entry told us they had never called the  National Targeting Center to verify the legitimacy of a license and that all  of their inquiries had been made solely to seek technical assistance.
In addition, the officers we spoke to had minimal knowledge of the general  regulatory structure established by NRC and agreement states. While we  found officers generally were aware that radioactive materials and sources  must be licensed, they typically did not take steps to verify licenses, as  required by the May 2006 guidance. At the ports of entry we visited, we  observed CBP officers working to ensure that when radioactive materials  triggered an alarm, the people carrying (or contaminated with) these  materials had a good explanation and that the readings from the portal  monitors and RIIDs were in accord with what travelers said and what their  documents attested to. In short, the officers were focused on resolving the  alarm according to the rules established in the 2003 radiation detection  program directive and on attending to the many other tasks they have in  monitoring what flows through U.S. land ports of entry.
In fact, the approach to resolving radiation alarms according to the  procedures prescribed in the 2003 radiation detection directive has been  so ingrained in day-to-day practice at one port of entry that CBP field  office managers had discovered only in the week before our visit that  officers had been allowing large neutron radiation-emitting shipments to  enter the United States without contacting the National Targeting Center  for technical support and to verify their legitimacy. While this situation has  since been corrected, this is of particular concern because (1) some  neutron radiation-emitting materials can be used to produce nuclear  weapons and (2) it is in direct conflict with CBP’s 2003 directive and 2006  supplemental guidance.
A senior CBP headquarters official told us that the 2003 radiation  detection program directive, as supplemented by the additional criteria  established by the May 2006 memorandum on when CBP officers must call  to verify the legitimacy of radioactive materials, reflected current policy.  He told us that the May 2006 memorandum was always envisioned as only  an interim solution, pending a revision of the directive. According to this  official, CBP was still working on a revision to the directive that would  fully incorporate the heightened security of the memorandum—but he  could not give a firm date when an updated directive would be issued. In  our view, until CBP effectively communicates the guidance in the 2006  memorandum to its border locations, CBP officers at the border will not  know when they should contact the National Targeting Center to verify  that radioactive materials being brought into the United States are  legitimately licensed.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: NRC has taken a number of important actions to implement several of our  recommendations from our 2003 report that will enhance the  accountability and control of radioactive sources and materials and its  ability to help protect the nation from nuclear smuggling. Still, its actions  in three key areas remain incomplete. In our view, the reasons behind our  recommendations 4 years ago are still valid today. Accordingly, to further  enhance public protection from the threats posed by potentially dangerous  quantities of radioactive sealed sources and materials, we continue to  believe that NRC should implement the recommendations from our 2003  report. Specifically, NRC should    correct the vulnerabilities uncovered in NRC’s materials licensing  process and implement the steps needed to ensure that radioactive  materials can only be purchased by those with a legitimate reason to  possess them, and    determine whether certain radioactive sources should be regulated  through specific licenses rather than general licenses and move quickly  to implement whatever changes are deemed necessary.
In addition, we continue to believe that a plan of how to effectively  mitigate the potential psychological effects of an RDD event needs to be  developed. For potential incidents involving radiological facilities or  materials licensed by NRC or agreement states, for which NRC has  coordinating responsibilities, NRC should work with DHS, other federal  agencies, and agreement states, respecting the roles described in the  National Response Framework, to take action to determine how to  effectively mitigate the potential psychological effects of such an event.
Also, the causes of the delays in the development and implementation of  NRC’s more comprehensive systems for securing, monitoring, and tracking  radioactive materials need to be confronted and addressed. Specifically,  NRC’s National Source Tracking System and Web-based licensing system  have missed numerous milestones and are not expected to be complete as  currently envisioned until at least 2010. Past delays in implementing these  systems give reason to wonder whether these dates will again be extended  and whether NRC is firmly committed to delivering these systems. The  recent decision to develop a third new system has added to these  concerns. In our view, given the potential consequences of the use of these  materials in an RDD and the potential for these systems to greatly improve  the security of both NRC’s and agreement states’ materials licensing  processes, it is time for NRC to make meaningful progress in successfully  completing these important initiatives.
While CBP has a comprehensive system in place to detect radiation at  ports of entry on the northern and southern borders, CBP’s task of  preventing the smuggling of radioactive materials is made more difficult by  the fact that guidance on when officers should verify whether radioactive  materials being brought into the United States are legitimately licensed has  not been effectively communicated. The result of this communication gap  is that resources that are available to CBP officers at the border to ensure  that those possessing radioactive materials are doing so legitimately are  underutilized.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Given the repeated delays in implementing improvements to the Nuclear  Regulatory Commission’s ability to monitor and track radioactive sealed  sources, we recommend that the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission take steps, consistent with sound systems development  practices, to ensure that priority attention is given to meeting the current  January 2009 and summer 2010 target dates for launching the National  Source Tracking System, Web-based licensing system, and the new license  verification system, respectively.
In addition, because some quantities of radioactive materials are  potentially dangerous to human health if not properly handled, we  recommend that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission complete the steps  needed to include all potentially dangerous radioactive sources (category  3 and the larger category 4 sources, as well as categories 1 and 2) in the  National Source Tracking System as quickly as is reasonably possible.
Finally, to improve the likelihood of preventing radioactive sources and  materials from being smuggled into the United States, we recommend that  the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs  and Border Protection to    effectively communicate current Customs and Border Protection  guidance to officers at ports of entry regarding when they are required  to contact the National Targeting Center to verify that radioactive  materials are legitimately licensed, and  take measures to ensure that this guidance is being followed.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the  Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, the  Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Chair of  the Organization of Agreement States with draft copies of our report for  their review and comment.
In commenting on the draft of this report, NRC neither agreed nor  disagreed with our findings and recommendations. Instead, NRC  described its current efforts to implement the recommendations from our  2003 report.  On this point, NRC outlined the steps it is taking to modify  and strengthen its processes and procedures for licensing radioactive  materials. NRC also provided an update on the status of the efforts of the  Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force’s subgroup on public  education—a subgroup led by DHS of which NRC is a member—to  proactively educate the general public about radiation with the goal of  reducing public anxiety and mitigating the adverse psychological effects in  the event of an RDD attack. Finally, NRC described its proposed rule,  expected to be issued in the fall of 2009, to limit the quantity of radioactive  material allowed in a generally licensed device. Although we are  encouraged by NRC’s efforts to finish implementing the recommendations  from our 2003 report, we remain concerned that nearly 5 years after we  issued our report these recommendations have yet to be fully  implemented. Furthermore, NRC stated that it is taking the steps  necessary to launch the National Source Tracking System (NSTS) and  Web-based licensing and to complete the needed steps to include all  potentially dangerous radioactive sources in the NSTS as quickly as is  reasonably possible.  In addition, NRC assures that it intends to place the  highest priority on the completion and deployment of the NSTS and Web- based licensing system. However, we are concerned that NRC has once  again postponed its estimated completion dates for these systems—by at  least 9 months in the case of expanding NSTS to include the smaller but  still potentially dangerous radioactive sources and estimates a similar  delay in the deployment of the Web-based licensing system. Finally, in its  technical comments, NRC informed us that it is developing a new, third  system which will draw information from both the NSTS and the Web- based licensing system to provide an improved capability for vendors and  regulators to verify licensing information. While we hope this new, third  system provides the intended additional capabilities, we are concerned  that after so many delays with NSTS and the Web-based licensing system,  adding a third system may further delay the ultimate security benefits that  these systems are expected to provide. NRC also provided additional  technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as  appropriate.
The other federal agencies that were offered the opportunity to comment  on our report either agreed with our recommendations and outlined the  steps to be taken to implement them, or chose not comment on the final  draft. Specifically, according to DHS’s written comments, CBP concurred  with our recommendations and specified the steps it will take to  effectively communicate current Customs and Border Protection guidance  to officers at ports of entry regarding when they are required to contact  the National Targeting Center to verify that radioactive materials are  legitimately licensed, and the measures it will take to ensure this guidance  is being followed. In fact, CBP has already updated its current guidance to  CBP officers at the border by issuing a memorandum to the field directors  restating and clarifying when officers must contact the National Targeting  Center to verify that radioactive materials are legitimately licensed and  requiring them to incorporate this guidance into ports of entry standard  operating procedures. Finally, DOE and EPA reviewed and provided  comments on earlier versions of our draft report and, after reviewing our  final draft, had no further comments.
The Organization of Agreement States neither agreed nor disagreed with  our findings and recommendations, but offered two comments which we  incorporated into the report. Specifically, state officials thought it was  important to recognize the quality of agreement state regulatory programs  by highlighting the fact that while GAO investigators succeeded in  obtaining an NRC radioactive materials license using fictitious documents,  GAO withdrew its application to obtain a materials license from the  agreement state when that state informed GAO investigators that it would  take steps that would have revealed the application not to be authentic.  State officials also wanted to stress what they view as the high level of  collaboration they enjoy with NRC, as evidenced by the number of state  officials involved in security-related working groups with NRC officials  and the financial support that NRC provides to states to enable this level  of state participation.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report, we plan no further distribution until 24 days from the report  date.  At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Chairman of  the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Secretary of Homeland Security,  the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the Environmental  Protection Agency, the Chair of the Organization of Agreement States, and  interested congressional committees.  We will also make copies available  to others upon request.  In addition, this report will be available at no  charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Potential Effects of a Radiological Dispersal Device with Category 1, 2, and 3 Quantities of Radioactive Material
paragraphs: A radiological dispersal device (RDD) is any type of device that is intended  to disperse radioactive materials, through conventional explosives or  other means. Among the federal agencies, the Environmental Protection  Agency (EPA) has lead responsibility for providing radiological emergency  planning guidance, known as Protective Action Guides (PAG), to protect  the public from exposure to radiation. In addition, the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) issued PAGs for responses to RDD and  improvised nuclear devices (IND) for interim use and comment. Both  EPA’s and DHS’s PAGs can be used by other federal agencies or state  governments to develop their own guidance or regulations to protect  public health. According to EPA officials, the general public’s fear of  radiation, coupled with most law enforcement officers’ relative  inexperience dealing with radioactive material, would likely cause any  emergency incident that triggers first responders’ radiation detectors to be  treated as an RDD. Until the type and specific quantity of radioactive  material could be determined, the situation would initiate a federal  response, whether or not specific, federal thresholds for safety have been  reached. Even very small amounts of radioactive material are sufficient to  set off the radiation detectors of first responders.
For purposes of illustration (see table 3), we calculated how large an area  might be sufficiently contaminated using International Atomic Energy  Agency (IAEA) category 1, 2, and 3 quantities of cesium-137—assuming  the material could be evenly distributed—to (1) trigger the EPA PAG  recommending relocation of the public until the site is cleaned up and (2)  reach the threshold at which potential direct health effects, such as  radiation sickness, might occur. We used category 2 and 3 amounts of  cesium-137 (one of the 16 radionuclides of concern) because, according to  the International Atomic Energy Agency categorization scheme, the  threshold category 3 quantity is the amount at which a radionuclide  becomes potentially dangerous to human health if not handled  appropriately. A category 2 quantity of a radioactive material is at least 10  times more dangerous than the category 3 threshold quantity and is also  the level at which NRC requires licensees to take additional security  measures to protect the material from unauthorized access or use. We  calculated how large an area might be contaminated with a category 1  quantity of cesium-137 because such quantities can be found in medical  devices and irradiators throughout the United States.
Specifically, when the potential additional exposure to radiation for a  person remaining in a given area for 1 year reaches 2 rem, EPA considers  the area sufficiently dangerous to recommend that people be relocated  until the site can be decontaminated. When the potential exposure to  radiation over the course of 1 year reaches 100 rem, the International  Commission on Radiological Protection—an organization of radiation  scientists from around the world who provide recommendations regarding  radiation exposure—concludes that readily observable health effects, such  as radiation sickness, are possible with extended exposure. Only a  category 1 quantity would be likely to produce health effects due to acute  radiation doses. This level, however, is still substantially below the level at  which prompt fatalities could occur. (Prompt fatalities from untreated  radiation exposure may only result from acute radiation doses—that is,  doses delivered in their entirety in a matter of hours or days—of at least  hundreds of rem from a predominately beta-gamma emitting radionuclide  like cesium-137.)
EPA guidance is based on protecting human health and calculating the  odds that radiation exposure will lead to cancer, the most common of  radiation’s long term side effects. In the event of an RDD, federal RDD  PAGs, such as those issued by DHS in 2006, would be used to manage the  response to the incident. PAGs are operative during the emergency, and  their chief goal is to protect the public by providing standards to guide the  response in the early and intermediate phases of an incident. However,  any PAG guidance is only a series of recommendations and is not legally  enforceable or binding.
Furthermore, a PAG does not establish cleanup levels. In fact, guidance for  specific cleanup levels after an RDD has been deliberately left ad hoc, and  is to be established after an evaluation occurs using an “optimization”  process for long-term site cleanup and restoration. The level to which a  contaminated site would be cleaned up for the long term would be agreed  upon after the emergency has passed and would depend on the uses of the  site. A cleanup standard would factor in the lifetime exposure that the  contamination creates for the people using the site—generally, the long- term increased risk of developing cancer. For example, a site that is used  for business purposes, where the typical person would spend only working  hours, would not have to be cleaned up to the same level as a site where  people live, where some people could reasonably be exposed to the post- cleanup radiation levels 24 hours a day. Public involvement in the decision  would play a significant role in determining what risk levels are  acceptable. While EPA provides guidelines, state and local authorities  make the ultimate decisions under most scenarios.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Organization of Agreement States
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Ned Woodward, Nabajyoti  Barkakati, Kevin Bray, Ryan Coles, Nancy Crothers, Walker Fullerton,  Cindy Gilbert, Richard Hung, Carol Kolarik, Keith Rhodes, and Kevin  Tarmann made significant contributions to this report.