Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans
Published: 2006-09-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Army considers its modular force transformation its most extensive restructuring since World War II. Restructuring units from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force will require an investment of over $52 billion, including $41 billion for equipment, from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2011, according to the Army. Because of broad congressional interest in this initiative, GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority and assessed (1) the Army's progress and plans for equipping modular combat brigades, (2) progress made and challenges to managing personnel requirements of the modular force, and (3) the extent to which the Army has developed an approach for assessing the results of its modular conversions and the need for further changes to designs or implementation plans.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army is making progress in creatingactive and National Guard modular combat brigades while fully engaged in ongoing operations, but it is not meeting its equipping goals for active brigades and has not completed development of an equipping strategy for its new force rotation model. This raises uncertainty about the levels to which the modular brigades will be equipped both in the near and longer term as well as the ultimate equipping cost. The Army plans to employ a force rotation model in which units nearing deployment would receive required levels of equipment while nondeploying units would be maintained at lower readiness levels. However, because the Army has not completed key details of the equipping strategy--such as defining the specific equipping requirements for units in various phases of its force rotation model--it is unclear what level of equipment units will have, how this strategy may affect the Army's equipment funding plans, and how well units with low priority for equipment will be able to respond to unforeseen crises. While the Army has several initiatives under way to meet its modular force personnel requirements in the active component, it faces challenges in achieving its modular restructuring without permanently increasing its active component end strength above 482,400, as specified by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Army plans to increase its active combat force but doing so without permanently increasing its overall active end strength will require the Army to eliminate or realign many positions in its noncombat force. The Army has made some progress in reducing military personnel in noncombat positions by converting some to civilian positions and pursuing other initiatives, but Army officials believe future initiatives may be difficult to achieve and could lead to difficult trade-offs. Without information on the progress of these initiatives and what risks exist if the Army's goals are not met, Congress and the Secretary of Defense lack the information they need to understand challenges and risks. Finally, the Army does not have a comprehensive and transparent approach to measure progress against its modularity objectives, assess the need for further changes to modular designs, and monitor implementation plans. While GAO and DOD have identified the importance of establishing objectives that can be translated into measurable metrics that in turn provide accountability for results, the Army has not established outcome-related metrics linked to most of its modularity objectives. Further, although the Army is analyzing lessons learned from Iraq and training events, the Army does not have a long-term comprehensive plan for further analysis and testing of its modular combat brigade designs and fielded capabilities. Without performance metrics and a comprehensive testing plan, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress will have full visibility into how the modular force is currently organized, staffed, and equipped. As a result, decision makers lack sufficient information to assess the capabilities, cost, and risks of the Army's modular force implementation plans.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 2004, the Army began its modular force transformation to restructure  itself from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force—an  undertaking it considers the most extensive reorganization of its force  since World War II. This initiative, according to Army estimates, will  require a significant investment exceeding $52 billion through fiscal year  2011, at a time when the Army is fully engaged in a high pace of operations  and is facing many other demands for funding such as the Future Combat  System program, now expected to cost over $160 billion. The foundation  of the modular force is the creation of standardized modular combat  brigades in both the active component and National Guard. The new  modular brigades are designed to be stand-alone, self-sufficient units that  are more rapidly deployable and better able to conduct joint and  expeditionary operations than their larger division-based predecessors.  The Army plans to achieve its modular restructuring without permanently  increasing its active component end strength above 482,400, in accordance  with a Department of Defense (DOD) decision reached during the 2006  Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). It plans to achieve this primarily by  eliminating some noncombat positions in which military personnel  currently serve, and transferring these positions to its operational combat  forces. The February 2006 QDR also specified that the Army would create  70 modular combat brigades in its active component and National Guard.  This represents a 7-brigade reduction from the Army’s original plan of  having 77 modular combat brigades. However, according to Army officials,  resources from the 7 brigades that were part of the original plan will be  used to increase support units in the reserve component, and DOD  officials believe that 70 brigades will be sufficient to execute the defense  strategy.
Because of the cost and magnitude of the Army’s transformation plans,  and broad congressional interest, we have initiated a body of work on both  the force structure and cost implications of the Army’s transformation to a  modular force under the Comptroller General’s statutory authority. We  presented our preliminary observations on the Army’s plan in a March  2005 hearing before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,  House Committee on Armed Services. In our September 2005 report on  the cost of the modular force conversion, we reported that the Army’s $48  billion total modular force conversion cost estimate was evolving and  included uncertainties that may drive costs higher. We recommended that  the Army clarify its definition of modular force costs including equipment  costs, which constituted $41 billion of the $48 billion estimate. In our  April 2006 testimony before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land  Forces, House Committee on Armed Services, we observed that the  Army’s cost estimate through fiscal year 2011 had increased from the  earlier $48 billion estimate to $52.5 billion, and that the Army faces  significant challenges in executing its modularity plans to fully achieve  planned capabilities within this current estimate and the time frames it has  established for the modular conversion. This report focuses on the Army’s  plans for implementing the modular force initiatives, with an emphasis on  active combat brigades, since the Army has already begun to restructure  its active divisions to the new brigade-based designs.
We are sending this report to you because of your oversight  responsibilities on defense matters. Specifically for this report we  assessed (1) the Army’s progress and plans for equipping modular combat  brigades, (2) progress made and challenges to managing personnel  requirements of the modular force, and (3) the extent to which the Army  has developed an approach for assessing the results of the modular  conversions and for further adjusting designs or implementation plans.
To assess the Army’s progress and plans for equipping active component  modular combat brigades, we analyzed Department of Army data on  selected equipment that the Army identified as essential for achieving the  modular combat brigades’ intended capabilities. For these selected items,  we analyzed the Army’s active component equipment requirements  obtained from the Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of  Staff for Operations and Training for each of the three brigade variants— heavy, light, and Stryker. We compared the equipment requirements of the  brigades to data we obtained from officials from the Department of the  Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-8 on the levels of equipment expected to be  on hand in 2007 and discussed plans for meeting key equipment  requirements with these officials. We also reviewed unit readiness reports  from those brigades that had completed or were in the process of  completing their modular conversion as of February 2006. In addition, we  visited the first three Army divisions undergoing modular conversions to  obtain information on the plans for organizing, staffing, and equipping the  modular brigades. To assess progress made and challenges to managing  personnel requirements of the modular force, we reviewed documents and  discussed the implications of force structure requirements with officials  from the Department of Army Offices of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for  Personnel, Intelligence, and Operations and Training, and the Office of the  Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. We  also reviewed the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report.  Finally, to assess the extent to which the Army has developed an approach  for assessing the results of the modular conversions and for further  adjusting designs or implementation plans, we examined key Army  planning documents and discussed objectives, performance metrics, and  testing plans with officials in the Department of the Army Office of the  Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training, and the Training and  Doctrine Command. Also, we met with a panel of retired senior Army  general officers at the Association of the U.S. Army Institute of Land  Warfare. In addition, we relied on our past reports assessing organizations  undertaking significant reorganizations. We conducted our work from  September 2004 through March 2006 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards and determined that the data  used were sufficiently reliable for our objectives. The scope and  methodology used in our review are described in further detail in appendix  I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Army’s conversion to a modular force encompasses the Army’s total  force—active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve—and  directly affects not only the Army’s combat units, but related command  and support organizations. A key to the Army’s new modular force design  is embedding within combat brigades reconnaissance, logistics, and other  support units that previously made up parts of division-level and higher- level command and support organizations, allowing the brigades to  operate independently. Restructuring these units is a major undertaking  because it requires more than just the movement of personnel or  equipment from one unit to another. The Army’s new modular units are  designed, equipped, and staffed differently than the units they replace;  therefore, successful implementation of this initiative will require changes  such as new equipment and a different mix of skills and occupational  specialties among Army personnel. By 2011, the Army plans to have  reconfigured its total force—to include active and reserve components  and headquarters, combat, and support units—into the modular design.  The foundation of the modular force is the creation of modular brigade  combat teams—combat maneuver brigades that will have a common  organizational design and are intended to increase the rotational pool of  ready units. Modular combat brigades (depicted in fig. 1) will have one of  three standard designs—heavy brigade, infantry brigade, or Stryker  brigade.
Until it revised its plans in early 2006, the Army had planned to have a total  of 77 active component and National Guard modular combat brigades by  expanding the Army’s existing 33 combat brigades in the active  component into 43 modular combat brigades by 2007, and by creating 34  modular combat brigades in the National Guard by 2010 from existing  brigades and divisions that have historically been equipped well below  requirements. To rebalance joint ground force capabilities, the 2006 QDR  determined the Army should have a total of 70 modular combat brigades— 42 active brigades and 28 National Guard brigades. Table 1 shows the  Army’s planned numbers of heavy, infantry, and Stryker combat brigades  in the active component and National Guard.
At the time of this report, the Army was in the process of revising its  modular combat brigade schedule to convert its active component combat  brigades by fiscal year 2010 instead of 2007 as previously planned, and  convert National Guard combat brigades by fiscal year 2008 instead of  2010. Table 2 shows the Army’s schedule that reflects these changes as of  March 2006.
According to the Army, this larger pool of available combat units will  enable it to generate both active and reserve component forces in a  rotational manner. To do this, the Army is developing plans for a force  rotation model in which units will rotate through a structured progression  of increased unit readiness over time. Units will progress through three  phases of operational readiness cycles, culminating in full mission  readiness and availability to deploy. For example, the Army plans for  active service members to be at home for 2 years following each  deployment of up to 1 year.
The Army’s objective is for the new modular combat brigades, which will  include about 3,000 to 4,000 personnel, to have at least the same combat  capability as a brigade under the current division-based force, which range  from 3,000 to 5,000 personnel. Since there will be more combat brigades in  the force, the Army believes its overall combat capability will be increased  as a result of the restructuring, providing added value to combatant  commanders. Although somewhat smaller in size, the new modular  combat brigades are expected to be as capable as the Army’s existing  brigades because they will have different equipment, such as advanced  communications and surveillance equipment, and a different mix of  personnel and support assets. The Army’s organizational designs for the  modular brigades have been tested by its Training and Doctrine  Command’s Analysis Center against a variety of scenarios, and the Army  has found the new designs to be as capable as the existing division-based  brigades in modeling and simulations.
The Army’s cost estimate for modularity through fiscal year 2011 is $52.5  billion as of April 2006. Of this $52.5 billion estimate, $41 billion, or 78  percent, is planned to be spent on equipment for active and reserve units,  with the remaining $11.5 billion allocated to military construction,  facilities, sustainment, and training (see table 3). In addition, Army leaders  have recently stated they may seek additional funds after 2011 to procure  more equipment for modular restructuring.
section_title: Army Is Well Under Way in Its Modular Combat Brigade Conversions, but Its Ability to Meet Near- and Long-Term Equipping Goals Is Unclear
paragraphs: The Army has made progress in creating active component modular  combat brigades, but it is not meeting its equipping goals for these  brigades and has yet to complete the development of its rotational  equipping strategy, which raises concerns about the extent to which  brigades will be equipped in the near and longer term. Moreover, brigades  will initially lack planned levels of key equipment, including items that  provide enhanced intelligence, situational awareness, and network  capabilities needed to help the Army achieve its objective of creating  combat brigades that are able to operate on their own as part of a more  mobile, rapidly deployable, joint, expeditionary force. In addition, because  of existing equipment shortages, the Army National Guard will likely face  even greater challenges providing the same types of equipment for its 28  planned modular combat brigades. To mitigate equipment shortages, the  Army has developed a strategy to provide required levels of equipment to  deploying active component and National Guard units, while allocating  lesser levels of remaining equipment to other nondeploying units.  However, the Army has not yet completed key details of this strategy,  including determining the levels of equipment it needs to support this  strategy, assessing the operational risk of not fully equipping all units, or  providing to Congress information about these plans so it can assess the  Army’s current and long-term equipment requirements and funding plans.
subsections: section_title: Army Faces Difficulty Meeting Its Goals for Equipping Active Modular Combat Brigades
paragraphs: The Army faces challenges meeting its equipping goals for its active  modular combat brigades both in the near and longer term. As of February  2006, the Army had converted 19 modular combat brigades in the active  force. According to the Army Campaign Plan, which established time  frames and goals for the modular force conversions, each of these units is  expected to have on hand at least 90 percent of its required major  equipment items within 180 days after its new equipment requirements  become effective. We reviewed data from several active brigades that had  reached the effective date for their new equipment requirements by  February 2006, and found that all of these brigades reported significant  shortages of equipment 180 days after the effective date of their new  equipment requirements, falling well below the equipment goals the Army  established in its Campaign Plan. Additionally, the Army is having  difficulty providing equipment to units undergoing their modular  conversion in time for training prior to operational deployments, and  deploying units often do not receive some of their equipment until after  their arrival in theater. At the time of our visits, officials from three Army  divisions undergoing modular conversion expressed concern over the lack  of key equipment needed for training prior to deployment.
The Army already faced equipment shortages before it began its modular  force transformation and is wearing out significant quantities of equipment  in Iraq, which could complicate plans for fully equipping new modular  units. By creating modular combat brigades with standardized designs and  equipment requirements, the Army believed that it could utilize more of its  total force, thereby increasing the pool of available and ready forces to  meet the demands of sustained rotations and better respond to an  expected state of continuous operations. Also, by comparably equipping  all of these units across the active component and National Guard, the  Army further believes it will be able to discontinue its practice of  allocating limited resources, including equipment, based on a system of  tiered readiness, which resulted in lower priority units in both active and  reserve components having significantly lower levels of equipment and  readiness than the higher priority units. However, because of the need to  establish a larger pool of available forces to meet the current high pace of  operational commitments, the Army’s modular combat brigade conversion  schedule is outpacing the planned acquisition or funding for some  equipment requirements. The Army has acknowledged that funding does  not match its modular conversion schedule and that some units will face  equipment shortages in the early years of transformation. According to  Army officials, the Army may continue to seek funding to better equip its  modular forces beyond 2011.
For example, according to Army officials, funds programmed for the  Army’s tactical wheeled vehicle modernization strategy will not meet all of  its requirements for light, medium, and heavy tactical vehicles and trucks  through fiscal year 2011. In 2007, when 38 of 42 planned active component  brigades are expected to complete their modular conversions, the Army  expects to have only about 62 percent of the heavy trucks it needs to meet  its requirements for these brigades. New higher requirements for trucks  for the modular brigades added to an existing shortage of trucks in the  Army’s inventory. In addition, battle damage and losses along with higher- than-normal wear and tear on Army vehicles from current operations in  Iraq and Afghanistan are contributing to this shortfall. While the Army  plans to eventually fill these shortages through a combination of new  procurement and modernization of its existing truck fleet, Army officials  told us that the higher requirement for trucks is currently unaffordable  within its near-term budget authority. Until the Army is able to meet its  modular combat brigade design requirement for trucks, these brigades will  not have their envisioned capability to conduct their own logistical  support operations if necessary without requiring the augmentation of  external combat and combat-service support forces.
section_title: Equipment Shortages Include Key Items the Army Identified as Essential for Achieving Modular Force Capabilities
paragraphs: Active modular combat brigades will initially lack required numbers of  some of the key equipment that Army force design analyses determined  essential for achieving their planned capabilities. Two primary objectives  underlying the Army’s modular force designs and concepts are to (1)  create more combat forces within the Army’s current end strength that are  as lethal as the division-based brigades they are replacing and (2) organize,  staff, and equip these units to be more responsive, rapidly deployable, and  better able to operate on their own compared to division-based brigades.  Army force designers identified a number of key organizational, personnel,  and equipment enablers they determined must be present for the modular  combat brigades to be as lethal as the division-based brigades they are  replacing. They include key battle command systems that are intended to  provide modular combat brigades the latest command and control  technology for improved situational awareness; advanced digital  communications systems to provide secure high-speed communications  links at the brigade level; and advanced sensors to provide modular  combat brigades with their own intelligence-gathering, reconnaissance,  and target-acquisition capabilities.
We reviewed equipping plans for several command and control,  communications, and reconnaissance systems to determine the Army’s  timelines for providing active modular combat brigades some of the key  equipment they need to achieve their planned capabilities and function as  designed. According to Army officials responsible for managing the  distribution and fielding of equipment, the Army will not have all of this  equipment on hand to meet the new modular force design requirements by  2007, when 38 of 42 active component modular combat brigades are to  complete their modular conversions. These shortfalls are due to a range of  reasons, but primarily because the modular conversion schedule is  outpacing the planned acquisition or funding. For example,    The Army does not expect to meet until at least 2012 its modular combat  brigade requirements for Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance  Systems, an advanced visual sensor that provides long-range surveillance  capability to detect, recognize, and identify distant targets.
The Army decided that it cannot meet design requirements within its  current budget for Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below  (FBCB2), a battle command component that provides real-time situational  awareness information through identification and tracking of friendly  forces to control battlefield maneuvers and operations. Moreover, because  it has been in full production for less than 2 years, FBCB2 production has  not kept pace with the new higher modular force FBCB2 requirements. As  a result, the Army plans to provide active heavy and infantry brigades with  less than half of their design requirement for FBCB2 through at least 2007.
The Army plans to meet only 85 percent of its requirements across the  force for Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, a command  and control network radio system that provides voice and data  communications capability in support of command and control operations,  due to a funding decision.
The Army’s design requirement for Shadow tactical unmanned aerial  vehicle systems was to have one system composed of seven air vehicles  per modular combat brigade, but because the Army lacks adequate  numbers of air vehicle operators and maintainers, it decided to field the  Shadow systems with four air vehicles instead.
The Army’s schedule for the acquisition of Joint Network Node—a key  communications system that provides secure high-speed computer  network connection for data transmission down to the battalion level— could be delayed. According to Army officials, DOD recently decided to  require the Army to have Joint Network Node undergo developmental and  operational testing prior to further acquisition, which could delay  equipping modular combat brigades.
The systems discussed above are key to achieving the benefits Army  officials expect to achieve with a modular force. For example, the Army  decided to structure its new modular combat brigades with two maneuver  battalions each instead of three battalions each, even though Army  analysis showed that brigades with three maneuver battalions have several  advantages and the Army’s former division-based brigades have three  battalions. The Army’s decision to approve a brigade design with two  maneuver battalions was made largely because of affordability concerns.  However, the Army determined that brigades with two maneuver  battalions could be as effective in combat as its division-based brigades  provided they have the right mix of maneuver companies and enablers  such as the systems discussed above. Until the Army is able to provide  modular units with required quantities of these enablers, it is not clear  whether the new brigades are as capable as the division-based brigades  they are replacing.
section_title: National Guard Faces Significant Equipping Challenges
paragraphs: In addition to the challenges the Army faces in providing active  component modular combat brigades the equipment necessary for meeting  expected capabilities, the Army will face greater challenges meeting its  equipping requirements for its 28 planned National Guard combat  brigades. The Army’s modular force concept is intended to transform the  National Guard from a strategic standby force to a force that is to be  organized, staffed, and equipped comparable to active units for  involvement in the full range of overseas operations. As such, National  Guard combat units will enter into the Army’s new force rotational model  in which, according to the Army’s plans, Guard units would be available  for deployment 1 year out of 6 years. However, Guard units have  previously been equipped at less than wartime readiness levels (often at 65  to 75 percent of requirements) under the assumption that there would be  sufficient time for Guard forces to obtain additional equipment prior to  deployment. Moreover, as of July 2005, the Army National Guard had  transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from nondeploying  units to support Guard units’ deployments overseas. As we noted in our  2005 report on National Guard equipment readiness, National Guard  Bureau officials estimated that the Guard’s nondeployed units had only  about 34 percent of their essential warfighting equipment as of July 2005  and had exhausted inventories of 220 critical items. Although the Army  says it will invest $21 billion into equipping and modernizing the Guard  through 2011, Guard units will start their modular conversions with less  and much older equipment than most active units. This will add to the  challenge the Army faces in achieving its plans and timelines for equipping  Guard units at comparable levels to active units and fully meeting the  equipping needs across both components. Moreover, the Army National  Guard believes that even after the Army’s planned investment, the Army  National Guard will have to accept risk in certain equipment, such as  tactical wheeled vehicles, aircraft, and force protection equipment.
section_title: To Mitigate Equipment Shortages, Army Plans to Rotate Equipment among Units Based on Their Movement through Training, Readiness, and Deployment Phases
paragraphs: Because the Army realized that it would not have enough equipment in the  near term to simultaneously equip modular combat brigades at 100 percent  of their requirements, the Army is developing a new equipping strategy as  part of its force rotation model; however, this strategy is not yet completed  because the Army has not finalized equipping requirements for this new  strategy or assessed the operational risk of not fully equipping all units.  Under the force rotation model, the Army plans to provide increasing  amounts of equipment to units as they move through training phases and  near readiness for potential deployment so they would be ready to  respond quickly if needed with fully equipped forces. The Army believes  that over time, equipping units in a rotational manner will enable it to  better allocate available equipment and help manage risk associated with  specific equipment shortages.
Under this strategy, brigades will have three types of equipment sets—a  baseline set, a training set, and a deployment set. The baseline set would  vary by unit type and assigned mission and the equipment it includes could  be significantly reduced from amounts the modular brigades are designed  to have. Training sets would include more of the equipment units will need  to be ready for deployment, but units would share the equipment that  would be located at training sites throughout the country. The deployment  set would include all equipment needed for deployment, including theater- specific equipment, high-priority items provided through operational  needs statements, and equipment from Army prepositioned stock. With  this rotational equipping approach, the Army believes it can have up to 14  active combat brigades and up to 5 Army National Guard combat brigades  equipped and mission ready at any given time.
While the Army has developed a general proposal to equip both active and  Army National Guard units within the force rotation model, it has not yet  fully developed specific equipment requirements, including the types and  quantities of items, required in each phase of the model. As of March 2006,  the Army was still developing proposals for what would be included in the  three equipment sets as well as the specific equipping requirements for  units. Figure 2 shows the Army’s three-phase force rotation model.
The Reset/Train phase will include modular units that redeploy from long- term operations and are unable to sustain ready or available capability  levels. The Ready phase will include those modular units that have been  assessed as ready at designated capability levels, may be mobilized if  required, and can be equipped if necessary to meet operational surge  requirements. The Available phase will include those modular units that  have been assessed as available at designated capability levels to conduct  missions. In this last phase, active units are available for immediate  deployment and reserve component units are available for mobilization,  training, and validation for deployment. However, this strategy is not yet  complete because the Army has not yet defined specific equipping  requirements for units as they progress through the force rotation model.  Therefore, it is difficult to assess the risk associated with decreasing  nondeploying units’ readiness to perform other missions or the ability of  units in the Reset/Train and Ready phases of the force rotation model to  respond to an unforeseen conflict or crisis, if required.
section_title: Army Faces Challenges in Managing Active Component Personnel Requirements for Its New Modular Force Structure
paragraphs: The Army has made some progress toward meeting modular personnel  requirements in the active component, but faces significant challenges in  achieving its modular restructuring without permanently increasing its  active component end strength above 482,400, as specified by the QDR.  The Army plans to increase the size of its modular combat force but doing  so without permanently increasing its overall end strength is an ambitious  undertaking that will require the Army to eliminate or realign many  positions in its noncombat force. While the Army is moving forward with  its personnel reduction and realignment plans through a variety of  initiatives, it is not clear to what extent the Army will be able to meet its  overall end-strength goals and what risks to meeting modular force  personnel requirements exist if these goals are not met. We have found  that strategic workforce planning is one of the tools that can help agencies  develop strategies for effectively implementing challenging initiatives.  Effective strategic workforce planning includes the development of  strategies to monitor and evaluate progress towards achieving goals.  Without information on the status and progress of its personnel initiatives,  Congress and the Secretary of Defense lack the data necessary to identify  challenges, monitor progress, and effectively address problems when they  arise.
The Army accounts for its congressionally authorized active component  personnel end strength in three broad categories—the operational combat  force, the institutional noncombat force, and personnel who are  temporarily unavailable for assignment. The operational combat force  consists of personnel who are assigned to deployable combat, combat  support, and combat service support units; these include modular combat  brigades and their supporting units such as logistics, medical, and  administrative units. The Army’s institutional noncombat force consists of  personnel assigned to support and training command and headquarters  units, which primarily provide management, administrative, training, and  other support, and typically are not deployed for combat operations. This  includes personnel assigned to the Department of the Army headquarters  and major commands such as the Training and Doctrine Command. In  addition, the Army separately accounts for personnel who are temporarily  unavailable for their official duties, including personnel who are in transit  between assignments, are temporarily not available for assignment  because of sickness or injury, or are students undergoing training away  from their units. The Army refers to these personnel as transients,  transfers, holdees, and students.
The Army plans to reduce its current temporary end-strength authorization  of 512,400 to 482,400 by 2011 in order to help fund the Army’s priority  programs. Simultaneously, the Army plans to increase the number of  soldiers in its operational combat force from its previous level of  approximately 315,000 to 355,000 in order to meet the increased personnel  requirements of its new larger modular force structure. The Army plans to  utilize several initiatives to reduce and realign the Army with the aim of  meeting these planned personnel levels. For example, the Army has  converted some noncombat military positions into civilian positions,  thereby freeing up soldiers to fill modular combat brigades’ requirements.  During fiscal year 2005, the Army converted approximately 8,000 military  positions to civilian-staffed positions within the Army’s noncombat force.  However, Army officials believe additional conversions to achieve the  19,000 planned reductions in the noncombat force will be significantly  more challenging to achieve. In addition to its success with the military-to- civilian conversions, the Army has been given statutory authority to  reduce active personnel support to the National Guard and reserve by  1,500. However, the Army must still eliminate additional positions,  including reducing transients, transfers, holdees, and student personnel  utilizing these and other initiatives, so it can reduce its overall end  strength while filling requirements for modular units. As shown in table 4,  the Army’s goal is to reduce overall active component end strength from  the current temporary authorization level while increasing the size of its  operational combat force.
While the Army is attempting to reduce end strength in its noncombat  force and realign positions to the combat force via several initiatives, it  may have difficulty meeting its expectations for some initiatives. For  example, the Army expected that the Base Realignment and Closure  (BRAC) decisions of 2005 could free up approximately 2,000 to 3,000  positions in its noncombat force, but the Army is revisiting this  assumption based upon updated manpower levels at the commands and  installations approved for closure and consolidation. Army officials  believe they will be able to realign some positions from BRAC, but it is not  clear whether the reductions will free up 2,000 to 3,000 military personnel  that can be reassigned to modular combat units. In the same vein, Army  officials expected to see reductions of several hundred base support staff  resulting from restationing forces currently overseas back to garrisons  within the United States. However, Army officials are still attempting to  determine if the actual savings will meet the original assumptions. As a  result, it is not clear to what extent the Army will be able to meet its  overall end-strength goals and what risks exist if these goals are not met.
Furthermore, the Army will face challenges in meeting its new modular  force requirements for military intelligence specialists. The Army’s new  modular force structure significantly increases requirements for military  intelligence specialists. In late 2005, Army intelligence officials told us that  the modular force would require approximately 8,400 additional active  component intelligence specialist positions, but the Army planned to fill  only about 57 percent of these positions by 2013, in part because of efforts  to reduce overall end strength. In May 2006, Army officials told us that the  Army had completed its most recent Total Army Analysis (for fiscal years  2008–2013), which balances Army requirements within a projected end- strength authorization of 482,400. Accordingly, the Army revised its earlier  estimate of intelligence specialist position requirements and determined  that its increased active component requirement for intelligence  specialists was only 5,600 and that it planned to fill all of these positions  by 2013. However, Army officials acknowledge that meeting modular  force requirements for intelligence specialists is a significant challenge  because it will take a number of years to recruit and train intelligence  soldiers.
According to Army intelligence officials, intelligence capability has  improved over that of the previous force; however, any shortfalls in filling  intelligence requirements would further stress intelligence specialists with  a high pace of deployments. Since intelligence is considered a key enabler  of the modular design—a component of the new design’s improved  situational awareness—it is unclear to what extent any shortages in  planned intelligence capacity will affect the overall capability of modular  combat brigades. Without continued, significant progress in meeting  personnel requirements, the Army may need to accept increased risk in its  ability to conduct operations and support its combat forces or it may need  to seek support for an end-strength increase from DOD and Congress.
section_title: Army Has Overall Objectives and Time Frames for Modularity, but Lacks a Long-Term Comprehensive Approach to Assess Progress and Monitor Implementation
paragraphs: While the Army has established overall objectives and time frames for  modularity, it lacks a long-term comprehensive and transparent approach  to effectively measure its progress against stated modularity objectives,  assess the need for further changes to its modular unit designs, and  monitor implementation plans. A comprehensive approach includes  performance measures and a plan to test changes to the design of the  modular combat brigades. The Army has not developed a comprehensive  approach because senior leadership has focused attention on developing  broad guidance and unit conversion plans for modularity while focusing  less attention on developing ways to measure results. Without such an  approach, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress will have full  visibility into the capabilities of the modular force and the Army’s  implementation plans.
subsections: section_title: Army Lacks Performance Metrics to Measure the Results of Modularity
paragraphs: While the Army has identified objectives for modularity, it has not  developed modular-specific quantifiable goals or performance metrics to  measure its progress. GAO and DOD, among others, have identified the  importance of establishing objectives that can be translated into  measurable, results-oriented metrics, which in turn provide accountability  for results. In a 2003 report we found that the adoption of a results- oriented framework that clearly establishes performance goals and  measures progress toward those goals was a key practice for  implementing a successful transformation. DOD has also recognized the  need to develop or refine metrics so it can measure efforts to implement  the defense strategy and provide useful information to senior leadership.
The Army considers the Army Campaign Plan to be a key document  guiding the modular restructuring. The plan provides broad guidelines for  modularity and other program tasks across the entire Army. However,  modularity-related metrics within the plan are limited to a schedule for  creating modular units and an associated metric of achieving unit  readiness goals for equipment, training, and personnel by certain dates  after unit creation. Moreover, a 2005 assessment by the Office of  Management and Budget identified the total number of brigades created as  the only metric the Army had developed for measuring the success of its  modularity initiative. Another key planning document, the 2005 Army  Strategic Planning Guidance, identified several major expected advantages  of modularity, including an increase in the combat power of the active  component force by at least 30 percent, an increase in the rotational pool  of ready units by at least 50 percent, the creation of a deployable joint- capable headquarters, the development of a force design upon which the  future network-centric developments can be readily applied, and reduced  stress on the force through a more predictable deployment cycle.  However, these goals have not translated into outcome-related metrics  that are reported to provide decision makers a clear status of the modular  restructuring as a whole. Army officials stated that unit-creation schedules  and readiness levels are the best available metrics for assessing modularity  progress because modularity is a reorganization encompassing hundreds  of individual procurement programs that would be difficult to collectively  assess in a modularity context. However, we believe that results-oriented  performance measures with specific, objective indicators used to measure  progress toward achieving goals are essential for restructuring  organizations.
A major Air Force transformation initiative may provide insights on how  the Army could develop performance metrics for a widespread  transformation of a military force. In 1998, the Air Force adopted the  Expeditionary Aerospace Force Concept as a way to help manage its  deployments and commitments to theater commanders and reduce the  deployment burden on its people. Like the Army’s modular restructuring,  the Air Force’s restructuring was fundamental to the force, and according  to the Air Force, represented the largest transformation of its processes  since before the Cold War. In our 2000 report, we found that the Air  Force expected to achieve important benefits from the Expeditionary  Concept, but had yet to establish specific quantifiable goals for those  benefits, which included increasing the level of deployment predictability  for individual service members. We recommended that the Air Force  develop specific quantifiable goals based on the Expeditionary Concept’s  broad objectives, and establish needed metrics to measure progress  toward these goals. In a January 2001 report to Congress on the  Expeditionary Aerospace Force Implementation, the Air Force identified  13 metrics to measure progress in six performance areas. For example, to  better balance deployment taskings in order to provide relief to heavily  tasked units, the Air Force developed 4 metrics, including one that  measures active duty personnel available to meet Expeditionary Force  requirements. The Air Force described each metric and assigned either a  quantitative goal (such as a percentage) or a trend goal indicating the  desired direction the metric should be moving over time. These results  were briefed regularly to the Air Force Chief of Staff. The Army’s  transformation is more extensive than the Air Force’s in that the Air Force  did not change traditional command and organizational structures under  its Expeditionary Concept, while the Army modular force has made  extensive changes to these structures, and the Air Force did not plan for  nearly the same implementation costs as the Army. Nonetheless, we  believe some of the goals and challenges faced by the Air Force that we  reported in August 2000 may have relevance to the Army today.
While we recognize the complexity of the Army’s modular restructuring,  without clear definitions of metrics, and periodic communication of  performance against these metrics, the Secretary of Defense and Congress  will have difficulty assessing the impact of refinements and enhancements  to the modular design—such as DOD’s recent decision to reduce the  number of modular combat and support brigades reported in the QDR, as  well as any changes in resources available to meet modular design  requirements.
section_title: Army Lacks a Plan for Comprehensively Evaluating Modular Designs
paragraphs: Since 2004, when the Army approved the original designs for its modular  brigades, it has made some refinements to those designs but does not have  a comprehensive plan for evaluating the effect of these design changes or  the need for additional design changes as the Army gets more operational  experience using modular brigades and integrating command and control  headquarters, combat support units, and combat brigades. In fiscal year  2004, TRADOC’s Analysis Center concluded that the modular combat  brigade designs would be more capable than division-based units based on  an integrated and iterative analysis employing computer-assisted  exercises, subject matter experts, and senior observers. This analysis  culminated in the approval of modular brigade-based designs for the Army.  The assessment employed performance metrics such as mission  accomplishment, units’ organic lethality, and survivability, and compared  the performance of variations on modular unit designs against the existing  division-based designs. The report emphasized that the Chief of Staff of  the Army had asked for “good enough” prototype designs that could be  quickly implemented, and the modular organizations assessed were not  the end of the development effort.
Since these initial design assessments, the Army has been assessing  implementation and making further adjustments in designs and  implementation plans through a number of venues, to include    unit readiness reporting on personnel, equipment, and training;    modular force coordination cells to assist units in the conversion process;    modular force observation teams to collect lessons during training; and    collection and analysis teams to assess units’ effectiveness during  deployment.
Based on data collected and analyzed through these processes, TRADOC  has approved some design change recommendations and has not approved  others. For example, TRADOC analyzed a Department of the Army  proposal to reduce the number of Long-Range Advanced Scout  Surveillance Systems, but recommended retaining the higher number in  the existing design in part because of decreases in units’ assessed lethality  and survivability with the reduced number of surveillance systems.
Army officials maintain that ongoing assessments described above provide  sufficient validation that the modularity concept works in practice.  However, these assessments do not provide a comprehensive evaluation of  the modular designs. Further, the Army does not plan to conduct a similar  overarching analysis to assess the modular force capabilities to perform  operations across the full spectrum of potential conflict. In November  2005, we reported that methodically testing, exercising, and evaluating  new doctrines and concepts is an important and established practice  throughout the military, and that particularly large and complex issues  may require long-term testing and evaluation that is guided by study  plans. We believe the evolving nature of the design highlights the  importance of planning for broad-based evaluations of the modular force  to ensure the Army is achieving the capabilities it intended, and to provide  an opportunity to make course corrections if needed. For example, one  controversial element of the design was the decision to include two  maneuver battalions instead of three in the modular combat brigades.  TRADOC’s 2004 analysis noted that the modular combat brigade designs  with the two maneuver battalion organization did not perform as well as  the three maneuver battalion design, and cited this as one of the most  significant areas of risk in the modular combat brigade design.  Nonetheless, because of the significant additional cost of adding a third  combat battalion the Army decided on a two-battalion design for the  modular combat brigades that included key enabling equipment such as  communications, and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Some  defense experts, including a current division commander and several  retired Army generals, have expressed concerns about this aspect of the  modular design. In addition, some of these experts have expressed  concerns about whether the current designs have been sufficiently tested  and whether they provide the best mix of capabilities to conduct full- spectrum operations. In addition, the Army has recently completed  designs for support units and headquarters units. Once the Army gets more  operational experience with the new modular units, it may find it needs to  make further adjustments to its designs. Without a comprehensive testing  plan, neither the Army nor congressional decision makers will be able to  sufficiently assess the capabilities of the modular combat brigades as they  are being organized, staffed, and equipped.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The fast pace, broad scope, and cost of the Army’s effort to transform into  a modular force present considerable challenges for the Army, and for  Congress as well in effectively overseeing a force restructuring of this  magnitude. The Army leadership has dedicated considerable attention,  energy, and time to achieving its modularity goals under tight time frames.  However, the lack of clarity in equipment and personnel plans raises  considerable uncertainty as to whether the Army can meet its goals within  acceptable risk levels. For example, until the Army defines and  communicates equipment requirements for all modular units and assesses  the risk associated with its plan to not equip brigades with all of their  intended capabilities, it will remain unclear the extent to which its new  modular combat brigades will be able to operate as stand-alone, self- sufficient units—a main goal of the Army’s modular transformation. With  respect to personnel, the Army’s goal to increase its operational force  while not permanently increasing its current end strength will require it to  make the most efficient use of its personnel. Until the Army communicates  the status of its various ongoing personnel initiatives, the Army’s ability to  meet personnel requirements of its new modular force will also remain  unclear. Finally, until the Army develops a long-term comprehensive  approach for measuring progress and a plan for evaluating changes, it  remains uncertain how the Army will determine whether it is achieving its  goal of creating a more rapidly deployable, joint, expeditionary force.  Without such an approach, and clearly defined and communicated plans,  the Secretary of Defense and Congress will not have the information  needed to weigh competing funding priorities and monitor the Army’s  progress in its over $52 billion effort to transform its force.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Actions
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army to take the following actions.
First, in order for decision makers to better assess the Army’s strategy for  equipping modular combat brigades, we recommend the Army develop  and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with    details about the Army’s equipping strategy, to include the types and  quantities of equipment active component and National Guard modular  units would receive in each phase of the force rotation model, and how  these amounts compare to design requirements for modular units; and    an assessment of the operational risk associated with this equipping  strategy.
Second, in order for decision makers to have the visibility needed to  assess the Army’s ability to meet the personnel requirements for its new  modular operational forces while simultaneously managing the risk to its  noncombat forces, we recommend that the Army develop and provide the  Secretary of Defense and Congress with    a report on the status of its personnel initiatives, including executable  milestones for realigning and reducing its noncombat forces; and    an assessment of how the Army will fully staff its modular operational  combat force while managing the risk to its noncombat supporting force  structure.
Third, to improve information available for decision makers on progress of  the Army’s modular force implementation plans, we recommend that the  Army develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a  comprehensive plan for assessing the Army’s progress toward achieving  the benefits of modularity to include    specific, quantifiable performance metrics to measure progress toward  meeting the goals and objectives established in the Army Campaign Plan;  and    plans and milestones for conducting further evaluation of modular unit  designs that discuss the extent to which unit designs provide sufficient  capabilities needed to execute National Defense Strategy and 2006 QDR  objectives for addressing a wider range of both traditional and irregular  security challenges.
Finally, the Secretary of the Army should provide a testing plan as part of  its Army Campaign Plan that includes milestones for conducting  comprehensive assessments of the modular force as it is being  implemented so that decision makers—-both inside and outside the  Army—-can assess the implications of changes to the Army force structure  in terms of the goals of modular restructuring. The results of these  assessments should be provided to Congress as part of the Army’s  justification for its annual budget through fiscal year 2011.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: Given the significant cost and far-reaching magnitude of the Army’s plans  for creating modular forces, Congress should consider requiring the  Secretary of  Defense to provide the information outlined in our  recommendations including;    details about the Army’s equipping strategy and an assessment of the  operational risk associated with this equipping strategy;  the status of the Army’s personnel initiatives and an assessment of how  the Army will fully staff its modular operational combat force and manage  the risk to its noncombat force structure; and  the Army’s plan for assessing its progress toward achieving the benefits of  modularity, plans and milestones for conducting further evaluation of  modular unit designs, and a testing plan for conducting comprehensive  assessments of the modular force as it is being implemented.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report provided by the Army on  behalf of DOD, the department noted that the report adequately reflects  the challenges associated with transforming the Army to modular force  designs while at war, but stated that the report fails to recognize ongoing  efforts and accomplishments to date.  (DOD’s comments are reprinted in  app. II).  DOD also stated that citing the views of unnamed sources  regarding the modular combat brigade design does not contribute to an  accurate, balanced assessment of the Army’s progress.  DOD agreed or  partially agreed with our recommendations to develop and provide  information on its equipping strategy and personnel initiatives and to  develop expanded performance metrics for assessing progress.  However,  DOD disagreed with three recommendations regarding the need for risk  assessments and a testing plan to further assess designs for modular units.  As discussed below, because of the significance, cost, scope, and potential  for risk associated with the Army’s modularity initiative, we continue to  believe that more transparency of the Army’s plans and risk assessments is  needed in light of the limited amount of information the Army has  provided to Congress. Therefore, we have included a matter for  congressional consideration to require the Secretary of Defense to provide  more detailed plans and assessments of modularity risks. Our specific  comments follow.
First, we strongly disagree with DOD’s assertion that GAO used  anonymous and unverifiable sources which detracted from an accurate  and balanced assessment of the Army’s progress in implementing  modularity.  Our analysis of the Army’s progress and potential for risk in  implementing modular units is primarily based on our independent and  thorough analysis of Army plans, reports, briefings, and readiness  assessments, which we used to compare the Army’s goals for modularity  against its actual plans for equipping and staffing modular units.  We  sought views on modular unit designs to supplement our analysis from a  diverse group of knowledgeable people both inside and outside the Army  and DOD, including Army headquarters officials, division and brigade  commanders, Army officials who played key roles in developing and  assessing modular unit designs, and retired generals and defense experts  who have studied and written about Army transformation.  Our long- standing policy is not to include the names of individuals from whom we  obtained information but to use information and evidence from  appropriate and relevant sources and provide balance in our report.  We  integrated evidence and information from all sources to reach conclusions  and formulate the recommendations included in this report.  Our report  recognizes the Army’s progress in implementing modular units while fully  engaged in ongoing operations but also identifies and provides  transparency regarding a number of risks inherent in the Army’s plans so  that Congress will have better information with which to make decisions  on funding and oversight.  The discussion we present highlighting the  concerns of some current and retired senior Army officers and defense  experts regarding certain aspects of modular designs is used to illustrate  the need for further evaluation of modular units as they move from  concept to reality—an approach consistent with DOD policy and best  practice in transforming defense capabilities.
DOD also stated that the report inaccurately (1) asserts that Shadow  tactical unmanned aerial vehicle systems will be fielded with fewer air  vehicles due to a shortage of operators and maintainers, and (2) depicts  the growth of Army Intelligence positions. We disagree with DOD’s  assessment.  As our report clearly points out, based on documentation  obtained from the Army, the Army’s approved modular combat brigade  design was for seven air vehicles per Shadow system, which would  provide 24-hour per day aerial surveillance, but the Army opted to field  Shadow systems with four air vehicles instead, primarily because it lacks  adequate numbers of air vehicle operators and maintainers.  Although the  Army believes that Shadow systems with four air vehicles are adequate at  this time, we believe it is important to provide transparency by presenting  information which shows that modular combat brigades will not have all  of the capabilities intended by the original modular combat brigade  designs (i.e., brigade-level 24-hour per day surveillance operations)  without Shadow systems composed of seven air vehicles.
With regard to the number of intelligence positions, our report accurately  notes that the Army decided to increase its intelligence positions by 5,600  in the active force.  However, we also note that this was a revision of an  earlier higher estimate of 8,400 positions projected by Army intelligence  officials.  Therefore, we do not agree with the department’s comment that  the report inaccurately depicts the growth of Army intelligence positions,  nor do we agree with its characterization that the report inappropriately  focuses on the Army’s manning challenges. We believe that it is important  for the Secretary of Defense and Congress to have a clear and transparent  picture of the personnel challenges the Army faces in order to fully  achieve the goals of modular restructuring and make informed decisions  on resources and authorized end strength.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Army develop and provide  the Secretary of Defense and Congress with details about the Army’s  equipping strategy.  DOD commented that the Army recently completed  development of the equipping strategy for modular forces and that the  Army has conducted equipping conferences to ensure that soldiers have  the best equipment available as they train and deploy.  We requested a  copy of the Army’s recently completed equipping strategy but did not  receive a copy prior to publication and therefore have not been able to  assess how and to what extent it meets the intent of our recommendation.  Moreover, DOD did not indicate what, if any, actions it planned to take to  provide Congress with specific details about the Army’s equipping  strategy, as we recommended.  Therefore, we have highlighted the need  for more complete information on the Army’s equipping strategy in a  matter for congressional consideration.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Army develop and  provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with an assessment of the  risk associated with the Army’s rotational equipping strategy and said in  its comments that this action is already occurring on a regular basis.   Although the Army is considering risk in managing existing equipment, at  the time of our review the Army had not finished developing its equipping  strategy for its new rotational force model. Therefore, we continue to  believe that the Army needs to document and provide risk assessments to  Congress based on its newly completed equipping strategy.  This is  particularly important given other Army priorities such as the Future  Combat System and near-term equipping needs for Iraq that will compete  for funding and may cause changes to the Army’s current equipping  strategy for modular units.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Army develop  and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a report on the  status of its personnel initiatives.  However, DOD commented that adding  another report on this issue would be duplicative and irrelevant and said  this action is already occurring on a regular basis.  However, while Army  documents present an overview of how the Army is allocating military  personnel to operational and nonoperational positions, they do not  provide specific information on the Army’s progress in implementing  personnel initiatives.  Moreover, the department’s comments did not  address whether the Army plans to provide additional information to  Congress.  We continue to believe that such information is needed by  Congress to inform their decisions on Army personnel levels.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Army develop and  provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a risk assessment of  how the Army will fully staff its modular operational combat force while  managing the risk to its noncombat supporting force structure.  DOD  commented that the Army provided the Office of the Secretary of Defense  with a plan for reshaping the Army, including increasing the active  operating force and downsizing overall active end strength by fiscal year  2011, based on several assumptions.  However, this document, which  Army officials provided to us, does not highlight potential risks in  executing the Army’s plan.  Moreover, DOD’s comments did not address  the intent of our recommendation that the Army improve transparency by  providing Congress with additional information on its plans and  assessment of risk.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Army develop and  provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a comprehensive plan  for assessing the Army’s progress toward achieving modularity goals and  said the Army will explore the development of expanded performance  metrics.  However, DOD stated that plans and milestones for measuring  progress are unwarranted as such evaluations occur continuously.  We  commend DOD for agreeing to develop expanded performance metrics.   However, because of the cost and magnitude of the Army’s transformation  plans, we continue to believe that developing and disseminating a  comprehensive and formal evaluation plan are critical for providing  transparency and accountability for results.  As discussed in the report,  the Army is collecting some data on the performance of modular units that  attend training events and deploy overseas, but lacks a long-term  comprehensive and transparent approach for integrating the results of  these assessments to measure overall progress.
Finally, DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to provide a testing plan that  includes milestones for assessing modular unit designs as they are being  implemented.  DOD said the Army thoroughly evaluated modular force  designs and continues to evaluate all facets of modular force performance  both in training and combat operations.  Nevertheless, we believe that the  Army needs a more transparent, long-term, and comprehensive plan for  evaluating the modular designs.  The Army is still early in its  implementation of modular support brigades and higher echelon  command and control and support units and further evaluation of these  designs based on actual experience may demonstrate that design  refinements are needed. Furthermore, although the Army has gained some  useful operational experience with modular combat units, this experience  has been limited to stability operations and irregular warfare, rather than  major combat operations or other operations across the full spectrum of  potential conflict.  To facilitate further assessment of unit designs, we  have included this issue in our matter for congressional consideration.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), and the Secretary of the Army.  We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this  report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512- 4402. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  Major contributors to  this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, obtained and  reviewed documentation, and interviewed officials from Headquarters,  Department of Army; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, U.S.  Army Forces Command; and the U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis. We  supplemented this information with visits to the first three Army divisions  undergoing modular conversions—-the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions and  the 101st Airborne Division—to gain an understanding of the Army’s  modular force implementation plans and progress in organizing, staffing,  and equipping active modular combat brigades.
To determine the Army’s modular force organizational design  requirements and supporting analysis, we analyzed Department of the  Army guidance for creating modular forces, and briefings and other  documents on the Army’s modular force design and analytical process  from the Training and Doctrine Command’s Analysis Center. To determine  the Army’s progress and plans for equipping active component modular  combat brigades, we analyzed Department of Army data on selected  equipment that Army analysis identified as essential for achieving the  modular combat brigades’ intended capabilities. For these selected items,  we calculated the Army’s equipment requirements for active component  modular combat brigades by multiplying equipment requirements obtained  from the Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for  Operations and Training (G-3) for each of the three brigade variants— heavy, light, and Stryker—by the planned number of brigades in each  variant. We then compared the sum of equipment requirements in the  active component to data we obtained from officials from the Department  of the Army G-8 on the expected on-hand levels of equipment and assessed  the reliability of the data by discussing the results with knowledgeable  officials. We determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for  our objectives. We also reviewed unit readiness reports from those  brigades that had completed or were in the process of completing their  modular conversion as of February 2006. For our assessment of Army  National Guard equipping challenges, we relied on past GAO reports and  testimony.
To determine the progress made and challenges to managing personnel  requirements of the modular force, we reviewed documents and discussed  the implications of force structure requirements with officials from the  Department of Army Offices of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel  (G1) and Intelligence (G2). We also discussed key personnel-related  concerns during our visits to the divisions undergoing modular  conversion. To determine the Army’s strategies and plans for meeting its  modular force personnel requirements without permanently increasing  overall end strength, we interviewed officials from the Office of the  Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the  Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations  and Training (G3). We also reviewed the 2006 Quadrennial Defense  Review as it pertained to Army personnel end strength, and the Army’s  Future Year Defense Program and supplemental budget requests for fiscal  years 2005 and 2006 to determine the Army’s personnel funding plans.
To determine the extent to which the Army has developed an approach for  assessing implementation of modularity and for further adjusting designs  or implementation plans, we reviewed our prior work on assessing  organizations undertaking significant reorganizations. We reviewed and  analyzed the Army Campaign Plan and discussed it with officials in the  Department of Army Headquarters, especially officials from the Deputy  Chief of Staff for Operations and Training (G3). To analyze the Army’s  approach for assessing the implementation of its modular conversion, we  examined key Army planning documents and discussed objectives,  performance metrics, and testing plans with appropriate officials in the  Department of the Army Headquarters, and the Training and Doctrine  Command’s Analysis Center. In addition, we met with a panel of retired  senior Army general officers at the Association of the U.S. Army Institute  of Land Warfare, Arlington, Virginia.  We relied on past GAO reports  assessing organizations undertaking significant reorganizations.
We conducted our work from September 2004 through March 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Gwendolyn Jaffe, Assistant  Director; Margaret Best; Alissa Czyz; Christopher Forys; Kevin Handley;  Joah Iannotta; Harry Jobes; David Mayfield; Jason Venner; and J. Andrew  Walker made major contributions to this report.