Environmental Satellites: Planning Required to Mitigate Near-term Risks and Ensure Long-term Continuity
Published: 2010-06-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Environmental satellites provide data used for weather forecasting, measuring variations in climate over time, and predicting space weather. Due to the continuing cost, schedule, and tri-agency management challenges of the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)--a key satellite acquisition managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) decided in February 2010 to disband NPOESS and, instead, to have NOAA and DOD undertake separate acquisitions. GAO was asked to summarize its report being released today on plans for NOAA's and DOD's separate acquisitions and the key risks of the transition, as well as its recent work on federal efforts to establish long-term strategies for satellite-provided climate and space weather data.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: OSTP's decision to disband NPOESS came at a time when the program's cost estimate had more than doubled--to over $15 billion, the launch date for a demonstration satellite had been delayed by over 5 years, and the tri-agency management structure had repeatedly proven to be ineffective. To implement the decision, NOAA and DOD have begun planning for separate acquisitions to replace NPOESS. NOAA has developed preliminary plans for its new program--called the Joint Polar Satellite System--to meet the requirements of the afternoon NPOESS orbit. DOD expects to make final decisions on the spacecraft and sensors in August 2010. However, because neither agency has completed its plans, the impact of the decision to disband the program on the expected costs, schedules, and capabilities has not yet been determined. Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to their separate programs, including the loss of key staff and capabilities, delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing new program offices, the loss of support for the other agency's requirements, insufficient oversight of new program management, and cost growth resulting from contract and program changes. While NOAA and DOD are establishing plans for their new programs, the development of key NPOESS components is continuing. However, the launch date of the demonstration satellite--to be used operationally to ensure climate and weather data continuity--has been delayed by 9 months, and the program has slowed down work on all development activities. Until the transition risks are effectively mitigated, and unless components are able to continue scheduled development, it is likely that launch dates will continue to be delayed. Further delays are likely to jeopardize the availability and continuity of critical weather and climate data. For over a decade, the climate community has clamored for a national interagency strategy that coordinates agency priorities, budgets, and schedules for environmental satellites over the long-term--and the governance structure to implement that strategy. While the federal government has taken several steps to ensure the provision of environmental data from satellites for both climate and space weather in the short term, federal efforts to ensure the long-term provision of these environmental measurements are still lacking. Specifically, although both the climate and space weather communities have recently drafted reports for OSTP containing recommendations for climate and space weather satellites, respectively, the climate report focuses only on short-term needs and does not include longer term priorities, nor does it include budgets or schedules. Further, OSTP does not have plans for finalizing or releasing either the climate or space weather reports. Until an interagency strategy for environmental observation is established, and a clear process for implementing it is in place, federal agencies will continue to procure their immediate priorities on an ad hoc basis, the economic benefits of a coordinated approach to investments in earth observation may be lost, and our nation's ability to understand long-term climate changes may be limited. In its reports, GAO recommended that NOAA and DOD address key transition risks, and that the President's Assistant for Science and Technology implement interagency strategies for the long-term provision of environmental observations. NOAA and DOD agreed, while the Assistant's office neither agreed nor disagreed, but noted its plan to develop a strategy for earth observations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on efforts  to disband the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite  System (NPOESS) and federal planning to ensure long-term environmental  monitoring from satellites. NPOESS was planned to be a state-of-the-art,  environment-monitoring satellite system that would replace two existing  polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems. Managed jointly by the  Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD)/U.S. Air Force,  and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the  program was considered critical to the nation’s needs through the year  2026. However, to address continuing cost, schedule, management, and  technical challenges, the White House’s Office of Science and Technology  Policy (OSTP) decided in February 2010 to disband the NPOESS  acquisition and, instead, to have NOAA and DOD undertake separate  acquisitions. As requested, this statement summarizes our report being  released today on plans for NOAA’s and DOD’s separate acquisitions and  the key risks of transitioning from NPOESS to these new programs, as well  as our recent work on federal efforts to establish long-term strategies for  satellite-provided climate and space weather data.
In preparing this testimony, we relied on the work supporting the  corresponding reports. Those reports contain detailed overviews of our  scope and methodology. All of our work for the reports was performed in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, the United States has used satellites to observe the earth  and its land, oceans, atmosphere, and space environments. Satellites  provide a global perspective of the environment and allow observations in  areas that may be otherwise unreachable or unsuitable for measurements.  Used in combination with ground, sea, and airborne observing systems,  satellites have become an indispensable part of measuring and forecasting  weather and climate. For example, satellites provide the graphical images  used to identify current weather patterns, as well as the data that go into  numerical weather prediction models. These models are used to forecast  weather 1 to 2 weeks in advance and to issue warnings about severe  weather, including the path and intensity of hurricanes. Satellite data are  also used to warn infrastructure owners when increased solar activity is  expected to affect key assets, including communication satellites or the  electric power grid. When collected over time, satellite data can also be  used to observe climate change—the trends and changes in the earth’s  climate. For example, these data are used to monitor and project seasonal,  annual, and decadal changes in the earth’s temperature, vegetation  coverage, and ozone coverage.
subsections: section_title: Satellite-provided Environmental Data for Climate and Space Weather
paragraphs: One key subset of satellite-provided data is climate data. These data are  used in combination with ground and ocean observing systems to  understand seasonal, annual, and decadal variations in the climate.  Satellites provide land observations such as measurements of soil  moisture, changes in how land is used, and vegetation growth; ocean  observations such as sea levels, sea surface temperature, and ocean color;  and atmospheric observations such as greenhouse gas levels (e.g., carbon  dioxide), aerosol and dust particles, and moisture concentration. When  these data are obtained over long periods of time, scientists are able to use  them to determine short- and long-term trends in how the earth’s systems  work and how they work together. For example, climate measurements  have allowed scientists to better understand the effect of deforestation on  how the earth absorbs heat, retains rainwater, and absorbs greenhouse  gases. Scientists also use climate data to help predict climate cycles that  affect the weather, such as El Niño, and to develop global estimates of  food crop production for a particular year or season.
Another subset of satellite-provided environmental information is space  weather data. Satellite-provided observations of space weather generally  describe changes in solar activity in the space environment. Just as  scientists use observations of weather that occurs on the earth’s surface  and in its atmosphere to develop forecasts, scientists and researchers use  space weather observations to detect and forecast solar storms that may  be potentially harmful to society.
section_title: Coordination and Oversight of Satellite- Provided Environmental Observations
paragraphs: NASA, NOAA, and DOD all have responsibilities for acquiring, processing,  and disseminating environmental data and information from research or  operational satellites. In addition to these agencies, there are two  interagency organizations—the U.S. Group on Earth Observations  (USGEO) and the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP)—that  are primarily responsible for coordinating federal efforts with respect to  observations of the earth’s environment. The National Space Weather  Program serves as the coordinating body for space weather. USGEO and  USGCRP report to the Executive Office of the President through the  National Science and Technology Council’s Committee on Environment  and Natural Resources, while the National Space Weather Program  coordinates its activities through NOAA’s Office of the Federal  Coordinator for Meteorology.
The Executive Office of the President provides oversight for federal space- based environmental observation. Within the Executive Office of the  President, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the Office  of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Council on Environmental  Quality carry out these governance responsibilities. In addition, the  National Science and Technology Council and its Committee on  Environment and Natural Resources provide the Executive Office of the  President with executive-level coordination and advice.
section_title: The NPOESS Program: Inception, Challenges, and Divergence
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate operational  polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-orbiting  Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is managed by  NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), which  is managed by the Air Force. Currently, there is one operational POES  satellite and two operational DMSP satellites that are positioned so that  they cross the equator in the early morning, midmorning, and early  afternoon. In addition, the government is also relying on a European  satellite, called the Meteorological Operational (MetOp) satellite.  Together, they ensure that, for any region of the earth, the data provided  to users are generally no more than 6 hours old.
With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would  reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994  Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the  two satellite programs into a single satellite program—NPOESS—capable  of satisfying both civilian and military requirements.  To manage this  program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency Integrated Program  Office, with NOAA responsible for overall program management for the  converged system and for satellite operations; the Air Force responsible  for acquisition; and NASA responsible for facilitating the development and  incorporation of new technologies into the converged system.
Since the program’s inception, NPOESS costs have grown by over $8  billion, and launch schedules have been delayed by over 5 years. In  addition, as a result of a 2006 restructuring of the program, the agencies  reduced the program’s functionality by decreasing the number of originally  planned satellites, orbits, and instruments. The restructuring also led  agency executives to mitigate potential data gaps by deciding to use a  planned demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory Project  (NPP) satellite, as an operational satellite providing climate and weather  data. Even after this restructuring, however, the program continued to  encounter technical issues, management challenges, schedule delays, and  further cost increases. To address these issues, in recent years we have  made a series of recommendations to, among other things, improve  executive-level oversight and develop realistic time frames for revising  cost and schedule baselines.
In August 2009, the Executive Office of the President formed a task force,  led by OSTP, to investigate the management and acquisition options that  would improve the NPOESS program. As a result of this review, the  Director of OSTP announced in February 2010 that NOAA and DOD will  no longer jointly procure the NPOESS satellite system; instead, each  agency would plan and acquire its own satellite system. Specifically,  NOAA is to be responsible for the afternoon orbit and the observations  planned for the first and third NPOESS satellites. DOD is to be responsible  for the early-morning orbit and the observations planned for the second  and fourth NPOESS satellites. The partnership with the European satellite  agencies for the midmorning orbit is to continue as planned.
section_title: Agencies Have Started Planning Separate Acquisitions, but the Impact of This Approach Is Not Known and Key Risks and Challenges Remain
paragraphs: NOAA has developed preliminary plans for its new satellite acquisition  program—called the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS)—to meet the  requirements of the afternoon NPOESS orbit. Specifically, NOAA plans to  acquire two satellites; the plans call for the first JPSS satellite to be  available for launch in 2014, and the second JPSS satellite to be available  for launch in 2018. NOAA will also provide the ground systems for both  the JPSS and DOD programs. NOAA is also planning technical changes to  the satellites, including using a smaller spacecraft than the one planned for  NPOESS and removing sensors that were planned for the NPOESS  satellites in the afternoon orbit. In addition, NOAA plans to transfer the  management of acquisition from the NPOESS program office to NASA’s  Goddard Space Flight Center, so that it can be co-located at a space  system acquisition center as advocated by an independent review team.  NOAA has developed a team to lead the transition from NPOESS to JPSS,  and plans to begin transitioning in July and complete the transition plan— including cost and schedule estimates—by the end of September.
DOD is at an earlier stage in its planning process, in part because it has  more time before the first satellite in the morning orbit is needed. DOD  officials are currently developing plans—including costs, schedules, and  risks—for their new program, called the Defense Weather Satellite System.  DOD expects to make final decisions on the spacecraft, sensors,  procurement strategy, and staffing in August 2010, and begin the program  immediately.
Because neither agency has finalized plans for its acquisition, the full  impact of OSTP’s decision on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities  is unknown.
Cost: NOAA anticipates that the JPSS program will cost approximately  $11.9 billion to complete through 2024. Although this estimated cost is  less than the current baseline and recent estimates for the NPOESS  program, DOD will still need to fund and develop satellites to meet the  requirements for the early morning orbit. DOD’s initial estimates are for  its new program to cost almost $5 billion through fiscal year 2015. Thus,  the cost of the two acquisitions will likely exceed the baselined life-cycle  cost of the NPOESS program.
Schedule: Neither NOAA nor DOD has finalized plans that show the full  impact of the restructuring on the schedule for satellite development. We  have previously reported that restructuring a program like NPOESS could  take significant time to accomplish, due in part to the time taken revising,  renegotiating, or developing important acquisition documents, including  contracts and interagency agreements. With important decisions and  negotiations still pending, it is likely that the expected launch date of the  first JPSS satellite will be delayed.
Capabilities: Neither agency has made final decisions on the full set of  sensors—or which satellites will accommodate them—for their respective  satellite programs. Until those decisions are made, it will not be possible  to determine the capabilities that these satellites will provide and their  associated costs.
Timely decisions on cost, schedule, and capabilities would allow both  acquisitions to move forward and satellite data users to start planning for  any data shortfalls they may experience. Until DOD and NOAA finalize  their plans, it is not clear whether the new acquisitions will meet the  requirements of both civilian and military users.
subsections: section_title: Key Transition Risks and Continuing Development Challenges Threaten Satellite Data Continuity
paragraphs: Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in transitioning from NPOESS  to their new programs, including loss of key staff and capabilities, delays  in negotiating contract changes and establishing new program offices,  failure to support the other agency’s requirements, insufficient oversight of  new program management, and potential cost growth from contract  terminations and other program changes.
Loss of key staff and capabilities: The NPOESS program office is  composed of NOAA, NASA, Air Force, and contractor staff with  knowledge and experience in the status, risks, and lessons learned from  the NPOESS program. This knowledge will be critical to moving the  program forward both during and after the transition period. However,  within the past year, the program office has lost its Program Executive  Officer, Deputy Program Executive Officer, and System Program  Director—the top three individuals who oversee day-to-day operations.  Thus, final critical decisions on work slow downs and priorities will be  made by a new Program Executive Officer, who has only overseen the  program for a few weeks. In addition, program office staff have already  begun leaving—or looking for other employment—due to the uncertainties  about the future of the program office. Unless NOAA and DOD are  proactive in retaining these staff, the new program may waste valuable  time if staff must relearn program details and may repeat mistakes made  and lose lessons learned by prior program staff.
Delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing new programs:  According to NOAA officials, the plan for JPSS may require negotiations  with contractors and between contractors and their subcontractors. In  addition, both NOAA and DOD will need to establish and fully staff  program offices to facilitate and manage the transition and new programs.  Until decisions are made on how the program is to proceed with contract  changes and terminations, the contractors and program office cannot  implement the chosen solution, and some decisions, such as how to hold  schedule slips to a minimum, could become much more difficult.
Failure to support the other agency’s requirements: As a joint program,  NPOESS was expected to fulfill many military, civilian, and research  requirements for environmental data. However, because the requirements  of NOAA and DOD are different, the agencies may develop programs that  meet their own needs but not the other’s. If the agencies cannot find a way  to build a partnership that facilitates both efficient and effective decision- making on data continuity needs, the needs of both agencies may not be  adequately incorporated into the new programs.
Insufficient oversight of new program management: Under its new JPSS  program, NOAA plans to transfer parts of the NPOESS program to NASA,  but it has not yet defined how it will oversee NASA’s efforts. We have  reported that NASA has consistently underestimated time and cost and has  not adequately managed risk factors such as contractor performance.  Because of these issues, we listed NASA’s acquisition management as a  high-risk area in 1990, and it remains a high-risk area today. NOAA  officials reported that they are developing a management control plan with  NASA and intend to perform an independent review of this plan when it is  completed. They could not provide a time frame for its completion.  Without strong NOAA oversight of NASA’s management of program  components, JPSS may continue to face the same cost, schedule, and  contract management challenges as the NPOESS program.
Cost growth resulting from contract and program changes: Because  neither acquisition has fully developed plans for their respective programs,  it is unclear whether contracts will need to be fully or partially terminated,  and what the terminations and other program changes could ultimately  cost. We have previously reported that if the government decides to  terminate a contract for convenience, it must compensate the contractor— in the form of a termination settlement—for the work it has performed.  However, a settlement only addresses the government’s obligation under a  terminated contract, and there may be additional costs. For example,  additional costs could result from awarding a new contract to replace a  terminated contract. Until NOAA and DOD make decisions and plans for  their programs, the full cost of contract and program changes will be  unknown.
NOAA, NASA, and DOD acknowledge that there are risks associated with  the transition to new programs, but they have not yet established plans to  mitigate these risks.
While NOAA and DOD are developing plans for their new programs, the  development of key NPOESS components is continuing. In recent months,  the program completed the development of the critical imaging sensor,  called the Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), and delivered  it to NASA for integration onto the NPP satellite. Four of the five sensors  intended for NPP are now on the spacecraft. In addition, the program  continues to work on components of the first and second NPOESS  satellites, which are to be transferred to NOAA and DOD to become part of  their respective follow-on programs. However, the expected launch date of  the NPP satellite has been delayed by 9 months (moving the launch date to  September 2011 or later), due to technical issues in the development of the  NPP sensor that has not yet been integrated. In addition, the development  of the VIIRS sensor for the first NPOESS or JPSS satellite is experiencing  significant cost overruns. Further, the program is slowing down and may  need to stop work on key components because of potential contract  liabilities and funding constraints, but it has not developed a prioritized  list on what to stop first.
Until the transition risks are effectively mitigated, and unless selected  components are able to continue scheduled development, the launches of  NPP and the first NOAA and DOD satellites could be further delayed.  Further launch delays are likely to jeopardize the availability and  continuity of weather and climate data. For example, the POES satellite  currently in the afternoon orbit is expected to reach the end of its lifespan  at the end of 2012. If NPP is delayed, there could be a gap in polar satellite  observations in the afternoon orbit. Similarly, a delay in the launch of the  first JPSS satellite may lead to a gap in satellite data after NPP reaches the  end of its lifespan.
section_title: Federal Efforts to Ensure the Long-term Provision of Environmental Data from Satellites Are Lacking
paragraphs: For over a decade, the climate community has clamored for an interagency  strategy to coordinate agency priorities, budgets, and schedules for  environmental satellites over the long term—and the governance structure  to implement that strategy. Specifically, in 1999, the National Research  Council reported on the need for a comprehensive long-term earth  observation strategy and, in 2000, for an effective governance structure  that would balance interagency issues and provide authority and  accountability for implementing the strategy. The National Research  Council and others have repeated these concerns in multiple reports since  then, including after the agencies responsible for NPOESS canceled key  climate and space weather sensors from the program in 2006. Similarly,  in 1999, the Administrators of NOAA and NASA wrote letters to OSTP  noting the need for an interagency strategy and the means to implement it.
While progress has been made in developing near-term interagency plans,  this initiative is languishing without a firm completion date, and federal  efforts to establish and implement a strategy for the long-term provision of  satellite data are insufficient. Specifically, in 2005, the National Science  and Technology Council’s Committee on Environment and Natural  Resources established USGEO to develop an earth observation strategy  and coordinate its implementation. Since that time, USGEO assessed  current and evolving requirements, evaluated them to determine  investment priorities, and drafted the Strategic Assessment Report—a  report delineating near-term opportunities and priorities for earth  observation from both space and ground. According to agency officials,  this report is the first in a planned series, and it was approved by OSTP  and multiple federal agencies in May 2009. However, OSTP has not yet  forwarded the draft to the Committee on Environment and Natural  Resources and the President’s National Science and Technology Council  because it is reconsidering whether to revise or move forward with the  plan. USGEO officials could not provide a schedule for completing this  near-term interagency plan.
This draft report is an important first step in developing a national strategy  for earth observations, but it is not sufficient to ensure the long-term  provision of data vital to understanding the climate. The draft report  integrates different agencies’ requirements and proposes continuing or  improving earth observations in 17 separate areas, using both satellite and  land-based measuring systems. However, the report does not include  costs, schedules, or plans for the long-term provision of satellite data.  While the report does note the importance of continuing certain near-term  plans for sensors, it does not make recommendations for what to do over  the long term.
In addition, the federal government lacks a clear process for implementing  an interagency strategy. Key offices within the Executive Office of the  President with responsibilities for environmental observations, including  OSTP and the Council for Environmental Quality, have not established  processes or time frames for implementing an interagency strategy— including steps for working with OMB to ensure that agencies’ annual  budgets are aligned with the interagency strategy. As a result, even if an  interagency strategy was finalized, it is not clear how OSTP and OMB  would ensure that the responsibilities identified in the interagency strategy  are consistent with agency plans and are funded within agency budgets.
Until an interagency strategy for earth observation is established, and a  clear process for implementing it is in place, federal agencies will continue  to procure their immediate priorities on an ad hoc basis, the economic  benefits of a coordinated approach to investments in earth observation  may be lost, and the continuity of key measurements may be jeopardized.  This will hinder our nation’s ability to understand long-term climate  changes.
subsections: section_title: Federal Agencies Lack a Strategy for the Long-term Provision of Space Weather Data
paragraphs: While key federal agencies have taken steps to plan for continued space  weather observations in the near term, they lack a strategy for the long- term provision of space weather data. Similar to maintaining satellite- provided climate observations, maintaining space weather observations  over the long term is important. The National Space Weather Program, the  interagency coordinating body for the United States space weather  community, has repeatedly recommended taking action to sustain the  space weather observation infrastructure on a long-term basis.
Agencies participating in the National Space Weather Program have taken  short-term actions that may help alleviate near-term gaps in space weather  observations, but OSTP has not approved or released two reports that are  expected to establish plans for obtaining space weather observations over  the long term. Specifically, NOAA and DOD are seeking to replace key  experimental space-observing satellites. Further, the National Space  Weather Program recently developed two reports at the request of OSTP  documenting specific recommendations for the future of space weather,  one on what to do about a critical NASA space weather satellite, called the  Advanced Composition Explorer, and the other on the replacement of the  space weather capabilities removed from the NPOESS program. The  program submitted the reports in October and November of 2009,  respectively. However, OSTP officials do not have a schedule for  approving or releasing the reports.
While the agencies’ short-term actions and the pending reports hold  promise, federal agencies do not currently have a comprehensive  interagency strategy for the long-term provision of space weather data.  Until OSTP releases the reports, it will not be clear whether they provide a  clear strategy to ensure the long-term provision of space weather data—or  whether the current efforts are simply ad hoc attempts to ensure short- term data continuity. Without a comprehensive long-term strategy for the  provision of space weather data, agencies may make ad hoc decisions to  ensure continuity in the near term and risk making inefficient decisions on  key investments.
section_title: Implementation of Recommendations Could Help Ensure Near- and Long-Term Satellite Continuity
paragraphs: In the report being released today, we are making recommendations to  ensure that the transition from NPOESS to its successor programs is  efficiently and effectively managed. Among other things, we are  recommending that the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce direct their  respective NPOESS follow-on programs to expedite decisions on the  expected cost, schedule, and capabilities of their planned programs; direct  their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to develop plans to address  key transition risks, including the loss of skilled staff, delays in contract  negotiations and setting up new program offices, loss of support for the  other agency’s requirements, and oversight of new program management;  and direct the NPOESS program office to develop priorities for work  slowdown and stoppage to allow the activities that are most important to  maintaining launch schedules to continue.
In written comments on the NPOESS report, both NOAA and DOD agreed  with our recommendations and identified plans to implement them. In  addition, NASA made comments on two of our findings. For example,  NASA commented on our finding that NOAA would need to provide  enhanced oversight of NASA’s management of the JPSS program. NASA  officials asserted that the proper basis for comparison should not be their  leading-edge research missions, but, instead, should be their operational  environmental satellite programs. However, the JPSS program does  include leading-edge sensor technologies, and the complexity of these  sensor technologies has been a key reason for the cost growth and  schedule delays experienced to date on the NPOESS program. Thus, it will  be important for both NOAA and NASA to ensure that the subcontractors  are adequately managed so that technical, cost, and schedule issues are  minimized or mitigated. The full text of the three agencies’ comments and  our evaluation of those comments are provided in the accompanying  report.
In the report issued in April, we made recommendations to improve long- term planning for environmental satellites. Specifically, we  recommended that the Assistant to the President for Science and  Technology, in collaboration with key Executive Office of the President  entities (including the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office  of Management and Budget, the Council on Environmental Quality, and  the National Science and Technology Council) establish a deadline to  complete and release three key reports on environmental observations.  We also recommended that the Assistant to the President direct USGEO to  establish an interagency strategy to address the long-term provision of  environmental observations from satellites that includes costs and  schedules for the satellites, as well as a plan for the relevant agencies’  future budgets, and establish an ongoing process, with timelines, for  obtaining approval of the interagency strategy and aligning it with agency  plans and annual budgets.
When asked to comment on our report, the Executive Office of the  President did not agree or disagree with our recommendations; however,  officials noted that OSTP is currently revising USGEO’s Strategic  Assessment Report to update information on launch schedules and on the  availability of certain measurements that have changed since completion  of the report a year ago. In crafting this strategy, it will be important for  OSTP to address long-term interagency needs and to work with OMB to  ensure that the long-term plans are aligned with individual agencies’ plans  and budgets. If the plan does not include these elements, individual  agencies will continue to address only their most pressing priorities, other  agencies’ needs may be ignored, and the government may lose the ability  to effectively and efficiently address its earth observation needs.
In summary, at the end of this fiscal year, the federal government will have  spent 16 years and almost $6 billion to combine two legacy satellite  programs into one, yet will not have launched a single satellite. Faced with  expected cost growth exceeding $8 billion, schedule delays of over 5  years, and continuing tri-agency management challenges, a task force led  by the President’s Office of Science and Technology Policy decided to  disband NPOESS so that NOAA and DOD could pursue separate satellite  acquisitions. While the two agencies are scrambling to develop plans for  their respective programs, it is not yet clear what the programs will  deliver, when, and at what cost, but it is very likely that they will cost more  than the existing NPOESS baseline and recent program office estimates.  Timely decisions on cost, schedule, and capabilities are needed to allow  both acquisitions to move forward. In addition, the agencies face a number  of transition risks, but neither agency has developed plans to mitigate  these risks. Meanwhile, the NPOESS program is continuing to develop  components of the NPP satellite and components of the first two satellites.  However, program officials reported that they have slowed all  development work, and may need to stop work on these deliverables.  Slowing or stopping work could further delay the satellites’ launches, but  the program has not developed a prioritized list of what to stop first to  mitigate impacts on satellite launches. Until it does so, there may be an  increased risk of gaps in satellite data.
Although initial steps have been taken to ensure the short-term continuity  of key climate and space weather measurements from satellites, the  federal government has not taken the necessary steps to ensure the long- term sustainment of these critical measurements. For example, NOAA  recently removed sensors from JPSS that were originally planned for the  NPOESS satellites in the afternoon orbit, but it is unclear how this will  affect other agencies and programs. Until an interagency strategy for earth  observation is established, and a clear process for implementing it is in  place, federal agencies will continue to procure their immediate priorities  on an ad hoc basis, the economic benefits of a coordinated approach to  investments in earth observation may be lost, and the continuity of key  measurements may be lost. This will hinder our nation’s ability to  understand long-term climate changes and risk our ability to measure,  predict, and mitigate the effects of space weather.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, please  contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov. Other  key contributors include Colleen Phillips, Assistant Director; Kate  Agatone; Franklin Jackson; Kathleen S. Lovett; Lee McCracken; and John  Ockay.
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