Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System Components
Published: 2009-10-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) expects to spend more than $50 billion to develop and procure eight major space systems. Typically, the systems have two main components: satellites and ground control systems. Some also have a third component--user terminals--that can allow access from remote locations. If the delivery of these three components is not synchronized, there can be delays in providing full capabilities to the warfighter, and satellites on orbit can remain underutilized for years. Given preliminary indication of uncoordinated deployment, GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which satellite, ground control, and user terminal deployments are aligned; (2) the reasons deployments have not always been well coordinated; (3) actions being taken to enhance coordination; and (4) whether enhancements to ground systems could optimize the government's investment. To accomplish this, GAO analyzed plans for all major DOD satellite acquisitions and interviewed key officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals in most of DOD's major space system acquisitions are not optimally aligned, leading to underutilized satellites and limited capability provided to the warfighter. Of the eight major space system acquisitions we studied, three systems anticipated that their satellites will be launched well before their associated ground control systems are fully capable of operating on-orbit capabilities. Furthermore, for five of the eight major space systems GAO reviewed, user terminals were to become operational after their associated satellites reach initial capability--in some cases, years after. When the deployments of satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals are not well synchronized, problems arise that can affect both the warfighter and the space systems themselves. When capabilities are delayed because of lack of alignment between satellite and ground control systems or user terminals, the warfighter may develop short-term solutions, often at diminished capability and added cost. In addition, according to DOD testing officials, when the deployment of space system components is not properly timed, components may be ready for system testing at different times. This means that the space system may not be tested as a whole, connected system. DOD has inherent challenges in aligning its satellite and ground control systems. However, long-standing acquisition problems, a tendency to shift funds from ground control system development to satellite development when satellite development problems arise and the underestimation of software complexity on several major space systems have exacerbated the problem. The primary cause for user terminals not being well synchronized with their associated space systems is that user terminal development programs are typically managed by different military acquisition organizations than those managing the satellites and ground control systems. DOD does have several efforts in place to help achieve better synchronization. The Air Force has also made some attempts to improve acquisition management and increase oversight of contractors by separating the acquisition of satellites and their ground control systems. However, the outcomes of these efforts are still pending. Moreover, there is a lack of guidance needed to help plan for and coordinate the development of satellite and ground systems and a lack of transparency into costs for ground control systems and user terminals. DOD representatives in the satellite acquisition community agree that opportunities exist for DOD to transition to a more common type of architecture for satellite ground control systems in order to achieve additional efficiencies, capabilities, and a higher degree of information sharing among space systems, ultimately resulting in increased capability to the warfighter. All of the officials GAO spoke with agreed that ground control systems can be developed to provide data and information to other systems, and expect the same in return, to potentially enhance the flow and timeliness of information and better exploit satellite capabilities.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) expects to spend over $50 billion to  develop and procure eight major space systems. These systems are  intended to provide military communications, global positioning and  navigation information, weather monitoring data, and missile warning  information. Typically, space system acquisitions consist of two main  components: satellites and ground control systems. Satellites use sensors  to collect data or provide communications capabilities, while ground  control systems receive and often process and transmit data from the  satellites. Space systems often include a third component, user terminals,  which allow the combatant commands, also known as the warfighters, to  use the space systems’ capabilities in the field. While the costs associated  with the ground control systems and user terminals can be much less than  the costs of the satellites, space systems often require all three  components—satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals—to  work together to be fully utilized.
The majority of major space acquisition programs in DOD’s space  portfolio, however, have experienced problems during the past two  decades that have delayed deployment and driven up cost. Many programs  are experiencing significant schedule delays—as much as 7 years— resulting in potential capability gaps in areas such as positioning,  navigation, and timing; missile warning; communications; and weather  monitoring. We recently estimated that costs for major space acquisition  programs have increased by about $11.0 billion from initial estimates of  $11.4 billion for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. This investment risk is  compounded because the development of satellite ground systems and  user terminals sometimes lags considerably behind the development of  satellites, even when the satellite development has faced considerable  delay. This means that mission-capable satellites may be in orbit for  months or years, but warfighters and others would be unable to use the  full complement of the satellites’ capabilities. The extent to which this  problem is likely to occur is not well known. Satellite development  problems typically represent a greater risk to the program and may  therefore receive more attention. Ground system development problems  may not be as visible as those facing satellite developments partially  because the oversight and management of these development efforts is  often intertwined. Moreover, while many DOD, congressional, and GAO  studies have focused on the causes of satellite development delays and  cost increases, few have focused on the delivery of ground control systems  and user terminals, which are just as critical to optimizing the investment  in space.
For these reasons, you asked us to determine (1) the extent to which the  deployment of satellite, ground control systems, and user terminals is  aligned, or “synchronized,” so that the delivery of these assets optimizes  investments in space; (2) the reasons satellites, ground control systems,  and user terminals are not always aligned; (3) actions being taken to  enhance coordination in the development of these assets; and (4) whether  opportunities exist to enhance ground systems to better optimize the  government’s investment in space, given recent trends in information  technology and networking.
To assess the coordination of satellite and ground system deployment, we  analyzed current and future testing and fielding plans for corresponding  satellite and ground assets (control systems and user terminals) of all  major DOD space system acquisitions: the Advanced Extremely High  Frequency Satellite (AEHF), NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS),  Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), National Polar-orbiting  Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), Space Based  Infrared System (SBIRS), Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS), Space  Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), and Wideband Global SATCOM  (WGS). In making determinations about whether space system acquisition  programs had synchronization issues, we compared the fielding dates of  satellites, ground systems, and user terminals to determine whether there  were gaps in the delivery of capabilities associated with these three  components. We assessed user terminals to be not synchronized if a small  percentage of terminals were scheduled to be delivered at the time of  satellite and ground system delivery. Programs without gaps between  fielding dates of satellites and ground system capabilities, and that had  higher percentages of user terminals scheduled to be fielded, were  determined to be synchronized. We also examined four of these programs  in greater detail to better understand the causes of less-than-optimal  synchronization. Further, we discussed ground control system and user  terminal development with combatant commanders (warfighters) to help  determine the effect(s) that synchronization issues have on the users of  the space system capabilities. We also interviewed various space officials  within DOD, including program management officials of the satellite  programs we reviewed. To determine whether enhancements can be made  to ground systems to increase utility of satellite capabilities, we  interviewed high-level DOD representatives of various offices in the  satellite acquisition community, officials in the intelligence community,  and staff at ground control system facilities.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 to September  2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. For more information on  our scope and methodology, see appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD’s major space system acquisition programs are intended to perform a  wide variety of functions, including communications, missile warning,  navigation, tracking space objects, and even providing weather  information. Communication satellites provide DOD the ability to  communicate along narrowband, wideband, and secure and protected  bandwidths. Narrowband communications use lower (slower) rates to  process data and give the warfighter the ability to communicate better  while on the move, and also work better in disadvantaged environments,  such as in forests, where conventional frequencies might be less effective.  Wideband communications use higher data rates and work better for  stationary locations in addition to allowing more warfighters to use this  type of bandwidth. Secure and protected bandwidths allow warfighters to  communicate when other satellites are disabled because of enemy  jamming measures and allow a wider use of terminals deployed on  backpacks, submarines, airborne assets, and other means. Missile  detection satellites allow DOD to identify launches and initially track  ballistic missiles and provide early warnings to warfighters. Positioning  and navigation satellites give DOD the ability to pinpoint a location,  enabling soldiers to call for precise air support and lowering the risk of  accidents. Satellites that track space objects and debris help keep  satellites safe in space. Finally, weather satellites allow the warfighter to  directly receive weather and climate information for more effective  military operations. The satellites DOD is developing have finite useful  lives that range from about 5 to15 years. Some space systems under  development, such as AEHF, are intended to replace older legacy systems  with upgraded and more robust capabilities—such as increasing the  volume of data transmitted per second. Table 1 shows the various  missions of current and planned DOD satellite programs.
Most space systems consist of satellites, ground control systems, and user  terminals, though some space systems only require ground control  systems to provide capability to users. Ground control systems are  generally used to (1) download and process data from satellite sensors and  disseminate this information to warfighters and other users and (2)  maintain the health and status of the satellites, including steering the  satellites and ensuring that they stay in assigned orbits.
User terminals, typically procured by the military services and managed  separately from associated satellites and ground control systems, can  range from equipment hosted on backpacks to terminals mounted on  Humvees, airborne assets, or ships. Terminals can be used to help the  warfighter determine longitude, latitude, and altitude via GPS satellites, or  securely communicate with others via AEHF satellites. Some user  terminals are not solely dedicated to delivering capability from a specific  satellite system. For example, the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is  the primary user terminal associated with the MUOS program, but the  system is also designed to be the next generation of tactical radios,  allowing extensive ground-to-ground communication as well.
section_title: Most Major Space Systems Are Not Aligned with Delivery of Ground Assets, User Assets, or Both
paragraphs: For six of DOD’s eight major space system acquisitions, DOD has not been  able to align delivery of space assets with ground assets, user assets, or  both. Of the eight major space system acquisitions, five ground control  system efforts are optimally aligned to deliver capability with their  companion satellites, while three are not optimally aligned. For the five  space systems requiring user terminals, none were aligned. In some cases,  capability gaps resulting from delays in the fielding of ground control  systems or user terminals are 4 or more years. When space system  acquisitions are not aligned, satellite capability is available but  underutilized, though in some cases, work-around efforts can help  compensate for the loss or delay of capability. Moreover, when ground  systems, user terminals, or both are not aligned with satellites, there are  significant limitations in the extent to which the system as a whole can be  independently tested and verified. Table 2 provides a summary of  alignment between space systems and corresponding ground control  systems or user terminals.
In making determinations about whether space system acquisitions were  aligned, we examined whether there were gaps between fielding dates of  satellite capabilities compared to ground control system capabilities and  whether lower percentages of user terminal types were planned to be  fielded by the space system acquisitions’ planned initial capability. We  generally only considered aspects of a space acquisition unaligned if there  was a gap of years, rather than months, between the fielding dates of  significant capabilities. Regarding user terminals, we only considered  these unaligned compared to satellite capabilities when user terminals did  not meet DOD’s measure of synchronization for military satellite  communications space acquisitions. This measure, established by U.S.  Strategic Command (STRATCOM), a primary user of DOD space systems,  asserts that 20 percent of any type of user terminal should be fielded by a  space system acquisition’s initial capability date and 85 percent should be  fielded by its full capability date.
Notwithstanding the fact that alignment gaps are undesirable, several  factors provide insight into the inherent challenges associated with  managing alignment. First, alignment may be relatively easier to achieve in  some programs than in others. For example, some space systems may  require only a ground system or few user terminals and may even manage  these acquisitions within one organization. By contrast, other programs  may require literally tens of thousands of terminals that must be installed  on a wide span of weapon systems, including ships, planes, vehicles, and  even other space systems—which are owned and controlled by various  military services. Second, an inherent difficulty in aligning satellite  launches with ground and user terminal programs is the lead time needed  to schedule satellite launches—about 2 years—which makes it difficult to  hold back satellite deployment if a ground or user terminal is experiencing  a considerable delay. Nevertheless, there is a consensus that investments  in space are not optimized when satellites are in orbit and user terminals  or ground systems are many months or years away from being delivered.
Third, it is difficult to measure the extent to which warfighters and other  users are being affected by delayed capability or even the extent to which  capability is delayed. As figure 1 depicts, satellites themselves only offer  initial capabilities until enough satellites have been launched to provide  the coverage needed to achieve full capability. This process alone can take  years and will vary system to system as the number of satellites required  to achieve full operational capability depends on mission requirements  and coverage offered by satellites, among other factors. At the same time,  ground control systems can be delivered in phases, the first of which may  focus solely on controlling and maintaining the health of the satellite, with  subsequent phases delivering software that can collect and process sensor  data. User terminals can take years to install as they can span a broad  spectrum of weapon systems and their installation is usually done along  side other upgrades.
subsections: section_title: Alignment of Ground Control Systems and Satellites
paragraphs: Ground systems deployment for three of DOD’s major space system  acquisitions is lagging behind delivery of satellites. This means that  satellites either already are in space or will be in space, but are or will be  unable to deliver all of their planned capabilities. In one case, the  development of the ground system was completed in time, but the system  has not worked properly. In contrast, five major space system acquisitions  have largely aligned their satellites and associated ground control systems  acquisitions so that capabilities on satellites are fielded at approximately  the same time as on the ground. In some of these instances, schedule slips  in satellite development allowed more time for ground control system  development. Had the satellites been delivered on their original schedules,  the ground control systems might not have aligned with satellite delivery.   The three instances where we identified gaps are described below.
GPS achieved full operational capability in 1995 and currently is a  constellation of 31 active satellites of various generations used extensively  by the military for multiple applications worldwide. The current GPS  ground control system consists of the Operational Control Segment and an  upgrade under way called the Architecture Evolution Plan. However, the  plan and the capabilities it is being designed to provide have been delayed  and are significantly over budget. As a result, some new capabilities are  not now available to the warfighter because the ground control system  features needed to command and operate the capabilities have not been  completely delivered. For example, updated user equipment possessing a  capability to prevent spoofing of navigation information started being  delivered to the warfighter in 2004. However, the Architecture Evolution  Plan, representing the current ground control system, is not capable of  providing two important aspects of this capability and is not expected to  do so until early fiscal year 2010.
The first SBIRS satellite will carry scanning and staring sensors designed  to provide early missile warning capabilities. However, DOD will not be  able to fully utilize the data collected from the staring sensor when this  first satellite launches, currently planned for September 2010, because the  ground control software that is to process the sensor’s data is not planned  to be fully functional until at least 2014. This means that complete, usable  data from the staring sensor will not be available until about 4 years after  the satellite is on orbit.
The first WGS satellite launched in October 2007, but its associated ground  mission planning software—the Consolidated Network Planning  Software—does not work properly. This planning software was designed  to compute required bandwidth for all users simultaneously accessing  WGS satellites. It would then disseminate that information to various  satellite operation and support stations located globally so that all stations  had a real-time view of the availability of WGS satellite capabilities.  However, because the development of the mission planning software has  had problems and is not well coordinated with WGS satellite capability,  the dissemination of information does not occur as designed, and the  information has to go through a time-consuming and labor-intensive work- around through a single ground station before it reaches the warfighter.
section_title: Alignment of User Terminals
paragraphs: Five of the eight major space systems we reviewed had user terminals  scheduled to be delivered and become operational after, and in some  cases long after, their associated space systems achieved initial capability.  The other three space systems did not require user terminals. It should be  noted that in some cases—for example, AEHF, GPS, and NPOESS—there  is more than one type of terminal that will serve a similar purpose.  However, when we examined these programs we also identified gaps  across the programs. For AEHF specifically, the most prominent gap  existed in the terminal that will have the widest use—Family of Advanced  Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T). Three instances where we  identified gaps are described below. Appendix III contains more details.
FAB-T. The Air Force’s FAB-T program is designed to provide antijam and  protected communications for nuclear and conventional forces as well as  many airborne assets and ground command posts. As one of the primary  user terminal programs associated with AEHF, FAB-T has recently  experienced numerous problems and is not currently aligned with the  AEHF satellite program. Specifically, contractor performance problems,  which caused design teams to be restructured to improve performance  and efficiency, caused a delay in the start of initial production from fiscal  year 2007 to fiscal year 2010. In addition, design changes and contract cost  growth have more than tripled development costs since the contract was  first awarded. While AEHF will be able to provide capability through other  user terminals, current estimates show that FAB-T will only have 2 percent  of its terminals fielded when AEHF is scheduled to reach its initial  operating capability in 2011. Further, estimates are that FAB-T will not  have all of its terminals fielded until fiscal year 2019.
JTRS. JTRS is a family of interoperable, digital, modular, and software- defined radios that is planned to provide the capability to receive,  transmit, and relay voice, data, and video. In the past, tactical military  radios could not work well with each other. The JTRS radio is also being  designed as the primary user terminal for the new MUOS satellite  capability to help the warfighter achieve information superiority. Although  MUOS will be able to provide capability through other, legacy user  terminals, DOD estimates that less than 20 percent of JTRS terminals will  be available to access the MUOS satellite when it achieves operational on- orbit capability in December 2011. In 2014, when MUOS is expected to  reach full operational capability, 32 percent of JTRS terminals are  expected to be available to the warfighter. DOD expects to field all the  needed JTRS terminals by 2021—about 7 years after MUOS is expected to  be fully operational. In the past, we have expressed concerns about the  JTRS program because of problems with requirements, technology  development, and program management. A recent DOD independent  program assessment concluded that the interface between MUOS and the  JTRS radios and satellite contained unwarranted risk.
Military GPS user equipment. DOD also plans to field extensive—both in  quantity and type—GPS user equipment and terminals to assist with  positioning and navigation on a variety of air, ground, and sea platforms to  utilize a modernized military signal (M-code), designed to be secure and  jam resistant. This signal is planned to reach its initial operating capability  on the GPS satellites and ground control system by 2014. While user  terminals will start to receive and process the signal in 2014 as they are  being fielded leading up to 2025, the user equipment and terminals are not  expected to be fully fielded and operational until 2025. As a result, the  military services’ ability to achieve a joint navigation capability, an  essential element of conducting future military operations, may not be  fully realized until 2025. In a 2007 memo from United States Strategic  Command (STRATCOM) to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  the combatant command expressed concern that new GPS capabilities will  not be realized in a timely manner because of the lack of alignment  between the major GPS components.
section_title: Implications on Warfighters and the Testing Community
paragraphs: When space capabilities are not delivered in a coordinated manner or are  partially delivered, the warfighter will either not have certain capabilities  available when expected or may have to develop short-term solutions  while waiting for the expected capability. Officials from one warfighting  command (users of the capability) told us that because of the 2-year gap  between when all MUOS satellites reach on-orbit capability and when the  MUOS-capable user terminals (JTRS) first become available, the MUOS  satellites will have spent a portion of their expected lifespan less than fully  utilized. This issue concerns the combatant command because MUOS is  replacing the aging Ultra High Frequency Follow-On space system, which  currently serves more military customers than it was originally designed to  handle. While waiting for the JTRS capability, the command will likely  have to lease commercial satellite capability and user terminals to increase  bandwidth capacity and improve the speed and effectiveness of  information and communication transfers.
The testing community is also significantly affected when satellite delivery  is not aligned with ground control systems and user terminals, according  to officials from the Office of the Director of Operational Test and  Evaluation (DOT&E). If all three space system components—satellites,  ground control systems, and user terminals—are not working together,  they essentially do not represent actual system capability, thus requiring  nonrepresentative equipment to be used in testing and possibly yielding  results that are not characteristic of the actual system. Overall, DOT&E  officials identified alignment issues as the most significant obstacle to  their obtaining credible and useful test results. However, these officials  also noted that there have been recent efforts by some space system  programs to better synchronize satellite capabilities with their ground  systems. For example, MUOS will have production-representative satellite  and ground control systems available for testing, which will facilitate  optimal operational testing.
DOT&E officials identified GPS as a specific example of where delays in  delivery of ground assets have hampered testing. The GPS program office  has not yet fully developed the ground control software designed to  prevent spoofing of navigation information. The unavailability of this  software has delayed both the testing and the use of the antispoofing  capability by the warfighter. Had the needed ground system component  been fielded as scheduled, this capability could have been tested shortly  after user equipment started being delivered to the warfighter in 2004. As it  stands now, by the time testing of these functionalities is conducted, the  entire constellation of satellites will have been launched. DOT&E officials  told us that recently the GPS program has undertaken efforts to align  schedules to achieve a higher degree of overall synchronization, which  should facilitate more effective testing.
Another example involved JTRS user terminals, which are 2 years behind  MUOS. While the MUOS satellite and ground control systems are ready for  testing with production-representative equipment, representative user  terminals are not. Because operational testing relies on production- representative components, DOT&E officials will not be able to test the  overall system. For more examples of how less-than-optimal  synchronization issues can affect testing, see appendix II.
section_title: Acquisition and Other Problems Contribute to a Lack of Space System Component Alignment
paragraphs: Though there are inherent difficulties in aligning delivery of satellites,  ground control systems, and user terminals, the lack of synchronization  between segments of space acquisition programs is largely the result of  the same core issues that hamper acquisition in general—requirements  instability, funding instability, insufficient technology maturity,  underestimation of complexity, and poor contractor oversight, among  other issues. Previous GAO reports on DOD acquisitions have consistently  linked such problems to significant cost increases and schedule delays. In  addition, user terminals are not optimally aligned because of a lack of  coordination and effective oversight over the many military organizations  that either develop user terminals or have some hand in development.
subsections: section_title: Acquisition Problems
paragraphs: The satellite, ground system, and user terminal programs we studied have  had execution problems that have caused substantial delays in schedule  that in turn have made it more difficult to align delivery of all three space  system components. Most prominent are requirements changes, technical  problems resulting from underestimation of complexity, and poor  contractor oversight. The first satellite delivery of SBIRS, for instance, has  been delayed at least 7 years in part because of poor oversight, technical  complexities, and rework. The first satellite delivery for NPOESS is over 4  years late. AEHF has experienced delays of about 3 years for these  reasons along with requirements changes that occurred earlier in the  program and difficulties meeting information assurance requirements for  its satellite. The GPS IIF system has also had about a 3-year delay because  of technical and workmanship problems and requirements changes.  Ground systems and user terminals have experienced similar problems.   JTRS, for example, has experienced significant delays because of  problems in maturing critical technologies, and as noted earlier, FAB-T  delays have occurred because of contractor performance problems. Also,  as noted earlier, the WGS ground system has experienced technical  problems that have prevented it from working properly with WGS  satellites now in orbit.
We have previously reported that space acquisition problems are leading  to potential gaps in the delivery of critical capabilities, and that with too  many programs in its portfolio, DOD is forced to continually shift funds to  and from programs. Additionally, DOD has preferred to make fewer but  more complex satellites, which has stretched technology challenges  beyond current capabilities in some cases, and vastly increased the  complexities related to software. Also, there is no way to accurately  estimate how long the design, development, and construction of a satellite  system will take when critical technologies planned for that system are  still in relatively early stages of discovery and invention. These factors and  more can contribute to the inherent challenges in aligning delivery of  space system components.
Underestimating software complexity has also been a problem. The  complexity of software on any system, including space systems, is often  denoted by the amount of software, or number of lines of software code.  Generally, the greater the number of lines of code, the more complicated  the software system development, and ground control systems typically  require significantly more software than the satellites. This means that  software development for ground control systems is oftentimes the higher  risk. In some cases, unanticipated software complexity can lead to lack of  synchronization between the satellite and ground systems of space system  acquisitions. For example, on the AEHF space system, the prime  contractor has experienced quality control problems with the software for  the mission planning element of the ground control system. In testing so  far, the government has identified numerous significant software  deficiencies and continues to find deficiencies as testing continues.  Ground control system fielding will be delayed until the deficiencies are  corrected. Also, our past work has shown that the MUOS ground control  software represented one of the greatest risks to the program because of  the size and complexity of the design. On SBIRS, the total estimated lines  of code on the ground control system software grew from approximately  1.55 million in August 2004 to approximately 1.88 million in December  2008.
In at least one case, delays being experienced as a result of program  execution development difficulties in satellite programs may actually offer  a ground control or user terminal program some schedule relief. For  example, when the AEHF space system was forced to delay the launch of  its first two satellites because of issues that arose during vacuum testing,  the unplanned delay allowed time for ground control system and user  terminal capabilities to catch up to the revised satellite launch dates so  that they are now planned to be fielded closer together. At the same time,  however, these difficulties may ultimately require changes in requirements  or designs that can create disruptive changes to ground control and user  terminal programs.
We have made numerous recommendations over the past decade aimed at  reducing execution problems experienced in weapon system and space  system programs, many of which inherently make it more difficult to align  delivery of space system components and achieve better synchronization.  Generally, we have recommended that DOD separate technology  discovery from acquisition, follow an incremental path toward meeting  user needs, match resources and requirements at program start, and use  quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move  to next phases. We have also identified practices related to cost  estimating, program manager tenure, quality assurance, technology  transition, and an array of other aspects of acquisition program  management that space systems could benefit from.
section_title: Funding Shifts
paragraphs: Space system acquisition programs sometimes shift funds from the  development of ground control systems to their associated satellite  development efforts to meet unexpected obstacles—an action that can  create new problems. For example, when the GPS IIF satellite program  encountered development problems, the program shifted funds set aside  for the GPS ground control system to address the satellite problems,  causing a delay in the delivery of some ground control capabilities.  Similarly, SBIRS officials reallocated funding from the ground control  system to address satellite software issues, which may have contributed to  the system’s initial inability to utilize the staring sensor data from the first  geosynchronous earth orbit satellite. Program officials told us that they  like the flexibility of being able to move funds from ground control  systems to the satellites if priorities warrant. However, as we indicated  above, this can put the development of ground control systems at a  disadvantage compared to development of the satellites for space systems,  for example, GPS and SBIRS.
section_title: Lack of Coordinated Planning among Organizations Involved in Development
paragraphs: DOD program office officials told us the primary reason that user  terminals are not optimally synchronized is a lack of coordination and  effective oversight over the many military organizations that either  develop user terminals or have some hand in the development. For some  systems, user terminal development could involve several different  organizations and a complex sequencing of events. For example, in the  case of GPS, the Air Force must first develop prototype electronic  modules and production-ready receiver hardware for selected platforms  within the space, air, ground, and maritime environments—a process that  can take several years. After this is done, each of the military services will  still need to procure the new user equipment and install it on a range of  other platforms. Given the breadth of equipment that the terminals must  be installed on and the need to coordinate installations with existing  maintenance schedules, the process of realizing capability could take 10 or  more years. Thus, user terminal programs need to have timely funding and  be well-coordinated.
In the case of GPS, this advance planning did not take place, and it is likely  that the installation of user equipment that can take advantage of the  satellites’ modernized military signal (M-code), designed to be secure and  jam resistant, will not be completed until 2025. We reported earlier this  year that there was a lack of coordination with GPS and that no single  authority was responsible for synchronizing GPS satellites and ground  systems and user terminals. Both the Defense Science Board and the U.S.  Space Commission identified the same problem in earlier reports. A  January 2001 study by DOD’s U.S. Space Commission noted that when  satellites and ground control systems are funded in one budget and user  terminals in another, the result can be a lack of synchronization in the  acquisition of satellites and their associated user terminals because of this  decentralized arrangement.
In another example, the responsibility for developing and acquiring the  MUOS satellite and associated ground control systems falls under the  Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, but responsibility for  developing and acquiring JTRS user equipment and terminals associated  with MUOS falls under a joint program office with multiple services  involved. Under this structure, there is no single office or group  responsible for the coordination of these two interdependent program  offices to help achieve better synchronization. However, MUOS program  officials told us that in 2004 they began to recognize that their program’s  success was tied to the JTRS program and there was a need to coordinate  and address synchronization and other issues. As a result, a formal group  was established to address systems engineering coordination issues under  both programs. While this group does not constitute a single authority  responsible for synchronizing MUOS and JTRS, program officials stated  that it has helped resolve coordination issues.
Officials from a third program, AEHF, agreed that space system  synchronization challenges often result from the way the military services  are organized to manage the various space system components. Officials  told us that satellites and associated user terminals are often not well  synchronized because they are frequently managed by different military  services with different development contracts and funding accounts. They  said that they would like for all of the terminals to be fielded at the same  time, but because of the independent nature of these programs and their  complexity, they are unable to synchronize them to a greater extent. These  officials acknowledged that it would help if there was one person or  organization that could oversee all the components of a satellite system,  both within a service and among services, to help ensure that satellites and  their user terminals are better synchronized. We recently reported that  DOD’s acquisition process is not well designed to manage across programs  in part because the military services have traditionally focused on  developing and acquiring systems to meet their own specific missions and  have placed relatively less emphasis on developing and acquiring the types  of interoperable systems needed to meet the demands of joint operations.
Finally, another factor contributing to user terminal delays is the  difficulties some programs have in anticipating security requirements and  gaining approval from the National Security Agency (NSA), which is  responsible for certifying a satellite system’s information security. In the  past, we have reported on delays in obtaining NSA’s certification  associated with the AEHF and MUOS space systems. In addition, the risk  of this potential delay is not always fully known at program inception. For  example, in the AEHF program, the changing nature of security  requirements placed stress on an already tight schedule by adding a high  level of complexity to the program’s user terminal efforts. In the case of  MUOS, which is associated with the JTRS user terminal, NSA determined  that the user terminal’s existing security architecture was not adequate,  and as a result, NSA declined to certify the system until changes were  made to its architecture.
section_title: Efforts Are Being Made to Achieve Better Alignment of Satellite, Ground Control System, and User Terminal Deliveries, but They Are Limited by Lack of Guidance and Cost Data
paragraphs: There are efforts in place focused specifically at better aligning delivery of  satellite, ground system, and user terminals as well as reducing the kinds  of acquisition problems that contribute to delays that make alignment  difficult. However, it remains to be seen how effective these will be.  Moreover, improvements are likely to be hampered by a lack of guidance  to help plan for and coordinate the development of satellite and ground  systems and a lack of transparency into the costs of ground control  systems and user terminals.
In 2005, DOD’s Joint Terminal Engineering Office (JTEO) began  monitoring the alignment of military satellite communication space  systems, including satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals.  JTEO analyzes program plans, schedules, and budgets; identifies  interdependent systems that are not aligned; and analyzes the impact of  systems that are not aligned and shares the results of its analysis with a  wide variety of organizations involved with military communications  satellites. JTEO uses guidance established by STRATCOM to define basic  and optimal synchronization to assess the level of synchronization of  military satellite communications space systems. However, officials from  both JTEO and STRATCOM acknowledged that these definitions are  somewhat arbitrary and do not really measure what is most important— capability provided to the warfighter via a certain level of synchronization  related to a space system’s components. Further, JTEO only tracks  synchronization of military satellite communications space systems, not  the space systems involved with other space missions.
Also, the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics, has recently been utilizing an advisory body called the  Narrowband SATCOM Systems Engineering Group to focus specifically on  the alignment of MUOS and JTRS given the extent of schedule gaps and  the importance of JTRS to MUOS. The advisory body seeks to anticipate  and identify the technical challenges between MUOS and JTRS and any  other interdependent systems.
In addition, the Air Force is attempting to mitigate some of the  contributing factors that create synchronization issues by separating the  acquisition of satellites and their ground control systems, intending to  ensure that ground systems receive increased oversight. Specifically, the  GPS program recently split the acquisition and funding of the GPS IIIA  satellites from its ground control system. While both acquisitions remain  under the same GPS program management, GPS officials told us that they  expect the funding separation to yield greater government oversight of the  contractor and increased control over programmatic decisions. For  example, if a satellite encounters a problem during development, a  contractor may be tempted to make changes to the satellite’s operating  software. Such changes, which could add time and rework to the ground  control system’s software development effort, might not receive attention  from the government. By acquiring the satellites and ground system  separately, GPS program officials believe that acquisition changes will  have to be approved through program management, and that more  generally, the ground programs would receive more focused oversight  than they receive now. Officials also indicated that when programs use the  same contractor to develop both the satellite and ground control systems,  the government can be beholden to the single contractor to deliver some  capability, even if contractor performance falls below expectations.
Other actions have been taken to improve program execution within space  and other weapon programs that have the potential to improve DOD’s  ability to align delivery of satellites with ground and user terminals. For  example, the Air Force is planning to conduct a review in November 2009  with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to enable better management  of GPS as an enterprise instead of as many individual programs. Further,  within the space community, the Air Force has been emphasizing the use  of an incremental development approach where it will gradually meet the  needs of its users, and it is requiring space programs to make independent  technology readiness assessments at particular points in the acquisition  process. For some newer space programs, such as GPS III, the Air Force  has taken actions to ensure that requirements remain stable and to hold  contractors more accountable for their performance. The Office of  Networks Information and Integration within the Office of the Secretary of  Defense has also developed tools to enable better coordination among  interdependent programs, such as the Net-Centric Integrated Master  Schedule, an online software program designed to provide insight to  program schedules, key events, and most importantly cross-program  dependencies, to more effectively synchronize aspects of the net-centric  portfolio, including space system acquisitions. Moreover, recently passed  acquisition reform legislation also sets requirements for space and other  programs to increase emphasis on systems engineering and developmental  testing, preliminary design reviews, and technology readiness  assessments. We recently testified that actions that the Air Force and the  Office of the Secretary of Defense have been taking to address problems  related to technology development are good steps. However, there are still  more significant changes to processes, policies, and support needed to  ensure that reforms can take hold, including addressing the diffused  leadership for space programs, which hampers the ability of DOD to  synchronize delivery of space, ground, and user assets for space programs.
subsections: section_title: Limited Insight into Costs of Ground Systems and User Terminals Can Hamper Oversight
paragraphs: DOD’s efforts to improve coordination of satellite, ground control system,  and user terminal efforts may be hampered by a lack of transparency in  the costs associated with ground control systems and user terminals. To  identify the costs associated with the poor synchronization of space  system components, we attempted to determine development and  procurement costs associated with ground control systems. However,  several of DOD’s space system acquisitions do not break out these costs  through their standard reporting measures, reporting instead combined  satellite and ground system costs. We asked the program offices to provide  separate costs for their ground control systems, and while most programs  were able to provide some information, officials with two programs— AEHF and GPS—told us that they did not officially track cost information  in this manner. The next-generation GPS ground control system is being  acquired under a separate contract than the satellites which could allow  the program to separate cost information. Without better cost information  on ground control systems, congressional decision makers and  appropriators have limited insight into costs, and the possibility of cost  overruns, for ground control systems of major space systems.
Table 3 shows the six space systems that were able to provide cost  information that distinguished the development and procurement costs of  their satellites from the development and procurement costs of their  ground control systems. It also shows the two space systems, AEHF and  GPS, that were not able to officially break out and distinguish  development and procurement costs between satellites and their ground  control systems.
Although six programs were able to provide some information that  distinguished costs between satellites and ground control systems, the  programs did not report this information separately in their Selected  Acquisition Reports (SAR). DOD officials at one program office told us  that they do not break out these costs because they have a combined  contract for development of the satellites and ground control systems.
Officials at another program explained that when a program uses one  contractor for satellite and ground control system development, it has  flexibility to move funds between satellite and ground control system  development, as necessary. As a result, it can be difficult to identify, track,  and report separate cost information for satellites and ground control  systems. However, the Air Force initiative to separate the acquisition of  satellites and their ground control systems might make it easier to track  and report separate cost information. In addition, the overall acquisition  costs associated with user terminal programs are also difficult to  determine because different DOD organizations often manage these  acquisitions. Even though user terminals are what allow for the day-to-day  use of a typical space system’s capabilities by military services in the field,  the costs of user terminal programs are not usually reported along with, or  as part of, the total space system. This can result in a lack of transparency  regarding the total costs of all components of a space system.
section_title: Opportunities Exist to Enhance the Capabilities of Satellite Ground Systems
paragraphs: DOD has typically developed and operated its ground systems in a  stovepiped manner. Specifically, each ground system’s development is  dedicated to a particular satellite system for a specific mission area, such  as communications, missile warning, navigation, space object tracking, or  weather monitoring. As a result, ground systems generally only receive  and process data from the satellites for which they were developed. They  generally do not control and operate more than one type of satellite and  they generally do not share their data with other ground systems. More  important, there are few ground systems that are capable of fusing data  from multiple space systems to enhance military and intelligence planning  and operations.
In recent years, however, information technology has migrated toward  common architectures and systems that enabled systems that were  traditionally stovepiped to share or even fuse data to maximize their value.  There is a consensus among officials we spoke with—including individuals  from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,  Technology and Logistics; the Joint Requirements Oversight Council;  National Reconnaissance Office; Office of the Secretary of the Air Force;  Air Force Space Command; and Lincoln Laboratory (a federally funded  research and development center)—that investments in ground systems  can be optimized in two ways. First, common ground systems can be built  to operate and control multiple satellite systems rather than just one.  Second, ground systems or other types of information technology can be  used to combine or fuse data from multiple space assets to optimize  planning and execution of military operations. Several of the officials we  spoke with in fact believe that including air-, land-, and sea-based sensor  data in addition to satellite data in such systems or architectures could  ultimately reduce the current level of capability needed in space. We have  also reported in the past that designing systems with common subsystems  and components and using an open systems design approach can reduce  production and life cycle costs.
Several of these officials, however, also identified obstacles to such  commonality. These obstacles include getting agreement on a common  design, meaning whether it will be based primarily on the warfighter’s  needs or cost savings, and overcoming the resistance of different DOD  organizations to sharing their data and trusting that the data will not be  misused.
Moreover, progress on building common ground systems or technology  that can fuse data from a variety of sensors in the military has been  limited. One satellite control facility operated by the Navy, known as  Blossom Point, does operate a ground system that can control a variety  of national security satellites. The facility uses a common approach  (architecture) to command and control the satellites as well as receive and  analyze data and information transmitted from the satellites. The common  approach allows the facility to reuse a large percentage of the existing  software across multiple satellites. Typically, 80 percent of the software  required on the ground to operate the satellites can be reused and only  about 20 percent is unique and has to be created for that new system.  However, the facility primarily operates nonmilitary space systems and  according to Blossom Point officials, no major Navy or Air Force space  system uses the facility even though the capacity and capability exists. The  Air Force has no similar facility, opting instead to primarily develop  unique ground control systems for each satellite system. In addition,  there are efforts currently being planned at the Air Force’s Space and  Missile Systems Center that will fuse early missile warning information  from SBIRS and information from the next generation of infrared missile  detection satellites. These efforts are aimed at eliminating the need for the  Air Force to develop separate dedicated ground control systems.   However, these efforts are in the planning stages.
In 2004, DOD established policy directing that data collected by various  means, including space systems, be made visible and accessible to any  potential user in DOD by making them available in shared spaces, but  again, according to the individuals we interviewed, this has not made  progress because of resistance to sharing data as well as system design,  development, and operation. Confirming these views, in 2009, DOD’s  Defense Science Board reported that while DOD has initiated some  efforts to achieve interoperability, it is a long way from achieving the  desired level of interoperability in several areas, including satellite  communication.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD’s space systems continue to offer opportunities to enhance and  transform how the military conducts its operations. But such  opportunities are being limited or delayed because of problems in  synchronizing the delivery of space, ground, and user assets. While  synchronization is inherently difficult for space systems and complete  synchronization is practically unattainable, there are relatively  straightforward actions that can be taken to allow for better  synchronization. These include better coordination among the many  players involved with development and more transparency into and  awareness of program complexity, costs, consequences of delays, and  criteria to help planning and oversight. DOD has appropriately started  taking some of these actions, but expanding this effort could increase cost  transparency. Moreover, in response to previous recommendations, DOD  has taken actions to address long-standing acquisition problems and  ensure that development of the three space system components is  knowledge based. Without doing so, synchronization will not be achieved  even if coordination and guidance are strengthened. Because acquisition  improvements are still relatively recent, the success of these efforts will  not be known for some time. Lastly, there are opportunities to increase the  quality and usefulness of data collected from satellites that DOD has been  slow to take advantage of. In this case, technical obstacles seem to be  easier to overcome than cultural obstacles. DOD has already issued  policies to adopt approaches that would facilitate data sharing and senior  leaders have been encouraging such approaches, but they have not been  implemented. Resistance and lack of coordination among the individual  organizations that develop and use space systems are seen by some as key  factors. As such, it may be in DOD’s best interest to support small-scale  demonstrations of new architectures and technologies, such as DOD  planned efforts to fuse missile warning information, and find ways to  incentivize programs to participate in these demonstrations.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help DOD space systems provide more capability to the warfighter  through better synchronization and increased commonality, and to provide  increased insight into the costs associated with ground assets, we are  making five recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
Define a basic level of expected synchronization during the development  of each space system acquisition based on delivering a capability to the  warfighter.
Assess the value of designating an office with responsibility for overseeing  the relative progress of satellite, ground, and user terminal programs with  the aim of ensuring that problems that could affect the ability to  synchronize a space system are known and addressed.
Formulate guidance to better align space system components so that all  components are available to facilitate optimal operational testing.
Develop DOD-wide guidance, specific to space systems, to allow for the  integration and consolidation, to the extent feasible, of DOD’s current and  future satellite ground control systems via common ground architecture or  by other similar means.
Provide annual documentation to Congress (in SARs or in other  documents) that specifically delineates the cost, and cost performance,  associated with (1) the satellites, (2) the ground control systems, and (3)  associated user terminals, and as a result, provides the total cost of all  planned components of each space system acquisition.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. DOD  concurred with four of our recommendations and partially concurred with  a fifth recommendation and identified actions it has taken or plans to take  to address them. The comments are reprinted in appendix IV.
In partially concurring with our recommendation to formulate guidance to  align space system components to better facilitate optimal operational  testing, the department noted that it had taken some steps to better align  space system oversight and noted that it did not want to significantly delay  providing the warfighter with needed space system capabilities to optimize  operational testing. We agree that any efforts to optimize space system  operational testing should not result in significant delays in providing the  warfighter with needed capabilities.  However, the purpose of operational  testing is to ensure a system’s effectiveness and suitability for use by the  warfighter. Not being able to conduct operational testing with production- representative equipment can yield results that are not characteristic of  the actual system. This can also negatively affect the warfighter. Our  recommendation seeks to achieve a more pragmatic balance. It seems  reasonable and even beneficial to the warfighter to have guidance that  endorses operational testing that includes all of a space system’s  components, or at least as many components as can be feasibly tested  before delivery to the warfighter.
In concurring with our other recommendations, DOD identified actions it  has already taken that it believes will address our concerns. However, we  considered these actions in formulating our recommendations and found  that they did not go far enough to address the problems we identified. For  example, DOD cited a newly created Space and Intelligence Office within  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology  and Logistics as a means of enhancing oversight for space programs.   However, the office does not have oversight authority over all user  terminals. DOD also stated that total cost information on each space  system is provided to the Congress in SARs. However, these reports do not  currently capture satellite, ground system, and related user terminal costs  in a single document, which we found was needed to provide more  accessible and transparent data on total costs for space programs. To  improve synchronization and commonality of space systems, we believe  that DOD needs to go beyond what it is already doing. This is the intent of  our recommendations.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, and other interested parties. The  report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512- 4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are provided in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD)  manages the synchronization of capabilities between satellite and ground  components of satellite programs, we assessed eight DOD satellite  programs: the Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite (AEHF),  NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), Mobile User Objective  System (MUOS), National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental  Satellite System (NPOESS), Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), Space- Based Space Surveillance (SBSS), Space Tracking and Surveillance System  (STSS), and Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS). We developed and sent  data requests to the respective program offices, and examined planned  deployment dates for satellites, ground systems, and user terminals to  determine if capabilities will be synchronized. In making determinations  about whether space system acquisitions had synchronization issues, we  examined whether there were gaps between fielding dates of satellite  capabilities compared to ground system capabilities and whether lower  percentages of user terminal types were planned to be fielded by the space  system acquisitions’ planned initial capability. Programs without gaps  between fielding dates of satellite capabilities and ground system  capabilities and that had plans for higher percentages of user terminal  types to be fielded by their associated space system’s initial capability,  were determined to be synchronized. While there is no DOD standard by  which to measure lack of synchronization between satellite capabilities  and ground system capabilities, we generally only considered aspects of a  space acquisition unsynchronized if there was a gap of years, rather than  months, between the fielding dates of significant capabilities. Regarding  user terminals, we only considered these unsynchronized compared to  satellite capabilities when user terminals did not meet DOD’s measure of  synchronization for military satellite communications space acquisitions.  This DOD measure of basic synchronization, established by U.S. Strategic  Command (STRATCOM) says that 20 percent of any type of user terminal  should be fielded by a space system acquisition’s initial capability date and  85 percent should be fielded by its full capability date. Although DOD  officials acknowledged that these definitions are somewhat arbitrary and  do not really measure what is most important—capability provided to the  warfighter via a certain level of synchronization—this is the only DOD  measure of space system synchronization.
We analyzed four programs (AEHF, GPS, MUOS, and SBIRS) in greater  detail to better understand the causes of less-than-optimal  synchronization. We also reviewed various reports and analyses that  identified factors contributing to a lack of synchronization. To determine  the effect(s) of space systems that are not synchronized, we interviewed  combatant commanders (in STRATCOM, Omaha, Nebraska; U.S. Special  Operations Command, Tampa, Florida; and U.S. Central Command,  Tampa, Florida) and testing personnel from the Office of the Director of  Operational Testing and Evaluation, Washington, D.C., to determine if  programs are optimally synchronized for testing and the consequences if  they are not. We also analyzed cost data for the various programs to  determine how much money was allocated to the satellites versus the  ground control systems.
To determine whether enhancements could be made to ground control  systems and what challenges must be overcome to better utilize space  systems, we interviewed DOD and government personnel at the Joint  Requirements Oversight Council, Washington, D.C.; Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington,  D.C.; National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia; Office of the  Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.; United States Air Force  Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles, California; the Navy’s  Blossom Point Tracking Facility, Maryland; and RAND Corporation, Los  Angeles, California.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 to September  2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Summary of Synchronization Issues Affecting Testing
paragraphs: AEHF. A communications satellite intended to  provide global, secure, jam-resistant  communications capability for strategic and  tactical warfighters.
The prime contractor has experienced significant software development problems  (issuing numerous deficiency reports) with an aspect of the ground control system  that controls mission planning. Ground control system fielding will be delayed until  the deficiencies are corrected and verified by the government testers.
The Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) command post  terminal for command and control (ability to “fly”) of AEHF will be delayed. As a  result, an interim, non-production-representative command and control terminal  will have to be relied upon for testing and initial support of AEHF. In order to  determine that a space system is operationally effective and suitable, production- representative equipment for all components must be in place for operational  testing.
MOUS. A communications satellite designed  to provide a worldwide, multiservice  population of mobile and fixed terminal users  with narrow-band line of sight satellite  communications capability. MUOS will be  capable of operating in adverse weather  conditions.
Delays in the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) terminals mean that these are  not well synchronized with MUOS. As a result, there may be no production- representative JTRS available for MUOS operational testing scheduled for fiscal  year 2010, which will affect the ability to test several aspects of MUOS.
Because of development delays, the majority of MUOS testing will be conducted  in a laboratory instead of an operational platform environment. This will limit the  capability to assess operational effectiveness and suitability issues associated  with satellites’ payload performance in their intended environment.
GPS. A navigation satellite with a space- based radio-positioning system providing  navigation and timing data to military and  civilian users worldwide.
The development delays of a ground control system capable of commanding  several significant satellite capabilities, which are designed to ensure that military  GPS signals are secure, has delayed both testing and operational use of the  capabilities. These capabilities could have been tested in 2005 if there had been  no delays, but now they most likely will not be tested until 2010. As a result, by  the time operational testing can be conducted for these significant capabilities, the  entire GPS constellation (Block IIR-M and IIF satellites) will have already been  launched, eliminating the opportunity for operational testing to influence the  development of those satellites before they launch. Therefore, the overall lack of  GPS program synchronization limits the utility of operational testing.
SBIRS. A missile warning satellite designed  to meet requirements in the missile warning,  missile defense, technical intelligence, and  battlespace characterization missions.
The hardware for an important sensor capability was placed on the first increment  of SBIRS satellites, but because of problems, the associated software to enable  full utilization of the sensor data will not be available. As a result, this sensor’s  data will be available years before it can be fully utilized. From a testing  standpoint, this means that initial satellite capabilities cannot be tested in time to  affect the subsequent increment of satellites.
There has also been instability in the plan for the ground control system  architecture because system requirements have continued to change. These  requirements changes have led to ground software development delays and, from  a test perspective, difficulties in developing an efficient test strategy.
WGS. A communications satellite designed to  provide essential communications services to  U.S. warfighters, allies, and coalition partners  during almost all levels of conflict.
The mission planning system does not work as intended. It was acquired  separately from the satellite, and its shortcomings affect the ability of the  Wideband Satellite Operations Center to perform its missions. This affects the  ability of testers to validate user operations.
section_title: Appendix III: Synchronization Issues between Satellites and User Terminals
subsections: section_title: -Initial operational capability (IOC) 2011 (two satellites fielded)
paragraphs: Function: Provide voice and data military satellite communications for  nuclear and conventional forces as well as airborne and ground command  posts. Synchronization issue: Two percent fielded by AEHF IOC (2011).
Ground Element Minimum Essential Emergency Communication  Network  Function: Fixed and deployable communication for alerting aircrew of  emergencies on bombers, tankers, and reconnaissance aircraft.  Synchronization issue: Sixty-four percent fielded by AEHF IOC (2011).
Minuteman Minimum Essential Emergency Communication Network  Program –-Upgrade  Function: Provides 24/7 survivable, redundant communication links for the  reception of emergency action messages and command and control of  ICBM force. Synchronization issue: Fifty-two percent fielded by AEHF IOC  (2011).
Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical Terminal  Function: Provide worldwide, low probability of intercept/detection, jam- resistant, survivable multichannel communications and robust operations.  Synchronization issue: Fifty-eight percent fielded by AEHF IOC (2011).
Function: Next generation of maritime satellite communication designed to  enhance protected and survivable satellite communications to naval forces.  Synchronization issue: Only 14 percent fielded by AEHF IOC (2011)
Military GPS user equipment:  DOD plans to field extensive GPS user equipment and terminals to assist  with positioning and navigation on a variety of air, ground, and sea  platforms. While we did not evaluate plans to field the many types of GPS  user equipment, we did examine when user equipment would be able to  utilize a modernized military signal (M-code), designed to be secure and  jam resistant.
Synchronization issue: The M-code signal is planned to reach its IOC on  the GPS satellites and ground control system by 2014. While user  terminals will start to receive and process the signal as they begin to be  fielded leading up to 2025, the user equipment and terminals are not  expected to be fully fielded and operational until that year. - IOC 2014 (one satellite  fielded)
AN-SMQ-11 – Navy Field Terminal  - FOC 2017 (number of  satellites not specified by  program)
Function: Fielded primarily shipboard, with some shore, depot, and training  assets. It ingests, processes, stores, and displays environmental data  records (EDR) from meteorology and oceanographic (METOC) satellite  families. Synchronization issue: System is currently fielded, but program  estimates that only 50 percent of population will be upgraded for NPOESS  compatibility by NPOESS IOC (2014).
AN-FMQ-17 - Navy Field Terminal  Function: Fielded on shore only. It ingests, processes, stores, and displays  EDRs from METOC satellite families. Synchronization issue: System is  currently fielded, but program estimates that only 67 percent of population  will be upgraded for NPOESS compatibility by NPOESS IOC (2014).
Field Terminal Segment (FTS) Mobile  Function: Signal Processing Element (SPE), Data Processing Element  (DPE), and Mission Applications Element (MAE). SPE receives, decrypts,  and conducts basic RF processing. DPE provides the data analysis  algorithms that transform the raw data into usable images and METOC  data. MAE provides the graphical user interface for the system, conducts  postprocessing analysis, and displays finished products. This capability is  highly desired in the FTS for size and weight considerations.  Synchronization issue: Twelve planned, but only 1 estimated to be  available by NPOESS IOC.
MARK IVB and RSS terminals  Function: Both types of terminals designed to receive geostationary  information. Synchronization issue: Systems are currently fielded and work  with legacy systems. Plans and funding are in place to achieve NPOESS  compatibility. - IOC 2011 (one satellite  fielded)  - FOC 2014 (when all five  satellites are fielded)
Function: Software-defined radios that will interoperate and increase  communication and networking capabilities. Synchronization issue: Less  than 20 percent of MUOS-capable JTRS terminals available by MUOS IOC  (on orbit capability) in late 2011.
Army, Navy, and Air Force - several airborne intelligence surveillance  reconnaissance terminals  - IOC 2009 (one satellite  fielded)  - FOC 2013 (when all five  satellites are fielded)
Synchronization issue: SADT for Predator/Reaper UAV, FAB-T Increment  2, and the Aerial Common Sensor—all zero percent fielded as of WGS IOC  (2009).
Legend: IOC = Initial Operational Capability; FOC = Full Operational Capability.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; Michael Aiken; Greg Campbell; John  Crawford; Claire Cyrnak; John Krump; and Don Springman.