Environmental Satellites: Launch Delayed; NOAA Faces Key Decisions on Timing of Future Satellites
Published: 2015-12-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: NOAA is procuring the next generation of polar and geostationary weather satellites to replace aging satellites that are approaching the end of their useful lives. GAO has reported that gaps in polar satellite coverage and in backup coverage for geostationary satellites are likely in the near future. Given the criticality of satellite data to weather forecasts, concerns that problems and delays on the new satellite programs will result in gaps in the continuity of critical satellite data, and the impact such gaps could have on the health and safety of the U.S. population, GAO added mitigating weather satellite gaps to its High-Risk List in 2013 and it remained on the list in 2015.
GAO was asked to testify, among other things, on the cause and impact of a recent launch delay on the GOES-R program, and the status and key remaining challenges on the JPSS program. To do so, GAO relied on prior reports issued from 2012 to 2015 as well as on ongoing work on both programs. That work included analyzing progress reports and interviewing officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) $10.9 billion Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) program recently delayed the planned launch of the first satellite in the new series from March 2016 to October 2016. Based on its ongoing work, GAO found that the decision to delay the launch was due to poor schedule performance over the last few years (losing more than 10 days a month on average), recent technical issues with key components, and little schedule margin as the program entered integration testing. The October 2016 launch date may also be delayed if additional technical challenges arise or if schedule performance remains poor.
NOAA recently changed assumptions about the expected lifespan of existing GOES satellites from 7 to 10 years based on the longevity of prior satellites. However, the analysis supporting this change is over 10 years old. Even with this extension, NOAA may fall short of its policy of having 2 operational satellites and 1 backup satellite in orbit. The agency faces an 11 month gap in backup coverage until GOES-R is operational, during which time there would be only 2 operational satellites (see figure). Any further delays in the GOES-R launch date could exacerbate that gap. NOAA is now facing important decisions on when to launch the remaining satellites in the GOES-R series to maximize satellite coverage while minimizing development and storage costs.
Based on its ongoing work, GAO found that NOAA's $11.3 billion Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program is making progress toward the planned launch of the JPSS-1 satellite in March 2017. However, the program has experienced technical issues that have affected internal schedule deadlines, such as an issue with debris in an instrument's subsystem that delayed its delivery by approximately 8 months, and faces key risks in the remainder of development. NOAA is also facing the risk of a potential near-term gap in polar data prior to the launch of the JPSS-1 satellite. Similar to the decision on the GOES satellites, in April 2015, NOAA revised its assumptions about the expected life of the satellite that is currently in-orbit by adding up to 4 years, which would reduce the chance of a near-term gap. However, risks to the performance and health of the on-orbit satellite, and to development of the JPSS2 satellite could increase the risk of a gap. Also, NOAA faces key decisions on timing the development and launch of the remaining JPSS satellites to ensure satellite continuity while balancing the possibility that satellites could last much longer than anticipated.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement, but—since 2012—has made 23 recommendations to NOAA to strengthen its satellite acquisition programs and contingency plans. The department agreed with GAO's recommendations and is taking steps to implement them. To date, NOAA has implemented 6 recommendations and is working to address the remaining 17. Timely implementation of these recommendations will help mitigate program risks.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on two  important satellite acquisition programs within the Department of  Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  Both the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series  (GOES-R) and the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) are expected to  replace current operational satellites as they near the end of their  expected lifespans. Both programs are critical to the United States’ ability  to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting.
As requested, this statement discusses (1) the GOES-R program: our  prior concerns about the program’s schedule, recent events that have  delayed the planned launch date and their impact, and key decisions  facing the program as it moves forward; and (2) the JPSS program: our  prior findings on key risks and the potential for a satellite data gap, as well  as the program’s current status and key remaining challenges. To  prepare this testimony, we relied on the work supporting our prior reports  on GOES-R and JPSS. More detailed information on our objectives,  scope, and methodology for that work can be found in the issued reports.  We also obtained information on the current status and key challenges  facing the JPSS program through ongoing work we are doing for the full  Committee, which is to be issued in spring 2016. We assessed  documentation associated with NOAA’s efforts to address our prior  recommendations on both programs. Specifically, we analyzed program  office documents on cost, schedule, and key risks, and assessed  changes in assumptions on the longevity of existing satellites. We also  interviewed program officials and key contractors. We confirmed facts  and analyses presented in this statement with NOAA officials.
All of our work was performed and is being conducted in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, the United States has used geostationary and polar- orbiting satellites to observe the earth and its land, ocean, atmosphere,  and space environments. Geostationary satellites maintain a fixed  position relative to the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in  space. In contrast, polar-orbiting satellites circle the earth in a nearly  north-south orbit, providing global observation of conditions that affect the  weather and climate. As the earth rotates beneath it, each polar-orbiting  satellite views the entire earth’s surface twice a day.
Both types of satellites provide a valuable perspective of the environment  and allow observations in areas that may be otherwise unreachable.  Used in combination with ground, sea, and airborne observing systems,  satellites have become an indispensable part of monitoring and  forecasting weather and climate. For example, geostationary satellites  provide the graphical images used to identify current weather patterns  and provide short-term warning. Polar-orbiting satellites provide the data  that go into numerical weather prediction models, which are a primary tool  for forecasting weather days in advance—including forecasting the path  and intensity of hurricanes. These weather products and models are used  to predict the potential impact of severe weather so that communities and  emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate its effects.
Federal agencies are currently planning and executing major satellite  acquisition programs to replace existing geostationary and polar satellite  systems that are nearing the end of their expected life spans. However,  these programs have troubled legacies of cost increases, missed  milestones, technical problems, and management challenges that have  resulted in reduced functionality and major delays to planned launch  dates over time. We and others—including an independent review team  reporting to the Department of Commerce and the department’s Inspector  General—have raised concerns that problems and delays with  environmental satellite acquisition programs will result in gaps in the  continuity of critical satellite data used in weather forecasts and warnings.
According to officials at NOAA, a polar satellite data gap would result in  less accurate and timely weather forecasts and warnings of extreme  events, such as hurricanes, storm surges, and floods. Such degradation  in forecasts and warnings would place lives, property, and our nation’s  critical infrastructures in danger. The importance of having such data  available was highlighted in 2012 by the advance warnings of the path,  timing, and intensity of Superstorm Sandy.
Given the criticality of satellite data to weather forecasts, concerns that  problems and delays on the new satellite acquisition programs will result  in gaps in the continuity of critical satellite data, and the impact of such  gaps on the health and safety of the U.S. population, we concluded that  the potential gap in weather satellite data is a high-risk area. We added  this area to our High-Risk List in 2013 and it remained on the High-Risk  List in 2015.
subsections: section_title: The GOES-R Program: An Overview
paragraphs: NOAA operates a two-satellite geostationary satellite system that is  primarily focused on the United States (see figure 1). The GOES-R series  is the next generation of satellites that NOAA is planning; the satellites  are planned to replace existing weather satellites. The ability of the  satellites to provide broad, continuously updated coverage of atmospheric  conditions over land and oceans is important to NOAA’s weather  forecasting operations.
NOAA is responsible for GOES-R program funding and overall mission  success, and has implemented an integrated program management  structure with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)  for the GOES-R program. Within the program office, there are two project  offices that manage key components of the GOES-R system. NOAA has  delegated responsibility to NASA to manage the Flight Project Office,  including awarding and managing the spacecraft contract and delivering  flight-ready instruments to the spacecraft. The Ground Project Office,  managed by NOAA, oversees the Core Ground System contract and  satellite data product development and distribution.
The program estimates that the development for all four satellites in the  GOES-R series will cost $10.9 billion through 2036. In 2013, NOAA  announced that it would delay the launch of the GOES-R and S satellites  from October 2015 and February 2017 to March 2016 and May 2017,  respectively.
Since 2012, we have issued three reports on the GOES-R program that  highlighted management challenges and the potential for a gap in backup  satellite coverage. In these reports, we made 12 recommendations to  NOAA to improve the management of the GOES-R program. These  recommendations included improving satellite contingency plans,  addressing shortfalls in defect management, and addressing weaknesses  in scheduling practices. The agency agreed with these recommendations.
As of October 2015, the agency implemented 4 of these  recommendations and is working on the remaining 8 recommendations.  For example, NOAA improved its geostationary satellite contingency plan  and improved its risk management processes. Also, while NOAA has  made progress by improving selected practices, it has not yet fully  implemented our recommendation to address multiple weaknesses in its  scheduling practices. For example, the agency included subcontractor  activities in its core ground schedule, but has not yet provided details  showing a realistic allocation of resources. We have ongoing efforts to  assess the agency’s progress in addressing the open recommendations.
section_title: The JPSS Program: An Overview
paragraphs: In addition to the geostationary satellite constellation, for over 40 years,  the United States has operated two separate operational polar-orbiting  meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-orbiting Operational  Environmental Satellite series, which is managed by NOAA, and the  Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), which is managed by  the Air Force. Currently, there is one operational Polar-orbiting  Operational Environmental Satellite (called the Suomi National Polar- orbiting Partnership, or S-NPP) and two operational DMSP satellites that  are positioned so that they cross the equator in the early morning,  midmorning, and early afternoon. In addition, the government relies on  data from a European satellite, called the Meteorological Operational  satellite, or Metop. Figure 2 illustrates the current operational polar  satellite constellation.
A May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and the  Department of Defense (DOD) to converge the two satellite programs into  a single satellite program—the National Polar-orbiting Operational  Environment Satellite System (NPOESS)—capable of satisfying both  civilian and military requirements. However, in the years after the program  was initiated, NPOESS encountered significant technical challenges in  sensor development, program cost growth, and schedule delays.
Faced with costs that were expected to reach about $15 billion and  launch schedules that were delayed by over 5 years, in February 2010,  the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy announced  that NOAA and DOD would no longer jointly procure NPOESS; instead,  each agency would plan and acquire its own satellite system. Specifically,  NOAA would be responsible for the afternoon orbit, and DOD would be  responsible for the early morning orbit.
When this decision was announced, NOAA and NASA began planning for  a new satellite program in the afternoon orbit—called JPSS. In 2010,  NOAA established a program office to guide the development and launch  of the S-NPP satellite as well as the two planned JPSS satellites, known  as JPSS-1 and JPSS-2. NOAA’s current life cycle cost baseline for the  JPSS program is $11.3 billion through fiscal year 2025. The current  anticipated launch dates for JPSS-1 and JPSS-2 are March 2017 and  December 2021, respectively. More recently, NOAA has also begun  planning the Polar Follow-On program, which is to include the  development and launch of a third and fourth satellite in the series. These  satellites are planned to be nearly identical to the JPSS-2 satellite.
Since 2012, we have issued three reports on the JPSS program that  highlighted technical issues, component cost growth, management  challenges, and key risks. In these reports, we made 11  recommendations to NOAA to improve the management of the JPSS  program. These recommendations included addressing key risks and  establishing a comprehensive contingency plan consistent with best  practices. The agency agreed with these recommendations.
As of October 2015, the agency has implemented 2 recommendations  and was working to address the remaining 9 recommendations.
Specifically, NOAA established contingency plans to mitigate the  possibility of a polar satellite data gap and began tracking completion  dates for key risk mitigation activities. NOAA also took initial steps to  improve its scheduling practices, contingency plans, and assessment of  the potential for a gap. We have ongoing work reviewing the agency’s  efforts to fully implement these open recommendations, and plan to issue  our report in spring 2016.
section_title: Prior Schedule Concerns Were Warranted; GOES-R Program Delayed Its Committed Launch Date and Faces Important Decisions on How to Proceed
paragraphs: As previously noted, we have issued a series of reports on the GOES-R  program that highlighted schedule delays, management challenges, and  the potential for a gap in backup satellite coverage. In these reports, we  found that technical issues had caused a series of delays to major  program milestones, which in turn had the potential to affect the GOES-R  satellite’s launch readiness date. In 2012 and 2013, we made  recommendations to NOAA to strengthen its scheduling practices. While  the agency is making progress on these recommendations, they have not  yet been fully implemented.
Most recently, in December 2014, we reported that the GOES-R program  had made significant progress in developing its first satellite, including  completing testing of the satellite instruments. However, we also reported  that even though NOAA had delayed the launch of the GOES-R satellite  from October 2015 to March 2016, the program continued to experience  schedule delays that could affect the new launch date. Specifically, the  program had delayed multiple key reviews and tests, with delays ranging  from 5 to 17 months. We also reported that the program’s actions to  mitigate its schedule delays introduced further risks, which could increase  the extent of the delays. For example, the program attempted to mitigate  delays in developing detailed plans for ground-based data operations by  performing system development while concurrently working on the  detailed plans. In addition, the program compressed its testing schedule  by performing spacecraft integration testing 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a- week. As we reported previously, methods such as conducting planning  and development work concurrently and compressing test schedules are  activities that increase the risk of further delays because there could be  too little time to resolve any issues that arise. At the time of our report,  program officials acknowledged that they could not rule out the possibility  of further delays, and that these delays could affect the planned March  2016 launch date.
Other entities, including a NOAA standing review board and the  Department of Commerce’s Inspector General, shared these concerns. In  late 2014, NOAA’s standing review board noted that the program’s plan  for the remaining integration and testing activities was very aggressive,  and that additional failures and subsequent rework could threaten the  then-expected planned launch date in early 2016. In May 2015, the  Inspector General expressed concerns about the program’s lagging  progress and reported that the program needed to proactively address  testing risks in order to maintain its launch schedule.
Based on information collected during our ongoing work, these prior  concerns about the program schedule were warranted. The program  continued to experience poor schedule performance as it moved through  integration and testing. Program data show that the program lost more  than 10 days of schedule reserve each month, on average, between July  2013 and July 2015. When asked about this poor schedule performance,  program officials stated several reasons, including the complexity of the  satellite build, the difficulties faced as part of a first-time build, and that  the testing schedule was extremely aggressive. The monthly loss in  margin occurred even though the program introduced steps designed to  minimize a loss in reserves, such as switching to round-the-clock testing,  eliminating selected tests, and implementing process and management  changes. In October 2015, program officials reported that schedule  performance improved for the month of September.
subsections: section_title: GOES-R Satellite Launch Date Delayed; NOAA Extends the Expected Lifespans of Current Satellites, but the Risk of a Gap in Backup Coverage Remains
paragraphs: In August 2015, NOAA decided to delay the planned launch date of the  first GOES-R satellite from March 2016 to October 2016. While previously  reported schedule delays contributed to this decision by decreasing the  overall amount of available schedule reserves, program officials noted  several other reasons for this decision. These reasons included finding  debris in the solar array drive assembly that required them to replace  the component, needing additional spacecraft repair and rework after  testing was completed, and resolving disconnects in the expected  duration of tasks at the launch site. NOAA also considered the likelihood  of future delays in thermal vacuum testing, which is considered to be one  of the more difficult environmental tests. NOAA officials stated that they  chose the new launch date because it was the next available launch slot  at the Kennedy Space Center and was consistent with expectations on  when the GOES-R satellite would be ready to launch.
Based on findings from our ongoing work, recent events have increased  the risk of achieving the October 2016 launch date. In September 2015,  NOAA identified a new technical issue in a component that helps regulate  and distribute the satellite’s power supply. To try to address this issue,  the GOES program replaced the component on the GOES-R satellite with  the same component from GOES-S, the next satellite in the series. The  program has experienced delays as a result of the need to replace and  retest this component, and it is not yet clear that this switch will address  the problem. According to a recent NOAA review of the program, this  issue, along with several other issues discovered in testing, has put the  new October 2016 launch date at risk. In late 2015, NOAA officials plan to  reassess the schedule leading up to the planned launch date. Program  officials stated that if GOES-R does not launch in October 2016, another  launch slot would likely be available by May 2017.
subsections: section_title: NOAA Extended the Expected Life Span of Its Operational Satellites, but the Agency Continues to Face a Potential Gap in Backup Satellite Coverage
paragraphs: NOAA’s policy for geostationary satellites is to have two operational  satellites and one backup satellite in orbit at all times. Three viable GOES  satellites—GOES-13, GOES-14, and GOES-15—are currently in orbit.  Both GOES-13 and GOES-15 are operational satellites, with GOES-13  covering the eastern United States (GOES-East in figure 1, on page 4)  and GOES-15 covering the western United States (GOES-West in figure  1). GOES-14 is currently in an on-orbit storage mode and is available as  a backup for the other two satellites should they experience any  degradation in service. As we previously reported, this backup policy  proved useful on two previous occasions when the agency experienced  problems with one of its operational satellites, and was able to move its  backup satellite into place until the problems had been resolved.
Based on ongoing work, we found that NOAA recently decided to change  its assumptions about the lifespan of the currently operational GOES  satellites. The satellites were originally designed to have a 7-year life,  consisting of 5 operational years and 2 years in storage. NOAA officials  stated that, in April 2015, the agency revised its expectations for the total  life for the GOES-13, GOES-14, and GOES-15 satellites to 10 years  (including both operational and storage years). On October 21, 2015, the  Deputy Assistant Administrator for Systems in NOAA’s National  Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service informed us that  the decision to change the lifespan was based on an analysis performed  in 2005 that showed a 3-year extension was reasonable. At that time,  NOAA chose to continue to depict the shorter lifespan due to its judgment  of overall risk. The Deputy Assistant Administrator stated that in spring  2015, NOAA determined that it had sufficient history and performance on  the GOES-13 and 15 satellites to begin reflecting the 10-year lifespan in  its planning documents. This change had the effect of increasing the  expected life of GOES-13 and GOES-15 from the previous estimate, and  slightly decreasing the expected life of GOES-14. Figure 3 shows the  original and extended estimates of the useful lives of the geostationary  satellite constellation.
If NOAA had not made the decision to extend its expectation of the useful  life of GOES-15, the recent delay in the GOES-R launch could have put  NOAA at risk of a coverage gap in early 2017. With the change in  assumptions, NOAA officials now expect that there will be coverage of the  GOES-East and West satellite positions through 2019 regardless of when  the GOES-R series of satellites are available.
However, the risk of a gap in backup satellite coverage remains. In  December 2014, we reported that the geostationary satellite constellation  was at risk of a gap in backup coverage, based on the GOES-R launch  date of March 2016. This risk is increased by moving the launch date to  October 2016 or later. The GOES-13 satellite, which has experienced  issues with 4 of 11 subsystems and had previously been taken offline  twice, is still expected to reach the end of its useful life in mid-2016. If  GOES-R were to launch in October 2016, and then undergo a 6-month  on-orbit checkout period, it would begin operations in April 2017, close to  a year after the expected end of GOES-13’s useful life. Figure 4 shows  the backup gap based on current assumptions of satellite life. Any further  delays in the GOES-R launch date would increase this gap in backup  coverage, which could mean a gap in coverage if one of the primary  operational satellites were to fail.
section_title: NOAA Faces Significant Decisions on Building, Storing, and Launching Future Geostationary Satellites
paragraphs: NOAA now faces a series of significant decisions on the development,  launch, and maintenance of its GOES-R series satellites. Based on our  ongoing work, these decisions include the following:
Determine how to manage schedule risks to ensure GOES-R  launches on schedule.
NOAA and the GOES program continue to experience issues in  completing integration and testing of the GOES-R satellite. NOAA  officials have stated that the program was still losing about 10 reserve  days per month through August 2015. As of September 2015, the  program had 113 days of schedule reserve, which is 43 days more  than suggested by NASA’s guidelines. Program officials expect the  monthly loss of schedule reserve to decrease because they are using  more realistic estimates of how long tasks will take based on past  performance. However, given the potential for a gap in backup  coverage leading up to the time that GOES-R is in orbit and  operational, NOAA continues to look for ways to minimize remaining  schedule risks on the GOES-R satellite. As previously noted, we  made recommendations to NOAA in 2012 and 2013 to improve  schedule management practices; these recommendations remain  open today. Timely implementation of our recommendations could  help to mitigate program risks.
Determine when GOES-S should be launched.
NOAA’s current plans to launch GOES-R in October 2016 and to  launch GOES-S in May 2017 would allow 7 months between launch  dates. However, NOAA officials would prefer to maintain a 14-month  interval between the launch dates of these two satellites. Officials  have stated that this interval is necessary due to the limited number of  qualified personnel that work to develop both satellites, the need to  rebuild the hardware planned for GOES-S that will now be used on  GOES-R, and to allow adequate time for test and checkout of the  GOES-R satellite before launching GOES-S. In late 2015 or early  2016, NOAA plans to conduct a detailed schedule analysis on GOES- S development. From this analysis, NOAA plans to decide whether to  move the GOES-S planned May 2017 launch date to a later time.
Decide the appropriate spacing of the GOES-T and GOES-U  satellite launches to ensure satellite coverage and minimize  costs.
In addition to GOES-R and GOES-S, NOAA has established planned  launch dates for the final two satellites in the GOES-R series. GOES- T is planned for launch in April of 2019, and GOES-U is planned for  launch in October 2024. Key questions exist about the optimal timing  for these later satellites.
Program officials believe that it would be best to develop and launch  the GOES-T satellite as soon as possible to sustain NOAA’s policy of  having two operational satellites and one spare satellite on-orbit and  to obtain the enhanced functionality these satellites offer. NOAA  officials are considering options related to delaying the development  of the GOES-U satellite or developing it and putting it into storage.
Alternatively, delaying the development of GOES-T and GOES-U  could result in cost efficiencies. For example, if the GOES-R and S  satellites last for a minimum of 10 years, NOAA could be in the  position of storing GOES-U on the ground for an extended time.  NOAA officials stated that they would consider a later launch date for  GOES-U depending on the health of the satellite system when it is  due to launch. Storing satellites on the ground is costly and requires  maintenance to ensure the satellites function once finally launched.  Delaying the development of GOES-U would both reduce storage  costs and delay annual costs associated with these satellites’  development. Moving forward, thoroughly assessing the relative costs  and benefits of various launch scenarios will be important.
section_title: The JPSS Program Is Making Progress; Key Risks Remain in Meeting the March 2017 Launch Date
paragraphs: In December 2014, we reported that the JPSS program had completed  significant development work on the JPSS-1 satellite and had remained  within its cost and schedule baselines. However, we noted that the  program had encountered technical issues on a key component that led  to cost growth and a very tight schedule. We also noted that while the  program reduced its estimate of a near-term gap in satellite data, this gap  assessment was based on incomplete data. We recommended that  NOAA update its assessment of potential polar satellite data gaps to  include more accurate assumptions about launch dates.
We also assessed NOAA’s efforts to improve its satellite contingency plan  and to implement mitigation activities. Specifically, we reported that while  NOAA improved its polar satellite contingency plan by identifying  mitigation strategies and actions, the contingency plan had shortfalls  when compared to best practices. For example, the plan did not include  an assessment of available mitigation alternatives based on their cost and  impact. Moreover, NOAA was not providing consistent or comprehensive  reporting of its progress on all mitigation projects. As a result, NOAA had  less assurance that it was adequately prepared to deal with a gap in polar  satellite coverage. We recommended that NOAA revise the polar satellite  contingency plan to, among other things, include an assessment of  available alternatives based on their costs and potential impacts, and  ensure that the relevant entities provide monthly and quarterly updates on  the progress on all mitigation projects and activities. We currently have  ongoing work for your Committee assessing NOAA’s efforts to address  each of these recommendations, and we plan to report our results by  spring 2016.
subsections: section_title: NOAA Is Planning to Launch the JPSS-1 Satellite in 2017, but Continues to Face Schedule and other Risks
paragraphs: Based on our ongoing work, NOAA and the JPSS program continue to  make progress towards the launch of the JPSS-1 satellite as a  replacement for the currently on-orbit S-NPP satellite. Since 2013, the  program’s life cycle cost baseline through 2025 has remained stable at  $11.3 billion, and the launch date has remained set for March 2017.
While the launch date has not changed, the JPSS program has  experienced technical issues that have affected internal schedule  deadlines. For example, the expected completion date of the Advanced  Technology Microwave Sounder instrument was recently delayed from  March 2015 to November 2015, due to foreign object debris in a key  subsystem. NOAA has also experienced delays in completing a needed  upgrade that will allow the JPSS ground system to provide command,  telemetry, and data processing for more than one JPSS-class satellite, a  capability that will become necessary when both S-NPP and JPSS-1 are  in orbit.
In addition to these ongoing technical issues, there is the possibility of  conflicts with the GOES-R program for both resources and facilities as  both programs complete testing at the NOAA Satellite Operations Facility.
NOAA officials stated that they are aware of this issue and are taking  steps to mitigate needs for common resources.
section_title: The Possibility of a Gap in Polar Satellite Data Remains; JPSS Program Faces Key Risks, and Decisions Are Needed on Developing and Timing Future Satellites
paragraphs: We previously reported that NOAA is facing a potential near-term gap in  polar data between the expected end of useful life of the S-NPP satellite  and the launch of the JPSS-1 satellite. As of December 2014, NOAA  officials stated that a 3-month gap was likely based on an analysis of the  availability and robustness of the polar constellation. However, we  reported that several factors could cause a gap to occur sooner and last  longer—potentially up to several years. For example, if S-NPP were to  fail today—exactly 4 years after its launch—the agency would face a gap  of about 23 months before the JPSS-1 satellite could be launched and put  into operation. Concerns about a near-term gap will remain until the  JPSS-1 satellite is launched and operational. Further, if JPSS-1 fails on  launch, there could be a gap until JPSS-2 is launched and operational in  mid-2022.
In April 2015, based on an updated analysis of its performance over time,  NOAA decided to extend the expected life of the S-NPP satellite.  Specifically, NOAA officials estimated that S-NPP would last as long as 9  years, up from its initial estimate of 5 years. Should S-NPP last for 9  years, it could alleviate a potential near-term gap. NOAA provided us with  an assessment of the S-NPP satellite’s availability over time, and we  have ongoing work analyzing the assessment. Figure 5 shows the original  and extended estimates of the useful lives of the S-NPP and first two  JPSS satellites.
While NOAA’s changes in assumptions on how long S-NPP will last may  lessen the likelihood of a near-term data gap, our ongoing work shows  that the JPSS program continues to face key risks which could increase  the possibility of a gap.
Risks to the currently on-orbit satellite: The S-NPP satellite  continues to experience isolated performance issues. For example, a  mechanical component that facilitates the collection of sounding data  on the S-NPP Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder instrument  experienced electrical currents that were higher than expected in early  2015. While program officials believe that the issue has been  addressed, the JPSS program is carrying it as a risk because it could  affect the satellite’s useful life. There is also a risk that space debris  could collide with S-NPP, which will not factor into NOAA availability  calculations until its 2015 analysis is complete.
Risks to satellites in development: As discussed above, the JPSS  program is currently dealing with technical issues on both the flight  and ground components of the JPSS-1 satellite which have caused  schedule delays and decreased the remaining margin to launch. In  addition, NOAA switched to a new spacecraft contractor beginning  with the JPSS-2 satellite. With a new contractor, it may be more  difficult to apply lessons learned from issues in JPSS-1 development if  similar issues arise on JPSS-2.
Moving forward, NOAA also faces decisions on timing the development  and launch of the remaining satellites in the JPSS program. The design  life of the JPSS satellites is 7 years and NOAA plans, beginning with  JPSS-2, to launch a new satellite every 5 years in order to achieve a  robust constellation of satellites. However, NOAA officials stated that they  expect the satellites to last 10 years or more. If the satellites last that  long, then there could be unnecessary redundancy. If they do not, then  there is an increased potential for future gaps in polar satellite coverage,  as there will be several periods in which only one satellite is on orbit.  Similar to its geostationary program, evaluating the costs and benefits of  different launch scenarios to ensure robust coverage while decreasing  unnecessary costs will be important.
In summary, we have made multiple recommendations to NOAA to  improve management of the GOES-R and JPSS satellite programs and to  address weaknesses in contingency plans in case of a gap in satellite  coverage. NOAA has addressed about a quarter of our recommendations  to date; it is important that the agency expedite its efforts to address the  remaining ones in order to reduce existing risks and strengthen its  programs.
NOAA recently decided to delay the GOES-R satellite launch until  October 2016 and to change its assumption for how long the currently  operational satellites will last. Even with the new assumption that existing  satellites will last longer, the risk remains that there will be a gap in  backup satellite coverage that lasts for almost a year. The agency is now  facing important decisions on how to achieve the new launch schedule  and how to space out future satellites to ensure satellite coverage while  minimizing costs.
Regarding the JPSS program, NOAA continues to make progress  developing and testing the JPSS-1 satellite as it moves toward a March  2017 launch date. Moreover, NOAA decided to extend its expectation for  how long the current satellite will last. However, there is the potential for a  coverage gap should the currently on-orbit satellite not last until the  launch and calibration of the JPSS-1 satellite is completed. According to  NOAA officials, it is also possible that JPSS-1 and -2 will last longer than  anticipated. Moving forward, reconsidering development and launch  calendars to ensure robust satellite coverage while decreasing  unnecessary costs will be important.
Chairmen Bridenstine and Loudermilk, Ranking Members Bonamici and  Beyer, and Members of the Subcommittees, this completes my prepared  statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may  have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
paragraphs: If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, please  contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknwledgements
paragraphs: Other contributors include Colleen Phillips (assistant director),  Christopher Businsky, Shaun Byrnes, Kara Lovett Epperson, Rebecca  Eyler, and Torrey Hardee.
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