Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation of Army Truck Armor during Current Wartime Operations
Published: 2006-03-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In April 2005, GAO reported on factors affecting the timely production of up-armored high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and add-on armor kits for HMMWVs, as well as other items critically needed by deployed forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Due to high interest by Congress and the public regarding vehicle armor, GAO initiated this subsequent engagement to examine issues affecting the production and installation of armor for medium and heavy trucks. The objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what factors affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what actions the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army have taken to improve the timely availability of truck armor. To address these objectives, GAO collected and analyzed supply data for medium and heavy tactical trucks used by Army forces.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the production and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 except for fuel tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for tankers is expected by January 2007. Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780 truck armor kits for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not produce all of the kits until February 2005 and did not install the kits to fully meet the requirement until May 2005--18 months after the initial requirement was identified. However, by that time, requirements had increased substantially. As subsequent requirements for an additional 7,847 kits, excluding tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them lessened. A number of factors contributed to the time to provide truck armor kits to deployed troops, placing them at greater risk as they conducted wartime operations in vehicles not equipped with the preferred level of protection. For example, the Army missed a valuable opportunity to have substantial numbers of truck armor kits available for Operation Iraqi Freedom by not fully capitalizing on approved operational requirements established in 1996. In addition, production time lengthened because contracts were awarded for amounts less than total requirements due to increasing needs for truck armor and inadequate funding. As was the case for other critical wartime shortages that GAO previously examined, sufficient documentation was lacking to determine why funding was not available when needed, limiting effective oversight over funding decisions. Material shortages and limited tanker kit installation rates also impacted the availability of truck armor. DOD and the Army have taken a number of short-term actions, such as leveraging available funding, to improve truck armor availability during current operations. The Army is also developing a long-term armoring plan to improve the availability of truck armor for future operations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: When combat operations were declared over during Operation Iraqi  Freedom (OIF), U.S. and coalition forces transitioned to stabilization  operations to restore public order and infrastructure in Iraq.  Since that  time, U.S. forces have come under frequent and deadly attacks from  insurgents using a variety of weapons that include improvised explosive  devices (IED), mortars, and rocket launchers.  During this situation there  have been numerous attacks on military convoys as they carry supplies and  equipment throughout the region.  The threat of IEDs, in particular, has  become increasingly frequent and has been ranked as the number one killer  of U.S. troops in Iraq. The explosives used in IEDs consist mainly of  dynamite, land mines, old artillery shells or other types of military  ordnances. Many IEDs are hidden and disguised along traffic routes and  are remotely detonated against unsuspecting military personnel.
As a result of experiences in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and  the services have taken several immediate steps to improve the protection  of military forces operating in the region.  Among these is the fielding of  new capabilities to counter emerging threats encountered in Iraq, to  include such improvements as add-on-armor for trucks and systems for  detecting and defeating IEDs.
Since the onset of OIF, we have reported on several supply chain  management issues that have impeded support to the warfighter. For  example, after visiting the theater in 2003, we provided our preliminary  observations on the effectiveness of logistics support during OIF.  Among  the problems we observed were the unavailability of spare parts, hundreds  of backlogged shipments, and an inability to track shipments at the  distribution centers.  In April 2005, we reported on shortages of a number  of critical items during OIF, to include certain protective items such as  body armor and armored high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles  (HMMWV).  We identified a number of systemic causes for these  shortages, including inaccurate requirements, delayed funding, and  ineffective distribution processes.  As a result, we made several  recommendations to the Secretary of Defense calling for actions, such as  ensuring the accuracy of Army war reserve requirements and developing  and exercising deployable distribution capabilities, to improve DOD’s  system for supplying items to U.S. forces.
Due to high interest by Congress and the public regarding the availability of  armor for HMMWVs and other vehicles, we initiated this subsequent  engagement under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United  States to examine issues affecting the production and installation of armor  for medium and heavy trucks used by Army forces during OIF and other  ongoing operations in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of  responsibility.  Our objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which  truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements,  (2) identify what factors affected the time to provide truck armor to  deployed forces, and (3) identify what actions DOD and the Army have  taken to improve the timely availability of truck armor.
In conducting this review, we focused on medium and heavy tactical trucks  used by Army forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, which  included those in Iraq and Afghanistan. We also reviewed the production  and installation of truck armor for Marine Corps forces, which we will  report separately.  To identify the extent to which truck armor was  produced and installed to meet identified requirements, we visited  numerous DOD and Army organizations to obtain data on the  requirements, funding, production, and installation of truck armor kits.  We  considered the armor requirement as met for each type of truck when the  quantity of armor kits produced and installed onto vehicles equaled the  requirement.  Based on the information gathered, we identified factors that  affected the time to provide truck armor kits to deployed forces.  We also  identified DOD’s and the Army’s short-term and long-term efforts to  improve the availability of truck armor.  We assessed the reliability of the  data we obtained and determined that they were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report.  We performed our review from April 2005 to  January 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. A detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is located  in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Army convoys carrying supplies and equipment in the CENTCOM area of  responsibility have been subjected to deadly attacks by insurgents using  IEDs and other weapons.  In response to these attacks, the Army has  undertaken several force protection measures such as adding armor to a  number of medium and heavy trucks operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and  other CENTCOM locations.
subsections: section_title: Deployed Army Forces Face a Significant Threat from IEDs
paragraphs: Army convoys operating in the CENTCOM area of responsibility have been  subjected to deadly attacks by enemy forces.  In particular, attacks in Iraq  by insurgents using IEDs have placed trucks and personnel at tremendous  risk as they carry supplies and equipment throughout the region.  In May  2003, U.S. and coalition forces began stabilization operations in Iraq that  continue today.  However, since that time, the United States has incurred  more casualties than during major combat operations, mostly due to  ambushes and IED attacks by insurgents operating in Iraq.  The threat from  IEDs has grown progressively, from single mortar rounds, to multiple  explosives linked together, to suicide car bombs.  In the spring of 2004,  nearly every attack from an IED resulted in a coalition casualty.  In  particular, U.S. military convoys have been the targets of these types of  attacks.  In addition to attacks in Iraq, U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan  have been subjected to IED attacks.
IEDs take a variety of shapes and sizes and have been employed in a  number of different ways.  They can contain commercial or military  explosives, homemade explosives, or military ordnance and ordnance  components.  For example, mortar and artillery projectiles have been  employed as IEDs in Iraq.  In addition, IEDs have been placed in many  vehicles—from small sedans to large cargo trucks—and stationed along the  roadways.  Furthermore, “person-borne” suicide bombs have also been  used, with explosives contained in a vest, belt, or clothing that is  specifically modified to conceal and carry this material.
section_title: Outfitting Army Trucks with Armor
paragraphs: In light of the threat posed by IEDs and other weapons, such as mortars  and rocket launchers, the Army has taken several force protection  measures to include adding armor to a number of medium and heavy trucks  operating in Iraq, and Afghanistan. The Army’s medium and heavy tactical  trucks that are being armored include: M939 5-ton trucks, family of medium  tactical vehicles (FMTV), heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks  (HEMTT), heavy equipment transporters (HET), palletized load systems  (PLS), the M915 truck family, and tankers.  Appendix II contains a detailed  description of each Army vehicle in addition to a discussion of the armor  kit availability and the significant factors that affected armor availability  for each truck.
The Army’s medium tactical trucks include the M939 5-ton and FMTV.  The  M939 tactical truck is a general-purpose military vehicle, primarily  designed for tactical, off-road use.  The M-939 is a 5-ton capacity, six-wheel  drive cargo truck used for transportation of all types of supplies and comes  in various vehicle types, including a cargo truck, dump truck, and wrecker.   The Army’s FMTV addresses medium tactical-vehicle requirements for unit  mobility and unit resupply, and transportation of equipment and personnel.
The FMTV consists of the light medium tactical vehicle, which has a 2.5-ton  capacity, and the medium tactical vehicle, which has a 5-ton capacity.
The Army’s heavy tactical trucks include the HEMTT, HET, PLS, M915, and  tankers. The Army utilizes the HEMTT to provide transport capabilities for  the resupply of various combat vehicles and weapons systems.  The HET is  used to transport, deploy, recover, and evacuate main battle tanks and  other heavy tracked and wheeled vehicles to and from the battlefield.  The  PLS performs long distance and local hauls and unit resupply in the tactical  environment to support combat units.  The PLS consists of a truck with  self-loading capabilities and a trailer.  The Army’s family of M915 trucks  consists of highway tractors used primarily for the long distance transport  of containers, which is similar to commercial tractor-trailer trucks.
The Army uses its tankers to haul and dispense bulk fuel.  Four models of  fuel tankers are involved in the Army’s armoring program: the M967, the  M969, the M978, and the M1062.  The primary component of the tanker  armoring effort is a self-sealing coating material that is sprayed onto the  exterior of the fuel tank.  When a small arms round penetrates the coating  material and the fuel tank, the hole self seals and the fuel leak is stopped  within minutes.  A secondary component is composed of a set of armor  panel kits mounted at select locations on the fuel tanker to protect critical  equipment that is not protected by the coating material.
section_title: Processes for Developing Truck Armor Requirements and Solutions
paragraphs: The Army identified wartime truck armor requirements and initiated a  procurement program to develop an armor solution, which involved  seeking funding from a variety of sources, identifying and contracting with  suppliers for armor materials and components, designing and testing armor  solutions, and installing armor onto trucks in the CENTCOM area of  responsibility or other installation sites in the United States and Europe.
subsections: section_title: Process for Developing Wartime Requirements
paragraphs: When a need for new equipment is identified by Army warfighters deployed  to Iraq and other CENTCOM locations in support of the global war on  terrorism, official requirements for these items are developed through the  submission of the Army’s operational needs statement (ONS).  Army field  commanders prepare an ONS, which documents the urgent need for a  materiel solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a capability that  impacts mission accomplishment.  The ONS is sent forward through the  unit’s chain of command to the Coalition Forces Land Component  Command (CFLCC) for theater-level approval, while an information copy is  provided directly to Army headquarters for an initial check to ensure the  requested capability and operational concept are clearly stated.
Once approved by CFLCC, the ONS is forwarded to the Office of the  Deputy Chief of Staff G-3 at Army headquarters where it is reviewed and  validated by the Army Strategic Planning Board (ASPB).   The ASPB is  chaired by the G-3, with representatives from other Army headquarters  staff offices and major Army commands.  In the case of truck armor, once  the requirement is validated by the ASPB, it is transmitted to the Program  Executive Office-Combat Support and Combat Service Support, which  manages the procurement of truck armor through its Project Manager for  Tactical Vehicles (Project Manager). Validated requirements are also  passed to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-8 and the Army Budget  Office to obtain the necessary funding.
section_title: Development of Truck Armor Solutions
paragraphs: To address validated requirements for truck armor, the Army initiated a  procurement program to develop an armor solution for its deployed trucks.  Procurement is funded through congressional appropriations. However, at  the time requirements for current operations were identified in November  2003, there were no truck armor kit procurement programs in place.   Consequently, funding for armor kits in the current Army procurement  budgets did not exist. Because no funding was available at the time the  requirements were identified, the Army obtained funding for its program  from a variety of sources.  While the Army can reprogram a small amount  of funds from one program budget to another, the majority of funding had  to be approved by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  (Comptroller) and in some cases, Congress.  Specifically, to obtain funding  for truck armor, the Army sought approval from the DOD Comptroller and  Congress to reprogram funding from other procurement or appropriations accounts, requested funding from the DOD-managed Iraqi Freedom Fund,  and requested armor funding through supplemental appropriations.
The Army’s approved armor protection for medium and heavy tactical  vehicles consisted of add-on armor kits to be installed on vehicles already  in use in the theater of operations or prior to deployment.  These kits  included armor panels and ballistic glass, as well as other components such  as air conditioners. For all trucks except the M939 5-ton, the Army awarded  contracts to armor companies to produce add-on kits for each type of  truck. According to Army officials, as needed production quantities  increased, the Army modified these contracts to reflect the additional  quantities and revised prices.  In the case of the 5-ton truck, the armor kits  were produced by the Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise (GSIE), an  Army organization of depots and other facilities. Instead of a contract,  agreements on quantities and costs for work were provided through  Military Inter-departmental Purchase Requests (MIPR), which were issued  to GSIE for each new production order.  Once armor kits were produced by  contractors or Army depots, they were shipped to installation sites in the  United States, Middle East, and Europe, where they were installed onto  trucks by military or contractor personnel.
section_title: Army Expects to Have Met Most Truck Armor Requirements by January 2006
paragraphs: The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the production  and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 except for fuel  tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for tankers is expected by  January 2007. Figure 1 shows the overall production and installation  quantities of truck armor as compared to requirements.  The Army’s  solution to addressing truck armor requirements focused on developing  add-on armor kits to be attached to the vehicles.  These add-on armor kits  included armor panels and ballistic glass, as well as other components such  as air conditioners.
Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780 truck armor kits  for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not produce all of the kits  until February 2005 and did not install the kits to fully meet the initial  requirement until May 2005, or 18 months later.  As shown in table 1, the  time to produce and install armor kits to meet initial requirements varied  by truck type, and ranged from 15 to 18 months.  However, as shown in  figure 1, by that time requirements had increased substantially.  More  detailed information on requirements, production, and installation times  for each specific truck is provided in appendix II.
As subsequent requirements for an additional 7,847 kits, excluding tankers,  were identified, the time lag to meet them lessened. The Army now  estimates that the total demand for all 11,627 required truck armor kits,  excluding tankers, will have been met in January 2006, or 10 months after  the latest requirements increase was validated in March 2005.  Table 2  shows the time needed to complete production and installation of armor  kits to meet the latest validated requirements increase from March 2005.   The Army estimates that production of a sufficient number of tanker kits to  meet requirements will be completed by May 2006, but does not expect to  complete installation of tanker kits until January 2007.
Before armor kits were available, units operating in the CENTCOM area of  responsibility developed their own interim improvised armor, consisting of  locally fabricated steel armor plates, to obtain some level of protection for  their vehicles.  As a result, interim armor with minimum protection  standards in accordance with Army policy was in place on some vehicles  by the time the preferred add-on armor kits were available for installation.   In addition, CFLCC issued a directive in February 2005 stating that no  unarmored vehicles would be allowed to operate in Iraq outside of secured  forward operating bases. During congressional testimony held in the spring  and summer of 2005, Army officials confirmed that this policy had been  fully implemented with use of approved interim improvised armor or add- on armor kits.
section_title: Several Factors Lengthened the Time to Provide Truck Armor Kits
paragraphs: We identified a number of factors that contributed to the time to provide  truck armor to deployed troops. First, the Army did not fully capitalize on a  requirement for truck armor that had been identified prior to operations in  OIF. Second, availability of armor kits was constrained by the Army’s  funding of contracts at less than the total requirement. Third, material  shortages also affected the availability of armor kits.  Finally, limited  installation rates lengthened the time to provide armor kits for tankers. As  a result, troops were placed at greater risk as they conducted wartime  operations in vehicles not equipped with the preferred level of protection.
subsections: section_title: Army Did Not Fully Capitalize on Truck Armor Requirements Identified Prior to Operations in Iraq
paragraphs: The Army did not fully capitalize on an earlier operational requirement for  truck armor that was identified several years before current operations in  Iraq began, which caused the Army to lose an opportunity to have a  significant number of armor kits already available when operational needs  arose in Iraq for this capability. An official requirement for truck add-on  armor kits was identified and approved by the Army in 1996 to address  threats similar to what deployed forces are currently facing in Iraq.  On  January 19, 1996, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)  issued an operational requirement document (ORD) for the tactical  wheeled vehicle crew protection kit. Generally, official requirements  documents lead to the development and production of new systems to  address the specified required capabilities.
According to Army officials, the Army developed this ORD because  officials recognized that operations in Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia exposed  troops to a civilian threat and led to concerns over countermine protection  for supply and troop transport vehicles. The crew protection kit was to  provide increased crew survivability in tactical wheeled vehicles against  small arms fire, artillery/mortar fire, mines, submunitions, and IEDs where  needed while operating throughout an area of operations.  The ORD  described the threat against U.S. forces usually consisting of small arms,  hand portable antitank weapons such as light antitank weapons and rocket  propelled grenades, and IEDs.  According to the document, tactical  wheeled vehicles at that time lacked armor protection to provide crew  survivability against these threats.  No existing ballistic protection systems  had met this requirement, with one exception of the Up-Armored Heavy  HMMWV.  According to the ORD, the kit’s capabilities would enable all  units to provide ballistic protection to crews of tactical wheeled vehicles,  including most of the same types of trucks being armored today in the  Middle East.
Once the ORD was approved, the Army Tank-Automotive Research,  Development and Engineering Center built prototype armor kits for the  HMMWV and 5-ton truck, and blast testing was also done at Fort A.P. Hill.
The ORD specified a number of kits to be built and available to add on to  vehicles as operations dictated the need for them.  However, the Army  never fully addressed this requirement. The need for armor kits after  Somalia never materialized, and, according to Army officials, the ORD was  not completed because funding was not available to fully meet the 1996  requirement due to other higher funding priorities in the Army. According  to one Army official, given the amount of effort expended to develop and  approve the ORD, it is relatively uncommon for an ORD not to be funded  through production, especially when research and development funds had  been spent, prototypes developed, and blast testing performed.
Even though the 1996 requirement was not fully addressed, a small number  of armor kits were produced around this time period for two types of  trucks, the HEMTT and the PLS, to support operations in Bosnia.  According to the Army’s Project Manager, development of these kits was  initiated in response to an ONS from units deployed to Bosnia.  The ONS  was submitted prior to completion of the ORD.  However, these kits did not  meet all the protective requirements specified in the ORD, such as  providing blast protection.  The Bosnia kits were never installed on  vehicles and were placed into storage because the need for them was never  realized.
The Army’s November 2003 armor requirement, developed in response to  experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, addressed the same vehicles  confronting similar threats as those found in the January 1996 ORD. This  November 2003 requirement for the crew protection kit validated an  operational wartime need for add-on armor kits for light, medium, and  heavy tactical wheeled vehicles in support of OIF and OEF.  The  requirement cites the January 1996 ORD as providing the basis for add-on  armor and extends the requirement to continue identifying alternative  capabilities for development, testing, and procurement.  The November  2003 requirement noted that the armor kits are necessary to provide a  capability to protect against small arms fire, IEDs, mine blast protection,  and artillery fragmentation; and to minimize degradation of the vehicle  mission.  Army officials in theater modified the November 2003  requirement by changing the distribution of armor and prioritizing armor  needs; however, the amounts of armor kits required remained the same.  Table 3 shows the 1996 and 2003 requirements, as well as the most recent  armor requirements.
Because not all the kits required under the 1996 ORD were developed, the  Army went into Iraq with less protective capability than it might otherwise  have done.  However, the Army’s work done in support of the ORD and the  Bosnia kits laid a foundation to meet future truck armor requirements.  For  example, the limited number of kits developed for military operations in  Bosnia was pulled from storage and used in Iraq. Furthermore, according  to Army officials, the knowledge gained and the processes for design,  research, development, and testing of these kits, as well as the kits  themselves, were used to address and meet the need for armor during  current operations.  Based on these efforts, the Army’s Project Manager for  truck armor in 2003 had knowledge of the concepts of designing and  building armor kits, the necessary materials in terms of weight and  protective capabilities, and system performance requirements and  technical specifications for ballistic protection. In addition, the 2003  requirement for kits cites the January 1996 ORD as providing the basis for  add-on armor.
section_title: Army’s Awarding of Contracts for Less Than the Total Requirement Constrained Armor Kit Production
paragraphs: The Army’s award of armor contracts for quantities less than the total  requirement constrained the production of armor kits. The award of  contract quantities in amounts less than the total requirements instead of  all at one time affected production rates and caused production schedules  to be longer than they might otherwise have been. The award of contracts  in this manner was, in part, a result of several increases in requirements  over time due to changing operational conditions. Another factor that  contributed to obtaining less than the total requirement was the delayed  flow of funding available for armor kits.
subsections: section_title: Awarding Contracts at Less Than the Total Requirement Lengthened the Time to Meet Requirements
paragraphs: For all of the Army trucks we reviewed except for the 5-ton truck, the  Army’s award of contracts for quantities less than the total requirement  instead of all at one time caused production schedules to be longer than  they might otherwise have been.  Contractors tend to size their production  levels to the contract orders they have on hand.  Thus, larger contract  quantities generally mean increased production rates.  Larger up-front  contracts can affect a contractor’s production capacity for a number of  reasons.  For example, according to one contractor producing armor kits  for all four of the Army’s heavy trucks, ordering smaller quantities of armor  kits caused a lack of continuity for its supply base and fluctuations in kit  deliveries.  More specifically, the contractor experienced (1) a lack of  supplier commitment, which wavered with the uncertainty of future orders;  (2) fluctuations in its labor force; (3) constrained ability to make process  improvements to expedite production, such as the creation of specialized  tooling, due to a short-term focus of work; and (4) insufficient support for  investment and facility decisions that would have resulted in more efficient  production operations for the contractor and its supply base.
In some cases, increases in requirements caused contracts to be awarded  in an intermittent fashion. In other cases, funding was not available to  award complete contract quantities to meet requirements at the time  requirements were identified. Although it is difficult to determine the exact  effects of intermittent contracting on the availability of armor kits, we  identified a number of specific cases where it lengthened the production  schedule.  For example, there were breaks in production for three different  types of truck kits (the FMTV, HEMTT, and HET) because the contractors  had completed their current contact orders and new orders were not  placed early enough to maintain continuous production.  In one of these  cases regarding an armor kit for the FMTV, the contractor received an  additional contract from the Army in December 2004 for 1,049 kits as it  neared completion of its current requirement of 771 kits.  Although the new  requirement for additional kits was validated by the Army in April 2004,  funding was not available to award the new contract until December 2004,  which was not early enough to overcome the required 15-week material  lead time.  As a result, production stopped and new production did not  resume until 2 months later.  According to the contractor, production could  have been maintained or even accelerated if the new contract had been  awarded in time to meet the long lead time item requirements.
In the cases of the HEMTT and the HET armor kits, the production lines  stopped when the contractor completed the current contract quantities of  1,598 and 665 armor kits respectively.  The contractor did not receive  additional contract awards of 791 HEMTT kits and 131 HET kits until April  2005, or about a month after completion of the previous contract quantities  in March 2005.  By that time, production had already stopped, employees  and subcontractors were released, and equipment and facility space were  given up for other uses.  As a result, there was a two and a half month break  in production.  The reason the additional production quantities were not  awarded earlier was that validated requirements did not increase until  March 2005, which, according to Army Project Manager officials, was too  late to avoid a production stoppage.
In another example of the impact of intermittent contract awards, the  initial armor kit production contract for the M915 was awarded in April  2004 for 250 kits, which was based on the validated Army requirement at  the time.  However, when subsequent contracts for 240 and 136 kits were  awarded in September and October 2004 respectively, due to increasing  Army requirements, the manufacturer, an Israeli subcontractor to the  primary contractor, did not have sufficient capacity to keep up with the  demand.  This was due, in part, to other commitments the manufacturer  already had for producing Marine Corps truck armor. As a result, the  production levels for M915 kits were lower than desired based on the new  requirements and remained so until July 2005 when the contractor was able  to transition production from the Israeli subcontractor to its own facilities  in the United States. According to contractor officials, if they had known in  the beginning that the total quantities needed by the Army would have been  as high as they were, they would have proceeded differently from the  outset, such as using a different manufacturer.
In one instance, the quantities of contracts also adversely affected the costs  of armor kits.  Specifically, the first contract for the FMTV armor kits was  awarded in February 2004 for 270 kits.  Subsequently, in March 2004, a  second contract was placed for 501 kits.  According to the contractor, the  quantity in the initial contract was too low for the Army to receive the  highest price break, which was received for the second contract.  As a  result, the first 270 kits cost the Army over $1.7 million more than if the two  production quantities had been combined.  The Army made the two orders  separately because funding was not available to award all quantities at one  time.
section_title: Truck Armor Requirements Increased Due to Changing Operational Conditions
paragraphs: The Army’s requirements for truck armor increased numerous times since  November 2003 due to changing operational conditions.  Army  headquarters developed and approved the first requirement for truck armor  kits in November 2003 in consultation with Army officials from the theater  of operations.  Army headquarters validated an operational wartime need  for kits in support of OIF and other CENTCOM operations, and approved  3,780 armor kits for medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles.  According to Army officials, this requirement arose based on an  identification of the need for truck armor and an August 2003 requirement  from Army units in the theater for additional up-armored HMMWVs. All  subsequent requirements for specific numbers of armor kits have been  generated by Army theater commanders in the field and forwarded to Army  headquarters for approval and funding.
The Army has continued to validate additional requirements for truck  armor as the need has evolved and increased over the course of operations  to the present, with March 2005 being the most recent date for validated  requirements increases.  In September 2005, the total requirement for truck  armor decreased slightly based on revised unit needs.  Army theater level  commanders have requested additional kits by documenting their  requirements in ONSs.  Army headquarters validated these requirements on  several occasions between April 2004 and March 2005.  Figure 2 illustrates  the increases in the Army’s requirements for truck armor according to the  approval of the multiple ONSs.
Increasing requirements for truck armor from the first requirement in  November 2003 were a direct result of operational conditions.  Army  officials from the theater of operations attributed these increasing  requirements to the enemy’s changing tactics and the increase in frequency  and lethality of IEDs. In addition, the number of trucks in Iraq increased  over time, which drove a corresponding increase in truck armor  requirements.  As noted previously, changing requirements necessitated the  Army awarding production contracts in an intermittent manner; and, in  some cases, led directly to gaps in production levels.
section_title: Incremental Funding Lagged Behind Requirements, Delaying Contract Awards
paragraphs: The flow of funding for truck armor kits was initially provided in amounts  less than total requirements and lagged significantly behind validated  requirements.  As a result, the Army could not award contracts for the full  required quantities of armor kits at the time requirements were validated.   Instead, the Army awarded contracts as funding became available.  Figure 3  shows the availability of funding for truck armor kits as compared to armor  kit requirements.
Although funding was not always available to award contracts at the time  requirements were identified, the Army did provide some advanced funding  to the contractors to buy items with long lead times, such as steel and  ballistic glass, to mitigate some of the effects of delayed production  contracts.  To do this, the Army Project Manager used funds designated for  the installation of armor kits already under contract until sufficient armor  kit production funding was made available.  However, according to Army  Project Manager officials, they only used this advanced funding approach  when they were certain additional funding would be administratively  approved, because of the risks associated with using these installation  funds and not being able to replace them.
We could not specifically determine why the required funds for armor kits  were not made available when the Army first identified the requirements  because neither the Army nor DOD could provide us with sufficient records  to track when the Department of the Army requested funding from the  DOD Comptroller.  Special funding requests from the Army to the DOD  Comptroller were required because funding for armor kits was not  available in the Army’s procurement budget.  According to Army officials,  the Army requested full funding for the truck armor requirements when  first identified, but the DOD Comptroller denied the requests and provided  only a limited amount of funding over several months. However, the Army  was not able to document these funding requests.
Additionally, DOD Comptroller officials were unable to verify or document  how much funding the Army asked for and when it was requested.  DOD  Comptroller officials further noted that although there was sufficient  funding available in the Iraqi Freedom Fund to fund all of the truck armor  requirements at the time they were initially identified by the Army, there  were other competing funding priorities that would have prevented DOD  from fully funding the entire truck armor requirement at once.  Examples  of these competing priorities include other force protection requirements  such as the procurement of up-armored HMMWVs and night vision  equipment, IED countermeasures, reimbursements to other coalition  forces for logistics support, operational costs associated with deploying a  Marine Expeditionary Force to Iraq, financing clearance of captured  munitions, and funding for various classified programs.
In April 2005, we reported that insufficient and delayed funding also  contributed to critical wartime shortages of armored vehicle track shoes,  lithium batteries, and tires.  However, we could not determine why  sufficient funding was not provided earlier because adequate  documentation was not available to track when the Army requested the additional funding from DOD.  Without formal documentation and  communication of urgent wartime funding requirements and the  disposition of funding decisions, the rationale for funding decisions and the  officials and organizations accountable for making those decisions may not  be subject to effective oversight by Congress or the Secretary of Defense.
section_title: Material Shortages Affected Availability of Army Truck Armor Kits
paragraphs: Material shortages negatively impacted the Army’s ability to meet  requirements for all of its vehicles except for the FMTV and tankers.  For  example, the contractor producing armor kits for the Army’s heavy trucks  stated that shortages of armor-grade steel and aluminum constrained  production rates for the HEMTT, HET, PLS, and M915 armor kits between  July 2004 and November 2004.  The shortage was alleviated through Army,  Joint Staff, and congressional efforts to work directly with material  suppliers to increase the amount of armor plates for the military.
In addition, shortages of material negatively impacted the production of  M939 5-ton armor kits, which were produced by the Army depots.   According to GSIE officials, the production capacity for 5-ton truck armor  kits was established based on the availability of material and components  that are used to build the armor kits.  When GSIE was asked to accelerate  the production of M939 5-ton kits, the lack of availability of certain  materials limited GSIE’s ability to increase production levels.  Examples of  items that were difficult to obtain included several sizes and types of steel,  door handles, and wiper components.
Army and Marine Corps officials also found themselves in competition for  armor contractors and materials, which exacerbated the problems with  material shortages.  For example, as mentioned previously, the initial  manufacturer for the Army’s M915 armor kits did not have sufficient  capacity to meet needed production levels as requirements increased.  This  was due, in part, to the fact that the company had committed most of its  capacity to producing Marine Corps truck armor by the time additional  Army requirements were identified.  Although minor schedule  improvements were achieved as a result of discussions and agreements on  joint schedules between the two services, it was still insufficient to meet  the Army’s needs.  As a result, the Army moved production of the M915 to  another company in the United States, which created further delays.
section_title: Limited Installation Rates Constrained the Availability of Tanker Armor Kits
paragraphs: A significant factor that affected the availability of armor kits for tankers  was a limited installation rate.  For example, the installation of add-on  armor kits was slowed by the rate of rotation of trucks into the in-theater  installation facilities as they returned from missions.  Operational  constraints limited the number of vehicles that could be taken out of use at  any one time.  In addition, unique requirements to coat the tankers with a  protective chemical prior to installing armor panels also limited the  installation rate.  The primary component of the tanker armoring effort is a  self-sealing coating material that is sprayed onto the exterior of the fuel  tank.  When a small arms round penetrates the coating material and the fuel  tank, the hole self-seals and the fuel leak stops.  The proper application of  the chemical coating requires controlled environmental conditions, such as  humidity and temperature, which has led to a limited number of spray  locations accessible to the Army.  Thus, although production of armor kits  for tankers is expected to be completed by May 2006, because of these  constraints, installation of enough kits to meet requirements is not  expected to be finished until 8 months later in January 2007.
section_title: DOD and the Army Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability
paragraphs: DOD and the Army have taken a number of actions to improve the timely  availability of truck armor.  Some of the actions were short-term and were  meant to address the immediate armor need for deployed forces in Iraq and  other CENTCOM locations. Other efforts are long-term plans designed to  improve the overall availability of truck armor for future operations.
subsections: section_title: DOD and the Services Took Actions to Improve Availability of Truck Armor during Current Operations
paragraphs: DOD and the Army have taken a number of short-term actions to improve  the availability of truck armor to meet the needs of forces deployed for OIF  and other CENTCOM operations.    Examples of these efforts include the  following:  Leveraging of available Army funds. The Army’s Project Manager for  Tactical Vehicles took a number of steps to leverage available funding in  an attempt to mitigate the effects of an inadequate funding flow for  truck armor.  For example, it used funding designated for future armor  kit installations to buy long lead time materials and award some  contracts for armor kits until additional armor kit funding could be  made available.  In addition, when the Project Manager received funding  for armor kits from Army headquarters, it allocated the funding among  all the armor kit contracts to maintain sufficient work flow to keep all  production lines open, rather than fund some truck kits to the full level  of requirements.  While these efforts may have improved the timely  availability of armor kits, as we noted earlier, the inadequate availability  of funding still contributed to a longer schedule in many cases.
Early identification of Army requirements. Army headquarters  developed the initial requirements for truck armor based on emerging  needs before formal requirements were submitted by units in the  theater.  As noted earlier, the first requirement for truck armor was  developed and validated by Army headquarters in November 2003, while  the first requirements submitted from units in the theater were not  actually validated until April 2004.  As a result, the Army was able to  begin seeking funding and awarding contracts for design and production  of armor kits earlier than if it had waited for an official request from  units in the theater.
Addition of armor installation sites. To reduce armor installation  time, as requirements and production levels for truck armor increased,  the Army expanded its installation capacity in the CENTCOM area of  responsibility through the addition of installation sites, going from one  initial facility in Kuwait to nine facilities in Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan  between August 2004 and July 2005.  As indicated in figure 1, during this  period, production levels increased dramatically from 220 kits per  month in August 2004 to a peak level of almost 1,800 kits per month by  May 2005.  After increasing the numbers of installation facilities,  according to Army officials, total installation capacity has grown from  approximately 50 kits per week to more than 350 kits per week.
Establishment of Joint Staff fusion cell. In December 2004, the Joint  Staff’s Directorate of Logistics established a team, called the Joint  Armor Fusion Cell, to monitor the progress of the services’ armoring  efforts to enhance visibility of the program to DOD and congressional  leadership.  In addition, the armor fusion cell was established to  accelerate the availability of armor kits by identifying and fixing gaps in  the supply chain.  For example, the Joint Staff armor fusion cell,  working with the Army, helped identify and deploy certified welders  from the Air Force and Navy to assist with production and installation of  armor in the United States and in the CENTCOM area of responsibility,  thereby speeding up the availability of truck armor to the units.  The cell  also worked with the U.S. Transportation Command to increase the use  of airlift for armor kits within the CENTCOM area of operations, which  reduced the need for ground transportation and increased the speed of  deliveries to armor installation sites.
section_title: Army Has Developed a Long-term Plan to Address the Availability of Truck Armor for Future Operations
paragraphs: The Army is taking long-term actions to improve the availability of truck  armor for future operations through the development of a long-term  armoring plan.  While we did not evaluate the plan’s potential for success,  we did note it is aimed at identifying long-term requirements for truck  armor and developing solutions to address these requirements.
The Army’s long-term plans, designed to improve the overall availability of  truck armor for future operations, are outlined in the Army Tactical  Wheeled Vehicle Long Term Armoring Strategy. The Army’s G8 division for  programming, analysis, and materiel integration tasked TRADOC to  develop this plan in January 2005. The Long Term Armoring Strategy  incorporates the Army’s plan to provide add-on armor to its tactical  wheeled vehicle fleet. Under the plan, add-on armor will consist of two kits,  one that includes hardware to be placed on the vehicle to receive the  armor, and another that contains the actual armor.  The plan also includes  provisions to facilitate the production and availability of armor. Estimated  costs for the armor are based on current armor models that use heavy  metals, such as steel and aluminum; however, according to Army program  office officials, they are considering the use of lighter metals for greater  efficiency but at higher costs.
According to the Long Term Armoring Strategy, its purpose is to  demonstrate the Army’s deliberate process to outline a path forward and  avoid long response times for providing truck armor in the future.  The plan  further notes that the framework supports a balanced approach for  procurement of armoring kits that mitigates risk and enhances safety and  force protection. According to the plan, the end state is a tactical wheeled  vehicle fleet that provides the commanders with flexibility to increase the  protection level when needed and ensures the Army’s ability to rapidly  acquire additional kits. The initial draft concept was completed in March  2005 and a final plan was presented to the G8 division in June 2005.   According to the program office, Army headquarters approved the plan in  August 2005 with a few outstanding issues to be resolved. The necessary  protection level for trucks is based on the Department of the Army’s  approved threat assessment, developed by the intelligence community,  which spans through 2018.  The Long Term Armoring Strategy will be  implemented in concert with the Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and  Trailer Modularity and Modernization Strategy, which is aimed at  addressing the Army’s truck needs through fiscal year 2018.
The Army’s long-term plan for add-on armor for trucks requires two kits.  The A kit provides a basic framework of fixtures for all trucks ready to  accept armor and includes hard to install parts and permanent mounting  provisions for the B kit. The B kit contains the actual armor to be applied to  all trucks fitted with an A kit and includes modular components to be  installed and removed by two crewmen.  The B kits will be procured based  on operational and training requirements, while all trucks will be outfitted  with A kits. The A kits will be installed by 2018 on current trucks during  recapitalization and on newly produced vehicles at the factory.  The second  quarter of fiscal year 2006 is the program manager’s proposed deadline to  begin installing all trucks with A kits; however, as of September 2005 the  date was not finalized. Program officials advocate the use of lighter  materials for producing the kits instead of the heavier metals currently  being used.  According to these officials, lighter materials like ceramics are  more expensive but could provide greater efficiencies such as reducing the  amount of weight on a vehicle, preventing wear and tear, and allowing for  more weight to be apportioned for operational purposes.
The long-term plan includes provisions to facilitate the production and  availability of armor in the future.  As part of the plan, the Army will own  the blueprints for the armor to expand competition from multiple sources  and avoid relying on one contractor at critical decision points when more  kits are needed. According to Army officials, contractors currently own the  blueprints, and the Army’s ability to buy quantities on demand could be  restricted by the contractors’ production capabilities.  Technical  requirements to facilitate the availability of armor in the future include  maximizing the commonality of kit components among vehicles, and  ensuring compatibility of the A and B kits with future armor upgrades.
Army program officials stated that preliminary budget estimates for the  armoring plan have been developed and included in the Army’s future  budget plans for fiscal years 2006 through 2011.  However, these estimates  are based on the costs of the current armor kits produced with heavy  metals and do not include estimates of the costs of lighter armor as  advocated by the program office.  Final cost estimates and a decision about  the types of armor to be used have not yet been finalized.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: A number of challenges hindered the Army’s ability to provide truck armor  in the timeliest manner to its deployed forces operating in the Middle East.   While some of these challenges may have resulted from operational  conditions in the region that the Army and DOD had little control over,  other limitations were a direct result of key decisions and ineffective  supply processes within the Army and DOD.  The availability of truck  armor was limited by the Army’s decision not to fully fund previously  identified requirements, numerous increases in requirements, the Army’s  inability to timely obtain funding for current wartime needs from DOD or  within its own budget, and limited industrial base resources.
In our prior report examining critical supply shortages during Operation  Iraqi Freedom, we recommended that the Army take actions to address two  of these same issues.  Specifically, we recommended the Army expedite  the funding process to support timely and sufficient funding for wartime  requirements, and assess the industrial base capacity to minimize  acquisition delays.  One of these recommendations, to assess the industrial  base, would also apply to the Army’s approach to armoring trucks.  The  other related recommendation to improve the timeliness of the funding  process was specific to the individual types of supplies we examined, and  may not be directly applicable to truck armor as it was written.
The results of both our current and prior work indicate a broader systemic  problem of not documenting and communicating urgent wartime funding  requirements and the disposition of funding decisions.  We reported in  April 2005 that funding delays also contributed to critical wartime  shortages of armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, and tires, but  we could not determine why sufficient funding was not provided earlier  because adequate documentation of funding requests was not available.
Without formal documentation and communication of urgent wartime  funding requirements and the disposition of funding decisions, the  rationale for funding decisions and the officials and organizations  accountable for making those decisions may not be subject to effective  oversight by Congress or the Secretary of Defense. It is likely DOD could  again face urgent requirements to rapidly develop and produce materiel  solutions to improve force capability or protection of deployed forces.   Without improving DOD’s ability to provide that support to the warfighters  in the timeliest manner, deployed military personnel and their missions  may be placed at significant risk because they lack the necessary  equipment and supplies at the critical times they may be needed.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure funding needs for urgent wartime requirements are identified  quickly, requests for funding are well documented, and funding decisions  are based on risk and an assessment of the highest priority requirements,  we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army  to establish a process to document and communicate all urgent wartime  funding requirements for supplies and equipment at the time they are  identified and the disposition of funding decisions.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the intent  of our recommendation, but stated that it believes the Army Requirements  and Resourcing Board (AR2B) process, previously the ASPB process  discussed earlier in this report, conforms to the process described in our  recommendation.   As noted by DOD, the AR2B is a forum where urgent  wartime requirements are reviewed, staffed, and validated.  However, as  demonstrated by our work, once requirements are validated, funding must  be made available to execute programs to respond to those requirements.   When sufficient funding is not available in the Army’s budget for the  validated requirement, the Army must seek additional funding through  DOD.  Because, as we noted in this report and in April 2005, funding  requests from the Army to DOD to resource validated requirements and the  corresponding decisions as to the amount and timing of funding to be  provided were not adequately documented, we were unable to determine  the reasons why funding was not made available to respond to urgent  wartime requirements as needed.  In addition, in April 2005 we also  reported that funding requests for critical wartime supplies such as  armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, and tires also could not be  tracked from the Army Materiel Command, where they originated, to Army  headquarters for validation, which precluded our ability to determine why  funding for these items lagged behind the time the need was identified.  We  continue to believe these events in the funding process for urgent wartime  requirements must be fully documented to provide effective program  oversight and to ensure funding decisions are made based on risk and an  assessment of the highest priority requirements.  DOD’s comments are  reprinted in appendix III.  DOD also provided technical comments that  have been incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and the  Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director of the  Office of Management and Budget.  We will also make copies available to  others upon request.  In addition, the report will be available at no charge  on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this  report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address our objectives, we examined the Army’s programs to produce  and install armor for each of its medium and heavy tactical wheeled  vehicles, or trucks, operating in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)  area of responsibility, which included Iraq and Afghanistan.  The Army  trucks we examined included the family of medium tactical vehicles  (FMTV), heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT), heavy  equipment transporter (HET), palletized load system (PLS), M915 truck  tractor, M939 5-ton tactical truck, and fuel tankers.  Descriptions of each of  these trucks along with detailed information on the availability of armor for  each truck are included in appendix II.
To determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed  to meet identified requirements, we interviewed DOD and Army officials  involved in identifying armor requirements, providing funding, and  acquiring truck armor for deployed forces.  We also met with truck armor  contractors from the industrial base.  A complete list of the DOD and other  organizations that we met with during this review is found in table 4. We  also collected and analyzed armor supply data such as requirements,  funding levels, contract order awards, production levels, and installations  for the period November 2003 (when truck armor requirements were first  formally identified) through September 2005, which we obtained from the  Army based on source documents. We considered the armor requirement  met for each type of truck when the quantity of armor kits installed onto  vehicles equaled the requirement.  We did not, however, visit the  CENTCOM area of responsibility to validate the extent to which armor kits  had been installed and were actually in use by trucks.
To determine what factors affected the time to provide truck armor to  deployed forces, we analyzed the armor supply data we collected to  identify trends and isolate factors that impacted the timeliness of  producing and installing armor.  We also met with and collected additional  information from DOD, Army and armor contractor officials involved with  the armor acquisition programs to evaluate the significance of these factors  and to determine the extent of their impact on the availability of truck  armor.
To determine what actions DOD and the Army have taken to improve the  availability of truck armor for current and future operations, we  interviewed military service and Joint Staff personnel to identify short- and  long-term efforts to address supply shortages.  We also reviewed  documentation related to addressing future truck armor needs.  However,  we did not evaluate the identified solutions’ potential for success.
We assessed the reliability of the truck armor supply data we obtained for  this review by interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data  and corroborating it with other information gathered from other military  service organizations and armor contractors, and by reviewing existing  documentation about the data and the sources that produced the data.  We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report.  We performed our audit from April 2005 through January 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts
paragraphs: We assessed the armoring efforts for each of the following medium and  heavy trucks: heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks, heavy equipment  transporters, palletized load systems, M939 5-ton trucks, family of medium  tactical vehicles, M915 truck family, and tankers. For these seven types of  trucks we reviewed, each assessment provides the status of the armoring  efforts at the time of our review.  The profile presents a general description  of the truck and the approach to developing armor solutions.  The  assessments also include our evaluation of the extent to which armor kits  were produced and installed to meet identified requirements and the  significant factors that affected armor availability.
The Army’s efforts to armor its heavy and medium tactical wheeled  vehicles have been hindered by awarding contracts for quantities less than  the total requirement, material shortages, and a limited rate of installation.  The Army’s efforts to armor its trucks experienced 12 to 18 month delays  between when initial requirements were identified and when the initial  requirements were met, although requirements for all vehicles increased  over time such that by the time the initial requirements were met, the  actual requirements were in excess of that initial amount. The schedule for  contract orders constrained the Army’s ability to meet requirements for all  vehicles except 5-ton trucks. Material shortages negatively impacted the  Army’s ability to meet requirements for all vehicles except for medium  tactical vehicles and tankers.  Limited installation rates constrained the  availability of tanker armor.
subsections: section_title: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
paragraphs: The Army uses its heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) to  provide transport capabilities for the resupply of various combat vehicles  and weapons systems. Figure 4 shows an example of a HEMTT.  To protect  the HEMTT crew from enemy fire in Iraq, the Army contracted with Simula  Inc. to develop and build add-on armor kits for installation on HEMTTs.   The Army’s armoring program involves applying armor kits to 2,705  HEMTTs.
Simula developed about 180 armor kits for the HEMTT in 1996 to support  operations in the Balkans.  However, the kits were placed in storage and  never actually used.  When armor requirements were identified for  operations in Iraq, the Army and Simula retrieved and tested the stored kits  and subsequently shipped them to southwest Asia for use in Iraq.  In  February 2004, the Army contracted with Simula to begin production of  new kits.
subsections: section_title: Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements
paragraphs: Requirements for 1,080 HEMTT armor kits were first identified in  November 2003, but a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement  were not installed until February 2005, or 15 months after the first  requirement was established.  Identified requirements continued to grow to  a level of 2,430 armor kits by March 2005, but dropped slightly in  September 2005 to 2,246.  However, as of September 2005 the total amount  of kits installed was 2,088, or 158 fewer than the quantity required.  Figure 5  compares the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit  requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed. According  to Army officials, the total number of required armor kits was installed by  December 2005.
section_title: Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
paragraphs: Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the  HEMTT.  First, the Army’s lack of timeliness of contract awards over the  life of the program constrained the overall production schedule.  Second, a  shortage of key materials, specifically steel and aluminum negatively  impacted the contractor’s ability to maximize production in the early stages  of the program.
subsections: section_title: Contracts Constrained Production
paragraphs: The Army issued five contracts for HEMTT armor kits, which affected the  contractor’s ability to produce more kits faster.  For example, according to  contractor officials, they have not had capacity constraints in the building  of HEMTT armor kits; however, they sized production capacity to meet the  quantities in the contract that the contractor had been awarded.  Therefore,  production levels were lower than they could have been if the contractor  had received a contract for larger quantities of kits upfront, which  prevented production of more of the kits sooner.  One reason for the  Army’s use of a contract in this manner was the fact that funding was  received in amounts less than the total requirements and initially lagged  several months behind requirements.  As shown in figure 6, the availability  of funding affected the pace of contract awards.
Another reason for the lower quantity of contract orders was the changing  requirements for HEMTT armor kits.  For example, armor kit production  output for the HEMTT dropped to zero in April and May because the  contractor had completed production for the current requirement.   However, subsequent contract orders were awarded after the contractor  had ceased production.  By the time that the contractor had received the  last two contracts for 791 and 319 HEMTT armor kits, respectively,  production had already stopped, employees and sub-contractors were  released, and equipment and facility space were given up for other uses.   Consequently, production of the 791 and 319 kits had to wait about two  months until the contractor could restart this industrial base.
Although an additional requirement had been identified in March 2005, a  contract to meet this requirement was not awarded until April 2005, which  was not soon enough to prevent the stoppage of the production line.    According to the Army’s program manager, to prevent a production  stoppage the requirement would have had to be identified and the contract  order issued several months earlier.
section_title: Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production
paragraphs: A shortage of armor materials, specifically steel and aluminum, negatively  impacted the HEMTT armor kit program.  Shortages of high hard armor  steels and aluminum negatively affected the start up and pace of  production through the end of 2004.  The material shortages were  eventually rectified by the intervention of the Army’s Tactical Wheeled  Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various congressional staff appealing  directly to the material suppliers.
section_title: Heavy Equipment Transporter
paragraphs: The heavy equipment transporter (HET) is a system used by the Army to  transport, deploy, recover, and evacuate main battle tanks and other heavy  tracked and wheeled vehicles to and from the battlefield.  The HET system  consists of a truck tractor and HET trailer, as shown in figure 7.  The Army’s  armoring effort involves applying armor to a total of 796 HETs.  In April  2004, the Army contracted with Simula Inc. to begin producing armor kits  for the HET.
subsections: section_title: Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements
paragraphs: Requirements for 500 HET armor kits were first identified in November  2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were  not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first requirement was  established. Identified requirements continued to grow to 758 by March  2005, but dropped in September 2005 to 663.  As of September 2005 the  total number of kits installed was 700, or 37 greater than the quantity  required.  Figure 8 compares the time elapsed from the identification of  armor kit requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed.
section_title: Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
paragraphs: Two significant factors affected the contractor’s ability to produce armor  kits for the HET.  First, the award of contracts over the armoring program’s  life and a lack of contractor visibility into upcoming contracts affected HET  production.  Second, the HET armoring program was also negatively  impacted by a material shortage.
subsections: section_title: Contracts Constrained Production
paragraphs: The Army issued four contracts for the HET, which lagged behind  requirements.  This limited the contractor’s ability to maximize production  of HET kits.  Specifically, contractor officials told us that they did not have  capacity constraints in the building of HET armor kits; however, they sized  production capacity to meet the quantities in the contract orders that they  had been awarded.  Therefore, production levels were lower than they  could have been if the contractor had received contract orders for larger  quantities of kits upfront, which prevented production of more of the kits  sooner.  Significant reasons for awarding less than the total requirements  were changing requirements and delayed and less than the total funding.   Figure 9 demonstrates the relationship among timing of requirements,  funding, and contracts.
A lack of contractor visibility into upcoming contract awards also affected  HET production.  Specifically, the Army awarded a contract for 131  additional HET add-on-armor kits in April 2005.  However, in February 2005  the contractor’s supply base had completed production for HET  components related to the previous contract order for 66 HET kits.   Consequently, the supply base required two months to reinitiate production  of these components from a cold start. If the contractor had had visibility  into the upcoming contract, it could have maintained the needed supply  base and reduced production time for the additional 131 HETs by 2 months.
section_title: Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production
paragraphs: The HET armoring program was also negatively impacted by a material  shortage.  The shortage of materials, specifically of high-hard armor steels  and aluminum, affected the start up of heavy tactical vehicle contract  orders and the pace of production through the end of 2004.  The material  shortages were eventually rectified by the intervention of the Army’s  Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various  congressional staff appealing directly to the material suppliers.
Palletized Load System The Army’s palletized load system (PLS) performs long distance and local  haul, and unit resupply in the tactical environment to support combat units.   The PLS is supposed to facilitate the rapid movement of combat configured  loads of ammunition as well as all classes of supplies and containers.  The  PLS consists of a truck with self-loading capabilities and a trailer, as shown  in figure 10.
According to contractor officials, the Army’s Tank-Automotive Research,  Development and Engineering Center had developed and built around 30  armored kits to support operations in the Balkans; however, the kits were  placed in storage and never used.  Subsequently, when armor requirements  were identified for operations in Iraq, the Army retrieved the kits from  storage and shipped them to southwest Asia for use in Iraq.  In February  2004, the Army issued contract orders to Simula Inc. to produce additional  PLS armor kits.  Simula Inc. has completed production of a total of 1,282  armor kits, which satisfies the current requirement for 914 armor kits and  provides 368 spare PLS armor kits for future requirements.
section_title: Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements
paragraphs: Requirements for 800 PLS armor kits were first identified in November  2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were  not installed until May 2005, or 18 months after the first requirement was  established.  By March 2005, the identified requirements had increased by  114, which were met in July 2005. In September 2005, the identified  requirements increased again by 30, which were met in September 2005.   Figure 11 compares the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit  requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed. In  anticipation of a greater requirement, the Army program office ordered 338  kits above the Army’s current requirement.
section_title: Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
paragraphs: Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the PLS.   First, the Army’s use of contracts for quantities less than total requirements  over the life of the program constrained the overall production schedule.   Second, a shortage of key materials, specifically steel and aluminum,  negatively impacted the contractor’s ability to maximize production.
subsections: section_title: Contracts Constrained Production
paragraphs: The Army issued four contracts for PLS kits, which initially lagged behind  requirements and affected the contractor’s ability to maximize the  production of PLS kits.  According to contractor officials, they have not had  capacity constraints in the building of PLS armor kits; however, they sized  production capacity to meet the quantities in the contracts that the  contractor had been issued.  Therefore, production levels were lower than  they could have been if the contractor had received contracts for larger  quantities of kits upfront, which prevented the production of more of the  kits sooner.  Significant reasons for awards for less than the total  requirements were changing requirements and delayed and less than total  funding.  Figure 12 demonstrates the relationship among timing of  requirements, funding, and contracts.
The PLS armoring program was also negatively impacted by material  shortages.  The shortage of materials, specifically of high-hard armor steels  and aluminum, affected the start up of heavy tactical vehicle contract  orders and the pace of production through the end of 2004.  The material  shortages were eventually rectified by the intervention of the Army’s  Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various  Congressional staff appealing directly to the material suppliers.
section_title: M939 5-Ton Truck
paragraphs: The Army’s M939 5-ton tactical truck is a general-purpose military vehicle,  primarily designed for tactical, off-road use.  The M-939 is a 5-ton capacity,  six-wheel drive cargo truck used for transportation of all types of supplies  and comes in various vehicle types, including a cargo truck, dump truck,  and wrecker. Figure 13 shows an example of an M-939 5-ton truck.
The M939 5-ton truck armoring effort includes manufacturing armoring kits  for 3,000 5-ton trucks at six army facilities through a program manager  agreement with the Army’s Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise (GSIE).
GSIE began producing truck kits in December 2004 and completed the last  kits in July 2005.
subsections: section_title: Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements
paragraphs: Requirements for 2,229 M939 5-ton truck armor kits were first identified in  April 2004; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement  were not produced until June 2005, or 14 months after the first requirement  was established. As of September 2005, 2,224 kits had been installed.   Identified requirements grew to 3,073 by August 2004, but dropped 2,688 by  March 2005, and dropped again slightly in September 2005 to 2,592.  By  June 2005 a sufficient quantity of kits had been produced to meet those  requirements. Figure 14 compares the time elapsed from the identification  of armor kit requirements to the time when kits were produced and  installed. The Army estimated the required quantity of kits would have  been installed by January 2006.  According to GSIE officials, GSIE does not  anticipate any further production orders for the M939 armor kits.
section_title: Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Availability of Armor Kits
paragraphs: Shortages of material negatively impacted the production of M939 5-ton  armor kits.  According to GSIE officials, the production capacity for the 5- ton truck armor kits was established based on the availability of material  and components that are used to build the armor kits.  When GSIE was  asked to accelerate the production of M939 5-ton kits, the lack of  availability of certain materials limited GSIE’s ability to increase the  production quantity of the armor kit.  Examples of items that were difficult  to obtain included armor grade steel, door handles, and wiper components.
section_title: Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
paragraphs: The Army’s family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV) addresses medium  tactical-vehicle requirements for unit mobility and unit resupply, and  transportation of equipment and personnel. The FMTV consists of the Light  Medium Tactical Vehicle, which has a 2.5-ton capacity, and the Medium  Tactical Vehicle, which has a 5-ton capacity.  Variants of the FMTV include  cargo trucks and tractor, van, wrecker, and dump truck models. The FMTV  armoring effort involves producing a total of 3,890 armor kits.
The FMTV armoring production is split between two separate contractors,  Radian Inc. and Stewart and Stevenson Inc.  The Army’s Tank-Automotive  Research, Development and Engineering Center designed and produced a  small number (approximately 35) of FMTV armor kits with components  that bolt onto the cab.  In March 2003, the Army arranged for Radian to help  with the installation of these kits onto vehicles.  In February 2004, Radian  received a contract to produce 270 kits based on the Army design.  The kit  being produced by Radian is called the Radian Armor Crew Kit (RACK).   Figure 15 shows an example of an FMTV RACK truck. Stewart and  Stevenson produces an armored cab, called the Low Signature Armored  Cab (LSAC), that replaces the FMTV cab in its entirety. Figure 16 shows an  example of an FMTV LSAC truck. On its own initiative, in 2002, Stewart and  Stevenson developed an FMTV armored cab design to protect against mine  blasts.  Subsequent to its first armored cab design, Stewart and Stevenson  modified its design based on the emerging threats in Iraq, and in October  2004, after completing design and testing, received its initial contract from  the Army to produce 385 LSAC cabs.
subsections: section_title: Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements
paragraphs: Requirements for 1,150 FMTV armor kits were first identified in November  2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were  not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first requirement was  established.  Identified requirements continued to grow to 3,335 by March  2005, and again to 3,377 by September 2005.  However, as of September  2005 only 3,053 RACK and LSAC kits had been installed, or 324 fewer than  the quantity required. Figure 17 compares the time elapsed from the  identification of armor kit requirements to the time when kits were  produced and installed. According to Army officials, the total number of  required armor kits was installed by December 2005.
section_title: Contracts Constrained Production
paragraphs: Orders for FMTV armor kits were awarded for less than the total  requirement and lagged behind requirements.  These contracts slowed  production of armor kits for both FMTV contractors.   For Radian, there  was a complete break in production because the final contract for 1,049  FMTV armor kits was received after its long lead time for ordering items  needed to maintain continuous production.  According to the Radian  officials, production could have been maintained or even accelerated if the  requirements had been identified and funding provided in time to meet the  long lead time.  However, the contractor did not have any visibility into the  pending requirements and was told by the Army that there would be no  further contracts for kits.  In addition, according to a Stewart and  Stevenson official, if they had been awarded the contract for the final 292  armor kits in the March/April 2005 time frame, they could have finished  producing the kits in the July/August 2005 time frame, or 3 months earlier  than the October/November 2005 time frame when the kits were estimated  to be completed.  Significant reasons for ordering in this manner were  changing requirements and delayed and less than total funding.  Figure 18  demonstrates the relationship between timing of requirements, funding,  and contracts.
section_title: Contracts Affected Price
paragraphs: The award of contracts in quantities less than total requirements resulted in  the Army not receiving the best price available for the RACK.  The Army  ordered FMTV kits from Radian in increments of 270 and 501 in February  2004 and March 2004, respectively. The 270 kits that the government  ordered did not allow for receiving the highest price break for production  quantities, while the 501 kits the government ordered allowed for the best  price break available.  For the 272 kit contract, the cost was about $51,603  for each kit, and for the 501 kit contract, the cost was $45,271 for each kit, a  difference of $6,332 per kit.  According to the Army program officials, the  reason there were two contract awards was that funding was not available  for the full quantity in February 2004.
section_title: M915 Truck Family
paragraphs: The Army’s family of M915 trucks comprises highway tractors used  primarily for the long distance transport of containers. The M915 is very  similar to commercial tractor-trailer trucks. Figure 19 illustrates an M915  truck.  To protect the M915 crew from enemy fire in Iraq, the Army  contracted with Simula Inc., Radian Inc. and Armor Works Inc. to develop  and build add-on armor kits.  The Army’s armoring program involves  producing armor kits for 2,026 M915s.
subsections: section_title: Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements
paragraphs: Requirements for 250 M915 truck armor kits were first identified in  November 2003, but a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement  were not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first  requirement was established.  Identified requirements continued to grow to  1,877 armor kits by March 2005, but dropped slightly in September 2005 to  1,805.  However, as of September 2005 the total number of kits installed  was 1,295, or 510 fewer than the quantity required. Figure 20 compares the  time elapsed from the identification of armor kit requirements to the time  when kits were produced and installed. Army officials estimated that the  total number of required armor kits would have been installed by January  2006.
section_title: Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
paragraphs: Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the M915.   First, the Army’s award of contracts for less than the total requirement over  the life of the program constrained production.  Second, a shortage of key  materials, specifically steel and aluminum, negatively impacted the  contractor’s ability to maximize production.
subsections: section_title: Contracts Constrained Production
paragraphs: Contracts for the M915 truck armor kits were awarded in quantities less  than the total requirement and generally lagged behind requirements.  This  manner of contracting for M915 armor kits constrained production,  particularly for Simula.  The Army issued four contracts to Simula for 1,228  of the M915 armor kits over a 9-month period.  According to Simula  officials, they subcontracted the workload to Plasan Sasa in Israel based on  the first contract of 250.  However, subsequent to the first contract, the  Army validated additional requirements of 1,627 kits between April 2004  and March 2005.  However, Simula was not aware when the first contract  was awarded that the total quantities could eventually exceed 1,600.  Had  the contractor been aware of this, it would have proceeded differently from  the outset, such as using a different manufacturer. By the time the  additional contracts came into Simula, Plasan Sasa was facing capacity  constraints in the production of the M915 armor kits.  Unable to overcome  the capacity constraints at Plasan Sasa, Simula negotiated with Plasan Sasa  to bring some of the M915 production to the United States. In total, Simula  arranged to complete 738 of the 1,228 M915 armor kits in the United States.   Significant reasons for awarding contracts in this manner were changing  requirements and delayed and less than total funding.  Figure 21  demonstrates the relationship among timing of requirements, funding, and  contracts.
Shortages of strategic armor materials negatively impacted M915 armor kit  production.  Shortages of high-hard armor steels and aluminum affected  the start up of contract orders and the pace of production through the end  of 2004.  The material shortages were eventually rectified by the  intervention of the Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities  and by various congressional staff appeals directly to the material  suppliers.
section_title: Tankers
paragraphs: The Army uses its tankers to haul and dispense bulk fuel.  There are four  models of fuel tankers involved in the Army’s armoring program: the M967,  the M969, the M978, and the M1062. Figure 22 shows an example of an  M969 tanker. The primary component of the tanker armoring effort is a self- sealing coating material that is sprayed onto the exterior of the fuel tank.   When a small arms round penetrates the coating material and the fuel tank,  the hole self-seals and the fuel leak is stopped within minutes. The second  component of tanker armoring comprises armor panel kits mounted at  select locations on the fuel tanker to protect critical equipment not  protected by the coating material.  VSE Corporation is applying the self- sealing coating to the tankers and is manufacturing the armor kit for the  M967, the M969, and the M1062 tankers.  Oshkosh Truck Corporation is  manufacturing the armor kit for the M978 tanker.
subsections: section_title: Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements
paragraphs: Requirements for armoring 371 tankers were first identified in August 2004;  however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were not  produced and installed until August 2005, 12 months after the initial  requirement was identified. Identified requirements have continued to  grow to 1,375 armor kits by January 2005, but dropped in September 2005  to 1,192.   However, as of September 2005 the total amount of armor kits  installed was 443, or 749 fewer than the quantity required. Figure 23  compares the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit  requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed. Army  officials estimate that the total number of required armor kits will be  produced by May 2006 and installed by January 2007.
section_title: Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
paragraphs: Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for tankers.   First, the Army’s award of contracts for less than the total requirement over  the life of the program constrained production.  Second, installation of  armor kits was constrained by a limited rate of rotation for tankers into  installation facilities and unique requirements for applying the protective  spray-on coating.
subsections: section_title: Contracts Constrained Availability of Armor Kits
paragraphs: The production time line for one of the armor kits, for the M967 tanker, is  longer than it would have been if contract awards had been for the total  requirement.  The Army awarded two contracts for M967 armoring with  quantities of 171 and 152, with an 8-month interval between the two  contracts.  According to the contractor, if all 323 tanker kits had been  awarded together, the total production time line would have decreased due  to production efficiencies.  Contracts for the other three tankers, the M969,  the M978, and the M1062, were awarded for the total requirement and,  therefore, the contractor stated that production has gone as efficiently as  possible.
section_title: Limited Installation Rates Paced Availability of Armor Kits
paragraphs: A significant factor that affected the availability of armor kits for tanker  trailers was a limited installation rate.  For example, the installation of add- on armor kits was slowed by the rate of rotation of trucks into the in- theater installation facilities as they returned from missions.  Operational  constraints limited the number of vehicles that could be taken out of use at  any one time.  In addition, unique requirements to coat the tankers with a  protective chemical prior to installing armor panels also limited the rate of  installation.  The proper application of the chemical coating requires  controlled environmental conditions, such as humidity and temperature,  which has led to a limited number of spray locations accessible to the  Army.    Thus, although production of armor kits for tankers is expected to  be completed by May 2006, because of these constraints, installation of  enough kits to meet requirements is not expected to be finished until 8  months later in January 2007.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgements
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, David Schmitt, Assistant Director;  Renee S. Brown, Judith C. Collins, Kenneth E. Patton, Richard G. Payne,  Jay Rangaram, Maria-Alaina I. Rambus, Paulina T. Reaves, Cary B. Russell,  Patricia Sari-Spear, Rebecca Shea, and John D. Strong also made key  contributions to this report.