Mine Safety: MSHA Devotes Substantial Effort to Ensuring the Safety and Health of Coal Miners, but Its Programs Could Be Strengthened
Published: 2003-09-05T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Despite a drop in injury and fatality rates since the formation of the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), mining is still a dangerous industry. Focusing on underground coal mines, GAO assessed how well MSHA oversees its process for reviewing and approving critical types of mine plans and the extent to which MSHA's inspections and accident investigations processes help ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: To help ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners, MSHA staff review and approve mine plans, conduct inspections, and investigate serious accidents. In these three areas, GAO found that MSHA has extensive procedures and qualified staff. However, MSHA can improve its oversight, guidance, and human capital planning efforts. MSHA is not effectively monitoring a few key areas. MSHA headquarters does not ensure that 6-month technical inspections of ventilation and roof support plans are being completed in a timely fashion. This may lead to mines operating without up-to-date plans or mine operators not following all requirements of the plans. Additionally, MSHA officials do not always ensure that hazards found during inspections are corrected promptly. Gaps were found in the information that MSHA uses to monitor fatal and nonfatal injuries, limiting trend analysis and agency oversight. Specifically, the agency does not collect information on hours worked by independent contractor staff needed to compute fatality and nonfatal injury rates for specific mines, and it is difficult to link information on accidents at underground coal mines with MSHA's investigations. Guidance provided by MSHA management to agency employees could be strengthened. Some inspection procedures are unclear and are contained in many sources, leading to differing interpretations by mine inspectors. The guidance on coordinating inspections conducted by specialists and regular inspectors is also unclear, resulting in some duplication of effort. Finally, although about 44 percent of MSHA's underground coal mine inspectors will be eligible to retire in the next 5 years, the agency has no plan for replacing them or using other human capital flexibilities available to the agency to retain its highly qualified and trained inspectors. The potential shortage of inspectors may limit MSHA's ability to ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Last year at the Quecreek mine in Pennsylvania, a group of nine coal  miners accidentally broke through to an abandoned mine not shown on  their map and were trapped underground for 3 days. Although they were  eventually rescued, this event and other more tragic mining accidents,  including the explosion in 2001 at a mine in Alabama in which 13 miners  were killed, serve as a reminder that the safety and health of the thousands  of men and women who mine the coal in over 2,000 mines that is used to  produce over half of the country’s electricity must be protected. In passing  the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the “Mine Act”), Congress  gave much of the responsibility for ensuring the safety and health of mine  workers to the Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health  Administration (MSHA). Since that time, the nation’s mines have become  safer—in the past 25 years, both the number and the rate of deaths and  nonfatal injuries have declined. However, despite these trends, mining  remains a dangerous industry. Data collected by MSHA on serious injuries  (those involving days away from work) indicate that mining, particularly  underground coal mining, is one of the most dangerous industries in the  United States.
Under the stringent requirements of the Mine Act, MSHA protects the  health and safety of miners by inspecting each underground coal mine at  least four times a year, citing mine operators for violations of the act or  regulations, ensuring that hazards are quickly corrected, restricting  operations or closing mines for serious violations, and investigating  serious mine accidents. In addition, MSHA must approve the initial plans  that mine operators prepare for essential systems that protect mine  workers—such as ventilation and roof support systems—and revisions to  the plans. As part of its review of these plans, MSHA conducts technical  inspections of the mines every 6 months to determine whether mine  operators are following the plans and whether the plans have been  updated. These technical inspections are conducted in addition to the  comprehensive quarterly inspectionsof each mine. MSHA’s headquarters  office is responsible for managing the operations of the agency and  monitoring the activities of the 11 district offices responsible for  protecting safety and health at coal mines nationwide. The district offices  have day-to-day responsibility for reviewing and approving mine plans,  conducting inspections, and investigating mine accidents. To carry out all  of these responsibilities, MSHA received an appropriation for fiscal year  2003 of almost $273 million. This included funding for the approximately  350 inspectors who are responsible for inspecting underground and  surface coal mines and investigating mine accidents and the 210 specialists  who are responsible for reviewing and approving mine plans, conducting  technical inspections of mine plans, and participating in investigations of  mine accidents.
You asked us to provide you with information on MSHA’s efforts by  assessing (1) how well MSHA oversees its process for reviewing and  approving three critical types of mine plans, (2) the extent to which  MSHA’s inspection process helps ensure the safety and health of mine  workers, and (3) the extent to which MSHA uses its accident  investigations process to improve the future safety and health of mine  workers.
We reviewed MSHA’s policies and procedures, interviewed agency  officials, and analyzed data obtained from computer files and documents  at the agency’s headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. We also reviewed  documents and interviewed officials at the National Mine Health and  Safety Academy in Beckley, West Virginia (Mine Academy); the Pittsburgh  Safety and Health Technology Center in Bruceton, Pennsylvania  (Technology Center); and 5 of MSHA’s 11 district offices. In order to  include a review of the districts’ accident investigations, we selected  districts in which serious accidents had occurred in the past 5 years. We  visited several underground coal mines and interviewed mine operators  and workers at these mines. In addition, we obtained documents from and  interviewed officials with industry associations, including the United Mine  Workers of America and the National Mining Association. We conducted  our work between November 2002 and July 2003 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: As of the end of calendar year 2002, the United States had approximately  2,050 coal mines—about 700 underground coal mines and 1,350 surface  mines. Over the past 10 years, the number of underground and surface  coal mines in the United States has declined: from approximately 1,300  underground mines in 1993 to just over 700 mines in 2002, and from over  2,100 surface mines in 1993 to about 1,300 in 2002. Over that same period,  the number of mine workers also decreased; from over 62,500  underground coal mine workers in 1993 to about 45,500 in 2002 and from  over 74,000 surface coal miners in 1993 to about 62,000 in 2002. As shown  in figure 1, the number of coal mines and mine workers declined from  1993 to 2002.
These mines produced over 1 billion tons of coal in 2002, about one-third  by underground mines. Despite the decrease in the number of mines and  miners from 1993 to 2002, production has remained constant because of  the increased use of mechanized mining equipment and more efficient  mining techniques. In addition, over the past several decades, coal  production has shifted from primarily underground mines to large surface  mines, including mines in Wyoming and other areas west of the Mississippi  that produce millions of tons of coal annually. The 20 largest coal  companies account for 70 percent of all coal that is produced in the United  States.
Some underground mines do not actively produce coal all year. Some  mines are only operated seasonally because of local weather conditions,  and mine operators often suspend operations at smaller, less cost-effective  mines when the price of coal drops below a certain level. MSHA is  required to inspect inactive mines as long as some miners are still working  at the mine; however, these inspections generally take substantially less  time than inspections of active mines.
Both the fatality rates and the nonfatal injury rates—the number of  fatalities and injuries for every 200,000 hours worked—are higher for  underground coal mines than surface mines. As shown in figure 2, our  analysis of MSHA’s data on fatalities for the 10-year period from 1993 to  2002 indicated that the fatality rates for underground coal mines were  much higher than those for surface mines for this period.
For 1993 to 2002, nonfatal injury rates for underground coal mines were  higher than those for surface mines, as shown in figure 3.
A variety of factors contribute to underground coal mines being more  dangerous than surface mines. One factor is that many underground coal  mines are less than 40 inches high, requiring miners to kneel, crawl, or  crouch in the mine throughout their work shifts. In some cases, the  workspace is so small that the large machinery used to mine the coal takes  up most of the space in the passageway, as shown in figure 4.
Another critical factor that contributes to the hazardous working  conditions is methane gas, which is highly explosive. It is often produced  in large quantities when coal is extracted from underground mines.  Additional factors are the geological conditions in many areas of the  country that make the roofs of mines unstable, the danger posed by fire in  an underground mine, coal and silica dust that can cause silicosis and  pneumoconiosis (black lung disease), and the close proximity of unknown  areas of abandoned mines, which can lead to flooding of the mine, as it did  at the Quecreek mine last year.
MSHA’s Coal Administration’s headquarters is located in Arlington,  Virginia, and 8 of its 11 district offices are located in the eastern United  States near coal seams located in or near the Appalachian Mountains. As  shown in table 1, as of May 2003, MSHA’s 11 districts had a total of 1,017  staff who were responsible for protecting the safety and health of mine  workers nationwide, including 283 inspectors and 200 specialists assigned  specifically to underground coal mines. In addition to the district office  staff, MSHA had 38 headquarters staff members assigned to coal mine  safety and health, for a total of 1,055 staff.
section_title: MSHA Devotes Substantial Effort to Approving Mine Plans, but Does Not Provide Adequate Oversight of the Approval Process
paragraphs: MSHA has extensive procedures and highly qualified staff for approving  two of the three types of plans we reviewed—ventilation and roof support  plans—and most of these plans are reviewed and approved on a timely  basis. However, MSHA headquarters does not adequately monitor  completion of 6-month technical inspections conducted as part of the  districts’ review of ventilation and roof support plans; data maintained by  the district offices indicate that some districts are not completing these  inspections in a timely manner. In addition, MSHA headquarters has not  provided clear guidance to the districts on coordinating technical  inspections related to mine plans with quarterly inspections of  underground coal mines in order to avoid duplication of effort by district  staff. Finally, staffing shortages have prevented MSHA from reviewing and  approving plans for containing debris produced by the mines on a timely  basis.
subsections: section_title: MSHA Has Extensive Procedures and Highly Qualified Staff for Approving Ventilation and Roof Support Plans
paragraphs: MSHA has extensive procedures for approving ventilation and roof  support plans. The Mine Act and its implementing regulations contain  many of the requirements for approving ventilation and roof support plans.  Additional procedures are contained in MSHA’s Program Policy Manual,  ventilation and roof support plan approval procedures handbooks, and the  standard operating procedures for each district office. These procedures  provide specific steps for approving the ventilation and roof support plans  submitted by mine operators to MSHA for approval. Mine operators are  required to submit their initial ventilation and roof support plans to the  MSHA district in which the mine is located for approval prior to operating  a mine and are required to submit revised plans to the district whenever  significant changes are made to the plans. The district managers are  ultimately responsible for approving ventilation and roof support plans  submitted to their districts. Generally, districts are required to approve  ventilation and roof support plans within 45 days of receipt unless  problems are found that must be resolved. In some of the districts we  visited, state mine agencies were also required to approve the mine plans.  See appendix I for additional information on MSHA’s approval process for  ventilation and roof support plans.
Specialists assigned to each district office to review and approve mine  plans are generally highly trained and experienced. MSHA currently has  200 underground specialists assigned to its 11 district offices who review  ventilation, roof support, and other types of mine plans. A majority of the  specialists assigned to underground mines have at least 5 years of  experience in mining and were former inspectors of underground coal  mines. As such, they receive 25 weeks of underground coal mine inspector  training at the Mine Academy as well as on-the-job training, which  qualifies them to conduct inspections and write citations for safety and  health violations. In addition, most specialists have several years of  experience as inspectors before applying for specialist positions. Each  specialist is also required to take a minimum of 2 weeks of training in mine  safety and health, such as specialized training on ventilation or roof  support systems, every 2 years.
Most district offices approve ventilation and roof support plans within the  required 45-day period. District offices track the review and approval of  ventilation and roof support plans, noting the date mine operators submit  the plans to the district, the dates plans are assigned to specialists for  review, and the dates the plans are approved. We reviewed this  information for the most recent 5-year period, 1998 to 2002, and found that  most districts approve these plans on a timely basis.
section_title: MSHA Does Not Ensure Districts Are Completing Technical Inspections of Mine Plans
paragraphs: MSHA headquarters does not adequately monitor completion of 6-month  technical inspections of ventilation and roof support plans by the district  offices. Districts conduct technical inspections of the ventilation and roof  support plans at least once every 6 months in order to ensure that mine  operators are updating the plans to reflect changes in the ventilation and  roof support systems and following the requirements of the plans. The  specialists who review the mine plans during the approval process also  conduct many of these technical inspections.
Our analysis of the information submitted by the district offices to MSHA  headquarters on the timeliness of 6-month technical inspections of mines’  ventilation and roof support plans for the most recent 5-year period, 1998  to 2002, indicated that several districts had not completed the inspections  as required by agency procedures. The data showed that, although 6 of  MSHA’s 11 district offices completed the 6-month technical inspections of  ventilation plans for most quarters of the 5-year period, 5 districts did not,  and 2 districts did not complete these inspections during any quarter of  the 5-year period. In addition, our analysis of the data submitted by the  district offices to MSHA headquarters on technical inspections related to  roof support plans for the same period showed that 3 of the 11 districts  had not completed these inspections during most quarters of the 5-year  period.
As a result of districts not completing these 6-month technical inspections  in a timely manner, some mines may be operating without adequate  ventilation or roof support systems. Technical inspections of the mines’  ventilation and roof support plans are essential in ensuring adequate  airflow and controlling the accumulation of dust particles in underground  coal mines and that the roofs are adequately supported. Inadequate  ventilation systems or roof support systems can directly affect the safety  and health of mine workers. For example, our review of MSHA’s data on  fatalities at underground coal mines from 1998 to 2002 showed that  problems related to ventilation and roof support systems accounted for  high proportions of fatalities in underground coal mines. For this 5-year  period, ignitions or explosions from excessive gas or coal dust accounted  for the third largest percentage of all fatalities, 14 percent, and roof falls  accounted for the largest percentage, 34 percent.
Officials at MSHA headquarters initially were not aware that these  inspections had not all been completed in a timely manner and contacted  the district offices to find out why. We also contacted several districts and,  according to district officials, all technical inspections related to the  mines’ ventilation and roof support plans had been conducted, but not all  of the inspections were completed within the 6-month time frame. In  addition, officials in the 5 districts in which the data indicated that  technical inspections had not been completed in almost every quarter of  the 5-year period we reviewed—districts 1, 2, 4, 9, and 10—told us that  information in their databases was not accurate and that most inspections  had been completed within the 6-month time frame. However, they were  not able to explain why they had not corrected the information in their  databases on completion of the 6-month technical inspections.
Headquarters officials told us that ensuring the timely completion of  technical inspections would be included in one of the agency’s new  initiatives. As part of this initiative, which was started in June 2003,  individuals from MSHA’s Safety Division have been assigned to each one  of the 11 district offices and given responsibility for monitoring the  district’s performance. These monitoring efforts include ensuring that the  district is conducting all inspections, tracking trends in the number and  rates of injuries and fatalities at the district’s mines, and reviewing the  number and types of safety and health violations cited. In addition, the  Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health told us that MSHA plans to  incorporate the databases the districts use to track the completion of  6-month technical inspections of ventilation and roof control plans into  MSHA’s overall data systems as part of its agencywide upgrade of MSHA’s  databases. This part of the upgrade is currently planned for 2006.
section_title: MSHA Has Not Provided Clear Guidance to Districts on Coordinating Inspections
paragraphs: MSHA headquarters has not provided clear guidance to its district offices  on coordinating technical inspections of mine plans with quarterly  inspections of underground coal mines in order to avoid duplication of  effort by district staff. Specialists who conduct on-site technical  inspections of underground coal mines related to mine plans often spend  several days inspecting the mines’ ventilation and roof support systems.  For example, a ventilation specialist might spend several days walking  through the 30 to 50 miles of airways at large mines to test whether an  adequate amount of air is passing through the ventilation system and  ensure that the passageways are not blocked. Inspectors are required to  walk through these same airways during each quarterly inspection of the  mine. They may, however, rely on the work of specialists who conduct the  technical inspections, if the specialists coordinate their inspections with  the inspectors and charge their time to the quarterly inspections. However,  in 2 of the 5 districts we visited, we found that, in some instances,  specialists and inspectors were duplicating each other’s work, resulting in  an inefficient use of MSHA’s resources. In one of these districts, because  district management prohibited specialists from charging their time to  quarterly inspections, inspectors could not count the time spent by  specialists examining certain areas of the mines that inspectors are  required to examine as part of their quarterly inspections, such as  ventilation systems. Therefore, in this district, inspectors were required to  examine the same areas of the mines even when a specialist had recently  examined them. If the district had allowed the specialists to coordinate  with the inspectors and charge the time they spent examining these  systems to the quarterly inspections as in other districts, the inspectors  would not have been required to examine these same systems again during  the quarterly inspection. District officials told us it was their  understanding that MSHA’s procedures prohibited them from charging  specialists’ time to quarterly inspections, although MSHA headquarters  officials told us there was no such prohibition.
MSHA headquarters officials told us they have no procedures that require  specialists to coordinate technical inspections with quarterly inspections  in order to avoid duplication. They agreed that the policies and procedures  governing whether specialists may charge their time to quarterly  inspections are unclear and told us they plan to clarify the procedures  soon. In the interim, MSHA headquarters issued a memorandum to the  district offices in June 2003 encouraging them to better coordinate  inspections by specialists and inspectors.
section_title: MSHA Does Not Approve Plans for Containing Mine Debris on a Timely Basis
paragraphs: MSHA is responsible for approving plans for containing mine debris, called  impoundment plans. Many of these plans are extremely complex and  require highly qualified engineers who are familiar with technical areas  such as dam building techniques, hydrology, and soil conditions. Failure of  an impoundment can be devastating to nearby communities, which may be  flooded with water and sludge, and to the environment, affecting streams  and water supplies for years afterwards. Because of the potential for  failure, such as the impoundment dam failure in 1972 in Buffalo Creek,  West Virginia, in which 125 people were killed and 500 homes were  destroyed, MSHA is extremely careful about approving impoundment  plans. MSHA has responsibility for approximately 600 coal impoundments.
All but one of MSHA’s district offices send most of their mines’  impoundment plans to the Mine Waste and Geotechnical Engineering  Division of MSHA’s Safety and Health Technology Center, which the  agency established in 1973 to provide district offices with the technical  expertise needed to review impoundment plans. District staff review and  approve only plans that are less complex or contain only minor  modifications of existing impoundments. The one district that reviews its  own impoundment plans has a professional engineer with the  qualifications and experience needed to review such plans. See appendix  II for additional information on the process for reviewing and approving  impoundment plans.
Many impoundment plans sent to the Technology Center are not approved  on a timely basis because MSHA does not have an adequate number of  technical staff needed to review these complex plans. The Technology  Center has historically faced staffing shortages that affect its ability to  approve impoundment plans on a timely basis. As a result, the backlog of  impoundment plans has grown—it now takes MSHA 2 to 3 years to  approve most plans and has taken as long as 5 years to approve some  plans. In an effort to address the growing backlog, MSHA developed an  expedited process for reviewing and approving impoundment plans in  order to avoid disruption of the mines’ operations. This system, however,  added time to the approval process for plans that were not part of the  expedited process. In addition, because so many plans were expedited, a  backlog of expedited plans developed. For example, the number of regular  (not expedited) impoundment plans pending review almost doubled  during the 3-year period from 1998 to 2001, from 124 plans to 245. In 2000,  when the expedited system was implemented, there were 69 expedited  plans pending review. By the following year, there were 148 expedited  plans waiting to be reviewed. During this period, engineers who left the  Technology Center were not always replaced because, according to MSHA  officials, the agency has had difficulty attracting civil engineers and  certified professional engineers at the salary levels offered.
MSHA conducted two reviews of its procedures for approving  impoundment plans and has begun to take steps for improving the  process. The most recent review identified several weaknesses in the  procedures, including the need for the agency to develop guidance for  determining which impoundment plans should receive expedited review  as well as evaluating the staffing levels needed to ensure timely and  complete review of the plans. MSHA officials acknowledged that the  delays in the review and approval of impoundment plans have been a  problem for a number of years. However, the officials told us that they  have recently taken a number of steps to alleviate these delays. First, they  are in the process of hiring additional engineers for the Technology Center  to review impoundment plans and provide assistance to staff in district  offices. Second, to reduce the backlog of plans, the Administrator for Coal  Mine Safety and Health sent a memorandum to all district managers in  January 2003 encouraging them to hire specialists with experience in civil  engineering and have them review less complex impoundment plans  instead of sending them to the Technology Center for review. Finally,  MSHA has formed a committee to rewrite the Impoundment Inspection  Handbook, which the agency plans to issue in March 2004. According to  MSHA headquarters officials, these new procedures will bring more  uniformity to the review and inspection process and will eliminate a  number of outdated and confusing procedures and policies. The  committee is also tasked with developing a system for rating the  complexity of impoundment plans. This rating system will establish  criteria for districts to use in deciding which impoundment plans to review  in the district and which ones to send to the Technology Center for review.  Agency officials said they expect to have this rating system in place no  later than March 2004.
section_title: MSHA Has Extensive Procedures, Highly Qualified Staff, and Conducts Most Quarterly Inspections as Required, but Its Inspection Process Could Be Improved
paragraphs: Although MSHA’s procedures for conducting inspections of underground  coal mines are comprehensive, its inspectors are highly qualified, and it  conducts almost all quarterly inspections as required by MSHA policy, the  inspection process could be improved in a number of ways. Although  MSHA has extensive inspection procedures, some of them are unclear,  while others are difficult to locate because they are contained in so many  different sources. In addition, although MSHA conducted over 96 percent  of required quarterly inspections each year over the past 10 years, MSHA  headquarters does not provide adequate oversight to ensure that its  district offices follow through to make sure that unsafe conditions  identified during inspections are corrected. And, although MSHA has  highly qualified inspectors, it has no plan for addressing the fact that  44 percent of them will be eligible to retire in the next 5 years. Finally,  MSHA does not collect all of the information it needs to assess the  effectiveness of its enforcement efforts because it does not collect data on  independent contractor staff who work at each mine.
subsections: section_title: MSHA Has Extensive Procedures for Inspecting Mines, but Some Procedures Are Unclear
paragraphs: MSHA has extensive procedures for inspecting mines. The two major  sources of inspection procedures are the policy manual and the inspection  handbook. In addition, MSHA issues many ad hoc procedures in formats  such as bulletins and memorandums. MSHA’s procedures require  inspectors to follow many different steps in conducting quarterly  inspections of mines. These steps include, among many others, (1) walking  all of the air passages in the mine which, in a large mine, can total over  50 miles in length; (2) taking samples of the mine environment, including  air, dust, and noise levels; (3) observing miners’ work habits; and  (4) reviewing the mine operators’ records of their own daily inspections of  the mine. Inspectors are also required to issue citations for any violations  of the law, health or safety standards, rules, orders, or regulations they  identify during inspections.
Although MSHA has extensive inspection procedures, some of them are  unclear and they are located in so many different sources that they can be  difficult to find. Some procedures do not clearly specify the criteria  inspectors should use in citing violations. For example, several district  officials in two of the districts we visited told us that the lack of specific  criteria for floating coal dust makes it difficult to determine what is an  allowable level. As a result, mine inspectors must rely on their own  experience and personal opinion to determine if the accumulation of  floating coal dust is a safety hazard that constitutes a violation. According  to some of the inspectors we interviewed, this has led, in some cases, to  inconsistencies in inspectors’ interpretations of the procedures—some  inspectors have cited violations for levels of floating coal dust that have  not brought citations from other inspectors. In addition, the inspection  procedures are located in so many different handbooks, manuals, policy  bulletins, policy letters, and memorandums that it can be difficult for  inspectors to make sure that they are using the most recent guidance and  procedures.
MSHA headquarters officials told us that they are working to clarify the  agency’s procedures and consolidate the number of sources in which they  are located. For example, MSHA established a committee in February 2003  to clarify and consolidate its inspection procedures, including developing  a checklist for inspections that will be available, along with the  procedures, to inspectors on their portable computers. These online  procedures will provide a single source of guidance for all types of coal  mine inspections. MSHA plans to have these new online inspection  procedures completed by late 2003.
section_title: MSHA Conducts Most Quarterly Inspections as Required, but Does Not Always Follow Through to Ensure Unsafe Conditions Identified During Inspections are Corrected
paragraphs: MSHA’s data on its quarterly inspection completion rates indicates that, of  the over 2,000 quarterly inspections district offices are required to conduct  each year, they completed over 96 percent each year from fiscal year 1993  to 2002, as shown in table 2.
Although MSHA conducts almost all of the quarterly inspections as  required, MSHA headquarters does not monitor district office performance  to ensure that inspectors are following up with mine operators to  determine that unsafe conditions identified during inspections have been  corrected. During inspections of mines, MSHA’s inspectors set deadlines  for the mine operators to correct the safety and health hazards violations  identified. The deadlines vary based on a number of factors—including the  degree of danger to miners affected by the violation—and range from  15 minutes from the time the inspector writes the citation to 27 days  afterwards. Deadlines can be a short as 15 minutes because some of the  hazards have the potential to quickly lead to serious injuries. MSHA’s  procedures require inspectors to follow up with mine operators within the  deadline they set or to extend the deadline. Inspectors may extend the  deadlines under certain circumstances, such as when a mine has  temporarily shut down its operations or when a mine operator is unable to  obtain a part needed to correct a violation cited for a piece of equipment.  MSHA tracks all citations, deadlines for correction, and extensions of  deadlines in its Coal Management Information System.
Our analysis of MSHA’s data for the most recent 10-year period, 1993 to  2002, indicated that, for almost half—48 percent—of the 536,966 citations  for which a deadline was established, inspectors did not follow up in a  timely manner to make sure mine operators had corrected the hazards.However, as shown in figure 5, of the 48 percent of the citations for which  the inspectors did not follow up in a timely manner, they followed up on  many citations within 4 days of the deadline and, for all but 11 percent of  the citations, they followed up in less than two weeks to verify that the  mine operators had corrected the hazards identified during inspections.
Moreover, the more serious type of violations—“significant and  substantial” (S&S) violations—accounted for a significant proportion of  the citations for which inspectors did not follow up by the deadlines. For  the over 235,447 citations written for S&S violations from 1993 to 2002 for  which a deadline was specified, inspectors did not follow up on more than  48 percent of the citations by the deadline. However, inspectors followed  up on all but about 10 percent of the citations for S&S violations within  less than 14 days of the deadline.
MSHA headquarters and district officials told us that there are many  different reasons why inspectors may not follow up by the deadlines  specified in their citations. One of these, according to several district  officials, is scheduling conflicts that prevent inspectors from visiting the  mine within the specified deadline. In addition, there are circumstances in  which inspectors are not able to follow up, such as when a mine operator  suspends a mine’s operations. However, in these instances, the inspector  should update the information in the database to extend the deadline.
District officials we interviewed said that they are tracking the number of  citations for which inspectors have not followed up by the deadlines and  are taking steps to reduce this number. For example, officials in District 6  told us that they are revising the process of scheduling mine visits to  improve the timeliness of follow up. In addition, MSHA headquarters  officials said that tracking the number of citations on which inspectors  have not followed up in a timely manner in each district office is part of  their new initiative to better monitor district office performance that  began in June 2003.
We did not review the quality of MSHA’s quarterly inspections. Some  inspectors and mine operators we interviewed at 2 of the 5 district offices  we visited, as well as officials from the United Mine Workers of America  headquarters, told us that staffing shortages sometimes cause MSHA to  rush its inspections at the end of the quarter. For example, inspectors and  a mine operator in one district told us that, last year, some of the quarterly  inspections were not completed until the end of the quarter and that, in  some cases, MSHA sent a large number of inspectors to a few of the  district’s mines at the end of the quarter in order to complete the  inspections as required. MSHA headquarters officials said they were in the  process of balancing the workloads of the district offices in order to  address some of these staffing shortages. They also have begun hiring  additional inspectors for some districts.
section_title: MSHA Has Highly Trained and Experienced Staff, but Lacks a Plan for Replacing the Large Number of Inspectors Who May Soon Retire
paragraphs: MSHA’s mine inspectors are highly trained and experienced. Under the  Mine Act, inspectors are required to have, whenever possible, 5 years of  practical mining experience before being hired. Newly hired inspectors  receive a minimum of 18 months of classroom and on-the-job training  before qualifying to conduct inspections on their own. Classroom training  for new mine inspectors includes 25 weeks of instruction at MSHA’s Mine  Academy provided in 3- and 4-week segments. The classroom training  covers a wide range of topics, from inspecting mine equipment to  conducting tests of air quality. In between attending classes at the Mine  Academy, new inspectors accompany experienced inspectors on mine  inspections. Once they have completed their training and are certified by  the district office to which they are assigned—a process that takes, on  average, 18 to 24 months according to MSHA officials—inspectors receive  their Authorized Representative credentials indicating that they are  certified underground Coal Mine Inspectors and are allowed to write  citations. In addition to their initial training, inspectors are required to  take at least 2 weeks of refresher training every 2 years. Finally, MSHA’s  current underground coal mine inspectors have been with the agency, on  average, for over 18 years and most had a number of years of mining  experience prior to joining MSHA. For example, each of the four  inspectors we interviewed in one of the districts we visited had at least 10  years of mining experience prior to joining MSHA and had from 3 to 16  years’ experience inspecting mines.
Although many of MSHA’s highly trained and experienced underground  coal mine inspectors will be eligible to retire within the next 5 years, and  the agency’s historic attrition rates indicate that many of them will actually  retire, the agency has not developed a plan for replacing these inspectors.  As shown in table 3, about 44 percent of MSHA’s inspectors will be eligible  to retire in the next 5 years and, in 2 districts, a much larger proportion  will be eligible to retire. The table also shows that districts have fewer  inspector trainees on board than vacancies that will need to be filled when  inspectors retire. MSHA’s historic attrition data show that half of the  individuals who are eligible for retirement actually retire within 1 year of  the date they are eligible and 85 percent retire within 4 years.
MSHA headquarters officials also told us that it will be difficult for them to  quickly hire and train replacements for the inspectors who retire. In  addition to the fact that it takes at least 18 months to train each new  inspector, it takes the agency several months from the date an individual  retires to advertise and fill each vacant position. As a result of losing these  inspectors, MSHA may find it difficult to maintain its current level of  enforcement activity, including completing all quarterly inspections of  underground coal mines.
MSHA headquarters and district officials told us that they do not have a  plan that addresses the potential staffing shortages among its inspection  staff because, although they recognize that the shortages may affect their  ability to complete all required inspections, they cannot fill vacancies until  individuals actually retire, so their options are limited.
However, MSHA is not making full use of available human capital  flexibilities to streamline its hiring procedures or retain the services of  inspectors. For example, it is not using the direct-hire authority available  to federal agencies that would allow the agency to choose applicants  directly for inspector positions. Furthermore, use of a category-based  rating and selection procedure could help MSHA increase the number of  qualified applicants for its inspector positions. In addition, MSHA is not  using retention allowances to keep employees with specialized skills,  including inspectors, who are critical to accomplishing the agency’s  mission. Finally, MSHA has not formally reviewed its hiring process,  including identifying internal deficiencies, such as problems with its  process for assessing the quality of applicants that causes delays in hiring  new inspectors. MSHA headquarters officials told us, however, that they  are considering conducting a review of their hiring system.
section_title: MSHA Does Not Collect Data on Independent Contractor Staff Needed to Assess the Effectiveness of Its Enforcement Activities
paragraphs: MSHA does not collect all of the information on staff employed by  independent contractors who work in underground coal mines needed to  assess the effectiveness of its enforcement activities. The regulations  implementing the Mine Act require mine operators, including independent  contractors, to report the number of hours worked by staff at specific  mines as well as injuries received during the performance of that work.  However, MSHA issued a memorandum in 1981 that limited the reporting  requirements for independent contractors who performed all but nine  types of services in “high hazard activities,” including mining coal, and  exempted other independent contractors completely. As a result, MSHA  only collects aggregate information from independent contractors that  engage in these hazardous activities. It collects data on the number of  hours worked by their staff at all mines, but does not collect this  information for contractor staff at specific mines. MSHA headquarters  officials told us the agency exempted independent contractors from these  reporting requirements in order to reduce the regulatory burden on them  and because, at the time the memorandum was issued, independent  contractor staff represented a relatively small proportion of all coal  miners.
However, because MSHA does not collect information on the hours  worked by contractor staff who mine coal in each underground coal mine,  it cannot calculate accurate fatality or nonfatal injury rates for mines that  use contractor staff to mine coal—rates used to evaluate the effectiveness  of its enforcement efforts. Although MSHA can determine whether it is  meeting these goals for all underground coal mines as a whole, it cannot  determine whether it is meeting its goals for specific mines. In addition,  MSHA cannot track trends in fatal or nonfatal injury rates at mines that  use contractor staff to mine coal. The fact that MSHA is not tracking the  number of independent contractor staff who work in each mine has  become more important in recent years, because the proportion of miners  who work for independent contractors has grown significantly since 1981,  when they represented only 5 percent of all mine workers. Our analysis of  MSHA’s data on workers in underground coal mines shows that the  percentage of underground coal miners who work for independent  contractors increased from 13 percent in 1993 to 18 percent in 2002, as  shown in figure 6, and the percentage who incurred nonfatal injuries also  increased over this period.
To address these concerns, MSHA established a task group that was  directed to work with the members of the mining community to  (l) determine how to best identify and collect data on independent  contractor staff and (2) develop an enforcement policy for independent  contractors. MSHA headquarters officials said the task group is in the  process of drafting an action plan but is having difficulty identifying  independent contractors because the agency has issued a number of  duplicate identification numbers to these contractors. In addition, MSHA  headquarters officials told us that obtaining information on the hours  worked by contractor staff at specific mines will be difficult because these  workers often work at more than one mine.
section_title: MSHA Has a Comprehensive Process for Conducting Accident Investigations, but Does Not Fully Utilize It to Prevent Future Accidents
paragraphs: MSHA’s process for conducting accident investigations is comprehensive,  but the agency does not use its investigations to the fullest extent to  improve the future safety of mine workers. MSHA has detailed policies and  rigorous requirements for how investigations must be conducted and  reported and uses a number of mechanisms to monitor the quality of its  accident investigations process. However, weaknesses in its databases  make it difficult for MSHA to track key data on mine hazards and  potentially useful indicators of its own performance.
subsections: section_title: MSHA’s Polices and Procedures for Conducting Accident Investigations Are Extensive
paragraphs: MSHA has extensive policies and procedures for conducting accident  investigations. These policies and procedures are contained in the Mine  Act and its implementing regulations, the Accident Investigations  Handbook, policy documents, and a training manual. They provide  guidance for determining when to conduct investigations, who should  conduct them, how they should be conducted, and how to report the  results. MSHA is required to investigate all accidents involving fatalities  and may also investigate nonfatal accidents. While the decisions regarding  whether to conduct investigations of most accidents are made at the  district level, investigations of high-profile accidents, such as those  involving more than two fatalities and mine emergencies, are handled by  MSHA’s headquarters office. The primary objective of an accident  investigation, as stated in the investigation handbook, is “to determine the  root cause(s) of the mine accident and to utilize and share this information  with the mining community and others for the purpose of preventing  similar occurrences.” Other purposes of investigations are to determine  whether any violations of the Mine Act or its implementing regulations  contributed to the accident and to help formulate and assess MSHA’s  health and safety standards.
MSHA’s accident investigations are conducted by experienced teams of  inspectors and specialists, usually consisting of staff from the district in  which the accident occurred. Additional staff from MSHA headquarters  and the Technology Center, and, in the case of fatal accidents, attorneys  from the Department of Labor’s Solicitor’s Office, may also provide  assistance. In order to become qualified to conduct investigations of mine  accidents, inspectors and specialists are required to take special training  on accident investigations, in addition to that received by all inspectors  and specialists during their initial training. The special accident  investigation training covers such topics as data and evidence collection,  accident reconstruction, interviewing techniques, and preparation of  investigative reports. MSHA investigators are also required to take an  accident investigation retraining seminar every other year.
Investigators are required to follow specific steps in conducting and  documenting each accident, including trying to determine the underlying,  or “root,” cause of the accident. Investigators must conduct an on-site  examination of the accident scene, interview witnesses, and analyze  relevant mining equipment and material. Investigators must also follow  detailed reporting requirements, including completing standardized forms  and, in the case of serious accidents such as those involving a fatality,  preparing formal written reports that cover specific topics. In addition to  determining the direct causes of an accident, MSHA’s investigators must  determine the underlying causes. For example, for one mine in which  frequent ignitions were occurring, investigators determined that the direct  cause of the ignitions was sparks from the metal bit of a cutting machine  striking rock. These sparks in turn ignited the methane released as the  coal was cut out of the seam. The investigation team also went further and  identified the underlying cause as a problem with ventilation at the mine.  As a result, the mine operator made changes to the mine’s ventilation plan  and, according to MSHA officials, there had been no further ignitions in  that section of the mine.
MSHA uses several means to monitor the quality of accident  investigations. The accident investigation program manager in MSHA’s  headquarters office and the accident investigation coordinator at each  district office monitor the progress of each investigation and provide  guidance and recommendations to investigators on resources, collection  of evidence, and conducting interviews. A number of individuals at the  district and headquarters level review draft investigation reports, which  the accident investigation program manager then approves. The district  manager, the Office of the Solicitor, and the accident investigation  program manager each review proposed citations and orders to be issued  as a result of accident investigations.
Although we did not conduct a comprehensive review of MSHA’s accident  investigations, we reviewed eight investigations in great depth at several of  the district offices we visited. For these selected cases, we reviewed  MSHA files and reports, interviewed investigators, and interviewed miners  and mine operators at some of the mines involved. We found that, for  these cases, the MSHA investigators had followed the required procedures  for conducting accident investigations.
section_title: MSHA’s Databases Used to Track Accidents and Investigations Have Weaknesses
paragraphs: Because of weaknesses in the databases that MSHA uses to collect data on  accidents and its investigations, MSHA cannot properly monitor its  accident investigations activity, including determining whether accidents  were investigated, or track trends in mine hazards that cause accidents.
MSHA cannot use the data it collects on accidents, injuries, and  investigations to readily determine whether accidents were investigated or  monitor district performance in regard to their accident investigation  activity. MSHA has one database that contains information on all accidents  and injuries reported to MSHA by mine operators and contractors. It has  another database that tracks MSHA’s accident investigations activity,  including time spent by inspectors and specialists on each investigation.  However, it is very difficult to link the information on accidents and  investigations contained in these two databases. As a result, MSHA  headquarters cannot easily use the data to monitor whether districts have  investigated all fatal accidents as required or determine which serious  nonfatal accidents have been investigated. For example, we analyzed  information from both databases in an attempt to determine whether  MSHA investigated all fatal accidents in underground coal mines from  1993 to 2002. Although we were able to manually match each fatality to a  fatal accident investigation using the mine identification number and the  date of the investigation, and we found that MSHA had investigated all  fatalities as required, it was a difficult, time-consuming process.
In addition, it is difficult for MSHA to track trends in the most frequent  causes of mine accidents or to readily determine which types of accidents  result in multiple injuries or the percentage of accidents that result in  injuries. This occurs because MSHA does not assign an identifier to each  accident but rather tracks only the information reported by mine  operators on individuals injured in accidents. For example, MSHA cannot  easily determine the number of roof falls that occurred each year, or the  percentage of all roof falls that were investigated. It can only show the  number of individuals who were injured or killed as the result of roof falls  and the number of noninjury roof falls that occurred.
A few years ago, MSHA established a third database on accident  investigations in order to record and disseminate information on accident  investigations, including the results of investigations. The database  contains detailed information on some accidents as well as MSHA’s  investigations activity. However, because the information in the database  is not complete (it does not contain information on all accidents), it  cannot be used to monitor trends in the types of accidents or to determine  the percentage of accidents investigated. Further, MSHA headquarters  officials told us that few field or headquarters staff use the database to  obtain or analyze information on accident investigations because the  system is not user friendly.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: MSHA plays an important role in protecting the safety and health of coal  miners. MSHA has extensive policies and procedures and has assigned  highly qualified staff to its processes for reviewing and approving mine  plans, conducting inspections of underground coal mines, and  investigating accidents. However, it is important for MSHA headquarters  to ensure that the district offices to which it has delegated much of the  responsibility for protecting the safety and health of mine workers have  appropriate oversight, guidance, and staffing and to collect all of the data  needed to evaluate their performance.
MSHA headquarters has not always provided the oversight of district  office operations needed to ensure timely completion of 6-month technical  inspections in some districts, nor has it ensured that hazards identified  during inspections are being corrected by mine operators on a timely  basis. As a result, some mines may be operating without accurate or  complete ventilation or roof control systems or with uncorrected hazards,  which may adversely affect the safety and health of mine workers.
Headquarters also has not provided inspectors with the guidance they  need to carry out their work. Some procedures and guidance it has  provided to district offices for inspections are unclear and, in some cases,  difficult to locate. In the absence of such guidance, inspectors may not be  consistently applying the law and regulations designed to protect the  safety and health of mine workers. Moreover, the lack of guidance with  regard to coordinating inspections has led to duplication of effort,  diminishing MSHA’s ability to use its staff resources most efficiently.
In addition, MSHA is not preparing for a likely shortage of inspectors in  the future. MSHA officials have said the fact that they are unable to hire  until someone retires justifies their lack of planning. However, this  discounts the possibility that they might be able to better use their existing  resources or plan ways to lessen disruptions during the transitions. If  MSHA does not develop a plan for addressing the large number of  retirements of inspectors over the next 5 years, it may not be able to  continue to ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners.
Finally, MSHA is not collecting all of the data needed to evaluate its  performance and prevent future accidents. It does not collect data on the  hours worked by staff employed by independent contractors at specific  mines. MSHA also does not track information on accidents needed to  identify trends in mining accidents or link accidents and injuries to  investigations. Given the latitude that district managers have in deciding  whether to investigate serious accidents, it is important for MSHA  headquarters to be able to link information on accidents and investigations  in order to monitor district office performance. As a result, MSHA is not  able to assess the adequacy of its enforcement efforts at mines that  employ independent contractor staff to mine coal, properly target its  efforts to improve mine safety at mines with relatively high injury rates, or  maximize the likelihood of preventing future accidents.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: In order to provide better oversight over its operations, including  collecting all of the data needed to provide this oversight, we recommend  that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety  and Health to monitor the timeliness of 6-month technical inspections conducted as part  of MSHA’s review of ventilation and roof control plans to ensure that all  inspections are completed by the district offices; monitor follow-up actions taken by its district offices to ensure that mine  operators are correcting hazards identified during inspections on a timely  basis; update and consolidate guidance provided to its district offices on plan  approval and inspections to eliminate inconsistencies and outdated  instructions, including clarifying guidance on coordinating technical  inspections with regular quarterly inspections of mines; develop a plan for addressing anticipated shortages in the number of  qualified inspectors due to upcoming retirements, including considering  options such as streamlining the agency’s hiring process and offering  retention allowances; amend the guidance provided to independent contractors engaged in high- hazard activities requiring them to report information on the number of  hours worked by their staff at specific mines so that MSHA can use this  information to compute the injury and fatality rates used to measure the  effectiveness of its enforcement efforts; and  revise the systems it uses to collect information on accidents and  investigations to provide better data on accidents and make it easier to  link injuries, accidents, and investigations.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to MSHA for comment. MSHA did not  comment on our recommendations but expressed concern about many of  our findings and disagreed with three of the findings on which our  recommendations are based. In addition, MSHA provided a few technical  comments and clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate.  MSHA’s full comments and our responses are contained in appendix III.
MSHA disagreed with our finding that the agency does not ensure the  completion of 6-month technical inspections related to mine plans  conducted by its district offices. While MSHA acknowledged that the  information provided by the district offices to MSHA headquarters on  technical inspections is not accurate or complete, the agency said that the  inspections are actually being conducted by the district offices but not  recorded by the districts in the database, as evidenced by reports on file in  the district offices. MSHA also noted that the database is being upgraded,  which will enhance the agency’s ability to track and monitor the status of  technical inspections. In our view, MSHA’s current system places all  oversight responsibility on the district offices because MSHA headquarters  does not have the data needed to ensure that districts are completing  technical inspections as required by agency procedures. We maintain that  MSHA cannot properly monitor the completion of technical inspections by  its district offices when the information provided by the districts to MSHA  headquarters for this purpose is inaccurate.
MSHA expressed concern that it would be difficult to develop guidance for  all district offices on coordinating different types of inspections in order to  avoid duplication of effort because of the dynamic nature of the mining  industry. MSHA said that District Managers should be responsible for  developing standard operating procedures in this area. We continue to  believe that, while developing such guidance may be difficult, it is needed  to ensure that MSHA’s resources are used most effectively. In addition,  several district officials told us that more coordination of effort in this area  by MSHA could lead to better use of the agency’s resources and eliminate  potential duplication of effort.
MSHA took issue with portions of our finding related to the procedures  provided to inspectors for inspecting underground coal mines, noting that  the agency provides extensive training to inspectors on the procedures  and that inspectors must rely on their experience and knowledge in  determining what constitutes a violation. MSHA also noted that it is in the  process of providing additional training to its inspectors and improving the  ease of use of its manuals and other procedures. While we commended  MSHA on its efforts to provide additional training to inspectors and  consolidate its procedures, we noted that over reliance on inspectors’  experience can lead to inconsistencies in their interpretations of the  procedures.
On following through on its inspections to make sure that unsafe  conditions are corrected in a timely manner, MSHA agreed that this is an  important issue and said that it has already taken several actions to  address inconsistencies in this area. The agency detailed its efforts to  provide better guidance and additional training, establish a new  accountability program to ensure the consistency of its enforcement  actions, and stress the importance of timely follow up by inspectors to  ensure that hazards are corrected.
MSHA disagreed with our finding that it does not have a plan for replacing  the large number of inspectors who will be eligible to retire in the next  5 years, saying that it does have such a plan. After receiving MSHA’s  comments on our draft report, we asked MSHA officials for a copy of the  plan referred to in their comments. They told us they did not have one plan  but, instead, had recently developed plans for each of the 11 district  offices and provided us with a copy of a plan for one district. This plan,  however, does not contain all of the elements of a high quality human  capital plan, such as linking the accomplishment of the agency’s strategic  goals to its future human capital needs. We maintain that MSHA needs to  develop a comprehensive plan that addresses the agency’s human capital  needs related to protecting the safety and health of coal miners.
Finally, MSHA disagreed with our finding that the databases it uses to  track mine accidents and investigations of these accidents have  weaknesses that limit its ability to monitor trends in mine hazards and  determine whether districts are investigating accidents. MSHA said that  the information it collects on accidents in its databases can be used for  these purposes. Our finding is accurate. The Accident Investigation  Database to which MSHA refers in its comments does not track all  accidents, it only tracks those that were investigated; therefore, the  database cannot be used to monitor trends in all mine accidents. In  addition, as noted in our report, the information in the database is  incomplete, and the database is not widely used throughout the agency  because it is not user friendly.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the  issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary  of Labor, the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health, and other  interested parties. Copies will be made available to others upon request.  This report is also available at no charge on GAO’s web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-7215 or Revae Moran at (202) 512-3863. Other major contributors  are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: MSHA’s Approval Process for Ventilation and Roof Support Plans
section_title: Appendix II: MSHA’s Approval Process for Impoundment Plans
paragraphs: Technology Center  specialist conducts  review of plan  for compliance  with regulations,  policies, and  procedures  Specialist/supervisor suggests  approval/disapproval to Chief  of the Mine Waste and  If the plan is disapproved, MSHA forwards the review comments and requests for additional technical  information to the mine operator via the same process indicated for plan approval.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. 	 The briefing to which MSHA refers is the exit conference held on  August 5, 2003, in which we described the findings, conclusions, and  recommendations contained in this report to MSHA in detail. At this  conference, as well as briefings held with top MSHA officials in June,  MSHA generally concurred with our findings, conclusions, and  recommendations. The information presented at the exit conference  and the other briefings is consistent with the information contained in  this report.  2. 	 We believe the title of the report presents a fair, balanced, and  accurate representation of the information in our report. Moreover,  MSHA’s own suggested title acknowledges a need for improvement.  3. 	 Our finding that MSHA does not provide adequate oversight of the  districts’ completion of 6-month technical inspections is accurate. As  MSHA acknowledges in its comments, the information reported by the  district offices to MSHA headquarters on technical inspections is not  accurate or complete. Therefore, MSHA headquarters cannot use this  information to monitor the completion of inspections by the districts.  Our draft report noted problems with the accuracy of the data reported  by district offices to MSHA headquarters on technical inspections.  However, because of the concerns MSHA expressed in its comments  about the accuracy of the data, we clarified the discussion of this issue  in the report and deleted detailed information included in an appendix  to the draft derived from the data. We commend MSHA on its efforts to  improve the accuracy of the data collected by its district offices,  thereby enhancing the agency’s ability to monitor the status of these  inspections.  4. 	 We used the term “technical inspection” in our report in order to  provide a reader friendly method of referring to the on-site inspections  conducted by MSHA related to mine plans. The term “plan review”  used by MSHA does not distinguish the reviews specialists conduct at  the district offices in order to determine whether written plans  submitted by mine operators comply with the law, regulations, and  MSHA’s procedures from the on-site inspections conducted at the  mines in order to compare the plans to actual conditions at the mines.  5. 	 We clarified the language in the report to more accurately reflect  agency procedures.  6. 	 While MSHA believes the “dynamics” of the mining industry preclude a  formal plan for coordinating inspections, several district officials we  interviewed said that more coordination of effort in this area by MSHA  could lead to better use of agency resources and eliminate potential  duplication of effort. Furthermore, MSHA headquarters officials issued  a memorandum in June 2003 encouraging districts to better coordinate  inspections conducted by specialists and inspectors, suggesting that  coordination could be important in avoiding duplication.  7. 	 We commend MSHA on its efforts to address this problem. Both of the  initiatives MSHA mentions are included in our report, and we  encourage the agency to move forward with these hiring and staffing  initiatives.  8. 	 We commend MSHA on its efforts to provide additional training to  inspectors and to consolidate its procedures. However, our interviews  with inspectors indicate that they interpret guidance they receive  differently and are sometimes uncertain as to what constitutes a  violation. While we acknowledge that an inspector’s experience is an  important component of the decision-making process, an over reliance  on experience can lead to inconsistencies in inspectors’ interpretations  of the procedures. We also note that MSHA’s comment that our report  implies that MSHA and the Office of the Solicitor have been inattentive  in ensuring that inspectors receive accurate and timely training on the  legal tests needed to be applied for various enforcement decisions is  not accurate. Our report makes no such statement; it refers only to the  written procedures provided by MSHA to inspectors.  9. 	 We commend MSHA’s efforts in this area and again stress the  importance of using the data it collects in its Coal Management  Information System to monitor the timeliness of inspectors’ actions to  ensure that mine operators are correcting all mine hazards as required.  MSHA’s own guidance states that a violation cannot be abated until an  inspector re-inspects the area. As noted in our report, MSHA officials  told us that they have begun tracking the numbers of citations for  which inspectors have not followed up in a timely manner as part of a  new initiative to better monitor district office performance.  10.  We made this correction to the report. However, we note that we did,  in fact, request information from MSHA officials on the historical  status of each mine but chose not to use the information because the  officials expressed doubts about its accuracy.  11.  In several conversations with senior level MSHA officials, including the  Assistant Director for Human Resources, they told us that, although  they were in the process of developing a plan for addressing the large  number of retirements the agency is facing over the next 5 years, they  had not yet developed such a plan. After receiving MSHA’s comments  on our draft report, we asked MSHA officials for a copy of the plan  referred to in the agency’s comments.  They told us they did not have  one plan but, instead, had recently developed plans for each of the 11  district offices and provided us with a copy of a plan for one district  dated March 2003. When we visited this district office in March 2003,  we discussed the issue of how the district will address the large  number of inspectors who will retire in the next 5 years. At that time,  the district officials told us they were in the process of developing a  plan for how to replace these inspectors but had not completed the  plan. They did not mention having such a plan in place, and we were  not provided with a copy of the plan at that time.
Based on our review of the district plan provided to us by MSHA, we  commend the agency for beginning to take appropriate actions  necessary to address anticipated staffing shortages. The plan, however,  does not integrate accomplishment of MSHA’s mission to protect the  safety and health of coal miners with its human capital approaches,  including identifying the total number of inspectors needed to  accomplishment its mission, or address how these numbers will be  maintained through hiring and training of new inspectors as  retirements occur.  The plan also does not link the accomplishment of  MSHA’s strategic goals using outcome data—such as trends in the  incidence rate (fatalities and nonfatal injuries) at underground coal  mines—to its future human capital needs. As noted in our  recommendation, MSHA needs to develop a comprehensive plan that  addresses the human capital needs of the agency as they pertain to  protecting the safety and health of coal miners rather than just  developing plans for each of its district offices.  12.  We suggested the use of retention allowances as one type of human  capital flexibility that can benefit an agency facing a potential loss of  employees in a particular skill area.  The use of retention allowances,  however, is only one of the human capital flexibilities we mentioned in  the report. In including a list of human capital flexibilities, our intent  was that MSHA would select those that are cost-effective and  beneficial to the agency.  13.  While we commend MSHA in its continuing efforts to address the issue  of reporting by independent contractors, our recommendation to  amend guidance so that all independent contractors are required to  report the number of hours worked by their staffs at specific mines  would not require a regulatory change.  However, if MSHA believes  that a regulatory change is necessary, it should take appropriate  action.  In either case, we believe that obtaining input from the mining  community prior to making such a change and notifying them of the  change would be beneficial to the entire mining community.  14.  Our report does not state that information on certain types of  accidents and investigations cannot be linked but rather that doing so  is a difficult process and, in its comments, MSHA agreed that the  process is cumbersome. The report, however, refers to linking data in  the Part 50 Database in which injuries resulting from accidents are  tracked with data in the Coal Management Information System on  accident investigations. In its comments, MSHA refers to linking data  from the Part 50 Database to information in the Accident Investigation  Database. MSHA is correct in stating that injuries and noninjury  accidents recorded in the Part 50 Database can be linked to accident  investigations in the Accident Investigation Database. However, the  Accident Investigations Database only contains information on  accidents that were investigated, not all mine accidents. In addition, as  noted in our report, the database is incomplete and is not widely used  throughout the agency because it is not user friendly.  15.  Our finding that MSHA does not assign an identifier to each mine  accident is accurate.  The document number on the Form 7000-1 to  which MSHA refers in its comments is assigned to each injury, not  each accident, except for accidents in which no injuries occur.  Therefore, it is difficult to determine how many accidents of each type  occurred or to track trends in the types of accidents that account for  the most injuries.  16.  The detailed list MSHA provided to us as an appendix to its comments  shows the total number of injuries, by degree, that resulted from roof  falls and the total number of noninjury accidents that occurred as a  result of roof falls for the past 20 years. The data do not, as MSHA  implies, show the total number of roof falls that occurred during this  period. As noted in our report, this makes it difficult for MSHA to track  trends in the most frequent causes of mine accidents or readily  determine the percentage of accidents that result in injuries.  17.  We made this correction to the report.
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Other major contributors to this report are Patrick J. Dibattista, Julian P.  Klazkin, Stanley J. Kostyla, Anne Inserra, Lori Rectanus, Leslie C. Ross,  Jerome T. Sandau, Linda W. Stokes, and Kris Trueblood.