DHS Intelligence Analysis: Additional Actions Needed to Address Analytic Priorities and Workforce Challenges
Published: 2014-06-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DHS plays a vital role in securing the nation, and its intelligence analysis capabilities are a key part of this effort. Within DHS, I&A has a lead role for intelligence analysis, but other operational components also perform their own analysis activities. GAO was asked to review the management of departmental analysis efforts.
This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS intelligence analysis activities are integrated to support departmental intelligence priorities, (2) I&A customers find analytic products and services useful, and (3) I&A has addressed challenges in maintaining a skilled analytic workforce.
GAO examined mechanisms DHS used to coordinate analysis across components, I&A reports and feedback surveys, and human capital plans. GAO also interviewed officials from I&A, the five DHS components with intelligence analysis as a core function, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who represent the Intelligence Community, 7 of 78 fusion centers (focal points within states that analyze and share information), and the private sector. The fusion center and sector interviews, chosen based on geographic location and other factors, are not generalizable, but provided insight on progress.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established mechanisms—including an intelligence framework and an analytic planning process—to better integrate analysis activities throughout the department, but the mechanisms are not functioning as intended. For example, the framework does not establish strategic departmental intelligence priorities that can be used to inform annual planning decisions, such as what analytic activities to pursue and the level of investment to make, as called for in DHS guidance. According to officials from DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), it can be challenging for DHS components to focus on developing both strategic priorities and more tactical priorities that support their specific operations. Absent strategic priorities, DHS used component subject matter experts and other information to develop key questions of common interest they would address through analysis. As a result, DHS does not have reasonable assurance that component analytic activities and resource investments are aligned to support departmental priorities. The mechanisms to integrate analysis, however, gave components insight into one another's work and helped them avoid unnecessary overlap and duplication.
I&A customers had mixed views on the extent to which its analytic products and services are useful. GAO's interviews with representatives of I&A's five customer groups indicate that two groups—DHS leadership and state, local, tribal, and territorial partners—found products to be useful, while three groups—DHS components, the Intelligence Community, and the private sector—generally did not. Representatives of four of the five groups said that they found other types of services, such as briefings, to be useful. Results from surveys that are attached to I&A products indicate that most customers were very satisfied with the products' usefulness, but the results are not generalizable because they reflect only the views of customers who chose to respond. To address this issue, I&A is conducting more comprehensive surveys and interviews with customers to evaluate the products and services that best meet their needs. I&A expects to complete this effort by the end of June 2014.
I&A has taken steps to address challenges it faced in maintaining a skilled workforce, but has not assessed whether its efforts are resolving the challenges. For example:
I&A faced challenges in recruiting and hiring analysts, in part because of its hiring authority, which put it at a disadvantage compared with other agencies that were able to process hiring actions more quickly. I&A's hiring authority was changed in 2013, a fact that could help ease these challenges.
I&A experienced low morale and high rates of attrition, particularly among its lower-level analysts. To help address these issues, I&A restructured its grade levels in 2012 to provide additional career advancement opportunities.
However, I&A has not established mechanisms to evaluate its efforts and use the results to make any needed changes because I&A leadership has focused on other priorities. Such mechanisms will help I&A evaluate if efforts are achieving their intended results of improving recruiting and hiring, bolstering morale, and reducing attrition. In addition, using the evaluation results to determine any needed changes will help ensure that I&A is making sound workforce decisions.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends, among other things, that DHS (1) establish strategic intelligence priorities and use them to inform analytic activities and (2) establish mechanisms to evaluate workforce initiatives and use results to determine any needed changes. DHS concurred with our recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The bombings at the Boston Marathon in April 2013 underscore the  importance of ensuring that intelligence is analyzed and shared with  stakeholders across all levels of government in an effective and timely  manner. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Office  of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has a lead role in analyzing and sharing  law enforcement, intelligence, and other information in support of the  department’s missions and responsibilities. Other DHS components also  have their own intelligence analysis capabilities and are part of the DHS  Intelligence Enterprise (the enterprise). In an effort to promote the  understanding of threats, members of the enterprise are to deliver  intelligence analysis and information to DHS leadership; state, local,  tribal, and territorial partners; DHS components; the Intelligence  Community; and private sector partners.
Established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in response to the  terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DHS has a primary mission that  includes preventing terrorist attacks within the United States and reducing  the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism. In furtherance of the  department’s mission, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis is  responsible for ensuring that the department’s information analysis  activities are carried out. For example, to identify and assess the nature  and scope of terrorist threats to the homeland and to understand such  threats in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities, the Under Secretary  for I&A is to access, receive, analyze, and integrate information from  federal, state, and local government agencies, and private sector entities,  in support of DHS’s missions. To assist in the deterrence, prevention,  preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the United States,  the Under Secretary is to, as appropriate, disseminate DHS-analyzed  information within the department; to other federal, state, and local  agencies, and to private sector entities, with responsibilities relating to  homeland security. In general, the Under Secretary’s responsibilities  encompass intelligence analysis; information sharing; department-wide  intelligence integration; and supporting state, local, and tribal  governments, as well as the private sector.
In 2005, we designated the sharing of terrorism-related information as  high risk because of the significant challenges the federal government  faces in sharing this information in a timely, accurate, and useful  manner. We have since monitored federal efforts to implement the  Information Sharing Environment—an approach that is intended to serve  as an overarching solution to strengthening the sharing of intelligence,  terrorism, law enforcement, and other information among federal, state,  local, tribal, international, and private sector partners.and sharing of terrorism-related information is a key part of this effort. You  asked that we assess DHS’s progress in managing the enterprise’s  intelligence analysis efforts, as well as the usefulness of I&A products,  and how I&A ensures that it has a staff capable of performing I&A’s  analysis mission. This report addresses the following questions:   DHS’s analysis
To what extent are the intelligence analysis activities of the enterprise  integrated to support departmental strategic intelligence priorities, and  to what extent are enterprise analysis activities unnecessarily  overlapping or duplicative?
To what extent do I&A’s customers report that they find I&A products  and other analytic services to be useful?
What challenges does I&A face in maintaining a skilled analytic  workforce and what steps has it taken to address these challenges?
For all objectives, we focused on the six DHS entities in the enterprise for  which intelligence analysis is a core function in supporting their unique  missions and operations: I&A, the U.S. Coast Guard, Transportation  Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection  (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S.  Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Subject to departmental  direction, and consistent with any direction and guidance from the  President and, as applicable, by the Office of the Director of National  Intelligence (ODNI), the head of each DHS intelligence component is  responsible for, among other things, ensuring the effective and efficient  collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence  information, and supporting and implementing the intelligence mission of  the department.products generated by each entity.
See appendix II for a description of the intelligence  To address the first objective, we analyzed DHS and I&A documents  intended to set strategic departmental intelligence priorities—such as the  fiscal years 2011 through 2014 DHS Intelligence Enterprise Program of  Analysis (POA) and the fiscal years 2012 and 2013 Homeland Security  Intelligence Priorities Framework (the Framework)—to determine how  strategic intelligence priorities are established and how the enterprise is  to follow them. We also analyzed component documents—such as  TSA’s Mission and Functional Statement and ICE’s intelligence fact sheet  on securing borders, safe travel, and legal trade—to help determine to  what extent components address departmental priorities. We met with  officials responsible for managing the enterprise to determine  expectations for components in following the priorities, and with officials  from I&A and the intelligence offices of CBP, the U.S. Coast Guard, ICE,  TSA, and USCIS to obtain views on the extent to which the POA and  Framework guide their analytic production. We compared DHS’s actions  with requirements of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended,  that call for the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under  Secretary for I&A, to, among other things, establish departmental  intelligence priorities.finished intelligence products, we analyzed all 21 products written by I&A,  CBP, and ICE in response to questions in the 2012 POA related to the  DHS mission area of U.S. border security. We selected the 2012 POA  because it was the most recent available when we began this analysis.  We selected this mission area because it contained the most questions  assigned to multiple components, and chose I&A, CBP, and ICE products  to review because these components all have responsibility for different  aspects of intelligence related to border security. By reviewing only one  mission area, we cannot determine if there was duplication in other areas.
To assess potential overlap or duplication in  To address the second objective, we met with staff from I&A’s Production  Management Division, which is responsible for distributing finished  intelligence products and measuring their usefulness, to determine how  I&A uses surveys to obtain feedback on products and identify other efforts  to improve customer satisfaction. We also analyzed the results of  customer satisfaction surveys that were included with all fiscal year 2012  I&A finished analytic products to determine what users of I&A products  think of the quality and usefulness of the products. We compared I&A’s  efforts to ensure its products’ quality and usefulness with criteria in the  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government related to  meeting stakeholder needs. Also, to determine how customers view the  usefulness of I&A products and other analytic support, we met with  officials from four of I&A’s five customer groups. While we did not meet  with representatives from DHS leadership, we did meet with  representatives of the I&A unit that briefs leadership. Specifically, we met  with (1) officials from DHS component intelligence programs (USCIS, the  U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and TSA); (2) staff from ODNI; (3) state and  local officials from 7 of the 78 nationwide fusion centers; and (4)  members of the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS) and  the National Council of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC),  two organizations composed of private sector critical infrastructure  sectors that coordinate with the federal government on security  measures. The information we obtained from fusion centers and the  private sector may not be generalized across all fusion centers and  throughout the private sector, but provided us with an overview of users’  perspectives on the usefulness of I&A’s products and other analytic  support.
For the third objective, we reviewed documents from the Office of  Personnel Management (OPM), DHS, I&A, and ODNI to obtain  information on intelligence analyst hiring needs and practices, such as the  November 2012 I&A memorandum on hiring standards and the January  2010 I&A recruitment strategy. To determine the challenges I&A  experienced maintaining a skilled workforce, we reviewed I&A data such  as analyst attrition rates from 2009 through 2013, and documents such  as I&A’s November 2012 memo to the Director of National Intelligence  requesting conversion of competitive service positions to excepted  service positions. To assess I&A’s training and development practices,  we analyzed training expectations, offerings, and strategies by DHS and  I&A. We also analyzed documents from DHS and I&A to determine I&A’s  performance management practices, including the January 2010 I&A  Human Capital Standard Operating Procedures and the December 2008  DHS Human Resources Performance Management Program Guidance.  We compared I&A’s workforce hiring and development actions against   We also met with officials  criteria in DHS’s Workforce Planning Guide.from I&A’s human capital office, training branch, mission support office,  and the acting Chief of Staff to discuss attrition, recruitment, hiring,  training, and evaluation practices and procedures. For a complete  discussion of the objectives, scope, and methodology of this report see  appendix III.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to May 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DHS Intelligence Enterprise
paragraphs: Consistent with provisions of the Homeland Security Act, as amended,  the Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) of the department—who also holds  the position of DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and is  the head of I&A—is to exercise leadership and authority over the  enterprise and intelligence policy throughout the department. For  example, the CINT is to provide strategic oversight to and support the  missions and goals of members of the enterprise. The enterprise is  composed of all DHS component intelligence programs. Specifically, it  consists of I&A, the intelligence elements of six DHS operational  components (CBP, USCIS, ICE, TSA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S.  Secret Service), and three DHS headquarters elements supported by I&A  (the National Protection and Plans Directorate, the Office of Operations  Coordination and Planning, and the Office of the Chief Security Officer).
However, as shown in figure 1, not all members of the enterprise perform  intelligence analysis activities.
section_title: DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis
paragraphs: I&A emerged from what the Homeland Security Act originally established  as the Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.  Specifically, the Homeland Security Act established within DHS the  directorate—led by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for  Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection—to carry out DHS’s  responsibilities in regard to, among other things, information analysis. In  2007, amendments to the Homeland Security Act included in the  Implementing Recommendations of 9/11 Commission Act of 2007  reorganized the department by dividing the directorate into an Office of  Intelligence and Analysis—headed by the Under Secretary for Information  and Analysis—and an Office of Infrastructure Protection, headed by the  Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection. As a result of the  reorganization, responsibilities previously assigned to the Under  Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection relating to  intelligence analysis became attributed to the Secretary (as carried out  through the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis) and remained  largely unchanged. I&A is an element of the Intelligence Community.
According to its February 2011 strategic plan, I&A’s mission is to equip  the homeland security enterprise with the intelligence and information it  needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient. To carry out its mission, I&A is to ensure that information related to homeland security  threats is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to homeland security  partners to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient.
I&A prepares written, finished analytical products that it makes available  to its customers. In addition to written analytical reports, I&A provides  intelligence analysis to its customers through oral briefings (both  classified and unclassified) and other analytic services, such as access to  I&A analysts for review of the customers’ intelligence products, and  advice and instruction on tradecraft standards.provides services to state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, as well as  the private sector, through deployed personnel at fusion centers.  Additionally, I&A’s deployed personnel are to assist fusion centers in  obtaining needed information and analysis to aid in supporting their own  customer bases. I&A is also to act as a conduit between the DHS  component intelligence programs and the Intelligence Community. For  example, I&A provides relevant information from the Intelligence  Community to the components.
section_title: Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication
paragraphs: In 2010, we were mandated to identify programs, agencies, offices, and  initiatives with duplicative goals and activities within departments and  government-wide and report annually to Congress. In March 2011,  February 2012, April 2013, and April 2014 we issued our first four annual  reports to Congress in response to this requirement.describe, in part, areas in which we found evidence of fragmentation,  overlap, or duplication among federal programs. Using the framework we  established in these reports, we used the following definitions for the  purpose of assessing the analysis activities of the enterprise:
Fragmentation occurs when more than one federal agency (or more  than one organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad  area of national need.
Overlap occurs when multiple programs have similar goals, engage in  similar activities or strategies to achieve those goals, or target similar  beneficiaries.
Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are  engaging in the same activities or providing the same services to the  same beneficiaries.
section_title: Mechanisms to Integrate DHS Analysis Activities to Support Departmental Intelligence Priorities Are Not Functioning as Intended but Help Reduce Overlap and Duplication
paragraphs: DHS has established mechanisms—including a governance board,  intelligence framework, and analysis planning process—intended to better  integrate analysis activities across the enterprise and help ensure that  activities support strategic departmental intelligence priorities. However,  the framework does not establish strategic departmental intelligence  priorities or drive the analytic planning process across the enterprise, as  intended. On the other hand, intelligence officials from I&A and all five  components in our review reported that efforts to implement these  mechanisms, particularly the analytic planning process, have allowed  them to coordinate component activities and avoid unnecessary overlap  or duplication of efforts. Likewise, we did not find unnecessary overlap or  duplication in our review of border security products from I&A and two  components.
subsections: section_title: DHS’s Intelligence Framework and Component Analysis Planning Process Are Not Functioning as Intended
paragraphs: According to the DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan, an integrated  and collaborative Intelligence Enterprise is crucial to the department  accomplishing its homeland security mission. Further, according to the  plan, removing existing barriers to integration, while concurrently  respecting and supporting DHS components’ unique missions—such as  CBP’s mission to protect the borders—is necessary in order to fully  integrate the DHS components that perform intelligence analysis. In 2005,  DHS established a governance board—the Homeland Security  Intelligence Council (the council)—to serve as the decision-making and  implementation oversight body that supports the CINT in leading and  managing the activities of the enterprise, and furthering a unified,  coordinated, and integrated intelligence program for the department.
The council’s Analysis Working Group—composed of subject matter  experts from I&A’s analytic divisions and the intelligence elements of the  components—is to coordinate analysis and production across the  enterprise.
Additionally, DHS has established two key mechanisms to help ensure  that component intelligence analysis activities and resource investments  align to support strategic departmental intelligence priorities—the  Framework and the POA. According to the Framework, this is an annual  document that is intended to present the department’s overall strategic  intelligence priorities and to inform annual intelligence planning decisions  related to collection, analysis, and resource management. In addition to  the Framework, the POA is to be an annual document that DHS uses to  plan and manage the more specific intelligence analysis activities of its  enterprise. Specifically, according to DHS guidance, the POA is to identify  a series of key intelligence questions that the enterprise will seek to  address in the upcoming year. According to the 2011 I&A Strategic Plan  and DHS guidance, the strategic priorities in the Framework should be  used to drive analytic planning and production in the POA. However,  neither mechanism is working as intended. Specifically, we identified two  gaps in the implementation of these mechanisms that limit DHS’s  assurance that component analytic activities support strategic  departmental intelligence priorities:
The Framework does not establish strategic departmental  priorities: The Framework does not establish strategic departmental  intelligence priorities that can be used to inform annual intelligence  planning decisions—such as what analytic activities to pursue and  what level of investment to make, as called for in DHS guidance. The  Framework—developed by I&A’s Information Sharing and Intelligence  Enterprise Management Division—was established in fiscal year  2011. However, the senior I&A official who assumed management of  the Framework process in May 2013 stated that the Framework does  not accomplish its intended purpose of informing annual intelligence  planning decisions. According to this official, DHS took a bottom-up  approach to developing the Framework in fiscal years 2011 through  2013. Specifically, DHS created a matrix that links the broad  departmental missions outlined in the Quadrennial Homeland Security  Review—such as preventing terrorist attacks and effectively  controlling U.S. borders—to different intelligence categories that are  relevant to these missions.points and asked the components to distribute these points across the  QHSR missions and intelligence categories in accordance with the  types of intelligence activities the component conducted. I&A then  added up the total points assigned by the components for each  intelligence category. These totals became a proxy for the intelligence  priorities of the enterprise as a whole. Accordingly, the Framework  presented the existing intelligence activities of the members of the  enterprise, rather than outlining strategic departmental intelligence  priorities.
DHS allocated each component 100  According to officials responsible for the Framework, the goal of the  fiscal years 2011 through 2013 Frameworks was to understand the  diverse nature of intelligence priorities across the enterprise, not to  establish overall departmental intelligence priorities. Accordingly, the  officials acknowledged that the Framework does not fulfill its stated  purpose of informing annual intelligence planning decisions. To begin  addressing this problem, the officials stated that I&A plans to make  some changes to the fiscal year 2014 Framework. However, the  planned changes relate primarily to the methodology used to tally the  current intelligence activities of the components. Specifically, the  officials said that rather than giving all components equal weighting,  the fiscal year 2014 Framework will give greater weight to the  priorities of components that have a large intelligence portfolio.  However, the official stated that the fiscal year 2014 Framework will  look similar to the fiscal year 2013 Framework. planned changes to the fiscal year 2014 Framework will not result in  the establishment of strategic departmental intelligence priorities that  can be used to inform annual intelligence planning and resource  decisions, as called for in DHS guidance.
As of March 2014, the fiscal year 2014 Framework had not been finalized.
The Framework does not drive analytic planning and production:  The Framework was not used to drive analytic planning and  production in the POA. The POA, established in fiscal year 2011, is  overseen by the Homeland Security Intelligence Council’s Analysis  Working Group. As with the Framework, DHS took a bottom-up  approach to developing the POA for fiscal years 2012 and 2013.  Specifically, each component independently developed a set of key  intelligence questions that it would address in the upcoming year.  Officials from each of the five components we contacted said that they  developed these questions in order to be responsive to their unique  missions and customer needs. DHS then aggregated these individual  component responses to generate the POA. For the 2013 POA, this  resulted in a catalogue of more than 80 questions to be addressed.
DHS modified the process for the fiscal year 2014 POA in order to  focus analytic planning efforts on a smaller, more strategic set of  priority questions of common interest to the enterprise as a whole. As  a result, the number of key intelligence questions decreased to 15.  Also, rather than having each component individually generate key  intelligence questions for inclusion in the POA, subject matter experts  from participating DHS components brainstormed to collectively  develop the 2014 key intelligence questions, determine which DHS  components would contribute analysis to each question, and identify  what specific intelligence products each would generate to address  the questions. According to the I&A official responsible for the POA,  the brainstorming was informed by the subject matter experts’ daily  engagement with DHS leadership, knowledge of operational and  policy priorities and missions, the current threat environment,  customer-specific requirements, and Intelligence Community and law  enforcement engagement and collaboration. However, given the  Framework limitations described above, and because of the new  focus of the fiscal year 2014 POA, the official stated that the 2014  process was not informed or influenced by the Framework.
Because of the gaps we identified in the Framework and POA processes,  DHS cannot provide reasonable assurance that component intelligence  analysis activities and resource investments throughout the enterprise are  aligned to support both strategic departmental intelligence priorities as  well as component-specific priorities driven by their unique operational  missions. According to I&A officials, it can be challenging for components  to focus on both overall strategic departmental intelligence priorities and  their more tactical intelligence priorities that support their specific  operations and component customers. As articulated in the DHS  Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan, the CINT recognizes the  importance of respecting and supporting these unique component  intelligence missions. However, to achieve its strategic goal of  establishing an integrated intelligence enterprise, it will be important for  DHS to clearly define its departmental intelligence priorities and ensure  that annual enterprise intelligence planning activities are aligned to  support these priorities. Establishing strategic departmental intelligence  priorities in the Framework, and using these priorities to inform the  planned analytic activities of the enterprise, as articulated in the POA,  would better assure DHS of this alignment.
section_title: Enterprise Officials Reported That the Component Analytic Planning Process Has Helped Reduce Duplication, and We Did Not Find Evidence of Unnecessary Duplication
paragraphs: DHS’s efforts to implement mechanisms—particularly the POA—have  helped to minimize unnecessary overlap and duplication across  component intelligence analysis activities. The intelligence analysis  activities within DHS are inherently fragmented, as multiple DHS  components conduct intelligence analysis in support of the same broad  intelligence topics. For example, I&A, CBP, ICE, TSA, and the U.S. Coast  Guard all contributed intelligence analysis to the DHS goal of Securing  and Managing Our Borders in fiscal year 2012, as articulated in that  year’s POA. However, intelligence officials at I&A and all five operational  components with whom we met stated that the mechanisms DHS  instituted to integrate analysis throughout the enterprise—particularly the  POA—helped to avoid unnecessary overlap and duplication. Specifically,  senior intelligence officials in all five components said the POA helped  them gain a better understanding of the work of other components or  prevent duplication in the intelligence analysis activities of the  components. For example, U.S. Coast Guard intelligence officials stated  that through the POA process, they gained an understanding of what  other DHS components were doing in the intelligence realm to meet their  mission requirements and learned that they may have some areas of  commonality with CBP. This understanding allowed U.S. Coast Guard  analysts to reach out to CBP analysts to determine which component  would lead analysis work on different topics, thereby preventing  duplication. Specifically, the U.S. Coast Guard agreed to lead maritime  border analysis work and CBP agreed to lead land border analysis work.  Intelligence officials from another component stated that because of the  POA, departmental components have developed a relationship such that  two components conducting similar analysis will work together to  determine which component is better suited to do the analysis.
Officials from four of the five DHS components we met with also reported  that the revised POA process used in fiscal year 2014 was an  improvement over the process used in prior years for various reasons.  The reasons most often mentioned were improved coordination and  reduced redundancy, and the ability of the components to display their  contributions and inject the components’ internal needs into the broader  priorities included in the POA. Additionally, DHS is considering additional  ways to enhance coordination across its enterprise, according to I&A  officials. For example, officials said that DHS is exploring ways to have  the Homeland Security Intelligence Council’s Analysis Working Group— the group currently responsible for developing the POA—play a more  active role in sharing information on planned analytic production  throughout the enterprise and in monitoring joint production across the  components.
In addition, we did not find evidence of any duplication among the  intelligence analysis products that we reviewed as part of our case study  in the area of border security. We did identify one instance of overlap  where two DHS components provided similar information to similar  customers in different products, but the information was packaged  differently such that the products were not duplicative. This result is  consistent with our determination based on our case study review, which  senior intelligence officials at I&A and the components confirmed, that  I&A products tend to be more strategic and written to a broader customer  base than are component intelligence products, which tend to be more  tactical and written to component operators. We also found that I&A  products tend to be based on multiple sources of information, including  DHS component data and information from the Intelligence Community,  whereas component products tend to be sourced primarily from internal  component data. In this way, I&A products aggregate information from  across the department and the Intelligence Community to present a  national picture, whereas component products use component  information to discuss the implications on component operations. For  example, a component intelligence product may provide analysis of a  specific law enforcement incident, such as a drug seizure in a specific  jurisdiction, whereas an I&A product may provide a strategic look at drug  activity across the country using data from CBP, ICE, and international  law enforcement sources.
section_title: Customers Reported Mixed Views on the Usefulness of I&A Products and Services; I&A Is Taking Steps to Better Understand Customers’ Analytic Support Needs
paragraphs: Results from customer feedback surveys that are attached to I&A  intelligence products indicate general satisfaction with these products, but  the results have limitations that prevent I&A from drawing readership-wide  conclusions. Our discussions with representatives of I&A’s five customer  groups indicate that customers in two groups—DHS leadership and state  and local officials at fusion centers—found I&A’s products to be useful,  while customers in the other three groups—DHS components, the  Intelligence Community, and private critical infrastructure sectors— generally did not. Customers in four of the five groups reported that they  found other types of I&A analytic support to be useful, such as briefings  from I&A analysts. I&A is taking steps to identify the analytic products and  services that best meet its customers’ needs.
subsections: section_title: Customer Feedback Surveys Indicate General Satisfaction with the Usefulness of I&A Products, but Results Cannot Be Used to Draw Readership-wide Conclusions
paragraphs: I&A assesses the accuracy and usefulness of its intelligence analysis  products through voluntary customer feedback surveys that are attached  to products. Survey results indicate general satisfaction, but the results  have limitations that prevent I&A from drawing statistically significant  conclusions about all the readers of its products. Specifically, during fiscal  year 2013, 73 percent of I&A customers that responded to the feedback  surveys were very satisfied with the products’ usefulness, and 68 percent  were very satisfied with the products’ timeliness. During this period, I&A  issued a total of 830 intelligence products, of which 467 included a  customer feedback survey. I&A received survey responses for 104 (22  percent) of the 467 products, with a total of 4,162 responses. According  to ODNI officials, I&A’s level of effort directed at obtaining feedback from  its customers, along with the number of responses received, were above  the norm for the Intelligence Community.
While generally positive, I&A survey results have limitations due in part to  a bias in those who respond to the surveys. This bias exists because the  results reflect the views of I&A customers who chose to respond to the  feedback form and do not reflect the views of those who did not respond,  a fact that prevents I&A from drawing statistically significant conclusions  about the usefulness of its products since the results are not  representative of all customers. Also, certain products concerning  particularly notable topics can also account for a disproportionate number  of survey responses received, which can bias the overall results since the  responses do not reflect the full range of issued products. For example, in  September 2012, I&A data show that three intelligence products  accounted for 513 (88 percent) of the 586 total survey responses  received during the month. The remaining 73 responses (12 percent) I&A  received during the month covered a total of 18 products.
Further, because I&A’s products are distributed through broad  information-sharing networks and generally not sent directly to individual  recipients, I&A cannot determine the full extent of its customer base. I&A officials agree that this distribution method limits its ability to form  readership-wide conclusions based on the survey results; however, I&A  officials stated that I&A uses these networks to further its goal for a wide  distribution of its products. Additionally, because of the broad distribution  through information sharing networks, I&A cannot track the number of  individuals who ultimately open and read its products in order to obtain  more complete feedback. All of these factors limit I&A’s ability to draw any  readership-wide conclusions about its products.
Despite these limitations, I&A officials view the survey results as a useful  tool for generally understanding how their products are being received by  the customer base. The surveys also allow customers to submit product  and service improvement recommendations that help to inform I&A in  making adjustments to products to better serve customers’ needs.  Officials from I&A’s Production Management Division said they provide  the survey results to the I&A analytic division responsible for the product  in order for the division to consider and make improvements in future  products. In addition, I&A formed the Analytic Production Improvement  Council in fiscal year 2012 to implement product quality improvement  initiatives. For example, one product improvement effort the council  implemented was to change product titles to better inform prospective  customers of the topic of interest in those products.
I&A has established portals on web-based distribution networks to facilitate customers’  access to its intelligence products, such as the Homeland Security Information Network for  unclassified products and the Homeland Secure Data Network for classified reporting.
section_title: Selected Officials from Two of I&A’s Five Customer Groups Said Products Were Useful, and Officials from Four of the Five Groups Said Other Types of Analytic Services Were Useful
paragraphs: According to I&A’s strategic plan, because of resource constraints and  other factors, I&A gives priority in its intelligence analysis efforts to the  needs of DHS leadership and state and local customers. I&A officials  added that the priority order of customer groups is (1) departmental  leadership; (2) state, local, tribal, and territorial partners; (3) DHS  operational components; (4) Intelligence Community members; and (5)  private critical infrastructure sectors. Our work indicates that I&A’s  finished intelligence products are useful and relevant to DHS leadership  and state, local, tribal, and territorial customers, but generally not to  customers in the other three groups. Officials from four of the five  customer groups (state, local, tribal, territorial partners; DHS components;  the intelligence community; and the private sector) said they found other  types of I&A analytic support to be useful, including briefings on emerging  threats, tradecraft review of the customers’ own products, assistance with  developing intelligence analysis, training, and the general exchange of  information.
subsections: section_title: DHS Leadership
paragraphs: I&A’s first priority is to provide finished intelligence products and other  analytic services to DHS leadership—which consists of the Secretary of  Homeland Security, Deputy Secretary, and DHS component heads—to  support decision making. According to I&A officials who brief the  Secretary, I&A’s products and services are useful and relevant to meeting  leadership needs. For example, I&A’s daily intelligence report and related  threat briefing to the Secretary include actions DHS components plan to  take in response to threats, which helps the Secretary ensure that the  department is taking actions to mitigate these threats.
section_title: State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Partners
paragraphs: I&A has given priority to providing intelligence reports and other support  to state, local, tribal, and territorial entities, consistent with provisions of  the Homeland Security Act, as amended, and subsequently enacted  laws.that I&A products were useful for providing an overall, strategic-level  perspective and situational awareness regarding emerging threats. The   Officials from five of the seven fusion centers we contacted said  officials also said they incorporate threat analysis from I&A products into  their own reporting to state and local customers. They specifically cited  I&A’s Joint Intelligence Bulletins and Roll Call Releases as products that  were useful. Officials at the two fusion centers that generally did not find  I&A analytic products to be useful said the products rarely addressed  concerns that were unique to their geographic area, such as domestic  terrorist groups that operate in their regions. In addition, officials from all  seven fusion centers said that they valued access to I&A personnel,  including analysts, for assistance with fusion center needs related to  intelligence analysis. This assistance included training on proper methods  for developing analytic products, reviewing fusion center products, and  providing other analytic services, such as oral briefings on emerging  threats that may be relevant to the center.
I&A has deployed analysts to fusion centers on a limited basis.  Specifically, I&A initially deployed one analyst to the Los Angeles and  San Diego fusion centers. According to I&A officials responsible for  FAST, the purpose of these embedded analysts is to work with fusion  centers to do detailed analytic work in accordance with the tradecraft  standards that I&A follows.officials noted that these analysts provide an avenue for improving the  tradecraft skills of fusion center analysts, which could help reduce delays  in the issuance of I&A’s joint products with centers. I&A has recently  taken steps to deploy additional analysts to fusion centers. According to  the I&A Deputy Research Director, I&A deployed an additional four  analysts to fusion centers and plans to deploy a fifth analyst in June.
section_title: DHS Components
paragraphs: Intelligence officials from all five DHS components we contacted generally  stated that they did not consider themselves customers of I&A with regard  to finished intelligence products. The officials recognized the overall high- level perspectives and situational awareness that I&A products can  provide, but noted that their operational elements generally have a more  critical need for tactical information and analysis to support operations  and investigations—such as details on specific individuals or groups— which their own intelligence groups typically provide. Officials from all five  components noted the value of I&A’s other analytic support, such as  providing access to the Intelligence Community and training. Managers of  the intelligence elements of two components (the U.S. Coast Guard and  USCIS) cited a desire to have I&A analysts placed in the components’  intelligence offices to allow for better exchanges of information, analysis,  and subject matter expertise. For example, according to U.S. Coast  Guard officials, colocating I&A analysts within components would allow  I&A to better serve the Secretary by facilitating the identification of  relevant information and analysis. In January 2014, I&A officials said that  they were in the process of developing and considering several plans to  deploy analysts to jointly work on high-priority issues of mutual interest to  I&A and components.
section_title: Intelligence Community
paragraphs: ODNI officials said that they generally do not perceive the members of the  Intelligence Community to be customers of I&A’s finished intelligence  products because the products are not targeted to the Intelligence  Community elements, and these agencies rely on other sources for  analysis. The officials noted that Intelligence Community elements also  tend to have an international focus, while I&A focuses on the homeland.  ODNI officials said that they appreciated that I&A serves state and local  customers since they are not traditional Intelligence Community  customers. The officials also noted that I&A frequently writes its products  at an unclassified level, which hinders their usefulness to the Intelligence  Community. According to ODNI officials, the daily interaction between  their personnel and I&A analysts embedded at ODNI’s National  Counterterrorism Center provides expertise and perspective on DHS data  sets—such as data on individuals crossing the borders—that are valuable  to the Intelligence Community. The officials noted that they value being  able to integrate information from these data sets into their own analyses.
section_title: Private Critical Infrastructure Sectors
paragraphs: Representatives from all nine private critical infrastructure sectors and  subsectors we contacted said that I&A generally does not generate  products that are either useful or relevant to them, except for I&A’s  analytic efforts related to cyber security, for which all of the officials  generally had positive views. The officials said that I&A’s finished  intelligence products are usually more strategic than they require, and  I&A does not fully understand the intelligence needs of their industries.  The officials added that they are interested in developing a relationship  with I&A. For example, officials from all nine sectors noted that having  I&A analysts detailed to the private sector on a limited and temporary  basis would better position I&A to understand their industries and related  threats and provide intelligence analysis, including written reports, oral  briefings, and other direct assistance. In January 2014, I&A officials said  they are not considering long-term deployments (90 days or longer) in  part because of staffing constraints, but are considering shorter-term  deployments to interested private sector companies.
According to I&A officials, I&A has historically given the private sector  lower priority with respect to intelligence analysis than its other customer  groups because of resource considerations. However, the officials stated  that I&A is continuing efforts going forward to perform outreach to the  private sector to better determine private sector’s analytic needs and how  to satisfy them. For example, I&A is participating in the Federal Bureau of  Investigation’s (FBI) Infragard program for sharing information and  analysis with the private sector. Further, I&A’s Strategic Plan calls for enabling the National Network of Fusion Centers to serve as a conduit for  disseminating products to private sector partners.
section_title: I&A Is Taking Steps to Identify the Analytic Products and Services that Best Meet the Needs of Its Customers
paragraphs: I&A has not identified the types and mix of analytic products and services  that best meet the needs of its various customers, but has recently taken  steps that could support doing so. Specifically, the surveys I&A attaches  to individual products help obtain customer feedback on various aspects  of the products, but are not intended to obtain customer views on the full  range of analytic products or services that I&A provides. However, in  fiscal year 2012, I&A’s Production Management Division initiated a Core  Customer Study to ascertain, among other things, its core customers’  organizations, the functions they perform, and their intelligence-related  mission needs. The study is using a combination of interviews and  surveys with members of I&A’s five customer groups. I&A characterized  the Core Customer Study as a long-term effort to define, identify, and  profile its core customers as a step to better identify their overall  intelligence needs. Production Management Division officials said they  expect to complete the study by the end of June 2014.
In addition, in January 2014, I&A initiated the Customer Satisfaction  Assessment to obtain views on I&A products and services that were  provided to customers during 2013 and forecast how I&A can better meet  customer needs in the future. To support this assessment, and in  response to our September 2012 report, I&A initiated a survey in March  2014 to gain a better understanding of its customers’ satisfaction with and  use of I&A intelligence products and services.survey covers the types of I&A products the customers read in 2013,  including finished intelligence and current intelligence (e.g., alerts and   Among other things, the  warnings); the extent to which the products were useful in informing  actions and decisions, such as in making resource investments; and  satisfaction with I&A services, such as threat briefings and tradecraft  assistance. According to I&A officials, they sent the survey to customers  who were likely recipients of I&A intelligence products and services in  2013. Specifically, I&A sent the survey to customers who maintained an  active account to a portal where I&A products are posted (e.g., the  Homeland Security Information Network), were members of a homeland  security information-sharing network that regularly distributes I&A  products (e.g., terrorism liaison officer network), or were individually  referred by their local fusion center or the I&A private sector outreach  program. According to I&A officials, the results of this survey will be  analyzed and provided directly to I&A intelligence analysts, managers,  and senior leadership to help them better understand how their customers  use I&A intelligence and determine how to tailor and improve products  and services in the future.
I&A officials said that as part of the Customer Satisfaction Assessment  they also plan to conduct detailed interviews with a smaller group of  customers in order to obtain a more in-depth understanding of ways to  increase the usefulness of I&A’s analytic products and services that will  guide its improvement efforts. According to I&A officials, the assessment  will also help I&A understand its customers’ desired mix of products and  analytic services. I&A plans to complete the first draft of a report on the  results of the assessment by the end of April 2014.
Once completed, the Core Customer Study and Customer Satisfaction  Assessment could provide I&A with information to help it more clearly  define how it plans to support each customer group, the types of analytic  products and services it will provide, and related levels of investment. The  results could also assist I&A in determining how best to use its available  analytic resources, including deciding whether additional deployments of  I&A intelligence analysts to DHS components, fusion centers, and private  sector entities would allow for better exchanges of information and  analysis in support of national counterterrorism efforts.
section_title: I&A Has Taken Steps to Address Challenges It Faces in Maintaining a Skilled Workforce, but Assessing Results Could Help Strengthen Future Human Capital Efforts
subsections: section_title: I&A Has Taken Steps to Address Challenges Related to Recruiting, Hiring, and Professional Development
paragraphs: I&A has faced human capital challenges in recruiting and hiring the skilled  workforce it needs and providing training and professional development  opportunities that keep morale high and attrition low. Specifically,  according to I&A’s recruitment strategy, I&A’s hiring authority under  competitive service put it at a disadvantage compared with other  organizations that were able to process hiring actions more quickly and   For  offer career advantages associated with excepted service status. example, according to officials, under competitive service status, it could  take anywhere from several months to a year between the initial hiring  offer and completion of the hiring process, a time lag that they said led  many applicants to seek employment elsewhere. The officials added that  when they engaged in Intelligence Community career fairs, many  individuals were looking for offers on the spot that other Intelligence  Community elements could provide but that I&A could not, a fact that  affected their ability to compete for top talent. In addition, according  officials, the perception of I&A as a less than prestigious intelligence  agency than the others in the Intelligence Community also affects its  ability to recruit top talent.
To some extent, such hiring challenges contributed to I&A’s historical  reliance on contractors to fill the gaps in Intelligence Community  experience. For example, a 2009 Homeland Security Institute study  concluded that burdensome recruitment and hiring processes resulted in  I&A’s heavy reliance on contract labor to staff key positions. I&A officials  stated that the use of contractors was the primary method outside of  federal hiring to acquire the needed tradecraft skills. They added that  budgetary limitations on the number of authorized full-time equivalent  (FTE) positions, the desire for operational flexibility to deal with  uncertainty, and the need for “surge capability” also made contractors a  viable alternative. As of November 2013, I&A’s Office of Analysis had the  smallest percentage of contractors compared with the rest of I&A, but the  office still relied on contractors to support analytical instruction, such as  reviews of the Program of Analysis.
I&A has also faced challenges in providing professional development  opportunities for its workforce, and experienced low morale scores and  high rates of attrition, particularly among its lower-level analysts.  Regarding professional development, I&A historically did not  institutionalize a commitment to investing in its workforce, according to  I&A officials. For example, they said that some managers sent their  employees to training, assigned mentors, and provided rotational  opportunities, while others did not. Furthermore, I&A’s training program  did not always focus on mission-specific requirements that its workforce  needed, according to officials. The 2009 Homeland Security Institute  report also concluded that I&A lacked a robust training program.  According to officials, these challenges contributed to I&A’s low morale  and high rates of attrition. For example, I&A employee responses to the  2012 Intelligence Community Climate Survey show that 36 percent of  employees responded positively when asked if they would recommend  I&A as a good place to work, as shown in figure 2.
Also, in September 2012, we reported that I&A had one of the lowest  morale scores within DHS in OPM’s Federal Viewpoints Survey—a tool  that measures employees’ perceptions of whether and to what extent  conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their  agencies.
According to I&A officials, attrition among I&A intelligence analysts has  led to a loss in valuable technical expertise and organizational  knowledge. I&A data show that attrition has been the highest for lower- level analysts, with attrition for GS-9 positions fluctuating from a high of  80 percent in fiscal year 2009 to 21 percent in fiscal year 2013. According  to exit interviews, I&A officials attributed the attrition to a number of  factors, including low morale and limited promotion opportunities for  lower-level analysts. The officials added that exit interviews indicate that  analysts leave for positions with other Intelligence Community agencies,  which are often perceived as higher-profile agencies.
To help address these challenges, I&A has taken the following steps:
To help address recruitment and hiring challenges, in November  2012, DHS requested excepted service status on behalf of I&A from  ODNI and OPM to align itself with the rest of the Intelligence  Community and better compete for top talent. In June 2013, I&A  received excepted service status. According to I&A officials, this will  allow them to process hiring actions quicker and offer career  advantages associated with excepted service positions, which will in  turn help them recruit and hire the right applicants. In addition, I&A  human capital officials stated that they started working with DHS  human capital officials in 2013 to improve intelligence analyst position  descriptions by, for example, targeting specific skill requirements, to  help ensure that I&A recruits the right people.
To address low morale and attrition among its intelligence analysts  and enhance professional development opportunities, I&A  restructured its organizational grade structure to provide more career  advancement and promotion opportunities. In 2012, I&A awarded a  contract to the MITRE Corporation to review its workforce structure.
MITRE concluded that I&A had more staff at the higher grade levels  and that this was out of line with the rest of the Intelligence  Community. As a result, in November 2012, I&A released a  memorandum that noted the grade structure changes. Specifically,  I&A increased the number of GS-7 through GS-12 analyst positions  and decreased the number of GS-13 through GS-15 positions.  According to the directors of the four Office of Analysis analytic  divisions, this change is intended to help I&A grow its workforce  through junior analysts and increase promotion opportunities that  were previously not available.
In fiscal years 2012 and 2013, I&A provided over 20 courses related to analytic  tradecraft for its analytic workforce. According to I&A officials, these courses were  developed in accordance with ODNI standards. were detailed to other Intelligence Community elements or DHS  components. According to I&A officials, this program helps I&A analysts  better understand the operations and needs of other Intelligence  Community elements and DHS components and helps them develop their  analytic tradecraft.
section_title: Assessing Results and Impacts of Recently Completed and Ongoing Initiatives Could Help I&A Strengthen Future Human Capital Efforts
paragraphs: In May 2013, I&A began to strategically assess whether its workforce has  the right skills—such as written communications, program knowledge,  and decision making—through a competency gap assessment.  According to officials, this gap assessment will also to serve as an  opportunity for I&A to determine whether its current practice of recruiting  and hiring individuals that have strong analytical skills as opposed to  subject matter expertise, and then training them to specialize in areas that   According to  support DHS’s unique operational missions, is appropriate.officials, the gap assessment will include a survey of the knowledge,  skills, and capabilities of intelligence analysts across the enterprise. The  survey will cover critical skills and competencies that I&A developed in  conjunction with other DHS components. According to I&A officials, the  results of the assessment are to be released in fiscal year 2014. I&A  officials said that they intend to use the results of the assessment to help  fill skill gaps within the current workforce through training and analyst  performance management activities. I&A officials acknowledged the  importance and the need to use the results of the competency gap  assessment given the absence of other mechanisms or documents that  can help guide its overall workforce planning efforts.
While the competency gap assessment is an important step in strategic  workforce planning, I&A has not assessed the effects of its recently  completed workforce efforts. In the past 3 years, I&A has implemented  changes that are intended to strengthen its workforce, however; I&A  currently has no established mechanisms in place to monitor and  evaluate the effect of these efforts and use the results to make any  needed changes. Specifically, we identified three areas where I&A could  strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of its human capital efforts.  First, I&A officials stated that they use ODNI and DHS-OPM surveys and  survey forms from analysts regarding training to review changes in  morale; however, I&A does not have a systematic way of monitoring  these activities and using the results to make changes. Second, the  results I&A receives from the ODNI and DHS-OPM morale surveys reflect  all of I&A, which makes it difficult for I&A to determine whether its  workforce activities are having any results on the intelligence analysts  within the Office of Analysis. Third, I&A does not have any mechanisms in  place to monitor and assess the effects of its excepted service status and  grade restructuring.
According to I&A officials, these mechanisms are not in place because  I&A leadership was focused on other priorities. However, these officials  agreed that such mechanisms could help ensure that its efforts are  helping to address the challenges of its analytic intelligence workforce.  According to DHS workforce planning guidance, workforce planners must  monitor and assess the progress of their strategies, evaluate the  outcomes, and use the results from the evaluation to revise the  strategies, if needed. Consistent with this guidance, establishing  mechanisms to monitor and evaluate workforce efforts, such as changes  to I&A’s hiring authority and grade levels restructuring, could help the  Office of Analysis determine if the efforts are achieving their intended  results. In addition, using the results from these evaluations to determine  any need for changes will help ensure that I&A is making sound  workforce decisions.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The organizations within the DHS Intelligence Enterprise play critical roles  in uncovering and analyzing threats to the United States. DHS has made  efforts, such as developing the Framework and POA, to integrate the  analysis activities of its enterprise in support of common departmental  intelligence priorities. These efforts, however, are not functioning as  intended and as a result, DHS has not yet reached its goal of having an  intelligence enterprise that responds to an integrated set of strategic  departmental priorities that in turn drive analytical plans and resource  decisions. Because of challenges I&A experienced in recruiting and hiring  a skilled workforce, it has also taken actions intended to make it easier to  attract, develop, and maintain skilled analysts, and many of these actions  have been recently completed. By not monitoring and evaluating the  effect of these actions, I&A cannot be confident that it is making progress  in improving its ability to build and maintain the workforce it needs to  effectively and efficiently analyze possible threats to the homeland.  Furthermore, I&A lacks the information essential to know whether  additional changes are needed to its workforce improvement activities  and the strategies that underlie those activities.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that the intelligence analysis activities and resources  throughout the enterprise align to an integrated set of strategic  departmental intelligence priorities, we recommend that the Under  Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Homeland Security take the  following two actions: establish strategic departmental intelligence priorities in the Homeland  Security Intelligence Priorities Framework that can be used to guide  annual enterprise planning efforts, including intelligence analysis and  resource management and ensure that once strategic departmental intelligence priorities are  established, the Framework is used to inform the planned analytic  activities of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, as articulated in the  Program of Analysis.
To help ensure that I&A maintains critical skills and competencies, when  planning for and implementing current and future workforce actions, we  recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security establish  mechanisms to monitor and evaluate workforce initiatives and use results  to determine any needed changes.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. In its  written comments, reprinted in appendix V and summarized below, DHS  concurred with the three recommendations and described actions  underway and planned to address them. In addition, DHS provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
With regard to the first recommendation, that I&A establish strategic  departmental intelligence priorities in the Framework that can be used to  guide annual enterprise planning efforts, DHS concurred and stated that,  based in part on GAO’s work, I&A has revised its approach to developing  strategic departmental intelligence priorities. Further, DHS stated that the  2014 Framework was approved on April 9, 2014, and I&A will coordinate  future refinements to the methodology with the Homeland Security  Intelligence Enterprise prior to the beginning of the 2015 priorities  process.  We will determine if I&A’s revised approach and the resulting  2014 Framework address the intent of our recommendation as part of our  recommendation follow-up process.
With regard to the second recommendation, that I&A ensure that once  strategic departmental intelligence priorities are established the  Framework is used to inform the planned analytic activities of the DHS  Intelligence Enterprise, DHS concurred, and stated that the priorities  established in the 2014 Framework will inform the development of the  2015 POA. Additionally, DHS stated in its letter that the 2015 POA will be  informed by updated Intelligence Community-wide guidance from the  Director of National Intelligence pertaining to both the development of the  POA and key intelligence questions, and lessons learned from last year’s  development process. If fully implemented, these planned actions should  address the intent of the recommendation.
With regard to the third recommendation, that I&A establish mechanisms  to monitor and evaluate workforce initiatives and use results to determine  any needed changes, DHS concurred and stated that I&A is developing  specific performance indicators to monitor and evaluate workforce  initiatives and plans to develop a complete set of measures by the end of  fiscal year 2014. If fully implemented, these planned actions should  address the intent of the recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis, and interested  congressional committees as appropriate. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributions to this report are listed in  appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Members of the Intelligence Community
paragraphs: The Intelligence Community consists of 17 U.S. intelligence agencies  whose mission is to collect and convey essential information that the  President and members of the policymaking, law enforcement, and  military communities require to execute their appointed duties. See 50  U.S.C. § 3003(4).The agencies include the following:  Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Intelligence and  Analysis (I&A)
section_title: Appendix II: Description of Key Finished Intelligence Products from the Six DHS Intelligence Entities in Our Review
paragraphs: Appendix II: Description of Key Finished  Intelligence Products from the Six DHS  Intelligence Entities in Our Review Finished Intelligence  Product  Homeland Intelligence Today  DHS’s daily product that provides the Secretary, DHS operational  component leadership, and other federal partners with timely homeland- relevant analysis and reporting.
Provides strategic analysis on a variety of topics that impact homeland  security; can range from covering a single issue to an in-depth multi- themed analysis.
Produced jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and focused on  emergent or recent terrorism-related threats or events that are pertinent to  the Homeland.
Produced for frontline law enforcement officers to highlight emergent  terrorist or criminal techniques or tactics they may encounter in the field.
A sister product to Roll Call Release that is geared toward fire, rescue, and  emergency management personnel to aid in planning, response, and  mitigation.
Provides an informational overview on an issue, development, key figure,  or lasting trend.
Provides a comprehensive analysis of threats and hazards that impact  CBP operations.
Provides analysis, trends, and patterns that directly relate to CBP efforts.
Provides research, primarily associated with travel and imports, to other  law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence Community.
Provides DHS and other members of the Intelligence Community with CBP  analysis of terrorism and other criminal activities that affect border security.
Homeland Security  Assessment (HSA)
Provides a comprehensive analysis of a complex intelligence topic or target  related to specific events or trends. HSA’s typically include a threat  analysis; a discussion or potential threat actors and tactics, techniques,  and procedures; and an outlook or review of potential mitigation strategies,  counter-measures, or vulnerabilities.
Provides in-depth analysis of a single intelligence development, discovery,  finding, or issue.
Covers new intelligence and summarize developments on an issue or topic  area of interest to ICE customers.
Provides information and analysis on a single threat or situation involving  transportation security.
Provides analyses of threats to transportation’s critical modal sectors, such  as aviation and mass transit.
Posters focus on a single topic of concern, such as concealment  techniques.
Analyzes how violent extremists, typically overseas, attack transportation  modes in order to discern impacts on the homeland transportation  environment.
subsections: section_title: Finished Intelligence Product
paragraphs: Product Description  Provides information on individual subjects such as their immigration  history, current immigration status/expiration, previous and pending  immigration benefits, and a list of immigration systems checked.
Contains the information in an individual’s Immigration Systems History, as  well as additional information on the evolution of the subject’s immigration  history.
Provides in-depth analysis and judgments of an event or development  previously addressed in a previous product.
Provides immediate maritime intelligence and law enforcement situational  awareness.
An Analytic product providing judgments and prognosis regarding a specific  intelligence issue.
Provides an overview and summary judgments on an intelligence issue  based on all-source intelligence information.
section_title: Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report addresses the following questions:
To what extent are the intelligence analysis activities of the enterprise  integrated to support departmental strategic intelligence priorities, and  to what extent are enterprise analysis activities unnecessarily  overlapping or duplicative?
To what extent do I&A’s customers report that they find I&A products  and other analytic services to be useful?
What challenges does I&A face in maintaining a skilled analytic  workforce and what steps has it taken to address these challenges?
To address the first objective, we analyzed documents produced by DHS  and I&A related to setting intelligence priorities to determine how priorities  are established and how the priorities are to be followed by the  enterprise. Specifically, we reviewed the Department of Homeland  Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2012-2016, the 2006 and 2008  versions of DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan; Office of  Intelligence and Analysis Strategic Plan Fiscal Year 2011–Fiscal Year  2018; Delegation to the Under Secretary for Intelligence and  Analysis/Chief Intelligence Officer, August 10, 2012; DHS Management  Directive 8110, Intelligence Integration and Management, January 30,  2006; Department of Homeland Security Directive 264-01, Intelligence  Integration and Management, June 12, 2013; DHS Instruction Number:  264-01-001 DHS Intelligence Enterprise June 28, 2013; the 2005 and  2009 versions of the Homeland Security Intelligence Council Charter; I&A  memos including the fiscal year 2013 and the fiscal year 2014 DHS  Enterprise Programmatic Guidance; DHS Intelligence Enterprise  Programs of Analysis (POA) for fiscal years 2011 through 2014; and the  Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities Framework for fiscal years 2012  and 2013 to determine the roles and responsibilities of DHS in managing  its enterprise and the analytic efforts of the enterprise, and how DHS was  carrying out these responsibilities.
Additionally, we analyzed documents from DHS components for which  intelligence analysis is a core function in supporting their unique missions  and operations—the U.S. Coast Guard, Transportation Security  Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services (USCIS)—to help determine the roles and  responsibilities of component agency intelligence programs and how they  respond to the coordination and prioritization efforts of I&A. These  included U.S. Department of Homeland Security Annual Performance  Report, Fiscal Years 2011–2013, Appendix A: Measure Descriptions and  Data Collection Methodologies; National Infrastructure Advisory Council,  Intelligence Information Sharing, Final Report and Recommendations,  January 10, 2012; Transportation Security Administration Office of  Intelligence and Analysis Mission and Functional Statement; ICE  Strategic Plan, FY 2010-2014; U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations, Office of Intelligence,  Analysis Division, Fact Sheet; Secure Borders, Safe Travel, Legal Trade,  U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic  Plan; United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Intelligence and  Information Products Fact Sheet; and U.S. Coast Guard Publication 2-0,  Intelligence, May 2010; among others.
We compared these efforts against requirements listed in the Homeland  Security Act of 2002, as amended, that call on the DHS Chief Intelligence  Officer (CINT) to establish the intelligence analysis priorities for the  intelligence components of the department, consistent with any directions  from the President and, as applicable, the Director of National  Intelligence. According to DHS guidance, the appropriate vehicle for  establishing enterprise-wide intelligence priorities is the Homeland  Security Intelligence Priorities Framework.
We met with the I&A Research Director and members of his staff, and the  Director of the Information Sharing and Enterprise Management Division  and his staff who are responsible for developing and implementing the  management coordination mechanisms for the enterprise. We also met  with representatives from the intelligence programs of USCIS, the U.S.  Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and TSA to discuss the coordination  mechanisms established by DHS.
Additionally, to address in the first objective whether overlap or  duplication exists in the analytic activities of the DHS Intelligence  Enterprise, we analyzed all 21 products written by I&A, CBP, and ICE  where these three organizations shared responsibility to answer  questions in the 2012 POA in support of DHS’s border security mission.  We selected the 2012 POA because it was the most recent available  when we began this analysis. We selected this mission area for our  analysis because this departmental mission contained contributions from  the largest number of DHS intelligence components, and chose I&A,  CBP, and ICE products to review because these three entities had the  greatest number of key intelligence questions assigned to them within the  border security mission area. By reviewing only one mission area, we  cannot determine if there was duplication in other areas, but our findings  support statements from intelligence officials in both I&A and the  operational components that the content of their products differs because  of their unique missions and primary customer sets and, therefore the  products are not duplicative, even when they cover the same broad  topical area.
Within the DHS mission area of securing the border, we requested an  inventory of finished intelligence products for fiscal year 2012 from I&A,  CBP, and ICE—the three entities with the greatest number of key  intelligence questions assigned to them in this topic area. Products  written in 2012 were chosen because this was the most recent complete  available to us at the time of this analysis. According to an analysis of  these product inventories, we identified six key intelligence questions in  which I&A and either ICE or CBP both generated finished intelligence  products. In support of these six key intelligence questions, I&A, ICE, and  CBP generated a total of 21 finished intelligence products—15 authored  by I&A, 4 by ICE, and 2 by CBP. We analyzed these 21 products to  determine the extent to which duplication existed by comparing the topics,  sources, and customers of these products.
To address the second objective, we met with I&A staff from the  Production Management Division to determine how I&A develops,  administers, and analyzes feedback surveys included with all I&A finished  intelligence products, as well as to discuss the efforts I&A had in place  through February 2014 to improve customer satisfaction. We then  analyzed the results of the feedback surveys that were included with all  fiscal year 2012 I&A finished analytic products to determine what readers  of these products thought about the quality and usefulness of them. We  also met with representatives from four of the five I&A customer groups:  DHS components; the Intelligence Community; state, local, tribal, and  territorial governments; and the private sector. While we did not meet with  representatives from DHS leadership, we did meet with representatives of  the I&A unit that briefs leadership. Specifically, we met with  representatives from the intelligence programs of the DHS components  for which intelligence analysis is a core function in supporting their  missions and operations—USCIS, the U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and  TSA—to discuss the extent to which these organizations find I&A analysis  relevant and useful. We met with staff from the Office of the Director of  National Intelligence—the office that administers the overall efforts of the  Intelligence Community—to discuss their review of the quality of I&A  analytic products, as well as the usefulness of these products to the  Intelligence Community. We met with DHS and state and local  government agency staff members working at 7 of 78 state and major  urban area fusion centers—centers that serve as primary focal points  within the state and local environments for the receipt, analysis,  gathering, and sharing of threat-related information among federal, state,  local, tribal, and territorial homeland security partners. The fusion centers  we met with were (1) the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center,  (2) El Paso (Texas) Fusion Center (no DHS staff were located in the El  Paso Fusion Center at the time of our discussion), (3) Montana All Threat  Intelligence Center, (4) New York State Intelligence Center, (5) San Diego  (California) Law Enforcement Coordination Center, (6) Texas Fusion  Center in Austin, and (7) the Washington State Fusion Center. These  fusion centers comprised 4 of the 6 centers we considered southwest  border fusion centers and 3 of the 11 northern border fusion centers. We  selected each center to provide access to a range of state-level users of  I&A analytic products with an emphasis on border issues because of our  examination of potential overlap or duplication related to DHS  components’ intelligence analysis reporting on border issues. While  information we obtained at these locations cannot be generalized across  all fusion centers because we selected these locations based on the  diversity of participation in the POA and geographic locations along the  southwest and northern border, the units we visited provided us with an  overview of users’ perspectives on the usefulness and relevance of I&A  analytic products. We also met with representatives of the Partnership for  Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS), the National Council of Information  Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC), and individual representatives  from the Transportation and Commercial Facilities critical infrastructure  sectors to determine how the private sector views the analytic services  provided by I&A. We compared I&A’s efforts against criteria in the  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government that note the  importance for management to communicate to, and obtain information  from, both internal and external stakeholders that may have a significant  impact on the organization’s ability to achieve its goals and utilize  resources effectively and efficiently.
For objective two, we also reviewed the standards by which I&A’s  products are judged. To do so we reviewed I&A Policy Directive 900.2- Producing Finished Intelligence (July 15, 2011), I&A Policy Directive  900.4-I&A Joint Production with State and Major Urban Area Fusion  Centers (August 31, 2011), I&A Policy Instruction IA-901 DHS Intelligence  and Analysis Review and Clearance of Analytic Products Disseminated  Outside the Federal Government, I&A memos including Fiscal Year 2013  and Fiscal Year 2014 DHS Intelligence Enterprise Programmatic  Guidance; and ODNI Intelligence Community Directive 203, Analytic  Standards (June 21, 2007). To obtain a general view of the quality of  these products, we reviewed the 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 DHS  Report to Congress on Voluntary Feedback from State, Local, Tribal, and  Private Sector Consumers; I&A’s fiscal year 2011 Customer Feedback  Report and the September 2012 Production Performance Report that  includes monthly production and feedback information.
For the third objective, we reviewed the U.S. Office of Personnel  Management Position Classification Standard Flysheet for Intelligence  Series GS-0132 June 1960, the classification standard in effect as of  December 2013, and the I&A Human Capital Standard Operating  Procedures to obtain basic information about personnel standards and  operations at I&A. To determine the challenges I&A experienced  maintaining a skilled workforce, we reviewed correspondence between  I&A and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence related to  obtaining excepted service hiring (November 2012-June 2013) and I&A- reported data on personnel attrition. To obtain information on intelligence  analyst hiring needs and practices, we reviewed the I&A memo on career  ladder decision and hiring standards (November 2012), the DHS  Competency Assessment Pilot frequently asked questions and  presentation, and the I&A Recruitment Strategy (January 2010). To  determine I&A training and development practices and needs we  reviewed the Fiscal Year 2013 Intelligence Training Academy Catalog,  DHS Intelligence Learning Roadmap for Analysts (September 2012), and  the Analysis 101/BITAC Study Report comparing two alternative  introductory courses for intelligence analysts prepared for I&A by Booz  Allen and SAIC (November 2008). We also reviewed the DHS Human  Resources, Performance Management Program (December 2008), and  I&A performance competencies to determine I&A’s performance  management practices. We then compared I&A’s work force planning  activities with those enumerated in DHS’s Workforce Planning Guide  (November 2012), the DHS document that outlines the process for  workforce planning at DHS. We also met with representatives from I&A’s  human capital office, training branch, mission support office, and the  acting Chief of Staff to discuss human capital recruitment, hiring, training,  and evaluation practices and procedures.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to May 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix IV: Analysis of Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication in DHS Components’ Intelligence Analysis
paragraphs: Appendix IV provides additional information about our analysis of  fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in DHS components’ intelligence  analysis activities. The intelligence analysis activities within DHS are  inherently fragmented, as multiple DHS components conduct intelligence  analysis in support of the same broad intelligence topics. However, on the  basis of our case study in the area of border security, we did not find  evidence of unnecessary overlap or duplication among the activities. DHS  intelligence entities said that implementing the mechanisms to date has  helped them to minimize such overlap and duplication.
subsections: section_title: Analysis Activities are Inherently Fragmented
paragraphs: The intelligence analysis activities of the enterprise are inherently  fragmented, as multiple DHS components conduct intelligence analysis in  support of shared departmental goals. As articulated in the fiscal year  2012 DHS Intelligence Enterprise Program of Analysis, three to five DHS  intelligence components planned to provide intelligence analysis products  in support of each departmental goal in fiscal year 2012. For example, as  shown in table 1, five components planned to support the departmental  goal of Securing and Managing Our Borders through their fiscal year  2012 intelligence analysis activities.
Although this creates fragmentation, each entity is providing distinct  perspectives because of its unique missions and primary customer sets.  As shown in table 2, I&A focuses on threats to the homeland in general,  whereas the operational components—such as CBP, ICE, and TSA— each focus more narrowly on supporting their unique operational missions  through intelligence analysis. Further, DHS intelligence officials report  that the primary customers of I&A are DHS leadership and state and local  partners, whereas the primary customers of the operational components  are generally internal component customers.
Despite distinct missions and primary customer sets, some overlap does  exist in the secondary customers that the six DHS intelligence entities  serve. For example, as shown in table 2, all six entities reported serving  the Intelligence Community, and three entities reported serving state and  local partners as part of their secondary customer sets. In some cases, it  may be appropriate for multiple entities to be involved in the same  programmatic or policy area because of the nature or magnitude of the  federal efforts. For example, having multiple DHS entities contributing  intelligence analysis to shared departmental goals and serving  overlapping customers can be beneficial, as it provides a mechanism to  share and validate information and to facilitate complementary analysis.  However, fragmentation and overlap may create inefficiencies if  customers are burdened with too much information or if entities are  inefficiently using resources to develop duplicate products.
section_title: Our Analysis Showed No Unnecessary Overlap or Duplication among Select Products, and Customers We Interviewed Agreed
paragraphs: We did not find evidence to suggest that DHS customers were being  burdened with too much information or that DHS resources were being  used to develop products that unnecessarily overlapped or were  duplicative. Specifically, senior intelligence officials from all seven fusion  centers we contacted said that they had not experienced any instances of  unnecessary overlap or duplication in the border security–related  intelligence products they received from various DHS components.  Further, we did not find any duplicative products among those we  reviewed in the area of border security that were generated by different  components. We did identify one instance of overlap where two DHS  components provided similar information to similar customers in different  products, but the information was packaged differently such that the  products were not duplicative. Specifically, we identified one instance  where I&A and ICE each wrote an intelligence product on a similar  topic—human smuggling—and for similar customers—DHS leadership  and the Intelligence Community. Both products discussed the relationship  between permissive visa policies and the potential for exploitation by  human-smuggling networks. Further, both products specifically identified  one particular country as susceptible to exploitation from human  smugglers due at least in part because of its permissive visa policies.
However, we determined that the overlapping information was presented  in a different context in each product. Specifically, the I&A product  provided a summary graphic depicting the visa permissiveness level of  each country within a particular region of the world. This provided its  customers with a snapshot of countries with permissive visa policies and  a warning that these countries may be more susceptible to exploitation  from human smugglers than others. This graphic was presented as part  of I&A’s Border Security Monitor—a quarterly compilation of relevant  border security intelligence analysis from throughout the enterprise.  Alternatively, the ICE product was a broader assessment of the factors  that make certain locations vulnerable to exploitation from human  smuggling networks. Accordingly, the ICE product provided an analysis of  the reasons that the specifically identified country may be vulnerable to  human smuggling, identifying its visa permissiveness policy as just one  contributing factor.
While our results cannot be generalized beyond the border security  mission area, our findings support statements from intelligence officials in  both I&A and the operational components that the content of their  products differs because of their unique missions and primary customer  sets and, therefore, are not duplicative, even when the products cover the  same broad topical area.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Eric Erdman (Assistant Director),  Jonathan Bachman, Katherine Davis, Michele Fejfar, Michael Harmond,  Eric Hauswirth, Katherine Lee, Thomas Lombardi, Bintou Njie, and  Anthony Pordes made significant contributions to this report.