National Nuclear Security Administration: Agency Report to Congress on Potential Efficiencies Does Not Include Key Information
Published: 2014-05-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Nuclear weapons are an essential part of the nation's defense strategy, and NNSA is charged with performing key activities in support of this strategy. Like other agencies, however, NNSA is being asked to find ways to operate more efficiently and reduce costs.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated that NNSA submit a report to congressional defense committees that, among other things, includes an assessment of the role of the nuclear security complex sites, as well as opportunities for efficiencies at these sites and how these efficiencies may contribute to cost savings and help strengthen safety and security. The act required that NNSA's report include certain topics and mandated that GAO assess the report submitted by NNSA. This report evaluates the extent to which the NNSA report (1) assessed the role of nuclear security complex sites in supporting key NNSA activities and (2) identified opportunities for efficiencies and cost savings within the nuclear security complex. GAO analyzed NNSA's statutory reporting requirements, the agency's report to congressional committees and supporting documentation, and interviewed NNSA officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) report to congressional defense committees describes, but does not assess, the role of the nuclear security complex sites. The act required that NNSA's report include an assessment of the role of the nuclear security complex sites in supporting a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; reductions in the nuclear stockpile; and the nuclear nonproliferation efforts of the nation—which GAO refers to in this report as key NNSA activities. NNSA's report does not include such an assessment. Instead, the report describes activities such as certifying annually that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. NNSA officials told GAO that a prior 2008 report that assessed the role of the nuclear security complex is still valid and said that they did not think the act required them to update it. GAO notes, however, that NNSA's report to Congress does not cite the 2008 report as support for its assessment and provides no other information that would constitute an assessment. NNSA officials said that a new analysis of the role of the nuclear security complex sites may be warranted in the future if circumstances change. Officials acknowledged that characteristics of some major projects—such as the Chemistry and Metallurgical Research Replacement Nuclear Facility in New Mexico—have changed recently due to technical and fiscal challenges, but that such changes do not alter the fundamental role each site plays.
NNSA's report to congressional defense committees identified seven opportunities for efficiency, but it did not, as required by the act, provide an assessment of how these efficiencies could contribute to cost savings or strengthening safety and security. For example, NNSA's report cites the establishment of two new offices—the Office of Acquisition and Project Management in 2011 and the Office of Infrastructure and Operations in 2013—as efficiency opportunities but does not provide an assessment of how these offices have contributed or will contribute to cost savings or improved safety and security. In addition, some efficiency opportunities noted in NNSA's report—such as the capabilities provided by the new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex—involve projects or strategies that GAO has previously reported face challenges, which, if not addressed, may impact NNSA's ability both to achieve cost savings and strengthen safety and security. Key principles for preparing savings estimates include a methodology that identifies the basis of any assumptions included in the savings estimates and a process for tracking actual savings. Such a methodology could help ensure that savings from proposed efficiencies can be achieved. Because NNSA did not assess how these efficiencies would lead to savings, however, it is not clear whether any cost savings will result.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that, when reporting on efficiencies and cost savings in the future, NNSA establish a methodology for estimating the savings derived from potential efficiencies and track savings resulting from efforts. NNSA disagreed, stating that the act did not require, as GAO recommends, that efficiencies be linked to cost savings. GAO believes its recommendation remains valid.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Nuclear weapons are an essential part of the nation’s defense strategy.  During the cold war the nation designed, tested, and produced new  nuclear weapons. Since the end of the cold war, however, some of the  infrastructure supporting the nuclear security enterprise has aged and  deteriorated, and the approach has shifted toward reducing the nuclear  weapons stockpile, and maintaining certain weapons indefinitely by  extending their operational lives, without nuclear testing. This approach  requires not only refurbishing existing weapons, but also replacing or  renovating research, development, and production facilities that date back  to the 1940s and 1950s; performing simulations and laboratory  experiments to ensure existing nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable;  and recruiting and training personnel with the specialized skills to sustain  the nuclear weapons program and maintain the stockpile into the future.  The Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security  Administration (NNSA) is charged with ensuring a safe, secure, and  reliable nuclear deterrent; achieving designated reductions in the nuclear  weapons stockpile; and supporting the nation’s nuclear nonproliferation  efforts. NNSA is responsible for activities in pursuit of these missions,  which are largely executed at eight government-owned, contractor- operated sites that comprise the nuclear security enterprise.
As the United States reduces its nuclear weapons stockpile, the  administration has pledged additional funds to modernize and operate the  nuclear security enterprise, including refurbishment of weapons currently  in the stockpile and construction of replacement research and production  facilities to support these refurbishments. This increased investment in  the nuclear security enterprise is intended to ensure that scientific,  technical, and engineering capabilities are sufficiently supported such that  a smaller nuclear deterrent continues to be safe, secure, and reliable. But  NNSA, like all other federal agencies, is being asked to find ways to  operate more efficiently and reduce its costs. In November 2011, the  President issued Executive Order no. 13589, which stressed agencies  should act in a fiscally responsible manner, including minimizing agency  costs, in order to perform mission-critical functions in the most cost- effective way. Also, as we reported in December 2013, NNSA’s 2014  future budget estimates incorporated about $24 billion in cost savings to  be achieved through management efficiencies and workforce prioritization  savings through 2038, including $320 million in 2014. NNSA officials said  the Office of Management and Budget directed NNSA to include cost  savings in its future budget estimates so that the overall estimate could  be reduced. Our December 2013 report also noted that NNSA  incorporated these cost savings into its budget estimates before  assessing how it could achieve the savings, which may affect whether the  estimates accurately reflect the amounts NNSA may request in the future.  Our report recommended that NNSA include a range of budget estimates  for preliminary projects and programs in future modernization plans.  NNSA generally concurred with our recommendation.
See, for example, GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Factors Leading to Cost Increases with the  Uranium Processing Facility, GAO-13-686R, (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2013) and  Department of Energy: Observations on Project and Program Cost Estimating in NNSA  and the Office of Environmental Management, GAO-14-510T (Washington, D.C.: May 8,  2013). money-saving alternatives from consideration.recommended, among other things, that NNSA ensure that future cost  analyses consider the full useful life of the facility, revise the Kansas City  Plant relocation schedule to be consistent with DOE guidance and GAO- identified best practices, and develop a risk-based approach for  managing technologies that could advance adversaries’ nuclear  capabilities. NNSA generally agreed with our recommendations but has  not implemented the recommendations.
In our report, we  The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, which was  enacted in December 2011, required NNSA to submit a report to  congressional defense committees not later than March 1, 2013, that (1)  assesses the role of nuclear security complex sites in supporting a safe,  secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; reductions in the nuclear stockpile;  and the nuclear nonproliferation efforts of the nation—which we refer to in  this report as key NNSA activities—and (2) identifies opportunities for  efficiencies and cost savings within the nuclear security complex. The act  requires the NNSA report to include certain topics, including an  assessment of how efficiency opportunities could contribute to cost  savings and strengthen safety and security. The act also mandates GAO  to submit a report to the congressional defense committees that assesses  the report submitted by NNSA. On November 7, 2013, more than 8  months after the deadline, NNSA submitted its report to Congress entitled  U.S. Department of Energy: Role of the Nuclear Security Enterprise and  Potential Efficiencies. evaluates the extent to which the NNSA report (1) assessed the role of  nuclear security complex sites in supporting key NNSA activities and (2)  identified opportunities for efficiencies and cost savings within the nuclear  security complex.
The report to Congress was dated October 2013, but it was not delivered to  congressional committees until November 2013. information provided in NNSA’s November 2013 report to Congress and  supporting documentation, such as DOE’s Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile  Stewardship and Management Plan Report to Congress and NNSA’s  2008 Record of Decision for the Complex Transformation Supplemental  Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, and the fiscal year 2014  NNSA Congressional Budget Request.
In addition to our analysis of the statutory reporting requirements  discussed above, to determine the extent that NNSA’s report identified  opportunities for efficiencies and cost savings within the nuclear security  complex, including an assessment of how efficiency opportunities could  contribute to cost savings and strengthen safety and security, we also  reviewed other key documents. Specifically, we reviewed savings targets  for workforce prioritization and management efficiency actions that were  included in DOE’s 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan,  the fiscal year 2014 NNSA Congressional Budget Request, and an  agency report responding to the joint Department of Defense Office of  Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation recommendations that NNSA  implement workforce prioritization actions to achieve cost efficiencies in  nuclear stockpile management. To further our understanding of the issues addressed in these reports, we also reviewed prior GAO and DOE  Office of the Inspector General reports and nonfederal studies addressing  duplication, potential cost savings, and cost efficiencies in the nuclear  security enterprise, and interviewed knowledgeable officials at NNSA  Office of Defense Programs and others involved in drafting the November  2013 report to Congress. In addition, we derived general principles for  evaluating cost savings estimates by reviewing key federal guidance,  standards, and practices for cost estimating, budget preparation, financial  planning, and public reporting.criteria for evaluating NNSA’s approach to achieving cost savings by  implementing management and other efficiencies.
We then used these derived principles as  We conducted this performance audit from October 2013 to May 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: As the largest civilian contracting agency in the federal government, DOE  relies primarily on contractors to carry out its diverse missions and  operate its laboratories and other facilities. About 90 percent of DOE’s  budget is spent on contracts and large capital asset projects. DOE’s fiscal  year 2015 discretionary budget request totaled almost $28 billion, with  NNSA accounting for a substantial share—more than 40 percent. With  three projects under way as of August 2012 that are expected to cost  upwards of $17 billion, and with a history of significant cost growth and  schedule delays, we designated NNSA’s contract and project  management for contracts and projects with values of at least $750  million as high risk due to vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and  mismanagement.
NNSA, a separately organized agency within DOE, is responsible for the  management and security of the nation’s nuclear weapons programs.  NNSA articulates its strategy for managing the nuclear weapons  infrastructure in its annually updated Stockpile Stewardship and  Management Plan. The plan includes information on NNSA’s eight  government-owned, contractor-operated sites that comprise its nuclear  security enterprise—formerly known as the nuclear security complex.  These include three national nuclear weapons design laboratories— Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, Los Alamos  National Laboratory in New Mexico, and Sandia National Laboratories in  New Mexico and California; four nuclear weapons production plants—the  Pantex Plant in Texas, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee,  the Kansas City Plant in Missouri, and tritium operations at DOE’s  Savannah River Site in South Carolina; and the Nevada National Security  Site, formerly known as the Nevada Test Site. These sites carry out,  among other things, the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which helps  ensure a U.S. nuclear deterrent without full-scale nuclear testing.  Activities under this program include dismantlement and disposition of  nuclear weapons, as well as long-range planning to modernize NNSA’s  nuclear security enterprise.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 required  NNSA to submit a report to congressional defense committees (1)  assessing the role of the nuclear security complex in supporting key  activities and (2) identifying any opportunities for efficiencies and cost  savings in the complex. More specifically, section 3123 of the act required  the report to include the following: an assessment of the role of the nuclear security complex sites in  supporting a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; reductions in  the nuclear stockpile; and the nuclear nonproliferation efforts of the  nation; an identification of opportunities for efficiencies within the nuclear  security complex and an assessment of how those efficiencies could  contribute to cost savings and strengthening safety and security; an assessment of duplicative functions within the nuclear security  complex and a description of which duplicative functions remain  necessary and why; an analysis of the potential for shared use or development of high  explosives research and development capacity, supercomputing  platforms, and infrastructure maintained for the Work for Others  program, if the Administrator determines it appropriate; and a description of the long-term strategic plan for the nuclear security  complex.
section_title: Report Describes Activities of the Nuclear Security Enterprise but Does Not Assess the Sites’ Role
paragraphs: The act required that NNSA’s report to congressional defense committees  include an assessment of the role of the nuclear security complex sites in  supporting a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; reductions in the  nuclear stockpile; and the nuclear nonproliferation efforts of the nation.  NNSA’s report, however, does not include such an assessment. Instead,  the NNSA report describes activities of the nuclear security enterprise  such as (1) certifying annually that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe,  secure, and reliable; (2) extending the life of existing weapons; (3)  dismantling some nuclear weapons to reduce their quantity; and (4)  developing and deploying technologies, approaches, and monitoring tools  to ensure compliance with international agreements. In addition, NNSA’s  report states that the 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan,  issued in June 2013, provides supplemental information on the role of the  nuclear security enterprise. NNSA officials told us that that they did not  think the act required them to submit an updated assessment of the  nuclear security enterprise and stated that carrying out such an  assessment would have taken more time to complete than the 14 months  provided under the act.  NNSA officials also said that a 2008 report that  assessed the role of the nuclear security enterprise sites is still valid.
NNSA officials said that a new analysis of the role of the nuclear security  enterprise sites may be warranted in the future if circumstances change  sufficiently. Officials acknowledged that, since 2008, characteristics of  some large capital asset projects have changed in the face of increasing  costs, fiscal constraints, and technical difficulties, including plans to  construct a Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear  Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and plans to construct a Pit  Disassembly and Conversion Facility at Savannah River.  Notwithstanding such changes across the nuclear security enterprise,  NNSA officials said that the fundamental role that each site plays in  supporting the nuclear security enterprise is consistent with the  assessment included in the 2008 report. We did not evaluate NNSA’s  2008 report, but given the report is more than 5 years old, it raises  questions about the assessment still being relevant. Moreover, we note  that NNSA’s report to Congress did not cite the 2008 report as support  and, as discussed previously, NNSA did not provide an assessment of  the role of the nuclear security complex sites in supporting key NNSA  activities, as required by the act.
In March 2014, NNSA decided to evaluate  alternative plutonium disposition technologies that it believes can achieve a safe and  secure solution more quickly and cost effectively. Office of Management and Budget,  Fiscal Year 2015 Budget of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 4, 2014).
Plan, issued in June 2013, constitutes its 25-year strategic plan for the  nuclear security enterprise.
section_title: Report Identifies Opportunities for Efficiencies but Does Not Include Other Required Information
paragraphs: NNSA’s report to Congress identifies opportunities for efficiencies and  assesses duplicative functions. It does not, however, (1) assess how  identified efficiencies could contribute to cost savings and strengthen  safety and security, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2012, (2) or analyze the potential for shared use of  facilities, which was a task the act stated should be included if the  Administrator determines it to be appropriate.
subsections: section_title: NNSA’s Report Identifies Efficiency Opportunities and Assesses Duplicative Functions
paragraphs: NNSA’s report identifies seven efficiency opportunities. The opportunities  included in the report are a summary of efficiency opportunities included  in the 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, issued in June  2013, as well as some infrastructure and research and development  initiatives. Specifically, NNSA’s report discusses efficiency opportunities  that may result from (1) establishing the Office of Acquisition and Project  Management in 2011; (2) establishing the Office of Infrastructure and  Operations in fiscal year 2013; (3) consolidating the management and  operating contracts for Y-12 National Security Complex and the Pantex  Plant; (4) efficiencies in the nuclear weapons research and development  portfolio, such as refurbishing facilities to reduce downtime between  experiments; (5) improving the planning process for High Energy Density  activities; (6) reducing the size of the Kansas City Plant; and (7) achieving  projected benefits from the new Uranium Processing Facility.
NNSA’s report also includes an assessment of duplicative functions— which determined that most duplication has been eliminated over the past  25 years, and the duplicative activities that remain are essential to  operations. For example, the report states that the nuclear security  enterprise does maintain duplicative weapons design, certification, and  surveillance functions but that it is an intended redundancy. Los Alamos  National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory both  act as design agents for scientific matters pertaining to the weapon  physics package. But, according to the report, the intellectual diversity  that results from competing physics design laboratories is important to  fulfill the requirement of stockpile stewardship.
section_title: NNSA’s Report Does Not Assess How Identified Efficiencies Could Contribute to Cost Savings or Strengthen Safety and Security, as Required
paragraphs: As discussed above, NNSA’s report identifies seven efficiency  opportunities. The act, however, required NNSA to submit a report to  congressional defense committees that included not only an identification  of efficiency opportunities, but also an assessment of how those  efficiencies could contribute to cost savings and strengthen safety and  security.
NNSA’s report does not provide an assessment of how the efficiencies  identified could contribute to cost savings and strengthen safety and  security, as required by the act. For example, NNSA’s report cites the  establishment of two new offices—the Office of Acquisition and Project  Management in 2011 and the Office of Infrastructure and Operations in  2013—as efficiency opportunities, but it does not provide an assessment  of how these offices have contributed or will contribute to cost savings.  Similarly, the report cites efficiencies achieved in recent years related to  experiments and simulations conducted in support of nuclear weapons  research and development, but it does not include information about how  these efficiencies might lead to cost savings. These and other efficiencies  described in NNSA’s report also do not include an assessment of how the  efficiencies will strengthen safety and security.
In addition, three of the efficiency initiatives included in NNSA’s report  involve projects or strategies that, in prior reviews, we have found face  challenges, which, if not addressed, may impact NNSA’s ability both to  achieve cost savings and strengthen safety and security.
Consolidating the Y-12 and Pantex management and operations  contracts to integrate finance systems and streamline management  support services. We previously concluded that it is unclear how cost  savings from this consolidation could be achieved and whether it  would produce as much in savings as NNSA has anticipated.  NNSA’s report does not address these previously raised concerns.
Constructing a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National  Security Complex: NNSA stated that the new facility would include  engineered controls that will provide improved safety, security, and  reliability of enriched uranium operations, among other things. But,  NNSA’s report contains no other information regarding how the new  facility will improve safety and security and, as NNSA itself has  acknowledged, challenges inherent in this project are being  addressed, and the features of the facility have undergone significant  changes. We have previously reported, in 2012, project costs had  increased almost 6 times NNSA’s initial estimates. Accordingly, as a  result of the increased cost estimate for this project, how or whether it  can lead to cost savings remains unclear.
Moving Kansas City operations to a smaller, nearby leased facility.
This move began in 2013 and is scheduled for completion in August  2014. In October 2009, however, we found the potential cost  efficiencies gained from this leasing arrangement may have been  overstated because the methodology used to estimate savings  eliminated potentially less costly alternatives. NNSA’s report does  not address these previously raised concerns or address how  efficiencies gained from this move will lead to improved safety and  security.
GAO, VA Health Care: Methodology for Estimating and Process for Tracking Savings  Need Improvement, GAO-12-305 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2012); Defense  Management: Opportunities Exist to Improve Information Used in Monitoring Status of  Efficiency Initiatives, GAO-13-105R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 4, 2012); and Veterans  Affairs: Limited Support for Reported Health Care Management Savings, GAO-06-359R  (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2006). estimates, and a detailed process for tracking actual savings resulting  from improvements. Consistent with our prior recommendations, we  derived several key principles for preparing cost savings estimates from  federal budgeting and cost estimating guidance. These principles include  preparing an appropriate level of detailed documentation so that a  reasonably informed person can easily recreate, update, or understand  the cost savings estimate; identifying key assumptions used in preparing  the estimate; assessing the reliability of data used to develop the  estimate; and verifying or validating the accuracy of the calculations  performed.
NNSA’s recent experience with previously identified cost savings targets  underscores the importance of assessing whether cost savings can in fact  be achieved. As discussed previously, the Office of Management and  Budget directed NNSA to include cost savings to be achieved through  management efficiencies and workforce prioritization savings in its 2014  future budget estimates so that the overall estimate could be reduced.  NNSA incorporated these cost savings into its budget estimates before  assessing how it could achieve the savings, thereby limiting the credibility  of savings for budgetary purposes. In November 2013, NNSA determined  that savings anticipated from workforce prioritization would not be  feasible. NNSA officials told us, in March 2014, that they are assessing  whether and how it might still achieve the management efficiency savings  incorporated in its budget estimates, but that they have not yet  determined when the assessment will be completed.
section_title: NNSA’s Report Does Not Analyze Potential Shared Use of Facilities
paragraphs: NNSA’s report does not provide an analysis of the potential for shared  use of facilities. The National Defense Authorization Act for 2012 required  NNSA, if the Administrator determined it appropriate, to provide an  analysis of the potential for shared use or development of high explosives  research and development capacity, supercomputing platforms, and  infrastructure maintained for the Work for Others program. NNSA’s report  does not discuss the Administrator’s determination regarding whether  such an analysis is appropriate. Nonetheless, NNSA includes in its report  a section entitled potential for shared use of selected facilities. The  information contained in the report, however, focuses on existing, not  potential, shared use opportunities. Specifically, NNSA’s report includes  two examples of sites that operate Work for Others programs and three  examples where they use facilities not owned by the nuclear security  enterprise to execute its missions. The report states that NNSA leverages  the costs saving and benefits of time-sharing and collaboration at these  facilities, but it provides no additional information on the potential for new  opportunities to supplement those efforts the agency has already put into  practice.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Like other federal agencies, NNSA is being asked to find ways to operate  more efficiently and reduce costs. Modernizing the nuclear security  enterprise to ensure a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent will  involve billions of dollars and take many years to accomplish. NNSA has  identified several opportunities to achieve efficiencies across the nuclear  security enterprise, but it is not clear whether cost savings will result  because NNSA did not assess how these opportunities would create  savings, how much could be saved, and in what time frame. Some of the  opportunities NNSA proposes are associated with projects or activities for  which NNSA has had difficulties accurately estimating costs and  schedules or which are currently in flux. Without a sound methodology for  assessing efficiency opportunities—a methodology that includes the basis  of any assumptions included in the savings estimates, an assessment of  the reliability of data used to develop the estimate, and verification or  validation of the accuracy of savings calculations performed, as well as a  process for tracking actual savings—NNSA cannot provide reasonable  assurance that the efficiency opportunities it has identified will result in  savings. Without such information, Congress does not have critical  information to make the budgetary and policy choices that best balance  long-term spending and nuclear security goals.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure Congress receives reliable information regarding budgetary  savings, we recommend that the Administrator of NNSA, when reporting  on efficiency and savings opportunities in the future, develop a  methodology that includes details on how savings from each operational  improvement will be achieved; the basis of any assumptions included in  the savings estimates; an assessment of the reliability of data used to  develop the estimate; verification or validation of the accuracy of savings  calculations performed; and a process for tracking actual savings  resulting from operational improvements.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to NNSA for its review and comment.  NNSA provided written comments, which are presented in appendix I.  NNSA also provided technical comments on our draft report, which we  incorporated as appropriate.
In its written comments, NNSA disagreed with our findings and our  recommendation. Specifically, in its comments, NNSA stated that it was  concerned that our report reflects an interpretation of the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 that differs from NNSA’s,  resulting in potentially misleading conclusions. NNSA further stated that  the report incorrectly concludes that the NNSA report to Congress did not  provide an assessment of the roles of Nuclear Security Enterprise sites in  performing certain missions as required and that the basis for our  conclusion that the assessment was not provided is unclear. We  disagree. The act required NNSA to provide a report to congressional  defense committees “assessing the role of the nuclear security complex  sites in supporting a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent;  reductions in the nuclear stockpile; and the nuclear nonproliferation  efforts of the United States.” As we noted in our report, NNSA described  the activities of the nuclear security enterprise in its report to Congress,  but it did not provide an assessment. A description is not an assessment.
In its comments, NNSA stated that the 2008 Complex Transformation  Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement that  underlies its report to Congress, is still operative, and there have been no  substantive transformations of the Nuclear Security Enterprise since. As  we note in our report, however, NNSA did not cite this assessment in its  report to congressional defense committees. Moreover, the 2008  Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental  Impact Statement is more than 5 years old, which raises questions about  its continued relevance.  Notably, key elements of that document, such as  the construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement  Nuclear Facility and the Uranium Processing Facility, have not been  constructed and NNSA is reconsidering its approach on how to address  these critical needs.
NNSA also states in its comments that we appear to have interpreted the  act as requiring NNSA to causally and quantitatively link its cost efficiency  initiatives to specific cost savings when the congressional language does  not make any reference to linking the two. We disagree because the act  does link efficiencies and cost savings. Specifically, the act states that the  NNSA report must identify “opportunities for efficiencies within the nuclear  security complex and an assessment of how those efficiencies could  contribute to cost savings and strengthening safety and security.” As we  stated in our report, NNSA’s report to congressional defense committees  identifies opportunities for efficiencies. It does not, however, assess how  identified efficiencies could contribute to cost savings and strengthen  safety and security, as required by the act. For example, in its report  NNSA cites efficiencies achieved in recent years related to experiments  and simulations conducted in support of nuclear weapons research and  development but does not include information about how these  efficiencies might lead to cost savings.
Finally, NNSA did not concur with GAO’s recommendation that future  reporting on efficiencies and cost savings should include a methodology  for estimating the savings derived from potential efficiencies and track  savings resulting from new efficiency efforts. NNSA stated that it would  not have reliable information to accurately develop cost estimates directly  linked to the efficiencies and that the congressional language does not  make any reference to linking the two. NNSA states that it believes doing  so would be speculative and result in unreliable information. We disagree.  We have previously reported in evaluations of other agencies’ cost  savings efforts that a sound methodology for estimating savings helps  ensure that proposed savings can be achieved. Though such an effort  may present analytical and other challenges, it is nonetheless important  to do so. As we noted in our report, a methodology that includes the basis  of any assumptions included in the savings estimates, assessing the data  reliability of the estimate, validating savings calculations, and tracking  actual savings achieved will help NNSA provide Congress the information  it needs to make important budgetary and policy choices that best  balance long-term spending and nuclear security goals. Thus, we  continue to believe that NNSA should take action to fully address this  recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of NNSA, and  other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov..
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov . Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found   on the last page of this report. Other GAO staff who made key  contributions to this report are Diane LoFaro, Assistant Director; Delwen  Jones; Jeanette Soares; and Ginny Vanderlinde.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration
section_title: Related GAO Reports
paragraphs: Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA’s Budget Estimates  Do Not Fully Align with Plans. GAO-14-45. Washington, D.C.: December  11, 2013.
Modernizing the National Security Enterprise: Observations on NNSA’s  Options for Meeting Its Plutonium Research Needs. GAO-13-533.  Washington, D.C., September 11, 2013.
Nuclear Weapons: Factors Leading to Cost Increases with the Uranium  Processing Facility. GAO-13-686R. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2013.
Defense Management: Opportunities Exist to Improve Information Used  in Monitoring Status of Efficiency Initiatives. GAO-13-105R. Washington,  D.C.: December 4, 2012.
VA Health Care: Methodology for Estimating and Process for Tracking  Savings Need Improvement. GAO-12-305. Washington, D.C.: February  27, 2012.
Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: The National Nuclear  Security Administration’s Proposed Acquisition Strategy Needs Further  Clarification and Assessment. GAO-11-848. Washington, D.C.:  September 20, 2011.
Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plans for Its  Uranium Processing Facility Should Better Reflect Funding Estimates and  Technology Readiness. GAO-11-103. Washington, D.C.: November 19,  2010.
Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration Needs to  Better Manage Risks Associated with Modernization of Its Kansas City  Plant. GAO-10-115. Washington, D.C.: October 23, 2009.
Veterans Affairs: Limited Support for Reported Health Care Management  Efficiency Savings. GAO-06-359R. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2006.