Peacekeeping: Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN Operations
Published: 2007-06-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: As of June 2007, more than 100,000 military and civilian personnel are engaged in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in 15 locations in Africa, Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East. In 2006, the United States provided the UN with about $1 billion to support peacekeeping operations. Given that thousands of U.S. troops are intensively deployed in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, UN peacekeeping operations are an important element in maintaining a secure international environment. As requested, this testimony discusses (1) the costs of the current UN mission in Haiti compared with the estimated cost of a hypothetical U.S. operation and (2) the strengths and limitations of the United States and the UN in leading peace operations. This testimony is based on our prior report and information we updated for this hearing. To estimate U.S. costs, we developed parameters for a U.S. mission similar to the UN mission in Haiti, which the Joint Staff validated as reasonable. We then applied DOD's official cost estimating model. However, it is uncertain whether the United States would implement an operation in Haiti in the same way as the UN.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as it would the UN to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the UN mission in Haiti. The UN budgeted $428 million for the first 14 months of the mission. A similar U.S. operation would have cost an estimated $876 million. Virtually the entire cost difference can be attributed to cost of civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities. First, civilian police costs are less in a UN operation because the UN pays police a standard daily allowance, while U.S. police are given salaries, special pay, and training. Second, U.S. military pay and support reflect higher salaries and higher standards for equipment, ammunition, and rations. Third, U.S. facilities-related costs would be twice those of the UN and reflect the cost of posting U.S. civilian personnel in a secure embassy compound. When we varied specific factors, such as increasing the number of reserve troops deployed, the estimated cost for a U.S. operation increased. Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or the UN should lead a peacekeeping operation. Each offers strengths and limitations. Traditionally, the United States' strengths have included rapid deployment, strong command and control, and well-trained and equipped personnel. However, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have reduced personnel and equipment readiness levels and resulted in shortfalls for military police, engineers, and civil affairs experts. The UN provides broad multinational support for its missions, with a UN Security Council mandate and direction for its operations. The UN also has access to international civil servants, police, and senior officials who have nation-building experience and diverse language skills. Finally, the UN has fostered a network of agencies and development banks to coordinate international assistance with peacekeeping missions. However, the UN has traditionally had difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and ensuring unified command and control over its peacekeeping forces.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the results of the work we  completed for this subcommittee on the cost of a United Nations (UN)  peacekeeping operation versus the cost of a similar U.S. operation. As of  May 2007, more than 100,000 military and civilian personnel are engaged in  UN peacekeeping operations in 15 locations in Africa, Europe, Asia, the  Americas, and the Middle East. In 2006, the United States provided the UN  with about $1 billion to support peacekeeping operations out of a total  peacekeeping budget of about $5.5 billion. Given that U.S. troops are  intensively deployed in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, UN  peacekeeping operations are a key element in maintaining a secure  international environment.
My testimony today focuses on (1) the costs of the current UN mission in  Haiti compared with the estimated cost of a hypothetical U.S. operation  and (2) the strengths and limitations of the United States and the UN in  leading peace operations. This testimony is based on our prior report and  information we updated for this hearing. We reviewed classified and  unclassified information, but we used only unclassified information in this  statement. We selected the UN mission in Haiti as a case study because  both the United States and the UN have conducted operations in that  country, thus providing comparative information on their two approaches.  However, it is uncertain whether the United States would implement an  operation in Haiti in the same way as the UN, given operational, structural,  and doctrinal differences. While the results of the review cannot be  generalized to other U.S. and UN operations, we believe this report  provides useful insights into the costs and effectiveness of unilateral and  multilateral peacekeeping missions.
To compare UN and U.S. costs to implement a comparable peacekeeping  operation, we obtained budget data for the first 14 months of the UN  Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). We developed a scenario for a  U.S. operation in Haiti that used the same deployment schedule as the UN,  with the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel and  aircraft over the same period. Officials from the Joint Staff validated this  scenario as reasonable. We used DOD’s Contingency Operation Support  Tool to estimate military costs. DOD requires that this model be used to  generate estimates for all U.S. contingency operations, and it is used as the  basis for the supplemental appropriation requests to Congress. To  estimate civilian costs, we used historical data and formulas from the  Department of State. To assess the relative strengths and limitations of  U.S. and UN forces, we analyzed UN and U.S. reports, including  information on UN- and U.S.-led operations in Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan.  We interviewed officials from DOD and State to get their perspectives on  the strengths and limitations of UN- and U.S.-led operations. We  conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Both the UN and United States have a long history of conducting  operations to promote peace and stability. The UN has undertaken more  than 60 peacekeeping missions since 1948 and states that it has negotiated  more than 170 settlements that have ended regional conflicts. As of June  2007, 15 UN peacekeeping operations were ongoing in Africa, Europe, the  Middle East, Asia, and the Americas. As shown in figure 1, the number of  military troops and police in UN peacekeeping operations has steadily  increased from 29,140 personnel in 1996 to 83,071 in 2007, with a record  number of peacekeepers deployed around the world by March 2007. The  United States has led and participated in many peacekeeping operations,  such as in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans; as of April 2007, there were 310  U.S. military and police serving in UN operations. In contrast to the  relatively few U.S. troops and police in UN operations, the United States  has about 146,000 troops in Iraq and about 25,000 in Afghanistan in  stability operations as of April 2007.
The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping,  with payments of more than $1 billion in 2006. In total, the United States  pays 25 percent or more of the annual peacekeeping budget. (Figure 2  provides information about U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping.) The  UN annually assesses the United States about 26 percent of the UN  peacekeeping budget (including higher percentages before 2006).  However, U.S. legislation capped payments in 1995 at 25 percent, resulting  in arrears. Congress has lifted the cap for some years. According to the  Department of State, the amount of U.S. arrears for UN peacekeeping  since 2005 is $117 million. This amount reflects arrears as of June 2007. In  addition, the United States, as a permanent member of the UN Security  Council, approved many UN peacekeeping missions and activities prior to  2005. According to the Department of State, U.S. arrears for these  peacekeeping efforts total $505 million, but State does not have legal  authority to pay for them.
Since 1993, the UN has maintained a nearly constant peacekeeping  presence in Haiti to help stabilize the country, combat crime, and support  elections (see figure 3). Since 1994, the United States has led two military  interventions and one humanitarian mission to help stabilize the country.  The primary task of the current UN mission in Haiti is to provide a secure  and stable environment, assist the transitional government with Haiti’s  political processes, protect human rights, and support the Haitian National  Police. Authorization for the mission is set to expire in October 2007, but  the UN Security Council has renewed MINUSTAH’s mandate since 2004.  UN reports cite MINUSTAH’s role in attempting to create a relatively  stable security environment in most of the country. However, the overall  situation is still volatile and sporadic armed violence continues.
The UN has spent about $891 million from the inception of MINUSTAH in  2004 to June 2006. For the UN’s current fiscal year for peacekeeping,  ending June 30, 2007, the UN budgeted about $491 million. (See table 1 for  details on budgeted and actual UN expenditures for MINUSTAH.) The  current budget of $491 provides for 7,500 military personnel, 1,000 police  in formed units, 897 civilian police, and 1,771 civilian officials and staff.
section_title: Estimated Costs for a U.S. Operation Are at Least Twice the Cost of a Similar UN Mission
paragraphs: We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as it  would the UN to conduct an operation similar to the UN mission in Haiti.  Virtually the entire difference is attributable to the higher cost of civilian  police, military pay and support, and facilities. The difference also reflects  the additional cost of ensuring high U.S. standards for training, troop  welfare, and personnel security. If the United States were to deploy a  higher percentage of reserves rather than active duty troops, deploy more  quickly, or operate at a higher intensity, U.S. costs would be higher.
subsections: section_title: Estimated U.S. Costs Are Higher in Major Categories
paragraphs: From May 1, 2004, to June 30, 2005—the first 14 months of MINUSTAH— the UN budgeted costs for the operation totaled $428 million. This budget  assumed a phased deployment of 6,700 military personnel, 750 police in  formed units, 872 civilian police officers, and 1,184 civilian administrators  and staff. It also included the cost of operational support, equipment,  facilities, and transportation. Financial responsibilities of the U.S. for  MINUSTAH for the first 14 months were about $116 million.
Using the same basic parameters of troop and staff deployment in Haiti for  14 months, we estimate that a comparable U.S. operation would cost about  $876 million, slightly more than twice as much as the UN. Table 2 details  the differences between the UN and a hypothetical U.S. operation in major  cost categories.
As table 2 illustrates, the costs for civilian police, military pay and support,  and facilities account for most of the difference between the two  operations. These differences are explained below.
Civilian police. The UN budgeted $25 million to deploy 872 civilian  officers for MINUSTAH, while we estimate that it would cost the United  States $217 million to deploy the same number of civilian U.S. police  officers. The UN provides a daily allowance for police and does not  reimburse countries contributing police for the officers’ salaries. U.S.  costs, however, include salaries, special pay, benefits, equipment, and  special training.
Military pay and support. The UN budgeted $131 million for pay and  support of military troops, while we estimate it would cost the United  States $260 million for the same number of soldiers. The UN costs are  based on a monthly payment of up to $1,400 per soldier to contributing  nations for basic pay and allowances, clothing, equipment, and  ammunition. U.S. costs include pay and allowances for troops, as well as  clothing, arms, protective gear, and rations. U.S. costs provide a higher  standard of living for U.S. soldiers and higher standards for equipment,  nutrition, health, and morale.
Facilities. The UN budgeted $100 million for facilities-related costs, while  we estimate that the cost to the United States would be $208 million. The  UN budget includes acquisition and construction of troop and civilian  housing and equipment and supplies. U.S. facilities must meet State  Department security standards, which include posting civilian staff within  secure U.S. embassy or consulate compounds. Also, U.S. agencies with  staff in these compounds would be required to contribute to State’s  Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program.
section_title: Alternative Military Assumptions Generated Higher U.S. Cost Estimates
paragraphs: According to U.S. experts, changes in the underlying planning factors  significantly affect the estimated cost of a U.S. operation. Based on  consultations with the joint staff officials and other experts, we analyzed  how the cost of a U.S. operation would vary if we (1) changed the mix of  active duty to reserve soldiers from 85 percent active to an entirely reserve  force, (2) assumed U.S. forces would fully deploy within 60 rather than 180  days, and (3) increased the intensity of the operation. As figure 4 shows,  each of these changes increased the estimated costs for a U.S. operation.
Specifically, the changes resulted in these increases in each category:    By deploying an all reserve force, the estimated U.S. cost would increase  by $477 million. The increase is because DOD must begin to pay full active  duty military salaries to reservists when they are activated for an  operation. Officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed that this is one  of a number of possible scenarios of a U.S. operation.
By fully deploying U.S. troops in 60 days, U.S. costs would increase by  about $60 million due to additional military pay and support for all troops  deployed during the operation’s initial months. Joint Staff noted this as a  possible U.S. option for Haiti.
DOD measures the intensity of a military operation, or operational tempo,  on a scale from 1 to 3. The higher the number, the more heavily the forces  use equipment and the higher the operations and maintenance costs. By  increasing the operational tempo from 1.5, which is typical for  peacekeeping, to 2, U.S. military costs would increase by $23 million due  to increased expenses such as fuel.
section_title: U.S. and UN-Led Operations Each Have Strengths and Limitations
paragraphs: Cost is not the only factor in deciding whether the United States or the UN  should lead a peace operation. The United States and the UN each have  strengths and limitations that could affect the success of an operation. The  traditional strengths of a U.S.-led operation stem from the well-established  U.S. military infrastructure, which provides rapid deployment capabilities,  unified command and control, and well trained and equipped personnel.  However, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to shortages in key  personnel and strained troop and equipment readiness. Also, in some  locations a U.S.-led force may not be perceived as being impartial. Among  the strengths of a UN operation are its multinational participation and  extensive experience in peace operations, but the UN has limitations in  deploying a force, ensuring it is adequately equipped, and providing strong  command and control.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Military Has Elements Critical for Peacekeeping, but Faces Shortages of Personnel and Equipment
paragraphs: Traditionally, U.S. operations have benefited from the advantages of a  strong and well-established military that has provided quick deployment, a  unified command and control structure, and direct access to well-trained  military personnel and equipment. For example, two U.S.-led  peacekeeping efforts in Haiti were recognized as accomplishing their  objectives rapidly and with minimal loss of life. In the 1994 mission in  Haiti, the United States provided leadership to multinational forces and  ensured adequate troops and resources were available to carry out the  operation.
The following strengths of the U.S. military have led to successful U.S.  peacekeeping efforts.
Rapid deployment. According to a 2000 UN report, the first 6 to 12 weeks  following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most critical for  establishing a stable peace and a credible new operation; opportunities  lost during this period are hard to regain. UN and U.S. officials have stated  that a key strength of the U.S. military has been its ability to rapidly deploy  in part because it has traditionally emphasized readiness of the forces as a  major objective. DOD systematically measures the readiness of its forces  and produces the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review to monitor its  readiness posture. This has helped the United States rapidly deploy in past  operations. For example, in 1994, the United States deployed an operation  in Haiti within 60 days of the issuance of a UN Security Council  Resolution. The 20,000-member force quickly established itself in 500  locations throughout Haiti and achieved its primary goals within 76 days.
Unified command and control. According to the UN, clear and cohesive  command and control, including communications and intelligence are  critical for effective operations. According to Joint Staff officials,  operations in Haiti were effective because the United States used its  cohesive command and control structure, a reliable communication  system, and good field intelligence. With regard to intelligence, the United  States can draw upon the extensive resources of the U.S. intelligence  community, consisting of an array of agencies, departments, and offices  throughout the U.S. government. For example, the Defense Intelligence  Agency, with more than 7,500 military and civilian employees worldwide,  produces and manages foreign military intelligence for warfighters,  defense policymakers, and force planners in support of U.S. military  planning and operations. The Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S.  Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force, among other organizations, also  provide intelligence support to U.S. military operations.
Tradition of well trained and equipped personnel. A key element of  DOD’s mission is to train and equip its personnel to a high standard and  DOD spends considerable amounts to do so. As of 2006, DOD was  spending more than $17 billion annually for military schools that offer  nearly 30,000 military training courses to almost 3 million military  personnel and DOD civilians. With regard to equipment, DOD spends  billions every year to purchase and maintain equipment. Since fiscal year  2002, Congress has appropriated about $38 billion to the Army for the  reset (repair, replacement, and modernization) of equipment that has been  damaged or lost as a result of combat operations. In addition, DOD uses  soldiers and contractors to repair vehicles and other equipment where the  equipment is located.
However, ongoing operations in Iraq have challenged U.S. capabilities in  key areas. Specifically, current shortages of the critical personnel skills  and equipment needed for operations are a limitation that could affect U.S.  ability to lead a peacekeeping force. A second limitation of a U.S.-led force  is perceived lack of impartiality in some locations.
Current shortages of critical skills and equipment. Our work has shown  that ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have challenged DOD’s  capabilities and created a continuing high demand for certain combat  specialties, including military police, engineers, and civil affairs experts.  Many of these skills reside heavily in the reserve military component due  to current force structuring practices. DOD policy restricts the duration of  deployment and activation of reserve forces. As operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan continue and the number of deployed reservists increases, it  is likely to become increasingly difficult for DOD to identify reserve  personnel in high-demand areas who are eligible to deploy. We reported  that the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, for example, are already  stretched to a point where their readiness for additional deployments, or  homeland security crises, has been degraded. In a January 2007 report, we  stated that current operations are also taking a heavy toll on the condition  and readiness of the military’s equipment due to strain created by the high  operational tempo and harsh environmental conditions of operations in  Iraq and Afghanistan.
Perceived lack of impartiality. In some locations, a U.S.-led force may not  be perceived by the local people and neighboring countries as an impartial  and fair force. These two qualities, according to the UN and U.S. officials,  are key to gaining the confidence and trust of the people. State and DOD  officials stated that Lebanon is a good example. These officials considered  several options for assisting Lebanon, following the 2006 hostilities with  Israel, including a U.S.-led peace operation, a NATO-led one, or a modified  UN operation. U.S. officials concluded that either a U.S. or a NATO-led  operation would be perceived by some factions in Lebanon and by  neighboring countries as a threat and a potentially hostile force. Thus, the  UN operation was considered the most politically feasible option and the  UN Security Council, with U.S. support, expanded the UN peacekeeping  force in Lebanon.
section_title: UN Has Multinational Participation and Extensive Experience, but Has Limitations in Rapidly and Effectively Deploying Its Initial Force
paragraphs: The UN’s strengths in peacekeeping are rooted in the multinational  character of its operation as well as extensive experience with  peacekeeping and related nation building. The UN has developed a  structure for coordinating international organizations involved in nation  building and has access to a pool of experienced and skilled international  civil servants, including personnel with diverse language capabilities.
Multinational participation. As of May 2007, 115 countries had military  troops or police serving in UN operations. According to State and DOD  officials, this multinational character and the UN Security Council  mandate provide international legitimacy and direction for its operation.  MINUSTAH also demonstrates the multinational character of UN  operations. During the first year, MINUSTAH was comprised of 7,624  military staff and police personnel from 41 countries, with the United  States contributing 29 military and police personnel.
Experienced peacekeeping officials. The UN has developed a cadre of  senior officials who have gained experience with peacekeeping and  nation-building activities over many missions. The international nature of  the UN also provides access to a large pool of civil servants and security  personnel with native language speaking abilities and translation skills. As  of May 2007, almost 5,700 international civil servants were deployed to UN  peacekeeping missions with 12,400 local civilian staff and some 2,000 UN  volunteers supporting these operations.
Structure for coordinating international assistance. The UN has fostered  a network of humanitarian agencies and development banks that UN  peacekeeping missions can draw on to coordinate the extensive  humanitarian and developmental activities related to operations with  broad, integrated mandates that include nation building. In Haiti, for  example, MINUSTAH has established a framework for coordination that is  integral to the mission’s organization. With UN sponsorship, official  donors in this network, including the World Bank and the Inter-American  Development Bank, have pledged over one billion dollars in development  assistance.
The UN has several limitations in leading peace operations. Three of these  are the lack of capacity to deploy quickly, limits on its command and  control of forces, and considerable variance in the training and equipment  standards of its multinational force.
Limited ability to deploy rapidly. The UN has traditionally had  difficulties in rapidly deploying the military and civilian positions needed  for peacekeeping missions. According to the UN, the first 6 to 12 weeks  following a ceasefire are critical for establishing a stable peace presence.  However, the UN does not have a standing army, a police force, or the  needed equipment to deploy a force quickly. For example, during the first  12 weeks of MINUSTAH, only 30 percent of the authorized military troops  and police in formed units were deployed by the UN to Haiti.
Limits on command and control. The UN also has limitations on the  command and control of its peacekeeping forces. According to DOD  officials, the participation of multiple nations diffuses the unity of  command, as each troop contingent is under the command of its national  authority. The UN force commander is not assured that an individual or  contingents will follow his orders. Command and control is also an issue  for disciplinary actions against UN peacekeeping troops involved in  criminal, sexual, or other misconduct. The UN sets standards of behavior,  including prohibiting peacekeeping troops from criminal activities and  sexual exploitation. The involvement of peacekeeping personnel in these  activities has been documented in several operations’ and the UN had  nearly 1,200 cases of alleged misconduct or crimes by peacekeepers in  2003 and 2004. However, troop-contributing countries are responsible for  disciplinary actions against their own troops. According to the UN, there is  widespread perception among international observers that peacekeeping  personnel rarely if ever face disciplinary charges. The UN is taking several  steps to address this problem, such as developing specific standards of  behavior for all UN troops and a model memorandum of understanding on  conduct for all troop contributing countries. However, individual countries  are still responsible for discipline of their own troops.
Varying equipment and training levels. The equipment and training of  military and police personnel provided to UN operations by contributing  countries often varies. Developing nations are currently the largest  contributors of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. The UN states  that, while many developing countries provide well-equipped troops with  high professional standards, there are also situations in which the  countries contributing troops cannot meet the equipment standards  agreed to with the UN. The UN reports that some troops provided by  contributing countries have arrived without rifles, helmets, or other  necessary equipment. DOD officials stated that during previous operations  in Haiti, the United States provided some equipment, provisions, and  military supplies to UN troops that were deployed with insufficient  equipment. Training levels vary widely by country with some troops  having little previous training in peacekeeping operations. The United  States, through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, is helping train  troops from member UN nations that contribute to UN peacekeeping.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: The costs, strengths, and limitations of the United States and the UN are  important factors in considering who should lead a peacekeeping  operation. A U.S. peacekeeping operation, as illustrated by the specific  example in Haiti, is likely to be much more expensive than a UN operation.  This one example cannot be generalized across all operations. However,  many of the cost elements, such as police and military costs, are likely to  be more expensive for a U.S.-led operation, regardless of location. The  higher cost for a U.S. operation pays for a force that has traditionally  deployed rapidly, operated effectively, and maintained high standards for  equipment and training. However, combat operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan over the past six years have strained U.S. troops, equipment,  and readiness, limiting U.S. ability to lead a peacekeeping intervention. In  some situations, a U.S.-led force would not be perceived as an impartial  and fair force, further limiting its ability to conduct operations. The UN  has certain strengths in leading a peacekeeping operation, including  multinational participation and international legitimacy, access to  international civil servants needed for peacebuilding activities, and a  structure for coordinating international assistance. However, the UN has  traditionally had difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and ensuring  unified command and control over its peacekeeping forces.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any  questions you or the members of the subcommittee may have.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Joseph A. Christoff  at (202) 512-8979. Other key contributors to this statement were Tetsuo  Miyabara, James Michels, Suzanne Perkins, Lynn Cothern, Mark Speight,  Grace Lui, Charlie Perdue, and Kendall Schaefer.
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