Nuclear Security: Actions Needed by DOE to Improve Security of Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material at Its Energy, Science and Environment Sites
Published: 2005-07-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: A successful terrorist attack on a Department of Energy (DOE) site containing nuclear weapons material could have devastating effects for the site and nearby communities. DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment (ESE), which is responsible for DOE operations in areas such as energy research, manages five sites that contain weapons-grade nuclear material. A heavily armed security force equipped with such items as automatic weapons protects ESE sites. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE's existing readiness requirements and (2) the actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully defend against the larger, revised terrorist threat identified in the October 2004 design basis threat (DBT) by DOE's implementation deadline of October 2008.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing weapons-grade nuclear material generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements. Specifically, GAO determined that ESE protective forces generally comply with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and equipment standardization and that the five ESE sites had the required training programs, facilities, and equipment. However, GAO did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability of protective forces to defend these sites. For example, despite the importance of training exercises in which protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists (force-on-force exercises), DOE neither sets standards for individual protective force officers to participate in these exercises, nor does it require sites to track individual participation. GAO also found that protective force officers at all five of the ESE sites reported problems with their radio communications systems. Specifically, according to 66 of the 105 protective force officers GAO interviewed, they did not always have dependable radio communications as required by the DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force Program Manual. Security officials stated that related improvements were under way. To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they will need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include transforming its current protective force into an elite, possibly federalized, force, developing and deploying new security technologies to reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack, consolidating and eliminating nuclear weapons material between and among ESE sites, and creating a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient authority to ensure coordination across all ESE offices that have weapons-grade nuclear material. However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early stages of development and will require significant commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is uncertain.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the work you requested on  nuclear security at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of the Under  Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment (ESE). My testimony is  based on the report being released today, entitled Nuclear Security:  DOE’s Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and  Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New  Design Basis Threat (GAO-05-611).
DOE has long recognized that a successful terrorist attack on a site  containing the material used in nuclear weapons, such as plutonium or  highly enriched uranium, could have devastating consequences for the site  and its surrounding communities. The risks associated with these  materials, which in specified forms and quantities are referred to as  Category I special nuclear material, vary but include theft for use in an  illegal nuclear weapon; the creation of improvised nuclear devices capable  of producing a nuclear yield; and the creation of so-called “dirty bombs,”  in which conventional explosives are used to disperse radioactive  material.
Because terrorist attacks could have such devastating consequences, an  effective safeguards and security program is essential. For many years, a  key component for DOE security programs has been the development of  the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies the  potential size and capabilities of adversary forces. In response to the  September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE issued an updated DBT in May  2003 and gave its sites until October 2006 to comply with its requirements.  In response to recommendations in our April 2004 report to this  Subcommittee, congressional criticism, and a new review of intelligence  data, DOE issued a revised DBT in October 2004. The 2004 DBT identified  a larger terrorist threat for DOE sites than the 2003 DBT. Consequently,  DOE is not requiring full compliance with the 2004 DBT until October 2008  in order to allow its sites adequate time to implement measures to defeat  this larger terrorist threat. By July 29, 2005, DOE sites will have to forward  2004 DBT implementation plans to the Deputy Secretary of Energy and,  within 3 months, begin submitting quarterly DBT implementation reports.  At the time of our review, cost estimates were still preliminary, but  security officials at ESE sites said that, collectively, they may require an  additional $384 million-$584 million over the next several years in order  for all ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material to meet the 2004  DBT.
The private contractors who operate DOE’s facilities counter the terrorist  threat contained in the DBT with a multifaceted protective system. While  specific measures vary from site to site, a key universal component of  DOE’s protective system is a heavily armed protective force equipped with  such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor,  and chemical protective gear.
On June 22, 2004, we testified before this Subcommittee, identifying  several issues that could impede ESE’s ability to fully meet the threat  contained in the May 2003 DBT by DOE’s October 2006 deadline. Not the  least of theses issues was the lack of a departmentwide, multiyear, fully  resourced implementation plan for meeting DBT requirements; the plan  would have to include important programmatic activities, such as the  closure of facilities and the transportation of special nuclear material.
Subsequently, you asked us to examine ESE in more detail and to  determine, for the five ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material,  (1) the extent to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE’s existing  readiness requirements and (2) what actions DOE and ESE will need to  take to successfully defend against the larger, revised terrorist threat  identified in the October 2004 DBT by DOE’s implementation deadline of  October 2008.
To determine the extent to which protective forces at ESE sites are  meeting existing DOE readiness requirements, we reviewed pertinent  literature about the factors that affect the readiness of forces, such as  military forces, that are like those defending ESE sites. We conducted  structured interviews with 105 randomly selected ESE protective force  officers at the five ESE sites that contain Category I special nuclear  material. While the responses from these interviews are not projectable to  the entire universe of ESE protective force officers, we did speak to about  10 percent of the total protective forces at the five sites. We asked the  officers questions designed to determine their readiness to defend the  sites, including questions about their morale, training, and equipment. We  also reviewed the training records of the 105 officers for selected firearms  and physical fitness qualifications to determine if these officers complied  with existing DOE requirements and regulations. Finally, we reviewed the  equipment used by ESE protective forces to determine if it met current  DOE requirements.
To determine what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully  defend against the new threat identified in the October 2004 DBT by DOE’s  implementation deadline of October 2008, we reviewed the October 2004  DBT and associated guidance documents. We discussed the October 2004  DBT with officials in DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance  Assurance and with officials in ESE’s Offices of Environmental  Management; Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology; and Science,  which oversee the five ESE sites that contain Category I special nuclear  material. Finally, where available, we reviewed documents prepared by  ESE officials on how they plan to comply with the October 2004 DBT. We  performed our work between March 2004 and July 2005 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary, we found the following:    Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing Category I special  nuclear material generally meet existing DOE readiness requirements.  However, we did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely  affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. With  respect to current readiness, 102 of the 105 officers we interviewed stated  that they believed that they and their fellow officers understood what was  expected of them if the site were attacked by a terrorist group. Moreover,  65 of the 105 officers rated themselves as highly ready to defend their site  while 20 officers rated themselves as somewhat or moderately ready.  Supporting their views, we found that the five ESE sites we visited had the  required training programs, facilities, and equipment, and that the 105  protective force members whose records we reviewed generally complied  with existing DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness  levels, and equipment standardization. However, we did find some  weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability of  protective forces to defend these sites. For example, despite the  importance of training exercises in which protective forces undergo  simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists (force-on-force exercises),  DOE neither sets standards for individual protective force officers to  participate in these exercises, nor requires sites to track individual  participation. While 84 of the 105 protective force officers we interviewed  stated they had participated in a force-on-force exercise, only 46 of the 84  protective force officers believed that the force-on-force exercises they  had participated in were either realistic or somewhat realistic. We also  found that protective force officers at all five of the ESE sites reported  problems with their radio communications systems. Specifically,  according to 66 of the 105 protective force officers we interviewed, they  did not always have dependable radio communications, as required by  DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force Program Manual. Site security  officials stated that improvements were underway and would be  completed this year.
To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in the  2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they will  need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include  transforming its current protective force into an “elite force”—modeled on  U.S. Special Forces, developing and deploying new security technologies  to reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack, consolidating  and eliminating nuclear weapons material between and among sites, and  creating a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient authority  to ensure coordination across all ESE offices that have Category I special  nuclear material. However, these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are  in the early stages of development and will require a significant  commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE.  Consequently, their completion by the 2008 October DBT implementation  deadline is uncertain.
In our report to you we made five recommendations to the Secretary of  Energy to track and increase protective force officers’ participation in  force-on-force training exercises, correct weaknesses with protective  force officers’ equipment, coordinate implementation of DOE’s various  efforts designed to meet the 2004 DBT through the development of a  departmentwide, multiyear implementation plan, and create a more  effective ESE security organization.
DOE concurred with our report, accepted our recommendations and  provided an update on actions it anticipated taking to address our  recommendations. While we believe that most of DOE’s anticipated  actions will be responsive to our recommendations, we are concerned  about DOE’s response to our recommendation that it develop a  departmentwide, multiyear implementation plan for meeting the 2004 DBT  requirements. Specifically, in responding to this recommendation, DOE  cited only individual efforts to address the development of an elite force,  the deployment of enhanced security technologies, and the consolidation  of special nuclear material, not the development of a departmentwide,  multiyear implementation plan. While each of these efforts is important,  we continue to believe that DOE cannot be successful in meeting the  requirements of the 2004 DBT by its deadline of October 2008 without an  integrated effort that is built around a comprehensive plan.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Five ESE sites collectively contain substantial quantities of Category I  special nuclear material. These include the following:  the Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina, and the Hanford Site  in Richland, Washington, which are managed by the Office of  Environmental Management; the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and the  Argonne National Laboratory-West, which are located in Idaho Falls,  Idaho, and are managed by the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and  Technology; and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which is  managed by the Office of Science.
Contractors operate each site for ESE. DOE has requested over $300  million in fiscal year 2006 for security at these five sites.
Within DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, DOE’s  Office of Security develops and promulgates orders and policies to guide  the department’s safeguards and security programs. DOE’s overall security  policy is contained in DOE Order 470.1, Safeguards and Security  Program, which was originally approved in 1995. The key component of  DOE’s approach to security is the DBT, a classified document that  identifies the characteristics of the potential threats to DOE assets. A  classified companion document, the Adversary Capabilities List,  provides additional information on terrorist capabilities and equipment.  The DBT traditionally has been based on a classified, multiagency  intelligence community assessment of potential terrorist threats, known as  the Postulated Threat. The threat from terrorist groups is generally the  most demanding threat contained in the DBT.
DOE counters the terrorist threat specified in the DBT with a multifaceted  protective system. While specific measures vary from site to site, all  protective systems at DOE’s most sensitive sites employ a defense-in- depth concept that includes the following:    a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting intruders;    physical barriers, such as fences and antivehicle obstacles;    numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers, vehicle  inspection stations, radiation detectors, and metal detectors;   operational security procedures, such as a “two person” rule that prevents  only one person from having access to special nuclear material; and   hardened facilities and vaults.
Each site also has a heavily armed protective force that is often equipped  with such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body  armor, and chemical protective gear. These protective forces are  comprised of Security Police Officers who are classified into three groups:  Security Police Officer-I, Security Police Officer-II, and Security Police  Officer-III. Security Police Officer-Is are only assigned to fixed, armed  posts. Generally, very few of these officers are used at ESE sites because  of the limited roles they can fill. Security Police Officer-IIs generally are  assigned to posts such as access control booths, or to foot or vehicle  patrols. Finally, Security Police Officer-IIIs are responsible for operations  such as hostage rescue and the recapture and recovery of special nuclear  material. According to federal regulations, Security Police Officer-IIIs have  more demanding physical fitness and training standards than Security  Police Officer-Is or Security Police Officer-IIs. The ESE sites we visited  employ about 1,000 Security Police Officer-IIs and Security Police   Officer-IIIs. ESE protective forces work for private contractors and are  unionized.
Protective force duties and requirements, such as physical fitness  standards, are explained in detail in DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force  Program Manual, as well as in DOE regulations (10 C.F.R. pt. 1046,  Physical Protection of Security Interests). DOE issued the current  Protective Force Program Manual in June 2000. Although protective  forces are expected to comply with the duties and requirements  established in DOE policies, deviations from these policies are allowed as  long as certain approval and notification criteria are met.
In addition to complying with these security requirements, DOE protective  systems, including protective forces, also must meet performance  standards. For example, DOE sites are required to demonstrate that their  protective systems are capable of defending special nuclear material  against terrorist forces identified in the DBT. The performance of  protective systems is formally and regularly examined through  vulnerability assessments. A vulnerability assessment is a systematic  evaluation process in which qualitative and quantitative techniques are  applied to detect vulnerabilities and arrive at effective protection of  specific assets, such as special nuclear material. To conduct such  assessments, DOE uses, among other things, subject matter experts, such  as U.S. Special Forces; computer modeling to simulate attacks; and force- on-force exercises, in which the site’s protective forces undergo simulated  attacks by a group of mock terrorists. In addition to their use in evaluating  the effectiveness of physical protection strategies, DOE believes force-on- force exercises are the most realistic representation of adversary attacks  that can be used to train protective forces.
section_title: Protective Forces at ESE Sites Generally Meet Established DOE Readiness Requirements, but Some Weaknesses in Protective Force Practices Exist
paragraphs: Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing Category I special  nuclear material generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements.  Specifically, we determined that ESE protective forces generally comply  with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and  equipment standardization and that the five ESE sites had the required  training programs, facilities, and equipment. In addition, we found that the  majority of the 105 protective force members we interviewed at ESE sites  generally believe that they currently are ready to perform their mission of  protecting the site’s special nuclear material. However, we did find some  weaknesses at ESE sites that could impair the ability of ESE protective  forces to defend their sites.
subsections: section_title: Protective Force Officers Are Confident in Their Current Overall Readiness and Generally Meet the DOE Training and Equipment Requirements We Reviewed
paragraphs: A ready force should possess a sufficient number of experienced, trained,  and properly equipped personnel. Through realistic and comprehensive  training, these personnel are forged into a cohesive unit that can perform  its tasks even under extreme conditions. DOE orders and federal  regulations establish the framework for ensuring that DOE protective  forces are ready to perform their mission. We found that ESE protective  force officers generally believe that they are ready to perform their  mission. Specifically, 102 of the 105 officers we interviewed stated that  they believed that they, and their fellow officers, understood what was  expected of them should the site be attacked by a terrorist group.  Moreover, 65 of the 105 officers rated the readiness of their site’s  protective force as high, while 20 officers rated their protective force as  somewhat or moderately ready to defend the site. Only a minority of the  officers (16 of 105) we interviewed rated the readiness of their force to  defend their sites as low. In addition, the majority of officers we  interviewed believed they and the protective force officers with whom  they worked on a regular basis have formed a cohesive unit that would be  able to perform their most essential mission—that of protecting special  nuclear material. For example, of the 105 officers we interviewed, 84  officers responded that they had a high degree of confidence in their  fellow officers in the event of a terrorist attack, and 88 reported that their  fellow officers would be willing to risk their lives in defense of their site.
As called for in DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual, readiness is  achieved through appropriate training and equipment. Each of the five  sites we visited had formally approved annual training plans. Each site  generally had the training facilities, such as firearms ranges, classrooms,  computer terminals, and exercise equipment, which enabled them to meet  their current DOE and federal training requirements. Furthermore, each  site maintained computerized databases for tracking individual protective  force officers’ compliance with training requirements. To determine if  these programs and facilities were being used to implement the DOE  requirements and federal regulations, we focused on three key areas— firearms proficiency, physical fitness, and protective force officer  equipment.
Firearms Proficiency. DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual states  that protective force officers must demonstrate their proficiency with the  weapons that are assigned to them every 6 months. According to the  training records of the 105 protective force officers we interviewed, 79 had  met this proficiency requirement with their primary weapon, the M-4 or M- 16 semiautomatic rifle. Of the 26 officers who had not met this  requirement within the 6 month time frame, 11 officers were all located at  one site and 8 of these 11 officers did not meet the requirement until 2 to 5  months after the required time. According to an official at this site, seven  of the eight officers could not complete the requirement in a timely fashion  because the site’s firing range was closed for the investigation of an  accidental weapon discharge that had resulted in an injury to a protective  force officer. We determined that 2 of the 26 officers did not complete the  requirement for medical reasons. We were not given reasons why the  remaining officers did not meet the requirement.
Physical Fitness. Under DOE regulations, DOE’s contractors’ protective  force personnel who are authorized to carry firearms must meet a  minimum standard for physical fitness every 12 months. There are two  standards for such personnel—Offensive Combative and Defensive  Combative. All Security Police Officer-IIIs, which include DOE special  response team members, must meet the Offensive Combative standard,  which requires a 1-mile run in no more than 8 minutes 30 seconds and a  40-yard prone-to-running dash in no more than 8 seconds. All other  protective officers authorized to carry firearms must meet the Defensive  Combative standard, which requires a one-half mile run in no more than 4  minutes 40 seconds and a 40-yard prone-to-running dash in no more than  8.5 seconds. According to the training records of the 105 protective force  officers we reviewed, 103 of the 105 protective force officers had met the  standard required by federal regulation for their position. Two officers  who did not meet the requirement were on medical restriction. The  records for another officer showed him as having met the requirement, but  additional records provided by the site showed the officer had completed  the run in a time that exceeded the standard. Site officials could not  provide an explanation for this discrepancy.
Protective Officer Equipment. DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual  sets a number of requirements for protective force equipment. For  example, all Security Police Officers are required to carry a minimum set  of equipment, including a portable radio, a handgun, and an intermediate  force weapon such as a baton. In addition, a mask to protect against a  chemical attack must be carried or available to them. All Security Police  Officer-IIs and Security Police Officer-IIIs must also have access to  personal protective body armor. In addition, firearms must be kept  serviceable at all times and must be inspected by a DOE-certified armorer  at least twice a year to ensure serviceability. Issued firearms must be  inventoried at the beginning of each shift, an inventory of all firearms in  storage must be conducted weekly, and a complete inventory of all  firearms must be conducted on a monthly basis. Finally, DOE protective  forces equipment must be tailored to counter adversaries identified in the  DBT. To this end, sites employ a variety of equipment, including automatic  weapons, night vision equipment, and body armor. In most cases, each  site’s protective forces carried or had access to the required minimum  standard duty equipment. Most sites demonstrated that they had access to  certified armorers, and each site maintained the required firearms  maintenance, inspection, and inventory records, often kept in a detailed  computerized database. The appropriate policies and procedures were  also in place for the inventory of firearms. In addition, some sites have  substantially increased their protective forces weaponry since September  11, 2001, or have plans to further enhance these capabilities to meet the  2004 DBT.
section_title: Some Weaknesses in ESE Site Protective Force Practices Exist
paragraphs: While protective forces at ESE sites are generally meeting current DOE  requirements, we identified some weaknesses in ESE protective force  practices that could adversely affect the current readiness of ESE  protective forces to defend their sites. These include protective force  officers’ lack of participation in realistic force-on-force exercises; the  frequency and quality of training opportunities; the lack of dependable  communications systems; insufficient protective gear, including protective  body armor and chemical protective gear; and the lack of armored  vehicles.
Performance Testing and Training. According to DOE’s Protective Force  Program Manual, performance tests are used to evaluate and verify the  effectiveness of protective force programs and to provide needed training.  A force-on-force exercise is one type of performance test during which the  protective force engages in a simulated battle against a mock adversary  force, employing the weapons, equipment, and methodologies postulated  in the DBT. DOE believes that force-on-force exercises are a valuable  training tool for protective force officers. Consequently, DOE policy  requires that force-on-force exercises be held at least once a year at sites  that possess Category I quantities of special nuclear material or Category  II quantities that can be rolled up to Category I quantities. However, DOE  neither sets standards for individual protective force officers’ participation  in these exercises, nor requires sites to track individual participation.  While 84 of the 105 protective force officers we interviewed stated they  had participated in a force-on-force exercise, only 46 of the 84 protective  force officers believed that the force-on-force exercises they had  participated in were either realistic or somewhat realistic. Additionally,  protective force officers often told us that they did not have frequent and  realistic tactical training. In this regard, 33 of the 84 protective force  officers reported that safety considerations interfered with the realism of  the force-on-force exercises, with some protective force officers stating  that they were limited in the tactics they could employ. For example, some  protective force officers stated that they were not allowed to run up  stairwells, climb fences, or exceed the speed limit in patrol vehicles.  Contractors’ protective force managers agreed that safety requirements  limited the kind of realistic force-on-force training that are needed to  ensure effective protective force performance.
Communications Equipment. According to DOE’s Protective Force  Program Manual, the radios protective force officers use must be capable  of two-way communications, provide intelligible voice communications,  and be readily available in sufficient numbers to equip protective force  personnel. In addition, a sufficient number of batteries must be available  and maintained in a charged condition. Protective force officers at all five  of the sites we visited reported problems with their radio communications  systems. Specifically, 66 of the 105 protective force officers reported that  they did not always have dependable radio communications, with 23  officers identifying sporadic battery life, and 29 officers reporting poor  reception at some locations on site as the two most significant problems.  In addition, some of the protective force officers believed that radio  communications were not sufficient to support their operations and could  not be relied on if a terrorist attack occurred. Site security officials at two  sites acknowledged that efforts were under way to improve radio  communications equipment. In addition, security officials said other forms  of communications, such as telephones, cellular telephones, and pagers,  were provided for protective forces to ensure that they could  communicate effectively.
Protective Body Armor. DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual requires  that Security Police Officer-IIs and -IIIs wear body armor or that body  armor be stationed in a way that allows them to quickly put it on to  respond to an attack without negatively impacting response times. At one  site, we found that most Security Police Officer-IIs had not been issued  protective body armor because the site had requested and received in July  2003 a waiver to deviate from the requirement to equip all Security Police  Officer-IIs with body armor. The waiver was sought for a number of  reasons, including the (1) increased potential for heat-related injuries  while wearing body armor during warm weather, (2) increased equipment  load that armor would place on protective force members, (3) costs of  acquiring the necessary quantity of body armor and the subsequent  replacement costs, and (4) associated risks of not providing all Security  Police Officer-IIs with body armor could be mitigated by using cover  provided at the site by natural and man-made barriers. According to a site  security official, this waiver is currently being reviewed because of the  increased threat contained in the 2004 DBT.
Special Response Team Capabilities. Security Police Officers-IIIs serve on  special response teams responsible for offensive operations, such as  hostage rescue and the recapture and recovery of special nuclear material.  Special response teams are often assigned unique equipment, including  specially encrypted radios; body armor that provides increased levels of  protection; special suits that enable officers to operate and fight in  chemically contaminated environments; special vehicles, including  armored vehicles; submachine guns; light machine guns; grenade  launchers; and precision rifles, such as Remington 700 rifles and Barrett  .50 caliber rifles. These response teams are also issued breaching tools to  allow them to reenter facilities to which terrorists may have gained access.  Each site with Category I special nuclear material must have a special  response team capability available on a continuous basis. However, one  ESE site does not have this capability and, instead, relies on another  organization, through a formal memorandum of understanding, to provide  a special response team. This arrangement, however, has not been  comprehensively performance-tested, as called for in the memorandum of  understanding. Site officials state that they will soon conduct the first  comprehensive performance test of this memorandum of understanding.
Chemical Protective Gear. DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual  specifies that all Security Police Officer-IIs and -IIIs be provided, at a  minimum, with protective masks that provide for nuclear, chemical, and  biological protection. Other additional chemical protective gear and  procedures are delegated to the sites. At the four sites with special  response teams, we found that the teams all had special suits that allowed  them to operate and fight in environments that might be chemically  contaminated. For Security Police Officers-IIs, chemical protective  equipment and expectations for fighting in chemically contaminated  environments varied. For example, two sites provided additional  protective equipment for their Security Police Officer-IIs and expected  them to fight in such environments. Another site did not provide additional  equipment but expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to evacuate along  with other site workers. Finally, the one site that did not have a special  response team expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to fight in  chemically contaminated environments. However, the site provided no  additional protective gear for its officers other than standard-duty issue  long-sleeved shirts and the required protective masks.
Protective Force Vehicles. We found that ESE sites currently do not have  the same level of vehicle protection as National Nuclear Security  Administration (NNSA) sites that also have Category I special nuclear  material. Specifically, while not a DOE requirement, all NNSA sites with  Category I special nuclear material currently operate armored vehicles.  However, only one of the five ESE sites with Category I special nuclear  material operated armored vehicles at the time of our review. One other  ESE site was planning to deploy armored vehicles.
section_title: DOE and ESE Officials Need to Take Several Prompt and Coordinated Actions to Address the New DBT Requirements by 2008
paragraphs: To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in the  2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they  need to take several actions. These include transforming its current  protective force into an elite force, developing and deploying new security  technologies, consolidating and eliminating special nuclear material, and  making organizational improvements within ESE’s security program.  However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early  stages of development and will require a significant commitment of  resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the  October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is uncertain. The status of  these initiatives is as follows:    Elite Forces. DOE officials believe that the way its sites, including those  sites managed by ESE, currently train their contractor-operated protective  forces will not be adequate to defeat the terrorist threat contained in the  2004 DBT. This view is shared by most protective force officers (74 out of  105) and their contractor protective force managers who report that they  are not at all confident in their current ability to defeat the new threats  contained in the 2004 DBT. In response, the department has proposed the  development of an elite force that would be patterned after U. S. Special  Forces and might eventually be converted from a contractor-operated  force into a federal force. Nevertheless, despite broad support, DOE’s  proposal for an elite force remains largely in the conceptual phase. DOE  has developed a preliminary draft implementation plan that lays out high- level milestones and key activities, but this plan has not been formally  approved by the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance. The  draft implementation plan recognizes that DOE will have to undertake and  complete a number of complex tasks in order to develop the elite force  envisioned. For example, DOE will have to revise its existing protective  forces policies to incorporate, among other things, the increased training  standards that are needed to create an elite force. Since this proposal is  only in the conceptual phase, completing this effort by the October 2008  DBT implementation deadline is unlikely.
New Security Technologies. DOE is seeking to improve the effectiveness  and survivability of its protective forces by developing and deploying new  security technologies. It believes technologies can reduce the risk to  protective forces in case of an attack and can provide additional response  time to meet and defeat an attack. Sixteen of the 105 protective force  officers we interviewed generally supported this view and said they  needed enhanced detection technologies that would allow them to detect  adversaries at much greater ranges than is currently possible at most sites.  However, a senior DOE official recently conceded that the department has  not yet taken the formal steps necessary to coordinate investment in  emerging security technologies and that the role of technology in helping  sites meet the new threats contained in the 2004 DBT by the department’s  deadline of October 2008 is uncertain.
Consolidation and Elimination of Materials. ESE’s current strategy to  meet the October 2008 deadline relies heavily on consolidating and  eliminating special nuclear material between and among ESE sites. For  example, the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology plans to  down-blend special nuclear material and extract medically useful isotopes  at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory—an Office of Science site. This  action would eliminate most of the security concerns surrounding the  material. Neither program office, however, has been able to formally agree  on its share of additional security costs, which have increased significantly  because of the new DBT. In addition, neither ESE nor DOE has developed  a comprehensive, departmentwide plan to achieve the needed cooperation  and agreement among the sites and program offices to consolidate special  nuclear material, as we recommended in our April 2004 report. In the  absence of a comprehensive plan, completing most of these consolidation  activities by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is unlikely.
Organizational Improvements. The ESE headquarters security  organization is not well suited to meeting the challenges associated with  implementing the 2004 DBT. Specifically, there is no centralized security  organization within the Office of the Under Secretary, ESE. The individual  who serves as the Acting ESE Security Director has been detailed to the  Office by DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance and  has no programmatic authority or staff. This lack of authority limits the  Director’s ability to facilitate ESE and DOE-wide cooperation on such  issues as material down-blending at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and  material consolidation at other ESE sites.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may  have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Gene Aloise at  (202) 512-3841. James Noel, Jonathan Gill, Don Cowan, and Preston Heard  made key contributions to this testimony.
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