Supply Chain Security: Container Security Programs Have Matured, but Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning
Published: 2012-02-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Cargo containers that are part of the global supply chainthe flow of goods from manufacturers to retailersare vulnerable to threats from terrorists. The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 and the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to take actions to improve maritime transportation security. Also, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) required, among other things, that by July 2012, 100 percent of all U.S.-bound cargo containers be scanned. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for container security programs to address these requirements. This testimony addresses, among other things, (1) efforts to gather advance information about container shipments to assess risks, (2) technologies used to protect the integrity of containers and scan them, and (3) the status of efforts to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound containers. GAOs statement is based on products issued from April 2005 through July 2011, along with selected updates conducted from January to February 2012. Updates involved collecting information from CBP on the status of efforts to address GAOs prior recommendations on these issues and its plans to implement 100 percent scanning.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As part of its efforts to identify high-risk cargo for inspection, CBP uses various sources of information to screen containers in advance of their arrival in the United States. For example, in 2009, CBP implemented the Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements to collect additional information for targeting. The additional cargo information required, such as country of origin, is to be provided to CBP in advance of arrival of the cargo containers at U.S. ports. In September 2010, GAO recommended that CBP establish milestones and time frames for updating its targeting criteria to include additional information. In response, CBP updated its targeting criteria in January 2011.
DHS has made some progress in developing and implementing container security technologies to protect the integrity of containers and to scan them. GAO reported in September 2010 that DHSs Science and Technology Directorate initiated four container security technology projects to detect and report intrusions into cargo containers. However, operational testing had not occurred to ensure the prototypes would function as intended. Therefore, GAO recommended that testing and evaluation occur in all environments in which DHS planned to implement the technologies. DHS concurred and has made progress implementing this recommendation. To prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials, CBP, in coordination with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), has deployed over 1,400 radiation portal monitors (RPM) at U.S. ports of entry to detect the presence of radiation in cargo containers. Since 2006, GAO reported on problems with DNDOs efforts to deploy a more-advanced and significantly more-expensive type of RPM. Among other things, GAO reported that an updated cost-benefit analysis might show that DNDOs program to replace existing equipment with the advanced technology was not justified. After spending more than $200 million, DHS ended the program in July 2011.
Uncertainty persists over how DHS and CBP will fulfill the mandate for 100 percent scanning given that the feasibility remains unproven in light of the challenges CBP has faced implementing a pilot program for 100 percent scanning. In response to the SAFE Port Act requirement to implement a pilot program to determine the feasibility of 100 percent scanning, CBP, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy announced the formation of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) pilot program in December 2006. However, logistical, technological, and other challenges prevented the participating ports from achieving 100 percent scanning and CBP has since reduced the scope of the SFI program from six ports to one. In October 2009, GAO recommended that CBP perform an assessment to determine if 100 percent scanning is feasible, and if it is, the best way to achieve it, or if it is not feasible, present acceptable alternatives. However, to date, CBP has not conducted such an assessment or identified alternatives to 100 percent scanning. Further, as GAO previously reported, DHS acknowledged it will not be able to meet the 9/11 Acts July 2012 deadline for implementing the 100 percent scanning requirement, and therefore, it expects to grant a blanket extension to all foreign ports pursuant to the statute, thus extending the target date to July 2014. To do so, DHS is required to report to Congress by May 2, 2012, of any extensions it plans to grant.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO has made recommendations in past reports to DHS to strengthen its container security efforts. DHS concurred with GAOs recommendations and has either addressed them or is undertaking efforts to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of federal efforts to  enhance the security of maritime cargo containers used for shipping  many imports to the United States. The potential for terrorists to smuggle  weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inside cargo containers bound for  the United States has remained a concern since the terrorist attacks of  September 11, 2001. Cargo containers are an important segment of the  global supply chain—the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailers. In  2011, about 10.7 million oceanborne cargo containers arrived at U.S.  ports, and according to the U.S. Department of Transportation, the  majority of U.S. imports arrive by ocean vessel. The typical supply chain  process for transporting cargo containers to the United States involves  many steps and participants. For example, the cargo containers, and the  goods in them, can be compromised not only by the manufacturers or  suppliers of the goods being shipped, but also by vessel carriers who are  responsible for transporting the containers from foreign ports to U.S.  ports, as well as by personnel who load and unload cargo containers onto  and off vessels.
Given the complexity of the global supply chain process and the vast  number of cargo containers that are shipped to the United States each  year, the global supply chain is vulnerable to threats that terrorists and  criminals might be able to exploit. As we reported in October 2009, while  the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has noted that the likelihood  of terrorists smuggling WMD into the United States in cargo containers is  low, the nation’s vulnerability to this activity and the consequences of  such an attack—such as billions of losses in U.S revenue and halts in  manufacturing production—are potentially high.
November of 2012 will mark the 10th anniversary of the enactment of the  Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, which, among  other things, called for the establishment of a program to evaluate and  certify secure systems of international intermodal transportation, including  standards and procedures for screening and evaluating cargo prior to  loading and for securing and monitoring cargo while in transit. In 2006,  the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act, which  amended MTSA, required DHS to develop, implement, and update as  appropriate a strategic plan to enhance the security of the international  supply chain. To address concerns regarding international supply chain  security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of  DHS, developed a layered security strategy for cargo containers. Core  components of the layered security strategy include analyzing information  to identify containers that may be at high risk of transporting WMD or  other contraband, working with governments of other nations to examine  containers CBP has determined to be high risk before such containers  are loaded onto U.S.-bound vessels at foreign ports, and providing  benefits to companies that comply with predetermined security measures.
6 U.S.C. § 981. A similar requirement was enacted that same year by the Department of  Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006))  and is codified at 6 U.S.C. § 981a. Both statutes specify scanning as examination with  both radiation detection equipment and nonintrusive imaging equipment. 6 U.S.C.   §§ 981(a), 981a(a)(1). before being placed on U.S.-bound vessels, with possible extensions for  ports at which certain conditions exist. Further, in July 2007, DHS  issued the strategic plan called for in the SAFE Port Act, entitled the  Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security, and on  January 23, 2012, the administration issued the National Strategy for  Global Supply Chain Security, which describes a strategy for promoting  the efficient and secure movement of goods and fostering a resilient  supply chain.
DHS and CBP have taken various actions to enhance maritime container  security. As requested, this statement addresses our work in this area  and includes the following topics: efforts to gather advance information about container shipments to  assess the risks of these containers, technologies used to protect the integrity of containers and to scan  them to detect WMD and other contraband, partnerships with foreign governments and the private sector to  improve container security efforts, and the status of efforts to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo  containers.
This statement is based on related GAO reports and testimonies issued  from April 2005 through July 2011, which addressed various programs  that constitute CBP’s layered security strategy, along with selected  updates conducted from January 2012 to February 2012. For our prior  reports and testimonies, among other things, we analyzed CBP  documents; reviewed legal documentation; and interviewed foreign  government, DHS, CBP, and trade industry officials. We also conducted  site visits to select ports that participate in CBP’s container security  programs and CBP’s National Targeting Center – Cargo. Additional  details on the scope and methodology for those reviews are available in  our published products. For the updates, we collected information from  CBP on actions it has taken to address recommendations made in prior  GAO reports on which this statement is based. We also reviewed publicly  available documents, such as CBP’s budget justifications for fiscal years  2011 and 2012 and the administration’s National Strategy for Global  Supply Chain Security, for information regarding DHS’s and CBP’s plans  for implementing the 100 percent scanning requirement. We conducted  this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
subsections: section_title: CBP Has Various Tools for Targeting U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers for Inspections
paragraphs: As part of its efforts to target high-risk cargo containers for inspection,  CBP uses various sources of information to screen containers in advance  of their arrival in the United States. Specifically, CBP’s 24-hour rule  requires that vessel carriers submit cargo manifest information to CBP 24  hours before U.S.-bound cargo is loaded onto a vessel. To further  enhance CBP’s ability to target high-risk shipments, in 2006 the SAFE  Port Act required CBP to collect additional data related to the movement  of cargo to identify high-risk cargo for inspection, and in 2009 CBP  implemented the Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier  Requirements, collectively known as the 10+2 rule. The cargo  information required by the 10+2 rule comprises 10 data elements from  importers, such as country of origin, and 2 data elements from vessel  carriers, such as the position of each container transported on a vessel,  all of which are to be provided to CBP in advance of arrival at a U.S. port.
Some of the data are required to be submitted prior to loading the  container onto a U.S.-bound vessel. Additionally, the United States has  worked to expand the program beyond domestic implementation by  coordinating with the World Customs Organization (WCO) to  incorporate some of the 10+2 data elements into the international supply  chain security standards, which are discussed later in this statement. (Fig.  1 illustrates where CBP’s container security programs intersect with the  key points of transfer in the global supply chain.)
Data that CBP collects on U.S.-bound cargo containers and their contents  are fed into the Automated Targeting System (ATS)—a computerized  model that CBP uses as a decision-support tool in targeting cargo  containers for inspection. Specifically, within ATS, CBP uses various  data elements to determine an overall risk score for a particular threat in a  shipment. CBP officers use these scores to help them make decisions on  the extent to which documentary reviews or nonintrusive inspections are  to be conducted on cargo containers. In our September 2010 report on  the implementation of the 10+2 rule, we recommended that CBP establish  milestones and time frames for updating ATS to use the 10+2 data in its  identification of shipments that could pose a threat to national security. In  response to this recommendation, CBP took steps in January 2011 to  improve targeting efforts by updating its targeting criteria in to include risk  factors present in the 10+2 data. We recently began a review of the  effectiveness of ATS as part of CBP’s targeting efforts and plan to issue a  report later this year.
section_title: DHS Has Made Some Progress in Implementing Technologies to Improve Container Security
subsections: section_title: Container Security Technologies Are Intended to Detect Intrusion and Track Movement
paragraphs: As we reported in September 2010, DHS’s Science and Technology  Directorate (S&T) initiated four container security technology projects, in  part, in response to general MTSA requirements, as well as CBP’s need  for technologies to detect intrusion and track the movement of containers  through the supply chain. Specifically, a CBP study recognized that  existing container seals provided inadequate security against physical  intrusion (e.g., removing a container door to bypass a container seal) and  therefore CBP should develop a technology to monitor and record  intrusions on any of the six sides of a container. In September 2010, we  reported that DHS had conducted research and development for these  projects, but had not yet developed performance standards for them.  Specifically, each project had undergone laboratory testing, but S&T had  not yet conducted testing in an operational environment to ensure that the  prototypes for those projects that had passed laboratory testing would  function as intended. Furthermore, S&T’s plans for conducting operational  testing, did not reflect all of the operational scenarios being considered for  implementation. We recognized that successfully testing the performance  of these technologies is a precursor to developing performance standards  for them; therefore, we recommended that DHS test and evaluate the  technologies within all of the operational scenarios DHS identified for  potential implementation before S&T provides performance standards to  the Office of Policy Development and CBP—DHS concurred with our  recommendation and has completed operational testing for two of the four  container security technology projects in the maritime environment. S&T  officials considered the laboratory and operational testing of both  technology projects a success because they were proven to function  under one operational scenario, which resulted in the development of  performance standards that are necessary to pursue implementation of  these technologies. To fully address our recommendation, however, DHS  would need to test and evaluate the technologies within each of the  remaining operational scenarios it identified for potential implementation.  DHS has informed us that it plans to conduct further operational testing  and anticipates completing this testing in May 2013.
We also reported on the challenges DHS and CBP could face regarding    the implementation of the four container security technology projects. For example, DHS and CBP could face challenges in obtaining support  from the trade industry and international partners as it pursues  implementation of the security technologies. Specifically, some members  of the trade industry we spoke with were resistant to purchasing and  using the technologies given the number of container security programs  with which they already have to comply.  DHS will also need to obtain  support from international organizations and the WCO to implement new  container security technologies. For instance, for container security  technologies to be admitted to foreign countries without being subject to  import duties and taxes, as well as import prohibitions and restrictions,  the technologies first have to be recognized as accessories and  equipment of the containers under the Customs Convention on  Containers. The successful implementation of security technologies also  depends on the security procedures throughout the supply chain as well  as people engaged in those procedures, which are typically documented  in the concept of operations. As a result, DHS and CBP could face  challenges developing a feasible concept of operations that addresses  the necessary technology infrastructure needs and protocols. Container  security technologies require a supporting technology infrastructure,  including readers to communicate to customs officials whether a  technology has identified an intrusion. Thus, CBP will be faced with  determining who will have access to the container security technologies  through readers, where to place these readers, and obtaining permission  to install fixed readers at domestic and foreign ports.  Also, protocols will  need to be developed to identify which supply chain participants will be  involved in arming and disarming the technologies, reading the status  messages generated by the technologies, responding to alarms, and  accessing data.
section_title: Radiation Detection and Nonintrusive Imaging Technology Can Help Identify Container Contents
paragraphs: To prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials, as of  September 2010, CBP in coordination with DHS’s Domestic Nuclear  Detection Office (DNDO), has deployed over 1,400 radiation portal  monitors (RPM) at U.S. ports of entry. Most of the RPMs are installed in  primary inspection lanes through which nearly all traffic and shipping  containers must pass before they can exit U.S. ports. These monitors  alarm when they detect radiation. CBP then conducts further inspections  of the suspect contents at its secondary inspection locations to identify  the cause of the alarm and determine what further security measures, if  any, need to be taken.
While these RPMs are sensitive and have been effective at detecting  radiation, they also have limitations. In particular, in May 2009 we  reported that RPMs are capable of detecting certain nuclear materials  only when these materials are unshielded or lightly shielded. In contrast,  advanced nonintrusive inspection equipment can be used to detect dense  material that may be consistent with the presence of certain nuclear  materials. CBP already uses nonintrusive inspection equipment to more  closely investigate the contents of cargo containers that it has selected for  secondary inspection at a U.S. port of entry; however, according to CBP  officials, only a small percentage of vehicles or cargo containers are  subjected to secondary inspections.
Since 2006, we have been reporting on long-standing problems with  DNDO’s efforts to deploy advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) radiation  detection monitors, a more-advanced and significantly more-expensive  type of RPM designed to replace the RPMs CBP currently uses. GAO last  reported on ASP testing in 2009 and found that DHS’s cost analysis of  the ASP program did not provide a sound analytical basis for DHS’s  decision to deploy the portals. We also reported that an updated cost- benefit analysis might show that DNDO’s plan to replace existing  equipment with ASPs was not justified, particularly given the marginal  improvement in detection of certain nuclear materials required of the ASP  and the potential to improve the current-generation RPM’s sensitivity to  nuclear materials, most likely at a lower cost. DNDO officials stated that  they planned to update the cost-benefit analysis; however, after spending  more than $200 million on the program, in February 2010, DHS  announced that it was scaling back its plans for development and use of  the ASP, and subsequently announced in July 2011 that it was ending the  ASP program, which means DHS continues to face limitations in radiation  detection. Since DNDO continued ASP testing through 2011, GAO has  ongoing work to review, among other things, the results of testing of ASP  since 2009, lessons learned from the ASP program, and whether DNDO  plans to conduct additional ASP testing in the future.
Since 2005, DNDO was also engaged in trying to develop a more  advanced nonintrusive inspection equipment system in order to detect  nuclear materials that might be heavily shielded. In September 2010, we  reported that DNDO was simultaneously engaged in the research and  development phase while planning for the acquisition phase of its cargo  advanced automated radiography system (CAARS) to detect certain  nuclear materials in vehicles and cargo containers at ports.pursued the acquisition and deployment of CAARS machines without fully  understanding that they would not fit within existing primary inspection  lanes at CBP ports of entry. We reported that this occurred because,  during the first year or more of the program, DNDO and CBP had few  discussions about operating requirements. DHS spent $113 million on the  program since 2005 and canceled the development phase of the program  in 2007.
section_title: CBP Works with Foreign Governments, the Private Sector, and International Organizations to Implement Supply Chain Security Efforts
paragraphs: As part of its risk-management approach, CBP operates two voluntary  security programs—the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the  Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). CSI, through  partnerships with CBP’s foreign counterparts, is designed to target and  examine high-risk container cargo as early as possible in the global  supply chain. CSI places CBP officers at select foreign seaports to work  with host-country customs officials to identify and scan high-risk cargo  before it is shipped to the United States. CBP launched CSI in January  2002, and in fiscal year 2007 CBP reached its goal of operating CSI in 58  foreign seaports, and as of October 2011, these ports collectively  accounted for over 80 percent of the cargo containers shipped to the  United States. In 2005 and 2008, we made recommendations to CBP to  further strengthen the CSI program by, among other things, revising its  staffing model, developing performance measures, and improving  processes for gathering information. CBP generally agreed and took  action to implement these recommendations.to one of our recommendations, in January 2009, CBP began transferring  CSI staff from overseas ports to perform targeting remotely from the  National Targeting Center-Cargo in the United States. As part of this   For example, in response  effort, foreign staffing levels for CSI decreased from 170 in January 2009  to 86 in April 2011 while 32 positions were added to the National  Targeting Center – Cargo. As a result of the changes in its overseas  staffing model, CBP has experienced a decrease in operating costs of  over $35 million from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011.
While the CSI program involves partnerships between CBP and foreign  governments, the C-TPAT program is a government-to-business  partnership program that provides benefits to supply chain companies  that comply with predetermined security measures. Under C-TPAT, CBP  officials work with private companies to review their supply chain security  plans and improve members’ security measures. In return, C-TPAT  members may receive benefits, such as reduced scrutiny or expedited  processing of their shipments. CBP initiated C-TPAT in November 2001,  and as of November 2010, CBP had awarded initial C-TPAT  certification—or acceptance of the company’s agreement to voluntarily  participate in the program—to over 10,000 companies. C-TPAT  certified members are then subject to validation whereby CBP verifies  that the members’ security measures meet or exceed CBP’s minimum  security requirements. We previously reported that C-TPAT provides CBP  with a level of information sharing that would otherwise not be available  from nonmember companies. In 2008, we made recommendations to  CBP to strengthen C-TPAT program management, in part, by developing  performance measures and improving the process for validating security  practices of C-TPAT members. CBP has since implemented these  recommendations.
CBP also partners with international trade and security groups to develop  supply chain security standards that can be implemented by the  international community. In 2005, the WCO developed the Framework of  Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade—commonly referred to  as the SAFE Framework—for which the core concepts are based on  components of CBP’s CSI and C-TPAT programs. As of the publication of  the most recent edition of the SAFE Framework in June 2011, 164 of the  177 WCO member countries have pledged to adopt the framework. As  part of the SAFE framework, customs administrations may develop  Authorized Economic Operator programs that offer incentives to supply  chain companies that comply with predetermined minimum security  standards. For example, C-TPAT is the designated Authorized Economic  Operator program for the United States. According to data from the WCO,  as of May 2011, 59 countries, including the 27 member states of the  European Union, have implemented or have begun developing  Authorized Economic Operator programs.
CBP and the WCO anticipate that widespread adoption of these  standards could eventually lead to a system of mutual recognition  whereby the security-related practices and programs taken by the  customs administration of one country are recognized and accepted by  the administration of another. According to CBP, a system of mutual  recognition could lead to greater efficiency in providing security by, for  example, reducing redundant examinations of container cargo and  avoiding the unnecessary burden of addressing different sets of  requirements as a shipment moves through the supply chain in different  countries. As of June 2011, CBP has signed five Mutual Recognition  Arrangements and is currently working toward two more with other  customs administrations, according to CBP.
section_title: As The Deadline for 100 Percent Scanning Approaches, Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning
subsections: section_title: The Scope of the Secure Freight Initiative Has Decreased after Facing Numerous Challenges
paragraphs: In response to the SAFE Port Act requirement to implement a pilot  program to determine the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.- bound containers with both radiation detection and nonintrusive  equipment, CBP, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy  jointly announced the formation of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) pilot  program in December 2006. CBP selected three ports to implement the  SFI pilot program: Qasim, Pakistan; Puerto Cortes, Honduras; and  Southampton, United Kingdom.
In October 2009, we reported that while CBP and the Department of  Energy had made progress in integrating new technologies as part of the  SFI program, progress in implementing and expanding the scanning of  U.S.-bound cargo containers at participating ports was limited.  Specifically, according to CBP officials, while initiating the SFI program at  these ports satisfied the SAFE Port Act requirement to implement the  program at three ports, CBP also selected the ports of Hong Kong;  Busan, South Korea; and Salalah, Oman to more-fully demonstrate the  capability of the integrated scanning system at larger, more complex ports  with higher percentages of transshipment container cargo—cargo  containers from one port that are taken off a vessel at another port to be  placed on another vessel bound for the United States. However, these  ports faced numerous challenges in implementing the 100 percent  scanning requirement, as we reported in October 2009, and some ports  that initially agreed to participate in the SFI program did so for a limited  time, or on a limited basis. For example, the SFI program began  operating in one of the nine terminals at the port of Hong Kong in January  2008 and ended in April 2009. The SFI program was not renewed at the  port of Hong Kong based on a mutual decision by the Hong Kong  government and DHS, in part, because of concerns that equipment and  infrastructure costs, as well as costs to port efficiency, would make full  implementation of the SFI program at all of its terminals unfeasible. CBP  has since reduced the scope of the SFI program, and currently the only  port that continues to operate under SFI protocols is Qasim, Pakistan.
Logistical, technological, and other problems at participating ports have  prevented any of the participating ports from achieving 100 percent  scanning, as ultimately required by the 9/11 Act, leaving the feasibility  and efficacy of 100 percent scanning largely unproven. For example, we  reported in October 2009 that while CBP had been able to scan a majority  of U.S.-bound cargo containers from three comparatively low-volume  ports (Qasim, Puerto Cortes, and Southampton), at the higher volume  ports of Hong Kong and Busan, CBP had been able to scan no more than  5 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, on average. Additionally,  scanning operations at the initial SFI ports encountered a number of  challenges—including safety concerns, logistical problems with  containers transferred from rail or other vessels, scanning equipment  breakdowns, and poor-quality scan images. Furthermore, since the 9/11  Act did not specify who is to conduct the container scans or who is to pay  for scanning equipment or operations and maintenance, questions persist  regarding who will bear the costs of scanning.
In addition to the challenges CBP faced in implementing 100 percent  scanning at the select SFI pilot ports, CBP also faces a number of  potential challenges in integrating the 100 percent scanning requirement  with the existing container security programs that make up CBP’s layered  security strategy. The 100 percent scanning requirement is a departure  from existing container security programs in that it requires that all  containers be scanned before CBP determines their potential risk level.  Senior CBP officials and international trading partners say this change  differs from the risk-based approach based on international supply chain  security standards and accepted practices. Specifically, as we reported in  October 2009 and October 2010, foreign government officials have  expressed the view that 100 percent scanning is not consistent with risk- management principles as contained in the SAFE Framework. For  example, European and Asian customs officials we spoke with told us  that the 100 percent scanning requirement is in contrast to the risk-based  strategy, which serves as the basis for other U.S. programs, such as CSI  and C-TPAT. Further, the WCO, which represents 177 customs agencies  around the world, stated that the implementation of 100 percent scanning  would be “tantamount to abandonment of risk management.” Some  foreign governments have stated they may adopt a reciprocal  requirement that all U.S.-origin containers be scanned, which would  present additional challenges at domestic U.S. ports.
We recommended that CBP perform analyses to determine whether 100  percent scanning is feasible, and if so, the best way to achieve it; or,  alternatively, if it is not feasible, present acceptable alternatives. To date,  however, CBP has not conducted such a feasibility assessment. CBP has  not pursued a feasibility assessment, in part, due to the interagency effort  to develop the recently issued National Strategy for Global Supply Chain  Security. CBP officials told us in August 2011 that the agency’s position  was that a risk-based approach to global supply chain security was a  more feasible and responsible approach than 100 percent scanning. Further, CBP has not provided any details about any alternatives to 100  percent scanning that DHS or CBP may be considering.
section_title: DHS Intends to Issue a Blanket Extension Because 100 Percent Scanning Cannot be Implemented by the July 2012 Deadline
paragraphs: Additionally, according to CBP, the current SFI budget is focused on maintaining  operations at the remaining SFI port in Qasim, Pakistan, and funds are not presently  available to conduct a feasibility assessment. The current funding levels may be  attributed, in part, to CBP’s request to reduce funding for the SFI program. In CBP’s fiscal  year 2011 budget justification, CBP requested a reduction $16.6 million due to plans to  revert three of the SFI ports to CSI operations. containers regardless of risk. According to CBP’s fiscal year 2011 budget  justification, the SFI program is a “helpful but not essential part” of CBP’s  layered security strategy. In addition, the budget justification noted that  DHS will continue to use and, when appropriate, strengthen other means  to achieve the same goals of SFI, such as the 24-hour rule, the 10+2 rule,  and C-TPAT. Further, there is no mention of the 100 percent scanning  mandate or efforts to meet the mandate in the recently released National  Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security. Rather, the strategy notes that  the federal government intends to focus its efforts on “those  enhancements that result in the most significant improvement or  reduction in risk.”
As the July 2012 deadline in the mandate approaches, uncertainty  remains regarding DHS’s long term course of action to satisfy the 100  percent scanning mandate. As we previously reported, in the short term,  DHS acknowledged it will not be able to meet this deadline for full-scale  implementation of the 9/11 Act’s scanning requirement and will need to  grant extensions to those foreign ports unable to meet the scanning  deadline in order to maintain the flow of trade and comply with the 9/11  Act. The 9/11 Act allows DHS to grant an extension to a port or ports by  certifying that least two of six conditions exist, and as we previously  reported, DHS believes the last two conditions—(1) use of the equipment  to scan all U.S.-bound containers would significantly impact trade  capacity and the flow of cargo and (2) scanning equipment does not  adequately provide automatic notification of an anomaly in a container— could apply to all foreign ports that ship containers to the United States.  Therefore, DHS expects to grant a blanket extension to all foreign ports  pursuant to the statue, thus extending the target date for compliance with  this requirement by 2 years, to July 2014. To do so, the 9/11 Act requires  DHS to report to Congress 60 days before any extension takes effect on  the container traffic affected by the extension, the evidence supporting  the extension, and the measures DHS is taking to ensure that scanning  can be implemented as early as possible at the ports covered by the  extension. As a result, DHS will need to notify Congress by May 2,  2012, of any extensions it plans to grant.
Given that the feasibility of 100 percent scanning remains unproven and  DHS and CBP have not yet identified alternatives that could achieve the  same goals as 100 percent scanning, uncertainty persists regarding the  scope of DHS’s and CBP’s container security programs and how these  programs will collectively affect the movement of goods between global  trading partners.
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy  to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee  may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Stephen L. Caldwell at  202-512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. In addition to the contacts named above, Christopher  Conrad, Assistant Director, managed this review. Gene Aloise, Lisa  Canini, Frances Cook, Alana Finley, Rich Hung, Katie Mauldin, Jessica  Orr, Janay Sam, David Schmitt, Kevin Tarmann, and Ned Woodward  made key contributions to this statement.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and  Development of New Technologies. GAO-11-829T. Washington, D.C.:  July 15, 2011.
Maritime Security: Responses to Questions for the Record.  GAO-11-140R. Washington, D.C.: October 22, 2010.
Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container  Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational  Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended.  GAO-10-887. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2010.
Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting the Trade  Industry in Implementing the New Importer Security Filing Requirements,  but Some Challenges Remain. GAO-10-841. Washington, D.C.:  September 10, 2010.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication and  Oversight Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography  System to Detect Nuclear Materials. GAO-10-1041T. Washington D.C.:  September 15, 2010.
Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist  DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to  Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington,  D.C.: October 30, 2009.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from DHS Testing of  Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors. GAO-09-804T.  Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2009.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced  Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show Limits  of the New Technology. GAO-09-655. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2009.
Supply Chain Security: CBP Works with International Entities to Promote  Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but Challenges  Remain. GAO-08-538. Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has  Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges  Remain in Verifying Security Practices. GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.:  April 25, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign  Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance  Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25,  2008.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of  Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T.  Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment  Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts.  GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
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