Weapons Of Mass Destruction: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Addresses Broad Range of Threats, but Performance Reporting Can Be Improved
Published: 2004-02-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), within the Department of Defense (DOD), plays a key role in addressing the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the visibility of DTRA's role has increased as federal agencies and military commanders have looked to the agency for additional support and advice. GAO was asked to report on DTRA's (1) mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill this mission; (2) relationship with other government entities, specifically the Department of Energy and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and (3) process that it uses to prioritize resources and assess progress toward organizational goals.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since its establishment in 1998, DTRA has worked to address the threat of WMD. DTRA addresses WMD threats through four core functions: threat control, threat reduction, combat support, and technology development. The agency supports the implementation of arms control treaties by conducting inspections in other countries and by supporting inspections of U.S. facilities, reduces the threat of WMD by eliminating and securing weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union, supports military commanders by providing technical and analytical support regarding WMD, and develops technologies that support efforts to address the WMD threat. DTRA also uses its specialized capabilities and services in various ways to support other government efforts to address WMD threats. DTRA has a formal relationship with Energy to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. DTRA's relationship with DHS is subject to the broader DOD-DHS relationship and may change as the relationship between DOD and DHS evolves. The agency uses a strategic planning process modeled on the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) to prioritize its resources and assess progress toward its organizational goals. DTRA's planning process identifies long-term goals, establishes short-term objectives by which to measure progress in meeting goals, and collects data to assess progress. DTRA's planning process is influenced by funding, most of which is appropriated for specific programs. GAO found that the performance report resulting from its internal review summarized DTRA's accomplishments and activities but did not compare them with established goals and objectives nor explain the actions needed to achieve or modify these unmet goals as called for under GPRA.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), within the Department of  Defense (DOD), plays a key role in addressing the threats posed by  weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  With a fiscal year 2004 budget  request of more than $2.3 billion, the agency has a broad range of  responsibilities, including the support of combat commanders in defending  against nuclear, chemical, and biological threats on the battlefield and  monitoring international arms control treaties.  Since the September 11,  2001, attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon  in Washington, D.C., and the anthrax attack in Washington, D.C., federal  agencies and military commanders have increasingly looked to DTRA for  support and advice.
Because of the increased visibility of this agency’s role within DOD and in  relation to other federal agencies, particularly the Departments of Energy  and Homeland Security (DHS), you asked us to report on DTRA’s (1)  mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill this mission; (2) relationship  with other government entities, specifically Energy and DHS; and (3)  process that it uses to prioritize resources and assess progress toward  organizational goals.
To meet these objectives, we reviewed DTRA’s 2000, 2001, and 2003  strategic plans and interviewed its Director.  We reviewed supporting  documentation, including budget documents, historical records, program  and project plans, and assessments.  We also interviewed senior officials  from each of DTRA’s core functions and other DTRA officials and  contractors associated with specific programs.  We met with officials from  the Office of the Secretary of Defense to discuss their assessments of  DTRA and the agency’s relationships with other government entities.  In  addition, we interviewed officials from Energy to discuss its interaction  with DTRA, including the management of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In the early 1990s, DOD officials recognized that the proliferation of  chemical, biological, and nuclear materials that could be used to develop  WMD was a growing threat.  A series of terrorist attacks highlighted by the  1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack in Tokyo’s subway system heightened  concerns about U.S. vulnerability to a terrorist attack involving WMD.
Senior DOD leaders, supported by a Defense Science Board study,  concluded that DOD was not properly organized to focus on  nonproliferation and counterproliferation.
On October 1, 1998, DTRA was established, with a budget of approximately  $1.7 billion and almost 2,000 military and civilian personnel, to address all  aspects of the WMD threat.  The agency reports to the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, with the Under  Secretary of Defense for Policy providing input into several of DTRA’s  programs.  Additionally, DTRA responds to the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff pertaining to the agency’s support of military commanders.  Table 1 provides data on DTRA’s budget and personnel since the agency’s  inception.  DTRA’s budget has increased by over $650 million (about 40  percent) since its establishment, of which over $450 million was due to  increases in the funding of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program  (CBDP).  Total personnel at DTRA also have increased.
DTRA is currently headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; maintains test  facilities in the United States; maintains a Defense Nuclear Weapons  School in New Mexico; and maintains permanent staff at other locations,  including Germany, Japan, and the Russian Federation, as seen in figure 1.   DTRA also maintains liaison officers at several locations, including the  combatant commanders’ headquarters, the National Guard Bureau, and the  Pentagon.
DTRA was established in 1998 through the consolidation of three agencies  and two programs, as shown in figure 2.  The Defense Special Weapons  Agency tested, analyzed, and provided assistance in developing new  technologies for maintaining and modernizing the nation’s nuclear  weapons.  The agency also worked to counter the effects of the use of  chemical and biological weapons against U.S. military bases and forces.   The Defense Technology Security Administration managed the DOD  license review process for the export of munitions and critical technologies  that have both civilian and military applications.  As part of this effort, the  Defense Technology Security Administration oversaw U.S. satellites  launched abroad.  The On-Site Inspection Agency, established as a result of  the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, carried out on-site  inspections to verify that treaty implementation was done in accordance  with all treaty requirements.  Throughout the 1990s, the agency’s  responsibilities were expanded as new treaties were ratified, and, in 2000,  the agency was asked to support the United Nation’s mission to monitor  and eliminate WMD in Iraq.
The two additional programs included in DTRA’s formation dealt  extensively with the threats posed by WMD and related materials.  The  Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program implemented a  congressionally mandated program to assist the nations of the former  Soviet Union in securing and eliminating their WMD stockpiles.  We have  undertaken several reviews of the DTRA-managed CTR program.  A list of  our reports concerning the CTR program appears at the end of this report.   In addition, CBDP was established in 1994 to consolidate, coordinate, and  integrate the chemical and biological defense requirements of all the  services into a single DOD program.  DTRA was given the responsibility to  administer the distribution of program funds, but the agency did not  directly manage the program.
To integrate these components, DTRA began a strategic planning process in  January 1999 and published its first strategic plan in March 2000.  DTRA  used the principles of the Government Performance and Result Act of 1993  (GPRA) to guide its planning process.  The act calls for agencies to develop  long-term strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual  assessment reports.  Also in 2000, DTRA realigned itself around four core  functions (1) threat control, (2) threat reduction, (3) combat support  (support to military forces), and (4) technology development.  Among these  core functions, DTRA officials have stressed combat support as its first  priority.
Three major changes have occurred in the agency’s responsibilities, as  illustrated in figure 2.  First, in August 2001, responsibility for the export  license review process shifted from DTRA to the reestablished Defense  Technology Security Administration.  According to senior officials, the  export license review process did not integrate well with other DTRA  functions and was more appropriately placed under the Under Secretary of  Defense for Policy.  Second, in March 2003, DTRA was assigned the mission  to support the elimination of WMD materials found in Iraq.  Third, in April  2003, DTRA was given the responsibility for managing the CBDP’s science  and technology program rather than just overseeing the funds  disbursement.
section_title: DTRA’s Mission Is to Address All Aspects of the WMD Threat
paragraphs: DTRA carries out its mission to address the threat posed by WMD through  four core functions:  (1) threat control, (2) threat reduction, (3) combat  support, and (4) technology development.  First, the agency controls the  threat of WMD through inspections of Russian facilities to ensure  compliance with treaties limiting WMD, as well as supporting inspections  of U.S. facilities by foreign inspectors.  Second, DTRA works to reduce the  WMD threat by securing and eliminating WMD materials, such as  destroying aircraft and missiles, through the CTR program in the former  Soviet Union.  Third, DTRA supports military commanders by providing  technical and analytical support regarding WMD threats on the battlefield  and U.S. installations.  Finally, DTRA develops technologies to assist in its  threat control and reduction efforts and in the support of military  operations, such as developing weapons and sensor technologies to  destroy or detect WMD and related materials.  Figure 3 provides examples  of DTRA activities in each of these areas.
subsections: section_title: Threat Control Focuses on Inspection and Treaty Activities
paragraphs: DTRA implements U.S. responsibilities established under four arms control  treaties dealing with WMD and other treaties and agreements.  DTRA  conducts on-site inspections at other nations’ WMD facilities and supports  on-site inspections of U.S. facilities by foreign inspectors.  These  inspections are carried out in accordance with agreements between the  U.S. and other governments.  The agency provides inspectors,  transportation, and linguists in support of inspection efforts, and also  provides visa and passport support for visiting inspection teams.  Table 2  shows nine treaties and agreements and DTRA’s role in each.
section_title: Threat Reduction Has Focused on the WMD Threat in the Former Soviet Union
paragraphs: DTRA works to reduce the threat of WMD primarily through its activities  with the CTR program, which assists the states of the former Soviet Union  to (1) destroy WMD in the former Soviet Union, (2) safely store and  transport weapons in connection with their destruction, and (3) reduce the  risk of the WMD proliferation.  Our previous reviews of the CTR program  have found that it has faced two critical challenges:  the Russian  government has not always paid its agreed-upon share of program costs,  and Russian ministries have often denied U.S. officials access to key  nuclear and biological sites (see the list of prior GAO reports at the end of  this report).  In addition to the CTR program, DTRA was recently tasked to  secure and destroy any WMD or related materials that might be found in  Iraq.
The CTR program has removed nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan,  Ukraine, and Belarus inherited from the former Soviet Union, and the  United States continues to work with Russia and other former Soviet states  in WMD elimination programs.  According to agency documents, the CTR  program had, as of October 31, 2003, overseen the destruction of 520 of  1,473 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 451 of 831 missile silos, 122 of 205  strategic bombers, and 27 of 48 strategic missile submarines that the  United States and former Soviet Union agreed to destroy.  WMD  destruction programs continue with CTR overseeing projects to eliminate  missile fuel and launcher equipment.  DTRA personnel have also  supervised the securing of chemical weapons and are overseeing the  construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye,  Russia.
DTRA also assists with the storing and transporting of WMD materials as  part of the CTR program.  For example, DTRA is overseeing the  construction of a facility that will be used to securely store nuclear  materials from weapons at Mayak, Russia.  This project, however, has  suffered from both a lack of committed Russian funding and access to the  site.  As a result, the project, once scheduled to begin accepting nuclear  materials for storage in 1998, will not begin to do so until 2004.   Additionally, DTRA works through the CTR program to enhance the  security and safety of biological pathogens located at research centers in  the former Soviet Union, such as at Novosibirsk and Obolensk.  However,  lack of Russian cooperation has affected DTRA’s ability to access other  suspected biological facilities, and, after 4 years of effort, DOD has made  little progress in addressing security concerns at the 49 biological sites  where Russia and the United States have collaborative programs.
DTRA works to prevent the spread of WMD through continuing contacts  with former Soviet Union military personnel and providing expertise and  equipment to the countries of the former Soviet Union to enhance border  security.  According to agency documents, in fiscal year 2002, the CTR  program sponsored 423 contacts with former Soviet Union military  personnel in support of various efforts to halt the spread of WMD.
In March 2003, DTRA was also assigned the responsibility of destroying any  WMD materials found in Iraq.  Agency personnel accompanied combat  forces into Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  For example, DTRA  teams were involved in searching the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center to  recover, inventory, and safeguard several tons of non-weapons-grade  uranium and other radiological materials.  DTRA personnel remain in Iraq  and continue to support efforts to search for WMD and WMD-related  materials.  If WMD are found, DTRA personnel would have the  responsibility for securing and eliminating them.
section_title: DTRA Supports U.S. Military Forces in Addressing WMD Threats
paragraphs: DTRA provides a wide variety of support to military commanders in their  efforts to address WMD threats.  DTRA provides liaison officers to assist  military commanders in their planning and conduct of military operations.   For example, DTRA personnel assisted military commanders during the  recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq by providing information on the  appropriate weapons to use on suspected WMD storage sites, how to  counter the effects of WMD that might be used on coalition forces, and how  to secure and dispose of any WMD or WMD-related materials that might be  found. DTRA also developed a handbook used by troops in Iraq for how to  recognize and handle WMD and WMD-related materials.  In addition, these  efforts are supported by DTRA’s operations center, which responds to  WMD-related requests for expertise, computer modeling of potential  events, and support for training exercises.
DTRA teams evaluate the security of personnel and facilities worldwide  and assess the survivability of specific infrastructure crucial to maintaining  command and control of U.S. forces.  According to agency documents,  DTRA evaluates 80 to 100 DOD installations per year through Joint Staff  Integrated Vulnerability Assessments, which are broad in scope and focus  on the overall safety and security of personnel.  For example, agency teams  assess physical security plans, review architectural and structural  drawings, and perform analyses of potential blast effects to recommend  procedural, structural, or other enhancements to reduce vulnerabilities.   These assessments were instituted in the aftermath of (1) the Khobar  Towers bombing in 1996 and (2) the publication of a subsequent DOD  report in 1997 that determined there were no published standards for  securing personnel and facilities.  In addition, DTRA conducts Balanced  Survivability Assessments to evaluate specific U.S. and allied infrastructure  crucial in maintaining command and control of all U.S. forces.  These  assessments evaluate the ability of power, heating, computer, and  communications systems to continue functioning in the event of a WMD  attack, accident or natural disaster, technological failure, or sabotage.   According to agency officials, DTRA teams conduct an average of 8  Balanced Survivability Assessments per year, but that number rose  temporarily to 30 to meet additional requirements.
DTRA provides additional support to military commanders through the  Defense Nuclear Weapons School and Consequence Management Advisory  Teams (CMAT).  DTRA operates the Defense Nuclear Weapons School in  Albuquerque, New Mexico, to train military and civilian personnel in  various aspects of WMD.  The school originally focused on training military  personnel in the aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons and their effects.  The  school now includes other areas of the WMD threat, such as addressing the  civil and military responses to radiological, chemical, and biological  attacks or accidents and preventing the spread of WMD.  Additionally,  DTRA maintains and deploys teams to deal with the effects of WMD use.   The agency has CMATs whose purpose is to mitigate the effects of WMD  use or accidents.  CMATs also work with military and civilian authorities by  conducting training exercises that simulate the effects of WMD use or  accidents in the United States and overseas.
section_title: DTRA Works to Develop Technologies to Address the WMD Threat
paragraphs: To assist in WMD threat control activities, DTRA has developed  technologies that detect WMD.  For example, the agency has been  developing sensors to help countries of the former Soviet Union prevent  smuggling of WMD or WMD-related materials across borders.  DTRA has  also developed computer-tracking systems to help member countries  comply with the reporting obligations stated in treaties and other  agreements.  The agency also works to develop ways to protect military  equipment and personnel from WMD effects and manages and operates  various technology testing facilities, such as facilities that simulate the  effects of electromagnetic energy or radiation on military equipment in the  event a nuclear weapon is detonated.  Additionally, DTRA has also  developed software to model nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks or  accidents.
DTRA does not have its own laboratories.  Rather, the agency uses existing  institutions, such as the service laboratories (Departments of the Army,  Navy, and Air Force), and national laboratories as well as academic  institutions.  For example, in response to the military requirement for a  specialized weapon to bomb caves and tunnels in Afghanistan, DTRA  organized a team that employed products and expertise from the Navy, Air  Force, Energy, and industry, which allowed DTRA to develop, test, and  deploy a weapon that could be used to attack cave and tunnel targets.   DTRA has also worked to develop specialized incendiary devices that  would destroy WMD material held in a storage facility.
To support DTRA’s efforts to address the WMD threat, the agency’s  Advanced Systems Concepts Office (ASCO) works to address ways to  identify, anticipate, and address technology gaps to improve agency  capabilities.  For example, ASCO personnel with scientific expertise work  to analyze the potential threat to military forces of pathogens such as  bubonic plague, E. coli, and Ebola.  DTRA also has overseen a project to  test the ability of military facilities to protect against and recover from the  consequences of chemical and biological attacks.  From 2001 to 2003,  DTRA and other military personnel undertook a series of exercises,  technology demonstrations, and assessments at the U.S. Air Force base at  Osan, Korea, to determine different ways to defend military forces and  facilities against chemical and biological attacks.
section_title: DTRA Works with Other Government Agencies
paragraphs: As the DOD agency responsible for addressing all aspects of WMD threats,  DTRA possesses specialized capabilities and services that can assist  civilian entities, including Energy and DHS.  DTRA has a formal  relationship with Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration  (NNSA) that coordinates and supports legislatively mandated joint DOD- Energy responsibilities for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.  DTRA also  works with NNSA to secure nuclear materials in Russia.  DTRA works with  DHS offices on programs related to WMD issues, such as the International  Counterproliferation Program and crisis response exercises.  DTRA’s  interface with DHS is through DOD’s newly established Office of the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.  DTRA’s relationship  with DHS may be subject to change as the broader DOD-DHS relationship  evolves.  In addition to its relations with NNSA and DHS, DTRA also works  with and supports other federal agencies, state and local governments, and  governments with which the United States has bilateral agreements.
subsections: section_title: DTRA Works on Many Programs with the Department of Energy
paragraphs: DTRA works closely with Energy’s NNSA in matters pertaining to the U.S.  nuclear weapons stockpile.  This relationship has its roots in the 1946  Atomic Energy Act, which establishes joint DOD and NNSA responsibility  for the U.S. nuclear weapons program, including ensuring the safety,  security, and control of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.  These  activities are conducted through the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), the  senior-level body dedicated to these activities.  DTRA plays an active role in  all activities of the NWC, from participating as an observer on the NWC to  membership on its subordinate bodies.  In addition, both DTRA and NNSA  are responsible for providing the working staff for the NWC.  DTRA also  works with NNSA on various nuclear weapons issues associated with the  U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship program, such as nuclear surviviability, nuclear surety, and nuclear weapons effects.  According to  both DTRA and NNSA officials, coordination between DTRA and NNSA on  activities related to these issues takes place at various levels, such as  serving on committees and working groups, cooperating on research, and  participating on various ad hoc working groups.  For example, DTRA and  NNSA are currently engaged in a joint study to understand nuclear  weapons effects and develop simulation techniques to address survivability  of U.S. weapons systems in nuclear environments.
DTRA also works with Energy to implement various agreements, research  projects, and training and exercises.  According to DOD documents, DTRA  works with Energy on a variety of agreements related to nuclear weapons,  including the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, the Plutonium  Disposition Agreement, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.  In addition,  DTRA works with Energy laboratories on joint research projects, working  groups, and field tests.  For example, DTRA is currently working with the  laboratories on the development of DOD’s unconventional nuclear warfare  defense program, which is developing tools for detecting an  unconventionally delivered nuclear or radiological weapon.  DTRA and  Energy work on programs to secure nuclear warheads in Russia, but, as we  reported in March 2003, these efforts face several coordination issues, such  as deciding which agency will secure sites identified in both of their plans  and coordinating the type of equipment used and guard force training.
section_title: DTRA’s Relationship with DHS Is Dependent on the Broader DOD-DHS Relationship
paragraphs: DTRA worked and continues to work with several government entities that  are now part of DHS.  For example, DTRA works with the U.S. Customs  Service on the congressionally mandated International  Counterproliferation Program, which is designed to prevent the illicit  movement of WMD material, technology, and expertise.  As the executive  agent, DTRA implements this program in cooperation with the U.S.  Customs Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  DTRA works  with these two agencies to develop courses and training exercises that  provide training and equipment to customs, border guards, and law  enforcement personnel in 25 countries of the former Soviet Union, the  Baltic region, and Eastern Europe.
DTRA also works with DHS on joint exercises and interagency working  groups.  For example, DTRA, DHS, and Energy recently sponsored and  participated in a joint atmospheric dispersion study in Oklahoma City.   According to documentation, the study conducted a series of experiments  to evaluate current outdoor atmospheric dispersion models and to advance  the knowledge of the dispersion of contaminants in urban environments  and building interiors.  In addition, DTRA participates with DHS entities in  interagency working groups that address issues of homeland security and  preparedness.
According to DTRA officials, the agency is working to share information  and experiences with DHS for homeland security applications.  For  example, DTRA has shared with DHS information regarding its experience  on demonstrations conducted as part of the unconventional nuclear  warfare defense program.  In addition, DTRA has also shared with DHS the  WMD crisis decision guides that it developed for DOD.  These guides  provide response plans for various WMD scenarios.  According to DTRA  officials, DHS used the response plans for WMD scenarios that are outlined  in these crisis decision guides to develop its own WMD response plans.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense,  within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was recently established as  the focal point for DOD’s interaction with DHS and the interagency  community for homeland security issues.  This newly established office is  responsible for ensuring internal coordination of DOD policy direction and  for coordinating activities with DHS.  Therefore, the coordination of all  new activities, programs, and assistance related to the threat of WMD that  involve DTRA and DHS is the responsibility of this office.  DTRA’s  relationship with DHS is subject to the broader DOD-DHS relationship and  therefore may change.  The new relationship between DOD and DHS itself  is still evolving because the roles and responsibilities of the two  departments are still under development.
section_title: DTRA’s Expertise Is Shared with Civilian Entities
paragraphs: DTRA has provided various capabilities and services, such as vulnerability  assessments and first-responder training programs to civilian government  entities.  DTRA’s capabilities for conducting vulnerability assessments are  used to perform vulnerability assessments of civilian facilities and  personnel.  After the events of September 11, 2001, DTRA was called upon  to complete vulnerability assessments of several federal buildings, such as  the U.S. Capitol Building and U.S. Supreme Court, as well as vulnerability  assessments of commercial U.S. ports.  DTRA shares its capabilities and  expertise by providing training programs to civilian entities.  For example,  the agency provides training to the National Guard for performing  vulnerability assessment of infrastructure.  DTRA also provides WMD and  first-responder awareness training to state and local government entities.
In addition, DTRA provides informational support—ranging from modeling  to subject matter expertise—to civilian government entities and bilateral  partners through the services of its operations center.  For example, the  operations center modeled the potential spread of contamination resulting  from a chemical spill of a derailed train by using the agency’s software for  chemical weapon attack models.  Finally, DTRA’s expertise is also shared  with governments with which the United States has bilateral agreements.   For example, according to senior DTRA officials, the WMD handbooks  developed by DTRA were provided to allied forces supporting U.S. efforts  in Iraq, and DTRA has conducted vulnerability assessments for allies.   Finally, DTRA is also involved in interagency programs that address issues  related to WMD threats.  For example, DTRA supports the integration of  the DOD Technical Support Working Group that conducts a national  interagency response and development program for combating terrorism.   Participants in this program include DOD, Energy, State, the Federal  Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Aviation Administration.
section_title: DTRA’s Planning Process Establishes Priorities and Summarizes Progress, but Achievements Are Not Reported against Goals
paragraphs: DTRA uses a strategic planning process, guided by the principles of GPRA,  to prioritize its resources and assess its progress.  It has developed  strategic plans identifying long-term goals and short-term objectives by  which it measures progress in meeting its goals.  These objectives are  affected by funding that comes from several appropriations, some of which  must be spent on specific activities, such as the funding for the CTR  program.  Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of  Defense assess DTRA every 2 years.  In 2002, DTRA completed its first  internal self-assessment, which it intends to do annually.  We found that the  performance report resulting from the self-assessment summarized the  agency’s accomplishments and activities but did not assess its progress  against established annual performance goals.
subsections: section_title: Strategic Planning Process Establishes Agency’s Priorities
paragraphs: DTRA has incorporated GPRA principles in its planning process.  Under  GPRA, agencies should prepare 5-year strategic plans that set the general  direction for their efforts.  These plans should include comprehensive  mission statements, general and outcome-related goals, descriptions of  how those goals will be achieved, identification of external factors that  could affect progress, and a description of how performance will be  evaluated.  Agencies should then prepare annual performance plans that  establish connections between the long-term goals in the strategic plans  with the day-to-day activities of program managers and staff.  These plans  should include measurable goals and objectives to be achieved by a  program activity, descriptions of the resources needed to meet these goals,  and a description of the methods used to verify and validate measured  values.  Finally, GPRA requires that the agency report annually on the  extent to which it is meeting its goals and the actions needed to achieve or  modify those goals that were not met.
DTRA’s current strategic plan, issued in 2003, contains most of the elements  in a strategic plan developed using GPRA standards.  This plan lays out the  agency’s five goals, which serve as the basis of its individual units’ annual  performance plans: (1) deter the use and reduce the impact of WMD, (2)  reduce the present threat, (3) prepare for future threats, (4) conduct the  right programs in the best manner, and (5) develop people and enable them  to succeed.  These long-term goals are further broken down into four or  five objectives, each with 6 to 17 measurable tasks under each objective.   These tasks have projected completion dates and identify the DTRA unit  responsible for the specific task.  For example, under the goal “deter the  use and reduce the impact of WMD” is the objective “support the nuclear  force.”  A measurable task under this objective is to work with Energy to  develop support plans for potential resumption of underground nuclear  weapons effects testing.  The technology development unit in DTRA is  expected to complete this task by the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2004.  The  strategic plan does not discuss external factors that could affect goal  achievement, but it does have a discussion of how performance will be  measured externally, by other DOD components, and internally through an  annual performance report.
Each unit within DTRA develops its own annual performance plan that  identifies the activities to be completed each year with available funding.   These plans do not use the same format, but they all include goals,  performance measures by which to measure achievement of those goals,  and a link to the strategic plan to show how they support the long-term  goals of the agency.  DTRA’s leadership discusses each unit’s plan to  validate the prioritization of resources and establish the unit’s priorities.   DTRA’s annual performance plan consists of these units’ plans and detailed  budget annexes.  DOD guidance now requires DTRA to submit a  consolidated annual performance plan to the DOD comptroller to facilitate  DOD’s GPRA reporting.  DTRA is in the process of making the unit plans  more consistent for fiscal year 2004.
section_title: DTRA’s Planning Is Influenced by Its Funding
paragraphs: Most of DTRA’s funding is appropriated only for specific programs over  which it has various levels of control.  First, it administers the funding for  CBDP.  Second, it receives money that Congress provides solely for the  CTR program that DTRA is in charge of managing with congressional  direction.  Third, it receives funding that it can spend according to its own  priorities, while meeting certain mission requirements, such as treaty  implementation work.  Fourth, it receives reimbursements from other  federal entities for some activities, such as vulnerability assessments  conducted for non-DOD agencies.  Figure 4 shows the funding profile for  DTRA in fiscal year 2004.
Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP)
Funds to DTRA from Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program   (fenced off funding)
As shown in figure 4, DTRA’s administration of CBDP includes funds that it  uses, distributes, and manages.  DTRA uses a portion of the CBDP funds for  large-scale technology demonstration projects, such as a project that  focused on restoring operations at bases attacked by chemical or biological  agents.  The agency distributes a large portion of the CBDP funds to others  for various purposes, such as procuring chemical suits for the military  forces.  Recently, in April 2003, DTRA was given the responsibility for  managing the CBDP’s Science and Technology projects, which are  conducted by various laboratories and research institutes throughout the  country.
section_title: DTRA Undergoes External and Internal Reviews, but Reporting on Internal Review Could Be Improved
paragraphs: DTRA undergoes two DOD reviews—the Biennial Defense Review  commissioned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Combat  Support Agency Review conducted for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff.  These reviews focus on how well DTRA meets its customers’  requirements as a combat support agency.  Overall, these two reviews have  concluded that DTRA supports the requirements of the operating military  forces and provides useful products and services.
The most recent biennial review was issued December 2002.  DTRA was  assessed on its combat support, technology development, and threat  reduction and control efforts.  DTRA’s efforts at threat reduction and  control received high satisfaction ratings from the customers surveyed.   The agency received acceptable satisfaction ratings in combat support but  had below average ratings in the area of technology development.
In 2001, the Combat Support Agency Review Team conducted an  assessment of DTRA’s responsiveness and readiness to support operating  forces in the event of war or threat to national security.  The Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required by law to conduct assessments of all  combat support agencies every 2 years.  The review team went to the  commands supported by DTRA and conducted extensive interviewing and  fieldwork regarding the support provided by DTRA.  In the 2001  assessment, DTRA was commended for significant improvements in  customer orientation and combat support focus.  DTRA was found to be  ready to support the requirements of the operating forces.  A major finding  in the assessment concerned DTRA’s ongoing work on decontamination  standards for airbases and strategic air and sealift assets.  The study  acknowledged that DTRA was supporting the development of these  standards, but, as DOD’s center of WMD expertise, it needs to provide  commanders with the best possible information currently available, rather  than wait until all studies have been completed.  A Combat Support Agency  Review Team official stated that DTRA has addressed the findings of the  2001 assessment, and that the 2003 assessment was delayed by operations  in Iraq but should be released in early 2004.
As part of the GPRA process, DTRA produced its first annual performance  assessment in 2002.  GPRA requires that agencies report on the extent to  which they are meeting their annual performance goals and the actions  needed to achieve or modify the goals that have not been met.  DTRA’s  performance report did not compare the agency’s achievements to its  goals, discuss the areas where DTRA fell short of its goals, or discuss  DTRA’s plans to address goals that it did not achieve.  For example, in the  threat control area, the agency discussed the number of missions  conducted and the equipment provided under the International  Counterproliferation Program without stating the program’s goals.  In the  threat reduction area, the report discussed the number of weapons systems  eliminated in the former Soviet Union and other achievements, such as  implementing security measures over chemical stockpiles at two sites,  again, without discussing the goals of the program.  In the area of combat  support, the report discussed the number of vulnerability and survivability  assessments, training exercises of all types, and number of training courses  provided, but does not discuss how many of each were planned.  Finally, in  the technology development area, the report discussed several  technologies developed or under development but does not discuss the  agency’s plans for the year.  See figure 5 for a comparison of what is  expected in an annual performance report and what DTRA’s report  contained.
Although this information is not in DTRA’s performance report, we found  that DTRA leadership meets quarterly to assess progress in meeting each  unit’s goals and discuss activities that are not on track.  Further, DTRA  leadership discusses what needs to be done to get on track and whether  goals are unrealistic or not within its control.  For example, according to  agency officials, they have in the past transferred funding from CTR  programs that were having problems into successful CTR programs to  prevent those funds from being lost because congressionally provided  funds must be spent within a certain time frame.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: When DTRA was established in 1998, it modeled its strategic planning  process on GPRA to prioritize resources and assess progress toward its  organizational goals.  Although DTRA officials do measure progress against  these goals in quarterly reviews, the agency’s performance report does not  capture the findings from these reviews.  The performance report does not  compare accomplishments and activities with established goals and  objectives, nor does it explain what actions are needed to achieve or  modify goals that are not met.  Providing this information would allow  decision makers outside of DTRA to have better information regarding  DTRA’s performance.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: We recommend that the Director of DTRA improve the agency’s annual  performance report by comparing the agency’s actual performance against  planned goals and, where appropriate, explaining why the goals were not  met and the agency’s plan for addressing these unmet goals in the future.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DTRA provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are  reproduced in appendix I.  In these comments, DTRA concurred with our  recommendation to improve DTRA’s annual performance report by  including a comparison of the agency’s actual performance against planned  goals and, where appropriate, explain why goals were not met, and the  agency’s plan for addressing these unmet goals in the future.  DTRA stated  that it is refining its performance report methodology to better address the  linkage of reported performance to planned goals and future efforts.  DTRA  also separately provided technical comments that we discussed with  relevant officials and included in the text of the report where appropriate.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To report on DTRA’s mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill that  mission, we reviewed agency documentation.  Specifically, we reviewed  historical documents, including documentation of interviews of the DOD  senior officials responsible for the creation of DTRA, and other agency  mission documentation.  We relied on our prior work that reviewed specific  DTRA projects.  In addition, we interviewed DTRA officials, including the  agency’s Director, senior leadership from each of DTRA’s units responsible  for the agency’s mission, other DTRA staff, and DTRA contractor  personnel.  Finally, we attended a 3-day DTRA liaison officer training class  to learn how DTRA trains its liaison officers about the variety of  capabilities and services it can offer to military forces in the field.  We did  not assess the effectiveness of DTRA’s programs.
To discuss DTRA’s relationship with other government entities, we  reviewed the agency’s documentation of programs and activities that it  undertakes with other government entities.  We reviewed documents  provided by DTRA and NNSA staff regarding NWC responsibilities.  In  addition, we interviewed DTRA, DOD, Energy, and NNSA officials about  DTRA’s coordination with Energy and NNSA.  We relied on documentation  and discussions with DOD officials regarding the nature of DTRA’s  relationship with DHS.  We also relied upon our previous audits reviewing  DHS and DOD to ascertain the nature of the relationship.
To determine how DTRA prioritizes its resources to meet its mission  objectives, we reviewed DTRA’s 2000, 2001, and 2003 strategic plans.  We  reviewed supporting documentation, including budget documents,  program and project plans, and internal and external assessments of DTRA.   Specifically, we compared DTRA’s strategic plan, each unit’s annual  performance plans for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and documentation on  the units’ ongoing assessments of their activities with what we have  reported should be found in GPRA-based documents.  We met with DTRA  officials to discuss the agency’s planning and review process and with  officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to discuss their  assessments of DTRA.
We also relied on related prior GAO reports.  We performed our review  from April 2003 to December 2003 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Defense  Threat Reduction Agency.  We will also make copies available to others  upon request.  In addition, this report will be available at no cost on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-8979 if you or your staff have any questions  about this report.  Key contributors to this report were F. James Shafer,  Hynek Kalkus, Monica Brym, Tim Wilson, Etana Finkler, Lynn Cothern,  Martin de Alteriis, and Ernie Jackson.
section_title: Related GAO Products
subsections: section_title: GAO Products Covering the CTR Program
paragraphs: Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. GAO-03-1008R.   Washington, D.C.:  July 18, 2003.
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. GAO-03-627R.   Washington, D.C.:  April 8, 2003.
Weapons of Mass Destruction:  Additional Russian Cooperation Needed  to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites.
GAO-03-482.  Washington, D.C.:  March 24, 2003.
Weapons of Mass Destruction:  Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction  and Nonproliferation Programs in Russia. GAO-03-526T.  Washington,  D.C.:  March 5, 2003.
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. GAO-03-341R.  Washington, D.C.:  December 2, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat  Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO- 02-426.  Washington, D.C.:  May 16, 2002.
Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of  Assistance, but Procedural Limitations Remain. GAO-01-694.  Washington, D.C.:  June 19, 2001.
Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers  Benefits, Poses New Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-138. Washington, D.C.:  April 28,  2000.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some U.S. Assistance to Redirect Russian  Scientists Taxed by Russia. GAO/NSIAD-00-154R. Washington, D.C.:  April  28, 2000.
Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD's 1997-98 Reports on Accounting for  Assistance Were Late and Incomplete. GAO/NSIAD-00-40. Washington,  D.C.:  March 15, 2000.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Efforts to Reduce the Threats from the  Former Soviet Union. GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-00-119. Washington, D.C.:  March 6, 2000.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May  Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned. GAO/NSIAD-99-76. Washington,  D.C.:  April 13, 1999.
Cooperative Threat Reduction: Review of DOD's June 1997 Report on  Assistance Provided. GAO/NSIAD-97-218. Washington, D.C.:  September 5,  1997.
Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts in  the Former Soviet Union. GAO/NSIAD-97-101. Washington, D.C.:  April 11,  1997.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat  Assistance Has Improved. GAO/NSIAD-97-84. Washington, D.C.:  February  27, 1997.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction  Program. GAO/NSIAD-96-222. Washington, D.C.:  September 27, 1996.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Newly Independent States  Improve Their Nuclear Material Controls. GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-96-118.  Washington, D.C.:  March 13, 1996.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S Efforts to Improve Nuclear  Material Controls in Newly Independent States. GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89.  Washington, D.C.:  March 8, 1996.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat  Reduction Assistance Can Be Improved. GAO/NSIAD-95-191. Washington,  D.C.:  September 29, 1995.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from the Former  Soviet Union-An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165. Washington, D.C.:  June 17,  1995.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from the Former  Soviet Union. GAO/NSIAD-95-7. Washington, D.C.:  October 6, 1994.
Soviet Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Efforts to Help Former Soviet Republics  Secure and Destroy Weapons. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-5. Washington, D.C.:   March 9, 1993.
Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S.  Dismantlement Assistance. GAO/NSIAD-93-154. Washington, D.C.:  March  8, 1993.
Russian Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Implementation of the Soviet Nuclear  Threat Reduction Act of 1991. GAO/T-NSIAD-92-47. Washington, D.C.:  July  27, 1992.
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