Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to Address High-Risk Travelers and Strengthen Visa Security
Published: 2017-05-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DHS seeks to identify and interdict travelers who are potential security threats to the United States, such as foreign fighters and potential terrorists, human traffickers, drug smugglers and otherwise inadmissible persons, at the earliest possible point in time. DHS also adjudicates petitions for certain visa categories and has certain responsibilities for strengthening the security of the visa process, including oversight of VSP and VWP. State manages the visa adjudication process for foreign nationals seeking admission to the United States.
This statement addresses (1) CBP programs aimed at preventing high-risk travelers from boarding U.S.-bound flights; (2) ICE's management of VSP; and (3) DHS's oversight of VWP. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from March 2011 through January 2017, along with selected updates conducted in April 2017 to obtain information from DHS on actions it has taken to address prior GAO recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In January 2017, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operates predeparture programs to help identify and interdict high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights. CBP officers inspect all U.S.-bound travelers on precleared flights at the 15 Preclearance locations and, if deemed inadmissible, a traveler will not be permitted to board the aircraft. CBP also operates nine Immigration Advisory Program and two Joint Security Program locations, as well as three Regional Carrier Liaison Groups, through which CBP may recommend that air carriers not permit identified high-risk travelers to board U.S.-bound flights. CBP data showed that it identified and interdicted over 22,000 high-risk air travelers through these programs in fiscal year 2015 (the most recent data available at the time of GAO's report). However, CBP had not fully evaluated the overall effectiveness of these programs using performance measures and baselines. CBP tracked some data, such as the number of travelers deemed inadmissible, but had not set baselines to determine if predeparture programs are achieving goals, consistent with best practices for performance measurement. GAO recommended that CBP develop and implement a system of performance measures and baselines to better position CBP to assess if the programs are achieving their goals. CBP concurred and has established a working group to develop such measures and baselines.
In March 2011, GAO reported on the Visa Security Program (VSP) through which DHS's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deploys personnel to certain U.S. overseas posts to review visa applications. Among other things, GAO found that ICE did not collect comprehensive data on all VSP performance measures or track the time officials spent on visa security activities. DHS did not concur with GAO's recommendations to address these limitations, stating that ICE collected data on all the required performance measures and tracked VSP case investigation hours. However, GAO continues to believe DHS needs to address these limitations. GAO has ongoing work assessing U.S. agencies' efforts to strengthen the security of the visa process, including oversight of VSP, in which GAO plans to follow up on the findings and recommendations from its March 2011 report related to ICE's efforts to enhance VSP performance measurement.
In May 2016, GAO reported on DHS's oversight of the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which allows nationals from 38 countries to travel visa-free to the United States for business or pleasure for 90 days or less. GAO reported, among other things, that all 38 countries entered into required agreements, or their equivalents, to (1) report lost and stolen passports, (2) share identity information about known or suspected terrorists, and (3) share criminal history information. However, not all countries shared such information. In August 2015, DHS established a new requirement for VWP countries to implement the latter two agreements; however, DHS did not establish time frames for instituting the amended requirements. GAO recommended that DHS work with VWP countries to implement these agreements and DHS concurred. As of April 2017, DHS reported that officials are continuing to work with VWP countries on time frames for implementing program requirements.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO previously made recommendations to improve evaluation of CBP's predeparture programs' performance and strengthen DHS's oversight of VSP and VWP. DHS agreed with GAO's recommendations related to CBP's predeparture programs and VWP. DHS did not agree with some of GAO's recommendations related to VSP. GAO has ongoing work related to, among other things, DHS's management and oversight of VSP and plans to report later this year on the results of this work.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s body of work on U.S.  government programs and activities related to screening foreign nationals  seeking to travel to the United States on a temporary basis—either with a  nonimmigrant visa, or in some cases, without a visa. Each year, millions  of such temporary visitors legally enter the United States. From fiscal year  2010 through fiscal year 2015, the Department of State (State) issued  more than 52 million visas for business travel, pleasure, or for foreign and  cultural exchange student programs, among other things. In addition,  from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2015, more than 116 million  visitors were admitted to the United States under the Visa Waiver  Program (VWP), which allows nationals from 38 countries to apply for  admission to the country as temporary visitors for business or pleasure  without first obtaining a visa from a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seeks to identify and  interdict travelers who are potential security threats to the United States,  such as foreign fighters and potential terrorists, human traffickers, drug  smugglers, and otherwise inadmissible persons, at the earliest possible  point in the travel lifecycle to make the nation’s physical borders the last,  not the first, line of defense. DHS adjudicates petitions for certain visa  categories, and also has certain responsibilities for strengthening the  security of the visa process, including establishing visa policy and  managing the VWP. In particular, DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) is tasked with, among other duties, securing U.S.  borders and processing all travelers on U.S.-bound flights; inspecting all  people entering or applying for admission to the United States; and  screening VWP applicants to determine their eligibility to travel to the  United States under the program. In addition, DHS’s U.S. Immigration  and Customs Enforcement (ICE) oversees the Visa Security Program  (VSP) under which it deploys officials to certain U.S. embassies and  consulates to strengthen the visa process by working with State officials  in reviewing visa applications. State is responsible for visa adjudication  and issuance for foreign nationals seeking admission to the United States  and is responsible for managing the consular officer corps and its  functions at over 220 visa-issuing posts overseas.
Foreign nationals who wish to come to the United States on a temporary  basis and are not citizens or nationals of countries that participate in the  VWP must generally obtain a visa authorizing their travel. U.S. law  provides for the temporary admission of various categories of  nonimmigrants, such as tourists, foreign students, diplomats, and  temporary workers, who are admitted for an authorized period of stay,  consistent with any time limitation and other terms of admission. The  process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains  several steps, including document reviews; collection of biometrics  (fingerprints and full-face photographs); cross-referencing an applicant’s  name and biometrics against multiple databases maintained by the U.S.  government; and in-person interviews. Personal interviews with consular  officers are required by law for most foreign nationals seeking visas. For  an overview of the visa process, see figure 1.
The VWP was established in 1986 to facilitate the legitimate travel of  visitors for business or pleasure to the United States. Qualifying nationals  from the 38 countries participating in the VWP—for example, France,  Germany, and Hungary—may travel without a visa to the United States  for business or pleasure stays of up to 90 days. In 2007, Congress  passed the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act  of 2007, which mandated several changes to modernize the program  through enhanced bilateral cooperation on critical counterterrorism and  information-sharing initiatives, support and expansion of tourism and  business opportunities to enhance long-term competitiveness, and  strengthening of bilateral relationships. In particular, the U.S.  government began requiring each VWP country to enter into a
Lost and Stolen Passport (LASP) agreement to report information  about the theft or loss of passports,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6) arrangement to  share watch list information about known or suspected terrorists, and
Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) agreement to  establish frameworks for enhanced law enforcement cooperation,  including sharing of criminal history information.
The Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention  Act of 2015, which became law in December of that year, amended  certain requirements to provide enhanced security measures for the  program, among other purposes.
My testimony discusses: (1) CBP programs aimed at preventing high-risk  travelers from boarding U.S.-bound flights, (2) ICE’s management of the  VSP, and (3) DHS’s oversight of the VWP. This testimony is based on our  prior reports, in particular, those published in March 2011, May 2016, and  January 2017. For these reports, we examined program documentation,  such as standard operating procedures and agencies’ policies and  guidance, as well as agency data on program performance. We also  interviewed DHS and State officials, among others, in headquarters and  at U.S embassies and consulates. Additional details on the scope and  methodology are available in our published reports. In addition, this  statement contains updates to selected information from these reports.  For the updates, we collected information from DHS on actions it has  taken to address findings and recommendations made in prior reports on  which this statement is based. All of our work was conducted in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: CBP’s Air Predeparture Programs Interdict High-Risk Air Travelers, but CBP Has Not Fully Assessed the Programs’ Performance
subsections: section_title: CBP Identifies and Interdicts High-Risk Travelers before They Board U.S-Bound Flights
paragraphs: As we reported in January 2017, CBP electronically vets all travelers  before they board U.S.-bound flights and continues to do so until they  land at a U.S. port of entry. Through these vetting efforts, CBP seeks to  identify high-risk travelers from the millions of individuals who travel to the  United States each year. As we reported in January 2017, CBP’s vetting  and targeting efforts are primarily conducted by its National Targeting  Center (NTC) and entail (1) traveler data matching and analysis, (2) rules- based targeting, and (3) recurrent vetting. Specifically:
CBP’s primary method of identifying high-risk individuals is through  the comparison of travelers’ information (such as name, date of birth,  and gender) against records extracted from U.S. government  databases, including the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)—the  U.S. government’s consolidated terrorist watch list. Traveler data  matching focuses on identifying known high-risk individuals—that is,  individuals who may be inadmissible to the United States under U.S.  immigration law or who may otherwise pose a threat to homeland or  national security. CBP’s primary tool for vetting and targeting travelers  is the Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is a computer-based  enforcement and support system that compares traveler information  against intelligence and law enforcement data to identify high-risk  travelers. Traveler data matching occurs throughout the travel process  and, upon a positive or possible match, CBP officers can select these  individuals for further vetting, interviewing, and inspection.
CBP’s rules-based targeting efforts seek to identify unknown high-risk  travelers—that is, travelers for whom U.S. government entities do not  have available derogatory information directly linking them to terrorist  activities or any other actions that would make them potentially  inadmissible to the United States but who may present a threat and  thus warrant additional scrutiny. CBP identifies unknown high-risk  individuals by comparing their information against a set of targeting  rules based on intelligence, law enforcement, and other information.  NTC officials stated that these rules have identified potential high-risk  travelers, including potential foreign fighters. Rules-based targeting  evaluates travelers during the travel process and, in some cases, in  advance of the travel process. If a traveler is a rule “hit,” this individual  can be selected for further vetting, interviewing, and inspection.
CBP supports its traveler data matching and rules-based targeting  efforts through the use of recurrent vetting. NTC’s vetting, targeting,  and traveler data matching activities in ATS run 24 hours a day and  seven days a week and automatically scan updated traveler  information, when available. This process is to ensure that new  information that affects a traveler’s admissibility is identified in near  real time. Recurrent vetting occurs throughout the travel process and  continues until a traveler arrives at a domestic port of entry. For  example, after checking into a foreign airport, a traveler may have his  or her visa revoked for a security or immigration-related violation. Due  to recurrent vetting, CBP would be alerted to this through ATS and  could take action, as appropriate.
section_title: CBP’s Air Predeparture Programs Interdict High- Risk Travelers on U.S.- Bound Flights, but CBP Has Not Evaluated Overall Effectiveness of Air Predeparture Programs
paragraphs: As we reported in January 2017, throughout the travel process, CBP’s  predeparture programs use the results of NTC’s efforts to identify and  interdict high-risk individuals destined for the United States while they are  still overseas; however, we found that CBP had not evaluated the  effectiveness of its predeparture programs as a whole, including  implementing a system of performance measures and baselines to  assess whether the programs are achieving their stated goals.
CBP operates three air predeparture programs that are responsible for all  U.S.-bound air travelers—Preclearance; the Immigration Advisory  Program (IAP) and Joint Security Program (JSP); and the regional carrier  liaison groups (RCLG). As we reported in January 2017, CBP data  indicated that these programs identified and ultimately interdicted  approximately 22,000 high-risk air travelers in fiscal year 2015, the most  recent data available at the time of our review. Information on individuals  who the NTC identifies through traveler data matching or rules-based  targeting, including recurrent vetting, is compiled automatically through  ATS into a daily high-priority list, or traveler referral list. CBP officers at  the NTC review the traveler referral list for accuracy and to remove, if  possible, any automatically generated matches determined to not be  potential high-risk individuals. After this review, CBP officers at the NTC  use ATS to send the traveler referral list to officers at each Preclearance,  IAP, JSP, and RCLG location, as shown in figure 2.
Preclearance. Preclearance locations operate at foreign airports and  serve as U.S. ports of entry. Preclearance operations began in 1952 in  Toronto to facilitate trade and travel between the United States and  Canada. As of January 2017, CBP operated 15 air Preclearance locations  in six countries. Through the Preclearance program, uniformed CBP  officers at a foreign airport exercise U.S. legal authorities to inspect  travelers and luggage and make admissibility determinations prior to an  individual boarding a plane to the United States. According to CBP  officials, an inspection at a Preclearance location is the same inspection  an individual would undergo at a domestic port of entry, and officers  conducting Preclearance inspections exercise the same authority as  officers at domestic ports of entry to approve or deny admission into the  United States. As a result, travelers arriving at domestic air ports of  entry from Preclearance locations do not have to be re-inspected upon  entry. According to CBP data, in fiscal year 2015, CBP officers at  Preclearance locations determined that 10,648 air travelers were  inadmissible out of the approximately 16 million air travelers seeking  admission to the United States through a Preclearance location. In  addition to requiring that all travelers undergo a primary inspection, CBP officers in these locations also referred almost 290,000 individuals for  secondary inspection.
Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and Joint Security Program  (JSP). IAP and JSP operate at 9 and 2 foreign airports, respectively, as of  January 2017. According to CBP officials, under this program, unarmed,  plainclothes CBP officers posted at foreign airports partner with air  carriers and host country government officials to help prevent terrorists  and other high-risk individuals from boarding U.S.-bound flights by vetting  and interviewing them before travel. According to CBP program  documentation, CBP established IAP in 2004 to prevent terrorists, high- risk travelers, and improperly documented travelers from boarding airlines  destined to the United States. Building on the IAP concept, CBP  established JSP in 2009 to partner with host country law enforcement  officials to identify high-risk travelers. CBP officers at IAP and JSP  locations have the ability to question travelers and review their travel  documents. They are to act in an advisory manner to the air carriers and  host governments and do not have authority to deny boarding to  individuals on U.S.-bound flights or fully inspect travelers or their  belongings. IAP and JSP officers are authorized by CBP to make  recommendations to airlines as to whether to board or deny boarding  (known as a no-board recommendation) to selected travelers based on  their likely admissibility status upon arrival to the United States. The final  decision to board travelers, however, lies with the carriers. According to  CBP data, CBP officers at IAP and JSP locations made 3,925 no-board  recommendations in fiscal year 2015 for the approximately 29 million air  travelers bound for the United States from such locations. During this  same time period, CBP data indicated 1,154 confirmed encounters with  individuals on the TSDB, including 106 on the No Fly List.
Regional Carrier Liaison Groups (RCLG). RCLGs are located and  operate at three domestic airports—Miami International Airport, John F.  Kennedy International Airport, and Honolulu International Airport. CBP  established RCLGs in 2006 to assist air carriers with questions regarding  U.S. admissibility requirements and travel document authenticity.  According to CBP officials, RCLGs are responsible for coordinating with  air carriers on all actionable referrals from NTC on U.S.-bound travelers  departing from an airport without an IAP, JSP, or Preclearance presence.  Each RCLG is assigned responsibility for travelers departing out of a  specific geographic location. Similar to IAP and JSP, CBP officers in  RCLGs also make no-board recommendations, as appropriate, to air  carriers. CBP officers at RCLGs do not have authority to make  admissibility determinations about U.S.-bound air travelers, and the final  decision to board or not board a traveler lies with the carrier. CBP officers  working at the three RCLGs made 7,664 no-board recommendations in  fiscal year 2015 for the approximately 59 million travelers bound for the  United States from locations within the RCLGs’ spheres of responsibility.  During this time period, CBP data indicated that RCLGs also reported  1,634 confirmed encounters with individuals in the TSDB, including 119  on the No Fly List.
In January 2017, we reported that CBP had not evaluated the  effectiveness of its predeparture programs as a whole, including  implementing a system of performance measures and baselines to  assess whether the programs were achieving their stated goals. We  reported that CBP had taken some initial steps to measure the  performance of these programs. Specifically, CBP officials told us that  they had collected a large quantity of data and statistics regarding the  actions of their predeparture programs and had done so since program  inception for all programs. However, due to changes in operational focus,  technology updates, and the use of separate data systems at program  locations, CBP had not collected consistent data across all of its  predeparture programs. As a result, CBP did not have baseline data on  which to measure program performance. However, CBP officials stated at  the time that they had updated and uniform data collection systems that  were consistent across all predeparture programs, which would enable  CBP to identify performance baselines from fiscal year 2015 onward.  According to senior CBP officials, some of the results of these programs  were not easily measured. Officials also noted that relying on data alone  may not always present the most accurate picture of the true impact of  predeparture programs because changes to the travel process or other  factors may impact the programs in ways that are not fully captured by  the data. However, on the basis of our analysis of CBP’s documentation,  including official hearing statements, and interviews with program  officials, we found that CBP used these data as indicators of the  programs’ success.
According to GAO’s Program Evaluation Guide, which articulates best  practices for program evaluation, a program evaluation is a systematic  study using research methods to collect and analyze data to assess how  well a program is working and why. Moreover, consistent with  requirements outlined in the Government Performance and Results Act of  1993 (GPRA), as updated by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010,  performance measurement is the ongoing monitoring and reporting of  program accomplishments, particularly towards pre-established goals,  and agencies are to establish performance measures to assess progress  towards goals. Agencies can use performance measurement to make  various types of management decisions to improve programs and results,  such as developing strategies and allocating resources, and identify  problems and take corrective action. Therefore, we recommended that  CBP develop and implement a system of performance measures and  baselines for each program to help ensure that these programs are  achieving their intended goals. By using data from fiscal year 2015, for  example, to develop initial baselines, CBP could better measure program  performance towards meeting stated goals. In response, CBP established  a working group to develop and implement a system of performance  measures and baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of CBP’s  predeparture programs. As of December 2016, the working group was  gathering baseline data from fiscal year 2015 to compare with fiscal year  2016 data. In February 2017, CBP officials stated that the working group  had identified potential performance measures but needs to further refine  them. CBP officials stated that they expect to complete this work by the  end of June 2017.
section_title: ICE Aims to Strengthen Screening of Visa Applicants through its Visa Security Program
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized DHS to assign officers to  each diplomatic and consular post at which visas are issued, and also  authorized DHS to immediately assign personnel to Saudi Arabia to  review all visa applications prior to final adjudication. In response, DHS  implemented the Visa Security Program (VSP) in 2003, and as of March  2016, ICE had established 26 visa security units in 20 countries. VSP  aims to prevent terrorists and otherwise inadmissible travelers from  attempting to enter the United States by screening visa applicants before  the travel process begins. When reviewing applications for visas under  VSP, ICE screens applicant information to identify applicants that  potentially match records of individuals who are known or suspected  threats to the United States or have immigration violations or derogatory  information related to their criminal histories. In accordance with the  Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS officers assigned overseas are  authorized to perform the following functions: provide expert advice and training to consular officers regarding  specific security threats relating to the adjudication of individual visa  applications or classes of applications,  review any such visa applications either on the initiative of the  employee of the department or at the request of a consular officer, or  other persons charged with adjudicating such applications, and  conduct investigations with respect to consular matters under the  jurisdiction of the Secretary of Homeland Security.
In March 2011, we reported, among other things, on DHS’s efforts to  expand VSP and challenges to VSP operations overseas. For example,  we found that training of consular officers by VSP agents varied from post  to post, with some consular officers at some posts receiving no training.  Therefore, we recommended that DHS issue guidance requiring ICE to  provide training for consular officers. DHS concurred and issued guidance  to enhance the training of consular officers by VSP offices abroad.
We also found that ICE did not gather comprehensive data on all the  performance measures needed to evaluate the VSP mission objectives  and that the data that ICE collected on VSP activities were limited by  inconsistencies. Therefore, we recommended that ICE collect reliable  data to allow it to accurately evaluate VSP performance. DHS did not  concur with this recommendation and stated that VSP captured all the  required performance metrics. However, as we reported, we determined  that ICE was collecting some data on the required performance  measures, but that the data were not sufficient to accurately demonstrate  the progress made toward the program’s stated objectives. We continue  to believe that without collecting comprehensive data on performance  measures, DHS cannot accurately demonstrate progress of VSP in  enhancing national security. In addition, we found that VSP agents  performed various investigative and administrative functions beyond their  visa security responsibilities, which limited their time spent on visa  security activities, and ICE did not track this information in its tracking  system, making it unable to identify the time spent on investigative and  administrative functions. Therefore, we recommended that ICE develop a  mechanism to track the amount of time its agents spent on visa security  activities and other investigations to determine appropriate staffing levels  and resource needs for VSP operations. DHS did not concur with our  recommendation and stated that ICE tracked case investigation hours  through its case management system, and that adding the metric to the  VSP tracking system would be redundant. However, we found at the time,  according to ICE documentation, that ICE could not accurately determine  the amount of time that VSP agents spent on investigative and visa  security activities because ICE did not distinguish between the hours  logged by VSP agents and hours logged by other ICE officials at posts  abroad and that ICE did not maintain accurate data on the time VSP  agents spent on visa security activities at posts.
ICE did not take action to implement these recommendations and we  continue to believe that it needs to take steps to address issues we  identified. We have ongoing work assessing DHS, State, and other U.S.  agency efforts to strengthen the security of the visa process, including  oversight of VSP, in which we plan to follow up on the findings and  recommendations from our March 2011 report related to ICE’s efforts to  enhance VSP performance measurement, among other things. We plan  to report later this year on the results of this work.
section_title: All VWP Countries Have Entered into Information Sharing Agreements or Equivalents, but Not All Are Sharing Information as Required
paragraphs: In May 2016, among other things, we reported that all 38 countries  participating in the VWP had entered into the three types of required  information-sharing agreements, or their equivalents, to (1) report lost and  stolen passports, (2) share identity information about known or suspected  terrorists, and (3) share criminal history information. However, we  reported that not all countries had shared information through two of the  agreements. Specifically, we reported that all VWP countries reported  passport information through the first agreement, but about one-third of  VWP countries were not sharing terrorist identity information through the  second agreement and about one-third of the countries had not yet  shared criminal history information through the third agreement. Although  U.S. agencies receive law enforcement and national security information  from VWP countries through other means, such as multilateral entities,  the U.S. government identified the information-sharing agreements as  critical for protecting the United States from nationals of VWP countries  who might present a threat. For example, as we reported, information  provided through HSPD-6 arrangements has enhanced U.S. traveler- screening capabilities and improved U.S. agencies’ ability to prevent  known and suspected terrorists from traveling to the United States. Prior  to the December 2015 enactment of the Visa Waiver Program  Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015, U.S. law  required VWP countries to enter into, but did not specifically require that  countries implement, the information sharing agreements. DHS  announced in August 2015 that it had developed a new requirement that  countries implement the agreements by sharing information. However,  as we reported, DHS had not specified time frames for working with VWP  countries to institute this and other new VWP security requirements. In  May 2016, we recommended that DHS specify time frames for working  with VWP countries to institute the additional VWP security requirements,  including the requirement that the countries fully implement agreements  to share information about known or suspected terrorists through the  countries’ HSPD-6 arrangements and PCSC agreements with the United  States. DHS concurred with the recommendation and, as of April 2017,  reported that officials are continuing to work with VWP countries on time  frames for implementing program requirements.
Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members  of the Task Force, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Rebecca  Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. In addition, contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key  contributions to this testimony are Kathryn H. Bernet, Assistant Director;  Eric Hauswirth; Paul Hobart; Brandon Hunt; Hynek Kalkus; Thomas  Lombardi; Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi; Erin O’Brien; Mary Pitts; and Garrett  Riba.
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