Space Acquisitions: Space Based Infrared System Could Benefit from Technology Insertion Planning
Published: 2015-04-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: SBIRS is a key part of DOD's missile warning and defense systems. To replace the first two satellites currently on orbit, the Air Force plans to build two more with the same design as previous satellites. The basic SBIRS design is years old and some of its technology has become obsolete. To address obsolescence issues in the next satellites, the program must replace old technologies with new ones, a process that may be referred to as technology insertion or refresh. A Senate Armed Services Committee report included a provision for GAO to review an Air Force assessment of the feasibility of inserting newer technologies into the planned replacement satellites, SBIRS GEO satellites 5 and 6, and how it intends to address technology insertion issues for future satellite systems.
This report examines (1) the extent to which the Air Force assessed the feasibility of inserting newer technologies into SBIRS GEO satellites 5 and 6 and (2) plans to address obsolescence issues and risk associated with technology insertion for future satellites or systems. GAO identified technology insertion planning guidance and practices, reviewed the Air Force's assessment and plans, and met with DOD and contractor offices.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Air Force assessed options for replacing older technologies with newer ones—called technology insertion—in the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites 5 and 6. However, the assessment was limited in the number of options it could practically consider because of timing and minimal early investment in technology planning. The Air Force assessed the feasibility and cost of inserting new digital infrared focal plane technology—used to provide surveillance, tracking, and targeting information for national missile defense and other missions—in place of the current analog focal plane, either with or without changing the related electronics. While technically feasible, neither option was deemed affordable or deliverable when needed. The Air Force estimated that inserting new focal plane technology would result in cost increases and schedule delays ranging from $424 million and 23 months to $859 million and 44 months. The assessment came too late to be useful for SBIRS GEO satellites 5 and 6. It occurred after the Air Force had approved the acquisition strategy and while negotiations were ongoing to procure production of the two satellites. According to the Air Force, implementing changes at that stage would require contract modifications and renegotiations and incur additional cost and schedule growth. Limited prior investment in technology development and planning for insertion also limited the number of feasible options for adding new technology into SBIRS GEO satellites 5 and 6. Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition policy and guidance indicate that such planning is important throughout a system's life cycle, and GAO has reported on leading commercial companies' practice of planning for technology insertion prior to the start of a program. Air Force officials said early technology insertion planning was hampered in part by development challenges, test failures, and technical issues with the satellites, which took priority over research and development efforts.
The current approach to technology insertion for the system or satellites after SBIRS GEO satellites 5 and 6 could leave the program with similar challenges in the future. GAO's work on best practices has found that leading companies conduct strategic planning before technology development begins to help identify needs and technologies. Similarly, the MITRE Corporation—a not-for-profit research and development organization—has highlighted the importance of technology planning to provide guidance for evolving and maturing technologies to address future mission needs. Technology insertion decisions for the future system or satellites are not guided by such planning. Instead, decisions are largely driven by the need to replace obsolete parts as issues arise. Current efforts—such as individual science and technology projects, including those in the Space Modernization Initiative—are limited by lack of direction, focusing on isolated technologies, and therefore are not set up to identify specific insertion points for a desired future system. In addition, the SBIRS program has had little time to develop and demonstrate new technologies that could be inserted into a SBIRS follow-on system. The Air Force is working to develop a technology road map for the next system, according to officials. Given the lack of a clear vision for the path forward and the road map's early development status, it is too soon to determine whether it will be able to identify specific technology and obsolescence needs and insertion points in time for the next system.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: To improve technology planning, GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Air Force establish a plan as part of the SBIRS follow-on acquisition strategy that identifies obsolescence needs, specific potential technologies, and insertion points. DOD concurred with the recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In the mid-1990s, the Department of Defense (DOD) selected the Space  Based Infrared System (SBIRS) to replace the Defense Support Program  (DSP), the preceding missile early-warning system, which is now over  four decades old. SBIRS is a key part of DOD’s missile warning and  defense systems and provides critical functions for protecting the United  States and its allies. A combination of two infrared sensors in highly  elliptical orbit (HEO) and four satellites in geosynchronous earth orbit  (GEO) make up the nominal SBIRS constellation. To replace the first two  GEO satellites on orbit by 2020 and 2021, the Air Force developed an  acquisition strategy to procure two more SBIRS GEO satellites as  derivatives—that is, of the same design aside from limited changes to  accommodate obsolete parts—of the fourth GEO satellite being built.  DOD approved the acquisition strategy in February 2012. In September  2012, the Air Force awarded a contract for initial nonrecurring engineering  and in June 2014 procured the production of the two satellites—GEO  satellites 5 and 6—for a total target price of $2.4 billion.design is years old—the system has been in development for over 18  years, and some of its technology has already become obsolete. To  address obsolescence issues in the next satellites, the program must  replace old technologies with newer ones, a process that may be referred  to as technology insertion or refresh.
The basic SBIRS  The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report accompanying S.  1197, a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2014, directed the Secretary of the Air Force to assess how the Air Force  might insert newer technology in the production of GEO satellites 5 and  6. Specifically, the report directed the Air Force to determine whether it  would be feasible to introduce newer focal plane arrays—technology used  to provide surveillance, tracking, and targeting information for national  missile defense—and other technologies and at what cost. If not feasible,  the report also directed the Air Force to clarify how it intends to address  future technology insertion issues. The Air Force issued its report, Space  Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) 5/6  Focal Plane Technology Insertion, in May 2014.
Additionally, the committee included a provision in its report for GAO to  review the Air Force’s assessment. This report examines (1) the extent to  which the Air Force assessed the feasibility of inserting newer  technologies into SBIRS GEO satellites 5 and 6 and (2) Air Force plans to  address obsolescence issues and ongoing risk associated with  technology insertion beyond the GEO satellites 5 and 6 replenishment  efforts.
To conduct this work, we reviewed DOD acquisition guidance and prior  GAO work on best practices in technology insertion to identify criteria for   We reviewed the Air Force’s report and  technology insertion planning.interviewed DOD officials to determine how new technologies for GEO  satellites 5 and 6 were assessed and what plans are in place for future  technology insertion. We then evaluated the Air Force plans against the  guidance, criteria, and practices for technology insertion planning  identified to determine the extent to which the Air Force’s plans align with  them. The DOD offices whose officials we interviewed included the Office  of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics; Office of the Secretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and  Program Evaluation; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Executive Agent for Space  Staff; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition); Air  Force Space Forces Requirements Division; Air Force Space Operations  Division; Air Force Space Command; and Air Force Space and Missile  Systems Center, Remote Sensing Systems Directorate. We also  reviewed documents from and interviewed officials at Lockheed Martin,  the prime contractor for SBIRS, and Northrop Grumman, the SBIRS  payload integrator.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2014 to April 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: SBIRS is intended to be a more capable successor to DSP and provide  initial warning of a ballistic missile attack on the United States, its   Once complete, the nominal SBIRS  deployed forces, or its allies.constellation is to consist of two hosted HEO sensors and four GEO  satellites. The GEO satellite constellation provides midlatitude coverage  and the hosted HEO sensors provide polar coverage for missile warning  and defense and other missions. Figure 1 shows the field of view of a  single GEO satellite.
Large, complex satellite systems like SBIRS can take a long time to  develop and construct. As a result, they can contain technologies that  have become obsolete by the time they are launched. Although two GEO  satellites were launched in recent years—the first in May 2011 and the  second in March 2013—they had been designed in the late 1990s and  primarily use technology from that period. The third and fourth GEO  satellites, which have some updates to address parts obsolescence  issues, are in production and expected to be initially available for launch  in May 2016 for GEO satellite 4, and September 2017 for GEO satellite 3,  which will first be stored. Figure 2 depicts a nominal constellation of  SBIRS GEO satellites and HEO sensors once SBIRS GEO satellites 3  and 4 are launched and operational, augmented by DSP satellites.
SBIRS GEO satellites 5 and 6 are needed in 2020 and 2021,  respectively, to replenish the first two SBIRS GEO satellites and maintain  the SBIRS constellation. In February 2013, the Air Force awarded a fixed- price incentive (firm target) contract for nonrecurring engineering activities  and procurement of long lead spacecraft parts for GEO satellites 5 and  6.June 2014, 1 month after the Air Force’s assessment on inserting newer  technologies.
The Air Force procured the production of GEO satellites 5 and 6 in  In accordance with the acquisition strategy and to reduce risk in meeting  need dates, GEO satellites 5 and 6 are to be derivatives of GEO satellite  4, with limited design changes to capitalize on the use of previously  procured engineering and parts. According to the Air Force, it plans for  limited technology refresh improvements. GEO satellites 5 and 6, including some on the sensors, are being  upgraded to address parts obsolescence and essential technology  updates. They will also include updates that were incorporated into GEO  satellites 3 and 4—approximately 30 percent of these satellites’ parts  were updated, according to the Air Force’s report. Figure 3 depicts the  key components of the SBIRS GEO satellite.
DOD’s definition of technology refresh is the periodic replacement of both custom-built  and commercial-off-the-shelf system components, within a larger DOD weapon system, to  ensure continued supportability throughout the weapon system’s life cycle.
section_title: Air Force Assessed the Feasibility of GEO Satellites 5 and 6 Technology Insertion, but Earlier Assessment and Investment in Technology Development and Planning Could Have Improved the Effort
paragraphs: The Air Force assessed the feasibility and cost of incorporating a newer  infrared focal plane into the SBIRS GEO satellites 5 and 6 and found that  inserting a new focal plane would incur significant cost and schedule  increases. The assessment came too late to be useful to GEO satellites 5  and 6, but that might not have been the case if the Air Force had invested  in technology development and insertion planning earlier in the program  to provide more options for consideration.
subsections: section_title: The Air Force Met Congressional Requirements to Assess New Focal Plane Technology for GEO Satellites 5 and 6
paragraphs: As directed in the Senate report, the Air Force assessed the feasibility  and costs of inserting newer infrared focal plane technologies—sensors  that can detect heat from missile launches, for example—into GEO  satellites 5 and 6. The Air Force considered one digital focal plane, a  staring sensor, in lieu of the current analog focal plane. It identified two  plausible options for insertion, and though technically feasible, neither  was deemed affordable or deliverable within the replenishment need  dates of 2020 and 2021. According to the Air Force report:
The first option would develop and replace the current analog focal  plane assembly with more a modern digital focal plane while  minimizing changes to the electronic interfaces. This would not  increase system performance; however, the cost would be about   $424 million and incur a schedule delay of 23 to 32 months.
The second option would also include replacement of the analog focal  plane with a digital focal plane; however, the most significant  difference between this option and the first option is the redesign of  the signal processor assembly. According to the Air Force, this  redesign could maximize the capability of the new digital focal plane  by at least 20 percent beyond the current system’s requirements by  increasing, among other items, target resolution. However, this  option—at $859 million—would more than double the cost of the first  option, and bring with it a 35- to 44-month schedule delay.
The timing of the Air Force’s assessment occurred after the Air Force had  already approved the GEO satellites 5 and 6 acquisition strategy and  awarded the advance procurement contract to complete nonrecurring  engineering activities and procurement of critical parts with long lead  times—on February 26, 2012, and February 19, 2013, respectively. In its  assessment, the Air Force reported that to implement changes to the  infrared focal planes at this stage, the current advanced procurement  GEO satellites 5 and 6 contract would have to be modified, which would  require renegotiations. In addition, the Air Force noted that at the time of  the assessment, the fix-priced production modification had not yet been  executed and changes could also have affected the related negotiations.  Furthermore, any changes to the design of the satellites at this juncture  would most likely have incurred additional cost with resulting schedule  slips. For example, Air Force officials stated additional nonrecurring  engineering would likely be required to design, build, test, and qualify a  new focal plane design and to mitigate impacts to other subsystems on  the satellite.
section_title: Limited Prior Investment in Technology Development and Planning Efforts Reduced Technology Insertion Options
paragraphs: Because of limited prior investment in research and development and  technology insertion planning leading up to the acquisition of GEO  satellites 5 and 6, there was only one viable alternative focal plane to be  considered. As a result, the Air Force was limited in the number of  feasible options for adding new technology to GEO satellites 5 and 6.
Effectively planning and managing technology development—including  specifying when, how, and why to insert technologies into a deployed  system—can help to increase readiness and improve the potential for  reduced costs. We have found that leading commercial companies plan  for technology insertion prior to the start of a program, which provides  managers time to gain additional knowledge about a technology. DOD  policy and guidance indicate that planning for technology insertion and  refresh is also important throughout a system’s life cycle. Specifically,  DOD Instruction 5000.02, January 7, 2015, requires program managers  to prepare a Life Cycle Sustainment Plan, and notes that technology  advances and plans for follow-on systems may warrant revisions to the  plan. In addition, DOD’s Defense Acquisition Guidebook advises the  use of trade studies to inform system modifications, such as technology  insertion or refresh, and the development and implementation of  technology refresh schedules.
Very little technology insertion or refresh planning was completed early on  in the SBIRS program to address potential obsolescence and find  opportunities to insert newer technologies in later stages of the program’s  life cycle. The SBIRS program was unable to plan for technology  upgrades and refresh, according to program officials, because of other  issues with the satellites being built. Officials said it was difficult to obtain  funding for exploring future technologies at a time when the program was  experiencing satellite development problems. As we have reported, the  SBIRS program has experienced significant cost growth and schedule  delays since its inception, in part because of development challenges,   For example, in 2014 we reported a  test failures, and technical issues. total cost growth of $14.1 billion over the original program cost estimate,  and a delay of roughly 9 years for the first satellite launch. Hence,  funding that could have been used for technology development and  planning for parts obsolescence or technology insertion to reduce risk  was, instead, used to address significant cost and schedule breaches as  they arose. Though the SBIRS program started in 1996, efforts to begin  studying options for transitioning to the next system did not start until  2007. The program also began to invest in technology development in  2007 with the Third Generation Infrared Surveillance program, which was  intended to reduce risk for the development of new sensor technology.  The Air Force later incorporated the technology into the Commercially  Hosted Infrared Payload (CHIRP), which received funding for an on-orbit  demonstration beginning in fiscal year 2011, though it was not used  operationally for SBIRS missions. Funding for SMI started in fiscal year  2013. Figure 4 depicts a timeline of key SBIRS program events and  efforts to study options for the next system, including technology  development investments.
Beyond assessing the two options—of replacing the current analog focal  plane with a more modern digital focal plane, either with or without  changes to the electronic interfaces—the Air Force was not in a position  to incorporate changes and still maintain the efficiencies planned by  buying GEO satellites 5 and 6 together.
section_title: Limited Planning May Hinder the Air Force’s Ability to Fully Address Technology Insertion Risks in Future Systems
paragraphs: The current approach to technology insertion for SBIRS is not consistent  with the best practice of establishing a plan prior to the start of a program  that identifies specific technologies to be developed and inserted to  achieve a desired end state. The efforts that are under way are limited by  lack of direction and time constraints in informing an acquisition decision  and technology insertion plan for the follow-on to the current SBIRS  program. While the Air Force is working to develop a technology road  map for the next system, the effort is still hampered by the lack of a clear  vision for the path forward, requiring the Air Force to plan for multiple  potential systems. Further, it is too soon to tell whether the road map will  be sufficiently developed in time to address future technology insertion  needs.
subsections: section_title: Current Technology Insertion for SBIRS Lacks a Defined Plan
paragraphs: Technology insertion decisions for SBIRS do not systematically follow an  established plan. Instead, efforts are more near-term oriented to solve  known problems or to take advantage of isolated technologies. A  technology insertion plan ideally envisions desired capabilities for a  system and then directs investments to develop those capabilities. In its  Systems Engineering Guide, the MITRE Corporation—a not-for-profit  research and development company—highlights the importance of  technology planning to provide guidance for evolving and maturing  technologies to address future mission needs. As mentioned above, we  have also found that leading commercial companies conduct strategic  planning before technology development and plan for technology  insertion before a program begins. Such practices enable managers to  identify needs and technologies, prioritize resources, and validate that a  technology can be integrated.
Currently, technology insertion for SBIRS is largely driven by the need to  replace obsolescent parts, that is, parts that are no longer available and  need to be rebuilt or redesigned and qualified for the space environment.  For example, when a contractor was having difficulty delivering an  encoder and decoder system—which assists with pointing control of the  sensor—on time, the program office sought another source for the  system. In place of a technology insertion plan, Air Force officials have  cited SMI as a means for demonstrating developed technologies that  could be inserted into future systems. One of the areas under the SMI  plan, Evolved SBIRS, focuses on reducing cost and technical risk for  replenishments of the current SBIRS satellites and future SBIRS systems,  including addressing obsolescence. By simplifying designs and studying  ways to reduce the risk of obsolescence, the effort aims to significantly  reduce costs if the decision is made to procure a seventh and eighth GEO  satellite.
Beyond replacing obsolescent parts, technology insertion efforts for  SBIRS are generally ad hoc and focus on isolated technologies. Although  Air Force Space Command’s (AFSPC) annual integrated planning  process identifies technology concepts that could be a part of a future  system, it is the program’s responsibility to decide which concepts to   Program managers generally  pursue further, according to officials.initiate technology development ideas and propose them to AFSPC as  they arise, at which point they develop into science and technology  projects. Air Force officials noted that ongoing technology development  efforts are relatively narrow in scope because of resource constraints. For  example, another SMI effort, Wide Field of View Testbeds, is focused on  demonstrating a prototype wide field of view staring payload that could be  inserted either into an evolved program of record or an alternate system,  such as a host satellite. Officials said this effort has been limited to testing  one focal plane in a relevant space environment, although it would have  been beneficial to test others that were available. The Data Exploitation  effort, another SMI effort, is focused on ways to further exploit data  collected from existing sensors on orbit by advancing on-orbit data  collection and analysis and developing algorithms to process data. Given  that these efforts aim for varying goals, they are not together intended to  plan for a single end system and are not set up to identify the specific  technologies required for such a system. Officials acknowledge that the  SMI efforts cover different directions to keep options open for the various  potential approaches to a future system but anticipate that efforts will  become more focused once the SBIRS Follow-on analysis of alternatives  (AOA) is completed and a decision is made on the way forward.
section_title: Timing Constraints Could Limit the Effectiveness of Ongoing Efforts
paragraphs: SMI efforts are also hampered by time constraints that could limit their  usefulness in informing technology insertion decisions for the follow-on  system. Air Force officials have stated that an acquisition decision for the  follow-on to SBIRS—whether a continuation of the program with next- generation satellites or a different system—will need to be made within  the fiscal year 2017-2018 time frame. To inform that decision, any new  technologies required for the follow-on will need to be developed enough  that the Air Force can be certain they will be ready to transition in time.  For example, if the follow-on uses a wide field of view sensor, the Air  Force will need to complete significant work—including data exploitation,  testing, and demonstrations—to ensure that the sensor is capable of  performing the necessary function. Officials said the relevant Wide Field  of View Testbeds effort, expected to be active by fiscal year 2017, could  potentially meet the decision time frame if it stays on track, though a  delay in the AOA or funding decisions could affect the program’s ability to  keep the effort on schedule. Given the short history of SMI, which started  in fiscal year 2013, the SBIRS program has had limited time to develop  and demonstrate new technologies that could be inserted into a follow-on.
Going forward, program officials said they are developing a technology  road map for each of the different options being considered in the AOA.  As the results of the AOA are pending, officials must develop plans for  multiple potential paths forward, including those that may involve less  mature technology currently. This road map will be modified based on the  option selected from the AOA to identify the technologies available and  determine when they may be inserted into the follow-on, officials said.  Though specific timelines for the final road map are not yet determined,  once finalized, the program plans to use it to guide SMI investment plans  and to work with the science and technology community on development  efforts. It is too early to determine how successful the road map will be in  providing a timely plan for inserting technology into the next system.  Delays in previous efforts to analyze alternatives and plan for a follow-on  suggest similar delays could occur for the ongoing SBIRS Follow-on  AOA. Such delays would make it difficult to develop a thorough road map  for technology insertion if the program does not know the system for  which to plan. In addition, some officials have cited concerns that all  segments of the system—particularly the ground system, which provides  command and control of the satellites and is already delayed behind the  satellites currently on orbit—may not be fully assessed in ongoing  analyses and that potential risks could be marginalized or overlooked in a  technology insertion plan.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Large and complex satellites like SBIRS take a long time to develop and  build, which can make the technology aboard outdated compared to what  might be available when the satellites are launched and operated. The Air  Force has been focused on building the satellites versus developing new  capabilities and, in doing so, has missed opportunities to pursue viable  technology options. Establishing a plan for when, how, and why  technology improvements should be inserted into a system can be  essential to providing capabilities when needed and reducing life cycle  costs. Without an early technology insertion plan for SBIRS and the  associated technology development, the Air Force was limited to  assessing few new technologies, which were too late to be incorporated  into GEO satellites 5 and 6 without significant cost and schedule  increases. Given the time it took to develop, produce, and launch the  SBIRS satellites, spanning over 18 years, a forward-looking approach  that develops and inserts technologies within planned schedule windows  could be more effective in satisfying mission needs and anticipating future  requirements.
Going forward, the Air Force is at risk of being in the same position for the  next system that follows the current SBIRS program. Plans to establish  more specific technology insertion strategies for potential alternatives  could encourage earlier technology development, though these cannot  yet be assessed because they are still in development. Without a clear  vision of the path forward and a corresponding plan that lays out specific  points for addressing potential obsolescence issues, assessing  technology readiness, and determining when it is appropriate to insert  technology for all segments of the program, the Air Force could be limited  in its ability to mitigate technology insertion risk. Further, as the deadline  approaches for deciding on a follow-on to SBIRS, the Air Force continues  to lose valuable time to develop, demonstrate, and assess new  technologies. As a result, it may be forced to continue with the current  design for subsequent satellites, potentially requiring more attention to  obsolete components and continuing the cycle of limited technology  insertion.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve technology planning and ensure planning efforts are clearly  aligned with the SBIRS follow-on, we recommend that the Secretary of  the Air Force establish a technology insertion plan as part of the SBIRS  follow-on acquisition strategy that identifies obsolescence needs as well  as specific potential technologies and insertion points.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written  comments, which are reprinted in appendix I, DOD concurred with our  recommendation. DOD also provided technical comments which were  incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff any have questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4841 or at chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff members who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Art Gallegos (Assistant Director), Maricela Cherveny, Brenna  Guarneros, Bob Swierczek, Hai Tran, Oziel Trevino, and Alyssa Weir.