Highway Safety: Improved Monitoring and Oversight of Traffic Safety Data Program Are Needed
Published: 2004-11-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Auto crashes kill or injure millions of people each year. Information about where and why such crashes occur is important in reducing this toll, both for identifying particular hazards and for planning safety efforts at the state and federal levels. Differences in the quality of state traffic data from state to state, however, affect the usability of data for these purposes. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) administers a grant program to help states improve the safety data systems that collect and analyze crash data from police and sheriff's offices and other agencies, and the Congress is considering whether to reauthorize and expand the program. The Senate Appropriations Committee directed GAO to study state systems and the grant program. Accordingly, GAO examined (1) the quality of state crash information, (2) the activities states undertook to improve their traffic records systems and any progress made, and (3) NHTSA's oversight of the grant program.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: States vary considerably in the extent to which their traffic safety data systems meet recommended criteria used by NHTSA to assess the quality of crash information. These criteria relate to whether the information is timely, consistent, complete, and accurate, as well as to whether it is available to users and integrated with other relevant information, such as that in the driver history files. GAO reviewed systems in 9 states and found, for example, that some states entered crash information into their systems in a matter of weeks, while others took a year or more. While some systems were better than others, all had opportunities for improvement. States reported carrying out a range of activities to improve their traffic safety data systems with the grants they received from NHTSA. Relatively little is known about the extent to which these activities improved the systems, largely because the documents submitted to NHTSA contained little or no information about what the activities accomplished. The states GAO reviewed used their grant funds for a variety of projects and showed varying degrees of progress. These efforts included completing strategic plans, hiring consultants, and buying equipment to facilitate data collection. NHTSA officials said their oversight of the grant program complied with the statutory requirements, but for two main reasons, it does not provide a useful picture of what states were accomplishing. First, the agency did not provide adequate guidance to ensure that states provided accurate and complete data on what they were accomplishing with their grants. Second, it did not have an effective process for monitoring progress. The agency has begun to take some actions to strengthen oversight of all its grant programs. If the Congress decides to reauthorize the program, however, additional steps are needed to provide effective oversight of this particular program. GAO also noted that in proposing legislation to reauthorize the program, one requirement was omitted that may be helpful in assessing progress--the requirement for states to have an up to date assessment of their traffic data systems.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Automobile crashes exact an enormous personal and economic toll on this  country. In 2003, 42,643 people died in automobile crashes in the United  States, and nearly 2.9 million more were seriously injured. In 2000, the most  recent year for which cost estimates are available, the economic cost of  fatalities and injuries from crashes totaled almost $231 billion. Reducing  this toll requires making informed decisions about safety problems. Traffic  safety data, which are compiled from police accident reports completed at  the scene of crashes and assembled largely at the state level, are key to  making these decisions. The states and the federal government use data  from state-level crash data systems to make many roadway-related  spending and policy decisions, ranging from deciding to fix particular  roadways to launching major national safety campaigns, such as preventing  alcohol-impaired driving or increasing seat belt use. There is known  variability in the quality of information in state traffic data systems, and  these differences impact the usefulness of data for these purposes.
When the Congress was considering reauthorizing various transit and  highway programs earlier this year, both the House and Senate proposed  bills that would have expanded the section “411 grant program,” which was  initially authorized in the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century  (TEA-21). The 411 grant program was designed specifically to help states  improve their traffic safety data systems and provided states with $36  million over 6 years. The House and Senate proposals would have  authorized a similar grant program with a budget authority of up to $270  million over 6 years. However, an 8-month extension of TEA-21 was  passed on September 30, 2004, extending current highway and transit  programs through May 2005 when both bills may be reintroduced.
The Senate Appropriations Committee Report accompanying the  Department of Transportation Appropriations bill for fiscal year 2004 (S.  1589) directed us to conduct a survey of state traffic safety data systems.  The committee also asked us to report on the extent to which the 411 grant  program has led to improvements in these systems. The grant program is  overseen by the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) National Highway  Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), which has established six criteria  for assessing such systems when states request guidance from NHTSA.  Four criteria relate to the information itself (timeliness, consistency,  completeness, and accuracy); two relate to the use of the information  (accessibility to users and links to other related data). Accordingly, this  report examines (1) the quality of state crash information; (2) the activities  states undertook using 411 grant funds to improve their traffic safety data  systems, and the progress they made using the grant funds; and (3)  NHTSA’s oversight of the grant program, including what changes in  oversight, if any, might help encourage states to improve their traffic data  systems and ensure accountability under a reauthorized program.
To provide information on the quality of state crash data and state efforts to  improve these data, we conducted site visits, analyzed available traffic  safety data, and reviewed grant documentation. Using several criteria, we  selected 9 states to visit for detailed reviews and assessed the status of  their data systems on the basis of NHTSA’s six quality criteria for crash  information. Eight of these 9 states had participated in the 411 grant  program. To identify variations in data structure and quality, we also  analyzed crash data for 17 states that currently participate in NHTSA’s State  Data System (SDS) program. Finally, we reviewed the grant  documentation submitted by the 48 states that participated in the 411 grant  program, including grant applications, traffic records assessments,  strategic plans, progress reports, and highway safety plan annual  evaluation reports. To provide information about NHTSA’s oversight of the  program, we interviewed NHTSA officials responsible for oversight and  administration and reviewed NHTSA guidance and policy. We conducted  our review from January 2004 through October 2004 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix I for  more details regarding our objectives, scope, and methodology. Because an  examination of data quality was one of the objectives of this report, we also  conducted an assessment of data reliability. A more complete discussion of  data reliability can be found in appendix II.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Traffic safety data are the primary source of knowledge about crashes and  how they are related to the traffic safety environment, human behavior, and  vehicle performance. Most states have developed traffic safety data  systems and manage these data through the initial reporting of crashes by  law enforcement officers through data entry and analysis. Figure 1, which  is based on NHTSA’s Traffic Records Highway Safety Program Advisorydepicts a model state traffic safety data system, including the collection  and submission of data, the processing of these data into state safety data  systems, and the potential uses for quality crash information. These data  are often not housed in a single file or on just one computer system;  however, users should have access to crash information in a useful form  and of sufficient quality to support the intended use.
At the state level, state agencies use traffic safety data to make highway  safety planning decisions and to evaluate the effectiveness of programs,  among other uses. In those states where quality crash data on a range of  crashes are not available, officials use federal data such as that from  NHTSA’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) to make programming  decisions. FARS data, while useful for some purposes, are limited because  they only include information about fatal crashes, thus preventing decision  making based on a range of crash severity or the entirety of a state’s crash  situation. At the federal level, NHTSA provides guidelines,  recommendations, and technical assistance to help states improve their  crash data systems and is responsible for overseeing state highway safety  programs. Under TEA-21, NHTSA awarded $935.6 million in highway  safety incentive grants to improve safety. In 2003, NHTSA made improving  traffic safety data one of the agency’s highest priorities.
Since the early 1980s, NHTSA has been obtaining crash data files from  states, which in turn have been deriving the data from police crash reports.  These statewide crash data files are referred to as the SDS program.  Participation by states is voluntary, with 27 states currently participating.  These data include some of the basic information for the analyses and data  collection programs that support the NHTSA mission of identifying and  monitoring traffic safety problems.
One of NHTSA’s grant programs was specifically aimed at improving traffic  safety data. Administered through its 10 regional offices around the  country, the program provided about $36 million to states for improving  their crash data systems. This grant program was authorized under TEA-21  and was known as the “411 grant program” after the relevant section of the  U.S. Code. NHTSA administers a number of other grant programs besides  the 411 grant program; however, it was the only incentive grant program  that was specifically directed at improving state traffic safety data  systems. The grant program required states to establish a foundation for  improving their traffic safety data systems by first completing three  activities:
Establish a coordinating committee of stakeholders to help guide and  make decisions about traffic safety data: The committee would ideally  include stakeholders from agencies that manage the various data files  (e.g., representatives from the state department of transportation  responsible for roadway information, and from the state department of  motor vehicles responsible for the management of vehicle licensing  information).
Conduct an assessment of the current system: The assessment would  evaluate a state’s system by identifying strengths and weaknesses and  providing a baseline from which the state could develop its strategic  plan to address data system needs.
Develop a strategic plan that prioritizes traffic safety data system  needs and identifies goals: The strategic plan is to provide the “map”  specifying which activities should be implemented in order to achieve  these goals. As with the assessment, the focal point for developing the  strategic plan, if a state did not already have one, would be the  coordinating committee.
The level of funding available to a state was dependent on whether states  had already put these requirements in place. Additionally, states were  required to contribute matching funds of between 25 and 75 percent,  depending on the year of the grant. Three types of grants were awarded:
A state received a start-up grant if it had none of the three requirements  in place. This was a one-time grant of $25,000.
A state received an initiation grant if it had established a coordinating  committee, had completed or updated an assessment within the  previous 5 years, and had begun to develop a strategic plan. This grant  was a one-time grant of $125,000, if funds were available.
A state received an implementation grant if it had all three  requirements in place and was positioned to make specific  improvements as indicated in its strategic plan. This grant was at least  $250,000 in the first year and $225,000 in subsequent years, if funds were  available.
The Congress has extended TEA-21 until May 2005, and new House and  Senate bills will likely be introduced during the next congressional session.  The most recent House and Senate bills under consideration, which were  not passed in the 2004 session, included proposals to reauthorize the 411  grant program in a similar, but not identical, form to the original program.  The proposals included funding up to $270 million, which is over six times  the original funding amount. They also included (1) additional  requirements for documentation from states describing how grant funds  would be used to address needs and goals in state strategic plans and (2) a  requirement that states demonstrate measurable progress toward  achieving their goals. The proposals, however, did not include one of the  original program requirements—that states have an assessment of their  traffic safety data systems that is no more than 5 years old when they  applied for the grant.
section_title: Quality of Data Systems Varied Greatly, with All States Examined Showing a Need for Improvement
paragraphs: The 9 states we examined in detail varied considerably in the extent to  which their traffic safety data systems met NHTSA’s recommended criteria  for the quality of crash information. NHTSA’s six criteria (shown in table 1  below, along with an explanation of each criterion’s significance) appear in  the agency’s Traffic Records Highway Safety Program Advisory, the guide  used by NHTSA when it carries out traffic records assessments at the  request of state officials. These assessments are a technical assistance tool  offered to state officials to document state traffic safety data activities,  note strengths and accomplishments, and offer suggestions for  improvement. In addition, NHTSA released the report Initiatives to  Address Improvement of Traffic Safety Data in July 2004, which  emphasized these data quality criteria and provided recommendations to  states. We examined all six criteria for the 9 case-study states, and our  review of 17 states that participated in NHTSA’s SDS program provided  additional information for three of these six criteria. None of the 9 states  in our case-study review met all six criteria, and most had opportunities for  improvement in many of the criteria. The sections below discuss each  criterion.  data available. Data processing times for the 9 states ranged from less than  1 month in 2 states to 18 months or more in 2 others. For example, to  develop their 2005 highway safety plans during 2004, 4 of the 9 states used  data from 2000, 2001, or 2002, and the remaining 5 states used 2003 data.  (See fig. 2.)
For 6 of the 9 states, three factors accounted for their not meeting the  timeliness criterion: slow data entry, data integration delays, and lengthy  data edits. As a result, the state safety plans are unable to take recent crash  trends into account in these states. Generally, those states submitting data  electronically from local law enforcement agencies to the state traffic  safety data system had much faster entry of crash information into  centralized databases. In contrast, states that processed reports manually  by keying in information from paper forms at the state level had longer data  entry time frames. The availability of data was also sometimes delayed by  inefficient data completion processes. In states where this is not done  automatically, crash data and location information are often manually  entered into the traffic safety data system. In addition, checks for accuracy  also delayed data availability. For example, 1 of the states that had to use  data from 2000 to develop its highway safety plan, had used electronic  methods to enter more recent data, but detailed edit checks delayed the  data’s release considerably.
subsections: section_title: Consistency: Data Were Not Consistent Across States, Even for Basic Information
paragraphs: Seven of the 9 states we visited had crash forms that could be used to  collect data across all jurisdictions within the state, helping to ensure that  data collected within the state are consistent. However, no state had forms  that met all of the consistency criteria recommended in the Model  Minimum Uniform Crash Criteria (MMUCC) guidelines that were  developed collaboratively by state and federal authorities. These guidelines  provide a recommended minimum set of data elements to be collected for  each crash, including a definition, attributes, and the rationale for  collecting each element. While variation in the crash data collected by  states can be attributed to varying information needs, guidelines help to  improve the reliability of information collected and also assist in state-to­ state comparisons and national analyses. The variation between states can  be seen among the 17 states we analyzed that contribute to NHTSA’s SDS  program. For example, the MMUCC guidelines recommend reporting on  whether alcohol was a factor in the crash by indicating the presence or  absence of an alcohol test, the type of test administered, and the test  results. However, several of the states collected information on impaired  driving without specifying the presence of an alcohol test, the test type, or  the test result; thereby making it difficult to determine whether alcohol-use  contributed to the crash. In addition, the states were not uniform in  collecting and reporting the VIN, another element recommended in the  MMUCC. A VIN is a unique alphanumeric identifier that is applied to each  vehicle by the manufacturer. The VIN allows for an effective evaluation of  vehicle design characteristics such as occupant protection systems. As  figure 3 shows, data about VINs were not available for all 17 states in  crashes for any year between 1998 and 2002. For example, although every  state had submitted crash data for 1998 and 1999, crash data for 6 of the 17  states did not include VINs.
The lack of consistency limits the use of state crash data for most  nationwide analyses. For example, in a recent National Center for Statistics  and Analysis (NCSA)Research Note on child safety campaigns, only 3  states met the criteria to be included in the analysis, not nearly enough data  to statistically represent the nation. The criteria necessary for inclusion in  the report included collecting data on all vehicle occupants, including  uninjured occupants, and VINs for the relevant years (1995-2001). If state  systems matched the MMUCC, they would include this information.  Similarly, only 5 states qualified for use in a NCSA analysis of braking  performance as part of the New Car Assessment Program because only  these states collected VINs and had the necessary variables for the years  involved in the study.
There is evidence that as states redesign their crash forms, they are  following the MMUCC guidelines more closely. Remaining differences from  the suggested guidelines often reflect the needs of individual states. Among  the 9 states we visited, 5 had redesigned their crash forms since 1997. All 5  used the guidelines as a baseline, although each of them tailored the form  to a degree. One state, for example, collected no data about the use of seat  belts for uninjured passengers, while another chose to collect additional  state-specific attributes, such as describing snow conditions (e.g., blowing  or drifting). Among the remaining 4 states we visited, 2 states are currently  using the MMUCC guidelines to redesign their forms.
section_title: Completeness: Gaps Existed in the Completeness of Reporting
paragraphs: One factor affecting the degree of completeness is state reporting  thresholds—that is, standards that local jurisdictions use to determine  whether crash data should be reported for a particular crash. These  thresholds include such things as the presence of fatalities or injuries or the  extent of property damage. Although all 9 of the states we visited had  reporting thresholds that included fatalities and injuries, the thresholds for  property damage varied widely. For example, some states set the property  damage threshold at $1,000, while 1 state did not require reporting of  property-damage-only crashes. In addition, it was not possible to determine  the extent that all reportable crashes had been included in the traffic safety  data system. Officer discretion may play a role. For example, capturing  complete documentation of a crash event is often a low priority when  traffic safety data are not perceived as relevant to the work of the law  enforcement officer or other public safety provider. In 1 state, for example,  the police department of a major metropolitan area only reported crashes  involving severe injuries or fatalities, although the state’s reporting  threshold included damage of $1,000 or more.
Variation in thresholds among states is not the only factor that affects the  completeness of crash data. For the crash information that does make it  into the state database, there are often gaps in the data, as we learned from  evaluating the records of 17 states participating in NHTSA’s SDS program.  For 5 of these states, we analyzed data coded “unknown” and “missing” for  24 data elements. The percentage of data coded as unknown or missing  was frequent for several key data elements, such as the VIN; the results of  alcohol or drug testing; and the use of seat belts, child car seats, and other  restraint devices. For example, the percentage of data coded as unknown  or missing for the use of seat belts and other restraints ranged between 1.5  and 54.8 percent for 4 of the 5 states. Such data can be inherently difficult  to collect.For example, when officers arrive at the scene of a crash,  drivers and passengers may already be outside their vehicles, making it  impossible to know if they were wearing seat belts. Asked if they were  wearing a seat belt, those involved in the crash may not tell the truth,  especially if the state has a law mandating seat belt use.
section_title: Accuracy: States Varied Greatly in the Extent of Checks for Data Accuracy
paragraphs: Six of the 9 states we visited made use of quality control methods to help  ensure that individual reports were accurate when they were submitted to  the traffic safety data system. Of these 6 states, for example, 4 linked crash  reports to other traffic safety data, including driver or vehicle files, to verify  or populate information on crash reporting forms. Table 2 contains  examples of other tools and checks that the states used to help ensure  accuracy.
Four of the 9 states did quality checks at the aggregate level—that is, when  crash reports are analyzed in batches to identify abnormalities in reporting  that may not be apparent looking at individual reports. Of these 4 states, for  example, 1 had staff analyze the reports to identify invalid entries and data  miscodings, while another conducted edit checks each year to check for  invalid vehicle types or other problems. Such aggregate-level analysis can  be useful to identify systematic problems in data collection that may lead to  erroneous investigation or false conclusions, such as when officers report  one type of collision as another. For instance, officers in 1 state were found  to be characterizing some car-into-tree crashes as head-on collisions. Once  identified, such data collection problems can often be resolved through  officer training.
To test data accuracy, we analyzed crash data submitted by the 17 states to  NHTSA and found relatively few instances of data that had been coded as  “invalid”—generally 3 percent or less. Data classified as invalid were most  often for elements more likely to be transposed or miscopied, such as VINs.  However, because we could not observe crash-scene reporting and did not  examine or verify information on source documents (such as police  accident reports), we cannot assume that the other 97 percent of data were  accurately reported and entered correctly. Invalid data entries are a good  starting point for measuring the accuracy of a data system, but they are  only one indication of the accuracy of state traffic safety data.
section_title: Accessibility: Crash Data Were Accessible to Users in Varying Ways
paragraphs: All 9 states produced crash information summaries, although some were  based on data that were several years old—a factor that limited their  usefulness. In addition, 8 states provided law enforcement agencies or  other authorized users with access to crash information within 6 months of  crashes. Such access was often via the Internet, and data analysis tools  were typically limited to a certain number of preestablished data reports.  Thus, any in-depth analysis was limited to the tools available online. Three  states had analysts available to provide information or complete data  queries upon request. In another state, which had the capability to conduct  data collection electronically, local law enforcement agencies had access to  analysis tools to use with their own data.
If users wanted direct access to completed data for more detailed analysis,  they often had to wait somewhat longer, given the need for additional data  entry or the completion of accuracy checks. In 1 state, for example, there  was a 2- to 3-month delay due to the transfer of preliminary crash data from  the state police database to the state department of transportation where  location information was added to complete the data.
section_title: Data Integration: Only 1 State Integrated Traffic Safety Information with All Databases
paragraphs: Only 1 of the 9 states integrated the full array of potential databases—that  is, linked the crash file with all five of the files typically or potentially  available in various state agencies: driver, vehicle, roadway,  citation/conviction, and medical outcome. All 9 of the states we visited  integrated crash information with roadway files to some degree, but only a  few integrated these data with driver or vehicle licensing files, or with the  conviction files housed in state court systems. (See table 3.) In addition, 7  of the 9 states participated in NHTSA’s Crash Outcome Data Evaluation  System (CODES) program, which links crash data with medical  information such as emergency and hospital discharge data, trauma  registries, and death certificates.
Technological challenges and the lack of coordination among state  agencies often posed hurdles to the integration of state data. In 1 state, for  example, crash files were sent from the central traffic records database  kept by the state department of safety to the state department of  transportation for manual entry of location information from the roadway  file. Once the state department of transportation completed these records,  however, there was no mechanism to export that information back into the  central database. Also, in some states data integration was limited because  data were not processed with integration in mind. In 1 state, for example,  state department of transportation officials noted that the new crash  system had been developed for state police use, and that efforts were still  under way to develop an interface to bring crash data into the department’s  system. In contrast, a state official in another state noted that the housing  of several agencies involved in the traffic safety data system—including  those responsible for the driver, vehicle, and roadway files—in the state  department of transportation had facilitated the direct sharing of  information and the full integration of data.
section_title: NHTSA Continues to Emphasize Quality Criteria
paragraphs: In support of these quality criteria and improved traffic safety data  systems, NHTSA released a report in July 2004 detailing steps that could be  taken by federal and state stakeholders to improve traffic safety data. The  report, Initiatives to Address Improvement of Traffic Safety Data, was  issued by NHTSA and drafted by an Integrated Project Team that included  representatives from NHTSA, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, the  Federal Highway Administration, and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety  Administration. The report articulates the direction and steps needed for  traffic safety data to be improved and made more useful to data users. It  makes a number of recommendations under five areas, including  improving coordination and leadership, improving data quality and  availability, encouraging states to move to electronic data capture and  processing, creating greater uniformity in data elements, and facilitating  data use and access. Along with these recommendations, the report also  outlines initiatives that NHTSA and other stakeholders should implement.  For example, under the area of data quality and availability, the report  indicates that states—under the guidance of their coordinating  committees—should encourage compliance by law enforcement with state  regulations for obtaining blood-alcohol concentration and drug use  information and should also strive to capture exact crash locations (using  latitude and longitude measures) in their traffic safety data systems.
section_title: States Carried Out Various Activities Using 411 Grant Funds, but Little Is Known about Progress
paragraphs: States reported carrying out a range of activities with funding made  available under the 411 grant program. However, relatively little is known  about the extent to which they made progress in improving their traffic  safety data systems for the years of the grant. When applying for follow-on  grants, states were required to report to NHTSA’s regional offices on the  progress they were making in improving their traffic safety data systems  during the prior year. However, the required documents filed with NHTSA  yielded little or no information on what states had achieved. We were able  to discern from the 8 states we reviewed in detail that those states had  indeed used their grants for a variety of projects and showed varying  degrees of progress. Regardless of whether states concentrated their  grant funds on one project or funded a number of activities, the level of  progress was influenced by the effectiveness of state coordinating  committees.
subsections: section_title: Most States Received Grants for 4 Years and Initiated State Data Improvements
paragraphs: Forty-eight states applied for and received grant awards under the 411  grant program. As table 4 shows, most states (29) began their participation  at the implementation grant level—that is, most of them already had the  three basic requirements in place, including a coordinating committee, an  assessment of their data system, and a strategic plan for improvement.  Those states receiving start-up or initiation grants were expected to put the  three requirements in place before beginning specific data-related  improvement projects. By the 4th year of the grant, 44 states were still  participating, and all but 1 was at the implementation grant level. The 4  states that were no longer participating by the 4th year reported that they  discontinued participation mainly because they could not meet grant  requirements.
All three basic program requirements were useful to states to initiate or  develop improvements in their traffic safety data systems. By meeting  these grant requirements, states were able to “jump start” their efforts and  raise the importance of improving state traffic safety data systems. The  assessments, which were required to be conducted within 5 years of the  initial grant application, provided benchmarks and status reports to  NHTSA and state officials and included information on how well state  systems fared in regard to NHTSA’s six recommended quality criteria.  Officials with whom we spoke generally agreed that these assessments  were excellent tools for systematically identifying needed state  improvements. Similarly, strategic plans generally appeared to be based on  the state assessment findings and helped states identify and prioritize their  future efforts. The establishment of the traffic records coordinating  committees to guide these efforts was also key to initiating improvements,  since traffic safety data systems involve many departments and their  cooperation is essential in developing and implementing improvements to a  state traffic safety data system.
section_title: Progress Reports Were Limited and Difficult to Assess
paragraphs: Documentation of state progress was limited and of little use in assessing  the effect of traffic safety data improvement efforts. To qualify for grants  beyond the first year, each state had to (1) certify that it had an active  coordinating committee and (2) provide documentation of its efforts  through updated strategic plans, separate progress reports, or highway  safety annual evaluation reports. We reviewed these documents when  available and found that they contained a variety of activities, ranging from  completing the basic requirements (such as conducting assessments and  developing strategic plans) to identifying specific projects (such as  outsourcing data entry services and redesigning crash forms). Figure 4 lists  examples of these types of reported activities.
The grant documentation NHTSA received provided few details on the  quality of the state efforts. For example, although states certified the  existence of a coordinating committee, they were not required to report on  what the committee did or how well it functioned. Also, while states for the  most part identified efforts to improve their data systems, we found it  difficult to assess their progress because the reports lacked sufficient  detail. For example:
One state reported using grant funds on alcohol testing devices to  collect more alcohol impairment data on drivers. However, the progress  reports did not indicate who received these devices and how data  collection was improved.
One state used funds to hire data entry staff to reduce the backlog of old  crash reports. However, the state provided no indication of whether the  increase in staff had reduced the backlog and how any reduction in the  backlog could be sustained in the longer term.
One state reported using funds on multimillion dollar information  technology projects, but it is unclear how the grant funds were used in  these projects.
section_title: Case-study States Conducted a Variety of Activities Ranging from One Specific Project to a Variety of Activities
paragraphs: Our visits to 8 of the states that participated in the 411 grant program  yielded additional information and documentation about their grant  activities, the nature of their efforts, and the extent of progress made.  These states expended funds on a variety of activities, ranging from  completing the basic requirements of assessments and strategic plans to  implementing specific projects. As figure 5 shows, in the aggregate, these  activities translated into two main types of expenditures—equipment, such  as computer hardware and software, and consultant services, such as  technical assistance in designing new data systems.
The 8 states either concentrated funding on one large project or used  funding on a variety of activities, including data entry, salaries, training, and  travel. Four of the 8 states focused on a single project related to improving  their data systems mainly by enhancing electronic reporting. One state  reengineered its files to better integrate them with other data systems; 1  piloted an electronic crash data collection tool; and the remaining 2 created  new electronic data systems, which were upgrades from their previous  manual systems. These states also improved the tools used by law  enforcement officers to input data into their crash systems, such as  software for mapping and graphing traffic crashes or laptop computers for  patrol cars so that law enforcement officers could collect and transmit  crash data electronically to statewide repositories.
The remaining 4 states used funding on multiple activities, such as  obtaining technical support, adding capability for more data entry, or  attending conferences. Some also conducted pilot projects. For example, 1  state created a project that enabled electronic uploads of traffic citation  data from local agencies to the state department of motor vehicles.  According to state officials, this project helped considerably with both  timeliness and completeness in the uploading of conviction information to  driver files. In another example, the state used funding to pilot a project to  capture data about crashes electronically.
States made improvements under both the single- and multiple-project  approaches. One state that focused on a single project, for example,  developed a new statewide electronic crash system that officials said had  improved data timeliness and completeness. Similarly, of the states that  spread funding among multiple activities, 1 state used funding for a data  project on driver convictions—paying for traffic records staff’s salaries and  hiring consultants to map crashes to identify roadway issues. As a result,  the quality and completeness of crash data improved overall, according to a  state official.
One factor that affected state progress was the relative effectiveness of the  state’s coordinating committee. In those states, where the state  coordinating committee did not actively engage all stakeholders or where  its level of authority was limited, projects did not fully address system  needs. For example, 1 state established a coordinating committee that  included few stakeholders outside the state police, and this committee  decided to concentrate funding on a new electronic crash data system. The  new system, acknowledged by many stakeholders as improving the  timeliness and completeness of crash data, resulted in a useful resource  allocation and crash-reporting tool for the state police to allocate resources  and report on crashes. According to officials at the state department of  transportation, however, improvements in the crash information did not  effectively serve to facilitate the state’s use of crash data to identify unsafe  roadways because the state department of transportation was not fully  engaged in the coordinating committee’s process.
Similarly, in another state, the coordinating committee lacked the authority  needed to fully implement its efforts. The coordinating committee created  two subcommittees—a technical committee and an executive committee.  While the executive committee was made up of higher level managers from  various agencies, the coordinating committee did not have the legislative  authority to compel agencies to participate in the process or to even use  the newly created statewide crash data system. To date, the state does not  have all key stakeholders participating in the process and is continuing to  have difficulty persuading the largest municipality in the state to use the  newly developed statewide electronic reporting system. As a result, the  municipality continues to lag behind other communities in having its crash  information entered into the state crash system. In contrast, another state’s  coordinating committee had the authority to approve or reject proposals  for data system improvements as well as funding. This state was able to  complete several agreed-upon projects, including implementing an  electronic driver citation program, which improved the completeness and  timeliness of the state crash data.
section_title: NHTSA’s Limited Oversight of the 411 Grant Program Contributed to Incomplete Knowledge of How Funds Were Used
paragraphs: NHTSA did not adopt adequate regulations or guidelines to ensure states  receiving 411 grants submitted accurate and complete information on  progress they were making to improve their traffic safety data systems. In  addition, the agency did not have an effective process for monitoring  progress and ensuring that grant monies were being spent as intended. We  found some examples where states did not report their progress accurately.  NHTSA, while beginning to take some actions to strengthen program  oversight, must be more proactive in developing an effective means of  holding states accountable under this program.
subsections: section_title: Regulatory Requirements and Guidance for 411 Program Activities Were Not Specific
paragraphs: In our previous discussion about activities being carried out under the  grant program, we described how state documentation of progress often  contained too little detail to determine anything about the progress being  made as a result of activities being funded with program grants. Reasons  for this lack of information, in our view, were NHTSA’s limited regulatory  requirements and inconsistent guidance about what information states  should submit.
Regulations for the 411 grant program required states to submit an updated  strategic plan or a progress report, but did not specify how progress should  be reported. Further, NHTSA’s regulations required states to report on  progress as part of their 411 grant application, which in effect meant that  states did not have to report specifically on 411 activities after fiscal year  2001. According to NHTSA regulations, states were to include information  on progress through their highway safety plans and annual evaluation  reports after fiscal year 2001, which are part of the reporting for all of  NHTSA’s highway safety grants. However, our analysis of these documents  found that they lacked the detail needed to adequately assess state  activities undertaken with 411 funds. Further, while NHTSA officials told us  they also informally obtained information about progress after fiscal year  2001, the available information about what the activities actually  accomplished was limited. Limitations in the information regarding states  activities were particularly significant given that states spent most of their  grant funds after fiscal year 2001.
NHTSA regional offices supplemented the regulatory requirements with  their own guidance to states, but the guidance varied greatly from region to  region. Some of the regional offices said that their contact with states  about these requirements was informal, and that their primary contact with  states (1) was over the telephone or by e-mail and (2) was generally in  regards to technical assistance, such as training or referring states to  existing guidelines. Other regional office staff said they had additional  contact with states through participation in meetings of state coordinating  committees, where they were able to provide additional assistance.  However, we found this participation occurred most often for states in  proximity to NHTSA regional offices. Few regional offices provided written  guidance to states with specific direction on what to include in their  progress reports. For the regions that did so, the requested information  included documentation indicating how states intended to use the current  year grant funds, a list of projects implemented in the past fiscal year, a  brief description of activities completed, an account of problems  encountered, and the status of allocated funds.
Without consistent and clear requirements and guidance on the content of  progress reports, states were left to their own devices. We found that even  in regions where NHTSA officials outlined the information that should be  included in the progress reports, states did not necessarily provide the level  of information needed for NHTSA to adequately track state progress. For  example, in 1 region, states were to provide NHTSA with documentation  that included a list of projects and a description of progress made.  However, 1 state in that region did not provide the list of completed  projects; it only provided a brief description of projects completed during 1  of the 4 years of the grant.
We also found a wide variation in how states reported their activities. For  example:
Some states provided brief descriptions of the activities completed or  under way, while others did not.
States that provided brief descriptions of their activities did not always  include the same information. For example, some states indicated how  they were intending to use the current grant funds but did not list  projects implemented in the past year. Some states did not indicate the  status of their allocated funds for ongoing activities.
None of the states in our review indicated problems that were  encountered in implementing projects or activities.
section_title: Monitoring of State Progress and Activities Was Lacking
paragraphs: Under the 411 grant program, NHTSA’s oversight process for monitoring  state progress and ensuring that funds were spent in line with program  intent was limited. In fact, NHTSA was unable to provide copies of many of  the documents that states were required to submit to qualify for the 411  grant program. We requested these documents beginning in February 2004,  and NHTSA was only able to provide us with complete documentation for  half of the states participating in the program.
When we visited 8 states that participated in the program, we were able to  compare expenditure reports obtained from the states with activities that  were reported to NHTSA. We found instances in which documentation of  state reported activities provided by NHTSA did not match information  provided directly to us by the states.
In documentation submitted to NHTSA, 1 state reported using grant  funds on alcohol breath test devices. However, documents available at  the state level indicate that nearly all of the funds were expended on a  single project to redevelop a crash data system. Officials we spoke with  also indicated that the money had gone for redeveloping the data  system.
In a report to NHTSA, 1 state we visited had reported undertaking four  projects, but we found that two of them were actually funded by a  different federal grant.
The degree to which NHTSA monitored state 411-funded activities was  difficult to determine. NHTSA officials told us that they were not required  to review state 411-funded activities in detail. A few regional office officials  told us that they verified state reported activities by linking them to  objectives identified in state strategic plans; however, no documentation of  these reviews was provided.
section_title: Recent Steps Were Announced for Improving Oversight, but Impact on the 411 Program Is Unclear
paragraphs: NHTSA has taken several steps to improve its oversight and assist states in  improving their traffic safety data systems; however, more efforts are  needed. As we were completing our work, NHTSA released a report,  Initiatives to Address Improvement of Traffic Safety Data, that provides  the status of data systems in five areas, including coordination and  leadership, improving data quality and availability, encouraging states to  move to electronic capture and processing, creating greater uniformity in  data elements, and facilitating data use and access. It also provides  recommendations and initiatives in support of NHTSA’s efforts to improve  state traffic safety data systems. Although the report outlines (1) steps to  be taken, (2) stakeholder responsibilities for each recommendation, and  (3) the general outcomes expected, the extent to which actions will occur  as a result of the report is unclear. The report is limited to a description of  conditions and needs for traffic safety data improvements and does not  include an implementation plan with milestones or timelines. The report  acknowledges that due to limited funding, NHTSA will focus primarily on  recommendations that are feasible given current resources. According to  NHTSA, the report was issued as a fact-finding status report and, therefore,  no timelines or milestones were included. However, beginning October  2004, a newly created National Traffic Records Coordinating Committee is  developing an implementation plan for the goals identified in the report.
NHTSA also recently enhanced its oversight tools for all safety grants. It  has mandated management reviews every 3 years and also expanded its  existing regional planning documents for the areas of occupant protection  and impaired driving, with three additional areas, including traffic safety  data.The first of these regional action plans aimed at data improvements  are being initiated fiscal year 2005 and include goals, objectives, and  milestones. Mandating management reviews that encompass the broad  array of grant programs every 3 years is an improvement over the  inconsistent application of these reviews in the past. Also, by establishing  traffic safety data improvements as part of the regional action plans,  NHTSA will have more uniform tracking of state data improvements and  also better information on state progress. While these newly initiated  efforts are positive steps to improving oversight, it is too soon to tell how  effective they will be for monitoring and ensuring accountability under the  411 grant program, should the Congress chose to reauthorize it.
section_title: Language in Reauthorization Bills Also Enhances Oversight, but Omits One Key Step
paragraphs: NHTSA’s oversight of the 411 grant program may be strengthened under  reauthorized legislation. Proposed reauthorization bills that were  considered by the Congress in 2004 included additional requirements that  states (1) demonstrate measurable progress toward achieving goals in their  strategic plans and (2) specify how they will use grant funds. These  additional provisions would be important steps in addressing the too-vague  reporting requirements of the current program and would be helpful in  addressing congressional and other inquiries about what the program is  accomplishing.
As the previous proposed bills were drafted, however, they omitted one  requirement that will be important in tracking state progress—the  requirement for a state to have an assessment of its traffic safety data  system no more than 5 years prior to participating in the 411 grant program.  Assessments are used mainly to establish the status of state efforts, but  state and NHTSA officials suggest that updated assessments could also  help in tracking state progress. During our review, we found some  assessments submitted by states that were nearly 10 years old. We also  found that assessments based on recent information reflected the dynamic  and often-changing reality of state systems. For example, 1 of our case­ study states had recently conducted an assessment in 2002. When we  compared the information we had collected during our site visit, we found  much of the information from our visit reflected in the assessment.  Updating these assessments at least every 5 years would allow NHTSA to  track state progress. According to NHTSA officials, these assessments  were valuable starting points in helping states take stock of the strengths  and weaknesses of their entire systems. Updated assessments would take  into account changes made as a result of the new 411 grant program and  other efforts to improve the system since previous assessments were  conducted.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The states and the federal government base significant roadway-related  spending and policy decisions on traffic safety data, ranging from deciding  to repair particular roadways to launching major safety campaigns. The  quality of such decisions is tied to the quality of these data. Our review  indicates that there were opportunities for states to improve crash data.  However, because NHTSA exercised limited oversight over the 411 grant  program, it is difficult to say what the program as a whole specifically  accomplished or whether there was a general improvement in the quality of  these data over the program’s duration. Nevertheless, information we  obtained from the 8 states we visited suggests the premise that the 411  program did help states improve their traffic safety data systems. Based on  our work in these 8 states, we believe that states undertook important  improvements in their data systems with the federal grant funds. The  potential reauthorization of the grant program and NHTSA’s recent study of  state safety data provide an opportunity to include assurances that states  use these grants on effective and worthy projects. Furthermore, the  reauthorization may provide greater funding and, therefore, greater  opportunity for states to improve their traffic safety data systems.  However, a larger program would come with a greater expectation  regarding what states will accomplish as well as with a need to effectively  track the progress states are making.
NHTSA’s inability to provide key grant documentation and its deficiencies  in monitoring state progress with 411 grant funds could be minimized if  NHTSA (1) better managed grant documents, (2) had clearer requirements  and guidance for the grant program, and (3) had an effective oversight  process in place to monitor activities and progress. Requiring more specific  information on the improvements states are making in their data systems  would begin to address the problems we identified with regard to  inadequate reporting on the program. If the program is reauthorized,  NHTSA should develop an oversight process that does a better job of (1)  tracking state activities to their strategic plans and assessments, (2)  providing information about progress made in improving safety data, and  (3) ensuring that NHTSA can adequately manage the documentation it is  requiring. In addition, if NHTSA develops a plan to implement the  recommendations in its recent Integrated Project Team report on traffic  safety data systems, it could incorporate these recommendations through  improved oversight efforts.
Finally, one requirement present in the earlier program—up-to-date  assessments of state traffic safety data systems—was not included in  recent proposals to reauthorize the 411 grant program. These assessments  proved a valuable tool to states in developing and updating their strategic  plans and activities for the 411 grant program. They also provide NHTSA  with valuable information, including the current status of state traffic  safety data systems organized by NHTSA’s own recommended quality  criteria.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In considering the reauthorization of the traffic safety incentive grant  program, the Congress should consider including the requirement that states have their traffic safety data system assessed or an update of the  assessment conducted at least every 5 years.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: If the Congress reauthorizes the traffic safety data incentive grant during  the next session, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation  direct the Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,  to do the following:
Ensure better accountability and better reporting for the grant program  by outlining a process for regional offices to manage and archive grant  documents.
Establish a formal process for monitoring and overseeing 411-funded  state activities. Specifically, the process should provide guidance for  submitting consistent and complete annual reporting on progress for as  long as funds are being expended. These progress reports should, at a  minimum, include the status of allocated funds, documentation  indicating how states intend to use the current year grant funds, a list of  projects implemented in the past fiscal year, brief descriptions of  activities completed, and any problems encountered.
Establish a formal process for ensuring that assessments, strategic  plans, and progress reports contain the level of detail needed to  adequately assess progress and are appropriately linked to each other.
Agency Comments and 	 We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for  Our Evaluation	 its review and comment. Generally, the department agreed with the recommendations in this report. Department officials provided a number of  technical comments and clarifications, which we incorporated as  appropriate to ensure the accuracy of our report. These officials raised two  additional points that bear further comment. First, officials voiced concern  regarding the use of data quality criteria from NHTSA’s Traffic Records  Highway Safety Program Advisory to review the quality of data or the  performance of states. The department emphasized that these criteria are  voluntary and states are not required to meet them; therefore, states should  not be judged against them. We acknowledge that these criteria are  voluntary and clarified the report to emphasize this point more fully.  However, we used the criteria as a framework for providing information on  the status of state systems and view this analysis as appropriate since these  criteria are used by NHTSA in conducting assessments of state traffic  safety data systems. Second, department officials noted that their oversight  of the 411 grant program was in accordance with the statutory  requirements. Although we recognize that there were minimal  requirements for the 411 grant program specifically, we believe the  department should carry out more extensive oversight activities so that  NHTSA can monitor the progress states are making to improve their traffic  safety data systems and better ensure that states are spending the grant  monies as intended.
We will send copies of this report to the interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and other interested parties.  We will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the  report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me at  (202) 512-6570. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives in this report were to identify (1) the quality of state crash  information; (2) the activities states undertook using 411 grant funds to  improve their traffic safety data systems, and progress made using the data  improvement grants; and (3) the National Highway Traffic Safety  Administration’s (NHTSA) oversight of the grant program, including what  changes in oversight, if any, might help encourage states to improve traffic  safety data systems and ensure accountability under a reauthorized  program. To address these objectives, we conducted case-study visits to 9  states, analyzed state crash data, interviewed key experts, reviewed 411  grant program documentation, and interviewed NHTSA officials regarding  their oversight and guidance to states in improving their traffic safety data  systems.
To provide information on the quality of state crash data and state efforts to  improve these data, we conducted site visits to 9 states, including  California, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Tennessee, Texas,  and Utah. The case-study states were chosen on the basis of a variety of  criteria, including population, fatality rates, participation in the 411 grant  program, the level of funding received through the program, and  participation in the State Data System (SDS) program and the Crash  Outcome Data Evaluation System (CODES). We adopted a case-study  methodology for two reasons. First, we were unable to determine the  status of state systems from our review of 411 documents. Second, while  the results of the case studies cannot be projected to the universe of states,  the case studies were useful in illustrating the uniqueness and variation of  state traffic safety data systems and the challenges states face in improving  them. During our case-study visits, we met and discussed the status of state  traffic data systems with a variety of traffic safety data officials. These  discussions included gathering information on NHTSA’s criteria, state  objectives, and the progress made with 411 grant funds. In addition to  these case-study visits, we analyzed data for 17 states that currently  participate in NHTSA’s SDS program to identify variations in data structure  and quality. We selected a number of elements to assess the quality of data  as they related to completeness, consistency, and accuracy for 5 of the 17  states that were part of the SDS program and also part of our case-study  visits. We based the analysis on data and computer programs provided by  NHTSA. We reviewed the programs for errors and determined that they  were sufficiently accurate for our purposes. (See app. II.) Finally, we  interviewed key experts who use traffic safety data, including consultants,  highway safety organizations, and researchers.
In order to describe the activities that states undertook to improve their  traffic safety data systems and the progress made under the data  improvement grant, we reviewed 411 grant documentation for all 48  participating states, including 8 of our 9 case-study states. Our review  included examining required documents states submitted to NHTSA,  including their assessments, strategic plans, and grant applications and  progress reports. We obtained these documents from NHTSA regional  offices. For the case-study states, we also obtained additional  documentation, including 411 grant expenditure information, in order to  (1) describe state activities and progress made and (2) compare actual  expenditures with the activities states reported to NHTSA.
To review NHTSA’s oversight of the 411 grant program, we interviewed  NHTSA officials responsible for oversight and administration of the  program. Our interviews were conducted with NHTSA program staff at  headquarters and in all 10 NHTSA regional offices. We also discussed  program oversight with state officials in 8 of our 9 case-study states. We  reviewed NHTSA guidance and policy, including regulations for the 411  grant program and rules issued by NHTSA for the program. We also  reviewed previous House and Senate bills that were introduced  reauthorizing the 411 grant program. Finally, in order to understand  NHTSA’s broader role in oversight, we spoke with NHTSA staff and  reviewed NHTSA’s response to our recommendations that it improve its  oversight.
We conducted our review from January 2004 through October 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Because an examination of data quality was one of the objectives of this  report, we also conducted an assessment of data reliability. Appendix II  contains a more complete discussion of data reliability.
section_title: Additional Analysis of Data Quality in NHTSA’s State Data System
paragraphs: As part of our work, we examined data quality for 17 states that participate  in NHTSA’s SDS program. The body of our report presents several  examples of the kinds of limitations we found; this appendix contains  additional examples. The examples discussed below relate to two of  NHTSA’s quality criteria—data consistency and data completeness.
subsections: section_title: Variations in Reporting Thresholds Impact the Usefulness of Data in the State Data System
paragraphs: The extent to which a state captures information about various data  elements has much to do with the standards or thresholds it sets for what  should be reported in crash reports. NHTSA’s Model Minimum Uniform  Crash Criteria (MMUCC) recommends that every state have reporting  thresholds that include all crashes involving death, personal injury, or  property damage of $1,000 or more; that reports be computerized  statewide; and that information be reported for all persons (injured and  uninjured) involved in the crash.
We found these thresholds differed from state to state. Two thresholds, in  particular, create variation in the data: (1) criteria for whether a crash  report must be filed and (2) criteria for whether to report information  about uninjured occupants.
Determining Which Crashes  The states varied greatly in their policies on when a police report must be  Require a Crash Report	 filed. Fourteen of the 17 states set a property damage threshold, but the  threshold varied from less than $500 to as much as $1,000 (see fig. 6).  Among the other 3 states, 1 left the reporting of property-damage-only  crashes to the officer’s discretion, and 2 stipulated that no report is to be  filed unless at least one vehicle has to be towed from the scene. Thus, a  crash involving $900 of damage to an untowed vehicle would be reported in  some states but not in others.
subsections: section_title: Reporting Information about Uninjured Passengers
paragraphs: Similarly, some states did not collect information about uninjured  passengers involved in crashes. (See fig. 7.) While all 17 states collected  information about uninjured drivers (such as whether he or she was  wearing a seat belt), 5 did not collect such information about uninjured  passengers. Such information could potentially be important, for example,  in assessing the degree to which seat belt use helped prevent injuries from  occurring. Even for states that collected information about uninjured  passengers, the information may be incomplete. NHTSA officials said they  thought that in these states, some officers left seat belt information blank  or coded it as “unknown,” either because reporting officers did not know  the information or because collecting it was too time-consuming.
section_title: Variations in Reporting Alcohol and Drug Data
paragraphs: Alcohol and drug data also showed state-to-state differences, both in  consistency and completeness. Alcohol and drug data are important in  addressing a major safety issue—impaired driving. In 2000, crashes in  which drivers had blood-alcohol levels above .08 (.08 recently became the  threshold for being legally impaired in all 50 states) accounted for an  estimated 2 million crashes that killed nearly 14,000 people and injured  nearly 470,000 others. Alcohol-related crashes in the United States that year  cost an estimated $114.3 billion.
To assess the quality of these data in the SDS program, we selected 5 states  for detailed review. The states, chosen because they were also visited as  part of our case studies, were California, Kentucky, Maryland, Texas, and  Utah—although they are not identified by name in the results below. We  looked at the degree to which they conform to guidelines recommended in  the MMUCC with regard to the consistency and completeness of their data.
subsections: section_title: Consistency of Traffic Safety Data
paragraphs: Information collected about alcohol- and drug-impaired driving varied from  state to state and was not consistent with MMUCC guidelines. Table 5  provides examples of this variation by comparing crash information  submitted by states with the recommended guidelines. The table shows  MMUCC’s recommended guidelines for four elements—two elements each  for alcohol and drugs. One element relates to whether the officer suspects  alcohol or drug use, and the other to an actual test for alcohol or drugs. All  5 states collected some type of information on suspected alcohol or drug  use, but each state differed from the others to some degree. Three states,  for example, collected this information as part of a broader element that  includes suspected alcohol and drug use as one attribute in a list of causes  that might have contributed to the crash. For alcohol and drug testing, 1  state did not report such testing at all, and the 4 others differed both from  each other and from MMUCC guidelines.
section_title: Completeness of Traffic Safety Data
paragraphs: To determine the completeness of state data files regarding impaired  driving, we looked at alcohol test result data that were coded as “missing”  or “unknown.” Figures 8 and 9 show the results for the first and last years  we reviewed. The percentage of data recorded as missing varied from 0  percent to more than 12 percent, while the percentage of data recorded as  unknown varied from 0 percent to more than 6 percent.In addition, the 2  states with the most data in these two categories were almost mirror  images of each other: that is, state D showed no data as missing but had the  highest percentage of data classified as unknown, while state E showed  virtually no data as unknown but had the highest percentage of data  classified as missing. These variations could reflect differences in how  states classify and record information. For example, NHTSA officials said  some states may code an alcohol test result that comes back indicating no  alcohol in the driver’s blood stream as missing or unknown, rather than  “negative” or “.00.”
section_title: Researchers’ Use of Another Database Omits Data on Nonfatal Crashes
paragraphs: Because the alcohol and drug data in SDS are subject to so many problems  with completeness and consistency, many researchers and state policy  makers use alcohol and drug data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting  System (FARS) database instead. This database, which is also administered  by NHTSA, contains information on crashes involving fatalities that occur  within 30 days of the crash. FARS is generally seen as a reliable data  source, with quality control measures and personnel that do as much  follow-up as possible to fill in data gaps by contacting hospitals, medical  offices, and coroners’ offices to obtain accurate and complete information.  However, FARS contains information only on fatal crashes—about 1  percent of all crashes. Thus, while the FARS data may be more complete  and consistent for those crashes that are included, the vast majority of  alcohol- and drug-related crashes are not included. Further, NHTSA  imputes some of the alcohol information because even with follow-up there  are often gaps in data.
section_title: Examples of Federal and Other Efforts at Improving Traffic Safety Data
paragraphs: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)
The Commercial Vehicle Analysis and Reporting Systems is a cooperative effort between  NHTSA and FMCSA to improve collection of bus and truck data. Its aim is to improve the  national data system for all crashes involving commercial motor vehicles and to develop a  national analytical data system similar to the Fatality Analysis Reporting System for commercial  vehicles.
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
The Highway Safety Information System (HSIS) is a 9-state database that contains crash,  roadway inventory, and traffic volume data. Under contract with FHWA, the University of North  Carolina Highway Safety Research Center and LENDIS Corporation operate the system. The  HSIS uses state highway data for the study of highway safety. The system is able to analyze a  large number of safety problems, ranging from more basic "problem identification" issues to  identify the size and extent of a safety problem to modeling efforts that attempt to predict future  accidents from roadway characteristics and traffic factors.
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO)
The Transportation Safety Information Management System (TSIMS) is a joint application  development project sponsored by AASHTO to enable states to link crash data with associated  driver, vehicle, injury, commercial carrier, and roadway characteristics. TSIMS is an enterprise  safety data warehouse that will extend and enhance the safety analysis capabilities of current  state crash records information systems by integrating crash data with other safety-related  information currently maintained by each state.
Association of Transportation Safety Information Professionals (ATSIP)
ATSIP aims to improve traffic safety data systems by (1) providing a forum on these systems for  state and local system managers, including the collectors and users of traffic safety data; (2)  developing, improving, and evaluating these systems; (3) encouraging the use of improved  techniques and innovative procedures in the collection, storage, and uses of traffic safety data;  and (4) serving as a forum for the discussion of traffic safety data programs.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those individuals named above, Nora Grip, Brandon Haller,  Molly Laster, Dominic Nadarski, Beverly Ross, Sharon Silas, Stan Stenersen, and Stacey Thompson made key contributions to this report.