Army Networks: Select Programs Are Utilizing Competition to Varying Degrees
Published: 2014-05-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: For nearly 20 years, the Army has had limited success in developing an information network—sensors, software, and radios—to give soldiers the exact information they need, when they need it, in any environment. The Army has declared its tactical network as its top modernization priority and estimated the modernization may cost up to $3 billion per year into the foreseeable future. The Army's current modernization approach is intended to leverage solutions developed by private industry.
Given the costs and importance of the network, GAO was asked to examine aspects of the Army's effort to acquire network capabilities. This is the third report in response to the Subcommittee's requests.
In this report, GAO examines the Army's progress in implementing competitive strategies for tactical networking systems. GAO selected a non-generalizable sample of 9 of these 25 systems that the Army indicated are critical for ensuring soldiers are able to send and receive mission-critical information between units, and that cover the breadth of warfighter operations. GAO reviewed acquisition strategies for evidence that the Army was seeking competition.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army is incorporating competition in various ways for most of the nine tactical networking acquisition programs GAO examined. To achieve the best return on the government's investment, federal agencies are generally required to award contracts competitively. As the Army has decreased the amount of in-house system development it is doing for tactical networking equipment, it is using various tools to involve private industry to meet its needs. One such tool is the agile capabilities life cycle process whereby the Army determines the capabilities it needs and gaps in those capabilities, and uses market research and semi-annual evaluations, among other means, to involve industry. According to the Army, this agile process provides opportunities for enhancing competition. The Army acquisition strategy for eight of the nine systems discusses plans for competition and market research. An acquisition strategy is not required for the Soldier Radio Waveform Appliqué system because it is not a formal acquisition program; however, the Army conducted market research and is seeking competition. GAO grouped the nine systems into three categories based on similarities in the competition strategy. Specifically,
In two of the nine systems GAO examined—Mid-tier Networking Vehicular Radio and Soldier Radio Waveform Appliqué—the Army is beginning new programs and structuring the acquisition approaches to competitively procure non-developmental capabilities directly from industry. The Army competitively awarded a procurement contract for its Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio, providing units for risk reduction and requirements verification. In April 2014 the Army competitively awarded contracts to four vendors to buy the Soldier Radio Waveform Appliqué.
Five of the nine systems GAO studied have been under development for many years. Three of those—the Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Station radio; the Rifleman Radio; and the Manpack Radio—were part of the Joint Tactical Radio System, which was previously competed and which the Army has restructured. The Army had been developing software-defined radios to interoperate with existing radios. The Army is now seeking non-developmental solutions through competition to provide the needed capability. For the other two systems, the Joint Battle Command–Platform and Nett Warrior, the Army reports that it plans to use full and open competition for individual subcomponents. In both cases, the Army conducted market research to identify vendors or seek feedback on requirements.
The Army deemed competition impractical for the two remaining systems in GAO's review, the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2 and Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 3. The Army considered acquisition strategies for more competition in the development and procurement of these systems but determined that only the incumbent contractor could satisfy the requirements without unacceptable delays. Nevertheless, the Army continues using market research to identify interested contractors and has awarded several competitive contracts for subcomponents under these two systems.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated, as appropriate.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 2011, the Army began a major undertaking to modernize its tactical  network—an effort that may cost about $3 billion per year into the  foreseeable future—to improve communication and other capabilities and  to provide needed information to soldiers and commanders on the  battlefield. The Army has declared the network its number one  modernization priority. For nearly 20 years, the Army has had limited  success in developing its information network of sensors, software, and  radios to give soldiers and commanders exact information when they  need it, in any environment, and thus improve situational awareness and  decision making in combat. Under its current network modernization  strategy, the Army is implementing a new agile process, intended to  leverage industry technology solutions with less system development by  the Army to field new and improved capabilities as they become  available.
Due to the network’s cost and importance, the ambitious nature of the  current network modernization strategy, and the department’s history with  system acquisitions over the past decade, you asked us to examine  elements of the new process the Army is using to acquire network  capabilities. We have issued two products on these efforts. In our first  report, we addressed issues related to the Army’s agile process. In our  second report, we examined the Army’s Network Integration Evaluations  (NIE), a key enabler of the agile process.
In this third report, we examined the progress the Army has made in  implementing competitive contracting strategies for tactical networking  systems to allow soldiers to move mission-critical information between  units.
To conduct this work, we reviewed Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)  and Department of Defense (DOD) policies to identify documentation and  procedures as a guide to assess the Army’s use of competitive  contracting strategies. We looked for evidence that the Army had utilized  some of the principles of competition in its acquisition strategies, but did  not assess compliance with policy and federal acquisition regulations, for  a non-generalizable sample of 9 of the 25 tactical networking systems by  determining if DOD had developed the documentation. These systems  are the Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio, Soldier Radio Waveform— Appliqué, Rifleman Radio, Manpack, Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station,  Joint Battle Command—Platform, the Nett Warrior, Warfighter Information  Network—Tactical Increment 2, and Warfighter Information Network— Tactical Increment 3. We selected these 9 systems because the Army  has indicated they are critical systems for ensuring soldiers are able to  send and receive mission-critical information between units and they  cover the breadth of warfighter operations. Because this is a non- generalizable sample, we are not projecting our findings across the  universe of tactical networking systems. We reviewed Army market  research reports, requests for information, acquisition strategies, contract  award information, and briefings to senior Army officials. We  independently researched accessibility of acquisition announcements on  federal procurement opportunity web sites. We also interviewed key  program officials to discuss both their consideration of competition in  contracting strategies and their plan for engaging industry. A detailed  description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2013 to May 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Over the last decade, the Army focused most of its decisions to field  network improvements on supporting operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan—an effort that was both expensive and time consuming. The  Army did not synchronize the development and fielding efforts for these  network improvements and the funding and timelines for the associated  acquisition activities were rarely, if ever, aligned. The Army’s efforts to  develop networking capabilities fell far short of their objectives, resulting  in what the Army believes was a loosely coordinated set of disparate  sensors, applications, and services. The Army fielded capabilities in a  piecemeal fashion and the user in the field was largely responsible for  integrating them with existing technology. In other words, the Army had  neither an overarching framework outlining its desired tactical networking  capabilities nor a strategy for acquiring them.
In an effort to establish a requirements framework for acquiring its  networking capabilities, the Army, in December 2011, finalized the  Network-enabled Mission Command Initial Capabilities Document, a  central document that describes the essential network capabilities  required by the Army, as well as scores of capability gaps. These  capabilities support an Army mission-command capability defined by a  network of command posts, aerial and ground platforms, manned and  unmanned sensors, and dismounted soldiers linked by an integrated suite  of mission command systems. A robust transport layer capable of  delivering voice, data, imagery, and video to the tactical edge (i.e., the  forward battle lines) connects these systems.
The Army also developed a network strategy that changes the way it  develops, evaluates, tests, and delivers networked capability to its  operating forces, using an approach called capability set management. A  capability set is a suite of network components, associated equipment,  and software that provides an integrated network capability.approach, the Army plans to buy only what is currently available, feasible,  and needed for units preparing to deploy, instead of developing an  ultimate capability and buying enough to cover the entire force. Every  year, the Army plans to integrate another capability set that reflects  changes or advances in technology since the previous set. To support  this approach, the Army has implemented the agile capabilities life-cycle  process, which uses the identified capability gaps to solicit solutions from  industry and government and then evaluate those solutions during the  NIEs in consideration for later fielding to combat units. This process is  quite different from the past Army methods in which the Army assumed  beginning-to-end control of the design, development, test, and  procurement of networking systems. Army officials expect the agile  process and associated network integration evaluations to provide  opportunities for greater industry involvement by allowing vendors to both  propose solutions to address capability gaps and showcase their systems  in a realistic environment. This allows the Army to identify and evaluate  systems without the need for large investments in development programs  and without having to enter into procurement contracts.
Competition in contracting is a critical tool for achieving the best return on  investment for taxpayers and can help save the taxpayer money, improve  contractor performance, and promote accountability for results. Past GAO  work has found that the federal government can realize significant cost  savings when awarding contracts competitively. DOD also acknowledges  specific benefits from competition, such as direct cost savings; improved  product/service quality; enhanced solutions and industrial base; fairness  and openness; prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse; and increased  likelihood of efficiencies and innovation. Federal acquisition regulations  require, with limited exceptions, that contracting officers shall promote  and provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding  government contracts.
Federal acquisition regulations also require that agencies conduct market  research, which DOD recognizes as a key to effective competition.
According to the Defense Acquisition University, market research involves  collecting and analyzing information about capabilities within the market  to satisfy agency needs. It is a continuous process for gathering data on  product characteristics, suppliers’ capabilities, and the business  practices/trends that surround them—plus the analysis of that data to  make smart acquisition decisions. Market research can vary across  acquisitions given that the nature of the research depends on such  factors as urgency, dollar value, complexity, and past experience. One  such market research method allows for government to communicate its  needs to industry and identify commercial items that could be used to  satisfy those needs. The FAR outlines specific techniques for conducting  market research. These could include, but are not limited to, consulting  with government and industry subject-matter experts, publishing requests  for information, or conducting interchange meetings with potential  offerors, and hosting pre-solicitation conferences for potential offerors,  which the Army has called industry days.
Congress passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009,  which outlines several congressionally-directed defense acquisition  reforms related to competition. Subsequently, the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics issued an update to  DOD acquisition policy, which provides direction and guidance on how  program management will create and sustain a competitive environment  at both the prime and subcontract level throughout the program’s life  cycle. DOD policy requires programs to outline their market research in  their acquisition strategies, which is the business and technical  management framework for planning, directing, contracting for, and  managing a program. Market research, in general, is a process for  gathering data on, among other things, product characteristics, suppliers’  capabilities, and the business practices and trends that surround them- plus the analysis of that data to make smart acquisition decisions.
section_title: Army Utilizing Competition in Various Ways Across Nine Tactical Networking Systems
paragraphs: The Army is incorporating competition in various ways for most of the  nine tactical networking acquisition programs we examined. As the Army  decreases the amount of in-house system development it is doing for  tactical networking equipment, it is using various tools to involve industry  in seeking items that the Army does not pay to develop to meet its needs.  One such tool is the agile capabilities life cycle process and the  associated semi-annual Network Integration Evaluations (NIEs), which  serve as market research to identify potential solutions to meet capability  gaps. This process relies heavily on industry for success, thus providing  opportunities for enhancing competition when procuring new tactical  networking capabilities. The Army has also reached out to industry to  identify small businesses with the skills, experience, knowledge, and  capabilities required to manage, maintain, operate, sustain, and support  several tactical networking systems. Two of the Army networking systems  are new programs that are building their acquisition approaches around  competition and leveraging contracting mechanisms that Army officials  believe will enhance competition. Five other networking systems have  modified their acquisition approaches in ways that would incorporate  greater levels of competition. This includes reaching out to industry to  provide potential solutions, and competing the procurement of individual  components. The two remaining systems have incorporated competition  at some point in their past development efforts, but the Army has  determined that expanding competition at this stage is not feasible or cost  effective. In these cases, the Army continues to engage with industry to  identify potential vendors for future components of these systems.
Table 1 contains a list of the nine systems in our review and provides a  brief description of each. Appendix II contains more detailed information  about the nine systems in our review.
Eight of the nine systems we reviewed have either completed an  acquisition strategy or have one in draft, and all include language that  pertain to market research and competition as required by DOD policy.  The Army has not developed an acquisition strategy for SRW-Appliqué  because it does not meet the requirements of a formal acquisition  program. Rather, the Army has developed a plan to deliver a radio  waveform capability to satisfy a directed requirement, has used market  research, and is seeking competition for this system, as discussed below.  Table 2 presents the status of the acquisition strategy for the nine  systems.
subsections: section_title: Army Initiating Two New Systems Predicated on Competition and Off-the- shelf Acquisitions
paragraphs: In two of the cases we examined, the Army is beginning new programs,  structuring the acquisition strategies to focus on competition, and  procuring directly from industry. One of these systems, the Mid-Tier  Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR), will provide a subset of functionality  the Army intended to get from the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)  Ground Mobile Radio (GMR), which was canceled in 2011. The other  system, SRW Appliqué, augments the capabilities of existing radios and  allows them to communicate with newer, software-defined radios.
subsections: section_title: Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio
paragraphs: The MNVR represents a subset of functionality that was demonstrated in  the JTRS Ground Mobile Radio (GMR) program. The Army has a directed  requirement to procure MNVR to provide secure communications.  Accordingly, on September 24, 2013, following full and open competition,  the Army awarded an MNVR production contract. The Army used the  initial delivery order from this contract to procure a limited number of radio  systems to conduct risk reduction and requirements verification. The  acquisition strategy contains summary information regarding plans for  competition and market research and states that follow-on production  contracts are expected to use a full-and-open competition strategy.
section_title: SRW Appliqué
paragraphs: Two vendors sent SRW Appliqué radios through the Army’s Network  Integration Evaluation in 2011, which the Army has described as a  mechanism for market research. In March 2012, the Army finalized  market research to identify sources for the production and delivery of  approximately 5,000 radios to satisfy a directed requirement for a soldier  radio waveform capability. The associated indefinite delivery, indefinite  quantity contracts were competitively awarded in April 2014 to four  vendors. Additionally, in 2013, the Army also purchased SRW Appliqué  radios off the General Services Administration schedule for demonstration  at a Network Integration Evaluation in May 2014 and operational testing  at a Network Integration Evaluation in November 2014.
section_title: Army Modifying Approaches to Create Opportunities for Competition for Five Legacy Networking Systems
paragraphs: AMF, Rifleman Radio, and Manpack were all part of the restructured  JTRS program, which utilized competition early on to develop software- defined radios that would interoperate with existing radios and increase  communications and networking capabilities. Before the Army began  restructuring the JTRS program in 2011, it encountered a number of  technical challenges that resulted in cost growth and schedule delays.  Consequently, the Army is now reaching out to industry for proposed  solutions. The Army has also adjusted its approach for the Joint Battle  Command-Platform (JBC-P) and Nett Warrior programs and assumed the  role of integrator. In this capacity, the Army is purchasing individual  components from industry and integrating them together to build the  systems. According to the Army, all of the contract orders for both  systems over fiscal years 2012 and 2013 were awarded using full and  open competition.
subsections: section_title: Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station
paragraphs: Initially, Army officials believed there was only one source that could  produce a particular AMF variant, but they later used market research to  identify a second potential source that was interested in competing for  that system. The acquisition strategy for that variant now states that full  and open competition and best value procedures will be used when  awarding contracts, with an emphasis on modified non-developmental  solutions. To continue efforts to identify potential sources to fulfill this  requirement, the Army has also posted pre-solicitations for industry  comment and hosted interested vendors at industry days to discuss draft  Requests for Proposals (RFP) and answer any non competition-sensitive  question about the pending solicitation.
section_title: Rifleman Radio
paragraphs: Both DOD and Congress have pressed for additional competition for the  Rifleman Radio. In the Conference Report of the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, the conferees noted strong  agreement with the direction provided by certain DOD and Army  documents regarding the conduct of full and open competition within the  JTRS program, which included the Rifleman Radio. The Army modified  the acquisition strategy to reflect the push for added competition, which  entailed developing a competition strategy, conducting market research,  releasing draft solicitations, and holding industry days. Consequently, the  full-rate production decision was delayed from May 2012 to the second  quarter of fiscal year 2017. The Army is currently receiving low-rate initial  production units. Army planning documents indicate plans for full and  open competition and IDIQ contracts for the subsequent full-rate  production units. Further, the Army anticipates releasing the RFP by June  2014 and awarding contracts by March 2015. The Army has also posted  requests for information to seek industry feedback on documentation  required for potential future solicitations as well as hosted industry days  for added market research.
section_title: Manpack
paragraphs: As with Rifleman Radio, the DOD and the Congress have encouraged  increased competition for the Manpack, which was also part of the JTRS  system. The Army is currently receiving low-rate initial production units.  However, the full-rate decision has slipped to the fourth quarter of fiscal  year 2017. According to the Army, this resulted from congressional  direction for full and open competition of the full-rate production units,  which involve several activities noted above. In addition, delayed approval  of the acquisition strategy postponed the RFP, which is expected to occur  by September 2014.sources for sustainment of Manpack radios, solicited feedback on  documentation required for future solicitations, and hosted industry days.
section_title: Joint Battle Command-Platform
paragraphs: The JBC-P is largely a software development effort that will utilize existing  hardware from a predecessor system. However, it will also incorporate  new hardware such as a new tablet computer and a beacon device for  situational awareness data. Wherever possible, the Army plans to use  existing, competitively awarded Army contracts to procure new hardware.  The Army contracted with the Software Engineering Institute to assess  the capabilities of several software development organizations, ultimately  selecting the Software Engineering Directorate at Redstone Arsenal to   According to Army officials, any necessary  develop JBC-P software. software that is beyond the directorate’s capabilities will be competed to  industry. Army officials told us they also have plans to compete the blue- force tracker 2 component, which is the Army’s latest system for tracking  the location of friendly forces. During fiscal years 2012 and 2013, the  Army made 15 contract awards, 13 of which were awarded using full and  open competition and the remaining 2 were awarded using full and open  competition after exclusion of sources.vendors were automatically excluded from competition because they  failed to meet certain criteria, such as security classification. These  contract awards covered a variety of items, including miscellaneous  communications equipment, cables, system configuration services, and  other information technology equipment and services. The Army also  conducted market research to identify a second source for armored and  Stryker brigade combat team installation kits, which, according to Army  officials, saved $900,000 per brigade.
section_title: Nett Warrior
paragraphs: The Nett Warrior acquisition strategy describes the program’s planned  approach for engaging in market research, including Internet-based  searches, manufacturer site visits, and requests for information via the  Federal Business Opportunities website—federal agencies’ primary tool  for soliciting potential offers. Major Nett Warrior components include the  Rifleman Radio and the end user device, which is a smartphone-like  device. According to documents provided by the Army, the program has  already competed the procurement of end user devices. Army documents  show that the Army has made a number of other purchases such as  cases, secure digital memory cards, and styluses competitively. The  Army is acquiring radios from a current vendor for the Nett Warrior  program as government-furnished equipment but plans to purchase other  hardware and software-related items competitively.
section_title: Army Deemed Competition Impractical for WIN-T Increments 2 and 3
paragraphs: The Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) connects soldiers in  theater with higher levels of command via line-of-sight and satellite-based  communications. For WIN-T Increments 2 and 3, the Army has  determined that competition for the overall system is impractical, although  aspects of competition are still being used on the programs. When the  WIN-T program was in system development, the Army contracted with  two separate companies to develop competing designs for the system. In  August 2004, the Army combined the two designs in order to develop a  system with attributes from both and proceeded with a single contractor  after the two contractors teamed to establish a single architecture for  WIN-T that leveraged each contractor’s proposed architecture to provide  the Army with what it believed was a superior technical solution for WIN- T. An updated acquisition strategy for WIN-T includes language that  describes plans for both market research and competition.
Pursuant to a DOD acquisition decision memorandum, the Army  conducted a business case analysis to provide a recommendation with  the least development and procurement cost and greatest benefit to the  Army for the follow-on production of WIN-T Increment 2. Based on the  analysis, the Army concluded that a sole source contract with competition  at the subcontract level was most appropriate. The Army’s market  research led it to conclude that only one contractor, the incumbent, is  capable of providing the WIN-T capability. Federal acquisition regulations  permit contracting without providing for full and open competition for DOD  in cases where only one responsible source or a limited number of  sources, and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency  requirements. Furthermore, based on market research, government  technical experts determined that there are no new technologies being  developed that can meet WIN-T Increment 3 requirements. However, the  Army is awarding contracts for numerous items that support WIN-T, many  of which are awarded competitively.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided a draft  of this report to DOD for their review and comment. DOD provided written  comments, which are reproduced in Appendix III.  These comments  provided updated and clarifying information on a few of the systems in our  review.  We incorporated these and other technical comments in the  report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and  other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no  charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  Belva Martin at (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov. Contact points for  our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objective was to examine the Army’s progress in implementing  competitive contracting strategies for its network-related systems, in  particular for its radio capabilities. To address this objective, we selected  nine of the Army’s 25 tactical networking systems as a non-generalizable  sample for review. These systems are the Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular  Radio, Soldier Radio Waveform—Appliqué, Rifleman Radio, Manpack,  Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station, Joint Battle Command—Platform,  the Nett Warrior, Warfighter Information Network—Tactical Increment 2,  and Warfighter Information Network—Tactical Increment 3. We chose  these systems for a variety of reasons. These systems exist on either the  tactical network’s transport or applications level and the Army has  indicated they are critical systems for ensuring soldiers are able to move  mission-critical information between units. They are also a subset of the  systems that constituted over $3.6 billion in Army spending in fiscal year  2014 and several of them may also be included in capability set 14.  These nine programs also cover the breadth of operations from the  warfighter at the tactical edge to the brigade command post.
We reviewed Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and Department of  Defense (DOD) policies to identify documentation and procedures as a  guide to assess the Army’s use of competitive contracting strategies. We  reviewed program acquisition strategies to determine how the programs  plan to use market research and competition. While we did not attempt to  assess compliance with policy and federal acquisition regulations for any  of these programs, we did identify examples in acquisition strategies  where the Army has utilized or intends to utilize competition. We reviewed  Army market research reports, requests for information, acquisition  strategies, contract award information, and briefings to senior Army  officials. We reviewed acquisition decision memoranda to identify key  programmatic decisions that affect contracting strategies. We reviewed  defense acquisition training materials designed to enhance competition in  defense programs. We interviewed Army acquisition personnel and  discussed both their consideration of competition in contracting strategies  and their plan for engaging industry. We independently researched  accessibility of acquisition announcements on federal procurement  opportunity web sites. We reviewed market research strategies for  identifying the contractors with the ability to provide networking solutions  and alternative courses of actions the Army considered for meeting  networking requirements.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2013 to May 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions, based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Supplemental Information for Nine Army Networking Systems
subsections: section_title: Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio
paragraphs: The Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR) will host the  Department of Defense’s (DOD) Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)  Wideband Networking and Soldier Radio waveforms to connect  unmanned sensors to decision makers on the move, which is expected to  significantly reduce the decision-making time. MNVR will also provide a  mobile Internet-like ad-hoc networking capability and will be interoperable  with current soldier radios though simultaneous and secure voice, data,  and video communications. MNVR will support Battle Command, sensor- to-shooter, sustainment and survivability applications in a full range of  military operations on vehicular platforms. The program includes specific  requirements to support the U.S. Army, Brigade Combat Teams, and the  warfighter.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The MNVR represents a subset of functionality that was successfully  demonstrated in the JTRS Ground Mobile Radio (GMR) program. The  Army reported that lessons learned from recent operational experiences  have shown that a significant capability gap exists at the company level in  Brigade Combat Teams in the inability of legacy tactical radios to  seamlessly pass real-time information throughout the range of military  operations. To address this capability gap, the Army initiated its GMR  program; however, due to poor performance and rising costs, the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics directed  the Army to establish a new program that manages the evaluations,  testing, and delivery of non developmental item products to meet the  reduced set of capabilities to be fielded to operational units in fiscal year  2014. This program is the Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio that will  host the JTRS networking waveforms. The MNVR program achieved a  Material Development Decision in September 2013 and the program  awarded a MNVR radio production contract. The initial Increment 1  Delivery Orderbegin risk reduction developmental testing and requirements verification  testing. The acquisition has two components, (1) the manufacture,  testing, and delivery of the radio and associated hardware (B-kit) and (2)   procures a limited number of MNVR radio systems to  the manufacture and testing of the adaption kit (A-kit) that mounts the B- kit to the intended platforms. Three delivery orders are planned for the B- kit:
Delivery order 1—Provides procurement of a limited number of MNVR  systems to undergo Government verification testing, and limited user  test. Provides assets to support the development of vehicle  installation kits by platform integrators and to meet various  certification requirements.
Delivery order 2—Successful limited user test results will inform a  Milestone C decision and support an initial operational test and  evaluation.
Delivery order 3—Successful initial operational test and evaluation  results will inform a full-rate production decision to procure assets to  field systems to Capability Sets 17 and 18.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: Acquisition category: Non-Major Defense Acquisition Program ACAT  ID, Special Interest.
Procurement award: September 2013  Contract type: Hardware—indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (IDIQ)  with firm-fixed-price (FFP)
Total program: $1,304.5 million  Research and development: $109.1 million  Procurement: $1,195.4 million  Quantity: Estimated procurement of 10,293 radios  Next major program event: MNVR will participate in NIE 14.2 in May  2014 as a risk reduction exercise. A limited user test is scheduled for the  first quarter of fiscal year 2015.
section_title: Competition History and Plans
paragraphs: In February 2012, the Army revalidated the need for a mid-tier wideband  networking radio for brigade combat teams to fill the gap created by the  cancellation of the Ground Mobile Radio. The Army conducted a  cost/benefit analysis for three options and concluded that a new MNVR  procurement was the best solution. The Army posted a pre-solicitation  notice and later posted the request for proposals. On August 27, 2012,  the Under Secretary of the Army determined that full and open  competition would be used to make a single award for a firm fixed price,  IDIQ contract for a MNVR. According to the Army, such a contract  instrument would not obligate the Army to procure large quantities of  units. Rather, it would allow the Army to purchase only what is needed in  the near-term through delivery orders. It also provides the Army the  opportunity to infuse technology as it becomes available into future  delivery orders. On September 24, 2013, following full and open  competition, the Army awarded a MNVR production contract to Harris  Corporation valued at up to $140 million. The Army included a clause in  the contract that makes Harris responsible for all government and  contractor costs related to follow-on verification testing, to include the  costs of any associated retesting required by failures. The contract has a  3 to 5 year ordering period. The Army expects that after 3 to 5 years,  advancements in operating system software, power amplifiers, digital  processing, as well as advancements in waveform capabilities will evolve  to the point that defense stakeholders will consider revising the governing  requirements document and will coordinate to determine the need for an  updated requirement and a new procurement. If stakeholders determine  the need for a new procurement, MNVR will pursue industry competition  with a full and open solicitation.
section_title: SRW Appliqué
paragraphs: The Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW) Appliqué Radio System is a single  channel, vehicular mounted, software-defined radio for use by brigade  combat teams. It is essentially a data transmission module that can be  mounted into certain vehicle configurations of current Single Channel  Ground and Airborne Radio System radios that have no capability to send  or receive data. SRW-Appliqué runs the JTRS soldier radio waveform and  acts as a conduit for transmitting voice and data between the dismounted  soldier, the soldier’s unit, and higher headquarters. SRW-Appliqué is  intended to interact seamlessly with the Rifleman Radio, which is carried  by platoon, squad-level, and team-level soldiers, and which also runs the  SRW. The Army plans to integrate the SRW-Appliqué radios with multiple  vehicle platforms for fielding flexibility.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In May 2011, the Army issued a directed requirement for a soldier radio  waveform capability. Two vendors offered systems that the Army  ultimately evaluated at a Network Integration Evaluation in October and  November 2011. The operational need for SRW-Appliqué was confirmed  by the systems’ participation at this event.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: Acquisition category: NA-Commodity Buy  Procurement contract award: April 2014  Contractor: Contracting team of Exelis, General Dynamics, Harris  Corporation, and Thales  Total program: Estimated $800 million to $900 million  Quantity: Estimated procurement of 5,000 radios  Next major program event: Source selection and contract award.
section_title: Competition History and Plans
paragraphs: Using full and open competition, the Army plans to award multiple multi- year indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts with a firm-fixed-price  for SRW-Appliqué radios. In March 2012, the Army finalized market  research results and concluded that only five of the 10 interested vendors  were capable of providing the requisite SRW radio system. In June 2012,  the Army posted a presolicitation notifying industry of plans to publish a  request for proposal, which it did in October 2012. The Army is  considering the use of on ramps and off ramps in the contract so new  vendors can be added or underperforming vendors can be removed.government-owned SRW will be made available to contractors for  integration onto their existing hardware solutions.
section_title: Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station
paragraphs: AMF products are software programmable, multi-band, multi-mode mobile  networking radios, providing simultaneous voice, data and video  communications for Army aviation platforms. The radios will operate in  networks supporting the Common Operational Picture, situational  awareness, and interoperability of Mission Command Systems. The AMF  program will procure two non-developmental radios to meet user needs.  One radio, Small Airborne Link 16 Terminal (SALT), will possess Link 16  and SRW capability. The second, Small Airborne Networking Radio  (SANR), will provide networking and legacy waveform capability. SALT  will provide one channel dedicated to a Link 16 capability and a second  software-defined radio channel that can host SRW. SANR will provide a  two-channel software-defined radio that provides interoperability with the  Army’s Mid-tier Networking Waveform capability that will be widely  deployed to ground forces. The radio will be installed on AH-64E Apache,  UH-60M/L Black Hawk, CH-47F Chinook, and OH-58F Kiowa Warrior  helicopters in addition to the MQ-1C Gray Eagle unmanned aircraft  system.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The AMF program was restructured in accordance with Milestone  Decision Authority direction dated May 2012 and July 2012. The May  2012 decision memorandum directed the closeout of the AMF system  development and demonstration contract awarded in March 2008. The  July 2012 decision memorandum approved a non-developmental item  acquisition approach leveraging previous industry investment in tactical  radio technology.
AMF will operate networking waveforms and select waveforms that are  widely deployed by Joint Forces today, enable interoperability between  different types of platforms, and transport information through the tactical  network to joint network member nodes. The Army has determined that  the need for interoperable systems, including common waveforms,  software applications, and network operations is critical to the mobile  tactical network capability.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: Acquisition category: ACAT ID  Acquisition phase: Pre-solicitation for production  System development contract award: March 2008  Total program: $3,582.7 million  Research and development: $1,849.3 million  Procurement: $1,733.4 million  Quantity: 7,720 radios, which is 15,440 channels  Next major program event: SALT production and SANR low-rate initial  production decisions in first quarter 2016.
section_title: Competition History and Plans
paragraphs: The Army developed two AMF variants—the SALT and the SANR. The  SALT is intended as a 2-channel radio capable of running the Link 16 and  SRW waveforms. The Army intends to install the 2-channel Link 16 and  SRW capable AMF SALT radios on all AH-64E aircraft starting with Lot 6.
The SANR is also a 2-channel radio capable of utilizing the Single  Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System, Soldier Radio, and  Wideband Networking Waveforms. The radio will be installed on AH-64E  Apache Block III, UH-60M/L Black Hawk, CH-47F Chinook, and OH-58F  Kiowa Warrior helicopters, in addition to the MQ-1C Gray Eagle  unmanned aerial system.
In March 2008, the Program Office awarded Lockheed Martin Corporation  a cost-plus-award-fee contract through full and open competition. The  basic contract was to acquire the complete JTRS Software Defined Radio  system and subsystems in accordance with the 2006 JTRS Operational  Requirements Document with the option to add capability packages for  additional platform requirements. In September 2011, the Milestone  Decision Authority (MDA) directed a program and contract restructure in  order to meet the requirements. AMF then conducted market research on  potential non-developmental Item solutions for Army Aviation. Market  research showed less complex non developmental solutions would be  available to meet revised user requirements and identified an additional  vendor who was interested in competing.
AMF conducted market research for the SALT radio, advising industry of  the pending acquisition and soliciting inquiries from interested parties.  AMF received and analyzed market survey data and initially determined a  competitive approach in support of the planned SALT procurement for the  PM Apache AH-64E Lot 6, was not feasible. On June 24, 2013, via  Federal Business Opportunities, the government announced its intention  to solicit on a sole source basis. In response to the synopsis, another  vendor indicated its interest in the acquisition. Based on information  presented by the second vendor, the Government concluded the SALT  contract strategy should be full and open competition. The Army posted a  revised solicitation notifying industry that the award would be competed  and posted the draft request for proposals on January 17, 2014. On  February 3, 2014, under an update to the same solicitation, the Army  notified interested vendors that it would be hosting a pre-solicitation  conference at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, in order to address  any non-competition sensitive questions about the draft request for  proposals. The Army anticipated issuing the formal request for proposals  by March 3, 2014, and contracts by September 2014, but this has been  delayed due to the lack of an approved acquisition strategy. The Army  plans to award, via full and open competition, a single firm-fixed- price/cost-plus-fixed-fee hybrid type contract with a one-year base period  and three one-year option periods for delivery of low-rate production and  full-rate production quantities of SALT systems, spares and associated  services. The program office estimates that the SALT full-rate production  contract will be awarded in fiscal year 2017.
According to a September 17, 2013, presolicitation announcement, the  Army anticipates awarding two firm-fixed-price/cost-plus-fixed-fee hybrid  type contracts with a one-year base period and four one-year option  periods for SANR. The Army anticipated issuing a request for proposals  by December 2, 2013, but the SANR solicitation schedule is being  reassessed as a result of the budget estimate submissions. The Army  would later down select to a single contractor to deliver both low-rate  initial production units and full-rate production units.
section_title: Rifleman Radio
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The JTRS HMS program meets the radio requirements for Soldiers and  small platforms (such as missiles and ground sensors). JTRS HMS  Increment 1 is structured as a single program of record with two phases.  Phase 1 developed Small Form Fit and a Rifleman Radio for use in a  sensitive but unclassified environment. Phase 2 is for the 2-Channel  Manpack and small form fit-B for use in a classified environment. JTRS  HMS will provide new networking capability to the individual Soldiers,  Marines, Sailors and Airmen and also continue to provide legacy radio  interoperability. JTRS HMS provides the warfighter with a software  reprogrammable, networkable multi-mode system capable of  simultaneous voice, data and video communications. The program  encompasses specific requirements to support the US Army, US Navy,  US Marine Corps, US Air Force and the Special Operations Command  communication needs.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: Acquisition category: ACAT ID, as part of HMS program  System development contract award: July 2004  Contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems Inc.
section_title: Competition History and Plans
paragraphs: The Army continues to receive low rate units from the June 2011 contract;  however, Army officials say that because of the Congressional direction  for full and open competition, the full rate production decision has been  delayed to allow for changes in the program acquisition strategy. The  program is coordinating with DOD officials on a competition strategy prior  to solicitation for procurement.
The Army plans to award multiple fixed-price contracts to all qualified  vendors using a two-step sealed bid process. Further, the Army plans to  award initial delivery orders for qualification testing and operational  assessment and award full rate production orders based on operational  assessments and best value. The full-rate production review for the  Rifleman Radio, which was initially expected to take place in May 2012, is  now expected to begin in January 2015.
section_title: Manpack
paragraphs: The HMS program evolved from the JTRS program and provides  software-programmable digital radios to support tactical communications  requirements. The Manpack radio is a two-channel radio with military  global positioning system that is capable of operating at various  transmission frequencies using the SRW, the legacy Single Channel  Ground and Airborne Radio System waveform, and current military  satellite communications waveforms allowing Soldiers to participate in  voice and data communications networks and transmit position location  information.
Army commanders use Manpack radios to provide networked  communications for host vehicles and dismounted Soldiers during all  aspects of military operations; communicate and create networks to  exchange voice, video, and data using legacy waveforms or the SRW;  and share voice and data between two different communications  networks.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: As we discussed earlier, the histories of the Manpack and Rifleman  radios were parallel until 2011. Low-rate production began in June 2011,  for 100 Manpack radios. The full-rate production decision, initially  expected in December 2012, is now expected to be in February 2015.  However, in October 2012, the Army received approval for an additional  3,726 low-rate production Manpack radios. The initial production delays  caused a delay in initial operational capability from March 2013 to August  2013.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: Acquisition category: ACAT ID, as part of HMS program  System development contract award: July 2004  Contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems Inc.
Low rate production contract: June 2011  Contract type: Firm Fixed Price  Total program (fiscal year 2013-2019): $1,900.35 million  Quantity (fiscal years 2013-2019): 12,553  Next major program event: Draft Request for Proposal fourth quarter  fiscal year 2014.
section_title: Competition History and Plans
paragraphs: Following full and open competition, a single cost-plus-award-fee  development contract was awarded in July 2004. The Army began low  rate production in 2011, using a firm-fixed-price contract, and continues to  receive low-rate units. However, the Army told us that, because of the  Congressional direction for full and open competition, the full rate  production decision has been delayed to allow for changes in the program  acquisition strategy. The program is coordinating with DOD officials on a  competition strategy prior to solicitation for procurement. The Army plans  to award multiple fixed-price contracts to all qualified vendors using a two- step sealed bid process. Further, the Army plans to award initial delivery  orders for qualification testing and operational assessment and award full- rate production orders based on operational assessments and best value.
section_title: Joint Battle Command-Platform
paragraphs: The Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) provides joint forces  command and control (C2) and situational awareness capability at the  platform level and enables mission accomplishment across the entire  spectrum of joint military operations. JBC-P serves as the cornerstone for  Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness and provides continuous near  real-time identification of friendly locations to populate the Joint Common  Operating Picture. JBC-P software is designed to run on existing Force  XXI, Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FCBC2) systems as well as  new hardware items, thereby reducing the Army’s investment in new  hardware. JBC-P is an upgrade from FCBC2 in that it provides enhanced  chat room capability, improved mission command applications, a more  intuitive graphical interface, enhanced blue force situational awareness,  and ruggedization of hardware.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Force XXI, Battle Command, Brigade and Below began as a program in  1996 with primary capabilities of Situational Awareness (e.g. friendly and  enemy position data) and Command and Control messaging (orders, free  text, overlays, etc.) for combat platforms and tactical vehicles. In its early  years, FBCB2 relied upon line-of-sight radio communications, but later  adopted satellite and became commonly referred to as Blue Force  Tracking, or BFT. In 2006, the Army began a software product line called  Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) that, according to Army officials,  provided increased chat and messaging capabilities. However, these  capabilities were still limited. To address these limitations, the Army  initiated a follow-on effort called JBC-P, which the Joint Requirements  Oversight Council approved in May 2008. JBC-P heavily leverages both  the hardware and product line software of JCR and FBCB2 to introduce  its enhancements to operational units. In September 2009, an Acquisition  Decision Memorandum approved the system’s entry into the Engineering  and Manufacturing Development Phase. In July 2012, the Program  Executive Office, Command and Tactical, as the JBC-P Milestone  Decision Authority, approved the program for production. During the  October through November 2013 Network Integration Evaluation 14.1, the  Army conducted a JBC-P software build 5.1 customer test to demonstrate  correction of Initial Operational Test and Evaluation deficiencies which  supported a Full Rate Production decision in December 2013.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: Quantity: 25,086Next major program event: JBC-P will participate in NIE 14.2 for Follow- on Test and Evaluation as well as NIE 15.1 as a System Under  Evaluation (SUE).
section_title: Competition History and Plans
paragraphs: According to the Army, the FBCB2 and BFT hardware systems are known  as the mounted Family of Computer Systems; DRS Tactical has a 3-year  contract with 2 option years to provide needed hardware. The JBC-P  software is being developed in-house at the U.S. Army Aviation and  Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center’s Software  Engineering Directorate, rather than selecting a contractor. The program’s  strategy is to use existing hardware so that JBC-P will largely be a  software-intensive effort. The Army also stated they plan to recompete  periodically for things like computers to get new technologies and reduce  costs and contends that competition has already netted 25-30% satellite  savings and other cost savings for the network operations center. The  program has conducted market research to identify potential sources and  is engaging industry, both large and small.
section_title: Nett Warrior
paragraphs: The Nett Warrior is an integrated dismounted leader situational  awareness system for use during combat operations. According to the  Army, the system provides unparalleled situational awareness to the  dismounted leader and allows for faster and more accurate decisions in  the tactical fight. The Nett Warrior program focuses on the development  of the situational awareness system, which has the ability to graphically  display the location of an individual leader’s location on a digital geo- referenced map image on a smart device. Additional Soldier and leader  locations also can appear on the smart device digital display. Nett Warrior  connects through a secure radio to send and receive information from  one Nett Warrior to another, thus connecting the dismounted leader to the  network. These radios will also connect the equipped leader to higher  echelon data and information products to assist in decision making and  situational understanding. Soldier position location information will appear  on network via interoperability with the Army’s JTRS capability. This  allows the leader to easily see, understand and interact in the method that  best suits the user and the particular mission, help leaders avoid  fratricide, and make soldiers more effective and lethal in the execution of  their combat missions.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics approved the Ground Soldier Ensemble (later renamed Nett  Warrior) for entry into the Technology Development Phase in February  2009. The initial low-rate production contract was awarded in 2012 with a  follow-on low-rate buy authorized in July 2013. The Nett Warrior is  intended to address operational requirements to provide the dismounted  Leader with improved situational awareness, command and control  capabilities. It links the dismounted Leader via voice and data  communications to Soldiers at the tactical edge and to headquarters at  Platoon and Company levels.
section_title: Program Status
section_title: Competition History and Plans
paragraphs: Three Technology Development contracts were awarded in April 2009 to  General Dynamics C4 Systems of Scottsdale, Arizona; Raytheon Network  Centric Systems of McKinney, Texas; and Rockwell Collins of Cedar  Rapids, Iowa. The systems developed under these contracts have  undergone Developmental Tests and completed a limited user test in late  2010.
In August 2011, the Army held a configuration steering board that  approved the recommended de-scoping of the system’s requirements and  set the new technical baseline. Based on the configuration steering board  recommendations, the Army further refined the system to provide  competitively procured End User Devices (commercial-based  smartphone-like devices) connected to the Rifleman Radio. As a result of  the steering board changes, the Army did not pursue the original planned  limited competition among the technology development phase contractors  for production effort and instead adopted a commercial approach,  allowing the program to proceed directly to low rate production.  Additionally, according to Army Officials, the program plans to employ  competition at the component level through contract actions with short  durations, even one-time buys, to take advantage of technology  advancements. For example, the end user devices will likely be  purchased using competitively awarded indefinite delivery, indefinite  quantity contract delivery orders. This type of contract allows the agency  to bring in new contractors without having to go through the process of  awarding a new competitive contract.
According to documents provided by the Army, the Nett Warrior program  executed 24 competitive contract actions over fiscal years 2012 and 2013  valued at $94.9 million. According to officials, the Army made the majority  of these purchases through other agencies’ contract vehicles as purchase  orders. The purchases included a variety of items, such as smart phones,  cases, secure digital memory cards, and styluses. The Nett Warrior has  also used market research to get feedback from industry utilizing the  Federal Business Opportunities site to post notices intended to obtain  industry comments on proposed solicitations for subcomponents. In  January 2013, the Army posted a notice seeking industry feedback on a  draft request for proposals that would seek to procure networking hubs  and power supply.
section_title: Warfighter Information Network- Tactical Increment 2
paragraphs: Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T) is essentially the  soldiers’ Internet, providing a satellite-based tactical communications  backbone, to which other Army networked systems need to connect in  order to function. WIN-T employs a combination of terrestrial, airborne,  and satellite-based transport options, to provide robust, redundant  connectivity. It enables battle command on the move, keeping highly  mobile and dispersed forces connected to one another and to the Army’s  global information network. With essential voice, video and data services,  commanders can make decisions faster than ever before and from  anywhere on the battlefield information. WIN-T will be fielded in three  increments, all of which are managed by the same program office.  Increment 1 is fielded, Increment 2 is currently fielded, and Increment 3 is  currently being restructured. We discuss Increment 3 later in this  appendix.
WIN-T Increment 2 provides commercial and military band satellite  communications to Division, Brigade, Battalion and Company while also  providing on the move capability and a mobile infrastructure. It further  provides satellite communications and supports limited collaboration and  mission planning. Using equipment mounted on combat platforms, WIN-T  Increment 2 delivers a mobile capability that reduces reliance on fixed  infrastructure and allows leaders to move on the battlefield while retaining  situational awareness and mission command capabilities. It enables  distribution of information via voice, data and real-time video from ground- to ground and ground-to-satellite communications.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Army designed the WIN-T as three-tiered communications  architecture (space, terrestrial and airborne) to serve as the Army’s high- speed and high-capacity tactical communications network. WIN-T was  restructured following a March 2007 Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of  the critical threshold, and will be fielded in the following three  increments:  Increment 1: Networking At-The-Halt enables the exchange of voice,  video, data and imagery throughout the battlefield using a satellite  based network. Increment 1 has been fielded.  Increment 2: Initial Networking On-The-Move provides command and  control down to the company level and implements improved network  security architecture. Increment 2 has been fielded.  Increment 3: Develops the network operations software to enable  seamless integration of tactical network functions and enhanced  waveforms for increased throughput capability. WIN-T Increment 3 is  currently being restructured.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: Acquisition category: ACAT ID  Program start: June 2007  Low rate production contract award: March 2010  Contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc.
section_title: Competition History and Plans
paragraphs: The initial milestone B, which is the point at which a system enters  system development, in 2003 included two competing contractors— Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics C4 Systems. In August 2004 the  competing contractors merged into one team with General Dynamics as  the lead. After the Nunn McCurdy breach in 2007 and program  restructure, a sole source contracting approach was used based on the  authority of 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1) that the requirements were available  from only one or a limited number of responsible sources and no other  supplies or services would satisfy agency requirements and for follow-on  production since supplies are only available from the original source for  continued production. A second Follow-on Operational Test and  Evaluation is scheduled for the October through November 2014  timeframe at NIE 15.1 to support the full rate production decision review,  which is expected to occur in 2015. The Government will consider  requiring the contractor in the proposal to identify items which the  government will be able to acquire competitively in the future, in  substantial quantities.
section_title: Warfighter Information Network- Tactical Increment 3
paragraphs: WIN-T Increment 3 builds on the capabilities of previous WIN-T  Increments by developing the network operations software (NetOps)  that enables the seamless integration and management of tactical  networks, and the enhanced waveforms that increase throughput and  improve network capacity and robustness. Until recently, WIN-T  Increment 3 had intended to introduce an additional line-of-sight link using  an airborne platform. However, an Army Configuration Steering Board  meeting held on November 7, 2013 approved the de-scoping of the  program to focus on NetOps and completion of the waveform  development efforts. As a result, WIN-T Increment 3 is currently being  restructured and upon Defense Acquisition Executive approval, a revised  program baseline will be created.
subsections: section_title: Background:
paragraphs: Increment 3: Full Networking On-The-Move provides full mobility  command and control for all Army field commanders. Network reliability  and robustness is enhanced with the addition of enhanced network  operations software and enhanced waveforms.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: Acquisition category: ACAT ID  Program start: June 2007  Development contract award: July 2007  Contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc.
section_title: Competition history and plans
paragraphs: The initial development contract was the result of a competitively awarded  contract between two competing contractors—Lockheed Martin and  General Dynamics C4 Systems. In August 2004 the competing  contractors merged into one team with General Dynamics as the lead.  The follow-on development contract will be a sole source to the current  contractor—General Dynamics C4 Systems. According to Army officials,  sole source is planned because the contract cannot be competitively  awarded without unacceptable delays in fulfilling the Army’s  requirements. For the follow-on development contract, the contractor  plans to conduct sub-tier competition to ensure it is getting the best  commercial products at fair and reasonable prices. The program  anticipates a sole source award for low rate production to ensure success  of the manufacturing demonstrations and initial operational tests.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Belva M. Martin, (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, LaTonya Miller, Assistant  Director; Marie P. Ahearn; William C. Allbritton; Marcus C. Ferguson;  William Graveline; James Haynes; Sean C. Seales; Wendy P. Smythe;  Robert S. Swierczek; and Paul G. Williams made key contributions to this  report.