Force Structure: Better Information Needed to Support Air Force A-10 and Other Future Divestment Decisions
Published: 2016-08-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD faces difficult decisions on how to best balance current demands and future needs within fiscal constraints. Decisions regarding the A-10 aircraft exemplify the difficulty. In the fiscal year 2015 budget request, DOD and the Air Force prioritized modern multi-role aircraft and proposed divesting the A-10 fleet, but Congress prohibited this action. DOD and the Air Force have continued to propose divesting the A-10 in two subsequent budget requests.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for GAO to review the A-10 divestment proposal. This report reviews the extent to which (1) the Air Force and DOD have quality information needed to understand the implications of A-10 divestment; and (2) the Air Force followed best practices when estimating cost savings from A-10 divestment and evaluating alternatives. GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed knowledgeable officials for this review.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force do not have quality information on the full implications of A-10 divestment, including gaps that could be created by A-10 divestment and mitigation options. While A-10 pilots are recognized as the Air Force experts in providing close air support (CAS) to friendly forces, the A-10 and its pilots also perform other missions that are important to ongoing operations or to combatant commander operational plans and divestment will result in reduced capacity and capability in these other areas. The Air Force is taking a number of steps to try to mitigate any potential negative impacts from its proposed A-10 divestments. However, the Air Force has not established clear requirements for the missions the A-10 performs, and in the absence of these requirements, has not fully identified the capacity or capability gaps that could result from the A-10 divestment. Without a clear understanding of the capability or capacity gaps and risks that could result from A-10 divestment, it is also unclear how effective or necessary the Air Force's and the department's mitigation strategies will be. For example, although the Air Force has several efforts underway to generally mitigate the loss of capabilities that would result from A-10 divestment, it has not identified how or if it will replace the A-10's role in combat search and rescue missions. Depending on the specific mitigation strategy chosen, the Air Force may have to address a number of different secondary impacts that could affect its ability to execute existing missions. The A-10 is one example of a challenge DOD could continue to face as it balances current needs against investing in the future force to replace aging systems. For example, in June 2014, GAO reported on a Navy challenge in balancing current capability and capacity with future modernization needs. Overall, the department does not have guidance to ensure that the services and DOD are collecting quality information to inform divestment decisions on major weapon systems before the end of their service lives. Without quality information that fully identifies gaps and associated risks resulting from divestment that can be used to develop mitigation strategies, DOD and the Air Force may not be well-positioned to best balance current demands and future needs.
According to the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide , a high-quality, reliable cost estimate is comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. GAO's analysis found that the Air Force's cost estimate for its fiscal year 2015 divestment proposal partially met best practices for being comprehensive, minimally met best practices for being well-documented and accurate, and did not meet best practices for being credible. Additionally, Air Force officials stated they used similar practices when developing fiscal years 2016 and 2017 budget requests that included A-10 divestment. As a result, the Air Force cannot ensure that it has a reliable estimate of the cost savings it would generate by divesting the A-10. Further, without developing a reliable estimate, the Air Force does not have a sound basis from which to develop and consider alternatives to achieve budget targets, such as making adjustments to other fighter-attack programs or mission areas like air superiority or global strike.
This is a public version of a classified report GAO issued previously. It excludes classified information which described specific intelligence assessments, scenarios, and operational details.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: With regard to the A-10, GAO recommends that the Air Force fully identify mission gaps, risks, and mitigation strategies, and also develop high-quality, reliable cost estimates of the savings from divestment before again proposing to divest its A-10 fleet, and that DOD establish quality information requirements to guide major weapon system divestments. DOD non-concurred with the recommendations, but GAO continues to believe that they remain valid as discussed in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to face difficult decisions  regarding how best to address continuing operational demands while  preparing for future challenges within fiscal constraints. An important  aspect of this, across all of the military services, is determining an  appropriate balance between maintaining and upgrading legacy weapon  system platforms currently in operational use and procuring the platforms  that will constitute the future force. Some of these legacy platforms are  projected to have life spans into the next decade or beyond, so decisions  to divest them in order to modernize the force can be contentious. One  example of the department’s attempts to strike this balance is DOD’s and  the Air Force’s proposal, in the fiscal year 2015 budget request, to retire  the A-10 fighter aircraft fleet in order to focus resources on modernization  and multi-role aircraft that can operate in highly-contested environments.  Facing a lower-than-expected budget level, the Air Force argued that an  earlier-than-planned A-10 divestment would maximize cost savings with  less risk compared to other force management alternatives, and that  there were other aircraft that would continue to successfully conduct close  air support (CAS) missions. CAS is one of a number of missions  conducted by the Air Force. Air Force officials emphasized that,  considering budgetary constraints and DOD strategy, A-10 divestment— though not a good choice—was the best option. Proponents of the A-10  argue that it is the most effective and least expensive aircraft for  delivering CAS and other mission capabilities critical to ongoing  operations in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. Facing considerable  opposition, the fiscal year 2017 DOD budget request proposed delaying  the A-10 retirement in order to maintain capacity in support of current  operations. Congress has thus far prohibited A-10 divestment.
Section 133 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for us  to conduct an independent study of the platforms used to carry out the  CAS mission in light of the recommendation of the Air Force to retire the  A-10 fleet. We published our preliminary observations on Air Force A-10  divestment in June 2015. Subsequently, the Senate Armed Services  Committee, in its report accompanying a proposed bill for the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, included a provision for  us to conduct a broader complementary study on DOD-wide CAS  options. This report addresses both requirements for us to conduct a  DOD CAS options review and an A-10 review. We included in the scope  of our review DOD’s revised position on A-10 divestment in the fiscal year  2017 budget proposal. The objectives of this report are to review the  extent to which (1) the Air Force and DOD have the quality information  needed to understand the implications of A-10 divestment and (2) the Air  Force followed best practices when estimating cost savings from A-10  divestment. In addition, we describe the process and priorities that led to  the Air Force’s fiscal year 2015 proposal to divest the A-10 and how DOD  has evaluated options for redistributing CAS responsibilities, including the  feasibility of transferring the A-10 fleet to the Army or Marine Corps, in  appendixes I and II of this report.
To assess the extent to which the Air Force and DOD have the  information needed to understand the implications of A-10 divestment, we  reviewed a variety of DOD documentation that included strategic  guidance, memorandums, A-10 squadron data, aircraft inventory  projections, training syllabi, and test reports. We assessed the reliability  of A-10 squadron divestment data by reviewing Air Force briefings that  describe the divestment phasing of the A-10 squadrons by Air Force base  and fiscal year and confirmed our interpretation of the data in these  briefings with Air Force officials. We assessed the reliability of inventory  projection data by comparing Air Force data with an inventory graphic  from the Air Force’s fiscal year 2017 budget briefing to Congress and  discussed it with Air Force officials. We found both sources of data  sufficiently reliable for our purposes of providing a general comparison of  the three recent A-10 divestment proposals and showing a general trend  in Air Force-projected inventory. We compared this documentation to  DOD guidance and GAO knowledge-based criteria, which identify key  factors for investment decisions that we applied to the divestment  decision. These key factors include, among other things, having clearly  defined and understood requirements to provide a baseline from which to  identify gaps and their associated risks and inform decisions on how to  best address the gaps.
To assess the extent to which the Air Force’s estimate of A-10 cost  savings followed best practices, we analyzed the Air Force’s cost  estimating approach against best practices found in the 2009 GAO Cost  Estimating and Assessment Guide. We collapsed the best practices in  this guide into four general categories representing practices that help  ensure a cost estimate is reliable: specifically, that it is (1) accurate, (2)  well-documented, (3) comprehensive, and (4) credible. We interviewed  and obtained input from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),  Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; Office of the Under Secretary  of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Office of the  Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; Joint Staff; U.S. Central  Command; U.S. European Command; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S.  Forces Korea; U.S. Special Operations Command; and the U.S. Air  Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. To better understand training and  operational issues relevant to the A-10, we met with units at Davis- Monthan, Nellis, and Osan Air Force bases, as well as the 175th Wing of  the Maryland Air National Guard. We chose these locations based on  factors such as the training and operational expertise resident in some of  these locations and discussions with Air Force officials. Appendix III  provides further details on our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to August 2016 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
This report is a public version of a classified report (GAO-16-525C)  issued in July 2016. DOD deemed some of the information in the  classified report secret (SECRET), Secret Not Releasable to Foreign  Nationals (SECRET//NOFORN), and For Official Use Only (FOUO),  which must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report  excludes SECRET, SECRET//NOFORN, and FOUO information and  data, which described specific intelligence assessments, scenarios, and  operational details. Although the information provided in this public report  is more limited, it addresses the same objectives as the classified report  and includes the same recommendations. Also, the overall methodology  used for both reports is the same.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The A-10 is a single seat fixed-wing platform specifically designed for  close air support and defeating enemy armor. According to the Air Force,  this fourth generation fighter achieved its initial operational capability in  1977, but the aircraft has received many upgrades since that time,  including a major modernization in 2007. The Air Force describes the A- 10 as a highly accurate and survivable weapons-delivery platform with  excellent maneuverability at low air speeds and altitude, a wide combat  radius, and extended loiter times. Figure 1 shows a picture of an A-10.
As of April 2016, the Air Force A-10 inventory includes 283 aircraft  stationed across the United States and also in South Korea, as shown in  figure 2.
The Air Force assigns three primary missions and two secondary  missions to the A-10, which are described in table 1.
The A-10 is one of a number of DOD aircraft—both manned and  unmanned—that conduct the CAS mission. Besides the A-10, the Air  Force currently has two other fighter aircraft that conduct the CAS  mission (F-16 and F-15E) and plans to use the F-35 for this mission in the  future. The Air Force also uses bombers (B-1, B-52), special operations  aircraft (AC-130), and remotely-piloted aircraft (MQ-1, MQ-9) to conduct  CAS. Other DOD assets used for CAS include the F/A-18 (Navy/Marine  Corps), AV-8 (Marine Corps), AH-1 (Marine Corps), and AH-64 (Army).  Figure 3 includes examples of CAS-capable aircraft in the Air Force and  other services.
Joint Terminal Attack Controllers provide ground commanders with  recommendations on the use of CAS and its integration with ground  operations. According to Joint Doctrine, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers  are qualified (certified) servicemembers who, from a forward position,  direct the action of combat aircraft engaged in CAS and other offensive  air operations. FAC(A)s are also qualified to exercise control of aircraft  engaged in CAS, but FAC(A)s exercise control from the air while Joint  Terminal Attack Controllers typically exercise control from ground  positions. In short, both are responsible for ensuring that aircraft strike the  target accurately while avoiding hitting friendly troops. DOD and partner  nations have Memorandums of Agreement that standardize Joint  Terminal Attack Controller and FAC(A) certification and qualification  requirements, including identifying minimum training and performance  standards. Joint Terminal Attack Controllers and FAC(A)s are the only  personnel authorized to control the maneuver of, or grant weapons  release clearance to, attacking aircraft.
section_title: Air Force and DOD Do Not Have Needed Information to Fully Understand Implications of A-10 Divestment and Could Face Similar Challenges with Future Divestments
paragraphs: The Air Force and DOD do not have needed information on the full  implications of A-10 divestment, including the gaps that could be created  by divestment and options for mitigating any potential gaps. Divestment  decisions can have far-reaching consequences and should be based on  quality information. The Air Force’s recent proposal to postpone full A-10  divestment until 2022 mitigates some near-term capacity gaps, but  divestment may still create capacity gaps and gaps in the service’s ability  to conduct missions currently carried out by the A-10. Moreover, the Air  Force has not yet clearly identified gaps and resulting risks that could be  created by A-10 divestment, so it is not well-positioned to determine  appropriate mitigation strategies. Further, DOD may face similar  decisions to divest other weapon systems before the end of their service  lives in the future and does not have guidance to ensure that the services  and the department overall are collecting quality information to inform  these decisions.
subsections: section_title: Divestment Decisions Can Have Far-Reaching Consequences and Should Be Based on Quality Information
paragraphs: Because they can have far-reaching cost and operational consequences,  major divestment decisions, like the original decisions to invest in  platforms, should be based on quality information. With regard to DOD’s  divestment actions that would affect military capabilities, this quality  information should, among other things, clearly identify any gaps created  by the action and strategies for mitigating any gaps that result from the  action. The Air Force has numerous policy documents to guide  investment decisions; by contrast, it does not have guidance identifying  the factors it must consider before choosing to divest a major weapon  system before the end of its expected service life. Although the Air Force  lacks specific guidance to identify the factors it must consider before  choosing to divest a major weapon system, the Air Force has guidance  that recognizes that divestment decisions, like investment decisions, are  actions that can have major financial and non-financial consequences for  an organization and so should be carefully considered. Similarly, we  were not able to find DOD guidance specifically identifying such factors.  However, DOD guidance and GAO knowledge-based criteria identify key  factors that, while developed for investment decisions, are applicable to  making divestment decisions. One key factor is having clear  requirements, which (1) provide a baseline to identify gaps and  associated risks, and (2) inform decisions on how best to address the  gaps. The Navy has also recognized the similarities between investment  and divestment decisions, and it has issued guidance requiring that  senior Navy leaders and Congress be provided specific information to  support proposals to divest a vessel before the end of its expected  service life. Specifically, these proposals must describe the reason for  the divestment, identify any resulting capability gaps, and recommend  strategies for mitigating gaps.
section_title: Delay in A-10 Divestment Mitigates Near-Term Loss of Fighter Capacity but Risks May Remain
paragraphs: The Air Force’s current A-10 divestment proposal delays loss in fighter  capacity that would have occurred under prior proposals. If implemented,  the current proposal would result in the complete divestment of the A-10  by 2022, 3 years later than proposed in the fiscal years 2015 and 2016  budget requests. The Air Force 2014 budget request anticipated retaining  all 283 A-10s through at least 2035. However, Air Force leaders have  recently testified that the service must start divesting the A-10 fleet after  fiscal year 2017 because, without an increase in personnel and  associated funding, the Air Force does not have the manpower needed to  support both the A-10 and F-35 fleets. Figure 4 provides a comparison of  the 2015, 2016, and 2017 divestment proposals.
Changes in the current operational environment—specifically the rise of  the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Russia’s  provocations—led to increased fighter aircraft demands and also affected  the decision to temporarily defer A-10 divestment, according to the Air  Force. This decision was made in consultation with the combatant  commanders, according to Air Force testimony. Since the Air Force  originally proposed divesting its A-10s, units have deployed to U.S.  European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM),  and U.S. Pacific Command. The A-10 brings useful and unique  capabilities to the battlefield, according to officials from the commands.  The Secretary of Defense noted that the A-10 has been devastating  ISIL. Figure 5 shows A-10s returning from a deployment to EUCOM.
Although the 2017 A-10 divestment proposal provides more near-term  fighter capacity than the two prior proposals, implementation of this latest  divestment proposal could still lead to near-term capacity gaps. According  to a DOD summary of its fiscal year 2017 budget proposal, the Air Force  plans to replace A-10 squadrons one-for-one with F-35 squadrons in  order to mitigate the drop in fighter capacity projected under the original  A-10 divestment proposal. However, Air Force documentation reveals  that the loss of A-10 squadrons will outpace the F-35 squadron gain, with  eight A-10 squadrons divested by the end of the 5-year budget plan but  only six F-35 squadrons stood up.
North Korea remains one of the most challenging security problems for  the United States and its allies and partners in the region, according to  DOD. DOD reports that North Korea’s large, forward-positioned military  can initiate an attack against South Korea with little or no warning. In  April 2015, the U.S. Forces Korea commander testified that having very  little warning of a provocation was the command’s top concern. In  response to questions, the commander also stated that loss of the A-10  would create a gap, primarily in the ability to defeat the North Korean  armor threat. He also testified that he had been assured that, should the  A-10 unit based in South Korea be divested, it would be replaced by  another squadron in South Korea. However, the current Air Force  proposal would divest the A-10 squadron in South Korea in fiscal year  2019 without replacement.
We found that the full extent to which the divestment proposals create  capacity gaps and increase risk is difficult to determine, because DOD  does not have a clearly established Air Force fighter aircraft capacity  requirement. However, all three A-10 divestment proposals would  contribute to a decline in Air Force fighter capacity, when compared to the  Air Force’s fiscal year 2014 budget plans, which called for the Air Force to  maintain its A-10s through 2035. In March 2016, the Air Force began a  major force structure review that will include an examination of its fighter  capacity requirements, according to Air Force officials. Until it has such  a baseline, the Air Force cannot determine the full extent of capacity gaps  and associated risks it will incur under its current A-10 divestment  proposal and the effectiveness or necessity of any mitigation strategies.  Figure 6 shows the Air Force’s planned fighter and bomber inventories  from 2017 through 2046.
section_title: Lack of Quality Information on Gaps in A-10 Missions Caused by Divestment Limits the Air Force’s Ability to Assess Mitigation Efforts
paragraphs: The Air Force has not comprehensively assessed potential mission  capability gaps caused by A-10 divestment or the effects of divestment on  its ability to support Joint Terminal Attack Controller training. Though the  Air Force and DOD are taking steps to mitigate potential gaps, they have  not established clear requirements for the missions that the A-10  performs, and in the absence of these requirements, have not fully  identified the capability gaps and risks that could result from A-10  divestment and the effectiveness or necessity of the Air Force’s and the  department’s mitigation strategies. The following sections provide  summary information, based on our analysis, about the mission  capabilities the A-10 and its pilots currently provide; about efforts to  mitigate potential gaps that could result from A-10 divestment; and about  the uncertainty of the effectiveness of mitigation efforts due to lack of  quality information, such as specific mission requirements. The missions  and A-10 contributions are discussed more expansively in appendix IV.
subsections: section_title: Primary Mission – Close Air Support (CAS)
paragraphs: Over the last 12 years, ground commanders have relied primarily on air  support rather than artillery or other ground-based systems for their  combat fire support, according to the Joint Staff. CAS provides ground  commanders with flexible and responsive support and, under some  circumstances—including airborne assaults, counter-insurgency  operations, and special operations—may be the only fire support  available. Though many Air Force platforms have performed CAS in the  past decade, A-10 pilots are considered the Air Force’s CAS experts due  to the amount and depth of their CAS training that builds up over their  careers. The A-10 CAS focus, which begins at initial qualification training  and extends to yearly training and advanced training, far exceeds the  CAS training of other Air Force pilots. According to Air Force and  combatant command officials, the CAS expertise that resides in the A-10  community is particularly important in contested environments, such as  Korea, where a wider skillset is needed to effectively provide CAS. Table  2 summarizes the CAS training flight (sortie) requirements for pilots of Air  Force CAS-capable fighters along with the mission priority of CAS for  each aircraft type.
The A-10 aircraft also has unique capabilities not replicated in other Air  Force fighters such as the F-16 and F-35. CAS experts convened by the  Air Force in 2015 concluded that A-10 divestiture creates a gap, because  the Air Force is losing a high-capacity and cost-efficient ability to kill  armor, moving, and close-proximity targets in poor weather conditions.  However, CAS needs can vary considerably according to circumstances  and in certain cases, different platforms have advantages over the A-10,  according to Air Force officials. For example, a B-1 bomber has a longer  loiter time and larger bomb capacity than the A-10, which is  advantageous in some circumstances.
section_title: Primary Mission – Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC(A))
paragraphs: Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC(A)) pilots are CAS experts who  help efficiently manage air-to-ground operations. Although largely not  used during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, FAC(A)s are invaluable  during contested CAS operations because they perform reconnaissance  and develop battlefield awareness under conditions where intelligence  and communications will be much more limited, according to Air Force  officials. FAC(A)s also play an important role in cases where there are not  enough qualified Joint Terminal Attack Controllers authorized to control  coalition and allied aircraft, according to Air Force officials. Though all  DOD FAC(A)s are required to meet minimum training requirements for  certification and qualification retention, as established in a memorandum  of agreement, Air Force FAC(A) training requirements are higher for A- 10 pilots than for those of other Air Force aircraft. A-10 FAC(A)s are  required to attain mission proficiency while F-16 FAC(A)s and future F-35  FAC(A)s are only required to have familiarity with the mission. Further,  the A-10 community spends significantly more effort developing and  retaining FAC(A) expertise. For example, A-10 FAC(A)s are required to  conduct four times the yearly training sorties of F-16 FAC(A)s and almost  triple those of future F-35 FAC(A)s. Moreover, A-10 pilots currently  constitute approximately half of the Air Force’s FAC(A)s.
section_title: Primary Mission – Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) – Sandy
paragraphs: According to Air Force officials, combat search and rescue is an  unpredictable mission, unique from other rescue missions in that it is  often done with little warning, deep into hostile territory, and requires  searching for the survivor’s location. CSAR-Sandy is an important part of  the overall CSAR mission, requiring pilots specifically trained to  coordinate rescue missions, escort helicopters, and suppress enemy  forces. According to Air Force and combatant command officials, there is  an enduring requirement for CSAR, including CSAR-Sandy. The A-10 is  currently the only DOD platform assigned to this mission and every  combat-coded squadron has CSAR-Sandy qualified pilots. Training  requirements for CSAR-Sandy qualification are very high due to the  complexity of the mission. Gaining and retaining CSAR-Sandy  qualification is also resource intensive because it requires many aircraft,  according to Air Force and combatant command officials.
According to Air Force officials, the A-10 platform has certain capabilities  that make it well suited for the CSAR-Sandy mission, including long loiter  time, communications capabilities, survivability, forward-firing munitions,  and ability to fly low and slow. The Air Force assessed the feasibility of  using F-16s or F-15Es for the CSAR-Sandy mission and concluded  aircrews could not conduct both the training necessary for this mission  and the training required for their existing missions. The assessment,  completed in September 2015, recommended that F-15Es or F-16s  should not be tasked with the Sandy role without adequate training and  also noted that the aircraft would require a number of upgrades for the  CSAR-Sandy mission. The Air Force has not formally determined what  aircraft, if any, will replace the A-10 for this mission, according to Air  Force officials. Figure 7 illustrates the CSAR-Sandy roles and a further  description can be found in appendix IV, which discusses missions  conducted by the A-10.
Counter Fast Attack/Fast Inshore Attack Craft (CFF) is a secondary  mission for a number of Air Force fighters, including the A-10, but we  found it is an important mission in several theaters. Potential adversaries  could use groups of small boats employing swarming tactics to attack  maritime assets. In June 2015, we reported that Air Force analysis  indicated that the A-10 is the best single Air Force platform for the CFF  mission. Further, an Air Force analysis that looked at future risks  concluded that divestment of the A-10 was a risk driver in one of the  scenarios studied due to the loss of its CFF capability.
Air Interdiction is a very broad mission category, and a secondary mission  for A-10s. However, the A-10s provide important Air Interdiction  capabilities, according to combatant command officials. According to the  officials, the A-10’s long loiter time, large weapons load, and diverse set  of weapons make it a critical asset. Further, focused low-altitude pilot  training, combined with the A-10’s flight characteristics, enable A-10s to  effectively operate at low altitude in adverse weather conditions, which is  critical in locations where the weather is often unfavorable, according to  the officials.
section_title: Other Support – Joint Terminal Attack Controller Training
paragraphs: According to Air Force officials, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers provide  a vital link between the Army and Air Force, directly calling in air support  as well as advising and providing expertise to ground commanders on air  support. Demand for Joint Terminal Attack Controllers has grown  significantly since 2003 and exceeds supply. The Air Force has the  largest number of Joint Terminal Attack Controllers in DOD, followed by  Special Operations Command, according to the Joint Staff. The A-10  community provides significant support for Air Force Joint Terminal Attack  Controller certification and qualification training; and A-10 divestment  could exacerbate existing training challenges. From March 2010 to March  2016, A-10s provided 44 percent of aircraft support for Air Force Joint  Terminal Attack Controller certification training, according to Air Force  data. The Air Force does not centrally track qualification training, but Air  Force officials said that the level of A-10 support has been similar to  certification training support. The quality of Joint Terminal Attack  Controller training support provided by the A-10 community is also better  than the support provided by other Air Force platform communities,  according to DOD officials. The A-10’s wide variety of ordnance gives  Joint Terminal Attack Controllers more options and allows them to deal  with a larger variety of situations than they would using other aircraft.  DOD officials involved with Joint Terminal Attack Controllers training told  us that the A-10 community generally provides better quality training  opportunities because of its high level of CAS expertise and knowledge of  the standards as well as deeper understanding of how ground forces  operate. The A-10 community is also highly sought-after by partner  nations for their own Joint Terminal Attack Controller training, which is an  important component of theater cooperation efforts, according to officials  from EUCOM and U.S. Pacific Command.
section_title: Air Force Is Taking Steps to Mitigate Potential Gaps Caused by A-10 Divestment but the Necessity and Effectiveness of These Efforts Are Unclear
paragraphs: The Air Force recognizes that A-10 divestment could affect the missions  currently performed by the A-10, and is taking a number of mitigation  steps, including establishing an Air Force group focused on CAS,  developing new weapons, and addressing the needs of Joint Terminal  Attack Controllers. Although the Air Force will begin divesting its A-10  units in fiscal year 2018 under the current proposal, mitigation efforts are  still being developed. Additionally, the Air Force has not yet determined  the extent to which it will change or reprioritize training requirements for  aircrew of other aircraft as a result of A-10 divestment – a decision that  could significantly affect a range of missions. Examples of planned  mitigation steps are described in table 3.
Another step the Air Force could take to mitigate the loss in expertise  associated with A-10 divestment would be to change or reprioritize  training requirements for aircrew of other aircraft. However, the Air Force  has no concrete plans to do so and the delay in A-10 divestment has  removed some of the urgency to develop such plans, according to Air  Force officials. Changing training requirements comes with a cost,  however. Air Force officials cautioned that aircrews have limited time in  which to conduct their training, and in recent years, aircrews have  struggled to complete their expected training. Units have had low  completion rates for their secondary missions and, in many cases, have  had low completion rates for their primary mission training requirements.  If pilots who fly multi-role aircraft were required to increase their training in  CAS, FAC(A), CSAR, CFF, and/or Air Interdiction, they would have less  time available to train for other missions, and completion rates for training  on these other missions would likely fall even lower than they are today.  Since the A-10 trains more on CAS than any other platform and has a  higher training requirement to gain proficiency, transferring those  responsibilities to another platform or platforms would represent a  substantial addition to existing training requirements for those platforms.  Moreover, CAS is a lower priority mission for the Air Force compared to  others, making it less likely that the Air Force would increase CAS training  for multi-role fighters.
The Air Force’s ability to determine the effectiveness and necessity of its  mitigation strategies is currently limited, because it does not have clear  requirements for CAS and the other missions performed by the A-10,  though it has recently begun examining them. One of the difficulties in  establishing a CAS requirement is that it is a fluid mission that can vary  considerably according to circumstances. Unlike some missions where  there are defined targets in known locations, CAS depends on the actions  and interactions of enemy and friendly ground forces, making it more  difficult to analyze, according to Air Force and combatant command  officials. The Army—the Air Force’s prime CAS customer—also has not  defined its CAS needs, according to Air Force officials. However, Army  officials stated that the CAS requirements developed by the Army in  collaboration with the Air Force in the 1980s continue to apply even as  the Army is working with the Air Force on several efforts to further define  future CAS requirements. Further, the Air Force has not defined its  FAC(A) requirements or CSAR requirements. The Air Force, in  consultation with the combatant commands, manages current  requirements by assigning missions, such as CAS, FAC(A) and CSAR,  and mission priorities to its current force, according to Air Force officials.  However, the Air Force has not clearly defined its future needs in these  mission areas. As discussed earlier, in March 2016, the Air Force initiated  a comprehensive force structure study that will include examining its  requirements for CAS and the other missions performed by the A-10,  according to Air Force officials.
Clear requirements are an example of the type of quality information the  Air Force would need to fully identify the capacity or capability gaps and  risks that could result from A-10 divestment and determine appropriate  mitigation strategies. Though Air Force officials stated that A-10  divestment was the best option available under its budget  circumstances, the absence of clear requirements hinders the ability of  the Air Force to analyze its gaps and prioritize its decisions. The Air Force  has identified potential challenges associated with A-10 divestment. For  example, the Air Force has identified a need for preserving CAS culture  and developing a light attack CAS aircraft. The CAS experts convened by  the Air Force in 2015 stated there will be a CAS capability and capacity  gap following the divestment of the A-10. However, the Air Force has  been hampered in its ability to determine the significance of any  reductions in CAS capabilities that result from A-10 divestment, because  it does not have a requirement to assess against. This, in turn, limits the  Air Force’s ability to weigh risks and choose appropriate mitigation  strategies. For example, an examination of CAS requirements could shed  light on the relative importance of the capability to destroy moving and  armored targets, something the A-10 does well. Should DOD determine  that it is not an important capability, the Air Force could focus its limited  resources on developing higher priority capabilities. The Air Force also  has not made decisions regarding the extent to which limited training  resources from other fighter aircraft need to be shifted to missions  currently performed by the A-10. Such decisions are difficult to weigh  without understanding the reductions in capabilities and potential gaps  and risks created in these mission areas by A-10 divestment. The lack of  clarity on the risks posed by A-10 divestment is evidenced by the fact that  the decision was made without fully understanding the near-term impact  on combatant command missions and before key decisions, including the  feasibility of CSAR-Sandy replacements, were studied. Without clearly  understanding the capability gaps and risks that could result from A-10  divestment before again proposing to divest the A-10, it is unclear how  effective or necessary the Air Force’s mitigation strategies will be.
section_title: DOD May Be Faced with Similar Divestment Decisions in the Future
paragraphs: DOD may be faced with similar divestment decisions as it seeks to best  balance current capacity and capability demands with future needs. The  A-10 divestment proposal is a case study of this kind of difficult decision.  The Navy faced a similar situation in 2012. In June 2014 we found that  the Navy, although it has a policy to guide divestment decisions, had not  followed its policy when it decided in 2012 to decommission seven  cruisers and two dock-landing ships well prior to the end of their service  lives. The Navy’s policy requires a decision memorandum in such  circumstances to address why it is in the best interest of the Navy to  decommission the ships and mitigation strategies for any resulting  capability gaps. Navy officials told us that they did not prepare the  decision memorandum because they were under time pressure to identify  budget savings. As with the A-10, Congress did not support the Navy’s  decision. We also found in June 2014 that the Navy policy does not  require the Navy to evaluate risks associated with shortfalls in the number  of ships—i.e., capacity—in making decommissioning decisions. In this  case, the Navy recommended decommissioning large surface  combatants and amphibious ships when it was simultaneously reporting  shortfalls in those same ship types to support its shipbuilding plans.
Overall, DOD does not have guidance to help ensure that the services  are collecting quality information needed to inform decisions for divesting  major weapon systems before the end of their service lives. As the Air  Force and Navy examples indicate, the services have made divestment  proposals to emphasize modernization efforts without fully understanding  and documenting the potential operational effects of those proposals.  Without quality information that fully identifies capability and capacity  gaps and associated risks resulting from divestment, the services and  DOD will lack information they need to develop effective mitigation  strategies, and DOD may not be well-positioned to balance current  demands and future needs.
section_title: Air Force Estimates of A-10 Divestment Cost Savings Did Not Meet All Best Practices
paragraphs: Overall, the Air Force did not meet all best practices in estimating cost  savings from A-10 divestment, which affected its ability to determine  comparable alternatives. In its fiscal year 2015 divestment proposal, we  found the Air Force’s cost estimates partially met best practices for being  comprehensive, minimally met best practices for being well-documented  and accurate, and did not meet best practices for being credible. Because  the Air Force’s cost estimate did not meet best practices in these areas,  the 2015 proposal potentially overstated or understated the actual  savings from A-10 divestment. Additionally, Air Force officials stated they  used similar practices to estimate cost savings when developing budget  requests for fiscal years 2016 and 2017, thereby continuing to potentially  overstate or understate the actual savings from A-10 divestment.
As we reported in June 2015, the Air Force did not fully assess the cost  savings and implications associated with the A-10 divestment or its  alternatives. In its fiscal year 2015 budget request, the Air Force  estimated that divesting the A-10 would allow it to save $4.2 billion over  its 5-year budget plan. However, we found the Air Force did not include  certain costs related to the A-10 divestment. For example, A-10  divestment could increase the operational tempo of remaining CAS- capable aircraft, which could increase costs related to extending the  service lives of those remaining aircraft. To the extent that this occurs, it  would reduce the actual savings from the A-10 divestiture below the  estimated $4.2 billion. Alternatively, we found that savings could be  greater than $4.2 billion, because the Air Force estimate did not include  potentially significant costs for things such as software upgrades or  structural enhancements that it could incur if it were to keep the A-10. In  addition, we found in June 2015 that, in presenting its budget to  Congress, the Air Force provided a number of alternatives to A-10  divestment that it said would also result in approximately $4.2 billion in  cost savings. However, these alternatives were rough estimates that were  illustrative only and not fully considered as alternatives to A-10  divestment, according to Air Force officials.
When we compared the Air Force’s estimate to best practices, we found it  did not meet all best practices when estimating savings from the A-10  divestment for its fiscal year 2015 budget. The GAO Cost Estimating and  Assessment Guide lists 20 best practices for a reliable cost estimate. We  collapsed these best practices into four general characteristics for sound  cost estimating, specifically that a sound cost estimate be (1)  comprehensive, (2) well-documented, (3) accurate, and (4) credible.  While the cost guide is typically used across the federal government to  support decisions for investments in capital programs, the best practices  in this guide also apply to cost estimates for other purposes, including  decisions to fund one program over another. Since the Air Force used  estimated cost savings as part of its justification for retiring the A-10  among other divestment alternatives, we believe these best practices are  applicable for assessing the reliability of the Air Force’s A-10 cost savings  estimate. Table 4 provides a summary of our assessment of the Air  Force’s A-10 cost estimate against these four characteristics.
The Air Force used cost estimation practices similar to those used for the  fiscal year 2015 budget process to estimate A-10 cost savings for the  fiscal years 2016 and 2017 budgets, according to Air Force officials. In its  fiscal year 2016 budget request, the Air Force estimated that A-10  divestment would amount to $ 4.7 billion in savings over its 5-year budget  plan. In its fiscal year 2017 budget request, the Air Force estimated that  retaining the A-10 under its revised divestment plan would cost $3.4  billion over 5 years. By applying similar cost estimation practices from its  fiscal year 2015 budget process, the Air Force’s fiscal year 2016 and  2017 A-10 divestment cost estimates may continue to overstate or  understate the actual figure and may not be reliable, as we found the  2015 estimate to be.
As we reported in June 2015, the A-10 divestment proposal emerged  from the Air Force’s budget development process for fiscal year 2015,  which was driven by DOD and Air Force guidance to reduce top-line  funding. Following DOD strategic and budget guidance, the Air Force  sought to prioritize, among other things, fifth-generation aircraft like the F- 35, readiness, and multi-role aircraft, while placing a lower priority on  single-role aircraft like the A-10. According to Air Force officials,  significant research, operational analysis, and strategic planning are  combined during the budget development process to give senior  leadership the correct information to make major force structure  decisions, such as divesting aircraft (see app. I for details of the budget  development process that led to the fiscal year 2015 A-10 divestment  proposal).
Although the A-10 divestment cost savings estimate follows some cost  estimating best practices, it largely was developed using budget  guidance. Air Force and DOD budget guidance documents do not require  cost estimates for divestments, and therefore the A-10 cost savings  estimate did not follow best practices and include certain elements, such  as all life-cycle costs or sensitivity analysis that identifies a range of  possible costs based on varying assumptions. According to Air Force cost  estimation guidance, it is understandable that decision makers need point  estimates and not a range of possible costs when preparing and  managing a budget. However, by making a major divestment decision  within the constraints of its budget development process, the Air Force  and DOD based the proposal to retire the A-10 on a point estimate,  without insight into the probability of achieving those savings. Overall,  since the A-10 divestment estimate did not meet all best practices, the Air  Force cannot ensure that it has a reliable estimate of the cost savings it  could generate by divesting the A-10. Without developing a reliable cost  estimate based on best practices, the Air Force is at risk of continuing to  make decisions regarding the A-10 without full knowledge of the cost  implications. As we reported in June 2015, the Air Force presented a  number of alternative options that would result in similar savings as A-10  divestment, with the highest risk option being deferring some F-35  procurement. By developing a high-quality, reliable cost estimate of  savings from A-10 divestment, the Air Force would have a sound basis  from which to develop and compare alternatives and their associated  risks that achieve similar savings or make adjustments to other fighter- attack programs or mission areas like air superiority or global strike. In  addition, we did not find DOD-wide budget guidance requiring cost  estimates for divestment decisions on other major weapon systems.  Without this guidance, DOD may not be able to develop a high-quality,  reliable cost estimate of savings when divesting other major weapon  systems in the future and experience difficulty identifying alternatives for  achieving similar cost savings.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: As late as fiscal year 2014, the Air Force had planned to keep its A-10  fleet through at least 2035, but faced with an increasingly constrained  fiscal environment, it determined that divesting the aircraft was a  necessary step to balance its current and future needs. However, it made  this decision as part of its fiscal year 2015 budget deliberations without  fully examining the implications of this course of action. The upcoming  DOD evaluation of F-35 CAS capabilities and the Air Force efforts under  way to evaluate its force structure requirements are positive steps forward  that should provide a better basis from which the Air Force can evaluate  the implications of A-10 divestment and determine the appropriate path  forward, which may or may not include early divestment. However, the  fiscal year 2017 budget request marks the third consecutive year that the  Air Force proposed divesting the A-10 without having determined its  requirements for the A-10’s missions and the gaps and risks resulting  from divestment. As a result, it is unclear how effective or necessary its  mitigation strategies will be. A recent example illustrates this lack of  clarity. In its fiscal year 2017 budget proposal the Air Force deferred  some F-35 procurement—an option the Air Force originally identified as  the highest risk alternative to A-10 divestment. Should it continue to  pursue the early divestment of the A-10 fleet as a way to balance current  demands and future needs, the Air Force would benefit from quality  information that fully identifies capacity and capability gaps and  associated risks resulting from divestment and it could use that  information to develop mitigation strategies. Additionally, a high-quality,  reliable cost estimate would provide the Air Force with a sound basis from  which to develop and consider alternatives to achieve its budget targets.
More broadly, the lack of quality information to support A-10 divestment  reveals a weakness in how DOD may make future decisions to divest  major weapon systems, because the department lacks guidance on how  to approach such decisions. Department officials could find themselves in  the position where they must again consider divesting legacy platforms as  a means to achieve savings that can then be applied to their  modernization plans. Should that happen, the department will need  guidance to ensure that DOD is collecting the quality information it needs  to fully consider the consequences of such divestments—consequences  that can be both operational and financial. Such guidance could help to  ensure that DOD’s examination of divestment options includes the quality  information needed to fully identify gaps and associated risks resulting  from divestment that can then be used to develop effective mitigation  strategies. Further, it could help to ensure that DOD uses high-quality,  reliable cost estimates that better position the department to identify  alternatives for achieving similar cost savings in the future. Without this  guidance, DOD may continue to face congressional challenges to future  divestment proposals and take unnecessary risks as it continues to  balance current demands and future needs.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To make a well-informed decision about the future of its A-10 aircraft, we  recommend that before again recommending divestment of the A-10, the  Secretary of the Air Force:
Develop quality information that fully identifies gaps in capacity or  capability that would result from A-10 divestment, including the timing  and duration of any identified gaps, and the risks associated with  those gaps; and
Use that information to develop strategies to mitigate any identified  gaps.
In addition, to further inform decisions about the future of the A-10, we  recommend the Secretary of the Air Force, in considering divestment,  develop a high-quality, reliable cost estimate utilizing best practices.
As DOD faces future decisions on how to balance its existing capabilities  and capacities against future modernization requirements, it will need  quality information to help inform such decisions. To ensure that senior  leaders have the quality information on which to base future force  structure decisions, we recommend the Secretary of Defense develop  and promulgate department-wide guidance that establishes specific  informational requirements to be met before proposing divestment of  major weapon systems that have not reached the end of their expected  service lives. This guidance should require identifying gaps in capacity or  capability that will occur for the proposing service and any other service if  the divestment proposal is approved; recommending strategies for  mitigating any identified gaps; and developing a high-quality, reliable cost  estimate of the major weapon system proposed for divestment that can  be used to identify alternatives for achieving similar savings.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of the July 2016 classified report, the  Secretary of the Air Force, on behalf of DOD, non-concurred with all three  of our recommendations. The department subsequently provided an  unclassified version of those comments, which are included in this report,  in appendix V. The complete classified response and our evaluation of  those comments are in the classified report (GAO-16-525C). DOD also  provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as  appropriate.
The Air Force, on behalf of DOD, non-concurred with our  recommendation that the Secretary of the Air Force should, before again  recommending A-10 divestment, develop quality information that fully  identifies gaps in capacity or capability that would result from A-10  divestment, and use that information to develop strategies to mitigate any  identified gaps. In its comments, the Air Force stated that it took  exception to GAO’s assertion that the Air Force made the decision to  divest the A-10 without knowledge or understanding of the associated risk  and capability gaps. Both in this report and our classified preliminary  observations report (GAO-15-600RC), we detail the process that led to  the divestment proposal and explain how fiscal constraints and strategic  priorities, including prioritizing fifth generation fighters like the F-35, drove  the Air Force decision. We also recognize that the Air Force conducted  some analysis on the effects of A-10 divestment and is taking some  mitigation steps. However, since divestments, like investments, can have  far-reaching cost and operational consequences, such decisions should  be based on quality information that would include, among other things,  clearly identifying the gaps created by the action and strategies for  mitigating those gaps.
In our report, we identify numerous areas where significant gaps in  knowledge persist years after the Air Force decided to pursue A-10  divestment. For example, we found that the full extent to which the  divestment proposals create capacity gaps and increase risk is difficult to  determine, because DOD does not have a clearly established Air Force  fighter aircraft capacity requirement. Further, we found that the Air Force  has not comprehensively assessed potential mission capability gaps  caused by A-10 divestment or the effects of divestment on its ability to  support Joint Terminal Attack Controller training. As we describe in our  report, though the Air Force and DOD are taking steps to mitigate  potential gaps, they have not established clear requirements for the  missions that the A-10 performs, including CAS, FAC(A), and CSAR- Sandy, and in the absence of these requirements, have not fully identified  the capability gaps and risks that could result from A-10 divestment and  the effectiveness or necessity of the Air Force’s and the department’s  mitigation strategies. We recognize that the upcoming DOD evaluation of  F-35 CAS capabilities and the Air Force efforts under way to evaluate its  force structure requirements are positive steps forward that should  provide a better basis from which the Air Force can evaluate the  implications of A-10 divestment and determine the appropriate path  forward. However, the Air Force does not yet have the quality information  it needs to make a well-informed decision about the future of its A-10  aircraft.
In its response, the Air Force also stated that we failed to highlight Air  Force analysis that indicated the A-10 divestment was the most  acceptable strategy, specifically citing two classified documents as  evidence that it had the necessary information to support its divestment  decision. The Air Force’s classified response included a third document.  However, these three documents have significant limitations. Both the Air  Force summary of these documents and our analysis of their limitations  are classified and therefore they are not included in this report. They can  be found in GAO-16-525C.
The Air Force’s response that it had the necessary information to make  an informed divestment decision is not consistent with the actions it made  subsequent to the analyses it cited. For example, a year after proposing  to divest the A-10, the Air Force convened a group of CAS experts to,  among other things, examine the state of CAS affairs and examine gaps.  We also reported that in March 2016 the Air Force initiated a  comprehensive force structure study that will include examining its  requirements for CAS and other missions performed by the A-10. It is  also studying the requirements for a future weapon system to provide  CAS in a permissive environment. Our report also notes that a September  2015 Air Force study identified challenges to replacing the A-10 in the  CSAR-Sandy role and that the service has not yet settled on a  replacement. While the analysis identified by the Air Force in its  comments may have been sufficient at the time to help inform much of  the fiscal year 2015 budget deliberations, we believe that, because of  their far-reaching cost and operational consequences, divestment  decisions, like investment decisions, should be based on a higher  standard of information. The findings of our report show that significant  information gaps remain despite the initial and subsequent Air Force  analyses and therefore we believe our recommendation remains valid.
In addition, the Air Force did not concur with our recommendation to  develop a high-quality, reliable cost estimate utilizing best practices to  further inform decisions about the future of the A-10 but without much  explanation. In its response, the Air Force disagreed with our  characterization that such criteria were not used in the A-10 divestment  considerations and stated that high-quality internal data were used to  develop accurate cost estimates based on existing best practices. In our  report, we recognized that the Air Force used programming and  sustainment data to inform their cost estimate, such as weapons system  sustainment, flying hours, and military personnel. In addition, we do not  state that the Air Force did not use criteria in its A-10 divestment  consideration but rather describe, in detail, the aspects of the A-10 cost  estimate that did and did not meet best practices. Specifically, we  describe the estimate as partially meeting best practices for being  comprehensive, minimally meeting best practices for being well- documented and accurate, and not meeting best practices for being  credible. Further, and as summarized in the scope and methodology  section of this report, we sent our analysis to the Air Force for feedback  prior to publication and they agreed with our assessment. A high-quality,  reliable cost estimate would provide the Air Force with a sound basis from  which to consider alternatives to achieve its budget targets. We therefore  continue to recommend that the Air Force enhance the quality and  reliability of its A-10 cost estimate by utilizing these best practices.
Finally, the Air Force, on behalf of DOD, did not concur with our  recommendation to provide senior leaders with quality information by  developing and promulgating department-wide guidance that establishes  specific informational requirements to be met before proposing  divestment of major weapon systems that have not reached the end of  their expected service lives. The response stated that the department  already has guidelines and robust procedures in place to provide senior  leaders with quality information with which to make divestment decisions,  including through budgeting and acquisition processes. As we reported,  the A-10 divestment proposal came out of the fiscal year 2015 budget  development process. We cited key information gaps that remain despite  the department proposing to divest the A-10 in three consecutive budget  proposals. The response also stated that in cases where it is considering  developing a new weapon system to replace existing capabilities, it  conducts a thorough Analysis of Alternatives that examines the factors  identified in the GAO recommendation in order to provide senior leaders  with quality information. As our report shows, this was not the case for the  A-10 divestment and has not been the case for other divestment  proposals in the past. Proposals like the A-10 divestment and the Navy’s  2012 proposal to decommission seven cruisers and two dock-landing  ships well prior to the end of their service lives were made in the context  of the budget process, not as part of a proposal to develop new systems.  As such, the Analysis of Alternatives described by DOD in its response is  not applicable. Therefore, in order to ensure senior leaders have the  quality information DOD agrees they need, we continue to believe that  DOD needs to develop and promulgate guidance to help ensure that the  department and services are collecting the quality information necessary  to inform decisions for divesting major weapon systems before the end of  their service lives. Without this guidance, DOD may continue to divest  weapon systems and overlook the kinds of capability, capacity, and cost  issues we point out in this report, which ultimately hinders DOD’s ability to  best balance current demands and future needs.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff; and the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy. In addition,  the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Fiscal Constraints and Strategic Priorities Drove the A-10 Divestment Proposal
paragraphs: The Air Force proposal to divest the A-10 was the result of fiscal  constraints and a strategy-based, portfolio-wide review of alternatives. Air  Force budget guidance for fiscal year 2015 stated that it needed to  reduce its previously planned spending by 11.5 percent over the 5-year  budget. In developing its fiscal year 2015 budget request at lower-than- anticipated levels, the Air Force examined its entire portfolio and  concluded, among other things, that the benefits of divesting the A-10  outweighed the cost of retaining it. Department of Defense (DOD) and Air  Force strategic priorities guiding the Air Force proposal included fifth  generation aircraft, such as the F-35; high-end intelligence, surveillance,  and reconnaissance capabilities; and multi-role aircraft over single-role  aircraft. With a smaller total force, multi-role fighters provide commanders  with greater operational flexibility. For example, F-16s and F-15Es not  only perform close air support (CAS) missions but can also conduct air-to- air missions, which the A-10 generally cannot. DOD reviewed and  approved the Air Force A-10 divestment decision and submitted it as part  of its fiscal year 2015 budget request. Figure 8 describes the fiscal year  2015 Air Force budget development process.
According to Air Force officials, the Air Force did not re-examine this  decision or conduct additional analysis for the fiscal year 2016 budget  request, which also proposed divesting the A-10 by the end of fiscal year  2019. Citing rising demands caused by operations against the Islamic  State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and growing concerns about Russia,  the Air Force fiscal year 2017 budget request temporarily reversed its  decision to divest the A-10 fleet by fiscal year 2019.
section_title: Appendix II: Close Air Support (CAS) Responsibilities and Capabilities Among the Services
subsections: section_title: Department of Defense (DOD) Evaluations of CAS Responsibilities and Feasibility of Transferring the A-10 to Another Service
paragraphs: DOD has not recently evaluated the distribution of CAS responsibilities  and capabilities among the services, but officials believe DOD would  likely incur significant costs and operational challenges if it were to  transfer the A-10 from the Air Force to the Army or Marine Corps. For  example, Air Force officials said the Air Force owns and distributes its  targeting and jamming pods across several fleets, including the A-10;  therefore, the Army or Marine Corps would need to purchase targeting  and jamming pods for the A-10 fleet if the Air Force transferred its A-10s  to them. In addition, existing Army and Marine Corps facilities and  runways may need to be enhanced to support the A-10s. Army and  Marine Corps officials also cited several cost-related issues. According to  Army officials, Army Aviation already consumes a large portion of the  Army’s budget and the A-10 fleet transfer would not likely be  accompanied by increased funding. This would force the Army to sacrifice  resources from other aviation priorities. Similarly, the Marine Corps does  not want to operate and maintain an aging fleet of A-10s, because it  would divert resources away from current modernization efforts. The  Marine Corps also prefers aircraft with “from the sea” capabilities and the  A-10 does not operate from Navy ships.
Service officials stated that the services have different perspectives on  the tactical application of CAS that could affect training if the A-10 fleet  was transferred from the Air Force. Air Force officials see the A-10 as a  theater-wide air asset and believe that the Army would tie A-10s to the  division or brigade level, thereby generating situations where an Army  ground commander could be reluctant to use the A-10 outside of his  battle area. Air Force officials also noted that transferring the A-10 to  another service would create an overlap of responsibilities with Air Force  CAS-capable platforms, such as F-16, and require years to redefine joint  fires doctrine and training on new tactics, techniques, and procedures.  Marine Corps officials stated that the primary purpose for Marine  Aviation—the Air Combat Element specifically—is to provide support for  the Ground Combat Element as part of an integrated campaign. Typically,  Marine Aviation is not made available for joint tasking, unless there is  excess capacity.
section_title: History of the Distribution of Close Air Support Responsibilities and Capabilities
paragraphs: The distribution of CAS responsibilities and capabilities among the  services has been discussed since World War II but has not seen  significant debate since 1989. Table 5 provides a chronological summary  of key CAS events set within the context of ongoing wars or operations  (purple rows), and procurement actions (blue rows). It also shows how  similar CAS issues have remained over the years.
section_title: Appendix III: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which the Air Force and the Department of  Defense (DOD) have the quality information needed to understand the  implications of A-10 divestment, we assessed strategic guidance,  memorandums, aircraft inventory, training syllabi, and other  documentation against DOD guidance on economic analysis for decision- making, Air Force guidance on business case analysis procedures, and  GAO knowledge-based criteria. DOD guidance and GAO knowledge- based criteria identify key factors that, while developed for investment  decisions, are applicable to making divestment decisions. These key  factors include, among other things, having clearly defined and  understood requirements that provide a baseline from which to identify  gaps and their associated risks and inform decisions on how to best  address the gaps. Specifically, we reviewed documents—such as the  DOD Global Force Management Implementation Guidance and DOD  Directive 8260.05 on the Support for Strategic Analysis—that describe  how the combatant commands are to identify force requirements and  request resources for current operations and how the services are to  explore potential future force structure requirements. We met with officials  to understand the extent to which the Air Force used these processes to  specifically assess current and future force structure requirements and  gaps for the range of missions conducted by the A-10 and develop  corresponding mitigation options.
To assess the reliability of Air Force A-10 squadron divestment data, we  reviewed Air Force briefings that describe the divestment phasing of A-10  squadrons by Air Force base and fiscal year and confirmed our  interpretation of the data in these briefings with Air Force officials. To  assess the reliability of Air Force close air support (CAS)-capable  inventory data, we compared Air Force data with an inventory graphic  from the Air Force’s fiscal year 2017 budget briefing to Congress and  discussed it with Air Force officials. We found both sources of data  sufficiently reliable for our purposes of providing a general comparison of  the three recent A-10 divestment proposals and showing a general trend  in Air Force-projected inventory. We also reviewed training requirements  in Air Force Ready Aircrew Program Tasking Memorandums as well as  initial qualification and advanced course syllabi for the A-10, F-15E, F-16,  and F-35 to compare the levels of CAS knowledge taught to the pilots of  each aircraft. We met with officials to determine whether the Air Force  used these requirements to assess training expertise that could be lost by  divesting the A-10 and develop mitigation options. We also reviewed  classified reports describing the assumptions and scenarios used to  analyze risk levels associated with several Air Force divestment options  to determine whether the Air Force specifically assessed the effect that A- 10 divestment would have on conducting CAS and several other A-10  missions. We did not, however, assess the reasonableness of the  scenarios or assumptions, because they were derived from DOD  guidance to all services and were outside the scope of this review.
To assess the Air Force’s estimate of A-10 cost savings, we analyzed the  Air Force’s cost estimating approach against best practices in the 2009  GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. GAO designed the cost  guide to be used by federal agencies to assist them in developing reliable  cost estimates and also as an evaluation tool for existing cost estimates.  To develop the cost guide, GAO cost experts assessed measures applied  by cost-estimating organizations throughout the federal government and  industry and considered best practices for the development of reliable  cost estimates. We analyzed the cost-estimating practices used by the Air  Force against these best practices. For our reporting needs, we collapsed  these best practices into four general categories representing practices  that help ensure that a cost estimate is reliable: specifically, that it is (1)  accurate, (2) well documented, (3) comprehensive, and (4) credible. After  a review of all source data, all supporting documentation, interviews with  cognizant officials, and independent research, we assessed the extent to  which the Air Force met these best practices on a five-point scale:
Not Met—Air Force provided no evidence that satisfies any of the  criteria.
Minimally Met—Air Force provided evidence that satisfies a small  portion of the criteria.
Partially Met—Air Force provided evidence that satisfies about half of  the criteria.
Substantially Met—Air Force provided evidence that satisfies a large  portion of the criteria.
Met—Air Force provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire  criteria.
We determined the overall assessment rating by assigning each  individual best practice a number: Not Met = 1; Minimally Met = 2;  Partially Met = 3; Substantially Met = 4; and Met = 5. For the purposes of  this assessment we also included a Not Applicable (N/A) assessment  category. Then, we took the average of the individual best practice  assessment ratings to determine the overall rating for each of the four  characteristics. The resulting average becomes the overall assessment  as follows: Not Met = 1 to 1.4; Minimally Met = 1.5 to 2.4; Partially Met =  2.5 to 3.4; Substantially Met = 3.5 to 4.4; and Met = 4.5 to 5.0. We had an  analyst independently rate each individual best practice and then had a  supervisor verify the analyst’s rating against Air Force documentation.  Finally, we sent our analysis to the Air Force for feedback and gave the  Air Force an opportunity to provide additional documentation if it  disagreed with our scores. We shared this detailed analysis with the Air  Force, and it agreed with our assessment.
We reviewed DOD and Air Force documentation and met with  knowledgeable officials to understand the process leading to the fiscal  year 2015 A-10 divestment proposal and how DOD has evaluated options  for CAS over the years. To describe the process, including any  consideration of alternatives, and priorities that led to the Air Force’s A-10  divestment proposal, we reviewed Air Force briefing slides and classified  reports summarizing the priorities, assumptions, and scenarios used to  assess several fiscal year 2015 budget options. To describe how DOD  has evaluated options for redistributing CAS responsibilities, including the  feasibility of transferring the A-10 fleet to the Army or Marine Corps, we  reviewed historic documents—such as the Key West agreement of  1948—and interviewed knowledgeable Air Force, Army, and Marine  Corps officials. Due to the potentially large number of proposals for  redistributing CAS force structure and service responsibilities over the  years, we limited our scope to a selection of proposals that originated  from DOD and were reviewed by the senior-most levels of the  department. In addition, we vetted our time line of key CAS events with  historians from the Naval History and Heritage Command and the Air  Force Historical Support Division. We did not have representatives from  the Army Center of Military History and the Marine Corps History Division  review the time line but believe our analysis of historic documents, input  from other service historians, and interviews with officials from the Army  and Marine Corps were sufficiently reliable for our purposes of describing  a select history of CAS from World War II to the present day.
We interviewed officials across DOD and the services to determine  whether our assessment of DOD information was factually accurate and  obtained input, as appropriate, from the following offices:
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific  Command, U.S. Forces Korea, and U.S. Special Operations  Command; and
U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.
To better understand training and operational issues relevant to the A-10,  we met with units at Davis-Monthan, Nellis, and Osan Air Force bases, as  well as the 175th Wing of the Maryland Air National Guard. We chose  these locations based on factors such as the training and operational  expertise resident in some of these locations and discussions with Air  Force officials.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to August 2016 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix IV: Missions Conducted by the A- 10
paragraphs: This appendix contains information on the three primary missions  currently assigned to the A-10 as well as the role it plays supporting the  training of Joint Terminal Attack Controllers. Each section begins with a  definition of the mission, the mission’s relevance, and the A-10’s role in  the mission, including potential impacts of A-10 divestment. The A-10 is  required to be proficient in its primary missions – Close Air Support  (CAS), Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC(A)), Combat Search and  Rescue – Sandy (CSAR-Sandy)–and familiar with its secondary  missions–Counter Fast Attack Craft/Fast Inshore Attack Craft (CFF) and  Air Interdiction (AI). We excluded further discussion of the secondary  missions in this appendix because they are classified. The additional  details can be found in the classified version of this report  (GAO-16-525C).
subsections: section_title: Primary Mission – Close Air Support (CAS)
paragraphs: Air action by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets  that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed  integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.
Ground commanders have relied on CAS to supply the majority of their  fire support in combat operations over the last 12 years, according to the  Joint Staff. CAS provides ground commanders with flexible and  responsive support and, under some circumstances —including airborne  assaults, counter-insurgency operations, and special operations—may be  the only fire support available. The Air Force is the primary supplier of  CAS to the Army. Unlike some missions where there are defined targets  in known locations, CAS is a dynamic mission whose needs change  depending on the actions and interactions of enemy and friendly ground  forces, making it more difficult to model, according to Air Force officials.
A-10 divestment could result in a reduction in Air Force CAS expertise.  Department of Defense (DOD) doctrine and officials across DOD identify  training as a key condition for effective CAS. DOD doctrine states  maintaining proficiency through training allows aircrews to adapt to rapidly  changing conditions in the operational environment. Although many  platforms have performed CAS in the past decade, A-10 pilots are  considered the Air Force’s CAS experts due to the amount and depth of  their CAS training. The A-10 pilots’ CAS focus begins at initial  qualification training, where they spend significantly more time focused on  CAS in their lectures, simulator training, and sorties than pilots of other  Air Force CAS-capable fighters. During initial qualification training, pilots  of multi-role platforms, such as the F-16 and F-15E, receive a  comparatively smaller fraction of CAS training because of the many other  missions on which they must focus. This differential in CAS focus extends  to yearly training requirements and through the advanced-level Weapons  Instructor Course, which is the graduate-level training for elite Air Force  pilots. Fewer sorties are required to retain CAS proficiency in the F-15E,  F-16 and F-35A than in the A-10. In the advanced-level Weapons  Instructor Course, A-10 pilots fly more CAS sorties and train against far  more complex CAS scenarios than other Air Force fighter pilots. Table 6  summarizes the training sortie requirements for pilots of Air Force CAS- capable fighters along with the mission priority of CAS for each aircraft  type.
CAS expertise becomes more important as conditions become more  complex, according to Air Force officials. However, much of the CAS  provided over the last decade in Afghanistan and Iraq has been in  environments where threats to the aircraft were low, where CAS often  consisted of dropping bombs on coordinates, and where squadrons had  months to prepare for their CAS-focused deployments, according to Air  Force officials. The CAS experts convened by the Air Force in 2015 found  that a broad range of aircraft have become good at providing CAS in  these permissive environments. The advantages of A-10 CAS expertise  may not be as significant under these circumstances but become more  pronounced in contested environments when a wider CAS skillset is  needed, according to Air Force and combatant command officials and  DOD is planning on conducting CAS in contested environments in the  future.
Loss of the A-10 airframe will also cause a decrease in Air Force CAS  capability. Senior DOD leaders have stated that the A-10 is the Air  Force’s best CAS aircraft. The CAS experts convened by the Air Force in  2015 concluded that A-10 divestiture creates a gap because the Air Force  is losing a high-capacity and cost-efficient ability to kill armor, moving,  and close proximity targets in low weather conditions. Table 7 provides a  summary of some A-10 CAS advantages.
Although the A-10 has a number of advantages that are highlighted in  table 7, the dynamic nature of CAS means that other aircraft also have  some advantages. For example, although the A-10 has a relatively long  loiter time and large weapons capacity, a B-1 bomber far exceeds both.  While acknowledging the capabilities of other aircraft, officials from the Air  Force and combatant commands emphasized that A-10 capabilities stand  out in circumstances where enemy forces are close to friendly forces,  there are moving and armored targets, and the weather is bad.
A specifically-trained and qualified aviation officer who exercises control  from the air of aircraft engaged in CAS of ground troops. The FAC(A) also  provides coordination and terminal attack control for CAS missions, as  well as locating, marking, and attacking ground targets using other fire  support assets.
FAC(A)s are CAS experts that help to efficiently manage air-to-ground  operations. This role is challenging because FAC(A)s must first  understand a dynamic situation on the ground and then determine the  best way to support the ground commander utilizing available air (e.g. F- 15E, MQ-1, A-10) and ground-based assets (e.g. artillery) that each have  unique capabilities and limitations. According to Air Force officials, the Air  Force generally chose not to use FAC(A)s during operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan. However, according to Air Force officials, FAC(A)s would be  invaluable during contested CAS operations, because they would perform  reconnaissance and develop battlefield awareness under conditions  where intelligence and communications would be much more limited than  they have been in Iraq and Afghanistan. FAC(A)s are also important in  cases where there are not enough qualified Joint Terminal Attack  Controllers authorized to control coalition and allied aircraft, according to  Air Force officials. FAC(A)s can also help coordinate actions in a very  crowded airspace. In addition, FAC(A)s have a much broader view of the  battlespace than Joint Terminal Attack Controllers, which is important in a  major conflict, according to combatant command officials. FAC(A)s can  also be a significant force multiplier and risk mitigation tool to compensate  for an inevitable decline in Air Force CAS proficiency associated with the  transition to a multi-role fighter force, according to Air Force officials.  FAC(A)s could do so by providing training expertise to pilots in their home  squadrons and by managing the CAS fight when operationally deployed.
A-10 divestment could result in a reduction in Air Force FAC(A) expertise.  All DOD FAC(A)s are required to meet minimum training requirements for  certification and qualification retention as established in a memorandum  of agreement. However, Air Force FAC(A) training requirements are  higher for A-10 pilots than for those of other Air Force aircraft. A-10  FAC(A)s are required by the Air Force to be mission proficient whereas F- 16 FAC(A)s and future F-35 FAC(A)s are only required to be familiar with  the mission. A-10 FAC(A)s are required to conduct four times as many  yearly training sorties as F-16 FAC(A)s and almost three times as many  as future F-35 FAC(A)s. In addition, the A-10 program is the only  Weapons Instructor Course that requires all entering students to be  FAC(A) qualified and has a training phase specifically dedicated to  FAC(A). Moreover, Air Force officials told us that the skills needed for the  FAC(A) mission build upon CAS skills. As a result, A-10 pilots have a  more robust foundation upon which to build their FAC(A) expertise. The  Air Force has not determined the significance of any lost FAC(A)  expertise that may be associated with A-10 divestment.
A-10 divestment could also result in a decrease in the number of Air  Force FAC(A)s. All A-10 fighter squadrons and some F-16 fighter  squadrons are assigned a minimum number of FAC(A) pilots on a  squadron-by-squadron basis. Although the F-35’s advanced networking  and sensor capabilities could make it well suited for the FAC(A) role,  according to Air Force and Joint Staff officials, the Air Force has not yet  determined how many FAC(A)s its F-35 squadrons will be required to  have. Currently, approximately half of the Air Force FAC(A) needs are  filled by A-10 pilots. The Air Force does not centrally track the number of  FAC(A) pilots it has and has not established a requirement for the number  of FAC(A)s it will need in the future.
section_title: Primary Mission – Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) – Sandy
paragraphs: Tactics, techniques, and procedures performed by forces to recover  isolated personnel from hostile or uncertain operational environments.  The Sandy mission involves aircraft and pilots specifically trained to  coordinate rescue action, escort helicopters on combat rescue missions,  and suppress enemy forces.
CSAR is a highly dynamic and unpredictable mission, unique from other  rescue missions in that it is done with little warning, deep in hostile  territory, and requires searching for the survivor’s location, according to  Air Force and combatant command officials. CSAR-Sandy is a subset of  the CSAR mission that requires pilots who are specifically trained to  coordinate rescue missions, escort helicopters, and suppress enemy  forces. According to Air Force and combatant command officials, there is  an enduring requirement for CSAR, including CSAR-Sandy. It is not a  mission whose value is easily quantified but they noted that it is part of  the ethos of the U.S. military that no servicemember will be left behind.  The CSAR-Sandy mission is one way the military fulfills that promise,  according to the officials. Moreover, it helps morale and encourages pilots  to remain aggressive when conducting their missions. Officials from three  combatant commands indicated that their commands have a requirement  for CSAR-Sandy forces. Further, CSAR capabilities are very important for  assuring potential partner nations and facilitating their participation in  operations. According to officials from one command, partner nations  often want U.S. CSAR capabilities to be available before agreeing to join  in operations.
The A-10 is currently the only DOD platform assigned this mission and  every combat-coded A-10 squadron has CSAR-Sandy qualified pilots. A- 10s typically conduct the CSAR-Sandy mission using four aircraft  designated Sandy 1 through Sandy 4. Sandy 1 - the Rescue Mission  Commander – controls recovery efforts and provides protection of the  isolated personnel from ground threats. This is a complex task that  includes responsibility for planning and directing the actions of all ground  forces, air forces, and supporting forces involved in the rescue, including  the HH-60 rescue helicopters, aircraft suppressing enemy air defenses,  and tankers. Sandy 2 assists the Sandy 1 and acts as the FAC(A),  clearing the rescue area of potential threats. Sandy 3 and 4 conduct  rescue escort with responsibilities that include conducting  reconnaissance, escorting rescue vehicles and helping them navigate the  safest possible route, providing communications relay, and finding and  neutralizing threats. Helicopters are very vulnerable to small arms fire and  so there are many potential threats. According to rescue group officials,  qualified Sandy-trained pilots are vital for combat search and rescue  capabilities. They also said that a drop in Sandy-trained pilots would  restrict the ability of rescue groups to conduct CSAR in volatile  environments. Figure 9 provides an example of a CSAR mission and the  Sandy roles.
Developing CSAR-Sandy qualified pilots requires a lot of training due to  the complexity of the mission and the training builds upon skills  developed during CAS and FAC(A) training, according to Air Force  officials. A-10 pilots that become Sandy-qualified start at Sandy 4 and  then work up to Sandy 1 (Rescue Mission Commander), which can take  5-10 years, according to Air Force officials. Sandy 1 and 2 pilots are  required to fly a minimum of 12 CSAR training sorties per year in addition  to their CAS sorties. A-10 pilots must be Sandy 1-qualified to participate  in the A-10 Weapons Instructor Course, which officials described as the  graduate level training. During the program, students fly five CSAR- related sorties spanning 10 hours, attend five lectures on CSAR, and  participate in a 30-hour practicum that focuses on CAS and CSAR.  Gaining and retaining CSAR-Sandy qualification is resource intensive  because it requires many aircraft, according to Air Force and combatant  command officials.
The A-10 platform has certain capabilities that make it well suited for the  CSAR-Sandy mission. A-10s are well suited for the Sandy 1 (Rescue  Mission Commander) role because of their long loiter time and large  communications suite. The A-10 is currently the only Air Force fighter with  a radio designed to locate and communicate with DOD’s hand-held  emergency radio. A-10 platform characteristics are also useful for the  Sandy 3 and 4 roles, where rescue escort aircraft must respond quickly.  A-10s are survivable and can fly low and slow, and are able to stay close  to the rescue helicopters so they can quickly identify and respond to  threats. The A-10’s forward-firing munitions – the 30 mm gun, missiles,  and rockets – and tight turning radius allow it to quickly engage and re- engage a variety of targets. A rescue aircraft pilot gave an illustrative  example of how, when he is flying at 300 feet and identifies a possible  threat ahead, rescue escort A-10s quickly come beside his aircraft, locate  the potential target, and take care of it. Other jets fly higher and faster and  rely on their targeting pods. The pilot said that he is often over or beyond  the potential threat by the time other jets are able to locate it.
The Air Force has not formally determined what aircraft, if any, will  replace the A-10 for the CSAR Sandy mission. Should the Air Force  remain committed to this mission it will need to identify another platform  to take on this responsibility, but, according to Air Force officials, there is  no obvious replacement for the A-10. The Air Force assessed the  feasibility of using F-16s or F-15Es for the CSAR-Sandy 1 role and  concluded that aircrews for both aircraft would require extensive training  and that their existing missions would prevent such training. Combatant  command officials echoed the finding that other aircraft could not be  prepared to conduct the CSAR-Sandy mission along with their current  missions. The Air Force assessment, completed in September 2015,  recommended that F-15E and F-16 aircrews not be tasked with the  Sandy 1 role without adequate training, and noted that the aircraft  required communications gear, survivability systems, and weapons  upgrades. The Air Force has not taken formal actions on these findings,  according to Air Force officials.
section_title: Other Support – Joint Terminal Attack Controller Training
paragraphs: Joint Terminal Attack Controllers Mission  Joint Terminal Attack Controllers are qualified (certified) servicemembers  who, from a forward position, direct the action of combat aircraft engaged  in CAS and other offensive air operations.
Joint Terminal Attack Controller Significance  Demand for Joint Terminal Attack Controllers has grown significantly over  the last decade and exceeds supply, according to DOD data. The Air  Force has the largest number of Joint Terminal Attack Controllers in  DOD, and according to Air Force officials, Air Force Joint Terminal Attack  Controllers provide a vital link between the Army and the Air Force. Air  Force Joint Terminal Attack Controllers serve in Army units, advising  ground commanders and directly calling in air support. Army officials said  they do not anticipate a decrease in the Army’s requirement for Joint  Terminal Attack Controllers.
A-10 Role in Supporting Joint Terminal Attack Controller Training  A-10 divestment could negatively affect the Air Force’s ability to train Joint  Terminal Attack Controllers. Joint Terminal Attack Controllers must  conduct a minimum number of CAS “controls”—calling in of airstrikes—to  be certified or to maintain their qualification. Getting aircraft to support  Joint Terminal Attack Controllers training has been increasingly difficult,  especially as the number of Joint Terminal Attack Controllers has risen  and the aircraft inventory has declined. According to the Joint Staff, the A- 10 divestment will compound training shortfalls already being felt. The  loss of A-10 training support is disproportionate to the number of aircraft  being divested because the A-10 provides a significant portion of Joint  Terminal Attack Controller certification training and qualification training.  From March 2010 to March 2016, A-10s provided 44 percent of aircraft  support for Air Force Joint Terminal Attack Controller certification training,  according to Air Force data. Air Force officials said they do not centrally  track qualification training but A-10 support levels are similar to  certification training. Officials from several combatant commands also  stated that A-10s provide significant support for Joint Terminal Attack  Controller training. The F-35’s ability to make up for some of this capacity  loss is limited by its inability to use inexpensive and light training  munitions that allow aircraft to support more training CAS controls. It also  currently lacks video downlink and infrared pointer capability often used in  CAS and therefore also important for training. The Air Force also has not  yet determined the extent to which it will be able to link F-35 and Joint  Terminal Attack Controller simulators, according to officials from the Air  Force and Joint Staff. Further, the F-35 has a large number of missions  and the extent to which limited flight hours will be made available to  support Joint Terminal Attack Controller training is unknown at this point.
The quality of Joint Terminal Attack Controller training support provided  by the A-10 community is better than that provided by other Air Force  aircraft, according to DOD officials. The A-10’s wide variety of ordnance  gives Joint Terminal Attack Controllers more options and allows them to  deal with a larger variety of situations. DOD officials involved with Joint  Terminal Attack Controller training told us that A-10 pilots generally  provide better training because of their CAS expertise, knowledge of the  standards, and an understanding of how ground forces operate. Officials  provided an illustrative example comparing Joint Terminal Attack  Controller qualification training support provided by A-10 pilots and pilots  from a different Air Force fighter community. A-10 pilots often use detailed  notes, maps, and data in detailed debriefs that can last several hours  after Joint Terminal Attack Controller training. In the counter-example, the  training debrief provided by the pilots from a different fighter community  lasted several minutes and involved no notes. The officials ascribed the  difference to a difference in culture, where A-10s are closely tied to  ground forces and other fighters generally are not. A-10s are also better  positioned to support Joint Terminal Attack Controller training going  forward as Joint Terminal Attack Controllers expand their training focus  to, once again, include CAS in contested environments, according to Air  Force officials. In addition, officials from EUCOM and U.S. Pacific  Command said partner nations often request A-10 support for their Joint  Terminal Attack Controller training, and this support is an important  component of their theater cooperation efforts.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: John Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Michael Ferren, Assistant  Director; Tracy Barnes, Laurie Choi, Nicolaas Cornelisse, Travis Masters,  Amie Lesser, Karen Richey, Michael Silver, Matthew Spiers, Erik Wilkins- McKee, and Edward Yuen made key contributions to this report.