Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Infrared System-low at Risk of Missing Initial Deployment Date
Published: 2001-02-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Pentagon considers defenses to counter attacks from ballistic missiles, both long-range strategic and shorter-range theater missiles, to be critical to U.S. national security. The Air Force is developing a new satellite system, called Space-Based Infrared System-low (SBIRS-low) to expand the military's infrared satellite capabilities for supporting ballistic missile defenses. GAO reviewed the Defense Department's (DOD) efforts to acquire SBIRS-low. Specifically, GAO (1) evaluated the cost, schedule, and performance risks of the current acquisition schedule; (2) evaluated the program's technical risks; and (3) determined whether DOD has assessed alternative approaches to SBIRS-low.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO found that the Air Force's current SBIRS-low acquisition schedule is of high risk of not delivering the system on time or at cost or with expected performance. SBIRS-low has high technical risks because some critical satellite technologies have been judged immature for the current stage of the program. DOD acquisition policy and procedures require that the cost and mission effectiveness of space systems be assessed relative to alternative terrestrial systems. However, the Air Force has not analyzed or identified terrestrial alternatives to the SBIRS-low system because, according to Air Force Space Command officials, terrestrial alternatives do not exist. Nevertheless, studies on various aspects of the National Missile Defense system by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and other groups have pointed out alternatives to SBIRS-low, such as sea- or land-based radar.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) considers missile defense to counter  attacks from ballistic missiles, both long-range strategic and shorter-range  theater missiles, to be critical to our national security. The Air Force is  developing a new satellite system, called Space-Based Infrared System-low  (SBIRS)-low, to expand DOD’s current infrared satellite capabilities for  supporting ballistic missile defense. The ability to detect missile launches,  track missiles throughout their flights, and counter these threats is  essential to ballistic missile defense. The primary mission of SBIRS-low is  to detect launches and track missile flights. SBIRS-low accomplishes this  by using infrared sensors to detect the heat missiles radiate. DOD plans to  begin launching SBIRS-low satellites in fiscal year 2006 and estimates the  life-cycle cost through fiscal year 2022 to be $11.8 billion.
Because this system is planned to support the proposed National Missile  Defense System as well as theater missile defense programs, you asked us  to evaluate DOD’s plans and progress to acquire SBIRS-low. Specifically, we  (1) evaluated the cost, schedule, and performance risks of the current  acquisition schedule; (2) evaluated technical risks of the program; and (3) determined whether DOD has assessed alternative approaches to  SBIRS-low. For each of these tasks, we discussed the program with DOD  and contractor officials and reviewed studies and reports regarding cost,  schedule, performance, and technical risks as well as possible alternatives  to the program. (See our scope and methodology section.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Based on its experiences with the launching of short-range theater missiles  by Iraq during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, DOD concluded that expanded  theater missile warning capabilities were needed and it began planning for  an improved infrared satellite sensor capability that would support both  long-range strategic and short-range theater ballistic missile warning and  defense operations. In 1994, DOD studied consolidating various infrared  space requirements, such as for ballistic missile warning and defense,  technical intelligence, and battlespace characterization, and it selected  SBIRS to replace and enhance the capabilities provided by the Defense  Support Program. The Defense Support Program is a strategic surveillance  and early warning satellite system with an infrared capability to detect  long-range ballistic missile launches that has been operational for about 30 years. DOD has previously attempted to replace the Defense Support  Program with the Advanced Warning System in the early 1980s; the Boost  Surveillance and Tracking System in the late 1980s; the Follow-on Early  Warning System in the early 1990s; and the Alert, Locate, and Report  Missiles System in the mid-1990s. These attempts failed due to immature  technology, high cost, and affordability issues. SBIRS is to use more  sophisticated infrared technologies than the Defense Support Program to  enhance the detection of strategic and theater ballistic missile launches  and the performance of the missile-tracking function.
The SBIRS development effort consists of two programs—SBIRS-high and  SBIRS-low. SBIRS-high is to consist of four satellites operating in  geosynchronous earth orbit and sensors on two host satellites operating in  a highly elliptical orbit. SBIRS-high will replace Defense Support Program  satellites and is primarily to provide enhanced strategic and theater  ballistic missile warning capabilities. The SBIRS-high program includes the  consolidation of the three existing Defense Support Program ground  facilities—two overseas and one in the United States—at a single U.S.  ground station to reduce operations and maintenance costs. The program  is in the engineering and manufacturing development phase, with a  scheduled launch of the first SBIRS-high satellite in fiscal year 2005.
The SBIRS-low program is currently in the program definition and risk  reduction acquisition phase and is expected to consist of about 24  satellites in low earth orbit, but it could consist of more or less satellites,  depending on the results of contractor cost and performance studies. The  primary purpose of SBIRS-low is to support both national and theater  missile defense by tracking ballistic missiles and discriminating between  the warheads and other objects, such as decoys, that separate from the  missile bodies throughout the middle portion of their flights. Its  deployment schedule is tied to fiscal year 2010, the date when these  capabilities are needed by the National Missile Defense System. According  to DOD, the first SBIRS-low satellites need to be launched in fiscal  year 2006 if full deployment is to be accomplished by fiscal year 2010.
Due to the importance Congress has placed on the deployment of a  National Missile Defense System, Congress has maintained a high level of  interest in the SBIRS-low program and has included in legislative  provisions dates by which the first satellites are to be launched and initial  operational capability is to occur. The National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2000 is the latest expression of such interest. It defines, in  section 231, the SBIRS-low baseline schedule as a program schedule that  includes a first launch of a SBIRS-low satellite to be made during fiscal year 2006. This provision also requires that before the Secretary of the Air  Force makes any changes to the SBIRS-low baseline schedule he must  obtain the approval of the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense  Organization.
section_title: SBIRS-low Program Employs a High-Risk Acquisition Strategy
paragraphs: The Air Force’s current SBIRS-low acquisition schedule is at high risk of  not delivering the system on time or at cost or with expected performance.  Specifically, satellite development and production are scheduled to occur  concurrently and the results of a 1-year flight test that is to test and finalize  the design of the satellites will not be available until more than 5 years after  the program enters production. The software required for SBIRS-low to  perform all its missions is to be developed concurrent with the deployment  of the satellites and is not to be completed until more than 3 years after the  first SBIRS-low satellites are to be launched.
subsections: section_title: On-Orbit Test Results Will Not Be Available to Support Production Decision
paragraphs: Under the Air Force’s previous schedules for SBIRS-low, the results of an  on-orbit flight demonstration of crucial satellite functions and capabilities  were to be available and used to support the decision to enter satellite  production; however, the current schedule does not provide such test  results in time to support the production decision. In February 1999, the Air  Force established the current acquisition schedule (see fig.1) for the  SBIRS-low program, which includes a program definition and risk  reduction phase, a concurrent development and production phase, and  a 1-year on-orbit test with the first six SBIRS-low satellites produced (to be  launched with two launches—three satellites per launch).
The decision to enter the engineering and manufacturing development  phase and production phases is to be made in the third quarter of fiscal  year 2002. The 1-year on-orbit test, which is intended to test and finalize the  design of the satellites, will not be completed until January 2008, more than  5 years after development and production is to start. In contrast, under  previous schedules (see app. I), the Air Force had stressed the importance  of on-orbit tests, stating they were critical to support the decision to enter  production. According to the Air Force, its decision to enter the  engineering and manufacturing development and production phases will  now be based on information obtained from the ground demonstrations  performed under the program definition and risk reduction contracts and  from other completed on-orbit demonstration programs such as the  Midcourse Space Experiment and the Miniature Sensor Technology  Integration Program. These program results, however, may be of limited  utility to SBIRS-low. For example, according to Air Force officials, they  plan to use information on midcourse discrimination collected by the  Midcourse Space Experiment in their decision concerning SBIRS-low  development and production. However, according to DOD’s Director of  Operational Test and Evaluation, the Midcourse Space Experiment did not  collect discrimination data on objects representative of those that  SBIRS-low must be able to discriminate.
According to the Air Force, launches are not to be resumed until after the 1-year on-orbit test period has been completed, test results have been  reviewed, and modifications, if required, have been made to the remaining  satellites. However, the production of satellites will not stop during the 1-year on-orbit test. As a result, by the time the test is to be completed in  fiscal year 2008, 9 satellites will have been produced (including the first 6  used for flight-testing), an additional 21 satellites will be in various stages  of production, and at least $1.9 billion of the $2.4 billion (then-year) cost for  these 30 satellites will have been expended or committed. Because the  on-orbit test results for crucial functions and capabilities is not to be  available until more than 5 years after the start of production, there is a risk  that design changes will be required for satellites in production. For  example, if parts that have already been purchased for the SBIRS-low  operational satellites became obsolete because their acquisition was based  on the initial system design, new parts may be required, program costs will  increase, and the schedule will slip. Also, additional changes may be  necessary to the satellite configuration that could affect not just long lead  items, but also modifications may be required to satellite components  already produced.
In a July 1999 memorandum to the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition and Technology, DOD’s Director of Operational Test and  Evaluation expressed concern that the new (current) schedule eliminated  critical on-orbit experiments that were to be conducted under the flight  demonstration. The Director stated that while the restructured program  schedule includes ground demonstrations that were previously lacking  from the SBIRS-low program, considering the many technical challenges  and high risk in the program, DOD must seek every opportunity to obtain  early on-orbit experience. According to the Director, many of the functions  and capabilities that must be demonstrated (and would have been  demonstrated under the flight demonstration) before SBIRS-low exits the  program definition and risk reduction phase and enters the engineering and  manufacturing development phase are impossible to demonstrate with only  ground tests. For example, the Director stated that DOD has no flight  experience where two or more satellites in low earth orbit have  communicated with each other. He stated that this was challenging  because of the dynamically changing positions of orbiting satellites relative  to each other and the high data rates needed to transmit data between  satellites thousands of kilometers apart. Another example cited by the  Director where DOD has no flight experience is with coordinating the  operation of acquisition and tracking infrared sensors, both of which are to  be mounted on each SBIRS-low satellite. Specifically, when the acquisition  sensor detects the heat from a missile’s booster motor, it must determine  and relay highly accurate information on the missile’s position to the  tracking sensor. The tracking sensor must then point to the proper location  in space, find the missile, and begin tracking the missile. All of these  activities must occur within short time frames (seconds) to support missile  defense.
We have reported on numerous occasions about the risks associated with  program concurrency and of initiating production without adequate  testing. In a 1990 testimony, we cited the Navy’s F/A-18 aircraft, the Air  Force’s B-1B Bomber, and the Navy’s AEGIS Destroyer as examples where  a rush to production without adequate testing resulted in increased costs,  lower than expected performance, or both. In 1994 and 1995, we reported  that programs are often permitted to begin production with little or no  scrutiny and that the consequences have included procurement of  substantial inventories of unsatisfactory weapons requiring costly  modifications to achieve satisfactory performance, and in some cases,  deployment of substandard systems to combat forces. In 2000, we reported  that programs were allowed to begin production before the contractors and  the government had conducted enough testing to know whether the  systems’ design would meet requirements.
section_title: Evolutionary Software Development Plan Increases Program Risk
paragraphs: In December 1999, the SBIRS-low program office concluded that  development of software to perform all SBIRS-low missions, as originally  scheduled, could not be completed 1 year before the scheduled first launch  of SBIRS-low satellites in fiscal year 2006. According to the Air Force, this  conclusion was based on lessons learned from other programs under which  software development efforts were underestimated. As a result, to maintain  the fiscal year 2006 first launch, the program office plans to use an  evolutionary software development approach under which software is to  be developed in increments. The software needed to support all SBIRS-low  missions will not be completed (ready for use for satellite operations) until  March 2010, over 3 years after the first satellites are launched.
According to Air Force officials, DOD traditionally completes software  required to support satellite systems 1 year before the scheduled first  launch of a new satellite system. DOD established this practice to reduce  risk by ensuring that all system problems have been identified and  resolved, and that the personnel operating the systems have been  adequately trained. This was the original plan for the SBIRS-low program.
Under the evolutionary approach, software will be developed to support  satellite launches, early on-orbit testing, ballistic missile defense, and  integration with SBIRS-high, followed by the software needed to support  ancillary missions, such as technical intelligence and battlespace  characterization. Figure 2 shows the schedule for the incremental  development and completion of the software relative to the launch and  testing schedule for the SBIRS-low satellites.
As figure 2 shows, by the time the on-orbit test period for the first six  SBIRS-low satellites is to begin in fiscal year 2007, the first two increments  of software are to be completed. According to program office officials,  these two increments of software will provide all of the capabilities the  ground control system and the satellites need to support and perform the  on-orbit test. The third increment, the ground control and space related  software required to operate the full satellite constellation in support of  ballistic missile defense, is not to be completed until fiscal year 2008. The  fourth software increment, which is to be completed in mid-fiscal  year 2009, is to integrate SBIRS-low with SBIRS-high. The fifth increment,  which is to be completed in mid-fiscal year 2010, is to add the software  required for SBIRS-low to perform ancillary missions such as technical  intelligence, battlespace characterization, and space surveillance. Thus, the  software required to support all of SBIRS-low missions is not to be  completed until over 3 years after the first satellites are launched. While  this evolutionary approach reduces schedule pressure for completing the  ground control and space software before the first launch in fiscal year  2006, it increases the risk that software may not be available when needed  or perform as required. Under the traditional approach, all software would  have been completed in fiscal year 2005, 1 year before the launch of the  first satellites.
section_title: SBIRS-low Program Includes Immature Critical Technologies
paragraphs: The SBIRS-low program has high technical risks because some critical  satellite technologies have been judged to be immature for the current  stage of the program. Specifically, the SBIRS-low program office rated the  maturity of five of six critical technologies at levels that constitute high risk  the technologies will not be available when needed.
In developing a complex system, an assessment of the maturity levels of  critical technologies can provide information on the risks those maturity  levels pose if the technologies are to be included in the development. For  example, in a previous report, we discuss a tool, referred to as Technology  Readiness Levels, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and  Air Force Research Laboratory use to determine the readiness of  technologies to be incorporated into a weapon system. The readiness  levels are measured along a scale of one to nine, starting with paper studies  of the basic concept and ending with a technology that has proven itself in  actual usage on the intended product. The Air Force Research Laboratory  considers a readiness level of six to be an acceptable risk for a program  entering the Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase—the  Laboratory considers lower readiness levels at this stage to translate to  high program cost, schedule, and performance risks. Reaching a readiness  level of six denotes a significant transition point for technology  development in which the technology moves from component testing in a  laboratory environment to demonstrating a model or prototype in a  relevant environment.
At our request, the SBIRS-low program office rated the maturity, as of the  start of the Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase, of six  technologies critical to the success of the SBIRS-low program. The  program office rated five of the six technologies at levels that, according to  criteria used by the Air Force Research Laboratory, constitute high risk in  the ability of the program to meet its objectives. A detailed description of  the Technology Readiness Levels is provided in appendix II.
As shown in figure 3, SBIRS-low entered the Program Definition and Risk  Reduction phase with a number of critical subsystem technologies with  maturities below a readiness level of six.
Specifically, the program office rated the maturity of the (1) scanning  infrared sensor, which is to acquire ballistic missiles in the early stages of  flight, at a readiness level of four; (2) tracking infrared sensor, which is to  track missiles, warheads, and other objects such as debris and decoys  during the middle and later stages of flight, at a readiness level of four;  (3) fore optics cryocooler and (4) tracking infrared sensor cryocooler,  which are needed to cool the tracking sensor optics and other sensor  components to enable the sensor to detect missile objects in space, at  readiness levels of four; (5) satellite communications crosslinks, which  enable satellites to communicate with each other, at a readiness level of  five; and (6) on-board computer processors, critical for performing  complex and autonomous satellite operations for providing missile  warning and location information within short time frames, at a level of six.  So critical are each of these subsystem technologies is that if one is not  available when needed, SBIRS-low would be unable to perform its mission.  And, in sum, five of six critical technologies are at a low maturity level,  causing high program risk.
section_title: Alternative Approaches to SBIRS-low Have Not Been Assessed
paragraphs: Current DOD acquisition policy and procedures require that assessments  be made of the cost and mission effectiveness of space systems to  alternative terrestrial—land, sea, and air—systems. Despite this  requirement, DOD has not adequately analyzed or identified cost-effective  alternatives to SBIRS-low that could satisfy critical missile defense  requirements such as a Navy ship-based radar capability. Compliance with  this requirement would seem especially important, given the high risks  identified with the SBIRS-low program.
Terrestrial alternatives to SBIRS-low are not being considered. While  competing SBIRS-low contractors are performing cost and trade studies on  the various options that could satisfy program requirements, none of these  studies is to consider the cost-effectiveness of terrestrial alternatives. The  most recent study assessing alternatives to SBIRS-low was performed in  1994; however, according to an Air Force Space Command official, the  study’s scope was focused only on options that would use space-based  infrared sensors; terrestrial options were not included. According to Air  Force Space Command officials, terrestrial alternatives to SBIRS-low do  not exist.
Studies on various aspects of the National Missile Defense System by the  Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and other organizations have  pointed out that alternatives to SBIRS-low may exist. For example, the  Ballistic Missile Defense Organization’s June 1999 study, which assessed  whether and how the Navy Theater Wide program, a DOD program to  develop a ship-based theater missile defense capability, could be upgraded  to provide a limited national missile defense capability, cited the potential  utility of sea-based radars to a national missile defense capability.  Specifically, the report states that properly deployed ship-based radars can  provide a forward-based radar warning and tracking function against many  of the potential ballistic missile threats to the United States, and that  because the radars would be difficult to target due to the mobility and  unknown locations of ships, the radars would add robustness against  enemy attacks, particularly before SBIRS-low is available.
In a 1999 RAND issue paper that dealt with an assessment of the planning  for the National Missile Defense System, the authors suggest that  ground-based radars could potentially be used to provide midcourse  tracking and cueing for interceptors. Specifically, they conclude that the  planned initial capability of the National Missile Defense System is  inadequate and suggest that an interim solution be considered to enhance  the system’s capabilities against more sophisticated, larger, and more  geographically dispersed ballistic missile threats prior to the next planned  enhancement to the missile defense system. They suggest that one aspect  of the interim solution could include deploying additional ground-based  radars to perform ballistic missile tracking and discrimination functions, or  alternately, speeding the deployment of SBIRS-low.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Air Force is implementing a high-risk acquisition schedule for the  SBIRS-low program in an attempt to deploy the system starting in fiscal  year 2006 to support the National Missile Defense System. The highly  concurrent acquisition schedule has evolved because of design,  development, and technology challenges, as well as the importance  Congress has placed on the deployment of a National Missile Defense  capability. Although the schedule includes on-orbit tests to finalize satellite  design and performance, the results will not be available in time to be  useful for informed decision-making related to satellite design and  production.
In addition, the Air Force’s evolutionary software development approach  creates risk because it delays completion of the software needed to support  all SBIRS-low missions over 3 years after the first launch of SBIRS-low  satellites.
Finally, critical satellite technologies that have been judged to be immature  for the current phase of the program, place program success in peril.
Due to these deficiencies, the SBIRS-low program is at high risk of not  delivering the system on time or at cost or with expected performance. In  spite of the high risk that SBIRS-low will not be available to support the  National Missile Defense System when needed, DOD has not identified  alternatives or interim solutions.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order to reduce the cost, schedule, performance, and technical risks in  the SBIRS-low program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Secretary of the Air Force, with the approval of the Director of  the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, to develop a schedule that  reduces concurrency and risks, and that sets more realistic and achievable  cost, schedule, and performance goals. In addition, the Secretary of  Defense should assess the impact of the revised schedule on the National  Missile Defense program and provide the results of the assessment to  Congress.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director,  Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, to analyze and develop, as  appropriate, and in compliance with DOD acquisition policy and  procedures, alternative approaches to satisfy critical missile defense  midcourse tracking and discrimination requirements in case SBIRS-low  cannot be deployed when needed (based on the resulting lower risk  SBIRS-low schedule, threat analyses, and missile defense program  schedules).
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments to a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with  our recommendations. DOD also pointed out that it is taking actions that it  believes will address our recommendations. These actions begin to address  our concerns, but they are not yet completed or approved, and it is not  clear yet whether they will fully address the risks identified by our review.  Therefore, our recommendations are still relevant.
Our first recommendation deals with restructuring the SBIRS-low  acquisition schedule to reduce cost, schedule, performance, and technical  risks; assessing the impact of the restructured schedule on the National  Missile Defense program; and providing the results of the assessment to  Congress. DOD stated it has developed a proposed update to the  SBIRS-low acquisition strategy that it believes addresses our concerns for  concurrency in the production phase, while still retaining the fiscal  year 2006 first launch date. For example, DOD’s proposed strategy would  delay the full operational capability date of the first SBIRS-low  constellation by 1 year and allow for additional ground demonstration  program activities and on-orbit testing, thus reducing concurrency between  production and testing, while maintaining the schedule for implementation  of the full constellation. DOD stated that the Ballistic Missile Defense  Organization is assessing the impact of this delay on the National Missile  Defense program. This proposal has not been approved and will be  reviewed for final decision by the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in May 2001.
Since DOD’s proposed update to the SBIRS-low acquisition strategy has not  been approved (due to cost concerns) and will not be considered again for  approval until May 2001, we did not assess the proposed strategy in any  detail. On the surface, the additional on-orbit testing does somewhat  reduce production concurrency. However, even with this additional testing,  the program still appears to have high concurrency risk, for example, with  substantial long lead time procurement before testing results are complete.  Therefore, we believe our recommendation is still appropriate in relation to  the new proposal or in light of any changes to DOD’s new proposal.
With regard to our second recommendation, DOD stated that it has  initiated a study to address viable alternatives to SBIRS-low capabilities  and will provide the results of the study to the Deputy Secretary of Defense  on March 1, 2001. While initiation of this study is a good beginning, until it  is complete, we cannot assess the extent to which alternatives will be  identified and whether critical missile defense requirements allocated to  SBIRS-low will be satisfied.
DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided separate  technical comments that we have incorporated in this report where  appropriate.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To evaluate risks of the current acquisition schedule, we had discussions  with officials of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for the  Comptroller; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,  Communications, and Intelligence; the Office of the Director, Operational  Test and Evaluation; the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation; and  the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, all in Washington,  D.C. We also held discussions with, and reviewed documents from, officials  of the SBIRS program office in Los Angeles, California; the U.S. and Air  Force Space Commands, Colorado Springs, Colorado; the Defense  Contract Management Agency offices in Van Nuys, California, and Phoenix,  Arizona; the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, Buckley Air  National Guard Base, Aurora, Colorado; TRW, Inc., Redondo Beach,  California; and Spectrum Astro, Gilbert, Arizona.
To evaluate technical risks of the program, we had discussions with, and  reviewed documents from, officials of the program office; the Office of the  Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; and the Air Force Research  Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico. We also discussed technical risks  with TRW and Spectrum Astro.
To determine whether DOD has assessed alternative approaches to  SBIRS-low, we had discussions with the Ballistic Missile Defense  Organization, in Washington, D.C.; the program office; and U.S. and Air  Force Space Commands. We also reviewed two related studies by the  Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the RAND Corporation.
We performed our work from May 1999 through December 2000 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call  me on (404) 679-1900. The GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Space-Based Infrared System-low Program History
subsections: section_title: Original Schedule
paragraphs: The Department of Defense’s (DOD) original 1995 schedule for  Space-Based Infrared System-low (SBIRS)-low called for (1) a launch of a  two-satellite flight demonstration—both satellites on one launch  vehicle—in the first quarter of fiscal year 1999; (2) a deployment decision  in fiscal year 2000 after key technologies and operating concepts were  validated by the demonstration satellites; and (3) launches of SBIRS-low  satellites—3 satellites per launch vehicle—beginning in fiscal year 2006.
According to Air Force officials, the satellite flight demonstration was  critical to validate the integration of key technologies and operational  concepts that are crucial to national missile defense and other SBIRS  missions such as technical intelligence and battlespace characterization.  The primary emphasis was to be on the ability to detect and track ballistic  missiles and their warheads throughout flight and distinguish between  missile warheads and decoys. The Air Force planned to test these satellites’  ability to perform national missile defense functions against live theater  and national missile defense targets and to use the demonstration and test  results to model and simulate the full performance capability of a  constellation of operational SBIRS-low satellites.
According to the program officials who established this acquisition  strategy, performing this function autonomously while in orbit is one of the  most complex and technologically challenging operational concepts ever  attempted. They also stressed that the two-flight demonstration satellites  would have provided an informed basis for deciding whether the program  was ready to enter the engineering and manufacturing development and  production phases of the acquisition process. They stated that a National  Missile Defense System with space-based sensors depended on a  successful flight demonstration program and that proceeding into the  engineering and manufacturing development and production phases before  demonstrating this capability would not provide an opportunity to assess  lessons learned, thus introducing unacceptable risk into the program.
Figure 4 shows the original acquisition schedule for a fiscal year 2006 first  launch of SBIRS-low satellites.
Under this schedule, the first year of the planned 2-year flight  demonstration would have been completed in the first quarter of fiscal year 2000, about the same time the program was scheduled to enter the  pre-engineering and manufacturing development phase. The first year  results from the demonstration could have influenced requirements  development and system design during this phase. The second year of the  demonstration would have been completed in the first quarter of fiscal  year 2001, about the same time the program was scheduled to enter the  engineering and manufacturing development and production phases. Thus,  DOD would have had almost 2-years of information on the demonstration  satellites’ performance to consider in deciding whether the system should  enter the engineering and manufacturing development and production  phases.
section_title: Accelerated Schedule Established in December 1996
paragraphs: DOD did not implement the original schedule because Congress required in  the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 that DOD  establish a program baseline to include a first launch of SBIRS-low  satellites in fiscal year 2002. The Defense Science Board, at DOD’s request,  assessed the viability of accelerating the first launch from fiscal year 2006  to fiscal year 2002 and found it would not be viable; however, it did  determine that the first launch could be accelerated to fiscal year 2004.
Subsequently, DOD informed Congress that the first launch of SBIRS-low  satellites could not begin in fiscal year 2002 because technical, funding, and  management problems had delayed the scheduled launch of the two  demonstration satellites from the first quarter to the third quarter of fiscal  year 1999. According to Air Force officials, this delay prevented basing a  milestone decision to enter the engineering and manufacturing  development and production phases of the SBIRS-low acquisition process,  scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year 2000, on the results of the  planned flight demonstration. However, in December 1996, DOD  committed to accelerating the first launch of SBIRS-low satellites to fiscal  year 2004. Figure 5 shows the acquisition schedule for the flight  demonstration and a fiscal year 2004 first launch of SBIRS-low.
Under this acquisition schedule, the demonstration satellites were to be  launched in the third quarter of fiscal year 1999, two quarters later than  scheduled under the original schedule. Consequently, the flight  demonstration and the pre-engineering and manufacturing development  phase would have run concurrently and the demonstration results could  not have influenced the development of requirements and the system  design as they could have under the original schedule. However, the first  year of the flight demonstration would still have been completed about  4 months before the start of the engineering and manufacturing  development and production phases, which were still scheduled to begin in  the first quarter of fiscal year 2001 as they were under the original  schedule. As a result, DOD would have had the information from the first  year of the demonstration satellites’ performance, which it considered the  most critical in deciding whether the system should enter these phases, to  support a fiscal year 2004 deployment.
section_title: Technology Readiness Levels and Their Definitions
paragraphs: Lowest level of technology readiness.  Scientific research begins to be translated into applied  research and development. Examples might include paper studies of a technology’s basic  properties.
Invention begins.  Once basic principles are observed, practical applications can be invented.   The application is speculative, and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the  assumption.  Examples are still limited to paper studies.
Active research and development is initiated. This includes analytical studies and laboratory  studies to physically validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology.   Examples include components that are not yet integrated or representative.
Basic technological components are integrated to establish that the pieces will work together.   This is relatively “low fidelity” compared to the eventual system.  Examples include integration  of “ad hoc” hardware in a laboratory.
Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly.  The basic technological components  are integrated with reasonably realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be  tested in a simulated environment.  Examples include “high fidelity” laboratory integration of  components.
Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond the breadboard tested for  technology readiness level 5, is tested in a relevant environment.   Represents a major step up  in a technology’s demonstrated readiness.  Examples include testing a prototype in a high  fidelity laboratory environment or in simulated operational environment.
Prototype near or at planned operational system.  Represents a major step up from technology  readiness level 6, requiring the demonstration of an actual system prototype in an operational  environment, such as in an aircraft, vehicle, or space.  Examples include testing the prototype  in a test bed aircraft.
Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under expected conditions. In almost  all cases, this technology readiness level represents the end of true system development.   Examples include developmental test and evaluation of the system in its intended weapon  system to determine if it meets design specifications.
Actual application of the technology in its final form and under mission conditions, such as  those encountered in operational test and evaluation.   In almost all cases, this is the end of the  last “bug fixing” aspects of true system development.  Examples include using the system  under operational mission conditions.
section_title: Comments From the Department of Defense
paragraphs: The following are our comments on DOD’s letter dated December 14, 2000.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. We are cognizant of the fact that the National Missile Defense program  is driving the need date for SBIRS-low and not the converse. We do not  intend to suggest that the SBIRS-low acquisition schedule be a driver  for the National Missile Defense program schedule. Our primary goal in  making this recommendation is to help ensure SBIRS-low is acquired at  lower risk and will satisfy critical missile defense requirements. This is  why we are also making our second recommendation—to develop  alternative approaches to satisfy critical missile defense midcourse  tracking and discrimination requirements in case SBIRS-low (under a  new lower risk schedule) cannot be deployed when needed.  2. We disagree that we misstate the risks of the SBIRS-low incremental  software development strategy. We recognize that an evolutionary, or  incremental, approach to software development is valid. However, an  acquisition approach such as the original SBIRS-low approach that  calls for the completion of all software prior to the first launch poses  less risk than one that does not, that is, the evolutionary or current  approach. From the perspective of meeting the schedule for a first  launch in fiscal year 2006, the evolutionary software development  approach may reduce schedule risk because, according to the Air  Force, the first launch date would be unachievable under the original  strategy due to an underestimation of the software development effort.  However, from the perspective of comparing the evolutionary software  development approach with the original approach, there is increased  program risk associated with the evolutionary approach because there  is less assurance the software will be completed when needed with the  mission capabilities specified. 3. While we agree that a revised acquisition strategy would likely increase  costs, cost increases associated with program delays or rework could  also occur under the current schedule. Due to the highly concurrent  acquisition schedule, we believe that there is substantial risk that  delays and rework resulting from the production of hardware and  software that fail to satisfy requirements may occur—resulting in cost  increases if the current schedule is strictly adhered to. We believe that  early effort to understand acquisition options and the associated costs  is important.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Ted B. Baird, Richard Y. Horiuchi,  and Robert W. Stewart of the Denver Field Office and David G. Hubbell and  Dale M. Yuge of the Los Angeles Field Office made key contributions to this  report.
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