Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Firearms Trafficking to Mexico Have Improved, but Some Collaboration Challenges Remain
Published: 2016-01-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Violent crimes committed by drug trafficking organizations in Mexico often involve firearms, and a 2009 GAO report found that many of these firearms originated in the United States. ATF and ICE have sought to stem firearms trafficking from the United States to Mexico.
GAO was asked to undertake a follow-up review to its 2009 report ( GAO-09-709 ) addressing these issues. This report examines, among other things, (1) the origin of firearms seized in Mexico that have been traced by ATF, (2) the extent to which collaboration among U.S. agencies combating firearms trafficking has improved, and (3) the extent to which the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy measures progress by U.S. agencies to stem firearms trafficking to Mexico. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed program information and firearms tracing data from 2009 to 2014, and met with U.S. and Mexican officials on both sides of the border.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: According to data from the Department of Justice's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), 73,684 firearms (about 70 percent) seized in Mexico and traced from 2009 to 2014 originated in the United States. ATF data also show that these firearms were most often purchased in Southwest border states and that about half of them were long guns (rifles and shotguns). According to Mexican government officials, high caliber rifles are the preferred weapon used by drug trafficking organizations. According to ATF data, most were purchased legally in gun shops and at gun shows in the United States, and then trafficked illegally to Mexico. U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials also noted a new complicating factor in efforts to fight firearms trafficking is that weapons parts are being transported to Mexico to be later assembled into finished firearms, an activity that is much harder to track.
In 2009, GAO reported duplicative initiatives, and jurisdictional conflicts between ATF and the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). That year, in response to GAO's recommendations on these problems, ATF and ICE updated an interagency memorandum of understanding (MOU) to improve collaboration. ATF and ICE have taken several steps since then to improve coordination on efforts to combat firearms trafficking, such as joint training exercises and conferences to ensure that agents are aware of the MOU and its jurisdictional parameters and collaboration requirements. However, GAO found that ATF and ICE do not regularly monitor the implementation of the MOU. In the absence of a mechanism to monitor MOU implementation and ensure that appropriate coordination is taking place between the two agencies, GAO found that gaps in information sharing and misunderstandings related to their roles and responsibilities persist.
The indicator used to track U.S. agencies' efforts to stem firearms trafficking to Mexico in the Office of National Drug Control Policy's (ONDCP) National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy , by itself, does not adequately measure progress. ONDCP tracks progress based on the number of arms seized in Mexico and traced to the United States; however, this number does not reflect the total volume of firearms trafficked from the United States, and it does not take into account other key supporting agency actions and activities as measures.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States take steps to formally monitor implementation of the 2009 MOU between ATF and ICE. GAO also recommends that ONDCP establish comprehensive indicators that more accurately reflect progress made in efforts to stem arms trafficking to Mexico. The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, and ONDCP agreed with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Violence perpetrated by Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTO)  continues to raise security concerns on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico  border. Mexican authorities consider firearms trafficking to be a major  factor in these organizations’ capacity to resist government efforts to  combat organized crime. Similarly, U.S. law enforcement agencies have  acknowledged the role firearms smuggling across the Southwest border  plays in fueling violent criminal activity in Mexico. As we reported in 2009,  trace data on firearms seized from criminals in Mexico confirm that tens  of thousands of weapons seized in Mexico came from the U.S. side of the  border. Over the past decade, U.S. and Mexican administrations have  recognized that addressing firearms trafficking requires bilateral attention,  and they have pledged to collaborate in their efforts to combat it.
You requested that we update our 2009 report and review U.S. efforts to  stem the flow of firearms trafficking into Mexico. In this report, we  examine (1) the origin of firearms seized in Mexico that have been traced  by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,  Firearms and Explosives (ATF); (2) the extent to which collaboration  among U.S. agencies combating firearms trafficking has improved; (3) the  status of coordination between U.S. agencies and their Mexican  counterparts combating firearms trafficking; and (4) the extent to which  the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy (Strategy)  measures progress by U.S. agencies to stem firearms trafficking to  Mexico.
To identify the number, source, and types of firearms trafficked to Mexico  that have been seized and traced, we relied primarily on ATF’s trace data  compiled by that agency’s National Tracing Center Firearms Tracing  System through eTrace. We also reviewed the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) data on  seizures of southbound firearms and cases involving firearms trafficking  to Mexico. To address collaboration among U.S. agencies, we reviewed  and analyzed documentation and reports on collaborative activities  among those agencies responsible for combating firearms. To obtain a  better understanding of the scope and progress of various U.S. agencies’  activities related to firearms trafficking, we met with officials from ATF,  ICE, DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Department  of State (State). To examine the status of cooperation between U.S.  agencies and their Mexican counterparts, we met with U.S. and Mexican  officials to discuss their cooperative activities. To discuss cooperation by  U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials to stem the flow of firearms  smuggling across the border, we met with U.S. and Mexican officials at  two major Southwest border locations—San Diego/Tijuana and El  Paso/Juarez. We traveled to Mexico City and Guadalajara, Mexico, to  meet with U.S. embassy and consulate officials responsible for  implementing programs to combat firearms trafficking and Mexican  government officials responsible for related activities. We also met with  the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to discuss the  Weapons Chapter of the Strategy. We assessed the reliability of data  provided by various U.S. agencies by interviewing agency officials  knowledgeable about the data and reviewing related supporting  documentation about the data and the systems that produced them. We  determined that data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this  report. Appendix I contains additional details about our scope and  methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2014 to January  2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: U.S.-Mexico Collaboration to Stem Firearms Trafficking
paragraphs: For almost a decade, the government of Mexico has sought to combat the  growing power of criminal groups that initially emerged as DTOs in the  1980s and 1990s. This struggle became a national priority in 2006 when  then-President Felipe Calderón mobilized the Mexican military and law  enforcement agencies to disrupt DTO operations and target their  leadership structures. As the Congressional Research Service reported,  while these efforts have continued, under current President Enrique Peña  Nieto, who was elected in 2012, there has been a shift in emphasis  toward reducing criminal violence that threatens the security of civilians  and the business sector. According to a RAND Corporation report,  besides trafficking billions of dollars’ worth of narcotics into the United  States annually, Mexican DTOs’ criminal activity now extends to other  areas, including human trafficking, kidnapping, money laundering,  extortion, bribery, racketeering, and weapons trafficking.
According to the Strategy DTOs require a constant supply of firearms and  ammunition to assert control over the territory where they operate,  eliminate rival criminals, enforce illicit business dealings, and resist  government operations. The Strategy indicates that firearms that criminal  organizations acquire from the United States are primarily transported  overland into Mexico using the same routes and methods employed when  smuggling bulk cash south and drugs north across the U.S.-Mexico  border. The Strategy also notes that within the United States, DTOs or  their agents typically rely on “straw purchasers.” According to ATF, a  “straw purchase” occurs when a person who is a convicted felon (or  otherwise prohibited by federal law from purchasing a firearm) or who  wishes to remain anonymous, uses a third party, the straw purchaser, to  execute the paperwork necessary to purchase a firearm from a federally  licensed firearms dealer. The straw purchaser is a person who, but for  making false statements on the license application, would otherwise be  eligible under federal law to purchase a firearm and is therefore able to  pass the mandatory background check conducted by the federal firearms  licensee. Although straw purchasers may legally purchase firearms for  their own possession and use, when they purchase firearms on behalf of  criminals or others, they violate federal law by making a false statement  to a federal firearms licensee on the required forms. Firearm trafficking  organizations also frequently obtain firearms from unlicensed private  sellers in secondary markets, particularly at gun shows and flea markets  or through classified ads or private-party Internet postings, according to  ATF officials.
The surge in criminal activity by DTOs along the U.S.-Mexico border has  generated concern among policymakers that this violence is spilling over  into the United States. Since 2009, according to the National Drug Threat  Assessment—which is produced by the U.S. Department of Justice’s  National Drug Intelligence Center, Mexican-based DTOs have been  known to operate in more than a thousand cities in the United States.
While the extent of violence seen in Mexico has not been reported in the  United States, law enforcement officials in two border cities we visited told  us that murders and other criminal activity on the U.S. side are often  linked to Mexican DTO activities.
The governments of the United States and Mexico have committed to  work together to stem the activities of these criminal organizations,  including illicit arms trafficking. From fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2015,  Congress appropriated about $2.5 billion in assistance for Mexico that  has been provided through the Mérida Initiative, including approximately  $194 million provided in the Consolidated and Further Continuing  Appropriations Act, 2015. For fiscal year 2016, the administration’s  budget request for the Mérida Initiative is $119 million, from various  accounts. The Mérida Initiative is a bilateral security partnership between  the United States and Mexico to fight organized crime and build the  capacity of Mexico’s justice sector and law enforcement institutions to  uphold the rule of law. Among the many activities supported under the  Mérida Initiative, some assistance is provided to help combat firearms  trafficking, such as providing canines trained to detect weapons and  ammunition, and non-intrusive inspection equipment to detect the flow of  illicit goods, including firearms.
section_title: Principal U.S. Agencies Involved in Combating Firearms Trafficking
paragraphs: DOJ’s ATF and DHS’s ICE are the two primary agencies combating illicit  sales and trafficking of firearms across the Southwest border. ATF  combats firearms trafficking within the United States and from the United  States to other countries as part of its mission under the Gun Control Act  (see table 1). ATF is responsible for investigating criminal and  regulatory violations of federal firearms laws, among other  responsibilities. In carrying out its responsibilities, ATF licenses and  regulates federal firearms licensees to ensure that they comply with  applicable laws and regulations. ATF also traces U.S. and foreign  manufactured firearms for international, federal, state, and local law  enforcement agencies to link a firearm recovered in a criminal  investigation to its first retail purchaser. This information can be used to  help link a suspect in the criminal investigation to a firearm or identify  potential traffickers. ATF is the only entity within the U.S. government with  the capacity to trace firearms seized in crimes in Mexico. The agency has  conducted investigations to identify and prosecute individuals involved in  firearms trafficking schemes and has provided training to Mexican law  enforcement officials on firearms identification and tracing techniques,  among other efforts.
ICE enforces U.S. export laws, and ICE agents and other staff address a  range of issues, including combating the illicit smuggling of money,  people, drugs, and firearms (see table 2). As the primary federal law  enforcement agency responsible for investigating international smuggling  operations and enforcing U.S. export laws, ICE’s Homeland Security  Investigations division targets the illegal movement of U.S.-origin  firearms, ammunition, and explosive weapons with the goal of preventing  the procurement of these items by DTOs and other transnational criminal  organizations. ICE’s investigative strategy includes the identification and  prosecution of criminal networks and individuals responsible for the  acquisition and movement of firearms from the United States.
Other U.S. agencies that contribute to the effort to stem firearms  trafficking to Mexico include:
CBP. DHS’s CBP is charged with managing, securing, and controlling  the nation’s borders for both people and cargo entering and leaving  the United States. CBP’s outbound mission is to facilitate the  movement of legitimate cargo, while interdicting the illegal export of  weapons and other contraband out of the United States.
State. State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement  Affairs (INL) advises the President, Secretary of State, and  government agencies on policies and programs to combat  international narcotics and crime. INL programs support State’s  strategic goals to reduce the entry of illegal drugs into the United  States and to minimize the impact of international crime on the United  States and its citizens. INL oversees funding provided to build the  capacity of Mexico to fight organized crime under the Mérida Initiative,  including funds to support efforts to combat firearms trafficking.
ONDCP. ONDCP is a White House component whose principal  purpose is to establish policies, priorities, and objectives for the  nation’s drug control program. It produces a number of publications,  including the Strategy—first issued in 2007. The Strategy is intended  to serve as an overarching guide for combating criminal activity along  the U.S.-Mexico border; since 2009 it has included a Weapons  Chapter in recognition of the threat posed by the smuggling of  firearms across the Southwest border. Given ATF’s and ICE’s roles in  combating firearms trafficking, these agencies share responsibility for  preparing the information presented in the Weapons Chapter of the  Strategy. While ONDCP tracks progress by U.S. agencies in meeting  these objectives, it is not directly involved in planning or implementing  their activities.
section_title: Most Firearms Seized in Mexico That Are Traced by ATF Come from the United States, and Most Are Purchased in Southwest Border States
subsections: section_title: Most Firearms Recovered in Mexico That Are Traced by ATF Come from the United States
paragraphs: Data from ATF on firearms seized in Mexico and traced from calendar  year 2009 to 2014 indicate that the majority originated in the United  States. Because of the illicit nature of the trafficking, the exact number of  firearms trafficked from the United States into Mexico is unknown.  Similarly, ATF officials noted that since firearms seized in Mexico are not  always submitted for tracing the same year they were seized, or are not  submitted at all, it is not possible to develop data to track trends on  firearms seized. However, ATF uses the number of firearms seized and  traced as an indicator to estimate extent of illicit firearms trafficking. While  the government of Mexico collects data on the number of firearms its law  enforcement entities seize each year, our analysis and findings refer  exclusively to the universe of firearms seized in Mexico that were  submitted for tracing using eTrace.
According to ATF data, of the 104,850 firearms seized by Mexican  authorities and submitted for tracing from 2009 to 2014, there were  73,684, or 70 percent, found to have originated in the United States.  About 17 percent of the total, 17,544 firearms, were traced to a country  other than the United States. ATF could not determine the origin of  13,622 (13 percent) of these firearms because of incomplete  information. See figure 1.
From 2009 to 2011, numbers of firearms seized by Mexican authorities  and submitted for tracing fluctuated significantly, followed by a steady  decline after 2011. According to ATF officials, shifts in the number of guns  seized and traced do not necessarily reflect fluctuations in the volume of  firearms trafficked from the United States to Mexico from one year to the  next. ATF staff explained that there are several factors that have  influenced the year-to-year variance in the number of firearms traced  since 2009. For example, they explained that the high number of firearms  traced in 2009 reflects a single submission by the Mexican military to ATF  for tracing of a backlog of thousands of firearms. Conversely, ATF  officials noted there was a lower number of firearms submitted for tracing  in 2010 because that is the year eTrace in Spanish was initially deployed  in Mexico, and Mexican law enforcement officials at the local, state, and  federal level had to be trained on using the system. In 2011, a much  higher number of firearms were traced as Mexican officials became  proficient in using the system. Finally, U.S. and Mexican officials suggest  the decline since 2011 may reflect a period of adjustment in cooperation  under the Peña Nieto administration. This included the centralization of  access to eTrace in Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office and retraction of  eTrace accounts from federal, state, and local law enforcement, which  resulted in fewer Mexican law enforcement officials able to trace firearms  using the system.
section_title: Long Guns Account for about Half of All Firearms Seized in Mexico and Traced
paragraphs: According to Mexican law enforcement officials we interviewed, DTOs  prefer high caliber weapons with greater firepower, including high caliber  rifles or long guns, and military grade equipment. Officials explained that  the firearms of choice for drug traffickers are high caliber assault rifles,  such as AK type and AR 15 type, which are available for purchase in the  United States and which can be converted to fully automatic fire (i.e.,  converted into machine guns). Officials also noted that in recent years  they have seen DTOs acquire military equipment, such as .50 caliber  machine guns, rocket launchers, and grenade launchers. However, they  said that unlike firearms typically used by DTOs, which often can be  traced back to the United States, this type of equipment is known to often  be trafficked into Mexico from leftover Central American military  stockpiles from past conflicts. See figure 2 for examples of long and short  guns (also referred to as handguns).
According to data provided by ICE, the agency seized 5,951 firearms that  were destined for Mexico in the last 6 years. Of firearms seized by ICE  from 2009 to 2014, 2,341, or 39 percent, were long guns—including rifles  and shotguns. During the same period, ICE seized 3,610 short guns— including revolvers and pistols (see fig. 3).
According to data provided by ATF, almost half of all firearms seized in  Mexico and traced in the last 5 years were long guns. From 2009 through  2014, 49,566 long guns—rifles and shotguns—were seized and traced.  During that same period, 53,156 short guns—including revolvers and  pistols—were seized and traced. The data also show a substantial  decline in the number of long guns traced since 2011 (see fig. 4).  Mexican law enforcement officials said that in the last 2 years they often  seized more handguns than rifles, but stated that the use of high caliber  rifles by cartels is still widespread.
According to ATF officials, steps the bureau has taken to combat firearms  trafficking to Mexico have made it more difficult for firearms traffickers to  acquire long guns. Specifically, they noted implementation of Demand  Letter 3, which requires licensed dealers and pawnbrokers in Arizona,  California, New Mexico, and Texas to report multiple sales of certain  rifles. According to ATF, information from multiple sales reports on long  guns allows the bureau to identify indicators of suspicious or high-volume  purchasing by individuals, repetitive purchasing, and purchases by  associates, as well as geographical trends for such sales. ATF officials  reported that this information has helped them identify firearms traffickers  and others involved in a timelier manner, which on several occasions has  led to arrests and seizures of firearms intended for trafficking to Mexico.  From 2011 to 2014, 490 long guns that had been recorded as part of  multiple sales transactions under Demand Letter 3 were seized in crime  scenes—259 in the United States, 209 in Mexico, and 22 in undetermined  locations.
section_title: Most Firearms Seized in Mexico and Traced to the United States Were Purchased in Southwest Border States
paragraphs: Most of the firearms seized in Mexico that were traced and found to be of  U.S. origin from 2009 to 2014 came from U.S. Southwest border states.  While guns seized in Mexico of U.S. origin were traced to all of the 50  states, most came from Texas, California, and Arizona. As shown in  figure 5, of all firearms seized in Mexico that were traced and identified to  be of U.S. origin, about 41 percent came from Texas, 19 percent from  California, and 15 percent from Arizona. According to ATF, in fiscal year  2014, there were about 10,134 licensed dealers and pawnbrokers in the  four Southwest border states, many of them along the border. This  represents about 16 percent of the approximately 63,311 licensed dealers  and pawnbrokers nationwide. These licensed dealers and pawnbrokers  can operate in locations such as gun shops, pawn shops, their own  homes, or gun shows.
According to ATF officials, most firearms seized in Mexico and traced  back to the United States are purchased in the United States then  transferred illegally to Mexico. ATF has been able to determine the  original retail purchaser for about 45 percent of firearms seized in Mexico  and traced to the United States from 2009 to 2014. However, ATF was  unable to determine a purchaser for 53 percent, because of factors such  as incomplete identifying data on trace request forms, altered serial  numbers, no response from the federal firearm licensee to ATF’s request  for trace information, or incomplete or never received out-of-business  licensee records.
section_title: Trafficking in Firearms Parts May Facilitate DTOs’ Acquisition of Firearms and Complicates Authorities’ Efforts to Prevent Trafficking
paragraphs: ATF and Mexican government officials told us that a new complicating  factor in their efforts to fight firearms trafficking is the use of weapons  parts transported to Mexico to be later assembled into finished firearms.  According to documents provided by ATF, firearm parts include  unfinished receivers barrels, triggers and hammers, buttstocks, pistol  grips, pins, bolts, springs, and other items. Figure 6 shows some of these  firearms parts. None of these firearm parts are classified as firearms  under the Gun Control Act. In general, U.S. federal laws and regulations  requiring manufacturers and importers of firearms to identify firearms with  a serial number do not apply to parts, unless otherwise specified by law.  Federal firearms licensees and other retailers are not required to report  on the acquisition and disposition of firearm parts as they must for  firearms. Furthermore, any individual in the United States may legally  acquire and possess certain firearm parts that are not otherwise  proscribed by law, including persons prohibited from possessing firearms  and ammunition, such as convicted felons.
Firearms may be assembled by using parts kits that include all of the  components of a fully operable firearm minus the firearm receiver or  frame, which may be obtained separately. ATF officials explained that in  order to circumvent marking requirements on transactions involving  firearms and thus avoid tracing, criminals will sometimes use unfinished  receivers, such as “castings” or “flats,” rather than fully functional  receivers. A frame or receiver by itself is classified as a firearm by  definition under the Gun Control Act. The receiver is the part of the  firearm that houses the operating parts, typically the bolt or bolt carrier  group, the magazine well, and the trigger group. A casting is essentially a  piece of metal fabricated with the exterior features and contours of the  firearm receiver for which it is intended to substitute, but that without  further machining will not function as a firearm. Castings and flats are  commonly referred to as 80 percent receivers in marketing materials and  advertisements promoting their sale. The “80 percent” label is intended to  convey that the product has been cast or fabricated with most of the  features of a finished, functional firearm receiver, but it will require further  machining to function as a firearm (see fig. 7).
A receiver flat is a piece of metal that has the same dimensions as a  receiver, but that has not been shaped into a firearm configuration. In this  form, it cannot accept any component parts, but with the proper  equipment it can be readily bent into shape and molded into a receiver  (see fig. 8).
According to documents provided by ATF, since kits, castings, and flats  are not classified as firearms, transfers of those items are not regulated  under the Gun Control Act or National Firearms Act. Although ICE  officials noted they are subject to export control laws, they have no serial  numbers and generally no markings; thus, firearms assembled with them  are untraceable. In addition, receivers and firearms parts are small and  when transported separately may not be easily identified as items  intended for the production of firearms. They are also easy to conceal,  making it more challenging for customs authorities to detect illicit  shipments of such parts.
According to ATF officials, there are no reliable data on the extent of  firearm parts trafficking from the United States into Mexico. They noted,  however, that recent seizures of firearms parts, firearms made with  unmarked parts, and equipment used to assemble or manufacture  firearms in Mexico suggest an emerging reliance by criminal  organizations on this source of weapons. For example, law enforcement  officials in Mexico described to us two high-profile cases in 2014 involving  illicit firearm parts assembly of this type. One was in Guadalajara, where  Jalisco state police seized hundreds of unfinished receivers and pieces of  sophisticated equipment being used to complete high caliber rifles. The  second was in Tijuana, where Baja California state police seized 25 rifles  in the process of assembly with firearm parts from the United States.
section_title: ATF and ICE Have Taken Steps to Improve Collaboration, but Lack of Monitoring May Contribute to Coordination Challenges
subsections: section_title: ATF and ICE Have Taken Steps to Improve Collaboration, but Some Challenges Remain
paragraphs: ATF and ICE have taken several steps to improve coordination on efforts  to combat firearms trafficking that we previously identified. In 2009, we  reported instances of dysfunctional operations, duplicative initiatives, and  jurisdictional conflicts between ATF and ICE. In response to our  recommendations on how to address these challenges, ATF and ICE  updated and signed an interagency collaboration memorandum of  understanding (MOU) in June 2009. In their revised MOU, the agencies  committed to a shared goal of keeping the public safe by using the tools  given to both agencies and which are vital to the effective control of  domestic and international trafficking of firearms, ammunition, explosives,  weapons, and munitions. Specifically, the MOU set forth roles and  requirements for each agency with respect to (1) intelligence and  information sharing, (2) general investigative guidelines, (3) specific  investigative guidelines, (4) sources of information, and (5) conflict  resolution. This effort to improve coordination and optimize use of the  agencies’ expertise provided the basis to address the issues that had  hampered interagency collaboration prior to the MOU’s implementation.
ICE and ATF officials said that after the MOU was signed, they held joint  training exercises and conferences to ensure that agents had knowledge  of the MOU and its jurisdictional parameters and collaboration  requirements. Officials from each agency in headquarters, Mexico, and  border locations we visited indicated that personnel working on firearms  trafficking to Mexico were generally aware of the MOU’s key provisions  and collaborated on this basis. Agency officials also highlighted a more  recent joint interagency conference in September 2014, which sought to  provide participants with a common understanding of collaborative efforts  and respective areas of jurisdiction. Additionally, senior agency  headquarters officials asserted that there is extensive cooperation  between ATF and ICE, at the headquarters and field office levels. ATF  and ICE officials in border field offices we visited confirmed that they were  familiar with the MOU and that it provides them guidance on interagency  collaboration. Similarly, ATF and ICE officials in Mexico stated that since  they are co-located physically, they have a greater opportunity to work  together closely on firearms trafficking-related cases, and an ICE official  said that they rely on the MOU to help define their respective roles.
Nevertheless, we identified persistent challenges in information sharing  and some disagreement on the agencies’ respective roles in  investigations. For example, ATF and ICE disagree on the extent to which  trace data on firearms seized in Mexico collected through eTrace should  be shared to support ICE firearms trafficking investigations. According to  an ICE assistant deputy director, these firearms trace data from Mexico  are currently only shared on a limited basis with ICE. Several ICE officials  expressed an interest in obtaining access to these data and indicated that  this access would enhance their ability to identify methodologies used by  firearms traffickers and trends in criminal activity along the Southwest  border. ICE officials responsible for investigations said that trace data  should be shared in accordance to the MOU, which states “ATF shall  report to the appropriate ICE field office in a timely manner any  intelligence received relating to the illegal exportation, attempted  exportation, or planned exportation of any item on the United States  Munitions List...” However, the MOU does not address how general  trafficking information, such as that submitted through eTrace by a third  law enforcement agency, may be shared.
ATF officials asserted that their agency shares trace data on firearms  seized in Mexico with ICE according to established agency polices, which  currently only allow ATF to provide non-case-specific information to other  agencies in aggregate form. With respect to the results of individual trace  requests, ATF officials explained that they are provided only to the law  enforcement agency that submits the trace information; generally, this  information is not shared with third parties, including other law  enforcement agencies. ATF would have to obtain authorization from the  third-party law enforcement agency that submitted the trace information to  share it with ICE. Thus, ATF cannot automatically share information with  ICE on firearm traces submitted by Mexican law enforcement agencies  without their authorization. ATF staff said these policies are set forth in  the agreements ATF signs with each law enforcement agency for the use  of eTrace. Officials from ATF and ICE said there are joint efforts under  way to find a mechanism to share this information.
Additionally, the 2009 MOU sets forth investigative guidelines to define  the roles and responsibilities of ATF and ICE pursuant to their respective  statutory authorities. For example, the MOU states that “the regulation  and inspection of the firearms industry is within the sole purview of ATF”  and that “all investigative activities at the port of entry, borders and their  functional equivalents must be coordinated through ICE.” Notwithstanding  these guidelines, we found some confusion among some agency officials  about the appropriate roles of their counterparts in conducting  investigations. For example, a senior ICE official responsible for  investigations questioned the involvement of ATF in firearms trafficking  investigations to Mexico, because, according to the official, ATF’s  jurisdiction focuses on combating domestic firearms violations. ICE  officials also expressed concerns that the involvement of ATF’s  international desk with Mexican agencies may create confusion among  Mexican government authorities over the roles that ICE and ATF play in  addressing firearms trafficking cases. However, an ICE assistant deputy  director explained that pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, ICE has  primary jurisdiction over violations related to the international trafficking of  firearms, but many such trafficking investigations begin with domestic  criminal activities for which ATF has jurisdiction. Therefore, he stressed  that it is essential that the two agencies collaborate to leverage ICE’s  international and ATF’s domestic legal authorities. He added that ATF’s  international operations also provide much-needed capacity building  regarding forensics and e-Trace activities in Mexico. However, ICE and  ATF must work to ensure that confusion is not created among Mexican  agencies regarding the responsibilities for the investigation of  international firearms trafficking by U.S. authorities.
ATF officials agree that their agency’s efforts to combat firearms  trafficking are concentrated in the United States, and that they recognize  the role of ICE in addressing transnational weapons trafficking. However,  some ATF officials said that it is incorrect to suggest that ICE has  exclusive jurisdiction with respect to illicit cross-border firearms trafficking  to Mexico. According to these officials, most investigations involving the  smuggling of firearms from the United States to Mexico implicate ATF  jurisdiction, because they typically involve the illegal acquisition of  firearms inside the United States. ATF’s jurisdiction extends to unlawful  acquisition of firearms by prohibited persons, straw purchasing, and other  unlawful transfers of firearms. ATF officials added that the bureau’s  statutory responsibility for tracing firearms includes the deployment of  eTrace to Mexican and other foreign law enforcement entities, and noted  that eTrace entries from Mexico can result in the opening of firearm  trafficking investigations focused on criminal activity in the United States.  ATF officials also acknowledge that because of the nature of firearms  trafficking to Mexico, many investigations involve overlapping jurisdiction  with respect to cross-border offenses squarely within ICE’s jurisdiction.  They also noted the critical role ATF plays in providing training and  capacity building on firearms and explosives identification and tracing for  Mexican law enforcement. During our fieldwork, Mexican law enforcement  agencies confirmed the benefits they derived from ATF capacity-building  efforts, and they said they regarded ATF as their lead U.S. counterpart in  investigating firearms trafficking. Thus, although ATF has established  productive cooperative relations with Mexican agencies, there may also  be some confusion in Mexico over ATF’s and ICE’s roles in combating  firearms trafficking, as expressed by some ICE officials.
section_title: ATF and ICE Do Not Consistently Monitor Implementation of the 2009 MOU, Resulting in Continued Coordination Challenges
paragraphs: In prior work, we have identified several interagency mechanisms that  can be used to improve collaboration among agencies working on a  shared mission, such as information sharing, agency roles and  responsibilities, and oversight and monitoring. We have also reported  that written interagency agreements, such as MOUs, are most effective  when they are regularly updated and monitored. We observed that when  implementation of such agreements is not regularly monitored, there is  sporadic and limited collaboration among agencies. We also have found  that agencies that create a means to monitor, evaluate, and report the  results of collaborative efforts can better identify areas for improvement.
Immediately after the MOU was updated in 2009, the agencies committed  to undertake efforts to ensure that its provisions would be implemented  accordingly. For example, at that time, ICE informed GAO that  headquarters had a process to obtain information from ICE field offices  every 60 days to identify coordination issues with ATF that could not be  resolved at the field level within the framework of the MOU. In such  situations, ICE headquarters would then work with the appropriate ATF  component to resolve the issue. ICE officials explained these initial  monitoring efforts were designed to ensure that the updated MOU was  being effectively followed as it introduced several provisions or guidelines  on how ATF and ICE should collaborate on firearms trafficking. However,  according to ICE officials, this process was only in place during the initial  implementation period of the MOU, and the effort was not sustained.
Currently, officials from both agencies acknowledged that there is no  specific mechanism in place to monitor implementation of the MOU.  However, each agency’s officials referred to different efforts that they said  provide an opportunity to monitor interagency collaboration under the  MOU. For example, a deputy assistant director for ICE stated that  coordination between ICE and ATF on firearms trafficking cases occurs at  the Export Enforcement Coordination Center as well as at the field level.  ICE’s Export Enforcement Coordination Center is intended to serve as the  primary forum within the federal government for executive departments  and agencies to coordinate their export control enforcement efforts. The  Center seeks to maximize information sharing, consistent with national  security and applicable laws. Thus, it is likely that coordination challenges  between ICE and ATF on firearms trafficking could potentially be detected  at the Center. However, given the Center’s broader responsibility to  enhance export control enforcement efforts with multiple agencies, it is  not directly intended to monitor implementation of the MOU. Moreover,  coordination challenges related to the MOU persist even though the  Center has been in place for 5 years, indicating that this may not be an  effective means to monitor the MOU’s implementation.
Senior ATF officials said that although there is no formal arrangement to  regularly monitor implementation of the MOU, they consider joint  interagency training to be an effective approach to ensure that officials  from both agencies are familiar with the provisions of the MOU and are  working together effectively. However, only two such training exercises  have taken place—one in 2014 and another in September 2015. The  training is intended to acquaint officials from both agencies with how the  agencies coordinate firearms trafficking efforts, and as part of the training,  the MOU provisions are discussed, but these training exercises do not  constitute a mechanism for consistent monitoring of implementation of the  MOU. By not sustaining a monitoring process for the MOU, the agencies  have no assurance that its provisions are being implemented effectively,  and challenges we identified are continuing to persist without a process  for resolution.
section_title: U.S.-Mexico Collaboration on Firearms Trafficking Was Scaled Back after 2012, but While Challenges Continue, Bilateral Efforts Have Recently Been Gaining Momentum
subsections: section_title: Bilateral Firearms Trafficking Efforts Slowed Following Mexican Moves to Consolidate Law Enforcement Collaboration
paragraphs: Mexican and U.S. officials described how upon coming to power in  December 2012, the current administration of Mexican President Enrique  Peña Nieto undertook a reevaluation of U.S.-Mexico law enforcement  collaboration, including efforts to combat firearms trafficking. According  to some officials, the government of Mexico took steps to consolidate law  enforcement cooperative activities under an approach termed Ventanilla  Única—which translates to Single Window. Under Ventanilla Única,  Mexico’s Interior Ministry has become the primary entity through which  Mérida Initiative training and equipment are coordinated, including  capacity-building activities related to firearms trafficking. The government  of Mexico also established a single point of contact within Mexico’s Office  of the Attorney General to approve joint investigations with U.S.  counterparts. Additionally, Mexican officials explained that Mexican law  categorizes firearms trafficking as a federal crime and permits only  federal authorities to work on such cases. This has led to some notable  changes in the way U.S. and Mexican authorities work together on  firearms trafficking efforts.
One of these changes stemmed from the decision to centralize access to  ATF’s eTrace in the Mexican Attorney General’s Office. Consistent with  our prior recommendations, in 2010, ATF reached an agreement for  deployment of eTrace in Spanish in Mexico, with Mexican authorities.  According to ATF, this was a significant investment for which ATF  provided training to numerous officials from various Mexican federal,  state, and local law enforcement agencies on the use of eTrace, while  assigning accounts to allow them to access the system. However, by  2013 the Mexican government retracted access to many of these  accounts, effectively limiting eTrace in Mexico to certain authorized  officials in the office of Mexico’s Attorney General. Mexican officials  explained that the decision to consolidate access at the Attorney  General’s office was intended to provide the government of Mexico with  more effective control over the information associated with eTrace, and to  support a central repository of evidence related to federal crimes such as  trafficking of firearms. However, U.S. officials and some Mexican  authorities said that limiting access to eTrace to a single governmental  entity has restricted opportunities for bilateral collaboration. Some U.S.  officials based in Mexico similarly noted that limiting access to eTrace  diminished tracing of total firearms seized by Mexican authorities.
Another significant change following the reassessment of bilateral  collaboration, which began in 2012, was the suspension of periodic  meetings of a working group known as GC Armas, which brought  together U.S. and Mexican officials from various agencies involved in  combating firearms trafficking. According to ATF officials, prior to 2013,  GC Armas held periodic meetings annually with the participation of  approximately 70 to 100 officials from both governments. These officials  shared useful information on firearms trafficking trends, trace data,  investigations, collaboration questions, and many other issues. ATF  officials said that oftentimes very productive cooperative efforts on  firearms trafficking began informally at GC Armas meetings and were  subsequently formalized. Mexican officials similarly characterized GC  Armas meetings as contributing in a fundamental manner to reaching  significant agreement between law enforcement in both countries on how  to combat firearms trafficking. They noted one such bilateral effort that  resulted in a comprehensive assessment of firearms and explosives  trafficking with recommendations for each country on sharing information  and cooperating on cross-border investigations. Officials from both  countries explained that while bilateral coordination did not cease after  the suspension of GC Armas meetings, overall collaboration slowed down  with fewer opportunities to promote bilateral firearms trafficking initiatives.
section_title: Corruption and Frequent Turnover Continue to Hamper Bilateral Collaboration on Firearms Trafficking
paragraphs: U.S. and Mexican authorities acknowledge the challenges to law  enforcement efforts posed by continuing corruption among some Mexican  officials. As we discussed in our 2009 report, concerns about corruption  within Mexican government agencies often limit U.S. officials’ ability to  develop a full partnership with their Mexican counterparts. Officials we  met with from ATF, ICE, CBP, and State continued to express such  concerns regarding corruption in Mexico. Some Mexico-based ICE  officials, for example, stated that they are conscious that their U.S.-based  colleagues will not always share with them all of the information they have  on firearms trafficking investigations because of concerns about  corruption. That is, ICE officials in the United States and along the U.S.- Mexican border are concerned about sharing information with ICE  officials based in Mexico, fearing that the information may unintentionally  reach corrupt Mexican authorities and compromise their investigations.  According to ICE officials, concerns they had about corruption in Mexico  were exacerbated early in the Peña Nieto administration when a vetted  unit of Mexican law enforcement officials that they trusted and that ICE  had trained and worked with for several years was disbanded.
U.S. officials also highlighted the problems frequent turnover in Mexican  law enforcement pose for bilateral efforts to combat criminal activities,  including firearms trafficking. Some U.S. officials explained that recurring  personnel changes aggravate the issue of corruption. In a country such  as Mexico, where there is an underlying concern about government  corruption, frequent turnover complicates efforts to develop trust with  counterpart officials. Other U.S. officials noted that there are no civil  service protections in Mexico, so there can be a virtually complete change  in the staff of a government agency when a new administration comes  into office, or even when the head of an agency is reassigned. As a  result, all of the people who received specialized training, such as  firearms recognition, can be removed suddenly leaving no institutional  memory, which complicates planning future collaboration and program  implementation. Similarly, ATF officials commented that oftentimes  Mexican law enforcement personnel in key positions for whom they  provided firearms training were subsequently replaced. While turnover  has been a recurring challenge for U.S. agencies working in Mexico,  various U.S. officials said that it appears to have been particularly  frequent in the past few years. For example, the spokesperson for one  U.S. agency in Mexico noted that in the past 5 years the division  responsible for implementing professional development at a key Mexican  law enforcement entity has been replaced seven times.
section_title: Over the Past Year, Bilateral Collaboration on Firearms Trafficking Efforts Has Gained Momentum
paragraphs: While both U.S. and Mexican officials collaborating on firearms trafficking  said that bilateral efforts had been scaled back after the Peña Nieto  administration came into power, these officials noted that over the past  year collaborative activities have been bolstered and are gaining  momentum. For example, around the time of our fieldwork in Mexico,  CBP was working with Mexican authorities to deploy specially trained  canine units able to detect firearms and explosives around the country.  Similarly, ATF was providing training on firearms identification for  Mexican Customs. A Mexican Customs spokesman stressed the  importance of such training in helping front-line customs officers  recognize and safely secure not just firearms but also ammunition,  firearms’ components, and explosives that criminals try to smuggle across  the border. He explained that this training has been critical in allowing  officers at the border to perform their mission.
Mexican Attorney General officials also noted their increasing level of  cooperation with U.S. authorities on firearms trafficking. They highlighted  ATF training on the use of eTrace and the resumption of GC Armas  meetings in 2015. ICE officials also told us that they have recently  reestablished the vetted unit in Mexico, which improves trusted working  relationships with Mexican counterparts. Finally, in addition to renewing  existing collaborative efforts with Mexican law enforcement counterparts,  ATF has also sought to reach out to other Mexican government entities.  For example, this year ATF has been collaborating with the Mexican Navy  on training for firearms and explosives detection, identification, and  seizure. Mexican Navy officers expressed gratitude for this training,  noting that they are increasingly confronting real-world situations that  require this type of knowledge.
section_title: The Current Weapons Chapter Indicator in the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy Does Not Adequately Measure the Progress of U.S. Agencies in Stemming Firearms Trafficking to Mexico
paragraphs: The indicator used in the Strategy to track progress by U.S. agencies to  stem firearms trafficking to Mexico does not adequately measure  implementation of the strategic objective. The Strategy includes strategic  objectives and indicators for each of its nine issue chapters to ensure  effective implementation. The strategic objective for the Weapons  Chapter is to “stem the flow of illegal weapons across the Southwest  border into Mexico.” ONDCP’s indicator for this chapter is the “number of  firearms trafficking/smuggling seizures with a nexus to Mexico.” The  Strategy does not further define the indicator, but ONDCP staff explained  that it refers to the number of firearms seized in Mexico that are traced by  ATF.
While ONDCP’s Strategy asserts that it is critical to have indicators that  enable tracking the implementation of objectives, this indicator for the  Weapons Chapter does not effectively track the status of efforts to stem  the flow of illegal weapons across the Southwest border. As previously  noted in this report, ATF officials readily acknowledge that shifts in the  number of guns seized and traced do not necessarily reflect fluctuations  in the volume of firearms trafficked from the United States to Mexico in  any particular year. There are many factors that could account for the  number of firearms traced in a given year beside the number of firearms  smuggled from the Unites States. Moreover, as discussed above, for  various reasons the number of firearms seized in Mexico and traced back  to the United States shifted significantly year to year after 2009 and then  declined steadily since 2011. Thus, while the number of firearms seized  and traced by ATF is useful to provide an overall indication of firearms of  U.S. origin found in Mexico, by itself it is not an adequate measure of  progress agencies are making to stem the flow of firearms trafficked from  the United States into Mexico. Additionally, ONDCP has not reported  progress made on the strategic objective in the Weapons Chapter in 2011  or 2013. ONDCP staff said they anticipate that the 2015 Strategy will  include a section to report on the outcomes of the last 2 years, and they  plan to report on this indicator.
Beside the strategic objective and indicator, the Weapons Chapter of the  Strategy also includes five supporting actions, along with associated  activities to achieve those actions; see table 3. According to an ONDCP  spokesman, while the number of firearms seized in Mexico and traced by  ATF may be an indicator of the flow of firearms across the border, these  five supporting actions and their associated activities should also be  considered to get a full picture of the agencies’ progress in combating  arms trafficking. ONDCP officials said that they monitor progress in  combating arms trafficking by obtaining periodic information from ATF  and ICE on their implementation of these and other activities.
Our review of the Weapons Chapter in the 2011 and 2013 Strategies  determined that, generally, accomplishments under each supporting  action were discussed. For example, in the 2011 Strategy, one supporting  action called for ATF to increase staffing at the El Paso Intelligence  Center Firearms and Explosives Trafficking Intelligence Unit through the  incorporation of partner agencies. In 2013, the Strategy included an  update that the unit had incorporated a CBP analyst dedicated to  weapons-related intelligence. Similarly, in 2011, the agencies said they  had plans under way to train over 200 Mexican law enforcement  personnel in how to correctly use eTrace. The 2013 Strategy noted that  350 Mexican law enforcement personnel had received training on using  eTrace. Nevertheless, the supporting actions described in the Strategy  are not consistently linked to indicators or regularly measured. Currently,  the narrative related to these supporting actions typically covers ongoing  efforts by the agencies to address these actions, but it does not include a  measure of overall progress. By including these supporting actions and  activities in the Weapons Chapter as measures, ONDCP could better  assess the agencies’ efforts in combating firearms trafficking because this  would provide a more comprehensive assessment.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Although ATF and ICE have pledged, through the 2009 MOU, to  collaborate effectively to combat firearms trafficking, these agencies have  not set up a mechanism to monitor implementation of the MOU that would  allow them to identify and address information sharing and collaboration  challenges. Consequently, gaps in information sharing and some  disagreement about agency roles in the broader effort to combat firearms  trafficking have emerged that weaken the effectiveness of the MOU.
It is unclear to what extent ONDCP’s Strategy has advanced U.S.  government efforts to combat firearms trafficking, since the indicator used  to track progress, by itself, is not sufficient to measure progress made by  U.S. agencies in stemming arms trafficking to Mexico. Other actions that  agencies take to stem the flow of firearms from the United States into  Mexico may be worth considering as additional measures of progress,  such as the number of interdictions of firearms destined for Mexico, the  number of investigations leading to indictments for firearms trafficking  related to Mexico, and the number of convictions of firearms traffickers  with a nexus to Mexico. By including these types of measures in a  comprehensive indicator or set of indicators, ONDCP will be better  positioned to monitor progress on stemming firearms trafficking across  the Southwest border.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Attorney General of the United States and the  Secretary of Homeland Security convene cognizant officials from ATF  and ICE to institute a mechanism to regularly monitor the implementation  of the MOU and inform agency management of actions that may be  needed to enhance collaboration and ensure effective information  sharing.
To ensure effective implementation of the strategic objective of the  Weapons Chapter of the Strategy, we recommend that the ONDCP  Director establish a more comprehensive indicator, or set of indicators,  that more accurately reflects progress made by ATF and ICE in meeting  the strategic objective.
subsections: section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the  Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and State; and the Office of  National Drug Control Policy.
DHS agreed with our recommendation regarding monitoring  implementation of the MOU and provided written comments in response  to the draft, reproduced in appendix II. In comments on the draft report  provided via e-mail by a designated ATF Audit Liaison Officer, DOJ also  agreed with this recommendation, noting that ATF officials will work with  counterparts at DHS to create a mutually acceptable method to further  enhance implementation of the MOU. State did not provide comments on  the draft report.
In e-mail comments provided by a designated General Counsel official,  ONDCP concurred with our recommendation to establish a more  comprehensive set of indicators for the Weapons Chapter of the Strategy.  Accordingly, ONDCP indicated that it would work with ICE and ATF to  develop additional indicators to evaluate their progress. The indicators  developed through this collaborative process will be used in future  iterations of the Strategy beginning with the next report in 2017.
ICE and ATF also provided technical comments which we incorporated  throughout the report where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Attorney General of  the United States; the Director of the Office of National Drug Control  Policy; the Secretary of State; and other interested parties. In addition,  the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-6991 or farbj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify data available on the origin of firearms trafficked to Mexico that  were seized and traced, we relied primarily on the Bureau of Alcohol,  Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) data compiled by its National  Tracing Center (NTC).The data provided by NTC were obtained from  ATF’s Firearms Tracing System, most of which is developed through  eTrace submissions. We discussed with cognizant NTC officials the  methodology used to collect these data and reviewed supporting agency  documentation. Based on these discussions, we determined that NTC  data were sufficiently reliable to permit an analysis of where the firearms  seized in Mexico that were submitted for tracing had been manufactured  and whether they had been imported into the United States before  arriving in Mexico. For those firearms that were traced to a retail dealer in  the United States before being trafficked to Mexico, NTC data also  contained information on the states where they had originated. NTC trace  data also contained information allowing identification of the types of  firearms that were most commonly seized in Mexico and subsequently  traced. We corroborated this information in discussions with U.S. and  Mexican law enforcement officials.
Since firearms seized in Mexico are not always submitted for tracing  within the same year as they were seized, it was not possible for us to  develop data to track trends on the types of firearms seized year to year.  Similarly, we were unable to obtain quantitative data from U.S. or  Mexican government sources on the users of illicit firearms in Mexico.  However, there was consensus among U.S. and Mexican law  enforcement officials that most illicit firearms seized in Mexico had been  in the possession of organized criminal organizations linked to the drug  trade. The involvement of criminal organizations with ties to drug  trafficking in the trafficking of illicit firearms into Mexico was confirmed by  law enforcement intelligence sources. We learned about the use of  firearms parts for the assembly of firearms in Mexico through our  interviews with cognizant U.S. and Mexican government and law  enforcement officials and through review of ATF-provided documents.
To learn more about U.S. government efforts to combat illicit sales of  firearms in the United States and to stem the flow of these firearms  across the Southwest border into Mexico, we interviewed cognizant  officials from the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) ATF, the Department of  Homeland Security’s (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)  and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Department of State  (State) regarding their relevant efforts. We obtained data from ATF and  ICE on funding for their respective efforts to address firearms trafficking to  Mexico, and data from ICE on seizures of southbound firearms. To  assess the reliability of the data, we discussed sources and the  methodology use to develop the data with agency officials. We  determined that the information provided to us was sufficiently reliable to  describe agencies’ efforts to combat firearms trafficking. We also  conducted fieldwork at U.S.-Mexico border crossings at El Paso, Texas,  and San Diego, California. In these locations, we interviewed ATF, CBP,  and ICE officials responsible for overseeing and implementing efforts to  stem the flow of illicit firearms trafficking to Mexico and related law  enforcement initiatives.
We reviewed and analyzed DOJ and DHS documents relevant to U.S.  government efforts and collaboration to address arms trafficking to  Mexico, including funding data provided to us by ATF and ICE, the 2009  memorandum of understanding (MOU) between ICE and ATF, data from  ICE on seizures of firearms destined for Mexico, data from ATF and ICE  on efforts to investigate and prosecute cases involving arms trafficking to  Mexico, and agency reports and assessments related to the issue. We  also reviewed relevant prior GAO reports, Congressional Research  Service reports and memorandums, and reports from DOJ’s Office of  Inspector General related to ATF’s efforts to enforce federal firearms  laws. We reviewed provisions of federal firearms laws relevant to U.S.  government efforts to address firearms trafficking to Mexico, including the  Gun Control Act of 1968, the National Firearms Act of 1934, and the Arms  Export Control Act of 1976. We did not independently review any Mexican  laws for this report.
To determine how well agencies collaborated with Mexican authorities to  combat illicit firearms trafficking, we conducted fieldwork in Mexico City,  Guadalajara, and border locations in Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana, Mexico.  In Mexico, we met with ATF, CBP, ICE, and State officials working on law  enforcement issues at the U.S. embassy. We interviewed Mexican  government officials engaged in efforts to combat firearms trafficking from  the Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la República), the  Federal Police (Policía Federal); the Ministry of Public Safety (Secretaría  de Seguridad Pública); the Ministry of Defense (Secretaría de la Defensa  Nacional); the Mexican National Intelligence Agency (Centro de  Investigación y Seguridad Nacional, or CISEN); the Mexican Navy  (Secretaría de Marina or Armada de Mexico); Customs (Servicio de  Administración Tributaria); the Forensic Science Institute of Jalisco  (Instituto Jalisciense de Ciencias Forenses); Attorney General Regional  Offices, Federal Police, and State Police in Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez;  and the State Attorney General in Guadalajara. Because our fieldwork  was limited to selected locations along the Southwest border and in the  interior of Mexico, our observations in these locations are illustrative but  are not generalizable and may not be representative of all efforts to  address the issue.
To assess the extent to which the National Southwest Border  Counternarcotics Strategy (Strategy) outlines U.S. goals and progress  made in efforts to stem firearms trafficking to Mexico, we reviewed the  2011 and 2013 versions of the Strategy’s Weapons Chapter and the 2010  implementation guide. We also met with Office of National Drug Control  Policy officials responsible for the implementation and monitoring the  Strategy, as well as with ATF and ICE officials responsible for writing the  Weapons Chapter and overseeing implementation and reporting on  activities described within their respective agencies.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Charles Johnson (Director), Juan  Gobel (Assistant Director), Francisco Enriquez (Analyst-in-Charge),  Danny Baez, and Julia Jebo-Grant made key contributions to this report.  Ashley Alley, Karen Deans, Justin Fisher, and Oziel Trevino provided  additional assistance.