Homeland Defense: Preliminary Observations on Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Plans and Preparedness
Published: 2009-07-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD plays a support role in managing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents, including providing capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship or suffering, and minimize property damage. This testimony addresses GAO's preliminary observations on DOD's role in CBRNE consequence management efforts and addresses the extent to which (1) DOD's plans and capabilities are integrated with other federal government plans, (2) DOD has planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE consequence management assistance, (3) DOD's CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) are prepared to perform their mission; and (4) DOD has funding plans for the CCMRF that are linked to requirements for specialized CBRNE capabilities. GAO reviewed DOD's plans for CBRNE consequence management and documents from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. GAO also met with officials from the Undersecretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S Northern Command, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army North, the National Guard Bureau, and some CCMRF units.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has its own CBRNE consequence management plans but has not integrated them with other federal government plans because all elements of the Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007 have not been completed. The system is to develop and link planning documents at the federal, state, and local levels. While the system's framework is established, the CBRNE concept and strategic plans that provide further guidance are incomplete. DOD has had operational plans in place and revises these plans regularly. However, until the Integrated Planning System and its associated plans are complete, DOD's plans and those of other federal and state entities will not be integrated, and it will remain unclear whether DOD's CCMRF will address potential gaps in capabilities. With a goal to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous, catastrophic CBRNE incidents, DOD has plans to provide the needed capabilities, but its planned response times may not meet incident requirements, it may lack sufficient capacity in some capabilities, and it faces challenges to its strategy for sourcing all three CCMRFs with available units. Without assigned units and plans that integrate the active and reserve portions of the CCMRF, and agreements between DOD and the states on the availability of National Guard units and the duty status in which they would respond to an incident requiring federal forces, DOD's ability to train and deploy forces in a timely manner to assist civil authorities to respond to multiple CBRNE incidents is at risk. DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the readiness of units assigned to the CCMRF, increasing both individual and collective training focused on the mission and identifying the mission as high priority. However, the CCMRF has not conducted realistic full force field training to confirm units' readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly. Competing demands of overseas missions may distract from a unit's focus on the domestic mission, and some CCMRF units rotate more frequently than stated goals. These training and force rotation problems have prevented DOD from providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build cohesiveness. DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to identify total program requirements have not been completed, and funding responsibilities have been assigned across the department and are not subject to central oversight. When the CCMRF mission priority increased in the spring of 2008, more funding was provided. However, units did not have dedicated funding and thus purchased equipment with existing funding which is also used for other missions. DOD lacks visibility over the mission's total funding requirements. Without an overarching approach to developing requirements and providing funding and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified and funded, DOD's ability to ensure that its forces are prepared to carry out this high priority mission remains challenged.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss preliminary results of our work  on the Department of Defense’s efforts to provide consequence  management support to civilian authorities in the event of a catastrophic  chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosives  (CBRNE) incident. The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security  highlighted the continuing threat posed to the United States by the  potential use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organizations. In  addition to efforts focused on preventing such attacks, the strategy  highlights the need for a comprehensive capability to mitigate the  consequences of an attack involving weapons of mass destruction. Such a  capability is also a key pillar of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons  of Mass Destruction. The Department of Defense (DOD) characterizes  weapons of mass destruction in terms of CBRNE materials. Incidents  involving CBRNE could range in magnitude, from such things as accidents  like chemical spills that likely could be addressed by local responders to  catastrophic incidents such as terrorist attacks involving nuclear material  that could result in extraordinary levels of casualties and property  damage.
A catastrophic CBRNE-related incident occurring within the United States  would require a unified, national response, including action by DOD. The  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating  federal disaster response planning, with the Federal Emergency  Management Agency (FEMA) serving as the primary federal agency under  DHS for coordinating federal assistance in response to an incident. DOD  would act in support of the primary federal agency. In addition to  establishing CBRNE response units in the National Guard, including the  Civil Support Teams and CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages,  DOD is establishing CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces  (CCMRF). The CCMRF is intended to be roughly a brigade-sized force  (approximately 4,500 troops) that provides the federal military assistance  when a CBRNE incident exceeds local and state capabilities.
In May 2006, we reported that the National Guard Civil Support Teams  were generally organized and prepared for their mission, and we  highlighted management challenges that needed to be addressed. In  response to the request of this subcommittee and other Senate requesters  that we assess DOD’s federal role in CBRNE consequence management  efforts, we initiated a review focusing on federal military planning and  preparedness efforts and the CCMRF. This testimony is based on  preliminary findings from this work and addresses the extent to which (1)  DOD’s plans and capabilities are integrated with other federal government  plans to address capability requirements, (2) DOD has planned for and  structured its force to provide CBRNE consequence management  assistance, (3) DOD’s CCMRF are prepared to perform their mission; and  (4) DOD has funding plans for the CCMRF that are linked to requirements  for specialized CBRNE capabilities.
To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for CBRNE  consequence management operations and integrated plans with other  federal government plans, we reviewed and compared current DOD  operational and tactical level plans for civil support and CBRNE  consequence management with existing FEMA and DHS planning efforts.  We also met with officials of the Department of Homeland Security, the  Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and U.S  Northern Command. We reviewed prior GAO reports and worked with  other GAO staff currently examining the overall domestic homeland  security planning integration process. To determine how prepared the  CCMRF is to perform the mission we compared existing DOD policy and  practices on readiness with the current process used to prepare CCMRF  units and report mission readiness. We also met with U.S. Joint Forces  Command and U.S. Army Forces command—which are responsible for  providing ready forces to the combatant commands—to discuss the  manpower sourcing process followed for the CCMRF. We obtained  readiness reports for CCMRF units from U.S. Northern Command and  from judgmentally selected units that were part of task force operations— which contains most of the specialized capabilities. To determine CCMRF  funding planning and the linkage of funding to mission requirements, we  met with Army and U.S. Northern Command officials to obtain guidance  on the topic and to discuss mission requirements, funding needs, and  sources. We compared funding sources to known CBRNE consequence  management requirements and highlighted areas where funding was not  identified for key activities or areas relevant to unit preparedness. We also  met with the National Guard Bureau and some key units that were  assigned to or soon to be assigned to the CCMRF to discuss their current  capabilities, identified shortfalls, and their approach to mitigating any  identified shortfalls. These units were selected because they belonged to  the task force that would provide most of the specialized CBRNE  capabilities that reside in the CCMRF.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 through July  2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We plan to report on our  complete findings and any recommendations at a future date.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD plays a support role in CBRNE consequence management, including  providing those capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship or  suffering, and minimize property damage caused by the incident. DOD  generally provides defense support of civil authorities only when (1) state,  local, and other federal resources are overwhelmed or unique military  capabilities are required; (2) assistance is requested by the primary federal  agency; or (3) NORTHCOM is directed to do so by the President or the  Secretary of Defense. DOD has designated U.S. Northern Command  (NORTHCOM) to lead the federal military portion of such a support  operation in direct support of another federal agency—most often the  Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). DOD would be the lead  federal agency for CBRNE consequence management or any other civil  support mission only if so designated by the President. To be effective,  DOD’s efforts must be coordinated with a wide range of federal  departments and agencies—including FEMA and the Departments of  Health and Human Services and Justice—in order to support 50 states, the  District of Columbia, six territories, and hundreds of city and county  governments.
The National Response Framework establishes the principles that guide all  response partners in preparing for and providing a unified national  response to disasters.  Under the Framework, disaster response is tiered;  local government and agencies typically respond immediately after an  incident. When additional resources are required, states may provide  assistance with their own resources or may request assistance from other  states through interstate mutual agreements or the Emergency  Management Assistance Compact. Localities and states usually respond  within the first several hours of a major incident. The federal government  provides assistance to states if they require additional capabilities and  request assistance. In the event of a catastrophic incident, such as one  involving CBRNE, the framework also calls for federal response partners  to anticipate the need for their capabilities before their assistance is  requested. The framework lists 15 emergency support functions and  designates federal lead agencies in areas such as search and rescue, public  health and medical services, and transportation. DOD is a supporting  agency for all 15 emergency support functions but is the primary agency  only for search and rescue and public works and engineering. Additional  tools to guide response efforts are provided by The National Preparedness  Guidelines, including National Planning Scenarios, Target Capability and  Universal Target Lists, and national priorities.
DOD has created significant capabilities that could be used to augment a  federal CBRNE response. It also contributes to the organization, training,  and equipping of several other state military units focused on consequence  management. These include the 22-person National Guard Weapons of  Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams that are located in each state and  territory); the larger National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force  Packages of about 200 soldiers each that are located in 17 states for more  expansive response; and the DOD’s CBRNE Consequence Management  Response Forces (CCMRF).
The Civil Support Teams and CBRNE Emergency Response Force  Packages are intended to be part of the state response to an incident and  therefore remain under the control of the respective governors, unless  they are mobilized into federal service. The CCMRF is intended to be a  roughly brigade-sized force (approximately 4,500 troops) that provides the  federal military assistance when a CBRNE incident exceeds local and state  capabilities—including the Civil Support Teams and CBRNE Enhanced  Response Force Packages. The CCMRFs are not whole units by  themselves. They are a collection of geographically separated DOD  capabilities and units across the military services and consist of such  existing specialized capabilities as the U.S. Marine Corps’ Chemical  Biological Incident Response Force as well as general capabilities, such as  transportation units. Although the CCMRF is intended to be about 4,500  personnel in size, the size of the force that would deploy in support of an  actual incident could be modified based on the size of the incident. DOD  ultimately plans to have three fully functional CCMRFs. DOD would, if  necessary, draw on additional general military forces over and above the  CCMRF to provide assistance in the event of one or more major CBRNE  incidents.
section_title: DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Plans and Integration with Other Federal Plans
paragraphs: DOD has operational plans for CBRNE consequence management.  However, DOD has not integrated its plans with other federal government  plans, because the concept and strategic plans associated with the  Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in  December 2007 have not been completed.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Developed Plans for CBRNE Consequence Management
paragraphs: Unlike most federal agencies, DOD has had CBRNE consequence  management operational plans for over 10 years. DOD, NORTHCOM, and  its components have prepared individual plans that address CBRNE  consequence management following DOD’s well-established joint  operation planning process. This process establishes objectives, assesses  threats, identifies capabilities needed to achieve the objectives in a given  environment, and ensures that capabilities (and the military forces to  deliver those capabilities) are distributed to ensure mission success. Joint  operation planning also includes assessing and monitoring the readiness of  those units providing the capabilities for the missions they are assigned.  DOD and NORTHCOM routinely review and update their plans as part of  DOD’s joint planning system. For example, the most recent NORTHCOM  CBRNE consequence management plan was completed in October 2008.  DOD and NORTHCOM have also developed such planning documents as  execute orders that are key to linking immediate action to those plans, as  well as scenario-based playbooks to guide the planning, operations, and  command and control of military forces for CBRNE efforts.
section_title: Governmentwide Integrated Planning System Is under Development but Not Yet Complete
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is leading a governmentwide  effort to develop an Integrated Planning System that would link the plans  of all federal agencies involved in incident response, including DOD’s;  however, this effort is not yet complete. While much in the way of federal  guidance has been developed, to be most effective, policy documents must  be operationalized by further detailing roles and responsibilities for each  entity that may be involved in responding to high-risk or catastrophic  incidents.
In December 2007, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1,  mandated that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with  the heads of other federal agencies with roles in homeland security,  develop an Integrated Planning System to provide common processes for  all of the entities developing response plans. The directive also called for  the development of strategic plans, concepts of operations plans, and  operations plans that would be integrated at the federal, regional, state,  and local levels. DHS has grouped the 15 national planning scenarios on  which preparedness plans are to be based into 8 scenario sets, of which 5  are CBRNE-related. Each of the scenarios, listed in table 1, includes a  description, assumptions, and likely impacts, so that entities at all levels  can use them to guide planning.
The directive required that the Integrated Planning System be submitted to  the President for approval within 2 months of the directive’s issuance in  December 2007. As we have reported, the Integrated Planning System was  approved in January 2009 by former President Bush, but is currently under  review by the new administration, and no time frame for its publication  has been announced. The approval of the CBRNE plans required under  the directive (see table 2 below) would be a step toward unifying and  integrating the nation’s planning efforts. For example, for each National  Planning Scenario, a strategic guidance statement is intended to establish  the nation’s strategic priorities and national objectives and to describe an  envisioned end-state. Strategic guidance statements will have  corresponding strategic plans, which are intended to define roles,  authorities, responsibilities, and mission-essential tasks. Under each  strategic plan, a concept of operations plan will be developed, and federal  agencies are further required to develop operations plans to execute their  roles and responsibilities under the concept of operations plan.
As of today, strategic guidance statements have been approved for all 5  CBRNE-related scenario sets. Four of the 5 required strategic plans have  also been completed. The remaining strategic plan (chemical attack) was  begun in June 2009 upon the approval of the strategic guidance statement  for that scenario. One of the 5 required overall federal concept plans—that  for terrorist use of explosives attack—has been completed. As we have  previously reported, apart from the sequential timelines required in HSPD  Annex 1, FEMA and DHS have no schedule or project plan for completing  the guidance and plans. Table 2 shows the status of federal CBRNE  strategy and plans called for under HSPD 8 Annex 1.
DOD’s plans and those of other federal and state entities cannot be fully  integrated until the supporting strategic and concept plans are completed.
section_title: Current Capability Assessments at Local, State, and Federal Levels May Provide Insufficient Data for DOD to Shape Its Response to CBRNE Incidents
paragraphs: A number of efforts to develop capability assessments are under way at  local, state, and federal levels, but these efforts may not yet be sufficiently  mature to provide DOD with complete data that it can use to shape its  response plans for CBRNE-related incidents. For example, FEMA has  begun to catalog state capabilities in its preparedness reports and is  working on a capability gap analysis. However, DHS faces challenges in  developing its approach to assessing capabilities and preparedness. As  noted in DHS’s January 2009 Federal Preparedness Report, several key  components of the national preparedness system are still works in  progress, and not all data required for the federal government to assess its  preparedness are available. We have previously reported that state  capability data developed by individual states cannot be used to determine  capability gaps across states, because the states do not use common  metrics to assess capabilities and do not always have the data available  that they need to complete their reports. In addition, according to DOD  and FEMA, even to the extent that these data are available, states may  limit their sharing of sensitive information on capability gaps with DOD  entities responsible for developing DOD’s plans and related capabilities.
section_title: DOD’s Planned Response to CBRNE Incidents
paragraphs: DOD has had plans to provide CBRNE consequence management support  to civil authorities since before 9/11 and in the last few years has set higher  goals in the expectation of being able to provide expanded capabilities  through its 3 CCMRFs. However, its ability to respond effectively may be  compromised because (1) its planned response times may not meet the  requirements of a particular incident, (2) it may lack sufficient capacity in  some key capabilities, and (3) it faces challenges in adhering to its strategy  for sourcing the CCMRFs with available units.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Planned Response Times May Be Too Long
paragraphs: In 2005, DOD established a standard for itself that called for the ability to  respond to multiple, simultaneous catastrophic incidents, and it initiated  efforts to create 3 CCMRFs. For the first 3 years, DOD did not regularly  assign units to the CCMRF mission, and this decreased DOD’s ability to  actually field any of the CCMRFs within the timelines it had established. In  October 2008 DOD sourced the first CCMRF, primarily with active force  units. A second CCMRF, comprised primarily of reserve units, will assume  the mission in October 2009 and a third in October 2010. In the absence of  national guidance suggesting what level of response capability DOD  should have available within a specified time frame, DOD’s plans use a  phased deployment to allow the CCMRF to be able to provide  consequence management support to civilian authorities within 48-96  hours of being notified of an CBRNE incident. The earlier phases of the  deployment will provide the lifesaving capabilities. However, multiple  DOD estimates for some of the more catastrophic scenarios, such as a  nuclear detonation, have identified significant gaps between the time  certain life saving and other capabilities would be needed and DOD’s  planned response times. For example, victims of a nuclear attack would  require decontamination, which medical experts have established must be  provided within as soon as possible after exposure. If DOD adheres to its  planned response times in such a scenario, the capabilities of early  responders such as local police and fire departments would likely be  overwhelmed before DOD arrived at the incident site. NORTHCOM’s  assessment  and other DOD estimates demonstrated that, for a number of  capabilities, DOD’s response would not be timely. Table 3 shows one  estimate of the potential shortfall in decontamination capabilities that  could result.
The NORTHCOM capability-based assessment similarly suggests that  without a national, risk-based determination of DOD’s share of the federal  capability requirements, DOD will be unable to determine whether its  planned response times should be adjusted.
section_title: DOD’s Planned Force May Lack Sufficient Capacity in Some Key Capabilities Needed for Catastrophic Incidents
paragraphs: In addition to timeliness issues, DOD’s planned force has limited quantities  of some of the needed life saving capabilities, such as medical and  decontamination services. For example, some nuclear detonation  scenarios project that hundreds of thousands could be killed, injured,  displaced, contaminated, or in need of medical care. The CCMRF would be  able to provide only a small portion of the necessary capability. Although a  CCMRF is estimated, under optimal circumstances, to be capable of  decontaminating several thousand people per day, some estimates project  that the gap between needed decontamination capabilities and what local,  state, and other entities could provide would be tens of thousands. DOD  recognizes that it may need additional units to augment the CCMRF, and it  has made some tentative estimates. However, DOD has not developed  contingency plans designating specific units to augment the CCMRF.  Unless these units are identified in advance and trained for the mission,  they may be unable to deploy rapidly. Without clear plans aligning CCMRF  objectives with the projected need for response capabilities and clearly  delineating national expectations for timely response, neither DOD nor  other entities involved in incident response can be certain that the  CCMRFs will be able to respond adequately to mitigate the consequences  of a catastrophic CBRNE incident.
section_title: DOD Faces Challenges in Adhering to Its Strategy for Sourcing the CCMRFS with Available Units
paragraphs: In sourcing its 3 CCMRFs, DOD has encountered challenges in  implementing an approach that could enhance unit availability and  training and readiness oversight for forces that are not assigned to  NORTHCOM. DOD originally intended the CCMRF to be comprised  entirely of federal active military forces, but the two follow-on CCMRFs  will be sourced with large numbers of National Guard and Army Reserve  units. The demands of ongoing overseas operations have led DOD to draw  more and more heavily on Guard and Reserve forces to fulfill civil support  functions. Because National Guard units have responsibilities in their  respective states, a competition for resources issue may arise between  DOD and the states. For example, while governors may need the same  capabilities within the state or to support mutual assistance agreements  with other states as would be needed to support a CCMRF, there is no  clear understanding between the governors and DOD to ensure that these  units will be available if they are needed for a federal mission. Moreover,  elements from a single unit can be spread over many states, further  complicating the task of coordinating between DOD and each of the states.  For example, one Army National Guard aviation company belonging to the  CCMRF has elements in Arkansas, Florida, and Alabama. Three different  states would be required to make these elements available to form the  company. The potential rapid deployment mission of the CCMRF makes it  imperative that specific agreements be reached. However, the agreements  that have been reached to date are general in nature and do not specify  how states are to ensure that Guard units will be available for a CCMRF  deployment.
Similar issues arise with the Army Reserve. The training demands of the  CCMRF mission have caused DOD to authorize additional training days,  but according to Army Reserve officials, reservists cannot be compelled to  attend training events beyond their annual training requirement. They  stated that, as a result, units must rely on the voluntary participation of  their personnel for training beyond the requirement, which reduces their  assurance that these personnel will be available for other necessary  CCMRF training. For example, one reserve company was unable to fulfill  all aspects of its mission requirements because of low participation at a  training event. Unit officials stated that some of the unit’s members had  school or work obligations that conflicted with this training. Moreover,  reserve unit officials stated that, unlike active unit officials, they cannot  restrict the personal travel of unit members to ensure that they will be  available if they are needed to support an unexpected federal CBRNE  incident response. These challenges to sourcing the CCMRF increase the  risk that DOD’s ability to effectively respond to one or more major  domestic CBRNE incidents will be compromised. That risk can be  mitigated by plans that integrate the active and reserve component  portions of the CCMRF and agreements between DOD and the states on  the availability of National Guard units and the duty status under which  they would respond to a major incident requiring federal forces.
DOD’s decision to change its approach to how NORTHCOM will routinely  interact with units designated for the CCMRF will present additional  challenges. In 2008, DOD’s sourcing approach was to assign the first  CCMRF (primarily active forces) to NORTHCOM and allocate the  remaining two CCMRFs (mix of Guard and Army Reserve) to  NORTHCOM. Beginning in October 2009, DOD will allocate the units  from all three CCMRFs to NORTHCOM, rather than assigning them to the  NORTHCOM commander outright. As a result, despite the fact that  NORTHCOM’s commander is responsible for commanding the federal  military domestic CBRNE response in the continental United States,  NORTHCOM will have no CBRNE forces under its direct control. There  are advantages to assigning forces directly to NORTHCOM. For example,  the command would have direct authority over the units’ day-to-day  activities, including training and exercise schedules, and would be better  able to monitor readiness. Additionally, there would be fewer  administrative steps required for the NORTHCOM commander to activate  and deploy the CCMRF in the event of an incident. This would be crucial  for deploying the critical initial response elements of the overall force.  Under allocation, while DOD’s current approach would provide  NORTHCOM with authority over units while they are participating in  scheduled NORTHCOM training events, NORTHCOM would have to  coordinate with multiple commands to obtain participation from these  units. Current guidance states that other commands should make their  units available for scheduled NORTHCOM exercises “to the greatest  extent possible.” However, NORTHCOM cannot always be assured that  units will be available for these exercises. In addition, NORTHCOM  remains uncertain about the extent to which it will have oversight of  CCMRF units’ day-to-day training activities and be able to confirm that  these units are ready to perform their mission even when they are under  the authority of another command.
section_title: DOD Actions on CCMRF Readiness and Training and the Impact of Current Deployments
paragraphs: DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the  readiness of its CCMRF units. However, our ongoing work shows that the  CCMRF may be limited in its ability to successfully conduct consequence  management operations because (1) it does not conduct realistic full force  field training to confirm units’ readiness to assume the mission or to  deploy rapidly, and (2) conflicting priorities between the CCMRF mission  and overseas deployments impact some units’ mission preparation and  unit cohesion.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Taken Actions to Improve CCMRF Readiness
paragraphs: The initial assignment of the CCMRF to NORTHCOM in October 2008 and  the increased priority DOD has placed on the CBRNE mission have  resulted in a number of improvements in unit preparation for the first  fielded CCMRF. The Army, in coordination with NORTHCOM and its  subordinate commands, has established guidance for both individual and  collective training—including joint mission essential task lists—for units  designated for the CCMRF. Therefore, for the first time, identified units  are conducting individual and collective training focused on the CCMRF  mission. For example, key leaders such as brigade task force headquarters  personnel and battalion commanders are required to participate in a  number of command and control training events to provide them with an  understanding of how to organize and conduct operations in a complex  interagency environment under catastrophic disaster conditions.  Moreover, the increased priority given to the mission in the spring of 2008  has led to units receiving personnel and equipment before they assume the  mission and ahead of many other units that do not participate in the  CBRNE mission.
section_title: Extent of Realistic Field Training Impacts CCMRF’s Ability to Perform Effectively
paragraphs: Despite units being certified as ready prior to assuming the mission in  October 2008, it is unclear whether the CCMRF can effectively perform  CBRNE consequence management operations throughout the 1-year  mission period to which it is assigned, because the readiness of the entire  CCMRF is not confirmed through a realistic field training exercise before  the force assumes the mission, nor have its rapid deployment capabilities  been fully assessed. Before designated units assume the CBRNE mission,  they must be certified by the military services to be trained to perform that  mission. However, there is no requirement to provide these units with a  full force tactical field training exercise. While units conduct this type of  training prior to an overseas deployment, and NORTHCOM and Joint  Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) training officials have  discussed the desirability of such an exercise, the first CCMRF units have  not received this kind of training. Although some CCMRF units have  participated in joint field exercises, critical units often did not participate.  In addition, the exercises were conducted several months after units had  been certified as trained to perform the mission.
Units also must demonstrate that they will be able to meet the required  response times once they assume the mission. A key aspect of the CCMRF  mission is to be able to rapidly deploy each of the three force packages  that comprise each CCMRF within a specified response time. One of the  primary challenges to a timely response is that CCMRF packages may have  to deploy rapidly from their home stations. Deployment readiness  exercises are important, because they test units’ abilities to ascertain how  quickly staff can be notified and assembled, equipment prepared and  loaded, and both staff and equipment moved to the designated point of  departure. DOD has provided general guidance that supported commands,  such as NORTHCOM, should verify the ability of CCMRF units to activate  and deploy. However, DOD has not yet conducted deployment exercises  for the entire CCMRF, and it is not clear if its plans for future CCMRFs will  include such exercises. In the absence of such exercises, NORTHCOM and  DOD will continue to be unable to verify the ability of CCMRF units to  deploy.
section_title: Units’ Preparation for the CCMRF Mission and Efforts to Achieve Unit Cohesion Are Impacted by Other Missions
paragraphs: The demands that overseas missions are placing on the Army also may put  the effectiveness of the CCMRF mission at risk. While DOD has identified  CCMRF as a high priority mission, competing demands associated with  follow-on missions may distract from a unit’s focus on the domestic  mission. For example, Army units are frequently given the CCMRF mission  when they return from an overseas deployment. Because these units are at  the beginning of the “reset” phase of the Army Force Generation  (ARFORGEN) cycle, they often lack personnel and equipment. Although  the Army attempts to accelerate the fill of personnel and equipment to  these units, some units may not have received their personnel and  equipment in sufficient time to allow them to meet all of the requirements  of the CBRNE mission before they assume it. These training and force  rotation issues have prevented DOD from providing the kind of stability to  the force that would allow units to build cohesiveness. While DOD’s goal  has been to assign units for at least 12 months and to set standard start  and end dates for each rotation, several critical units have been unable to  complete their 1-year CCMRF rotations for fiscal year 2009. As a result, the  replacement units who have finished out these rotations have missed  important training. For example, the headquarters units for the aviation  and medical task forces rotated out of the mission after only 4 and 6  months, respectively, because of competing priorities. Because key  leaders from units of the entire force attend a mission rehearsal exercise  prior to mission assumption, the replacement of these units after only a  few months negated much of the value that was gained from these three  task forces working together and precluded the replacement task force  leaders from having the same opportunity.
section_title: CCMRF Requirements Development, Funding, and Oversight
paragraphs: DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and  equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to  identify total program requirements have not been completed, and its  approach to providing program funding has been fragmented, because  funding responsibilities for CCMRF-related costs are dispersed throughout  DOD and are not subject to central oversight.
subsections: section_title: CCMRF Mission Requirements Have Not Been Fully Developed
paragraphs: The units initially designated for the CCMRF mission did not have fully  developed funding and equipment requirements. In addition, the recent  NORTHCOM Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based  Assessment highlighted a number of systemic capability gaps that need to  be addressed and may generate additional funding requirements.  Moreover, other important requirements for this mission have not been  identified and funded. The Joint Forces Land Component Commander  (U.S. Army North—ARNORTH) and the Joint Task Force Civil Support  are responsible for developing and approving service-specific equipment  unique to the CCMRF’s Joint Mission Essential Tasks. However, to date,  mission essential equipment requirements have not been fully developed.  While some equipment requirement lists have been developed and are  being reviewed by NORTHCOM, equipping officials said that lists have not  been developed for non-standard equipment that units may need in order  to support civil authorities in a CBRNE environment. As a result, some  fiscal year 2008 units have determined requirements based on their own  independent mission analyses. Unit officials stated that filling some of the  needs they identified—such as the need for non-standard communications  equipment that is compatible with civilian equipment—was difficult  because the units lacked a documented requirement for their planned  acquisition. In addition, the review process did not always include the  command organizations that are responsible for the mission. Thus,  decisions on what to buy and in what quantity were not consistently vetted  to ensure standardization in equipping various units. ARNORTH officials  stated that they were in the process of developing mission essential  equipment lists and hope to have them completed in time for the next  rotation, which begins in October 2009.
section_title: Extent of Dedicated Funds for Some CCMRF Training Impacts Mission
paragraphs: In the spring of 2008, sourcing priority for the CCMRF mission increased  substantially within the department, and funding was provided for specific  aspects of the mission. For example, funding was provided for  NORTHCOM’s training program—which totals more than $21 million  annually—for three major exercises associated with the CCMRFs for fiscal  year 2010 and beyond, and the Army Reserve has planned funds of more  than $37 million for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to support additional full- time personnel and training days that have been authorized to support the  CCMRF mission. In addition, while the military services have not planned  funds for equipment specifically for the CCMRF mission, equipment has  been purchased with funds left over from past Global War on Terrorism  deployments. In other cases, purchase requests for certain equipment  were denied by administrative parent commands because, unit officials  believed, the equipment was considered non-critical by reviewing officials.  Moreover, units must fund their CCMRF training activities from their  operations and maintenance accounts, which were developed and  approved months before units knew they would be assigned to the  CCMRF. According to unit officials, because they do not have dedicated  funds for CCMRF in their budgets, they sometimes must take money from  other sources to meet what they believe are their highest priorities for the  CCMRF mission. Also according to these officials, while the lack of  planned funds for the CCMRF has been mitigated to some extent by the  mission’s high priority level, they have found it necessary to curtail or  cancel some desirable training because funding was unavailable. Army  officials told us that if funding shortfalls develop because units lack  sufficient funds to conduct both CCMRF and follow-on mission training,  units can request additional funds from the Army. However, unless units  assess their total funding requirement for the CCMRF and their other  designated mission and receive funding based on both missions, CCMRF  units may be at risk of not having enough funding to conduct all of their  CCMRF training. This, in turn, puts units at risk of not being fully prepared  if they are needed to respond to an incident.
CCMRF units may face more acute funding issues as the United States  begins drawing down in Iraq and as military supplemental funding, such as  funding for Global War on Terrorism, is reduced. Because DOD has  assigned funding responsibilities across the department and because much  of the funding for the CCMRF is coming from existing operations and  maintenance accounts, DOD lacks visibility across the department over  the total funding requirements for this mission. Without an overarching  approach to developing requirements and providing funding, and a  centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified  and fully funded, DOD’s ability to carry out this high-priority homeland  security mission in an efficient and effective manner is at risk.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided the Departments of Defense and of Homeland Security an  extensive briefing on our preliminary findings. We also provided them a  draft of this statement. Neither DOD nor DHS had formal comments, but  both provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the  statement, as appropriate.
We plan to provide this subcommittee and our other congressional  requesters with our final report on DOD’s CBRNE consequence  management efforts in September 2009. We expect to make a number of  recommendations for DOD action at that time. Mr. Chairman, this  concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any  questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee might have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or  daogostinod@gao.gov. Individuals who made key contributions to this  testimony include Joseph Kirschbaum, Assistant Director; Rodell  Anderson; Joanne Landesman; Robert Poetta; and Jason Porter.
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