Aircraft Requirements: Air Force and Navy Need to Establish Realistic Criteria for Backup Aircraft
Published: 1995-09-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the trend in the number of backup aircraft maintained by the Air Force and Navy, focusing on the: (1) actions that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have taken in response to prior recommendations to validate backup aircraft requirements; and (2) opportunities to remove unneeded backup aircraft from the force to minimize the cost of operating and maintaining combat-designated aircraft.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO found that: (1) the Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps operate and maintain about one backup aircraft for every two combat-designated fighter aircraft; (2) the Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps will achieve the Bottom-Up Review's goals to reduce the size of the combat-designated aircraft forces by the end of fiscal year(FY) 1996; (3) the Air Force has not developed supportable plans for structuring and managing backup forces and justifying the procurement of backup aircraft; (4) realistic criteria are needed prior to the procurement of backup aircraft systems to prevent the Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps from buying more aircraft than needed; and (5) if attrition aircraft in excess of short-term needs are stored until needed, the Air Force could reduce operation and maintenance costs.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 1977, numerous audits by the Department of Defense (DOD) and us have reported that the military services overstate the number of backup fighter/attack aircraft needed for training, test and evaluation, and as replacements for combat-designated aircraft that are in maintenance or lost through attrition. As of the end of fiscal year 1993, the Air Force and the Navy/Marine Corps operated and maintained 2,954 combat-designated fighter/attack aircraft and 1,623 similar, equally capable backup aircraft.
The former Chairmen of the Subcommittee on Readiness and the Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel were concerned that backup forces were not efficiently managed and that this mismanagement adversely affected funds available for combat-designated forces. The Chairmen requested that we identify trends in the number of backup aircraft maintained by the services, actions that DOD and the services have taken in response to prior recommendations by others and us to validate backup aircraft requirements, and opportunities to remove unneeded backup aircraft from the force to minimize the cost of operating and maintaining combat-designated aircraft.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Backup aircraft account for about 35 percent of the Air Force’s and Navy/Marine Corps’ fighter/attack aircraft inventory. Operations and maintenance funds appropriated to support these aircraft are allocated based on the number of combat-designated aircraft, and the test and evaluation, and training aircraft in the backup force. There is no additional allocation for maintenance and attrition aircraft in the backup force. Those backup aircraft are operated and maintained with the same funds. This affects the budget, because maintenance and attrition backup forces siphon off funds from the combat-designated force.
DOD’s October 1993 Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era required the services to reduce and reshape their forces. The Bottom-Up Review specified 20 Air Force wings, 11 Navy air wings, and 4 Marine Corps air wings. DOD’s goals for the services include reducing combat-designated fighter/attack aircraft forces to 2,230 aircraft by 1999, a reduction of 25 percent from 1993 levels.
Since 1977, audits by us and DOD have recommended that DOD (1) develop supportable criteria to justify backup aircraft inventories and procurement, (2) reduce the number of these assets, and (3) improve the management and oversight of these aircraft.
In 1993, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported that each service continues to use its own methodology, terminology, and philosophy to determine backup fighter/attack aircraft requirements. The report recommended the services use standard terminology and inventory definitions and thereby help ensure that procurement and maintenance funds be spent only on necessary aircraft.
The Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) is a mechanism for reporting material management weaknesses, such as unsupported inventory criteria, to agency heads, Congress, and the President. FMFIA also requires a corrective action plan be devised and milestones established to correct identified problems.
section_title: Services’ Plan to Significantly Reduce Combat-Designated and Backup Aircraft by 1996
paragraphs: By fiscal year 1996, the services’ force structure plans show significant reductions in combat-designated fighter/attack aircraft. These reductions are summarized in table 1 and appendix I. If these reductions are achieved, the ratio of combat-designated aircraft to backup aircraft will not significantly change. The relative number of combat-designated aircraft will increase slightly compared with backup aircraft, from 64.5 percent of the total active force in fiscal year 1993 to 66.5 percent of the total force in fiscal year 1996.
Appendix II shows reductions by type of aircraft.
section_title: DOD Has Not Acted on Recommendations to Validate Backup Criteria
paragraphs: Over many years, there has been concern that the services’ criteria for backup fighter/attack aircraft overstate requirements and need to be validated. In most cases, DOD responded that the existing criteria were relevant or that DOD would study the matter. Subsequent studies by others and us have repeatedly found that little has been done to validate the criteria.
In 1977, we examined inventories of F-15s and F-14s and found that backup requirements for training, maintenance, and attrition aircraft were overstated. We recommended that Congress require DOD to base its justification for backup aircraft on realistic and supportable data. DOD agreed and responded that a review was underway to validate the requirements.In 1983, we again questioned criteria used by the services to justify backup F-14, F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 training, maintenance, and attrition aircraft. Further, we reported DOD had not initiated a review to validate the criteria.
In 1992, the Naval Audit Service reported that the Navy had overstated the need for F-14 training aircraft.
In 1993, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported that the services’ requirements for combat-designated and backup aircraft were inconsistent, outdated, and in need of revision.
See appendix III for a list and discussion of our previous audits and DOD audits of backup aircraft inventories and criteria.
Despite recommendations to validate backup aircraft criteria, the Air Force continues to use unvalidated criteria. The Navy/Marine Corps has made progress toward justifying the number of aircraft needed to support the combat-designated force.
section_title: Backup Aircraft Criteria
paragraphs: The Air Force and the Navy/Marine Corps used standard planning factors or percentages to determine the number of backup aircraft required to support the combat force. More recently, the Navy/Marine Corps has used student volume, flying hour requirements, and aircraft utilization rates to determine the need for training backup aircraft, and a Test and Evaluation Master Plan to determine the need for test and evaluation backup aircraft. Table 2 summarizes the Air Force’s and the Navy/Marine Corps’ planning factors used to determine the need for backup aircraft.
subsections: section_title: Valid Criteria Needed Prior to Procurement of the F-22 and FA-18E/F
paragraphs: The Air Force plans to spend over $72 billion to procure 442 F-22 fighter/attack aircraft (4 fighter wing equivalents): 288 combat-designated aircraft and 154 backup aircraft. Table 3 shows the breakout of backup F-22 aircraft given (1) backup aircraft required using current Air Force backup aircraft criteria and (2) the procurement plan.
If the F-22 experiences the same attrition rate as the F-15, the Air Force will be able to sustain four fighter wing equivalents for 12.5 years with a force of 36 attrition aircraft. Conversely, if the F-22 experiences one-half the attrition rate of the F-15, the Air Force will be able to sustain four fighter wing equivalents for 25 years with a force of 36 attrition aircraft.
DOD plans to spend $89 billion to procure 1,000 F/A-18E/F aircraft. The Navy’s planned inventory distribution for the F/A-18E/F would continue to increase the relative number of fighter/attack aircraft used for combat versus backup categories. For example in fiscal year 1993, 65 percent of the Navy/Marine Corps fighter/attack aircraft were categorized for combat. In fiscal year 1996 that is planned to increase to 68 percent. The distribution of the planned F/A-18E/F aircraft procurement would increase the fighter/attack combat aircraft proportion to 70 percent.
section_title: Navy Uses FMFIA to Report Its Aircraft Requirements Process as a Material Management Weakness
paragraphs: FMFIA requires ongoing evaluations of internal agency management controls and accounting systems and annual reports to the President and Congress on the condition of those systems. FMFIA is not limited to accounting or administrative matters. Rather, it is intended to address the entire range of policies and procedures that management employs to perform its mission efficiently and effectively. In February 1994, the Secretary of Defense directed all Assistant Secretaries of Defense to improve implementation of the FMFIA.
Numerous audits by DOD and us, reports, and congressional testimony have shown that the Air Force and the Navy need to validate their backup aircraft criteria. In our view, the lack of valid criteria is a material weakness reportable under the FMFIA. In addition, to the extent that other program analyses rely on backup aircraft criteria, those analyses would share the same weakness. The Navy acknowledged this when it reported aircraft acquisition requirements processes (which used current backup aircraft criteria) as a material management weakness in its fiscal year 1993 and 1994 FMFIA reports.
section_title: Managing Attrition Aircraft Differently Could Be More Cost-Effective
paragraphs: Attrition aircraft are used to replace combat-designated training, and test and evaluation aircraft lost in peacetime mishaps. In 1994, the Air Force Materiel Command developed a concept that could be used to support the services’ aircraft needs. Although the report on which that recommendation was based offered no specific cost savings, a 1992 Air Force-sponsored study compared 8 years of storage costs plus reconstitution costs to 8 years of operating costs for selected aircraft, including the F-15 and the F-16. The study concluded that storage and reconstitution costs were only 1.9 percent of the operating and maintenance costs for an F-15 and 2.1 percent of operating and maintenance costs for an F-16. Neither the Air Force nor the Navy/Marine Corps had exercised this option as of 1994.
The services’ fiscal year 1996 plans show 218 attrition aircraft. Past attrition rates, however, show that some of these aircraft will not be needed for over 7 years. For example, over the past 5 years, the Air Force lost an average of about 17 F-16 aircraft per year to peacetime mishaps. On the basis of this rate, some of those F-16s will not be needed until the year 2002. However, the Air Force operates and maintains those aircraft in the same manner as combat-designated aircraft. That is, attrition aircraft are assigned to active and reserve units and the Air Force uses operation and maintenance funds that are appropriated for combat-designated, training, and test and evaluation aircraft to support attrition aircraft. In essence, funds that are expected to be used to operate and support combat-designated aircraft are being siphoned off to support attrition aircraft.
Attrition aircraft operating and maintenance costs are difficult to determine. However, in 1994 the Air Force Logistics Management Agency estimated the annual incremental cost of one attrition F-16 in operating units to be $13,366. In fiscal year 1994, the Air Force provided Air National Guard units about $75,000 for each additional attrition aircraft in excess of the first three aircraft supported by the units. However, individual Guard units estimate annual operation and maintenance costs range from about $120,000 to $400,000 for each aircraft. According to Air National Guard and Air Force officials, as the number of authorized combat-designated aircraft assigned to each unit decreases, supporting attrition aircraft becomes more difficult. One unit has already reported a potential degradation of its combat-designated aircraft operation as a result of attrition aircraft that have been assigned to that unit.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to (1) develop and use supportable and consistent criteria to justify backup aircraft inventories and future procurement of backup aircraft as the Navy is doing and (2) report the lack of valid backup fighter/attack aircraft requirements criteria as a material management weakness, in compliance with FMFIA, until these criteria are developed and put in use.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Navy to adjust backup aircraft inventories, where needed, to conform to supportable and consistent criteria once established.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The comments DOD provided on a draft of this report appear in appendix IV. DOD partially concurred with the report. DOD believes more progress has been made in developing sound backup aircraft criteria than we describe. DOD agreed, however, that additional improvements may be necessary. Accordingly, DOD will undertake a review of the backup aircraft criteria.
DOD concurred with our description of the trends in the number of backup aircraft maintained by the services, but commented there were inaccuracies in the report, apparently referring to the process we describe that arrived at the specific number of combat-designated aircraft in the forces. We believe our description of how the number of combat-designated aircraft was determined is accurately summarized, including reference to the Secretary of Defense’s January 1994 Annual Report to the President and the Congress.
DOD only partially agreed with our analysis of actions taken in response to prior audit recommendations by others and us to validate backup aircraft requirements. According to DOD, both services have recognized a need to review their criteria. We believe this is a positive step. We also believe, however, that, in light of previous, largely unsuccessful efforts by others and us to persuade DOD and the services of the need to formulate valid backup aircraft criteria, actions now underway need to be part of a larger process to ensure those actions are fully implemented. The recommendations in this report are intended to help achieve that objective.
The Air Force does not accept that past criticisms of its criteria, or revisions currently being made to its policies, reflect a material weakness reportable under FMFIA. We disagree. The Air Force’s and the Navy’s lack of supportable criteria has been the long-standing subject of numerous reports and recommendations by others and us for corrective action. Based on those reports, the Navy has identified the aircraft requirements process as a material weakness and established a time frame for corrective action. In light of new Air Force aircraft procurements potentially costing over $72 billion, we continue to believe the lack of valid backup aircraft criteria constitutes a material management weakness and reportable under FMFIA. DOD concurred with our conclusion that the procurement of F-22 and F/A-18E/F aircraft should be based on valid criteria.
DOD partially agreed with our conclusion that unneeded attrition aircraft should be placed in storage. DOD, while citing Navy policy to store unneeded aircraft to save costs, noted the Air Force contention that the incremental cost to maintain such aircraft with the active forces is relatively small and these aircraft would be available for emergencies or other temporary needs. However, according to DOD, conclusive cost data is not yet available to support the Air Force’s contention. In light of the Navy’s retention policy, the analysis discussed in this report that compare storage and reconstitution costs against operating costs, and the need to base backup aircraft requirements on quantifiable needs, we continue to believe unneeded aircraft should not be operated and maintained with funds intended to support the authorized forces.
DOD partially concurred with the recommendation that the Secretary of the Air Force develop supportable and consistent criteria to justify backup aircraft inventories and future procurements, and did not concur with a similarly directed recommendation to report backup fighter/attack aircraft requirements criteria as a material management weakness under FMFIA. Further, DOD partially concurred with the recommendation that the Air Force and the Navy adjust backup aircraft inventories to conform to supportable and consistent criteria. Considering the (1) lengthy history of reports concerning the need to strengthen the backup aircraft requirements determination criteria, (2) numerous recommendations to strengthen that process, (3) slow progress in that direction, and (4) planned procurements of costly F-22 and F/A-18E/F aircraft, we are retaining recommendations that identify the known weaknesses, and establish time frames for resolving those weaknesses through the FMFIA mechanism.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We analyzed directives and other pertinent documents and interviewed agency officials regarding backup aircraft procurement planning criteria, inventory management requirements, and force reduction goals. We documented past findings and recommendations regarding backup inventories and criteria. We documented changes to backup criteria and other actions taken as a result of prior recommendations.
Using the services’ fiscal years 1995 and 1996 programming plans and other service provided aircraft inventory data, we documented and compared reductions in combat and backup aircraft inventories for fiscal years 1993 and 1994 and projected inventories for fiscal years 1995 and 1996.
We interviewed management officials at the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, and reviewed studies regarding the potential for storing attrition aircraft until needed. We also visited operational units responsible for operating and maintaining backup aircraft, including active wings and squadrons, a training command, and Air National Guard units, to discuss the impact of these aircraft on unit operations and costs. We reviewed backup aircraft procurement plans to determine whether the standardized backup aircraft planning factors, previously reported as outdated and in need of revision, had been changed.
We reviewed FMFIA reports prepared by the Air Force, the Navy, and DOD for fiscal years 1993 and 1994 to determine whether material weaknesses were reported in the area of aircraft requirements.
We performed our review between October 1993 and February 1995 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the Air Force, and the Navy; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and other appropriate congressional committees. We will also make copies available to other interested parties upon request.
Please contact me at (202)512-3504 if you have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Air Force and Navy Fighter Aircraft Inventories
section_title: Air Force and Navy Fighter Aircraft Inventories by Type of Aircraft
section_title: Past Audits Addressing Backup Aircraft Requirements
paragraphs: F-14 Aircraft Requirements Naval Audit Service (050-S-92, May 19, 1992). The Naval Audit Service reported that the Navy had overstated its need for backup F-14 training and maintenance aircraft. The Navy did not concur with the methodology the Naval Audit Service proposed to calculate training aircraft requirements, nor with a recommendation to reduce F-14 depot maintenance funding. The Navy did concur, in principle, with the recommendation that it develop plans to remove nonessential F-14s from its active inventory.
Opportunities to Reduce the Number of Combat Aircraft Purchased for Noncombat Purposes (GAO Testimony, June 2, 1983). We questioned criteria used by services to justify the number of non-combat aircraft required. We questioned the training, maintenance, and attrition categories for the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 and reported that the Department of Defense (DOD) had never reviewed support aircraft justifications as it said it would in 1977. DOD stated that, regardless of the justification, the support aircraft were necessary and would be used in war.
F-16 Integrated Logistics Support: Still Time to Consider Economical Alternatives (GAO/LCD-80-89, Aug. 20, 1980). We questioned the Air Force’s stated requirement for a 10-percent increase in F-16 aircraft to compensate for aircraft in depot maintenance, since the aircraft was designed to eliminate planned depot maintenance. DOD stated that the 10-percent factor had been historically accurate for tactical fighter aircraft.
The Congress Should Require Better Justification of Aircraft for Noncombat Missions (GAO/LCD-80-93, July 22, 1980). We recommended to Congress, on the basis of past work, that appropriations be withheld for procurement of F-14s, F-15s, F-16s, F/A-18s, and A-10s until the services justified their noncombat aircraft needs with current and realistic data.
Operational and Support Costs of the Navy’s F/A-18 Can Be Substantially Reduced (GAO/LCD-80-65, June 6, 1980). We determined that the Navy overstated the need for F/A-18 maintenance backup aircraft because they had not fully factored in the F/A-18’s reliability and maintainability characteristics.
Unnecessary Procurement of A-10 Aircraft for Depot Maintenance Floats (GAO/LCD-79-431, Sept. 6, 1979). We found that, despite the A-10’s design to eliminate depot-level maintenance, the Air Force continued to use the standard 10-percent reserve for maintenance to justify procurement. We recommended that DOD direct the Air Force to come up with more meaningful estimates to justify procurement. The Air Force responded they would study how to develop backup aircraft numbers. However, they generally felt the additional aircraft were needed.
Letter to the Secretary of Defense (GAO/LCD-79-420, May 22, 1979). We restated our findings from our 1977 report and recommended that action be taken immediately to affect procurement of F-14s and F-15s.
Need to Strengthen Justification and Approval Process for Military Aircraft Used for Training, Replacement, and Overhaul (GAO/LCD-77-423, Oct. 28, 1977). We examined inventories of F-15s and F-14s and found that backup requirements for training, attrition, and maintenance were overstated. We recommended that Congress require DOD to justify requirements for noncombat aircraft on realistic and supportable data. DOD agreed that all programs should be based on supportable data and announced that a review was underway to determine whether this was the case.
section_title: Comments From the Department of Defense
section_title: Major Contributors to This Report
subsections: section_title: National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C.
section_title: Norfolk Regional Office
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subsections: section_title: Address Correction Requested