Burma: UN and U.S. Agencies Assisted Cyclone Victims in Difficult Environment, but Improved U.S. Monitoring Needed
Published: 2011-07-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Cyclone Nargis hit Burma's impoverished Irrawaddy Delta on May 2, 2008, leaving nearly 140,000 people dead or missing and severely affecting about 2.4 million others, according to the UN. The Burmese military government initially blocked most access to the affected region; however, amid international pressure, it slowly began allowing international aid workers entry into the region. Since 1997, the United States has imposed sanctions to prohibit, among other things, the exportation of financial services to Burma and transactions with Burmese officials. In response to a congressional mandate, GAO (1) described the assistance UN and U.S. agencies have provided in response to Cyclone Nargis, (2) assessed USAID actions to help ensure funds are used as intended and do not benefit sanctioned entities, and (3) described the challenges responders experienced and the lessons learned. GAO reviewed financial and program documents; interviewed U.S., UN, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) officials; and traveled to Thailand and Burma.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: UN and U.S. agencies provided about $335 million for emergency response and recovery activities after Cyclone Nargis. Of that total, 11 UN agencies obligated roughly $288 million for assistance in various sectors, including food, health, water and sanitation, and agriculture. The U.S. government provided about $38 million of the UN's total as part of its roughly $85 million in obligations for emergency response and longer-term recovery activities. Of the $85 million U.S. response, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which led U.S. efforts, obligated about $72 million. The Department of Defense obligated about $13 million to procure and deliver emergency relief supplies. USAID took actions to help ensure U.S. funds were used as intended and did not benefit sanctioned entities, but had some monitoring weaknesses. USAID took actions prior to the delivery of assistance, including selecting partners experienced in working with USAID and in Burma and providing extra guidance to help ensure funds were not misused. To monitor assistance, USAID has conducted some site visits. However, USAID's monitoring contains little financial oversight and we found that two grantees charged USAID for unapproved international travel. Also, in some cases site visits were not sufficiently documented. USAID relies on external audits of grantees, but relevant USAID staff were not aware of audit findings related to one grantee's cash payments to villagers in Burma. The grantee subsequently addressed the audit findings. Lastly, U.S. and UN agencies said they examined reports of misuse of assistance in their programs and found no evidence that assistance had been misused. GAO's review of 16 after-action reports from donors, NGOs, and UN agencies, showed that those responding to Cyclone Nargis experienced similar challenges and developed lessons learned in four main areas: access, coordination, implementation, and limited in-country disaster response capacity. Responders found it difficult to reach affected areas because the Burmese government limited their travel and the infrastructure was poor. Responders also had difficulty coordinating between headquarters and field offices for several reasons, including limited telecommunication services. A U.S. report highlighted coordination challenges amongst U.S. agencies, stating that agencies' conflicting agendas resulted in difficulties related to the appropriateness, timing, procurement, and distribution of aid. Implementation challenges include supplies that were incompatible with local conditions, such as medicines with instructions printed in non-Burmese languages and difficulties monitoring aid. Capacity challenges included a lack of experienced disaster specialists in Burma, which resulted in nonqualified individuals being placed in positions out of necessity. To address some of these challenges, reports suggested that organizations increase support staff and use the same reporting systems. Other reports prioritized involving local communities in decision making and improving emergency preparedness and local response capacity.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Administrator of USAID (1) take four actions to improve the management of grants related to Burma, including enhancing financial monitoring and reinforcing the requirement to document site visits, and (2) review the questionable costs for international travel GAO identified. USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Cyclone Nargis hit Burma’s impoverished Irrawaddy Delta on May 2,  2008, leaving nearly 140,000 people dead or missing and severely  affecting about 2.4 million others, according to the United Nations (UN)  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). In  response, UN OCHA reports that the international community mobilized  more than $600 million in aid as of May 2011, including $334.8 million  from U.S. and UN agencies. The Burmese military government initially  blocked most international access to the affected region; however, amidst  international pressure, it slowly began allowing aid to be delivered  throughout May 2008 and finally allowed international aid workers into the  cyclone-affected delta by late May 2008. The United States has provided  funds for Cyclone Nargis emergency response and recovery activities  largely through UN agencies and international nongovernmental  organizations (NGO). The U.S. Agency for International Development  (USAID) has funded most of the U.S. response and recovery activities.  The Department of Defense (DOD) provided emergency supplies, direct  air transport, and logistics support. The U.S. Department of State (State)  played a role in coordinating and monitoring the U.S. government  response.
In 1997, the United States prohibited new investment in Burma and has  since imposed broad sanctions to prohibit the exportation of financial  services to Burma, certain imports from Burma, and transactions with  senior Burmese officials and others, and has provided limited assistance  to Burma. The sanctions arise from actions and policies by the Burmese  military government that repress the democratic opposition in Burma. The  U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) implements many elements  of the sanctions program, including the prohibitions on exports of financial  services to Burma and the targeted financial prohibitions. Congressional  committees mandated that we assess the assistance that the United  States provided in response to the cyclone. To address the mandate, in  this report we (1) describe the assistance UN and U.S. agencies have  provided in response to Cyclone Nargis, (2) assess USAID actions to help  ensure funds are used as intended and do not benefit sanctioned entities,  and (3) describe the challenges responders experienced and the lessons  learned.
To address these objectives, we reviewed financial and program  documents from USAID, DOD, State, Treasury, UN agencies, and NGOs.  We also interviewed U.S., UN, and NGO officials in Washington, D.C.;  Bangkok, Thailand; and Rangoon, Burma; and conducted site visits to  select USAID-funded recovery projects in Burma. To address the first  objective, we reviewed relevant documents, including grants, cooperative  agreements, and progress reports. We interviewed U.S. and UN officials  and conducted site visits. To address the second objective, we reviewed  program and financial files for funds USAID awarded in response to  Cyclone Nargis and spoke with USAID officials about their monitoring of  programs. We also conducted a limited internal controls review of three  NGOs, which collectively account for 66 percent of funding that USAID  awarded to international NGOs to respond to Cyclone Nargis. We also  met with officials from these three NGOs and with USAID officials  responsible for financial oversight of the NGOs’ programs. To address the  third objective, we reviewed 16 relevant after-action and assessment  reports prepared by the U.S. government, UN agencies, and NGOs to  identify challenges experienced during the Cyclone Nargis response, as  well as lessons learned. We also interviewed U.S., UN, and NGO  officials.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 through July 2011 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for a more  detailed discussion of our scope and methodology.
In this report, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID direct the  appropriate mission and offices to improve management of grants related  to Burma by taking actions, such as (1) enhancing financial monitoring of  agreements by including periodic reviews of grantee internal controls,  transactions, and disbursement records; (2) providing grantees with  specific guidance on the approval process for international travel  requests, and ensuring that USAID staff monitor grantees’ expenditures  for compliance with related laws, regulations, and grant agreements,  including international travel; (3) reinforcing the requirement for staff to  formally document site visits to grantees; and (4) ensuring all relevant  offices are made aware of audit findings in a timely manner. We also  recommend that the Administrator of USAID direct the appropriate  mission and offices to follow-up on the questionable costs associated with  international travel that we identified in this report and take action as  appropriate on any identified unallowable costs. USAID concurred with all  recommendations.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Cyclone Nargis Severely Affected More than 3 Million Burmese
paragraphs: Cyclone Nargis left nearly 140,000 people dead or missing, up to 800,000  displaced, and roughly 2.4 million severely affected. The strong tropical  cyclone struck Burma’s impoverished Irrawaddy Delta on May 2, 2008,  with a storm surge of 12 feet and continued east-northeast through the  Rangoon division (see fig. 1).
Strong winds and heavy rainfall led to the flooding of inland areas and  agricultural lands, the destruction of 450,000 homes, and the devastation of  food stocks, livelihoods, and infrastructure, according to the Tripartite Core  Group joint assessment. For examples of Cyclone Nargis’s destruction in  the delta region, see figure 2 and our video. The assessment stated that the  cyclone destroyed or severely damaged more than 50 percent of schools  and nearly 75 percent of health facilities in the affected areas. The cyclone  also impaired access to clean water because the salt water contaminated  communal water collection systems and destroyed household rainwater  collection containers. Prior to the cyclone, Burma had significant  humanitarian needs resulting from decades of chronic underinvestment in  essential services by the Burmese government, ongoing ethnic conflict, and  government policies that stifle economic growth.
In the week following the cyclone, the Government of Burma said it was  accepting international aid but was not ready to accept international aid  workers, insisting that the disaster could be handled internally and  therefore they did not need experts. Due to the inability to enter Burma,  many foreign donors, including the U.S. government, began assembling  staff in Bangkok, Thailand, to be ready for quick deployment if granted  access. The U.S. and other donors also had military ships anchored off  the coast of Burma, ready to supply humanitarian assistance if allowed by  the Burmese government.
The Government of Burma restricted the movement of the few  international aid workers who were in Burma when the cyclone hit as well  as those it eventually allowed to enter the country. The Burmese  Government has had a longstanding policy requiring approval for any  international staff to travel outside of Rangoon. Within the first two weeks  after the cyclone struck, the government set up military checkpoints  outside of Rangoon, blocking access to the cyclone-affected areas for  anyone without the proper travel approvals.
Despite the inability of international aid workers to get into Burma and  government restrictions on the movement of international aid workers  within Burma, some aid was delivered. International agencies already in  Burma launched operations within a few days, working through their local  staff or in partnership with local organizations. The Burmese government  provided some assistance to cyclone-affected areas. One U.S. official  reported that the Burmese military set up a logistics center in Rangoon  and delivered some relief supplies. One report also suggested that the  Burmese army and navy rescued some people stranded in remote areas;  set up camps for displaced people; and restored some electricity,  communication, and transportation links.
Burmese citizens and local organizations also assisted cyclone victims.  According to the same report, within hours of the cyclone, the first local  response efforts were underway, led by monks, doctors, students, artists,  intellectuals, travel agents, and small business owners. Several hundred  new and existing groups, including a contingent of Burmese citizens  returning from abroad, provided relief. While most of the larger  international agencies initially focused on the main population centers,  many of these small, informal groups assisted the most isolated areas.  Several officials cited the local response as one of the main reasons there  was not a further loss of life in the weeks immediately following the  cyclone; however, they reported that the local response was exhausting  its supplies by the end of May 2008.
section_title: Tripartite Core Group Formed to Facilitate Response
paragraphs: Under pressure by the international community and UN entities to allow  international aid workers access to affected populations, the Burmese  government pledged on May 23, 2008, during a visit by the UN Secretary  General, that it would begin granting international aid workers access to  Burma and the cyclone-affected regions. The Association of South East  Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Burma is a member, played a leading  role in getting international disaster response workers into Burma.  ASEAN took the lead in coordinating assistance offered by the  international community, with full support from the UN, and in late May  2008 formed the Tripartite Core Group (TCG). The TCG’s mission was to  facilitate trust, confidence, and cooperation between the Government of  Burma and the international community on matters concerning Cyclone  Nargis humanitarian relief and recovery work. The TCG consisted of three  members from the Burmese government, three from ASEAN, and three  from the UN. The TCG started its work on May 31, 2008, and met once a  week until its mandate ended in July 2010. The TCG facilitated the  issuance of visas and permits to travel, as well as visa extensions for UN  and foreign aid workers. The TCG also led the post-Nargis Joint  Assessment, conducted in June 2008, and helped facilitate the entry and  deployment of 10 commercial helicopters used in conducting  assessments and delivering relief supplies.
section_title: U.S. Government Has Imposed Sanctions on Burma Since 1997
paragraphs: Since 1997 the U.S. government has imposed sanctions on Burma mainly  due to the ruling Burmese military regime’s actions and policies. The  State Law and Order Restoration Council (later known as the State Peace  and Development Council) that took power in 1988 has routinely  restricted freedom of speech, religion, and movement and committed  other serious human rights violations against the Burmese people. It has  condoned the use of forced labor and taken military action against ethnic  minorities living within the country. Burma’s ruling regime has also  periodically blocked or impeded activities undertaken by UN and  international NGOs in Burma, as we previously reported. In 1990,  national parliamentary elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for  the National League for Democracy party, led by Aung San Suu Kyi.  However, the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council refused to  yield power and maintained its policies of autocratic rule.
Parliamentary elections held in November 2010—described by a U.S.  government source as “flawed”—saw the ruling regime’s party garner  more than 75 percent of the seats. Parliament convened in January 2011  and selected the former Prime Minister as President. The government  source reported that the vast majority of national-level appointees named  by the new President are former or current military officers.
The current U.S. sanctions against Burma limit, among other things, the  export of financial services by U.S. persons or from the United States to  Burma and new U.S. investment in Burma. The Treasury’s Office of  Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) manages the U.S. sanctions program by  issuing licenses, monitoring compliance, and bringing enforcement  actions against violators of the sanctions. The sanctions have developed  through laws, such as the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003  and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic  Efforts) Act of 2008, as well as through presidential executive orders. U.S.  law also requires that the United States withhold a share of its voluntary  contributions to most UN organizations proportionate to their funding for  programs in Burma. Generally, aid donated to Burma on behalf of the  United States is not intended to benefit sanctioned entities, such as  senior Burmese government officials or persons associated with the  military regime that have been designated as such by OFAC. Further,  State identifies Burma as a “major illicit drug producing country” that has  failed to adhere to its obligations under international counter-narcotics  agreements and is, therefore, banned from receiving some U.S. aid under  the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
To operate legally in Burma, USAID used funds provided with  notwithstanding authority and obtained OFAC licenses. Notwithstanding  authority allowed USAID to provide humanitarian assistance to Burma  despite other provisions of law limiting agencies’ ability to operate in  Burma. This authority automatically applied to USAID’s Office of Foreign  Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) programs because the law allows for  international disaster assistance, including relief and rehabilitation, to be  provided notwithstanding any other provision of law. Other appropriations  were also provided with notwithstanding authority to fund humanitarian  assistance in Burma for individuals and communities impacted by the  cyclone. OFAC licenses have allowed USAID and its grantees and  contractors to operate in Burma, in order to conduct financial transactions  and other activities otherwise prohibited by the U.S. sanctions.
section_title: UN and U.S. Agencies Obligated About $335 Million in Assistance to Burma after Cyclone Nargis
paragraphs: In response to the humanitarian crisis in Burma following Cyclone Nargis,  UN and U.S. agencies obligated roughly $334.8 million in assistance, as  of March 2011. Of this total, the UN obligated $288 million and the United  States obligated $84.6 million—$37.8 million of which went to UN  agencies, and is therefore included in the UN total as well. Of the  remaining U.S. assistance, $33.9 million was provided through NGOs and  $12.9 million was provided by DOD.
subsections: section_title: UN Agencies Obligated $288 Million for Emergency Response and Recovery Assistance
paragraphs: UN agencies played a critical role in implementing international  assistance in response to Cyclone Nargis. Eleven UN agencies obligated  $288 million since 2008, $37.8 million (13 percent) of which came from  U.S. funding, and provided emergency response and recovery  assistance. The UN, through the acting Humanitarian Coordinator and  the country team, organized the emergency and early recovery phase of  the Cyclone Nargis response and assigned UN agencies and NGOs lead  responsibility for particular relief sectors, as shown in figure 3, an  interactive graphic. (See app. II for mission descriptions of the UN  agencies.)
Figure 1. Text goes here Figure 3: UN Assistance by Sector, 2008 through March 2011 Interactive instructions: The online version of this matrix is interactive. Hover your mouse over each UN organization for a description  of that organization.
To view these descriptions in the offline version, see appendix II. (illion U.S. doll)
Lead responsibility for the sector; also provided assistance UN OCHA provided a broad array of coordiantion assistance across the sectors.
Four UN agencies—the World Food Program (WFP), United Nations  Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Program (UNDP),  and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)— contributed approximately 90 percent of the $288 million. Nearly half of the  total funding came through WFP, which distributed food and supplied common  services, such as providing trucks and cargo vessels for transporting  humanitarian assistance, to the UN and other responding agencies. These  four UN agencies provided the following activities and services:    WFP. As the UN’s largest assistance provider for this humanitarian  emergency and the lead agency responsible for the food, logistics, and  telecommunications sectors, WFP obligated nearly $130 million for  associated activities, as of March 2011. WFP distributed food in the  Irrawaddy Delta and Rangoon Division, reaching nearly one million  people and supplying more than 70,000 tons of food according to WFP  reports. The food commodities included rice, beans, vegetable oil, salt,  ready-to-eat meals, and high-energy biscuits. In urban areas of the  Rangoon Division, where markets remained viable, WFP conducted a  cash transfer program that provided cash assistance to purchase a  week’s worth of food to more than 49,000 beneficiaries. However, the  Burmese government cancelled this program in June 2008. According to  WFP officials, the Burmese government maintained that the cash  transfer program had a negative impact on the economy because it used  informal rather than formal exchange rates. In August 2008, following  the termination of the project, WFP began providing food rations for  131,400 Rangoon beneficiaries. In fall 2008, WFP and its partners began  to shift their focus from relief food provision to early recovery efforts in  order to establish opportunities for work and livelihood redevelopment— principally in the occupations of farming and fishing.
In addition to food assistance, WFP helped supply and coordinate  common services to the UN and other responding agencies. WFP  established five logistics hubs across the delta to provide forward  locations for temporary food storage prior to distribution, and bases  for transportation to onward destinations by road, waterways, or air.  Upon completion of air operations in August 2008, WFP reported that  it had transported 4,177 tons of food and relief supplies from the UN  staging area in Bangkok. Helicopters delivered 1,088 tons of  emergency food and nonfood items to 160 remote locations. Because  the delta is a labyrinth of waterways, WFP contracted a fleet of  barges, push tugs, and river boats, which various agencies used to  transport an additional 10,405 tons of humanitarian supplies, as well  as trucks for inland travel.    UNICEF. UNICEF led three sectors—education; nutrition; and water,  sanitation, and hygiene—and obligated more than $79 million for  associated activities, as of March 2011. UNICEF reported that strong  winds and heavy rainfall from Cyclone Nargis left more than 4,000  schools and more than 600 health facilities destroyed or badly  damaged. As a result, their immediate priorities included preventing  disease outbreaks, ensuring availability of safe drinking water,  establishing temporary learning spaces for children, creating child- friendly spaces for traumatized children, and tracing and reintegrating  the families of separated children. UNICEF said it constructed and  maintained 300 emergency latrines, installed 558 large rainwater  containers and 8 water treatment plants, administered more than  110,000 measles vaccinations to children in cyclone-affected areas  and deployed health assistants to severely affected townships,  provided school kits to 2,322 schools to facilitate resuming of the  school year and renovated 965 schools and 702 staff houses, and  supported 27,000 children through a range of care and protection  activities in 272 locations in 13 affected townships.    UNDP. As the lead agency for the early recovery sector, UNDP was the  only UN agency with project offices located in the delta region prior to  Cyclone Nargis. UNDP’s eight project offices and associated staff  helped distribute supplies, such as water, food, plastic sheets, cooking  utensils, medicine, and clothing. UNDP obligated nearly $34 million, as  of March 2011, and adapted its pre-cyclone Human Development  Initiative projects to meet the early recovery needs of Cyclone Nargis  survivors, focusing primarily on livelihood re-establishment, but also  including grass-roots interventions in the areas of primary health care,  the environment, HIV/AIDS, training and education, and food security.  UNDP also adapted its micro-enterprise/micro-credit program to  support enterprise creation and rehabilitation, including helping affected  populations to rebuild their houses.    FAO. To restore and strengthen food security by helping to restore  livelihoods in agriculture and fisheries production in Burma’s cyclone- affected provinces, FAO obligated about $17 million, as of March  2011. As the lead agency for the agriculture sector, FAO provided  crop, vegetable, and fruit seedlings; fertilizers; technical assistance for  crop and livestock production; improved fishing techniques; fish  processing equipment; livestock and fisheries inputs; veterinary  equipment; and animal vaccinations.
section_title: U.S. Government Responded to Cyclone Nargis with Nearly $85 Million in Assistance
paragraphs: In response to Cyclone Nargis, the U.S. government obligated $84.6  million since May 2008—$74.9 million for emergency response activities  and $9.7 million for longer-term recovery assistance. Of the total funds  obligated, USAID obligated $71.7 million, of which $37.8 million went to  UN programs, and DOD obligated $12.9 million. U.S. assistance covered  multiple sectors throughout the delta region; however, certain townships  received a more extensive range of assistance. (See app. III for a map  that shows the location and type of emergency assistance that U.S.  agencies provided in response to Cyclone Nargis.)
As the lead agency for the U.S. government’s response to Cyclone  Nargis, USAID/OFDA established a disaster assistance response team in  the region within days after the cyclone struck. USAID/OFDA also  immediately provided $250,000 to UN agencies for emergency  assistance. Due to the delay in the Burmese government’s issuance of  visas, USAID deployed the disaster response team to Bangkok, and a  logistics team established operations in Utapao, Thailand.
The U.S. government’s emergency response consisted of $33.9 million in  assistance from USAID/OFDA, $28.1 million in food aid assistance from  USAID’s Office of Food for Peace, and $12.9 million in assistance from  DOD, as shown in figure 4.
USAID/OFDA obligated the nearly $34 million as follows:    $21.5 million was provided through 21 awards in 2008 to 20 different  NGOs and UN organizations. Most of the awards were for emergency  shelters, relief commodities and hygiene and sanitation facilities,  including providing the means to access safe drinking water. Some  awards also helped support capacity building for the local  communities, particularly for food production.    $5 million was provided in 2009 through seven awards to seven  NGOs and UN organizations. These awards were largely  modifications to the 2008 awards that extended the original grant time  periods and provided extra funding for ongoing activities.    $4.5 million was provided to procure and distribute relief commodities  to various NGOs for distribution throughout the delta region in the  early weeks following the cyclone.    $2.9 million was provided for administrative, travel, and logistical  support for the emergency response. This included travel and  transportation costs for the disaster assistance response team  members.
In addition to USAID/OFDA, USAID’s Office of Food for Peace obligated  $28.1 million of Food for Peace emergency food assistance between  September 2008 and January 2009, which WFP distributed to affected  populations. The 23,640 metric tons of assistance included beans, rice,  vegetable oil, and corn-soy blend. The first U.S. food shipment, consisting  of 300 metric tons of corn-soy blend, arrived in Burma in September 2008  from U.S. prepositioned food stocks in Djibouti, Africa. Most of the other  food supplies arrived from the United States between November 2008  and January 2009, approximately 7 to 9 months after Cyclone Nargis  struck Burma.
DOD provided $12.9 million in transportation assistance and emergency  supplies after Cyclone Nargis struck Burma. Between May 12 and June  22, 2008, DOD operated a U.S. government air-bridge with C-130 aircraft  between Thailand and Burma and provided critical supplies, such as  water, food, and emergency shelter material. The U.S. government air- bridge completed 185 airlifts and delivered more than $4 million of  USAID/OFDA emergency relief supplies and commodities from DOD, UN  agencies, NGOs, and the Government of Thailand. Upon the insistence of  the Government of Burma, and because of a lack of other viable options,  DOD provided early shipments of supplies to the Government of Burma  for delivery. Soon thereafter, DOD consigned all emergency supplies  flown to USAID’s NGO partners.
To sustain the efforts initiated in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone  Nargis, USAID’s Regional Development Mission for Asia (USAID/RDMA)  obligated an additional $9.7 million to fund four cooperative agreements  in the priority sectors of livelihoods; health; water, sanitation, and hygiene;  and shelter starting in May 2010, as shown in figure 5. This assistance  was targeted to provide for critical needs in sectors that required  continued support as assistance moved into the recovery and  reconstruction phases. USAID said its programs complemented other  ongoing donor-funded programs, involved high levels of community  participation, and fostered local beneficiary ownership. Ultimately, USAID  will have supported relief and recovery in the Cyclone Nargis-affected  communities for 4.5 years after the disaster at the close of these  agreements.
section_title: USAID Has Taken Actions to Help Ensure Funds Have Been Used As Intended, but Has Some Monitoring Weaknesses
subsections: section_title: USAID Took Actions Prior to Delivery of Assistance
paragraphs: Prior to delivery of assistance, USAID took several actions to help ensure  that funds were used as intended and did not benefit sanctioned entities.  First, USAID selected grantees that had experience working in Burma  and with the United States. To provide immediate emergency assistance,  USAID/OFDA generally selected grantees already working in Burma who  were also familiar with USAID regulations and restrictions. In addition,  USAID/OFDA said that they required all grantees, or their sub-grantees,  to be registered to work in Burma before grants were finalized. This  ensured grantees were able to begin providing assistance immediately. In  providing follow-on assistance, USAID/RDMA decided to provide  recovery funds to organizations that had received USAID/OFDA grants, a  strategy that they said allowed them to implement their programs faster.  They said these organizations had built relationships with the affected  villages, were familiar with all the U.S. restrictions, and had demonstrated  success operating in Burma. Officials reviewed the previous performance  of each grantee in selecting organizations for the follow-on assistance.
Second, USAID/OFDA, State, and DOD officials initially decided to  provide only low-value emergency relief supplies to limit the risk of theft  by the Burmese military. Given that the Government of Burma insisted on  receiving and distributing all aid in the initial days of the response, U.S.  agencies said they chose their mix of relief supplies carefully to limit the  risk of diversion by the Government of Burma. A State official told us that  they chose certain goods, such as bottles of water and plastic sheeting,  specifically with this purpose in mind. This official stated that the  Government of Burma requested items such as helicopters and vehicles  that could have been diverted, which the U.S. government did not  provide.
Third, USAID/RDMA included written guidance in its agreements to  emphasize restrictions and help grantees determine who in Burma is  restricted from receiving U.S. assistance. For example, each agreement  contains a clause clarifying that assistance cannot be provided to or  through the Government of Burma, while recognizing that situations may  arise where government workers, such as teachers or local health  officials, may observe USAID-funded training. U.S. officials told us that  they provide this extra guidance to help organizations better understand  the restrictions. USAID/RDMA has also tried to design its programs to  reduce the risks that U.S. assistance will benefit Government of Burma  employees. For example, since U.S. funds generally cannot be used to  provide any benefit to official village midwives because they are  Government of Burma employees, USAID/RDMA approved grantees to  work with community health workers, who are not government  employees, as part of their health sector programs. In addition to the  guidance in the agreements, USAID conducted post-award briefings with  all partners to discuss the terms of the agreements, with an emphasis on  ensuring that U.S. assistance does not benefit sanctioned entities. A  USAID legal advisor participated in these briefings to answer participants’  questions about how to differentiate between beneficiaries and local  government employees.
Finally, USAID obtained licenses from OFAC, or ensured its grantees had  valid licenses, which allowed grantees to conduct all operations— including financial transactions—necessary to implement humanitarian  assistance programs in Burma without violating U.S. sanctions. USAID  ensured that all of its grant agreements included copies of OFAC  licenses. Under the terms of the licenses, USAID and its grantees had to  continue to ensure that U.S. funding did not benefit sanctioned entities in  Burma.
section_title: USAID Monitored Assistance Under Difficult Conditions, But Documentation Is Insufficient
paragraphs: Amid numerous travel and operational constraints, USAID has taken  actions to monitor grantees’ program delivery; however, we found that  their site visits were not always documented as required. USAID does  not have an official presence in Burma, so staff must request permission  to enter Burma weeks prior to any planned monitoring site visits;  however, the Burmese government often does not grant permission in a  timely manner, according to USAID officials. In addition, the Government  of Burma placed numerous and significant restrictions on international  travel to the affected region, which USAID officials said negatively  affected their ability to conduct monitoring. USAID/OFDA officials also  reported difficulties in conducting monitoring due to staffing constraints.  They stated that a disaster of this magnitude could warrant fifteen to  twenty members on the response team. However due to the inability to  get visas for all team members, there were only four members in Burma  during the height of the emergency response, and ultimately only seven  team members gained access to Burma. USAID’s ability to monitor is also  constrained by the remoteness of the cyclone-affected areas. For  example, one USAID grantee runs programs that are located on Middle  Island, which took us 16 hours of travel by car and boat to reach under  good conditions from Rangoon, where the U.S. embassy is located.
As discussed below, despite the numerous constraints, USAID conducted  some monitoring of its programs:    Emergency assistance. USAID and State officials told us they  monitored emergency assistance from May 2008 through May 2009.  USAID/OFDA officials reported that members of USAID’s disaster  assistance response team made visits to the cyclone-hit delta region  to oversee implementation of USAID-funded grant activities and to  discuss results with beneficiaries from May 2008 to July 2008.  However, the USAID-provided documentation of visits during this time  focuses on the assessment of needs in the region, with no detailed  discussion of monitoring of USAID programs. Further, USAID  assigned an emergency disaster response coordinator—who was  stationed in Burma from September 2008 to May 2009—to monitor  program activities. She told us that during her time in Burma, she  made only one monitoring site visit to each partner because of  Burmese government-imposed travel restrictions. While she did not  prepare formal trip reports, she told us that she reported her activities  to USAID/OFDA staff members through e-mails and conversations  and also reported her activities and findings to embassy staff for  inclusion in classified cables issued by the embassy. However, while  she was sometimes asked to clear information on the cables, she  reported that she never saw finalized cables containing information  she submitted.    Food aid. To oversee USAID’s food aid contributions to Burma,  USAID assigned a food aid official to the disaster assistance response  team in Bangkok roughly 2 weeks after Cyclone Nargis hit Burma.  However, the food aid official returned to Washington, D.C., when she  was unable to obtain a visa and monitored food aid activities from  there, relying on disaster assistance response team members, other  embassy officials, and WFP staff in Burma to monitor food assistance  in a limited capacity. The official said she had regular informal  communication via e-mail and telephone with WFP staff in  Washington, D.C., and Burma. She was able to travel to Burma  several months later, in September 2008, during which time she  conducted site visits with WFP personnel across the Irrawaddy Delta.  Her site visits included observations of food distributions and an  inspection of a WFP warehouse. Upon returning, she drafted a trip  report that was circulated within USAID, but was never finalized. The  report included, among other things, her observations from the field  visits and challenges encountered in the response.    Recovery assistance. To monitor recovery assistance, USAID officials  visited cyclone-affected areas three times between 2010 and 2011  and made several other visits to Rangoon, where they met with  grantees. USAID officials said that while the Burmese government  typically grants access, the level of uncertainty surrounding when they  will grant the access makes it difficult to monitor aid delivery on short- term notice, limits the number of site visits they make, and precludes  them from properly planning monitoring visits. USAID officials  responsible for monitoring recovery assistance provided us with nine  trip reports, including two for trips to monitor grantee activities. The  trip reports include headings for information such as activities  monitored, key meetings, issues identified, recommendations, and  photographs from site visits. We found that one of the two reports was  generally lacking in detail. For example, the report included no detail  on what the officials actually observed during the visit or any  discussion of the activities they monitored in terms of potential issues  or progress.
USAID staff reported that State officials from the embassy in Rangoon  also conducted some monitoring activities; however, they did not receive  instructions on monitoring procedures. According to a USAID official,  State officials provided additional support for USAID staff on some site  visits, or if traveling in the vicinity of USAID programs, they were asked to  observe some of the activities and report back to USAID. While this  monitoring was helpful, a USAID official told us that these State officials  had not received formal USAID training on what to look for during site  visits or how to conduct effective monitoring visits. All USAID agreement  officers and their technical representatives are required to attend  mandatory training that includes monitoring procedures.
section_title: USAID’s Monitoring Includes Limited Financial Oversight and Relies on External Audits, but Staff Were Not Aware of Relevant Audit Findings
paragraphs: USAID’s monitoring activities, including their limited number of site visits,  involve little financial oversight, which is to help ensure funds are used as  intended. USAID monitoring consists of program and financial monitoring.  Program monitoring is focused on the effectiveness of USAID programs  and is carried out by field officers, program officers, and the relevant  agreement officer’s technical representative (AOTR). Financial  monitoring is carried out by the AOTR and the relevant mission’s office of  financial management. For financial monitoring, USAID primarily relies on  its reviews of grantee’s quarterly self-reported cumulative expenditure  data, and the grantee’s annual single audit to reveal any instances of  financial noncompliance.
Grantees are required to submit regular financial reports that are  reviewed by the program office and the mission’s office of financial  management. These reports include cumulative financial transactions,  such as drawdowns and expenditures. The office of financial  management and the AOTR review these reports to assess the  reasonableness of grantee drawdowns. USAID does not require grantees  to provide supporting documentation, such as invoices or detailed  transactions. An official in USAID/RDMA’s office of financial  management told us that the AOTR, who is also the relevant program  officer, compares these reports to information obtained from site visits  and progress reports to ensure the information grantees report is  reasonable.
USAID officials said that staff conducting monitoring in Burma, including  the relevant AOTR, focused their site visits on programmatic issues but  did not review grantee internal control frameworks or review  disbursements to determine whether funds were used for intended  purposes. However, USAID officials told us they consider their  observation of grantees’ use of materials procured with grant funds and  the connection of those materials to the program activities described in  the grant agreement to be a review of grantee financial actions. A USAID  contracting officer reported that, given the limited amount of time the  AOTR spends in the field monitoring, the emphasis is often on the  programmatic side of her monitoring responsibilities. Further, the AOTR  stated that the administrative burden associated with obtaining  permission to enter Burma and travel to grantee sites detracts from  USAID’s ability to monitor the Cyclone Nargis-related programs more  closely and make more meaningful assessments.
USAID officials also told us they rely on the grantees’ annual single  audits, in addition to their review of grantee financial reports, to monitor  compliance with their grant agreements; however, we found that relevant  USAID program staff were not aware of some internal control  weaknesses and questioned costs included in a grantee’s single audit  report. Two of the three grantees we reviewed were required to submit  single audits, and one had significant findings. We reviewed the June 30,  2009, and June 30, 2010, single audits of one of the grantees and the  December 31, 2009, single audit of a second grantee. We found that the  June 30, 2009, single audit of the first grantee had 11 findings related to  internal controls and compliance with federal program requirements. For  example, the auditors questioned cash payments to Burmese villages  totaling $641,695 because the grantee did not provide the auditor with  sufficient documentation for the cash payments. Officials from the  grantee’s Bangkok office told us that they addressed the auditor’s findings  and that they now maintain records of cash payments made to  beneficiaries. We reviewed the same grantee’s June 30, 2010, single  audit report and noted that 9 of the 11 prior year findings related to the  grantee’s programs in Burma had been resolved, and the grantee is  taking steps to resolve the remaining two findings.
During our fieldwork, USAID program officials responsible for overseeing  the Burma programs said that they were not aware of the single audit  findings. USAID officials told us that the USAID Inspector General’s office  reviews the single audit reports and distributes the audit packages to the  relevant program offices. In this instance, because the Bangkok program  staff did not receive any information from the Inspector General’s office,  they assumed that the single audits did not contain any findings related to  the programs in Burma. USAID/RDMA officials told us that they would  also have expected to uncover any audit findings during their preaward  survey conducted in March 2010; however, the 2009 audit that contained  the relevant findings for the first grantee was not released until a month  after USAID’s request for audits, and the grantee did not forward the  report when it was released. USAID/RDMA officials stated that if they  had been informed of the single audit findings, they most likely would  have awarded the grant to the NGO, but they would also have requested  information from the grantee about how they were addressing the audit  findings.
In conducting a limited transaction review of selected USAID grantees,  we found that two of the three grantees incurred questionable costs  because they failed to obtain USAID’s mandatory prior approval for each  international trip funded by the grants. According to USAID regulations,  the grantees may only charge international travel costs to the award when  USAID has previously approved each separate international trip for which  such costs are incurred. Under USAID regulations, prior approval  means securing USAID’s permission in advance of incurring costs on  restricted items, and such advance permission may be obtained by  specifying items in an approved budget. According to USAID guidance,  “ailure to comply with prior approval requirements generally causes  USAID to deem the costs unallowable.”
Although the USAID award agreements require grantees to obtain prior  approval for international travel, we found that this was not always done.  For example, we found that for one grantee who has completed a $4.9  million grant, USAID had approved one traveler for six international trips  between Thailand and Burma. However, this grantee incurred costs for 15  trips in 2008—10 trips between Thailand and Burma and 5 trips between  Thailand and other countries, including Pakistan and Japan—at a total  cost of about $7,357. A grantee official told us that they did not seek  USAID prior approval for the additional trips, but that they did  subsequently inform USAID of the trips in their required periodic reports.  For another grantee, although the USAID agreement did not authorize  any international travel, a grantee official told us that four international  trips totaling approximately $3,633 had been paid for under their ongoing  USAID award.
USAID officials told us that their practice is to review written requests that  grantees submit for international travel and to grant approval if the work  and travel proposed are to be performed in conformance with the award  terms and sufficient funds are available. They also said that unplanned  international travel can arise as a legitimate need for grantees in Burma  due to the challenges in obtaining visas for non-Burmese staff. With  regard to the international trips taken by the two grantees mentioned  above, USAID/OFDA officials told us that they rely on some monitoring by  the program staff and annual audits to detect unapproved travel;  however, they said they did not approve the first grantee’s international  trips we questioned. Under USAID regulations on grant administration,  USAID retains the right to recover funds from its grantees for any costs  charged to the grant that a final USAID audit determines to be disallowed  costs. USAID/RDMA officials told us that for the second grantee, USAID  approval for international trips was not necessary because they were  within the budget limitations specified in the agreement for travel and  transportation. However, we reviewed the agreement, noting that the  travel and transportation budget is approximately $137,000; however, the  agreement did not expressly specify any international travel. Therefore  compliance with existing regulations, guidance, and the USAID award  agreement would require USAID’s prior approval for each separate  international trip. This grantee did not obtain such prior approval, and  therefore incurred questionable costs that may be unallowable under its  agreement. In this grantee’s agreement USAID reserved the right to an  earlier recovery of unallowable costs, which includes requiring the  grantee to refund the disallowed amount during the grant’s performance  period. Additionally, USAID policy provides that in certain circumstances  USAID may ratify the grantee’s activities by approving the disallowed  international travel expenditures after the travel has occurred and the  costs have been incurred.
section_title: USAID Relies on Partners’ Monitoring and Reporting of Activities
paragraphs: Given the difficulties in traveling to USAID-funded project sites in Burma  to conduct monitoring, USAID relies on its partners’ monitoring of  program activities and self-reporting to gauge program progress and to  identify any issues for follow-up during their limited number of site visits.  USAID told us that both the UN and NGO partners had established  operations in the cyclone-affected region and had procedures for  monitoring assistance. The UN agencies we reviewed told us that they  had established a presence in the delta and conducted monitoring visits  using Burmese local staff, supplemented by international staff site visits,  as feasible. In addition, the UN agencies are subject to internal audits on  a regular basis. For example:    WFP relied on both its existing oversight mechanisms as well as  international organizations’ staff present in the delta prior to Cyclone  Nargis to carry out monitoring and oversight of its operations.  According to a WFP official, these mechanisms helped the agency  account for the purchase of commodities, their transport to  established warehouses, and their distribution to implementing  partners for distribution to affected communities.    UNICEF set up five hubs throughout the delta region responsible for  monitoring and oversight. In addition, UNICEF headquarters has an  office of internal audit that audits each country office on a regular  basis. The September 2009 audit of UNICEF’s Burma Country Office  included all major areas related to operations and programs, including  emergency funds. The audit did not find any problems in the way  UNICEF conducts its business in Burma.    UNDP reported that all of its projects were implemented at the village  level, with direct implementation and supervision by UNDP project  personnel and by NGOs with direct UNDP supervision. In addition, an  Independent Assessment Mission is organized annually to verify  UNDP compliance with its mandate in Burma. The three missions in  2008, 2009, and 2010 concluded that UNDP’s program fully complied  with the mandate. In addition, UNDP has provided written assurance  to State each year to certify its compliance with the following U.S.  conditions: (1) UNDP’s work must focus on eliminating human  suffering and addressing the needs of the poor, while providing no  benefit to the Government of Burma, and (2) UNDP’s work must be  undertaken only through internal or international private voluntary  organizations independent of the Government of Burma and in  consultation with stakeholders, including the leadership of the  National League for Democracy and National Coalition Government of  the Union of Burma.
USAID also reported that NGOs established local offices in the delta  region to oversee operations, conducting site visits with local and  international staff. During our site visits with three implementing partners,  we observed field-level internal controls, which are designed to safeguard  funds. For example, several NGOs had cash transfer programs. To  address the risk that individuals could steal or misuse funds, the  organizations developed systems for documenting cash receipts and  disbursements and for ensuring physical control over funds. For example,  as illustrated in figure 6, one village we visited safeguarded cash by  establishing lock boxes that required four assigned villagers be present to  open—three key holders and the village president. Similar processes for  documenting cash receipts and disbursements and ensuring physical  controls were also utilized by other partners we examined. In addition,  each implementing partner used methods to encourage local oversight by  beneficiaries, such as forming local committees to make important  resource allocation decisions and distributing transparency flyers to  advertise the amount and recipients of delivered aid. In addition, one  partner hired young female villagers as bookkeepers because, according  to program officials, in this culture, Burmese villagers would more likely  be willing to ask young females questions, as opposed to older males.  Bookkeepers in two villages told us they had received several inquiries  into the bookkeeping and expenditures from fellow villagers.
USAID has also relied on UN and NGO partners’ required reports and  informal communication to monitor progress and keep informed of issues.  USAID required most NGO grantees to formally report to USAID  quarterly, with some required to report semiannually. USAID requires  UN partners to report based on standard guidelines in ADS for awards to  public international organizations.
USAID/OFDA and USAID/RDMA officials also communicated informally  with grantees in Bangkok and Rangoon. Even with this communication  and reporting, we found that USAID program staff still observed issues  requiring follow-up during the site visit to one grantee, reinforcing the  importance of USAID site visits. During our site visit, USAID staff  expressed concern about the way the grantee reported program results  and the possibility that the reports may not be fully accurate because the  local manager may be reluctant to raise issues or problems, given the  Burmese cultural norms which discourage providing negative information.  USAID staff told us that they will discuss this with the grantee and  possibly revise the information the grantee reports to help ensure  problems are identified.
section_title: U.S. and Other Organizations Found No Evidence of Misuse
paragraphs: USAID, State, UN, and international NGO officials said they examined all  reports of potential misuse of assistance within their programs and found  no evidence of misuse, although they did find that some beneficiaries sold  small amounts of materials. For example, a USAID official told us that a  beneficiary may sell an item, such as a USAID supplied tarp, he no longer  needs in order to buy items that he does need. However, USAID officials  told us this may not be a misuse of assistance as it still allows  beneficiaries to obtain goods they need. USAID and DOD officials said  they kept very detailed lists of all relief supplies provided. USAID said  they gave these lists to U.S. Embassy staff who used them in market  surveys. In these surveys, Embassy staff, including Burmese national  staff, monitored local markets in the delta and Rangoon for evidence that  U.S.-provided relief materials were being sold. USAID/OFDA officials also  reported that branding USAID-donated goods was important for  effectively monitoring assistance, as any diverted aid would be easily  identifiable.
In a highly publicized example of potential diversion of assistance, WFP  reported that during the first week of the Cyclone Nargis response, the  Burmese government airport authorities briefly took control of the  contents of two flights, including 38 tons of high energy biscuits, when  they landed. However, these contents were released to WFP the next day  after negotiations with the Ministry of Social Welfare.
section_title: Organizations Responding to Cyclone Nargis Experienced Similar Challenges and Developed Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Our analysis of 16 evaluative reports from NGOs, governments, and UN  agencies as well as interviews with U.S., UN, and NGO officials found  that organizations responding to Cyclone Nargis experienced similar  challenges in four main categories: access to affected populations,  coordination among responding organizations, implementation of  assistance, and in-country disaster response capacity. We also identified  some lessons learned to confront these, and other, challenges from these  organizations’ experiences in responding to Cyclone Nargis. In analyzing  the various challenges each organization reported facing in their  response to Cyclone Nargis, we developed the four main categories, as  well as several subcategories, to capture the similarities of challenges  reported and quantify the number of times each type of challenge was  reported. We then reviewed the lessons identified and selected those  relevant to the overall categories and subcategories. Not all responding  organizations faced the challenges reported or might find the lessons  applicable. (App. IV contains additional information on the challenges  and lessons learned, and app. V discusses U.S.-specific challenges.)
subsections: section_title: Restricted Access Delayed Response, Limited Coverage, and Complicated the Operating Environment
paragraphs: According to the reports we reviewed, restricted access and poor  infrastructure delayed assistance, limited coverage, and complicated  emergency response and recovery operations for some organizations in  Burma (see fig. 7). The most frequently cited challenge regarding  restricted access was obtaining travel authorizations from the Burmese  government, both to enter Burma and to travel around the country. The  Government of Burma initially restricted foreigners from entering into  Burma and required government issued authorizations for international  staff to travel within Burma. Consequently, the emergency relief and  humanitarian efforts became highly dependent on Burmese nationals and  international staff already in Burma. These responders were often  overworked and operated beyond their mandate or outside their areas of  expertise. In addition, responders faced poor roads and infrastructure and  high transportation costs. Many areas were only accessible by boat or by  air and, given the scarcity of boats, hiring them became very difficult and  air drops were too expensive. The reports we reviewed suggest that  similar access and infrastructure constraints call for creative approaches  to negotiating with the host country government and looking for ways to  modify normal operations, such as by bringing in national staff from other  countries and owning boats as opposed to trying to hire them in a market  experiencing shortages and inflated prices.
Our review found that coordination among donors was also problematic  (see fig. 8). Difficulties in communicating between headquarters in either  Bangkok or Rangoon and the field were the most commonly reported  coordination challenge. As a result, occasionally decisions made at  headquarters conflicted with those made in the field. Reports mentioned  the physical distance between the locations and the limited, and  unreliable, telecommunication services in the delta, as some of the  reasons contributing to the communication challenges. Reliable internet  access was generally lacking in the field, and the Burmese government  restricted the importation and use of communications equipment. Another  widely experienced challenge was gathering and sharing data among  responding organizations. Many reports noted that shared information  was often inaccurate, unreliable, and inconsistent. Some reports  attributed this challenge to factors such as mistrust among organizations,  poor information management practices of some groups, and a lack of  commonly used and readily available reporting mechanisms or common  databases accessible by all responding organizations. Lastly, USAID’s  after action report on the U.S. Cyclone Nargis Emergency Response cited  a challenge within the U.S. government of carrying out a coordinated  response. Conflicting agendas amongst USAID, DOD, and State officials  resulted in coordination difficulties related to the appropriateness, timing,  procurement, and distribution of aid. USAID officials reported that, while  their response was based on humanitarian needs, State and DOD also  had political motives which included engagement with the Burmese  government. As a result, USAID officials reported that DOD conducted  air lifts for a longer period of time than some USAID officials thought was  necessary, and in some cases provided aid that USAID considered  inappropriate. The lessons we identified emphasize the need for installing  common reporting formats for all organizations to use and improving  support to the field offices, including providing more resources such as  local information centers.
The reports we reviewed highlighted implementation challenges, including  the use of incompatible relief supplies, inappropriate targeting, and  inability to monitor (see fig. 9). Many reports cited examples of donated or  procured assistance supplies that were inferior in quality or incompatible  with local conditions, which limited their usefulness. Examples included  tents, which proved to be inappropriate given the delta’s hot and  humid conditions;    5-gallon water bottles, which were heavy and difficult to transport; and    medical supplies that had instructions printed only in non-Burmese  languages.
In addition, cultural norms and inadequate information about affected  populations complicated responders’ efforts to effectively target and  distribute aid. For example, some organizations based targeting decisions  on the level of need of individuals; however, Burmese culture values  fairness and equality, and as a result many villages would redistribute  supplies to ensure all villagers received something, thereby reducing the  efficacy of the organizations’ efforts to target the neediest with their aid.  Lastly, the lack of trained personnel in the field, the remoteness of certain  locations, or lack of government approval hindered robust monitoring and  evaluation mechanisms. Strategies reported to improve effectiveness of  implementation included engaging with local beneficiaries to involve them  in the development of procurement, targeting, and distribution strategies.
Our review found that limited emergency preparedness and response  capacity in Burma exacerbated the impact of the disaster and hindered  efforts throughout the response (see fig. 10). One of the most frequently  cited capacity challenges was the inability to meet the high demand for  technical, skilled, and experienced disaster responders. The number of  staff in Burma experienced or trained in disaster relief was below what  was needed. As a result, some positions had to be filled with personnel  that had no previous experience and limited knowledge of humanitarian  response principles, which caused delays or difficulties in carrying out the  response. Also, many organizations described their interaction with local  organizations in coordinated response activities as limited due to  Burmese political, cultural, or capacity factors. These factors included  language and cultural barriers, lack of access to electronically shared  information, limited modes of transportation, and insufficient time and staff  to attend coordination meetings. In addition, the response to Cyclone  Nargis was hampered by weak early warning systems and disaster  preparedness plans in Burma, as well as among international  organizations. Lastly, emergency supply stocks and prepositioned food  supplies were lacking within the country. Responders cited the  improvement of in-country emergency preparedness and response  capacity through personnel training and local engagement as critical.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In response to the urgent humanitarian needs in Burma resulting from  Cyclone Nargis, the U.S. government has obligated about $85 million for  emergency response and recovery activities under difficult conditions  stemming from political concerns and operational constraints. USAID has  taken actions to monitor its assistance and ensure funds have been used  as intended and did not benefit sanctioned entities. Given USAID’s limited  ability to visit project sites in Burma, actions such as conducting more  comprehensive financial oversight, documenting site visits, and  communicating past audit findings become even more important to help  ensure funds are used for intended purposes. The fact that single audit  reports are issued several months after the end of an entity’s fiscal year,  further supports the need for current, on-going financial monitoring.  Periodic reviews of grantee internal controls together with a review of  some of the grantee’s disbursement transactions and supporting  documentation would strengthen USAID’s financial oversight and help  ensure compliance with the terms of the grant agreements, including  compliance with international travel requirements. Reviewing  questionable costs for international travel under the completed and  ongoing grants could enable USAID to recover any costs that USAID  determines to be unallowable. Documenting site visits, as required by  USAID policy, provides a record that can be particularly useful when  program staff change. By including relevant and sufficient detail, these  documents create a historical record on which future monitoring and grant  award decisions can be based. Finally, better communication of single  audit findings among the USAID offices would ensure that program staff  become aware of important issues they should pursue when monitoring  assistance.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Administrator of USAID direct the appropriate  mission and offices to improve management of grants related to Burma  by taking actions, such as:    enhancing financial monitoring of agreements by including periodic  reviews of grantee internal controls, transactions, and disbursement  records;    providing grantees with specific guidance on the approval process for  international travel requests, and ensuring that USAID staff monitor  grantees’ expenditures for compliance with related laws, regulations,  and grant agreements, including international travel;  reinforcing the requirement for staff to formally document site visits to  grantees; and    ensuring all relevant offices are made aware of audit findings in a  timely manner.
We also recommend that the Administrator of USAID direct the  appropriate mission and offices to follow-up on the questionable costs  associated with international travel that we identified in this report and  take action as appropriate on any identified unallowable costs.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: USAID and DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. We  have reprinted their comments in appendixes VI and VII. These agencies,  along with the Departments of State and the Treasury and the UN  Country Team in Burma, provided technical comments and updated  information, which we have incorporated throughout this report, as  appropriate.
USAID, the agency to which we directed our recommendations,  concurred with our recommendations. USAID said that financial  monitoring is critical and that financial reviews should be enhanced as  allowable given regulatory and operational limitations. They also said that  existing guidance in USAID awards should be adhered to and enforced  and USAID’s ability to conduct preawards surveys and timely audits  should be enhanced. USAID also recognized the importance of  documenting oversight while noting that in disaster response  environments, the main focus is on life-saving and life-sustaining  activities. USAID agreed that relevant offices and officials should be  aware of adverse audit information given their monitoring responsibilities.  USAID also agreed to conduct appropriate follow-up actions with the  grantees on questionable costs associated with international travel that  we identified. In addition, USAID commented on our characterization of  their actions to ensure funds were used as intended, as well as the  evidence that assistance had not been misused. We made changes  consistent with the information we obtained.
We are sending copies of this report to interested members of Congress;  the Administrator of USAID; the Secretaries of Defense, State, and the  Treasury; the UN Country Team in Burma; and relevant NGOs. The  report is also available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
subsections: section_title: UN and U.S. Assistance
paragraphs: To describe assistance provided by UN and U.S. agencies in response to  Cyclone Nargis, we reviewed documents, including grants, cooperative  agreements, and progress reports, from UN agencies, the U.S. Agency  for International Development (USAID), Department of Defense (DOD),  Department of State (State), and nongovernmental organizations (NGO).  We also interviewed United Nations (UN), U.S., and NGO officials in  Washington, D.C.; Bangkok, Thailand; and Rangoon, Burma; and  conducted site visits to select USAID-funded recovery projects in Burma.
The team obtained the data for UN agency assistance to Burma from the  UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)  Financial Tracking Service. We report UN agency obligations. In  assessing this data we found that the service data are reported by donors  and appealing organizations. UN OCHA reported that they cross-check  and reconcile the data to ensure there is no duplicate reporting of funding  and to verify the accuracy of the numbers reported.
The tracking service makes efforts to collect and report all humanitarian  assistance. However, the service guarantees only that suitable  humanitarian funding information sent to it will be posted; it cannot  guarantee that it will find and record information not sent to it. Given this  limitation, it is possible that we may have underreported total assistance  obligated through UN agencies. Overall, through our review of UN OCHA  procedures for capturing and reporting the data, we found the data  sufficiently reliable to report on obligations as compiled by UN OCHA.
We obtained data on U.S. obligations from USAID and DOD. For USAID  obligations, we verified these data against the underlying agreements and  found the data to be sufficiently reliable to report on total assistance  obligated by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Regional  Development Mission for Asia, and Food for Peace. For DOD obligations,  we interviewed officials on their process for recording and reconciling  expenses and found the total amount of assistance reported by DOD to  be sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
section_title: Actions to Help Ensure Funds Were Used as Intended
paragraphs: To assess USAID actions to help ensure funds were used as intended  and did not benefit sanctioned entities, we reviewed program and  financial files for funds USAID awarded in response to Cyclone Nargis  and spoke with USAID officials about their monitoring of programs. The  documents we reviewed included grants and cooperative agreements  awarded for Cyclone Nargis response activities, progress reports, and  Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control licenses. We  also conducted a limited internal controls review of three NGOs, which  collectively account for 66 percent of funding that USAID awarded to  international NGOs to respond to Cyclone Nargis. We also met with  officials from these three NGOs and with USAID officials responsible for  financial oversight of the NGOs’ programs.
In choosing the three NGOs to review, we selected those organizations  that had ongoing recovery activities in response to Cyclone Nargis, in  addition to having conducted emergency response and relief activities.  This risk-based approach to grantee selection allowed us to examine the  evolution of oversight by USAID from the immediate aftermath of Cyclone  Nargis to the current recovery phase, more than 2 years later. The three  organizations that met these criteria received multiple USAID awards  beginning in 2008 to conduct emergency relief operations, such as  distribution of commodities, as well as to conduct recovery work, such as  rehabilitating markets and reconstructing sanitation facilities.
For our limited internal controls review of these three NGOs, we  interviewed grantee officials, reviewed single audit reports; and performed  detailed reviews of transactions. We also tested certain grantee  expenditures. We reviewed supporting documentation for selected  grantee expenditures for sufficiency, compliance with laws, regulations,  and grant agreements, as well as appropriateness. While we identified  some questionable expenditures, our work was not designed to identify all  improper or questionable expenditures or to estimate their extent.
section_title: Challenges and Lessons Learned
paragraphs: To report on the challenges and lessons learned from the Cyclone Nargis  emergency response, we reviewed relevant evaluative reports from U.S.  government and UN agencies, and NGOs involved in the response. We  selected 16 reports for content analysis based on their methodology.  Specifically, the reports needed to outline reasonable methods for  collecting data—such as surveys and interviews with responders—and a  process for filtering this information prior to reporting.
The reports offer a range of scope and content. While some reports  evaluate a specific organizational response, others include the efforts of  and information from several organizations. Some reports focus on the  early months of the response, while others evaluate efforts up to almost  two years after the onset of the emergency. Table 1 lists the reports we  included in our review.
Once we selected reports that met the above criteria, two analysts  separately identified challenges and lessons learned cited within each  document. We defined “challenge” as any significant obstacle that  hindered a specific response effort. We defined “lesson learned” as any  successful or promising approach derived from a Cyclone Nargis  response that could enable actors to overcome challenges or improve  efforts in future emergencies. Furthermore, a “lesson” must be derived  from a common or well-proven response experience and address  Burma’s unique political, social, or environmental circumstances. After the  two analysts independently identified reported challenges and lessons  based on these criteria, they compared the results and reconciled  inconsistencies. A supervisory analyst reviewed their work.
We also gathered information on challenges and lessons from interviews  with the previously mentioned responding organizations. We used this  input to substantiate data gained from the document review, as well as  supplement it with information that was not previously reported. For  reporting purposes, once all the challenges were identified, we tallied  each under broad categories and subcategories that summarized the  similarities amongst the various challenges being reported. These  categories and subcategories were developed by us based on an  analysis of the challenges identified as well as our experience from  previous disaster assistance work. Similarly, we reviewed the lessons we  identified from the various reports and selected relevant lessons that  address the subcategories of challenges we identified. Not all responding  organizations faced the challenges reported or might find the lessons  applicable. We did not assess the feasibility of implementing the lessons  learned.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 to July 2011 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Mission Descriptions of the UN Agencies That Responded to Cyclone Nargis
paragraphs: Table 2 describes the overall mission of each UN agency that provided  aid after Cyclone Nargis, as depicted in figure 3.
section_title: Appendix III: U.S. Emergency Assistance Provided to Burma in Response to Cyclone Nargis
paragraphs: The U.S. government funded emergency humanitarian assistance for  townships in Burma damaged by Cyclone Nargis. As shown in figure 11,  the townships of Bogale, Labutta, and Mawlamyinegyun received the  most extensive range of assistance, covering at least five of the seven  relief sectors the U.S. funded.
section_title: Appendix IV: Organizations Responding to Cyclone Nargis Experienced Interconnected Challenges and Developed Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Our analysis of 16 evaluative reports from NGOs, governments, and UN  agencies found that organizations responding to Cyclone Nargis  experienced interconnected challenges and developed lessons learned in  four categories: access to affected populations, coordination among  responding organizations, implementation of assistance, and in-country  capacity. In analyzing the various challenges each organization reported  facing in their response to Cyclone Nargis, we developed the four main  categories, as well as several subcategories, to capture the similarities of  challenges reported and quantify the number of times each type of  challenge was reported. We then reviewed the lessons identified and  selected those relevant to the overall categories and subcategories. Not  all responding organizations faced the challenges reported or might find  the lessons applicable.
subsections: section_title: Restricted Access Delayed Response, Limited Coverage, and Complicated the Operating Environment
paragraphs: According to 13 reports, the time needed to gain access to affected  populations delayed assistance and complicated logistics. The  Government of Burma restricted foreigners from entering into and  traveling within Burma. Furthermore, many responders had to negotiate  with government authorities to operate in affected areas. Consequently,  the response became highly dependent on nationals and those already in  Burma. These responders and others who gained access were often  overworked and operated beyond their mandate or outside their  expertise.
Eight reports described transportation obstacles as further restricting  access. Responders faced poor roads and infrastructure, high  transportation costs, difficult climatic conditions, and remote affected  areas.
Only one report cited the challenge of donor imposed restrictions, which  prevented access to local authorities, limiting meaningful coordination and  capacity-building. This challenge was, however, cited in several  interviews with implementing partners. Some partners described  restricted access to health workers, teachers, and technical experts as  particularly cumbersome. One UN Development Program (UNDP) official  stated that U.S. restrictions significantly hindered the effectiveness of its  development work in Burma. The inability to coordinate with Burmese  government officials created difficulties for the USAID disaster assistance  response team, one Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA)  official said.
The analyzed reports suggest that similar restricted situations call for  creative approaches to negotiating with the Government of Burma and  operational flexibility, such as the following:    According to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),  the Tripartite Core Group was “an innovative example of a body that  ASEAN and other regional associations around the world could  replicate in response to future emergencies.”    According to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), although they  generally experienced good working relationships with the  Government of Burma, some negotiations were necessary.  Discussions to gain access required skilled negotiation with support  from Burmese nationals. UNICEF brought in their Burmese staff  working in other country offices because they did not require entry  visas and internal travel permits, whereas their foreign counterparts  did.
If a similar situation arises, the Protection of Children and Women  Cluster recommends exploring alternative coordination methods to  engage local actors that do not have Burmese government  authorization to operate, without putting them at risk. For example,  during the Cyclone Nargis response UNICEF was the only  organization with a formal agreement with the Ministry of Education to  carry out emergency education activities. The UN agency included  other relevant actors in education activities through the cluster  system.    According to one NGO, the cluster system was initially effective in  organizing responders, but geographical (rather than sectoral)  clusters would have been more appropriate, given the restrictions on  access and the inability of some organizations to reach affected  populations.    Boats and helicopters helped to overcome ground transportation  obstacles and reach remote villages. However, boats were in scarce  supply and difficult to hire. For more effective future responses, one  report suggests that organizations could own or rent boats on a  monthly basis.
section_title: Complex and Poorly Managed Coordination Resulted in Disjointed Response Efforts
paragraphs: Coordination was somewhat difficult between headquarters (either in  Bangkok or Rangoon) and provisional field offices, according to 12  reports. Problems stemmed from limited telecommunication services, the  isolation of and weak leadership at field offices, unclear division of  responsibility between headquarters and the field, and poor  understanding of how information should be communicated from the field  back to headquarters.
Ten reports described poor information management and issues related  to data gathering as obstacles to coordinating, planning, or monitoring.  Difficulties stemmed from limited baseline data on affected populations at  the onset of the emergency, weak assessment structures and capacities,  and the restrictive political context. These problems were exacerbated by  some organizations’ hesitancy to share information and a lack of  commonly used and readily available formats and databases for data  exchange. Many reports noted that shared information among responding  organizations was often inaccurate, unreliable, and inconsistent.  Communication among responders was also hindered by limited  telecommunications (radio, telephone, and Internet services) and  government restrictions on the importation and use of certain  communication equipment. Internet access at field locations was  particularly problematic.
Six reports found that coordination among international humanitarian  organizations lacked coherence. These reports cited reasons such as  high turnover of cluster leadership, weak strategic planning and guidance,  and poor coordination of assessment and distribution activities.
The lessons we identified below emphasize the need for clearer guidance  on responsibility, increased support for field staff, and common reporting  formats:    Coordination of future response activities could be improved with the  use of statements of intent that clearly define each actor’s role.    The Emergency Shelter Cluster Review advocated for the replication  of the “Bangkok-Yangon decision-making model” in similar emergency  events, in which those outside the country provide logistical support  and field offices have decision-making authority over operational  matters.    According to ASEAN, field offices were “indispensable” in providing  strategic direction and facilitating coordination. To improve  coordination between the field and headquarters, one report  recommends establishing local resource centers and NGO liaison  officers at field locations. Another report noted that increasing  visitation and technical advising from Rangoon to the field would be  helpful.    Analyzed reports described the Myanmar Information Management  Unit and cluster managed resources—including update documents,  Google Group networks, and maps—as useful approaches to  information management. However, the responsibilities of cluster  information managers need to be expanded, including increasing  coordination with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian  Affairs reports officer and the UN Communications Group.    Reports described the need for common reporting templates and  information management tools to improve the consistency and  reliability of shared information.
section_title: Some Decisions Based on Limited Information and Burma’s Unique Constraints Hindered Implementation Effectiveness
paragraphs: Some shortsighted decisions by responders and Burma’s highly  restrictive operating environment hindered the effectiveness of some  response activities. Ten reports cited examples of assistance supplies  that were inferior in quality or incompatible with local conditions, which  limited their usefulness. Examples included tents, food, water treatment  and filtration systems, information technology equipment, building  materials, and fishing boats. Multiple reports and interviews identified  U.S.-donated bottled water, tarpaulins, and medical supplies as  particularly problematic. For example, DOD-procured water bottles were  heavy and difficult to transport and medical supplies had instructions  printed in non-Burmese languages. Generic packages, such as the Red  Cross’s shelter toolkit and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s  fishing gear, needed revision to meet the needs of local practices.  Multiple reports credited local dissatisfaction of some aid commodities to  poor participatory consultation and limited local procurement.
According to 10 reports, effective targeting and distribution of assistance  was obstructed by political, logistical, or organizational capacity factors.  Inadequate information about affected populations, logistical obstacles in  reaching remote areas, and time and staff constraints complicated  responders’ efforts. The Burmese practice of redistribution within  communities limited the efficacy of targeting: many Burmese communities  would decide who received aid based on principles of fairness rather than  need. Carrying out protection programs was also challenging in Burma,  given the political sensitivity associated with individual rights. The  Protection of Women and Children Cluster found it difficult to advocate for  the inclusion of women and children in high-level strategy and planning.
Coordinating the transition between relief and early recovery activities  was also problematic. Donors’ focus on food and water distribution in the  first months of the emergency delayed the initiation of and support for  livelihood and economic recovery activities. According to UNDP, failing to  target “medium to big farmers” exacerbated unemployment among the  landless poor who depended on farmers for income. Interviews we  conducted with NGOs confirmed weaknesses in livelihood responses, but  also highlighted the same for shelter recovery.
Six reports found that procuring commodities in Burma was difficult due to  factors such as inadequate supply and quality, lack of registered  suppliers, and government-controlled supply chains. Implementing  partners also told us the restricted banking system was a challenge,  along with a declining exchange rate (with respect to the dollar), which  made materials more expensive. Contrastingly, international procurement  was costly and subject to Burmese government restrictions and approval.  An interview revealed that USAID’s food aid shipped from the United  States took up to 3 to 5 months to reach Burma.
Monitoring, evaluation, and oversight mechanisms were limited in Burma.  Three reports cite such contributing factors as the overall restrictive  environment, remoteness of affected areas, inadequate staff capacity,  and limited resources of local authorities. In one interview, an  implementing partner explained that Burmese staff are reluctant to report  bad news, which is an obstacle to reporting fraud or misuse.
The analyzed reports presented various strategies to improve the  effectiveness of assistance through specific implementation efforts, such  as the following:    Reports described local procurement, incorporation of traditional  practices and robust local engagement as strongly contributing to  beneficiaries’ satisfaction with assistance. UNICEF’s water, sanitation,  and hygiene division balanced this goal with the need to respond  quickly by importing expensive goods only while local, low-cost  solutions were being created. Reports cited rainwater harvesting,  ceramic water filters, and earthenware water storage as successful  local solutions. The Red Cross found that bamboo and timber shelter  kits were better accepted than generic versions. With regard to fishing  gear kits, FAO recommends supplying materials that can be used by  beneficiaries to construct gear to meet their own requirements.  Furthermore, nonlocal varieties of seed and livestock should only be  distributed if local counterparts are not available. Because tents are  inappropriate in Burma, UNICEF recommends developing and  propositioning a “semi-permanent school kit” or temporary spaces that  could be used as schools capable of withstanding the Burmese  climate.    Economic recovery should be identified and initiated as soon as  possible after a disaster, with improved coordination of livelihood  strategies between the Agriculture and Early Recovery Clusters.  According to Save the Children, cash distribution and in-kind grants,  such as those distributed through their Livelihood Quick Impact  Project, were effective in promoting early recovery. In situations where  markets were functioning, UNDP found that cash grants and cash-for- work were more effective than in-kind assistance.    Targeting efforts should factor in the Burmese tradition of equity that  underlines redistribution. FAO recommends engaging communities in  discussions of aid and allowing them to decide how it should be  distributed in a transparent way.    The Protection of Children and Women Cluster Review describes the  established Vulnerability Network as a creative response to the  challenging operating environment in Burma prior to Cyclone Nargis  but also states the need for a broader protection cluster to address  remaining protection gaps.    Analyzed reports also emphasized the need for improved  procurement resources and processes, such as local market  assessments, “preferred supplier” relationships for key commodities,  and joint buying agreements. One report stated that a scheme like  World Concern’s Joint Procurement Initiative is potentially useful but  only if initiated at the onset of the emergency.    Technical field officer positions helped facilitate monitoring and  interaction with implementing partners during the Cyclone Nargis  response. One report recommends further building community-level  capacity for monitoring. UNDP claims that at this level “diverse and  representative membership,” robust accountability systems, and a  culture of transparency are essential to preventing mismanagement of  assistance. In an interview, one USAID official stated that clear  branding of donated goods was the key to effective monitoring in  Burma.
section_title: Limited In-Country Capacity and Preparedness Exacerbated the Impact and Hindered Response Efforts
paragraphs: According to 13 reports, a limited number of experienced personnel and  technical specialists in-country had difficulty meeting all response needs.  The inexperience of some cluster coordinators created delays and  complications in the field. While local responders were generally better  accepted by local citizens and government authorities, they generally had  limited capacity and experience.
Seven reports describe local engagement in coordinated response  activities as limited, due to Burmese political, cultural, or capacity factors.  These factors included language and cultural barriers, lack of access to  electronically shared information, limited modes of transportation, and  inadequate time and staff to attend cluster meetings. Local responders  without formal operating agreements with the Government of Burma often  censored their input, which limited participation at cluster meetings.  International organizations noted time pressure, limited access to affected  populations, and lack of confidence in local capacity as obstacles to  engaging local actors.
The response to Cyclone Nargis was also hampered by weak early  warning systems and disaster preparedness plans at all levels—local,  national, and among international organizations. In addition, emergency  supply stocks and prepositioned food supplies were lacking within the  country.
Responders cited the improvement of in-country emergency  preparedness and response capacity through personnel training and local  engagement as critical. The following are recommendations culled from  the reports that we analyzed.    Many reports emphasize the need to build local capacity and better  incorporate national actors into contingency planning and cluster  activities. Standby arrangements with skilled personnel with  humanitarian and remote management experience could be  established by organizations operating in Burma. This should include  a roster of local actors involved in the Cyclone Nargis emergency  response who receive capacity training that is updated periodically  over the long-term. One report recommends prioritizing local capacity- building in areas now under the responsibility of expatriates.    Recommended strategies to improve local engagement included:  training facilitated through learning resource centers in the field;  appointing local counterparts for cluster leadership, such as  information managers; providing Burmese translation at cluster  meetings and for key documents; and developing alternatives to  electronic information sharing. Engaging and gaining the buy-in of  local authorities and other government actors (i.e., medical,  education, and development affairs officers) is also key to facilitating  local participation.    A database of in-country information technology and communications  support, suppliers, warehousing, and transportation providers would  also be helpful.    One implementing partner said that prepositioning relief supplies was  essential, and noted the usefulness of doing so before Cyclone Giri hit  Burma in 2010. The partner further suggested establishing reserve  warehouses in Southeast Asia.
section_title: Appendix V: U.S. Agencies Experienced Challenges and Developed Lessons Learned in Responding to Cyclone Nargis
paragraphs: In responding to Cyclone Nargis, U.S. agencies experienced numerous  challenges including Burmese restrictions on access to affected areas;  U.S. legal restrictions; and difficulties coordinating, planning, and staffing  activities. USAID issued recommendations to address the lessons  learned from many of these challenges.
subsections: section_title: Burmese Government Travel Restrictions Constrained the U.S. Response
paragraphs: U.S. officials said Burmese government restrictions that limited their entry  into Burma and access to Cyclone Nargis-affected areas constrained their  response, limited their ability to assess needs, and made it difficult to  monitor aid delivery. The Burmese government granted visas to disaster  assistance response team members slowly and incrementally; with only 7  of 10 team members eventually granted visas.
Once in Burma, the team faced various travel restrictions and  administrative barriers to providing relief, according to a team official. The  official stated that he had to notify the Burmese government 4 days ahead  of time to receive their approval for a flight carrying relief commodities to  land. He also had to provide a manifest of the commodities and persons  on board four days in advance and to work with local partners to ensure  they would be available to offload the supplies as the airplanes landed.  Further, the Burmese government sometimes denied travel permits for  USAID and other officials and set up numerous checkpoints in the early  days of the response. The team also had to tap a wider breadth of  resources to assess the extent of damage and need for supplies. USAID  officials said that obtaining permission to travel to the Cyclone Nargis- affected areas remains difficult. They said that while the Burmese  government typically grants access, the level of uncertainty surrounding  when they will grant the access makes it difficult to monitor aid delivery on  short-term notice, limits the number of site visits they make, and  precludes them from properly planning monitoring visits. These officials  said they would like to visit Burma and project sites whenever they want  to monitor implementation.
section_title: U.S. Restrictions Limit Work with Burmese Government
paragraphs: USAID officials also said that U.S. restrictions limiting their ability to work  with the Burmese government made it difficult to coordinate U.S.  response and recovery activities. USAID/OFDA officials told us that  typically the disaster assistance response team is able to work with the  national government to coordinate a response. This was not the case in  Burma and it created difficulties for the team. USAID officials told us that  the restrictions on whom the United States can work with were a  significant constraint and made it difficult to develop recovery programs.  For example, in many villages midwives (who are government  employees) are the only source of healthcare; therefore, not working with  them makes it very difficult to improve health conditions in these villages.  Some of USAID’s implementing partners, including UNDP, said this  constraint limited the effectiveness of their programs, especially in the  areas of health and emergency preparedness, as they were not able to  engage with key personnel. Some partners described restricted access to  health workers, teachers, and technical experts as particularly limiting  given the importance these officials have in their sectors. One NGO cited  a reluctance to accept USAID funding given the constraints it would place  on that organization’s activities.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Struggled to Coordinate their Cyclone Nargis Response
paragraphs: USAID’s after action report and our interviews with U.S. government  officials revealed that U.S. agencies struggled to carry out a “whole of  government” response. USAID said that while their response was based  on humanitarian needs, State and DOD also had political motives which  included engagement with the Burmese government. Conflicting  agendas resulted in coordination difficulties related to the  appropriateness, timing, procurement, and distribution of aid. One  USAID/OFDA official reported that once U.S. and international  responders were allowed into Burma, competing priorities among U.S.  agencies strained the response to Cyclone Nargis. USAID officials stated  that in their opinion, DOD did not procure the commodities needed in  Burma. For example, a company in Thailand produces mosquito nets that  meet international standards. USAID asked DOD to buy nets from this  provider. DOD originally agreed to do this but then later denied the  request. They stated that the nets were not dense enough to fill the  airplanes to capacity. Instead DOD provided items such as 5-gallon water  bottles, which USAID stated are inappropriate for a number of reasons,  including that people cannot transport them easily. The USAID officials  stated that it was clear that DOD had different goals than USAID in  providing assistance to Burma. A DOD official reported that all decisions  on goods transported were made after consultations with DOD, State,  and USAID officials. A State official reported having significant input on  the decision to provide 5-gallon water bottles, as these goods had little  risk of being misused.
USAID/OFDA officials told us that three USAID teams had to  communicate effectively to conduct USAID’s response—the response  management team in Washington, D.C.; USAID/OFDA in Bangkok,  Thailand; and disaster assistance response team in Burma—complicating  communication efforts. USAID’s after action report also cited numerous  challenges related to information management. These included difficulty  in communicating with the disaster assistance response team due to  geography, limited available communication systems, and a lack of  systematic reporting. The report also cited difficulty in tracking  commodities because USAID/OFDA headquarters and the assistance  response team used different tracking systems. USAID/OFDA  headquarters used the standard USAID tracking tools, while the  assistance response team had to use DOD tracking mechanisms.
As part of their after action report, USAID/OFDA issued numerous priority  recommendations to address their communication and coordination  challenges. For example, the report recommended developing a  standardized commodity tracking system and setting up email accounts  by position, not person to address challenges related to managing  information. It also recommended developing an overall outreach strategy  to raise USAID/OFDA’s visibility and get information on USAID/OFDA’s  mandate, mission, and role as lead federal agency for foreign disaster  response to key decision makers in other agencies, Congress, and  partners in part to address the challenge of coordinating with DOD.  USAID/OFDA reported that as of July 2011, it had implemented or was  implementing each of these recommendations. For example,  USAID/OFDA designed and implemented a formal in-kind grant  agreement to facilitate better commodity tracking. In addition,  USAID/OFDA is working on a video and resource kit for USAID/OFDA  regional advisors and team leaders to use with senior U.S. officials in  disaster-affected countries.
section_title: USAID’s Planning of Assistance Delivery was Problematic
paragraphs: U.S. agencies reported challenges related to the planning and delivery of  assistance as well. According to USAID’s after action report, planning  processes and products recently instituted for better response decision  making were not well understood and did not meet needs. Some  respondents noted a disconnect between planning and the flow of day-to- day work. Others noted difficulty understanding the purpose and timing of  the Response Action Plan, a key planning document, stating that other  tools were developed to track pending actions. Recommendations to  address these challenges included a system for tracking day-to-day tasks  in the planning process that may change more frequently than the  response plan. Also it was recommended that USAID/OFDA’s senior  management team define the goal for the first response action plan in the  disaster assistance response team activation meeting. Subsequent goals  should be defined in the planning meetings and conference calls. As of  July 2011, USAID reported that it had implemented these  recommendations.
section_title: USAID Experienced Staffing Difficulties in Responding to Cyclone Nargis
paragraphs: U.S. agencies also experienced staffing difficulties in responding to  Cyclone Nargis. USAID’s after action report stated that staffing of  response management teams and disaster assistance response teams  were inconsistent and in some cases inadequate for the mission. Staffing  seemed inequitable among the necessary field functions—over staffing  some sectors, such as military liaison, and under staffing other important  sectors, such as logistics. Also, USAID did not always follow staffing  guidelines in response management policy and procedures, such as  assigning staff with the necessary skills. Finally, due to the high demand  for the limited number of specialists with specific needed skills, such as  health and shelter, USAID/OFDA had difficulty finding technical  specialists to meet all field needs. As a result, USAID/OFDA reported not  having sufficient representation within all relevant sectors in the UN  clusters, including the water, sanitation, and hygiene; shelter; and health  clusters.
USAID developed the following recommendations to address the staffing  challenges:    The disaster assistance response team staffing process must be  strategic, systematic, and deliberate. The team should drive field  staffing requirements.    USAID/OFDA should seek to expand the number of technical  specialists available for field assignments at both the strategic and  operational levels. Technical input within the UN cluster process must  be early in order to influence the overall direction of the response.    To the extent possible, USAID/OFDA should not put technical people  in nontechnical roles, because it further reduces the number of  available specialists when needed.
USAID reported that as of July 2011, it had implemented the first  recommendation on the staffing process and was working on the other  two recommendations. They stated that USAID/OFDA has worked  aggressively to supplement staffing in key technical functions. This effort  has included adding full time staff in areas such as health, nutrition, and  shelter.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We acknowledge that USAID faced numerous constraints in  conducting monitoring, and we recommend steps USAID can take to  enhance oversight.  We deleted the word “some”  from before   “actions.” Regarding the statement in our draft report that “U.S. and  UN agencies said that they found little evidence that assistance had  been misused,” USAID said no misuse of resources has been  encountered.  They requested that we change the word “little” to “no”,  which we have done consistent with the information we obtained.   They suggested we report that “there is no evidence that United  States Government (USG) resources went to sanctioned entities”;  however, this conclusion is beyond the scope of our report.    2.  USAID requested we clarify that, with the exception of international  travel, we found no evidence of expenditures not compliant with  related laws, regulations, and grant agreements in USAID programs in  Burma.  Our report discusses the questionable costs we identified  from the selected transactions we reviewed.  Our work should not be  generalized to cover all USAID expenditures.
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Cheryl Goodman, Assistant Director; Michael Maslowski; Bonnie Derby;  Ranya Elias; Elizabeth Guran; Kimberly McGatlin; Susan Ragland; Kai  Carter; Ashley Alley; Sada Aksartova; David Dayton; Martin de Alteriis;  Lauren Fassler; Will Horton; Etana Finkler; and Jena Sinkfield made key  contributions to this report.