Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs Consistent Policies and Clear Processes to Address the Survivability of Weapon Systems Against Chemical and Biological Threats
Published: 2006-04-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The possibility that an adversary may use chemical or biological weapons against U.S. forces makes it important for a weapon system to be able to survive such attacks. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress mandated that the Department of Defense submit a plan to address weapon system chemical and biological survivability by February 28, 2005. This plan was to include developing a centralized database with information about the effects of chemical and biological agents on materials used in weapon systems. DOD did not submit its plan as mandated. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the extent to which DOD addresses weapon system chemical and biological survivability during the acquisition process, and (2) DOD's internal controls for maintaining a comprehensive database that includes chemical and biological survivability research and test data for weapon system design and development.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The extent to which chemical and biological survivability is considered in the weapon system acquisition process is mixed and varied. Although DOD strategic guidance and policy has emphasized the growing threat of an adversary's use of chemical and biological weapons for over a decade, DOD, joint, and military service weapon system acquisition policies are inconsistent and do not establish a clear process for considering and testing system chemical and biological survivability. To assess the extent DOD addresses chemical and biological survivability during the acquisition process, GAO conducted a non probability sample of nine major weapon systems based on high dollar value, whether the system was a joint program, and risk of exposure to chemical and biological weapons. Because DOD and joint acquisition policies do not require that survivability be specifically addressed, the military services have developed their own varying and unique policies. Thus, for the nine weapon systems GAO reviewed, the program offices involved made individual survivability decisions, resulting in inconsistent survivability consideration and testing. In the absence of DOD requirements, program offices also inconsistently document their decisions regarding how they consider and test chemical and biological survivability. Furthermore, DOD policies do not establish a clear process for responsibility, authority, and oversight for monitoring program office decisions regarding chemical and biological survivability. Without establishing consistent policies requiring that chemical and biological survivability be considered during weapon system acquisition, and a clear process for doing so, military planners and commanders are likely to face varying weapon system performance, availability, and interoperability issues. These could negatively affect system availability in a contaminated environment and limit DOD's ability to identify risk and ensure that appropriate decisions are made. DOD, through its Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), maintains a centralized database for science and technology information that could facilitate program offices' consideration of weapon system chemical and biological survivability, but the comprehensiveness of this database is unknown due to inadequate internal controls. It is unlikely that the DTIC database contains fully comprehensive information about this for three reasons. First, it is unclear whether this information is covered by the broad DOD policy directing that scientific and technical information be submitted to DTIC. Second, there is no established process for submitting scientific and technical information to DTIC. As a result, it is submitted to DTIC through the ad hoc actions of individual personnel and organizations, and some DOD officials expressed concern that not all information is being submitted to DTIC. Third, no office or organization in DOD has been given clear oversight responsibility to ensure that information is submitted to DTIC. The lack of a database with comprehensive information about weapon system chemical and biological survivability creates the risk of unnecessary expenditures on duplicative testing.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that an adversary may use  chemical or biological weapons against U.S. forces to respond to our  superior conventional warfare capabilities and potentially gain an  advantage on the battlefield. This increases the importance of considering  a weapon system’s ability to survive chemical and biological attacks as part  of its design and development. DOD’s investment of billions of dollars in  modern weapon systems makes it critical that equipment can continue to  operate after a battlefield is contaminated and can be reused after  undergoing decontamination procedures.
DOD and service policies consider chemical and biological survivability to  be the capability of a system and its crew to withstand a chemically or  biologically contaminated environment without losing the ability to  accomplish the assigned mission. This capability includes a weapon  system’s ability to withstand chemical or biological decontamination, a  process that may itself be caustic, corrosive, or otherwise harmful to the  system. Throughout this report, we will refer to this issue as weapon  system chemical and biological survivability.
This report updates aspects of our prior work and is intended to help  facilitate DOD’s efforts to address chemical and biological survivability in  its weapon system acquisition process. Both GAO’s and DOD’s Inspectors  General have previously reported on problems regarding this aspect of  weapon system acquisition. For example, in 2003 we reported that DOD  had not developed a systematic approach for ensuring that the services  appropriately incorporate chemical and biological survivability into  weapon system design and testing. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress mandated that DOD submit a plan for  addressing such survivability by February 28, 2005. This plan was to  include development of a centralized database containing comprehensive  information about the effects of chemical and biological agents and  contaminants on the materials used in weapon systems. In addition, the  Senate Armed Services Committee directed that we evaluate DOD’s plan  and report our findings to Congress within 180 days of the plan’s  submission. As of April 3, 2006, DOD has not submitted the mandated plan.  On August 2, 2005, DOD provided Congress with an interim report in partial  response to the congressional mandate. The interim report indicated that  DOD may not fully address the mandate until the end of fiscal year 2007. In  anticipation of receiving DOD’s plan and to provide a foundation for our  review you asked us to examine DOD’s existing policies and processes for  considering chemical and biological survivability of weapon systems, and  to assess the status of DOD’s efforts to create a centralized chemical and  biological effects database. Our objectives were to evaluate (1) the extent  to which DOD addresses weapon system chemical and biological  survivability during the acquisition process, and (2) DOD’s internal controls  for maintaining a comprehensive database that includes chemical and  biological survivability research and test data for weapon system design  and development.
To examine the extent to which DOD addresses weapon system chemical  and biological survivability during the acquisition process, we reviewed  DOD, joint staff, and service policies, guidance, and procedures and  obtained documentation and interviewed officials throughout DOD and at  program offices from a non probability sample of nine major weapon  systems based on several factors including (1) high dollar value   (2) whether the system is a joint program, and (3) risk of exposure to  chemical and biological weapons. To evaluate the adequacy of DOD’s  internal controls for maintaining a comprehensive database that facilitates  the inclusion of chemical and biological survivability in weapon system  design and development, we reviewed DOD and service policies, guidance,  and procedures and conducted interviews with database officials, officials  at the weapon system program offices we visited, and members of the  chemical and biological testing community. We compared these policies,  guidance, and procedures to the objectives and fundamental concepts of  internal controls defined in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government. We conducted our review from February 2005 through  January 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. More detailed information on our scope and methodology is  provided in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In the post–Cold War era, the proliferation of chemical and biological  weapon technologies in developing countries presents DOD with a national  security challenge. The 1997, 2001, and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews  as well as other DOD publications have emphasized the need to address the  increasing threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass  destruction, including chemical and biological weapons. The 2006  Quadrennial Defense Review specifically states that DOD’s vision is to  organize, train, equip, and resource the future force to deal with all aspects  of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. It notes that DOD has  doubled its investment in chemical and biological defenses since 2001, and  is increasing funding for its Chemical Biological Defense Program across  the Future Years Defense Program by $2.1 billion (approximately 20  percent). However, experiences during the Persian Gulf War and the  preparations for Operation Iraqi Freedom exposed weaknesses in the  preparedness of U.S. forces to defend against a chemical or biological  attack. In addition, we and DOD’s Inspector General have published reports  addressing continued problems in aspects of DOD’s chemical and  biological defense preparedness. Finally, at present there remain  disagreements within DOD regarding the nature and extent of the chemical  and biological threat and the degree to which major weapon systems  should be survivable against such threats and capable of operating in a  contaminated environment (see app. II). This lack of agreement could  adversely affect DOD’s ability to develop and carry out a coherent plan to  defend against chemical and biological threats.
Until 2003, DOD’s acquisition procedures (unless waived) required that  weapon systems survivability be addressed in accordance with assessed  threat levels, including chemical and biological, anticipated in the weapon  system’s projected operating environment. These procedures defined  survivability as the capability of a weapon system and crew to avoid or  withstand a man-made hostile environment without suffering an abortive  impairment of its ability to accomplish its designated mission. The Army,  Navy, and Air Force issued supplemental acquisition policies that  established service-specific procedures to address the chemical and  biological contamination survivability of their weapon systems. In 2003,  DOD replaced its acquisition procedures with a Defense Acquisition  Guidebook, which, together with the controlling DOD directive and  instruction, no longer specifically requires that weapon system  survivability against chemical and biological threats be addressed during  the system design and development phase. According to a DOD official,  this action was part of a DOD effort to simplify its weapon system  acquisition process. The only current DOD acquisition requirement  specifically related to chemical and biological threats is that weapon  system program offices address protection for crew members (as opposed  to the weapon system itself) against the effects of a chemical or biological  threat.
As part of weapon system design and development efforts, DOD uses  scientific and technical information from research and testing activities to  better understand various chemical and biological agents and their impact  on military operations, including the survivability of weapon systems. DTIC  maintains a centralized database containing a broad range of scientific and  technical information intended to maximize the return on investment in  research, evaluation, and studies. In addition to its centralized database,  DTIC uses the Chemical and Biological Information Analysis Center  (CBIAC), a contractor-operated information analysis center, to maintain  additional databases and provide information specific to chemical and  biological issues. DOD indicated in its August 2005 interim report that it  intends to build on the existing databases maintained by CBIAC and to  develop a centralized database by the end of fiscal year 2007 that contains  comprehensive information on the effects of chemical and biological  agents and decontaminants on weapon systems.
In executing its role as a coordinating point for DOD scientific and  technical information databases and systems, DTIC makes information  available throughout DOD. Figure 1 illustrates the intended flow of  information among testing facilities, program offices, and DTIC.
section_title: DOD and the Military Services Do Not Consistently Address Weapon System Chemical and Biological Survivability
paragraphs: DOD and the military services do not consistently address weapon system  chemical and biological survivability during the acquisition process. In the  absence of clear DOD guidance and effective controls, responsibility for  decisions regarding weapon system chemical and biological survivability  has devolved largely to the individual military services and weapon system  program offices. The program offices we visited do not consistently  document their chemical and biological survivability decisions, nor is there  an established, clear, and effective DOD-level process for the oversight of  these decisions.
subsections: section_title: DOD and Service Policies Do Not Establish a Clear Process for Considering and Testing Weapon System Chemical and Biological Survivability
paragraphs: Although emphasis is placed on chemical and biological threats in DOD's  strategic guidance, DOD and military service policies do not establish a  clear process for considering and testing weapon system chemical and  biological survivability. While DOD acquisition policies require that  survivability of personnel after exposure to chemical and biological agents  be addressed by all weapon system programs, they do not specifically  require the consideration of weapon system survivability. There also are  no DOD policies regarding the quantity and type of weapon system  survivability testing that should be conducted. In addition, joint staff  policies do not address or provide specific instruction as to how chemical  and biological survivability should be considered during the acquisition  process, or how this consideration should be monitored, reviewed, and  documented.
Each of the existing service acquisition policies is therefore unique and  differs in the extent and amount of detail it requires for considering  weapon system chemical and biological survivability. DOD acquisition  officials told us that each weapon system service sponsor has the ability to  decide whether and to what extent to incorporate survivability testing. Of  the military services, the Army has the most detailed policy for addressing  this. However, while emphasizing the need to monitor and review chemical  and biological survivability issues in general, Army policies allow service  sponsors and program offices to individually decide how and to what  extent to consider weapon system survivability during the acquisition  process. The Air Force and Navy have less detailed policies and also leave  decision making to the weapon system sponsor and program office. Navy  officials told us that, in their opinion, having less rigid requirements was  advantageous because it reduces system development time and costs.
The extent to which services consider weapon system survivability during  the acquisition process is further influenced by differences in how each  service perceives the chemical and biological threat and plans to conduct  operations in a contaminated environment. The Army focuses on tactical  and theater chemical and biological threats against exposed ground  combat personnel and equipment. In comparison, the Air Force concept of  operations in a contaminated environment is mainly a strategy of  avoidance and protection, while the Navy view is that a chemical or  biological attack on surface ships is a less likely threat.
In the absence of DOD-wide policies and processes, DOD officials stated  that the responsibility for determining the extent of chemical and biological  survivability consideration or testing has fallen largely on the individual  weapon system program offices, in consultation with each service sponsor.  However, program offices also lack specific guidance and a clear process  governing the extent to which chemical and biological survivability should  be considered or tested. In our review of nine weapon system programs, we  found that the program offices exercised broad discretion over whether or  to what extent to evaluate the need for and benefit of conducting chemical  and biological survivability testing. Although all nine of these program  offices had conducted or were considering some kind of testing, we found  that the extent and nature of this testing varied widely, even for similar  types of systems. For example, the two sea-based weapon system program  offices we reviewed considered chemical and biological testing differently,  even though both systems are intended for similar operating environments.  The program offices for the three land systems we reviewed also  conducted very different tests from one another, although these systems  also are intended for the same operating environment.
Many factors affected the program offices' determination about the extent  to test a weapon system's chemical and biological survivability, including  the type of system (air, land, or sea), required system capabilities, system  concept of operation, perceived chemical and biological threat, and other  factors relating to the status of system cost, schedule, and performance. A  more detailed discussion of the testing conducted for the nine weapon  system programs we reviewed can be found in appendix II.
section_title: Program Offices Did Not Consistently Document Chemical and Biological Survivability Decisions
paragraphs: The nine weapon system program offices we reviewed did not consistently  document their decisions regarding how they considered or tested  chemical and biological survivability. Although they could provide  documentation regarding what survivability testing was conducted, they  did not have a consistent method to track what was considered or was not  included, because there is no DOD, joint, or service requirement for  program offices to document these decisions. DOD officials stated that  there is currently no DOD-level process for documenting how weapon  system program offices determined whether to consider or test chemical  and biological survivability.
section_title: DOD Lacks Effective Survivability Oversight
paragraphs: There is no effective DOD-level oversight of how chemical and biological  survivability is considered by weapon system program offices. In 1993,  Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to designate an office as the  single DOD focal point for chemical and biological defense matters. DOD  subsequently identified the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for  Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs as the single DOD  focal point for chemical and biological defense matters. However, the  military services and various offices within DOD never adopted a  consistent method for incorporating chemical and biological survivability  and related testing into major weapon system development acquisition,  including oversight responsibilities. Between 1994 and 2004, GAO and DOD  Inspector General reports identified multiple management and oversight  process problems regarding the incorporation of chemical and biological  survivability into weapon system development. Various military service  acquisition offices and DOD agencies, such as the U.S. Army Nuclear  Chemical Agency, and the office of the Assistant to the Secretary of  Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense, held differing  views as to where this responsibility resided and how chemical and  biological survivability should be incorporated into weapon system  development. These differing views have hindered the development of an  oversight process and prevented effective monitoring of weapon system  program office decisions regarding chemical and biological survivability.
Although the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and  Chemical and Biological Defense Programs directed the development and  issuance of DOD's August 2005 interim report, DOD continues to lack a  clear and effective department-level process for overseeing the inclusion of  chemical and biological survivability in weapon system development.
In addition, according to DOD officials, no single joint organization, such as  the Joint Requirements Oversight Council or the Joint Requirements  Office, specifically monitors or tracks whether weapon system chemical  and biological survivability is considered in the weapon system acquisition  process. There also is no specific chemical and biological survivability  Functional Capabilities Board to review program office survivability  decisions. DOD officials stated that these joint oversight organizations do  not have a role in overseeing weapon system chemical and biological  survivability and that consideration of survivability requirements during  the acquisition process is therefore service-specific. Furthermore, because  chemical and biological survivability is not usually a key performance  parameter for a weapon system, it is often traded off to satisfy other  pressing requirements dealing with the weapon system cost, schedule, or  performance. DOD officials we spoke with acknowledged that program  cost and schedule concerns could reduce the amount of chemical and  biological weapon system survivability testing conducted. While the  Milestone Decision Authority focuses on requirements associated with key  performance parameters, none of the nine weapon systems we reviewed  included chemical and biological survivability as a key performance factor.  Only specific chemical and biological equipment-such as detection,  protection, and decontamination equipment-have identified chemical and  biological survivability as a key performance parameter.
section_title: Comprehensiveness of Chemical and Biological Survivability Information in DOD's Centralized Database Is Unknown
paragraphs: DOD, through DTIC, maintains a centralized database for science and  technology information that could facilitate program offices' consideration  of weapon system chemical and biological survivability, but the  comprehensiveness of the survivability information in this database is  unknown. We found it unlikely that this database is comprehensive for  three reasons: (1) DOD policy is unclear as to whether chemical and  biological information is covered by the policy, (2) no process has been  established governing how information should be submitted to DTIC, and  (3) no office or organization is responsible for overseeing that information  is submitted to DTIC.
It is unclear whether chemical and biological survivability information is  covered by the broad DOD policy directing that scientific and technical  information be submitted to DTIC. This policy requires that DTIC be  provided with copies of DOD-sponsored scientific and technical  information, but does not specifically address whether chemical and  biological survivability information is included. Some DOD officials  involved in chemical and biological survivability research and/or testing  told us that they believed they were not required to submit the results of  their work to DTIC. Further, there is no established process for submitting  chemical and biological information to DTIC. As a result, individual  personnel and organizations submit information to DTIC through ad hoc  actions, and some DOD officials expressed concern that not all information  is submitted to DTIC as required.
Finally, no office or organization in DOD has been clearly designated as  responsible for exercising oversight to ensure that chemical and biological  research and testing results are submitted to DTIC. The DOD instruction  addressing management of the collection of scientific and technical  information assigns responsibility for submitting research and testing  results to the DOD activities involved, but this instruction does not  specifically indicate whether the activity sponsoring or approving the work  or, alternatively, the organization performing it is responsible for its  submission to DTIC. Officials at the DOD research and testing facilities we  visited told us they routinely submitted the results of their work to DTIC,  and we observed that DTIC and CBIAC were storing large amounts of this  information. The two major DOD chemical and biological research and  testing facilities we visited had an oversight process in place for ensuring  that all research and testing projects submitted the required information to  DTIC. However, responsibility for submitting this information was either  left to individual research or testing staff, or was presumed to have been  submitted to DTIC by the program offices requesting the work. DTIC  officials stated that DTIC was not responsible for ensuring that DOD  research and testing facilities submitted all research and testing results,  and that DTIC had neither the authority nor the desire to do this. We could  not identify any military service or program office level oversight for  ensuring that research and testing results were submitted to DTIC, and  some of the program offices we visited said the submission of research and  test results to DTIC was not their responsibility. The absence of an internal  control for ensuring that research and test results are submitted to DTIC  and entered in DTIC's database could result in unnecessary expenditures  on duplicative work. For example, if research or testing is performed  regarding an aspect of survivability, but its results not entered in the DTIC  database, officials in another program office interested in the same  research or testing might fail to recognize it had already been performed  and cause this work to be done again.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The issues identified in previous DODIG and GAO reports regarding  weapon system incorporation of chemical and biological survivability  during the system acquisition process remain largely unresolved. Without  DOD establishing consistent policy requiring that chemical and biological  survivability be considered during weapon system acquisition and  establishing a clear process for doing so, the incorporation of chemical and  biological survivability into major weapons system acquisition is likely to  remain varied and inconsistent. Consequently, military planners and  commanders are likely to face varying weapon system performance,  availability, and interoperability issues. This, in turn, could complicate the  planning and execution of operations and increase the risk of mission  failure, because systems that are not chemically or biologically survivable  but become exposed to chemical or biological agents may not be available  to a combatant commander for reuse in critical missions, such as deploying  or supplying troops. Furthermore, without consistent documentation of  program offices' rationales for trade-off decisions in their consideration of  weapon system chemical and biological survivability, DOD's ability to  identify and analyze associated risks could be hindered. Finally, the  absence of a clearly defined DOD-level process for overseeing military  service and program office actions limits DOD's ability to ensure that  appropriate weapon system survivability decisions are being made.
Without clarifying existing policies regarding which research and testing  information should be submitted, the process to be used for submitting it,  and which DOD offices or organizations are responsible for overseeing its  submission, DTIC will likely be unable to ensure the maintenance of a  centralized database containing comprehensive chemical and biological  research and testing information. This could limit DOD's ability to  efficiently and economically assess the effects of chemical and biological  agent contamination on weapon system components and materials, and  could result in duplicative research and testing, thus causing unnecessary  design and development costs.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better ensure the incorporation of chemical and biological survivability  into weapon systems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics  to take the following six actions:  Either modify current DOD policy or develop guidance to ensure that  chemical and biological survivability is consistently addressed in the  weapon system acquisition process. This policy or guidance should  establish a clear process for program offices to follow regarding the  extent to which chemical and biological system survivability should  be considered and tested;  require consistent, DOD-wide documentation of decisions regarding  how weapon system chemical and biological survivability is  considered and tested; and   establish an oversight process within DOD and the services for  monitoring weapon system program office decisions;   modify current DOD policy to ensure that DOD's database of chemical  and biological scientific and technical information is comprehensive.  This modified policy should   state which chemical and biological survivability information belongs  in the body of scientific and technical information that is required to  be submitted to DTIC;  clarify responsibilities and establish a specific process for the  submission of chemical and biological scientific and technical  information to DTIC; and   designate which DOD office or organization is responsible for  exercising oversight to ensure that this information is submitted to  DTIC.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all  recommendations. Regarding our recommendations for either modifying  current DOD policy or developing guidance to ensure that chemical and  biological survivability is consistently addressed in the weapon system  acquisition process, DOD plans to issue a Chemical Biological  Contamination Survivability Policy by May 2006 and subsequently draft a  DOD Directive addressing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear  Survivability. With regard to our recommendations for modifying current  DOD policy to ensure that DOD's database of chemical and biological  scientific and technical information is comprehensive, DOD initiated the  development of a chemical and biological material effects database by  forming and hosting an executive steering committee that met for the first  time in March 2006. DOD plans to establish and institute this database at  the Chemical and Biological Defense Information and Analysis Center  (CBIAC) managed by the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC).  The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and  Biological Defense Programs is overseeing the development of this  database, which DOD expects to be ready by the end of Fiscal Year 2007.  DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided  technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the Air  Force, the Army, the Navy, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and  the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at  no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which DOD addresses weapon system chemical and  biological survivability during the acquisition process, we reviewed DOD,  joint staff, and service policies, guidance, and procedures and interviewed  officials throughout DOD. We also conducted a non probability sample of  nine major weapon systems. We selected programs for this non probability  sample based on several factors, including (1) high dollar value,  (2) whether the weapon system was a joint program, and (3) risk of  exposure to chemical and biological weapons. The methodology used to  select our sample helped achieve a sample of weapon systems that was  both diverse and relevant to chemical and biological survivability. For  example, the sample includes weapon systems from all military services  and all types of systems-land, sea, and air. The sample also includes both  legacy systems and those currently in development. To understand how  DOD's acquisition, testing, and data submission and storage policies affect  weapon systems program offices' practices, we spoke with officials and  examined documentation from the nine weapon system program offices we  reviewed. The list of selected weapons systems is provided below:  DD(X) Destroyer  Stryker Infantry Carrier  V-22 Osprey Vertical Lift Aircraft To determine the extent to which DOD maintains a comprehensive  database for facilitating the inclusion of chemical and biological  survivability in weapons system design and development, we reviewed  DOD and service policies, guidance, and procedures. We compared these  policies, guidance, and procedures to the objectives and fundamental  concepts of internal controls defined in Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government. We also conducted interviews with database  officials and members of the chemical and biological testing community  and reviewed documents at the following locations in consultation with  DOD officials and identified as crucial to this subject area in previous GAO  reports:   Air Force Research Laboratory, Dayton, Ohio  Army Research Laboratory, Survivability and Lethality Analysis  Directorate, Aberdeen, Maryland  Chemical and Biological Information Analysis Center, Edgewood,   Defense Technical Information Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia  West Desert Test Center, Dugway Proving Ground, Utah  Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Alexandria, Virginia We conducted our review from February 2005 through January 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Sampled Weapon System Programs Either Conducted or Considered Some Level of Chemical and Biological Survivability Testing
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subsections: section_title: Program Offices' Chemical and Biological Survivability Testing Varied for Reviewed Weapon Systems
paragraphs: We found that the extent and nature of chemical and biological  survivability testing varied widely in all nine weapon systems we reviewed,  even for similar types of systems. Both sea-based weapon systems we  reviewed exhibited varying consideration of chemical and biological  testing. For example, the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program office  considered chemical and biological survivability testing low-risk due to the  perceived operating environment and concept of operations for this  weapon system. Officials stated that the key survivability approach will be  to reduce susceptibility to contamination through detection and avoidance.  In contrast, the Navy's next generation destroyer DD(X) was designed with  a higher chemical and biological system protection level, and consequently  the program office conducted limited coupon testing of specific materials  found in the ship's superstructure. In its technical comments on this  report, DOD stated that this occurred because the DD(X) concept of  operations does not preclude exposure to chemical and biological attacks,  while the LCS concept of operations does preclude exposure to chemical  and biological agents. These systems thus utilized different concepts of  operations although both are intended to operate in a littoral environment.
DOD and program officials stated that land systems would be those most  likely to include chemical and biological survivability testing because of the  increased likelihood of encountering contamination on the modern  battlefield. However, these programs also conducted tests very different  from each other although they are intended for the same operating  environment. The Marine Corps' Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program  office conducted four chemical and biological materials tests that looked at  the effects of decontaminants on a variety of materials and included  extensive tests using Chemical Agent Resistant Coating on the exterior and  interior of the vehicle. In comparison, program officials from the Army's  new wheeled personnel carrier, Stryker, used a different approach,  focusing on applying a chemical agent simulant to a complete Stryker  vehicle and then conducting decontamination procedures. However, in this  case a different testing approach for a similar system may have been  appropriate because the Stryker is not constructed with new materials and  all existing materials used in constructing the Stryker meet military  specification requirements for chemical and biological survivability. The  Army's Future Combat System is currently reassessing chemical and  biological survivability in its design and development. This program is still  in development and has not reached the point where definitive decisions on  chemical and biological survivability are applicable. The Army sponsor and  the program office have been coordinating with the Joint Requirements  Oversight Council, U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, and the Army  Training and Doctrine Command in creating chemical and biological  survivability requirements.
Of the four aircraft weapon system programs we sampled, three conducted  similar levels of chemical and biological testing. Of the three current  systems, the Air Force's F/A-22 Raptor and Joint Strike Fighter program  offices conducted testing as extensive as that conducted by the Navy for  the V-22 Osprey, although these two systems were assessed as much less  likely to encounter chemical and biological contamination as the V-22  Osprey. The V-22 Osprey program office performed vulnerability  assessments, survivability assessments, and some material coupon tests.  Both the Air Force Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-22 Raptor program offices  conducted complementary material and component contamination and  decontamination compatibility tests. To identify material survivability  issues, the F/A-22 Raptor program office contracted with a defense  contractor to perform a literature search in advance of any testing. The  Joint Strike Fighter program office effectively employed the results of this  F/A-22 Raptor testing performed by using the survivability manual  developed for the F/A-22 Raptor rather than developing its own. This  manual was effectively used as a reference to meet both program's  chemical and biological survivability and decontamination thresholds  following exposure to chemical and biological weapons and  decontamination procedures. The legacy aircraft system we reviewed, the  C-17, conducted little chemical and biological testing because much of its  testing and development occurred during a different threat environment.  Program officials stated that decontamination procedures for the C-17  were developed in the 1980s and that the chemical and biological  survivability requirements were drastically scaled down after the end of the  Cold War.
section_title: Variety of Factors Affected Testing Decisions
paragraphs: Many factors affected the program office's determination about the extent  to test a weapon system's chemical and biological survivability. These  factors included the type of system (i.e., air, land, or sea), required system  capabilities, system concept of operation, the perceived chemical and  biological threat, and other factors related to the status of system cost,  schedule, and performance. Senior DOD officials stated that each service  sponsor has the ability to choose whether to accept the risks related to cost  and schedule to incorporate testing of chemical and biological survivability.
DOD officials stated that in general land systems are perceived as the most  likely to encounter chemical and biological contamination and that the  perceived threat for sea and air systems has traditionally been considered  lower than the perceived threat for land systems. This perception was  based on old Cold War concepts and has since changed. DOD officials told  us that asymmetric threats are a greater concern today and that system  developers must weigh the threat context as they are developing systems  and deciding what types of survivability to test based on perceived risk.
Program offices we visited stated that the high financial cost of both live  and simulated chemical and biological agent testing was a factor that  influences decisions about testing weapon system chemical and biological  survivability. For example, officials at the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle  program office estimated that coupon testing with live agents could cost  approximately $30,000 to $50,000, and full system, live agent field testing of  equipment at a facility such as the West Desert Test Center at Dugway  Proving Grounds would cost approximately $1 million. In addition, the C-17  program office stated that live agent testing cost approximately $1 million.  Interviews with various DOD research facilities where testing is conducted  supported these amounts. F/A-22 program officials also stated that  although they conducted coupon and component tests, they would not  encourage a full system chemical and biological survivability test because  such a test would be too expensive and would destroy the aircraft being  tested.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, William Cawood, Assistant  Director; Renee S. Brown, Jane Ervin, Catherine Humphries, David  Mayfield, Renee McElveen, Anupama Patil, Matthew Sakrekoff, Rebecca  Shea, and Cheryl Weissman also made key contributions to this report.