2010 Census: Planning and Testing Activities Are Making Progress
Published: 2006-03-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Rigorous planning is key to a successful census as it helps ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimates the 2010 Census will cost around $11.3 billion, which would make it the most expensive census in our country's history, even after adjusting for inflation. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the Bureau's progress in preparing for the 2010 Census, (2) the challenges that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita might pose for the Bureau's future activities, and, (3) more broadly, the importance of planning for a range of events that could severely disrupt the census.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Bureau's preparations for the 2010 Census are making progress along several fronts. Of particular note is (1) the re-engineered design of the census, which holds promise for controlling costs and maintaining accuracy; (2) the Bureau's early planning process which was more rigorous than for the 2000 Census; and (3) the Bureau's greater willingness to outsource key census-taking operations that would be difficult for it to carry out on its own. At the same time, it will be important for the Bureau to resolve issues that pose a risk to a successful census. For example, the Bureau plans to use hand-held mobile computing devices (MCD) to develop the census address list and collect data from millions of households that do not respond to the initial census questionnaire. The MCDs are an important step forward because they are designed to replace many of the paper questionnaires and maps that were used in past censuses, and are a key element of the Bureau's Field Data Collection Automation program. The Bureau has never before used the devices in a decennial. In tests held in 2004 and 2006 to date, census workers found the MCDs easy to use, but sometimes unreliable, which reduced efficiency. Some workers also deviated from prescribed procedures which points to the need for better training. The Bureau has taken steps to address these issues and future tests will help determine the effectiveness of the Bureau's actions. The Bureau also faces a possible brain drain, as 45 percent of its workforce will be eligible to retire by 2010. Although the Bureau has taken preventative measures, it could improve those efforts by, among other actions, strengthening the monitoring of its mission-critical workforce. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita highlight the importance of contingency planning and examining whether the Bureau's existing operations are adequate for capturing the demographic and physical changes that have occurred along the Gulf Coast. Overall, as the Bureau's preparations for 2010 continue, it will be important for Congress to monitor the Bureau's progress in (1) identifying and diagnosing problems, (2) devising solutions, and (3) integrating refinements in time to be evaluated during the Census Dress Rehearsal scheduled for 2008.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to provide the  subcommittee a progress report on the U.S. Census Bureau’s (Bureau)  preparations for the 2010 Census. For the past several years, we have  issued several reports on the Bureau’s 2010 planning and testing efforts at  the subcommittee’s request. My remarks today highlight some of the key  findings in our reports on preparations for 2010, as well as present the  preliminary results of ongoing work we plan to issue in the near future on  the Bureau’s efforts to build a complete and accurate address list.  Additionally, I will provide our preliminary observations on the challenges  that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita might pose for the Bureau’s future  activities and, more broadly, for the Bureau’s continuity of operations  planning to help it prepare for a range of events that could severely disrupt  the census.
Importantly, our perspective on the census goes well beyond these recent  studies. Because the decennial has grown in cost and complexity since  1970, we have been reviewing the national enumeration for decades on  behalf of Congress. Over the years, through scores of reports and  testimonies, we have acquired broad institutional knowledge that gives us  a historical view of the key ingredients of a successful census.
Today’s hearing is particularly timely. The Bureau is holding a test census  in the central portion of Travis County, Texas, and at the Cheyenne River  American Indian Reservation and Tribal Trust Lands in South Dakota,  where it is evaluating key operations and equipment it plans to employ for  the full enumeration in 2010. “Census Day” for this exercise is April 1,  2006; after this, the Bureau will have only one more major opportunity to  assess its census taking-procedures—a “dress rehearsal” scheduled for  2008. Moreover, the actual census is little more than 4 years away, and  before too long the Bureau will transition from preparatory to operational  activities, leaving little room for delays and missteps.
With this in mind, I commend the subcommittee for calling today’s  hearing, as past experience has shown that strong and continuing  congressional involvement—especially while there is still time to make  decisions and influence the direction of the census—is essential to the  decennial’s ultimate success.  An accurate population count is critical  because the Constitution requires a census to apportion seats in the House  of Representatives. Census data are also used to redraw congressional  districts, allocate approximately $200 billion in federal assistance to state  and local governments each year, and for numerous other public and  private sector purposes.
My remarks are based on our analysis of Bureau documents and data, and  interviews with key Bureau officials. In addition, to get a street-level  perspective of the performance of key operations, we visited the Texas  and South Dakota test sites, as well as Queens, New York, and several  counties in rural south-central Georgia, where an earlier field test was held  in 2004. During these visits, we interviewed local census office managers  and staff, viewed various data collection activities, and observed training  sessions the Bureau held for two different field worker positions:  address  canvassers, who go door-to-door verifying addresses as part of the  Bureau’s effort to build a complete and accurate address list, and  enumerators, who collect information from those households that do not  return their initial census questionnaire.
My major point today is that the Bureau is further along in planning the  2010 Census compared to a similar point during the 2000 Census cycle.  Particularly noteworthy is (1) the re-engineered design of the census,  which holds promise for controlling costs and maintaining accuracy; (2)  the Bureau’s early planning process which was more rigorous than for the  2000 Census; and (3) the Bureau’s greater willingness to outsource key  census-taking operations that would be difficult for it to carry out on its  own.
At the same time, it will be important for the Bureau to resolve issues that  pose a risk to a successful census. Specific steps we have recommended in  our prior work include (1) improving the reliability of the hand-held  mobile computing devices (MCD) the Bureau plans to use for collecting  field data, (2) ensuring census workers follow prescribed procedures, and  (3) strengthening its human capital efforts so that it has the skill mix  necessary to meet its future requirements.  The Bureau is aware of these  issues and has taken actions to address them.  Future tests will shed light  on the effectiveness of the Bureau’s efforts.
As a backdrop to these findings, I want to highlight several broad themes  that have emerged from our work over the years—lenses really—through  which to view the Bureau’s business environment. They are important  because they ultimately affect the Bureau’s readiness to conduct the  census and the quality of the results.
First, because the scale of the census is enormous, streamlined and  efficient operations are critical for cost-effectiveness.  For  example, during the 2000 Census, the Bureau hired more than  500,000 enumerators, temporarily making it one of the nation’s  largest employers; opened nearly 24,000 questionnaire assistance  centers; processed 1.5 billion pieces of paper; and, in 10 weeks,  followed up with 42 million households that did not mail back their  census questionnaires. The size of the census means that small  problems can magnify quickly, and big problems could be  overwhelming.  For example, 60 seconds might seem like an  inconsequential amount of time, but in 2000, if enumerators had  spent just 1 minute more at each household during nonresponse  follow-up, it could have added almost $10 million in labor costs to  the census, assuming a pay rate of around $13 per hour (wages  ranged from $8.25 to $18.50 per hour for enumerators in 2000,  depending on location).
A second theme is the importance of sound risk management, as  the risks to a successful census are interrelated, and a shortcoming  in one operation could trigger other activities to spiral downward.  For example, a low mail response rate would drive up the follow- up workload, which in turn would increase staffing needs and  costs.  Of course the reverse is also true, where a success in one  operation could have a number of positive downstream impacts.  Rigorous up-front preparations, testing, and where feasible,  contingency planning, are the best ways to stave off problems.   Likewise, management information systems capable of tracking  key operations with real-time measures are essential because they  enable the Bureau to quickly address trouble spots.  The Bureau  did this successfully in recruiting enumerators for the 2000 Census  where, to help ensure it had a steady supply of candidates for its  500,000 enumerator positions, it set a recruiting goal of 2.4 million  qualified applicants. Because the Bureau tracked the progress local  census offices were making in meeting their individual goals, it was  able to quickly raise pay rates and take other actions at those  offices where recruiting was lagging. Partly as a result of its  monitoring efforts, the Bureau exceeded its recruitment goal by  100,000 people.
Third, it is important for the Bureau to stay on schedule, as the  census is conducted against a backdrop of immutable deadlines  and an elaborate chain of interrelated pre- and post-Census Day  activities are predicated upon those dates.  Specifically, the  Secretary of Commerce is legally required to (1) conduct the  census on April 1 of the decennial year, (2) report the state  population counts to the President for purposes of congressional  apportionment by December 31 of the decennial year, and (3) send  population tabulations to the states for purposes of redistricting no  later than one year after the April 1 census date. To meet these  reporting requirements, census activities need to take place at  specific times and in the proper sequence.  Moreover, considerable  risk could accompany any significant design changes that occur  late in the decade because of the difficulties in properly testing,  evaluating, and integrating them with existing operations.  As  Census Day approaches, the tolerance for any operational delays  or changes becomes increasingly small.
Fourth, the decennial census is a shared national undertaking,  where Congress, other federal agencies, state and local  governments, nonprofit and private organizations, and ultimately  the American public, all play vital roles in securing a complete and  accurate population tally.  Recognizing this, the Bureau fosters  partnerships with these various entities to help with such activities  as recruiting census workers, boosting participation, and building  the Bureau’s master address list.  Mobilizing and coordinating  these organizations requires an enormous effort on the Bureau’s  part.  During the 2000 Census, about 140,000 organizations  participated in its partnership program, according to the Bureau.
Collectively, these themes point to the following: The decennial census is  an inherently fragile endeavor. On the one hand, if all the enumeration  activities perform as planned, the response rate is as expected, the Bureau  meets its enumerator hiring goals, and operations stay on schedule, the  2010 Census will likely produce acceptable results.  On the other hand,  everything from a technological glitch to national and world events could  trigger a chain of setbacks that could jeopardize the accuracy and  completeness of the count. This is why it is so important for Congress to  follow the census closely and help ensure it stays on track.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Thorough and comprehensive planning is crucial to the success of any  large, long-term project, especially one with the cost, complexity, and high  stakes of the decennial census.  Indeed, the Bureau’s past experience has  shown that the lack of proper planning can increase the costs and risks of  downstream operations.
Past experience has also underscored the importance of strong oversight  of the census to (1) inform congressional decision making on budgetary  and operational matters, (2) raise Congress’s confidence that the Bureau  has chosen an optimum design and will manage operations and control  costs effectively, and (3) help ensure the progress the Bureau has made  thus far in refining, planning, and testing census-taking activities,  continues as the Bureau shifts into the operational phases of the  decennial.
Given the escalating cost of the census in an era of serious national fiscal  challenges, oversight will be particularly important.  Bureau officials  estimate the total life-cycle cost of the 2010 Census will be around $11.3  billion, which would make it the most expensive census in our country’s  history, even after adjusting for inflation.
Although some cost growth can be expected, in part, because the number  of housing units—and hence the Bureau’s workload—has grown, the cost  escalation has far exceeded the housing unit increase. The Bureau  estimates that the number of housing units for the 2010 Census will  increase by 10 percent over 2000 Census levels; meanwhile, the average  cost per housing unit for 2010 is expected to increase by approximately 29  percent from 2000 levels (from $56 to $72), nearly five and a half times  greater than the $13 it cost to count each household in 1970 (see fig. 1).
A key reason for the increasing cost of the census is that because of  various societal trends such as concerns over personal privacy, more non- English speakers, and more people residing in makeshift and other  nontraditional living arrangements, the Bureau is finding it increasingly  difficult to locate people and get them to participate in the census. As a  result, the Bureau needs to spend more money simply to achieve the  accuracy of earlier enumerations. This can be seen, for example, in the  rising cost of securing public participation in the census.  During the 1990  Census, the Bureau spent an average of $0.88 per housing unit (in 2000  dollars) to market the census and was able to rely on a pro-bono  advertising campaign.  The response rate was 65 percent. For the 2000  Census, recognizing that extra effort would be needed to motivate  participation, the Bureau used a paid advertising campaign developed by a  consortium of private-sector advertising agencies.  It cost an average of  $3.19 per housing unit (in 2000 dollars) and achieved a response rate of 64  percent.  As the Bureau plans for 2010, maintaining cost effectiveness will  be one of the single greatest challenges confronting the agency.
section_title: The Bureau’s Preparations for 2010 Are Progressing but Certain Challenges Will Need to Be Addressed
paragraphs: The Bureau’s preparations for the 2010 Census appear to be further along  than at a similar point during the planning cycle for the 2000 Census. For  example, the fundamental design of the 2010 Census has the potential to  contain costs and improve coverage and accuracy, and the Bureau’s  planning process for 2010 is generally more thorough than was the case  for the 2000 Census. At the same time, the 2004 test and, to date, the 2006  test, have identified areas where improvements are needed.  Uncovering  trouble spots is an important objective of any test, thus it is not surprising,  and, in fact, should be expected and commended that problems were  found.  Moreover, the Bureau has taken steps to resolve the issues that  have surfaced.  Remaining activities in the 2006 test, and the 2008 Dress  Rehearsal, will help determine the effectiveness of the Bureau’s efforts.
subsections: section_title: The Design of the 2010 Census Shows Promise
paragraphs: The Bureau developed a design for the 2010 Census early in the decade,  and Congress has been supportive of the Bureau’s approach. The situation  10 years ago was vastly different. In testimony before Congress in late  1995, we expressed concern that Congress and the Bureau had not agreed  on the fundamental design and budget of the census, and that the longer  this situation continued, the opportunity for a well-planned census would  be lost and the greater the risk that hundreds of millions of dollars would  be spent inefficiently.
Key features of the design of the 2010 Census include the following:    Enhancing procedures for building its address list, known as the Master  Address File, and its associated geographic information system, called the  Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER)®  database;     Replacing the census long-form questionnaire with the American  Community Survey (ACS); and    Conducting a short-form-only decennial census supported by early  research and testing.
Also noteworthy is the fact that for the 2010 Census, the Bureau plans to  make the most extensive use of contractors in its history, turning to the  private sector to supply a number of different mission-critical functions,  including the Bureau’s nationwide data processing activities, and  improvements to the Master Address File and TIGER. The Bureau  estimates that of the $11.3 billion total cost of the census, around $1.9  billion (approximately 17 percent) will be spent via its seven largest  contracts which include information technology systems, advertising, and  the leasing of local census offices.
The Bureau is relying more heavily on contractors because it recognizes it  needs to look outside the agency to obtain the expertise and services  essential for a successful enumeration. That said, the Bureau’s contracting  efforts during the 2000 Census did not always go smoothly, and it will be  important for Bureau management to focus on its procurement activities  to help ensure the 2010 contractors fulfill the Bureau’s expectations. Our  companion testimony at today’s hearing provides greater detail on two of  the Bureau’s information technology contracts.
In concept, the Bureau’s approach has the potential to achieve its principal  goals for the 2010 Census which include (1) increasing the relevance and  timeliness of data, (2) reducing operational risk, (3) increasing coverage  and accuracy, and (4) containing costs.  However, some aspects of the  design, including the use of technology that has never been employed for  the decennial, as well as the heavy reliance on contractors, introduce new  risk.  This is not inappropriate as the need to secure a complete count and  addressing problems with past censuses call for bold new initiatives that  entail risk.  What will be important is how effectively the Bureau manages  those risks.
section_title: The 2010 Planning Process Is Generally More Rigorous Than for Past Efforts
paragraphs: Another sign of progress can be found in the thoroughness of the Bureau’s  planning process where the Bureau has taken several positive steps to  correct problems it encountered when planning past censuses. For  example, early in the decade, senior Bureau staff considered various goals  for the 2010 Census and articulated a design to achieve those goals.  Moreover, staff with operational experience in the census participated in  the 2010 design process. According to Bureau officials, this was a  departure from the 2000 planning effort when Bureau staff with little  operational experience played key roles in the design process, which  resulted in impractical reform ideas that could not be implemented.
At the same time, the Bureau’s planning process could benefit from an  overall business or project plan that (1) includes milestones for  completing key activities; (2) itemizes the estimated cost of each  component; (3) articulates a clear system of coordination among project  components; and (4) translates key goals into measurable, operational  terms to provide meaningful guidance for planning and measuring  progress. Some, but not all of this information is available in various  documents, but one would need to piece it together.  Noting the  importance of this information to inform congressional decision-making  and oversight of the census, as well as to improve the Bureau’s planning  process, in our January 2004 report, we recommended that the Bureau  combine this information into a single, comprehensive document.  The  Bureau disagreed with the recommendation although it said it would  develop such a plan nonetheless and provide it to GAO, Congress, and  other stakeholders.  The Bureau has not yet issued this document.
section_title: Address File and Map Improvements Could Help Resolve Past Problems if Operational Challenges Are Resolved
paragraphs: A complete and accurate address list is the cornerstone of a successful  census because it identifies all households that are to receive a census  questionnaire, and serves as the control mechanism for following up with  households that fail to respond. Although the Bureau went to great lengths  to build a complete and accurate Master Address File for the 2000 Census,  of the 116 million housing units contained in the database, the Bureau  estimates it incorrectly included 2.3 million housing units and missed  another 2.7 million housing units. In light of these and other problems, the  Bureau concluded that enhancements to the Master Address File and  TIGER were necessary to make census data more complete and accurate.
In the preliminary results of our ongoing work on enhancements to the  Master Address File and TIGER, we found that the Bureau has developed  procedures to help resolve each of the broad categories of problems  experienced in 2000 including addresses that were duplicated, missed,  deleted, and incorrectly located on a map (a problem known as geocoding  error).  The Bureau has several ongoing evaluations that should provide  valuable information on the effectiveness of these procedures.
The Bureau is also taking steps to improve the accuracy of the TIGER  maps which, among other benefits, should help prevent geocoding errors.  In June 2002, the Bureau awarded an 8-year contract, in excess of $200  million intended to, among other tasks, correct in TIGER the location of  every street, boundary, and other map feature so that coordinates are  aligned with their true geographic locations. According to the Bureau, the  contractor completed this work for 250 counties in 2003, 602 counties in  2004, and 623 counties in 2005. Furthermore, the contractor plans to  deliver the remaining 1,758 county maps between 2006 and 2008.
However, based on this time line, it appears that several hundred county  TIGER maps will not be updated in time for the Local Update of Census  Addresses (LUCA) program, through which the Bureau gives local and  tribal government officials the opportunity to review and suggest  corrections to the address lists and maps for their jurisdictions. LUCA is to  begin in July 2007 when, according to the current schedule, the Bureau  will still have 368 counties to update in 2008 alone. These counties will not  have the most current maps to review but will instead be given the most  recent maps the Bureau has available.  According to the Bureau, some of  the maps have been updated for the American Community Survey, but  others have not been updated since the 2000 Census, which could affect  the quality of a local government’s review.  The Bureau is aware of the  overlapping schedules, but told us that it needs to start LUCA in 2007 in  order to complete the operation in time for address canvassing.
LUCA is an example of how the Bureau partners with external entities,  tapping into their knowledge of local populations and housing conditions  in order to secure a more complete count. In 1994, Congress required the  Bureau to develop a local address review program to give local and tribal  governments greater input into the Bureau’s address list development  process.
When the Bureau conducted LUCA for the 2000 Census, the results were  mixed. In our 1999 congressional testimony, we noted that many local  governments said they were satisfied with specific aspects of the materials  and assistance the Bureau provided to them. At the same time, LUCA may  have stretched the resources of local governments, and participation in the  program could have been better.
The census schedule will also be a challenge for an operation called  address canvassing, where census workers are to walk every street in the  country, verifying addresses and updating maps as necessary. The Bureau  has allotted 6 weeks to verify the nation’s inventory of 116 million housing  units. This translates into a completion rate of over 2.75 million housing  units every day. The challenge in maintaining this schedule can be seen in  the fact that for the 2000 Census, it took the Bureau 18 weeks just to  canvass “city-style” address areas, which are localities where the U.S.  Postal Service uses house-number and street-name addresses for most  mail delivery.
section_title: The Unreliability of Mobile Computing Devices Has Been Problematic
paragraphs: Of particular concern is the previous unreliability of the MCDs the Bureau  plans to use for its address canvassing and nonresponse follow-up  operations (see fig. 2).
For address canvassing, the MCDs are to be loaded with address  information and maps; for nonresponse follow-up, they will be used in lieu  of paper questionnaires and maps to collect household information. The  MCDs are also equipped with global positioning system (GPS) receivers, a  satellite-based navigational system to help enumerators locate street  addresses and to collect coordinates for each structure in their assignment  area. Bureau officials expect the MCDs will help improve the cost- effectiveness of the census by allowing it to eliminate millions of paper  questionnaires and maps, improve the quality of address data, and update  enumerators’ nonresponse follow-up workload on a daily basis.
The move from paper to digital was a very positive step.  At the same time,  rigorous testing is essential to assess their durability, functionality, and  that enumerators are able to use them. The MCDs were first evaluated for  nonresponse follow-up as part of the 2004 Census Test, and for address  canvassing in 2005 as part of the 2006 Census Test. The Bureau will use  MCDs next month for nonresponse follow-up in the 2006 test.
In both our prior and ongoing work, we found the test results have been  mixed. On the one hand, the census workers we observed had little  difficulty using the MCDs. For example, address canvassers we  interviewed said the electronic maps were accurate and that they were  able to find their assignment areas with relative ease. On the other hand,  the reliability of the MCDs proved troublesome during the 2004 and to  date, the 2006 test. For example, in 2004, the MCDs experienced  transmission problems, memory overloads, and difficulties with a mapping  feature--all of which added inefficiencies to the nonresponse follow-up  operation.
The Bureau is using MCDs made by a different manufacturer for the 2006  test which resolved some of these problems, but other difficulties emerged  during address canvassing. For example, the device was slow to pull up  and exit address registers, accept the data entered by the canvassers, and  link map locations to addresses for multi-unit structures. Furthermore, the  MCDs would sometimes lock up, requiring canvassers to reboot them.
Canvassers also found it difficult to transmit an address and map location  that needed to be deleted from the master list. The Bureau was unable to  fix this problem so canvassers had to return to the local census office  where technicians dealt with the problem. The reliability of the GPS was  also problematic. Some workers had problems receiving a signal, and  when a signal was available, it was sometimes slow to locate assignment  areas and correct map locations.
According to the Bureau, these problems reduced the productivity of the  canvassers, and the Bureau stopped the operation 10 days after it was  scheduled to finish.  Even with the extension, however, the Bureau was  unable to complete the job, leaving census blocks in both Austin and on  the Cheyenne Indian Reservation unverified.
According to the Bureau, the problems were caused by unstable software  and insufficient memory.  The Bureau delayed the start of address  canvassing for a month at both test sites to troubleshoot the MCDs.   However, it was unable to fix all the problems and decided to move  forward with the test.
The MCDs will be evaluated again next month as part of the 2006 Census  Test and we will be on-site to assess the extent to which the Bureau has  fixed the MCD problems.  However, even if the MCDs prove to be more  reliable, questions remain for the future.  The Bureau has acknowledged  that the MCD’s performance is an issue, but believes it will be addressed  as part of its contract for the Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA)  program, which is aimed at automating the Bureau’s field data collection  efforts, and is scheduled to be awarded later this month (the MCDs used  for the 2006 test are off-the-shelf purchases that were customized by the  Bureau).
As a result, the 2008 Dress Rehearsal will be the first time the entire  system—including the contractor’s MCD—will be tested under conditions  that are as close as possible to the actual census.  If new problems emerge,  little time will be left to develop and test any refinements.
Our field observations also suggest that the training of census workers  could be improved to help ensure they follow proper procedures. Failure  to do so could affect the reliability of census data. During the 2004 test, for  example, we observed enumerators who did not read the coverage and  race/ethnicity question exactly as worded, and did not properly use  flashcards the Bureau had developed that were designed to help  respondents answer specific questions. During the address canvassing  operation for the 2006 test, we observed workers who were not properly  verifying addresses, or were unsure of what to do when they happened  upon dwellings such as duplex housing units. In our past work, we  recommended that the Bureau take a more strategic approach to training,  and that local census offices include in their instruction special modules  covering the unique living arrangements that might be prevalent in that  particular jurisdiction.
The Bureau acknowledged that the shortcomings we identified require  improvement, and indicated that for the 2006 test, it will enhance training  to reinforce the procedural requirements. The Bureau also intends to  incorporate additional training to prepare enumerators to handle realistic  situations encountered in their work.  As part of our field work for the  2006 test, we will review the improvements the Bureau made to its training  procedures.
section_title: Succession Planning and Management Will Be Important in the Years Ahead
paragraphs: If the operational challenges of conducting a census were not daunting  enough, the Bureau faces the additional challenge of a possible brain  drain. In our June 2005 report, we noted that the Bureau has projected that  45 percent of its workforce will be eligible to retire by 2010. The Bureau  has long benefited from its core group of managers and experienced staff  who developed their expertise over several census cycles; their  institutional knowledge is critical to keeping the census on track. Indeed,  according to Bureau officials, many experienced employees retired or left  the agency after the 1990 Census which affected planning efforts for the  2000 Census.
Leading organizations go beyond simply backfilling vacancies, and instead  focus on strengthening both current and future organizational capacity. In  this regard the Bureau acknowledges that re-engineering the 2010 Census  requires new skills in project, contract, and financial management;  advanced programming and technology; as well as other areas. To help  address this important human capital issue, the Bureau has implemented  various succession planning and management efforts to better position the  agency to meet its future skill requirements.
Still, we found that the Bureau could take additional steps to enhance its  succession planning and management efforts and recommended that the  Bureau (1) strengthen the monitoring of its mission-critical workforce,   (2) seek appropriate opportunities to coordinate and share core  succession training and development programs with other outside  agencies, and (3) evaluate core succession training and development  programs to gauge the extent to which they contribute to enhancing  organizational capacity.  The Bureau agreed with our recommendations  and indicated it was taking steps to implement them.
section_title: Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Highlight the Importance of Disaster Preparedness
paragraphs: On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the coastal communities  of Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Alabama. A few weeks later,  Hurricane Rita plowed through the border area of Texas and Louisiana.
Damage was widespread.  In the wake of Katrina, for example, the Red  Cross estimated that nearly 525,000 people were displaced. Their homes  were declared uninhabitable, and streets, bridges, and other landmarks  were destroyed. Approximately 90,000 square miles were affected overall  and, as shown in figure 3, entire communities were obliterated.
The destruction and chaos caused by the storms underscore the nation’s  vulnerability to all types of hazards, and highlights how important it is for  government agencies to consider disaster preparedness and continuity of  operations as part of their planning.  We have had a preliminary discussion  with the Bureau on this topic and will continue to assess the Bureau’s  contingency planning as part of our oversight of the 2010 Census.
Moreover, it will be important for the Bureau to assess the impact the  storms might have on its census-taking activities, as well as whether the  affected areas have any special needs for data.  Securing a complete count,  a difficult task under normal circumstances, could face additional hurdles  along the Gulf Coast, in large part because the baseline the Bureau will be  working with—streets, housing stock, and the population itself—will be in  flux for some time to come. According to the Bureau, different parts of the  agency work on hurricane-related issues at different times, but no formal  body has been created to deal with the hurricanes’ impact on the 2010  Census. The Bureau anticipates that by 2008, as it is preparing to conduct  address canvassing, people will have decided whether or not to return. At  that time, the Bureau believes it will be in a better position to identify  vacant, occupied, and new construction for 2010.
Although Census Day is still several years away, preliminary activities,  such as operations for building the Master Address File, are to occur  sooner.  Consequently, a key question is whether the Bureau’s existing  operations are adequate for capturing the migration that has taken place  along the Gulf Coast, the various types of dwellings in which people live,  and the changes to roads and other geographic features that have  occurred, or does the Bureau need to develop enhanced and/or additional  procedures to account for them?  For example, new housing and street  construction could require more frequent updates of the Bureau’s address  file and maps, while local governments’ participation in LUCA might be  affected because of the loss of key personnel, information systems, or  records needed to verify the Bureau’s address lists and maps.
It will also be important for the Bureau to work with Congress and state  and local governments to determine whether the hurricane-affected areas  have any special data needs to track the economic and social well-being of  the region and benchmark the recovery process. Although the decennial  census would not be the instrument to collect this information, it might be  feasible doing so through one of the Bureau’s other survey programs. To  date, the Bureau plans to do a special tabulation of its American  Community Survey (ACS) data for the areas affected by Katrina that will  provide information on the population that remained in the region.  However, because of several methodological issues, it will not be an  “official” ACS data product. The Bureau is also trying to use data from  administrative records to update its population estimates of the area.
Building on these efforts, some key considerations for the future include  the following:  1.  How have the hurricanes affected the counties and parishes in the Gulf  Coast region and what are the implications, if any, for the Bureau’s  future operations?  2.  Which external and internal stakeholders including federal, state, and  local government agencies, as well as nonprofit organizations and  specific areas of expertise need to be included in the Bureau’s  decision-making process?  3.  To what extent does the Bureau have a plan (including objectives,  tasks, milestones, etc.) for assessing and acting on any new  requirements imposed by the hurricanes?   4.  Do the hurricane-affected areas have any special data requirements,  and if so, how should they be addressed and which stakeholders need  to be involved?
In summary, over the last few years, the Bureau has put forth a  tremendous effort to help ensure the success of the 2010 Census. The  Bureau is moving forward along a number of fronts, and has been  responsive to the recommendations we made in our past work aimed at  improving its planning process, address file, MCDs, training, human  capital, and other census-taking activities. Still, some aspects of the census  are proving to be problematic and a number of operational questions need  to be resolved.
To be sure, challenges are to be expected in an endeavor as vast and  complex as the decennial census. Moreover, shortcomings with prior  censuses call for the Bureau to consider bold initiatives for 2010 that entail  some risk. Thus, in looking toward the future, as the planning and testing  phases of the 2010 Census begin to wind down, it will be important for  Congress to monitor the Bureau’s progress in (1) identifying and  diagnosing problems, (2) devising cost-effective solutions, and (3)  integrating refinements and fixes in time to be evaluated during the Dress  Rehearsal in 2008. Indeed, while the ramp-up to 2010 is making progress,  past experience has shown that Congress has every reason to remain  vigilant. As we have done throughout the past several decades, we look  forward to supporting the subcommittee in its decision-making and  oversight efforts.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Clay, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you or other members of the  subcommittee might have.
section_title: Contact and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Brenda S.  Farrell on (202) 512-3604, or by e-mail at farrellb@gao.gov.
Individuals making contributions to this testimony included Betty Clark,  Robert Goldenkoff, Carlos E. Hazera, Shirley Hwang, Andrea Levine, Anne  McDonough-Hughes, Lisa Pearson, Michael Volpe, and Timothy Wexler.
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