Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined
Published: 2005-10-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since September 2001, the National Guard has experienced the largest activation of its members since World War II. Currently, over 30 percent of the Army forces now in Iraq are Army National Guard members, and Guard forces have also carried out various homeland security and large-scale disaster response roles. However, continued heavy use of the Guard forces has raised concerns about whether it can successfully perform and sustain both missions over time. In the short term, the National Guard is seeking additional funding for emergency equipment. GAO was asked to comment on (1) the changing role of the Army National Guard, (2) whether the Army National Guard has the equipment it needs to sustain federal and state missions, and (3) the extent to which DOD has strategies and plans to improve the Army National Guard's business model for the future.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The heavy reliance on National Guard forces for overseas and homeland missions since September 2001 has resulted in readiness problems which suggest that the current business model for the Army National Guard is not sustainable over time. Therefore, the business model should be reexamined in light of the current and expected national security environment, homeland security needs, and fiscal challenges the nation faces in the 21st century. Under post-Cold War planning assumptions, the Army National Guard was organized as a strategic reserve to be used primarily in the later stages of a conflict after receiving additional personnel, equipment and training. Therefore, in peacetime Army National Guard units did not have all the equipment and personnel they would need to perform their wartime missions. However, over 70,000 Guard personnel are now deployed for federal missions, with thousands more activated to respond to recent natural disasters. To provide ready forces, the Guard transferred large numbers of personnel and equipment among units, thereby exacerbating existing personnel and equipment shortages of non-deployed units. As a result, the preparedness of non-deployed units for future missions is declining. The need to reexamine the business model for the Army National Guard is illustrated by growing equipment shortages. As of July 2005, the Army National Guard had transferred over 101,000 equipment items to units deploying overseas, exhausting its inventory of some critical items, such as radios and generators, in non-deployed units. Nondeployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls because: (1) prior to 2001, most Army National Guard units were equipped with 65 to 79 percent of their required war-time items and (2) Guard units returning from overseas operations have left equipment, such as radios and trucks for follow-on forces. The Army National Guard estimates that its units left over 64,000 items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas. However, the Army cannot account for over half of these items and does not have a plan to replace them, as DOD policy requires. Nondeployed Guard units now have only about one-third of the equipment they need for their overseas missions, which hampers their ability to prepare for future missions and conduct domestic operations. Without a plan and funding strategy that addresses the Guard's equipment needs for all its missions, DOD and Congress do not have assurance that the Army has an affordable plan to improve the Guard's equipment readiness. DOD is taking some steps to adapt to the new security environment and balance the Army National Guard's overseas and homeland missions. For example, the Army has embarked on reorganization to a modular, rotational force. Also, DOD issued a strategy for homeland defense and civil support in June 2005. However, until DOD develops an equipping plan and funding strategy to implement its initiatives, Congress and DOD will not have assurance that these changes will create a new business model that can sustain the Army National Guard affordably and effectively for the full range of its future missions.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the critical role of the National  Guard in conducting missions at home and overseas as well as equipment  issues affecting the Army National Guard. Recent and ongoing military  operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and new homeland missions have led to  higher demands on the reserve component, particularly the Army National  Guard. As we described in our previous report and testimony on the  Department of Defense’s (DOD) use of the National Guard, the launch of  the Global War on Terrorism has resulted in the largest activation of  National Guard forces for overseas missions since World War II. In  addition, Guard members have been called upon to perform new  homeland security missions as well as state missions ranging from fighting  forest fires to providing hurricane relief. As of July 2005, more than 30  percent of the Army forces deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom are  National Guard members and as of September 2005 over 50,000 National  Guard personnel from over 48 states, 2 U.S. territories and the District of  Columbia supported the hurricane disaster response in the Gulf Coast.
Before I address the primary subject of this hearing, I would like to bring  an important matter to the attention of this committee relating to the  Guard and Reserves. This past Saturday evening, I had the privilege and  pleasure to attend the Annual Freedom Awards Banquet sponsored by the  National Committee of Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve here  in Washington. This year’s banquet honored 15 employers, including  Enterprise Rent-a-Car and Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. who  demonstrated their above and beyond commitment to their employees  who are members of the Guard or Reserves. During the evening it became  clear to me that the U.S. Government is not leading by example or  practicing what it preaches in connection with employer support for the  Guard and Reserves. GAO would like to be able to do what many of the  awardees have already done but we are limited in doing so under current  law. Namely, we believe federal agencies should be able to make up any  salary differential that activated Guard and Reserve members might  otherwise lose out of our annual appropriation. We would also like to be  able to be sure that applicable employees and their family members  continue to receive their employer provided benefits. We and other federal  employers need your help to make this a reality.
The Army National Guard’s heavy involvement in recent operations and  growing equipment problems are a reflection of the significant changes in  the security environment—changes that are occurring at a time when our  nation is threatened by growing fiscal imbalances stemming, in large part,  from an aging population and rising health care costs. If left unchecked,  these fiscal imbalances will ultimately impede economic growth, which  could impact our ability to address key national and homeland security  needs. To assist the Congress in reviewing and reconsidering federal  programs in light of changing security threats and fiscal challenges, we  have identified a number of fundamental questions that we believe  policymakers will need to address in the coming years to ensure that  federal programs and organizations are focused on the nation’s highest  priority challenges and are affordable in light of fiscal projections. To  facilitate a process of reexamining the base of federal government, we  issued a report in February 2005 that identifies a number of 21st century  challenges and includes 12 reexamination areas. One of these areas is the  need to reassess defense programs and practices that stem from the Cold  War era. Within defense, a specific issue we believe bears review is the  need to reexamine the current business model for the reserve component.  The current business model is unsustainable, especially in light of recent  changes in how the DOD uses its reserve units. In essence, we believe that  policymakers need to focus on helping to assure that DOD has an  appropriate model for the National Guard that adequately balances the  demand for forces with appropriate human capital policies, readiness  standards, and equipping policies for all of the National Guard’s missions.
My statement today focuses on (1) challenges facing the Army National  Guard as a result of its changing role and high pace of operations, (2)  whether the Army National Guard has the equipment needed to maintain  readiness for future missions, and (3) the extent to which DOD is  transforming the Army National Guard to enhance its equipment posture  and preparedness for the future. In conjunction with this testimony, we  have also prepared a report at the committee’s request, on Army National  Guard equipment issues and the Army’s plans to convert the Army  National Guard to a modular force that equips units to support continuous  overseas operations.
To address these objectives, we drew from previous reports on the  National Guard’s use for overseas and homeland security missions and  collected and analyzed data to assess the status of Army National Guard  equipment. To determine the status of equipment, we analyzed  information on the types and quantities of Army National Guard  equipment that have been used in overseas operations; determined the  equipment status of nondeployed units; assessed the extent to which Army  National Guard equipment has been retained overseas to support ongoing  operations; and identified some of the equipment issues associated with  responding to homeland security missions and natural disasters, such as  Hurricane Katrina. To assess DOD’s transformation plans, we evaluated  the Army’s plans to convert Guard units to modular brigades and develop  a rotational deployment model to equip units to support continuous  overseas operations. We interviewed officials in the DOD, the Department  of the Army, the National Guard Bureau, and the Army National Guard and  supplemented this information with visits to Army commands and two  units—the 30th Brigade Combat Team in North Carolina, which deployed  in February 2004, and the 48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia, which  deployed in May 2005. We selected these units because they enabled us to  evaluate how the process used to prepare units has changed with  subsequent rotations to Operation Iraqi Freedom. We also discussed the  National Guard’s response to Hurricane Katrina with senior leaders of the  National Guard and visited National Guard officials in Louisiana and  Mississippi to gain their perspectives. We conducted our review of the  National Guard’s equipment status from December 2004 to October 2005  and determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for our  objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: As we have previously testified, legislative proposals involving substantial  long-term costs and commitments should be considered in the context of  the serious fiscal challenges facing this country. The federal government’s  liabilities and commitments have grown from $20.4 trillion to $43.3 trillion  from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2004. This amount continues to  increase due to continuing deficits, known demographic trends, and  compounding interest costs. Furthermore, our long-range budget  simulations show that this nation faces a large and growing structural  deficit. Given the size of our projected deficit, we will not be able to  eliminate the deficit through economic growth alone. The long-term fiscal  pressures created by the impending retirement of the baby boom  generation, rising health care costs, and increased homeland security and  defense commitments intensify the need to weigh existing federal  budgetary resources against emerging new priorities. In our 21st Century  Challenges report, we noted that it is time for a baseline review of all  major federal programs and policies, including the military’s reserve  components.  We have previously reported on a number of military force  management issues in the active and reserve components, including roles  and missions of the Army and Air National Guard and the Army Reserve  and the process for assessing the numbers of active duty military forces.  We have also reported on a number of military personnel issues, including  military compensation, health care, and recruiting and retention. In each  of these areas, questions have arisen as to whether DOD has the right  strategies to cost effectively sustain the total force in the future. In the  case of the National Guard, how this is accomplished is of particular  importance in light of its dual missions of supporting overseas operations  as well as its considerable responsibilities in its state and homeland  security roles.
The National Guard of the United States consists of two branches: the  Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. The National Guard  Bureau is the federal entity responsible for the administration of both the  Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. The Army National  Guard, which is authorized 350,000 soldiers, makes up more than one-half  of the Army’s ground combat forces and one-third of its support forces  (e.g., military police and transportation units). Army National Guard units  are located at more than 3,000 armories and bases in all 50 states and 4  U.S. territories. Traditionally, the majority of Guard members are  employed on a part-time basis, typically training 1 weekend per month and  2 weeks per year. The Guard also employs some full-time personnel who  assist unit commanders in administrative, training, and maintenance tasks.  In the past 2 years, the Army National Guard has faced increasing  challenges in recruiting new soldiers to fill authorized positions.
Army National Guard personnel may be ordered to duty under three  general statutory frameworks – Titles 10 or 32 of the United States Code or  pursuant to state law in a state active duty status. In a Title 10 status, Army  National Guard personnel are federally funded and under federal  command and control. Personnel may enter Title 10 status by being  ordered to active duty, either voluntarily or involuntarily (i.e.,  mobilization) under appropriate circumstances. When Army National  Guard forces are activated under Title 10, the National Guard is subject  to the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits it from law enforcement  activities unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or law.  Personnel in Title 32 status are federally funded but under state control.  Title 32 is the status in which National Guard personnel typically perform  training for their federal mission. In addition, the federal government  reimburses states for Guard units’ activities in response to federally- designated disasters, such as hurricane response. Personnel performing  state missions are state funded and under state command and control.  Under state law, a governor may order National Guard personnel to  respond to emergencies, civil disturbances, or perform other duties  authorized by state law. While the Army National Guard performs both  federal and state missions, the Guard is organized, trained, and equipped  for its federal missions, and these take priority over state missions.
The Guard can also be tasked with homeland security missions under the  state governors or, when activated, by DOD under command of the  President. DOD refers to its contributions to the overall homeland security  effort as “homeland defense.” Homeland defense activities include military  missions within the United States, such as flying armed patrols over U.S.  cities and guarding military installations. DOD also supports civilian  authorities to provide quick response or capabilities that other agencies do  not have. The U.S. Northern Command provides command and control for  DOD’s homeland defense missions, including land, air, aerospace, and  maritime defense operations, and coordinates DOD’s support to civil  authorities for homeland security missions.
section_title: Declining Preparedness from High Pace of Operations Signifies A Need to Reexamine the Army National Guard’s Business Model
paragraphs: As we previously reported, the high number of Army National Guard  forces used to support overseas and homeland missions since September  11, 2001, has resulted in decreased preparedness of nondeployed Guard  forces which suggests the need to reassess DOD’s business model for the  Army National Guard. We have previously reported that high-performing  organizations must reexamine their business models to ensure that their  structures and investment strategies enable them to meet external changes  in their operational environments efficiently and effectively. To meet the  demand for forces since September 11, especially for forces with special  skills that reside heavily in the Army National Guard, such as military  police, over 50 percent of Army National Guard members have been called  upon to deploy. At the same time, the Army National Guard’s involvement  in operations at home has taken on higher priority since 2001. The change  in the roles and missions of the Army National Guard has not been  matched with a change in its equipping strategy that reflects its new high  pace of operations, and as a result the Army National Guard’s ability to  continue to support ongoing operations is declining.
In keeping with post-Cold War planning assumptions, most Army National  Guard units were not expected to deploy in the early days of a conflict, but  to augment active duty units in the event of an extended conflict.  Therefore, the Army accepted some operational risk by providing the  Army National Guard fewer soldiers than it would need to fully equip its  units and less equipment than it would need to deploy, on the assumption  that there would be time to provide additional personnel, equipment, and  training during the mobilization process before units would deploy. For  example, as of 2004, the Army National Guard’s force structure called for  about 375,000 soldiers, but it was authorized about 350,000 soldiers. In  addition, Army National Guard combat units are only provided from 65 to  74 percent of the personnel and from 65 to 79 percent of the equipment  they would need to deploy, depending on the priority assigned to their  warfighting missions.
However, after September 11, 2001, the President authorized reservists to  be activated for up to 2 years, and approximately 280,000 Army National  Guard personnel have been activated to support recent operations. As of  July 2005, about 35,500 Army National Guard members were deployed to  Iraq—nearly one-third of the 113,000 U.S. forces in theater. Army National  Guard personnel deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq are expected to serve 1  year in these countries and to spend up to several additional months  mobilizing and demobilizing. As figure 1 shows, the number of activated  Army National Guard personnel for federal missions has declined since its  peak in December 2004 and January 2005. However, the Army National  Guard continues to provide a substantial number of personnel to support  current operations.
The Army National Guard has begun adapting its forces to meet the  warfighting requirements of current operations, but some measures taken  to meet immediate needs have made sustaining future operations more  challenging. Because its units did not have all the resources they needed to  deploy at the outset of current operations, the Army National Guard has  had to transfer personnel and equipment from nondeploying units to  prepare deploying units. We reported in November 2004 that as of May  2004, the Army National Guard had performed over 74,000 personnel  transfers and shifted over 35,000 pieces of equipment to deploying units.  These initial transfers worsened personnel and equipment shortages in  units that were then alerted for deployment and had to be staffed and  equipped through more transfers. The cumulative effect of these personnel  and equipment transfers has been a decline in the readiness of Army  National Guard forces for future missions, both at overseas and at home.
Even as significant numbers of personnel and equipment are supporting  overseas operations, since September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard’s  role in homeland security and civil support has taken on greater priority,  as demonstrated by the Guard’s recent involvement in responding to  Hurricane Katrina. Since September 11, 2001, the Guard has performed  other operational duties such as providing airport security and supporting  events such as the 2004 Democratic and Republican national conventions.  In the pre-September 11 security environment, it was assumed that the  National Guard could perform its domestic roles with the personnel and  equipment it was supplied for its warfighting missions. While the Army  National Guard is implementing pilot programs to strengthen capabilities  to respond to homeland security needs, such as improving critical  infrastructure protection, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the  full spectrum of the Guard’s roles and requirements for homeland security,  as we recommended. Until such an analysis is completed, congressional  policymakers may not be in the best position to assess whether the Army  National Guard’s current structure and equipment can enable it to sustain  increased homeland security responsibilities in addition to its overseas  missions.
section_title: Critical Equipment Shortages Have Degraded the Readiness of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions
paragraphs: Increasing equipment shortages among nondeployed Army National Guard  units illustrate the need for DOD to reexamine its equipping strategy and  business model for the Army National Guard. The amount of essential  warfighting equipment nondeployed National Guard units have on hand  has continued to decrease since we last reported on the Army National  Guard in 2004. Compounding the equipment shortages that have  developed because most Army National Guard units are still structured  with lesser amounts of equipment than they need to deploy, Army National  Guard units have left more than 64,000 equipment items valued at over  $1.2 billion in Iraq for use by follow-on forces; however, the Army has not  developed replacement plans for this equipment as required by DOD  policy. In addition, DOD has not determined the Army National Guard’s  equipment requirements for homeland security missions, and some states  are concerned about the Guard’s preparedness for future missions.
subsections: section_title: Equipment Status of Nondeployed Units Has Worsened in Recent Months due to Challenges in Supporting Overseas Operations with Current Inventory Levels
paragraphs: While most Army National Guard combat units are typically provided from  65 to 79 percent of the equipment they would need for their wartime  missions, for recent operations, combatant commanders have required  units to deploy with 90 to100 percent of the equipment they are expected  to need and with equipment that is compatible with active Army units.  While the Army can supply deploying Army National Guard forces with  additional equipment after they are mobilized, nondeployed Guard units  will be challenged to maintain readiness for future missions because they  transferred equipment to deploying units and have less equipment to train  with or to use for other contingencies.
The Army National Guard began transferring people and equipment to  ready units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan in the early days of the  Global War on Terrorism and the number of transfers has grown as  overseas operations have continued. In June 2004 the Army National  Guard had transferred more than 35,000 pieces of equipment to ready units  for overseas operations. By July 2005, the number of equipment items  transferred among Army National Guard units had grown to more than  101,000 items. As a result of these transfers, the proportion of  nondeployed units that reported having the minimum amount of  equipment they would need to deploy dropped from 87 percent in  October 2002 to 59 percent in May 2005. However, Army National Guard  officials estimated that when substitute items which may be incompatible  with active forces, equipment undergoing maintenance, and equipment left  overseas for follow-on forces are subtracted, nondeployed units had only  about 34 percent of their essential warfighting equipment as of July 2005.  Further, as of July 2005, the Army National Guard reported that it had less  than 5 percent of the required amount or a quantity of fewer than 5 each of  more than 220 critical items. Among these 220 high-demand items were  generators, trucks, and radios, which could also be useful for domestic  missions.
section_title: Retaining Army National Guard Equipment Overseas without Plans for Replacement Hinders the Guard’s Ability to Prepare and Train Units
paragraphs: To address equipment requirements for current overseas operations, the  Army now requires units, in both the active and reserve components, to  leave certain essential items that are in short supply in Iraq for follow-on  units to use, but it has not developed plans to replace Army National  Guard equipment as DOD policy requires.  The Army’s requirement for  leaving equipment overseas is intended to reduce the amount of  equipment that has to be transported from the United States to theater, to  better enable units to meet their deployment dates, and to maintain stocks  of essential equipment in theater where it is most needed. While this  equipping approach has helped meet current operational needs, it has  continued the cycle of reducing the pool of equipment available to  nondeployed forces for responding to contingencies and for training.
The Army National Guard estimates that since 2003, it has left more than  64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas to support  continuing operations, but the Army lacks visibility and cannot account for  all this equipment and has not developed plans to replace it. According to  Army officials, even though DOD policy requires the Army to replace  equipment transferred to it from the reserve component for more than 90  days, the Army neither created a mechanism in the early phases of the  war to track Guard equipment left in theater nor prepared replacement  plans for this equipment because the practice of leaving equipment behind  was intended to be a short-term measure. As operations continued, in June  2004, the Army tasked the Army Materiel Command with overseeing  equipment retained in theater. However, according to Army and National  Guard officials, the Army Materiel Command developed plans to track  only certain high-demand equipment items that are in short supply, such  as armored humvees and other items designated to remain in theater for  the duration of the conflict. As of July 2005, the National Guard Bureau  estimates that the Army Material Command was only tracking about 45  percent of the over 64,000 equipment items the Army National Guard units  have left in theater. The tracking effort does not include over half of the  equipment items, such as cargo trucks, rough terrain forklifts, and  palletized load trucks Guard units have left behind that were only  documented at the unit level through unit property records, even though  these items may remain in theater for up to 3 years. As a result, the Guard  does not know when or whether its equipment will be returned, which  challenges its ability to prepare and train for future missions.
As operations have continued, the amount of Guard equipment retained in  theater has increased and has hampered the ability of returning Guard  units to maintain a high level of readiness and train new personnel. For  example, according to Army National Guard officials, three Illinois Army  National Guard military police units were required to leave almost all of  their humvees, about 130, in Iraq when they returned home from  deployment, so they could not conduct training to maintain the proficiency  they acquired while overseas or train new recruits. In all, the National  Guard reported that 14 military police companies left over 600 humvees  and other armored trucks overseas, and these items are expected to  remain in theater for the duration of operations.
In May 2005, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs  expressed concerns about the significant amount of equipment Army  National Guard units have left overseas and directed the Army to develop  replacement plans as required by DOD policy. The Army expects to  complete its plans to replace stay behind equipment by October 2005.  While Army officials have stated that the equipment tracked by individual  units may eventually be returned to the Guard, both Army and Army  National Guard officials said that even if this equipment is eventually  returned, its condition is likely to be poor given its heavy use and some of  it will likely need to be replaced. Until the Army develops plans to replace  the equipment, including identifying timetables and funding sources, the  National Guard will continue to face critical equipment shortages that  reduce its readiness for future missions and it will be challenged to train  and prepare for future missions. In the report we are publishing  concurrently with the testimony, we recommended that DOD develop  and submit to the Congress a plan and funding strategy that address the  equipment needs of the Army National Guard for the Global War on  Terrorism and how the Army will transition from short-term equipping  measures to long-term equipping solutions. DOD agreed with this  recommendation, stating in its written comments that the Army needs to  determine how Army National Guard forces will be equipped to meet state  disaster response and potential homeland defense requirements and  include these requirements in its resource priorities. We believe that such  a plan should address the measures the Army will take to ensure it  complies with existing DOD directives to safeguard reserve component  equipment readiness.
section_title: States Are Concerned about Preparedness for Future Domestic Missions in Light of Growing Army National Guard Equipment Shortages
paragraphs: While Army National Guard forces have supported a range of homeland  security missions since September 11, 2001, states are concerned about  the Guard’s ability to perform future domestic missions given its declining  equipment status. For example, New Jersey officials told us that Army  National Guard units lacked some essential equipment, such as chemical  protective suits and nerve agent antidotes; they needed to respond to a  terrorist threat in December 2003. More recently, Louisiana Army National  Guard units lacked some key items they needed to conduct large-scale  disaster response. According to National Guard officials, at the time  Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf coast, much of the Guard’s most modern  equipment was deployed to Iraq while less capable equipment remained in  the United States. We are currently examining the federal response to  Hurricane Katrina, including the roles of DOD’s active duty and reserve  forces. At the time of the hurricane over 8,200 personnel and two brigade  sets of equipment from the 155th Armored Brigade of Mississippi and the  256th Infantry Brigade of Louisiana were deployed in support of Operation  Iraqi Freedom and were not available to perform their domestic missions.
Furthermore, the Adjutant General of Louisiana reported to the Army  National Guard in August 2005 that based on their analysis of the state  Guard’s equipment for state missions, even after the 256th Infantry  Brigade returned home from deployment, the brigade would lack about  350 essential equipment items needed for hurricane response including  trucks, humvees, wreckers, and water trailers because it was required to  leave a majority of its equipment items in Iraq. When we visited the area in  October 2005, Louisiana National Guard officials particularly noted that  more radios would have enabled them to communicate with other forces  and more vehicles that could be used in high water would have been very  helpful.
Louisiana and Mississippi, like many other states, have entered into mutual  assistance agreements with other states to provide additional National  Guard forces in times of need, typically to facilitate natural disaster  response. Under such agreements, in August and September 2005, over  50,000 National Guard personnel from 48 states, 2 U.S. territories and the  District of Columbia responded to the devastation caused by Hurricanes  Katrina and Rita in the Gulf Coast region. According to Louisiana officials,  state partners were proactive in identifying troops to send to the area  when the magnitude of the storm was anticipated. These forces brought  with them additional equipment such as key command and control  equipment and aviation assets.
section_title: DOD and Army Have Some Initiatives to Improve Future Readiness of Army National Guard Forces but Has Not Developed Detailed Implementation and Funding Plans
paragraphs: DOD, and the Army have recognized the need to transform the Army  National Guard to meet the new threats of the 21st century and support  civil authorities, and are undertaking some initiatives to improve the  Guard’s organization and readiness for these missions. However, it is too  early to determine whether these initiatives together comprise a  sustainable equipping and funding model for the future because  implementation plans are not complete and funding strategies have not  been fully identified. For example, the Army has not decided how to  manage equipment to ready forces as they move through the proposed  rotational force model. In addition, while DOD has produced a strategy for  homeland defense and civil support in June 2005, it has not yet completed  a plan to implement that strategy, including clarifying the Army National  Guard’s role and assessing what capabilities the Guard will require for  domestic missions, as we previously recommended. Until these initiatives  are more fully developed and key implementation decisions are made,  DOD and the Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh their  affordability and effectiveness, and the Army National Guard will be  challenged to train and prepare for all its future missions.
subsections: section_title: Army Converting Guard to Modular Designs, but Plans and Cost Estimates for Equipping Units Are Incomplete
paragraphs: In 2004, the Army developed a plan to restructure Army forces, including  the Army National Guard, to become more flexible and capable of  achieving a wide range of missions, but it has not yet completed detailed  implementation plans or cost estimates for its transformation. Rather than  being organized around divisions, the Army will transform to an  organization based on standardized, modular brigades that can be tailored  to meet the specific needs of the combatant commander. Two primary  goals of this new structure are to standardize designs and equipment  requirements for both active and reserve units and maintain reserve units  at a higher level of readiness than in the past. While the Army plans to  convert most Army National Guard units to the modular organizational  structure by 2008, Guard forces will not be fully equipped for the new  design until 2011 at the earliest. The Army had originally planned to  convert Guard units on a slower schedule by 2010, but at the request of the  Army National Guard, accelerated the conversions so that Guard units  would share the new standardized organizational designs with the active  component at least 2 years earlier, which is expected to help avoid training  soldiers for the previous skill mix and better facilitate recruiting and  retention efforts. However, our work indicates that accelerated modular  conversions will exacerbate near-term equipment shortfalls for three key  reasons. First, according to current plans, units will be expected to  convert to the new modular designs with the equipment they have on  hand. However, because of existing shortages and the large number of  equipment items that deployed units have left in Iraq or that need repair or  replacement due to heavy use, units will not have the equipment needed  for their new unit designs. For example, converted Guard units expect  initially to be without some key equipment items that provide improved  capabilities, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, single channel ground and  airborne radio systems, and Javelin antitank missiles. Second, the Army  has not planned funding to provide equipment based on the new  conversion schedule. Instead, the Army plans to proceed with the original  equipping schedule, which will not equip the Guard’s modular force until  at least 2011. Army resourcing policy gives higher priority to units engaged  in operations or preparing to deploy than those undergoing modular  conversions. As a result, the requirements of ongoing operations will  continue to deplete the Army National Guard’s equipment resources and  will affect the pace at which equipment will be available for nondeployed  units to transform to the modular design. In the meantime, modular Guard  units are expected to continue using equipment that may be older than  their active counterparts’ and will initially lack some key enablers, such as  communications systems, which are the basis for the improved  effectiveness of modular units.
In addition to the equipment shortfalls and lack of comparability that are  projected for near-term Guard conversions, the Army’s initial estimate of  $15.6 billion through 2011 for converting Guard units to modular designs is  incomplete and likely to grow for several reasons. First, the Army’s cost  estimate was based on a less modern equipping plan than the design the  Army tested for the new brigades. Second, the estimate does not include  costs for 10 of the Guard’s support units, nor does it include nearly $1.4  billion that the Guard currently estimates is needed for military  construction costs associated with the modular conversion of the Guard’s  40 support units. Third, current cost estimates assume that Guard  equipment inventories will be at prewar levels and available for modular  conversions. This, however, may not be a reasonable assumption because  as discussed previously, Army National Guard units have left large  amounts of equipment overseas, some of which will be retained  indefinitely, and the Army has not provided plans for its replacement. The  lack of complete equipping requirements and cost estimates for converting  the Army National Guard to the new modular structure raises concerns  about the affordability and effectiveness of this multibillion dollar  restructuring effort. Furthermore, without more detailed data, the  Congress may not have sufficient information to fully evaluate the  adequacy of the Army’s funding requests for its modular force initiative.
section_title: Army Plans for Managing Equipment under Its Rotational Force Model Are Not Complete
paragraphs: While the Army plans to transform into a rotational force, it has not yet  finalized plans for how Army National Guard units will be equipped under  its new model. The rotational force model is intended to provide units with  a predictable cycle of increasing readiness for potential mobilization once  every 6 years. As such, it involves a major change in the way the Army  planned to use its reserve forces and has implications for the amount and  types of equipment that Army National Guard units will need for training  to improve their readiness as they progress through the cycle. Under the  rotational force concept, rather than maintain units at less than full  readiness, the Army would cycle Army National Guard units through  phases of increasing readiness and provide increasing amounts of  equipment to units as they move through three training phases and near  readiness with the goal of predictable availability for potential deployment  once in a 6-year period.
While the Army has developed a general proposal to equip units according  to the readiness requirements of each phase of the rotational force model,  it has not yet detailed the types and quantities of items required in each  phase. Under this proposal, the Army National Guard would have three  types of equipment sets: baseline sets, training sets, and deployment sets.  The baseline set would vary by unit type and assigned mission and the  equipment it includes could be significantly reduced from the amount  called for in the unit design, but plans call for it to provide at least the  equipment Guard units would need for domestic missions, although this  standard has not been defined. Training sets would include more of the  equipment units will need to be ready for deployment, but units would  share equipment that would be located at training sites throughout the  country. The deployment set would include all equipment needed for  deployment, including theater-specific equipment, items provided through  operational needs statements, and equipment from Army prepositioned  stocks. At the time of our report, the Army was still developing the  proposals for what would be included in the three equipment sets and  planned to publish the final requirements in December 2005.
At present, it is not clear how the equipment requirements associated with  supporting deployment under the new rotational readiness cycle will  affect the types and quantities of items available for converting the Army  National Guard to a modular force. Until the near-term requirements for  the rotational model and long-term requirements for a modular force are  fully defined and integrated, the cost of equipment needed to most  efficiently implement the two initiatives will not be clear. Without firm  decisions as to requirements for both the new modular structure and  rotational deployment model and a plan that integrates requirements, the  Army and Army National Guard are not in a position to develop complete  cost estimates or to determine whether the modular and rotation  initiatives will maintain the Guard’s readiness for all its missions, including  warfighting, homeland security, and traditional state missions such as  disaster response. In our report, we recommend that DOD develop and  submit to the Congress a plan for the effective integration of the Army  National Guard into the Army’s rotational force model and modular  initiatives. We recommended that this plan include the equipment  requirements, costs, timelines and funding strategy for converting Army  National Guard units to the modular force and the extent to which the  Army National Guard will have the types of equipment and equipment  levels comparable to the active modular units. We further recommended  that the plan include an analysis of the equipment the Army National  Guard’s units will need for their missions in each phase of the rotational  cycle and how the Army will manage implementation risks to modular  forces if full funding is not provided on expected timelines. DOD agreed  with our recommendation.
section_title: DOD Has Developed a Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, but Identification of Requirements and Readiness Measures Are Not Complete
paragraphs: In June 2005, DOD published its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil  Support, which recognizes the National Guard’s critical role in these  missions in both its federal and state capacities. However, the strategy  does not detail what the Army National Guard’s role or requirements will  be in implementing the strategy. DOD has not yet completed a review of  the full range of the Army National Guard’s missions and the assets it will  need to successfully execute them. In the absence of such requirements,  National Guard units will continue to be structured and funded largely for  their warfighting roles, and with the exception of certain specialized units,  such as weapons of mass destruction civil support teams, Army National  Guard forces are generally expected to perform civil support missions  with either the resources supplied for their warfighting missions or  equipment supplied by states.
In its homeland defense and civil support strategy, DOD sets goals of  (1) maximizing threat awareness; (2) deterring or defeating threats away  from the U.S. homeland; (3) achieving mission assurance in performance  of assigned duties under attack or after disruption; (4) supporting civil  authorities in minimizing the damage and recovering from domestic  chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive mass  casualty attacks; and (5) improving national and international capabilities  for homeland defense and homeland security. The strategy recognizes the  need to manage risks in the homeland defense and civil support mission  areas given resource challenges the department faces in performing all its  missions. Therefore, the strategy puts first priority on homeland defense  missions that the department will lead, with second priority on ensuring  the department’s ability to support civil authorities in the event of multiple  mass casualties from chemical, biological, radiation, or nuclear incidents  within the United States.
To accomplish these goals, DOD has noted that it will have to integrate  strategy, planning, and operational capabilities for homeland defense and  civil support more fully into its processes. It plans to implement its  strategy with dual-purpose forces that are simultaneously trained and  equipped for warfighting and homeland missions. The strategy recognizes  that National Guard forces not on federal active duty can respond quickly  to perform homeland defense and homeland security within U.S. territory  and are particularly well suited for civil support missions because of their  locations across the nation and experience in supporting neighboring  communities in times of crisis. Based on this strategy, U.S. Northern  Command has been tasked to develop detailed contingency plans to  identify the full range of forces and resources needed for the homeland  missions DOD may lead or the civil support missions in which active or  reserve forces should be prepared to assist federal or state authorities.  However, it is not clear when this effort will be completed.
DOD has taken some steps to develop additional information on the  National Guard’s readiness for some of its domestic missions. In August  2005, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) directed  the National Guard to include readiness assessments for both its Title 10  (federal missions) and Title 32 (state missions conducted with federal  funding) in the department’s new readiness reporting system, the Defense  Readiness Reporting System, which is scheduled for implementation in  2007. The new system is expected provide officials better visibility into  unit readiness by reporting standardized metrics rather than general  categories of readiness. The National Guard Bureau is also preparing a  report for the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) on  concepts for reporting the Guard’s readiness for domestic missions and  plans to prepare a detailed implementation plan by mid-January 2006.  Until detailed concepts and implementation for these plans for domestic  readiness reporting are developed and approved, it is not clear whether  they will fully meet the recommendation in our prior report that DOD  establish readiness standards and measures for the full range of the  Guard’s homeland missions so that readiness for these missions can be  systematically measured and accurately reported.
As we reported in 2004, some states expressed concerns about the Army  National Guard’s preparedness to undertake state missions, including  supporting homeland security missions and disaster relief, given the  increase in overseas deployments and the shortages of personnel and  equipment among the remaining Guard units. Moreover, to meet new  threats, some homeland security missions could require training and  equipment, such as decontamination training and equipment that differ  from that needed to support warfighting missions. Some Guard officials  noted that states have limited budgets and that homeland security  requirements compete with other needs, although the states have funded  some homeland security activities, such as guarding critical infrastructure,  and have purchased some equipment for homeland security purposes.
To address some potential homeland security needs, DOD began  establishing weapons of mass destruction civil support teams within the  Army National Guard, as authorized by Presidential Directive and the  Congress in fiscal year 1999. These teams, which are comprised of 22 full- time personnel, are maintained at high readiness levels and can respond  rapidly to assist local officials in determining the nature of an attack,  provide medical and technical advice, and help identify follow-on federal  and state assets that might be needed. These teams are unique because  they are federally funded and trained, but perform their missions under  the command and control of the state governor. In the wake of Hurricane  Katrina, the Louisiana civil support team provided command and control  technology that was valuable in responding to this natural disaster.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While strategies such as transferring large numbers of Army National  Guard personnel and equipment from non-deploying units to deploying  units and leaving Guard equipment overseas have met DOD’s immediate  needs to support overseas operations, these strategies are not sustainable  in the long term, especially as increasing numbers of Army National Guard  personnel have already been deployed for as long as 2 years, recruiting  challenges have arisen, and equipment challenges have increased. The  current status of the Army’s equipment inventory is one symptom of the  much larger problem of an outdated business model. Critical shortages of  deployable equipment and the Army’s lack of accountability over the Army  National Guard’s equipment retained overseas have created considerable  uncertainty about what equipment the Guard will have available for  training and domestic missions, and DOD has not developed detailed plans  that include timeframes and identify resources for replacing equipment  that has been heavily used or left overseas in the short term. Without  replacement plans for equipment its units left overseas, Army National  Guard units are unable to plan for training and equipping forces for future  missions. Moreover, without a broader rethinking of the basis for Army  National Guard equipment requirements that considers both overseas and  homeland security requirements, preparedness will continue to decline  and the Guard may not be well positioned to respond to future overseas or  homeland missions or contingencies. As a result, we are recommending  that DOD develop an equipping strategy that addresses how the Army  National Guard will transition from short-term equipping measures to  long-term solutions.
DOD and the Army are implementing some initiatives to transform the  Army National Guard so that it can better support a broader range of  missions in light of the new security environment characterized by new  threats, including global terrorism. These initiatives include establishing  modular brigades; establishing a rotational model that seeks to target  equipment to a unit’s expected mission; and clarifying the Guard’s role,  training, and equipment needs for homeland security missions. However,  supporting ongoing operations will continue to strain Army National  Guard equipment inventories, and, under current plans, equipping Guard  units for new modular designs will take several years. Further, it is not  clear that these initiatives will result in a comprehensive and integrated  strategy for ensuring that the Army National Guard is well prepared for  overseas missions, homeland security needs, and state missions such as  responding to natural disasters. We are therefore making  recommendations to better integrate its initiatives. In this regard, we  believe that the Congress and senior DOD leadership must be ready to play  a key role in pressing the Army to provide more detailed plans for these  initiatives and outlining the specific funding required to implement them in  the most efficient manner.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond  to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For more information regarding this testimony, please contact Janet St.  Laurent, Director, at (202) 512-4402. Individuals making key contributions  to this testimony include Margaret Morgan, Assistant Director; Frank  Cristinzio; Alissa Czyz; Curtis Groves; Nicole Harms; Tina Morgan  Kirschbaum; Kim Mayo; Kenneth Patton; Jay Smale; and Suzanne Wren.
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