DOD Acquisitions: Contracting for Better Outcomes
Published: 2006-09-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense's (DOD) spending on goods and services has grown significantly since fiscal year 2000 to well over $250 billion annually. Prudence with taxpayer funds, widening deficits, and growing long-range fiscal challenges demand that DOD maximize its return on investment, while providing warfighters with the needed capabilities at the best value for the taxpayer. DOD needs to ensure that its funds are spent wisely, and that it is buying the right things, the right way. In this testimony, GAO discusses (1) recent trends in DOD contracting activity and the environment in which this activity takes place, and (2) practices which undermine its ability to establish sound business arrangements, particularly those involving the selection and oversight of DOD's contractors and incentivizing their performance. This statement is based on work GAO has completed over the past 6 years covering a range of DOD acquisition and contracting issues. Some of these issues are long-standing. GAO has identified DOD contract management as a high-risk area for more than decade. With awards to contractors large and growing, DOD will continue to be vulnerable to contracting fraud, waste or misuse of taxpayer dollars, and abuse.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD obligated nearly $270 billion on contracts for goods and services in fiscal year 2005, an 88 percent increase over the amount obligated in fiscal year 2000. All indications are that this upward trend will continue. Aside from growth in dollar value there have also been changes in what DOD is buying. DOD's new weapons system programs are expected to be the most expensive and complex ever and will consume an increasingly large share of its budget. In the last 5 years DOD has doubled its commitment to major weapon systems from $700 billion to $1.4 trillion, and DOD is counting on these efforts to fundamentally transform military operations. As overall obligations have increased so has its reliance on the private sector to provide services to fulfill DOD's missions and support its operations. Additionally, in recent years DOD has increased its use of existing contracts awarded by other agencies (i.e. interagency contracts). While this approach provides a number of benefits, our work, and that of some agency inspector generals, revealed instances of improper use, including issuing orders that were outside the scope of the underlying contract as well as failing to establish clear lines of accountability and responsibility. While the amount, nature, and complexity of DOD contract activity have increased, its acquisition workforce has remained relatively unchanged in size. At the same time, the acquisition workforce faces certain skills gaps and serious succession planning challenges. There are a number of DOD practices which undermine its ability to establish sound business arrangements. For example, with regard to competition and pricing, we recently found that the Army acquired guard services under authorized sole-source contracts at 46 of 57 Army installations, despite the Army's recognition that it was paying about 25 percent more for its sole-source contracts than for those it previously awarded competitively. Another element of a sound business arrangement is the fee mechanism used to incentivize excellent contractor performance. In December 2005, we reported that DOD gives its contractors the opportunity to collectively earn billions of dollars through monetary incentives. Unfortunately, we found DOD programs routinely engaged in practices that failed to hold contractors accountable for achieving desired outcomes and undermined efforts to motivate results-based contractor performance. As a result, DOD paid out an estimated $8 billion in award fees on contracts in our study population, regardless of whether acquisition outcomes fell short of, met, or exceeded DOD's expectations. DOD also increased its risk of poor acquisition outcomes by not assuring that another element of a sound business arrangement, contractor oversight, was sufficient. For example, in 2005 we reported that DOD's oversight on nearly a third of 90 service contracts reviewed was insufficient, in part because DOD failed to assign performance monitors.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss challenges that the Department of  Defense (DOD) faces to achieving better acquisition outcomes. With DOD  spending well over $250 billion annually to acquire products and services,  prudence with taxpayer funds, widening deficits, and growing long-range  fiscal challenges demand that DOD maximize its return on investment and  provide the warfighter with needed capabilities at the best value for the  taxpayer. DOD needs to ensure that its funds are spent wisely, and, in  doing so, it needs to ensure that it is buying the right things, the right way.  Several elements are essential to achieving this objective, including a  sound business case supporting executable programs, sound business  arrangements, and clear lines of responsibility and accountability.
My testimony today is based on work we have completed over the past   6 years that covered a range of acquisition and contracting issues and  which was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. My testimony will focus on (1) DOD’s recent  contracting trends, such as the spending on goods and services and the  environment in which this activity takes place; and (2) selected practices  which undermine DOD’s ability to establish solid business arrangements,  particularly those involving the selection and oversight of DOD’s  contractors and incentivizing their performance. As requested, we have  included briefing slides that we previously gave to your staff regarding  these issues and I will make reference to specific slides during the course  of my testimony.
First, I would like to reiterate the broader context. Given current policies,  in the next few decades the nation will face large and growing structural  deficits due to known demographic trends, rising healthcare costs and  current revenue-to-expenditure gaps. At the same time, weapons programs  are commanding more and more resources as DOD undertakes  increasingly ambitious efforts to transform its ability to confront current  and potential threats. Further, managing DOD is a challenge as it is one of  the world’s largest and most complex organizations, spending billions of  dollars each year to sustain key business operations that support our  forces. While DOD has embarked on a series of efforts to reform its  business operations, serious challenges and inefficiencies remain. In fact,  eight individual areas that GAO considers to be high risk because of their  greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement are  specific to DOD. Some of these issues are long-standing; for example, we  have identified DOD weapon systems acquisition and contract  management as high-risk areas for more than a decade. In a report issued  in July, we concluded that, with awards to contractors large and growing,  DOD will continue to be vulnerable to contracting fraud, waste or misuse  of taxpayer dollars, and abuse. While DOD has acknowledged its  vulnerabilities and taken some actions to address them, many of the  initiatives are still in their early stages and it is too soon to tell what  impact they may have.
Further, there are numerous factors that can contribute to poor  acquisition outcomes, which in turn erode DOD’s buying power. We list  some of these factors on slide 2.  This list is illustrative and not intended to  be exhaustive, and the risk these factors pose may manifest itself  differently depending on the nature of the acquisition.  To start, DOD’s  tendency to look for revolutionary solutions that depend on the  maturation and availability of critical technologies often results in  programs taking longer, costing more and delivering less capability than  originally promised to the warfighter.  Further, DOD wants often do not  reflect “true” requirements—in other words, based on credible threats and  risk-based needs—resulting in a mismatch between wants, needs,  affordability and sustainability.  Once true requirements are established,  they need to be stable. At times, DOD has allowed new requirements to be  added well into the acquisition cycle, significantly stretching technology  and creating design challenges, and exacerbating program budget  overruns.  Of course, defining requirements, managing contracts and  overseeing contractors requires a capable workforce that is up to meeting  these challenges, adheres to sound contracting practices, and provides  contractors with incentives that are based on results, rather than attitudes  and efforts.
subsections: section_title: Recent Contracting Trends
paragraphs: With this context in mind, I would like to turn now to recent trends in  DOD’s contracting activities. If you would turn to slide 4, DOD’s spending  on goods and services has increased by 88 percent since fiscal year 2000.  In fiscal year 2005, DOD obligated nearly $270 billion on contracts for  products, research and development efforts, and services, such as for  information technology and management support.
All indications are that this upward trend will continue. Aside from growth  in dollar value, there have also been changes in what DOD is buying.  DOD’s new weapon system programs are expected to be the most  expensive and complex ever, and will consume an increasingly large share  of DOD’s budget. To illustrate, in the last 5 years DOD has doubled its  commitment to major weapon systems from $700 billion to $1.4 trillion.  DOD is counting on these efforts to fundamentally transform military  operations. The Army, for example, is undertaking the Future Combat  Systems program—a family of weapons, including 18 manned and  unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, sensors and munitions, that will  be linked by an information network—to enable its combat force to  become lighter, more agile, and more capable. Future Combat Systems’  procurement will represent 60 to 70 percent of Army procurement from  fiscal years 2014 to 2022.
The Army, however, is not alone in pursuing complex and costly systems.  For example, the Air Force is modernizing its tactical aircraft fleet as part  of the $200 billion Joint Strike Fighter program and the F-22A Raptor  aircraft, which is expected to cost more than $65 billion. Similarly, the  Navy’s Virginia class submarine is expected to cost about $80 billion, while  the DDG-51 class of destroyer is expected to cost some $70 billion. DOD’s  development of such systems requires more funds than may reasonably be  expected to be available. For example, we testified in April 2006 that the  Navy’s shipbuilding plan projects a supply of shipbuilding funds that will  double by 2011 and will stay at high levels for years to follow.
As overall obligations have increased, so has DOD’s reliance on the private  sector to provide services to fulfill DOD’s missions and support its  operations. In some cases, the growth in services reflects that DOD is  using a different acquisition approach to support its missions. For  example, DOD is now buying launch services, rather than rockets. Service  contracts pose a number of challenges in terms of defining requirements,  establishing expected outcomes, and assessing contractor performance.
Additionally, in recent years, federal agencies including DOD have moved  away from using in-house contracting capabilities and are making greater  use of existing contracts awarded by other agencies. If you would turn  now to slide 7, these interagency contracts are intended to   leverage the government’s buying power;    provide a faster and easier method for procuring commonly used goods  and services, and  reduce initial contracting administrative costs.
DOD is the largest user of these interagency contracting vehicles, and their  availability has enabled DOD to save time by paying other agencies to  award and administer contracts for goods and services on its behalf. DOD,  however, lacks complete information about purchases made through other  agencies’ contracts. Moreover, our work and that of some agency  inspectors general have uncovered instances of improper use of  interagency contracts, including issuing orders that were outside the  scope of the underlying contract, failing to follow procedures intended to  ensure best pricing, and failing to establish clear lines of accountability  and responsibility. Further, in some instances fee-for-service arrangements  may have led to an inordinate focus on meeting customer demands at the  expense of complying with sound contracting policy and required ordering  procedures. These and other issues led us to designate management of  interagency contracting a governmentwide high-risk issue in January 2005.   Ensuring the proper use of interagency contracts must be viewed as a  shared responsibility which requires that agencies clearly define  responsibilities and adopt clear, consistent, and enforceable policies and  processes that balance the need for customer service with the  requirements of contract regulations.
At the same time that the amount, nature, and complexity of contract  activity has increased, DOD’s acquisition workforce has remained  relatively unchanged in size and faces certain skill gaps and serious  succession planning challenges. DOD’s acquisition workforce must have  the right skills and capabilities if it is to effectively implement best  practices and properly manage the goods and services it buys. We noted in  a report issued in 2003, and again in July 2006, however, that procurement  reforms, changes in staffing levels, workload, and the need for new skill  sets have placed unprecedented demands on the acquisition workforce.  Moreover, DOD’s current civilian acquisition workforce level reflects the  considerable downsizing that occurred in the 1990s. DOD’s approach to  acquisition workforce reduction during the 1990s was not oriented toward  shaping the makeup of the workforce; rather, DOD relied primarily on  voluntary turnover and retirements, freezes on hiring authority, and its  authority to offer early retirements and buyouts to achieve reductions.  Indeed, during our work on the early phases of DOD downsizing, some  DOD officials voiced concerns about what was perceived to be a lack of  attention to identifying and maintaining a balanced, basic level of skills  needed to maintain in-house capabilities.
section_title: Sound Business Arrangements
paragraphs: I would like to turn now to briefly discuss some of DOD’s practices in  three areas—(1) competition and sound pricing; (2) incentivizing  contractors; and (3) contract oversight—that increase risks and  undermine DOD’s ability to establish sound business arrangements.
subsections: section_title: Competition and Sound Pricing
paragraphs: Our work has identified a number of issues related to competition and  pricing in DOD’s efforts to obtain needed goods and services. Under the  Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, DOD contracting officers are, with  certain exceptions, to solicit offers and award contracts using full and  open competition, in which all responsible sources are permitted to  compete.  As shown on slide 10, DOD reports that only forty-one percent  of its contract obligations in fiscal year 2005 were made on contracts that  were awarded using full and open competition.  The impact of not using  full and open competition is reflected in one recent example involving the  Army’s award of sole-source contracts for security guards. In this case, we  found that the Army devoted twice as many contract dollars—nearly $495  million—to sole-sourced contracts for security guards at 46 of 57 Army  installations, despite the Army’s recognition that it was paying about   25 percent more for its sole-source contracts than for those it previously  awarded competitively.
GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees  Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-06-66 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2005); and  GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Wastes Billions of Dollars through Poorly Structured  Incentives, GAO-06-409T (Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2006).
section_title: Incentivizing Contractors
paragraphs: Another element of a sound business arrangement is the fee mechanism  used to incentivize excellent contractor performance. In December 2005,  we reported that DOD gives its contractors the opportunity to collectively  earn billions of dollars through monetary incentives. Unfortunately, we  found DOD programs routinely engaged in practices that failed to hold  contractors accountable for achieving desired outcomes and undermined  efforts to motivate results-based contractor performance, such as    evaluating contractor performance on award-fee criteria that are not  directly related to key acquisition outcomes (e.g., meeting cost and  schedule goals and delivering desired capabilities to the warfighter);   paying contractors a significant portion of the available fee for what  award-fee plans describe as “acceptable, average, expected, good, or  satisfactory” performance, which sometimes did not require meeting  the basic requirements of the contract; and   giving contractors at least a second opportunity to earn initially  unearned or deferred fees.
As a result, DOD has paid out an estimated $8 billion in award fees on  contracts in our study population, regardless of whether acquisition  outcomes fell short of, met, or exceeded DOD’s expectations. On slide 15,  we have included four cases in which contractors that were behind  schedule and over cost were paid between 74 and 100 percent of the  available award fee.
Despite paying billions of dollars in award and incentive fees, DOD has not  compiled data or developed performance measures to evaluate the validity  of its belief that award and incentive fees improve contractor performance  and acquisition outcomes. DOD’s strategies for incentivizing its  contractors, especially on weapon system development programs, are  symptomatic of a lack of discipline, oversight, transparency, and  accountability in DOD’s acquisition process.
section_title: Contract Oversight
paragraphs: I would like to briefly discuss the third element of sound business  arrangements, DOD’s oversight of its service contracts. Government  monitoring and inspection of contractor activity, if not done well, can  contribute to a lack of accountability and poor acquisition outcomes. In  2005, we reported that DOD’s monitoring of nearly a third of the 90 service  contracts we reviewed was insufficient. In these cases, we identified a  number of contributing factors, including DOD’s failure to assign  government performance monitors and the fact that personnel are usually  assigned such duties on a part-time basis and not evaluated on how well  they performed their duties. DOD and senior military acquisition policy  officials acknowledged that the priority of contracting offices is awarding  contracts, not ensuring that trained performance monitors are assigned  early so that contract oversight can begin upon contract award. Ultimately,  however, if appropriate monitoring is not being done, DOD is at risk for  paying contractors more than the value of the services they performed.
In closing, these three illustrative business arrangement issues, along with  those we have identified in DOD’s acquisition and business management  processes, present a compelling case for change. In short, it takes a myriad  of things to go right for acquisitions to be successful, but only a few things  to go wrong to cause major problems. Slide 17 provides examples of the  impact that these problems can have on reducing the government’s buying  power. Such examples illustrate the outcomes of poor acquisition  executions. The debate now centers on future investments and what  return on investment will be realized.
Finally, on slide 18 you will find a number of actions that can and should  be taken to improve acquisition outcomes. By implementing the  recommendations we have made on individual issues, DOD can improve  specific processes and activities and save huge amounts of taxpayer  dollars. At the same time, by working more broadly to improve its  acquisition practices, DOD can set the right conditions for becoming a  smarter buyer, getting better acquisition outcomes, and making more  efficient use of its resources in what is sure to be a more fiscally  constrained environment. DOD’s written acquisition policies reflect many  of our recommendations and often incorporate best practices.  As such,  the policies provide the basis for sound decisions and actions.  The  policies, however, are not consistently manifested on decisions made on  individual acquisitions. In these cases, officials are rarely held accountable  when acquisitions go astray.  It is essential to create an environment  conducive to changing behaviors and to recognize that achieving sound  acquisition outcomes are a shared responsibility between the Congress,  DOD, and the contractor community. Unless changes are made, DOD will  continue on a path where wants, needs, affordability and sustainability are  mismatched, with predictably and recurring unsatisfactory results.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my  testimony. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In preparing for this testimony, we relied principally on previously issued  GAO reports. We also obtained data on DOD’s contract activity from  DOD’s DD350 database and from the General Services Administration’s  Federal Procurement Data System. We have previously expressed  concerns about the accuracy of the data contained in the Federal  Procurement Data System. We determined, however, that the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this testimony. We also obtained  data from the Office of Personnel Management regarding DOD’s  acquisition workforce. For the purposes of this report, we selected   14 occupation series including contracting, business, purchasing, quality  assurance and supply and inventory management personnel. We  conducted our work in April and July 2006 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Katherine  V. Schinasi at (202) 512-4841 or schinasik@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this testimony. Key contributors to this report were Lily Chin,  David E. Cooper, Brendan Culley, Thomas Denomme, Timothy DiNapoli,  Paul Francis, Alan Frazier, Christopher Kunitz, Michele Mackin,   William Russell, Adam Vodraska, and Karen Zuckerstein.
section_title: Appendix I
subsections: section_title: Conducting the Business of Government
subsections: section_title: Among the 21st century challenges faced by the government is determining who will
paragraphs: do the business of government.
The work of the government is increasingly performed by the private sector under  contract.
DOD’s spending on goods and services has grown significantly since fiscal year  2000, and all indications are the trend will continue.
DOD’s weapon systems acquisition and contract management processes have been  on GAO’s high-risk list for more than a decade.
GAO designated the management of interagency contracting a governmentwide  high-risk issue in January 2005; DOD is the largest user of interagency contracting  vehicles.
section_title: DOD Contract Obligations and Acquisition Workforce Trends Since Fiscal Year 2000
paragraphs: Workforce: GAO analysis of OPM data of 14 acquisition-related job series.
section_title: Obligations Increased Across Goods and Services Categories
section_title: Growth in Contracting for Services Poses New Challenges
subsections: section_title: New missions and approaches contribute to increased spending on services:
paragraphs: Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, increased security  requirements and deployment of active duty and reserve personnel resulted in  DOD having fewer military personnel to protect domestic installations. The U.S.  Army awarded contracts worth nearly $733 million to acquire contract guards at  57 installations.
The Air Force historically bought space launch vehicles, such as the Delta and  Titan rockets, as products; under the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle  program, the Air Force purchases launch services using contractor-owned  launch vehicles. Projected program cost is $28 billion.
Defining requirements, establishing expected outcomes, and assessing contractor  performance is often more complicated compared with contracting for supplies and  equipment.
section_title: Rapid Growth of Interagency Contracting
subsections: section_title: While total sales of
section_title: GSA’s Multiple Award Schedule are available, data on the full extent of interagency contracting were not available.
section_title: Interagency Contracting Designated a Governmentwide High-Risk Area
subsections: section_title: Lack of transparency and reliable data regarding extent and details of use of
section_title: Lack of Fully Defined Requirements Increases DOD Cost Risk
subsections: section_title: Lack of fully defined requirements in DOD acquisitions contributes to numerous
paragraphs: changes to the scope and cost of the work.
Use of task order contracts and time-and-materials contracts provides DOD flexibility  to add work to contracts once needs are defined but may pose additional  management and oversight risks.
DOD may authorize contractors to begin work before reaching agreement on terms  and conditions, including scope of work, specifications, and price, under agreements  termed letter contracts or undefinitized contract actions.
DOD obligated nearly $6.5 billion under letter contracts in fiscal year 2004.
Allows DOD to initiate work quickly to meet urgent operational needs, but  contract incentives to control costs are likely to be less effective.
section_title: Competition
subsections: section_title: The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 requires that contracting officers promote and provide for full and open competition—i.e. all responsible sources are permitted to compete— when soliciting offers and awarding government contracts.
paragraphs: This enables the government to  rely on competitive market forces  to obtain needed goods and  services at fair and reasonable  prices.
Use of other than full and open  competition must be justified in  writing and must cite specific  statutory authority.
section_title: Examples of Competition and Pricing Issues
subsections: section_title: Army’s approach to acquire contract guard services under sole-source contracts at
paragraphs: 46 of 57 installations resulted in the Army paying 25 percent more for its sole-source  contracts than for those it previously awarded competitively.
February 2005 review of sole-source AWACS spare parts found that DOD did not  obtain or evaluate appropriate pricing information, such as sales data for items  asserted to be commercial, or   adequately consider analyses conducted by the Defense Contract Audit  Agency or Defense Contract Management Agency.
In the absence of adequate price competition, the Truth-in-Negotiations Act enables  DOD to obtain certified cost and pricing data for negotiated contracts exceeding  $550,000 that are not for commercial items.
GAO reviewed 20 contract actions valued at $4.4 billion in which DOD waived  the requirement for cost and pricing data.
DOD lacked guidance to help contracting officers determine whether a waiver  should be granted, what constitutes acceptable data and analyses, or the need  for assistance.
section_title: Impact of Multiple Contractor Levels on Costs Uncertain
subsections: section_title: Evidence suggests DOD is increasingly relying on contractors to manage a greater
paragraphs: range of responsibilities than traditional prime contractors. Examples include:  The Army’s $200 billion Future Combat Systems, in which the contractor is  acting as a lead system integrator. Contractor is assuming greater responsibility  for requirements development, design, and source selection of major system  and subsystem contractors, and trade-off decisions.
In an interagency contract for construction services, DOD paid 7 percent to  Treasury to award a contract to a staffing company, which then subcontracted  to a construction firm. In combination, Army paid 17 percent more than  subcontractor’s proposed price.
Historically, DOD has limited visibility over the cost impact associated with using  multiple layers of contractors to perform work.
section_title: Award- and Incentive-Fee Structures
subsections: section_title: To encourage innovative, efficient, and effective performance, DOD provides its
paragraphs: contractors the opportunity to collectively earn billions of dollars through monetary  incentives known as award and incentive fees.
On award-fee contracts, DOD personnel conduct periodic evaluations of the contractor’s performance against specified criteria and recommend the amount  of fee to be paid. Criteria and evaluations tend to be subjective.
Incentive-fee contracts typically apply a formula, specified in the contract, that  adjusts the fee based on an objective evaluation of the contractor’s  performance.
DOD reports it obligated more than $75 billion on award- and incentive-fee contracts  in fiscal year 2004.
section_title: DOD Practices Undermine Award- and Incentive-Fee Objectives
subsections: section_title: December 2005 analysis of 93 award- or incentive-fee contracts found that DOD
paragraphs: programs engaged in practices that undermined efforts to motivate contractor  performance and that did not hold contractors accountable for achieving desired  outcomes. DOD frequently paid most of available award fees regardless of whether acquisition  outcomes fell far short of, met, or exceeded expectations;   allowed contractors at least a second opportunity to earn initially unearned or   paid significant amount of fee for “acceptable, average, expected, good, or  satisfactory” performance.
Contracts with incentive fees provided a clearer link to acquisition outcomes;  however, about half of the contracts failed or are projected to fail to complete the  acquisition at or below the target price.
Despite paying billions in fees, DOD has little evidence to support its contention that  these fees improved contractor performance.
section_title: Award Fee Decisions Not Tied to Acquisition Outcomes
paragraphs: *When calculating the percentage of award fee paid (i.e. percentage of award paid = total fee paid  to date/ (total fee pool – remaining fee pool)), we included rolled-over fees in the remaining fee  pool when those fees were still available to be earned in future evaluation periods.
section_title: Insufficient Oversight on DOD Service Contracts
subsections: section_title: Monitoring and inspection of contractor performance is a key oversight mechanism.
paragraphs: If monitoring and inspection is not performed, not sufficient, or not well  documented, DOD is at risk of   being unable to identify and correct poor contractor performance in a timely   paying contractors more than the value of the services performed.
DOD personnel performed insufficient monitoring on nearly a third of the 90 service  contracts reviewed in March 2005 report.
DOD personnel failed to assign personnel to perform monitoring or did not  document monitoring and some monitoring personnel were not formally trained;  Monitoring is not perceived as important as awarding contracts; and  Personnel are usually assigned monitoring duties as a part-time responsibility and  are not evaluated on how well duties were performed.
section_title: Examples of Programs With Reduced Buying Power
section_title: Improving Acquisition Outcomes
subsections: section_title: Reconcile the differences between wants, needs, affordability and sustainability on
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