Aviation Security: DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the Commercial Aviation System, but Key Challenges Remain
Published: 2007-10-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) mission is to protect the nation's transportation network. Since its inception in 2001, TSA has developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure commercial aviation. GAO examined (1) the progress DHS and TSA have made in securing the nation's commercial aviation system, and (2) challenges that have impeded the Department's efforts to implement its mission and management functions. This testimony is based on issued GAO reports and testimonies addressing the security of the nation's commercial aviation system, including a recently issued report (GAO-07-454) that highlights the progress DHS has made in implementing its mission and management functions.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In August 2007, GAO reported that DHS had made moderate progress in securing the commercial aviation system, but that more work remains. Specifically, DHS generally achieved 17 of the 24 performance expectations that GAO identified in the area of aviation security but had generally not achieved 7 of them. DHS and TSA have made progress in many areas related to securing commercial aviation. For example, to meet congressional mandates to screen airline passengers and 100 percent of checked baggage, TSA initially hired and deployed a federal workforce of over 50,000 passenger and checked baggage screeners and installed equipment at the nation's more than 400 commercial airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems. TSA has since turned its attention to, among other things, strengthening passenger prescreening; more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the transportation security officer (TSO)------formerly known as screener------workforce; strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic air cargo security. While these efforts have helped strengthen the security of the commercial aviation system, DHS and TSA still face a number of key challenges in further securing this system. For example, TSA has faced difficulties in developing and implementing its advanced passenger prescreening system, known as Secure Flight, and has not yet completed development efforts. In addition, DHS's efforts to enhance perimeter security at airports may not be sufficient to provide for effective security. TSA has also initiated efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of security-related technologies, such as biometric identification systems, but has not developed a plan for implementing new technologies to meet the security needs of individual airports. TSA has also not yet effectively deployed checkpoint technologies to address key existing vulnerabilities, and has not yet developed and implemented technologies needed to screen air cargo. GAO also reported that a number of issues have impeded DHS's efforts in implementing its mission and management functions, including not always implementing effective strategic planning or fully adopting and applying a risk management approach with respect to commercial aviation security.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the  Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) progress and challenges in  securing our nation’s aviation system.  The Transportation Security  Administration (TSA), originally established as an agency within the  Department of Transportation in 2001 but now a component within DHS,  is charged with securing the transportation network while also ensuring  the free movement of people and commerce.  TSA has primary  responsibility for security in all modes of transportation and since its  inception has developed and implemented a variety of programs and  procedures to secure the commercial aviation system. Other DHS  components, federal agencies, state and local governments, and the  private sector also play a role in aviation security. For example, the U.S.  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has responsibility for conducting  passenger prescreening—in general, the matching of passenger  information against terrorist watch lists prior to an aircraft’s departure— for international flights operating to or from the United States, as well as  inspecting inbound air cargo upon its arrival in the United States. In  accordance with TSA requirements, airport authorities are responsible for  implementing measures to secure access to restricted airport areas as well  as airport perimeters, while air carriers are responsible for inspecting air  cargo, among other things.
My testimony today will focus on: (1) the progress TSA and other DHS  components have made in securing the nation’s commercial aviation  system and (2) challenges that have impeded DHS’s (and, as they relate to  transportation security, TSA) efforts to implement its mission and  management functions. My comments are based on issued GAO reports  and testimonies addressing the security of the nation’s aviation system,  including an August 2007 report that highlights the progress DHS has made  in implementing its mission and management functions. In this report, we  reviewed the extent to which DHS has taken actions to achieve  performance expectations in each of its mission and management areas  that we identified from legislation, Homeland Security Presidential  Directives, and DHS strategic planning documents. Based primarily on our  past work, we made a determination regarding whether DHS generally  achieved or generally did not achieve the key elements of each  performance expectation. An assessment of “generally achieved” indicates  that DHS has taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the  expectation; however, an assessment of “generally achieved” does not  signify that no further action is required of DHS or that functions covered  by the expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,  an assessment of “generally not achieved” indicates that DHS has not yet  taken actions to satisfy most elements of the performance expectation. In  determining the department’s overall level of progress in achieving  performance expectations in each of its mission and management areas,  we concluded whether the department had made limited, modest,  moderate, or substantial progress. These assessments of progress do not  reflect, nor are they intended to reflect, the extent to which actions by  DHS and its components have made the nation more secure. We  conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted in  November 2001, created TSA and gave it responsibility for securing all  modes of transportation.5  TSA’s aviation security mission includes  strengthening the security of airport perimeters and restricted airport  areas; hiring and training a screening workforce; prescreening passengers  against terrorist watch lists; and screening passengers, baggage, and cargo  at the over 400 commercial airports nation-wide, among other  responsibilities. While TSA has operational responsibility for physically  screening passengers and their baggage, TSA exercises regulatory, or  oversight, responsibility for the security of airports and air cargo.  Specifically, airports, air carriers, and other entities are required to  implement security measures in accordance with TSA-issued security  requirements, against which TSA evaluates their compliance efforts.
Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). to an aircraft’s departure. TSA plans to take over operational responsibility  for this function with the implementation of its Secure Flight program  initially for passengers traveling domestically. CBP has responsibility for  conducting passenger prescreening for airline passengers on international  flights departing from and bound for the United States,  while DHS’s  Science and Technology Directorate is responsible for researching and  developing technologies to secure the transportation sector.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the Nation’s Commercial Aviation System, but More Work Remains
paragraphs: DHS, primarily through the efforts of TSA, has undertaken numerous  initiatives since its inception to strengthen the security of the nation’s  commercial aviation system. In large part, these efforts have been affected  by legislative mandates designed to strengthen the security of commercial  aviation following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  These efforts  have also been affected by events external to the department, including  the alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to blow up commercial aircraft  bound from London to the United States. For example, TSA has  undertaken efforts to hire, train, and deploy a screening workforce; and  screen passengers, baggage, and cargo. Although TSA has taken important  actions to strengthen aviation security, the agency has faced difficulties in  implementing an advanced, government-run passenger prescreening  program for domestic flights, and in developing and implementing  technology to screen passengers at security checkpoints and cargo placed  on aircraft, among other areas. As shown in table 1, we identified 24  performance expectations for DHS in the area of aviation security, and  found that overall, DHS has made moderate progress in meeting these  expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved 17  performance expectations and has generally not achieved 7 performance  expectations. We identified these performance expectations through  reviews of key legislation, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, and  DHS strategic planning documents.
Aviation Security Strategic Approach. We concluded that DHS has  generally achieved this performance expectation. In our past work, we  reported that TSA identified and implemented a wide range of initiatives to  strengthen the security of key components of the commercial aviation  system. These components are interconnected and each is critical to the  overall security of commercial aviation. More recently, in March 2007,  TSA released its National Strategy on Aviation Security and six supporting  plans that provided more detailed strategic planning guidance in the areas  of systems security; operational threat response; systems recovery;  domain surveillance; and intelligence integration and domestic and  international outreach. According to TSA officials, an Interagency  Implementation Working Group was established under TSA leadership in  January 2007 to initiate implementation efforts for the 112 actions outlined  in the supporting plans.
Airport Perimeter Security and Access Controls. We concluded that  DHS has generally achieved one, and has generally not achieved three, of  the performance expectations in this area. For example, TSA has taken  action to ensure the screening of airport employees against terrorist watch  lists by requiring airport operators to compare applicants’ names against  the No Fly and Selectee Lists.  However, in June 2004, we reported that  although TSA had begun evaluating commercial airport perimeter and  access control security through regulatory compliance inspections, covert  testing of selected access procedures, and vulnerability assessments at  selected airports, TSA had not determined how the results of these  evaluations could be used to make improvements to the nation’s airport  system as a whole. We further reported that although TSA had begun  evaluating the controls that limit access into secured airport areas, it had  not completed actions to ensure that all airport workers in these areas  were vetted prior to being hired and trained. More recently, in March  2007, the DHS Office of Inspector General, based on the results of its  access control testing at 14 domestic airports across the nation, made  various recommendations to enhance the overall effectiveness of controls  that limit access to airport secured areas. In March through July 2007,  DHS provided us with updated information on procedures, plans, and  other efforts it had implemented to secure airport perimeters and  strengthen access controls, including a description of its Aviation Direct  Access Screening Program. This program provides for TSOs to randomly  screen airport and airline employees and employees’ property and vehicles  as they enter the secured areas of airports for the presence of explosives,  incendiaries, weapons, and other items of interest as well as improper  airport identification. However, DHS did not provide us with evidence that  these actions provide for effective airport perimeter security, nor  information on how the actions addressed all relevant requirements  established by law and in our prior recommendations.
Regarding procedures for implementing biometric identification systems,  we reported that TSA had not developed a plan for implementing new  technologies to meet the security needs of individual airports and the  commercial airport system as a whole.
In December 2004 and September 2006, we reported on the status of the  development and testing of the Transportation Worker Identification  Credential program (TWIC) – DHS’s effort to develop biometric access  control systems to verify the identity of individuals accessing secure  transportation areas. Our 2004 report identified challenges that TSA faced  in developing regulations and a comprehensive plan for managing the  program, as well as several factors that caused TSA to miss initial  deadlines for issuing TWIC cards.  In our September 2006 report, we  identified the challenges that TSA encountered during TWIC program  testing, and several problems related to contract planning and oversight.   Specifically, we reported that DHS and industry stakeholders faced  difficult challenges in ensuring that biometric access control technologies  will work effectively in the maritime environment where the  Transportation Worker Identification Credential program is being initially  tested. In October 2007, we testified that TSA had made progress in  implementing the program and addressing our recommendations  regarding contract planning and oversight and coordination with  stakeholders. For example, TSA reported that it added staff with program  and contract management expertise to help oversee the contract and  developed plans for conducting public outreach and education efforts.However, DHS has not yet determined how and when it will implement a  biometric identification system for access controls at commercials  airports. We have initiated ongoing work to further assess DHS’s efforts to  establish procedures for implementing biometric identifier systems for  airport secured areas access control.
Aviation Security Workforce. We concluded that DHS has generally  achieved all 7 performance expectations in this area. For example, TSA  has hired and deployed a federal screening workforce at over 400  commercial airports nationwide, and has developed standards for  determining TSO staffing levels at airports. TSA also established numerous  programs to train and test the performance of its TSO workforce, although  we reported that improvements in these efforts can be made. Among other  efforts, in December 2005, TSA reported completing enhanced explosives  detection training for over 18,000 TSOs, and increased its use of covert  testing to assess vulnerabilities of existing screening systems. TSA also  established the Screening Partnership Program which allows eligible  airports to apply to TSA to use a private screening workforce. In addition,  TSA has trained and deployed federal air marshals on high-risk flights;  established standards for training flight and cabin crews; and established a  Federal Flight Deck Officer program to select, train, and allow authorized  flight deck officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist or  criminal acts. Related to flight and cabin crew training, TSA revised its  guidance and standards to include additional training elements required by  law and improve the organization and clarity of the training. TSA also  increased its efforts to measure the performance of its TSO workforce  through recertification testing and other measures.
Passenger Prescreening. We reported that DHS has generally achieved  one, and has not generally achieved two, of the performance expectations  in this area. For example, TSA established policies and procedures to  ensure that individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk or  threat to security are identified and subjected to appropriate action.  Specifically, TSA requires that air carriers check all passengers against the  Selectee List, which identifies individuals that represent a higher than  normal security risk and therefore require additional security screening,  and the No Fly List, which identifies individuals who are not allowed to  fly. However, TSA has faced a number of challenges in developing and  implementing an advanced prescreening system, known as Secure Flight,  which will allow TSA to take over the matching of passenger information  against the No Fly and Selectee lists from air carriers, as required by law.   In 2006, we reported that TSA had not conducted critical activities in  accordance with best practices for large-scale information technology  programs and had not followed a disciplined life cycle approach in  developing Secure Flight. In March 2007, DHS reported that as a result of  its rebaselining efforts, more effective government controls were  developed to implement Secure Flight and that TSA was following a more  disciplined development process. DHS further reported that it plans to  begin parallel operations with the first group of domestic air carriers  during fiscal year 2009 and to take over full responsibility for watch list  matching in fiscal year 2010. We are continuing to assess TSA’s efforts in  developing and implementing the Secure Flight program. We have also  reported that DHS has not yet implemented enhancements to its passenger  prescreening process for passengers on international flights departing  from and bound for the United States. Although CBP recently issued a  final rule that will require air carriers to provide passenger information to  CBP prior to a flight’s departure so that CBP can compare passenger  information to the terrorist watch lists before a flight takes off, this  requirement is not scheduled to take effect until February 2008. In  addition, while DHS plans to align its international and domestic  passenger prescreening programs under TSA, full implementation of an  integrated system will not occur for several years.
Checkpoint Screening. We reported that DHS has generally achieved  two, and has not generally achieved one, of the performance expectations  in this area. For example, we reported that TSA has developed processes  and procedures for screening passengers at security checkpoints and has  worked to balance security needs with efficiency and customer service  considerations. More specifically, in April 2007, we reported that  modifications to standard operating procedures were proposed based on  the professional judgment of TSA senior-level officials and program-level  staff, as well as threat information and the results of covert testing.  However, we found that TSA’s data collection and analyses could be  improved to help TSA determine whether proposed procedures that are  operationally tested would achieve their intended purpose. We also  reported that DHS and its component agencies have taken steps to  improve the screening of passengers to address new and emerging threats.  For example, TSA established two recent initiatives intended to strengthen  the passenger checkpoint screening process: (1) the Screening Passenger  by Observation Technique program, which is a behavior observation and  analysis program designed to provide TSA with a nonintrusive means of  identifying potentially high- risk individuals; and the (2)  Travel Document  Checker program which replaces current travel document checkers with  TSOs who have access to sensitive security information on the threats  facing the aviation industry and check for fraudulent documents.  However, we found that while TSA has developed and tested checkpoint  technologies to address vulnerabilities that may be exploited by identified  threats such as improvised explosive devices, it has not yet effectively  deployed such technologies. In July 2006, TSA reported that it installed 97  explosives trace portal machines—which use puffs of air to dislodge and  detect trace amounts of explosives on persons—at 37 airports. However,  DHS identified problems with these machines and has halted their  deployment. TSA is also developing backscatter technology, which  identifies explosives, plastics and metals, giving them shape and form and  allowing them to be visually interpreted. However, limited progress has  been made in fielding this technology at passenger screening checkpoints.  The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007  (9/11 Commission Act), enacted in August 2007, restates and amends a  requirement that DHS issue a strategic plan for deploying explosive  detection equipment at airport checkpoints and requires DHS to expedite  research and develop efforts to protect passenger aircraft from explosives  devices. We are currently reviewing DHS and TSA’s efforts to develop,  test and deploy airport checkpoint technologies.
Checked Baggage Screening. We concluded that DHS has generally  achieved all three performance expectations in this area. Specifically, from  November 2001 through June 2006, TSA procured and installed about  1,600 Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and about 7,200 Explosive Trace  Detection (ETD) machines to screen checked baggage for explosives at  over 400 commercial airports.  In response to mandates to field the  equipment quickly and to account for limitations in airport design, TSA  generally placed this equipment in a stand-alone mode—usually in airport  lobbies—to conduct the primary screening of checked baggage for  explosives. Based in part on our previous recommendations, TSA later  developed a plan to integrate EDS and ETD machines in-line with airport  baggage conveyor systems. The installation of in-line systems can result in  considerable savings to TSA through the reduction of TSOs needed to  operate the equipment, as well as increased security. Despite delays in the  widespread deployment of in-line systems due to the high upfront capital  investment required, TSA is pursuing the installation of these systems and  is seeking creative financing solutions to fund their deployment. In March  2007, DHS reported that it is working with airport and air carrier  stakeholders to improve checked baggage screening solutions to enhance  security and free up lobby space at airports. The installation of in-line  baggage screening systems continues to be an issue of congressional  concern. For example, the 9/11 Commission Act reiterates a requirement  that DHS  submit a cost-sharing study along with a plan and schedule for  implementing provisions of the study, and requires TSA to establish a  prioritization schedule for airport improvement projects such as the  installation of in-line baggage screening systems.
Air Cargo Security. We reported that TSA has generally achieved two,  and has not generally achieved one, of the performance expectations in  this area. Specifically, TSA has developed a strategic plan for domestic air  cargo security and has taken actions to use risk management principles to  guide investment decisions related to air cargo bound for the United States  from a foreign country, referred to as inbound air cargo, but these actions  are not yet complete. For example, TSA plans to assess inbound air cargo  vulnerabilities and critical assets—two crucial elements of a risk-based  management approach—but has not yet established a methodology or  time frame for how and when these assessments will be completed. TSA  has also developed and implemented procedures to screen domestic and  inbound air cargo. We reported in October 2005 that TSA had significantly  increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections conducted of air  carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with security requirements.  However, we also reported that TSA exempted certain cargo from random  inspection because it did not view the exempted cargo as posing a  significant security risk, although air cargo stakeholders noted that such  exemptions may create potential security risks and vulnerabilities since  shippers may know how to package their cargo to avoid inspection. In  part based on a recommendation we made, TSA is evaluating existing  exemptions to determine whether they pose a security risk, and has  removed some exemptions that were previously allowed. The 9/11  Commission Act requires, no later than 3 years after its enactment, that  DHS have a system in place to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on  passenger aircraft.  Although TSA has taken action to develop plans for  securing air cargo and establishing and implementing procedures to  screen air cargo, DHS has not yet developed and implemented screening  technologies. DHS is pursuing multiple technologies to automate the  detection of explosives in the types and quantities that would cause  catastrophic damage to an aircraft in flight. However, TSA acknowledged  that full development of these technologies may take 5 to 7 years. In April  2007, we reported that TSA and DHS’s S&T Directorate were in the early  stages of evaluating and piloting available aviation security technologies to  determine their applicability to the domestic air cargo environment. We  further reported that although TSA anticipates completing its pilot tests by  2008, it has not yet established time frames for when it might implement  these methods or technologies for the inbound air cargo system.
section_title: Cross-cutting Issues Have Hindered DHS’s Efforts in Implementing Its Mission and Management Functions
paragraphs: Our work has identified homeland security challenges that cut across  DHS’s mission and core management functions. These issues have  impeded the department’s progress since its inception and will continue as  DHS moves forward. While it is important that DHS continue to work to  strengthen each of its mission and core management functions, to include  aviation security, it is equally important that these key issues be addressed  from a comprehensive, department-wide perspective to help ensure that  the department has the structure and processes in place to effectively  address the threats and vulnerabilities that face the nation. These issues  include: (1) transforming and integrating DHS’s management functions; (2)  establishing baseline performance goals and measures and engaging in  effective strategic planning efforts; (3) applying and strengthening a risk  management approach for implementing missions and making resource  allocation decisions; (4) sharing information with key stakeholders; and  (5) coordinating and partnering with federal, state and local, and private  sector agencies. We have made numerous recommendations to DHS to  strengthen these efforts, and the department has made progress in  implementing some of these recommendations.
DHS has faced a variety of difficulties in its efforts to transform into a fully  functioning department. We designated DHS’s implementation and  transformation as high-risk in part because failure to effectively address  this challenge could have serious consequences for our security and  economy. DHS continues to face challenges in key areas, including  acquisition, financial, human capital, and information technology  management. This array of management and programmatic challenges  continues to limit DHS’s ability to effectively and efficiently carry out its  mission. In addition, transparency plays an important role in helping to  ensure effective and efficient transformation efforts. We have reported  that DHS has not made its management or operational decisions  transparent enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively,  efficiently, and economically using the billions of dollars in funding it  receives annually. More specifically, in April 2007, we testified that we  have encountered access issues during numerous engagements at DHS,  including significant delays in obtaining requested documents that have  affected our ability to do our work in a timely manner. The Secretary of  DHS and the Under Secretary for Management have stated their desire to  work with us to resolve access issues and to provide greater transparency.  It will be important for DHS and its components to become more  transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing access to  information on its programs and operations so that Congress, GAO, and  others can independently assess its efforts.
In addition, DHS has not always implemented effective strategic planning  efforts and has not yet fully developed performance measures or put into  place structures to help ensure that the agency is managing for results. We  have identified strategic planning as one of the critical success factors for  new organizations, and reported that both DHS’s and TSA’s efforts in this  area have been mixed. For example, with regards to TSA’s efforts to  secure air cargo, we reported that TSA completed an Air Cargo Strategic  Plan in November 2003 that outlined a threat-based risk management  approach to securing the nation’s domestic air cargo system, and that this  plan identified strategic objectives and priority actions for enhancing air  cargo security based on risk, cost, and deadlines.  However, we reported  that TSA had not developed a similar strategy for addressing the security  of inbound air cargo—cargo transported into the United States from  foreign countries, including how best to partner with CBP and  international air cargo stakeholders. In another example, we reported that  TSA had not yet developed outcome-based performance measures for its  foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs, such as the  percentage of security deficiencies that were addressed as a result of  TSA’s on-site assistance and recommendations, to identify any aspects of  these programs that may need attention. We recommended that DHS  direct TSA and CBP to develop a risk-based strategy, including specific  goals and objectives, for securing air cargo; and develop outcome-based  performance measures for its foreign airport assessment and air carrier  inspection programs. DHS generally concurred with GAO’s  recommendations.
DHS has also not fully adopted and applied a risk management approach  in implementing its mission and core management functions. Risk  management has been widely supported by the President and Congress as  an approach for allocating resources to the highest priority homeland  security investments, and the Secretary of Homeland Security and the  Assistant Secretary for Transportation Security have made it a centerpiece  of DHS and TSA policy. Several DHS component agencies and TSA have  worked towards integrating risk-based decision making into their security  efforts, but we reported that these efforts can be strengthened. For  example, TSA has incorporated certain risk management principles into  securing air cargo, but has not completed assessments of air cargo  vulnerabilities or critical assets—two crucial elements of a risk-based  approach without which TSA may not be able to appropriately focus its  resources on the most critical security needs. TSA has also incorporated  risk-based decision making when making modifications to airport  checkpoint screening procedures, to include modifying procedures based  on intelligence information and vulnerabilities identified through covert  testing at airport checkpoints. However, in April 2007 we reported that  TSA’s analyses that supported screening procedural changes could be  strengthened. For example, TSA officials decided to allow passengers to  carry small scissors and tools onto aircraft based on their review of threat  information—which indicated that these items do not pose a high risk to  the aviation system—so that TSOs could concentrate on higher threat  items. However, TSA officials did not conduct the analysis necessary to  help them determine whether this screening change would affect TSO’s  ability to focus on higher-risk threats.
We have further reported that opportunities exist to enhance the  effectiveness of information sharing among federal agencies, state and  local governments, and private sector entities. In August 2003, we reported  that efforts to improve intelligence and information sharing need to be  strengthened, and in 2005, we designated information sharing for  homeland security as high-risk.  In January 2005, we reported that the  nation still lacked an implemented set of government-wide policies and  processes for sharing terrorism-information, but DHS has issued a strategy  on how it will put in place the overall framework, policies, and  architecture for sharing information with all critical partners—actions that  we and others have recommended. DHS has taken some steps to  implement its information sharing responsibilities. States and localities are  also creating their own information “fusion” centers, some with DHS  support. With respect to aviation security, the importance of information  sharing was recently highlighted in the 9/11 Commission Act, which  requires DHS to establish a plan to promote the sharing of transportation  security information among DHS and federal, state and local agencies,  tribal governments, and appropriate private entities. The Act also  requires that DHS provide timely threat information to carriers and  operators that are preparing and submitting a vulnerability assessment and  security plan, including an assessment of the most likely methods that  could be used by terrorists to exploit weaknesses in their security.
In addition to providing federal leadership with respect to homeland  security, DHS also plays a large role in coordinating the activities of key  stakeholders, but has faced challenges in this regard. To secure the nation,  DHS must form effective and sustained partnerships between legacy  component agencies and a range of other entities, including other federal  agencies, state and local governments, the private and nonprofit sectors,  and international partners. We have reported that successful partnering  and coordination involves collaborating and consulting with stakeholders  to develop and agree on goals, strategies, and roles to achieve a common  purpose; identify resource needs; establish a means to operate across  agency boundaries, such as compatible procedures, measures, data, and  systems; and agree upon and document mechanisms to monitor, evaluate,  and report to the public on the results of joint efforts. We have found that  the appropriate homeland security roles and responsibilities within and  between the levels of government, and with the private sector, are  evolving and need to be clarified. For example, we reported that  opportunities exists for TSA to work with foreign governments and  industry to identify best practices for securing air cargo, and  recommended that TSA systematically compile and analyze information on  practices used abroad to identify those that may strengthen the  department’s overall security efforts. Further, regarding efforts to  respond to in-flight security threats, which—depending on the nature of  the threat—could involve 15 federal agencies and agency components, we  recommended that DHS and other departments document and share their  respective coordination and communication strategies and response  procedures.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: The magnitude of DHS’s and more specifically TSA’s responsibilities in  securing the nation’s commercial aviation system is significant, and we  commend the department on the work it has done and is currently doing  to secure this network. Nevertheless, given the dominant role that TSA  plays in securing the homeland, it is critical that its programs and  initiatives operate as efficiently and effectively as possible. In the almost 6  years since its creation, TSA has had to undertake its critical mission while  also establishing and forming a new agency.  At the same time, a variety of  factors, including threats to and attacks on aviation systems around the  world, as well as new legislative requirements, has led the agency to  reassess its priorities and reallocate resources to address key events, and  to respond to emerging threats. Although TSA has made considerable  progress in addressing key aspects of commercial aviation security, more  work remains in the areas of checkpoint and air cargo technology, airport  security, and passenger prescreening. As DHS and TSA and other  components move forward, it will be important for the department to  work to address the challenges that have affected its operations thus far,  including developing results-oriented goals and measures to assess  performance; developing and implementing a risk-based approach to guide  resource decisions; and establishing effective frameworks and  mechanisms for sharing information and coordinating with homeland  security partners. A well-managed, high-performing TSA is essential to  meeting the significant challenge of securing the transportation network.  As TSA continues to evolve, implement its programs, and integrate its  functions, we will continue to review its progress and performance and  provide information to Congress and the public on its efforts.
Madam Chair, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at  this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen Berrick  at (202) 512- 3404 or at berrickc@gao.gov. Individuals making key  contributions to this testimony include Steve D. Morris, Assistant Director,  Gary Malavenda, Susan Langley, and Linda Miller.
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