Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for Determining Civilian Position Requirements
Published: 2012-07-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Security clearances allow personnel access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can, in some cases, cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. In 2011, the DNI reported that over 4.8 million federal government and contractor employees held or were eligible for a clearance. To safeguard classified data and manage costs, agencies need an effective process to determine whether civilian positions require a clearance. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which the executive branch has established policies and procedures for agencies to use when (1) first determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance and (2) reviewing and revising or validating existing federal civilian position security clearance requirements. GAO reviewed executive orders and the Code of Federal Regulations and met with officials from ODNI and OPM because of their Directors assigned roles as Security and Suitability executive agents, as well as DHS and DOD based on the volume of clearances they process.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), as Security Executive Agent, has not provided agencies clearly defined policy and procedures to consistently determine if a position requires a security clearance. Executive Order 13467 assigns DNI responsibility for, among other things, developing uniform and consistent policies to determine eligibility for access to classified information, and gives the DNI authority to issue guidance to agency heads to ensure uniformity in processes relating to those determinations. In the absence of this guidance, agencies are using an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) tool that OPM designed to determine the sensitivity and risk levels of civilian positions which, in turn, inform the type of investigation needed. OPM audits, however, found inconsistency in these position designations, and some agencies described problems in implementing OPMs tool. In an April 2012 audit, OPM reviewed the sensitivity levels of 39 positions in an agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) and reached different conclusions than the agency for 26 of them. Problems exist, in part, because OPM and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) did not collaborate on the development of the position designation tool, and because their roles for suitabilityconsideration of character and conduct for federal employmentand security clearance reform are still evolving. Without guidance from the DNI, and without collaboration between the DNI and OPM in future revisions to the tool, executive branch agencies will continue to risk making security clearance determinations that are inconsistent or at improper levels.
The DNI also has not established guidance to require agencies to review and revise or validate existing federal civilian position designations. Executive Order 12968 says each agency shall request or grant clearance determinations, subject to certain exceptions, based on a demonstrated need for access, and keep to a minimum the number of employees that it determines are eligible for access to classified information. The order also states that access to classified information shall be terminated when an employee no longer has a need for access, and prohibits agencies from requesting or approving eligibility in excess of actual requirements for access. During this review of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOD components, GAO found that agency officials were aware of the need to keep the number of security clearances to a minimum, but were not always required to conduct periodic reviews and validations of the security clearance needs of existing positions. Overdesignating positions results in significant cost implications, given that the fiscal year 2012 base price for a top secret clearance investigation conducted by OPM is $4,005, while the base price of a secret clearance is $260. Conversely, underdesignating positions could lead to security risks. GAO found that the agencies follow varying practices because the DNI has not established guidance that requires executive branch agencies to review and revise or validate position designations on a recurring basis. Without such a requirement, executive branch agencies may be hiring and budgeting for initial and periodic security clearance investigations using position descriptions and security clearance requirements that no longer reflect national security needs. Further, since reviews are not done consistently, DHS and DOD and other executive branch agencies cannot have assurances that they are keeping the number of positions that require security clearances to a minimum.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the DNI issue clearly defined policy for agencies to follow when determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance, and that the DNI and Director of OPM collaborate to revise the existing position designation tool. GAO further recommends that the DNI issue guidance to require agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the designation of their existing federal civilian positions. ODNI and OPM concurred, although OPM raised concerns with which GAO disagrees and addresses in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The ODNI report notes that there could be some duplicative entries. However, we did not  verify the accuracy of this number.
According to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) fiscal year 2010 data, the  federal government workforce consisted of over 4.4 million federal civilian employees and  military personnel. This figure does not include contractors. $57 million, respectively, on suitabilitybackground investigations in fiscal year 2011.
GAO, Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance Process,  GAO-08-776T (Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008) and Personnel Clearances: Key Factors  to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security Clearance Processes, GAO-08-352T  (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2008). to conduct background investigations between fiscal years 2005 and  2011. Specifically, OPM’s reported costs increased from about $602  million in fiscal year 2005 to almost $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2011 (in  fiscal year 2011 dollars).
You asked us to evaluate federal government policies and practices for  identifying positions that require security clearances, and analyze whether  a uniform, consistent, and effective security clearance requirements  determination process is in place. In response to this request, we  examined the extent to which the executive branch has established        (1) policies and procedures for agencies to use when first determining  whether federal civilian positions require a security clearance and           (2) policies and procedures for agencies to review and revise or validate  existing federal civilian position security clearance requirements.
Specifically, the scope of our work focused on the security clearance  requirements of federal civilian positions from selected components within  DHS and DOD, due to the volume of clearances that these two agencies  process. Within DHS, selected components included the U.S. Coast  Guard, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the  Transportation Security Administration. Within DOD, selected  components included the headquarters-level elements of the  Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and Washington  Headquarters Services, which provides human capital support for several  nonservice DOD agencies and activities. For our first objective, to  examine the extent to which the executive branch has established  policies and procedures for agencies to use when first determining  whether federal civilian positions require a security clearance, we  interviewed key officials from the above-mentioned federal departments  and selected components, as well as OPM and ODNI. In addition, we  reviewed relevant Executive Orders including 10450, 12968, and 13467,  Joint Reform Team reports, and part 732 of Title 5 of the Code of  Federal Regulations. We also obtained and analyzed personnel security  clearance policies within DHS, DOD, and the selected components within  these departments. Further, we obtained and analyzed OPM’s position  designation tool because agencies we spoke with use the tool in the  position designation process. For our second objective, to examine the  extent to which the executive branch has policies and procedures for  agencies to review and revise or validate existing federal civilian position  security clearance requirements, we held meetings with knowledgeable  officials from DHS, DOD, OPM, and ODNI. In addition, we reviewed part  732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations. We also analyzed  DHS’s and DOD’s personnel security policies, and the applicable policies  of selected components within these departments. We conducted this  performance audit from July 2011 through July 2012 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our objectives. A more thorough description of our scope and  methodology is provided in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Security clearances are required for access to certain national security  information, which is classified at one of three levels: top secret, secret, or  confidential. The level of classification denotes the degree of protection  required for information and the amount of damage that unauthorized  disclosure could reasonably cause to national security.
subsections: section_title: Relevant Orders and Regulations
paragraphs: Executive Order 10450, which was originally issued in 1953, makes the  heads of departments or agencies responsible for establishing and  maintaining effective programs for ensuring that civilian employment and  retention is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.  Agency heads are also responsible for designating positions within their  respective agencies as sensitive if the occupant of that position could, by  virtue of the nature of the position, bring about a material adverse effect  on national security. In addition, Executive Order 12968, issued in 1995,  is relevant to position designation because the order also makes the  heads of agencies—including executive branch agencies and the military  departments—responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective  program to ensure that access to classified information by each employee  is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. This order also  states that, subject to certain exceptions, eligibility for access to classified  information shall only be requested and granted on the basis of a  demonstrated, foreseeable need for access. Further, part 732 of Title 5 of  the Code of Federal Regulations provides requirements and procedures  for the designation of national security positions, which include positions  that (1) involve activities of the government that are concerned with the  protection of the nation from foreign aggression or espionage, and          (2) require regular use of or access to classified national security  information.
In addition, part 732 states that most federal government positions that  could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material  adverse effect on national security must be designated as a sensitive  position and require a sensitivity level designation. The sensitivity level  designation determines the type of background investigation required,  with positions designated at a greater sensitivity level requiring a more  extensive background investigation. Part 732 establishes three sensitivity  levels—special-sensitive, critical-sensitive, and noncritical-sensitive— which are described in figure 1. According to OPM, positions that an  agency designates as special-sensitive and critical-sensitive require a  background investigation that typically results in a top secret clearance.  Noncritical-sensitive positions typically require an investigation that  supports a secret or confidential clearance. OPM also defines non- sensitive positions that do not have a national security element, but still  require a designation of risk for suitability purposes. That risk level  determines the type of investigation required for those positions. Those  investigations include aspects of an individual’s character or conduct that  may have an effect on the integrity or efficiency of his or her service.
section_title: Position Designation Process
paragraphs: The personnel security clearance process begins when a human  resources or security professional determines a position’s level of  sensitivity, which includes consideration of whether or not a position  requires access to classified information and, if required, the level of  access. DHS and DOD follow a general process for determining whether  a federal civilian position requires access to classified information, which  informs whether a position requires a security clearance. This process is  described in figure 1 below and is based on our review of the  corresponding guidance and testimonial evidence gathered during  interviews with DHS and DOD officials. In addition, a more thorough  description of DHS and DOD component-level policies appears in  appendix II.
The personnel security clearance process is further described in appendix  III.
section_title: Personnel Security Clearance and Suitability Reforms
paragraphs: The increased demand for personnel with security clearances following  the events of September 11, 2001, led GAO and others to identify delays  and incomplete documentation in the security clearance process. In light  of these concerns, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and  Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which set objectives and  established requirements for improving the clearance process, including  improving the timeliness of the clearance process, achieving interagency  reciprocity, establishing an integrated database to track investigative and  adjudicative information, and evaluating available technology for  investigations and adjudications.
Executive Order 13467 calls for investigations of suitability and security to be aligned  using consistent standards, to the extent practicable. predecessor that continues to focus on the reform effort—detailing  reform-related plans, including a February 2010 strategic framework that  established goals, performance measures, roles and responsibilities, and  proposed metrics for determining the quality of security clearance  investigations and adjudications. Those reports contained a reform plan  that outlined a new seven-step process for end-to-end suitability and  security clearance reform, see figure 2 below. According to ODNI officials,  the first step—to “validate need,”—focuses on ensuring that the sensitivity  level of positions is designated appropriately on the basis of mission  needs, among other things.
Separate from, but related to, security clearances are determinations of  suitability that the executive branch uses to ensure individuals are  suitable, based on character and conduct, for federal employment in their  agency or position. Suitability requirements sometimes overlap with  national security requirements. For example, the Department of Justice  checks suitability to ensure that applicants for jobs with the Drug  Enforcement Agency have never used illegal drugs. In addition, Health  and Human Services checks the suitability of applicants for jobs working  with children. Similarly, the Intelligence Community requires polygraph  evaluations, among other things, to determine suitability for most  intelligence positions. OPM was involved in many aspects of the  suitability investigation process under Part 731 of Title 5 of the Code of  Federal Regulations, prior to the issuance of Executive Order 13467 and,  as the Suitability Executive Agent, the Director continues to be  responsible for developing and implementing uniform and consistent  policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely  completion of background investigations and adjudications relating to  determinations of suitability.
In contrast, the DNI was assigned a new role. Executive Order 13467  states that the DNI, as the Security Executive Agent, is responsible for,  among other things, developing uniform and consistent policies and  procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of  background investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of  eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a  sensitive position. In addition to these responsibilities, the Executive  Order also provides the DNI the authority to issue guidelines and  instructions to the heads of agencies to ensure appropriate uniformity,  centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, and timeliness in processes  relating to determinations by agencies of eligibility for access to classified  information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position. The order also states  that the Performance Accountability Council is responsible for ensuring  that the Executive Agents align their respective processes. Finally, the  order states that agency heads should implement any policy or procedure  developed by either the Performance Accountability Council or Executive  Agents under the order.
section_title: The Executive Branch Has Not Issued Clearly Defined Policy Guidance for Determining When a Federal Civilian Position Needs a Security Clearance
paragraphs: The DNI, in the capacity as Security Executive Agent responsible for  developing uniform and consistent policies related to the security  clearance process, has expressed intent to issue guidance relating to  national security positions. However, the DNI has not provided agencies  with clearly defined policy through regulation or other guidance to help  ensure that executive branch agencies use appropriate and consistent  criteria when determining if positions require a security clearance.  Instead, executive branch agencies are using a position designation tool  developed by OPM. This tool is designed to determine the sensitivity level  of civilian positions which, in turn, informs the type of background  investigation needed if a clearance is warranted. The DNI, however, did  not have a role in its development even though the two Executive Agents  are to align their respective processes. As a result, agency officials we  met expressed mixed views on the effectiveness of the tool for national  security positions.
subsections: section_title: The DNI Has a Role to Guide Agencies in Designating Positions for Security Clearances, But Has Not Provided Agencies with Clearly Defined Policy Guidance
paragraphs: According to Executive Order 13467, issued in June 2008, the DNI, as  the Security Executive Agent, is responsible for developing uniform and  consistent policies and procedures for determinations of eligibility for  access to classified information or to hold a sensitive position. Further,  the executive order states that agency heads shall assist the  Performance Accountability Council and Executive Agents in carrying out  any function under the order, which includes implementing any policies or  procedures developed pursuant to the order. Although agency heads  retain the flexibility to make determinations regarding which positions in  their agency require a security clearance, the DNI is well positioned, by  virtue of its role as the Security Executive Agent, to provide guidance to  help align the process from agency to agency. The DNI, however, has not  provided agencies with clearly defined policy or instructions.
section_title: OPM Has Developed a Tool to Help Agencies Determine the Proper Sensitivity Level for Most Federal Positions, but the Tool Lacks Input from the DNI
paragraphs: To assist with position designation, the Director of OPM—the Executive  Agent for Suitability—has developed a process that includes a position  designation system and corresponding automated tool to guide agencies  in determining the proper sensitivity level for the majority of federal   This tool—namely, the Position Designation of National  positions.Security and Public Trust Positions—enables a user to evaluate a  position’s national security and suitability requirements so as to determine  a position’s sensitivity and risk levels, which in turn dictate the type of  background investigation that will be required for the individual who will  occupy that position. In most agencies outside the Intelligence  Community, OPM conducts the background investigations for both  suitability and security clearance purposes. The tool does not directly  determine whether a position requires a clearance, but rather helps  determine the sensitivity level of the position. The determination to grant a  clearance is based on whether a position requires access to classified  information or other relevant factors, and, if access is required, the  responsible official will designate the position to require a clearance.
OPM developed the position designation system and automated tool for  multiple reasons. First, OPM determined through a 2007 initiative that  its existing regulations and guidance for position designation were  complex and difficult to apply, resulting in inconsistent designations. As a  result of a recommendation from the initiative, OPM created a simplified  position designation process in 2008. Additionally, OPM officials noted  that the tool is to support the goals of the security and suitability reform  efforts, which require proper designation of national security and  suitability positions.
OPM first introduced the automated tool in November 2008, and issued  an update of the tool in 2010. In August 2010, OPM issued guidance      (1) recommending all agencies that request OPM background  investigations use the tool and (2) requiring agencies to use the tool for all  positions in the competitive service, positions in the excepted service  where the incumbent can be noncompetitively converted to the  competitive service, and career appointments in the Senior Executive  Service. Both DHS and DOD components use the tool. A DHS instruction  requires personnel to designate all DHS positions by using OPM’s  position sensitivity designation guidance, which is the basis of the tool. In addition, DOD issued guidance in September 2011 requiring its  personnel to use OPM’s tool to determine the proper position sensitivity  designation for new or vacant positions, including the establishment and  reclassification of positions. ODNI officials told us that they believe OPM’s  tool is useful for determining a position’s sensitivity level. However,  despite the DNI’s responsibility for policy related to ensuring uniformity in  the security clearance process, ODNI officials noted that the DNI did not  have input into recent revisions of OPM’s position designation tool.
DHS Management Instruction 121-01-007, Department of Homeland Security Personnel  Suitability and Security Program (June 2009). the DNI as Executive Agents are still evolving, although Executive Order  13467 defines responsibilities for each Executive Agent. Accordingly, we  found that the Director of OPM and the DNI have not fully collaborated in  executing their respective roles in the process for determining position  designations. For example, OPM has had long-standing responsibility for  establishing standards with respect to suitability for most federal  government positions. Accordingly, the sections of the tool to be used for  evaluating a position’s suitability risk level are significantly more detailed  than the sections designed to aid in designating the national security  sensitivity level of the position. While most of OPM’s position designation  system, which is the basis of the tool, is devoted to suitability issues, only  two pages are devoted to national security issues, despite the reference  to national security in its title. Moreover, OPM did not seek to collaborate  with the DNI when updating the tool in 2010. Similarly, in 2010, OPM  initiated revisions to the part of the Code of Federal Regulations that   According to OPM and ODNI  pertain to national security positions.officials, the revision is expected to clarify the standards for designating  whether federal positions are national security sensitive, which will help  agencies more accurately assess the sensitivity of a position. The  sensitivity level includes consideration of whether a position is eligible for  access to classified information and the level of access. Further, the  revision is currently expected to update the definition of national security  positions to include positions that could have a material impact on  national security, but might not clearly fall within the current definition in  part 732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations. For example, such  positions include those with duties that involve the protection of borders,  ports, and critical infrastructure, as well as those with responsibilities  related to public safety, law enforcement, and the protection of  government information systems.
During our review, human capital and security officials from DHS and  DOD and the selected components affirmed that they were using the  existing tool to determine the sensitivity level required by a position.  However, in the absence of clearly defined policy from the DNI and the  lack of collaborative input into the tool’s design, officials explained that  they sometimes had difficulty in using the tool to designate the sensitivity  level of national security positions.
OPM regularly conducts audits of its executive branch customer agency  personnel security and suitability programs, which include a review of  position designation to assess the agencies’ alignment with OPM’s  position designation guidance. In the audit reports we obtained, OPM  found examples of inconsistency between agency position designation  and OPM guidance, both before and after the implementation of OPM’s  tool. For instance, prior to the implementation of the tool, in a 2006 audit  of an executive branch agency, OPM found that its sensitivity  designations differed from the agency’s designation in 13 of 23 positions.  Specifically, OPM concluded that 11 positions were underdesignated,       1 position was overdesignated, and 1 position was adjusted. More  recently, after the implementation of the tool, in an April 2012 audit of a  DOD agency, OPM assessed the sensitivity levels of 39 positions, and  OPM’s designations differed from the agency’s designations in 26 of  those positions. In the April 2012 report, the DOD agency agreed with  OPM’s recommendations related to position designation, and the audit  report confirmed that the agency had submitted evidence of corrective  action in response to the position designation recommendations. OPM  provided us with the results of 10 audits that it had conducted between  2005 and 2012, and 9 of those audit reports reflected inconsistencies  between OPM position designation guidance and determinations of  position sensitivity conducted by the agency. OPM officials noted,  however, that they do not have the authority to direct agencies to make  different designations because Executive Order 10450 provides agency  heads with the ultimate responsibility for designating which positions are  sensitive positions.
As of May 2012, the Naval Audit Service is currently finalizing its own  internal audit on its top secret requirements determination process for  civilian positions. While the results were not complete at the time of our  review, officials explained to us that they began this audit to validate their  top secret requirements and ensure that they have effective internal  controls over their designation process.
DHS and DOD officials expressed varying opinions regarding the tool. For  instance, some of the officials we met raised concerns regarding the  guidance provided through the tool and expressed that they had difficulty  implementing it. Specifically, officials from DHS’s U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement stated that the use of the tool occasionally resulted  in inconsistency, such as over- or underdesignating a position, and  expressed a need for additional clear, easily interpreted guidance on  designating national security positions. DOD officials stated that they  have had difficulty implementing the tool because it focuses more on  suitability than security, and the national security aspects of DOD’s  positions are of more concern to them than the suitability aspects.  Further, an official from DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  for Personnel and Readiness stated that the tool and DOD policy do not  always align and that the tool does not cover the requirements for some  DOD positions. For example, DOD’s implementing guidance on using the  tool states that terms differ between DOD’s personnel security policy and  the tool, and the tool might suggest different position sensitivity levels  than DOD policy requires. Also, officials from the Air Force Personnel  Security Office told us that they had challenges using the tool to classify  civilian positions, including difficulty in linking the tool with Air Force  practices for position designation. Moreover, an Air Force official stated a  concern that the definition for national security positions is broadly written  and could be considered to include all federal positions. Further,  individuals responsible for making position designation determinations  can easily reach different conclusions. For instance, officials from DHS’s  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement stated that the tool is not  necessarily intuitive and users of the tool need to understand its nuances  in order to avoid overdesignating a position. Conversely, officials from the  U.S. Coast Guard stated that they found the tool to be intuitive, and that it  helps to ensure consistency in designation. Finally, officials from the  Transportation Security Administration noted that the tool is user friendly  and provides consistency for managers.
Recently, we have seen indications that the Executive Agents are working  to align their respective processes. According to OPM’s website, OPM  has conferred with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)  concerning the possibility of reissuing pertinent sections of the Code of  Federal Regulations jointly with ODNI, with a targeted issuance before  the end of the 2012 calendar year. ODNI officials also stated their  intention to work with OPM on the revision effort. ODNI officials further  acknowledged that they are collaborating with OPM to reach agreement  on their respective roles as Executive Agents. Our prior work has found  that two or more agencies with related goals can benefit from enhancing  their collaboration in various areas to achieve common outcomes.
section_title: The Executive Branch Does Not Have a Consistent Process for Reviewing and Validating Existing Security Clearance Requirements for Civilian Positions
paragraphs: According to Executive Order 12968, the number of employees that each  agency determines is eligible for access to classified information shall be  kept to the minimum required, and, subject to certain exceptions, eligibility  shall be requested or granted only on the basis of a demonstrated,  foreseeable need for access. Additionally, Executive Order 12968 states  that access to classified information shall be terminated when an  employee no longer has a need for access, and that requesting or  approving eligibility for access in excess of the actual requirements is  prohibited. Also, Executive Order 13467 authorizes the DNI to issue  guidelines or instructions to the heads of agencies regarding, among  other things, uniformity in determining eligibility for access to classified  information. However, the DNI has not issued policies and procedures for  agencies to review and revise or validate the existing clearance  requirements for their federal civilian positions to ensure that clearances  are kept to a minimum and reserved only for those positions with security  clearance requirements that are in accordance with the national security  needs of the time.
As previously noted, OPM published a December 2010 notice in the  Federal Register of a proposed revision to the Code of Federal  Regulations to clarify the policy for designating national security positions.  Again, as we previously noted, OPM’s website states that OPM has  conferred with OMB concerning the possibility of reissuing pertinent  sections of the Code of Federal Regulations jointly with ODNI. One  feature of the proposed revision would require all federal agencies to  conduct a onetime review of position descriptions and requirements over  a period of 2 years to ensure that all positions are properly designated  using the revision’s updated definition for national security positions.  Position descriptions not only identify the major duties and responsibilities  of the position, but they also play a critical role in recruitment, training,  and performance management, among other things. While position  descriptions may change, so can the national security environment as  previously observed.
During our review of several DHS and DOD components, we found that  officials were aware of the need to keep the number of security  clearances to a minimum but were not always subject to a requirement to  review and validate the security clearance needs of existing positions on  a periodic basis. We found, instead, that agencies’ policies provide for a  variety of practices for reviewing the clearance needs of federal civilian  positions. According to DHS guidance, supervisors are responsible for  ensuring that (1) position designations are updated when a position  undergoes major changes (e.g., changes in missions and functions, job  responsibilities, work assignments, legislation, or classification  standards), and (2) position security designations are assigned as new  positions are created. Some components have additional requirements to  review position designation more regularly to cover positions other than  those newly created or vacant. For example,
U.S. Coast Guard guidance states that hiring officials and  supervisors should review position descriptions even when there is no  vacancy and, as appropriate, either revise or review them.
According to officials in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,  supervisors are supposed to review position descriptions annually  during the performance review process to ensure that the duties and  responsibilities on the position description are up-to-date and  accurate. However, officials stated that U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement does not have policies or requirements in place to  ensure any particular level of detail in that review.
DOD’s personnel security regulation and other guidancecomponents with criteria to consider when determining whether a position  is sensitive or requires access to classified information, and some of the  components also have developed their own guidance.   provides DOD
An Air Force Instruction requires commanders to review all military  and civilian position designations annually to ensure proper level of  access to classified information.
The Army issued a memorandum in 2006 that required an immediate  review of position sensitivity designations for all Army civilian positions  by the end of the calendar year and requires subsequent reviews  biennially. That memorandum further states that if a review warrants  a change in position sensitivity affecting an individual’s access to  classified information, then access should be administratively adjusted  and the periodic reinvestigation submitted accordingly. However,  officials explained that improper position sensitivity designations  continue to occur in the Army because they have a limited number of  personnel in the security office relative to workload, and they only spot  check clearance requests to ensure that they match the level of  clearance required.
Officials from DOD’s Washington Headquarters Services told us that  they have an informal practice of reviewing position descriptions and  security designations for vacant or new positions, but they do not  have a schedule for conducting periodic reviews of personnel security  designations for already-filled positions.
These various policies notwithstanding, agency officials told us that they  are implemented inconsistently.
Some of the components we met were in the process of conducting a  onetime review of position designation during our review. For example,  Transportation Security Administration officials stated that they  reevaluated all of their position descriptions over the last 2 years because  the agency determined that the re-evaluation of its position designations  would improve operational efficiency by ensuring that positions were  appropriately designated by using OPM’s updated position designation  tool. Further, those officials told us that they review position descriptions  as positions become vacant or are created. Between fiscal years 2010  and 2011, while the Transportation Security Administration’s overall  workforce increased from 61,586 to 66,023, the number of investigations  for top secret clearances decreased from 1,483 to 1,127. In March 2011,  the Naval Audit Service begin an audit of its top secret requirements  determination process for civilian positions at selected activities to verify  that civilian top secret clearances are based on valid requirements and  that effective internal controls over the top secret requirements  determination process are in place. According to a Navy official, the  results of the audit were still undergoing the Navy’s internal review  process as of May 2012.
There is a cost to conducting background investigations, and a potential  for dollar savings when overdesignated positions are identified. DHS and  DOD officials acknowledged to us that overdesignating a position can  result in expenses for unnecessary investigations. When a position is  overdesignated, additional resources are unnecessarily spent conducting  the investigation and adjudication of a background investigation that  exceeds agency requirements. As stated earlier in this report, the  investigative workload for a top secret clearance is about 20-times greater  than that of a secret clearance because it must be periodically  reinvestigated twice as often as secret clearance investigations (every 5  years versus every 10 years) and requires 10 times as many investigative  staff hours. The fiscal year 2012 base price for a top secret clearance  investigation conducted by OPM is $4,005 and the periodic  reinvestigation is $2,711, while the base price of an investigation for a  secret clearance is $260. Further, the base price of a Moderate Risk  Background Investigation—most commonly used by DHS, according to  officials—is $752. However, we did not find policies in which position  designation reviews were linked to the position holders’ periodic  reinvestigations. In contrast, underdesignating a position carries security  risks, such as the potential release of classified information or the  placement of a person in a position for which they have not been properly  cleared.
Agencies employ varying practices because the DNI has not established  a requirement that executive branch agencies consistently review and  revise or validate existing position designations on a recurring basis.  Such a recurring basis could include reviewing position designations  during the periodic reinvestigation process. Without a requirement to  consistently review, revise, or validate existing security clearance position  designations, executive branch agencies—such as DHS and DOD—may  be hiring and budgeting for both initial and periodic security clearance  investigations using position descriptions and security clearance  requirements that no longer reflect national security needs. Finally, since  reviews are not being done consistently, DHS and DOD and other  executive branch agencies cannot have reasonable assurances that they  are keeping to a minimum the number of positions that require security  clearances on the basis of a demonstrated and foreseeable need for  access.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Executive Order 13467, issued in June 2008, established a Suitability and  Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council and appointed  the DNI as the Security Executive Agent and the Director of OPM as the  Suitability Executive Agent. However, while the order gives the Executive  Agents the authority to issue policy, the DNI has not provided executive  branch agencies with clearly defined policy and procedures for  determining whether federal civilian positions require a security  clearance. Until the DNI articulates such policy and procedures, executive  branch agencies, such as DHS and DOD, will not have a foundation on  which to build consistent and uniform policies. Further, Executive Order  13467 indicates that executive branch policies and procedures relating to,  among other things, suitability and eligibility for access to classified  information shall be aligned using consistent standards to the extent  possible. However, OPM updated its position designation tool in 2010  without input from the DNI. Without collaborative input from both OPM  and DNI in future revisions to the tool, executive branch agencies will  continue to risk making security clearance determinations that are  inconsistent or at improper levels. Finally, while Executive Order 12968  says that clearances should, subject to certain exceptions, be granted  only on the basis of a demonstrated need for access and kept to a  minimum, the DNI has not issued guidance that requires agencies to  review and revise or validate their existing federal civilian position  designations. Until the DNI does so, DHS and DOD, along with other  executive branch agencies, cannot have reasonable assurances that all  security clearance designations are correct, which could compromise  national security if positions are underdesignated, or create unnecessary  and costly investigative coverage if positions are overdesignated.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the DNI, in coordination with the Director of OPM  and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined  policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow when determining if  federal civilian positions require a security clearance.
In addition, we recommend that, once the policy and procedures are  issued, the DNI and the Director of OPM collaborate in their respective  roles as Executive Agents to revise the position designation tool to reflect  that guidance.
Finally, we recommend that the DNI, in coordination with the Director of  OPM and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue  guidance to require executive branch agencies to periodically review and  revise or validate the designation of all federal civilian positions.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to ODNI, OPM, DHS, and DOD for  comment. Written comments from ODNI, OPM, and DHS are reprinted in  their entirety in appendices IV, V, and VI respectively. Technical  comments were provided separately by ODNI, OPM, and DHS, and were  incorporated as appropriate. DOD concurred with the report without  written comment. We also provided a draft of the report to OMB for  information purposes.
subsections: section_title: ODNI Comments
paragraphs: In commenting on this report, ODNI stated that the report is a fair  assessment of existing executive branch policies for determining security  clearance requirements for federal civilian positions. The DNI has a lead  or collaborative role in our recommendations, and ODNI concurred with  all three. First, ODNI concurred with our recommendation that the DNI, in  coordination with the Director of OPM and other executive branch  agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined policy and procedures for  federal agencies to follow when determining if federal civilian positions  require a security clearance. ODNI agreed that executive branch  agencies require simplified and uniform policy guidance to assist in  determining appropriate sensitivity designations, and cited steps it is  taking in coordination with OPM, DOD, and OMB. Specifically, ODNI  acknowledged its work with OMB and OPM to jointly issue revisions to  part 732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations by the end of 2012.   Second, ODNI concurred with our recommendation that, once the policy  and procedures are issued, the DNI coordinate with the Director of OPM  to revise the position designation tool to reflect that guidance. ODNI  stated that it plans to work with OPM and other executive branch  agencies through the Security Executive Agent Advisory Committee to  develop a position designation tool that provides detailed descriptions of  the types of positions where the occupant could bring about a material  adverse impact to national security due to the duties and responsibilities  of the position. ODNI stated its belief that a tool that provides agencies  with detailed descriptions of this type will bring about greater uniformity  across the government in agency position designations. Third, ODNI  concurred with our recommendation that the DNI, in coordination with the  Director of OPM and other executive branch agencies as appropriate,  issue guidance to require executive branch agencies to periodically  review and revise or validate the designation of all federal civilian  positions. ODNI agreed with our assessment that the duties and  responsibilities of federal positions may be subject to change, and stated  that it plans to work with OPM and other executive branch agencies  through the Security Executive Agent Advisory Committee to ensure that  position designation policies and procedures include a provision for  periodic reviews.
While ODNI recognized that the emphasis of this report is on civilian  positions that require access to classified information, it wished to  emphasize that the DNI’s role as Security Executive Agent under  Executive Order 13467 applies to all sensitive positions, and that  positions that require access to classified information are a subset of all  sensitive positions. ODNI stated that any guidance issued by the Security  Executive Agent will cover all sensitive positions and associated  investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines.
section_title: OPM Comments
paragraphs: OPM also commented on all three of the recommendations in this report  in its written comments. OPM concurred with our second  recommendation, which is addressed more directly to OPM, that its  Director collaborate with the DNI in their respective roles as executive  agents to revise the position designation tool to reflect updated federal  position designation guidance. OPM stated that it committed to doing so  in a February 2010 strategic framework document which was executed by  officials within OMB, OPM, DOD, and ODNI. OPM also acknowledged  that any revisions to the tool need to await final action with respect to  proposed position designation regulations, which is consistent with our  recommendation. In addition, OPM summarized executive orders that  describe its authority. OPM also supported our third recommendation that  the DNI, in coordination with the Director of OPM and other executive  branch agencies as appropriate, issue guidance to require executive  branch agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the  designation of all federal civilian positions. OPM stated that it would be  pleased to work with the DNI on guidance concerning periodic reviews of  existing designations.
While ODNI concurred with our first recommendation—that the DNI, in  coordination with the Director of OPM and other executive branch  agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined policy and procedures for  federal agencies to follow when determining whether federal civilian  positions require a security clearance—OPM stated that it is not clear to  OPM that it has a significant role in prescribing the policy and procedures  for federal agencies to follow when determining if a federal civilian  position requires a security clearance. The basis for OPM’s statement is  Executive Order 12968 (as amended by Executive Order 13467), which  gives agency heads the ultimate responsibility to grant or deny security  clearances, subject to investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines  prescribed by the DNI. In this report, we acknowledge that authority to  grant or deny a security clearance resides with agency heads under  Executive Order 12968. However, as we also state in our report,  Executive Order 13467 provides the DNI the authority to issue guidelines  and instructions to the heads of agencies to ensure appropriate  uniformity, centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, and timeliness in  processes relating to determinations by agencies of eligibility for access  to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position. Further,  as we state in our report, this Executive Order established a Suitability  and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council to be the  government-wide governance structure responsible for driving  implementation and overseeing security and suitability reform efforts. This  order appointed the DNI as the Security Executive Agent and the Director  of OPM as the Suitability Executive Agent, and calls for investigations of  suitability and security to be aligned using consistent standards, to the  extent practicable. Therefore, we continue to believe that additional  guidance from the Security Executive Agent—the DNI—would help align  processes across multiple executive branch agencies, and note that  ODNI agreed with this assessment. Further, we included OPM in our  recommendation as a consulting agency in its role as the Suitability  Executive Agent and because, according to OPM, it is the investigative  service provider for much of the executive branch. Finally, we  recommended that the DNI work with other agencies as necessary in an  acknowledgement of the joint nature of reform effort and its oversight  structure through the Performance Accountability Council.
OPM’s response to this report discussed other points for consideration,  which are summarized below.
Relationship between the existing position designation tool and security  clearances: OPM stated in its comments that one of the premises upon  which this report is based is not accurate. Specifically, OPM asserted that  we repeatedly posited that agencies must perform the national security  designation in order to know whether the occupant will require a security  clearance when, in fact, whether the occupant of a particular position will  need access to classified information or eligibility for such access (i.e. a  security clearance) is one of the factors that help determine whether a  position is sensitive. Accordingly, OPM wrote that there is no basis for  GAO to conclude that OPM’s position designation tool affects how  agencies determine whether the occupant of a position requires access to  classified information or eligibility for such access. We state in our report  that to assist with position designation, the Director of OPM has  developed a process that includes a position designation system and  corresponding tool. We continue by stating that the tool does not directly  determine whether a position requires a clearance, but rather helps  determine the sensitivity of the position, which informs the type of  investigation needed. We believe that these statements are consistent  with OPM’s explanations and, therefore, do not believe that one of the  premises upon which this report is based is inaccurate. However, we  have reviewed and made revisions to other statements in our final report  to ensure consistency with this point.
Additional need for guidance to support the position designation tool:  OPM noted that it provided us with copies of audits that OPM had  performed on agencies that employ competitive service civilian personnel,  where it observed inconsistencies in agency application of the tool. In its  comments, OPM cited several reasons why this might happen. We  believe this is consistent with our findings that OPM found examples of  inconsistency between agency position designation and OPM guidance,  and also that officials from executive branch departments expressed  varying opinions to us regarding the tool. In response to other discussion  in our report about the tool, OPM stated that its proposed revision to part  732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations was intended to  establish a basis for more detailed guidance. We also note, as previously  discussed, that OPM concurred with our recommendation to collaborate  with the DNI to revise the tool.
section_title: DHS Comments
paragraphs: In its written comments, DHS noted GAO’s positive acknowledgement of  DHS’ efforts to ensure that only those who need a security clearance are  authorized one. Although the report does not contain any  recommendations specifically directed to DHS, the Department stated  that it remains committed to being an active member of the government- wide Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability  Council.
We are sending copies of this report to the House Committee on  Homeland Security. We are also sending copies to the Director of  National Intelligence, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management,  the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and the  Office of Management and Budget. This report will also be available at no  charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report  are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: This report reviewed government policies and practices for identifying  federal civilian positions that require security clearances, and analyzed  whether a uniform, consistent, and effective security clearance  requirements determination process is in place. Our work focused on the  Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), on the basis of its  role to develop personnel security clearance policy and guidance for the  federal government. Further, the scope of our work focused more  specifically on the security clearance requirements of federal civilian  positions from selected components within the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD), because of the  volume of clearances that these two agencies process. Within DHS,  selected components include the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement, and the Transportation Security Administration.  Within DOD, selected components include the headquarters level  elements of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and  the Washington Headquarters Services. We also included the Office of  Personnel Management (OPM) in our review on the basis of its role  implementing security clearance reform and as the primary investigative  service provider of the federal government. See table 1 for a complete list  of the agencies and departments interviewed for our review.
To determine the extent to which the executive branch has established  policies and procedures for agencies to use when first determining  whether federal civilian positions require a security clearance, we  interviewed key federal officials from the above mentioned federal  agencies and selected components, as well as OPM and ODNI. We  reviewed relevant Executive Orders including 10450, 12968, and 13467,  Joint Reform Team reports, OPM and ODNI audits, and part 732 of Title  5 of the Code of Federal Regulations. We also reviewed OPM’s  proposed revision to the Code of Federal Regulations, which aims to  clarify the policy for designating national security positions that was  published in the Federal Register in December 2010. We obtained and  analyzed personnel security clearance policies within DHS, DOD, and the  selected components within these departments to identify the extent to  which they have outlined processes for individuals responsible for  determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance. In  addition, we obtained and analyzed OPM’s position designation system  and tool because agencies we visited use the tool in the position  designation process.
To determine the extent to which the executive branch has established  policies and procedures for agencies to review and revise or validate  existing federal civilian position security clearance requirements, we  interviewed knowledgeable officials from the federal agencies and  selected components in table 1. We reviewed part 732 of Title 5 of the  Code of Federal Regulations to identify the extent to which it delineates  processes and responsibilities for federal agencies to review and revise  or validate whether federal civilian positions require a security clearance.  We also analyzed DHS’s and DOD’s personnel security policies, and the  applicable policies of selected components within these departments to  identify the extent to which each department and selected component has  established processes for reviewing, revising, and validating existing  federal civilian position security clearance requirements.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 through July 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Position Designation Guidance
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense  (DOD), and their respective components have developed policies and  procedures that relate to position designation. Both DHS and DOD  policies provide criteria, in addition to those outlined in the Office of  Personnel Management’s (OPM) tool, for position designating officials to  use in determining the sensitivity level of the position. Table 2 below  provides a descriptive comparison of DHS- and DOD-specific position  designation guidance.
subsections: section_title: Department of Homeland Security
paragraphs: DHS’s management instruction regarding the personnel security and  suitability program (DHS Management Instruction 121-01-007) defines  sensitivity levels and instructs the DHS components to follow OPM’s  position sensitivity designation guidance when determining the proper  sensitivity level for civilian positions. Further, the supervising official with  sufficient knowledge of duty assignments is responsible for collaborating  with Human Resources and assigning position sensitivity designations  and then those designations are subject to final approval by the  component’s respective Personnel Security Office.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement: In addition to DHS’s  management directive, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials  confirmed that they are using OPM’s position sensitivity designation  guidance and position designation tool to ensure that their civilian  positions have the proper sensitivity level. According to these officials, the  Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Office of Professional  Responsibility and Office of Human Capital work with the program offices  to establish and validate position security designations.
Transportation Security Administration: In addition to DHS’s management  directive, the Transportation Security Administration developed informal  guidance on the position designation process and uses OPM’s position  designation tool to determine the sensitivity level for its positions. The  Transportation Security Administration Personnel Security Section  requires the manager to confirm that access to classified information is  required to perform the duties of the position. In addition, the  Transportation Security Administration’s Personnel Security Section does  a final review of all position and risk designations.
U.S. Coast Guard: According to U.S. Coast Guard officials, the U.S.  Coast Guard follows the criteria for position designation laid out in the  Commandant of the Coast Guard Instruction 5520.12C, Personnel  Security and Suitability Program. In addition, those officials indicated that  the U.S. Coast Guard uses OPM’s position designation tool for  determining the sensitivity level for civilian positions. As part of a standard  hiring practice, supervisors engage Human Resources with a request for  personnel action. This initiates the prerecruitment phase of the process  where the need of the position is validated, the position description is  reviewed and updated, the job analysis is confirmed, and the recruitment  strategy is executed.
section_title: Department of Defense
paragraphs: provide the  DOD’s personnel security regulation and other guidanceDOD components with detailed criteria to consider when determining  whether a position requires access to classified information. Although  DOD’s policy is also under revision, the current policy incorporates OPM’s  definitions for critical-sensitive and noncritical sensitive positions. Further,  DOD’s regulation specifically states that personnel security clearances  shall not normally be issued:  to persons in nonsensitive positions;  to persons whose regular duties do not require authorized access to  classified information;  for ease of movement of persons within a restricted area whose duties  do not require access to classified information;  to persons who may only have inadvertent access to sensitive  information or areas, such as guards, emergency service personnel,  firefighters, doctors, nurses, police, ambulance drivers, or similar  personnel;  to persons working in shipyards whose duties do not require access to  classified information;  to persons who can be prevented from accessing classified  information by being escorted by cleared personnel;  to food service personnel, vendors and similar commercial sales or  service personnel whose duties do not require access to classified  information;  to maintenance or cleaning personnel who may only have inadvertent  access to classified information unless such access cannot be  reasonably prevented;  to persons who perform maintenance on office equipment, computers,  typewriters, and similar equipment who can be denied classified  access by physical security measures;  to perimeter security personnel who have no access to classified  information; and  to drivers, chauffeurs and food service personnel.
In addition, DOD’s Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness issued a memorandum requiring the use of OPM’s position  designation system and tool to determine the sensitivity level for civilian  positions. Further, some of the DOD components that we visited have  developed policies that extend beyond the DOD personnel security policy.
Army: Army officials affirmed that they use OPM’s position designation  tool to determine the sensitivity level of all civilian positions. In addition,  Army Regulation 380-67 defines sensitive positions and gives heads of  DOD components or their designees authority, subject to certain  conditions, to delegate the designation of position sensitivity within their  chain of command. Further, a 2006 Army memorandum called for  sensitivity reviews of all Army civilian positions every 2 years, at a  minimum.
Navy: According to officials, the Department of the Navy follows guidance  in the Secretary of the Navy Regulation M-5510.30 along with DOD’s  personnel security regulation, which requires designators to set the  clearance level for civilian personnel according to the risk the position  poses. According to a Navy personnel security official, Human Resources  offices and local commands have been revalidating positions according to  the needs of the command in response to a 2011 memorandum from the  Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.  According to Navy officials, Human Resources offices used the position  designation tool provided by OPM to determine the sensitivity level for all  civilian positions.
Air Force: The Air Force uses Air Force Instruction 31-501 coupled with  the DOD 5200.2-R to implement its personnel security program.  According to the instruction, commanders with position designation  authority determine the security sensitivity of civilian positions. Each  position is coded with the appropriate security access requirement and  identified in the unit manning document and the Defense Civilian  Personnel Data System. If the security access requirement code requires  a change, the unit commander submits an authorization change request  to the servicing security activity. The commander also conducts an annual  review of positions to determine the accuracy of position coding and  adjust coding if necessary. Air Force officials confirmed that they are  using OPM’s Position Designation System and Tool to determine the  proper sensitivity level for all civilian positions. Also, according to Air  Force officials, in situations where a commander wants to upgrade a  particular position, it must be reviewed and approved by a 3-star general.
Washington Headquarters Services: Washington Headquarters Services  oversees position designation for certain DOD headquarters activities and  defense agencies. According to Washington Headquarters Services  officials, these agencies and activities follow DOD’s personnel security  regulation for position designation and use OPM’s position designation  system and tool in accordance with DOD policy.
section_title: Appendix III: Personnel Security Clearance Process
paragraphs: Since 1997, federal agencies have followed a common set of personnel  security investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines for  determining whether federal workers and others are eligible to receive  security clearances. Once an applicant is selected for a position that  requires a security clearance, government agencies rely on a multiphased  personnel security clearance process that includes the application  submission phase, investigation phase, and adjudication phase, among  others. Different departments and agencies may have slightly different  security clearance processes—the steps outlined below are intended to  be illustrative of a typical process.
The application submission phase. A security officer from an  executive branch agency (1) requests an investigation of an individual  requiring a clearance; (2) forwards a personnel security questionnaire  (Standard Form 86) using the Office of Personnel Management’s  (OPM) e-QIP system or a paper copy of the Standard Form 86 to the  individual to complete; (3) reviews the completed questionnaire; and  (4) sends the questionnaire and supporting documentation, such as  fingerprints and signed waivers, to OPM or the investigation service  provider.
The investigation phase. Federal investigative standards and OPM’s  internal guidance are typically used to conduct and document the  investigation of the applicant. The scope of information gathered in an  investigation depends on the level of clearance needed and whether  the investigation is for an initial clearance or a reinvestigation for a  clearance renewal. For example, in an investigation for a top secret  clearance, investigators gather additional information through more  time-consuming efforts, such as traveling to conduct in-person  interviews to corroborate information about an applicant’s employment  and education. After the investigation is complete, the resulting  investigative report is provided to the agency.
The adjudication phase. Adjudicators from an agency use the  information from the investigative report to determine whether an  applicant is eligible for a security clearance. To make clearance  eligibility decisions, the adjudication guidelines specify that  adjudicators consider 13 specific areas that elicit information about (1)  conduct that could raise security concerns and (2) factors that could  allay those security concerns and permit granting a clearance.
In addition, once the background investigation and adjudication for a  security clearance are complete, the requesting agency determines  whether the individual is eligible for access to classified information.  However, often the security clearance—either at the secret or top secret  level—does not become effective until an individual needs to work with  classified information. At that point, the individual would sign a  nondisclosure agreement and receive a briefing in order for the clearance  to become effective. DOD commonly employs this practice and, in some  cases, the individual ultimately never requires access to classified  information. Therefore, not all security clearance investigations result in  an active security clearance.
Finally, once an individual is in a position that requires access to  classified national security information, that individual is reinvestigated  periodically at intervals that are dependent on the level of security  clearance. For example, top secret clearanceholders are reinvestigated  every 5 years, and secret clearanceholders are reinvestigated every 10  years.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Office of Personnel Management
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, David Moser (Assistant Director),  Sara Cradic, Cynthia Grant, Nicole Harris, Jeffrey Heit, Kimberly Mayo,  Richard Powelson, Jason Wildhagen, Michael Willems, and Elizabeth  Wood made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Personnel Security Clearances: Continuing Leadership and Attention Can  Enhance Momentum Gained from Reform Effort. GAO-12-815T.  Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2012.
Background Investigations: Office of Personnel Management Needs to  Improve Transparency of Its Pricing and Seek Cost Savings.  GAO-12-197. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February  2011.
Personnel Security Clearances: Overall Progress Has Been Made to  Reform the Governmentwide Security Clearance Process. GAO-11-232T.  Washington, D.C.: December 1, 2010.
Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve  Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum.  GAO-11-65. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2010.
DOD Personnel Security Clearance Reform: Preliminary Observations on  Timeliness and Quality. GAO-11-185T. Washington, D.C.: November 16,  2010.
Privacy: OPM Should Better Monitor Implementation of Privacy-Related  Policies and Procedures for Background Investigations. GAO-10-849.  Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2010.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and  Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide  Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. GAO-10-117T.  Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce  Delays but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain  Reform Efforts. GAO-09-684T. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is  Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process.  GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting,  Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed  to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington,  D.C.: May 19, 2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January  22, 2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations about Timeliness  and Quality. GAO-09-261R. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2008.
Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint  Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility  Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Questions for the Record Regarding Security  Clearance Reform. GAO-08-965R. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance  Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.
Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s  Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement.  GAO-08-551T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions for the Record Related to the  Quality and Timeliness of Clearances. GAO-08-580R. Washington D.C.:  March 25, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts  to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. GAO-08-470T.  Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform  Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.:  February 27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable  More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.:  February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation  Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17,  2007.
High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January  2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to  Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington,  D.C.: September 28, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record  Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security  Clearance Process. GAO-06-693R. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of  Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments  Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2006.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance  Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process.  GAO-06-323R. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain.  GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles  Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk  Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January  2005.