Federal Advisory Committees: Additional Guidance Could Help Agencies Better Ensure Independence and Balance
Published: 2004-04-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Because advisory committees are established to advise federal decision makers on significant national issues, it is essential that their membership be, and be perceived as being, free from conflicts of interest and balanced as a whole. GAO was asked to (1) describe the role of federal advisory committees in the development of national policies, (2) examine the extent to which existing guidance and policies and procedures for evaluating committee members for conflicts of interest and points of view ensure independent members and balanced committees, and (3) identify practices and measures that could help ensure independence and balance.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Federal advisory committees play an important role in shaping public policy by providing advice on a wide array of issues, such as stem cell research, drinking water standards, space exploration, drug approvals, and federal land management. About 950 advisory committees perform peer reviews of scientific research; offer advice on policy issues; identify long-range issues; and evaluate grant proposals, among other functions. Additional governmentwide guidance could help agencies better ensure the independence of members--that is, that they are free from significant conflicts of interest--and balance of federal advisory committees. For example, current limitations in the Office of Government Ethics' (OGE) guidance are a factor in at least three agencies' continuing a long-standing practice of appointing most or all members as "representatives"--expected to reflect the views of the entity or group they are representing and not subject to conflict-of-interest reviews--even when the agencies call upon the members to provide advice on behalf of the government. Such members would be more appropriately appointed as "special government employees," who are reviewed for conflicts of interest. OGE officials agreed with GAO that these agencies' appointments of some members as representatives of their fields of expertise are not appropriate, and this practice avoids using the special government employee category that was created to help the government hire experts in various fields for such purposes. OGE guidance that representatives may speak for, among others, any recognizable group of persons should be clarified to state that they generally are not to represent an expertise. Also, to be effective, advisory committees must be, and be perceived as being, fairly balanced in terms of points of view and functions to be performed. However, the General Services Administration's (GSA) guidance on advisory committee management does not address what types of information could be helpful to agencies in assessing the points of view of potential committee members, nor do agency procedures identify what information should be collected about potential members to make decisions about committee balance. Consequently, many agencies do not identify and systematically collect and evaluate information pertinent to determining the points of view of potential committee members, such as previous public positions or statements on matters being reviewed. GAO identified promising practices and measures that can better ensure independence and balance and promote transparency in the federal advisory committee system, such as obtaining nominations from the public and making public information about how members are identified and screened. Wider use of these practices--particularly for committees addressing sensitive or controversial topics--could reduce the likelihood that committees are, or are perceived as being, biased or imbalanced.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Federal advisory committees have been called the “fifth arm of  government” because of the significant role they play in advising federal  agencies, the Congress, and the President on important national issues.  To  be effective, these advisory committees must be—and, just as importantly,  be perceived as being—independent and balanced.  Specifically, individual  committee members who provide advice to the government must be free  from significant conflicts of interest—that is, they must be “independent.”   In addition, while it may be desirable to include experts on committees  who have particular viewpoints, federal law requires each committee, as a  whole, to be balanced in terms of the points of view and the functions to be  performed.  Recently, some appointments to scientific and technical  advisory committees have generated controversy because of the  perception by some scientists and others that these appointments were  based on ideology rather than expertise or were weighted to favor one  group of stakeholders over others.
In 1962, the Congress established the category of “special government  employee” and made the conflict-of-interest rules for such employees less  restrictive than for regular federal government employees to overcome  obstacles in hiring outside experts for occasional service, such as on  federal advisory committees.  Members of federal advisory committees are  often appointed as special government employees to provide advice on  behalf of the government on the basis of their best judgment.  In contrast,  members may also be appointed to federal advisory committees as  “representatives” to provide stakeholder advice—that is, advice reflecting  the views of the entity or interest group they are representing, such as  industry, labor, or consumers.
Federal advisory committee members who are employees of the federal  government must meet federal requirements pertaining to freedom from  conflicts of interest—which we refer to in this report as independence— and the committees as a whole must meet requirements pertaining to  balance.  Federal conflict-of-interest statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 201), including  the principal criminal financial conflict-of-interest statute (18 U.S.C. § 208),  apply to regular and, in large part, special government employees.  The  Office of Government Ethics (OGE) is responsible for developing  regulations and guidance for these statutory provisions.  The criminal  financial conflict-of-interest statute and related OGE regulations prohibit  regular and special government employees from participating in a  “particular matter” that may have a direct and predictable effect on their  financial interest, unless granted a waiver.  Members appointed as  representatives who are neither regular nor special government employees  are not subject to statutes regarding conflicts of interest.  The Federal  Advisory Committee Act (FACA) requires, among other things, that  committee memberships be “fairly balanced in terms of points of view  presented and the functions to be performed by the advisory committee.”   Courts have interpreted this requirement as providing agencies with broad  discretion in balancing their committees.  The General Services  Administration (GSA) is responsible for developing regulations and  guidance regarding the establishment of advisory committees under FACA.   In addition to OGE and GSA regulations and guidance, federal agencies  have their own policies and procedures to establish and manage advisory  committees.
You asked us to examine several issues regarding federal advisory  committees.  As agreed with your offices, this report (1) describes the role  of federal advisory committees in the development of national policies; (2)  examines the extent to which governmentwide guidance and agency- specific policies and procedures for evaluating committee members for  conflicts of interest and points of view ensure independent members and  balanced federal advisory committees; and (3) identifies practices that  could better ensure that committees are, and are perceived as being,  independent and balanced.
To address these objectives, we reviewed OGE regulations and guidance to  federal agencies regarding federal conflict-of-interest provisions and GSA  regulations and guidance to federal agencies regarding FACA.  We reviewed  the policies and procedures at six federal departments and agencies that  make extensive use of scientific and technical advisory committees—the  Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Energy, Health and Human Services  (HHS), and the Interior; the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA); and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).   Because HHS entities sponsor 26 percent of all federal advisory  committees and 36 percent of all scientific and technical advisory  committees, we also reviewed the policies and procedures at three HHS  agencies that sponsor many advisory committees—the Centers for Disease  Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),  and the National Institutes of Health (NIH).  We reviewed the procedures  used by these nine departments and agencies to identify, screen, and  appoint members for committees so as to ensure that members are free of  conflicts of interest (where conflict-of-interest requirements apply) and  that committees are balanced.  To better understand how agencies  implement OGE and GSA governmentwide regulations and guidance as  well as their own policies, we examined the management of one committee  at each agency.  We reviewed the confidential financial disclosure forms of  the committee members who were appointed as special government  employees, along with other information, and discussed with staff how the  committees used this information.  We did not, however, make any  judgments on whether conflicts of interest existed or whether these panels  were properly balanced.  To identify practices that promote independence  and balance, we examined the relevant policies and procedures of the  National Academies; the nine committees and agencies examined in this  review; and EPA’s Science Advisory Board, which made a number of  changes to its policies and procedures in response to our June 2001 report.   We conducted our review from January 2003 through March 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  For  more details on the scope and methodology of our review, see appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In recent years, controversies regarding the federal advisory committee  system have included concerns about the appointment of specific  individuals to committees and agency decisions to create or terminate  some committees.  Although a variety of concerns have been raised, the  overarching concern was that ideological bias was influencing the selection  of experts for scientific and health advisory panels.  Publications such as  Science, The Lancet, and Chemical and Engineering News have published  editorials and articles containing criticisms of decisions seen as injecting  ideology into a committee system that should be nonideological.  Further,  some current and potential federal advisory committee members reported  being asked about their political views in the context of decisions regarding  their appointment or reappointment to committees.
A number of recent articles and editorials identified specific concerns  about HHS committees that address controversial scientific and technical  issues.  Observers have alleged that some appointees either were  unqualified for the position, had extreme views that were outside the  mainstream of scientific thinking, or had personal conflicts of interest that  should have disqualified them from serving on particular committees.   Further, observers alleged that HHS has replaced large portions of the  membership of ongoing committees as a way of obtaining committees that  shared the administration’s viewpoint about particular issues.  Finally,  concerns were raised that HHS had terminated some advisory committees  with which the administration allegedly had ideological differences and  replaced them with committees that had different charters and a largely  new membership.
In 2003, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report on  organizational issues within NIH that included a discussion of the  perceived politicization of the advisory committee appointment process.   The report noted that these concerns had recently arisen within the  scientific and health advocacy communities and were similar to concerns  that were raised in the early 1970s.  In response to the most recent  concerns, the academy recommended, among other things, that  appointments to NIH advisory committees be based solely on a person’s  scientific or clinical expertise or his or her commitment to and involvement  in issues of relevance to the mission of the institute.
Also in 2003, the Center for Science in the Public Interest sent a letter to the  director of OGE about its concerns that conflicts of interest were  introducing biases into the federal advisory committee process at HHS,  Interior, and other agencies.  The center’s letter, signed by 21 individuals,  including public health advocates and members of academia, made a  number of recommendations to OGE aimed at strengthening  independence, transparency, and public trust in the federal advisory  committee process.  Further, the National Academies is examining the  selection of scientists, engineers, and health professionals to federal  advisory committees addressing science-based policy or reviewing  research proposals.  This study stems from its regular review of senior  scientific technical appointments in the federal government as well as from  concerns that scientists and others have raised to the academies about  some federal advisory committee appointments and the appointment  practices used by some agencies.  A report is planned for November 2004.
subsections: section_title: The Federal Advisory Committee Act Sets Broad Requirements and Guidelines for Advisory Committees
paragraphs: The Congress enacted FACA in 1972 in response to two principal concerns:  (1) that federal advisory committees were proliferating without adequate  review, oversight, or accountability and (2) that certain special interests  had too much influence over federal agency decision makers.  In this act,  the Congress articulated certain principles regarding advisory committees,  including broad requirements for balance, independence, and transparency.   Specifically, as previously discussed, FACA requires that the membership  of committees be fairly balanced in terms of points of view and functions to  be performed.  Further, FACA requires that any legislation or agency action  that creates a committee contain provisions to ensure that the advice and  recommendations of the committee will be independent and not  inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority (the agency) or any  special interest.  Finally, FACA generally requires that agencies announce  committee meetings ahead of time and give notice to interested parties  about such meetings.  With some exceptions, the meetings are to be open  to the public, and agencies are to prepare meeting minutes and make them  available to interested parties.
FACA also set broad guidelines for the creation and management of federal  advisory committees, most of which are created or authorized by the  Congress.  Agencies also establish committees using general statutory  authority, and some are created by presidential directives (see app. II).   Further, the act requires that all committees have a charter, and that each  charter contain specific information, including the committee’s scope and  objectives, a description of duties, the period of time necessary to carry out  its purposes, the estimated operating costs, and the number and frequency  of meetings.  As required by FACA, the advisory committee charters  generally expire at the end of 2 years unless renewed by the agency or by  the Congress.  The requirement encourages agencies to periodically  reexamine their need for committees.
GSA, through its Committee Management Secretariat, is responsible for  prescribing administrative guidelines and management controls applicable  to advisory committees governmentwide.  However, GSA does not have the  authority to approve or deny agency decisions regarding the creation or  management of advisory committees.  To fulfill its responsibilities, GSA has  developed regulations and other guidance to assist agencies in  implementing FACA requirements, provides training to agency officials,  and was instrumental in creating the Interagency Committee on Federal  Advisory Committee Management.  GSA also has created and maintains an  on-line FACA database (available to the public at  www.fido.gov/facadatabase) for which the agencies provide and verify the  data, including committee charters, membership rosters, budgets, and in  many cases links to committee meeting schedules, minutes, and reports.   The database also includes information about a committee’s classification  (i.e., scientific and technical or national policy issue).  According to the  database, 208 committees with 7,910 members were classified as scientific  and technical committees.  In addition, 131 committees with over 41,000  members were classified as grant review committees—a category that also  often addresses scientific and technical issues.  Appendix II provides data  on the classifications of the federal advisory committees in fiscal year 2003.
While the GSA’s Committee Management Secretariat provides FACA  guidance to federal agencies, each agency also develops its own policies  and procedures for following FACA requirements.  Under FACA, agency  heads are responsible for issuing administrative guidelines and  management controls applicable to their agency’s advisory committees.   Generally, federal agencies have a reasonable amount of discretion with  regards to creating committees, drafting their charters, establishing their  scope and objectives, classifying the committee type, determining what  type of advice they are to provide, and appointing members to serve on  committees.  However, when the Congress authorizes an agency to  establish a particular committee or a President establishes a committee,  the agency may have less flexibility in establishing and managing the  committee because such things as the committee’s objectives, the types of  expertise and backgrounds of members, and even the type of advice that is  to be provided may be specified by the Congress or the President.
Finally, to assist with the management of their federal advisory  committees, agency heads are required to appoint a committee  management officer to oversee the agency’s compliance with FACA  requirements, including recordkeeping.  Agency heads must also appoint a  designated federal official for each committee to oversee the committee’s  activities.  Among other things, the designated federal official must approve  or call the meetings of the committee, approve the agendas (except for  presidential advisory committees), and attend the meetings.
section_title: Criminal Financial Conflict- of-Interest Statute Applies to Some Advisory Committee Members
paragraphs: OGE is responsible for issuing regulations and guidance for agencies to  follow in complying with the statutory conflict-of-interest provisions that  apply to all federal employees, including special government employees  serving on federal advisory committees.  A special government employee is  statutorily defined as an officer or employee who is retained, designated,  appointed, or employed by the government to perform temporary duties,  with or without compensation, for not more than 130 days during any  period of 365 consecutive days.  Many agencies use special government  employees, either as advisory committee members or as individual experts  or consultants.  Special government employees, like regular federal  employees, are to provide their own best judgment in a manner that is free  from conflicts of interest and without acting as a stakeholder to represent  any particular point of view.  Accordingly, special government employees  appointed to federal advisory committees are hired for their expertise and  skills and are expected to provide advice on behalf of the government on  the basis of their own best judgment.  Special government employees are  subject to the federal financial conflict-of-interest requirements, although  ones that are somewhat less restrictive than those for regular federal  government employees.
The criminal financial conflict-of-interest statute (18 U.S.C. § 208) and  related OGE regulations prohibit federal employees, including special  government employees, from participating in “particular matters” that may  have a direct and predictable effect on their financial interests or those  interests of a spouse, minor child, or general partner.  A particular matter is  defined as one involving a deliberation, decision, or action that is focused  on the interests of specific people or an identifiable class of people.   Special government employees serving on federal advisory committees  thus are prohibited from participating when the subjects they consider are  particular matters in which the member has a financial interest.  However,  special government employees serving on federal advisory committees are  provided with an exemption that allows them to participate in particular  matters that have a direct and predictable effect on their financial interest  if the interest arises from their nonfederal employment and the matter will  not have a special or distinct effect on the employee or employer other than  as part of a class.  This exemption does not extend to the committee  member’s personal financial and other interests in the matter, such as stock  ownership in the employer.  If a committee member has a potential  financial conflict of interest that is not covered under this or other  exemptions, a waiver of the conflict-of-interest provisions may be granted  if the appointing official determines that the need for the special  government employee’s services outweighs the potential for conflict of  interest or that the conflict is not significant.  This standard for granting  waivers is less stringent than the standard for regular government  employees.
The principal tool that agencies use to assess whether nominees or  members of advisory committees have conflicts of interest is the OGE  Form 450, Executive Branch Confidential Financial Disclosure Report,  which special government employees are required to submit annually.  The  form 450 requests financial information about the committee member and  the member’s spouse and dependent children, such as the sources of  income and the identification of assets, but it does not request filers to provide the related dollar amounts, such as salaries.  For committees  addressing broad or general issues, rather than particular matters,  committee members hired as special government employees are still  generally required to complete the confidential financial disclosure form.
Agencies appoint ethics officials who are responsible for ensuring agency  compliance with the federal conflict-of-interest statutes.  OGE conducts  periodic audits of agency ethics programs to evaluate their compliance  and, as warranted, makes recommendations to agencies to correct  deficiencies in their ethics programs.
Under administrative guidance initially developed in the early 1960s, a  number of members of federal advisory committees are not hired as special  government employees, but are instead appointed as representatives.   Members appointed to advisory committees as representatives are  expected to represent the views of relevant stakeholders with an interest in  the subject of discussion, such as an industry, a union, an environmental  organization, or other such entity.  That is, representative members are  expected to represent a particular and known bias—it is understood that  information, opinions, and advice from representatives are to reflect the  bias of the particular group that they are appointed to represent.  Because  these individuals are to represent outside interests, they do not meet the  statutory definition of federal employee or special government employee  and are therefore not subject to the criminal financial conflict-of-interest  statute.  According to GSA and OGE officials, reliable governmentwide  data on the number of representative members serving on federal advisory  committees are not available.  However, data that agencies report to OGE  on special government employees serving on federal advisory committees  and to GSA on the number of federal advisory committee members indicate that only about 35 percent of the government’s federal advisory committee  members are appointed as special government employees.
section_title: Advisory Committees Play an Important Role in the Development of Federal Policies
paragraphs: Generally composed of individuals from outside of the federal government,  federal advisory committees play an important role in the development of  public policy and government regulations by providing advice to  policymakers on a wide array of issues.  In fiscal year 2003, 54 agencies  sponsored approximately 950 committees with about 62,000 members to  provide advice by performing peer reviews of scientific research;  developing recommendations on specific policy decisions; identifying long- range issues facing the nation; and evaluating grant proposals, among other  functions.  Their advice—on issues such as stem cell research, space  exploration, trade policy, drinking water standards, and drug approvals— can enhance the quality and credibility of federal decision making.
Advisory committees have been and continue to be involved in issues of  great importance to the advancement of knowledge and the development  of national policies and regulations.  For example, Energy’s decision to  undertake the Human Genome Project was based in part on the 1987  recommendation of the department’s Health and Environmental Research  Advisory Committee.  As a result, Energy, working with NIH, successfully  coordinated the multibillion-dollar research effort that succeeded in  identifying all of the genes on every chromosome in the human body and  determining their biochemical nature—leading the way to numerous  advances in medical science.
Advisory committees provide agencies with advice in a variety of broad  areas of federal policy, such as the environment, public health, and the  economy.  Committees provide agencies with advice about a wide array of  specific issues, such as the management of federal lands, the development  of alternative sources of energy, guidelines for assessing cancer risks, risk  assessments of toxic chemicals, hazardous waste cleanup, the  establishment of new standards for food safety, the delivery of health care  services, and the effectiveness of new prescription drugs and medical  devices.  Recently, federal advisory committees were established to help  agencies marshal the facts and weigh options in response to new national  issues, such as information security and terrorist attacks.
Federal advisory committees are sometimes established specifically to  address controversial issues about which the government believes it is  necessary to solicit the advice of individuals with the relevant background  and/or expertise from outside of the government.  Some of the issues  addressed by advisory committees are controversial because they touch  upon inherently sensitive personal, religious, or ideological matters, such  as stem cell research and genetic engineering.  Other committees address  issues that are controversial because of their potential regulatory impact  on industries or consumers, such as in the case of food and drug approvals  or environmental regulations.
To address controversial and other important matters, scientific and  technical advisory committees—which are the primary focus of this  report—play a number of different roles on behalf of agencies.  One role of  science committees is to advise agencies on how to address a set of  particular problems.  For example, the Advisory Committee on Foreign  Animal and Poultry Diseases gives the Secretary of Agriculture information  and advice on measures necessary to prevent and combat such threats as  foot-and-mouth disease.  The charter also charges the committee with  providing advice on the prevention or management of other threats from  foreign animal or poultry diseases.  Recent recommendations from the  committee addressed coordination between USDA and the Department of  Homeland Security and support for a national food animal identification  work plan.
In 1990, the Congress authorized the creation of the Aquatic Nuisance  Species Task Force to, among other things, coordinate federal efforts to  address the threats posed by nonnative aquatic plants and animals.  The  task force operates as a federal advisory committee and is composed of 7  federal agency representatives and 13 nonfederal members in an ex officio  status.  It reports to the Departments of the Interior and Commerce.   Among the task force’s accomplishments are a number of reports and  publications on risk assessment, prevention initiatives, and control  programs for such nonnative species as the brown tree snake and the green  crab.
Some science advisory committees offer advice to agencies on specific  regulatory decisions.  For example, FDA established science advisory  committees that offer advice on the licensing of specific drugs and on the  safety and effectiveness of medical devices.  These committees play an  important role in determining whether drugs and other medical products  make it into the marketplace and can therefore have a significant impact on  specific manufacturers as well as potential patients and consumers.
Other science advisory committees make recommendations to agencies on  strategic planning efforts needed to address long-range issues facing the  nation.  Existing committees are exploring efforts to chart new directions  in research in biology, physics, astronomy, and space exploration, to name  just a few.  For example, Energy’s Basic Energy Sciences Advisory  Committee issued a report in February 2003 entitled Basic Research Needs  to Assure a Secure Energy Future.  In that report, the committee stated  its belief that a new national energy research program is essential and must  be initiated with the intensity and commitment of the Manhattan Project.   The report included a lengthy list of proposed research topics.
Advisory committees may be established to provide a peer review function.   For example, a peer review group could be asked to review a body of  scientific literature and offer its opinion on the adequacy of the scientific  data that may be used to support regulatory actions.  As an illustration, in  2001, EPA revised its standards for safe levels of arsenic in drinking water  using, in part, the analysis and recommendations of two federal advisory  committees—the National Drinking Water Advisory Council and the EPA’s  Science Advisory Board.  This revised standard will have a far-reaching  effect on both human health and the operation of public drinking water  systems.  Other peer review groups are asked to judge the merits of  proposals submitted to national grant competitions.  For example, the  National Science Foundation, NIH, and other agencies use such groups to  evaluate proposals submitted for possible funding by academic or clinical  researchers covering a wide range of subject matter.  After the peer review  groups evaluate the proposals, other science advisory committees may  make recommendations to the agencies regarding which proposals to fund.
section_title: Federal Guidance Could Better Ensure Independence and Balance
paragraphs: OGE and GSA governmentwide guidance and the policies and procedures  of the nine departments and agencies we reviewed have limitations that  reduce their effectiveness in ensuring that advisory committee members  are independent and that advisory committees are, and are perceived as  being, balanced.  First, with respect to independence, OGE guidance on  whether to appoint members to advisory committees as special  government employees or representatives—a decision that determines  whether an agency conducts a conflict-of-interest review—has limitations  that we believe are a factor in three agencies’ continuing their long- standing practice of essentially appointing all members as representatives.   We found that USDA, Energy, and Interior appoint all or almost all  members to their federal advisory committees as representatives, even  when the members are called on to provide advice on behalf of the  government on the basis of their best judgment.  Because such members  are not providing stakeholder advice, they would be more appropriately  appointed as special government employees, subject to reviews for  conflicts of interest.  However, because conflict-of-interest reviews are only  required for federal or special government employees, agencies do not  conduct conflict-of-interest reviews for members appointed as  representatives.  As a result, the agencies cannot be assured that the real or  perceived conflicts of interest of their committee members’ providing  advice on behalf of the government are identified and appropriately  mitigated.  Further, allegations that the members have conflicts of interest  could call into question the independence of the committee and jeopardize  the credibility of the committee’s work.  Second, with respect to balance,  GSA guidance does not address what types of information would be helpful  in assessing the points of view of potential committee members with regard  to the matters the committees will consider, nor do agency procedures  identify what information the agencies believe should be collected about  potential members—an important step that can help agencies ensure  committees are, and are perceived as being, balanced.  We found that many  agencies do not consistently request information that would be helpful in  assessing the overall balance of committee members’ viewpoints—such as  previous public positions the members may have taken on the matters  being reviewed.  Without adequate policies and procedures, agencies are  vulnerable to allegations that committee members have conflicts of interest  and that committees are imbalanced.  Such allegations may call into  question a committee’s legitimacy and may jeopardize the work of  otherwise credible and competent committees.
subsections: section_title: Reviews for Conflicts of Interest Are Not Always Performed
paragraphs: Some agencies appoint most or all members to their advisory committees  as representatives, rather than as special government employees.   However, some of these committee members appointed as representatives  are asked to provide agencies with advice on behalf of the government  without representing any particular point of view, and thus it appears that  the members would be more appropriately appointed as special  government employees.  Because only regular and special government  employees are subject to the conflict-of-interest statutes, agencies do not  conduct conflict-of-interest reviews for members appointed as  representatives.  Some committees thus have members who had they been  appointed as special government employees would have undergone  reviews for conflicts of interest, but they have not been reviewed for  potential conflicts of interest because they were appointed as  representatives.
Representative members and special government employees are supposed  to serve different functions on advisory committees.  In 1962, the Congress  established the category of special government employee and amended the  federal conflict-of-interest laws to overcome obstacles in hiring outside  experts for occasional service.  Special government employees are  appointed to federal advisory committees to provide advice on behalf of  the government on the basis of their best judgment.  Representative  members, in contrast, are generally considered as those members of  advisory committees who are “chosen for committee membership only to  present the views of a private interest.”
In 1982, in response to uncertainties regarding when agencies should  appoint members to their advisory committees as special government  employees or representatives, OGE developed guidance on the appropriate  use of these two appointment categories for federal advisory committees.   In this guidance, OGE noted that it disagreed with “an occasional flat  assertion” by agencies that advisory committee members are never subject  to the federal conflict-of-interest laws.  The 1982 guidance, which is still  OGE’s principal guidance on this issue, states that a “consultant or  advisor whose advice is obtained by a department or agency from time to  time because of his individual qualifications and who serves in an  independent capacity is an officer or employee of the government”—that  is, this person is a regular federal employee or a special government  employee.  In contrast, a consultant or advisor “who is requested to appear  before a government department or agency to present the views of a non- governmental organization or group which he represents, or for which he is  in a position to speak, does not act as a servant of the government and is  not its officer or employee” but is a representative member.  The OGE 1982  guidance concludes by noting that if language used in the enabling  legislation, executive order, charter, or other pertinent document does not  specify whether the members are functioning as special government  employees or representatives, it is fair to conclude that the member is a  special government employee because this is the usual status of those  appointed by agencies to serve the government.
OGE’s most recent guidance that addresses representative appointments to  advisory committees is its February 2000 summary of ethical requirements  applicable to special government employees.  This summary includes a  paragraph discussing representative appointments, highlighting the fact  that unlike special government employees and other federal employees,  representatives are not expected to render disinterested advice to the  government but are expected to “represent a particular bias.”  This  document explains that representatives are described more fully in OGE’s  1982 guidance and also refers readers to two 1993 advisory letters that (1)  conclude that representatives can make policy recommendations to the  government and (2) explain the difference between the two types of  appointment as follows:  representatives are asked to represent a particular  bias, while special government employees are asked to provide their own  best judgment without representing any particular point of view and in a  manner that is free from conflict of interest.
In addition to developing the 2000 guidance on special government  employees, OGE has taken steps to educate agencies about special  government employee and representative appointments by participating in  GSA’s FACA management course that includes a session on ethics, conflict- of-interest, and financial disclosure issues.  According to GSA, this class is  conducted five times each year, reaching about 300 advisory committee  staff.  According to OGE, the ethics training begins with a discussion of the  special government employee/representative designation issue.  The  course material includes a discussion of representatives and also refers  readers to OGE’s 1982 guidance.  Further, OGE provides training at annual  ethics conferences for ethics officials in the executive branch.
Despite these efforts, a recent OGE staff study on agency management of  federal advisory committees, summarized in a November 2002  memorandum, indicates that some uncertainties about appointments to  federal advisory committees may continue to exist.  That is, OGE found  that four of the seven agencies it reviewed—Energy, Interior, the  Commission on Civil Rights, and the Small Business Administration— appointed all, or nearly all, members as representatives.  Further, the OGE  memorandum expressed concern that these agencies may be purposely  designating their committee members as representatives to avoid  subjecting them to the financial disclosure statements required for special  government employees and may not be conducting conflict-of-interest  reviews for some committee members when they should have been  conducted.  The OGE memorandum concluded that further scrutiny and  education about the proper designation of committee appointments was  warranted.  As a result, at the next annual conference for agency ethics  officials in March 2003, OGE included a session, Ethics Management Tools  for Your Federal Advisory Committee, which was principally devoted to  “designation” issues involving appointments to federal advisory committees.  In addition, in May 2003, OGE issued new audit guidelines  for its periodic reviews of agency ethics programs that provide for  additional focus and review of appointment designations for individuals  serving on committees, councils, boards, and commissions.  Finally, as  previously mentioned, OGE officials conduct a segment on ethics that  addresses the appointments of representatives and special government  employees during GSA’s FACA management course.
Nonetheless, three of the agencies we reviewed—USDA, Energy,and  Interior—appoint most or all of the members to their federal advisory  committees as representatives.  Upon examining some of the specific  committees at these agencies, we found that these agencies appoint  members as representatives even when the members are called on to  provide advice on behalf of the government on the basis of their best  judgment, rather than to represent views of outside organizations.   Specifically, USDA, Energy, and Interior have committees comprised  entirely of representative members where, on the basis of the agencies’  descriptions of the type of advice that the members are to provide, the use  of special government employees seems more appropriate, such as in the  following cases:  USDA’s National Advisory Committee for Microbiological Criteria for  Foods. According to its charter, the purpose of the committee is to  provide impartial, scientific advice to federal food safety agencies on the  development of an integrated national system to monitor food safety  from farm to final consumption in order to ensure the safety of  domestic, imported, and exported foods.
Energy’s Biological and Environmental Research Advisory  Committee.  According to the committee’s designated federal official,  the department uses the committee to obtain independent scientific  advice on Energy’s Biological and Environmental Research Program.   The committee addresses issues such as genomics, the health effects of  low-dose radiation, DNA sequencing, medical sciences, environmental  remediation, and climate change research.  In addition to reviewing  scientific issues, the committee provides advice on long-range research  plans and priorities and appropriate levels of funding.
Interior’s Scientific Earthquake Studies Advisory Committee.
According to the committee’s designated federal official, members are  selected to provide their independent advice to the U.S. Geological  Survey (USGS) on matters relating to the survey’s role in the National  Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, which is a multiagency  strategic program to reduce risks to lives and property resulting from  earthquakes.  The committee is to review the USGS National Earthquake  Hazards Reduction Program’s roles, goals, and objectives; assess its  capabilities and research needs; provide guidance on achieving major  objectives; and establish and measure performance goals.  (As  discussed below, in January 2004, Interior officials determined that the  members of this committee should be appointed as special government  employees, and the officials said that the committee would not meet  again until the appointments as special government employees have  been made.)
In contrast, we found that EPA, HHS, and NASA appoint members as  special government employees to committees that provide advice on behalf  of the government about scientific and technical issues similar to those  addressed by the committees discussed above.  Consequently, these  agencies do evaluate committee members who provide advice on behalf of  the government for potential conflicts of interest.
USDA, Energy, and Interior have 30 other committees with about 750  members that are classified as scientific and technical committees.  In  addition, some committees in other categories, such as national policy  advisory committees, also address scientific and technology issues— subject matters for which advice on behalf of the government on the basis  of members’ best judgment, rather than stakeholder advice, is typically  sought.  In speaking with USDA, Energy, and Interior officials about the  basis for their decisions to essentially appoint all advisory committee  members as representatives, we learned that this practice is long-standing  and firmly rooted in agency cultures—that is, it represents the way these  agencies have traditionally staffed their federal advisory committees.  The  agencies we reviewed generally have not developed sufficient policies,  procedures, or guidance for their staff to use when determining which type  of appointment is appropriate for individual committees.  For example, the  guidance of some agencies, such as USDA and Interior, does not address  the types of appointments that may be made.  Others, such as NASA and  Energy, recognize in agency policies and procedures that members can be  either special government employees or representatives.  However, few of  the agencies that have policies identifying the types of appointments  specify criteria that should be used when deciding whether the members  should be appointed as either special government employees or  representatives.
In our view, shortcomings in the OGE 1982 guidance regarding members of  federal advisory committees and the conflict-of-interest statutes may (1)  contribute to the agencies’ overreliance on representative appointments to  their advisory committees and (2) limit the effectiveness of OGE’s and  GSA’s education efforts on appointments to advisory committees.   Specifically, we found the following shortcomings in the 1982 guidance,  which OGE cites as its most complete discussion on the use of  representative appointments:  The OGE guidance is overly broad in describing the groups for which  representatives may speak.  That is, the guidance indicates that  representatives may speak for firms or an industry; for labor or  agriculture; or for “any other recognizable group of persons including,  on occasion the public at large.”  We found that Energy, Interior, and  USDA appoint some members to their committees on the basis that they  represent various scientific or technical fields, such as biology or  toxicology.  However, appointing individuals as representatives of a  broad category of people, such as a field of expertise, appears to  generally be more consistent with providing advice on behalf of the  government on the basis of the individual’s best judgment, rather than  acting as a stakeholder to represent the views of a nongovernment  entity or group with an interest in the matter.  At our exit conference,  OGE officials agreed that, generally, it is not appropriate to appoint  committee members as representatives on the basis of their expertise.   Further, this approach to classifying members does not recognize and  essentially avoids using the special government employee category,  which was specifically created to facilitate the government’s ability to  retain the services of experts in various fields for such purposes as  temporary service on federal advisory committees.
The conclusion section of the OGE guidance implies that when the term  “representative” is used in authorizing legislation, or other such  documents, members should be classified as representatives, despite  the fact that this term may be used for more generic purposes, such as to  direct the balance of a committee.  The guidance states that the decision  to make representative appointments to federal advisory committees   can be indicated in enabling legislation, executive orders, committee  charters, or other pertinent documents by “the use of words to  characterize  as the representatives of individuals  or entities outside the government who have an interest in the subject  matter assigned to the committee.”  However, the use of some form of  the terms “represent” or “representative” in these documents does not  always clearly indicate that the members are to be appointed to serve as  representatives; sometimes these terms are used to define committee  composition or balance.  For example, some of the documents use the  term “representative” to identify fields of expertise or employment  background needed—specifying, that is, the expertise and points of  view deemed pertinent.  Some of the documents do not state that the  representatives identified have an interest in the matter (as the guidance  quoted above calls for) or that they are to speak for their organizations;  thus the documents using the term “representative” are sometimes  ambiguous.  Unlike the guidance on identifying committee members  appointed as special government employees—“by the use of words to  command the members to exercise individual and independent  judgment”—the guidance on identifying representative members does  not specify the nature of the advice to be provided (e.g., stakeholder  advice).
The OGE guidance states that the fact that someone is appointed to a  committee on the recommendation of an outside organization tends to  support the conclusion that the person has a representative function.   However, a number of committees solicit recommendations from  outside organizations when appointing special government employees  in order to achieve appropriate balance and expertise on their  committees.  Thus, the guidance does not take into account a common  practice that agencies use to identify potential committee members and  may overemphasize the weight that agencies should give to this factor  when determining what constitutes a representative appointment.
Officials at EPA and NASA also said that the OGE guidance on  representative appointments is ambiguous in some respects.  They believe  it would be very helpful for agencies to have clear criteria for  representative appointments.  Further, the officials said that training on the  issue of appointments to advisory committees has limitations.  Specifically,  the EPA and NASA officials said that, in their view, the FACA management  course does not sufficiently clarify when appointments should be made as  special government employees and when they should be made as  representatives.  These officials also noted that the agencies’ ethics  officials generally are not the ones who make decisions on the appropriate  appointment category; rather, appointment type is viewed more as a FACA  management issue.  Thus, agency officials managing federal advisory  committees may look to GSA more than to OGE for clarification on  appointment questions.  For example, an official at EPA who has served a  detail at GSA said that GSA regularly receives calls from agencies with  questions about the distinction between the two types of appointments.   We believe these circumstances highlight the importance of both the  coordination between GSA and OGE to ensure that GSA is prepared to  respond to questions about appointments and the GSA FACA management  training directed at agency staff who manage federal advisory committees.
Although the FACA management course manual provides useful  information on appointments to committees, we identified some  limitations in this material as well.  For example, the introductory sentence  on appointments states that determining the status of an individual serving  on a federal advisory committee is “largely a matter of personnel  classification and should be coordinated with an agency’s personnel  office.”  In our view, this statement minimizes the importance of examining  the type of advice that the individual is being asked to provide as a key  determinant of the status of an individual (i.e., the type of appointment to  be made).  In this regard, in December 2003 officials at OGE told us that  they have now concluded (1) that agencies should decide at the outset  whether the members of each committee are going to be representatives or  special government employees and (2) that this decision should be part of  the chartering process.  In addition, the GSA manual is not clear and  unambiguous on the role of representative members, stating that, in  general, representative members of advisory committees “serve as  representatives of outside entities and may  represent the  views of a particular industry or group (e.g., labor, agriculture or other  similar group of interests).”  In contrast, OGE guidance states that  representatives are to represent the views of identified entities or groups.   Finally, the GSA manual highlights some OGE criteria from its 1982  guidance document that, as discussed above, we believe need clarification.
The consequences of appointing advisory committee members as  representatives when they are in fact asked to provide advice on behalf of  the government without representing any particular outside entity’s or  group’s point of view exposes the relevant committees to potentially  serious problems.  Because representative members are not subject to  reviews for potential conflicts of interest, allegations of conflicts of interest  may call into question the integrity of the committee and jeopardize the  credibility of the committee’s work.
Some agencies do address the potential conflicts of interest of their  representative members to some extent.  For example, Interior’s Bureau of  Land Management prohibits its advisory committee members from  participating in any matter in which they, a spouse, or dependent child have  a direct interest and requires the members to disclose any direct or indirect  interest in leases, licenses, permits, contracts, or claims and related  litigation that involve lands or resources administered by the bureau.   However, this policy does not require the representative members to  identify any other financial interests.  Interior officials also told us that the  department has begun inserting standard language into its committee  charters briefly stating the ethics obligations of the members, whether they  are special government employees or representatives.  The charters for  committees with representative members will include a statement that “a  member may not participate in matters that will directly affect, or appear to  affect, the financial interests of the member or the member’s spouse or  minor children, unless authorized by the designated federal official.”
In January 2004, Interior officials also said that the department has begun  working with its committee management officers to develop training and  distribute materials to heighten committee members’ awareness of  applicable ethical obligations and to develop and institute the appropriate  screening mechanisms.  Similarly, Energy does not require representative  members to provide information on their financial interests and affiliations  but does tell representative members in letters appointing them to  committees that they “are required to recuse themselves from participating  in any meeting, study, recommendation, or other committee activity that  could have a direct and predictable effect on the companies, organizations,  agencies, or entities with which they are associated or in which they have  financial interest.”  Interior and Energy policies thus rely on committee  members’ correctly identifying and voluntarily disclosing such  circumstances.  In contrast, USDA requires its representative members to  provide information about their employment and sources of income in  excess of $10,000 but does not ask for information about other financial  assets that may affect impartiality, such as stock holdings.  However, if  these members should have been, and actually were, appointed as special  government employees, none of these approaches would be adequate to  ensure that the members did not have conflicts of interest requiring  mitigation.
At the start of our review, Interior officials told us that they had begun to  review their appointment classifications for their 115 advisory committees  as a result of the November 2002 OGE study.  The officials noted that many  of their committees addressing federal land management issues are not  scientific and technical in content and, in their view, are appropriately  staffed with representative members.  In January 2004, Interior officials  acknowledged that it was appropriate to change the nature of some  committee members’ appointments upon reexamination of any underlying  legislation and the purpose of the committees.  The officials said the  department has been reviewing the appointments to committees as their  charters expire, and that the department has appointed special government  employees to a few advisory committees during the past year.  Regarding  the earthquake studies committee discussed above, in January 2004 the  department examined the appointments while renewing the charter and  determined, on the basis of its review of the committee’s authorizing  legislation, that the members of this committee should properly serve as  special government employees.  This committee has been operating for 2  years with members appointed as representatives.  Interior officials said  the change in appointments will be reflected in the charter and in the  pending appointment letters, and the committee will not be active again  until these changes are made.
While noting that it now believes the authorizing language for the  earthquake committee clearly calls for the appointment of the members as  special government employees, the officials said that other committees  that address scientific and technical issues specifically call for the  appointment of representatives, such as Interior’s National Cooperative  Geologic Mapping Advisory Committee.  This committee, comprised  primarily of officials from five federal agencies, is to review and provide  advice on a 5-year plan for the geologic mapping program that the  Secretary of the Interior is required to prepare.  In our view, while the  statute calls for the committee to include two representatives from the  state geological surveys and one each from “academia” and “the private  sector,” it does not clearly and unambiguously call for these individuals to  be appointed as representative members rather than special government  employees.  As previously discussed, the term “representative” may be  used in a variety of ways and may be used in a more generic manner to  describe a committee’s composition.  The term “representative” does not  necessarily indicate that members should be stakeholders speaking for  entities with an interest in the matter, nor is it clear in this case that  academia or the private sector would have a specific point of view that  could be represented.  We believe the department could choose to appoint  these members as special government employees to obtain their advice, if  Interior decided that nonstakeholder advice was appropriate in light of the  committee’s function.  On the other hand, if the department wants to obtain  stakeholder advice from the nonfederal committee members regarding the  government’s 5-year geologic mapping program plan, the representative  members should be clearly informed about the specific interest and points  of view they are to represent.
On this point, Interior officials acknowledged that their advisory  committee members themselves are not always clear on whether they are  to provide stakeholder advice or advice on behalf of the government.  For  example, during our review we learned that this question was raised at the  initial meeting of the earthquake committee in 2001, at which point in time  the representative members were told that they were charged with  providing advice on behalf of the government, guidance indicating that the  representative members were to function as special government  employees.  To be certain that committee members are clear on their roles  in the future, Interior officials said that the department has begun to ensure  that letters appointing individuals to advisory committees clearly inform  the member of their status as either a special government employee or a  representative.  Further, if the members are to serve as representatives,  they are to be clearly informed of the constituencies they are to represent  before the committee.  Clearly, this is an important fact to communicate to  the committee members.
GSA officials also told us that appointment information is relevant and  important to understanding the work of the various committees.  The  officials agreed that information on the nature of the advice being  provided—and, in the case of representative appointments, of the entities  or groups represented—that is not currently available to the public would  be useful and informative.  They further indicated that the GSA FACA  database, which is available to the public and which identifies the members  of the advisory committees, could be expanded to include, for each  committee member, the type of appointment and the entity or group  represented.
section_title: Information That Can Help Agencies Ensure Committees Are Balanced Is Not Systematically Gathered and Evaluated
paragraphs: Many agencies do not identify and systematically collect and evaluate  information that can help them determine the points of view of their  potential committee members regarding the subject matters the  committees will consider and thus better ensure that committees are, and  are perceived as being, balanced.  FACA requires that committees be fairly  balanced both in terms of the points of view represented and the functions  to be performed.  Courts have interpreted the FACA requirement for  committee balance as providing agencies with broad discretion in  balancing their committees.  In addition to the legal requirement for  balance, it is important that committees are perceived as being balanced in  order to be credible and effective.  However, GSA guidance does not  address what types of information could be helpful to agencies in assessing  the points of view of potential committee members, nor do agency  procedures identify what information should be collected about potential  members to make decisions about committee balance.  Many agencies do  not identify and systematically collect and evaluate information that would  be helpful in determining the points of view of committee members  relevant to the subject matters the committees will consider.  For example,  of the nine departments and agencies we reviewed, only EPA consistently  collected information on committee members who were appointed as  special government employees in order to assess the points of view of the  potential members and used this information to help achieve balance.
Assessing the points of view of individual members is fundamental to  ensuring that committees as a whole are, and are perceived as being, fairly  balanced in terms of points of view because agencies must first know  whether the members have particular viewpoints or whether they may  have—or may reasonably be perceived as having—certain biases.  For  example, only financial interests and affiliations during the prior year are  considered pertinent for conflict-of-interest purposes, but financial and  other relevant affiliations—extending beyond the 12-month period—may  identify a potential bias or point of view that agencies should consider both  in selecting individual members and balancing the committees as a whole.   Even when a legal conflict of interest does not exist, a committee member  may be so closely aligned with a point of view or an organization that his or  her ability to provide objective and impartial advice is impaired or appears  to be impaired.  Such circumstances in which a person’s impartiality may  be called into question, sometimes referred to as an “apparent conflict of  interest” and a “perceived conflict of interest,” are important for agencies  to be aware of because the perception of bias that can harm the reputation  of advisory committees is independent of the legal definition of a conflict of  interest.  In some cases, however, agencies may find it helpful to include  individuals with known biases, perspectives, or affiliations to serve on  certain advisory committees in order to ensure that the relevant points of  view are considered.  In these cases, the issue of the overall balance of  viewpoints on the committees is heightened in the sense of an agency’s  ability to ensure that the committee is balanced with respect to points of  view.  When agencies are unaware of the viewpoints and biases of its  members, they cannot adequately ensure that the committees are, and are  perceived as being, balanced as a whole.
Agencies typically rely on two sources to collect data about committee  members who were appointed as special government employees: curricula  vitae (CV) or résumés and the OGE form 450, the confidential financial  disclosure form.  Agencies generally collect CVs or résumés that may  provide some information pertinent to assessing points of view, such as  professional affiliations and published articles.  Some agencies may also  perform Internet searches for background information on candidates.   However, these sources vary in content and reliability and may not be  sufficient to consistently provide the information needed to assess for  points of view.
The form 450, which does collect specific information in a systematic  manner, was developed specifically for reviews for potential financial  conflicts of interest.  Some of the information on this form, however, also is  relevant to assessing the overall balance of viewpoints on a committee.   The form 450 requires potential committee members (and returning  members at least annually) to provide information on sources of income  and assets, liabilities, and outside positions during the prior year and on  existing employment agreements or arrangements, such as promises of  future employment and leaves of absence.  The information on income  sources, honoraria, and outside positions held during the prior year may be  important to assessing for points of view.  For example, a university  professor who is also an official of an environmental advocacy organization  may reasonably be viewed by a sponsoring agency and others as  representing an environmental rather than an unaligned “academic”  perspective.  Similarly, a university professor who is also an official of a  toxicology institute that receives funding from chemical companies or who  provided expert legal testimony for a corporation may reasonably be  viewed by a sponsoring agency and others as providing an industry  perspective.
Importantly, while the form 450 can provide some pertinent information for  assessing points of view, it was neither designed for nor does it provide  sufficient information for this purpose.  Specifically, as our review of EPA’s  Science Advisory Board demonstrated, the form 450—designed for  financial conflict-of-interest reviews—solicits information covering only  the prior year and does not request other information relevant to assessing  points of view, such as   previous public statements or positions on the matter being reviewed,  including statements in articles, testimony, or speeches;   positions taken in various legal forums, particularly in providing expert  legal testimony, on the matter;   research conducted on the matter;  interests of their employers or clients in the matter; and  sources of funding for research or other activities.
However, such information is helpful to understand the points of view of  potential committee members and therefore to assess how an individual  member’s participation on the committee would affect overall committee  balance.  For example, it is helpful for agencies to be aware of public  pronouncements that candidates have made on matters relevant to their  committees so that they can assess how such individuals may be viewed in  terms of impartiality.  In those instances where an agency selects a member  for their expertise who may have a viewpoint that is aligned with an  industry or environmental interest, without the information that would  reveal the existing viewpoint, the agency would not be aware of whether  including a member with a different viewpoint would be beneficial in terms  of the public’s perception of committee balance.
In addition, the extent to which a committee member’s employment is  funded by a grant or grants from the sponsoring agency is a reasonable  factor to consider in assessing the member’s impartiality in terms of  independence from the agency.  On this point, the Office of Management  and Budget recently highlighted in its proposed rule on peer review  procedures that the independence of scientists conducting peer reviews for  agencies while at the same time receiving funding from these agencies  might be called into question.  Similarly, the 2003 report by the National  Academies on organizational issues within NIH recommended that a  substantial portion of a committee’s scientific membership should consist  of persons whose primary source of research support is derived from a  different NIH center or institute or from outside of NIH in order to achieve  sufficient independence from the agency.  Officials at EPA and FDA told  us that they try to avoid appointing to committees members who receive  agency grants for work that is related to matters before the committee.  In  contrast, Energy and NASA officials said it would be difficult for them to  find for some committees the scientific and technical experts they need  who do not also receive grants from their agencies.  We are not suggesting  that having grants or contracts with the sponsoring agency should  disqualify individuals from serving on federal advisory committees, but  rather that agencies should consider the support they provide to potential  members since this does present potential issues of independence from the  agency.
Agencies generally have even less information to evaluate the viewpoints of  their representative members because representatives are not required to  complete the form 450.  Consequently, agencies generally do not collect  information relating to the financial interests of the representative  members.  Although representatives are not subject to the financial  conflict-of-interest rules, their financial interests could affect their  viewpoints.  An EPA official acknowledged that for some representative  committees, it may be important to consider this information, depending  on the work of the committees.  However, another EPA official expressed a  concern that asking representative members—who are not paid for their  services—for financial information, such as is obtained from those retained as special government employees, could have a chilling effect on the  willingness of people to serve on advisory committees as representatives.
Regarding special government employees, we found that although agencies  have generally collected forms 450 from these employees, the forms are not  always collected in time for them to be of any use in also evaluating the  points of view of potential committee members.  For example, some  agencies, such as NASA and CDC, do not collect the form 450 until the  agency has made decisions about appointments.  (We recognize that the  form 450 was designed to assess for conflicts of interest and that agencies  are not required to also use it to assess for points of view; however, as  previously discussed, the form nonetheless can provide some valuable  information to agencies regarding the viewpoints of an individual.)
Of the nine committees we reviewed, only EPA’s Federal Insecticide,  Fungicide, and Rodenticide (FIFRA) Scientific Advisory Panel consistently  collected information relevant to assessing the points of view of  prospective members and considered this information in selecting  members for its peer review panels.  Agencies with committees served by  special government employees generally collected information from CVs  and résumés and on the form 450, which, as discussed above, has  limitations in terms of assessing the points of view of committee members.   Agencies with representative members either collected only CVs or, in the  case of USDA, collected some additional information about sources of  income.  (See table 1.)
Regarding the EPA FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel, this advisory  committee convenes about six panels annually to address scientific and  technical issues.  For example, we reviewed one such panel that was (1)  evaluating the range of developmental effects associated with the exposure  of amphibians to the pesticide atrazine and (2) determining the significance  of these effects for risk assessment and the likely threshold exposure value  for eliciting these effects.  The executive director of this committee said  that candidates with known positions or biases generally are not selected  for the panels—that is, the agency does not select individuals previously  associated with the agency, regulated industries, or stakeholder  communities.  In addition, the agency generally does not select individuals  with a stated position on the particular matter being reviewed.  The FIFRA  Scientific Advisory Panel defines balanced membership as including the  necessary areas of technical expertise, different scientific perspectives  within each technical discipline, and the collective breadth of experience  needed to address the agency’s charge.  In order to evaluate potential  members, the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel uses CVs and the EPA  alternative disclosure form that asks committee members to provide  information needed to assess impartiality, such as information about  compensated expert testimony and sources of research and project funding  during the prior 2 years.  The form also asks candidates to consider all  relevant information over the past 5 years and to identify and describe any  reason that they may be unable to provide impartial advice on the matter to  be considered by the panel.
The executive secretary of the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel told us that  EPA’s alternative financial disclosure form—developed to address the  limitations we identified in our report on EPA’s Science Advisory Board— has greatly facilitated their ability to consistently obtain relevant  information.  The FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel also asks potential  members several standard questions that we identified in our prior report  as relevant to assessing impartiality, such as whether they have made any oral or written public statement on the issue before the panel.  As a result  of obtaining and reviewing this information in order to select members and  ensure appropriate committee balance overall, the FIFRA Scientific  Advisory Panel is in a position to make informed choices.  By  systematically collecting relevant background information on all  candidates, the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel is in a position to ensure  that its panels are balanced in terms of the points of view represented.  We  also found that FDA often collects similar information on an alternative  form that provides some pertinent information for assessing points of view,  but the agency does not use this information to assess the overall balance  of the committees.  That is, FDA generally uses the form 450 in reviewing  candidates for appointments to committees and uses the alternative form  to review for conflicts of interest for specific meetings that involve  particular matters.
In addition, agencies that have collected forms 450 for special government  employees for the purpose of conflict-of-interest reviews may not use the  information available to them on the forms that—although designed for  conflict-of-interest reviews—could also be helpful in evaluating the points  of view committee members may have.  For example, the Director of the  White House Liaison Office at HHS, who developed the committee roster  for the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections  that the Secretary of HHS approved, said that she did not review the forms  450 in selecting members.  She viewed the task of reviewing the forms 450  as the purview of the agency ethics officials who would determine whether  financial conflicts of interest existed.  In response to our questions about  whether affiliations with law firms, identified by some members on the  forms 450, may be relevant to consider in terms of their points of view, she  said that she did not need to know the particulars about the legal work  since she did not consider such information relevant to selection decisions.   Further, she said that she did not consider particular points of view  candidates may have in making selections.  For example, we asked her if  she considered the point of view of one member who had publicly stated  disagreement on religious grounds with certain research that is included in  the committee’s charter, and she said she did not.  The Director stated that  she nominated members to the Secretary for his approval primarily on the  basis of their expertise and also considering several demographic factors  (gender, race, and geographic location) to the extent these additional  factors did not impinge on the department’s ability to pick qualified  members.  She noted that these factors reflect the department’s written  policies and procedures.
Officials at other agencies said they considered similar factors in balancing  the other eight committees we examined.  Specifically, officials indicated  that they focused on expertise, demographic characteristics, and  employment history as factors to assess points of view as it affects balance.  (See table 2.)  As previously discussed, FACA does not elaborate on how  agencies are to ensure that advisory committees are fairly balanced in  terms of the expertise and the points of view of the members, nor does it  provide criteria for assessing balance.  Thus, agencies have considerable  discretion in determining how they will meet the requirement for achieving  balanced committees.
In discussing their selection criteria, most officials reported that in  selecting members for these science and technical committees, they  focused first and foremost on expertise.  Some agency officials said that  they do not consider a balance of points of view as relevant to science and  technical committees, believing that the appropriate focus for such  committees is obtaining the appropriate balance of required expertise.  We  do not disagree that this focus is appropriate, particularly for committees  that address scientific and technical issues.  While courts have interpreted  FACA as giving agencies broad discretion in how to balance their  committees, in our view, the integrity of these committees’ advice would be  better served if agencies were to consider additional information about  potential members’ points of view.  For example, experts in a given field of  expertise may have varying scientific perspectives that agencies could  consider for balancing the committee.  Along these lines, the FIFRA  Scientific Advisory Panel defines balance as including different scientific  perspectives within each technical discipline.
Second, the officials most commonly related “points of view” to  demographic factors, such as race, gender, or geographic locations—that  is, defining a balance of points of view in terms of demographic diversity.   While important, these criteria alone do not provide a robust understanding  of the points of view and potential biases the members may bring to the  committee vis-à-vis the specific matters the committees will address.  That  is, these approaches may achieve demographic diversity, but they cannot  ensure an appropriate balance of viewpoints relative to the matters being  considered by the committees.  Third, some of the officials also identified  the primary employment affiliation as a factor relevant to achieving a  balance of points of view.  For example, a factor in committee balance for  one committee is the breakdown of members employed by universities,  private industry, and federal and state agencies.  We agree the primary  employment affiliation may be an important consideration for a number of  committees to ensure a balance of points of view.  However, as we  illustrated in our work at EPA’s Science Advisory Board, the staff director  of the board viewed some academics as aligned either with industry or  environmental perspectives and some experts affiliated with industry as  representing an environmental perspective on the basis of information  about their other affiliations.  Additional information about the candidates’  viewpoints and potential biases would better ensure that the committees  are, and are perceived as being, fairly balanced in terms of points of view— and that no one interest or viewpoint dominates.  Along these lines, NIH  officials told us that the information EPA collects to evaluate potential  committee members would be very helpful to them in selecting members  and ensuring that committees are balanced as a whole.
Finally, we note that other practices agencies use in forming new  committees and in selecting replacement members for existing committees  can help them better ensure that their committees are appropriately  balanced.  These include steps agencies take to identify potential  candidates and to seek feedback on proposed committee membership.   Appendixes III through XI provide information on the nine committees we  reviewed, including how the agencies identified candidates and whether  they requested public comments on the committee membership.  These  and other practices are discussed in the next section.
section_title: Promising Practices Could Better Ensure Independence and Balance
paragraphs: Some agencies use practices when forming and managing their committees  that can better ensure that federal advisory committee members are  independent and that committees are balanced.  These practices include  (1) obtaining nominations for committee members from the public, (2)  using clearly defined processes to obtain and review pertinent information  on potential members regarding potential conflicts of interest and  impartiality, and (3) prescreening prospective members using a structured  interview.  In our view, these measures constitute promising practices  because they reflect the principles of conflict-of-interest provisions and  FACA by employing clearly defined procedures to promote systematic,  consistent, and transparent efforts to achieve independent and balanced  committees.  Although these practices for obtaining and reviewing  pertinent information to assess for conflicts of interest and impartiality are  broadly applicable, some of the practices, such as seeking public comment  on proposed committees, are most particularly relevant to those  committees addressing sensitive or controversial topics.  If more agencies  adopted and effectively implemented these practices, we believe they  would have greater assurance that their committees are, and are perceived  as being, independent and balanced.  In addition, we have identified  selected measures that could promote greater transparency in the federal  advisory committee system.
subsections: section_title: Obtaining Nominations from the Public
paragraphs: When seeking to appoint members to their federal advisory committees,  agencies often use a combination of methods to obtain nominations for  potential committee members.  Agencies typically rely on relevant program  officials in the agency, officials from other agencies, members of  professional organizations, and authors of relevant scientific and technical  literatures as ways to identify potential committee members.  Some  agencies also seek nominations from the public by using widely available  resources, such as the Federal Register and agency Web sites, to broaden  the pool of candidates from which committee members may be drawn.  The  latter approach is a systematic and transparent method of obtaining nominations and can provide agencies with greater assurance that a range  of relevant experts and/or stakeholders capable of creating impartial and  balanced committees are identified.
In addition to their other methods of obtaining nominations from  colleagues, professional associations, and the like, we believe agencies  should also routinely consider obtaining nominations from the public  because this practice can both (1) help agencies identify qualified  candidates and (2) alleviate any perception that they are choosing from a  narrow pool of candidates that may not provide the appropriate expertise  and points of view.  It may be particularly relevant to solicit nominations  from the public for committees that address sensitive or controversial  issues.  Obtaining nominations from the public may require more time and  effort than less formal approaches to identifying committee members and  may also involve a publishing cost.  However, by actively engaging the  public and all interested parties in the process in an open and transparent  manner, the agency’s credibility may be enhanced.
section_title: Using Clearly Defined Processes to Screen for Conflicts of Interest and Points of View
paragraphs: As previously discussed, many agencies do not consistently collect  information that could be helpful in determining the viewpoints of potential  members and ensuring that committees are, and are perceived as being,  balanced.  However, the National Academies and EPA have developed clear  processes that, if effectively implemented, can provide them with greater  assurance that relevant conflicts of interest and biases are identified and  addressed, and that committees are appropriately balanced in terms of  points of view because they have identified and evaluated the necessary  information before committees are finalized.
Specifically, the processes used by the National Academies  and EPA’s  Science Advisory Board clearly and consistently  identify the information they deem necessary to assess candidates for  independence and to balance committees,  explain to the candidates why the required information is important to  protect the integrity of the committee’s work,   request public comment on proposed committee membership, and   require evaluation of the overall balance of committees before  committees are finalized.
Overviews of the processes used by the National Academies and the  Science Advisory Board are provided below.
subsections: section_title: The National Academies
paragraphs: In 2001, we reported that to help balance their committees and safeguard  their credibility, the National Academies provide prospective members  with a document that offers a succinct, straightforward discussion of what  constitutes potential conflicts of interest and biases and explains what  information they are required to provide to the National Academies on a  standard form.  In 2003, the National Academies updated their procedures  covering conflicts of interest and bias, issuing their Policy on Committee  Composition and Balance and Conflicts of Interest for Committees Used  in the Development of Reports.  In explaining the need for obtaining  background information about prospective members, the National  Academies emphasize that the work of their committees must be, and must  be perceived as being, free of any significant conflict of interest and  uncompromised by bias.  The National Academies state that allegations of  conflict of interest or lack of balance and objectivity can undermine the  conclusions of fully competent committees.  The academies continue to  request the following information from potential members on a standard  form: public statements and positions.
In addition, prospective committee members are asked to identify and  describe any other circumstances in their background or present  connections that might reasonably be construed as unduly affecting their  judgment or that might be reasonably viewed as creating an actual or  potential bias or conflict of interest or the appearance of a bias or conflict  of interest.  Further, the National Academies post information about panel  candidates on a Web site for public comment, allowing the public the  opportunity to identify any real or perceived conflicts or biases associated  with individual members and the ability to raise issues regarding the  balance of viewpoints on the proposed committee.  Lastly, the National  Academies do not finalize their committee selections until officials have  reviewed and evaluated information provided by prospective members and  comments received from the public regarding the proposed makeup of the  committee.  As we previously reported, this process has proven beneficial  to the academies in selecting balanced peer review panels.
section_title: EPA’s Science Advisory Board
paragraphs: EPA’s Science Advisory Board staff office has also developed a systematic  process to obtain and evaluate the information it needs to assess potential  members for potential conflicts of interest and to properly balance the  range of expertise and viewpoints on the board.  As previously discussed,  federal committee members serving as special government employees are  subject to the criminal financial conflict-of-interest statute.  The staff office  uses the alternative form that EPA developed, form 3110-48, for special  government employees serving on advisory committees to collect  information that enables the agency to evaluate potential members for legal  conflicts of interest and also helps the agency in assessing for impartiality  and points of view.  The staff office also contacts prospective panelists and  asks them five standard questions to help the office assess the panelists’  points of view, such as whether they have made any public statements on  the issues that the panels will consider.  The staff office uses this  information to help ensure that any legal conflicts of interest are identified  and appropriately mitigated and to help ensure that committees as a whole  are balanced in terms of points of view.
EPA’s form 3110-48 explains that the information being requested is needed  so that EPA ethics officials can make an informed judgment regarding any  conflict of interest or appearance of lack of impartiality.  The Science  Advisory Board staff office further explains how it uses the information  that it collects in its brochure entitled Overview of the Panel Formation  Process at the Environmental Protection Agency Science Advisory Board.   As previously discussed, the information that EPA collects on the form  3110-48 includes sources of income and assets, liabilities, outside positions,  consulting activities, sources of research support or project funding, and  compensated expert testimony.   Further, similar to the National  Academies, EPA requests potential members to identify and describe on  the form any reason they may be unable to provide impartial advice on  matters before the committee and any reason their impartiality in the  identified matter might be questioned.  The Science Advisory Board staff  office also searches independently for background information on  prospective members to understand their qualifications and points of view.   Also, like the National Academies, EPA uses a public notice process to  obtain comments on proposed candidates for its Science Advisory Board.   That is, the staff office publishes the names and biographical sketches of  candidates for its committees on the board’s Web site, requesting the public  to provide information, analysis, or documentation that it  should consider  in evaluating the candidates.  The staff office does not finalize their  committee selections until officials have reviewed and evaluated the  information provided by the candidates, any other information the public  may have provided, and information gathered by the staff independently on  the background of each prospective member.  According to a designated  federal official for the board, the public comment period is a last check in  the screening process that can identify information about prospective  candidates, such as publicly stated positions on matters related to the  committee, that the staff office would want to verify and evaluate prior to  making panel selections.  He said the staff office has received feedback that  the biographical sketches are helpful, and he believes this practice  enhances the public’s perception of the board’s panel formation process.
section_title: Prescreening Prospective Members Using a Structured Interview
paragraphs: EPA’s FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel has a committee formation process  similar to that of the Science Advisory Board that also identifies the  specific information the staff will discuss in interviews with prospective  members.  Although the purposes of the structured interview include  assessing the interest, availability, and expertise of the potential member, a  primary focus is on evaluating potential financial conflicts of interest and  biases.  In addition, the interview provides EPA with the opportunity to  explain the ethical obligations of committee members and discuss in detail  the information that members would have to provide on the EPA form  3110-48 before they could be appointed to the committee.  This process is  efficient because it enables the panel to quickly identify those individuals  who meet its criteria for independence and impartiality.  Further,  prospective members who subsequently complete the form 3110-48 will be  better prepared to complete the form accurately.  We note that the panel’s  interview protocol, including the structured interview itself, is available on  its Web site.  Thus, prospective members and the public are informed of the  processes and the issues that will be discussed with all prospective  members.  The panel’s approach to obtaining relevant information from  prospective committee members is systematic, consistent, and transparent.   Further, we believe it unlikely that agencies formalizing and publicizing  their processes for obtaining information from prospective committee  members would approve questions that are generally inappropriate in a  professional working environment, such as questions about party  affiliation or political viewpoints that some committee members at other  agencies have reported being asked.
section_title: Selected Measures Could Promote Greater Transparency in the Federal Advisory Committee System
paragraphs: In light of recent controversies surrounding the perceived politicization of  federal advisory committees, we identified several other measures to  improve transparency in the federal advisory committee system.  Although  none of these measures can ensure that committee members are  independent and that committees are balanced, we believe each of these  alternatives has the potential to increase public understanding of the  process of appointing advisory committee members and make more  transparent the operations of federal advisory committees.
In the interest of transparency, agencies could make public the following  information about each of their advisory committees:  The committee formation process: how members are identified and  screened, and how committees are assessed for balance.
Whether members are appointed as special government employees and  are speaking as independent experts, or whether members are  appointed as representatives and speaking as stakeholders.
Whether committees arrive at decisions through a voting process or by  consensus.
There are several contexts in which agencies could make this information  available to the public.  Specifically, the information could be  written in the committee’s charter;  posted on the GSA on-line database;  posted on the agency or committee’s Web site;  announced at committee meetings; or  identified on committee work products (reports, studies, or  recommendations).
It is in the public interest to disclose such basic information about federal  advisory committees.  Further, we believe that taking such measures to  make information about committees available to the public would help  educate interested parties about the formation of committees and better  enable them to evaluate whether agencies have complied with conflict-of- interest requirements and the FACA requirements for balance.  Given  recent well-publicized accusations of biases and conflicts of interest,  efforts to improve the transparency of the federal advisory committee  system can only serve to inspire greater public trust in the process and  enhance the credibility of committees’ work.
Along these lines, we have identified two additional measures to promote  transparency that may warrant consideration: (1) public disclosure of  information concerning conflict-of-interest waivers and (2) internal  disclosure of potential conflicts of interest and sources of bias among  committee members prior to the initiation of committee work.
Agencies may grant waivers to special government employees who have  potential conflicts of interest if the agency determines that either (1) the  conflict is insignificant or (2) the need for the member’s expertise  outweighs the conflict.  The financial conflict-of-interest statute requires  that agencies provide limited information to the public about waivers upon  request; namely, that an agency has granted a waiver and the basis on  which it was granted.  The statute does not require, however, that agencies  proactively notify the public about waivers, either during advisory  committee meetings, in meeting minutes, or in committee products.  Our  review of selected committees found that agencies typically did not  disclose this information.  In contrast, FDA has had a practice of providing  at the beginning of meetings a summary disclosure of any waivers granted  to members for that meeting.  The disclosure identifies which members  have received waivers and whether the waivers were granted on the basis  that conflict was insignificant or that the need for the expertise outweighed  the potential conflict.  Because information about the conflicts pertained to  information that members provide to agencies on confidential financial  disclosure forms that are protected under the Federal Privacy Act, details  about the conflicts were not provided.  Thus, the public and others could  not evaluate the impact of the conflict on a person’s ability to provide  impartial advice.  In February 2002, as a result of a statutory requirement,  FDA issued for public comment a draft guidance document describing its  policy of disclosing specific information with respect to waivers granted  for particular matters of specific applicability—that is, when members  have a direct relationship with the products, interests, and issues under the  review of the committee.  Under this policy, FDA discloses not only the  existence of a waiver but also information on the committee member’s interests that constitute a conflict.  To address the constraints imposed by  the Federal Privacy Act, FDA requires committee members to sign a  consent form giving FDA permission to publicly disclose this information  before members receive a waiver.  According to FDA officials, committee  members have generally been willing to sign the consent forms and to  disclose this information.  We believe the practice of publicly disclosing the  issuance of conflict-of-interest waivers to committee members increases  transparency and can also increase the credibility of the committee process  by allowing the public to know when a potential conflict exists and why the  agency saw fit to grant the member a waiver.  Further, the application of  this practice could be expanded to include not only particular matters of  specific applicability (in which a particular company or individual is likely  to be affected by the matter) but also to other particular matters (in which,  for example, an industry or group of persons is likely to be affected).
The National Academies have a policy of asking their committees to engage  in an internal discussion about members' work experiences, affiliations,  and other circumstances that might pose a potential conflict of interest.   The academies believe that an internal disclosure of this information  promotes transparency and serves to increase the credibility of the  committees' work.  We agree that a confidential discussion among  committee members regarding real or perceived conflicts of interest and  biases can provide committee members with important background  information that can enable them to better evaluate the perspectives of  their fellow committee members.  Understandably, extending such a  practice to federal advisory committees, and in particular to members  appointed as special government employees, raises privacy questions  because special government employees are under no obligation to disclose  such information to fellow committee members or the public.  However, we  believe that the possibility of requiring members to disclose background  information, affiliations, and other sources of potential conflicts of interest  and biases among individual committee members at an internal disclosure  session prior to the committee’s beginning its work warrants study.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: For federal advisory committees to be successful, the members must be  independent and the committees balanced—that is, they must be able to  provide, and be perceived as providing, credible and balanced advice.  A  spectrum of scientists and other experts perceive recent appointments to  some science and technical committees as being influenced more by  ideology than expertise.  Independent of the facts and specific issues  involved, this perception alone is problematic.  The perception of the  federal advisory committee system as politicized can jeopardize the value  of an individual committee’s work; discourage the participation of  scientists, experts, and other potential members on future advisory  committees; and call into question the integrity of the federal advisory  committee system itself.  Because allegations of conflict of interest and  bias can undermine the work of otherwise credible and competent  committees and threaten the integrity of the federal advisory committee  system, the best interests of the government are served by governmentwide  guidance and agency-level policies and procedures for addressing potential  conflicts of interest and ensuring that committees are, and are perceived as  being, balanced.  However, federal guidance in these key areas has  limitations that reduce its effectiveness.
First, OGE guidance on representative appointments can be strengthened  to better ensure that agencies are appropriately appointing committee  members.  Unless certain ambiguities in the guidance are clarified, some  agencies may continue to appoint members providing advice on behalf of  the government as representatives and not conduct reviews of potential  conflicts, thereby leaving the specific committees and the federal advisory  committee system itself vulnerable to potential criticism if potential  conflicts of interest are identified.  Clarifications that are needed to ensure  that representative appointments are made only when the individuals are,  in fact, asked to provide advice representing the positions of the  stakeholders they are representing include specifying that representative  appointments generally are not appropriate for individuals who are to  provide advice on the basis of their expertise.  Justifying representative  appointments on this basis avoids using the special government employee  category, which was specifically created to facilitate the government’s  ability to hire various experts for just such a purpose as serving on federal  advisory committees.  The guidance should also clarify that the use of the  term “representative” in a statute or charter may be used in a generic sense  and does not necessarily mean the members are to be appointed as  representatives who are to provide stakeholder advice.  Again, in  considering which type of appointment is appropriate, the focus should be  on the nature of the advice to be provided.  That is, individuals who are  appointed to federal advisory committees to provide advice on behalf of  the government (i.e., individuals who are not providing stakeholder advice)  should be appointed as special government employees.  Finally, one of the  first steps agency officials should take in establishing new committees is to  determine, in consultations with agency ethics officials, the appropriate  appointment category for members.  These decisions should be reviewed  as committee charters are renewed every 2 years.
Second, GSA could provide guidance that would assist agencies in  identifying the kinds of information they should systematically collect in  order to determine the viewpoints of prospective committee members for  the purpose of ensuring that committees are, and are perceived as being,  balanced.  Although the type of information relevant to each committee  might differ in some respects, more systematic information collection and  evaluation can support better, and more informed, committee  appointments.
Improving existing federal guidance and agency procedures and  incorporating the revised guidance into the FACA management course  should enable federal agencies to better ensure that (1) potential conflicts  of interest of committee members have been identified and appropriately  mitigated upfront and (2) committees are appropriately balanced in terms  of points of view and functions to be performed.  Along these lines,  alternative procedures used to create and manage advisory committees at  some federal agencies and the National Academies constitute promising  practices that can better ensure independence and balance.  Procedures  such as obtaining nominations for committee members from the public,  reviewing more pertinent information regarding members’ points of view,  and prescreening prospective members using a structured interview would  help agencies establish more systematic and consistent methods of  achieving independent and balanced committees.  Consistent with FACA’s  principle of transparency, agencies could also adopt selected measures to  make public more information regarding how they form and manage their  committees.  We believe it is in the best interest of both the public and the  government to disclose more information about the formation and  operation of the advisory committees—for example, how the members are  identified and screened, and whether members are serving as  representatives of an identified interest or as special government  employees to provide independent advice.  In light of recent concerns  about biases and conflicts of interest, adopting more clearly defined  procedures to screen and appoint committee members and to increase  transparency in the advisory committee process would constitute  important steps toward protecting the integrity of the federal advisory  committee system and maintaining public confidence in the work of federal  advisory committees.
Because this report identifies improvements to guidance and promising  management practices that generally apply to all federal agencies that  sponsor advisory committees and not just to the nine agencies addressed in  this report, we are directing our recommendations to OGE and GSA in their  roles as providers of governmentwide guidance on federal ethics and  advisory committee management requirements.  Our expectation is that all  54 federal agencies that currently sponsor federal advisory committees  could benefit from the improved guidance and management practices.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better ensure that federal agencies correctly and consistently comply  with federal requirements when appointing federal advisory committee  members, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Government  Ethics revise its 1982 guidance to federal agencies defining representative  appointments to federal advisory committees.  The guidance should   clarify that classes of expertise generally are not a “recognizable group  of persons” for purposes of making representative appointments;   consistently state that appointments as representatives are limited to  circumstances in which the members are speaking as stakeholders for  the entities or groups they represent; and  clarify that the term “representative” in statutes and charters may also  be used more generically to identify the appropriate balance of points of  view or expertise and may not be specifying that representative  appointments be used, and revise the directions on specifying  representative appointments to focus on the type of advice  representatives are to provide—that is, stakeholder advice.
To ensure that agencies’ appointments to federal advisory committees are  appropriate, we further recommend that the Director of the Office of  Government Ethics and the GSA Committee Management Secretariat   direct federal agencies to review their representative appointments to  federal advisory committees either as the 2-year charters expire or, for  those committees with indefinite charters, within 1 year to determine if  the appointments are appropriate and to reappoint members as special  government employees, where appropriate, and    direct agency committee management officials to consult with agency  ethics officials in making decisions about the type of appointments that  should be made for each committee.
To better ensure that the agency staff managing federal advisory  committees understand when to appoint committee members as  representatives and when to appoint them as special government  employees, we recommend that GSA and OGE revise the training materials  for the FACA management course, incorporating the additional OGE  guidance as recommended above, and ensure that the course materials  highlight the fact that appointment decisions should be based on the type  of advice the committee members are to provide.
To better ensure that federal advisory committee members providing  stakeholder advice, and thus serving as representative members exempt  from federal financial conflict-of-interest statutes, do not have other  unknown points of view or biases, we recommend that OGE and GSA  direct agencies to determine, for each relevant committee, the potential for  such other biases and to take the appropriate steps to ensure their  representative members do not have such biases.  At a minimum,  representatives should receive ethics training and be asked whether they  know of any reason their participation on the committee might reasonably  be questioned—for example, because of any personal benefits that could  ensue from financial holdings, patents, or other interests.
To better ensure that agencies have robust information to establish  committees that are balanced in terms of points of view and the functions  to be performed, we recommend that GSA provide guidance to agencies  regarding what background information might be relevant in assessing  committee members’ points of view.  Relevant information for these  purposes could include previous or ongoing research, public statements or  positions on the matter being reviewed, the interest of the employer or  clients in the matter, participation in legal proceedings, and work for  affected entities.  In addition, potential committee members should be  asked if there is any reason they might be unable to provide impartial  advice on the matter or matters before the committee, or if they know of  any reason their impartiality on the matter or matters might be questioned.
To better ensure that the committee members, agency and congressional  officials, and the public understand the nature of the advice provided by  federal advisory committees, we recommend that GSA issue guidance that  agencies should  identify the committee formation process used for each committee,  particularly how members are identified and screened and how  committees are assessed for overall balance;  state in the appointment letters to committee members whether they are  appointed as special government employees or representatives; in cases  where appointments are as representatives, the letters should further  identify the entity or group that they are to represent;  identify each member’s appointment category on the GSA FACA  database; for representative members, the entity or group represented  should also be identified; and  state in the committee products the nature of the advice provided—that  is, whether the product is based on independent advice or consensus  among the various identified interests or stakeholders.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided copies of a draft of this report to the two agencies, GSA and  OGE, to whom we address our recommendations to provide additional  guidance to federal agencies, and to the agencies whose advisory  committee management policies and procedures we reviewed: EPA;  Energy; HHS (with copies to CDC, FDA, and NIH); Interior; NASA; and  USDA.
In commenting on the draft report, GSA agreed with the findings relating to  those areas under its purview.  Further, GSA generally agreed with our  recommendations to OGE and GSA and outlined a proactive approach to  addressing those that pertain to GSA, including making changes to its on- line FACA database, and to working with OGE on those that pertain to  OGE’s responsibilities.  GSA stated that it expects to complete all  necessary actions directly under its purview and those to be achieved  collaboratively with OGE and other agencies during fiscal year 2005.  GSA’s  comments are provided in appendix XII.
In its comments, OGE acknowledged that some agencies may be  inappropriately using representative appointments. Further, in responding  to our finding that several agencies believe representatives may be  appointed to represent their fields of expertise, OGE agrees with us that  such appointments are inappropriate—but does not agree that any  limitations in its guidance are a factor in the misuse of representative  appointments.  Instead, OGE believes some agencies may be purposely  designating their committee members as representatives to avoid  subjecting them to the financial disclosure statements required for special  government employees—that is, agencies understand the guidance and are  simply disregarding it.  Thus, OGE disagrees with us that its guidance  should directly address this apparent misinterpretation of its guidance by  clarifying, for example, that classes of expertise are not a “recognizable  group of persons” for purposes of making representative appointments.   OGE states that its 1982 guidance accurately represents a decades old,  executive branch interpretation of the definition of special government  employees, and that our report does not provide adequate support for a  recommendation that the guidance be modified.  We disagree.  Unless OGE  clarifies the issues our report has identified, progress will likely continue to  be slow or nonexistent—remembering that the 1982 guidance itself was  developed to address uncertainties regarding the appropriate uses of  representative and special government employee appointments.  We  believe that clearer guidance would make it more difficult for agencies to  misapply the guidance.  Further, unambiguous guidance would better assist  agency staff managing committees and better support oversight by agency  ethics officials, OGE, and others, such as inspectors general and GAO.  In  addition, OGE’s response that clarifications are not needed does not  acknowledge the views of other federal agencies, presented in the draft  report, that OGE guidance is ambiguous in some respects.  For example,  EPA and NASA officials stated that having clear criteria for representative  appointments would be helpful to agencies.  In addition, we note that  Interior states in its comments to us on the report that  “GAO’s  generalization that representation of fields of expertise is not appropriate  ignores the importance of such representation to some committees.”  On  the basis of this statement, we do not believe Interior appreciates that  expert advice can be appropriately obtained by the appointment of special  government employees.  In addition, NASA’s and Energy’s comments on the  report also support the appointment of representatives to represent fields  of expertise.  We believe these statements illustrate the need for  clarifications to OGE guidance on representative and special government  employee appointments to federal advisory committees.  Finally, in our  view, if agencies are continuing to make inappropriate appointments  decades after criteria and guidance were developed, it is not unreasonable  to take another look at the guidance.  OGE’s comments and our evaluation  of them are discussed in more detail in appendix XIII.
In commenting on the draft, officials from EPA and USDA agreed with the  substance of the report, providing only technical comments that we  incorporated into the draft as appropriate. USDA indicated that the report  is a helpful and comprehensive review of issues that can be used as a  resource for agencies that rely on the advice of federal advisory  committees.
HHS provided consolidated written comments (including its component  agencies CDC, FDA, and NIH).  HHS said the report will be useful in  evaluating current practices for appointing members to serve on federal  advisory committees and also noted that the report provides a number of  interesting ideas for determining balance in points of view and ensuring  transparency in the committee process.  HHS said that it finds the report’s  recommendations of great value and indicated that NIH has volunteered to  work with GSA to assist them in implementing the recommendations.  At  the same time, HHS expressed its belief that members of scientific advisory  committees should be selected because of their expertise, background, and  personal experience, rather than through a “process seeking out some  indefinable range of personal opinion”—characterizing points of view as  both undefinable and open to misinterpretation.  However, the draft and  final reports do not espouse a “process seeking out some indefinable range  of personal opinion” but rather identify processes that include an  evaluation of potential members’ points of view relevant to the subject  matters advisory committees will consider while focusing on the relevant  expertise needed.  The examples of agency processes provided in the  report include targeted evaluations of points of view by asking potential  members a few questions, such as whether they have made public  statements or taken public positions on the issue or matters the committee  will consider.  They also ask potential members to identify and describe  any reason they may be unable to provide impartial advice on matters  before the committee and any reason their impartiality in the identified  matter might be questioned.  In our view, agencies that do not proactively  and transparently address the relevant points of view of prospective  committee members regarding the matters the committees will consider  are more likely to be subject to questions about committee balance from  the public and potential users of the committees’ products than those  agencies that use such processes.  We continue to believe that the  credibility of advisory committees, in particular those that address  sensitive and controversial issues, depends in part upon agencies’ ability to  identify and balance points of view held by members and prospective  members that are relevant to the work of the committee.  HHS’s comments  and our evaluation of them are discussed in more detail in appendix XIV.
In written comments, Interior agreed with much in the report and indicated  that it contains many useful recommendations that can be used to enhance  the successful use of advisory committees.  Interior identified one  overarching concern with the draft report, however.  That is, Interior said  our report gave the incorrect impression that FACA requires individuals on  committees to be free of conflicts of interest, noting that FACA requires  that committees, rather than individuals, not be inappropriately influenced  by the appointing authority or any special interest.  The draft and final  reports acknowledge this FACA requirement in the background section.   However, the draft and final reports also explicitly state that our focus was  on (1) the requirements regarding individual conflicts of interest that are  included in federal conflict-of-interest statutes and (2) the FACA  requirement for committee balance.  Further, in the introduction, we state  that “federal advisory committee members who are employees of the  federal government must meet federal requirements pertaining to freedom  from conflicts of interest—which we refer to in this report as  independence—and committees as a whole must meet the requirements  pertaining to balance.”  We further highlight the key provisions of the  federal conflict-of-interest statutes that must be complied with unless  granted a waiver in one section of the report and the FACA requirements  for balance in another.   Interior’s comments and our evaluation of them are  discussed in more detail in appendix XV.
In commenting on the draft report, NASA said that our conclusion that  agencies could benefit from additional guidance to better ensure  independence, balance, and transparency is sound.  However, NASA  supports the appointment of federal advisory committee members as  representatives of their fields of expertise on the basis that some experts  would not be able to serve as special government employees due to  financial conflicts of interest.  We believe this perspective provides  additional support for our view that OGE needs to provide additional  guidance on the appropriate use of representative appointments, including  clarifying that fields of expertise generally are not a recognizable group of  persons for purposes of making representative appointments.  NASA’s  comments and our evaluation of them are discussed in more detail in  appendix XVI.
In commenting on the draft report, Energy’s Office of Science expressed its  concern that we were recommending a “one-size-fits-all” approach that  would diminish the effectiveness of the office’s advisory committees.  In  addition, the office said that our interpretation of the term “representative”  is unpersuasive and would be an unsound basis of guidance for the  department.  We do not believe that we are recommending a “one-size-fits- all” approach to advisory committee management.  We recognize that there  are many types of committees that serve different functions.  Nevertheless,  we believe that there are certain requirements in FACA and the conflict-of- interest statutes that must be met by all committees.  With regard to the  suggestions we made for selecting committee members, we note that they  were described as “promising practices” that could be useful to agencies.   They were not recommendations.  As for the term “representative,” we  continue to believe that our interpretation of the OGE guidance is correct  and that our interpretation is supported by OGE’s comments on our draft  report.  In particular, we believe that it is inappropriate for agencies to  appoint members as “representatives” of a field of expertise, as Energy’s  Office of Science indicates it will continue to do.  Energy’s comments and  our evaluation of them are discussed in more detail in appendix XVII.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we will plan no further distribution until 30 days from  the report date.  At that time, we will send copies of this report to other  interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of Agriculture,  Energy, Health and Human Services, and the Interior; the Administrators of  the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the General Services  Administration, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration;  and the Director of the Office of Government Ethics.  We will make copies  available to others upon request.  In addition, the report will be available at  no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-3841.   Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix XVIII.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report (1) describes the role of federal advisory committees in the  development of national policies; (2) examines the extent to which  governmentwide and agency-specific policies and procedures for  evaluating committee members for conflicts of interest and points of view  ensure independent and balanced federal advisory committees; and (3)  identifies practices that could better ensure that committees are, and are  perceived as being, independent and balanced.
To describe the role of federal advisory committees in the development of  national policies, we reviewed committee charters, reports, and Web pages  available through the General Services Administration’s (GSA) on-line  Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) database.  We discussed the  FACA database with the GSA staff that developed and maintain the  database.  Our discussion included issues such as data entry access, quality  control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data.  We  determined that the data on the overall universe of advisory committees  were reliable for the purposes of this report, including describing the  variety of issues the committees address.
To examine the extent to which current policies and procedures for  evaluating committee members for conflicts of interest and points of view  ensure independent and balanced federal advisory committees, we  reviewed the relevant policies and procedures at six federal departments  and agencies that make extensive use of federal advisory committees—the  Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Energy, Health and Human Services  (HHS), and the Interior; the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA); and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).   These agencies were among the 11 that used the most science and  technical committees in 2003. Because HHS entities manage 26 percent of  all federal advisory committees and 36 percent of the scientific and  technical committees, we also reviewed the policies and procedures at  three HHS entities that sponsor many federal advisory committees—the  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug  Administration (FDA), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH).  We  reviewed the policies and procedures used by these nine departments and  agencies to manage federal advisory committees.  These policies, in some  cases, address appointments of committee members as special government  employees or representatives and address how agencies identify, screen,  and appoint members so as to ensure that they are free of conflicts of  interest and that the committees are balanced.  We interviewed committee  management officials, designated federal officials, and agency staff on  committee management issues.
Further, to better understand how the agencies implement their policies  and procedures as well as the Office of Government Ethics’s (OGE) and  GSA’s governmentwide regulations and guidance, we examined the  management of one committee at each of the nine departments and  agencies.  We selected a nonprobability sample of nine committees that  address scientific and technical issues using the following criteria:   selected committees had to examine issues that are national in scope and  scientifically complex, could have regulatory implications, and/or could be  potentially controversial either because of the issues that they address or  because the committee had been the subject of allegations regarding  membership.  For these nine committees, we reviewed the confidential  financial disclosure forms of the committee members appointed as special  government employees and discussed with staff how the committees used  this information with respect to conflict-of-interest and/or balance  determinations. To learn more about how agencies screen individuals for  membership, we also examined other materials that agencies collected  about them, such as their curricula vitae (CV) and résumés.  The focus of  our review was on the adequacy of federal policies and procedures to  ensure independence and balance, and we did not make any judgments on  whether conflicts of interest existed or whether the committees we  examined were properly balanced.  The way in which the agencies  managed these particular committees cannot be generalized to represent  the way in which the agencies manage all of their committees.
To determine if conflict-of-interest evaluations were performed as required  by OGE guidance, we reviewed the relevant guidance and discussed with  agency officials their use of representative and special government  employee appointments.  The purpose of the discussions was to determine  whether the representative appointments were appropriately used because  representative members are not required to undergo conflict-of-interest  reviews.  For the three departments that used representative appointments  almost exclusively, we identified the committees the agencies categorize as  addressing scientific and technical matters for which advice on behalf of  the government on the basis of best judgment is often sought, rather than  stakeholder advice.  For the individual committees selected for review at  each agency (described above), we examined the committee statutes and  charters and interviewed agency officials to determine whether the  representative members were asked to provide stakeholder or  nonstakeholder advice.
To determine if agencies collect sufficient information to assess the points  of view of its committee members appointed as special government  employees, we assessed whether agencies systematically collected  background information on committee members in addition to the OGE  form 450 used to evaluate for potential financial conflicts of interest and  CVs or résumés.  We identified other information that is helpful in assessing  points of view and thus to ensuring that the committees achieve a proper  balance of viewpoints.
Further, in examining the extent to which the regulations and guidance on  evaluating committee members for conflicts of interest and impartiality  ensure independent and balanced federal advisory committees, we  reviewed the OGE regulations and guidance to federal agencies regarding  federal conflict-of-interest provisions and GSA regulations and guidance to  federal agencies regarding FACA.  We interviewed OGE staff who are  responsible for auditing agencies’ ethics programs and who assist agencies  in resolving conflict-of-interest issues.  These staff members also address  issues related to the appointment of special government employees and  representative members to federal advisory committees.  We interviewed  the director and other officials from GSA’s Committee Management  Secretariat to learn about FACA requirements, GSA regulations, and other  GSA guidance documents designed to assist agencies in managing their  committees.  We also discussed with GSA officials how agencies use the  GSA FACA database to provide information to the public about committee  membership and activities.
To identify practices that could better ensure that committees are, and are  perceived as being, independent and balanced, we examined the relevant  policies and procedures of the National Academies; the nine committees  and agencies examined in this review; and EPA’s Science Advisory Board,  which had implemented a number of relevant changes to its policies and  procedures in response to our June 2001 report.
We conducted our review from January 2003 through March 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Federal Advisory Committees, by Authorizing Mechanism and Type, in Fiscal Year 2003
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on the ways that advisory committees  have been authorized, the functional categories of the committees as  reported by agencies to GSA, and the number of federal advisory  committee members.
Presidents, the Congress, and federal agencies can create federal advisory  committees.  As shown in table 3, most of the federal advisory committees  operating in fiscal year 2003 were required or authorized by the Congress,  some were created by the agencies, while the fewest committees were  created by presidential directives.
Sponsoring agencies broadly classify their advisory committees according  to the types of issues they address, using one of the following seven general  categories defined in GSA’s federal advisory committee database: scientific  and technical program, nonscientific program, national policy issue, grant  review, grant review-special emphasis panel,regulatory negotiation, and  “other.”  According to GSA’s fiscal year 2003 database (see table 4), 208 of  the 948 active committees were categorized as scientific and technical  committees.  However, in addition to these, committees in other categories  also address scientific and technical issues, particularly the grant review  committees.  There were 131 grant review committees with over 41,000  members in 2003.  Further, some committees placed in the national policy,  regulatory negotiation, and “other” categories also address scientific and  technical issues.
The committees in fiscal year 2003 had more than 62,000 members, the  majority of whom were members of grant review and special emphasis  panels.  Overall, federal advisory committees range in size from under 10  members to over 9,000, with an average of about 48 members.   The  committees classified as scientific and technical had 7,910 members and an  average committee membership size of about 22 members.  Federal  advisory committee members come from a wide range of professional  backgrounds and include scientists, medical doctors and other health care  professionals, academics, lawyers, engineers, corporate executives, state  and local government officials, members of nongovernmental  organizations, community activists, and representatives from the public at  large, among others.  Some members are federal employees, often from  agencies other than the sponsoring agency.
section_title: Information on the Department of Agriculture’s National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods
paragraphs: This appendix contains information about the National Advisory  Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods.  Although this committee  is cosponsored by USDA, HHS, and the Departments of Defense and  Commerce, USDA is responsible for the overall management of the  committee.  Within USDA, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)  manages this committee, and the Secretary of Agriculture appoints the  members.
Purpose of the committee:  According to its charter, the purpose of the  committee is to provide impartial, scientific advice to federal food safety  agencies for use in the development of an integrated national food safety  systems approach from farm to final consumption to ensure the safety of  domestic, imported, and exported foods.
Number of members:  29 (see table 5).
Type of appointment:  Representative.
Conflict-of-interest reviews:  The members are appointed as  representatives and are not required to file OGE financial disclosure forms  for USDA review for potential conflicts of interest.  USDA does, however,  require all committee members to submit a USDA form AD-755, which is to  provide information about members’ current employment and sources of  income greater than $10,000 in the last calendar year, other than their  primary employment.
Conflict-of-interest waivers:  Not applicable.
Disclosure of waivers to the public:  Not applicable.
Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee:  According to  FSIS officials, the agency solicits nominations through notices in the  Federal Register, FSIS Constituent Updates (an electronic newsletter sent  to over 300 organizations and individuals), the FSIS Web site, and press  releases.  Officials said these notices serve to reach interested parties and  stakeholders—that is, persons from state and federal governments,  industry, consumer groups, and academia.
Criteria used to balance the committee:  According to FSIS officials,  the most important factor used to balance the committee is the expertise  identified in the charter: microbiology, risk assessment, epidemiology,  public health, food science, and other relevant disciplines.  Membership is  also balanced in terms of points of view by the approximately equal  proportions of members appointed from government, industry, and  academia.  Committee staff also tries to balance committee membership in  terms of demographic indicators, such as ethnicity and gender, as well as in  terms of geographical distribution.
External feedback on proposed committee membership:  None  sought.
section_title: Information on the Department of Energy’s Biological and Environmental Research Advisory Committee
paragraphs: This appendix contains information about the Biological and  Environmental Research Advisory Committee, which is managed by  Energy staff in the Office of Biological and Environmental Research.  The  members are appointed by the Secretary of Energy.
Purpose of the committee:  The advisory committee reviews and makes  recommendations on Energy’s biological and environmental research  program, addressing issues such as genomics, the health effects of low- dose radiation, DNA sequencing, medical sciences, environmental  remediation, and climate change research.  In addition to reviewing  scientific issues, the committee provides advice on long-range plans and  priorities and the appropriate levels of funding.
Number of members:  23 (see table 6).
Type of appointment:  Representative.
Conflict-of-interest reviews:  Because the members are appointed as  representatives, they are not required to file OGE financial disclosure  forms for Energy review for potential conflicts of interest.
Conflict-of-interest waivers:  Not applicable.
Disclosure of waivers to the public:  Not applicable.
Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee:  According to  the committee’s designated federal official, the department received  nominations from agency staff in the Office of Science.
Criteria used to balance the committee:  According to the committee’s  designated federal official, the primary criterion used to balance the  committee is expertise.  He also considers gender, ethnicity, and geography  and tries to achieve a balance of representatives from industry, academia,  and the national laboratories.
External feedback on proposed committee membership:  None  sought.
section_title: Information on the Environmental Protection Agency’s Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Scientific Advisory Panel
paragraphs: This appendix contains information about the Federal Insecticide,  Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) Scientific Advisory Panel.  The  committee is managed by EPA staff, and the members are appointed by the  Deputy Administrator of EPA.
Purpose of the committee:  The FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel  provides advice, information, and recommendations on pesticides and  pesticide-related issues regarding the impact of regulatory actions on  health and the environment of regulatory actions.  The objectives include  providing advice and recommendations on (1) scientific studies and issues  in the form of a peer review, (2) methods to ensure that pesticides do not  cause “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment,” and (3)  guidelines to improve the effectiveness and quality of scientific testing and  of data submitted to EPA.
Number of members:  There are 7 permanent members on the standing  committee (see table 7).  These members are appointed for 4-year terms  and serve on a number of individual peer review panels.  The FIFRA  Scientific Advisory Panel establishes between 5 and 7 peer review panels  each year to address a variety of specific topics.  These committees are  comprised of permanent members and ad hoc expert consultants.  Meeting  panels typically consist of approximately 15 members.
Type of appointment:  Special government employees.
Conflict-of-interest reviews:  As special government employees,  committee members are required to file financial disclosure forms.  As  discussed in this report, the EPA form 3110-48, an OGE-approved  alternative disclosure form, is used.  In addition, as also is discussed in this  report, FIFRA staff interview potential candidates using a structured  interview format to assess the interest, availability, and appropriateness of  candidates to serve on individual committees.  The structured interview  includes a discussion of financial conflicts of interest (statutory conflicts  and appearance problems), impartiality, and a review of the information  that is requested on the form 3110-48.
Conflict-of-interest waivers:  No waivers have been granted to current  members.
Disclosure of waivers to the public:  Not applicable.
Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee:  The Federal  Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1977 requires the EPA  Deputy Administrator to select the 7 members of the standing Scientific  Advisory Panel from nominees provided by NIH and the National Science  Foundation.  The committee’s management also routinely solicits  nominations for ad hoc expert consultants on the agency's Web site and  through notices in the Federal Register.
Criteria used to balance the committee:  Technical expertise is the  primary criterion used to balance the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel  committees.  The FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel defines balanced  membership as including the necessary areas of technical expertise,  different scientific perspectives within each technical discipline, and the  collective breadth of experience needed to address the agency’s charge.
External feedback on proposed committee membership:  As required  by statute, the advisory committee’s management posts the names,  professional affiliations, and selected biographical data of nominees  proposed for appointment as permanent members in the Federal Register  and on its Web site for public comment, providing instructions on how to  submit comments regarding the nominees.  Unlike the standing committee,  nominees considered for temporary service at particular meetings are not  subject to public comment prior to their appointment.
section_title: Information on the Department of Health and Human Services’s Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections
paragraphs: This appendix contains information about the Secretary’s Advisory  Committee on Human Research Protections.  The committee replaced the  National Human Research Protections Advisory Committee, established in  2000, whose charter HHS did not renew when it expired in 2002.  HHS  officials chose to revise the charter of the initial committee primarily by  adding populations potentially affected by human research protections,  appointing new members to provide advice to the Secretary.  The  committee is sponsored and generally managed by the Office of Public  Health Service, but the members are appointed by the HHS Secretary.  The  nominating and selection processes in 2002 and 2003 were managed by the  HHS Office of White House Liaison.
Purpose of the committee:  According to its charter, the committee is to  advise the HHS Secretary and the Assistant Secretary for Health on matters  pertaining to the continuance and improvement of functions within the  authority of HHS directed toward protections for human subjects in  research.  Specifically, the committee is to provide advice relating to the  responsible conduct of research involving human subjects with particular  emphasis on  special populations, such as neonates and children, prisoners, and the   pregnant women, embryos, and fetuses;  individuals and populations in international studies;  populations in which there are individually identifiable samples, data, or   investigator conflicts of interest.
In addition, the committee is responsible for reviewing selected ongoing  work and planned activities of the Office of Human Research Protections  and other offices/agencies within HHS that are responsible for human  subjects protection.  These evaluations may include but are not limited to a  review of assurance systems, the application of minimal research risk  standards, the granting of waivers, education programs sponsored by the  Office of Human Research Protections, and the ongoing monitoring and  oversight of institutional review boards and the institutions that sponsor  research.
Number of members:  11 (see table 9).
Type of appointment:  Special government employees.
Conflict-of-interest reviews:  As special government employees,  committee members are required to file OGE financial disclosure forms for  HHS’s review for potential conflicts of interest.  These forms were  reviewed by the cognizant committee management officer who consulted  with the designated federal official and the Office of General Counsel  ethics division.  In June 2003, after the members had been appointed to the  committee, the committee management officer identified some potential  conflicts of interest stemming from investments that she and the Office of  General Counsel believed required mitigation, such as waivers.  She also  requested that the designated federal official determine whether other  potential conflicts required waivers if the appointed members work for  institutions involved in research activities/studies/projects that may impact  human research protections.
Conflict-of-interest waivers:  Waivers were not issued before the  committee’s first meeting in July 2003.  The nine waivers granted were  finalized on January 16, 2004.
Disclosure of waivers to the public:  HHS policies and procedures do  not address the disclosure of waivers to the public.  HHS does not  proactively disclose the issuance of waivers to the public at committee  meetings.
Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee:  According to  the Director of the Office of White House Liaison, she asked a couple of  individuals at the Association of American Medical Colleges for  nominations for this committee.  The Director said that an Office of Public  Health Service staff member familiar with the previous committee also  assisted in identifying nominees from the previous slate to serve on the  new committee.  In addition, she said that HHS received self-nominations  and also used names from NIH’s database, particularly the group that was  solicited for the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and  Society.
Criteria used to balance the committee:  According to the agency  official responsible for nominating members for the committee, the factors  she considered in balancing the committee were expertise along with  geographic, gender, and racial diversity.  After HHS announced the  committee membership in January 2003, the National Organization for Rare  Disorders and some members of the predecessor advisory committee  expressed concern that the regulated research industry was  overrepresented and that there were no consumer or patient advocates on  the committee.  A week later, HHS added a member with a background in  patient advocacy.
External feedback on proposed committee membership:  None  sought.
section_title: Information on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention
paragraphs: This appendix contains information about the Advisory Committee on  Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention.  The committee is sponsored and  generally managed by CDC, but the members are appointed by the HHS  Secretary.  The nominating and selection processes in 2002 and 2003 were  managed by the HHS Office of White House Liaison.
Purpose of the committee:  The Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead  Poisoning Prevention provides advice and guidance to the Secretary; the  Assistant Secretary for Health; and the CDC Director, regarding new  scientific knowledge and technological developments and their practical  implications for childhood lead poisoning prevention efforts.  The  committee also reviews and reports on childhood lead poisoning  prevention practices and recommends improvements in national childhood  lead poisoning prevention efforts.
Number of members:  12 (see table 10).
Type of appointment:  Special government employees.
Conflict-of-interest reviews:  As special government employees,  committee members are required to file OGE financial disclosure forms for  HHS and CDC review for potential conflicts of interest.  CDC’s designated  federal official, a conflict-of-interest specialist in the CDC’s Committee  Management Office, and the director of CDC’s Management Analysis and  Services Office reviewed the completed forms for the current members of  the committee.
Conflict-of-interest waivers:  None granted to current members.
Disclosure of waivers to the public: Not applicable.
Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee:  According to  the Director of the Office of White House Liaison and the designated  federal official for the committee, nominations were generally solicited  informally, such as during conversations.  According to the Director, HHS  received nominations from the Dean of the St. Francis Hospital in Tulsa,  Oklahoma; the Chancellor of Columbia University; Senator Thad Cochran;  and the Deputy Secretary’s office.  They also used the Internet to search for  candidates associated with successful lead poison reduction programs in  large cities.
Criteria used to balance the committee:  According to the Office of  White House Liaison, the department and agency worked to find potential  appointees and balance the committee on the basis of expertise as well as  gender, ethnicity, and geography to the extent these additional factors did  not impinge on the department’s ability to pick qualified members.
External feedback on proposed committee membership:  None  sought.
section_title: Information on the Food and Drug Administration’s Food Advisory Committee
paragraphs: This appendix provides information about the Food Advisory Committee.   The committee is managed by FDA.  The members are appointed by FDA’s  Associate Commissioner for External Relations.
Purpose of the committee:  The committee is to provide advice to the  Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, and to the  Commissioner of Food and Drugs and other appropriate officials as  needed, on emerging food safety, food science, nutrition, and other food- related health issues that FDA considers of primary importance for its food  and cosmetics programs.  The committee may be charged with reviewing  and evaluating available data and making recommendations on matters  such as those relating to the following:  broad scientific and technical food-  or cosmetic-related issues, the safety of new foods and food ingredients,  the labeling of foods and cosmetics, nutrient needs and nutritional  adequacy, and safe exposure limits for food contaminants.  The committee  may also be asked to provide advice and make recommendations on ways  of communicating to the public the potential risks associated with these  issues and on approaches that might be considered for addressing the  issues.
Number of members:  25 (see table 11).
Type of appointment:  With the exception of nonvoting industry  representatives, all committee members are special government  employees.
Conflict-of-interest reviews:  As special government employees,  committee members are required to file the OGE confidential financial  disclosure form 450.  Members are required to update this form annually.   In addition, for meetings that involve particular matters of general or  specific applicability, members also complete an FDA form 3410, which  requires them to report interests directly related to the topic of discussion.   The designated federal official does an initial screening and officials from  FDA’s Ethics and Integrity Branch clear the members for conflicts of  interest.
Conflict-of-interest waivers:  During the last year, waivers were granted  seven times for members to participate in specific meetings.  FDA granted  the waivers on the basis that the need for these individuals’ expertise  outweighed the potential conflicts of interest.
Disclosure of waivers to the public:  The type of waiver and the names  of members who have received waivers for particular meetings are read  into the record by the designated federal officer at the beginning of the  public meeting.  Public disclosure of the substance of waivers issued is  only required in cases where the meetings deal with particular matters of  specific applicability.  When such waivers are issued, the members who  receive them are asked to sign a consent document authorizing FDA to  provide a description of the nature and the magnitude of the financial  interests being waived for the public record.
Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee:  FDA solicits  nominations through notices in the Federal Register.  According to the  committee’s designated federal official and an agency document identifying  the sources of the nominations, the agency obtained nominations from (1)  FDA and HHS officials; (2) interest groups and trade associations and other  interested parties, including the American Society for Nutritional Services,  the Center for Science in the Public Interest, the Association of Food and  Drug Officials, and officials at the Center for Health Policy at the University  of Oklahoma and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and (3)  individuals who nominated themselves in response to the Federal Register  notice.
Criteria used to balance the committee:  Committee managers  reported the following five criteria used to achieve balance: (1) scientific  expertise representing a range of scientific interpretation; (2) demographic  characteristics, including geographic distribution, gender, and ethnicity; (3)  differing levels of experience on advisory committees; (4) stakeholder  representation (e.g., consumers, industry, and academicians); and (5)  membership on advisory committees that is used to help ensure that the  agency has balance by not repeatedly appointing a limited set of people  either for a particular committee or for various committees the agency has  on related topics.  Temporary voting members may be added to enhance  balance.
External feedback on proposed committee membership:  None  sought.
section_title: Information on the National Institutes of Health’s Scientific Advisory Committee on Alternative Toxicological Methods
paragraphs: This appendix contains information about the Scientific Advisory  Committee on Alternative Toxicological Methods, which is sponsored and  managed by NIH.  Members are appointed by the Director of the National  Institute of Environmental Health Sciences.
Purpose of the committee:  The committee provides advice to the  Director of the National Institute of Environmental Heath Sciences  (NIEHS); the Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Validation of  Alternative Methods (ICCVAM); and the National Toxicology Program  Center regarding statutorily mandated functions, including  reviewing and evaluating new; revised; or alternative test methods,  including batteries of tests and test screens that may be acceptable for  specific regulatory uses;  facilitating appropriate interagency and international harmonization of  acute or chronic toxicological test protocols that encourage the  reduction, refinement, or replacement of animal test methods;    facilitating and providing guidance on the development of validation  criteria; validation studies; and processes for new, revised, or alternative  test methods and helping to facilitate the acceptance of such  scientifically valid test methods and awareness of accepted test  methods by federal agencies and other stakeholders; and  submitting ICCVAM test recommendations for the test methods  reviewed by ICCVAM, through expeditious transmittal by the HHS  Secretary (or the designee of the Secretary), to each appropriate federal  agency, along with the identification of specific agency guidelines;  recommendations; or regulations for test methods, including batteries  of tests and test screens, for chemicals or a class of chemicals within a  regulatory framework that may be appropriate for scientific  improvement, while seeking to reduce, refine, or replace animal test  methods.
The committee also provides advice to the Director of the NIEHS and the  National Toxicology Program Center on activities and directives relating to  the National Toxicology Program Center, such as on priorities and  opportunities for alternative test methods that may provide improved  prediction of adverse health effects compared with currently used methods  or advantages in terms of reduced expense and time, reduced animal use,  and reduced animal pain and distress.
Number of members:  15 (see table 12).
Type of appointment:  Special government employees.
Conflict-of-interest reviews:  As special government employees,  committee members are required to file OGE financial disclosure forms for  review for potential conflicts of interest.  The NIH committee management  officer performed a first-level review of the financial disclosure forms,  followed by a second-level review by the designated federal officer.  The  NIH’s Deputy Ethics Counselor performed the final review.
Conflict-of-interest waivers:  Fourteen of 15 members received waivers  because NIH determined that the need for their expertise outweighed the  potential conflicts.  One of the 15 members received a waiver because the  conflict was deemed not significant.
Disclosure of waivers to the public:  According to the designated  federal officer, the issuance of waivers to committee members was not  disclosed to the public.  For example, the waivers were not discussed at  any committee meetings.  According to the NIH committee management  officer, the agency sends its waivers to the HHS Ethics Counsels assigned  to NIH, who then sends them to OGE.
Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee:  The Director  of the Environmental Toxicology Program, NIEHS, asked the members of  the ICCVAM for nominations to the advisory committee and also asked for  nominations from former members and ad hoc advisors of the committee.   The Director also requested nominations from two stakeholder groups that  regularly attend committee meetings, the Doris Day Animal League and the  People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals.
Criteria used to balance the committee:  According to the committee  management officer and the designated federal officer, the legislation that  created the committee gives direction regarding membership that focuses  on expertise and work affiliations, and NIH uses these factors to achieve  committee balance.  Specifically, the legislation calls for members to come  from an academic institution; a state government agency; an international  regulatory body; or any corporation developing or marketing new, revised,  or alternative test methodologies, including contract laboratories. The  legislation also specifies that there shall be at least one knowledgeable  representative having a history of expertise, development, or evaluation of  new, revised, or alternative test methods from each of the following  categories: (1) personal care, pharmaceutical, industrial chemicals, or  agricultural industry; (2) any other industry that is regulated by one of the  federal agencies on ICCVAM; and (3) a national animal protection  organization established under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue  Code of 1986.  The committee management officer also told us that NIH  considered ethnicity, gender, and geography in balancing the committee  membership.
External feedback on proposed committee membership:  None  sought.
section_title: Information on the Department of the Interior’s U.S. Geological Survey’s Scientific Earthquake Studies Advisory Committee
paragraphs: This appendix provides information about the Scientific Earthquake  Studies Advisory Committee.  The committee is managed by the U.S.  Geological Survey (USGS), and members are appointed by the Secretary of  the Interior.
Purpose of the committee:  The advisory committee was established  under the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Authorization Act of 2000 (Pub.  L. No. 106-503, Title II) to advise the Director of USGS on matters relating  to the USGS’s participation in the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction  Program, a multiagency strategic program to reduce risks to lives and  property resulting from earthquakes.  The committee is to provide advice  on the USGS Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program’s roles, goals, and  objectives; capabilities and research needs; guidance on achieving major  objectives; and establishing and measuring performance goals.
Number of members:  9 (see table 13).
Type of appointment:  Representative.
Conflict-of-interest reviews:  In 2001, the committee members were  appointed as representatives and were not required to file OGE financial  disclosure forms for Interior review for potential conflicts of interest.  In  January 2004, Interior reevaluated the appointments and determined that  the members should be appointed as special government employees.   Interior said that the committee would not conduct further meetings until  the appointments had been changed.
Conflict-of-interest waivers:  Not applicable in 2001.
Disclosure of waivers to the public:  Not applicable.
Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee:  The  Earthquake Hazards Reduction Authorization Act of 2000 requires the  Director of USGS to obtain nominations from the National Academy of  Sciences, professional societies, and other appropriate organizations.  The  Director obtained nominations from the academy, the Geological Society of  America, the Seismological Society of America, the American Society of  Civil Engineers, the American Institute of Professional Geologists, the  American Geophysical Union, and the Earthquake Engineering Research  Institute.
Criteria used to balance the committee:  According to the statute that  established the advisory committee, the selection of individuals for the  committee is to be based solely on established records of distinguished  service and the USGS Director is required to ensure that “a reasonable  cross-section of views and expertise is represented.”  According to the  designated federal official, the primary factor for selection was expertise in  fields such as geology, seismology, engineering, and public safety.  In  addition, according to department officials, the agency also considered  gender, geography, and employment sector.
External feedback on proposed committee membership:  USGS  sought feedback from the National Academies on its slate of proposed  members.
section_title: Information on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Space Science Advisory Committee
paragraphs: This appendix provides information about the Space Science Advisory  Committee.  The committee is managed by the Office of Space Science, and  members are appointed by NASA’s Associate Administrator for Space  Science.
Purpose of the committee:  The NASA Space Science Advisory  Committee is to draw on the expertise of its members and other sources to  provide advice and make recommendations to the Administrator of NASA  on plans, policies, programs, and other matters pertinent to the agency’s  space science responsibilities.
Number of members:  17 (see table 14).
Type of appointment:  Special government employees.
Conflict-of-interest reviews:  NASA uses the OGE form 450 to collect  financial information from committee members.  The forms are collected  and reviewed after the Associate Administrator has concurred with the  appointment decisions.  The forms 450 are reviewed and approved by the  committee’s designated federal official and the Office of General Counsel.   On the basis of these reviews, the Office of General Counsel sometimes  sends cautionary letters to members indicating that they may need to  recuse themselves if the committees address matters that relate to their  financial interests.
Conflict-of-interest waivers:  No current members have waivers.
Disclosure of waivers to the public:  Not applicable.
Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee:  According to  the committee’s designated federal official, NASA gathered nominations  from staff within the agency’s Office of Space Science.
Criteria used to balance the committee:  The committee’s designated  federal official told us said that in addition to considering the nominees’  areas of expertise relative to the four themes of the Office of Space  Science, he also considers their gender, ethnicity, geography, and  institutional affiliation.
External feedback on proposed committee membership:  None  sought.
section_title: Comments from the General Services Administration
section_title: Comments from the Office of Government Ethics
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Office of Government Ethics  letter dated March 17, 2004.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. We continue to believe that OGE’s ongoing efforts to encourage  agencies to evaluate whether appointments should be made as special  government employees or representatives would prove more effective  if clear, unambiguous guidance addressing the limitations we identified  were available to agency staff. appropriate.  (We note that an exception would be if a committee were  considering an issue that would impact a particular group, for example,  physicists or biologists—a case in which a group of experts would be  stakeholders in the matter being considered.)  Instead, OGE’s response  is to state that it is not logical to say that a field or area of expertise is a  “group of persons” and to disagree that clarification to its guidance may  be warranted to eliminate this practice.  It is possible, as OGE suggests,  that some agencies understand the guidance and are simply  disregarding it.  However, we believe ambiguities in the OGE guidance  may provide agencies with some “cover” to support their  interpretations.  In such cases, clear guidance would make it more  difficult for them to continue to misapply it.  In addition, we direct  OGE’s attention to the responses to this report from Interior, NASA,  and Energy (see apps. XV, XVI, and XVII), which suggest that  clarifications to the guidance regarding the appointment of  representatives to represent fields of expertise may be necessary. 4. On the basis of our work at several agencies and our review of the OGE  guidance, we continue to believe some clarification is needed vis-à-vis  the use of the term “represent” and its cognate forms.  As the draft and  final reports state, OGE’s direction to agencies in making decisions  regarding representative appointments is to use “words to characterize  them as the representatives of individuals or entities outside the  government who have an interest in the subject matter assigned to the  committee.”  Notably missing from OGE’s specific direction to agencies  is a focus on the nature of the advice they will be giving—that is, that  they are to represent stakeholder views.  This is in contrast to OGE’s  direction to agencies regarding special government employees that  does focus on the fact that they are to exercise individual and  independent judgment.  Although OGE’s guidance does provide helpful  examples to agencies in examining statutory language to determine  whether committee members are actually intended to serve as  representatives of interest groups, we believe that language in the  conclusions section of the guidance that directs agencies how to  indicate the type of appointment contradicts the examples that OGE  cites.  We have clarified the final report to indicate that we were  specifically discussing the conclusions section of the OGE guidance.   We also note that OGE developed these conclusions in 1982—that is, it  is not citing the 1962 guidance the agency is hesitant to revise.  Overall,  we believe that clarifications, but not departures from the criteria  regarding appointments, are needed.
We point OGE also to the comments from the Interior (see app. XV) on  the matter of the term representative.  Interior stated that “GAO agrees  that the statute authorizing the National Cooperative Geologic Mapping  Advisory Committee’ calls for the committee to  include…representatives,’ but then goes on to say that the statute does  not “clearly and unambiguously call for these members to be appointed  as representatives rather than special government employees.’.”   Interior then characterized our statements as a contradiction and said  that the Secretary of the Interior “reasonably may interpret such a  statute by relying on its plain language….”.  In our draft and final  reports, we indicate that it is not clear what point of view the private  sector and academia members could be called upon to provide if  appointed as representatives, and the statute did not appear to clearly  mandate that they be appointed as representatives—that is, it may be  using the term generically.  We continue to believe that the statute does  not clearly and unambiguously call for representative appointments  and that this example underscores the need for OGE clarification as we  recommend.  5. Seeking recommendations for advisory committee members from  outside groups or organizations does not tend to support either  representative or special government employee status.  As noted in the  draft and final reports, obtaining outside nominations is a common  practice for committees appointing special government employees;  thus, it is not used only for representative appointments.  We think it  would be appropriate for the OGE guidance to reflect current practices  regarding nominations to federal advisory committees and avoid the  potential of agencies’ giving undue weight to this criterion. 6. We are only recommending clarifications to OGE’s guidance, not  changes to the fundamental principles or criteria upon which OGE  based its guidance.  See also comment 2 above. 7. Our draft and final reports highlight the various efforts OGE discusses  below.  However, we believe the effectiveness of these efforts will  continue to be reduced until OGE’s guidance on appointments is  clarified. 8. OGE has subsequently clarified this comment.  The program review  cited in the comment led to a recommendation that an agency reassess  the status of employees serving on a federally chartered corporation  and not on a federal advisory committee.
9. We have not evaluated the template that was still in draft form during  our review. 10. OGE does not explain its view that the clarifications to the GSA FACA  management training course that we identified in the report represent  an unreasonable interpretation of OGE guidance.  We continue to  believe the suggestions our draft and final reports highlight would  improve the effectiveness of the training sessions.  For example, the  GSA materials state that representatives may (emphasis added)  represent the views of a particular industry or group.  It is not clear to  us why OGE would object to revising the FACA training materials to be  consistent with OGE’s guidance that representatives are expected to  “represent a particular bias.” 11. The draft and final reports identify the session at the 2003 OGE Ethics  Conference cited in OGE’s letter. 12. The draft and final reports cite the most significant and comprehensive  OGE guidance documents addressing representative appointments,  including OGE Informal Advisory Opinion 00 x 01 highlighted by OGE  in its comments.  (In the report text, we refer to this guidance as OGE’s  February 2000 guidance, and we have added a legal citation to it in a  footnote.)  We note that this opinion includes one paragraph addressing  representative appointments and states that representatives are  described more fully in OGE Informal Advisory Letter 82 x 22, the  guidance document cited in our draft and final reports as OGE’s  principal guidance on the issue of appointment categories for federal  advisory committees. 13. We support OGE’s commitment to monitor and comment on  appointments to newly created committees.  However, in light of  evidence that some appointments to existing committees are  inappropriate, we believe it is appropriate to also review the  appointments for approximately 950 advisory committees that are  currently active.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Health and  Human Services’s letter dated March 19, 2004.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: shows that both the National Academies and EPA routinely obtain such  relevant information from its prospective members.  2. The report identifies the practice of soliciting public input on  nominations to advisory committees, used by the National Academies  and some federal advisory committees, as one that can be helpful in  ensuring an appropriate balance of points of view of committees,  particularly those that address sensitive and controversial matters.   Agencies can determine whether to use this tool on a case-by-case  basis.  Thus, we do not disagree with HHS’s comment that obtaining  comments on proposed candidates might be feasible for some HHS  committees but not workable for all of them. 3. Although we agree with HHS that FDA should emphasize technical  qualifications when selecting advisory committee members, we also  believe that it is important for agencies to assess prospective members  for viewpoints that they have that are relevant to the work of the  committee (see also comment 1).  HHS says that FDA follows the  National Academy of Sciences’ recommendation that the appointment  of members to scientific advisory committees be based primarily on  expertise and involvement in relevant issues.  This report notes that the  academies also seek to determine, through a few simple questions,  whether there is any reason to believe that the impartiality of members  or prospective members might be questioned. 4. EPA made changes in how it manages the Science Advisory Board in  response to the specific recommendations in our 2001 report. We did  not attempt to determine any role FDA may have had in assisting EPA,  but we note that EPA, unlike FDA, revised its processes for achieving  overall balance in terms of points of view, expressly integrating it with  its reviews for potential conflicts of interest and obtaining relevant  information prior to the appointment of committee members.  5. We agree that FDA provides useful information about its selection  process, but we continue to believe that FDA and the other agencies  could improve their processes for balancing committees.  The draft and  final reports highlight FDA policies for public notice of waivers.  We  note that the selection and waiver processes used by FDA are not used  by HHS, CDC, and NIH.
section_title: Comments from the Department of the Interior
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of the Interior’s  letter dated March 18, 2004.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. This report states, as did the draft, that while our report focuses  primarily on scientific and technical federal advisory committees, the  limitations in guidance and the promising practices we identified  pertaining to independence and balance are pertinent to federal  advisory committees in general.  This report and the draft also  identified the wide range of issues addressed by federal advisory  committees, including managing federal lands and natural resources.   2. The background section of the report and the draft acknowledged the  FACA requirement that committees not be inappropriately influenced  by the appointing authority or any special interest.  However, the draft  report also clearly stated that in addressing independence, our focus  was on the requirements regarding individual conflicts of interest that  are included in federal conflict-of-interest statutes, unless specifically  noted otherwise.  In our introduction, we state that “federal advisory  committee members who are employees of the federal government  must meet federal requirements pertaining to freedom from conflicts of  interest—which we refer to in this report as independence—and  committees as a whole must meet the requirements pertaining to  balance.”  Thus, we use the term “independence” as shorthand for the  conflict-of-interest requirements to which individual committee  members must adhere.  We further highlight the key provisions of the  federal conflict-of-interest statutes that must be complied with,  including a description of the ability of an individual who has a conflict  of interest to nonetheless participate on a committee if granted a  waiver.  Alternatively, an individual may divest the financial interest. shown above, the information identified as relevant to members’ points  of view is targeted and focuses on their points of view relevant to the  subject matter to be considered.  We disagree that such inquiries will  turn qualified individuals away from government service, evidenced by  the fact that the National Academies and EPA routinely obtain such  relevant information from its prospective members.  Finally, we  recognize that representatives are placed on committees because of  their stated stakeholder interests and do not assert that participation of  representatives is improper.  16. We agree that committees, whether composed of representatives or  special government employees, may invite outside experts to provide  information or guidance.  However, that does not affect the obligation  agencies have to make appropriate decisions about appointing  members as either representatives or special government employees.
section_title: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration’s letter dated March 26, 2004.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: stakeholder communities.  Specifically, fields of expertise may be  defined as a stakeholder community only in instances where the  subject matter a committee is addressing would have a particular  impact on a field of expertise—for example, biologists, teachers, or  doctors—but not in cases where the experts are called upon to provide  expert advice on the basis of their individual judgment.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Energy
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Energy’s letter  dated April 1, 2004.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. The first issue that Energy identifies as being of concern vis-à-vis its  perception of “GAO’s advocacy of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach” is, in  essence, the governmentwide application of OGE’s criteria for  representative appointments.  That is, while Energy does not disagree  that it may be generally inappropriate to appoint advisory committee  members to represent various fields of expertise, the department  believes it is appropriate for its Office of Science to do so on the basis  of the agency’s “unique structure.”  Specifically, Energy says that the  Office of Science’s advisory committee members are inherently  representative because the department’s basic research portfolio is  managed according to scientific disciplines (physics, chemistry,  mathematics) and the related advisory committees are “focused on the  health of specific scientific disciplines.”  In our view, the department’s  research structure is not unique and does not provide a basis for  appointing experts providing advice on the basis of their best judgment  as representatives.  For example, both the National Science Foundation  and NASA manage research portfolios by scientific disciplines, and  they generally appoint members to their scientific and technical  advisory committees appropriately as special government employees.  We believe Energy’s comments support our view that OGE needs to  clarify its guidance on representative appointments. 2. The second issue that Energy views as our advocacy of a “one-size-fits- all” approach concerns obtaining input on the “selection of committee  membership.”  Energy does not specify whether it is addressing (1)  nominations for committee membership from the public, (2) comments  on proposed committee membership, or (3) both of these practices.  In  any event, the draft and final reports identify these as promising  practices that are particularly relevant to those committees addressing  sensitive or controversial issues, and not as practices that should be  applied to all committees. committees use only representatives members; we indicated that this  one committee expired in June 2003.  In its comments on the draft  report, Energy identifies another committee for which DOE appointed  several members in 2004 as special government employees.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those individuals named above, Lindsay Bach, Ross  Campbell, Bernice Dawson, John Delicath, Judy Pagano, and Amy Webbink  made key contributions to this report.
section_title: GAO’s Mission
paragraphs: The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of  Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities  and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal  government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds;  evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,  recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed  oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government  is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
section_title: Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
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subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Public Affairs