Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past Efforts to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies
Published: 2006-03-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Through 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend $20 billion to significantly increase its inventory of unmanned aircraft systems, which are providing new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities to U.S. combat forces--including those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite their success on the battlefield, DOD's unmanned aircraft programs have experienced cost and schedule overruns and performance shortfalls. Given the sizable planned investment in these systems, GAO was asked to review DOD's three largest unmanned aircraft programs in terms of cost. Specifically, GAO assessed the Global Hawk and Predator programs' acquisition strategies and identified lessons from these two programs that can be applied to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program, the next generation of unmanned aircraft.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While the Global Hawk and Predator both began as successful demonstration programs, they adopted different acquisition strategies that have led to different outcomes. With substantial overlap in development, testing, and production, the Global Hawk program has experienced serious cost, schedule, and performance problems. As a result, since the approved start of system development, planned quantities of the Global Hawk have decreased 19 percent, and acquisition unit costs have increased 75 percent. In contrast, the Predator program adopted a more structured acquisition strategy that uses an incremental, or evolutionary, approach to development--an approach more consistent with DOD's revised acquisition policy preferences and commercial best practices. While the Predator program has experienced some problems, the program's cost growth and schedule delays have been relatively minor, and testing of prototypes in operational environments has already begun. Since its inception as a joint program in 2003, the J-UCAS program has experienced funding cuts and leadership changes, and the recent Quadrennial Defense Review has directed another restructuring into a Navy program to develop a carrier-based unmanned combat air system. Regardless of these setbacks and the program's future organization, DOD still has the opportunity to learn from the lessons of the Global Hawk and Predator programs. Until DOD develops the knowledge needed to prepare solid and feasible business cases to support the acquisition of J-UCAS and other advanced unmanned aircraft systems, it will continue to risk cost and schedule overruns and delaying fielding capabilities to the warfighter.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Through 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend $20  billion to develop, procure, and support a rapidly increasing inventory of  unmanned aircraft systems. Unmanned aircraft systems are providing  combat forces—including those in Iraq and Afghanistan—with new  intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities that are  helping to transform today’s military operations. The success of unmanned  aircraft has led to greatly increased demand for new and improved  platforms to be deployed into the field. While there have been successes  on the battlefield, the development of unmanned aircraft systems has  shared the same problems as other major weapon systems that begin an  acquisition program too early, with many uncertainties about  requirements, technology, design, and production. Likewise, the  unmanned systems have also experienced similar outcomes—changing  requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery, and reliability and support  problems.
Because of the expanding interest and promise in unmanned systems and  sizable future investments, you asked us to review the Global Hawk,  Predator, and Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems—DOD’s three largest  unmanned aircraft programs in terms of cost. Specifically, you asked us to  (1) assess the Global Hawk and Predator programs’ business cases and  acquisition strategies in terms of delivering their weapon systems on time  and within cost, and (2) identify any lessons that can be learned and  applied to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program as  it moves forward to develop a supportable business case and effective  acquisition strategy.
To assess these two objectives, we reviewed Global Hawk and Predator  acquisition strategies and business cases and evaluated them according to  best practices criteria utilizing GAO’s Methodology for Assessing Risks on  Major Weapons System Acquisition Programs. We assessed budget,  programmatic, and planning documents to determine the extent to which  acquisition strategies were meeting warfighter requirements. We identified  lessons learned from these and other programs and identified common  factors that can contribute to J-UCAS’s success. We interviewed DOD and  contractor officials and obtained programmatic data for these three  systems. We leveraged prior work on other systems and on best practices  of leading companies. We performed our review from August 2005 to  February 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD expects unmanned aircraft systems to transform the battlespace with  innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures and take on the so-called  “dull, dirty, and dangerous missions” without putting pilots in harm’s way.  The use of unmanned aircraft systems in military operations has increased  rapidly since the fall of 2001, with some notable successes. Potential  missions considered appropriate for unmanned systems have expanded  from the original focus on the intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance mission area to limited tactical strike capabilities with  projected plans for persistent ground attack, electronic warfare, and  suppression of enemy air defenses. The Global Hawk, Predator, and Joint  Unmanned Combat Air Systems are DOD’s three largest unmanned aircraft  programs in terms of cost. (For more details on the three systems and  their performance characteristics, see app. I.)
Since the terror attacks in September 2001, defense investments in  unmanned aircraft systems have exponentially increased. In the 10 years  prior to the attacks, DOD invested a total of about $3.6 billion compared to  the nearly $24 billion it plans to invest in the subsequent 10 years. DOD  currently has about 250 unmanned aircraft in inventory and plans to  increase its inventory to 675 by 2010 and to 1,400 by 2015. (These numbers  are the larger systems and do not count numerous small and hand- launched systems used by ground forces.)
In the fiscal year 2001 Defense Authorization Act, Congress set a goal that  by 2010, one-third of DOD’s deep strike force will be unmanned in order to  perform this dangerous mission; this would significantly increase the  number of unmanned aircraft in DOD’s inventory. In addition, foreign  countries and other federal agencies, including the Department of  Homeland Security and the Interior Department, are expressing interest in  unmanned aircraft systems. Table 1 shows the funding in the fiscal year  2006 Defense budget for research, development, procurement, and support  of current and planned unmanned aircraft systems.
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review contained a number of decisions  that would further expand investments in unmanned systems and their use  in military operations. The report states DOD’s intent to nearly double  unmanned aircraft coverage by accelerating the acquisition of the Predator  and the Global Hawk. It also restructures the J-UCAS program to develop  an unmanned, long-range carrier-based aircraft to increase naval reach  and persistence. It further establishes a plan to develop a new land-based,  penetrating long-range strike capability by 2018 and sets a goal that about  45 percent of the future long-range strike force be unmanned. Officials  told us that elements of the J-UCAS effort will be considered in Air Force  analyses and efforts supporting future long-range strike capability.
subsections: section_title: Best Practices for Achieving Successful Acquisition Outcomes
paragraphs: Unmanned aircraft systems are being developed under DOD’s acquisition  policy, which emphasizes a knowledge-based, evolutionary approach to  acquiring major weapon systems. This approach separates technology  development from product development, as suggested by best practices. In  implementing the policy, a critical first step to success is formulating a  comprehensive business case that justifies the investment decision to  begin development. The business case should validate warfighter needs  and match product requirements to available resources, including proven  technologies, sufficient engineering capabilities, adequate time, and  adequate funds. Several basic factors are critical to establishing a sound  business case for undertaking a new product development. First, the user’s  needs must be accurately defined, alternative approaches to satisfying  these needs properly analyzed, and quantities needed for the chosen  system must be well understood. The developed product must be  producible at a cost that matches the users’ expectations and budgetary  resources. Finally, the developer must have the resources to design the  product with the features that the customer wants and to deliver it when it  is needed. If circumstances substantially change, the business case should  be revisited and revised as appropriate. If the financial, material, and  intellectual resources to develop the product are not available, a program  should not move forward.
Best practices indicate that the business case is best accomplished using  an evolutionary (or incremental) approach that plans to deliver an early  but relevant capability first, followed by definable and doable increments  that ultimately achieve the full capability. Each increment is expected to  have its own decision milestones and baseline—cost, schedule, and  performance requirements. An acquisition strategy is the disciplined  process employed by the service program office and prime contractor to  manage the acquisition, deliver knowledge at key junctures to make  further investments, and continue the program. The strategy implements  the business case; sets schedules for developing, designing, and producing  the weapon system; and establishes exit/entrance criteria to guide  acquisition managers and executives through key program milestones to  control and oversee the acquisition.
section_title: Global Hawk and Predator Had Common Beginnings, but Different Acquisition Strategies Have Yielded Different Outcomes
paragraphs: While the Global Hawk and Predator both began as successful advanced  concept technology demonstration (ACTD) programs, they have since  adopted different strategies in system development that have led to  different outcomes. The Global Hawk adopted a riskier acquisition  strategy that has led to significant cost, schedule, and performance  problems. Conversely, the Predator program pursued a more structured  and evolutionary strategy more consistent with DOD’s acquisition policy  guidance and has thus far experienced fewer negative outcomes.
subsections: section_title: Global Hawk Program Has Experienced Relatively Poor Outcomes
paragraphs: Following a successful ACTD, DOD approved an acquisition program in  2001 to incrementally develop and acquire systems similar to the  demonstrators, now designated the RQ-4A (Global Hawk A). In 2002, the  Global Hawk program was substantially restructured to more quickly  develop and field a new, larger, and more advanced aircraft, designated  the RQ-4B (Global Hawk B). The new acquisition strategy was now highly  concurrent, overlapping technology development, design, testing, and  production. Our November 2004 report on Global Hawk, raised concerns  about the revised strategy and its elevated risks of poor cost, schedule,  and performance outcomes.  We recommended limiting procurement to  only those aircraft needed for testing to allow product knowledge to more  fully mature and the design and technologies to be tested before  committing resources to the full program. DOD officials did not agree  because, in their opinion, we overstated some risks and they were  effectively mitigating other risks.
The Global Hawk program is already experiencing problems that are  associated with high concurrency and gaps in product knowledge.  Production of the larger Global Hawk B aircraft began in July 2004 with  immature technologies and an unstable design. The design had been  expected to be very similar to the smaller Global Hawk A, whose  performance had been proven in the ACTD, but as the larger aircraft  design matured and production geared up, the differences were more  extensive, complex, and costly than anticipated. Within a year, there were  more than 2,000 authorized engineering drawing changes to the total  baseline of 1,400 drawings, and more than half were considered major  changes. Also, once manufacturing began, there were recurring quality and  performance issues on the work of several key subcontractors. The  subcontractor building the tail scrapped seven of the first eight main  structural components because of design changes and manufacturing  process deficiencies. The wing manufacturer had to terminate a key  subcontractor because of poor performance and quality. Other suppliers  delivered parts late and with defects. These specific problems have mostly  been resolved, but the potential for even greater problems exists when the  major subsystems, still in development, are integrated into the new larger  aircraft already being produced.
Outcomes so far have not been good, as the program has experienced  significant cost increases. Extensive design changes contributed to a $209  million overrun in the development contract and resulted in a more  expensive production aircraft than forecast. Requirements growth,  increased costs of airframe and sensors, and increased support  requirements significantly increased procurement costs. In April 2005, the  Air Force reported to Congress a Nunn-McCurdy breach in procurement  unit costs—an 18 percent increase over the program’s cost baseline  approved in 2002. In December 2005, we reported the Air Force had failed  to report $401 million in procurement costs and that the procurement unit  cost had actually increased 31 percent. Subsequently, in December 2005,  the Air Force renotified Congress that, if these additional costs were  included, the procurement unit costs had actually increased by over 25  percent and that program acquisition unit costs (including development  and military construction costs in addition to procurement) had also  breached the thresholds established in the law. Under the law, DOD must  now certify the program to Congress. The Air Force is currently  restructuring the Global Hawk program—the fourth restructuring since it  began as a major acquisition.
Program schedules and performance have also been negatively affected.  For example, the start of operational assessment of the Global Hawk A  slipped about 1 year, and the planned start of initial operational testing of  the Global Hawk B design has slipped 2 years. The Director, Operational  Test and Evaluation, reports that operational assessment of the Global  Hawk A identified significant deficiencies in processing and providing data  to the warfighter, communication failures, and problems with engine  performance at high altitudes. In addition, planned delivery dates have  continued to slip, the procurement for two aircraft were moved to later  years, and some development work content was deferred or deleted; this  means that the warfighter will not get anticipated capability at the time  originally promised. For example, defensive subsystems required by Air  Combat Command have been pushed off the schedule, and it is not known  whether they will be added in the future.
The frequent deployment of Global Hawk demonstrator aircraft to support  combat operations has further affected costs and schedule, according to  officials. Support to the warfighter is the program’s top priority.  Deployments have resulted in increased costs and time delays for  acquisition but, at the same time, provide a valuable, realistic test for the  system and its employment concepts to improve its performance and  responsiveness to the warfighter. Fleet flying hours now exceed 8,000  hours, more than half in combat operations.
The following table shows changes in cost and quantities since the  program started in March 2001. The restructured program tripled  development costs, reflecting the addition of the new Global Hawk B  aircraft with advanced capabilities still in technology development. Total  procurement costs increased moderately, resulting from higher costs for  the new aircraft tempered by a reduction in the number of aircraft to be  acquired for reasons of affordability and changed requirements. Total  program acquisition and procurement unit costs have increased 73 percent  and 35 percent, respectively, and aircraft quantities decreased by 19  percent. Thus far, seven Global Hawk As have been delivered to the Air  Force—14 percent of the combined fleet—and 34 percent of the planned  budget to completion has been invested.
section_title: Predator Program Has Had Better Outcomes than Global Hawk
paragraphs: The Predator program began in 1994 as an ACTD to demonstrate and  deliver what would become the MQ-1 (Predator A). It evolved from an  earlier unmanned aircraft, the Gnat, allowing delivery of an initial  demonstrator aircraft to DOD 6 months after contract award. The Predator  ACTD concluded in 1996 and transitioned to the Air Force in 1997 when  the Defense Acquisition Board approved the Predator A for production. A  limited strike capability, to launch Hellfire missiles against ground targets,  was later added. On the basis of the success of the Predator A, the  contractor designed and built two prototypes of a larger aircraft capable of  armed reconnaissance and surveillance. This new aircraft would evolve  into the second generation MQ-9 (Predator B), a larger and higher-flying  aircraft with more strike capability. In February 2004, the Predator B  program was approved as a new system development and demonstration  program. It is managed separately from Predator A and has its own  schedule and management reviews.
The Predator program overall has experienced fewer cost, schedule, and  performance problems than the Global Hawk program has experienced.  As of February 2006, the Predator A program has a stable design with little  cost growth and the Air Force recently increased its planned buys.  Although early in the acquisition cycle, cost increases in the Predator B  program have been moderate and schedule changes few. The fiscal year  2005 report of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, cited  favorable developmental testing results and recommended refining  acquisition and fielding strategies to permit more focused and effective  operational testing. To date, about 59 percent of the combined fleet (as  presented in last year’s budget) has been delivered for about 56 percent of  the current planned budget. Deliveries include 129 Predator As and 2  prototype and six production Predator Bs. The combined fleet has tallied  120,000 flight hours since 1995. Congress has been supportive of both  Predators, typically adding to annual funding requests and quantities.
Table 3 summarizes changes in the Predator B program estimates to  completion since its start of system development.
section_title: Differences in Global Hawk and Predator Business Practices Have Contributed to the Programs’ Outcomes to Date
paragraphs: The Global Hawk and Predator began with top leadership support and  successful demonstration efforts as ACTDs, but differences in their  business practices have been the primary contributors to different cost,  schedule, and performance outcomes so far in these programs. Both  programs were under pressure to field capabilities quickly to support the  warfighter. Original models of both systems have proven to be valuable  assets in combat operations, and both transitioned from technology  demonstrations into weapon system acquisition programs with sound  strategies to complete development and acquire initial systems with  enhanced capabilities. However, Global Hawk subsequently changed to a  riskier acquisition strategy that plans to develop technologies concurrently  with the system design, testing, and production phases of the program.  Predator, while not immune to typical developmental problems, has  pursued a more disciplined, structured approach intended to evolve new  capability in separate programs. Its decisions have been more consistent  with DOD’s acquisition policy preferences. Table 5 shows some of the  differences of the current programs that have led to greater success in the  Predator program so far.
The current Global Hawk acquisition strategy is risky. It plans to develop a  new, larger, and more capable aircraft by integrating as yet  undemonstrated technologies into a new airframe, also undemonstrated,  to provide a quantum leap in performance over its ACTD. The Predator  also added plans for a new, larger aircraft, but chose an incremental  approach by managing the new investment in a separate program with  separate decision points.
The Global Hawk program began in 1994 as an ACTD, managed first by the  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and, since 1998, by the Air  Force. Seven demonstrator aircraft were built, logged several thousand  flight hours, completed several demonstrations and other tests, and passed  a military utility assessment. Demonstrators subsequently provided  effective support to military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD  judged the demonstration a success, but tests identified the need to make  significant improvements in reliability, sensor performance, and  communications before producing operationally effective and suitable  systems.
In March 2001, DOD approved the Global Hawk for a combined start of  system development and limited initial production of six aircraft. The Air  Force’s acquisition strategy approached best practices standards in terms  of technology and design maturity. Officials planned to first acquire basic  systems very similar to the successful demonstrators and then  incrementally develop and acquire systems with more advanced sensors as  critical technologies were demonstrated, using the same platform.  Officials planned to acquire a total of 63 aircraft (Global Hawk As), and 14  ground stations for mission launch, recovery, and control. These aircraft  would all be dedicated to single missions, some having imagery  intelligence capabilities and others having signals intelligence capabilities.
In 2002, the Air Force radically restructured the Global Hawk program to  develop and acquire a larger and more advanced aircraft system, the  Global Hawk B. The decision to acquire the larger aircraft was driven by  the desire to have multimission capabilities (both signals intelligence and  imagery intelligence sensors on the same aircraft) and to deliver new  capabilities associated with advanced signals intelligence and radar  technologies still in development. The new acquisition strategy abandoned  an incremental approach and moved toward a strategy that called for  concurrent development of technologies, systems integration, testing, and  production. The Air Force planned to set and approve requirements and  mature technologies over time, instead of at the start of development, and  to do this at the same time as it designed and produced the new larger and  heavier aircraft that had never been built or flight-tested.
For affordability reasons and changing requirements, the restructured  program also reduced quantities to 51 aircraft—7 Global Hawk As and 44  Global Hawk Bs—and 10 ground stations. Most of the Global Hawk Bs are  planned to have multimission capabilities, including the advanced signals  intelligence sensor, and some will have single-mission capabilities,  including the advanced radar. Low-rate production was tripled from the 6  Global Hawk As approved at program start to 19 aircraft as restructured— 7 Global Hawk As and 12 Global Hawk Bs—about 40 percent of the entire  fleet. To speed up development and field these new capabilities sooner,  DOD also approved the program to streamline and accelerate acquisition  processes, bypassing some normal acquisition policy requirements and  controls when considered appropriate. For example, the Global Hawk B  business case did not include a comprehensive analysis of alternatives that  is intended to rigorously compare expected capabilities of a new system  with the current capabilities offered by existing weapon systems, such as  the signals intelligence capabilities provided by U-2 aircraft.
Although the program could have reduced cost and schedule risks by  managing a series of discrete increments to develop and acquire the  different configurations, the Air Force chose to manage it as one program,  with one baseline and one set of decision milestones. This revised strategy  attempts to deliver capability to the warfighter that significantly surpasses  that of the former Global Hawk A program. And the Air Force has  committed up-front to produce the larger Global Hawk B aircraft in order  to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter sooner, but the signals  intelligence sensor and advanced radar technologies critical to meeting  requirements are still immature and are not expected to be delivered and  integrated until very late in the program.
The Predator transitioned from its ACTD program in 1997, when the  Defense Acquisition Board approved the Predator A for production,  skipping the system development and design phases. The transition was  not without difficulty because the focus during the demonstration effort  had been to quickly ascertain operational capabilities, but without  emphasis on design and development aspects that make a system more  reliable and supportable—typically key aspects of a development program.  The Air Force had to organize a team to respond to these issues until  reliability and supportability issues could be resolved. Senior leadership,  however, kept the strategy simple and focused on buying additional  Predators very similar to the ACTD models.
In February 2004, the Predator B program was approved as a new system  development and demonstration program. The Predator B program was  approved without two fundamental elements of a good business case:  formal requirements documentation and an analysis of alternatives.  According to the Air Force, these were not prepared because of the  exigencies of the Global War on Terror. Officials initially planned to adopt  an acquisition strategy similar to the Global Hawk’s, but senior leadership  intervened and the acquisition strategy adopted was incremental and more  consistent with DOD acquisition policy preferences. Under the revised  strategy, the Air Force manages the Predator A and B acquisitions as  separate programs. The new Predator B program balanced requirements  and resources for a first increment and included its own sets of milestone  decision points. Subsequent increments will evolve when future  requirements and resources can be matched.
Figure 1 contrasts notional Predator B and Global Hawk schedules for  implementing their respective acquisition strategies with that espoused by  best practices and DOD acquisition policy. Predator’s incremental  approach with less overlap of technology and system development is more  similar to best practices.
Critical technologies were not sufficiently mature to support the start-up  of the Global Hawk B program—particularly those associated with the  signals intelligence and advanced radar, the very capabilities that drove  the decision to acquire the larger aircraft. Likewise, the larger and heavier  aircraft was neither prototyped nor demonstrated. The Predator B’s  technologies were mostly mature at program start, and the aircraft has  been built and flown. Mature technologies can leverage the potential for  success in development, providing early assurance that the warfighter’s  requirements can be met within cost and schedule goals.
Although Global Hawk A technologies were demonstrated in the ACTD,  the level of technology maturity significantly declined when Global Hawk  B was approved for development. In particular, the new signals  intelligence and multiplatform radar systems were still in technology  development, not expected to be mature and be tested in an operational  environment until sometime between 2009 and 2011. The spillover of  technology development into product development and overall immaturity  of technology increase risks of poor cost, schedule, and performance  outcomes. For example, as the advanced sensors mature and become  ready to be integrated into the aircraft, there is risk that the aircraft,  already being produced, will not have sufficient space, power, or cooling  or that the sensor systems will weigh more than planned, reducing aircraft  performance and ability to meet overall mission requirements—altitude,  speed, and endurance.
Predator A has been in production since 1997 and its technologies are  mature. All Predator B technologies, except for one, are mature. This one  meets the DOD standard for maturity—demonstration in a lab  environment—but has not yet met best practice standards that require  demonstrations in an operational environment. This technology is  important to manage the weapons that Predator B will carry and launch— more than those on Predator A. It relies on a data link that enables the  operator to release the weapon from the ground. Program officials have  stated that the current problems with this technology are related to its  integration into the Predator B weapon system. In unmanned aircraft,  unlike manned aircraft, there is no one in the cockpit to fire the weapon.  To develop this capability required revisions to software, cryptologic  controls, navigation sensors, and flight operations. The Air Force expects  this capability to be demonstrated in an operational environment after it  has been integrated into a Predator B in May 2006.
subsections: section_title: Global Hawk and Predator Both Include Concurrent Development and Production
paragraphs: The Global Hawk’s restructured program includes a significant overlap of  technology, design, and production. The Predator B program is also  concurrent, but to a lesser degree. Concurrency—the overlapping of  development, test, and production schedules—is risky and can be costly  and delay delivery of a usable capability to the warfighter if testing shows  design changes are necessary to achieve expected system performance.
Once in production, design changes can be an order of magnitude greater  than changes identified during the design phase.
By requiring a larger air vehicle to carry new advanced technologies while  speeding up the acquisition schedule, the Air Force accepted much higher  risks than the original plan, which followed a more evolutionary approach.  The Air Force restructured the Global Hawk program, extending the  development period, delaying testing, and accelerating aircraft production  and deliveries, resulting in substantial concurrency. The development  period was expanded by 5 years, and production deliveries were  accelerated and compressed to fewer years, creating significant overlap  from fiscal years 2004 to 2010. As a result, the Air Force plans to buy  almost half of the new larger Global Hawk aircraft before a production  model is flight-tested and operational evaluations are completed to show  that the air vehicle design works as required. Substantially more than half  of the aircraft will be purchased before the airborne signals intelligence  and multiplatform radar, the two technologies that are required for the  larger aircraft, complete development and are integrated for flight testing.
The Predator B program’s revised strategy also overlapped development  and production. For example, 21 Predator aircraft will be purchased  before initial operational test and evaluation has been completed. Air  Force officials acknowledge that the concurrency will require them to  modify about 10 of these aircraft to bring them up to the full first  increment capability. Modifications will include the installation of the  system to manage and launch weapons and the digital electronic engine  controller.
section_title: Different Leadership Approaches Have Influenced Outcomes in Both Programs
paragraphs: Top management attention set the stage for the early success of Global  Hawk. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics became personally involved in establishing the original plan for  development. Leadership insisted on fielding an initial capability that  could be developed within a fixed budget while providing for an  evolutionary process to add enhancements to succeeding versions. The  result was a very successful ACTD program that produced seven  demonstrators, logged several thousand flight hours, passed its military  usefulness assessment, and has since very effectively supported combat  operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Once the Global Hawk was approved  as a major acquisition program, however, senior Air Force leaders diverted  Global Hawk to a high-risk spiral development strategy that featured  frequent changes to development plans and time frames. They also  approved the larger Global Hawk B with immature critical technologies  and a highly concurrent test and production program—much of this  contrary to best practices and defense acquisition policy preferences.
The Predator also had top management attention early in the program and  has maintained its high visibility through a high-ranking group of Air Force  executives known as Task Force Arnold. Established in 2002 as a senior  oversight body for the Predator, Task Force Arnold has provided guidance  and headquarters-level direction to Air Combat Command on the needs  and capabilities for the system. The group has played a valuable role in  helping the Predator program maintain a tight focus on program  requirements and direction. Once the Predator A became operational, Air  Combat Command was besieged by requests from combatant commanders  for additional enhancements or capabilities. To alleviate the problem, the  task force acted as the arbiter for operational requirements. New  capabilities had to be vetted and prioritized through the task force before  they were incorporated. This kept a balance between requirements and  available resources and reduced the burden on Air Combat Command and  the program office, enabling the program to better manage its  requirements.
The task force was instrumental in revising the Predator B plans and  acquisition strategy. On the basis of an assessment from Task Force  Arnold, the Secretary of the Air Force directed that the program office  field an interim combat capability to balance an urgent operational need  with new acquisition. The Secretary also directed that the program office  revise its acquisition strategy to incrementally develop the Predator.  Accordingly, the Air Force restructured the program, dropping the spiral  development plan for an incremental approach. This strategy extended the  production schedule by 5 years and delayed initial operating capability by  3 years—lessening the degree of concurrency and providing more time to  mature technology and design. Whereas the original strategy called for  procuring 8 operational aircraft by August 2005, the revised, more  conservative strategy plans to acquire 6 aircraft delivered 1 year later.
section_title: Global Hawk Funding Requirements Are More Compressed than Those of the Predator
paragraphs: Global Hawk funding requirements are optimistic, have changed, and  continue to increase. In 2002 Global Hawk tripled estimated development  costs and compressed the procurement of aircraft into fewer years.  Program funding, which previously had been allocated relatively evenly  across 20 years, was compressed into roughly half the time, tripling Global  Hawk’s budgetary requirements in certain years. This adds to funding risk  should large annual amounts be unaffordable as they compete with other  defense priorities. The Air Force is currently preparing a new acquisition  baseline estimate, its fourth baseline since the program started in March  2001.
In contrast, Predator funding requirements are less optimistic and are  spread over a longer production period. The stable Predator A program  has been in production since 1997 and had been focused on replacing  aircraft lost through attrition. However, the Air Force increased its buy  quantities in the fiscal year 2007 budget to reflect increased future force  requirements. The revised acquisition strategy for the Predator B extended  the production period by 5 years and decreased annual buy quantities,  resulting in more even and achievable levels of annual funding. Annual  funding for both Predators has been increased by Congress in recent  years, enabling the Air Force to procure additional Predator systems or  make enhancements to the fielded systems.
section_title: J-UCAS Program Can Benefit from Lessons Learned by Global Hawk and Predator Programs
paragraphs: J-UCAS represents the next generation of unmanned aircraft. In addition  to providing intelligence and surveillance capabilities, J-UCAS is being  designed as a heavily weaponized and persistent strike aircraft. The joint  Air Force and Navy technology demonstration combined the two services’  separate efforts to develop early models of advanced unmanned attack  systems. Since the pre-acquisition program was initiated in 2003, it has  experienced funding cuts and leadership changes. The recent Quadrennial  Defense Review calls for again restructuring the program into a Navy  effort to demonstrate an unmanned carrier-based system. Regardless of  future organization, DOD still has the opportunity to learn from the  lessons of the Global Hawk and Predator programs to develop the  knowledge needed to prepare solid and feasible business cases to support  advanced unmanned aircraft acquisitions.
subsections: section_title: J-UCAS Plans and Acquisition Strategy Continue to Evolve
paragraphs: Before J-UCAS was established as a joint program, the Air Force and Navy  had separate unmanned combat aircraft projects under way, each in  partnership with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency  (DARPA). In 2003, we reported that the Air Force’s original business plan  provided time to mature technologies and was a relatively low-risk  approach, but that plans and strategy had changed to a much accelerated  and higher-risk approach. The new plan proposed to increase  requirements and accelerate the schedule for development and  production, substantially increasing concurrency of development, test, and  production activities. The gaps in product knowledge and the unfinished  technology development added significant risks of poor cost, schedule,  and performance outcomes. Therefore, we supported DOD’s decision,  under discussion at the time of our review, which advocated a new joint  service approach and which reduced risks by significantly slowing down  the Air Force’s plans.
DARPA was then designated to lead a joint demonstration program with  Air Force and Navy participation. The joint office began operations in  October 2003 and devised a $5 billion pre-acquisition program that would  develop and demonstrate larger and more advanced versions of the  original Air Force and Navy prototypes (three from each contractor for a  total of six aircraft). The office planned to conduct an operational  assessment starting in 2007 and use the results to inform Air Force and  Navy decisions for possible system acquisition starts in 2010. The  demonstrators were expected to meet both the Air Force and Navy  requirements and to share a common operating system, sensors, and  weapons. Compared with the revised Air Force plans, the joint approach  provided a more knowledge-based strategy with decreased risks of poor  outcomes. The joint strategy delayed the start of system development,  providing more time to mature the technologies, incorporate new  requirements, and conduct demonstrations with prototype aircraft.
In December 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reduced  programmed funding by $1.1 billion and directed that funding and  leadership be transitioned to the Air Force, with Navy participation, and  that the joint program be restructured. The funding and leadership  perturbations added about 19 months to the schedule for completing  technology demonstration and deciding whether to start new system  developments. The plan then was to develop and demonstrate five aircraft  to inform system development decisions in fiscal year 2012.  Now it appears the J-UCAS program will change one more time as the 2006  Quadrennial Defense Review directed its restructuring into a Navy  program to develop an unmanned longer-range carrier-based aircraft  capable of being air-refueled to provide greater standoff capability, to  expand payload and launch options, and to increase naval reach and  persistence. The Quadrennial Defense Review also directed speeding up  efforts to develop a new land-based, penetrating long-range capability to  be fielded by 2018. The Air Force is expected to use the accomplishments  and technologies from the restructured J-UCAS program to inform the  upcoming analysis of alternatives for the next generation long range strike  program. The Air Force has a goal that approximately 45 percent of its  future long-range strike force will be unmanned. Although the J-UCAS and  follow-on efforts appear somewhat unstable as they go through these  changes, we see benefits to this. Addition of requirements and changes in  user needs can be determined prior to full program initiation. If done after  an acquisition begins systems integration, these perturbations would be  much more costly.
section_title: Lessons Learned
paragraphs: The Navy’s restructured J-UCAS program, the Air Force’s new long-range  strike effort, and other future programs have opportunities to learn  lessons from the Global Hawk and Predator programs. As originally  envisioned, the J-UCAS demonstration effort provided for an extended  period of time to define warfighter requirements, mature and demonstrate  technologies, inform the design with systems engineering, and conduct a  thorough operational assessment to prove concepts and military utility.  These kinds of actions would establish a foundation for a comprehensive  business case and effective acquisition strategy. Key lessons that can be  applied to J-UCAS and its offspring include    maintaining disciplined leadership support and direction similar to that  experienced early in Global Hawk from the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and with the Predator’s Task  Force Arnold;    establishing a clear business case that constrains individual program  requirements to match available resources based on proven  technologies and engineering knowledge before committing to system  development and demonstration;    establishing an incremental acquisition strategy that separates  technology development from product development and minimizes  concurrency between testing and production;    establishing and enforcing controls that require knowledge and  demonstrations to ensure that appropriate knowledge is captured and  used at critical decision junctures before moving programs forward  and investing more money; and    managing according to realistic funding requirements that fully  resource product development and production based on a cost  estimate that has been informed by proven technologies and a  preliminary design.
Additionally, lessons of the Global Hawk and Predator transitions from  ACTDs into production and operation are important. The advanced  concept technology demonstration can be a valuable tool to prove  concepts and military utility before committing time and funds to a major  system acquisition. However, designing in product reliability and  producibility and making informed trade offs among alternative support  approaches are key aspects of development. If these operational aspects  of system development are not addressed early before production, they  can have major negative impacts on life cycle costs.
Finally, as the J-UCAS evolves one more time—and efforts return to the  individual services—some key challenges will exist to maintain the  advantages that were offered by a joint effort. The services need to be  aware of those advantages and not arbitrarily reject them for parochial  reasons. For example, exploiting past plans for common operating  systems, components, and payloads is important to affordability. Common  systems offer potential for cost savings as well as improved  interoperability. In particular, the common operating system pursued by  DARPA is a cutting edge tool to integrate and provide for interoperability  of air vehicles, allowing groups of unmanned aircraft to fly in a  coordinated manner and function autonomously (without human input).
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Global Hawk’s high-risk acquisition strategy resulted in increased costs  and delays. The restructured Global Hawk program is very different from  the original program that was approved in 2001 for a combined start of  development and limited production. The restructured program replaced  the original strategy to slowly and incrementally develop and acquire  enhanced versions of the proven demonstrator, with a highly concurrent  and accelerated strategy to develop and acquire a substantially new  aircraft with much advanced capabilities still in technology development.  Despite these major changes, officials essentially overlaid the new plans  on the old and did not prepare a comprehensive business case to support  the larger aircraft and justify specific quantities of the advanced signals  intelligence and advanced radar capabilities. Predator B’s strategy is less  risky, and as a result, the program has had moderate cost growth and has  delivered assets in a timely manner.
There are trends that run consistently through the Global Hawk and  Predator programs, similar to trends in other major defense acquisition  programs that we have reviewed. That is, when DOD provides strong  leadership at an appropriate organizational level, it enables innovative,  evolutionary, and disciplined processes to work. Once leadership is  removed or diminished, programs have tended to lose control of  requirements and add technical and funding risks. We have also found that  after successful demonstrations to quickly field systems with existing  technologies, problems were encountered after the programs transitioned  into the system development phase of the acquisition process. The  services pushed programs into production without maturing processes  and also began to add new requirements that stretched beyond technology  and design resources. Inadequate technology, design, and production  knowledge increased risk and led to cost, schedule, and performance  problems.
J-UCAS has had a bumpy road with several changes in leadership and  strategic direction. However, J-UCAS and its offspring as directed by the  Quadrennial Defense Review will be at a good juncture to establish a  sound foundation for developing the business case and an effective  acquisition strategy for follow-on investments by better defining  warfighter needs and matching them with available resources. Refining  requirements based on proven technologies and a feasible design based on  systems engineering are best accomplished in the concept and technology  development phase that precedes the start of a system acquisition  program. During this early phase, the environment is conducive to changes  in requirements that can be accomplished more cost-effectively than after  systems integration begins and large organizations of engineers, suppliers,  and manufacturers are formed to prepare for the start of system  production.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making following recommendations to reduce program risk and  increase the likelihood of more successful program outcomes by  delivering capabilities to the warfighter when needed and within available  resources. Specifically,  The Secretary of Defense should direct the Global Hawk program office to  limit production of the Global Hawk B aircraft to the number needed  for flight testing until the developer has demonstrated that signals  intelligence and radar imagery subsystems can be integrated and  perform as expected in the aircraft, and    update business case elements to reflect the restructured program to  include an analysis of alternatives, a justification for investments in the  specific quantities needed for each type of Global Hawk Bs being  procured (signals intelligence and advanced radar imagery), and a  revised cost estimate.
The Secretary of Defense should direct the Navy and Air Force  organizations responsible for the development efforts stemming from the  former J-UCAS program to not move into a weapon system acquisition  program before    determining requirements and balancing them to match proven  technologies, a feasible design based on systems engineering by the  developer, and available financial resources;    developing an evolutionary and knowledge-based acquisition strategy  that implements the intent of DOD acquisition policy; and    establishing strong leadership empowered to carry out the strategy that  will work in conjunction with the other services to ensure the design  and development continue to incorporate commonality as initiated  under the DARPA-managed joint program.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The  comments appear in appendix II. DOD concurred with our three  recommendations on the J-UCAS, but did not concur with our two  recommendations on the Global Hawk. Separately, DOD provided  technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
Regarding our recommendation to limit Global Hawk procurement, DOD  stated that the program is managing risk and would test the signals  intelligence sensor and advanced radar on other systems and transition  them to Global Hawk when mature. DOD stated that our recommendation  would stop the production line and incur significant cost and schedule  delays.
We continue to believe that limiting further Global Hawk B procurement  to units needed for testing until the aircraft and its advanced technologies  are integrated and operationally evaluated will lead to better program  outcomes. The Global Hawk program is experiencing significant cost,  schedule, and performance problems, and reducing procurement should  lessen future program risks and allow more time to mature and test the  new aircraft design and technologies before committing funds for most of  the fleet. No Global Hawk B aircraft has completed production yet and  first flight is not expected until November 2006. Initial operational test and  evaluation of the basic aircraft design with only imagery intelligence  capabilities has slipped into fiscal year 2009. According to the Air Force's  current budget plans, more than one-half of the total Global Hawk B fleet  will have been purchased before starting initial operational test and  evaluation. Schedules for follow-on operational tests of the aircraft  integrated with the advanced signals intelligence and radar technologies— the capabilities that drove the decision to acquire the larger aircraft—have  also slipped. While we support Air Force efforts to first test these new  capabilities on surrogate systems, our concern is again that, by the time  the Air Force tests fully integrated Global Hawk systems in an operational  environment, most of the aircraft will already be built or on order. If  problems are revealed during testing of the aircraft and its technologies,  they could require costly redesign and remanufacture of items already  produced and further delay getting these capabilities to combatant  commanders.
There are several other compelling reasons to limit procurement plans:
Projected delivery dates for the Global Hawk B continue to slip.
Estimated delivery schedules in the fiscal year 2007 budget show that  deliveries have slipped an average of almost 10 months since Global  Hawk B production started in July 2004 and by an average exceeding 6  months in the last year alone. If any further slippage occurs,  production may be a year or more behind what the Air Force's  strategy and financial plan was built upon. With these delays, the Air  Force should be able to reduce near-term buys and rebalance  subsequent procurements without materially affecting the flow of  production.
Procurement through fiscal year 2006 will complete its approved low- rate initial production quantity of 19 aircraft. By law, a major weapon  system cannot proceed beyond the low-rate quantity until initial  operational test and evaluation has been satisfactorily completed as  reported by the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. Again,  initial operational test and evaluation has been delayed until fiscal  year 2009. In his annual report, the Director stated that low-rate  production quantities should not be increased on the Global Hawk  until after an adequate initial operational test and evaluation of the  Global Hawk B aircraft and ground segments.
Operational assessment of the smaller Global Hawk A is not yet  complete. Testing and flight operations have experienced engine shut- downs, communication failures, and imagery data processing  deficiencies. These problems directly affect the Global Hawk B  because it uses the same engine and similar communication and data  processing systems.
Regarding our recommendation to update the Global Hawk’s business  case, DOD stated that the department’s current Nunn-McCurdy  certification evaluation and program rebaselining is thorough and provides  department leaders with the information they need to make informed  decisions. Because the Nunn-McCurdy certification and rebaselining effort  is ongoing, we cannot comment on whether these documents will make up  a comprehensive business case. However, given the magnitude of the  program’s continuing changes and challenges discussed in this report, we  are concerned that these efforts will fall short. A business case should be  rigorously updated to reflect significant restructurings, to justify specific  investments in new and emerging technologies, and to match revised  requirements to available resources.
Our apprehension is not unfounded. In November 2004, we similarly  recommended that DOD delay further procurement of the Global Hawk B  until a new business case—one that reduced risk and applied a  knowledge-based approach—was completed. DOD chose not to concur  with this recommendation, arguing that the department was effectively  mitigating risk. Despite DOD’s assurances, events that triggered the Nunn- McCurdy review in April 2005 not only indicate that the risk mitigation  measures were ineffective but underscore the wisdom of making a new  business case. In addition to cost increases, schedule delays, and  performance problems that have altered many of the program’s conditions  and plans as they were originally envisioned, officials said they are  rethinking Global Hawk test plans and low-rate quantities, which could  affect the elements on which a business case is made. Our past work on  major weapon systems acquisitions has clearly shown the value of  preparing and maintaining a comprehensive business case to justify and  guide investments, and the need to revisit the business case if  circumstances substantially change, as they have on Global Hawk.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which Global Hawk and Predator acquisition  strategies and business cases were effective in meeting warfighter  requirements we reviewed budget and planning documents. We also  utilized GAO’s Methodology for Assessing Risks on Major Weapon System  Acquisition Programs to assess their acquisition strategies and business  cases with respect to best practices criteria. The methodology is described  from the best practices and experiences of leading commercial firms and  successful defense acquisition programs. We interviewed DOD and  contractor officials and obtained programmatic data and reports for the  Global Hawk and Predator. We incorporated our recent Global Hawk and  Predator Quick Look efforts and past GAO reports and testimony. We  reviewed management plans, cost reports, progress briefings, and risk data  to identify execution efforts and results to date.
The primary comparisons made in the report are for the most part focused  on the combined Global Hawk program and the Predator B program.  Information on the Predator A program mainly provides a historical  perspective and lessons learned from that older and more mature system.  We received DOD comments questioning whether the Global Hawk and  Predator B programs can reasonably be compared given the differences in  time frames; Global Hawk’s system start was in March 2001, 3 years earlier  than Predator B’s start in February 2004.
While we agree that there may sometimes be a period of time before  problems in a newer program become evident, we believe the two  programs can be compared to provide valuable lessons for future  acquisitions. First, concerns about acquisition strategy, concurrency, and  funding profiles are not particularly dependent on time frames. Second,  the DOD policy preference for incremental acquisitions used as criteria in  comparing programs was in effect when both programs started. Third, the  Global Hawk B, which comprises most of the Global Hawk program, did  not begin production until after the start of Predator B. In a comparable  time frame since then, the Predator B program has provided some interim  combat capability and has production models flying and undergoing tests,  while the first Global Hawk B is expected to make its first flight later this  year.
To identify what lessons can be learned and applied on the J-UCAS  program, or its offspring, we interviewed DOD and contractor officials and  obtained programmatic data and reports on J-UCAS. We used our  comparisons of the Global Hawk and Predator, as well as past audit work  on unmanned and manned systems, to identify factors conducive to  successful programs and development of effective business cases and  implementation strategies. We monitored the changes in J-UCAS  leadership, priorities, and support within the department and Congress,  including the most recent decisions by the Quadrennial Defense Review.  We utilized also information obtained in past Quick Look and budget  review efforts concerning J-UCAS.
In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed officials  from the Global Hawk, Predator, and Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems  Program Offices, all at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; Air Combat  Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; Northrop Grumman  Integrated Systems, Rancho Bernardo and Palmdale, California; General  Atomics Aeronautical Systems, San Diego and Palmdale, California; and  DOD Task Force for Unmanned Systems, Office of the Secretary of  Defense, Washington, D.C.
We performed our review from August 2005 to February 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretary of the Air Force, and the Secretary of the Navy, and interested  congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions regarding this report, please call me at (202) 512- 4841. Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs are listed on the last page of this report. The following staff made  key contributions to this report: Michael Hazard, Assistant Director, Bruce  Fairbairn, Rae Ann Sapp, Charlie Shivers, Adam Vodraska, and Karen  Sloan.
section_title: Appendix I: Unmanned Aircraft Systems Included in This Review
paragraphs: The Air Force’s Global Hawk system is a high-altitude, long-endurance  unmanned aircraft with integrated sensors and ground stations providing  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. After a  successful technology demonstration, the system entered development  and limited production in March 2001. Considered a transformational  system, the program was restructured twice in 2002 to acquire 7 air  vehicles similar to the original demonstrators (the Global Hawk A) and 44  of a new, larger, and more capable model (the Global Hawk B). Seven  Global Hawk As have been delivered to the Air Force. Global Hawk Bs are  in production with first flight and first delivery expected in fiscal year  2007. Demonstrators have seen combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan  and the first Global Hawk As recently arrived in-theater.
The Predator began as a technology demonstration in 1994 and  transitioned to an Air Force program in 1997. Predators have supported  combat operations since 1995. Originally designed to provide tactical  reconnaissance, the Predator A was modified in 2001 to employ Hellfire  missiles, giving it a limited ground strike capability. In response to the  Global War on Terror initiatives, the Air Force proposed a larger model  carrying more weapons and flying higher and faster. The Predator B was  approved as a new system development and demonstration program in  February 2004. Funding plans at the time of our review were to procure a  total of 232 Predators—181 A models and 63 B models—with additional  future buys expected. Through calendar year 2005, 137 aircraft have been  delivered, 8 Predator Bs and the rest Predator As.
The Joint Unmanned Combat Systems (J-UCAS) program is a joint Air  Force and Navy effort begun in October 2003 to develop and demonstrate  the technical feasibility and operational value of a networked system of  high-performance, weaponized unmanned aircraft. Planned missions  include suppression of enemy air defenses, precision strike, persistent  surveillance, and potentially others such as electronic attack as resources  and requirements dictate. The program consolidated two formerly  separate service efforts and was to develop and demonstrate larger, more  capable, and interoperable aircraft to inform decisions on starting  acquisition program(s) in fiscal year 2012. The Quadrennial Defense  Review calls for restructuring J-UCAS into a Navy effort to develop an  unmanned carrier-based aircraft, while the Air Force will consider J-UCAS  technologies and accomplishments in its efforts to develop a new, land- based long-range strike capability.
Figure 2 compares the salient performance characteristics of these  unmanned aircraft systems.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Cost Increase Understated in  Nunn-McCurdy Report. GAO-06-222R. Washington, D.C.: December 15,  2005.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote  Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments. GAO-06-49.  Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.
Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers  Needed to Improve Outcomes. GAO-06-110. Washington, D.C.: November  30, 2005.
DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change. GAO-06-257T.  Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs.  GAO-05-301. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition  Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-395T.  Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2005.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk’s Acquisition  Strategy Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks. GAO-05-6. November 5,  2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs.   GAO-04-248. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Major Management Issues Facing DOD’s  Development and Fielding Efforts. GAO-04-530T. Washington, D.C.: March  17, 2004.
Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD’s  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington, D.C.: March  17, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices,  but More Controls Are Needed. GAO-04-53. Washington, D.C.: November  10, 2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to  the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program’s Success. GAO-03-598.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early  Improves Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15,  2002.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best  Practices. GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to  Better Weapons System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March  8, 2001  Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better  Weapon System Decisions. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April  26, 2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced  Concept Technology Demonstration. GAO/NSIAD-00-78. Washington, D.C.  April 25, 2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Demonstration Approach Has  Improved Project Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-33. Washington, D.C.: August  16, 1999.