Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but United States Is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed
Published: 2008-06-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2004, in response to the Group of Eight (G8) Sea Island Summit, the United States established the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a 5-year program to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide, with a focus on Africa. Since 2005, the Department of State (State) has allocated $374 million and selected 52 countries to participate in the program. Congress mandated that GAO assess and report on the initiative. This report assesses (1) progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2) whether State is consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness of the training, and (3) the extent to which countries meet program criteria and whether trainees are adequately screened for human rights abuses. GAO assessed State and Department of Defense (DOD) data and program documents, interviewed U.S. and host country officials, and conducted field work in eight countries.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: State and DOD have made some progress in achieving GPOI objectives in three principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing equipment and transportation for peacekeeping missions, and building peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but challenges remain in meeting these goals. First, nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers have been trained and some training equipment has been provided. However, State is unlikely to meet the goal of training 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010 and has encountered problems in accounting for the delivery of training equipment to countries. Second, State supports an equipment depot in Africa and has supplied equipment for missions in Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan, but has been delayed in providing some equipment in support of these missions. Third, State and DOD have trained 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors, conducted several multinational peacekeeping exercises, and refurbished some training centers. However, State has targeted a smaller share of resources to build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure than for training and equipping peacekeepers in Africa in comparison to other regions, in part due to needs and capabilities of the region and a focus on training African peacekeepers for current missions. Of the $98 million State has spent in Africa, 12 percent was spent on building skills and infrastructure needed for long-term peacekeeping capabilities, compared to 20 percent to 51 percent in other regions. While 56 percent of trained military peacekeepers--primarily from Africa--have deployed to peacekeeping missions, State faces challenges in assessing the proficiency of trained peacekeepers against standard skills taught in training and accounting for the activities of trained instructors. Although GPOI training standards follow U.S. military doctrine and United Nations requirements, State does not have a program-wide standard to assess the proficiency of military peacekeepers in skills taught. Further, State is unable to fully account for the training activities of the trained instructors. Collectively, these program limitations result in State's inability to assess the overall outcomes of its program in providing high-quality, effective training. State, in consultation with DOD, has selected 52 partner countries that generally meet program criteria, but in some cases State did not screen trainees for human rights abuses. For 24 countries, State's human rights reporting identified documented human rights violations by security forces in 2007, and GAO found that peacekeepers were not always screened or were not properly screened for human rights abuses. For example, we found that 81 individuals from one country received military training but were not screened for human rights violations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Peace support operations throughout the world have grown from 4 United  Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in 1988 to 17 in 2008; more than  half of these missions began in the last 10 years. At the 2004 Group of  Eight (G8) Sea Island Summit, the United States and other G8 nations  responded to the growing need for well-trained and equipped  peacekeepers by committing to expand the global capability for peace  support operations—particularly African peacekeeping skills and  capabilities. In 2004, the United States established the Global Peace  Operations Initiative (GPOI), a 5-year, $660 million program to build  peacekeeping capabilities worldwide, with a focus on enhancing  peacekeeping capabilities in Africa. Key goals of the program are to train  military peacekeepers and stability police for peacekeeping missions,  including a target of 75,000 military peacekeepers; provide long-term skills  and infrastructure to GPOI partner countries and regional organizations;  and provide nonlethal equipment and transportation to support countries’  deployment of peacekeepers. Since 2005, the Department of State (State),  in consultation with the Department of Defense (DOD), has allocated $374  million to support GPOI objectives.
In the fiscal year 2008 Defense Authorization Act, Congress mandated that  GAO assess the initiative and report on a number of issues, including the  extent to which GPOI has met its goals, the metrics used to measure  progress, the quality of training, GPOI’s impact on countries’ contributions  to peacekeeping, and G8 and other countries’ financial and technical  assistance to expand global capacity for peace support operations. To  address the mandate, this report assesses (1) progress made in meeting  GPOI goals, (2) whether State is consistently assessing the quality and  effectiveness of the training program, and (3) the extent to which  countries meet program criteria and whether trainees are adequately  screened for human rights abuses. Appendix III contains data on G8 and  other countries’ contributions to expanding the global capability for  peacekeeping.
To complete this review, we assessed State Department data on the  number of troops trained, equipment provided, and other indicators. We  interviewed officials from State and DOD in Washington, D.C.; officials  from U.S. Combatant Commands for the Pacific, Southern Hemisphere,  and Africa during visits to Germany and Miami; and U.S. and host country  officials during site visits to Guatemala, Italy, Senegal, Sierra Leone,  Ghana, Ethiopia, and Mongolia. We determined that the data provided by  State and DOD were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review.  We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to June 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained in this review provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: On April 1, 2004, the President approved GPOI, a 5-year program to help  address significant gaps in international peace operations, including a  shortage of capable peacekeepers, limited national capabilities to train  and sustain peacekeeping proficiencies, and a lack of mechanisms to help  countries deploy peacekeepers and provide logistics support for them in  the field. To support the development of peacekeeping capabilities of  GPOI countries, the program incorporates and expands on the pre-existing  Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program  and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)  program.
subsections: section_title: GPOI Has Seven Objectives to Improve Peacekeeping Operations Worldwide
paragraphs: In 2004, the United States established GPOI as a $660 million, 5-year  program with seven objectives to increase and maintain the capacity,  capability, and effectiveness of peace operations worldwide. These  objectives are to  train and, when appropriate, equip 75,000 military peacekeepers by  2010;    support efforts at the International Center of Excellence for Stability  Police (COESPU) in Italy to increase the capabilities and  interoperability of stability police to participate in peace operations;    develop a program to procure and store peace operations equipment to  facilitate the equipment’s quick mobilization for peace operations;    develop a transportation and logistics support system to deploy and  sustain peacekeeping in the field;    enhance the capacity of regional and subregional organizations for    provide a worldwide clearinghouse function for GPOI-related activities  in Africa and globally; and    conduct activities that support and assist partners in achieving self- sufficiency and maintaining the proficiencies gained from GPOI.
section_title: U.S. Agencies and Partner Countries Participate in GPOI
paragraphs: State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, in coordination with DOD’s  Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, is responsible for  providing policy guidance; allocating resources; and coordinating GPOI  programs, events, and activities. All GPOI allocations and program  activities must be approved by the GPOI Coordination Committee (GCC),  the formal decision-making body co-chaired by State’s Bureau of Political- Military Affairs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Participants of  the GCC include the Joint Staff and, as required, other program  implementers. GPOI implementers include the U.S. Combatant  Commands, State’s regional bureaus, the Office of the Secretary of  Defense’s regional offices, and U.S. diplomatic posts. The regional  combatant commands are the lead implementers of GPOI activities  throughout the world, with the exception of Africa, where State’s Bureau  of African Affairs leads implementation of GPOI activities. Within the  African Affairs Bureau, ACOTA is the lead implementer for the training  and equipment portion of GPOI activities in Africa.
State has designated 52 countries as partner countries eligible to receive  funding for GPOI activities—38 for military peacekeepers, 3 for stability  police, and 11 for both military peacekeepers and stability police, as of  April 2008. As figure 1 shows, the majority are located in Africa (22  countries) and the remaining are in Asia, South and Central America,  Europe, and the Near East and Central Asia. (See app. II for a list of all  GPOI partners.)
section_title: Majority of GPOI Funds Provided for Activities in Africa
paragraphs: State has allocated $374 million, from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year  2008, for GPOI activities worldwide, of which it has expended about $152  million for activities in four major categories: training, training equipment,  deployment assistance, and skills and infrastructure. As displayed in figure  2, the majority—about $98 million—has been spent in Africa, followed by  about $30 million in Asia and $12 million in South and Central America. In  Africa, the majority has been spent on training and training equipment  together followed by deployment assistance of equipment and  transportation for deployed peacekeeping missions. In Asia, the majority  has been spent on skills and infrastructure followed by training. In South  and Central America, the majority has been spent on training equipment  followed by activities for building skills and infrastructure. (App. II  identifies the GPOI partner countries in these geographic regions.)
section_title: State and DOD Provide Training Using a Variety of Means
paragraphs: Training of military peacekeepers under GPOI can be provided by  contractors, U.S. military active duty personnel, or by trainers from  neighboring countries in the region, and is focused on providing battalion- level training for peacekeeping missions. U.S. contractors provide the  majority of training in Africa and, when available, U.S. military active duty  personnel serve as mentors to African trainees. In Asia, U.S. military  personnel provide the majority of training but use contractors to provide  some of the training for military officers. In Central America, training is  provided by other countries and by U.S. military personnel. The United  States has funded the training of a few individuals in the Near East and  Europe. U.S. military personnel may serve as mentors to trainees in these  regions. Training has not yet occurred in Central Asia. GPOI training of  stability police is provided at COESPU—Italy’s international training  center for peace operations located in Vicenza, Italy, where the Italian  Carabinieri train instructors of stability police units.
section_title: GPOI Has Made Progress in Meeting Program Goals, but Challenges Remain
paragraphs: State and DOD have made some progress in achieving GPOI goals in three  principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing equipment  and transportation for deployed missions, and building peacekeeping skills  and infrastructure, but challenges remain in meeting these goals. Table 1  summarizes the status of GPOI activities for the three principal goals and  seven objectives. First, State and DOD have trained about 40,000 military  peacekeepers, predominantly in Africa, and supported the training of over  1,300 stability police, but it is unlikely that GPOI will meet its goal of  training 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010 due to the time it takes to  expend program funds, and State and DOD have encountered delays in  delivering nonlethal training equipment. Second, State has provided  equipment to deployed missions in Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, and Haiti;  supports an equipment depot in Sierra Leone; and initiated a process for  peacekeeping countries to request donor assistance for their  transportation and logistics needs, but some efforts have been delayed.  Third, State and DOD have trained more than 2,700 military peacekeeping  instructors and conducted other activities. However, State faces delays in  completing activities to build skills and infrastructure in Africa by 2010. In  addition, State has targeted a smaller share of resources to build African  peacekeeping skills and infrastructure than to train and equip African  peacekeepers, compared to other regions. This is due in part to the needs  and capabilities of the region and a focus on training peacekeepers in this  region for current missions. The following sections provide more  information about the progress made in these areas.
subsections: section_title: Thousands of Military Peacekeepers Trained in Africa, but Challenges Remain in Supporting Stability Police Training and Providing Training Equipment
paragraphs: The majority—92 percent—of military peacekeepers trained under GPOI  are from African partner countries, while the remainder have been trained  in Asia, Central America, and Europe. In addition, State has supported the  training of over 1,300 stability police instructors at COESPU, providing  about one-quarter of the school’s budget. However, State is not likely to  train 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010 and has not provided support  for all requested staff positions at COESPU. Further, State has provided  about $31 million of training equipment to military peacekeepers in 27  countries, predominantly in Africa. However, State has faced challenges in  delivering training equipment to GPOI partner countries in a timely  manner and accounting for equipment delivery.
subsections: section_title: GPOI Has Supported Training and Equipping of Military Peacekeepers, but Is Unlikely to Meet Its Goals by 2010
paragraphs: State and DOD have trained about 40,000 military peacekeepers as of April  2008—36,968 in Africa; 1,805 in Asia; 455 in Central and South America;  and 289 in Europe (see app. IV for details on the number trained by region  and country). State is not likely to complete the training of 75,000 military  peacekeepers by the target date of 2010. As figure 3 shows, the actual  number of troops trained is lower than State’s projections. State expects to  reach its goal once it has spent all GPOI training funds, but this will likely  not occur until after 2010 due to the time it takes to expend training funds.  In commenting on a draft of this report, State asserts that it now expects  that GPOI will train 75,000 peacekeepers by July 2010 based on new  training rates. We were unable to validate State’s new projections since as  recently as May 2008, program officials from the GPOI office in the Bureau  of Political-Military Affairs and its GPOI evaluation team indicated that  slow expenditure rates related to training rates would delay their efforts to  reach the 2010 training goal.
State has spent approximately $56 million to train military peacekeepers,  as of April 2008. Figure 4 shows the expenditures of GPOI funds for  training military peacekeepers by region. The majority of the funds, about  $39 million, have been spent in Africa.
In addition to these funds, some of the combatant commands have spent  additional DOD funds to support the State-funded GPOI training. For  example, U.S. Pacific Command officials identified that they spent an  estimated $8 million of additional DOD funds to develop courses for  peacekeeping training and support multinational training exercises held in  Mongolia and Bangladesh.
section_title: COESPU Is Likely to Meet Training Goal for Stability Police by 2010 Despite Shortfalls in State’s Assistance
paragraphs: Based on current projections, COESPU has indicated that it is likely to  meet its goal of training 3,000 stability police instructors by 2010. As of  April 2008, State had expended $9 million of $15 million obligated for  COESPU’s operations, directly supporting about one-quarter of COESPU’s  budget. In 2005, the Italians requested assistance from the United States  in filling six staff positions at COESPU in the areas of management,  training, research, and publications. Since 2005, the United States has  provided a military officer to serve in the deputy director position, but  support has not been provided for the other requested staff positions at  COESPU.
According to a February 2008 State document and COESPU and U.S.  officials we met with in Italy, the United States planned to provide support  to fill a total of five staff positions at COESPU: deputy director, head of the  training department for high-level courses, manager of research for  stability police training doctrine, evaluator of course outcomes, and Web  site and magazine manager. In January 2008, COESPU and U.S. officials  we met with in Italy stated that these positions would help COESPU track  the activities of its graduates, dispatch mobile training teams, and expand  the number of students in each class. In May 2008, State officials in  Washington, D.C., indicated that they plan to fund the position for an  evaluator of course outcomes in the near future. In addition, we found that  State does not always use staff at U.S. missions in partner countries to  facilitate U.S. support to COESPU. For example, an embassy official in  Senegal stated that when COESPU sent a questionnaire to Senegalese  officials inquiring about deployments and training activities of COESPU  graduates, State did not instruct the embassy to follow up and help obtain  a response.
section_title: State and DOD Have Encountered Problems in Providing and Accounting for Training Equipment
paragraphs: State has provided about $31 million in nonlethal training equipment to  military peacekeepers in 27 countries, predominantly in Africa. The  equipment provided includes individual and unit equipment for military  units training for peacekeeping missions, as well as equipment for  COESPU to train stability police instructors. State has encountered delays  in the purchase and delivery of this equipment, often resulting in State’s  inability to provide equipment concurrently with training sessions.  Further, State officials have been unable to fully account for training  equipment delivered in Africa.
The equipment provided includes individual equipment such as boots, first  aid kits, and uniforms; and unit equipment such as radios, tents, and  toolkits. (See app. V for more information on the types of training  equipment provided in each region.) As figure 5 shows, the majority of the  equipment was provided to partner countries in Africa. State also has  provided individual training equipment directly to COESPU for students  attending the school. This equipment included nonlethal items such as riot  batons and shields.
In addition, officials from some of the combatant commands stated that  they use other sources of funds to provide additional equipment to military  peacekeepers. For example, U.S. Central Command officials identified an  estimated $14 million in funds from DOD accounts to provide items such  as body armor, water purification units, vehicles, and uniform equipment  for a peacekeeping brigade in Kazakhstan in fiscal years 2006 and 2007.
State and DOD have encountered problems in providing training  equipment to partner countries in a timely manner. The procurement of  equipment through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which is  responsible for a large amount of equipment for GPOI, has encountered  delays due to the procurement priorities for U.S. military forces, the time  needed to identify the specific equipment needs for each country, and  manufacturing backlogs. For example, a 2007 State program evaluation  found that only two of several hundred training equipment items procured  through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for Central America  with fiscal year 2005 funds had arrived in country by the end of 2007, and  the delivery dates for the remaining equipment were unknown.  Contractors and agency and host country officials in the countries we  visited in Africa stated that training equipment often is not concurrently  provided with GPOI training, due to the delays in procurement and  delivery. In addition, U.S. officials in Guatemala stated they had to delay  training when equipment was not delivered in time.
State also has encountered problems in accounting for the delivery and  transfer of equipment to partner countries. Specifically, State officials in  Washington, D.C., have been unable to fully account for training  equipment delivered to Africa. State has used a contractor to purchase in  total approximately $19 million of equipment for African partner countries  but, as of December 2007, could not account for the equipment’s delivery.  State officials responsible for implementing the program in Africa said that  they instituted a new system in mid-2007 to account for the equipment  delivered to partner countries. These officials said that the difficulties with  accounting for equipment deliveries have been due to the fact that the  previous system was poorly organized. In June 2008, these officials stated  they had completed an inventory identifying the equipment items ordered  and delivered using GPOI funds and were now able to fully account for the  entire inventory of equipment purchase.
section_title: State Has Provided Equipment and Transportation Support to Deployed Missions, but Some Efforts Have Been Delayed
paragraphs: State has provided equipment to deployed missions and recently  established a system to facilitate donor assistance for transport and  logistic support to peacekeeping countries deploying to missions.  However, State has encountered delays in delivering equipment to  missions, similar to the delays in delivering equipment for training.
State has provided equipment to deployed missions in a number of ways.  As figure 6 shows, the majority of this support has been provided to Africa.  In Sierra Leone, since 2005, State has spent over $9 million in equipment  and operational support, for an equipment depot used for peacekeeping  missions and election support by the Economic Community for West  African States (ECOWAS). As of April 2008, State also had provided $18  million of nonlethal equipment for six countries deploying to missions in  Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan. For example, State provided field  kitchens, field medical clinics, water purification units, and generators to  peacekeepers deploying to Somalia. This equipment helped support the  deployment of at least 4,600 peacekeepers, according to State.
Although State’s goal is to provide equipment to countries deployed to  peacekeeping missions in a timely manner, as of April 2008, $9 million of  equipment obligated since 2005 for countries deployed to missions in  Somalia and Sudan had not been provided by State. For example, State  obligated $9 million in fiscal year 2005 to support Nigeria, Kenya, and the  African Union in the peacekeeping mission to Sudan, but this equipment  was not provided until 2007, according to State reporting, and $3.6 million  remains to be expended. In another example, State documents indicate  that $5.6 million in fiscal year 2006 funds obligated for the purchase of  equipment to support peacekeepers deployed from Rwanda, Ghana,  Burundi, and Nigeria have not yet been expended.
To facilitate donor support for transportation and logistical needs of  countries deploying peacekeepers, State established an electronic  communication system in the fall of 2007. Requests made by countries  seeking assistance with transportation and equipment for peacekeeping  missions can be sent by e-mail to G8 and other countries that could  provide such assistance. As of April 2008, five potential donor G8  countries have designated a contact person to receive such requests,  according to State. Although the GPOI strategy committed to initiating the  process and establishing an electronic system by 2006, State did not  establish the system until 2007. In April 2008, the first request for  assistance for one country’s deployment to the African Union mission in  Somalia was communicated by State to donors through the system,  according to State.
section_title: State Has Targeted a Smaller Share of Resources to Build Peacekeeping Skills and Infrastructure in Africa Compared with Other Regions and Faces Delays in Completing Activities
paragraphs: State and DOD have conducted a number of activities to enhance  peacekeeping skills and infrastructure to develop the ability of countries  to conduct training for their own peacekeeping missions and to improve  the capabilities of regional organizations to plan, train for, and execute  peacekeeping missions. Although African partners receive the majority of  GPOI funds, State has targeted a smaller share of resources,  comparatively, for activities to build peacekeeping skills and  infrastructure among Africa peacekeepers, in part due to the needs and  capabilities of the region and its focus on training and equipping  peacekeepers to serve in current missions.
subsections: section_title: State and DOD Have Conducted Activities to Build Skills and Infrastructure for Peacekeeping
paragraphs: State and DOD have conducted a range of activities to build peacekeeping  skills and infrastructure among partner countries. (See app. VI for  information on the status of these activities in each region.) These  activities include the following:    Enhancing the ability of countries to conduct their own peacekeeping  trained 2,384 military peacekeeping instructors in African countries,  266 in Asian countries, 43 in Central American countries, and 26 in  European countries;  refurbished training centers in Guatemala, Indonesia, Jordan,  Mongolia, and Ukraine; and    supported three annual multinational training exercises in Asia  beginning in 2006, enabling peacekeeping units from different countries  to train together.
Improving the capabilities of regional organizations to plan, train for, and  execute peacekeeping missions. These activities include the following:   trained ECOWAS staff on mission planning and management;    provided equipment and supported operations for the ECOWAS    provided computer equipment to regional peacekeeping training  centers in Ghana, Kenya, and Mali.; and  funded training of units from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and  Nicaragua, which will serve as a multinational brigade under the  Conference of Central American Armed Forces.
section_title: Smaller Proportion of GPOI Resources Have Been Targeted for Skills and Infrastructure Activities in Africa than in Asia
paragraphs: State has spent approximately $32 million in building skills and  infrastructure in different regions of the world. As displayed in figure 7,  State has spent more in Asia than Africa on activities that build skills and  infrastructure—about $15 million in Asia and $12 million in Africa— although Africa receives the majority of GPOI funds overall.
Further, State has targeted a higher proportion of funds in South and  Central America, Asia, and Europe on building skills and infrastructure  than on training and equipping peacekeepers within those regions. In  support of its goal to build skills and infrastructure, State has spent 51  percent of all funds for Asia in this area, and about 20 percent of all funds  for both South and Central America and Europe. In comparison, of the $98  million spent in Africa, 12 percent was spent on assisting with  peacekeeping skills and infrastructure. In response to our findings, State  officials attributed the limited focus of resources for building skills and  infrastructure in Africa to a drop in funding of more than 20 percent from  the funding initially anticipated in 2005. These officials told us that the  program objectives were developed with the expectation of receiving $660  million and the decrease in funding to approximately $500 million over 5  years has influenced program decisions and priorities. In May 2008, State  and DOD officials said that discussions are underway to develop proposals  for future GPOI activities after 2010.
In addition to the funds expended by State, some of the combatant  commands have used DOD funds to support GPOI activities in Asia,  Africa, and Europe. For instance, U.S. Pacific Command officials identified  that they spent about $500,000 in fiscal year 2007 to supplement the  refurbishment of buildings at Mongolia’s peacekeeping training center. In  addition, some of the commands assign officers to serve as liaisons at  peacekeeping training centers in other countries. For instance, U.S.  African Command has a liaison officer at a peacekeeping training center in  Ghana, and U.S. European Command has an officer at a peacekeeping  training center in Bosnia.
section_title: State Faces Delays in Completing Skills and Infrastructure Activities in Africa
paragraphs: Activities to build skills and infrastructure in Africa have faced delays and  will likely not be completed by 2010. Specifically, State faces delays in  building African countries’ ability to maintain their training programs,  establishing a regional communication system for ECOWAS and the  African Union, and transferring the equipment depot to ECOWAS.  According to State officials, these delays are affected, in part, by African  peacekeeping countries’ limited resources and capabilities for supporting  their own peacekeeping programs. State officials also have noted that the  ability these countries have to support their peacekeeping program is  directly affected by the rates of peacekeeper deployments these countries  provide to peacekeeping missions.
In two of the African countries we visited, high rates of deployments of  trained instructors limit their ability to build and maintain a training  program. For example, in Senegal, officials stated that building a cadre of  Senegalese instructors was difficult because once these instructors  complete GPOI training, they are frequently deployed on missions due to  their high skill levels.
The strategic communications system that State established for ECOWAS  member countries is not fully operational. State documents identified that,  while some countries were using the equipment, others had yet to either  receive or use it. In commenting on a draft of this report, State told us that  11 countries have equipment and 2 are waiting on equipment delivery.  State also obligated $4.5 million to set up a strategic communications  system for the African Union but has been unable to install the system due  to a licensing issue, according to State.
The ECOWAS equipment depot in Sierra Leone is likely to continue to  function under joint control of the United States and ECOWAS. State  maintains the depot, including the delivery and maintenance of nonlethal  equipment used by ECOWAS members for peacekeeping and election  support. State intends to transfer full responsibility to ECOWAS for the  maintenance of the depot, according to State officials, but this is unlikely  to happen in the near term. State officials said that ECOWAS is not fully  capable of financing the depot in the near future and will require U.S.  support in the near term for its operations and maintenance.
section_title: More than Half of GPOI-Trained Military Peacekeepers Have Deployed to Missions, but State Cannot Assess the Quality or Effectiveness of Its Training Program
paragraphs: State and DOD provide training on a number of military peacekeeping  skills, and 56 percent of these trained military peacekeepers from 13  countries have deployed to peacekeeping missions, as of April 2008.  However, State faces challenges in assessing the quality and effectiveness  of its training program. First, State cannot ascertain the proficiency of the  peacekeepers it has trained against a standard level of skills taught during  their training to determine if it is providing effective training. Second,  State officials are unclear about their responsibilities for maintaining and  recording evaluations of performance evaluations in the contractor  performance system of contractors who provide training in Africa. Third,  State is unable to fully account for the activities of trained instructors to  measure the program’s impact in building countries’ capability to continue  this training. Specifically, as of April 2008, State had trained more than  2,700 military instructors and supported the training of over 1,300 stability  police instructors at COESPU, but could not identify whether these  instructors subsequently conduct training.
subsections: section_title: State and DOD Train Military Peacekeeping Units and Support Training of Stability Police but Cannot Ascertain the Proficiency of Trainees
paragraphs: State and DOD train military units in peacekeeping skills, primarily to aid  participating countries in their deployment to peacekeeping operations.  According to GPOI strategy and agency officials, the instruction is based  on standard tasks identified in U.S. military training doctrine and UN  training materials and is modified by the partner country’s or region’s  needs, the skill levels of the soldiers in the unit, and the specific  requirements of the peacekeeping mission. However, State does not have  program-wide standards in place to measure the proficiency of trainees,  the quality of instruction they receive, the performance of deployed  trainees, or the activities of the trained military peacekeeping instructors.  Further, State supports the Italian government, specifically the Italian  Carabinieri, in providing training to stability police instructors for unit- level police operations on peacekeeping missions. However, State has no  measures in place to identify the training provided by or the deployments  of trained stability police instructors.
subsections: section_title: Military Peacekeeper Training Consists of U.S. Military and UN Training Materials
paragraphs: State and DOD have provided training to military peacekeeping units in 43  of the 52 countries, according to State documents. According to State  data, 56 percent of about 40,000 trained military peacekeepers from 13  countries have deployed to peacekeeping missions, the majority—97  percent—from African countries. Training is focused on providing  peacekeeping skills to military units to assist preparation for deployment  to a specific peacekeeping mission and is intended to supplement training  already provided by the partner country. According to GPOI strategy and  agency officials, GPOI implementers use relevant U.S. military doctrine to  develop training instruction for military tasks. As displayed in table 2,  training for these military units includes categories such as tactical skills  for peacekeeping, medical care issues, and interaction with civilian groups  and organizations, which contain a variety of peacekeeping tasks. For  example, DOD and State provide instruction on tactical peacekeeping  tasks such as how to escort a convoy, conduct checkpoint operations, or  guard fixed sites. In addition, training of military peacekeepers in Africa  may include instruction on firearms safety and marksmanship when  training in such skills is identified as a need of that unit or country’s  military peacekeepers. Military peacekeeper training also includes  standardized training identified by the United Nations, such as basic  information about the United Nations, UN structure and capabilities,  issues regulating the behavior of the individual peacekeeper, standard  operations procedures, logistics, medical support, and human rights.
Military officers also are provided training in planning and managing  battalion functions during peacekeeping operations. For example, officers  are introduced to skills needed to plan and execute the protection of a  fixed site, such as a food distribution site or protecting a convoy. In Africa,  State provides more detailed training in military staff skills than in Asia, in  response to the level of capabilities and needs of the peacekeeping units.  For example, training of peacekeeping military officers in Africa includes  instruction on the basic roles and responsibilities of officers staffed to a  battalion.
While there are some consistencies across the regions in the curriculum  available, military peacekeepers do not receive the same training in all  regions. Regional implementers have developed a training curriculum that  is generally based on tasks identified in U.S. military doctrine and UN  training materials, which are modified to address the specific needs or  desires of the region or country. Identified training instruction is further  modified or adapted for each training session to meet the identified needs  of the partner country, skill levels of the individuals in the unit to be  trained, and the requirements of the specific peacekeeping mission,  according to training officials and State and DOD program implementers.
section_title: COESPU Training Tailored to General Topics of Instruction for Stability Police Units
paragraphs: COESPU has trained stability police instructors from 13 countries,  providing training at two levels—senior- and junior-level officers or their  civilian equivalents. Training for junior-level instructors is focused on the  leaders of a stability police unit, while senior-level training is focused on  the overall leadership of stability police operations. Courses in both levels  include instruction on peace support operations, tactics, stability police  operations, humanitarian law, international law, territorial awareness, and  first aid. The Italian government developed the COESPU curriculum to  provide general instruction for unit-level police operations on  peacekeeping missions rather than tailoring the curriculum to specific  missions. The 5-week senior-level course instructs course participants on  the management of stability police operations as well as tactical  instruction on shooting and driving. The 7-week junior-level course  includes tactical courses on crowd control, urban area patrolling, high-risk  arrests, VIP security, fire fighting, shooting, driving, and personal defense.  The junior-level course also contains a simulation where course  participants practice their skills in the training area.
section_title: State Cannot Assess the Proficiency of Trainees to Determine if Capabilities Are Comparable to Other GPOI- Trained Peacekeepers
paragraphs: State does not have an established process for measuring the proficiency  of trainees who receive similar types of training. GPOI trainers conduct  training exercises and use after-action reviews and their professional  judgment to determine students’ ability to perform tasks as a unit during a  training course. However, State and DOD do not evaluate the military  peacekeeper trainees against a program-wide standard level of proficiency  in the skills taught during their training. For example, the evaluation  process to assess a unit’s proficiency in operating a checkpoint depends  on the instructor’s judgment, and the information is not collected in a way  that can be compared against other trained units. Rather, a participant is  considered a GPOI-trained peacekeeper if he or she attends 80 percent of  the training GPOI provides.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State noted that an individual  participant is considered a GPOI-trained peacekeeper if his or her unit  masters 80 percent of the training GPOI provides. However, according to  the GPOI strategy and reporting provided by the GPOI evaluation team,  implementers and trainers collect information that identifies individuals  that participated in at least 80 percent of the training curriculum.   Furthermore, the GPOI strategy states that the number of individuals who  participate in unit training may be counted toward the goal of 75,000 if  individuals are present for 80 percent or more of the unit training. In  addition, implementers we met with told us that participants are counted  as trained if they participate in at least 80 percent of the training  curriculum. State provided one example in which 50 students from one  country participating in two training courses were not counted as GPOI- trained because it was determined that the personnel were not sufficiently  trained due to poor English language ability.
Training and program officials in the countries we visited stated that,  although they are not required to test students, they use their professional  judgment as former or current U.S. military personnel to monitor students’  performance and determine if more time should be spent in developing  certain skills, when possible. According to training documents, after  receiving instruction in tactical peacekeeping tasks, trainees perform the  task as a unit, and the instructors are to observe their performance and  determine how the unit is performing against a standard checklist of items.  For example, during an exercise for securing a distribution site,  instructors will observe the training to judge if the unit follows proper  procedures to control a crowd, set up checkpoints and observation points  for the distribution area, and report incident information. Trainers in  Ethiopia, Ghana, and Senegal stated that the intent of the training is to  expose students to the tasks they need for peacekeeping, although they  are not expected to achieve a specific level of proficiency in the skills  taught. Military troops from Ghana and Senegal account for 44 percent of  the deployed GPOI-trained troops.  In addition, State officials told us that  although instructors follow training standards, the evaluation process of  training is subjective and a unit’s performance is affected by the skills and  capabilities the soldiers bring to the training.
The 2006 GPOI strategy states that GPOI program management personnel  were in the process of developing military task lists and related trainings  standards to contribute to standardization, interoperability, and  sustainability, and ensure the proper use of resources.  The strategy also  states that developing such standards would help efforts to evaluate the  overall effectiveness of the GPOI training program, events, and activities.   However, during the course of our review State officials were unable to  provide program-wide standards against which they could collect  assessments to identify and evaluate the overall proficiency in comparable  peacekeeping skills provided by GPOI to trainees worldwide.  In  commenting on a draft of this report, State stated that the program  currently does not have standard military task lists and associated training  standards to specify tasks, conditions, and standards for different types of  military units participating in peacekeeping operations but that steps are  being taken to develop training standards and military task lists that would  be used as a basis to develop training plans and assess trainees.  Such an  evaluation would provide a measure with which to evaluate data that may  be collected to identify the quality of the military peacekeepers GPOI has  trained.
Another measure of trainees’ performance is how a unit performs during a  peacekeeping mission. However, State and DOD are unable to collect  assessments of peacekeepers’ performance during a mission. GPOI  trainers in Senegal, Ghana, and Ethiopia said they occasionally receive UN  after-action reports that provide feedback on the performance of military  peacekeepers trained by GPOI. However, State and DOD do not routinely  collect or analyze these reports or independently assess how GPOI-trained  troops performed. Without consistent reporting on the performance of the  deployed units, State is unable to compare the performance of units  trained within a country or region or between regions to identify  similarities in the proficiency of military peacekeepers trained by GPOI.
section_title: State Has Procedures for Monitoring Contractors Providing Training in Africa but Officials Are Unclear about Their Responsibility for Recording and Maintaining Performance Evaluations
paragraphs: State has some procedures in place to monitor whether contractors are  meeting cost, schedule, and performance requirements in training  peacekeepers and providing advisor support. Specifically, State has  assigned personnel in its Bureau of African Affairs to monitor the  performance of contractors providing advisor support in Africa,  established a program management team to oversee the activities of  contractors providing training in Africa, and developed a plan to regularly  monitor contractor performance. In addition, State receives regular status  reports from the contractors.
Quality assurance, especially regular surveillance and documentation of  results, is essential to determine whether goods or services provided by  the contractor satisfy the contract requirements. Surveillance includes  oversight of a contractor’s work to provide assurance that the contractor  is providing timely and quality goods or services and to help mitigate any  contractor performance problems. An agency’s monitoring of a  contractor’s performance may serve as a basis for past performance  evaluations that are considered during future source selections. State has  a plan for monitoring and evaluating the performance of its contractors  providing training in Africa. The quality assurance plan specifies the  desired outcomes of the training provided, performance standards that the  contractors are to meet, and State’s process for evaluating contractors’  performance.
Although State’s quality assurance plan identifies the process for  evaluating contractors’ performance, State officials implementing the  program are unclear which office at State is responsible for recording the  evaluation in the contractor performance system, as required by State  regulations. State’s contracting officials were uncertain whether  evaluations of past contractor performance for training in Africa had been  entered in the system by the program management team. An official from  the ACOTA program management team told us they are not responsible  for entering performance evaluations in the contractor performance  system, in part because they are unable to access the system. However,  evaluations of contractor past performance are prepared and maintained  by this team, according to this official. State provided some evidence that  indicated that evaluations of contractors’ past performance had been  prepared by the ACOTA program management team and considered when  new task orders were placed on the existing contract for training in Africa.  However, we did not fully assess the extent to which the evaluations of  contractors’ performance had been completed and considered in awarding  training task orders. We did not examine State’s compliance with its  performance plan and the extent to which past performance evaluations  were used to award training task orders.
section_title: State Cannot Identify the Outcomes of the Training Program
paragraphs: State cannot fully account for the training activities of more than 2,700  military peacekeeping instructors trained by the GPOI program. Further,  State has supported the training of more than 1,300 stability police  instructors at COESPU but cannot account for either the training or the  deployment activities of these instructors.
subsections: section_title: State Is Unable to Identify whether Military Peacekeeping Instructors Are Conducting Training as Intended
paragraphs: The activities of trained instructors provide a measure for the progress  made in building a partner country’s capacity to sustain its peacekeeper  deployments in the future. Although State and DOD have trained more  than 2,700 military peacekeeper instructors to continue training in their  respective countries, State cannot fully determine whether this training  has taken place. For example, as of April 2008, State had only been able to  identify training that had occurred by GPOI-trained instructors for two  countries. The deployment of peacekeepers trained by these instructors  is another measure of the program’s ability to increase peacekeeping  contributions. In March 2008, 47 GPOI partner countries had military  peacekeepers and observers deployed to UN peacekeeping missions. State  cannot fully identify how many troops from these 47 countries, if any,  were trained by the 2,700 GPOI-trained military peacekeeping instructors.
section_title: State Is Unable to Identify the Extent to Which Stability Police Instructors Are Conducting Training and Deploying to Peacekeeping Missions
paragraphs: COESPU has estimated that instructors trained at its training program will  train an additional 4,500 stability police, according to COESPU documents  and officials. The training activities of COESPU graduates are one measure  of the efforts by Italy and the United States to increase worldwide capacity  for stability police. Although State has supported the training of more than  1,300 stability police instructors at COESPU, State and COESPU have been  unable to fully account for training conducted by these instructors in their  home countries. Specifically, State has only been able to account for the  indigenous training of one stability police unit conducted by COESPU  graduates from one country, according to a State document.
State and COESPU also are unable to identify if stability police units  deploying to peacekeeping missions were trained by graduates from  COESPU or if these graduates have deployed to missions themselves.  First, State has been able to account only for the deployment of a stability  police unit from the one country in which the unit was trained by  graduates of COESPU, as of April 2008. Second, although COESPU has  trained some instructors that are likely to lead stability police units in  peacekeeping operations, State and COESPU cannot fully account for the  deployments of these instructors. Specifically, State can account for the  deployments of 13 of 236 students from India who were trained at  COESPU, as of April 2008.
section_title: GPOI Partner Countries Generally Meet Program Criteria, but in Some Cases State Did Not Screen Trainees for Potential Violations of Human Rights
paragraphs: According to the GPOI strategy and State officials, before countries and  their peacekeepers can receive GPOI training and other assistance, they  must generally meet certain criteria including having an elected  government, an acceptable human rights record, and the willingness to  participate in peace support operations. GPOI partner countries generally  met the criteria for inclusion in the program. However, for 24 of the 52  countries, State’s human rights reports for 2007 identified human rights  violations by security personnel. To comply with U.S. laws, State must  verify that it does not have credible evidence that the foreign security  forces identified to receive assistance have committed gross violations of  human rights prior to the provision of training. We found that military  peacekeepers and stability police were not always screened or were not  properly screened for human rights abuses, as required by State guidance  for the legislative requirements.
subsections: section_title: GPOI Partner Countries Generally Meet Program Criteria
paragraphs: State, in consultation with DOD, has selected 52 partner countries to  participate in GPOI based on a list of criteria identified in the program’s  strategy. Partner countries should have an elected government and  acceptable human rights record, willingness to participate in peace  support operations, and agreements to ensure that U.S. training and  equipment are used for the purposes intended, according to agency  documents.
State and DOD periodically review whether partner countries continue to  meet these criteria and may suspend GPOI funding in cases where criteria  are not met, according to agency officials. For example, funding of GPOI  activities for Thailand was suspended after a military coup overthrew the  democratically elected government in 2006. However, some DOD officials  expressed concern about the selection of certain countries and the criteria  used to select countries. For example, officials in the African and Pacific  commands and the Joint Staff said they did not agree with the selection of  two countries in Africa and Asia and they felt it would limit available  resources for ongoing activities in other countries. In another example, a  DOD official said that additional criteria, such as the military HIV infection  rates or attrition rates, should be taken into account in selecting partner  countries because these factors affect the country’s ability to deploy. For  the training of stability police at COESPU, Italy and the United States  jointly decided which countries would participate.
We found that most of the 52 partner countries met the participation  criteria, but 24 countries had identified human rights violations by security  personnel in State’s human rights reporting for 2007. State officials cited  a number of reasons to justify the inclusion of these countries in GPOI:  State did not consider the human rights violations for some countries to be  a systemic problem in the military or stated that these violations were  associated with private security companies, not with the countries’  military personnel; some countries were selected to support other  strategic goals; and participation would allow some countries to receive  human rights training not otherwise available. In addition, State officials  said that the selection criteria are recommended but not required by the  program and the United States engaged in diplomatic discussions with  these countries to improve their human rights records. These officials  indicated that the vetting of trainees for human rights abuses guards  against the training of any human rights violators. Finally, State also  formally submits a list of GPOI partner countries each year to Congress to  ensure that Congress has oversight over the list of partner countries.
section_title: State Did Not Properly Screen and Did Not Always Follow Its Guidance for Human Rights Vetting
paragraphs: Before providing any training or equipment support under GPOI, State  must verify that it does not have credible evidence that the foreign security  forces identified to receive assistance have committed gross violations of  human rights. In our review of vetting documentation of 2007 GPOI  trainees from 14 countries identified in State reporting to have  documented human rights violations by security personnel, we found  cases where individuals and units that received training were not properly  vetted.
Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts from 1998 to  2006 included a provision, commonly referred to as the Leahy  Amendment, that restricted the provision of assistance appropriated in  these acts to any foreign security unit when the Secretary of State has  credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human  rights. In the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, the Foreign  Assistance Act was permanently amended to restrict the provision of  assistance to foreign security units when credible evidence exists of gross  violations of human rights by that unit. While the legal provisions restrict  funding to “any unit of the security forces of a foreign country,” State  guidance is to screen or vet individuals who are identified for individual  training or who are members of newly formed or composite units. Should  an entire existing unit receive the training together, State guidance  requires vetting of the unit name and commander only. To implement  these legislative restrictions, State’s guidance calls for U.S. embassies and  State bureaus to screen individuals or units proposed for training to  determine whether these foreign security forces have committed gross  human rights violations.
We found that State did not vet some individuals and units for human  rights violations before training. Specifically, all 81 military peacekeepers  who received training in 2007 from Honduras were not vetted before  participating in GPOI-funded training courses. In addition, 16 military  peacekeepers and stability police from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia,  Nigeria, and Sri Lanka were not vetted out of 382 trained in those  countries in 2007, and a 665-person Nigerian battalion trained by GPOI  was not vetted. In response to our findings, State officials have begun the  vetting process for the individuals from Honduras who received GPOI  training. We also found that some individuals who received training in  2007 were not screened in accordance with State’s guidance for vetting  newly formed or composite units. Specifically, the commanders of seven  composite units in Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda and the commander of the  ECOWAS standby force were screened for human rights violations, but the  individual members of these units were not vetted, as required by State  guidance. As a result of these lapses in vetting, it is possible that State and  DOD have provided training to security personnel who committed human  rights violations.
State and DOD officials in the countries we visited said they face  challenges in conducting vetting prior to training due to the difficulties  both in getting the names of individuals in units prior to training and in  having sufficient time to properly conduct vetting in the country and in  Washington, D.C. State officials in the ACOTA office told us they have  taken corrective action to prevent further vetting oversights by creating a  new position in their office that would be responsible, in part, for  monitoring the vetting data for all training provided in Africa.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The growth of peace support operations has increased the importance and  need for more comprehensive measures to ensure worldwide capability  and capacity for responding to peacekeeping demands. The United States  has taken the lead in the G8 goal to build this peacekeeping capability  worldwide through GPOI. Since 2005, State and DOD, focusing the  majority of GPOI resources on efforts in Africa, have undertaken  numerous activities to increase countries’ ability to serve in peacekeeping  missions, including the training of nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers.  However, it appears that GPOI will fall short of reaching certain  established goals, such as training 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010.  State also has faced some challenges in supporting COESPU’s need for  additional staff, accounting for the delivery and transfer of nonlethal  training equipment to partner countries, evaluating the quality and  effectiveness of its training program, and screening trainees for human  rights abuses. Addressing these challenges will enhance GPOI’s  effectiveness as the program nears the end of its 5-year authorization and  will help ensure that U.S. resources are focused on building partner  countries’ capabilities to provide quality peacekeepers worldwide. To  meet the G8 commitment to expand global capabilities for peace support  operations, GPOI activities that extend beyond 2010 will require more  emphasis on developing the capabilities of African partners to maintain  peacekeeping operations on their own.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance GPOI’s effectiveness, better identify program outcomes, and  ensure proper screening for human rights violations, we recommend that  the Secretary of State take the following six actions:  1.  Work in consultation with DOD to assist Italy in staffing the key  unfilled positions at COESPU to better evaluate progress made and  monitor results.  2.  Monitor implementation of new procedures to account for delivery and  transfer of nonlethal training equipment to partner countries on an  ongoing basis.  3.  Provide additional guidance to U.S. missions to help the United States  and Italy collect data on the training and deployment activities of  COESPU graduates in their home countries.  4.  Develop and implement, in consultation with DOD and in accordance  with the GPOI strategy, the use of standard military task lists and  related training standards to enable program managers to evaluate the  quality of training and measure the proficiency of trainees program- wide.  5.  Ensure that the evaluations of contractor performance of training in  Africa are properly recorded into the contractor performance system  as required by agency regulations.  6.  Develop a system for monitoring the vetting activities for all GPOI  training and ensure that all individuals in composite units are vetted  for human rights violations, as required by State policy.
To ensure that GPOI activities enhance the capabilities of countries to  maintain peacekeeping operations on their own, we also recommend that  the Secretary of State, in consultation with DOD, take the following two  actions:  1.  Assess estimated resources and time frames needed to complete  peacekeeping skills and infrastructure activities in Africa by 2010.  2.  Ensure that any plans for extending GPOI activities beyond 2010  identify sufficient resources for developing long-term peacekeeping  skills and infrastructure in Africa.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State and  Defense.  We received written comments from State and DOD, which we  have reprinted in appendixes VII and VIII, respectively.  State and DOD  provided technical comments which we have incorporated in the report,  as appropriate.
State concurred or partially concurred with seven of the eight GAO  recommendations and provided additional information to highlight the  program’s achievements.  State did not concur with GAO’s  recommendation to develop a method for evaluating GPOI training.  State  notes that methods already exist to evaluate the quality of the training  program and measure the proficiency of trainees.  We disagree that State’s  current evaluation methods address our recommendation.  State has not  developed military task lists and associated training that can be applied at  all GPOI training sites; sites currently use varying standards to assess the  proficiency of trainees.  DOD agrees with the need for greater  standardization and more analysis of trainee performance.  We modified  the recommendation to clarify the need for GPOI-wide standard military  tasks and related training that State, in consultation with DOD, should  develop in accordance with the commitments made in the GPOI strategy.   State also commented that it now projects that GPOI will train 75,000  peacekeepers by July 2010 based on new training rates.  We were unable  to validate State’s new data since as recently as May 2008, program  officials indicated that slow expenditure rates would delay State’s efforts  to reach the 2010 training goal.
DOD agreed with the findings and concurred or partially concurred with  our recommendations.  DOD agreed with the need for greater  standardization and more analysis of trainee performance and agreed that  State should work with DOD and Italy to validate personnel shortfalls at  COESPU and fill the identified positions.  DOD also stated that an  assessment of resources and time frames required to achieve GPOI  objectives should apply to all regions engaged by the GPOI program.  We  did not revise this recommendation because it is intended to address our  finding that State is unlikely to complete skills and infrastructure activities  in Africa by 2010.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and  Defense. We will also make copies available to others on request. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IX.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In response to a congressional mandate in the fiscal year 2008 Defense  Authorization Act to review the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI),  we assessed (1) the progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2) whether  State is consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness of the training  program, and (3) the extent to which countries meet program criteria and  whether program participants are adequately screened for human rights  abuses. We attended a planning conference in October 2007 in  Washington, D.C., for GPOI implementers and an October 2007 conference  with Group of Eight (G8) members and other partners to discuss  worldwide efforts to enhance peacekeeping.
Our scope of work included the Departments of State (State) and Defense  (DOD) in Washington, D.C.; U.S. Combatant Commands for Africa,  Europe, Pacific, and Southern Hemisphere; and site visits to Ethiopia,  Ghana, Guatemala, Italy, Mongolia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. We  observed training and visited facilities refurbished with GPOI funds during  site visits to Ghana, Guatemala, Italy, Mongolia, and Senegal. In selecting  field work countries, we considered the following criteria: funding  allocations, number of military peacekeepers trained, number of trained  peacekeepers that have deployed to missions, training schedules, and  unique characteristics, such as the location of Italy’s training school for  stability police and the equipment depot in Sierra Leone. We selected  these countries in Africa, Asia, and Central America because they had  received more funding allocations and had trained and deployed more  troops than other GPOI partner countries in those regions and also were  scheduled to conduct training during our visits. We selected Italy to assess  U.S. support to stability police training at the Center of Excellence for  Stability Police Units (COESPU), Germany to interview officials from the  U.S. European and African commands, Sierra Leone to assess the GPOI  equipment depot, and Ethiopia to assess GPOI activities with the African  Union.
To assess the progress GPOI made in meeting its goals, we reviewed data  gathered by State on the number of troops trained and the equipment  provided, reports from agencies and COESPU of activities at COESPU, and  monthly and annual progress reports. We compared the information in  these sources with benchmarks established in the GPOI strategy for the  goals and objectives of the program. In addition, we collected and  reviewed information on obligations and expenditures of GPOI funds and  surveyed the combatant commands responsible for implementing GPOI to  estimate any additional funds they used to support GPOI activities. To  assess the reliability of State’s data on troops trained and equipment  provided, as well as obligations and expenditures, we reviewed relevant  documentation and spoke with agency officials, including the GPOI  program assessment team, about data quality control procedures. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report.
To determine whether State is consistently assessing the quality and  effectiveness of the GPOI training program, we identified the training  provided and determined what training assessments were conducted. We  reviewed training programs of instruction, training contracts and task  orders, and related training documents. We also interviewed State and  DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and during site visits to the countries  listed, as well as trainers in Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Mongolia, and  Senegal. To identify the training provided at COESPU, we reviewed  training documents and conducted interviews with Italian officials at  COESPU. To identify the measures that State has in place to oversee  contractor activities for training and advisor support in Africa, we  reviewed contracts and related documents and interviewed State officials,  including officials from the Office of Acquisitions Management and the  Bureau of African Affairs.
To identify the activities of trained instructors and stability police, we  reviewed data gathered by State on the deployments of trained military  peacekeepers, including instructors and stability police instructors, and  data gathered by State and COESPU on the training activities of these  instructors. We also interviewed Italian officials at COESPU, State  officials, and training officials and contractors. We reviewed relevant  documentation and spoke with agency officials, including the GPOI  program assessment team, about data quality control procedures. We  identified a limitation in the data on deployments of trained peacekeepers.  State is not able to obtain the individual names of those who deploy to  compare with the rosters of those trained under GPOI. However, based on  the fact that State can identify which of the units trained under GPOI has  deployed, and that any individual who joins the peacekeeping unit  subsequent to its training by GPOI may receive additional training from  their unit officers, we determined that the data on military peacekeepers  deployed were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting the  deployments of GPOI-trained peacekeeping. For the data on the activities  of instructors trained under GPOI, we found that State and COESPU did  not have complete or reliable data for the purposes of identifying  comprehensive information about the training activities of these  individuals in their home country. We also found that COESPU and State  did not have sufficient information to identify the deployment or training  activities of stability police instructors trained at COESPU.
To determine the extent to which countries meet program criteria and  whether participants are adequately screened for human rights abuses, we  examined the GPOI strategy and interviewed State and DOD officials in  Washington, D.C., and during site visits to the countries listed previously.  To determine how human rights violations were taken into account, we  compared State’s 2007 human rights reports, which identified countries  with documented human rights violations by security personnel, with the  list of GPOI partner countries. We also reviewed State’s human rights  reports to identify whether partner countries had an elected government.  To determine whether GPOI countries showed a willingness to deploy, we  examined which countries had deployed troops on United Nations (UN)  peacekeeping missions. To ensure that end-use and re-transfer provisions  for equipment and training were agreed to, we reviewed whether Section  505 agreements were signed with each of the countries. We interviewed  State officials and collected additional information for countries that did  not clearly meet some of these criteria. In addition, we reviewed State  documents identifying human rights vetting procedures. We selected 14  countries with documented human rights violations by security forces that  received training in 2007 and assessed whether individuals and units  trained in these countries were vetted for human rights violations. To do  this, we compared vetting records from State for the training provided to  individuals and units from these countries with the training rosters  provided by State.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to June 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: GPOI Partner Countries
paragraphs: There are 52 countries that received GPOI training, equipment, or other  support to enhance their peacekeeping capabilities and contributions.  Table 3 provides a list of partner countries that received support for their  military peacekeeping, stability police, or both, from 2004 to 2008, as of  April 2008.
section_title: Appendix III: International Contributions to 2004 G8 Summit Goal and GPOI
paragraphs: The members of the G8 and other nations have supported the  commitments of the 2004 G8 Summit and GPOI. The information below  provides additional information on the nature of contributions made by  the international community but does not provide a comprehensive list of  all contributions made by the G8 and other nations.
G8 nations have contributed to peace support operations in a number of  ways, including the training and equipping of military peacekeepers,  individual police, and stability police; supporting the development of  peacekeeping doctrine; providing funding to support national and regional  peacekeeping training centers; providing funding and logistical support to  regional organizations; and establishing a stability police training school.  For example, three G8 nations have provided instructors to the COESPU,  according to State and COESPU officials. In another example, countries  have provided equipment to support the troops deployed to peacekeeping  missions. Contributions of G8 nations are largely for activities in Africa or  in support of peacekeeping missions in this region, according to State  documents. According to State, in 2007, the G8 and other nations  identified 760 peacekeeping-related programs, events, and activities that  member states were conducting in Africa alone.
The G8 and other nations also have directly contributed to the U.S. GPOI  program. According to State, 19 countries have contributed to the U.S.  program, primarily by providing training instructors to support GPOI- funded training. For example, 4 countries provided instructors to the  Central American peacekeeper training school in Guatemala and 14  countries provided instructors to the multilateral peacekeeper training  exercises held in Mongolia in 2006 and 2007. State paid travel costs for all  the training instructors for the Central American training. For the  Mongolia exercises, seven countries paid their own way, and State and  DOD paid for the remaining countries.
Two countries also have provided funding and personnel support directly  to State for GPOI. Specifically, the Netherlands has committed to provide  State with $7 million per year for 3 years, to be used for peacekeeping  training and equipment activities in Africa. According to State officials,  about $5.3 million was received at the end of 2007, and they expect to  receive the remaining $1.7 million for 2007 in the near term. State officials  in the Bureau of African Affairs told us that two additional countries have  indicated plans to provide a total of about $37 million directly to State to  support peacekeeping missions in Darfur and Somalia.
section_title: Appendix IV: Training and Peacekeeping Deployments of GPOI Partners
paragraphs: State and DOD have trained nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers from a  total of 43 countries and the Economic Community of West African States  (ECOWAS). As of April 2008, about 56 percent of GPOI-trained military  peacekeepers have deployed to peacekeeping missions, and the majority  have deployed from African partner countries. As table 4 shows, of the  39,518 military peacekeepers trained by GPOI, almost 22,000 have  deployed to peacekeeping missions. According to State, these  peacekeepers have deployed to 12 United Nations or African Union  missions, as well as other missions not supported by the UN or the African  Union. African partner countries have deployed the majority of GPOI- trained military peacekeepers—97 percent or 21,435—and the remaining 3  percent have deployed from partner countries in Asia. An additional 6,277  military peacekeepers from African partner countries were trained in  anticipation of deployments to UN missions in the near future, according  to State reporting.
section_title: Appendix V: Equipment Provided to GPOI Partner Countries
paragraphs: Table 5 provides information on the type of equipment that has been or  may be provided to partner countries to support training and deployments  for peacekeeping. Table 6 provides information on the type of equipment  that has been provided to COESPU to support stability police training.  State officials indicated that military peacekeepers keep some of the  individual training equipment for use during deployments.
section_title: Appendix VI: GPOI Activities to Support Long-term Skills and Infrastructure for Peacekeeping
paragraphs: Table 7 provides information on the type and status of activities that State  and DOD have conducted to build skills and infrastructure to meet partner  countries’ long-term needs to sustain peacekeeping.
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s responses to the Department of State’s letter  dated June 18, 2008.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  State asserts that GPOI is on track to meet its objectives with over  35,000 peacekeepers deployed to 18 peacekeeping operations.  We  disagree that 35,000 peacekeepers have deployed to 18 missions with  the training or support of GPOI.  State’s assertion conflicts with GPOI  evaluation team data that identified 22,000 peacekeepers trained by  GPOI that deployed to 12 UN or AU missions, as well as other missions  not supported by the UN or AU, as of April 2008.  State’s statistics  include peacekeepers GPOI trained that have not deployed, supported  but not trained by GPOI, or troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan  (non-UN missions).  Appendix IV provides additional information on  the peacekeeper deployments of GPOI partners.  2.  State asserts that GPOI objectives will be achieved under the current  conditions and within projected resource levels.  We disagree with this  assessment because according to State’s own training projections it is  not likely to train 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010, faces delays in  providing support of nonlethal equipment to deployed peacekeepers,  and is unlikely to complete planned skills and infrastructure activities  in Africa by 2010.  In addition, State has not provided additional  support for requested staff positions at COESPU that would facilitate  the evaluation of progress made at COESPU.  3.  State now projects that GPOI will train 75,000 peacekeepers by the  third quarter of 2010 based on new training rates and asserts that we  do not provide a realistic projection.  We were unable to validate this  information.  As of April 2008, the number of military peacekeepers  trained is lower than the target number needed to meet the goal of  75,000 by the end of 2010. As recently as May 2008, officials from the  GPOI office in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and its GPOI  evaluation team indicated that slow expenditure rates related to  training rates would delay their efforts to reach the goal by 2010.  Accordingly, we are unable to validate State’s new projections  provided in its comments to this report.  4.  State asserts that it has contributed $10.5 million to COESPU and plans  to provide an additional $4.5 million.  We disagree that this is a  contribution already provided to COESPU. State has obligated $15  million for COESPU, which includes the $10.5 million and $4.5 million,  but has only provided $9 million of that amount to COESPU, according  to State funding data identifying expenditures as of April 2008.  5.  State has stated that the United States established a virtual donors’  coordination mechanism to enable deploying nations to facilitate  donor assistance in transportation and logistics support.  We agree that  a communication system has been established, however, we note that  the mechanism for facilitating this support is an e-mail system.  We  also note that the system was established in the fall of 2007 and that, as  of April 2008, only one request had been communicated by State to  donors through this system, according to the State officials responsible  for this system.  6.  State presents information on a number of activities that it asserts  were conducted under GPOI to improve the capabilities of regional  organizations to plan, train for, and execute peacekeeping missions.   We disagree that GPOI has conducted all of these activities and believe  that the activities listed in State’s comment include a combination of  planned and completed activities.  In appendix VI we have presented  the GPOI activities that have been completed to build skills and  infrastructure for peacekeeping in support of the GPOI objective to  assist partners in achieving self-sufficiency and maintaining GPOI  proficiencies.  The information we have presented was obtained from  expenditure information and data provided by the GPOI assessment  team and GPOI program office. To confirm activities that were  completed as of April 2008, we crosschecked reported information by  the GPOI program with GPOI program implementers responsible for  implementing these activities, including the Africa Bureau and its  ACOTA program, and U.S. African, Pacific, and Southern Commands.  7.  State asserts that methods already exist for evaluating the quality of  training and measuring the proficiency of trainees in critical skills.  We  disagree that these methods address our recommendation.  State has  not developed military task lists and associated training that can be  applied at all GPOI training sites, although the GPOI strategy in 2006  identified the need for the development of military task lists and  related military training standards to contribute to standardization,  interoperability, and sustainability, and to ensure the proper use of  resources.  The strategy also indicated that developing such standards  would help efforts to evaluate the overall effectiveness of GPOI  training programs, events, and activities. We assert that there is value  in evaluating the performance of trainees, in the areas where there are  consistencies in the training, against a standard level of proficiency in  the skills taught during their training, in order to identify the quality of  training provided across the program and to identify the proficiency of  trained troops program-wide. We modified the recommendation to  clarify the need for GPOI-wide standards to provide program managers  with the ability to measure proficiency of GPOI-trained troops  program-wide and in accordance with the commitments made in the  GPOI strategy.  8.  State asserts that its process for vetting composite units to prevent  potential recipients from receiving training where there is credible  evidence of committed gross violations of human rights is effective  and that our findings on the vetting of composite units trained under  GPOI are unfairly applied against an updated agency policy on vetting  composite units. We disagree. The seven composite units we identify  in this report were vetted and received training after the policy change  in April 2007.  We identified these units in our review of vetting records  provided by State’s ACOTA office and training rosters of individuals  trained provided by State’s GPOI evaluation team. According to the  data provided by State, three composite units from Niger received  training in August 2007 and November-December 2007, one composite  unit from Nigeria received training in September-October 2007, and  three composite units from Uganda received training in July 2007.   Records for these units indicate that vetting was completed between  June 2007 and November 2007.
section_title: Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report include Audrey Solis, Assistant Director;  Monica Brym; Justin Monroe; and Diahanna Post. Technical assistance  was provided by Ashley Alley, Johana Ayers, Joseph Brown, Lynn Cothern,  Barry Deweese, Nisha Hazra, Chris Kunitz, Isidro Gomez, Matthew Reilly,  Elizabeth Repko, Ronald Schwenn, Jay Smale, Adrienne Spahr, Barbara  Steel-Lowney, Laverne Tharpes, and Heather Whitehead.