Defense Management: DOD Needs to Increase Attention on Fuel Demand Management at Forward-Deployed Locations
Published: 2009-02-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) relies heavily on petroleum-based fuel to sustain its forward-deployed locations--particularly those that are not connected to local power grids. While weapon platforms require large amounts of fuel, DOD reports that the single largest battlefield fuel consumer is generators, which provide power for base support activities such as cooling, heating, and lighting. Transporting fuel to forward-deployed locations presents an enormous logistics burden and risk, including exposing fuel truck convoys to attack. GAO was asked to address DOD's (1) efforts to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed locations and (2) approach to managing fuel demand at these locations. This review focused on locations within Central Command's area of responsibility. GAO visited DOD locations in Kuwait and Djibouti to learn about fuel reduction efforts and challenges facing these locations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD components have some efforts under way or planned to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed locations. Many of these efforts are in a research and development phase, and the extent to which they will be fielded and under what time frame is uncertain. Notable efforts include the application of foam insulation to tent structures, the development of more fuel-efficient generators and environmental control units, and research on alternative and renewable energy sources for potential use at forward-deployed locations. In addition, during visits to Kuwait and Djibouti, GAO met with officials about local camp efforts aimed at reducing fuel demand. DOD lacks an effective approach for implementing fuel reduction initiatives and maintaining sustained attention to fuel demand management at its forward-deployed locations. Moreover, DOD faces difficulty achieving its goals to reduce dependence on petroleum-based fuel and its logistics "footprint," as well as operating costs associated with high fuel usage, because managing fuel demand at forward-deployed locations has not been a departmental priority and fuel reduction efforts have not been well coordinated or comprehensive. GAO found that DOD's current approach to managing fuel demand lacks (1) guidance directing locations to address fuel demand, (2) incentives and a viable funding mechanism to invest in fuel reduction projects, and (3) visibility and accountability for achieving fuel reduction. Although it may not be practical for DOD to decrease fuel usage at every forward-deployed location and base commanders must place their highest priority on meeting mission requirements, fuel demand is likely to remain high until the department gives systematic consideration to incorporating fuel demand in construction, maintenance, procurement, and other policy decisions for forward-deployed locations. The 2009 defense authorization act requires DOD to establish a director of operational energy and an energy strategy, providing the department with an opportunity to increase attention on improving fuel demand management.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) depends heavily on petroleum-based  fuel to sustain its forward-deployed locations around the world— particularly those locations that are not connected to local power grids  and must rely on fuel-consuming generators for heating/cooling, lighting,  and other base support activities. Each day, over 2 million gallons of jet  fuel alone are supplied to U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Transporting large quantities of fuel to forward-deployed locations  presents an enormous logistics burden and risk. In 2006, a senior U.S.  commander in Iraq submitted an urgent request to DOD for renewable  energy systems in order to reduce supply line vulnerabilities associated  with the military’s dependence on fuel for power generation at forward- deployed locations. Furthermore, global oil supply routes are vulnerable  because they flow through unstable regions. High fuel demand, coupled  with the recent volatility of fuel prices, also have significant implications  for DOD’s operating costs. With the ongoing Global War on Terrorism,  which DOD officials have referred to as “the longer war,” the department  may need to sustain many of its forward-deployed locations supporting  current operations for longer than initially anticipated.
This report is the third in a series of studies requested by the  Subcommittee on Readiness of the House Committee on Armed Services  examining DOD’s energy usage for military operations. Our March 2008  report found that while DOD and the military services have several efforts  under way to reduce energy used for military operations, the department  lacks key elements of an overarching organizational framework to manage  mobility energy matters across the department. We also testified last  March on the need for DOD to establish an overarching organizational  framework, including an executive-level Office of the Secretary of Defense  (OSD) official who is accountable for mobility energy. This report  addresses DOD’s (1) efforts to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed  locations and (2) approach to managing fuel demand at these locations.  We are also providing information on DOD’s fuel demand at selected  forward-deployed locations (see app. I). We focused our review on  forward-deployed locations within Central Command’s area of  responsibility. Central Command has more than 400 forward-deployed  locations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as locations in other countries.
To address our objectives, we analyzed DOD and military service  guidance, relevant legislation, and other documents and discussed fuel  demand issues with agency officials to gain their perspectives. Our review  focused on forward-deployed locations—DOD installations or base camps  situated outside of the United States that support current operations—that  relied primarily on fuel-based generators, as opposed to local power  grids. We asked officials to identify for us key efforts planned or under  way to reduce fuel demand. After consultation with Central Command  officials, we selected and visited two forward-deployed locations—Camp  Arifjan, an Army facility in Kuwait and Camp Lemonier, a Navy facility in  Djibouti—to gain a firsthand understanding of fuel demand reduction  efforts and challenges facing these locations. We chose to visit these  locations because they relied heavily on fuel-based generators to carry out  very different missions—the former directly supported operations in Iraq  while the latter provided diplomatic, development, and counterterrorism  support within the Horn of Africa. In assessing DOD’s approach to  managing fuel demand at forward-deployed locations, we reviewed  documents and held discussions with agency officials on issues including  forward-deployed location construction and maintenance, procurement,  and funding procedures. For comparison purposes, we reviewed DOD  guidance related to energy reduction for the department’s permanent or  U.S. facilities.
We conducted our review from March 2008 through February 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. Details about our scope and methodology  are contained in appendix II.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Forward-Deployed Locations
paragraphs: At any given time, the United States has a large portion of its military  personnel serving abroad in forward-deployed locations. The forward  presence of military forces at overseas locations is critical to supporting  U.S. strategic interests. Forward-deployed forces provide the basic  building blocks with which to project military power in crises and  strengthen U.S. military access. While the numbers of personnel and  locations vary with the frequency and types of military operations and  deployment demands, military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have led  to the creation of several hundred new locations. Operational control of  U.S. military forces at forward-deployed locations is assigned to the  nation’s six geographic, unified overseas regional commands, which  include Central Command. For current operations, Central Command has  identified the need for forward-deployed locations within its area of  responsibility to meet mission requirements, and its military service  components have been responsible for establishing and maintaining the  locations.
DOD is likely to continue its use of forward-deployed locations in support  of future U.S. defense strategy. In recent years, DOD has been undergoing  a transformation to develop a defense strategy and force structure capable  of meeting changing global threats. As part of its transformation, DOD has  been reexamining overseas basing requirements to allow for greater U.S.  military flexibility to combat conventional and asymmetric threats  worldwide. U.S. military presence overseas has been converting from a  posture established on familiar terrain to counter a known threat to one  that is intended to be capable of projecting forces from strategic locations  into relatively unknown areas in an uncertain threat environment.
section_title: DOD Fuel Demand and Delivery for Current Operations
paragraphs: In 2008, more than 68 million gallons of fuel, on average, were supplied by  DOD each month to support U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. While  DOD’s weapon systems require large amounts of fuel—a B-52H, for  example, burns approximately 3,500 gallons per flight hour—the  department reports that the single largest battlefield fuel consumer is  generators. Generators provide power for base support activities such as  air conditioning/heating, lighting, refrigeration, and communications. A  2008 Defense Science Board Task Force report noted that Army  generators alone consume about 26 million gallons of fuel annually during  peacetime and 357 million gallons annually during wartime. Fuel is  delivered to forward-deployed locations in Iraq via three main routes— from Kuwait in the south, Jordan in the west, and Turkey in the north— and to forward-deployed locations in Afghanistan via two main routes— from Central Asian states in the north and from Pakistan in the east.  According to the Defense Energy Support Center, an organization within  the Defense Logistics Agency that manages contracts for the department’s  fuel acquisitions and distribution, approximately 1.7 million gallons of jet  fuel are delivered into Iraq and approximately 300,000 gallons of jet fuel  are delivered into Afghanistan each day, in addition to other types of fuel,  such as diesel, motor gasoline, and aviation gasoline. At one truck fill  stand that we visited in Kuwait in June 2008, about 125 trucks, each  holding 9,000 gallons of fuel, were loaded daily for delivery to forward- deployed locations in Kuwait and Iraq.
High fuel requirements on the battlefield can place a significant logistics  burden on military forces, exposing supply convoys to risk. For example,  long truck convoys moving fuel to forward-deployed locations have  encountered enemy attacks, severe weather, traffic accidents, and  pilferage. Army officials have estimated that about 70 percent of the  tonnage required to position its forces for battle consists of fuel and water.  Most fuel deliveries to forward-deployed locations in Afghanistan are  made by commercial contractors, and there is no military-provided  protection for the supply convoys other than the protection contractors  provide themselves. DOD officials reported that in June 2008, for example,  44 trucks and 220,000 gallons of fuel were lost due to attacks or other  events. While fuel delivery issues have not been as severe in Iraq recently,  the U.S. military provides force protection to supply convoys in Iraq,  increasing the logistics burden. Fuel delivery to locations outside of Iraq  and Afghanistan may not be subject to battlefield conditions but is also  logistically complex. For example, Camp Lemonier receives its fuel  through the Djiboutian port. Fuel is loaded from the port into the storage  tanks as it arrives, and trucks also make daily runs to the port to bring fuel  to the camp.
section_title: DOD Mobility Fuel Costs
paragraphs: DOD reported that it consumed almost 4.8 billion gallons of mobility fuel  and spent $9.5 billion in fiscal year 2007, in addition to its costs for fuel  consumed at fixed U.S. installations. While fuel costs represent less than 3  percent of DOD’s total budget, they can have a significant impact on the  department’s operating costs. DOD has estimated that for every $10  increase in the price of a barrel of oil, DOD’s operating costs increase by  approximately $1.3 billion. DOD organizations pay a standard price for  fuel that differs from the market price. The Office of Management and  Budget (OMB) establishes for DOD the price the department will use when  constructing its budget for upcoming fiscal years. DOD in turn uses OMB's  price in establishing the standard price to be used for a barrel of fuel for  budgeting purposes by DOD's customers, such as the military services.  Because of the volatility of world petroleum prices, the standard price for  a barrel of fuel included in the President's annual budget request for DOD  may be lower or higher than the actual price established by the world  market at any point in time after DOD's budget request is submitted to the  Congress. The fiscal year 2009 President's budget assumed a standard fuel  price of $115.50 per barrel. At the time of this report, the price DOD  charged its customers was $104.58, or $2.49 per gallon of jet fuel (JP8). In  the past, DOD's standard fuel price was typically adjusted annually.  However, with rising fuel costs in recent years, the price has been adjusted  more frequently. Effective July 1, 2008, for example, DOD raised the  standard fuel price per barrel from $127.68 to $170.94; and effective  December 1, 2008, DOD lowered the standard fuel price per barrel from  $170.94 to $104.58.  Because the military services prepare their annual  budgets based on the approved fuel price in the President's budget, market  volatility resulting in out-of-cycle fuel price increases can be difficult for  the services to absorb. DOD has received supplemental appropriations  from the Congress in recent years to cover budget shortages associated  with rising fuel prices.
Moreover, the fully burdened cost of fuel—that is, the total ownership cost  of buying, moving, and protecting fuel in systems during combat—can be  much greater than the cost of fuel itself. A 2008 Defense Science Board  Task Force report noted that preliminary estimates by the OSD Program  Analysis and Evaluation office and the Institute of Defense Analyses  indicate that the fully burdened cost of a $2.50 gallon of fuel could begin at  about $15, assuming no force protection requirements for supply convoys,  and increases as the fuel moves further onto the battlefield. Fuel delivered  in-flight has been estimated at about $42 gallon, though the report notes  that these figures are low. OSD has initiated a pilot program to determine  the fully burdened cost of fuel for three mobile defense systems.
Concerns about future fuel costs, price volatility, and fuel availability have  led the Air Force to undertake an effort to certify its entire aircraft fleet to  run on a synthetic blend of alternative and jet fuels by early 2011. The Air  Force has established a goal to acquire 50 percent of the aviation fuels it  uses within the United States from domestic sources by 2016.
section_title: DOD Fuel Distribution Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: Fuel distribution is a complex process involving several DOD offices. Joint  Publication 4-03 sets forth principles and establishes doctrine for bulk  petroleum and water in support of U.S. military operations. The combatant  commander has the predominant responsibility for fuel within a theater,  and this responsibility is discharged by its Joint Petroleum Office. The  Joint Petroleum Office is responsible for the overall planning of petroleum  for operations, and it may establish sub-area petroleum offices as needed  to support specific petroleum requirements. The Director, Defense  Logistics Agency, as the integrated materiel manager for bulk petroleum, is  responsible for meeting the petroleum support requirements of the  combatant commands and military services. These functional  responsibilities have been delegated to the Director, Defense Energy  Support Center, which is responsible for procurement, transportation,  ownership, accountability, budgeting, quality assurance, and quality  surveillance. It also plans and budgets for the construction and repair of  fuel storage and distribution facilities, monitors the petroleum market, and  negotiates international agreements for energy commodities.
Each military service has responsibilities for providing petroleum support.  The Army normally provides management of petroleum support to U.S.  land-based forces of all DOD components. However, actual movement of  bulk petroleum may include the use of commercial vehicles and  associated infrastructure. The Air Force provides distribution of bulk  petroleum products by air within a theater where immediate support is  needed at remote locations. The Navy provides bulk petroleum products  for U.S. sea- and land-based forces. The Marine Corps maintains a  capability to provide bulk petroleum support to Marine Corps units. Within  Central Command’s area of responsibility, military units communicate  their fuel requirements, which are based on historical usage and planned  rotations, to the sub-area petroleum offices. The sub-area petroleum  offices in turn provide these requirements to Central Command’s Joint  Petroleum Office for validation. Once the requirements are validated, the  Defense Energy Support Center determines the most appropriate means to  support the requirements and provides for the distribution of the fuel up to  the “point of sale.” The point of sale is the point at which the customer  takes possession of the fuel. The Defense Energy Support Center owns  and tracks the fuel up until this point, at which time the fuel may be placed  directly into a weapons system or battlefield storage unit or handed off to  the customer to move to a forward-deployed location.
section_title: Congressional Requirements for Operational Energy
paragraphs: Section 902 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2009 requires that DOD establish a Director of Operational  Energy Plans and Programs, who shall be appointed by the President and  confirmed by the Senate, to provide leadership and facilitate  communication and conduct oversight of operational energy plans and  programs within the department and military services. Among other  responsibilities the director shall establish and maintain an operational  energy strategy for the department; serve as the principal adviser to the  Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense on operational  energy plans and programs; and consider operational energy demands in  defense planning, requirements, and acquisition processes. In addition, the  act requires that, within 90 days of the director’s appointment, the  secretaries of the military departments each designate a senior official to  be responsible for operational energy plans and programs for his  respective service. These senior service officials shall be responsible for  coordinating with the director and implementing operational energy  initiatives. The act further requires DOD to consider fuel logistics support  requirements in the department’s planning, requirements development,  and acquisition processes—including the consideration of the fully  burdened cost of fuel when analyzing fuel-consuming system  alternatives. The act also includes other energy requirements, including  that DOD conduct a study on the feasibility of using solar and wind energy  to provide electricity to deployed forces and the extent to which the use of  such alternative energy sources could reduce the risk of casualties  associated with convoys supplying fuel to forward-deployed locations.  The Secretary of Defense, acting through the director, must also submit,  on an annual basis, a report to the congressional defense committees on  operational energy management and the implementation of the  operational energy strategy.
section_title: DOD Components Have Initiated Efforts to Reduce Fuel Demand at Forward- Deployed Locations
paragraphs: DOD components have efforts under way or planned for reducing fuel  demand at forward-deployed locations. Many of these efforts are in a  research and development phase, and the extent to which they will be  fielded and under what time frame is uncertain. Notable efforts include the  application of foam insulation to tent structures, the development of more  fuel-efficient generators and environmental control units, and research on  alternative and renewable energy sources for potential use at forward- deployed locations. In addition, during our visits to Kuwait and Djibouti,  we found local camp efforts aimed at reducing fuel demand.
subsections: section_title: Power Surety Task Force Demonstrated Energy- Saving Benefits of Applying Foam Insulation to Tents
paragraphs: DOD is beginning to apply foam insulation on tents at some forward- deployed locations to reduce energy demand for powering these  structures. In 2006, the DOD Power Surety Task Force was created in  response to a joint urgent operational needs statement from a senior U.S.  commander in Iraq calling for alternative energy sources to reduce the  amount of fuel transported to forward-deployed locations for power  generation. A mission of the task force is to identify and demonstrate  emerging or commercial off-the-shelf technology that can reduce DOD’s  fuel demand. As one of several initiatives, the task force has demonstrated  the benefits of applying foam insulation on temporary structures such as  military tents. According to task force officials, tests show that the  application of foam insulation reduces dust, heat, cold, noise, and air  conditioning requirements, which in turn reduces generator-powered fuel  demand. For example, the officials said that military tents insulated with  foam at Fort Benning, Georgia, used half the climate control units and  required 75 to 90 percent less power than non-insulated tents. (See fig. 2.)
The Power Surety Task Force first demonstrated this technology at Fort  Benning in January 2007, and later at some forward-deployed locations in  Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Djibouti. According to task force officials,  based on the results of a recent demonstration of this technology, DOD  decided to pursue a large-scale effort to apply foam insulation to  temporary structures, such as military tents, in Iraq to reduce the number  of generators needed to power those structures. According to a Central  Command official, the tent foaming initiative could reduce energy  consumption by approximately 50 percent, potentially reducing the  number of convoys needed to supply fuel to locations in Iraq, although  metrics had not yet been established to systemically measure efficiency.  However, the contract for this initiative was terminated prior to  completion, effective December 16, 2008. According to another Central  Command official, the contract was terminated early due to contractor  performance as well as support issues. At the time the contract was  terminated, a DOD contractor noted that foam insulation had been applied  to about 900 temporary structures (3.8 million square feet) at 10 forward- deployed locations in Iraq. According to a senior Army official, DOD has  also issued a $29 million contract to apply foam insulation to tent  structures in Afghanistan, though he did not expect foaming to proceed  until after the winter weather in Afghanistan subsided.
In addition to foam insulation, the DOD Power Surety Task Force is  demonstrating other potential energy-saving technologies for use at  forward-deployed locations. The Power Surety Task Force initiated a 3- year demonstration project—called the Net-Zero Plus Joint Capability  Technology Demonstration—at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin,  California, to demonstrate some of these technologies and solicit feedback  from visiting military personnel. (App. III provides additional information  on task force initiatives.)
section_title: Joint Program Office Is Developing More Fuel- Efficient Generators
paragraphs: Another DOD effort to reduce fuel demand is the development of new fuel- efficient generators and environmental control units. A DOD joint program  organization, the Project Manager-Mobile Electric Power office, is  responsible for providing a modernized standard family of mobile electric  power generators to the military services. According to the office, many of  DOD’s generators have been in use for about three decades, exceeding  their expected life cycle of 15 years. The office is developing a next  generation of generators, called the Advanced Medium Mobile Power  Sources, which employ advanced technologies to achieve greater fuel  efficiency and other improvements over current military generators. When  fully fielded, the new generators are expected to consume approximately  28 million gallons less fuel per year than the tactical quiet generators  currently in use by the Army. According to a Project Manager-Mobile  Electric Power official, DOD plans to begin procuring these new  generators in 2010 at a weighted average cost of about $18,000 per  generator. In addition, officials said that the Project Manager-Mobile  Electric Power office intends to replace its current environmental control  units with improved environmental control units to provide cooling,  heating, and dehumidifying for servicemembers and material systems. The  improved units are expected to reduce energy consumption by up to 25  percent over current units. (See fig. 3.) An official told us that one version  of the improved units is currently in low-rate initial production and a  contract for another version is expected to be awarded in February 2009.
The Project Manager-Mobile Electric Power office also has initiatives  under way to improve the efficiency of power generation. For example,  the office has fielded a more fuel-efficient method of generating power,  called Central Power, at tactical operations centers (command posts) for  the Army’s 4th Infantry Division. Previously, power for these operations  centers was provided by many small generator sets that had a large  logistics footprint; required considerable fuel, maintenance, and personnel  to operate; and were subject to disruptions in continuous power. The  Central Power concept uses fewer, larger generators to provide  independent “islands” of power generation, decreasing fuel consumption  and the logistics footprint. According to Project-Manager Mobile Electric  Power officials, Central Power saved the 4th Infantry Division roughly  $384,000 during its first year in use. The officials said that they have plans  to field Central Power to all active Army components by the end of fiscal  year 2009 but noted that the Army had not yet updated its equipment  requirements list for units to include Central Power as a requirement.
Finally, the Project Manager-Mobile Electric Power office is pursuing a $30  million, 6-year program to develop a future generation intelligent  management grid architecture, called Hybrid Intelligent Power (HI- Power). HI-Power is intended to provide a flexible, grid-based architecture  that enables “plug-and-play” power generation using a variety of power  sources, including military and commercial generators, vehicles, and  renewable energy sources such as wind and solar. According to the  officials, HI-Power will automatically start and stop generators to match  demand and store energy for transient power requirements. The intended  benefits include reduced fuel consumption (by 17 to 40 percent depending  on the scenario), maintenance, personnel requirements, and power  interruptions. The officials are planning for HI-Power to go into  production during fiscal year 2013.
section_title: Military Services Are Researching Alternative and Renewable Energy Technologies
paragraphs: Several military services are exploring the use of alternative and  renewable energy technologies to generate power at forward-deployed  locations and reduce the demand for petroleum-based fuel. The Air  Force’s Air Force Research Laboratory created the Renewable Energy  Tent City—a collection of various deployable shelters powered by solar  and fuel cell generators situated at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. (See  fig. 4.) The purpose of this research is to evaluate renewable energy  technologies for use at forward-deployed locations, according to an Air  Force Research Laboratory official. The official told us that the laboratory  is assessing, among other technologies, a solar-integrated cover that it  developed to generate power for small shelter systems using a form of  solar cell technology. The Air Force is also engaged in other research and  development projects involving the use of fuel cell, biofuel, and other  alternative and renewable energy technologies.
The Marine Corps has several research initiatives under way to develop  alternative energy systems for forward-deployed locations. For example,  the Marine Corps Systems Command is working on the Deployable  Renewable Energy Alternative Module. This module is intended to be  towed by a vehicle and is designed to be used at forward-deployed  locations to temporarily power radios or computers until fuel can be  resupplied to the locations by employing solar, wind turbine, battery, and  generator technologies. (See fig. 5.) A Marine Corps Systems Command  official told us that three prototypes have been designed using variations  of these alternative technologies and that two have been tested. The  official noted, however, that the technologies used for the modules have  limitations. For example, vendors for this project developed solar cells  that either required large surface areas—equal to the size of a tennis  court—to recharge batteries or were too fragile for use in an austere  environment. Furthermore, according to the official, the prototypes were  not cost effective, since comparable diesel-powered generators with a 30- day supply of fuel could be procured and transported for considerably  less. For these reasons, the modules are not likely to be deployed in the  field, but the official said that lessons learned from this project could be  used to inform the development of future energy systems.
The Army is also investigating ways of reducing fuel demand at forward- deployed locations through various research initiatives. For example, the  Army Research Laboratory is working with universities and private sector  firms to develop a processor that converts tires into energy and recyclable  products that can be used at forward-deployed locations. (See fig. 6.) The  scrap tire recycling process produces diesel, gas, carbon char, and steel— byproducts that can either be used to power generators, boilers, and other  items or recycled into products such as asphalt and paint. Project partners  estimated that 2.7 million gallons of diesel fuel per year could be produced  from a tire recycling facility operating at a forward-deployed location in  Iraq, thereby reducing the number of trucks needed to deliver fuel. The  fuel produced from this process is currently being tested to determine if it  meets Army standards. In addition, the Army is providing support to the  Project Manager-Mobile Electric Power office for the development of the  Hi-Power program, and to the Power Surety Task Force for the  development of a refinery system designed to convert trash into energy.  Using a similar form of technology, the Army, working with the Defense  Energy Support Center, intends to demonstrate six waste-to-fuel (diesel  fuel) plants at six U.S. Army locations over the next year, according to a  senior Army official.
section_title: Specific Forward- Deployed Locations Have Efforts Under Way or Planned to Reduce Fuel Demand
paragraphs: During our visits to forward-deployed locations in Kuwait and Djibouti, we  found some local efforts by camp officials to reduce fuel demand. In  Kuwait, an official at Camp Arifjan shared plans to consolidate loads on  small generators by creating groupings—or networks—of multiple  generators, which could improve overall efficiency and reduce the number  of generators that operate at most times of the year. Camp officials said  that they would like to build a centralized power plant for the location’s  communication complex by 2010. An Army official also told us that foam  insulation was being used to cool tent structures in Kuwait, where outside  temperatures can exceed 120 degrees Fahrenheit. According to the  official, insulated facilities require fewer ventilation and air conditioning  units to maintain cooler temperatures, thereby providing 20 to 40 percent  in energy savings and reducing the wear and tear on the camp’s generator  fleet. As of June 2008, the Army was in the process of insulating tents with  foam at Camp Buehring, Kuwait, and had plans to insulate tents at Camp  Virginia, Kuwait. The official also told us that other alternatives to increase  cooling efficiency, such as the use of special ceramic paints, were being  explored.
During our visit to Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, Navy officials told us that  they allowed the Power Surety Task Force to apply foam insulation on the  tent exterior of the camp’s gymnasium in August 2007. According to camp  officials, the temperature inside the air-conditioned tent decreased from  95-100 degrees Fahrenheit to about 72 degrees after the foam insulation  was applied. The officials also said that they were able to remove two of  the five air conditioning units used to cool the facility, resulting in an  estimated fuel savings of 40 percent. The officials were pleased with the  reduced fuel demand and improved quality of life that were produced as a  result of the demonstration. However, they noted that the disadvantages of  the foam include more material to dispose of when the tent is  disassembled and difficulty in moving or rearranging the tent after the  foam was applied. In addition to the foaming, Camp Lemonier officials had  also posted signs aimed at modifying the behavior of personnel to  conserve energy. The signs included tips on taking shorter showers, using  less air conditioning, and unplugging transformers when not in use. Camp  officials had also developed an energy savings plan to reduce electrical  consumption.
section_title: DOD Does Not Have an Effective Approach for Managing Fuel Demand at Forward- Deployed Locations
paragraphs: Although DOD is undertaking a number of initiatives focused on reducing  fuel consumption, it lacks an effective approach for implementing fuel  reduction initiatives and maintaining sustained attention to fuel demand  management at its forward-deployed locations. DOD has stated that it  needs to reduce its dependence on petroleum-based fuel and the logistics  “footprint” of its military forces, as well as reduce operating costs  associated with high fuel usage. In 2008, the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics reported to Congress that fuel  demand for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is higher than any war in  history and that protecting large fuel convoys imposes a high burden on  combat forces. The Under Secretary’s report noted that reducing fuel  demand would move the department toward a more efficient force  structure by enabling more combat forces to be supported by fewer  logistics assets, reducing operating costs, and mitigating the budget effects  caused by fuel price volatility. However, we found that DOD’s current  approach to managing fuel demand at forward-deployed locations is not  effective because it lacks (1) guidance directing locations to address fuel  demand, (2) incentives and a viable funding mechanism to invest in fuel  reduction initiatives, and (3) visibility and accountability within the chain  of command for achieving fuel reduction. Until DOD addresses these  shortcomings and makes fuel demand management a higher priority, DOD  will face difficulty achieving its goals of reducing its reliance on  petroleum-based fuel, the associated logistics burden, and fuel costs.
subsections: section_title: DOD Generally Lacks Guidance That Requires Attention to Fuel Demand
paragraphs: DOD generally lacks guidance that directs forward-deployed locations to  manage and reduce fuel demand and thus cannot ensure that base  commanders and their staffs will give sustained attention to this issue  among their many other mission requirements. In contrast, DOD is driven  to reduce energy consumption at its U.S. installations largely by federal  mandates and DOD guidance. For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005,  Executive Order 13423, and the Energy Independence and Security Act of  2007 set energy reduction goals for federal buildings within the United  States. Moreover, in November 2005, the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics issued an instruction that provided  guidance, assigned responsibilities, and prescribed procedures for energy  management at its U.S. installations. The instruction addresses topics  such as ensuring sufficient funds to meet energy goals, tracking and  measuring progress and energy efficiency improvement, reporting energy  use and accomplishments, and training facility managers on the energy  efficient operation of facilities. Among other responsibilities, it requires  the heads of DOD components to develop programs that result in facilities  that are designed, constructed, operated, and maintained to maximize  energy efficiency. However, DOD, Central Command, and military service  officials we met with could not identify similar DOD policies, directives, or  other documents that specifically require attention to fuel demand  management at forward-deployed locations, and we were told that it is not  a key consideration. In responding to a draft of this report, DOD stated  that the Army had issued an energy security implementation strategy in  January 2009 that provides overarching guidance for reducing energy  consumption at forward locations. Our analysis of the Army’s new  strategy found that it emphasizes the need to reduce energy consumption,  including at forward-deployed locations, but it does not provide specific  guidance that directs forward-deployed locations to manage and reduce  fuel demand. Instead, the strategy tasks offices of primary responsibility to  develop and execute implementation plans that include activities to  achieve the Army’s energy security goals.
subsections: section_title: Construction
paragraphs: While some of DOD’s combatant commands and military services have  developed construction standards for forward-deployed locations, our  analysis showed that this existing guidance is largely silent with regard to  fuel demand management and energy efficiency. Pertinent guidance for  Central Command, as well as Army guidance used by Central Command  and European Command, revealed only one reference to energy  efficiency—that is, semipermanent locations are to be designed and  constructed with finishes, materials, and systems selected for moderate  energy efficiency. According to the guidance, semipermanent  construction standards will be considered for operations that are expected  to last more than 2 years. Army construction guidance that Southern  Command uses for its forward-deployed locations does not address fuel  demand management or energy efficiency. A Southern Command official  told us that the command is in the process of developing new guidance on  construction standards similar to Central Command’s guidance. Pacific  Command officials told us that they were unaware of guidance on  constructing and maintaining forward-deployed locations within their area  of responsibility.
Within Central Command, the temporary status of many forward-deployed  locations has limited the emphasis on energy efficiency. Army Corps of  Engineers officials said that the concern about maintaining a temporary  presence, particularly in Iraq, limits the type of materials and equipment  they are authorized to bring to forward-deployed locations and presents a  challenge for creating energy efficiencies. The officials noted that, in  practice, the Army—which has the most expertise in establishing forward- deployed locations in austere environments—does not typically use  materials designed for operations lasting longer than 6 months at locations  supporting current operations. Similarly, when we visited Camp Lemonier  in June 2008, Navy officials told us that their camp’s “expeditionary” status  hindered their ability to make construction upgrades to the camp, though  we observed that Camp Lemonier had been under DOD’s control for about  6 years at that time.
In addition, the expedited nature of setting up forward-deployed locations  limits emphasis on energy efficiency. For example, Army Corps of  Engineers officials said that the approach to establishing forward- deployed locations in support of current military operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan has been to start out with an austere set-up and build up the  locations as needed. Because it is unknown how long a location might be  in existence, the Army’s initial focus is on establishment, not on  sustainment. In general, after the combatant commander determines a  need for a forward-deployed location and the requirement is relayed to the  Army, the Army moves quickly to deploy with prepackaged kits of  equipment. According to the officials, energy efficiency is not a   consideration at this point, and in fact, because the goal is to set up a  location quickly, establishing a forward-deployed location can be energy  intensive.
Though the process may vary depending on military service and the  specific circumstances, including mission requirements, officials from the  other military services described a similar process for how they establish  forward-deployed locations. An Air Force official told us that because its  service guidance does not explicitly address energy efficiency, it allows a  certain amount of freedom and flexibility for the engineers, who   “implicitly” incorporate energy efficiency into their planning. A Marine  Corps headquarters official told us that it is difficult to address fuel  demand at forward-deployed locations because, as an expeditionary force,  the Marine Corps does not expect to maintain a long-term presence at  forward-deployed locations. Our review of the Navy’s guidance on  advanced basing also revealed no mention of fuel demand management.  A Navy official involved with equipment logistics told us that his service  has not been directed to examine energy efficiency while outfitting or  procuring products for forward-deployed locations and that the Navy often  resides at locations operated by other military services.
section_title: Maintenance
paragraphs: Similarly, we found a lack of attention to fuel demand in guidance,  including an absence of fuel usage guidelines and metrics to evaluate  progress of reduction efforts, as forward-deployed locations are sustained  over time. The guidance officials identified for us generally does not  address fuel demand management in sustaining locations even after they  have been in existence for a certain period of time. For example, while the  Air Force has issued guidance on vehicle management, which includes a  goal to replace 30 percent or more of all applicable light duty vehicles with  more fuel-efficient, low-speed vehicles by fiscal year 2010, Air Force  officials did not provide us specific guidance on overall fuel demand  management at forward-deployed locations. The general lack of military  service guidance on this issue makes it difficult to ensure the continuity of  fuel reduction efforts at individual locations. For example, during our visit  to Camp Arifjan, an official told us that the camp’s public works  department was considering efficiency ratings, when possible, during the  installation of heating and cooling systems in new or upgraded facilities in  Kuwait, but he was unaware of DOD guidance requiring forward-deployed  locations to address fuel demand. Moreover, officials we spoke with at  Camp Lemonier said that they intended to implement a Navy instruction  on energy management at their location even though it only applies to non- nuclear ships, aircraft, vehicles, and shore installations. While we found  that both camps we visited were pursuing efforts to reduce fuel demand,  the efforts were driven largely by individual officers with short tours of  duty (typically 12 months or less). Without guidance and metrics that  require forward-deployed locations to address fuel demand, DOD cannot  ensure that fuel reduction actions taken at specific locations will be  continued over time, as personnel and mission requirements change.
section_title: Procurement
paragraphs: In addition to construction and maintenance, the procurement of products  for forward-deployed locations presents opportunities for DOD to  consider making purchases that take into account fuel demand or energy  efficiencies when practical. DOD’s guidance for its U.S. or permanent  installations requires the selection of energy-efficient products when they  are life-cycle cost effective, and the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has established the DOD Green  Procurement Program that strives to meet the requirements of federal  green procurement preference programs. However, we did not find a  similar emphasis on procuring energy-efficient products at DOD’s forward- deployed locations. Moreover, while the Energy Policy Act of 2005  requires federal agencies to procure Energy Star products or Federal  Energy Management Program-designated products, except in cases when  they are not life-cycle cost effective or reasonably available to meet  agency requirements, the law does not apply to any energy-consuming  product or system designed or procured for combat or combat-related  missions. Officials from each of the military services indicated that there  were unaware of efforts to procure energy-efficient products for forward- deployed locations. Instead, they told us that other factors, such as  mission requirements, availability from local economies, or cost played a  larger role in procurement decisions. Moreover, military services often  gather together available equipment for forward-deployed locations from  prepackaged sets, units, or the region, with little attention to energy  efficiency. For example, Army Corps of Engineers officials told us that the  Army often deploys with disparate generators that may be old and energy  inefficient. While DOD guidance requires components to obtain approval  to procure nonstandard generators, an official from DOD’s Project  Manager-Mobile Electric Power office admitted that it is difficult to  enforce the requirement at forward-deployed locations. He also noted  that the military services’ lists of required equipment may not contain  enough power generation and distribution equipment to support current  operations. Thus, we found that the military services turn to a variety of  sources to find enough generators and other products to meet mission  requirements, often without regard to energy efficiency.
There are some difficulties with procuring energy-efficient products for  forward-deployed locations. From the Defense Logistics Agency’s  perspective, for example, these include limited product availability,  logistics associated with transport to remote locations, and the  compatibility of products with locally available energy sources, if used; or  in the case of a solar-powered system, for instance, availability of on-site  technical expertise for installing such a system. However, given DOD’s  high fuel demand for base support activities at its forward-deployed  locations, without guidance in place to incorporate energy efficiency  considerations into procurement decisions when practical, DOD may be  missing opportunities to make significant reductions in demand without  affecting operational capabilities.
section_title: Joint Living Standards
paragraphs: In a separate effort, the Joint Staff is in the process of developing common  living standards (referred to as “joint standards of life support”) for  military servicemembers at forward-deployed locations, which could  provide another opportunity to make decisions that take into account fuel  demand considerations. Joint Staff officials said that the effort is intended  to create a consistent level of habitability for servicemembers through the  establishment of standard square footage requirements for living space,  duration of showers, and so forth that would be applied at forward- deployed locations after 45 days of establishment. The officials described  the effort as a long-term initiative intended to inform acquisitions. Once  initial standards are approved by the department, a DOD memorandum  would require the acquisition of common items, such as military tents,  based on the standards.
At the time we completed our audit work, the Joint Staff had proposed an  initial set of six standards—pertaining to field billeting, showers, laundry  facilities, latrines, ice, and feeding—and had requested that a Senior  Warfighting Forum be convened within DOD to review the initial  standards. While officials told us that the Joint Staff has not included fuel  demand considerations to date, we found that the types of standards the  Joint Staff is developing have implications for fuel demand. For example,  the duration of showers relates to how much fuel is required for hot water  heaters. Moreover, the officials said that there may be opportunities in the  future to develop standards for items such as military tents, generators,  and other equipment used at forward-deployed locations. Thus, the effort  provides an opportunity to integrate fuel demand considerations that  could lead to long-term, departmentwide energy efficiencies.
section_title: DOD Lacks Incentives and a Viable Funding Mechanism for Fuel Reduction Projects
paragraphs: DOD has not established incentives or a viable funding mechanism for fuel  reduction projects at its forward-deployed locations, which does not  encourage commanders to identify fuel demand management as a priority.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Not Established Fuel Reduction Incentives for Forward-Deployed Locations
paragraphs: DOD does not provide incentives to commanders to encourage fuel  demand reduction at forward-deployed locations. By contrast, DOD  emphasizes and encourages energy reduction efforts at its U.S.  installations. A November 2005 instruction issued by the Under Secretary  of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics requires the heads of  DOD components to develop internal energy awareness programs to  publicize energy conservation goals, disseminate information on energy  matters and energy conservation techniques, emphasize energy  conservation at all command levels and relate energy conservation to  operational readiness, and promote energy efficiency awards and  recognition through the use of incentives. The instruction also requires  training and education for achieving and sustaining energy-efficient  operations at the installation level through venues such as technical  courses, seminars, conferences, software, videos, and certifications. The  Navy has also established an energy conservation program, which has an  award component, to encourage ships to reduce energy consumption.  Awards are given quarterly to ships that use less than the Navy’s  established baseline amount of fuel, and fuel savings achieved during the  quarter are reallocated to ships for the purchase of items such as paint,  coveralls, and firefighting gear. We previously reported that the ship  energy conservation program receives $4 million in funding annually, and  Navy officials told us that they achieved $124.6 million in cost avoidance in  fiscal year 2006. They said that some other benefits of the ship energy  conservation program include more available steaming hours, additional  training for ships, improved ship performance, reduced ship maintenance,  and conservation of resources.
However, neither the Navy nor the other military services have established  similar incentive programs for their forward-deployed locations. Instead,  officials throughout the department consistently said that the amount of  fuel forward-deployed locations consumed was related to mission  requirements. We found that the lack of incentives tends to discourage  commanders from pursuing projects that could reduce fuel demand.  During our visit to Camp Lemonier, for example, we noted that officials  had identified several projects that could reduce the camp’s fuel usage,  including a proposal to right-size air conditioning units in living units by  replacing the current 2-ton units (24,000 BTUs) with 1-ton units and  applying foam insulation to the rooftops of several buildings. However,  camp officials questioned whether the upfront costs of these projects  made them worth undertaking because there was no apparent “return on  investment” for the camp, which would not see the associated savings to  invest in other camp projects. Similarly, while officials at Camp Arifjan  provided several examples of projects that could increase fuel efficiency at  Kuwait locations, without incentives to pursue these projects, it is unclear  whether they would take priority over other initiatives.
While DOD is driven to reduce energy consumption at its U.S. installations  largely by federal mandates and DOD guidance, encouraging fuel demand  reduction at forward-deployed locations will likely require a culture  change for DOD. According to OSD and DOD Power Surety Task Force  officials, the department has viewed fuel as a commodity necessary to  meet its mission requirements because, historically, fuel has been  inexpensive and free flowing for the department. However, from the  perspective of the Power Surety Task Force, if commanders could  reallocate funds saved through fuel reduction to other initiatives, DOD  could be in a position to significantly reduce fuel demand at their  locations.
Given DOD’s view of the Global War on Terrorism as a “longer war,”  forward-deployed locations such as Camp Lemonier, Camp Arifjan, and  others could remain in existence for the foreseeable future and future  conflicts will likely require the department to establish new locations.  DOD recognizes the risks associated with its heavy fuel burden, but  without incentives, commanding officials at DOD’s forward-deployed  locations are unlikely to identify fuel reduction as a priority in which to  invest their resources.
section_title: DOD Has Not Established a Viable Funding Mechanism for Fuel Reduction Projects
paragraphs: DOD also has not developed a viable funding mechanism for fuel  reduction projects at its forward-deployed locations. This makes it  difficult for commanders to pursue projects that would reduce fuel  demand, even though such projects could lower costs and, in some cases,  risks associated with fuel delivery. A lack of a viable funding mechanism is  an obstacle for locations supporting current operations, which are largely  dependent on supplemental congressional appropriations. Since  September 2001, a large portion of funding for military operations in  support of the Global War on Terrorism has come through supplemental  appropriations, which are requested by the department and approved by  Congress separately from DOD’s annual appropriation. At the time of our  visit, Camp Lemonier relied completely on supplemental appropriations  for its base support activities, and officials told us delays in receiving these  funds presented challenges in covering existing costs, making it  particularly difficult to pursue more expensive fuel demand reduction  projects. Camp Arifjan was also heavily reliant on supplemental  appropriations associated with the Global War on Terrorism. However,  because about 40 percent of the camp was funded through a defense  cooperative agreement with Kuwait, it also depended on the host country  for resources.
We have previously reported that past DOD emergency funding requests  have generally been used to support the initial or unexpected costs of  contingency operations. Once a limited and partial projection of costs  could be made, past administrations have generally requested further  funding in DOD’s base budget requests. We have encouraged DOD to  include known or likely projected costs of ongoing operations related to  the Global War on Terrorism with DOD’s base budget requests. However,  current administration policy is that the costs of ongoing military  operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism, such as Operation  Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, should be requested as  emergency funding. A senior Air Force official noted that, from his  perspective, forward-deployed locations dependent on this type of  emergency funding do not have to worry about reducing energy costs as  DOD’s permanent installations do because the commanders of forward- deployed locations know they will receive supplemental appropriations to  cover their costs.
Our discussions with Army and DOD Power Surety Task Force officials  about construction and maintenance of forward-deployed locations  revealed that, from their perspectives, other funding restrictions also pose  challenges in addressing fuel demands. DOD is appropriated funds for  certain activities such as operation and maintenance, military  construction, and other procurement. Operation and maintenance funds  are used for minor construction spending, and such projects are limited to  $750,000 or less. In using operation and maintenance funds, the  department and military services are also restricted by law from  purchasing any investment item that has a unit cost greater than  $250,000. The officials told us that, from their perspective, this restriction  can result in energy inefficiencies. For example, the Army typically  deploys with several smaller, less expensive and energy-inefficient  generators. The officials said that, ideally, the Army would like to deploy  with a larger, energy-efficient generator that exceeds the funding limit but  could produce savings over the long term. The military services can seek  approval for projects in excess of the limit, but projects compete with  other priorities. An official with DOD’s Power Surety Task Force told us  that officials at Camp Victory in Iraq recently requested funding to  consolidate generators, which would result in greater fuel efficiency, but  were denied due to other priorities.
The department manages an Energy Conservation Investment Program  that provides congressionally-appropriated military construction funds for  projects that save energy or reduce defense energy costs for its existing  installations but has no similar program specifically for forward-deployed  locations. Through the program, the military services and defense agencies  may submit projects for funding consideration based on a 10-year or less  savings payback. Funds accrued through project savings may be used on  projects that have experienced cost growth, for the design of energy  conservation investment program projects, to supplement the funding of  future or prior-year program projects, or for additional program projects.  In fiscal year 2007, the Energy Conservation Investment Program provided  over $54 million for 48 projects. Projects at all but five locations—Naval  Support Activity Souda Bay, Greece; Kadena Air Base, Japan; Fort  Buchanan, Puerto Rico; Ramstein Air Base, Germany; and a Defense  Commissary project in Guam—were located within the United States.
DOD also uses energy savings performance contracts (ESPC) at several of  its U.S. installations. Under an ESPC, DOD enters into a long-term contract  (up to 25 years) with a private energy services company whereby the  company makes energy-efficiency improvements financed from private  funds. DOD then repays the company over a specified period of time until  the improvements have been completely paid off. We previously reported  that DOD had undertaken 153 ESPCs to finance about $1.8 million in costs  at about 100 military installations from fiscal years 1999 through 2003.  Moreover, the Army Corps of Engineers reported that from 1998 to March  2008, its Huntsville Center had awarded ESPC contracts that have resulted  in $420 million in contractor-financed infrastructure improvements on  Army installations and a total projected energy cost savings to the  government of $100 million.
At the time of our review, the DOD Power Surety Task Force was  investigating the feasibility of establishing an energy dividend  reinvestment program to fund DOD energy projects across the  department. According to the officials, the program would be structured  similarly to an ESPC whereby an installation commander or program  manager could submit a project for funding consideration. If, after analysis  and review, funding was provided to pursue the project, the installation or  program would then repay the program using savings achieved by the  resulting energy efficiencies. While an initial briefing prepared for DOD’s  Energy Security Task Force and other department stakeholders noted all  energy projects within DOD could be eligible under the program, including  those at forward-deployed locations, the officials told us that this is  unlikely because, like ESPCs, the program would rely on long-term  contracts. DOD’s forward-deployed locations might not be in existence for  long periods of time, and therefore, the program might not be able to  recoup savings for projects funded at these locations. Moreover, the  officials expressed concern that if an installation or program incurred  higher energy costs than anticipated, it might not achieve its projected  savings and might not be in a position to repay DOD.
DOD’s Power Surety Task Force found that the source of funding for large  fuel demand reduction projects, such as foaming tents at forward- deployed locations in Afghanistan, has been a challenge for the  department, noting that energy efficiency does not fit neatly into the  military services’ budget processes. While the military services’ budget  processes allow them to budget for operation and maintenance costs,  research and development efforts, and so forth, the processes prevent  DOD from making quick, upfront investments in energy-efficiency  projects. Conversely, the officials told us that DOD’s budget process in  effect discourages commanders from generating savings by reducing their  future budgets—a limitation also cited by officials during our visit to Camp  Lemonier. In 2003, our work highlighted a similar funding problem  concerning corrosion mitigation projects. We found that DOD and the  military services gave corrosion mitigation projects, whose benefits may  not be apparent for many years, a lower priority than other requirements  that showed immediate results. In response to a subsequent Senate Armed  Services Committee report, DOD established a specific, separate budget  line for corrosion prevention activities to help ensure that sustained and  adequate funding is available for the corrosion control projects that have  the best potential to provide maximum benefit across the department.  This serves as one example for the department in considering how best to  fund fuel reduction projects at forward-deployed locations. Without  establishing a viable funding mechanism for these projects, DOD is not  well-positioned to achieve fuel savings at its forward-deployed locations.
section_title: DOD Lacks Visibility and Accountability over Fuel Demand Reduction
paragraphs: While DOD and the military services have efforts under way to reduce fuel  demand at forward-deployed locations, DOD’s current organizational  framework does not provide the department visibility or accountability  over fuel demand issues at its forward-deployed locations. We found that  fuel reduction efforts are not consistently shared among locations, military  services, or across the department and that there is no one office or  official specifically responsible for fuel demand management at forward- deployed locations.
Officials we spoke with from each of the military services told us that fuel  demand reduction practices at forward-deployed locations were not  consistently shared. For example, Army Corps of Engineers officials said  that no formal system is in place specifically designed to share fuel  demand reduction practices. Informal conversations occur, though on an  ad hoc basis. They acknowledged that forward-deployed locations often  pursue different initiatives; and the department, other military services, or  other Army forward-deployed locations are often unaware of these  different initiatives. Air Force officials also said that their service does not  have visibility over fuel demand reduction practices that may occur at  forward-deployed locations, noting that with joint operations and Air  Force forces embedded with the Army, fuel consumption is not  systemically recorded. Officials from the Navy and Marine Corps were also  unable to provide examples where fuel demand reduction practices were  shared across locations.
Moreover, while DOD guidance sets forth principles and establishes  doctrine for bulk petroleum and water in support of military operations, it  does not designate any DOD office or official as being responsible for fuel  demand management at forward-deployed locations. As table 1 shows,  several different offices have responsibility for petroleum management,  but none is specifically accountable for fuel demand management at  forward-deployed locations.
In addition, we could not identify anyone who is specifically accountable  for fuel demand management through our interviews with various DOD  and military service offices. While the DOD Power Surety Task Force has  been serving as a liaison on energy issues between the combatant  commands and military services, its temporary status and resources limit  its effectiveness. Moreover, because the Power Surety Task Force staff is  made up of contactors, OSD recognizes that the Power Surety Task Force  cannot represent the department. Defense Energy Support Center officials  told us that DOD needs to create an energy office to oversee fuel demand  reduction efforts and develop policy for the department.
The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2009 requires DOD to establish a Director of Operational Energy Plans and  Programs, an operational energy strategy for DOD, and military  department-level energy officials. The military departments have  established senior energy officials, but DOD has not yet established a  director or strategy for operational energy. In meeting these requirements,  DOD has an opportunity to improve visibility and accountability by  assigning responsibility and emphasize fuel demand management at  forward-deployed locations at both the department and military service  levels. An OSD official involved with the DOD Energy Security Task Force  noted that operational energy options should be a high priority of the new  director. Without establishing visibility and accountability over fuel  demand management at forward-deployed locations, DOD is not well  positioned to address the shortcomings we have identified in this report— including the lack of fuel reduction guidance, incentives, and a viable  funding mechanism for initiatives to decrease demand. Thus, DOD cannot  be assured that good fuel reduction practices are identified, shared,  prioritized, resourced, implemented, and institutionalized across locations  in order to reduce the costs and risks associated with high fuel demand.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD faces high costs, operational vulnerabilities, and logistical burdens in  sustaining forward-deployed locations that depend heavily on fuel-based  generators. Moreover, current operations have resulted in DOD  maintaining some forward-deployed locations for longer than initially  anticipated and generally without regard to fuel demand. While DOD’s  future operations may be unknown, the department’s goals to reduce its  reliance on petroleum-based fuel and minimize its logistics footprint— coupled with its reexamination of its overseas posture to better respond to  the changing threat environment—underscore the importance of  increasing attention on fuel demand management at overseas locations  where U.S. forces are stationed. Although base commanders must place  their highest priority on meeting mission requirements and it may not be  practical for DOD to decrease fuel usage at every forward-deployed  location, particularly at those that might not be in existence for very long,  fuel demand is likely to remain high until the department gives systematic  consideration to incorporating fuel demand in construction, maintenance,  procurement, and other policy decisions for forward-deployed locations.  In addition, the department will not be in a position to effectively identify,  share, prioritize, resource, implement, or institutionalize good fuel  reduction practices across locations that may exist for longer periods of  time. By placing a higher priority on fuel reduction at forward-deployed  locations and developing a comprehensive and coordinated approach to  managing fuel demand, one that includes specific guidelines, incentives, a  viable funding mechanism, visibility, and accountability, DOD would be  more likely to achieve its goals of reducing its reliance on petroleum-based  fuel, the vulnerabilities and logistics burden associated with transporting  large amounts of fuel to forward-deployed locations, and operational  costs.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To establish an effective approach to managing fuel demand that would  facilitate the widespread implementation of fuel reduction initiatives and  sustained attention to fuel demand issues at its forward-deployed  locations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following  five actions.   1.  Direct the combatant commanders, in consultation with their military  service component commands, to establish requirements for managing  fuel demand at forward-deployed locations within their areas of  responsibility and provide specific guidelines as appropriate. Officials  may wish to consider identifying a triggering mechanism in the  guidance, such as a specific length of time after a location is  established, when fuel demand management should become a  consideration in forward-deployed location sustainability. In  establishing requirements, the combatant commanders should  coordinate their efforts with the new DOD Director of Operational  Energy Plans and Programs to ensure departmentwide communication  and consistency, where appropriate. 2.  Direct the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the  Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop guidance that  implements combatant command requirements for managing fuel  demand at forward-deployed locations. The guidance should include  specific guidelines that address energy-efficiency considerations in  base construction, maintenance, procurement, and policies regarding  fuel usage at a location. In establishing guidance, the military services  should coordinate their efforts with the new DOD Director of  Operational Energy Plans and Programs to ensure departmentwide  communication and consistency, where appropriate.  3.  Direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to require that fuel demand  considerations be incorporated into the Joint Staff’s initiative to  develop joint standards of life support at DOD’s forward-deployed  locations.   4.  Designate the new, congressionally-mandated DOD Director of  Operational Energy Plans and Programs as the department’s lead  proponent of fuel demand management at forward-deployed locations,  and through this designation, require that the director develop action  plans as part of the congressionally-mandated DOD energy strategy.
Specifically, the strategy should incorporate the department’s action  plans for facilitating departmentwide communication and consistency, when  appropriate, in the development or revision of combatant command  and military service guidance that establishes requirements and  provides guidelines for managing fuel demand at forward-deployed  locations;   establishing incentives for commanders of forward-deployed  locations to promote fuel demand reduction at their locations, as  well as identifying a viable funding mechanism for the department  and commanders of forward-deployed locations to pursue fuel  reduction initiatives;   establishing visibility over fuel demand management at forward- deployed locations, including plans for sharing good fuel reduction  practices and solutions to identified challenges; and   establishing accountability for fuel demand management at  appropriate levels across the department.   5.  Direct the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to assign  their senior energy officials, among their other duties, responsibility  for overseeing fuel demand management at forward-deployed  locations operated by their military department components. In  carrying out this responsibility, the officials should identify and  promote sharing of good fuel reduction practices and solutions to  identified fuel demand challenges at their component’s forward- deployed locations and communicate those practices and solutions to  the DOD Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs for  potential use across the department.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred  with all of our recommendations. Technical comments were provided  separately and incorporated as appropriate. The department’s written  comments are reprinted in appendix IV.
In response to our recommendation that DOD direct the combatant  commanders to establish requirements for managing fuel demand at  forward-deployed locations in coordination with the new DOD Director of  Operational Energy Plans and Programs, DOD partially concurred, stating  that it believes the combatant commanders must be the decision  authorities for when reduction efforts should begin to be tracked and what  conservation measures are employed, in order to avoid distraction from  tactical operations. While we agree that the combatant commanders  should be responsible for establishing requirements for managing fuel  demand at their forward-deployed locations, it is important that this effort  be coordinated with the new DOD director of operational energy as well  as with the service component commands. Our report recommends that  DOD designate the new director of operational energy as the lead  proponent of fuel demand management at forward-deployed locations, and  through this designation, facilitate departmentwide communication and  consistency of requirements and guidelines for managing fuel demand, as  well as establish visibility and accountability for fuel demand  management. DOD generally concurred with our recommendations  pertaining to the new director’s responsibilities. In order to effectively  carry out these responsibilities, attain visibility over fuel demand issues  across the department, and serve as the DOD official accountable for such  issues, the director of operational energy should be consulted by the  combatant commanders in establishing fuel demand management  requirements to ensure departmentwide communication and consistency  occurs where appropriate.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the secretaries of the  military services develop guidance that implements the combatant  command requirements for managing fuel demand and include specific  guidelines that address energy efficiency considerations. In its response,  the department stated that guidelines on policy will be general in nature  and allow combatant commands flexibility. While we believe that forward- deployed locations within different regions could require different  guidelines, our audit work revealed that current guidance for Central  Command and Army guidance used in Central Command and European  Command contain only a general reference to energy efficiency—that  semipermanent locations are to be designed and constructed with finishes,  materials, and systems selected for moderate energy efficiency—and that  this guidance is not effective in implementing fuel demand considerations  at forward-deployed locations. Our report concludes that fuel demand is  likely to remain high until DOD gives systematic consideration to  incorporating fuel demand management into construction, maintenance,  procurement, and other policy decisions for forward-deployed locations.  Therefore, we continue to believe that the military service guidelines on  fuel demand management should provide enough specificity to  appropriately address these issues so that DOD can achieve its goals of  reducing its fuel demand, logistics burden, and operational costs.
As noted, DOD generally concurred with our recommendations on the  responsibilities of the new director of operational energy. However,  regarding the need to establish a viable funding mechanism for fuel  reduction projects at forward-deployed locations, the department stated  that it is not convinced that financial incentives represent the best fuel  reduction strategy for forward-deployed locations. We recognize that DOD  has various options for providing incentives to commanders at forward- deployed locations to reduce fuel demand but continue to believe that,  based on our audit work, the availability of funding for such projects is a  concern that needs to be addressed.
DOD concurred with our other recommendations that the Joint Staff  incorporate fuel demand considerations into its initiative to develop joint  standards for life support at DOD’s forward-deployed locations and that  the military department senior operational energy officials be assigned  responsibility for oversight of fuel demand management at forward- deployed locations operated by their military service component  commands.
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Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors to the report are listed in  appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Fuel Demand at Selected DOD Forward-Deployed Locations during June 2008
paragraphs: This appendix illustrates the Department of Defense’s (DOD) fuel demand  at selected forward-deployed locations for a 1-month period during 2008.  We obtained and analyzed fuel receipts and consumption information, by  fuel type (jet fuel, diesel, and mobility gasoline), for each day in June 2008  from five forward-deployed locations that were in Central Command’s  area of responsibility and heavily reliant on fuel-consuming generators for  power. The locations, which were selected in consultation with Central  Command officials, were:     Camp Lemonier, Djibouti,     Qayyarah West (Q-West) Air Base, Iraq,     Camp Arifjan, Kuwait,    Contingency Operating Base (COB) Adder, Iraq, and    Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan  The information presents a snapshot in time and cannot be generalized to  other time periods or forward-deployed locations. One limitation of the  data involves how locations classified fuel consumed for either base  support activities (defined as power, heating/cooling, facilities,  communications) or air and ground operations (the later defined as  vehicles). Although we provided the locations with examples of base  support activities and air and ground operations, these categories can  encompass a wide range of interrelated or overlapping activities.  Therefore, we deferred to the discretion of location officials in how they  classified their fuel use activities. Another limitation involves how the data  were collected. Data collection procedures and systems varied by military  service component and location; however, we found that each location  used a quality assurance process to ensure that the data were accurate and  complete. Therefore, we concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable  for descriptive purposes. For more information on our scope and  methodology, see appendix II.
subsections: section_title: Selected Forward- Deployed Locations Reported Consuming Large Amounts of Fuel for Base Support Activities and Air and Ground Operations in June 2008
paragraphs: The locations we reviewed reported consuming a total of approximately  11.67 million gallons during June 2008 for base support activities,  including power for heating/cooling units, machinery, and lighting; and for  air and ground operations, including aircraft, armored vehicles, and other  forms of transport. Table 2 and figure 7 summarize these fuel consumption  data.
As shown in table 2, of the overall amount of fuel consumed by the five  locations during this 1-month period, more than 4 million gallons (35  percent) were consumed for base support activities. In comparison, the  same amount of fuel could be used to fill 71 Boeing 747 jet airliners. Base  support activities accounted for over 70 percent of total fuel consumption  for three of the locations in our review—Q-West Air Base, Camp Arifjan,  and COB Adder. COB Adder consumed the largest amount of fuel for base  support activities in June at 1.17 million gallons. Bagram Air Field reported  that 13 percent of its fuel consumption in this month was for base support  activities—a proportion that was lower than that of the other bases.
However, the 6.16 million gallons that Bagram Air Field consumed for air  and ground operations in June was more than four times the amount of  fuel consumed for air and ground operations by the other four locations  combined.
section_title: Fuel Demand Profiles of Individual Locations
paragraphs: Figures 8 through 12 provide a brief description of the mission, power  structure, and June 2008 fuel demand for each of the five forward- deployed locations. Each profile also includes a chart showing the  proportion of total fuel consumed for base support activities and air and  ground operations.
section_title: Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We conducted our work at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD);  the Joint Staff; the headquarters and select components of the Army, Air  Force, Navy, and Marine Corps; the Defense Logistics Agency, including  the Defense Energy Support Center; and the Power Surety Task Force.
To review DOD efforts to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed  locations, we reviewed DOD component documents describing efforts and  met with DOD and military service officials to identify and discuss the  intent, scope, and status of these efforts. Our review focused on forward- deployed locations—installations or base camps situated outside of the  United States that support current operations—that rely primarily on fuel- based generators, as opposed to local power grids. We supplemented our  analysis with visits to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, and Camp Lemonier, Djibouti,  where we observed efforts made at the locations and discussed them with  cognizant officials. After consultation with Central Command officials, we  selected and visited these two forward-deployed locations to gain a  firsthand understanding of fuel demand issues at these locations. We  chose to visit these locations because servicemembers at each location  relied heavily on fuel-based generators, as opposed to local power grids, to  carry out very different missions—the former directly supported  operations in Iraq while the latter provided diplomatic, development, and  counterterrorism support within the Horn of Africa. We also chose these  locations because officials told us that the camps were pursuing fuel  demand reduction efforts; for example, Camp Lemonier had applied foam  insulation to a facility to reduce fuel demand. We treated these two  locations as illustrative case studies in our report and information  obtained from these locations is not generalizable to other forward- deployed locations.
To review DOD’s approach to managing fuel demand at forward-deployed  locations, we analyzed department documents and held discussions with  DOD and military service officials to gain their perspectives on issues  including forward-deployed location construction and maintenance;  procurement; funding procedures; and applicable DOD guidance and laws  related to energy reduction, procurement, and military construction. To  provide context for understanding the challenges associated with  managing fuel demand at forward-deployed locations, we obtained  information on fuel distribution and delivery processes and challenges in  Iraq, Afghanistan, and for the two forward-deployed locations we visited.  For comparison purposes, we reviewed policies and programs related to  energy awareness and reduction for DOD’s permanent or U.S. facilities. In  identifying opportunities for DOD to increase visibility and accountability  of fuel demand management at its forward-deployed locations, we  reviewed sections of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2009 that require DOD to, among other things, establish  a Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs and an operational  energy strategy and that require the secretaries of the military departments  to designate senior officials for operational energy.
To provide information on DOD’s fuel demand at selected forward- deployed locations (app. I), we asked Central Command officials to  identify and collect fuel receipts and consumption data from June 1  through 30, 2008, at several forward-deployed locations in Iraq and in  Afghanistan that rely heavily on generators, as opposed to commercial  power supplied by the host country. The data collected only represent a  snapshot in time of fuel demand at selected locations and cannot be  generalized to other time periods or other forward-deployed locations. In  total, Central Command collected fuel receipts and consumption data for  us on two locations in Iraq (Q-West and Contingency Operating Base  Adder) and one location in Afghanistan (Bagram Air Field). In addition, we  collected fuel receipts and consumption data for the same time period at  Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, and Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, the two locations  from our case-study analysis. The missions of these locations ranged from  providing logistics support to U.S. forces to supporting development and  diplomacy within the region. Central Command officials told us that  different military services and locations have different methods for  collecting and reporting data. Therefore, to attempt to collect as similar  data as possible among the various locations, we agreed that Central  Command would develop a standard data collection spreadsheet for the  locations to record the following information by day in June 2008:   the quantity of fuel in gallons received by fuel type—JP8 jet fuel, diesel,  or mobility gasoline,  the quantity of fuel in gallons consumed for base support (defined as  power, heating/cooling, facilities, or communications),  the quantity of fuel in gallons consumed for air mobility,   the quantity of fuel in gallons consumed for ground mobility (vehicles),  the largest consumer of base support fuel (for example,  heating/cooling) and  the largest consumer of ground mobility fuel by day (for example, Mine  Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle).
This spreadsheet was used to collect fuel receipt and consumption data  from all five of the locations we reviewed. We agreed with Central  Command officials to use this spreadsheet to increase the likelihood that  the locations would categorize fuel consumed for base support activities  and ground and air operations similarly; however, some of the locations  categorized fuel used for aerospace ground equipment differently. In an  attempt to reconcile these differences, we subsequently requested that  officials provide us separate data pertaining to aerospace ground  equipment, but officials stated that the data were not collected in a way  that could enable them to do so. Therefore, in appendix I we have noted  this difference in the data illustrating fuel used by the locations for base  support and ground and air operations. To determine whether the data  were reliable and valid, we sent follow-up questionnaires to each of the  locations reviewed, asking how the locations recorded and maintained the  data provided to us and what quality assurance process they used to  ensure that the data were accurate and complete. Although data collection  procedures and systems varied by military service component and  location, we found that the data underwent a quality review. Therefore, we  concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for descriptive purposes.
We conducted our review from March 2008 through February 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Selected Initiatives of the DOD Power Surety Task Force to Reduce Fuel Demand at Forward-Deployed Locations
paragraphs: This appendix provides an overview of selected initiatives of the DOD  Power Surety Task Force that are aimed at reducing fuel demand at  forward-deployed locations. It also provides information on the status of  each initiative at the time we conducted our review.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Thomas Gosling, Assistant  In addition to the contact named above, Thomas Gosling, Assistant  Director; Karyn Angulo; Alissa Czyz; Gilbert Kim; James Lawson; Marie  Director; Karyn Angulo; Alissa Czyz; Gilbert Kim; James Lawson; Marie  Mak; and Ryan Olden made major contributions to this report.   Mak; and Ryan Olden made major contributions to this report.