Human Capital: Opportunities Exist to Build on Recent Progress to Strengthen DOD's Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan
Published: 2009-02-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Having the right number of civilian personnel with the right skills is critical to achieving the Department of Defense's (DOD) mission. With more than 50 percent of its civilian workforce (about 700,000 civilians) eligible to retire in the next few years, DOD may be faced with deciding how to fill numerous mission-critical positions--some involving senior leadership. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 requires DOD to develop a strategic human capital plan, update it annually through 2010, and address eight requirements. GAO previously found that DOD's 2007 plan did not meet most requirements. The 2007 NDAA added nine requirements to the annual update to shape DOD's senior leader workforce. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DOD's 2008 update addressed (1) the 2006 human capital planning requirements, (2) the 2007 senior leader requirements, and (3) key factors that may affect civilian workforce planning. GAO analyzed the update, compared it with the requirements, and reviewed factors identified in the update and prior GAO work.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While DOD's 2008 update to its strategic human capital plan, when compared with the first plan, shows progress in addressing the FY 2006 NDAA requirements, the update only partially addresses each of the act's requirements. For example, DOD identified 25 critical skills and competencies--referred to as enterprisewide mission-critical occupations, which included logistics management and medical occupations. The update, however, does not contain assessments for over half of the 25 occupations, and the completed assessments of future enterprisewide mission-critical occupations do not cover the required 10-year period. Also, DOD's update included analyses of "gaps," or differences between the existing and future workforce for about half of the 25 occupations. Finally, DOD's update partially addressed the act's requirements for a plan of action for closing the gaps in DOD's civilian workforce. Although DOD recently established a program management office whose responsibility is to monitor DOD's updates to the strategic human capital plan, the office does not have and does not plan to have a performance plan--a road map--that articulates how the NDAA requirements will be met. Until such a plan is developed, DOD may not be able to design the best strategies to address the legislative requirements and meet its civilian workforce needs. DOD's 2008 update and related documentation address four of the nine requirements in the FY 2007 NDAA for DOD's senior leader workforce and partially address the remaining five. For example, the update identifies a plan of action to address, among other things, changes in the number of authorized senior leaders. However, the update noted that DOD had conducted only initial leadership assessments as a first step in identifying some of its needs, capabilities, and gaps in the existing or projected senior leader workforce and stated that the final assessments would not be completed until the summer of 2009. Although DOD recently established an executive management office to manage the career life cycle of DOD senior leaders, as well as the FY 2007 NDAA requirements, this office has not and does not plan to develop a performance plan to address the NDAA-related requirements. While DOD's 2008 update identified some key factors that could affect civilian workforce plans, such as base closures and legislation requiring the use of government employees for certain functions, it does not include strategies for addressing these factors. For example, the update noted that DOD may consider using government employees to perform, among other things, an activity performed by a contractor when an economic analysis shows DOD civilian employees are the low-cost providers, but DOD does not provide a strategy for doing so. Further, GAO's body of work has noted a similar factor not discussed in DOD's update--DOD's extensive reliance on contractors and its long-standing challenges in developing a civilian workforce strategy to address the use of contractors and the appropriate mix of contractors and civilians. Without strategies that address key factors like the use of contractors, DOD may not have the right number of people, in the right place, at the right time, and at a reasonable cost to achieve its mission in the future.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Having the right number of federal civilian personnel with the right skills  Having the right number of federal civilian personnel with the right skills  is critical to achieving the Department of Defense’s (DOD) mission. With  is critical to achieving the Department of Defense’s (DOD) mission. With  more than 50 percent of its total civilian workforce (about 700,000  more than 50 percent of its total civilian workforce (about 700,000  civilians) becoming eligible to retire in the next few years, DOD may be  civilians) becoming eligible to retire in the next few years, DOD has also stressed the need for leadership in human  government. Since 2001, we have listed federal human capital  Review (QDR).capital management to respond to 21st century challenges.
DOD officials noted that this figure includes various types of retirement eligibilities for its  civilians, including early retirement.
U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Results From the 2006 Federal Human Capital  Survey (2006).
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Feb. 6, 2006).
GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-09-271 (January 2009). workforce and its senior leaders. For example, in section 1122 of the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (FY 2006 NDAA),  Congress directed DOD to develop and submit to the Senate and House  Armed Services Committees a strategic plan to shape and improve the  department’s civilian employee workforce. The act stipulated eight  requirements for the plan. This plan was to, among other things, include  assessments of (1) existing critical skills and competencies in DOD’s  civilian workforce, (2) future critical skills and competencies needed over  the next decade, and (3) any gaps in the existing or future critical skills  and competencies identified. In addition, DOD was to submit a plan of  action for developing and reshaping the civilian employee workforce to  address any identified gaps, as well as specific recruiting and retention  goals and strategies on how to train, compensate, and motivate civilian  employees. The act required DOD to submit its original plan to Congress  by January 6, 2007, and to provide updates to its civilian human capital  strategic plan no later than March 1 for each year from 2007 through 2010.  We assessed DOD’s original plan (which DOD submitted to Congress on  November 6, 2007) and noted that it partially addressed two of the eight  statutory requirements. For example, while DOD’s plan listed current  critical skills that DOD called enterprisewide mission-critical occupations,  it lacked a “gap analysis”—an assessment of the difference between the  existing and future critical skills and competencies of the civilian  workforce. We recommended that DOD provide Congress a plan that  addresses all of the legislative requirements. DOD disagreed, noting that  its response to the congressional reporting requirements reflected a  centralized enterprisewide strategic perspective---as opposed to providing  the information specified by law such as recruiting and retention goals.
In October 2006, section 1102 of the John Warner National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (FY 2007 NDAA) was enacted. This  act required DOD to include in its March 1, 2008, update to the civilian  human capital strategic plan, an assessment of the senior management,  functional, and technical personnel, and a plan of action for improving  them. The act stipulates nine requirements for the update. The update was  to include assessments of (1) the needs of DOD for senior leaders, (2) the  capability of DOD’s existing senior leader workforce to meet DOD mission  requirements, and (3) the gaps in DOD’s existing or projected civilian  workforce that should be addressed to ensure continued access to the  senior leader workforce that DOD needs. DOD was to also submit a plan  of action to address the gaps identified in its assessment. This plan was to  include, among other things, (1) any legislative or administrative action  that may be needed to adjust the requirements applicable to DOD’s senior  leader workforce, (2) any changes in the number of personnel authorized,  (3) any changes in the rates or methods of pay, and (4) specific strategies  for developing, training, deploying, compensating, motivating, and  designing career paths and career opportunities for its senior leadership.  DOD officials stated that the latter would encompass some parts of talent  management and succession planning. On June 24, 2008, DOD submitted  its update to the original human capital strategic plan.
In response to your request, we reviewed DOD’s first update to the 2007  civilian human capital strategic plan. As agreed with your staff, we are  reporting on the extent to which DOD’s 2008 update addressed (1) the FY  2006 NDAA’s human capital planning requirements, (2) the FY 2007  NDAA’s senior management-related human capital and succession  planning requirements, and (3) other factors that may affect human capital  planning for its civilian workforce.
To examine the extent to which DOD’s 2008 update addresses civilian  human capital planning requirements in the 2006 and 2007 acts, we  obtained and analyzed the update and compared it with the legislative  requirements. We considered a requirement to be “addressed” if DOD  demonstrated, through verifiable evidence, that it met all aspects of a  stipulated requirement in the legislation and considered a requirement to  be “partially addressed” if DOD provided evidence that showed some  aspects of the legislation had been met. While we did not assess the  reliability of the data in DOD’s workforce assessments and gap analyses,  we have previously reviewed information on the workforce forecasting  system used by DOD and, during this review, we interviewed officials at  OPM and DOD to obtain updated information on this system. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our  review. Additionally, we interviewed officials in the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’ (OUSD ) Civilian  Personnel Policy and the Civilian Personnel Management Service, along  with officials from the individual services, the Defense Logistics Agency,  and the Defense Information Systems Agency, about the update and  ongoing human capital efforts within DOD. The latter include the Office of  the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) ongoing efforts to establish a program  management office that is responsible for, among other things, developing  and monitoring overall civilian workforce trends, competency  assessments, and gap analyses, particularly for the DOD enterprisewide  mission-critical occupations.
To determine DOD’s succession planning efforts for its senior  management workforce, we analyzed applicable documents related to  DOD’s current efforts, along with our prior work on DOD’s human capital  planning efforts for senior leaders. To corroborate our understanding of  DOD’s efforts related to succession planning, we interviewed officials in  DOD’s office for Civilian Personnel Policy and the components about  these matters. Among other things, we discussed DOD’s efforts to  establish an executive management office for talent management and  succession planning at the OSD level. Finally, for our last objective, we  identified and reviewed factors that would affect DOD’s civilian workforce  planning such as those that DOD identified in its update, and a factor  previously identified in GAO’s prior work—the department’s reliance on  contractors.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to February  2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our objectives. We believe that the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. For more information about  our scope and methodology, see appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD stressed the importance of strategic human capital management in  its 2006 QDR. For example, it noted the importance of involving senior  leadership in this area and stated that DOD must (1) compete effectively  with the civilian sector for highly qualified personnel, (2) possess an up-to- date human capital strategy, and (3) have the authorities to recruit, shape,  and sustain the force it needs. Within the department, the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, who serves as the Chief  Human Capital Officer for DOD, has overall responsibility for the  development of DOD’s civilian human capital strategic plan and  competency-based workforce planning. The Deputy Under Secretary of  Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy has the lead role in developing and  overseeing the implementation of the civilian human capital strategic plan.
In January 2006, section 1122 of the FY 2006 NDAA was enacted. It  directed DOD to develop and submit to the Senate and House Armed  Services Committees a strategic plan to shape and improve the DOD  civilian employee workforce. The plan was to include eight requirements.  These requirements included an assessment of  the critical skills that will be needed in the future DOD civilian employee  workforce to support national security requirements and effectively  manage the department over the next decade,  the critical competencies that will be needed in the future DOD civilian  employee workforce to support national security requirements and  effectively manage the department over the next decade,  the skills of the existing DOD civilian employee workforce,  the competencies of the existing DOD civilian employee workforce,  the projected trends in that workforce based on expected losses due to  retirement and other attrition, and    gaps in the existing or projected DOD civilian employee workforce that  should be addressed to ensure that the department has continued access  to the critical skills and competencies needed to support national security  requirements and effectively manage the department over the next decade.
Also, as part of its civilian human capital strategic plan, the act directed  DOD to include a plan of action for developing and reshaping the DOD  civilian employee workforce to address identified gaps in critical skills and  competencies, including specific  recruiting and retention goals, including the program objectives of the  department to be achieved through such goals; and    strategies for developing, training, deploying, compensating, and  motivating the DOD civilian employee workforce and the program  objectives to be achieved through such strategies.
In October 2006, the FY 2007 NDAA was enacted. Section 1102 of this act  required DOD to include in its March 1, 2007, update a strategic plan to  shape and improve its senior leader workforce.
The plan was to include nine requirements. These nine requirements  included an assessment of  the needs of DOD for senior leaders in light of recent trends and projected  changes in the mission and organization of the department and in light of  staff support needed to accomplish that mission,  the capability of the existing civilian employee workforce to meet  requirements relating to the mission of the department, and    gaps in the existing or projected civilian employee workforce of the  department that should be addressed to ensure continued access to the  senior leader workforce DOD needs.
Also, as part of its civilian human capital strategic plan, the act directed  DOD to include a plan of action for developing and reshaping the senior  leader workforce to ensure the department has continued access to the  senior executives it needs. The plan of action is to include    any legislative or administrative action that may be needed to adjust the  requirements applicable to any category of civilian personnel identified or  to establish a new category of senior management or technical personnel,    any changes in the number of personnel authorized in any category of  personnel identified that may be needed to address such gaps and  effectively meet the needs of the department,    any changes in the rates or methods of pay for any category of personnel  identified that may be needed to address inequities and ensure that the  department has full access to appropriately qualified personnel to address  such gaps,    specific recruiting and retention goals, including the program objectives of  the department to be achieved through such goals,    specific strategies for developing, training, deploying, compensating,  motivating, and designing career paths and career opportunities for the  senior leader workforce of the department, including the program  objectives to be achieved through such strategies; and    specific steps that the department has taken or plans to take to ensure that  the senior leader workforce is managed in compliance with the  requirements of section 129 of title 10, United States Code.
To conduct the assessments of end strength and projected trends in the  civilian workforce based on expected losses due to retirement and other  attrition as required in the legislation, the department used OPM’s  workforce forecasting software Workforce Analysis Support System  (WASS) and Civilian Forecasting System (CIVFORS). WASS is used to  evaluate workforce trends and can perform simple to complex analyses  from counts and averages to trend analyses, using such characteristics as  employee age, retirement plan participation, and historical retirement  data. CIVFORS was adapted from an Army military forecasting model for  civilian use in 1987 and uses data from DOD’s Defense Civilian Personnel  Data System (DCPDS). CIVFORS is a life-cycle modeling and projection  tool, which models most significant events, including personnel actions  such as promotions, reassignments, and retirements. Officials can use a  default projection model or create their own, which can be tailored to  examine issues such as projected vacancies of hard-to-fill occupations or  turnover in specific regions by occupation. The workforce forecasts are  generated over a 7-year projection period, using the most recent 5 years of  historical data. While CIVFORS is used at the DOD enterprisewide level,  the department has not directed the components to use the system. As a  result, components use various systems and approaches for their forecasts  and trend analyses. For example, when we met with officials from the  Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) they noted that while they had received  training on WASS/CIVFORS, the agency was not currently using the  program, though they were having discussions to determine if they wanted  to use the system in the future. Currently, DLA conducts workforce  analysis by reviewing past information to determine future needs and uses  a commercial off-the-shelf business software package to assist in the  analysis.
section_title: While DOD’s 2008 Update Shows Progress, It Only Partially Addresses Each of the Fiscal Year 2006 Legislative Requirements
paragraphs: DOD has made progress in implementing the eight requirements in the FY  2006 NDAA as compared to its first plan; however, as seen in table 1, the  2008 update only partially addresses each of the eight requirements. For  example, DOD—through the department’s functional and human resource  leadership—identified 25 enterprisewide mission-critical occupations but  did not provide an assessment that covered a 10-year period as required by  the FY 2006 NDAA. Additionally, DOD provided projected trend data  related, for example, to expected losses due to retirement on 11 of the 25  enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. Furthermore, DOD’s 2008  update only included gap analyses for about half of the 25 identified  enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. DOD’s update also partially  addresses the legislative requirements for a plan of action to develop and  reshape the civilian employee workforce. More importantly, the recently  established program management office does not have a performance plan  to articulate how it will address the legislative requirements.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Update Partially Addresses the Legislative Requirements to Assess Existing and Future Critical Skills and Competencies and Projected Trends
paragraphs: DOD’s 2008 update partially addresses the legislative requirements of the  FY 2006 NDAA to assess existing and future critical skills and  competencies over the next decade and projected trends of the DOD  civilian employee workforce. For example, DOD identified—through the  department’s functional and human resource leadership—25  enterprisewide mission-critical occupations but did not provide an  assessment of future enterprisewide mission-critical occupations that  covered a 10-year period. As shown in table 2, DOD provided assessments  of current and future enterprisewide mission-critical occupations and  projected trend data in separate sections of its update. Specifically, the  update had separate explanatory appendixes that addressed assessments  for 12 of the 25 enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. These  appendixes included assessment information compiled by OSD and the  components.
The update also had two separate appendixes with OSD-identified  workforce assessments for the department and the components, along  with projected trends data related to expected losses from retirements and  attrition for 11 of the 25 DOD enterprisewide mission-critical occupations.
These data were obtained from the WASS/CIVFORS analyses and are also  presented in table 2.
DOD’s update provided assessments for 12 of the 25 existing and future  critical skills and competencies, which OSD refers to as enterprisewide  mission-critical occupations. As shown in table 2, DOD included  explanatory appendixes on some of the enterprisewide mission-critical  occupations, including information technology management, computer  science, and logistics management. Specifically, these appendixes  discussed various issues, including end strength of the existing  workforce for these 12 enterprisewide mission-critical occupations during  fiscal year 2007. The update also contained two separate appendixes with  OSD-identified workforce assessments for the department and the  components, along with projected trends data related to expected losses  from retirements and attrition for 11 of the 25 DOD enterprisewide  mission-critical occupations. The update noted that the department had  just begun its assessments of the enterprisewide mission-critical  occupations. It further noted that, to establish a baseline for its civilian  workforce, the department decided to hold future workforce levels for the  majority of the enterprisewide mission-critical occupations at the then  2007 level of employment—“steady state”—through 2014. This “steady  state” would be maintained by controlling gains like “new hires.” For  example, in the appendix that contained the contracting enterprisewide  mission-critical occupation, DOD noted that the 2007 end strength level  was 19,090 and that this steady state could be maintained at the fiscal year  2007 end strength levels of 19,090 through 2014, by controlling gains like  new hires.
However, DOD’s update does not include an assessment of its future  enterprisewide mission-critical occupations that cover a 10-year period, as  required by the FY 2006 NDAA. DOD officials told us that the modeling  tool it used to assess its workforce, WASS/CIVFORS, only generates  forecasts for a 7-year period, in line with the department’s budget—the  Future Years Defense Program. DOD officials have noted that it is  difficult to conduct workforce planning out to 10 years, especially in light  of factors that cannot be predicted, like the Global War on Terror and  economic factors. On the other hand, some factors that could affect  human capital planning are known well in advance, such as eligibility for  retirement and the development of weapons systems that could take more  than 10 years.
subsections: section_title: Assessment of Projected Trends in the Critical Skills and Competencies of the Civilian Workforce Based on Expected Losses from Retirements and Other Attrition
paragraphs: As seen in table 2, DOD’s update contained projected trend data on  expected losses from retirement and other attrition for 11 of DOD’s 25  enterprisewide mission-critical occupations and thus partially addressed  the legislative requirement. Again, OSD used OPM’s WASS/CIVFORS  projection tool to fulfill the legislative requirement for DOD to assess the  projected trends in the civilian workforce. WASS/CIVFORS was used to  develop charts on workforce demographics for the 11 enterprisewide  mission-critical occupations identified. For the medical occupations of  physician, nurse, and pharmacist, as an example, the projected trends data  show that the majority of the department’s projected losses in the medical  community were due to transfers to other federal agencies, movement to  the private sector, or internal transfers within DOD components.
section_title: Assessment of Gaps in the Existing or Projected Critical Skills and Competencies of the Civilian Workforce
paragraphs: As seen in table 1, DOD has made progress in assessing the gaps in its  civilian workforce since the publication of its 2007 civilian human capital  strategic plan. Specifically, DOD’s 2008 update notes that its approach to  gap analysis has been both centralized at the OSD level—with focus on the  enterprisewide mission-critical occupations—and decentralized within the  components. While not clearly identified as a gap assessment in the  update, DOD provided data, at the OSD centralized level, from  WASS/CIVFORS that showed end strength being maintained at the 2007  level—steady state—through 2014 for 10 of the previously mentioned 11  enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. As stated before, the update  noted that this steady state would be maintained by controlling gains in  its workforce. Specifically, of the 11 enterprisewide mission-critical  occupations for which OSD projected trends, OSD forecasted that 10  could be maintained at a steady state—for a baseline, as previously noted.  We also note that, for the civil engineering enterprisewide mission-critical  occupation, DOD did not project a steady state for this occupation but  rather identified a gap, stating that the projected gains would not meet  projected losses. With this steady state assumption, OSD assumes that its  goals for projected total gains will be achieved. We note however, that if  these gains—that is, new hires or transfers from other government  agencies—are not attained, then a potential gap exists. Furthermore DOD  officials told us these steady state projections do not incorporate changes  in workforce requirements resulting from initiatives like the “Gansler  report”—which identified a need for additional contracting officials. We  were told that the department would incorporate such changes in future  updates. These changes could affect the size of the workforce.
At the time of our review, the department had asked the components and  functional community managers to validate the projected trends, which  was originally expected to be completed by July 1, 2008. However, DOD  officials stated that the functional community managers had not yet  validated OSD’s projections because they had to be trained on  WASS/CIVFORS first. DOD officials said this training occurred in  September 2008. At the time of our review, the revised completion date to  validate the projected trends was January 2009.
As previously stated, the update contained explanatory appendixes that  specifically identified gap assessments for 6 enterprisewide mission- critical occupations: civil engineering, human resource management,  information technology management, computer engineering, computer  scientist, and logistics management. Various methods and tools were used  for these assessments—from discussions about the gaps to use of tools  other than WASS/CIVFORS. For example, OPM’s Federal Competency  Assessment Tool for Human Resources was used to conduct a competency  gap assessment for the human resource management enterprisewide  mission-critical occupation. Additionally, the assessment indicated that  there were gaps in the employee relations and compensation  competencies, among others. On the other hand, in the information  technology appendix—which includes the enterprisewide mission-critical  occupations information technology management, computer engineering,  and computer scientist—a federal survey was used and administered to  the information technology community. The assessment identified gaps in,  among other areas, information systems security certification and network  security.
DOD’s update also included some competency gap analyses at the  component level, in addition to the enterprisewide mission-critical  occupation gap analyses. For example, DOD’s update noted that the  Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) conducts gap analyses by  having its employees do self-assessments to determine their proficiency  level in the skills needed for their competency or career field. The update  noted that all DISA employees are required to complete the competency  gap assessment process and have a completed individual development  plan. The update also stated that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency  has completed the first competency gap assessment for 250 of its research  and development workforce personnel.
DOD officials acknowledge that work on the gap analyses for its 25  enterprisewide mission-critical occupations is not complete and efforts at  the component level are ongoing. In addition, the update notes that the  department has developed a proposed plan to identify and address future  gaps. As mentioned previously, the functional community managers were  tasked to validate and provide information for the projected trends;  however, at the time of our review, some of the functional community  managers were just established, and OSD officials said, as a result, the  department published what it had.
As we previously reported, the absence of fact-based gap analyses can  undermine an agency’s efforts to identify and respond to current and  emerging challenges. Without including gap analyses for each of the areas  DOD has identified as mission-critical, DOD and the components may not  be able to design and fund the best strategies to fill their talent needs or to  make the appropriate investments to develop and retain the best possible  workforce.
section_title: DOD’s Update Partially Addresses the Legislative Requirements for a Plan of Action
paragraphs: As seen in rows 7 and 8 of table 1, we found that DOD partially addressed  the legislative requirements for a plan of action for developing and  reshaping the civilian employee workforce to address the gaps in critical  skills and competencies identified.
subsections: section_title: Plan of Action, Including Specific Recruiting and Retention Goals and the Program Objectives to Be Achieved through Such Goals
paragraphs: DOD’s update contains recruiting and retention goals for 11 of the 25  enterprisewide mission-critical occupations, which were developed with  the WASS/CIVFORS projection tool; however, as stated previously, these  forecasts cover 7 years, not 10 years as required by the FY 2006 NDAA. At  the time of this review, DOD was just starting the process for developing  projected trends for its enterprisewide mission-critical occupations to  determine, among other things, overall workforce needs and retention  goals for 11 of its 25 enterprisewide mission-critical occupations over a 7- year period. DOD’s update states that the department is in the process of  identifying 10-year recruiting and retention goals for all of the  enterprisewide mission-critical occupations and expects to complete this  effort by the end of calendar year 2008; however, DOD did not provide  additional information on these assessments before completion of this  review. Furthermore, DOD’s update does not link specific recruiting and  retention goals to program objectives.
Additionally, DOD’s update contains strategies for recruiting and retaining  civilian employees in the appendixes that discuss the enterprisewide  mission-critical occupations. For example, for the medical occupations,  DOD formed the Tri-Service Medical Recruitment Workgroup in 2007 to,  among other things, analyze current recruitment, hiring, and retention  strategies for civilian health care positions. Some accomplishments of the  workgroup include creation of a DOD medical recruitment sub-Web on the  DOD Civilian Personnel Management Service Web site, guidance on the  use of referral bonuses as a recruitment tool, and development of a  handbook for recruiters and managers on compensation and hiring  flexibilities.
section_title: Plan of Action Including Specific Strategies for Developing, Training, Deploying, Compensating, and Motivating the DOD Civilian Workforce and Program Objectives
paragraphs: DOD’s update does contain some strategies for developing, training,  deploying, compensating, and motivating the civilian workforce.  Specifically, DOD’s update discusses strategies to address workforce  requirements in the explanatory appendixes, which cover 12 of the 25  enterprisewide mission-critical occupations identified. For example, the  FY 2008 NDAA granted DOD the authority to implement a modified  version of the Information Technology Exchange Program, which would  allow DOD civilians in the IT community to conduct job details in the  private sector. However, because DOD has not completed its assessment  of all 25 enterprisewide mission-critical occupations, any plan of action  the department develops will not address gaps that have yet to be  identified. While DOD’s update contains an extensive list of strategies, it  does not address the requirements of the law—that the strategies be  specifically related to gaps in the enterprisewide mission-critical  occupations. Furthermore, DOD’s update does not link specific strategies  for developing, training, deploying, compensating, and motivating the  civilian workforce to program objectives.
section_title: DOD’s Recently Established Program Management Office Does Not Have a Performance Plan to Articulate How the Legislative Requirements Will Be Addressed
paragraphs: OSD officials stated that they are working to more fully address all of the  legislative requirements, and in November 2008 OUSD (P&R) officially  established a program management office—whose responsibility is to,  among other things, specifically monitor and review DOD’s enterprisewide  mission-critical occupation assessments, workforce trends, and gap  analyses. According to DOD, the budget for this office included salary and  benefits for 20 people and training for human resource consultants on  strategic human capital management.
While it is notable the office has been established, at the time of our  review, DOD officials stated that they did not have and did not plan to  have a performance plan or “road map” to articulate how the department  will fully address requirements of the FY 2006 NDAA. Additionally, we  note that, prior to the establishment of this new office, the Program  Executive Office for Strategic Human Capital Planning, per DOD officials,  had responsibility to develop DOD’s civilian human capital plan. It appears  DOD has never had a performance plan to help manage this area. Our  prior work has shown that key elements of a sound management approach  contain performance plans that include establishing implementation goals  and time frames, performance measures, and activities that are aligned  with resources. Without such a plan, DOD and its components may not be  able to design and fund the best strategies to address the legislative  requirements and meet their workforce needs.
section_title: DOD’s 2008 Update of Its Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan Generally Addresses 2007 Legislative Requirements for DOD’s Senior Leader Workforce
paragraphs: Of the nine requirements stipulated in the FY 2007 NDAA, DOD’s update  and related documentation addresses four and partially addresses the  remaining five. Table 3 summarizes the legislative requirements and  identifies the extent to which the civilian human capital strategic plan  update addresses the requirements. Although DOD recently established, in  October 2008, an executive management office responsible for talent  management, succession planning, and other issues, this office is  operating without a performance plan that establishes implementation  goals and time frames, measures performance, and aligns activities with  resources.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Update Addresses Four of Nine Legislative Requirements
paragraphs: DOD’s 2008 update addresses four requirements of the FY 2007 NDAA— specifically, a plan of action that identifies (1) legislative or administrative  actions needed, (2) changes in the number of personnel authorized, (3)  changes in the rates or methods of pay, and (4) specific steps DOD has  identified to ensure compliance with section 129 of title 10, United States  Code.
subsections: section_title: A Plan of Action Including Any Legislative or Administrative Action
paragraphs: At the time of our report, DOD officials said that the department has not  determined whether additional legislative actions are needed. DOD’s  update, however, identifies the issuance of DOD Directive 1403.03, which  established the policy for competency requirements and other  requirements for the management of the career life cycle of senior  executives. In addition, DOD Instruction 1400.25, issued in November  2008, established a competency-based approach to manage the life cycle of  senior executive personnel from accession through separation.
section_title: A Plan of Action Including Any Changes in the Number of Personnel Authorized
paragraphs: DOD’s update notes that the department has requested an increase in the  number of Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service personnel  allowed under section 1606a of title 10. Specifically, the update noted that  the department required an additional 100 allocations for Defense  Intelligence Senior Executive Service personnel in the following agencies:  Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,  Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Defense Security Service, and Office  of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Although the update  states that this change will allow critical mission requirements to be met,  we did not conduct a review of the department’s analysis to determine its  validity.
section_title: A Plan of Action Including Any Changes in the Rates or Methods of Pay
paragraphs: DOD’s update describes the finalization of a common Senior Executive  Service position tier structure, which creates a framework for  determining comparability in the management and compensation of  executive positions. The update also includes new sourcing methods to fill  positions within each tier using component talent management processes,  which includes identifying candidates across the department who, based  on annual talent reviews, have been identified as ready for an enterprise  senior executive position.
section_title: A Plan of Action Including Specific Steps DOD Has Taken or Plans to Take to Ensure Compliance with Section 129 of Title 10, United States Code
paragraphs: DOD’s update describes a DOD Instruction that is being developed that is  intended to address how DOD manages and allocates resources based on  mission requirements, workload, and prescribed performance objectives,  as prescribed by 10 U.S.C. §129. Specifically, section 129 of title 10 states  that the civilian personnel of DOD will be managed each fiscal year solely  on the basis of and consistent with (1) the workload required to carry out  the functions and activities of the department and (2) the funds made  available to the department for such fiscal year.
According to DOD’s update, the new instruction will explain the  manpower and resources that are allocated and managed to support the  strategic objectives, daily operation, and effective and economical  administration of the department. Further, where possible, measures of  performance will be established as indicators of mission accomplishment  and will be regularly monitored by management officials to ensure that  budgeted manpower reflects the minimum necessary to achieve program  objectives consistent with defense priorities. In addition, the instruction  will cover the flexibilities to manage to a requirement and the budget. The  update and DOD officials did not, however, give any indication as to when  this instruction will be completed.
section_title: DOD’s Update Partially Addresses Five of Nine Legislative Requirements
paragraphs: DOD’s 2008 update partially addresses the remaining five requirements of  the FY 2007 NDAA. As seen in table 3, these include an assessment of the  needs for, the capabilities of, and the gaps in the existing senior leader  workforce; and a plan of action that includes specific recruiting and  retention goals, along with specific strategies for developing, training,  deploying, compensating, motivating, and designing career paths and  career opportunities for the senior leader workforce.
subsections: section_title: Assessment of DOD’s Needs for Senior Leaders
paragraphs: DOD’s 2008 update notes that the department has not completely  addressed this requirement and has ongoing work to do so through a  baseline review of senior leadership positions. DOD officials said that the  latter will include an assessment of the needs for senior leaders. DOD’s  update does, however, identify leadership capabilities needed as part of an  overall assessment of the senior leader workforce and includes some  competencies developed to address the changing environment in which  DOD operates. Specifically, the update identifies the need for senior  leaders to assimilate quickly, possess language skills and cultural  awareness, understand interagency roles and responsibilities, and have an  enterprise-spanning perspective, including knowledge of joint matters and  network-centric concepts as new leadership capabilities.
section_title: Assessment of the Capability of the Senior Leader Workforce
paragraphs: The update acknowledges that work on this requirement is ongoing, and a  DOD Instruction has been drafted that will clarify, when completed, DOD’s  official policy on the development and sustainment of its senior leader  workforce. In addition, DOD officials have told us that the department  began conducting a baseline review of its senior leader workforce in April  2008, and this review is expected to provide an assessment of the  capability of existing executive talent. While work is ongoing, however,  DOD’s update provides projected trend data for the senior leader  workforce, including retirements and other attrition, projecting that  approximately 60 percent of DOD’s senior leader workforce will be  eligible to retire within the next 3 years.
section_title: Assessment of Gaps in the Existing or Projected Workforce
paragraphs: DOD’s update partially addresses this requirement, and the update  acknowledges that work on this requirement will be ongoing until the  summer of 2009. Specifically, the update states that DOD conducted initial  leadership competency assessments at the Senior Executive Service,  manager, and supervisor levels, in 2007, using OPM’s Web-based Federal  Competency Assessment Tool for Managers. The update noted that the  department identified competency gaps against DOD’s Executive Core  Qualifications in areas including: creativity, flexibility, strategic thinking,  vision, conflict management, and oral and written communications. In  addition, DOD’s subject-matter experts and senior leaders, through  qualitative assessments, identified the following gaps: (1) lack of critical  transformational leadership skills, (2) lack of enterprisewide approach to  managing the talent pipeline for DOD leaders, and (3) the shortfall of  excepted-service senior intelligence executives.
section_title: A Plan of Action Including Specific Recruiting and Retention Goals
paragraphs: DOD’s update partially addresses this requirement. For example, the  update identifies a 5-year goal for the number of employees in leadership  positions and contains projected trends in senior leader workforce gains,  accessions, total losses, and retirement over a 7-year period. In addition,  DOD is reviewing federal travel entitlements, benefits, and allowances to  promulgate policies that attract and retain senior leaders. For example,  DOD is reviewing Overseas Benefits Allowances to ensure the allowances  are attractive incentives for senior leaders. The update, however, does not  identify specific program goals to be achieved through such efforts. In  addition, although the update suggests that DOD has tracking measures  that relate to recruitment and retention, it does not link specific recruiting  and retention goals to program objectives.
section_title: A Plan of Action Including Specific Strategies for Developing, Training, Deploying, Compensating, Motivating, and Designing Career Paths and Career Opportunities
paragraphs: DOD’s update and the implementation of DOD Directive 1403.03 partially  address specific strategies for developing, training, deploying,  compensating, motivating, and designing career paths and opportunities,  which DOD officials stated are components of talent management and  succession planning. The update does not, however, address specific  strategies for deploying senior leaders.
Developing and Training. DOD has developed the Defense Senior  Leader Development Program (DSLDP), which is intended to provide  senior leaders with, among other things, targeted individual development,  professional military education, and defense-focused leadership seminars.  This program is available to a small percentage of the DOD workforce and  will replace the Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP).  According to DOD officials, DLAMP faced a number of problems, such as  lack of involvement of senior leadership in the career path or progression  of potential SES candidates, lack of interaction and camaraderie among  participants, and no plan for use of employees or progression after  graduation. These shortcomings were identified through participant  feedback and studies conducted by DOD.
Although the development of DSLDP seeks to address some of the  challenges that faced DLAMP, some components and defense agencies  have indicated they will not use DSLDP because they prefer using their  own component or agency programs, which they said are more focused on  the unique needs for their specific senior leaders.
In addition to DSLDP and other OSD-level leadership programs, the  components and defense agencies have other leadership development  programs, including but not limited to the Air Force’s Civilian Strategic  Leader Program, the Defense Information Systems Agency’s Enterprise  Leadership Development Program, and the Army Civilian University. For  more information on selected leadership development programs  throughout DOD, see appendix II.
Designing Career Path and Career Opportunities (Talent  Management and Succession Planning). With regard to talent  management and succession planning efforts, DOD officials stated that  OSD does not conduct departmentwide succession planning for DOD’s  senior leader workforce. Nevertheless, DOD issued Directive 1403.03 in  October 2007 establishing DOD policy to more effectively manage the  career life cycle of DOD’s Senior Executive Service leaders, which  specifically covers succession planning for senior executives in the service  components and defense agencies. DOD’s 2008 update to its civilian  human capital strategic plan states that succession planning efforts are  currently being developed.
Additionally, according to DOD officials, the executive management office  for talent management and succession planning, which was not  established until October 2008, will address these issues. This office will  provide guidance and tools for the departmentwide talent management  programs. For example, OSD is exploring the use of a talent management  system that will allow OSD and the components to centralize their talent  management efforts in accordance with DOD guidance. Specifically, this  guidance requires DOD and the components to coordinate such efforts for  the Senior Executive Service workforce. DOD officials noted that until this  office is fully operational they will be unable to completely address the  legislative requirements and this guidance.
Compensating and Motivating Senior Executives. In an effort to  address compensation for and motivation of its Senior Executive Service  workforce, DOD’s update notes that the department issued a directive-type  memorandum on April 28, 2008, establishing a common Tier Policy to help  ensure transparency and comparability in the management and  compensation of executive positions. Specifically, the DOD tier structure  is built upon the principle that DOD senior executive positions vary in  terms of effect on mission, level of complexity, span of control, inherent  authority, scope and breadth of responsibility, and influence in joint,  national security matters. Under the three-tier structure, DOD senior  executive positions will be sorted into three tiers based upon position  characteristics, with Tier 1 positions generally having less complexity and  effect on mission outcomes and Tier 3 positions having significant  complexity, effect on mission outcomes, or influence on joint, national  security matters. Responsible DOD officials told us that compensation  levels within the tier system are common throughout the department.
According to DOD officials, however, while the common Tier Policy  addresses compensation, the pay overlap of some General Schedule (GS)  15 employees and Senior Executive Service personnel could pose a  challenge to recruiting for the Senior Executive Service workforce.  Specifically, this overlap of pay, which involved DOD’s Senior Executive  Service, some GS-15 federal compensation, and some GS-15 compensation  with Washington, D.C., locality, is shown in figure 1.
Additionally, we have previously reported on other challenges related to  Senior Executive Service compensation regarding pay compression— which occurred when their pay reached the statutory cap.
section_title: DOD’s Recently Established Executive Management Office Does Not Have a Performance Plan to Articulate How the Legislative Requirements Will Be Addressed
paragraphs: OSD officials acknowledged that, while some work on the legislative  requirements and succession planning for its senior management  workforce had started, it was not complete, primarily because the newly  formed executive management office responsible for talent management,  succession planning, and other issues at the OSD level was not established  until October 2008. At the time of our review, these officials stated that  this new office, like the program management office, did not have and did  not plan to have a performance plan that included implementation goals  and time frames, performance measures, and activities that are aligned  with resources. As noted before, without such a plan, DOD and its  components may not be able to design and fund the best strategies to  address the legislative requirements and meet their workforce needs.
section_title: Although DOD Identified Some Factors That Could Affect Its Plan, the Update Does Not Include Strategies to Address These Factors
paragraphs: While DOD’s update identified a number of factors that could affect  civilian workforce plans, such as the effect of decisions made during  BRAC and the conversion of military positions to civilian positions, it  did not specifically incorporate strategies to address these factors.  Importantly, the department did not consider a factor we previously  identified—specifically, the department’s reliance on contractors and the  related human capital challenges associated with this reliance. For  example, we previously identified the need to develop a civilian workforce  strategy to address the extent of contractor use and the appropriate mix of  contractors. The greater reliance on contractors requires a critical mass of  civilian personnel with the expertise necessary to protect the  government’s interest and ensure effective oversight of contractor work.
Without considering contractors as a factor in strategic human capital  planning, DOD may not have the right number and appropriate mix of  federal civilian employees and contractors it needs to accomplish its  mission.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Update Identified Some Factors That Could Affect Its Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan
paragraphs: The update identified a number of factors that could affect the  department’s civilian human capital strategic plan. These included the  execution of 2005 BRAC-round activities; military-to-civilian position  conversions; and the “in-sourcing” requirement in the FY 2008 NDAA— that is, the requirement that certain positions be filled by federal civilian  employees rather than contractors. The update, however, did not provide  strategies for addressing these factors but stated that strategies were being  developed.
Specifically regarding BRAC, the update noted that the process has the  potential to affect how, when, and where positions are ultimately  realigned relative to their original location. It further noted that if  employees do not move, open positions and attrition could result, thus  increasing the recruiting needs of the department. We have previously  reported that implementing hundreds of BRAC actions by the statutory  deadline of September 15, 2011, will present a challenge for DOD to  realign about 123,000 military and civilian personnel to various  installations across the country.
The update also noted that the conversions of military positions to civilian  positions could also affect the department’s workforce projections. For  example, it stated that a key aspect of maintaining the nation’s “All- Volunteer” force was the use of DOD’s military members in only those  positions that are military-essential. It stated that since 2004, more than  55,000 military positions have been selected for conversion to civilian  status in areas such as healthcare administrators. It further noted that the  department needs to consider this potential increase in civilians as it plans  and implements its human capital strategies for future years.
Additionally, the update noted that the management of the civilian  workforce would also be affected by a new in-sourcing law—section 324  of the FY 2008 NDAA. The update mentioned that the department may  consider using government employees to perform, among other things, a  new mission requirement or an activity performed by a contractor when  an economic analysis shows DOD civilian employees are the low-cost  providers. The department further noted that the increased use of civilians  to accomplish such critical work will put greater demands on its civilian  human resources, policies, and practices.
We have previously reported a similar factor that has been a primary  challenge for DOD—the department’s increasing reliance on contractors.  GAO’s body of work has shown that DOD faces long-standing challenges  with increased reliance on contractors to perform core missions. These  challenges are accentuated in operations such as Iraq, where DOD has  lacked adequate numbers of personnel to provide oversight and  management of contractors.
Key to meeting this primary challenge is developing workforce strategies  that consider the extent to which contractors should be used and the  appropriate mix of contractor and federal personnel. In 2003, we  recommended that DOD develop a human capital strategic plan that  considers contractor roles and the mix of federal civilian and contractor  employees in these plans. DOD did not concur with this recommendation,  at the time, noting that the use of contractors was just another tool to  accomplish the department’s mission and was not a separate workforce  with separate needs to manage. However, we noted that strategic  planning for the civilian workforce should be undertaken in the context of  the “total force,” including contractors. The 2006 QDR and DOD’s 2008  update recognize contractors as part of DOD’s total workforce. We  continue to believe that, without strategies that address DOD’s reliance on  contractors—a key part of DOD’s workforce—the department may not  have the right people, in the right place, at the right time, and at a  reasonable cost to achieve its mission in the future.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: According to DOD’s projections, it is possible that the department could  be faced, within the next few years, with replacing over 300,000 civilian  employees. With the change in administration, the roles of these civilians  are of particular importance because of the institutional knowledge they  possess, as the military rotates, and as political appointees change. Also, it  becomes imperative that DOD strategically manage this workforce to  ensure resources are used effectively. While DOD has made good progress  in developing its civilian human capital strategic plan, the recent update  remains incomplete. For example, the update does not assess gaps in all of  the enterprisewide mission-critical occupations identified by DOD. Also  not included are strategies for addressing factors like BRAC and DOD’s  reliance on contractors. DOD’s human capital strategic plan may not be as  useful as it could be to ensure that DOD has the right number of people  with the right skills to accomplish the department’s mission. DOD is  moving forward in making operational the two management offices it  established in the fall of 2008—one to shape and monitor DOD’s updated  plans and the other to address, among other things, talent management  and succession planning for the senior leader workforce. However, this  progress comes without performance plans to help guide and gauge how  the department is achieving its objective, which we have previously  reported is a key element of a sound management approach.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To continue the progress DOD has made with its human capital strategic  planning efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to  take the following three actions:  task the newly established program management office, which is  responsible for addressing the requirements of the FY 2006 NDAA, to  develop a performance plan that includes establishing implementation  goals and time frames, measuring performance, and aligning activities with  resources;  task the newly established executive management office, which is  responsible for addressing the requirements of the FY 2007 NDAA, to  develop a performance plan that includes establishing implementation  goals and time frames, measuring performance, and aligning activities with  resources; and  incorporate, in future updates to its strategic human capital plan,  strategies for addressing factors that could significantly affect DOD’s  civilian workforce plans—including contractor roles and the effect  contractors have on requirements for DOD’s civilian workforce.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of our report, the Acting Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially concurred with our three  recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD  also provided technical comments on our draft report, which we  incorporated, as appropriate into the report.
In written comments, DOD stated that the department had made great  progress in its strategic human capital plan implementation—from its  institutionalization in the department’s philosophy to the actual conduct of  workforce forecasting and competency assessments. The comments  further stated that the department was disappointed that the complexity of  its undertaking and accomplishments were not fully acknowledged in our  report and trusted that this could be corrected in the final report. Our  review was structured to assess the extent to which DOD’s update  addressed the FY 2006 and FY 2007 NDAA requirements and key factors  that may affect civilian workforce planning. We note that our report  acknowledges that DOD has made progress in addressing the FY 2006  NDAA requirements when compared with its first strategic human capital  plan. Specifically, our report shows that the initial plan did not meet most  of the statutory requirements, while the update partially addressed each  requirement. We also noted some of DOD’s accomplishments—including  issuance of a DOD Instruction on strategic human capital management and  training of component representatives on the OPM forecasting tool.  However, our report also identified those areas where DOD has further  work to do to enhance its civilian human capital strategic plan.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the newly  established program management office, which is responsible for  addressing the requirements of the FY 2006 NDAA, develop a performance  plan that includes establishing implementation goals and time frames,  measuring performance, and aligning activities with resources. The  department noted that our report said DOD does not have and does not  plan to have a performance plan or road map for its newly formed civilian  workforce readiness program office and that this statement was not  correct. It further noted that, at the time of our review, the newly formed  program office was only a couple of months old and that the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy had required the new  office to develop both a performance plan and a road map—and that these  efforts were in progress. We disagree. To the contrary, DOD officials did  not provide any specific documentation from OUSD(P&R) or Civilian  Personnel Policy requiring the new office to develop such plans, when  asked about this plan. In fact, we were told that the department did not  have a performance plan and that the Civilian Personnel Policy office,  which had responsibility for the new program management office,  normally does not produce such documents. We were further told that,  essentially, any overall plan for the new office was scattered through  several documents—including position descriptions, budget requests, and  briefings to senior leadership. DOD also stated that, at the time of our  review, the establishment of the civilian readiness office was only a couple  of months old and its staffing was ongoing. We note however, that another  office, per DOD officials, had been addressing the FY 2006 NDAA  requirements and that DOD did not provide us with a performance plan for  that office either. After reviewing DOD’s comments, we asked for  additional documentation to support its statement that the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy had required the  development of a performance plan. DOD officials told us that while they  have drafted a performance plan, they were unable to provide a copy  because it is currently under review. In light of these circumstances, we  believe it is imperative that DOD have a performance plan that provides  additional guidance and measures to assess the extent to which the  program management office is addressing the requirements of the FY 2006  NDAA.
DOD also partially concurred with the recommendation to task the newly  established executive management office, which is responsible for  addressing the requirements of the FY 2007 NDAA, to develop a  performance plan that includes establishing implementation goals and  timeframes, measuring performance, and aligning activities with  resources. The department stated that, at the time of our review, the  executive management office was only a couple of months old. It further  noted that OUSD(P&R) and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  (Civilian Personnel Policy) had required the new office to develop both a  performance plan (which measures performance and aligns activities to  resources) and a road map (with implementation goals and timeframes).  The department also noted that development of these documents was in  progress. Again, DOD officials did not mention or provide GAO with any  specific documentation from OUSD(P&R) or Civilian Personnel Policy  requiring the new office to develop such plans. These actions, if  performed, appear consistent with the intent of our recommendation to  develop a performance plan that provides additional guidance and  measures to assess the extent to which the executive management office  is addressing the requirements of the FY 2007 NDAA.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to incorporate in  future updates to its strategic human capital plan, strategies for addressing  factors that could significantly affect DOD’s civilian workforce plans— including contractor roles and responsibilities and the effect the use of  contractors has on requirements for DOD’s civilian workforce. The  department stated that it has strategies in place to address recruitment  and retention needs arising from factors affecting the DOD workforce, and  that it will more closely align these strategies to the causal factors so the  linkage is clearly evident. We believe these actions, once implemented,  may meet the intent of our recommendations.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, this report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you  or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense’s (DOD)  2008 update to its civilian human capital strategic plan addresses the  statutory requirements established in section 1122 of the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (FY 2006 NDAA) and section 1102  of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (FY 2007  NDAA), we obtained and reviewed DOD’s May 2008 update. This  document was approximately 400 pages and was titled “Implementation  Report for the DOD Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan.” We developed  a checklist based on the FY 2006 NDAA and FY 2007 NDAA legislative  requirements, which enabled us to compare the requirements to DOD’s  updated plan. Two analysts independently assessed the DOD update using  the checklist and assigned a rating to each of the elements from one of  three potential ratings: “addresses,” “partially addresses,” or “does not  address.” According to our methodology, a rating of “addresses” was  assigned if all elements of a legislative requirement were cited, even if  specificity and details could be improved upon. Within our designation of  “partially addresses,” there was a wide variation between an assessment or  plan of action that includes most of the elements of a legislative  requirement and an assessment or plan of action that includes few of the  elements of a legislative requirement. A rating of “does not address” was  assigned when elements of a characteristic were not explicitly cited or  discussed or any implicit references were either too vague or too general  to be useful. Independent assessments between the two analysts were in  agreement in the majority of the cases. When different initial ratings were  given by the two analysts, they met to discuss and resolve differences in  their respective checklist analyses and a senior analyst validated the  results. On the basis of those discussions a consolidated final checklist  was developed for both of the NDAAs.
We did not assess the reliability of the data in DOD’s workforce  assessments and gap analyses; however, we have previously reported  information on the workforce forecasting system used by DOD. In  addition, we interviewed officials at the Office of Personnel Management  (OPM) to obtain updated information on the workforce forecasting  systems DOD used to assess its civilian workforce and ascertained that the  data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. We also  interviewed officials in DOD offices for Civilian Personnel Policy (CPP),  the Civilian Personnel Management Service, the Army, the Air Force, the  Navy, the Defense Information Systems Agency, and the Defense Logistics  Agency about the update and ongoing human capital efforts within DOD.  We also discussed DOD’s ongoing efforts to establish a program  management office that is responsible for, among other things, monitoring  and reviewing overall civilian workforce trends, competency assessments,  and gap analyses. Additionally, we talked with officials responsible for  standing up the separate talent management offices within the  components and defense agencies. These offices will coordinate talent  management efforts with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To  determine DOD’s succession planning efforts for its Senior Executive  Service workforce, we analyzed applicable documents related to DOD’s  current efforts, along with our prior work on DOD’s human capital  planning efforts for senior executives. We also interviewed officials in  DOD’s offices for CPP, the individual services, and the components about  these matters. Among other things, we discussed the department’s efforts  to establish an executive management office for talent management and  succession planning at the OSD level.
Finally, we identified and reviewed factors that may affect DOD’s civilian  workforce planning such as those that DOD identified in its update. We  also analyzed prior GAO reports examining other human capital  challenges within DOD related to the department’s reliance on contractors  and discussed these matters with DOD and service officials. We conducted  this performance audit from February 2008 to February 2009, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Examples of DOD’s and the Components’ Senior Leader Development and Training Programs
subsections: section_title: DOD Programs
paragraphs: In 1997, in response to recommendations from the Commission on Roles  and Missions of the Armed Forces, the Department of Defense (DOD)  created its Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP). This  is a program aimed at preparing civilian employees for key leadership  positions throughout the department. DOD refers to DLAMP as a  systematic program of “joint” civilian leader training, education, and  development that provides the framework for developing civilians with a  DOD-wide capability, substantive knowledge of the national security  mission, and strong leadership and management skills.
Between 1997 and 2006, 1,894 participants were admitted to DLAMP, of  which 1,132 completed senior-level professional military education, 480  graduated, 470 remained in the program, and 187 were selected for Senior  Executive Service positions. Based on feedback from the components and  program participants, DOD made modifications to the program and  decided to end DLAMP in its current form in 2010. The modifications to  DLAMP resulted in it being transitioned into a new program called  Defense Senior Leader Development Program (DSLDP).
The modified approach in DSLDP focuses on developing senior civilian  leaders to excel in the 21st century’s joint, interagency, and multinational  environment. DSLDP supports the governmentwide effort to foster  interagency cooperation and information sharing by providing  opportunities to understand and experience, first-hand, the issues and  challenges facing leaders across DOD and the broader national security  arena.
Table 4 shows the differences between DOD’s DLAMP and DSLDP  programs. For example, DLAMP was a self-paced program and DSLDP  uses a cohort-based approach.
In addition to DLAMP, DOD has revamped its Executive Leadership  Development Program (ELDP), another program at the Office of the  Secretary of Defense level designed to develop a pipeline of high-potential  future leaders. The ELDP is a 10-month program for GS-12- to GS-14- equivalent civilian personnel. According to DOD, ELDP provides  participants with exposure to roles and missions of the entire department  and fosters an increasing understanding of today’s warfighter.
section_title: Component-Specific Programs
paragraphs: Some of the individual components and fourth estate agencies have their  own senior leader development programs, which are comparable to  DLAMP and DSLDP. Below is a sample of the additional programs  available to DOD civilians:    The Air Force’s Civilian Strategic Leader Program (CSLP), which is  designed to provide senior civilian leaders the career management and  development necessary to put them on par with similar general officers in  the Air Force. The intent of the CSLP process is to build a corps of civilian  personnel within the Air Force that have the potential to progress into the  Senior Executive Service.
The Defense Information Security Agency’s (DISA) Enterprise Leadership  Development Program provides leadership development and training to its  senior executives. The program focuses on its GS-13 to GS-15 civilian  employees with leadership potential. DISA also has a program called the  Emerging Leaders Program, which focuses on GS-9 through GS-12 civilian  employees.
The Army Civilian University has been established to oversee and fully  integrate an enterprise approach to education for civilians in support of  the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The university  uses an integrated and TRADOC-complementary curriculum with a more  standardized, competency-based approach to civilian education, training  and leader development initiatives. The Army has also established the  Army Senior Fellows Program to build a bench of future Army senior  executives who are innovative, adaptive, interchangeable civilian leaders.  This program is designed to (1) identify high-potential GS-14 and GS-15  employees through an Army Secretariat Board selection and (2) provide  the employees with executive experience assignments and educational  opportunities.
The Defense Logistics Agency launched a new Enterprise Leader  Development Program in fiscal year 2007 for supervisors and managers  who hold critical leadership positions. The objective of this program is to  increase participants’ proficiency in six critical leadership competencies:  integrity/honesty, leading people, external awareness, strategic thinking,  executive-level communication, and human capital management.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on specific sections in the Department  of Defense’s (DOD) letter sent on January 23, 2009. The specific sections  are entitled, “The following additional comments are provided regarding  the GAO report” and “DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GENERAL  COMMENTS.”  1.  DOD states that contractor issues were not a part of our interviews  and fact finding for this review. However, as identified in the DOD  notification letter, other challenges and emerging issues facing DOD’s  Senior Executive Service (SES) workforce in the human capital area  was a key question included in this review. Our approach included  reviewing our prior work, analyzing DOD’s update, interviewing OSD  and component officials about these issues, and discussing our  potential findings with them. These officials noted that contractor  reliance was a major challenge for the department, and we noted that  the DOD 2008 update did not mention this as one of the challenges  and, thus, did not provide a strategy. As noted in our report we  assessed the extent to which the update addressed key factors like the  reliance on contractors.  2.  DOD states that our report mentions the need for increased contract  oversight and that this issue, again, was not part of our interviews or  fact-finding. See comment 1.  3.  DOD stated that our review was bifurcated between an independent  GAO review of the defense acquisition workforce section and a review  of the remaining part of the update to DOD’s plan. This is not correct.  This review focused on how DOD’s 2008 update submitted to Congress  addressed the Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 and 2007 National Defense  Authorization Act (NDAA) and key factors that could affect civilian  human capital planning. According to section 851 of the FY 2008  NDAA, DOD was required to include a section on the defense  acquisition workforce planning efforts in its 2008 update, but it did not.  This review focused on DOD’s 2008 update. A separate GAO review is  looking at, among other things, the defense acquisition workforce  requirements in the FY 2008 NDAA.  4.  DOD stated that we did not address the department’s efforts to  institutionalize strategic human capital management planning. We  disagree. As we state in the report, the objectives for our review were  to assess the extent to which DOD’s update addressed the FY 2006 and  FY 2007 NDAA requirements and key factors that may affect civilian  workforce planning and our report was, therefore, structured  accordingly. Our report did, however, note some of DOD’s efforts— including issuance of a DOD Instruction on Strategic Human Capital  Management and training for component representatives on the Office  of Personnel Management’s forecasting tool.  5.  DOD’s comments provided a list of institutionalized efforts that  included issuance of a DOD Strategic Human Capital Management  instruction. This information is referenced in our report.  6.  DOD’s comments provided a list of institutionalized efforts that  mentioned training of component representatives on the Office of  Personnel Management forecasting tool. This information is  referenced in our report.  7.  DOD’s comments provided a list of institutionalized efforts that  mentioned formulation, submission, and authorization of a budget for  the strategic human capital management program office. We added  some of this information to our report.  8.  DOD’s comments noted that our report said that more than 50 percent  of the DOD civilian workforce is eligible to retire in the next few years  and noted that this statement was correct but misleading because the  figure included optional and early retirement. We have revised our  report accordingly.  9.  DOD’s comments said that our assertion that the department’s  forecasting was for a 7-year period and not a 10-year period is correct;  however, the department believes that a 7-year forecast is valid and  should be acceptable because it mirrors DOD’s budget planning cycle.  We provided DOD’s perspective in our report but note that the FY 2006  NDAA requires a 10-year forecast.  10. The department noted that our report said DOD does not have and  does not plan to have a performance plan or road map for its newly  formed civilian workforce readiness program office and that this  statement was not correct. It further noted that, at the time of our  review, the newly formed program office was only a couple of months  old, its staffing was still in progress, and there would definitely be both  a performance plan and a road map for the office. The department  stated that these were just not complete at the time of the GAO  engagement. We disagree. To the contrary, DOD did not provide us  with any specific documentation that a performance plan was in  progress during our review. In fact, we were told that the department  did not have a performance plan and the Civilian Personnel Policy  office, which has responsibility for the new program management  office, normally does not produce such documents. We were further  told that, essentially, any overall plan for the new office was scattered  through several documents—including position descriptions, budget  requests, and briefings to senior leadership.  11. DOD stated that our report discussed DOD’s mix of contractors and  civilians and this was not discussed during our interviews. We  disagree. See comment 1.  12. DOD’s comments state that our report discussed the department’s  reliance on contractors and this was not raised in discussions with  DOD. We disagree. See comment 1.  13. DOD’s comments assert that our report incorrectly states that the  department did forecasting only for eleven mission-critical  occupations and this was not correct. We have revised the report  accordingly.  14. DOD states that our report indicates that the department did a gap  analysis for about half of its 25 enterprisewide mission-critical  occupations, but it was not clear to what gap analyses this was  referring. It further noted that, if the report was referring to a  competency gap assessment, it was misleading and noted that the  update had discussed competency assessments on pages 2-15 through  2-25 of its update. We note that our report states that 11 gap  assessments were done with the forecasting tool---10 of which DOD  identified as “steady state” and one with an actual gap. We further  noted that the update also discussed other gap assessments for six  enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. We note that only one of  these was not previously identified as one of the 11 mission-critical  occupations with gap assessments—this was the computer science  mission-critical occupation. We also clarified that competency gap  assessments were done at the component levels and provided  examples in the body of our report.  15. DOD states that our report indicates DOD’s update partially addressed  a plan of action to develop and reshape the civilian workforce and note  that while its recruitment, retention and development activities did not  focus solely on its mission-critical occupations, the strategies are  widespread and cover most of the department’s occupations. We note,  however, that the law required the plan to address identified gaps in its  “critical” skills and competencies or what DOD has identified as  enterprisewide mission-critical occupations.  16. While DOD acknowledged our report correctly stated that its update  contained appendixes on 12 mission-critical occupations, it believed  that we did not reflect the totality of the Departments efforts because  the acquisition workforce section was not considered in the GAO  assessment. As stated in comment 3, information from the section on  defense acquisition workforce planning was not included in our report  because it was not completed during the course of our review.  17. DOD’s comments stated that the acquisition community had  conducted a human capital analysis and undertaken initiatives to  strengthen this workforce and these should be included in the GAO  report. We disagree. See comment 3.  18. DOD stated that chapter 3 of its update addressed recruitment and  development strategies to meet DOD civilian workforce needs—noting  that strategies were key to ensuring the successful conversion of  military positions to civilians and readying a supply of candidates to  meet in-sourcing requirements. Accordingly, the department noted that  it believed it indeed had strategies in place to address emergent  recruitment needs. We note however that the introduction and  executive summary of the update noted several factors we discussed  as challenges and stated that strategies, at the time of our review, were  being developed—and, as stated previously, contractor reliance was  not identified as a challenge in the update.
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact name above, Marion Gatling, Assistant Director;  Andrew Curry; Michael Hanson; Mae Jones; Amber Lopez; Lonnie  McAllister; Brian Pegram; Charlie Perdue; Terry Richardson; and Nicole  Volchko made major contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
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Ensuring a Continuing Focus on Implementing Effective Human  Capital Strategies. GAO-09-234CG. Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2008.
Results-Oriented Management: Opportunities Exist for Refining the  Oversight and Implementation of the Senior Executive Performance- Based Pay System. GAO-09-82. Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2008.
Department of Homeland Security: A Strategic Approach Is Needed to  Better Ensure the Acquisition Workforce Can Meet Mission Needs.  GAO-09-30. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2008.
Human Capital: DOD Needs to Improve Implementation of and Address  Employee Concerns about Its National Security Personnel System.  GAO-08-773. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2008.
Human Capital: Selected Agencies Have Implemented Key Features of  Their Senior Executive Performance-Based Pay Systems, but  Refinements Are Needed. GAO-08-1019T. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2008.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Human Capital Planning  Has Improved, but Strategic View of Contractor Workforce Is Needed.  GAO-08-582. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2008.
Human Capital: Workforce Diversity Governmentwide and at the  Department of Homeland Security. GAO-08-815T. Washington, D.C.: May  21, 2008.
Human Capital: Transforming Federal Recruiting and Hiring Efforts.  GAO-08-762T. Washington, D.C. May 8, 2008.
Human Capital: Corps of Engineers Needs to Update Its Workforce  Planning Process to More Effectively Address Its Current and Future  Workforce Needs. GAO-08-596. Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2008.
Older Workers: Federal Agencies Face Challenges, but Have  Opportunities to Hire and Retain Experienced Employees. GAO-08-630T.  Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2008.
Human Capital: Diversity in the Federal SES and Senior Levels of the  U.S. Postal Service and Processes for Selecting New Executives.  GAO-08-609T. Washington, D.C.: April 3, 2008.
Defense Contracting: Army Case Study Delineates Concerns with Use of  Contractors as Contract Specialists. GAO-08-360. Washington, D.C.:  March 26, 2008.
The Department of Defense’s Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan  Does Not Meet Most Statutory Requirements. GAO-08-439R. Washington,  D.C.: February 6, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Increased Reliance on Service Contractors  Exacerbates Long-standing Challenges. GAO-08-621T. Washington, D.C.:  January 23, 2008.
Federal Acquisition: Oversight Plan Needed to Help Implement  Acquisition Advisory Panel Recommendations. GAO-08-160. Washington,  D.C.: December 20, 2007.
DOD Civilian Personnel: Medical Policies for Deployed DOD Federal  Civilians and Associated Compensation for Those Deployed.  GAO-07-1235T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.
Human Capital: DOD Needs Better Internal Controls and Visibility over  Costs for Implementing Its National Security Personnel System.  GAO-07-851. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2007.
Human Capital: Retirements and Anticipated New Reactor Applications  Will Challenge NRC’s Workforce. GAO-07-105. Washington, D.C.: January  17, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Tailored Approach Needed to Improve Service  Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-07-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2006.
Human Capital: DOD’s National Security Personnel System Faces  Implementation Challenges. GAO-05-730. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005.
Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed DOD National  Security Personnel System Regulations. GAO-05-432T. Washington, D.C.:  March 15, 2005.
DOD Civilian Personnel: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce Plans  Needed. GAO-04-753. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and  Development Efforts in the Federal Government. GAO-04-546G.  Washington, D.C.: March, 2004.
Information Technology Management: Governmentwide Strategic  Planning, Performance Measurement, and Investment Management Can  Be Further Improved. GAO-04-49. Washington, D.C.: January 12, 2004.
Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce  Planning. GAO-04-39. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2003.
Human Capital: Insights for U.S. Agencies from Other Countries’  Succession Planning and Management Initiatives. GAO-03-914.  Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2003.
DOD Personnel: Documentation of the Army’s Civilian Workforce- Planning Model Needed to Enhance Credibility. GAO-03-1046.  Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2003.
DOD Personnel: DOD Comments on GAO’s Report on DOD’s Civilian  Human Capital Strategic Planning. GAO-03-690R. Washington, D.C.:  April 18, 2003.