Mass Transit: Bus Rapid Transit Shows Promise
Published: 2001-09-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: To make buses a more reliable and effective high-speed transit alternative, a new concept-- Bus Rapid Transit--proposes (1) running buses on highways exclusively for them or on HOV lanes or (2) improving service on busier routes on city streets. Federal support for Bus Rapid Transit projects may come from several different sources, including the Federal Transit Administration's New Starts, Bus Capital, and Urbanized Area Formula Grants programs, but its use is constrained. Two Bus Rapid Transit projects have received about $831 million in funding commitments from the current New Starts Program. Few additional Bus Rapid Transit projects will likely receive funding commitments under the current New Starts Program, which expires in 2003, because few Bus Rapid Transit projects are ready to compete for funding; many projects are eligible to compete for the $462 million that is projected to remain available for fiscal year 2003; and some types of Bus Rapid Transit projects are ineligible for New Starts funding because projects are required to operate on separate right-of-ways for the exclusive use of mass transit and high-occupancy vehicles. The Bus Rapid Transit systems generally had lower capital costs per mile than did the Light Rail systems in the cities GAO reviewed, although neither system had a clear advantage in operating costs. Precise operating cost comparisons for Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail systems within and between cities are difficult because of differences among transit agencies, transit systems, and how they account for costs. The performance characteristics also varied widely, with the largest Bus Rapid Transit system ridership about equal to the largest Light Rail ridership. Each program offers various advantages and disadvantages. Bus Rapid Transit provides a more flexible approach than light rail because buses can be routed to eliminate transfers; buses can operate on busways, HOV lanes, and city arterial streets; and the Bus Rapid Transit concept can be implemented in stages. However, transit officials repeatedly said that buses have a poor public image.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Each day millions of Americans face traffic congestion as they commute to  work in automobiles.  The impact from this congestion is substantial in  time, resources, and pollution. For example, it is estimated that in 68 urban  areas congestion cost U.S. travelers 4.5 billion hours of delay, 6.8 billion  gallons of wasted fuel, and $78 billion in 1999.  In an attempt to present  buses as a more reliable and effective high-speed transit alternative, a  concept involving the improved use of buses--Bus Rapid Transit--has  emerged.  Bus Rapid Transit includes operating buses on exclusive bus  highways, High-Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes, or improving service on  busier routes on city streets.  Bus Rapid Transit may also include a variety  of technological and street design improvements, including traffic signal  prioritization for buses; exclusive lanes; better stations or bus shelters;  fewer stops; faster service; and cleaner, quieter, and more attractive  vehicles.
Bus Rapid Transit as a comprehensive transportation option is exemplified  in Curitiba, Brazil.  Curitiba’s Bus Rapid Transit system is an extensive  commuter bus system that includes exclusive busways and a number of  other features designed to increase speed, such as traffic signal  prioritization, rail-like stations with level-floor boarding, and advance fare  collection.  In the United States at least 17 cities are planning to  incorporate aspects of Bus Rapid Transit.  The Department of  Transportation’s Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has begun to  support this concept and expand awareness of new ways to design and  operate high capacity Bus Rapid Transit systems as an alternative to  building Light Rail systems.  Light Rail systems generally are electric trains  that may operate on streets with other traffic.
You asked us to (1) examine the federal role in supporting Bus Rapid  Transit; (2) compare the capital costs, operating costs, and performance  characteristics of Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail systems; and (3)  describe the other advantages and disadvantages of Bus Rapid Transit and  Light Rail.
To address these questions, we identified where Bus Rapid Transit is being  used extensively in the United States and determined how FTA supports  Bus Rapid Transit projects.  In addition, we visited transit agencies in  Dallas, Denver, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, San Diego, and San Jose to obtain  capital and operating cost information on Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail  systems in those cities.  We also interviewed FTA officials and industry  experts to identify the advantages and disadvantages of Bus Rapid Transit  and Light Rail systems.  Appendix I provides a detailed discussion of our  scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Bus Rapid Transit involves coordinated improvements in a transit system’s  infrastructure, equipment, operations, and technology that give preferential  treatment to buses on urban roadways.  Bus Rapid Transit is not a single  type of transit system; rather it encompasses a variety of approaches,  including buses using exclusive busways or HOV lanes with other vehicles,  and improving bus service on city arterial streets.  Busways--special  roadways designed for the exclusive use of buses--can be totally separate  roadways or operate within highway rights-of-way separated from other  traffic by barriers.  Busways currently exist in Pittsburgh, Miami, and  Charlotte.  Buses on HOV lanes operate on limited-access highways  designed for long-distance commuters.  Dallas, Denver, Houston, Los  Angeles, and Seattle provide examples of extensive HOV lane use by  buses.  Bus Rapid Transit on busways or HOV lanes is sometimes  characterized by the addition of extensive park and ride facilities along  with entrance and exit access for these lanes.  Bus Rapid Transit systems  using arterial streets may include lanes reserved for the exclusive use of  buses and street enhancements that speed buses and improve service.  Los  Angeles recently instituted a Bus Rapid Transit type of service on two bus  arterial corridors.
Bus Rapid Transit may also include any of the following features:  Traffic signal priority.  Buses receiving an early or extended green light  at intersections reduce travel time--in Los Angeles, for example, by as  much as 10 percent.
Boarding and fare collection improvements.  Convenient and rapid fare  collection through prepaid or electronic passes and low-floor and/or  wide-door boarding results in timesavings.
Limited stops.  Increasing distances between stations or shelters  improves operating speeds.
Improved stations and shelters.  Bus terminals and unique stations or  shelters differentiate Bus Rapid Transit service from standard bus  service.  (See fig. 2.)
Intelligent Transportation System technologies.  Advanced technology  can maintain more consistent distances between buses and inform  passengers when the next bus is arriving.
Cleaner and quieter vehicles.  Improved diesel buses and buses using  alternative-fuels are cleaner than traditional diesel buses.
Exclusive Lanes.  Traffic lanes reserved for the exclusive use of buses  help buses pass congested traffic.
Light Rail transit is a metropolitan-electric railway system characterized by  its ability to operate in a variety of environments such as streets, subways,  or elevated structures.  (See fig. 3 for an example of a Light Rail System.)   Since Light Rail systems can operate on streets with other traffic, they  typically use an overhead source for their electrical power and boardings  take place from the street or platforms.  According to a transportation  consultant, because Light Rail systems operate in both exclusive and  shared right-of-way environments, they have stricter limits on their length  and the frequency of service than heavy rail systems.
Light Rail systems gained popularity as a lower-cost option to heavy rail  systems, and a number of cities have constructed Light Rail projects over  the past 20 years.  Since 1980, Light Rail systems have opened in 13  metropolitan areas:  Baltimore, Buffalo, Dallas, Denver, Northern New  Jersey (Hudson and Bergen counties), Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, Portland,  Sacramento, San Diego, San Jose, St. Louis, and Salt Lake City.  Several  other cities, including Minneapolis and Seattle, are in the process of  planning Light Rail systems.
section_title: Federal Funding Available for Bus Rapid Transit Projects, but Use Is Constrained
paragraphs: While there is no federal program specifically designed to fund Bus Rapid  Transit, several FTA programs can be used to help fund these projects.  FTA  provides funding for new Bus Rapid Transit projects primarily through its  New Starts Program but eligible projects face stiff competition from Light  Rail, Heavy Rail, and Commuter Rail projects.  Funding for additional New  Starts projects of all types is constrained--FTA projects little remaining  authority to make funding commitments to new projects and the  Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) identified a large  number of projects eligible for funding under the program.  In addition to  the New Starts Program, transit agencies may use other FTA funds, such as  those from the Bus Capital Program and the Urbanized Area Formula Grant  Program, to fund Bus Rapid Transit projects.  However, the Bus Capital  Program grants tend to be relatively small, thus limiting this program as a  significant contributor to large projects.  In addition, some Bus Rapid  Transit projects may qualify for certain types of federal highway funding,  notably Surface Transportation Program and Congestion Mitigation and Air  Quality Improvement funds administered through the Federal Highway  Administration.  Since these funds are provided to state governments, local  transit agencies must compete with many other state needs for these funds.   In addition to providing capital funding, FTA began a demonstration  program in 1999 to highlight the benefits of Bus Rapid Transit.  Under this  program, FTA awarded $50,000 grants to 10 transit agencies to share  information and data on new Bus Rapid Transit projects.  The program  provides workshops and information-sharing opportunities for the transit  agencies, but no capital funding.  The grantees’ projects include a wide  variety of busways, arterial bus lanes, and bus technologies.
subsections: section_title: New Starts Funding Provided to Few Bus Rapid Transit Projects
paragraphs: FTA’s New Starts Program is the primary federal program to support  construction of new transit systems and extensions to existing systems.   Projects for bus and rail systems that operate on exclusive rights-of-way  compete for FTA grants of up to 80 percent of their costs.  To obtain funds,  a project must progress through a local or regional review of alternatives,  develop preliminary engineering plans, and meet FTA approval of final  design.  FTA proposes New Starts projects to the Congress for funding on  an annual basis based on an evaluation of their technical merits, including  mobility improvements and cost effectiveness, and the stability of the local  financial commitment.  In making its funding proposal each year, FTA gives  preference to projects with existing grant agreements.  Following that,  consideration is given to projects with overall ratings of “recommended” or  “highly recommended” under the evaluation criteria.  The Transportation  Equity Act for the 21st Century authorized about $6 billion in “guaranteed”  funding over 6 years for New Starts transit projects.
Bus Rapid Transit projects compete with many other projects for New  Starts funding, including Light Rail, Heavy Rail, and Commuter Railroads.   In total there are over 200 projects in various stages of development.  As  shown in table 2, for the 26 projects with Full Funding Grant Agreements in  fiscal year 2001, two projects with Bus Rapid Transit components have  commitments of about $831 million in New Starts funds.  The total New  Starts commitment for these 26 projects is about $8.3 billion, which  includes $4.67 billion for Light Rail, $2.69 billion for Heavy Rail, and $111  million for Commuter Rail projects.
For a number of reasons, few Bus Rapid Transit projects are likely to be  considered for New Starts funding in the final year of the period covered by  TEA-21.  First, few Bus Rapid Transit projects are ready for funding  consideration.  Only 1 of the 11 projects with pending grant agreements or  in the final design stage is a Bus Rapid Transit project.  Further, of the 31  projects in the preliminary engineering stage that have proposed about $8.3  billion in support from the New Starts program, only 6 Bus Rapid Transit  projects proposing about $490 million are included.  Reasons for the  relatively few projects being ready for funding consideration include the  newness of the Bus Rapid Transit concept and the decisions of local transit  agencies, which are responsible for conducting analyses of various  alternatives and proposing projects for funding.  Second, FTA’s authority to  make new funding commitments for projects of any type will be highly  limited through 2003 if FTA makes the funding commitments proposed in  its fiscal year 2002 New Starts report and funding request.  It projects about  $462 million in remaining commitment authority for the last year of the  current program.  Lastly, some Bus Rapid Transit projects are not eligible  for New Starts funding because projects must operate on separate rights- of-way for the exclusive use of mass transit and high-occupancy vehicles.   While some Bus Rapid Transit projects, such as busways, would fit this  requirement, some would not.  For example, the Wilshire-Whittier Bus  Rapid Transit Service in Los Angeles operates on city streets in mixed  traffic; it is not, therefore, on a separate right-of-way.
section_title: Agencies Can Use Other Federal Funds for Bus Rapid Transit Projects
paragraphs: Local transit agencies may use other types of federal funds, in addition to  New Starts funds, to build Bus Rapid Transit and other systems.  For  example, transit agencies can apply funds obtained through FTA’s  Urbanized Area Formula Grant program to Bus Rapid Transit and rail  projects.  This program provides capital and operating assistance to  urbanized areas with populations of more than 50,000.  However, areas  with populations over 200,000 may only use the funds for capital  improvements.  For example, in fiscal year 2001, one Bus Rapid Transit  project, Boston’s Silver Line project, planned to use $150 million from the  formula grant program, about $331 million from the New Starts Program,  and $120 million in Massachusetts state bond funds.  In addition, one  commuter rail, one heavy rail, and six Light Rail projects planned to use  about $629 million in formula grant funds, in addition to New Starts funds,  as part of their overall funding.
An additional potential source for bus system improvements is the Bus  Capital Program, which provides funds to states and local transit agencies  for bus improvements.  This program is characterized by a large number of  relatively small grants.  For example, for fiscal year 2001 the Congress  appropriated about $574.1 million for 314 grants, ranging from $39,000 to  $15.5 million; the largest amounts typically were provided for statewide bus  grants.  While these funds can be combined with funds from other  programs, such as New Starts, they are generally not sufficient to fund a  major Bus Rapid Transit project alone.
Bus Rapid Transit and other transit projects can qualify for certain types of  federal highway funds administered by the Federal Highway  Administration.  For example, transit agencies have used Surface  Transportation Program and Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality  Improvement funds to help pay for transit projects.  Neither of the two Bus  Rapid Transit projects with Full Funding Grant Agreements in fiscal year  2001 planned to use federal highway funds.  Six of the Light Rail projects  with Full Funding Grant Agreements plan to use about $171 million in  federal highway funds.  The South Miami-Dade Busway Extension project  in Final Design plans to use about $39 million in these funds.
section_title: FTA Supports Bus Rapid Transit Concept Through Demonstration Program
paragraphs: From FTA’s perspective, Bus Rapid Transit is a step toward developing  public transit systems that have the performance and appeal of Light Rail  transit, but at a lower capital cost.  FTA contends that using technological  advancements will allow buses to operate with the speed, reliability, and  efficiency of Light Rail.  FTA promotes the Bus Rapid Transit concept with  the slogan “think rail, use buses.”
In 1999, the FTA initiated a demonstration program to generate familiarity  and interest in Bus Rapid Transit.  The goal of the program was to promote  improved bus service similar to model systems in Curitiba, Brazil; Adelaide,  Australia; and Ottawa, Canada, as an alternative to more capital-intensive  rail projects.  The program initially provided $50,000 to 10 transit agencies  to share information and data on new Bus Rapid Transit projects.  FTA  wanted the Bus Rapid Transit program to show how using technological  advancements and improving the image of buses would allow buses to  increase ridership and operate with the speed, reliability, and efficiency of  Light Rail.  The grantees in the demonstration program may be eligible for  federal capital funds such as New Starts, Bus Capital, and Urbanized Area  Formula Grant funds.  FTA has held workshops for consortium members  focusing on developing Bus Rapid Transit's component features, such as  vehicles, image, marketing, fare collection, and traffic operations.  (See fig.  4.)
Some locations participating in the demonstration program have more  extensive elements of a Bus Rapid Transit system than others.  For  example, Miami and Charlotte have busways for the exclusive use of buses,  while San Jose is implementing technological and service improvements  such as signal prioritization on a high-ridership HOV lane arterial corridor.   In Eugene, plans are to purchase buses that will have a train-like  appearance and operate on special bus lanes (see fig. 5).  In Cleveland, an  extensive Bus Rapid Transit project is planned that involves the extensive  reconstruction of Euclid Avenue, including signal prioritization, bus station  structures, and reconstruction of the sidewalks along the corridor.  Table 3  illustrates the variations in the Bus Rapid Transit concept among the 10  initial demonstration projects.
FTA plans to conduct evaluations of each project participating in the  demonstration program after the projects are implemented.  FTA also plans  to evaluate Pittsburgh’s Bus Rapid Transit project.  Through these  evaluations, FTA wants to determine the most effective Bus Rapid Transit  elements so that other transit agencies can model similar systems.  The  Department of Transportation’s Volpe Center will conduct the first  evaluation on Honolulu’s CityExpress! bus program.  FTA does not plan to  include all the consortium members' projects in the evaluation.
section_title: Capital Costs Appear to Favor Bus Rapid Transit, While Results Are Mixed for Operating Costs
paragraphs: Bus Rapid Transit capital costs were generally lower than Light Rail capital  costs in the cities we reviewed, when compared on a cost-per-mile basis.   We found mixed results when we compared the operating costs of Bus  Rapid Transit and Light Rail systems.  In examining performance  characteristics, we found that the ridership and operating speeds of Bus  Rapid Transit and Light Rail systems were similar in many respects.
subsections: section_title: Bus Rapid Transit Capital Costs Per Mile Generally Lower Than Light Rail
paragraphs: The Bus Rapid Transit projects that we reviewed cost less on average to  build than the Light Rail projects, on a per-mile basis.  As shown in figure 6,  Bus Rapid Transit capital costs averaged about $13.5 million per mile for  busways, $9.0 million per mile for buses on HOV lanes, and $680,000 per  mile on city streets, when escalated to 2000 dollars.  For 13 cities that  built Light Rail lines, since 1980, capital costs averaged about $34.8 million  per mile, ranging from $12.4 million to $118.8 million per mile, when  escalated to 2000 dollars.  On a capital cost per-mile basis, the three  different types of Bus Rapid Transit systems have average capital cost that  are 39 percent, 26 percent, and 2 percent of the average cost of Light Rail  systems we reviewed.
Bus Rapid Transit capital costs vary considerably, depending on the type of  system built.  Costs of Bus Rapid Transit projects include the cost of the  roadway—busways or bus lanes, station structures, park-and-ride facilities,  communications and improved traffic signal systems, and vehicles, if  additional or special buses are needed for the project.  Given the variety of  ways in which Bus Rapid Transit may be designed, we classified the  systems into three broad categories: busways, bus-HOV lanes, and Bus  Rapid Transit on arterial streets. Appendixes III and IV provide information  on the Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail systems that we analyzed.
Exclusive busways, which are essentially separate highways for buses,  generally had the highest capital cost per mile for those systems we  analyzed, averaging $13.5 million per mile in 2000 dollars.  The capital costs  of nine busways in four cities ranged from $7 million to $55 million per  mile.  The most expensive one was the Pittsburgh West Busway, which  cost significantly more than other busways we analyzed.  However,  according to local transit agency officials, they needed to construct only 5  miles of busway to achieve their goal of rapid transit to the airport because  the buses could exit the busway and use existing highways.  They added  that an alternative Light Rail system would have been longer, cost two to  three times as much to construct and significantly more to operate and  maintain, while attracting essentially no additional passengers.
Other types of Bus Rapid Transit systems had lower capital costs.  For HOV  facilities where buses used HOV lanes in five cities we reviewed, capital  costs ranged from $1.8 million to $37.6 million per mile.  For bus-HOV  facilities we considered the capital cost of HOV lanes, bus stations, park- and-ride facilities, and additional vehicles.  See appendix I for additional  details.
Bus Rapid Transit improvements on arterial streets can have the lowest  cost per mile.  For example, Los Angeles completed the Wilshire Boulevard  and Ventura lines at a cost of about $200,000 per mile.  These two lines  operate on major arterial streets, but without a dedicated right-of-way.  The  Bus Rapid Transit improvements included in this cost were signal  prioritization, improved stations, and real-time information systems  informing riders of bus arrival times.  While this type of surface street  treatment was the least expensive Bus Rapid Transit option in the cities we  reviewed, Bus Rapid Transit lines on arterial streets can have higher costs  if they involve more extensive construction, such as building special bus  lanes.  In Orlando Bus Rapid Transit on arterial streets included lane  construction and vehicle costs, and averaged $9.6 million per mile.
Light Rail systems we reviewed also vary considerably in their capital cost  per mile.  Included in capital costs are the stations, structures, signal  systems, power systems, utility relocation, rights-of-way, maintenance  facilities, transit vehicles, and project oversight. Again, we adjusted the  historic capital cost of the projects to fiscal year 2000 dollars to provide a  better basis of comparison.  For the systems we reviewed the cost per mile  for Light Rail averaged $34.8 million per mile, ranging from $12.4 million to  $118.8 million per mile.
The higher capital costs per mile for Light Rail systems compared with Bus  Rapid Transit arise from several factors.  First, Light Rail systems contain  elements not required in Bus Rapid Transit systems.  Light Rail systems  typically require train signal, communications, and electrical power  systems with overhead wires to deliver power to trains.  A consultant study  of eight Light Rail lines in five cities (Dallas, St. Louis, Denver, Salt Lake  City, and Portland) found the average costs of these elements to be $2.8  million per mile.  Light Rail systems also require additional materials  needed for the guideway--rail, ties, and track ballast.  In addition, if a Light  Rail maintenance facility does not exist, one must be built and equipped.   Finally, Light Rail vehicles, while having higher carrying capacity than most  buses, also cost more--about $2.5 million each.  In contrast, according to  transit industry consultants, a typical 40-foot transit bus costs about  $283,000 and an articulated, higher capacity bus costs about $420,000.   However, buses that incorporate newer technologies for low emissions or  that run on more than one fuel can cost more than $1 million each.  For  example, the Boston Silver Line low-floor, articulated, compressed natural  gas-hybrid electric buses will cost $1.5 million each according to FTA  officials.
Another factor that can affect the cost of the systems is the amount and  availability of required right-of-way.  Right-of-way costs are affected by the  design requirements of Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail.  Transit planners  told us that a basic busway required a wider right-of-way than Light Rail.   They estimated a two-lane busway required a right-of-way about 30 feet  wide, compared with 24 feet wide for a double-track Light Rail system.   Regardless of the transportation mode---bus or rail—the basic design has a  major effect on the capital costs.  Specifically, projects that use tunneling  or elevated structures are more expensive than those with surface level  construction.  For example, the Boston South Piers Transitway, a 1-mile  tunnel with three stations built adjacent to the Boston Central  Artery/Tunnel project, has an estimated cost of $601 million.  Tunneling can  be three to six times more expensive than surface construction, regardless  of the type of system—bus or rail.
section_title: Operating Costs Vary for Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail Systems
paragraphs: We found mixed results when we compared the operating costs for Bus  Rapid Transit and Light Rail in each of the six cities that operated both  types of systems.  We used three measures to examine operating costs:  cost per vehicle revenue hour, cost per vehicle revenue mile, and cost per  passenger trip.  We also compared these measures, correcting for vehicle  capacity.  Each measure resulted in somewhat different relative operating  cost levels.
Part of the reason for the variation in results is that the Bus Rapid Transit  systems in our example cities operate in different ways.  The systems  ranged from arterial bus routes in Los Angeles to freeway express buses on  barrier-separated HOV lanes in Denver, Dallas, and San Diego to exclusive  busways in Pittsburgh.  In addition, the Light Rail systems in these cities  also serve different functions in different ways.  The Light Rail systems  range from local distributor systems sharing downtown city streets with  cars and trucks, as in Dallas and Denver, to commuter-type service along  tracks separated from all other traffic, such as the Los Angeles Green Line.   The route, type of service, size of vehicles, and function of the systems— long haul commuter service or downtown circulator—each have an impact  on the operating cost.  Greater speed can also lower operating and capital  costs by permitting a bus route or rail line to be serviced with fewer  vehicles.
Operating costs for Bus Rapid Transit systems included such costs as  driver's salaries, fuel, vehicle maintenance, and maintenance of the busway  or HOV lane.  In Dallas it also includes the cost to move 5.2 miles of road  barriers twice each day to change the direction of an HOV lane that the Bus  Rapid Transit system and other HOVs use as well as the cost to provide  daily enforcement of lane restrictions and motorist assistance.  Light Rail  operating costs include driver's salaries, electricity, and maintenance of the  vehicles and track system.  Light Rail systems require at least one repair  facility and specialized maintenance staff, while Bus Rapid Transit vehicle  maintenance is often done at existing maintenance facilities by current  employees whose costs can be spread over the regular bus service.
subsections: section_title: Operating Cost Per Vehicle Hour
paragraphs: To determine operating cost per vehicle hour, the annual operating costs  are divided by the number of hours the buses or trains operate in that year.   This measure shows the average cost to operate a vehicle for 1 hour,  regardless of the number of passengers carried.  As shown in figure 7, using  this measure, Bus Rapid Transit had lower costs in five cities and Light Rail  in one.
section_title: Operating Cost Per Revenue Mile
paragraphs: Operating cost per revenue mile is another way of measuring the cost of  operating individual vehicles.  Operating cost per revenue mile is a vehicle’s  annual operating cost divided by the total annual number of miles traveled  while actually in passenger service.  It calculates the average cost of the  vehicles to travel 1 mile.  As shown in figure 8, all six cities' Light Rail  systems showed higher costs per vehicle mile than Bus Rapid Transit  routes.  According to one transit expert, Bus Rapid Transit lines often run  only during the busiest rush hour periods while Light Rail systems typically  offer all-day service, which may in part explain this result.
Transit operating costs can also be measured on a per passenger trip basis.   Operating cost per passenger trip measures the total annual operating cost  divided by the total annual passenger boardings, regardless of whether the  passenger is transferring from a bus to a Light Rail vehicle, or vice versa.   Thus, it shows how much it costs to carry a person on a trip, regardless of  the length of that trip.  Using this measure, four of six Bus Rapid Transit  routes had lower operating costs per passenger trip than did Light Rail  systems, as shown in figure 9.
The wide disparities in operating costs and ridership levels are likely due to  the variety of Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail systems we reviewed.  For  example, our evaluation of Bus Rapid Transit service in Dallas included the  costs to move 5.2 miles of barriers twice a day to allow Bus Rapid Transit  and other HOVs to use the lanes, as well as enforcement and roadway  assistance costs.  In Los Angeles, the Bus Rapid Transit service on the  Wilshire-Whittier line has very high ridership—about as high as the highest  ridership levels achieved by Light Rail lines in the United States.  High  ridership generally reduces the cost per rider.  In contrast, both San Diego  and San Jose have lower Bus Rapid Transit ridership, which contributes to  higher costs per rider.  In addition, vehicle sizes and passenger capacity can  vary greatly between Light Rail and bus vehicles, which can affect vehicle- based comparisons.   The Light Rail systems also have varied functions  that can affect operating costs.  For example, Denver’s initial Light Rail  system operated as a slower local circulator system on city streets shared  with vehicular traffic, while San Diego’s system is used more for longer  commuting trips.
section_title: Ridership and Speed of Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail Vary Widely
paragraphs: Two elements of transit system performance are ridership and system  speed.  We found that while ridership varied considerably, the largest  ridership on Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail systems were quite similar.   We also found that speed varied but that Bus Rapid Transit projects in our  review were generally faster.  This was likely due to the nature of the Bus  Rapid Transit systems that we visited; express bus operations or operations  with longer stop spacing have higher speeds.
We found that ridership on Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail systems varies  widely and depends, in part, on frequency of service, number of stops,  hours of operation, and customer demand.  For example, ridership on 4  busways ranged from 7,000 riders per day to about 30,000 per day and  averaged about 15,600 riders per day.  For 13 bus lines on HOV lanes,  ridership ranged from 1,000 to about 25,000 riders per day, with an average  ridership of about 8,100.  In addition, the ridership on the two arterial street  Bus Rapid Transit lines in Los Angeles was about 9,000 to 56,000 per day,  with an average of 32,500 per day.  The highest Bus Rapid Transit ridership  was on Los Angeles’ Wilshire-Whitter line, which runs buses about every 5  minutes and operates all day.  Light Rail system ridership also varies  widely.  For example, ridership on 18 Light Rail lines ranged from 7,000  riders to 57,000 daily riders and averaged about 29,000 per day.  The largest  Light Rail ridership was also found in Los Angeles on its Blue Line.
According to a transportation consultant, system speeds generally depend  on characteristics such as the distance between stops, fare-collection  methods, and the degree to which the tracks or roadway are exclusive to  transit vehicles or share right-of-way with cars and other vehicular traffic,  as both buses and Light Rail lines typically do in downtown areas.  In the  cities with both Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail, Bus Rapid Transit speeds  were higher than Light Rail in five of six cities.  The high-speed Bus Rapid  Transit lines, as shown in figure 10, are generally commuter bus routes that  run much or their entire route on highway HOV lanes.
Bus Rapid Transit improvements to service such as exclusive bus lanes,  skipped stops, dual bus lanes, and busways each may provide incremental  improvements in vehicle speeds.  Improvements such as bus traffic signal  priority, level boarding onto low-floor buses, schedules based on time  between buses rather than set schedules, fewer stops, and active  management of bus spacing and traffic signal priority from a bus  operations control center, can also each contribute to better service.  For  example, the Los Angeles Wilshire-Whitter Rapid Bus route made many of  these improvements, resulting in a 29-percent improvement in average bus  speeds.  According to transit officials, one-third of the speed improvement  along the Wilshire Avenue route was from the bus signal priority system  and the rest from the other improvements.
section_title: Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail Have a Variety of Advantages and Disadvantages
paragraphs: Besides cost and performance characteristics already discussed, Bus Rapid  Transit and Light Rail each have a variety of advantages and disadvantages.   Bus Rapid Transit generally has the advantage of (1) having more flexibility  than Light Rail, (2) being able to phase in service rather than having to wait  for an entire system to be built, and (3) being used as an interim system  until Light Rail is built.  Transit operators with experience in Bus Rapid  Transit systems told us that one of the challenges faced by Bus Rapid  Transit is the negative stigma potential riders attach to buses regarding  their noise, pollution, and quality of ride.  Light Rail has advantages,  according to transit officials, associated with increased economic  development and improved community image.  On the negative side,  building a Light Rail system can have a tendency to provide a bias toward  building additional rail lines in the future.
subsections: section_title: Bus Rapid Transit Is Generally More Flexible Than Light Rail
paragraphs: Bus Rapid Transit systems operate more flexibly than Light Rail systems.   Bus Rapid Transit can respond to changes in employment, land-use, and  community patterns by increasing or decreasing capacity.  Bus Rapid  Transit routes can also be adjusted and rerouted over time to serve new  developments and dispersed employment centers that may have resulted  from urban sprawl.  For example, an official in San Jose noted that  because of development outside the city center, there are now eight  employment centers that need to be considered in its transit analysis.  On  the other hand, Light Rail lines are fixed and cannot easily change to adjust  to new patterns of housing and employment.  For example, the western  portion of the Los Angeles Light Rail Green Line was built in part to provide  mass transit service for workers in defense production facilities in Los  Angeles.  However, by the time the Green Line opened these facilities had  been closed.  As a result, projected ridership levels were not achieved.
Although Bus Rapid Transit sometimes uses rail-style park-and-ride lots,  Bus Rapid Transit routes can also collect riders in neighborhoods and then  provide rapid long-distance service by entering a busway or HOV facility.   Transit agencies have considerable flexibility to provide long distance  service without requiring a transfer between vehicles.  This is a significant  benefit, because some research has shown that transit riders view  transferring to be a significant disincentive to using mass transit.  In  contrast, Light Rail systems frequently require a transfer of some type— either from a bus or a private automobile.  When Light Rail lines are  introduced, transit agencies commonly reroute their bus systems to feed  the rail line.  This can have the effect of making overall bus operations less  efficient when the highest-ridership bus route has been replaced by Light  Rail; the short feeder bus routes can be relatively costly.
Finally, bus-based systems’ ability to operate both on and off a busway or  bus lane provides Bus Rapid Transit the flexibility to respond to operating  problems.  For example, buses can pass disabled vehicles, while Light Rail  trains can be delayed behind a stalled train or other vehicle on the tracks.   Thus, the impact of a breakdown of a Bus Rapid Transit vehicle is limited,  while a disabled Light Rail train may disrupt portions of the system.
section_title: Bus Rapid Transit Operation Can Be Phased in
paragraphs: Bus Rapid Transit systems differ from Light Rail systems in that they  provide greater flexibility in how they can be implemented and operated.   In constructing a Bus Rapid Transit system, it is not necessary to include all  the final elements before beginning operations; it is possible to phase in  improvements over time.  Improvements such as signal prioritization and  low-floor buses, which improve capacity and bus speed, can be added  incrementally.  These incremental changes can have significant effects.  For  example, one Los Angeles Bus Rapid Transit route increased its speed and  cut 10 percent off its schedule time, by installing signal priority for buses to  provide several additional seconds to allow buses to pass through  intersections before the signal changed.  Overall, the line was able to  reduce travel time by 29 percent with all the improvements.  In contrast, a  transit expert noted that a Light Rail line segment must be fully completed  and tested before starting operation and realizing benefits.
section_title: Bus Rapid Transit Can Be an Interim System
paragraphs: Bus Rapid Transit also has the advantage of establishing a mass transit  corridor and building ridership without precluding future changes.  The  development of a busway secures a transit right-of-way for the future.   Some cities have identified Bus Rapid Transit as a means of building transit  ridership in a travel corridor to the point where investment in a rail  alternative becomes a cost-effective choice.  For example, one of the  projects in FTA’s demonstration program, the Dulles Corridor Bus Rapid  Transit project in Virginia, hopes to build transit ridership in this fashion.   However, converting a bus facility to Light Rail involves additional capital  costs.  The idea of converting a Pittsburgh busway to rail was studied by  the Port Authority of Allegheny County, and the agency concluded that the  $401 million capital cost of the conversion was too high.
section_title: Bus Service’s Negative Image Can Be Overcome With Equal Service Characteristics
paragraphs: Officials we interviewed from FTA, transit agencies, academia, and private  consulting stated that a negative image exists for bus service, particularly  when compared to rail service.  Communities may prefer Light Rail systems  to Bus Rapid Transit in part because the public sees rail as faster, quieter,  and less polluting than buses, even though Bus Rapid Transit is designed to  overcome those problems.  While transit officials noted a public bias  toward Light Rail, research has found that riders have no preference for rail  over bus when service characteristics are equal.
While environmental benefits have helped justify Light Rail systems, the  gap in environmental benefits between rail and buses may be narrowing.   FTA and bus manufacturers have focused on improving the design of buses  not just to increase their attractiveness, but also to reduce their noise levels  and emissions.  In December 1999, we reported that diesel buses are  becoming much cleaner.  We noted that according to the EPA, emissions  from individual buses declined substantially between 1988 and 1999.   Improvements in diesel technology have resulted in heavy-duty diesel  engines that are more reliable and less polluting than their predecessors.   In addition, we found that newer buses can use alternative fuels, such as  liquefied natural gas, fuel cells, and hybrid technologies, which may have  some beneficial effect on urban air quality as they are adopted into bus  fleets.
In commenting on a draft of this report, FTA officials said that the poor  image of buses was probably a result of a history of slow bus service due to  congested streets, slow boarding and fare collection, and traffic lights.  Bus  Rapid Transit is essentially designed to eliminate delays and provide faster  service on better vehicles.  FTA believes that the image of buses can be  improved over time through bus service that incorporates Bus Rapid  Transit features.  This change could replicate the improved image that Light  Rail systems experienced when modern Light Rail systems began to be  built in the 1980’s.
section_title: Light Rail Seen as a Stimulus for Community Economic Development
paragraphs: Transit agency officials told us that Light Rail provides the opportunity for  improved economic development along the rail lines.  Several city transit  officials and transit consultants told us that communities see Light Rail as a  mark that a city is "world-class," and could help a city improve its image  and ability to attract economic development.  According to transit agency  officials, because Light Rail systems have permanent stations and routes,  developers are more likely to locate new business, residential, or retail  development along a Light Rail line than along a bus route.  For example,  Dallas transit officials cited $800 million in commercial development along  its Light Rail line.  The Light Rail line itself cost $860 million to build in  1994, so these officials saw the Light Rail line as an excellent investment.   On the other hand, San Jose transit officials noted that while some  residential development had occurred along its Light Rail line, the  expectation is for changes in land use over a longer period of time, perhaps  over 20 years, resulting in a more densely developed corridor.
Transit officials we interviewed disagreed on the extent that Bus Rapid  Transit could spur economic development.  For example, officials in Dallas  said they had not experienced development near their Bus-HOV stations  that they could trace to the Bus Rapid Transit service.  However, the  Director of the Cleveland Bus Rapid Transit project cited development  already occurring in the Euclid Avenue corridor in anticipation of the Bus  Rapid Transit line.  Here the Bus Rapid Transit line would operate much  like a Light Rail system, with the same kind of fixed route on city streets  and identifiable station structures that allow for transit-oriented  development on Light Rail routes.
In commenting on a draft of this report, FTA officials said that Light Rail’s  economic development impact comes about, in part, because of the high  capital investment that gives a sense of permanence.  Rail’s economic  development impact at stations also results from a pattern of rail service  where there is excellent service to rail stations but much poorer service  requiring a transfer beyond the stations.  According to FTA officials, most  development attributed to rail service occurs within walking distance of  the rail station.  In contrast, bus service that can leave the guideway and  eliminate the need for a transfer places less emphasis on the stations as a  focus for economic development.  This may diffuse the economic  development impact of Bus Rapid Transit guideways and stations.
section_title: Light Rail Systems Are Usually Expanded Over Time
paragraphs: Most cities that built Light Rail systems did not end construction with the  first rail line.  Rather, the early Light Rail lines were often later extended or  additional lines added.  Of the 13 cities that built Light Rail systems since  1980,   5 cities already have more than one Light Rail line operating,  4 cities have already extended their initial Light Rail lines,  3 cities are doing initial expansions of earlier systems, and   Buffalo is the only city of the 13 that has not expanded or is not  expanding its initial Light Rail system.
In addition, of the 13 cities,  9 cities have current Full Funding Grant Agreements amounting to over  $2.6 billion and have construction under way on 10 projects to expand  existing Light Rail systems.  Overall, the cost estimates for these  projects range from $19.5 million per mile to $238.3 million per mile with  an average cost of about $54 million to construct a mile of Light Rail  line.  10 cities have proposed 15 additional New Starts Light Rail projects that  are in various levels of design or development.
Two transportation experts told us that Light Rail systems, once installed,  tend to expand because of the ease of making rail to rail connections, as  opposed to bus to rail connections.  In addition, they said that expansion  also occurs because once a system has incurred the initial costs of building  rail maintenance and repair facilities and training a new labor force of  drivers and specialized maintenance workers, the initial costs can be  spread over a larger system.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: A number of transit options are available to communities to help address  growing traffic congestion.  One such option is Bus Rapid Transit.  Bus  Rapid Transit is an emerging approach to using buses as an improved high- speed transit system.  By employing innovative technologies such as signal  prioritization, better stations or shelters, fewer stops, and faster service on  more attractive vehicles, Bus Rapid Transit shows promise in meeting a  variety of transit needs.  In addition, in many communities Bus Rapid  Transit systems can have lower capital costs than Light Rail systems yet  can often provide similar performance.  Further, Bus Rapid Transit’s  flexibility may be a potentially valuable feature for many communities with  sprawling patterns of development, where public transportation needs can  be more complex and difficult to address than focusing on a single central  business district.
While Bus Rapid Transit shows promise, the primary federal program to  support new and expanded transit systems, the New Starts Program, will  provide little capital funding for Bus Rapid Transit over the next 2 years.   First, the New Starts Program is stretched to its capacity to respond to the  growing number of eligible projects and few projects of any kind will  receive funding for the remainder of the current program.  In addition,  some of the Bus Rapid Transit projects do not fit the exclusive right-of-way  requirements of the New Starts Program and thus would not be eligible for  funding consideration.  Further, since Bus Rapid Transit is a relatively new  concept, some of the projects have not reached the point of being ready for  funding consideration and there are many other rail projects further along  in development with which they will ultimately have to compete.
FTA is encouraging Bus Rapid Transit through a Demonstration Program.   This program does not provide funding for construction but rather focuses  on obtaining and sharing information on projects being pursued by local  transit agencies.  The evaluations of the Bus Rapid Transit projects, which  are under way and planned, will hopefully provide additional needed  information on the effectiveness of this transit option.
The future of Bus Rapid Transit in the United States largely rests with the  willingness of communities to consider it as they explore transit options to  address their specific situations.  Such decisions are difficult and made on  a case-by-case basis considering a variety of factors including cost,  ridership, environmental impacts, and community needs and attitudes.  No  one transit option is right for all situations.  However, given the merits of  Bus Rapid Transit and its potential cost advantages, we believe that it  should be given serious consideration as options are explored and  evaluated.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for  review and comment.  Officials from the Department generally agreed with  the report. Officials from FTA’s Office of Research, Demonstration, and  Innovation; Office of Planning; and Office of the Chief Counsel provided  observations on the public’s poor image of bus service and the economic  development impact of rail and bus service, which we included in the  report.  These officials also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated into the report as appropriate.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the  date of this letter.  At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the Federal Transit  Administration.  We will also make copies available to others upon request.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please call me at (202)  512-2834 or write to heckerj@gao.gov.  Key contributors to this report were  Samer Abbas, Robert Ciszewski, David Ehrlich, and Glen Trochelman.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify the status of federal funding for Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail  systems, we reviewed FTA budget and program data, reports on New Starts  projects, and prior GAO reports. To analyze support being provided to Bus  Rapid Transit and Light Rail, we used the most recent report on the New  Starts Program Annual Report on New Starts, Proposed Allocation of  Funds for Fiscal Year 2002, Department of Transportation, Federal  Transportation Administration, May 25, 2001.  To describe FTA’s Bus Rapid  Transit Demonstration Program, we interviewed officials from FTA,  reviewed program documents, and contacted the demonstration project  sponsors for additional information.
To determine the capital costs of Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail projects,  we obtained cost data from FTA and transit agencies for selected cities.   For Bus Rapid Transit systems, we initially selected the cities of Dallas,  Denver, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, San Diego, and San Jose because they had  both Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail systems.  We added Houston and  Seattle because they have extensive Bus Rapid Transit type systems and  are in advanced stages of planning to build Light Rail systems.  We also  added Miami and Charlotte because they are operating dedicated busways.   Lastly, we added Orlando because it is operating a Bus Rapid Transit type  system on arterial streets.  For Light Rail, we identified 13 cities that built  systems between 1980 and 2000.  We limited systems to this timeframe due  to concerns about the availability of data from earlier dates.  To obtain the  capital costs for the Bus Rapid Transit systems, we used prior reports, if  available, or contacted the local transit agency.  For the Light Rail projects,  FTA and transit agency officials provided total capital expenditures.
We calculated capital costs based on the cost to complete the transit line,  escalated to 2000 dollars.  To escalate project costs, we used the Gross  Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator applied to the lump-sum capital  cost at the year of completion.  The only exception to this method was for  the San Diego Light Rail system.  Due to the way in which this system was  built over time, escalating from the final lump-sum cost of the projects was  not appropriate.  However, the transit agency provided us annual capital  expenditures, and we escalated each of these annual costs to 2000 dollars  to determine the capital cost of this system.
The capital cost analysis we conducted focused on capital cost per mile  that was derived by dividing the total escalated costs by the number of  miles of the various systems.  We used cost per mile as our measure  because it presents comparable information on a common basis.  While  other measures might have been attempted, such as annualized costs or  cost per passenger, sufficient data were not available to do so.  However, in  our view, cost per mile presents a reasonable representation of the  magnitude of the cost differences.
In determining operating costs, we selected cites that had both significant  Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail systems—Dallas, Denver, Los Angeles,  Pittsburgh, San Diego, and San Jose.  We believed it important to use cities  with both types of systems so that accounting of costs would be more  consistent.  Local transit agencies did not collect or maintain operating  costs for Bus Rapid Transit systems or their individual lines.  As a result,  transit authorities had to calculate or estimate the operating costs  associated with their operations.  Because of the difficulty of this, we were  able to analyze a limited number of Bus Rapid Transit lines in the cities.   Based on discussions with the transit agencies, we judgmentally selected  routes that had the most Bus Rapid Transit elements.  The following  identifies the Bus Rapid Transit type line in each city and the source of that  data.  For Light Rail operating costs, data were obtained from the 1999  National Transit Database.
Dallas:  We examined express bus routes on two Dallas area barrier- separated HOV lanes: I-35 East (Stemmons), and I-30 (Thornton).  The  Dallas Area Rapid Transit agency calculated the operating costs for  buses using the HOV lanes.  The reported operating costs are actual  operating costs, not estimates, and are "fully loaded" to include direct,  indirect, and general and administrative allocations.  This includes the  cost to move 5.2 miles of barriers twice a day to provide an extra HOV  lane during rush hours.
Denver:  At the suggestion of local transit officials, we used the 120X  Express Bus Route as an example of Bus Rapid Transit in Denver, since  it includes all-day service and a substantial portion of the route runs on  a freeway HOV lane.  Operating costs were estimated according to  average operating cost per vehicle hour for regular bus service.  A  Regional Transportation District official told us that he believed that the  operating costs for the 120X route would be similar to regular bus  operating costs, and that the same buses and drivers are used for both  the 120X and regular buses.
Los Angeles:  We examined two Bus Rapid Transit routes:  one runs  along Wilshire-Whittier Boulevard and the other along Ventura  Boulevard.  Los Angeles officials provided an estimate of the operating  costs for these lines.  These lines operate all-day on routes that run  concurrently with local buses, but with fewer stops and higher  ridership.  The buses travel on streets with other traffic and do not run  on HOV lanes or bus lanes.
Pittsburgh:  Two Bus Rapid Transit busways were examined in  Pittsburgh: the East Busway and the South Busway.  The West Busway  was not included because it was not open in 1999.  Pittsburgh officials  provided actual ridership figures and estimated the operating costs,  vehicle hours, and vehicle miles for all routes using each busway from  the outer end of the busway and including the downtown loop circulator  portion where buses pick up and drop off passengers.  Operating costs  included all busway expenses for the two busways, including salaries  and wages for operators, maintenance, and administration; diesel fuel;  maintenance of facilities; materials and supplies; utilities; and  purchased services.
San Diego:  We examined several express commuter bus routes in San  Diego: the 810, 820, 850, 860, and 870.  All travel at least part of their  route on barrier-separated HOV lanes.  San Diego officials provided  estimates for the operating cost for these lines.
San Jose: On the recommendation of local transit officials, we examined  one Bus Rapid Transit route of the Santa Clara Valley Transit Authority,  Route 102, from South San Jose to Stanford Research Park.  Route 102 is  a 32-mile long express commuter bus route that is 70 percent on HOV  lanes--the highest HOV level of any Valley Transit bus route.  Operating  costs were estimated according to average operating cost per vehicle  hour for regular bus service.
In analyzing operating cost we used three measures:  cost per vehicle  revenue hour, cost per vehicle revenue mile, and cost per passenger trip.   These are commonly used comparisons in this industry.  To arrive at the  results, the operating cost for 1999 was divided by the number of hours the  vehicles operated in service that year, the number of miles the vehicles  traveled when in service that year, or the number of passenger trips on  each route that year.  We also tried to calculate cost per passenger mile, but  sufficient information was not widely available on where and how many  passengers were getting on and off vehicles along their routes.
To obtain information on the ridership and performance of Bus Rapid  Transit and Light Rail systems, we relied on information obtained from  transit agencies, supplemented with information from the National Transit  Database, and interviewed FTA and transit agency officials, academic  researchers, and private consultants.
To determine other advantages and disadvantages of Bus Rapid Transit and  Light Rail systems, we reviewed FTA documents, academic and private  consultants’ reports, and interviewed FTA officials and study authors.  We  also interviewed transit agency officials to determine what additional  factors they considered when they made choices to develop bus or rail  systems, and what they had observed in the actual construction and  operation of the systems.
Certain limitations apply to the data presented in this report.  First, the  report primarily focuses on the cost of transit projects; we have not  attempted to quantify all the possible benefits of these projects.  Therefore,  our review is not a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis.  Second, because  of differences among transit agencies in how they report operational  information, analyses in this report generally are restricted to operating  cost comparisons between bus and Light Rail within a given transit agency.   Conclusions on the relative operating efficiency of one transit agency  versus another should not be drawn from this report.  In addition, not all  the transit agencies we reviewed were able to totally segregate Bus Rapid  Transit costs from their overall bus operating costs, which limited our  analysis to overall operating cost rather than the various elements that  contribute to it.  Finally, transit agencies collect ridership information in a  variety of ways, ranging from actual farebox counts to periodic ridership  surveys.  Because transit agencies are the only available source for such  information, we relied on ridership data they provided.
In addition, for some of the Light Rail analyses in this report we relied on  information contained in FTA’s 1999 National Transit Database, the most  recent at the time of our analysis.  While we did not perform a  comprehensive data reliability assessment of this information, we did  determine that FTA has procedures in place to monitor data quality.  We  performed our review from July 2000 through August 2001 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Bus Rapid Transit Demonstration Projects
subsections: section_title: Boston, MA – Silver Line
subsections: section_title: Project Description
paragraphs: The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority is constructing a two- phased Silver Line project, which will run from Dudley Square to Logan  Airport, via downtown and the South Boston Waterfront.  As of January  2001, funding has been secured for one of the project’s two phases.  The  project calls for the buses to operate on exclusive lanes on surface streets  and in an exclusive busway-tunnel.  Vehicles are expected to feature low- floors and real-time information.  Some buses will use alternative-fuels to  reduce emissions.  When it begins operations, the Silver Line is expected to  make 17 trips per hour with a round-trip running time of 48 minutes.  Once  completed, the Silver Line expects to serve 60,000 riders daily.
section_title: Cost Estimates
paragraphs: According to a Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority official, the  estimated cost for developing the two phases of the Silver Line is $1.34  billion, of which $641 million has been secured.  The Authority is seeking  an additional $700 million from federal, state, and local sources.
section_title: Estimated Time Savings
paragraphs: The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority estimates a 3 to 5 minute  time savings from Washington Street to downtown.  Time savings for the  completed Silver Line and the service from South Station to the Piers area  and Logan Airport are not possible to calculate because this is a new  service.
section_title: Comparative Analysis
paragraphs: The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority decided that Bus Rapid  Transit could attract similar ridership as a Light Rail system.  In addition,  according to the Project Manager, the Bus Rapid Transit project could be  built at a much lower cost than Light Rail.  Further, a busway would create  fewer disturbances to Boston’s infrastructure than Light Rail.  However, the  construction of the Bus Rapid Transit system allows for possible  construction of a future Light Rail system.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: According to the Project Manager, as of January 2001, the project was 35  percent to 40 percent complete.  The Massachusetts Bay Transportation  Authority plans to provide a fully integrated Silver Line service by 2008.
section_title: Charlotte, NC – Independence Corridor
subsections: section_title: Project Description
paragraphs: Charlotte’s project involves extending the existing busway on  Independence Boulevard, adding intelligent transportation systems on its  buses, and adding new stations.  In 1998, the Charlotte Area Transit System  opened a 2.6-mile two-way express busway (without stations) in an unused  HOV lane that, according to the Project Manager, cannot open to carpools  until 2006, when the next phase of the Independence freeway project is  completed.  The project allows buses to bypass congestion.  Under the  current Bus Express Lane system, the Charlotte Area Transit System  estimates that the monthly total ridership for January 2000 on the busway  was about 15,700 —an increase of 55 percent from the previous year.  The  express bus routes make 32 trips during the morning period and 29 trips  during the afternoon. The plan consists of retrofitting 3.6 miles of  Independence Boulevard into a busway facility with five new stations and  adding intelligent transportation systems technology such as automated  vehicle locators and automatic passenger counters.  The long-range goal is  to extend the busway 13.5 miles, according to the Project Manager.  The  Metropolitan Transit Commission began a Major Investment Study that will  cover the entire corridor and involve an evaluation of various forms of  transit, including Bus Rapid Transit, Light Rail, and Commuter Rail.  The  Commission expects to complete the study in late 2001.
section_title: Cost Estimates
paragraphs: According to the Project Manger, the Major Investment Study will  determine the cost of the next phase.  Federal, state, and local funding is  planned for the project with the local share coming from a sales tax  approved in a countywide referendum in 1998.  The Charlotte Area Transit  System plans to dedicate this revenue source to public transportation  expenditures.  The Charlotte Area Transit System estimated that the sales  tax would generate over $50 million annually for transit in the Charlotte  area.
section_title: Estimated Time Savings
paragraphs: The Charlotte Area Transit System estimates that the current Bus Rapid  Transit system saves 10 to 15 minutes in the afternoon rush hour trips and 2  to 4 minutes in the morning.  According to the Project Manager, the Major  Investment Study will estimate time savings for the next phase.
section_title: Comparative Analysis
paragraphs: The Major Investment Study will compare various forms of transit,  including Bus Rapid Transit, Light Rail, and Commuter Railroad, according  to the Project Manager.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: The 2.6-mile express busway has been in use since 1998.  In January 2000, it  carried over 15,000 passengers.  The Major Investment Study is under way  to analyze the remaining phase of this project.  It is expected to be  complete in late 2001.
section_title: Cleveland, OH – Euclid Corridor Transportation Project
subsections: section_title: Project Description
paragraphs: The Euclid Corridor Transportation Project, located in the cities of  Cleveland and East Cleveland, will connect the region’s two largest  employment centers—downtown/central business district and University  Circle.  The project calls for bus stations to be located over 7 miles on a  landscaped center median, on the city’s major arterial street.  The exclusive  bus lane would be located along the median, with the curb lane available  for other vehicle traffic.  The last 2.5 miles of the route will have buses  operating at the curb lane in mixed traffic.  According to the Project  Director, the vehicles are expected to be 60 foot, articulated, low-floor,  diesel/electric buses.  The system features an exclusive busway, intelligent  transportation systems technologies, traffic signal preemption, and faster  boarding and alighting due to off-board fare collection.
section_title: Cost Estimates
paragraphs: The Euclid Corridor Transportation Project estimates the capital cost for  the program at $220 million.
section_title: Estimated Time Savings
paragraphs: The Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority estimates a travel time  reduction of 30 to 40 minutes along the route.
section_title: Comparative Analysis
paragraphs: In December 1995, Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority’s  management planning organization, the Northeast Ohio Area Wide  Coordinating Agency, selected the Bus Rapid Transit project.  Prior to this  selection, rail options were evaluated against the Bus Rapid Transit  approach.  The Authority’s decision was heavily influenced by the costs as  compared with the expected benefits of the options.  The Authority  selected the Bus Rapid Transit option because it was estimated to cost  about one-half of the best rail option, yet would achieve many of the transit  benefits.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: The FTA New Starts Program has given the project a “recommended”  rating. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority is currently working  on design completion.  It expects to begin limited service by 2005 and  complete service in 2007, according to the Project Director.
section_title: Dulles Corridor, VA – Dulles Corridor Bus Rapid Transit
subsections: section_title: Project Description
paragraphs: The Dulles Corridor Bus Rapid Transit project is part of a multiyear, four- phased effort to bring rail service to the rapidly growing Dulles Corridor in  the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area.  The Virginia Department of Rail  and Public Transportation’s goal is to build a 23.5-mile rail transit system in  the area that will serve as an extension to the 103-mile Metrorail service.   The Bus Rapid Transit segment of the project is to serve as an interim step  to rail.  The plan calls for vehicles in the Bus Rapid Transit project to  operate between an existing Metrorail stop and Dulles International Airport  and beyond to Loudon County.  Most of the route to the airport would be on  the existing limited access road.  A total of four stations would be  constructed.  Consideration is being given to buses that would feature  intelligent transportation systems technology such as real-time and parking  information and automated vehicle location.  The plan calls for buses to  run every 10 to 20 minutes in peak hours and every 20 to 60 minutes during  the off-peak and weekend hours.  The Virginia Department of Rail and  Public Transportation estimates an average weekday ridership of 23,000 for  the fully operating Bus Rapid Transit system.  It plans to start operations in  2003 and begin conversion to rail by 2006. The Virginia Department of Rail  and Public Transportation plans full implementation of rail by 2010.
section_title: Cost Estimates
paragraphs: The Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation estimates a total  cost of $287.3 million for the Bus Rapid Transit portion of the project and  $2.2 billion for the entire project including rail service.
section_title: Estimated Time Savings
paragraphs: The Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation Project Manager  estimates that for the Bus Rapid Transit portion of the project, average rush  hour time savings will be about 18 minutes.
section_title: Comparative Analysis
paragraphs: In 1997, a Major Investment Study on the Dulles Corridor recommended a  “seamless” extension of the Metrorail system.  The Virginia Department of  Rail and Public Transportation evaluated Light Rail as an alternative, but it  did not offer any cost savings or operational advantages.  A 1999  supplement to the Major Investment Study concluded that Bus Rapid  Transit could provide interim mobility improvements in the corridor but,  due to operating constraints in the Tysons Corner area and projected future  demand, a rail line was the most appropriate long-term solution.  Current  analysis will determine the most effective alignment for the future  Metrorail extension.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: According to the Project Manger, in 2000, FTA approved advancing the Bus  Rapid Transit portion of the project into preliminary engineering, and the  entire Bus Rapid Transit-to-rail project into the National Environmental  Policy Act process.  The Bus Rapid Transit portion of the project received a  “recommended” rating from FTA.
section_title: Eugene, OR – Pilot East- West Corridor
subsections: section_title: Project Description
paragraphs: Eugene’s Lane Transit District is directing a two-phased, 10-mile Pilot East- West Corridor Bus Rapid Transit project that will connect east Springfield  to west Eugene.  The Lane Transit District’s goal is to provide fast “rail-like”  transit service along major corridors with smaller buses providing access  from neighborhoods to the Bus Rapid Transit Lines, nearby shopping, and  employment.  The project calls for the system to use exclusive busways,  traffic signal priority, prepaid fares, real-time information, and fewer stops.   At implementation, the pilot corridor will operate at 10-minute intervals  during weekdays and 20-minute intervals during evenings and weekends.
section_title: Cost Estimates
paragraphs: The Lane Transit District estimates a total cost of $44 million to construct  the project.
section_title: Estimated Time Savings
paragraphs: The Lane Transit District estimates that the Bus Rapid Transit system  would decrease travel time by 20 percent compared to regular bus service  in the year it begins operation.  It also estimates that this may grow to 40  percent by 2015.
section_title: Comparative Analysis
paragraphs: According to the Project Manager, the Lane Transit District conducted a  Major Investment Study that determined that Bus Rapid Transit is the  preferred approach to Eugene’s transportation needs.  The evaluation  concluded that Eugene currently does not have the population density to  support a rail system.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: The Bus Rapid Transit project is in preliminary engineering and  environmental assessment.  According to the Project Manager, the Lane  Transit District developed a public input process to educate residents and  business owners about the Bus Rapid Transit project and to gather input on  corridor issues such as engineering solutions and system image and  character.  The Project Manager stated that the goal is to complete Phase I  by 2003 and Phase II by 2005.  Once Phase I is completed, 4 miles of the  project would be operational.  The completion of Phase II would complete  the 10-mile project and allow for full Bus Rapid Transit operation.
section_title: Hartford, CT – Hartford New Britain Busway
subsections: section_title: Project Description
paragraphs: The Hartford-New Britain Busway project consists of a two-way, 9-mile  exclusive busway linking downtown New Britain with Hartford’s Union  Station.  The plan calls for buses to use intelligent transportation systems  technologies, possibly including signal priority, automatic vehicle location,  real-time information, and a smart signal system for grade crossing control.   The Connecticut Department of Transportation estimates that daily  ridership will increase by almost 11,500 new riders to 28,500 riders in the  selected busway system, according to the Planning Manager.
section_title: Cost Estimates
paragraphs: The Connecticut Department of Transportation estimates a total project  cost of $100 million, according to the Planning Manager.
section_title: Estimated Time Savings
paragraphs: The Connecticut Department of Transportation estimates a 40.5 percent  time savings using the busway from Hartford to New Britain.
section_title: Comparative Analysis
paragraphs: The Connecticut Department of Transportation recommended the busway  project after considering six alternatives.  The agency selected the busway  project as the preferred option based on transit-related, highway, and  arterial-roadway performance measures and cost.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: FTA approved the project into preliminary engineering with a  “recommended” New Starts project rating.  The Connecticut Department of  Transportation expects to begin design in 2001.  The plan calls for the Bus  Rapid Transit system to begin operating in 2003.
section_title: Honolulu, HI – CityExpress!
subsections: section_title: Project Description
paragraphs: The City and County of Honolulu plans to expand its current bus system  and implement Bus Rapid Transit in the primary urban corridor.  Honolulu  began a limited-stop express bus service in 1999 in the corridor as a  precursor to Bus Rapid Transit.  Known as “CityExpress!” the system  operates between Kalihi Transit Center and the University of Hawaii.   During the first 6 months of operation, CityExpress! experienced a 50- percent increase in ridership.  Honolulu plans to implement the Bus Rapid  Transit system in the same corridor by providing exclusive lanes where  heavy traffic congestion impedes the transit operation.  According to the  Public Transit Chief, the plan calls for Bus Rapid Transit to include transit  centers, signal prioritization, and traveler information systems.  A fully  constructed Bus Rapid Transit system would produce an estimated 46,000  additional daily riders on mass transit in 2025.
section_title: Cost Estimates
paragraphs: Total capital cost is estimated at $1.06 billion over 25 years.
section_title: Estimated Time Savings
paragraphs: Bus Rapid Transit would result in estimated time savings of approximately  35 percent.
section_title: Comparative Analysis
paragraphs: The Major Investment Study/Draft Environmental Impact Statement  recommended Bus Rapid Transit over Light Rail.  Furthermore, it stated  that the Bus Rapid Transit alternative forecasts the highest level of transit  usage compared with other alternatives.  The study deleted the rail option  through a collaborative process after the analyses indicated that Bus Rapid  Transit would provide an equal level of service and performance with less  cost and impacts.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: The Honolulu City Council selected Bus Rapid Transit as the Locally  Preferred Alternative in November 2000.  According to the Public Transit  Chief, it expects to complete the Final Environmental Impact Study in 2001.   Upon competition of the study, the Chief said that Honolulu plans on  seeking New Starts funding assistance from FTA.
section_title: Miami, FL – South Miami- Dade Busway
subsections: section_title: Project Description
paragraphs: The South Miami-Dade Busway project is an 11.5-mile expansion of the  existing busway south to the cities of Homestead and Florida City.  In 1997,  the Miami-Dade Transit Agency implemented the original 8.5-mile busway.   According to a transit agency official, this was to facilitate increased  economic development to the region in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew.   The system features exclusive lanes, signal priority, low-floor buses, and  automated vehicle location and real-time announcements.  The original  busways resulted in significant growth in transit use, with ridership rising  by 40 percent, according to the Management Chief.
section_title: Cost Estimates
paragraphs: The Miami-Dade Transit Agency states that the total estimated cost for the  extension is $85.5 million, according to the Management Chief.
section_title: Estimated Time Savings
paragraphs: Currently, the Miami-Dade Transit Agency states that the scheduled time  savings is less than 10 percent. The agency states that the time savings is  minimal because buses operate at-grade and are interrupted at  intersections located at half-mile intervals. Thus, service is not much faster  than when the buses operate on U.S. Highway 1.
section_title: Comparative Analysis
paragraphs: The Management Chief stated that the Miami-Dade Transit Agency  evaluated various modes of transit before building the South Miami-Dade  Busway.  It found other options too expensive: Heavy Rail would have cost  10 times as much to build, while Light Rail would cost 4 times as much in  comparison with a busway.  In addition to the cost disparities, the agency  concluded that Light Rail would be too disruptive to existing surface  traffic.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Construction is scheduled to begin in November or December 2001, with  completion of the extension by 2003.  The U.S. Department of  Transportation is working  with  the Miami-Dade Transit Agency to  coordinate the construction of the extension with its repair project of U.S.  Highway 1 to reduce disruptions, according to the Management Chief.
section_title: San Jose, CA – Line 22 Rapid Transit Corridor
subsections: section_title: Project Description
paragraphs: The Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority plans to expand the  “backbone” of its bus system—the 27-mile Line 22 corridor--into a Bus  Rapid Transit project.  The plan calls for enhanced station areas, fare  prepayment, low-floor buses, and intelligent transportation systems  technology such as automatic vehicle location and signal prioritization.   Line 22 runs every 10 minutes during peak hours and operates near  capacity with 28,000 average daily riders (18 percent of total system  ridership).  Based on projections for one segment of the project, the Santa  Clara Valley Transportation Authority estimates that ridership could  increase by over 9 percent.
section_title: Cost Estimates
paragraphs: Consultants for the Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority estimated a  total cost of $38 million.
section_title: Estimated Time Savings
paragraphs: After developing Line 22 into a Bus Rapid Transit line, the Santa Clara  Valley Transportation Authority expects to experience time savings in the  range of 25 percent to 40 percent over current travel times.
section_title: Comparative Analysis
paragraphs: According to a Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority official, Line  22’s proximity to Caltrain—the Bay Area’s commuter railroad—served as a  disincentive in considering a Light Rail transit project for this corridor.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: The Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority has begun the preliminary  engineering needed to complete elements of the line.  The agency expects a  fully operational Bus Rapid Transit system by late summer or fall 2002  using federal highway and FTA Bus Capital funds, in addition to state and  local funds.
section_title: San Juan, PR – Rio Hondo Connector Bus Rapid Transit
subsections: section_title: Project Description
paragraphs: The Rio Hondo Connector Bus Rapid Transit project is to provide high- speed bus shuttle service between the Tren Urbano rapid transit line now  under construction and intermodal transfer facilities.  The plan calls for the  the construction of a plaza and park-and-ride lot at the end of the  connector, and a 2.5-mile length of limited-access HOV lanes in each  direction.  The project will feature intelligent transportation system  technology, including automated vehicle location, computer-aided  dispatching systems, traffic signal priority, and vehicle monitoring systems.
section_title: Cost Estimates
paragraphs: The Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority estimates a total  cost of approximately $66 million for the entire project, including  construction of HOV lanes and stations.  The agency estimates $7 million to  $8 million for the Bus Rapid Transit portion of the project.
section_title: Estimated Time Savings
paragraphs: The Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority expects a 10- minute travel time savings on the Bus Rapid Transit route.
section_title: Comparative Analysis
paragraphs: The Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority did not conduct an  alternative analysis for this project.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: The Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority is advancing its  work on the highway element and expects to implement its Bus Rapid  Transit system by 2003.
section_title: Capital Costs of Light Rail Systems
paragraphs: Total cost (year of expenditure)
Escalated total cost (year 2000 dollars)
System length (miles)
Total cost (year of expenditure)
Escalated total cost (year 2000 dollars)
System length (miles)
section_title: Appendix IV