Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat
Published: 2005-07-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: A successful terrorist attack on a Department of Energy (DOE) site containing nuclear weapons material could have devastating effects for the site and nearby communities. DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment (ESE), which is responsible for DOE operations in areas such as energy research, manages five sites that contain weapons-grade nuclear material. A heavily armed paramilitary force equipped with such items as automatic weapons protects ESE sites. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE's existing readiness requirements and (2) the actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully defend against the terrorist threat identified in the October 2004 design basis threat (DBT) by DOE's implementation deadline of October 2008.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing weapons-grade nuclear material generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements. Specifically, GAO determined that ESE protective forces generally comply with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and equipment standardization and that the five ESE sites had the required training programs, facilities, and equipment. However, GAO did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. For example, despite the importance of training exercises in which protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists (force-on-force exercises), DOE neither sets standards for individual protective force officers to participate in these exercises, nor does it require sites to track individual participation. In another example, GAO found that protective force officers at all five of the ESE sites reported problems with their radio communications systems. Specifically, according to 66 of the 105 protective force officers GAO interviewed, they did not always have dependable radio communications as required by the DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force Program Manual. Security officials stated that improvements were under way. To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they will need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include transforming its current protective force into an "elite force"--modeled on U.S. Special Forces, developing and deploying new security technologies to reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack, consolidating and eliminating nuclear weapons material between and among ESE sites to reduce security costs, and creating a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient authority to ensure coordination across all ESE offices that have weapons-grade nuclear material. However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early stages of development and will require significant commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the 2008 October DBT implementation deadline is uncertain.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Energy (DOE) has long recognized that a successful  terrorist attack on a site containing the material used in nuclear weapons,  such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium, could have devastating  consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. The risks  associated with these materials, which in specified forms and quantities are  referred to as Category I special nuclear material, vary but include theft for  use in an illegal nuclear weapon; the creation of improvised nuclear  devices capable of producing a nuclear yield; and the creation of so-called  “dirty bombs,” in which conventional explosives are used to disperse  radioactive material.
Because terrorist attacks could have such devastating consequences, an  effective safeguards and security program is essential. For many years, a  key component for DOE security programs has been the development of  the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies the  potential size and capabilities of adversary forces. DOE issued its current  DBT in October 2004 in response to recommendations in our April 2004  report, congressional criticism, and a new review of intelligence data. The  October 2004 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat for DOE sites than had  previous DBTs. Consequently, DOE is not requiring full compliance until  October 2008 in order to allow its sites adequate time to implement  measures to defeat this larger terrorist threat. Private contractors, who  operate DOE’s facilities, counter the terrorist threat contained in the DBT  with a multifaceted protective system. While specific measures vary from  site to site, a key universal component of DOE’s protective system is a  heavily armed protective force equipped with such items as automatic  weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, and chemical protective  gear.
The following two major organizations in DOE are responsible for securing  Category I special nuclear material:   The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately  organized agency within DOE, is responsible for the nation’s nuclear  weapons programs and manages six sites that contain Category I special  nuclear material.
DOE’s Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and  Environment (ESE) is responsible for DOE operations in areas such as  energy research, basic physical science research, and environmental  cleanup and manages five sites that collectively contain substantial  quantities of Category I special nuclear material.
We reported on security at NNSA sites in May 2003 and April 2004. We  found that NNSA needed to improve the management of its safeguards and  security program and that while some action had been taken in response to  the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, additional action was needed to  ensure that DOE’s sites were adequately prepared to defend themselves.  Since the attacks of September 11, DOE has focused on the security of its  NNSA sites more than it has on its ESE sites. Consequently, you asked us  to determine for the five ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material  (1) the extent to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE’s existing  readiness requirements and (2) what actions DOE and ESE will need to  take to successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat identified in  the October 2004 DBT by DOE’s implementation deadline of October 2008.
To determine the extent to which protective forces at ESE sites are meeting  existing DOE readiness requirements, we reviewed DOE policies and other  pertinent literature about the factors that affect the readiness of forces,  such as military forces, that are like those defending ESE sites. We  conducted structured interviews with 105 ESE protective force officers at  the five ESE sites that contain Category I special nuclear material. While  the responses from these interviews are not projectable to the entire  universe of ESE protective force officers, we did speak to about 10 percent  of the total protective forces at the five sites. Even though not projectable,  we randomly selected protective force officers to interview at each site in  order to help assure their independence from the views of site  management. We asked the officers questions designed to determine their  readiness to defend the sites, including questions about their morale,  training, and equipment. We also reviewed the training records of the 105  officers to determine if key elements of their training complied with  existing DOE training requirements. In particular, we reviewed selected  firearms and physical fitness qualifications to determine if these officers  complied with existing DOE requirements and regulations. Finally, we  reviewed the equipment used by ESE protective forces to determine if it  met current DOE requirements. Further details on our interview  procedures and random selection methods are found in the scope and  methodology appendix at the end of this report.
To determine what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully  defend against the new threat identified in the October 2004 DBT by DOE’s  implementation deadline of October 2008, we reviewed the October  2004  DBT and associated guidance documents. We discussed the October 2004  DBT with officials in DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance  Assurance and with officials in ESE’s Offices of Environmental  Management; Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology; and Science.  Finally, where available, we reviewed documents prepared by ESE officials  on how they plan to comply with the October 2004 DBT. Appendix I  presents a detailed description of our scope and methodology. We  performed our work between March 2004 and July 2005 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment  comprises nine program offices, including the Offices of Environmental  Management; Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology; and Science and  accounts for about 57 percent of DOE’s fiscal year 2006 budget request (see  fig. 1).
ESE has five sites that collectively have substantial quantities of Category I  special nuclear material. (See table 1.) For fiscal year 2006, DOE requested  over $300 million for security at these five sites. This represents about 70%  of the entire security budget request for ESE. (See table 2.) Contractors  operate all of these sites.
Within DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, DOE's  Office of Security develops and promulgates orders and policies to guide  the department's safeguards and security programs. DOE’s overall security  policy is contained in DOE Order 470.1, Safeguards and Security Program,  which was originally approved in 1995. The key component of DOE's  approach to security is the DBT, a classified document that identifies the  characteristics of the potential threats to DOE assets. A classified  companion document, the Adversary Capabilities List, provides  additional information on terrorist capabilities and equipment. The DBT  has been traditionally based on a classified, multiagency intelligence  community assessment of potential terrorist threats, known as the  Postulated Threat. The threat from terrorist groups is generally the most  demanding threat contained in the DBT.
DOE counters the terrorist threat specified in the DBT with a multifaceted  protective system. While specific measures vary from site to site, all  protective systems at DOE's most sensitive sites employ a defense-in-depth  concept that includes the following:  a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting   physical barriers, such as fences and antivehicle obstacles;  numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers,  vehicle inspection stations, radiation detectors, and metal detectors;  operational security procedures, such as a “two person” rule that  prevents only one person from having access to special nuclear  material; and  hardened facilities and vaults.
Each site also has a heavily armed protective force that is often equipped  with such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body  armor, and chemical protective gear. These protective forces comprise  Security Police Officers that are classified into three groups: Security  Police Officer-I, Security Police Officer-II, and Security Police Officer-III.  Security Police Officer-Is are only assigned to fixed, armed posts.  Generally, very few of these officers are used at ESE sites because of the  limited roles they can fill. Security Police Officer-IIs generally are assigned  to posts such as access control booths, or to foot or vehicle patrols. Finally,  Security Police Officers-IIIs are responsible for operations such as hostage  rescue and the recapture and recovery of special nuclear material.  According to federal regulations, Security Police Officers-IIIs have more  demanding physical fitness and training standards than Security Police  Officers-Is or Security Police Officers-IIs. At the ESE sites we visited,  protective forces work for private contractors and are unionized. The  number of qualified Security Police Officers-IIs and Security Police  Officers-IIIs at ESE sites is shown in table 3.
Protective force duties and requirements, such as physical fitness  standards, are explained in detail in DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force  Program Manual, as well as in DOE regulations (10 C.F.R. pt. 1046,  Physical Protection of Security Interests). DOE issued the current  Protective Force Program Manual in June 2000. Although protective forces  are expected to comply with the duties and requirements established in  DOE policies, deviations from these policies are allowed as long as certain  approval and notification criteria are met. Following are the three types of  deviations:   Variances: Variances are approved conditions that technically vary from  DOE security requirements but afford equivalent levels of protection.
Waivers: Waivers are approved nonstandard conditions that deviate  from DOE security requirements that, if uncompensated, would create a  potential security vulnerability. As such, waivers require implementation  of what DOE calls compensatory measures. Compensatory measures  could include deploying additional protective forces or curtailing  operations until the asset can be better protected.
Exceptions: Exceptions are approved deviations from DOE security  requirements that create a safeguards and security vulnerability.  Exceptions are approved only when correction of the condition is not  feasible, and compensatory measures are inadequate.
In addition to complying with these security requirements, DOE protective  systems, including protective forces, also must meet performance  standards. For example, DOE sites are required to demonstrate that their  protective systems are capable of defending special nuclear material  against terrorist forces identified in the DBT. The performance of  protective systems is formally and regularly examined through  vulnerability assessments. A vulnerability assessment is a systematic  evaluation process in which qualitative and quantitative techniques are  applied to detect vulnerabilities and arrive at effective protection of  specific assets, such as special nuclear material. To conduct such  assessments, DOE uses, among other things, subject matter experts, such  as U.S. Special Forces; computer modeling to simulate attacks; and  force-on-force exercises, in which the site's protective forces undergo  simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists. In addition to their use in  evaluating the effectiveness of physical protection strategies, DOE believes  force-on-force exercises are the most realistic representation of adversary  attacks that can be used to train protective forces.
Through a variety of complementary measures, DOE ensures that its  contractors are complying with DOE’s safeguards and security policies,  including protective force duties and requirements, and that its systems are  performing as intended. Contractors perform regular self-assessments and  are encouraged to uncover any problems themselves. In addition to routine  oversight, DOE orders require field offices to comprehensively survey  contractors' operations for safeguards and security every year. DOE's  Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance provides yet  another check through its comprehensive inspection program. This office  performs comprehensive inspections roughly every 18 months at each DOE  site that has specified quantities of Category I special nuclear material. All  deficiencies (findings) identified during surveys and inspections require the  contractors to take corrective action.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE security policies  have been under almost constant reexamination and have undergone  considerable change. For example, the department’s security polices have  been undergoing a streamlining process for nearly 2 years. In addition, as  we pointed out in our April 2004 report, DOE worked for almost 2 years to  develop and issue a new DBT. When DOE issued its first post-September 11  DBT in May 2003, we recommended that DOE reexamine it because, among  other things, it contained a terrorist threat that was less than the threat  identified in the intelligence community’s Postulated Threat. DOE agreed  to reexamine the 2003 DBT and issued a revised and more demanding DBT  in October 2004. The October 2004 DBT significantly increased the terrorist  threat to DOE facilities and required enhanced protection strategies for  DOE facilities. Under the new DBT, sites with Category I special nuclear  material will not have to be fully prepared to defend their sites against the  terrorist threat contained in the new 2004 DBT until October 2008. By July  29, 2005, DOE sites will have to forward 2004 DBT implementation plans to  the Deputy Secretary of Energy and, within 3 months, begin submitting  quarterly DBT implementation reports. At the time of our review, cost  estimates were still preliminary, but security officials at ESE sites said that  they may require collectively an additional $384-$584 million over the next  several years in order for all ESE sites with Category I special nuclear  material to meet the 2004 DBT.
section_title: Protective Forces at ESE Sites Generally Meet Established DOE Readiness Requirements, but Some Weaknesses in Protective Force Practices Exist
paragraphs: We found that the majority of the 105 protective force members we  interviewed at ESE sites generally believe that they currently are ready to  perform their mission of protecting the site’s special nuclear material.  Consistent with that belief, the five ESE sites we visited had the required  training programs, facilities, and equipment, and the 105 protective force  members whose records we reviewed were generally meeting the readiness  requirements contained in the DOE orders and federal regulations.  However, we did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely  affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. These  include protective force officers’ lack of regular participation in  force-on-force exercises; the frequency and quality of training  opportunities; the lack of dependable communications systems; and  insufficient protective gear, including protective body armor and chemical  protective gear, and the lack of armored vehicles.
subsections: section_title: Protective Force Officers Are Confident in Their Current Overall Readiness
paragraphs: Readiness is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as the ability of  forces to deploy quickly and to accomplish specific goals and missions. In  particular, DOD believes that a ready force should possess a sufficient  number of experienced, trained, and properly equipped personnel. Through  realistic and comprehensive training, these personnel are forged into a  cohesive unit that can perform its tasks even under extreme conditions.  DOE orders and federal regulations establish the framework for ensuring  that DOE protective forces are ready to perform their mission.
ESE protective force officers generally believe that they are ready to  perform their mission. Specifically, 102 of the 105 officers we interviewed  stated that they believed that they, and their fellow officers, understood  what was expected of them should the site be attacked by a terrorist group.  Moreover, 65 of the 105 officers rated the readiness of their site’s protective  force as high, while 20 officers rated their protective force as somewhat or  moderately ready to defend the site. Only a minority of the officers (16 of  105) we interviewed rated the readiness of their force to defend their sites  as low. Two officers were uncertain of their forces’ readiness, and two did  not respond to the question.
In addition, the majority of officers we interviewed believed they and the  protective force officers with whom they worked on a regular basis formed  a cohesive unit that would be able to perform their most essential mission  of protecting special nuclear material. Specifically, of the 105 officers we  interviewed,  86 reported that they were satisfied with their jobs,  73 reported that their morale was high or at least moderately high,   91 reported that protective force officers had developed the necessary  teamwork to defend the site against a terrorist attack,  84 officers responded that they had a high degree of confidence in their  fellow officers in the event of a terrorist attack, and   88 reported that their fellow officers would be willing to risk their lives  in defense of their site.
section_title: ESE Protective Forces Generally Meet the DOE Training and Equipment Requirements We Reviewed
paragraphs: As called for in DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual, readiness is  achieved through appropriate training and equipment. Each of the five sites  we visited had formally approved annual training plans. Each site generally  had the training facilities, such as firearms ranges, classrooms, computer  terminals, and exercise equipment, which enabled them to meet their  current DOE and federal training requirements. Furthermore, each site  maintained computerized databases for tracking individual protective force  officers’ compliance with training requirements. To determine if these  programs and facilities were being used to implement the DOE  requirements and federal regulations, we focused on three key  areas—firearms proficiency, physical fitness, and protective force officer  equipment.
subsections: section_title: Firearms Proficiency
paragraphs: DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual states that protective force  officers must demonstrate their proficiency with the weapons that are  assigned to them every 6 months. According to the training records of the  105 protective force officers we interviewed, 79 had met this proficiency  requirement with their primary weapon, the M-4 or M-16 semiautomatic  rifle. Of the 26 officers who had not met this requirement within the 6  month time frame, 11 officers were all located at one site with 8 of the 11  officers not meeting the requirement until 2 to 5 months after the required  time. According to an official at this site, 7 of the 8 officers could not  complete the requirement in a timely fashion because the site’s firing range  was closed for the investigation of an accidental weapon discharge that had  resulted in an injury to a protective force officer. Although the DOE  Protective Force Program Manual provides guidance that allows for  off-site training to meet requirements, officials noted that a stand-down of  all firearms training prevented training requirements from being met. We  determined that 2 of the 26 officers did not complete the requirement for  medical reasons. We were not given reasons why the remaining officers did  not meet the requirement.
section_title: Physical Fitness
paragraphs: Under DOE regulations, protective force personnel employed by DOE  contractors who are authorized to carry firearms must meet a minimum  standard for physical fitness every 12 months. There are two standards for  such personnel—Offensive Combative and Defensive Combative. All  Security Police Officer-IIIs, which include DOE special response team  members, must meet the Offensive Combative standard which requires a  1-mile run in no more than 8 minutes 30 seconds and a 40-yard  prone-to-running dash in no more than 8 seconds. All other protective  officers authorized to carry firearms must meet the Defensive Combative  standard, which requires a one-half mile run in no more than 4 minutes 40  seconds and a 40-yard prone-to-running dash in no more than 8.5 seconds.  According to the training records of the 105 protective force officers we  reviewed, 103 of the 105 protective force officers had met the standard  required by federal regulation for their position. Two officers who did not  meet the requirement were on medical restriction. The records for another  officer showed him as having met the requirement, but additional records  provided by the site showed the officer had completed the run in a time  that exceeded the standard. Site officials could not provide an explanation  for this discrepancy.
subsections: section_title: Protective Officer Equipment
paragraphs: DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual sets a number of requirements  for protective force equipment. Among these requirements are the  following:   Minimum standard duty equipment. All Security Police Officers are  required to carry a minimum set of equipment, including a portable  radio, a handgun, and an intermediate force weapon such as a baton. In  addition, a mask to protect against a chemical attack must be carried or  available to them. All Security Police Officer-IIs and Security Police  Officer-IIIs must also have access to personal protective body armor.
Firearms serviceability. Firearms must be kept serviceable at all times  and must be inspected by a DOE-certified armorer at least twice a year  to ensure serviceability. All DOE sites with armed protective force  personnel are required to have the services of a certified armorer who is  responsible for inspecting, maintaining, and repairing firearms.
Firearms inventories. Issued firearms must be inventoried at the  beginning of each shift, and an inventory of all firearms in storage must  be conducted weekly. A complete inventory of all firearms must be  conducted on a monthly basis.
Appropriate equipment to counter the DBT. In line with DOE’s  performance standards, DOE protective forces equipment must be  tailored to counter adversaries identified in the DBT. To this end, sites  employ a variety of equipment including automatic weapons, night  vision equipment, and body armor.
In most cases, each site’s protective forces carried or had access to the  required minimum standard duty equipment. Most sites demonstrated that  they had access to certified armorers, and each site maintained the  required firearms maintenance, inspection, and inventory records, often  kept in a detailed computerized database. We did not, however, conduct a  detailed inspection of these records nor did we conduct an independent inventory of each site’s firearms. The appropriate policies and procedures  were also in place for the inventory of firearms. In addition, some sites  have substantially increased their protective forces weaponry since  September 11, 2001, or have plans to further enhance these capabilities to  meet the 2004 DBT. For example, one site provided us with a list of  upgrades since September 11, 2001, including new M-4 carbines, grenade  launchers, Barrett .50 caliber rifles, armor piercing ammunition, chemical  and biological protection suits, and decontamination kits, as well as  additional units that use specially trained dogs (K-9 units) and portable  X-ray machines to detect explosives.
section_title: Some Weaknesses in ESE Site Protective Force Practices Exist
paragraphs: While protective forces at ESE sites are generally meeting current DOE  requirements, we identified some weaknesses in ESE protective force  practices that could adversely affect the current readiness of ESE  protective forces to defend their sites. These include protective force  officers’ lack of regular participation in force-on-force exercises; the  frequency and quality of training opportunities; the lack of dependable  communications systems; and insufficient protective gear, including  protective body armor and chemical protective gear, and the lack of  armored vehicles.
subsections: section_title: Performance Testing and Training
paragraphs: According to DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual, performance tests  are used to evaluate and verify the effectiveness of protective force  programs and to provide needed training. Performance tests can also  identify protective systems requiring improvements, validate implemented  improvements, and motivate protective force personnel. A force-on-force  exercise is one type of performance test during which the protective force  engages in a simulated battle against a mock adversary force, employing  the weapons, equipment, and methodologies postulated in the DBT. DOE  believes that force-on-force exercises are a valuable training tool for  protective force officers. Consequently, DOE policy requires that  force-on-force exercises must be held at least once per year at sites that  possess Category I quantities of special nuclear material or Category II  quantities that can be rolled up to Category I quantities.
We asked protective force members whether they had participated in  force-on-force exercises during their service at their site and when they  most recently had participated. Eighty-four of the 105 protective force  officers we interviewed reported that they had participated in a  force-on-force exercise, but 8 reported they had never participated during  their service at the site, and 13 did not respond to this question. Of the 84  protective force officers that had participated,  60 reported participating within 12 months of the interview,   10 had participated within the last 2 to 5 years,   one had participated 13 years ago,  one could not remember the last force-on-force he had participated in,   12 did not respond to the question.
We were unable to verify whether protective force officers’ recollections  were accurate because DOE sites are not required to track individual  participation in force-on-force exercises. However, DOE’s Office of  Security and Safety Performance Assurance 2004 review of protective  forces found that the average protective force officer is only likely to  participate in a force-on-force exercise once every 4 to 6 years. DOE’s  Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance has concluded that  this frequency is not adequate for the training of protective forces.
DOE’s 2004 protective force review also found that the frequency, quality,  and rigor of performance tests and training exercises vary widely  throughout the complex. Our interviews of protective force officers and  protective force managers produced a similar result. For example, we  asked protective force members whether they believed the force-on-force  exercises they participated in were realistic and challenging. Only 23 of the  84 protective force officers that had participated in these exercises  believed they were realistic while 23 stated they were somewhat realistic.  In contrast, 38 officers believed that the force-on-force exercises they had  participated in were not realistic. Twenty officers did not respond to the  question. In addition, 33 of the 84 protective force officers reported that  safety considerations interfered with the realism of the force-on-force  exercises with some protective force officers stating that they were limited  in the tactics they could employ. For example, some protective force  officers stated that they were not allowed to run up stairwells, climb  fences, or exceed the speed limit in patrol vehicles. Some protective force  officers at one site reported that for safety reasons they were no longer  allowed to deploy on the roof of a facility although this position provided a  significant advantage over adversaries approaching the facility. Some  contractor protective force managers agreed that safety requirements  limited the kind of realistic force-on-force training and other forms of  realistic training that are needed to ensure effective protective force  performance.
More broadly, most of the 105 protective force officers reported some  negative attitudes about the training they had received. Specifically, 85 of  the 105 protective force officers we interviewed identified a number of  deficiencies with their training, especially regarding the frequency and  quality of firearms and tactical training. The following deficiencies were  identified:  43 protective force officers reported that there was a lack of adequate  firearms training, with 13 officers noting that the only training they had  was when they went to satisfy the semiannual DOE qualification  requirements. Some officers also reported that they did not have first  priority at firing ranges because other local or federal law enforcement  agencies were using them.   42 protective force members, including 16 officers who are members of  special response teams, reported that tactical training  opportunities—where protective force officers move, shoot, and  communicate as a unit—at their respective sites were very limited. A  review of the standard DOE training curricula for Security Police  Officer-IIs showed that these officers currently receive very little  tactical training.
section_title: Communications Equipment
paragraphs: According to DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual, protective force  officers must have the capability to communicate information among  themselves. The radios these officers use must be capable of two-way  communications, provide intelligible voice communications, and be readily  available in sufficient numbers to equip protective force personnel. In  addition, a sufficient number of batteries must be available and maintained  in a charged condition to support routine, emergency, and response  operations.
Protective force officers at all five of the sites we visited reported problems  with their radio communications systems. Specifically, 66 of the 105  protective force officers reported that they did not always have dependable  radio communications, with 23 officers identifying sporadic battery life,  and 29 officers reporting poor reception at some locations on site as the  two most significant problems. In addition, some of the protective force  officers believed that radio communications were not sufficient to support  their operations and could not be relied on to transfer information between  officers if a terrorist attack occurred. Site security officials at two sites  acknowledged that efforts were under way to improve radio  communications equipment. In addition, some security officials said other  forms of communications, such as telephones, cellular telephones, and  pagers, were provided for protective forces to ensure that they could  communicate effectively.
section_title: Protective Body Armor
paragraphs: DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual requires that Security Police  Officer-IIs and -IIIs wear body armor or that body armor be stationed in a  way that allows them to quickly put it on to respond to an attack without  negatively impacting response times. At one site, we found that most  Security Police Officer-IIs had not been issued protective body armor  because the site had requested and received in July 2003 a waiver to deviate  from the requirement to equip all Security Police Officer-IIs with body  armor. The waiver was sought for a number of reasons, including the (1)  increased potential for heat-related injuries while wearing body armor  during warm weather, (2) increased equipment load that armor would  place on protective force members, (3) costs of acquiring the necessary  quantity of body armor and the subsequent replacement costs, and (4)  associated risks of not providing all Security Police Officer-IIs with body  armor could be mitigated by using cover provided at the site by natural and  man-made barriers. According to a site security official, this waiver is  currently being reviewed because of the increased threat contained in the  2004 DBT.
section_title: Special Response Team Capabilities
paragraphs: Security Police Officer-IIIs serve on special response teams responsible for  offensive operations, such as hostage rescue and the recapture and  recovery of special nuclear material. Special response teams are often  assigned unique equipment, including specially encrypted radios; body  armor that provides increased levels of protection; special suits that enable  officers to operate and fight in chemically contaminated environments;  special vehicles, including armored vehicles; submachine guns; light  machine guns; grenade launchers; and precision rifles, such as Remington  700 rifles and Barrett .50 caliber rifles. These response teams are also  issued breaching tools to allow them to reenter facilities to which terrorists  may have gained access.
Each site with Category I special nuclear material must have a special  response team capability available on a continuous basis. However, one  ESE site does not have this capability and, instead, relies on another  organization, through a formal memorandum of understanding, to provide  a special response team. This arrangement, however, has not been  comprehensively performance tested, as called for in the memorandum of  understanding. Site officials state that they will soon conduct the first  comprehensive performance test of this memorandum of understanding.
section_title: Chemical Protective Gear
paragraphs: DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual specifies that all Security Police  Officer-II and -IIIs be provided, at a minimum, with protective masks that  provide for nuclear, chemical, and biological protection. Other additional  chemical protective gear and procedures are delegated to the sites. At the  four sites with special response teams, we found that the teams all had  special suits that allowed them to operate and fight in environments that  might be chemically contaminated. For Security Police Officer-IIs,  chemical protective equipment and expectations for fighting in chemically  contaminated environments varied. For example, two sites provided  additional protective equipment for their Security Police Officer-IIs and  expected them to fight in such environments. Another site did not provide  additional equipment, but expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to  evacuate along with other site workers. Finally, the one site that did not  have a special response team expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to  fight in chemically contaminated environments. However, the site provided  no additional protective gear for its officers other than standard-duty issue  long-sleeved shirts and the required protective masks.
section_title: Protective Force Vehicles
paragraphs: DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual requires that protective force  vehicles exhibit a degree of reliability commensurate with their intended  functions and enhance the efficiency, speed, and safety of routine and  emergency duties under all expected weather conditions. Vehicles must be  maintained in serviceable condition, with preventive maintenance  performed at intervals that meet or exceed the manufacturer  recommendations.
Nearly half (14 of 30) of the protective force officers we interviewed at two  sites reported that patrol vehicles were old, in poor physical condition, and  not suitable for pursuit and recovery missions. Some reported maintenance  as a significant problem, with one officer observing that more vehicles  were in the shop than on patrol. Some protective force officers also  reported that door handles on patrol vehicles did not work, which made it  difficult for them to enter and exit the vehicles. A site security official told  us that they had never had problems with the physical condition or  maintenance of patrol vehicles, but did note that they had experienced  difficulties in acquiring new vehicles.
We also found that ESE sites currently do not have the same level of vehicle  protection as NNSA sites that also have Category I special nuclear material.  Specifically, while not a DOE requirement, all NNSA sites with Category I  special nuclear material currently operate armored vehicles. However, only  one of the five ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material operated  armored vehicles at the time of our review. One other ESE site was  planning to purchase armored vehicles.
section_title: DOE and ESE Officials Need to Take Several Prompt and Coordinated Actions to Address the New DBT Requirements by 2008
paragraphs: To successfully defend against the much larger terrorist threat contained in  the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they  need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include the  transformation of current protective forces into an “elite force,” the  development and deployment of new security technologies, the  consolidation and elimination of special nuclear material, and  organizational improvements within ESE’s security program. However,  because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early stages of  development and will require significant commitment of resources and  coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the October 2008  DBT implementation deadline is uncertain.
subsections: section_title: DOE Proposes Creating an “Elite Force” to Protect Its Sites in the New Threat Environment
paragraphs: DOE officials believe that the way its sites, including those sites managed  by ESE, currently train their contractor-operated protective forces will not  be adequate to defeat the terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT. This  view is shared by most protective force officers (74 out of 105) and their  contractor protective force managers who report that they are not at all  confident in their current ability to defeat the new threats contained in the  2004 DBT. In response, DOE has proposed the development of an “elite  force” that would be patterned after the U. S. military’s Special Forces.
However, creating this elite force is a complex undertaking and will be a  challenge to fully realize by the October 2008 implementation deadline.
Even before the issuance of the 2004 DBT, DOE had become concerned  about protective force preparedness because of intense demands placed on  protective forces following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The  need to increase security at DOE sites as rapidly as possible following the  2001 attacks meant that DOE protective forces worked extensive overtime.  DOE’s Inspector General, DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance  Assurance, and GAO reported on the potential for large amounts of  protective force overtime to increase fatigue, reduce readiness, and reduce  training opportunities for protective forces.
In recognition of this situation, in September 2003, the Secretary of Energy  directed DOE’s Office of Performance Assurance and Independent  Assessment, now a part of the Office Security and Safety Performance  Assurance, to conduct a special review to determine the effectiveness of  the management of protective forces and protective force capabilities. This  classified review, which was issued in June 2004 and covered five NNSA  sites and one ESE site, found that the current organization and tactics of  DOE protective forces need improvement to deal with possible terrorist  threats. Historically, DOE protective forces had been more concerned with  a broad range of industrial security and order-keeping functions than with  preparation to conduct a defensive battle against a paramilitary attacker, as  is described in the 2004 DBT. The June 2004 review recommended a shift to  an aggressive military-like, small-unit, tactical defense posture, which  included enhanced tactical training standards to allow protective forces to  move, shoot, and communicate effectively as a unit in a combat  environment. The review also recommended more frequent, realistic, and  rigorous force-on-force performance testing and training for the  department’s protective forces.
Based on this review, the Secretary of Energy proposed transforming  DOE’s protective force that safeguards special nuclear material into an  “elite force” with training and capabilities similar to the military’s Special  Forces units. Subsequently, in June 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Energy  directed the formation of a Protective Forces Working Group to formally  review missions, standards, and current protective force status as the basis  for developing recommendations on policy, training, and equipment that, if  enacted, could serve as the basis for creating an elite force. This working  group consisted of representatives from DOE’s Office of Security and  Safety Performance Assurance, NNSA, and ESE’s Office of Environmental  Management. In August 2004, the working group recommended a set of  near-term actions that could be used to elevate protective force  capabilities. These included instituting more demanding medical and  physical fitness standards, increasing tactical training, and reorganizing  protective forces into tactically cohesive units. In October 2004, the  working group also recommended considering federalizing DOE protective  forces as a long-term option. In January 2005, the Deputy Secretary of  Energy endorsed the report’s findings and directed that implementation  actions begin.
Most protective force officers we interviewed generally support some of  the ideas embodied in the elite force concept. Specifically, most protective  force officers (74 out of 105) at the ESE sites we visited reported that they  are not at all confident in their current ability to defeat the new threats  contained in the 2004 DBT. In particular, some protective force officers  believed that they would be outgunned and overwhelmed by the terrorist  force identified in the 2004 DBT. In addition, some feared they could be  surprised by a large terrorist force because of the sites’ security strategy  and the physical layout of their sites. Some sites are already responding to  the elite force concept by increasing tactical training, and others plan to  institute “training relief shifts,” which will increase the amount of time  protective force officers have available for uninterrupted training. Some  sites also have ambitious plans for constructing new facilities to enable  increased tactical training.
Nevertheless, despite broad support and some sites’ progress, DOE’s  proposal for an elite force remains largely in the conceptual phase. DOE  has developed a preliminary draft implementation plan that lays out  high-level milestones and key activities, but this plan has not been formally  approved by the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance. The  draft implementation plan recognizes that DOE will have to undertake and  complete a number of complex tasks in order to develop the elite force  envisioned. For example, DOE will have to revise its existing protective  forces policies to incorporate, among other things, the increased training  standards that are needed to create an elite force. This may be a  time-consuming effort.
As we reported in April 2004, the DOE policy process emphasizes  developing consensus through a laborious review and comment process by  program offices. We found that this policy process contributed to the  nearly 2 years it took the department to develop DOE’s first  post-September 11, 2001, DBT. Likewise, DOE has been working on a  streamlined overall security policy for nearly 2 years. Once this streamlined  policy is formally issued, now scheduled for summer 2005, DOE’s draft  implementation plans for an elite force call for the new policy to  immediately undergo revision to incorporate elements of the elite force  concept. DOE’s Office of Security has not yet identified a time frame for  completing these actions. In addition, DOE officials believe that broader  DOE policies will have to be revised. For example, DOE security officials,  as well as contractor protective force managers, see some DOE health and  safety policies and practices as an impediment because they do not allow  the kind of realistic and physically demanding training that is required for  an elite force. According to these officials, revising these policies will  require broad, high-level support within DOE. Furthermore, some DOE  protective force requirements, such as medical, physical fitness, and  training standards are mandated by DOE regulations. Changing these  regulations, according to a DOE security official, would require DOE to  follow rule-making procedures. All these protective force policies and  regulations, as well as broader DOE policies are contained in collective  bargaining agreements between protective force unions and protective  force contractors and in protective force contracts, which also will need to  be modified to create the kind of elite force that DOE believes is necessary  to defeat the 2004 DBT.
Some site security officials recognize that they will have to carefully craft  transition plans for currently employed protective force officers who may  not be able to meet the new standards required for an elite force. Some of  these officials have expressed concern about the ability of some protective  force officers to meet more rigorous physical and training standards that  are likely to be part of an elite force. DOE field security officials and  contractor protective force managers likewise have expressed concern  about finding ways for less capable protective force officers to move into  different roles or retire from service with a sense of dignity. Because all the  protective forces at the five ESE sites we visited operated, at the time,  under separate contracts and separate collective bargaining agreements,  there is no uniform benefit or retirement plan for protective forces, and  these benefits, according to one contractor security official, differ  considerably among sites. Some contractor protective force managers  recognized that they needed such mechanisms as early retirement  incentives and more attractive retirement packages to make the effective  transition to an elite force. They believed, however, that they would not be  able to provide these mechanisms, most of which are quite expensive,  without DOE’s help. Officials from the one protective force contractor,  which had a placement and income protection program for protective force  officers who could no longer meet existing DOE requirements, said that  payouts from the program have far exceeded contributions and that the  program will have to be restructured in the near future.
Given these complexities, DOE security officials recently told us that  implementing all the measures associated with the elite force concept will  take about 5 years to complete. With this time line, the development of the  elite force will be under way by the new DBT’s implementation deadline of  October 2008, but the full benefit of an elite force, according to DOE’s own  preliminary plans, will not be realized until fiscal year 2010.
section_title: DOE Believes Security Technologies Can Improve the Effectiveness of Protective Forces
paragraphs: DOE is seeking to improve the effectiveness and survivability of its  protective forces through the development and deployment of new security  technologies. The department believes technologies can reduce the risk to  protective forces in case of an attack and provide additional response time  to meet and defeat an attack. Many of the ESE sites we visited currently  possess some advanced security technology. For example, all sites operate  central alarm stations that often integrate hundreds of alarms and dozens  of sensors, such as video cameras and infrared and microwave detection  systems, as well as redundant communications systems. Some sites also  have thermal imaging sensors, which can detect adversaries at long ranges  and in all types of weather. Some of these sensors have data links that  allow the information to be rapidly shared. One site deploys classified  devices that can immobilize or delay the movement of an adversary.
DOE officials believe that additional technology can further enhance site  security. The Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance is  assisting sites in identifying and deploying existing technologies to enhance  protection systems, principally through the following programs:   Technology and Systems Development Program. DOE has funded this  program for many years, although funding has been reduced in recent  years. Specifically, DOE provided over $20 million for this program in  fiscal year 2004. However, DOE only requested $14.5 million for this  program in fiscal year 2006–about 1 percent of the entire DOE security  program budget. Moreover, the program has had only limited success in  developing technologies that can actually be deployed. The Director of  DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance recently  stated that DOE has not yet taken the formal steps necessary to  coordinate investment in emerging security technologies to ensure they  are deployed at DOE sites in a timely manner.
Site Assistance Visit Program. Immediately after the issuance of the  2004 DBT, DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance  embarked on site assistance visits—a targeted effort to encourage the  use of technologies that could offset the more costly  manpower-intensive approaches needed to meet the more demanding  requirements of the DBT. These site assistance visits focus on new and  emerging security technologies. Each site visit lasts approximately 2  weeks and consists of exercises and simulations designed to evaluate  each site’s preliminary plans for meeting the new DBT and to  demonstrate how technologies can assist in countering the 2004 DBT in  a cost-effective manner. DOE conducted these visits between October  2004 and April 2005. Four of the five ESE sites we examined have  received these visits. DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance  Assurance completed the final report on the results of the site  assistance visits in May 2005. DOE plans to use the results of these visits  to help justify its fiscal year 2007 budget.
Even before the site assistance visits, ESE sites were actively considering  advanced security technologies. For example, at least two ESE sites are  considering installing automatic weapons that can be operated from  remote, secure locations—known as remotely operated weapons systems  within DOE. A few ESE protective forces also supported this push toward  technology, especially technology that allows more timely detection of  adversaries. Specifically, 16 of the 105 protective force officers we  interviewed said they needed enhanced detection technologies that would  allow adversaries to be detected and engaged at much greater ranges than  is currently possible at most sites.
section_title: ESE’s Strategy for Meeting the New DBT Relies Heavily on the Consolidation of Special Nuclear Materials
paragraphs: ESE’s current strategy for meeting the October 2008 deadline for  compliance with the 2004 DBT relies heavily on the consolidation and  elimination of special nuclear materials between and among other ESE  sites. At all five of the ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material,  material consolidation and elimination are important goals for the site and  the responsible DOE program office and are inextricably tied to security  plans. However, neither ESE nor DOE has developed a comprehensive,  departmentwide plan to achieve the needed cooperation and agreement  among the sites and program offices to consolidate special nuclear  material, as we recommended in our April 2004 report. In the absence of  such a comprehensive, coordinated plan, completing some of these  significant activities by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is  unlikely. In particular:   Savannah River Site. Currently, special nuclear material is stored in  three separate, widely dispersed areas at the Savannah River Site—an  Office of Environmental Management (EM) site. In November 2004, EM  directed the site to consolidate all its current and future storage of  Category I special nuclear material into a single area by fiscal year 2007.  This consolidation will free up over 100 protective force officers who  currently guard facilities at the sites’ two other areas. It will also allow  for a substantially increased protective force presence at the single  remaining area and could save the site over $100 million in expected  costs to implement measures to defend the site against the 2004 DBT.
Hanford Site. Hanford, another EM site, had plans to transfer most of  its special nuclear material to the Savannah River Site by the end of  fiscal year 2006. However, a number of factors threaten to delay this  transfer of material. These factors include (1) NNSA’s Office of Secure  Transportation’s shipping and load restrictions on transporting special  nuclear material across the United States, (2) the Savannah River Site’s  inability to store some of Hanford’s special nuclear material in its  present configuration, and (3) the Savannah River Site’s current lack of  facilities to permanently dispose of Hanford’s special nuclear material.  Faced with these challenges, EM decided in February 2005 to postpone  shipping material from Hanford until these issues could be resolved.  Hanford had begun planning for such a contingency, but the site will  now have to expend additional funds of about $85 million annually to  protect these materials against the 2004 DBT.
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and  Argonne National Laboratory-West. Managed by the Office of Nuclear  Energy, Science and Technology, the Idaho National Engineering and  Environmental Laboratory had removed—by NNSA’s Office of Secure  Transportation—its currently known Category I special nuclear material  from its single Category I storage facility in May 2005. Removal will  allow a substantial number of its protective forces to transfer to the  nearby Argonne National Laboratory-West site, which has a continuing  Category I special nuclear material mission. These additional protective  forces will be critical to helping the site meet the 2004 DBT. However, a  recent DOE site assistance visit suggested that several other facilities at  the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory may  have some previously unrecognized Category I special nuclear material.  Site security officials report that they are trying to resolve these issues  with DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance. If any  of these other Idaho National Engineering and Environmental  Laboratory facilities do have Category I special nuclear material, they  will require additional protection, which could severely damage the  current DBT implementation plans for both Idaho sites. In addition,  because of its remote location, the robust design of some of its facilities,  its large protective force, and extensive training facilities, the Idaho  National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory is now being  evaluated as a potential future consolidation location for NNSA  Category I special nuclear material.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, an  Office of Science Site, plans to eliminate its Category I special material.  Current plans call for down-blending this material in place to less  attractive forms and for extracting medically useful isotopes that may  help treat certain forms of cancer. The Office of Nuclear Energy, Science  and Technology is responsible for this down-blending program.  However, the costs for this program have risen steeply, even without the  additional security costs of the meeting the 2004 DBT. In addition, the  Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology and the Office of  Science have not formally agreed on which program office will bear the  brunt of the estimated $53 million annual security costs required to meet  the implementation deadline for the 2004 DBT. If these issues can be  resolved, down-blending operations are scheduled to begin in fiscal year  2009 and to be completed in fiscal year 2012. If down-blending  operations do not take place, Oak Ridge National Laboratory will face  high additional security costs—approaching an additional $43 million  each year, according to preliminary site estimates—as long as the  material remains on-site.
section_title: ESE’s Headquarters Security Organization Is Not Well Suited to Meet the Challenges of the 2004 DBT
paragraphs: ESE’s current organization is not well suited to meeting the challenges  associated with implementing the 2004 DBT. First, ESE lacks a formally  appointed senior security advisor or a centralized security organization. In  contrast, NNSA has such a position. Specifically, Title 32 of the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, which created NNSA,  established the position of Chief, Defense Nuclear Security, to serve as the  primary security advisor to the NNSA Administrator. The Chief is  responsible for the development and implementation of NNSA security  programs, including the physical security for all NNSA facilities. Over the  past several years, ESE has recognized the need for such a position and has  sought to fill the security advisor role through the use of employees  temporarily detailed from other organizations. For example, beginning in  2004, a detailee from the Office of Security and Safety Performance  Assurance has served as the Acting Director for ESE Security. The current  acting director was preceded by a visiting White House Fellow. However,  the position of the Director for ESE Security has no programmatic  authority or staff. This lack of authority limits the director’s ability to help  facilitate ESE and DOE-wide cooperation on such issues as material  down-blending at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and material  consolidation at other ESE sites.
Second, ESE does not have a consolidated headquarters security office. In  April 2005, the recently confirmed ESE Under Secretary stated that ESE  was composed of “institutional ‘stovepipes’” and that this structure has  hampered strategic management within ESE. ESE has explored creating a  consolidated headquarters security office, but each of the three program  offices we examined continues to maintain its own headquarters security  offices. These offices, however, are organized and staffed differently. For  example, the Office of Environmental Management’s headquarters security  office has more than 17 professional security personnel on staff. In  contrast, the headquarters offices of Science and of Nuclear Energy,  Science and Technology each have only one and two security professionals  on staff, respectively. For the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and  Technology this situation is problematic because its security  responsibilities are increasing with the consolidation of two of its sites into  the Idaho National Laboratory and with the Oak Ridge National  Laboratory’s down-blending program. Indeed, safeguards and security  funding is a much larger percentage of the Office of Nuclear Energy,  Science and Technology’s total budget—$75 million out of a total fiscal year  2006 budget request of $511 million, about 15 percent—than it is for either  the Office of Science or the Office of Environmental Management. As a  result, according to the EM Security Director and Acting Director, ESE  security, the Environmental Management security office provides informal  support to the other ESE programs offices, including the Offices of Nuclear  Energy, Science and Technology and Science.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Successfully defending against the increased terrorist threat contained in  the 2004 DBT will require a significant coordinated effort by DOE, ESE, and  the ESE sites that contain Category I special nuclear material. While ESE  sites are not required to meet the requirements of the 2004 DBT until  October 2008, we believe that ESE needs to take action to correct  weaknesses with its current training and equipment practices. Addressing  these issues will put ESE protective forces in a better position to defend  their sites, in the short run, while DOE and ESE press ahead on the broader  initiatives, such as the elite force concept and materials consolidation that  they believe will be necessary to meet the requirements of the 2004 DBT.  While we support DOE’s and ESE’s broader initiatives, we believe that  these initiatives cannot be successfully implemented without a more  strategic approach. Such an approach will need to include a comprehensive  plan for all of the initiatives DOE and ESE are considering and will need to  be supported by a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient  authority to ensure coordination across all ESE program offices that have  Category I special nuclear material.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order to ensure that DOE and ESE protective forces can meet the new  terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT, we are making the following five  recommendations to the Secretary of Energy:  Develop a requirement for individual protective force officer  participation in force-on-force exercises.
Require that sites track protective force member participation in  force-on-force exercises.
Take immediate action to correct weaknesses in protective force  equipment at ESE sites by providing the following where needed:  body armor,   special response team capabilities, and   vehicles that provide enhanced protection for protective forces.
Develop and implement a departmentwide, multiyear, fully resourced  implementation plan for meeting the new 2004 DBT requirements that  includes detailed plans for   the creation of an elite force through the revision of existing DOE  protective force policies and practices,  the development and deployment of enhanced security technologies,   the transportation and consolidation of special nuclear materials.
Require the Under Secretary, ESE, to establish a security organization to  oversee the development, implementation, and coordination of ESE,  and broader DOE efforts, to meet the 2004 DBT.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided DOE with a copy of this report for review and comment. DOE  stated that it concurred with the report and accepted our  recommendations. In that context, DOE provided an update on the actions  it anticipated would address our recommendations. While we believe that  most of DOE’s anticipated actions will be responsive to our  recommendations, we are concerned about DOE’s response to our  recommendation that it develop a departmentwide, multiyear, fully  resourced implementation plan for meeting the 2004 DBT requirements.  Specifically, in responding to this recommendation, DOE cited only  individual efforts to address the development of an elite force, the  deployment of enhanced security technologies, and the consolidation of  special nuclear material, not the development of a comprehensive plan.  While each of these efforts is important, as we demonstrated in our report,  the success of these efforts requires close coordination across numerous  DOE, ESE, as well as NNSA organizations. We continue to believe that DOE  cannot be successful in meeting the requirements of the 2004 DBT by its  deadline of October 2008 without an integrated effort that is built around a  comprehensive plan. DOE also provided three additional technical changes  that we have incorporated. DOE’s letter commenting on our draft report is  presented in appendix II.
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If you or your staff have any questions about this report or need additional  information, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made  major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To obtain an overall perspective on how protective forces are prepared to  defend Department of Energy (DOE) sites, we reviewed relevant literature  focusing on Special Nuclear Materials, DOE’s protective forces, and reports  by DOE’s Inspector General, as well as previous GAO reports. We  conducted multiple rounds of interviews with DOE headquarters officials  and conducted document reviews. We also met with DOE and protective  force officials at five sites under the oversight of DOE’s Office of the Under  Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment: Oak Ridge National  Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory,  Argonne National Laboratory–West, the Savannah River Site, and the  Hanford Site.
To determine the extent to which protective forces at Office of the Under  Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment sites are meeting DOE’s  existing readiness requirements, we reviewed DOE policies to determine  current requirements. We also reviewed pertinent literature about the  factors that affect the readiness of military forces. We conducted  structured interviews with 105 ESE protective force officers at the five ESE  sites. We took several steps to ensure that we selected protective force  officers independently and interviewed protective force officers with  varying levels of experience. We interviewed a nonprobability sample of  protective force officers from all five ESE sites. Even though we are not  generalizing to the population as a whole, at each site we randomly  selected the protective force officers to interview. Random selection  protects against selection bias and helps assure that the officers we  interviewed were independent of site management. Specifically, we  obtained a complete roster of all protective force officers at each site,  which included the name, position, area assignment, and length of service  for each protective force officer and identified the dates and potential time  slots for the interviews during our site visits. We submitted modified  rosters to the security contractor with the potential interview time slots,  and the contractor resubmitted this roster with the availability of each  protective force officer. We then stratified protective force officers by  position, rank, and length of service and assigned them random numbers  from a random number table. We also assigned random numbers, in  sequence from the random number table, to protective force officers at  each site, eliminating random numbers to ensure that no random number  was ever used twice. The random numbers assigned to protective force  officers were placed in chronological order and officers were selected  based on the lowest random number assigned, their availability during the  prescribed time slots, position, area assignment, and length of service.  Lastly, we informed the security contractor at each site of those protective  force officers we wished to interview prior to our site visit. The structured  interviews were administered by two-person teams to Security Police  Officer-IIs and Security Police Officer-IIIs. We asked the officers questions  designed to determine their readiness to defend the sites, including  questions about their morale, training, and equipment. We also reviewed  the training records and physical fitness qualifications of the 105 officers to  determine if key elements of their training complied with existing DOE  training requirements. In particular, we reviewed selected firearms and  physical fitness qualifications to determine if these officers complied with  existing DOE requirements and federal regulations.
Finally, we reviewed the equipment ESE protective forces use to determine  if it met current DOE requirements. For example, we reviewed the  minimum standard duty equipment that was employed at each site. We also  checked to ensure that most sites’ armorers were certified as required by  DOE and, for most sites, we inspected armories, inspection records, as well  as firearms inventory procedures. Finally, we reviewed the types of  equipment that some sites are evaluating and/or planning to purchase.
To determine what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully  defend against the new threat identified in the 2004 DBT by DOE’s  implementation deadline of October 2008, we reviewed the 2004 DBT and  associated guidance documents. We discussed the 2004 DBT with officials  in DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance and with  officials in ESE’s Offices of Environmental Management; Nuclear Energy,  Science and Technology; and Science. Where available, we reviewed  documents prepared by ESE and contractor officials on how they plan to  comply with the 2004 DBT. We discussed DOE’s initiative to transform its  current protective force into an elite force with DOE’s Office of Security  and Safety Performance Assurance and security officials at all five of the  ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material. We also discussed site  assistance visits and their concentration on security technology with DOE  security officials. Furthermore, we reviewed recent DOE congressional  testimony on the role of security technology and reviewed the relevant  portion of the fiscal year 2006 DOE budget submission. In addition, we  discussed plans for special nuclear material consolidation with ESE  program security officials and site security officials. Finally, we discussed  ESE’s security organization with DOE’s Office of Security and Safety  Performance Assurance, ESE’s Acting Security Director, and ESE program  security offices. We also reviewed congressional testimony given by the  Under Secretary of Energy at his recent confirmation hearing.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Don Cowan, Joyce Evans,  Doreen Feldman, Jonathan Gill, Preston Heard, James Noel, Joe Oliver, and  Carol Hernstadt Shulman made key contributions to this report.