Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages
Published: 2005-07-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) cannot meet its global commitments without continued reserve participation. The Army Reserve provides critical combat support and combat service support units, such as medical and transportation units, to the Army. While Army Reserve members historically could expect to train one weekend a month and 2 weeks a year with activations for limited deployments, since September 11 some have been called upon to support ongoing military operations for a year or more. GAO (1) identified the challenges the Army Reserve faces in continuing to support overseas operations and (2) assessed the extent to which the Army and Army Reserve have taken steps to improve the Army Reserve's readiness for future missions.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While the Army Reserve has provided ready forces to support military operations since September 11, 2001, GAO found that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the Army Reserve to continue to provide these forces due to personnel and equipment shortages. The three primary causes of these shortages are (1) the practice of not maintaining Army Reserve units with all of the personnel and equipment they need to deploy, (2) current DOD and Army personnel policies that limit the number of reservists and length of time reservists may be deployed, and (3) a shortage of full-time support staff to develop and maintain unit readiness. These challenges are compounded by emerging recruiting shortfalls. The Army and Army Reserve have recently begun several initiatives to improve the Army Reserve's readiness and provide more deployment predictability for its soldiers; however, the Army lacks a comprehensive management strategy for integrating the initiatives to ensure that each initiative most efficiently contributes to the achievement of its overall readiness and predictability goals. One of the Army Reserve's major initiatives has been to develop a rotational force model. However, the model cannot be fully implemented until the Army determines the types and number of Army Reserve units it will need to carry out its plans to restructure into a more modular and flexible force. Because the Army has not defined what personnel, units, and equipment the Army Reserve will need under the new modular and rotational models, it cannot be assured that its initiatives are most efficiently working together to meet readiness goals and that funding is appropriately targeted to meet those goals. Until plans that integrate the initiatives are completed and approved and adequate resources are provided to implement them, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress will continue to lack assurance that DOD has an effective and efficient plan for resolving the Army Reserve's growing challenges.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Army Reserve is a citizen-soldier force that is trained and organized to  complement the combat forces of the active Army by providing specialized  combat service and combat service support skills.   For example, the Army  Reserve provides over 95 percent of the Army’s internment brigades,  railway units, Judge Advocate General units, training and exercise  divisions, and civil affairs units.  It also provides over two-thirds of the  Army’s psychological operations units, chemical units, hospitals, and  medical groups. As of March 2005, the Army Reserve had about 196,000  readily accessible members who participated in drills and training.
Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Army Reserve’s  primary role was to provide support forces for major combat operations  and limited support to operations around the world, such as those in the  Balkans and Kosovo.  However, since September 11, the Army Reserve has  provided large numbers of soldiers and units on an ongoing basis to meet  requirements for ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.   Some skills, such as civil affairs specialists, that have been in particularly  high demand reside heavily in the Army Reserve.  Moreover, while Army  Reserve soldiers historically could expect their military service to be part  time—including attending training for 2 weeks each year and attending  drills one weekend each month with potential activations for limited  deployments—many reservists have been on active duty for over a year to  support current operations.
The challenges in mobilizing large numbers of reservists on an ongoing  basis have led to questions about whether changes are needed in the way  the Army Reserve is structured and resourced.  In light of new security  threats and increased operational demands, the Army has recently  embarked on several new initiatives to increase its flexibility and  responsiveness.  For example, as outlined in 2004 in the Army Campaign  Plan, the Army, including its reserve components, is in the midst of a major  transformation to a more flexible modular force based on brigades rather  than divisions. In addition, the Army plans to implement a force rotation  model that would enable it to better predict when soldiers might be  mobilized.
We have previously reported on issues related to how the reserve  components have been mobilized and used for recent operations and made  recommendations on actions the Department of Defense (DOD) and the  services need to take to improve the efficiency of mobilization for reserve  forces.  In August 2003 and September 2004, we reported on several reserve  mobilization issues, including the mobilization approval process, DOD’s  limited use of the Individual Ready Reserve, and long-term reserve force  availability issues.  We also reported on the effect of the continuing high  use of National Guard forces and challenges to prepare the National Guard  for future overseas and domestic missions.  In addition, we recently  provided observations on the Army’s plans to convert to a modular force.
We prepared this report focused on the Army Reserve under the  Comptroller General’s statutory authority and are sending it to you because  it contains information that will be useful for your oversight  responsibilities for reserve personnel and readiness issues.  The objectives  of this report are to (1) identify the challenges the Army Reserve faces in  continuing to support overseas operations and (2) assess the extent to  which the Army and Army Reserve have taken steps to improve the Army  Reserve’s readiness for future missions.
To address our objectives, we analyzed data generated by the Total Army  Personnel Data Base - Reserves and provided by the U.S. Army Reserve  Command on the numbers of reservists that were mobilized for operations  since September 11, 2001, and their military occupations and numbers of  personnel that had not been mobilized.  We assessed the reliability of data  from the Total Army Personnel Data Base - Reserves and the Reserve End  Item Management System by 1) reviewing existing information about the  data and the systems that produced them; 2) performing electronic testing  of the relevant data elements; and 3) interviewing Army Reserve officials   knowledgeable about the data.  We determined that the data used were  sufficiently reliable to address our objectives. We analyzed DOD  publications and reports on equipment shortages to identify trends in the  status of equipment the Army Reserve has on hand. We supplemented this  information with visits to Army and Army Reserve commands and units,  including training units and an Army mobilization station.  We reviewed  documentation on the status of initiatives to improve long-term readiness  and predictability.  We also discussed the challenges the Army Reserve  faced in providing ready forces and initiatives to improve readiness and  deployment predictability with officials in the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, the Army, and the Army Reserve.  We conducted our review from  April 2004 through June 2005 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Details on the scope and methodology  used in our review are described in further detail in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Army Reserve is composed primarily of citizen soldiers who balance  the demands of a civilian career with military service on a part-time basis.   During the Cold War, it was expected that the Army Reserve would be a  force to supplement active forces in the event of extended conflict.   However, since the mid-1990s, the Army Reserve’s citizen soldiers have  been continuously mobilized to support operations worldwide, including  those in Bosnia and Kosovo. In today’s strategic environment, the Army  Reserve’s role has evolved to a complementary force, continuously  supplying specialized skills for combat support and combat service support  for Operations Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Iraqi Freedom.   Rather than the historical part-time employment in the Army Reserve,  some Army Reserve personnel have now been involuntarily activated for  over a year.
The members of the Army Reserve fall into three major categories:  the  Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.  (See fig. 1.)   Members of all three categories are subject to mobilization in the event of  national emergency.
The Army's Ready Reserve includes about 310,000 members and is made  up of two subcategories: the Selected Reserve, which has about 197,500  members, and the Individual Ready Reserve, which comprises about  112,500 members.  The Selected Reserve includes soldiers who are  assigned to units and participate in at least 48 scheduled drills or  training periods each year and serve on active duty for training at least  14 days each year; soldiers who voluntarily serve on extended tours of  active duty; and soldiers assigned on an individual basis to various  headquarters where they would serve if mobilized and train on a part- time basis to prepare for mobilization.  Members of the Individual Ready  Reserve include individuals who were previously trained during periods  of active service, but have not completed their service obligations;  individuals who have completed their service obligation and voluntarily  retain their reserve status; and personnel who have not completed basic  training.  Most of these members are not assigned to organized units, do  not attend weekend or annual training, and do not receive pay unless  they are called to active duty.
The Army's Standby Reserve represents about 1,030 personnel who  maintain their Army affiliation without being in the Ready Reserve.   Standby Reserve personnel have been designated key civilian  employees who have responsibilities that would keep them from being  mobilized, such as members of the Congress, or have temporary  hardships or disabilities that prevent them from participating in reserve  activities.  These personnel can be mobilized if necessary to fill  manpower needs in specific skills.
The Army Retired Reserve comprises all reserve officers and enlisted  personnel who receive retired pay on the basis of active or reserve  service and may be ordered to active duty in emergency situations.   Currently, about 747,000 personnel are in the Retired Reserve.
The majority of the reserve forces mobilized for current operations have  been members of the Selected Reserve, who are members of units and  attend monthly drills.  Some members of the Individual Ready Reserve and  Retired Reserve have also been mobilized to provide specialized skills.
In addition to personnel in these categories, the Army Reserve relies on a  small number of full-time personnel to provide the day-to-day  administrative, training, and maintenance tasks that units need to be able  to attain readiness for their missions and deploy.  The Army Reserve full- time support personnel are equal to about 13 percent of the authorized  number of reservists.
The Army Reserve is headed by the Chief, Army Reserve who is the  principal advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army for all Army Reserve  matters.  Among other duties, the Chief, Army Reserve provides reports to  the Secretary of Defense and the Congress, through the Secretary of the  Army, on the state of the Army Reserve and the ability of the Army Reserve  to meet its missions; manages the full-time support program; justifies and  executes the personnel, operation and maintenance, and construction  budgets for the Army Reserve; and participates in formulation and  development of Army policies.
The Army Reserve is a part of the total Army, which also includes the active  Army and the Army National Guard. The Chief of Staff of the Army is  charged with integrating reserve component matters into Army activities  and provides strategic guidance to the Army Reserve on transformation.  The Chief of Staff of the Army, as senior military leader of the Army,  participates in the development of Army plans, policies, programs, and  activities and supervises their execution. The Secretary of the Army, as the  senior official of the Department of the Army, is responsible for its effective  and efficient functioning.
Reserve forces may be called to active duty under a number of mobilization  authorities.  As shown in table 1, two authorities enable the President to  mobilize forces, but with size and time limitations.  Full mobilization,  which would enable the mobilization of forces for as long as they are  needed, requires a declaration by the Congress.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense implements the activation of  reservists under mobilization authority.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Reserve Affairs, who reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness, is responsible for providing policy, programs,  and guidance for the mobilization and demobilization of the reserve  components.
On September 14, 2001, President Bush declared that a national emergency  existed as a result of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York  and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and he invoked the partial  mobilization authority. On September 20, 2001, DOD issued mobilization  guidance that among other things directed the services as a matter of policy  to specify in initial orders to Ready Reserve members that the period of  active duty service would not exceed 12 months.  However, the guidance  allowed the service secretaries to extend orders for an additional 12  months or remobilize reserve component members under the partial  mobilization authority as long as an individual member’s cumulative  service did not exceed 24 months under the President’s partial mobilization  authority.
Since September 11, there have been six separate rotations of troops to  support Operation Enduring Freedom and four rotations of troops to  support Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began in 2001.  The Army has  identified the personnel and units that are expected to deploy in 2005 in the  seventh rotation of forces for Operation Enduring Freedom and the fifth  rotation for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
To address the continuing demand for ground forces, in 2004, the Army  extended the time that reservists must be deployed overseas for missions  related to Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq or Operation Enduring Freedom  in Afghanistan.  The Army’s current guidance is that soldiers should serve  12 months with their “boots on the ground” in the theater of operations, not  including the time spent in mobilization and demobilization activities,  which could add several more months to the time a Reserve member  spends on active duty.  The Army’s Forces Command identifies the Army  units and personnel to be deployed to meet the requirements of the  combatant commanders.
section_title: Personnel and Equipment Shortages Will Make It Increasingly Difficult for the Army Reserve to Continue to Support Overseas Operations
paragraphs: The Army Reserve has provided ready forces for ongoing military  operations since September 11, 2001, by transferring personnel and  equipment to deploying units; however, it is running out of personnel who  can be mobilized under current policies and equipment that meets  deployment standards for three key reasons.  First, the Army Reserve is  having difficulty continuing to support ongoing operations because its units  are not routinely resourced with all the personnel and equipment needed to  deploy.  Therefore, to meet combatant commanders’ requirements that  deploying units have all the personnel they require for their missions and  have equipment that is compatible with other units in the theater of  operations, the Army Reserve has had to transfer uniformed personnel and  equipment from nonmobilized units to prepare mobilized units.  This has  left nondeploying units with shortages in personnel and equipment, which  hampers their ability to train for future missions.  Second, based on data  provided by the Army Reserve, about 40 percent of Army Reserve  personnel have already been mobilized once and under personnel policies  cannot be mobilized again. This, in addition to emerging recruiting issues  that contribute to the availability of personnel, has led to a smaller pool of  reservists eligible for deployment and is making it more difficult for the  Army Reserve to provide trained and ready personnel with the specific  grades and skills needed for future operations.  Third, the Army Reserve  has been experiencing increasing shortages of the full-time support staff  who maintain equipment, train personnel, and conduct the day-to-day  administration of nonmobilized and returning units.  This hampers the  Army Reserve’s ability to maintain unit readiness.  These challenges, when  viewed collectively and in view of emerging recruiting challenges, threaten  the Army Reserve’s ability to provide ready units for ongoing operations  and prepare units for future missions.
subsections: section_title: The Army Reserve Has Prepared Mobilized Units by Transferring Personnel and Equipment from Nonmobilizing Units, but It Faces Shortages of Personnel and Equipment in the Near Term
paragraphs: To provide the ready forces required to meet mission requirements since  September 11, 2001, the Army Reserve has had to transfer personnel and  equipment from nonmobilized units to mobilized units—a practice that has  left nonmobilized units with shortages of resources and challenges the  Army Reserve to continue to support near-term operations.  The Army  Reserve, like the National Guard, has been structured according to a “tiered  resourcing” approach.  Under tiered resourcing, the Army has accepted  some operational risks to save money by funding Army Reserve units to  maintain fewer personnel and less equipment than they would need in the  event of a deployment.  Instead, units train at lower states of readiness with  the expectation that there would be sufficient time to add the required  personnel and equipment prior to a deployment.  Units anticipated to be  needed earlier in an operation are provided a larger portion of their  required personnel and equipment, while units that are not likely to be  needed until later during an operation, if at all, are given lower levels of  resources.  This strategy effectively supported the types of operations that  were anticipated before September 11, 2001, but in the current  environment combatant commanders have required that Army Reserve  units deploy with all the personnel and equipment they needed for their  missions.  While the Army Reserve has met these requirements, it has done  so by transferring resources from nonmobilized units, which has impaired  its ability to train for future missions. It has used this approach because its  personnel and equipment levels have not increased significantly since  September 11, 2001, despite the high pace of operations.  In addition, the  overall number of personnel in the Army’s Selected Reserve has declined as  recruiting and retention issues have emerged. Senior Army Reserve  officials have expressed concern that without change in the policies, the  Army Reserve will soon be unable to continue to provide forces with the  necessary skills and grades to support Army operations.
subsections: section_title: Personnel Transfers Have Enabled the Army Reserve to Mobilize Ready Units, but the Pool of Deployable Units and Personnel Is Declining
paragraphs: To meet combatant commander requirements for fully manned units, the  Army Reserve has had to transfer large numbers of personnel from  nonmobilizing units to provide specifically required capabilities and to  prepare mobilizing units for deployment.   From September 11, 2001,  through March 2005, the Army Reserve mobilized about 118,270 soldiers  from the Selected Reserve.  Of the total number of soldiers mobilized,  approximately 53,000 (45 percent) were transferred from nonmobilized  units to fill shortages in mobilized units and to provide personnel to fill  specialized requirements, such as medical teams, that did not require an  entire unit.  Over 50 percent of the requests for Army Reserve personnel  have been for groups of six soldiers or less.  As a result of these personnel  transfers, existing shortages in nonmobilized units are growing, which limit  these units’ ability to conduct training and require them to receive  significant infusions of personnel from other units if they are alerted for  mobilization.  Additionally, the pool of reservists from which to fill  requirements for certain skills and grades is decreasing.
Under tiered resourcing, Army Reserve units have generally been assigned  about 80 to 85 percent of the personnel they require to perform their  assigned missions, under the assumption that the shortages could be filled  before the units would deploy.  Additionally, some personnel assigned to  units may not be deployable for personal reasons, such as unfulfilled  training requirements, health problems, or family situations.  However, for  Operation Iraqi Freedom, combatant commanders requested that the Army  mobilize Army Reserve units with 100 percent of the required personnel.   Therefore, to support the first rotation of Army Reserve troops for  Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, the Army Reserve had to transfer  about 20 percent of the required personnel from nonmobilized units.    These initial transfers worsened existing personnel shortages in  nonmobilized units and increased the numbers of personnel that had to be  transferred when these units were subsequently mobilized.  To meet the  combatant commander’s personnel requirements during the second  rotation of troops for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2004, about 40 percent of  the required personnel were transferred from other units.  Beginning in fall  2004, combatant commanders have required that Army Reserve units  mobilize with 102 percent of their required personnel so that casualties or  other personnel losses during the mobilization process or during  deployment can be replaced from within the unit.  This requirement means  that units will require even more personnel to be transferred to them before  they deploy and will increase personnel shortages in remaining units even  further.  According to Army Reserve officials, units mobilizing in the near  future may have to receive over half of their required personnel from  outside the units.
As current conflicts have continued, the Army Reserve has experienced  recruitment shortfalls and lost personnel from resignations and retirement.   Although the Army Reserve is authorized to have 205,000 personnel in its  Selected Reserve, the number of participating members was about 197,000  in February 2005.  The number of members had decreased to about 196,000  in March 2005.
As the number of Army Reserve personnel available for mobilization  continues to decrease, the personnel who remain do not necessarily have  the ranks or skills needed to fulfill combatant commander requirements.   For example, captains are the Army Reserve’s unit-level leaders,  responsible for filling key command and staff positions.  In 2001, the Army  Reserve lacked about 42 percent of the 14,996 captains it required, and as  of January 2005, this percentage had increased to about 52 percent.  The  Army Reserve attributes the shortage of captains to fewer officers  transferring to the Army Reserve from the active Army.  Similarly, the  number of warrant officers—the Army Reserve’s technical experts and  pilots—has also been decreasing.  In September 2003, the Army Reserve  lacked 28 percent of its required 2,730 warrant officers, and as of February  2005, it lacked 37 percent.  In order to meet requirements with these  shortages, the Army Reserve has had to fill requirements by assigning  personnel in other grades who may not have as much training and  experience as these officers.
Furthermore, the Army Reserve is experiencing increasing shortages of  personnel who have certain skills that have been in high demand since  September 11, 2001.  For example, there has been a large requirement for  truck drivers to support current military operations.  Of the over 11,200  truck drivers assigned to the Army Reserve, over 8,690 have already been  mobilized since September 11, 2001, leaving only about 2,510 (or 22  percent) still available for deployment.  As table 2 shows, over 70 percent  of enlisted personnel in some occupations have already been deployed and  are no longer eligible for deployment.  While some of these skills have been  in high demand across the Army, some, such as civil affairs, reside  primarily in the Army Reserve and sometimes in small numbers of critical  personnel.  While new recruits are constantly entering the Army Reserve,  training them with specialized skills, such as intelligence analysis, takes  time.
As the pool of Army Reserve personnel considered available for  deployment continues to decrease, the Army Reserve is becoming  increasingly challenged to find qualified soldiers to perform key functions  needed to support ongoing operations.
section_title: The Army Reserve Has Transferred Equipment between Units to Prepare Mobilized Units but Is Experiencing Increasing Equipment Shortages
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, the Army Reserve has mobilized its units with  the most modern and highest quantity of equipment it has had available,  but increasing shortages threaten the Army Reserve’s ability to continue to  meet equipment requirements in the near term.  As with personnel, Army  Reserve units are not generally allotted all of the equipment they need to  deploy; they receive a percentage based on the mobilization sequence of  war plans, with those units expected to deploy first receiving priority for  equipment.  Since September 11, combatant commanders have required  deploying units to have 90 percent of their required equipment, even  though Army Reserve units are typically maintained with less than 80  percent of their equipment requirement.  In order to meet equipment  requirements, the Army Reserve has had to fill shortages from other  sources within the Army Reserve.  According to our analysis, the Army  Reserve transferred 235,900 pieces of equipment worth about $765 million  from September 13, 2001 through April 5, 2005.   As figure 2 shows,  individual (49 percent) and unit (23 percent) equipment represented the  two largest categories of equipment transferred.
In the fiscal year 2006 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report,  the Army Reserve reported that in February 2005 it had about 76 percent of  the equipment it requires.  However, this estimate includes equipment  items that are older than those used by the active component, such as  previous generations of trucks and older models of night vision goggles,  rifles, and generators.  The Army Reserve does not generally receive new  equipment at the same time as the active Army.  When the active Army  receives newer, modern equipment items, it often passes the older  equipment to the Army Reserve. While these items are considered  substitutes for newer items for some purposes, such as training, combatant  commanders barred many of them from current operations because the  Army cannot provide logistics support for the older items in theater.   Therefore, the equipment Army Reserve units have that is acceptable for  deployment is lower than the overall figure indicates.   For example, Army  Reserve units often train with older less capable versions of radios than  their active duty counterparts have, so deploying Army Reserve units have  had to be supplied with the new radios after they deployed.  In addition,  Army Reserve units have far fewer than the overall average for some  equipment items.  For example, the Army Reserve has less than half of its  requirement of night vision goggles, and a portion of the goggles it has are  not the most modern type.  While units can be provided additional  equipment from the Army after they deploy, these units do not have much  time to train with new equipment prior to conducting actual operations.   Moreover, continuing equipment shortages in nondeploying units also  result in loss of training opportunities and increase the number of  equipment items that must be transferred to prepare units for mobilization.
As the Army Reserve struggles to continue to provide the required  equipment to its mobilized units, its existing equipment inventory is aging  more quickly than originally planned due to high use and a harsh  operational environment.  According to the 2006 National Guard and  Reserve Equipment Report, equipment is being used in theater at rates five  times higher than under peacetime conditions, and several major  equipment items, including some light and light-medium truck fleets and  engineering equipment, are nearing or past their anticipated lifetime use.   The report noted that higher use is resulting in increased costs for parts  and maintenance as well as a reduction in overall unit readiness.   Additionally, according to the report, the Army Reserve estimates that  currently as much as 44 percent of its equipment needs servicing.  This  includes equipment returned from the first rotation of troops in support of  Operation Iraqi Freedom, about one-fourth of which still requires  maintenance before it can be reused.  Moreover, returning Army Reserve  units are being required to leave certain equipment items, such as vehicles  that have had armor added to them, in theater for continuing use by other  forces, which further reduces the equipment available for training and  limits the Army Reserve’s ability to prepare units for mobilizations in the  near term.
section_title: The Army Reserve’s Ability to Provide Ready Forces Is Affected by Current Personnel Policies
paragraphs: The Army Reserve’s ability to continue to provide ready forces in support  of ongoing operations is further affected by current DOD and Army  personnel policies, which affect the number of reserve personnel eligible  for deployment.  As we have reported previously, the availability of reserve  component forces to meet future requirements is greatly influenced by  DOD’s implementation of the partial mobilization authority under which  personnel serving in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom  were mobilized and by the department’s personnel policies.  Specifically,  we reported that the policies that affect mobilized reserve component  personnel were focused on the short-term needs of the services and reserve  component members rather than on long-term requirements and  predictability of deployment.
Army Reserve personnel serving in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring  Freedom have been activated under a partial mobilization authority, which  enables the secretary of a military department, in a time of national  emergency declared by the President or when otherwise authorized by law,  to involuntarily mobilize reservists for up to 24 consecutive months.   However, DOD’s policy implementing the mobilization authority is that any  soldier who has served 24 cumulative months during the current conflicts  is ineligible for any further activation unless the President signs an  additional executive order or that soldier volunteers for additional duty.   Time for pre- and postmobilization activities and accrued leave days are  also counted toward time served on a reservist's "24-month clock" under  this policy.  While the DOD policy limits the time a reservist can serve on  active duty to 24 months, Army policy states that reservists who have  been mobilized for Operations Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom will  serve no more than 12 months in the theater of operations.  Thus, under  this policy, an Army reservist who completes an in-theater rotation of 12  months, along with pre-and postmobilization activities (adding an average  of 6 months to mobilization), serves about 18 months of the 24 months  allowed under the DOD policy.  In addition, because these deployments  cannot be less than 12 months under Army policies, the Army Reserve  considers these reservists ineligible to deploy again.
As figure 3 shows, as of March 2005, about 43 percent of Army Selected  Reserve personnel have been mobilized since September 11, 2001, and are  not eligible to be remobilized under current DOD and Army policies.  Only  about 16 percent, or 31,300 personnel, are considered eligible for  mobilization.   The other 41 percent are ineligible or not available at this  time for a variety of reasons, including the nature of their current  assignments—such as providing recruiting and retention support, training  for mobilizing units, and other critical duties; lack of required training; or  various medical and administrative issues, such as pregnancy or pending  separations.  Those soldiers who complete the required training or resolve  medical and family issues may become available for mobilization in the  future.
In a December 2004 memorandum, the Chief, Army Reserve reported to the  Chief of Staff of the Army that the Army Reserve’s ability to provide ready  personnel was impaired by the DOD’s implementation of mobilization  authorities and the Army’s deployment policies, among other issues.  He  noted that the overall ability of the Army Reserve to continue to provide  ready forces was declining quickly.  He reiterated similar concerns during  testimony to the House Committee on Armed Services’ Subcommittee on  Military Personnel, in February 2005.  Senior DOD officials maintained that  the military services have enough personnel available to meet  requirements, and the policies have not changed since then.
section_title: The Army Reserve Lacks Required Full-time Support Staff
paragraphs: Another significant challenge the Army Reserve faces in continuing to  provide support for near-term operations is that it has not been authorized  all of the full-time support staff it needs to perform critical readiness duties  at home.  These personnel play a key role in maintaining Army Reserve unit  readiness and participating in mobilization/deployment planning and  preparation by performing the day-to-day equipment maintenance,  administrative, recruiting and retention, and training tasks for the Army  Reserve force.   These staff fall into three categories:  reservists who have  been selected to serve on extended active duty, civilian employees, and  active Army personnel.
Based on a pre-September 11, 2001, analysis, the Army Reserve identified a  requirement for about 38,000 full-time support personnel during peacetime,  which equates to about 18.5 percent of the 205,000 members it is authorized  by law.  These personnel are needed to perform ongoing equipment  maintenance, administrative, recruiting and retention, and training tasks.   However, the Army Reserve is only authorized about 26,350 full-time  support personnel, or about 68 percent of its full-time requirement and 12.8  percent of the authorized number of reservists.  The Army Reserve’s full- time staffing is the lowest proportion of all the reserve components.  By  comparison, in 2004, the Army National Guard was authorized full-time  support equal to 15 percent of its end strength, and the Air Force Reserve  was authorized full-time support equal to about 22 percent of its end  strength.  Moreover, the Army Reserve’s authorized full-time support does  not take into consideration recent increases in the pace of operations.  The  Army Reserve has not been authorized all of the full-time support staff it  requires because, under the tiered resourcing planning strategy, it was  assumed that Army Reserve units would not need to deploy quickly, and  thus the risk associated with lowered unit readiness was acceptable.
While the Army Reserve has not been authorized the full-time personnel  necessary to meet its requirements, the number of full-time personnel  available for day-to-day activities is being further reduced because of the  ongoing requirements for active duty and reserve personnel.  First, some  full-time civilian employees, called military technicians, must as a  condition of employment be members of Army Reserve units.  According to  Army Reserve data, as of May 2005, about 1,100 (14 percent) of the Army  Reserve’s military technicians were deployed in support of current  operations, in some instances resulting in a gap in support for day-to-day  operations in nonmobilized units.  In addition, in March 2005, the Army  announced its decision to reassign 223 (about 88 percent) of the 254 active  Army staff who perform critical training and readiness support positions in  the Army Reserve because these soldiers are needed in the active  component.  In announcing the planned reduction, the Army noted that the  planned decrease will reduce premobilization training; threaten the Army  Reserve's ability to activate units at required levels of capability; and  reduce or limit support for approval of training plans, oversight of  readiness reports, and annual assessments of personnel, equipment, and  training.  The Army Reserve is in the process of determining ways to  mitigate the loss of the active Army personnel.
section_title: The Army and the Army Reserve Have Initiatives to Improve Readiness and Deployment Predictability, but Full Implementation Depends on Detailed Coordination and Funding Decisions
paragraphs: The Army and Army Reserve have taken several steps to plan and  implement a number of initiatives to address the readiness challenges  described above and improve deployment predictability for soldiers, but  they have not yet made decisions on the numbers and types of units the  Army Reserve will need in the future and several key decisions about the  Army Reserve’s structure and funding have not yet been finalized.  One of  the Army Reserve’s primary initiatives is to transition to a rotational force  model, which would enable reservists to know in advance when they might  be expected to deploy to overseas operations and would break the cycle of  unanticipated and ad hoc transfers of personnel from nondeploying units to  deploying units.  While the Army Reserve plans to begin implementing its  rotational force model with the return of currently deployed units, it is  awaiting several Army decisions concerning the structure, number, and  types of Army Reserve support units the Army will require for its new  modular force and how the Army Reserve’s rotational force model will be  funded.  The Army Reserve is also undertaking a number of other initiatives  designed to make the most efficient and effective use of its personnel— including reducing its force structure to provide remaining units with all  the personnel they are authorized, increasing full-time support, establishing  a process for centrally managing soldiers who are ineligible for  deployment, and changing the command and control of some units—but  these initiatives are not all linked by a detailed management plan.  While  the Army’s Campaign Plan defines overall goals to improve readiness of  Army units, including Army Reserve units, it does not describe the  personnel, units, and equipment the Army Reserve will need under the  Army’s modular structure and rotational force generating model. Until the  Army determines these future requirements for the Army Reserve and  integrates the various initiatives under way in a detailed plan, the Army and  Army Reserve will not be in a position to determine their needs, so the  Secretary of Defense and the Congress will not have assurance that the  current problems of degrading readiness and unpredictable deployments  will be fully and efficiently addressed.
subsections: section_title: Implementation of the Army Reserve’s Rotational Force Model Awaits Critical Funding and Structure Decisions
paragraphs: The initiative to transform the Army Reserve into a rotational force, within  which units are provided a predictable cycle for conducting individual and  unit training followed by potential mobilization, involves a major change in  the way the Army planned to train and use Army Reserve forces in the past.    The Army Reserve has completed significant planning on its rotational  force model, and its plan appears to address the critical issue of providing  forces continuously without undue stress on reservists.  However, the  Army Reserve is awaiting several key decisions by the Department of the  Army before it can implement the model, and full implementation could  take several years.
At present, Army Reserve units are assigned to missions based on war  plans and, under tiered resourcing, are maintained at varying levels of  readiness based on when they are expected to be needed to deploy in  accordance with war plans.  Units that are not expected to be needed early  in existing war plans are not expected to be ready to deploy without  significant time following the outbreak of a war to improve their readiness  with additional personnel and equipment.  However, current military  operations associated with the Global War on Terrorism have called for  units and personnel earlier and for longer periods than anticipated in  previous war plans and have raised issues about the impact of unforeseen  deployments of Army Reserve forces on reservists, their families, and their  employers.
In July 2003, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum to the Army  directing it to develop a plan that would enable the service to better predict  when personnel and units might expect to be mobilized. The Secretary's  objective was to limit a reservist's involuntary call-up to active duty to 1  year in every 6 years.   The Army’s 2004 Campaign Plan assigned  responsibility to the Army Reserve for developing a method to meet this  objective.  When the plan was issued in April 2004, the Army Reserve had  already begun developing a proposal for a new rotational force generation  model based on cyclical readiness, called the Army Reserve Expeditionary  Force model.  As shown in figure 4, under the Army Reserve Expeditionary  Force model, reserve forces would be divided into 10 groups called  packages, each containing several units with the range of capabilities that  might be needed to conduct military operations.  Army Reserve units would  move through the phases of the cycle and be ready to serve as a standby  deployable force during the fifth year of the 5-year cycle.
Train–individual and unit                       Validate                      Standby Train-individual and unit                       Validate                      Standby The Army Reserve designed the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model  with the intention of keeping units and packages intact and on a  predictable schedule.  In addition, unlike the tiered resourcing strategy  based on when units would be needed for combat operations under  existing war plans, the plan assigns priority based on when units will be  ready and available for deployment.  It also reflects an assumption that in  the future the United States will be less able to predict and plan for specific  threats, so the services will have to maintain a certain portion of their  active and reserve forces ready at all times to conduct a range of potential  military operations should the need arise.   The Army has included the  rotational concept in the Army Campaign Plan and intends to implement it  across the Army.  We believe that the concept is a step toward balancing  the need for a continuing supply of ready units with the need for more  predictability of deployments, but plans are in the preliminary stages and  implementation issues, such as training standards and funding needs, have  yet to be decided.
Under the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model, Army Reserve units  would not be expected to have all the personnel and equipment they would  need to complete their missions until they were in the later phases of the  model.  During the beginning phases of the cycle, units would begin to  receive new or replacement equipment and additional personnel and begin  other administrative, logistical, or personnel activities necessary to  increase their level of readiness.  During the next phases, individuals would  receive training to develop the skills needed for their specific occupations,  and units would train together on unit tasks.  For example, truck drivers  would be initially expected to improve their individual ability to drive a  particular truck.   After achieving a specific level of driving proficiency,  they would train with the other drivers and learn how to drive in a truck  convoy.  Over the training period, units would have access to all the  modern equipment they would need to deploy, so there would be no need  for large-scale, unscheduled transfers of equipment to ready mobilizing  units.  At the end of the training phase, units would undergo a validation  process to determine whether they would be capable of mobilizing in  support of Army operations.  Units in the final phase of the Army Reserve  Expeditionary Force model would be trained, manned, and equipped to  perform their missions, so the time needed to mobilize these units would  be significantly reduced compared to current operations.
In addition to the improved ability to provide ready forces, the Army  Reserve expects the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model to improve  the quality of life for its members by enabling soldiers, their families, and  thier employers to better predict when a reservist could be mobilized.  The  planned rotational model is intended to meet the Secretary of Defense’s  goal of limiting involuntary mobilizations, although under the model  proposed by the Army Reserve, units could be mobilized once every 5 years  rather than every 6 years, the Secretary’s original goal.  The Army Reserve’s  current force rotational planning model would enable it to inform  reservists of their deployment eligibility schedules several years ahead of a  possible deployment so they could make family and career plans.
According to the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force plans, if requests for  forces exceed those that are within their deployment time frame, the Army  Reserve could accelerate training for forces nearing the final phases of the  model.  This would mean earlier deployment than anticipated for some  forces.  However, according to Army Reserve analysis, no historical  deployments since World War II have required more forces than would be  contained in 4 of the planned 10 Army Reserve Expeditionary Force  packages.
While the Army agrees with the Army Reserve’s concept of the rotational  force model and intends to implement the concept for the active forces as  well as Army Reserve and Army National Guard forces, Army and Army  Reserve officials have not come to agreement on the specifics of how the  Army Reserve model will be implemented.  Key issues currently under  discussion are the number of packages that should be created and the  duration of the rotational cycle.  Although the Army Reserve proposal  would create 10 force packages and establish a rotational cycle of between  5 and 6 years, some Army officials advocate creating 12 force packages and  a 6-year cycle that would comply with the Secretary of Defense’s initial  guidance.  Army Reserve officials noted that the model could be adjusted to  accommodate a deployment cycle of 6 years.  However, the Army Reserve  proposal advocates creating 10 packages rather than 12 packages because  each package could contain a larger percentage of the force.  Likewise,  Army and Army Reserve officials have not agreed on a plan for how the  Army Reserve would provide additional forces if the Army Reserve  Expeditionary Force model cannot provide enough deployable forces to  meet operational requirements.   Army officials anticipate that final plans  for the Army Reserve’s rotational model will be approved in midsummer  2005 and will detail the rotational cycle and the number of expeditionary  packages the Army Reserve will need to build.  However, even if all the  planning decisions were finalized in the near future and the Army Reserve  could begin implementation immediately, full implementation will likely  take several years to complete because the rotational concept is based on  the sequential flow of units through the model, and the first units would not  reach readiness until at least 2010.
While the Army Reserve intends to implement its Army Reserve  Expeditionary Force model with troops returning in 2005 from military  operations overseas, continued demands for units and individuals may  make it difficult for the Army Reserve to adhere to the model and avoid  having to take deployment-eligible reservists out of their units’ rotational  cycles to meet immediate needs for personnel.  Further, the Army and  Army Reserve have not fully estimated the costs associated with the Army  Reserve’s rotational model and programmed funding to begin the process  of resetting and reconstituting returning forces as they enter the rotational  model.  As of May 2005, Army Reserve planning officials were still in the  process of reviewing what equipment, training, and personnel will be  required for both the units rotating through the model and the support  structure that will be required for those units once the model is  implemented.  Army Reserve officials explained that they cannot begin to  develop funding requirements until the Army determines the units the  Army Reserve will need.  If funding requirements are not carefully  estimated and included in the Army’s budget, the model’s eventual  effectiveness in providing a more orderly and predictable process for  supporting overseas operations may be diminished.
section_title: The Army Is Reorganizing Its Forces, but Plans Detailing the Numbers and Types of Army Reserve Support Units It Needs Are Not Completed
paragraphs: The Army has recognized that it needs to become more flexible and  capable of achieving a wide range of missions.  To this end, in fiscal year  2004, the Army began to reorganize its active duty combat forces from a  force structure organized around divisions to one that is based on more  flexible modular brigades.  However, as we have previously reported, the  design of the modular units is still evolving and not all the equipment  required is fully known or funded.  The Army has not completed planning  for how active and Army Reserve component combat support and combat  service support units will be organized to support the new modular brigade  combat teams.
The Army is currently completing a review of its force structure—called  the Total Army Analysis—to determine the number and type of units it  needs to meet the goals of the National Defense Strategy.  Previously  conducted Total Army analyses did not include an assessment of the  support forces that would be needed under the Army's modularity  initiative.  In 2004, the Army began another review to determine what active  and reserve support units it will need to support its new multifunctional  modular brigades.  The Army plans to use the results of the analysis to  compile a detailed list of the numbers and types of units the Army Reserve  will need to provide in support of the modular combat forces.   As of March  2005, the Army was still analyzing the results of the process and was  continuing to assess the requirements for support forces. Until the results  are released, the Army Reserve cannot identify the numbers and types of  units that it will need to support the Army requirements in each of the  rotational packages.
In addition, the Army and Army Reserve have not yet developed detailed  estimates for the Army Reserve’s reorganization into modular units.  The  Army Campaign Plan assumes that supplemental resources the Congress  provides to the Army to fund the Global War on Terrorism will be available  to pay some of the costs of the modular conversion for reserve component  support units.  However, until the Army completes all of its force structure  designs for support brigades, the Army Reserve will not have a total picture  of its personnel and equipment requirements and will not have all the  information it needs to evaluate funding requests for modularity.
section_title: The Army and the Army Reserve Have Several Other Initiatives Currently Under Way to Improve Capabilities, but Stages of Implementation Vary
paragraphs: The Army and the Army Reserve have other initiatives under way for the  purposes of improving readiness and capability.  However, these initiatives  are in varying stages of planning and implementation. While all the  transformational initiatives seek to improve the Army Reserve’s ability to  provide ready forces, they have not been coordinated as part of a  comprehensive plan that would establish goals for initiatives, coordinate  their objectives and time frames, and set funding priorities. Moreover, the  Army has not determined the personnel, units, and equipment the Army  Reserve will need to transform to a modular, rotational force and  effectively support Army operations in the future.
In July 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed the services to begin to  rebalance the capabilities that reside in the active and reserve forces to  better meet the continued high demand for personnel with certain skills in  support of ongoing operations.  Key objectives of this initiative are to  improve unit readiness and increase services' ability to meet the  requirements of continuous operations by eliminating units with low- demand skills and moving personnel into units with high-demand skills.  It  also aims to provide units with more of the required personnel by ensuring  that all personnel assigned to units are eligible to deploy. When the  initiative is fully implemented in 2009, the rebalancing will result in force  structure changes affecting about 34,000 Army Reserve positions and 236  Army Reserve units.  Although intended to increase the Army Reserve’s  readiness and capability, this rebalancing effort was begun before the Army  began its modular restructuring effort.  The two initiatives—rebalancing  and modular restructuring—have not been coordinated within a  management framework that is needed in light of the potential impact of  major organization changes. Senior Army Reserve leaders have raised  concerns that because the initiatives are not well integrated, the Army  Reserve may be eliminating some of the types of units that it will eventually  need to supplement the modular support brigades.
To increase units’ readiness by assigning only deployable personnel, the  Army Reserve is also establishing a process to centrally manage soldiers  who are not eligible for deployment because they are untrained, awaiting  administrative discharge, pending medical evaluations for continued  service, or in the process of voluntarily moving between units.  Until this  initiative is fully implemented some soldiers will remain assigned to units  where they occupy positions, but because they are not eligible for  mobilization, they do not contribute to unit readiness. By accounting for  these soldiers centrally in a separate “Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and  Students” account, as exists in the active Army, the Army Reserve  anticipates that it can relieve units of a major administrative responsibility  and enhance overall unit readiness.  The Army Reserve has begun  implementing this initiative and estimated that at the end of June 2004  about 12.8 percent of its assigned strength met the requirements for  assignment to one of the four categories.  The Army Reserve expects the  number of personnel in this account to eventually level off at about 10  percent of the number of soldiers it is authorized, or about 20,000 soldiers.
Recognizing the need for more full-time support staff, in fiscal year 2001,  the Army started to implement an initiative to increase the number of full- time support positions for reservists on active duty and civilians by 4,551  positions by the end of fiscal year 2011.  When complete, the planned  increase would bring the number of full-time support staff for the Army  Reserve to 28,806 personnel, about 14 percent of the Army Reserve’s end  strength.  However, planned increases would not provide the Army  Reserve’s peacetime requirement for full-time support, even as the high  pace of current operations has increased demands for the training,  administrative, and maintenance skills full-time staff provide.  Moreover,  the Army Reserve will lose the full-time support of about 223 active duty  Army soldiers because they are needed in the active component, which will  offset some of the benefit of increases in reservist and civilian full-time  support.  The Army Reserve has not yet developed a management plan to  offset these risks in the near term or address the increasing shortage of full- time support staff due to deployments.
Another initiative is designed to address the readiness problem that is  created when personnel are transferred out of some units to provide  capabilities to other units in the active or reserve component.  The Army  Reserve’s Individual Augmentee initiative is designed to provide a pool of  volunteer soldiers, trained in high-demand specialties, who are ready to  mobilize quickly as individuals rather than units. According to the Army  Reserve, it is currently working to implement this initiative and has  established a goal of 3,000 to 9,000 Individual Augmentee positions by the  end of 2007.
The Army Reserve is also in the process of changing the command and  control of some of its units to better focus on soldier and unit readiness.   For example, the Army Reserve plans to reduce the number of commands  charged with readiness activities and establish a training command in order  to clarify responsibilities and standardize training.  In addition, the Army  Reserve is implementing plans to transfer some installation and facility  support activities to the Army so that Army Reserve readiness personnel  can focus on training programs.  Furthermore, the Army Reserve is in the  process of establishing a consolidated medical command and a  consolidated intelligence command to more effectively manage these  specialized skills.   While the Army Reserve expects these actions to  support the goals of the Army Campaign Plan, the details of how that will  be accomplished are not specified in that plan.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While the Army’s acceptance of military risk in maintaining the Army  Reserve in peacetime with fewer people and less equipment than it needed  for its mission was an effective strategy for containing costs during the  Cold War, the security environment has changed dramatically since the  September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and that strategy is no longer viable.   Threats are no longer as predictable, so the services will need to maintain  more forces ready to deploy as needed.  In addition, operations related to  the Global War on Terrorism are expected to last a long time and require  the continuing support of the Army Reserve.  The Army and Army Reserve’s  previous tiered readiness policy has created the need for wholesale  transfers of personnel among units to meet wartime requirements and  degraded the Army Reserve’s ability to continue to provide forces for  ongoing operations.  In particular, the Army Reserve is running out of  personnel who are eligible to mobilize under current personnel policies and  who have the grades and skills required for current operation.  The current  operations are not expected to end soon, and without change, the Army  Reserve will not be able to provide the personnel and units needed for  future rotations of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, or  other needs.
The Army’s Campaign Plan sets out overall goals for improved readiness of  Army units, including Army Reserve units, but it does not describe the  personnel, units, and equipment the Army Reserve will need under the  Army’s modular structure and rotational force generating model.  Without a  clear indication of what the Army Reserve will look like in the future, the  Army and Army Reserve cannot be sure that the changes they are  undertaking in the short term will enable it to achieve the desired end state  of a flexible and ready force and ensure that funding is targeted to priority  activities.  While the Army and Army Reserve have various initiatives under  way to improve Army Reserve readiness over time, not all of these  initiatives are being integrated and coordinated to ensure they most  efficiently achieve overall goals.  Lacking a mechanism that coordinates  and synchronizes initiatives that are in various stages of implementation,  the Army and Army Reserve cannot be sure that all of the separately  developed initiatives work together in timing and scope to achieve  readiness goals efficiently and set funding priorities for various activities.   For example, without information on the types of units that the Army  Reserve will need under modularity, the Army Reserve cannot be sure that  its other rebalancing efforts are not eliminating the types of units that will  be needed in the future when additional costs would be generated and  delays incurred to re-create them.
The Army Reserve’s key initiative of establishing a rotational force cannot  be fully implemented until the Army finalizes decisions concerning how the  Army Reserve will fit into the Army’s planned transformation to a modular  force and funding needs and sources have been determined.  Until these  decisions are finalized and an implementation plan is agreed upon that  details how the Army Reserve can ready units and individuals to meet  requirements on an ongoing basis, the Army Reserve will have to continue  transfers from its dwindling levels of personnel and equipment.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army; the Chief, Army  Reserve; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,  to define the end state of the units, personnel, skills, and equipment the  Army Reserve will need to fit into the Army's modular force and develop a  detailed plan to ensure that the ongoing diverse initiatives collectively  support the desired outcome of improved readiness and predictable  deployments within current and expected resource levels.  The plan  should, at a minimum, include   an assessment of the types and numbers of units that the Reserve needs  in its force structure to support future Army and joint missions,   a process for coordinating the implementation steps and time frames of   a method of assessing the progress and effectiveness of the initiatives,  a reassessment of the Army Reserve’s requirement for full-time staffing  support given its new operational role, and   identification of resources needed to implement each of the Army’s and  the Army Reserve’s initiatives to improve the Army Reserve's readiness.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army, in conjunction with the Chief of Staff of the Army; the Chief, Army  Reserve; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,  to develop an implementation plan for a force rotation model for the Army  Reserve that describes  the types and numbers of units that should be available for deployment   the funding the Army Reserve will need to support its transition to a   the readiness levels for each phase of the rotation, including a  description of the associated levels of personnel and equipment and the  strategy for providing them, and how readiness will be evaluated.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) provided written  comments on a draft of this report.  The department agreed with our  recommendations.  The department’s comments are reprinted in their  entirety in appendix II.  In addition, the department provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority  Members, House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, and other  interested committees.  We are also sending a copy to the Director of the  Office of Management and Budget, the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of  Staff of the Army, and the Chief, U.S. Army Reserve, and we will make  copies available to others upon request.  In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions, please contact me on (202) 512-4402 or  by e-mail at stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report.  Major contributors to this report are included in  appendix III.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess whether the Army Reserve has provided forces required by the  combatant commanders since September 11, 2001, and the challenges it  faces in sustaining near-term operations, we analyzed the Department of  the Army’s Manpower and Reserve Employment of Reserve Component  Forces & Effect of Usage report data for fiscal years 1986 through 2003 and  discussed the sources and uses of the information with officials from the  Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  We obtained  information on personnel mobilized and remaining from the Army  Reserve’s Personnel Division.  We analyzed data generated by the Total  Army Personnel Data Base - Reserves and provided by the U.S. Army  Reserve Command on the numbers of reservists that were mobilized for  operations since September 11, 2001, and their military occupations and  numbers of personnel that had not been mobilized.  We obtained and  analyzed data detailing the amounts, types, and costs of completed  equipment transfers by the Army Reserve from September 13, 2001 through  April 5, 2005, from the Reserve End Item Management System. We assessed  the reliability of data from the Total Army Personnel Data Base - Reserves  and the Reserve End Item Management System by 1) reviewing existing  information about the data and the systems that produced them; 2)  performing electronic testing of the relevant data elements; and 3)  interviewing Army Reserve officials knowledgeable about the data.  We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.  We  analyzed Department of Defense publications and reports information on  equipment shortages, including the 2004, 2005, and 2006 National Guard  and Reserve Equipment reports to analyze trends in the status of the  equipment the Army Reserve has on hand. We obtained and analyzed data  on the numbers and types of full-time staff assigned to Army Reserve units  and the metrics used in identifying full-time staff requirements from the  Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Force Programs Office.  We also  discussed full-time support issues with readiness and training officials.  To  understand how current personnel and equipment policies affect the Army  Reserves’ capability to provide support for near-term operations, we  gathered and reviewed copies of relevant documents, including  presidential executive orders and the Army's personnel planning guidance.
To assess the extent to which the Army Reserve is planning and  implementing initiatives designed to improve its readiness and provide  predictability of deployment for its members, we reviewed and analyzed  policy guidance; instructions; documents; and implementation plans  related to Army and Army Reserve initiatives, including the Total Army  Plan; the 2004 Army Campaign Plan with change 1; the 2003 and 2004 Army  Transformation Roadmap; the Army's 2004 and 2005 posture statements;  the Army Reserve's 2005 posture statement; the Army's 2004 and 2005  modernization plans; the Army Reserve's expeditionary force planning  documents; and other Army Reserve planning and budget documents.  We  also discussed the status of planning for the Army Reserve’s conversion to  a rotational force and a modular structure with Army and Army Reserve  officials.  To assess ongoing initiatives to improve readiness and force  management, we reviewed status reports and discussed implementation  challenges with Army Reserve officials managing the initiatives.
We conducted our review from April 2004 through July 2005 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgements
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals also  made major contributions to the report:  Margaret Morgan, Timothy A.  Burke, Alissa Czyz, Ronald La Due Lake, Kenneth Patton, Rebecca Medina,  and Eileen Peguero.