Uranium Contamination: Overall Scope, Time Frame, and Cost Information Is Needed for Contamination Cleanup on the Navajo Reservation
Published: 2014-05-05T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Four million tons of uranium ore were extracted from mines on the Navajo reservation primarily for developing the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. For over 30 years, the Navajo people have lived with the environmental and health effects of uranium contamination from this mining. In 2008, five federal agencies adopted a 5-year plan that identified targets for addressing contaminated abandoned mines, structures, water sources, former processing sites, and other sites. Federal agencies also provide funding to Navajo Nation agencies to assist with the cleanup work.
GAO was asked to examine the agencies' cleanup efforts. This report examines (1) the extent to which the agencies achieved the targets set in the 5-year plan and reasons why or why not; (2) what is known about the future scope of work, time frames, and costs; and (3) any key challenges faced by the agencies in completing this work and any opportunities to overcome them. GAO examined agency documents; interviewed agency officials, tribal leaders, and stakeholders; and visited sites on the Navajo and Hopi reservations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Federal agencies implementing the 2008 5-year plan, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the Indian Health Service, met the targets in six of the plan's eight objectives, working in cooperation with tribal agencies, including the Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency. Reasons agencies met the targets were primarily because additional federal and other resources were dedicated to these efforts compared with prior years. For example, from 2008 through 2012, EPA spent $22 million to test and replace contaminated houses, compared with $1.5 million spent in the preceding 5 years. In contrast, targets for two objectives—cleanup of the Northeast Church Rock mine and Tuba City Dump—were not met primarily because EPA's and BIA's estimated schedules were optimistic, and EPA added additional work that extended the time frames. BIA experienced project and contract management challenges in conducting work at Tuba City Dump and did not always follow best practices when estimating the schedule for assessment work at the site. These challenges, if not addressed, could affect BIA's ability to meet future targets for cleanup at the site and successfully plan for project resources.
Federal agencies have not identified the full scope of remaining work, time frames, or costs to fully address uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, although they recognize that significant work remains. In 2008, congressional decision makers requested the agencies provide an overall estimate of the full scope of work needed to address the contamination. The 5year plan the agencies developed in response to this request does not provide a comprehensive estimate; instead, it focuses on the highest priorities over 5 years. EPA officials said that they typically do not provide cost or schedule estimates until a specific cleanup action is selected and that a number of current uncertainties make developing such an estimate difficult. Even with significant uncertainties, GAO has reported that agencies can create high-level estimates of costs and time frames that can be useful for decision makers and stakeholders. The agencies have collected important information that could provide a starting point for such an estimate. However, absent a statutory requirement to develop such a comprehensive estimate, it appears unlikely that the agencies will undertake such an effort. As a result, decision makers and stakeholders will not have the information they need to assess the overall pace of the cleanup efforts or make resource allocation decisions.
Federal agencies face a variety of challenges in continuing to address uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation. For example, according to EPA officials, funding for EPA's efforts at the Navajo abandoned uranium mines is expected to decrease from funding levels available during the 2008 5-year plan because of overall declining federal resources for cleanup. Further, agencies face challenges in effectively engaging tribal communities, in part, because agencies have not always collaborated on their outreach efforts. These agencies identified opportunities to enhance their collaboration by creating a coordinated outreach strategy for the next 5-year plan. Creating such a strategy is consistent with one of the several key practices that GAO has reported can enhance and sustain interagency collaboration and help ensure that agencies make efficient use of limited resources.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: Congress should consider requiring federal agencies to develop an overall estimate of the remaining scope of work, time frames, and costs to fully address uranium contamination. GAO also recommends that BIA address its project management challenges, and agencies incorporate key practices into their coordinated outreach strategy. In commenting on a draft of this report, the agencies generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Beginning in the 1940s and continuing for approximately 40 years, private  companies extracted approximately 4 million tons of uranium ore from  mines on the Navajo reservation. Until 1970, the U.S. government  purchased most of the ore to meet the demand for developing the  nation’s first atomic bomb and the subsequent production of weapons for  the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Uranium production directly affected  the Navajo people who worked in the mines to extract the uranium ore or  who lived and raised families in close proximity to the mines. Active  uranium mining on the reservation ceased by 1986, and companies often  abandoned the mines. Nearly 30 years later, the Navajo people continue  to live with the environmental and health effects from mining operations:  more than 500 abandoned mines are located across the reservation,  some close to homes and communities, and an unknown number of  homes and drinking water sources contain radioactive elements.  According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other  federal agencies, health effects—including lung cancer, bone cancer, and  impaired kidney function—can result from exposure to elevated levels of  uranium and other radionuclides. Uranium contamination at one location  also directly affects the Hopi Tribe.
After uranium mining on the Navajo reservation ended, some federal and  tribal agencies began to address different aspects of the legacy of  uranium contamination. These efforts on the whole have been sporadic,  with some exceptions. The largest effort was conducted by the  Department of Energy (DOE), which completed remedial actions at  four uranium mill sites on the Navajo reservation where uranium ore was  processed under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978,  as amended (UMTRCA). DOE also began monitoring groundwater  contamination or implementing plans to address groundwater  contamination at three of these sites. Among other efforts, from the 1970s  to the mid-2000s, EPA surveyed 65 structures and replaced 2 that had  elevated levels of radiation; federal and tribal agencies and others  sampled thousands of unregulated water sources to identify  contamination; and a Navajo mine reclamation program addressed many  of the physical hazards posed by abandoned mines. Even though these  efforts represented some progress, Navajo and Hopi tribal officials have  repeatedly expressed the tribes’ frustrations with the pace of federal  efforts to address uranium-related issues.
In October 2007, the House Committee on Oversight and Government  Reform held hearings on the health and environmental effects of uranium  contamination on the Navajo reservation. Based, in part, on information  received in that hearing, in January 2008, the committee requested that  five federal agencies create a 5-year plan to address the effects of  uranium contamination on Navajo and Hopi tribal lands. All five agencies  were either directly involved with uranium mining and processing or with  addressing the environmental and health effects of uranium  contamination, or both, and included: EPA, DOE, the Department of the  Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Department of Health and  Human Services’ Indian Health Service (IHS), and the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission (NRC). This plan—referred to in this report as the 2008  5-year plan—was the first collective plan and included actions organized  under eight objectives, each of which was to be carried out by one or  more of the federal agencies from 2008 through 2012. The plan focused  on addressing, over the 5-year period, what the agencies identified as the  most urgent uranium-related problems and was not intended to be a long- term plan for fully resolving the entirety of the contamination. The  eight objectives were as follows:  1.  Assess abandoned uranium mines for contamination and begin  to identify potentially responsible parties. Assessments are  needed to understand the scope of contamination and to identify  necessary cleanup actions, and range from radiation scans to field  surveys to more thorough site evaluations. Potentially responsible  parties, such as former owners or operators of mines, can be  compelled to clean up the contamination or to pay cleanup costs  under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,  and Liability Act (CERCLA).  2.  Clean up the Northeast Church Rock mine. The Navajo Nation  identified this mine, which produced one of the largest volumes of  uranium of all the Navajo uranium mines, as its highest priority for  cleanup. Located near Church Rock, New Mexico, a former operator  of the mine is involved in the cleanup efforts.  3.  Assess and clean up contaminated houses and other structures.  Some Navajo community members used materials from the sites that  were contaminated with uranium, such as rocks and pieces of wood  or metal, to build homes and other structures.  4.  Test and provide alternatives to contaminated, unregulated  drinking water sources. Federal and tribal agencies have estimated  that from 15 to 30 percent of Navajos do not have regulated, piped  drinking water in their homes. These residents typically haul water to  their homes, and it is not uncommon for them to use unsafe,  unregulated water sources, such as livestock wells, for domestic  water use.  5.  Continue to remediate groundwater at former uranium  processing sites. DOE is developing or implementing plans to clean  up groundwater contamination found at three of the four former  processing sites. DOE also conducts long-term surveillance and  maintenance at the sites.  6.  Assess the “Highway 160 site.” This site, located across a highway  from one of the former uranium processing sites, consists of an area  where waste from the processing site was dumped and buried.  7.  Clean up the Tuba City Dump. A former dump serviced by BIA,  Tuba City Dump is located primarily on Hopi land, but it encompasses  an area of Navajo land as well, and was used by the nearby  communities for more than 50 years. BIA, EPA, and the tribes have  identified high levels of uranium in the groundwater underneath a  portion of the landfill, and BIA has entered into an administrative  settlement agreement with EPA to assess contamination and potential  cleanup at the site.  8.  Assess and treat health conditions. IHS is responsible for treating  health conditions in eligible Indians, including any health conditions  that may result from exposure to uranium.
Under each plan objective, the relevant federal agencies established  targets that they expected to meet by the end of the 5-year period, in  consultation with the Navajo Nation. Although not identified as a specific  objective, Members of Congress also requested that the federal agencies  work together to ensure a coordinated federal response. During the  course of the 5-year plan period, health research efforts by a sixth  agency—the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry  (ATSDR)—was rolled into the health objective. The federal agencies  published a summary report in January 2013, outlining their  accomplishments under the plan.
Since the 2008 5-year plan period ended in 2012, the federal agencies  have continued their work and started the process of developing their  next plan, which they intend to publish in 2014. During this transition, you  asked us to report on the federal agencies’ efforts under the 2008 5-year  plan and going forward. This report examines (1) the extent to which  federal agencies achieved the targets identified in the 2008 5-year plan,  and the reasons why or why not; (2) what is known about the scope of  work, time frames, and estimated costs of fully addressing uranium  contamination; and (3) the key challenges, if any, faced by federal  agencies in completing this work and the opportunities, if any, which may  be present to help overcome these challenges.
To determine the extent to which federal agencies achieved the targets  identified in the 2008 5-year plan, and reasons why they did or did not, we  compared the agencies’ targets with the actions taken by the agencies  and their partners over the 5-year plan period, reviewed key documents,  and interviewed federal agency and tribal officials. To identify what is  known about the scope of work, time frames, and estimated costs of fully  addressing uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, we  reviewed available documents and interviewed federal agency and tribal  officials. We also assessed the schedule and cost estimates for the Tuba  City Dump based on our March 2009 cost estimating and assessment  guide, a compilation of cost-estimating best practices drawn from across  government and industry, and our May 2012 schedule assessment  guide. To ascertain any key challenges faced by federal agencies in  completing this work and the opportunities that may be present to help  overcome these challenges, we reviewed reports and interviewed federal  agency and tribal officials, as well as knowledgeable stakeholders, who  included local government officials and community members, university  researchers, and representatives of nonprofit organizations. We also  visited abandoned uranium mines, a former uranium processing site, and  other relevant sites on the Navajo and Hopi reservations; we selected  these sites based on the level of activity that federal and tribal agencies  conducted there during the 2008 5-year plan or because the agencies  identified the sites as needing cleanup in the near future. Appendix I  describes our objectives, scope, and methodology in more detail.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2013 to May 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In keeping with its trust responsibility with respect to Indian tribes, the  federal government holds title to the Navajo and Hopi tribal land in trust  for the benefit of the tribes and their members. In this context, this section  provides information on (1) the Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe; (2) uranium  mining and processing on the Navajo reservation and its environmental  effects; (3) Navajo people’s exposure to uranium contamination and  related health effects; (4) key statutes relevant to addressing uranium  contamination; and (5) the roles of federal and tribal agencies and  selected actions taken to address uranium contamination on the Navajo  and Hopi reservations prior to 2008.
subsections: section_title: Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe
paragraphs: The Navajo reservation consists of more than 24,000 square miles of  land—about the size of the state of West Virginia—in the states of  Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, making it the largest reservation,  geographically, in the United States. The Hopi reservation consists of  approximately 2,500 square miles of land in northeastern Arizona, entirely  surrounded by the Navajo reservation. Figure 1 shows the locations of the  Navajo and Hopi reservations, as well as the locations of 521 abandoned  uranium mines and other key sites.
According to the 2010 Census, 174,000 people lived on Navajo land, and,  according to Census Bureau estimates, more than 90 percent of the  population identified as Navajo. Navajo culture is historically agrarian, and  the Navajo people tend to live in small group clusters that are widely  dispersed across the reservation. Many Navajo graze sheep and other  livestock, which they use for wool and for consumption, among other  things. According to Census Bureau estimates, the Navajo reservation’s  poverty rate is more than twice as high as the poverty rate in the state of  Arizona, with 38 percent of people on the reservation—and 44 percent of  all children on the reservation—living in poverty. Most homes do not have  electricity or telephones; roads are unpaved, and there are no urban  centers, although there are large towns generally found near the  boundaries of the reservation. Residents living in homes without piped,  regulated water sources haul their water from a nearby source, and many  of these sources are unregulated, untreated water sources such as  livestock wells or natural springs. The Navajo Nation government includes  110 local government subdivisions, known as chapters.
There are more than 5,000 Hopi living on Hopi land, according to the  2010 Census. Poverty rates on the Hopi reservation are similar to those  among the Navajo. There were no uranium mines on the Hopi  reservation.
section_title: Uranium Mining and Processing on the Navajo Reservation and its Environmental Effects
paragraphs: The Navajo reservation is located on the southern end of a stretch of  naturally occurring uranium deposits that spans the western United States  (see fig. 2). The uranium found on the reservation is primarily located in  sandstone formations that range from surface outcrops to deposits more  than 4,000 feet deep.
On the Navajo reservation, uranium ore was removed from the ground at  more than 500 mines, generally through open pit mining for ore deposits  located relatively close to the surface, or underground mining for deeper  deposits. The mines were often located in mountainous areas and  consisted of multiple features, such as portals and vertical shafts. The  material left behind after the ore was removed—known as waste rock— was then disposed, often in nearby piles, and contained dangerous  materials, such as radium, radon, and heavy metals. Once mining ceased  at a site, companies often abandoned the mines, leaving the waste rock  piles in place without conducting any cleanup or posting signs warning  about the dangers of contamination or physical hazards. The extracted  ore was sent to an off-site processing facility called a mill. At the mill, the  mined uranium ore was crushed, ground, and then fed to a leaching  system that produced yellow slurry—called yellowcake—that was further  processed for use in nuclear weapons or, as of the mid-1960s, for use in  nuclear power plants. The leaching system left a waste product known as  mill tailings that retained some toxic contaminants. The tailings were of a  sandy consistency and mixtures of tailings and water were placed in  unlined evaporation ponds at the mill site. DOE estimates that millions of  gallons of water contaminated by mill tailings were released into the  groundwater over the life of the sites through the unlined ponds. In  addition, on July 16, 1979, the largest release of radioactive materials in  the United States occurred when a dam on one of the evaporation ponds  broke at a processing site near Church Rock, New Mexico, resulting in  the release of 94 million gallons of radioactive waste to the Puerco River,  which flowed through nearby communities. Figure 3 depicts the uranium  mining and processing that occurred on or near the Navajo reservation.
Most of the uranium mining and processing on the Navajo reservation  occurred from the late 1940s through the 1960s, and the federal  government played a variety of roles during this time. For example, as  reported by EPA and the Navajo Nation, beginning in the 1940s, the  Secretary of the Interior, along with the Navajo Nation, and later BIA,  issued leases and permits to private companies and individuals for  uranium mining on the Navajo reservation. In another example, the  Atomic Energy Commission (Commission)—a precursor agency to  DOE—established a series of financial incentives for the discovery and  production of domestic uranium, including guaranteed minimum prices for  uranium ore and financial bonuses for uranium ore mined from any  previously unidentified site, according to a report prepared by the  Commission. According to the report, the Commission also provided  infrastructure support, such as roads needed to survey mine sites and  transport ore. Finally, the federal government was the sole customer of  the processed uranium from 1947 to 1965.
Beginning in 1970, uranium from the Navajo reservation was sold  exclusively to the commercial sector for use in nuclear power plants, but  prices fell in the 1980s, and uranium mining operations on the reservation  ended in 1986. Because of lingering contamination and its effects, in  2005 the Navajo Nation enacted a law placing a moratorium on uranium  mining and processing on any site within the tribe’s territorial jurisdiction.  In 2012, the Navajo Nation enacted a law prohibiting transportation of  uranium ore or radioactive waste through lands under the tribe’s territorial  jurisdiction unless fees, bonding, and other requirements were met. The  2012 law also stated that the Navajo Nation generally opposed  transportation of uranium ore or radioactive materials, except for the  purpose of disposing of materials from past mining or milling in a long- term facility outside of the tribe’s territorial jurisdiction or a temporary  facility within the jurisdiction. Even with these laws, however, increases in  the price of uranium during the past 10 years have sparked renewed  interest in uranium mining and processing on and near the Navajo  reservation, and opinions over new mining appear split, especially given  the potential for job creation offered by the industry in economically  depressed areas. For example, a committee of the Navajo Nation  Council approved a resolution in December 2013 acknowledging a private  company’s right-of-way across tribal land near Church Rock, New  Mexico, and authorizing its use for a demonstration project that extracts  uranium from beneath the surface. The Navajo Nation Department of  Justice has concluded that the resolution conflicts with the 2005 and 2012  laws.
section_title: Exposure to Uranium and Its Health Effects
paragraphs: Uranium is present naturally in virtually all soil, rock, and water, and is  spread throughout the environment by geological processes, as well as  by wind and rain. On the Navajo reservation, winds blow during most of  the year, exceeding 50 miles per hour at times, and localized, heavy  rainstorms occur throughout the summer. When uranium is present in the  environment, people may be exposed to it, as well as the radioactive by- products that are created as uranium decays—including radium and  radon (a gas)—through a variety of exposure pathways. For example,  Navajo people have been exposed to naturally occurring uranium and its  by-products by drinking water from unregulated wells that tap into  groundwater that comes into contact with underground uranium deposits.  People are also exposed to naturally occurring radon when it migrates  into their homes from the uranium-bearing soil underneath.
Mining and milling processes on the Navajo reservation created new  pathways for exposure to uranium, increasing the amount of potential  exposure at the surface. When the uranium mines were in operation,  uranium miners inhaled radioactive dust and radon in and near the mines  where they worked. Miners tracked the dust into their homes, exposing  their families. Community members occasionally used materials from the  mines and mill sites to build their houses and ceremonial structures,  leading to increased radon inside these structures. When waste rock piles  were left next to abandoned mines, wind and rain at times spread—and  could continue to spread—the hazardous materials, sometimes through  intermittent streams, where these materials could come into contact with  residents of nearby communities, who could then be exposed by  inhalation or ingestion. Residents of some communities located near the  mines reported playing as children in and around the open mines. Many  of the exposure pathways that existed when the mines and processing  sites were in operation have been eliminated, and the Navajo Nation has  stated that the most significant safety hazards that were present at the  abandoned mines have been addressed. However, there are pathways of  exposure that remain for Navajo residents today (see fig. 4).
Although historic, occupational exposure to uranium has been shown by  the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and others to have  affected human health, the extent to which the Navajo people have  experienced health effects resulting from uranium exposures in other  ways has not been thoroughly examined and remains uncertain. For  nonoccupational exposures, comprehensive health studies have not been  conducted to assess the health effects of uranium contamination on  Navajo communities or other communities located near active or  abandoned uranium mines and processing sites, but Navajo community  members who have lived near these sites have reported a variety of  serious health effects, including cancers, according to CDC. EPA  reports that exposure to gamma radiation—such as from waste rock  located near abandoned mines—can cause a variety of cancers,  including lung cancer and leukemia, and that exposure to radon can  cause lung cancer. Because of these potential dangers, EPA  recommends that people stay away from areas on the Navajo reservation  with especially high levels of radiation—more than 10-times above the  naturally-occurring, background radiation—in order to avoid potential  health effects. ATSDR and EPA have noted that the abandoned mines  pose a risk especially to children, since children tend to put dirt in their  mouths, and the dirt at the mines could be contaminated. EPA noted in  the 2008 5-year plan that inhabitants of structures constructed with  uranium mining waste are at risk of developing lung cancer because of  the increased presence of radon in indoor air. In addition, given the  consumption by Navajo residents of livestock that have grazed on plants  located on or near abandoned mine sites, residents and researchers have  identified the need to study the potential for exposure to radiation through  consuming these animals.
section_title: Key Statutes Relevant to Addressing Uranium Contamination
paragraphs: Two key statutes involved with addressing uranium contamination are  (1) CERCLA, also known as Superfund, and (2) UMTRCA.
CERCLA established the Superfund program in 1980 to protect human  health and the environment from the effects of hazardous substances,  including uranium. Under CERCLA, potentially responsible parties—such  as current or former owners or operators of a mine site containing  hazardous substances—are liable for conducting or paying for cleanup of  hazardous substances at contaminated sites. If the federal government  is a potentially responsible party at a site, it is liable for cleanup costs  even if there are nonfederal potentially responsible parties. For example,  one court has held that the federal government was liable as an owner  under CERCLA for the cleanup costs at a mine located within an Indian  reservation.
Under CERCLA, EPA has the authority to compel potentially responsible  parties to clean up contaminated sites, or to conduct cleanups itself and  then seek reimbursement from the potentially responsible parties. EPA  may compel cleanup by bringing an enforcement action against a  potentially responsible party or by attempting to reach an administrative  agreement—known as an administrative order on consent, or a  settlement agreement—requiring the responsible party to perform and  pay for site cleanup. Sometimes, however, potentially responsible parties  cannot be identified or may be financially unable to perform the cleanup.
Under the Superfund program, EPA and potentially responsible parties  can undertake two types of cleanups: (1) removal actions and  (2) remedial actions.
Removal actions are generally shorter-term or emergency cleanups to  mitigate immediate threats. These include time-critical removals for  threats requiring action within 6 months, and non-time-critical removals  for threats where action can be delayed to account for a 6-month or  longer planning period, which includes a site evaluation to characterize  the site and identify and analyze removal alternatives. Removal actions  can include, for example, installing a fence around a contaminated site  and excavating contaminated soils for disposal, and can be quite  complex. Removal actions can be financed by the Hazardous Substance  Superfund Trust Fund (Superfund Trust Fund).
Remedial actions typically are longer-term actions that involve a more  elaborate process to permanently and significantly reduce contamination.  Remedial actions are taken instead of, or in addition to, a removal action.  Before undertaking a remedial action, a remedial investigation and  feasibility study (RI/FS) is conducted in accordance with an approved  work plan to (1) characterize site conditions and assess the risks to  human health and the environment, among other things, and (2) evaluate  various options to address the problems identified. A remedy is selected  for addressing the site’s contamination in a record of decision, and the  design of the selected remedy is then developed and implemented (see  fig. 5). Only sites on the National Priorities List (NPL)—EPA’s list of the  nation’s most contaminated sites—are eligible to have remedial actions  financed by the Superfund Trust Fund. None of the mine sites on the  Navajo reservation are currently listed on the NPL.
UMTRCA required DOE to take remedial actions at certain uranium mill  sites across the country—and properties in the vicinity that were  contaminated with radioactive materials from the mill sites—to stabilize  and control the mill tailings in a safe and environmentally sound manner  and to minimize or eliminate health hazards, among other things.
UMTRCA included four sites on the Navajo reservation: Mexican Hat,  Monument Valley, Shiprock, and Tuba City, which we refer to as the Rare  Metals site in this report. Under the act, DOE is also responsible for  ensuring that any residual radioactive minerals entering the groundwater  do not exceed specified limits; therefore, DOE maintains groundwater  remediation systems at sites where groundwater contamination has  persisted. In accordance with the act, the Secretary of Energy has  entered into cooperative agreements with the Navajo Nation to perform  the remedial actions at the sites located on the tribe’s land; the current  agreement lasts until 2017. The act also required DOE to complete the  remedial actions at the processing sites and vicinity properties before  DOE’s authority under the act, as amended, to perform these actions  expired in 1998; DOE’s authority to perform groundwater restoration  activities has not expired. UMTRCA did not include provisions for DOE to  remediate abandoned uranium mines.
section_title: Federal and Tribal Agencies’ Roles and Selected Actions Taken to Address Uranium Contamination on or Near the Navajo Reservation Prior to 2008
paragraphs: A variety of federal agencies have specific roles in addressing uranium  contamination on or near the Navajo reservation. Table 1 outlines the  agencies, their roles, and selected actions they took to begin addressing  the contamination prior to 2008.
In addition to the federal agencies, tribal agencies play key roles and  have been actively addressing the impacts of historical uranium mining  and processing on or near the Navajo reservation.
Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency (NNEPA). NNEPA is  the lead Navajo agency for regulating radiological contamination at  abandoned uranium mines. NNEPA addresses uranium  contamination on the Navajo reservation through a variety of  programs, including the Navajo Superfund program, which is  responsible for assessing hazardous waste sites on the reservation,  including abandoned uranium mines. NNEPA partners with EPA in  working under the structures, abandoned mines, and unregulated  drinking water objectives of the 2008 5-year plan, and provides input  on the other objectives as well.
Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation/ Uranium Mill Tailings  Remedial Action (UMTRA) Department. This Navajo department  consists of two programs, the Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation  Program and the UMTRA program. The Abandoned Mine Lands  Reclamation Program reclaims abandoned mines on the Navajo  reservation. From the 1990s through 2005, the Abandoned Mine  Lands Reclamation Program reclaimed more than 900 abandoned  uranium mine features found at the 521 mines located on or near the  reservation, primarily addressing surface hazards, including stabilizing  steep areas and burying uranium-contaminated soils. According to  Navajo Nation officials, this work did not address all associated  radiological hazards, and the program continues to conduct  maintenance on past reclamation work. The department’s UMTRA  program provides assistance to DOE under an UMTRCA cooperative  agreement at the four former uranium processing sites on the  reservation. Under the 2008 5-year plan, the Navajo Nation chose  not to have the Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program  coordinate its reclamation work with EPA and NNEPA’s abandoned  mine work. The UMTRA program, however, supported DOE’s efforts  at the former processing sites under the 5-year plan.
section_title: Agencies Met the Targets in Six Out of Eight Plan Objectives Primarily Because of Additional Federal Resources
paragraphs: Federal agencies met the targets in six of the eight objectives they  established in the 2008 5-year plan, but they did not meet the targets in  two of the eight objectives. Reasons the agencies met the targets in  five objectives were primarily because additional federal resources,  including funding and staff time, were dedicated to their efforts. DOE met  the targets in a sixth objective because the agency set targets that  represented a continuation of previously required activities. By contrast,  the reasons federal agencies did not meet the targets in two objectives  were, in part, because of decisions to conduct additional assessment and  outreach activities before identifying final cleanup actions. Remaining  actions are necessary to meet the targets in these two objectives.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Met the Targets in Six Out of Eight Plan Objectives
paragraphs: In the 2008 5-year plan, federal agencies identified targets under each of  the eight objectives that they intended to meet, in cooperation with tribal  agency partners, by the end of the plan period in 2012. We found that the  agencies met the targets in six of the eight objectives. According to the  agencies’ January 2013 summary report, the 2008 5-year plan outlined a  strategy for gaining a better understanding of the scope of the problem  and addressing the greatest risks first. The scope of work required to  meet most of the targets did not represent the entirety of work necessary  to fully address the issues encompassed by each objective. Table 2  explains the actions taken by the federal agencies—and the tribal  agencies with whom they worked—during the period of 2008 through  2012, and our assessment of whether these actions met the targets in the  2008 5-year plan.
We also found that federal agencies completed additional actions and  produced results beyond the targets in the 2008 5-year plan during the  plan period and in 2013. Among other things, EPA, working with the  Navajo Nation, conducted a time-critical removal action at the Skyline  mine, located within the Oljato Chapter in southern Utah. The action  involved moving 25,000 cubic yards of radioactive mine waste—most of  which was located at the bottom of a 700-foot high mesa—to a repository  constructed on-site at the top of the mesa. According to EPA officials, the  agency built the repository to be permanent, but the waste could  ultimately be removed from the site given the Navajo Nation’s preference  that all contamination be removed from the reservation. EPA undertook  smaller, interim removal actions at three other sites, including the Quivira  mine, which is located near the Northeast Church Rock mine. At two of  the sites, EPA built temporary storage repositories to hold the waste      on-site until a final disposal option is selected.
In addition, EPA and NNEPA identified 43 of the 521 abandoned mines  as the highest priority for additional assessment work and cleanup  actions; EPA officials said these mines are the highest priority because  they pose the greatest exposure risks to the Navajo people since  elevated radiation levels are present at the mines and they are located  near houses or other potentially inhabited structures. EPA recommends  that people stay away from areas on the Navajo reservation with such  elevated levels of radiation in order to avoid potential health effects. The  43 highest priority mines include 37 mines where radiation levels  measured at or above 10-times the background radiation at the mine and  where a potentially inhabited house or structure is within one-quarter mile  of the mine. Of these mines, 8 mines measured at or above 50-times the  background radiation, and 3 mines measured above 95-times the  background radiation. EPA and NNEPA identified 6 additional mines as  part of the 43 highest priority mines where radiation levels were lower— from 2-times to 10-times background—but that posed especially high  risks because, for example, a potentially inhabited house or structure is  within 200 feet. EPA Region 9 officials we spoke with said prioritizing the  mines benefits both federal and tribal agencies by providing a common  road map for their efforts. Figure 6 shows how the 43 highest priority  mines relate to the rest of the 521 abandoned uranium mines in terms of  radiation levels and distance to homes or structures.
Further, ATSDR worked with the Navajo Nation, the University of New  Mexico, and IHS to develop and begin the Navajo Birth Cohort Study, a  health study that is intended to improve the understanding of the  relationship between uranium exposures and human health—specifically  that of mothers and babies—on the Navajo reservation. According to the  study proposal, for the Navajo Nation, congenital anomalies remain the  leading cause of infant deaths, and the infant mortality rate among the  Navajo people is 8.5 deaths per 1,000 live births, compared with  6.9 deaths per 1,000 live births overall in the United States. ATSDR  awarded a research cooperative agreement to the university in August  2010, and ATSDR and the university received approval to begin recruiting  participants in February 2013; this approval occurred after a lengthy  review process that included obtaining multiple, separate approvals,  including from the university, the Navajo Nation, and the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB). The Navajo Nation and others  expressed frustration about the length of time spent developing and  approving the study, which took longer than anticipated for a variety of  reasons. For example, one reason for the overall amount of time is that  OMB did not approve the information collection necessary for the study,  or take other actions, within the 60-day regulatory deadline, but rather  approved it after more than 300 days. Now that the study is under way,  however, ATSDR officials told us that it has already had positive  outcomes in Navajo communities. For example, according to ATSDR  officials, recent observations of increased levels of prenatal care across  the reservation may be a result of the outreach and community education  that has occurred as part of the study. Moreover, according to ATSDR’s  study proposal, the results of the study will answer long-standing  questions on whether or not exposures to uranium wastes and other  environmental contaminants are associated with adverse birth outcomes  or developmental delays on the Navajo reservation. Navajo Nation  officials, however, stated that the Navajo Birth Cohort Study is just a small  step and that more comprehensive studies are needed to better assess  the health effects of uranium contamination on the Navajo people.
We found that some of the agencies’ actions during the 2008 5-year plan  period yielded additional benefits. For example, outreach to affected  communities was an important component of some of the objectives  under the 2008 5-year plan, although the plan did not include a strategy  for coordinating agencies’ outreach. Regardless, federal agencies began  to coordinate these efforts, and, for example, held five joint workshops for  stakeholders, including members of Navajo communities affected by  uranium contamination, during which the agencies presented information  about their efforts and solicited feedback. Federal agencies also  partnered with Navajo agencies on some outreach efforts, which was  important for their success in some cases. For example, EPA and  NNEPA officials told us EPA relied heavily on NNEPA’s outreach staff to  communicate with affected community members in identifying and  addressing contaminated structures. NNEPA outreach staff’s ability to  speak Navajo and their familiarity with Navajo cultural practices allowed  them to work more effectively with community members than if EPA had  conducted outreach on its own. Other benefits from the agencies’ actions  included tribal capacity building and career development and education  opportunities for Navajos. For example, EPA helped enhance capacity  building within NNEPA by training some of its staff to assess potentially  contaminated structures, and it also provided job training to 20 Navajo  hazardous waste workers through EPA’s Superfund Job Training Initiative  program. In another example, DOE continued to sponsor a summer  internship program to give assistance to American Indian college  students—including Navajo students—who are pursuing degrees in  science, engineering, and technology.
section_title: Agencies Met the Targets in Six Objectives Primarily Because of Additional Federal Resources or Because Targets Continued Previously- Established Efforts
paragraphs: We found that a key reason why agencies met the targets for five  objectives in the 2008 5-year plan was because additional resources,  mostly federal but also private, were dedicated to their efforts. For their  work on the objectives addressing contaminated houses, abandoned  mines, unregulated drinking water sources, the Highway 160 site, and  treatment of health conditions, the agencies either dedicated more funds  and staff resources than during the previous 5-year period or received  additional appropriations for work related to Navajo uranium  contamination. DOE was able to meet the targets for a sixth objective,  regarding former uranium processing sites, primarily because its targets  largely represented a continuation of previously required activities.
subsections: section_title: Additional Resources
paragraphs: In accomplishing the targets under five of the objectives outlined in the  2008 5-year plan, according to agency officials, agencies benefited from  dedicating additional resources from their existing budgets, receiving  additional appropriations to conduct the work, or leveraging funds from  private parties. Examples are as follows:
Additional funding and staff time from agencies’ existing budgets. EPA  prioritized its work under three objectives of the 2008 5-year plan by  dedicating additional resources from its existing budget for addressing  contaminated houses, assessing abandoned uranium mines, and  addressing unregulated drinking water sources. EPA provided from  $1.8 million to $7.8 million annually to the Region 9 Superfund  Removal program to fund the program’s Navajo uranium work during  the 5-year plan period—a significant increase over the previous  5-year period. For example, from fiscal years 2008 through 2012, EPA  reported that it expended $22 million on efforts to identify and address  contaminated houses and other structures, compared with the  $1.5 million it expended on similar efforts in the preceding 5 years.  Throughout the 2008 5-year plan period, the additional Superfund  Removal program funds allowed EPA Region 9 to increase the  amount of money it spent on the Navajo work even as the national  Superfund budget decreased, according to a senior EPA Region 9  official. Further, EPA officials told us that they conducted work that  went beyond the 5-year plan targets because of the increased funding  the agency dedicated to Navajo uranium work. Specifically, these  officials said they could not have completed the removal action at the  Skyline mine without the increased funding since the Region 9  Superfund removal program’s prior budget would have been  insufficient, and there was no potentially responsible party to  contribute funds. In addition to increased funding, EPA Region 9 also  increased the number of full-time equivalent employees that it  dedicated to its Navajo uranium work from approximately 3.68 in 2008  to 6.95 in 2012. Similarly, IHS reported that its Navajo Area identified  nearly $1 million from within its existing budget that it used to support  the creation of a uranium-related health screening program, which  was established in 2010.
Additional funding from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act  of 2009 (Recovery Act). EPA and IHS used Recovery Act funds for  some of the water infrastructure projects that were selected to serve  Navajo communities in which contaminated, unregulated water  sources had been identified. For example, in fiscal year 2009, EPA  contributed $3 million in Drinking Water Infrastructure Grants Tribal  Set Aside funds, and IHS contributed about $2 million from the IHS  Recovery Act Sanitation Facilities Construction Fund toward a nearly  $10 million, 50-mile extension of a water main to the communities  around Sweetwater, Arizona. An EPA official familiar with the project  told us that it will supply water to homes within the vicinity of four  contaminated, unregulated wells, including a well that had the highest  uranium levels of all unregulated water sources tested during the  5-year plan period.
Additional appropriations. In fiscal year 2009, DOE received a  $5 million appropriation to carry out a remedial action of the Highway  160 site. The 2008 5-year plan included a target for assessing the  site and identifying the best path forward, but not for completing  cleanup at the site. According to DOE and NNEPA officials involved  with the project, having the resources available to fund assessment  and cleanup work allowed the agencies to move forward and  complete the cleanup more quickly than they had anticipated.  Moreover, NNEPA and DOE also used the appropriated funds to  begin to address recently discovered, contaminated structures in the  area of the Highway 160 site and the nearby Rare Metals processing  site. In addition, ATSDR officials we spoke with said they would not  have been able to fund the Navajo Birth Cohort Study without  additional appropriations for such research. These officials said  ATSDR received an increase of $2 million in funding for fiscal year  2010 to begin the study, and that the agency has subsequently put  that amount toward the study.
Leveraging funding from private, potentially responsible parties and  other federal agencies. According to EPA officials, the agency was  able to complete some of the work that went beyond the targets in the  2008 5-year plan, including conducting the interim time-critical  removal actions at the Quivira mine and others, because of funding  that came from private, potentially responsible parties. Specifically,  EPA issued an administrative order to one of the former operators of  the Quivira mine to conduct and pay for the interim removal action. In  addition, EPA and NNEPA used funds from a bankruptcy settlement  with another potentially responsible party to pay for the interim actions  at three other mines or mine-related sites. Without funds from the  private, potentially responsible parties, EPA officials said they would  not have been able to conduct these actions during the 5-year plan  period. Further, EPA officials said that funds from the bankruptcy  settlement were instrumental in providing the initial funding for the  agency’s efforts to pursue potentially responsible parties at other  abandoned uranium mines on the Navajo reservation.
Federal agencies’ ability to share resources was also an important  factor in meeting the targets in at least one objective. Specifically, IHS  officials told us the agency would not have been able to contribute  funding to all 13 drinking water infrastructure projects funded during  the 5-year plan period without combining its funds with funds from  EPA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. IHS  officials said the agency’s ability to fund these drinking water projects  would have been limited because IHS’s share of some of the projects’  costs would have exceeded the agency’s limit for economic feasibility.  For example, if the agency had to solely fund a $4.75 million project in  Dennehotso, in the northern part of the reservation, it would have cost  the agency about $44,000 per home, an amount that would have  been considered economically infeasible for IHS in fiscal year 2009,  the year the project was funded. However, contributions of $2 million  from EPA and $1 million from the Department of Housing and Urban  Development reduced IHS’s per-home cost so that the agency was  able to participate in funding the project that provided piped drinking  water to 107 homes that did not previously have piped water.
Overall, the federal agencies reported spending $121 million on work  performed under the 2008 5-year plan. These amounts do not include  the approximately $17 million in private funds spent during the 5-year  plan period, including by potentially responsible parties at the Northeast  Church Rock mine, the Quivira mine, and from the bankruptcy settlement,  according to the federal agencies’ January 2013 summary report. In  contrast, agencies reported spending approximately $42 million during  the prior 5 years, and more than half of that amount was spent by DOE at  the four processing sites. Figure 7 compares the amount of funds spent  by the federal agencies under each objective in the 5-year plan period  with the previous 5 years. Because the 2008 5-year plan did not include  an overall cost estimate for conducting the work, we cannot determine  whether the total amount spent by the agencies was in keeping with their  expected costs. The 5-year plan included estimated costs of varying  specificity for the first 2 years of the plan—2008 and 2009—since agency  budgets for the first 2 years were already in place at the time of the plan’s  development but not for the final 3 years of the plan.
For one objective of the 2008 5-year plan—addressing contamination at  former uranium processing sites—DOE set targets that largely continued  previously authorized activities that the agency was already undertaking,  which according to DOE officials, helped the agency accomplish the  targets. DOE set targets to continue to address groundwater  contamination at three of the sites and to continue long-term surveillance  and maintenance at all four sites—actions the agency was required to  undertake under UMTRCA. DOE officials told us that continuing to carry  out the already approved groundwater remediation strategies at the sites  was the most appropriate action for the agency during the 2008 5-year  plan period since those were the actions they were explicitly authorized to  conduct. Navajo Nation officials told us that they were disappointed that  DOE did not increase its level of effort at the sites. They also told us they  were concerned that the remediation efforts that DOE is implementing are  not achieving sufficient results, and that it appears that the agency is not  expected to complete its efforts to treat contaminated groundwater in the  foreseeable future.
section_title: Agencies Did Not Meet the Targets in Two Objectives for a Variety of Reasons, Including Optimistic Schedules and Decisions to Perform Additional Work That Extended Time Frames
paragraphs: Federal agencies did not meet the targets for two of the eight objectives  in the 2008 5-year plan—cleanup of the Northeast Church Rock mine and  the Tuba City Dump—for a variety of reasons, including that the  schedules were optimistic and ambitious, and EPA decided to increase  outreach work at the Northeast Church Rock mine and assessment work  at the Tuba City Dump before identifying final cleanup actions for the  sites. EPA and BIA officials told us they estimated the schedules based  on the information they had at the time, but neither agency anticipated the  need for additional steps in the assessment process and therefore did not  include these steps in their schedules. Officials from both agencies said  they deliberately created ambitious schedules for these sites, in part, to  acknowledge the threats they posed and to make it clear that the  agencies were committed to cleaning them up. Work remains for both  agencies to complete the cleanups at the two sites, and the agencies  expect that time frames will likely extend beyond the agencies’  2014 5-year plan and that federal costs will be in the tens of millions of  dollars at each site.
subsections: section_title: Northeast Church Rock Mine
paragraphs: EPA did not meet its target to complete cleanup of the Northeast Church  Rock mine in part because its schedule was optimistic and ambitious.  According to the 2008 5-year plan, EPA expected to select the removal  action for the site in December 2008; however, this selection did not  occur until September 2011. According to EPA officials familiar with the  project, selecting the removal action took longer than anticipated for a  number of reasons. First, completing the cleanup assessment for the site  took 8 months longer than planned. Second, after EPA issued the  cleanup assessment, the agency postponed selecting the removal action  by 2 years so that agency officials could better understand and attempt to  address community concerns. Over this 2-year period, EPA conducted  10 public meetings and brought in a Navajo peacemaker to facilitate  discussions and improve communication between the agency and the  community. According to EPA officials we spoke with, in order to further  respond to community concerns, EPA also began work on some  predesign analyses that are normally conducted at a later stage in the  cleanup process. EPA officials told us they felt the meetings were  valuable and that they have conducted more outreach at this site than at  most other sites, but community members we spoke with said they  remain frustrated with the decision process and disappointed with the  outcome.
Third, when estimating the schedule under the 2008 5-year plan, EPA  Region 9 officials did not anticipate that additional approval processes  would be necessary to implement the removal action for the site that EPA  ultimately selected. EPA’s selected action involves disposing of  approximately 1 million cubic yards of mine waste within an existing  disposal cell for mill tailings at a former uranium processing site. The site  is located less than 1 mile from the Northeast Church Rock mine and is  regulated and managed by NRC and EPA Region 6, respectively. The  former operator of the processing site—which is also the former operator  and a potentially responsible party for the mine—currently holds a license  from NRC for the existing disposal cell at the former processing site.  According to EPA Region 9 officials, for EPA to transfer waste from the  mine to the disposal cell, EPA headquarters officials determined that EPA  Region 6 would need to approve a Record of Decision, which took  18 months to complete.
A number of steps remain for EPA to fully meet the target of cleaning up  the mine. As of February 2014, EPA was in the removal predesign phase  of the cleanup process. NRC and DOE are both participating in an EPA- led design work group since NRC will transfer responsibility for the site to  DOE once the processing site is closed for long-term surveillance and  maintenance pursuant to UMTRCA. Once the design phase is complete,  the former operator of the processing site must submit a license  amendment request and receive an amended license from NRC before  disposing of the mine waste at the former processing site. This former  operator and potentially responsible party for the mine is expected to  implement the removal action if and when NRC issues the amended  license. In addition, NNEPA officials told us they have concerns regarding  groundwater contamination at the site that have yet to be examined.
EPA’s current schedule estimate is to complete the removal action in  2020. EPA officials, however, acknowledged that this schedule is also  optimistic since it assumes that NRC’s approval process for the license  amendment will take 1 year, and that the cleanup itself will take 4 years.  NRC officials also said they felt the schedule was too optimistic, and they  told us that NRC’s safety and environmental reviews will take  approximately 2 years but, if a public hearing on the license amendment  is requested, the approval process could take up to 5 years. An EPA  project manager for the mine told us EPA is working with NRC to revise  the schedule to provide 2 years for the license amendment approval  process in order to better account for NRC’s process. Moreover, although  the former operator and potentially responsible party at Northeast Church  Rock mine is taking the lead for the cleanup, the government will pay up  to 33 percent of future cleanup costs; in 2009, EPA estimated that these  total future costs could be $44 million.
section_title: Tuba City Dump
paragraphs: BIA also did not meet its targets in the 2008 5-year plan for the Tuba City  Dump, in part, because the schedules were optimistic and ambitious.  Under the plan, BIA was to (1) complete a set of studies to assess  whether interim actions were warranted to protect Hopi water supplies,  including drinking water wells, by mid-2008; (2) create a work plan for,  then conduct and complete a RI/FS by late 2009; and (3) complete a  remedial action by the end of 2012. Partway through BIA’s  implementation of the 5-year plan, in August 2010, BIA entered into a  settlement agreement with EPA to conduct the RI/FS. Under the  settlement agreement, BIA’s work is subject to EPA’s approval, and EPA  will select the remedial action. As of the end of the 5-year plan period in  2012, BIA had completed the interim action studies, which found the  dump did not pose an immediate threat to the wells, and it had  implemented certain actions recommended by the studies, including  installing a fence around the perimeter and conducting a detailed analysis  of one location with high levels of uranium. BIA developed the RI/FS work  plan but had not completed the plan’s required work. EPA had not  selected a remedial action and, therefore, BIA had not begun or  completed a remedial action.
Further, BIA’s actions under the 5-year plan took longer than expected,  for various reasons, which also contributed to the agency not meeting the  targets. First, BIA spent nearly 1 year longer than expected conducting  the interim action studies, and implementing the recommended actions  took an additional year that had not been accounted for in the 5-year  plan. BIA officials said they underestimated the amount of time needed to  complete these efforts. Second, BIA spent more time developing the work  plan for the RI/FS than had been anticipated, in part because EPA  directed it to significantly revise the work plan. Under the settlement  agreement, BIA was responsible for submitting a work plan for EPA  approval that specified the activities and deliverables, as well as  deadlines, for BIA in the development of the RI/FS. The work plan and  its deadlines are legally enforceable once EPA approves the work plan.  EPA approved the initial work plan developed by BIA in January 2011,  and BIA issued a $2 million task award for its implementation in June  2011. However, in July 2011, 1 month later, EPA notified BIA that it  would need to revise the RI/FS work plan, which significantly increased  the amount of work to be performed. BIA then spent an additional year  working with EPA revising the work plan, which EPA ultimately approved  in July 2012. According to EPA correspondence to BIA, although it would  delay completion of the RI/FS, the additional investigative work was  necessary to resolve conflicting interpretations of data collected over the  previous years of assessments and to support a defensible selection of a  remedial action for the site. EPA officials said the additional work has  yielded valuable information, including determining whether groundwater  contamination at the site can reach nearby Hopi drinking water wells.  Hopi tribal leaders, however, told us that although they appreciate the  additional understanding that has been gained through the RI/FS, they  are frustrated that the federal agencies have continued to dedicate  resources to conducting additional assessments instead of cleanup  actions, especially in light of the fact that, as of 2013, BIA had overseen  assessment work at the site for more than 10 years.
Third, implementing the RI/FS has taken longer than expected by BIA  under the 2008 5-year plan, in part because BIA conducted additional  work under the work plan at EPA’s direction. In addition to the work EPA  directed BIA to add in 2011, EPA subsequently required BIA to conduct  additional field investigations. EPA officials explained that the scope of an  RI/FS is often changed in response to conditions found on the ground,  and that the Tuba City RI/FS has been typical in that respect. According  to EPA and BIA documents, conducting this additional fieldwork  contributed to BIA missing some of the work plan deadlines.
Moreover, project and contract management challenges faced by BIA  have also contributed to the length of time spent on the RI/FS. BIA  officials told us they had communication problems with the agency’s  contractor for the RI/FS and performance problems regarding the quality  and timeliness of the contractor’s deliverables. For example, in  correspondence with the contractor, BIA noted multiple instances when  the contractor was late in providing draft deliverables to BIA, which did  not provide sufficient time for BIA to review the deliverables before they  were due to EPA. In addition, when BIA completed its review of the  deliverables, it found they did not all meet the terms and conditions of the  contract. BIA also noted in its correspondence with the contractor that the  contractor’s performance problems began soon after the contract was  signed. After the problems continued to mount, according to BIA officials,  they worked informally through phone calls and e-mails to correct the  performance problems; however, BIA did not formally notify the contractor  of the problems and require corrective action until about 16 months after  the problems began. During that time period, BIA modified the contract  four times, each time increasing the work to be performed in accordance  with direction from EPA; these modifications totaled nearly $1.6 million,  about an 80 percent increase above the value of the original contract. By  adding work to the contract without correcting the contractor’s poor  performance and adding stronger performance provisions, BIA was  effectively rewarding the contractor for its poor performance. In hindsight,  BIA officials responsible for managing the contract told us, had they  known the problems would not improve, they would have initiated formal  action against the contractor sooner; however, they were reluctant to  further delay the project. Had they terminated the contractor for default,  BIA would have had to award a new contract, taking a minimum of  90 days, plus the additional time it would take to bring a new contractor  up to speed to perform the contract. The BIA officials said, instead, they  prioritized meeting the deadlines in the work plan and avoiding the delay  of awarding a new contract. These officials told us that the RI/FS contract,  initially valued at approximately $2 million, is not typical for their region  and is much larger than any other contract they manage. For example,  the next largest environmental contract in BIA’s Western region is worth  $300,000. Learning from its challenges in managing the RI/FS contract  will become even more important to BIA in the next few years as the  agency moves from assessment to cleanup work after a remedial action  is selected. At that time, BIA officials said their agency will award and  manage a new contract, one that is even larger and more complicated  that will increase costs significantly. In August 2011, we reported that  incorporating lessons learned from past contracts is an important element  of successful acquisition planning when preparing to award a new  contract. Through this process, agencies ensure that knowledge gained  from prior acquisitions is used to refine requirements and acquisition  strategies. Without examining lessons learned from managing the RI/FS  contract and considering these lessons as part of the acquisition planning  process for the remedial action contract, BIA could face contract  management challenges on a larger scale.
Further, according to EPA and BIA officials, BIA’s management of the  project also contributed to BIA’s missing some legally enforceable  deadlines in the work plan within months of EPA approving it in July 2012.  Specifically, BIA did not comply with the settlement agreement’s terms for  requesting an extension to these deadlines in the work plan. As a result,  BIA was subject to stipulated penalties under the settlement agreement  for the deadlines it missed. EPA officials told us the agency held the  penalties in abeyance; as a result, EPA did not calculate the total amount  of the penalties. As EPA noted in correspondence to BIA, the missed  deadlines only led to a few weeks of direct delays to the work plan  schedule, but the missed deadlines used much of the contingency, or  slack, in the schedule, meaning any future delays could not be absorbed  without directly lengthening the project. In 2013, according to EPA  officials, BIA notified EPA that it was going to miss another work plan  deadline, however, BIA again did not submit the extension request before  the deadline passed, potentially subjecting it to additional stipulated  penalties.
Further complicating its management of the project, we found that the  schedule BIA used to manage its responsibilities under the RI/FS was not  created based on best practices for effective scheduling. We have  reported that a sound schedule is comprehensive, well-constructed,  credible, and controlled. The RI/FS schedule generated by BIA’s  contractor and approved by EPA minimally met these criteria. For  example, we could not verify that the schedule included all the actions  needed to complete the RI/FS, which is an essential practice in ensuring  that the schedule is comprehensive. If a project schedule does not fully  reflect the scope of the project, it can result in unreliable estimated  completion dates and delays. In another example, neither BIA nor EPA  regularly updated the schedule based on actual progress, an important  aspect of a controlled schedule. BIA officials explained that they do not  keep a copy of the schedule file that they can update; BIA relies on its  contractor to update the schedule, and EPA maintains control of the  master schedule file for the RI/FS. Without an updatable version of the  schedule, BIA cannot effectively monitor its contractor’s progress and  cannot evaluate the quality of changes to the schedule proposed by the  contractor, which BIA then proposes to EPA for approval. According to  BIA officials, not having information about the basis for the proposed  schedule changes contributed to the agency proposing a new RI/FS  schedule to EPA in 2012 that contained errors and was not achievable.  Appendix II contains additional details about our analysis.
A number of steps remain for BIA to meet the target of completing  cleanup at the Tuba City Dump. As of February 2014, the full scope of  remaining cleanup work—and an estimate of when it may be completed— had not been determined since the RI/FS was ongoing. BIA requested  two extensions to the deadlines in the work plan in 2013; as a result, the  current deadline for completion of the RI/FS is May 2014, more than  4 years after the completion date in the 2008 5-year plan. According to  BIA officials, the May 2014 deadline may not be achieved. For example,  BIA officials said they are expecting the schedule to change to allow for  additional time for stakeholders’ review of a key draft document and for  additional analysis requested by EPA in December 2013. In another  example, BIA has continued to experience performance problems with its  contractor related to timeliness and product quality. These performance  problems prompted BIA to send a second formal notification to take  corrective action to its contractor in January 2014. Nevertheless, in the  short-term, EPA officials said they plan to conduct extensive outreach  with local communities as they evaluate the remedial options for the site.  Hopi officials we spoke with stressed the tribe’s concern over protecting  their water sources in the area and told us that having a contaminated  dump located on their land is affecting their ability to expand economic  development. Because of these concerns, Hopi officials stated that the  only acceptable solution is to remove the contamination from the site.  DOE and EPA officials involved at the site told us, however, that the data  collected thus far indicate the Hopi drinking water wells will not be  affected by the dump, and there are other factors limiting development in  the area, including the region’s scarcity of water.
Based on two potential remedial actions for the site identified by BIA, the  agency has estimated that the range of probable future cleanup costs is  from $22 million to $72 million. BIA created this estimate range in order  to contribute to the Department of the Interior’s (Interior) environmental  and disposal liability estimate, which is included in Interior’s annual  financial statement, but we found the estimate was not generated  according to the government and industry cost-estimating best practices  identified in our 2009 cost estimating and assessment guide. According  to BIA officials, the estimate was created according to Interior’s guidance.  Nevertheless, according to best practices, cost estimates should be  comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible, which are the  four characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate of any type, and BIA’s  estimate does not fully reflect these characteristics. For example, the  estimate did not completely define the program, an important aspect of a  comprehensive schedule. In response to our questions about some  aspects of the work scope that were included in the estimate, including  whether future groundwater treatment was included, BIA officials stated  that such treatment should be included in the estimate. However, after  checking with the contractor that created the estimate, one BIA official  involved with managing the project discovered that costs for groundwater  treatment were not included in the estimate. Without fully accounting for  all future costs, management will have difficulty successfully planning  program resource requirements. In response, BIA officials said that they  directed the contractor to include these costs in a revised estimate. These  officials also said they did not apply all of the best practices when  developing the estimate, in part, because it would not have been  appropriate for BIA to expend significant resources developing a detailed  cost estimate since they have not completed the RI/FS, and that once  EPA selects a final remedial action, BIA will work to apply cost estimating  protocols when it develops a more detailed cost estimate for the site.  Appendix III provides additional details of the results of our analysis of the  cost estimate.
section_title: Agencies Have Not Estimated the Full Scope of Work, Time Frames, or Costs Needed to Address Uranium Contamination but Recognize That Significant Work Remains
paragraphs: The agencies that implemented the 2008 5-year plan have not identified  the full scope of remaining work, time frames, or costs of fully addressing  uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, especially at  abandoned uranium mines, but have recognized that significant work  remains for addressing such contamination beyond the targets in the  plan. As a result, decision makers and stakeholders do not have sufficient  information about the overall remaining work, time frames, and costs to  assess the overall pace of the cleanup efforts. Given that significant work  remains to address contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, it is  likely that it will take many decades and cost at least hundreds of millions  of dollars in additional funding to make significant progress in this area.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Have Not Identified the Full Scope of Remaining Work, Time Frames, or Costs Needed to Fully Address Uranium Contamination, Especially at Abandoned Mines
paragraphs: The draft action plans do not clearly delineate a course of action for fully resolving the  problem. Given the extent of the contamination that is already known, it is obvious that the  contamination cannot and will not be cleaned up in the 3- to 9-month timeframes covered  by the draft plans. We need a 5-year plan from each agency that sets out specific cleanup  objectives, specific timeframes for achieving those objectives, and the new authorities and  funding, if any, necessary to achieve those objectives. These plans will provide the  Congress, the Navajo Nation, and the public with concrete benchmarks against which to  measure the progress of the federal agencies in cleaning up the contamination.
In its critique of the short-term action plans, the committee requested of  the agencies additional information to understand the full scope of the  cleanup effort. The same critique is also generally applicable to the 2008  5-year plan because it too did not contain information on the full scope of  the cleanup and instead provided targets for achieving incremental  progress under the plan. For example, it is still unclear what percentage  of the overall cleanup effort was expected to be achieved in the 2008  5-year plan or how many additional 5-year plans may be necessary to  fully address the contamination. As we discussed above, the agencies  stated that the 2008 5-year plan focused on addressing over the 5-year  period what they identified as the most urgent uranium-related problems  and was not intended to be a long-term plan for dealing with the entirety  of the contamination. EPA officials involved with coordinating the  development of the agencies’ 2014 5-year plan told us this plan also will  not include the full scope of the cleanup work.
EPA officials cited a variety of reasons for not having identified estimates  of the full scope, time frames, or costs of cleanup, including at the  abandoned mines. These officials explained that providing such high- level, general estimates of required work, time frames, or costs is not  consistent with how EPA cleans up contaminated sites under CERCLA.  The agency typically develops detailed, site-specific information on a site- by-site basis, and then estimates costs and schedules based on that  specific information. They said the agency generally does not create even  rough estimates if cleanup actions have not been selected or if they do  not know the total number of mines that will need cleanup. These officials  also said that a number of other uncertainties remain. More specifically,  Incomplete information about the extent of contamination. According  to the January 2013 report summarizing the agencies’  accomplishments under the 2008 5-year plan, EPA and NNEPA’s  actions resulted in an improved understanding of the scope of  uranium contamination at the mines on the reservation, and the  agencies identified and prioritized 43 mines that pose the highest risk  to surrounding communities. EPA, however, does not know the full  scope of cleanup actions that will be necessary to address these  highest priority mines (see app. IV for more information about the  status of each of the 43 mines), and EPA officials said they expect  that some number of the rest of the 521 abandoned mines will also  need cleanup, but they do not know what that number will be. EPA  officials said that they need additional information about, for example,  the location and volume of waste present at each site before they can  identify the scope of cleanup actions. However, EPA officials told us  they have begun making assumptions about what work may be  needed at the highest priority mines based on the site-specific  information they have already collected. These officials stated that  they expect that most of the highest priority mines will need removal  actions, involving excavating and disposing from a few thousand to  hundreds of thousands of cubic yards of mine waste at each mine,  and a few of these mines may warrant longer-term remedial actions  where surface water and/or groundwater may be contaminated.
Uncertainty about potentially responsible parties. According to EPA  officials, the total number of abandoned mines that will have a  potentially responsible party to lead or contribute funding for  assessment and cleanup work is unknown, and this number will affect  the scope of work, time frames, and costs necessary to clean up  abandoned mines using federal funds. As of February 2014, EPA had  signed agreements with potentially responsible parties regarding  24 mines and received money from a bankruptcy settlement for use at  another 49 mines—these actions covered 9 of the 43 highest priority  mines. EPA Region 9 officials said they are continuing to pursue  potentially responsible parties, but the total number of mines that  could ultimately be subject to agreements with such parties may be  limited, in part, because of difficulties associated with identifying  parties more than 50 years after mines were abandoned. Further,  there are other reasons why the government’s ultimate share of the  cleanup costs is unknown. If the federal government is a potentially  responsible party at a site, it is liable for the cleanup costs even if a  viable nonfederal potentially responsible party is also identified. Also,  in November 2013, the Navajo Nation formally stated its intent to file a  claim against the United States, and DOE in particular, for  reimbursement of its cleanup costs at the abandoned mines on the  reservation if a cooperative approach is not successful, which could  further affect the government’s share of those costs.
Uncertainty about disposal options. Another uncertainty that affects  the scope, time frames, and costs of the remaining abandoned mine  work is where the mine waste will ultimately be disposed. Currently,  the Navajo Nation’s position is that all remaining contaminated  materials from uranium mines and at processing sites should be  excavated and disposed off of Navajo lands. As a result, it is unclear  where the volumes of mine waste will be disposed. As of January  2014, the Navajo Nation was working on drafting legislation to create  a Uranium Commission under Navajo law that is expected to  recommend options for mine waste disposal. However, according to a  Navajo Nation official involved with the process, this commission is  not expected to make any disposal recommendations until sometime  in the next few years.
Even when significant uncertainties regarding the scope of work and  available funding remain, however, we have reported that agencies can  create high-level estimates of costs and time frames that can be useful for  decision makers and stakeholders. For example, EPA can base these  estimates on the information it currently has regarding the removal  actions that may be necessary at most of the highest priority mines.  Specifically, according to our 2009 cost estimating and assessment guide  of government and industry cost-estimating best practices, agencies can  create high-level cost estimates—for example, rough order of magnitude  estimates—for efforts, even with significant uncertainties, that can inform  decision makers as they evaluate resource requirements. These cost  estimates are often in the form of a range to correspond with the level of  uncertainty associated with the estimate and can be developed in short  time frames of weeks or months. Although not budget-quality estimates,  these types of estimates can be used in planning and can be created  before detailed requirements are known. Typically, according to our 2009  cost estimating and assessment guide, an estimate should be revised  and contain more detail as the agency obtains more site-specific  information and the effort becomes better defined, and the estimate  should become more certain as actual costs begin to replace earlier  estimates. For example, as EPA obtains more detailed information about  the site-specific characteristics at each of the highest priority mines, it  would be able to update the scope of its estimate, bringing more certainty.  According to our 2009 cost estimating and assessment guide and our  2012 schedule assessment guide, agencies can also create high-level  schedules that are linked to cost estimates, based on stated assumptions,  and that incorporate uncertainties regarding future activities through a  schedule risk analysis. The risk analysis provides agencies with a range  of dates that correspond with levels of confidence in the ability to meet  those dates.
As further evidence that it is possible to develop these types of high-level  estimates, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013  requires the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the EPA  Administrator and the Secretary of the Interior, to undertake a review of  and prepare a report on abandoned uranium mines across the United  States that previously provided uranium ore for the nation’s nuclear  defense activities. According to DOE documents, the agency plans to  issue a report in July 2014 that will include information about the potential  costs and feasibility of reclaiming or remediating abandoned uranium  mines, including the mines on or near Navajo lands. According to a DOE  presentation on the draft report, the report is expected to contain cost  estimate ranges based on the amount of uranium ore produced at the  mines, among other assumptions. A DOE official involved with developing  the draft report told us that the cost estimate ranges are not specific to  mines on the Navajo reservation but are based on production size  categories of mines across the United States that provided ore to the  Atomic Energy Commission. This work by DOE could be a good starting  point for a high-level cost estimate to clean up the uranium mines on or  near the Navajo reservation; however, based on the statutory  requirements for the study, we neither anticipate that it will provide  information on the full scope or costs of any other activities covered in the  2008 5-year plan nor any time frames.
Although EPA, DOE, BIA, IHS, and NRC provided some information on  high-priority cleanup issues in their 2008 5-year plan, the agencies did not  provide the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform with  overall estimates of the remaining scope of work, time frames, and costs  of fully addressing uranium contamination on or near the Navajo  reservation as requested. Without an estimate of the remaining scope of  work, time frames, and costs to fully address uranium contamination,  especially at the abandoned mines, decision makers and stakeholders  neither have the information they need to assess the overall pace of the  cleanup efforts, nor do they have a basis to put the agencies’  accomplishments under the 2008 5-year plan into perspective. Navajo  Nation officials and other stakeholders told us that they want the federal  agencies to describe the full scope of work that remains to fully address  the contamination.
section_title: Agencies Recognize That Significant Work Remains to Address Uranium Contamination
paragraphs: Although the agencies have not identified the full scope of work that  remains to address uranium contamination on or near the Navajo  reservation, through implementing the 2008 5-year plan, federal and tribal  agencies have compiled information that shows that significant work is  needed. For some plan objectives, the agencies have developed a  significant long-term scope of work, including the objectives of providing  regulated, piped drinking water to Navajo residents in uranium-affected  areas, treating groundwater contamination at the former processing sites,  and at the abandoned mines. For example, to help lower the number of  Navajo residents without access to regulated, piped drinking water in their  homes and to continue reducing the use of unregulated and potentially  contaminated water sources, IHS developed a list of 145 potential water  infrastructure projects that would serve approximately 3,300 homes that  do not have piped water. IHS, however, considers just 36 of the  145 projects—serving about 1,000 homes—as economically feasible to  fund, according to IHS documents, so it is unclear how many of the  145 projects will ultimately be undertaken by IHS. In another example,  according to DOE officials, the agency will continue its active groundwater  remediation work at the Rare Metals and Shiprock processing sites, but  the future scope of work at the sites is unclear. This is, in part, because  the remediation systems that were designed to address contamination  from millions of gallons of water contaminated by mill tailings that entered  the ground at these sites are not performing as anticipated. As a result,  DOE has not made as much progress toward meeting water quality  standards as it originally projected. According to DOE officials, they plan  to revise the two sites’ groundwater compliance action plans beginning in  2014 and 2015, and these revised plans will dictate the future scope of  work at these sites.
For EPA’s work at the abandoned uranium mines, although many  uncertainties remain about the full scope of work needed to clean up the  mines, EPA and Navajo Nation officials said that they recognize that the  amount of work will be significant. During the 2014 5-year plan period,  EPA officials said, in order to obtain additional information needed to  select removal or remedial actions at the highest priority mines, the  agency plans to conduct additional assessments at 41 of the 43 highest  priority mines, beyond the initial screening information gathered during  the 2008 5-year plan period, in cooperation with potentially responsible  parties where applicable. EPA and NNEPA officials said these additional  assessments range from, at a minimum, scanning the entire site to  identify the likely boundaries of contamination and conducting tests to  estimate the volume of waste present, to conducting more thorough  assessments. These officials told us they do not anticipate conducting  cleanups at any mines without potentially responsible parties that would  require full funding from EPA during this time period. Appendix V contains  additional information about the future work associated with the other  2008 5-year plan objectives not discussed here.
section_title: Full Scope of Additional Work Will Likely Take Many Decades to Complete
paragraphs: Given what is known about the significant scope of work that agencies  have recognized as remaining to address uranium contamination on or  near the Navajo reservation, it is clear that, at current funding levels, it  could take at least many decades to complete.
For example, at the abandoned uranium mines, EPA officials said that  they are assuming that most of the remaining 42 of the 43 highest priority  abandoned mines will need additional removal actions. For one of the  highest priority mines—the Skyline mine—EPA has conducted a removal  action to clean it up, but the waste remains on the reservation. In the  absence of an EPA-estimated time frame, we roughly estimated time  frames using information from EPA officials about the number of removal  actions that they said they assumed EPA will need to fund and the costs  of the agency’s removal action for the Skyline mine. Specifically,  assuming viable nonfederal potentially responsible parties can be  identified for about half of these highest priority mines, which EPA officials  said is a reasonable early assumption, federal funds would be necessary  to cover the full cost of removal actions at the other half of these mines,  or 21 mines. Over the 2008 5-year plan period (i.e., 2008 through 2012),  EPA funded the removal action at the Skyline mine from Region 9’s  Superfund removal budget, spending about $7 million. Assuming Region  9’s Superfund removal budget funding levels from the 2008 5-year plan  period continued, it would take EPA 105 years to fund the removal  actions at 21 of the highest priority mines. According to our rough  estimate, it would take even longer to also address the unknown number  of mines without potentially responsible parties that will also need  cleanup, but which have not been identified.
Moreover, during the decades-long time frames for conducting cleanup at  the highest priority abandoned mines, the Navajo people living near these  mines could continue to be exposed to elevated radiation levels that pose  a high risk, either by visiting the abandoned mines or by inhaling or  ingesting contaminated dust that migrates from the mines into  communities. For example, as of February 2014, 38 of the 43 highest  priority mines remained physically accessible and/or there were no signs  communicating the radiation dangers present at the sites. We visited one  such mine—the A&B #3 mine near Cameron, Arizona—in July 2013,  where EPA measured radiation levels that were 37-times above  background (see fig. 8). The mine is not signed or fenced and is located  within one-quarter mile of nearby homes. According to a local government  official and a Navajo agency official, they have seen evidence that people  visit the mine site; they told us they have found children’s toys at the site  and pointed out vehicle tracks.
In addition, the time frames associated with addressing contamination  under other plan objectives are lengthy as well. For example, IHS officials  estimated that it would take approximately 38 years to complete 36 of the  145 projects it identified as necessary to provide regulated, piped drinking  water to residents of areas affected by historic uranium mining, assuming  IHS were the sole contributor of funds and based on IHS’s Navajo Area  water program budget for fiscal year 2013. During this time frame,  residents may continue to be exposed to harmful constituents potentially  found in unregulated drinking water sources. EPA and NNEPA officials  told us that although the official position of the Navajo Nation is that  unregulated water sources are not fit for human consumption, they  continue to receive reports that Navajo residents use these sources, in  part if there is no alternative, but for other reasons as well. In addition to  health dangers posed by drinking uranium-contaminated water, which  ATSDR and others have linked to kidney disease, IHS and EPA consider  the general lack of regulated drinking water to be a health risk because  contaminants often found in unregulated sources, such as E. coli  bacteria, can pose an immediate health danger to people that consume  them. Appendix V contains additional information about the potential  future time frames associated with the other 2008 5-year plan objectives  not discussed here.
section_title: The Scope of Additional Work Will Most Likely Cost Hundreds of Millions of Dollars
paragraphs: For the significant amount of remaining work to address uranium  contamination that federal agencies recognize is needed, it appears that  associated costs could exceed hundreds of millions of dollars. For  example, in the absence of a cost estimate from EPA for work at the  abandoned mines, our rough estimate based on previously incurred costs  by EPA at the Skyline mine indicates that EPA’s costs to fund removal  actions at just half of the highest priority mines, or 21 mines, could be a  minimum of about $150 million. This is a conservative, low-end estimate  for a number of reasons but, most importantly, because it does not  include costs to transport and dispose of waste off-site. According to  EPA officials, this is one of the most significant factors influencing  cleanup costs; disposing of waste offsite is consistent with the Navajo  Nation position that such waste be removed from Navajo lands.
Other federal agencies have developed cost estimates for addressing  contamination under other plan objectives, and the costs for these efforts  appear to reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars as well. For  example, IHS officials estimated that the 36 economically feasible  drinking water projects would cost about $35 million, and that all  145 projects would cost about $195 million to complete. In another  example, DOE has estimated that its various actions at the former  processing sites will cost about $193 million over the next 75 years, but  DOE officials said that this estimate will need revision based on new  groundwater remediation plans at the Rare Metals and Shiprock sites.  Appendix V contains additional information about the potential future  costs associated with the other 2008 5-year plan objectives not discussed  here.
section_title: Agencies Face Challenges Meeting Funding Needs and Engaging Affected Communities, Though Opportunities Exist for Improving Relationships with the Navajo and Hopi People
paragraphs: Federal agencies face a variety of challenges in continuing to address  uranium contamination on and near the Navajo reservation, including  securing adequate funding and effectively engaging tribal communities.  However, federal and Navajo agency officials and community members  we spoke with identified opportunities for improving relationships with the  Navajo and Hopi people, which could help the federal agencies more  effectively engage these communities. In addition, other opportunities  exist to enhance collaboration with federal agencies and with Navajo  agencies.
subsections: section_title: Adequate Funding for Continued Efforts to Address Uranium Contamination Is a Key Challenge
paragraphs: One key challenge that federal agencies face is difficulty meeting funding  needs with available federal resources. Specifically, according to EPA  Region 9 officials, funding for EPA’s efforts to assess and clean up  abandoned uranium mines under its Superfund removal program,  especially those without viable private, potentially responsible parties, and  to provide clean and safe drinking water is expected to decrease from  funding levels that have been available from 2008 through 2012. EPA  officials told us that reducing the human health risks associated with  abandoned uranium mines on the Navajo reservation is a priority and that  the agency intends to continue providing funding as resources allow.  However, these officials stated that declining Superfund removal program  resources nationally will likely result in a reduction in funding available to  conduct removal actions at Navajo abandoned mines from the level  available in previous years. An EPA Region 9 official familiar with funding  tribal drinking water projects on the Navajo reservation also told us that  federal resources available for drinking water infrastructure projects are  expected to continue to decrease. In addition, as federal funding  resources for abandoned mines and water projects become more  constrained, such projects on the Navajo reservation may be less likely to  receive federal funds because the programs by which they are funded  prioritize projects based on risk. For example, under the EPA Superfund  removal program, which EPA has used to pay for assessment and  cleanup at the Navajo abandoned mines, projects that address  emergency situations, such as toxic waste spills, are prioritized for  funding over projects that generally are not considered emergencies, like  the abandoned mine projects. EPA officials have prioritized the Navajo  abandoned mine projects, but these officials told us that there is already a  high demand for Region 9’s Superfund removal program funds with more  projects that warrant selection than available funding.
Moreover, with few exceptions, federal agencies currently have limited  options for other sources of federal funding for uranium-related work on  the Navajo reservation. For example, according to EPA Region 9 officials,  one possible source of funding for the typically longer-term remedial  actions that may be warranted at a few of the highest priority mines  without potentially responsible parties is the Superfund Trust Fund.  Although the Superfund Trust Fund can be used for removal actions at all  sites, it can only be used for remedial actions at sites that are included on  the NPL. None of the Navajo abandoned mines are currently listed on  the NPL, and, according to EPA Region 9 officials, only a few of the  highest priority mines on the reservation may qualify for listing. In general,  according to these officials, to score high enough in the Hazard Ranking  System to be included on the NPL, an abandoned uranium mine would  need to impact a sufficient number of people using a drinking water  supply contaminated by the mine, expose a sufficient population to  uranium through air or soil contamination, or impact a sensitive  environment such as a wetland. However, given the locations and  characteristics of the mines on the reservation and the population or  environment affected, these officials said they believe most mines do not  meet these criteria. For example, EPA officials told us that even the  Navajo mines located near communities affect relatively small populations  given the dispersed nature of the Navajo population, and the surrounding  desert conditions mean that most of the mines do not appear to impact  surface water. EPA officials said that community members in rural  communities, including Navajo communities, have expressed a deep  frustration with the ranking system used to determine sites’ inclusion on  the NPL because they feel that the system unfairly discriminates against  small communities. Nevertheless, EPA officials said they will continue to  pursue including some of the mines on the NPL in order to use the  Superfund Trust Fund to pay for remedial actions.
Another potential source of federal funding is Interior’s Central Hazardous  Materials Fund (Fund), an appropriation available to pay for Interior’s  CERCLA response actions. BIA received $162,000 from the Fund for the  Tuba City Dump site, in 2008 and 2009. According to BIA officials, this  money was used, in part, to search for another potentially responsible  party at the site, pay for project oversight, and hire a technical consultant.  In 2011, Interior issued a memorandum stating that CERCLA response  actions on Indian trust lands were no longer eligible to receive money  from the Fund. BIA officials told us, based on this memorandum, they  believed that they were no longer eligible to obtain money for assessment  or cleanup work at the Tuba City Dump. These officials said that they  have not requested funding from the Fund to pay for assessment work  and do not plan to request funding for the eventual remedial action at the  site. However, Interior’s memorandum also stated that the Fund would  continue to fund cleanup-related activities on Indian trust lands if BIA had  received funding for cleanup-related activities, including those undergoing  CERCLA assessments, in the past. According to a senior Fund official,  because the Tuba City Dump site received Fund money prior to 2011, it is  eligible to receive additional funds, including funding for the remedial  action work. Pursuing this funding is important for two reasons: (1) once  the remedial action has been selected, BIA’s funding requirements are  likely to increase substantially (BIA estimated the remedial action could  cost about 3- to 10-times as much as the RI/FS), and (2) federal  standards for internal control encourage agencies to strive for efficiency in  their use of resources. Since the Tuba City Dump is located in BIA’s  Western region, the agency has paid for its work at the site out of that  region’s budget. According to BIA officials, BIA has prioritized the Tuba  City Dump project over other projects in the region that also need funding,  which has resulted in some projects not receiving funding when BIA’s  costs at the Tuba City site were especially high.
In addition, EPA is pursuing two other funding sources to contribute to the  work at the abandoned mines. First, EPA and a potentially responsible  party have reached an agreement to settle a pending lawsuit which, if  approved by the judge presiding over the lawsuit, could result in  approximately $1 billion for the agency’s and the Navajo Nation’s cleanup  efforts at 50 mines and other contaminated sites. Second, EPA has  sought to involve DOE in assessments and potentially cleanups at mines  that do not have potentially responsible parties. In June 2013, EPA  Region 9 corresponded with DOE, stating that DOE’s financial assistance  with developing and implementing an approach to conducting  assessments, interim actions, and cleanups at highest priority mines on  the Navajo reservation is essential. Senior DOE officials told us they  interpreted the letter as encouraging DOE to play a larger role in  addressing the contamination from the mines on the reservation by  funding assessment and cleanup at some of the mines. In January 2014,  DOE responded to EPA that, although the National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2013 required a DOE report on abandoned uranium  mines, DOE was not given budget authority in fiscal year 2013 to  remediate uranium mines, and its authority to take remedial actions under  UMTRCA, which was limited to the former uranium processing sites and  vicinity properties, has expired.
section_title: Engaging Tribal Communities Continues to Be a Key Challenge
paragraphs: Another key challenge faced by federal agencies is identifying ways of  more effectively engaging with tribal communities. According to outreach  plans prepared by DOE and EPA, and other documents prepared by  various federal agencies, engaging with communities is important for a  number of reasons, including soliciting feedback on the decision-making  process, obtaining meaningful input into cleanup decisions, and working  with community members to determine how best to limit exposures to  uranium contamination. During the 2008 5-year plan period, federal  agency officials increasingly recognized the importance of community  engagement and began building bridges in the communities where they  conducted work, both by developing relationships themselves, and by  funding Navajo agency officials’ outreach work. Even with the federal  agencies’ increased attention to outreach activities, agency officials and  community members we spoke with said that the need for increased and  improved outreach is great. Nevertheless, federal agencies face  challenges in their ongoing efforts to effectively engage Navajo  communities for at least four reasons: (1) building trust may require  significant time and effort on the Navajo reservation, (2) the number of  outreach staff is small compared with the size of the reservation,  (3) commonly used tools for engaging communities may not be effective  in Navajo communities, and (4) federal agencies have not coordinated  their outreach efforts.
subsections: section_title: Building Trust
paragraphs: Agency officials and community members we spoke with said that  although building trust among the Navajo people is necessary to  effectively engage local communities, it will take significant time and  effort. One reason for this is that many members of the Navajo  community distrust outsiders—especially those representing the federal  government—because of historical events, related to both uranium mining  and the government’s treatment of Native people. The federal  government’s inconsistent attention to uranium-related issues on Navajo  lands in recent decades may also have contributed to a lack of trust  among community members. For example, according to EPA Region 9  officials, EPA compiled a list of potentially contaminated houses on the  Navajo reservation in the 1970s, but it did not take steps to ensure that all  houses on the list were assessed for contamination until it began work  under the 2008 5-year plan. Distrust of the federal government is also  exacerbated by concerns about ongoing issues, such as fears that federal  agencies will issue permits for new uranium mining near the Navajo  reservation before contamination from previous mining is fully  addressed.
Another reason why building trust will be a challenge is because Navajo  community members are concerned that the federal agencies that worked  on the 2008 5-year plan may not have a long-term commitment to  addressing uranium contamination, according to Navajo Nation officials  and some stakeholders. For example, Navajo community members have  expressed disappointment that the 2008 plan encompassed just 5 years’  worth of work when, in their view, fully addressing the effects of  contamination will take decades of commitment. A long-term  commitment—along with completing cleanup work—could help build trust  with Navajo communities. One challenge the federal agencies will  continue to face in addressing these concerns, however, is that, in some  cases, the agencies are limited in the types of long-term commitments  that they can make. For example, EPA officials explained that the agency  cannot commit to cleaning up even the 43 highest priority mines at this  time because they do not have dedicated funding for addressing the  highest priority mines that do not have potentially responsible parties and  are not listed on the NPL. This is in contrast to the situation at the former  uranium processing sites, where DOE must prepare and implement a  long-term surveillance plan for disposal sites, in accordance with NRC  regulations implementing UMTRCA.
In addition, building trust is a challenge because Navajo Nation officials  and some stakeholders told us they are frustrated by what they see as  examples of environmental injustice. These are instances when uranium  contamination on the Navajo reservation appears to be treated differently  than contamination on non-Indian lands, such as the community in Moab,  Utah, where DOE is excavating a large mill tailings pile and disposing of it  elsewhere. In another example of environmental injustice on the Navajo  reservation, high-level Navajo officials and others have said that the  release of radioactive materials from the uranium processing site near  Church Rock, New Mexico, has received far less attention nationally than  the radioactive release at Three Mile Island—which occurred 4 months  earlier—although the amount of radioactive materials released in the later  incident was significantly greater.
Finally, some tribal agency officials we spoke with told us they believe the  federal agencies had fostered mistrust by sometimes overstating their  progress in addressing uranium contamination on the Navajo reservation.  Specifically, some high-level Navajo Nation officials have stated that they  believe the federal agencies have understated the scope of the uranium  contamination problem on the Navajo reservation and have overstated  the federal agencies’ efforts in addressing the problem. For example,  Navajo Nation officials said they were frustrated that the federal agencies’  January 2013 summary report, published at the end of the 2008 5-year  plan period, highlighted the agencies’ accomplishments but did not  identify or communicate the larger context: that, overall, significant  progress has not been made in addressing uranium contamination on the  reservation.
section_title: Limited Number of Outreach Staff
paragraphs: Federal and tribal agency officials we spoke with said that the number of  federal and tribal agency outreach staff working on engaging Navajo  communities about uranium-related issues is very small compared with  the size of and conditions on the reservation. Outreach staff are  responsible for engaging communities that are spread out over three  states across the 24,000 square-mile reservation. Many of these  communities are not only remote, but they are also difficult to access  because of harsh terrain and rough roads.
Dedicated outreach staff. As of November 2013, EPA Region 9 had  the full-time equivalent of 1.5 outreach staff working on Navajo  uranium issues, including only one staff member who speaks Navajo.  EPA outreach staff are not based on the Navajo reservation, and  travel time between the reservation and Region 9 headquarters in San  Francisco limits the amount of time that staff are able to spend  engaging communities. In addition to EPA outreach staff, NNEPA has  one outreach staff member dedicated to uranium issues, and one  additional staff member who incorporates outreach in her work.  NNEPA’s dedicated staff person, however, is responsible for activities  in addition to community outreach, such as interfacing with the media  on uranium-related issues, and this staff person told us that she  cannot meet all the outreach needs put before her. For example, she  said that coordinating with IHS on outreach events could be a full-time  position, but that she is limited by other demands on her time.
Other staff conducting outreach. Other federal and tribal agencies that  worked on the 2008 5-year plan conduct outreach as part of their  activities, but they do not have dedicated staff working full-time on  uranium-related outreach to Navajo communities. For example, IHS  has two staff members who engage with communities on uranium  issues, in addition to their other responsibilities, and DOE has one  staff member who performs outreach activities in addition to her site  management responsibilities. The Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands  Reclamation/UMTRA department’s public affairs staff, under the  UMTRA program’s cooperative agreement with DOE, has engaged  Navajo communities to discuss concerns about former processing  sites located on the reservation. In addition, the Navajo Nation  Division of Health has used ATSDR funding to hire staff who conduct  outreach activities as part of their responsibilities related to  implementing the Navajo Birth Cohort Study.
section_title: Limitations of Common Outreach Tools
paragraphs: For a variety of reasons, commonly used tools for communicating with  communities—such as disseminating written materials, including  brochures or e-mails, and putting up signs and fencing off contaminated  areas—may generally be less effective on the Navajo reservation. For  example, written materials may be less effective because Navajo and  Hopi are traditionally spoken languages—not written languages—and  many community members learned English as a second language. Also,  many residents are not connected by Internet or telephone in their  homes. According to EPA and NNEPA officials, the most effective way to  communicate with many members of Navajo communities is through  face-to-face interactions, which requires trusted native speakers and is  more time-consuming than written communications. Furthermore,  although signs and fences may be used to communicate information  about risks from contamination, they may be less effective on the Navajo  reservation. In part because of differences in how Navajo people  traditionally view the land, it is generally not acceptable to restrict the use  of reservation lands, although there are some exceptions, such as those  related to grazing uses and home sites. As a result, knowledgeable EPA  officials told us they did not believe that signs and fences would be  sufficient to limit access to contaminated areas because they felt signs  and fences would be disregarded. As an example, these officials told us  that a mining company had erected a fence to restrict access to an area  contaminated by uranium, but, rather than staying out of the area, a  community member had instead used the fence to contain his livestock,  confining them in the very area to which the agency was trying to restrict  access. Furthermore, according to these officials, physical structures  such as signs and fences are difficult to maintain in remote areas of the  reservation, where vandalism and theft pose challenges.
Moreover, providing information, regardless of delivery method, may itself  be a limited tool for changing behavior because, in many cases, no  acceptable alternatives are available. For example, according to Navajo  agency officials and community members with whom we spoke, some  community members—because they do not have a better alternative— continue to get their drinking water from unregulated livestock wells that  may be contaminated with uranium and other toxins, even though some  of these community members understand that doing so is unsafe. Some  community members we spoke with said that they used unregulated  water sources for domestic purposes, such as cooking and drinking, and  that more education would not be effective in changing this behavior until  better alternatives were made available.
section_title: Limited Federal Agency Collaboration on Outreach Efforts
paragraphs: Federal agencies that worked on the 2008 5-year plan have not generally  coordinated their outreach efforts. Although the agencies began hosting  joint workshops for stakeholders in 2008, according to agency officials,  the agencies generally have conducted their own public meetings in  communities without inviting other agencies to participate. Agency  officials told us that not coordinating outreach poses a challenge to  effectively engaging communities because community members often  expect these meetings to cover a variety of uranium-related issues,  regardless of whether those issues fell within the jurisdiction of the  agency present. For example, according to an EPA official we spoke with,  when EPA conducted outreach related to abandoned uranium mines,  community members often had questions about other uranium-related  topics, such as health effects. In some cases, the limited scope of issues  covered in community meetings has caused significant frustration among  community members, according to EPA and IHS officials. An EPA official  told us that this may hamper the efforts of outreach staff to build  relationships in tribal communities. Because the costs of attending  community meetings can be high for both federal agencies and  community members—many of whom travel significant distances to  attend the meetings—EPA officials said they realized it is important to  maximize each contact that they have with affected communities. Officials  from multiple agencies told us they recognize the value in coordinating on  outreach and have begun to coordinate their efforts by, for example,  holding joint community meetings. For example, in March 2012, IHS and  DOE met jointly with community members to discuss the Shiprock former  uranium processing site, including concerns about health impacts. In  another example, in 2013, EPA and IHS jointly hosted a health screening  in one Navajo community for residents who had been living in  contaminated homes that were being demolished through EPA’s actions  to address and replace contaminated structures.
section_title: Opportunities Exist to Improve Federal Agencies’ Relationships with the Navajo and Hopi People
paragraphs: Federal and Navajo agency officials and community members we spoke  with identified a number of opportunities that federal agencies could  pursue to improve relationships with the Navajo people, as well as with  the Hopi people affected by the Tuba City Dump. Opportunities identified  for improving relationships with tribal communities include the following:
Provide information on long-term scope of work. Federal officials and  community members identified opportunities for federal agencies to  provide a more complete picture of the scope of the uranium  contamination problem and their progress toward addressing the  problem. For example, some community members, including  participants at one of the agencies’ stakeholder workshops, told the  agencies they would like to see the next interagency plan cover a  period longer than just another 5 years because they believe it is clear  that the amount of work remaining will take significantly longer than  5 years. Stakeholders said that including information about the long- term scope of work in the next plan would increase their ability to hold  the agencies accountable and provide a benchmark against which  they can measure the agencies’ progress.
Conduct in-person outreach. Federal officials and community  members identified opportunities for federal agencies to improve their  relationships with Navajo communities—and the Hopi people affected  by the Tuba City Dump—by conducting in-person outreach where  possible, although such methods are resource intensive. For example,  in a community involvement plan created to guide its outreach related  to the Tuba City Dump, EPA noted that distributing information in  small group or door-to-door settings assists in developing trust and  keeping misunderstandings of new materials and information to a  minimum. According to the plan, the Hopi people have regularly  requested that federal agencies rely on in-person outreach methods  when feasible. The plan stated that although it is not feasible to  distribute all information in person, doing so conveys to community  members that they are important and are part of the process.
Establish agency offices on or near the reservation. One way agency  officials identified to establish a more constant presence on the  reservation would be for federal agencies that do not already have  offices nearby, including EPA and DOE, to set up and assign  technical and outreach staff to offices in the area. This would increase  the amount of time that staff can interact with communities, since  typically EPA and DOE staff travel to the reservation from California or  Colorado. According to a Navajo Nation official we spoke with, having  staff on or near the reservation would increase the federal agencies’  ability to connect with communities, especially since it would help  increase their cultural awareness and sensitivity. One EPA staff  member who spent 2 months working on-site during a mine cleanup  said that his consistent presence during that time—as well as the  extensive outreach he conducted over a longer period—allowed him  to build strong relationships with community members, which in turn  increased that community’s acceptance of the cleanup remedy.
Partner with community organizations. Some stakeholders we spoke  with said that opportunities may exist for federal agencies to more  effectively engage Navajo communities by partnering with trusted  community organizations. For example, the president of a nonprofit  community organization that works to ensure that the Navajo  people—especially those affected by uranium contamination in a  remote region of the reservation—have access to safe drinking water  and economic development, among other things, told us that he would  welcome a partnership with federal agencies to conduct outreach on  uranium-related issues. Such a partnership would take full advantage  of the organization’s existing connection with Navajo communities.  Representatives from this organization and others told us that  community organizations are often a trusted source of information,  and their involvement would lend credibility to federal and tribal  agencies’ engagement efforts.
Promote job creation and training. Navajo officials we spoke with also  told us that the federal agencies could help improve relationships by  identifying opportunities to promote job creation and training on the  Navajo reservation as part of the efforts to address uranium  contamination. Officials we spoke with said the federal government  should provide more funding for new positions within the tribal  agencies to address uranium contamination. They said that, in 2007,  the Navajo Nation had identified the need for 20 new full-time  employees within NNEPA to address uranium contamination, but that  federal agencies awarded funding for just 2 additional employees from  2008 to 2012. Tribal officials also said that they would like to see the  federal agencies provide job training programs similar to the one that  EPA offered during the 5-year plan period.
Issue a formal apology. Some stakeholders, including Navajo  community members, told us they felt that receiving an official apology  from the federal government for failing to ensure that the companies  conducting uranium mining to support U.S. nuclear weapons  development were protective of the environment and public health  would go a long way toward improving relationships.
section_title: Additional Opportunities Exist for Federal Agencies to Enhance Interagency Collaboration and Collaboration with Navajo Agencies
paragraphs: Agency officials we spoke with said that additional opportunities exist for  the federal agencies to enhance both interagency collaboration at the  federal level and collaboration with Navajo agencies. Specifically, EPA,  IHS, and DOE officials identified a number of opportunities for increased  interagency collaboration on efforts to engage tribal communities. For  example, an IHS official involved with conducting uranium-related health  screenings told us that the joint health screening event conducted with  EPA in 2013 was a success and that, in addition to duplicating such  efforts in other affected communities, there may be additional  opportunities for enhanced interagency collaboration to help ensure that  the Navajo people receive health screenings as well as information on  how they can most effectively protect themselves from uranium  contamination. More specifically, the IHS official told us that there may be  opportunities to work with partners, including CDC and EPA, to develop  informational videos on the health effects of uranium exposure that could  be screened in IHS clinics. In addition, EPA officials told us that they have  initiated a pilot effort to provide more coordinated outreach in the  Cameron region of the reservation. In that region—where potentially  responsible parties will be conducting extensive assessment and some  cleanup of abandoned mines in the coming years—EPA and NNEPA plan  to work with other partners, including other federal agencies, to provide a  more coordinated approach to engaging the communities in discussions  about, among other things, steps the federal agencies and community  members can take to mitigate exposures to hazardous uranium  contamination. Further, EPA officials involved in coordinating the 2014  5-year plan told us that they plan to engage the other federal agencies in  developing and including a coordinated outreach strategy in the plan to  better ensure that the agencies maximize each contact that they have  with affected communities by, for example, providing the communities  with information on a variety of uranium-related issues. Officials from the  other agencies agreed that they would engage with EPA to develop or  support such a strategy. This is consistent with one of the key practices  that, in October 2005, we reported can help enhance and sustain  collaboration among federal agencies—establishing mutually reinforcing  or joint strategies—which can assist partner agencies in aligning their  activities and resources, among other things. We have reported on other  key practices to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration, including,  for example, for collaborating agencies to define and agree on their  respective roles and responsibilities. In doing so, collaborating agencies  can identify how their collaborative efforts will be led, clarify who will do  what, organize their joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision  making.
Federal and Navajo agency officials also identified opportunities for the  federal agencies to enhance collaboration with Navajo agencies, some of  which also present opportunities to enhance capacity building. For  example, an EPA official we spoke with said that the agency could  potentially train NNEPA staff to perform the more detailed assessments  that EPA has been conducting to determine whether houses are  contaminated and warrant replacement. In addition, Navajo Nation  officials told us that they would like the federal agencies to work with them  to identify as many opportunities as possible for the federal agencies to  partner with the Navajo agencies on uranium-related work. These officials  pointed to the partnership between DOE and NNEPA at the Highway 160  site—where NNEPA led the implementation of the cleanup work—as a  particular success that they would like to see replicated in other areas.  EPA Region 9 officials also pointed to the partnership between EPA and  the Navajo Community Housing and Infrastructure Department, a Navajo  agency that is helping to replace some of the contaminated houses on the  reservation.
According to both federal and tribal agency officials, federal agencies  could also enhance their collaboration with Navajo agencies by including  additional tribal agencies in future efforts. For example, EPA and DOE  identified potential opportunities for enhanced collaboration with the  Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program, which was not  involved in the abandoned mine work conducted under the 2008 5-year  plan, although the UMTRA program under the same department has  been working with DOE at the former uranium processing sites. The  Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program was active in  abandoned uranium mine-related efforts during the plan period by, among  other things, maintaining reclamation work previously conducted to  mitigate physical hazards at the mines. According to Navajo Abandoned  Mine Lands Reclamation Program officials, they plan to continue this  maintenance work at reclaimed mine sites in the future. According to both  federal and tribal agency officials we spoke with, EPA could potentially  collaborate with that program and NNEPA to help ensure that, where  feasible, any additional maintenance work on reclaimed uranium mines is  done in coordination with NNEPA and EPA to help further reduce  radiological hazards. EPA officials told us that they have begun talking  with Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program staff to identify  ways to work together, whereas in the period of the 2008 5-year plan, the  program and NNEPA each generally operated independently from one  another. According to DOE, EPA and DOE have agreed to invite officials  from NNEPA and both programs within the Navajo Abandoned Mine  Lands Reclamation/UMTRA Department to participate in activities of  either federal agency. In another example, a CDC official told us there  may be opportunities for CDC to increase its collaboration with the Navajo  Division of Health to improve available data on how cancers impact the  Navajo people.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: From 2008 through 2012, six federal agencies increased their overall  efforts to address the legacy of uranium contamination that remained on  the Navajo reservation after uranium mining and processing ceased,  spending more than $120 million on various actions, including  assessments of abandoned mines and cleanups of contaminated homes  and other sites. However, nearly 30 years since the last active uranium  mine on the Navajo reservation ceased production, federal agencies do  not have comprehensive information about the extent of the  contamination or the total scope of work—and associated time frames  and costs—required to fully address it, especially the contamination found  at the abandoned mines. When requesting the 2008 5-year plan,  policymakers were looking for a comprehensive course of action for fully  resolving the problem of uranium contamination on or near the Navajo  reservation. Given that the scope of the 2008 5-year plan focused on  addressing the most urgent problems, and the agencies’ next 5-year plan  is not expected to identify the full scope of work that remains, it is unclear  how many 5-year plans at this rate would be needed to estimate the  remaining scope of work, time frames, and costs for fully addressing the  contamination. While many uncertainties exist, it is possible to generate  useful, high-level estimates of the work, time frames, and costs in a short  period of time based on the information the federal agencies currently  possess. However, absent a statutory requirement to develop such a  comprehensive estimate, it appears unlikely that the agencies will  undertake such an effort. Without more comprehensive information about  the overall remaining scope of work, time frames, and costs needed to  address contamination across the reservation, including at the  abandoned mines, stakeholders and decision makers do not have a basis  on which to assess the overall pace of the cleanup efforts; and without  this information cannot put the accomplishments of the 2008 5-year  plan—or any future plans—into perspective, and cannot make effective  resource allocation decisions.
Effectively engaging with tribal communities is a key challenge facing  federal agencies in the efforts to address contamination on Navajo and  Hopi lands. The 2008 5-year plan did not contain information about how  the federal agencies would coordinate their outreach efforts to these  communities. While the agencies began to integrate their outreach  activities over the course of the 5-year plan period, community members  continued to express frustration with the agencies’ efforts. Creating a  coordinated outreach strategy is consistent with the key practice of  establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies that we have reported  can help enhance and sustain interagency collaboration and help  agencies better align their activities and resources. Such an effort should  also identify how the collaborative effort will be led, clarify who will do  what, organize their joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision  making.
In addition, assessment work conducted by BIA at the Tuba City Dump  has yielded information about the contamination at the site that has  provided significant value to decision makers. In doing so, however, BIA  has experienced a number of challenges, some concerning contract  management. BIA has missed enforceable deadlines, subjecting BIA to  stipulated penalties under its settlement agreement with EPA. Moreover,  BIA continued to increase the value of the contract while the contractor  was not performing according to the contract’s terms and conditions. BIA  is nearing the end of its management of the current RI/FS contract; these  contract management challenges, however, if left unaddressed, will  become even more pertinent in the next few years as BIA moves into the  cleanup phase after a remedial action is selected. At that point, the  agency will award and manage an even larger and more complicated  contract that will increase costs significantly. Without examining lessons  learned from managing the RI/FS contract and considering these lessons  as part of the acquisition planning process for the remedial action  contract, BIA could face contract management challenges on a larger  scale. Further, BIA did not fully follow best practices in estimating the  schedule for the RI/FS, which was not fully comprehensive or controlled.  Without control over the schedule, BIA cannot effectively monitor its  contractor’s progress and cannot evaluate the quality of changes  proposed by the contractor. BIA’s estimate of probable future costs for the  cleanup at the Tuba City Dump also did not always reflect the  characteristics of a comprehensive high-quality cost estimate. Without  fully accounting for all future costs, management will have difficulty  successfully planning program resource requirements. Further,  significantly more funds will likely be needed to implement the remedial  action that will be selected for the Tuba City Dump site. Given this  increased need and other competing interests for BIA’s limited resources,  other funding sources for remedial actions, such as Interior’s Central  Hazardous Materials Fund, become more important. The Tuba City Dump  site is eligible to receive funds from the Fund for the RI/FS, as well as the  selected remedial action, although BIA officials have not applied for such  funding and do not plan to do so. Without leveraging the Fund, BIA will  have difficulty meeting the funding needs for the remedial action cleanup  phase of the project.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: To develop an estimate of the scope of work remaining to address  uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, Congress  should consider requiring that the Environmental Protection Agency take  the lead and work with the other federal agencies to develop an overall  estimate of the remaining scope of the work, time frames, and costs.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making the following four recommendations in this report:  To ensure that agencies working on the 2014 5-year plan better align  their activities and resources, we recommend that the Administrator of  EPA; the Secretaries of Energy, the Interior, and Health and Human  Services; and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as  they develop a coordinated outreach strategy to include in the 2014  5-year plan, take action to incorporate key practices in their collaborative  effort, such as defining and agreeing on the agencies’ respective roles  and responsibilities.
In light of the problems BIA has encountered in managing the cleanup at  the Tuba City Dump site, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior  direct the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs to take the following three  actions:  identify and examine any lessons learned from managing the RI/FS  contract and consider these lessons as part of the acquisition  planning process for the remedial action contract, employ best practices in creating the schedule and cost estimates for  the remedial action cleanup phase, and apply for funding from Interior’s Central Hazardous Materials Fund in  order to help meet the funding needs for the remedial action cleanup  phase of the project.
section_title: Agency and Third Party Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the  Environmental Protection Agency; the Departments of Energy, the  Interior, and Health and Human Services; the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission; the Office of Management and Budget; and the Navajo  Nation and Hopi Tribe. EPA, DOE, BIA (responding on behalf of Interior),  the Department of Health and Human Services, and NRC generally  agreed with our recommendations, and their written comments are  reproduced in appendixes VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X, respectively. Each of  these agencies also provided technical comments, which we incorporated  as appropriate. The Navajo Nation also provided written comments  (reproduced in app. XI) and technical comments, which we incorporated  as appropriate. The Office of Management and Budget and the Hopi Tribe  did not comment on our report.
DOE was the only agency that commented on our Matter for  Congressional Consideration. Specifically, DOE acknowledged the need  to identify the remaining scope of work, time frames, and costs of fully  addressing uranium contamination on the Navajo reservation. However,  the agency expressed concern about the difficulty of quantifying the full  scope of work at this time, given the number of uncertainties that remain.  We agree that attempting to quantify, in a detailed manner, the full scope  of remaining work is not possible at this time because of the uncertainties  we describe in this report, as well as those identified by DOE in its  comments. However, we believe that the agencies’ estimates can be  improved and, for the reasons detailed in our report, consider it essential  for Congress to have more comprehensive information about the  remaining scope of work in order to assess the overall pace of the  cleanup and to make informed resource allocation decisions. In addition,  DOE commented on (1) our use of the term “Rare Metals” site instead of  the “Tuba City Mill Site” or the “Tuba City Former Processing Site” and  (2) an observation in the report about the cleanup of the former  processing sites on the Navajo reservation versus another site near  Moab, Utah. Regarding the comparison of the former processing sites on  the Navajo reservation to the Moab site, DOE provided comments on the  unique nature of each site. Regarding the Rare Metals site, we clarified  our report to indicate that our use of the term “Rare Metals site” was  solely to prevent it from being confused with other contaminated sites in  the Tuba City area, including BIA’s Tuba City Dump site.
In agreeing with our recommendation that the federal agencies  incorporate key practices for enhancing and sustaining interagency  collaborative efforts into their coordinated outreach strategy, EPA, DOE,  and the Department of Health and Human Services provided additional  details about the contents of the draft outreach strategy that they intend to  include in their 2014 5-year plan. We are encouraged by elements of the  draft strategy, which appear to include some of the key practices for  enhancing and sustaining interagency collaboration. For example, the  agencies plan to leverage resources to fund a shared coordinator who will  direct a community outreach network composed of representatives from  the federal and tribal agencies.
In its written comments, BIA asserted that our report disproportionately  focuses on the agency’s management of the Tuba City Dump site, a site  that BIA described as comprising a very small part of the overall problem  of uranium contamination across the Navajo reservation. Although we  agree that cleaning up the Tuba City Dump is but one part of the  agencies’ broader efforts to address uranium contamination on the  Navajo reservation, we believe that our detailed examination of BIA’s and  EPA’s management of the assessment work at the site was appropriate.
As explained in our report, the Tuba City Dump site was one of the two  objectives where the federal agencies did not meet the targets in the  2008 5-year plan. In order to identify reasons why BIA did not meet those  targets, we analyzed the agency’s management of the Tuba City Dump  site, including its project and contract management approaches. In  addition, BIA commented that it believes the management of the cleanup  has been handled responsibly but that circumstances beyond its control  have contributed to delays. We acknowledge in this report that  circumstances beyond BIA's control contributed to delays in the Tuba City  Dump cleanup; however, BIA's own actions also contributed to these  delays. For example, BIA had communication problems with its RI/FS  contractor and performance problems regarding the quality and timeliness  of the contractor’s deliverables. These problems and others led BIA to  miss several legally enforceable deadlines in the RI/FS work plan and  resulted in BIA failing to complete the RI/FS for the site, an objective of  the 2008 5-year plan and a work plan requirement. In its comments, BIA  appears to fault EPA and the contractor for the delays and associated  stipulated penalties, but BIA did not explain how, if at all, EPA’s and the  contractor’s actions would relieve BIA of its legal obligation to meet the  work plan deadlines, or of the consequences of failing to do so.
While agreeing with our recommendations, BIA disagreed with our  findings regarding the agency’s cost and schedule estimating at the Tuba  City Dump. These findings were the basis for our recommendation that  BIA employ best practices in creating the schedule and cost estimates for  the forthcoming CERCLA remedial action at the Tuba City Dump. BIA  asserted that its approach to developing the cost and schedule estimates  was reasonable, and did not believe that the best practices found in our  cost estimating and assessment guide were applicable, at least in part,  because the details of the remedial action to be conducted at the site  have not been identified. As explained in this report, the best practices in  our cost estimating and assessment guide can be used for projects with  significant unknowns, such as the Tuba City Dump, and include specific  steps for properly taking those unknowns into account. For example, the  guide discusses how every cost estimate is uncertain because of the  assumptions that must be made about future projections. It also states  that because many of the assumptions made at the start of a project turn  out to be inaccurate, it is important to assess the risk associated with  changes in assumptions. As described in our report, we found that BIA  did not assess such risks when creating its cost estimate. In addition,  although BIA concurred with our recommendation to use best practices  when creating cost and schedule estimates for the forthcoming remedial  action, BIA stated that it does not intend to use these best practices when  developing future estimates at the site because it does not believe that  they are applicable to environmental cleanup projects. To the contrary,  these guides offer best practices that are directly relevant to a wide range  of government projects, including environmental cleanups, and we have  previously assessed such projects using the criteria in the guides. BIA’s  refusal to apply cost and schedule estimating best practices is  troublesome, especially since, as we note in the report, the remedial  action at the site will represent a more significant undertaking than the  RI/FS. As such, it is important that BIA have reliable cost and schedule  estimates in order to effectively manage the project.
In written comments, the Navajo Nation stated that, overall, our report  represented a good start toward illuminating the nature and extent of the  damage uranium mining and processing has caused to Navajo lands and  people. However, the Navajo Nation also noted some instances where it  felt the report fell short. For example, the tribe noted that our projection of  the need for hundreds of millions of dollars to address the remaining  scope of work that has been identified by the agencies was a significant  underestimation of the total projected costs for future remediation at all  uranium-related sites on Navajo lands. The tribe stated that it believes  that these total costs will be in the billions of dollars rather than hundreds  of millions of dollars. As noted in our report and recognized by the Navajo  Nation in its comments, our estimate related to the cleanup of highest  priority abandoned mines represents a conservative, low-end estimate.  While we cannot comment on the accuracy of the tribe’s characterization  of total future costs, the tribe’s estimate further illuminates the need for  the federal agencies involved to generate a high-level estimate, as  discussed in our report, based on their most current information regarding  the remaining scope of work. In addition, the Navajo Nation noted the  absence of any discussion of potential groundwater contamination in the  draft report, especially at the Northeast Church Rock mine. In response,  we have made changes to include information about the status of federal  agencies’ groundwater assessment efforts.
We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator of the  Environmental Protection Agency; the Secretaries of Energy, the Interior,  and Health and Human Services; the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the  President of the Navajo Nation; the Chairman of the Hopi Tribe; the  appropriate congressional committees; and other interested parties. In  addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or gomezj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to the  report are listed in appendix XII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: In this report, we examined: (1) the extent to which federal agencies,  including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of  Energy (DOE), the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs  (BIA), the Department of Health and Human Services’ Indian Health  Service (IHS), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) achieved  the targets identified in the 2008 5-year plan, and the reasons why or why  not; (2) what is known about the scope of work, time frames, and  estimated costs of fully addressing uranium contamination on the Navajo  reservation; and (3) the key challenges, if any, faced by federal agencies  in completing this work and the opportunities, if any, which may be  present to help overcome these challenges.
To determine the extent to which federal agencies achieved the targets  identified in the 2008 5-year plan, we compared the agencies’ targets as  laid out in the 5-year plan with the actions taken by the agencies and their  partners over the 5-year plan period from 2008 through 2012. We  identified these actions by reviewing key documents, including the  summary report issued by the federal agencies in January 2013. We  corroborated information in the documents by interviewing relevant  federal agency officials and Navajo and Hopi tribal officials from relevant  tribal government agencies—the Navajo Nation Department of Justice,  Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency, the Navajo Nation  Division of Natural Resources’ Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands  Reclamation/Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action Department, and the  Hopi Tribe Department of Natural Resources’ Water Resources  Program—and by obtaining additional documentation and visiting relevant  sites across the Navajo and Hopi reservations where federal and tribal  agencies have been conducting their work. In addition to the five federal  agencies listed above, other relevant federal agencies we spoke with  included the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the  Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), the Office  of Management and Budget, and the Department of the Interior’s Office of  Environmental Policy and Compliance, which manages the Central  Hazardous Materials Fund, and the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation  and Enforcement, which provides funding to the Navajo Abandoned Mine  Lands Reclamation Program. In April 2013 and July 2013, we visited key  sites, including the Northeast Church Rock, Quivira, and Skyline mines,  as well as abandoned uranium mines and mine-related sites near the  communities of Cameron, Cove, and Teec Nos Pos, Arizona; and  Haystack, and Casamero Lake, New Mexico; the former uranium  processing site in Shiprock, New Mexico; the Highway 160 site near Tuba  City, Arizona; and the Tuba City Dump, located on both the Hopi and  Navajo reservations and near the Hopi Villages of Moenkopi and the  Navajo town of Tuba City, Arizona. We selected these sites based on the  level of activity that federal and tribal agencies conducted there during the  5-year plan, and in order to see some of the sites that the agencies have  identified as needing cleanup work in the near future.
To identify the reasons why the agencies met or did not meet the targets  in the 5-year plan, we reviewed agency documents and interviewed  federal and tribal agency officials. We also reviewed federal agency  expenditure data for the 2008 5-year plan period (fiscal years 2008  through 2012) and compared it with expenditure data from the previous  5 years (fiscal years 2003 through 2007). These data represent  obligations or direct outlays by the agencies and represent the agencies’  direct costs and did not include intramural costs, such as staff salaries.  We received data from ATSDR, BIA, CDC, DOE, EPA, and IHS; NRC did  not provide expenditure data because NRC did not incur any direct  obligations during the time period, although it did expend resources for  staff time. In order to determine costs in constant 2013 dollars, we  adjusted the amounts reported to us for inflation by applying the fiscal  year chain-weighted gross domestic product price index, with fiscal year  2013 as the base year. To evaluate the reliability of these data and  determine their limitations, we reviewed the data obtained from each  agency. For each data source, we analyzed related documentation,  examined the data to identify obvious errors or inconsistencies, and  compared the data we received with other published data sources, where  possible. We also interviewed officials from each agency to obtain  information on the internal controls of their data systems. On the basis of  our evaluation of these sources, we concluded that the expenditure data  we collected and analyzed were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
To identify what is known about the scope of work remaining to fully  address uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, we  reviewed available documents and interviewed knowledgeable federal  agency and tribal officials. To identify what is known about time frames  and costs, we reviewed documentation containing schedule and/or cost  estimates or general information about time frames or costs, where  available. To create estimates of time frames and costs to clean up the  highest priority abandoned mines, we gathered information about the  costs associated with the Skyline mine cleanup, which was the one  cleanup EPA conducted during the 5-year plan period with the agency’s  funds, the pace of work conducted under the 5-year plan, and the number  of mines that would need full funding from EPA. In addition, we analyzed  the extent to which the schedule generated by BIA for the remedial  investigation and feasibility study at the Tuba City Dump reflected the four  general characteristics for sound schedule estimating, as outlined in our  schedule assessment guide: comprehensive, well-constructed, credible,  and controlled. We selected this schedule to review because it was the  most robust of the available schedules, and it represented an entirely  federal effort. We also examined the extent to which BIA’s estimate of  probable future costs for Tuba City Dump reflected the four  characteristics of high-quality cost estimates, as outlined in our cost  estimating and assessment guide: comprehensive, well-documented,  accurate, and credible. We selected this cost estimate to review since  the cleanup will be paid for entirely with federal funds, and it represented  a distinct cleanup project rather than an ongoing level of effort. In  reviewing BIA’s schedule and cost estimates, we analyzed supporting  documentation submitted by BIA and conducted interviews with BIA and  EPA project managers and staff. We shared our cost and schedule  guides and the criteria against which we would be evaluating the  estimates with BIA staff. We then compared BIA’s methods and  approaches for preparing the estimates with the best practices contained  in the guides.
To ascertain the key challenges faced by federal agencies in completing  this work and the opportunities that may be present to help overcome  these challenges, we reviewed key documents, including the January  2013 summary report, written materials from the federal agencies’ Navajo  uranium stakeholder workshops, agency reports, and Navajo Nation laws  and position papers. We corroborated and supplemented information in  the documents by interviewing relevant federal agency officials and  Navajo and Hopi tribal officials. We also interviewed knowledgeable  stakeholders, including community members living in areas affected by  uranium mining or contamination. For example, we worked with the  federal and tribal agencies and others to hold meetings in seven affected  communities, which were attended by 50 local government officials and  community members. We also spoke with other knowledgeable  stakeholders, such as university researchers and representatives of  nonprofit and community organizations active on Navajo uranium issues.  We met with most of these stakeholders during our July 2013 site visits  and at the April 2013 Navajo Uranium Stakeholder Workshop held in  Gallup, New Mexico, and spoke with other stakeholders by telephone. We  identified stakeholders by performing an Internet and literature search for  individuals and organizations involved in relevant issues, attending the  stakeholder workshop and identifying participating stakeholders, and  requesting referrals from agency officials and stakeholders with whom we  spoke. The views of the stakeholders we spoke with are not  representative of and cannot be generalized to all stakeholders.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2013 to May 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Detailed Results of GAO Assessment of the Schedule for the Tuba City Dump Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study Work Plan
paragraphs: Our prior work has identified 10 best practices associated with effective  scheduling. These are (1) capturing all activities; (2) sequencing all  activities; (3) assigning resources to all activities; (4) establishing the  duration of all activities; (5) verifying that the schedule is traceable  horizontally and vertically; (6) confirming that the critical path is valid;  (7) ensuring reasonable total float; (8) conducting a schedule risk  analysis; (9) updating the schedule with actual progress and logic; and  (10) maintaining a baseline schedule. These practices are summarized  into four characteristics of a reliable schedule—comprehensive, well- constructed, credible, and controlled. We assessed the extent to which  the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (BIA) January 2013 schedule for the  remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS) at the Tuba City Dump  met each of the 10 best practices, and characterized whether the  schedule met each of the four characteristics of a reliable schedule. We  found that the schedule minimally met each of the four characteristics of a  reliable schedule. As a result, we are concerned about the validity of the  dates that were forecasted by the schedule, as well as the identification of  the critical path. Without an accurate critical path, management cannot  focus on the activities that will be most detrimental to the project’s key  milestones and finish date if they slip. Table 3 provides the detailed  results of our analysis.
section_title: Appendix III: Detailed Results of GAO Assessment of the Tuba City Dump 5-Year Cost Estimate
paragraphs: To analyze the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (BIA) 5-year cost estimate, dated  April 2013, for the Tuba City Dump, we determined the extent to which  BIA followed the best practices outlined in the GAO Cost Estimating and  Assessment Guide. The guide identifies 12 practices that are the basis  for effective cost estimation, including cost estimation for annual budget  requests. The guide associates these practices with four characteristics:  accurate, well-documented, comprehensive, and credible. The Office of  Management and Budget endorsed this guidance as being sufficient for  meeting most cost-estimating requirements, including for budget  formulation. If followed correctly, these practices should result in reliable  and valid budgets that (1) can be easily and clearly traced, replicated, and  updated; and (2) enable managers to make informed decisions. BIA  created this cost estimate to contribute to the Department of the Interior’s  (Interior) environmental and disposal liability estimate as part of Interior’s  annual financial statement. Since a remedial action has not been selected  for the site, BIA estimated two options, a low-cost option and a high-cost  option. In accordance with Interior’s guidance, BIA submitted the low-cost  option as part of the liability estimate. We assessed the extent to which  the Tuba City Dump 5-year cost estimate from April 2013 met each of the  four characteristics associated with cost-estimating best practices. As  table 4 illustrates, we found that the Tuba City Dump April 2013 cost  estimate minimally met each of these four characteristics.
section_title: Appendix IV: The 43 Highest Priority Mines, Their Locations, and the Status of Assessment and Cleanup Efforts
paragraphs: Removal actions conducted at these sites were done as time-critical removal actions and are listed  as interim because they did not constitute the final cleanup actions at the mines.  Detailed assessments listed here include remedial action assessments (preliminary assessment  and/or site investigation) and removal action assessments (engineering evaluation/cost analysis).  The Skyline mine cleanup is included here because the Navajo Nation considers it to be temporary,  given its current position regarding removing all mine waste from the reservation. EPA considers the  cleanup complete.
section_title: Appendix V: Additional Information about the Remaining Scope of Work, Time Frames, and Costs to Address Uranium Contamination on or Near the Navajo Reservation
paragraphs: The following is a discussion of what is known about the remaining scope  of work, time frames, and costs to assess and clean up contaminated  structures and to assess and treat health conditions and conduct health  research.
subsections: section_title: Assess and Clean Up Contaminated Houses and Other Structures
paragraphs: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Navajo Nation  Environmental Protection Agency (NNEPA) have not identified a full  scope of work because there is no comprehensive source of information  regarding the number of houses that may be contaminated; the agencies  do not have an end date for this work nor an overall cost estimate.
Scope of work: EPA Region 9 officials told us they believe living in  contaminated homes continues to be the greatest uranium-related health  risk to people on the Navajo reservation today. To continue mitigating this  risk, EPA and NNEPA officials told us they plan to continue the work they  conducted under the 2008 5-year plan, but they do not know how many  homes they will ultimately need to assess and replace since there is no  comprehensive source for this information. According to NNEPA officials,  the agency has a backlog of more than 100 homes where residents have  requested testing. A NNEPA official familiar with the work told us the  agency expects to address this backlog in the 2014 5-year plan period.  The official also told us that the number of requests continues to increase  significantly as more people become aware of the agencies’ efforts to  assess houses and structures, in part, through outreach conducted by  NNEPA. NNEPA is also responsible for communicating the results of  completed assessments to residents when those results indicated homes  were safe. A NNEPA official told us that, as of February 2014, the agency  had communicated the results of fewer than half of the completed  assessments, in some cases, because the agency was waiting for EPA to  provide the results, and that the agency will continue to address this  backlog moving forward. Overall, EPA officials said that they expect the  total number of homes needing replacement will decrease in the 2014  5-year plan period since they believe the homes most likely to be  contaminated have been addressed through earlier efforts.
Time frame: According to EPA officials involved, there is no end date for  this work. They expect that the work assessing and potentially cleaning  up contaminated houses to continue into the future as long as NNEPA  continues to receive requests.
Cost: Given the unknown number of homes needing assessment and  cleanup, EPA has not developed an overall cost estimate. However, EPA  officials told us they typically spend $6,000 on a detailed assessment and  from $80,000 to $300,000 to demolish a home and either provide financial  compensation or a replacement home.
section_title: Assess and Treat Health Conditions and Conduct Health Research
paragraphs: Federal agencies do not have concrete plans or available funds to begin  additional health studies on the Navajo reservation, but the Indian Health  Service (IHS) will continue its work and the Agency for Toxic Substances  and Disease Registry (ATSDR) and its partners will continue the Navajo  Birth Cohort Study, spending up to $10 million from 2013 to 2018.
Scope of work: IHS and ATSDR officials told us they intend to include  short-term health treatment and assessment efforts in the 2014 5-year  plan, and they are developing overall goals for health research related to  exposure to uranium on the Navajo reservation as well. In the short-term,  beyond health care delivery to patients, IHS plans to continue its efforts  under the uranium health-screening program that it established under the  2008 5-year plan. With 3.5 staff members, however, this is a small-scale  effort. In addition, the Navajo Birth Cohort Study is expected to continue.  Regarding other long-term research studies, ATSDR officials told us they  do not have specific plans or funding to initiate additional uranium-related  health research studies at this time. Members of the Navajo Nation,  researchers, and other stakeholders have repeatedly called for a long- term epidemiological study of the effects of nonoccupational exposures to  uranium in the communities that have lived closest to former mines and  processing sites in order to gain a better understanding of how these  communities have been and continue to be affected. IHS officials told us  they have been limited in their ability to identify or plan potential studies  because conducting research studies is not a part of IHS’s mission, and  dedicated funding is not available for such efforts. ATSDR officials told us  that their agency infrequently funds such studies; for example, it is  currently conducting two long-term epidemiological studies across the  country in addition to the Navajo study.
Time frame: IHS officials said they expect to extend the uranium health  screening program into the future, at least through the 2014 5-year plan  period. In 2013, ATSDR extended its agreement with the University of  New Mexico and the Navajo Nation for the Navajo Birth Cohort Study by  5 years, until 2018.
Cost: ATSDR has committed to spending up to $10 million on the Navajo  Birth Cohort Study from 2013 to 2018, but overall costs for potential future  studies are unknown.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior
section_title: Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
section_title: Appendix X: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
section_title: Appendix XI: Comments from the Navajo Nation
section_title: Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Jeffery D. Malcolm (Assistant  Director), Juaná Collymore, John Delicath, Tisha Derricotte, Emily  Hanawalt, John Krump, Leslie Kaas Pollock, Karen Richey, Dan Royer,  Kelly Rubin, Jeanette Soares, Kiki Theodoropoulos, and Sarah Veale  made significant contributions to this report.