Military Transformation: DOD Needs to Strengthen Implementation of Its Global Strike Concept and Provide a Comprehensive Investment Approach for Acquiring Needed Capabilities
Published: 2008-04-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: To increase the range of options available to the President, the Department of Defense (DOD) is taking steps to develop a portfolio of capabilities, referred to as global strike, to rapidly plan and deliver limited duration and extended range precision strikes against highly valued assets. GAO was asked to assess (1) whether DOD has clearly defined and instilled a common understanding and approach for global strike throughout the department, (2) the extent to which DOD has developed capabilities needed for global strike, and (3) the extent to which DOD has identified the funding requirements and developed an investment strategy for acquiring new global strike capabilities. GAO reviewed and analyzed plans and studies within DOD, the services, and several commands on global strike implementation and capabilities development.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has taken a number of steps to implement its global strike concept and has generally assigned responsibilities for the planning, execution, and support of global strike operations. However, key stakeholders, particularly the geographic combatant commanders, have different interpretations of the concept, scope, range, and potential use of capabilities needed to implement global strike. Several factors affect the understanding and communication of DOD's global strike concept among key stakeholders, including the extent to which DOD has (1) defined global strike, (2) incorporated global strike into joint doctrine, (3) conducted outreach and communication activities with key stakeholders, and (4) involved stakeholders in joint exercises and other training involving global strike. GAO's prior work examining successful organizational transformations shows the necessity to communicate to stakeholders often and early with clear and specific objectives on what is to be achieved and what roles are assigned. Without a complete and clearly articulated concept that is well communicated and practiced with key stakeholders, DOD could encounter difficulties in fully implementing its concept and building the necessary relationships for carrying out global strike operations. DOD has underway or completed several global strike assessments to identify potential conventional offensive strike weapons systems, particularly those for prompt global strike, which would provide capabilities sometime after 2018. However, DOD has not fully assessed the requirements or coordinated improvements for related enabling capabilities that are critical to the planning and execution of successful global strike operations. These critical enabling capabilities include intelligence collection and dissemination, surveillance and reconnaissance, and command and control, communications, and battlefield damage assessment. Furthermore, DOD has not coordinated its efforts to improve these capabilities with potential offensive systems it intends to develop. Without fully assessing the enabling capabilities required or coordinating with other DOD studies, DOD might not make the best decision of which enabling capability to pursue in meeting global strike requirements. DOD has not yet established a prioritized investment strategy that integrates its efforts to assess global strike options and makes choices among alternatives given the department's long-term fiscal challenges. GAO's prior work has shown that a long-term and comprehensive investment approach is an important tool in an organization's decision-making process to define direction, establish priorities, assist with current and future budgets, and plan the actions needed to achieve goals. While DOD studies and officials recognize a need for a broad, holistic view of global strike development, DOD has not identified and assessed all global-strike-related capabilities and technologies and has not explained how its plans to link long-term studies to identify potential weapons systems will result in a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for global strike.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD), in its December 2001 Nuclear Posture  Review, provided a conceptual framework for transforming U.S. strategic  capabilities to address the new security risks the United States faces. The  review proposed a New Triad that would bring together the capabilities of  nuclear and conventional (nonnuclear) offensive strike forces, active and  passive defenses, a revitalized defense infrastructure, and enhanced  command and control, planning, and intelligence capabilities. The synergy  realized with the integration of these capabilities, according to DOD  officials, would provide the President and other senior decision makers  with a wider range of military options against emerging threats while  reducing U.S. reliance on the use of nuclear weapons.
In transforming offensive strike capabilities for the New Triad, DOD plans  to develop a portfolio of capabilities, referred to as global strike, that  would provide the United States with an ability to rapidly plan and deliver  limited duration and extended range precision strikes against highly  valued assets, such as weapons of mass destruction production, storage,  and delivery systems and adversary leadership power bases. To provide a  joint focus for global strike, the President, in January 2003, assigned the  U.S. Strategic Command with responsibility for providing integrated  planning and command and control support to deliver rapid, extended  range, precision effects for global strike missions conducted by the  geographic combatant commanders, or in some scenarios, its own global  strike missions. While nuclear systems would be part of the portfolio, DOD  has placed significant emphasis on the role that kinetic and nonkinetic  conventional capabilities would provide in generating the desired strategic  effects. DOD envisions that global strike missions could use existing U.S.  conventional military capabilities, depending on the desired effect to be  achieved and the operational scenario.
However, DOD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted the lack of  a prompt, precise, long-range conventional strike capability for some time- critical situations as an important gap in U.S. global strike capabilities. In a  September 2007 classified report, we discussed DOD efforts to develop a  near-term solution to convert some of its Trident submarine-launched  missiles as a means to deliver an intercontinental prompt conventional  strike capability. DOD is also undertaking or has completed several  analytical efforts to assess mid- and long-term options for prompt, long- range global strike and examining other conventional strike capability  options, such as a new long-range bomber that would be available for  global strike missions in less time-sensitive situations. In the conference  report for the defense fiscal year 2008 appropriation’s bill, the conferees  agreed to provide $100 million for a new prompt global strike program  element within the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense- Wide appropriation for development of promising conventional prompt  global strike technologies.
As DOD seeks to transform its forces and organization to better meet the  demands of the new security environment, we have reported that the  department is faced with identifying new warfighting capabilities it needs,  including critical technologies, while at the same time striking an  affordable and sustainable balance in its spending for current and future  investments. Furthermore, to successfully transform itself, DOD also must  reshape its policies and practices and the cultural perspectives of various  organizations that have responsibilities for implementing the required  changes.
At your request, we reviewed DOD’s actions to implement its global strike  concept and increase U.S. conventional global strike capabilities.  Specifically, you asked us to determine (1) whether DOD has clearly  defined and instilled a common understanding and approach to its global  strike concept throughout the department, (2) the extent to which DOD  has assessed and developed capabilities needed for global strike, and  (3) the extent to which DOD has identified the funding requirements and  developed an investment strategy for acquiring new global strike  capabilities.
To identify whether DOD has clearly defined and instilled a common  understanding and approach to its global strike mission, we reviewed DOD  guidance, concepts, studies and assessments, directives, briefings, status  reports, and other pertinent documentation. We also interviewed and  discussed this information with officials at the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, the Joint Staff, Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force,  Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Advanced Research Projects  Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S.  Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic  Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Air Combat Command, and Air  Force Space Command. We also reviewed documentation on the  department’s efforts to develop capabilities for global strike, as well as,  the results of studies and other assessments to determine the capabilities  needed and potential solutions for improving global strike operations. To  determine the extent to which DOD has identified the funding  requirements and developed an investment strategy for acquiring new  global strike capabilities, we reviewed documentation and interviewed  DOD officials on the department’s use of its Future Years Defense  Program (FYDP) database and related supporting documentation to  identify and manage possible programs that may contribute to global  strike capabilities. We conducted an analysis of the FYDP and related  supporting budget documentation for the President’s fiscal year 2008  budget submission to Congress to determine the range of possible  programs with global strike application. We conducted this performance  audit from November 2006 through February 2008 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based for our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. Further information on our scope and methodology  appears in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review envisioned that the New Triad would  include the majority of current and planned conventional strike  capabilities, as well as a family of unique global strike capabilities, to  address the new security risks faced by the United States. Current global  strike assets could include long-range precision attacks delivered from  aircraft or naval platforms, such as B-52H bombers equipped with  conventional air-launched cruise missiles and surface ships and  submarines outfitted with sea-based Tomahawk land attack missiles. Use  of nonkinetic capabilities, such as information operations, may also be  needed to defeat an adversary’s capability to deny U.S. forces access to  areas or to achieve the surprise necessary to defeat high-value/high-payoff  targets such as weapons of mass destruction, leadership, or command and  control capabilities in more difficult environments. Successful conduct of  global strike operations also is likely to require several enabling  capabilities such as intelligence collection and dissemination, surveillance  and reconnaissance, command and control, communications, and  battlefield damage assessment to support all aspects of the planning and  conduct of missions. Most of the platforms, weapons, nonkinetic assets  and supporting command, control, communications, and computers and  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities used to support  the global strike mission are not unique to global strike. These assets also  provide general purpose capabilities used to support a variety of other  missions conducted by the geographic combatant commands. However,  DOD is studying several new capabilities to address shortfalls in prompt  and global range conventional capabilities.
Many DOD organizations, including the Joint Staff, military services,  combatant commands, and defense agencies, have responsibilities for  developing and implementing the global strike concept, identifying and  acquiring needed capabilities, and conducting global strike missions.  Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, two organizations have key  responsibilities for overseeing and managing global strike related  activities:    The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible  for developing the policy and guidance for global strike. The office is  also responsible for preparing DOD’s annual report to Congress on  global strike, which includes information on the purpose, mission,  assets, potential target, desired capabilities, and conditions for  execution.
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics is responsible for providing oversight for the  development and fielding of global strike capabilities. The office also  has responsibilities for various DOD initiatives to improve the  department’s acquisition processes and management of investments.
Additionally, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Office  of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for assembling and distributing  the FYDP, which is an automated database that DOD uses to report the  estimated projected resources and proposed appropriations to support  DOD programs, projects, and activities, including those related to global  strike capabilities. The FYDP includes cost estimates for the fiscal year  reflected in the current budget request and at least 4 subsequent years.
The Joint Staff is responsible for providing oversight of the Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Capabilities Integration and Development  System process to identify improvements to existing capabilities and guide  development of new capabilities from a joint perspective that recognizes  the need for trade-off analysis. The various global strike analyses  conducted as part of this process are intended to result in a set of potential  solutions, including additional resources or changes to doctrine and  training designed to correct capability shortcomings. The Joint Staff, along  with the Commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command, have  responsibilities for overseeing development of joint doctrine and  managing and providing support for joint exercises of the combatant  commands. Additionally, the military services and defense agencies also  have important roles in identifying and acquiring potential technologies  and weapons systems development programs that could provide global  strike capabilities.
The U.S. Strategic Command has a significant role in implementing the  global strike concept and supporting global strike operations. For its  global strike mission, the command is responsible for providing integrated  planning and command and control support to deliver rapid, extended  range, and precision kinetic and nonkinetic effects in support of theater  and national objectives, and in some situations, executing command and  control of selected global strike missions. The command also advocates  for global strike capabilities on behalf of the combatant commands,  services, and defense agencies through such means as preparing and  reviewing global-strike-related documentation and analyzing needed  capabilities. The command supports other combatant commands during  day-to-day operations by integrating their capabilities for potential global  strike missions through training, exercises, and planning activities. During  a crisis, the command, in close coordination with other combatant  commands, would develop plans and courses of action for executing  global strike missions on very tight timelines for the Secretary of Defense  or the President. The command also has responsibilities for other mission  areas that support global strike, including oversight of intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance, and global command and control; DOD  information operations; space operations; and integrating and  synchronizing DOD’s efforts in combating weapons of mass destruction.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Steps to Implement Global Strike, but Its Concept Is Interpreted Differently by Key Stakeholders
paragraphs: DOD has taken a number of steps to implement its global strike concept  and has generally assigned responsibilities for the planning, execution, and  support of global strike operations. However, key stakeholders,  particularly the geographic combatant commanders, have different  interpretations of the scope, range, and potential use of capabilities  needed to implement global strike and under what conditions global strike  would be used in U.S. military operations. Several factors affect  understanding and communication of the global strike concept among key  stakeholders, including the extent to which DOD has (1) defined global  strike, (2) incorporated global strike into joint doctrine, (3) conducted  outreach and communication activities with key stakeholders, and  (4) involved stakeholders in joint exercises and other training involving  global strike. Without a complete and clearly articulated concept that is  well communicated and practiced with key stakeholders, DOD could  encounter difficulties in fully implementing its concept and building the  necessary relationships for carrying out global strike operations.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Taken a Number of Steps to Implement Its Global Strike Concept
paragraphs: DOD has taken a number of steps to implement its global strike concept  since completing its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, which provided the  rationale for global strike. Specifically, the U.S. Strategic Command has  played a major role in DOD’s implementation of global strike by helping to  shape the concept, developing new processes and procedures, and  providing inputs in identifying and developing new capabilities.
Since issuing its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD has conducted several  analyses to evaluate desired capabilities and identify capability gaps. In  January 2005, DOD completed the Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept,  which describes how a global strike joint task force would operate, the  time frame and environment in which it must operate, its required  capabilities, and its defining physical and operating characteristics. The  concept was used as input for analyses conducted under the Joint Staff’s  Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System requirements  process to identify the desired capabilities and shortfalls in current global  strike capabilities. The first two of the three analyses, the functional area  analysis and functional needs analysis, were completed in 2005. The  functional area analysis synthesized existing guidance to specify the  military problem to be studied. The analysis identified the specific military  tasks the force is expected to perform, the conditions under which these  tasks are to be performed, and the required standards of performance. The  functional needs analysis examined that problem; assessed how well DOD  can address the problem given its current program; identified capability  gaps and shortfalls, risk areas, and redundancies; and identified the  capabilities DOD should develop. The last of the analyses, Global Strike  Raid Evaluation of Alternatives,  will make recommendations on potential  approaches to overcome capability gaps by way of doctrine, organization,  training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities actions. The Joint  Staff plans to complete this analysis in May 2008. DOD also has several  similar analytical efforts underway or completed, such as the Air Force-led  Prompt Global Strike Analysis of Alternatives, to identify potential  weapons systems solutions for global strike.
Moreover, the U.S. Strategic Command has been implementing its assigned  planning and command and control support responsibilities for the global  strike mission. In addition to the support its headquarters provides for  DOD efforts to implement and develop global strike capabilities, the  command established a joint functional component command for global  strike and integration to provide day-to-day management for its global  strike mission. The command has also initiated several activities including  improving processes and procedures for command and control,  communications, and decision making and the management of  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, and incorporating  global strike operations into its concept plan. For example, development  of adaptive planning systems such as the theater integrated planning  subsystem and the integrated strategic planning and analysis network will  allow Strategic Command planners to collaborate with and support the  geographic combatant commands.
section_title: Global Strike Is Interpreted Differently among Combatant Command and Service Stakeholders
paragraphs: While key stakeholders have been involved in various global strike  development efforts, global strike is interpreted differently among  combatant command and service officials, who have significant roles and  responsibilities in planning, coordinating, and executing global strike  operations. DOD, Joint Staff, combatant command, and service officials  we spoke with generally believe that global strike is a broad and  unbounded concept that could include a wide range of forces and other  capabilities and involve different scenarios. As a result, the concept can be  difficult to understand and creates different interpretations among  stakeholders. For example, officials from the services offered a range of  different interpretations of global strike operations:    At a roundtable discussion we held with a number of officials at the  U.S. Pacific Air Force Command, which supports the U.S. Pacific  Command, the consensus reached was that global strike was a mission  associated with the U.S. Strategic Command and the strikes conducted  would originate from the continental United States. Some of the  officials said that global strike was a special capability reserved only  for the President, Secretary of Defense, and a Joint Force Commander.
U.S. Pacific Fleet headquarters representatives told us that global  strike implied that the capability would originate from outside the  geographic command’s region and would not include maritime-based  targets.
Air Force Air Combat Command representatives told us that they  viewed global strike as encompassing a mission that was an  autonomous event; had a global element; occurred in days rather than  months; and involved no build-up of forces in the area of the strike  prior to the mission.
Additionally, U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command officials  we spoke with had difficulty distinguishing the differences between global  strike and theater strike operations, which are strike operations  conducted by a geographic command against potential targets within its  area of responsibility. U.S. Pacific Command headquarters officials told us  that they did not see a clear distinction between the characteristics and  objectives of global strike and a theater strike. The officials said that  operations in theater conducted by their command would address all  potential targets, including high-value ones that are also identified as  potential targets for global strike. Some Pacific Command officials viewed  global strike as a unique capability that is requested by the theater  commander when it is considered a better option. Other Pacific Command  officials said the only difference between the two types of strike  operations is whether the U.S. Strategic Command or the affected  combatant command is assigned lead responsibility for the planning  and/or execution of the operation. U.S. Central Command officials also  agreed that global strike is currently a broad and unbounded concept that  can, depending upon interpretation, take in much of current theater  operations.
section_title: Different Stakeholder Interpretation of Global Strike Exists Due to Several Factors
paragraphs: We identified four factors that have led to stakeholders’ varying  perceptions of the global strike concept. These factors include the extent  to which DOD has (1) defined global strike, (2) incorporated global strike  into joint doctrine, (3) conducted outreach and communication activities  with key stakeholders, and (4) involved stakeholders in joint exercises and  other training involving global strike. However, while DOD has taken some  actions to address each of these factors, further management actions are  needed to foster better understanding and communication with key  stakeholders for global strike.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Not Clearly Defined Global Strike
paragraphs: DOD uses several definitions to describe global strike in its key studies,  reports, and other documents. However, various officials from a number  of DOD organizations do not believe these definitions provide a clear and  consistent description of global strike. According to officials in DOD’s  Program Analysis and Evaluation Office, global strike is not well-defined  and the term can mean different things among the combatant commands,  services, and DOD organizations. DOD Program Analysis and Evaluation  Office officials said that while a Senior Warfighter Forum in August 2006,  which was led by the U.S. Strategic Command and included participants  from the services, combatant commands, and defense agencies, was able  to reach a consensus on a list of attributes for global strike capabilities,  the forum was unable to agree on a common definition for global strike.  A senior official in DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics said that DOD does not have a  common definition for global strike or for prompt global strike.  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics officials told us, however, that DOD  intends to reach agreement with stakeholders on a common global strike  definition through the series of ongoing studies on potential global strike  weapons systems that are nearing completion. Table 1 provides some  examples of the definitions used within DOD to describe global strike.
The lack of a universally accepted definition has hindered some of the  services from incorporating global strike into their documents. U.S. Pacific  Fleet representatives told us that because DOD has not provided a  common definition or bounded the global strike concept and mission very  well, the Pacific Fleet has not incorporated global strike into its planning  and training activities and documents. Additionally, Department of the  Army headquarters officials told us that, due to the lack of an approved  joint definition of global strike, the Army has yet to incorporate global  strike into its documents and publications. The officials also said the role  and responsibilities and contributions of the Army for global strike  operations have not been clearly defined in global strike documents.  The Army would likely play a role in global strike operations by deploying  follow-on forces after a global strike attack to assess battle damage and  provide security and civil operations, according to the officials.
Officials at the U.S. Special Operations Command told us that the lack of a  universally accepted common definition would not affect the successful  planning and execution of a global strike operation. The officials said that  should a decision be made to conduct a global strike operation, the  specific details will be provided in various orders prior to the operation.  However, the officials stated that an agreed upon definition that gave a  specific description of the global strike would provide everyone with a  common point of departure and clearer understanding of the term. U.S.  Central Command officials similarly agreed that a clear, accepted joint  definition would help to promote a more consistent interpretation of  global strike and what it entails. According to Air Force headquarters  officials, while the Air Force has developed a definition that focuses on its  own forces’ contributions and support for global strike, a joint definition  that is generally accepted and used throughout DOD would provide  common ground among the services and DOD organizations for discussing  and interpreting global strike. Officials in the Joint Staff’s Force Structure,  Resources and Assessment Directorate likewise agreed that a universally  accepted global strike definition would promote greater acceptance and  understanding among DOD organizations.
section_title: Global Strike Has Not Been Widely Included in Joint Doctrine
paragraphs: While the Joint Chiefs of Staff has included a short description of global  strike and the responsibilities of the U.S. Strategic Command for the global  strike mission in two joint doctrine publications for homeland security and  homeland defense, it has not included a more detailed discussion of  global strike operations in any other existing or proposed doctrine  publication. Joint doctrine consists of the fundamental principles that  guide the employment of military forces in a coordinated action toward a  common objective and is meant to enhance the operational effectiveness  of U.S. forces. According to officials in the Joint Doctrine Group at the  U.S. Joint Forces Command, global strike and the mission responsibilities  of the U.S. Strategic Command were included in the homeland security  and homeland defense joint publications to cite an example of a possible  preemptive and/or offensive action that could be taken in defense of the  United States. The officials said the publications were not intended to  provide a comprehensive and specific discussion of global strike  operations but rather to discuss how global strike would contribute to  homeland security and defense objectives.
Although a proposed joint publication on strategic attack was to include a  more detailed discussion of global strike, the publication was cancelled  and there have been no other proposals for incorporating such a  discussion in any new or existing joint publication. Officials in the Joint  Forces Command’s Joint Doctrine Group said that a detailed discussion of  global strike was to be included in a proposed joint publication on  strategic attack, which would have focused on the strategic effects  achieved at the theater operational and/or tactical levels of war. In  June 2005, U.S. Strategic Command, the lead sponsor for the new  publication, submitted a draft publication for review but the publication  was subsequently cancelled after it was determined to be inconsistent with  the approved Joint Staff guidance for preparing the publication. According  to Joint Doctrine Group officials, the proposed publication on strategic  attack would have overlapped with other publications and did not provide  any unique doctrinal fundamentals that were not already covered in  existing doctrine. According to officials in Joint Forces Command’s Joint  Doctrine Group, a proposal to include a more comprehensive discussion  of global strike in joint publications could be made to the Joint Staff and  their group would be responsible for conducting an analysis to determine  the proposal’s validity. However, the officials said they were not aware of  any action by the U.S. Strategic Command or another organization to  propose that global strike be considered for a new joint publication or  incorporated into an existing one. The Joint Doctrine Group officials told  us they believe that a proposal has not been made because the joint  community may not consider global strike to be mature enough and  therefore be reluctant to incorporate it into joint doctrine until the concept  is better defined and demonstrated in joint exercises and actual crises.  U.S. Strategic Command officials told us that their command had no  current plans to resurrect the strategic attack publication or propose one  for global strike.
Although some officials in the joint community say that incorporating  global strike into joint doctrine is premature, several DOD officials said  that developing joint doctrine would promote understanding and  implementation of the concept. The Air Force’s Air Combat Command and  U.S. Central Command officials told us that there is sufficient reason to  begin developing or incorporating global strike into existing doctrine for  those forces and capabilities that are currently available to conduct a  global strike operation. The Air Combat Command officials said that  because of the 2-year process to develop doctrine, it makes sense to begin  creating joint doctrine now for current capabilities. The officials added  that the resulting doctrine would be revised as additional global strike  capabilities, such as advanced prompt global strike systems, become  available. Additionally, a U.S. Central Command official stated that the  development of joint doctrine would help clarify the global strike concept  because it could assist operational planners in explaining the situations  where global strike would be a good option and the responsibilities and  expectations of the U.S. Strategic Command and the geographic  commands. Central Command officials said that doctrine also could  distinguish global strike from other types of strike operations conducted  by geographic combatant commands. According to the Joint Chiefs of  Staff’s instruction on the development of joint doctrine, joint doctrine  standardizes the terminology, training, relationships, responsibilities, and  processes among all U.S. forces to free joint force commanders and their  staffs to focus efforts on solving the strategic, operational, and tactical  problems confronting them. Without a more comprehensive inclusion of  global strike within joint doctrine for current capabilities, the combatant  commands and services will not have complete guidance to further their  understanding and effectively plan, prepare, and deploy forces for global  strike operations.
section_title: Opportunities Exist to Enhance U.S. Strategic Command’s Outreach Approach for Global Strike
paragraphs: Although the U.S. Strategic Command has taken steps to explain and  promote understanding of global strike operations and its mission  responsibilities, various geographic combatant command and service  officials we spoke with generally said that the Strategic Command should  increase its global strike outreach activities (e.g., visits, briefings, and  education) to reach more staff throughout the commands and services.  These officials also said that these activities should be provided on a  continuous and consistent basis to reach command and service staffs that  experience frequent turnover. As part of its responsibilities for the global  strike mission, the Strategic Command supports other combatant  commanders and integrates the capabilities of all affected combatant  commands through training, exercises, and planning for both theater  interests and potential global strike missions. In our prior work in  identifying key practices adopted by organizations undergoing successful  transformations, we found that it is essential for organizations to adopt a  communication strategy that provides a common framework for  conducting consistent and coordinated outreach within and outside its  organization and seeks to genuinely engage all stakeholders in the  organization’s transformation.
U.S. Strategic Command officials have conducted visits, provided  briefings, and assigned liaison staff to the geographic combatant  commands to promote understanding of its global strike mission and  responsibilities. The Strategic Command, according the command’s liaison  to U.S. Central Command, initiated a visit to the Central Command in  October 2006 to provide a briefing on all of the command’s missions and  activities, including global strike. The liaison said that the visit provided an  opportunity for Central Command’s staff to gain perspectives on global  strike and the Strategic Command’s mission responsibilities. Similarly,  U.S. Special Operations Command officials told us that the Strategic  Command’s joint functional component command for global strike and  integration commander provided a global strike mission briefing to  U.S. Special Operations Command’s senior leadership in August 2006.
However, while Strategic Command officials are generally satisfied with  the existing communications, a number of other combatant commands are  looking for additional support. U.S. Pacific Command officials told us that  while the Pacific Command has established a close relationship with the  Strategic Command over the past few years, the command is still learning  about Strategic Command’s mission responsibilities, particularly for global  strike. According to Pacific Command officials, the U.S. Strategic  Command’s liaison officer provided an outreach briefing in early 2007 to  their organization which included information on the global strike  concept. The officials said that similar briefings should be given regularly  throughout the command because of the constant turnover of staff.  According to the U.S. Strategic Command’s liaison at the U.S. Pacific  Command, it does not appear that information on global strike is getting  out to all of the Pacific Command staff. The liaison based his statement on  comments made by Pacific Command staff to GAO during a March 2007  visit to the command. This indicates, according to the liaison, that the  Strategic Command should provide briefings and hold discussion sessions  with more of the Pacific Command organizations, particularly on how  global strike operations fit into the theater commander’s plans and differ  from other types of theater operations. Air Force Space Command officials  told us that the Strategic Command should provide thorough and updated  education and communication of its prompt global strike mission with the  geographic combatant commands to increase understanding and mitigate  any misconceptions the commands may have about the conduct of global  strike operations in their regions. The officials said that it is important for  the Strategic Command and other combatant commands to establish a  consistent dialogue on their roles and responsibilities and the use of global  strike weapons before any new prompt global strike weapon is deployed.  Similarly, a U.S. Central Command official said that the Strategic  Command should conduct more outreach activities for global strike with  combatant command staffs to explain the global strike concept and the  relationships with other commands. Additionally, U.S. Special Operations  Command officials told us that while they found the Strategic Command’s  Web site beneficial, it was not widely known among the command’s staff.
While the U.S. Strategic Command has taken several positive actions to  promote global strike and its mission, without a consistent and  comprehensive outreach strategy the command may not reach the  combatant commands and services to the extent needed to foster  acceptance and understanding of global strike. As a result, the command  may encounter difficulty in future global strike implementation efforts.
section_title: Global Strike Has Not Been Widely Practiced in Exercises and Training
paragraphs: Joint exercises and other training activities can provide opportunities for  service and combatant command staffs to practice operational procedures  and processes to increase their understanding of global strike. However,  global strike has only been included in a few major joint exercises, largely  those sponsored by the U.S. Strategic Command, over the past 2 years. The  U.S. Strategic Command has incorporated global strike and its other  missions into its annual joint command exercises. Beginning with the  command’s Global Lightning exercise in November 2005, the Strategic  Command has included global strike objectives in its annual Global  Lightning, Global Storm, and Global Thunder exercises. According to  Strategic Command officials, representatives from some of the other  combatant commands have participated in portions of these exercises,  while other combatant commands, such as the U.S. Central Command,  may not always participate because of other commitments. A Strategic  Command joint exercise division official said, however, that some global  strike objectives have been incorporated into recent exercises sponsored  by U.S. Pacific, European, and Special Operations Commands. For  instance, global strike time-sensitive planning has been included in Special  Operations Command’s Able Warrior exercises.
U.S. Strategic Command officials told us that while global strike needs to  be incorporated to a greater extent in joint exercises, it is often difficult  because of differing exercise objectives. For example, a senior official in  the Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component Command for  Global Strike and Integration said that including global strike objectives in  joint exercises other than those of Strategic Command can be challenging  because it is often difficult to create scenarios that make sense for  executing a global strike mission considering other primary exercise  objectives. U.S. Central Command, for example, has not included global  strike in the joint exercises it sponsors. Additionally, officials in U.S.  Strategic Command’s exercise branch told us that other combatant  commands are hesitant to add objectives that could lessen the focus on  the primary exercise objectives. As a result, Strategic Command officials  said that it can also be difficult to overlap its exercises with those of  another command. For example, U.S. Strategic Command proposed  linking its Global Lightning 2007 exercise, which had a global strike focus,  with U.S. Pacific Command’s Terminal Fury 2007 exercise. Both were  scheduled for late 2006. Global Lightning and Terminal Fury are annual  command post exercises sponsored by U.S. Strategic Command and  U.S. Pacific Command, respectively, and involve the commanders and  their staffs in testing and validating the communications within and  between headquarters and simulated forces in deterring a military attack  and employing forces as directed. Terminal Fury is partly intended to train  the command’s staff in exercising its theater warfighting concept plan and  is considered by the commander of the Pacific Command to be the  command’s number one priority exercise. The Pacific Command agreed to  overlap the two exercises after the command determined there would be  only minimal impact on its objectives. However, U.S. Pacific Fleet officials  told us that Pacific Command, reluctant to have another command operate  forces in its theater, insisted on having control of the forces executing the  global strike operation in the exercise.
U.S. Strategic Command makes some training on global strike available to  its staff and those of other commands and organizations. An official in  U.S. Strategic Command’s joint exercise division, who was designated to  speak for the command, told us that staffs from U.S. Special Operations,  Pacific, and European Commands have attended basic courses on global  strike during visits to Strategic Command. The official said that the global  strike courses are also available on its Web site on DOD’s classified  computer network. Additionally, during the preparation for joint exercises,  participating staffs are made aware and encouraged to take the online  courses to come up to speed on various areas. However, the command is  considering sending staff to other combatant commands to help provide  more consistent training.
section_title: DOD Is Assessing Several Potential Offensive Strike Weapons Systems for Global Strike but Has Not Fully Assessed Related Enabling Capabilities
paragraphs: DOD has underway or completed several global strike assessments to  identify potential conventional offensive strike weapons systems it may  need in the near, mid, and long term, particularly those for prompt global  strike. However, DOD has not fully assessed the requirements for various  enabling capabilities it needs for global strike or coordinated its efforts to  improve these capabilities with potential offensive systems it intends to  develop. Enabling capabilities DOD considers critical include intelligence  collection and dissemination, surveillance and reconnaissance, command  and control, communications, and battlefield damage assessment. Without  a full assessment of enabling capabilities, DOD may not make the best  decision regarding which enabling capability improvements to pursue to  meet global strike operational requirements.
subsections: section_title: DOD Efforts Largely Focus on Evaluating Potential Near-, Mid-, and Long-term Offensive Global Strike Capabilities
paragraphs: While DOD has several analyses underway to determine desired  capabilities and identify capability gaps and shortcomings, recent efforts  for global strike have largely focused on developing new offensive strike  systems that provide improved prompt and long-distance response  capabilities. DOD has two major efforts underway to develop potential  offensive systems that provide a sea- and land-based prompt global strike  capability in the near- and midterm time frames. For the long term, DOD  has four key studies underway or completed that are examining potential  offensive strike systems to provide global strike capabilities beginning  sometime after 2018.
To provide a near-term prompt global strike capability, DOD has requested  funds to develop the Navy’s conventional Trident modification proposal,  which would place conventional warheads on some Trident II ballistic  missiles aboard strategic Trident submarines. However, while Navy plans  could have the modified missile available around 2011, the proposal has  not been fully funded in recent budgets because of congressional concerns  over placing conventional missiles on submarines that would also carry  missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. Because of these concerns,  Congress has also mandated a study by the National Academy of  Sciences to review alternative prompt global strike options. The  Academy provided the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense  with an interim report in May 2007, which concluded that a single system  for prompt global strike was not the best way to proceed in the long term  given the uncertainties in the strategic environment and a range of systems  that need to developed. The report also concluded that while the  conventional Trident missile is not the optimal solution, it offers the only  viable prompt global strike capability within the next 6 years. The  Academy plans to issue a final report in the spring of 2008. Additionally, in  the conference report for the defense fiscal year 2008 appropriations bill,  the conferees agreed to provide no funding for testing, fabrication, or  deployment of the new conventional Trident missile.
The Air Force Space Command is examining a midterm land-based  ballistic missile system that would provide a prompt global strike  capability and could be available as early as 2015. The proposed  conventional strike missile would carry off-the-shelf conventional  weapons and may incorporate a new maneuverable weapons delivery  system. The Air Force’s preliminary plans would station the conventional  strike missile first at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, which has  some preexisting infrastructure that can support the system, and possibly  later at Cape Canaveral, Florida. However, several technical, security, and  policy issues would need to be resolved before the missile could be  fielded, including technological advances in thermal protection systems  and resolution of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty implications. Beginning  in fiscal year 2008, the Air Force transferred its funding for prompt global  strike to a defensewide account to fund a consolidated, multiservice  approach, managed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
To provide global strike capabilities sometime after 2018, DOD has  conducted four global strike capability assessment studies: (1) Next  Generation Long-Range Strike Analysis of Alternatives, (2) Nuclear and  Conventional Global Strike Missile Study, (3) Prompt Global Strike  Analysis of Alternatives, and (4) Global Strike Raid Evaluation of  Alternatives. Each is shown in table 2.
DOD has completed two of its four long-term studies examining potential  offensive strike systems to provide global strike capabilities sometime  after 2018. Three of the four studies assess possible offensive strike  weapons systems that would provide a prompt and long-range capability  for global strike, while the fourth study, the Next Generation Long Range  Strike Analysis of Alternatives, examines potential strike systems that  could potentially travel great distances to penetrate and loiter deep within  an enemy’s territory to deliver high-volume strikes against time-critical  targets.
section_title: DOD Considers Enabling Capabilities as Critical for Conducting Successful Global Strike Operations
paragraphs: Enabling capabilities that DOD considers critical in supporting global  strike operations include intelligence collection and dissemination,  surveillance and reconnaissance, command and control, communications,  and battlefield damage assessment. Planning, executing, and assessing the  success of global strike operations may place greater demands on enabling  capabilities as new offensive capabilities are acquired. Although the  successful conduct of all strike operations depends on enabling  capabilities, the nature of global strike operations—such as the potentially  long distances over which strike systems may be required to operate,  compressed time frames for execution, improved accuracy, the fleeting  nature of some global strike targets, and the high-level decision authority  required—creates potential operational challenges for these capabilities.  Figure 1 shows the role of enabling capabilities in supporting sequential  key events in the conduct of strike operations from prior monitoring of the  area; initially finding, locating, and identifying a target; executing a strike;  to conducting of battlefield damage assessment to determine the success  of the strike and whether further actions are required.
According to the Defense Science Board’s Report on Future Strategic  Strike Forces, current enabling capabilities are not sufficient to fully  support the requirements for global strike operations. Current intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance and command and control capabilities  generally do not provide the persistent coverage, processing and sharing  of information, and rapid planning required for compressed global strike  time frames, according to U.S. Strategic Command officials. Additionally,  Air Force Space Command officials told us that they are concerned about  whether current capabilities of intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance assets would be able to recognize and assess the damage  caused by future global strike systems. For example, future systems may  use flechette warheads, which would disperse metal darts upon impact  that do not create large craters like traditional explosive devices;  therefore, the damage may not be readily visible to intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Further, according to U.S. Air  Force officials, current enabling capabilities lack the ability to reliably  produce up-to-date accurate and responsive information to strike fleeting  targets that can change locations unexpectedly, particularly in areas  where U.S. forces may be denied access. Fleeting targets may be difficult  to detect or identify with current intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance sensors because of the adversary’s use of techniques such  as mobility and/or camouflage, concealment, and deception. Therefore,  the target must be rapidly engaged before the adversary can employ these  techniques and disrupt effective targeting efforts. According to Air Force,  Defense Intelligence Agency, and RAND Corporation officials we spoke  with, striking mobile and fleeting targets—the most difficult types of  targets to strike—requires greater intelligence capabilities than many  other types of strike operations to positively identify the target and  provide persistent surveillance to track and engage the target.
DOD is pursuing several independent efforts to assess and improve  enabling capabilities that are critical elements in the pre- and poststrike  phases of global strike operations. For example, U.S. Strategic Command  has a number of initiatives underway to improve command and control  with the goal of providing military planners with a clear understanding of  the threat, fast and accurate planning, and tools for timely and efficient  decision making. Additionally, U.S. Strategic Command and defense  agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Threat  Reduction Agency, are exploring initiatives to reduce the time needed to  gather information for strike planning and assessments by increasing  available intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. For  example, to be able to quickly assess battle damage, the Defense Threat  Reduction Agency and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency  are exploring the idea of dispensing intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance sensors from future prompt global strike platforms, such  as the proposed conventional strike missile, around target areas shortly  before the release of its weapon.
section_title: DOD’s Recent Studies Have Not Comprehensively Included Assessments of Critical Enabling Capabilities
paragraphs: Recent DOD studies to identify potential offensive strike systems for  global strike provide only limited assessments of the enabling capabilities  needed for a particular focus of global strike or a particular weapons  system and do not collectively provide a complete assessment of enabling  capabilities needed to support global strike operations. Joint Staff officials  who are conducting the Global Strike Raid Evaluation of Alternatives  study said they plan to assess the enabling capabilities as an important  step in understanding all of the capabilities needed to support global strike  operations. However, the global strike raid study will only analyze the use  of global strike as a limited strike capability against time-critical targets  and will not examine its use in all aspects of major combat operations.  Similarly, the Nuclear and Conventional Global Strike Missile Study only  examined enabling capabilities needed for the future conventional and  nuclear land-based ballistic missile options considered in its assessment.  However, the National Academy of Sciences, recognizing the importance  and greater demand that global strike would place on enabling  capabilities, plans to include an assessment of global strike capabilities in  its congressionally mandated spring 2008 final report on conventional  prompt global strike.
Global strike operations can increase the demand for enabling capabilities  depending on the threat and the target to be attacked. For example,  conducting strikes against mobile delivery systems for weapons of mass  destruction poses one of the most dangerous and elusive threats for global  strike operations. Defense Threat Reduction Agency officials told us that  they rely on enabling capabilities to provide the information needed to  locate the target and guide the weapons system to strike with accuracy  within compressed time frames, while minimizing any potential collateral  effects. Moreover, the intelligence needed for planning and executing  strikes against mobile delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction is  currently limited or incomplete, according to Defense Threat Reduction  Agency officials.
Several DOD and Air Force officials we spoke with said that enabling  capabilities were not being fully considered to the extent needed in global  strike system studies. According to a DOD Program Analysis and  Evaluation official, who has responsibility for global strike issues, both of  the Air Force’s analyses of alternatives studies—i.e., prompt global strike  and next generation long-range strike—had methodological weaknesses  because neither assessed the enabling capabilities required for conducting  global strike operations. Instead, the teams conducting the two studies  assumed that certain needed improvements in enabling capabilities, such  as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, would be available when  any future system is fielded. The scope and range of enabling capabilities  that could be assessed in the studies were limited because of the need to  obtain special security clearances, according to U.S. Strategic Command  and Air Force Space Command officials. Similarly, the Global Strike Raid  Evaluation of Alternatives study was delayed for several months because  of difficulties obtaining special access clearances needed to review  enabling capability development efforts across DOD. Air Force officials  responsible for conducting the Prompt Global Strike Analysis of  Alternatives stated that an assessment of needed enabling capabilities  should be done to complement their study. However, the officials did not  know of any such assessment of enabling capabilities being conducted.  The Air Force officials said that their analysis does not completely address  enabling capabilities because (1) an assessment of enabling capabilities  was not the focus of their analysis, (2) the analysis work required to assess  offensive systems for their study alone is expected to take 2 years, (3) the  study staff lacks the special access clearances required to obtain  information on all DOD efforts for improving enabling capabilities, and  (4) the services submitting proposals for potential prompt global strike  systems wanted to limit their cost estimates to the weapon system only.
Furthermore, the analyses conducted for the conventional Trident missile  and conventional strike missile proposals have not fully included  assessments of required enabling capabilities. According to Joint Staff  officials we spoke with, the analyses conducted for the Navy’s  conventional Trident missile proposal did not fully consider intelligence  capabilities and requirements. As a result, the intelligence, surveillance,  and reconnaissance capabilities needed to support this potential global  strike system, which are currently in limited availability, may not be in  place since an analysis of enabling capabilities has not yet been performed  for it. Air Force Space Command officials developing the conventional  strike missile told us that they have yet to perform an analysis of the  enabling capabilities that potential strike systems would require.
Additionally, DOD has not coordinated all of its efforts to improve  enabling capabilities with its assessments for new offensive global strike  systems. Because DOD has not fully assessed the enabling capabilities  required or coordinated various department efforts to improve enabling  capabilities alongside its plans for future strike systems, it may not have  all of the key enabling capabilities in place when needed to support new  offensive capabilities if and when they are funded. For example, Defense  Advanced Research Projects Agency officials told us that the agency  recognizes that such efforts as its Rapid Eye program, which is examining  concepts for an aircraft that would arrive within hours in an emerging area  of interest to provide a limited persistent intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance capability, could potentially fill gaps in enabling  capabilities needed for global strike. Nevertheless, the officials said that  DOD has not yet recognized the importance of coordinating these efforts  with ongoing offensive global strike system assessments to better  understand the range of enabling capabilities being developed and their  estimated availability. DOD has taken some important first steps to  formulate a strategy for improving the integration of future intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements through the development  of its Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Integration  Roadmap. However, as we previously reported in 2007, the roadmap does  not define requirements for global persistent surveillance; clarify what  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements are already  filled; identify critical gaps as areas for future focus; or otherwise  represent an enterprise-level architecture of what the intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance enterprise is to be for future operations,  such as global strike.
Since DOD has not fully assessed the required enabling capabilities or  coordinated various department efforts to improve enabling capabilities,  such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and command and  control, for future strike systems, DOD might not make the best decisions  regarding which enabling capabilities to pursue. As a result, the  effectiveness of these new offensive capabilities against critical high-value  targets may be limited when initially fielded.
section_title: DOD Has Identified and Tracked Some Investments Related to Global Strike but Has Not Developed a Prioritized Global Strike Investment Strategy
paragraphs: While DOD plans investments in a range of global-strike-related  capabilities, it has not yet begun to develop a prioritized investment  strategy that considers the breadth of current efforts and future plans to  develop capabilities for global strike, integrates these efforts to assess  global strike options, and makes choices among alternatives in light of the  department’s long-term fiscal challenges. Such a strategy would initially  capture currently planned investments and would be refined and updated  as DOD further develops its concept and identifies additional capabilities.  Our prior work has shown that a long-term and comprehensive investment  approach is an important tool in an organization’s decision-making  process to define direction, establish priorities, assist with current and  future budgets, and plan the actions needed to achieve goals. DOD studies  and officials have identified a need for a broad, holistic view of global  strike development that captures and gives visibility to all its efforts— proposed or underway—for increasing both offensive and enabling global  strike capabilities. However, DOD has not fully assessed its FYDP to  determine the extent to which current development programs, projects,  and activities could contribute to global strike capabilities or explained  how it plans to link its long-term studies to identify potential offensive  weapons systems for global strike that will result in a comprehensive  prioritized investment strategy. Ongoing DOD initiatives examining  portfolio management approaches to manage selected groupings of  investments could help DOD in developing a comprehensive prioritized  investment strategy for global strike.
subsections: section_title: Comprehensive Investment Strategies Are an Important Tool in an Organization’s Decision- making Process
paragraphs: Our prior work has shown that developing a long-term, comprehensive  investment strategy provides an organization with an important tool in its  decision-making process to define direction, establish priorities, assist  with current and future budgets, and plan the actions needed to achieve  goals. This strategy is intended to be a dynamic document, which would  be refined and updated to adapt to changing circumstances. Such a  strategy addresses needs, capabilities gaps, alternatives, and affordability,  and includes information on future investment requirements, projected  resources, investment priorities and trade-offs, milestones, and funding  timelines. It allows an organization to address requirements on an  enterprisewide, or departmentwide, basis and provides a means to  evaluate the efficacy and severity of capability gaps or, alternatively, areas  of redundancy. Without a long-term, comprehensive prioritized investment  strategy, it is difficult to fully account for and assess real and potential  contributions from other current and future weapons and supporting  systems providing similar capabilities, mitigate capability shortfalls and  eliminate duplication, and allocate scare funds among a range of priorities.
section_title: DOD Has Not Conducted a Comprehensive Assessment of Global- strike-related Efforts in Its FYDP
paragraphs: Various DOD officials we spoke with recognize the need for DOD to have a  broad, holistic view of global strike development that captures and gives  visibility to all its efforts—proposed or underway—for increasing both  offensive and enabling global strike capabilities. DOD, however, has yet to  perform a comprehensive assessment to identify and track all potential  global-strike-related efforts in its FYDP. An official in DOD’s Office of  Program Analysis and Evaluation, who has responsibility for global strike  issues, told us that his office tracks several significant FYDP programs that  have specific global strike application, such as the Conventional Trident  Modification, Common Aero Vehicle, and Falcon programs. The U.S.  Strategic Command, according to command officials, informally tracks  global-strike-related programs through DOD-wide conferences and  periodic meetings with various contractors that are working on global- strike-related technology efforts. Additionally, in February 2007, the U.S.  Strategic Command sponsored a prompt global strike technology  conference to identify ongoing research, development, test, and evaluation  efforts being conducted by the services, DOD laboratories, and defense  agencies that would support development of prompt global strike  capabilities.
While DOD organizations have conducted some assessments of global  strike capabilities in the FYDP, they have not conducted a comprehensive  assessment of the FYDP to manage and track DOD’s global-strike-related  investments in conventional offensive and enabling capabilities. For  example, according to an office official who has responsibility for global  strike issues, DOD’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation has not  determined the full range and status of science and technology  development efforts with potential global strike application in the FYDP.  As we reported in 2005, DOD’s Program Analysis and Evaluation office  conducted a limited analysis of the FYDP and related budget documents  and internal reviews to identify the range of New Triad spending, including  spending for global strike. However, Program Analysis and Evaluation  officials told us that their analysis, which has not been updated, did not  attempt to capture all of the potential global-strike-related development  efforts in the FYDP. One Program Analysis and Evaluation official said  that if a comprehensive assessment of all global-strike-related  development efforts was conducted, it might show that existing systems  could provide the high volume and compressed time required for prompt  global strike with only limited investments in enabling and offensive  capabilities. This lack of complete knowledge about how existing systems  could be adapted to meet global strike requirements underscores the need  for a more holistic assessment of DOD’s efforts related to global strike.
The U.S. Strategic Command also has not conducted a comprehensive  assessment of global strike investments that included DOD’s FYDP. For  example, the Strategic Command’s 2007 prompt global strike technology  summit did not fully capture development of offensive global strike  technology or enabling capabilities, such as command and control,  intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance. One of the summit’s  purposes was to inform and raise the awareness of prompt global strike  technology development at the service laboratories and defense agencies.  According to a Strategic Command official, however, the summit focused  only on those efforts that could improve offensive kinetic global strike  capabilities.
subsections: section_title: Our Analysis Identified 135 Global Strike and Related FYDP Programs, Projects, and Activities
paragraphs: Given that DOD has not conducted a comprehensive assessment of its  FYDP for global-strike-related investments, we performed an analysis of  FYDP program elements in the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget  submission to Congress to identify the range of potential global-strike- related research and development efforts. We established criteria and a list  of key terms to use in our assessment from a review of descriptions,  terms, and characteristics used by DOD in its principal global strike  documents, including the Global Strike Joint Capabilities Document and  Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, and information obtained  in discussions with DOD officials. Such an analysis would need to be  conducted in developing a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy  for global strike. Other global strike assessments of the FYDP programs,  projects, and activities may determine different criteria and methodologies  to use and thus, may yield different results.
In our analysis, we identified 94 FYDP program elements in the fiscal year  2008 budget request that would provide funding for 135 programs,  projects, and activities to develop conventional offensive and enabling  capabilities having possible application for global strike. Of the 135  programs, projects, and activities we identified in our analysis:    85 would improve offensive capabilities, including efforts to improve  kinetic weapons, nonkinetic weapons, and propulsion systems;    41 would improve enabling capabilities such as command, control,  communications and computers and surveillance and reconnaissance  systems; and    9 would improve both offensive and enabling capabilities such as  predator development.
Also, we determined that 13 of the 135 programs, projects and activities,  such as the Air Force’s Common Aero Vehicle program, were exclusively  for research and development of global strike capabilities. The remaining  122 programs, projects, and activities support research and development  of offensive and enabling capabilities with potential application for global  strike operations.
While the programs, projects, and activities we identified in our analysis  are largely directed at developing capabilities for a wide range of military  needs other than just global strike, these efforts reflect substantial near- term investments of several billions dollars in capabilities that could  potentially be used in conducting future global strike operations.  Appendix II summarizes the results of our analysis to identify global strike  and related development in DOD’s FYDP.
section_title: DOD Has Not Explained How Results of Its Global Strike Studies Will Be Integrated into a Prioritized Investment Strategy
paragraphs: DOD officials also have not clearly explained whether DOD plans to  integrate the results of its four global strike studies to identify potential  weapons systems into a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy.  Additionally, none of the four studies would provide a roadmap that shows  DOD’s plans and schedules for developing and acquiring the full range of  strike and enabling capabilities identified for global strike. For example,  both of the Air Force’s analyses of alternatives for prompt global strike  and next generation long-range strike will provide investment information  as a part of their final products, but that information will be limited to life- cycle costs for the preferred weapons system solution and will not address  any needed investments required for enabling capabilities. Similarly, DOD  also plans to provide investment information in its Nuclear and  Conventional Global Strike Missile Study and the Global Strike Raid  Evaluation of Alternatives. However, DOD intends to prepare cost  estimates only for capabilities required for the future ballistic missile  solutions identified in the Nuclear and Conventional Global Strike Missile  Study. Additionally, while DOD plans to review the full range of global- strike-related offensive and enabling capabilities in its Global Strike Raid  Evaluation of Alternatives study, it only intends to provide possible  investment options for offensive strike capabilities.
section_title: Portfolio Management Initiatives Could Help DOD Develop an Investment Strategy for Global Strike
paragraphs: The use of portfolio management, a best business practice, could help  DOD in developing a prioritized investment strategy for global strike.  Portfolio management is used to manage selected groupings of  investments, or portfolios, at the enterprise level to collectively align  investments with strategic goals and performance measures and provide a  sound basis to justify the commitment of resources. In our March 2007  report examining the use of the portfolio management approach to  improve DOD’s ability to make weapon system investment decisions, we  determined that although the military services fight together on the  battlefield as a joint force, they identify needs and allocate resources  separately, using fragmented decision-making processes that do not allow  for an integrated portfolio management approach like that used by  successful commercial companies. Through portfolio management, an  organization can explicitly assess the trade-offs among competing  investment opportunities in terms of their benefit, costs, and risks.  Investment decisions can then be made based on a better understanding of  what will be gained or lost through the inclusion or exclusion of certain  investments. Use of portfolios in investment planning, according to DOD,  could improve its efforts to increase interoperability, minimize  redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness.
As part of its Defense acquisition transformation, DOD is examining the  use of portfolio management and has begun two initiatives—concept  decision and capability portfolio management—within the past year that  focus on the use of portfolio management approaches to manage  capability investments in a mission area. If either is successful, these  approaches could benefit DOD’s management and tracking of its global  strike investments. The concept decision initiative is using four pilot  studies that apply portfolio management techniques and other tools to  merge information on requirements, technology maturity, and available  resources to improve the range of choices for strategic investment  decision making. If successful, the pilots would ensure that DOD is  making investment choices that balance operational and programmatic  risks, are affordable, and can be successfully developed, produced,  fielded, and maintained within planned funding levels. DOD plans to  complete each of the four pilots by May 2008. The other initiative— capability portfolio management—is to investigate approaches to consider  investment trades across previously stove-piped areas, and to better  understand the implications of investment decisions across competing  priorities. For example, senior decision makers, if the approach is  successful, would be able to determine the implications of additional  investments in prompt global strike with investments for joint command  and control.
Viewing capabilities across the entire portfolio of assets, according to the  2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, enables decision makers to  make informed choices about how to reallocate resources among  previously stove-piped programs and hence to deliver needed capabilities  to the joint force more rapidly and efficiently. DOD and U.S. Strategic  Command officials involved with the Global Strike Raid Evaluation of  Alternatives said that formulating portfolio options and making investment  trade-offs for global strike will be difficult, because few of the capabilities  are uniquely for global strike. However, DOD officials in the Office of the  Secretary of Defense we spoke with stated that managing future global  strike development as a portfolio of capabilities could result in more  effective development of this mission area. Officials who are involved with  the DOD concept decision pilot studies stated that a broader look at all  related capabilities would likely increase the extent of improvements that  could be made for the mission area when compared with a more limited  look at solutions available from a single service or functional area.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While DOD has taken a number of steps to advance its global strike  concept and assign responsibilities, its ability to implement the concept  will be limited among key stakeholders until it more clearly defines global  strike, begins incorporating global strike into joint doctrine, increases  outreach and communication activities, and involves stakeholders to a  greater extent in joint exercises and other training. Without a complete  and clearly articulated concept that is well communicated and practiced  with key stakeholders, DOD could encounter difficulties in fully  implementing its concept and building the necessary relationships for  carrying out global strike operations.
DOD has begun to identify a range of potential conventional offensive  weapons systems to provide global strike capabilities. However, without  fully assessing the requirements for various enabling capabilities that DOD  considers critical to the success of global strike operations and  coordinating its efforts to improve these capabilities with potential  offensive systems it intends to develop, DOD may not have the enabling  capabilities it needs to support new offensive capabilities, if and when  they are funded. Similarly, without fully assessing the breadth of  capabilities and technologies being developed within its FYDP that  potentially contribute to global strike, DOD does not have the complete  information it needs to track and manage its capability development  efforts and develop a prioritized long-term investment strategy for global  strike.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four  actions to strengthen DOD’s efforts to implement its global strike concept  and improve communications and mutual understanding within DOD of  the scope, range and use of capabilities, and the incidence of global strike  operations:    Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in consultation with  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the  Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop and approve a  common, universally accepted joint definition for “global strike,” and  consistently incorporate this definition in global strike documents and  joint doctrine.
Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander,  U.S. Joint Forces Command, in consultation with the Under Secretaries  of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and Policy and  the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to determine possible  changes to existing joint doctrine or development of new joint doctrine  that may be required to incorporate global strike operations, including  the terminology and discussion of training, relationships,  responsibilities, and processes for these operations, and initiate any  subsequent doctrine development activities.
Direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, in consultation with  the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretaries of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and Policy, to  establish an ongoing communications and outreach approach for  global strike to help guide DOD’s efforts to promote, educate, and  foster acceptance of the concept among the combatant commands,  military services, and other DOD organizations.
Direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, in consultation with  the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, to identify additional  opportunities where global strike can be integrated into major joint  exercises and other training activities.
We further recommend that the Secretary take the following four actions  to provide the most complete information on the range of capabilities  needed for global strike and to determine an affordable and sustainable  balance in its spending for current and future global strike investments.
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics, in consultation with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the  Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and the Secretaries of the Army,  Navy, and Air Force, to conduct a comprehensive assessment of  enabling capabilities to identify (1) any specific global strike  operational requirements and priorities, (2) when these capabilities are  needed to support future offensive strike systems, and (3) what plans  DOD has for developing and acquiring these capabilities. DOD should  link this assessment with other assessments examining potential strike  systems for global strike and those being conducted for any specific  supporting capability area to ensure that it has the most complete  information available when making decisions on future global strike  investments.
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics, in consultation with the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and  Air Force, to provide guidance on how the results of DOD studies to  identify potential strike systems for global strike will be integrated into  a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for global strike,  including a roadmap that shows the department’s plans and schedules  for developing and acquiring offensive strike and enabling capabilities.
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics, in consultation with the Director, Office of Program Analysis  and Evaluation and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to perform  a comprehensive review of all capabilities being developed within  DOD’s Future Years Defense Program to determine the extent to which  these capabilities contribute or can be leveraged for global strike and  incorporate the results of this review into the development of a  comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for global strike. The  investment strategy should be updated, as needed, to adapt to changing  circumstances.
Direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the  Deputy’s Advisory Working Group, the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and Director for Program,  Analysis, and Evaluation, to determine the appropriateness of using a  portfolio management approach for global strike to align its  investments with strategic goals and performance measures and  provide a sound basis to justify the commitment of resources, develop  a prioritized investment strategy, and manage development and  acquisition of global strike capabilities.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, signed by the Director, Joint  Advanced Concepts, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), DOD agreed with the report and  with all of its eight recommendations. The department’s comments are  discussed below and are reprinted in appendix III.
DOD concurred with our four recommendations intended to strengthen  the department’s efforts to implement its global strike concept and  improve communications and mutual understanding within DOD of the  scope, range, and use of capabilities, and the incidence of global strike  operations. Specifically, DOD concurred with our recommendations to  (1) develop and approve a common, universally accepted joint definition  for “global strike,” and consistently incorporate this definition in global  strike documents and joint doctrine; (2) determine possible changes to  existing joint doctrine or development of new joint doctrine that may be  required to incorporate global strike operations; (3) establish an ongoing  communications and outreach approach for global strike; and (4) identify  additional opportunities where global strike can be integrated into major  joint exercises and other training activities. DOD stated that the  Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, in consultation with the Under  Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  would develop a common, universally accepted concept and definition for  “global strike.” DOD also stated that global strike, as a validated and  executable concept, had not matured to the point that it is an extant  executable capability, which DOD considers a prerequisite for  incorporating global strike into joint doctrine. According to the  department, when the concept is fully developed and validated, the U.S.  Joint Forces Command will prepare the appropriate doctrine or determine  possible changes in existing doctrine. While these are positive steps, we  continue to believe that DOD can and should take additional steps now to  facilitate the development of joint doctrine. For example, DOD should  establish a time soon for completing development and reaching approval  of its global strike concept and definition and incorporating the approved  concept and definition in department documents. Reaching agreement on  the concept and definition is also important as DOD moves ahead with its  decisions on new investments in weapons systems and other capabilities  for global strike and continues implementation of the concept among key  stakeholders. In regard to our recommendations that U.S. Strategic  Command establish an ongoing communications and outreach approach  for global strike and identify additional opportunities where global strike  can be integrated into major joint exercises and other training activities,  DOD stated that the socialization of evolving concepts contributes to their  maturing and validation and that it is U.S. Strategic Command’s  responsibility, with support and assistance from the U.S. Joint Forces  Command, to establish its training requirements and objectives for global  strike. Considering the different interpretations of global strike we found  among combatant command and service officials, we continue to believe  that our recommendations, when fully implemented, would strengthen the  positive actions currently being taken by the U.S. Strategic Command to  conduct outreach and include global strike in major exercises and other  training activities; promote greater understanding, involvement, and  experience among these key stakeholders; and further DOD’s efforts to  implement the global strike concept. In taking actions to implement our  recommendations, for example, we believe that the Strategic Command  could begin by consulting with combatant command and service  stakeholders to identify opportunities to increase and enhance the  command’s current outreach activities (e.g., visits, briefings, and  education) and include additional global strike segments in major  exercises and other training activities.
DOD also concurred with our four recommendations intended to provide  more complete information on the range of capabilities needed for global  strike and to determine an affordable and sustainable balance in its  spending for current and future global strike investments. Specifically,  DOD concurred with our recommendations to (1) conduct a  comprehensive assessment of enabling capabilities (intelligence collection  and dissemination, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and  control, communications, and battlefield damage assessment); (2) provide  guidance on how the results of its studies to identify potential strike  systems for global strike would be integrated into a comprehensive  prioritized investment strategy for global strike; (3) perform a  comprehensive review of all capabilities being developed within DOD’s  FYDP to determine the extent to which these capabilities contribute or  can be leveraged for global strike; and (4) determine the appropriateness  of using a portfolio management approach for global strike. DOD’s  responses to our recommendations largely focus on conventional prompt  global strike, which is a subset of the broader global strike mission area. In  regard to enabling capabilities, DOD stated that its departmentwide  capability portfolio management provides the means to optimize  capabilities through the integration, coordination, and synchronization of  department investments. Managers of the individual capability portfolios  are responsible for identifying those aspects of their portfolios that are  connected to more than one portfolio because of the breadth and depth of  mission areas such as prompt global strike. According to DOD, as part of  its comprehensive assessment for conventional prompt global strike, it  intends to include ongoing and follow-on studies, such as the Air Force-led  prompt global strike analysis of alternatives, in identifying operational  requirements and priorities to determine when they are needed to support  development of future offensive strike systems. DOD also stated that it  plans to use its fiscal year 2008 Defense-wide Research, Development,  Testing, and Evaluation account for prompt global strike to provide  limited funding for mission-enabling capabilities. In regard to guidance for  integrating the results of its long-term global strike studies, DOD stated  that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics will provide guidance for developing a comprehensive prioritized  investment strategy and roadmap. It stated that for conventional prompt  global strike in fiscal year 2008 the department will pursue an integrated  approach in crafting this investment strategy, which will emphasize the  application of ongoing and follow-on studies, including the Air Force-led  prompt global strike analysis of alternatives and the congressionally- mandated National Research Council’s Committee on Conventional  Prompt Global Strike Capability report provided by the National Academy  of Sciences, and reference the evolving operational requirements and  constraints described by U.S. Strategic Command and validated by the  Joint Staff. DOD stated that its effort will also emphasize full utilization  and collaboration with separately funded programs throughout DOD and  the Department of Energy that potentially support conventional prompt  global strike and cross-service and agency transparency and collaboration  of all technology and experimentation matters. Concerning our  recommendation to identify FYDP capabilities that could contribute or be  leveraged for global strike, DOD stated that the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics would lead a  comprehensive, capability-based review and prioritization of the global  strike investment strategy within the FYDP. According to DOD, the goal of  the FYDP for fiscal years 2008 through 2013 is to apply, advance, and  demonstrate engineering for the selection and development of material  solutions for the conventional prompt global strike mission area so that  individual service acquisition programs can be funded and executed. DOD  stated that it plans to submit a conventional prompt global strike research  and development testing plan to Congress in April 2008, as required by the  fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. This plan will  describe the strategy and investment needed over the next 5 years to  develop and field full-mission prototypes. And lastly, in regard to our  recommendation on portfolio management, DOD stated that with the  creation of the Defense-wide Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation  program element for prompt global strike in the President’s 2009 budget, a  portfolio management approach is being initiated. DOD further stated that  the department fully supports using a portfolio management approach for  conventional prompt global strike to align its investments with strategic  goals and performance measures and provide a sound basis to justify the  commitment of resources. The specific actions that DOD described in its  comments for these four recommendations are positive steps in providing  greater focus, transparency, and accountability for the department’s  efforts to increase global strike capabilities.
We are sending electronic copies of this report to interested congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;  and the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. We will also make  electronic copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will  be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions, please contact me at  (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Other major contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify whether the Department of Defense (DOD) has clearly defined  and instilled a common understanding and approach to its global strike  mission, we reviewed relevant global strike concept documents, studies,  reports, briefings, and other pertinent documents to determine the scope,  capabilities, range of operations, types of targets, doctrine, and other  factors that make up the global strike concept and identify the definitions  that are used throughout DOD to define the term “global strike.” For  example, we reviewed the April 2006 Global Strike Joint Capabilities  Document, a key document that identifies the set of capabilities required  across all functional areas to accomplish the global strike mission, to  obtain information on current global strike capabilities and shortfalls.  Additionally, we reviewed various DOD guidance documents to identify  assigned roles and responsibilities for global strike, including concept  development, implementation, and operations. We reviewed, for instance,  the most recent 2006 Unified Command Plan, which establishes the  missions and responsibilities, geographic areas of responsibilities, and  functions for the commanders of the combatant commands, to identify the  roles and responsibilities for the U.S. Strategic Command and the  respective geographic combatant commands related to the global strike  operations. We also met with officials from the Office of the Secretary of  Defense; U.S. Joint Forces Command; U.S. Central Command; U.S. Special  Operations Command; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Strategic Command;  the Air Force, Army, and Navy headquarters and commands; and Defense  Threat Reduction Agency to obtain information on various global strike  areas such as roles and responsibilities, the global strike concept and its  implementation, and joint doctrine. With these officials, particularly the  geographic combatant commands, we also discussed their participation  and inputs into relevant global strike exercises, training, and relative  educational activities and with communication strategy used by the U.S.  Strategic Command to explain and promote understanding of global strike  operations and its mission responsibilities. Additionally, we met with  officials from the U.S. Strategic Command to discuss challenges faced by  the command and DOD in developing and implementing the global strike  concept and communicating the concept to the combatant commands and  other relevant entities within DOD.
To assess the extent to which DOD has assessed and developed  capabilities needed for global strike, we reviewed the study plans,  supporting and relevant documentation, and final reports, if available, for  DOD’s four principal global strike assessments—Next Generation Long- Range Strike Analysis of Alternatives; Nuclear and Conventional Global  Strike Missile Study; Prompt Global Strike Analysis of Alternatives; and  Global Strike Raid Evaluation of Alternatives—to identify potential  conventional offensive strike weapons systems it may need in the near,  mid, and long term. We discussed these assessments with officials at the  Air Combat Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Air Force  headquarters, Air Force Space Command, Joint Staff, and other lead and  supporting organizations that were participants or had knowledge about  the assessments. In discussing the ongoing Prompt Global Strike Analysis  of Alternatives, for example, with officials at the Air Force Space  Command at Colorado Springs, Colorado, we obtained documentation of  the assessment, including its methodology, scope, assumptions, and  schedule, as well as the organizations involved and the status of work to  date. For each of the four major studies, we also examined the extent to  which DOD has considered the requirements for enabling capabilities,  such as intelligence and command and control, and their importance in  achieving desired mission effectiveness. We reviewed studies and  assessments on enabling capabilities from various organizations such as  RAND Corporation, the Air Force, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the  Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and U.S. Strategic Command, and  discussed the information with officials from each of these organizations.  We also reviewed our prior work, including our recent report on DOD’s  approach to managing requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance capabilities, to determine how DOD has coordinated and  integrated its efforts to improve enabling capabilities. Additionally, we  reviewed the Defense Science Board’s 2004 report on Future Strategic  Strike Forces to obtain their assessment of enabling capabilities  requirements and recommendations for future strategic strike systems. In  our discussions with officials at various combatant commands—such as  U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the Defense Intelligence  Agency, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and military services—we  obtained information on the roles and requirements for enabling  capabilities in support of global strike systems and availability and  shortfalls for these capabilities.
To assess the extent to which DOD has identified the funding  requirements and developed an investment strategy for acquiring new  global strike capabilities, we obtained and analyzed information and  interviewed officials within the Office of Secretary of Defense, including  the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the Defense Science Board,  the Hypersonics Joint Technology Office, and the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, and U.S. Strategic Command. We documented DOD’s research and  development efforts with possible application to global strike and  investment information provided in ongoing and completed studies on  potential global strike weapons systems. Additionally, we reviewed  reports and studies and interviewed officials at the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  the Defense Science Board, the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and GAO to determine how DOD  initiatives, particularly for portfolio management, could be used to manage  global strike investments. We also obtained information on DOD’s efforts  to identify funding requirements and develop an investment strategy for  global strike. We conducted an analysis of the Future Years Defense  Program (FYDP) that supports the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget  submission to Congress to determine the range of programs, projects, and  activities within various research and development program elements in  the FYDP that could have potential application for improved conventional  global-strike-related capabilities. To establish criteria and create a list of  key terms to use in conducting our assessment, we reviewed the  descriptions, terms, and characteristics used by DOD in its principal  documents describing global strike characteristics, including the Global  Strike Joint Capabilities Document, Global Strike Joint Integrating  Concept, and Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, and  information obtained in discussions with knowledgeable DOD, combatant  command, defense agency, and service officials. We then reviewed  supporting research and development budget submission documents from  all the military services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, two  defense agencies, and Special Operations Command. We also discussed  our analysis with an official from DOD’s Office of Program Analysis and  Evaluation, who generally concurred that our methodology and results  were sound and reasonable. Other global strike assessments of the FYDP  programs, projects, and activities may determine different criteria and  methodologies to use and, hence, may yield different results. Our  assessment also does not include those programs, projects, and activities  in any classified program elements or data from nuclear systems  development. It also includes some, but not all, nonkinetic capabilities that  could contribute to improving global strike.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2006 to February  2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. In conducting our work, we contacted officials at several DOD  organizations and agencies; joint combatant and service commands; and  think-tank organizations. Table 3 shows the organizations and offices we  contacted during our review.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO’s Analysis of DOD’s Research and Development Efforts for Global Strike in Its Future Years Defense Program
paragraphs: We conducted an analysis of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)  that supports the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget submission to  Congress to determine the range of programs, projects, and activities  within various research and development program elements in the FYDP  that could have potential application for improved conventional global- strike-related capabilities. We established criteria and a list of key terms to  use in our assessment from a review of descriptions, terms, and  characteristics used by the Department of Defense (DOD) in its principal  global strike documents, including the Global Strike Joint Capabilities  Document and Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, and  information obtained in discussions with DOD officials. While our  methodology and results were discussed with a DOD Office of Program  Analysis and Evaluation official and were determined to be reasonable and  relevant, other global strike assessments of the FYDP programs, projects,  and activities may determine different criteria and methodologies to use  and therefore, may yield different results. Additionally, our assessment  does not include those programs, projects, and activities in any classified  program elements or data from nuclear systems development. It also  includes some, but not all, nonkinetic capabilities that could contribute to  improving global strike.
Our analysis of research and development budget submission documents  from a number of DOD organizations identified 94 FYDP program  elements in the fiscal year 2008 budget request related to global strike.  The 94 FYDP program elements provide funding for 135 programs,  projects, and activities that are developing conventional offensive strike  and enabling capabilities that could contribute to improved global strike  capabilities. Of the 135 programs, projects, and activities identified in our  analysis:    85 would improve offensive capabilities, including efforts to improve  kinetic weapons, nonkinetic weapons, and propulsion systems;    41 would improve enabling capabilities such as (1) command, control,  communications, and computers and (2) surveillance and  reconnaissance systems; and    9 would improve both offensive and enabling capabilities such as  Predator development.
Table 3 summarizes the results of our analysis to identify global strike and  related development by category and type of offensive, enabling, or  multiple capabilities in DOD’s FYDP.
Of the 135 programs, projects, and activities, we determined that 13, such  as the Air Force’s common aero vehicle, were exclusively for research and  development of global strike capabilities. The remaining 122 programs,  projects, and activities support research and development of offensive and  enabling capabilities that were not specifically for global strike but had  potential application for global strike operations.
In conducting our analysis, we reviewed the research and development  budget submissions from the Departments of the Air Force, Navy, and  Army; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Defense Advanced Research  Projects Agency; Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and U.S. Special  Operations Command. Figure 2 shows that the majority (88) of the 135  research and development programs, projects, and activities we identified  were in the budgets of the services, with the Department of the Air Force  budget having the largest number (48) among the three services. The  remaining 47 programs, projects, and activities were in the budgets of the  Defense Threat ReductionAgency (5); Special Operations Command (6);  Office of the Secretary of Defense (17); and Defense Advanced Research  Projects Agency (19).
The programs, projects, and activities we identified in our analysis are  largely directed at developing capabilities for a wide range of military  needs other than just global strike and their associated funding, and  therefore should not be considered when determining DOD’s total  spending for global strike. However, these efforts reflect substantial near- term investments of several billions of dollars in capabilities that could  potentially be used for future global strike operations. For example, DOD  plans to spend about $4.8 billion then-year dollars in fiscal years 2007  through 2009 for the 29 weapon platforms programs, projects, and  activities we identified, and about $2.6 billion for other offensive  capabilities including kinetic weapons, nonkinetic weapons, and  propulsion system programs, projects, and activities over the same period.  Additionally, DOD plans to spend about $3.0 billion then-year dollars in  fiscal years 2007 through 2009 for the 41 programs, projects, and activities  we identified to improve enabling capabilities. And lastly, DOD plans to  spend about $0.7 billion then-year dollars for the 9 programs, projects, and  activities included in our analysis for multiple capabilities over the period.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Assistant  Director; Lisa M. Canini; Grace A. Coleman; David G. Hubbell;  Jason E. Porter, Sr.; and Mark J. Wielgoszynski, Analyst-in-Charge, made  key contributions to this report.
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