Overstay Enforcement: Additional Actions Needed to Assess DHS's Data and Improve Planning for a Biometric Air Exit Program
Published: 2013-07-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a temporary basis either with or without a visa. Overstays are individuals who were admitted legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission. DHS has primary responsibility for identifying and taking enforcement action to address overstays. In April 2011, GAO reported on DHS's actions to identify and address overstays and made recommendations to strengthen these processes. DHS concurred and has taken or is taking steps to address them. DHS has also reported taking further actions to address overstays.
GAO was asked to review DHS's progress since April 2011. This report addresses (1) DHS's efforts to review its records to identify potential overstays, (2) the extent to which DHS's changes in its systems or processes have improved data on potential overstays and DHS's ability to report overstay rates, and (3) the extent to which DHS has made progress toward establishing a biometric exit system. GAO analyzed DHS overstay data and documents-- such as those related to the overstay identification processes and biometric exit plans--and interviewed relevant DHS officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since April 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken action to address a backlog of potential overstay records that GAO previously identified. Specifically, DHS reviewed such records to identify national security and public safety threats, but unmatched arrival records--those without corresponding departure records--remain in DHS's system. GAO had previously reported that, as of January 2011, DHS had a backlog of 1.6 million unmatched arrival records that had not been reviewed through automated or manual processes. DHS tracks arrivals and departures and closes records for individuals with matching arrival and departure records. Unmatched arrival records indicate that the individual is a potential overstay. In 2011, DHS reviewed this backlog of 1.6 million records, closed about 863,000 records, and removed them from the backlog. As new unmatched arrival records have accrued, DHS has continued to review all of these new records for national security and public safety concerns. As of June 2013, DHS's unmatched arrival records totaled more than 1 million.
DHS has actions completed and under way to improve data on potential overstays and report overstay rates, but the effect of these improvements is not yet known. Further, DHS continues to face challenges in reporting reliable overstay rates. DHS has streamlined connections among databases used to identify potential overstays. However, these improvements do not address some underlying data quality issues, such as missing land departure data. Federal law requires DHS to report overstay estimates, but DHS or its predecessor has not regularly done so since 1994. In April 2011, GAO reported that DHS officials said that they have not reported overstay rates because DHS has not had sufficient confidence in the quality of its overstay data. In February 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security testified that DHS plans to report overstay rates by December 2013. However, DHS has not assessed or documented improvements in the reliability of data used to develop overstay estimates, in accordance with federal internal control standards. Without such a documented assessment to ensure the reliability of these data, decision makers would not have the information needed to use these data for policy-making purposes.
Developing and implementing a biometric exit capability to collect biometric data, such as fingerprints, which is required by federal law, has been a long-standing challenge for DHS. In May 2012, DHS internally reported recommendations to support the planning for a biometric exit capability at airports--DHS's priority for biometric exit capabilities--that could also be implemented at seaports in the future; however, as of June 2013, DHS's planning did not address a biometric exit capability at land ports of entry. DHS officials stated that the department's goal is to develop information and report to Congress about the benefits and costs of biometric air exit options before the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle. Standard practices for project management state that time frames should be documented as part of the planning process; however, DHS has a high-level plan for a biometric air exit capability, and it does not clearly define the steps, time frames, and milestones needed to develop and implement an evaluation framework, as recommended in DHS's May 2012 report. Without robust planning that includes time frames and milestones, DHS does not have reasonable assurance that it will meet its time frame for developing and implementing an evaluation framework.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a  temporary basis either with a visa or, in some cases, as visitors who were  allowed to enter without a visa. Overstays are individuals who were  admitted into the country legally on a temporary basis but then  overstayed their authorized periods of admission. We have previously  reported that most overstays are likely motivated by economic  opportunities to stay in the United States beyond their authorized periods  of admission.concerns—for example, 5 of the 19 September 11, 2001, hijackers were  overstays.
However, overstays could pose homeland security  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has primary responsibility  for identifying and taking enforcement action to address overstays. Within  DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is tasked with, among  other duties, inspecting all people applying for entry to the United States  to determine their admissibility to the country and screening Visa Waiver  Program applicants to determine their eligibility to travel to the United  States under the program. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement  (ICE) is the lead agency for enforcing immigration law in the interior of the  United States and is primarily responsible for overstay enforcement.  Within ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) directorate, the  Overstay Analysis Unit is responsible for reviewing records of potential  overstays and providing the results of these reviews to ICE’s  Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU), which is  responsible for initiating overstay investigations. Since 2004, DHS has  collected biometric data, such as fingerprints, from travelers as part of an  effort to comply with legislative requirements to track nonimmigrants’  entry into and exit from the United States. Biometric Identity Management (OBIM), within DHS’s National Protection  and Programs Directorate, manages the Arrival and Departure  Information System (ADIS), which tracks and matches arrival and  departure records for the purpose of identifying potential overstays, and  the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), which maintains  biometric information that DHS collects from nonimmigrants upon their  entry into the United States.
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1365a, 1365b.
In April 2011, we reported on DHS’s actions to identify and take actions to  address overstays and made recommendations to the department to  strengthen those efforts. DHS concurred with our recommendations and  has taken or is taking steps to address them, as discussed later in this  report. In addition, we have issued a number of reports since 2004 on  DHS’s collection of biometric data from nonimmigrants upon their entry  into the United States, as well as the department’s efforts to collect  biometric data to track their exit from the country. Relying on some of this  work conducted from 2007 through 2010, we made recommendations to  DHS to improve planning for and implementation of a biometric exit  system. DHS generally concurred with our recommendations in these  reports and has taken action to address a number of them, as also  discussed later in this report. In addition to taking actions in response to  the recommendations we have made, since April 2011, DHS has reported  taking other actions to strengthen its processes for identifying and taking  enforcement action against overstays, such as enhancing its use of  biographic data to identify overstays and developing plans to capture  biometric data as part of departure records to comply with federal law.
You asked us to review actions taken by DHS to identify and address  potential overstays since our April 2011 report. This report addresses   (1) DHS’s efforts to review records that are maintained in its databases to  identify potential overstays, (2) the extent to which DHS’s changes in its  systems or processes have improved data on potential overstays and  DHS’s ability to report overstay rates, and (3) the extent to which DHS  has made progress in developing and implementing a biometric exit  system.
To address the first objective, we analyzed documentation on DHS’s  processes to review records of potential overstays and improve overstay  identification, such as ICE’s standard operating procedures for reviewing  records of potential overstays. Specifically, we analyzed the results of  DHS’s 2011 review of a backlog of records of potential overstays that we  identified and reported on in April 2011. We also analyzed the 1.2 million  records from ADIS, as of November 2012, that represent data on  individuals for whom ADIS has a record of arrival but for whom DHS has  no record of departure (unmatched arrival records) at that time. This was  the most recent date for which DHS had compiled these records at the  time we began our review. To analyze the reliability of these data on the  prior backlog, as well as DHS’s unmatched arrival records as of  November 2012, we reviewed documentation regarding the databases  used to collect these data and interviewed DHS officials familiar with the  data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our  purposes.
To address the second objective, we analyzed documentation on  changes to DHS component agency systems, such as ADIS, to enhance  the use of biographic information to identify overstays, and we  interviewed DHS officials to discuss the expected results of these  changes. We also analyzed agreements between the United States and  Canada to exchange entry and exit data as part of the Beyond the Border  initiative, through which entry into one country is treated as exit from the  other, and interviewed DHS and Canada Border Services Agency officials  responsible for overseeing the initiative. We also collected all available  data on the results of the Beyond the Border pilot phase, which occurred  from September 30, 2012, through January 15, 2013. To analyze the  reliability of these data, we reviewed documentation related to the  exchange of these data and interviewed OBIM, CBP, and DHS Office of  Policy officials familiar with the data. We determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also conducted interviews with  ICE and DHS Office of Policy officials regarding the department’s plans to  calculate and report overstay rates using the data available in its  component agency systems and evaluated those plans based on  statutory requirements and standards for internal control. We also evaluated those plans against guidance for designing evaluations and  assessing the reliability of computer-processed data.
To address the third objective, we reviewed statutory requirements for a  biometric exit system and analyzed DHS documents, including a May  2012 report on the status of efforts to implement biometric exit capabilities  at airports that was based on analysis that DHS’s Science and  Technology Directorate (S&T) conducted. We compared the status of  DHS’s efforts against statutory requirements and standard practices for  project management. S&T officials regarding DHS’s plans for addressing recommendations in  the department’s May 2012 report and other ongoing efforts to develop a  biometric exit system.
We also interviewed DHS Office of Policy and  We conducted this performance audit from November 2012 to July 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Process for Gaining Admission to the United States
paragraphs: Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge  (PMBOK® Guide), Fifth Edition, (Newton Square, PA: 2013).
United States. Second, those not eligible for the Visa Waiver Program  and not otherwise exempt from the visa requirement must obtain a visa  from a U.S. consular office overseas. Upon arriving at a port of entry,  nonimmigrants must undergo inspection by CBP officers, who determine  whether or not they may be admitted into the United States. If CBP  determines a nonimmigrant is admissible, he or she is granted an  authorized period of admission. This period may be for a specific length of  time, which CBP designates by assigning a specific “admit until” date, or  for as long as the nonimmigrant maintains a particular status. For  example, in general, foreign students are eligible to remain in the United  States for “duration of status,” meaning as long as they are enrolled in  and attending a qualified education program or engaging in authorized  practical training following completion of studies.
An overstay is a nonimmigrant who is legally admitted to the United  States for an authorized period but remains in the country illegally after  that period expired without obtaining an extension of stay or a change of  status or meeting other specific conditions, such as claiming asylum.  This includes a nonimmigrant admitted for duration of status who fails to  maintain that status, such as a student who is no longer pursuing a full  course of study at an approved educational institution or engaging in  authorized practical training following completion of studies. In-country  overstays refer to nonimmigrants who have exceeded their authorized  periods of admission and remain in the United States without lawful  status, while out-of-country overstays refer to individuals who have  departed the United States but who, on the basis of arrival and departure  information, stayed beyond their authorized periods of admission. Federal  law establishes consequences for foreign nationals who overstay their  authorized periods of admission.
section_title: Federal Agencies’ Roles and Responsibilities Related to Overstay Identification and Enforcement
paragraphs: Three DHS components and offices—CBP, ICE, and OBIM—are primarily  responsible for taking action to identify and address overstays, as shown  in table 1. In addition, the Department of State is responsible for ensuring  that individuals who have previously overstayed and are ineligible for a  visa do not receive one when applying for a visa to the United States at  consular offices overseas.
Federal agencies use various databases to determine whether  nonimmigrants have potentially overstayed their authorized periods of  admission to the United States. As shown in table 2, several databases,  in particular, provide key information on foreign nationals’ arrival in and  departure from the United States, foreign nationals’ applications to  change status once in the United States, and the status of foreign  students.
ICE primarily analyzes biographic entry and exit data collected at land,  air, and sea ports of entry to identify potential overstays. ICE identifies  both in-country and out-of-country overstays by analyzing and comparing  biographic data maintained in ADIS against information in other  databases to find matches that demonstrate that a nonimmigrant may  have, for instance, departed the country or filed an application to change  status and thus is not an overstay. In particular, ICE analysts use ADIS to  identify arrival records for which the subject’s admit until date has passed  and for whom DHS does not have a corresponding departure record  (unmatched arrival records), which may indicate that the subject of the  record is an in-country overstay. For these records of potential  overstays, ICE analysts conduct automated searches, such as searching  for immigration benefit application information through U.S. Citizenship  and Immigration Services. ICE analysts also determine whether the  subject of the record meets ICE’s overstay enforcement priorities based  on national security and public safety criteria. ICE prioritizes investigation  of overstay leads based on the perceived risk each lead is likely to pose  to national security and public safety as determined by threat analysis. In  order to prioritize investigation of overstay leads, ICE uses an automated  system to assign each overstay lead a priority ranking based on threat  intelligence information. For the records that meet ICE’s overstay  enforcement priorities, ICE analysts then conduct manual searches of  other databases to determine, for example, if the individual applied for  refugee or asylum status. For these priority records, if ICE analysts are  unable to identify evidence of a departure or a change in status, they  search for the nonimmigrant’s current U.S. address, and if they are able  to identify an address, they send the lead to the relevant ICE HSI field  office for investigation.
For cases in which ICE’s analysis shows that a nonimmigrant visa holder  departed the United States after the admit until date—an out-of-country  overstay—and the departure was more than 90 days after the  nonimmigrant’s authorized period of admission expired, ICE creates a  lookout that CBP officers at ports of entry and State Department officials  at overseas consulates can access to determine whether that  nonimmigrant is eligible for readmission at ports of entry or can receive a  new visa upon application at a U.S. consulate.
section_title: Comprehensive Biometric Entry and Exit System
paragraphs: Beginning in 1996, federal law has required the implementation of an  integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals. Additionally,  the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management  Improvement Act of 2000 required implementation of an integrated entry  and exit data system for foreign nationals that would provide access to  and integrate foreign national arrival and departure data that are  authorized or required to be created or collected under law and are in an  electronic format in certain databases, such as those used at ports of  entry and consular offices.
In 2003, DHS initiated the US-VISIT program  to develop a comprehensive entry and exit system to collect biometric  data from aliens traveling through United States ports of entry. In 2004,  US-VISIT initiated the first step of this program by collecting biometric  data on aliens entering the United States at 115 airports and 14 sea  ports. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004  required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to  accelerate full implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit  data system that matches available information provided by foreign  nationals upon their arrival in and departure from the United States.
Since 2004, we have issued a number of reports on DHS’s efforts to  implement a biometric entry and exit system. For example, in February  and August 2007, we found that DHS had not adequately defined and  justified its proposed expenditures for exit pilots and demonstration  projects and that it had not developed a complete schedule for biometric   In September 2008, we further reported that DHS  exit implementation. was unlikely to meet its timeline for implementing an air exit system with  biometric indicators, such as fingerprints, by July 1, 2009, because of  several unresolved issues, such as opposition to the department’s  published plan by the airline industry. In November 2009, we found that  DHS had not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing,  and tracking the work that needed to be accomplished to deliver a   In our prior reports, we have made  comprehensive exit solution.recommendations intended to help ensure that biometric exit was  planned, designed, developed, and implemented in an effective and  efficient manner. DHS generally agreed with our recommendations. DHS  has implemented or taken actions to implement some of these  recommendations; however, DHS has not addressed others. For  example, in March 2012, DHS reported that the US-VISIT office was  adopting procedures to comply with the nine scheduling practices we  recommended in our November 2009 report and has conducted training  on our scheduling methodology. However, DHS did not implement our  February 2007 recommendations to (1) report to Congress on US-VISIT  program risks associated with not fully satisfying legislative conditions,  such as compliance with Office of Management and Budget capital  planning and investment control guidance, and (2) limit planned  expenditures for program management-related activities until such  investments are economically justified and have well-defined plans.
section_title: DHS Continually Reviews Records of Potential Overstays, but a Significant Number of Unmatched Arrival Records Remain
subsections: section_title: DHS Reviewed a Backlog of 1.6 Million Records of Potential Overstays in 2011
paragraphs: DHS reviewed a backlog of records of potential overstays that we   DHS uses ADIS to match departure  previously identified in April 2011.records to arrival records and subsequently close records for individuals  with matching arrival and departure records because either (1) the  individual departed prior to the end of his or her authorized period of  admission and is therefore not an overstay, or (2) the individual departed  after the end of his or her authorized period of admission and is therefore  an out-of-country overstay. Unmatched arrival records—those records in  ADIS that do not have corresponding departure records—remain open  and indicate that those individuals are potential in-country overstays. In  April 2011, we reported that, as of January 2011, ADIS contained a  backlog of 1.6 million unmatched arrival records that DHS had not  reviewed through automated or manual processes. This backlog included  prior nonpriority overstay leads that had not been reviewed, nonpriority  leads that continued to accrue on a daily basis, and leads generated in  error as a result of CBP system changes. DHS officials attributed this  backlog to resource constraints and US-VISIT’s focus on reviewing leads  that met ICE’s priorities.
In the summer of 2011, DHS completed a review of these 1.6 million  records against various national security and law enforcement databases  to determine if the subjects of these records had already left the United  States and to help identify if the subjects posed any potential national  security or public safety threats. As a result, DHS closed approximately  863,000 records for individuals who had departed, were in status, or had  adjusted status, and removed them from the backlog by conducting  additional automated checks. Second, DHS reviewed the remaining  757,000 records against national security and law enforcement databases  to identify potential national security or public safety threats. As part of  this national security and public safety review, DHS also reviewed  approximately 82,000 additional records identified by CTCEU that were  unresolved or had not yet undergone full review because they did not  meet ICE’s enforcement priorities (a total of approximately 839,000  combined records). As a result of these reviews, DHS reprioritized 1,901  of the 839,000 records because the subjects of the records could pose  national security or public safety concerns and provided them to CTCEU  for further review and consideration for enforcement action. Table 3  describes how CTCEU resolved these leads.
According to our analysis of DHS documentation, since completing this  review of the backlog of records of potential overstays in the summer of  2011, as new records have accrued, DHS has continued to review all  records of potential overstays through national security and law  enforcement databases to identify potential threats, regardless of whether  the subjects of the records meet ICE’s priorities for enforcement action.  DHS also regularly rereviews these records using various national  security and law enforcement databases to identify new information on  individuals who were not previously identified as threats.
ICE’s continual review of records of potential overstays enables it to  prioritize and investigate individuals who pose a potential national security  or public safety threat; however, most records of potential overstays do  not result in enforcement action because they do not meet HSI’s overstay  enforcement priorities. CTCEU provides those records that do not meet  HSI’s overstay enforcement priorities for possible investigation to ICE’s  ERO for review to determine if the subjects of these records could be  within the scope of one of ERO’s programs. For example, ERO oversees  the Criminal Alien Program, which seeks to identify, arrest, and remove  priority aliens who are incarcerated within federal, state, and local prisons  and jails. According to ERO officials, upon receiving records from  CTCEU, ERO may also determine through this program that the subject  of the record has committed a crime and is incarcerated or at large. In  fiscal years 2011 and 2012, the number of nonpriority records of potential  overstays sent to ERO (more than 420,000) was almost three times the  number of priority records that CTCEU reviewed for potential homeland  security investigations (about 147,000) (see app. I for additional data on  ICE’s enforcement actions). According to ERO officials, ERO does not  initiate investigations of records of potential overstays it receives unless  there is evidence at the time ERO receives the record that the subject  meets ERO’s priorities. ERO officials stated that few records of potential  overstays have met ERO’s priorities.
In April 2011, we found that ICE was assessing funding and resources  needed to shift more overstay enforcement responsibilities to ERO, but  ICE had not established a time frame for completing that assessment. We  recommended that ICE establish a target time frame for completing the  assessment and use the results to inform its decision on whether to  assign ERO additional responsibility for overstay enforcement. DHS  concurred with our recommendation and took action to address it. In June  2011, ICE conducted a pilot study and completed its assessment later  that year in which it concluded that significant resources would be  required to establish ERO teams dedicated to enforcement against  overstays. As a result, ICE did not change ERO’s overstay enforcement  responsibilities.
section_title: DHS Has More than 1 Million Unmatched Arrival Records That Do Not Meet Enforcement Priorities
paragraphs: Since DHS conducted its review of the previous backlog in 2011,  additional unmatched arrival records have accrued, and as of June 2013,  DHS has more than 1 million unmatched arrival records in ADIS (that is,  arrival records for which ADIS does not have a record of departure or  status change), which do not meet ICE’s enforcement priorities. Some of  these individuals are overstays, while others have either departed or  changed immigration status without an ADIS record of their departure or  status change. For example, the individual may have departed via a land  port of entry without providing a record of departure or the individual may  have applied for immigration benefits using a different name that does not  match the ADIS arrival record. DHS conducts ongoing automated reviews  of these records to rule out potential national security or public safety  threats should updated information become available. In certain  circumstances, such as when a record of a potential overstay meets one  of ICE’s enforcement priorities, DHS also manually searches additional  databases to locate evidence of a departure or change of status.  However, DHS’s automated reviews have not produced evidence that the  subjects of these 1 million unmatched arrival records meet its  enforcement priorities. Thus, DHS has not manually reviewed them and  does not plan to take enforcement action against these individuals. Until  such evidence becomes available, DHS will continue to maintain this set  of unmatched records.
In November 2012, DHS’s set of unmatched arrival records not manually  reviewed totaled approximately 1.2 million records, and we analyzed data  on these records to assess trends by admission class (e.g., tourist or  temporary agricultural worker), mode of travel (i.e., air, land, or sea), and  time elapsed since the travelers were expected to leave the country.  Our analysis of the records by admission class shows that 44 percent of  the unmatched arrival records were nonimmigrants who traveled to the  United States on a tourist visa, while 43 percent were tourists admitted to  the country under the Visa Waiver Program. Figure 1 presents our  analysis of unmatched arrival records by admission class.
With regard to mode of travel, our analysis of the 1.2 million unmatched  arrival records from November 2012 indicates that most of the records  were for air arrivals (64 percent), and roughly one-third were for land  arrivals (32 percent). The remaining 4 percent of the records were for  arrivals by sea. Figure 2 presents the results of this analysis. DHS has  reported a similar distribution for modes of travel for nonimmigrants  arriving in fiscal years 2010 and 2011—roughly one-third by land and two- thirds by other modes, which would include air and sea arrivals.
We also analyzed the records to assess the amount of time that has  elapsed since travelers were expected to depart the country, based on  travelers’ admit until date. Figure 3 presents our analysis of the amount of  time elapsed, as of November 2012, since the admit until date. The  average amount of time elapsed for the unmatched arrival records we  analyzed was 2.7 years. Our analysis indicates that the majority of  unmatched arrival records correspond to travelers who were expected to  depart within the past 2 years. According to DHS officials, this may reflect  that overstays are more likely to depart the United States as time  proceeds. For example, the overstays may choose to return to their  countries of origin.
section_title: DHS Has Actions Completed and Under Way to Improve Data to Identify Potential Overstays, but the Effect of These Improvements Is Not Yet Known
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Begun Collecting Additional Data and Improved Sharing of Data among Its Databases to Help Identify Potential Overstays
paragraphs: Since April 2011, DHS has taken various actions to improve its data on  potential overstays. In April 2011, we found that DHS’s efforts to identify  and report on overstays were hindered by unreliable data, and we  identified various challenges to DHS’s efforts to identify potential  overstays, including the incomplete collection of departure data from  nonimmigrants at ports of entry, particularly land ports of entry, and the  lack of mechanisms for assessing the quality of leads sent to HSI field  offices for investigation. Since that time, DHS has taken action to  strengthen its processes for reviewing records to identify potential  overstays, including (1) streamlining connections among DHS databases  used to identify potential overstays and (2) collecting information from the  Canadian government about those exiting the United States and entering  Canada through northern land ports of entry.
First, DHS has taken steps to improve connections among its component  agencies’ databases used to identify potential overstays and reduce the  need for manual exchanges of data. For example:  In August 2012, DHS enhanced data sharing between ADIS and a  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services database, the Computer- Linked Application Information Management System 3 (CLAIMS), to  enable automatic transfers of immigration status or benefits  information from CLAIMS to ADIS. For example, this enhancement  has enabled CLAIMS to automatically provide data to ADIS when an  individual files a work authorization application form with U.S.  Citizenship and Immigration Services, and CLAIMS also provides data  to ADIS daily on whether an application is pending, approved, or  denied.  In August 2012, DHS enhanced data sharing between ADIS and  IDENT. This improved connection provides additional data to ADIS to  improve the matching process based on fingerprint identification. For  example, when an individual provides a fingerprint as part of an  application for immigration benefits from U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services or a visa from the State Department, or when  apprehended by law enforcement, IDENT now sends identity  information, including a fingerprint identification number, for that  individual to ADIS. This additional source of data is intended to help  allow ADIS to more effectively match the individual’s entry record with  a change of status, thereby closing out more unmatched arrival  records.
Beginning in April 2013, ICE’s Student and Exchange Visitor  Information System (SEVIS) began automatically sending data to  ADIS on a daily basis, allowing ADIS to review SEVIS records against  departure records and determine whether student visa holders who  have ended their course of study departed in accordance with the  terms of their stay. Prior to this date, DHS manually transferred data  from SEVIS to ADIS on a weekly basis. According to DHS officials,  these exchanges were unreliable because they did not consistently  include all SEVIS data—particularly data on “no show” students who  failed to begin their approved course of study within 30 days of being  admitted into the United States.
Also in April 2013, DHS automated the exchange of records of  potential overstays between ADIS and CBP’s Automated Targeting  System (ATS), a CBP system used to improve the collection, use,  analysis, and dissemination of information on terrorism and other  violations of United States laws. This exchange is intended to allow  DHS to more efficiently (1) transfer data between the systems for the  purpose of identifying national security and public safety concerns,  and (2) use matching algorithms in ATS that differ from those in ADIS  to close additional records for individuals who departed.
Second, DHS is implementing the Beyond the Border initiative to collect  additional data to strengthen the identification of potential overstays. In  October 2012, DHS and the Canada Border Services Agency began  exchanging entry data on travelers crossing the border at selected land  ports of entry. Because an entry into Canada constitutes a departure from  the United States, DHS will be able to use Canadian entry data as proxies  for U.S. departure records. We found in April 2011 that DHS faced  challenges in its ability to identify overstays because of unreliable  collection of departure data at land ports of entry. The Beyond the  Border Initiative would help address those challenges by providing a new  source of data on travelers departing the United States at land ports on  the northern border. In the pilot phase, DHS exchanged data with the  Canada Border Services Agency on third-country nationals at four of the  five largest ports of entry on the northern border.entries from September 30, 2012, through January 15, 2013. DHS’s  analysis of the 413,222 records received through the pilot showed that  DHS was able to match 97.4 percent of Canadian entry records to a U.S.  entry record in ADIS. DHS was able to use Canadian entry records to  verify the departure of approximately 11,400 subjects prior to the end of  their authorized period of admission who would otherwise have been  thought to be potential overstays. DHS determined that roughly 4,300  subjects with indeterminate status (meaning that DHS lacked exit records  for those individuals) had left the United States after their authorized  period of admission, meaning that they had overstayed while in the  United States and are now considered out-of-country overstays.
DHS plans to expand this effort to collect data from additional ports of  entry and to share data on additional types of travelers. Specifically,  according to DHS officials, as of June 30, 2013, DHS began exchanging  data for third-country nationals at all automated ports of entry along the  northern border. During this phase of the initiative, in accordance with  the agreement between the United States and Canada, DHS also plans  to begin using these data for operational purposes (e.g., taking  enforcement action against overstays, such as working with the State  Department to have their visas revoked or imposing bars on readmission  to the country based on the length of time they remained in the country  unlawfully).travelers, including U.S. and Canadian citizens, at all automated ports of  entry along the northern border. Both DHS and Canadian officials with  whom we spoke stated that the initiative is proceeding on schedule.
After June 30, 2014, DHS plans to exchange data on all  The Beyond the Border initiative provides DHS with additional data that  should enable it to close out potential overstay leads for individuals who  depart across the northern border; however, according to DHS and CBP  officials, the southern land border poses unique challenges that make an  approach similar to Beyond the Border difficult to implement there.  Mexican entry procedures differ from those in Canada. For example,  according to DHS officials, at some border crossings, Mexican officials  may not collect entry data until travelers reach a station located miles  past the border. Therefore, Mexican border authorities may not collect  information on every traveler entering Mexico. In addition, according to  DHS officials, Mexican information technology systems may be less  compatible with U.S. systems than are the Canadian systems. DHS is  conducting informal outreach to the Mexican government regarding the  potential to share entry data in the future, but according to DHS officials,  such a program would be years away.
section_title: DHS Continues to Face Limitations in Reporting Reliable Overstay Rates and Has Not Assessed and Documented Improvements in Reliability
paragraphs: Since 1994, neither DHS nor its predecessor has regularly reported  annual overstay rates to Congress because of concerns about the  reliability of the department’s overstay data. According to statute, DHS is  to submit an annual report to Congress providing numerical estimates of  the number of aliens from each country in each nonimmigrant  classification who overstayed an authorized period of admission that  expired during the fiscal year prior to the year for which the report is  made. Overstay rates are among the statutory criteria that determine a  participant’s termination from the Visa Waiver Program. Therefore, we  have previously concluded that reliable and valid estimates of the number  of overstays are important to manage the program. In April 2011, we  reported that DHS officials stated that the department had not reported  overstay estimates because it had not had sufficient confidence in the  quality of its overstay data. DHS officials stated at the time that, as a  result, the department could not reliably report overstay estimates in  accordance with the statute.
See testimony of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, before  the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington, D.C.: February 13,  2013.
2012 and the first half of fiscal year 2013 for all travelers and classes of  admission at all air, land and sea ports of entry. DHS has also calculated  overstay rates by country for these time periods by determining the  number of overstays (in-country plus out-of-country) divided by the total  number of confirmed nonimmigrants arrivals (who were expected to  depart during the identified period). However, the department is still in the  process of determining what methodology it will use to generate the data  it plans to report by the end of the year. In addition, DHS officials stated  that the department has not yet determined whether to report data from  fiscal year 2012 or fiscal year 2013, and whether to report certain  overstay data publicly.
Moreover, DHS continues to face challenges in ensuring the reliability of  its overstay data. In September 2008, we reported on limitations in  overstay data that affect the reliability of overstay rates, such as  weaknesses in departure data. We recommended that the Secretary of  Homeland Security explore cost-effective actions necessary to further  improve, validate, and test the reliability of overstay data. DHS  concurred with this recommendation and has explored actions to improve  overstay data, as discussed above, but has not yet validated or tested  their reliability. According to DHS Office of Policy officials, the department  is better positioned than in the past to describe the limitations in the  overstay data. However, challenges to reporting reliable overstay  estimates remain. Although DHS has improved connections among its  various databases used to help identify potential overstays, these  improvements do not address some of the underlying data quality and  reliability issues we previously identified. For example, in April 2011, we  found that DHS faced challenges in collecting accurate and complete  information from nonimmigrants departing the United States through land  ports of entry. The Beyond the Border initiative is intended to help  address this issue by collecting proxy data on individuals exiting from the  United States at northern border ports of entry; however, DHS has not yet  identified mechanisms for collecting data on individuals exiting through  southern border ports of entry.
Further, inaccuracies in passenger data provided by air carriers may lead  to incorrect records of potential overstays if passengers’ departures are  not accurately recorded. For example, according to CBP officials, CBP  learned in early 2011 that some carriers were inadvertently transmitting  passenger data without properly recording the passengers’ departure  after DHS noticed an increase in the number of potential overstays.  According to these officials, the issue was resolved in April 2011, but  because of the errors in the data, an unknown number of those  passengers were incorrectly identified as potential overstays. Moreover,  DHS Office of Policy and ICE officials stated that, prior to the April 2013  improvements between ADIS and SEVIS, ADIS was receiving limited  information on foreign students; therefore, the overstay estimates prior to  April 2013 do not fully account for the extent to which foreign students in  the United States were in legal status in the country. These limitations in  overstay data may affect DHS’s ability to report reliable overstay  estimates unless resolved. Estimates of in-country overstays are based  on ADIS’s identification of unmatched arrival records for individuals who  were expected to depart during a given year. As discussed earlier in this  report, DHS does not manually review all unmatched arrival records in  ADIS because many do not meet ICE’s enforcement priorities. Therefore,  the reliability of data in ADIS may affect the accuracy of year-end  overstay statistics.
DHS has documented the results of receiving new departure data in the  pilot phase of the Beyond the Border initiative to demonstrate how DHS  may be able to close out more records of potential overstays in the future.  However, DHS has not assessed and documented how its changes to  database connections have improved the reliability of its data for the  purposes of reporting overstay rate calculations and has not analyzed the  incremental improvements that database changes have made in data  quality. According to DHS Office of Policy and ICE officials, DHS has not  conducted such an analysis because it is difficult to pull such data from  ADIS. DHS has not maintained a separate, mirrored system of ADIS and  must therefore pull data directly from the live ADIS system—a resource- intensive process that can take several months. However, there may be  other cost-effective ways to assess data improvements, such as  conducting quantitative analyses of the number of records closed as a  result of the improvements in connections among databases.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  program managers need operational data to determine whether they are  meeting their goals for accountability for effective and efficient use of  resources. The standards also require that all transactions be clearly  documented in a manner that is complete and accurate in order to be  useful for managers and others involved in evaluating operations.  Additionally, GAO’s methodology transfer paper on the logic of program  evaluation designs, which describes key issues in evaluating federal  programs, states that the basic components of an evaluation design  include identifying information sources and measures, data collection  methods, and an assessment of study limitations, among other things.  Moreover, GAO’s standards for assessing computer-processed data,  which can provide a framework for assessing DHS’s computer-processed  overstay data, states that care should be taken to ensure that collected  data are sufficient and appropriate. Data may not be sufficiently reliable if  (1) significant errors or incompleteness exists in some of or all the key  data elements, and (2) using the data would probably lead to an incorrect  or unintentional message. Without an assessment and documentation  of improvements in the reliability of the data used to develop overstay  estimates and any remaining limitations in how the data can be used,  decision makers will not have the information needed to use these data  for policy-making purposes.
section_title: DHS Faces Long- standing Challenges and Uncertain Time Frames in Planning for a Biometric Exit System at Airports
paragraphs: DHS has not yet fulfilled the 2004 statutory requirement to implement a  biometric exit capability, but has planning efforts under way to report to  Congress in time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle on the costs and  benefits of such a capability at airports and seaports. In 2004, the  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act required DHS to  develop a plan to accelerate full implementation of an automated  biometric entry and exit system at air, sea, and land ports of entry.  However, development and implementation of a biometric exit capability  has been a long-standing challenge for DHS. With regard to an exit  capability at airports, in an October 2010 memo, DHS identified three  primary reasons why it has been unable to determine how and when to  implement a biometric solution: (1) the methods of collecting biometric  data could disrupt the flow of travelers through air terminals; (2) air  carriers and airport authorities had not allowed DHS to examine  mechanisms through which DHS could incorporate biometric data  collection into passenger processing at the departure gate; and (3)  challenges existed in capturing biometric data at the point of departure,  including determining what personnel should be responsible for the  capture of biometric information at airports. With regard to an exit  capability at land ports of entry, in 2006, we reported that according to  DHS officials, for various reasons, a biometric exit capability could not be  implemented without incurring a major impact on land facilities. As a  result, as of April 2013, according to DHS officials, the department’s  planning efforts focus on developing a biometric exit capability for  airports, with the potential for a similar solution to be implemented at  seaports, and DHS’s planning documents, as of June 2013, do not  address plans for a biometric exit capability at land ports of entry.
According to DHS officials, the challenges DHS identified in October 2010  continue to affect the department’s ability to implement a biometric air exit  system. For example, in 2009, DHS conducted pilot programs for  biometric air exit capabilities in airport scenarios. In August 2010, we  found that there were limitations with the pilot programs—for example, the  pilot programs did not operationally test about 30 percent of the air exit  requirements identified in the evaluation plan for the pilot programs—that  hindered DHS’s ability to inform decision making for a long-term air exit  solution and pointed to the need for additional sources of information on  air exit’s operational impacts. According to DHS officials, the  department’s approach to planning for biometric air exit since that time  has been partly in response to our recommendation that DHS identify  additional sources for the operational impacts of air exit not addressed in  the pilot programs’ evaluation and to incorporate these sources into its air  exit decision making and planning. Figure 4 depicts a timeline of DHS’s  efforts to develop a biometric exit capability and key findings from our  prior reports.
Move mouse over the blue shaded text boxes to get more information on GAO’s findings and recommendation, click on text box to open the  referenced GAO report. For an accessible and printable version of this graphic please see appendix II.
April 2003 The Department of  Homeland Security  (DHS) initiated the  United States Visitor  and Immigrant Status  Indicator Technology  (US-VISIT) program  to develop a  comprehensive  biometric entry and  exit system.
January 2004 US-VISIT began  collecting biometric  data on aliens  entering the United  States at 115 air and  14 sea ports of entry.
October 2005 US-VISIT began  collecting biometric  data on aliens  entering the United  States at all ports of  entry.
DHS directed its  Science and  Technology  Directorate (S&T), in  coordination with  other DHS component  agencies, to research  long-term options for  biometric exit.
May 2012 DHS reported  internally on the  results of S&T’s  analysis and made  recommendations to  support the planning  and development of a  biometric air exit  capability.
December 2004 The Intelligence  Reform and Terrorism  Prevention Act of  2004 required a plan  to accelerate full  implementation of an  automated biometric  entry and exit system.
DHS operated two  biometric air exit pilots  from May 2009 until  July 2009, and DHS  submitted its  evaluation report for  these pilots to  Congress in October  2009.
June 2003 GAO issued a report  entitled Information  Technology:  Homeland Security  Needs to Improve  Entry Exit System  Expenditure Planning.
February 2005 GAO issued a report  entitled Homeland  Security: Some  Progress Made, but  Many Challenges  Remain on U.S.  Visitor and Immigrant  Status Indicator  Technology Program.
August 2007 GAO issued a report  entitled Homeland  Security: U.S. Visitor  and Immigrant Status  Program's Long-  standing Lack of  Strategic Direction  and Management  Controls Need to Be  Addressed.
November 2009 GAO issued a report  entitled Homeland  Security: Key US-  VISIT Components at  Varying Stages of  Completion, but  Integrated and  Reliable Schedule  Needed.
August 2010 GAO issued a report  entitled Homeland  Security: US-VISIT  Pilot Evaluations Offer  Limited  Understanding of Air  Exit Options.
In 2011, DHS directed S&T, in coordination with other DHS component  agencies, to research long-term options for biometric air exit. In May  2012, DHS reported internally on the results of S&T’s analysis of previous  air exit pilot programs and assessment of available technologies, and the  report made recommendations to support the planning and development   In that report, DHS concluded that the  of a biometric air exit capability.building blocks to implement an effective biometric air exit system were  available. In addition, DHS’s report stated that new traveler facilitation  tools and technologies—for example, online check-in, self-service, and  paperless technology—could support more cost-effective ways to screen  travelers, and that these improvements should be leveraged when  developing plans for biometric air exit. However, DHS officials stated that  there may be challenges to leveraging new technologies to the extent that  U.S. airports and airlines rely on older, proprietary systems that may be  difficult to update to incorporate new technologies. Furthermore, DHS  reported in May 2012 that significant questions remained regarding (1)  the effectiveness of current biographic air exit processes and the error  rates in collecting or matching data, (2) methods of cost-effectively  integrating biometrics into the air departure processes (e.g., collecting  biometric scans as passengers enter the jetway to board a plane), (3) the  additional value biometric air exit would provide compared with the  current biographic air exit process, and (4) the overall value and cost of a  biometric air exit capability. The report included nine recommendations to  help inform DHS’s planning for biometric air exit, such as directing DHS to  develop explicit goals and objectives for biometric air exit and an  evaluation framework that would, among other things, assess the value of  collecting biometric data in addition to biographic data and determine  whether biometric air exit is economically justified.
DHS reported in May 2012 that it planned to take steps to address these  recommendations by May 2014; however, according to DHS Office of  Policy and S&T officials, the department does not expect to fully address  these recommendations by then. In particular, DHS officials stated that it  has been difficult coordinating with airlines and airports, which have  expressed reluctance about biometric air exit because of concerns over  its effect on operations and potential costs. To address these concerns,  DHS is conducting outreach and soliciting information from airlines and  airports regarding their operations. In addition, DHS officials stated that  the department’s efforts to date have been hindered by insufficient  funding. However, in fiscal year 2012, DHS requested that Congress  release funds allocated to the biometric exit program and funds being  withheld pending the full implementation of a biometric exit system so that  these funds could be applied to DHS’s efforts to enhance the biographic  exit system. In its fiscal year 2014 budget request for S&T, DHS  requested funding for a joint S&T-CBP Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering  Apex project. Apex projects are crosscutting, multidisciplinary efforts  requested by DHS components that are high-priority projects intended to  solve problems of strategic operational importance. According to DHS’s  fiscal year 2014 budget justification, the Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering  Apex project will develop tools to model and simulate air entry and exit  operational processes. Using these tools, DHS intends to develop, test,  pilot, and evaluate candidate solutions. As of April 2013, DHS Policy and  S&T officials stated that they expect to finalize goals and objectives for a  biometric air exit system in the near future and are making plans for future  scenario-based testing.
Although DHS’s May 2012 report stated that DHS would take steps to  address the report’s recommendations by May 2014, DHS officials told us  that the department’s current goal is to develop information about options  for biometric air exit and to report to Congress in time for the fiscal year  2016 budget cycle regarding (1) the additional benefits that a biometric air  exit system provides beyond an enhanced biographic exit system and   (2) costs associated with biometric air exit. However, DHS has not yet  developed an evaluation framework, as recommended in its May 2012  report, to determine how the department will evaluate the benefits and  costs of a biometric air exit system and compare it with a biographic exit  system. According to DHS officials, the department needs to finalize  goals and objectives for biometric air exit before it can develop such a  framework, and in April 2013 these officials told us that the department  plans to finalize these elements in the near future. However, DHS does  not have time frames for when it will subsequently be able to develop and  implement an evaluation framework to support the assessment it plans to  provide to Congress.
According to A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge,  which provides standards for project managers, specific goals and  objectives should be conceptualized, defined, and documented in the  planning process, along with the appropriate steps, time frames, and  milestones needed to achieve those results. In fall 2012, DHS  developed a high-level plan for its biometric air exit efforts, which it  updated in May 2013, but this plan does not clearly identify the tasks  needed to develop and implement an evaluation framework. For example,  the plan does not include a step for developing the methodology for  comparing the costs and benefits of biometric data against those for  collecting biographic data, as recommended in DHS’s May 2012 report.  Furthermore, the time frames in this plan are not accurate as of June  2013 because DHS is behind schedule on some of the tasks and has not  updated the time frames in the plan accordingly. For example, DHS had  planned to begin scenario-based testing for biometric air exit options in  August 2013; however, according to DHS officials, the department now  plans to begin such testing in early 2014. A senior official from DHS’s  Office of Policy told us that DHS has not kept the plan up to date because  of the transition of responsibilities within DHS; specifically, in March 2013,  pursuant to the explanatory statement for DHS’s 2013 appropriation, DHS  established an office within CBP that is responsible for coordinating  DHS’s entry and exit policies and operations. This transition was in  process as of June 2013, and CBP plans to establish an integrated  project team in July 2013 that will be responsible for more detailed  planning for the department’s biometric air exit efforts. Without robust  planning that includes up-to-date time frames and milestones to develop  and implement an evaluation framework for its assessment of biometric  air exit benefits and costs, DHS does not have reasonable assurance that  it will be able to provide this assessment to Congress as planned for the  fiscal year 2016 budget cycle.
DHS Policy and S&T officials agreed that setting time frames and  milestones is important to ensure timely development and implementation  of the evaluation framework in accordance with DHS’s May 2012  recommendations. According to DHS officials, implementation of a  biometric air exit system will depend on the results of discussions  between the department and Congress after the department provides this  assessment of options for biometric air exit. Any delays in providing the  assessment to Congress could further affect implementation of a  biometric air exit system, and without reasonable assurance when DHS  will be able to provide this assessment to Congress, it remains unclear  when DHS will make progress toward addressing the statutory  requirements for a biometric exit system.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Addressing the large number of foreign visitors who have entered the  United States legally but then overstayed has been a long-standing  challenge. Given the government’s finite resources for addressing  overstays, and competing priorities, reliable data and analysis are of  particular importance to both DHS and Congress. Without clear  assessment and reporting of the extent to which the reliability of the data  used to develop overstay estimates has improved and any remaining  limitations in how the data can be used, decision makers may not have  complete information needed to use these data for policy-making  purposes. Furthermore, DHS has faced long-standing challenges in  making progress toward meeting the statutory requirement for biometric  exit capabilities since 2004. DHS plans to provide Congress with an  assessment of the benefits and costs of various options for pursuing a  biometric exit system at airports, but without robust planning that includes  time frames and milestones to develop and implement an evaluation  framework for this assessment, DHS lacks reasonable assurance that it  will be able to provide this assessment to Congress for the fiscal year  2016 budget cycle as planned. Furthermore, any delays in providing this  information to Congress could further affect possible implementation of a  biometric exit system to address statutory requirements.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help improve confidence in the quality of overstay data that DHS plans  to report in December 2013 in accordance with statutory reporting  requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security  direct relevant DHS components to assess and document the extent to  which the reliability of the data used to develop any overstay estimates  has improved and any remaining limitations in how the data can be used.
To provide reasonable assurance of when DHS will be able provide an  assessment of the benefits and costs of biometric air exit options to  Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security  establish time frames and milestones for developing and implementing an  evaluation framework to be used in conducting the department’s  assessment of biometric air exit options.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS and the Department of State for  their review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are  summarized below and reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS concurred  with our two recommendations and described actions under way or  planned to address them. Regarding our first recommendation, that DHS  assess and document the extent to which the reliability of the data used  to develop any overstay estimates has improved and any remaining  limitations in how the data can be used, DHS indicated that it is  establishing a working group that will include representation from DHS  component agencies with responsibility for collecting, recording, and  analyzing entry and exit data and that this working group will be functional  by January 31, 2014. According to DHS, the component agencies that  oversee information systems used to identify overstays will be  responsible for the data captured in their respective systems, and the  working group will be responsible for aggregating information across  components regarding the validity of the data and defining any limitations  to the use of the data. DHS estimated that completion of an initial  evaluation of the data would occur by July 31, 2014. To fully address our  recommendation, DHS should assess the reliability of, and document any  remaining limitations in, any overstay data that the department may  report. Regarding our second recommendation, that DHS establish time  frames and milestones for developing and implementing an evaluation  framework to be used in conducting the department’s assessment of  biometric air exit options, DHS indicated that CBP and S&T will finalize  the goals and objectives for biometric air exit by January 31, 2014, and  that these goals and objectives will be used in the development of an  evaluation framework that DHS expects to have completed by June 30,  2014. These actions, when fully implemented, should help address the  intent of our recommendations. DHS also provided technical comments,  which we incorporated as appropriate.
The Department of State did not have formal comments on our draft  report, but provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Secretary of State, appropriate congressional committees,  and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no  charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions on matters discussed in this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major  contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Overstay Enforcement Actions
paragraphs: In April 2011, we reported that U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE), a component within the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS), takes actions to address a small portion of the estimated  overstay population because of, among other things, competing priorities.  In particular, ICE’s Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit  (CTCEU), within the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) directorate,  prioritizes in-country overstay leads based on various factors that  consider the potential risks overstays may pose to national security and  public safety, and HSI field offices investigate those leads that CTCEU  identifies as priorities.
As it reviews leads for potential overstays, CTCEU closes records for  nonimmigrants that have either left the country or changed their status,  identifies nonpriority records for processing by ICE Enforcement and  Removal Operations, and sends records that do not have a viable  address to contractors to continually monitor for new address information.  CTCEU assigns valid, high-priority overstay leads to HSI field office  agents within their respective geographical areas of responsibility for  mandatory investigation. From fiscal years 2004 through 2012, CTCEU  processed over 2.2 million records of potential overstays and sent about  44,500 leads to HSI field offices for investigation. Table 4 provides  information related to the records of potential overstays that CTCEU has  processed from fiscal years 2004 through 2012 (our April 2011 report  included the data from fiscal years 2004 through 2010). Out of the  approximately 44,500 leads sent to HSI field offices over this period of  time, approximately 9,000 (about 20 percent) resulted in arrests.
In April 2011, we reported that overstay investigations that do not lead to  an arrest result in one of three outcomes: (1) evidence is uncovered  indicating that the suspected overstay departed the United States,   (2) evidence is uncovered indicating that the subject of the investigation is  in-status (e.g., the subject filed a timely application with DHS’s U.S.  Citizenship and Immigration Services to change his or her status or  extend his or her authorized period of admission in the United States), or  (3) investigators exhaust all investigative leads and cannot locate the  suspected overstay. If the evidence of departure shows that the individual  departed after his or her authorized admit until date (i.e., the individual is  an out-of-country overstay), the individual could be subject to  administrative enforcement actions including restrictions on readmission  to the United States. Figure 5 shows the outcomes of CTCEU  investigations from fiscal years 2004 through 2012 that did not result in  arrest (our April 2011 report included the data from fiscal years 2004  through 2010).
As we reported in April 2011, ICE has reported allocating a small  percentage of its resources in terms of investigative work hours to  overstay investigations. For this report, we found that, from fiscal years  2005 through 2012, ICE reported devoting from 1.8 to 3.4 percent of its  total HSI field office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations,  as shown in figure 6 (our April 2011 report included the data from fiscal  years 2006 through 2010).
section_title: Appendix II: Timeline of Events Related to Biometric Entry and Exit System
paragraphs: Table 5 lists events in DHS’s efforts to develop a biometric exit capability  and key findings from our prior reports (see interactive fig. 4) and includes  the figure’s rollover information.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet (Assistant  Director), Susan Baker, Frances A. Cook, Alana Finley, Eric Hauswirth,  Richard Hung, Lara Miklozek, Amanda Miller, Anthony Moran, Karl  Seifert, and Ashley D. Vaughan made significant contributions to this  report.