Army and Marine Corps Training: Metrics Needed to Assess Initiatives on Training Management Skills
Published: 2011-07-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Over the past decade, Army and Marine Corps forces have deployed repeatedly with limited time between deployments. At their home stations, combat training centers, and other locations, units have focused their limited training time on training for counterinsurgency operations. Prior to deploying, units also conduct a large-scale exercise referred to as a culminating training event. With the drawdown of forces in Iraq, the services have begun to resume training for a fuller range of offensive, defensive, and stability missions. The House report to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 directed GAO to report on the Army's and Marine Corps' abilities to complete training requirements. GAO assessed the extent to which the services' (1) active component forces are completing training prior to the culminating training event and (2) leaders are positioned to plan and manage training as forces resume training for a fuller range of missions. GAO analyzed training requirements and unit training documentation, and interviewed headquarters and unit personnel during site visits between July 2010 and July 2011.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Deploying Army and Marine Corps units conduct extensive predeployment training--both individual and collective, to include a large-scale culminating training event--at their home stations, combat training centers, and other locations. However, several factors, such as limited training time between deployments, the large number of training requirements, and the current focus on counterinsurgency operation training have been preventing units from completing all desired training prior to the culminating training event. For example, based on GAO's site visits, 7 of 13 units were not able to complete all of the desired individual and collective training (e.g., company-level live fire training) prior to arriving at the combat training centers. Further, officials from all of the units GAO spoke with stated that they planned to delay certain training until they were at the combat training centers since resources--such as theater-specific equipment like mine resistant ambush protected vehicles--were more readily available there. GAO found that some units had to train to improve proficiency levels at the combat training centers prior to beginning the culminating training events, and therefore were not always able to take full advantage of the training opportunities available to them at the combat training centers to conduct complex, higher-level training. Still, according to trainers at the combat training centers, while units arrive with varying levels of proficiency, all forces leave with at least the platoon level proficiency required to execute the counterinsurgency missions required for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over the past decade, continuous overseas deployments have reduced training timeframes and resulted in senior leaders assuming training management responsibilities from junior leaders. Specifically, leaders at higher headquarters have taken responsibility for much of the training management function--planning, preparing, and assessing training--while junior leaders have focused primarily on training execution. However, changing conditions, such as increased competition for resources in a constrained fiscal environment, increased time at home station, and a return to training for a fuller range of missions, make it imperative that all leaders possess a strong foundation in training management. The services are developing various initiatives to restore and develop training management skills in their leaders, but neither service has developed results-oriented performance metrics to gauge the effectiveness of their efforts to restore these skills. As GAO has previously reported, establishing metrics can help federal agencies target training investments and assess the contributions that training programs make to improving results. Without a means of measuring the effectiveness of their efforts, the Army and Marine Corps will not have the information they need to assess the extent to which their leaders have the training management skills needed to plan, prepare, and assess required training.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the services develop results-oriented performance metrics that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of their training management initiatives and support any adjustments that the services may need to make to these initiatives. DOD concurred with this recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United States is nearly a decade into an era of persistent conflict,  one in which Army and Marine Corps forces have experienced continual  operational deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan with limited time to  prepare between deployments. In preparation for these deployments,  Army and Marine Corps combat arms and combat support forces train  to meet numerous requirements, with particular focus on  counterinsurgency operations. These training requirements are de to follow a progressive building block approach—moving from individual  to small unit training, both of which are typically conducted at a unit’s  home station, to larger unit collective training,  which are sometimes  conducted at a unit’s home station but may be conducted at other  locations. Finally, prior to deployment, Army brigade combat teams and  signed  all Marine Corps battalions deploying to Afghanistan conduct a large- scale exercise referred to as a culminating training event at a service The culminating training event is intended to  combat training center.  challenge units and their leaders in an environment that involves scenarios that replicate current operational conditions in the theater t which they will be deploying.
The drawdown of forces in Iraq has begun to increase the amount of time that units will spend at home station. While units may have more time to  train, this time will be used to train for additional missions. Specifically,  the past few years, the Army and Marine Corps have issued guidancedirecting forces to expand the training focus from counterinsurgency  operations to a fuller range of offensive, defensive, and stability miss For example, in October 2010, U.S. Army Forces Command issued  guidance directing units to renew training emphasis on, among other  things, integration of aviation assets. Further, as the Army and Marine  ve  Corps return to training for a fuller range of missions, the services ha begun to place renewed focus on restoring and developing leaders’  training management skills. These skills involve planning and preparing  for unit training, actually executing the training, and, finally, assessing the  execution of training.  ions.
Army combat support units and smaller units, as well as Marine Corps units not deploying  to Afghanistan, conduct their culminating training event at home station or other locations. positioned to plan and manage training as forces resume training for a  fuller range of missions.
To determine the extent to which active component Army and Marine  Corps combat arms and combat support forces are completing training  prior to the culminating training event, we reviewed Office of the  Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant command, Army, and  Marine Corps training guidance, to determine the nature of training  requirements, and interviewed officials from these offices to discuss these  documents. In addition, we reviewed service guidance to identify the  extent to which specific training had to be completed prior to the  culminating training events and interviewed service officials to discuss  this guidance. We also interviewed service training officials to discuss any  differences between training requirements for combat arms and combat  support forces. We selected eight Army and Marine Corps locations for  site visits based on deployment and training dates to allow a review of  multiple units trained at the location. For the Army, we used readiness  information from the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army to  identify the universe of units for site selection purposes, and we selected  the installations with the largest number of combat arms and combat  support brigades present during our site visit time frames. We found this  data to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose of site selection. For the  Marine Corps, we focused on battalion-sized combat arms and combat  support units; these units conduct their culminating training events at the  service’s combat training center at Twentynine Palms, California.  Findings from the site visits with the Army and Marine Corps are not  generalizable to all units. Specifically, we reviewed unit training  documents and interviewed officials from 19 Army and 10 Marine Corps  units to discuss training information such as: (1) the training that units  were completing, (2) any training that units were unable to complete prior  to the culminating training event, (3) any factors that impacted units’  abilities to complete training prior to the culminating training event, and  (4) the impact that not completing training prior to the final culminating  training event might have on those events.
To assess the extent to which leaders are positioned to plan and manage  training as the forces resume training for a fuller range of missions, we  reviewed service policy and guidance that provided information on the  return to training for a fuller range of missions, such as the U.S. Army  Forces Command Training and Leader Development Guidance for Fiscal  Year 2011-2012 and the Marine Corps Posture Statement for 2011. We  interviewed service and unit officials to discuss these documents and  changing conditions, such as the drawdown of forces from Iraq, and the  impact of these conditions on training for a fuller range of missions. We  also examined service plans to restore and develop training management  skills for all Army and Marine Corps leaders, including junior leaders, and  discussed these plans with service officials. Appendix I provides a more  detailed description of our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 to July 2011, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: The Nature of Army and Marine Corps Forces’ Training Requirements
paragraphs: All Army and Marine Corps forces are required to annually complete  individual training requirements, such as weapons qualification; sexual  assault prevention and response; and chemical, biological, radiological,  and nuclear defense training. Congress, the Department of Defense, and  the Army and Marine Corps all have the authority to establish training  requirements. Service policies do not specify where annual training  should be completed, and commanders can prioritize this training to align  it with other training the units are conducting to develop units’ combat  capabilities. As a result of this flexibility, units conduct annual training  throughout the year at home stations and even while deployed.
In addition to annual training, forces that deploy conduct both individual  and collective predeployment training. Army and Marine Corps  predeployment training, which can be conducted at home station or other  locations, begins with individual and small unit training and progresses to  larger scale collective training exercises that are designed to build  proficiency in the skills required for deployment and the culminating  training event. The requirements for this training come from a variety of  sources. The Commander of U.S. Central Command has established  baseline individual and collective training requirements for units deploying  to Iraq and Afghanistan. Required individual training requirements  include, but are not limited to, basic marksmanship, high-mobility  multipurpose wheeled vehicle and mine resistant ambush protected  vehicle egress assistance training, and first aid. Each service secretary is  responsible for training their forces to execute the current and future  operational requirements of the combatant commands. Accordingly, U.S.  Army Forces Command, as the Army’s force provider, and the  Commandant of the Marine Corps have also issued training requirements  for forces deploying in support of missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Other Army and Marine Corps commands at various levels have also  imposed predeployment training requirements and increased the required  number of repetitions for certain training tasks. Unit training requirements  may differ based on various factors, such as unit type—for example,  combat arms and combat support forces—the units’ mission, or  deployment location.
Training requirements may have several associated tasks. For example,  depending on the mission, Army soldiers and units are required to  conduct counter-improvised explosive device training, which may consist  of up to 8 individual and 11 collective tasks, including reacting to, and  preparing for, a possible counter-improvised explosive device attack.  Likewise, Marines are required to conduct language and culture training,  which depending on the mission, may include 2 to 5 individual and 4  collective training tasks.
section_title: Training within the Army and Marine Corps Force Generation Processes
paragraphs: The Army’s Force Generation model (ARFORGEN) is a cyclical model  designed to build the readiness of units as they move through three  phases termed RESET, Train/Ready, and Available. The Army uses  these phases to synchronize training with the arrival of unit personnel and  equipment. The initial phase of ARFORGEN is RESET, which begins  when a unit returns from deployment or exits the Available phase. Units in  RESET perform limited individual, team, and/or crew training tasks. As  units exit RESET, they enter the Train/Ready phase, where they build  readiness through further individual and collective training tasks. As units  exit Train/Ready, they enter the Available phase, when they may be  deployed. During this phase, units focus on sustainment training.
Together, figures 1 and 2 show how training opportunities are expected to  change as deployment-to-dwell ratios—the amount of time spent  deployed compared to the amount not deployed—change. As forces draw  down in Iraq, the length of the Train/Ready phase is expected to increase.  In addition, the types of training conducted during this phase will change.  The figures are not meant to show the exact amount of time devoted to  training—for assigned missions, such as the current counterinsurgency  missions, or for a fuller range of missions—but they do illustrate the  current and expected future trends.
Figure 1 shows how training has generally occurred within the  ARFORGEN process in recent years, when much of the active Army was  experiencing 1:1 deployment-to-dwell ratios.
Figure 2 shows how training is expected to change as requirements for  ongoing operations in Iraq decline.
Marine Corps Force Generation is a four-block process designed to  synchronize manning, equipping, and training to build a total force  capable of responding to combatant commander requirements. As shown  in table 1, Marine Corps predeployment training is planned and executed  in accordance with a standardized system of “building blocks,” which  progresses from individual to collective training. Training in block one is  individual training and is divided into baseline requirements (Block 1A)  and theater-specific training requirements (Block 1B).
At the Army’s and Marine Corps’ combat training centers, units are able  to execute large-scale, highly realistic and stressful advanced training,  including live-fire training, which they may not be able to conduct at their  home stations. Each training rotation affords units and their leaders the  opportunity to face a well-trained opposing force, focus training on higher  unit-level tasks, develop proficiency under increasingly difficult conditions,  and receive in-depth analyses of performance from training experts. In  addition, training at the combat training centers is tailored to bring units to  the proficiency level needed to execute their missions.
The Army maintains two combat training centers in the continental United  States: the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California and the Joint  Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. These centers focus  on training brigade combat teams—approximately 5,000  servicemembers—during rotations that last between 18 and 25 days. The  Marine Corps has a single combat training center, the Air Ground Combat  Center at Twentynine Palms, California. At this combat training center,  multiple battalion-sized units preparing to deploy to Afghanistan  participate in a 28-day exercise. Each exercise includes two infantry  battalions, a combat logistics battalion, and an aviation combat element.  These exercises prepare marines for the tactics and procedures they are  expected to employ in Afghanistan.
Units are not required to complete a specific level of training prior to the  culminating training events that are held at the combat training centers.  However, service policies identify training goals for units to complete. For  example, in October 2010, Forces Command established a goal for active  component units to achieve company-level proficiency at home station.  In addition, in 2010, U.S. Army Forces Command identified a goal for  training to be completed at the combat training centers—brigade-level,  live-fire exercises. Similarly, an April 2010 Marine Corps policy stated  that units should conduct battalion level training prior to conducting a  culminating training event. The Army and Marine Corps are developing  and implementing systems to assist units in tracking training proficiency  and completion throughout the service force generation cycles.
section_title: Several Factors Impact Unit Abilities to Complete Desired Training Prior to the Culminating Training Events
paragraphs: While deployable combat arms and combat support forces in the Army  and Marine Corps conduct extensive predeployment training, they are not  always able to complete all desired training prior to the culminating  training event. Based on our unit visits, 7 of 13 Army and Marine Corps  units conducting a culminating training event at a combat training center  were not able to complete all of the desired individual and collective  training (e.g., company-level, live-fire training) prior to their arrival at the  combat training centers. During our discussions with unit and training  command officials, we found that units do not always reach the desired  level of proficiency prior to their culminating training events due to several  factors—such as the current focus on training on counterinsurgency skills  that are needed in Iraq and Afghanistan, the large number of  requirements, limited training time between deployments, and availability  of necessary equipment.
Unit officials from both services identified training that they were unable to  complete prior to arriving at the combat training centers. The following are  examples of the types of desired training that some Army and Marine  Corps units that we visited were not able to complete prior to arriving at  the combat training centers.    Due to the extensive licensing and certification requirements for the  different types of vehicles, which are currently being used in Iraq and  Afghanistan, units were not always able to license and certify all  necessary drivers prior to arriving at the combat training centers.    Aviation units, which balance aviation requirements and ground  requirements, were not always able to complete all ground training  requirements, such as all language and culture training.    Marine Corps units often waived the first two levels of weapons  qualifications.    Given limited theater-specific equipment at home station, units were  not always able to complete convoy training using mine resistant  ambush protected vehicles.    Biometrics training and training on communications equipment were  often not completed prior to arriving at the combat training centers.    Given limited systems at home station, units were often unable to  integrate unmanned aerial systems into training prior to arriving at the  combat training centers.    Due to land constraints, units were often unable to complete  company-level, live-fire attack prior to arriving at the combat training  centers.
Further, officials from all of the Army and Marine Corps units we spoke  with stated that they planned to delay certain training until they were at  the combat training centers since resources—such as theater-specific  equipment like mine resistant ambush protected vehicles—were more  readily available there. In addition, due to land constraints in the Pacific,  Hawaii units are unable to conduct heavy artillery training prior to arriving  at the combat training centers.
Furthermore, we found that some units had to train to improve proficiency  levels at the combat training centers prior to beginning the culminating  training events, and therefore were not always able to take full advantage  of the training opportunities available to them at the combat training  centers to conduct complex, higher-level training. In the past, units used  the initial week at the combat training centers to replicate their arrival in  theater and prepare to commence combat operations by conducting tasks  such as receiving and organizing equipment; however, over the past  decade, units have had to incorporate other types of training into this first  week. For example, training officials at the National Training Center  stated that it was necessary for soldiers that were new to the units to  complete individual weapons qualifications during the first 5 days of the  combat training center rotation because these soldiers often arrived after  their unit’s home station ranges were completed, failed to qualify on their  weapon, or were not available on the day their unit was at the range.  Army and Marine Corps officials, including trainers at the combat training  centers, reported that while units arrive at the combat training centers  with varying levels of proficiency, all units leave with at least the platoon  level proficiency required to execute counterinsurgency missions for the  current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, Army and Marine  Corps guidance places responsibility on unit commanders to certify that  their units have completed all required training and are prepared to  deploy. Once certified, the Commanding General of Army Forces  Command and the Marine Expeditionary Forces Commanding Generals  validate completion of training for all Army and Marine Corps units,  respectively, prior to deploying.
section_title: Army and Marine Corps Have Initiatives to Restore and Develop Leaders’ Training Management Skills, but Lack Results-Oriented Performance Measures to Evaluate Their Impact
paragraphs: While leaders are responsible for the training of their units, the pace of  operations over the past decade has led to reduced training time frames,  and as a result, the services have shifted training management  responsibilities from junior leaders to their higher headquarters. However,  changing conditions—such as the increased competition for training  resources in an increasingly constrained fiscal environment and the return  to training for a broader range of missions—highlight the importance of  solid training management skills for all leaders. While the Army and  Marine Corps are developing initiatives to restore and develop the  capabilities of leaders to plan, prepare, execute, and assess training,  neither service has established results-oriented performance measures to  evaluate the impact of these initiatives.
subsections: section_title: Pace of Current Operations Has Resulted in Fewer Opportunities to Focus on Training Management
paragraphs: Effective training, which can be best accomplished when founded on solid  training management, is critical to overall mission readiness, but the pace  of current operations has resulted in fewer opportunities for junior leaders  to focus on training management. As noted in Army policy,  leaders  manage training to ensure effective unit preparation and successful  mission execution. Similarly, Marine Corps guidance notes that training  management allows for maximized results when executing training. To  train effectively, leaders at all levels must possess a thorough  understanding of training management—the process of planning,  preparing, executing, and assessing training—and continually practice  these skills. Training management skills are especially important for junior  leaders, as it is these leaders that focus the priorities of their units— squads, platoons, and companies—to achieve training goals, maximize  training, and reach the greatest level of readiness and proficiency prior to  and during the culminating training event. Traditionally, leaders have  gained these skills through training and education in formal schools, the  learning and experience gained while assigned to operational and training  organizations, and individuals’ own self-development.
Continuous deployments to evolving theaters have, over the past decade,  led to shorter timeframes during which units can accomplish training.  Given these shorter time frames, much of the responsibility for training  management has been assumed by senior leaders, leaving some junior  leaders with limited opportunities to perform or observe training  management. As a result, junior leaders have focused more on training  execution and their higher headquarters have assumed much of the  responsibility for planning and preparing unit training.
According to Army and Marine Corps unit officials, while junior leaders  are capable of executing live-fire training and combat scenarios, many  of these leaders have not had experience in preparing the ranges for  such training exercises. Further, the U.S. Army Forces Command  Training and Leader Development Guidance for Fiscal Year 2011-2012  states that training meetings have not always been conducted to standard over the last nine years. These training meetings—which are essential to  training management—are conducted by unit leaders and are meant to  provide feedback on the completion of training requirements, task  proficiency, and the quality of the train ing conducted.
section_title: Training Management Will Become More Complex with the Changing Conditions
paragraphs: With the decline in operational requirements in Iraq, more units are at  home for longer periods, resulting in increased competition for training  resources—such as training ranges, centrally managed equipment, and  simulators. At the same time, these units are facing an increasingly  constrained fiscal environment in which the services are seeking to  achieve greater efficiencies in training, and potential savings. In this  environment, junior leaders will be expected to learn the fundamentals of  planning and conducting individual and small unit collective training  including obtaining resources, identifying critical requirements, and  integrating individual and collective training events.
During our visit, officials at Joint Base Lewis-McChord noted that 2010- 2011 was the first time since the start of operations in Iraq in 2003 that  the installation’s nine brigades were on base at the same time. With the  large number of units at the base, installation officials, in coordination with  corps and brigade training officers, identified strict time frames during  which individual units would have priority over training resources and  assisted junior leaders in planning for the use of training ranges and other  resources. Likewise, Marine Corps officials noted that their units in the  Pacific, which rely on Army installations across Hawaii to conduct a  significant portion of their live-fire training and large-scale collective  training exercises, would experience increased competition for the use of  training ranges as time at home station begins to increase.
The ability of junior leaders to effectively manage expanded training  requirements will be a key to meeting the Army’s recently established  goal for active component units to achieve company-level proficiency at  home station prior to the culminating training event. Further, the services  are seeking to address the atrophy of some critical skills by shifting their  training focus from counterinsurgency operations to a fuller range of  missions. For example, while some Marine Corps units have retained the  capability to conduct amphibious operations, this critical skill has not been  exercised by all units since the start of operations in Iraq. However, as the  Marine Corps returns to training for its full range of missions, junior  leaders will be expected to plan and manage additional individual and  collective training requirements to prepare units to execute this mission.  Training management will also become more complex as the services  return to conducting more joint, combined, and multinational exercises.  For example, units are supposed to prepare for exercises with partner  nations, but some units have recently been unable to train for or  participate in such exercises. With an increase in dwell time, and fewer  units deploying to Iraq, more time will be available for units to focus on  training and preparing for these exercises.
section_title: The Services Have Developed Various Initiatives to Restore and Develop Training Management Skills
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps recognize the need to renew emphasis on  the training management skills that enable leaders to plan and resource  training, optimize installation resources, track individual qualifications and  proficiencies, and assess training readiness. As a result, the services  have been proactive in developing initiatives that are designed to restore  training management skills in some leaders, and develop these skills in  junior leaders.
Specifically, the Army and Marine Corps have developed online  resources and demonstration videos to refresh leaders’ training  management skills and serve as instructional tools until leaders can  attend formal instruction on these skills. For example, the Army has  developed online videos that show leaders how to conduct training  meetings. Likewise, Marine Corps officials stated that they are currently  revising one of their online training management courses and plan to  release an 8-hour computer-based course designed to assist leaders in  developing training management skills.
Further, the services are developing and implementing automated training  management systems. According to Army guidance, the Army’s Digital  Training Management System, an automated system for tracking and  managing both individual and collective training, is the key to establishing  training management amongst its leaders. The system allows unit  leaders—including junior leaders—to develop their mission-essential task  list, establish calendars for their training plans, and track the completion  of training requirements and exercises. Similarly, according to officials,  the Marine Corps’ Training Information Management System, once fully  implemented, will allow leaders to track and manage individual marine  and collective unit capabilities and assist leaders in developing training  plans and calendars. According to Army and Marine Corps officials, in the  future, the automated training management systems will interface with  their readiness reporting systems and allow leaders to have a more  objective view of unit training readiness.
In addition to the online training and automated systems, both services  are revamping their professional military education courses to emphasize  training management skills. Specifically, the Army is currently working to  standardize and update the training management content within its  leadership courses, starting with the Captains’ Career Course. Officials  stated that they expect to test the revised course content by September  2011 and are also looking to identify and standardize the training  management content taught in other career courses, such as those  designed for non-commissioned officers. In January 2009, the Marine  Corps began conducting the Unit Readiness Planning Course, a  comprehensive, 5-day training management course that is available to  leaders in the ranks of corporal to colonel. The service has also added a  training management component to many of its professional military  education courses for junior leaders, such as the Commander’s  Symposium and the Expeditionary Warfare School.
section_title: Army and Marine Corps Lack Results-Oriented Performance Metrics to Fully Evaluate the Impact of Their Training Management Initiatives
paragraphs: The Army’s and Marine Corps’ initiatives are a solid start to the  development of training management skills in their junior leaders, but  neither service has developed results-oriented performance metrics to  gauge the effectiveness of their efforts to restore training management  skills. Our prior work has shown that it is important for agencies to  incorporate performance metrics to demonstrate the contributions that  training programs make to improve results. Incorporating valid measures  of effectiveness into training and development programs enables an  agency to better ensure that desired changes will occur in trainee’s skills,  knowledge, and abilities. When developing results-oriented performance  metrics, organizations should consider the frequency of evaluation, and  the indicators that will be used to evaluate the performance of initiatives.
For example, the services could measure the ability of junior leaders to  plan, prepare, and assess training that will be expected of them, or the  amount and types of on-the-job training required for junior leaders to  perform required training tasks after those leaders have attended  identified courses or participated in on-the-job training. By establishing  metrics, the services can identify approaches that may not be working  and adjust training as needed. In addition, given the variety of ways to  provide training, such as classroom, e-learning, and on-the-job training,  results-oriented performance metrics can help target training investments  and provide the services with credible information on how their initiatives  are impacting performance.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Training can prepare Army and Marine Corps forces to execute a wide  range of missions. However, the pace of operations over the past decade  has limited training time and reduced the services’ abilities to focus on  developing training management skills in their junior leaders. At the same  time, the Army and Marine Corps have focused their limited training time  on training personnel in the skills needed to carry out their  counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the drawdown  of forces in Iraq and a commitment to resume training for a fuller range of  missions, both services have recognized the need and opportunity to  restore and develop leaders’ abilities to plan, prepare, execute, and  assess the wider range of needed training. While the Army and Marine  Corps have initiatives to restore and develop leaders’ training  management skills, neither service has developed results-oriented  performance metrics that would allow them to determine the effectiveness  of their initiatives and adjust when necessary. Ensuring that these training  management skills are restored and developed is an essential step in  maximizing training effectiveness, especially as forces spend more time  at home station and face increased competition for installation training  resources. However, without a means of measuring the effectiveness of  their efforts to restore and develop leaders’ training management skills,  the Army and Marine Corps lack the information they need to assess the  extent to which their leaders are prepared to plan, prepare, and assess  required training.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: As the Army and Marine Corps continue to develop and implement  programs to restore and develop leaders’ training management skills, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop results- oriented performance metrics that can be used to evaluate the  effectiveness of these training management initiatives and support any  adjustments that may be needed.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our  recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop results- oriented performance metrics that can be used to evaluate the  effectiveness of training management initiatives and support any  adjustments that may be needed. DOD noted that for the Army, results- oriented performance metrics could help provide an objective view to  support the subjective assessment of training readiness. DOD further  stated that as the Marine Corps redeploys and resets the force, the  service will ensure doctrinal unit training management practices are  emphasized as a means to most effectively plan and meet training  readiness requirements. In addition, the Marine Corps will continue to  develop and refine performance metrics and tools that support the  commander’s ability to assess individual and unit training readiness. The  full text of DOD’s written comments is reprinted in appendix II.
We are also sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretary of the Army, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and  appropriate congressional committees. In addition, this report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which Army and Marine Corps combat arms  and combat support forces are completing training prior to the culminating  training event, we first reviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint  Staff, combatant command, Army, and Marine Corps training  requirements and guidance, including U.S. Central Command Theater  Entry Requirements, U.S. Pacific Command Fiscal Year 11-14 Pacific  Joint Training Strategy, U.S. Army Forces Command Pre-deployment  Training Guidance in Support of Combatant Commands, Army Regulation  350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, and Marine Corps Order  3502.6, Marine Corps Force Generation Process, to determine the nature  of training requirements. We also interviewed officials from these offices  to discuss these documents. In addition, we interviewed trainers from the  Army’s two maneuver combat training centers in the continental United  States at Fort Irwin, California and Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the Marine  Corps single combat training center at Twentynine Palms, California, to  discuss the desired training, if any, that units could not complete prior to  the culminating training event. We also reviewed service training  guidance such as U.S. Army Forces Command Regulation 350-50-1,  Training at the National Training Center, and U.S. Army Forces  Command Regulation 350-50-2, Training at the Joint Readiness Training  Center, to identify the extent to which the guidance established  requirements for training to be completed prior to the culminating training  events and interviewed trainers from the combat training centers to  discuss this guidance.
Further, we reviewed unit training documents and interviewed officials  from 19 Army and 10 Marine Corps units to discuss training information  such as: (1) the training that units were completing, (2) any training that  units were unable to complete prior to the culminating training events, (3)  any factors that impacted units’ abilities to complete training prior to the  culminating training events, and (4) the impact that not completing  training prior to the final culminating training event might have on those  events. For the Army, we used readiness information from the Defense  Readiness Reporting System-Army from November 2010, to identify the  universe of all deployable brigade-sized units, since these units may  conduct their culminating training event at a combat training center. We  then selected the installations with the largest number of combat arms  and combat support brigades present during our site visit timeframes. We  found this data to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose of site selection.  Based on the data, we selected Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Hood,  Texas; Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington; and Schofield Barracks,  Hawaii, where we held discussions with 10 Army brigade combat teams  and 9 Army support brigades. For the Marine Corps, we focused on  battalion-sized combat arms and combat support units; these units  conduct their culminating training events at the service’s combat training  center at Twentynine Palms, California. Specifically, we identified those  units who would be conducting their culminating training events at the  combat training center between November 2010 and February 2011. We  held discussions with 5 Marine Corps ground combat units, and 5 Marine  Corps support units from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Camp  Pendleton, California; Twentynine Palms, California; and Marine Corps  Base Hawaii. Findings from the Army and Marine Corps site visits are not  generalizable to all units. We also spoke with Army and Marine Corps  officials from Fort Shafter, Hawaii, and Okinawa, Japan, respectively, to  discuss any factors that impacted units’ abilities to complete training prior  to the culminating training events.
To assess the extent to which leaders are positioned to plan and manage  training as forces resume training for a fuller range of missions, we  reviewed service policy and guidance that provided information on the  return to training for a fuller range of missions, such as the U.S. Army  Forces Command Training and Leader Development Guidance for Fiscal  Year 2011-2012, Army Field Manual 7-0, Training Units and Developing  Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations, the Marine Corps’ Commandant  Planning Guidance, and the Marine Corps Posture Statement for 2011.  We interviewed service and unit officials to discuss these documents and  how training for a fuller range of missions might be impacted by changing  conditions, such as the drawdown of forces from Iraq. We interviewed  installation management officials from both Army and Marine Corps  installations to discuss challenges that may exist for units as more units  are stationed at home for longer periods of time, and reviewed installation  policies and plans regarding the scheduling of home station resources,  such as ranges, centrally managed equipment, and simulators. We also  examined service plans and strategies to develop and restore training  management skills amongst Army and Marine Corps leaders, and  discussed these plans with service officials. For example, we reviewed  the U.S. Army Forces Command Inspector General’s Office Training  Management Assessment, Army Field Manual 7-0, Marine Corps MCRP  3-0A, Unit Training Management Guide, the Marine Corps Posture  Statement and the Marine Corps Task 9 Vision and Strategy 2025. We  also discussed current and future initiatives to restore and develop  training management skills with officials from the Army’s Training and  Doctrine Command and the Marine Corps’ Training and Education  Command. Furthermore, we participated in an online demonstration of  the Army’s Digital Training Management System and reviewed the online  trainings available through the Army Training Network. Table 2 outlines all  of the organizations we contacted and interviewed during the course of  our review.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 to July 2011, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Michael Ferren (Assistant Director), Jerome Brown, Kenya Jones,  Ashley Lipton, Lonnie McAllister, Terry Richardson, and Erik Wilkins- McKee.