Countering Overseas Threats: DOD and State Need to Address Gaps in Monitoring of Security Equipment Transferred to Lebanon
Published: 2014-02-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2009, the United States has allocated $671 million in security-related assistance for Lebanon to train, modernize, and equip the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces. The U.S. government established end-use monitoring programs to ensure that defense equipment is safeguarded. The Foreign Assistance Act prohibits certain assistance to any unit of foreign security forces if the Secretary of State has credible information that such a unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. GAO was asked to examine U.S. security-related assistance for Lebanon.
This report assesses the extent to which the U.S. government (1) disbursed or committed funds allocated for Lebanese security forces in fiscal years 2009 through 2013, (2) implemented end-use monitoring for equipment transferred to Lebanese security forces, and (3) vetted Lebanese recipients of U.S. security-related training for human rights violations. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed laws and regulations, analyzed agency data, and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and Beirut, Lebanon.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The United States allocated $671 million for Lebanese security forces from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013. Of these total allocated funds, $477 million, or 71 percent, had been disbursed or committed by the end of fiscal year 2013. Nearly all of the allocations made in fiscal years 2009 through 2011 had been disbursed or committed. For the largest program, Foreign Military Financing, the Department of Defense (DOD) had committed about $352 million of the $481 million allocated in fiscal years 2009 through 2013.
Consistent with end-use monitoring requirements, DOD and the Department of State (State) conduct annual inventories for equipment transferred to Lebanese security forces. However, GAO found gaps in efforts to document and monitor physical security of some U.S. equipment transferred to Lebanese security forces that may weaken efforts to safeguard physical security of some equipment. First, while DOD annually inventories sensitive equipment by serial number, as required by its policy, U.S embassy officials in Beirut have not always used DOD's required checklists to document compliance with physical security safeguards. Second, State did not fully document 4 of the 10 end-use monitoring checks it conducted in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 for defense equipment the Lebanese government purchased commercially. State end-use monitoring guidance requires that specific information be documented and maintained for all such checks. Third, while State conducts an annual inventory of the equipment it transfers to the Lebanese security forces, State may not be ensuring that the recipients of defense articles implement recommended physical security safeguards because State lacks procedures to identify defense articles and any recommended safeguards for storing them.
Examples of Items Subject to End-Use Monitoring in Lebanon
GAO estimates that State vetted 100 percent of the Lebanese students that attended U.S.-funded security-related training from October 10, 2010, through April 30, 2013, for human rights violations. On the basis of a cross-check analysis of vetting data and a sample of names from six training rosters, GAO estimates that State vetted all of the 7,104 Lebanese students that attended training during that period.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD ensure U.S. officials use required checklists to confirm Lebanese facilities' compliance with required safeguards, and that State maintain proper documentation of end-use checks and establish formal procedures to ensure that bureaus identify defense articles and any recommended physical security safeguards for storing them. DOD and State concurred.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Lebanon is a religiously diverse country transitioning toward  independence and democratic consolidation after a 15-year civil war and  subsequent occupation by Syrian and Israeli forces. Following Syrian  withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 and the war between Israel and the  Lebanese militant group Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, the United  States significantly increased security-related assistance for Lebanon to  support its efforts to build a stable, secure, and independent democracy.  U.S. agencies have allocated over $925 million in security-related  assistance for Lebanon from fiscal years 2007 through 2012, to train,  modernize, and equip the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal  Security Forces (ISF). Those efforts and the U.S. investment are now  challenged by new tensions resulting from spillover of the civil war in  Syria. Members of Congress have raised concerns about U.S. assistance  to Lebanon and possible weapons smuggling to Hezbollah and other  armed groups, given Hezbollah’s involvement in the Lebanese  government and a clash between the LAF and Israeli Defense Forces  along Lebanon’s and Israel’s shared border.
This is the second of two reports responding to your request that we  review U.S. security equipment and training for Lebanon. In this report,  we assess the extent to which the U.S. government (1) disbursed or  committed funds allocated for Lebanese security forces in fiscal years  2009 through 2013, (2) implemented end-use monitoring for equipment  transferred to Lebanese security forces, and (3) vetted Lebanese  recipients of U.S. security-related training for human rights violations.
To address these objectives, we obtained funding data from the  Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (State) on  programs that provide security-related assistance to Lebanon. We also  examined documents from DOD and State, such as cables, handbooks,  and compliance and inventory reports, and analyzed data on U.S.-  provided equipment, training, end-use checks, and human rights vetting  of applicants for security-related equipment and training. To assess the  extent to which DOD and State complied with their regulations and  guidance on end-use monitoring and human rights vetting, we selected  and analyzed the following: a nongeneralizable random sample of 30  items out of 184 provided to the LAF at two locations in Beirut that  required enhanced end-use monitoring for physical inspection; a  judgmental sample of all 10 end-use checks performed by State for  equipment exported to Lebanon in fiscal years 2010 through 2012; and a  generalizable random sample of 118 of 7,104 Lebanese students who  were vetted for human rights violations from October 10, 2010, through  April 30, 2013. We interviewed DOD and State officials in Washington,  D.C.; at the U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida; and at the U.S.  Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. We also interviewed officials of the LAF and  ISF in Lebanon. To assess the reliability of the data provided, we  requested and reviewed information from officials from each agency  regarding the agency’s underlying financial data systems and the checks,  controls, and reviews used to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the  data provided. We determined that the data provided were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report. Appendix I provides a detailed  description of our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 to February 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Lebanon is a small, religiously diverse country on the Mediterranean Sea  that borders Israel and Syria (see fig. 1).
Religious tensions among Lebanon’s Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims,  and Shiite Muslims, and others, along with an influx of Palestinian  refugees, for decades have underpinned Lebanon’s internal conflicts as  well as its conflicts with neighboring countries. Hezbollah emerged in  Lebanon as a powerful Islamic militant group and since 2005, a member  of Hezbollah has held a cabinet position in the Lebanese government.  Hezbollah is funded by Iran and has been designated by the United  States and Israel as a terrorist organization. In the summer of 2006,  Hezbollah and Israel entered into a month-long conflict that ended with  the adoption of United Nations Resolution 1701 by both the Israeli and  Lebanese governments. The resolution called for, among other things,  Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in parallel with the deployment  of Lebanese and United Nations forces and the disarmament of all armed  groups in Lebanon. Instability arising from the civil war in neighboring  Syria that began in 2011 has exacerbated sectarian conflict within  Lebanon. In May 2013, Hezbollah leaders confirmed their intervention in  the Syrian conflict. Figure 2 presents a timeline of selected political  events in Lebanon.
Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war, the United States has  kept strategic goals for Lebanon constant. These goals are to support  Lebanon as a stable, secure, and independent democracy. The  overarching priorities of U.S. assistance programs for Lebanon focus on  supporting Lebanese sovereignty and stability and countering the  influence of Syria and Iran. Security-related goals for Lebanon focus on  counterterrorism and regional stability or internal security, and  corresponding activities seek to support development of the LAF and the  ISF as the only legitimate providers of Lebanon’s security. The United  States has provided security equipment and training to the LAF, which is  generally responsible for providing border security, counterterrorism, and  national defense, and to the ISF, or national police force, which is  generally responsible for maintaining law and order in Lebanon.
subsections: section_title: End-Use Monitoring
paragraphs: In 1996, Congress amended the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which  authorizes the President to control the sale or export of defense articles  and services, to require the President to establish a program for  monitoring the end-use of defense articles and defense services sold,  leased, or exported under the act, including through Foreign Military  Sales (FMS) and direct commercial sales, or the Foreign Assistance Act  of 1961. The amendment specified that the program should provide  reasonable assurances that recipients comply with restrictions imposed  by the U.S. government on the use, transfer, and security of defense  articles and defense services. The President delegated responsibilities  for the program to the Secretary of Defense, insofar as they relate to  defense articles and defense services sold, leased, or transferred under  FMS, and to the Secretary of State, insofar as they relate to commercial  exports licensed under the Arms Export Control Act. For FMS, DOD’s  Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is responsible for end-use  monitoring; for direct commercial sales, State’s Directorate of Defense  Trade Controls is responsible for end-use monitoring. In addition to the  end-use monitoring requirements under the Arms Export Control Act, the  Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, directs the President to take all  reasonable steps to ensure that aircraft and other equipment made  available to foreign countries for international narcotics control under the  Foreign Assistance Act are used only in ways that are consistent with the  purposes for which such equipment was made available. State’s Bureau  of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has  implemented this requirement by means of its End-Use Monitoring  Program.
section_title: DOD and State Leahy Laws
paragraphs: To help ensure that U.S. assistance is not used to support human rights  violators, Congress prohibits certain types of assistance from being  provided to foreign security forces implicated in human rights abuses.  Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits the United States  from providing assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms  Export Control Act to any unit of a foreign country’s security forces if the  Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed  a gross violation of human rights. This provision is known colloquially as  the State Leahy law. DOD’s annual appropriation contains a similar  provision, known colloquially as the DOD Leahy law. The current version  prohibits funds from being used to support training, equipment, or other  assistance for security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of  Defense has received credible information that the unit has committed a  gross violation of human rights. DOD, in consultation with State, must  give full consideration to any credible information available to State  relating to human rights violations by a unit of the foreign security forces  before it conducts training for the unit. According to State, Leahy laws and  the corresponding policies developed to enforce and supplement these  laws are intended to leverage U.S. assistance to encourage foreign  governments to prevent their security forces from committing human  rights violations and to hold their forces accountable when violations  occur. According to State, U.S. programs subject to the Leahy laws in  Lebanon include Foreign Military Financing; International Narcotics  Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism,  Demining, and Related programs; and Sections 1206 and 1207  authorities. See appendix II for additional information on the U.S. human  rights vetting process.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Have Disbursed or Committed Most of the $671 Million Allocated for Security- Related Assistance Programs for Lebanon in Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013
paragraphs: The United States allocated $671 million for security-related assistance  for Lebanon from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013. Of these total  allocated funds, $477 million, or 71 percent, had been disbursed or  committed by the end of fiscal year 2013. Nearly all of the allocations  made in fiscal years 2009 through 2011 had been disbursed or  committed.
Since 2007, the United States has provided security-related assistance  for Lebanon through the Foreign Military Financing program; the  International Military Education and Training program; the INCLE  program; the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related  programs; and Section 1206 and 1207 authorities for training and  equipping foreign militaries and security forces and for reconstruction,  stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries, respectively. For  the largest program, Foreign Military Financing, DOD had committed  about $352 million of the $481 million allocated from fiscal years 2009  through 2013. Table 1 presents the amounts of funds allocated,  committed, or disbursed to these programs for Lebanon in fiscal years  2009 through 2013. Appendix III provides additional information on the  status of these funds.
Table 2 describes the U.S. security-related assistance programs for  Lebanon and their goals, and identifies the agencies that implement  them.
We provide examples of the types of equipment some of these programs  provide to the Lebanese security forces in the next section.
section_title: DOD and State Monitor End Use of Equipment Transferred to Lebanese Security Forces, but Gaps in Documentation and Security Checks May Limit Efforts to Safeguard Some Equipment
paragraphs: DOD and State conduct end-use monitoring for equipment each has  provided or authorized for sale to Lebanese security forces, but gaps in  implementation of procedures may limit efforts to safeguard some  equipment. DOD annually inventories sensitive equipment by serial  number, as required by its policy; however, U.S. embassy officials in  Beirut have not always used DOD’s required checklists to document  compliance with security safeguards and accountability procedures. In  addition, State officials in headquarters and at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut  did not always document the results of end-use monitoring checks as  specified in State guidance. Finally, State INL officials annually inventory  all equipment INL has provided to the ISF, but INL may not be ensuring  that the ISF is implementing recommended physical security safeguards  for defense articles because INL lacks procedures to identify defense  articles and the recommended safeguards for storing them.
subsections: section_title: DOD Officials Conduct Annual Inventories in End- Use Monitoring for Sensitive Equipment
paragraphs: DOD officials conduct annual inventories as part of end-use monitoring  through the Golden Sentry program, which is DOD’s program to comply  with requirements of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, related to  the end use of defense articles and services. DOD personnel at U.S.  missions worldwide conduct the monitoring activities established and  overseen by DSCA. Under this program, DOD conducts two levels of  monitoring: routine end-use monitoring and enhanced end-use  monitoring.
Routine end-use monitoring: DOD conducts routine end-use  monitoring for defense articles and services sold through FMS that do  not have any unique conditions associated with their transfer. Routine  end-use monitoring is conducted in conjunction with other required  security-related duties. For example, U.S. officials might observe how  a host country’s military is using U.S. equipment when visiting a  military installation on other business.
Enhanced end-use monitoring: DOD conducts enhanced end-use  monitoring for defense services, technologies, or articles specifically  identified as sensitive—such as night vision devices. DOD policy  requires serial number inventories for defense articles requiring  enhanced end-use monitoring following delivery of the articles and at  regular intervals thereafter. In addition, Letters of Offer and  Acceptance, the FMS purchase agreements authorizing the sale of an  item, may contain specialized notes or provisos requiring the  purchaser to adhere to certain physical security and accountability  requirements.
With respect to enhanced end-use monitoring, DSCA’s policy manual for  end-use monitoring, the Security Assistance Management Manual, and  the associated standard operating procedures for Beirut require DOD  officials annually to  conduct a physical inventory of 100 percent of designated defense  articles,  conduct physical security checks of facilities where the equipment is  kept, and use and maintain records of equipment-specific checklists that outline  the physical security requirements for Lebanese facilities that store  the equipment.
Officials of DOD’s Office of Defense Cooperation in Beirut told us that  they annually conduct an inventory involving the inspection of serial  numbers for 100 percent of defense articles requiring enhanced end-use  monitoring. Such equipment includes certain types of missiles, night  vision devices, sniper rifles, aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles.  Figure 3 shows examples of defense articles provided to the LAF.
During our visit to Beirut in July 2013, we determined that DOD and the  LAF accounted for almost 100 percent of the defense items in our sample  in two locations. To assess the extent to which DOD accounts for  equipment provided to the LAF, we drew a random sample by serial  number from DOD’s equipment inventory database for two locations we  planned to visit during our fieldwork in Lebanon. The items in the  sample included various types of night vision devices at one location and  various types of night vision devices and a sniper rifle at the other  location. Although the results cannot be generalized to these or other  locations, they showed that DOD and the LAF accounted for almost 100  percent of the items in our sample in both locations. In addition, during  our visit, DOD performed its 2013 inventory of 100 percent of the  equipment provided to one of the LAF regiments, including some new  equipment not previously inventoried. The DOD officials were able to  confirm that all equipment was either physically present or accounted for  through documentation. Figure 4 shows U.S. officials conducting the  inventory of U.S.-provided equipment at an LAF facility.
When U.S. travel restrictions due to security concerns prohibit U.S.  embassy personnel from traveling to specific areas of Lebanon in which  some LAF storage facilities are located, DOD officials in Beirut require the  LAF to bring the equipment to a central location in Beirut to allow the  DOD officials to conduct the annual inventory. DOD quarterly reports from  2011 through 2013 show 100 percent accountability for equipment  provided to the LAF.
section_title: DOD Officials Have Not Always Used Required Checklists to Document Compliance with Security Safeguards
paragraphs: As part of end-use monitoring, DSCA’s Security Assistance Management  Manual and the standard operating procedures for Beirut require DOD  officials to conduct physical security checks of LAF facilities, using a  required checklist to document accountability and physical security of  U.S.-provided equipment. While DOD’s quarterly reports from 2011  through 2013 show 100 percent accountability for equipment provided to  the LAF, during our site visit in July 2013, we determined that DOD  officials in Beirut were not using the required checklist to document  compliance with physical security safeguards. The DOD manual  specifically directs that enhanced end-use monitoring must be performed  using checklists developed by the military departments. Furthermore,  according to the manual, all such checks must be recorded, with the  physical security and accountability checklists attached to the inventory  records that must be maintained for 5 years.
According to a DOD official in Beirut, at least 75 percent of the U.S.- provided equipment subject to end-use monitoring is held in locations  where DOD can and has conducted inspections to verify compliance with  physical security requirements. For the remaining facilities, DOD  mitigates security challenges by other means. DOD officials stated that a  U.S. embassy employee who is a Lebanese national had visited some  locations that U.S. officials were not able to visit because of security  concerns and had conducted physical security compliance checks at  those locations. For each of the remaining facilities that neither a U.S.  official nor this Lebanese employee could personally inspect, DOD also  requires the LAF to submit a letter attesting that the appropriate physical  security measures had been implemented.
During our site visit in July 2013, we determined that when DOD officials  in Beirut were able to conduct physical security checks, they were not  using checklists for enhanced end-use monitoring required by DSCA’s  Security Assistance Management Manual to ensure that security  safeguards and accountability procedures are in place. The manual  directs that enhanced end-use monitoring must be performed using  checklists developed by the military departments. Furthermore, according  to the manual, all such checks must be recorded, with the physical  security and accountability checklists attached to the inventory records  that must be maintained for 5 years.
Our finding was consistent with the results of a 2011 DSCA compliance  assessment visit, when DSCA officials also found that the DOD Office of  Defense Cooperation in Beirut was not using the required checklists to  verify Lebanese compliance with facility security requirements. In April  2012, U.S. officials in Beirut responded to the DSCA finding, stating that  they planned to use the checklists during their 2012 annual inventory. In  their response, they also stated that the requirement to use DSCA- provided checklists during inventories was captured in the post’s updated  standard operating procedures for end-use monitoring. We followed up  on this matter in September 2013 and found that, when presented  examples of the checklists, DOD officials in Beirut said that they were not  aware of the checklists. The officials, however, noted that the information  requested in the checklists is the same type of information they enter into  the Security Cooperation Information Portal, which is the system used to  record end-use monitoring activities. However, the documentation of the  end-use monitoring we observed did not include sufficient information on  the physical security of the equipment. Use of the checklists would help  ensure that DOD officials document compliance with physical security  requirements for defense items transferred to the LAF. Without such  documentation, it is not clear whether DOD officials verify physical  security safeguards as required by DSCA’s manual. In December 2013,  DOD officials acknowledged that there had been a gap in the Office of  Defense Cooperation’s use of the checklists.
section_title: State Did Not Consistently Document End-Use Checks for Defense Equipment That Lebanon Purchased Commercially
paragraphs: State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls administers a program  called Blue Lantern to conduct end-use monitoring for defense articles  and defense services exported through direct commercial sales. Under  the Blue Lantern program, U.S. embassy officials conduct end-use  checks by means of a case-by-case review of export license applications  against established criteria or “warning flags” for determining potential  risks. Embassy officials primarily conduct two types of end-use monitoring  checks: prelicense checks prior to issuance of a license and  postshipment checks after an export has been approved and shipped.
Prelicense checks: A prelicense check may be requested to (1)  confirm the bona fides of an unfamiliar consignee or end-user; (2)  ensure that details of a proposed transaction match those identified  on a license application; (3) confirm that the end-user listed on the  license application has ordered the items in question; (4) verify the  security of facilities where items may be permanently or temporarily  housed; and (5) help to ensure that the foreign party understands its  responsibilities under U.S. regulations and law.
Postshipment checks: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls may  request a postshipment check in order to (1) confirm that the party or  parties named on the license received the licensed items exported  from the United States; (2) determine whether the items have been or  are being used in accordance with the provisions of that license; (3)  identify any parties involved in the transaction that are not listed on  the license application; and (4) determine the specific use and  handling of the exported articles, or other issues related to the  transaction.
State’s Blue Lantern guidebook provides instructions to U.S. diplomatic  posts on how to conduct Blue Lantern end-use monitoring, including  reporting and documentation requirements. For example, the guide  specifies the type of information that should be included in cables from  the overseas posts in response to an inquiry from State.
In fiscal years 2007 through 2012, State conducted 15 Blue Lantern end- use monitoring checks for equipment—mostly firearms for the ISF— authorized for export to Lebanon through direct commercial sales. State  reported favorable results for 14 of the Blue Lantern checks and  unfavorable results for one.
On the basis of our review of State documents and interviews with U.S.  officials in Washington, D.C., and Beirut, we determined that State  officials in headquarters and at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut did not always  document the results of the Blue Lantern checks consistent with guidance  specified in State’s Blue Lantern guidebook. According to the guidebook,  all Blue Lantern requests are sent by cable to the U.S. embassy or  consulate in the country or countries involved in the transaction. The  guidebook specifies that Blue Lantern cables prepared by the U.S.  mission in response to the request should describe specific actions taken  and results of the inquiry, including identification of persons interviewed;  description of documents or equipment reviewed; difficulties incurred;  degree of cooperation by the end-users, consignees, or both; and  recommendations for State action, if appropriate. According to the  guidebook, the U.S. mission should maintain detailed records regarding  the Blue Lantern cases as a resource to facilitate future checks and to  brief new staff on how to conduct the checks.
To assess State’s compliance with its Blue Lantern guidance, we selected  a judgmental sample of all 10 Blue Lantern checks for equipment  exported or intended for export to Lebanon in fiscal years 2010 through  2012 and requested copies of the cables associated with those checks.
State documented the details of 5 of the 10 checks in diplomatic cables  and 1 in e-mail messages. For the 4 remaining Blue Lantern checks,  State officials informed us that the requests from headquarters and the  responses from the embassy were made by e-mail. We asked for copies  of the e-mails, but State officials told us that the e-mails were no longer in  State’s information system. A State official noted that the Blue Lantern  database had case summaries based on the e-mails. However, the  summary information in the database consisted of notes that did not  always contain all the required information specified in State’s guidance.  For example, the summary information for the cases in which the e-mails  were no longer available showed that the embassy officials met with the  ISF but did not identify the officials interviewed. Without the information  specified in the guidebook, State may not have information it needs to  fully inform future checks and train new staff. State said in February 2014  that the U. S. Embassy in Beirut has established a policy requiring all  Blue Lantern responses to be sent via cable to Washington, D.C., in order  to ensure that there is a permanent record of the Embassy's response to  a Blue Lantern check.  However, State did not provide support this  statement.
section_title: State’s INL Inventories Equipment Provided to the ISF but May Not Be Ensuring That Recipients Implement Recommended Physical Security Safeguards for Defense Articles
paragraphs: As required by INL’s End-Use Monitoring Program, INL officials conduct  an annual inventory by serial number of equipment that INL has provided  to the ISF. This equipment typically includes office furniture, vehicles, and  computer equipment but may also include boats, training firearms, and  police vehicles. (See fig. 5 for photographs of equipment INL provided to  the ISF.) INL personnel said they had attached barcodes to the  equipment and we observed them use a scanner to inventory the  equipment. The 2012 INL inventory report for Lebanon shows that INL  personnel inspected about 78 percent of 1,243 items provided to the  Lebanese security forces. INL personnel may also inspect items by  secondary means including comparing inventory records and consulting  with host government officials.
While INL officials annually inventory all equipment INL has provided to  the ISF, INL may not be ensuring that the ISF is implementing  recommended physical security safeguards for defense articles because  INL lacks procedures to identify defense articles and the recommended  safeguards for storing them. In May 2013, we asked INL officials if any of  the equipment INL had provided to Lebanon were defense articles.  Though INL officials first told us that they had provided no defense  articles or any other controlled items to Lebanon, in August 2013 INL  provided us with its formal response confirming that it had provided two  defense articles to the ISF—night vision devices and ceramic plates for  bullet proof vests. With regard to these two articles, we found the  following:  INL consulted with the directorate only one of the two times it sought  to transfer defense articles to Lebanon during the period covered by  our review. While INL did not have formal procedures for identifying  defense articles, INL officials stated that their practice is to contact  State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, which licenses direct  commercial sales of defense articles, when providing equipment  pursuant to a certain license exception. In 2012, INL consulted with  the directorate to confirm that no export license would be required for  the provision of night vision devices to the Government of Lebanon.  In the directorate’s memo back to INL confirming that no license was  required, INL was informed of physical security safeguards that the  directorate recommended that the INL should direct the ISF to  implement as conditions for a transfer of night vision devices to the  ISF. However, INL did not consult the directorate about ceramic  plates, which INL provided for bullet proof vests that it transferred to  the ISF in February 2013 under the license exception. This was the  only other case that INL identified in which it provided a defense  article to the ISF. Although INL did not consult with the directorate  about the ceramic plates, INL officials said that INL would contact the  directorate in the future about any defense articles it planned to  transfer to the ISF.
INL lacked written procedures to determine what physical security  safeguards are recommended for defense articles. INL officials said  that the ISF secures INL-provided equipment and guards the facilities  where it is stored. According to embassy officials in Beirut, there are  no INL requirements for inspecting the ISF facilities where U.S.- provided equipment is stored. However, when INL consulted the  Directorate of Defense Trade Controls about the transfer of night  vision devices to the ISF, the directorate recommended that INL place  10 conditions on the transfer. These conditions included 5 technical  parameters setting limitations on the performance of key components  of the night vision devices, such as the brightness and resolution of  their image intensifier tubes, and 5 physical security safeguards that  the ISF should implement, such as storing the devices in a secured,  locked facility. State officials in Washington, D.C., said that, although  the conditions communicated by the directorate to the INL were not  requirements, embassy officials would, in the future, inspect ISF  facilities to see that the recommended physical security safeguards  were being implemented. Nonetheless, in the absence of written  procedures, it is unclear what procedures INL would follow for future  transfers of defense articles. Moreover, INL communicated the  conditions of the transfer of night vision devices to the ISF only in  September 2013, after transferring the equipment in August 2013.  Communicating conditions for physical security safeguards to the ISF  after delivery of the equipment could lessen INL’s ability to determine  whether the ISF implements those safeguards.
In response to our inquiries on its plans to address potential gaps in  physical security safeguards for defense articles, INL stated in January  2014 that it would update its Acquisition Handbook to document new  policies. State anticipates that changes to the handbook would require  INL to inform the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls of INL’s decision  to procure and provide equipment without an export license, as allowed  under Section 38(b)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act. However, it is  unclear whether these revisions would establish procedures to (1) identify  when items are defense articles and (2) determine if physical security  safeguards are recommended.
section_title: U.S. Government Has Vetted Lebanese Recipients for Human Rights Violations Prior to Providing Assistance
paragraphs: State’s 2012 Guide to Vetting Policy and Process—a primary source of  guidance for U.S. personnel responsible for implementing the Leahy  laws—requires State officials in Washington, D.C., and overseas to vet  for potential human rights violations all individuals or units nominated to  receive training or equipment by checking their names against files,  databases, and other sources of information. In detailing the steps for  vetting, the guidance specifies that relevant data are to be entered into  the International Vetting and Security Tracking (INVEST) database.  INVEST is State’s official system of record for conducting Leahy vetting  and recording compliance with the Leahy laws. State requires human  rights vetting through INVEST unless the individual or unit has already  been vetted within the prior year, according to a State official. State  approves, suspends, or denies the requests for training as a result of its  vetting efforts.  Our review of State’s INVEST database showed that  State vetted almost 10,000 individuals and units in Lebanon that applied  for U.S. training from October 10, 2010, through April 30, 2013. The  majority (77 percent), applied for INCLE training (see figure 6). By cross- checking a random sample of names from six rosters for U.S. training  delivered to Lebanese security force individuals or units against State’s  designated vetting database, we found that all the names in the sample  had been vetted for human rights violations before the individuals  received the training, as required.
State approved training for approximately 93 percent of the candidates  and disallowed training for the remaining 7 percent for whom the vetting  process produced a suspension. While administrative reasons accounted  for most of the suspensions, such as a name submitted with insufficient  time for vetting clearance prior to the class start date, potential human  rights violations accounted for a few suspensions. U.S. officials in Beirut  communicated suspensions based on human rights violations to  Lebanese government officials.  Administrative reasons for some  suspensions were not communicated to the Lebanese government  because the U.S. officials did not think they were required to do so. In  September 2013, we reported that State guidance to embassies on the  human rights vetting process did not specify whether the requirement to  inform foreign governments applies when a unit or individual is  suspended from receiving assistance. Hence, we recommended that  State provide clarifying guidance for implementing the duty-to-inform  requirement of the State Leahy law, such as guidance on whether U.S.  embassies should or should not notify a foreign government in cases of  suspensions. On the basis of evidence presented in a June 2013  Human Rights Watch report on Lebanon, in August 2013, State issued its  first denial for training to individuals from the Drugs Repression Bureau of  the ISF and informed ISF about this denial. As a result of the denial,  three Lebanese counternarcotics officials were not approved for a  September 2013 training course. Officials of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut  communicated the reasons for the denial to the ISF during the course of  our review.
On the basis of our cross-check analysis of a sample of names from six  training rosters against INVEST data, we estimated that State vetted for  potential human rights violations all Lebanese students who attended  security forces training from October 10, 2010, through April 30, 2013.  We selected a random sample of 118 names from training rosters from  the Lebanese Armed Forces; INCLE; Antiterrorism Assistance and other  Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related programs; and  International Military Education and Training. We cross-checked those  names with the names of all Lebanese candidates vetted for human rights  violations through INVEST from October 10, 2010, through April 30, 2013.  Results of our analysis show that all 118 names on the training rosters  were also found in INVEST. Therefore, we estimate that 100 percent of  the 7,104 Lebanese students that attended U.S. training during that  period were vetted for human rights violations through INVEST before  they received training (see table 3).
The U.S. Embassy in Beirut also conducts human rights vetting for units  that are to receive equipment. In November 2011, State agreed with our  recommendation that it implement individual- and unit-level human rights  vetting for all recipients of equipment. As of July 2013, Bureau of  Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor officials said that vetting of units  that receive equipment is increasing worldwide and that the bureau hopes  to achieve State-wide concurrence implementing the recommendation.
State guidance also requires embassies to develop standard operating  procedures for human rights vetting. The U.S. Embassy in Beirut  developed standard operating procedures to implement State guidance  during the course of our review. In September 2013, we found that State  does not monitor whether all U.S. embassies have developed standard  operating procedures that address the Leahy laws’ requirements.  Therefore, we recommended, and State agreed, to ensure that all U.S.  embassies have standard operating procedures that address human  rights vetting requirements in the Leahy laws.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: U.S. agencies have allocated hundreds of millions of dollars for  equipment and training to the government of Lebanon as part of U.S.  efforts to build partner capacity and address threats to U.S. interests.  Such efforts remain a U.S. priority. Just as important to the interests of  the United States and its partners are efforts to ensure that any provided  security-related equipment or training assistance does not help those who  wish to do harm to the United States or its partners. Hence, end-use  monitoring and human rights vetting are two critical activities that the U.S.  government employs in Lebanon and worldwide to prevent misuse of its  security-related equipment and training assistance. However, existing  implementation gaps may weaken efforts to safeguard some equipment  from misuse. These gaps involve embassy officials not utilizing required  checklists to verify Lebanese facilities’ safeguards for sensitive defense  equipment and not documenting details of State’s end-use checks.  Closing these gaps could help mitigate the impact of security-related  travel restrictions on U.S. officials’ access to some locations and could  also help raise the level of confidence that Lebanese security forces are  complying with security requirements. Because end-use monitoring in  Lebanon is intended to provide U.S. officials with visibility over the  implementation of required safeguards, the above-mentioned gaps  reduce the U.S. government’s confidence that safeguards are being  properly implemented to prevent equipment from falling into the wrong  hands. Furthermore, the absence of INL procedures for identifying  defense articles erodes confidence that State officials are applying  recommended end-use monitoring and security safeguards on defense  equipment. On a more positive note, our analysis did confirm that 100  percent of the Lebanese recipients of U.S. training were vetted for human  rights violations and that this system appears to be working as intended in  Lebanon.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that U.S. agencies are in a better position to ensure  adequate safeguards for and monitoring of sensitive equipment, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense take additional steps to ensure  that Office of Defense Cooperation officials in Beirut use the checklists  required during the physical security checks.
In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the following  three actions:
Direct the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and U.S. officials  overseas to maintain cables or e-mails as required by State guidance  to document each Blue Lantern end-use check.
Direct State bureaus transferring equipment to foreign security forces  under security-related assistance programs to establish formal written  procedures to identify whether items are defense articles.
Direct State bureaus transferring equipment to foreign security forces  under security-related assistance programs to establish formal written  procedures to consult with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls  to determine if there are additional safeguards recommended for the  transfer of the defense articles.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD and State for comment. DOD  and State provided written comments which are reprinted in appendixes  IV and V, respectively. State also provided technical comments, which we  have incorporated into the report, as appropriate. In their comments, DOD  and State generally concurred with the report’s findings and  recommendations.
In its written comments, DOD noted that the Office of Defense  Cooperation in Beirut has started taking steps to address the  recommendation.
In its written comments, State noted that while it agreed with our  recommendation that it maintain records of cables and e-mails that  document each Blue Lantern end-use check, it disagreed with our finding  that it did not adequately do so with regard to Lebanon. State noted that it  did document key findings of the four inquiries in the Blue Lantern  database, as these cases were adjudicated together as a group involving  the same foreign consignee and Lebanese Security Forces. However, as  we pointed out in the draft report, the summary information in State’s  database consisted of notes that did not always contain all the required  information specified in State’s guidance. For example, the summary  information on the four cases showed that the embassy officials met with  the ISF but did not identify the officials interviewed. State also noted that  the draft referred to defense articles that were "exported" to Lebanon  rather than “authorized” for export. We have revised the report  accordingly.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until five days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to appropriate  congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of  State; and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available  at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of this review were to assess the extent to which the U.S.  government (1) disbursed or committed funds allocated for Lebanese  security forces in fiscal years 2009 through 2013, (2) implemented end- use monitoring for equipment transferred to Lebanese security forces,  and (3) vetted Lebanese recipients of U.S. security-related training for  human rights violations. To address these objectives, we obtained  funding data from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department  of State (State) on programs that provide security-related assistance to  Lebanon. We also analyzed documents from DOD and State, such as  cables, manuals, handbooks, compliance and inventory reports, and data  on U.S.-provided equipment, training, and end-use checks, among  others. We interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C.; at the U.S.  Central Command in Tampa, Florida; and at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut,  Lebanon, as well as officials of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and  Internal Security Forces (ISF) in Beirut, Lebanon.
To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has disbursed or  committed security-related assistance funding for Lebanon’s security  forces since fiscal year 2009, we requested data from State and DOD.  The funding data we report represent the balances as of September 30,  2013. State provided data on the status of allocations, obligations,  unobligated balances, and disbursements for all of the funding accounts  that support security-related assistance in Lebanon: Foreign Military  Financing; International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement;  International Military Education and Training; and Nonproliferation,  Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs; and Section 1206 and  1207 authorities. State collected the data directly from each bureau for  State-implemented accounts and from DOD for Foreign Military Financing  and International Military Education and Training. However, because  Foreign Military Financing funds are budgeted and tracked in a different  way than other foreign assistance accounts, DOD provided us with data  on commitments. Recognizing that different agencies and bureaus may  use slightly different accounting terms, we provided each agency with the  definitions from GAO’s A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget  Process and requested that each agency provide the relevant data  according to those definitions. We also discussed the types of assistance  provided with various officials of the LAF and the ISF. To assess the  reliability of the data provided, we requested and reviewed information  from officials from each agency regarding the agency’s underlying  financial data system(s) and the checks, controls, and reviews used to  ensure the accuracy and reliability of the data provided. We determined  that the data provided were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report.
To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has implemented  end-use monitoring for equipment provided to Lebanese security forces,  we reviewed relevant laws and regulations, DOD and State policy  guidance, and reports and other documents; analyzed equipment and  end-use monitoring data and reports; and interviewed officials from DOD,  State, the LAF, and the ISF.
For DOD’s Golden Sentry program, we reviewed policy and guidance  documents, including the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s  Security Assistance Management Manual, the Office of Defense  Cooperation-Beirut’s Standard Operating Procedures, the Security  Cooperation Information Portal End-Use Monitoring Customer Assistance  Handbook, and U.S. Central Command regulations. We also obtained  and analyzed the 2012 Compliance Assessment Visit to Lebanon report,  U.S. Central Command Inspector General Report for the Office of  Defense Cooperation-Beirut, annual end-use monitoring reports for  Lebanon, reports of lost or destroyed U.S. equipment provided to  Lebanon, Lebanese compliance plans for safeguarding U.S. equipment,  and security checklists required for enhanced end-use equipment in  Lebanon. In addition, we reviewed and analyzed data and management  reports on the equipment provided to Lebanon and end-use checks.  Specifically, we reviewed management reports from DOD’s Security  Cooperation Information Portal database, including delinquent,  reconciliation, ad-hoc, and trend reports. We used the portal database to  identify defense articles provided to Lebanon that require routine and  enhanced end-use monitoring and the compliance actions taken for the  items. We compared the data on defense articles and end-use monitoring  to the various management reports and found the data to be sufficiently  reliable for our purposes. Using the data provided by DOD, we drew a  nongeneralizable random sample of 30 items for physical inspection out  of 184 items that required enhanced end-use monitoring at two locations  in Beirut, Lebanon. During our fieldwork at one of the locations, we  observed DOD officials conducting enhanced end-use monitoring checks.  In addition, we interviewed DOD officials with the Defense Security  Cooperation Agency, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations  Command, and the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. In Lebanon, we also met with  officials from the LAF and the ISF.
For State’s Blue Lantern program, we reviewed the Blue Lantern  guidebook. We reviewed and analyzed Direct Commercial Sales license  data, and Blue Lantern checks for Lebanon from fiscal years 2007  through 2012. Although State conducted 15 checks between fiscal years  2007 and 2012, we analyzed only the 10 Blue Lantern checks conducted  in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. We limited our analysis to checks during  these years to increase the likelihood that the embassy officials who  conducted these checks would still be in their current positions, thereby  enabling further discussion about the specific details of the checks. We  requested both outgoing and responding cables for each of the 10  checks; State was unable to provide cables or email communication for 4  of the 10 Blue Lantern checks. Based on summary information provided  for each check and cables and e-mail correspondence on 7 of the 10  checks, we analyzed and recorded information about each case,  including the subject of the check, the commodity checked, license  conditions, evidence that site visits were or were not requested and  conducted, inventories requested and conducted, and any follow-up that  post indicated was necessary. We determined the Blue Lantern data to  be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. In addition, we interviewed State  officials in the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs, the Bureau of Near  Eastern Affairs, the Office of Foreign Assistance, and the Directorate of  Defense Trade Controls in Washington, D.C., as well as officials at the  U.S. Embassy in Beirut.
For State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement  Affairs (INL), we reviewed policy and procedure guidelines for end-use  monitoring. We obtained and analyzed inventory lists of equipment that  INL provided to Lebanon’s security forces during fiscal years 2007  through 2012, data extracted from the Integrated Logistics Management  System database. We received a demonstration on the use of this  database to record annual inspection and inventory of equipment. In  addition, we reviewed annual inspection reports submitted by embassy  officials, Letters of Offer and Acceptance, and a sample transfer letter that  contained inspection requirements. In addition, we toured two ISF  facilities in Beirut, Lebanon, and observed INL-provided equipment.  Lastly, we interviewed State officials of the Bureaus Political and Military  Affairs, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and Near  Eastern Affairs; the Office of Foreign Assistance; the Directorate of  Defense Trade Controls; and the U.S. Embassy in Beirut.
To assess the extent to which the U.S. government vetted Lebanese  recipients of U.S. security-related training for potential human rights  violations, we interviewed DOD and State officials, reviewed both  agencies’ vetting guidance, and analyzed State documents from Lebanon  on individuals and units vetted. We interviewed officials from State’s  Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and Bureau of Near  Eastern Affairs who are responsible for overseeing the human rights  vetting process and answering questions from vetting personnel at the  U.S. Embassy in Beirut. In Lebanon, we also met with U.S. embassy  officials from DOD and State, and also relevant officials from the  Department of Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development  to understand these other agencies’ roles in the human rights vetting  process. We also met with representatives of the LAF and ISF to  understand their familiarity with the Leahy laws and the U.S. human rights  vetting process, as well as how the U.S. Embassy in Beirut  communicates vetting results to them. In addition, we reviewed State’s  human rights vetting guidance, including the Leahy human rights vetting  guide; the International Vetting and Security Tracking (INVEST) user  guide; multiple cables from State communicating directives to embassies  regarding the implementation of the State and DOD Leahy laws; and a  Joint Staff message issued by DOD in June 2004 that provided guidance  on human rights verification for DOD-funded training of foreign security  forces.
Furthermore, we reviewed the State and DOD Leahy laws, as well as the  U.S. Embassy in Beirut’s standard operating procedures. Lastly, to  assess whether or not Lebanese students who attended training were  previously vetted for potential human rights violations, we analyzed data  from State’s INVEST database on almost 10,000 Lebanese individuals or  units vetted from October 10, 2010, through April 30, 2013. We  requested, obtained, and reviewed six training rosters with about 7,100  names of Lebanese students that attended training from October 1, 2010,  to April 30, 2013, provided by these security-related assistance programs:  International Military Education and Training; International Narcotics  Control and Law Enforcement; and Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism,  Demining, and Related programs. We selected a random sample of 118  Lebanese names that included representation from all rosters, with a  minimum of 10 sampled names per roster. We provided this list of names  to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and observed as  a bureau official entered the first and last name into the search feature of  INVEST. If the name was found, we then confirmed other fields, such as  the date and description of the training, or the rank of the trainee. Despite  some spelling variations, all 118 names of students were found in  INVEST. Therefore, we estimate that 100 percent of the Lebanese  recipients of training were vetted. The 95 percent margin of error on this  estimate is 3 percentage points.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 to February 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: U.S. Human Rights Vetting Process
paragraphs: To address both the State and DOD Leahy laws and determine whether  there is credible information of a gross violation of human rights, State  has established a U.S. human rights vetting process. The State-led  process, as illustrated in figure 7, consists of vetting by personnel  representing selected agencies and State offices at (1) the U.S. Embassy  in Beirut and State headquarters in Washington, D.C.; (2) State’s Bureau  of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; and (3) State’s Bureau of Near  Eastern Affairs. The personnel involved in the vetting process screen  prospective recipients of assistance by searching relevant files,  databases, and other sources of information for credible information  about gross violations of human rights. State processes, documents, and  tracks human rights vetting requests and results through its International  Vetting and Security Tracking system (INVEST), a web-based database.  The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor is responsible for  overseeing the vetting process and for developing human rights vetting  polices, among other duties.
section_title: Appendix III: Status of Funds for U.S. Security-Related Assistance Programs for Lebanon
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (State)  allocated $671 million in security-related assistance for Lebanon in fiscal  years 2009 through 2013, with funds varying by year and program. The  agencies utilized eight programs to provide this security-related  assistance: Foreign Military Financing, International Narcotics Control and  Law Enforcement, Section 1206, International Military Education and  Training, Antiterrorism Assistance, Counterterrorism Financing, Export  Control and Related Border Security, and Section 1207. See figures 8  through 15 for details on allocation, obligation, and disbursement, or  commitment of funds for each program’s security-related assistance  provided to Lebanon in fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Data are as of  September 30, 2013.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of State
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Jeff Phillips (Assistant Director),  Claude Adrien, Jenna Beveridge, David Dayton, Justin Fisher, Julia Ann  Roberts, and La Verne Tharpes made key contributions to this report.  Martin de Alteriis, Jeff Isaacs, Grace Lui, and Etana Finkler provided  additional technical assistance.