Secure Communities: Criminal Alien Removals Increased, but Technology Planning Improvements Needed
Published: 2012-07-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Initiated in 2008, Secure Communities is an ICE program designed to identify potentially removable aliens, particularly those with criminal convictions, in state and local law enforcement custody. Fingerprints checked against a Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal database are checked against DHSs immigration database to help determine whether an arrested individual is removable. GAO was asked to review Secure Communities operations. This report addresses (1) enforcement trends under Secure Communities, (2) ICEs adherence to best practices in acquiring Secure Communitiesrelated technology, and (3) ICE safeguards to help protect against potential civil rights abuses under Secure Communities. GAO analyzed ICE data on removals from October 2008 through March 2012, and arrest charges from October 2010 through March 2012; reviewed program guidance, policies, and reports; and interviewed ICEs Law Enforcement Support Center and agency officials, local law enforcement and community groups in four locations selected for geographic diversity, among other factors. These perspectives are not generalizable, but provided insights into Secure Communities operations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Data from the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) indicate that the percentage of its removals attributable to Secure Communities increased from about 4 percent in fiscal year 2009 to about 20 percent in fiscal year 2011. Of about 183,000 aliens removed under the program from October 2008 through March 2012, about 74 percent had a criminal conviction. ICE did not have state or local arrest charges for about 56 percent of alien Secure Communities removals from October 2010 (when ICE began collecting arrest charges) through March 2012, so we were unable to determine the most frequent arrest charges under the program. For the 44 percent of aliens removed on whom ICE collected arrest charge data, traffic offenses, including driving under the influence of alcohol, were the most frequent arrest charges. ICE is taking steps to improve the collection of arrest charge data, but it is too early to assess the effectiveness of its efforts.
ICE has not consistently followed best practices in acquiring technology to help determine the immigration status of aliens identified by Secure Communities. ICE awarded contracts to modernize its technology without fully defining requirements or developing an integrated master scheduletwo best practices for managing capital programs. As a result, ICE encountered delays, cost increases, and products that did not meet ICEs needs. For example, ICE spent $14.3 million for one contract to develop services that ICE found to be unusable. Establishing well-defined requirements and developing an integrated schedule for completing technology modernization could better position ICE to prevent delays and cost increases. Further, ICE plans to develop a workforce plan after the systems are deployed. Developing a workforce plan prior to full system deployment, consistent with internal controls, could better position ICE to effectively use staff when it deploys the modernized technology.
DHSs Office of Civil Rights and ICE identified four safeguards to help protect aliens civil rights under Secure Communities, including providing detainees with a revised detainer form with telephone numbers to call when they feel their civil rights have been violated. Officials are also developing briefing materials on how to protect aliens civil rights, statistically analyzing arrest and other information to identify potential civil rights abuses, and using an existing DHS complaint process for addressing Secure Communities concerns.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that ICE develop well-defined requirements and an integrated master schedule that accounts for all activities for its technology contracts, and a plan for workforce changes in preparation for full technology deployment. DHS concurred with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimated that as of  January 2011 there were about 11.5 million aliens (non-U.S. citizens)  living in the United States without lawful immigration status. DHS’s U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for  apprehending and removing aliens who have violated immigration law. All  aliens not lawfully present in the United States are potentially removable.  Removal is a civil enforcement process that does not lead to a criminal  conviction. A criminal alien is a noncitizen in the United States, who may  be present on a lawful basis or not, who has been convicted of a crime. A  criminal alien lawfully in the United States may be removable, depending on the nature of the particular offense of which the alien was convicted.Secure Communities, initiated in 2008 and expected by DHS to be  deployed nationwide by 2013, is one of ICE’s programs for identifying  potentially removable aliens arrested by state or local law enforcement  agencies, particularly those with criminal convictions. Under Secure  Communities, the fingerprints that these agencies submit to the  Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for criminal  background checks are automatically forwarded to DHS for comparison  with fingerprint records DHS maintains. If the fingerprints match DHS’s  records, ICE is to use its information systems to access law enforcement  and immigration databases to conduct additional analysis of the  individuals’ immigration status and criminal history, and determine  whether to request that the law enforcement agency hold the subject so  ICE can take custody for further enforcement action.
Secure Communities is one of four programs under ICE to identify  criminal aliens who are subject to removal, a key agency enforcement  priority. In addition to Secure Communities, ICE’s Criminal Alien Program  (CAP) is designed to identify, process, and remove criminal aliens from  prisons across the United States; the National Fugitive Operations  Program is to pursue known at-large criminal aliens and fugitive aliens;  and the 287(g) program, authorized by section 287(g) of the Immigration  and Nationality Act, is to provide state and local law enforcement agency  officers with delegation of authority, training, and resources to perform  certain functions of an immigration officer. While identifying criminal  aliens is a priority for ICE, individuals identified by Secure Communities  who are not convicted for the offense for which they are arrested and  have no previous criminal conviction may be removed because they fall  under other ICE priorities (such as previous violations of immigration  laws).
Different stakeholders have provided differing perspectives on the effects  of Secure Communities. According to ICE, Secure Communities  strengthens public safety by improving ICE’s ability to identify, detain, and  ultimately remove criminal aliens nationwide. ICE has also reported that  Secure Communities reduces the potential for racial or ethnic profiling by  state and local law enforcement agencies because anyone who is  arrested and fingerprinted is subject to the Secure Communities matching  process. In contrast, some immigrant advocacy groups have expressed  concern that the program encourages racial profiling because officers  could find pretexts to arrest individuals based on their physical  appearance, knowing that they will be screened for immigration status as  a result of the arrest. Further, these groups believe that Secure  Communities discourages witnesses of crimes and domestic violence  victims from contacting law enforcement for fear of possible deportation.  A DHS Advisory Task Force identified similar community concerns, based  in part on forums held in communities across the country, and concluded  that such fears could erode the police’s ability to build strong relationships  with immigrant communities and engage in community policing.
In March and April 2012, DHS’s Office of Inspector General issued two  reports on Secure Communities, one of which reviewed how ICE  communicated the intent and requirements for participation in Secure  Communities to states and local jurisdictions, and the other reviewed  ICE’s operation of Secure Communities. recommendations made in both reports.
You asked us to review ICE’s implementation of the Secure Communities  program. This report addresses the following questions: (1) What trends  can be identified in ICE’s enforcement actions related to the Secure  Communities program? (2) To what extent has ICE adhered to best  practices to acquire Secure Communities–related technology? (3) What  safeguards, if any, does ICE have in place to protect against potential civil  rights abuses under Secure Communities?
DHS, Office of the Inspector General, Communication Regarding Participation in Secure  Communities, OIG-12-66 (Washington, D.C.: March 2012), and Operations of United  States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Secure Communities, OIG-12-64  (Washington, D.C.: April 2012) (Revised).
Chicago, Illinois; and Miami, Florida, where we met with agency officials,  local law enforcement officials, and community groups. We selected  these field offices because they are geographically dispersed and would  provide perspectives from different parts of the country, and because the  Los Angeles, Chicago, and Miami field offices house three of ICE’s four  Interoperability Response Centers where Secure Communities fingerprint  match information is analyzed. The information obtained from these visits  is not generalizable to other ICE field offices, but it provided valuable  insights into Secure Communities implementation. We also visited ICE’s  Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) in Williston, Vermont, where we  met with officials responsible for determining the immigration status of  individuals identified by Secure Communities as potentially removable.
To identify trends in ICE’s enforcement actions related to the Secure  Communities program, we reviewed ICE’s progress reports for activating  jurisdictions into the program and conducted interviews with ICE officials  on each of our site visits. We reviewed ICE alien removal data from  October 2008 through March 2012, and analyzed arrest charges for  aliens removed from the United States during fiscal year 2011, when ICE  began collecting arrest charge data, and the first half of fiscal year 2012.  We also examined ICE’s policies and procedures for identifying and  removing criminal aliens, and documents related to enforcement actions  and detainers. We interviewed officials from ICE’s Secure Communities  and Law Enforcement Systems and Analysis offices. We assessed the  reliability of Secure Communities–related data by examining  documentation about the various systems that ICE uses to analyze  Secure Communities fingerprint submissions and maintain information on  aliens it encounters, and confirming with ICE officials that the  documentation is accurate and up to date. In doing so, we confirmed that  ICE has controls in place to ensure that the data it maintains on aliens  encountered by the program are entered accurately. We determined that  the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To examine ICE’s efforts to plan and manage the acquisition of  technology for determining the immigration status of aliens identified  through Secure Communities, we reviewed documents, such as  contracts, acquisition plans, and project schedules, from 2007 through  2012, which corresponds to the time frame of ICE’s acquisition efforts.  We reviewed ICE workforce documents related to Secure Communities  technologies, such as LESC budget and staffing data and ICE’s  Deployment Dashboard, a document listing each location where Secure  Communities is activated or is planned to be activated. To obtain  information on workload and staffing issues associated with planned  technology changes, we interviewed headquarters officials in ICE’s  Enforcement and Removal Operations, officials responsible for  overseeing technology procurements in ICE’s Office of the Chief  Information Officer and Office of Acquisition Management, and  knowledgeable officials in the field offices we visited. We evaluated ICE’s  plans for acquiring a modernized system for determining the immigration  status of Secure Communities matches using GAO’s Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government, and best practices for  managing capital investments.
To determine the extent to which DHS has safeguards in place to protect  against potential civil rights abuses, we reviewed ICE documents, such as  the detainer form—the form that ICE sends to state and local law  enforcement agencies to request that they maintain custody of a  removable alien—met with community groups at each of our site visits  regarding Secure Communities, interviewed ICE officials responsible for  managing the Secure Communities program, and officials in DHS’s Office  for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) responsible for addressing  complaints and conducting monitoring activities related to Secure  Communities. We viewed training videos CRCL developed for state and  local law enforcement officials, and reviewed CRCL’s dissemination and  completion plans for additional training videos. We examined documents  and discussed the status of CRCL’s plans for monitoring arrests by state  and local law enforcement with CRCL’s statistician. We discussed  CRCL’s process for individuals to submit civil rights and civil liberties  complaints associated with Secure Communities, and obtained  summaries of complaint investigations under way. We reviewed LESC’s  summary statistics for calls received on its detainee phone line from  December 26, 2011(when it was initiated), through April 17, 2012. We  also reviewed examples of call records from January, February, and  March 2012, and picked three for illustrative purposes. The examples are  not generalizable, but provided us with perspectives on the types of calls  LESC receives. To assess the reliability of the call record data, we  discussed the call receipt process with LESC officials, reviewed the  relevant standard operating procedures, and reviewed the detainee  phone line call categorization guidelines. We determined that the data  were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 through July 2012,  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: ICE has received funding specifically designated for removing criminal  aliens. For example, the fiscal year 2008 DHS appropriations act made  $200 million of ICE’s salaries and expenses appropriation available  through the end of fiscal year 2009 to “improve and modernize efforts to  identify aliens convicted of a crime, sentenced to imprisonment, and who  may be deportable, and remove them from the United States, once they  are judged deportable.” In response, ICE initiated Secure Communities  and issued a plan that detailed how ICE would implement policies and  modernize technologies to accomplish its overall goal of identifying and   ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations  removing criminal aliens.(ERO) is responsible for identifying and apprehending removable aliens,  detaining these individuals when it deems it necessary, and removing  them from the United States. ERO manages the Secure Communities  program and has 24 field offices nationwide.
Under Secure Communities, when an individual is arrested by a state or  local law enforcement agency, the individual’s fingerprints are taken and  automatically checked against the Integrated Automated Fingerprint  Identification System (IAFIS), a national fingerprint and criminal history  system maintained by the FBI, and DHS’s Automated Biometric  Identification System (IDENT) to identify a fingerprint match. IDENT  contains fingerprint and other biometric information on immigration  violators, known or suspected terrorists, criminal aliens, and foreign  nationals who are enrolled in DHS’s United States Visitor and Immigrant  Status Indicator Technology program, among others. When a law  enforcement agency (LEA) arrests and books an individual on suspicion  of committing a crime, the person’s fingerprints are routinely sent to the  FBI for a criminal background check. FBI electronically forwards the  fingerprints to DHS for a check against IDENT records. If there is a  fingerprint match, ICE is to then determine whether the individual is  subject to removal. On the basis of the match, the FBI is to send an  Immigration Alien Query to ICE’s LESC. Using the Alien Criminal  Response Information Management (ACRIMe) system, LESC specialists  are to search multiple databases, such as the FBI’s National Crime  Information Center (NCIC) and the Student and Exchange Visitor  Information System for information on the individual’s criminal history and  immigration status. LESC is to then send an Immigration Alien  Response to the LEA and relevant ICE ERO field office or Interoperability  Response Center (IRC)—offices established in the Los Angeles, Chicago,  Miami, and Buffalo, New York, field offices to expand ICE’s ability to  respond to Secure Communities matches.
The ICE field office or response center is to then determine whether to  send an immigration detainer (Form I-247) to the LEA that has custody of  the individual. A detainer is an ICE request that the law enforcement  agency maintain custody of the individual for up to 48 hours after that  person would otherwise be released, excluding weekends and holidays,  to allow ICE time to administratively arrest (i.e., assume custody of) the  person. The decision whether to issue a detainer for a particular alien is  based on whether the alien falls within ICE’s priorities for removal and  other factors, such as whether ICE detention resources are available, and  whether the individual is still in the custody of the arresting local or state  law enforcement agency (under some circumstances a person may be  held for only a few hours). If the individual is convicted and serves a  criminal sentence, ICE is to wait until the sentence is completed to take  the person into custody. Figure 1 describes the Secure Communities  process.
According to ICE, Secure Communities helps carry out ICE’s civil  immigration enforcement priorities. In a March 2011 memorandum, ICE’s  Director provided guidance to all ICE employees on ICE’s civil  immigration enforcement priorities as they relate to the apprehension,  detention, and removal of aliens across all ICE programs. The types of  crimes included under the different priority classifications are described in  table 1.
In a June 2011 memorandum, ICE’s Director provided guidance to ICE  officers, agents, and attorneys on the exercise of “prosecutorial  discretion” to ensure that the agency’s immigration enforcement  resources are focused on its enforcement priorities. As noted in the  memorandum, because the agency is confronted with more  administrative violations than its resources can address, the agency must  regularly exercise prosecutorial discretion to prioritize its efforts. The  memorandum provides a list of criteria for ICE personnel to use when  assessing whether an individual case is appropriate for an exercise of  prosecutorial discretion. In a second memorandum, also issued in June  2011, ICE provided additional guidance on the use of prosecutorial  discretion for victims, witnesses, and plaintiffs. Specifically, the  additional guidance stated that ICE is to exercise discretion on a case-by- case basis when making detention and enforcement decisions in the  cases of (1) victims of domestic violence, human trafficking, or other  serious crimes; (2) witnesses involved in pending criminal investigations,  plaintiffs in nonfrivolous lawsuits regarding civil rights or civil liberties  violations; and (3) individuals engaging in a protected activity related to  civil or other rights, such as union organizing. In August 2011, DHS  began to review all incoming cases in immigration court to identify the  cases most clearly eligible and ineligible for exercising discretion to not  pursue removal of the individual. DHS and DOJ launched pilot programs  in which an intra-agency team of attorneys from ICE, U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection applied  the June 2011 memorandums to its review of existing cases in the  Denver and Baltimore immigration courts.announced that in the next phase of its pilot, beginning in April 2012, it  would extend its case reviews to immigration courts in Seattle, Detroit,  New Orleans, Orlando, New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.
On March 30, 2012, DHS  ICE has followed an incremental approach to activating Secure  Communities interoperability in jurisdictions nationwide. 2011, ICE has been simultaneously activating all jurisdictions within a  given state into Secure Communities. From October 2008 to August  2011, ICE activated 1,508 jurisdictions after signing individual  memorandums of agreement with their respective state governments. In  August 2011, ICE terminated all existing memorandums of agreement,  stating that they were not required because once a law enforcement  agency voluntarily submits fingerprint data to the federal government, no  agreement with the state is legally necessary for one part of the federal  government to share it with another part.
As of June 5, 2012, ICE had fully activated Secure Communities in all  jurisdictions in 48 states, the District of Columbia, and four United States  territories. Additionally, the program has been partially activated in 2  states. The 50 states where Secure Communities has been fully or  partially activated cover 97 percent of jurisdictions nationwide. ICE plans  to have all jurisdictions in all 50 states and U.S. territories activated by  March 2013. Figure 2 depicts the states activated under Secure  Communities as of June 5, 2012.
A jurisdiction is activated when interoperability between IAFIS and IDENT becomes  functional for that location. For purposes of this report, jurisdiction is synonymous with  county or a county-equivalent.
section_title: Most Secure Communities Removals Were Criminal Aliens, but Arrest Charge Data Are Incomplete
paragraphs: ICE data show that from October 2008 through March 2012, Secure  Communities led to the removal of about 183,000 aliens, of which  approximately 74 percent had a criminal conviction and 26 percent did not  have a criminal conviction known to ICE. All four ICE field offices we  visited were using agency policies to help determine which aliens  identified by Secure Communities should be selected for detention and  removal. Additionally, ICE did not have a record of the state or local arrest  charges for about 56 percent of the aliens that Secure Communities  identified and ICE removed during fiscal year 2011 and the first half of  fiscal year 2012, so we were unable to determine the most frequent arrest  charges of aliens removed under the program. Of the data that ICE  collected, traffic offenses were the most frequent arrest charges, of which  over half were arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol.
subsections: section_title: Secure Communities Removals Have Increased, and ICE Data Show That the Majority of Aliens Removed Had Criminal Convictions
paragraphs: ICE data indicate that the percentage of removals attributable to Secure  Communities has increased from fiscal year 2009 through the first 6  months of fiscal year 2012 and that nearly three-fourths of aliens removed  under the program during this time frame had a criminal conviction. As  shown in table 2, Secure Communities was responsible for identifying  about 20 percent of the approximately 400,000 aliens that ICE removed in  fiscal year 2011, up from approximately 4 percent of the aliens that ICE  removed in fiscal year 2009. Other ICE enforcement programs such as  CAP and 287(g) were responsible for identifying the majority of aliens that  ICE removed in each year since fiscal year 2009.
From October 2008 through March 2012, ICE removed 182,896 aliens  identified by Secure Communities, as indicated by ICE’s data. According  to ICE, all aliens removed committed an immigration violation and were  removable on that basis. About 74 percent had been convicted of a  criminal offense; that is, they were either convicted of the offense that led  to their identification under Secure Communities or had a record of  conviction for a previous offense. For these individuals, the current or  prior criminal conviction served as the basis for ICE’s prioritization for  removal. Twenty-one percent of aliens removed did not have a criminal  conviction known to ICE prior to their removal, but were identified as one  of ICE’s other removal priorities, including aliens who were fugitives or  who reentered the country illegally after removal. The remaining 5  percent of aliens removed also did not have a known criminal conviction  prior to their removal but were nonetheless removable because, for  example, they entered the United States without inspection or violated the  terms of their admission. ICE reports its removal data for aliens without a  criminal conviction under three categories: ICE fugitives; prior removals  and returns; and entries without inspection (EWI) and visa violators.  Figure 3 provides information on the overall composition of Secure  Communities removals by category and figure 4 provides this information  for each activated state.
ICE reported that the total number of Secure Communities removals has  increased each year since fiscal year 2009, but there has been some  variation across fiscal years in the proportion of aliens removed by  criminal level, as shown in figure 5. For example, there was a decrease in  the proportion of convicted criminal Level 3 offenders removed, from 40  percent of total removals in fiscal year 2009 to 26 percent during the first  half of fiscal year 2012. According to ICE, the percentage of removals  who are Level 3 offenders has been decreasing, in part because ICE has  continued to prioritize its resources on the identification and removal of  aliens convicted of felonies. Additionally, ICE redefined its criminal  offense levels between fiscal years 2010 and 2011, causing some Level 3  offenders to be reclassified as Level 2 offenders based upon repeat  misdemeanor offenses, which ICE officials said resulted in an increase in  the percentage of removals who were Level 2 offenders to 19 percent in  fiscal year 2011 as compared with 13 percent in fiscal year 2010, and a  decrease in the percentage classified as level 3.
ICE’s removal data do not reflect those aliens identified as removable  through the Secure Communities program who are currently serving  criminal sentences in state and local prisons, as ICE has not yet detained  and removed them. For example, an alien arrested and identified through  Secure Communities who is then convicted of a felony and classified by  ICE as convicted criminal Level 1 offender is more likely to serve a longer  criminal sentence than a Level 3 offender serving a sentence of less than  1 year. As a result, according to ICE, the percentage of Secure  Communities removals who are Level 1 offenders—ICE’s highest removal  priority—could increase over time as Level 1 offenders complete their  sentences and are removed.
Officials from the four ICE field offices we visited told us that they were  following agency policies to help determine which aliens identified by  Secure Communities should be selected for detention and removal, and  establishing the criminal offense level for each alien. ICE officials said  that aliens are initially classified as Level 1, 2, or 3, based on the offense  category definitions explained in the March 2011 priorities memorandum,  and available information on the aliens’ arrest charges and any previous  convictions. ICE staff told us that they then use this offense level  classification to prioritize which aliens should be detained. ICE officials  said that investigative actions are first focused on aliens who are initially  classified as Level 1, but those classified as Level 2 and 3 may also be  investigated if field offices have the resources to do so. At all four field  offices we visited, ICE officials said that they generally have the  resources to investigate the immigration and criminal histories of aliens  initially classified as Level 1 and Level 2. Officials at three of the field  offices said they also investigate aliens initially classified as Level 3, but  do so only when the office has no one in the Level 1 or 2 category  awaiting review. At the fourth field office, officials said that with their  current resources, they can investigate all aliens initially classified as  Level 1, 2, and 3.
section_title: ICE Had Incomplete Data on Arrest Charges for Over Half of the Aliens It Removed under Secure Communities
paragraphs: ICE did not have a record of the state or local arrest charges for about 56  percent of the approximately 119,000 aliens that Secure Communities  identified and ICE removed during fiscal year 2011 and the first half of  fiscal year 2012, so we were unable to determine the most frequent arrest  charges of aliens removed under the program. ICE officials said that their  records are incomplete because arrest charge information is not always  available at the time ICE agents record aliens’ criminal encounters and  because agents may not have been familiar with a requirement, instituted  by ICE in October 2010, to enter this information into ICE’s database of  investigations, arrests, bookings, detention, and removals. ICE issued  guidance in August 2010 in advance of this requirement, and began  offering training to its agents in the field on the agency’s process for  entering criminal arrest charge information into ICE’s database. Further,  ICE instituted a measure in November 2011 that calls for its data analysis  unit to check on a monthly basis the criminal history database entries of  aliens who did not have convictions at the time of their removal. If the  check returns updated conviction data for these aliens, according to its  guidance, ICE is to update its database to ensure that all available arrest  and conviction data are included. ICE officials told us in May 2012 that  going forward they expect to have arrest and conviction history data on a  higher percentage of aliens as a result of these steps. As these efforts  have only recently been initiated, it is too early to assess the  effectiveness of ICE’s efforts to improve the collection of arrest charge  data.
Of the data ICE did collect, about 37 percent of aliens identified by  Secure Communities and removed during fiscal year 2011 and the first  half of fiscal year 2012 were arrested for traffic offenses (of whom over  half were charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol), about  12 percent were arrested for drug offenses (of whom almost one-third  were charged with marijuana offenses), about 10 percent were arrested  for assault (of whom over half were arrested for unspecified assaults),  and the remaining 40 percent were arrested for other offenses. Table 3  provides the available arrest charge information of aliens that Secure  Communities identified and ICE removed during fiscal year 2011 and the  first half of fiscal year 2012.
section_title: ICE Is Modernizing Its Technology System for Determining Immigration Status, but Acquisition and Implementation Planning Could Be Improved
paragraphs: ICE is modernizing its ACRIMe system to make the process of  determining an individual’s immigration status more efficient, but these  efforts have experienced delays and cost overruns, and developed  products that did not meet mission needs. ICE could mitigate the risk of  further delays and cost overruns by better defining the ACRIMe program’s  requirements and developing an integrated master schedule. ICE could  also better plan its future workforce needs to help realize the anticipated  efficiency gains of the modernized ACRIMe system.
subsections: section_title: ICE Is Modernizing Its ACRIMe System
paragraphs: ICE is in the process of developing a modernized ACRIMe system to  update its aging legacy system and meet the anticipated increase in the  number of law enforcement queries as Secure Communities is  implemented in more jurisdictions across the country. The modernized  ACRIMe system is designed to be accessible throughout ICE and not just  in LESC, as is currently the case. Additionally, to help determine an  individual’s immigration status and offense category, modernized  ACRIMe is intended to allow officials in LESC, ICE field offices, and  response centers to automatically search multiple data sources with a  single electronic query. Currently, LESC staff must conduct separate  searches to obtain information from separate databases and, because of  limitations in the legacy ACRIMe system, they cannot share the full  results of their searches with staff in ICE field offices and response  centers. Since the modernized ACRIMe system is intended to allow users  to search, receive, distribute, and manage relevant immigration status  information, ICE officials expect that the modernized system will eliminate  the need for ICE field office and response center staff to duplicate LESC’s  efforts to determine aliens’ immigration status.
ICE initially planned to develop the modernized ACRIMe system through  three contracts, each for a separate project. The first contract (referred to  here as ACRIMe-1), awarded in March 2008, was to develop a  modernized ACRIMe system so ICE staff could access multiple law  enforcement and immigration databases to determine an individual’s  immigration status and offense category. ICE awarded two additional  contracts in September 2009 to develop six services to further enhance  the functionality of the modernized ACRIMe system. One contract was to  develop a web-based Automated Threat Prioritization (ATP) service that  would allow modernized ACRIMe users to automatically retrieve prior  conviction information from state and federal criminal history records to  help prioritize ICE enforcement actions based on aliens’ criminal charges.  The other contract, the Status Determination Support (SDS) contract, was  to develop five web-based services to enhance the modernized ACRIMe  system’s ability to determine immigration status. The five services were  (1) Status Determination Support, (2) Automated National Crime  Information Center Warrants, (3) Criminal Alien Tracking, (4) Jail  Roster/Release Tracking, and (5) Integrated Case Management. Table  4 provides summary information on the three ACRIMe modernization  projects and the contracts issued in 2008 and 2009.
Weaknesses in ICE’s acquisition planning contributed to delays, cost  increases, and products provided under the contracts that did not meet  mission needs. As of April 2012, ICE had spent approximately $4 million  over its original cost estimate to develop the modernized ACRIMe  system—without the ATP and SDS services—and expected that it would  begin deploying the system in LESC in July 2012 and in ICE field offices  in December 2012. This date is over 2 years after the initial planned  deployment date of March 2010 for the ACRIMe system. Further, the  contractor that ICE selected for the ACRIMe-1 contract did not develop a  system that met ICE’s performance requirements. As a result, ICE  canceled the ACRIMe-1 contract, selected a new contractor in September  2011 to complete and deploy the modernized system, and expects to  award another contract by September 2012 to develop call center  functionalities within the modernized ACRIMe system that were originally  supposed to be delivered through the ACRIMe-1 contract. In August  2011, ICE also canceled the original SDS contract because of the delays  encountered with the ACRIMe-1 contract. Further, because of its  dissatisfaction with the quality of the work completed on the SDS  contract, ICE now plans to award additional contracts to different  contractors to start over with developing the services it requires. ICE has  also reduced the scope of the SDS services’ capabilities (as discussed  below). As a result, ICE expects that the SDS services will be completed  for about $22 million less than the baseline cost estimate, even though it  spent $14.3 million on a contract that did not produce useable services. In  contrast, ICE has expanded the scope of the ATP requirements and  expects to exceed its baseline cost estimate by about $7.8 million. ICE  projects that for the ATP and SDS services, it will be able to meet and  potentially finish ahead of its estimated deployment dates. See appendix I  for additional information on all of ICE’s ACRIMe-related contracts. Table  5 compares the baseline estimates for deployment and cost of the  projects, and status as of April 2012.
The schedule delays and cost increases can be attributed in part to  weaknesses in ICE’s planning, including ICE (1) not fully defining  requirements before awarding contracts and (2) not developing an  integrated master schedule.
According to ICE officials, the agency did not fully define its requirements  before awarding the ACRIMe-1, ATP, or SDS contracts. We have  previously reported that firm requirements should be established at the  beginning of an acquisition program and that requirements should be well  defined to ensure communication about what the government needs from  the contractor providing services.
Regarding the ACRIMe-1 contract, ICE officials stated that ICE’s  requirements did not accurately reflect the needs of LESC system users  or fully define technical expectations. Although ICE involved LESC users  in the development of the system requirements, ICE officials told us that  ICE did not ensure the users’ needs were clearly defined in the  requirements documentation and the contractor did not routinely meet  with the users to ensure its understanding of the requirements. As a  result, the contractor misinterpreted some of the requirements, according  to ICE officials. ICE revised the requirements after the contractor had  already conducted a significant amount of work, contributing to delays.  Further, ICE officials told us that ICE did not fully define its technical  expectations of the contractor, such as specific requirements for the  software code. According to the officials, ICE did not include more  specific technical requirements because it wanted to encourage the  contractor to develop innovative solutions and did not want to be too  prescriptive. However, the officials also noted that not having more  specific technical requirements contributed to the unsatisfactory  performance by the contractor in producing software that did not meet  ICE’s needs. Consequently, ICE deemed the modernized ACRIMe  system the contractor delivered in April 2011 to be unusable, and ICE  awarded a new contract in September 2011 to a different contractor to  complete and deploy the system. ICE also plans to award another  contract for $1.7 million by September 2012, to develop call center  functionalities within the ACRIMe system that were originally supposed to  be developed under the ACRIMe-1 contract.
Shortcomings in defining requirements and changes in the scope of the  requirements also contributed to cost increases on the ATP contract.  Specifically, cost increases occurred when, in August 2011, nearly 2  years after the ATP contract was awarded, ICE added a new requirement  that the contractor develop a “risk classification assessment score.” This  score is meant to help standardize the method for determining if an alien  should be detained by ICE or released on bond or other condition.  According to ICE, the requirement for a risk classification assessment  score was added to the ATP contract to support ICE detention reform  initiatives based on revisions that were made in 2011 to ICE’s detention  standards. Among other things, the 2011 detention standards call for  detention facilities to take into account risk factors when making custody  decisions. Officials told us it would be more efficient to add the risk  classification assessment score requirement to the ATP contract than to  develop this capability through a separate system. However, the officials  also stated that ICE could do a better job of defining its requirements. As  of April 2011, ICE had spent about $21.5 million on acquiring the ATP  service, which is about 17 percent over ICE’s baseline cost estimate of  $18.3 million. To complete the ATP service, ICE estimates that it may  need to spend an additional $4.6 million, for a total cost of $26.1 million.  This would be a 42 percent increase over ICE’s baseline cost estimate.
With respect to the SDS contract, in September 2010, about a year after  the SDS contract was awarded (and over 2 years after ACRIMe-1 was  awarded), ICE determined that the SDS contract requirements  overlapped significantly with those of the ACRIMe-1 contract. In  response, ICE expanded the scope of the SDS contract to include all of  the requirements for aggregating data from multiple law enforcement and  immigration databases that had previously been spread between the  ACRIMe-1 and SDS contracts, and eliminated the requirements from the  ACRIMe-1 contract. ICE officials stated that not clearly defining how the  SDS services would be integrated with the ACRIMe system was an  oversight. As with the ACRIMe-1 contract, ICE officials stated that the  technical requirements for the contract were not well defined, and this  contributed to the contractor producing poor-quality software.  Consequently, ICE spent $14.3 million for the SDS contract to develop  services that ICE found to be unusable. ICE terminated the SDS contract  in August 2011. As of April 2012, ICE officials planned to award four new  contracts at an estimated total cost of $5.4 million that would involve the  contractors starting over with developing services to enhance the  functionality of the modernized ACRIMe system. In commenting on a draft  of this report, in June 2012 ICE officials told us that to complete the SDS  services, they now plan to award two (instead of four) new contracts and  that they are incorporating the work that would have been done through  the two other previously planned contracts into other ACRIMe   modernization efforts.
According to ICE officials, some of the documents the SDS contractor  developed, such as the Concept of Operations, will be used to help inform  future contractors’ work. ICE officials noted that despite spending $14.3  million on the SDS contract, which did not produce useable  functionalities, ICE expects to spend about $22 million less than the  original cost estimate of $41.7 million because the scope of capabilities to  be provided by the contractor have been reduced. Specifically, ICE found  after awarding the SDS contract that it would be more technically  complicated and costly to develop the criminal alien tracking service than  it had anticipated, so ICE does not plan to pursue the development of this  functionality further. ICE officials acknowledged the importance of  establishing well-defined requirements going forward, but as of April  2012, ICE had not developed the requirements for the contracts it  planned to award starting in July 2012 through December 2012.of the challenges it has experienced as a result of unclear and changing  requirements, ICE could be better positioned to help prevent delays and  cost increases by establishing well-defined requirements that accurately  reflect both user and technical needs prior to awarding additional  contracts.
Although ICE anticipates meeting its baseline deployment dates for the  SDS services that it plans to develop through new contracts, it has not  developed an integrated master schedule for completing ACRIMe  modernization. Rather, ICE has used the separate schedules developed  for each contract to manage the modernization effort. We have previously  reported that one critical management tool for complex systems that  involve the incorporation of a number of different projects—in this case,  ACRIMe modernization—is an integrated master schedule that allows  managers to monitor all work activities, how long the activities will take,  and how the activities are related to one another. Because ICE lacked  an integrated master schedule when it issued the first three ACRIMe  modernization contracts in 2008 and 2009, it was not well positioned to  understand how schedule changes in each individual contract would  affect the overall modernization effort. For example, ICE assumed that  the modernized ACRIMe system would be completed before work began  on the ATP and SDS contracts. However, the deployment of the  modernized ACRIMe system was delayed, and because ICE did not have  an integrated master schedule, ICE was not in a position to effectively  identify and resolve the effects of delays in the deployment of the  modernized ACRIMe system on the development of the SDS and ATP  services. Subsequently, the delays with the deployment of the  modernized ACRIMe system contributed to the cancellation of the SDS  contract and delayed the integration of the ATP service with the  modernized ACRIMe system, according to ICE officials.
ICE is using an incremental development approach called “Agile software development.”  Agile software development is a philosophy based on selected values, such as the highest  priority is to satisfy customers through early and continuous delivery of valuable software;  delivering working software frequently; and that working software is the primary measure  of progress. was based on their knowledge of the remaining work to be done and past  experience developing schedules. However, they acknowledged that by  not developing an integrated master schedule, ICE did not meet best  practices for managing capital programs and recognized the importance  of having an integrated master schedule moving forward. Accordingly,  ICE officials said they began developing an integrated master schedule in  April 2012, during the course of our review. While we recognize this as a  positive step, it is too early to tell if ICE’s efforts will result in an integrated  master schedule that reflects all of the tasks to be completed by the  agency and contractors. For example, as of May 2012, ICE had not  incorporated detailed project schedules for the four SDS services into its  integrated master schedule. GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment  Guide states that an integrated master schedule should include all tasks  necessary to complete the project, including work to be performed by  both the government and contractors. Given the number of new  contracts ICE plans to award and its previous difficulties with accounting  for all contract activities and their interrelationships, ICE could help  ensure that its deployment schedule is reliable and mitigate schedule  risks by developing an integrated master schedule that includes all  activities and identifies dependencies among the complementary  contracts it plans to award.
section_title: Workforce Planning Could Improve Use of Resources under ACRIMe Modernization
paragraphs: Various developments could change ICE’s workforce requirements for  responding to state and local law enforcement’s queries about aliens’  immigration and criminal status, providing ICE with an opportunity to  examine the most efficient number and location of staff to accomplish the  task. One development is the anticipated deployment of modernized  ACRIMe to ICE field offices in December 2012, which could help reduce  the existing duplication of effort in analyzing immigration and criminal  status information. This duplication of effort involves ICE field office staff  repeating database searches that LESC has already conducted because  ACRIMe, which LESC uses to determine individuals’ immigration status,  cannot generate reports or electronically transmit the results of LESC’s  database searches to field offices; and field offices do not have access to  ACRIMe, necessitating that they conduct their own database searches.  According to ICE officials, such duplication of effort is necessary not only  because of the current ACRIMe system’s limitations, but also because it  serves as a quality control to minimize the likelihood of ICE making an  incorrect arrest or detention decision. Modernized ACRIMe is expected to  reduce the total number of immigration status database searches  because the system is intended to be able to generate a report on the  databases searched and electronically transmit the results of those  searches. Another development is the anticipated increase in Secure  Communities matches as the program is activated nationwide. ICE  estimates indicate that when Secure Communities interoperability is  activated in all jurisdictions in fiscal year 2013, it expects an additional  approximately 90,000 Secure Communities queries will be generated  each year. In calendar year 2011, LESC conducted database searches  based on about 423,550 Secure Communities matches.
As of April 2012, ICE had not determined or planned for how many staff it  will need to conduct these searches. The new system will be accessible  not only to LESC, as is currently the case, but also to field offices and  interoperability response centers ( which were set up primarily to analyze  an increased number of immigration status queries resulting from Secure  Communities), making it possible for multiple organizational entities in  ICE to conduct the database searches. LESC officials said that if they had  60 additional staff, LESC would be able to process all Secure  Communities requests for database searches for the entire country when  modernized ACRIMe is deployed; however, an expansion under way at  the Los Angeles response center could also accommodate additional staff  for processing Secure Communities database searches. ICE officials  have not yet addressed the role that LESC, the field-based response  centers, or other ICE components involved with immigration status  determination will have after modernized ACRIMe becomes operational.
In its April 2012 report, DHS’s Inspector General recommended that ICE  develop procedures to eliminate duplication in the process of identifying  potentially removable criminal aliens. Further, congressional staff  requested that ICE brief members in March 2012 regarding the efficient  allocation of resources between LESC and the response centers;  however, the briefing had not been scheduled as of June 8, 2012.  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government identifies  effective management of an organization’s workforce as essential to  achieving results and maintaining internal control, and program  management guidance states that successful execution of any program  includes developing plans that include efficient use of workforce  resources.
ICE officials acknowledged the need for comprehensive workforce  planning, but officials indicated to us and to DHS’s Office of Inspector  General that the agency plans to wait until after Secure Communities is  activated nationwide and modernized ACRIMe becomes operational in  fiscal year 2013 to make decisions about how to effectively realign  resources. In August 2011 ICE completed an Operational Workforce  Analysis, which projected the additional ERO workforce needed for  detention and removal when Secure Communities is fully activated. A  separate ICE analysis provided estimates of the workforce needs at  LESC for analyzing an additional 90,000 queries. ICE’s analyses,  however, did not consider the impact of modernized ACRIMe on  workforce requirements or how staff resources at response centers will be  utilized for making status determinations. Agency officials also said that  uncertainty about funding was a factor they would need to consider as  part of their planning. While planning efforts can be subject to uncertainty  about future funding, developing a workforce plan prior to full program  and system deployment could help position ICE so it is ready to  effectively align staff among components responding to law enforcement  agency queries when the modernized ACRIMe system is deployed.
section_title: ICE and CRCL Identified Safeguards to Help Address Potential Civil Rights Abuses under Secure Communities; Some Efforts Have Not Yet Been Fully Implemented
paragraphs: ICE and CRCL jointly identified four safeguards used to help protect  aliens’ civil rights under Secure Communities. These safeguards include  providing detainees a revised detainer form with telephone numbers to  call when they believe their civil rights have been violated or they are U.S.  citizens or crime victims, developing training materials for state and local  law enforcement and ICE officials on how to protect aliens’ civil rights,  initiating a process to statistically monitor arrests under Secure  Communities to identify and investigate potential patterns of civil rights  abuses, and using DHS’s existing complaint process to investigate  complaints about possible civil rights abuses related to Secure  Communities.
subsections: section_title: ICE’s Revised Detainer Includes Phone Numbers for Detainees to Report Potential Abuse
paragraphs: ICE began using a revised detainer form in December 2011, in part as a  safeguard against potential abuse of detainees. Changes on the form  include a request that law enforcement officials provide the detainee a  copy of the form, and to notify ICE if the individual may be the victim of a  crime. The revised form also includes a Notice to Detainee section  printed in six languages with telephone numbers for arrested individuals  to call. Calls for one number go to the LESC for individuals who believe  they are U.S. citizens or victims of a crime and have been inappropriately  identified for removal. The other number goes to the Joint Intake Center  for individuals who believe their civil rights have been violated.detainer form is not specific to detainees identified under Secure  Communities; ICE requests all detainees be given a copy of their  detainer, regardless of how the detainees were identified. The English  version of the notice is reproduced in figure 6.
The
Avoiding Racial Profiling;
Explaining Secure Communities to Your Community;
Witnesses, Refugees and Victims of Crime or Domestic Violence:  Protecting Those in Need;
Retaliation by Private Actors; and
Speaking Their Language: Working with Non-English Speakers  In May 2012, DHS established a dissemination plan for the Secure  Communities videos, noting that ICE and CRCL plan to distribute the  Secure Communities videos and materials to state and local LEAs. CRCL  envisions that these agencies will share the information with law  enforcement officers during routinely held briefings or in other settings.  Beginning in June 2011, CRCL distributed the first video to 117 LEAs and  143 nongovernmental organizations during visits made to eight major  cities and at major conferences, such as the National Sheriff’s  Association conference. ICE also plans to provide the videos and  materials to law enforcement training agencies and instructors in each  state and to make the videos available as downloadable files on the  Internet.
section_title: Data Complexities a Challenge in Analyzing Potential Arrest Anomalies under Secure Communities
paragraphs: To help determine whether local law enforcement agencies may be  making inappropriate or unlawful arrests that could lead to removal  through Secure Communities, CRCL and ICE developed a monitoring  process in which Secure Communities–related statistics are reviewed on  a quarterly basis. The monitoring process is designed to take place in  three phases. In the first phase, CRCL’s plan calls for analyzing crime,  arrest, and demographic data from activated jurisdictions to determine the  extent to which foreign-born individuals are arrested at a rate that is  proportional to their representation in the jurisdiction’s population, and the  extent to which the types of charges for which foreign-born individuals are  arrested are proportional to the types of arrest charges for all individuals  in that jurisdiction.
In the second phase, CRCL is conducting additional in-depth analyses of  arrest, crime, and demographic data on the 10 large jurisdictions (those  with populations over 100,000 that had over 30 Secure Communities  submissions for the quarter), and 5 smaller jurisdictions (those with  populations under 100,000) that produced the most anomalous results in  the first phase of the analysis. CRCL stated that anomalies may indicate  that police engaged in racial profiling, but they may also reflect local crime  patterns and legitimate police practices. For example, they said, in a  jurisdiction where highway patrol is a primary function, officers would be  making more traffic stops, and higher rates of traffic offenses might be  expected. According to CRCL, because its second-phase analysis relies  in part on data collected by local and state law enforcement agencies, the  data are frequently less consistent across jurisdictions. These variations  present challenges for CRCL’s analysis.
In the third phase, CRCL, in conjunction with ICE, plans to conduct  inquiries into relevant policing practices in jurisdictions where the in-depth  statistical analyses were unable to account for the anomalies in the   Officials said the decision to proceed with the third  statistical results.phase of monitoring will be made on a case-by-case basis, and could,  among other things, involve interviewing law enforcement personnel or  complainants, or requesting documents from a law enforcement agency.  ICE and CRCL officials said they would decide what actions they may  take at the conclusion of the inquiry phase.
CRCL had planned to begin reporting the results of its statistical  monitoring beginning with data from early fiscal year 2011, but began with  the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. As of May 2012, CRCL was  completing its analysis under the second phase for the third and fourth  quarters of 2011. CRCL said the work and report have not yet been  completed because of challenges with using multiple sources of data that  were not designed for real-time monitoring. Examples of the data  limitations and how CRCL plans to take the limitations into account in  their analysis include the following:
The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program summary  reporting system (a FBI national crime database that includes the  number and types of arrests by police department) is used by CRCL  for its foreign-born arrest charge comparisons. However, participation  in the UCR Program is voluntary and not all police departments in the  United States participate, including, for example, 21 counties in  Illinois. In such cases, CRCL plans to identify and use other data,  such as the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS),  another FBI UCR Program method for collecting crime data, and  arrest data, if available, that are publicly reported outside the  summary UCR system, by some states, such as Florida, through its  state UCR program.
There is a lag between the time that the U.S. Census Bureau’s  American Community Survey collects and releases demographic  information on the foreign-born population in the United States. CRCL  began working with the Community Survey data for the 2005-2009  period, and shifted to the 2006-2010 data when it became available in  December 2011.
Noncitizens in different parts of the country have different rates of  inclusion in the IDENT database, making careful comparisons  important and more difficult. Foreign-born residents who have not  interacted with federal immigration agencies would not have been  included in the IDENT database. The CRCL monitoring statistics  could underestimate potential civil rights abuses in such jurisdictions,  compared with jurisdictions in which IDENT includes a larger  proportion of the foreign-born population. ICE stated that officials are  working to better understand variation in IDENT coverage for  improved comparisons.
CRCL officials also said that in working with the actual arrest data for  the first time, they are discovering and resolving such data problems  as incongruous categorizations of crimes. For example, definitions of  “serious” or “aggravated” arrests vary between the UCR and LESC.  Consequently, CRCL’s work with the first data set to account for such  differences is taking longer than subsequent analysis is expected to  take.
ICE, CRCL, and DHS headquarters officials met in May 2012 to assess  the progress of the statistical monitoring effort, discuss potential changes  to Secure Communities protocols as a result of the statistical analyses,  determine what and how information from the monitoring effort will be  reported, and decide on any actions to be taken at the conclusion of all  monitoring phases. They determined that further development and  analysis were required, and CRCL officials told us that follow-up sessions  were scheduled for July 2012. CRCL officials explained that CRCL would  issue its report when it is confident that everything possible had been  done to resolve the statistical anomalies, because doing so would avoid  inappropriately flagging jurisdictions whose statistics appeared  anomalous, but were later explained. Once the first report is issued,  according to CRCL officials, they expect to report quarterly.
section_title: Allegations of Civil Rights Abuses under Secure Communities Are Investigated under DHS’s Complaint Process
paragraphs: Under a complaint process applicable to all of DHS, CRCL has opened  four investigations, all in fiscal year 2011, of civil rights complaints that  CRCL identified as involving Secure Communities. CRCL has authority to  review and assess civil rights or civil liberties complaints regarding DHS  policies, activities, or actions taken by DHS personnel, and receives  complaints submitted by mail, e-mail, fax, and the CRCL telephone  hotline. CRCL also reviews a monthly list of complaints processed  through the Joint Intake Center, and a complaint form is posted on the  Secure Communities’ and CRCL’s websites.meet quarterly with community organizations and ask for allegations  regarding Secure Communities to be forwarded.
ICE and CRCL issued a joint memorandum on June 14, 2011, outlining  how civil rights complaints involving state and local law enforcement and  Secure Communities would be addressed. The memorandum noted that  the strategy for Secure Communities differs from those of most other  programs in that CRCL has no compulsory process that requires state  and local LEAs to cooperate in CRCL investigations because CRCL and  the LEAs do not have formal partnerships under Secure Communities.  The memorandum stated that CRCL may initiate investigations based on  complaints alleging misconduct, statistical information indicating  anomalies in arrests that led to Secure Communities matches, or the  results of third-party research. The investigation process can vary based  on how the complaint was initiated and is described in the June  memorandum.
CRCL categorizes complaints by issue (what the complaint is about) and  by the situation in which the issue occurred. There are 21 categories of  issues, such as use of excessive force, sexual assault, or abuse, and 16  categories of situations, such as a complaint arising from a port of entry  incident or a Secure Communities encounter. Knowing whether a  complaint is actually related to Secure Communities is not always clear,  CRCL officials stated. This is because not all of those who file complaints  know that they were identified through Secure Communities, and  conversely, some may mistakenly believe that Secure Communities was  involved in their arrest when they were actually identified by other means.  CRCL staff said they discuss each allegation to determine if it is related to  Secure Communities by looking at the specifics of the complaint. CRCL  officials said that under Secure Communities, likely complaint issues are  those involving discrimination or profiling, Fourth Amendment rights, and  language access issues. A CRCL Complaint Opening Meeting group,  composed of CRCL management, including the Compliance Branch  Deputy Director and other stakeholders, decides on a weekly basis  whether to take further action on specific complaints, using their  professional judgment.
Four investigations have been initiated by CRCL based on complaints  regarding Secure Communities, three of which were submitted by one  nongovernmental organization in one region. The complaints involve  allegations that each of the four arrests was made because the officers  believed the individuals were in the country illegally, and the individuals  were arrested to determine their immigration status.
CRCL’s Compliance Branch Director said there is no “standard”  investigation process for a complaint because each complaint is fact  specific; but, in each case, CRCL requests documents from ICE and the  local law enforcement agency that arrested the complainant. If available,  the complainant is interviewed, in addition to relevant DHS personnel and  witnesses. CRCL officials stated that CRCL is currently working through  procedures for investigating Secure Communities complaints with two  local law enforcement agencies and requested that officers sit for  voluntary interviews. These complaints are taking longer than what is  normal for investigations of DHS policy and practices, officials said, in  part because of the need to create new procedures with local law  enforcement for investigating the allegations.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In 2009, about 11.5 million noncitizens were living in the United States  without lawful immigration status, some of whom have been arrested and  convicted of various crimes and incarcerated. Secure Communities  assists in identifying those who have been incarcerated and are subject to  removal. ICE has invested millions of dollars to modernize ACRIMe  capabilities that are central to Secure Communities’ success, but has not  followed best practices in its acquisition of the modernized technology.  Effective management of future ACRIMe modernization efforts hinges on  establishing well-defined requirements and the development of a reliable  integrated master schedule. Likewise, a modernized ACRIMe, along with  the extension of Secure Communities to all jurisdictions, will change ICE  workforce requirements for the analysis of immigration status  determinations. Developing a workforce plan to guide workforce resource  decisions could help ensure workforce decisions are made in an effective  and cost-efficient manner.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that ICE acquires effective technology to support the  Secure Communities program and effectively uses its workforce, we  recommend that the Director of ICE take the following three actions to  follow sound management practices: establish well-defined requirements prior to awarding additional develop an integrated master schedule that identifies all tasks to be  performed by the government and current and future contractors, and  links activities being performed by different contractors; and develop a workforce plan to support the analysis of immigration status  determinations under Secure Communities.
section_title: Agency Comments and GAO’s Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ for their review and  comment. DHS provided written comments which are reprinted in full in  Appendix II. DHS concurred with our three recommendations and  described efforts underway to address them. For example, with respect to  establishing well-defined requirements prior to awarding additional  ACRIMe modernization contracts, DHS stated that ICE is piloting an  incremental development and requirements definition process within  ACRIMe, including using smaller requirements teams to complete  requirements by the end of July 2012, before additional contracts are  issued. These actions are consistent with the intent of the  recommendation and should help ICE manage future ACRIMe  modernization efforts. With respect to developing an integrated master  schedule, DHS reiterated that it began developing such a schedule in  April 2012 and expects to complete it by the end of December 2012. This  action is consistent with the intent of the recommendation and should  improve ICE’s understanding of how schedule changes in individual  contracts may affect the overall modernization effort. With respect to  developing a workforce plan, DHS noted that ICE plans to complete a  proposal for consolidating Interoperability Response Centers into one  central location by the end of December 2012. DHS stated that it will  determine what, if any, additional workforce plans are needed after it  completes the proposal. While this is a step in the right direction, we  continue to believe that ICE would benefit from comprehensive workforce  planning that includes examining how to reduce the existing duplication of  effort between LESC and ICE field offices when ICE deploys modernized  ACRIMe. DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated  as appropriate.
DOJ did not have formal comments on our draft report, but provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of the  Department of Homeland Security and other interested parties. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Alien Criminal Response Information Management Modernization Contracts
paragraphs: As of April 2012, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)  had awarded four contracts and planned to award additional contracts to  modernize its Alien Criminal Response Information Management  (ACRIMe) system. In commenting on a draft of this report, in June 2012  ICE officials told us that they now plan to award three new contracts and  that the work for the previously planned ACRIMe/ENFORCE Integration  and Batch Processing contracts would be incorporated into other ACRIMe  modernization efforts. Table 6 provides summary information on these  contracts as of April 2012.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Evi Rezmovic (Assistant  Director), David Alexander, Frances Cook, Kevin Craw, Dorian Dunbar,  Monica Kelly, Jason Lee, Heather May, Linda Miller, Karen Richey, and  Nate Tranquilli made key contributions to this report.