World Trade Center: EPA's Most Recent Test and Clean Program Raises Concerns That Need to Be Addressed to Better Prepare for Indoor Contamination Following Disasters
Published: 2007-09-05T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and World Trade Center (WTC) collapse blanketed Lower Manhattan in dust from building debris. In response, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted an indoor clean and test program from 2002 to 2003. In 2003, EPA's Inspector General (IG) recommended improvements to the program and identified lessons learned for EPA's preparedness for future disasters. In 2004, EPA formed an expert panel to, among other goals, guide EPA in developing a second voluntary program; EPA announced this program in 2006. As requested, GAO's report primarily addresses EPA's second program, including the (1) extent to which EPA incorporated IG and expert panel member recommendations and input; (2) factors, if any, limiting the expert panel's ability to meet its goals; (3) completeness of information EPA provided to the public; (4) way EPA estimated resources for the program; and (5) extent to which EPA has acted upon lessons learned regarding indoor contamination from disasters.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: EPA has incorporated some recommendations and input from the IG and expert panel members into its second program, but its decision not to include other items may limit the overall effectiveness of this program. For example, while EPA agreed to test for more contaminants, it did not agree to evaluate risks in areas north of Canal Street and in Brooklyn. EPA reported that it does not have a basis for expanding the boundaries of its program because it cannot distinguish between normal urban, or background, dust and WTC dust. The expert panel's ability to meet its goals was limited by two factors: (1) EPA officials' belief that some panel goals were more appropriately addressed by other agencies, and (2) EPA's approach to managing the panel process. Furthermore, the majority of expert panel members believe the panel did not meet any of its goals, and that EPA's second program does not respond to the concerns of residents and workers affected by the disaster. EPA's second plan does not fully inform the public about the results of its first program. EPA concluded that a "very small" number of samples from its first program exceeded risk levels for airborne asbestos. However, EPA did not provide information such as how representative the samples were of the affected area. Residents who could have participated in this voluntary second program might have opted not to do so because of EPA's conclusion about its first program. EPA did not develop a comprehensive cost estimate to determine the resources needed to carry out its second program. EPA is implementing this program with $7 million remaining from its first program. While EPA has acted upon lessons learned following this disaster, some concerns remain about its preparedness to respond to indoor contamination following future disasters. Specifically, EPA has not developed protocols on how and when to collect data to determine the extent of indoor contamination, one of the concerns raised by panel members.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center  turned Lower Manhattan into a disaster site on a scale the nation had  never experienced. The World Trade Center was a complex of seven  buildings on 16 acres surrounding a 5-acre plaza. The twin towers were at  the center of the complex. Each tower had 110 floors, with approximately  43,200 square feet on each floor. As the towers collapsed, the area was  blanketed in a mixture of building debris and combustible materials that  coated building exteriors and streets, as well as the interiors of apartments  and offices, with dust. This complex mixture gave rise to another major  concern: that thousands of residents and workers in the area would now  be exposed to known hazards in the air and in the dust, such as asbestos,  lead, glass fibers, and pulverized concrete.
On the day of the attacks, the President signed a major disaster  declaration, which activated the Federal Response Plan. The Federal  Response Plan, now replaced by the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) National Response Plan, established the process and structure for  the federal government’s assistance to state and local governments when  responding to any major disaster or emergency declared under the Robert  T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act).  In May 2002, after numerous cleanup, dust collection, and air monitoring  activities were conducted outdoors by the Environmental Protection  Agency (EPA), other federal agencies, New York City, and New York State,  New York City formally requested that FEMA provide the necessary  funding for the hiring of contractors to perform the cleaning and testing of  exterior and interior spaces in the vicinity of the World Trade Center  (WTC) site for asbestos that might be present.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which administered  the Federal Response Plan, provided such assistance, entering into an  interagency agreement with EPA in 2002 to develop EPA’s first program.  This voluntary program allowed residents of Lower Manhattan living south  of Canal Street (representing over 20,000 residences) to elect to have their  home professionally cleaned, followed by testing, or to have their home  tested only. Approximately 20 percent of the eligible residences  participated in the program. As part of EPA’s first program, the majority of  these residences were professionally cleaned before they were sampled  for airborne asbestos because their owners selected the clean and test  option rather than the test only option. Even though samples were  collected after cleaning in most cases, some residences (less than 1  percent) were still found to have levels of asbestos exceeding EPA’s  cleanup benchmark.
Owing to concerns by members of the affected community regarding its  first program, EPA developed a second program, which is the focus of our  current work. This second program was influenced by a variety of  individuals, including the EPA Inspector General and an expert panel that  EPA convened. In August 2003, EPA’s Inspector General made  recommendations and provided additional input that addressed EPA’s first  indoor WTC cleanup efforts, as well as EPA’s preparedness for future  large-scale disasters resulting in indoor contamination. The Inspector  General reported that “additional actions can be taken to provide greater  assurances that the program is fully protective of human health.” For  example, EPA’s first program did not require that entire buildings be  systematically cleaned, and therefore, the Inspector General  recommended that EPA implement a program to verify that apartments  that had participated in the first program had not been recontaminated by  uncleaned apartments through heating, ventilation, and air conditioning  (HVAC) systems. With regard to preparedness, the Inspector General  identified lessons learned from the WTC disaster and recommended,  among other things, that EPA develop protocols for determining how  indoor environmental contamination would be handled in the event of a  future disaster.
The White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) indicated in  October 2003 that EPA would organize and lead an expert technical review  panel to address the concerns of the Inspector General and others. In  March 2004, EPA convened the World Trade Center Expert Technical  Review Panel, which met periodically through December 2005. The panel  included 18 individuals from academe and from city and federal health and  science agencies, such as the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety  and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Department of Health and  Human Services (HHS). It also included two representatives from the  Community-Labor Coalition (CLC)—a network of community, tenant,  labor, and environmental organizations formed after September 11, 2001,  to advocate for appropriate health and safety efforts in the recovery from  the WTC attacks. The panel was chaired by an EPA official. The expert  panel’s broader goal or purpose, as outlined at the first panel meeting by  the EPA chairman, was to advise EPA “on ongoing efforts to monitor the  situation for New York City residents and workers potentially affected by  the collapse of the WTC.” This purpose included providing advice on the  development of EPA’s second program plan. The panel chairman also  provided the following longer-term goals: (1) identify any remaining risks  using exposure and health surveillance information, (2) identify unmet  public health needs, and (3) determine steps to further minimize risks.  Expert panel members, including the CLC representatives, submitted  individual recommendations to EPA.
After obtaining views from many sources, including the Inspector General,  members of the expert panel, and the CLC, EPA announced its plan for a  second program in December 2006. In this 2006 plan, EPA indicates that it  will test residences for the presence of contaminants and clean residences  if test results exceed EPA’s cleanup benchmarks. The plan targets  residents and building owners in the same portion of Lower Manhattan as  its first program. The plan also provides the results of EPA’s sampling  from its first program. EPA told us that 272 residents and 25 building  owners had enrolled in the second program, compared with 4,167  residents and 144 building owners that participated in the first program.
In this context, you asked us to determine (1) the extent to which EPA  incorporated recommendations and additional input from the expert panel  members and its Inspector General in its second program; (2) what  factors, if any, limited the expert panel’s ability to meet its goals; (3) the  completeness of information EPA provided to the public in its second  plan; (4) the way EPA estimated the resources needed to conduct the  second program; and (5) the extent to which EPA has acted upon lessons  learned to better prepare for indoor contamination that could result from  future large-scale disasters. In June 2007, we testified on some of these  issues before the Subcommittee on Superfund and Environmental Health,  Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. In addition, owing  to concerns raised in the media about EPA’s use of classification authority,  you asked that we determine the extent to which EPA has classified  information, and, if so, whether any classified information discusses the  environmental impact of the towers’ collapse. Appendix I provides the  results of our analysis of EPA’s classification of information under this  authority.
In conducting our work, we reviewed, among other things, EPA’s 2002- 2003 indoor program plan, EPA’s planning leading to the December 2006  program plan, the 2003 EPA Inspector General report, all 13 summaries of  EPA’s WTC Expert Technical Review Panel meetings and conference calls,  and funding data from EPA. We assessed the reliability of EPA’s funding  data and determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report. In addition, we interviewed officials from EPA  headquarters, including the Office of Research and Development and the  Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response; Region 2, which is  responsible for New York City, and EPA’s National Homeland Security  Research Center, among others; FEMA Region 2; and the New York City  Department of Environmental Protection. We also attended a National  Institute of Standards and Technology technical seminar on WTC  materials and observed the disaster area with a FEMA official. In addition,  we conducted structured interviews with all 18 WTC Expert Technical  Review Panel members and both EPA panel chairmen. A more detailed  description of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix II. We  performed our work from June 2006 to September 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: On the day of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the  President’s declaration of a major disaster under the Stafford Act activated  the Federal Response Plan (superseded by and incorporated into the  National Response Plan). The Federal Response Plan established the  process and structure for the federal government to provide assistance to  state and local governments when responding to major disasters and  emergencies declared under the Stafford Act. Under the Federal Response  Plan, FEMA coordinated this assistance through mission assignments and  interagency agreements, which assigned specific tasks to federal agencies  with the expertise necessary to complete them. The Congress authorized  $20 billion to respond to the attacks, of which $8.8 billion was provided  through FEMA, for the New York City area.
Under the Federal Response Plan (and the National Response Plan today),  EPA served as coordinator during large-scale disasters for 1 of 15  emergency support functions (ESF)—ESF 10, which addresses oil and  hazardous material releases. ESF 10 encompasses various phases of  hazardous material response, including assessment and cleanup. In the  first 6 months after the WTC disaster, EPA responded to FEMA mission  assignments to assist with the response efforts and, among other tasks,  provided wash stations for responders and disposed of waste from the  WTC site.
There are an estimated 330 office buildings in Lower Manhattan below  Canal Street and roughly 900 residential buildings with approximately  20,000 apartments. In 2002, after initial efforts by the city of New York to  advise New York residents how to clean the World Trade Center dust in  their homes, FEMA and EPA entered into an interagency agreement to  address indoor spaces affected by the disaster. While EPA has responded  to hazardous material releases for decades, the WTC disaster was the first  large-scale emergency for which EPA provided testing and cleanup in  indoor spaces.
WTC dust is a fine mixture of materials that resulted from the collapse and  subsequent burning of the twin towers and includes pulverized concrete,  asbestos, and glass fibers. WTC dust entered homes and offices through  open windows, was tracked in, or was picked up by air-conditioning  system intakes. Figures 1 and 2 show the dust generated by the WTC  disaster.
The amount of dust in indoor spaces in and around Lower Manhattan  varied due to a variety of factors, including distance from the WTC site;  weather conditions, such as wind; and damage to individual buildings. In  the years since the disaster, the level of WTC dust in indoor spaces has  varied, depending upon the cleaning performed by residents and other  groups, including EPA and professional cleaning companies.
In May 2002, EPA, New York City, and FEMA officials announced a  program, to be overseen by EPA, offering a cleanup of residences in Lower  Manhattan. Between September 2002 and May 2003, residences were  cleaned and tested, or tested only, for airborne asbestos. EPA analyzed  samples from 4,167 apartments in 453 buildings and 793 common areas in  144 buildings. This program cost $37.9 million—$30.4 million for indoor  cleaning and testing by the New York City Department of Environmental  Protection and $7.5 million for EPA oversight and sample analysis. Figure  3 shows the area in Lower Manhattan eligible for participation in EPA’s  program. Residents could choose either an aggressive or modified  aggressive testing method for providing samples of indoor air to EPA. For  the modified aggressive method, the contractor ran a 20-inch fan for the  duration of testing. For the aggressive method, a leaf blower was used, in  addition to the 20-inch fan, to direct a jet of air toward corners, walls,  fabric surfaces, and the ceiling to dislodge and resuspend dust. The  contractors HEPA vacuumed and wet-wiped hard surfaces, including  floors, ceilings, ledges, trims, furnishings, appliances, and equipment; and  they HEPA vacuumed soft surfaces, such as curtains, two times. In  addition, in cases where there were still significant amounts of WTC dust  and debris, contractors used asbestos abatement procedures such as the  use of personal protective equipment, including respirators and a properly  enclosed decontamination system; posting of warning signs; isolation  barriers to seal off openings; and disposal of all waste generated during  the cleaning in accordance with applicable rules and regulations for  asbestos-containing waste.
The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and the U.S.  Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for Toxic Substances  and Disease Registry (ATSDR) collected samples from in and around 30  buildings in Lower Manhattan from November though December 2001. In  September 2002, these agencies released their assessment of the public’s  exposure to contaminants in air and dust, recommended additional  monitoring of residential spaces in Lower Manhattan, and referred  residents to EPA’s program.
Before EPA finalized its second indoor program plan, several assessments  related to indoor contamination were conducted: an August 2003 EPA  Inspector General report; an expert technical review panel that EPA  conducted from March 2004 through December 2005; and three EPA  studies. The studies identified background levels of contamination in New  York City (“background study”); the WTC-related contaminants of  potential concern, and associated cleanup benchmarks (“COPC study”);  and the efficacy of various cleaning methods in eliminating WTC-related  contaminants of concern (“cleaning study”).
During the time EPA met with the WTC Expert Technical Review Panel,  some expert panel members encouraged EPA to develop a method for  differentiating between contaminants found in the New York City urban  environment and those found in WTC dust. This method would have  served as the basis for determining the extent of WTC-related  contamination, and EPA officials believed it would have enabled the  agency to limit its focus to contamination specific to the WTC disaster.  Early in the panel process, EPA formed a subpanel of these experts to  assist EPA’s Office of Research and Development in developing such a  methodology. In August 2005, EPA released its final report describing its  methodology, which was peer reviewed. In their October 2005 final report,  the peer reviewers criticized the reliability of EPA’s method and provided  suggestions on improving EPA’s approach. In a November 2005 letter, EPA  officials told expert panel members that in the absence of a valid method,  EPA could not definitively distinguish between WTC contaminants in dust  and levels of the same contaminants found in an urban environment. At  the same time, 2 weeks before the final panel meeting, the EPA chairman  informed the panel that it would be disbanded as of the final meeting and  that EPA would not be implementing a plan that included determining the  extent of WTC contamination. Experts that were a part of the subpanel  addressing this method reported that the peer-review comments could be  addressed and that EPA should perform additional sampling. Nonetheless,  EPA ultimately decided not to pursue developing this methodology. Figure  4 shows the chronology of events preceding the second program.
In January 2006, EPA formally requested funds from FEMA. EPA and  FEMA signed an interagency agreement to conduct EPA’s second program  in July 2006, and EPA announced the agency’s second program to test  indoor spaces in Lower Manhattan in December 2006. Appendix III  provides information regarding EPA’s first and second indoor programs.
section_title: EPA Incorporated Some Recommendations, but It Did Not Adopt Other Input, Which May Limit the Second Program’s Effectiveness
paragraphs: In response to recommendations and additional input from the Inspector  General and expert panel members, EPA’s second program incorporates  some additional testing elements. However, EPA’s second program does  not incorporate other items. Figure 5 shows the key recommendations and  additional input the EPA Inspector General and expert panel members  provided to EPA.
subsections: section_title: EPA Expanded the Number of Contaminants It Will Evaluate in Testing
paragraphs: While EPA tested solely for airborne asbestos in order to trigger cleanup  in the first program, it agreed to test for three additional contaminants in  its second program—man-made vitreous fibers, polycyclic aromatic  hydrocarbons, and lead. These contaminants, as well as two additional  ones—dioxin and silica, were identified as WTC contaminants of potential  concern in a May 2003 report issued by EPA and other federal, New York  City, and New York state agencies. EPA did not include dioxin and silica  in the second program for several reasons. Regarding dioxin, EPA noted  that concentrations were elevated in the weeks following the disaster  when fires were still burning, but concentrations returned to predisaster  levels by December 2001. Furthermore, because “only eight” of 1,500  dioxin samples exceeded cleanup benchmarks during tests in 2002 and  2003, EPA decided not to sample for this contaminant in its second  program. Regarding silica, EPA noted that in 2002 an ATSDR/New York  City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene report stated that short- term exposure to silica is unlikely to cause adverse health effects and that  adverse health effects from chronic exposure are possible but unlikely if  recommended cleaning is conducted. EPA also explained that levels of  silica are likely to have been reduced by cleaning activities over the past 3  years.
EPA also agreed to test for contaminants in dust. To do so, EPA developed  site-specific cleanup benchmarks for asbestos and man-made vitreous  fibers in dust over the course of nearly a year. In its second program plan,  EPA explains that these benchmarks are not risk based but rather are  based on, among other things, work by experts in the field as to what  constitutes contamination and how it compares with site-specific  background levels, and the benchmarks employed for cleanup at a  Superfund site with asbestos-contaminated residences.
section_title: EPA Is Not Assessing the Extent of WTC Contamination, and It Did Not Agree to Evaluate Risk in Workplaces
paragraphs: Though EPA expanded the number of contaminants tested for in its  second program, it did not adopt recommendations and additional input  from the EPA Inspector General or the expert panel that addressed the  following issues:    Evaluating risks in geographic areas north of Canal Street and in  Brooklyn. EPA did not expand the scope of testing north of Canal Street,  or to Brooklyn, as advisory groups had advised. EPA reported it did not  expand the scope of testing because it could not differentiate between  normal urban dust and WTC dust; differentiating between the two would  have enabled EPA to determine the geographic extent of WTC  contamination. Some expert panel members had suggested that EPA  investigate whether it was feasible to develop a method for distinguishing  between normal urban dust and WTC dust. EPA initially agreed to do so.  Beginning in 2004—almost 3 years after the disaster—EPA conducted this  investigation into developing a WTC dust signature. However, EPA  officials told us that because so much time had passed since the terrorist  attack, it was difficult to distinguish between WTC dust and urban dust.  EPA ultimately abandoned this effort because peer reviewers questioned  its methodology; EPA decided not to explore alternative methods that  some of the peer reviewers had proposed. Instead, EPA will test only in an  area where visible contamination has been confirmed by aerial  photography conducted soon after the WTC attack, although aerial  photography does not reveal indoor contamination. Furthermore, EPA  officials told us that some WTC dust was found immediately after the  terrorist attacks in areas, including Brooklyn, that are outside the area  eligible for its first and second program.
Testing in HVACs and inaccessible areas. In its November 2005 draft plan  for the second program, EPA had proposed collecting samples from a  number of locations in HVACs. In some buildings, HVACs are shared; in  others, each residence has its own system. In either case, contaminants in  the HVAC could recontaminate the residence unless the system is also  professionally cleaned. However, EPA’s second program will not provide  for testing in HVACs under any circumstances but will offer cleaning in  HVACs if tests in common areas reveal that cleanup benchmarks for any of  four contaminants have been exceeded. EPA officials told us that EPA will  sample near HVAC outlets in common areas and will obtain dust samples  in proximity to these locations. EPA explained in the second plan that it  will not sample within HVACs because it is no longer assessing the extent  of contamination resulting from the WTC disaster and because it is  attempting to devote the maximum resources to testing requests.
Similarly, EPA had proposed sampling for contaminants in “inaccessible”  locations, such as behind dishwashers and rarely moved furniture within  apartments and common areas. Again, because it was unable to  differentiate between normal urban dust and WTC dust, EPA stated that it  would not test in inaccessible locations in order to devote its resources to  as many requests as possible. EPA told us that 272 residents and 25  building owners had enrolled in the second program, compared with 4,167  residents and 144 building owners that participated in the first program.
Evaluating risks to workers/workplaces. According to EPA, its second  program plan is “the result of ongoing efforts to respond to concerns of  residents and workers.” Workers were concerned that workplaces in  Lower Manhattan experienced the same contamination as residences. In  its second program, EPA will test and clean common areas in commercial  buildings, but only if an individual owner or manager of the property  requests the service. EPA stated that employees who believe their working  conditions are unsafe as a result of WTC dust may file a complaint with  OSHA or request an evaluation by HHS’s National Institute of  Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Concerns remain, however,  because these other agencies do not have authority to conduct cleanup in  response to contaminant levels that exceed cleanup benchmarks. In  addition, OSHA’s benchmarks are designed primarily to address airborne  contamination, while EPA’s test and clean program is designed to address  contamination in building spaces, whether the contamination is airborne  or in settled dust. OSHA requires individual employers to adopt work  practices to reduce employee exposure to airborne contaminants, whereas  EPA’s test and clean program is designed to remove contaminants from  affected spaces.
Addressing whole buildings. Between March 2004 and December 2005,  when EPA met with expert panel members, officials discussed sampling a  representative number of each buildings’ apartments in order to  “characterize the building,” which would have allowed EPA to  characterize areas in Lower Manhattan. This information would have been  used to inform decision-making regarding the extent of indoor  contamination. According to EPA officials, all residents from each building  would need to volunteer their individual apartments, and EPA would  select the units it then tested. The approach that EPA developed entailed  cleaning a building, including all units, common areas and HVACs, if there  was a high degree of certainty that the average concentration of at least  one contaminant, across all apartments tested, exceeded the benchmark,  and dust could be associated with the WTC. While this method addressed  the Inspector General recommendation that buildings be treated as a  system so that potentially contaminated apartments did not contaminate  previously cleaned apartments, EPA did not ultimately include this  particular methodology in its second program plan due to the lack of a  method to identify WTC dust. Instead, EPA will clean whole common  areas, such as lobbies, and HVACs in buildings. It will clean common areas  when at least one contaminant is found to exceed the cleanup benchmark  in that area. It will clean HVACs and common areas when there is a high  degree of certainty that the mean contaminant level for accessible areas,  infrequently accessed areas, or air samples in common areas exceeds one  contaminant benchmark.
section_title: Two Factors Limited the Expert Panel’s Ability to Meet Its Goals
paragraphs: The expert panel’s ability to meet its goals was limited by two factors: (1)  EPA officials’ belief that some panel goals were more appropriately  addressed by other agencies and (2) EPA’s approach to managing the  panel process. Furthermore, the majority of expert panel members do not  believe the panel successfully met any of its goals. All of the panel  members who responded to our follow-up inquiry regarding EPA’s second  program (10 out of 10 members) told us the program is not responsive to  the concerns of residents and workers affected by the collapse of the WTC  towers. Appendix IV provides the full range of responses from structured  interviews with expert panel members about EPA’s management of the  panel process.
subsections: section_title: EPA Officials Believed That Some Panel Goals Were More Appropriate for Other Agencies
paragraphs: According to EPA officials, some panel goals were more appropriately  addressed by other agencies. We believe this view limited the panel’s  ability to address these issues. In particular, one panel goal, as stated by  CEQ, was to advance the identification of unmet public health needs.  However, EPA officials believed that other federal agencies, such as HHS,  were better equipped to address the issue of public health. Therefore,  rather than having the expert panel members discuss and identify actions  to address this issue, EPA allowed time during panel meetings for public  health presentations. EPA officials believe that the panel met CEQ’s  charge by including health experts on the panel and by including health  presentations during panel meetings.
While the panel was provided with these presentations, the majority of  expert panel members (16 out of 18) told us the panel did not successfully  identify unmet public health needs. Outside of the panel, a multiagency  effort established a WTC health registry to assess the health impact of the  WTC collapse. The EPA panel chairman noted that panel member  recommendations to maintain the WTC health registry for more than 20  years and to link the results of subsequent indoor testing to the registry  had been provided to the appropriate agencies.
In addition, EPA officials believed that, despite the panel’s broader goal,  which was to help guide EPA in its ongoing efforts to “monitor the  situation for New York residents and workers impacted by the collapse of  the WTC towers,” OSHA should address the issue of workplace safety  because that is OSHA’s mission. Consequently, as noted earlier, the second  program does not address workers’ concerns, and employers and workers  are not eligible to request testing or cleaning. EPA stated that employees  who believe their working conditions are unsafe as a result of WTC dust  may file a complaint with OSHA or request an evaluation by HHS’s  National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).
section_title: EPA’s Management of the Panel Process Was Problematic, According to Expert Panel Members
paragraphs: EPA’s management of the panel process limited the panel’s ability to  successfully meet its goals. According to 9 or more of the 18 expert panel  members we interviewed, problematic aspects of EPA’s management  included (1) the lack of a consensus approach, (2) inadequate time for  technical discussion, and (3) no fully transparent decision-making process.  In addition, a number of expert panel members told us that failure to  document recommendations created other concerns.
Lack of a consensus approach. EPA did not allow the panel to reach  consensus on key issues and prepare a final report; instead it obtained  recommendations from each member of the expert panel. The majority of  expert panel members (13 out of 18) told us that EPA’s approach was not  appropriate, and one panel member noted that the lack of a consensus  approach prevented the resolution of key issues. The EPA chairman told  the panel that the panel would not be asked to reach consensus because  this approach might limit the contribution of individual panel members.  EPA officials also noted that it would have been difficult to reach  consensus with such a diverse panel of experts and the technical nature of  the discussion.
Inadequate time for technical discussion. The majority of expert panel  members (14 out of 18) told us there was not adequate time on the agenda  for the panel to discuss issues. According to several panel members, EPA  dedicated half or less of each daylong panel meeting to technical  discussions, devoting the remainder of each day to public comment.
Lack of a fully transparent decision-making process. EPA’s reasons for  accepting or rejecting expert panel members’ recommendations were not  at all transparent, according to half of the panel members (9 out of 18).  Furthermore, six panelists said that EPA did not respond to their  recommendations or provide any explanation for rejecting  recommendations. In contrast, the two EPA panel chairmen we  interviewed told us they believed the decision-making process was  completely transparent.
Failure to document recommendations. Although EPA stated in its  operating principles that it would keep detailed minutes of each panel  meeting, including all individual recommendations, whether oral or  written, EPA did not maintain a list of recommendations. Instead, EPA  provided “summaries” of each meeting that included an overview of issues  raised, and, starting with the fifth meeting, EPA provided audio recordings  of six of the remaining panel meetings. The majority of expert panel  members (10 out of 18) said that having written transcripts of the meetings  available would have been somewhat or very helpful. Some expert panel  members told us the lack of transcripts presented a problem because they  had no record of EPA agreement with several recommendations that were  later not adopted.
section_title: Most Expert Panel Members Did Not Believe They Addressed the Panel’s Goals and Ultimately Did Not Agree with EPA’s Final Indoor Test and Clean Program
paragraphs: The majority of expert panel members told us that the panel was unable to  meet its goals as outlined by EPA. As figure 6 shows, these included  guiding EPA in: (1) developing the second program, (2) identifying unmet  public health needs, (3) identifying any remaining risks using exposure  and health surveillance information, and (4) determining steps to further  minimize risks.
According to all expert panel members who responded to our follow-up  inquiry regarding EPA’s second program (10 out of 10 members), this  program does not respond to the concerns of residents and workers  affected by the collapse of the WTC towers. At the final panel meeting,  some expert panel members said publicly that they would discourage  participation in EPA’s program and several expert panel members said  that the data yielded by the test and clean program will not be useful and  the program is unlikely to adequately identify or clean up contaminants. In  addition, the Community-Labor Coalition distributed information that also  discouraged participation, citing lack of expert panel member support.
section_title: EPA Did Not Provide the Public with Complete Information to Make Fully Informed Decisions
paragraphs: EPA did not provide complete information in its second plan to allow the  public to make informed choices about their participation in its voluntary  program. While EPA stated that the number of samples in its first program  exceeding risk levels for airborne asbestos was “very small,” EPA did not  provide the following additional information to help inform residents’  decisions regarding participation in the second program:    Voluntary program participation. Participation in the first program came  from about 20 percent of the residences eligible for participation. In  addition, participation was voluntary, which may suggest that the sample  of apartments was not representative of all residences eligible for the  program.
Only asbestos tested. EPA’s conclusions were based only on tests for  asbestos, rather than other contaminants, and the conclusions focused on  airborne contamination rather than contamination in dust inside  residences.
Sampling protocols varied. EPA did not explain that over 80 percent of  the samples were taken after professional cleaning was completed as a  part of EPA’s program. In addition, EPA did not identify the portion of the  samples that were collected following aggressive, as opposed to modified  aggressive, techniques. In the first case, the air inside apartments was  more actively circulated before sampling occurred. In these instances,  about 6 percent of apartments tested were found to exceed EPA’s asbestos  level, compared with roughly 1 percent that used the modified aggressive  technique. Out of 4,167 apartments sampled, 276 were sampled using the  aggressive method.
Discarded sample results. EPA also did not explain in its second program  plan that its first program’s test results may have been affected by sample  results that were discarded because they were “not cleared”—that is, they  could not be analyzed because the filter had too many dust particles to be  analyzed under a microscope. However, EPA’s final report on its first  program stated that residences with more than one inconclusive result,  such as filter overload, were encouraged to have their residences  recleaned and retested.
Without complete explanations of EPA’s sampling data, residents who  could have elected to participate might have decided not to do so. The  number of participants declined from roughly 4,200 residents and 144  building owners in the first program to 272 residents and 25 building  owners in the second program. In addition, community leaders on the  panel believed that allowing participants to choose between two sampling  techniques, coupled with the voluntary nature of the program, had the  effect of making the overall program appear unnecessary.
section_title: EPA Did Not Assess Resource Needs for the Second Program
paragraphs: EPA did not take steps to ensure that it would have adequate resources to  effectively implement the second program. Instead, EPA is implementing  this program with the approximately $7 million in Stafford Act funds  remaining after its first program. Although this program increases the  number and type of contaminants being sampled, the funds available are  less than 20 percent of those used in the first program.
subsections: section_title: EPA Is Implementing the Second Program with $7 Million and Did Not Complete a Cost Estimate to Determine Whether This Was an Appropriate Amount
paragraphs: EPA is implementing its second program with the funding remaining after  completion of its first program—approximately $7 million—but EPA did  not determine whether this amount would support the effective  implementation of its second program. According to EPA officials, they  could not estimate the cost of the second program without information on  the number of program participants and the size of residences, which vary  widely throughout Lower Manhattan. Nevertheless, the interagency  agreement between FEMA and EPA for the first program included  estimated costs, although EPA faced the same challenges. This first  estimate of $19.6 million was based on projections for the number of  eligible residents participating in the program—specifically, 10,000  residences requesting cleaning and 3,000 residences requesting testing  only—and included, among other things, detailed estimates for sample  analysis, equipment and supplies, and EPA salary and travel costs.
In the first program, EPA spent $7.5 million—of $19.6 million obligated by  FEMA to EPA—on program oversight and analysis of air samples, while  New York City spent approximately $30.4 million to collect air samples  and clean residences. EPA returned $12.1 million in unspent funds to  FEMA. According to FEMA officials, when the agency learned about the  establishment of the expert panel, FEMA retained $7 million for additional  EPA activities. EPA officials told us that in discussions with FEMA about  whether the amount was appropriate, FEMA responded that only $7  million was available.
In July 2006, an interagency agreement was signed by EPA and FEMA for  the second program that describes EPA’s role as developing and  implementing a program to test and clean in the specified area. After EPA  entered into this agreement, EPA officials told us that if the number of  registrants for the program exceeded the number that could be covered by  the $7 million, they were unsure where additional funds could be obtained.  EPA did not provide information to FEMA in the agreement about how  many residents and building owners could potentially be served under the  program. Thirteen of the 18 expert panel members told us they did not  believe the $7 million for the sampling and cleanup was sufficient.  According to one of the expert panel’s chairmen, the $7 million was  sufficient for initial sampling in the second program but not for sampling  and cleanup. In its final plan, EPA noted that requests for participation  from eligible residents and building owners would be prioritized based on  proximity to the WTC site.
Although EPA’s second program increases the number and type of  contaminants being sampled, the $7 million available is less than 20  percent of the $37.9 million spent on the first program. While only 1  percent of roughly 20,000 eligible residences are participating in the  second program, compared with 20 percent who participated in the first  program, it is not clear whether funding for the second program will be  adequate without a cost estimate.
section_title: EPA Has Taken Preparedness Actions, but Some Concerns Remain
paragraphs: EPA has acted upon lessons learned from the WTC disaster to prepare for  future disasters, such as clarifying internal roles and responsibilities and  improving health-related cleanup benchmarks. Nevertheless, we are  uncertain about how completely these activities address EPA’s ability to  respond to contamination in indoor environments in the face of future  disasters. For example, EPA has not yet addressed certain methodological  challenges raised by expert panel members regarding the WTC disaster,  such as how it will determine the extent of contamination, which we  believe are important for addressing future disasters. Without addressing  this and other challenges, it is uncertain whether people in affected areas  will be protected adequately from risks posed by indoor contamination  stemming from future disasters.
subsections: section_title: EPA Has Taken Preparedness Actions Following the WTC Disaster
paragraphs: Since the WTC disaster, EPA has taken actions to improve its ability to  respond to future disasters. However, EPA’s approach to emergency  response does not differentiate between indoor and outdoor  contamination, and therefore it is difficult to determine how EPA’s  preparedness actions have improved EPA’s readiness to respond  specifically to indoor contamination. EPA’s actions are consistent with  several Inspector General recommendations, as the following examples of  EPA’s preparedness actions illustrate:    Clarified roles and responsibilities. EPA has completed response  policies, established various specialized response teams, and conducted  training. Though not specific to indoor contamination, EPA’s June 2003  National Approach to Response policy outlines EPA roles and  responsibilities in the event of future large-scale disasters. Its October  2004 Homeland Security Strategy also notes that in the event of a national  incident, EPA has the lead responsibility for decontaminating affected  buildings and neighborhoods and for advising and assisting public health  authorities on when it is safe to return to these areas and on what the  safest disposal options for contaminants are. EPA’s National  Decontamination Team provides general scientific support and technical  expertise for identifying technologies and methods for decontaminating  buildings and other infrastructure. EPA also expanded the capabilities of  its existing Environmental Response Team (ERT), which is responsible for  technological support and training through the establishment of an  additional ERT office in Las Vegas, Nevada. Along with the Radiological  Emergency Response Team and the National Decontamination Team,  these teams provide support during emergencies. In addition, EPA officials  noted that they have developed and delivered a training course on the  Incident Command System, to be used under the National Response Plan,  to 2,000 staff as well as senior managers in all regions to provide additional  guidance on roles and responsibilities. Finally, in its newly developed  Crisis Communication Plan, EPA outlines the responsibilities of agency  staff in providing the public with information during disasters. EPA  officials told us they have added 50 on-scene coordinators to their  emergency response staff to improve preparedness and response  capabilities.
Shared information on likely targets and threats and developed  approaches to address them. EPA’s Office of Research and Development  (ORD) has several efforts to develop approaches to address future threats,  including research on building decontamination, and EPA’s Office of Solid  Waste and Emergency Response has begun to establish a network of  environmental laboratories. In 2003, EPA created the National Homeland  Security Research Center (NHSRC), part of ORD, to develop expertise and  products to prevent, prepare for, and recover from public health and  environmental emergencies arising from terrorist threats and incidents. Its  research focuses on five areas: threat assessment, decontamination, water  infrastructure protection, response capability, and technology evaluation.  In November 2004, NHSRC reported on several threat scenarios for  buildings and water systems; these threat scenarios guide NHSRC’s  research, which is focused heavily on chemical, biological, and  radiological (CBR) agents. EPA also participates on a number of  interagency workgroups, including policy coordination committees  formed by the White House Homeland Security Council; DHS work groups  addressing sampling and other issues; and FEMA work groups that  address various aspects of the National Response Plan. Although an  interagency team, including EPA, has developed tabletop exercises to  respond to nationally significant incidents, these exercises have not yet  included residential contamination. EPA has also developed standardized  analytical methods that environmental laboratories can use to analyze  biological and chemical samples during disasters caused by terrorist  attacks, and the agency has begun to establish a network of environmental  laboratories capable of analyzing CBR agents, which would benefit from  these methods.
Improved health-related benchmarks for assessing health risks in  emergencies. According to EPA officials, EPA’s Office of Prevention,  Pesticides and Toxic Substances is leading the agency’s participation in  developing acute exposure guideline levels (AEGL), an international effort  aimed at describing the risk resulting from rare exposure to airborne  chemicals. The AEGLs focus on exposures of 10 minutes, 30 minutes, 1  hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours. To date, AEGLs have not been developed under  emergency situations; however, EPA officials told us the availability of  methodologies such as those used to derive AEGLs make it possible to  develop emergency benchmarks quickly, if necessary. EPA is also  developing subchronic exposure guidance—provisional advisory levels  (PAL)—to bridge the gap between acute exposure durations addressed by  AEGLs and the chronic lifetime exposure guidance. EPA officials told us  that NHSRC is developing this guidance for contaminants in air and water,  and it will focus on exposure periods of 1 day, 30 days, and 2 years. EPA  officials noted that, to date, it has developed PALs for over 20 chemical  agents. In addition, EPA officials told us that the agency has completed a  method to assess risk from exposure to contaminated building surfaces  and that it is also completing guidance on how to address future incidents  involving asbestos.
Additional monitoring capabilities. The Deputy Director of EPA’s Office  of Emergency Management told us the agency has five total suspended  particulate (TSP) monitors in each region; however, these are not real- time monitors. For real-time data monitoring, each region has portable air  monitors—Data-Rams—to provide approximate measures of ambient  particulate matter concentrations. EPA officials told us they also have  mobile monitoring labs, as well as specialized vans and aircraft, that can  be deployed during disasters to conduct monitoring. EPA officials said  they are evaluating other monitors—electronic beta attenuation monitors  (EBAM)—that have the capability to work with higher dust loads. The  Deputy Director of EPA’s Office of Emergency Management also told us  that fixed near real-time radiation monitors, part of the environmental  radiation ambient monitoring system (ERAMS), are currently being  deployed at a rate of five per month at cities across the United States.
section_title: EPA Has Not Demonstrated How It Will Overcome Methodological Challenges Identified by Expert Panel Members to Better Respond to Future Disasters
paragraphs: While EPA has taken actions since the WTC disaster to prepare for future  incidents, it has not demonstrated how it will overcome several  methodological challenges that expert panel members identified. These  challenges include determining the extent of contamination; developing  appropriate cleanup benchmarks; and testing for contaminants that cause  acute or short-term health effects. In addition, some expert panel members  questioned EPA’s reliance on visual evidence, rather than sample data, as  the primary basis for its actions, as well as its use of the modified  aggressive sampling technique.
Assessing extent of contamination. Some expert panel members  recommended that EPA reconsider its decision to abandon its efforts to  develop a method for differentiating between normal, urban dust, and  WTC dust, which would have allowed EPA to determine the extent of WTC  contamination. Several panel members encouraged EPA to continue to  refine the method and collect applicable sample data, saying that  collecting data now could provide critical information for future  responses. EPA was unable to develop a WTC dust signature that would  have allowed it to determine the extent of WTC contamination, in part,  because of the limited number of dust samples taken immediately after the  disaster, and the length of time that elapsed between the event and  development of the signature. EPA officials told us they would need to  identify contamination signatures in responding to future disasters.
Developing cleanup benchmarks. Some expert panel members also  expressed concerns regarding the cleanup benchmarks that EPA  developed in response to the WTC disaster. Some expert panel members  agreed with the concept of dividing sampled spaces into categories, such  as accessible and inaccessible areas, with associated cleanup benchmarks;  however, these panel members disagreed with how EPA defined the  categories. For example, an expert panel member noted that children  access areas under beds, which were not considered “accessible” by EPA’s  definitions, and workers such as telecommunications technicians and  housing inspectors access areas defined by EPA as “inaccessible” on a  daily basis. In addition, expert panel members disagreed with some  cleanup benchmarks that EPA developed for the various categories. For  example, two panel members asserted that EPA’s proposed cleanup  benchmark for man-made vitreous fibers was not stringent enough. While  EPA then changed the benchmark for man-made vitreous fibers in  inaccessible areas from 100,000 fibers/cm to 50,000 fibers/cm  Using the modified aggressive sampling technique. Some expert panel  members questioned EPA’s use of the modified aggressive sampling  technique. The number of samples exceeding cleanup benchmarks was  greater when the aggressive sampling technique was used. EPA’s rationale  for departing from the technique specified by the Asbestos Hazard  Emergency Response Act (AHERA) is that the aggressive technique does  not appropriately represent conditions of human exposure in a residence.
EPA has not identified in its protocols how these methodological concerns  can be overcome, such as how and when data collection will occur, in  order to facilitate determining the extent of contamination. Without  clarifying actions that are appropriate for EPA and other federal agencies  in these scenarios, important determinations about risk from disaster- related contamination may not be promptly addressed.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Shortcomings in EPA’s second program to test and clean residences for  WTC contamination raise questions about the agency’s preparedness for  addressing indoor contamination resulting from future disasters. With  respect to communication, the public relies on EPA to provide accurate  and complete information about environmental hazards that may affect  them. However, in announcing its plan for the second program, EPA did  not fully disclose the limitations of its earlier test results. Consequently,  some eligible residents of Lower Manhattan may have concluded that they  were not at risk from contaminated dust and therefore elected not to  participate in the second program.
EPA did not develop a cost estimate to support its use of available Stafford  Act funds for its second program. Without this information, EPA and other  decision makers could not know how many residents and building owners  could potentially be served by the program. Given limited federal disaster  response funds and competing priorities, the federal government must  carefully consider how best to allocate these monies to be sure that these  funds are used most cost effectively. In the future, unless officials justify  the Stafford Act funds necessary for achieving program objectives prior to  implementation, EPA will not have a sound basis for securing needed  funds and, as a result, may be forced to scale back its programs in ways  that limit their effectiveness.
Moreover, EPA has reported that it faced several challenges in addressing  WTC indoor contamination, including limited indoor sampling protocols,  health benchmarks, and background data for urban areas. In addition,  since the National Response Plan does not explicitly address indoor  contamination, it is unclear how EPA, in concert with other agencies— including the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human  Services, and Labor—will address these challenges. Unless these agencies  establish an approach for responding to indoor contamination, the nation  may face the same challenges after future disasters.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance EPA’s ability to provide environmental health risk information  to the public that is complete and readily understandable, we recommend  that the Administrator of EPA facilitate the implementation of the recently  issued Crisis Communication Plan by issuing guidance that, among other  things, ensures the presentation of environmental data in an appropriate  context, with appropriate technical caveats noted in plain language.
To provide decision makers with a sound basis for the Stafford Act funds  needed for future disaster response programs, we recommend that the  Administrator of EPA establish guidelines for developing program cost  estimates. These cost estimates should support the programs’ objectives  and promote the efficient and effective use of government resources.
To ensure that EPA is better prepared for future disasters that involve  indoor contamination and that it captures important information that  could guide future cleanup decisions, we recommend that the  Administrator of EPA, in concert with the Departments of Homeland  Security, Health and Human Services, and Labor, and other appropriate  federal agencies, develop protocols or memorandums of understanding  under the National Response Plan that specifically address indoor  contamination. These protocols should define when the extent of  contamination is to be determined, as well as how and when indoor  cleanups are to be conducted. EPA should seek additional statutory  authority if it determines that such additional authority is necessary.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, EPA’s Assistant Administrator for  Research and Development and Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste  and Emergency Response identified actions that EPA has begun taking  that are responsive to these recommendations. EPA also provided  comments on aspects of the report it considered misleading or inaccurate,  such as our characterization of the Expert Technical Review Panel  process, including the panel’s goals. Though EPA preferred that we  present the charges identified by CEQ, we reported the goals that EPA  provided directly to the expert panel at its first meeting, and we believe  this accurately characterizes the priorities that EPA established for the  panel. In addition, EPA asserted that the report creates a misleading  impression that EPA did not fully disclose the limitations of test results  from its first program. EPA refers to an appendix in its second plan, which  includes a discussion of EPA’s methodology; raw data, such as the total  number of samples taken; and the results of sampling efforts, but does not  include a discussion of the factors that may have influenced these results.  We continue to believe that EPA did not include appropriate caveats that  clearly articulated the limitations in the results in its discussion, such as  that 20 percent of eligible residents participated and, therefore, the results  may not have been representative of all residences. We believe that the  report offers a balanced portrayal of EPA’s development of its second  program, the expert panel process, and EPA’s actions to better prepare for  future disasters. EPA also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate. EPA’s letter and our detailed response to it  appear in appendix V.
We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator, EPA;  appropriate congressional committees; and other interested parties. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report or need additional information,  please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and of Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Information Classified by the Environmental Protection Agency Does Not Address the World Trade Center
paragraphs: Since the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was given the authority  to classify information in May 2002, it has classified information in three  documents. However, none of these documents address the World Trade  Center (WTC) or the environmental impact of its destruction.
subsections: section_title: EPA Received Authority to Classify Information Related to National Security in May 2002
paragraphs: In May 2002, through Executive Order 12958, the President gave the EPA  Administrator the authority to classify information as “Secret.” Section 1.4  of the executive order, as amended, prescribes a uniform system for  classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information,  including information relating to defense against transnational terrorism.  It also identifies the types of information that should be considered for  classification: military plans, weapon systems, and operations; foreign  government information; intelligence activities, sources, and methods, and  cryptology; scientific, technological, and economic matters relating to the  national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism;  U.S. programs for safeguarding nuclear materials and facilities;  vulnerabilities and capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures,  projects, plans, and protection services relating to the national security,  which includes defense against transnational terrorism; and weapons of  mass destruction.
The executive order also describes several different classification types  and levels. Original classification refers to the classification of information  that has not already been classified by another authority. Derivative  classification refers to the classification of a document that uses  information that has already been classified. The levels of classification— “Top Secret,” “Secret,” or “Confidential”—refer to the severity of national  security damage that disclosure of the information would result in.
section_title: EPA Originally Classified Information in Three Documents
paragraphs: Since it received its classification authority in May 2002, EPA has  originally classified information in three documents, according to EPA’s  review of classified information, and identified 51 documents with  derivative classification. This assessment concurs with our review of  National Archives program data, as table 2 shows.
In information that EPA submitted to the National Archives, it explained  that, although EPA did not originally classify information in any  documents in fiscal year 2006, the three documents containing originally  classified information significantly increased the number of derivative  classification decisions made by EPA because subsequent documents  included the originally classified information.
section_title: Information EPA Originally Classified Does Not Concern the Environmental Impact of the WTC Collapse
paragraphs: EPA has not classified any WTC information, including environmental  information, according to our review of the three documents that EPA has  classified. According to nonclassified portions of these three documents,  they discuss threat scenarios for buildings, water systems and drinking  water infrastructure, and water decontamination.
section_title: Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: We were asked to determine (1) the extent to which the Environmental  Protection Agency (EPA) incorporated recommendations and additional  input from the expert panel and its Inspector General in its second  program; (2) what factors, if any, limited the expert panel’s ability to meet  its goals; (3) the completeness of information EPA provided to the public  in its second plan; (4) the way EPA estimated the resources needed to  conduct the second program; and (5) the extent to which EPA has acted  upon lessons learned to better prepare for indoor contamination that  could result from future large-scale disasters. In addition, owing to  concerns raised in the media about EPA’s use of classification authority,  we were asked to determine the extent to which EPA has classified  information, and, if so, whether any classified information discusses the  environmental impact of the towers’ collapse.
To examine EPA’s actions to incorporate recommendations and additional  input from the expert panel and its Inspector General, we reviewed four  Inspector General recommendations on EPA’s test and clean program; all  13 WTC Expert Technical Review Panel meeting summaries, which  included input from the WTC Community-Labor Coalition representatives  to the panel and other panel members; and EPA’s 2002-2003 indoor test  and clean program plan and all drafts leading to the 2006 program plan.  We analyzed the December 2006 Final Test and Clean Plan to determine  whether EPA had incorporated individual panel member and Inspector  General input. We relied upon EPA’s summaries of the panel meetings to  obtain information on individual panel member input because EPA did not  have a comprehensive list of panel recommendations. We also conducted  interviews with EPA officials from headquarters (Washington, D.C.) and  Region 2 (New York City) to identify actions EPA took to incorporate the  expert panel and Inspector General input into the test and clean program  plan. Finally, we conducted structured interviews with all 18 expert panel  members, as well as the two chairs of the WTC Expert Technical Review  Panel. The expert panel members included community representatives,  local and federal government officials from the Federal Emergency  Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Labor’s Occupational  Safety and Health Administration, the New York City’s Department of  Environmental Protection and Department of Health and Mental Hygiene,  and nongovernment members.
To determine the factors that affected the expert panel’s ability to meet its  goals, we conducted structured interviews with all 18 WTC expert panel  members, as well as the two former EPA Assistant Administrators for the  Office of Research and Development who chaired the panel. We analyzed  expert panel member and panel chair responses to both qualitative and  quantitative questions in order to describe the panel process and obtain  information on EPA’s management of the process. In follow-up  correspondence, we asked panel members whether EPA’s second program  was responsive to the concerns of residents and workers; we were only  able to obtain 10 panel member responses. We also reviewed all 13 panel  meeting summaries and reviewed selected video or audio recordings of  meetings.
To evaluate the completeness of information EPA provided to the public in  its second plan, we reviewed EPA’s 2002-2003 program plan and all drafts  leading to the December 2006 program plan, information on testing data  included on EPA’s Web site, the 2003 EPA Inspector General report, and  all 13 summaries of EPA’s Expert Technical Review Panel meetings.
To examine EPA efforts to estimate the resources needed to conduct the  second program, we obtained and analyzed funding documentation,  including interagency agreements between FEMA and EPA, as well as  documentation related to funding and expenditure data for the WTC  indoor test and clean program. We found discrepancies in the data EPA  and FEMA provided. We assessed the reliability of expenditure data  received from EPA but were unable to assess the reliability of expenditure  data provided by FEMA. We assessed the reliability of the EPA  expenditure data by interviewing officials knowledgeable about the data  and reviewing existing information about the data and the system that  produced them. We determined that EPA’s funding data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of our review. We also interviewed agency  officials to gather information on EPA’s expenditures, its plans to spend  funding, and whether EPA plans to seek additional funds.
To examine the extent to which EPA has acted upon lessons learned for  addressing indoor contamination resulting from future large-scale  disasters, we interviewed officials from EPA headquarters, including the  Office of Research and Development and the Office of Solid Waste and  Emergency Response; from Region 2, which is responsible for New York  City; and from EPA’s National Homeland Security Research Center, among  others. We compared EPA’s activities with the Inspector General’s  recommendations on preparedness and with recommendations in EPA’s  Lessons Learned in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001. We also  attended a National Institute of Standards and Technology technical  seminar on WTC materials and observed the disaster area with a FEMA  official.
To determine the extent to which EPA has classified information, and, if  so, whether any classified information discusses the environmental impact  of the towers’ collapse, we requested a statement from EPA on (1)  whether any EPA officials, including former EPA Administrators,  authorized by Executive Order 12958 to classify information as secret have  done so since the executive order was promulgated; and (2) whether any  of the classified information pertains to the environmental impact of the  WTC collapse, including the indoor test and clean program, contaminants  of potential concern, or geographic boundaries, that are relevant to EPA’s  approach to addressing indoor contamination. After EPA responded, we  requested access to and we reviewed all classified information to  determine whether it was related to the WTC disaster. In addition, we  obtained and reviewed data from the National Archives to determine the  number of documents EPA has classified since receiving authority to do  so. Appendix I provides the results of our analysis of EPA’s classification  of information under this authority.
We performed our work between June 2006 and September 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix III: Comparison of EPA’s First and Second Indoor Programs
subsections: section_title: World Trade Center residential dust cleanup program (2002-2003)
paragraphs: Lower Manhattan indoor dust test and clean  program (December 2006)
In general, a cleanup will be offered if a benchmark for  any contaminant is exceeded in any unit or building  common area tested. EPA will conduct surveys to  determine if contamination levels exceeding  benchmarks may be attributed to sources within or  adjacent to the place of business or residence. This  information will be considered with information on  building cleaning history to determine whether  additional sampling or further cleaning will be offered.
Streets based on the EPIC visual    residents: owners or renters    residents: owners or renters    residential buildings: common areas, as well as    buildings: residential or commercial building    employees and employers not eligible   Air samples were also analyzed for total fibers, including MMVF; however, this did not affect cleanup  decisions. In a subset of residences, pre- and post-cleanup dust wipe samples were collected and  analyzed for dioxin, mercury, lead, and 21 other metals. This included over 1,500 samples from 263  residences and 157 buildings.
section_title: Appendix IV: Questions and Responses to the Structured Interview Questions for the Expert Panel
paragraphs: The body of this report generally identifies expert responses to our  questions about EPA’s management of the panel process. The following  tables include the full range of experts (out of 18) who responded to these  questions. The tables also indicate the number of experts who provided no  response.
Question: Was EPA’s decision to obtain individual recommendations  rather than have the panel arrive at consensus appropriate?
Question: Did expert panel members have adequate agenda time for panel  discussion of issues?
Question: How transparent was EPA’s decision-making process behind  changes in the test and clean plan versions?
Question: How helpful would it have been to have written transcripts of  the meetings available?
Question: How successful do you think the panel was in meeting each of  the following panel goals?
Follow-up question: Is the Lower Manhattan Indoor Dust Test and Clean  Program Plan responsive to the concerns of residents and workers  impacted by the collapse of the World Trade Center towers?
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Environmental Protection  Agency’s letter dated August 21, 2007.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We believe that the report offers a balanced portrayal of EPA’s  development of its second program, the WTC Expert Technical Review  Panel process, and EPA’s actions to better prepare for future disasters.   In several cases we have clarified the language in the draft report to  address EPA concerns.  2.  In regard to EPA’s comments about the transparency of the WTC  Expert Technical Review Panel process, we reported on the factors  that limited the panel’s ability to meet its goals and not on the overall  transparency of the process. We stated that two factors limited the  panel’s ability to meet its goals: (1) EPA officials’ assertion that other  agencies were better equipped to address public health and (2) EPA’s  approach for managing the panel process.  Regarding EPA’s  management of the panel process, however, expert panel members told  us that EPA did not have a transparent process for adopting or  rejecting their recommendations, as we stated in the draft report.    3.  Regarding panel members’ views on the responsiveness of EPA’s  second program to concerns of residents and workers, we clarified our  report to note that the source of the views included all of the expert  panel members who responded to a follow-up inquiry regarding this  question.    4.  We disagree that the draft report provided panel member views in a  misleading manner.  However, we clarified the report language to  indicate that 9 of 18 panel members reported that the decision-making  process behind EPA’s changes to its plan were not at all transparent.   In doing so, we reported the category with the largest number of  responses and, as indicated in the draft report, the full range of  responses can be found in appendix IV.  As stated in the draft report, in  order to determine the factors that affected the expert panel’s ability to  meet its goals, we conducted structured interviews with all 18 expert  panel members. We analyzed these responses in order to describe the  panel process, including EPA’s management of the panel process. We  reported the views that panel members provided to us during  structured interviews and included the full range of responses to these  questions in an appendix, as stated above.  Regarding comments  supporting inadequate time for decision making, panel members  requested at the final panel meeting that EPA allow time for additional  discussion. According to the December 2005 meeting summary, the  panel co-chair “summarized that the overall sense of the panel  members is that there is a need for additional discussion.”  5.  We acknowledge that EPA would have preferred for us to include more  detailed information in our discussion of the agency’s second WTC  program, the WTC Expert Technical Review Panel process, and its  programs for responding to disasters.  However, the purpose of our  report was not to reiterate the technical details of EPA’s efforts but to  summarize specific findings related to our key objectives.    6.  EPA asserts that it conducted extensive monitoring and modeling after  September 11, 2001, in order to determine the extent of contamination.  We acknowledge that appendix I in EPA’s December 2006 plan states,  “the plumes resulting from the collapse of the towers and subsequent  fires were modeled by EPA” and that “EPA and many other agencies  collected and analyzed environmental samples after the September 11,  2001, attack on the WTC,” and we incorporated these facts in the  report.  However, when we asked EPA to identify which samples were  taken indoors, EPA officials told us they did not have this information.   Furthermore, in the body of EPA’s December 2006 program plan, EPA  acknowledges that it is no longer attempting to assess the extent of  WTC contamination.  We maintain that the challenge of identifying the  extent of WTC contamination in indoor spaces remains.    7.  We agree that neither EPA nor panel members suggested testing in  inaccessible areas as a means of determining the adequacy of its  cleanups.  However, our statement was intended to convey our belief  that if EPA had information about these areas, a more complete picture  of both the extent of contamination and the adequacy of overall efforts  directed toward cleaning and testing could be assessed.  8.  EPA takes issue with our assertion that EPA did not estimate the  resources needed to carry out its second program.  We believe that  EPA did not conduct a cost estimate that identified the resources  needed to effectively implement the second program.  As EPA stated in  comments, it provided information for potential contract costs for the  second program; however, we continue to believe that the information  was limited as it related to only one program component—sampling— and it was unclear how the sampling costs related to an overall cost  estimate.  In EPA’s comments, it states that cost data provided in its  interagency agreement constituted a cost estimate; however,  information on key assumptions such as estimated participation rates  as well as key program elements, including the cost of sampling, were  not included.  Further, the information provided in the interagency  agreement was not the basis for determining whether $7 million in  funding would be adequate for implementing the second program—as  this amount had already been established as the remaining funds  FEMA set aside for EPA’s use.  In contrast, for its first program, EPA  provided information in the interagency agreement with FEMA that  included details associated with individual cost elements, such as  sample analysis, equipment and supplies, and salary and travel costs.   For example, EPA provided detailed estimates for analytical services  based on key assumptions related to participation, samples per unit,  and the testing for specific contaminants.  EPA did not provide this  information in the second interagency agreement to support its  identification of resources needed for analytical activities.  We note  that the interagency agreement for EPA’s first program identified over  $9 million for sampling and analysis of asbestos.  While the second  program is addressing three additional contaminants, the interagency  agreement has limited detail on the associated sampling and analysis  costs or how these relate to the total funding of $7 million.   9.  EPA asserts that table 1 in the draft report (figure 5 in the final report)  does not accurately characterize the IG recommendations and the  relationship between them and the CEQ charges.  As the draft report  stated, table 1 in the draft report (figure 5 in the final report) showed  key recommendations and additional input that the IG and panel  members provided to EPA.  We believe that the figure accurately  presents both recommendations such as those found in Chapter 6 of  the IG report, as well as input the IG provided in other sections of the  report that supports these specific recommendations.  The figure also  presents input provided by panel members, which we believe is not  documented comprehensively in other locations.   10. In EPA’s comments, it notes that panel members were free to refocus  issues, and our draft report acknowledged that EPA adopted panel  members’ input to address contamination, rather than  recontamination, of spaces.  On page 8 of its comments, EPA took  issue with our description of the panel’s goals.  EPA provided the  charges identified by CEQ in its October 27, 2003, letter to the agency.   In our report, rather than present these charges, we instead reported  goals that EPA directly provided to the expert panel at its first meeting  on March 31, 2004.  We believe this is an accurate characterization of  the priorities EPA established for the panel.  11. In its comments, EPA states that the agency decided to implement a  voluntary program to test and clean residences and whole buildings.  In  fact, when requested by building owners, the December 2006 program  plan offers testing and cleaning in residential and commercial  buildings’ common areas, but does not use the term “whole buildings.”     12. EPA takes issue with our assessment that EPA failed to disclose the  limitations in testing results.  EPA refers to appendix I of its second  plan and notes that it contains an “extensive discussion” of the results  of the first program.  The appendix includes a discussion of EPA’s  methodology, raw data such as the total number of samples taken, and  the results of sampling efforts but does not include a discussion of the  limitations that may have influenced these results.  EPA also notes that  discussion of its first program’s test results were available in panel  meeting summaries and on EPA’s WTC Web site; however, these  sources summarized presentations made to the panel and responses to  panel member comments but lacked the same discussion of limitations  as EPA’s second program plan.  We continue to believe that EPA did  not include appropriate caveats that clearly articulated the limitations  in the results in its discussion, such as that 20 percent of eligible  residents participated and, therefore, the results may not have been  representative of all spaces.  Finally, GAO did not conclude that EPA  withheld data, as EPA suggested in its comments.    13. In EPA’s comments, EPA disagrees with our assessment that EPA has  not demonstrated how it will overcome certain challenges identified by  expert panel members.  We acknowledge EPA’s analytical capabilities  and the acute exposure guideline levels and other benchmarks that are  available to EPA.  We continue to believe that expert panel members  raised valid issues regarding EPA’s second program following the WTC  disaster, including what cleanup benchmarks EPA used, what  contaminants EPA tested for, and EPA’s reliance on visual evidence.   We believe these issues point to the need for protocols or interagency  agreements that clarify how EPA, along with other agencies, is to  address indoor contamination in the future.  Further, after reviewing  the summary that EPA provided on pages 24 and 25 of its comments of  the HVAC system evaluation process it employed, we continue to  believe that this process is primarily a visual assessment and that we  accurately portrayed panel member concerns with EPA’s reliance on  visual evidence rather than sample data for HVAC evaluations.     14. We encourage EPA to complete and implement its Crisis  Communication Plan’s companion resource guide, described in its  comments, in a timely fashion.  The public relies on EPA to provide  accurate and complete information about environmental hazards that  may affect them.  Assuring that environmental data are presented in  language that is easily understood and in easily accessible formats will  improve the public’s ability to make informed decisions.  15. We note that EPA’s comments indicated that since the WTC disaster,  EPA has developed more detailed cost estimates to help plan the  agency’s Stafford Act activities and that the agency is working to  establish more specific reporting requirements.  In order to more fully  inform planning and to allow for the efficient allocation of disaster  funds, we encourage the agency to continue these efforts.   16. We recognized in our recommendation the role that DHS and other  federal agencies would play in developing protocols and  memorandums of understanding under the National Response Plan  that specifically address indoor contamination.  We acknowledge that  EPA plays a critical role under Emergency Support Function 10 for  addressing oil and hazardous waste releases.  It is encouraging that  EPA is pursuing a number of efforts related to chemical, biological, and  radiological incidents, including the development of protocols that  specifically address indoor contamination involving these types of  agents.  In addition to these areas, we believe that protocols specific to  indoor contamination, which define when the extent of contamination  is to be determined, as well as how and when indoor cleanups are to be  conducted, should be priorities.    17. We edited the sentence as suggested, but we note that the May 3, 2002,  letter from Christopher Ward, New York City Department of  Environmental Protection, to Brad Gair, FEMA, refers specifically to  asbestos.  It states, “The City of New York believes that it is in the  public’s interest to remove this material from buildings in the vicinity  of the WTC site.  Samples collected during the inspections indicate that  asbestos  may be present in some of the debris.  The  removal of this material will assure that it will not become re-entrained  in the air in the future, thereby protecting against any adverse affects  on air quality or public health and safety.”     18. We edited the sentence on residential sampling as suggested.    19. EPA is concerned that we provided additional detail beyond the  specific statement of IG recommendation 6-3.  We believe our  statement accurately characterizes the recommendation by taking into  consideration other information in the IG report.  Specifically,  preceding this recommendation, the IG provides details that support  this recommendation.  The IG states on page 51 of its August 2003  report that “in the case of centralized HVAC systems, selective cleaning  does not ensure that cleaned apartments will not be recontaminated by  uncleaned apartments through the HVAC system.  Consequently, the  cleaning of contaminated buildings should proceed by treating the  building as a system.”    20. We included this information in our final report.  21. EPA asserts that our discussions of EPA’s efforts to develop a WTC  dust screening method are incorrect. We recognize that additional  development would have been necessary to improve the precision and  accuracy of the method and, in doing so, render the method usable as a  WTC dust screening tool.  Our draft report described the subpanel’s  work to help EPA develop such a methodology and provided  information about the peer review of the methodology.  As indicated  on page 18 of its comments, EPA suggested that its method was never  intended to distinguish “WTC contaminants in dust.”  Our draft report  asserted that EPA was unable to develop a method for differentiating  between normal background dust and WTC dust and therefore EPA  was unable to determine the extent of WTC contamination.  We believe  the phrase “WTC contaminants in dust” is synonymous with dust  contaminated with “WTC residue.”      22. We included this information in our final report.   23. EPA disagrees with our statement that EPA did not begin examining  methods for differentiating between normal urban dust and WTC dust  until May 2004.  While multiagency workgroup and task force activities  were related, EPA initiated its specific effort to develop a method for  identifying a WTC dust signature after individual expert panel members  recommended that it do so at its May 12, 2004, meeting.  This decision  is documented in a September 8, 2006, letter from the EPA Region 2  Administrator to a Member of Congress that states, “As a result of  these  discussions, EPA decided to explore whether a WTC  signature exists in dust.”  We continue to believe that our statement is  accurate.    24.  We disagree that our statement regarding workplaces is misleading.   Despite OSHA and NIOSH presentations made at panel meetings, we  continue to have concerns because these agencies do not have  authority to conduct cleanup in response to contaminant levels that  exceed EPA’s site-specific cleanup benchmarks.  Furthermore, our  draft report stated that OSHA’s standards are designed primarily to  address airborne contamination, while EPA’s test and clean program  is designed to address contamination in building spaces, whether it is  airborne or in settled dust.  25.  We disagree with EPA’s assertion that this statement creates the  impression that other agencies were not addressing health-related  issues.  Our comments were limited to the panel’s ability to meet its  goals, one of which was to identify unmet public health needs.  While  EPA’s facilitation of public health presentations may have provided  information about health issues, all but two expert panel members  told us that the panel did not successfully identify unmet public health  needs.  We did not address the quality of the WTC Health Registry or  other agencies’ public health activities.    26.  The source of the office and residential building data is the May 12,  2004, panel meeting summary posted on EPA’s Web site.  The  summary identifies a New York City Department of Buildings  database from which EPA drew this information.  27.  The draft report provided basic facts and background information  about EPA’s first program that were derived from EPA’s December  2006 program plan and other EPA reports in order to provide context  for the development of the second program.   28.  EPA takes issue with our draft regarding our characterization of the  availability of sample results from the New York City Department of  Health and Mental Hygiene and the Agency for Toxic Substances and  Disease Registry’s study.  In fact, our draft report provided a footnote  pointing out the results of the study were made available to EPA in  February 2002.  29.  EPA said the dates we provided in a timeline of events did not  accurately portray when the results of agency studies were available  for its use.  We provided publication dates for three EPA studies in  our timeline to illustrate the range of activities that EPA engaged in  prior to its second program.  EPA also asserted that there was no  single date for reoccupation of residences.  In fact, our timeline  specifically includes the date, 9/17/2001, that New York City residents  began to reoccupy homes and Wall Street was reopened.  30.  As suggested, we replaced the term “cleanup standards” with “cleanup  benchmarks” and we expanded our discussion of how these  benchmarks were developed.    31.  EPA asserts that our statement is incorrect because it omits  discussion of cleaning in common areas.  We acknowledge that EPA  will clean in common areas under certain circumstances; however,  the context of this discussion was the panel members’  recommendations that EPA clean in HVACs.    32.  We believe that the draft report correctly presents the IG  recommendation, what EPA considered, and the agency’s rationale  for not electing to pursue a sampling approach that would have  addressed whole buildings; however, we clarified the report’s  language to include more detail regarding EPA’s proposed approach.   The July 26, 2004, panel meeting summary supports our description of  how EPA considered various approaches.  While EPA said that its  intent was not to characterize buildings but rather to use the  information from buildings “to characterize areas,” the meeting  summary includes a presentation by an EPA official on a sampling  approach that involved “…conducting air and dust sampling in several  units within the building to characterize the building.”  Further, we  disagree with EPA’s explanation of why its proposal to do so was  rejected by panel members and the public.  Panel members rejected  the aspect of the plan that would have limited the sampling to the  same residences that participated in EPA’s first program, as panel  members wanted the plan to allow for sampling in residences that had  not participated previously. Thus, EPA’s assertion in its comments  that the panel members rejected EPA’s approach because it was  addressing whole buildings is not accurate.    33.  We clarified this statement in the report, noting that EPA did not  maintain a list of recommendations; however, we continue to believe  that the meeting summaries maintained by EPA did not constitute  comprehensive documentation of recommendations made by expert  panel members.   34.  We disagree that our discussion of overloaded samples is incorrect;  however, we clarified report language to indicate that sample results,  rather than samples, were discarded and that dust particles, rather  than fibers, obscured analysis.   In EPA’s final report from its first  program, the agency states, “there were a number of outcomes that  resulted in inconclusive results. Filter overload was the most  common. Filter overload occurs when too many dust particles are  captured on the filter. The filter becomes obscured so technicians  examining it under a microscope cannot separate out individual  fibers. This causes an inconclusive result, which is discarded.”  In its  second program plan, EPA does not present this information in its  description of its first program’s test results.  We continue to believe  that this information would have provided additional context to the  public.   35.  EPA disagrees with our assessment that EPA guidance has not yet  addressed how the agency will determine the extent of contamination  resulting from disasters.  We acknowledge that EPA has built its  capacity to address contamination since the WTC disaster and that it  continues to work to develop additional sampling methods. In fact,  the draft report provided examples of research EPA is conducting,  benchmarks EPA is developing, and other preparedness activities that  EPA has undertaken.  However, we do not believe that existing  guidance or protocols have provided additional assurances that EPA  has addressed the challenges it faced from 2004 to 2005 when working  to develop a reliable screening method for WTC dust.   36.  As suggested, we edited the sentence regarding the Environmental  Response Team.   37.  As suggested, we edited the sentence regarding environmental  laboratory networks.   38.  As suggested, we edited the sentence regarding acute exposure  guideline levels.   39.  EPA noted matters for correction in an appendix that provides  background information on EPA’s first and second programs.  We  edited the statement regarding EPA’s role in the first program, as  suggested.  However, we note that in its final report on its first  program EPA states, “contractors cleaned and tested homes, under  the direction of the EPA.”  In addition, our draft report included a  table note referring to the subset of 263 residences that EPA tested for  additional contaminants, and we have added detail regarding total  fibers.  For common areas, the draft report included the number of  samples taken from common areas, and it also notes that 144  buildings had common areas cleaned.  We clarified the appendix III  language regarding geographic extent to note that the appendix  provides program boundaries.
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Diane B. Raynes, Assistant  Director; Janice Ceperich; Michele Fejfar; Brandon H. Haller; Katheryn  Summers Hubbell; Karen Keegan; Omari Norman; Carol Herrnstadt  Shulman; and Sandra Tasic made major contributions to this report.  Additional assistance was provided by Katherine M. Raheb.