Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future Combat System
Published: 2007-03-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Future Combat System (FCS) is central to Army transformation efforts, comprising 14 integrated weapon systems and an advanced information network. In previous work, GAO found that the elements of a sound business case--firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding--were not present. As a result, FCS is considered high risk and in need of special oversight and review. Congress has mandated that the Department of Defense (DOD) decide in early 2009 whether FCS should continue. GAO is required to review the program annually. In this report, GAO analyzes FCS development, including its requirements definition; status of critical technologies, software development, and complementary programs; soundness of its acquisition strategy related to design, production and spin-out of capabilities to current forces; and reasonableness of costs and sufficiency of funding.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army has been granted a lot of latitude to carry out a large program like FCS this far into development with relatively little demonstrated knowledge. Tangible progress has been made during the year in several areas, including requirements and technology. Such progress warrants recognition, but confidence that the program can deliver as promised depends on high levels of demonstrated knowledge, which are yet to come. Following the preliminary design review in 2009, there should be enough knowledge to demonstrate the soundness of the FCS business case. If significant doubts remain about the program's executability at that time, DOD will have to consider alternatives to proceeding with the program. Currently, GAO sees the FCS business case as follows. Requirements--Progress has been made in defining requirements and making some difficult trade-offs, but key assumptions about the performance of immature technologies and other technical risks remain to be proven. Technology--The Army has made progress in maturing technologies, but it will take several more years to reach full maturity. All key technologies should have been mature in 2003 when the program began. FCS software has doubled in size compared to original estimates and faces significant risks. The Army is attempting a disciplined approach to managing software development. Acquisition Strategy--The FCS acquisition strategy is compressed. Key testing to demonstrate FCS performance will not be completed, and maturity of design and production will not be demonstrated until after the production decision. Program Costs--New estimates place FCS costs significantly above the current estimate of $163.7 billion. The Army has recently proposed a plan to buy fewer systems and slow production rates. This recent program adjustment will affect program costs, but details are not yet available.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: As the centerpiece of the Army’s transformation to a lighter, more agile,  and more capable combat force, the Future Combat System (FCS)  program—which comprises 14 integrated weapon systems and an  advanced information network needed for a brigade combat team—is  considered to be, according to the Army, the greatest technology and  integration challenge it has ever undertaken. The Army started its FCS  program in May 2003 without fulfilling the basic elements of a business  case—that is, determining if the program’s requirements and concept were  valid and that the concept could be successfully developed with existing  resources including proven technologies, stable design, adequate funding,  and adequate time. The Army projects the FCS program will cost   $163.7 billion, which has been adjusted for inflation, but does not include  key complementary programs. As a result, the program is recognized as  being high risk and in need of special oversight and review. In 2006,  Congress mandated that the Department of Defense (DOD) hold an FCS  milestone review, essentially a “go/no-go” decision, following its  preliminary design review, which is now scheduled for early 2009.
Given its cost, scope, and technical challenges, section 211 of the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires GAO to report  annually on the FCS program. The specific objectives of this report are to  assess FCS progress in terms of (1) definition of requirements; (2) status  of critical technologies, software development, and complementary  programs; (3) the soundness of the acquisition strategy as it relates to  design and production as well as the spin-out of capabilities to current  forces; and (4) reasonableness of program costs and whether funds have  been committed to complete the program as planned.
In conducting our work, we have contacted numerous DOD and Army  offices. We reviewed documents pertaining to the FCS program, attended  meetings at which DOD and Army officials reviewed program progress,  and held discussions with key DOD and Army officials on various aspects  of the program. Officials from DOD and the Army have provided us access  to sufficient information to make informed judgments on the matters in  this report. In addition, we drew from our body of past work on weapon  systems acquisition practices. We performed our work from March 2006 to  March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Appendix I further discusses our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The FCS concept is designed to be part of the Army’s Future Force, which  is intended to transform the Army into a more rapidly deployable and  responsive force that differs substantially from the large division-centric  structure of the past. The Army is reorganizing its current forces into  modular brigade combat teams, each of which is expected to be highly  survivable and the most lethal brigade-sized unit the Army has ever  fielded. The Army expects FCS-equipped brigade combat teams to provide  significant warfighting capabilities to DOD’s overall joint military  operations. The Army is implementing its transformation plans at a time  when current U.S. ground forces continue to play a critical role in the  ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army has instituted plans to  spin out selected FCS technologies and systems to current Army forces  throughout the program’s system development and demonstration phase.
As we were preparing this report, the Army made a number of adjustments  to its plans for the FCS program. The revised program will no longer  include all 18 systems as originally planned. The FCS family of weapons is  now expected to include 14 manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air  vehicles, sensors, and munitions that will be linked by an advanced  information network. The systems include    eight new types of manned ground vehicles to replace current  tanks, infantry carriers, and self-propelled howitzers;  two classes of unmanned aerial vehicles;    several unmanned ground vehicles; and    an attack missile.
Fundamentally, the FCS concept is to replace mass with superior  information—allowing soldiers to see and hit the enemy first rather than  to rely on heavy armor to withstand a hit. This solution attempts to  address a mismatch that has posed a dilemma to the Army for decades: the  Army’s heavy forces had the necessary firepower needed to win but  required extensive support and too much time to deploy while its light  forces could deploy rapidly but lacked firepower. If the Future Force  becomes a reality, then the Army would be better organized, staffed,  equipped, and trained for prompt and sustained land combat, qualities  intended to ensure that it would dominate over evolving, sophisticated  threats. The Future Force is to be offensively oriented and will employ  revolutionary concepts of operations, enabled by new technology. The  Army envisions a new way of fighting that depends on networking the  force, which involves linking people, platforms, weapons, and sensors  seamlessly together in a system-of-systems.
If successful, the FCS system-of-systems concept will integrate individual  capabilities of weapons and platforms, thus facilitating interoperability  and open system designs. This would represent significant improvement  over the traditional approach of building superior individual weapons that  must be retrofitted and netted together after the fact. This transformation,  in terms of both operations and equipment, is under way with the full  cooperation of the Army warfighter community. In fact, the development  and acquisition of FCS is being accomplished using a uniquely  collaborative relationship among the Army’s developers, the participating  contractors, and the warfighter community.
The Army has employed a management approach for FCS that centers on a  lead systems integrator to provide significant management services to help  the Army define and develop FCS and reach across traditional Army  mission areas. Because of its partner-like relationship with the Army, the  lead systems integrator’s responsibilities include requirements  development, design, and selection of major system and subsystem  subcontractors. The team of Boeing and Science Applications  International Corporation is the lead systems integrator for the FCS  system development and demonstration phase of acquisition, which is  expected to extend until 2017. The FCS lead systems integrator acts on  behalf of the Army to optimize the FCS capability, maximize competition,  ensure interoperability, and maintain commonality in order to reduce life- cycle costs. Boeing also acts as an FCS supplier in that it is responsible for  developing two important software subsystems. The Army advised us that  it did not believe it had the resources or flexibility to use its traditional  acquisition process to field a program as complex as FCS under the  aggressive timeline established by the then-Army Chief of Staff. The Army  will maintain oversight and final approval of the lead systems integrator’s  subcontracting and competition plans. The FCS lead systems integrator  originally operated under a contractual instrument called an “other  transaction agreement.” In 2006, the Army completed the conversion of  that instrument to a more typical contract based on the Federal  Acquisition Regulation. As required by section 115 of the John Warner  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, we are reviewing  the contractual relationship between the Army and the lead systems  integrator and will be reporting on that work separately.
subsections: section_title: Elements of a Business Case
paragraphs: We have frequently reported on the wisdom of using a solid, executable  business case before committing resources to a new product development  effort. In the case of DOD, a business case should be based on DOD  acquisition policy and lessons learned from leading commercial firms and  successful DOD programs. The business case in its simplest form is  demonstrated evidence that (1) the warfighter’s needs are valid and that  they can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the chosen concept  can be developed and produced within existing resources—that is, proven  technologies, design knowledge, adequate funding, adequate time, and  management capacity to deliver the product when it is needed. A program  should not go forward into product development unless a sound business  case can be made. If the business case measures up, the organization  commits to the product development, including making the financial  investment.
At the heart of a business case is a knowledge-based approach to product  development that is both a best practice among leading commercial firms  and the approach preferred by DOD in its acquisition policies. For a  program to deliver a successful product within available resources,  managers should demonstrate high levels of knowledge before significant  commitments are made. In essence, knowledge supplants risk over time.  This building of knowledge can be described as three levels or points that  should be attained over the course of a program.
First, at program start, the customer’s needs should match the  developer’s available resources—mature technologies, time,  funding, and management capacity. An indication of this match is  the demonstrated maturity of the technologies needed to meet  customer needs. The ability of the government acquisition  workforce to properly manage the effort should also be an  important consideration at program start.
Second, about midway through development, the product’s design  should be stable and demonstrate that it is capable of meeting  performance requirements. The critical design review is the vehicle  for making this determination and generally signifies the point at  which the program is ready to start building production- representative prototypes.
Third, by the time of the production decision, the product must be  shown able to be manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality  targets and have demonstrated its reliability. It is also the point at  which the design must demonstrate that it performs as expected  through realistic system-level testing.
A delay in attaining any one of these levels delays the points that follow. If  the technologies needed to meet requirements are not mature, design and  production maturity will be delayed. In successful commercial and  defense programs that we have reviewed, managers were careful to  develop technology separately from and ahead of the development of the  product. For this reason, the first knowledge level is the most important  for improving the chances of developing a weapon system within cost and  schedule estimates. DOD’s acquisition policy has adopted the knowledge- based approach to acquisitions. DOD policy requires program managers to  demonstrate knowledge about key aspects of a system at key points in the  acquisition process. Program managers are also required to reduce  integration risk and demonstrate product design prior to the design  readiness review and to reduce manufacturing risk and demonstrate  producibility prior to full-rate production.
The FCS program is about one-third of the way into its scheduled product  development. At this stage, the program should have attained knowledge  point one, with a strategy for attaining knowledge points two and three.  Accordingly, we analyzed the FCS business case first as it pertains to  firming requirements and maturing technologies, which indicate progress  against the first knowledge point. We then analyzed FCS’s strategy for  attaining design and production maturity. Finally, we analyzed the costs  and funding estimates made to execute the FCS business case.
section_title: Agency and Congressional Actions Since Our Last Report
paragraphs: In our previous report on the FCS program, released in March 2006, we  reported that the program entered the development phase in 2003 without  reaching the level of knowledge it should have attained in the pre- development phase. The elements of a sound business case were not  reasonably present, and we noted that the Army would continue building  basic knowledge in areas such as requirements and technologies for  several more years. We concluded that in order for the FCS program to be  successful, an improved business case was needed.
The Defense Acquisition Board met in May 2006 to review the FCS  program. That review approved the Army approach to spin out certain  FCS technologies to current Army forces in 2008 and directed the Army to  continue with yearly in-process reviews and a Defense Acquisition Board  meeting in the late 2008 timeframe. Performance expectations were also  established for the review. During the meeting, it was noted that  significant cost and schedule risk remains for the program and that  reductions in scope and more flexibility in schedule are needed to stay  within current funding constraints.
Also in 2006, Congress mandated that the Secretary of Defense conduct a  milestone review for the FCS program, following the preliminary design  review scheduled for early 2009. Congress stated that the review should  include an assessment of whether (1) the needs are valid and can be best  met with the FCS concept, (2) the FCS program can be developed and  produced within existing resources, and (3) the program should continue  as currently structured, be restructured, or be terminated. The Congress  required the Secretary of Defense to review specific aspects of the  program, including the maturity of critical technologies, program risks,  demonstrations of the FCS concept and software, and a cost estimate and  affordability assessment and to submit a report of the findings and  conclusions of the review to Congress. Additionally, Congress has required  the Secretary of Defense to provide an independent cost estimate that will  encompass costs related to the FCS program and a report on the estimate.  The Institute for Defense Analyses is expected to deliver this analysis to  Congress by April 2007.
Finally, in response to concerns over funding shortfalls and other resource  issues for fiscal years 2008 to 2013, the Army has recently made a number  of changes to its plans for the FCS program. Although complete details are  not yet available, the Army plans to  reduce the number of individual systems from 18 to 14 including  eliminating 2 unmanned aerial vehicles;    slow the rate of FCS production from 1.5 to 1 brigade combat team    change the total quantities to be bought for several systems; and  reduce the number of planned spin-outs from four to three.
Full details of the Army’s plans were not available at the time of this  report. Based on what is known, program officials expect that the  production period for the 15 brigade combat teams would be extended  from 2025 to 2030. The initial operating capability date would also be  delayed by 5 months to the third quarter of fiscal year 2015.
section_title: Despite Progress, FCS Requirements Must Still Prove Technically Feasible and Affordable
paragraphs: The Army has made considerable progress in defining system-of-systems  level requirements and allocating those requirements to the individual FCS  systems. This progress has necessitated making significant trade-offs to  reconcile requirements with technical feasibility. A key example of this  has been to allow a significant increase in manned ground vehicle weight  to meet survivability requirements which in turn has forced trade-offs in  transportability requirements. The feasibility of FCS requirements still  depends on a number of key assumptions about immature technologies,  costs, and other performance characteristics like the reliability of the  network and other systems. As current assumptions in these areas become  known, more trade-offs are likely. At this point, the Army has identified  about 70 high technical risks that need to be resolved to assure the  technical feasibility of requirements.
subsections: section_title: Army Has Made Progress in Defining System-Level Requirements
paragraphs: The Army has defined 552 warfighter requirements for the FCS brigade  combat team that are tied to seven key performance parameters: network- ready, networked battle command, networked lethality, transportability,  sustainability/reliability, training, and survivability. Collectively, the Army  has stated that the FCS-equipped brigade combat teams must be as good  as or better than current Army forces in terms of lethality, responsiveness,  sustainability, and survivability. In August 2005, the Army and the lead  systems integrator translated the warfighter requirements into 11,500 more  specific system-of-systems level requirements, established the functional  baseline for the program, and allocated requirements to individual FCS  systems. Since then, the contractors have clarified their design concepts  and provided feedback on the technical feasibility and affordability of the  requirements.
In an August 2006 review, the Army and its lead systems integrator  reduced the number of warfighter requirements to 544, but increased the  system-of-systems requirements to 11,697. Of the system-of-system  requirements, 289 have “to be determined” items and 819 have open issues  to be resolved. At this review, the FCS requirements were translated  further down to the individual system level, totaling about 90,000. The  system level requirements provide the specificity needed for the  contractors to fully develop detailed designs for their individual systems.  While the stages of translating requirements for FCS are typical for  weapon systems, the enormous volume suggests the complex challenge  that a networked system-of-systems like FCS presents.
Figure 2 illustrates how the FCS requirements are translated from the  warfighter to the individual systems.
Leading up to the review, the lead systems integrator and the  subcontractors identified over 10,000 “to-be-determined” items and issues  to be resolved related to the flow-down of the system-of-systems  requirements to the FCS system-level requirements. The “to-be- determined” items generally involve the need for the user community and  the developers to come to an understanding on a way to better specify or  quantify the requirement. A common issue to be resolved involves the  need for compromise between the users and developers when the design  solution may not be able to fully meet the initially allocated requirement.  The Army and lead systems integrator plan to resolve the “to-be- determined” items and issues prior to the preliminary design review in  early 2009.
The Army and lead systems integrator are also developing a network  requirements document that is intended to provide end-to-end network  requirements in an understandable format to inform the system-level  requirements. The number of network requirements in this document has  not yet been determined. However, the Army and lead systems integrator  have identified about 2000 “to-be-determined” items and issues to be  resolved in this area that need to be addressed and clarified. The Army and  lead systems integrator expect to complete this work by the time of the  preliminary design review.
subsections: section_title: Some Key Requirements and Design Trade-offs Have Been Made
paragraphs: The Army and its subcontractors have already made some trade-offs as  they continue to refine their system design concepts and the FCS system- level requirements. One key trade-off came in the area of the projected  weight of the manned ground vehicles and their transportability by  aircraft. Originally, the manned ground vehicles were to weigh less than   20 tons so they could be carried on the C-130 aircraft. These vehicles were  to be lightly armored at 19 tons and with add-on armor bringing the total  vehicle weight up to about 24 tons. However, the Army and its contractor  team found that this design did not provide sufficient ballistic protection.  Currently, the vehicle designs with improved ballistic protection are  estimated to weigh between 27 and 29 tons. At this weight, it is practically  impossible to transport the vehicles on the C-130s, and they are now being  designed to be transported by the larger C-17 aircraft. Illustrative of the  FCS design challenges, the added weight of the vehicles could have ripple  effects for the designs of the engine, suspension, band track, and other  subsystems. The Army still wants vehicles to be transportable by the C-130  when stripped of armor and other equipment, so that C-130 cargo size and  weight limits will still serve to constrain the design of the manned ground  vehicles. As these are primarily paper and simulated designs, the potential  for future trade-offs is high.
Another example involves the requirement that the manned ground  vehicles be able to operate for several hours on battery power and without  the engine running. Based on the analyses to date, it has been determined  that current battery technologies would permit less than one hour of this  “silent watch” capability. The Army, lead systems integrator, and the FCS  subcontractors are continuing their assessments, as is the user  community, which is re-evaluating which internal manned ground vehicle  subsystems may need to operate in these situations. With less demand for  power, the batteries are expected to last somewhat longer. As that work  concludes, the Army will be able to determine the specific level of silent  watch capability it can expect for the manned ground vehicles and how  best to change the operational requirements document. The Army plans to  finalize this and other requirement changes and numerous clarifications by  the time of the preliminary design review in early 2009.
section_title: Technical Feasibility of System-Level Requirements Based on Numerous Assumptions
paragraphs: The Army and lead systems integrator believe that most of the FCS  system-level requirements are technically feasible and have decided that  design work should proceed. However, as the design concepts and  technologies mature, their actual performance does not necessarily match  expectations, and trade-offs have to be made. To date, the Army has had to  make a number of requirements and design changes that recognize the  physical constraints of the designs and the limits of technology. Ideally,  these trade-offs are made before a program begins. Because many  technologies are not yet fully mature, significant trade-offs have been  made and will continue to be necessary. The technical feasibility of FCS  requirements still depends on a number of key assumptions about the  performance of immature technologies, thus more trade-offs are likely as  knowledge replaces assumptions. The challenge in making additional  changes to requirements is at least two-fold: first is assessing the potential  ripple effect of changing a requirement for one system on the thousands of  other system requirements; the second is assessing the cumulative effect  of numerous system level requirements changes on the overall  characteristics of survivability, lethality, responsiveness, and  supportability.
subsections: section_title: Technical Feasibility Dependent on Addressing Some High Level Risks
paragraphs: The Army has identified numerous known technical risks, about 70 of  which are considered to be at a medium or high level. These involve the  information network, characteristics like weight and reliability that cut  across air and ground vehicles, and several system-specific risks. The  Army is focusing management attention on these risks and has risk  reduction plans in place. Nonetheless, the results of these technology  development efforts will have continuing implications for design and  requirements trade-offs.
FCS survivability depends on the brigade-wide availability of network- based situational awareness plus the inherent survivability of the FCS  platforms. There is hardly any aspect of FCS functionality that is not  predicated on the network, and for many key functions, the network is  essential. However, the FCS program manager has stated that the Army  still has a lot yet to learn on how to successfully build such an advanced  information network. Some of the network medium and high level risks  include:    End-to-end quality of service on mobile ad-hoc networks. The  probability is high that the FCS network will not be able to ensure  that the information with the highest value is delivered to the  recipients. Failure to support the warfighter in defining and  implementing command intent for information management will  result in substantially reduced force effectiveness, in a force that  trades information for armor.
Wideband waveform availability. The current Joint Tactical Radio  System Ground Mobile Radio program continues to pose risks  because its schedule is not yet synchronized with the schedule for  the core FCS program or FCS spin-outs. Any schedule slip in this  area could lead to further delays. This consequence will mean  integrators will not have Joint Tactical Radio System hardware in  sufficient quantities, capability, and function to support the FCS  schedule. In addition to schedule delays this could also jeopardize  the network spin-outs, experiments, and the integration of the core  program requirements.
Soldier radio waveform availability. The soldier radio waveform  provides functional capabilities that are needed to support many  FCS systems but may not be completed in time to support FCS  development. These functional capabilities facilitate interoperability  and gateway functions between the FCS family of systems. These  systems are critical to FCS performance and delays of these  functional capabilities will negatively impact the FCS schedule.
Spectrum availability and usage. There is a high likelihood that  more frequency spectrum is required for all of the communications  needs than will be available given current design assumptions. Lack  of system spectrum may force a choice to operate without critical  data due to reduced data throughput, reducing mission  effectiveness and leading to possible failure.
Unmanned vehicle network latency. Unmanned ground and air  vehicles are completely dependent on the FCS network for  command and control interaction with their soldier/operators.  Inadequate response time for unmanned payload tele-operation and  target designation will result in degraded payload performance and  targeting when these modes are required.
Net-ready critical performance parameter verification and  testability. The Army recognizes the risk that FCS will not be able to  adequately verify and test compliance with this parameter as it  relates to the Global Information Grid. FCS is expected to have  extensive connectivity with other services and agencies via the  Grid. The risk is due to, among other things, the many yet-to-be- defined critical or enterprise interfaces which are being delivered in  parallel. Failure to meet the net-ready testability requirements could  result in, among other things, fielding delays and cost and schedule  overruns.
All of the unmanned and manned ground vehicles and several other FCS  systems are expected to have difficulty meeting their assigned weight  targets. According to program officials, about 950 weight reduction  initiatives were being considered just for the manned ground vehicles. The  Army expects the FCS program to make substantial progress toward  meeting these goals by the time of the preliminary design review. It is not  yet clear what, if any, additional trade-offs of requirements and designs  may be needed to meet the FCS weight goals.
High levels of reliability will be needed for the FCS brigade combat teams  to meet their requirements for logistics footprint and supportability.  Current projections indicate that many FCS systems—including the Class  IV unmanned aerial vehicle, communications subsystems, and sensors— may not meet the Army’s high expectations for reliability. The Army plans  to address these issues and improve reliability levels by the time of the  preliminary design review in 2009.
The Army and lead systems integrator have also identified other medium  to high risk issues that could affect the requirements and design concepts  for individual FCS systems. These include:    Class I unmanned aerial vehicle heavy fuel engine. The Class I  vehicle requires a heavy fuel engine that is small in size, lightweight,  and operates with high power efficiency. Such an engine does not  currently exist, and no single candidate system will meet all FCS  requirements without additional development. An engine design  that cannot balance size and power will critically affect compliance  with several key requirements.
Lightweight track component maturation. Current band track  designs do not meet mine blast requirements and may not meet the  FCS durability requirement or the critical performance parameter  requirements for reducing logistics footprint and reduced demand  for maintenance and supply. Without enhanced mine blast  resistance, vehicle mobility will be diminished, which could result  in survivability impacts.
Vehicular motion effects. There is likelihood that system design may  not preclude vehicular-induced motion sickness capable of  degrading the crews’ ability to execute their mission. These effects  may reduce the ability of the crew to perform cognitive tasks while  in motion, thereby reducing operational effectiveness.
Safe unmanned ground vehicle operations. If necessary operational  experience and technology maturity is not achieved, the brigade  combat teams may not be able to use these vehicles as planned.  Also, if a high level of soldier confidence in the reliability and  accuracy of fire control of weapons on moving unmanned ground  vehicles is not achieved, the rules of engagement of these systems  may be severely restricted.
section_title: Cost Could Force Additional Requirements Trade-offs
paragraphs: Unit cost reduction goals have been established at the FCS brigade combat  team level and have been allocated down to the individual FCS systems  and major subsystems. Many FCS systems are above their assigned  average cost levels, and stringent reduction goals have been assigned. In  particular, the manned ground vehicles have a significant challenge ahead  to meet their unit cost goals. In order to meet these goals, requirements  and design trade-offs will have to be considered.
The Army faces considerable uncertainty about how much investment  money it will have in the future for FCS. The Army has capped the total  amount of development funding available for FCS, and the contract  contains a provision to identify trade-offs to keep costs within that cap.  Hence, if costs rise, trade-offs in requirements and design will be made to  keep within the cap. Recent events provide a good example of this  situation. In 2006, the Army conducted a study to determine the number  and type of unmanned aerial vehicles it can and should maintain in its  inventory. All four of the FCS unmanned aerial vehicles were included in  that study, and a decision has recently been made to remove the Class II  and III vehicles from the core program. While this will free up money for  other needs, the Army will have to reallocate the requirements from those  unmanned aerial vehicles to other FCS systems.
section_title: Considerations for the 2009 FCS Milestone Review
paragraphs: As it proceeds to the preliminary design review and the subsequent go/no- go milestone, the Army faces considerable challenges in completing the  definition of technically achievable and affordable system-level  requirements, an essential element of a sound business case. Those  challenges include    completing the definition of all system-level requirements for all  FCS systems and the information network (including addressing the  “to-be-determined” items and issues to be resolved);    completing the preliminary designs for all FCS systems and    clearly demonstrating that FCS key performance parameters are    obtaining a declaration from the Army user community that the  likely outcomes of the FCS program will meet its projected needs;    clearly demonstrating that the FCS program will provide  capabilities that are clearly as good as or better than those available  with current Army forces, a key tenet set out by the Army as it  started the FCS development program in 2003;    mitigating FCS technical risks to significantly lower levels; and    making demonstrable progress towards meeting key FCS goals  including weight reduction, reliability improvement, and average  unit production cost reduction.
section_title: Army Reports Significant Progress, but Major Technological Challenges Remain
paragraphs: The Army has made progress in the areas of critical technologies,  complementary programs, and software development. In particular, FCS  program officials report that the number of critical technologies they  consider as mature has doubled in the past year. While this is good  progress by any measure, FCS technologies are far less mature at this  point in the program than called for by best practices and DOD policy, and  they still have a long way to go to reach full maturity. The Army has made  some difficult decisions to improve the acquisition strategies for some key  complementary programs, such as Joint Tactical Radio System and  Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, but they still face significant  technological and funding hurdles. Other complementary programs had  been unfunded, but Army officials told us that these issues have been  addressed. Finally, the Army and the lead systems integrator are utilizing  many software development best practices and have delivered the initial  increments of software on schedule. On the other hand, most of the  software development effort lies ahead, and the amount of software code  to be written—already an unprecedented undertaking—continues to grow  as the demands of the FCS design becomes better understood. The Army  and lead systems integrator have recognized several high risk aspects of  that effort and mitigation efforts are underway.
subsections: section_title: FCS Critical Technologies Are Maturing Faster Than Predicted Last Year
paragraphs: Last year, we reported that an independent review team assessment  revealed that 18 of the program’s 49 critical technologies had reached  Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6—a representative prototype system  in a relevant environment. The independent team projected that by 2006,  22 of FCS’s 49 critical technologies would reach TRL 6. The FCS program  office currently assesses that 35 of 46 technologies are at or above TRL  6—a significantly faster maturation pace than predicted last year. Figure  3 compares the readiness levels of FCS technologies over a 3-year period.
Several of these technologies jumped from a TRL 4 (low-fidelity  breadboard design in a laboratory environment) to a TRL 6 including cross  domain guarding solutions and the ducted fan for the Class 1 unmanned  aerial vehicle. The program’s technology officials maintain that such a leap  can be made, even though it was not anticipated by the independent  assessment. They cited the ducted fan technology for small unmanned  aerial vehicles as an example. This technology was largely considered  immature until a single demonstration showcased the system’s capabilities  in demanding conditions, which convinced Army leadership that the  ducted fan technology was at a TRL 6. Appendix IV lists all critical  technologies, their current TRL status, and the projected date for reaching  TRL 6.
However, not all of the FCS technologies are truly at a TRL 6. Two of the  most important technologies for the success of manned ground vehicles  and the overall FCS concept are lightweight armor and active protection.  The Army has previously been more optimistic about the development  pace for these technologies. However, during the past year, the Army  recognized that the particular solutions they were pursuing for lightweight  armor were inadequate and active protection only satisfied the conditions  for a TRL 5.
subsections: section_title: Active Protection System
paragraphs: An active protection system is part of the comprehensive FCS hit  avoidance system architecture that will protect the vehicles from incoming  rounds, like rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles. The active  protection system would involve detecting an incoming round or rocket  propelled grenade and launching an interceptor round from the vehicle to  destroy the incoming weapon. In mid-2006, the lead systems integrator  (with Army participation) selected Raytheon from among numerous  candidates to develop the architecture to satisfy FCS short-range active  protection requirements. A subsequent trade study evaluated several  alternative concepts and selected Raytheon’s vertical launch concept for  further development.
While the FCS program office’s most recent technology readiness  assessment indicates that the active protection system is at TRL 6, a 2006  trade study found that the Raytheon concept had only achieved a TRL 5.  Active protection system is a vital technology for the FCS concept to be  effective, and the FCS manned ground vehicles survivability would be  questionable without that capability. Not only will the active protection  system concept chosen need additional technology development and  demonstration, but it also faces system integration challenges and the  need for safety verifications. Indeed, the Army recognizes that it faces a  challenge in demonstrating if and how it can safely operate an active  protection system when dismounted soldiers are nearby.
section_title: Lightweight Hull and Vehicle Armor
paragraphs: A fundamental FCS concept is to replace mass with superior  information—that is to see and hit the enemy first rather than to rely on  heavy armor to withstand a hit. Nonetheless, the Army has recognized that  ground vehicles cannot be effective without an adequate level of ballistic  protection. As a result, the Army has been developing lightweight hull and  vehicle armor as a substitute for traditional, heavier armor. In the past  year, the Army concluded that it would need additional ballistic protection  and the Army Research Laboratory is continuing armor technology  development to achieve improved protection levels and to reduce weight.  The Army now anticipates achieving TRL 6 on the new armor formulation  in fiscal year 2008, near the time of the manned ground vehicle preliminary  design review. Armor will continue to be a technology as well as  integration risk for the program for the foreseeable future.
section_title: Technology Maturity Must Be Seen in a Broader Context
paragraphs: As noted above, the Army’s progress in FCS technology is notable  compared with the progress of previous years. This progress, however,  does need to be put in a broader context. The business case for a program  following best practices in a knowledge-based approach is to have all of its  critical technologies mature to TRL 7 (fully functional prototype in an  operational environment) at the start of product development. For the  FCS, this would mean having had all technologies at TRL 7 by May 2003.  By comparison, even with the progress the program has made in the last  year, fewer than 35 of FCS’s 46 technologies have attained a lower  maturity—TRL 6—3½ years after starting product development. Immature  technologies are markers for future cost growth. In our 2006 assessment of  selected major weapon systems, development costs for the programs that  started development with mature technologies increased by a modest  average of 4.8 percent over the first full estimate, whereas the  development costs for the programs that started development with  immature technologies increased by a much higher average of   34.9 percent.
FCS program officials do not accept these standards. Rather, they  maintain they only need to mature technologies to a TRL 6 by the time of  the critical design review which is now scheduled for 2011. According to  the Army’s engineers, once a technology achieves TRL 6, they are no  longer required to track the technology’s progress. They maintain that  anything beyond a TRL 6 is a system integration matter and not necessarily  technology development. Integration often involves adapting the  technologies to the space, weight, and power demands of their intended  environment. To a large extent, this is what it means to achieve a TRL 7.  This is work that needs to be accomplished before the critical design  reviews and is likely to pose additional trade-offs the Army will have to  make to reconcile its requirements with what is possible from a  technology and engineering standpoint. Accordingly, the FCS program has  singled out several critical technologies that have been assessed at TRL 6  but yet continue to have moderate or high risk that could have dire  consequences for meeting program requirements if they are not  successfully dealt with. Examples include:    High density packaged power. Current battery technology may not  meet the performance levels needed to support the initial  production of FCS. Among other things, calendar life, cost, cooling  methods, safety, and thermal management have not been  demonstrated. The potential impacts of this risk could affect not  only vehicle propulsion but also lethality and supportability.
High power density engine. The Army has recognized that there is a  risk that engine manufacturers may not have the capability to build  a reliable, cost effective engine that will meet FCS requirements  within the FCS program schedule. Engines have been tested that  meet the power density required but not at engine power levels  consistent with manned ground vehicle needs. The mitigation  strategy includes engine testing to identify and correct potential  engine design issues as soon as possible.
Hull anti-tank mine blast protection. The Army recognizes that there  is a probability, given the weight constraints on FCS platforms and  evolving blast mitigation technology, that the FCS hull and crew  restraints will not protect the crew from life threatening injury due  to anti-tank blast mines equal to (or greater than) the threshold  requirement. The potential consequence is that the mobility and  survivability of the brigade combat team will be affected. The FCS  program and Army Research Laboratory are developing an anti-tank  mine kit for each manned ground vehicle to meet requirements.
Highband networking waveform. FCS needs a high data rate  capability to send sensor data and to support the FCS transit  network. The Wideband Information Network-Tactical does not yet  meet the performance requirements for size, weight, and power;  signature management; and operational environments. There may  be significant schedule and cost risk involved in getting that radio to  meet the requirements. Without the high data rate capability, sensor  data may not be presented in an adequate or timely fashion to  perform targeting or provide detailed intelligence data to the  warfighter.
Cross-domain guarding solution. FCS needs this technology to  ensure the security of information transmitted on the FCS  information network. The Army recognizes that it will be difficult to  obtain certification and accreditation as well as to meet the space,  weight, and power and interface requirements of FCS. Failure to  address these concerns in a timely manner will result in delays in  fielding FCS-equipped units and additional costs.
The FCS program will continue to face major technological challenges for  the foreseeable future. The independent technology assessment planned to  coincide with the preliminary design review in early 2009 should provide  objective insights regarding the Army’s progress on technology maturity  and system integration issues.
section_title: Army Reassessing Complementary Programs
paragraphs: The FCS program may have to interoperate or be integrated with as many  as 170 other programs, some of which are in development and some of  which are currently fielded programs. These programs are not being  developed exclusively for FCS and are outside of its direct control.  Because of the complementary programs’ importance to FCS—52 had  been considered essential to meeting FCS key performance parameters— the Army closely monitors how well those efforts will synchronize with  the FCS program. However, many of these programs have funding or  technical problems and generally have uncertain futures. We reported last  year that the Army is reassessing the list of essential complementary  programs given the multiple issues surrounding them and the budgetary  constraints the Army is facing. In addressing the constrained budget  situation in the 2008 to 2013 program objective memorandum, program  officials said the Army is considering reducing the set of systems. When  the set of complementary programs is finalized, the Army will have to  determine how to replace any capabilities eliminated from the list.
Two complementary programs that make the FCS network possible, the  Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Warfighter Information  Network-Tactical (WIN-T), were restructured and reduced in scope. A  challenge in making changes in these programs is their individual and  cumulative effects on FCS performance.
JTRS is a family of software-based radios that is to provide the high  capacity, high-speed information link to vehicles, weapons, aircraft,  sensors, and soldiers. The JTRS program to develop radios for ground  vehicles and helicopters—now referred to as Ground Mobile Radio — began product development in June 2002 and the Army has not yet been  able to mature the technologies needed to generate sufficient power as  well as meet platform size and weight constraints. A second JTRS program  to develop variants of small radios that will be carried by soldiers and  embedded in several FCS core systems—now referred to as Handheld,  Manpack, and Small Form Factor radios—entered product development  with immature technologies and a lack of well-defined requirements. In  2005, DOD directed the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office to develop  options for restructuring the program to better synchronize it with FCS  and to reduce schedule, technology, requirements, and funding risks. The  restructuring plan was approved in March 2006 and is responsive to many  of the issues we raised in our June 2005 report. However, the program  still has to finalize details of the restructure including formal acquisition  strategies, independent cost estimates, and test and evaluation plans.  Further, there are still cost, schedule, and technical risks associated with  the planned delivery of initial capabilities, and therefore it is unclear  whether the capabilities will be available in time for the first spin-out of  FCS capabilities to current forces in 2008. Fully developed prototypes of  JTRS radios are not expected until 2010 or later.
The Army is developing WIN-T to provide an integrated communications  network to connect Army units on the move with higher levels of  command and provide the Army’s tactical extension to the Global  Information Grid. Although the program has been successful in developing  some technologies and demonstrating early capabilities, the status of its  critical technologies is uncertain. As a result of an August 2005 study, the  WIN-T program is being re-baselined to meet emerging requirements as  well as a shift in Army funding priorities. The Army’s proposal for  restructuring would extend system development for about 5 years, and  delay the production decision from 2006 to about 2011, while seeking  opportunities to spin out WIN-T technologies both to FCS and to the  current force. Despite this improvement, several risks remain for the  program, and the restructuring does have consequences. Coupled with  new FCS requirements, the restructure will increase development costs by  over $500 million. Critical technologies that support WIN-T’s mobile ad  hoc networking must still be matured and demonstrated, while the new  FCS requirements will necessitate further technology development. Also,  some WIN-T requirements are unfunded, and the Office of the Secretary of  Defense recently non-concurred with part of the program’s Technology  Readiness Assessment. In order to obtain concurrence, the WIN-T  program manager is updating the body of evidence material to reaffirm the  technology maturity estimates.
section_title: Army Is Devoting Considerable Attention to Software Development, but Major Risks Need to be Addressed
paragraphs: The FCS software development program is the largest in DOD history, and  the importance of software needed for FCS performance is  unprecedented. The Army is attempting to incorporate a number of best  practices into their development, and some initial increments of software  have been delivered on time. However, since the program started, the  projected amount of software needed for FCS has almost doubled, to   63.8 million lines of code. Further, the Army must address a number of  high risk issues that could impact delivery schedules, operational  capabilities, and overall FCS performance.
section_title: Disciplined Approach Needed to Manage Unprecedented Amount of Software
paragraphs: Several numbers help illustrate the magnitude of the FCS software  development effort    95 percent of FCS’s functionality is controlled by software,    63 million lines of code are currently projected to be needed for  FCS, more than 3 times the amount being developed for the Joint  Strike Fighter;    FCS will have its own operating system, like Microsoft Windows,  called the System-of-Systems Common Operating Environment; and    Over 100 interfaces or software connections to systems outside FCS  will have to be developed.
Of primary importance to the success of FCS is the System-of-Systems  Common Operating Environment software. This software is expected to  act as the infrastructure for other FCS software. It is to standardize  component-to-component communications within computers, vehicles,  the virtual private networks, and the Global Information Grid, enabling  interoperability with legacy Army, joint, coalition, government, and non- government organizations. Finally, it is to provide the integration  framework for the FCS family of systems and enable integrated system-of- systems functionality and performance.
We have previously reported that software-intensive weapon programs are  more likely to reach successful outcomes if they used a manageable  evolutionary environment and disciplined process and managed by  metrics. The Army is attempting to follow such an approach to meet the  software challenges on FCS. Specifically, FCS software will be developed  in four discrete stages, or blocks. Each block adds incremental  functionality in eight functional areas (command and control, simulation,  logistics, training, manned ground vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles,  unmanned ground vehicles, and warfighting systems). The Army and lead  systems integrator are also partitioning software into at least 100 smaller,  more manageable subsystems. The FCS program is also implementing  scheduled and gated reviews to discipline software development and have  developed a set of metrics to measure technical performance in terms of  growth, stability, quality, staffing, and process.
subsections: section_title: Considerable Risks Remain with Software Development
paragraphs: Apart from the sheer difficulty of writing and testing such a large volume  of complex code, a number of risks face the FCS software development  effort. As requirements have become better understood, the number of  lines of code has grown since the program began in 2003. Specifically, in  2003, the Army estimated that FCS would need 33.7 million lines of code,  compared to today’s estimate of 63.8 million. As the Army and its  contractors learn more about the limits of technology and its design  concepts, the amount and functionality to be delivered by software may  change.
FCS’s 63 million lines of software code can be broken down further into  code that is new, reused, or commercial-off-the-shelf, as seen in figure 4.
The Army maintains that new software code presents the greatest  challenge because it has to be written from scratch. Reused code is code  already written for other military systems that is being adapted to FCS.  Similarly, commercial-off-the shelf software is code already written for  commercial systems that is being adapted to FCS. A program official told  us that estimates of software code that will be reused are often overstated  and the difficulty of adapting commercial software is often understated in  DOD programs. This optimism translates into greater time and effort to  develop software than planned. An independent estimate of reuse and  commercial software has concluded that these efforts have been  understated for the FCS program, which will translate into higher cost and  schedule slippage. If the independent estimate proves correct, more  software development could be pushed beyond the production decision.
A foundational block of software (Build 0) has already been completed  and an interim package of the System-of-Systems Common Operating  Environment software was recently tested and delivered. However, as can  be seen in table 1, even if FCS stays on schedule, a portion—10 percent— of FCS software is planned to be delivered and tested after the early 2013  production decision that will limit the knowledge available to decision  makers at that point.
Currently, the Army estimates that 45 percent of the total 63 million source  lines of code will have been written and tested by the early 2009  preliminary design review and 75 percent will be done by the 2011 critical  design review. Although there has been no significant schedule slippage to  date on the initial increments of software, both of these estimates may  prove to be ambitious. Additionally, according to program officials, the  most difficult part of software development is the last 10 percent.
Although the Army is attempting to implement several software best  practices, there are a number of factors that may complicate those efforts.  One of the leading problems in software development is the lack of  adequately defined requirements. Without adequate definition and  validation of requirements and design, software engineers could be coding  to an incorrect design, resulting in missing functionality and errors. As we  discussed earlier, the ultimate system-level requirements may not be  complete until the preliminary design review in 2009. The Army  acknowledges that the FCS’s lack of adequate requirements and  incomplete system architecture could result in software that does not  provide the desired functionality or performance. This lack of top-level  requirements and architecture definition also affects the accuracy of  projected lines of code. Program risk charts suggest that software  estimates could be understated by as much as 70 percent, which could  impact overall schedule and performance.
The Army has identified specific aspects of FCS software development as  high risk and is developing plans to mitigate the risks:    System-of-Systems Common Operating Environment Availability and  Maturity. There is a recognized risk that the software may not reach the  necessary technical maturity level required to meet program  milestones.
FCS software integration performance and development. Due to the  complexity, functional scope, net-centric focus, and real-time  requirements for the command and control software, software  integration may not yield fully functional software that performs as  desired.
Block 1 incompatible software components during integration. There  are a large number of diverse groups working on software components  that need to be integrated into full units. A lack of early integration  process and collaboration among the suppliers represents substantial  risk to rework during integration and subsequent schedule impact.
Software estimating accuracy. To date, estimating accuracy has been  hampered by changing requirements, immature architecture, and  insufficient time to thoroughly analyze software subsystems sizing. The  difficulties associated with accurate software estimating is an  indication that complexity increases as the design is better understood  and this serves to increase the level of effort.
Software supplier integration. The unprecedented nature, volatility, and  close coupling of FCS suppliers’ software will frequently require  various combinations of suppliers to share information and rapidly  negotiate changes in their products, interfaces, and schedules. As these  suppliers are traditionally wary competitors that are used to  performing to fixed specifications, there are significant risks of slow  and inflexible adaptation to critical FCS sources of change. Failure to  do so will translate directly into missed delivery schedules,  significantly reduced operational capabilities, and less dependable  system performance.
section_title: Considerations for the 2009 FCS Milestone Review
paragraphs: As it approaches the preliminary design review and the subsequent go/no- go milestone review, the Army should have made additional progress in  developing technologies and software as well as aligning the development  of complementary programs with the FCS program. The challenges that  will have to be overcome include    demonstrating that all critical technologies are mature to at least  the TRL 6 level. This assessment should be reviewed and validated  by an independent review team;    mitigating the recognized technical risks for the FCS critical  technologies, including their successful integration with other FCS  subsystems and systems;    clearly demonstrating that the risks inherent in the active protection  system and the lightweight hull and vehicle armor have been  reduced to low levels;    synchronizing the JTRS and WIN-T development schedules with  FCS system integration and demonstration needs for both the  spinouts and core program;    mitigating the cost, schedule, and performance risks in software  development to acceptably low levels; and    establishing the set of complementary programs that are essential  for FCS’s success, ensuring that that are fully funded, and aligning  theirs and the overall FCS program schedules.
section_title: Concurrent Acquisition Strategy Will Provide for Late Demonstration of FCS Capabilities
paragraphs: The FCS acquisition strategy and testing schedule have become more  complex as plans have been made to spin out capabilities to current Army  forces. The strategy acquires knowledge later than called for by best  practices and DOD policy. In addition, knowledge deficits for  requirements and technologies have created enormous challenges for  devising an acquisition strategy that can demonstrate the maturity of  design and production processes. Even if requirements setting and  technology maturity proceed without incident, FCS design and production  maturity is not likely to be demonstrated until after the production  decision is made. The critical design review will be held much later on  FCS than other programs, and the Army will not be building production- representative prototypes with all of their intended components to test  before production. Much of the testing up to the 2013 production decision  will involve simulations, technology demonstrations, experiments, and  single system testing. Only after that point, however, will substantial  testing of the complete brigade combat team and the FCS concept of  operations occur. However, production is the most expensive phase in  which to resolve design or other problems found during testing. Spin-outs,  which are intended to accelerate delivery of FCS capabilities to the  current force, also complicate the acquisition strategy by absorbing  considerable testing resources and some tests.
subsections: section_title: Acquisition Strategy Will Demonstrate Design Maturity after Production Begins
paragraphs: The Army’s acquisition strategy for FCS does not reflect a knowledge- based approach. Figure 5 shows how the Army’s strategy for acquiring  FCS involves concurrent development, design reviews that occur late in  the program, and other issues that are out of alignment with the  knowledge-based approach that characterizes best practices and is  supported in DOD policy.
Ideally, the preliminary design review occurs at or near the start of  product development. Activities leading up to the preliminary design  review include, among others, translating system requirements into design  specifics. Doing so can help reveal key technical and engineering  challenges and can help determine if a mismatch exists between what the  customer wants and what the product developer can deliver. Scheduling  the preliminary design review early in product development is intended to  help stabilize cost, schedule, and performance expectations. The critical  design review ideally occurs midway into the product development phase.  The critical design review should confirm that the system design performs  as expected and is stable enough to build production-representative  prototypes for testing. The building of production-representative  prototypes helps decision makers confirm that the system can be  produced and manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality targets.  According to the knowledge-based approach, a high percentage of design  drawings should be completed and released to manufacturing at critical  design review. The period leading up to critical design review is referred to  as system integration, when individual components of a system are  brought together, and the period after the review is called system  demonstration, when the system as a whole demonstrates its reliability as  well as its ability to work in the intended environment.
The Army has scheduled the preliminary design review in early 2009,  about 6 years after the start of product development. The critical design  review is scheduled in fiscal year 2011, just 2 years after the scheduled  preliminary design review and 2 years before the initial FCS production  decision in fiscal year 2013. This will leave little time for product  demonstration and correction of any issues that are identified at that  time. This is not to suggest that the two design reviews for the FCS could  have been conducted earlier but rather that commitments to build and test  prototypes and begin low-rate production are scheduled too soon  afterward. The timing of the design reviews is indicative of how late  knowledge will be attained in the program, even if all goes according to  plan. With requirements definition not being complete until at least the  final preliminary design review in early 2009 and technology maturation  not until after that, additional challenges will have to be addressed within  the system integration phase. System integration will already be a  challenging phase due to known integration issues and numerous  technical risks. The best practice measure for the completion of the  system integration phase is the release of at least 90 percent of engineering  drawings by the time of the critical design review.
The Army is planning to have developmental prototypes of all FCS systems  available for testing prior to low-rate initial production. For example, most  of the manned ground vehicle prototypes are expected to be available in  2011 for developmental and qualification testing. However, these  prototypes are not expected to be production-representative prototypes  and will have some surrogate components. Whereas the testing of fully  integrated, production-representative prototypes demonstrate design  maturity and their fabrication can demonstrate production process  maturity, neither of these knowledge points will be attained until after the  initial production decision is made.
section_title: System-Level Testing Compressed into Late Development and Early Production
paragraphs: The FCS test program is unique because it is designed to field a new  fighting unit and concept of operations to the Army, not just new  equipment. To help do this, the Army has incorporated a new evaluation  unit, known as the Evaluation Brigade Combat Team, to help with  development and testing of the FCS systems and the tactics, techniques,  and procedures necessary for the unit to fight. The test effort will involve  four phases during development, which examine how the program is  maturing hardware and software, during development. These phases are  intended as check points. The first phase has a corresponding spin-out of  mature FCS capabilities to current forces.
The Army is proceeding with its plans to reduce FCS risks using modeling,  simulation, emulation, and system integration laboratories. This approach  is a key aspect of the Army’s acquisition strategy and is designed to reduce  the dependence on late testing to gain valuable insights about many  aspects of FCS development, including design progress. However, on a  first-of-a-kind system—like FCS—that represents a radical departure from  current systems and warfighting concepts, actual testing of all the  components integrated together is the final proof that the FCS system-of - systems concept works both as predicted and expected. FCS program test  officials told us that while they understand the limitations involved, the  use of emulators, surrogates, and simulations gives the Army a  tremendous amount of early information, particularly about the system-of-  systems and the network. This early information is expected to make it  easier for the Army to deal with the compressed period between 2010 and  2014 and give the Army the ability to fix things quicker. As we were  preparing this report, it was not clear what, if any, impact the Army’s  program adjustments would have on its testing and demonstration plans  and schedules. Table 2 describes the key test events, as currently  scheduled, throughout the FCS program.
The majority of testing through 2012 is limited in scope and is more about  confidence building than demonstrations of key capabilities. Much like the  overall acquisition strategy, the FCS testing plan will provide key  knowledge late in the systems development phase. Early test efforts will  focus on experiments and development testing of individual systems.  Some early systems will be tested as part of the Army’s efforts to spin out  technologies to current forces, including unmanned ground sensors and  the non-line-of-sight-launch system. The bulk of the developmental  prototypes will not be available until 2010 and later for testing and  demonstrations.
The first large scale FCS test that will include a majority of the  developmental prototypes and a large operational unit will not take place  until 2012, the year before production is now slated to begin. This will  mark the start of the Army’s testing of the whole FCS, including the  overarching network and the FCS concept. For example, a limited user  test in 2010 involves only a platoon and a few unmanned aerial vehicles  while a similar test, in 2012, will involve two companies and  developmental prototypes for each of the manned ground vehicles as well  as other systems being tested at the brigade level.
Starting in 2012, several key tests will occur that should give decision  makers a clearer understanding of whether the FCS system-of-systems and  concept actually work as expected. By the end of 2014, production  representative vehicles are expected to be available and tested in a  production limited user test. Another important test is the initial  operational test and evaluation in 2016, which provides the first full  assessment of the entire program including all of the FCS systems, the  brigade combat team, network operations, and the actual operating  concept. This test involves full spectrum operations in a realistic  environment.
There are two major risks in the FCS testing approach: schedule  compression and testing of the network. The first risk centers on the lack  of time available to identify, correct, and retest for problems that come up  during early testing and the second on the lack of capabilities to test an  essential element of the FCS concept, the information network.  Independent test officials noted that it is unclear what the Army expects  from the network. With the network identified as a major risk element of  the program, as well as a major risk, test officials noted that the Army  needs to set benchmarks for what will be demonstrated over time.  Independent testing officials have also told us that the FCS test schedule is  very tight and may not allow adequate time for “test-fix-test” testing. The  test and evaluation master plan recognizes this possibility by noting that  within each integration phase there is only time to test and fix minor  issues. More substantial problems would have to be fixed in a succeeding  integration phase. Overall, testing officials are concerned that the FCS  program is driven by its schedule and that the Army may rush prematurely  into operational testing and perform poorly when it is too late to make  cost effective corrections.
Testing of the network is critical because it must provide secure, reliable  access and distribution of information over extended distances and,  sometimes, when operating in complex terrain. Testing the large number  of FCS sensors and the network’s ability to process the information will  not be effective since test capabilities, methodologies, and expertise  needed to test a tactical network of this magnitude are incomplete and  insufficient. The first major test of the network and FCS together with a  majority of prototypes will not take place until 2012, the year before low- rate production is now expected to begin.
The FCS program is thus susceptible to late-cycle churn, that is, the effort  required to fix a significant problem that is discovered late in a product’s  development. In particular, churn refers to the additional—and  unanticipated—time, money, and effort that must be invested to overcome  problems discovered through testing. Problems are most serious when  they delay product delivery, increase product cost, or escape to the  customer. The discovery of problems through testing conducted late in  development is a fairly common occurrence on DOD programs, as is the  attendant late-cycle churn. Often, tests of a full system, such as launching  a missile or flying an aircraft, become the vehicles for discovering  problems that could have been found earlier and corrected less  expensively. When significant problems are revealed late in a weapon  system’s development, the reaction—or churn—can take several forms:  extending schedules to increase the investment in more prototypes and  testing, terminating the program, or redesigning and modifying weapons  that have already made it to the field. While DOD has accepted such  problems over the years, FCS offers particular challenges, given the  magnitude of its cost in an increasingly competitive environment for  investment funds. Problems discovered at the production stage are  generally the most expensive to correct.
section_title: Spin-Outs Support the Current Force but Place More Demands on FCS Test Resources
paragraphs: When the Army restructured the FCS program in 2004, it revised its  acquisition strategy to include a way to field various FCS capabilities— technologies and systems—to current forces while development of the  core FCS program is still underway. This restructuring was expected to  benefit the current forces as well as provide early demonstrations that  would benefit the core FCS program. Known as spin-outs, the Army plans  to begin limited low-rate production of the systems planned for Spin-Out   1 in 2009 and field those systems to current Army forces 2 years later.  Leading up to the production decision in 2009 will be system development  tests and a limited user test. Additional spin-outs are now planned to occur  in 2010 and 2012. Using this method, the Army plans to deliver significant  capabilities to the current force earlier than previously planned. Over the  long-term, these capabilities include enhanced battle command  capabilities and a variety of manned and unmanned ground and air  platforms that are intended to improve current force survivability and  operations.
Currently, FCS Spin-Out 1 involves the non-line-of sight launch system and  unmanned ground sensors as well as early versions of the System-of-  Systems Common Operating Environment and Battle Command software  subsystems. Also included are the kits needed to interface with current  force vehicles. These capabilities will be tested and validated using the  Evaluation Brigade Combat Team, which will provide feedback to help  refine the FCS doctrine and other matters. These systems are expected to  be fielded to operational units starting in 2010, although it is unclear yet if  these elements of FCS will provide significant capability to the current  forces at a reasonable cost.
There are two test-related concerns with spin-outs. One is that spin-outs  have complicated the FCS acquisition strategy because they focus early  testing and test resources on a few mature systems that will be spun out to  current Army forces. FCS program test officials told us that the primary  focus of the program’s first integration phase will be on events supporting  systems in that spin-out. It is unclear if subsequent integration phases will  be similarly configured. If that were to occur, fewer overall FCS systems  would be looked at and tested in each phase, and testing to evaluate how  the FCS system-of-systems and concept of operations could come later  than originally planned. A program official has noted that the schedule to  deliver the needed hardware and software to the evaluation brigade  combat team is ambitious and the schedule for tests leading up to a  production decision for Spin-Out 1 is compressed. Some individual  systems developmental and other testing began in 2006, but key user and  operational tests will not occur until 2008, just prior to the production  decision for systems in Spin-Out 1. Independent test officials have  expressed concern not only over whether there will be enough time to  test, fix and test again during these key tests but also whether there will be  enough time to “reset” or refurbish the equipment being used from one test  to another. For example, the technical field test, force development test  and evaluation and pilot test, and the limited user tests for Spin-Out 1 are  to be conducted back-to-back over a several month period just before the  production decision. In addition, key tests including a limited user test for  the non-line-of-sight launch system will take place after the Spin-Out   1 production decision. FCS program test officials have told us, however,  that the program does not plan to fix and test again any problems  discovered in a particular integration phase until the next integration  phase. They also noted that the compressed event schedule allowed them  to use the same resources and soldiers in each test.
section_title: Considerations for the 2009 FCS Milestone Review
paragraphs: As the Army proceeds to the preliminary design review, the FCS  acquisition strategy will likely continue to be aggressive, concurrent, and  compressed and one that develops key knowledge later in the  development process than called for by best practices. Few FCS platforms  will have been tested by this point. The majority of testing and the proof of  whether the systems can be integrated and work together are left to occur  after prototypes are delivered starting in the next decade. The Army faces  a number of key challenges as it proceeds to and beyond the preliminary  design review including    completing requirements definition and technology maturity (at  least to TRL 6) to be able to complete the final preliminary design  review;    clearly demonstrating spinout capabilities prior to committing to  their initial production and fielding;    completing system integration and releasing at least 90 percent of  engineering drawings by the critical design review in 2011;    allocating sufficient time, as needed, for test, fix and retest  throughout the FCS test program; and    allocating sufficient time to thoroughly demonstrate each FCS  system, the information network, and the FCS concept prior to  committing to low rate initial production in 2013.
section_title: Likely Growth of FCS Costs Increases Tension between Program Scope and Available Funds
paragraphs: Last year, we reported that FCS program acquisition costs had increased  to $160.7 billion—76 percent—since the Army’s original estimate (figures  have been adjusted for inflation.) While the Army’s current estimate is  essentially the same, an independent estimate from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense puts the acquisition cost of FCS between $203 billion  and $234 billion. The comparatively low level of technology and design  knowledge at this point in the program portends future cost increases. Our  work on a broad base of DOD weapon system programs shows that most  developmental cost increases occur after the critical design review, which  will now be in 2011 for the FCS. Yet, by that point in time, the Army will  have spent about 80 percent of the FCS’s development funds. Further, the  Army has not yet fully estimated the cost of essential complementary  programs and the procurement of spin-out items to the current force. The  Army is cognizant of these resource tensions and has adopted measures in  an attempt to control FCS costs. However, some of these measures involve  reducing program scope in the form of lower requirements and  capabilities, which will have to be reassessed against the user’s demands.  Symptomatic of the continuing resource tension, the Army recently  announced that it was restructuring several aspects of the FCS program,  including the scope of the program and its planned annual production  rates to lower its annual funding demands. This will have an impact on  program cost, but full details are not yet available.
subsections: section_title: New Independent Estimates Indicate Higher FCS Acquisition Costs
paragraphs: The Army’s official cost estimate for FCS has changed only slightly from  last year’s estimate, which reflected a major program restructuring from  the original estimate. In inflated dollars, the program office estimates the  acquisition cost will be $163.7 billion, up from the original 2003 estimate of  $91.4 billion. However, independent cost estimates are significantly higher,  as presented in table 3.
Recent independent estimates from the Office of the Secretary of  Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group indicate that FCS acquisition  costs could range from $203 billion to $234 billion in inflated dollars. The  independent estimate reflected several additional years and additional  staffing beyond the Army’s estimate to achieve initial operational  capability. The difference in estimates is also attributable to the Cost  Analysis Improvement Group’s assessment that FCS software  development would require more time and effort to complete than the  Army had estimated. The independent estimate also provided for  additional risks regarding the availability of key systems to support the  FCS network, such as the JTRS radios. Neither the Army nor the Defense  Acquisition Board has accepted the independent estimate. Program  officials believe the independent estimate of research and development  costs is too high because it is too conservative regarding risks.
The higher estimates of procurement costs reflect additional quantities of  individual systems needed to provide full capabilities to the Brigade  Combat Team. Neither the Army nor independent estimate reflects the  recent decision to reduce the number of FCS systems and slow down the  production rate. Prior to that decision, the Army had actually been  contemplating expanding the scope of FCS to include additional Class IV  unmanned aerial vehicles, additional unattended ground sensors,  intelligent munitions systems, and test assets for the Army user  community, as well as two new systems—a centralized controller device  and a rearming module for the manned ground vehicles. This expansion  would have increased the Army’s estimate to about $208 billion, but  appears obviated by the recent decision to reduce scope.
subsections: section_title: Soft Knowledge Base for Cost Estimates Portends Future Cost Growth
paragraphs: Cost estimates for any program are limited by the level of product  knowledge available. All of the FCS estimates are thus limited by the  relatively low level of knowledge in the FCS program today. If the FCS  program had been following knowledge-based acquisition practices, its  2003 estimate would have been based on mature technologies and the  current estimate would have had the benefit of a complete preliminary  design review and a considerable amount of work towards the critical  design review. The program’s estimate would be based much more on  demonstrated knowledge and actual cost versus assumptions. Instead, the  current FCS estimates are built on a knowledge base without mature  technologies, a preliminary design that is at least 2 years away, and a  critical design review that is 3 to 4 years away. The Army must, therefore,  make significant assumptions about how knowledge will develop. As  experience has shown, in many DOD weapon systems, assumptions  generally prove optimistic and result in underestimated costs.
As it is currently structured, the Army is planning to make substantial  financial investments in the FCS program before key knowledge is gained  on requirements, technologies, system designs, and system performance.  Table 4 shows the annual and cumulative funding, as reported in the  program’s current cost estimate, and the level of knowledge to be attained  each fiscal year.
The impact of the Army’s recent program adjustments on the research and  development funding stream were not known at the time this report was  written.
As can be seen in table 4, through fiscal year 2007, the program will have  spent about a third of its development budget—over $11 billion. By the  time of the preliminary design review and the congressionally mandated  go/no-go decision in 2009, the Army will have spent about 60 percent of its  FCS development budget—over $18 billion. At that point, the program  should have matured most of the critical technologies to TRL 6, and the  definition of system-level requirements should be nearing completion. This  is the level of knowledge the program should have achieved in 2003 before  being approved for development start, according to best practices and the  approach preferred by DOD in its acquisition policies. The FCS critical  design review is now scheduled for fiscal year 2011. By that time, the  program will have spent about $24.7 billion, or about 81 percent of its  expected research and development expenditures.
The immature state of FCS technologies and the timing of its critical  design review make the FCS cost estimate vulnerable to future increases.  In our 2006 assessment of selected major weapon systems, we found that  development costs for the programs with mature technologies increased  by a modest average of 4.8 percent over the first full estimate, whereas the  development costs for the programs with immature technologies increased  by a much higher average of 34.9 percent. Similarly, program acquisition  unit costs for the programs with mature technologies increased by less  than 1 percent, whereas the programs that started development with  immature technologies experienced an average program acquisition unit  cost increase of nearly 27 percent over the first full estimate. Our work  also showed that most development cost growth occurred after the critical  design review. Specifically, of the 28.3 percent cost growth that weapon  systems average in development, 19.7 percent occurs after the critical  design review.
The current cost estimates do not fully reflect the total costs to the Army.  Excluded are the costs of complementary programs, such as the Joint  Tactical Radio System, which are substantial. Also, the costs to procure  the FCS spin-out items and needed installation kits—previously estimated  to cost about $23 billion—are not included. In fact, the procurement of  FCS spinout items was not previously funded; however, as we were  preparing this report, Army officials told us that in finalizing its budget  plans for fiscal years 2008 to 2013, there was a decision to provide  procurement funding for FCS items to be spun out to current forces.  Congress recently mandated an independent cost estimate to address the  full costs of developing, procuring, and fielding the FCS to be submitted by  April 1, 2007.
section_title: Army Steps to Control FCS Program Costs
paragraphs: The Army has taken steps to manage the growing cost of FCS. Program  officials have said that they budgeted for development risk by building   $5 billion into the original cost estimates to cover risk. They have also said  that they will not exceed the cost ceiling of the development contract, but  as a result, they may have to modify, reduce, or delete lower-priority FCS  requirements. However, this approach would reduce capabilities, and a  lesser set of FCS capabilities may not be adequate to meet the user’s  expectations. Also, the Army is focusing on reducing the average unit  production cost of the FCS brigade combat teams, which currently exceed  the amount at which each brigade combat team is budgeted. The Army has  established a glide path to reduce the unit costs; however, program  officials have said they are struggling to further reduce the unit costs in  many cases, particularly as a result of challenges with the manned ground  vehicles. Further, any additional savings from such initiatives may not be  realized until several years later into the program.
The FCS contract allows for the program to make what is called “Program  Generated Adjustments” whereby any known cost overrun or increase in  scope of work that would require additional funding is offset by identifying  work scope that can be deleted with minimal impact to the program. Each  year, the government and lead systems integrator will identify a prioritized  list of candidates for capabilities that can be partially or completely  deleted and its associated budget re-directed to the new work scope or to  offset a cost overrun.
The Army and lead systems integrator monitor the performance of the FCS  program through an earned value management system, which allows  program management to monitor the technical, schedule, and cost  performance of the program. As it proceeds, the Army and lead systems  integrator can use the information gleaned from the earned value  management system to make informed program decisions and correct  potential problems early. According to earned value data, the FCS is  currently tracking fairly closely with cost and schedule expectations.  However, it is too early in the program for the data at this point to be  conclusive. Historically, the majority of cost growth on a development  program occurs after the critical design review. Further, according to  program officials, due to the size and complexity of the program, coupled  with an uncertain budget from year to year, detailed planning packages are  only planned about 3 to 6 months in advance. While this may be  unavoidable for a program as complex as FCS, the near term status of the  program, as reported by the earned value management system, does not  fully represent the extent of the challenges the Army still faces with FCS.
section_title: Funding Constraints Have Forced the Army to Restructure Its FCS Plans
paragraphs: FCS will command most of the Army’s investment budget and thus must  compete with other major investments and operations. If FCS costs  increase, demands outside FCS increase, or expected funding decreases,  adjustments are likely to be necessary in FCS. Last year, we reported that  the large annual procurement costs for FCS were expected to begin in  fiscal year 2012, which was largely beyond the then-current budget  planning period (fiscal years 2006 to 2011). This situation is called a  funding “bow wave.” This means that more funds would be required in the  years just beyond the years covered in the current defense plan that are  subject to funding limits. As previously structured, the FCS program  would require over $12 billion annually in its peak procurement years. If  the Army budget remains at its current levels, FCS could represent   60-70 percent of the Army’s procurement budget in those years at a time  that the Army was meeting other demands, including force modularity,  FCS spin-outs, complementary programs, aviation procurement, missile  defense, trucks, ammunition, and other equipment.
Recently, this tension between FCS scope, costs, and competing demands  has led to another set of changes in the FCS program. The FCS program  manager has informed us that, in light of budget issues for the 2008 to 2013  planning period, the Army has reduced annual production rates, and plans  to forego two of the originally planned unmanned aerial vehicles, among  other adjustments. While this course of action is necessary to  accommodate funding realities, it has other consequences, as it would  increase the FCS unit costs and extend the time needed to produce and  deploy FCS-equipped brigade combat teams. It would also necessitate  evaluating the effects of these changes on individual system requirements  and on the aggregate characteristics of lethality, survivability,  responsiveness, and supportability. Details of the adjustment to the FCS  program are not yet finalized; thus, we have not evaluated the full  implications of the changes.
section_title: Considerations for the 2009 FCS Milestone Review
paragraphs: By the time of the preliminary design review and the congressionally  mandated go/no-go milestone in 2009, the Army should have more of the  knowledge needed to build a better cost estimate for the FCS program.  The Army should also have more clarity about the level of funding that  may be available to it within the long term budget projections to fully  develop and procure the FCS program of record. Continuing challenges  include    developing an official Army cost position that narrows the gap  between the Army’s estimates and the independent cost estimate  planned for that time frame. In the cost estimate, the Army should  clearly establish if it includes the complete set and quantities of  FCS equipment needed to meet established requirements;    ensuring that adequate funding exists in its current budget and  program objective memorandum to fully fund the FCS program of  record; and    securing funding for the development of the complementary  systems deemed necessary for the FCS as well as to procure the  FCS capabilities planned to be spunout to the current forces.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Army has been granted a lot of latitude to carry out a large program  like FCS this far into development with relatively little demonstrated  knowledge. Tangible progress has been made during the year in several  areas, including requirements and technology. Such progress warrants  recognition, but not confidence. Confidence comes from high levels of  demonstrated knowledge, which are yet to come. Following the  preliminary design review in 2009, there should be enough knowledge  demonstrated to assess FCS’s prospects for success. It is thus important  that specific criteria—as quantifiable as possible and consistent with best  practices—be established now to evaluate that knowledge.
At the same time, decision makers must put this knowledge in context.  Specifically, if the FCS is able to demonstrate the level of knowledge that  should be expected at a preliminary design review, it will be about at the  point when it should be ready to begin system development and  demonstration. Instead, by that time, FCS will be halfway through that  phase, with only 4 years left to demonstrate that the system-of-systems  design works before the planned production commitment is made. For  that reason, decision makers will have to assess the complete business  case for FCS. This will include demonstrative proof not only that  requirements can be met with mature technologies and the preliminary  design, but also that the remainder of the acquisition strategy adequately  provides for demonstration of design maturity, production process  maturity, and funding availability before the production decision is made.
Clearly, it is in the nation’s interests for the FCS to be the right solution for  the future and to be a successful development. FCS has not been an easy  solution to pursue and underscores the commitment and vision of Army  leadership. Nonetheless, in view of the great technical challenges facing  the program, the possibility that FCS may not deliver the right capability  must be acknowledged and anticipated. At this point, the only alternative  course of action to FCS appears to be current Army weapons, increasingly  upgraded with FCS spin-out technologies. It is incumbent upon DOD, then,  to identify alternative courses of action to equip future Army forces by the  time the go/no-go decision is made on FCS. Otherwise, approval to “go”  may have to be given not because FCS is sufficiently developed, but  because there is no other viable course of action.
subsections: section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish criteria now that it  will use to evaluate the FCS program as part of its go/no-go decision  following its preliminary design review. At a minimum, these criteria  should include    a definition of acceptable technology maturity consistent with DOD  policy for a program half way through system development and  demonstration;    determination which FCS technologies will be scored against those    use of an independent assessment to score the FCS technologies;    a definition of acceptable software maturity consistent with DOD  policy for a program half way through system development and  demonstration;    an independent assessment to score FCS software;  the likely performance and availability of key complementary  systems;    an assessment of how likely the FCS system-of-systems—deemed  reasonable from the progress in technology, software, and design— is to provide the capabilities the Army will need to perform its roles  in joint force operations (Such an assessment should include  sensitivity analyses in areas of the most uncertainty.);    a definition of acceptable levels of technology, design, and  production maturity to be demonstrated at the critical design  review and the production decision;    an assessment of how well the FCS acquisition strategy and test  plan will be able to demonstrate those levels of maturity;    a determination of likely costs to develop, produce, and support the  FCS that is informed by an independent cost estimate and  supported by an acceptable confidence level; and    a determination that the budget levels the Army is likely to receive  will be sufficient to develop, produce, and support the FCS at  expected levels of cost.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense analyze alternative  courses of action DOD can take to provide the Army with sufficient  capabilities, should the FCS be judged as unlikely to deliver needed  capabilities in reasonable time frames and within expected funding levels.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD concurred with our recommendations and stated that the Defense  Acquisition Board’s review, aligned with the FCS program’s preliminary  design review in 2009, will be informed by a number of critical  assessments and analyses. These include a technology readiness  assessment, a system engineering assessment, an independent cost  estimate, an evaluation of FCS capabilities, an affordability assessment,  and ongoing analyses of alternatives that include current force and  network alternatives.
We believe that these are constructive steps that will contribute to the  Defense Acquisition Board review of the FCS following the preliminary  design review. We note that it is important that the board’s review be  recognized as a decision meeting—albeit not technically a milestone  decision—so that a declarative go/no-go decision can be made on FCS.  Accordingly, while it is necessary that good information—such as that  included in DOD’s response—be presented to the board, it is also  necessary that quantitative criteria that reflect best practices be used to  evaluate the information. These criteria, some of which were included in  our recommendations, should be defined by DOD now. For example, while  FCS technologies need to be independently assessed, it is likewise  important to establish what level of technology maturity is needed for a  program at that stage and to evaluate the FCS technologies against that  standard. This is true for software as well. In the area of cost, Army cost  estimates should be evaluated against recognized standards, such as  confidence levels as well as the independent cost estimate.
We had also recommended that criteria be established to serve as a basis  for evaluating the FCS acquisition strategy, including what would  constitute acceptable levels of technology, design, and production  maturity to be demonstrated at the critical design review and the  production decision. DOD did not respond to these aspects of our  recommendations, but a response is important because they have to do  with the sufficiency of the FCS business case for the remainder of the  program. Finally, as DOD evaluates alternatives, there are several things to  keep in mind. First, an alternative need not be a rival to the FCS, but  rather the next best solution that can be adopted if FCS is not able to  deliver the needed capabilities. Second, an alternative need not represent  a choice between FCS and the current force, but could include fielding a  subset of FCS, such as a class of vehicles, if they perform as needed and  provide a militarily worthwhile capability. Third, the broader perspective  of the Department of Defense—in addition to that of the Army—will  benefit the consideration of alternatives.
We also received technical comments from DOD which have been  addressed in the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretary of the Army; and the Director, Office of Management and  Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff has any questions  concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.   Other contributors to this report were Assistant Director William R.  Graveline, William C. Allbritton, Noah B. Bleicher, Marcus C. Ferguson,  John P. Swain, Robert S. Swierczek, and Carrie R. Wilson.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To develop the information on the Future Combat System program’s  progress toward meeting established goals, the contribution of critical  technologies and complementary systems, and the estimates of cost and  program affordability, we interviewed officials of the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Army   G-8; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the  Secretary of Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group; the Director of  Operational Test and Evaluation; the Assistant Secretary of the Army  (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology); the Army’s Training and Doctrine  Command; Surface Deployment and Distribution Command; the  Fraunhofer Center at the University of Maryland; the Program Manager for  the Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team); the Future Combat  System Lead Systems Integrator; and Lead Systems Integrator One Team  contractors.
We reviewed, among other documents, the Future Combat System’s  Operational Requirements Document, the Acquisition Strategy Report, the  Selected Acquisition Report, the Critical Technology Assessment and  Technology Risk Mitigation Plans, and the Integrated Master Schedule.
We attended the FCS System-of-Systems Functional Review, In-Process  Reviews, In-Process Preliminary Design Review, Board of Directors  Reviews, and multiple system demonstrations. In our assessment of the  FCS, we used the knowledge-based acquisition practices drawn from our  large body of past work as well as DOD’s acquisition policy and the  experiences of other programs.
We discussed the issues presented in this report with officials from the  Army and the Secretary of Defense and made several changes as a result.  We performed our review from March 2006 to March 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels
paragraphs: Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) are measures pioneered by the  National Aeronautics and Space Administration and adopted by DOD to  determine whether technologies were sufficiently mature to be  incorporated into a weapon system. Our prior work has found TRLs to be  a valuable decision-making tool because they can presage the likely  consequences of incorporating a technology at a given level of maturity  into a product development. The maturity level of a technology can range  from paper studies (TRL 1), to prototypes that can be tested in a realistic  environment (TRL 7), to an actual system that has proven itself in mission  operations (TRL 9). According to DOD acquisition policy, a technology  should have been demonstrated in a relevant environment (TRL 6) or,  preferably, in an operational environment (TRL 7) to be considered mature  enough to use for product development. Best practices of leading  commercial firms and successful DOD programs have shown that critical  technologies should be mature to at least a TRL 7 before the start of  product development.
section_title: Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Level Ratings
paragraphs: Last year’s  TRL 6  projections  4  Army, Joint, Multinational Interface  6  Cross Domain Guarding Solution  9  Mobile Ad Hoc Networking Protocols  10  Quality of Service Algorithms  15  Multi-Spectral Sensors and Seekers  17  Air (Rotary Wing/UAV)—to—Ground  18  Air (Fixed Wing)—to—Ground (Interim/Robust Solutions  20  Ground—to—Ground (Mounted)
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Key for Future Combat  System’s Success, GAO-06-564T. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case is Needed for Future  Combat System’s Successful Outcome, GAO-06-367. Washington, D.C.:  March 14, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Business Case and Business Arrangements Key  for Future Combat System’s Success, GAO-06-478T. Washington, D.C.:  March 1, 2006.
DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change, GAO-06-257T.  Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2005.
Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of  Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force, GAO-05-926.  Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Development Risks in the Army’s  Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future  Force, GAO-05-669. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects  for Success, GAO-05-428T. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects  for Success, GAO-05-442T. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.
NASA’s Space Vision: Business Case for Prometheus 1 Needed to Ensure  Requirements Match Available Resources, GAO-05-242. Washington, D.C.:   February 28, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: The Army’s Future Combat Systems’ Features,  Risks, and Alternatives, GAO-04-635T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs,   GAO-04-248. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Issues Facing the Army’s Future Combat Systems Program,   GAO-03-1010R. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems  Challenges, GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 2001.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to  Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8,  2001.