Human Capital: DOD Needs Better Internal Controls and Visibility over Costs for Implementing Its National Security Personnel System
Published: 2007-07-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Given a large-scale organizational change initiative, such as the Department of Defense's (DOD) National Security Personnel System (NSPS), is a substantial commitment that will take years to complete, it is important that DOD and Congress be kept informed of the full cost of implementing NSPS. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO analyzed the extent to which DOD has (1) fully estimated total costs associated with the implementation of NSPS and (2) expended or obligated funds to design and implement NSPS through fiscal year 2006. GAO interviewed department officials and analyzed the NSPS Program Executive Office's (PEO), and the military services' and the Washington Headquarters Services' (hereafter referred to as the components) cost estimates and reports of expended and obligated funds.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD's November 2005 estimate that it will cost $158 million to implement NSPS does not include the full cost that the department expects to incur as a result of implementing the new system. Federal financial accounting standards state that reliable information on the costs of federal programs and activities is crucial for effective management of government operations and recommend that full costs of programs and their outputs be provided to assist Congress and executives in making informed decisions on program resources and to ensure that programs get expected and efficient results. The full cost includes both those costs specifically identifiable to carry out the program, or direct costs, and those costs that are common to multiple programs but cannot be specifically identified with any particular program, or indirect costs. While the standards emphasize that full cost information is essential for managing federal programs, their activities, and outputs, the standards also provide that items may be omitted from cost information if that omission would not change or influence the judgment of a reasonable person relying on the cost information. Based on GAO's review of documentation provided by DOD and discussions with department officials, GAO found that DOD's estimate includes some direct costs, such as the start-up and operation of the NSPS PEO and the development and delivery of new NSPS training courses, but it does not include other direct costs such as the full salary costs of all civilian and military personnel who directly support NSPS activities departmentwide. Before developing its estimate, DOD had not fully defined all the direct and indirect costs needed to manage the program. Without a better estimate, decision makers--within DOD and Congress--will not have complete information about whether adequate resources are being provided for implementing NSPS. The total amount of funds DOD has expended or obligated to design and implement NSPS during fiscal years 2005 through 2006 cannot be determined because DOD has not established an oversight mechanism to ensure that these costs are fully captured. In May 2005, the NSPS Senior Executive established guidance for tracking and reporting NSPS implementation costs that requires the components to develop mechanisms to capture these costs and to report quarterly their costs to the NSPS PEO. However, this guidance does not define the direct and indirect costs DOD requires that the components capture. DOD's pervasive financial management deficiencies have been the basis for GAO's designation of this as a high-risk area since 1995. GAO's review of submitted reports from the components found that their official accounting systems do not capture the total funds expended or obligated to design and implement NSPS. Without an effective oversight mechanism to ensure that the official accounting systems capture all appropriate costs, DOD and Congress do not have visibility over the actual cost to design and implement NSPS.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Given a large-scale organizational change initiative, such as the National  Given a large-scale organizational change initiative, such as the National  Security Personnel System (NSPS), is a substantial commitment that will  Security Personnel System (NSPS), is a substantial commitment that will  take years to complete, it is important that the Department of Defense  take years to complete, it is important that the Department of Defense  (DOD) and Congress be kept informed of the full cost of implementing  (DOD) and Congress be kept informed of the full cost of implementing  NSPS. In November 2003, Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to  NSPS. In November 2003, Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to  establish NSPS, a new human resources management system. On  establish NSPS, a new human resources management system. On  November 1, 2005, DOD and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)  November 1, 2005, DOD and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)  jointly released the final regulations on NSPS. Successful implementation  jointly released the final regulations on NSPS. Successful implementation  of NSPS is essential for DOD because this new human resources  of NSPS is essential for DOD because this new human resources  management system, if properly designed and effectively implemented,  management system, if properly designed and effectively implemented,  could serve as a model for governmentwide human capital transformation.  could serve as a model for governmentwide human capital transformation.
We have undertaken a number of human capital engagements to track how  We have undertaken a number of human capital engagements to track how  DOD began to make use of its new human capital authorities. This body of  DOD began to make use of its new human capital authorities.
GAO, Human Capital: Observations on Final Regulations for DOD’s National Security  Personnel System, GAO-06-227T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006); Human Capital: DOD’s  National Security Personnel System Faces Implementation Challenges, GAO-05-730  (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005); Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed  DOD National Security Personnel System Regulations, GAO-05-432T (Washington, D.C.:  Mar. 15, 2005); Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed Department of  Defense National Security Personnel System Regulations, GAO-05-559T (Washington,  D.C.: Apr. 14, 2005); Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed Department  of Defense National Security Personnel System Regulations, GAO-05-517T (Washington,  D.C.: Apr. 12, 2005).
To determine the extent to which DOD has fully estimated the total costs  associated with the implementation of NSPS, we obtained and analyzed  DOD’s estimate that was published in the NSPS Final Regulations in  November 2005. We interviewed officials from the NSPS Program  Executive Office (PEO) and the NSPS Program Management Offices for  the Department of the Navy (which is also responsible for the Marine  Corps), the Army, the Air Force, and the Washington Headquarters  Services to discuss how they had interpreted PEO guidance on how to  estimate NSPS costs. To determine what costs should be included in NSPS  estimates, we analyzed DOD guidance, government accounting standards,  and other government regulations and manuals. To determine the extent  to which DOD expended or obligated funds to design and implement NSPS  through fiscal year 2006, we obtained quarterly reports collected by the  PEO and consolidated for fiscal years 2005 and 2006. We compared the  quarterly reports to data from the components’ official accounting systems  to determine what NSPS cost data had been captured in these accounting  systems. To obtain criteria for tracking and managing the costs of  programs, activities, and their outputs, we compared the PEO’s  management of the reporting of NSPS costs with internal control factors  described in Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool and  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. We  conducted our review from June 2006 through June 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 provided  DOD with the authority to establish (1) a pay-for-performance  management system, (2) an appeals process, and (3) a labor relations  system—which together comprise the major components of NSPS. The  legislation permits DOD significant flexibility in designing NSPS, allowing  for a new framework of rules, regulations, and processes to govern how  defense civilian employees are hired, compensated, promoted, and  disciplined. The law grants DOD certain exemptions from laws governing  federal civilian personnel management found in Title 5 of the U.S. Code.
Congress provided these flexibilities in response to DOD’s position that  the inflexibility of federal personnel systems was one of the most  important constraints to the department’s ability to attract, retain, reward,  and develop a civilian workforce to meet the national security mission of  the 21st century.
On November 1, 2005, DOD and OPM jointly developed and issued the  final NSPS regulations in the Federal Register. In the Federal Register,  DOD estimated the overall costs associated with implementing NSPS to be  approximately $158 million through 2008. The components’ estimates  projected that over 700,000 civilian employees would be converted to the  new system over a period of 4 years. By component, the Army projected  converting 235,000 civilian employees between fiscal years 2005 and 2008;  the Navy, 185,985; the Air Force, 128,408; and the Washington  Headquarters Services, 156,454.
DOD established a team to design and implement NSPS and manage the  transformation process. In April 2004, the Secretary of Defense appointed  an NSPS Senior Executive to, among other things, design, develop, and  establish NSPS. Under the Senior Executive’s authority, the PEO was  established as the central policy and program office to design, plan,  develop, deploy, assess, and fully implement NSPS. Specifically, the PEO’s  responsibilities include designing the labor relations, appeals, and human  resource/pay-for-performance systems; developing communication and  training strategies; modifying personnel information technology; and  drafting joint enabling regulations and internal DOD implementing  regulations. As the central DOD-wide program office, the PEO directs and  oversees the components’ NSPS program managers, who report to their  parent components and the NSPS PEO. These program managers also  serve as their components’ NSPS action officers and participate in the  development, planning, implementation, and deployment of NSPS.   Figure 1 shows the organization of the NSPS design and implementation  team.
section_title: DOD’s Estimated Costs to Implement NSPS Do Not Fully Represent Its Total Resource Needs
paragraphs: DOD’s estimate that it will cost $158 million to implement NSPS between  2005 and 2008 does not include the full cost that the department expects to  incur as a result of implementing the new system.
Federal financial accounting standards state that reliable information on  the costs of federal programs and activities is crucial for effective  management of government operations and recommend that full costs of  programs be reported so that decision makers have information necessary  to make informed decisions on resources for programs, activities, and  outputs, and to ensure that they get expected and efficient results.  According to the standards, the full cost of a program or activity includes  both those costs that are specifically identifiable to carry them out, or  direct costs, and those costs that are common to multiple programs or  activities but cannot be specifically identified with any particular program  or activity, or indirect costs. While the standards emphasize that cost  information is essential for managing federal programs, their activities,  and outputs, the standards also provide that items may be omitted from  cost information if that omission would not change or influence the  judgment of a reasonable person relying on the cost information.
To implement NSPS, the PEO estimated costs of about $51 million for the  start-up and operation of its office and the start-up of the National Security  Labor Relations Board. The components estimated costs of about $23  million in fiscal year 2005, about $27 million in fiscal year 2006, about $35  million in fiscal year 2007, and $22 million in fiscal year 2008, as shown in  table 1. Typical direct costs include salaries and benefits for employees  who work directly on NSPS activities; materials and supplies used in the  work; various costs associated with office space, equipment, facilities, and  utilities that are used exclusively to produce the output; and the costs of  goods and services received from other segments or entities that are used  to produce the output.
DOD’s estimate included several broad cost categories. These categories  are (1) design and implementation, (2) training, (3) evaluation, (4) human  resources automated systems, and (5) program office operations. DOD’s  estimate contained some examples of the types of costs included in each  of these broad categories. However, before calculating its estimate, DOD  had not fully defined what direct and indirect costs should be included for  it to effectively manage NSPS. Neither could DOD provide us with  complete supporting documentation that identifies the specific types of  costs included in its estimate. The Standards for Internal Controls in the  Federal Government require that all transactions and other significant  events, such as cost estimates, be clearly documented.
Based on our review of the documentation provided by DOD and  discussions with PEO and component officials, however, the estimate  does not include all direct costs of implementing the system. For example,  PEO and component officials stated that the estimate includes direct costs  for the start-up and operation of the Program Executive Office and the  National Security Labor Relations Board; development and delivery of  training materials, Web-based courses, and classroom sessions by DOD  contractor and civilian instructors; modification of existing automated  personnel and payroll transaction processing systems—the Defense  Civilian Personnel Data System and the Defense Civilian Pay System—to  accommodate changes brought about by NSPS; travel costs for NSPS  trainers and training participants; outreach with employees and other  parties; and collaboration activities with employee representatives.  However, PEO and component officials agreed that the estimate does not  include all direct costs of implementing the system. For example, PEO and  component officials agreed that the estimate does not include the full  salary costs of all civilian and military personnel who directly support  NSPS activities departmentwide and any of the direct costs that the  various organizations and defense agencies expect to incur to implement  the system, such as salaries and benefits for employees who work directly  on NSPS activities and materials and supplies used in NSPS activities.  Furthermore, PEO and component officials acknowledge that the estimate  did not include any of the typical indirect costs associated with the design  and implementation of NSPS such as costs of general administrative  services, general research, and technical support. Without a cost estimate  that includes all costs that the department expects to incur as a result of  implementing the new system, decision makers—within DOD and  Congress—will not have the complete cost information they need to make  decisions about whether adequate resources are being provided for  implementing NSPS.
Moreover, component officials told us that certain categories of the  estimated costs provided by the components do not contain comparable  cost elements. One of DOD’s key financial management regulation  principles—comparability—requires the reporting of financial  management data in the same manner throughout DOD, using common  definitions when necessary. However, officials from the Departments of  the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Washington Headquarters Services  told us that they used different approaches to estimate NSPS funding  requirements when calculating this cost estimate. While the PEO issued  general instructions to the military services and the Washington  Headquarters Services for estimating the costs associated with the design  and implementation of NSPS, this office did not provide a description of  the specific types of direct and indirect costs to be included in the  estimate or a cost-estimating methodology containing assumptions and  approaches. The PEO guidance provided a general reporting template with  broad cost categories but did not contain detailed instructions for  ensuring comprehensive and comparable cost estimates. Army and Navy  officials told us that they estimated civilian personnel costs under the  category of “Program Office Operations”; the Air Force officials noted that  they estimated civilian personnel costs under four other categories; and  Washington Headquarters Services officials stated that they did not  estimate their NSPS design and implementation costs in any of the eight  categories. Without comparable cost estimates, DOD and congressional  decision makers cannot contrast and compare or otherwise evaluate NSPS  implementation costs across the various DOD components.
section_title: Total Funds Expended or Obligated to Design and Implement NSPS Cannot Be Determined
paragraphs: The total amount of funds DOD has expended or obligated to design and  implement NSPS during fiscal years 2005 through 2006 cannot be  determined because DOD has not established an effective oversight  mechanism to ensure that all these costs are fully captured. In May 2005,  the NSPS Senior Executive established guidance intended to provide the  PEO with visibility over NSPS expenditures. The guidance requires the  components to develop appropriate mechanisms to capture these costs  within their official appropriation accounting systems and allows them  flexibility to establish the desired level of specificity to track NSPS costs— such as a job order number and cost account code—provided the  established mechanism allows complete visibility of all costs. In addition,  the guidance requires the components to submit reports quarterly of their  NSPS obligations to the NSPS PEO. This guidance does not, however,  define the direct and indirect costs that DOD requires the components to  capture. Our prior work on DOD’s financial and related business  management and systems has revealed pervasive deficiencies that affect  its ability to control costs; ensure basic accountability; anticipate future  costs and claims on the budget; measure performance; maintain funds  control; prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse; and address pressing  management issues. GAO first designated DOD financial management as  high risk in 1995.
Based on discussions with PEO and component officials and our review of  the quarterly reports of NSPS implementation costs submitted for fiscal  years 2005 and 2006, the components’ official appropriation accounting  systems do not capture the total amount of funds reported expended or  obligated to design and implement NSPS. By component, the Army’s  quarterly reports indicated that $9.8 million had been obligated to  implement NSPS; however, just $6.0 million of these costs were captured  in the Army’s official accounting system. The remaining $3.8 million was  not captured in the Army’s official accounting system, and Army officials  could not provide sufficient evidence supporting the amount. The Air  Force’s quarterly reports indicated that $21.7 million had been obligated to  implement NSPS, of which $3.8 million was captured in its official  accounting system. According to Air Force officials, the remaining  reported amount, $17.9 million, was an estimate of expended and  obligated funds Air Force-wide. The Navy and the Washington  Headquarters Services reported $21.6 million and $13.1 million,  respectively, but neither component was able to provide any evidence that  these obligated funds had been captured in their official accounting  systems.
While the quarterly NSPS cost reports are intended to provide DOD with  visibility over NSPS implementation costs, the PEO does not have an  effective oversight mechanism or internal controls in place to ensure that  the information contained in the reports is complete and accurate. The  Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government sets out  management controls for all aspects of an agency’s operations. The  Standards emphasize the importance of management oversight and review  to ensure that programs, their activities, and outputs continue to meet  their intended goals and comply with the law and policies and recommend  that agencies establish internal controls to monitor and review operations  and programs to provide reasonable assurance that they meet their goals.  Moreover, although the PEO relies on the components to follow its  guidance for capturing NSPS costs in their official accounting systems, it  does not conduct an independent verification of the completeness or  accuracy of financial data reported by the components. Although  independent verification is an important internal control activity under  segregation of duties designed to reduce the risk of errors, PEO officials  told us that none of the reports submitted by the components are reviewed  by an independent or second reviewer to ensure that the information  reported is accurate or complete. Federal internal control standards  require that data control activities, such as verification and reconciliation,  be conducted and documented to help provide reasonable assurance that  the objectives of a program and its activities are being met. Moreover, we  consider establishing such controls, including policies and oversight  mechanisms, a best practice that can ensure greater visibility over the total  costs associated with the design and implementation of NSPS. Without an  effective oversight mechanism and internal controls, DOD and Congress  do not have adequate visibility over the actual cost to design and  implement NSPS.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: At a time when DOD is competing for resources in an increasingly fiscally  constrained environment, it is critically important that DOD and Congress  know the full cost to design and implement NSPS. Defining what direct  and indirect costs are needed to effectively manage NSPS is a crucial first  step for the department and Congress to lay a foundation for future  decisions. Without a full cost estimate, decision makers within DOD and  Congress will not have the complete cost information they need to make  decisions about whether adequate resources are being provided for  implementing NSPS. Moreover, the cost information that makes up the  components’ portion of the overall DOD cost estimate was prepared using  different approaches and is therefore not comparable. Without  comparable cost estimates, DOD and congressional decision makers  cannot contrast and compare or otherwise evaluate NSPS implementation  costs across the various DOD components.
Although the components are reporting NSPS implementation costs, the  total amount of funds DOD has expended or obligated to design and  implement the system cannot be determined. Until the PEO establishes an  effective oversight mechanism with reporting requirements and  independent verification processes, DOD cannot ensure that the  components track and report cost information that includes funds that  they have expended or obligated to design and implement NSPS. Without  an effective oversight mechanism, DOD and Congress do not have  adequate visibility over the actual cost to design and implement NSPS.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To provide decision makers in DOD and Congress with improved visibility  and internal controls over the costs of NSPS, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the National Security Personnel System Senior  Executive to take the following three actions:
Direct the NSPS Program Executive Office to define all direct and  indirect costs necessary to effectively manage NSPS, in accordance  with internal control standards, federal financial accounting  standards, and DOD’s financial management regulation principle  related to comparability.
Direct the NSPS Program Executive Office to prepare a revised  estimate of the full costs of implementing NSPS in accordance with  the established definitions, internal control standards, federal  financial accounting standards, and DOD’s financial management  regulation principle related to comparability.
Develop a comprehensive oversight framework to ensure that all  funds expended or obligated to design and implement NSPS are  fully captured and reported. Such a framework should establish  quality controls, including independent reviews of the data being  reported by the components in the quarterly reports, to ensure the  accuracy and completeness of the reported information.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report and generally  agreed with our recommendations.  In an overall comment, DOD noted  that NSPS is not a program; however, it also noted that DOD modeled the  development and implementation of NSPS on the acquisition model. Also,  the department noted that costing and accounting requirements for NSPS  were never intended to be the same as those for the acquisition model. We  believe DOD raises this point because we used the federal financial  accounting standards to analyze DOD’s costs associated with the  implementation of NSPS. We note in our report that federal financial  accounting standards not only apply to the cost of programs, but also to  the cost of activities such as NSPS. Therefore, we believe that the same  costing and accounting rigor and discipline that are applied to major  acquisition programs should apply to NSPS.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to define all direct and  indirect costs necessary to effectively manage the program, its activities,  and outputs, in accordance with internal control standards, federal  financial accounting standards, and DOD’s financial management  regulation principle related to comparability. DOD stated that the PEO is  reconstituting the Financial Integrated Product Team (IPT) to define all  direct and indirect costs necessary to effectively manage the program;  relook at the original cost categories to determine if they are still  appropriate and change if appropriate; and stipulate the costs included in  each category. If the PEO follows through with its effort, we believe that it  will be responsive to our recommendation. Regarding indirect costs, DOD  stated that a test of reasonableness was applied. The department  explained that the components were allowed to weigh the cost/benefit of  collecting, tracking, and reporting indirect costs. While we agree that it is  indeed appropriate for the components to apply a test of reasonableness  to weigh the cost/benefit of collecting, tracking, and reporting indirect  costs, it is important to note that a crucial first step for the department to  lay a foundation for such decisions about reasonableness is to define what  direct and indirect costs are needed to effectively manage NSPS. It is also  important to note that we cannot verify DOD’s statement that the  components applied a reasonableness test because DOD did not provide  documentation to reflect this during our review. DOD further stated that  the PEO had tracked both direct and indirect costs. While the PEO does  capture funds it expended or obligated to design and implement NSPS, we  continue to believe that the total amount of funds DOD has expended or  obligated to design and implement NSPS cannot be determined because  DOD has not established an effective oversight mechanism to ensure that  the cost information reported is accurate and complete.
Regarding our recommendation to prepare a revised estimate of the full  costs of implementing NSPS in accordance with established definitions,  internal control standards, federal financial accounting standards, and  DOD’s financial management regulation principle related to comparability,  the department concurred, noting that the PEO will develop an estimate  covering fiscal years 2008 through 2011.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the NSPS Senior Executive  develop a comprehensive oversight framework to ensure that NSPS funds  that are expended or obligated are fully captured and reported, noting that  the department should leverage existing policies and procedures to ensure  oversight of these costs. However, in the absence of more specific details  on its planned actions to leverage existing policies and procedures to  ensure oversight of NSPS costs, we continue to emphasize the  department’s need for a comprehensive oversight framework because  without it DOD and Congress do not have adequate visibility over the  actual cost to design and implement NSPS.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees. We will make copies available to others upon request. This  report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-5559 or by e-mail at stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to the  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  estimated the current and future total costs associated with the  implementation of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS), we  reviewed the estimate that was published in the NSPS Final Regulations.  We also analyzed guidance the NSPS Program Executive Office (PEO)  provided to the components that would be providing input to this  estimate. We interviewed officials from the PEO and the NSPS Program  Management Offices for the Navy (which is also responsible for the Marine  Corps), the Army, the Air Force, and the Washington Headquarters  Services to discuss how they had interpreted the guidance directing them  to estimate NSPS costs, and we obtained and reviewed documents of the  estimates provided by the NSPS Program Management Offices to the PEO.  To determine what costs should be included in NSPS estimates, we  analyzed government accounting standards defined in the following  documents: DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, vol. 1,  chapter 2, Conceptual Framework, December 1998, and “Managerial Cost  Accounting Concepts and Standards for the Federal Government,”  Number 4, July 31, 1995.
To determine the extent to which DOD expended or obligated funds to  design and implement NSPS through fiscal year 2006, we obtained  quarterly reports collected by the PEO and consolidated for fiscal years  2005 and 2006. To gain an understanding of the roles and responsibilities  of the various organizations in tracking NSPS cost data, we reviewed  pertinent NSPS documents, including the NSPS Requirements Document,  the Charter for the PEO, and the memorandum sent out by the PEO  directing that the components report their NSPS costs on a quarterly basis.  We reviewed quarterly reports provided by the components and the PEO  for the 2-year period and interviewed officials from each of the component  PMO offices to gather documentation showing how the reported data had  been captured. We compared the quarterly reports to data from the  components’ official accounting systems to determine what NSPS cost  data had been captured in these accounting systems. To obtain criteria for  tracking and managing the costs of programs, activities, and outputs, we  compared the PEO’s management of the reporting of NSPS costs with  internal control factors described in Internal Control Management and  Evaluation Tool and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government.
We conducted our review from June 2006 through June 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, John Needham, Acting Director;  Sandra Burrell, Assistant Director; Margaret Braley; Renee Brown;  Nicolaas Cornelisse; William Doherty; Cara Kochheiser; Julia Matta;  Donald Neff; Charles Perdue; Beverly Schladt; Rebecca Shea; and John  Warner made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Human Capital: Observations on Final Regulations for DOD’s National  Security Personnel System. GAO-06-227T. Washington, D.C.: November  17, 2005.
Human Capital: DOD’s National Security Personnel System Faces  Implementation Challenges. GAO-05-730. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005.
Questions for the Record Related to the Department of Defense’s National  Security Personnel System. GAO-05-771R. Washington, D.C.: June 14,  2005.
Questions for the Record Regarding the Department of Defense’s  National Security Personnel System. GAO-05-770R: Washington, D.C.:  May 31, 2005.
Post-hearing Questions Related to the Department of Defense’s National  Security Personnel System. GAO-05-641R. Washington, D.C.: April 29,  2005.
Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform  DOD Business Operations. GAO-05-629T. Washington, D.C.: April 28,  2005.
Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed Department of  Defense National Security Personnel System Regulations. GAO-05-559T.  Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2005.
Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed Department of  Defense National Security Personnel System Regulations. GAO-05-517T.  Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2005.
Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed DOD National  Security Personnel System Regulations. GAO-05-432T. Washington, D.C.:  March 15, 2005.
Department of Defense: Further Actions Are Needed to Effectively  Address Business Management Problems and Overcome Key Business  Transformation Challenges. GAO-05-140T. Washington, D.C.: November  18, 2004.
DOD Civilian Personnel: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce Plans  Needed. GAO-04-753. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and  Organizational Transformations. GAO-03-669. Washington, D.C.: July 2,  2003.
Human Capital: Building on DOD’s Reform Efforts to Foster  Governmentwide Improvements. GAO-03-851T. Washington, D.C.: June 4,  2003.
Human Capital: DOD’s Civilian Personnel Strategic Management and  the Proposed National Security Personnel System. GAO-03-493R.  Washington, D.C.: May 12, 2003.
Defense Transformation: DOD’s Proposed Civilian Personnel System  and Governmentwide Human Capital Reform. GAO-03-741T.  Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2003.
Defense Transformation: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s Proposed  Civilian Personnel Reforms. GAO-03-717T. Washington, D.C.: April 29,  2003.
DOD Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Strengthen Civilian Human  Capital Strategic Planning and Integration with Military Personnel and  Sourcing Decisions. GAO-03-475. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2003.