Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams
Published: 2002-05-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In 1999, the Army announced its plans to transform its forces during the next 30 years to enable them to deploy more rapidly and operate more effectively during all types of military conflicts, from small-scale contingencies to major wars. The Army's goal is to be able to deploy a brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division within 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days. The first step is to form and equip six interim brigade combat teams by 2008. Created to fill a gap in military capability, the teams are intended to be a lethal and survivable deterrent force that can be rapidly deployed around the world. The commanders in chief envision different uses for the teams according to the unique requirements of their respective regions. However, they generally agree that the teams should provide them with a broader choice of capabilities to meet their operational needs. The Army faces many challenges in assembling its first team. For example, some planned combat capabilities will not be present when the team is certified for deployment next year. In addition, the interim armored vehicle delivery schedule has compressed the time available for training. Army officials believe that the organization at Fort Lewis that was created to help assemble the brigades has been effective in dealing with day-to-day challenges. The Army is chronicling lessons learned in forming the teams, but this information is not readily available in a central source. As a result, the Army may be unaware of some best practices or may repeat mistakes in forming later teams.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In October 1999, the U.S. Army announced its intentions to transform its  forces into a more strategically responsive force that could more rapidly  deploy and effectively operate in all types of military operations, whether  small-scale contingencies or major theater wars.  Army plans call for an  over 30-year transformation that will lead to the ability to deploy a brigade  anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five  divisions within 30 days.   The first step in this process is to form and equip  six Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) by 2008.  The first two brigades  are being formed at Fort Lewis, Washington, with the goal of organizing,  equipping, training, and certifying the first such brigade to deploy by May  2003.  The Army Chief of Staff stated that it would cost approximately  $1 billion to form each brigade.
Because these brigades are entirely new, many questions have arisen as to  how their capabilities differ from those of more traditional brigades, how  the Army plans to use them, and whether they will possess capabilities that  the war-fighting Commanders in Chief (CINC) need.  Thus, we monitored  IBCT formation at Fort Lewis during 2001 to gain a better understanding of  the challenges that have arisen that might apply to subsequent brigades  scheduled to be formed in other locations.  We also visited the war-fighting  CINCs responsible for Europe, Southwest Asia, Korea, and the Pacific to  gain their perspectives on how they might use these brigades.  Our  objectives were to (1) identify the expected capabilities of the IBCT,  (2) determine the CINCs’ views on the utility of the IBCTs and how the  CINCs might use them, (3) identify the challenges that have arisen in  forming the brigades, and (4) determine if the Army has an effective means  of capturing lessons learned.  This is the third in a planned series of reports  related to Army Transformation and is being provided to you because of  your oversight responsibilities for these issues.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In testimony before the U.S. Senate in March 2000, the Chief of Staff of the  Army stated that the Army had to transform to meet current and future  strategic requirements.  The Army believes that the transformation is  necessary to respond more effectively to (1) the growing number of  peacekeeping operations and small-scale contingencies and (2) the  challenges posed by nontraditional threats such as subnational and  transnational terrorist groups.  The Army plans to transform its forces over  a 30-year period.
The first phase of the Army's transformation is to form six IBCTs, the first  two of which are being formed at Fort Lewis, Washington.  The first of  these brigades has been in the process of being formed since fiscal year  2000.  The Army's plan is to certify it as achieving its initial operational  capability by May 2003, at which time it will be deployable.  The second  brigade is in its early stages of formation.  The Army has programmed  funding for six IBCTs and has announced the locations of the remaining  four.   Under current plans, all six brigades are to have been formed,  equipped, trained, and ready to deploy by 2008.  The Army is also  considering how it might accelerate the fielding of the last three brigades  so that all six can be fielded by 2005.  Additionally, the 2001 Quadrennial  Defense Review stated that an IBCT be stationed in Europe.  Because this  was not in the Army's plans, it is considering establishing an IBCT in  Europe.  Taken together, the IBCTs represent what the Army terms its  Interim Force because it begins to meet the Army’s rapid deployment needs  for the next decade.
Beginning in 2008 and continuing beyond 2030, the Army plans to transition  to its Objective Force.  During this period, all Army forces, including the  IBCTs, are to be transformed into new organizational structures operating  under new war-fighting doctrine.  Their new combat systems are to be  lighter and more mobile, deployable, lethal, survivable, and sustainable  than current systems.  Four competing research and development teams  have completed work on alternative designs for these future combat  systems and a contract has been awarded to a single lead systems  integrator.
As the Army transitions to its Objective Force, it plans to maintain the  organizational designs of a portion of its existing combat force, which it  terms its Legacy Force, and to modernize selected equipment in this force.   This equipment includes such major weapons systems as the Abrams tank,  Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and Black Hawk helicopter.  Figure 1 depicts  these weapons systems.  This selective modernization is intended to enable  the Army to maintain capability and readiness until the future combat  systems are delivered to the Objective Force.
section_title: IBCTS Are Expected to Fill a Perceived Gap in Military Capability
paragraphs: The Army expects the IBCT to provide a force capability that it does not  currently have:  a rapidly deployable early-entry combat force that is lethal,  survivable, and capable of operating in all types of military operations,  from small-scale contingencies like the Balkans’ missions to a major  theater war.  It also expects to use the IBCT to test new concepts that  would be integrated into the Army’s future Objective Force.  Many of these  concepts are still under development.
subsections: section_title: Expected Uses
paragraphs: The IBCT has been optimized for small-scale contingencies, being  specifically designed to operate in a variety of terrains, including  mountains and urban areas.  Yet it is expected to also be capable of  participating in a major theater war and addressing both conventional and  nonconventional threats.  As an early-entry force, the brigade is expected  to have sufficient built-in combat power to conduct immediate combat  operations upon arrival in theater if required.  It is designed to supply its  own needs for 72 hours, after which time it would need a source of  resupply.  The IBCT is intended, in general, to fight as a component of a  division or corps but also be capable of operating separately under the  direct control of a higher headquarters, such as a joint task force.  The  Army expects that in many possible contingencies, the IBCT could initially  be the single U.S. maneuver component under a higher headquarters.
In a major theater war, the IBCT under current plans would fight as a  subordinate maneuver component within a division or corps.  However, the  brigade would be augmented with additional mission-specific combat  capabilities such as armor, aviation, and air defense artillery.  The Army,  however, is considering the need for an Interim Division structure that  would include IBCTs as the maneuver forces because some analyses have  concluded that placing an IBCT with its differing design into an existing  infantry or armored division might impede the division’s ability to achieve  its full combat capabilities.  The Army expects to complete the new  divisional concept by spring 2003 if the Chief of Staff decides to go forward  with it.
section_title: Expected Organization, Equipment, and Capabilities
paragraphs: The IBCT is organized primarily as a mobile infantry organization and will  contain about 3,500 personnel and 890 vehicles.  The brigade includes  headquarters elements; three infantry battalions, composed of three rifle  companies each; an antitank company; an artillery battalion; an engineer  company; a brigade support battalion; a military intelligence company; a  signal company; and a unique Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target  Acquisition squadron.  This squadron is expected to be the IBCT’s primary  source of combat information through the traditional role of  reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.  However, the  squadron is also designed to develop a situational understanding of other  elements within the operational environment, including political, cultural,  economic, and demographic factors.  This awareness is expected to enable  the brigade to anticipate, forestall, or overcome threats from the enemy.   The squadron offers the IBCT a variety of new systems and capabilities that  are generally not contained in an infantry brigade including manned  reconnaissance vehicles and ground reconnaissance scouts,  counterintelligence, human intelligence collectors, unmanned aerial  vehicles, ground sensors, and radars.  Moreover, the squadron’s all-weather  intelligence and surveillance capabilities, coupled with the digitized  systems, are designed to enable it to maintain 24-hour operations.
All six of the IBCTs are planned to be equipped with new light-armored  wheeled vehicles, termed interim armored vehicles, which are significantly  lighter and more transportable than existing tanks and armored vehicles.   These vehicles include ten types of vehicles that share a common chassis— infantry carriers, mobile gun systems, reconnaissance and surveillance  vehicles, and others.  These wheeled vehicles are expected to enable the  IBCT to maneuver more easily in a variety of difficult terrains.  The first  vehicles were scheduled for delivery to the first brigade in April 2002.   Meanwhile, the brigade has been training on substitute vehicles, including  32 Canadian infantry vehicles and German infantry carrier and nuclear,  biological, and chemical vehicles.  These vehicles approximate the  capabilities of the interim armored vehicles. Figure 2 depicts two of the  interim armored vehicles.
The brigade’s digitized communications are designed to enable brigade  personnel to “see” the entire battlefield and react before engaging the  enemy.  In addition to light armored vehicles equipped with digital systems,  the IBCT is expected to rely on advanced command, control, computer,  communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems  purchased from commercial or government sources.   The squadron’s all- weather intelligence and surveillance capabilities, together with its  digitized systems, are intended to enable it to maintain 24-hour operations.   The Army expects this awareness to enable the IBCT to anticipate,  forestall, or overcome threats from the enemy.
The IBCT's planned capabilities also differ in other ways from those found  in traditional divisional brigades.  For example, the Army determined that  achieving decisive action while operating in various types of terrain,  including urban settings, would require the brigade to possess a combined  arms capability at the company level, rather than at the battalion level.   Focusing on dismounted assault, companies are expected to support  themselves with  (1) direct fire from weapon systems on the infantry  carrier vehicle and from the mobile gun system and (2) indirect support  through mortars and artillery.  This combined arms capability is to be  reinforced through the Army’s current development of a training program  aimed at developing soldiers with a wider range of skills as well as leaders  who can adapt to many different kinds of conflict situations.
section_title: Expected Deployment Capability and Relation to Objective Force
paragraphs: The Army expects the IBCT to rely on new sustainment concepts that will  permit it to deploy more rapidly because it will carry fewer supplies and  have lighter vehicles, resulting in less weight to be shipped.  Due to its  smaller and lighter vehicles, the Army expects that the IBCT will be  transported within the theater by C-130 aircraft.  There are more of these  aircraft, and they provide greater access to airstrips than would be possible  with larger C-17 and C-5A aircraft that are intended for use in deploying an  IBCT from its home station to the theater.  Figure 3 shows a C-130 aircraft.
The IBCTs will serve an additional purpose in that they will test and  validate new doctrine and organizational structures as well as new combat  training and leadership development concepts.  As such, the Army expects  the formation and operation of the IBCT to provide insights for subsequent  transformation.
section_title: Estimated Schedule for Accelerating IBCTs
paragraphs: In September 2001, Army officials announced the possibility of accelerating  the formation of the last three IBCTs.  Under this proposal, all six IBCTs  would be formed by 2005, 3 years earlier than planned.  A key to  acceleration is the ability of the manufacturer to deliver the vehicles ahead  of the current delivery schedule.  According to this schedule, the first IBCT  would begin receiving its vehicles in April 2002.  The second brigade would  begin receiving its vehicles in February 2003.
The Army cannot acquire vehicles for more than the second IBCT until it  meets certain legislative requirements.   The Army must compare the costs  and operational effectiveness of the Interim Armored Vehicle with its  existing vehicles before it can acquire the Interim Vehicle for the third  IBCT.  The Army must also complete an operational evaluation of the first  IBCT.  The evaluation must include a unit deployment to the evaluation site  and execution of combat missions across the spectrum of potential threats  and operational scenarios.  The Army cannot acquire vehicles for the fourth  and subsequent IBCTs until the Secretary of Defense certifies that the  operational evaluation results indicate that the IBCT design is operationally  effective and suitable.  The significance of this is that the Army would need  to complete this evaluation and authorize vehicle production for the fourth  brigade by June 2003 for the Army to accelerate formation of the fourth and  subsequent brigades, as has been proposed.  This is because the  manufacturer must have 330 days of lead time to produce and deliver the  vehicles.
section_title: Regional Commander in Chiefs View Planned IBCTS Favorably and Could Use Them in Various Ways
paragraphs: Our visits to the unified combat commands covering Europe, Southwest  Asia, the Pacific, and the United Nations Command/U.S. Forces in Korea  confirmed their support for the Army’s plans for the IBCT.  They generally  agree that the current Army force structure does not meet their  requirements for a rapidly deployable, lethal, and survivable force.   According to the CINCs, if the IBCTs are formed and deployable as  planned, they should fill the perceived near-term gap in military capability.   The CINCs view the IBCT as a means to provide them with a broader  choice of capabilities to meet their varied operational requirements rather  than a substitute for current force structure.  However, CINC planners  need information about the brigade’s deployability and other limitations for  planning purposes.  Their anticipated uses of an IBCT vary from serving as  an early entry force within the European Command to conducting  reconnaissance and securing main supply routes in Southwest Asia for the  Central Command.  To ensure that the CINCs’ needs and concerns are  addressed as the transformation evolves, the Army has created a forum  that meets periodically with their active participation.
section_title: IBCTs Would Fill a Capabilities Gap
paragraphs: Our discussions with CINC officials confirmed their agreement with Army  conclusions about a gap in military capability.  In announcing the Army’s  plans for its transformation in October 1999, the Army’s Chief of Staff  pointed to this gap in current war-fighting capabilities and the IBCT’s  planned ability to rapidly deploy.  He noted that although the Army can  dominate in all types of conflicts, it is not strategically responsive.  The  light forces can deploy within a matter of days but lack combat power,  tactical mobility, and the ability to maintain sustained operations.  On the  other hand, armor and mechanized forces possess significant combat  power and are able to maintain sustained operations but cannot deploy  rapidly.
CINC officials cited past military operations that pointed to this gap.  For  example, in the Persian Gulf War, the Army deployed a light infantry  force—the 82nd Airborne Division—as the early entry force to deter Iraq  and defend Saudi Arabia.  However, there is general agreement that this  force did not possess the anti-armor capability to survive and stop a heavy  armored attack.  Moreover, it took 6 months to position the heavy forces  and associated support units and supplies needed to mount offensive  actions against Iraq—a time frame that might not be available in the future.   The urban operation in Mogadishu, Somalia, in October 1993 that resulted  in the deaths of 16 U.S. soldiers was also mentioned to illustrate the need  for a force that is lethal, is maneuverable, and provides sufficient  protection to U.S. forces.  The difficulty in maneuvering heavy vehicles in  peacekeeping operations in the Balkans was also cited by CINC  representatives as a reason why lighter, more maneuverable vehicles are  needed.
CINC officials pointed out many features of the IBCT that they felt would  address the existing capability shortfalls.  These features included its  planned ability to deploy within 96 hours anywhere in the world and to  provide a formidable, survivable deterrent force that could bring combat  power to bear immediately if necessary.  Also mentioned was its expected  ability to rapidly transition from being a deterrence, to serving in a small- scale contingency, to fighting in a major theater of war in the event  operations escalated.
CINC officials also commented on the IBCT’s enhanced capabilities for  situational awareness.  Situational awareness is the ability to see and  understand the battlefield before coming into actual contact with the  opponent through the use of advanced integrated systems that provide  command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance,  and reconnaissance capabilities.  This expected improvement in awareness  should provide a major comparative advantage over potential enemies.   They also noted that the IBCT would support their rapid deployment needs  by using interim armored vehicles that would be deployable within theater  by C-130 aircraft, which are more readily available, better able to access  small airfields, and therefore better able to be moved around the  battlefield.  CINC officials also pointed out that the IBCT relies on a family  of vehicles with a common platform, which reduces logistics and support  requirements through commonality of spare parts, fuel, and lubricants.
While generally positive about the IBCTs, CINC officials cautioned that  many questions remain about whether these brigades will be able to  achieve all their envisioned capabilities, especially by the time they are  certified for deployment.  Concerns expressed to us included  whether the IBCT would actually be available to deploy anywhere in the  world in 96 hours, given many potential competing demands for mobility  assets;  what combat capability shortfalls might exist in the IBCT until it  receives all its planned vehicles and weapon systems;  whether new logistics concepts would succeed in reducing supply  tonnages sufficiently to achieve rapid deployment and intratheater  goals;  when the vehicles that need further development, such as the mobile  gun system and the nuclear, biological, and chemical vehicle, would be  available; and  whether the IBCT will be able to provide sufficient combat power when  heavy forces are needed.
CINC operational and logistics planners need specific data regarding the  brigade’s combat capabilities and logistics factors that are not yet available.   They emphasized that it was important to have these data to adequately  integrate the IBCTs into their plans.  If, for instance, certain planned  capabilities would not be in place when the first IBCTs become deployable,  planners would need to know this so that they could plan for mitigating any  risks that this might create.  For example, Army officials in Korea related  their concern that the IBCT will not include the mobile gun system until  after the Army certifies the brigade as operationally capable.  In the Korean  theater, the capability of this weapon system is a high priority.
CINC officials raised additional concerns about the IBCT’s support on our  visits.  Logistics planners in Korea said the amounts of fuel, water, and  ammunition used by the brigade need to be analyzed to determine what the  theater needs to have when a brigade arrives.  Although Korea contains  significant support resources, logistics planners need to know the unit’s  unique and specific support requirements.   In the Pacific Command,  questions remain regarding the adequacy of the IBCT’s 3-day supply of  medical items.
subsections: section_title: CINCs’ Employment of IBCTs Will Vary
paragraphs: The CINCs’ specific requirements and planned use for the IBCTs varies  depending on the requirements of their respective areas of operational  responsibility.  (See fig. 4.)  Officials in both Europe and Korea expressed  their views that IBCTs could be used effectively in their theaters of  operation.  Officials of the U.S. Central Command, which covers Southwest  Asia, said that an IBCT had utility in their theater—notably Africa—where  fighting in urban terrain might occur.  According to Pacific Command  officials, their theater could use Army forces that are more deployable,  lethal, and sustainable than currently assigned, especially for use in the  urban areas prevalent in that theater.  CINC representatives generally did  not expect the IBCT to substitute for forces currently assigned.  Rather,  they saw the IBCT as providing them with a broader choice of capabilities  to meet their operational needs.
The European Command wants the Army to station an IBCT in its area of  responsibility.  As noted earlier, the most recent Quadrennial Defense  Review stated that an IBCT would be stationed in Europe.  Command  officials emphasized that the planned characteristics of the IBCT—rapid  deployment, enhanced situational awareness, tactical mobility, and  lethality—are key to the requirements of the European theater.  Further,  the expected intelligence-gathering capabilities of the IBCT reconnaissance  squadron will exceed that of the Command’s currently assigned divisions.   This capability is a necessity for missions such as those in the Balkans.
Recognizing strategic and tactical mobility deficiencies from past and  ongoing contingency operations in the Balkans, in the year 2000 Command  officials in fact created a rapid reaction force with some of the same  characteristics as the IBCT.   This rapid reaction force is composed of both  light and heavy forces and is expected to deploy within 24 hours after being  alerted.  By using on-hand forces and equipment, the European Command  has created an immediate reaction force that possesses some of the IBCT's  capabilities.  However, this reaction force lacks the intelligence,  reconnaissance, and surveillance systems found in the IBCT that allows  greater situational understanding of the battlefield.  Furthermore, the force  is not equipped with the new interim armored vehicles, which allows for a  commonality among sustainment requirements and training.  Command  officials said that an IBCT would complement this rapid reaction force by  providing an early entry force that could bring more combat power to bear.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Central Command
paragraphs: The Central Command’s primary area of responsibility is Southwest Asia  and is one of two geographic areas that have required war planning for a  major theater war.  One official noted that an IBCT could provide  significant capability to the CINC's theater engagement plans by providing  mobile training teams and other military-to-military missions with  developing nations.
Command officials stated that the IBCTs would offer new capabilities to  their theater in certain circumstances.  For example, had an IBCT been  available during the Persian Gulf War, the IBCT could have been used  rather than the 82nd Airborne Division since the IBCT's planned anti-armor  capability far exceeds that of a light division.  Moreover, the IBCT would be  useful in conducting missions such as reconnaissance and security and  securing main supply routes.  Command officials stated that an IBCT would  have been valuable had it been available for the urban mission in  Mogadishu, Somalia, during October 1993.  They added that the IBCT could  also be used for evacuating noncombatants.  Command officials noted that  even though the IBCT offers them new capabilities, they would not  substitute it for the heavy combat forces that are required for a major war  such as the Gulf War.
section_title: United Nations Command/ U.S. Forces Korea
paragraphs: Army officials in Korea have stated that they want to station an IBCT in  Korea.  According to one senior Army official in Korea, the IBCT would  provide the maneuverability and combat power needed to operate in the  mountains and the increasingly urbanized areas of Korea.  War planners in  Korea expressed their view that the IBCT is optimized to meet the  operational requirements of the Korean peninsula and that the IBCT would  have more utility than Bradley Fighting Vehicles and M1 tanks.  They  explained that these latter weapons would have to be used primarily as  stationary weapon platforms because the terrain and the sprawling urban  terrain limit their use.  They noted that IBCTs are more mobile than light  forces and once equipped with all their new weapon systems will have  good lethality and be survivable.  Further, according to CINC officials, the  theater will not lose or diminish its combat capability by substituting IBCTs  for heavy forces.
section_title: U.S. Pacific Command
paragraphs: While Pacific Command officials noted that Army forces currently assigned  to the theater are capable of meeting most CINC operational requirements,  an IBCT would bring certain desirable capabilities to the theater.  For  example, an IBCT would provide increased situational awareness, tactical  mobility, and firepower currently unavailable within assigned Army forces.   Command war planners explained that the IBCT’s communications  capabilities would help eliminate some communications shortfalls between  and among the Command’s service components.  Moreover, an IBCT could  be more effectively employed for stability and support operations in the  Pacific, providing a rapid deployment capability.  They mentioned that the  planned capabilities of the IBCT offer both (1) considerable flexibility by  having substantial nonlethal capabilities for use in stability and support  missions and (2) substantial lethality for more intense operations such as  peace enforcement.  Command officials noted that the IBCT’s interim  armored vehicles would provide better protection for infantry forces than  can be provided by currently assigned infantry forces.
section_title: Forum Exists to Address CINC Concerns
paragraphs: The Army has established a CINC Requirements Task Force that provides a  forum for the commanders to voice their current and future requirements.   Army officials assigned to the combatant commands stated that the  quarterly meetings have allowed the CINCs to ensure that their concerns  are heard.  Issues raised are then forwarded to the Army staff for  resolution.  For example, the task force has addressed issues such as how  the U.S. Pacific Command plans to employ IBCTs in that theater as well as  reintegrating the Army’s first IBCT into the operational plans.  Based on  discussions with combatant command officials, the perceived value of the  forum is such that participation at the quarterly meetings is generally  obligatory for command representatives.
section_title: Challenges Have Arisen in Forming the Initial IBCT
paragraphs: Fort Lewis officials said that they are generally satisfied with the progress  being made to date in fielding the first IBCT and believe the IBCT is on  track to meet its certification milestone of May 2003.  However, the Army  has encountered challenges in forming the IBCT at Fort Lewis.  One  challenge to overcome is a combat capability shortfall in the first IBCT  when it is certified.  Specifically, certain specialized interim vehicles, such  as the mobile gun system, will not be available.  Further, the interim  armored vehicle delivery schedule has compressed the time available for  soldiers to train on the vehicles; personnel turnover resulted in more time  spent on digital training than planned; and the 96-hour deployment  capability, while a goal rather than a requirement, will not be attained by  the first IBCT.   Army planners are still developing plans on how the IBCT  will obtain needed logistics support in the theater after its planned 72-hour  supply is depleted.  Other challenges relate more to the first IBCT; its home  station, Fort Lewis; and potentially, future home stations.  These challenges  include retention of skilled soldiers and the increased costs to provide  maintenance support and facilities at Fort Lewis and ultimately to  subsequent IBCT home stations.
subsections: section_title: First IBCT Will Not Possess All Envisioned Combat Capabilities
subsections: section_title: Delivery Schedule for Interim Armored Vehicles Will Impact Planned Combat Capabilities at Certification Date
paragraphs: The first IBCT will not achieve all designed combat capabilities by the time  it reaches its certification date because it will not have all the interim  infantry vehicle variants.  One key variant it will lack is the mobile gun  system, which is expected to be more capable than the system currently  being used.  Until the first IBCT is fully equipped with its complement of  interim armored vehicles, it will be limited in its designed capabilities by  using in-lieu-of vehicles.  Specifically, until the mobile gun system vehicle  and the nuclear, biological, and chemical vehicle arrive, the IBCT cannot  fully meet its planned war-fighting capabilities.  These vehicles— particularly the mobile gun system—are critical to meet the expectations of  the war-fighting CINC in Korea, as well as the Army’s transformation plans.   Based on the current delivery schedule, at the time of its operational  certification in May 2003, the first IBCT will have about 86 percent of its  interim armored vehicles and the remaining 14 percent will be approved  substitutes.  Army regulations allow a unit to use substitute equipment and  vehicles to meet its initial operational capability date.  The first mobile gun  systems and nuclear, biological, and chemical vehicles will be delivered  beginning in 2004.
section_title: Delayed Vehicles and Digitized Systems Have Created Training Challenges
paragraphs: The Army has encountered training challenges due to the delivery schedule  for the interim armored vehicles and the need for extensive training on  digital systems.  Despite these challenges, training officials believe that the  IBCT has made great strides in achieving training goals, including the  transformation goal of developing soldiers who are skilled in a wide range  of tasks so that they can transition quickly from small-scale contingencies  to higher levels of combat and the reverse.
Because deliveries of the interim vehicles are not scheduled to begin until  April 2002, the IBCT has been dependent on substitute wheeled infantry  carriers loaned by the Canadian and German governments.  These vehicles  have been passed from unit to unit, thereby limiting training to company  level and below.  Training officials said that although they were  disappointed that they did not have sufficient vehicles to train as a  battalion or brigade, a hidden benefit was that the IBCT was able to focus  more training on individual and dismounted infantry skills instead.   According to a senior Fort Lewis official, subsequent brigades should not  experience the same training limitations as the first brigade unless, for any  unforeseen reason, the contractor’s expected delivery schedule cannot be  met.  However, the first brigade will experience a further training challenge  in that the revised delivery schedule will compress the time available to  train at the battalion and brigade level to just 3 months.  Fort Lewis training  officials would have liked to have a full 6 months to train after receiving  most of the vehicles.  However, a senior Fort Lewis official also told us that  he is confident that all the training requirements will be accomplished in  the lesser time available.
The need to train IBCT soldiers in digital systems has posed other  challenges.  Digitization provides a critical situational awareness capability  to the IBCT similar to that afforded units at Fort Hood, Texas, under the  Army’s Force XXI program.  These systems use sophisticated information  technology, that allows personnel in the IBCT to achieve superior  battlefield information enabling them to engage the enemy long before  coming into contact.  IBCT soldiers train with many digitized systems and  must maintain specific levels of proficiency.   Maintaining proficiency in  these systems has been challenging due to personnel turnover in the IBCT.   The Army does not currently have a formal digital sustainment-training  program for individual soldiers and leaders.  Fort Lewis officials cited their  concerns that without a digital sustainment-training program, soldier skills  will quickly erode.  The Army Training and Doctrine Command is currently  developing an individual digital sustainment-training program for the two  brigades, which may be applicable to the entire Army.  However, the Army  has not yet implemented initial formal training in digitized systems within  its institutional centers and schools; as a result, many individual leaders  and soldiers arrive at the IBCT unit without any prior experience with the  hardware or software.  The Army plans to begin teaching digitized systems  at its schoolhouses in 2004, but even then, the training will only be an initial  overview.
As part of the Army's multi-skilled soldier concept, the Army’s Infantry  branch has combined the occupational skill specialties of infantryman,  fighting-vehicle infantryman, and heavy anti-armor weapons infantryman  into a single consolidated specialty and will train them in a wide range of  infantry skills.  Army officials spoke favorably about this concept and said  that concerns that the Army may be requiring too many skills and  capabilities for individual soldiers to absorb have not been borne out in  their experience so far.  In their view, individual soldiers at Fort Lewis had  adapted well to the requirements of the digitized systems and multiple  combat skills needed for IBCT missions.  They are generally satisfied with  the progress being made to date and believe that the IBCT is on track to  meet its certification milestone of May 2003.  Figure 5 depicts a schematic  of this multi-skilled soldier approach.
The Army’s ability to meet its rapid deployment goal for the first IBCT will  depend on availability of aircraft to transport unit equipment, completed  infrastructure improvements at Fort Lewis specifically, and Air Force  certification of the IBCT as deployable.  In commenting on the draft report,  Army officials stated that Air Force certification of the interim armored  vehicle is currently underway with weight and load certification scheduled  for May 2002.
Initially the Army announced that the IBCTs would be capable of deploying  within 96 hours anywhere in the world, but the Army has since made it a  goal for the IBCTs rather than a requirement.  It has not established a  substitute deployability timetable for the first IBCT.  However, under  current plans, the Army retains the 96-hour deployment requirement for the  future transformed units entering the Army’s force following formation of  all six brigades in 2008.  Other requirements for this future force are to be  able to deploy a division in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days.
It appears that this 96-hour deployability goal for the first IBCT will not be  achieved.  Army transportation planners have determined that it would  take 201 C-17 and 51 C-5 aircraft to transport all of the IBCT’s equipment to  a distant theater.  (See fig. 6.)  Army officials have stated that with all the  competing demands for these aircraft, the Air Force currently does not  possess sufficient numbers of them to meet the 96-hour goal for the IBCTs.   Additional analyses would be needed to evaluate other ways to supplement  this capability, such as through the forward positioning of some materials  or the use of commercial aircraft.   Strategic airlift is an Air Force  responsibility and therefore beyond the purview of the Army.
The installation where an IBCT is located will dictate the additional  infrastructure requirements necessary to deploy the brigade.  In October  2000, the Army’s Military Traffic Management Command reported in its  Army Transformation study that the existing infrastructure at Fort Lewis  and McChord Air Force Base could not meet the Army’s requirements for  deploying the IBCT.   The study identified five projects at the air base and  Fort Lewis that needed to be constructed or upgraded at an estimated cost  of about $52 million.  Since the publication of the report, the Army has  funded four of the five projects at a cost of more than $48 million and  begun one of the projects. The remaining project requires improvements to  deployment ramps at McChord Air Force Base.  According to Army  officials, the remaining project has not been funded and will most likely not  be completed before the Army certifies the IBCT as deployable in May  2003.
Another impediment to achieving this goal is the Air Force’s certification  that the IBCT and all its equipment items can be loaded on and deployed by  aircraft.  The Air Force cannot certify the unit until the vehicles are fielded  and loaded aboard the aircraft in accordance with combat mission  requirements.  The fiscal year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act  requires the Secretary of the Army to conduct an operational evaluation of  the first IBCT and the Secretary of Defense to certify that its design is  operationally suitable and effective.  The evaluation is to include  deployment of the brigade to the site of the evaluation.  Generally, the IBCT  cannot be deployed outside the United States until this requirement is met.   A successful evaluation will be necessary if the Army is to achieve its goal  of having six IBCTs by 2008.
section_title: Other Challenges Have Arisen at Fort Lewis
subsections: section_title: Personnel Stabilization Has Been the Key Human Capital Challenge
paragraphs: Army officials recognized early on that some form of personnel  stabilization policy for the IBCTs might be needed to provide sufficient  continuity of leadership and training to the brigade.  However, the delay in  setting up the policy and certain exemptions from the policy have led to  more turbulence than officials would have liked.  They believe that the  personnel turnover may have diminished training effectiveness in some  instances and may have led to devoting more time than they could afford to  digitization training.
Officials explained that the need for stabilization stems from the unique  nature of the training being done at Fort Lewis and from the normal Army  rotational policy that generally has personnel rotating between  assignments in 2 years or less.  In short, when the trained personnel rotate  out of the IBCT, they take their training with them; but no equally trained  personnel are available to rotate in.  Consequently, the IBCT requires a  constant program of providing basic training to incoming personnel on  digital equipment, which is available only at Fort Lewis or Fort Hood.
Moreover, because this skill is perishable, periodic refresher training is also  required.   Similarly, the IBCT is training to future war-fighting concepts  and doctrine and new concepts for leadership development.  Finally, the  first IBCT expects to begin receiving some of its interim armored vehicles,  which are not available elsewhere in the Army.  These unique training  requirements argue for more continuity than can be achieved through the  normal Army rotational policies that create a constant turnover of  personnel within a 24-month period.
Recognizing this need for more continuity, Fort Lewis officials expressed to  Army headquarters their concern that permitting normal policies to remain  in place would adversely affect the IBCT’s readiness and ability to achieve  certification on time.  In response, the Department of the Army established  a formal stabilization policy for the IBCTs in May 2001.  Except for certain  exemptions under this policy, soldiers must remain in an IBCT for 1 year  following certification of the brigade’s operational capability.
By stabilizing its soldiers, the unit had hoped to reduce the amount of time  it has to spend on training soldiers new to the IBCT on digital and other  specialized equipment.  Unfortunately, the stabilization policy has not been  as effective as officials had hoped.  First, the stabilization policy was not in  place until May 2001, and by then, many IBCT soldiers had already begun  leaving the unit under normal Army rotational procedures.  As a result,  IBCT trainers spent much of the year repeating their training to new  soldiers.
A second problem in the stabilization policy’s effectiveness stemmed from  the exemptions that are allowed under the policy.  For example, soldiers  are allowed to rotate out of an IBCT to attend a required school, when  promoted, or they can elect to leave an IBCT when they come up for  reenlistment.  Fort Lewis officials have been encouraged by the fact that  IBCT soldiers re-enlisted in fiscal year 2001 at higher rates than those  achieved by either of the brigade’s higher headquarters—I Corps at Fort  Lewis and Forces Command (FORSCOM).  As shown by figure 7, all three  organizations achieved over 100 percent of the retention goals set by the  Army.
Officials noted, however, that IBCT soldiers who have elected to remain in  the Army have not necessarily elected to remain in the IBCT.  As shown by  figure 8, whereas 34 percent on average of I Corps soldiers elected to  remain in their units, only 27 percent of IBCT soldiers elected to stay with  the IBCT.  Moreover, despite the acknowledged need for continuity in the  IBCTs, officials have not been capturing data on the reasons why IBCT  soldiers are re-enlisting to leave the brigade early and therefore lack  information that could help them reduce personnel turbulence.  Further,  data are not available to determine which re-enlistment options IBCT  soldiers are choosing other than remaining in the unit.
Fort Lewis officials said that the problems with stabilization may not be as  severe with subsequent brigades since the stabilization policy will be in  effect from the beginning, unlike the first brigade when the policy was not  instituted until months after its formation began.  As a result, Army officials  anticipate that these latter brigades will experience fewer departures.   Personnel turbulence related to reenlistments would become more  significant if the brigades experience slippage in their certification dates  and lose more soldiers to re-enlistment transfers.
section_title: Installation Support Needed for IBCTs Has Been Greater than Anticipated
paragraphs: The Army specifically designed the IBCT to have fewer support personnel,  fewer supplies, and lighter vehicles so that the brigade could be quickly  deployed.  As a result, the IBCT cannot provide all its own support and  requires installation support when located at its home station and other  outside support after 72 hours once deployed.  In addition, the home  station must provide additional and costly facilities for that support.
The IBCT is designed with an austere support battalion that contains fewer  mechanics to support and maintain its vehicles.  IBCT battalion  commanders pointed out, however, that the number of vehicles to support  has remained the same, even though the number of mechanics has been  reduced by two-thirds.  Therefore, the IBCT is capable of conducting only  about one-third of its vehicle maintenance requirements.  As a result, the  IBCT must depend on its home installation for scheduled maintenance  support.  Fort Lewis addressed this capability limitation by hiring  contractors and temporary employees to meet the IBCT support  requirements.  Fort Lewis officials estimate the IBCT’s recurring  maintenance requirements at about $11.1 million a year.
After being deployed for 72 hours, the IBCT must be supported by other  organizations due to its streamlined support battalion and, under  transformation concepts, must “reach” for this support.  Under the reach  concept, the IBCT is expected to request fuel, ammunition, food, spare  parts, water, and other supplies through an integrated distribution system  by a linked communications network that includes the IBCT home station,  contractor support, and multinational or foreign national commercial  systems.  Army logistics planners have not yet determined how all this will  work.  Further, in the interim, the support battalion logistical systems are  not yet integrated and lack a dedicated secure network interface to the  Army’s computerized Battle Command System.  As a result, IBCT soldiers  are being temporarily used as couriers to relay logistics data between  headquarters.  The Army’s immediate solution to this challenge may be to  increase the IBCT support battalion personnel.  For the long term, the  Army is developing a system software fix.
Providing support to IBCTs will require Army installations to provide new  and costly facilities to meet IBCT requirements. The extent and cost of  needed improvements at the other installations will vary widely depending  upon the location.  Army planners noted that it takes at least 3 to 5 years to  plan and construct maintenance and other needed infrastructure facilities  and that therefore it will be important to develop these plans as soon as  possible.  Moreover, Army officials have determined that at a minimum,  future IBCT home stations will require a mission-support training facility, a  fixed tactical Internet, ammunition igloos, and digital classrooms.   Examples of long-term requirements include live-fire ranges, maneuver- training areas, mock villages for urban training, and deployment facilities.   Figure 9 shows the facility constructed at Fort Lewis to train soldiers in  urban warfare techniques.
At Fort Lewis and Yakima Training Center, existing support facilities—such  as barracks, motor pools, ammunition storage facilities, and training  ranges—need to be upgraded or constructed.  To meet IBCT training needs,  Fort Lewis converted an existing building to a mission-support training  facility, which accelerated the normal new construction timeline.  However,  all support requirements have not yet been funded.  For example, Fort  Lewis has requested about $10 million for IBCT communication  infrastructure requirements that include a secure fiber optic upgrade to  link to McChord Air Force Base.  Installations also need the ability to  integrate digitized systems between home stations and training centers.
subsections: section_title: Brigade Coordination Cell Has Proven to Be Valuable Coordinating Mechanism
paragraphs: After the Army announced its planned transformation, the Army Chief of  Staff designated the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command as the lead agent  for transformation.  The Command in turn established the Brigade  Coordination Cell (BCC) at Fort Lewis.   Its mission is to ensure successful  formation of the first two IBCTs at Fort Lewis, synchronize efforts between  FORSCOM and the Training and Doctrine Command, and provide insight  on Army Battle Command System architecture.  The BCC is empowered to  directly coordinate with other Army major commands and agencies.  It  provides a centralized link between the IBCT and a variety of Army  organizations responsible for doctrine, training, organization, material, and  leadership development.  Fort Lewis officials emphasized to us that  resolving some of the challenges they are facing points to the need for  subsequent installations to establish some sort of mechanism, such as a  Brigade Coordination Cell, to deal with the many issues that will inevitably  arise.
The BCC is designed as a matrix organization and conduit for feedback  between various Army organizations pertaining to training, equipment, and  logistics.  IBCT soldiers as well as analysts from the BCC, the Army Test  and Evaluation Command, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned  evaluate and validate training doctrine provided by the Infantry and Armor  schools.  After training exercises, IBCT commanders and soldiers as well as  the appropriate Army agencies provide informal and formal lessons- learned data to the cell.  The BCC communicates these data to the doctrine  writers for their use as they develop the training support packages for  squad-to brigade-level collective tasks and formulate conceptual guidance  for use by the IBCT commanders.  Cell personnel are a part of the working  groups created to solve issues in training, deployment, and logistics.  A  representative from the Army Materiel Command coordinates the vehicle  fielding and its associated new equipment training between the IBCT and  the civilian contractors.
The BCC supplements an existing staff hierarchy.  It provides staff  enforcement and support for the I Corps staff while existing external to the  Fort Lewis chain of command.  The BCC is not a higher headquarters staff  for the IBCT.  The cell’s focus is the same as its mission—to successfully  deliver the first two IBCTs to the Army.
Senior Fort Lewis officials have stated that the BCC has proven to be a  valuable means of coordinating activities related to brigade formation and  has offered several important benefits.  For example, they noted that some  of the difficulties that have arisen have been time-consuming to resolve.   The existence of the BCC has relieved such burdens from brigade  operations personnel so that they could concentrate more on their  substantive work, such as training.  The BCC also acted as a  communication intermediary between the IBCT and the institutional  schoolhouses to develop training doctrine for the brigade’s new mission  requirements.  In addition, the BCC relieved Fort Lewis from some of the  public affairs requirements.  The acknowledged benefits of the BCC have  led Fort Lewis officials to conclude that a similar organization may be  needed at subsequent locations.
section_title: Lessons Learned on Brigade Formation Are Not Readily Available
paragraphs: In accordance with Army regulations, the Army routinely documents the  lessons it learns from battles, projects, and reorganizations using  memorandums, after-action reports, messages, briefings, and other  historical documents.  Various organizations traditionally chronicle Army  strengths and weaknesses with respect to organization, peacekeeping  missions, and wartime operations.  During our review, we determined that  while fielding the initial IBCT at Fort Lewis, the Army learned valuable  lessons that would be critical to future IBCT formation.  These lessons  were captured and communicated in a variety of ways.  However, they were  not always forwarded to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, as required,  for retention.  Further, there is no central location or database where all  relevant IBCT lessons learned are available for research.   Without having  the lessons learned available, the Army may repeat mistakes in fielding  subsequent brigades and may lose opportunities that could help it field  subsequent brigades more efficiently.
subsections: section_title: Lessons Learned Not Always Forwarded as Required
paragraphs: Army Regulation 11-33 designates the Center for Army Lessons Learned as  the focal point for its lessons-learned system.  The regulation stresses that  all Army entities are to forward appropriate analytical data, including after- action reports, to the Center.  After-action reviews are structured  discussions among commanders and soldiers after military exercises to  determine what went right or wrong and what can be improved.  However,  it appears that the Army is not taking full advantage of this repository to  capture all relevant IBCT lessons learned.  For example, we found that  organizations that have played important roles in the initial brigades’  formation are all independently chronicling IBCT fielding information.   Furthermore, there is an indication that all lessons learned are not being  forwarded to the Center.  For example, in May 2001, the Army Test and  Evaluation Command published two independent reports that assessed  IBCT training events at the squad and platoon levels at Fort Lewis.  These  reports contained analyses and lessons-learned data about training  exercises, equipment, and tasks.  The Test and Evaluation Command  reports stated that the after-action reviews identified significant issues in  conducting adequate equipment training.   However, the reports are  available from the Test and Evaluation Command, not the Center for Army  Lessons Learned.
The Center for Army Lessons Learned published one newsletter dated July  2001 that identified some lessons learned and issues concerning the IBCT.   This information was compiled from subject matter experts’ observations  during training events such as the Senior Leader and Tactical Leaders  Course, digital equipment training, and news articles printed in  professional publications.  Center officials stated that as a result of the  terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, homeland security  has become the Center’s primary focus, not the IBCTs.  Although the Center  intends to publish a second newsletter addressing the support concepts  and requirements for the IBCT, it does not anticipate publishing it until  later in 2002.  An official at the Center for Army Lessons Learned said that  information comes in sporadically from disparate sources.  Although  fielding of the IBCTs is no longer a Center priority, it intends to continue  collecting lessons learned and historical information regarding the fielding  of the IBCTs and to publish subsequent newsletters as appropriate.
section_title: Fort Lewis Held Conference to Share Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Officials at Fort Lewis, at the behest of FORSCOM, hosted an Information  Exchange Conference, from November 27 to November 29, 2001, to provide  a forum to communicate IBCT lessons learned to officials who will be  overseeing formation of subsequent IBCTs as well as to officials from  organizations such as Army headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Army  Pacific, and the National Guard Bureau.  At this conference, Fort Lewis  officials noted the challenges that they had faced in several areas.  The  problem areas included personnel turnover and stabilization, digitization  training, classroom shortages, issues related to maintenance and support,  budget shortfalls related to vehicle maintenance, difficulties related to  equipment turn-in, and deficiencies in installation infrastructure.  Other  lessons learned concerned information technology requirements and the  need to establish working relationships throughout the Army.  Fort Lewis  officials told us that they hoped that the conference attendees would use  these lessons learned as they plan and budget for the subsequent brigades  at their locations starting in fiscal years 2004 and beyond.
However, it did not appear that these valuable lessons learned would  necessarily be readily available for future use.  We were told, for example,  that FORSCOM would maintain copies of the various slide presentations  given at the conference on its Web site for about 12 days.  Moreover, there  was no plan to submit this information to the Center for Army Lessons  Learned for later availability to interested officials of subsequent brigades.   While Army officials emphasized that lessons learned are being discussed  at all levels throughout the Army, one official commented that he was  waiting for the Center for Army Lessons Learned to contact him regarding  the lessons identified by his department rather than being proactive about  forwarding the information to the Center.  Senior officials at Fort Lewis did  not know of any other central repository for such information.  In our  opinion, with the frequent turnover of personnel in the brigades and in  some installation functions, it would be valuable to have all IBCT lessons  learned available in a central repository.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Successful formation of the first IBCT is critical to the Army's  transformation plan because it will begin to fill a near-term gap in military  capability and test new concepts that would be integrated into the future  Objective Force.  Although Army officials are pleased with the progress  made thus far, concerns remain about whether all capabilities envisioned  for the brigade will be achieved in time for the IBCT’s May 2003  certification milestone.  Concerns include, notably, the unavailability of the  mobile gun system, which provides a key combat capability, and the  likelihood that the IBCT will be unable to meet the 96-hour deployment  goal due to insufficient quantities of aircraft.  Because the IBCT could be  deployed to their theaters, it is important that CINC war planners know as  soon as possible what planned capabilities are likely to be missing when  the brigade is certified as having achieved its initial operating capability.    Similarly, logistics planners will need logistics data soon to enable them to  plan how best to meet the support requirements of the IBCT if it is  deployed to their theater.
Certain challenges have also arisen in forming the first IBCT at Fort Lewis.   These challenges include concerns about retaining skilled personnel in the  brigade, the ability of IBCT soldiers to sustain their skills on digital  systems, and the need for and cost of facility improvements to support the  formation of this brigade and, potentially, subsequent brigades.  Taking  actions now to address these and other challenges faced by the Fort Lewis  facility could enhance the chances that subsequent IBCT formations will be  accomplished smoothly.
The BCC set up at Fort Lewis appears to have been an effective means of  funneling the day-to-day challenges that have arisen in forming the IBCT to  the appropriate Army entity for resolution and thus allowing brigade  officials to focus on critical training and operational matters.  Each  installation will likely experience similar issues and benefit from a similar  organization.  The experiences of those forming the first IBCT and of Fort  Lewis in hosting the IBCT provide examples of pitfalls and best practices  that, if systematically recorded and made available in a central repository  to others throughout the Army, could help the Army form subsequent  brigades more efficiently.  The Army’s Center for Lessons Learned is the  designated focal point for lessons learned; however, the Center is neither  collecting nor receiving all the lessons learned from forming the first IBCT.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that regional CINCs have the information they need to plan for  mitigating any risks associated with shortfalls in IBCT combat capability as  well as logistical requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to   estimate the combat capabilities that will exist at the time the IBCTs are  certified as deployable and set milestones for providing this information  to CINC planners and  provide CINC planners with relevant logistics information as soon as  possible so that they can adequately plan how best to support the IBCTs.
Because some mobility issues are beyond the Army’s purview and a long  lead time could be necessary to rectify any identified shortfalls, we are  further recommending that the Secretary of Defense obtain the Army’s  specific IBCT mobility requirements to meet its goal for deploying a  brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours and determine how best to  address any shortfalls.
To assist subsequent installations where IBCTs will be formed in their  planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary  of the Army to  expedite development of a program to sustain personnel skills on  digitized equipment so that it will be available for subsequent IBCTs,   collect and analyze data on why soldiers leave the IBCTs and take  appropriate action to reduce personnel turnover,  estimate the extent and cost of facility improvements that will be  needed at installations scheduled to accommodate the subsequent  IBCTs to assist them in their planning,  establish a BCC-type organization at subsequent IBCT locations to deal  with day-to-day challenges, and  provide a central collection point for IBCT lessons learned so as to  make the information available to personnel throughout the Army.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense  generally agreed with the report’s findings and recommendations and  outlined ongoing management actions to address the concerns noted in the  report.  In addition, we obtained technical comments from the Department  on a draft of this report and incorporated them where appropriate.
In responding to our recommendations that the Army estimate the combat  capabilities and logistics requirements of the IBCT and provide the data to  CINC planners, the Department acknowledged that since the first IBCT has  not been fully fielded, there might be some planning information shortfalls  that may inhibit CINC war planning.  However, the Department noted that  the Army, through the CINC Requirements Task Force, has provided a  successful forum to address CINC concerns and derive solutions.  We  acknowledge that the CINC Requirements Task Force meetings provide a  valuable communication tool.  Nevertheless, during our fieldwork, CINC  operational and logistics planners, who have been represented at these  meetings, expressed concerns about not yet receiving specifics regarding  the combat capabilities of the IBCT and its logistics requirements.  As  noted in our report, the planners emphasized that it was important to have  these data to adequately integrate the IBCTs into their plans.  Moreover, if  certain planned capabilities would not be in place when the first IBCTs  become deployable, the planners would need to know this.  Accordingly,  we do not believe that the CINCs’ participation in the Requirements Task  Force can substitute for being directly provided data on planned combat  capabilities and logistics requirements, as we recommended.  Providing  information as soon as possible to the CINCs would enable operational  planners to begin their risk mitigation process in developing their  contingency and operational plans.
Regarding Army mobility requirements for the IBCTs, the Department  stated that the Army would continue to define the mobility requirements to  meet the goals for IBCT deployment.  We recognize that prioritization and  allocation of lift assets is an operational challenge to be faced by the CINCs  and acknowledge that timely allocation of strategic and tactical mobility is  needed for the IBCTs to meet planned operational capabilities.  However,  because the Army does not control mobility allocations, we believe that our  recommendation is appropriately directed to the Secretary of Defense, who  is in a better position to assess how best to mitigate any projected  shortfalls.
With respect to our recommendation that the Army expedite development  of a program to sustain personnel skills on digitized equipment that will be  available for subsequent IBCTs, the Department said that its ability to  accelerate digitized training at the proponent schools was limited due to  the equipment delivery schedules.   Our recommendation, however, was  directed at accelerating development of a sustainment training program for  future use at the IBCT locations rather than the proponent schools, as  noted in our report.  During our review, Army officials expressed concerns  that the individual soldiers’ digitization skills would quickly erode without  a continuing focused regimen of training.  Therefore, we continue to  believe that the Army needs to expedite developing such a program and  implement it as a part of each IBCT’s training program.
In responding to our recommendation regarding IBCT reassignments, the  Department said that the Army is carefully managing IBCT personnel  reassignments pointing to the IBCT personnel stabilization policy that the  Army instituted.  Although this policy is intended to limit personnel  turnover in the IBCT, the fact remains that IBCT soldiers are re-enlisting to  leave the IBCT at a higher rate than other units in I Corps.  We believe that  collecting information on the reasons why IBCT soldiers are leaving at this  higher rate would help Army officials identify actions that they might take  to encourage re-enlistments in the IBCT.  We also believe that this  recommendation is especially important in that continuity is critical to  achieving training objectives.
In responding to our recommendation concerning facility requirements at  subsequent IBCT locations, the Department stated that the Army routinely  conducts estimates as part of the annual budgetary process.  The  Department said that the Army now has a draft transformation template for  Army installations that will provide facility requirements to support IBCT  stationing, training, and sustainment.  The draft template is designed to  provide installation planners a starting point to determine their installation  peculiar requirements to support an IBCT.
With regard to establishing a BCC-like organization at future IBCT sites, the  Department stated that the Army has identified certain functions,  processes, and support capabilities required to transform a unit into an  IBCT.  The Department noted that each IBCT location will have different  levels of internal staff capability to execute transformation and that the  Army will tailor, on a case-by-case basis, the resources required to fill the  shortfalls at each location.  We did not intend to dictate the size nor  organizational structure for the BCC-like organization we recommended.   We agree that as the Army learns about fielding IBCTs, requirements will  differ from location to location and the Army should tailor whatever  organization it sets up to fit the situational needs.
In response to our recommendation regarding establishing a central  collection point for IBCT lessons learned, the Department acknowledged  that some lessons learned have not been disseminated throughout the  Army nor sent to the Army’s Center for Lessons Learned.  It said that the  Army is planning to establish a central repository and procedures to inform  the Army about past and future lessons learned from the Army’s  transformation as we recommended.
Appendix II contains the full text of the Department’s comments.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify and gain an understanding of the anticipated capabilities of the  IBCT, we discussed planned IBCT capabilities with Army officials at Fort  Lewis, Washington; I Corps; the Brigade Coordination Cell; 3rd Brigade/2nd  Infantry Division; and officials at the Armor and Infantry Schools and the  Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  We also obtained  and reviewed various briefing documents, the IBCT Organizational and  Operational Concept, the Center for Lesson Learned newsletter, test and  evaluation reports, and the IBCT’s modified table of organization and  equipment.
To determine whether the CINCs believe the IBCTs’ planned combat  capabilities will meet their requirements, we received briefings and  discussed IBCT capabilities with commanders and staff at the U.S. Pacific  Command and U.S. Army, Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii; U.S. Forces Korea and  8th U.S. Army, Seoul, Korea; U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany;  and U.S. Army Europe, Heidelberg, Germany; and U.S. Central Command,  MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.  We reviewed documents that the Army  developed concerning its respective areas of responsibility and planning.
To identify challenges in forming the IBCTs, we concentrated our efforts on  the first brigade being formed at Fort Lewis since the second brigade is in  its early stages of formation.  We attended weekly transformation update  meetings at Fort Lewis from April 2001 through January 2002 to gain a  sense of the challenges being faced. We interviewed the Commanding  General and Deputy Commanding General for I Corps and Fort Lewis, the  Deputy Commanding General for Training and Readiness, the Deputy  Commanding General for Transformation (TRADOC) at Fort Lewis, their  staffs, representatives from the Brigade Coordination Cell, the IBCT  Commander and his battalion commanders, and the Army Materiel  Command’s Director of Transformation Support on the extent of issues and  challenges that had arisen in forming the first IBCT.  In addition, to gain the  perspective of the Army’s schools for training the IBCTs, we interviewed  Army representatives from the U.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning,  Georgia; the U.S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky; and the  Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  We obtained and  reviewed IBCT training doctrine and manuals and discussed the IBCTs with  senior Army officials and their staff to understand IBCT training issues.   Based on the results from the Army’s weekly IBCT meetings and our  interviews and analysis of documentation, we were able to discuss issues  regarding potential challenges in the core areas of manning, equipping,  training, supporting, and deploying the initial IBCT.
To determine if the Army had an effective means for capturing lessons  learned that may be applied to subsequent brigade formations, we  interviewed I Corps and Fort Lewis representatives and the BCC historian;  received briefings and interviewed representatives from the Center for  Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and attended the  Information Exchange Conference held at Fort Lewis.  We obtained reports  published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned and the Army’s Test and  Evaluation Command with regards to fielding the IBCTs at Fort Lewis. In  addition, we acquired the current history files from the I Corps and Fort  Lewis historian as well as the regulations for recording the Army’s history  and lessons learned.  As a result, we identified the Army’s process to  capture lessons learned that may be applied to subsequent IBCT  formations.
Our review was performed from April 2001 to March 2002 in accordance  with generally accepted government audit standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and the  Director, Office of Management and Budget.  We will also make copies  available to appropriate congressional committees and to other interested  parties on request.  In addition, the report will be available at no cost on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.  If you or your staff have any  questions about this report, please call me at (202) 512-5140.
Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Jr.; Beverly G.  Burke; Timothy A. Burke; Kevin Handley, M. Jane Hunt; Tim R. Schindler;  Pat L. Seaton; and Leo B. Sullivan.
section_title: Sections from Public Laws 107-107 and 106-398 Concerning Limitations on Army Transformation Actions
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
subsections: section_title: GAO’s Mission
paragraphs: The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, exists to  support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve  the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American  people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and  policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help  Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s  commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,  integrity, and reliability.
section_title: Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
paragraphs: The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is  through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and full- text files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older  products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents  using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety,  including charts and other graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and  correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site  daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have GAO e-mail this  list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to daily E-mail alert for newly released products” under the GAO Reports heading.
subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Public Affairs