Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be Systematically Reassessed
Published: 2007-02-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Over 600 million people travel by air each year in the United States, and the screening of airline passengers and their carry-on and checked baggage is vital to securing our transportation security system. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001, established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and significantly changed how passenger and checked baggage screening is conducted in the United States. This act removed screening responsibility from air carriers and the contractors who conducted screening for them, and placed this responsibility with TSA. As a result, TSA hired and deployed about 55,000 federal passenger and baggage Transportation Security Officers (TSO)--formerly known as screeners--to more than 400 airports nationwide based largely on the number of screeners that the air carrier contractors had employed. Since August 2002, however, TSA has been statutorily prohibited from exceeding 45,000 full-time equivalent positions available for screening. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted in December 2004, required TSA to develop and submit to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, standards for determining the aviation security staffing for all airports at which TSA provides or oversees screening services by March 2005. These standards are to provide the necessary levels of aviation security and ensure that the average aviation security related delay experienced by passengers is minimized. TSA submitted these standards, which form the basis of TSA's Staffing Allocation Model on June 22, 2005. The purpose of this optimization model, as identified by TSA, is to estimate the most efficient balance of TSOs needed to ensure security and minimize wait times. Models, in general, are expected to approximate the real world. These approximations must be validated to assure model users that their predictions are credible within the bounds of specific situations, environments, and circumstances. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act also mandated that we conduct an analysis of TSA's staffing standards. In particular, the congressional committees to which TSA submitted the staffing standards were interested in how TSA is using the Staffing Allocation Model to identify the number of TSOs needed across the more than 400 commercial airports and how the model ensures that TSA has the right number of TSOs at the right checkpoints at the right times. This report addresses the following questions: (1) How does TSA ensure that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a sufficient number of TSOs to perform passenger and checked baggage screening at each airport and what challenges has it faced while implementing the model? (2) How does TSA deploy its TSO allocation and what factors affect the model's effectiveness in helping TSA accomplish this deployment?
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: TSA aims to ensure that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a sufficient number of TSOs to perform passenger and checked baggage screening by: (1) building assumptions into its allocation model that are designed to calculate the necessary levels of TSOs to ensure security and minimize wait times, and (2) employing multiple monitoring mechanisms for the sufficiency of the model's outputs. However, TSA faces some challenges to effective implementation of the model, primarily in ensuring that the model's key assumptions reflect operating conditions across airports. The model determines the annual TSO allocation for each airport by first considering the workload demands unique to each airport based on an estimate of each airport's peak passenger volume. This input is then processed against certain TSA assumptions about screening passengers and checked baggage--including expected processing rates, required staffing for passenger lanes and baggage equipment based on standard operating procedures, and historical equipment alarm rates. To monitor the sufficiency of the model's allocation outputs, TSA has both field and headquarters-driven mechanisms in place. However, TSA does not have a mechanism, such as a documented plan, for selecting and prioritizing which assumptions to review each year and for assuring that all assumptions are periodically reviewed to help ensure that they are current with and reflect actual operating conditions. Without a plan for periodically validating all of the assumptions, TSA is at risk of assumptions becoming outdated, which could result in TSO allocations that do not reflect operating conditions. TSA has vested its FSDs with responsibility for deploying and managing to their TSO allocation in light of local circumstances, including those that might affect scheduling and pose challenges to most efficiently deploying their resource allocations. After receiving the annual staffing allocation from TSA headquarters, FSDs must prepare work schedules, which may include use of the Staffing Allocation Model's optional scheduling tool, to deploy TSO staff to meet screening demand. However, Federal Security Directors (FSD) we interviewed identified several challenges they faced in deploying their TSO workforce. These challenges involve factors outside the model's determination of overall TSO staffing levels and affect FSDs' ability to effectively deploy their TSO staff regardless of their allocation. Specifically, FSDs cited difficulties in achieving a 20 percent part-time TSO workforce, which the model has identified as the optimal ratio for scheduling efficiency; recruiting and retaining sufficient TSOs (both full-time and part-time) to reach their full allocations as determined by the model; staffing checkpoints appropriately given that some TSOs are unavailable due to absenteeism and injuries; and managing competing demands on TSOs' time, particularly with regard to operational support functions sometimes performed by TSOs and TSO training requirements. FSDs also had to manage around physical infrastructure limitations at some airports, such as lack of room for additional lanes or baggage check areas despite demand levels that would justify such added capacity. TSA headquarters officials and FSDs we interviewed reported having several efforts underway to help address challenges they face in deploying the TSO workforce. TSA officials at individual airports we visited are also working to address these challenges. TSA human capital officials told us that they plan to evaluate the effects of their workforce initiatives and use the results of the evaluations to make any needed changes to their approach.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Over 600 million people travel by air each year in the United States, and  the screening of airline passengers and their carry-on and checked  baggage is vital to securing our transportation security system. The  Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001,  established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and  significantly changed how passenger and checked baggage screening is  conducted in the United States. This act removed screening responsibility  from air carriers and the contractors who conducted screening for them,  and placed this responsibility with TSA. As a result, TSA hired and  deployed about 55,000 federal passenger and baggage Transportation  Security Officers (TSO)—formerly known as screeners—to more than 400  airports nationwide based largely on the number of screeners that the air  carrier contractors had employed. Since August 2002, however, TSA has  been statutorily prohibited from exceeding 45,000 full-time equivalent  positions available for screening.
TSA’s mission is to protect the nation’s transportation systems while also  ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. To help accomplish  its security mission, TSA has established standard operating procedures to  ensure that every airline passenger and checked bag undergoes some level  of scrutiny to help ensure that objects and devices that may threaten  public safety are not taken onboard aircraft. Although, according to TSA  officials, these security duties are the primary objective of its screening  efforts, it also attempts to minimize the effect on the movement of people  and commerce by seeking to keep wait times at airport checkpoints  reasonable.
TSA has identified its most important asset in accomplishing its mission as  the TSO workforce. TSA deploys TSOs to screen passengers and checked  baggage at the nation’s more than 400 commercial airports. TSOs, for  example, monitor passengers as they walk through metal detectors,  examine carry-on items on X-ray machines, and conduct more thorough  inspections of passengers selected for additional scrutiny at screening  checkpoints. The rapid changes in procedures stemming from the alleged  August 2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard multiple  commercial aircraft departing from the United Kingdom and bound for the  United States highlights the challenge TSA faces in balancing security with  customer service and the vital role TSOs play in ensuring the security of  our commercial aviation system.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted in  December 2004, required TSA to develop and submit to the Senate  Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House of  Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,  standards for determining the aviation security staffing for all airports at  which TSA provides or oversees screening services by March 2005. These  standards are to provide the necessary levels of aviation security and  ensure that the average aviation security related delay experienced by  passengers is minimized. TSA submitted these standards, which form the  basis of TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model on June 22, 2005. The purpose of  this optimization model, as identified by TSA, is to estimate the most  efficient balance of TSOs needed to ensure security and minimize wait  times. Models, in general, are expected to approximate the real world.  These approximations must be validated to assure model users that their  predictions are credible within the bounds of specific situations,  environments, and circumstances.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act also mandated that  we conduct an analysis of TSA’s staffing standards. In particular, the  congressional committees to which TSA submitted the staffing standards  were interested in how TSA is using the Staffing Allocation Model to  identify the number of TSOs needed across the more than 400 commercial  airports and how the model ensures that TSA has the right number of  TSOs at the right checkpoints at the right times.
This report addresses the following questions: (1) How does TSA ensure  that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a sufficient number of TSOs to  perform passenger and checked baggage screening at each airport and  what challenges has it faced while implementing the model? (2) How does  TSA deploy its TSO allocation and what factors affect the model’s  effectiveness in helping TSA accomplish this deployment?
To address our objectives, we reviewed TSA’s report to the specified  congressional committees on its staffing standards and technical materials  detailing the staffing allocation model’s assumptions, and analyzed  relevant legislation. We analyzed screening performance and TSO  workforce data, such as passenger wait times, TSO absenteeism rates,  TSO attrition rates, TSO overtime usage, TSO injury rates, number of TSOs  devoted to administrative duties, and the level of usage of part-time TSOs.  We assessed the reliability of these data for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 and  concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  review. We also interviewed officials from various TSA headquarters  offices to ascertain the methodology used in developing the Staffing  Allocation Model. We reviewed TSA’s previous staffing model, examined  methods used by TSA for allocating TSOs to the nation’s airports, and  reviewed TSA’s approach to monitoring the performance of the Staffing  Allocation Model and obtaining feedback from Federal Security  Directors—the top ranking TSA authority responsible for security at each  of the nation’s commercial airports—on their staffing allocations. We  visited 14 airports selected by nonprobability sampling during our review.   We visited 6 of the 14 airports during the design phase of our review based  on several factors including geographic location and airport category.   After completing the design phase of our study, we visited eight additional  airports including two airports from each of categories X, I, II, and III. We  selected the two airports in each category because they had a similar  number of annual passenger boardings, yet had different TSO allocations  as determined by the Staffing Allocation Model. We visited each pair of  airports in order to determine why the model treated seemingly similar  airports differently. At all 14 airports we visited, we met with Federal  Security Directors (FSD) and their staffs to discuss their views on how  well the airport’s TSO staffing allocation takes into account the unique  characteristics of the airport and the TSO workforce and to observe  passenger and checked baggage screening operations. We also met with  representatives from the airport governing authority and at least one of the  larger airline operators, based on passenger enplanements, to obtain their  perspectives on TSA’s implementation of the Staffing Allocation Model  and other relevant workforce issues. Because we selected a  nonprobability sample of airports to visit, the information we obtained  from interviews in our visits to different airports cannot be generalized to  all Federal Security Directors, airport managers, and air carriers. We also  met with representatives from aviation industry associations to obtain  their perspectives on relevant TSA workforce issues.
We conducted our work from January 2006 through January 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. More  details about the scope and methodology of our work are presented in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Our Nation’s Commercial Airports
paragraphs: There are more than 400 airports in the United States at which TSA  provides or oversees passenger and checked baggage screening. These  airports, often referred to as the nation’s “commercial” airports, each  contain one or more passenger screening checkpoints, and each  checkpoint is composed of one or more screening lanes. In addition,  airports have one or more baggage screening areas, either in airport  lobbies or baggage makeup areas where baggage is sorted for loading onto  aircraft. As of October 31, 2006, the nation’s commercial airports  contained a total of 761 checkpoints and 2,002 screening lanes at which  passengers are screened. These airports can vary dramatically, not just in  terms of passenger and flight volume, but in other characteristics,  including physical size and layout. Figure 1 identifies the number of  commercial airports by airport security category, as of April 2006.
Federal Security Directors (FSD) are the ranking TSA authorities  responsible for leading and coordinating TSA security activities at the  nation’s commercial airports. TSA had 122 FSD positions at commercial  airports nationwide, as of October 2006. Although an FSD is responsible  for security at every commercial airport, not every airport has an FSD  dedicated solely to that airport. Most category X airports have an FSD  responsible for that airport alone. Other smaller airports are arranged in a  “hub and spoke” configuration, in which an FSD is located at or near a hub  airport but also has responsibility over one or more spoke airports of the  same or smaller size.
section_title: Performance of Screening Functions at Commercial Airports
paragraphs: Passenger screening is a process by which authorized personnel inspect  individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of any  unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item  aboard an aircraft or into a sterile area. Passenger screening personnel  must inspect individuals for prohibited items at designated screening  locations. There are four screening functions at passenger screening  checkpoints. As shown in figure 2, the four passenger screening functions  are:    X-ray screening of property,    walk-through metal detector screening of individuals,    hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and    physical search of property and trace detection for explosives.
Typically, passengers are only subjected to X-ray screening of their carry- on items and screening by the walk through metal detector. Passengers  who set off the alarm on the X-ray machine or the walk through metal  detector or who are designated as selectees—that is, passengers selected  by a computer-assisted passenger prescreening system or another TSA- approved process to receive additional screening—are screened by hand- wand or pat-down and have their carry-on items screened for explosives  traces, or they are physically searched.
Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security  screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and prevent  the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or weapon  onboard an aircraft. As shown in figure 3, checked baggage screening is  accomplished through the use of explosive detection systems or  explosive trace detection systems, and through the use of alternative  means, such as manual searches, canine teams, and positive passenger bag  match, when the explosive detection or explosive trace detection systems  are unavailable.
section_title: History of TSO Staffing Levels and Staffing Models
paragraphs: The Aviation and Transportation Security Act mandated that TSA assume  responsibility for passenger and checked baggage screening at the nation’s  airports using federal employees within 1 year of enactment. By  November 2002, TSA had fully deployed a federal passenger and checked  baggage TSO workforce of about 55,000 full-time equivalents to the  nation’s commercial airports. This level of TSOs needed to conduct  passenger and checked baggage screening was identified by a consultant,  relying largely on the number of private sector screeners that had been in  place prior to TSA. Subsequently, TSA decided to develop a staffing model  to more effectively determine the appropriate number of TSOs needed at  the nation’s airports. TSA developed a demand driven model—a model  based on flight schedules, connecting flight data, passenger loads,  passenger arrival distribution curves, and number of passenger bags  along with throughput rates for processing the passengers and bags—in an  effort to make screening operations more efficient. This model identified  a TSO staffing level of 49,600 full-time equivalents based, in part, on the  need for 5.5 TSOs per passenger screening lane. The DHS Appropriations  Act, 2004, enacted in October 2003, however, imposed a 45,000 full-time- equivalent cap specific to the number of TSOs.
In May 2003, TSA set out to develop a tool to better define aviation  security staffing requirements at airports nationwide by accounting for  changes in screening technology, operating conditions, and airline  operations. The result of this effort is the Staffing Allocation Model—an  optimization model that seeks, within certain TSA constraints, to  estimate the most efficient balance of TSOs needed to ensure security and  minimize wait times.
As shown in figure 4, TSA uses the staffing allocation model to generate  (1) an annual full-time-equivalent total for each airport, known as an  “annual allocation run,” and (2) TSO work schedules throughout the  course of the year, known as a “production, or scheduling, run.” To  determine the annual full-time-equivalent total for each airport, FSDs must  first provide input to the model on their airports’ passenger and checked  baggage screening configuration. FSDs also provide input to the model on  their airports’ busiest month for screening demand based on originating  passenger load factors. This “peak month” determination forms the basis  of one of the model’s key operating parameters used to compute each  airport’s full-time-equivalent staffing allocation. Specifically, for  determination of an airport’s annual full-time equivalent level, the model  assumes a screening demand based on the average demand day during the  airport’s peak month. This assumption is linked to TSA’s 10-minute wait  time goal for processing passengers and baggage through security.  According to TSA officials, the use of the average peak demand day is  intended to ensure that, on an annual basis, 85 percent or more of the total  passengers screened in U.S. airports will not have to wait more than 10  minutes to be screened. Once the peak month is selected for each airport,  TSA performs the annual allocation run on a representative week within  the peak month.
After receiving and reviewing the inputs and assumptions for each airport,  TSA runs the Staffing Allocation Model to determine each airport’s full- time equivalent level for the upcoming year. During the run, the model  takes each airport’s configuration and peak month screening demand  input, combines it with the assumptions regarding baggage and passenger  processing, and uses these factors to simulate the flow of passengers and  baggage through an airport’s screening areas to provide work force  requirements. Then it calculates the total number of TSOs required  (expressed in full-time equivalents) for the year based on the results of  running the model for the representative week of the peak month. This  representative week FTE level is used to calculate the annual FTE  estimate for the airport.
After receiving their annual full-time-equivalent allocation, TSA staff at  individual airports may periodically run the model throughout the year. As  shown in figure 4, during these “scheduling” runs, FSD staff may use the  model’s optional scheduling tool to determine work schedules for TSO  staff that will satisfy screening demand on a day-to-day basis.  Similar to  the annual allocation runs, TSA also inputs various historic data into the  model during the scheduling runs. This input includes originating  passenger load factors, estimates of number of bags per passenger, and  passenger arrival distribution curves.
In order to formulate TSO work schedules, the model monitors the  passenger arrival patterns and recommends opening and closing lanes at  passenger checkpoints to accommodate the demand. The optional  scheduling software recommends a mix of full-time and part-time TSOs to  satisfy the workforce requirements based on projected screening demand.
According to TSA officials responsible for the staffing allocation model,  TSA first ran the Staffing Allocation Model in August 2004 for fiscal year  2005. The model, which did not yet contain complete data on each airport,  identified a TSO full-time-equivalent level of 47,865 across all airports. To  reach the congressionally-mandated limit of 45,000 full-time-equivalent  TSOs, TSA applied a 7 percent reduction to the staffing levels identified by  the model across all airport categories. TSA officials stated that they  subsequently questioned this approach given that smaller (category III and  IV) airports have significantly fewer TSOs and, therefore, were more  significantly impacted by the 7 percent reduction in full-time equivalent  positions.
According to TSA officials, because the Staffing Allocation Model was not  centrally hosted and did not contain complete data, the model may have  over-estimated the required FTEs for fiscal year 2005. TSA determined that  in August 2005, the Staffing Allocation Model contained complete and  accurate data on each airport and the agency used it to identify TSO FTE  allocations for each airport, and the output reflecting the total number of  FTEs required—42,303—required no adjustment to fall within the  congressionally-mandated limit of 45,000 TSO FTEs. According to TSA  officials, when TSA ran the model, it did so without imposing a limitation  on the maximum number of full-time-equivalent TSOs, including either the  45,000 congressional limit or any budgetary limits. TSA informed FSDs of  their TSO full-time-equivalent allocations in October 2005. Figure 6 shows  the total TSO allocation, by airport category, for fiscal year 2004—the year  prior to implementation of the staffing allocation model—through fiscal  year 2007.
FSDs, air carrier representatives, and airport operators we interviewed at  the 14 airports we visited stated that TSA’s efforts to allocate a sufficient  number of TSOs to screen passengers and checked baggage and minimize  wait times have improved over the years. These officials stated that  passenger and checked baggage screening has become more efficient as  TSA has matured and gained a better understanding of the airport  operating environment, and frequent travelers have become more familiar  with the screening process.
section_title: TSA’s Use of the National Screening Force, Reserve TSO Full-Time Equivalents, and Private Screeners for Certain Screening Needs
paragraphs: TSA sets aside TSO full-time equivalents for needs outside of those  considered by the Staffing Allocation Model in the annual allocation run  for all airports. In order to handle short-term extraordinary needs at  airports, TSA has established the National Screening Force of 615 TSOs  who can be sent to airports to augment local TSO staff during periods of  unusually high passenger volume. In addition, certain airports may, during  the course of the year, experience significant changes to their screening  operations (e.g., arrival of a new airline, opening of a new terminal, etc.).  For these airports, TSA established a reserve of 329 TSO full-time  equivalents for fiscal year 2006 that can be used to augment the existing  force. This allocation approach allowed TSA to stay within the 43,000 full- time-equivalent TSO budgetary limit for fiscal year 2006—a staffing level  that TSA’s Assistant Secretary stated is sufficient to provide passenger and  checked baggage screening.
Lastly, TSA allows certain airports to hire private contract screeners in  lieu of TSOs. Under the Screening Partnership Program, six airports have  applied to TSA and received approval to hire private contract screener  forces as of fiscal year 2006. Despite the fact that these airports do not use  federal screeners, TSA still used the Staffing Allocation Model to  determine the full-time equivalent screening staff at each of these airports  for fiscal year 2006. These staffing levels, as determined by the model,  served as a limit on the number of private screeners that the private  screening contractors could employ. According to TSA, the 1,702 total full- time equivalent staffing allocation at these airports does not count against  TSA’s nationwide ceiling of 45,000 full-time equivalents for TSO staff.
section_title: TSA Relies on the Assumptions in Its Staffing Allocation Model, along with Mechanisms for Monitoring Them, to Help Ensure Sufficient TSO Staffing Levels, but Some Key Assumptions Do Not Reflect Operating Conditions
paragraphs: TSA aims to ensure that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a sufficient  number of TSOs to perform passenger and checked baggage screening by:  (1) building assumptions into its allocation model that are designed to  calculate the necessary levels of TSOs to ensure security and minimize  wait times, and (2) employing multiple monitoring mechanisms for the  sufficiency of the model’s outputs. TSA’s staffing allocation model  determined the fiscal years 2005 and 2006 TSO staffing level for each  airport based on built-in assumptions designed to ensure the necessary  levels of security and to minimize wait times—such as assumptions  regarding processing of passengers and baggage through security  checkpoints and information about each airport’s baseline configuration— e.g., physical infrastructure. During the first 2 years of the Staffing  Allocation Model’s use, TSA established several mechanisms to monitor  the sufficiency of the model’s outputs and make adjustments in key model  assumptions that do not fully reflect operating conditions for some  airports. For example, TSA established a process for FSDs to request  revisions to the assumptions used for their individual airports. In fiscal  year 2006, TSA granted some, but not all, requests. TSA headquarters also  started an assessment to evaluate selected Staffing Allocation Model  assumptions, an assessment it expects to perform annually, varying the  assumptions it examines each year. However, TSA does not have a  mechanism for selecting and prioritizing which assumptions to review  each year and for assuring that all assumptions are periodically reviewed.  Additionally, FSDs and our own analysis identified concerns with the  appropriateness of some of the assumptions for the fiscal year 2006 model.  For example, some FSDs stated that TSA’s method of calculating  screening demand (the 85th percentile day) to also account for TSO  absences from screening did not provide them with sufficient surplus  staffing. In addition, the model assumed a ratio of 20 percent part time to  80 percent full time (expressed in full-time equivalents), even in airports  that have consistently been unable to achieve a 20 percent part-time TSO  workforce; and the model had no mechanism to account for use of TSOs  to perform operation support functions.
subsections: section_title: TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model Seeks to Determine the Optimal TSO Staffing Levels for Each Airport, Relying on Assumptions that Are Designed to Help Ensure Necessary Levels of Security and to Minimize Passenger Wait Times
paragraphs: TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model determined the fiscal years 2005 and 2006  TSO staffing level for each airport using several built-in assumptions  regarding security and wait times, in addition to data that reflect each  airports’ baseline configuration—e.g., permanent infrastructure and type  of screening equipment.
The key built-in assumptions are adjustable and designed to help ensure  the necessary levels of security while minimizing wait times and include:    The minimum number of TSOs needed to staff each passenger  screening checkpoint or baggage screening area based on the standard  operating procedures for screening passengers and checked baggage  and throughput rates for passenger and checked baggage screening  equipment (see app. II).
A 10-minute maximum wait time for processing passengers and  checked baggage.
Originating passenger and baggage load factors by airport based on a  representative week during each airport’s peak month (the 85th  percentile assumption), which TSA expects will give FSDs some time  during less busy periods to allow TSOs to obtain required training,  perform operational support functions, and take annual or other forms  of leave.
A desired ratio of 80 percent full-time to 20 percent part-time TSO staff,  expressed as full time equivalents, at each category X, I, and II airport  to allow for heavier staffing during busier periods (e.g., the hours when  business travelers typically depart) and to minimize overstaffing during  less busy periods, times during which part-time TSOs would not be  scheduled to work.
Nonpassenger throughput rate of 4 percent.
Rates at which screening equipment have historically signaled the  possibility of a threat object and the consequent need for additional  screening.
The Staffing Allocation Model used these assumptions, along with other  inputs such as each airport’s baseline configuration—e.g., the number and  type of checkpoints, security lanes, baggage screening areas, and  screening equipment at each airport—to determine TSO staffing  allocations for the nation’s commercial airports for fiscal years 2005 and  2006. TSA officials stated that the assumptions used in the staffing  allocation model and the other inputs collectively determine the TSO full- time-equivalent allocation for each airport. For this reason, airports with  similar screening demand but different checkpoint configurations and  types of screening equipment may receive different allocations. For  example, TSA officials identified two category I airports that have similar  screening demand, yet one airport received almost 50 percent more full- time equivalent TSOs in fiscal year 2006 due to the physical infrastructure  differences at these airports. Specifically, one airport has one terminal  building, with three concourses, which generally enables passengers to be  efficiently routed through one checkpoint in that one terminal. In contrast,  the other airport has two separate terminals that prevent passengers from  being routed through common checkpoints. This airport’s separate  terminals make sharing TSOs among the various checkpoints more  challenging, creating a need for additional TSOs, thus the larger TSO  allocation. Additionally, we visited category X and I airports with similar  passenger volumes and differing TSO full-time-equivalent allocations for  fiscal year 2006. According to TSA, in the case of the category X airports,  while the passenger volumes for the two airports were similar—17.4 and  16.5 million, respectively—the difference in the type of passengers and the  type of baggage screening equipment resulted in one of these airports  receiving 26 percent more full-time-equivalent TSOs. Table 1 provides a  summary of the various factors that influenced full-time-equivalent TSO  allocations for fiscal year 2006 at some of the airports we visited.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required  TSA to develop staffing standards that provide for the necessary levels of  security and minimize delays for passengers. According to TSA officials  responsible for the Staffing Allocation Model, the model ensures that the  staffing allocations provide for the necessary levels of security because the  model is based on TSA’s standard operating procedures for screening  passengers and their carry-on items and checked baggage and on the  technology available at the passenger checkpoints and baggage screening  areas. For example, the passenger checkpoint standard operating  procedures require that a minimum of one TSO be staffed for each of the  screening functions at a checkpoint. The staffing model includes an  assumption (for larger airports) of at least 5.5 TSOs per screening lane— which responds to the need for one TSO per function at every checkpoint  and includes a value for supervisors that typically oversee two lanes. In  addition, the staffing model provides an allocation for each airport based,  in part, on the screening technology at the airport. In addition, the model  includes assumptions on alarm rates for various types of passenger and  baggage screening equipment and determines the sufficient number of  TSOs needed to resolve the alarms at the projected rate to be able to  achieve the model’s wait time standard of 10 minutes for processing  passengers and checked baggage.
Regarding minimizing passenger delays, a key assumption in the staffing  allocation model is that wait times for screening passengers and checked  baggage will not exceed 10 minutes when the model is set at a level  referred to as the airport’s 85th percentile day, which TSA calculates by  estimating screening demand at the level required for a representative  week of each airport’s busiest month. TSA officials stated this assumption  is based on a goal that was established when TSA was first created within  the Department of Transportation. Specifically, the Secretary of the  Department of Transportation established a goal that passengers be  processed through passenger screening checkpoints in 10 minutes or  less—a standard considered appropriate to meet the dual needs of  ensuring security while maintaining national mobility. TSA officials stated  that they determined that basing the Staffing Allocation Model’s demand  level on the representat eiv  demand week of each airport’s peak month,  coincided with screening 85 percent of passengers within 10 minutes. TSA  officials told us that some0  minutes at certain airports passengers will still have to wait longer than 1 that about 7 percent of an at certain times due, at least in part, to the fact  the year are expected to e  airport’s travel days (about 25-30 days) during  xceed the 85 percentile demand day.
As shown in table 2, TSA data for fiscal years 2004 through 2006 show that  the nation’s smaller airports (categories II, III, and IV) had shorter average  wait times than the standard, overall, with a wait time during peak periods  averaging less than 10 minutes, although wait times exceeded this level at  certain airports on certain days. Average peak wait times at the nation’s  larger airports (category X and I) generally exceeded the wait time  standard, overall, although wait times were less than 10 minutes at certain  airports on certain days. According to TSA headquarters officials, if  airports are consistently exceeding the 10 minute wait time goal, it is the  responsibility of the Area Directors to reach out to the FSDs at those  airports in an effort to determine whether the root cause relates to  staffing, equipment, capacity, or some other issue and to take appropriate  remedial action.
TSA officials cited capacity issues as a factor that contributed to category  X airports generally exceeding the 10-minute wait time goal during peak  periods, as shown in table 2.  These airports have higher screening  demand than smaller airports and sometimes lack the capacity, with  regard to space available for additional passenger lanes and baggage  screening areas, to process passengers and baggage quickly enough to  have lower wait times.  Smaller airports are more likely to have a numbe of passenger lanes and baggage screening areas that are more  commensurate with their screening demand than some larger airports th have higher screening demand.
section_title: TSA Has Four Mechanisms in Place to Monitor the Sufficiency of Its TSO Allocations and Is Formalizing Its Process for Revising the Model’s Assumptions
paragraphs: TSA has four mechanisms in place to monitor the sufficiency of the TS allocations. First, at individual airports, FSDs and the industrial engineers  assigned to their airports are responsible for monitoring their pass and checked baggage screening operations to ensure that the staffing  allocation model’s inputs are reliable. A process currently exists to  enable FSDs to request revisions to the assumptions used for their  individual airports when they believe that a model assumption is  unrealistic. As part of this process, FSDs are to submit empirical data to  support requests to alter assumptions. Based on TSA’s review of the data,  TSA may send an “optimization team” to the airport in an effort to identify the cause of the staffing problem. Optimization teams are composed of  experts in passenger and baggage screening operations and procedures ,  the staffing allocation model, and TSO scheduling. These teams obser ve  screening operations and seek to maximize efficiencies by applying  practices learned at other airports.  the design of passenger and baggage checkpoints, evaluate staffing and  scheduling practices, determine compliance with the standard operating  procedures, validate the TSO staffing model at the airport, and make  adjustments to model assumptions, if necessary. TSA officials stated they are formalizing a process for systematically collecting information o best practices identified by optimization teams so that this information be disseminated across airports. TSA’s solicitation of input from FSDs  regarding changes that need to be made to the assumptions that guide  their TSO allocations is consistent with our standards for internal co which call for management to ensure effective internal communicatio The reviews are used to help improve  ns,  for example, by establishing mechanisms for employees to recommend  improvements in operations.
January 2007, captures information such as the date of the request; the  airport for which the request is being made; the justification for the  request; and approvals at various levels, such as the industrial engineer  and TSA headquarters.  TSA stated that FSDs were previously made aware  of the draft form and provided instructions on using this form through  various communication mechanisms, including written instructions  provided to FSDs and FSD conferences held in September 2006. TSA is  also developing a database to record and track the requests made by FSDs,  decisions on whether to approve or deny requests, and the basis for the  decisions. TSA officials stated that they expect the database to be  completed by April 30, 2007.
Regarding the second mechanism to monitor the sufficiency of the model’s  outputs, TSA headquarters officials said it is the responsibility of  individual FSDs and the industrial engineers assigned to their airports to  ensure that the staffing allocation model reflects the configuration of and  operating conditions at their airports. Therefore, TSA officials stated that,  just prior to the model’s annual allocation run for fiscal year 2006, they  system ically solicitedat input from the industrial engineers assigned to the  more than 400 commercial airports to determine whether the model  contains correct information regarding the configuration of each airport.  TSA expects this process to occur annually in order to help ensure the  reliability of the data inputs.
As a third mechanism to monitor the sufficiency of the model’s outputs,  TSA headquarters officials stated that they continually monitor  performance data reported by individual airports to identify any anom that may require further investigation such as high wait times over anextended period of time, lower than expected throughput at passenger  lanes, high overtime rates (in excess of 4 percent), and airports with  onboard TSO staff consistently below their staffing allocation. In some  cases, anomalies identified by TSA may result in an optimization team visit  to an airport in an effort to determine their cause. For example, TSA  headquarters officials stated that  ti s (with the assistance of the staffing allocation model) to determine the  an airport with consistently high wait  mes (generally greater than 40 minutes during peak periods) may prompt  uch a visit. During the visits, the optimization teams perform analyses  causes of the problems the airport is having and suggest to the local FSD  ways to increase efficiency in the passenger and baggage screening  operations to overcome the problems. In some cases, the optimization  team may conclude that a change to the Staffing Allocation Model’s  baseline assumptions for the airport is necessary. For example, the ai may have lower throughput rates at some of its passenger or baggag e  o  screening areas than the Staffing Allocation Model assumes, due t different types of screening equipment or the physical layout of the airpor security checkpoints.
Finally, according to TSA officials, in September 2006, TSA completed itsl.  first annual review of certain assumptions in the Staffing Allocation Mode This review included an assessment of whether the assumptions under  review are still realistic, including assumptions related to screening  procedures, technology, screening throughput, and nonpassenger alarm  rates; and whether adjustments to the model are needed to make the full - time-equivalent allocation reflect actual operating conditions at airports.  nd  As a result, as shown in table 3, TSA has changed some assumptions a added others to more realistically reflect actual operating conditions. example, TSA headquarters officials responsible for the model stated the  fiscal year 2007 model will provide 4.25 TSOs per passenger checkpoint  screening lane rather than the 5.5 TSOs per lane provided in the fiscal y 2006 model—a change TSA officials attributed to the model directly  accounting for collateral duties performed by TSOs, TSO time paid but not  worked, and TSO training requirements.
section_title: Some Key Assumptions Used in the Fiscal Year 2006 Staffing Allocation Model Did Not Reflect Operating Conditions at Individual Airports
paragraphs: FSDs we interviewed reported that the screening allocation model is a  more accurate predictor of their overall staffing needs than previous  models that took into account fewer factors affecting screening  operations. However, these FSDs and our own analysis identified that  some of the key assumptions used in the staffing allocation model, during  the first 2 years of its implementation, did not reflect actual operating  conditions. Specifically, the FSDs identified five weaknesses in the model  for fiscal year 2006.
First, 11 of the 14 FSDs identified concerns related to TSA’s basing its  estimate of demand levels for the Staffing Allocation Model on a  representative week of each airport’s peak screening demand month to  allow excess time for training, leave, and other factors not directly  considered by the staffing allocation model. Regarding training, 9 of the 14  FSDs expressed concern that the model did not specifically account for  the training requirement of 3 hours per week averaged over a fiscal year  quarter. Three of these FSDs said they faced challenges in meeting the  minimum training requ irements. With respect to annual and sick leave, 5  of the 14 FSDs stated that in their view the model did not adequately  account for this leave. Two FSDs stated that the use of the peak demand  month to account for training and leave, though sound in principle, is  particularly difficult for smaller airports because they do not have as fluctuation between their peak period and their non-peak period, which  leaves little cushion in the allocation to accommodate TSO absences from screening duties such as training and annual leave.
TSA headquarters officials stated that TSA determined that using the 85th  percentile day concept would more than account for training, leave, and  other factors related to TSOs not being available for work because,  according to TSA, on only about 7 percent of days do passenger volumes  exceed it. Thus, according to TSA officials, the Staffing Allocation Mo set at a high enough demand level to cover screening demand for most  days during the year and allow for the extr a time needed for necessary  nonscreening time needed by TSOs such as training, leave, and other  duties. TSA officials told us that they believe this method of calculating  demand provides the necessary level of security and, secondarily, reflects  eir responsibility to be good financial stewards of taxpayer dollars, as  th using even higher volume days would result in higher costs and perhaps  lo for various forms of TSO leave needs, TSA had included an allowance, for  fiscal year 2007, in the Staffing Allocation Model  equivalents (14.5 percent full-time-equivalent allowa sick, comp, injury, and military eave.  wer overall productivity. Regarding the need for an additional allowance  nce) to cover annual,  Additionally, TSA fiscal 2007 Staffing Allocation Model (an additional 2 percent full-time  equivalent allowance) for training that cannot be completed during  operational down times. TSA specifically intended this allowance to  provide additional assurance that TSOs complete the required training  each month onised explosive devices—which TSA has  detecting improv identified as the highest threat to commercial aviation security.
TSA officials involved in developing the staffing model stated that they did  not plan to assess the extent to which the representative week of  screening demand during each airport’s peak month does, in fact,  represent actual screening demand for that week. However, officials  acknowledged that such an assessment could help verify that, for  purposes of the model’s annual allocation run, the resulting allocation  provides TSO staffing levels adequate to allow for 85 percent of airline  passengers at the nation’s commercial airports to wait 10 minutes or less  at security ch eckpoints.
Second, 7 of the 14 FSDs we interviewed stated that the goal of a 20  me TSO workforc percent part-ti e, as measured by full-time-equivale how that the part-time TSO full-time- TSOs, is not realistic. TSA data sanged from   visited, as of July 2006, r equivalent level at 13 airports we ith an average of 8 percent. FSDs stated  approximately 1 to 38 percent, w 0 percent part-time goa that the 2ime workers, remote airport locations  l for TSOs has been difficult to achieve fosit in some locations, TSO base pay that   other things, economic conditions  most airports because of, acal year 2002, the lack of benefits for part-time  mongpart-time TSOs who convert to full-time  leading to competition for  part-then full-time positions become available. According to TSA, these  coupled with a lack of mass tran has not changed since fisd TSOs, and the large number of a status w factors have made the hiring an  retention of part-time TSOs particularly 0 percent in the first 2 years of  difficult. As shown in figure 6, TSA d ta reflect that, nationwide, part-time ation model (fiscal years 2005  levels of TSOs had not reached 2 implementation of the current staffing allocion’s larger (category X, I, and II)  and 2006) with regard to the natalso shows that in fiscal years 2005 and  airports. For example, figu re 6 rts had a TSO workforce comprised  2006, the nation’s 26 category X airpoivalents. TSA officials stated that the  of about 9 percent part-time equ number of part-time TSOs had increased in recent months.
TSA officials originally assumed that the 20 percent TSO part-time  assumption provides the most efficient coverage for airports (especially  those in categories X, I, and II) by enabling FSDs to have more flexibility  in matching the daily peak-load workflow at airports. Nonetheless, figure 6 shows that, on average, only smaller airports (categories III and IV) came  close to or exceeded the 20 percent part-time TSO workforce goal during  fiscal years 2004 through 2006.
TSA has recognized that some airports cannot likely achieve a 20 percent  part-time FTE level and others (most likely smaller airports) may ope rate  more effectively with other levels of part-time TSO staff. As a result, for  fiscal year 2007, TSA has modified this assumption to include a variablepart-time goal based on each airport’s historic part-time to full-time T ratio.
Third, 5 of the 14 FSDs stated that the staffing model does not appear to consider new passenger screening procedures that may require addition al  TSOs at the checkpoint. For example, one FSD stated that the model h as yet to incorporate the additional TSOs that will be required by TSA’s new Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques program currently being  implemented at the nation’s airports. acknowledged that changes to screening procedures could increase the  number of TSOs needed at a checkpoint or, conversely, increase wait  times at the checkpoint. Therefore, TSA has made changes to the staffing  allocation model for fiscal year 2007 to include line item allocations for t new Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques, Bomb Appraisal  Officer, and Aviation Direct Access Screening Program security initiatives.
Fourth, two of the five FSDs with in-line checked baggage screening  systems stated that in their view TSA overestimated the TSO labor savi that would be achieved as a result of deploying in-line baggage scree systems. TSA headquarters officials responsible for the staffing mode stated that some adjustments had to be made to individual airports’ TSO staffing levels to adequately reflect the configuration of the airports’ in-lin systems, which permit higher throughput rates. Specifically, som have full in-line systems, while others have partial in-line systems that are  installed at a particular terminal or terminals. Additionally, TSA officials  cited one example in which a category X airport received a reduct TSOs in fiscal year 2005 to account for the in-line baggage screenin system at the airport. However, TSA officials responsible for the staff model later learned that the model had incorrectly assumed that th system was fully operational, when in fact it was still under constructio Officials stated that the FSD at this airport was consequently allocated  additional TSO positions. TSA officials stated that the model validation  process currently underw ay should help ensure that the model adequately  reflects the actual operating conditions at the airport, which highlights the  importance of a mechanism to provide assurance that all assumption periodically undergo validation.  n.
The “Screening Passengers by Observation Technique” involves specially trained TSOs  observing the behavior of passengers and resolving any suspicious behavior through casual  conversation with passengers and referring suspicious passengers to selectee screening.
Finally, FSDs identified that the model does not account for TSOs being  used in operational support functions. Eleven of the 14 FSDs we  interviewed stated that because they are not authorized to hire a suffici ent  number of mission support staff, TSOs are being routinely used to perform  certain operational support functions such as payroll processing,  scheduling, distribution and maintenance of uniforms, data entry, and  workman’s compensation processing. At 13 airports January and August 2006, out of a total of 4,710 TSOs on-board at those  airports, TSA was using 242 TSOs (about 5 percent) for operational  support functions. FSDs and their staffs stated that these TSOs w spending varying amounts of time on operational support duties, some on  a nearly full-time basis. As shown in figure 7, nearly 7 percent of T nationwide performed operational support (on at least a part-time basis) during a specific 2-week pay period in fiscal 2006. This percentage was  slightly higher for the smaller airport categories. Also, as shown in figu 7, the TSOs performing operational support functions at the airports spent approximately half their time on these duties—38 out of 80  possible hours—during the 2-week period. In addition, TSOs perfor operational support functions at Category X airports spent significantly  more time on these duties (approximately 63 out of 80 hours) than TSOs i the other airport categories.
section_title: TSA’s FSDs Are Responsible for Deploying TSO Allocations at their Airports, but Face Workforce and Other Challenges to Effective Deployment
paragraphs: TSA has vested its FSDs with responsibility for managing their TSO  allocations while considering local circumstances that can affect the  staffing allocation model’s effectiveness in deploying the TSO workforce.  After receiving the annual FTE allocation from TSA headquarters, the FSD  and his or her staff must prepare TSO work schedules, by using the  staffing model’s optional scheduling tool or some other method, to ensure  that adequate numbers of TSOs are conducting passenger and baggage  screening operations, at all times, to ensure adequate security and attempt  to meet the 10 minute wait time standard. However, factors outside the  model’s determination of overall staffing levels can affect FSDs’ ability to  effectively schedule TSOs at passenger lanes and baggage check areas. For  example, as previously discussed, few airports have been able to achieve a  20 percent FTE level for part-time staff as assumed by the staffing  allocation model in its first 2 years of implementation (fiscal years 2005  and 2006)—forcing FSDs to adjust the scheduling tool based on actual  part-time TSOs on board. Also, as of September 30, 2006, approximately  one-third of airports had less than 90 percent of their overall TSO  positions filled, and nine of the 14 airports we visited were similarly below  their staffing allocation. FSDs cited certain other challenges in scheduling  TSO staff including injuries and absenteeism, in addition to time spent  away from screening duties due to training requirements and operational  support needs—factors that the scheduling tool did not directly consider  in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. As previously discussed, to address some of  these difficulties, TSA has revised some of the assumptions in the Staffing  Allocation Model for fiscal year 2007. To address other difficulties, TSA  has implemented several human capital initiatives to improve hiring and  retention of TSO staff, lessen the impact of injuries and absenteeism, and  study the impact of training and operational support demands on TSO  time. TSA has not yet assessed the impact of these initiatives on hiring and  retention, but plans to do so during fiscal year 2007.
subsections: section_title: FSDs Are Responsible for Managing to Their TSO Staffing Allocation in Light of Local Circumstances
paragraphs: FSDs are responsible for deploying and managing to their TSO allocation  in light of local circumstances, including those that might affect  scheduling and pose challenges to most efficiently deploying their  resource allocations. At the beginning of each fiscal year, the staffing  allocation model identifies the annual allocation of TSOs needed at each  airport based on projected demand levels and other factors that make up  the model. Nonetheless, this stated allocation is only a starting point.  Throughout the fiscal year, FSDs are responsible for preparing TSO work  schedules that adapt to changing circumstances at the local level.  Specifically, FSDs are responsible for scheduling TSOs to ensure that a  sufficient number of TSOs are deployed, from available staff, to meet  airport screening needs.
TSA has provided FSDs with an optional tool they can use to facilitate the  management of their TSO allocation. Specifically, the Staffing Allocation  Model includes a scheduling component that uses the various inpu and assumptions of the model, including the number of checkpoints, la and checked baggage screening machines needed to respond to the  passenger and checked baggage load and the minimum TSO staffing levels  identified in the standard operating procedures for passenger and checke d  baggage screening. This tool is then to produce daily workforce  requirements and calculates a work schedule for each airport. The  schedule identifies a recommended mix of full-time and part-time staff a total number of TSO FTEs needed to staff the airport on a given day,  consistent with a goal of 10 minutes maximum wait time for processing  passengers and baggage. In addition, there are several areas where TSA  adjusts the scheduling tool to most accurately reflect actual conditions  and needs. These areas include:    Flight schedule changes.    TSO training requirements (based on available times identified by t scheduling tool).
Number of TSOs needed for operational support associated with  operating the checkpoint and baggage screening areas.
New passenger and checked baggage screening procedures that affect  TSO utilization.
FSDs stated that because the scheduling tool does not contain this  information, they must modify the input to the tool, or use an alternative  scheduling tool, to deploy their TSO workforce. For example, FSDs and  their staffs stated that the scheduling tool does not contain the most  current flight schedule data due to the reporting practices of various  airlines. During our airport visits, TSA scheduling officers reported that  the scheduling tool includes data from as much as 90 days in advance, but  some airlines provide their final flight schedules and anticipated passenger  volume as late as 1 week in advance—sometimes leaving FSDs little time  to ensure adequate TSO availability. TSA officials said that in order to  keep their flight offerings competitive, airlines seek to protect their flight  data from public disclosure as long as possible. For this reason, TSA  headquarters officials said they expect FSDs to work with airport  operators and airline officials to obtain the most current data available on  which to base their scheduling efforts and to make adjustments to the  scheduling tool to ensure that their deployment of TSOs most effectively  meets the screening demand.
The nine FSDs we interviewed at category X and I airports reported tha the scheduling tool was useful as a starting point for developing their  schedules. However, all six FSDs who said they used the scheduling tool  regularly reported making adjustments to the schedule output to more  accurately reflect their local conditions primarily because, accordi these FSDs, the scheduling tool does not automatically take into account  the actual composition of the TSO workforce at each individual airp in some cases, unique work schedules that may be implemented at so airports (other than a standard 5-day work week). For example, the  scheduling tool is based on the model’s assumption of a 20 percent part- time force expresses as a full-time-equivalent level among available  staff,  although few of the larger airports have been able to achieve this level of  part-time staff. Specifically, only 2 of the 26 category X airports had a  workforce composed of at least 20 percent part-time staff in July 20 Because the scheduling tool assumes a 20 percent part-time level for TSO FSDs at airports we visited with lower levels of part-time TSOs stated  they make adjustments to the scheduling tool’s output to more accu reflect the airport’s actual mix of full-time and part-time TSOs and then  develop a work schedule accordingly. In addition, as of September 30,  2006, TSA data showed that approximately one-third of the nation’s  airports had less than 90 percent of their annual TSO positions filled According to FSDs we interviewed, however, the scheduling tool ass that each airport has its full TSO allocation on board. Moreover, according  to TSA, the scheduling tool assumes that TSOs across all airports have  standard 5-day work weeks, although individual a to work varying schedules. For example, an FSD for a category III airport  told us that he requires TSOs to work a sixth day once every 4 weeks.  However, the FSD at this airport stated that the scheduling tool cannot  account for this schedule.  06.
In response, TSA headquarters officials stated that the scheduling tool can  indeed account for the actual number of onboard TSOs, the actual mix of  full-time and part-time TSOs, and most scheduling anomalies FSDs  encounter. The TSA headquarters officials attributed the FSDs’  comments to misunderstandings regarding the full capabilities of the  scheduling tool. The officials further explained that the agency has d better job recently in training field staff in the use of the scheduling to ol  than was done earlier in the Staffing Allocation Model’s implementation.
FSDs at the four smaller (category II and III) airports we visited state d that  the scheduling tool was more useful for larger airports with more complex  scheduling challenges given the size of the workforce, the higher  passenger volumes, and the larger number of checkpoints and terminals.  These FSDs stated that smaller airports can more easily predict their  screening demand and generally said they did not believe that the staffing  model’s scheduling tool added value to their scheduling process— especially since they are dealing with small numbers of TSO staff and  limited passenger and baggage check facilities, for example, having  only  one checkpoint with few lanes. Therefore, they have chosen to continue  use such locally developed tools, such as spreadsheets. However, TSA  headquarters officials stated that use of the scheduling tool by all airports will eliminate applications, such as these spreadsheets, that are  inconsistent with the Staffing Allocation Model and TSA’s time and  attendance reporting system, thereby enhancing efficiency in scheduling  TSOs.
While TSA headquarters officials stated that the scheduling tool is capable of preparing schedules for any size airport and accounting for all the  issues noted as problems by the FSDs we visited, officials are currently  permitting each FSD to determine whether to use the scheduling tool. TS officials stated that technical improvements planned for the scheduling  tool will improve its usefulness in preparing TSO schedules. For example,  installation of high-speed internet connectivity and implementation of  electronic time and attendance reporting will allow the scheduling tool to  efficiently maintain up-to-date rosters of available TS according to TSA officials. After these technical improvements are made,  w hich TSA expects to be completed in fiscal year 2007, TSA officials told  us they may consider making the tool mandatory.
We did not assess the adequacy of training of FSDs because it was outside the scope o our work. scheduling and timekeeping information and provide planned schedule and actual time worked.
section_title: FSDs Cited Challenges in Deploying Their TSO Workforce to Perform Screening, and Several Efforts Are Underway to Address These Challenges
paragraphs: All 14 FSDs we interviewed identified challenges they faced in deploying their TSO workforce. Nine of the 14 airports we visited were below their allocation for TSOs as determined by the staffing model. FSDs at these  airports cited the inability of TSA’s centralized hiring process to repl TSOs quickly. However, attrition, particularly by part-time TSOs, was also  cited as a barrier to achieving and maintaining their TSO staffing levels.  TSA has stated a goal of each FSD maintaining a TSO staffing lev less than 90 percent of each individual airport’s TSO allocation. Bas TSA data, approximately 53 percent (237) of commercial airports were  either at, or no less than 10 percent below, their respective TSO  allocations at the end of fiscal year 2006. Approximately 31 percent of  airports (140) were below 90 percent of their allocation, and 16 percent  (71) of airports were 110 percent or more above their allocation. Sixty- nine of the 71 airports above thei category III and IV airports. Conversely, as also shown in figure 8, 131 of  the 140 airports below 90 per cent of their TSO allocations are airports in  categories II, III, and IV. These smaller airports have correspondingly  smaller numbers of TSOs; therefore, even small staff fluctuations have a  greater impact on being above or below their TSO allocations. Overal mo TSO allocations determined by the Staffing Allocation Model.  el of not  ed on  r allocation were among the small  re large airports (categories X and I) have succeeded in meeting their  According to TSA officials, airports that are above their allocation must  reduce their TSO staffing levels by either (1) attrition or (2) transferring  their excess TSOs to airports that are below their allocation. TSA officials  also stated that airports grouped together under TSA’s “hub and spoke”  organizational structure often share TSO resources as needs dictate.
FSDs we interviewed cited various reasons for attrition, including limited  advancement opportunities, need for higher paying job, work hours,  difficulty of work, and job dissatisfaction. At the same time, as shown in  figure 9, TSO attrition rates, for both full-time and part-time staff,  decreased from approximately 24 percent to 21 percent from fiscal year  2004 to fiscal year 2006. However, as previously discussed, the part-tim e  TSO attrition rate remains considerably higher than the rate for full-time  personnel (approximately 46 percent versus 16 percent for fiscal ye 2006).  ar  s  from their person before going through the walk through metal detector.  According to the air carrier, it spent about $15,000 to $18,000 of its own  money each month in personnel costs to staff the checkpoints over a 12- hour period most days. In another case, a representative of an airport  board for a category X airport told us that in response to concerns about  high wait times—wait times exceeding 30 minutes—the airport board  spent $1 million to hire a consultant to simulate existing checkpoint  configurations and conditions to determine where and how improvements  could be made to increase passenger throughput, thereby reducing wait  times. As a result of this effort, several improvements were made,  including posting a TSO at the front of each checkpoint to facilitate the  screening process, posting signage at checkpoints to explain the items that  passengers should remove from their person; adding space at end of the x- ray screening belt so that passengers can easily pick up their items without  holding up the line; and providing more room for passengers to remove  items from their person before they get to the x-ray machines. According  to this airport official, these improvements collectively resulted in an  increase in passenger throughput from 175 to 200 passengers per hour at  relatively low cost. However, the official expressed concern that most  airports are not in a position to fund similar projects because they do not  have the resources.
section_title: TSA Reported Several Efforts Underway to Help Address Challenges in Deploying the TSO Workforce
paragraphs: TSA headquarters officials and FSDs we interviewed reported having  several efforts underway to help address some of the challenges they face  in deploying the TSO workforce. For example, to allow FSDs to more  efficiently address staffing needs, TSA has shifted responsibility for hiring  TSOs from TSA headquarters to FSDs at individual airports and, according  to TSA officials, provided contractor support to assist in this effort. TSA  data show that since local hiring began in March 2006, TSA has increased  the number of new hire TSOs from approximately 180 per pay period in  February 2006 to nearly 450 each pay period under the local hiring  initiative. Additionally, TSA officials stated that prior to the  implementation of the local hiring initiative, TSA was able to support  hiring at only about 30 airports during any given period compared to more  than 100 airports each pay period since the local hiring initiative was  implemented. Table 4 provides a summary of the national human resource- related initiatives intended to help increase TSO retention, utilization, and  effectiveness.
In addition to these workforce initiatives, TSA also continues to use from the national screening force to address short-term needs at individu airports nationwide. According to TSA, the national screening force is  generally deployed only to those airports experiencing significant staffing  shortfalls associated with increased seasonal traffic or when a special  event—such as a Super Bowl or a large national conference—occurs  requiring an immediate influx of additional, though temporary, TSO  support. Of the 14 FSDs we interviewed, 6 stated that they had used the  national screening force at least once. All but one of these FSDs told us  that the national screening force was used to meet short-term screening  demand associated with special events and unexpected circumstances,  such as heavy passenger loads stemming from hurricanes Katrina and Rit In the other instance, at a category X airport, the FSD stated that, because  of challenges in hiring and retaining TSOs for this airport, he has had to  rely on about 60 members of the National Screening Force deployed to his  airport since 2004. However, in November 2006, TSA officials stated that  as of November 1, 2006, there were no National Screening Force TSOs  assigned to this airport, which they attributed to TSA’s local hiring  initiative.  a.
TSA officials stated that they are examining methods for addressing hiring and retention challenges at specific airports where these problems are  particularly acute. For example, as shown in table 4 above, TSA has  implemented a $500 retention incentive for TSOs at 22 “hard-to-hire”  airports who were on-board as of April 15, 2006. As also shown in the  table, to help with hiring and retention of part-time TSOs, TSA is piloting a  program that offers full health benefits to part-time TSOs at six airports. A these airports, part-time TSOs receive the same health benefits as full-ti TSOs. At all other airports, part-time TSOs do not receive health benefits.  In addition to incentives and expanding health benefits, TSA is considering other options for attracting and retaining TSOs. For example, these  options include (1) parking allowances, (2) child care, (3) elder care, and  (4) tuition assistance.
In addition to the national initiatives underway, several FSDs at the 14  airports we visited were implementing their own local initiatives to  address some of the staffing challenges they faced at their airports. For  example, after receiving local hiring authority under the nationwide local  hiring initiative, one FSD we spoke to stated that he puts brand-new TSO  hires out on the passenger lanes as “helpers” so that they may better  understand what the job entails. He expects that this will cut down on  attrition at his airport and help reduce wasted training resources for TSOs  who leave within short periods of being hired. Regarding absenteeism, all  the FSDs we spoke to stated that they monitored unscheduled absences  and counseled TSOs as needed. To help reduce the number of on the jobinjuries, 6 of the 14 FSDs we interviewed said they had local initiatives,  such as injury prevention committees and detailed instruction on safe  lifting techniques. To help mitigate inadequate numbers of part-time TSOs two TSA managers we interviewed said that they asked some of their fu ll- time TSOs to work “split” shifts to cover demands in peak periods tha would normally go to part-time TSOs, one of whom might work the first  peak period shift and another who might work the second peak period  shift. The result was that it eliminated the staffing of full-time TSOs non-peak periods when they were most likely to be idle. The experience these managers illustrates an attempt at an efficient use of TSOs and also  the primary reason that TSA has tried to achieve a mix of 20 percent part- time to 80 percent full-time TSOs. Specifically, using part-time TSOs can  help to permit adequate staffing during peak periods while avoiding the  consequent overstaffing stemming from having the same number of TSOs  on duty during non-peak periods. Additionally, to maximize the flexibi lity  in staffing passenger and checked baggage screening checkpoints, 3 of the  10 FSDs whose TSOs were not all dual-trained stated that they were  working to increase the number of dual-trained TSOs—TSOs trained and  certified in both pass 14 airports we visited already had dual-trained TSOs at the time of our  v enger and checked baggage screening. Four of the   isits.
Given that many of TSA’s workforce initiatives were only recently  implemented or are in the planning stages, we could not assess the extent  to which these initiatives achieved the intended results. TSA human  capital officials told us that they plan to establish performance metrics to  use in evaluating their workforce initiatives and use the results of the  evaluations to make any needed changes to their approach.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Given the extent to which TSOs hav support functions at airports, TSA h first time in the staffing allocati that FSDs may have to rely on TSOs at some times. However, overrelian limits the availability of TSOs to pe perform, contributes to challenges i number of TSOs are at the right che the investment TSA has made in tra could over time limit on-the-job trai important for TSA to determine under what circumstances it is  apprse TSOs to perfopriate to u provide Fs with guidance on when TSOsSD e been used to perform operational  as directly accounted for this for the  on model for fiscal year 2007. We recogniz  to perform operational support du ce on TSOs for operational support  rform the functions they were hired to n scheduling TSOs so that the right  ckpoints at the right times, undermines ining them in screening functions, and  ning opportunities. Therefore, it is  orm operational support functions and to   can be used this way.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To assist TSA in its efforts to identify TSO staffing levels that reasonably reflect the operating conditions at i  that TSOs are effectively utilized, we recommend that the Secretary of ndividual airports and to help ensure  Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for Transportation  Security to take the following two actions:  a formal, documented assumptions in the Staffing Allo ensur he assumptions res accure that t ately r  staffing allocations that  eflect operating conditions that may change over time.   plan for reviewing all of the  cation Model on a periodic basis to  ult in TSO SOs can be used to provide operational  support.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We p February t report,  which are reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS concurred with our  findings and recommendations and stated that the findings and  recommendations are constructive and useful.   rt to DHS for review and comment. On  7, we received written comments on the draf TSA also provided comments on our draft report, which are also  reproduced in full in appendix III. In its comments, TSA stated that the  conclusions of our study are valuable, but TSA wants to ensure that a full  and current picture of the state of its workforce management is portrayed.  TSA orkforce management initiatives it hhighlighted several of the was  implemented. These initiatives were already discussed in the draft report  provided and TSA for comm to DHSent.
Rega plan for reviewing all of the assump on a periodic basis, DHS concurred implementing this recommendation as part of its review of the Staffing  Alloc TSA has  identify a ed that, as partnd prioritize the staffing model assumptions for periodic review.  We a irical data to valida studies a methods that should enhance the v to document this new assumption validation process and have it approved  by senior leadership.   that TSA establish a formal, documented  tions in the Staffing Allocation Model   and stated that TSA has already begun el assumptions f developing a formal and systematic process that would  or fiscal year 2007. DHS also stated  of this process, TSA plans to use form te the staffing model’s assumption alidity of TS A’s efforts. TSA also plans  rred with our recom DHS also when TS  be used to provide  TSA’s Offices of Security Operation together to develop a policy that wo to provide operational support. DH final  FSDs concerning the use of TSOs in mendation to establish a policy for  operational support. DHS stated that  s and Human Capital are working  uld define when TSOs might be used S also stated that TSA e r degree of structure and guidance to   operational support positions.
We will spies of this report tend co the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for  interested congressional committees as appropriate. o the Secretary of Homeland Security;  Transportation; and  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact m at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
subsections: section_title: Objectives
paragraphs: The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted in  December 2004, required the Transportation Security Administration  (TSA) to develop and submit to the Senate Committee on Commerce,  Science, and Transportation, and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, standards for determining the  aviation security staffing for all airports at which TSA provides or overse screening services by March 2005. These standards are to provide the  necessary levels of aviation security and ensure that the average aviation  security-related delay experienced by passengers is minimized. This  provision of the act also mandated that we conduct an analysis of TSA’s  staffing standards. To assess TSA’s efforts in developing a staffing  allocation model that ensures that it provides the necessary levels of  aviation security and that the average aviation security-related delay  experienced by passengers is minimized, we addressed the following  questions:    How does TSA ensure its Staffing Allocation Model provides a  sufficient number of Transportation Security Officers (TSO) to pe passenger and checked baggage screening at each airport and what  challenges has it faced while implementing the model?
How does TSA deploy its TSO allocation and what factors affect the  model’s effectiveness in helping TSA accomplish this deployment?
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: Our work generally focused on the two major components of TSA’s  determination of TSO staffing at the nation’s airports. First, at the T headquarters level, we interviewed (and reviewed documentation  provided by) officials responsible for the development, implementation,  and ongoing monitoring of the Staffing Allocation Model and its  determination of the annual allocation of TSOs to each of the nation’s  commercial airports. Second, at the field level, we interviewed TSA  staff at  selected airports who were responsible for working within their allocation  to deploy sufficient TSO staff to their airports’ passenger and checked  baggage screening operations.
SA  During our design phase, we visited six airports selected based on  location, airport category, and participation in TSA’s Screening  Partnership Program. Table 5 provides information on the airports we  visited during the design phase.
Aft air small airports. We select of categories X, I, and II with a similar number of annual passenger  enplanements er completing the design phase of our study, we visited eight additio ports, shown in table 6, representing a geographic mix of large and  ed these airports by choosing two airports in each  , but which have significantly different passenger wait times  and full time equivalent allocations under the Screening Allocation Model.  We also selected two additional airports in category III based solely on  their geographic proximity to two of the airports we visited in the larger  airport categories. All of the nation’s airports in the categories we select (categories X, I, II, and III) to visit collectively comprise more than 90  percent of TSA’s total TSO allocation nationwide.
In total, since we selected a limited nonprobability sample of 14 airports,  the information and results obtained cannot be generalized to all airports  nationwide. Rather, the results from our airport visits were designed to  help identify aspects of the Screening Allocation Model that may not be  adequately addressing unique airport characteristics. Also, on a year-to- year basis, TSA may change the data inputs and assumptions used to  calculate TSO allocations nationwide and at individual airports.
In reviewing TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model, we did not (1) review the  statistical algorithm used in the model, (2) verify the model’s computer  programming, or (3) run test data through the model.
More details about the scope and methodology of our work regarding each  of the objectives are presented in the following sections, respectively.
subsections: section_title: Objective One: Use of the Staffing Allocation Model to Provide a Sufficient Number of TSOs to Perform Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening at Each Airport and Challenges Faced While Implementing the Model
paragraphs: To determine how TSA ensures its Staffing Allocation Model provides a  sufficient number of Transportation Security Officers (TSO) to perform  passenger and checked baggage screening at each airport and what  challenges it has faced while implementing the model, we first sought to  obtain an understanding of how the Staffing Allocation Model works to  provide the appropriate number of TSO staff at the nation’s airports. We  interviewed key officials in TSA headquarters responsible for the  development and implementation of the model about the inputs and  assumptions to the model and how these elements are used to determine  appropriate TSO staffing levels. We also reviewed documentation,  provided by these officials, on the design and operation of the model.  Additionally, we interviewed Federal Security Directors (FSD) and their  staff at the 14 airports about how the Staffing Allocation Model considers  factors unique to their airports in determining the allocation of TSOs to  perform passenger and baggage screening functions. In addition, we asked  FSDs and staff about the adequacy of their allocation and their ability to  make changes to the model input, for their airport, if necessary. During the  visits to category X, I, and II airports, we also interviewed representatives  of each airport’s governing authority and one or more of each airport’s  significant airline operators, to obtain their perspectives on the adequacy  of TSA’s staffing allocations and TSO scheduling practices at the  respective airports. In addition, we interviewed representatives of two  airline industry associations—the Air Transport Association and the  Regional Airline Association—about their perspectives on TSO staffing  levels at the nation’s commercial airports. checkpoints and checked baggage screening areas. We also obtained data  on the changes in nationwide TSO allocations since 2004 and examined  how TSA, using the model, ensures that it has a sufficient number of TSOs  to perform passenger and checked baggage screening.
We also examined how TSA ensures the model complies with statutory  ry  requirements—specifically, whether the model (1) provides the necessa levels of passenger and baggage security, (2) minimizes average passengerwait times, and (3) ensures that TSA remains in compliance with the  congressionally mandated full-time-equivalent TSO cap. To that end, we  interviewed TSA headquarters officials and reviewed Screening Allo Model-related documentation to ascertain TSA’s approach to monitor performance of the model. We also analyzed TSA’s airport-specific  performance data to determine how, if at all, various workforce indica have chang passenger wait times, TSO absenteeism rates, TSO attrition rates, TSO  overtime usage, TSO injury rates, number of TSOs devoted to  adm Na tors  ed since the model was implemented. These indicators include  inistrative duties, level of usage of part-time TSOs, and use of the  tional TSO force.  t the 14 airports, we met with FSDs and other TSA officials to determine  e  ffing Allocation Model and their level of input into the model’s annu SO allocation process. During our discussions with the FSDs, we  iscussed how well the airport’s allocation, as determined by the model,  A details on the extent to which they participated in the development of th Sta T d takes into account the unique characteristics of the airport and the T workforce. These characteristics include airport layout, passenger  checkpoint configuration, and passenger and baggage screening  procedures and equipment. We also examined how the Staffing Allocatio Model addresses changes in air traffic and airport layout, change s in  security screening procedures, and changes in screening equipment.
In addition to the discussions with FSDs and other TSA officials, during  our airport visits we also physically observed the airport’s passenger  checkpoints and baggage screening areas in order to better understand  any unique situations or airport characteristics that affect screening  operations and assessed the impact of these situations on the model’s  allocation of TSOs to the airport.
During the visits to the two similar airports in each of categories X, I, and  II, we attempted to determine (1) why one airport received a larger TSO  allocation under the Screening Allocation Model, (2) reasons for  differences in passenger wait times, and (3) how the SAM allocations at  these two airports affected the FSD’s ability to schedule TSOs to pe required security screening activities.
section_title: Objective Two: TSA’s Deployment of Its TSO Allocation at Individual Airports and Factors That Impact the Allocation Model’s Effectiveness in Helping TSA Accomplish This Deployment
paragraphs: To determine how TSA deploys its allocation of TSOs at individual airports  and addresses other factors affecting the deployment, we interviewed TSA  staff at headquarters and at the airports we visited, regarding TSO  scheduling and workforce-related factors that can affect these efforts. We  also obtained and reviewed various TSO workforce-related data from TSA  headquarters pertaining to these factors than can affect TSA’s scheduling  efforts at individual airports. These data include airport-specific  information on the number of part-time TSOs, absenteeism rates, attrition,  overtime, workman’s compensation injury claims, and number of TSOs  being used for operational support. In addition, we interviewed TSA  headquarters officials, and FSDs at individual airports, about various  human capital initiatives TSA is implementing to address TSO workforce  issues (e.g., TSO attrition, lack of sufficient part-time staff, TSO  absenteeism, injuries, etc.) that affect the deployment of TSOs allocated to  individual airports.
At the 14 airports we visited, we met with FSDs and other TSA officials to  determine details on their methods for scheduling TSOs allocated to them  by the model and their use of the model for this purpose. During our  discussions with the FSDs, we discussed challenges they face in  scheduling the required number of TSOs to perform screening functions.  These challenges include airport layout and associated physical  infrastructure limitations, type of passenger and baggage screening  procedures employed and type of equipment available, number and mix of  available full-time/part-time TSOs, number of TSOs unavailable for work  (including those on leave, absent, injured, in training, or performing  administrative duties), and experience level of TSOs. We also examined  how each airport’s scheduling operation addresses changes in air traffic  and airport layout, changes in security screening procedures, and changes  in screening equipment.
We also analyzed certain TSA airport-specific performance data to  determine how these factors impact FSDs’ ability to effectively schedule  their TSO allocation. Finally, we interviewed TSA airport and human  capital officials to determine workforce actions TSA has taken to improve or enhance the Screening Allocation Model’s ability to effectively allocate TSOs to the nation’s airports and what other efforts, if any, TSA has  underway to enhance its ability to deploy TSOs—specifically with respect  to the indicators noted above.
section_title: Data Reliability
paragraphs: In addressing our objectives, we obtained the following data from TSA:    Staffing by airport, in full-time equivalents, as of September 30, 2006.
TSO staffing allocation, by airport, for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006.
TSO full-time and part-time full-time equivalents levels for fiscal years  2004, 2005, and 2006.
TSO absenteeism for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006.
Workman’s compensation historical claims activity for calendar years  2004, 2005, and first half of 2006.
TSO attrition data for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006.
TSO overtime rates for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006.    Number and percentage of TSOs used for operational support for   2-week period ending September 30, 2006.
Deployment of the National Screening Force TSOs as of   October 10, 2006.
Airport passenger wait times for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006.
section_title: Appendix II: Development and Description of TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model
subsections: section_title: TSA’s Development of Its Staffing Allocation Model
paragraphs: The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001,  significantly changed how passenger and checked baggage screening is  conducted in the United States. ATSA removed screening responsibility  from air carriers and the contractors who conducted screening for them,  and placed this responsibility with TSA. As a result, TSA hired and  deployed approximately 55,000 federal passenger and baggage  Transportation Security Officers (TSO) (formerly known as screeners) to  more than 400 airports nationwide. This initial deployment was based on  input from a contract consultant and the number of private sector  screeners that had been in place prior to TSA. After this initial roll-out of  TSOs, TSA developed a demand-driven staffing model called the “GRA”  model in order to improve screening operations and make them more  efficient. To derive a TSO staffing allocation for each airport, the GRA  model used flight schedules, load factors and connecting flight data,  passenger arrival distribution curves, and the number of passenger  baggage. However, according to TSA, the GRA model did not provide  flexibility to react to dynamic changes in the transportation industry. An  initial run of the GRA model in 2003 called for an overall staffing level of  49,600 despite a congressionally imposed 45,000 full-time-equivalent cap  on the number of TSOs TSA could hire. As a result, TSA had to impose a   7 percent TSO reduction across the board to comply with the  congressional cap by the end of the year. TSA decided it needed to  improve its existing demand-driven staffing model—the GRA model—to  create a more dynamic model that takes into account information about  each airport’s configuration, as well as assumptions about passenger and  baggage processing.
TSA developed its new model, the Staffing Allocation Model (SAM), with  the assistance of a contractor, Regal Decisions (the model was originally  called the “Regal” model). As part of the contract requirements, Regal staff  and TSA industrial engineers visited airports and met with their Federal  Security Directors (FSD) to collect baseline information such as number  of lanes, and number of checked baggage processing nodes, along with  unique characteuration) of the airports. FSDs had ristics (physical config some input (mostly verification of the model input data specific to their  airports) into the process, but were not directly involved in creating the  model. Overall, it took Regal and TSA almost a year to get the new  Staffing Allocation Model stabilized and ready for initial roll-out. TSA  obtained data for, developed, and began deploying the model for testing in  the summer of 2004 and first used it for the fiscal year 2005 TSO staffing  allocation for the nation’s airports. The latest TSO staffing numbers based  on the model (for fiscal year 2006) were sent out to the field in October  2005. TSA was in the process of developing allocations for fiscal year 2007  at the time of our report.
section_title: Staffing Allocation Model Components
paragraphs: The Staffing Allocation Model consists of three different components. The  first is the “GRA” flight data, which provides information to the model on  flight schedules and passenger and baggage volume. These data are fed  into the “Regal” software (from Regal Decision Systems), which is a  simulation model that replicates each airpornfiguration and t’s co screening process. Finally, the “Sabre” software is a scheduling tool that  takes the Regal output, expressed in numbers of TSOs needed to staff  security checkpoints in 5-minute increments during the day, and produces  an FTE requirement and corresponding TSO work schedules for each  airport. Below is a detailed description of the three components that  combine to make up TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model.
subsections: section_title: GRA Flight Data
paragraphs: The GRA flight data uses historical data to determine screening demand at  each airport. These historical data include baggage volume, flight and  passenger distribution curves, size/type of aircraft, and load factors. The  GRA firm obtains these data mainly from the various airport authorities  and from published sources such as the Official Airlines Guide. The  guide’s flight schedules are provided to the airports 60-90 days in advance.  This allows airports enough time to react to potential changes in their  passenger flow, and for the FSDs to make any needed changes to the flight  schedules listed in the model, so as to account for last minute scheduling  changes or added flights that were not originally published in the guide.  The updated flight schedules and passenger loads (which represent the  screening demand) from the GRA model serve as the input for the Regal  software, which determines the number of open lanes and the amount of  baggage equipment needed.
section_title: Regal Software
paragraphs: The annual staffing allocation for each airport is based on the peak month  demand level (derived by reviewing historical flight and  passenger/baggage load data available from the GRA software) input into  the Regal software, together w configurations and ith data on airport assumptions about passenger and baggage processing (that were not a  part of the old GRA demand-driven model). The Regal software uses these  input data to simulate the actual flow of passengers and baggage through  the airport. The final oeach airport’s requirements (in numberutput— of  TSO staff for all passenger lanes and baggage pods, expressed in 5 minute  increments throughout the day)—is determined based on the various  assumptions outlined in table 7 and discussed as follows:  —This is the additional demand for  personnel screening checkpoints created by nonpassengers (e.g.,  airline crews, concession staff, and airport vendors). Based on  discussions with TSA leadership and estim s by industrial engineate the model constant for nonpassenger screening demand was set at 4  percent of passenger lane volume.  —This is the amount of time passengers  have to wait to undergo  reening at the security checkpoint. The  model sets a threshold of a 10-minute wait before opening additional  lanes, if available, based on passenger volumes.
Peak month screening demand—TSA derives the Staffing Allocation  Model’s allocations based on originating passenger load factors for the  85th percentile day of each airport’s peak month. In determining the  85th percentile day, TSA must first determine each airport’s peak  month by reviewing historical monthly passenger lo month in the airport’s year. According to TSA industrial engineers,  selection of the peak month is based on the average demand day  (based on passenger load) for each month with the peak month being  the month with the highest average demand day. Since daily screening  demand data are not reported by the airlines (and, is therefore, not  available) TSA must approximate each month’s average demand day b dividing the monthly passenger load data by the number of days in th month. This assumption is linked to TSA’s 10-minute wait time goal fo processing passengers and baggage through security. That is, accordin to TSA industrial engineers, basing the Staffing Allocation Model on th average peak demand day is intended to ensure that, on an annual  basis, 85 percent or more of the total passengers screened in U.S.  airports will not have to wait more than 10 minutes to be scree Further, based on TSA’s analysis, basing the model on this level ofned.  demand may result in TSA taking longer than 10 minutes to screen  passengers during 7 percent of an airport’s days during the year. According to TSA, these 25 to 30 days are typically the exceptionall high travel days such as the days before the Thanksgiving and  Christmas holidays. Conversely, for purposes of the annual allocation,  TSA industrial engineers added that basing the model’s demand level on the average peak demand day may result in TSA screening  passengers in 10 minutes or less during 93 percent of the airport’s day s  during the year (approximately 335 to 340 travel days over the airport’s  year). Lastly, when determining the annual allocation, TSA officials run  the model on a representative week during the peak month.
By basing airports’ staffing allocations on their peak month pa volume, TSA intends to ensure that airports will have some staff to  accommodate nonscreening activities such as training and annual leave  during off-peak periods. In addition, the peak month-based allocation is  intended to provide airports with excess staffing capacity to respond to  ssenger  unforeseen events such as changes in flight schedules, injuries, and  sick leave. In addition to nonpassenger screening demand, pass processing wait time, and the calculation of demand, the following  assumptions were included in the fiscal year 2007 model:  Line item full-time-equivalent allocation for TSO time paid but not  worked—In fiscal year 2007, TSA, for the first time, provided a sep line item allocation for the various categories of TSO time paid not  worked. These categories include vacation, sick, comp, injury, and  military leave. Prior to fiscal year 2007, TSO time paid not worked was  indirectly accounted for within the peak month screening demand/85 percentile day assumption.
Part-time staff—TSA sets the SAM to run at a staffing mix of full-time  and part-time TSO full-time equivalents based on each airport’s  individual part-time to full-time TSO ratio. Prior to fiscal year 2007, TSA assumed the same part-time goal for all category X, I, and II airports— regardless of their actual ratios.
Passenger checkpoint throughput—The passenger checkpoint  throughput is the number of passengers that are processed per security  checkpoint lane, per hour. The model assumes this to be 200.
Checked baggage processing rates—The checked baggage processing  rate is the number of bags that various types of screening equipment  will process per hour. Table 7 shows baggage processing rates basedon type of screening equipment and whether the baggage sc system is in-line or stand-alone.
Baggage staffing requirements required to adequately staff screening equipment. As with checked  baggage processing rates, baggage staffing requirements vary by  screening equipment, whether the equipment is stand-alone or inline,  and by airport category.  —This is the number of TSO FTEs    Staffing per lane by airport category—The model allocates staffing by airport category and by lane type. A standard checkpoint lane is  a lane  that processes only passengers who are not selectees (i.e., those  passengers selected for more intense screening). An integrated  checkpoint lane is a lane that processes both standard passengers a selectees. A dedicated checkpo int lane is a lane that processes only  passengers who are selectees.
Standard alarm rates—The model assumes specific rates for alarms o screening equipment used at both passenger checkpoints and  check areas. The model also assumes a selectee rate for passenger  checkpoints.
section_title: Sabre Software
paragraphs: Sa re Airline Solutions, Inc., provides the commercial, off-the-shelf b sfo tware for the staffing allocation model’s scheduling tool. The Sabre  scheduling tool has three features—Staff Admin, Staff Manager, and Staff  Plan. (TSA did not purchase the Staff Manager component.) Staff Admin  rosters an airport’s employee group in a database (shifts, schedules,  personal information, training, etc.) while Staff Plan recommends a m ix of  full-time and part-time TSOs and generates a daily work schedule based on the Regal software’s staffing requirement output. Sabre takes th output and converts it into an full-time-equivalent figure and it determines  scheduling plans based on that figure (if the airport uses Sabre for  scheduling) using the 80/20 full-time/part-time TSO mix for category X and II airports.
section_title: TSA’s Use of the Staffing Allocation Model
paragraphs: TSA uses the Staffing Allocation Model in three different ways—first, it is  run once a year to determine the staffing allocation for all airports (annual  allocation run). Second, it is run at other times to perform capacity  analysis for both lanes required and number and types of baggage  equipment required. Third, it is run at other times of the year where  airports can tweak certain aspects of the model for scheduling runs  without approval from TSA headquarters—for example, to conduct “what- if” scheduling scenarios by changing different inputs, such as passenger  flow, or flight schedules. However, they cannot do so for an annual  allocation run unless TSA headquarters grants approval to change an  assumption for a specific airport. The baseline for an annual allocation run  always stays the same and cannot be changed by an airport without TSA  headquarters approval. TSA models each airport according to its unique  configuration—that is, no two airports are modeled the same because no  two airports look the same (nor do they have the same airline traffic  profile). FSDs and their staffs typically meet with airline carriers on a  continuing basis to obtain updated flight schedules. The scheduling runs to  determine TSO schedules incorporate these updated flight schedules  whereas, the fiscal runs to determine overall full-time-equivalent  allocation, using peak month passenger volumes from historical flight  data. If the historical flight schedule used for an annual allocation run is  significantly different from current flight schedules at an airport (e.g., a  new airline carrier joins the airport), the FSD can submit an appeal to TSA  headquarters to re-run the model using the current flight schedule in order  to obtain a more accurate staffing allocation for his or her airport. (This  has been done on an annual basis or when a significant change in the  airport’s flight schedule occurs.) Unlike for annual allocation runs,  updated flight schedules are used more frequently for scheduling runs at  the local airports without headquarters intervention. elements and assumptions are accurate for their airports and bringing to  headquarters’ attention any factors that should be reviewed to determine changes to the model for their airports may be appropriate.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Brian J. Lepore (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov.
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Maria Strudwick, Assistant Director;  David Alexander; Richard Ascarate; Philip Caramia; Kathryn Godfrey;  Michael Harmond; Thomas Lombardi; Enemencio Sanchez; Edith S Pamela Valentine; Vaughn Williams; and Greg Wilmoth made key  contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains. GAO-07-448T.  Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007.
Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the  Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed  to Further Mitigate Security Risks. GAO-07-375. Washington, D.C.:  January 24, 2007.
Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening  Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D.C.: July  28, 2006.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding  Uncertainties Remain. GAO-06-875T. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006.
Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the  Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program. GAO- 06-864T. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better  Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in  Deploying Less-than-Lethal Weapons. GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.:   May 26, 2006.
Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked  Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington,  D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made  Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring  Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T.  Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private- Sector Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains. GAO-06-166.  Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely  Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s  Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from  Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.:  November 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air  Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2005.
Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority  of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.:  September 23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training  Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed.   GAO-05-781. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not  Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information during Secure Flight  Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps  to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.:   July 22, 2005.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of  Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.:  July 13, 2005.
Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement  Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.:  May 2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way,  but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05- 356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.  Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial  Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.:  February 23, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize  Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA’s Progress to Allow  Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services.   GAO-05-126. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but  Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term  Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of  Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728.  Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention Needed  to Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington, D.C.: May  28, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. GAO-04- 785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to  Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519.  Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility  to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T. Washington, D.C.:  April 22, 2004.
Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation  Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer- Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.:  March 17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the  Transportation Security Administration’s Efforts to Secure Aerial  Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System  Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington,  D.C.: February 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing  Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington,  D.C.: February 12, 2004.
The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a  Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development  Program. GAO-04-341R. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen  Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges  of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.  GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address  Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress  Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.:  September 24, 2003.
Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the  Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security  Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address  Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides  Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T.  Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover  Airports’ Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.:  February 25, 2003.
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a  Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.:   January 17, 2003.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and  DOT’s Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January 10,  2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the  Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and  Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22,  2002.
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has  Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27.  Washington, D.C.:  October 15, 2002.
Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses  Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces  Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.:  July 25, 2002.
Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial  Pilots. GAO-02-822R.  Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard  Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.:  September 25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for  Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:  September 21, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s  Efforts. GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve  Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.:  September 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in  Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.