NASA: More Knowledge Needed to Determine Best Alternatives to Provide Space Station Logistics Support
Published: 2005-05-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space shuttle fleet has been key to International Space Station operations. Since the grounding of the fleet in February 2003, Russia has provided logistics support. However, due to the limited payload capacity of the Russian space vehicles, on-orbit assembly of the space station stopped. In May 2004 and in February 2005, NASA testified before the Congress that it had assessed using alternative launch vehicles to the space shuttle for space station operations. NASA concluded that using alternatives would be challenging and result in long program delays and would ultimately cost more than returning the space shuttle safely to flight. Yet uncertainties remain about when the space shuttle will return to flight, and questions have been raised about NASA's assessment of alternatives. GAO was asked to determine whether NASA's assessment was sufficient to conclude that the space shuttle is the best option for assembling and providing logistics support to the space station.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NASA's 2004 assessment identified significant challenges associated with using alternative launch vehicles for space station assembly and operation. According to previous studies and our discussions with industry representatives, these challenges would likely preclude using alternative vehicles for assembly missions. However, NASA's assessment was insufficient to conclude that the shuttle was the best option for logistics support missions prior to the proposed retirement of the space shuttle in 2010. NASA relied primarily on headquarters expertise to conduct the informal assessment, and while we recognize that the extensive experience of its senior managers is an important element in evaluating alternatives, NASA officials did not document the proceedings and decisions reached in its assessment. As a result, the existence of this assessment of alternatives cannot be verified, nor can the conclusions be validated. NASA is currently evaluating responses from a September 2004 request for information from various commercial space transportation industries that could provide launch services to support space station operations, following retirement of the shuttle in 2010, until the station's planned retirement in 2016. NASA officials indicated that a commercial launch capability to support space station operations is possible prior to the proposed shuttle retirement in 2010, but stated that this capability would not eliminate any of the scheduled space shuttle flights. NASA is also re-examining its requirements for the type of scientific research to be conducted on the space station as well as the manifest requirements of the space shuttle. Combining the information gathered from commercial industry and a better definition of space station and shuttle requirements, NASA officials agree there is an opportunity to perform a more comprehensive assessment of alternatives, especially for logistics missions late this decade.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) space  shuttle has been the primary vehicle for delivering components for  assembly and providing logistics support to the International Space  Station. NASA grounded the space shuttle fleet following the Space Shuttle  Columbia accident in February 2003, leaving the space station dependent  on Russia to provide crew rotation, crew rescue, and logistics support.  However, due to the limited payload capacity of Russian space vehicles,  on-orbit assembly of the space station has halted. NASA plans to return  the space shuttle to flight by mid 2005 and resume space station assembly  and logistics missions.
In May 2004 and again in February 2005, NASA testified before the  Congress that it had assessed using alternative launch vehicles for  completing space station assembly and providing logistics support.  According to NASA officials, their assessment showed that using  alternative launch vehicles would introduce unacceptable operational  risks, technical challenges, long program delays, and would ultimately cost  more than returning the space shuttle to flight. Therefore, NASA  concluded that the space shuttle’s unique capabilities provided the best  available option for these missions. Despite these testimonies, concerns  have been raised about NASA’s conclusions, both within Congress and the  industry. Due to the uncertainty regarding when the space shuttle would  return to safe flight and concerns that additional flights would be needed  to support assembly and logistics operations, you asked us to determine  whether NASA’s assessment of alternatives was sufficient to conclude that  the space shuttle is the best option for completing assembly and providing  logistics support to the space station.
To conduct our work, we obtained and analyzed agency documentation  and interviewed NASA officials responsible for managing the launch  services, space shuttle, and space station programs within NASA  headquarters as well as program managers at NASA centers involved in  space shuttle and space station operations. We also interviewed  commercial space transportation contractors and reviewed pertinent  documentation related to expendable launch vehicles. In addition, we  reviewed NASA’s request for information for commercial space  transportation services, which it issued in September 2004, and its plans  for assessing the responses to this request and follow-on activities. We  conducted our work from August 2004 through April 2005 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. For a complete  description of our scope and methodology, see appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: NASA and its international partners—Canada, Europe, Japan, and  Russia—are building the space station to serve as an orbiting research  facility. The space shuttle is the primary vehicle supporting the assembly  and resupply of the station. Figure 1 shows the Space Shuttle Endeavour  docked to the International Space Station. Following the Columbia  accident in February 2003, the NASA Administrator grounded the space  shuttle fleet pending an investigation into the cause of the accident. The  administrator appointed the Columbia Accident Investigation Board to  determine the cause of the accident and to make recommendations for  improving the safety of the space shuttle before it could return to flight.  The board issued its report in August 2003 with 29 recommendations for  improvement—15 of which must be implemented before the space shuttle  can return to flight. NASA plans to return the shuttle to flight in July 2005.
While the shuttle has been grounded, space station crew transfers and  logistics resupply have depended on Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles.  Europe and Japan are also developing logistics cargo vehicles to support  space station operations later this decade. These Russian, European, and  Japanese vehicles are launched on expendable rockets. The European  Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), scheduled to be available for missions  to the space station in 2006, is being designed to rendezvous and dock  with the space station’s Russian Service Module. The Japanese H-II  Transfer Vehicle (HTV) is scheduled to be available in 2008 and will fly  within the proximity of the space station to be caught by the station’s  robotic arm before being berthed to the space station. The ATV and HTV  also carry less cargo than the shuttle.
Because the Russian Soyuz and Progress are the only vehicles currently  available and carry significantly less payload than the space shuttle,  operations are generally limited to transporting crew, food, potable water,  as well as propellant resupply for reboosting the space station to higher  orbits. Launches of space station assembly elements and large orbital  replacement items for maintenance have effectively ceased.
From 2000 to early 2004, NASA performed two studies that focused on the  potential use of commercial launch vehicles to provide logistics services to  the space station. In a 90-day study conducted in 2000, NASA determined  that no commercial logistics service for the space station was possible at  that time, as no launch vehicles possessed the critical capabilities  necessary to provide logistics services, including automated rendezvous  capabilities. As a result of this study, NASA decided to solicit and fund a  more detailed review of concepts designed to provide logistics services to  the space station. The Alternate Access to Station (AAS) study contracts  were awarded in July 2002, with 1-year contracts given to four contractors.  In summer 2003, these contractors presented architectures that relied on  existing domestic or international expendable launch vehicles. In the fall  of 2003, the contracts were extended, and the contractors were asked to  address larger cargo delivery capabilities and “downmass” (e.g. returning  research materials to earth) requirements were added for the return of  cargo. This study ended in January 2004 with the contractors briefing on  their study results, at which time NASA concluded that developing a  domestic capability to meet most of the space station cargo service needs  was possible within 3 to 5 years.
In January 2004, the President announced a new Vision for Exploration  that called for retiring the shuttle in 2010, requiring NASA to find an  alternative to support space station operations through 2016 by the end of  the decade. The President called for a shift in NASA’s long-term focus,  envisioning that NASA will retire the space shuttle after nearly 30 years of  service as soon as assembly of the International Space Station is  completed, planned for the end of the decade, and will develop a new crew  exploration vehicle as well as launch human missions to the moon  between 2015 and 2020. In essence, NASA’s implementation plan holds  aeronautics, science, and other activities at near constant levels and  transitions funding currently dedicated to the space station and space  shuttle programs to the new exploration strategy as the space station and  space shuttle programs phase out. The vision also changed the space  station’s on-board research focus. Originally, the space station was to be  used for conducting experiments in near-zero gravity to include life  sciences research on how humans adapt to long durations in space,  biomedical research, and materials-processing research. Under the new  vision, the research will be focused on determining the effects of long  duration space travel on humans and developing countermeasures for  those effects, with the goal that the space station research necessary to  support human explorers on other worlds would be complete by 2016.  Figure 2 shows NASA’s proposed plan for operational support of the space  station until 2016.
section_title: NASA’s 2004 Assessment Was Based on Insufficient Knowledge for Concluding Space Shuttle Was Best Launch Option, but Opportunities Now Exist for More Detailed Study
paragraphs: According to program officials, NASA’s 2004 informal assessment  concluded that alternative launch vehicles would present operational  risks, technical challenges, and long program delays and would cost more  than returning the space shuttle to flight, making the space shuttle the best  option for both assembly and logistics missions through the end of the  decade. According to previous studies and our discussions with  commercial industry representatives, the time involved for developing an  alternate capability would probably preclude assembly missions from  consideration. However, NASA did not have sufficient knowledge to  support its conclusion regarding logistic support missions. Specifically,  NASA did not perform a comparative cost analysis that considered the  schedule impacts or associated costs of planned space shuttle operations.  Furthermore, NASA officials did not document these informal proceedings  and decisions reached; therefore, the thoroughness of any assessment of  alternatives cannot be verified, nor can their conclusions be validated.
NASA is currently evaluating responses from commercial industry on  different ways to provide logistics services to and from the space station.  NASA’s re-examination of its requirements for the space station and space  shuttle, coupled with the cost information of alternatives obtained from  commercial industry responses, provide NASA with a basis for performing  a detailed analysis of alternatives to determine if any planned space  shuttle logistics missions could be performed by or complemented with  commercial launch vehicles later this decade.
subsections: section_title: Technical Challenges Difficult to Overcome for Assembly Missions, but Cost Comparison of Later Logistics Missions Insufficient
paragraphs: As a result of the informal assessment, NASA outlined a number of  technical challenges to using an alternate vehicle for space station  support, especially for assembly missions where the space shuttle’s crew  and remote manipulator arm perform key functions. Appendix III provides  a discussion of these challenges. NASA officials stated they used the AAS  study, which concentrated solely on logistics support missions, as the  foundation for its 2004 informal assessment. In a summary of that study,  NASA reported that the AAS contractors projected the cost to develop an  alternate launch capability would be approximately $1 billion, take 3 to 5  years to develop, and require $2 to $3 billion per year for operations. We  held discussions with commercial industry representatives who concurred  with this time frame to develop an alternate capability to support space  station operation. Since a majority of the space station assembly missions  are scheduled within the next 3 years, these types of missions could  preclude the use of an alternative vehicle.
However, NASA did not have sufficient knowledge to conclude that the  shuttle was the best option for logistics missions prior to its retirement of  the shuttle in 2010. NASA officials stated that the technical challenges for  developing an alternative vehicle could be overcome, but probably not  before the 28 missions scheduled through 2010, of which 8 are for  logistics, including 5 of the last 7 missions. However, we found no  evidence of analyses performed by NASA to compare the cost and  schedule impact of using alternate launch systems with the scheduled  space shuttle program costs, to include the cost of returning the space  shuttle to flight. We recently reported that the majority of NASA’s budget  estimates for returning the space shuttle to flight had not been fully  developed. In fact, NASA officials stated that they did not compare  estimated costs for developing alternative launch vehicles against budget  estimates for the 28 space shuttle flights currently planned to support the  space station, which total more than $22 billion between fiscal year 2005  and fiscal year 2010. In addition, NASA has also requested $1.8 billion for  crew and cargo services over the same time frame to purchase commercial  services using existing and emerging capabilities, both domestic and  foreign. In its fiscal year 2006 budget request, NASA indicated that such  commercial services are expected to be available not later than 2009 and  that these services are a key element in the future of the space station  program.
section_title: Informal Assessment Was Not Documented
paragraphs: In addition to lacking sufficient knowledge with regard to the use of  alternatives for logistics missions, NASA did not document the  proceedings and decisions reached in its 2004 assessment. Specifically, the  agency did not record the processes it followed and therefore did not  capture the basis of the decisions reached. When asked about the details  of the assessment, NASA officials indicated that the informal assessment  was based primarily on the expertise within the headquarters and they did  not formally document the decision paths. While we recognize that the  extensive experience of its senior managers is an important element in  evaluating alternatives, the existence of any formal assessment of  alternatives covering the entire range of missions for space station support  cannot be verified, and the agency’s position on the space shuttle being the  best option cannot be validated.
section_title: NASA’s Current Request for Information from Commercial Industry and Requirements Review Presents an Opportunity to Perform a More Detailed Analysis
paragraphs: NASA received 26 responses from a September 2004 request for  information that asked for, among other things, input from the commercial  space industry regarding capabilities and market interest for missions for  providing cargo launch services to, and the ability to return items from,  the space station. This request for information had similar characteristics  as the AAS study, which also had as its objective to explore the  development of alternative cargo “upmass” and “downmass” support for  the space station. The responses are being evaluated, and NASA plans to  seek more detailed information from the commercial launch industry for  additional study or development work in June 2005. According to NASA  officials, the responses from industry with regard to space station logistics  support have been very promising. The officials indicated that it might be  possible to have a developed and certified capability to provide  commercial cargo launch service to the space station prior to space  shuttle retirement late this decade, rather than only after its retirement.  However, we were told these services would not eliminate any of the  scheduled space shuttle flights, but only augment the capabilities of the  space shuttle.
While these responses are being evaluated and knowledge is being  gathered, NASA is also reviewing the space station research requirements  and re-examining the planned manifest for the 28 space shuttle flights in  an attempt to better align their missions to the Vision for Space  Exploration. According to NASA’s fiscal year 2006 budget submission, the  agency is examining configurations of the space station that meet the  needs of the new vision and the international partners with as few space  shuttle flights as necessary.
Combining the information gathered from commercial industry and a  better definition of space station requirements, NASA officials agreed  there is an opportunity to perform a more comprehensive assessment of  alternatives, especially for the logistics missions late this decade.  According to a recent revision of NASA’s internal guidance, the most  important aspect of formulating a program technical approach is  conducting a thorough analysis of alternatives. NASA guidance defines an  analysis of alternatives as a formal method that compares alternatives by  estimating their ability to satisfy mission requirements through an  effectiveness analysis and by estimating their life cycle costs through cost  analysis. The results of these two analysis are used together to produce a  cost-effectiveness comparison that allows decision-makers to assess cost  and effectiveness simultaneously. An analysis of alternatives broadly  examines multiple elements of program alternatives (including technical  performance, risk, life cycle cost, and programmatic aspects), and is  typically an important part of the formulation studies.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: NASA views a thorough analysis of alternatives as an important aspect in  the formulation of a program technical approach. While we recognize that  the extensive experience of its senior managers is an important element in  evaluating alternatives, NASA did not have the full breadth of knowledge  necessary to perform a comprehensive assessment of alternative launch  vehicles to enable it to conclude the space shuttle was the best option to  support space station operations. However, NASA’s recent request for  information from industry offers the agency an opportunity to enhance its  knowledge of alternatives to the space shuttle for providing logistics  support for the space station and to explore the use of alternatives to the  existing space shuttle manifest currently under review. Although alternate  vehicles would not be available for missions to the space station until later  this decade and difficult to use for assembly missions, several of the space  shuttle’s final flights are planned logistics support missions that might be  conducted using alternative launch vehicles. By completing a  comprehensive analysis, NASA could also identify the feasibility and risks  associated with an alternative means of providing logistics support to the  space station in case delays occur requiring extension of the planned 2010  date. Furthermore, a comprehensive and thoroughly documented analysis  of launch requirements and launch alternatives can provide NASA with  comparative cost information and afford the agency the opportunity to use  its resources more effectively and efficiently. This is particularly important  now since the space station and space shuttle programs will be competing  for limited resources.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better position the agency to determine the best available option for  providing logistics support to the space station, we recommend the NASA  Administrator take the following three steps:    Direct current efforts to explore other space launch options to utilize a  comprehensive and fully documented assessment of alternatives that  matches mission requirements, and associated manifest, with the  launch vehicles expected to be available;    As part of this assessment, (a) determine the development and  operation costs associated with these potential alternatives and (b)  perform a detailed analysis of these alternatives to determine the best  option for delivering the logistics cargo required for space station  operations prior to and after space shuttle retirement; and    Ensure this assessment is completed before any NASA investments are  made for commercial space transportation services to the space  station.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our  recommendations and stated that the agency seeks to fully explore space  launch options for assuring access to the space station in conjunction with  its retirement planning for the space shuttle.  NASA plans to document its  acquisition strategy through a NASA Headquarters Acquisition Strategy  Meeting prior to release of a request for proposal for commercial space  station cargo services later this summer. In addition, NASA said it will  evaluate the cost and capabilities of the proposed transportation system to  meet space station and agency needs, as well as the needs of its partners.  NASA also said that its acquisition strategy will be consistent with space  station requirements, international partner agreements, and available  funding.
We are encouraged that NASA has taken steps to pursue a deliberate  alternative cargo transportation system assessment. However, NASA  should not limit documentation of this effort to the acquisition strategy  meeting, but should also document the decision paths leading up to that  event and throughout the evaluation of the transportation systems  proposed by contractors responding to NASA’s request for proposals. This  approach should identify the decision makers involved and provide a fully  documented rationale of the acquisition processes as NASA analyzes all  alternatives to determine the best options for delivering the logistics cargo  for space station operations. NASA’s comments are reprinted in appendix  II.
As agreed, unless you publicly announce the contents earlier, we plan no  further distribution of this report until 15 days from its issue date. At that  time, we will send copies to the NASA Administrator; the Director, Office  of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will also  make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions  about this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix  IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine whether NASA conducted a detailed assessment of  alternatives to the space shuttle for completing assembly and providing  logistics support to the International Space Station, we:    Obtained and analyzed pertinent NASA documents and briefing slides  related to the International Space Station, space shuttles, and other  launch alternatives, such as Expendable Launch Vehicles, including:  European Space Agency Segment Specifications for the Automated  Transfer Vehicle; Specification for the Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicle;  International Space Station Payload Integration and Assembly  Sequence specifications; Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle  configurations; space station and space shuttle status, history, and cost  briefings; Return to Flight Status Briefings; and, Alternate Access to  Station briefings.
Reviewed previous GAO reports on NASA, the Space Shuttle Program,  International Space Station Program, and best practices in many areas  and multiple agencies. We also reviewed reports from the  Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, Office  of Management and Budget, and the Planetary Society, and Russian  Space Program.
Interviewed officials responsible for managing the programs within the  Space Operations Mission Directorate at NASA headquarters, as well as  program managers at Johnson Space Center, Texas. We also  interviewed NASA officials at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, who are  responsible for processing space station payloads and integrating those  payloads with the launch vehicles. We interviewed contractors at  Boeing Launch Services and Lockheed Martin Space Systems and  reviewed pertinent documentation related to expendable launch  vehicles for space station assembly and logistics support. We also  reviewed NASA’s request for information related to commercial  industry interest in providing that capability and NASA’s plans for  assessing responses to the request for information and follow on  activities. For this, we interviewed NASA officials within the Space  Operations Mission Directorate and at Johnson Space Center, Texas.  We also interviewed Air Force officials from the Evolved Expendable  Launch Vehicle Program. We also received, reviewed, and analyzed  follow-up written and oral comments from several individuals at these  locations and NASA’s Science Directorate.
To accomplish our work, we visited and interviewed officials at NASA  Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Johnson Space Center, Texas; and  Kennedy Space Center, Florida. These centers were chosen because they  maintain primary responsibility for conducting space shuttle and space  station operations on a day-to-day basis. The offices we met with at  headquarters and each of these centers included space station program  officials, space shuttle program officials, NASA Launch Services Office,  the International Space Station Payload Processing Directorate at  Kennedy Space Center, and Space Shuttle Program Integration Office at  Kennedy Space Center. We also visited the Boeing Launch Services, Inc.,  in Huntington Beach, California, and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station,  Florida; Boeing Commercial Space Systems in Research Park, Huntsville,  Alabama; and Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company in Littleton,  Colorado, and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida.
We conducted our work from August 2004 through April 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
section_title: Appendix III: Challenges of Using Alternative Vehicles
paragraphs: According to NASA officials involved in the 2004 assessment,  accommodating a transition to other launch vehicles would create  significant challenges that drive risk, schedule, and costs. NASA officials  stated the space station elements were designed and built to take  advantage of the more benign launch environment in the space shuttle’s  cargo bay, to be removed and repositioned by the space shuttle’s robotic  arm, and then connected together by the space shuttle crew during space  walk activities. The following outlines the major challenges NASA  identified:    There would be a need to develop a new process to assemble the space  station using only the space station crew and without the benefit of the  space shuttle remote manipulator arm.
Using another launch vehicle would require the redesign and retesting  of space station elements already built due to the change in launch  environment. NASA officials stated the space shuttle launch  environment, with respect to vibration and g-force exerted on the  payload, cannot be duplicated on an expendable launch vehicle.
A new, unique transfer vehicle would need to be developed in order to  rendezvous and dock assembly elements with the space station. For  logistics cargo support, two transfer vehicles are currently being  developed for logistics mission to support space station operations, the  European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and the Japanese H-II  Transfer Vehicle (HTV). These vehicles, much like the Russian  Progress vehicle, have a limited cargo capability when compared to the  space shuttle. The ATV, scheduled to be available for missions to the  space station in 2006, is being designed to rendezvous and dock to the  space station via the Russian Service Module. The HTV is scheduled to  be available in 2008 and will fly within the proximity of the space  station to be caught by the space station’s robotic arm before being  berthed to the space station.
A carrier to go inside the new transfer vehicle to replicate the space  shuttle attach points would need to be developed.
According to these officials, in order to meet volume requirements, the  payload fairings would have to be modified from the current 5-meter to  a 6-meter version to accommodate the larger diameter payloads to the  space station during assembly missions.
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Staff making key contributions to this report were Jim Morrison,   James Beard, Rick Cederholm, Karen Sloan, and T.J Thomson.