Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations
Published: 2004-02-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task--with hundreds of airports and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of baggage. In an effort to strengthen the security of commercial aviation, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created and charged with making numerous enhancements to aviation security, including federalizing passenger and baggage screening and screening checked baggage using explosive detection systems. To assess the progress of passenger and baggage screening operations, GAO was asked to describe TSA's efforts to (1) hire and deploy passenger and baggage screeners, (2) train the screening workforce, (3) measure screener performance in detecting threat objects, and (4) leverage and deploy screening equipment and technologies.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: TSA met its mandate to establish a federal screener workforce by November 2002, but continues to face challenges in hiring and deploying passenger and baggage screeners. Staffing shortages at some airports and TSA's hiring process have hindered TSA's ability to fully staff screening checkpoints without using additional measures, such as overtime. In addition, while TSA has taken steps to enhance its screener training programs, staffing shortages and lack of high-speed connectivity at airport training facilities have made it difficult for screeners at some airports to fully utilize these programs. TSA has also undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance of passenger screeners in detecting threat objects. These efforts include increasing covert testing at screening checkpoints and conducting annual recertifications of screeners. While TSA is making progress in measuring the performance of passenger screeners, it has collected limited performance data related to its baggage screening operations. However, TSA has begun collecting additional performance data related to its baggage screening operations, and plans to increase these efforts in the future. TSA also continues to face challenges in deploying and leveraging screening equipment and technologies. TSA deployed Explosive Detection Systems and Explosive Trace Detection equipment to all airports to screen checked baggage. However, TSA has been unable to fully utilize this equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage due to screener shortages, and equipment out of service for maintenance and/or repairs. When this equipment is not available, TSA continues to screen checked baggage using alternative means. TSA also has ongoing initiatives designed to increase the efficiency of screening checked baggage, including implementing in-line baggage screening systems and streamlining screening processes. TSA is also conducting research and development (R&D) activities to strengthen passenger and baggage screening. These efforts are designed to improve detection capability, performance, and efficiency for current technologies, and to develop next generation screening equipment. TSA faces a number of challenges with its R&D program, including balancing funding with competing priorities, and working with other components of the Department of Homeland Security to develop a strategy for merging their R&D programs.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing to discuss  progress and challenges in airport passenger and baggage screening.  Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task—with hundreds of  airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of flights daily carrying  millions of passengers and pieces of baggage. In an effort to strengthen the  security of commercial aviation, the President signed into law the Aviation  and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) on November 19, 2001. ATSA  created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and mandated  actions designed to strengthen aviation security, including the  federalization of passenger and baggage screening at over 440 commercial  airports in the United States by November 19, 2002, and the screening of  all checked baggage using explosive detection systems. Notwithstanding  these efforts, recent reviews and covert testing conducted by us, the  Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Inspector General,  and TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review revealed  continuing weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the screening system.
My testimony today focuses on the progress TSA is making in developing  and deploying tools to enhance and measure screener performance and  the challenges that remain. In particular, my testimony highlights four key  areas, including TSA’s efforts to (1) hire and deploy passenger and  baggage screeners, (2) train the screening workforce, (3) measure  screener performance in detecting threat objects, and (4) leverage and  deploy screening equipment and technologies. My testimony is based on  our prior work and preliminary observations from our ongoing reviews of  TSA’s passenger and baggage screening programs, and research and  development efforts.
While TSA met its mandate to establish a federal screener workforce by  November 2002, it continues to face challenges in hiring and deploying its  screener workforce. To accomplish its security mission, TSA needs a  sufficient number of passenger and baggage screeners trained and  certified in the latest TSA screening procedures and technology. However,  staffing shortages and TSA’s hiring process have hindered the ability of  some Federal Security Directors (FSD) to provide sufficient resources to  staff screening checkpoints and oversee screening operations at their  airports.
TSA has taken steps to enhance its training programs for passenger and  baggage screeners. In addition to strengthening its basic and recurrent  training programs, TSA is also enhancing and standardizing remedial  training for screeners who fail covert tests conducted by TSA’s Office of  Internal Affairs and Program Review. TSA has also established leadership  and technical training programs for screening supervisors. Although TSA  continues to make progress in this area, staffing shortages and lack of  high-speed connectivity at many airport training facilities have made it  difficult for screeners to fully utilize these programs and complete  required training.
While TSA has undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance  of passenger screeners in detecting threat objects, it has collected limited  data related to the performance of baggage screeners. In response to its  July 2003 Passenger Screener Performance Improvement Study, TSA  developed a short-term action plan that identified key actions TSA planned  to take to strengthen the performance of passenger screeners. These  actions built on several initiatives that TSA already had underway,  including enhancing training for screeners and supervisors, increasing  covert testing, completing installation of the Threat Image Projection  System (TIP), and conducting annual recertification of screeners. TSA has  focused on assessing the performance of passenger screeners, but has  collected limited data related to the performance of baggage screeners.  However, TSA has begun collecting additional performance data related to  its baggage screening operations, and plans to increase these efforts in the  future.
Although TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening  operations, it continues to face operational and funding challenges in its  efforts to screen all checked baggage using Explosive Detection Systems  (EDS) or Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) systems. TSA deployed this  equipment to all airports to screen checked baggage, but has been unable  to fully utilize this equipment due to screener and equipment shortages  and equipment being out of service for maintenance and/or repairs. When  EDS and ETD equipment cannot be used, TSA continues to use alternative  screening means identified in ATSA, including K-9 teams, manual  searches, and positive passenger bag match. TSA has ongoing initiatives  to increase the efficiency of screening all checked baggage using EDS and  ETD, including the development and construction of in-line baggage  screening systems—which streamlines screening processes and airport  operations at larger airports. In addition, although TSA is funding research  and development (R&D) on several technologies designed to improve the  effectiveness of screening checked baggage and passengers for explosives,  progress has been delayed due to competing priorities in a tight budget  environment.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The security of the U.S. commercial aviation system has been a long- standing concern. Over the years, numerous initiatives have been  implemented to strengthen aviation security. However, as we and others  have documented in numerous reports and studies, weaknesses continue  to exist. It was due in part to these weaknesses that terrorists were able to  hijack four commercial aircraft on September 11, 2001, with tragic results.  Concerns continue to exist regarding the security of the aviation system,  as evidenced by the recent cancellations of several, mostly transatlantic  flights to and from the United States in response to intelligence  information regarding specific threats to those flights.
In response to the attacks of September 11th, ATSA mandated specific  actions designed to strengthen aviation security, and established  ambitious deadlines for completing many of these initiatives.  Consequently, TSA initially focused on attempting to meet these deadlines,  particularly creating a federalized screener workforce at commercial  airports nationwide by November 19, 2002.  TSA also focused on screening  100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems by the  original deadline of December 31, 2002. These efforts resulted in the  deployment of more than 55,000 federal screeners at over 440 commercial  airports nationwide by November 19, 2002, as well as the deployment of  thousands of EDS and ETD systems.
Virtually all aviation security responsibilities now reside with TSA. Two of  the most important of these responsibilities are passenger and checked  baggage screening. Passenger screening involves the use of metal  detectors, X-ray machines, ETDs, and manual searches to examine  passengers and their carry-on baggage to identify threat objects. Checked  baggage screening involves the use of EDS, ETDs, K-9 teams, positive  passenger bag match, and manual searches to screen checked baggage.  Performing these screening functions can be cognitively demanding and  difficult for screening personnel.
The results I am presenting today are based on our preliminary  observations of TSA’s passenger and baggage screening programs and  related research and development efforts, based on our ongoing reviews of  these areas for this committee. As part of our ongoing reviews of TSA’s  passenger and baggage screening operations, we interviewed TSA officials  and visited 15 category X airports; 11 category I airports; and 7 category II,  III, and IV airports. During these visits, we observed screening operations  and interviewed FSDs, their staffs, and, at some airports, airport authority  and airline officials. We plan to visit additional airports and conduct  additional analysis during the remainder of our review, including  conducting a survey of all 158 FSDs regarding their screening operations.   Additionally, we will continue to assess TSA’s and DHS’s research and  development programs and the views of a panel of security and technology  experts that we convened with the assistance of the National Academy of  Sciences. We will report on the results of these reviews later this year.
section_title: Although Progress Has Been Made, Concerns Remain Regarding Hiring and Deploying the Screener Workforce
paragraphs: Although TSA successfully met its mandate to establish a federal screener  workforce by November 2002, it continues to face challenges in hiring and  deploying passenger and baggage screeners. To accomplish its security  mission, TSA needs a sufficient number of passenger and baggage  screeners trained and certified in TSA security procedures and  technologies. TSA has acknowledged that its initial staffing efforts created  imbalances in the screener workforce and is taking steps to address these  imbalances. However, staffing shortages at some airports and TSA’s hiring  process have hindered the ability of some FSDs to fully staff screening  checkpoints without using additional measures, such as overtime and the  use of a National Screening Force.
subsections: section_title: Staffing Shortages Affect Screening Operations
paragraphs: TSA accomplished a significant goal by hiring and deploying more than  55,000 passenger and baggage screeners by November 19, 2002. However,  TSA continues to struggle to maintain an adequate number of screeners at  airport checkpoints, and has not yet achieved a stable screener workforce.  Recognizing these difficulties, TSA has taken several steps to address  staffing imbalances—including enhancing its workforce planning efforts,  and deploying a National Screening Force to airports with pressing  screening needs.
subsections: section_title: Screener Imbalances
paragraphs: After meeting its deadline of deploying over 55,000 screeners by November  19, 2002, TSA recognized that its initial efforts created imbalances in the  screener workforce, as some airports had too many screeners while others  had too few. To address these imbalances, as well as congressional  concerns regarding screener-staffing levels, TSA began attempting to right- size its screener workforce. Specifically, TSA established a goal to reduce  its screener workforce by 3,000 screeners by June 1, 2003, and an  additional 3,000 screeners by September 30, 2003. These reductions were  achieved through attrition, voluntary transfers from full to part-time, and  involuntary transfers to part-time or terminations based on screeners’  scores on competency-based examinations.
Currently, a congressionally imposed staffing cap prohibits TSA from  exceeding a screener staffing level of 45,000 full-time equivalents (FTE).  Figure 1 shows that based on annualized FTE data, TSA is currently below  the 45,000 cap.
According to TSA officials, TSA has experienced an average annual  attrition rate of 14 percent for screeners. However, attrition among the  nation’s more than 440 commercial airports is sometimes considerably  higher. For example, at 8 category X airports visited during our review,  FSDs reported that average annual attrition ranged from 15 to 36 percent.
TSA has also experienced difficulties in hiring new staff, particularly part- time staff. FSDs at 11 of the 15 category X airports we visited reported that  they were below their authorized staffing levels due to attrition and  difficulties in hiring new staff. In addition, 3 of these FSDs noted that they  were never successful in hiring up to the authorized staffing levels. FSDs  said that some of the factors contributing to their inability to hire and  retain screeners were the location of their airport, the lack of accessible  and affordable parking and/or public transportation, and the high cost of  living.
In addition, FSDs at several of the airports we visited stated that they  experienced difficulty in attracting needed part-time screeners, which they  believed to be due to low pay and benefits, as well as undesirable hours.  Additionally, FSDs stated that very few full-time screeners were interested  in converting to part-time status, and TSA officials stated that attrition  rates for part-time screeners were considerably higher than those for full- time screeners. TSA began actively recruiting part-time screeners during  the summer of 2003, and continues to recruit part-time screeners at more  than 80 airports.
Due to screener shortages, FSDs at 6 of the category X airports we visited  stated that they frequently had to require mandatory overtime, particularly  during the holiday season, to accomplish passenger and baggage screening  functions. FSDs’ use of overtime was particularly high during peak  summer and holiday travel seasons. Figure 2 shows that between May 2003  and January 2004, TSA used the equivalent of an annualized average of  2,315 full-time-equivalent screeners in overtime hours per pay period  (every 2 weeks).
In an effort to right-size and stabilize its screener workforce, TSA hired a  consultant in September 2003 to conduct a study of screener staffing levels  at the nation’s commercial airports. Specifically, the consultant was tasked  with:    evaluating TSA’s current staffing methodology and systems to establish a  baseline for model development;    developing a method for collecting and analyzing data to realistically  portray specific airport conditions rather than using a generalized  large/small airport protocol;    developing a comprehensive modeling approach with appropriate details  to account for the considerable variability that occurs among airports;  integrating modeling parameters into TSA’s screener scheduling system;  implementing a staffing analysis model to be used as a management tool to  determine daily and weekly staffing levels and deploy the model to  commercial airports nationwide; and    delivering user-friendly simulation software that will determine optimum  screener staffing levels for each of the more than 440 commercial airports  with federal screeners.
TSA expects the consultant’s study to be completed in April 2004. In the  interim, TSA officials stated that they will continue to review the staffing  allocation provided through their internal modeling efforts, which, among  other things, assesses air carrier and airport growth patterns, and makes  adjustments as appropriate. We will continue to review TSA’s efforts to  determine appropriate staffing levels for passenger and baggage screeners  during the remainder of our review.
section_title: National Screening Force
paragraphs: To compensate for screener shortages and to enable operational flexibility  to respond to changes in risk and threat, in October 2003, TSA established  a National Screening Force to provide screening support to all airports in  times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under other special  circumstances that require a greater number of screeners than regularly  available to FSDs.  This force replaced the Mobile Screening Force—a  regionally-based force—that was created in early 2002 primarily to support  the initial deployment of federal screeners to commercial airports.  The  National Screening Force currently consists of over 700 full-time  passenger and baggage screeners, of which about 10 percent are screening  supervisors. Members of the National Screening Force volunteer to  participate on the force for a 1-year period. TSA officials stated that while  these screeners have a home airport to which they are assigned, they  travel to airports in need of screening staff approximately 70 percent of  the year.
TSA officials stated that they determine where to deploy members of the  National Screening Force based on four priorities. The highest priority is  given to those airports that need additional screeners in order to be able to  screen 100 percent of checked baggage using EDS and ETD.  The second  priority is given to small airports that have never met their authorized  screener staffing levels and have no permanent screeners. TSA officials  stated that several small airports have screening checkpoints that are  entirely staffed by the National Screening Force. They also stated that  some National Screening Force staff are deployed to airports, particularly  small airports, where they are only needed on a part-time basis. The third  priority is given to airports that are so understaffed that significant  screening delays would occur without additional staff. Finally, the fourth  priority is given to those airports with peak seasonal needs, such as Palm  Springs, airports that have a shortage of female passenger screeners; and  airports offering new commercial service. Additionally, when DHS  recently increased the threat condition from yellow (elevated) to orange  (high), TSA reportedly redeployed about 50 percent of the National  Screening Force to airports determined to be at a higher risk based on  intelligence data.
TSA is also currently drafting standard operating procedures for the  National Screening Force. We will continue to examine TSA’s use of the  National Screening Force during the remainder of our review.
section_title: TSA’s Hiring Process Not Fully Responsive to FSD Needs
paragraphs: TSA’s hiring process is designed to ensure that its hiring practices are  standardized and consistent throughout all airports. However, this process  has hindered the ability of some FSDs to adequately staff passenger and  baggage screening checkpoints. Several FSDs we interviewed expressed  concern that TSA’s hiring process was not responsive to their needs, and  wanted to have more input in the hiring process. These FSDs faced  screener shortages that hindered their screening capability.
To ensure consistency in its hiring process, TSA headquarters manages  hiring centrally through its Aviation Operations and Human Resources  offices. In general, the process includes the following steps.
FSDs identify their need for additional passenger or baggage screeners,  within their authorized allocation of screeners, and request headquarters  to initiate the hiring process.
Aviation Operations reviews and prioritizes each request in consultation  with FSDs.
Human Resources develops a hiring plan that identifies a schedule of  hiring events – from vacancy postings to the establishment of centers at  which the applicants’ skills are assessed.
A recruiting contractor receives and assesses all screener applications to  ensure the applicants meet the basic requirements for employment,  including U.S. citizenship and specific education and work experience. All  applicants that meet the minimum qualifications are invited to schedule  themselves for the assessment process.
Upon successfully completing the assessment process, the recruiting  contractor sends the list of qualified applicants to TSA’s hiring/personnel  contractor responsible for making job offers.
The hiring contractor schedules the candidates for orientation and training  once they have accepted the offers.
Many of the FSDs we interviewed expressed concern with the lack of a  continuous hiring process to backfill screeners lost through attrition, and  their lack of authority to conduct hiring on an as needed basis. The FSDs  also complained of the time lag between their request for additional staff  and having trained and certified screeners on board.  FSDs at 4 of the  category X airports we visited stated that the time lag between their  request for additional staffing and the opening of an assessment center  took several months.  For example, one FSD stated that in response to  continued attrition at his airport, he notified TSA in advance that  additional screeners would be needed before the peak summer travel  season.  However, an assessment center was not opened until mid-June  and the initial training did not begin until July.  The FSD reportedly had to  rely on the Mobile Screening Force and overtime to accommodate the  demand during the peak summer season.  This same FSD also stated that  the lengthy hiring process limited his ability to address screener  performance issues, such as absenteeism or tardiness, and contributed to  screener complacency because screeners were aware that they were  unlikely to be terminated due to staffing shortages.  In another example,  an FSD at one large airport found it difficult to fill the more than 100 part- time approved screener positions because the nearest assessment center  was too far away for local applicants to be processed.
Several FSDs we interviewed also stated that not all of the applicants who  were offered positions showed up for initial basic screener training. For  example, in November 2003, at one large category X airport, the FSD  reported that 80 individuals who accepted screener positions were  scheduled to report for basic screener training, but following orientation,  only 15 individuals (less than 20 percent) reported for training. TSA  headquarters reported that an average of 13 percent of screeners who are  hired fail to attend basic screener training.
FSDs also expressed concern regarding the lack of input they had during  the hiring process. Specifically, they stated that they do not have a role in  reviewing applications, interviewing applicants, or making hiring  decisions. In response to these concerns, TSA officials reported that they  plan to redesign and streamline their hiring process, particularly the  assessment center process (Phase II), to allow for more involvement by  FSDs and their staff. Specifically, officials reported that they are beginning  to (1) ensure that the recruiting contractor includes the FSD in  recruitment planning, including obtaining input regarding where and how  the contractor recruits; (2) allow FSDs to participate with the contractor  in the structured interview of the candidates during Phase II of the hiring  process; and (3) ensure that FSDs swear in the candidates and provides  organizational briefings on their first day of orientation. Officials also  reported that they plan to establish an advisory council of FSDs to help  guide the piloting and implementation of this new process. The goal of  these efforts is to make the hiring process more responsive to the wide  range of airports’ needs while ensuring efficiency and quality. We will  continue to review these initiatives as part of our ongoing review of TSA’s  process for hiring and deploying passenger and baggage screeners.
section_title: TSA Has Enhanced Its Screener Training Programs, but Access to Programs Is Sometimes Limited
paragraphs: TSA has taken steps to enhance its training programs for passenger and  baggage screeners. However, staffing shortages and lack of high-speed  connectivity at airport training facilities have made it difficult for  screeners to fully utilize these programs. Specifically, TSA recently  revamped its screener training program to include three main  components: (1) dual training for both passenger and baggage screeners  (replaces basic screener training); (2) recurrent (skills refresher) screener  training; and (3) technical screener training/certification for EDS. In  addition to strengthening its basic and recurrent training programs, TSA is  also enhancing and standardizing remedial training for screeners who fail  a covert test conducted by TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program  Review. Despite these efforts, however, FSDs at 5 of the 15 category X  airports we visited stated that ensuring screeners received required  training continued to be a challenge.
subsections: section_title: Dual Passenger and Baggage Screener Training
paragraphs: As required by ATSA, TSA established a basic screener training program  comprised of a minimum of 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60  hours of on-the-job training for passenger and baggage screeners. The  initial basic screener training courses were updated at the end of 2003,  respectively, to incorporate changes to standard operating procedures. In  addition to these updates, TSA officials stated that they recently developed  a new basic screener training program, “dual function screener training,”  to address technical aspects of both passenger and baggage screening.  This training will utilize modular courses to provide skills refresher  (recurrent) training or to cross-train screeners, such as refreshing baggage  screening skills for a screener who has worked predominately as a  passenger screener. TSA officials reported that beginning in April 2004, all  newly hired screeners will receive dual function screener training in order  to provide FSDs with the flexibility to staff them as either passenger or  baggage screeners.
section_title: Recurrent Training
paragraphs: Comprehensive and frequent training is key to passenger and baggage  screeners’ ability to detect threat objects. TSA requires passenger and  baggage screeners to participate in 3 hours of recurrent training per week,  averaged over each quarter. One hour is required to be devoted to x-ray  image interpretation, and the other 2 hours on screening techniques or  reviews of standard operating procedures.
We reported in September 2003 that TSA had not fully developed or  deployed a recurrent training program for passenger screeners. Since  then, TSA has developed 12 recurrent training modules for passenger and  baggage screeners. Two of these modules have been deployed to airports  nationwide, while 9 additional modules are expected to be deployed by  March 2004. The final module, a Web-based x-ray image interpretation  tool, is scheduled for implementation in April 2004.
As we reported in September 2003, many of the passenger screeners and  supervisors we interviewed expressed the need for recurrent training.  Screeners were particularly interested in receiving additional training  related to recognizing x-ray images of threat objects, and also identified an  interest in more realistic training for the detection of improvised explosive  devices. FSDs and training coordinators also emphasized that screeners  needed to receive more hands-on training using threat simulators and  emulators. TSA headquarters also identified these training needs as part of  a study of passenger screener performance, and developed and deployed  training tools to help address these needs. For example, TSA officials  reported that they provided every airport with at least one Modular Bomb  Set kit and one weapons training kit. These Modular Bomb Sets and  weapons training kits are intended to fill an identified gap in training by  allowing screeners to touch and feel the threat objects that they are  looking for. TSA also instituted a training program called “Threat In the  Spotlight” that provides screeners with the latest in threat information  regarding terrorist attempts to get threat objects past screening  checkpoints.
TSA is also in the process of developing specialized certification training  for technologies used by passenger and baggage screeners. TSA has  developed only one course, for EDS use, but plans to develop other  certifications and courses as new technologies are utilized and integrated  into the screening process. Additionally, in October 2003, TSA fielded an  Online Learning Center—a Web-based tool with 366 self-guided training  courses available to all screening staff. The courses provided on the  Online Learning Center Web site capture common developmental needs  identified by TSA. The Online Learning Center also enables screeners to  view the list of required and optional training courses and materials,  review their training records, and track their training progress.
section_title: Remedial Training
paragraphs: Consistent with ATSA, TSA requires remedial training for any passenger or  baggage screener who fails an operational test, and prohibits screeners  from performing the screening function related to the tests they failed  until they successfully complete the training. FSDs must certify that  screeners identified as requiring remedial training complete the training  before they can perform the screening function identified as a  performance weakness.
TSA is in the process of enhancing and standardizing remedial training  requirements required after failure of covert operational tests. Program  enhancements will provide specific guidance regarding materials to be  reviewed during remedial training and standardize the practice of  demonstrating proper techniques and procedures in the area of deficiency  noted during the failed test.
section_title: Supervisory Training
paragraphs: TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review identified a lack of  supervisory training as a cause for screener testing failures. In addition,  both FSDs and TSA headquarters officials have recognized the need to  enhance the skills of screening supervisors through supervisory training.  As we reported in September 2003, TSA had begun working with the  Department of Agriculture (USDA) Graduate School to tailor USDA’s off- the-shelf supervisory course to meet the specific needs of TSA’s screening  supervisors.  According to TSA, 500 screening supervisors participated in  the course during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2003. Since then, TSA  reportedly has sent an additional 1,500 of its approximately 3,600  screening supervisors to the enhanced USDA Graduate School supervisory  course, and expects all screening supervisors to have received this training  by April 2004.  TSA officials also stated that they intend to schedule  recently promoted supervisors to attend the USDA Graduate School  supervisory course after March 2004 if they had not yet attended, and plan  to extend the course offering to include screening managers, once  screening supervisors are trained.
In addition to the USDA Graduate School supervisory course, TSA officials  reported that the agency plans to have a Web-based technical training  course–required for all screening leads, supervisors, and managers–by the  end of February 2004.  This course will cover technical issues such as  resolving alarms at screening checkpoints.  Additionally, TSA’s Online  Learning Center includes over 60 supervisory courses designed to develop  leadership and coaching skills.  TSA officials noted that they focused their  efforts on training supervisors that were initially hired into supervisory  roles, rather than internally promoted supervisors.
section_title: Challenges Exist in Providing Screeners Access to Available Training
paragraphs: While TSA has begun developing and fielding recurrent training modules  to airports, staffing shortages and a lack of high-speed connectivity at  airports have made it difficult for all screeners to access these courses.  Specifically, due to staffing shortages, FSDs at 5 of the 15 category X  airports we visited stated that it was difficult, if not impossible, to comply  with the requirement that screeners receive 3 hours of recurrent training  each week, averaged over a 3-month period. FSDs stated that due to  staffing shortages, they were unable to let screeners take this training  because it would impact the FSDs’ ability to provide adequate screener  coverage. Consequently, screeners received an average of only 3 hours of  recurrent training per month. In an attempt to ensure screeners receive  required training, several FSDs provided training through overtime, or  established training relief teams with the sole purpose of staffing  screening checkpoints while screeners participated in training.
The lack of high-speed connectivity at airport training facilities has also  limited access to TSA’s training tools. TSA’s Online Learning Center was  established to provide passenger and baggage screeners with high-speed  access to over 350 training courses. However, TSA did not begin deploying  high-speed connectivity to its training sites and checkpoints until May  2003. Currently, TSA has reportedly provided high-speed connectivity to 71  airport locations, including training sites where 927 training computers are  fully connected. TSA expects to install high-speed connectivity at up to  81 additional airports by the end of fiscal year 2004. Until high-speed  connectivity is fully achieved, TSA plans to continue to distribute new  training products using multiple delivery channels, including written  training materials and CD-ROMs.
section_title: TSA Continues to Strengthen its Efforts to Measure Screener Performance in Detecting Threat Objects
paragraphs: TSA has undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance of  passenger screeners in detecting threat objects. However, TSA has  collected limited data related to the performance of baggage screeners. In  July 2003, TSA completed a study of the performance of its passenger  screening system, which identified numerous performance deficiencies.  These deficiencies were determined to be caused by a lack of skills and  knowledge, low motivation, ineffective work environment, and wrong or  missing incentives. In response to this study, TSA developed a short-term  action plan that identified key actions TSA plans to take to strengthen the  performance of passenger screeners. These actions build on several  initiatives that TSA already had underway, including enhancing training  for screeners and supervisors, increasing covert testing conducted by  TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs, completing installation of the TIP, and  conducting annual recertifications of screeners. While TSA is making  progress in each of these areas, it has collected limited data on the  performance of its baggage screening operations. Officials stated that they  have collected limited performance data related to baggage screeners due  to their focus on passenger screener performance, but plan to collect  additional performance data in the future.
subsections: section_title: Performance Improvement Study and Short-Term Action Plan
paragraphs: In July 2003, TSA completed a Passenger Screener Performance  Improvement Study designed to identify root causes for gaps between the  current performance of passenger screeners and TSA’s desired  performance—defined as 100 percent interception of prohibited items  coming through screening checkpoints. The study identified many of the  performance deficiencies that FSDs reported to us during our site visits to  more than 30 airports, including inadequate staffing and poor supervision  of screeners. While the study was focused on passenger screening, TSA  officials stated that many of the performance issues cited also pertained to  baggage screeners. TSA officials stated that they plan to assess the  performance of baggage screeners after recommendations from the  performance improvement study relative to passenger screening have  been implemented.
In October 2003, to address passenger screener performance deficiencies  identified in the Screener Performance Improvement Study, TSA  developed a “Short-Term Screening Performance Improvement Plan.” This  plan included nine action items that TSA plans to pursue to provide  tangible improvements in screener performance and security, and  identified 6 week, 3 month, 6 month, and, in some cases, milestones of 1  year or more. These action items include increasing covert testing at  screening checkpoints, completing installation of TIP at all airports,  enhancing screener training, and strengthening supervisor’s skills through  leadership and technical training. TSA is also establishing a longer-term  plan that addresses identified deficiencies, such as the need to establish  adequate training facilities at airports and to reconfigure checkpoints to  eliminate screener distractions. Table 1 provides a summary of TSA’s  short-term action items for strengthening passenger screener  performance.
section_title: Covert Testing
paragraphs: TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review conducts  unannounced covert tests of passenger and baggage screeners to assess  their ability to detect threat objects and adherence to TSA-approved  procedures. These tests, in which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass  threat objects through screening checkpoints, are designed to identify  systematic problems affecting the performance of screeners related to  their adherence to standard operating procedures and handling of  equipment. TSA’s testing to date has identified weaknesses in the ability of  passenger and baggage screeners to detect threat objects.
In November 2003, we reported that the Office of Internal Affairs and  Program Review had conducted 733 covert tests at 92 airports of  passenger screeners at screening checkpoints. Since then, TSA has  conducted an additional 362 passenger screening checkpoint tests through  January 17, 2004, for a total of 1,095 tests, and estimates that it will double  the number of tests conducted during fiscal year 2004. However, even with  the doubling of these tests, only a small percentage of the screener  workforce is subject to a covert test.
TSA initially focused most of its resources on testing passenger rather  than baggage screeners. While TSA began conducting covert tests of  passenger screeners in September 2002, it did not begin conducting covert  tests of checked baggage screeners until January 2003—after Congress’s  initial deadline for 100 percent screening of checked baggage using  explosive detection systems had passed.  Between January 2003 and  September 2003, TSA conducted checked baggage tests as part of the  Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening selectee testing protocol. In  November 2003, TSA developed a protocol specifically designed to test  checked baggage.  From January 2003 through January 17, 2004, TSA  conducted 192 checked baggage tests at 128 airports, and plans to increase  the number of checked baggage tests it conducts this fiscal year. We plan  to review the Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review’s covert  testing in more detail during the remainder of our reviews.
section_title: Threat Image Projection System
paragraphs: Another key source of information on screener performance in detecting  threat objects is the TIP system, which places images of threat objects on  the X-ray screen during actual operations and records whether screeners  identify the threat objects.  TIP was shut down immediately following the  September 11th terrorist attacks due to concerns that it would result in  screening delays and panic, as screeners might think that they were  actually viewing threat objects. Recognizing that TIP is a key tool in  maintaining and enhancing screener performance, TSA began reactivating  and expanding TIP in October 2003. Additionally, TSA has increased the  number of TIP-ready X-ray machines at passenger screening checkpoints  from about 1,300 in October 2003 to over 1,770 as of January 20, 2004. In  January 2004, TSA also reported that it had installed a new library of 2,400  threat images on all existing TIP ready X-ray machines—a significant  increase from the 200 images the Federal Aviation Administration had in  place. TSA has ordered an additional 30 TIP-ready X-ray machines and  expects TIP to be 100 percent operational by April 2004.
With an operational TIP program, FSDs have the capability to query and  analyze passenger screening performance data in a number of ways,  including by individual screeners, checkpoints, terminals, and airports.  However, until high-speed connectivity is available at screening  checkpoints, collecting this information for reporting and analysis  purposes will continue to be cumbersome. For example, at airports  where high-speed connectivity is not available, TIP data have to be  downloaded onto a disk and mailed to a remote location where they are  uploaded for analysis.
Although TIP is available to measure the performance of and train  passenger screeners, it is not currently available for baggage screeners.  TSA officials stated that they are currently working to resolve technical  challenges associated with using TIP for checked baggage screening on  EDS machines and have started EDS TIP image development.
section_title: Annual Recertification Program
paragraphs: ATSA requires that TSA collect performance information on all passenger  and baggage screeners by conducting an annual proficiency evaluation to  ensure each screener continues to meet all qualifications and standards  related to the functions that he or she performs.  To meet this requirement,  TSA established an annual recertification program. Currently, there are  two parts to recertification: a knowledge and skills assessment program  and a final rating on a screener’s annual assessment. The knowledge and  skills assessment is comprised of three modules: (1) knowledge of  standard operating procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3) a practical  demonstration of skills. To be certified, a passenger screener must pass all  applicable modules of the knowledge and skills assessment program and  have a rating of “met” or “exceeded” standards on a screener’s annual  assessment. However, baggage-only screeners are not required to  complete the image recognition test. If a screener does not meet the  recertification requirements, he/she is not certified and may not continue  employment as a screener. According to TSA officials, approximately 200  screeners have been terminated to date for failure to pass the  recertification program.
TSA began implementing its recertification program in October 2003, and  expects to complete testing at all airports in March 2004. As of January  30, 2004, TSA reportedly had completed modules one and two of its annual  screener recertification program at 100 percent of federalized airports, and  had completed module three at 50 percent of these airports. TSA does not  have a recertification track specifically for cross-trained screeners.   However, TSA officials stated that they plan to establish a dual functioning  screener recertification track for the 2004-2005 recertification cycle.  Currently, all screeners who are cross-trained and actively performing  both passenger and baggage screening functions are considered passenger  screeners for the purpose of recertification. However, the current  recertification program ensures that cross-trained screeners pass the  image interpretation test for x-ray threat image interpretation, as well as  the ETD system and manual bag search, which are also performed in  checked baggage screening. We will continue to examine TSA’s progress  in administering its annual recertification program during the remainder of  our reviews.
section_title: Performance Management Information System
paragraphs: TSA’s Performance Management Information System (PMIS) is designed  to collect, analyze, and report passenger and baggage screening  performance data. While PMIS does not contain information on screener  performance in detecting threat objects, it collects information on  operational performance, such as wait times at selected airports, workload  data, and the performance and utilization of passenger and baggage  screening equipment. TSA headquarters uses PMIS data to support  external reporting on performance and internal decision-making  processes.
TSA recently surveyed FSDs or members of their staff who use PMIS by  inputting or analyzing data, to solicit their feedback on the usefulness of  the system. PMIS users who responded to the survey identified several  areas for improvement, including additional capabilities, such as the  ability to customize reports, and enhanced technical features, such as split  screen report viewing and data entry. TSA reported that, to the extent  possible, they plan to use feedback from the survey to make  enhancements to the system.
TSA provides FSDs and other PMIS users with monthly PMIS system  updates that include new functionalities and improvements to the system.  These enhancements have allowed TSA to collect additional information  with which to better analyze its operations. For example, when TSA began  collecting employee census data in June 2003, it only collected information  on the number of screeners. TSA is now able to collect more detailed  information on screeners including the number of part-time screeners,  hours worked per week, and screener gender. TSA also developed pilot  programs in order to determine the usefulness of PMIS data before making  systemwide changes. For example, TSA began to collect additional data  regarding checked baggage screening operations during the spring of 2003  at 36 airports. Among other things, the 36 airports collect data on the  number of checked bags screened, number of prohibited items  confiscated, and number of law enforcement officer interventions. TSA is  evaluating whether to expand collection of baggage screening data to  additional airports. TSA plans to continuously enhance the system as it  learns what data are needed to best manage the agency.
To help ensure the quality of the data, TSA has also developed PMIS user  guides and procedures. TSA officials reported that headquarters’ staff and  contactors provide consultation to and review the input from FSDs to  ensure that the data provided are complete and consistent. The PMIS also  contains checks for data entries that are out of normal bounds. However,  because the PMIS system relies on self-reporting by FSDs, there may be  inconsistencies in the way in which the data are reported, reducing the  overall usefulness of the system in aiding management decisions. We will  continue to review TSAs plans to enhance the system and its reliability  during the remainder of our review.
section_title: Performance Indexes for Screeners and Screening Systems
paragraphs: In September and November 2003, we reported that in addition to making  improvements to PMIS, TSA was developing performance indexes for both  individual passenger and baggage screeners and the screening system as a  whole. The screening performance index will measure the effectiveness of  the screening system through nationwide TIP results and covert testing  data; efficiency through a calculation of dollars spent per passenger  screened or dollars spent per bag screened; and customer satisfaction  through a national poll, customer surveys, and customer complaints at  both airports and TSA’s national call center. TSA is currently developing  baseline data for fiscal year 2004 and plans to report the indexes to the  DHS in fiscal year 2005 in support of its Government Performance and  Results Act performance measures.
section_title: TSA Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to Deploy and Leverage Screening Equipment and Technologies
paragraphs: TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening operations, but  continues to face operational and funding challenges in screening all  checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by  ATSA. Although TSA has deployed EDS and ETD equipment to all airports,  TSA has not been able to fully utilize this equipment to screen 100 percent  of checked baggage for explosives by December 31, 2003, due to screener  and equipment shortages and equipment being out of service for  maintenance and/or repairs. When TSA cannot screen 100 percent of  checked baggage using EDS and ETD, TSA continues to use alternative  means outlined in ATSA, including K-9 teams, manual bag search, and  positive passenger bag match. TSA has ongoing initiatives to increase the  efficiency of screening checked baggage using EDS, including the  development and construction of in-line baggage screening systems at  larger airports—which, streamlines the screening processes. TSA is also  conducting research and development activities to strengthen passenger  and baggage screening. These efforts are designed to improve detection  capability, performance, and efficiency for current technologies, and to  develop the next generation of EDS equipment.
subsections: section_title: TSA Is Not Fully Utilizing Equipment for Meeting the 100 Percent Checked Baggage Screening Requirement
paragraphs: While TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening processes,  it continues to face challenges in attaining 100 percent screening using  explosive detection systems 100 percent of the time. Since its creation in  November 2001, TSA has deployed over 1,100 EDS machines and 6,000  ETD machines to over 440 airports nationwide. However, TSA has not  been able to fully utilize this equipment to screen 100 percent of checked  baggage due to screener and equipment shortages, and equipment being  out of service for maintenance and/or repairs.
In its effort to meet ATSA’s original requirement to screen 100 percent of  checked baggage using explosive detection systems by December 31, 2002,  TSA deployed hundreds of EDS and thousands of ETD machines to over  440 airports. As it became apparent that TSA would be unable to attain the  December 31, 2002, deadline, the Congress authorized an extension of that  deadline for noncompliant airports until December 31, 2003. In its effort to  meet these deadlines, in June 2002, TSA and its contractors began to  deploy EDS and ETD equipment to the nation’s commercial airports. This  effort involved designing and implementing facility modifications for EDS  and ETD equipment, installing equipment, and developing and  administering equipment training for baggage screeners. As EDS and ETD  were being deployed to airports, TSA implemented interim solutions to  screen 100 percent of checked baggage, until more permanent solutions  could be designed and constructed. For example, many large airports were  equipped with stand-alone EDS machines that were not integrated with  baggage conveyor systems. These minivan-sized machines were  sometimes deployed in airport lobbies, which led to crowding as  passengers filled lobbies waiting to have their checked baggage screened.  In addition, stand-alone EDS machines are both labor and time intensive  to operate since each bag must be physically carried to an EDS machine  for screening and then moved back to the baggage conveyor system prior  to being loaded onto an aircraft.
Realizing the inefficiencies of these interim solutions, TSA and some  airport authorities are developing more permanent solutions, such as in- line systems. TSA also continues to look for ways to improve the  efficiency and effectiveness of the baggage screening process, especially  ways that reduce reliance on screener personnel.
TSA has made progress during 2003 in its efforts to deploy equipment to  screen 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems.   However, some airports are currently unable to use this equipment to  screen all checked baggage for explosives, or reported that they do not  have enough EDS or ETD to conduct baggage screening. These airports  are unable to achieve the requirement to screen 100 percent of checked  baggage, 100 percent of the time, using EDS and ETD due to insufficient  screener staff to operate screening equipment, insufficient staff and  equipment to meet surges in passenger volume, and equipment being out  of service for maintenance and/or repairs. As a way to monitor baggage- screening operations, FSDs are expected to report, using TSA’s PMIS,  when they are unable to screen all checked baggage using EDS and ETD  and the reasons that prevented them from doing so. We reviewed TSA’s  Aviation Operations division’s report on the status of checked baggage  screening (based on PMIS data), dated January 5, 2004, to determine  whether airports were conducting 100 percent screening using EDS and  ETD, and to identify reasons for not achieving this deadline. Our  preliminary review of that data showed that the most frequently cited  reasons for not being able to meet the requirement—noted by about two- thirds of the FSDs that reported they were not conducting 100 percent  screening using EDS or ETD ---were staff shortages, absenteeism, and a  lack of training. Almost half of these FSDs also identified that they did not  have sufficient EDS and ETD equipment to screen all checked baggage,  and/or that some of their EDS and ETD equipment was inoperable.
Of the airports reporting that they were not screening 100 percent of  checked baggage using EDS or ETD, the number of consecutive days that  they were not conducting this screening ranged from 1 to 371 days.  In  addition, almost one-third of these FSDs reported that they did not  conduct 100 percent screening using EDS or ETD less than 10 consecutive  days, while half of the FSDs reported not conducting 100 percent  screening using EDS or ETD for more than 200 consecutive days. This  reporting status can change daily as the events that caused airports to not  conduct 100 percent screening using explosive detection systems may be  corrected.  FSDs are also expected to report whenever there is need to use  alternative screening means because fewer than 100 percent of checked  bags are being screened using EDS and ETD.
Furthermore, in our visits to several category X and I airports, FSDs  identified EDS and ETD machines that were unable to be used due to an  insufficient number of screeners to operate the equipment or because the  equipment was not in the locations where it was needed. FSDs at some of  these airports expressed concerns about not being able to resolve  operational issues that were causing them to be noncompliant with the  requirement for 100 percent screening using explosive detection systems.
To comply with a requirement from the Homeland Security Act that TSA  report on its status in achieving the checked baggage-screening deadline,  TSA provides classified reports monthly to selected committees of the  Congress identifying its progress in deploying EDS and ETD equipment to  screen 100 percent of checked baggage. As of December 31, 2003, TSA  reported that it fell short of this goal at several large airports, primarily  because these airports did not have the EDS and ETD equipment needed  and/or experienced staffing shortages to operate the equipment. We  compared TSA’s January 5, 2004, Aviation Operations Reports to the  December 2003 monthly report provided to the selected congressional  committees, and identified additional airports that were not using EDS and  ETD to screen checked baggage 100 percent of the time. TSA officials  stated that the discrepancies were caused because the primary focus of  their report to the selected congressional committees was on initial  deployment of the equipment, rather than fluctuations in staffing and  maintenance issues that affect TSA’s ability to utilize the equipment. We  will continue to monitor TSA’s compliance with the requirement to screen  100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems during  the remainder of our review.
section_title: TSA Faces Funding and Operational Challenges in Achieving Efficiencies in Checked Baggage Screening
paragraphs: TSA has two major initiatives underway to achieve efficiencies in its  baggage screening operations—integrating EDS machines into the  airports’ baggage handling systems and resolving EDS alarms using  computer images, referred to as on-screen resolution. Reconfiguring  airports for in-line checked baggage screening could be extensive and  costly, especially when new construction or extensive conveyor belt  systems are required. TSA estimates that the systemwide costs to  complete installations of in-line baggage screening systems may be as high  as $3 to $5 billion, not including the costs of EDS and ETD equipment. In  addition, TSA’s efforts to develop protocols for on-screen resolution,  which may permit more efficient screening operations without increasing  security risks, have taken longer than anticipated.
Many large airports are planning to install in-line baggage screening  systems—installing EDS machines as an integrated part of the airport  baggage handling systems—to improve throughput of baggage and reduce  crowding in airport lobbies. These in-line systems have been funded in  part through letters of intent (LOI) signed by TSA. To date, TSA has  signed 6 LOIs covering 7 airports promising multiyear financial support  totaling about $772 million for in-line integration of EDS equipment. For  example, LOIs are to provide $87 million in airport modifications at  Boston Logan International Airport, and over $104 million at Dallas/Fort  Worth International Airport. In addition, TSA is negotiating LOIs with 4  additional airports. The 7 airports with signed LOIs and the 4 airports  negotiating LOIs with TSA are shown in table 2.
TSA also reported that 23 additional airports, shown in table 3, have  requested LOIs.
TSA officials stated that they are assessing requested LOIs based on a  security evaluation, as well as a determination of return on investment.  Officials stated that top priority would be given to airports that need in- line systems to comply with the requirement for 100 percent screening of  checked baggage using explosive detection systems. However, officials  stated that they would also assess other airports that are currently  conducting 100 percent baggage screening using EDS and ETD. Officials  gave the following reasons why these airports may be good candidates for  in-line checked baggage screening systems.  airports that will fall out of compliance at peak passenger load times due  to seasonal fluctuations and/or carrier moves, additions, or changes;  airports with highly disruptive operational implementations and high  staffing levels; and  airports with a heavy reliance on ETDs that would benefit by improved  operational efficiencies and cost reductions.
In December 2003, the Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization  Act shifted the funding formula for LOIs from a 75 percent TSA (25  percent local contribution) to a 90 percent TSA (10 percent local  contribution). This increase in TSA’s required contribution for both  future and previously issued LOIs could diminish TSA’s capacity to  accommodate additional LOIs.
In addition, TSA has not yet approved protocols for on-screen resolution  of EDS alarms. TSA’s promulgation of these protocols is an important  element in enabling efficiencies in in-line baggage screening systems and  affects the design of the systems being constructed or planned. Under  these protocols, EDS operators would be able to view images of alarmed  bags and either clear the bags or divert them for further screening. Using  on-screen resolution, baggage screeners could be able to view images of  the baggage from a remote location electronically connected to the EDS  machines, raising the throughput rate of bags screened. Currently, TSA is  testing protocols for on-screen resolution at 4 airports. Officials from  TSA’s Office of Security Technologies initially reported that they  anticipated the protocols being completed by December 2003. However, to  date, the protocols have not been approved for nationwide use. Advance  knowledge of on-screen resolution protocols could assist airports in  developing in-line systems by providing valuable information that could be  used to design the systems for optimal efficiency. We are examining TSA’s  baggage screening program, including both development of in-line systems  and its issuance of letters of intent, in an ongoing review.
section_title: TSA is Funding R&D on Screening Technologies, but Deployment Is Years Away, and TSA Faces Several Challenges
paragraphs: TSA is funding R&D on several technologies designed to improve the  screening of checked baggage and passengers at the nation’s airports.   However, while the majority of these technologies are scheduled for pilot  testing within the next 12 to 18 months, they are not scheduled to be  deployed in quantity for 2 to 5 years. Furthermore, progress on this  research was delayed in fiscal year 2003 when TSA used more than half of  its R&D funds for other programs that TSA viewed as higher priorities. As  TSA moves forward with its R&D program, it faces a number of  challenges, including maintaining its schedule while planning for a merger  with the DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate.  TSA must also  balance funding for competing priorities in a tight budget environment, not  only between R&D and other requirements, but also between aviation and  other modes of transportation.
subsections: section_title: Checked Baggage Screening Technologies
paragraphs: To improve the detection capability and operational efficiency of its  current checked baggage-screening program, TSA has both near-term (2 to  5 years) and long-term (more than 5 years) approaches designed to  develop, test, acquire, and deploy checked baggage screening equipment.  In fiscal year 2003, TSA obligated about $12 million for near-term  activities, significantly more than the $75,000 it obligated for long-term  activities. For fiscal year 2004, TSA has budgeted $45 million for the  development of next generation explosive detection systems, which  encompass technologies for screening checked baggage, carry-on baggage,  and individuals.  The President’s fiscal year 2005 budget requests a total of  $155 million for TSA’s R&D program, of which $45 million is planned for  the development of next generation explosive detection systems.
The near-term activities for developing next-generation checked baggage  screening equipment are largely reflected in the Phoenix program, which  is funded jointly by government and industry. In September 2003, TSA  obligated about $9.4 million of the $12 million obligated for near-term  activities to enter into five cooperative agreements with private sector  firms under the Phoenix program. While the five agreements are designed  to enhance existing systems and develop new screening technologies, TSA  was not able to provide us with scheduled deployment dates.  The five  agreements are described below:    Two cooperative agreements, totaling $4.7 million, provide enhancements  to existing systems. These upgrades are intended to reduce false alarm  rates, advance screener user-interface tools, and improve service  diagnostics, thereby increasing reliability, maintainability, and availability.
One cooperative agreement, for $1.2 million, is intended to enhance  detection capabilities and reduce false alarm rates by combining two new  and emerging detection technologies, X-ray diffraction, and quadrupole  resonance, with currently deployed EDS technology, and computed  tomography.
Two cooperative agreements, totaling $3.5 million, are aimed at  developing new screening technologies that perform substantially better  than current technologies. One technology is intended to triple the pace of  checked baggage screening (throughput), reduce false alarms by 75  percent, and enhance detection through superior spatial resolution. The  other technology is intended to take up less space at less than half the unit  cost of current systems.
In addition to these checked baggage-screening technologies, TSA is  testing radio frequency identification (RFID) baggage tags at several  airports, including those in Jacksonville, Atlanta, San Francisco, and Las  Vegas. The RFID tags, which identify baggage much more accurately than  the bar code tags that are currently used, are intended to allow TSA to  track luggage, such as bags that must be searched by hand because they  triggered alarms.  The tags are also intended to allow TSA to redirect bags  that require further screening because of receipt of updated intelligence  information or interactions with the passenger who checked the bag. TSA  expects these tags to also benefit industry by reducing the incidence of  lost, mishandled, or misdirected luggage. TSA expects the pilot systems at  the previously mentioned airports to be fully operational by May 2004.
TSA’s long-term approach for improving checked baggage screening  systems, called the Manhattan II program, is in the planning stages. This  program will consist of several initiatives and technologies that are  designed to achieve “revolutionary” improvements in detection capability  and operational efficiency in 5 to 10 years using new screening  technologies. TSA intends to award this project’s first contracts in fiscal  year 2004.
section_title: Passenger Screening Technologies
paragraphs: To better detect explosives and weapons that an individual may try to  carry into an aircraft cabin, TSA obligated about $1.2 million in fiscal year  2003 for research, development, testing, and evaluation of checkpoint  screening technologies. As mentioned previously, for fiscal year 2004, TSA  has budgeted $45 million for the development of next-generation explosive  detection systems, which encompass technologies for screening checked  baggage, carry-on baggage, and individuals.  For example:    TSA has conducted tests of two explosive trace detection portals at  airports in Orlando and Knoxville. These portals analyze the air for  explosives as passengers pass through them. TSA anticipates that these  portals will be ready for limited deployment in 2004.
TSA is funding the development of a document scanner capable of  detecting traces of explosives on a document handled by a passenger,  such as a boarding pass. TSA anticipates that the scanner will be ready for  limited deployment in 2004.
TSA is evaluating body-scanning technologies—such as backscatter X-ray,  millimeter wave energy analysis, and terahertz wave technology—that  can detect a variety of weapons and explosives on passengers. However,  TSA acknowledges that it needs to resolve issues related to passenger  privacy before deploying any of these technologies.
section_title: Future Challenges
paragraphs: As TSA moves forward with passenger and baggage screening R&D, it  faces a number of organizational, funding, and coordination challenges.  One challenge will be to sustain its R&D efforts during a period of  organizational uncertainty and a possible merger. Under the Homeland  Security Act, TSA is mandated to operate as a distinct entity until  November 25, 2004, but after that date its organizational future is not  specified in statute. According to a DHS official, the Secretary of  Homeland Security intends to transfer TSA’s R&D program from DHS’s  Border and Transportation Security Directorate to DHS’s Science and  Technology Directorate, which is responsible for homeland security R&D.  One of the key areas that we will be reporting on later this year is the  extent to which TSA and DHS have developed strategies for the merger of  their R&D programs.
Balancing funding for competing priorities may also pose challenges for  TSA. In a tight budget environment, TSA may be under pressure to use  R&D funds for other purposes, as it did during fiscal year 2003, when it  reprogrammed about $61 million, or more than half of its $110 million  R&D appropriations to programs outside of R&D. As a result, TSA had to  delay several key R&D projects, including developing a device to detect  weapons, liquid explosives, and flammables in containers found in carry- on baggage or passengers’ effects, and further development and testing of  a walk-through chemical trace detection portal for detecting explosives on  passengers. Competition for resources may also increase the difficulty that  TSA already faces in allocating funds to address security threats in modes  of transportation other than aviation. While aviation has historically faced,  and continues to face, significant security threats, and improving aviation  security is an important goal, TSA is also responsible for security in the  other transportation modes, and these modes have significant  vulnerabilities that remain to be addressed.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Having achieved many of ATSA’s deadlines designed to strengthen  passenger and baggage screening, TSA has begun to focus on longer-term  planning to assist in stabilizing its screener workforce and screening  operations. Carefully considering how it strategically hires, deploys, and  manages its screener workforce will help TSA meet its mission and  stabilize its passenger and baggage screening operations. We are  encouraged that TSA is undertaking efforts to develop the tools needed to  train its screener workforce and measure their performance. However, as  TSA works toward improving the performance of individual screeners and  screening operations, it will also be important that the agency deploy and  leverage screening equipment and technologies and sustain its research  and development efforts.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at  this time.
section_title: Contact Information
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact   Cathleen A. Berrick at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key  contributions to this testimony include David Alexander, Lisa Brown,  Tammy Conquest, Kevin Copping, Gerald Dillingham, Christine Fossett,  David Goldstein, Christopher Jones, Lemuel Jackson, Noel Lance, Thomas  Lombardi, Jan Montgomery, Jobenia Odum, Jean Orland, Maria Strudwick,  Mark Tremba, and Susan Zimmerman.
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