Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed
Published: 2003-11-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: To help strengthen aviation security after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Congress expanded the size and mission of the Federal Air Marshal Service (the Service) and located the Service within the newly created Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Between November 2001 and July 1, 2002, the Service grew from fewer than 50 air marshals to thousands, and its mission expanded to include the protection of domestic as well as international flights. In March 2003, the Service, with TSA, merged into the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and in November 2003, it was transferred from TSA and merged into DHS's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). GAO looked at operational and management control issues that emerged during the rapid expansion of the Service, specifically addressing its (1) background check procedures and training; (2) management information, policies, and procedures; and (3) challenges likely to result from its mergers into DHS and ICE.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: To deploy its expanded workforce by July 1, 2002, a deadline set by the Deputy Secretary of Transportation, the Service used expedited procedures to obtain interim secret security clearances for air marshal candidates and provided abbreviated training for them. These procedures allowed candidates with interim clearances to work until they received their final top-secret clearances. Because of a governmentwide demand for clearances, nearly a quarter of the active air marshals had not received their top-secret clearances as of July 2003; but by October 2003, only about 3 percent were awaiting their top-secret clearances. To train its expanded workforce before the Deputy Secretary's deployment deadline, the Service incrementally revised and abbreviated its curriculum. The Service has begun to develop management information, policies, and procedures to support its expanded workforce and mission, but it has not yet completed this major effort. For example, it replaced a manual system for scheduling flight duty with an automated system, but it has not yet developed an automated means to monitor the effectiveness of its scheduling controls designed to prevent air marshals' fatigue. In addition, it has gathered and used information on potential security incidents and on air marshals' reasons for separation from the Service to improve its operations and workforce management. However, some of this information is not clear or detailed enough to facilitate follow-up. Finally, the Service has implemented policies needed to support its expansion. The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes resulting from its mergers into DHS and ICE, including changes to its roles, responsibilities, and training and to its procedures for coordinating with TSA's security organizations, as well as administrative changes. GAO's recent work on mergers and organizational transformations proposes several key practices--set implementation goals, establish a communication strategy, and involve employees to obtain their ideas--and associated implementation steps that could help the Service implement such changes.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Within 10 months of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the  United States, the number of federal air marshals grew from fewer than 50  to thousands; and within 2 years, the Federal Air Marshal Service (the  Service) underwent three organizational transfers. More specifically, the  Congress, through a provision of the Aviation and Transportation Security  Act, enacted on November 19, 2001, authorized a dramatic expansion of  the Service’s mission and workforce and transferred authority over the  Service from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to the  Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Under this legislation, the  Service’s mission grew from preventing hijackings on international flights  to protecting passengers, crews, and aircraft from terrorist activities on  both domestic and international flights. Additionally, the Deputy Secretary  of Transportation set a goal of hiring, training, and deploying thousands of  new air marshals by July 1, 2002. After the passage of the Homeland  Security Act, the Service moved with TSA from the Department of  Transportation (DOT) to the newly created Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) on March 1, 2003. Finally, in September 2003, the Secretary  of Homeland Security announced that the Service would be transferred  from TSA to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),  another law enforcement agency within the new department. Following  this transfer, which was supposed to take place on November 2, 2003, the  Secretary said that the Bureau’s three law enforcement workforces—air  marshals, immigration agents, and customs agents—would be cross- trained to create a “surge capacity” for responding to security threats.
The rapid expansion of the Service led to a number of operational and  management control issues, which surfaced in national media reports of  allegations that the Service conducted inadequate background checks on  newly hired air marshals, slashed its training program to expedite the air  marshals’ deployment, and failed to meet the needs of its air marshal  workforce. For example, the Service allegedly over- or underscheduled air  marshals for flight duty and reneged on promises of transfers to  alternative locations, thereby creating dissatisfaction with the Service that,  according to some reports, led to a flood of air marshal resignations.
Within the context of these allegations, our objective was to look at  operational and management control issues related to the Service’s  expansion. We also considered implications of the Service’s organizational  realignment. Specifically, as agreed with your offices, we addressed the  following questions:    What procedures for obtaining background checks and providing training  did the Service use to expedite the deployment of its expanded workforce  to meet the Deputy Secretary’s July 2002 deadline?
To what extent has the Service developed management information and  policies and procedures to support its expanded mission and workforce?
What challenges is the Service likely to face as a result of its recent  mergers into DHS and ICE?
To answer these questions, we analyzed program data; interviewed Service  and TSA officials; and reviewed documentation from the Service and TSA  on background checks and training; scheduling, mission incidents,  employee misconduct, and separations; and reviewed several workforce  policies and procedures. We also visited several facilities to look at the  Service’s operational and management control practices and documents,  including the Federal Air Marshal training facility and Human Resource  Center in New Jersey, the Federal Air Marshal headquarters office in  Virginia, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in New Mexico,  and the Federal Air Marshal field office in Texas. To guide our assessment  of the Service’s training, management information, and policies and  procedures, we reviewed key GAO documents on internal controls and  human capital management. These include our Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government (GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, November  1999), Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool (GAO-01-1008G,  August 2001), Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and  Development Efforts in the Federal Government (GAO-03-893G, July  2003), and Model of Strategic Human Capital Management (GAO-02-373SP,  March 2002). In addition, we used our report, Results-Oriented Cultures:  Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational  Transformations (GAO-03-669, July 2003), to provide a framework for  evaluating the Service’s challenges in merging into DHS. We also reviewed  a March 2003 report by the DOT Inspector General (IG), which evaluated  the Service’s selection and hiring process, training program, and  scheduling process. Finally, we discussed the governmentwide  background investigation process with the Office of Personnel  Management (OPM). Our analysis of the operational and management  control issues related to the Service’s expansion focuses primarily on the  period from November 2001 through September 2003, when the Service  was part of TSA; our assessment of the challenges related to the Service’s  mergers is, in part, prospective. We conducted our review from September  2002 through October 2003 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. See appendix I for a more detailed  discussion of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: FAA’s Federal Air Marshal program expanded the Sky Marshal program,  which was established as part of the Customs Service in the 1970s to deter  hijackings to and from Cuba. Shortly after TWA Flight 847 was hijacked in  Athens, Greece, in June 1985, then President Ronald Reagan called for an  expansion of the Sky Marshal program. On August 8, 1985, the Congress  enacted the International Security and Development Cooperation Act,  which established the statutory basis for the program within DOT, which  further delegated the responsibility to FAA. Since then, the Federal Air  Marshal program has provided specially trained, armed teams of civil  aviation security specialists for deployment worldwide on antihijacking  missions.
As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, the President and the  Congress decided to rapidly expand the Service. On September 17, 2001,  FAA began to develop a plan to recruit federal air marshals in  unprecedented numbers. Accordingly, FAA designed a process and put  together a team of specialists, incorporating resources from its Human  Resource Management, Aviation Medical, Civil Aviation Security, and  Federal Air Marshal Training organizations to implement the recruitment  process. The process was designed to ensure that each air marshal  candidate met the medical entry standards, passed DOT’s drug-testing  program, and was preliminarily judged suitable to obtain a top-secret  clearance, which is required for permanent employment with the Service.  As part of the assessment, each candidate was required to participate in a  security interview with an investigator from FAA, OPM, or the U.S.  Investigative Services (an OPM contractor), as well as interviews with  representatives of FAA’s Office of Human Resource Management and the  Service. In October 2001, FAA implemented this recruitment process, and  the Deputy Secretary of Transportation also set July 1, 2002, as the  deadline for recruiting, hiring, and training enough federal air marshals to  provide coverage on flights that posed high security risks. In November  2001, after the Aviation and Transportation Security Act was passed, TSA  assumed FAA’s responsibilities for aviation security and supported FAA’s  recruitment effort through July 2002.
Between October 2001 and July 2002, TSA received nearly 200,000  applications for federal air marshal positions. Thousands of applicants  were assessed for employment, and TSA, through OPM, initiated full  background investigations for top-secret clearances. Other federal  agencies also made law enforcement officers available to augment the  Service until TSA could hire, train, and deploy the first few classes of new  air marshals. See appendix II for a demographic profile of the Service’s  expanded workforce.
With expansion, the Service’s annual budget grew from $4.4 million for  fiscal year 2001 to $545 million for fiscal year 2003. Currently, the Service  operates a headquarters office in Virginia, 21 field offices, and a  specialized air marshal training and human resource facility in Atlantic  City, New Jersey. Basic law enforcement training takes place at the  Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Artesia, New Mexico. See  appendix III for a map of these facilities and appendix IV for a time line of  the major organizational events affecting the Service since September 11,  2001.
DHS brings together some 23 federal agencies comprising over 100  organizations, including the Federal Air Marshal Service, in what the  department describes as the most significant transformation of the U.S.  government since the merger in 1947 of the various branches of the armed  forces into the Department of Defense. DHS is divided into five  directorates, one of which, Border and Transportation Security, includes  both TSA and ICE. Among other organizations, ICE includes a portion of  the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, now called the Bureau  of Citizenship and Immigration Services; the U.S. Customs Service now  called Customs and Border Protection; and, as of November 2, 2003, the  Federal Air Marshal Service.
section_title: Expediting Background Checks and Training Enabled the Service to Meet the Deputy Secretary’s Deployment Deadline
paragraphs: To expedite the deployment of thousands of air marshals, the Service  obtained preliminary background checks and provided abbreviated  training before deploying air marshal candidates on flights. As a result, the  Service was able to meet the Deputy Secretary’s deployment deadline and  carry out its mission.
subsections: section_title: Initial Deployment Was Swift, but Completion of Final Background Investigations Has Been Slow
paragraphs: To deploy its expanded workforce as quickly as possible between October  2001 and June 2002, the Service followed the same expedited background  check procedures that federal agencies have used since 1995, when  Executive Order 12968 authorized the temporary use of interim security  clearances. Under these procedures, candidates who require security  clearances and pass preliminary background checks may, within about 24  hours, obtain interim security clearances that allow them to work until  their full background checks have been completed and they obtain their  final clearances. A preliminary background check consists of an interview  with a security specialist; a review of an applicant’s responses to a  standard questionnaire for national security positions; a criminal history  check, based on fingerprints and a review of biographical data from  National Crime Information Center files; and credit reports. An interim  security clearance may be revoked at any time if unfavorable information  is identified during an investigation.
Between October 2001 and July 2002, thousands of candidates were  assessed for employment, and TSA, through OPM, initiated full  background investigations for top-secret clearances. According to TSA  management, the majority of the candidates passed the preliminary  background checks and obtained interim security clearances that allowed  them to work while their full background checks were being completed.  Less than a quarter of the candidates did not pass the preliminary checks  because of bankruptcy, bad credit, or other problems. TSA placed these  candidates on a “pending/ready” list and did not allow them to work as air  marshals, but it pursued full background investigations for them because  many of the issues identified during preliminary background checks are  minor and are favorably resolved during full background investigations.  Full background checks for thousands of candidates identified a small  number as unsuitable. In June 2003, the Service placed 80 air marshal  candidates on administrative leave while TSA resolved issues that  surfaced during full background investigations. By August 2003, 47 of  these candidates had received their top-secret clearances and have since  been returned to flight status. Of the 33 remaining candidates, 19 have  been denied clearances, and the Service is taking steps to terminate their  employment; 4 have been approved for, but have not yet received, top- secret clearances; 7 have resigned; and the remaining 3 are awaiting TSA’s  approval of their top-secret clearances. The Service said it has continued  to identify some candidates as unsuitable, and as of October 2003, 14 air  marshals were on administrative leave because of issues that surfaced  during full background checks. When definitive information for each of  these cases is obtained, the Service said, the air marshal would be  returned to flight status or steps would be taken to terminate the air  marshal’s employment.
During our review, we found that the background investigations used to  grant top-secret clearances for air marshals were not being expedited as  requested. According to TSA, an expedited background investigation costs  $3,195 and should be completed within 75 days, whereas a regular  background check costs $2,700 and should be completed within 120 days.  Consequently, for every 1,000 background investigations, the Service paid  a premium of about $495,000. TSA paid the expedited fees to OPM up  front, as required, but as of July 2003, about 23 percent of the air marshals  were still operating under interim security clearances. Some candidates  had been awaiting final clearances for up to a year. The Service told us in  April 2003 that it had, on numerous occasions, raised concerns about the  delays in processing final security clearances but had met with little  success. Additionally, the Service said that its efforts to reclaim the  difference in cost were unsuccessful. DHS said that TSA’s Credentialing  Office had taken steps since June 2003 to ensure that every active air  marshal was operating under a top-secret clearance; and as of October  2003, about 3 percent of the active air marshals were operating under  interim security clearances.
According to OPM, the primary reason for these clearance-processing  delays is that the agency has received an unprecedented number of  requests for background investigations governmentwide since September  2001. For fiscal year 2002, OPM’s data indicated that the average  processing time for 75-day expedited background checks was 96 days.  OPM said that the expedited requests received higher-priority processing  than the regular (120-day) background checks, resulting in faster  turnaround for services related to the expedited requests. OPM added that  its contractor charges premiums for expedited requests because the costs  for these requests are higher. Consequently, according to OPM, no price  adjustments are made when overall deadlines are missed.
While the Service is not responsible for the delays in completing air  marshals’ full background investigations, we found that it could have  provided OPM with information for scheduling the investigations more  efficiently. As candidates applied for positions between October 2001 and  June 2002 and their preliminary background checks were completed, the  Service offered conditional employment to some of the candidates and, as  discussed, placed others on a “pending/ready” list. However, the Service  did not make this information available to OPM. As a result, some  potential employees received their top-secret clearances ahead of other  candidates who were being trained or deployed on flights. We brought  this issue to the attention of the Service in March 2003; and in May, the  Service sent OPM a list of candidates and asked OPM to give highest  priority to investigations of those who were already deployed on flights. In  addition, the Service has asked OPM to schedule the investigations for  senior managers first and then to schedule investigations for other  applicants on a first-in, first-out basis. On May 28, 2003, the Service also  detailed a liaison from its Office of Field Operations to assist TSA’s Office  of Security in setting priorities for reviewing and adjudicating the backlog  of background investigations.
section_title: Changes to the Training Curriculum Helped Expedite Deployment
paragraphs: To deploy the requisite number of air marshals by the Deputy Secretary’s  July 2002 deadline, the Service revised and abbreviated its training  program. From October 2001 through July 2002, it modified the air marshal  curriculum incrementally, eventually reducing the original 14-week  program to about 5 weeks for candidates without prior law enforcement  experience and about 1 week for candidates with such experience. The  revised curriculum was designed to provide candidates with the basic law  enforcement knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform their  duties as air marshals, including knowledge of the Service’s rules and  regulations, physical skills, and basic and advanced marksmanship. The  curriculum no longer included certain elements of the original training  program, such as driving skills and cockpit familiarization, because these  were not deemed critical for air marshals to perform their duties. The  curriculum also eliminated a 1-week’s visit to an airline and some  instruction in the Service’s policies and procedures, which was to be  provided on the job. Moreover, although the curriculum retained  instruction in both basic and advanced marksmanship, air marshal  candidates no longer had to pass an advanced marksmanship test to  qualify for employment. Candidates were still required to pass a basic test  with a minimum score of 255 out of a possible 300—the highest  qualification standard for any federal law enforcement agency, according  to the Service.
To provide all the newly hired air marshals with needed skills, beyond the  basic abilities the Service determined were critical for immediate  deployment, the Service instituted a new 4-week advanced training course  in October 2002. All air marshals hired from October 2001 through July  2002, regardless of their previous law enforcement experience, were  required to complete the course by January 2004. This course includes  some elements, such as emergency evacuation and flight simulator  training, that the Service did not include in the 5-week course because,  although it considered the elements important for air marshals to carry out  their mission, it did not consider them critical for immediate deployment.  In addition, the course provides further training in advanced  marksmanship skills. Air marshals hired after August 2002 attend this  advanced training course after completing their basic training. The Service  has developed a centralized tracking system to ensure that all air marshals  take this course.
Although the Service is now providing additional marksmanship training,  its decision not to restore the advanced marksmanship test as a  qualification standard for employment has proved controversial. Passing  this test would require candidates to demonstrate their speed and  accuracy in a confined environment similar to the environment on board  an aircraft. The DOT IG’s report suggested that the Service needed to  adopt a firearms qualification standard that was more stringent and  comprehensive than the basic firearms qualifying test. The Service  disagreed, emphasizing that its minimum score is the most stringent in  federal law enforcement and adding that its 4-week course provides  further training in advanced firearms skills. Our review of the Service’s  documentation confirmed that instruction in advanced marksmanship is a  critical part of this training, even though passing this element is no longer  a condition of employment.
In August 2003, the Service reported that proposed cutbacks in its training  funds would require it to extend the date for all air marshals hired from  October 2001 through July 2002 to complete the 4-week advanced course  from January 2004 to mid-2004. According to DHS, the Service’s transfer to  ICE will not adversely affect either the funding for air marshals’ training or  the schedule for newly hired air marshals to complete the 4-week training  course, since a total of $626.4 million is being transferred from TSA to ICE.  While this funding exceeds the $545 million that the Service received for  fiscal year 2003, it is not clear how much of the funding will be allocated  for training. Given the importance of training to ensure that air marshals  are prepared to carry out their mission, we believe that maintaining  adequate funding for training should remain a priority. Additionally,  should reductions in the funding for training be required, our recent work  on strategic training and development efforts provides alternatives that an  agency can consider to across-the-board cuts—such as evaluating training  needs, setting training priorities, developing alternative training  requirement scenarios, and determining how much funding each of these  scenarios would require. Our work further suggests that it is important  for agencies to ensure that their training and development efforts are cost  effective, given the anticipated benefits and to incorporate measures that  can be used to demonstrate contributions that training and development  programs make to improve results. These principles are applicable at all  times, but especially when funds are limited. Determining whether air  marshals with prior law enforcement experience have the same training  needs as those without such experience could help set cost-effective  training priorities.
We found that a cornerstone of human capital management is the ability to  successfully acquire, develop, and retain talent. Investing in and enhancing  the value of employees through training and development is a crucial part  of addressing this challenge. This investment can include not only formal  and on-the-job-training but also other opportunities, such as rotational  assignments. Our work further specifies that agencies should link their  training curriculum to the competencies needed for them to accomplish  their mission. The Service has begun developing a formal training  curriculum beyond the basic and advanced training courses described  above. This curriculum requires air marshals to participate in 5 days of  recurrent training each quarter that, in addition to the quarterly weapons  qualification, includes training in advanced firearms, operational tactics,  defensive tactics, surveillance detection, emergency medicine, physical  fitness, and legal and administrative elements. Additionally, the Service is  developing rotational assignments for air marshals that allow them to  participate in law enforcement task forces, as well as fill a variety of  operational and training positions in headquarters and the field. The  Service recognizes that such opportunities can not only enhance  professional development but also help to prevent problems such as  boredom and burnout. According to the Secretary of Homeland Security,  one of the advantages of the Service’s transfer to ICE is that it will  enhance air marshals’ professional development opportunities.
section_title: Management Information, Policies, and Procedures Have Not Kept Pace with Expanded Operations
paragraphs: As the Service grew from a small, centralized organization to an  organization with 21 field offices and thousands of employees, its need for  information, policies, and procedures to manage its expanded workforce  and operations also grew. The Service collects several types of  information that it can use to continually improve its operations and  oversight and, in some instances, it has used the information to do so. In  other instances, however, the Service lacks sufficiently detailed  information for effective monitoring and oversight. The new, decentralized  organization has also required new or written policies and procedures to  cover new situations and ensure that the same guidance is available to air  marshals in all locations. According to DHS, it recognized that the Service  would need to revise its existing policies or draft new ones, and it has  been working to do so since March 2002. Nonetheless, its policy- development efforts sometimes responded to problems, rather than  anticipating and preventing them. DHS told us that it is committed to  proactively addressing policy issues and developing procedures.
subsections: section_title: Management Information Is Not Sufficiently Detailed or Comprehensive for Effective Monitoring and Oversight
paragraphs: The Service collects information on air marshals’ work schedules and  other issues, including potential security incidents documented in reports  filed by air marshals after completing their missions, allegations of  misconduct by air marshals, and reasons provided by air marshals for  leaving the Service. Such information can be useful to managers in  monitoring mission operations and retention. According to our Standards  for Internal Control in the Federal Government, the information should  be recorded and communicated to management and others within the  agency who need it, and it should be provided in a form and within a time  frame that enables them to carry out their responsibilities. For example,  one way to do this would be to ensure that pertinent information is  captured in sufficient detail to help management identify specific actions  that need to be taken. Moreover, according to our human capital model, a  fact-based, performance-oriented approach to human capital management  is a critical success factor for maximizing the value of human capital. In  addition, high-performing organizations use data to determine key  performance objectives and goals, which enable them to evaluate the  success of their human capital approaches. For example, obtaining  employee input and suggestions can provide management with firsthand  knowledge of the organization’s operations, which management can use to  ensure ongoing effectiveness and continuous improvement. The Service  has analyzed and made effective use of its mission reports and conduct  data, but other management information that it currently collects is not  sufficiently well defined or detailed for monitoring and managing the  workforce. Although the Service initially had no systematic means of  obtaining regular input from its employees, it has recently put processes in  place to solicit air marshals’ opinions and suggestions. In addition, the  Service is participating in an Office of Management and Budget program  assessment project. As part of this effort, DHS said it has identified annual  and long-term performance measures and related performance outcome  targets to evaluate the Service’s organizational effectiveness along key  strategic goals and objectives. Through this project and other strategic  planning initiatives, DHS says it expects to systematically measure and  analyze the Service’s organizational performance along human capital,  mission scheduling, professional development, and quality of work-life  dimensions.
subsections: section_title: Automated System Improved Scheduling, but More Information Is Needed for Monitoring
paragraphs: When the Service was first directed to expand its mission and operations,  it was using a manual system to schedule air marshals for flight duty. This  system was quickly overwhelmed as the number of air marshals and flights  grew, leading to the concern that air marshals were being scheduled  inconsistently for flight duty. The Service acknowledged that during this  period, some air marshals were overworked while others were  underutilized. In June 2002, the Service replaced the manual system with  an automated system, which, according to Service officials, improved the  agency’s ability to schedule and deploy its workforce.
While the automated system expanded the Service’s scheduling capability,  it did not provide the Service with all of the information it needed for  effective monitoring. For example, it did not initially break down data on  air marshals’ use of leave into enough categories for the Service to assess  whether some air marshals were abusing sick leave in order to get a day  off. Specifically, an article in USA Today reported that about 1,250 air  marshals called in sick over an 18-day period. Eventually, the Service  determined that the article was based on a report generated by the  automated scheduling system that overrepresented the number of air  marshals who were on sick leave. Although the report was labeled “Sick  Leave,” it included data on all air marshals who were unavailable for flight  duty, not only for sickness but also for other reasons such as  administrative leave, and it listed each day of unavailability for flight duty  as a separate incident, although the same air marshal might have been  unavailable for several days in a row for the same reason.
In analyzing data from the scheduling system, we found that because the  system reported all leave charges—sick, administrative, military, or  other—as sick leave, the Service could not distinguish air marshals who  were unavailable to fly because they were out sick from air marshals who  were unavailable to fly because of injuries but were available for light field  office duty. For example, an air marshal with an injured ankle might not be  able to fly, but could perform administrative work in the field office. The  Service has since modified the scheduling system to obtain better  information on the type of leave—sick, military, or administrative— charged by air marshals who are unavailable to fly. The DOT IG also  investigated cases concerning sick leave abuse and likewise found that it  was based on a misunderstanding of the report’s contents stemming from  the report’s label.
Although the automated scheduling system provides information for  managers to monitor how many hours air marshals are scheduled for  work, automated information is not available for comparing the number of  hours actually worked with the number of hours initially scheduled. These  numbers can differ when flights are delayed or cancelled because of bad  weather or mechanical problems. Information on these differences is  important for Service managers to consider because of their implications  for both the Service’s mission and air marshals’ quality of life. For  example, if air marshals work too many hours, they may become too tired  to concentrate on their mission, or if they spend too much time away from  home, they may become dissatisfied with their jobs.
Information on the number of hours flown will also be important for the  Service to carry out a new long-term study, initiated by the Director in the  summer of 2002, on the medical and physiological effects of flying. To  date, the Service, in collaboration with FAA’s Civil Aviation Medical  Institute and the Air Force, has identified a methodology and objectives  for the study and completed a literature review to identify trends, possible  risks, and other pertinent information. As part of the study, the Service  plans to collect and analyze data from recurrent air marshal physical  examinations and to compare these data with physiological data from the  Civil Aviation Medical Institute. Although the Service is still awaiting  funding approval to conduct the physical examinations and develop the  database, Service officials plan to begin both efforts in the first quarter of  fiscal year 2004. The study team has also developed a training course on  human physiology as it relates to the aviation environment. The Service  expects this course to be available early in fiscal year 2004.
On the basis of some early findings from the study team’s literature search,  the Service set limits in its automated flight-scheduling system to address  mission, quality-of-life, and health concerns. The system limits scheduled  “duty time” to 10 hours a day or 50 hours a week. Our analysis of  schedules from the automated system for 37 weeks found that about 92  percent of the schedules were consistent with these controls. The Service  added that further guidance has been developed that results in scheduling  air marshals to fly an average of 4.2 hours per day, 18 days per month.  Thus, air marshals should fly about 75 hours per month, which the Service  said was within the aviation and military standards for pilots—90 and 100  hours per month, respectively. As part of implementing this guidance, the  Service is conducting a detailed analysis of individual flight schedules to  determine if the goals are being met. The Service reported on the basis of  this analysis that, as of September 2003, scheduled flight time averaged  76.5 hours per month. The Service’s analysis, however, focuses on flight  schedules and not on actual hours worked by the air marshals.  Information on the hours air marshals actually work is not available for  automated comparison with the hours they are scheduled to work because  the actual work hours are recorded manually on time and attendance  sheets and are not transferred to the automated system. Without an  automated way to compare actual hours worked with scheduled hours, the  Service lacks a tool needed to determine if the automated flight-scheduling  system is meeting its objectives related to mission, quality-of life, and  health concerns. DHS agreed that the information on actual hours should  be automated and said that the Service intended to incorporate this  capability via personal digital assistants (PDA) issued to all air marshals.
section_title: The Service Has Used Mission Reports to Improve Operations, but Some Coordination Issues Remain
paragraphs: Between September 2001 and September 2003, air marshals submitted  reports of almost 2,100 incidents that occurred during their missions. A  little over 40 percent of these mission reports describe passengers that  exhibited suspicious behavior to the air marshals. About 18 percent of the  reports discuss disagreements or conflicts between air marshals and  airline or airport personnel over airport or airline procedures. The  remaining mission reports cover a wide variety of incidents that the  Service grouped into 17 other categories, as shown in appendix V.
The Service has taken some action to follow up on the air marshals’  mission reports, but it has not addressed all of the issues the reports raise.  For example, the Service established a liaison with the airlines in response  to reports of disagreements and conflicts with the airlines. According to an  official with the Air Transport Association, this action has improved  relations between the air marshals and the airlines. Nevertheless, some  coordination and communication issues remain. In October 2002, for  instance, the Service purchased PDAs for distribution to all air marshals.  Service officials told us that before making the purchase, they contacted  FAA about obtaining approval to use the feature that would allow the air  marshals to communicate with one another aboard aircraft. In August  2002, FAA advised the Service that it planned to approve this PDA feature  for use by air marshals during flight. However, FAA’s approval was never  finalized, and the airlines have not allowed the air marshals to use the  PDAs for this purpose because of concerns about interference with flight  control or navigational signals. According to Service officials, air marshals  have stopped using their PDAs’ communication feature in flight until FAA  approves its use, and the Service continues to work with FAA to obtain  such approval. The Service reports that air marshals continue to use other  features of the PDAs, such as their cell phone, pager, e-mail, surveillance,  and photo-display capabilities.
section_title: The Service Has Used Reports of Misconduct to Improve Management Controls
paragraphs: Between October 2001 and July 2003, the Service collected data on almost  600 reports of misconduct by air marshals, which it classified into over 40  categories. Among the categories with large numbers of reported cases  were “insubordination or failure to follow orders,” “loss of government  property,” and “abuse of government credit cards.” According to Service  officials, they have used the misconduct database to identify issues such  as abuse of government credit cards and cell phones that need to be  investigated. For example, during the Service’s rapid expansion,  management noted an unacceptable number of unauthorized charges and  late payments associated with air marshals’ use of the government-issued  travel card. Further investigation revealed that the process of claiming  reimbursement for travel was slow and burdensome and there were  misunderstandings about what charges were proper. After corrective  action, the delinquency rate dropped dramatically. Similarly, an analysis of  the misconduct data indicated that a number of air marshals were accused  of being abusive to airline personnel during the boarding process. A  detailed review of the data pointed to differences in the Service’s and the  airlines procedures for boarding aircraft. Subsequently, the Service  negotiated a mutually agreeable solution with the airlines to resolve these  differences. In these instances, the Service used misconduct reports to  effectively refine its management controls.
section_title: Information on Air Marshals’ Reasons for Leaving the Service Is Not Detailed Enough to Target Retention Efforts
paragraphs: The Service maintains data on the number of air marshals who leave the  Service and categorizes their reason for leaving. However, these data are  not detailed enough for management to identify and follow up on issues  that could affect retention. Retention is important both to ensure the  continued deployment of experienced personnel who can carry out the  Service’s security mission and to avoid the costs to recruit, train, and  deploy new personnel, which, according to the Service, total about $40,275  per person.
Our analysis of the Service’s data on separations indicates that from  September 2001 through July 2003, about 10 percent of the thousands of  newly hired air marshals left the Service. However, during August 2002,  when the media reported a “flood” of resignations from the Service, our  analysis indicated that slightly more than 4 percent of the newly hired air  marshals had left. We found that the most frequently recorded reasons  for air marshals separating from the Service were to take other jobs and  personal reasons. Such reasons are not detailed enough for management  to identify and target issues that may hinder retention.
To gain greater insight into the reasons for separation, we examined the  Service’s documentation for 95 selected cases. For 37 of these cases, the  departing air marshals cited multiple reasons for leaving the Service. For  example, one departing air marshal cited personal reasons and going back  to his previous job. Even with this additional information, we could not  identify management issues that might have led to the separations because  the reasons documented by the Service were too general and vague.
The Service’s method of collecting data on air marshals’ reasons for  separation may be responsible, in part, for the generality and vagueness of  the information. Specifically, the Service uses either an open-ended exit  interview with the air marshal’s first-line supervisor, the air marshal’s  resignation letter, or both to collect the data. The supervisor conducts  and writes up the exit interview and an administrative official in the field  forwards the interview write-up, resignation letter, or both to human  resource officials in Service headquarters. A human resource specialist  then reviews the documentation and determines which of the reasons  cited is the primary reason for the separation. This method of collecting  information has several limitations. First, the open-ended exit interview  may not prompt responses that go beyond generalities, such as taking  another job or personal reasons, to determine whether management  issues, such as problems in transferring to a duty station closer to home or  burdensome work schedules, contributed to the air marshal’s resignation.
Second, using the first-line supervisor to conduct the interview may  discourage detailed responses, either because the air marshal may not  want to reveal his or her concerns or reasons or because the supervisor  may not want to report specific issues. Finally, using a human resource  specialist to determine the primary reason for a separation means that the  reason is filtered through another party rather than provided directly by  the air marshal who is resigning. Our work on human capital has  determined that feedback from exit interviews can guide workplace- planning efforts. If these exit interviews are constructed to collect valid  and reliable data, they allow managers to spotlight areas for attention,  such as employee retention.
According to the DOT report, air marshals interviewed by the IG’s office  were concerned about the way the air marshal program was being  managed, which contributed to low morale in the Service. The air  marshals the IG interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the Service’s  work schedules, aircraft boarding procedures, and dress code policy.
section_title: The Service Initially Lacked, but Has Recently Begun to Implement, Processes for Obtaining Employee Input
paragraphs: During the early stages of its expansion, the Service did not have  processes or mechanisms in place to gather input and suggestions from its  employees. Such processes and mechanisms would not only allow the  Service to monitor air marshals’ concerns about management issues, as  the DOT IG’s report also noted, but it would also provide the Service with  its employees’ firsthand knowledge and insights that it could use to  improve operations and policies. According to our work on human capital,  leaders at agencies with effective human capital management seek out the  views of employees at all levels and communication flows up, down, and  across the organization, facilitating continuous improvement. Tools  commonly used for obtaining employee input include employee  satisfaction surveys, employee advisory councils, and employee focus  groups.
Recently, the Service began putting processes and mechanisms in place to  gather input from its employees. The Service reports that all field offices  have methods, such as advisory committees, for air marshals to ask  questions or express concerns to senior field office management.  Additionally, question and answer sessions are held when the Director,  Deputy Director, or Assistant Director visits a field office and during the  basic and advanced training classes. To obtain further employee input, the  Service participated in an ombudsman program that TSA sponsors to  improve its operations and customer service. According to the Service, it  is also developing a lessons learned and best practices intranet site that  will allow substantive communication on issues of interest and concern to  all air marshals.
section_title: Developing and Implementing Policies and Procedures for an Expanded Organization Took Time and Created Some Confusion
paragraphs: Policies and procedures that were designed to support a small, centralized  Service were not designed for and could not accommodate the needs of a  vastly expanded and decentralized workforce. According to our Standards  for Internal Control in the Federal Government, internal control should  provide for an assessment of the risks an agency faces from both external  and internal sources. For example, when an agency expands its operations  to new geographic areas, it needs to give special attention to the risks that  the expansion presents. In attempting to hire, train, and deploy its new  workforce by the Deputy Secretary’s deadline and establish a new field  organization to support its new domestic mission, the Service had little  time to systematically assess the risks of expansion and ensure that its  policies and procedures were appropriate and adequate. Efforts to develop  new policies or modify existing ones to accommodate new circumstances  took time, and during the transition, some air marshals voiced concerns to  the media. Delays in hiring supervisors and the discretion they were given  in interpreting policies may have contributed to air marshals’ confusion.
subsections: section_title: Policy on Transfers Was Not Implemented until May 2003
paragraphs: Before its expansion, the Service was a centralized organization with one  office and fewer than 50 air marshals. Because there were no field offices,  the Service had no policy on transfers between field locations. The  vacancy announcement used during the hiring process stated that field  offices would be located in various major metropolitan areas, and a  Service official stated that air marshal applicants were allowed to express  their preferences for particular field locations. According to a media  report, air marshals alleged that transfers to their preferred locations were  promised but that those promises were not kept. Our review of a  recruiting video and other documents related to the hiring process did not  find any evidence that transfers were promised; however, the recruiting  video indicated that opportunities for transfer existed. Service officials  said that no transfers were promised and that as the Service hired air  marshals and implemented its new field office structure, it assigned the  newly hired marshals to the 21 field offices as needed. Service officials  later added that except in hardship cases, the air marshals were expected  to remain in the originally assigned field offices for 3 to 5 years. The DOT  IG also investigated this issue and interviewed air marshals who alleged  that promises of transfers made during the hiring process were not kept,  but the IG did not determine whether there was a legitimate basis for the  air marshals’ concerns.
By June 2002, the Service had received over 500 applications for transfers.  Until a policy was issued, the Service tried to respond to the air marshals’  requests and to address quality-of-life issues by developing guidance that  provided for transferring any air marshal (1) who owned a home within  100 miles of an established field office and (2) whose immediate family  resided in that location—provided that both of these conditions existed  before the air marshal’s employment with the Service. While the Service  communicated this guidance orally to field managers, some air marshals  were reportedly confused about why their requests for transfers were  denied.
In January 2003, the Service postponed further action on transfer requests,  officials said, until applicable policies—on hardship and transfers—were  finalized. On May 29, 2003, the Service implemented a hardship transfer  policy that established processes and criteria for approving transfer  requests when an air marshal or an immediate family member incurs a  medical or child-custody hardship. In developing the policy, the Service  said it looked into other law enforcement agencies’ transfer programs to  identify best practices.
section_title: Unwritten Policy on Dress Created Confusion
paragraphs: During the early months of the Service’s expansion, air marshals  expressed confusion and dissatisfaction to the media about policies  covering their attire. At that time, the Service had no written dress code  policy. Instead, according to Service officials, the agency carried over an  unwritten FAA policy that air marshals should dress appropriately for  their missions and the air marshal in charge of a mission should determine  what attire was appropriate for that mission. According to the Service,  some airline personnel complained to the Service that marshals were not  dressed to blend in with other passengers in the location of the air  marshals’ assigned seats. The Service said that the lack of a written policy  might have created confusion for some newly hired air marshals whose  initial training did not cover the Service’s policy on dress and whose field  office supervisors had discretion in interpreting the policy. In May 2002,  the Service issued a policy that directed air marshals to dress so as to  present a professional image and blend into their environment. The  Service believes that this policy enables air marshals to perform their  duties without drawing undue attention to themselves. For example, an air  marshal might wear a business suit on a morning flight to New York and a  sports shirt on an afternoon flight to Orlando. To explain and ensure  consistent application of the policy, the Director of the Service discussed  this policy with supervisors and staff during his visits to many field offices  and to the Service’s training center.
section_title: Air Marshals Expressed Concern about Reasons for Changes in Workweek Policy
paragraphs: Air marshals also discussed concerns about the Service’s workweek policy  with the media. Some air marshals complained that they had been  promised 4-day workweeks to compensate for the rigors of travel but were  being required to work 5-day workweeks. Other air marshals reported  being confused about the reasons for the change from a 4-day to a 5-day  workweek and questioned whether this change was necessary.
According to Service officials, the change in workweek policy occurred on  July 1, 2002, when the Director of the Service brought the air marshals into  compliance with the requirements of law enforcement availability pay  (LEAP), a pay premium for unscheduled duty equaling 25 percent of a law  enforcement officer’s base salary. Under this pay computation method, air  marshals are required to average 10 hours of overtime per week. LEAP  became applicable to the Service with the passage of the Aviation and  Transportation Security Act on November 19, 2001, but the Service initially  continued to compute air marshals’ schedules according to the method it  had previously used, called the “first forty” method. Under this method,  the first 40 hours worked in a week constituted the basic workweek, and  4-day and even 3-day workweeks were allowed if air marshals accrued 40  hours within that time. However, Service officials determined, in  consultation with TSA’s legal department and human resources office, that  a change to a 5-day workweek was necessary for the Service to comply  with LEAP. Accordingly, the Director ordered a 5-day basic workweek,  effective July 1, 2002.
The DOT IG reported that over 85 percent of the air marshals its staff  interviewed expressed concern about working 5 consecutive 10-hour  mission days (with 2 consecutive off-duty days), saying that it resulted in  fatigue and illness. Service officials acknowledged that working 10-hour  days can create fatigue, but said that such days are routine in the law  enforcement community. Service officials also maintained that fatigue can  be managed by applying scheduling controls and monitoring air marshals’  schedules. However, as noted, the Service lacks the data to ensure that air  marshals’ actual work hours are consistent with the scheduling controls.
section_title: Key Practices and Implementation Steps Can Help Address Merger Implementation Challenges
paragraphs: The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes resulting  from its mergers into DHS in March 2003 and into ICE in November 2003.  While changes in the size of its workforce could eventually occur in light  of the many recent improvements to aviation security and federal budget  constraints, the plans announced to date point to changes in the roles,  responsibilities, and training of ICE’s workforces; the Service’s  coordination with TSA and other organizations; and administrative  matters. DHS reported looking forward to the opportunities accompanying  the Service’s pending merger into ICE. Our recent work on mergers and  organizational transformations proposes several key practices and  implementation steps that could assist the Service and other departmental  organizations as they face these challenges.
subsections: section_title: The Service Is Likely to Face Challenges in Implementing Changes
paragraphs: One challenge for the Service will be to implement any changes in the size  or in the roles and responsibilities of its workforce that the department  determines are warranted after the Service is transferred to ICE. The right  size of a security organization’s workforce appears to depend, among  other things, on the nature and scope of the terrorist threat and on the  totality of measures in place to protect against that threat. When the  Service was first directed to expand, there were fewer protective  measures in place than there are today. Over the past 2 years, an entire  “system of systems” has been established for aviation security alone. This  system includes not only the expanded Federal Air Marshal Service, but  also about 50,000 federal security screeners in the nation’s airports, 158  airport security directors, explosives detection equipment for passengers  and baggage, requirements for performing background checks on about 1  million airline and airport employees, reinforced cockpit doors on all  passenger aircraft, and authorization for pilots to carry guns in the  airplane cockpit. Now, as the department assesses the nation’s homeland  security risks, considers the constraints on federal resources, and sets  priorities, it will need to determine its appropriate size. It has already  begun to make changes in the federal security screener workforce by  reducing the total number of full-time screeners by 6,000 in fiscal year  2003 and by planning a further reduction of 3,000 full-time screeners in  fiscal year 2004 together with the hiring of part-time screeners to meet  daily and seasonal periods of higher demand.
In announcing the Service’s merger into ICE, the Secretary of Homeland  Security did not propose a change in the size of the Service’s or of ICE’s  other two law enforcement workforces, but his statement pointed to an  expansion of their roles and responsibilities that would give the  department greater flexibility to adjust its law enforcement resources  according to varying threats. Through cross-training, the Secretary said,  thousands more law enforcement agents would be available for  deployment on flights, providing a surge capacity during times of  increased aviation security threats. At the same time, air marshals may be  assigned to other law enforcement duties, as threat information dictates.
This planned expansion of the roles and responsibilities of air marshals,  immigration agents, and customs agents will pose training challenges for  ICE and its component organizations. According to the Secretary’s  announcement, the training will be centralized, which could eventually  produce some cost efficiencies, but initially a needs assessment will have  to be conducted to identify each law enforcement workforce’s additional  training requirements. Cross-training requirements and curriculums will  also have to be established and approved. Finally, each component  organization will have to coordinate the new training requirements with its  other mission requirements and schedule its officers for the cross-training.
The Service is also likely to face coordination challenges following its  transfer from TSA to ICE. In part, the transfer is designed to improve  coordination by unifying DHS’s law enforcement functions, but it also  divides aviation security responsibilities that, for about 2 years, were  under TSA. According to the Secretary, the transfer will facilitate the  coordination and sharing of law enforcement information, thereby  enhancing aviation security. However, TSA has raised questions about  how air marshals’ flights will be scheduled, and the TSA Administrator has  expressed a desire to influence the scheduling. Immigration agents have  reportedly also wondered how ICE would juggle air marshal deployments  with the bureau’s current investigative work.
Finally, the Service’s transfer to ICE poses administrative challenges for  the three component organizations. For example, the planned changes in  the roles and responsibilities of the federal law enforcement officers could  have implications for their performance evaluations and compensation.  Currently, the three groups of law enforcement officers are under different  pay systems and are compensated at different rates. Efforts are under way  to resolve these challenges.
section_title: Key Practices and Implementation Steps Can Help the Service Address Potential Merger Challenges
paragraphs: On the basis of our work on mergers and organizational transformations,  we identified nine key practices and 21 implementation steps that could  assist DHS in successfully merging the roles, responsibilities, and cultures  of the Service and the department’s other component organizations.  While these practices will ultimately be important to a successful merger  and we have previously recommended them for the department, there are  three, we believe, that are particularly applicable to the Service, given the  concerns about communication and other allegations reported in the  media. These three practices emphasize communicating with employees  and obtaining and using their feedback to promote continuous  improvement. See appendix VI for a complete listing of the practices and  implementations steps.
One key practice in a merger or transformation is to set implementation  goals and a time line to build momentum and show progress from day one.  These goals and the time line are essential to pinpoint performance  shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse corrections. Research indicates  that people are at the heart of successful mergers and transformations.  Thus, seeking and monitoring employee attitudes and taking appropriate  follow-up actions is an implementation step that supports this practice.  Our work suggests that obtaining employee input through pulse surveys,  focus groups, or confidential hotlines can serve as a quick check of how  employees are feeling about large-scale changes and the new organization.  As discussed in this report, the Service did not initially have such tools in  place—in large part because of the enormous demands it faced in  recruiting, training, and deploying thousands of air marshals by the Deputy  Secretary’s deadline—and it was not monitoring employee attitudes.  Furthermore, although monitoring provides good information, it is also  important for agency management not only to listen to employees’  concerns but also to take action. By not taking appropriate follow-up  actions, negative attitudes may translate into actions such as employee  departures—or, as was the case with the Service, complaints to the media.  Identifying cultural features of merging organizations is another important  step in setting implementation goals. Cultural similarities between the  Service and the other organizations within ICE could facilitate the  Service’s merger into ICE. As the Director of the Service and others have  noted, air marshals, immigration agents, and customs agents are all law  enforcement officers and share a common culture. Moreover, as a  spokesperson for ICE pointed out, many air marshals came to the Service  from Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service; and some  other agents served as air marshals temporarily after September 11.
Establishing a communication strategy to create shared expectations and  report related progress is another key practice in implementing a merger  or transformation. According to our work on transformations and mergers,  communication is most effective when it occurs early, clearly, and often  and when it is downward, upward, and lateral. Organizations have found  that a key implementation step is to communicate information early and  often to build trust among employees as well as an understanding of the  purpose of planned changes. As the Service found when modifying its  workweek policy to implement LEAP premium pay, the absence of  ongoing communication can confuse employees. Two-way communication  is also part of this strategy, facilitating a two-way honest exchange with,  and allowing for feedback from, employees, customers, and stakeholders.  Once this solicited employee feedback is received, it is important to  consider and use it to make appropriate changes when implementing a  merger or transformation.
Involving employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership is a  third key practice for a successful transformation or merger. Employee  involvement strengthens the transformation process by including frontline  perspectives and experiences. A key implementation step in this practice  is incorporating employee feedback into new policies and procedures.  After obtaining sufficient input from key players, the organization needs to  develop clear, documented, and transparent policies and procedures. Not  having such policies and procedures was an impediment to the Service as  it expanded, creating confusion about issues such as transfers and dress  codes. DHS said that it fully recognizes the value and importance of  communicating with employees and of obtaining and using their feedback  to promote continuous improvement. It further noted that as the Service  merges into ICE, it is committed to involving employees to obtain their  opinions and gain their ownership.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The rapid expansion of the Service’s mission and workforce posed  significant challenges, many of which the Service has begun to address. In  the 2 years that have elapsed since the terrorist attacks of September 11,  the Service has deployed thousands of new air marshals on thousands of  domestic and international flights. During this time, the Service has also  established a decentralized organization and begun to integrate its  operations with those of a new department. While these accomplishments  initially came at some cost, as evidenced by air marshals’ concerns with  the Service’s management, the Service has taken steps to provide  advanced training, improve scheduling, obtain and use more detailed  management information, develop and communicate policies and  procedures, and obtain and respond to employee feedback.
Continuing these efforts will be important for the Service as it moves  forward. Developing and analyzing information on the hours air marshals  actually work is key to ensuring that the Service’s scheduling controls are  operating as intended. Flying for too many hours can cause fatigue,  potentially diminishing air marshals’ alertness and reducing their  effectiveness. Capturing detailed, firsthand information on air marshals’  reasons for separation is critical to developing cost-effective strategies for  promoting retention and would also allow the Service to identify and  analyze the root causes of issues and to address vulnerabilities through  changes to its policies, procedures, and training. While retention has not  been an issue to date, the cost of recruiting, training, and deploying air  marshals is too high to risk separations that could be avoided through  better understanding of and attention to air marshals’ concerns.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland  Security direct the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation  Security to support the Service’s continued commitment to developing  into a high-performing organization by taking the following actions to  improve management information and to implement key practices that  contribute to successful mergers and organizational transformations:    Develop an automated method to compare actual hours worked with  scheduled hours so that the Service can monitor the effectiveness of its  scheduling controls and support its planned long-term study of the effects  of flying on air marshals and their aviation security mission.
Seek and monitor employee attitudes by obtaining detailed, firsthand  information on air marshals’ reasons for separation, using such means as  confidential, structured exit surveys, that will allow management to  analyze and address issues that could affect retention and take appropriate  follow-up actions, such as improving training, career development  opportunities, and communication.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment.  DHS agreed with our report’s information and recommendations and said  it welcomes our proposals for practices that it believes will ultimately  maximize its ability to protect the American public, contribute to the  protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure, and preserve the viability  of the aviation industry. DHS also expressed a commitment to continuous  improvement as it moves forward, including actions designed to build on  the accomplishments the Service has already achieved in expanding its  mission and workforce since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  According to DHS, the Service has ongoing activities in several areas, such  as continuing to address policy issues and develop procedures and  establishing field office mechanisms and groups to discuss employee  issues and concerns. We included this information in the final report.
Additionally, DHS identified references in the draft report to  “overscheduling” of air marshals, with an explicit suggestion that such  “overscheduling” was among air marshals’ reasons for separating from the  Service. We revised the report to avoid this implication, since we had not  intended to suggest that air marshals were being overscheduled. Our  intent was to point out that without an automated method to compare  actual hours worked with scheduled hours, the Service would not readily  be able to monitor the effectiveness of its scheduling controls. We also  agreed with DHS that there were no data in the Service’s separation  information to suggest that “overscheduling” was among air marshals’  reasons for leaving the Service, and we modified the report accordingly.  DHS agreed with our recommendation to automate air marshals’ time and  attendance data to facilitate comparisons of actual hours worked with  scheduled hours and said that the Service was taking steps to implement  the recommendation. DHS also agreed that there was a need to improve  the quality of the Service’s separation information.
In its comments, DHS also emphasized its belief that the Service’s merger  with ICE would have a number of significant benefits, particularly from  cross-training personnel. DHS noted that after cross-training, the air  marshals, as well as personnel in the other ICE components, would have  far more law enforcement capability and could supplement each other’s  functions during times of heightened threat. Additionally, DHS said that  the aviation system would benefit from the concentration and  coordination of DHS law enforcement personnel under the direction of a  single Assistant Secretary. We discuss these changes in our report by  examining them in the context of issues that may arise as the Service  merges with other agencies. In addition, we discuss key practices and  implementation steps that could be useful in dealing with the changes. We  note, however, that it is too early to assess any possible benefits or  repercussions of the changes.
Finally, DHS provided technical clarifications to the report, which we  incorporated into the report as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 5 days after the  date of this letter.  At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,  and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform,  other interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security, the  Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, and the  Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs  Enforcement. This report is also available on GAO's home page at  http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact Carol Anderson-Guthrie or me at (202) 512-2834 if you have  any questions about the report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address each of our study objectives and research questions, we  reviewed and analyzed data and documentation provided by the Federal  Air Marshal Service (The Service) on background checks and training;  scheduling, mission incidents, employee misconduct, and separation; and  several workforce policies and procedures. We also interviewed officials  responsible for implementing and operating the Service. Additionally, we  used our Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government,  Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, Human Capital: A  Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the  Federal Government, and Model of Strategic Human Capital  Management, to help assess the Service’s training, management  information, and policies and procedures. We also reviewed an audit  report by the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Inspector General  (IG) on the Federal Air Marshal program. To guide our examination of the  Service’s future challenges, we used our Results-Oriented Cultures:  Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational  Transformations.
To compare the background check procedures for the newly hired air  marshals with those used before September 2001, we obtained and  reviewed Service documents that described the process and procedures  used to apply for a top-secret clearance, as well as for an interim secret  clearance waiver. We interviewed officials at the Service’s Human  Resource Center in New Jersey who were knowledgeable about the  process and were coordinating the Service’s requirements with the  responsible Security Management Offices at both the Federal Aviation  Administration (FAA) and the Transportation Security Administration  (TSA). We also analyzed data provided by the Office of Personnel  Management’s (OPM) Investigative Service and had discussions with OPM  personnel on the number of clearances processed and the procedures that  are used.
To determine what changes were made in the training curriculum for the  newly hired air marshals, we analyzed documents related to the air  marshal training curriculum. In order to identify the curriculum in place  before the changes were made, we interviewed air marshals who had been  with the Service before September 2001. To understand the Service’s  curriculum from September 2001 through July 2003, we evaluated class  schedules, training materials, and training data that tracked the  completion of coursework and firearms qualification training. We visited  the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Artesia, New Mexico and  the Service’s training center in New Jersey, where we interviewed officials  responsible for overseeing the air marshal training program. In addition,  we interviewed representatives of the Air Line Pilots Association, the Air  Transport Association, and current and former air marshals.
To determine what management information and policies and procedures  the Service had developed to support its expanded mission and workforce,  we examined the Service’s automated scheduling system and management  information on mission incidents, reported misconduct, and reasons for  separation. We analyzed the automated scheduling system data to  determine if the current system controls were operating as expected.  Additionally, to determine the extent of sick leave use and to address  allegations of excessive use, we analyzed the “sick calls” generated from  the scheduling system between July and October 2002. We also reviewed  and discussed with Service management its policies and procedures for air  marshals’ transfers between offices, dress code requirements, and work  schedules.
To determine how many newly hired air marshals have left the Service and  why, we used agency data on the number of air marshals on board, hired,  and separated each month; supervisory memorandums summarizing exit  interviews; resignation letters; personnel action forms; and the Service’s  summary database on separations. Using the summary database, we  determined the number of air marshals who separated, by reason, and  calculated the percentage of total employees that separated for a specific  reason. We discussed the process for collecting these data with agency  officials responsible for maintaining the Service’s personnel data from the  Service’s Human Resource Center in New Jersey. The Service provided  information on the processing and maintenance of its data and on the  relationships among its data systems. When we had concerns about the  consistency and validity of the data, we asked agency officials to address  each concern. On the basis of the information provided by the agency and  our review, we determined that the required data elements were adequate  for the purpose of this work.
To gain a basic understanding of the issues surrounding staff decisions to  leave the Service, we reviewed the agency’s separation data. For each  departed staff, these data capture only one predominant reason (for  leaving). To supplement this analysis, we selected 95 cases (36 percent of  264 separation cases) that had some form of documentation, had occurred  at various times between January 2002 and March 2003, and had originated  at various field offices. For each selected case, we reviewed any available  resignation letters, exit interviews, and forms documenting personnel  actions. This approach allowed us to conduct a limited quality check of the  Service’s data and determine whether reasons outside of those reported by  the Service provided a broader view of air marshals’ reasons for leaving  the Service.
To get a better understanding of the types of misconduct that air marshals  have been charged with, we reviewed the electronic spreadsheets that the  Service uses to track the status of each case of reported misconduct. The  spreadsheets included cases reported between October 2001 and July  2003. We sorted the cases of misconduct by category to determine if a  particular category was prevalent. We also spoke with Service  management about the adjudication of alleged misconduct and the issues  related to the completeness and definition of misconduct measures.
To determine the types and frequency of the mission reports submitted by  air marshals, we analyzed the database maintained by the Federal Air  Marshals’ Mission Operations Control Center. This database contained  approximately 1,600 incidents that were reported by air marshals between  September 11, 2001, and September 16, 2003. We then sorted the incidents  into broad categories, including mission-related incidents and incidents  that occurred between air marshals and airport or airline personnel. We  also received information on the Service’s use and dissemination of the  incident data from the Special Agent in Charge of Field Operations.
We reviewed the DOT IG’s report on the Federal Air Marshal program as  an additional source of information about the Service. This report  evaluated various aspects of the Service, including its selection and hiring  process and its procedures for properly training and fully qualifying air  marshals to respond to incidents aboard aircraft. For one aspect of the  report, the IG interviewed 112 air marshals in a one-on-one format at their  field office duty stations. The air marshals were not selected for interview  using structured or random selection methods. Information obtained  through these interviews highlights employee concerns with the Service  but is anecdotal and therefore cannot be projected to the universe of the  Service’s air marshal workforce.
section_title: Appendix II: Demographic Profile of the Federal Air Marshal Service
section_title: Appendix III: Locations of the Federal Air Marshal Service’s 21 Field Offices and Training Facility
section_title: Appendix IV: Events Affecting the Federal Air Marshal Service, September 2001 through October 2002
paragraphs: Appendix IV: Events Affecting the Federal Air  Marshal Service, September 2001 through  October 2002  The exact number of federal air marshals is classified.
section_title: Appendix V: Mission-Related Incidents Reported by Federal Air Marshals, by Broad Categories, September 15, 2001 — September 16, 2003
subsections: section_title: Subtotal: (Issues with airport or airline personnel)
section_title: Appendix VI: Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and Organizational Transformations
paragraphs: Appendix VI: Key Practices and  Implementation Steps for Mergers and  Organizational Transformations  Ensure top leadership drives the  transformation.
Define and articulate a succinct and  compelling reason for change.
Balance continued delivery of services  with merger and transformation activities.
Establish a coherent mission and  integrated strategic goals to guide the  transformation.
Adopt leading practices for results- oriented strategic planning and reporting.
Focus on a key set of principles and  priorities at the outset of the  transformation.
Embed core values in every aspect of the  organization to reinforce the new culture.
Set implementation goals and a  timeline to build momentum and show  progress from day one.
Make public implementation goals and  timeline.
Seek and monitor employee attitudes and  take appropriate follow-up actions.
Identify cultural features of merging  organizations to increase understanding of  former work environments.
Attract and retain key talent.  and skills inventory to allow knowledge  exchange among merging organizations.
Dedicate an implementation team to  manage the transformation process. implementation team.
Select high-performing team members.
Use the performance management  system to define the responsibility and  assure accountability for change.
Adopt leading practices to implement  effective performance management  systems with adequate safeguards.
Establish a communication strategy to  create shared expectations and report  related progress.
Communicate early and often to build  trust.
Ensure consistency of message.
Encourage two-way communication.
Provide information to meet specific needs  of employees.
Involve employees to obtain their ideas  and gain ownership for the  transformation.
Use employee teams.
Involve employees in planning and  sharing performance information.
Incorporate employee feedback into new  policies and procedures.  organizational levels.
Build a world-class organization.
Adopt leading practices to build a world- class organization.
section_title: Appendix VII: Contacts and Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Bess Eisenstadt, David Hooper, Kevin  Jackson, Maren McAvoy, Minette Richardson, Laura Shumway, Rick  Smith, Gladys Toro, and Alwynne Wilber made key contributions to this  report.