Compact of Free Association: Implementation Activities Have Progressed, but the Marshall Islands Faces Challenges to Achieving Long-Term Compact Goals
Published: 2007-07-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: From 1987 through 2003, the United States provided more than $2 billion in economic assistance to the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the RMI under a Compact of Free Association; approximately $579 million of this economic assistance went to the RMI. In 2003, the U.S. government approved an amended compact with the RMI that provides an additional 20 years of assistance, totaling about $1.5 billion from 2004 through 2023. The Department of the Interior's Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) is responsible for administering and monitoring this U.S. assistance. The amended compact with the RMI identifies the additional 20 years of grant assistance as intended to assist the RMI government in its efforts to promote the economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance of its people. The assistance is provided in the form of annually decreasing grants that prioritize health and education, paired with annually increasing contributions to trust funds intended as a source of revenue for the country after the grants end in 2023. The amended compact also contains several new funding and accountability provisions that strengthen reporting and bilateral interaction. These provisions include requiring the establishment of a joint economic management committee and a trust fund committee to, respectively, among other things, review the RMI's progress toward compact objectives and to assess the trust fund's effectiveness in contributing to the country's long-term economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance. In 2003, we testified that these provisions could improve accountability over assistance but that successful implementation will require appropriate resources and sustained commitment from both the United States and the RMI. Drawing on several reports that we have published since 2005, I will discuss the RMI's economic prospects, implementation of its amended compact to meet long-term goals, and potential trust fund earnings.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The RMI has limited prospects for achieving its long-term development objectives and has not enacted policy reforms needed to enable economic growth. The RMI depends on public sector spending of foreign assistance rather than on private sector or remittance income; public sector expenditure accounts for more than half of its gross domestic product (GDP). The RMI government budget largely depends on foreign assistance and, despite annual decrements in compact funding to support budgetary expenditures, is characterized by a growing wage bill. Meanwhile, the two private sector industries identified as having growth potential--fisheries and tourism--face significant barriers to expansion because of the RMI's remote geographic locations, inadequate infrastructure, and poor business environment. In addition, RMI emigrants lack marketable skills that are needed to increased revenue from remittances. Moreover, progress in implementing key policy reforms necessary to improve the private sector environment has been slow. Foreign investment regulations remain burdensome, and RMI government involvement in commercial activities continues to hinder private sector development. The RMI has made progress in implementing compact assistance, but it faces several challenges in allocating and using this assistance to support its long-term development goals. RMI grant allocations have reflected compact priorities by targeting health, education, and infrastructure--for example, funding construction of nine new schools. The RMI also has not planned for long-term sustainability of services that takes into account the annual funding decrement. Capacity limitations have further affected its ability to ensure the effective use of grant funds. The RMI currently lacks the capacity to adequately measure progress, owing to inadequate baseline data and incomplete performance reports. Moreover, although accountability--as measured by timeliness in single audit reporting and corrective action plans to single audit findings--has improved, insufficient staff and skills have limited the RMI's ability to monitor day-to-day sector grant operations as the compacts require. Inadequate communication about grant implementation may further hinder the U.S. and RMI governments from ensuring the grants' effective use. The RMI trust fund may not provide sustainable income for the country after compact grants end, potential sources for supplementing trust fund income have limitations, and the trust fund committee has experienced management challenges. Market volatility and the choice of investment strategy could cause the RMI trust fund balance to vary widely, and there is increasing probability that in some years the trust fund will not reach the maximum disbursement level allowed--an amount equal to the inflation-adjusted compact grants in 2023--or be able to disburse any income. The trust fund committee's reporting has not analyzed the fund's potential effectiveness in helping the RMI achieve its long-term economic goals. Although the RMI has supplemented its trust fund income with a contribution from Taiwan, other sources of income are uncertain or entail risk. As of June 2007, for example, the RMI trust fund committee had not appointed an independent auditor or a money manager to invest the fund according to the proposed investment strategy.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s recent work regarding the  Compact of Free Association between the United States and the Republic  of the Marshall Islands (RMI). From 1987 through 2003, the United States  provided more than $2 billion in economic assistance to the Federated  States of Micronesia (FSM) and the RMI under a Compact of Free  Association;  approximately $579 million of this economic assistance went  to the RMI. In 2003, the U.S. government approved an amended compact  with the RMI that provides an additional 20 years of assistance, totaling  about $1.5 billion from 2004 through 2023. The Department of the  Interior’s Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) is responsible for administering  and monitoring this U.S. assistance.
The amended compact with the RMI identifies the additional 20 years of  grant assistance as intended to assist the RMI government in its efforts to  promote the economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance of its  people. The assistance is provided in the form of annually decreasing  grants that prioritize health and education, paired with annually increasing  contributions to trust funds intended as a source of revenue for the  country after the grants end in 2023. The amended compact also contains  several new funding and accountability provisions that strengthen  reporting and bilateral interaction. These provisions include requiring the  establishment of a joint economic management committee and a trust fund  committee to, respectively, among other things, review the RMI’s progress  toward compact objectives and to assess the trust fund’s effectiveness in  contributing to the country’s long-term economic advancement and  budgetary self-reliance. In 2003, we testified that these provisions could  improve accountability over assistance but that successful implementation  will require appropriate resources and sustained commitment from both  the United States and the RMI.
Today, drawing on several reports that we have published since 2005, I  will discuss the RMI’s economic prospects, implementation of its amended  compact to meet long-term goals, and potential trust fund earnings.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Compact of Free Association: 1986-2003
paragraphs: In 1986, the United States, the FSM, and the RMI entered into the original  Compact of Free Association. The compact provided a framework for the  United States to work toward achieving its three main goals: (1) to secure  self-government for the FSM and the RMI, (2) to ensure certain national  security rights for all of the parties, and (3) to assist the FSM and the RMI  in their efforts to advance economic development and self-sufficiency.  Under the original compact, the FSM and RMI also benefited from  numerous U.S. federal programs, while citizens of both nations exercised  their right under the compact to live and work in the United States as  “nonimmigrants” and to stay for long periods of time.
Although the first and second goals of the original compact were met,  economic self-sufficiency was not achieved under the first compact. The  FSM and the RMI became independent nations in 1978 and 1979,  respectively, and the three countries established key defense rights,  including securing U.S. access to military facilities on Kwajalein Atoll in  the RMI through 2016. The compact’s third goal was to be accomplished  primarily through U.S. direct financial assistance to the FSM and the RMI  that totaled $2.1 billion from 1987 through 2003. However, estimated FSM  and RMI per capita GDP levels at the close of the compact did not exceed,  in real terms, those in the early 1990s, although U.S. assistance had  maintained income levels that were higher than the two countries could  have achieved without support. In addition, we found that the U.S., FSM,  and RMI governments provided little accountability over compact  expenditures and that many compact-funded projects experienced  problems because of poor planning and management, inadequate  construction and maintenance, or misuse of funds.
section_title: Amended Compacts of Free Association: 2004- 2023
paragraphs: In 2003, the United States approved separate amended compacts with the  FSM and RMI that (1) continue the defense relationship, including a new  agreement providing U.S. military access to Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI  through 2086; (2) strengthen immigration provisions; and (3) provide an  estimated $3.6 billion in financial assistance to both nations from 2004  through 2023, including about $1.5 billion to the RMI (see app. I). The  amended compacts identify the additional 20 years of grant assistance as  intended to assist the FSM and RMI governments in their efforts to  promote the economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance of their  people. Financial assistance is provided in the form of annual sector  grants and contributions to each nation’s trust fund. The amended  compacts and their subsidiary agreements, along with the countries’  development plans, target the grant assistance to six sectors—education,  health, public infrastructure, the environment, public sector capacity  building, and private sector development—prioritizing two sectors,  education and health. To provide increasing U.S. contributions to the  FSM’s and the RMI’s trust funds, grant funding decreases annually and will  likely result in falling per capita grant assistance over the funding period  and relative to the original compact (see app. II). For example, in 2004  U.S. dollar terms, FSM per capita grant assistance will fall from around  $1,352 in 1987 to around $562 in 2023, and RMI per capita assistance will  fall from around $1,170 in 1987 to around $317 in 2023.
Under the amended compacts, annual grant assistance is to be made  available in accordance with an implementation framework that has  several components (see app. III). For example, prior to the annual  awarding of compact funds, the countries must submit development plans  that identify goals and performance objectives for each sector. The FSM  and RMI governments are also required to monitor day-to-day operations  of sector grants and activities, submit periodic financial and performance  reports for the tracking of progress against goals and objectives, and  ensure annual financial and compliance audits. In addition, the U.S. and  FSM Joint Economic Management Committee (JEMCO) and the U.S. and  RMI Joint Economic Management and Financial Accountability Committee  (JEMFAC) are to approve annual sector grants and evaluate the countries’  management of the grants and their progress toward compact goals. The  amended compacts also provide for the formation of FSM and RMI trust  fund committees to, among other things, hire money managers, oversee  the respective funds’ operation and investment, and provide annual  reports on the effectiveness of the funds.
section_title: Current Development Prospects Remain Limited for the RMI
paragraphs: The RMI economy shows limited potential for developing sustainable  income sources other than foreign assistance to offset the annual decline  in U.S. compact grant assistance. In addition, the RMI has not enacted  economic policy reforms needed to improve its growth prospects.
The RMI’s economy shows continued dependence on government  spending of foreign assistance and limited potential for expanded private  sector and remittance income.
Since 2000, the estimated public sector share of GDP has grown, with  public sector expenditure in 2005—about two-thirds of which is funded  by external grants—accounting for about 60 percent of GDP.
The RMI’s government budget is characterized by limited tax revenue  paired with growing government payrolls. For example, RMI taxes have  consistently provided less than 30 percent of total government revenue;  however, payroll expenditures have roughly doubled, from around $17  million in 2000 to around $30 million in 2005.
The RMI development plan identifies fishing and tourism as key  potential private sector growth industries. However, the two industries  combined currently provide less than 5 percent of employment, and  both industries face significant constraints to growth that stem from  structural barriers and a costly business environment. According to  economic experts, growth in these industries is limited by factors such  as geographic isolation, lack of tourism infrastructure, inadequate  interisland shipping, a limited pool of skilled labor, and a growing  threat of overfishing.
Although remittances from emigrants could provide increasing  monetary support to the RMI, evidence suggests that RMI emigrants  are currently limited in their income-earning opportunities abroad  owing to inadequate education and vocational skills. For example, the  2003 U.S. census of RMI migrants in Hawaii, Guam, and the  Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands reveals that only 7  percent of those 25 years and older had a college degree and almost  half of RMI emigrants lived below the poverty line.
Although the RMI has undertaken efforts aimed at economic policy  reform, it has made limited progress in implementing key tax, land,  foreign investment, and public sector reforms that are needed to improve  its growth prospects. For example:    The RMI government and economic experts have recognized for  several years that the RMI tax system is complex and regressive, taxing  on a gross rather than net basis and having weak collection and  administrative capacity. Although the RMI has focused on improving  tax administration and has raised some penalties and tax levels,  legislation for income tax reform has failed and needed changes in  government import tax exemptions have not been addressed.  In attempts to modernize a complex land tenure system, the RMI has  established land registration offices. However, such offices have lacked  a systematic method for registering parcels, instead waiting for  landowners to voluntarily initiate the process. For example, only five  parcels of land in the RMI had been, or were currently being, registered  as of June 2006. Continued uncertainties over land ownership and land  values create costly disputes, disincentives for investment, and  problems regarding the use of land as an asset.
Economic experts and private sector representatives describe the  overall climate for foreign investment in the RMI as complex and  nontransparent. Despite attempts to streamline the process, foreign  investment regulations remain relatively burdensome, with reported  administrative delays and difficulties in obtaining permits for foreign  workers.
The RMI government has endorsed public sector reform; however,  efforts to reduce public sector employment have generally failed, and  the government continues to conduct a wide array of commercial  enterprises that require subsidies and compete with private  enterprises. As of June 2006, the RMI had not prepared a  comprehensive policy for public sector enterprise reform.
Although the RMI development plan includes objectives for economic  reform, until August 2006—2 years into the amended compact—JEMFAC  did not address the country’s slow progress in implementing these  reforms.
section_title: The RMI Faces Challenges to Effectively Implementing Compact Assistance for Its Long-Term Development Goals
paragraphs: The RMI has allocated funds to priority sectors, although several factors  have hindered its use of the funds to meet long-term development needs.  Further, despite actions taken to effectively implement compact grants,  administrative challenges have limited its ability to ensure use of the  grants for its long-term goals. In addition, although OIA has monitored  early compact activities, it has also faced capacity constraints.
The RMI allocated compact funds largely to priority sectors for 2004-2006.  The RMI allocated about 33 percent, 40 percent, and 20 percent of funds to  education, infrastructure, and health, respectively (see app. IV). The  education allocation included funding for nine new school construction  projects, initiated in October 2003 through July 2006. However, various  factors, such as land use issues and inadequate needs assessments, have  limited the government’s use of compact funds to meet long-term  development needs. For example:    Management and land use issues. The RMI government and Kwajalein  landowners have been disputing the management of public entities and  government use of leased land on the atoll. Such tensions have  negatively affected the construction of schools and other community  development initiatives. For example, the government and  landowners disagreed about the management of the entity designated  to use the compact funds set aside for Ebeye special needs;  consequently, about $3.3 million of the $5.8 million allocated for this  purpose had not been released for the community’s benefit until after  September 2006. In addition, although the RMI has completed some  infrastructure projects where land titles were clear and long-term  leases were available, continuing uncertainty regarding land titles may  delay future projects.
Lack of planning for declining U.S. assistance. Despite the goal of  budgetary self-reliance, the RMI lacks concrete plans for addressing the  annual decrement in compact funding, which could limit its ability to  sustain current levels of government services in the future. RMI  officials told us that they can compensate for the decrement in various  ways, such as through the yearly partial adjustment for inflation  provided for in the amended compacts or through improved tax  collection. However, the partial nature of the adjustment causes the  value of the grant to fall in real terms, independent of the decrement,  thereby reducing the government’s ability to pay over time for imports,  such as energy, pharmaceutical products, and medical equipment.  Additionally, the RMI’s slow progress in implementing tax reform will  limit its ability to augment tax revenues.
The RMI has taken steps to effectively implement compact assistance, but  administrative challenges have hindered its ability to ensure use of the  funds for its long-term development goals. The RMI established  development plans that include strategic goals and objectives for the  sectors receiving compact funds. Further, in addition to establishing  JEMFAC, the RMI designated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as its official  contact point for compact policy and grant implementation issues.  However, data deficiencies, report shortcomings, capacity constraints, and  inadequate communication have limited the RMI and U.S. governments’  ability to consistently ensure the effective use of grant funds to measure  progress, and monitor day-to-day activities.
Data deficiencies. Although the RMI established performance  measurement indicators, a lack of complete and reliable data has  prevented the use of these indicators to assess progress. For example,  the RMI submitted data to JEMFAC for only 15 of the 20 required  education performance indicators in 2005, repeating the submission in  2006 without updating the data. Also, in 2005, the RMI government  reported difficulty in comparing the health ministry’s 2004 and 2005  performance owing to gaps in reported data—for instance, limited data  were available in 2004 for the outer island health care system.
Report shortcomings. The usefulness of the RMI’s quarterly  performance reports has also been limited by incomplete and  inaccurate information. For example, the RMI Ministry of Health’s 2005  fourth-quarter report contained incorrect outpatient numbers for the  first three quarters, according to a hospital administrator. Additionally,  we found several errors in basic statistics in the RMI quarterly reports  for education and RMI Ministry of Education officials and officials in  other sectors told us that they had not been given the opportunity to  review the final performance reports compiled by the statistics office  prior to submission.
Capacity constraints. Staff and skill limitations have constrained the  RMI’s ability to provide day-to-day monitoring of sector grant  operations. However, the RMI has submitted its single audits on time.  In addition, although the single audit reports for 2004 and 2005  indicated weaknesses in the RMI’s financial statements and compliance  with requirements of major federal programs, the government has  developed corrective action plans to address the 2005 findings related  to such compliance.
Lack of communication. Our interviews with U.S. and RMI department  officials, private sector representatives, NGOs, and economic experts  revealed a lack of communication and dissemination of information by  the U.S. and RMI governments on issues such as JEMFAC decisions,  departmental budgets, economic reforms, legislative decisions, and  fiscal positions of public enterprises. Such lack of information about  government activities creates uncertainty for public, private, and  community leaders, which can inhibit grant performance and  improvement of social and economic conditions.
As administrator of the amended compact grants, OIA monitored sector  grant and fiscal performance, assessed RMI compliance with compact  conditions, and took action to correct persistent shortcomings. For  example, since 2004, OIA has provided technical advice and assistance to  help the RMI improve the quality of its financial statements and develop  controls to resolve audit findings and prevent recurrences. However, OIA  has been constrained in its oversight role owing to staffing challenges and  time-consuming demands associated with early compact implementation  challenges in the FSM.
section_title: RMI Trust Fund May Not Provide Sustainable Income After Compact Grants End
paragraphs: Market volatility and choice of investment strategy could lead to a wide  range of RMI trust fund balances in 2023 and potentially prevent trust  fund disbursements in some years. Although the RMI has supplemented its  trust fund balance with additional contributions, other sources of income  are uncertain or entail risks. Furthermore, the RMI’s trust fund committee  has faced challenges in effectively managing the fund’s investment.
Market volatility and investment strategy could have a considerable  impact on projected trust fund balances in 2023. Our analysis indicates  that, under various scenarios, the RMI’s trust fund could fall short of the  maximum allowed disbursement level—an amount equal to the inflation- adjusted compact grants in 2023—after compact grants end, with the  probability of shortfalls increasing over time (see app. V). For example,  under a moderate investment strategy, the fund’s income is only around 10  percent likely to fall short of the maximum distribution by 2031. However,  this probability rises to almost 40 percent by 2050. Additionally, our  analysis indicates a positive probability that the fund will yield no  disbursement in some years; under a moderate investment strategy the  probability is around 10 percent by 2050. Despite the impact of market  volatility and investment strategy, the trust fund committee’s reports have  not yet assessed the fund’s potential adequacy for meeting the RMI’s long- term economic goals.
RMI trust fund income could be supplemented from several sources,  although this potential is uncertain. For example, the RMI received a  commitment from Taiwan to contribute $40 million over 20 years to the  RMI trust fund, which improved the RMI fund’s likely capacity for  disbursements after 2023. However, the RMI’s limited development  prospects constrain its ability to raise tax revenues to supplement the  fund’s income. Securitization—issuing bonds against future U.S.  contributions—could increase the fund’s earning potential by raising its  balances through bond sales. However, securitization could also lead to  lower balances and reduced fund income if interest owed on the bonds  exceeds investment returns.
The RMI trust fund committee has experienced management challenges in  establishing the trust fund to maximize earnings. Contributions to the trust  fund were initially placed in a low-interest savings account and were not  invested until 16 months after the initial contribution. As of June 2007,  the RMI trust fund committee had not appointed an independent auditor  or a money manager to invest the fund according to the proposed  investment strategy. U.S. government officials suggested that contractual  delays and committee processes for reaching consensus and obtaining  administrative support contributed to the time taken to establish and  invest funds. As of May 2007, the committee had not yet taken steps to  improve these processes.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Since enactment of the amended compacts, the U.S. and RMI governments  have made efforts to meet new requirements for implementation,  performance measurement, and oversight. However, the RMI faces  significant challenges in working toward the compact goals of economic  advancement and budgetary self-reliance as the compact grants decrease.  Largely dependent on government spending of foreign aid, the RMI has  limited potential for private sector growth, and its government has made  little progress in implementing reforms needed to increase investment  opportunities and tax income. In addition, JEMFAC did not address the  pace of reform during the first 2 years of compact implementation.  Further, both the U.S. and RMI governments have faced significant  capacity constraints in ensuring effective implementation of grant funding.  The RMI government and JEMFAC have also shown limited commitment  to strategically planning for the long-term, effective use of grant assistance  or for the budgetary pressure the government will face as compact grants  decline. Because the trust fund’s earnings are intended as a main source of  U.S. assistance to the RMI after compact grants end, the fund’s potential  inadequacy to provide sustainable income in some years could impact the  RMI’s ability to provide government services. However, the RMI trust fund  committee has not assessed the potential status of the fund as an ongoing  source of revenue after compact grants end in 2023.
section_title: Prior Recommendations
paragraphs: Our prior reports on the amended compacts include recommendations  that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary for  Insular Affairs, as chair of the RMI management and trust fund  committees, to, among other things,    ensure that JEMFAC address the lack of RMI progress in implementing  reforms to increase investment and tax income;    coordinate with other U.S. agencies on JEMFAC to work with the the  RMI to establish plans to minimize the impact of declining assistance;    coordinate with other U.S. agencies on JEMFAC to work with the RMI  to fully develop a reliable mechanism for measuring progress toward  compact goals; and    ensure the RMI trust fund committee’s assessment and timely reporting  of the fund’s likely status as a source of revenue after 2023.
Interior generally concurred with our recommendations and has taken  actions in response to several of them. For example, in August 2006,  JEMFAC discussed the RMI’s slow progress in implementing economic  reforms. Additionally, the trust fund committee decided in June 2007 to  create a position for handling the administrative duties of the fund.  Regarding planning for declining assistance and measuring progress  toward compact goals, JEMFAC has not held an annual meeting since the  December 2006 publication of the report containing those  recommendations.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this completes my  prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you  may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call David Gootnick at  (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Individuals making key  contributions to this testimony included Emil Friberg, Jr., Ming Chen,  Tracy Guerrero, Julie Hirshen, Leslie Holen, Reid Lowe, Mary Moutsos,  Kendall Schaefer, and Eddie Uyekawa.
section_title: Appendix I: U.S. Assistance to Be Provided to the FSM and the RMI under the Amended Compacts, 2004 through 2023
paragraphs: FSM grants (Section 211) (Section 215) (Section 211) (Section 216) (Section 212)
For both the FSM and the RMI, annual grant amounts include $200,000 to be provided directly by the  Secretary of the Interior to the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management  Agency, for disaster and emergency assistance purposes. The grant amounts do not include the  annual audit grant, capped at $500,000, that will be provided to both countries.
These dollar amounts shall be adjusted each fiscal year for inflation by the percentage that equals  two-thirds of the percentage change in the U.S. gross domestic product implicit price deflator, or 5  percent, whichever is less in any one year, using the beginning of 2004 as a base. Grant funding can  be fully adjusted for inflation after 2014, under certain U.S. inflation conditions.
section_title: Appendix II: Estimated FSM and RMI per Capita Compact Grant Assistance for Fiscal Years 1987 – 2023
section_title: Appendix III: Amended Compact Implementation Framework
subsections: section_title: Annual sector grant budget
paragraphs: FSM/RMI propoe grnt budget for ech ector tht inclde proviion  report to used to: – Monitor gener  –  Expenditre, performnce go, nd pecific performnce indictor  –  Brekdown of peronnel expenditre nd other co  –  Informtion on U.S. federl progr nd other donor  United Ste evuate the propoed ector grnt budget for:   –  Contency with fnding requirement in the compct nd relted –  Identify poitive event thccelerte  performnce otcome nd prolem  encontered nd their impct on grnt  ctivitie nd performnce measureopertion to ensure complince with  grnt condition  Submit nnual report to the U.S.
section_title: Joint management and accountability committees
section_title: Appendix IV: RMI Sector Grant Allocation, 2004 through 2006
section_title: Appendix V: Probability of RMI Trust Fund Income Not Reaching the Maximum Disbursement Levels Allowed
paragraphs: Market volatility and choice of investment strategy could result in the RMI  trust fund’s inability to disburse the maximum level of income allowed in  the trust fund agreement, or any income, in some years.  Trust fund  income levels will depend on the investment strategy chosen, with a more  conservative strategy carrying a lower level of market volatility and a  lower level of expected returns over time than an aggressive investment  strategy.  Figure 1 illustrates projected RMI trust fund balances under the  conservative, moderate, and aggressive investment strategies that we  projected.  As shown in figure 2, under all three strategies, the RMI trust  fund’s annual income will likely not reach the maximum disbursement  allowed, with the probability of shortfall increasing with time.  For  example, our analysis of the moderate investment strategy shows  probability of about 10 percent that the RMI trust fund’s income will not  reach the maximum allowed disbursement after 2031, with the probability  rising to around 40 percent by 2050.