Social Security Administration: Agency Must Position Itself Now to Meet Profound Challenges
Published: 2002-05-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Social Security Administration (SSA) provided $450 billion in benefits to 50 million recipients in fiscal year 2001. Since 1995, when SSA became an independent agency, GAO has called for effective leadership and sustained management attention to several unresolved management challenges, including the redesign of its disability claims process, management and oversight problems with its SSI program, future service delivery demands, and implementing its information technology and research and policy development capacity. SSA has much more to do and will need to take bolder action or make more fundamental changes to existing programs.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the challenges facing the  Social Security Administration (SSA). SSA oversees three major programs  that in fiscal year 2001 provided more than $450 billion in benefits to more  than 50 million recipients. One or more of the three programs—Old Age  and Survivors Insurance (OASI), Disability Insurance (DI), and  Supplemental Security Income (SSI)—touches the lives of almost every  American family at one time or another.
SSA has many strengths. The agency is considered to be a leader in federal  service delivery, and it has a long tradition of strategic planning. In  addition, SSA produces timely and accurate financial statements and is a  leader among government agencies for its accountability reporting.
However, since 1995, when SSA became an independent agency, we have  called for effective leadership and sustained management attention to a  relatively constant set of unresolved management challenges. These  challenges include the need to redesign its disability claims process and  heighten the focus on work for claimants, address management and  oversight problems with its SSI program, meet its growing future service  delivery demands, effectively implement its information technology  initiatives, and strengthen its research and policy development capacity.  Solutions to these challenges are difficult but necessary because they are  linked to profound changes in our nation. The baby boom generation is  nearing retirement age, people are living longer, technology and its  applications are changing rapidly, and public expectations for faster and  better service from government are growing. The implications of these  changes create some management challenges and make others more  difficult to overcome.
Today, I will discuss SSA’s progress in meeting these and other challenges.  The information I am providing is based on our previous and ongoing  work, much of it performed for these subcommittees. (See Related GAO  Products at the end of this statement.)
In summary, SSA has taken a number of varied steps to address its  management challenges; however, the challenges remain, and some are  becoming ever more pressing. In certain instances, SSA’s actions show  promise, but it is too early to tell how effective they will be; in others,  SSA’s efforts have not produced the desired results. In almost all cases, the  agency has much more to do and will likely need to take bolder action or  make more fundamental changes to existing programs or procedures.
SSA has been working for years to improve its disability claims process;  yet, ensuring the quality and timeliness of its disability decisions remains  one of the agency’s greatest challenges. The agency faces some difficult  decisions about its next steps in this area and may need to consider more  fundamental changes to the process. In addition, although SSA has taken  some positive steps to return people with disabilities to work, a more  fundamental change to the agency’s process and underlying philosophy is  needed. Since 1996, we have called for SSA to integrate return-to-work  strategies into all phases of its disability determination process to help  disabled workers who can return to work to do so.
In 1997, we designated the SSI program as high risk because of its  susceptibility to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Since that time,  SSA has taken or begun to take a number of concrete and appropriate  steps to improve the integrity of the program. However, some of these  actions are still in the early stages and have yet to yield significant results.  We believe more can be done, including moving forward on proposals to  simplify program requirements, which are often error prone and a major  source of SSI overpayments.
The combination of three factors—the expected increase in demand for  services as the baby boomers reach retirement age, the imminent  retirement of a large part of the agencies workforce, and changing  customer expectations—has the potential to cripple SSA’s future service  delivery system. Even though SSA has a number of human capital  initiatives under way to help it prepare for the future, it lacks a service  delivery plan that lays out a detailed blueprint for how service will be  delivered in the future. Without such a plan, the agency cannot ensure that  its human capital efforts fully will support its vision for service delivery  and that it is effectively marshalling its scarce resources.
SSA is relying heavily on information technology initiatives to cope with  its growing workloads, and it plans to increasingly use Web-based  technologies to meet its service delivery goals. For fiscal year 2001, SSA  estimated spending about $741 million on information technology systems  and projects.  Sound policies and procedures are fundamental to  effectively managing information technology initiatives, and in a prior  review, we found that SSA had not consistently implemented some key  policies and procedures to guide its major information technology  functions, including information security.  Doing so is imperative, given  that the agency has experienced mixed success in carrying out prior  information technology initiatives.
Regarding the need to strengthen its ability to conduct research and  contribute to policy development, SSA is well positioned to contribute  vital information to policymakers on the overarching problem of ensuring  the long-term solvency of the Social Security Trust Funds. The agency also  has a responsibility to review and identify other areas where policy  changes are needed, such as in its disability programs. SSA has recently  increased the level of staff and resources available to support these  activities; however, many of the agency’s efforts are in the early stages,  and it is not yet clear how the agency will use them and what their  ultimate effect on SSA program policy will be.
Finally, in light of the terrorist events of September 11th, the nation has a  heightened awareness of the need to protect sensitive information. SSA  will need to continue to take steps to ensure that only individuals who are  eligible for social security numbers (SSN) receive them and to ensure that  its information on deceased SSN holders is accurate and timely. However,  once SSA has issued an SSN to an individual, the agency has little control  over how SSNs are used by other government agencies and the private  sector. As we complete our review of how federal, state, and local  programs and agencies use SSNs and how well they protect them, we look  forward to exploring with you additional options to better protect SSNs.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: SSA administers three major federal programs. OASI and DI, together  commonly known as Social Security, provide benefits to retired and  disabled workers and their dependents and survivors. In fiscal year 2001,  SSA provided OASI retirement benefits totaling more than $369 billion to  over 38 million individuals and DI benefits of more than $59 billion to 6.8  million individuals. These benefits are paid from trust funds that are  financed through payroll taxes paid by workers and their employers and  by the self-employed. The third program, SSI, provides income for aged,  blind, or disabled individuals with limited income and resources. In fiscal  year 2001, 6.7 million individuals received almost $28 billion in SSI  benefits. SSI payments are financed from general tax revenues.
To administer these programs, SSA must perform certain essential tasks. It  must issue SSNs to individuals, maintain earnings records for individual  workers by collecting wage reports from employers, use these records and  other information to determine the amount of benefits an applicant may  receive, and process benefit claims for all three programs.
To meet its customer service responsibilities, SSA operates a vast network  of offices distributed throughout the country. These offices include  approximately 1,300 field offices, which, among other things, take  applications for benefits; 138 Offices of Hearings and Appeals; and 36  teleservice centers responsible for SSA’s national 800 number operations.The agency’s policy is to provide customers with a choice in how they  conduct business with SSA. Options include visiting or calling a field  office, calling SSA’s toll-free number, or contacting SSA through the mail  or the Internet. To conduct its work, SSA employs almost 62,000 staff. In  addition, to make initial and ongoing disability determinations, SSA  contracts with 54 state disability determination service (DDS) agencies  under authority of the Social Security Act. Although federally funded and  guided by SSA in their decision making, these agencies hire their own staff  and retain a degree of independence in how they manage their offices and  conduct disability determinations. Overall, SSA relies extensively on  information technology to support its large volumes of programmatic and  administrative work.
The process for obtaining SSA disability benefits under either DI or SSI is  complex, and multiple organizations are involved in determining whether  a claimant is eligible for benefits. As shown in figure 1, the current process  consists of an initial decision and as many as three levels of administrative  appeals if the claimant is dissatisfied with SSA’s decision.
Each level of appeal involves multistep procedures for evidence  collection, review, and decision making. Generally, a claimant applies for  disability benefits at one of SSA’s 1,300 field offices across the country. If  the claimant meets certain nonmedical program eligibility criteria, the field  office staff forward the claim to the DDS. DDS staff then obtain medical  evidence about the claimant’s impairment and determine whether the  claimant is disabled. Claimants who are initially denied benefits can  appeal by requesting the DDS to reconsider its initial denial. If the decision  at the reconsideration level remains unfavorable, the claimant can request  a hearing before a federal administrative law judge at an SSA hearings  office and, if still dissatisfied, a review by SSA’s appeals council. After  exhausting these administrative remedies, the individual may file a  complaint in federal district court.
The agency’s ability to continue providing Social Security benefits over the  long term is strained by profound demographic changes.  The baby boom  generation is nearing retirement age. In addition, life expectancy has  increased continually since the 1930s, and further increases are expected.  This increase in life expectancy, combined with falling fertility rates, mean  that fewer workers will be contributing to Social Security for each aged,  disabled, dependent, or surviving beneficiary. Beginning in 2017, Social  Security’s expenditures are expected to exceed its tax income. By 2041,  without corrective action, experts expect the combined OASI and DI trust  funds to be depleted, leaving insufficient funds to pay the current level of  benefits. Unless actions are taken to reform the social security system, the  nation will face continuing difficulties in financing social security benefits  in the long term. Over the past few years, a wide array of proposals has  been put forth to restore Social Security’s long-term solvency, and in  December 2001, a commission appointed by the president presented three  alternative proposals for reform.
This solvency problem is part of a larger and significant fiscal and  economic challenge facing our aging society. The expected growth in the  Social Security program (OASI and DI), combined with even faster  expected growth in Medicare and Medicaid, will become increasingly  unsustainable over time, compounding an ongoing decline in budget  flexibility. Absent changes in the structure of Social Security and  Medicare, there would be virtually no room for any other budget priorities  in future decades. Ultimately, restoring our long-term fiscal flexibility will  involve reforming existing federal entitlement programs and promoting  the saving and investment necessary for robust long-term economic  growth.
section_title: Additional Progress Is Needed to Improve SSA’s Disability Determination Process and to Return People to Work
paragraphs: The disability determination process is time-consuming, complex, and  expensive. Individuals who are initially denied benefits by SSA and appeal  their claim experience lengthy waits for a final decision on their eligibility,  and questions have been raised about the quality and consistency of  certain disability decisions. Since 1994, SSA has introduced a wide range  of initiatives intended to address long-standing problems with its disability  claims process. However, the agency’s efforts, in general, have not  achieved the intended result, and the problems persist. Because SSA’s DI  and SSI programs are expected to grow significantly over the next decade,  improving the disability determination process remains one of SSA’s most  pressing and difficult challenges requiring immediate and sustained  attention from the new commissioner. Additionally, in redesigning its  disability decision-making process, SSA still needs to incorporate into its  eligibility assessment process an evaluation of what is needed for an  individual to return to work. We have recommended developing a  comprehensive return-to-work strategy that focuses on identifying and  enhancing the work capacities of applicants and beneficiaries.
subsections: section_title: Improvements to the Disability Determination Process Have Been Limited
paragraphs: SSA’s complex disability claims process has been plagued by a number of  long-standing weaknesses that have resulted in lengthy waiting periods for  claimants seeking disability benefits. For example, claimants who wish to  appeal an initial denial of benefits frequently wait more than 1 year for a  final decision. We have reported that these long waits result, in part, from  complex and fragmented decision-making processes that are laden with  many layers of reviews and multiple handoffs from one person to another.  The cost of administering the DI and SSI programs reflects the demanding  nature of the process. Although SSI and DI program benefits account for  less than 20 percent of the total benefit payments made by SSA, they  consume nearly 55 percent of annual administrative resources.
In addition to its difficulties in processing claims, SSA has also had  difficulty ensuring that decisions about a claimant’s eligibility for disability  benefits are accurate and consistent across all levels of the decision- making process. For example, our work shows that in fiscal year 2000,  about 40 percent of applicants whose cases were denied at the initial level  appealed this decision and about two-thirds were awarded benefits. This  happens in part because decision makers at the initial level use a different  approach to evaluate claims and make decisions than those at the  appellate level. The inconsistency of decisions at these two levels has  raised questions about the fairness, integrity, and cost of SSA’s disability  programs.
In 1994, SSA laid out a plan to address these problems, yet that plan and  three subsequent revisions in 1997, 1999, and 2001 have yielded only  limited success. The agency’s initial plan entailed a massive effort to  redesign the way it made disability decisions. Among other things, SSA  planned to develop a streamlined decision-making and appeal process,  more consistent guidance and training for decision makers at all levels of  the process, and an improved process for reviewing the quality of  eligibility decisions. In our reviews of SSA’s efforts after 2 years, 4 years,  and again in 2001, we found that the agency had accomplished little. In  some cases, the plans were too large and too complex to keep on track,  and the results of many of the initiatives that were tested fell far short of  expectations. Moreover, the agency was not able to garner consistent  stakeholder support and cooperation for its proposed changes.
Despite the overall disappointing progress, the agency did experience  some successes. For example, it conducted a large training effort to  improve the consistency of decisions, which agency officials believe  resulted in 90,000 eligible individuals’ receiving benefits 500 days sooner  than otherwise might have been the case over a 3-year period. In addition,  the agency issued formal guidance in a number of areas intended to  improve the consistency of decisions between the initial and appellate  levels.
Overall, however, significant problems persist and difficult decisions  remain. For example, SSA is currently collecting final data on the results  from an initiative known as the Prototype, which was implemented in 10  states in October 1999. Although interim data indicated that the Prototype  resulted in more awards at the initial decision level without compromising  accuracy, it also indicated that the number of appeals would increase.  This, in turn, would result in both higher administrative and benefit costs  and lengthen the wait for final decisions on claims.  As a result, SSA  decided that the Prototype would not continue in its current form.  Recently, SSA announced its “short-term” decision to revise some features  of the Prototype to improve disability claims processing time while it  continues to develop longer-term improvements. It remains to be seen  whether these revisions will retain the positive results from the Prototype  while also controlling administrative and benefit costs.
Even more pressing in the near term is the management and workload  crisis that SSA faces in its hearings offices. The agency’s 1999 plan  included an initiative to overhaul operations at its hearing offices to  increase efficiency and significantly reduce processing times at that level;  however, this nationwide effort not only has failed to achieve its goals but,  in some cases, has made things worse. The initiative has suffered, in part,  from problems associated with implementing large-scale changes too  quickly without resolving known problems. As a result, the average case- processing time slowed and backlogs of cases waiting to be processed  approached crisis levels. We have recommended that the new  commissioner act quickly to implement short-term strategies to reduce the  backlog and develop a long-range strategy for a more permanent solution  to the backlog and efficiency problems at the Office of Hearings and  Appeals. According to SSA officials, they have recently made some  decisions on short-term initiatives to reduce the backlogs and streamline  the process, and they are preparing to negotiate with union officials  regarding some of these planned changes.
Finally, SSA’s 1994 plan to redesign the claims process called for the  agency to revamp its existing quality assurance system.  However, because  of disagreement among stakeholders on how to accomplish this difficult  objective, progress in this area has been limited. In March 2001, a  contractor issued a report assessing SSA’s existing quality assurance  practices and recommended a significant overhaul to encompass a more  comprehensive view of quality management. We agreed with this  assessment and recommended that SSA develop an action plan for  implementing a more comprehensive and sophisticated quality assurance  program. Since then, the commissioner has signaled the high priority she  attaches to this effort by appointing to her staff a senior manager for  quality who reports directly to her.  The senior manager is responsible for  developing a proposal to establish a quality-oriented approach to all SSA  business processes.  The manager is currently assembling a team to carry  out this challenging undertaking.
The disappointing results of some of these initiatives can be linked, in  part, to slow progress in achieving technological improvements. As  originally envisioned, SSA’s plan to redesign its disability determination  process was heavily dependent upon these improvements. The agency  spent a number of years designing and developing a new computer  software application to automate the disability claims process. However,  SSA decided to discontinue the initiative in July 1999, after about 7 years,  citing software performance problems and delays in developing the  software.
In August 2000, SSA issued a new management plan for the development  of the agency’s electronic disability system. SSA expects this effort to  move the agency toward a totally paperless disability claims process. The  strategy consists of several key components, including (1) an electronic  claims intake process for the field offices, (2) enhanced state DDS claims  processing systems, and (3) technology to support the Office of Hearing  and Appeals’ business processes. The components are to be linked to one  another through the use of an electronic folder that is being designed to  transmit data from one processing location to another and to serve as a  data repository, storing documents that are keyed in, scanned, or faxed.  SSA began piloting certain components of its electronic disability system  in one state in May 2000 and has expanded this pilot test to one more state  since then. According to agency officials, SSA has taken various steps to  increase the functionality of the system; however, the agency still has a  number of remaining issues to address. For example, SSA’s system must  comply with privacy and data protection standards required under the  Health Information Portability and Accountability Act, and the agency will  need to effectively integrate its existing legacy information systems with  new technologies, including interactive Web-based applications.
SSA is optimistic that it will meet its scheduled date for achieving a  paperless disability claims process—anticipated for the end of 2005—and  has taken several actions to ensure that its efforts support the agency’s  mission. For example, to better ensure that its business processes drive its  information technology strategy, SSA has transferred management of the  electronic disability strategy from the Office of Systems to the Office of  Disability and Income Security Programs. In addition, SSA hired a  contractor to independently evaluate the electronic disability strategy and  recommend options for ensuring that the effort addresses all of the  business and technical issues required to meet the agency’s mission.  According to an agency official, SSA is currently implementing the  contractor’s recommendations. As SSA proceeds with this new system,  however, it is imperative that the agency effectively identify, track, and  manage the costs, benefits, schedule, and risks associated with the  system’s full development and implementation. Moreover, SSA must  ensure that it has the right mix of skills and capabilities to support this  initiative and that desired end results are achieved.
Overall, SSA is at a crossroads in its efforts to redesign and improve its  disability claims process. It has devoted significant time, energy, and  resources to its redesign initiatives over the last 7 years, yet progress has  been limited and often disappointing. SSA is not the only government  agency to experience difficulty in overhauling or reengineering its  operations. According to reengineering experts, many federal, state, and  local agencies have failed in similar efforts. Frequent leadership turnover,  constraints on flexibility posed by laws and regulations, and the fact that  government agencies often must serve multiple stakeholders with  competing interests all constrain progress. Yet, it is vital that SSA address  its claims process problems now, before the agency experiences another  surge in workload as the baby boomers reach their disability-prone years.  To date, the focus on changing the steps and procedures of the process or  changing the duties of its decision makers has not been successful. Given  this experience, it may be appropriate for the agency to undertake a new  and comprehensive analysis of the fundamental issues impeding progress.  Such an analysis might include reassessing the root causes contributing to  its problems and would encompass concerns raised by the Social Security  Advisory Board, such as the fragmentation and structural problems in the  agency’s overall disability service delivery system. The outcome of this  analysis may, in some cases, require legislative changes.
section_title: SSA Lacks a Comprehensive Strategy to Return People with Disabilities to Work
paragraphs: The number of working-age beneficiaries of the DI and SSI programs has  increased by 61 percent over the past 10 years. We have reported that as  the beneficiary population has grown, numerous technological and  medical advances, combined with changes in society and the nature of  work, have increased the potential for some people with disabilities to  return to, or remain in, the labor force. Also, legislative changes have  focused on returning disabled beneficiaries to work. The Americans with  Disabilities Act of 1990 supports the premise that people with disabilities  can work and have the right to work, and the Ticket to Work and Work  Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 increased beneficiaries’ access to  vocational services. Indeed, many beneficiaries with disabilities indicate  that they want to work, and many may be able work in today’s labor  market if they receive needed support. In 1996, we recommended that SSA  place a greater priority on helping disabled beneficiaries work, and the  agency has taken a number of actions to improve its return-to-work  practices. But even with these actions, SSA has achieved poor results in  this arena, where fewer than 1 in 500 DI beneficiaries and few SSI  beneficiaries leave the disability rolls to work.
Even in light of the Ticket to Work Act, SSA will continue to face  difficulties in returning beneficiaries to work, in part owing to  weaknesses, both statutory and policy, in the design of the DI program. As  we have reported in the past, these weaknesses include an either/or  disability decision-making process that characterizes individuals as either  unable to work or having the capacity to work. This either/or process  produces a strong incentive for applicants to establish their inability to  work to qualify for benefits.
Moreover, return-to-work services are offered only after a lengthy  determination process. Because applicants are either unemployed or only  marginally connected to the labor force at the time of application and  remain so during the eligibility determination process, it is likely that their  skills, work habits, and motivation to work deteriorate during this wait.  Thus, individuals who have successfully established their disability may  have little reason or desire to attempt rehabilitation and work. Unlike  some private sector disability insurers and foreign social insurance  systems, SSA does not incorporate into its initial or continuing eligibility  assessment process an evaluation of what is needed for an individual to  return to work. Instead of receiving assistance to stay in the workforce or  return to work—and thus to stay off the long-term disability rolls—an  individual can obtain assistance through DI or SSI only by proving his or  her inability to work. And even in its efforts to redesign the decision- making process, SSA has yet to incorporate into these initiatives an  evaluation of what an individual may need to return to work.
Moreover, SSA has made limited strides in developing baseline data to  measure progress in the return-to-work area. In June 2000, we reported  that many of SSA’s fiscal year 2001 performance measures were not  sufficiently results oriented, making it difficult to track progress. SSA’s  fiscal year 2002 performance plan shows that SSA has begun to  incorporate more outcome-oriented performance indicators that could  support their efforts in this area. Two new indicators, in particular, could  help SSA gauge progress: the percentage increase in the number of DI  beneficiaries whose benefits are suspended or terminated owing to  employment and the percentage increase in the number of disabled SSI  beneficiaries no longer receiving cash benefits. However, SSA has not yet  set specific performance targets for these measures.
Nevertheless, SSA has recently stepped up its return-to-work efforts. For  example, it has (1) established an Office of Employment Support  Programs to promote employment of disabled beneficiaries; (2) recruited  184 public or private entities to provide vocational rehabilitation,  employment, and other support services to beneficiaries under the Ticket  to Work Program; (3) raised the limit on the amount a DI beneficiary can  earn from work and still receive benefits to encourage people with  disabilities to work; (4) funded 12 state partnership agreements that are  intended to help the states develop services to increase beneficiary  employment; and (5) completed a pilot study on the deployment of work  incentive specialists to SSA field offices and is currently determining how  to best implement the position nationally.
While these efforts represent positive steps in trying to return people with  disabilities to work, much remains to be done. As we have recommended  previously, SSA still needs to move forward in developing a  comprehensive return-to-work strategy that integrates, as appropriate,  earlier intervention, including earlier and more effective identification of  work capacities, and the expansion of such capacities by providing  essential return-to-work assistance for applicants and beneficiaries.  Adopting such a strategy is likely to require improvements to staff skill  levels and areas of expertise, as well as changes to the disability  determination process. It will also require fundamental changes to the  underlying philosophy and direction of the DI and SSI programs, as well as  legislative changes in some cases. Policymakers will need to carefully  weigh the implications of such changes. Nevertheless, we remain  concerned that the absence of such a strategy and accompanying  performance plan goals may hinder SSA’s efforts to make significant  strides in the return-to-work area. An improved return-to-work strategy  could benefit both the beneficiaries who want to work and the American  taxpayer.
section_title: Longstanding High- Risk SSI Issues Require Sustained Management and Oversight
paragraphs: The SSI program is the nation’s largest cash assistance program for the  poor. In fiscal year 2000, the program paid 6.6 million low-income aged,  blind, and disabled recipients $31 billion in benefits. During that year,  newly detected overpayments and outstanding SSI debt totaled more than  $3.9 billion. In 1997, after several years of reporting on specific instances  of abuse and mismanagement, increasing overpayments, and poor  recovery of outstanding SSI debt, we designated SSI a high-risk program.  The SSI program poses a special challenge for SSA because, unlike OASI  and DI, it is a means-tested program; thus, SSA must collect and verify  information on income, resources, and recipient living arrangements to  determine initial and continuing eligibility for the program. Our prior  work, however, shows that SSA has often placed a greater priority on  quickly processing and paying SSI claims with insufficient attention to  verifying recipient self-reported information, controlling program  expenditures, and pursuing overpayment recoveries once they occur.
In response to our high-risk designation, SSA has made progress in  coordination with Congress to improve the financial integrity and  management of SSI, including developing a major SSI legislative proposal  with numerous overpayment deterrence and recovery provisions. Many of  these provisions were incorporated into the Foster Care Independence  Act, which was signed into law in December 1999. The act directly  addresses a number of our prior recommendations and provides SSA with  additional tools to obtain applicant income and resource information from  financial institutions; imposes a period of ineligibility for applicants who  transfer assets to qualify for SSI benefits; and authorizes the use of credit  bureaus, private collection agencies, interest levies, and other means to  recover delinquent debt. SSA also obtained separate legislative authority  in 1998 to recover overpayments from former SSI recipients currently  receiving OASI or DI benefits. The agency was previously excluded from  using this cross-program recovery tool to recover SSI overpayments  without first obtaining debtor consent. As a result of this new authority,  SSA has recently begun the process of recovering overpayments from  Social Security benefits of individuals no longer on the SSI rolls. The  agency has also issued regulations on the use of credit bureaus and  drafted regulations for wage garnishments. We have been told that the  draft regulations are currently under review by the new commissioner and  by the Office of Management and Budget.
In addition to establishing the new legislative authorities, SSA has initiated  a number of internal administrative actions to further strengthen SSI  program integrity. These include using tax refund offsets for delinquent  SSI debtors, an action that SSA said resulted in $61 million in additional  overpayment recoveries last year. SSA also uses more frequent (monthly)  automated matches to identify ineligible SSI recipients living in nursing  homes and other institutions. As of January 2001, SSA’s field offices were  also provided on-line access to wage, new-hire, and unemployment  insurance data maintained by the Office of Child Support Enforcement.  These data are key to field staff’s ability to more quickly verify  employment and income information essential to determining SSI  eligibility and benefit levels. SSA also increased the number of SSI  financial redeterminations that it conducted, from about 1.8 million in  fiscal year 1997 to about 2.2 million in fiscal year 2000. These reviews  focus on income and resource factors affecting eligibility and payment  amounts. SSA estimates that by conducting more redeterminations and  refining its methodology for targeting cases most likely to have payment  errors, it prevented nearly $600 million in additional overpayments in  fiscal year 1999.
SSA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) has also increased the level of  resources and staff devoted to investigating SSI fraud and abuse; key  among the OIG’s efforts is the formation of Cooperative Disability  Investigation teams in 13 field locations. These teams are designed to  identify fraud and abuse before SSI benefits are approved and paid.  Finally, in response to our prior recommendation, SSA has revised its field  office work credit and measurement system to better reward staff for time  spent thoroughly verifying applicant eligibility information and developing  fraud referrals. If properly implemented, such measures should provide  field staff with much-needed incentives for preventing fraud and abuse  and controlling overpayments.
SSA’s current initiatives demonstrate a stronger management commitment  to SSI integrity issues and have the potential to significantly improve  program management; however, our work shows that SSA overpayments  and outstanding debt owed to the program remain at high levels. A number  of the agency’s initiatives—especially those associated with the Foster  Care Independence Act—are still in the early planning or implementation  stages and have yet to yield results. In addition, at this stage, it is not clear  how great an effect the impact of SSA’s enhanced matching efforts, online  access tools, and other internal initiatives has had on the agency’s ability  to recover and avoid overpayments. The same is true for the agency’s  efforts to improve the accuracy of SSI eligibility decisions.
SSA also has not yet addressed a key program vulnerability—program  complexity—that is associated with increased SSI overpayments. In prior  work, we have reported that SSI living arrangement and in-kind support  and maintenance policies used by SSA to calculate eligibility and benefit  amounts were complex, prone to error, and a major source of  overpayments. We also recommended that SSA develop options for  simplifying the program. Last year, SSA’s policy office issued a study that  discussed various options for simplifying complex SSI policies. Although  SSA is considering various options, it has not moved forward in  recommending specific cost neutral proposals for change.
We believe that sustained management attention is necessary to improve  SSI program integrity. Thus, it is important that SSA move forward in fully  implementing the overpayment deterrence and recovery tools currently  available to it and seek out additional ways to improve program  management. Accordingly, we have a review under way that is aimed at  documenting the range of SSI activities currently in place; their effects on  program management and operations; and additional legislative or  administrative actions, or both, necessary to further improve SSA’s ability  to control and recover overpayments. A particular focus of this review will  be to assess remaining weaknesses in SSA’s initial and ongoing eligibility  verification procedures, application of penalties for individuals who fail to  report essential eligibility information, and overpayment recovery policies.
section_title: SSA Lacks a Plan to Help It Cope with Future Service Delivery Challenges
paragraphs: Among federal agencies, SSA has long been considered one of the leaders  in service delivery. Indeed, for fiscal year 2001, SSA reported that 81  percent of its customers rated the agency’s services as “excellent,” “very  good,” or “good.” SSA considers service delivery one of its top priorities,  and its current performance plan includes specific goals and strategies to  provide accurate, timely, and useful service to the public. However, the  agency faces significant challenges that could hamper its ability to provide  high-quality service over the next decade and beyond. Demand for services  will grow rapidly as the baby boom generation ages and enters the  disability-prone years. By 2010, SSA expects worker applications for DI to  increase by as much as 32 percent over 2000 levels. Determining eligibility  for disability benefits is a complex process that spans a number of offices  and can take over a year to complete. As we have observed earlier in this  statement, SSA already has trouble managing its disability determination  workload; adding additional cases without rectifying serious case  processing issues will only make things worse. Furthermore, by 2010, SSA  projects that applications for retirement benefits will also increase  dramatically—by 31 percent over the 2000 levels.
SSA’s ability to provide high-quality service delivery is also potentially  weakened by challenges regarding its workforce. First, SSA’s workforce is  aging, and SSA is predicting a retirement wave that will peak in the years  2007 through 2010, when it expects about 2,500 employees to retire each  year. By 2010, SSA projects that about 37 percent of its almost 62,000  employees will retire. The percentage is higher for employees in SSA’s  supervisory or managerial ranks. In particular, more than 70 percent of  SSA’s upper-level managers and executives (GS-14, GS-15, and SES level)  are expected to retire by 2010. Second, SSA will need to increase staff  skills to deal with changing customer expectations and needs. SSA’s staff  will need to obtain and continually update the skills needed to use the  most current technology available to serve the public in a more  convenient, cost effective, and secure manner. At the same time, some  aspects of SSA’s customer service workload will likely become more time  consuming and labor intensive, owing primarily to the growing proportion  of SSA’s non-English speaking customers and the rising number of  disability cases involving mental impairments. Both situations result in  more complex cases that require diverse staff skills.
SSA has a number of workforce initiatives under way to help it prepare for  the future. For example, as we recommended in 1993, and as required by  law, SSA developed a workforce transition plan to lay out actions to help  ensure that its workforce will be able to handle future service delivery  challenges. In addition, recognizing that it will shortly be facing the  prospect of increasing retirements, SSA conducted a study that predicts  staff retirements and attrition each year, from 1999 to 2020, by major job  position and agency component.  SSA also began to take steps to fill its  expected leadership gap. We have long stressed the importance of  succession planning and formal programs to develop and train managers  at all levels of SSA. As early as 1993, we recommended that SSA make  succession planning a permanent aspect of its human resource planning  and evaluate the adequacy of its investments in management training and  development. SSA created three new leadership development programs to  help prepare selected staff to assume mid- and top-level leadership  positions at the agency. Overall, many of the efforts being made today are  consistent with principles of human capital management, and good human  capital management is fundamental to the federal government’s ability to  serve the American people. For this reason, we have designated strategic  human capital management a high-risk area across the federal  government.
However, SSA is taking these human capital measures in the absence of a  concrete service delivery plan to help guide its investments. We  recommended as long ago as 1993 that SSA complete such a plan to ensure  that its human capital and other key investments are put to the best use.In 1998, the agency took a first step by beginning a multiyear project to  monitor and measure the needs, expectations, priorities, and satisfaction  of customer groups, major stakeholders, and its workforce. In 2000, SSA  completed a document that articulates how it envisions the agency  functioning in the future. For example, SSA anticipates offering services  in person, over the telephone, and via the Internet; its telephonic and  electronic access services will be equipped with sophisticated voice  recognition and language translation features, and work will be  accomplished through a paperless process.  In this service vision  document, SSA also states that it will rely heavily on a workforce with  diverse and updated skills to accomplish its mission. Although this new  vision represents a positive step for the agency toward acknowledging and  preparing for future service delivery challenges, it is too broad and general  to be useful in making specific information technology and workforce  decisions. We have stressed that this document should be followed by a  more detailed service delivery plan that spells out who will provide what  type of services in the future, where these services will be made available,  and the steps and timetables for accomplishing needed changes. SSA  officials told us that they are working on such a blueprint. Without this  plan, SSA cannot ensure that its investments in its workforce and  technology are consistent with and fully support its future approach to  service delivery.
section_title: SSA’s Future Success Is Linked to Effectively Managing Information Technology Initiatives
paragraphs: SSA also plans to rely heavily on information technology to cope with  growing workloads and to enhance its processing capabilities. To this end,  the agency has devoted considerable time and effort to identifying  strategies to meet its goal of providing world-class service. For example,  SSA has begun expanding its electronic service delivery capability—  offering retirees the option of applying for benefits on-line as well as  pursuing other on-line or Internet options to facilitate customer access to  the agency’s information and services. Yet, SSA’s overall success in  meeting its service delivery challenge will depend on how effectively it  manages its information technology initiatives. As SSA transitions to  electronic processes, it will be challenged to think strategically about its  information technology investments and to effectively link these  investments to the agency’s service delivery goals and performance.  Furthermore, its actions and decisions must effectively address dual  modes of service delivery—its traditional services via telephone, face-to- face, and mail contacts that are supported primarily by its mainframe  computer operations, as well as a more interactive, on-line, Web-based  environment aimed at delivering more readily accessible services in  response to increased customer demands.
SSA has experienced mixed success in carrying out prior information  technology initiatives. For example, the agency has made substantial  progress in modernizing workstations and local area networks to support  its work processes, and it has clearly defined its business needs and linked  information technology projects to its strategic objectives. Moreover, our  evaluation of its information technology policies, procedures, and  practices in five key areas—investment management, enterprise  architecture, software development and acquisition, human capital, and  information security—found that SSA had many important information  technology management policies and procedures in place.  For instance,  SSA had sound policies and procedures for software development that  were consistent with best practices.
However, SSA had not implemented its policies and procedures uniformly  and had not established several key policies and procedures essential to  ensuring that its information technology investments and human capital  were effectively managed. We noted weaknesses in each of the five key  areas and recommended actions to improve SSA’s information technology  management practices in each area. In total, our report included 20  specific recommendations for more effectively managing the agency’s  information technology. In responding to our report, SSA agreed with all  of the recommendations.
Let me illustrate some of the weaknesses that formed the basis for our  recommendations. In making decisions on technology projects, SSA  lacked key criteria and regular oversight for ensuring consistent  investment management and decision-making practices. It also did not  always consider costs, benefits, schedules, and risks when making project  selections and as part of its ongoing management controls. Without such  information, SSA cannot be assured that its investment proposals will  provide the most cost-effective solutions and achieve measurable and  specific program-related benefits (e.g., high-quality service delivered on  time, within cost, and to the customer’s satisfaction). Furthermore, given  competing priorities and funding needs, SSA will need such information to  make essential tradeoffs among its information technology investment  proposals and set priorities that can maximize the potential for both short- and longer-term improvements to services provided to the public.
As SSA pursues Internet and Web-based applications to better serve its  customers, it must ensure that these efforts are aligned with the agency’s  information technology environment. A key element for achieving this  transition is the successful implementation of SSA’s enterprise  architecture. An enterprise architecture serves as a blueprint for  systematically and completely defining an organization’s current  (baseline) and desired (target) environment and is essential for evolving  information systems, developing new systems, and inserting emerging  technologies that optimize their mission value. It also provides a tool for  assessing benefits, impacts, and capital investment measurements and  supporting analyses of alternatives, risks, and trade-offs. Nonetheless, we  found that SSA had not completed key elements of its enterprise  architecture, including (1) finalizing its enterprise architecture framework,  (2) updating and organizing its architectures and architecture definitions  under the framework, and (3) reflecting its future service delivery vision  and e-business goals. In addition, it had not ensured that enterprise  architecture change management and legacy system integration policies,  procedures, and processes were effectively implemented across the  agency.
As SSA moves forward in implementing electronic services and other  technologies, its architecture will be critical to defining, managing, and  enforcing adherence to the framework required to support its current and  future information processing needs. Moreover, without effective  enterprise architecture change management and legacy system integration  processes, SSA will lack assurance that (1) it can successfully manage and  document changes to its architecture as business functions evolve and  new technologies are acquired and (2) new software and hardware  technologies will interoperate with existing systems in a cost-effective  manner. In surveying 116 agencies across the federal government, we  found the use of enterprise architectures to be a work in progress, with  much left to be accomplished. We assessed SSA at a relatively low level  of maturity in enterprise architecture management.
SSA plans to rely extensively on software-intensive systems to help  achieve processing efficiencies and improved customer service. Because  SSA is an agency in which software development continues to be  predominantly an in-house effort, in 1997, its Office of Systems established  the Software Process Improvement program, in which new policies and  procedures were created to enhance the quality of the agency’s software  development. However, our evaluation of these policies and procedures  found that SSA was not consistently applying them to its software  development projects. In particular, SSA had not applied sound  management and technical practices in its development of the electronic  disability system. This poses a significant risk given SSA’s history of  problems in developing and delivering the critical software needed to  support its redesigned work processes. The use of sound, disciplined  software development processes is critical to ensuring that SSA delivers  quality software on schedule and within established cost estimates. Until  SSA consistently and effectively implements its software development  policies and procedures, it will lack assurance that it can meet its goal of  developing a technological infrastructure to support its service delivery  vision.
As SSA places increased emphasis on using information technology to  support new ways of delivering service, it must ensure that it effectively  manages its human capital to anticipate, plan for, and support its  information technology requirements. However, SSA had not taken all of  the necessary steps to ensure the adequacy of its future information  technology workforce. For instance, we found that although SSA had  begun evaluating its short- and longer-term information technology needs,  these efforts were not complete. Specifically, SSA had not linked its  information technology staff needs to the competencies it would require to  meet mission goals. Doing so is necessary, however, to ensure that SSA’s  plans project workforce needs far enough in advance to allow adequate  time for staff recruitment and hiring, skills refreshment and training, or  outsourcing considerations. Furthermore, SSA lacked an inventory  identifying the knowledge and skills of current information technology  staff, which is essential for uncovering gaps between current staff and  future requirements. Without such an inventory, SSA has no assurance  that its plans for hiring, training, and professionally developing  information technology staff will effectively target short- and long-term  skills needed to sustain its current and future operations. These  shortcomings in SSA’s information technology human capital management  could have serious ramifications as the agency moves toward making  larger investments in new electronic service delivery options, such as  Internet applications. Developing Internet applications represents a new  era for SSA—one in which the agency must ensure that is has enough of  the right people and skills to bring its electronic service delivery plan to  fruition.
As SSA proceeds with the development and implementation of Internet  and Web-based initiatives, the need for a strong program to address  threats to the security and integrity of its operations will grow. Without  proper safeguards, these initiatives pose enormous risks that make it  easier for individuals and groups with malicious intentions to intrude into  inadequately protected systems and use such access to obtain sensitive  information, commit fraud, disrupt operations, or launch attacks against  other organizations’ sites.
SSA has made progress in addressing the information protection issues  raised in prior years. Specifically, during fiscal year 2001, the agency  conducted a risk assessment to identify critical assets and vulnerabilities  as part of the Critical Infrastructure Protection project;  issued a final security policy for the state Disability Determination Service  sites in accordance with the information security requirements included in  the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication  800-18;  established and published technical security configuration standards for  operating systems and servers;  completed updates for accreditation and certification of key systems; and  further strengthened physical access controls over the National Computer  Center.
Nonetheless, weaknesses in SSA’s information security program continue  to threaten its ability to effectively mitigate the risk of unauthorized access  to, and disclosure of, sensitive information. For example, although the  agency has made improvements to its entity-wide security program and  standards, control weaknesses continue to expose key elements of its  distributed systems and networks to unauthorized access to sensitive data.  The general areas where exposures occurred included implementation,  enforcement, and ongoing monitoring of compliance with technical  security configuration standards and rules governing the operation of  firewalls; monitoring controls over security violations and periodic  reviews of user access; and physical access controls at nonheadquarters  locations. These exposures exist primarily because SSA has not completed  implementation of its enterprise-wide security program.
Until a complete security framework is implemented and maintained,  SSA’s ability to effectively mitigate the risk of unauthorized access to, and  modification or disclosure of, sensitive SSA data will be impaired.  Unauthorized access to sensitive data can result in the loss of data as well  as trust fund assets, and compromised privacy of information associated  with SSA’s enumeration, earnings, benefit payment processes, and  programs. The need for a strong security framework to address threats to  the security and integrity of SSA operations will grow as the agency  continues to implement Internet and Web-based applications to serve the  American public.
section_title: Program Challenges Require SSA to Play an Active Role in Research, Evaluation, and Policy Development
paragraphs: In the past, we have reported that SSA has not undertaken the range of  research, evaluation, and policy analysis necessary (1) to identify areas  where legislative or other changes are needed to address program  weaknesses and (2) to assist policymakers in exploring and developing  options for change.
The long-term solvency of the Social Security system is a critical issue  facing the nation and SSA. As the debate on Social Security reform  proceeds, policymakers and the general public need thoughtful, detailed,  and timely analyses of the likely effect of different proposals on workers,  beneficiaries, and the economy. SSA is well positioned to assess the  programmatic impacts of economic and demographic trends and to  identify areas where policy changes are needed to ensure that recipients’  needs are met efficiently and cost effectively.
At the same time, SSA needs to prepare for the implementation of  whatever programmatic changes are eventually made. Many of the reform  proposals currently under debate will likely affect not only SSA but other  government agencies as well. As part of their debate, policymakers need to  understand the administrative aspects of each proposal, including the  amount of time and money necessary to implement the proposed changes.  SSA has information that could be central to the implementation and  administration of proposed Social Security reforms and should be  providing this information in a timely and accurate manner.
SSA also faces a wide range of pressing challenges with its disability  programs, including how best to 1) ensure the quality and timeliness of its  decisions, 2) integrate return-to-work strategies into all phases of its  disability determination process, and 3) address program complexity  problems that have contributed to vulnerability in the SSI program.  To  address these challenges, SSA will need to target its research and conduct  analyses that will allow the agency to play a key role in proposing and  analyzing major policy changes.  However, in the past, we have noted  SSA’s reluctance to take the actions needed to fulfill its policy  development and planning role in advance of major program crises,  particularly when they require long-term solutions, legislative change, or  both.
In recent years, SSA has taken action to strengthen its research and policy  development role in these and other areas. It has initiated several  reorganizations of its policy component to strengthen its capacity.  The  agency has also significantly increased the level of staff and resources  available to support research activities and has several analyses planned  or under way to address key policy issues. Specific to the long-term  solvency issue, SSA’s Office of the Actuary has long provided key  information on the financial outlook of Social Security and projections of  the effects of different reform proposals on trust fund finances.  In  addition, SSA has expanded its ability to use modeling techniques to  predict the effects of proposed program changes, and it has established a  research consortium to conduct and advise on relevant research and  policy activities. With respect to its disability programs, SSA has  established a separate disability research institute and has submitted to  the Congress its first major SSI legislative proposal aimed at improving  program integrity. However, many of the agency’s actions and studies are  in the early stages, and it is not yet clear how the agency will use them and  what their ultimate effect on SSA program policy will be.
section_title: The Need to Protect Personal Information Has Gained New Urgency
paragraphs: The Social Security Administration is responsible for issuing SSNs to most  Americans. The agency relies on the SSN to record wage data, maintain  earnings records, and efficiently administer its benefit programs. In  addition, the SSN is used by other government agencies as well as the  private sector. This widespread use offers many benefits; however,  combined with an increase in reports of identify theft, it has raised public  concern over how this and other personal information is being used and  protected. Moreover, the growth of the Internet, which can make personal  information contained in electronic records more readily accessible to the  general public, has heightened this concern. Finally, the terrorist attacks  of September 11th and the indication that some of the terrorists  fraudulently obtained SSNs have added new urgency to the need to assess  how SSNs are used and protected.
We have recently testified on work we are completing at the request of  Chairman Shaw and others to review the many uses of SSNs at all levels of  government and to assess how these government entities safeguard the  SSNs. We found that SSNs are widely used across multiple agencies and  departments at all levels of government. They are used by agencies that  deliver benefits and services to the public as a convenient and efficient  means of managing records.  More importantly, these agencies rely on  SSNs when they share data with one another, for example, to make sure  that only eligible individuals receive benefits and to collect outstanding  debt individuals owe the government. Although these agencies are taking  steps to safeguard the SSNs from improper disclosure, our work identified  potential weaknesses in the security of information systems at all levels of  government.  In addition, SSNs are widely found in documents that are  routinely made available to the public, that is, in public records.  Although  some government agencies and courts are trying innovative approaches to  prevent the SSN from appearing on public records, not all agencies  maintaining public records have adopted these approaches.  Moreover,  increasing numbers of departments are considering placing or planning to  place documents that may contain SSNs on the Internet, which would  make these numbers much more readily available to others, raising the  risk of their misuse.
We also found that SSNs are one of three personal identifiers most often  sought by identity thieves and that SSNs are often used to generate  additional false documents, which can be used to set up false identities.  What is harder to determine is a clear answer on where identify thieves  obtain the SSNs they misuse. Ultimately, in light of the recent terrorist  events, the nation must grapple with the need to find the proper balance  between the widespread and legitimate uses of personal information such  as SSNs, by both government and the private sector, and the need to  protect individual privacy.
There are no easy answers to these questions, but SSA has an important  role to play in protecting the integrity of the SSN. Given the widespread  use of SSNs, the agency needs to take steps to ensure that it is taking all  necessary precautions to prevent individuals who are not entitled to SSNs  from obtaining them. Currently, the agency is reexamining its process of  assigning SSNs to individuals. This may require the agency to find a new  balance between two competing goals: the need to take time to verify  documents submitted during the application process and the desire to  serve the applicant as quickly as possible. In addition, the agency is  studying ways to make sure it provides accurate and timely information to  financial institutions on deceased SSN holders. However, once SSA has  issued an SSN, it has little control over how the number is used by other  government agencies and the private sector.  In this light, we look forward  to exploring additional options to better protect SSNs with you as we  complete our ongoing work in this area.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: We have outlined a number of difficult challenges, most of them long- standing, that the SSA Commissioner faces. These are, in general, the same  challenges we have been highlighting since SSA became an independent  agency. In some cases, SSA has begun to take positive steps to address its  challenges. Specifically, SSA’s efforts to strengthen its research,  evaluation, and policy development activities show promise. Likewise,  SSA has made considerable progress in addressing weaknesses in the  integrity of the SSI program. However, more can be done in these areas. As  new pressures inevitably arise that will also demand attention from the  commissioner and her team, it will be important for the commissioner to  sustain and expand on the agency’s actions to date.
We are particularly concerned, however, about other challenges where  SSA’s efforts to date have fallen short and where the agency faces  increasing pressures in the near future. The commissioner faces crucial  decisions on how to proceed on several of these challenges. SSA has made  disappointing progress on (1) its efforts to improve its disability claims  process, (2) the need to better integrate return-to-work strategies into all  phases of the disability process, and (3) the need to better plan for future  service delivery pressures and changes. These challenges will be  exacerbated by growing workload pressures as the baby boom generation  ages. After almost a year without a long-term leadership structure in place,  the commissioner and a SSA team have an opportunity to take a fresh look  at these longstanding challenges and the fundamental issues impeding  faster progress in these areas. Again, focused and sustained attention to  these challenges is vital, as the agency is running out of time to make  needed changes before the expected increases in workload overwhelm its  operations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond  to any questions that you or other member of the subcommittees may  have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Barbara  D. Bovbjerg, Director, or Kay E. Brown, Assistant Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security at (202) 512-7215. Individuals making key  contributions to this testimony include Michael Alexander, Yvette Banks,  Daniel Bertoni, Alicia Puente Cackley, Ellen Habenicht, Carol Langelier,  Valerie Melvin, Angela Miles, Carol Dawn Petersen, and William  Thompson.
section_title: Related GAO Products
subsections: section_title: Social Security Reform
paragraphs: Social Security: Issues in Evaluating Reform Proposals. GAO-02-288T.  Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2001.
Social Security: Program’s Role in Helping Ensure Income Adequacy.  GAO-02-62. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2001.
Social Security: Evaluating Reform Proposals. GAO/AIMD/HEHS-00-29.  Washington, D.C.: November 4, 1999.
SSA’s Management Challenges: Strong Leadership Needed to Turn Plans  Into Timely, Meaningful Action. GAO/T-HEHS-98-113. Washington, D.C.:  March 12, 1998.
section_title: Social Security Disability Programs
paragraphs: Social Security Disability: Disappointing Results From SSA’s Efforts to  Improve the Disability Claims Process Warrant Immediate Attention.  GAO-02-322. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.
SSA Disability: SGA Levels Appear to Affect the Work Behavior of  Relatively Few Beneficiaries, but More Data Needed. GAO-02-224.  Washington, D.C.: January 16, 2002.
SSA Disability: Other Programs May Provide Lessons for Improving  Return-to-Work Efforts. GAO-01-153. Washington, D.C.: January 12, 2001.
Social Security Disability: SSA Has Had Mixed Success in Efforts to  Improve Caseload Management. GAO/T-HEHS-00-22. Washington, D.C.:  October 21, 1999.
SSA Disability Redesign: Actions Needed to Enhance Future Progress.  GAO/HEHS/99-25. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 1999.
SSA Disability: SSA Return-to-Work Strategies From Other Systems May  Improve Federal Programs. GAO-HEHS-96-133. Washington, D.C.: July 11,  1996.
section_title: Supplemental Security Income Program
paragraphs: High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-01-273. Washington, D.C.: January  2001.
Supplemental Security Income: Additional Actions Needed to Reduce  Program Vulnerability to Fraud and Abuse. GAO/HEHS-99-151.  Washington, D.C.: September 15, 1999.
Supplemental Security Income: Long-Standing Issues Require More  Active Management and Program Oversight. GAO/T-HEHS-99-51.  Washington, D.C.: February 3, 1999.
Supplemental Security Income: Action Needed on Long-Standing  Problems Affecting Program Integrity. GAO/HEHS-98-158. Washington,  D.C.: September 14, 1998.
section_title: Service Delivery to the Public
paragraphs: SSA Customer Service: Broad Service Delivery Plan Needed to Address  Future Challenges. GAO/T-HEHS/AIMD-00-75. Washington, D.C.: February  10, 2000.
section_title: Information Technology
paragraphs: Information Security:  Additional Actions Needed to Fully Implement  Reform Legislation.  GAO-02-470T.  Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2002.
Information Technology: Enterprise Architecture Use Across the Federal  Government Can Be Improved.  GAO-02-6. Washington, D.C.: February 19,  2002.
Information Technology Management: Social Security Administration  Practices Can Be Improved. GAO-01-961. Washington, D.C.: August 21,  2001.
Information Security:  Serious and Widespread Weaknesses Persist at  Federal Agencies.  GAO/AIMD-00-295.  Washington, D.C.: September 6,  2000.
SSA Customer Service: Broad Service Delivery Plan Needed to Address  Future Challenges. GAO/T-HEHS/AIMD-00-75. Washington, D.C.: February  10, 2000.
Social Security Administration: Update on Year 2000 and Other Key  Information Technology Initiatives. GAO/T-AIMD-99-259. Washington,  D.C.: July 29, 1999.
Information Security:  Serious Weaknesses Place Critical Federal  Operations and Assets at Risk.  GAO/AIMD-98-92.  Washington, D.C.:  September 23, 1998.