Nonproliferation: U.S. Agencies Have Taken Some Steps, but More Effort Is Needed to Strengthen and Expand the Proliferation Security Initiative
Published: 2008-11-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The President announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2003 to enhance U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In a 2006 classified report, GAO recommended that agencies establish clear PSI policies and procedures and performance indicators. In 2007, Congress enacted a law calling for the administration to expand and strengthen PSI and address GAO's prior recommendations. This report assesses (1) the extent to which the administration issued a PSI directive and submitted required PSI-related reports to Congress; (2) steps U.S. agencies have taken to establish clear PSI policies and procedures, structures, budgets, and performance indicators; and (3) U.S. agencies' efforts to increase cooperation and coordination with PSI countries and develop a strategy to resolve interdiction issues. GAO reviewed and analyzed agency documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), and other agencies with PSI responsibilitie

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery  systems, and related materials poses a serious threat to the peace,  security, and stability of the global community. The threat of WMD  proliferation was underscored in 2002 when the United States and its allies  encountered difficulties in seizing a shipment of North Korean missiles  bound for Yemen. In December 2002, the U.S. administration released its  “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” which called  for a comprehensive approach to countering such threats. The President  subsequently announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in May  2003. According to the Department of State (State), PSI aims to enhance  and expand our efforts to prevent the flow of WMD, their delivery systems,  and related materials on the ground, in the air, and at sea, to and from  states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern.
In September 2006, we issued a classified report on the PSI. The report  found that U.S. agencies did not have the policies and procedures in place  to plan and manage their PSI activities or performance indicators required  to measure the results of PSI activities. Accordingly, we recommended  that the Secretaries of Defense and State better organize their efforts for  performing PSI activities, including establishing clear PSI policies and  procedures and indicators to measure the results of PSI activities. In  addition, we recommended that the two departments develop a strategy to  work with PSI-participating countries to resolve interdiction issues.
In August 2007, Congress passed the Implementing Recommendations of  the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (here and after, “the law”), which  specified that the President and relevant agencies and departments take a  variety of actions to expand and strengthen PSI, including implementing  our recommendations. Under a sense of Congress provision of the law,  the President is called upon to issue a directive to U.S. agencies to take  actions to expand and strengthen PSI. The law calls upon U.S. agencies to  take specific actions, namely to establish clear PSI policies and  procedures, structures, funding, and performance indicators to measure  the results of PSI activities; increase cooperation and coordination with  PSI countries; and develop a strategy to resolve interdiction issues. The  law required the President to submit a PSI implementation report by  February 2008 to relevant congressional committees. State and DOD are  required to submit a comprehensive joint budget report to Congress for  each fiscal year describing U.S. funding and other resources for PSI- related activities. Finally, Congress required GAO to assess and report on  the effectiveness of PSI, including the progress made in implementing the  provisions of the law.
Based on these provisions, we examined the actions that the  administration and relevant U.S. agencies have taken to expand and  strengthen PSI. Specifically, this report assesses the (1) extent to which  the administration issued a PSI directive and submitted to Congress the  required PSI-related reports; (2) steps U.S. agencies have taken to  establish clear PSI policies and procedures, structures, budgets, and  performance indicators; and (3) efforts U.S. agencies have made to  increase cooperation and coordination with PSI countries and develop a  strategy to resolve interdiction issues.
To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed U.S. agency  management reports, cables, and other documents. We interviewed  officials from the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security,  Justice, and other agencies with PSI responsibilities, including officials  and military personnel at five Combatant Commands: (1) Central  Command, (2) European Command, (3) Africa Command, (4) Southern  Command, and (5) Strategic Command’s Center for Combating WMD. We  also conducted structured interviews with U.S. agency officials and  military personnel who have attended multilateral PSI planning meetings  of WMD proliferation experts. At these multilateral meetings—referred to  as Operational Expert Group meetings—experts from the United States  and 19 other leading PSI countries consider ways to enhance the WMD  interdiction capabilities of PSI participants, plan PSI exercises, and build  support for the initiative. Appendix I provides more details on our  objectives, scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2007 to November  2008, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: PSI is a multinational effort to prevent the trafficking of WMD, their  delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and nonstate  actors of proliferation concern. The PSI has no formal organization or  bureaucracy. U.S. agencies are involved in the PSI as a set of activities,  rather than a program. PSI encourages partnership among states to work  together to develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic, military,  law enforcement, and other capabilities to prevent WMD-related transfers  to states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern. International  participation is voluntary, and there are no binding treaties on those who  choose to participate. Countries supporting PSI are expected to endorse  PSI principles, embodied in six broad goals in the Statement of  Interdiction Principles of September 2003 (see app. II) by a voluntary,  nonbinding “political” commitment to those principles and to voluntarily  participate in PSI activities according to their own capabilities. According  to the principles, PSI participants use existing national and international  authorities to put an end to WMD-related trafficking and take steps to  strengthen those authorities, as necessary.
The U.S. government’s PSI efforts involve three broad activities:  multilateral PSI planning meetings (referred to as Operational Expert  Group meetings), participation in PSI exercises, and other outreach efforts  such as workshops and conferences. According to State, at multilateral  PSI planning meetings, military, law enforcement, intelligence, legal, and  diplomatic experts from the United States and 19 other PSI countries meet  to explore and consider operational ways to enhance the WMD  interdiction capabilities of PSI participants, build support for the initiative,  develop operational concepts, organize PSI exercises, and share  information about national legal authorities. The policy office in the Office  of the Secretary of Defense heads the U.S. delegation to these multilateral  meetings.
PSI exercises vary in size and complexity, and some involve military  personnel and assets from participating PSI countries. Some exercises do  not involve any military assets but instead examine the use of law  enforcement or customs authorities to stop WMD proliferation. Other  exercises are “tabletop” exercises or simulations, which explore scenarios  and determine solutions for hypothetical land, air, or sea interdictions.
Among the most visible PSI exercises are those that combine a tabletop  and a live interdiction exercise using military assets from multiple PSI  countries, such as practicing the tracking and boarding of a target ship.  Outreach efforts include workshops, conferences, and other meetings that  relevant U.S. officials said they engage in to support PSI goals and bilateral  PSI shipboarding agreements that the United States concludes with other  states.
section_title: The Administration Has Not Issued Two of Three PSI Documents Called for or Required in Law
paragraphs: The administration has not issued the directive, as called for by a sense of  Congress provision in the law, that directs U.S. agencies to take actions to  improve PSI activities, such as establishing clear structures. In addition,  the administration has not submitted a PSI budget report for fiscal year  2009 detailing PSI-related expenditures in the past 3 fiscal years and a plan  for the next 3 years. In July 2008, the administration submitted to Congress  a PSI implementation report that was required by law to be issued in  February 2008.
subsections: section_title: The Administration Has Not Issued a Directive Directing U.S. Agencies to Take Actions Specified in Law to Expand and Strengthen PSI
paragraphs: The administration has not issued a directive to U.S. agencies that perform  PSI functions to take actions to expand and strengthen PSI, as called for  by a sense of Congress provision in the Implementing Recommendations  of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. Multiple U.S. agencies, including  State, DOD, and law enforcement agencies such as CBP and FBI, perform  PSI-related activities for the United States. Section 1821(a) of Pub. L. No.  110-53 contains a sense of Congress that a presidential directive should be  issued to direct these agencies to take actions such as establishing clear  PSI structures, incorporating a PSI budget request in each agency’s fiscal  year budget request, and providing other resources necessary to achieve  better performance of U.S. PSI-related activities.
The administration, in its implementation report to Congress in July 2008,  asserted that it is unnecessary to issue a directive for PSI. The  administration believes that an existing WMD interdiction process, as  documented in an 8-page 2002 National Security Presidential Directive,  addresses the relevant issues that would be covered under a PSI directive.  The existing WMD interdiction process covers how U.S. agencies should  coordinate U.S. government efforts to conduct WMD interdictions.  However, this process predates the creation of PSI and does not cover U.S.  agencies’ involvement in three broad PSI activities: multilateral planning  meetings, exercises, and other outreach efforts. According to the  administration, the President launched PSI in 2003 because of the  recognition that stopping WMD proliferation is a task the United States  cannot accomplish by itself. U.S. involvement in PSI activities, while  complementing U.S. agencies’ participation in WMD interdictions, is  focused on the diplomatic and educational outreach efforts of the U.S.  government to other countries to strengthen their interdiction capabilities  and efforts.
section_title: The Administration Has Not Submitted a PSI Joint Budget Report to Congress for 2008
paragraphs: The administration has not submitted a PSI joint budget report for fiscal  year 2009, as required by the law. Specifically, the law required the  Secretaries of State and Defense to submit an unclassified comprehensive  joint budget report to Congress in each year for which the President  submits a PSI budget request, with the first report due in February 2008.  The joint budget report should contain the following:    A 3-year plan, beginning with the fiscal year for which the budget is  requested, specifying the amount of funding and other resources the  United States would provide for PSI-related activities and the purposes  for such funding and resources over the term of the plan.
For the 2008 report, a description of the PSI-related activities carried  out during the 3 fiscal years preceding the year of the report, and for  2009 and each year thereafter, a description of PSI-related activities  carried out during the fiscal year preceding the year of the report.
Other information that the Secretaries of State and Defense determine  should be included to keep Congress fully informed of PSI operations  and activities.
Agency officials stated that they were in the process of preparing the  budget report, but they did not provide an estimated completion date.
section_title: The Administration Issued a PSI Implementation Report to Congress, but It Was Late and Does Not Fully Specify Steps Taken to Implement Provisions of the Law
paragraphs: The administration issued a required PSI implementation report to  Congress in July 2008, 5 months after the mandated issuance date of  February 2008. In addition, the report does not fully specify the steps  taken to implement GAO’s previous recommendations or other provisions  of the law. The law required the administration to issue an  implementation report to Congress describing the steps it had taken to  implement the recommendations contained in our classified September  2006 report and the progress it has made toward implementing the other  actions contained in the sense of Congress provisions of the law.
In our September 2006 report, we made two recommendations. First, we  recommended that the administration better organize its efforts for  performing PSI activities, including establishing clear PSI policies and  procedures and indicators to measure the results of PSI activities. Second,  we recommended that the administration develop a strategy to work with  PSI-participating countries to resolve interdiction issues. The agencies did  not concur with our recommendations. Their reasons are discussed in our  classified report. The administration’s 2008 implementation report  reiterates the agencies’ nonconcurrence with our prior recommendations.  While the implementation report primarily described the administration’s  activities with the 19 other leading countries that attend the multilateral  PSI planning meetings, it did not specify the steps taken to develop a  comprehensive strategy for resolving interdiction issues with PSI- participating countries.
Also, under a sense of Congress provision in the law, the administration is  called upon to issue a PSI directive, increase cooperation with all  countries, and increase coordination and cooperation with PSI- participating countries. The implementation report did not fully specify  the steps taken to implement these other provisions of the law. The report  stated that the administration did not consider it necessary to issue a PSI  directive because it believes that an existing WMD interdiction process  already addresses the relevant issues. However, this existing WMD  interdiction process is not responsive to the provisions of the  Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. As  previously noted, it predates the creation of PSI and does not cover U.S.  agencies’ involvement in three broad PSI activities: multilateral planning  meetings, exercises, and other outreach efforts.
section_title: DOD Has Taken More Steps than Other U.S. Agencies to Address the Law’s Provisions, but None Has Established Indicators to Measure PSI Results
paragraphs: DOD has taken more steps to address some of the law’s provisions, such  as establishing clearer PSI policies and procedures, structures, and  budgets, compared with other agencies such as State and law enforcement  agencies. State and U.S. law enforcement agencies do not all have the  policies, procedures, or budgets in place to facilitate their participation in  PSI activities, despite the need for greater involvement of U.S. law  enforcement agencies to address PSI law enforcement issues.  Furthermore, U.S. agencies have not established performance indicators  to measure the results of PSI activities.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Clarify PSI Policies and Procedures for PSI Activities, but Uncertainties Remain
paragraphs: DOD has taken some steps to establish PSI policies and procedures for  U.S. military support to PSI, specifically by encouraging Combatant  Commands (COCOM) to incorporate PSI components into existing DOD  exercises when resources or mission requirements permit. However,  uncertainties remain about how to incorporate law enforcement agencies  into PSI exercises and track PSI expenditures. Consistent with internal  controls, establishing clear PSI policies and procedures will help the  agencies better organize their PSI activities. COCOMs generally plan,  implement, and pay for military exercises in their area of responsibility.  According to agency officials, in the past, DOD Joint Staff encouraged the  COCOMs to implement PSI exercises in addition to their scheduled  standard DOD exercise program. As a result, financial and logistical  pressures of planning and implementing PSI exercises outside their  standard exercise program discouraged COCOM participation in PSI  exercises. In March 2007, DOD Joint Staff revised its guidance to direct  COCOMs to leverage the staff, assets, and resources of the existing DOD  exercise program in support of PSI exercises. Joint Staff guidance is the  primary document setting forth PSI policy and provides procedures,  including roles and responsibilities, for the planning and execution of U.S.  military support to PSI. The guidance encourages COCOMs to put a PSI  component into existing DOD exercises and establishes a small office that  will assist COCOMs in planning and executing a PSI component.
According to agency officials, COCOMs generally plan to include PSI  components, such as PSI-focused interdictions and boardings, into their  existing multinational exercises that regularly practice these activities and  intend to increase the complexity of PSI components in the future. For  example, since 2006, Southern Command has included a PSI component in  its multinational military exercise designed to defend the Panama Canal  against a terrorist-based threat. Agency officials stated that there is no  significant cost for including an additional PSI interdiction scenario. This  strategy helps to relieve COCOMs from developing and paying for a stand- alone PSI exercise with their operational funds and, therefore, allows  COCOMs to exercise PSI objectives more frequently.
However, placing a PSI component in a strictly military exercise does not  allow COCOMs to exercise law enforcement issues and interagency  coordination. To address these issues, COCOMs can plan stand-alone PSI  exercises and computer-based or gaming exercises. In one case, a COCOM  is planning a stand-alone PSI exercise that will address law enforcement  issues, such as seizure and disposal of cargo, and interagency  participation. DOD officials stated that it also plans to examine these and  other law enforcement concerns in greater detail through gaming and  simulation exercises. In February 2008, DOD conducted such a simulation  using a U.S. shipboarding agreement with Malta. In June 2007, DOD  sponsored a PSI game at the Naval War College to test national  interagency processes to interdict WMD-related materials and to address  post-interdiction issues, such as disposition of seized cargo and  prosecution of proliferators.
Although COCOM officials generally report having clear roles and  responsibilities in incorporating PSI components, they lack guidance on  how to incorporate law enforcement issues into military exercises and  track PSI expenditures. The revised Joint Staff guidance does not clearly  address some areas of COCOM responsibility. For example, to facilitate  interagency involvement, the revised Joint Staff guidance encourages  COCOMs to include law enforcement agencies in exercise planning, but  the guidance does not provide specifics on how to liaise with law  enforcement agencies. Some COCOM officials stated that they need clear  guidance on how to exercise the disposition of cargo and other law  enforcement issues. Direct coordination with either domestic or foreign  law enforcement agencies is outside of normal COCOM military function.  In one case, a PSI exercise was hosted by foreign law enforcement  agencies, but a DOD official stated that they did not have clear guidance  on how to coordinate U.S. military participation with U.S. and foreign law  enforcement agencies. Also, Joint Staff guidance calls upon COCOMs to  track PSI expenditures, personnel, and military assets used in support of  PSI activities. However, some COCOM officials stated that they typically  do not track these types of expenditures, except for PSI-related travel  costs for COCOM staff. For example, while COCOMs may submit to Joint  Staff the costs for travel to exercise planning conferences or a PSI  exercise site, as well as travel cost estimates for future activities, they  typically do not submit other costs expended on PSI stand-alone exercises  or PSI components of existing DOD exercises.
section_title: DOD Has Established Some PSI Structures and Budget
paragraphs: DOD has structures in place at the Office of the Secretary of Defense  (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the COCOMs to coordinate its involvement in  PSI activities. Within OSD, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threats leads the U.S.  interagency delegation to multilateral PSI planning meetings and  coordinates with Joint Staff on U.S. participation in PSI-related live and  tabletop exercises. Joint Staff assists with exercise planning and provides  COCOMs with policies and procedures to direct their participation in PSI  activities. Joint Staff also can provide COCOMs with information gathered  at multilateral PSI planning meetings to keep them informed on PSI- related developments. COCOMs plan, implement, and participate in PSI  stand-alone exercises or existing DOD exercises with PSI components  based on their mission priorities and available resources.
DOD also has established an office to further support COCOM  involvement in PSI exercises and produce guidance on how to achieve this  goal. The March 2007 Joint Staff guidance directed Strategic Command to  develop a “PSI Support Cell” that educates COCOMs regarding the process  of putting a PSI component into an existing DOD exercise and helps  develop exercise scenarios that meet objectives developed at multilateral  PSI planning meetings. COCOM officials reported that they have  collaborated with the cell to incorporate PSI components into two existing  DOD exercises and, in one case, it improved the exercise’s sophistication.  COCOM officials also reported that they use the cell’s secure Web portal,  which integrates information for planning and implementing PSI exercises,  such as scenarios and lessons learned from previous PSI exercises. The  PSI support cell is drafting an exercise planning handbook that will detail  guidelines and best practices for use by COCOMS in designing and  conducting multilateral PSI exercises. DOD also has created public affairs  guidance to publicize exercises and other PSI activities in U.S. and  international media.
OSD established an interagency working group that sets priorities for U.S.  agencies involved in multilateral PSI planning meetings. This interagency  working group leverages capabilities and resources of U.S. agencies  participating in PSI activities. Through this working group, OSD provides  input to the host of the multilateral meeting on the agenda and determines  which agencies will participate in the U.S. delegation. Before the  multilateral PSI planning meeting, OSD ensures that the U.S. delegation  coordinates and cooperates to reach a consensus on PSI-related issues  and resolves any disagreements. OSD requests relevant U.S. agencies to  submit briefings on agenda topics and circulates them to staff involved in  PSI to receive feedback before clearing them for presentation at the  multilateral meeting. After the multilateral meeting, OSD also oversees the  process of delegating tasks to relevant U.S. agencies and keeps track of  their progress. Agency officials reported that this informal interagency  working group is valuable because it is a regular channel for exchanging  information about PSI and setting priorities identified at multinational PSI  planning meetings among all U.S. agencies that support PSI activities.
DOD has established an annual budget to offset COCOM costs of adding a  PSI component into existing DOD exercises and other PSI-related  expenses. However, COCOM staff responsible for arranging PSI exercises  stated that this funding level is inadequate to support stand-alone PSI  exercises. DOD has created an $800,000 annual budget (starting fiscal year  2008) that can be used by COCOMs for variety of PSI-related activities,  including upgrades to equipment used in interdictions and to engage  subject matter experts. Some COCOMs stated that this funding helped  them to attend multilateral PSI planning meetings, exercise planning  conferences, and other PSI events. These funds are not available, however,  to other U.S. agencies to host PSI events, such as PSI workshops or other  outreach events, or to cover any foreign country’s costs to participate in  PSI activities. Some COCOM officials responsible for arranging PSI  exercises stated that the $800,000, which DOD has established out of  operations and maintenance funds, is sufficient to fund less-expensive PSI  activities, such as adding PSI components into existing DOD exercises,  hosting computer-simulated games or tabletop exercises. However, this  funding is inadequate to cover the costs of stand-alone PSI exercises or  large exercise planning conferences, according to these officials. For  example, one COCOM reported that it will need to request additional  funds from DOD or find additional operational funds to host a stand-alone  PSI exercise in the next 2 years. Otherwise, the COCOM will have to  reduce the scope of the exercise.
section_title: State Has an Existing Structure but Does Not Have Policies, Procedures, or a Budget in Place for PSI Activities
paragraphs: Although State has an existing structure, it has not established written  policies and procedures or developed a budget to facilitate its  participation in PSI activities. State placed responsibility for PSI in the  Office of Counter Proliferation Initiatives (CPI) within the bureau of  International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN). CPI handles a number  of WMD and related issues, in addition to PSI, and is primarily involved in  PSI’s diplomatic outreach. Besides a mission statement that describes  roles of CPI’s PSI activities, State has not created policies or procedures,  consistent with internal controls, regarding PSI-related activities. Also,  State has not established a separate funding line for PSI in its annual  budget but uses operational funds to travel to PSI activities. State stated  that its operating funds are sufficient for its officials’ involvement in PSI  activities, and it will continue to evaluate any funding requests for PSI in  accordance with established department budget procedures.
section_title: Law Enforcement Agencies Have Existing Structures, but Not All Agencies Have Policies, Procedures, or Budgets in Place for PSI Activities
paragraphs: Although relevant law enforcement agencies such as CBP, FBI, and Coast  Guard have some basic structures in place, only CBP has written policies  and procedures, and none has established PSI funding lines in their annual  budgets to facilitate participation in PSI activities. CBP’s Office of  International Affairs (INA) has the programmatic lead for the agency’s  contributions to PSI. Several personnel from other CBP offices coordinate  on legal, intelligence, and operational issues to facilitate support of PSI  activities. CBP has issued a PSI directive specifying roles and  responsibilities of INA and related program offices. CBP also created an  implementation plan that establishes the agency’s leadership role among  law enforcement agencies in PSI and specifies strategies to achieve this  and other PSI-related goals, including participating in PSI exercises and  hosting trainings and workshops. CBP has a limited budget, used mostly  for travel to PSI multilateral meetings from existing agency operational  funds, but budget constraints could limit the extent of CBP’s participation  in PSI activities. According to agency officials, CBP’s internal budget for  travel to multilateral PSI planning meetings and exercises was cut from  about $100,000 in fiscal year 2007 to about $50,000 in fiscal year 2008. CBP  officials stated that additional funds may be needed to host exercises or  workshops, or aid CBP’s outreach to industry, as stated in the goals of its  implementation plan.
FBI has delegated its PSI responsibility to the Counter Proliferation  Operations Unit within the WMD directorate and has one staff member  dedicated part-time to PSI activities. However, this unit has not created  policies and procedures for PSI-related activities. Coast Guard participates  in multilateral PSI meetings and exercises through its Office of Law  Enforcement, Operations Law Division, and Office of Counterterrorism  and Defense Operations. The Office of Law Enforcement and the  Operations Law Division also work with State to arrange bilateral PSI  shipboarding agreements to conduct interdictions at sea. However, the  Coast Guard also has not established policies and procedures to guide its  involvement in PSI activities.
The FBI has budgeted $40,000 to support staff travel costs to PSI meetings  and exercises for fiscal year 2008 but has generally been funding PSI  workshops and training exercises on an ad hoc basis. Agency officials  stated that additional funding would be needed to host exercises or  workshops. Also, the FBI made a special request for a fiscal year 2008  Global War on Terror (GWOT) grant of about $700,000 to fund training for  some PSI countries on how to enhance their national interagency decision- making processes and WMD interdiction capabilities. However, FBI  officials noted that this type of grant will probably not be available for PSI  activities next fiscal year. The Coast Guard has not established a PSI  funding line and uses operational funds to travel to PSI activities.
PSI exercises, multilateral PSI planning meetings, and workshops are  increasingly focused on law enforcement issues, including customs  enforcement, and legal authorities to detain and dispose of cargo. Agency  officials said that law enforcement agencies are key participants in PSI  activities since shipboardings and cargo inspections are conducted by  those agencies. For example, CBP and Coast Guard assisted New Zealand  with developing a PSI exercise hosted by New Zealand in September 2008.  According to agency officials, this was the first live PSI exercise mostly  focused on law enforcement issues. Agency officials stated that law  enforcement agencies of other countries, instead of their militaries, are  increasingly participating in PSI exercises. According to agency officials, it  can be challenging to find countries willing to exercise PSI law  enforcement issues with the U.S. military in an existing DOD exercise.  Constitutions or political considerations of some countries preclude their  military’s involvement in exercises with a law enforcement component.  For example, one COCOM planned to add a PSI component into an  existing DOD military exercise, but the foreign country participants  refused to allow such a component to be added. According to COCOM  officials, the foreign country participants said a PSI component should be  part of a law enforcement exercise with law enforcement agencies; these  countries’ military and law enforcement agencies can not exercise  together.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Have Not Established Performance Indicators to Measure the Results of PSI Activities
paragraphs: While the COCOMs assess the extent to which they meet the goals of their  mission to combat WMD, they do not make the same kind of assessments  for PSI activities. None of the agencies participating in PSI activities has  established performance indicators to measure the results of their  activities. GAO previously recommended in its 2006 report that DOD and  State develop performance indicators to measure PSI results. A good  internal control environment calls for agencies to create the means to  monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas needing  improvement. Further, a good internal control environment requires  assessing both ongoing activities and separate evaluations of completed  activities and should assess quality of performance over time. Without  establishing and monitoring performance indicators, it will be difficult for  policymakers to objectively assess the relevant U.S. agencies’  contributions to PSI activities over time. State officials stated that they  measure PSI progress by the number of endorsing PSI countries, the  number and complexity of PSI exercises around the world, and the  number of PSI shipboarding agreements. However, it is difficult to  attribute these high-level outcomes to the PSI activities of U.S. agencies  because these outcomes are dependent on the actions of other  governments as well. CBP officials stated that the agency has designed a  PSI Implementation Plan to use when participating in PSI. The plan  established expected goals and targets related to each goal. Although the  plan indicates which goals have been completed and which are ongoing,  the document has not been updated since June 2006. In addition, CBP has  not established performance indicators for its involvement in PSI  activities.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Have Made Efforts to Increase Cooperation and Coordination with Leading PSI Countries but Less So with Other PSI Countries and Have Not Developed a Written Strategy to Resolve Interdiction Issues
paragraphs: U.S. agencies have made efforts to increase cooperation and coordination  with PSI countries by working with the 19 other leading PSI countries at  multilateral PSI planning meetings; however, U.S. agencies have not built  relationships in the same way with their counterparts from the more than  70 PSI countries who are not invited to these meetings. U.S. agencies also  have made efforts to increase cooperation and coordination with PSI  countries through exercises and other outreach activities, but the more  than 70 PSI countries who are not invited to attend multilateral meetings  are not often involved. State and DOD have not developed a written  strategy to resolve interdiction issues, as we previously recommended.  Agency officials stated that the involvement of the U.S. delegation at the  multilateral meetings is part of an attempt to resolve these issues.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Agencies Have Made Efforts to Increase Cooperation and Coordination with 19 Leading PSI Countries through Multilateral Meetings but Less So with More than 70 Other PSI Countries
paragraphs: U.S. agencies have made efforts to increase cooperation and coordination  with PSI countries by working with the 19 other leading PSI countries at  multilateral PSI planning meetings; however, U.S. agencies have not built  and expanded relationships in the same way with their counterparts from  the more than 70 PSI countries who are not invited to attend these  meetings. According to DOD, multilateral PSI planning meetings are to be  held three to four times annually as delegations from 20 leading PSI  countries (including the United States) meet to consider ways to enhance  the WMD interdiction capabilities of PSI participants. At the meetings,  the delegations also consider ways to build support for PSI, share ideas to  strengthen legal authorities to interdict, and discuss hosting and  participating in PSI exercises. Each of the 20 leading PSI countries sends a  delegation to the multilateral PSI planning meetings; the Office of the  Secretary of Defense heads the U.S. delegation to these multilateral  meetings.
According to agency officials, the multilateral PSI planning meetings  themselves have no compliance mechanisms. However, according to  agency officials, by actively engaging in bilateral meetings, the U.S.  delegation is able to reach bilateral agreement with leading PSI countries  to take certain actions to support PSI, such as hosting a PSI exercise.  Before or during the multilateral meetings, the U.S. delegation often meets  with delegations from other leading PSI countries bilaterally. Agency  officials use bilateral meetings to reach agreements with other leading PSI  countries to host future multilateral PSI planning meetings, participate in  PSI exercises, or engage in outreach to countries that do not yet endorse  or support PSI. Agency officials said that the bilateral meetings have been  useful in increasing U.S. cooperation and coordination with the 19 other  leading PSI countries. Meeting bilaterally before the multilateral PSI  planning meetings allows the U.S. delegation to make arrangements with  other leading PSI countries before the large plenary session of the  multilateral PSI planning meeting begins.
Agency officials stated that the plenary session and related breakout  sessions at multilateral meetings have been useful in increasing  cooperation and coordination with their counterparts from other leading  PSI countries. The plenary session is where the heads of the delegations  from the 20 leading PSI countries meet to discuss current PSI issues and  explain their countries’ perspectives and opinions on such issues.  Following or concurrent with the plenary session, breakout sessions are  held for working-level officials to get together and discuss exercise, law  enforcement, intelligence, or legal issues in more detail.
However, because the multilateral PSI planning meetings only include the  20 leading PSI countries (including the United States), U.S. agencies have  not built and expanded relationships in the same way with their  counterparts from the more than 70 additional PSI countries who are not  invited to attend these meetings. Agency officials acknowledged that more  needs to be done to directly engage these more than 70 additional PSI  countries.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Have Made Efforts to Increase Cooperation and Coordination with PSI Countries through Exercises, but More Than 70 PSI Countries Are Not Always Involved
paragraphs: U.S. agencies also have made efforts to increase cooperation and  coordination with PSI countries through hosting and/or participating in  PSI exercises, but countries from among the more than 70 PSI countries  who are not invited to attend multilateral meetings are not always  involved. While the United States encourages PSI supporting countries to  participate in PSI exercises, agency officials acknowledged that more  needs to be done to directly engage the PSI countries who are not invited  to attend multilateral PSI planning meetings. According to DOD, PSI  exercises are intended to test national capabilities to conduct air, ground,  and maritime interdictions; increase understanding of PSI among  participating countries; and establish interoperability among PSI  participants. The 20 leading PSI countries have established a schedule of  PSI exercises to practice and enhance collective capabilities to interdict  suspected WMD cargoes shipped by sea, air, and land. These exercises  have also included simulations and scenarios to practice country-to- country and interagency communication processes to conduct WMD  interdictions.
Twenty-one countries have led 36 PSI exercises from September 2003  through September 2008. As figure 1 shows, these exercises have included  sea, land, and air exercises, spanning the different regions of the globe,  although more of them have been held in Europe and the Mediterranean.  Also, while the United States has led a number of the exercises, the large  majority of them have been led by other PSI countries, with European  countries leading most of these. However, only 6 of the 36 exercises held  from September 2003 to September 2008 were hosted or cohosted by  countries from among the more than 70 PSI countries who are not invited  to attend the multilateral PSI planning meetings.
According to agency officials, U.S. agencies have used PSI exercises to  increase cooperation and coordination with PSI countries and educate  countries that have not yet endorsed PSI about the initiative. For example,  DOD officials stated that they used a U.S.-hosted September 2007 exercise  to protect the Panama Canal as a means of increasing cooperation and  coordination among the 8 PSI countries (including the United States) that  participated in it. However, of the 8 PSI countries who participated, only 3  were from among the more than 70 PSI countries who are not invited to  attend multilateral meetings. According to DOD officials, the inclusion of  PSI in existing DOD exercises also creates opportunities to educate other  countries about PSI. The September 2007 exercise was an existing DOD  exercise, which included a PSI component, and involved 9 other countries  that have not yet endorsed PSI. However, agency officials cautioned  against potential backlash from “overloading” existing DOD exercises with  PSI components. For example, foreign countries may choose not to  participate in an existing DOD exercise if a PSI component appears to  overshadow the original objectives of the exercise.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Have Undertaken Other Outreach Activities to Increase Cooperation and Coordination with PSI Countries
paragraphs: U.S. agencies stated that they have engaged in other outreach activities to  increase cooperation and coordination with PSI countries. For example,  since we issued our 2006 report, State sponsored a PSI fifth anniversary  conference in May 2008 attended by 86 PSI countries. At this conference,  these countries restated their support for PSI and the PSI Statement of  Interdiction Principles. State officials also stated that their outreach  efforts have included promoting the PSI when senior State officials meet  foreign representatives or make high-level country visits. In addition,  agency officials said the United States and other leading PSI countries  sometimes engage in ad hoc outreach activities to other PSI countries  before or after multilateral PSI planning meetings, such as a 1-day  outreach session with Middle Eastern PSI countries after the February  2008 multilateral meeting in London, England.
Also, State is continuing to seek international agreements, such as PSI  shipboarding agreements, with input from the U.S. Coast Guard. These  legally binding bilateral agreements, between the United States and other  countries, facilitate bilateral, reciprocal cooperation by establishing the  authorities and procedures the parties use to confirm and authorize flag  state consent to board and search each other’s vessels suspected of  carrying WMD and related materials. Since PSI was announced in 2003, the  United States has signed a total of nine PSI shipboarding agreements,  including agreements with Malta, Mongolia, and the Bahamas since we  issued our report in 2006. In addition, as we reported in September 2006,  the United States helped negotiate an amendment to the Convention on  the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime  Navigation that criminalizes WMD proliferation activities. The amendment  also created an international framework for nations that are party to the  amended convention to board ships believed to be engaged in WMD  proliferation activities. Agency officials said that the amended convention  was sent to the Senate for review in October 2007, and the Senate Foreign  Relations Committee voted favorably on it on July 29, 2008. According to  agency officials, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification  of the amended convention on September 25, 2008. The administration  awaits congressional enactment of the necessary implementing legislation.  With the success of amending the maritime convention, U.S. agencies, with  other members of the International Civil Aviation Organization, are  currently examining ways to amend the Montreal Convention of 1971, to  criminalize the airborne transportation of WMD and related materials.
Other U.S. agencies have also made some efforts to increase cooperation  and coordination with PSI countries through outreach activities.  According to DOD officials, DOD has produced talking points on PSI for  high-level, military-to-military discussions with PSI countries and, where  appropriate, for high-level DOD officials’ discussions with high-level  foreign political officials. Also, through the recently established Africa  command, DOD officials, in consultation with State, have contacted some  North African political officials on enhancing their involvement in PSI  activities, including exercises. The FBI sponsored a workshop in 2006 to  train law enforcement officials from the 19 other leading PSI countries to  identify WMD items. According to agency officials, attendance of  representatives from the 19 other leading PSI countries at the conference  led to improved relationships between the United States and these  countries, and these relationships are still yielding benefits. However, only  representatives from the 19 other leading PSI countries who go to  multilateral meetings were invited to attend the FBI-sponsored workshop  in 2006; no other PSI countries were invited.
section_title: State and DOD Have Not Developed a Written Strategy to Resolve Interdiction Issues
paragraphs: According to State and DOD officials, the departments have not developed  a formal, written strategy to resolve interdiction issues, as GAO previously  recommended. Agency officials stated that the involvement of the U.S.  delegation at the multilateral meetings is part of an attempt to resolve  these issues. The administration’s PSI implementation report states that  diplomatic, military, law enforcement, and legal experts from the United  States and the 19 other leading PSI countries convene at multilateral PSI  planning meetings to develop cooperative strategies to address issues that  extend beyond the control of any one country, such as compensation for  seized cargo. These issues are discussed through a plenary session and in  greater detail through law enforcement, legal, intelligence, and exercise  breakout sessions. The PSI implementation report also states that the  United States, a leading member of the meetings, continues to develop and  implement multinational strategies to resolve issues beyond the exclusive  control of the United States.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The administration has only partially addressed the provisions of the  Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.  Although relevant agencies perform various activities under PSI, the  administration’s approach to PSI activities overall has been ad hoc. While  DOD has taken more steps than State and law enforcement agencies to  address some of the law’s provisions, such as clarifying policies and  procedures, none of the agencies has fully addressed the law’s provisions.  Consistent with internal controls, establishing clear PSI policies and  procedures and performance indicators to measure results will help the  agencies better organize their PSI activities. While U.S. agencies have  made efforts to increase cooperation and coordination with the 19 other  leading PSI countries that attend multilateral PSI planning meetings, they  have not yet built relationships in the same way with over 70 PSI countries  that are not part of these meetings. Agency officials acknowledged that  more efforts are needed to directly engage these countries; doing so could  create opportunities for increased PSI cooperation and coordination,  including information exchanges between them and the United States. We  also reaffirm the recommendations from our 2006 report on PSI that DOD  and State should better organize their efforts for performing PSI activities,  including establishing clear PSI policies and procedures and indicators to  measure the results of PSI activities, and that they develop a strategy to  work with PSI-participating countries to resolve interdiction issues.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Since PSI activities are increasingly focused on law enforcement  issues, we recommend that relevant law enforcement agencies, such as  CBP, FBI, and Coast Guard, establish clear PSI policies and procedures  and work toward developing performance indicators to support PSI  activities, including PSI workshops, training courses, and exercises.
Since U.S. agencies have not built relationships with their counterparts  from the more than 70 PSI countries who are not invited to attend  multilateral PSI planning meetings to the same extent as with the 19  other leading PSI countries, we recommend that DOD, in cooperation  with State, take additional steps to increase cooperation, coordination,  and information exchange between the United States and these  countries. In building such relationships, DOD and State will obviously  have to work cooperatively with the 19 other leading PSI countries that  attend the PSI multilateral planning meetings.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of State, Defense,  Homeland Security, and Justice for their review and comment. We  received written comments from State, DOD, and FBI within Justice that  are reprinted in appendixes VI, VII, and VIII; we also received e-mail  comments from DHS. DHS and FBI concurred with our first  recommendation and State and DOD concurred with our second  recommendation. State and DHS also provided us with technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
DHS concurred with our first recommendation and provided a Planned  Corrective Action for CBP that CBP will update its PSI directive and  implementation plan, including adding appropriate performance indicators  and milestones. FBI also concurred with our first recommendation and  described some steps being taken to mitigate the issues.
DOD concurred with our second recommendation and stated that it has  already taken several steps to implement it. State also concurred with our  second recommendation, recognizing the need to deepen the involvement  and knowledge of all PSI endorsing countries and stating that it is  undertaking new efforts to address this need. State said that foremost  among future plans of the leading PSI countries that attend the multilateral  meetings is to focus on regional PSI activities and outreach workshops to  increase the participation of those PSI countries who are not invited to  attend the multilateral meetings.
State maintained that a PSI directive is not necessary to strengthen and  expand PSI because an existing WMD interdiction process created by a  classified National Security Presidential Directive is sufficient. However,  as we noted in our report, the existing WMD interdiction process predates  the creation of PSI and does not cover U.S. agencies’ involvement in three  broad PSI activities: multilateral planning meetings, exercises, and other  outreach efforts. State also said the agency uses the number of countries  endorsing PSI, the number and complexity of PSI exercises, and the  conclusion of PSI shipboarding agreements as indicators to measure PSI  performance. However, a good internal control environment calls for  agencies to create their own means to monitor and evaluate their own  efforts to identify areas needing improvement and requires assessing the  quality of performance of ongoing and completed activities over time. We  reaffirm the recommendation from our 2006 report that DOD and State  should better organize their efforts for performing PSI activities, including  establishing indicators to measure the results of PSI activities.
State also said that it is not feasible or effective to develop a single  comprehensive written strategy to deal with issues arising after  interdictions because every interdiction must be dealt with on a case-by- case basis. While acknowledging the unique characteristics of each  interdiction, we reaffirm our prior recommendation; the recurring  interdiction issues that are beyond the control of the United States, as  noted in our 2006 classified report, demonstrate the need for a written  strategy to resolve these issues. State also stated that it has policies and  procedures in place for PSI activities, although they are not recorded in a  single document, but did not provide us any evidence of these written PSI  policies and procedures.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees. We also will make copies available to others on request. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IX.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine U.S. agencies’ efforts to take a variety of actions to expand  and strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), we assessed the  (1) extent to which the administration issued a PSI directive, a sense of  Congress provision in the law, and submitted to Congress required PSI- related reports; (2) steps U.S. agencies have taken to establish clear PSI  policies and procedures, structures, budgets, and performance indicators;  and (3) efforts U.S. agencies have made to increase cooperation and  coordination with PSI countries and develop a strategy to resolve  interdiction issues. We employed various methodologies to address these  three objectives. We reviewed the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Public  Affairs Guidance on the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Report to  Congress on Implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative Pub. L.  No. 110-53, Section 1821, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  Instruction on the Proliferation Security Initiative (2005 and revised in  2007) and documentation on the PSI fifth anniversary conference held May  2008 in Washington, D.C.
In addition, we reviewed various documents produced by the Departments of  State (State), DOD, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and other  agencies involved in PSI, such as presentations, management reports,  documents, and cables on U.S. agencies’ participation in and management of  their involvement in PSI activities. We reviewed various documents produced  by the U.S. delegation to multilateral PSI planning meetings, including  presentations, exercise summaries, meeting summaries, and DOD documents  that discussed best practices for PSI exercises. We met with officials from  State, DOD, CBP, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Coast Guard, and  other agencies in Washington, D.C., involved in PSI activities.
We interviewed officials and military personnel at five DOD Combatant  Commands (COCOM): (1) Central Command in Tampa, Florida; (2) European  Command in Stuttgart, Germany; (3) Africa Command in Stuttgart, Germany;  (4) Southern Command in Miami, Florida; and (5) the Strategic Command’s  Center for Combating WMD in Fort Belvoir, Virginia. We discussed how DOD  manages and coordinates its involvement in PSI activities, including  preparation and execution of PSI components within existing DOD exercises,  as well as stand-alone PSI exercises; cooperation between the COCOMs,  particularly with the Center for Combating WMD; and management of PSI  activities between the Joint Staff and the COCOMs.
To collect detailed qualitative information from participants on how and  why the multilateral PSI planning meetings (including breakout sessions  and related bilateral meetings) are or are not useful for the U.S. delegation,  we conducted structured interviews with 12 U.S. participants. In addition,  we gathered the participants’ perspectives on the structure, evolution, and  possible improvements for such meetings through the structured  interviews. While we did not select a generalizeable sample, we did select  one that included officials with a wide range of views and relatively more  experience of the meetings. Specifically, we selected U.S. agency officials  and military personnel that had a range of military, law enforcement, legal,  diplomatic, and intelligence expertise and that had attended two or more  of the last six multilateral PSI planning meetings. To ensure that the  structured instrument we used was clear and comprehensive, we pretested  the instrument with two agency officials who had attended at least four of  the last six multilateral meetings. We made changes to the content and  format of the structured interview based on comments from the expert  reviews, as well as the pretests.
The scope of our review was set by the Implementing Recommendations  of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The law specified that the President  and relevant agencies and departments take a variety of actions to expand  and strengthen PSI, including implementing recommendations from our  September 2006 classified report, which identified weaknesses with the  U.S. government’s planning and management of PSI. Under a sense of  Congress provision of the law, the President is called upon to issue a PSI  directive to U.S. agencies, and U.S. agencies are called upon to take  actions listed in the law, namely to establish clear PSI policies and  procedures, structures, funding, and performance indicators to measure  the results of PSI activities; to take steps to increase cooperation and  coordination with PSI countries; and to develop a strategy to resolve  interdiction issues. The law required the President to submit a PSI  implementation report by February 2008 to congressional committees;  State and DOD are required to submit a comprehensive joint budget report  to Congress describing U.S. funding and other resources for PSI-related  activities. Congress required GAO to issue three consecutive reports  assessing the effectiveness of PSI, including progress made in  implementing the provisions of the act. This report is the first of the three  reports.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2007 to November  2008, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Statement of Interdiction Principles
subsections: section_title: PSI: Statement of Interdiction Principles
paragraphs: The PSI is a response to the growing challenges posed by the proliferation  of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and  related materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the international  community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing  treaties and regimes. It is consistent with, and a step in the implementation  of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which  states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to  international peace and security, and underlines the need for member  states of the UN to prevent proliferation. The PSI is also consistent with  recent statements of the G8 and the European Union, establishing that  more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the  proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. PSI  participants are deeply concerned about this threat and of the danger that  these items could fall into the hands of terrorists and are committed to  working together to stop the flow of these items to and from states and  nonstate actors of proliferation concern.
The PSI seeks to involve, in some capacity, all states that have a stake in  nonproliferation and the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the  flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. The PSI also seeks  cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports, territorial waters,  airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by states and  nonstate actors of proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive  efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing  nonproliferation norms, and to profit from such trade, requires new and  stronger actions by the international community. We look forward to  working with all concerned states on measures they are able and willing to  take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the following set of “Interdiction  Principles.”
section_title: Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative
paragraphs: PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to  establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede  and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials  flowing to and from states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern,  consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law  and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They call on all states  concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join in  similarly committing to:  1.  Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other  states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery  systems, and related materials to and from states and nonstate actors  of proliferation concern. “States or nonstate actors of proliferation  concern” generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI  participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction  activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts  to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and  associated delivery systems or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving,  or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.  2.  Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant  information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the  confidential character of classified information provided by other  states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and  efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize  coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.  3.  Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities  where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to  strengthen when necessary relevant international law and frameworks  in appropriate ways to support these commitments.  4.  Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding  cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the  extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their  obligations under international law and frameworks, to include:  a.  Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or  from states or nonstate actors of proliferation concern and not to  allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.  b.  At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by  another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying  their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond  the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected  of transporting such cargoes to or from states or nonstate actors of  proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.  c.  To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate  circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels  by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in  such vessels that may be identified by such states.  d.  To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their  internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when  declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such  cargoes to or from states or nonstate actors of proliferation  concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified and (2) to  enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports,  internal waters, or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of  carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be  subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to  entry.  e.  At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown  by another state, to (1) require aircraft that are reasonably  suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or nonstate  actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their  airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are  identified and/or (2) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying  such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of  such flights. f.
If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment  points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or nonstate  actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other  modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes,  and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
section_title: Appendix III: Chronology and Location of Multilateral PSI Planning Meetings, 2003 to 2008
paragraphs: The following multilateral PSI planning meetings are also known as  Operational Expert Group (OEG) meetings:  1.  Brisbane, Australia (July)  2.  London, United Kingdom (July)  3.  Paris, France (September)  4.  London, United Kingdom (October)  5.  Washington, D.C., United States (December)  1.  Ottawa, Canada (April)  2.  Oslo, Norway (August)  3.  Sydney, Australia (November)  1.  Omaha, Nebraska, United States (March)  2.  Copenhagen, Denmark (July)  3.  Hamburg, Germany (November) – Regional OEG meeting  1.  Miami, Florida, United States (April)  2.  Singapore (July)  3.  Montreal, Canada (December)  1.  Auckland, New Zealand (March)  2.  Rhodes, Greece (October)  1.  London, United Kingdom (February)  2.  Paris, France (September)
section_title: Appendix IV: Bilateral Shipboarding Agreements, 2004 to 2008
paragraphs: 1.  Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed  with Liberia  Signed February 11, 2004, entered into force December 9, 2004.
According to State, Liberia has the second largest ship registry in the  world.  2.  Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed  with Panama  Signed May 12, 2004; entered into force December 1, 2004.
According to State, Panama has the largest ship registry in the world.  3.  Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed  with Marshall Islands  Signed August 13, 2004; provisionally applied from August 13, 2004;  entered into force November 24, 2004.
According to State, Marshall Islands has the eleventh largest flag  registry in the world.  4.  Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed  with Republic of Croatia  Signed June 1, 2005; entered into force March 5, 2007.  5.  Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed  with Cyprus  Signed July 25, 2005; entered into force January 12, 2006.
According to State, Cyprus has the sixth largest ship registry in the  world and was the first European Union member to sign such an  agreement with the United States.  6.  Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed  with Belize  Signed August 4, 2005; entered into force October 19, 2005.
According to State, Belize is the first Caribbean Community  (CARICOM) member state to sign such an agreement with the United  States in support of PSI.  7.  Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed  with the Republic of Malta  Signed March 15, 2007; entered into force December 19, 2007  According to State, Malta has the eighth largest ship registry in the  world.  8.  Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed  with Mongolia  Signed October 23, 2007; entered into force February 20, 2008.  9.  Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed  with the Bahamas  Signed August 11, 2008; not yet in force.
According to State, the Bahamas has the third largest flag registry of  merchant ships in the world and serves as an open registry for  shipowners from dozens of countries.
section_title: Appendix V: Countries Supporting PSI
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:  NONPROLIFERATION:  U.S. Agencies Have Taken Some Steps, but More Effort Is Needed to Strengthen and Expand the Proliferation Security Initiative (GAO-09-43, GAO Code 320563)
Thank you for giving the Department of State the opportunity to comment  on the draft report NONPROLIFERATION:  U.S. Agencies Have Taken  Some Steps, but More Effort Is Needed to Strengthen and Expand the  Proliferation Security Initiative.  The comments below respond to  statements made in various places in the GAO’s draft report.
GAO Recommendation:  DOD and State should take steps to increase  cooperation and coordination between the United States and the more than  70 PSI countries who are not invited to attend multilateral PSI planning  meetings.
Response:  The U.S. and the 19 other countries participating in the PSI  Operational Experts Group (OEG) have recognized the need to deepen the  involvement and knowledge of all PSI endorsing states.  This year, we are  undertaking several new efforts to implement this objective, including  creation of a PSI web portal to share documents among all PSI countries,  and creation of a regular PSI newsletter for all PSI countries.
The Department of State sponsored a PSI 5th Anniversary Senior-Level  Meeting on May 28, 2008 in Washington for all PSI countries.   Representatives from 86 PSI countries attended.  At this meeting, the  attendees discussed current PSI issues and restated their support for the PSI  and the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, in particular through  adoption of the Washington Declaration (available online at  http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/105268.htm).  The GAO’s draft  report failed to note that, on the following day, the U.S. hosted a PSI  outreach workshop, attended by representatives of 21 countries that had not  yet endorsed the PSI, as well as most of the PSI participating states.  The  workshop provided detailed information on the broad range of PSI activities  and tools that have been developed for training, organizing for, and  conducting interdictions of shipments of proliferation concern.  It was  designed both to promote PSI endorsement by additional states and to  deepen the knowledge of and participation in PSI activities by states that  have endorsed the PSI.
Foremost among future plans of the countries participating in the OEG is to  focus on regional PSI activities and outreach workshops intended to increase  active PSI participation by the countries that do not participate in the OEG  meetings.  For example, the USG will host an OEG meeting in May 2009 in  Miami, Florida, and will invite all PSI partners from the Western  Hemisphere to actively participate.  This will be the first time an OEG  meeting will integrate non-OEG regional partners from the Western  Hemisphere.  The meeting’s content will focus on interdiction issues and  challenges most relevant to the region.  Other PSI partners also plan to host  regional OEG meetings for other regions in 2009 and beyond.  These  meetings will help to increase the capabilities of all PSI partners to interdict  WMD shipments.
The Department of State has always disseminated summaries of each PSI  OEG meeting to all PSI countries.  State also has supported - with funding  and/or expert advice - several PSI exercises in Central and Eastern Europe,  Africa, and Central/South America hosted by and intended for non-OEG  countries.  These exercises have enhanced the skills and interoperability of  the non-OEG countries in that region in combating WMD-related  trafficking.  In addition, exercises hosted by OEG countries in the last two  years have been attended by a number of non-OEG countries, as well as by  countries that have not yet endorsed the PSI, as noted in DOD’s comments  on this report.
In addition, the Department of State leads USG efforts to conclude bilateral,  reciprocal PSI shipboarding agreements with key ship registry states, with  support from the U.S. Coast Guard, DOD and the Department of Justice.  All  nine agreements we have concluded so far are with non-OEG PSI partner  nations.  Since 2006, three more shipboarding agreements have been signed  -- with Malta, Mongolia and The Bahamas.  These agreements provide  expedited procedures for obtaining authorization to board and search ships  suspected of transporting proliferation-related cargo.
GAO Statement:  The Administration has not issued a PSI directive that  directs U.S. agencies to establish clear PSI authorities, structures, roles,  responsibilities, policies and procedures, including budget requests for PSI  activities.  In its implementation report to Congress in July 2008, the  Administration stated it is unnecessary to issue a directive for PSI because it  believes that an existing WMD interdiction process, documented in an 8- page 2002 National Security Presidential Directive, already addresses the  relevant issues that would be covered under a PSI directive.
Response:  As was the case in 2006, all U.S. PSI activities are conducted via  an extensive interagency coordination process through a policy coordination  committee chaired by National Security Council (NSC) staff, implementing  clearly defined strategy documents that established agency roles,  responsibilities, and common goals.  In its PSI implementation report to  Congress of July 2008, the Administration stated it does not consider issuing  an additional Presidential directive to be necessary in order to continue  expanding and strengthening the PSI.  The Administration continues to hold  this view.  A classified National Security Presidential Directive governs the  interdiction process.
The report correctly notes that there is no single Administration budget  request for the PSI.  In fact, the PSI was designed to be not a single, distinct  program, but rather a set of activities interwoven into the USG’s established  diplomatic, military, and law enforcement relations with other countries.  In  addition, many existing programs, missions, international agreements and  frameworks promote the same objectives as the PSI without being narrowly  defined as part of the PSI.  It should remain the responsibility of each agency  to determine whether it can accomplish its PSI objective best by establishing  a budget line item for PSI activities.
GAO Statement:  The existing WMD interdiction process covers how U.S.  agencies should coordinate U.S. government efforts to conduct WMD  interdictions.  However, this process predates the creation of PSI and does  not cover U.S. agencies’ involvement in three broad PSI activities: multilateral planning meetings, exercises, and other outreach efforts.
Response:  Presidential directives set out broad U.S. Government policy and  goals.  Such a document is neither appropriate nor necessary to administer  the details of USG agencies’ work on PSI Operational Experts Group  meetings, PSI exercises, PSI outreach, and WMD-related interdictions.   USG agencies are working together closely and continuously on these PSI  activities, via an extensive interagency coordination process through a policy  coordination committee chaired by National Security Council (NSC) staff.
GAO Statement:  U.S. agencies have not established performance indicators  to measure the results of PSI activities.
Response:  Standard Department of State procedures are followed regarding  indicators to measure program results for State’s work on the PSI.  There are  certain unclassified PSI activities that can be quantified, which State uses as  indicators to measure the Initiative’s progress as required in the annual  Strategic Plan of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation  (ISN).  These are:  increases in the number of countries endorsing the PSI;  the number and complexity of PSI exercises conducted around the world;  and the conclusion of PSI shipboarding agreements.
The Department of State requires evidence of countries’ endorsement of the  PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles in order to consider them to be PSI  participants.  Such evidence can take the form of a diplomatic note to the  U.S. or to another PSI partner state, a public statement of endorsement, or  representation at a meeting of PSI participating states.  Use of this clear  criterion allowed the Department to begin publishing in 2006 a list of PSI  participants on the State website.
GAO Statement:  State officials stated that they measure PSI progress by the  number of endorsing PSI countries; the number and complexity of PSI  exercises around the world; and the number of PSI shipboarding  agreements.  However, it is difficult to attribute these high-level outcomes to  the PSI activities of U.S. agencies because these outcomes are dependent on  the actions of other governments as well.
Response:  The mission of the Department of State is to conduct  international diplomacy in support of U.S. foreign policy goals, where all  outcomes depend on the actions of other governments.  State’s PSI activities  are no exception, as the GAO’s previous report highlighted.  State uses these  performance indicators because we are confident that the results would not  have occurred without our efforts.
GAO Statement:  State and DOD have not developed a written strategy to  resolve interdiction issues.  Agency officials stated that the involvement of  the U.S. delegation at the multilateral meetings is part of an attempt to  resolve these issues.
Response:  U.S. agencies have developed tools and use standard procedures  to plan and execute interdictions.  To deal with issues arising as a result of  interdictions that have taken place, we have not found it feasible or effective  to develop a single, comprehensive written strategy, because every  interdiction case is unique and each must be dealt with on a case-by-case  basis depending on the specific circumstances.  U.S. agencies are familiar  with the tools and resources available to deal with the issues that come up.   Subject matter experts from across the USG consult and coordinate courses  of action to address each WMD-related interdiction case, guided by  Presidential Directives and agency procedures.
Because interdictions involve other countries, resolving interdiction issues is  a task the U.S. cannot accomplish by itself.  The PSI is based on the concept  of cooperation and coordination among PSI partners in countering WMD- related trafficking, each utilizing the national authorities available to it.  All  PSI activities are aimed at strengthening such cooperation and coordination.
GAO Statement: State has an existing structure but does not have policies,  procedures, or a budget in place for PSI activities.
Response:  The Department of State does have policies and procedures in  place for its PSI activities, although they are not all recorded in a single  document.  State updates its PSI plans and strategies frequently to take  developments into account.
The Department of State has provided funding to support four complex  interdiction-related PSI exercises hosted by PSI partners Poland and  Ukraine, as authorized under section 504(a) of the FREEDOM Support Act  and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund’s (NDF) expanded  authority under the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related  Programs (NADR).  Apart from these line items, the ISN Bureau’s operating  budget has been sufficient to fund the expenses for State’s PSI activities.
In order to ensure that Department of State activities related to the PSI and  interdiction are properly coordinated, in late 2005 the Department created  the Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives.  This Office is responsible for  all State Department PSI activities, as part of its counterproliferation  diplomacy mission.  As noted in its Mission Statement, the Office of  Counterproliferation Initiatives develops and conducts diplomatic outreach  to prospective PSI participants, informs current participants of PSI events,  and works on broadening their participation; participates in negotiation of  ship-boarding and other relevant international agreements and  understandings; and facilitates State support to the PSI Operational Experts  Group.  Most important, this Office routinely interfaces with foreign  governments on WMD-related interdictions and the disposition of seized  cargo.
GAO Statement: International  participation is voluntary and there are  no binding treaties on those who choose to participate.
Response:  It is correct that PSI participation is voluntary.  Of course, the  actions of PSI participants must be consistent with their national legal  authorities and relevant international law.  The PSI is part of the overall  international nonproliferation framework that includes the international  nonproliferation treaties – such as the NPT, CWC, and BWC, to which most  countries are parties.  The Law of the Sea and the Chicago Conventions  govern the actions of PSI countries in the maritime and air domains,  respectively.  In addition, the UN Security Council resolutions addressing  North Korea’s and Iran’s WMD-related activities, as well as UNSC  Resolution 1540, are legally binding on all UN Member states.  Finally, our  bilateral PSI shipboarding agreements with other countries are binding on  the Parties.
GAO Statement:  The multilateral PSI planning meetings themselves have no  compliance mechanisms.
Response:  The term “compliance” indicates legal obligations.  The meetings  of the 20-nation OEG are not based on or involved with establishing legal  obligations, so it is meaningless to refer to compliance mechanisms in this  context.  The operational experts meet to discuss and resolve issues related  to interdictions, and to plan exercises and outreach events.  This forum for  experts to meet regularly with their counterparts from other countries has  proven very valuable for strengthening the PSI network and the collective  body of knowledge about how to effectively interdict proliferation-related  trafficking.  We are working on ways to expand the benefits of the OEG to  all PSI countries by holding more regionally-focused meetings.
GAO Statement:  The United States helped negotiate an amendment to the  Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of  Maritime Navigation that criminalizes WMD proliferation  activities…Agency officials said that the amended convention was sent to the  Senate for review in October 2007, and the Senate Foreign Relations  Committee voted favorably on it on July 29, 2008.  It is now awaiting full  Senate action.
Update:  The Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the  2005 Protocols to the Convention of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts  against the Safety of Maritime Navigation on September 25, 2008 (source:   Congressional Record).  The Administration welcomes the Senate’s action,  and awaits Congressional enactment of the necessary implementing  legislation before the U.S. can deposit its instruments of ratification.
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter  dated October 17, 2008.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We have added information in the report that State hosted a PSI  outreach workshop at the PSI fifth anniversary conference.  2.  We have added information in the report on the future multilateral PSI  planning meeting in 2009 to be hosted by the United States.  3.  Appendix IV provides information on the shipboarding agreements the  United States has signed with other countries.  4.  As we stated in our report, the existing WMD interdiction process  covers how U.S. agencies should coordinate U.S. government efforts to  conduct WMD interdictions. This process, as we noted, predates the  creation of PSI and does not cover U.S. agencies’ involvement in three  broad PSI activities: multilateral planning meetings, exercises, and  other outreach efforts.  5.  As noted in our report, the WMD interdiction process predates the  creation of PSI and does not cover U.S. agencies’ involvement in three  broad PSI activities: multilateral planning meetings, exercises, and  other outreach efforts.  6.  We reaffirm the recommendation from our 2006 report that DOD and  State should better organize their efforts for performing PSI activities,  including establishing indicators to measure the results of PSI  activities. As we stated in our report, a good internal control  environment calls for agencies to create their own means to monitor  and evaluate their own efforts to enable them to identify areas needing  improvement. Further, a good internal control environment requires  assessing both ongoing activities and separate evaluations of  completed activities and should assess quality of performance over  time.  7.  See response (6) above.  8.  State has not worked with DOD to implement the second  recommendation from our 2006 report, as called for in the law. While  acknowledging the unique characteristics of each interdiction, we  reaffirm our prior recommendation. The recurring interdiction issues  that are beyond the control of the United States, as noted in our 2006  classified report, demonstrate the need for a written strategy to resolve  these issues.  9.  While State said that it has PSI policies and procedures that are not  recorded in a single document, it did not provide GAO any evidence of  its written PSI policies and procedures.  10. Although State reports providing funding to support certain PSI  exercises, State has not requested funds necessary for PSI-related  activities, as called for in the law.  11. This statement was based on information from U.S. agency officials.
We have modified the text in our report to attribute it to agency  officials.  12. We have updated our report to reflect the Senate’s actions.
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter  dated October 10, 2008.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We have added information to the report noting the 2009 PSI events  DOD will be sponsoring.
section_title: Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Justice
section_title: Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Godwin Agbara, Assistant  Director; Ian Ferguson; Yana Golburt; Helen Hwang; and Lynn Cothern  made key contributions to this report.