Defense Acquisitions: Better Weapon Program Outcomes Require Discipline, Accountability, and Fundamental Changes in the Acquisition Environment
Published: 2008-06-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 1990, GAO has designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of major weapon system acquisitions a high risk area. DOD has taken some action to improve acquisition outcomes, but its weapon programs continue to take longer, cost more, and deliver fewer capabilities than originally planned. These persistent problems--coupled with current operational demands--have impelled DOD to work outside of its traditional acquisition process to acquire equipment that meet urgent warfighter needs. Poor outcomes in DOD's weapon system programs reverberate across the entire federal government. Over the next 5 years, DOD plans to invest about $900 billion to develop and procure weapon systems--the highest level of investment in two decades. Every dollar wasted on acquiring weapon systems is less money available for other priorities. This testimony describes DOD's current weapon system investment portfolio, the problems that contribute to cost and schedule increases, and the potential impacts of recent legislative initiatives and DOD actions aimed at improving outcomes. It also provides some observations about what is needed for DOD to achieve lasting reform. The testimony is drawn from GAO's body of work on DOD's acquisition, requirements, and funding processes, as well as its most recent annual assessment of selected DOD weapon programs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD's portfolio of weapon system programs has grown at a pace that far exceeds available resources. From 1992 to 2007, the estimated acquisition costs remaining for major weapons programs increased almost 120 percent, while the annual funding provided for these programs only increased 57 percent. Current programs are experiencing, on average, a 21-month delay in delivering initial capabilities to the warfighter--often forcing DOD to spend additional funds on maintaining legacy systems. Systemic problems both at the strategic and at the program level underlie cost growth and schedule delays. At the strategic level, DOD's processes for identifying warfighter needs, allocating resources, and developing and procuring weapon systems--which together define DOD's overall weapon system investment strategy--are fragmented and broken. At the program level, weapon system programs are initiated without sufficient knowledge about system requirements, technology, and design maturity. Lacking such knowledge, managers rely on assumptions that are consistently too optimistic, exposing programs to significant and unnecessary risks and ultimately cost growth and schedule delays. At the same time, frequent turnover of program managers and an increased reliance on contractors increases the government's risk of losing accountability. Recognizing the need for more discipline and accountability in the acquisition process, Congress recently enacted legislation part of which requires decision-makers to certify that programs meet specific criteria at key decision points early in the acquisition process. Likewise, DOD has recently begun to develop several initiatives that are based in part on congressional direction and GAO recommendations. If adopted and implemented properly, these measures could provide a foundation for establishing a well balanced investment strategy, sound business cases for major weapon system acquisition programs, and a better chance to spend resources wisely. While legislation and policy revisions can help guide change, DOD must begin making better choices that reflect joint capability needs and match requirements with resources or the department will continue to experience poor acquisition outcomes. DOD investment decisions continue to be dictated by the services who propose programs that overpromise capabilities and underestimate costs to capture the funding needed to start and sustain development programs. The transitory nature of leadership further undermines successful reform. To better ensure warfighter capabilities are delivered when needed and as promised, incentives must encourage a disciplined, knowledge-based approach, and a true partnership with shared goals must be developed among the department, the military services, the Congress, and the defense industry.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) management of its major weapon system acquisitions—an area that  has been on GAO’s high risk list since 1990. Prior to and since that time,  Congress and DOD have continually explored ways to improve acquisition  outcomes without much to show for their efforts. DOD’s major weapon  system programs continue to take longer, cost more, and deliver fewer  quantities and capabilities than originally planned. Current operational  demands have highlighted the impact of these persistent problems as DOD  has been forced to work outside of its traditional acquisition process to  acquire equipment that meet warfighter needs.
Investment in weapons acquisition programs is now at its highest level in  two decades. The department expects to invest about $900 billion (fiscal  year 2008 dollars) over the next 5 years on development and procurement  with more than $335 billion invested specifically in major defense  acquisition programs. Given the size of this investment, poor outcomes in  DOD’s weapon system programs reverberate across the entire federal  government. Every dollar wasted during the development and acquisition  of weapon systems is money not available for other internal and external  budget priorities—such as the war on terror and mandatory payments to  growing entitlement programs.
My statement today is drawn from our body of work on DOD’s acquisition,  requirements, and funding processes, as well as our annual assessment of  selected DOD weapon programs. As you requested, I will focus on   (1) the performance of DOD’s major defense acquisition program  portfolio; (2) the underlying systemic problems that contribute to poor  cost and schedule outcomes; (3) recent legislative initiatives and DOD  actions aimed at addressing these problems; and (4) the extent to which  those initiatives and actions can be expected to improve the future  performance of DOD’s major defense acquisition programs. Our work was  conducted in May 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Too Many Acquisition Programs Competing for Limited Resources, while Program Costs and Schedules Continue To Increase
paragraphs: DOD’s portfolio of major acquisition programs has grown at a pace that far  exceeds available resources. From 1992 to 2007, the estimated acquisition  costs needed to complete the major acquisition programs in DOD’s  portfolio increased almost 120 percent, while the funding provided for  these programs only increased 57 percent, creating a fiscal bow wave that  may be unsustainable (see fig. 1).
The total acquisition cost of DOD’s 2007 portfolio of major programs  under development or in production has grown by nearly $300 billion over  initial estimates. While DOD is committing substantially more investment  dollars to develop and procure new weapon systems, our analysis shows  that the 2007 portfolio is experiencing greater cost growth and schedule  delays than the fiscal years 2000 and 2005 portfolios (see table 1). For  example, total acquisition costs for programs in DOD’s fiscal year 2007  portfolio have increased 26 percent from first estimates—compared to a  6-percent increase for programs in its fiscal year 2000 portfolio. We found  a similar trend for total RDT&E costs and unit costs.
Continued cost growth results in less funding being available for other  DOD priorities and programs, while continued failure to deliver weapon  systems on time delays providing critical capabilities to the warfighter. Put  simply, cost growth reduces DOD’s buying power. As program costs  increase, DOD must request more funding to cover the overruns, make  trade-offs with existing programs, delay the start of new programs, or take  funds from other accounts. Delays in providing capabilities to the  warfighter result in the need to operate costly legacy systems longer than  expected, find alternatives to fill capability gaps, or go without the  capability. The warfighter’s urgent need for the new weapon system is  often cited when the case is first made for developing and producing the  system. However, DOD has already missed fielding dates for many  programs and many others are behind schedule. On average, the current  portfolio of programs has experienced a 21-month delay in delivering  initial operational capability to the warfighter, and 14 percent are more  than 4 years late.
section_title: Fragmented Processes, Unexecutable Business Cases, and Limited Accountability Underlie Poor Acquisition Outcomes
paragraphs: Poor program execution contributes to and flows from shortfalls in DOD’s  requirements and resource allocation processes. Over the past several  years our work has highlighted a number of underlying systemic causes  for cost growth and schedule delays both at the strategic and at the  program level.  At the strategic level, DOD’s processes for identifying  warfighter needs, allocating resources, and developing and procuring  weapon systems—which together define DOD’s overall weapon system  investment strategy—are fragmented and broken. At the program level,  the military services propose and DOD approves programs without  adequate knowledge about requirements and the resources needed to  successfully execute the program within cost, schedule, and performance  targets. In addition, DOD officials are rarely held accountable for poor  decisions or poor program outcomes.
subsections: section_title: Key Acquisition Support Processes Are Fragmented and Result in Unsound Programs
paragraphs: DOD largely continues to define war fighting needs and make investment  decisions on a service-by-service basis, and assess these requirements and  their funding implications under separate decision-making processes.  While DOD’s requirements process provides a framework for reviewing  and validating needs, it does not adequately prioritize those needs and is  not agile enough to meet changing warfighter demands. A senior Army  acquisition official recently testified before Congress that because the  process can take more than a year, it is not suitable for meeting urgent  needs related to ongoing operations; and a recent study by the Center for  Strategic and International Studies indicates that the process is unwieldy  and officials are now trying to find ways to work around it. Ultimately, the  process produces more demand for new programs than available  resources can support. This imbalance promotes an unhealthy competition  for funds that encourages programs to pursue overly ambitious  capabilities, develop unrealistically low cost estimates and optimistic  schedules, and to suppress bad news. Similarly, DOD’s funding process  does not produce an accurate picture of the department’s future resource  needs for individual programs—in large part because it allows programs to  go forward with unreliable cost estimates and lengthy development  cycles—not a sound basis for allocating resources and ensuring program  stability. Invariably, DOD and the Congress end up continually shifting  funds to and from programs—undermining well-performing programs to  pay for poorly performing ones.
section_title: Initiating Programs with Unexecutable Business Cases Sets Them Up to Fail
paragraphs: At the program level, the key cause of poor outcomes is the consistent  lack of disciplined analysis that would provide an understanding of what it  would take to field a weapon system before system development.  Our  body of work in best practices has found that an executable business case  is one that provides demonstrated evidence that (1) the identified needs  are real and necessary and that they can best be met with the chosen  concept and (2) the chosen concept can be developed and produced  within existing resources—including technologies, funding, time, and  management capacity. Although DOD has taken steps to revise its  acquisition policies and guidance to reflect the benefits of a knowledge- based approach, we have found no evidence of widespread adoption of  such an approach in the department. Our most recent assessment of major  weapon systems found that the vast majority of programs began  development with unexecutable business cases, and did not attain, or plan  to achieve, adequate levels of knowledge before reaching design review  and production start—the two key junctures in the process following  development start (see figure 2).
Knowledge gaps are largely the result of a lack of disciplined systems  engineering analysis prior to beginning system development. Systems  engineering translates customer needs into specific product requirements  for which requisite technological, software, engineering, and production  capabilities can be identified through requirements analysis, design, and  testing. Early systems engineering provides knowledge that enables a  developer to identify and resolve gaps before product development begins.  Because the government often does not perform the proper up-front  analysis to determine whether its needs can be met, significant contract  cost increases can occur as the scope of the requirements change or  become better understood by the government and contractor. Not only  does DOD not typically conduct disciplined systems engineering prior to  beginning system development, it has allowed new requirements to be  added well into the acquisition cycle. The acquisition environment  encourages launching ambitious product developments that embody more  technical unknowns and less knowledge about the performance and  production risks they entail. A new weapon system is not likely to be  approved unless it promises the best capability and appears affordable  within forecasted available funding levels. We have recently reported on  the negative impact that poor systems engineering practices have had on  several programs such as the Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System,   F-22A, Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff  Missile and others.
With high levels of uncertainty about technologies, design, and  requirements, program cost estimates and related funding needs are often  understated, effectively setting programs up for failure. We recently  assessed the service and independent cost estimates for 20 major weapon  system programs and found that the independent estimate was higher in  nearly every case, but the difference between the estimates was typically  not significant. We also found that both estimates were too low in most  cases, and the knowledge needed to develop realistic cost estimates was  often lacking. For example, program Cost Analysis Requirements  Description documents—used to build the program cost estimate—are not  typically based on demonstrated knowledge and therefore provide a shaky  foundation for estimating costs. Cost estimates have proven to be off by  billions of dollars in some of the programs we reviewed. For example, the  initial Cost Analysis Improvement Group estimate for the Expeditionary  Fighting Vehicle program was about $1.4 billion compared to a service  estimate of about $1.1 billion, but development costs for the system are  now expected to be close to $3.6 billion. Estimates this far off the mark do  not provide the necessary foundation for sufficient funding commitments  and realistic long-term planning.
Constraining development cycles would make it easier to more accurately  estimate costs, and as a result, predict the future funding needs and  effectively allocate resources. We have consistently emphasized the need  for DOD’s weapon programs to establish shorter development cycles.  DOD’s conventional acquisition process often requires as many as 10 or 15  years to get from program start to production. Such lengthy cycle times  promote program funding instability—especially when considering DOD’s  tendency to change requirements and funding as well as frequent changes  in leadership. Constraining cycle times to 5 or 6 years would force  programs to conduct more detailed systems engineering analyses, lend  itself to fully funding programs to completion, and thereby increase the  likelihood that their requirements can be met within established time  frames and available resources. An assessment of DOD’s acquisition  system commissioned by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2006 similarly  found that programs should be time-constrained to reduce pressure on  investment accounts and increase funding stability for all programs.
section_title: Accountability Suffers When Program Managers Lack the Authority to Shape Programs
paragraphs: When DOD consistently allows unsound, unexecutable programs to pass  through the requirements, funding, and acquisition processes,  accountability suffers. Program managers cannot be held accountable  when the programs they are handed already have a low probability of  success. In addition, program managers are not empowered to make go or  no-go decisions, have little control over funding, cannot veto new  requirements, and have little authority over staffing. At the same time,  program managers frequently change during a program’s development.   Our analysis indicates that the average tenure for managers on 39 major  acquisition programs started since March 2001 was about 17 months—less  than half the length of the average system development cycle time of 37  months. Such frequent turnover makes it difficult to hold program  managers accountable for the business cases that they are entrusted to  manage and deliver.
The government’s control over and accountability for decisions is  complicated by DOD’s growing reliance on technical, business, and  procurement expertise supplied by contractors. This reliance can reach a  point where the foundation on which decisions are based may be largely  crafted by individuals who are not employed by the government, who are  not bound by the same rules governing their conduct, and who are not  required to disclose whether they have financial or other personal  interests that conflict with the responsibilities they have performing  contract tasks for DOD. Further, in systems development, DOD typically  uses cost-reimbursement contracts, in which DOD generally pays the  allowable costs incurred for the contractor’s best efforts, to the extent  provided by the contract. This may contribute to an acquisition  environment that is not conducive for incentivizing contractors to follow  best practices and keep cost and schedule in check.
section_title: Recent Congressional Initiatives and DOD Actions Aim to Promote a More Disciplined, Knowledge-Based Acquisition Approach
paragraphs: Recognizing the need for more discipline and accountability in the  acquisition process, Congress recently enacted legislation that, if followed,  could result in a better chance to spend resources wisely. Likewise, DOD  has recently begun to develop several initiatives, based in part on  congressional direction and GAO recommendations that, if implemented  properly, could also provide a foundation for establishing a well balanced  investment strategy and sound, knowledge-based business cases for  individual acquisition programs.
subsections: section_title: Legislation Could Have a Positive Impact on Acquisition Outcomes
paragraphs: Over the past 3 years, Congress has enacted legislation that requires DOD  to take certain actions which, if followed, could instill more discipline into  the front-end of the acquisition process when key knowledge is gained and  ultimately improve acquisition outcomes. For example, 2006 and 2008  legislation require decision-makers to certify that specific levels of  knowledge have been demonstrated at key decision points early in the  acquisition process before programs can enter the technology  development phase or the system development phase. The 2006 legislation  also requires programs to use their original baseline estimates—and not  only their most recent estimates—when reporting unit cost threshold  breaches. It also requires an additional assessment of the program if  certain thresholds are reached. Other key legislation requires DOD to  report on the department’s strategies for balancing the allocation of funds  and other resources among major defense acquisition programs, and to  identify strategies for enhancing the role of program managers in carrying  out acquisition programs. (For more detailed description of recent  legislation, see appendix I).
section_title: Recent DOD Actions Provide Opportunities for Improvement
paragraphs: DOD has initiated actions aimed at improving investment decisions and  weapon system acquisition outcomes, based in part on congressional  direction and GAO recommendations. Each of the initiatives is designed to  enable more informed decisions by key department leaders well ahead of a  program’s start, decisions that provide a closer match between each  program’s requirements and the department’s resources. For example:    DOD is experimenting with a new concept decision review, different  acquisition approaches according to expected fielding times, and panels to  review weapon system configuration changes that could adversely affect  program cost and schedule.
DOD is also testing portfolio management approaches in selected  capability areas to facilitate more strategic choices about how to allocate  resources across programs and also testing the use of capital budgeting as  a potential means to stabilize program funding.
In September 2007, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics issued a policy memorandum to  ensure weapons acquisition programs were able to demonstrate key  knowledge elements that could inform future development and budget  decisions. This policy directed pending and future programs to include  acquisition strategies and funding that provide for contractors to develop  technically mature prototypes prior to initiating system development, with  the hope of reducing technical risk, validating designs and cost estimates,  evaluating manufacturing processes, and refining requirements.
DOD also plans to implement new practices that reflect past GAO  recommendations intended to provide program managers more incentives,  support, and stability. The department acknowledges that any actions  taken to improve accountability must be based on a foundation whereby  program managers can launch and manage programs toward greater  performance, rather than focusing on maintaining support and funding for  individual programs. DOD acquisition leaders have told us that any  improvements to program managers’ performance hinge on the success of  these departmental initiatives.
In addition, DOD has taken actions to strengthen the link between award  and incentive fees with desired program outcomes, which has the  potential to increase the accountability of DOD programs for fees paid and  of contractors for results achieved.
If adopted and implemented properly these actions could provide a  foundation for establishing sound, knowledge-based business cases for  individual acquisition programs, and the means for executing those  programs within established cost, schedule, and performance goals.
section_title: Concluding Observations on Achieving Successful and Lasting Reform
paragraphs: DOD understands what it needs to do at the strategic and at the program  level to improve acquisition outcomes. The strategic vision of the current  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics  acknowledges the need to create a high-performing, boundary-less  organization—one that seeks out new ideas and new ways of doing  business and is prepared to question requirements and traditional  processes. Past efforts have had similar goals, yet we continue to find all  too often that DOD’s investment decisions are service- and program- centric and that the military services overpromise capabilities and  underestimate costs to capture the funding needed to start and sustain  development programs. This acquisition environment has been  characterized in many different ways. For example, some have described it  as a “conspiracy of hope,” in which industry is encouraged to propose  unrealistic cost estimates, optimistic performance, and understated  technical risks during the proposal process and DOD is encouraged to  accept these proposals as the foundation for new programs. Either way, it  is clear that DOD’s implied definition of success is to attract funds for new  programs and to keep funds for ongoing programs, no matter what the  impact. DOD and the military services cannot continue to view success  through this prism. Adding pressure to this environment are changes that  have occurred within the defense supplier base. In 2006, a DOD- commissioned study found that the number of fully competent prime  contractors competing for programs had been reduced from more than 20  in 1985 to only 6. This limits DOD’s ability to maximize competition to  reduce costs and encourage innovation.
More legislation can be enacted and policies can be written, but until DOD  begins making better choices that reflect joint capability needs and  matches requirements with resources, the acquisition environment will  continue to produce poor outcomes. It should not be necessary to take  extraordinary steps to ensure needed capabilities are delivered to the  warfighter on time and within costs. Executable programs should be the  natural outgrowth of a disciplined, knowledge-based process. While DOD’s  current policy supports a knowledge-based, evolutionary approach to  acquiring new weapons, in practice decisions made on individual  programs often sacrifice knowledge and realism in favor of revolutionary  solutions. Meaningful and lasting reform will not be achieved until DOD  changes the acquisition environment and the incentives that drive the  behavior of DOD decision-makers, the military services, program  managers, and the defense industry. Finally, no real reform can be  achieved without a true partnership among all these players and the  Congress.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  answer any questions you may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact Katherine V.  Schinasi at (202) 512-4841 or schinasik@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this testimony. Individuals who made key contributions to this  statement include Michael J. Sullivan, Director; Ronald E. Schwenn,  Assistant Director; Megan Hill; Travis J. Masters; Karen Sloan; and Alyssa  B. Weir.
section_title: Appendix I: Recent Legislative Initiatives
subsections: section_title: Major Components
paragraphs: 10 U.S.C. § 2366a (as amended) - Milestone B Certification  Before a major defense program can receive approval to start system development, the Milestone  Decision Authority (MDA) must certify that, for example--  the program is affordable when considering DOD’s ability to accomplish the program’s mission using  alternative systems and the per unit and total acquisition costs in the context of the Future Year  Defense Plan;    reasonable cost and schedule estimates have been developed for system development and    appropriate market research has been conducted prior to technology development to reduce  duplication of existing technology and products; and  the technology in the program has been demonstrated in a relevant environment.
MDA may waive one or more requirements if the MDA determines that without a waiver, DOD would be  unable to meet critical national security objectives.  10 U.S.C. § 2433 (as amended) - Unit Cost Reports   Amended reporting and certification requirements for major defense programs that exceed baseline  costs, by:    creating two types of growth thresholds--“significant cost growth” and “critical cost growth”;    basing new thresholds on the percentage increases in both the original and current baseline estimate  incorporating these thresholds into existing unit cost reporting requirements; and    requiring that in the event of a breach of the critical cost growth threshold, the Secretary of Defense,  in coordination with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, to (1) assess the reasons for the cost  growth, the projected cost to either complete the program with current or reasonably modified  requirements, and the rough order of magnitude costs for a reasonable alternative system or  capability and (2) certify that the program is essential to national security; no less costly, equally  capable alternatives exist; new cost estimates are reasonable; and an adequate management  structure is in place to control costs.
Program Manager Empowerment and Accountability  Required the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy for enhancing the role of DOD program  managers in developing and carrying out defense acquisition programs that addressed matters such as: improved career paths and opportunities;  incentives for recruitment and retention of highly qualified individuals;  improved resources and support;    enhanced monetary and non-monetary awards for successful accomplishment of program objectives; Required that DOD guidance for major defense programs be revised to address program manager  qualifications, resources, responsibilities, tenure and accountability. Guidance for taking programs from  development to production was to address matters such as:  the need for performance agreements between program managers and MDAs that set forth expected  parameters for cost, schedule and performance and include commitments by both parties to ensure  parameters are met and  the extent to which a program manager should continue in the position without interruption until the  delivery of the first production units.
Investment Strategy for Major Defense Acquisition Programs  Required the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees a report on  DOD’s strategies for balancing the allocation of funds and other resources among major defense  acquisition programs. The report was to address topics such as DOD’s ability to:    establish priorities among needed capabilities and assess resources needed to achieve such    balance costs, schedule and requirements of major defense programs to ensure the most efficient  use of resources.
The report also was to address the role of a Tri-Chair Committee comprised of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and  the director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, among others; in the resource allocation process.  10 U.S.C. § 2366b Milestone A Certification   Before a major defense program can receive approval to begin technology development, the MDA must,  after consulting with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) on matters related to program  requirements and military needs, certify that, for example:  the system fulfills an approved initial capabilities document;  the system is necessary and appropriate if it duplicates a capability already provided by an existing  system; and  the cost estimate for the system has been submitted and the level of resources required to develop  and procure the system is consistent with the priority level assigned by the JROC.
If a milestone A certified major defense program exceeds the cost estimate for the system submitted at  the time of certification by at least 25 percent prior to milestone B approval, the MDA and JROC shall  determine whether the level of resources required to develop and procure the system remains  consistent with the priority level assigned.
The Secretary of Defense was also asked to review guidance and take steps to ensure that DOD does  not initiate a technology development program for a major weapon system without milestone A  approval.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.   GAO-08-467SP. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2008.
Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed  to Improve DOD’s Acquisition Environment and Weapon System  Quality. GAO-08-294. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2008.
Cost Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Estimating and Managing  Program Costs. GAO-07-1134SP, Washington, D.C.: July 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO- 07-406SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon  System Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes.   GAO-07-388, Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology  Transition Processes. GAO-06-883. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2006.
Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers  Needed to Improve Outcomes. GAO-06-110. Washington, D.C.: November  1, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience  Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD’s Revised Policy. GAO-06-368.  Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2006.
DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change. GAO-06-257T.  Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to  Improve DOD’s Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. GAO-04-393.  Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2004.
Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon  Systems’ Total Ownership Costs. GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.: February  11, 2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Factors Affecting Outcomes of Advanced Concept  Technology Demonstration. GAO-03-52. Washington, D.C.: December 2,  2002.
Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early  Improves Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15,  2002.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best  Practices. GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to  Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8,  2001.
Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better  Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington, D.C.: July 31,  2000.
Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better  Weapon System Decisions. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April  26, 2000.
Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System  Programs Implement Best Practices. GAO/NSIAD-99-206. Washington,  D.C.: August 16, 1999.
Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can  Improve Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington,  D.C.: July 30, 1999.
Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program  Outcomes. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999.
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible. GAO/T- NSIAD-98-123. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1998.
Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires  Changes in DOD’s Environment. GAO/NSIAD-98-56. Washington, D.C.:  February 24, 1998.
Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer  Improvements for DOD. GAO/NSIAD-96-162. Washington, D.C.: August 26,  1996.
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