Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Address Implementation Issues and Estimate Long-Term Costs for European Capabilities
Published: 2014-04-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2002, DOD has spent over $98 billion developing a ballistic missile defense system to protect the United States, U.S. forces, and allies against inbound threat missiles. In December 2011, DOD deployed the initial phase of a revised approach for Europe, with increased capabilities to be deployed in later phases. GAO has reported on potential risks to DOD's implementation caused by the lack of a coordinated management approach and an absence of life-cycle cost estimates. Given DOD's BMD investment and revised approach, GAO was asked to review EPAA's implementation. GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD (1) identified and planned to resolve implementation issues before deploying BMD capabilities to Europe; and (2) estimated the long-term costs to operate and support BMD elements in Europe. GAO reviewed DOD instructions, manuals, and other documents on the acceptance process and the status of operating and support cost estimates that have been developed to-date, and interviewed cognizant officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) met the presidentially announced time frame to deploy initial ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities in Europe under the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) but did not fully identify and plan to resolve implementation issues before deployment. As a result, DOD experienced implementation issues, such as incomplete construction of housing facilities for soldiers arriving at the EPAA radar site in Turkey and incomplete implementing arrangements defining how to operate with allies when certain BMD elements arrived in the host country. U.S. Strategic Command, in coordination with other combatant commands, developed criteria to assess whether a BMD capability is ready for operational use to ensure that BMD capabilities can be used as intended when they are delivered. However, the assessment criteria used during this process focused on effectiveness, suitability, and interoperability areas—such as whether BMD elements can work together to track ballistic missile threats—and did not explicitly require DOD to comprehensively identify and plan to resolve implementation issues prior to deploying these capabilities. DOD plans to continue to use its existing process to accept BMD capabilities planned for Europe in the future. Without identifying and planning to resolve implementation issues before deployment, DOD risks continuing to encounter implementation issues after it deploys additional BMD capabilities in Europe, which may lead to significant delays and inefficiencies.
DOD has estimated the long-term operating and support cost estimates for some but not all BMD elements in Europe, and existing estimates could change. Specifically, initial estimates indicate these costs could total several billion dollars over the elements' lifetime, but key decisions that have not been made are likely to change these estimates. Also, DOD has not developed a comprehensive estimate for a key element—Aegis Ashore. In prior work developing cost-estimating best practices, GAO concluded that cost estimates can assist decision makers in budget development and are necessary for evaluating resource requirements at key decision points and effectively allocating resources. Office of Management and Budget guidance also emphasizes that agencies should plan for operations and maintenance of capital assets. In 2012, the Army and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) estimated the lifetime operating and support costs for two BMD elements, a forward-based radar and terminal high-altitude air defense batteries. However, DOD has not completed business-case analyses for them, which would underpin a decision on long-term support strategies, and has not decided where to station the terminal-defense battery. In addition, MDA and the Navy have separately begun to identify some costs but have not developed a comprehensive joint estimate of lifetime operating and support costs for the two planned Aegis Ashore sites. Although MDA and the services agreed to jointly develop estimates of lifetime operating and support costs, there is no explicit requirement to complete business-case analyses to support a decision on long-term product support, and jointly develop cost estimates, before deploying BMD elements in Europe. However, without completed business-case analyses and up-to-date operating and support cost estimates, DOD and decision makers are limited in their ability to develop sound budgets and identify the resources needed over the long term to operate and support BMD elements in Europe.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD identify and plan to resolve implementation issues prior to deploying and operating BMD elements and require and set a deadline for completing business-case analyses and joint cost estimates for all BMD elements in Europe. DOD agreed with three recommendations and partially agreed with one, expressing concern about the proper entities for resolving implementation issues. GAO believes that the recommendation can be implemented through collaboration as discussed further in this report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent over $98 billion  to develop a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system intended to defend  the United States, U.S. forces, and allies around the world against  inbound threat missiles. In 2009, the President announced a revised  approach for BMD in Europe called the European Phased Adaptive  Approach (EPAA). This approach is to include ships, land-based radars  and interceptors, and a communications network, to be implemented in  phases of increasing capabilities beginning in 2011. EPAA is intended to  be a flexible and cost-effective way to address short-, medium-, and  intermediate-range ballistic missile threats from Iran. EPAA replaced a  prior plan to defend both Europe and the United States from longer-range  ballistic missiles by deploying a radar in the Czech Republic and ground- based intercontinental missile interceptors in Poland.
We have issued numerous reports over the last 10 years on  development, acquisition, and plans for operating ballistic missile defense  capabilities. In 2010 and 2011, we reported that DOD’s efforts to establish  EPAA lacked clear guidance and an integrated schedule, which could  result in decreased performance and increased costs, and that DOD had  not fully implemented a management process to synchronize EPAA  acquisition activities and ensure transparency and accountability. DOD  generally agreed with our recommendations to provide guidance on  EPAA that describes desired end states, develop an integrated EPAA  schedule, and adopt BMD performance metrics for durability and  effectiveness, but has not yet taken any actions. Given the resources  dedicated to BMD and the revised approach, you asked us to review  EPAA’s implementation. For this report, we assessed the extent to which  DOD has (1) identified and planned to resolve implementation issues  before deploying BMD capabilities to Europe; and (2) estimated the long- term costs to operate and support BMD elements in Europe.
To assess the extent to which DOD has identified and planned to resolve  implementation issues before deploying BMD capabilities to Europe, we  reviewed the U.S. Strategic Command document titled Ballistic Missile  Defense System (BMDS) Warfighter Capability Acceptance. This  document described the goal of the warfighter acceptance process, which  is, in essence, to ensure that capabilities can be used as intended when  they are delivered, and culminates in formal acceptance of BMD  capabilities by U.S. Strategic Command. We also reviewed key  documents, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction  titled Policy Guidance for Ballistic Missile Defense Operations and the  Joint Staff Publication on Countering Air and Missile Threats, which  describe DOD’s BMD guidance and responsibilities of various  organizations. We also met with officials from the Office of the Secretary  of Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. European Command and its military  service components, and U.S. Strategic Command to understand how  DOD’s acceptance process was implemented. In addition, we reviewed  after action-reports and briefings from the Army and Air Force that  described implementation challenges experienced during the deployment  of BMD elements to Europe and other regions, and provided an  assessment of lessons learned for future BMD element deployments.
To assess the extent to which DOD has estimated the long-term costs to  operate and support BMD elements in Europe, we first reviewed  agreements and their annexes between the Missile Defense Agency  (MDA) and the Army and between MDA and the Navy regarding how  these organizations would work together to manage the BMD elements,  including information on how they would jointly develop cost estimates.  To determine the general purpose for estimating long-term costs, we  identified and reviewed documents containing best practices for  determining high-quality cost estimates from the Office of Management  and Budget and the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.  Specifically, we determined that cost estimates can assist decision  makers in budget development and are necessary for evaluating resource  requirements at key decision points and effectively allocating resources.  In addition, we reviewed the Army’s regulation on Integrated Logistic  Support, which includes guidance on business-case analysis, and is  referenced in the agreement annexes between MDA and the Army, to  identify DOD criteria for conducting business-case analyses to assess  alternatives for providing long-term support. We then reviewed  documentation of estimates developed by MDA and the services for BMD  elements designated for EPAA, as well as elements that DOD could  deploy to support EPAA. Finally, we met with DOD officials from MDA,  and various Navy, Army, and Air Force offices, to identify key decisions  that could affect the estimates.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2012 to April 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further details on our  objectives, scope, and methodology can be found in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: EPAA Capabilities and Time Frames
paragraphs: In September 2009, the President announced a revised approach to  missile defense in Europe called EPAA, which consists of phases of  increasing capability to be deployed in the 2011, 2015, and 2018 time  frames. EPAA serves as the U.S. contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty  Organization’s (NATO) mission to protect alliance populations, territory,  and forces against ballistic missile threats. As originally announced,  EPAA included a fourth phase that was expected to add U.S. homeland  defense and expanded regional defense in the 2020 time frame. In March  2013, the Secretary of Defense canceled Phase Four, due, in part, to  development delays with a key element of this phase.
In 2011, DOD deployed BMD elements to meet the President’s  announced time frame for the first phase of EPAA. This provided  capability against short- and medium-range threats and included: Aegis  BMD-capable ships with the Standard Missile-3 Block IA interceptor  stationed in the Mediterranean; an Army Navy/Transportable Radar that  is forward-based in Turkey; and a Command, Control, Battle  Management and Communications system deployed to an Air Force base  in Germany. DOD is in the process of preparing for the second phase of  EPAA scheduled for implementation in December 2015. The second  phase will include Aegis Ashore based in Romania to provide additional  capability against short- and medium-range threats with a more advanced  interceptor. The third phase of EPAA is scheduled for late 2018 and will  include Aegis Ashore based in Poland to provide capability against  medium- and intermediate-range threats. Additionally, although Patriot  and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries were not  BMD elements originally announced as part of the revised approach to  missile defense in Europe, DOD officials stated that both elements could deploy to support EPAA as needed, independent of the EPAA phases.Figure 1 summarizes DOD’s proposed time frames and BMD elements  for the three phases of EPAA. Figure 2 graphically displays increasing  U.S. BMD capabilities introduced in each EPAA phase.
section_title: BMD and EPAA Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: A number of stakeholders within DOD have roles and responsibilities in  developing, building, deploying, and managing resources for BMD,  including MDA, combatant commands, the services, and other  organizations. MDA is responsible for the development, acquisition, and  testing of BMD system elements in close collaboration with the warfighter   The combatant commands mainly  community and testing organizations.involved in EPAA implementation are U.S. Strategic Command and U.S.  European Command. U.S. Strategic Command’s responsibilities include  synchronizing planning for global missile defense in coordination with  other combatant commands, the services, MDA, and appropriate  agencies, while U.S. European Command has operational control over  BMD elements located within its area of responsibility and collaborates  with the services that would employ the BMD elements during combat.  See appendix III for a summary of key stakeholders across DOD that are  involved in the implementation of EPAA.
section_title: Our Prior Work on BMD
paragraphs: In previous reports on BMD, we have identified challenges associated  with MDA’s BMD efforts and DOD’s broader approach to BMD planning,  implementation, and oversight. In an April 2013 report, we found that  MDA’s cost baselines were not useful for decision makers to gauge  progress because they did not include operating and support costs from  the military services and thus were not sufficiently comprehensive.Although MDA reports some operating and support costs in its annual  accountability report, we have found that this report does not include  services’ costs. DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to  include in its resource baseline cost estimates all life-cycle costs including  operating and support costs. Subsequently, as we found during this  review, MDA is working with the services to jointly develop estimates of  operating and support costs for two BMD elements. Further, we reported  in 2011 that DOD had not developed a life-cycle cost estimate for BMD in  Europe because the department considers EPAA an approach—not a  program—that is flexible and would change over time. At that time, we  recommended that DOD develop an EPAA life-cycle cost estimate which  would allow the department to assess whether its plans were affordable.  DOD responded that a more-effective approach would be to prepare  element-specific cost estimates.
In a January 2011 report, we reported that, though DOD initiated multiple  simultaneous efforts to implement EPAA, it faced key management  challenges that could result in inefficient planning and execution, limited  oversight, and increased cost and performance risks. We also reported  that DOD faced planning challenges because the BMD system’s desired  performance was not defined using operationally relevant quantifiable  metrics—such as how long and how well it can defend—that would  provide the combatant commands with needed visibility into the  operational capabilities and limitations of the BMD system they intended  to employ. As noted earlier, DOD generally agreed with our  recommendations to provide guidance on EPAA that describes desired  end states, develop an integrated EPAA schedule, and adopt BMD  performance metrics for durability and effectiveness but to date has not  taken any action. In a September 2009 report, DOD generally agreed with  our recommendations to perform a comprehensive analysis identifying its  requirements for BMD elements and require the establishment of  operational units before making elements available for use. In response,  DOD completed an analysis of BMD requirements which, according to  DOD officials, informed the Army’s process for fielding BMD elements  with operational units. For additional GAO reports on BMD, see the  Related GAO Products section at the end of this report.
section_title: DOD Met EPAA Phase One Deployment Time Frame, but Its Warfighter Acceptance Process Does Not Fully Identify and Plan to Resolve Implementation Issues
paragraphs: DOD met the presidentially announced time frame to deploy EPAA Phase  One capabilities to Europe when DOD positioned EPAA elements in the  region, and MDA declared EPAA Phase One architecture to be  technically capable in December 2011. According to DOD officials, the  BMD capabilities were in place and could have been used if needed. U.S.  Strategic Command, through its warfighter operational readiness and  acceptance process, used an established set of criteria to assess EPAA  Phase One capabilities and formally accepted the EPAA Phase One  architecture into the global BMD system in April 2012. However, DOD  experienced implementation issues deploying BMD capabilities in  Europe, such as incomplete construction of infrastructure, including  housing and dining facilities, for soldiers arriving at the EPAA forward- based radar site and incomplete implementing arrangements defining  how DOD would operate with allies when certain BMD elements arrived in  the host country. DOD’s existing warfighter acceptance process does  not explicitly require the combatant commands, the services, and MDA to  comprehensively identify and develop a plan to resolve such issues  before deploying BMD capabilities. Without taking steps to resolve  implementation issues prior to deployment, DOD risks encountering  similar challenges as it deploys additional BMD capabilities to Europe.
subsections: section_title: DOD Used Its Warfighter Acceptance Process and Criteria to Assess EPAA Phase One Capabilities
paragraphs: DOD’s warfighter acceptance process and criteria were used to accept  EPAA Phase One capabilities. The manual guiding the process for  warfighter acceptance of BMD capabilities indicates that the end state of  acceptance is crew knowledge and doctrine, tactics, techniques, and  procedures that reflect the reality of the fielded system or ensure that the  warfighter can fight with and optimize MDA-delivered BMD capabilities.  In essence, the goal of the warfighter acceptance process is to ensure  that capabilities can be used as intended when they are delivered. This  process—separate from but a companion to MDA’s process for technical  capability declaration—informs MDA’s testing so that the warfighter  understands the elements’ capabilities and limitations and can more  effectively employ BMD capabilities. In addition, the U.S. Strategic  Command, in coordination with other combatant commands, develops  criteria to assist in the determination of whether to officially accept an  element for operational use by the combatant commands. The criteria  used during the warfighter acceptance process focuses primarily on areas  such as effectiveness, suitability, and interoperability. For example, one  of the acceptance criteria used to assess initial EPAA capabilities was the  extent to which the forward-based radarcapable of searching for and tracking ballistic missile threats. By  comparing these acceptance criteria against BMD test results, U.S.  European Command and the services were able to better understand the  capabilities, limitations, and risks of initial EPAA BMD elements and  developed their plans, tactics, and procedures accordingly.   and Aegis BMD ship were  In addition to using acceptance criteria, U.S. European Command  conducted a separate BMD exercise in Europe with servicemembers  operating actual BMD elements to demonstrate the performance of initial  EPAA capabilities within the region. Using the results, U.S. European  Command and U.S. Strategic Command coordinated to identify technical  improvements that could be made, and U.S. Strategic Command  accepted the EPAA Phase One architecture into the global BMD system  in April 2012. After acceptance, U.S. European Command also  conducted a subsequent BMD exercise in May 2013 with U.S. and NATO  servicemembers to demonstrate interoperability of initial EPAA  capabilities with NATO BMD capabilities.
section_title: DOD’s Warfighter Acceptance Process Did Not Fully Identify and Resolve Warfighter Implementation Issues before Deploying BMD Elements
paragraphs: As discussed above, DOD used its warfighter acceptance process to  assess BMD elements dedicated to Phase One of EPAA. However,  though the goal of the warfighter acceptance process is, in essence, to  ensure that capabilities can be used as intended when they are delivered,  this process did not explicitly require the combatant commands, the  services, and MDA to comprehensively identify and develop plans for  resolving various implementation issues prior to deploying these and  other supporting elements to Europe. As a result, DOD experienced three  implementation issues related to deploying BMD capabilities to Europe.  These included: (1) incomplete infrastructure, such as housing and dining  facilities, for soldiers arriving at the forward-based radar site in Turkey; (2)  lack of defined policies and procedures for sharing BMD radar data  across geographic combatant commands; (3) and incomplete  implementing arrangements and tactics, techniques, and procedures with  allies.
Incomplete facilities in Turkey: DOD deployed the forward-based  radar to Turkey in December 2011 before completing construction of  infrastructure, such as permanent housing, dining, and other facilities  for soldiers arriving on the site. According to officials, construction  could not be completed prior to deploying the forward-based radar  due to compressed deadlines in order to meet the presidentially  announced time frame. As a result, Army officials stated that soldiers  arrived at the remote mountain-top radar site in winter conditions, and  their tent-based expeditionary facilities—though climate controlled and  equipped with latrines, showers, and other basic facilities—were  initially unable to withstand the conditions. Also, at the time, roads  leading to the nearest town were not well-maintained, which created  safety challenges and made access to nearby services less efficient.
The Army made some improvements after the 2011-2012 winter  season, such as replacing the expeditionary facilities with those  typically used in Alaska in order to better suit the wintery conditions,  but construction of longer-term infrastructure will not begin until mid- 2014. Until the permanent facilities are completed, soldiers deployed  to the site may continue to face difficult conditions. Further, without a  process that accounts for implementation issues such as this, DOD  may encounter similar challenges as it deploys additional capabilities  to the region.
Lack of defined policies and procedures for sharing BMD radar data  across geographic combatant commands: Sharing BMD element  data, such as radar data, can improve missile defense performance,  but DOD accepted its most-recently deployed forward-based radar  before finalizing policies and procedures that address potential  overlapping operational priorities across geographic combatant  commands. Subsequent to its deployment of a forward-based radar  for EPAA in 2011, DOD deployed another forward-based radar in the  operational area of U.S. Central Command in 2013. DOD had begun  discussions on the benefits and drawbacks of sharing radar data, but  the most-recent deployment proceeded without a decision for how to  address these issues, even though both regions face a common  threat. According to officials, the first priority for deploying each radar  was to support separate missions in their respective areas of  responsibility, and a decision to use one radar to support the other  radar was a secondary priority and thus did not require resolution prior  to deployment. However, officials also stated that sharing radar data  between the recently deployed radar with the EPAA forward-based  radar could benefit missile defense in Europe and potentially increase  operational effectiveness across both geographic combatant  commands. DOD guidance states that U.S. Strategic Command is  responsible for synchronizing global missile defense planning in  coordination with the combatant commands, services, MDA, and  appropriate agencies. Guidance further indicates that U.S. Strategic  Command, working with the geographic combatant commands,  integrates and synchronizes various BMD elements, such as radars.
However, the warfighter acceptance process did not explicitly require  a comprehensive assessment of whether policies and procedures for  sharing BMD radar data are defined. The combatant commands,  including U.S. European Command, have made progress on  addressing this implementation issue. For example, since  deployment, U.S. European Command, in coordination with U.S.  Strategic Command, has requested technical analysis from MDA in  order to determine the extent to which the radars can share  information. In addition to the technical analysis, U.S. European  Command officials stated that DOD has held several senior-level  meetings to discuss policies and procedures for addressing potential  overlapping operational priorities and to discuss possible  consequences that might occur if the radars are integrated. As a  result of not completing such policies and procedures prior to  accepting BMD capabilities, DOD continues to operate these radars  separately and may face difficulty in sharing the radar data across  geographic combatant commands, thus affecting efficient BMD  operations in Europe.
Incomplete implementing arrangements and procedures for working  with allies: DOD’s experience delivering Patriot batteries to Turkey in  early 2013 demonstrates some of the difficulties the warfighter could  encounter by not finalizing implementing arrangements and tactics,  techniques, and procedures with allies prior to deployment. DOD  deployed Patriot batteries to Turkey as part of a NATO mission to  support the country’s air defense, but this action was not part of  EPAA’s first phase. However, U.S. European Command officials  indicated that it shaped this deployment to be similar to future U.S.  deployments of Patriot batteries to Europe, and interoperability with  NATO is a key aspect of EPAA. However, according to Army officials,  host-nation implementing arrangements had not been finalized before  the Patriot batteries arrived in Turkey, resulting in the equipment  remaining at an airfield for several weeks before it could be deployed  for operations. In addition, according to Army officials, foreign  disclosure issues were not resolved by the time Patriot batteries  arrived in Turkey, and initially there were limitations on what  intelligence information could be shared with non-U.S. forces. Further,  according to Army officials, soldiers had to receive supplemental  training to perform the NATO mission, including using NATO tactics,  techniques, and procedures, which can differ from those of the United  States. According to officials, DOD was aware of these issues but  could not address them prior to deploying Patriot batteries to Turkey  due to the need to address threats there. Further, officials stated they  must also adhere to certain political and host-nation decisions that  can affect their ability to address all implementation issues before  deployment. Nonetheless, the warfighter acceptance process did not  explicitly require a comprehensive assessment of whether these  implementing arrangements and procedures were completed prior to  deployment. By not completing implementing arrangements and  procedures for how to work with allies before deployment, Army  officials stated that they spent extensive time working with allies to  resolve these implementation issues, which put a strain on Army’s  limited existing resources.
section_title: DOD’s Process for Accepting New BMD Capabilities Could Result in Future Implementation Challenges
paragraphs: DOD recognizes that it has encountered previous implementation  challenges related to deploying BMD capabilities to Europe and is taking  steps to address them, but these efforts may not prevent future problems.  According to U.S. European Command officials, one step they have taken  is to establish a synchronization board that tracks EPAA implementation,  but this board has focused more on Aegis Ashore than on potential  Patriot or THAAD battery deployments. Additionally, the Navy, in  coordination with MDA and U.S. European Command, is tracking the  development and deployment of the Aegis Ashore weapon systems and  facilities. However, these efforts are not part of DOD’s warfighter  acceptance process, which means that issues raised through these  efforts would not necessarily be addressed prior to accepting or deploying  additional EPAA capabilities. Also, the acceptance criteria used to assess  BMD elements in areas such as effectiveness, suitability, and  interoperability do not include a detailed identification of potential  implementation issues that may affect operational performance. Further,  DOD officials said that they plan to use the existing acceptance process  to accept and deploy future EPAA capabilities, but may not for other BMD  elements that could support BMD operations in Europe, such as THAAD.  In using the existing process, which does not explicitly require a  comprehensive assessment of various implementation issues prior to  deployment, DOD may deploy future BMD capabilities without identifying  or developing a plan to resolve implementation issues, such as  incomplete host-nation implementing arrangements for Aegis Ashore  radar operations.
One of the more-difficult challenges facing DOD is completing  implementing arrangements for access to frequencies that Aegis Ashore  is designed to use. We have previously reported on issues related to  frequency access for Aegis Ashore. The two Aegis Ashore elements  dedicated to EPAA Phases Two and Three—which are expected to  operate in Romania and Poland by 2015 and 2018 respectively—have  radars that DOD has designed to use a certain range of frequencies for  full operations, including maintenance, periodic testing of equipment, and  training of crews. However, according to U.S. European Command  officials, some of the frequencies Aegis Ashore is designed to use are  reserved for civil use, such as commercial and cell phone services.  Accordingly, U.S. European Command officials stated that resolving  frequency access issues and completing the implementing arrangements  for U.S. radars takes time and must be initiated early in the planning  process to allow time for completion before DOD deploys Aegis Ashore in  Romania. According to U.S. European Command officials, in 2013, DOD  and Romanian officials worked together to agree on frequencies available  for Aegis Ashore operations so that both the radar and the commercial  and cell phone services can coexist, with restrictions, by early 2015. In  Poland, however, resolving frequency range access issues is more  complex, according to DOD officials. Specifically, the frequency range is  more congested in central Europe, which increases the potential for  cross-border interference with neighboring countries. In addition,  according to U.S. European Command officials, Poland is in the process  of issuing new commercial licenses for frequencies within its civil  frequency range that overlap with those Aegis Ashore is designed to use.  This process may affect the time frame for resolving Aegis Ashore’s  access to these frequencies. DOD officials stated that they plan to work  closely with their Polish counterparts to resolve these issues prior to the  planned deployment of Aegis Ashore in 2018. According to DOD officials,  construction of Aegis Ashore can proceed without these issues being  resolved. However, the extent to which the radar could be used to train,  maintain, and test the capabilities may be limited. As a result, the current  warfighter acceptance process, with its focus on meeting operational  needs based on criteria that do not comprehensively include potential  implementation issues, may not ensure that radar capabilities can be fully  used once deployed.
In addition, DOD may choose to forward station or deploy Patriot and  THAAD batteries to supplement EPAA or NATO operations. U.S.  Strategic Command officials stated that the warfighter acceptance  process will not be applied to Patriot batteries, and they have not yet  decided whether the process will be applied to THAAD batteries.  Nonetheless, it is important that the warfighter be prepared to operate the  batteries and that implementing arrangements be in place. As with the  Aegis Ashore radar, if DOD forward-stationed a THAAD battery to  Europe, it may need to negotiate implementing arrangements for the  THAAD radar to access frequency ranges for periodic testing,  maintenance, and training to support BMD operations. Also, if Patriot  batteries were sent to Europe, DOD may need to negotiate implementing  arrangements and coordinate tactics, techniques, and procedures with  allies as it did for the Patriot deployment to Turkey. Since DOD’s  experience has shown that it may require considerable time in order to  develop necessary implementing arrangements, it would be important for  these types of issues to be identified as soon as possible. Unless DOD  comprehensively identifies and develops a plan to resolve implementation  issues for elements that may deploy to support BMD operations in  Europe, DOD risks experiencing challenges that may affect the  warfighter’s ability to fully utilize the systems as designed.
DOD has encountered various implementation issues when deploying  BMD capabilities in Europe and risks encountering similar issues in the  future, because there is no explicit requirement within the warfighter  acceptance process to ensure that these types of issues are  comprehensively identified before the capabilities are deployed. The  current warfighter acceptance process does not produce an integrated,  holistic identification of implementation issues and, as a result, DOD does  not identify and develop a plan to resolve them before BMD capabilities  are deployed. Instead, responsibilities are diffused across several  organizations. For example, U.S. Strategic Command officials view their  role as ensuring that EPAA capabilities function within the BMD system  worldwide, which includes BMD elements that are not among those  dedicated to EPAA. U.S. European Command is responsible for  conducting BMD operations in its area of responsibility. The services  operate individual BMD elements and provide the manpower and training  necessary to do so. Although U.S. Strategic Command considers input  from U.S. European Command and the services when defining  acceptance criteria, the criteria used to-date do not fully assess the extent  to which implementation issues may affect operational performance, for  instance by limiting the available frequencies for radar use in a particular  country or region. As a result, DOD will likely continue to face  implementation issues unless a more holistic, integrated view is taken to  identify and plan to resolve these issues before BMD capabilities are  deployed in Europe, which may result in less-efficient BMD operations.
section_title: DOD Lacks a Complete Understanding of the Long-Term Operating and Support Costs for BMD Elements in Europe
paragraphs: DOD has estimated the long-term operating and support costs for some,  but not all, BMD elements in Europe. Initial estimates indicate that these  costs could total several billion dollars over the elements’ lifetime, but  these estimates do not provide a complete picture of the likely costs. For  example, key decisions that have not yet been made—such as what long- term support strategies to adopt and where to forward-station some BMD  elements—are likely to change the estimates for THAAD and the forward- based radar. In addition, DOD has not developed a comprehensive, joint  estimate of operating and support costs for the two planned Aegis Ashore  sites. The lack of complete, long-term operating and support cost  estimates for the BMD elements could hinder DOD’s ability to develop  budgets and allocate resources for BMD operations in Europe.
subsections: section_title: Initial Operating and Support Cost Estimates for THAAD and the Forward-Based Radar Are Likely to Change
paragraphs: DOD developed initial estimates of operating and support costs for  THAAD and the forward-based radar—both of which are ultimately to be  managed by the Army—but these estimates are likely to change as these  programs mature and DOD completes business-case analyses and  makes key decisions, such as what their long-term support strategies will  be and where to forward-station these elements. The Army and MDA  have signed a memorandum of agreement and several annexes since  2009 outlining how the two organizations are to manage responsibilities  for BMD elements, which includes jointly estimating operating and  support costs. In addition, the element-specific annexes direct the  development of business-case analyses as part of determining the long- term support strategy for these elements. Further, Army guidance,  which is referenced in the annexes, similarly directs the use of business- case analyses as part of selecting the product-support strategy.
In January 2012, the Army and MDA estimated that the EPAA forward- based radar would cost $61 million in fiscal year 2014 and $1.2 billion in  then-year dollars over its 20-year life. However, this estimate assumes  continued contractor support throughout the life of the forward-based  radar. Even though forward-based radars have been deployed since  2006, DOD has not yet completed a business-case analysis as part of  determining the long-term support as described in an Army regulation and  in the forward-based radar annex, which is to include an assessment of  alternatives to contractor-provided support over the lifetime of this  element. In addition, the Army has made changes to reduce operating  and support costs for the forward-based radar, but these changes are not  reflected in the $1.2 billion lifetime cost estimate previously cited. Army  officials stated that the Army and MDA met in November 2013 to begin  developing the business-case analysis for the radar, which they intend to  complete in fiscal year 2015. However, the annex does not include an  explicit requirement that this analysis be completed by a specific time.  Also, MDA and Army officials said that completion of this analysis to  inform a decision on a long-term support strategy will, in turn, provide  information for updating the operating and support cost estimates for the  forward-based radar.
In December 2012, the Army and MDA estimated operating and support  costs for six THAAD batteries for 20 years, totaling $6.5 billion in then- year dollars.throughout the life of THAAD. Even though the first two THAAD batteries  have been available since early 2012, DOD has not yet completed a  business-case analysis as part of determining the long-term support  strategy, as provided for in the annex, which is to include an assessment  of alternatives to contractor-provided support over the lifetime of THAAD.  Specifically, MDA conducted an initial THAAD business-case analysis,  which it provided to the Army for comment. The Army did not agree with  the analysis because it was not done in accordance with Army  regulations. As the Army and MDA work through these disagreements,  the THAAD business-case analysis remains incomplete as of December  2013, and there is no firm deadline to complete the analysis. Completion  of this analysis to inform a decision on a long-term support strategy will, in  turn, provide information for updating the operating and support cost  estimates for the THAAD.
This estimate also assumes continued contractor support  In addition, the estimate of operating and support costs for THAAD  assumed that all six batteries would be located in the United States.  However, DOD officials stated that they are examining options for  forward-stationing some THAAD batteries overseas. Doing so would likely  increase operating and support costs due to higher operational tempo,  contractors that are deployed with the system, additional needed security,  life-support facilities such as barracks and a mess hall, and site  preparation for the equipment. For example, MDA recently estimated that  operating and support costs for one THAAD battery in Guam could be  $11 million higher annually than if the battery was located in the  continental United States. However, this estimate does not include costs  for military personnel, fuel, site activation, transportation, or some  contractor costs. Further, costs could be even higher if an element is  located at an austere location due to additional costs for site preparation,  security, transportation, and some contractor costs.
section_title: DOD Has Not Developed a Comprehensive Joint Estimate of Operating and Support Costs for Aegis Ashore
paragraphs: MDA and the Navy have not developed a comprehensive, joint estimate  of the operating and support costs for the two European Aegis Ashore  sites over their expected 25-year life span, and it is unclear when such an  estimate will be completed. The Navy and MDA completed an annex to a  memorandum of agreement in August 2012 describing how they are to  jointly manage Aegis Ashore, which notes that the two organizations will  collaborate on cost estimating and budget planning. Under the annex,  MDA responsibilities include providing funding for construction of certain  mission-essential facilities and the operations and support of aspects of  the Aegis weapon system through fiscal year 2017. The Navy  responsibilities include providing funding for construction and operations  and sustainment of housing and quality-of-life facilities, as well as the  training facility, which is located in the United States. The Navy will be  responsible for all Aegis Ashore operating and support costs at the two  planned sites beginning in fiscal year 2018. Although the Navy and MDA  have agreed to jointly develop cost estimates, and officials from the Navy  and MDA have stated these estimates will focus on operating and support  costs, their August 2012 memorandum of agreement does not include a  clear deadline for first completing a joint cost estimate. This estimate  would enable MDA and the Navy to more-accurately budget for their  respective share of the costs.
Although MDA and the Navy have not developed a comprehensive joint  estimate, they have individually begun to identify some costs. Specifically,  the Navy has estimated $155 million will be required for manning,  operating, and supporting the base facilities from fiscal year 2014 through  fiscal year 2018. MDA has reported in its 2013 Ballistic Missile Defense  System Accountability Report that operating and support costs for the  Aegis Ashore test facility and the two European sites may total $82 million  through fiscal year 2018, but this does not include operating and support  costs for the entire expected 25-year life. In addition, MDA officials stated  that their estimate does not include costs for base facilities, military  personnel, or other Navy costs and, therefore, cautioned against  combining both Navy and MDA’s individual estimates in order to  approximate total Aegis Ashore operating and support costs. By fiscal  year 2018, the Navy will assume responsibility for all operating and  support costs for the Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland.  However, without a comprehensive, joint estimate of the lifetime operating  and support costs for the two Aegis Ashore sites that is updated as key  program decisions are made, it will be difficult for the Navy to develop  accurate budgets for operating and supporting this element of EPAA.
section_title: More-Comprehensive Cost Estimates Can Aid Budget Development
paragraphs: We and the Office of Management and Budget have reported that cost  estimates are important to support budget development. Specifically, cost  estimates can assist decision makers in budget development and are  necessary for evaluating resource requirements at key decision points  and effectively allocating resources. In addition, Office of Management  and Budget guidance containing principles for capital asset acquisitions  emphasizes that government agencies should understand all costs in  advance of proposing acquisitions in the budget, and notes that agencies  should plan for operations and maintenance of capital assets. Further, it  is important to fully identify operating and support costs since these costs  can be up to 70 percent of a weapon system’s lifetime costs. Major  defense acquisition programs within DOD generally follow an acquisition  process that includes steps in which cost estimates are developed,  including operating and support costs. Due to the acquisition flexibilities  MDA has been granted, application of this process has been deferred and  MDA follows a separate process for development and acquisition.  Nonetheless, DOD has not required completed operating and support  cost estimates prior to introducing BMD capabilities in Europe. In addition,  existing memorandums of agreement and related annexes between MDA  and the services, while they require the completion of business-case  analyses for the forward-based radar and THAAD, do not clearly require  that these analyses be completed in a timely manner to support a  decision on long-term support strategies before introducing capabilities.  Similarly, these memorandums of agreement also do not clearly require  developing estimates in a timely manner, such as before capabilities are  introduced, or updating those estimates to support budget development  after long-term support strategies or other key program decisions—such  as whether to forward-station certain elements overseas—are made.  The lack of an estimate and subsequent updates could limit decision  makers’ ability to identify the resources that will be needed over the long  term to support the planned investment in the system’s capabilities.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD has made a substantial investment in BMD, and its initial  deployment of capabilities for EPAA proceeded in line with the  President’s announced timelines. However, the rapid fielding of EPAA  has resulted in challenges that, unless DOD takes action, are likely to  continue as DOD implements additional capabilities. By not fully  identifying and planning to resolve implementation issues in its  acceptance process to-date, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. European  Command, and the services have had to rush to secure and emplace the  resources needed to support the capabilities it has already deployed.  Without identifying the resources, implementing arrangements,  infrastructure, and other items that need to be in place before deploying  additional EPAA capabilities, DOD may continue to face challenges in  operating BMD elements as it moves forward with the future phases of  EPAA. In addition, if DOD does not also take action to identify and plan to  resolve these types of implementation issues for all current and future  BMD capabilities that could support BMD operations in Europe, DOD is  likely to experience additional implementation challenges.
Similarly, the department’s commitment to EPAA implementation has  proceeded without a full understanding of the related long-term operating  and support costs, thereby lessening assurance of the approach’s  sustainability through all phases. Although the services and MDA have  begun to estimate operating and support costs, there are no firm  deadlines for completing and revising estimates as the programs mature  and key decisions are made, such as completing business-case analyses  to support decisions on long-term support strategies or where the BMD  capabilities may be forward-stationed. Making such decisions and  updating the estimates accordingly would enable the services and MDA  to more-accurately develop budgets for their respective share of the  costs. Further, the lack of a comprehensive, joint estimate of operating  and support costs for Aegis Ashore can make it difficult for the Navy and  MDA to develop budgets to cover these costs. Without completed and  updated estimates for the long-term operating and support costs of BMD  elements in Europe, the department and congressional decision makers  may not be fully aware of the resources that will be needed over time to  support DOD’s commitment of providing BMD capabilities to Europe.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve DOD’s ability to identify and resolve implementation issues  and to improve budgeting for long-term operating and support costs of  BMD elements in Europe, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  take the following four actions.
To ensure that BMD capabilities can be used as intended when they  are delivered, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, direct U.S. Strategic Command to identify and develop a plan to  resolve implementation issues prior to deploying and operating future  BMD capabilities in Europe. U.S. Strategic Command should work in  consultation with U.S. European Command and the services to  resolve implementation issues such as infrastructure, resolving  policies and procedures to address potential overlapping operational  priorities if radars are integrated across geographic combatant  commands, completing host-nation implementing arrangements, and  any other key implementation issues.
To identify resources needed to support its plans for providing BMD  capabilities in Europe and to support budget development, direct the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to  require and set a deadline for the following three actions:  completing a business-case analysis for the forward-based radar to  support a decision on the long-term support strategy, and updating  the joint MDA and Army estimate for long-term operating and support  costs after a decision on the support strategy is made;  completing a business-case analysis for THAAD to support a decision  on the long-term support strategy, and updating the joint MDA and  Army long-term operating and support cost estimate after this and  other key program decisions, such as where the THAAD batteries are  likely to be forward-stationed, are made; and completing a joint MDA and Navy estimate of the long-term operating  and support costs for the Aegis Ashore two sites, and updating the  estimates after key program decisions are made.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD and the Department of State for  review and comment. DOD provided written comments, which are  reproduced in appendix IV, and the Department of State did not provide  written comments on the report. In its comments, DOD partially agreed  with one recommendation and agreed with three other recommendations.  Also, DOD completed a security review of this report and determined that  its contents were unclassified and contained no sensitive information.  DOD and the Department of State provided technical comments, which  we incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that U.S. Strategic  Command, in consultation with U.S. European Command and the  services, identify and develop a plan to resolve implementation issues  prior to deploying and operating future BMD capabilities in Europe. In its  comments, DOD stated that U.S. Strategic Command does not have the  authority or mission to resolve implementation issues, but the services  and MDA will work to identify and resolve implementation issues for future  BMD capabilities in Europe. DOD further stated that U.S. Strategic  Command will also work in consultation with U.S. European Command  and the services to resolve integrated air and missile defense  requirements and warfighter acceptance criteria, validate element  performance and system integration, and advise cross global combatant  command capability optimization/sharing as part of its global missile  defense role. We understand that U.S. Strategic Command may not have  the authority to directly resolve all implementation issues. However, it  does have a role in integrating capabilities across combatant commands,  as we discuss in this report.
In addition, our recommendation does not state that U.S. Strategic  Command should resolve all implementation issues prior to deploying  capabilities, but rather that it identify and develop a plan to resolve  implementation issues prior to deployment and to do so in consultation  with U.S. European Command and the services. As we note in the report,  the acceptance criteria used to-date focuses on effectiveness, suitability,  and interoperability; however, the manual describing the acceptance  process indicates that prerequisites for credibly assessing operational  suitability include assessing whether such things as organization, training,  or facilities are defined and in place for BMD elements. While it may be  appropriate for U.S. European Command and/or the services to take the  lead in resolving some implementation issues, such as ensuring proper  infrastructure is in place, U.S. Strategic Command, in its advocacy and  integration roles, can help in identifying and planning to resolve some  issues, such as advising cross-combatant command capability sharing.  Further, U.S. Strategic Command’s warfighter acceptance process is the  only existing high-level forum where all key BMD stakeholders come  together to assess operational utility of BMD elements. Therefore, we  believe that U.S. Strategic Command, in conjunction with U.S. European  Command and the services, can use its position as the warfighter  advocate to elevate implementation issues, such as cross-combatant  command capability sharing and system integration, to ensure that such  issues are identified and that a plan to resolve them is developed.
DOD agreed with our recommendation to require and set a deadline for  completing a business-case analysis for the forward-based radar to  support a decision on the long-term support strategy, and updating the  joint MDA and Army estimate for long-term operating and support costs  after a decision on the support strategy is made. DOD stated that the  business-case analysis will be delivered in late fiscal year 2015 and that  the joint cost estimate is updated biennially. The department further  stated that if the business-case analysis results substantially change the  underlying assumptions of the joint cost estimate, an out-of-cycle joint  cost estimate would be conducted. Establishing a target date for  completing the business-case analysis is a positive first step, and we  believe that DOD needs to be vigilant to ensure that the late fiscal year  2015 date is met in order to be fully responsive to the intent of our  recommendation. Doing so will enable DOD to update operating and  support cost estimates, which, in turn, can improve budget development.
DOD agreed with our recommendation to require and set a deadline for  completing a business-case analysis for THAAD to support a decision on  the long-term support strategy, and update the joint MDA and Army  estimate for long-term operating and support costs after this and other  key program decisions, such as where the THAAD batteries are likely to  be forward-stationed, are made. DOD stated that THAAD is a “surge  support” asset for EPAA with no specifically assigned area of  responsibility, battery quantities, or locations. DOD further stated that  MDA and the Army will support the decision to deploy THAAD assets and  any related business-case analysis for projected sites. According to an  Army official, conducting a business-case analysis to assess a weapon  system’s lifetime support strategy and making stationing decisions are  two separate, independent decisions although both affect operating and  support costs. In other words, a business-case analysis can be completed  and a support strategy decided upon without a decision on where the  weapon system may be located. The purpose of a business-case analysis  is to identify the optimum support concept at the lowest life-cycle cost,  and DOD had previously planned to complete a business-case analysis  for THAAD by late 2011. We recognized in this report that THAAD could  deploy to support EPAA as needed and that options are being examined  for forward-stationing some THAAD batteries overseas. We also noted  that operating and support costs can account for up to 70 percent of a  weapon system’s lifetime costs and that these costs are generally higher  when a system is stationed overseas. Given that decision makers need to  understand and therefore adequately budget for THAAD operating and  support costs, we believe it is important for DOD to set a deadline for  completing the business-case analysis to support a decision on the long- term support strategy and update the joint estimate of lifetime operating  and support costs accordingly. DOD should also update the cost estimate  after other key decisions are made, such as where THAAD may be  located. Completing these actions would meet the intent of our  recommendation.
DOD agreed with our recommendation to complete a joint estimate of the  long-term operating and support costs for the two Aegis Ashore sites and  update the estimates after key program decisions are made. However,  DOD did not set a deadline for completing the estimate, such as before  introducing these capabilities in Europe—in late fiscal year 2015 and  2018—as we also recommended. We noted in the report that the  operating and support costs will likely be significant and that the Navy will  be responsible for all Aegis Ashore operating and support costs at the two  planned sites beginning in fiscal year 2018. The lack of a joint estimate of  the long-term operating and support costs will make it difficult for the  Navy to accurately budget for these costs and can limit decision makers’  ability to identify the resources that will be needed over the long term to  support DOD’s planned investment in Aegis Ashore. Therefore, we  believe that DOD should set a deadline for completing this estimate in  order to meet the intent of our recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Commanders of the U.S.  Strategic Command and U.S. European Command, the Secretaries of the  Army and Navy, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, and the  Secretary of State. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on  GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: During our review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) implementation  of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), we examined  relevant documentation and met with representatives from numerous  agencies and offices. To assess the extent to which DOD has identified  and planned to resolve implementation issues before deploying ballistic  missile defense (BMD) capabilities to Europe, we reviewed the U.S.  Strategic Command document titled Ballistic Missile Defense System  (BMDS) Warfighter Capability Acceptance. This document describes the  goal of the warfighter acceptance process, which is, in essence, to ensure  that capabilities can be used as intended when they are delivered, and  culminates in formal acceptance of BMD capabilities by U.S. Strategic  Command. We also reviewed key documents, such as the Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3295.01, Policy Guidance for Ballistic  Missile Defense Operations, and the Joint Staff Publication 3-01,  Countering Air and Missile Threats, which describe DOD’s BMD guidance  and responsibilities of various organizations, and U.S. Strategic  Command’s June 2013 Instruction 538-03 on Integrated Air and Missile  Defense (IAMD) Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP). We also met with  officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S.  European Command and its service components, and U.S. Strategic  Command to understand how DOD’s process was implemented. In  addition, we reviewed U.S. European Command planning documents,  briefings on EPAA implementation and results of BMD exercises, and  minutes from synchronization board meetings to identify implementation  issues and assess the extent to which these issues are related to DOD’s  acceptance process.
We also reviewed Navy instructions and documents from the Navy  Ballistic Missile Defense Enterprise and U.S. Naval Forces Europe to  understand how the Navy monitors and addresses technical and  implementation issues related to Aegis Ashore for EPAA Phases Two and  Three. We reviewed 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command and  32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command reports and briefings that  described implementation challenges experienced during the deployment  of BMD elements to Europe and other regions, and provided an  assessment of lessons learned for future BMD element deployments. We  also reviewed documents and briefings from the U.S. Air Forces Europe  603rd Air Operations Center to understand whether implementation  issues—such as U.S.–NATO command and control relationships—are  identified and channeled through U.S. European Command as a part of  DOD’s capability acceptance process. We spoke to senior-level officials  from the Army, Navy, Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. European  Command, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Navy Europe, U.S. Air Forces  Europe, Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the  Missile Defense Agency (MDA) about their participation in the acceptance  process, including the selection of acceptance criteria to assess EPAA  Phase One BMD elements, identification and resolution of implementation  issues prior to accepting EPAA BMD elements, and any planned  adjustments to the existing process.
Finally, we spoke to senior-level State Department officials to understand  their role leading up to the deployment of EPAA Phase One capabilities  and overall involvement in subsequent EPAA implementation efforts. We  also spoke to senior-level NATO officials to get their perspectives on  possible implementation issues related to command and control  relationships during NATO-led BMD operations and interoperability  among U.S., NATO, and member-nation BMD systems.
To assess the extent to which DOD has estimated the long-term costs to  operate and support BMD elements in Europe, we first reviewed  agreements and their annexes between MDA and the Army and between  MDA and the Navy regarding how these organizations are to work  together to manage the BMD elements, including information on how they  are to jointly develop cost estimates. We identified and reviewed  documents containing best practices for determining high-quality cost  estimates from the Office of Management and Budget and the GAO Cost  Estimating and Assessment Guide, which indicate that estimating long- term operations and support costs assists in budget development and the  allocation of resources. In addition, we reviewed the Army’s regulation on  Integrated Logistic Support, which includes guidance on business-case  analysis and is referenced in the agreement annexes between MDA and  the Army to identify DOD criteria for conducting business-case analyses  to assess alternatives for providing long-term support. We then reviewed  documentation of estimates developed by MDA and the services for the  BMD elements that are part of EPAA or could be deployed to support  EPAA, which include Aegis Ashore, forward-based Army  Navy/Transportable Radar, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense  (THAAD), Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications,  Patriot, and Aegis BMD-capable ships. We focused our assessment on  the first three elements, because the services and MDA are sharing the  operating and support costs for these elements. We assessed the  documentation of the Army and MDA December 2012 joint estimate of  operating and support costs for THAAD and the January 2012 joint  estimate of operating and support costs for the forward-based Army  Navy/Transportable Radar. We interviewed Army and MDA officials to  understand the key assumptions underpinning each estimate.
Further, we examined the key issues that could affect these estimates  including DOD proposals for locating THAAD units overseas and the lack  of business-case analyses for supporting a decision on the long-term  support strategy for each element, which are called for by the BMD  element agreements between the Army and MDA and by Army guidance  referenced in those agreements. For Aegis Ashore, we confirmed with  MDA and Navy officials that the two organizations had not yet jointly  developed a comprehensive, long-term estimate. We did, however,  assess Navy and MDA documentation of some Aegis Ashore costs that  each organization expects to fund over the next 5 years. We did not  evaluate the quality of the estimates in this review since we reported in  2011 that six of MDA’s life-cycle cost estimates did not meet the  characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate. Since our objective for the  current review was to assess the extent to which DOD had identified the  operating and support costs of BMD elements, documenting the  existence or absence of estimates was sufficient for our purposes.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2012 to April 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Capabilities Available by European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase
section_title: Appendix III: Key Department of Defense (DOD) Stakeholders Involved in Planning and Implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach
paragraphs: Primary Role in European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)  Provides acquisition policy direction, program guidance, and overall management  oversight of the Missile Defense Agency. Chairs the Missile Defense Executive Board,  provides program guidance, and makes recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of  Defense on missile defense issues.
A senior-level body that reviews DOD’s ballistic missile defense efforts and provides the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics or Deputy  Secretary of Defense, as necessary, with a recommended ballistic missile defense  strategic program plan and feasible funding strategy for approval.  The geographic combatant command whose area of responsibility includes all of  Europe (including Russia and Turkey), Greenland, Israel, and surrounding waters. It is  the primary geographic combatant command involved in planning for and implementing  EPAA. It is assisted in this effort by its service components—principally U.S. Naval  Forces Europe, U.S. Army Europe, and U.S. Air Forces Europe.
The geographic combatant command whose area of responsibility includes parts of the  Middle East. Coordinates with U.S. European Command to defend against ballistic  missile threats originating from its area of responsibility.  Functional combatant commandcapabilities that cross the boundaries of the geographic combatant commands, such as  synchronizing planning and coordinating operations support for global missile defense,  as well as missile defense advocacy for the combatant commands.  with responsibilities to integrate global missions and  Responsible for providing forces and resources to support fielding of the ballistic missile  defense elements and assisting in planning for and managing the operations and  maintenance and infrastructure needs of ballistic missile defense elements.
Responsible for the research, development, testing, and acquisition of the integrated  ballistic missile defense system, comprised of individual ballistic missile defense  elements. In addition, the Missile Defense Agency is responsible for operating and  support costs for some ballistic missile defense elements until this responsibility is  undertaken by a military service.
Principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational test and  evaluation in DOD. Responsibilities include issuing policy and procedures; reviewing and  analyzing results of operational test and evaluation conducted for certain acquisition  programs; and other related activities. In the context of the ballistic missile defense  system, the director is responsible for conducting effective, independent oversight of  operational testing and providing timely assessments to support programmatic decisions  and reporting requirements.
Plans and directs independent operational tests and evaluations and provides  operational assessments of ballistic missile defense system capability to defend the  United States, its deployed forces, friends, and allies against ballistic missiles of all  ranges and in all phases of flight. The agency includes representation from service and  joint operational test entities.
A service component command is a command consisting of the service component commander and  all those service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations  under the command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command.
The three functional combatant commands are U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic  Command, and U.S. Transportation Command.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Patricia W. Lentini, Assistant  Director; Marie A. Mak, Assistant Director; Brenda M. Waterfield; Jennifer  S. Spence; Laurie Choi; Virginia A. Chanley; Michael Shaughnessy; Erik  Wilkins-McKee; and Amie Steele made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Missile Defense: Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition  Management. GAO-13-432. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2013.
Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by  Reducing Concurrency. GAO-12-486. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2012.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Training Integration  and Increase Transparency of Training Resources. GAO-11-625.  Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2011.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and  Accountability. GAO-11-372. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2011.
Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning and  Implementation Challenges for Future Capabilities in Europe.  GAO-11-220. Washington, D.C.: January 26, 2011.
Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face  Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges.  GAO-11-179R. Washington, D.C.: December 21, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Program Instability Affects  Reliability of Earned Value Management Data. GAO-10-676. Washington,  D.C.: July 14, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-10-388SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to  Strengthen Acquisition Approach. GAO-10-311. Washington, D.C.:  February 25, 2010.
Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and  Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities.  GAO-09-856. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2009.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and  Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European  Sites. GAO-09-771. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009.
Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When  Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency’s Roles and Missions.  GAO-09-466T. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense  Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned.  GAO-09-338. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2009.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost  Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense.  GAO-08-1068. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for  Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities. GAO-08-740.  Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but  Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. GAO-08-448. Washington, D.C.:  March 14, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency’s Flexibility Reduces  Transparency of Program Cost. GAO-07-799T. Washington, D.C.: April  30, 2007.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting  Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements.  GAO-07-430. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Needs a Better Balance between  Flexibility and Accountability. GAO-07-727T. Washington, D.C.: April 11,  2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates  Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. GAO-07-387. Washington,  D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning  and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense. GAO-06-473.  Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability but  Falls Short of Original Goals. GAO-06-327. Washington, D.C.: March 15,  2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for  Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System.  GAO-05-817. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify  New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach.  GAO-05-962R. Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify  New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach.  GAO-05-540. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in  2004. GAO-05-243. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve  Transparency of DOD’s Projected Resource Needs. GAO-04-514.  Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and  Accountability. GAO-04-409. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing  Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. GAO-04-254.  Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2004.
Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for  Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. GAO-03-600. Washington, D.C.:  August 21, 2003.
Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and  Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. GAO-03-597. Washington,  D.C.: May 23, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but  Risks Remain. GAO-03-441. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce  Risks in Developing Airborne Laser. GAO-02-631. Washington, D.C.: July  12, 2002.
Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early National  Missile Defense Flight Test. GAO-02-124. Washington, D.C.: February  28, 2002.
Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New  Patriot Missiles to Buy. GAO/NSIAD-00-153. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2000.
Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be  Revised to Reduce Risk. GAO/NSIAD-00-121. Washington, D.C.: May  31, 2000.