Countering Overseas Threats: Gaps in State Department Management of Security Training May Increase Risk to U.S. Personnel
Published: 2014-03-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: U.S personnel engaged in efforts overseas have faced numerous threats to their security. To mitigate these threats and prepare U.S. personnel for work in high-threat environments, State established a mandatory requirement that specified U.S. executive branch personnel under chief-of-mission authority and on assignments or short-term TDY complete FACT security training before arrival in a high-threat environment. This report examines (1) State and USAID personnel's compliance with the FACT training requirement and (2) State's and USAID's oversight of their personnel's compliance. GAO reviewed agencies' policy guidance; analyzed State and USAID personnel data from March 2013 and training data for 2008 through 2013; reviewed agency documents; and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C., and at various overseas locations. This public version of a February 2014 sensitive report excludes information that State has deemed sensitive.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Using data from multiple sources, GAO determined that 675 of 708 Department of State (State) personnel and all 143 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel on assignments longer than 6 months (assigned personnel) in the designated high-threat countries on March 31, 2013, were in compliance with the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) training requirement. GAO found that the remaining 33 State assigned personnel on such assignments had not complied with the mandatory requirement. For State and USAID personnel on temporary duty of 6 months or less (short-term TDY personnel), GAO was unable to assess compliance because of gaps in State's data. State does not systematically maintain data on the universe of U.S. personnel on short-term TDY status to designated high-threat countries who were required to complete FACT training. This is because State lacks a mechanism for identifying those who are subject to the training requirement. These data gaps prevent State or an independent reviewer from assessing compliance with the FACT training requirement among short-term TDY personnel. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government , program managers need operating information to determine whether they are meeting compliance requirements.
State's guidance and management oversight of personnel's compliance with the FACT training requirement have weaknesses that limit State's ability to ensure that personnel are prepared for service in designated high-threat countries. These weaknesses include the following:
State's policy and guidance related to FACT training—including its Foreign Affairs Manual , eCountry Clearance instructions for short-term TDY personnel, and guidance on the required frequency of FACT training—are outdated, inconsistent, or unclear. For example, although State informed other agencies of June 2013 policy changes to the FACT training requirement, State had not yet updated its Foreign Affairs Manual to reflect those changes as of January 2014. The changes included an increase in the number of high-threat countries requiring FACT training from 9 to 18.
State and USAID do not consistently verify that U.S. personnel complete FACT training before arriving in designated high-threat countries. For example, State does not verify compliance for 4 of the 9 countries for which it required FACT training before June 2013.
State does not monitor or evaluate overall levels of compliance with the FACT training requirement.
State's Foreign Affairs Manual notes that it is the responsibility of employees to ensure their own compliance with the FACT training requirement. However, the manual and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government also note that management is responsible for putting in place adequate controls to help ensure that agency directives are carried out. The gaps in State oversight may increase the risk that personnel assigned to high-threat countries do not complete FACT training, potentially placing their own and others' safety in jeopardy.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is making several recommen-dations to improve oversight of compliance with the FACT training requirement. These include identifying a mechanism to readily determine the universe of U.S. personnel subject to the requirement, updating State's policy manual to reflect changes made to the requirement in June 2013, consistently verifying that all U.S. civilian personnel have completed FACT training before arriving in designated high-threat countries, and monitoring compliance with the requirement. State concurred with the recommendations and stated that it will take steps to address them. USAID did not specifically agree or disagree but noted it plans to take additional steps.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Civilian U.S. personnel engaged in U.S. efforts overseas, including  assistance to foreign partners, have been the target of attacks by Al  Qaeda, its affiliates, and other violent extremists. In September 2012,  attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel in Benghazi, Libya  killed four Americans, including the U.S. Ambassador. In the same month,  a car bomb hit U.S. government vehicles in Pakistan, injuring two  Americans, and protesters in Egypt and Yemen overran the U.S.  embassies’ security defenses and broke into the embassy compounds.
The President has instructed U.S. chiefs of mission that they are  responsible for providing for the security of all U.S. government personnel  on official duty abroad and their accompanying dependents, unless an  interagency agreement provides otherwise. prepare personnel serving in high-threat countries, the Department of  State (State) established a mandatory requirement that specified U.S.  personnel under chief-of-mission authority in designated high-threat  countries receive Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) training before  deploying. FACT training, conducted by State’s Bureau of Diplomatic  Security, provides instruction in personal security skills necessary for  recognizing, avoiding, and responding to potential terrorist and other  threat situations.
Chiefs of mission are the principal officers in charge of U.S. diplomatic missions and  certain U.S. offices abroad that the Secretary of State designates as diplomatic in nature.  Usually, the U.S. ambassador to a foreign country is the chief of mission in that country.  According to the law, the chief of mission’s authority encompasses all employees of U.S.  executive branch agencies, excluding personnel under the command of a U.S. area  military commander and Voice of America correspondents on official assignment (22  U.S.C. § 3927). According to the President’s letter of instruction to chiefs of mission,  members of the staff of an international organization are also excluded from chief-of-  mission authority. The President’s letter of instruction further states that the chief of  mission’s security responsibility extends to all government personnel on official duty  abroad other than those under the protection of a U.S. area military commander or on the  staff of an international organization.
This report examines (1) compliance with the FACT training requirement  among civilian personnel employed by State and the U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID) and (2) State’s and USAID’s  oversight of personnel’s compliance with the requirement. We focused  our review on State and USAID because they are the primary foreign  affairs agencies with civilian personnel in countries for which State  requires FACT training. Because of broad congressional interest in  threats against U.S. personnel overseas, we prepared this report under  the authority of the U.S. Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on  his own initiative. This report is a public version of a sensitive report that  we issued in February 2014. State deemed some of the information in our  prior report as sensitive but unclassified information, which must be  protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive  information about the countries to which the FACT training requirement  pertains. Although the information provided in this report is more limited in  scope, this report addresses the same questions as the sensitive report  and uses the same methodology.
To examine compliance with the FACT training requirement, we collected  available data on State and USAID personnel who were in eight of the  nine high-threat countries for which State required FACT training and  were subject to the requirement on March 31, 2013. We collected data  from State and USAID on two categories of personnel: those on  assignments or temporary-duty (TDY) of more than 6 months (assigned  personnel) and those on TDY of 1 to 6 months (short-term TDY  personnel). We identified State and USAID personnel assigned to the  eight countries as of March 31, 2013. We compared these data with  State’s and USAID’s records of personnel’s completion of FACT or FACT- equivalent training, and we categorized as noncompliant any assigned  personnel with no such records or with no records within 5 years of the  start of their assignments. To assess the data’s reliability, we interviewed  agency officials responsible for compiling the data or maintaining the  systems that generated the data, and we performed checks of the data’s  consistency and completeness. We found the data to be reliable for  determining the extent of compliance with the FACT training requirement  among State and USAID assigned personnel. We also attempted to  conduct the same analysis for personnel on short-term TDY of 6 months  or less, but we found the data to be insufficiently reliable for determining  the extent of compliance among these personnel. (We discuss this issue  later in the report.) We did not examine compliance for Diplomatic  Security special agents and security protective specialists because  State’s Foreign Affairs Manual exempts these personnel from FACT  training.the FACT training requirement, we reviewed State and USAID policies  and procedures and interviewed relevant agency officials at State and  USAID headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at various overseas posts.  See appendix I for a detailed description of our objectives, scope, and  methodology.
To examine State’s and USAID’s oversight of compliance with  We conducted this performance audit from March 2013 to March 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: State’s Foreign Affairs Manual requires that U.S. government Foreign  Service and Civil Service employees under chief-of-mission authority with  assignments or short-term TDY to designated high-threat countries  complete FACT training before deploying. USAID’s Automated Directives  System additionally requires FACT training for USAID’s U.S. personal  services contractors deploying to these posts. The 1-week course, held  at a U.S. location, provides practical, hands-on instruction in topics such  as detection of surveillance, familiarization with firearms, awareness of  improvised explosive devices, and provision of emergency medical care  (see fig. 1 for other examples of topics addressed in FACT training).
To ensure that personnel are prepared to confront current risks in high- threat environments, State requires that personnel complete the course  every 5 years and updates the FACT training curriculum periodically to  reflect changing threats abroad. For example, in 2009, the ambassador to  one high-threat country noted that personnel needed to be familiar with  the sound of sirens announcing a rocket attack and with the physical  features of protective bunkers, in part because personnel were injuring  themselves when entering the bunkers. In response, State’s Diplomatic  Security Training Center added two bunkers at its training facility and  began conducting duck-and-cover exercises with recorded sirens. State  also revised the FACT training curriculum in 2013 to include instruction on  helicopter operations, vehicle rollover training, and evacuation from a  smoke-filled environment.
State initially established the FACT training requirement for personnel in  one country in 2003 and extended it to eight more countries over the next  9 years.  In June 2013, State doubled the number of countries for which  it required FACT training. Prior to that date, the requirement applied to  assigned personnel and those on short-term TDY in a designated high- threat country for 30 or more cumulative days in a 365-day period (with  the exception of personnel on short-term TDY to one country, where  State required FACT training for personnel with 60 cumulative days or  more of TDY status).
In December 2012, the Accountability Review Board, which State  convened to investigate the attacks on the mission in Benghazi, Libya,  recommended that FACT training be required for personnel assigned  to all high-threat, high-risk countries. An independent panel established as a result of the Accountability Review Board also  identified training as critical to State’s ability to ensure a safe and  secure environment for employees.
In response to the Accountability Review Board’s recommendation, in  June 2013, State issued a memorandum notifying U.S. agencies that  it was increasing the number of countries for which it requires FACT  training from 9 to 18. State also required that employed eligible  family members of personnel in all designated high-threat countries  complete FACT training and changed the requirement for short-term  TDY personnel. Under the new requirement, short-term TDY  personnel must take FACT training if they spend more than 45  cumulative days in a calendar year in one or more of the designated  countries.
13 FAM 322(b). training. In extraordinary circumstances, State may grant a waiver of the  FACT training requirement to individuals on a case-by-case basis.
section_title: Most State and USAID Assigned Personnel Completed FACT Training, but Gaps in State Department Data Prevent Compliance Assessment for Short-Term TDY Personnel
paragraphs: Using data from multiple sources related to State and USAID assigned  personnel, we determined that 675 of 708 State personnel and all of the  143 USAID personnel on assignments to the designated high-threat  countries on March 31, 2013, were in compliance with the FACT training  requirement. We found 33 State assigned personnel who were not in  compliance with the mandatory training requirement. We were unable to  assess compliance among short-term TDY personnel because of gaps in  State’s data. First, State has not established a mechanism to identify the  universe of short-term TDY personnel who are required to take FACT  training. Second, State’s eCountry Clearance (eCC) system—the most  comprehensive data source for identifying short-term TDY personnel  granted country clearance to high-threat posts—has limitations.  According to GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government, program managers need operating information to determine  whether they are meeting compliance requirements.
subsections: section_title: Most State and USAID Assigned Personnel Complied with FACT Training Requirement, but Limitations in State’s Data Systems Make It Difficult to Readily Determine Compliance
paragraphs: Based on our review of available data, we found that 675 of 708 State  personnel and all of the 143 USAID personnel in the designated high- threat countries on March 31, 2013, complied with the FACT training  requirement. We identified 33 noncompliant State personnel. According  to State officials, of the 22 noncompliant individuals in one country, 18  were State personnel’s employed eligible family members who were  required to take the training; State officials explained that these  individuals were not aware of the requirement at the time. The officials  noted that enrollment of family members in the course is given lower  priority than enrollment of direct-hire U.S. government employees but that  space is typically available. In addition, a senior official at the embassy in  another country as of March 31, 2013, did not complete FACT training  before or during his tenure. According to State officials, this resulted from  a pressing situation in the country; however, this individual did not receive  a waiver from the FACT training requirement. State provided a variety of  reasons why the remaining 10 personnel were not in compliance with the  requirement (see app. III for more information).
Because State does not maintain a single source of data on assigned  U.S. personnel who are required to complete FACT training, State or an  independent reviewer has to obtain and reconcile information from three  State databases—State’s Global Employment Management System  (GEMS), Student Training Management System, and Post Personnel—as  well as other sources to assess the extent of compliance among all U.S.  agencies with the FACT training requirement. In addition, limitations in  these various State data systems containing information needed to  assess compliance make it difficult to readily identify personnel subject to  the FACT training requirement. As a result, the data are not readily  available for decision making and require resource- and labor-intensive  efforts to determine compliance. According to internal control standards,  program managers need operating information to determine whether they  are meeting compliance requirements.
The following is a list of the current data systems and the limitations  associated with each.
Global Employment Management System. GEMS—the centralized  personnel database for State’s U.S. direct-hire personnel and employed  eligible family members—identifies direct-hire personnel on assignments,  including assignments to the designated high-threat countries. However,  GEMS does not consistently identify State personnel who are required to  complete FACT training. In some cases, the GEMS data that we reviewed  included dates for employees’ arrival at post; in other cases, it included  employees’ hire dates. As a result, to determine whether these personnel  had completed FACT training within 5 years of arrival at the posts,  additional employee profile information must be obtained from State’s  Bureau of Human Resources. Moreover, GEMS data do not contain a  field identifying whether certain personnel are subject to the FACT  training requirement based on their employment type or position. For  example, the GEMS data do not readily identify eligible family members,  some of whom were required to complete FACT training. As a result of  this limitation, additional evidence is required to verify whether they were  subject to the FACT training requirement.
Student Training Management System. State’s Student Training  Management System is the official system of record for State, USAID,  and other agency personnel’s FACT training completion dates. Although  the Student Training Management System shows personnel who enrolled  in FACT training, it does not consistently include training completion  dates. For example, the data that we reviewed lacked FACT training  completion dates for 9 of 143 assigned USAID personnel. State officials  could not provide a definitive explanation for the absence of these  completion dates in the training management system. For these nine  records, State and USAID officials had to provide alternate forms of  evidence, such as Foreign Service Institute training transcripts or FACT  training rosters, to show that personnel had completed the training.
Post Personnel. State’s Post Personnel system—a database managed  by the overseas posts—contains information on all U.S. executive branch  personnel assigned under chief-of-mission authority. Therefore, we  reviewed data from Post Personnel to identify some USAID personnel  who were required to complete FACT training, because USAID officials  told us that data maintained in USAID’s internal staffing report for March  31, 2013, might not include all personal services contractors at the  designated high-threat countries. We attempted to compare Post  Personnel records for USAID personnel with FACT training completion  records in State’s Student Training Management System to examine  compliance among USAID personnel. However, we found that the Post  Personnel data excluded 18 USAID assigned personnel who, according  to a USAID staffing report, were assigned to countries for which State  required FACT training on March 31, 2013.
According to State officials, Post Personnel is not an official or reliable  system of record for information. State is in the process of developing a  new, centralized system to replace Post Personnel—the Overseas  Personnel System—that will track the location of all U.S. employees  stationed at overseas posts and is expected to become operational in  February 2014, according to State Bureau of Human Resources officials.  However, according to agency officials, the new system will not integrate  data from State’s Student Training Management System or other  personnel data systems.
section_title: Gaps in State’s Data Prevent Compliance Assessment for Short- Term TDY Personnel
paragraphs: Gaps in State’s data on U.S. short-term TDY personnel at high-threat  countries make it impossible for State or an independent reviewer to  readily assess compliance with the FACT training requirement among  State and USAID short-term TDY personnel who are required to complete  FACT training. First, State does not systematically maintain data on the  universe of U.S. personnel on short-term TDY status in designated high- threat countries who are required to complete the training. Second,  neither the eCC system—the primary mechanism that State and USAID  short-term TDY personnel generally use to request country clearance— nor any other State system is set up to permit those responsible for  granting country clearance to determine whether the personnel  requesting clearance have reached the cumulative 45 days threshold in  one designated country or across multiple high-threat countries.  Determining whether U.S. personnel have reached, or will reach, the  cumulative-days threshold is a key factor in identifying short-term TDY  personnel who should have completed FACT training before receiving  country clearance.
We attempted to use data from the eCC system and State’s Student  Training Management System to identify the universe and determine  compliance with the FACT training requirement for short-term TDY  personnel. However, we were unable to do so because we could not  obtain a reliable or comprehensive universe of short term TDY personnel  in designated high-threat countries. Although we attempted to overcome  these data limitations by examining other State records, we ultimately  concluded that the available data and records on State and USAID short- term TDY personnel were not sufficiently reliable to determine the extent  of compliance for these personnel. This lack of reliable data is  inconsistent with internal control standards, which state that agencies  need operating information to determine whether they are meeting their  compliance requirements. Without such data, agencies cannot determine the extent to which personnel comply with the mandatory  training requirement.
section_title: State Department’s Guidance and Management Oversight of Compliance with FACT Training Requirement Has Weaknesses
paragraphs: Several weaknesses in State oversight of personnel’s compliance with  the FACT training requirement limit State’s ability to help ensure that all  personnel subject to the requirement are prepared for service in high- threat countries. First, State’s policy manual is outdated, and certain  guidance related to FACT training is inconsistent and unclear. Second,  State and USAID management personnel responsible for assigning  civilian personnel and granting them country clearance do not  consistently verify FACT training completion before the personnel deploy  to high-threat countries. Third, State management does not monitor or  evaluate overall levels of compliance with the training requirement.  Effective management of an organization’s workforce is essential to  achieving results and an important part of internal control. Only when the  right personnel for the job are on board and are provided the right  support, including training, is operational success possible.
subsections: section_title: State’s Policy and Guidance on FACT Training Requirement Are Outdated, Inconsistent, or Unclear
paragraphs: State has not updated the Foreign Affairs Manual to reflect changes  made to the FACT training requirement in June 2013. In addition,  State’s eCC system provides inconsistent and unclear instructions to  employees regarding the FACT training-related information they must  include on eCC request forms. Moreover, we found that State’s guidance  regarding the required frequency of FACT training is unclear. According  to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, information  should be recorded and communicated to management and others in the  agency in a form and within a time frame that enables them to carry out  their responsibilities. Without up-to-date, consistent, and clear guidance,  agencies and personnel may not have the information needed to ensure  compliance with the FACT training requirement.
subsections: section_title: State’s Foreign Affairs Manual Has Not Been Updated
paragraphs: As of January 2014, State had not updated its Foreign Affairs Manual to  reflect its policy change, announced in June 2013, that (1) increased the  number of designated high-threat countries requiring FACT training from  9 to 18, (2) changed the cumulative-days threshold for the FACT training  requirement from 30 or more cumulative days in one high-threat country  to more than 45 cumulative days in one or more of the countries, and (3)  described the conditions that indicate whether eligible family members  must complete the course.
Although State informed other federal agencies and personnel under  chief-of-mission authority about the changes to the FACT training  requirement in a June 2013 memorandum and a July 2013 cable,  respectively, we found that USAID was not implementing changes to the  requirement as of January 2014. USAID officials told us that they had not  implemented the revised requirement in part because they were made  aware that the State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security did not have the  capacity to train staff assigned to the newly designated high-threat  countries; therefore, they believed the changes had not taken effect.  Updating the Foreign Affairs Manual is important given that USAID  revised its Automated Directives System guidance in June 2013 to  provide a specific cross-reference to the FACT training requirement in the   USAID did this to help ensure that its staff are  Foreign Affairs Manual.aware of the designated high-threat locations for which FACT training is  required, in response to a GAO letter sent to USAID in April 2013  highlighting gaps in its Automated Directives System guidance.
section_title: Instructions in eCC System Provide Inconsistent and Unclear Guidance
paragraphs: Instructions in the eCC system—as previously noted, the primary  mechanism generally used to request and grant country clearance to  short-term TDY personnel—included the FACT training requirement for  eight of the nine designated high-threat countries that we reviewed (see  fig. 2).
However, instructions contained in the eCC system provide inconsistent  or unclear guidance to U.S. personnel. This occurs because State  headquarters has not provided instructions to posts in designated high- threat countries regarding the FACT training documentation that  personnel should include in the clearance requests that they submit  through the eCC system. Rather, State has granted each overseas post  responsibility for developing its country requirements information in the  system. According to State officials, each post is responsible for  maintaining and updating its own requirements. Thus, some  inconsistencies have occurred. Figure 3 illustrates the inconsistency in  eCC system instructions for designated high-threat countries.
Examples of inconsistency and lack of clarity in eCC country instructions  that we reviewed include the following:
The eCC instructions for four countries required employees to record  their FACT training completion dates on the eCC request or provide  evidence of FACT training before they arrive at post. The eCC  instructions for the other four relevant high-threat countries did not  require employees to provide any documentation of FACT training  before they arrive at post (see fig. 3). The instructions for three  countries required employees to specify the dates of training;  instructions for the fourth country required employees to provide  evidence of training completion but do not specify what evidence  should be provided—such as a completion date or training completion  certificate—or how or to whom the evidence should be provided.
The eCC instructions for only two countries required officials from the  sponsoring agency or office to ensure that employees completed  FACT training before arriving at post. The eCC instructions for one of  these countries required the employee’s sponsoring agency to provide  written verification that the employee has completed FACT training;  the instructions for the other country required the employee’s  sponsoring agency to ensure employees have FACT training before  traveling to post.
section_title: Other Guidance Related to FACT Training Is Also Inconsistent and Unclear
paragraphs: We also found other State guidance regarding the FACT training  requirement to be inconsistent and unclear. Specifically, State officials  have provided inconsistent guidance regarding the frequency with which  personnel must repeat FACT training. According to State’s Bureau of  Diplomatic Security, as of November 2013, FACT training must be current  through the end of an assignment to a designated high-threat country;  that is, the FACT training certificate must remain valid for the duration of  the personnel’s entire tour of duty. In contrast, according to State  Orientation and In-Processing Center (OIP) officials and instructions, all  required training must be completed within 5 years of arrival at the post,  and the period since the last training may exceed 5 years during the  assignment. In October 2013, State officials said that they were in the  process of clearing a “Frequently Asked Questions” cable intended to  resolve the inconsistency in the guidance, but the officials did not provide  a date when the cable would be issued.
section_title: State and USAID Do Not Consistently Verify FACT Training Completion before Personnel Deploy to High-Threat Countries
paragraphs: Although State and USAID have processes in place to notify assigned  and short-term TDY personnel of the FACT training requirement and to  enroll them in training, neither agency consistently verifies completion of  the training before its respective personnel deploy to high-threat  countries. While State’s Foreign Affairs Manual notes that it is each  employee’s responsibility to ensure his or her compliance with the FACT  training requirement, the manual also states that agency management is  responsible for ensuring adequate controls over all department  operations. Without such controls for ensuring FACT training  compliance, State increases the risk that personnel may deploy to the  designated high-threat countries without completing the mandatory  training.
subsections: section_title: Gaps in Verification of FACT Training Compliance for Assigned Personnel
paragraphs: State OIP verifies that all State and USAID assigned personnel departing  for five of the designated high-threat countries have complied with the  FACT training requirement, and USAID verifies compliance with the  requirement for assigned USAID personnel departing for two additional  countries. State does not verify compliance for personnel assigned to the  other designated high-threat countries (see fig. 4).
Verification of FACT training compliance varies across countries. U.S.  personnel with assignments to five countries submit eCC travel requests  that are routed through OIP to the posts. According to OIP officials, OIP  forwards the eCC request form to the posts only after verifying, using  State’s Student Training Management System, that personnel have  completed FACT training within 5 years of the assignment start date.  USAID generally verifies whether personnel on assignments to two  additional countries have completed FACT training before arrival by  requesting their FACT training completion certificate.
section_title: Gaps in Verification of FACT Training Compliance for Short- Term TDY Personnel
paragraphs: State and USAID generally do not verify short-term TDY personnel’s  completion of FACT training before deployment. We found two  instances—USAID in two countries—where agency officials told us that  they verified FACT training compliance before short-term TDY personnel  arrived at post.FACT training completion for either of these countries. Furthermore, State  and USAID officials told us that they do not obtain evidence of FACT  training completion for short-term TDY personnel for six additional  countries. For the remaining country, although the eCC instructions call  for personnel to provide evidence of FACT training, post officials told us  that they do not review the evidence provided. Moreover, according to a  State official responsible for managing the eCC system, the department  has issued no documented protocol or standard operating procedure to  posts regarding reviewing and approving eCC requests to ensure  compliance with the FACT training requirement.
In contrast, State officials told us that they do not verify  Although State OIP helps to ensure that eCC requests submitted by  short-term TDY personnel traveling to two countries include FACT  training completion dates, the office does not verify that the dates are  accurate. In addition, OIP does not review eCC requests or verify FACT  training compliance for short-term TDY personnel traveling to the three  other high-risk countries for which OIP supports short-term TDY travel.  According to OIP officials, OIP tested the accuracy of a random sample of  34 employee eCC records over a 2-week period and concluded that it is  unnecessary to verify eCC data on FACT training completion, based on   We believe that OIP’s methodology for conducting this  the test’s results.test is not sufficient or reliable for determining that no further verification is  necessary. While OIP’s sample provided anecdotal insights about  employees’ recorded training dates, the sample results were not  generalizable to the entire population. Thus, conclusions about the  population’s accuracy based on OIP’s sample are not appropriate.
To verify short-term TDY personnel’s compliance with the FACT training  requirement, agencies would need to determine how many days within a  calendar year personnel have traveled to designated high-threat  countries. In June 2013, the department changed the cumulative-days  requirement to 45 cumulative days or more in a calendar year in any of  those countries. However, State’s data systems do not enable personnel  to view an employee’s history of travel to more than one of the designated  countries. For short-term TDY personnel traveling to two specific  countries, State officials noted that OIP officials use the eCC system to  determine cumulative numbers of days traveled within each country;  however, they cannot determine personnel’s cumulative numbers of days  traveled across countries. Furthermore, in-country officials who approve  country clearance requests can generally view employees’ travel histories  only for that particular country and generally do not have eCC system  authority to look at employee travel histories for other countries.  According to State officials, the department has no plans to ensure short- term TDY personnel’s compliance with the 45 cumulative-day  requirement. The officials said that (1) the process to view personnel’s  travel records is labor intensive and (2) they would not want to burden  post officials by asking them to track personnel’s cumulative travel days.  We realize that this would be a difficult task, but one of the first steps to  ensuring compliance with the requirement is to collect the necessary  data.
section_title: State Management Does Not Monitor Overall Extent of Compliance with FACT Training Requirement
paragraphs: State, which is primarily responsible for the safety and security of U.S.  government personnel on official duty abroad, has not monitored or  evaluated the overall extent of compliance with the FACT training  requirement among assigned and short-term TDY personnel. According  to State officials, an agency working group began exploring options in  November 2013 for a process to validate and track FACT training, which  is intended to ensure an additional measure of compliance with the  requirement. While State’s Foreign Affairs Manual notes that it is each  employee’s responsibility to fulfill the FACT training requirement, the  manual also notes that agency management is responsible for ensuring  adequate controls over agency operations and that all managers are  responsible for maintaining and monitoring systems of management  control. In addition, according to Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government, agency management should assess the quality of  performance over time and, based on these reviews, should ensure that  any findings from audits and other reviews are promptly resolved. The  lack of monitoring prevents State officials from identifying systematic  deficiencies in their efforts to ensure FACT training compliance.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The presence of U.S. personnel at overseas posts is critical to promoting  U.S. interests and assisting foreign partners. This includes the  deployment of personnel to high-threat countries where they may be  targeted by Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other violent extremist  organizations. State has identified the need, and established the  requirement, for employees to complete a mandatory security course  (FACT) to better prepare employees for work in high-threat environments.  The lack of security awareness training by one individual could put not  only his or her own safety in jeopardy but could also place at risk the  safety of others serving in an overseas high-threat country.
While State’s Foreign Affairs Manual notes that it is the employee’s  responsibility to ensure compliance with the FACT training requirement, it  also notes that agency management is responsible for ensuring adequate  controls over all agency operations. Accordingly, it is essential that State  provide U.S. personnel with access to the most up-to-date information on  the requirements for training, establish mechanisms to identify the  individuals who are required to complete FACT training, and ensure that  they are in compliance with the requirements. State has not yet updated  the Foreign Affairs Manual to reflect changes related to the FACT training  requirement from June 2013, provided consistent and clear policy  guidance, or monitored compliance with the requirement. Undertaking  these steps is essential to ensuring that all U.S. personnel deploying to  designated high-threat countries are adequately prepared for challenges  associated with working in a high-threat security environment.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making 10 recommendations to the Secretary of State and one  recommendation to the USAID Administrator. To ensure that State’s  policy guidance reflects the June 2013 mandatory FACT training  requirements and provides clear information to U.S. agencies on which  personnel are required to take FACT training, we recommend that the  Secretary of State update the Foreign Affairs Manual to  reflect the nine additional countries that were added in June 2013, reflect the requirement for all eligible family members assigned or on  short-term TDY to the designated high-threat countries to complete  FACT training before deployment, indicate that short-term TDY personnel who spend more than 45  cumulative days in a calendar year at one or more of the designated  posts are required to complete FACT training, and clarify whether FACT training completion must be valid during an  employee’s entire assignment or short-term TDY visit.
To strengthen State’s ability to ensure that U.S. civilian personnel are in  compliance with the FACT training requirement, we recommend that the  Secretary of State  identify a mechanism to readily determine the universe of assigned  U.S. civilian personnel under chief-of-mission authority who are  required to complete FACT training; identify a mechanism to readily determine the universe of short-term  TDY U.S. civilian personnel who are required to complete FACT  training—specifically, required personnel who have spent 45 days or  more in the designated high-threat countries in a calendar year; ensure that eCC instructions regarding the documentation of the  FACT training requirement for short-term TDY personnel are  consistent for all designated high-threat countries;  take steps to ensure that management personnel responsible for  assigning personnel to designated high-threat countries consistently  verify that all assigned U.S. civilian personnel under chief-of-mission  authority who are required to complete FACT training have completed  it before arrival in the designated high-threat countries; take steps to ensure that management personnel responsible for  granting country clearance consistently verify that all short-term TDY  U.S. civilian personnel under chief-of-mission authority who are  required to complete FACT training have completed it before arrival in  the designated high-threat countries; and monitor or evaluate overall levels of compliance with the FACT  training requirement among U.S. civilian personnel under chief-of- mission authority who are subject to the requirement.
We recommend that the USAID Administrator take steps to ensure that all  USAID short-term TDY personnel who are required to take FACT training  complete the training before arrival in the designated high-threat  countries, as USAID has done for its assigned personnel.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to State and USAID for their review and  comment. State and USAID provided written comments, which we have  reprinted in appendices IV and V, respectively. State also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
State fundamentally concurred with our recommendations. State noted  that it has efforts underway to address these recommendations. In  addition, State noted that it established a working group chaired by the  Executive Assistant for the Under Secretary for Management in  November 2013 to identify areas where improvements can be made,  such as in the areas of notification, enrollment, and tracking of FACT  training. State indicated that it plans to distribute internal and external  guidance on this issue and document all existing and new measures  accordingly.
USAID did not specifically agree or disagree with our recommendation  that it take steps to ensure that all USAID short-term TDY personnel who  are required to take FACT training complete the training before arrival in  the designated high-threat countries. USAID noted challenges in verifying  whether its short-term TDY personnel are in compliance with the FACT  training requirement and indicated that the onus is on the employee to  fulfill the requirement. However, USAID indicated that it plans to take  some steps to assist employees in tracking their compliance with the  requirement. Specifically, USAID stated that every country clearance will  include (1) a reminder to employees about the FACT training requirement  and (2) a statement that employees must keep track of their cumulative  days of travel to FACT training posts, so that they do not exceed 45 days  at FACT training posts without getting the required training. USAID also  noted that its efforts will include a warning that if an employee fails to  meet this responsibility, he or she could be subject to discipline.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of State, and the USAID Administrator. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report reviews issues related to compliance with the Department of  State’s (State) Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) training, including  internal controls to ensure compliance. Specifically, we examined (1)  compliance with the FACT training requirement among civilian personnel  employed by State and the U.S. Agency for International Development  (USAID) and (2) State’s and USAID’s oversight of their personnel’s  compliance with the requirement.
Our work focused on personnel at State and USAID, the two primary  foreign affairs agencies with civilian personnel in the countries for which  State requires FACT training. We met with officials from relevant  components of these agencies. For State, we met with officials from the  Bureau of Diplomatic Security; Bureau of Human Resources; Office of  Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation; Orientation and In- Processing Center; relevant headquarters-based regional bureaus; and  the Foreign Service Institute. We interviewed State officials in seven of  the nine countries for which State required FACT training as of March  2013. For USAID, we met with officials from the agency’s Office of  Human Resources, the Office of Security, and regional offices for  designated high-threat countries. We also interviewed USAID officials in  five of the nine countries that were designated as high threat as March  13, 2013. Although we include Afghanistan in our discussion of State and  USAID processes to ensure compliance, we did not assess compliance  among State and USAID personnel in Afghanistan because we have  previously reported on the extent of compliance with the FACT training  requirement among U.S. personnel assigned to that country.
subsections: section_title: Objective 1: Compliance with the FACT Training Requirement among State and USAID Personnel
paragraphs: We evaluated the extent of compliance among State and USAID  assigned and short-term temporary duty (TDY)  personnel in the  countries for which State or USAID required FACT training as of March  31, 2013, against the relevant provisions in State’s Foreign Affairs Manual  (13 FAM 321-323) and USAID’s Automated Directives System (ADS  458). To do so, we collected available personnel and training data for  State and USAID assigned and short-term TDY personnel who were in  the designated countries on March 31, 2013. We chose this date because  it was a recent date during our initial planning of the review.
We assessed compliance with the requirement among State and USAID  direct-hire personnel and U.S. personal services contractors, who are  required to complete FACT training per State’s Foreign Affairs Manual  and USAID’s Automated Directives System. We also assessed the extent  of compliance among employed eligible family members of personnel  assigned to relevant designated posts in three countries, the only  locations in our compliance assessment for which State specified that  employed eligible family members were required to complete FACT  training, as of March 31, 2013. We excluded Diplomatic Security special  agents and security protective specialists from our analysis, because  State’s guidance specifically exempts these personnel from the FACT  training requirement. We excluded regional security officers, deputy  regional security officers, and assistant regional security officers from our  analysis, because, according to State, these personnel are categorized  as Diplomatic Security special agents and as such are exempt from the  FACT training requirement. In addition, we excluded personnel who were  at the designated country or post on March 31, 2013, but who arrived  before the FACT training requirement took effect for that country.
Because FACT training is valid for a 5-year period, we obtained FACT  training completion data for 2008 through 2013 from State’s Global  Employment Management System (GEMS) and Student Training  Management System (STMS). For State and USAID assigned personnel  who did not complete FACT training, we asked State and USAID officials  to provide one of the following: (1) evidence that these individuals  completed equivalent training—for example, an employee profile or  training roster indicating completion of either of two courses, Security for  Non-traditional Operating Environments or the diplomatic security  antiterrorism course designed for one country; (2) evidence that these  individuals were otherwise exempt from the requirement—for example, an  employee profile illustrating that an employee was a Diplomatic Security  special agent; or (3) an explanation for the noncompliance of personnel  who were not exempt but failed to comply with the requirement.
We used data from GEMS and State’s Bureau of African Affairs to  compile information for State assigned personnel who were in the  designated countries on March 31, 2013. All State records obtained from  GEMS contained FACT training completion dates for assigned personnel  who had completed the training; we used these completion dates in our  compliance review. For USAID assigned personnel, we used data from  State’s Post Personnel system and a USAID staffing report for March 31,  2013. The USAID personnel data obtained from State’s Post Personnel  system did not contain FACT training completion dates. For our  compliance review, we assessed the USAID personnel records against  FACT training completion records in STMS. To determine whether a  USAID assigned personnel record could be categorized as a match with  an STMS record containing a FACT training completion date, we  compared data for the employees’ first and last names and available data  for partial social security numbers and partial dates of birth.
To assess the reliability of the data that we used for assessing State and  USAID assigned personnel’s compliance with the FACT training  requirement, we interviewed agency officials responsible for compiling  these data or maintaining the systems that generated the data, and we  performed basic reasonableness checks of the data for obvious  inconsistencies and gaps. When we found discrepancies or missing data  fields, we brought them to the attention of relevant agency officials and  worked with the officials to correct the discrepancies and missing fields.  To assess the comprehensiveness of USAID Post Personnel data, we  compared data for USAID assigned personnel with data from USAID’s  staffing report for March 31, 2013. We found data on State and USAID  assigned personnel to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our report.
We were unable to conduct an assessment of the extent of compliance  with the FACT training requirement among short-term TDY personnel  because we determined that the data were not sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of our report. We worked for 7 months with various entities  within State and at USAID to obtain data identifying the universe of short- term TDY personnel in the designated countries as of March 31, 2013,  who were required to take FACT training. We collected data from the  eCountry Clearance (eCC) system as well as data provided by posts for  where short-term TDY personnel were present on March 31, 2013.  Through multiple data analysis steps, we identified problems with the  reliability of agency and employment type data contained in the eCC  system. For example, one eCC record listed an individual’s employer  incorrectly; according to a State official, the individual identified as a State  employee in the eCC system was actually a commercial contractor  working for USAID. We ultimately concluded that these data were not  sufficient or reliable for the purpose of our report.
To assess the reliability of the FACT training completion data from STMS,  we asked State and USAID to provide additional documentation of FACT  training completion. We obtained training records, such as rosters, for  those personnel who State and USAID officials told us had completed  FACT training but who did not have FACT training completion dates in  STMS. We asked State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security to explain  discrepancies between these records and the STMS data; however, the  bureau did not provide clear explanations. To test the reliability of the  dates in STMS, we tested a nonrepresentative sample of 27 personnel  from a list of State and USAID assigned and short-term TDY personnel  who had FACT training completion dates within the last 5 years in STMS.  We compared these dates with dates in training rosters that we obtained  from State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security for each of the personnel, and  we confirmed that all 27 personnel could be accounted for in the training  rosters. We determined that the FACT training completion data from  STMS were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report.
section_title: Objective 2: State’s and USAID’s Oversight of Their Personnel’s Compliance with the FACT Training Requirement
paragraphs: To assess State and USAID’s management oversight of assigned and  short-term TDY personnel’s compliance with the FACT training  requirement, we reviewed relevant documents from State and USAID,  including State’s Foreign Affairs Manual, USAID’s Automated Directives  System, and other standard operating procedures. We also interviewed  knowledgeable State and USAID officials, as well as State Orientation  and In-Processing Center contractors, to determine the steps that these  agencies take to ensure compliance with the FACT training requirement.  We compared these steps with State and USAID management and  internal controls guidance. We also assessed the agencies’ processes for  ensuring compliance against selected standards for enhancing internal  controls in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2013 to March 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Examples of Anti-U.S. Attacks Overseas: September 2012 to September 2013
paragraphs: This appendix provides examples of attacks against U.S. personnel and  facilities overseas from September 2012 through September 2013. We  derived this information from a chronology developed by the Department  of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Intelligence and Threat  Analysis.
subsections: section_title: Attacks in 2012
paragraphs: September 3, 2012 – Peshawar, Pakistan: A U.S. consulate three- vehicle motorcade was attacked by a suicide vehicle-borne improvised  explosive device in the vicinity of the U.S. Consulate General’s University  Town housing complex. Two U.S. consulate general officers were  wounded, as were two locally employed drivers, a local police bodyguard  assigned to the Consulate General, and several other policemen  providing security for the motorcade.
September 8, 2012 – Zabul Province, Afghanistan: The Zabul  Provincial Reconstruction Team was hit with two improvised explosive  devices. No chief-of-mission personnel were injured.
September 10, 2012 – Baghdad, Iraq: A U.S. embassy aircraft reported  seeing 7 to 10 tracer rounds of unknown caliber fired behind the aircraft.  There were no injuries to chief-of-mission personnel or Office of Security  Cooperation in Iraq personnel, and no property damage.
September 11, 2012 – Jerusalem, Israel: An Israeli “flash-bang”  distraction device was thrown at the front door of an official U.S.  consulate general residence. The detonation caused damage to an  exterior door and hallway, but no one was hurt in the attack.
September 11 to 12, 2012 – Benghazi, Libya: A series of attacks  involving arson, small-arms and machine-gun fire, rocket-propelled  grenades, and mortars were directed at the U.S. Mission in Benghazi and  a Mission annex, as well as against U.S. personnel en route between  both facilities. Four U.S. government personnel, including the U.S.  Ambassador to Libya, were killed. In addition, the attacks severely  wounded two U.S. personnel and three Libyan contract guards and  resulted in the destruction and abandonment of both facilities.
September 11 to 15, 2012 – Cairo, Egypt: Protesters overran the U.S.  embassy perimeter defenses and entered the embassy compound.  Though the embassy was cleared of intruders by that evening, battles  continued between police and the crowd until the morning of September  15, when Central Security Forces cleared the area of protesters. No  Americans were injured in the violent demonstrations.
September 12, 2012 – Tunis, Tunisia: Approximately 200  demonstrators gathered at the U.S. embassy to protest inflammatory  material posted on the Internet. At one point, demonstrators tried to get to  the embassy perimeter wall and threw stones at the fence. The police  responded immediately and secured the area. No U.S. citizens were  injured.
September 13, 2012 – Sana’a, Yemen: Approximately 500 protesters  pushed past security forces and stormed the U.S. embassy compound,  where they caused extensive damage by looting and setting several fires.  According to State officials, the physical defensive features of the  buildings performed fully as designed by successfully preventing  intrusion, despite repeated attempts by protesters to break through them.  No U.S. citizens were injured in the attack. Throughout the day, groups of  protesters continued to harass a number of chief-of-mission personnel.
September 14, 2012 – Chennai, India: Several hundred protesters threw  rocks and other material near the U.S. Consulate General, to protest  inflammatory material posted on the Internet. At one point, a Molotov  cocktail was thrown over the consulate wall, causing damage but no  injuries.
September 14, 2012 – Khartoum, Sudan: A mob of 4,000 protesters  ransacked the German and British embassies and stormed the U.S.  embassy. During the several-hour siege, the U.S. embassy compound  sustained extensive damage. According to State officials, the physical  defensive features of the buildings performed fully as designed by  successfully preventing intrusion, despite repeated attempts by protesters  to break through them. The rioters captured a police truck and set it on  fire, then used the vehicle as a make-shift battering ram in an  unsuccessful attempt to breach one of the compound’s rear entrance  doors. Police equipment, including tear gas, was seized from the truck for  use against the embassy’s defenders and intruders cut the embassy’s  local power supply. More than 20 windows were damaged by rocks, and  several surveillance cameras were destroyed  September 14, 2012 – Khartoum, Sudan: Police apprehended a man  attempting to throw a Molotov cocktail at the U.S. embassy. The embassy  building was not damaged and no one was injured.
September 14, 2012 – Tunis, Tunisia: Thousands of protesters  breached the U.S. embassy wall and caused significant damage to the  motor pool, outlying buildings, and the chancery. Separately, unknown  assailants destroyed the interior of the American Cooperative School in  Tunis. No U.S. citizens were injured in either attack.
September 15, 2012 – Sydney, Australia: Violent protesters conducted  large demonstrations near the U.S. consulate general.
September 16, 2012 – Karachi, Pakistan: Two hundred protesters  affiliated with a Shi’a religious group named Majilis-e-wahdat-ul- Muslimeen broke through police lines and threw rocks into the U.S.  consulate perimeter, causing damage to the compound access control  windows. No chief-of-mission personnel were injured, but two protesters  were killed, and several more were injured as security forces responded.
September 17, 2012 – Sydney, Australia: A U.S. citizen who was  employed by the U.S. Air Force was assaulted while waiting for a bus in  the central business district. This incident took place on the heels of the  violent protests near the U.S. Consulate General in Sydney on  September 15.
September 17, 2012 – Jakarta, Indonesia: Demonstrators threw  Molotov cocktails and other material at the U.S. embassy to protest  inflammatory material posted on the Internet. Eleven police officers were  hurt. No U.S. citizens were injured, and damage to the embassy was  minor.
September 18, 2012 – Beijing, China: Anti-Japanese protesters walked  to the U.S. embassy from the Japanese embassy and surrounded the  U.S. Ambassador’s vehicle. No injuries were reported, and there was only  minor cosmetic damage to the vehicle.
September 18, 2012 – Peshawar, Pakistan: The student wing of  Jamaat-e-Islami staged a demonstration at the U.S. consulate. The crowd  became violent, throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails and pulling down a  billboard showing an American flag.
September 27, 2012 – Kolkata, India: Fifteen thousand to 20,000  protesters marched toward the American Center and then rushed the  gates, throwing sticks and stones at the facility. There was minor damage  to a window.
October 1 and 4, 2012 – Kandahar Province, Afghanistan: The  Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team received small-arms fire. No  personnel were injured.
October 13, 2012 – Maruf District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan:  As a delegation of U.S. and Afghan officials arrived for a meeting in Maruf  District, a suicide bomber detonated a suicide vest. The explosion killed  two U.S. citizens and five Afghan officials. One of the U.S. citizens killed  was under chief-of-mission authority.
October 29, 2012 – Tunis, Tunisia: A U.S. military officer assigned to  the U.S. embassy was verbally harassed by two men in a car while he  was stopped at a traffic light. One of the men threw a can at the officer’s  car. He was not hurt in the incident.
November 4, 2012 – Farah, Afghanistan: A grenade exploded at U.S.  Provincial Reconstruction Team Farah. No chief-of-mission personnel  were injured in the attack.
November 18, 2012 – Peshawar, Pakistan: Two mortars impacted in  the vicinity of the U.S. consulate housing cluster in University Town, with  one round hitting the offices of the International Medical Committee, a  nongovernmental organization. The Consul General’s residence  sustained shrapnel damage and one local guard was slightly injured.
November 21, 2012 – Jakarta, Indonesia: A group of 150  demonstrators, protesting inflammatory material posted on the Internet,  staged a demonstration in which they threw objects at the U.S. embassy.
November 23, 2012 – Medan, Indonesia: Approximately 100 to 120  protesters from the Islamic Defender’s Front arrived at the American  Presence Post to protest events in Gaza. The protesters became  aggressive and damaged a vehicle gate in an attempt to gain access to  the ground floor of the building.
November 23, 2012 – Peshawar, Pakistan: A single round of indirect  fire impacted a non-U.S. government private residence adjacent to a  U.S. consulate residence in the University Town housing cluster. The  device did not detonate, no chief-of-mission personnel were injured, and  no facilities were damaged.
December 4, 2012 – Dhaka, Bangladesh: A U. S. embassy vehicle  carrying an embassy driver and police assigned to the embassy was  surrounded by protesters on Airport Road. The demonstrators threw  rocks and bricks at the vehicle, shattering several windows, injuring the  driver, and forcing him off the road; the crowd then attempted to set the  vehicle on fire.
December 22, 2012 – Tunis, Tunisia: While U.S. government  investigators were visiting the Tunisian Ministry of Justice, protesters  forced their way into the building to confront the team. No one was hurt.  Photos of the team, taken while they were inside the Ministry of Justice,  were later posted on multiple social media and other Internet sites.
section_title: Attacks in 2013
paragraphs: January 25, 2013 – Cairo, Egypt: Ten men climbed the gate of the U.S.  embassy motor pool, destroyed the facility, and stole U.S. government  property.
January 25, 2013 – Manila, Philippines: A crowd at the U.S. embassy  protested against the Visiting Forces Agreement. They threw paint on the  U.S. embassy facade.
January 28, 2013 – Manila, Philippines: Protesters gathered at the U.S.  embassy’s consular entrance to demonstrate against the grounding of the  USS Guardian. They threw paint on the facade and defaced the embassy  seal.
February 1, 2013 – Ankara, Turkey: A suicide bomber detonated inside  the pedestrian entrance to the U.S. embassy, killing himself and a local  guard. The building’s facade sustained substantial damage. The Turkish  leftwing group Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front claimed  responsibility for the attack.
February 27, 2013 – Helmand Province, Afghanistan: Six rounds of  indirect fire impacted northeast of Camp Bastion/Leatherneck. At the time  of the attack, a U.S. embassy aircraft was on the ground. No one was  hurt in the attack.
March 21, 2013 – Baghdad, Iraq: Three rockets were directed at the  U.S. diplomatic support center in Baghdad. There were no injuries and  minimal damage.
April 6, 2013 – Baghdad, Iraq: Two rockets were fired at the U.S.  diplomatic support center in Baghdad. There were no injuries or damage  to the center.
April 6, 2013 – Qalat City, Zabul Province, Afghanistan: A suicide  vehicle-borne improvised explosive device and a separate improvised  explosive device targeted a provincial reconstruction team movement.  The explosion killed a U.S. embassy officer, a U.S. Defense Department- contracted interpreter and three U.S. military personnel. Two other  Department of State personnel, along with eight members of the U.S.  military, and four Afghan civilians were wounded in the blast. The group  was en route to a boys’ school to hand out books to Afghan students.
April 10, 2013 – Baghdad, Iraq: Two rockets were fired at Baghdad  International Airport, impacting near the U.S. diplomatic support center  compound. There were no injuries or damage to the compound.
June 23, 2013 – Baghdad, Iraq: Two rounds of indirect fire were tracked  in the vicinity of the international zone, with one confirmed round  impacting near the embassy’s Military Attaché and Security Assistance  Annex.
June 29, 2013 – Baghdad, Iraq: Three rounds of indirect fire were  tracked to the international zone, with two rounds impacting  approximately 200 meters north of the U.S. embassy heliport and the  third round reportedly impacting100 meters north of the Embassy Annex  Prosperity.
August 10, 2013 – Baghdad, Iraq: Two rounds of indirect fire originating  north of the international zone were reported to have landed within the  international zone approximately 1 kilometer away from the U.S.  embassy.
August 13, 2013 – Baghdad, Iraq: Three rounds of indirect fire  originating north of the international zone reportedly landed within the  international zone, with one round reportedly landing as close as 0.6  kilometers north of the U.S. embassy.
September 13, 2013 – Herat, Afghanistan: Taliban-affiliated insurgents  conducted a complex attack against U.S. Consulate Herat using truck-  and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and seven insurgents  equipped with small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and suicide vests.  The insurgents detonated a truck-borne improvised explosive device  outside the consulate’s entry control point followed by a second vehicle- borne improvised explosive device, after which the seven insurgents  engaged U.S. and Afghan security personnel in a sustained firefight.  According to State officials, the consulate’s internal defense team  neutralized all attackers at the outer perimeter. No U.S. personnel were  killed or injured in the attack. The attack lasted approximately 90 minutes  and resulted in the death of eight Afghan guard force members and injury  to two additional third-country National Guard force members.
section_title: Appendix III: FACT Training Compliance among State and USAID Assigned Personnel Identified as Required to Complete FACT Training
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on the extent to which State and  USAID assigned personnel were in compliance with the FACT training  requirement as of March 31, 2013, and the reasons for noncompliance.  Table 1 shows the number of State assigned personnel we identified as  required to complete FACT training by country, and the number of those  personnel who complied with the requirement.
Table 2 shows the countries where State assigned personnel whom we  identified as required to complete FACT training that were not in  compliance with the FACT training requirement, the numbers of  noncompliant personnel, and State’s explanations of the noncompliance.
As table 3 shows, we found no instances of noncompliance with the  FACT training requirement among USAID personnel on assignments at  five designated posts on March 31, 2013. At that time, no USAID  personnel were on assignments to relevant posts in the three other  designated high-threat countries.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the U.S. Departments of State’s  letter dated February 18, 2014.  1. The numbers in our report reflect a compliance rate of about 95  percent for State Department assigned personnel.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Judith A. McCloskey (Assistant  Director), Jaime Allentuck, Emily Gupta, Jeffrey Isaacs, Farhanaz  Kermalli, Lina Khan, and Mona Sehgal made key contributions to this  report. Ashley Alley, Emily Christoff, Etana Finkler, Justin Fisher, Reid  Lowe, Ruben Montes de Oca, and Steven Putansu provided additional  support.