Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts in Northwest Africa Would Be Strengthened by Enhanced Program Management
Published: 2014-06-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Events in northwest Africa—such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's seizure of territory in Mali in 2012 and Boko Haram's near-daily attacks in Nigeria—have underscored concerns that the region is vulnerable to the spread of violent extremism. TSCTP, a U.S. multiagency counterterrorism effort begun in 2005, led by State, and primarily coordinated with USAID and DOD, focuses on strengthening partner countries' counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the spread of terrorist ideology through diplomacy, development, and security assistance.
This report examines (1) the status of TSCTP-related funding and U.S. agencies' ability to track such funding; (2) the extent to which U.S. agency implementation of TSCTP is consistent with key practices of interagency collaboration; and (3) whether U.S. agencies considered partner country needs, absorptive capacities, and other donor efforts when selecting TSCTP activities. GAO reviewed agency documents, met with key officials in Washington, D.C., and conducted fieldwork at the U.S. Africa Command in Germany and in Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Nearly half of the funds allocated for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) since fiscal year 2009 have been disbursed, but TSCTP program managers are unable to readily provide data on the status of these funds. As of late 2013, U.S. agencies reported disbursing nearly $140 million of the approximately $288 million allocated for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and 2013. Mali, Mauritania, and Niger were the top three recipients of bilateral funding. Although the Department of State's (State) Foreign Affairs Manual and federal standards for internal control note that effective internal management requires financial information for planning, programming, and performance evaluation, TSCTP's program managers do not routinely collect and assess data on the status of funding for TSCTP, such as the amount of funds unobligated. Consequently, TSCTP's program managers may lack the day-to-day access to financial information that federal standards for internal control state is required to make operating decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources.
State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Defense (DOD) actions to implement TSCTP are generally consistent with most but not all of the key practices of interagency collaboration that GAO has identified as important to enhancing collaborative agency efforts. For example, agencies have agreed on their roles and responsibilities, established a joint strategy, and defined a common outcome for TSCTP. However, although agencies have taken steps to leverage their resources and establish compatible procedures to operate across agency boundaries, the Department of Justice has not been fully integrated into TSCTP coordination efforts despite its expertise in building law enforcement capacity—one of TSCTP's five lines of effort.
U.S. agencies have used various means to consider partner country needs, absorptive capacities, and other donor efforts when selecting TSCTP activities. These include assessment reports, meetings with host governments, and bilateral and multilateral outreach to other donors. For example, the United States participates in the Global Counterterrorism Forum, a multilateral venue for sharing information on the counterterrorism activities of other donor nations.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID ensure that TSCTP program managers take steps to routinely collect and assess information on the status of funds for TSCTP. GAO also recommends that the Secretary of State take steps to better integrate the Department of Justice into TSCTP coordination efforts. State and USAID both concurred with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Several recent events in northwest Africa have underscored concerns  that the region’s vast ungoverned spaces, smuggling routes, porous  borders, poverty, and fragile states offer a conducive environment for the  spread of violent extremist ideology. In 2012, the terrorist group al Qaeda  in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its allies started seizing territory in  Mali, prompting a French-led military intervention and ongoing  international military involvement in northern Mali to disrupt terrorist  activity. AQIM continues to plan and encourage kidnappings for ransom  of U.S. citizens and other Westerners as its primary means of raising  funds for operations. In January 2013, an offshoot of AQIM attacked a  natural gas facility in Algeria, killing dozens of people, including three U.S.  citizens. In Nigeria, the terrorist group Boko Haram has carried out near- daily attacks since conducting a suicide car bombing at a United Nations  facility in 2011, to include an April 2014 bus station bombing in Nigeria’s  capital that killed at least 75 people and the kidnapping of more than 230  female students in northeast Nigeria later that same day, highlighting the  continuing threat that terrorist groups in the region pose.
Since 2005, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) has  been the primary U.S. counterterrorism initiative in northwest Africa.  TSCTP is a Department of State (State)-led effort primarily coordinated  with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the  Department of Defense (DOD) that focuses on strengthening partner  country and regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the  spread of terrorist ideology in the region through diplomacy, development,  and security assistance activities in 11 countries—Algeria, Burkina Faso,  Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,  and Tunisia.
In response to your request that we conduct a follow-on review of  TSCTP, this report examines (1) the status of TSCTP-related funding  and U.S. agencies’ ability to track such funding; (2) the extent to which  U.S. agency implementation of TSCTP is consistent with key practices of  interagency collaboration; and (3) whether U.S. agencies considered  partner country needs, absorptive capacities, and other donor efforts  when selecting TSCTP activities.
To address these objectives, we reviewed agency documents related to  TSCTP—including strategy and planning documents, progress reporting,  and funding information—as well as relevant documents from U.S.  implementing partners, other international donors, and related multilateral  entities, such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum. We also assessed  the extent to which agency actions have been consistent with key  practices GAO has identified for enhancing interagency collaboration and  discussed U.S. assistance efforts with State, USAID, and DOD; the  Departments of Justice (Justice), Homeland Security (DHS), and the  Treasury (Treasury); and intelligence community officials in the  Washington, D.C., area. Additionally, we conducted fieldwork at the U.S.  Africa Command (AFRICOM) in Germany in November 2013. We also  conducted fieldwork in Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger in December 2013,  during which we met with State, DOD, and USAID officials; U.S.  implementing partners; representatives of partner country security forces  and ministries; and international donors. See appendix I for a complete  description of our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The United States established TSCTP in 2005 as a result of growing  concerns about terrorist groups in the region affiliated with al Qaeda and  the increased efforts of those groups to attract young recruits, among  other reasons. Since 2005, terrorist activity in the region has increased  significantly. Figure 1 illustrates the number of terrorist events conducted  by select terrorist groups in the 11 TSCTP countries from 2009 to 2012.
Key terrorist groups in northwest Africa and their regions of operation  since 2009 are illustrated in figure 2.
Figure 3 further illustrates some of the political and security events in  TSCTP countries since 2009, including coups in Niger, Mauritania, and  Mali, as well as significant terrorist events, such as Boko Haram’s August  2011 attack in Nigeria outside the United Nations office in Abuja. It does  not include the numerous kidnappings for ransom that have taken place  since 2009 or other significant regional events that have affected TSCTP  countries, such as the collapse of the Libyan government in 2011, which  resulted in the spread of unsecured military-grade weapons and  experienced fighters throughout the region.
To assist partner country efforts to tackle the terrorist threat in the region,  State, USAID, and DOD have conducted a variety of activities using  TSCTP-dedicated funding. State’s TSCTP activities include public  diplomacy efforts as well as law enforcement training and equipping and  criminal justice sector reform. USAID’s TSCTP activities include efforts to  support youth employment, strengthen local governance capacity, and  improve access to education. DOD’s TSCTP activities, which are funded  by State, include counterterrorism training and equipping. See appendix II  for additional details as well as illustrations of TSCTP activities.
Funding for TSCTP comes from various appropriation accounts and is  administered by State or USAID, with DOD assisting in State’s  implementation of one of these accounts.following:
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)—authorizes the President to furnish  assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for  peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in  furtherance of the national security interest of the United States. PKO  funds are State- and DOD-implemented and are used, in part, to train  and equip military units tasked with monitoring and controlling border  areas and territory exploited by terrorist elements.
Development Assistance (DA)—authorizes the President to provide  assistance for various purposes, including agricultural development,  education and human resources development, grant assistance for  microenterprises, and a development fund for Africa, among other  purposes. DA funds are USAID-implemented and are used to support  host nation efforts to counter radicalization, recruitment, and violent  extremist organizations.
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs  (NADR)—authorizes the President to provide antiterrorism assistance,  nonproliferation and export control assistance, and other assistance to  foreign countries for various purposes. NADR funds are typically  State-implemented and are used to support activities designed to  enhance the law enforcement capacity and antiterrorism skills of  partner countries by providing training, equipment, and mentoring to  deter, detect, and respond to terrorism.
Economic Support Fund (ESF)—authorizes the President to assist  countries and organizations in order to promote economic or political  stability. ESF funds are State- and USAID-implemented and are used,  in part, to counter violent extremism.
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)— authorizes the President to assist foreign countries and international  organizations to control narcotics and other controlled substances, or  for other anticrime purposes. INCLE funds are typically State- implemented and are used to develop and implement policies and  programs that maintain the rule of law and strengthen institutional law  enforcement and judicial capabilities, including combating  transnational crime.
The five accounts funding TSCTP also fund other, non-TSCTP  counterterrorism assistance to TSCTP countries, such as NADR funds  that have been used to post Department of Justice legal advisers in some  TSCTP countries. In addition, State, DOD, and other U.S. agencies such  as Justice, Treasury, and DHS use other accounts to fund non-TSCTP  counterterrorism-related assistance in the TSCTP region. One such effort  is DOD’s Section 1206 program, which provides counterterrorism training  and equipment globally, including to TSCTP countries. See appendix III  for more information about select accounts and programs that support  U.S. counterterrorism efforts outside of TSCTP.
The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is responsible for  coordinating TSCTP activities funded through INCLE. The Bureau of Counterterrorism  coordinates TSCTP activities funded through NADR. The Bureau of Political-Military  Affairs coordinates TSCTP activities funded through PKO. implementation of programs such as TSCTP, as shown in figure 4. Each  country team is led by and falls under the authority of the U.S.  ambassador to that country and is generally made up of key officials from  State, USAID, DOD, and other relevant agencies.
USAID’s regional office in Accra, Ghana, and its bilateral office in  Bamako, Mali, manage the agency’s TSCTP activities with support from  USAID bureaus in Washington, D.C. DOD’s Office of the Secretary of  Defense is responsible for coordinating the agency’s TSCTP activities  that are undertaken using State’s PKO funding.representatives under the authority of AFRICOM work with country teams  in coordinating and implementing TSCTP’s security assistance activities,  as well as other counterterrorism-related activities in the region.
section_title: Nearly Half of Funds Allocated for TSCTP since 2009 Have Been Disbursed, but TSCTP Program Managers Are Unable to Readily Provide Data on the Status of Funding
paragraphs: U.S. agencies allocated about $288 million for TSCTP between fiscal  years 2009 and 2013, of which they have disbursed slightly less than half.  Although State’s Foreign Affairs Manual and federal standards for internal  control note that effective internal management requires financial  information, TSCTP’s managers at State and USAID do not routinely  collect and assess data on the status of funds for TSCTP activities, such  as the amounts of funds unobligated or disbursed—key data that could  help inform their management of the program. As a result, the process  of providing us with a complete, sufficiently reliable set of information on  the status of funds allocated for TSCTP took several months and,  according to State and USAID officials, was very time-consuming and  labor-intensive. Consequently, TSCTP’s program managers may lack the  day-to-day access to financial information that federal standards for  internal control state is required to make operating decisions, monitor  performance, and allocate resources.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Have Allocated Almost $288 Million and Disbursed Nearly $140 Million for TSCTP since 2009
paragraphs: While State and USAID could not readily provide data on the status of  funding for TSCTP (as discussed in more detail later in this report), the  data they eventually provided to us indicate that about $288 million was  allocated for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and 2013. As table 1  illustrates, the amount of funds allocated for TSCTP declined each year  between fiscal years 2010 and 2013, dropping from a high of about $80  million in fiscal year 2010 to about $53 million in fiscal year 2013. As of  late 2013, State and USAID had disbursed about $139 million, or 48  percent, of the funds allocated for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and  2013.
Of the approximately $288 million allocated in total for TSCTP between  fiscal years 2009 and 2013, about 62 percent (about $178 million) came  from the PKO and DA accounts. Table 2 shows the status of funding for  TSCTP broken down by funding account. See appendix IV for further  details on funding for TSCTP by funding account.
Of the approximately $288 million in total allocations for TSCTP between  fiscal years 2009 and 2013, about $260 million has been allocated to  country-specific and regional programs.distribution of allocations for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and 2013.  As the figure demonstrates, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger were the top  three recipients of bilateral funding, collectively accounting for  approximately $106 million of the funds allocated. In addition, State and  USAID allocated about $82 million for regionally focused programs.
section_title: State and USAID Program Managers Do Not Routinely Collect and Assess Data on the Status of Funds Allocated for TSCTP
paragraphs: State’s Foreign Affairs Manual notes that effective internal management  requires financial information for planning, programming, budgeting,  performance evaluation, and reporting. Further, federal internal control  standards state that financial information is required on a day-to-day  basis to make operating decisions, monitor performance, and allocate  resources. Various entities involved in TSCTP implementation, such as  embassies and State’s functional bureaus, track data on the status of  funding for TSCTP—such as the amounts unobligated and disbursed— from the respective accounts that they manage. However, TSCTP’s  program managers in State’s Bureaus of African Affairs and Near Eastern  Affairs and at USAID do not routinely collect and assess such data to  develop a complete picture of the status of TSCTP-dedicated funding.  Program managers in both State bureaus said that their efforts to compile  the status of funding for TSCTP to fulfill our request was the first time they  had done so. One program manager explained that State currently lacks  a system for routinely requesting and collecting such data from the  various embassies and State bureaus involved in TSCTP implementation.
Program managers in both regional bureaus added that, given other  priorities, State currently lacks the manpower to develop such a system.  Furthermore, officials from State’s Bureaus of Counterterrorism and  International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs stated that although  they track data on the status of TSCTP-dedicated funding from the  accounts that they manage, they typically do not provide and have  generally not been asked to provide such data to TSCTP program  managers. Regarding USAID, officials there stated that the agency does  not routinely track the status of its funding for TSCTP and therefore is not  in a position to readily generate such data. Overall, the process of  providing us with a complete, sufficiently reliable set of information on the  status of funds allocated for TSCTP took several months and, according  to State and USAID officials, was very time-consuming and labor- intensive. Consequently, TSCTP’s program managers may lack the day- to-day access to financial information that federal standards for internal  control state is needed to make operating decisions, monitor  performance, and allocate resources.
subsections: section_title: Program Managers See Value in Routinely Collecting TSCTP- Related Funding Data
paragraphs: Notwithstanding these difficulties, TSCTP program managers outlined  several ways in which having such data readily available would be useful  for their management of TSCTP. For example, one program manager  stated that the status of funding would be a valuable tool to have on hand  at TSCTP’s quarterly senior-level meetings for the purpose of providing  agency leadership with progress reports on the execution of TSCTP- dedicated funds, including details on the extent to which funds from  different accounts are being executed. Program managers in both  regional bureaus also stated that through their efforts to compile the  status of funding at our request, they identified millions of dollars in  unobligated balances of which they were previously unaware.  Specifically, as noted earlier, nearly $7 million in NADR, INCLE, and ESF  funding from fiscal years 2009 through 2012 was not obligated or was  deobligatedto incur new obligations. One program manager explained that having  routine access to such data would help him to identify funds for which the   and, according to State officials, may no longer be available  period of availability for obligation would soon expire, which would then  prompt him to work with the respective bureaus to develop other, more  expedited options for using the funds in support of TSCTP. This official  added that the Bureau of African Affairs is exploring the possibility of  hiring additional staff to assist with TSCTP program data collection and  analysis. Similarly, another program manager stated that he believes the  data could be useful for program management purposes in ways that  State has not yet anticipated, and that he plans to recruit staff to further  analyze the data collected at our request to identify how else the data can  inform TSCTP program management.
section_title: TSCTP Implementation Is Generally Consistent with Most Key Practices of Interagency Collaboration, but the Department of Justice Can Be Better Integrated
paragraphs: In implementing TSCTP, State, USAID, and DOD actions are generally  consistent with most but not all the key practices of interagency  collaboration that we previously reported as important to enhancing and  sustaining collaborative agency efforts. Specifically, in regard to these  key practices, agencies have (1) agreed on their roles and  responsibilities, (2) established a joint strategy, (3) defined a common  outcome, (4) developed consistent goals to reinforce agency  accountability, and (5) taken steps to evaluate their results. However,  although agencies have taken steps to (6) leverage their resources and  (7) establish compatible procedures to operate across agency  boundaries, State could do more to integrate Justice into TSCTP  coordination efforts.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Agree on Roles and Responsibilities and Have a Joint TSCTP Strategy That Defines a Common Outcome Consistent with Agency Goals
paragraphs: Officials at State, USAID, and DOD said that they understand and agree  on their respective roles and responsibilities related to TSCTP  implementation—a key practice that facilitates decision making and  assists agencies in organizing their efforts. Officials noted that State is the  lead U.S. agency for TSCTP and that the National Security Council  articulated TSCTP agency roles and responsibilities in 2005. In part to  assist in implementation of TSCTP and to facilitate decision making,  officials said that in 2013 they established a quarterly meeting at the  deputy assistant secretary level. Through these meetings, senior leaders  have approved an interagency guiding strategy for TSCTP, agreed on  expanding TSCTP membership, and discussed coordination opportunities   We confirmed these practices during our  with other international donors.review of agency documents and in our discussions with agency officials.
Agencies have also taken action to address the key practice of  establishing a joint strategy, as demonstrated by the January 2014 State-,  USAID-, and DOD-approved TSCTP Guiding Strategy. Because this is a  joint strategic document that also defines a common outcome and is  consistent with agency goals, it addresses three key practices that we  have previously reported assist in agency efforts to overcome differences  in missions, cultures, and established ways of doing business; help  agencies align activities and resources; and can reinforce agency   Figure 6 depicts the five lines of effort articulated in the  accountability. joint 2014 TSCTP strategy, which also provides a common outcome for  U.S. agencies participating in TSCTP. Additionally, the TSCTP strategy is  consistent with agency goals articulated in other strategic documents,  such as State and USAID’s Mission Resource Requests and DOD’s  Northwest Africa Campaign Plan, which outline complementary  counterterrorism goals.
GAO-06-15.
section_title: Agencies Have Taken Steps to Evaluate the Progress of Some TSCTP Efforts and Plan to Conduct a Holistic Evaluation
paragraphs: State, USAID, and DOD have taken steps to evaluate the progress of  their TSCTP efforts and plan to conduct a holistic evaluation of TSCTP  within a year. We have previously reported that evaluating and reporting  on results is a key practice that can assist interagency efforts to identify   To date, agencies have  areas for policy and operational improvement.taken various steps to evaluate the progress of some TSCTP efforts.  Examples of these steps include the following:  1.  Agency efforts to measure progress of specific programs that are a
State conducts assessments of its NADR-funded Antiterrorism  Assistance program in TSCTP countries. Such assessments are  conducted prior to providing assistance to a country and every 2-3  years thereafter to measure progress. According to State officials,  Antiterrorism Assistance assessments have been conducted in  every TSCTP country and assist State in tailoring assistance. For  example, State officials noted that the 2013 assessment in one  TSCTP country found that the partner country forces were not  effectively using the U.S. equipment provided. As a result, the  officials stated that future assistance to that country will focus  more on training and less on equipping.
USAID periodically conducts evaluations and assessments of its  Peace through Development program, which is primarily DA- funded and accounts for the majority of USAID’s TSCTP activities.  Such reviews have been either regional or country-specific in  nature and have identified areas of progress as well as areas for  improvement. One impact evaluation completed in 2011  concluded that USAID activities in Niger, Chad, and Mali had  some positive effects on program participants. For example, the  evaluation identified that media and messaging programs have  made moderate progress in reaching vulnerable populations and  are more effective in combination with other USAID activities.  Recommendations from the evaluation included expanding  assistance to insecure areas and considering whether program  suspension could undermine U.S. objectives when designing  activities.  2.  Agency and interagency efforts to measure progress toward  counterterrorism goals that are not specific to TSCTP efforts:
State conducts public opinion polls annually in most TSCTP  countries. While these polls may be influenced by factors beyond  U.S. counterterrorism assistance, they have shown that since  2008 favorable opinions toward the United States have generally  increased in TSCTP countries and that the United States has  made progress in reducing perceptions that it is fighting Islam  rather than terrorism.
State and USAID track counterterrorism measures in their annual  Foreign Operations Performance Reports and, prior to fiscal year   For  2015, some country-specific Mission Resource Requests.example, the fiscal year 2014 Foreign Operations Performance  Report showed that State and USAID had met or exceeded their  2012 performance targets related to countering threats to the  United States. Such performance targets include goals for the  number of new groups or initiatives created to resolve conflict or  drivers of conflict and the number of students trained through the  Antiterrorism Assistance program, neither of which is specific to  TSCTP countries, but both of which State and USAID exceeded in  fiscal year 2012.
DOD conducts periodic classified assessments of DOD assistance  efforts in northwest Africa to determine progress made toward the  objectives outlined in DOD’s Northwest Africa Campaign Plan.
The National Counterterrorism Center conducts an interagency  assessment, generally annually, of progress made through U.S.  counterterrorism efforts toward achieving the strategic goals of the  National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This assessment also  identifies areas where adjustments or changes are needed to  ensure that U.S. goals are achieved.
Although agencies have taken some steps to evaluate their TSCTP  efforts, they have not completed a comprehensive evaluation of the  program. Additionally, agencies have not conducted and documented  evaluations of all TSCTP activities that are funded from two of the five  accounts that support TSCTP: PKO and ESF. For these accounts,  agency officials said they primarily rely on informal feedback from posts to  determine progress. Agency officials recognize that a more holistic  evaluation of TSCTP-specific assistance is needed, noting that they plan  to develop progress benchmarks for TSCTP within the next year to  facilitate such an evaluation, consistent with a requirement in the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014.
section_title: Agencies Have Established Ways to Leverage Resources and Operate across Boundaries but Can Do More to Integrate the Department of Justice
paragraphs: State, USAID, and DOD have taken several actions consistent with the  key practices of leveraging resources and facilitating operations across  agency boundaries, but can do more to integrate the Department of  Justice. We have previously reported that leveraging resources and  operating across agency boundaries can assist agencies with identifying  opportunities to obtain additional benefits that would not be available if  they were working separately and to prevent misunderstandings between  the agencies.these key practices. For example, State, USAID, and DOD rotate the  hosting of an annual TSCTP conference, where U.S. embassy officials  implementing TSCTP in partner countries and in Washington, D.C., meet  and coordinate with their interagency and headquarters counterparts and  with representatives from other international donors, such as France. U.S.  embassy officials who have participated noted that this conference was  particularly useful for identifying important points of contact and gaining a  better understanding of TSCTP. We observed the interagency interaction  during the most recent TSCTP conference, held in Washington, D.C., in  October 2013.
Agencies have taken numerous actions consistent with  Agencies have also developed interagency working groups that meet  regularly in Washington, D.C., as well as at U.S. embassies in partner  countries. These working groups provide an opportunity for agency  officials to discuss potential activities as well as activities that will be  initiated, thereby facilitating activity coordination and helping agencies to  avoid conflicting or duplicative efforts. Other interagency efforts include  the joint State and DOD process for selecting TSCTP security assistance  activities to implement using PKO funds. To coordinate, State and DOD  conduct regular meetings to jointly identify and prioritize which  counterterrorism-focused security assistance activities to implement in  Africa.
While the agency actions described can enhance interagency  collaboration, Justice—a key agency for building law enforcement  capacity, with expertise in combating transnational crime and building the  capacity of foreign prosecutors, investigators, and judges—is not  currently included in the quarterly deputy assistant secretary meetings on  TSCTP. As a result, TSCTP may not be fully leveraging the resources  and expertise of one of the U.S. government’s lead agencies for building  partner nation law enforcement capacity in support of the TSCTP  strategy. According to a State official, the quarterly senior-level meeting  has traditionally involved higher-level strategic discussions among the  three primary TSCTP agencies—State, USAID, and DOD—that would not  have necessarily benefited from the participation of other agencies that  play a supporting role in TSCTP. However, after we spoke with this  official about the potential future participation of other agencies in the  quarterly meetings, State invited DHS and Treasury officials to  participate, and TSCTP program managers at State have expressed their  willingness to invite Justice representatives in the future. Justice officials  have also expressed an interest in participating in these meetings, given  their involvement in counterterrorism activities in TSCTP countries and  their potential growing role in assisting State with implementing some  TSCTP assistance.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Consider Partner Country Needs, Absorptive Capacities, and Other Donor Efforts when Selecting TSCTP Activities
paragraphs: In selecting TSCTP activities, and consistent with the presidential policy  directive on security sector assistance, U.S. agencies conduct a variety of  assessments and meetings to consider partner country needs and  absorptive capacities. They also rely on bilateral and multilateral  outreach to consider efforts undertaken by other donors, although some  donor nations are reluctant to share information on their activities.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Conduct Assessments and Meetings to Identify Partner Country Needs and Absorptive Capacities
paragraphs: State, USAID, and DOD have all conducted assessments to identify the  needs and absorptive capacities of TSCTP partner countries.
As noted earlier, State has conducted assessments in support of its  NADR-funded Antiterrorism Assistance program, which include  discussions of country needs and absorptive capacities. For example,  regarding partner country needs, one assessment noted that the  country assessed needed to become more capable in securing and  managing land and sea ports of entry, while the assessment of  another country called for strengthened communication and  coordination among units that jointly patrol the country’s borders. With  respect to absorptive capacity, an assessment of one country found it  to be capable of absorbing additional training, whereas an  assessment of another country identified infrastructural, personnel,  and technological limitations to absorbing training.
USAID has conducted country assessments that include  consideration of partner country needs and absorptive capacities in  support of its TSCTP activities. For example, its 2009 Niger Counter  Extremism Assessment notes that it had previously identified Niger’s  youth as the group most at risk for recruitment by violent extremists,  and had accordingly recommended that TSCTP programming  address the need for youth to find employment and participate in  governance. A 2010 assessment entitled Strengthening Stability  through Development in Burkina Faso comments on absorptive  capacity, noting that vocational training programs must be  appropriately tailored so that the local economy can absorb the  graduates of these programs and provide them with sustainable  economic opportunities.
DOD has developed assessments of country needs and absorptive  capacities as part of AFRICOM’s annual process for selecting  counterterrorism activities in Africa, including those funded by State  from the PKO account. Specifically, AFRICOM has created multiyear  plans for developing the counterterrorism capabilities of several  TSCTP countries. These plans identify various partner country needs.  For example, the plan for one country states the need for airborne  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to cover the country’s  long borders and provide operational support. The plan for another  country notes that enabling it to transport forces to threatened areas  will necessitate enhancements to aviation assets and the  development of usable airfields. AFRICOM’s plans also comment on  absorptive capacity, as the plan for each country includes a military  estimate of the maximum monetary amount of counterterrorism  assistance the country can absorb per year. We discussed several of  these plans during our November 2013 meetings with DOD and  interagency officials at AFRICOM.
Some agency and implementing partner officials also reported using  meetings with host nation officials to identify partner country needs and  absorptive capacities. For instance, a DOD official in Mauritania noted  that after DOD responds to the Mauritanian military’s requests for  assistance with detailed proposals of what the United States can provide,  she meets with Mauritanian military officials again to ensure that the  detailed proposals are in line with their needs and capacity. Using this  method, she said, has enabled her to identify opportunities for more  targeted assistance. For example, meetings with the Mauritanian military  led her and other DOD colleagues to modify a preexisting proposal to  provide the Mauritanians with two technically sophisticated video cameras  costing about $10,000 each and to instead purchase $1,100 cameras that  were more rugged, easier to use, and better suited to the Mauritanians’  needs. In another case, she learned from her meetings that the  Mauritanian military has limited access to the Internet, after which she  developed a project proposal to instead use satellite communications to  transmit real-time intelligence to the Mauritanian military’s national  command center. In Niger, USAID and implementing partner officials  stated that as part of the Peace through Development program, they meet  regularly with community action committees—entities composed of  representative members of the communities where the program is  conducted. As USAID and implementing partner officials explained, the  community action committees play a vital role in gauging the needs of the  communities they represent, proposing activities to address the needs,  and using firsthand knowledge of their communities to nominate  participants for the activities who they believe to be at risk of becoming  involved in violent extremism. A USAID official stated that the committees  also assist in identifying absorptive capacity, as they help to ensure that  the skills individuals learn through their participation in Peace through  Development activities, such as vocational training, are ones for which a  market exists in their home communities.
section_title: Agencies Use Bilateral and Multilateral Outreach to Identify Other Donor Efforts, but Some Donors Are Reluctant to Share Information
paragraphs: U.S. agencies rely on various forms of bilateral and multilateral outreach  to identify and consider the counterterrorism efforts other donors are  conducting in TSCTP countries. With respect to bilateral outreach,  agency officials in all three TSCTP countries we visited reported using  meetings to coordinate efforts. For example, the regional security officer  in Algeria stated that through discussions with her French counterparts,  she had gained an awareness of the types of law enforcement training  the French were providing to Algeria. Similarly, a DOD official in  Mauritania cited a briefing she received from her Spanish counterparts  that provided her insight into the security assistance activities Spain is  conducting in Mauritania. Additionally, the regional security officer in  Niger stated that he has contacted security officers at several other donor  nations’ embassies in Niger about their capacity-building efforts.
With respect to multilateral outreach, U.S. and other donor officials  identified a variety of multilateral efforts that have facilitated donor  coordination and informed U.S. assistance decisions. For instance,  several officials named the Global Counterterrorism Forum and its Sahel  Working Group as key multilateral venues for sharing information and  insights on the counterterrorism activities of other donor nations. In July  2013, for example, State officials noted that a recent meeting of the Sahel  Working Group had been used to take inventory of the participant nations’  civilian assistance efforts in the Sahel to ensure that U.S. efforts are not  duplicative. In addition, a European Union civilian mission in Niger has  assisted with international coordination. For example, through the  assistance of this mission, the U.S. embassy in Niger was able to  coordinate with the French on efforts to provide Niger with radios.
These efforts notwithstanding, officials identified several donor nations  that typically do not share information on their efforts with the United  States. For example, the official who chairs the counterterrorism working  group at the U.S. embassy in Niger stated that China does not participate  in international donor coordination meetings. As a result, he said, neither  the United States nor other donor countries have visibility into China’s  activities in Niger. In addition, officials at the European Union’s civilian  mission in Niger stated that Turkey and some of the wealthier TSCTP  partner countries, including Algeria and Morocco, have provided  counterterrorism aid to Niger but do not customarily share information on  such activities with other donors.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Terrorist groups in northwest Africa continue to pose a national security  threat to the United States. To address this threat, U.S. agencies have  allocated nearly $290 million since 2009 to provide a wide range of  diplomacy, development, and security assistance to partner countries  through TSCTP. However, because TSCTP program managers at State  and USAID do not routinely collect and assess data on the status of funds  for TSCTP—including unobligated balances, unliquidated obligations, and  disbursements—they may lack key information that could help inform  current and future TSCTP program management decisions. Further, while  State, USAID, and DOD are generally consistent with most key practices  of interagency collaboration in their efforts to implement a whole-of- government approach to TSCTP, the Department of Justice has not been  fully integrated into TSCTP coordination efforts although it has expertise  in building law enforcement capacity—one of TSCTP’s five lines of effort.  We believe opportunities exist to enhance program management and  interagency collaboration that would help program managers as well as  decision makers better plan future TSCTP activities and leverage the  expertise of all relevant U.S. agencies.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance TSCTP program management and interagency collaboration,  we make the following two recommendations.
First, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the Administrator of  USAID ensure that TSCTP program managers take steps to routinely  collect and assess information that will better enable them to efficiently  determine and report on the status of funds allocated for TSCTP.
Second, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in coordination with  the Administrator of USAID and the Secretary of Defense, take steps to  ensure that the Department of Justice is better integrated into TSCTP  coordination efforts. This could include inviting Justice to quarterly  meetings on TSCTP held at the deputy assistant secretary level.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to State, USAID, DOD, DHS, Justice,  Treasury, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the  Central Intelligence Agency for their review and comment. State and  USAID provided written comments, which we have reprinted in  appendixes V and VI, respectively. State, the Office of the Director of  National Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD, DHS,  Justice, and Treasury did not provide comments.
State concurred with our recommendations to take steps to routinely  collect and assess information on the status of funds allocated for TSCTP  and to better integrate the Department of Justice into TSCTP coordination  efforts. Specifically, State said it is seeking to identify better mechanisms  and processes for collecting and maintaining financial data on TSCTP  activities and will engage Justice to explore formalized participation in the  TSCTP working group as well as higher-level policy coordination  mechanisms. USAID also concurred with GAO’s recommendation to  routinely collect and assess information on the status of funds allocated  for TSCTP and stated that it is seeking to identify better processes for  collecting and maintaining financial data on TSCTP.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, State, USAID, DOD, DHS, Justice, Treasury, the Office of  the Director of National Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency.  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine the status of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership  (TSCTP)–related funding and U.S. agencies’ ability to track such funding,  we reviewed relevant laws and other funding documents and asked  officials from the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID) to provide data on allocations,  unobligated balances, unliquidated obligations, and disbursements for  TSCTP by country and account for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. As  neither State nor USAID routinely collects or maintains these funding  elements in a central source, the agencies had to gather the data from  various databases. The process of gathering the data took several  months and, according to State and USAID officials, was very time- consuming and labor-intensive. To determine the reliability of the funding  data we received from State and USAID, we compared and corroborated  information from the sources the agencies relied upon, requested  information from State and USAID officials regarding the processes they  use to collect and verify each data source, and checked the complete  agency data sets for reasonableness and completeness. As we note  throughout this report, the funding data we received from State are  current as of November 2013, while the funding data we received from  USAID are current as of December 2013. We did not conduct a financial  audit of the funding data and are not expressing a financial opinion on  them. Based on the checks we performed, we determined that the  funding data we collected from State and USAID were sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of this engagement.
To examine the extent to which U.S. agency implementation of TSCTP is  consistent with key practices of interagency collaboration, we collected  and reviewed U.S. government strategy documents, agency reports, and  evaluations to identify and compare agency actions with key practices  GAO has identified for enhancing interagency collaboration. We  reviewed the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for  Counterterrorism, State and USAID’s strategic plans for fiscal years 2007- 2012 and 2014-2017, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2014  Quadrennial Defense Review, and the Guiding Strategy for TSCTP,  approved in 2014. In addition, we reviewed State’s Foreign Operations  Performance Reports, Mission Resource Requests, Bureau Resource  Requests, Integrated Country Strategies, and Antiterrorism Assistance  assessments. For DOD, we reviewed the Northwest Africa Campaign  Plan and assessments of the Northwest Africa Campaign Plan, among  other documents. For USAID, we reviewed the mid-term and final  evaluations of the first phase of the Peace through Development  program; country assessments for Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania,  and Niger; and a report on factors contributing to violent extremism.
To identify whether U.S. agencies considered partner country needs,  absorptive capacities, and other donor efforts when selecting TSCTP  activities, we reviewed State and DOD guidance for agency officials  proposing TSCTP activities. In addition, we reviewed agency  assessments, to include several State Antiterrorism Assessments; USAID  assessments for Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; and  the U.S. Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) multiyear plans for developing  the counterterrorism capabilities of TSCTP countries. We also reviewed  documentation from the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the  European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy civilian mission  in Niger.
Additionally, we discussed our objectives with State, USAID, and DOD;  the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury; and  intelligence community officials in the Washington, D.C., area. At State,  we interviewed officials from the Bureaus of African Affairs, Near Eastern  Affairs, Political-Military Affairs, Counterterrorism, and International  Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. At USAID, we met with officials  from the Bureau for Africa and the Bureau for Policy, Planning, and  Learning. At DOD, we interviewed officials from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. Additionally, we met with  participants of the 2013 annual TSCTP conference that USAID hosted in  Washington, D.C., in October 2013, including U.S. embassy officials from  Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal.
To obtain a more in-depth understanding of TSCTP, we conducted  fieldwork in November 2013 at AFRICOM in Stuttgart, Germany, during  which we met with DOD representatives as well as a State political  adviser and a USAID adviser. Subsequently, in December 2013, we  conducted fieldwork in Algiers, Algeria; Nouakchott, Mauritania; and  Niamey, Niger, to observe TSCTP assistance and meet with U.S.  embassy and partner country officials implementing TSCTP as well as  international donors conducting similar counterterrorism activities,  including officials from the Canadian Embassy and African Union in  Algeria and officials from the European Union in Algeria and Niger. We  also interviewed U.S. implementing partners, including officials  implementing USAID’s Peace through Development program in Niger and  State-funded training and equipping efforts in Mauritania, as well as local  participants in TSCTP activities, including a community action committee  in Niamey, Niger. In addition, we visited a U.S.-funded military facility in  Mauritania and met with Algerian, Mauritanian, and Nigerien government  officials and Algerian and Mauritanian security forces officials. In selecting  the countries to visit, we considered several criteria, including but not  limited to the level of funding received by each country for TSCTP  activities, geographic distribution, the number and duration of TSCTP  activities in each country, and agency recommendations.
To identify terrorist events in TSCTP countries between 2009 and 2012,  we used the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and  Responses to Terrorism’s Global Terrorism Database. To determine the  reliability of these data on terrorist events, we reviewed documentation  outlining the database’s scope and methodology, checked the data for  reasonableness, and interviewed a knowledgeable official at the  consortium regarding the database. On the basis of these checks, we  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  engagement. Regarding key terrorist groups in northwest Africa and their  regions of operation, we received and incorporated input from officials in  State’s Bureaus of African Affairs, Counterterrorism, and Intelligence and  Research on how best to depict the geographic presence of groups that  State identified as primary concerns to U.S. interests.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Examples of Activities Conducted Using Funds Allocated for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
paragraphs: Between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, State, USAID, and DOD conducted  a variety of activities using TSCTP-dedicated funding. As previously  noted, State has conducted diplomacy and law enforcement activities,  while USAID and DOD have focused on development and security  assistance activities, respectively.
State’s TSCTP activities include public diplomacy efforts as well as  law enforcement training and equipping and criminal justice sector  reform. Through its public diplomacy efforts, State provides  messaging that is intended to represent an alternative to violent  extremist propaganda, including support for mainstream media and  other forums that promote interfaith dialogue and peaceful political  participation. For example, figure 7 shows an imam training and  interfaith dialogue workshop in Chad. State’s law enforcement training  and equipping efforts focus on building partner nations’ capacity to  prevent, respond to, investigate, and prosecute acts of terrorism.  According to State, providing border security training and equipment  to secure porous land, air, and maritime borders makes up a  significant component of these activities.
USAID’s TSCTP activities include efforts to support youth  employment, strengthen local governance capacity, and improve  access to education. USAID’s TSCTP activities are primarily  conducted through the Peace through Development program in Niger,  Chad, and Burkina Faso, which succeeds a prior Peace through  Development program that mainly targeted Niger and Chad.envisions the current Peace through Development program as a 5- year effort that, according to USAID officials, includes various “layers”  of activities, such as support for messages of tolerance and  moderation, livelihood support, and education, among others. Figure 8  shows one example of USAID assistance efforts—a radio studio built  in Niger to support messaging efforts as part of the Peace through  Development program.
DOD’s TSCTP activities, funded from State’s Peacekeeping  Operations account, include counterterrorism training and equipping.
Examples of DOD’s activities include multicountry training in logistics,  military intelligence, combat medical skills, and civil-military  operations; bilateral training and equipping of counterterrorism and  military intelligence units; and providing spare parts and maintenance  for vehicles. Other Peacekeeping Operations–funded activities have  been implemented directly by State contractors. For instance, figure 9  shows radio equipment provided for the Mauritanian military’s national  command center and body armor and night vision goggles for  Mauritanian special forces.
section_title: Appendix III: Examples of Accounts and Programs That Support Counterterrorism Activities outside of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
paragraphs: Examples of accounts used by State and USAID to support  counterterrorism activities outside of TSCTP include the following:
Foreign Military Financing—authorizes the President to finance the  procurement of defense articles and services for foreign countries and  international organizations. This assistance supports, among other  things, building and sustaining military counterterrorism capabilities  globally. In Africa, State created a Regional Africa Counterterrorism  program specifically to help sustain activities built through  counterterrorism capacity-building programs in Africa. These funds  are approved by State and implemented by DOD.
International Military Education and Training—authorizes the  President to furnish military education and training to military and  related civilian personnel of foreign countries. This assistance  supports the professionalization of militaries globally through training  and education activities, primarily in the United States. Courses in  Africa are not focused on counterterrorism but may include  counterterrorism topics as part of efforts to professionalize and  establish relationships with foreign militaries. These funds are State- approved and DOD-implemented.
Peacekeeping Operations—authorizes the President to furnish  assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for  peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in  furtherance of the national security interests of the United States.  Outside of funds dedicated for TSCTP programs, Peacekeeping  Operations funds have been used to support security sector reform in  the region, such as in Mali for fiscal year 2014. In fiscal year 2013,  Peacekeeping Operations funds not dedicated for TSCTP were used  to train and equip African troops deploying to the African Union  mission in Mali, which has since transitioned into a United Nations  mission.
Development Assistance—authorizes the President to provide  assistance for various purposes, including agricultural development,  education and human resources development, grant assistance for  microenterprises, and a development fund for Africa, among other  purposes. Outside of funds dedicated for TSCTP programs, USAID  has used Development Assistance funds to transfer financial  resources to developing countries as well as to help countries solve  development problems.
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs— authorizes the President to provide antiterrorism assistance,  nonproliferation and export control assistance, and other assistance to  foreign countries for various purposes. Outside of funds dedicated for  TSCTP programs, State has provided Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism,  Demining, and Related Programs–funded assistance to support  additional activities designed to enhance the antiterrorism skills of  friendly countries by providing training and equipment and other  programs run by State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism, including its  Counterterrorism Engagement, Counterterrorism Finance, Countering  Violent Extremism, and Regional Strategic Initiative programs. State  has provided some funding from this account to the Department of  Justice to implement activities, such as providing resident legal  advisers and training in criminal investigative techniques to select  TSCTP countries.
Economic Support Fund—authorizes the President to assist countries  and organizations in order to promote economic or political stability.  Outside of funds dedicated for TSCTP programs, State has used the  Economic Support Fund to support its Countering Violent Extremism  Program and the interagency Center for Strategic Counterterrorism  Communications, while USAID has used it for programs and activities  to counter violent extremism in the Sahel region.
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement—authorizes the  President to assist foreign countries and international organizations to  control narcotics and other controlled substances, or for other  anticrime purposes. Outside of funds dedicated for TSCTP programs,  State has provided International Narcotics Control and Law  Enforcement funds to assist foreign countries and international  organizations in developing and implementing policies and programs  that maintain the rule of law and strengthen institutional law  enforcement and judicial capabilities, including combating  transnational crime. State has provided some funding from this  account to the Department of Justice to provide resident and  intermittent legal advisers in TSCTP countries.
Examples of DOD accounts or programs supporting counterterrorism  activities outside of TSCTP include the following:
Section 1206 funds—These funds may be used by DOD to build the  capacity of a foreign country’s military forces and security forces to (1)  conduct counterterrorist operations and (2) enable foreign military  forces to participate in or support military and stability operations with  the U.S. armed forces. Programs funded with this assistance must be  jointly formulated and implemented by the Secretaries of Defense and  State, and the law authorizes DOD to provide the assistance with the  Secretary of State’s concurrence.
Various Title X programs—DOD’s primary source of funding to  support activities conducted by the armed forces, including its  counternarcotics program, Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program,  and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts.
Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans-Sahara—DOD’s mission- oriented regional program that supports personnel activities related to  implementation of TSCTP and other related DOD counterterrorism  efforts.
section_title: Appendix IV: Status of Funds Allocated for Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Activities
paragraphs: Between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, State and USAID allocated about  $288 million for TSCTP activities. Tables 4 through 10 show the status of  funding for TSCTP activities between fiscal years 2009 and 2013 and the  total by account. Specifically, the table for each account shows  allocations, unobligated balances, unliquidated obligations, and  disbursements.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Godwin Agbara (Assistant  Director), Aniruddha Dasgupta, Kendal Robinson, Ashley Alley, Martin de  Alteriis, Karen Deans, and Etana Finkler made key contributions to this  report. Cynthia Taylor and Sarah Veale provided technical assistance.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Combating Terrorism: State Department Can Improve Management of  East Africa Program. GAO-14-502. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2014.
Afghanistan: Oversight and Accountability of U.S. Assistance. GAO-14- 680T. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2014.
Countering Overseas Threats: DOD and State Need to Address Gaps in  Monitoring of Security Equipment Transferred to Lebanon. GAO-14-161.  Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2014.
Central America: U.S. Agencies Considered Various Factors in Funding  Security Activities, but Need to Assess Progress in Achieving Interagency  Objectives. GAO-13-771. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2013.
Combating Terrorism: DHS Should Take Action to Better Ensure  Resources Abroad Align with Priorities. GAO-13-681. Washington, D.C.:  September 25, 2013.
Building Partner Capacity: DOD is Meeting Most Targets for Colombia’s  Regional Helicopter Training Center but Should Track Graduates. GAO- 13-674. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2013.
Status of Funding, Equipment, and Training for the Caribbean Basin  Security Initiative. GAO-13-367R. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2013.
U.S. Assistance to Yemen: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of  Emergency Food Aid and Assess Security Assistance. GAO-13-310.  Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2013.
Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage  Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation. GAO- 13-335T. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2013.
Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues. GAO-13-218SP. Washington, D.C.:  February 11, 2013.
Security Force Assistance: DOD's Consideration of Unintended  Consequences, Perverse Incentives, and Moral Hazards. GAO-13-241R.  Washington, D.C.: January 8, 2013.
Counternarcotics Assistance: U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in  Andean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of Results.  GAO-12-824. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2012.
Combating Terrorism: State Should Enhance Its Performance Measures  for Assessing Efforts in Pakistan to Counter Improvised Explosive  Devices. GAO-12-614. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2012.
Foreign Police Assistance: Defined Roles and Improved Information  Sharing Could Enhance Interagency Collaboration. GAO-12-534.  Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2012.
Uncertain Political and Security Situation Challenges U.S. Efforts to  Implement a Comprehensive Strategy in Yemen. GAO-12-432R.  Washington, D.C.: February 29, 2012.
Combating Terrorism: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance Foreign  Partners’ Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel. GAO-11-637. Washington,  D.C.: June 30, 2011.
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on  Terrorist Safe Havens. GAO-11-561. Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2011.
Combating Terrorism: Planning and Documentation of U.S. Development  Assistance in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas Need to Be  Improved. GAO-10-289. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering  Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on  Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed. GAO-09-883. Washington,  D.C.: September 24, 2009.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Area with  Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. GAO-09-263SP.  Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2009.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of  Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. GAO-08-860. Washington,  D.C.: July 31, 2008.
Somalia: Several Challenges Limit U.S. and International Stabilization,  Humanitarian, and Development Efforts. GAO-08-351. Washington, D.C.:  February 19, 2008.