Information Sharing: DHS Is Assessing Fusion Center Capabilities and Results, but Needs to More Accurately Account for Federal Funding Provided to Centers
Published: 2014-11-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Fusion centers play a key role in sharing threat information among all levels of government and the private sector. Federal agencies support these centers by providing personnel, funding, and other assistance. GAO was asked to assess how federal agencies are accounting for ongoing support provided.
This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS has helped centers assess capabilities and address gaps, (2) the federal government has defined its expectations for centers and assessed their contributions to homeland security, (3) federal agencies have deployed personnel to centers, and (4) DHS grant reforms have improved accountability for federal funds that support centers.
GAO analyzed the results of center assessments, documents on center expectations, guidance for deploying personnel, and grant requirements. GAO also interviewed DHS and FBI officials who work with centers, and directors, staff, and deployed personnel at 10 of 78 fusion centers. GAO selected centers based on geographic location and other factors. Interviews are not generalizable, but provided insights on center capabilities and federal support provided.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is helping state and major urban area fusion centers assess baseline capabilities—such as the ability to receive, analyze, and disseminate threat information—and address capability gaps through an annual assessment process, resources it provides to centers to mitigate gaps, and an exercise program to evaluate capabilities in practice. Results of the 2013 annual assessment show that centers achieved an average score of about 92 out of 100, which generally indicates that centers have policies and procedures in place to implement key information sharing activities. The scores do not reflect if these activities have resulted in specific homeland security impacts. All 10 fusion center directors GAO contacted said that the annual assessment is a useful tool to identify capabilities and monitor progress.
Since 2004, the federal government has issued guidance and related documents that define its expectations and key roles for fusion centers and also has taken steps to assess their contributions to homeland security. For example, DHS has developed 45 performance measures to help assess fusion center contributions, which generally align with attributes of successful measures. The measures include outputs—such as the number of intelligence products—and outcomes, such as how products have influenced key partners' security decisions.
In 2013, federal agencies deployed a total of 288 personnel to fusion centers. The two agencies that provide the most support—DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—have developed nationwide guidance to help these agencies make fusion center support decisions and generally identified key roles and responsibilities for personnel deployed to centers. Other DHS components, including U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, have not developed such guidance and generally defer to field-level management to make deployment decisions. However, in September 2014, DHS issued guidance that is designed to assist federal agencies in planning and tracking resource deployments to fusion centers.
DHS reforms to the Homeland Security Grant Program are helping to ensure that grant funds intended for fusion centers are used to build or sustain baseline capabilities, but DHS cannot accurately account for federal funds provided to states to support these centers. Specifically, in fiscal year 2011, the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA)—the lead DHS agency responsible for grant funding—began to require that grant requests for fusion centers identify specific capabilities that proposed projects are to address. FEMA also requires that state grantees biannually report the amount of federal funds spent on fusion center projects. However, after further review of data provided to GAO, FEMA determined that states inaccurately categorized about $60 million in projects as related to fusion centers in 2012. Thus, FEMA could not reliably report on the amount of federal grants used to support centers, which is needed to help inform future investment decisions. FEMA is developing guidance to help grantees better categorize fusion center projects and improve the reliability of grant reporting, but an additional mechanism to verify that states act in accordance with the guidance could help FEMA ensure that projects are properly classified and more accurately account for grant funding provided to centers.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that FEMA develop a mechanism to verify that states act in accordance with proposed guidance, when implemented, to help ensure that data on fusion center projects are sufficiently accurate to provide a reliable accounting of the total amount of federal grant funding provided to centers. DHS concurred.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Homeland security incidents, such as the bombings at the Boston  Marathon in April 2013, emphasize the importance of developing a  national capability to efficiently and expeditiously gather, analyze, and  disseminate law enforcement, homeland security, and terrorism  information. Since 2001, 49 states and many major urban areas have  established fusion centers to help improve the sharing of information  among state, local, tribal, territorial, federal, and private sector entities.  As of June 2014, the National Network of Fusion Centers (National  Network) consisted of 78 centers and the partnerships and collaborative  efforts formed within and among them. While state and local governments  own and operate these centers, many federal partners—including the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice  (DOJ)—have supported fusion centers by providing resources in various  forms, such as training, technical assistance, funding, and personnel.  Within DHS, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is the lead  component with responsibilities for sharing terrorism-related information  with all levels of government and the private sector. I&A’s State and Local  Program Office (SLPO) serves as the focal point for fusion center  coordination.
Terrorism-related information sharing remained a high-risk area for our February 2013  update. See, GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.  2013), for the most recent update. Every 2 years, at the start of a new Congress, we call  attention to agencies and program areas that, according to our audits and evaluations, are  of high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most in need of  transformation. information among federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, international, and  private sector partners. The National Network of Fusion Centers is a key  part of this effort. Since 2007, we have conducted multiple reviews  addressing fusion center activities and operations. For example, in  September 2010, we reported that federal agencies were helping fusion  centers build and sustain capabilities and protect privacy—but could  better measure results—and recommended that DHS take steps to  implement standard performance measures for centers. DHS concurred  and has taken steps to address this recommendation. DHS has since  established a Fusion Center Performance Program to assess center  capabilities, mitigate potential capability gaps, and help justify investment  requests. Since 2011, DHS has also initiated grant management reforms  to improve the department’s ability to account for federal funds that  support fusion centers.
You asked us to assess federal efforts to support fusion centers and  account for resources provided. This report addresses the extent to which  (1) DHS has helped centers assess capabilities and mitigate potential  capability gaps through the Fusion Center Performance Program, (2)  federal agencies have defined expectations for fusion centers and  assessed homeland security contributions, (3) federal agencies have  deployed federal personnel to fusion centers and defined their roles and  responsibilities, and (4) DHS grant management reforms have improved  accountability for federal funds that support fusion centers.
To address all four objectives, we visited 10 fusion centers in 7 states and  interviewed center directors; staff, such as analysts and grants  administrators; and federal personnel supporting the center. We selected  these centers based on a range of factors, including geographic location,  staffing levels, and extent of federal support. The results of our interviews  are not generalizable to all fusion centers nationwide, but they provided  valuable information and perspectives on fusion centers activities and  operations.
To address the first objective, we analyzed strategic planning documents  and other guidance to identify Fusion Center Performance Program goals  and objectives. We analyzed assessment results—including the 2010  Baseline Capabilities Assessment of Fusion Centers and the National  Network of Fusion Centers: Final Reports for years 2011, 2012, and  2013—to determine the extent to which the assessments identify gaps in  baseline capabilities and mitigation actions. We also reviewed a sample  of individual assessment reports from the fusion centers we visited to  determine the extent to which the reports included recommendations to  address potential capability gaps and to identify progress made since the  previous year’s assessment. The reports we reviewed are not  generalizable to all fusion center assessments conducted nationwide, but  provided insights on the assessment process. Further, we interviewed  senior officials and program managers from SLPO regarding the criteria  and methods used to conduct the assessments, validate results, and  report progress, and determined that data related to the annual  assessments were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. We  also interviewed directors of the 10 fusion centers we visited and the  President of the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA) to obtain  perspectives on the value of the assessments and how the results are  utilized.
To address the second objective, we analyzed relevant laws, strategy  documents, and federal guidance that address the federal government’s  information-sharing responsibilities to fusion centers and the centers’  expected results. Documents analyzed include the Intelligence Reform  and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act), Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007  (9/11 Commission Act), the National Strategy for Information Sharing,  Fusion Center Guidelines, Baseline Capabilities for State and Major  Urban Area Fusion Centers, and the National Prevention Framework.
Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016(b)(2), 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-70 (2004) (codified as amended  at 6 U.S.C. § 485).
Regarding contributions to homeland security, we analyzed fusion center  performance measures and assessed them against criteria that GAO  developed in connection with work related to the Government  Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). We also interviewed  SLPO officials regarding the development and definitions of these  measures. Further, we interviewed other federal stakeholders—including  headquarters program officials and field personnel from I&A, U.S.  Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—to  determine the extent to which these agencies have developed  expectations for fusion centers and assessed how centers help support  the agencies’ homeland security missions. We selected these agencies  because they had the most personnel deployed to fusion centers during  fiscal year 2013.
The Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory provides the Office of Management and  Budget and the Program Manager of the ISE with an inventory of all federal funding that  agencies report was expended and the personnel deployed that are dedicated to support  the National Network of Fusion Centers.
ICE, and the FBI, as well as federal personnel deployed to the 10 fusion  centers we visited to (1) identify the range of activities personnel  performed; (2) assess the extent to which agencies defined personnel’s  roles, responsibilities, and expectations; and (3) determine what, if any,  performance criteria existed to hold deployed personnel accountable for  expected results. We also interviewed directors and other fusion center  officials at the 10 locations to obtain their views on federal support to the  centers.
To address the fourth objective, we analyzed Federal Emergency  Management Administration (FEMA) guidance related to the Homeland  Security Grant Program (HSGP) to identify reforms that are intended to  improve accountability for federal funds that support fusion centers. We  also reviewed grant requests for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 from the 10  centers we visited, and data provided by FEMA on the amount of DHS  grant funding provided to support fusion centers in fiscal years 2011 and  2012. We determined that FEMA data on the amount of federal funding  provided to fusion centers was unreliable, a conclusion we discuss later in  this report. We interviewed fusion center directors and FEMA grant  management officials to discuss the HSGP and related processes— including FEMA’s recent changes to grant requirements—and determine  how fusion centers utilized annual center assessments to identify and  prioritize grant projects. We also interviewed FEMA officials to determine  the steps they take to monitor the reliability of data reported by grantees  and compared these steps with related controls outlined in Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 through October  2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Fusion Centers
paragraphs: The federal government recognizes fusion centers as assets that are  critical to enhancing homeland security because they coordinate the  gathering, analysis, and dissemination of law enforcement, homeland  security, public safety, and terrorism information. Centers also serve as  focal points for the two-way exchange of information between federal  agencies and state and local governments. As of June 2014, there were  78 fusion centers across the United States, the District of Columbia, and  U.S. territories that collectively make up the National Network. These  include centers that are statewide or broad in jurisdiction—such as those  operated by state police—and regional centers that usually cover large  cities with substantial populations and numerous critical infrastructure  sites, which may be operated by a city or county law enforcement or  emergency management agency.
Recognition as a fusion center within the National Network generally  requires that the governor of the state make this formal designation; a  state or local governmental agency oversees and manages the center;  the center has plans and procedures to function as a focal point for  sharing law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and terrorism  information; and the center has achieved requisite baseline capabilities as  DHS—on  behalf of federal interagency partners—determines through an  annual assessment of each fusion center’s capabilities. A state or local  law enforcement official generally serves as the center director, but non- law enforcement contract personnel can also serve in this capacity as  determined by the applicable agency that owns and operates the center.  Analyst positions within these centers often make up a substantial portion  of the staffing and typically include a combination of state, local, and  federal personnel.
While each center engages in core information-sharing functions— namely, the receipt, analysis, gathering, and dissemination of threat- related information—some centers focus more broadly on “all-crimes” or  “all-hazards,” in addition to terrorism and homeland security information.  Fusion centers can issue a combination of situational awareness and  analytical products—such as daily or weekly bulletins on criminal or  intelligence information and intelligence assessments—which, in general,  provide reporting on an emerging threat, group, or crime. Centers  primarily create these products for law enforcement entities and other  partners within their jurisdiction, such as owners and operators of critical  infrastructure. Fusion centers also collect and process tips and leads as  part of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI), and  provide outreach and training to the private sector and other  governmental partners.
section_title: Federal Support to Fusion Centers
paragraphs: The 9/11 Commission Act required that the DHS Secretary establish a  DHS State, Local and Regional Fusion Center Initiative and that—in  coordination with representatives from fusion centers and the states—the  department take certain actions to support the initiative. For example,  the act requires the Secretary to support federal efforts to integrate fusion  centers into the ISE, assign personnel to centers, incorporate fusion  center intelligence information into DHS information, provide training, and  facilitate close communication and coordination between the centers and  DHS. The law also requires the Secretary, in consultation with the  Attorney General, to establish guidelines for fusion centers that include  standards that fusion centers must address.that centers collaboratively develop a mission statement, identify  expectations and goals, measure performance, and determine center  effectiveness; create a collaborative environment for the sharing of  intelligence and information among federal, state, local, and tribal   These include, for example,  government agencies, the private sector, and the public, consistent with  guidance from the President and the Program Manager for the  Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE); and offer a variety of  intelligence and information services and products.
Within DHS, I&A’s SLPO is responsible for providing a link among the  fusion center; the intelligence community; and state, local, and private  sector partners.either part-time or full-time personnel to fusion centers to support center  operations and serve as liaisons between the fusion center and federal  components.
section_title: Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities and Assessment Process
paragraphs: In September 2008, DHS and DOJ jointly published the Baseline  Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, which the  agencies developed in collaboration with the PM-ISE and other federal,  state, and local officials. This document identified the capabilities  determined necessary to achieve a national, integrated network of fusion  centers and detailed the standards necessary for a fusion center to be  considered capable of performing basic functions by the fusion center  community. In 2010, fusion center directors, in partnership with the  federal government, distilled the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major  Urban Area Fusion Centers into priorities, including four Critical  Operational Capabilities:  receive: ability to receive classified and unclassified information from  federal partners. analyze: ability to assess local implications of that threat information  through the use of a formal risk assessment process. disseminate: ability to further disseminate that threat information to  other state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector entities within  their jurisdiction; and gather: ability to gather locally-generated information, aggregate it,  analyze it, and share it with federal partners as appropriate.
In September 2010, federal, state, and local officials completed the first  nationwide assessment of fusion centers to evaluate center capabilities  and to establish priorities for federal government support. The  assessment process focuses on measuring fusion center implementation  of the four Critical Operational Capabilities, as well as four additional  Enabling Capabilities (privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections;  sustainment strategy; communications and outreach; and security). Since  2011, DHS has taken the lead to manage and implement the annual  assessment process as a core component of its broader Fusion Center  Performance Program. The other two components of the performance  program are DHS activities to further develop capabilities and mitigate  gaps, as well as an exercise program to evaluate fusion center  capabilities in practice, called the Fusion Center Readiness Initiative.
section_title: Federal Grants to Fusion Centers
paragraphs: While fusion centers are state and locally owned, the federal government  has continued to provide federal grant funding to support center  operations, in part because the government expects the National Network  of Fusion Centers to be a key player in sharing information. The fiscal  year 2013 Homeland Security Grant Program guidance also identified the  maturation and enhancement of fusion centers as one of five priority  areas for HSGP funding. The HSGP consists of three separate programs,  two of which states and local jurisdictions have primarily used to help fund  fusion centers—the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and the  Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). These grant programs are not  specifically focused on, or limited to, fusion centers and the fusion centers  do not receive direct, dedicated funding from DHS. Rather, a state  administrative agency—the state-level agency responsible for managing  all homeland security grants and associated program requirements—or  an urban area’s working group, which has similar responsibilities,  determines the amount of grant funding a fusion center receives. A fusion  center typically contributes to the development of a state’s federal grant  application by providing information on how the center will use the  proposed funding it requests, called an investment justification.
section_title: DHS Performance Program Helps Fusion Centers Assess Capabilities and Address Gaps, and DHS Has Plans to Further Evaluate Capabilities through Exercises
subsections: section_title: Fusion Center Assessment Process Is Systematically Assessing Capabilities and Monitoring Progress; Most Centers Are Achieving Baseline Capabilities
paragraphs: As the cornerstone of DHS’s efforts to evaluate how fusion centers are  meeting designated standards for the four critical capabilities and four  enabling capabilities, the fusion center annual assessment process is  serving to assess and monitor capability development for both individual  fusion centers and the National Network. To determine capability  scores, each fusion center completes an online questionnaire that  addresses multiple attributes for each of the eight capabilities, for a  collective total of 50 individual attributes. For example, the “gather”  capability is composed of 8 total attributes, which include questions to  determine if the center has a documented process to manage tips and  leads and has identified standing information needs from DHS entities,  among other partners. These attributes form the basis by which DHS  assesses each fusion center’s progress from year to year. The highest  possible score that each fusion center can receive is 100 points.
SLPO completed its third iteration of the annual assessment process in  2013, and released its annual report of the aggregate findings from this  assessment in July 2014. Results of the 2013 assessment indicate that  fusion centers are continuing to increase overall capability scores, and  many are nearing full achievement of the 50 individual attributes that the  assessment uses as evaluation criteria. Specifically, the average overall  capability score reported for the National Network was 91.7 out of 100 in   This score represents an improvement of about 3 points from the  2013. 2012 average score of 88.4 and continues an upward trend from the  average national score of 76.8 identified in 2011. These increases reflect  that fusion centers are continuing to take steps to achieve designated  capabilities and mitigate gaps identified in prior years. However, scores  also decreased for 1 or more of the capability attributes for 15 centers in  2013, a fact that, according to SLPO officials, highlights the importance of  continued monitoring through the annual assessment.
The 2013 assessment data cover the time period from August 2012 through July 2013.
The overall assessment scores represent fusion centers’ progress in  establishing designated baseline capabilities—such as implementing  specified policies and procedures—but the scores may not reflect  improvements in overall performance or homeland security contributions.  That is, the assessment questions are intended to capture the extent to  which each fusion center—regardless of size or staffing level—has met  baseline capabilities to receive, analyze, gather, and disseminate  information. However, the actual output of products and services can vary  considerably by center based on risk environment, resource levels, or  other factors. For example, 11 individual attributes constitute the  “analyze” capability, and represent a broad range of activities, such as  having developed an analytical production plan, the ability to access  subject matter experts, and being able to contribute to local and national  threat assessments. A center may report the successful completion of  such activities and improve its overall assessment scores, but the scores  do not reflect if the center effectively administered these activities or if  they resulted in any considerable impact. For example, developing an  analytical production plan may not equate to effectively meeting the plan’s  targets or producing the types of reports identified therein. This highlights  the importance of further validating these capabilities through other  mechanisms, such as the Fusion Center Readiness Initiative and targeted  performance metrics, which we discuss later in the report. Nevertheless,  the annual assessment process reflects a mechanism for systematically  assessing existing baseline capabilities and gaps, and provides fusion  centers an indicator of their progress in achieving baseline capabilities.  SLPO program management officials noted that they intend for other  efforts, including the recent development of additional performance  measures, to help capture the extent to which centers are achieving  intended results and supporting the federal government’s homeland  security mission.
All 10 directors of the fusion centers we visited stated that the annual  assessment program is an effective process to evaluate their capabilities  against a uniform standard, and serves to identify potential opportunities  for improvement. For example, directors identified specific actions that  their fusion center took to address an individual attribute and improve the  center’s capability score, such as developing a plan, policy, or developing  additional mechanisms to disseminate alerts. In general, the directors we  spoke with stated that the administrative requirements for completing the  assessment were reasonable and that center staff could generally  complete these steps in a few days. In addition to assessing capabilities  and related gaps, 2 directors noted that the assessment can serve as an  effective mechanism to familiarize a new director with the center, given  the relatively frequent turnover in directors across the National Network.  Two directors also said that they use the assessment results to brief  center management, such as state homeland security directors, on center  operations, and that these results provide information on progress the  center made toward achieving baseline capabilities. Further, 5 of the 10  directors we interviewed specifically noted the DHS requirement to utilize  the assessment results to inform annual federal grant funding requests.  Generally, the directors reported that while the grant requests are  routinely focused on maintaining existing capabilities through analytical  staff positions and technology platforms, the requests may also target the  development of plans or other actions necessary to address attribute  gaps, as applicable.
With the average assessment score now at almost 92 percent—and  many centers achieving the highest possible score of 100—SLPO officials  stated that the assessment process is unlikely to drive significant new  capability development. The majority of the fusion centers that we visited  had achieved scores of over 95 percent, and in 2 cases, center directors  did not plan to address the 1 or 2 remaining attributes required for a  perfect score because they said the cost and administrative burden  outweighed the benefit. One example cited was requiring fusion centers  to verify that recipients received all products as intended. These directors continued to support the overall assessment process, but they  acknowledged that their focus would likely shift to maintaining existing  capabilities rather than trying to achieve new capabilities to close any  remaining gaps.
Although fusion centers are continuing to mature and are beginning to  maintain high scores, SLPO officials said that they do not plan to change  the current assessment process or any of the individual attributes to  potentially capture additional capabilities. The officials noted that the  current process and attributes remain important to help monitor and  sustain existing capabilities and protect against possible backsliding as  fusion center directors turn over and fusion center funding becomes more  constrained. These officials also noted the importance of maintaining a  common standard that all fusion centers can achieve, regardless of size,  staffing, or location. Moreover, the officials said that they plan to maintain  the existing assessment questions to ensure direct comparability of  results from year to year. Finally, as discussed later, DHS uses the  assessment to collect data to measure progress according to certain  performance measures.
section_title: Fusion Center Directors We Contacted Found DHS Technical Assistance and Other Resources to Mitigate Gaps Helpful
paragraphs: As the second key component of the Fusion Center Performance  Program, SLPO conducts activities to identify common capability gaps  across the National Network and provides resources for fusion centers— such as technical assistance and document templates—to help centers  address and mitigate these gaps. Within the annual assessment report,  SLPO provides a summary of findings regarding National Network  capability scores and progress made, and includes data-informed  recommendations that are intended to address commonly identified gaps.  SLPO also includes specific recommendations for each of the eight  capabilities, as well as several overall areas identified as needing  improvement. For example, the 2012 report highlighted the need to  identify analytical products that meet specific information needs, as well  as expanded involvement in local government bodies to promote  improved collaboration. As part of information collection efforts during the  annual assessment process, SLPO officials noted that they also solicit  feedback regarding the quality and effectiveness of federal support  activities, such as training and technical assistance, received over the  previous 12 months. According to officials, SLPO uses this information to  help develop the suite of mitigation resources to be provided in the  following year.
According to program documentation, the gap mitigation resources are  intended to help fusion centers address gaps in capabilities and enhance  the knowledge and skills of fusion center personnel. These resources  include a combination of guidance and reference materials, as well as  targeted training and technical assistance programs. Two key documents  comprise the gap mitigation resources—the Gap Mitigation Guidebook  and an annual publication of Gap Mitigation Activities. The guidebook  notes that this resource is intended to assist fusion centers in developing  and implementing plans, policies, or standard operating procedures for  each of the critical operating capabilities. It includes plan templates and  reference materials that DHS intends to help fusion centers define and  document key business processes, such as the protection of privacy and  civil liberties. The Gap Mitigation Activities is a dynamic document  informed by both the annual assessment results and feedback DHS  receives from fusion centers. For example, the 2013 Gap Mitigation  Activities “menu” included a total of over 60 activities identified to  enhance or sustain fusion center capabilities across each of the core  capabilities. Specific resources identified include a combination of new  and existing activities intended to enhance and support capability  development, including staff exchange programs, risk analysis and  product feedback templates, and training and technical assistance  designed to educate fusion center personnel on specific subjects, such as  basic intelligence analysis.
All 10 fusion center directors we visited said that they were aware of  DHS’s annual Gap Mitigation Activities—such as its listing of analytical  training courses and exchange programs—and the 6 directors that  discussed participation in these activities said they were effective. Three  directors also specifically referenced the Gap Mitigation Guidebook and  said that they utilized a template or other written reference materials  contained within the document. In addition, several fusion center directors  said that they routinely interact with directors from other centers and one  noted they were most likely to address any identified capability gaps by  obtaining an example of a plan or policy from another center, or inquiring  about their approach to addressing a capability. In general, our interviews  with fusion center directors and SLPO headquarters officials indicate that  SLPO routinely provided outreach and communications to these fusion  centers regarding the mitigation support resources that are available.
section_title: DHS Has Not Yet Fully Implemented an Exercise Program to Further Evaluate Fusion Center Capabilities, but Is Planning Additional Actions
paragraphs: The Fusion Center Readiness Initiative is a core component of the Fusion  Center Performance Program, but it remains in the early stages of  development largely because of staffing challenges. According to DHS  program documents, this initiative includes the establishment of an  annual exercise program that is intended to provide fusion centers an  opportunity to apply and evaluate capabilities in an operational context.  According to DHS officials, the exercise program is intended to help  define capability improvement priorities and identify investment focus  areas, as well as provide support and functional consistency across the  National Network. The officials noted that limited progress has been  made in developing an exercise program since 2012 because of  challenges in hiring a candidate to fill a key program management  position. However, the officials said that this position was successfully  staffed in June 2014.
Although the Fusion Center Readiness Initiative is not fully implemented,  DHS has taken steps to conduct several drills and exercises involving  fusion centers in recent years. For example, in August 2012, SLPO  facilitated an exercise incorporating 7 fusion centers and other partners,  including representatives from FBI, CBP, and the Transportation Security  Administration. This day-long exercise included four objectives that  collectively targeted each of the fusion centers’ critical and enabling  capabilities. The after-action report identifies 18 individual corrective  actions and includes implementation details, such as the entity  responsible for taking the action and the expected time frame for  completion.
According to SLPO officials, efforts are underway to schedule and  coordinate additional fusion center exercises. Specifically, the officials  noted that they plan to conduct exercises under the readiness initiative  every 2 years with participation from a group of 7 to 10 fusion centers.  The officials said that the longer-term vision is to conduct up to three  exercises per year—as well as drills addressing specific analytical  capabilities and communications. SLPO officials also noted the  importance of aligning these activities with DHS’s National Exercise  Program.
Officials from the 10 fusion centers we visited also reported that centers  often participate in exercises and drills sponsored by a combination of  other federal, state, and local partners. The scope and purpose of these  exercises varied and ranged from full-scale exercises simulating a real- world threat scenario to routine drills validating communication and alert  notification procedures. Fusion centers also reported on their participation  in such exercises as part of publications the centers develop to identify  key products and services provided to centers’ partners over the year.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Defined Fusion Center Expectations and Developed Measures to Assess Homeland Security Contributions
subsections: section_title: Federal Agencies Have Developed a Combination of High-Level Strategic Guidance and Specific Capability Expectations for Fusion Centers
paragraphs: Over the past decade, Congress has enacted laws and federal agencies  have issued guidance and related documents that help to define  expectations for fusion centers, which have evolved from high-level  guidance focused on terrorism-related information sharing to more  specific guidance that defines expectations for fusion center capabilities,  operations, and functions. For example, provisions of the Intelligence  Reform Act, as amended, recognize that state and local partners have a  role in the sharing of terrorism-related information. In 2005, as states and  localities began to create centers, DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE issued  more specific guidance to fusion centers through Fusion Center  Guidelines that recommended procedures for establishing and  maintaining centers, training personnel, and producing privacy and civil  liberties policies. In conjunction with the guidelines, in 2008, DOJ’s Global  Justice Information Sharing Initiative issued Baseline Capabilities for  State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, which further clarified  expectations for fusion center capabilities and management and  administrative functions, such as those related to the collection, analysis,  and dissemination of information. Based on our analysis of the collective  laws and federal agency guidance issued to date, federal agencies have  defined expectations for fusion centers related to their role in information- sharing activities.policies.
section_title: Stakeholders Have Developed a National Strategy That Also Addresses Fusion Center Expectations
paragraphs: The NFCA—in collaboration with other state, local, and federal entities— developed a national strategy that builds upon federal guidance to further  outline key roles and priorities of the National Network from the fusion  center perspective. Among the elements included in the strategy is an  overview of the current status of the network; the network’s roles in  supporting information-sharing activities; and future goals, objectives, and  initiatives that the network is to carry out to support national security over  the period defined by the strategy, 2014 to 2017. The NFCA strategy was  issued in July 2014. The NFCA President noted that the strategy is  intended to help standardize how fusion centers function across the  network and further clarify the standards established in the baseline  capabilities guidance related to the analysis and dissemination of  intelligence information, among other things. The strategy also provides  specific examples that outline the network’s contributions to national  security and the types of services fusion centers provide to state, local,  and federal partners, among others. For example, the strategy discusses  the centers’ role in vetting information in support of the NSI and also  providing analysis that increases the value of analytic products centers  produce.
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, Majority Staff Report on  the National Network of Fusion Centers (Washington, D.C.: July 2013). outline a broader set of activities the National Network expects to  accomplish over the next 3 years, as figure 1 illustrates.
The strategy also identifies 37 specific initiatives that support the goals  and objectives that further highlight efforts that the National Network  expects to complete over the 3 years. For example, 1 initiative related to  goal 4 is to work with federal partners to establish a minimum level of  engagement and expectations that are uniform and consistent across all  regions and field offices related to access to data systems.
In addition to the recommendation that centers themselves articulate a  national strategy, the majority staff report also called for federal agencies  to develop a federal strategy that explains how and why the federal  government engages with fusion centers. The NFCA President also noted  that a federal strategy could, among other things, provide fusion centers  with a better understanding of the methodology federal agencies use to  deploy personnel to centers and standardize centers’ access to federal  data systems. SLPO officials said that DHS does not plan to develop a  federal strategy, since they believe this information currently exists in the  various strategy and guideline documents already issued. However, DHS  is currently working in coordination with DOJ to develop a Federal  Framework for Supporting the National Network of Fusion Centers that a  senior I&A official said is intended to help summarize the collective  federal efforts guiding support to fusion centers. The official also noted  that the framework will include efforts related to assessment and  performance programs, resource allocations, governance processes, and  analytic standards, among others. In technical comments provided on a  draft of this report, DHS noted that the federal framework document will  also include strategic objectives and priorities, in addition to identifying  current efforts. DHS added that a draft of this updated approach was  presented to the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council and the  Fusion Center and Suspicious Activity Reporting Subcommittee of the  Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee for  feedback in September 2014.
section_title: DHS Has Developed New Performance Measures to Assess Fusion Center Contributions to Homeland Security
paragraphs: In coordination with fusion centers and federal partners, DHS has  developed 45 performance measures designed to capture standardized  data to assess the impact and contribution of fusion centers on  information sharing and homeland security. DHS initially reported on five  measures in the 2012 fusion center assessment report. For example, one  measure included the number of suspicious activity reports that fusion  centers submit to the FBI that result in the initiation or an enhancement of  an FBI investigation.
To build upon these five initial measures, in 2013, DHS began an effort to  develop a “logic model” that graphically depicts how fusion center inputs  (e.g., funding and personnel), processes (e.g., activities and initiatives),  outputs (e.g., products and services), and outcomes (e.g., effect or  results) relate to one another. According to DHS’s performance measures  definition guide, the logic model was used to develop an additional 40  performance measures, and collectively, the 45 measures are intended to  determine the impact of fusion centers and homeland security  contributions. The guide notes that, using the logic model, 24 of the  measures are defined as outcome measures, which are grouped into six  outcome categories, examples of which are illustrated in table 2.
According to the guide, 21 of the 45 measures, also based on the logic  model, are intended to capture the outputs of key fusion center functions  and quantify the number of products or services delivered as a result of a  process, such as situational awareness reporting. Examples of such  measures are shown in table 3.
We assessed SLPO’s 45 performance measures against criteria for  successful measures that GAO developed in connection with work  conducted on the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.  Specifically, the criteria include key attributes developed to assess  performance goals and measures based on a combination of previously  established GAO criteria, GPRA, and the IRS Restructuring and Reform  Act of 1998, as well as related performance management literature.analysis showed that, collectively, the fusion center performance  measures are generally aligned with the successful attributes. For  example, among other attributes, the measures are aligned with DHS’s  goals and missions, are clearly stated, appear objective, and cover the  core activities of the program. While the new measures do not currently  incorporate performance targets, as our prior work suggests, SLPO  officials stated that they plan to analyze data collected for the measures  in 2013 to establish baseline targets for future years.
According to the Performance Measures Definition Guide, data obtained  from responses to DHS’s annual assessments of fusion centers will  provide information to implement some of the 45 measures. Data for  other measures will come from internal DHS offices, other federal  agencies—such as the FBI—and other fusion center partners, including  the National Governors Association and state homeland security  advisors. SLPO implemented 34 of the 45 performance measures as part  of the 2013 fusion center annual assessment and plans to implement the  remaining 11 measures in future assessment cycles as additional data  collection mechanisms are established.
Since all of the new performance measures have not yet been fully  implemented, it is too early to determine how these measures collectively  will help assess fusion center contributions to homeland security. For  example, 10 of the 11 performance measures that were not implemented  as part of the 2013 annual assessment are intended to assess outcomes  of fusion center activities related to enhancing homeland security, and  SLPO has not yet developed methodologies for collecting the data. An  example of an outcome measure not yet implemented is the percentage  of key customers—including state homeland security advisors—reporting  that fusion center products and services resulted in increased situational  awareness of threats within their area of responsibility. According to  SLPO officials, these measures are still in development since limitations  currently exist to collect data to implement them, but they are taking steps  to overcome these limitations. For example, some measures require DHS  to put additional data collection requirements into place or develop new  systems. Appendix I contains a summary of fusion center performance  measures and their implementation status.
The 2013 annual report on fusion centers contained results for the 34  measures that SLPO had implemented and noted that over 98 percent of   The report also  fusion centers provided data related to all 34 measures.highlighted specific measures that show the National Network’s  contributions to federal homeland security efforts. For example, the report  noted that fusion centers developed about 6,000 products in 2013 and  linked 2,250 (37.5 percent) to Homeland Security Standing Information  Needs. The report also noted that fusion centers issued 275 collaborative  products with federal partners in 2013, a 7.4 percent increase from 256 in  2012.
The 2013 annual assessment’s focus on performance measures reflects  that DHS and the National Network are taking steps to better capture key  results and outcomes of fusion center activities and their overall  contributions in support of the homeland security mission.
section_title: Federal Agencies Reported Deploying 288 Personnel to Fusion Centers in 2013 and Generally Defined Roles and Responsibilities
subsections: section_title: Federal Agencies Reported Deploying 288 Personnel to Fusion Centers in 2013
paragraphs: SLPO produces an annual Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory report  that shows the number of federal personnel agencies report that they  deployed to fusion centers—either full- or part- time—as well as the non- personnel support agencies provided. Figure 2 shows the number of  personnel federal agencies reported deploying to fusion centers from  fiscal years 2011 through 2013.
The Federal Resource Allocation Criteria—issued by the PM-ISE— defines the general criteria that federal departments and agencies are to  use when making deployments and other resource allocations to fusion  centers.must designate the fusion center as an official state center and the center  must participate in the baseline capabilities annual assessment process.  While the criteria provide high-level guidance to federal agencies, they   For example, the criteria note that the governor of the state  can develop additional criteria to inform deployment decisions, such as  how closely the missions of the fusion center and agency align. For fusion  centers where agencies have not deployed federal personnel, agencies  can provide support through off-site personnel or liaison representatives,  who can provide access to federal data systems, among other things.  Federal agencies can also provide non-personnel resources to fusion  centers, such as training, technical assistance, participation in exercises,  security clearance administration, and travel. According to federal cost  inventory reports, federal agencies provided fusion centers with non- personnel support totaling about $32.8 million in fiscal year 2011 and  about $18 million in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. The 2012 report lists  several factors that contributed to the reduction in federal funding  between the fiscal years, including continuing federal agencies’ budget  reductions and agencies transitioning from the initial costs of developing  data systems to maintaining the systems.
section_title: I&A Has Developed Guidance for Deploying Personnel to Fusion Centers, although Specific Roles and Responsibilities Depend on Center Needs and Capabilities
paragraphs: As of June 2014, I&A had deployed a total of 74 intelligence officers to  fusion centers across the National Network, as well as 9 regional  directors to manage officer activities. As of this date, I&A had also  deployed a total of 6 intelligence analysts to centers, as well as reports   I&A  officers that collectively cover every fusion center in the network.has developed general guidance that defines the roles and  responsibilities for each of these deployed positions, as shown in table 4.
Intelligence officers perform a range of activities at fusion centers  depending on the center’s size, maturity, capabilities, and needs. For  example, at a smaller center we visited, the intelligence officer’s activities  included training local intelligence analysts on basic analytic techniques  and helping to develop and produce intelligence products. At two large  fusion centers we visited that had their own experienced intelligence  analysts, the intelligence officers focused on performing more extensive  outreach with government and private sector partners and reviewing local  analysts’ finished intelligence products prior to dissemination. According  to intelligence officers at 2 of the 10 centers we visited, regional directors  that supervise intelligence officers allow them flexibility to support the  fusion center in the capacity that best benefits center operations.
In addition, intelligence officers also stated that regional directors and I&A  management communicate expectations to intelligence officers through  oral discussion and employee performance plans. These plans describe  expectations across a broad set of competencies that include  accountability for results, communications, critical thinking, engagement,  and collaboration, among others. According to intelligence officers and  regional directors we interviewed, these plans also provide a mechanism  to identify specific performance goals for the intelligence officer based  upon the needs and objectives of the fusion center. For example,  according to a performance plan template that we reviewed, an  intelligence officer’s goal is to facilitate the fusion centers’ execution of the  intelligence cycle. To address this goal, the officer can perform research  and identify analytical training opportunities for the fusion center and  advocate and facilitate the production of joint analytic products with other  centers, among other things.
According to 7 of the 10 of the fusion center directors we interviewed,  intelligence officers have helped the center develop analytic capabilities.  For example, 3 directors noted that officers participate in and arrange  intelligence training for the local intelligence analysts at the fusion center.  At 1 fusion center, the director emphasized the importance of having the  intelligence officer on-site to bring DHS and broader nationwide  perspectives on intelligence to the fusion center. One other director noted  that the intelligence officer provided the center with a connection to other  DHS components in the area of responsibility. Officers also served as a  conduit to DHS headquarters personnel and subject matter experts to  respond to inquiries on issues such as the annual fusion center  assessment process. According to 1 fusion center director, intelligence  officers also benefit the center by maintaining effective relationships with  external stakeholders such as InfraGard members and the area  Protective Security Advisor program.
subsections: section_title: Intelligence Analysts and Reports Officers
paragraphs: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive Number  203—Analytic Standards (Washington D.C.: June 21, 2007). deploying analysts to additional fusion centers and expanding the  deployments to 2-year rotations.
DHS has also deployed reports officers to fusion centers to primarily  collect raw intelligence and develop intelligence information reports— formerly known as homeland intelligence reports—which are intended to  address the intelligence community’s information requirements. In a 2012  report, congressional staff raised concerns about fusion center  intelligence reporting not being timely or of sufficient quality. to senior I&A officials, in response to these concerns, I&A modified  procedures for reporting intelligence and training reports officers. For  example, according to one regional director, to enhance the quality of  reporting, DHS restricted the development and reporting of intelligence  information reports to reports officers. Before this change, I&A intelligence  officers, among others, were involved in producing homeland intelligence  reports for DHS and the intelligence community, which the congressional  report notes were, in some instances, unrelated to terrorism and  outdated, among other things. One supervisory reports officer we  interviewed said that the goal is to standardize the reporting and approval  of intelligence reports before releasing them to I&A for further review and  then on to the intelligence community. One other reports officer said that  I&A also enhanced training for reports officers by increasing the training  itinerary from 2 to 3 weeks, in part to spend more time on certain issues— such as cyber security analysis—and place additional emphasis on the  quality of reporting over the quantity of reports generated. I&A expanded  the reports officer training as part of an officer certification program, which  includes supervised on-the-job training as well as an assessment of an  officer’s reporting for compliance with standards.
United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on  Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Federal Support for and Involvement in  State and Local Fusion Centers (Washington D.C.: Oct. 3, 2012).
section_title: FBI Headquarters Has Developed Guidance to Help Its Field Offices Determine the Level of Engagement They Should Have with Fusion Centers
paragraphs: As of June 2014, the FBI had deployed 94 intelligence analysts, special  agents, and others to 58 fusion centers, and had installed its secure data  system (FBINet) at 51 centers. While local field office management  makes deployment decisions, FBI headquarters developed guidance in  August 2011 that contains several factors local management is to  consider when deciding the type of engagement the office will have in  supporting a fusion center. These factors include the extent to which  the fusion center mission aligns with the FBI’s mission, particularly  related to counterterrorism—for example, both organizations share  information on terrorism-related activities;
FBI management participates in the fusion center governance  structure;  the fusion center operates in an accredited secure work environment  and has a process to receive, handle, store, and disseminate  classified information;  the fusion center is capable of receiving, analyzing, disseminating,  and gathering information that contributes to the understanding of the  current threat environment; and  the fusion center immediately shares all emerging, terrorism-related  information with the FBI, such as suspicious activity reports.
In addition to this overarching guidance, in February 2013, the FBI  developed guidance identifying the key roles and responsibilities of FBI  personnel assigned to work with fusion centers. As noted in the  document, this guidance is intended to provide additional policy and  governance to the field and facilitate uniformity across the FBI while  recognizing that individual roles and responsibilities may vary based on  fusion center maturity, operational capability, and other factors. The FBI  has identified three types of engagement levels it uses to support fusion  centers: enhanced (interaction with centers on a regular and reoccurring  basis), basic (interaction with centers on a liaison to part-time basis), and  liaison (no dedicated resources but FBI maintains an information sharing  relationship with the centers). As of July 2014, of the 78 total fusion  centers in the National Network, FBI data showed that 38 centers  received enhanced support, 20 centers received basic support, and 19  centers received liaison support.
At all 8 of the fusion centers we visited that had FBI personnel deployed,  FBI field office management—generally an assistant special agent-in- charge—were involved in the decision to support fusion center activities  with personnel and non-personnel resources. Managers at 2 fusion  centers said that they also provide guidance and oversight to deployed  intelligence analysts and agents regarding their roles and responsibilities,  and define general expectations in analysts’ and agents’ performance  work plans. The FBI tasks personnel deployed to fusion centers with  various duties, which can include performing liaison services with federal,  state, local, and private sector partners; reviewing suspicious activity  reports for dissemination to fusion center partners; briefing DHS and  fusion center personnel on threats; and collaborating with DHS and fusion  center staff to develop joint products. FBI officials noted that specific roles  and responsibilities for deployed staff also depend on factors such as the  size and maturity of the fusion center. For example, at 1 larger center with  an established history of FBI engagement we visited, an FBI supervisory  intelligence analyst managed the fusion center’s intelligence unit, which  consisted of about 35 intelligence analysts. At a smaller center, the FBI  intelligence analyst was primarily involved in vetting suspicious activity  reports. Among the responsibilities identified by other FBI analysts we  spoke with included providing center personnel with intelligence  information to enhance situational awareness, intelligence briefings to  fusion center leadership, and analysis for the fusion center’s tactical  efforts.
Fusion center directors at all 10 of the locations we visited generally  viewed engagement with the FBI as beneficial to the center. For example,  officials at 1 center noted that access to FBINet was particularly helpful to  determine if persons of interest had been the subject of any prior  investigations. Officials at another center noted that their relationship with  the FBI is working well since issues related to how the center vetted tips  and leads before submitting them to the FBI for processing have been  resolved. Specifically, this center now embeds personnel on a rotational  basis with the FBI unit that reviews these tips and leads. At another fusion  center, where the FBI’s engagement included a management role in the  center’s intelligence unit, center officials said that the bureau recognizes  the overall value that the center provides in supporting intelligence  activities.
section_title: CBP and ICE Headquarters Rely on Field Office Management to Make Deployment Decisions; CBP Headquarters Is Developing Additional Guidance
paragraphs: CBP and ICE headquarters officials said that local field office  management independently makes staff deployment decisions. The  officials noted that management generally bases decisions on existing  relationships with fusion center personnel and management interpretation  of shared mission goals with the center, rather than headquarters-level  guidance. For example, one CBP field office determined that because it  shared information with the fusion center on issues of mutual interest in  the southwest region of the country—such as border security—and both  the field office and center provided investigative leads to state, local, and  federal law enforcement partners, among other things, the field office  would deploy an officer to the center.
According to our interviews with headquarters and field office  representatives, roles and responsibilities for deployed CBP and ICE  personnel can include activities similar to those performed by I&A and FBI  personnel—such as providing liaison support for fusion center operations,  access to component data systems, and investigative case support— while also supporting the components’ own missions. For example, a  CBP supervisory official we interviewed said that the primary  responsibilities of one such deployment included an individual supporting  the activities of a task force consisting of fusion center partners, as well  as engaging with the DHS intelligence analyst that was deployed to the  center to develop intelligence products. An ICE intelligence analyst we  interviewed said that, in addition to performing ICE-related work priorities,  the analyst’s key roles within the center included coordinating  investigative activities and providing data in support of the center’s  investigative unit.
CBP and ICE headquarters officials said that they have not created  guidance to date for field office management to consider when making  deployment decisions primarily because field offices are decentralized  units with the authority to make such decisions independent of  headquarters management. However, in June 2014, CBP headquarters  officials said that they are developing a strategy to assist the agency in  determining the most appropriate locations and mechanisms to provide  personnel support to fusion centers and other CBP partners. The officials  noted that CBP expects to complete the strategy in fiscal year 2015.  According to the officials, the strategy will include several elements,  including (1) a listing of all existing CBP partnerships with fusion centers  and other agencies, (2) a matrix to evaluate current and potential future  partnerships against CBP mission needs and operational requirements,  and (3) training and equipment requirements to ensure consistency  across all partnerships.
ICE headquarters officials did not plan to develop additional guidance to  help govern field office personnel deployments. However, DHS is taking  additional actions to provide departmental components with information  on the support priorities and personnel requirements of individual fusion  centers. For example, I&A conducted a survey of fusion centers in 2010— and a follow-up data call in 2012—to help identify fusion center needs for  DHS component personnel to meet the centers’ operational mission and  requirements. Further, according to a senior I&A official, the forthcoming  Federal Framework for Supporting the National Network of Fusion  Centers is to include information related to federal resource allocations to  fusion centers and is intended to respond, in part, to the efforts called for  by the NFCA. DHS also issued the Implementation Guidance for the  Federal Resource Allocation Criteria Policy in September 2014.  According to the document, this guidance is designed to assist federal  agencies in planning and tracking resource deployments. Among the  elements included in the guidance are recommended best practices for  collecting data on support resources provided to fusion centers. These  suggested practices are intended to promote additional consistency  across federal agencies and help provide more comprehensive  information on the overall federal investment in fusion centers.
section_title: Grant Reforms Are Helping DHS Track Fusion Center Projects, but DHS Cannot Accurately Account for Total Funding Provided to Centers
subsections: section_title: Grant Reforms Are Helping DHS Ensure That Requests for Federal Funding to Support Fusion Centers Are Aligned with Expected Capabilities
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2011, FEMA initiated a requirement that each fusion center  complete DHS’s annual baseline capabilities assessment to be eligible for  HSGP funding, and federal officials began reviewing the grant requests to  ensure that proposed projects target the achievement or sustainment of  identified capabilities. Since that time, FEMA and SLPO officials have  collaborated to help ensure that each fusion center grant request  incorporates the results of the annual assessment as part of the  investment justification. Specifically, HSGP grant guidance calls for each  fusion center investment justification to describe the investment; identify  how the investment supports state or urban area homeland security goals  and objectives; explain capability gaps that the investment is intended to  address; and describe the outcomes the investment is to achieve, among  other things.
Since fiscal year 2012, the grant guidance also requires the investment  justification to further identify the specific capabilities and assessment  attributes that the proposed projects are intended to address. According  to SLPO officials who are responsible for reviewing these investment  justifications, the guidance requires narrative statements that support the  justifications to include explicit references to the capabilities covered  within the annual fusion center assessment. The officials stated that they  review each justification to ensure that these narratives adequately  address any identified capability gaps. SLPO officials also noted that the  narratives have improved from year -to -year based upon feedback  provided to grantees, including that FEMA rejected some requests until it  received additional information.
Our review of the fiscal year 2013 investment justifications for the 10  fusion centers we visited showed that the narratives routinely referenced  targeted capabilities, with most of the narratives focusing on sustaining  existing capabilities rather than initiating new ones. For example, the  most common areas targeted for funding were maintenance and  upgrades of existing technology platforms and sustainment of current  staff positions. DHS officials stated that sustainment of existing  capabilities would likely be the area of emphasis going forward but noted  that these narratives would remain helpful to identify network trends and  needs, particularly as funding becomes further constrained. While our  review indicated that many of the supporting narratives within the  investment justifications lacked explicit details—potentially, in part,  because of the focus on sustainment of existing staff positions and  technology systems rather than new capabilities—these grant  requirements and corresponding review procedures provide a mechanism  to help ensure that requested fusion center projects are addressing the  achievement of identified baseline capabilities.
section_title: FEMA Has Improved Tracking of Federal Grants for Fusion Centers, but Data on Total Levels of Federal Funding Remain Unreliable
paragraphs: In September 2010, we reported on Congress’ interest in knowing the  amount of federal funding going to support fusion center operations.  However, in the past, DHS generally, and FEMA more specifically, have  had challenges in tracking this amount because of the way FEMA  captured funding data in its systems. Moreover, a 2012 congressional  committee report cited concerns regarding DHS’s ability to provide  adequate oversight of its financial support for fusion centers. According  to FEMA grant management officials, FEMA initiated a new grant  requirement for the 2012 grant cycle in part to address these concerns  and help ensure more reliable reporting on fusion center grant funding in  the future.
Historically, FEMA relied upon a keyword search of its grant management  system to identify likely fusion center projects and related funding.
However, according to the 2012 committee report, depending on the  keywords searched, FEMA estimated that grant funding provided to  fusion centers from 2003 through 2010 ranged from $289 million to as  much as $1.4 billion. Subsequently, FEMA initiated a new requirement  for the fiscal year 2012 grant cycle that called for states to submit a  separate investment justification for all fusion center projects requested to  be funded through the HSGP. As part of this justification, FEMA requires  grant applicants to categorize individual fusion center projects among six  designated spending categories—equipment, exercises, management  and administration, organization, planning, and training. FEMA is to  capture this information in its grant management system, which is to allow  FEMA to account for aggregate spending in these individual areas across  the National Network. FEMA also requires states to specifically identify  fusion center projects—via a check mark—on all subsequent reports that  these entities submit to FEMA every 6 months, providing the status of  project implementation.
FEMA’s 2012 grant requirements represent an improvement over  keyword searches in identifying fusion center projects and funding, but  the data are unreliable, as grantees have incorrectly categorized many  projects. Specifically, in response to our request, FEMA provided data  indicating that states obligated approximately $124 million of DHS grant  funding to support fusion centers across the network in fiscal year 2012.  However, upon further review of the individual project descriptions that  states reported, FEMA and SLPO officials determined that states  incorrectly categorized many fusion center projects. These include cases  in which projects supported broader capabilities not directly related to  fusion centers—such as emergency management positions—as well as  those that were not specifically supporting center operations. For  example, one urban area reported obligating $14 million to a fusion center  for automated license plate readers and video surveillance equipment,  although the center will be one of a number of system users. Given that  FEMA identified that the $124 million estimate contained non-fusion- center-related projects, the figure is unreliable for quantifying total federal  grant funding provided to support fusion center operations in 2012. As an  alternative estimate of fusion center grant funding, SLPO officials  provided us with data on annual fusion center budgets that they collected  via the annual assessment process. According to these data that fusion  center directors reported, centers received approximately $60 million in  DHS grant funding to support their operations in fiscal year 2012. We  did not independently evaluate the reliability of this estimate; however, an  SLPO official stated that the $60 million estimate was generally consistent  with the amount remaining from the $124 million figure provided once  non-fusion-center-related projects were subtracted.
To address this issue, FEMA is planning additional efforts to help states  better categorize fusion center projects and improve the reliability of grant  reporting. Specifically, for grant awards issued prior to fiscal year 2014,  FEMA plans to provide supplemental guidance to grantees in advance of  the next reporting period, which ends on December 31, 2014. According  to FEMA officials, this guidance will direct grantees to reassess specified  projects to determine if they are properly identified as supporting fusion  centers. Additionally, the FEMA officials plan to introduce a series of  questions within the FEMA grant reporting system by the end of calendar  year 2014 to help grantees assess if designated projects should remain  categorized as support to fusion centers. These combined efforts, if  implemented as proposed, could provide grantees with information they  need to make revisions to incorrect categorizations and help address data  reliability issues.
As proposed, the efforts discussed above could also serve to support the  overall enhancement of project-level reporting that FEMA is currently  implementing, in part, to address our prior recommendations. Although  these efforts are not specific to fusion centers, we reported in February  2012 that FEMA lacked visibility over project-level details—particularly  within the SHSP and UASI grant programs—and we recommended that  DHS collect project information with sufficient detail to identify potential  duplication. DHS concurred with this recommendation and, beginning  with the 2014 grant cycle, FEMA started implementing a project-based  application and reporting process that is intended to help improve  oversight for individual projects. FEMA plans for this initiative to be fully  implemented for fiscal year 2015.process is intended to help ensure that FEMA receives more  comprehensive information from state grantees about project objectives  and overall implementation progress.
FEMA officials reported that this  The combined efforts of additional guidance and implementation of  project-level reporting may help states better categorize fusion center  projects, improve the reliability of grant reporting, and enhance oversight  of the projects. However, FEMA does not have plans to specifically  review state reporting to ensure that grantees act in accordance with the  proposed guidance—such as using the drop-down menus as intended— and take steps to revise any misclassified fusion center projects. It is  important that projects be accurately categorized, as FEMA uses these  data to determine the overall level of federal investment in fusion centers.  FEMA officials stated that overall grant monitoring efforts are expected to  help improve the reliability of fusion center funding data, but they noted  that only a sample of fusion centers will be targeted through these  processes. While sampling remains a reasonable approach for FEMA to conduct monitoring across the large number of HSGP projects  implemented annually, this approach is not likely to provide FEMA with  sufficient visibility over fusion center projects because each state reports  information independently and any actions taken by one state to  recategorize projects are not generalizable to others. Given the past  problems related to data reliability and FEMA not knowing why states  may have initially miscategorized fusion center projects, additional actions  beyond the monitoring efforts currently planned are important. According  to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, monitoring is  important not only to assess the quality of performance over time but also  to ensure that audit findings are promptly resolved. Development of a  specific mechanism to ensure that states act in accordance with the  forthcoming guidance could provide FEMA reasonable assurance that  fusion center projects are properly classified and accurately account for  total grant funding provided to centers. Such a mechanism could include,  for example, having SPLO officials review those projects that states  identify as supporting fusion centers to verify that states have accurately  done so in accordance with the guidance. SPLO officials are in a position  to conduct this review based on their knowledge of the results of the  annual center assessments, input from DHS representatives at fusion  centers, and other means. Developing a mechanism to ensure that states  act in accordance with the proposed guidance could provide DHS,  congressional, and other decision makers with more accurate information  on the level of federal investment in centers to help decision makers  determine future levels of investment.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: As focal points within states and urban areas for the receipt, analysis,  gathering, and dissemination of law enforcement, homeland security, and  terrorism information, fusion centers are uniquely situated to help  enhance the national threat picture and help protect the country. As these  centers continue to mature, it remains important for DHS to identify the  results that centers are achieving and how federal agencies can help  support and leverage these centers. The recent expansion of  performance measures is a positive step in this process, as are plans to  move forward with additional exercises to further evaluate fusion center  capabilities. DHS grant funding also remains an important component of  federal support to fusion centers, but to date, FEMA has not been able to  accurately account for and report on the amount of funds it has provided  to centers. FEMA’s proposed efforts to help ensure that grantees provide  more accurate information on fusion center projects remain critical to  improving reporting, but implementation of a specific mechanism to verify  that states have acted in accordance with the forthcoming guidance  would further help ensure that these efforts are achieving their intended  purpose and fusion center grant reporting is reliable.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help provide reasonable assurance that data states report on the  amount of federal grant funding used to support fusion centers is reliable,  we recommend that the FEMA Administrator implement a mechanism to  verify that states act in accordance with the proposed grant reporting  guidance, when implemented.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ for review and  comment. In its written comments, summarized below and reprinted in  appendix II, DHS concurred with the recommendation and described  actions planned to address it. In addition, DHS provided technical  comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate. On  October 27, 2014, DOJ’s Audit Liaison Group informed us via email that  the department did not have any comments on our draft report.
DHS concurred with our recommendation that FEMA develop a  mechanism to verify that states act in accordance with proposed  guidance to help ensure that data reporting on the amount of federal  grant funding used to support fusion centers is reliable. Specifically, DHS  said that beginning in January 2015, FEMA—in coordination with I&A as  appropriate—will review all fusion center projects to determine whether  state reported expenditures are actually in support of a designated fusion  center. In the event that the review identifies discrepancies, DHS said that  FEMA will work with grantees to obtain additional clarification. In addition,  DHS noted that any grantees currently scheduled for monitoring in fiscal  year 2015 will receive an in-depth review of all fusion center projects, to  include an examination of project progress, impediments to timely  completion, and verification of funding data provided by the state. If fully  implemented, DHS’s planned efforts will address the intent of the  recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security; the Attorney General, the Commissioner of Customs and Border  Protection, the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and  appropriate congressional committees. The report is also available at no  charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Summary of Fusion Center Performance Measures
paragraphs: This appendix provides a summary of performance measures that the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—in consultation with other  partners—has established for the National Network of Fusion Centers.  DHS grouped the performance measures by six outcome and five output  categories. Table 6 shows a description of measures, their  implementation status, and aggregated performance results across the  National Network, as reported in the 2013 National Network of Fusion  Centers, Final Report.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Eric Erdman (Assistant Director),  Eric Hauswirth, Ryan Lambert, Thomas Lombardi, Linda Miller, Marvin  McGill, and Jessica Orr made significant contributions to this report.