Nuclear Weapons: Some Actions Have Been Taken to Address Challenges with the Uranium Processing Facility Design
Published: 2014-10-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: NNSA conducts enriched uranium activities—including producing components for nuclear warheads—at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee. NNSA has identified key shortcomings in the Y-12 plant's current uranium operations, including rising costs due to the facility's age. In 2004, NNSA decided to build a new facility—the UPF—to consolidate and modernize its enriched uranium activities. In July 2012, the UPF contractor concluded that the UPF's processing equipment would not fit into the facility as designed, and that addressing this issue—which NNSA refers to as a “space/fit” issue—would cost an additional $540 million.
The Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act mandated that GAO periodically assess the UPF. This is the fourth report, and it assesses (1) factors NNSA identified that contributed to the UPF space/fit issue and (2) actions, if any, NNSA and the UPF contractor have taken to address the space/fit issue.
GAO reviewed NNSA and contractor documents, visited the Y-12 plant, interviewed NNSA and UPF contractor representatives, and observed the computer model NNSA and the UPF contractor use to track space usage within the facility.
GAO is not making any new recommendations. In commenting on a draft of this report, NNSA generally agreed with GAO's findings.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In January 2013, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) completed a review to identify the factors that contributed to the space/fit issue with the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), and identified a number of factors within both NNSA and the contractor managing the UPF design at that time. NNSA's review identified shortcomings in 1) federal oversight of the project, 2) design integration, 3) communications, and 4) the UPF contractor's management processes and procedures. For example, NNSA determined that it did not have adequate federal staff to perform effective oversight of the project, and that the design inputs for the computer model the contractor used to allocate and track space utilization within the facility were not well integrated. NNSA also found that communications shortcomings occurred because the contractor did not always provide timely notification to the NNSA project office of emerging concerns, and that the contractor's management processes and procedures did not formally identify, evaluate, or act on technical concerns in a timely manner.
NNSA and the UPF contractor took actions to address the factors that contributed to the space/fit issue, and NNSA has begun to share lessons learned from the space/fit issue, consistent with both Department of Energy (DOE) guidance and GAO's prior recommendation to ensure that future projects benefit from lessons learned. Specifically, NNSA has taken actions to improve its oversight of the project by increasing federal staffing levels for the UPF project office from 9 full-time equivalents (FTE) in 2012 to more than 50 FTEs as of January 2014. According to NNSA officials, these additional staff enabled NNSA to conduct more robust oversight of the contractor's design efforts than was previously possible. The contractor also took steps to better integrate the efforts of the four subcontractors that are conducting design and engineering work on different elements of the facility. For example, in late 2012 the contractor hired an engineer to integrate the subcontractors' design work and ensure that all design changes were incorporated into the contractor's computer model. The contractor also improved design integration by developing a monthly assessment process to evaluate and report on space utilization in the facility. In addition, according to an NNSA official, communications between NNSA and the contractor significantly improved after the space/fit issue was identified as the contractor kept NNSA better informed of emerging concerns and its plans to address them. The contractor also developed formal management processes for identifying and tracking the status of major technical and engineering issues. For example, the contractor implemented processes for tracking the identification and resolution of both technical and non-technical issues during the design process. In addition, NNSA has recently begun to share lessons learned from the space/fit issue, consistent with DOE guidance and our prior recommendation to ensure that future projects benefit from lessons learned. For example, in July 2014, the UPF federal project director conducted a presentation on lessons learned from the UPF project, including lessons learned from the space/fit issue, at a training session for NNSA federal project directors.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, is the  National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) site for conducting  enriched uranium activities, producing uranium-related components for  nuclear warheads and bombs, and processing nuclear fuel for the U.S.  Navy. According to NNSA documents, the Y-12 plant’s current enriched  uranium operations, which are conducted in four separate facilities, have  key shortcomings including: (1) an inefficient workflow; (2) continually  rising operations and maintenance costs due to facility age; and (3)  hazardous processes that could expose workers to radiological  contamination, among other things. To address these shortcomings, in  2004, NNSA decided to construct a new Uranium Processing Facility  (UPF). NNSA planned to construct a single, consolidated facility less  than half the size of existing facilities; reduce costs by using modern  processing equipment; and incorporate features to increase worker  protection and environmental health and safety.
In November 2011, the UPF contractor identified a concern that the  facility might not have adequate space to accommodate all processing  equipment and, in April 2012, when the UPF contractor assessed the  facility’s design to be 76 percent complete and planned to begin  construction in 2014, the contractor informed NNSA of its space concerns  and began working to resolve the issue. By July 2012, the UPF contractor  concluded that the UPF’s processing equipment would not fit into the  facility as designed, and that, as a result, the roof of the planned 388,000  square foot facility would have to be raised 13 feet. In July 2013, we  reported that addressing this issue, which NNSA referred to as a  “space/fit issue,” would require substantial design rework, cost an  additional $540 million, and delay the start of facility operations by 13  months, according to NNSA. NNSA estimated in 2012 that completing  the first phase of the UPF project will cost between $4.2 and $6.5 billion.  Based on the space/fit issue, NNSA rated the contractor’s fiscal year  2012 UPF performance as “unsatisfactory,” and agency officials told us  that NNSA denied the contractor $5 million out of $5.7 million in award  fees for its UPF work in fiscal year 2012.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 renamed UPF as the  Uranium Capabilities Replacement Project. actions, if any, NNSA and the UPF contractor have taken to address the  space/fit issue.
To do this work, we reviewed NNSA and contractor documents related to  the space/fit issue, including root cause analyses prepared by NNSA and  the UPF contractor, corrective action plans and monthly fit assessment  reports prepared by the UPF contractor, and a space/fit oversight review  prepared by NNSA. In addition, we interviewed NNSA and UPF  contractor representatives responsible for monitoring and addressing  space/fit issues. We also visited the Y-12 plant, received briefings from  NNSA officials and UPF contractor representatives, and observed a 3D  model NNSA and the UPF contractor used to track space usage within  the facility.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2013 to October  2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 1990, we designated DOE program and contract management as an  area at high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In  January 2009, to recognize progress made at DOE’s Office of Science,  we narrowed the focus of the high-risk designation to two DOE program  elements—NNSA and the Office of Environmental Management. In  February 2013, our most recent high-risk update, we further narrowed this  focus to major projects (i.e., projects over $750 million) at NNSA and the  Office of Environmental Management.
DOE has taken some steps to address our concerns, including  developing an order in 2010 (Order 413.3B) that defines DOE’s project  management principles and process for executing a capital asset  construction project, which can include building or demolishing facilities or  constructing remediation systems. NNSA is required by DOE to manage  the UPF construction project in accordance with this order. The project  management process defined in Order 413.3B requires DOE projects to  go through five management reviews and approvals, called “critical  decisions” (CD), as they move forward from project planning and design  to construction to operation. The CDs are as follows:
CD 0: Approve a mission-related need.
CD 1: Approve an approach to meet a mission need and a preliminary  cost estimate.
CD 2: Approve the project’s cost, schedule and scope targets.
CD 3: Approve the start of construction.
CD 4: Approve the start of operations.
In August 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Energy originally approved CD 1  for the UPF with a cost range of $1.4 to $3.5 billion. In June 2012, prior to  the UPF contractor’s August 2012 determination that the facility would  need to be enlarged due to the space/fit issue, the Deputy Secretary of  Energy reaffirmed CD 1 for the UPF with an estimated cost range of $4.2  to $6.5 billion and approved a phased approach to the project, which  deferred significant portions of the project’s original scope. According to  NNSA documents, this deferral was due, in part, to the multibillion dollar  increase in the project’s cost estimate and to accelerate the completion of  the highest priority scope. In July 2013, NNSA decided to combine CD 2  and CD 3 for the first phase of UPF, with approval planned by October  2015.of June 2012, and proposed start of operations.
Table 1 shows the UPF’s phases, scope of work, cost estimate as  Infrastructure Strategy for the Y-12 plant. In early February 2014,  the NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs directed his  staff to develop an Enriched Uranium Infrastructure Strategy to  establish the framework of how NNSA will maintain the Y-12 plant’s  uranium mission capabilities into the future. Key aspects considered  during the strategy’s development included, among other things: (1)  an evaluation of the uranium purification capabilities currently  conducted in building 9212 and the throughput needed to support  requirements for life extension programs and nuclear fuel for the U.S.  Navy; (2) an evaluation of the alternatives to the UPF that prioritizes  replacement capabilities by risk to nuclear safety, security, and  mission continuity; (3) an identification of existing infrastructure as a  bridging strategy until replacement capability is available in new  infrastructure. A draft of the strategy was delivered to the Deputy  Administrator in April 2014. NNSA is currently revising the draft, and  an NNSA official said that the agency has not yet determined when it  will deliver a revised version to the Deputy Administrator.
NNSA is currently evaluating alternatives to replacing enriched  uranium operations at the Y-12 plant with a single facility. In early  January 2014, NNSA began to consider options other than the UPF  for enriched uranium operations at the Y-12 plant because, according  to the UPF Federal Project Director, the project is facing budget  constraints, rising costs, and competition from other high-priority  projects within NNSA—such as the planned B61 bomb and W78/88  warhead nuclear weapon life extension projects. On April 15, 2014,  NNSA completed a peer review that identified an alternative to  replacing enriched uranium operations with a single facility. The  results of the review, which were released to the public on May 1,  2014, included a proposed solution for replacing or relocating only  Building 9212 capabilities (uranium purification and casting) by 2025  at a cost not exceeding $6.5 billion. This proposed solution would  require NNSA to (1) construct two new, smaller facilities to house  casting and other processing capabilities, (2) upgrade existing  facilities at the Y-12 plant to house other uranium processing  capabilities currently housed in Building 9212, and (3) appoint a  senior career executive within NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs  with the responsibility and authority to coordinate the agency’s overall  enriched uranium strategy. As of July 2014, NNSA was still evaluating  the review’s recommendations, but the NNSA Acting Administrator  previously stated that NNSA does not plan to continue full operations  in Building 9212, which has been operational for over 60 years, past  2025 because the building does not meet modern safety standards,  and increasing equipment failure rates present challenges to meeting  required production targets. In addition, according to NNSA officials,  while NNSA was conducting its review, the UPF project team  suspended some design, site preparation, and procurement activities  that could potentially be impacted by the range of alternatives being  considered.
section_title: NNSA Identified a Number of Factors That Contributed to the Space/Fit Issue
paragraphs: In January 2013, NNSA completed a review to identify the factors that  contributed to the space/fit issue. This review took into account the  actions completed by the contractor or in progress since the space/fit  issue was identified, input from the contractor, and NNSA’s own  experience with and knowledge of the project. NNSA identified a number  of factors that contributed to the space/fit issue within both the contractor  and NNSA organizations.
Specifically:
NNSA oversight. NNSA identified limitations in its oversight of the  project. Specifically, NNSA determined that it did not have adequate  staff to perform effective technical oversight of the project, and  requests and directives from NNSA to the UPF contractor were not  always implemented because NNSA did not always follow up.  According to NNSA officials, when the space/fit issue was identified in  2012, the UPF project office was staffed by nine full-time equivalents  (FTE). The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board also raised  concerns on several occasions prior to the space/fit issue about  whether this level of staffing was adequate to perform effective  oversight of the contractor’s activities.
Design integration. NNSA found that the design inputs from  subcontractors for the contractor’s 3D computer model, used to  allocate and track space usage within the facility, were not well  integrated. In 2008, the UPF contractor subcontracted portions of the  design work, such as glovebox and process area design, to four  subcontractors, and to track how these design elements fit together,  the UPF contractor developed a model management system that  generates a 3D computer model of the facility as the design  progresses. This 3D model was intended to, among other things,  allow the contractor to determine whether there is adequate space in  the building’s design for all processing equipment and utilities, or  whether changes to the design are necessary to provide additional  space. However, according to NNSA officials, prior to the space/fit  issue, the design work of the four subcontractors was not well  integrated into the model, and as a result, the model did not  accurately reflect the most current design.
Communications. NNSA identified communications shortcomings  throughout the project. For example, the contractor did not always  provide timely notification to the NNSA project office of emerging  concerns and did not engage NNSA in development of plans to  address these concerns. NNSA found that there was reluctance on  the part of the contractor to share information with NNSA without first  fully vetting the information and obtaining senior management  approval. In addition, NNSA found that a “chilled” work environment  had developed within the UPF contractor organization, and that, as a  result, communications from the working level and mid-level  managers up to senior management were limited because of  concerns of negative consequences. Furthermore, communications  between the NNSA project office, the UPF contractor, and NNSA  headquarters were limited by a complex chain of command.  According to NNSA officials, prior to 2013, the UPF project was  managed by NNSA’s Y-12 Site Office, and the UPF Federal Project  Director reported to NNSA at a relatively low level. NNSA officials said  that, as a result, any concerns with the UPF project had to compete  for attention with many other issues facing the Y-12 site as a whole.
Management processes and procedures. NNSA found that the  contractor’s management processes and procedures did not formally  identify, evaluate, or act on technical concerns in a timely manner. In  addition, NNSA found that the UPF contractor’s project management  procedures had shortcomings in areas such as risk management,  design integration, and control of the technical baseline documents.  Specifically, some of the contractor’s procedures were not project- specific and could not be used for work on the UPF project without  authorizing deviations or providing additional instructions. According  to NNSA, these shortcomings led in part to inadequate control of the  design development process, as the contractor did not document  interim decisions to deviate from the design baseline, adequately  describe the design, or maintain it under configuration control.
section_title: NNSA and the UPF Contractor Have Taken Some Actions to Address Factors That Contributed to the Space/Fit Issue, and NNSA Has Begun to Share Lessons Learned
paragraphs: In response to NNSA’s review of the factors that contributed to the  space/fit issue, NNSA and the UPF contractor have both taken some  actions to address the factors identified by the review. In addition, NNSA  has begun to share lessons learned from the UPF project consistent with  both DOE’s project management order, which states that lessons learned  should be captured throughout the course of capital asset construction  projects, as well as our prior recommendation to ensure that future  projects benefit from lessons learned. The specific actions NNSA and  the contractor have taken include the following:
NNSA oversight. NNSA has taken actions to improve its oversight of  the UPF project to ensure that it is aware of emerging technical issues  and the steps the contractor is taking to address them by, among  other things, increasing staffing levels for the UPF project office from  9 FTEs in 2012 to more than 50 FTEs as of January 2014. According  to NNSA officials, many of the additional staff members are technical  experts in areas such as engineering and nuclear safety, and these  additional staff have enabled NNSA to conduct more robust oversight  of the contractor’s design efforts than was previously possible. For  example, in July 2013, NNSA used some of these additional staff to  conduct an in-depth assessment of the UPF contractor’s design  solution for the space/fit issue. This assessment found that, among  other things, as of July 2013, the facility design and 3D model were  not sufficiently complete to determine whether there was adequate  space remaining in parts of the facility to accommodate all required  equipment while still providing adequate margin for future design  changes during construction and commissioning. The assessment  also found that the contractor’s monthly space/fit assessment reports,  developed to evaluate and report on space utilization in the facility,  were providing an overly optimistic view of space/fit, leading to a low  level of senior management engagement in resolving these issues.  According to NNSA officials, as of January 2014, the UPF contractor  had taken actions to address many of the assessment’s findings, and  the agency plans to continue to monitor the contractor’s performance  closely in these areas through its normal oversight activities, such as  attending periodic meetings to review the 3D model.
Design integration. According to NNSA and UPF contractor officials,  the UPF contractor took steps to better integrate the efforts of the  subcontractors conducting design and engineering work on different  elements of the facility. For example, in late 2012, the UPF contractor  hired a model integration engineer to integrate the subcontractors’  design work and ensure that all design changes are incorporated into  the model so that it accurately reflects the most current design. The  model integration engineer also manages a team of subject matter  experts who monitor space utilization in each individual process area  as the design progresses and conduct monthly assessments of the  space margins remaining in each area. In addition, the UPF contractor  also developed a formal change control process to define and  manage space within the 3D model. Under this process, design  changes made by the individual design teams must be submitted to  the model integration engineer for approval to ensure that they do not  exceed the boundaries established for each process area or interfere  with other equipment. Furthermore, changes that have a significant  impact on equipment layout must be approved by a review board prior  to being accepted and integrated into the model. According to  contractor officials, as of January 2014, the subcontractor teams had  submitted 111 change requests, and 75 requests had been approved.  The officials said that they are working to reduce the remaining  backlog.
According to NNSA, the contractor also developed a monthly space/fit  assessment process to evaluate and report on space utilization in the  facility. As part of this process, the model integration team evaluates  the space remaining in each process area of the facility to determine  whether each area has (1) no space/fit challenges, (2) no current  space/fit challenges but the potential for challenges in the future as a  result of the design being less complete than other areas, or (3)  confirmed space/fit challenges, i.e., areas where design changes are  necessary to ensure that all equipment will fit into the space allotted to  it. The model integration team then prepares a report and briefs senior  project management on its findings. According to a UPF contractor  document, as of December 2013, 26 process areas had no space/fit  challenges, 13 process areas had no challenges but had the potential  for challenges in the future, and 2 process areas had confirmed  space/fit challenges. NNSA and UPF contractor officials said that, as  of January 2014, they were confident that these remaining space/fit  challenges can be addressed within the current size parameters of the  facility, but that the project will not have absolute certainty about  space/fit until the design is fully complete. Instead, the project will only  be able to gradually reduce the amount of space/fit uncertainty and  risk as the detailed design progresses. However, the officials said  that, prior to CD 2/3 approval, the contractor is required to conduct a  detailed review of the 3D model to ensure there is adequate space for  all equipment and utilities, and NNSA plans to assess the results of  this review.
Communications. According to an NNSA official, communications  between NNSA and the contractor significantly improved after the  space/fit issue was identified, and the contractor kept NNSA better  informed of emerging concerns and its plans to address these  concerns. In addition, NNSA held a partnering session with the  contractor in June 2014, which included management representatives  from NNSA and the contractor in functional areas such as  engineering, nuclear safety, and procurement, and included  discussions on defining federal and contractor roles, managing  change, and mapping the path forward for the project. On July 15,  2014, NNSA and the contractor signed a formal partnering agreement  to enhance (1) clarity and alignment on mission and direction, (2)  transparency, (3) responsiveness, and (4) effectiveness in meeting  commitments, among other things. The agreement also included a  commitment to meet quarterly to discuss progress made toward  achieving these goals.
NNSA and UPF contractor officials also said that the contractor took  steps to enhance communications between working-level employees  and senior management and improve its organizational culture after  the space/fit issue was identified. For example, the contractor  established a Differing Professional Opinion (DPO) process through  which employees can raise concerns to project management, began  conducting annual surveys of the project’s safety culture to determine  the extent to which employees are willing to raise concerns, and  formally defined its safety culture policy to conform to guidelines  established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. According to  NNSA and UPF contractor officials, the contractor’s annual surveys  showed a steady improvement in employees’ willingness to bring  concerns and issues to management since the space/fit issue was  identified. In addition, the contractor also brought in additional senior  project and engineering managers from outside the UPF project in  order to foster greater communication between senior managers and  working-level employees.
In addition, NNSA recently reorganized its management of major  construction projects, including the UPF, resulting in more direct  communications between the UPF project office and NNSA  headquarters. Specifically, in 2012, the UPF FPD began reporting  directly to APM, rather than reporting to NNSA at a relatively low level  through the Y-12 Site Office, and NNSA officials said that this new  organizational structure has streamlined NNSA’s management of the  project by increasing the FPD’s control over project resources and  functions, as well as the FPD’s responsibility and accountability for  achieving project goals.
Management processes and procedures. According to the UPF  contractor, it developed formal processes for identifying and tracking  the status of major technical and engineering issues. For example,  according to NNSA and contractor officials, the contractor  implemented a process for tracking the project’s highest-priority action  items, as determined by the project’s management team, including  certain issues related to space/fit. Specifically, as of January 2014,  these items included actions to ensure that technical changes are fully  reviewed so that their impact on the project’s design, procurement  activities, and construction is understood. In addition, according to  UPF contractor officials, the contractor implemented a separate  system to track the identification and resolution of significant technical  issues during the design process, and any employee can submit a  technical issue for inclusion in this system if they believe that it is  serious enough to require management attention. After an issue is  added to the system, the corrective actions implemented to address it  are tracked until they are completed, and technical issues affecting  space/fit are placed into a separate, higher-priority category within the  system. As of January 2014, there were nine technical issues  affecting space/fit in this higher-priority category, and three of those  issues had been resolved. For example, in August 2013, the project  identified a technical issue in which one processing area did not  contain enough space to accommodate the replacement of a  component, but the project developed a solution that resolved the  issue in October 2013.
In addition, according to NNSA and the UPF contractor, the contractor  uses a separate system to track the status of non-technical issues  that are identified by project reviews. The contractor uses this system  to formally assign responsibility for any corrective actions to the  appropriate contractor personnel and to monitor the status of each  action until completion. In order for a corrective action to be closed out  in this system, the personnel responsible for the corrective action  must provide evidence of completion. For example, in April 2013, the  contractor identified nine corrective actions needed to address a  number of the contributing factors for the space/fit issue, and began  using this system to track their status. As of January 2014, six of  these actions had been completed, two were in process, and one had  been cancelled. For example, the contractor was still in the process of  reviewing and evaluating the procedure set used for the project to  identify any improvements necessary, and the cancelled corrective  action—the development of a communication partnering policy  between NNSA and the contractor—was replaced by the June 2014  partnering session discussed above.
NNSA has also recently begun to share lessons learned from the  space/fit issue. This was an original goal of NNSA’s review of the factors  that contributed to the space/fit issue, and is consistent with both DOE’s  project management order, which states that lessons learned should be  captured throughout the course of capital asset construction projects, as  well as our prior recommendation to ensure that future projects benefit  from lessons learned. NNSA officials said that lessons learned from the  space/fit issue had been informally incorporated into other NNSA  activities in a variety of ways, to include informing independent project  reviews and cost estimates, and led to a broader recognition of the need  for increased federal staffing levels to enhance NNSA’s oversight  activities on other projects. More recently, the UPF Federal Project  Director conducted a presentation on lessons learned from the UPF  project, including lessons learned from the space/fit issue, at a July 2014  training session for federal project directors. As we have noted in other  work, the sharing of lessons learned is an important element of NNSA’s  and DOE’s efforts to better inform and improve their management of other  capital acquisition projects. As we reported in December 2013, NNSA  estimated that it will need approximately $300 million per year between  2019 and 2038 in order to fund the construction projects it plans to  undertake during that time. Documenting the lessons learned as a result  of the UPF space/fit issue may help prevent other costly setbacks from  occurring on these other projects.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We are not making any new recommendations in this report. We provided  a draft of this report to NNSA for comment. In its written comments (see  appendix I), NNSA generally agreed with our findings. NNSA also  provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of NNSA, and  other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Jonathan Gill (Assistant  Director), Mike Armes, John Bauckman, Patrick Bernard, Antoinette  Capaccio, Will Horton, and Steven Putansu made key contributions to this  report.