DOD Joint Bases: Management Improvements Needed to Achieve Greater Efficiencies
Published: 2012-11-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: GAO has designated DOD support infrastructure as an area of high risk and included one key related category--installation support--as an area for potential savings. In 2005, DOD recommended to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission combining 26 installations into 12 joint bases to generate efficiencies and cost savings and, in 2010, completed this consolidation. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) DOD developed and implemented a plan to achieve cost savings and efficiencies at the joint bases, (2) joint base common standards provide a common framework to manage and plan for installation support services, and (3) DOD has a process to consistently identify and address any implementation challenges. GAO reviewed DOD policies and guidance on joint basing, visited 3 joint bases and obtained answers to written questions from the other 9, interviewed OSD and military service officials, and analyzed performance data on joint base support services.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has not developed or implemented a plan to guide joint bases in achieving cost savings and efficiencies. The Department of Defense (DOD) originally estimated saving $2.3 billion from joint basing over 20 years, but in the absence of a plan to drive savings, that estimate has fallen by almost 90 percent. OSD also does not yet have a fully developed method for accurately collecting information on costs, savings, and efficiencies achieved specifically from joint basing. GAO previously reported that organizational transformations such as merging components and transforming organizational cultures should be driven by top leadership, have implementation goals and a timeline to show progress, and include a communication strategy. Although the joint bases anecdotally reported achieving some savings and efficiencies, without an implementation plan to drive savings and a means to collect reliable information on the specific costs, estimated savings, and efficiencies from joint basing, DOD will not be able to facilitate achievement of the goals of cost savings and efficiencies, track the extent to which these goals have been achieved, or evaluate the continuation or expansion of joint basing.
The joint bases implemented common standards for installation support services developed by OSD, and in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 reported meeting the standards more than 70 percent of the time. However, three factors limited the usefulness of the reported standards as a common tool for managing installation support services: the lack of clarity in some standards, unclear standards that were not reviewed and changed in a timely manner, and data collection and reporting on the standards that in some cases adhered to individual service standards rather than the common standard. DOD guidance states that the purpose of the joint base common standards framework was to provide a common language to serve as a basis for planning and management across the joint bases, and GAO previously reported that performance measures should be clear and follow standard procedures. Without a consistent interpretation and reported use of the standards, OSD and the joint bases will not have reliable or comparable data with which to assess their service support levels.
OSD and the joint bases have various mechanisms in place to address challenges in achieving joint basing goals, such as a joint management oversight structure and annual OSD-joint base review meetings, but none of these routinely facilitates communication among the joint bases to identify solutions to common challenges. The reported challenges cover a wide range of issues, from different expectations among military services as to how base support services should be provided to incompatible information technology networks. However, the absence of a formal method to routinely share information on common challenges and possible solutions, or guidance on developing and providing training for new personnel on how joint bases provide installation support, means DOD is likely to miss opportunities to develop common solutions to common challenges. Federal internal control standards state that for an entity to control its operations, it must have relevant and timely communications, and information is needed throughout the agency to achieve objectives. In addition, without processes to identify common challenges and share information across the joint bases, DOD may miss opportunities for greater efficiencies and be unable to provide uniform policies across the joint bases.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD take six actions, such as developing a plan to achieve cost savings, prioritizing review and revision of unclear common standards, and developing a strategy to share solutions to common challenges. DOD partially agreed with five recommendations and did not concur with the recommendation to develop a plan to achieve cost savings, because it stated that such goals are not appropriate at this time. GAO continues to believe that the recommendations are valid as discussed further in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: GAO has designated Department of Defense (DOD) support  infrastructure as a high-risk area, and identified installation support as  one key support infrastructure category where opportunities existed for  savings. In originally citing support infrastructure as high risk, we stated  that reducing the cost of excess infrastructure activities was critical to  making use of scarce resources and maintaining high levels of military  capabilities. We reported that DOD believed that greater economies of  scale and savings could be achieved by further consolidation and  elimination of duplicate support services where military bases were  located close to one another or similar functions were performed at  multiple locations. However, we also noted that despite the potential for  reducing base operating support costs through greater reliance on  interservice-type agreements, differing service traditions and cultures and  concern over losing direct control of support assets had caused  commanders to resist such measures. In a subsequent recommendation  submitted to the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)  Commission, DOD proposed that the department consolidate 26 military  installations into 12 joint bases to take advantage of opportunities for  efficiencies arising from such consolidation and elimination of duplicate  support services on bases located close to one another. DOD estimated  that by taking this action it could save about $2.3 billion over a 20-year   In its justification for the recommendation, DOD noted, among  period.other things, that because the installations either shared a common  boundary or were in proximity to at least one other installation, and  performed common support functions, there was a significant opportunity  to reduce duplication of similar support services, which could produce  savings. The BRAC Commission approved a modified version of DOD’s  recommendation, which the commission found more fully reflected  statutory selection criteria and DOD’s force structure plan. Through  updates to our high-risk series reports, we have continued to monitor  DOD’s ability to achieve economies of scale and savings by consolidating  and eliminating duplicate installation support services. Our most recent  high-risk report, issued in February 2011, continued to designate DOD’s  management of its support infrastructure as an area of high risk. One of  the reasons for this designation was DOD’s lack of progress in achieving  the anticipated efficiencies and cost savings objectives associated with  consolidating installation services through the joint basing initiative.
DOD’s joint basing initiative—implemented in two phases, with 5 joint  bases established in October 2009 and the remaining 7 bases  established in October 2010—created 12 joint bases from the 26  installations that were originally operated by the Army, Navy, Air Force, or  Marine Corps, combining installation support services such as airfield  operations, grounds maintenance, and custodial services. The 2005  BRAC recommendation on joint basing established which military bases  would receive installation management functions from one or more other  bases. On the basis of these realignments, the Office of the Secretary of  Defense (OSD) designated the receiving military service as the lead for  delivering installation support at each joint base, and in 2008, OSD issued  further guidance for joint basing implementation. According to this  guidance, the lead service is referred to as the supporting component and  the military services receiving the installation support are referred to as  the supported components. OSD also established a set of joint base  common standards for providing consistent delivery of installation support  services to the 12 joint bases. According to the latest DOD information,  there are 280 joint base common standards grouped into 48 functional  areas. The standards cover a wide range of installation support services, from establishing the acceptable waiting time for ensuring that 100  percent of eligible children are placed within the base-run child  development program to conducting a minimum of two daily airfield  checks.
In 2009, we reviewed DOD’s progress to date toward meeting the joint  basing goals of increased efficiencies and cost savings. We reported that  the cost of installation support was expected to increase rather than  decrease due in part to the adoption of the new common standards,  which required higher levels of funding in some cases than the previous  standards, and because the services’ approach to implementing joint  basing would result in additional administrative costs and the loss of  some existing installation support efficiencies. As a result, in 2009 DOD  significantly reduced its estimated 20-year cost savings projection from  $2.3 billion to about $273 million. More recently, we reported in June  2012 that our analysis based on updated DOD estimates of the one-time  and recurring costs and savings from joint basing based on DOD’s fiscal  year 2011 BRAC budget submission to Congress showed that this 20- year savings estimate had fallen to $249 million.
We are conducting this follow-on review under the Comptroller General’s  authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative in order to provide  updated information on DOD’s progress in achieving its joint basing  objectives. For this report, we evaluated the extent to which (1) DOD  developed and implemented a plan to achieve cost savings and  efficiencies at the joint bases and has tracked the costs, estimated  savings, and efficiencies from joint basing; (2) joint base common  standards provide a common framework to manage and plan for  installation support services at the joint bases; and (3) the joint bases or  DOD have a process in place to consistently identify and address any  implementation challenges to facilitate achievement of joint basing goals.
To address these objectives overall, we analyzed DOD guidance and  data relating to joint basing. We also selected a nonprobability sample of  3 of the 12 joint bases to visit based on several criteria. Among these  criteria, we ensured that we would visit one base where each of the three  military departments was the supporting component and therefore had  the lead for ensuring that the joint base common standards were met, and  that we visited at least one joint base implemented in each of the two  implementation phases. We interviewed OSD officials in addition to  officials at the 3 joint bases we visited. For the remaining 9 joint bases,  we obtained written answers to our questions pertaining to these  objectives.
To assess the extent to which DOD developed and implemented a plan to  achieve cost savings and efficiencies at the joint bases and tracked the  cost effects of joint basing, we analyzed relevant DOD guidance as well  as our prior findings on key practices and steps used by organizations to  successfully implement organizational mergers and transformations. We  also interviewed OSD and joint base officials, and obtained answers to  written questions, to determine the extent to which there was a plan in  place to achieve cost savings and efficiencies, and the extent to which  OSD or the joint bases measured and tracked costs, estimated savings,  and efficiencies achieved as a result of joint basing.
To evaluate the extent to which joint base common standards have  provided a common framework for defining installation support services  and are used to manage and plan for those services at the joint bases,  we reviewed DOD’s policy and guidance on the joint base common  standards as well as federal internal controls and data reliability  standards. We obtained joint base performance reporting on the common  standards from fiscal years 2010 through 2011 and conducted a content  analysis of these data to determine the degree of achievement of the  standards and to identify reported challenges to the joint bases’ ability to  meet the standards. We analyzed OSD’s processes for reviewing and  changing the standards by reviewing OSD guidance, and interviewed or  obtained written answers to our questions from OSD and joint base  officials about how they addressed reported problems with the standards.  Although we identified some problems with the joint base common  standards, which we discuss in this report, we found the data on the joint  base common standards to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  reporting on the number of standards the joint bases reported as having  met or not met and the content of the comments accompanying the  standards reporting.
To assess OSD’s process for identifying and addressing implementation  challenges, we reviewed DOD policy and guidance for joint base  oversight and management, as well as federal internal control standards.  We then identified how OSD uses its formal joint base management  structure, joint base common standards reporting, and formal review  meetings between joint base commanders and OSD to obtain information  on challenges faced at the joint bases. We analyzed performance  reporting comments, DOD documentation that identified and  demonstrated how OSD addressed these challenges, and DOD guidance  on established procedures to resolve issues. We also interviewed or  obtained written answers to questions from OSD, military service, and  joint base officials in order to determine how OSD and the military  services resolved issues with the joint bases through informal methods,  such as newsletters and direct communications.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to November  2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We discuss our scope  and methodology in more detail in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Implementation of the Joint Bases and Management Responsibilities
paragraphs: DOD noted in its recommendation to the 2005 BRAC Commission that all  military installations employ personnel to perform common functions in  support of installation facilities and personnel and that all installations  execute these functions using similar or nearly similar processes. DOD’s  justification for the recommendation stated that this, along with the  proximity of the bases in question, allowed for significant opportunity to  reduce duplication and costs by consolidating the installations.  Specifically, DOD stated that savings in personnel and facilities costs  could be realized by, among other things paring unnecessary management personnel, achieving greater efficiencies through economies of scale, reducing duplication of efforts,  consolidating and optimizing existing and future service contract  requirements, establishing a single space management authority that could achieve  greater utilization of facilities, and  reducing the number of base support vehicles and equipment  consistent with the size of the combined facilities.
As a result, the BRAC Commission approved a modified version of DOD’s  recommendation, and recommended combining 26 installations that were  close to one another into 12 joint bases.
In its January 2008 joint basing implementation guidance, OSD  established a schedule dividing the joint bases into two implementation  phases and required that the installations complete a memorandum of  agreement that would describe how the military components would work  together at each joint base.among other things,   Each agreement was required to outline, how the installations were to fully implement the 2005 BRAC joint how the supporting component was to deliver installation support  services to the other military components at the base—called  supported components—in accordance with the joint base common  standards.
Table 1 identifies the location, implementation phase, and supporting  military service at each of the joint bases.
The 2008 joint basing implementation guidance designated the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as the  official within OSD responsible for establishing overarching guidance,  procedures, and policy and for providing oversight for implementation of  the joint basing guidance. Within the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the lead office for  DOD’s installations and facilities is the Office of the Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), which conducts  oversight of and provides guidance to the joint bases.
section_title: Joint Base Common Standards
paragraphs: OSD’s 2008 guidance on implementing joint basing established a set of  installation support functional areas and provided for the creation of a set  of joint base common standards to define the level of service expected to  be provided at each joint base and in order to ensure consistent delivery  of installation support services. As of April 2012, there were 280 joint  base common standards grouped into 48 functional areas, such as the  standard that 90 percent of law enforcement investigations be completed  within 30 days, which falls under the security services functional area  (see app. III for a complete list of these functional areas). Each joint base  can seek approval to have deviations from the common standards, which  would be outlined in its memorandum of agreement. One-third of the joint  bases told us they had approved deviations from certain common  standards. OSD officials stated that they have changed the joint base  common standards over time to clarify or better align them with how the  services are providing installation support services.
section_title: Joint Management Oversight Structure
paragraphs: The Joint Management Oversight Structure was established as a  mechanism to provide for six levels of performance review and dispute  resolution as part of managing implementation of the joint bases. Issues  raised at the joint bases are first addressed at the lowest level of the  structure, the local Joint Base Partnership Council, which includes  officials from the supported and supporting services on each joint base. If  issues are not resolved there, they are raised to higher levels of  command, such as the Senior Installation Management Group, which  includes the service installation commands, such as Commander, Navy  Installations Command, and the Army Chief of Staff Installation  Management Command. If the issues remain unresolved, they can go up  through the service Vice Chiefs of Staff and finally on to OSD. See figure  1 for the oversight structure and decision chain.
section_title: DOD Has Not Developed a Plan for Achieving Joint Basing Cost Savings and Efficiencies or a Reliable Method for Tracking Costs and Estimated Savings
paragraphs: DOD’s recommendation to the 2005 BRAC Commission noted anticipated  cost savings and efficiencies to be gained from joint basing, but OSD has  not developed an implementation plan to guide joint bases in their efforts  to achieve these cost savings and efficiencies. Furthermore, DOD does  not have a reliable method of collecting information on the net costs or  estimated savings, and efficiencies, specifically resulting from joint basing  and excluding other influences on the bases’ budgets. Without a plan to  guide and encourage joint bases to pursue cost savings and efficiencies  and without a method to track joint basing-specific costs, savings, and  efficiencies, DOD will likely miss opportunities for cost savings and  continue to be unaware of the extent to which joint bases have been able  to meet the objectives laid out in the 2005 BRAC recommendation on  joint basing.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Not Developed a Plan to Guide Joint Bases toward Achieving Cost Savings and Efficiencies
paragraphs: Officials in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  (Installations and Environment) said they did not have a plan in place to  guide the efforts to achieve cost savings and efficiencies at the joint  bases because joint basing is a relatively new initiative and they are still  resolving implementation issues. DOD’s 2005 joint basing  recommendation estimated a 20-year savings of $2.3 billion, with   $601 million in savings by the end of the implementation period in fiscal  year 2011. However, the 20-year savings estimate has now decreased by  nearly 90 percent, to $249 million.
We have previously reported that successful organizational  transformations—such as merging components and transforming  organizational cultures—in both the public and private sector, involve  several key practices, including ensuring that top leadership drives the  transformation, setting implementation goals and a timeline to show  progress from day one, and establishing a communication strategy to  create shared expectations and report related progress.
Ensuring top leadership drives the transformation. DOD  leadership has not provided clear direction to joint basing officials on  achieving the cost savings and efficiency goals of joint basing. Some  joint basing officials told us they perceived a lack of direction from  OSD about the joint basing initiative and more specifically about  whether the purpose of joint basing is to meet the joint base common  standards for installation support or to achieve cost savings and  efficiencies. These two goals may not always be in harmony since  meeting some joint standards requires a higher level of service, which  can increase costs rather than save money.
Setting implementation goals and a timeline to show progress.  One of DOD’s stated objectives for joint basing was to save money;  however, it did not establish quantifiable and measurable objectives  for how to achieve cost savings or efficiencies through joint basing,  nor did it establish a timeline to achieve such goals. Such methods for  achieving cost savings or efficiencies could include, for example,  reducing duplication of efforts, paring unnecessary management  personnel, consolidating and optimizing service contract  requirements, and reducing the number of base support vehicles and  equipment, among other things noted in DOD’s recommendation to  the 2005 BRAC Commission.
Establish a communication strategy. DOD has not established a  communication strategy that provides information to meet the needs  of joint basing officials on how to achieve the joint basing goals of cost  savings and efficiencies. Some joint base officials told us that they  desire additional guidance about how to achieve cost savings and  efficiencies.
section_title: DOD Has Developed a Method of Identifying Costs and Efficiencies on Joint Bases, but This Method Cannot Yet Accurately Isolate the Effects of Joint Basing
paragraphs: In addition to not having an implementation plan, DOD does not yet have  a fully developed method for accurately gathering information on costs,  estimated savings, and efficiencies achieved specifically as a  consequence of joint basing, and as a result it does not have an estimate  of the extent to which joint basing has realized actual cost savings. OSD  has developed a data collection tool, called the Cost and Performance  Visibility Framework, through which the joint bases report installation  support performance data, including annually reporting on funds obligated  to provide base support services, and officials involved in management  and oversight of the joint bases can use this information to improve joint  base management. In addition, OSD can measure these data against the  level of funding the military services expect they would have had to  obligate for installation support on the joint bases if no savings resulted  from joint basing—what DOD refers to as the Cost and Performance  Visibility Framework baseline. However, because of inconsistencies in the  way the joint bases reported data through the framework to date, and  because the data reported through the framework do not exclude costs  and savings that are not specific to joint basing, OSD is not yet able to  accurately isolate the effects of joint basing on the cost of providing  support services. In addition, comparing support service obligations to  the Cost and Performance Visibility Framework baselines does not show  whether overall savings were achieved as a result of joint basing since  the new support service standards themselves are a part of the joint  basing initiative. Measuring against these baselines therefore does not  provide a true picture of savings resulting from joint basing.
The Cost Performance and Visibility Framework is a web-based  application managed by OSD which allows joint bases to report on their  performance against the joint base common standards quarterly and to  report on the funds obligated and manpower employed to meet the  common standards annually. Various levels of the joint basing Joint  Management Oversight Structure use the framework as a management  tool to review and assess performance of the joint base common  standards by category, service, and base, including comparing  performance of the standards to the funds obligated and manpower  employed to meet particular categories of standards. For example,  officials can compare the funds obligated on housing on a particular joint  base with the extent to which that joint base met the common standards  related to housing, as well as the baseline, or anticipated cost of meeting  those common standards. OSD officials told us that they use these data  to identify categories of joint base common standards where the bases  are performing especially well or poorly, and can compare this  performance to the funds obligated relative to achievement of the  standards, as well as to the baseline—the level of funding the military  services anticipated they would need to obligate to meet the standards.  This information provides an initial insight and a basis for further  discussion at the working level with officials involved in joint base  management and oversight. Through further discussion, the officials said  they were able to identify the reasons why joint bases may be performing  well or underperforming in particular areas relative to the funds obligated  and the baseline. In turn, this allows the officials to make adjustments in  funding, learn from the experiences of particular joint bases in providing  support services, and improve joint base management going forward.
For fiscal year 2011, the first year all of the joint bases had completed  implementation, the joint bases reported through the Cost and  Performance Visibility Framework obligating a total of about $4.3 billion  on support services. The military services also created baselines against  which to measure these funding levels. According to these service- developed baselines the 12 joint bases’ installation services were  expected to cost $5.1 billion in fiscal year 2011, as compared with the  framework-reported actual cost of about $4.3 billion, for a reported  savings of $800 million less than the baseline.  However, this difference  between the reported baselines and the installation support funding levels  on the joint bases does not accurately reflect savings arising from joint  basing for several reasons. First, these baselines were calculated using  actual obligations in fiscal year 2008, when the joint bases were  standalone bases, and were adjusted to include increases in personnel  needed to meet the new joint base common standards and other  expected changes, such as utility rate changes. This effectively inflated  the baselines beyond what was actually obligated prior to joint basing.  Therefore, while the adjusted baselines are meant to represent the  projected costs to operate the newly established joint bases, they  overstate the actual cost to operate the bases as compared to when they  were standalone bases. As a result, these are not true baselines against  which a valid comparison can be made of the cost to operate joint bases  compared with standalone bases. Moreover, DOD officials noted that the  adjusted baselines and the reported obligations did not always exclude  one-time expenditures unrelated to the cost of providing support services,  such as military construction projects, which impairs the reliability of  comparisons using the obligations data. Finally, the framework does not  identify when costs, savings, or efficiencies occurred specifically as a  result of joint basing, as opposed to other actions such as military service- wide budget cuts. Therefore, the absence of a comparison with the funds  obligated for support services on the installations prior to becoming joint  bases, reliability problems in the data, and the inability to isolate joint- basing specific costs, savings, and efficiencies, limits the use of the  framework as a definitive tool to identify the overall effects on cost of the  joint basing initiative.
OSD officials said that they expect to correct the data reliability problems  by the end of fiscal year 2012, and as joint basing continues these  officials believe it will be possible to compare each year’s obligations at  the joint bases against prior years’ obligations and therefore gain insight  into the extent that savings and efficiencies are achieved. However, DOD  officials also acknowledged that other factors have affected and will  continue to affect funding levels at the joint bases, including budget- driven reductions by the military services that do not necessarily  represent savings or efficiencies specifically from joint basing, and as a  result, OSD may not be able to determine joint basing-specific costs and  estimated savings even with its improved data collection.
We found that the individual joint bases do not systematically track cost  savings and efficiencies achieved as a result of joint basing. However,  some joint bases have achieved efficiencies through consolidating service  contracts, combining departments, and reducing administrative overhead,  and identified anecdotal examples of such efficiencies, including the  following.
Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst. Base officials told us that by  combining telephone services under the existing Air Force contract,  call rates were substantially reduced, and that they have saved about  $100,000 annually as a result. Additionally, the officials said that  consolidating nine maintenance support contracts into one has  produced $1.3 million in annual savings.  Joint Base Charleston. Base officials stated that information  technology network upgrades resulted in improved high-speed access  and annual savings of $747,000. Additionally, these officials told us  that they consolidated multiple contracts for chaplains, resulting in  $55,000 in annual savings.  Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam. Base officials told us that they have  realized efficiencies and cost savings through consolidating some  offices in their Morale, Welfare & Recreation Departments. Through  this effort, they saved about $400,000 in fiscal year 2011 and expect  those savings to increase in subsequent years.
Conversely, some joint basing officials have told us that the joint basing  initiative may be increasing rather than cutting costs because in some  cases the new joint base common standards require a higher level of  support than was previously provided by service-specific standards. As  previously noted, we reported in 2009 that the new joint base common  standards required the services to fund installation support at higher-than- previous levels.
Even with the achievement of some efficiencies, the joint bases lack clear  direction and impetus to identify and execute cost-saving measures  because OSD has not established an implementation plan with  measurable goals to track progress toward meeting the cost savings and  efficiencies goals that it recommended to the 2005 BRAC Commission. In  the absence of such a plan, opportunities for savings and efficiencies are  likely to be missed. In addition, without a reliable method to collect data  on costs or estimated savings resulting specifically from joint basing,  DOD cannot identify the net savings, if any, associated with joint basing.  As a result, DOD will likely remain unable to quantify the effects of the  joint basing initiative and unable to evaluate whether to continue or  expand joint basing.
section_title: Joint Bases Report Meeting Many Common Standards, but the Usefulness of the Standards as a Common Framework to Manage Installation Support Services Is Limited
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2010 and 2011 the joint bases reported meeting the  common standards more than 70 percent of the time. However, the lack  of clarity in some standards, the fact that unclear standards are not  always reviewed and changed in a timely manner, and the fact that the  data collection and reporting on the standards in some cases adhere to  individual service standards rather than the common standard hinders the  effectiveness of the standards as a common framework for managing  installation support services. Without a consistent interpretation and  reported use of the standards, the joint bases will not have reliable and  comparable data with which to assess their service support levels, and  OSD cannot be assured of receiving reliable and comparable data on the  level of support services the joint bases are providing.
subsections: section_title: Meeting the Common Standards
paragraphs: According to OSD guidance, DOD developed the standards to provide  common output or performance-level standards for installation support,  and to establish a common language for each base support function on  the joint bases. These common standards provide a common  framework to manage and plan for installation support services. In  quarterly reporting from 2010 and 2011 using the joint basing Cost and  Performance Visibility Framework, the joint bases and various offices  within the joint bases reported on whether they met the established  common standards or whether the standard was either not applicable to  them or not reported by them. In eight quarters of reporting, the 12 joint  bases and various offices within the joint bases submitted over 53,000  reports on standards. Our analysis showed that 74 percent of these  reports stated that the joint base or office met the standard, and 10  percent of the time the joint base or office did not meet standard. The  other 16 percent of the time the joint bases or office reported that the  standard was either not applicable to the particular joint base or office, or  that the joint base or office did not report on the standard.
The functional areas of standards the joint bases most frequently reported  not meeting, according to our analysis of the joint base performance  reporting data, included the following.
Information technology services and management. This includes  such areas as telephone services and video teleconference.
Facilities sustainment. This includes certain building restoration,  modernization, and maintenance.
Command management. This includes such areas as postal  services and records administration services.
Emergency management. This includes such areas as emergency  notification and emergency training.
Base support vehicles and equipment. This includes shuttle bus  services, and vehicle and equipment maintenance.
Based on our analysis of the reasons joint base officials reported to OSD  for not meeting standards, we found that the joint bases reported a range  of reasons for not meeting a given standard, such as a lack of personnel  or resources, as well as the inability to meet the standard because of  contract-related resourcing issues. For example, the joint base may have  a contract in place for providing multimedia services, but the contract  does not provide for video production, and therefore the base chooses  not to meet the common standard because it would be too costly to  modify the contract or let an additional contract. The most common  reasons joint bases reported as to why the standard was not met, as  determined by our analysis, are shown in figure 2.
In addition to the ability of the joint bases to meet the standards, joint  base officials and our analysis of the comments in the common standard  reporting system identified three main issues affecting the joint bases’  ability to interpret and report on base support services, regardless of  whether the standards are met. These are (1) the standards are in some  cases unclear, (2) the standards are not reviewed and changed in a  timely manner when clarity issues arise, and (3) data in some cases are  still collected in a service-specific manner that does not correspond to the  common standard, or the bases are reporting according to a service- specific rather than a joint standard.
According to joint base officials, the joint base common standards in  some cases are not measurable or clear. We have previously reported  that key attributes of successful performance measures include a  measurable target and clarity. Having a measurable target in a  performance measure ensures the ability to determine if performance is  meeting expectations. Clarity of a performance measure means that the  measure is clearly stated and the name and definition are consistent with  the methodology used to calculate it, so that data are not confusing and  misleading to the users of the data. Joint basing officials provided many  examples of standards that lack clarity and therefore cause uncertainty in  how the standards should be reported, including the following:
One common standard requires that 100 percent of installations meet  a DOD requirement for at least annual exercise testing of mass  warning and notification systems. However, according to officials at  Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington (in Maryland),  there are many modes of emergency management notification and  many ways to test these modes. As a result, they are unsure about  how to adequately answer this common standard and therefore report  it as not met.
One common standard relating to awards and decorations to  recognize individual and unit achievements states that 90 percent of  awards should be posted to personnel records in accordance with  service-specific timeliness standards. However, the standard is not  clear because, according to joint base officials, not all of the services  have applicable timeliness standards. According to comments  accompanying common standard reporting from officials at Joint Base  San Antonio and Joint Region Marianas, no service standard defines  when a posting is late, and therefore they consider this standard to  always be met, regardless of when awards are posted.
One common standard requires that 60 percent of certain service  vehicles be repaired within 24 hours. However, officials at Joint Base  McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst said the standard was unclear because it  does not take into account the priority of the vehicle. Therefore, for the  purposes of the standard, a vehicle that is essential to accomplishing  the base’s mission would need to be fixed within the same time frame  as a non-mission-essential shuttle bus that transports personnel  around the base.
One common standard related to investigations and crime prevention  requires joint bases to maintain 7 days’ processing time for law  enforcement information to meet legal and command requirements for  adjudication and action. However, according to officials at Joint Base  McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, this standard does not specify whether the  timeline is in calendar or business days. In the absence of  clarification, the joint base has marked the standard as met.
According to GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government, information should be recorded and communicated to  management and others within a time frame that enables them to carry  out their responsibilities. However, according to officials at several joint  bases, the OSD process to review and clarify standards does not update  standards in a time frame to allow joint bases to accurately report each  quarter on those standards that are unclear. OSD conducts a review of  selected functional areas each year. As an example, for its most recent  review for fiscal year 2012, conducted in February 2012, OSD selected  the facility operations, facility investment, and information technology  services management as the functional areas for review. Changes made  to these standards took effect in April 2012. Joint base officials stated that  since OSD selects certain functional areas to review each year and does  not review standards outside those particular functional areas, standards  in those functional areas that are not selected are not reviewed and  clarified even though clarification in those areas may be necessary. OSD  officials told us that in their most recent review, they used input from the  joint bases, military services, and functional area experts within OSD to  determine which functional areas of standards to review, among other  inputs, such as which of the standards bases were most frequently not  meeting. However, since OSD does not necessarily select all those  standards to which joint bases have requested clarification and only  reviews standards for possible updating once a year, changes to the  standards are not implemented in time for the next quarterly reporting  cycle and joint base officials in some cases are required to continue  collecting data on and reporting on standards that they have difficulty  interpreting.
The joint bases do not always report on the common standards in ways  that produce similar results because in some cases they are using  service-specific data collection methods that are unable to provide  information on whether the joint standard is being met, and in some cases  they are reporting on service-specific performance measures rather than  the joint standard. We have previously reported that to achieve reliability  in performance reporting, measurements must apply standard procedures  for collecting data or calculating results so that they are likely to produce  the same results if applied repeatedly to the same situation. The  following are instances when joint bases may rely on data that do not  support reporting on the joint base common standard or where joint bases  are adhering to an individual service standard rather than the common  standard.
One common standard states that joint bases should maintain a clean  and healthy environment by cleaning certain restrooms three times a  week, and should sweep and mop floors, vacuum carpets, remove  trash, and clean walk-off mats once a week; buff floors monthly; and  maintain/strip floors and shampoo carpets annually. Officials at Joint  Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst reported not meeting the common  standard because the Air Mobility Command method for data  collection differs from the information needed to report on the  common standard. Therefore, the joint base could be meeting the  standard, but officials do not know because they are not collecting the  data required to identify whether they are doing so.
One common standard related to technical drawings requires that 98  percent of requests for location data result in no incidents of  misidentified data. Officials at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam  reported not meeting the common standard, stating that they were not  tracking this metric because the Air Force did not independently  require it and they were therefore unable to know whether they met  the metric.
One common standard requires that 100 percent of joint bases hold  emergency management working group meetings quarterly. Joint  Base San Antonio officials reported not meeting the common standard  because the base is instead holding semiannual emergency  management working group meetings, which officials said is in  accordance with Air Force policy.
Because some of the standards are not clear and are not reviewed and  changed in a timely fashion and in some cases the joint bases use  service-specific data and standards rather than the joint standard, the  common standards do not provide OSD and the joint bases with a  common tool to ensure that the joint bases are interpreting and reporting  on the standards consistently. As a result, it is not clear to what extent the  joint bases are achieving the intent of the common standards, even  though the joint bases report meeting the standards the majority of the  time. Without a consistent interpretation and reported use of the  standards, the joint bases will not have reliable and comparable data with  which to assess their service support levels, and OSD cannot be assured  of receiving reliable and comparable data on the level of support services  the joint bases are providing.
section_title: OSD and Joint Bases Have Processes to Identify Joint Basing Implementation Challenges, but Lack of Routine Communication Limits Opportunities for Greater Efficiencies
paragraphs: OSD and the joint bases have various mechanisms in place to address  challenges in achieving joint basing goals, but these mechanisms do not  routinely facilitate the identification of common challenges among the joint  bases or the development of common solutions to these challenges.  Specifically, we found that the joint bases do not have a formal method of  routinely sharing information among the joint bases on identified  challenges and potential solutions or guidance on developing and  providing training for new joint base personnel on how the joint bases  provide installation support services. Without processes to identify  common challenges and share information across the joint bases, and  guidance on delivering consistent training to new personnel, DOD will  likely miss opportunities to efficiently develop common solutions to  common challenges and to reduce duplicating efforts to provide training  to new personnel.
subsections: section_title: Mechanisms to Address Support Service Consolidation Challenges
paragraphs: OSD and the joint bases have several mechanisms in place to address  challenges in consolidating installation support services at the joint bases.  These include a multi-level management structure for the joint bases,  annual review meetings, performance reporting, newsletters, and informal  communications, as follows.
The Joint Management Oversight Structure. According to DOD  guidance, challenges at the joint bases in consolidating installation  support services should be addressed at the lowest possible level of  the Joint Management Oversight Structure—the local joint base  partnership council. Most problems are addressed between command  components at an individual joint base, or by intermediate service  commands, such as the Army’s Installation Management Command,  according to joint base officials.
Annual management review meetings between OSD and the joint  bases. As part of its management of the joint bases, OSD holds an  annual meeting each February in which joint base commanders brief  OSD on the status of the bases’ consolidation and any challenges that  the bases may or may not have been able to address.
Joint base common standards performance reporting. The joint  bases report on a quarterly basis on whether they met the common  standards. As part of this reporting, the bases can provide comments  identifying challenges they faced in meeting particular standards.
Joint base newsletters. OSD publishes a monthly newsletter about  and for the joint bases. This newsletter highlights changes to joint  basing processes, common challenges, lessons learned, and policy  issues affecting joint bases. For example, the March 2011 newsletter  noted that Joint Base San Antonio had combined the best practices of  the various military services in consolidating motorcycle safety  training.  Informal communications. Joint base officials told us that they  sometimes communicate implementation challenges directly to OSD  officials by e-mail or telephone in order to request assistance or  guidance.
section_title: Wide-ranging Implementation Challenges
paragraphs: In meetings and written responses, joint base officials reported facing a  variety of challenges in implementing joint basing as well as implementing  the specific common standards. These challenges cover a wide range of  issues, from differing expectations among the military services about how  particular base support services should be provided to the incompatibility  of information technology systems. The following examples illustrate the  range of problems joint bases have faced.
Differences in how the military services conduct snow removal have  led to unexpected effort or cost for some supported components. Joint  Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst officials told us that when the Air Force  took over providing the support for the joint base, Army and Navy  personnel were surprised when they had to shovel the sidewalk  around their buildings because previously this service was provided  by the base. By contrast, the officials said that the Air Force removes  snow from roads and parking lots on base but not from sidewalks and  building paths. The officials told us they had to spend additional  money to contract for snow removal on sidewalks or use their own  personnel to remove the snow, which diminished productivity of  mission functions. While there is no joint base common standard  specifically on snow removal, there is one on pavement clearance,  which includes snow and ice removal, which states that joint bases  should have an installation pavement clearance plan developed in  accordance with best practices of the military components to meet  safety and mission needs. Notes accompanying the standard state  that each joint base defines its own best practices.
Services had different expectations for maintenance of building  components such as alarm systems and fire extinguishers. For  example, Navy officials on Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst told us  that previously, the Navy installed security systems and replaced fire  extinguishers as part of base support services. However, following  joint basing and the installation becoming part of an Air Force- supported base, the Air Force did not provide these services and  expected building occupants to fund these services themselves.
Some supported components and tenant organizations are  experiencing changed expectations and increased costs under the  joint base structure, in part because of differences in the way the  military services budget and pay for installation support. For example,  officials of a Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam tenant told us that their  costs rose significantly following the transition to the joint base in  order to cover expenses, such as telephone service, not previously  required under the tenant’s own budget. In addition, the tenant  officials stated that the different service standards under the Navy had  raised their expenses.
The variety of incompatible information technology networks and other  systems among the services inhibits communication and requires  additional effort. For example, the absence of common information  technology and communications networks hampered communications  and information sharing between joint base occupants, and the bases  expended significant efforts transitioning data from one service  system to another.
Officials at a number of joint bases stated that they believe the individual  efforts and relationships developed between the components and  commands at the joint bases have facilitated consolidation of installation  support services and resolution of implementation challenges. However, a  number of joint base officials noted that there was no systematic process  in place to identify and resolve common challenges and share information  with new base personnel.
section_title: Limited Routine Communication
paragraphs: OSD and the joint bases have some methods to address challenges in  consolidating support services, but the absence of a method for routinely  communicating among the joint bases limits opportunities to jointly  identify common challenges to joint basing implementation and share  best practices and lessons learned in order to develop common solutions  to those challenges. Because problems are first identified and addressed  at the lowest level of the Joint Management Oversight Structure, which  only includes officials from a given joint base, other joint bases do not  become aware of these problems or the associated solutions. If joint  bases are not informed of problems at other joint bases, then they cannot  work together and collectively elevate issues to OSD for the purposes of  identifying best practices and disseminating them to the joint bases. One  joint base official noted that the information contained in the newsletters  does not represent formal guidance. In addition, some joint base officials  said that the annual program management reviews conducted by OSD  are not sufficient to respond to day-to-day challenges faced at the joint  bases. Joint base officials told us that in some cases they have obtained  needed guidance through informal contacts with OSD. However, they  noted that a formal, routine method of sharing information received from  these sources would help to ensure consistent performance across the  joint bases. Without such guidance and a mechanism to routinely share  lessons learned across the joint bases, opportunities will be missed to  work together to resolve common challenges and reduce duplication of  effort, and the potential that joint bases may be implementing policies  inconsistently will increase.
In addition, OSD has not provided guidance to the joint bases on  developing training materials to be used to inform incoming personnel  about the specifics of how installation services are provided on joint  bases. Such guidance is needed since joint base standards may differ  from standards and approaches used on standalone bases. Some  components, such as the Air Force Wing Command at Joint Base Pearl  Harbor-Hickam, developed their own briefings or training courses to  provide information on the process of requesting and receiving installation  support services and how the process is different from that of other Air  Force bases. Some joint base officials stated that educating personnel  about joint base-specific processes requires a great deal of effort.  Because of the lack of OSD guidance on providing common training  materials, the joint bases have in some cases developed their own  materials, which can result in duplication of efforts and inconsistencies  across the joint bases.
DOD recommended consolidation of installations into joint bases to the  2005 BRAC Commission to, among other things, reduce duplication of  management and installation support services, resulting in potential  efficiencies and cost savings. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government states that the policies, procedures, techniques, and  mechanisms that enforce management’s directives are an integral part of  an entity’s planning, implementing, reviewing, and accountability for  stewardship of government resources and achieving effective results. It  also states that for an entity to run and control its operations, the entity  must have relevant, reliable, and timely communications relating to  internal events, and that information is needed throughout the agency to   Without a means of identifying common  achieve all of its objectives.challenges and sharing best practices and lessons learned in order to  identify common solutions, DOD is likely to miss opportunities to  efficiently resolve joint base challenges using common methods. In  addition, without sharing guidance for new personnel, some joint bases  will duplicate efforts to solve problems previously encountered elsewhere  and be unable to provide uniform policies across joint bases.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Since 2008, OSD has consolidated installations in proximity into joint  bases and established common standards for delivering installation  support services at these bases. As DOD stated in its recommendation to  the 2005 BRAC Commission, DOD anticipated that this effort represented  a significant opportunity to reduce duplication of effort and achieve  efficiencies and cost savings across the 12 joint bases. However, to date  OSD has not developed and implemented a plan to guide the joint bases  in achieving cost savings and efficiencies. OSD has developed and  implemented a framework for collecting and reporting data on  performance of joint base common standards and the funds spent and  manpower used to meet those standards. However, OSD has not yet  developed this framework to the point where it can isolate the costs,  savings, and efficiencies resulting specifically from joint basing, excluding  non-joint basing actions and using reliable data. Without this information,  OSD is not in a position to know to what extent DOD has made progress  toward achieving the joint basing objectives, and will be unable to  evaluate whether to continue or expand joint basing. Additionally, a lack  of specificity and clarity within the joint base common standards, the long  process to review and adjust the standards, and the absence of  consistently reported data hinder the standards’ effectiveness as a  common framework or tool for managing support services. Without a  consistent interpretation and reported use of the standards, OSD and the  joint bases cannot ensure that they are receiving reliable and comparable  data on the level of support services provided, and as a result will not  have information necessary to make informed resource allocation  decisions so that joint base services are delivered consistently. While  OSD and the joint bases can identify challenges in implementing the joint  bases, OSD has no common strategy to ensure that the joint bases  routinely share information with each other on best practices and lessons  learned in order to resolve common challenges. Finally, OSD has not  provided guidance to ensure that bases provide consistent information to  new joint base personnel to better inform them as to procedures for  obtaining support services on joint bases. Without taking further steps to  address these issues, DOD will likely miss opportunities to achieve cost  savings and efficiencies, provide consistent levels of support services,  and to work together to resolve common challenges and reduce  duplication of effort across the joint bases.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enable DOD to achieve cost savings and efficiencies and to track its  progress toward achieving these goals, we recommend that the Secretary  of Defense direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations  and Environment) to take the following two actions:  Develop and implement a plan that provides measurable goals linked to  achieving savings and efficiencies at the joint bases and provide  guidance to the joint bases that directs them to identify opportunities for  cost savings and efficiencies. DOD should at a minimum consider the  items identified in its recommendation to the 2005 BRAC Commission as  areas for possible savings and efficiencies, including paring unnecessary management personnel, consolidating and optimizing contract requirements, establishing a single space management authority to achieve greater  utilization of facilities, and  reducing the number of base support vehicles and equipment.
Continue to develop and refine the Cost Performance and Visibility  Framework in order to eliminate data reliability problems, facilitate comparisons of joint basing costs with the cost of operating  the separate installations prior to implementing joint basing, and   identify and isolate the costs and savings resulting from actions and  initiatives specifically resulting from joint basing and excluding DOD-  or service-wide actions and initiatives.
To improve DOD’s ability to provide a common framework for the  management and planning of support services at the joint bases, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) to take the following  two actions:
Direct the joint bases to compile a list of those common standards in  all functional areas needing clarification and the reasons why they  need to be clarified, including those standards still being provided or  reported on according to service-specific standards rather than the  common standard.
Amend the OSD joint standards review process to prioritize review  and revision of those standards most in need of clarification within this  list.
To increase opportunities for the joint bases to obtain greater efficiencies  in developing common solutions to common challenges and reduce  duplication of efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) to  take the following two actions:
Develop a common strategy to expand routine communication  between the joint bases, and between the joint bases and OSD, to  encourage joint resolution of common challenges and sharing of best  practices and lessons learned.
Develop guidance to ensure all the joint bases develop and provide  training materials to incoming personnel on how installation services  are provided on joint bases.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it does not  agree that at this point in the joint bases’ development that the  department should establish savings targets because they would be  premature and arbitrary. DOD partially concurred with the remainder of  our recommendations; however, in most instances, DOD did not identify  what, if any, actions the department plans to take to implement the  recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in  appendix IV.
DOD did not concur with our first recommendation, to develop and  implement a plan to provide measurable goals linked to achieving savings  and efficiencies at the joint bases and provide guidance to the joint bases  directing them to identify the savings and efficiencies. In its comments,  DOD said such targets would restrict the authority of local commanders to  manage the merger of the formerly standalone bases into joint bases.  DOD also stated that while savings targets may be appropriate in the  future, imposing savings goals would restrict the authority of the joint  base commanders and burden them while implementing new  organizational structures, which would unnecessarily risk negative  impacts to mission support when operational effectiveness of the bases is  paramount. Moreover, DOD stated that the department should continue  its approach of being patient with obtaining savings and efficiencies at  joint bases because this approach is working. DOD cited two cost-savings  examples through personnel cuts achieved in fiscal years 2012 and 2013:  the Air Force reduced civilian positions for all the joint bases for which it is  the lead, and the Navy chose to not fill all of its civilian vacancies. Finally,  DOD stated that the creation of the joint bases from separate installations  is equivalent to the mergers of corporations with very different financial  systems, management structures, operating procedures, and cultural  differences. DOD has decided it is important to empower each joint base  commander to design, implement, and adapt cost efficient and effective  approaches to their unique situations while adopting new and cross- cutting business practices, thereby making them incubators of innovation.  Therefore, DOD has decided to allow for an extended transition period  and defer near-term savings.
We acknowledge that establishing joint basing is a complex undertaking,  but DOD’s current position of taking a patient approach and deliberately  deferring near-term savings contradicts the position it took when  requesting the BRAC Commission to approve its joint basing  recommendation. Specifically, in its justification to the Commission  (published in our report as appendix II), DOD stated that joint basing  would produce savings exceeding the cost of implementation  immediately. Moreover, as our report clearly points out, DOD projected  20-year net present value savings of over $2.3 billion although the current  20-year net present value savings estimate is now about $249 million—a  decrease of about 90 percent. DOD also asserted that it is achieving  savings, as shown by the Air Force and Navy manpower reductions at the  joint bases. However, these cuts were not the result of a purposeful effort  to pare unnecessary management personnel due to the implementation  of joint basing. Air Force and Navy documents and interviews with  officials from these services indicate that the joint bases’ memoranda of  agreement show increases in budget and civilian manpower required as a  result of joint basing. Any reductions in civilian positions at the joint bases  through attrition or leaving unfilled positions open are attributable to  general service-wide initiatives and reductions and not joint basing   The Secretary of Defense’s justification to the BRAC  efficiencies.Commission requesting approval of the joint basing recommendation  stated that “there is a significant opportunity to reduce duplication of  efforts with resulting reductions of overall manpower and facilities  requirements capable of generating savings.” We continue to believe that  DOD’s justification for joint basing—the realization of savings—is  attainable by developing guidance and encouraging appropriate  practices, goals, and time frames. Therefore, we continue to believe our  recommendation is warranted.
DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation, to continue to  develop and refine the Cost Performance and Visibility Framework in  order to (1) eliminate data reliability problems, (2) facilitate comparisons  of joint basing costs with the cost of operating the separate installations  prior to implementing joint basing, and (3) identify and isolate the costs  and savings resulting from actions and initiatives specifically resulting  from joint basing and excluding DOD or service-wide actions and  initiatives. DOD stated that its Cost Performance and Visibility Framework  already provides a method to collect quarterly data on performance  towards the Common Output Level Standards, annual data on personnel  assigned, and funds obligated for each joint base. However, DOD also  acknowledged that there were inconsistencies in the current data  captured in the Framework and that DOD is working through and  improving its data reliability. DOD stated that it invested considerable  effort to clarify this data and expected to have sufficient data to begin  assessing joint base efficiencies by the end of fiscal year 2012. It stated  that then it would be able to compare the current fiscal year financial and  performance data to the baseline and previous year’s obligations. DOD  also stated that it could perform an additional analysis to compare the  joint bases’ baseline data with the costs of operating the separate  installations prior to implementing joint basing because this information is  included in annex U of each joint base’s memorandum of agreement.  However, DOD also acknowledged that this comparison still would not be  able to identify cost savings resulting solely from joint basing and  asserted that it is impractical to isolate and distinguish joint basing cost  savings from the savings that result from DOD- or service-wide actions  using the data contained in its Framework. Furthermore, DOD pointed out  that it did not believe that accounting systems are designed to track  savings, rather they are designed to track expenses and disbursements,  which DOD stated in its comments is what we concluded in a 1997  report.
We also see that the Cost Performance and Visibility Framework  represents a good start on development of a system to measure joint  basing performance. However, as it was being used at the time of our  review, and as we clearly state in the report, it was not adequate to  reliably identify any savings.  First, DOD’s proposed analysis of  comparing current operating costs to the baseline would not result in an  accurate assessment of savings from the joint bases because DOD has  included in the baseline the higher costs of implementing the higher joint  basing standards, such as expected increases in personnel and higher  utility rates. The baseline would not accurately reflect the cost of the  standalone bases prior to the joint basing initiative. Therefore, while this  analysis might show some bases spending less than the inflated baseline,  it would not show if they are spending less than what they spent as  standalone bases. Second, DOD’s proposed analysis to compare the  current cost of joint basing documented in its framework to the cost of  standalone bases as captured in annex U of the memoranda of  agreement as currently planned would also produce inaccurate results.  As DOD stated, this analysis would not be able to isolate any savings  specific to joint basing since some savings have been made that are not  directly attributable to joint basing such as the general service personnel  reductions. Third, the memoranda of agreement annexes U do not  consistently and clearly show the costs of operations of each base prior to  joint basing and the respective transfers of funds between the services,  rendering them unreliable for this analysis. Finally, we agree with DOD’s  statement that our 1997 report concluded that the department’s  accounting systems are not designed to track savings. However, it is for  this reason that we also concluded in our 1997 report that “the absence of  efforts to update projected savings indicates the need for additional  guidance and emphasis from DOD on accumulating and updating savings  data on a comprehensive and consistent basis,” and we so recommended  it then. As we believed in 1997 and continue to believe, DOD needs to  improve its ability to update savings from BRAC recommendations.  Refinements to the Cost Performance and Visibility Framework would  position the department to effectively measure savings from joint basing,  and therefore the need for our recommendation remains.
DOD partially concurred with our third and fourth recommendations—to  compile a comprehensive list of common standards needing clarification  and to prioritize the review and potentially revise those standards within  that list, respectively—and stated that there is already a quarterly  feedback process on the joint base common standards and an annual  review process that incorporates input from the joint bases. Specifically,  DOD stated that standards may need changing as priorities change and  missions evolve, but that the current process strikes an appropriate  balance between the analytical burden of repeated reviews with the need  for clarity and refinement. DOD also stated that it believes that reviewing  all the standards simultaneously does not allow for the depth of analysis  required to make sound decisions. DOD suggested that GAO should  conduct a qualitative assessment of the standards because our findings  on the need to revise its process for reviewing and clarifying its standards  appear to be based on an anecdotal assessment.
While we agree with DOD that the standards need to be continually  reviewed and adjusted as priorities and missions change, we found ample  evidence that the individuals that report on the joint bases’ ability to meet  the current standards believe some of the standards need clarification  now, and that in many instances, these officials believe it is unclear what  some of the standards are measuring. It is important to note that nothing  in our recommendation requires DOD to review all the standards  simultaneously. To the contrary, our recommendation specifically states  that DOD should compile a list of standards needing clarification. In fact,  because DOD has not issued any guidance to prioritize the standards,  joint bases continue to report on and provide resources toward reporting  on all the standards whether they are problematic or not. Lastly, DOD  stated that they believed our evidence was based on an anecdotal  assessment. We disagree. We conducted a comprehensive qualitative  review of over 59,359 comments entered into the Cost Performance and  Visibility Framework from fiscal years 2009 through 2011 and categorized  them into broad themes of issues raised by the bases in reference to the  Common Output Level Standards. As shown in figure 2 of our report, the  need for clarity of the Common Output Level Standards was raised over  200 times by the joint bases during this timeframe. However, because  DOD’s data is not adequate to permit us to specifically identify what types  of clarification problems were being encountered by the bases, we  supplemented our analyses with follow-up interviews to provide anecdotal  examples that added some context to our analyses and described a few  of the types of problems encountered. Moreover, our data suggested that  DOD’s quarterly process had proven ineffective at addressing the need  for clarification and review of problematic standards since some  standards continue to be problematic despite the quarterly reviews which  DOD asserts are working. For these reasons, we continue to believe that  improvements are needed in DOD’s current process for reviewing and  clarifying the common standards to address the bases reported concerns.
DOD partially concurred with our fifth recommendation, to develop a  common strategy that expands routine communication between the joint  bases, and between the joint bases and OSD, to encourage joint  resolution of common challenges and sharing of best practices and  lessons learned. DOD stated that it believed there are already  mechanisms in place to facilitate routine communication between the joint  bases, as well as between OSD and the joint bases, and that it is  increasing those opportunities. DOD listed the various opportunities it has  for sharing joint basing information, all of which we are aware:
The military services have routine communication with the joint bases  and are the lead to encourage joint resolution of common challenges  and sharing of best practices.
DOD chairs a working group twice a month where headquarters  service representatives offer information and ideas generated during  internal service meetings with joint bases.
Best practices from the bases are shared in a periodic newsletter.
OSD and the military services conduct joint base site visits each year  to capture any opportunities for improvement and hosts an annual  management review meeting each year with the joint base  commanders.
While we recognize that DOD has facilitated communication of lessons  learned and best practices, as we note in our report, because different  services have the lead role in providing support services at different joint  bases, best practices are not necessarily shared with all the bases across  the services. DOD’s joint basing policy states that problems at the joint  bases should be identified and addressed at the lowest possible level,  which can include only officials at any given joint base. Thus, the majority  of these issues may not be elevated to the working group but may still  occur at multiple joint bases leading to duplication of effort in resolving  common problems experienced in multiple locations. Moreover, those  issues that are not elevated to the working group may never be relayed to  other joint bases since there is no explicit policy or process in place to do  so. The newsletters, which we discuss in our report, only convey a limited  number of best practices, and exclude problems and solutions identified  in the course of implementing joint basing. Additionally, contributions to  the newsletters are not required and are not always comprehensive.  Moreover, the contributions tend to highlight best practices which are  good but exclude unsolved challenges, which if shared, could result in the  bases jointly resolving problems or elevating them when needed to more  senior leadership. As a result, some joint base officials told us that they  found the newsletters to be of limited usefulness. For these reasons, we  continue to believe that the joint bases could benefit from routine  communication that allows them to commonly and routinely share  identified challenges and possible solutions, rather than having such  communication occur only sporadically or be filtered through the higher  levels of the oversight structure put in place by OSD.
DOD partially concurred with our sixth recommendation, to develop  guidance that would ensure all joint bases develop and provide training  materials to incoming joint base personnel. DOD stated that the  department will ensure each of the services is providing training materials  to incoming personnel; however, joint base commanders need flexibility to  tailor training to the needs of their installation. We agree that the  commander of each joint base needs the flexibility to provide joint base- specific training. The intent of our recommendation is that in addition to  establishing a requirement that joint bases develop training guidance and  ensure training occurs at each base, OSD’s guidance should encourage  the sharing of training materials across bases to reduce duplication of  effort, promote commonality where appropriate, and provide a means of  potentially sharing best practices. Our recommendation was not intended  to require standardized training at each location. Therefore, we continue  to believe that OSD-level guidance for joint bases to develop and provide  training to incoming personnel is necessary to help the joint bases  facilitate the provision of services on the bases and may provide a way to  reduce duplication of effort and more effectively share information.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Under Secretary of  Defense (Installations and Environment); the Secretaries of the Army,  Navy, and Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the  Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties.  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In order to assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD)  developed and implemented a plan to achieve cost savings and  efficiencies at the joint bases and tracked the costs, savings, and  efficiencies resulting from joint basing, we analyzed DOD guidance  related to joint base implementation, specifically looking for any measures  or reporting processes on efficiencies and cost savings. We also  reviewed our prior findings on key practices and implementation steps for  mergers and organizational transformations. We interviewed DOD  officials at the service headquarters and the Office of the Secretary of  Defense (OSD) to obtain information about cost savings, joint basing  budget data, and guidance related to cost savings and efficiencies. We  also interviewed joint basing officials at three joint bases and obtained  answers to written questions from the remaining nine joint bases that we  did not visit in person to obtain information on actual cost savings and  efficiencies achieved and guidance and communication related to cost  savings and efficiencies. We selected a nonprobability sample of three  site visit locations based the following factors: (1) we chose to visit one  base where each military department (Army, Air Force and Navy) had the  lead responsibility for providing installation support, (2) we considered  geographic diversity, (3) we chose to visit at least one base that we did  not visit for our 2009 joint basing report, (4) we selected at least one joint  base from each of the two phases of joint base implementation, and   (5) we chose joint bases where the installations that had been combined  into the joint base were directly adjacent to each other. Based on these  factors, we chose to visit Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, Joint Base  Lewis-McChord, and Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam.
To evaluate the extent to which joint base common standards have  provided a common framework for defining and reporting installation  support services, we reviewed DOD policy and guidance related to the  common standards; the standards themselves, including both functional  areas and specific standards; and federal internal control standards and  key elements of successful performance measures.reviewed the joint bases’ reporting on the joint base common standards  for fiscal years 2010 and 2011. To determine the degree to which the  standards were achieved, we analyzed the data to determine how many  standards were met, not met, or determined to be not applicable. We  conducted a content analysis of the comments accompanying the  standards reporting from fiscal years 2010 to 2011 to identifying concerns  regarding the various standards. In conducting this content analysis, we  reviewed comments accompanying all reported standards, including  those reported as met, not met, and not applicable. Using this analysis,  we identified the most frequent reasons the joint bases provided for not  meeting the standards, as well as challenges the joint bases faced in  implementing and reporting on various standards. To conduct the content  analysis, two analysts individually coded all comments accompanying the  standards reporting into one of the 17 categories listed in table 2. After  the comments were coded, a third analyst adjudicated any differences  between the coding of the first two analysts.
section_title: Appendix II: BRAC Commission Recommendation on Joint Basing (Including Elements of DOD’s Recommendation to the Commission)
paragraphs: Appendix II: BRAC Commission  Recommendation on Joint Basing (Including  Elements of DOD’s Recommendation to the  Commission)
section_title: Appendix III: Joint Basing Installation Support Functional Areas
paragraphs: The joint base common standards developed by the DOD for use by the  joint bases in managing and reporting on installation support services are  grouped into 48 functional areas of installation support. Table 3 shows the  48 functional areas.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant  Director; Jameal Addison; Grace Coleman; Chaneé Gaskin; Simon  Hirschfeld; Gina Hoffman; Charles Perdue; Michael Silver; and Michael  Willems made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Military Base Realignments and Closures: Key Factors Contributing to  BRAC 2005 Results. GAO-12-513T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2012.
Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy  to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts. GAO-11-814. Washington, D.C.:  September 19, 2011.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Review of the Iowa and Milan  Army Ammunition Plants. GAO-11-488R. Washington. D.C.: April 1,  2011.
GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington,  D.C.: February 17, 2011.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February  2011.
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is  Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the  Defense Access Roads Program. GAO-11-165. Washington, D.C.:  January 26, 2011.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to  Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs.  GAO-10-725R. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.
Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning  Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant Growth.  GAO-10-602. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2010.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have  Increased While Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year  2009. GAO-10-98R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transportation Impact of  Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are  Uncertain and Direct Federal Support Is Limited. GAO-09-750.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings  Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating Supply- Related Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations. GAO-09-703.  Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support  Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of  Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. GAO-09-336. Washington, D.C.:  March 30, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in  Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently  Updating Savings Estimates. GAO-09-217. Washington, D.C.:   January 30, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to  Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen  Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-1010R.  Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help  Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth.  GAO-08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road  Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R.  Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower  Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC  Recommendations. GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations  Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R.  Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have  Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T.  Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have  Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159.  Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating,  Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of  Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage,  and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics  Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely  Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial  Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13,  2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor  Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve  Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the  2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers  Are Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and  Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2007.
Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate  Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely  Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641.  Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental  Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.  GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.
Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and  Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905.  Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and  Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785.  Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC  Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and  Closures. GAO-05-138. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need  for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2004.
Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming  Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.:  March 25, 2004.
Defense Infrastructure: Long-term Challenges in Managing the Military  Construction Program. GAO-04-288. Washington, D.C.: February 24,  2004.
Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and  Organizational Transformations. GAO-03-669. Washington, D.C.: July 2,  2003.
Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve  Enclaves. GAO-03-723. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Management  Processes Needed to Improve Condition and Reduce Costs of Guard and  Reserve Facilities. GAO-03-516. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic  Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities.  GAO-03-274. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Greater Management Emphasis Needed to  Increase the Services’ Use of Expanded Leasing Authority. GAO-02-475.  Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2002.
Military Base Closures: Progress in Completing Actions from Prior  Realignments and Closures. GAO-02-433. Washington, D.C.: April 5,  2002.
Military Base Closures: Overview of Economic Recovery, Property  Transfer, and Environmental Cleanup. GAO-01-1054T. Washington, D.C.:  August 28, 2001.
Military Base Closures: DOD’s Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains  Substantial. GAO-01-971. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001.
Military Base Closures: Lack of Data Inhibits Cost-Effectiveness of  Analyses of Privatization-in Place Initiatives. GAO/NSIAD-00-23.  Washington, D.C.: December 20, 1999.
Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closure Rounds.  GAO/NSIAD-99-36. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 1998.
Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and  Closure. GAO/NSIAD-99-17. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998.
Navy Depot Maintenance: Privatizing Louisville Operations in Place Is Not  Cost-Effective. GAO/NSIAD-97-52. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 1997.
Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds.  GAO/NSIAD-97-151. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997.
Military Base Closures: Reducing High Costs of Environmental Cleanup  Requires Difficult Choices. GAO/NSIAD-96-172. Washington, D.C.:  September 5, 1996.
Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not  Easily Quantified. GAO/NSIAD-96-67. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 1996.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations  for Closure and Realignment. GAO/NSIAD-95-133. Washington, D.C.:  April 14, 1995.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Recommendations and Selection  Process for Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-93-173.  Washington, D.C.: April 15, 1993.
Military Bases: Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed  Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-91-224. Washington, D.C.:   May 15, 1991.
Military Bases: An Analysis of the Commission’s Realignment and  Closure Recommendations. GAO/NSIAD-90-42. Washington, D.C.:  November 29, 1989.