Equal Employment Opportunity: Hiring, Promotion, and Discipline Processes at DEA
Published: 2003-06-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: A 1981 U.S. District Court decision found that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) had discriminated against African American special agents in a number of personnel practices. Over the years, the plaintiffs and DEA had agreed to remedies in many of these areas. However, minority representatives continued to raise issues in three areas--hiring, promotion, and discipline. GAO was asked to examine DEA's current processes for hiring, promoting, and disciplining special agents, and provide information about racial, ethnicity, and gender differences in these three areas.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: During the October 1997 through March 2002 period, African American, Hispanic, and white applicants to be special agents passed DEA's medical requirements and interview process at about the same rates. However, African American and Hispanic applicants had lower passing rates on (1) the test of an applicant's ability to recall and write about a video of a drug-related enforcement action and (2) suitability requirements measured through a background investigation and other tests. DEA's hiring procedures are based on criteria in federal regulations, professional standards, and standards established by subject matter experts. However, DEA had not studied its hiring requirements to see why its procedures resulted in different selection rates and whether they could be modified to reduce differences while maintaining the high standards necessary for special agents. There were no statistically significant differences in promotion rates among the various racial, ethnic, and gender groups during fiscal years 1997 through 2001. DEA has a rigorous and validated competency-based process that uses job simulations to assess capabilities at the target grade level. However, the job-relatedness of a key step involving recommending special agents for promotion had not been established and our analysis showed that African American and Hispanic special agents were recommended for promotion at significantly lower rates. Despite differences in recommendation rates, DEA's promotion decisions mirrored the race, ethnic, and gender makeup of the agency's special agent workforce. Additionally, the agency, working with a diverse panel of special agents, subsequently developed a revised recommendation process. At the time of GAO's review, DEA and the African American representatives were involved in mediation to reach final agreement. Disciplinary data for fiscal years 1997 to 2001 showed that the proportion of African American, Hispanic, and women special agents disciplined for misconduct was significantly higher than their representation in the DEA special agent workforce. These higher rates reflect that African Americans, Hispanics, and women had a significantly higher percentage of allegations of misconduct lodged against them and that a significantly higher percentage of these allegations were substantiated by investigations and resulted in disciplinary action. A recent study by an outside contractor found DEA's disciplinary process to be fair and nondiscriminatory, but that study only considered African Americans and whites and not women or other minority groups.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 1981, ruling on a class action racial discrimination lawsuit brought by  African American special agents, a U.S. district court found that the Drug  Enforcement Administration (DEA) had discriminated against the agents  in a variety of personnel practices. Some 20 years have passed since the  initial decision, and not all areas covered by the court’s orders have been  finalized, particularly in regard to promotions. In your role as Chair of the  Congressional Black Caucus, minority representatives of DEA’s special  agents continued to raise issues with you about some of the personnel  practices at DEA. Based on discussions with your office, we agreed to  (1) develop information on the diversity of DEA’s special agent workforce  and (2) examine the processes DEA has put in place to provide for fair and  nondiscriminatory hiring, promoting, and disciplining of special agents and  provide information about racial, ethnic, and gender differences in those  three areas.
With regard to the diversity of DEA’s special agent workforce, we  developed information by race, ethnicity, and gender for each pay grade  level. To examine DEA’s processes for hiring, promoting, and disciplining  special agents, we reviewed policies and procedures and discussed them  with knowledgeable officials and representatives of groups representing  minority special agents. To identify the results that have been achieved, we  analyzed data by race, ethnicity, and gender generally for fiscal years 1997  through 2001, the 5 most recent fiscal years for which data were available,  with regard to how applicants fared at each step of DEA’s hiring process,  promotions of special agents to the General Schedule (GS) grade 14 and 15  levels, and disciplinary actions taken. Our analyses were not designed to  prove or disprove discrimination; rather, they were designed to provide  information about race, ethnicity, and gender differences in personnel  actions. In analyzing hiring actions, we used the 80 percent rule set out in  the federal government’s Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection  Procedures. Under the 80 percent rule, a selection rate for a racial, ethnic,  or gender group that is less than 80 percent of the selection rate for the  group with the highest rate is considered a substantially different rate of  selection that usually requires an employer to study the job relatedness of  selection procedures. To analyze differences in promotion and disciplinary  actions, we used standard statistical techniques. We did our work from  September 2001 through February 2003 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Further details about our  methodology are discussed in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, it is unlawful for  employers to discriminate against employees or job applicants on the basis  of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Other civil rights statutes  prohibit discrimination based on age or disability. Under these laws, it is  illegal to discriminate in any aspect of the terms and conditions of  employment, including hiring, firing, disciplinary actions, promotion, pay  assignments, and training. In addition, for federal civilian employees,  Executive Order 13087 prohibits discrimination based on sexual  orientation and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has interpreted  the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 to prohibit sexual orientation  discrimination in the federal workplace.
Intentionally treating people differently on account of their race, color,  religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability is called “disparate  treatment.” Title VII prohibits not only intentional discrimination, but also  practices that have the effect of discriminating against individuals because  of their race, color, national origin, religion, or sex. Personnel policies that  are neutral on their face but have a substantially different though  unintended affect on a group are said to have a “disparate impact” or  “adverse impact.” In general, the use of any procedure that has an adverse  impact on the hiring, promotion, or other employment actions of members  of any race, gender, or ethnic group is considered to be discriminatory  unless the procedure is shown to be job related and consistent with  business necessity.
subsections: section_title: Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures
paragraphs: The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, adopted in  1978 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Civil  Service Commission (the predecessor agency to OPM), and the  departments of Justice and Labor, provide a uniform set of principles  governing use of employee selection procedures and identifying adverse  impact. The guidelines apply to tests and other selection procedures that  are used to make employment decisions, including hiring, promotion, and  discipline.
Under the guidelines, adverse impact is a substantially different rate of  selection in hiring, promotion, or other employment decisions that works  to the disadvantage of a race, ethnic, or gender group. Specifically, a  selection rate for any group that is less than 80 percent of the selection rate  for the group with the highest rate is generally regarded as evidence of  adverse impact. This is not a legal definition of discrimination; rather, it is a  rule of thumb or guideline that is a practical means of keeping an agency’s  attention on different selection rates in personnel actions and on the  procedures they use. Tests of statistical significance may be used in lieu of  the 80 percent rule. The guidelines call for adverse impact determinations  to be made for each racial, ethnic, or gender group.
When adverse impact is identified, the Uniform Guidelines generally  require employers to conduct validity studies to determine the job- relatedness of a procedure or its business necessity. The guidelines also  call for an employer to make a reasonable effort to become aware of  suitable alternative selection procedures and methods that have as little  adverse impact as possible and to investigate those that are suitable. The  guidelines recognize validation strategies of the American Psychological  Association, and the validation provisions of the guidelines are designed to  be consistent with the generally accepted standards of the psychological  profession. One approach is “content validity,” which determines whether  the selection tests and measures used are representative of the knowledge,  skills, and abilities necessary for a job.
section_title: Litigation History
paragraphs: In February 1981, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled  on a class action lawsuit, commonly known as the Segar case, finding that  DEA had discriminated against African American special agents. The  court found that DEA’s personnel practices had an adverse impact on  African American special agents in terms of salary, grade at entry,  supervisory evaluations, discipline, and promotions. In addition, the court  found evidence of disparate treatment in work assignments because of the  way in which DEA used African American special agents for undercover  operations. The court found no discrimination in the type of appointments  or in training of special agents, and found that allegations of harassment  and reprisal were unsubstantiated. The court did not rule on issues relating  to hiring that DEA and the plaintiff class had already settled.
The court ordered DEA to change its procedures and conduct validity  studies on those changes in order to provide for effective,  nondiscriminatory supervisory evaluation, discipline, and promotion  systems. To oversee the implementation of its orders, two groups were  established. One is called the “Working Group.” Its mission is to help  ensure that the orders of the court requiring DEA to develop and validate  nondiscriminatory personnel practices are carried out. The Working Group  is made up of three industrial psychologists—two from OPM and one  representing the plaintiff class members. The other group is called the  “Equal Employment Opportunity Monitoring Committee” or Monitoring  Committee. Made up of eight African American special agents representing  plaintiff class members, this committee monitors DEA’s compliance with  the court’s orders. The committee also is to help facilitate informal  resolutions of disputes.
Over the years, all issues raised in the court’s findings, except with regard  to the process for promoting special agents to the GS-14 and GS-15 levels  and creating a career development program, have been resolved through  court-approved agreements between the plaintiff class and DEA. In  September 1999, the district court ruled on a motion for compliance  brought by the plaintiff class that claimed adverse impact in promotions of  African American special agents to managerial GS-14 and GS-15 positions.  The plaintiffs argued that there were disparities in two steps of the  multistep promotion process. They alleged that one step in the process,  called the Special Agent Promotion Program (SAPP), which involves  assessing candidates’ job-related knowledge and skills through job  simulations, had an adverse impact on African Americans, thereby  decreasing their opportunities to be placed on best-qualified lists for  promotion. The plaintiffs further argued that they were adversely impacted  by another step in the process, whereby DEA senior executives—special  agents in charge (SAC) and other office heads—for the offices advertising  promotion opportunities, recommended a select few from a best qualified  candidate list to DEA’s Career Board, the head of which ultimately makes  promotion decisions. However, the plaintiffs did not claim that there was  adverse impact in the ultimate number of promotions. According to the  court decision, the plaintiffs stated that “some of the expected effect of  denying African American agents spots on the  is not  visible in the ultimate number of promotions because the Career Board  tends to ‘overselect’ African American agents when they appear on  , and also when the Career Board bypasses the  .”
In its ruling, the court noted that the use of the SAPP caused an adverse  impact despite its having been validated. Although the court did not  conclude that the use of the SAPP violated title VII, it ordered DEA to  implement a career development program to reduce the acknowledged disparate impact of the SAPP. The court found that the process for  recommendations made by SACs and office heads did have an adverse  impact on African American special agents. In its analysis, the court said  that “the fact that some of the discriminatory effect of the use of   may not appear in ultimate hiring  decisions, because the Career Board appears to be more likely to select  African Americans when they do appear, does not excuse the use of a  discriminatory device earlier in the process.” The court concluded that the  SAC/office head recommendation process violated title VII, and enjoined  DEA from using such recommendations in making promotion decisions  until their use had been validated as job related. As a result, DEA  suspended promotions to GS-14 and GS-15 special agent positions. DEA  and the plaintiffs subsequently entered into a court-approved agreement in  January 2000 allowing DEA to temporarily use SAC/office head  recommendations for promotion decisions in accordance with certain  terms and conditions, until DEA created a permanent, validated process for  using SAC/office head recommendations.
At the time of our review, DEA, working with the plaintiff class and other  employees, had developed a recommendation process. The Working Group  approved this process, which met the requirements of content validity as  described in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.  A diverse six-person panel of senior managers appointed by the DEA  Administrator and under the direction of an industrial psychologist  accomplished validation. In terms of job-relatedness, panel members first  individually reviewed descriptions of each competency to be assessed in  the SAC/office head recommendation process and the weight each  competency would receive. The panel then analyzed the knowledge, skills,  and abilities required for GS-14 and GS-15 special agent positions; rated  their importance to these positions; and individually linked the knowledge,  skills, and abilities to the competencies. The panel members followed the  same process for tasks required of GS-14 and GS-15 special agents. Final  agreement between the plaintiffs and DEA, particularly with regard to  procedures for monitoring the implementation of the recommendation  process, and approval by the court remained to be accomplished as of  March 2003.
section_title: The Diversity of DEA’s Special Agent Workforce
paragraphs: In September 2002, 4,481 (about 51 percent) of DEA’s 8,726 employees were  criminal investigators (in the 1811 occupational series), better known as  special agents. Special agents conduct investigations, perform surveillance,  infiltrate drug trafficking organizations, confiscate illegal drugs, arrest  violators, collect and prepare evidence, and testify in criminal court cases.
Data from DEA showed that in September 2002, whites made up 80.3  percent, African Americans 8.2 percent, Hispanics 8.8 percent,  Asian/Pacific Islanders 2.2 percent, and Native Americans 0.5 percent of  the agency’s special agents. Women made up 8.3 percent of DEA’s special  agents. The diversity of DEA’s special agent workforce was below overall  government workforce percentages but generally comparable with the  governmentwide population of criminal investigators, except for women  whose representation was about half that of criminal investigators  governmentwide. (See table 1.)
Table 1 is not a measure of the appropriateness of DEA’s diversity but  rather a comparison of it with other law enforcement groups. The table  includes another common measure of diversity—the nonfederal law  enforcement labor force—that is derived from the decennial census and  includes individuals working in nonfederal law enforcement and security- related occupations that OPM, EEOC, and the Department of Labor  consider comparable to the 1811 occupational series. In addition to the  governmentwide criminal investigator workforce, DEA compares its  special agent workforce to the nonfederal law enforcement labor force.  The overall minority representation in DEA’s special agent workforce is  comparable to the nonfederal law enforcement labor force, although there  is some variation in the representation of the various minority groups. DEA  has a lower representation of Native Americans and African Americans  while having a higher representation of Asian/Pacific Islanders and  Hispanics. Representation of DEA’s women special agents is lower,  compared with the nonfederal law enforcement labor force. However,  there are several limitations to these data. First, these figures are dated in  that they are based on the 1990 census. Figures based on the 2000 census  will not be available until the fall of 2003, according to an official with  OPM’s Office of Diversity. Additionally, the data are based on a wide variety  of police, detective, and public service occupations that include traffic  officers and police department chauffeurs as well as criminal investigators  and narcotics officers. A further problem with the nonfederal law  enforcement labor force data is that they do not distinguish educational  attainment of those working in comparable 1811 occupations—DEA  requires a 4-year college degree.
subsections: section_title: Workforce Trends—1980- 2002
paragraphs: Over the last two decades, the overall representation of minorities in DEA  special agent positions hardly changed, increasing from 19.1 percent in  1980 to 19.7 percent in 2002, while the representation of women increased,  from 2.3 percent in 1980 to 8.3 percent in 2002. While minority  representation in DEA’s special agent workforce showed increases during  the 1980s, it decreased after 1990. Only Asian/Pacific Islanders continued to  increase throughout the 1980-2002 time frame. (See table 2.)
When looked at from a grade standpoint, minority representation in DEA’s  special agent workforce resembles an inverted pyramid. Representation of  minority special agents in Senior Executive Service (SES) and supervisory  special agent (GS-14 and GS-15) positions is higher than in nonsupervisory  (GS-7 to GS-13) ranks. (See table 3.) In September 2002, 36.7 percent of  DEA’s SES special agents, 23.2 percent of supervisors, and 18.4 percent of  nonsupervisory special agents were members of minority groups. This was  particularly noticeable for African American and Hispanic special agents.  African Americans were 12.2 percent of SES special agents, 10.4 percent of  supervisors, and 7.5 percent of nonsupervisory special agents, while  Hispanics were 22.4 percent of SES special agents, 10 percent of  supervisors, and 8.2 percent of nonsupervisory special agents. For women,  the situation was similar in that women made up 10.2 percent of SES  special agents, which was higher than their representation in the  nonsupervisory and supervisory ranks. However, their representation in  the nonsupervisory ranks (8.8 percent) was higher than their  representation among supervisors (6.6 percent). Table 3 shows the  distribution of DEA special agents in nonsupervisory, supervisory, and SES  positions by equal employment opportunity (EEO) group in September  2002.
The implication of the inverted pyramid is that DEA could face problems in  enhancing, or even maintaining, diversity in the agency’s upper ranks in the  near future as supervisory and SES special agents retire or otherwise leave  DEA. The extent of future attrition in DEA’s upper ranks (and at all levels)  is unclear because DEA has not performed a sufficient workforce analysis.  However, if governmentwide estimates are any indication, DEA could be  facing high levels of attrition. According to our estimates, 27 percent of  federal criminal investigators on board in fiscal year 1998 were expected to  retire from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2006.
Our work in the human capital area, as discussed in A Model of Strategic  Human Capital Management, found that high-performing organizations  identify their current and future human capital needs and then create strategies for filling these needs. In May 2001, the Office of Management  and Budget instructed each federal agency to provide information on the  demographics of its workforce, including age, grade, retirement eligibility,  and expected retirements over the next 5 years, and attrition, including  trends in recent retirements over the past 5 years. Such an analysis could  guide the development of DEA’s recruiting and hiring plans and strategies  for a diverse special agent workforce. However, DEA’s workforce analysis  is limited to examining attrition data for the previous 24 months to estimate  the coming year’s hiring needs. The agency has not developed estimates on  the number of its special agents who are or will become eligible for  retirement or reach mandatory retirement age over the next 5 years or  longer and how this could affect the diversity of the special agent  workforce at the supervisory and SES levels and future recruiting needs.  DEA has faced challenges in meeting its special agent workforce needs. As  we will discuss later in this report, in addition to the high percentage of  applicants failing to meet DEA’s hiring standards during the 1997-2002 time  frame covered by our review, a large number of applicants dropped out of  the hiring process. DEA officials said that many of them dropped out  because of the lengthy hiring process, which, the officials said, was  averaging about 2 years. As a result, DEA was left with a relatively small  pool of candidates meeting its hiring standards from which the agency  could hire. In fact, virtually everyone who made it through all the steps in  the hiring process was offered employment. DEA officials said that it  would be preferable to have a larger pool of suitable candidates from which  the agency could select. Because the agency is concerned about having lost  quality candidates that could have enhanced the agency’s skills base and  diversity due to the long hiring process and not having a larger pool of  suitable candidates from which to choose, DEA implemented hiring  process changes in December 2002 in an attempt to reduce the time to hire  a special agent. In February 2003, the coordinator of the hiring project said  it was too early to tell the extent to which time efficiencies were being  realized.
section_title: A Higher Proportion of Minority Applicants Did Not Meet Hiring Requirements
paragraphs: DEA’s multistep recruitment and hiring process is intended to assess  whether an applicant demonstrates the competencies, physical and  psychological fitness, and personal integrity and character required of a  DEA special agent. Following an initial qualifications review for basic  requirements like education and citizenship, an applicant must pass a  written assessment, interview, medical examination, and physical task test.  An applicant is also subject to psychological testing, a polygraph  examination, and a background examination, which are used to make a  suitability determination. Using the 80 percent rule, we found that a  higher proportion of minorities, particularly African Americans and  Hispanics, did not meet the requirements to become a special agent in all  the steps in DEA’s hiring process except for the interview and medical  examination steps. Overall, minority special agent applicants were selected  at lower rates, compared with white applicants. The Uniform Guidelines  require an employer to study the job-relatedness of selection procedures  when there are substantial differences in the selection rate for any race,  ethnic, or gender group. DEA’s hiring procedures appear job related and  consistent with the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection  Procedures in that they are based on criteria in regulations, professional  standards, or standards established by subject matter experts. However,  the agency had not studied the effects of these procedures on minorities  and women and whether the procedures could be modified to lessen the  differences without compromising the high standards necessary to perform  the job successfully.
subsections: section_title: Qualifications Review
paragraphs: As the first step in the special agent hiring process, DEA reviews and rates  applications to determine whether an applicant meets minimum  requirements for the special agent position—a bachelor’s degree and  specialized skills or substantive experience, especially in law  enforcement. DEA officials said that the experience requirement was a  barrier to recruiting minority and women college graduates with diversified  skills. As a result, in May 2000, DEA changed its policy so that applicants  with bachelor’s degrees in special skills areas—economics, accounting,  computer science/information systems, certain foreign languages,  finance, mechanical/electrical/telecommunications engineering, or  criminal justice—would meet minimum requirements without having  additional experience.
We reviewed DEA's actions on applications received under the two most  recent vacancy announcements—BA-98-01 and BA-20-00. The proportion  of minority applicants increased from 27 percent for BA-98-01 to 31 percent  for BA-20-00. Similarly, the proportion of women applicants increased,  from 12.7 percent under BA-98-01 to 16.4 percent under BA-20-00. Table 4  shows the demographic distribution of applicants reviewed and rated  under both vacancy announcements. We show the results separately for  BA-98-01 and BA-20-00 because of the revised qualifications under  BA-20-00.
The extent to which DEA found that applicants met its minimum  requirements was uneven. Applications from African American women, in  particular, were much less likely to meet DEA’s minimum education and  experience requirements, even after BA-20-00 changed the criteria for  awarding credit for special skills. We show the results separately for BA-98- 01 and BA-20-00 in table 5 below because of the revised qualifications  under BA-20-00.
section_title: Written Assessment
paragraphs: Applicants who meet DEA’s minimum qualifications requirements must  then pass a written assessment of their ability to (1) observe and recall  details, (2) organize the details in a writing sample, and (3) write in a  grammatically correct manner. The assessment, which consists of showing  applicants a videotape of a simulated “drug bust” and asking them to write  a narrative describing what was observed, was developed by subject matter  experts and tested to help ensure job-relatedness. The written assessment  is administered, and applicants’ narratives are first reviewed and rated, in a  field division. Later, headquarters staff review the narratives, in order to  help assure DEA-wide consistency with established rating standards.
Because of concerns about low passing rates of African American and  Hispanic applicants, based on the recommendation of an advisory panel of  subject matter experts, DEA changed scoring criteria under BA-20-00 by  reducing the number of details from the videotape that applicants were  expected to recall and identify. At the same time, however, responding to  senior special agents’ concerns that newer special agents lacked the  writing skills necessary for preparing investigation reports and other  documents, DEA required that applicants pass all three parts of the written  assessment, not two, as had been the policy under BA-98-01. These changes  resulted in lower passing rates for all applicant groups. However, the  passing rates for African American men, Hispanic men, and Hispanic  women under BA-20-00 were substantially lower compared with white  women, who had the highest passing rate. In table 6 below, we show the  passing rates separately for BA-98-01 and BA-20-00 because of the changes  to the written assessment under BA-20-00.
DEA officials had not studied the effects of the changes to the written  assessment and were unaware of the lower pass rates. However, they said  the lower pass rates might be an unintended result of requiring applicants  to pass all three parts.
section_title: Interview
paragraphs: A panel of three special agents at a field division office interviews  applicants who pass the written assessment. The interview follows a  structured format of 21 questions to elicit responses to evaluate an  applicant’s abilities in (1) structuring work activities, (2) demonstrating  interpersonal skills, (3) tolerating stress, (4) evaluating information, and  (5) communicating orally. Special agents and Office of Personnel staff  involved in recruiting developed the interview questions and pilot tested  them to help assure their job-relatedness. The interview panel rates  applicants in accordance with established standards and the Special Agent  Recruitment Unit staff in headquarters later reviews ratings to check that  panelists adequately documented their assessment and adhered to the  rating standards.
As table 7 shows, interview-passing rates showed relatively little variation,  with about 90 percent of all applicants passing.
section_title: Medical Examination
paragraphs: Applicants who pass the written assessment and interview are scheduled  for a medical examination and, if they pass, are scheduled for the physical  task test. According to DEA’s Chief Medical Officer, the medical  examination follows standards developed by the Federal Law Enforcement  Medical Program Division of the Public Health Service, based on a 1999  survey of the physical demands of a special agent’s job. Prior to 1999, DEA  followed OPM-prescribed medical standards. About 95 percent of  applicants passed the medical exam and there was little difference in the  pass rates among the applicant groups, as table 8 shows.
section_title: Physical Task Test
paragraphs: The physical task test is the next step for applicants who have passed the  interview and medical examination. This test, intended to measure an  applicant’s ability to participate in physical activity during Basic Agent  Training, consists of six tasks—pull-ups, sit-ups, push-ups, shuttle run,  2-mile run, and, until March 2003, the handgun trigger pull. (See app. II for  physical task test minimum requirements.) According to the Chief of DEA’s  Health Services Unit and the unit’s Health Fitness Specialist, the physical  task test format (except for the trigger pull test) is based on standards  developed by the Cooper Institute, which reports that the fitness tests it  recommends for law enforcement have been validated through scientific  research to be job related. With regard to the handgun trigger pull, a DEA  official formerly with DEA’s Firearms Training Unit said that the unit  developed the trigger pull standard based on tests of Basic Agent Training  students.
Overall, men had a higher passing rate on the physical task test than  women. African American applicants passed the physical task test at rates  lower than other groups. In fact, African American applicants had a  significantly lower passing rate under BA-20-00, as table 9 shows.
DEA officials had not studied physical task test trends and did not know  which test tasks accounted for lower pass rates. The Chief of DEA’s Health  Services Unit and the unit’s Health Fitness Specialist said that they would  examine test results for the physical task test components as they look into  updating the physical task test to be consistent with contemporary  standards.
section_title: Suitability
paragraphs: Applicants passing the physical task test are scheduled for polygraph and  psychological tests and a background investigation to assess their  character and conduct. DEA special agents trained as polygraphists  administer the polygraph test in accordance with standardized techniques  and procedures for conducting polygraph examinations established by the  Department of Defense Polygraph Institute. For quality assurance, senior  polygraphists in DEA headquarters review test results, including the  audiotape made during each polygraph session. For the psychological  assessment, a licensed psychologist under contract with DEA reviews two  validated written psychological tests and DEA’s Life Experiences  Inventory completed by the applicant, interviews the applicant, and  prepares an overall assessment, which a DEA psychologist reviews. DEA  contracts with OPM to do full-field background investigations on special  agent applicants in accordance with federal regulations. The investigation  develops information through interviews with coworkers, employers,  friends, educators, neighbors, and other individuals; a personal interview  with the applicant; and records checks of investigative files and other  records held by federal agencies, and state and local law enforcement and  court records. In addition, an applicant is subject to a financial review,  including a credit bureau check.
The results of the polygraph and psychological tests and the background  investigation are considered together for a suitability determination.  Suitability determinations are made in accordance with federal regulations by the approving official in the Office of Personnel or, where  there is a question about an applicant’s suitability, by a three-person panel  called the “1811-hiring panel.” DEA officials said that the panel approach  helps to assure consistency in applying criteria in cases in which there is  some question about an applicant’s suitability. To come to a determination  about an applicant’s suitability, the three panel members must be in  agreement. If the approving official or the panel approves an applicant, he  or she is offered employment.
Our analysis of suitability determinations showed that, overall, DEA found  67 percent of applicants, for whom a suitability determination was made,  suitable to be special agents, with women found suitable at higher rates  than men. However, the approval rate for African Americans—55.2  percent—was substantially lower. (See table 10.)
The approving official and current and former 1811 panel members said  that they had not examined the results of their decisions and could not  explain why African Americans fared worse than other applicants or  whether specific disqualifying factors predominate among one group. They  also said that, generally, they were not aware of an applicant’s race when  making their determinations. Since the panel was established in 1997, at  least one and sometimes two of the three panel members have been  minorities.
Because the 1811 hiring panel makes about 80 percent of the suitability  determinations, we developed information about the panel’s decisions. Our  analysis of the panel’s data found that the panel approved about 49 percent  of applicants it reviewed, while finding about 36 percent of African  Americans suitable. (See table 11.)
Data showed that most (82.7 percent) of the applicants whose suitability  was adjudicated by the panel presented multiple issues for adjudication.  The most frequently identified issues related to an applicant’s  psychological assessment (60.6 percent of referred files), polygraph  examination (36.4 percent), driving record (27 percent), not being  recommended by a SAC (26.5 percent), admissions such as drug use on the  Life Experiences Inventory (22.4 percent), and credit issues (17 percent).  Among African American applicants, the most frequently identified reasons  related to the psychological assessment (69.6 percent), not being  recommended by a SAC (34.8 percent), driving record (30.4 percent), credit  issues (21.7 percent), and admissions on the Life Experiences Inventory  (17.4 percent). The panel’s database did not show the basis for its  decisions.
section_title: Final Hiring Results
paragraphs: As of March 31, 2002, from the 10,748 applications found to meet its  minimum requirements under announcements BA-98-01 and BA-20-00, DEA  hired 793 applicants, while rejecting 3,038 applicants who did not pass the  written assessment, interview, medical or physical task test, or were found  unsuitable. The remaining 6,917 applicants had opted out or were still in  process. Overall, we found that about 20 percent of applicants on whom  DEA made a final eligibility determination met the special agent hiring  standards and were selected for training. However, we found that  minorities met DEA’s hiring standards at lower rates than white applicants,  with African American and Hispanic applicants meeting the standards and  being selected at substantially lower rates. (See table 12.)
DEA’s hiring decisions were somewhat less diverse, compared with the  pool of applicants that met DEA’s minimum education, skills, and  experience requirements. As table 13 shows, African Americans, Hispanics,  and women represented a smaller proportion of the special agents hired  under BA-98-01 and BA-20-00, compared with applicants who initially met  minimum requirements, while the proportion of whites increased.
DEA offers employment to virtually all applicants who make it all the way  through its hiring process. Because the agency is concerned about having  lost quality candidates that could have enhanced the agency’s skills base  and diversity due to the long hiring process (which had been averaging  about 2 years) and not having a larger pool of suitable candidates from  which to choose, DEA made reforms to its recruiting and hiring process  that had been implemented agencywide by December 2002. The reforms  include giving the field more responsibility for managing the hiring process  and avoiding time-consuming back-and-forth actions between the field and  headquarters. For example, field recruiters are to conduct criminal history  and credit records checks to identify unqualified applicants before, rather  than after, an application package is forwarded to headquarters, in order to  reduce the number of application packages reviewed. These preliminary  records checks will also help eliminate the need for costly background  investigations when an applicant is identified as unqualified, according to  DEA. In addition, background investigations are to be initiated earlier in  the process and by field offices, which also are to review the investigation  results, perform necessary follow-up, and make preliminary suitability  recommendations. Previously, background investigations had been  managed by headquarters, which referred follow-up questions to the field.  In addition, suitability determinations will be made before security  clearance reviews are conducted. This will help reduce the security  clearance backlog, which had been a major contributor to delays in the  hiring process, and reduce the need to update stale applicant information  when suitability determinations are made.
section_title: No Statistically Significant Differences in Promotion Rates
paragraphs: DEA’s process for promoting special agents to GS-14 and GS-15 positions  has been in place since 1992. The first step is the Special Agent Promotion  Program (SAPP), which uses a supervisor’s performance rating and job  simulation exercises at an assessment center to measure the candidate’s  knowledge and abilities to perform at the next grade level and determine  which applicants for promotion are placed on a best-qualified list. The SAC  or head of an office with a vacancy is asked to review the qualifications of  best-qualified applicants and recommend his or her top choices to DEA’s  Career Board, the head of which ultimately makes promotion decisions.  Our analysis showed that although African American and Hispanic special  agents received promotion recommendations at lower rates than white  agents, particularly for promotions to GS-14, there were no statistically  significant differences in promotion rates among the various race, ethnic,  and gender groups.
subsections: section_title: Special Agent Promotion Program
paragraphs: The SAPP establishes which GS-13 and GS-14 special agents can compete  for promotions. The SAPP is an annual process that was developed by an  outside consultant in response to the 1981 Segar decision. The Working  Group reviewed and approved its development. From 1997 to 2001, 1,355  GS-13 and 423 GS-14 special agents participated in the SAPP. Of the GS- 13s participating in the SAPP, 25.5 percent were minorities—mostly African  American and Hispanic—and 7.4 percent were women. Among the GS-14s,  28.4 percent were minorities—mostly African American and Hispanic—and  8.5 percent were women. Table 14 shows the demographics of the GS-13  and GS-14 special agent SAPP participants for 1997 through 2001. In our  analysis of promotion-related results, we combine men and women for  each race because of the small number of minority women.
The SAPP has two components: the performance rating on the  competencies needed at the next higher grade level and testing at an  assessment center in which job simulations are used to measure a special  agent’s knowledge and abilities needed at the next level.
In the performance rating, special agents are evaluated on job-related  competencies (see app. III) on a scale from 1 (unacceptable) to 5  (exceptional). An agent’s most recent supervisor prepares the rating, which  is reviewed by a SAC or office head to help ensure that performance  standards are uniformly applied. Data for 1997 through 2001 show that  average performance rating scale scores for SAPP participants were nearly  uniformly exceptional—almost a perfect 5—for all groups, with no  statistically significant differences in the scores among the various groups.  In this regard, the 2001 SAPP report found that the rating scores did not  differentiate between highly effective and less effective performers and  showed little if any correlation to assessment center tests of similar  competencies. Because performance rating scores for those who  participate in the assessment center are uniformly high and do little to  differentiate among candidates, a candidate’s assessment center score is  the primary determinant of promotion competitiveness.
The assessment center replicates a day in the life of a special agent through  exercises simulating the job at the next higher level. DEA conducts two  assessment centers each year, one for GS-13s aspiring to GS-14 level  positions and another for GS-14s aspiring to become GS-15s, which are  administered under a contract DEA awards annually. The assessment  centers consist of role-play, in-basket, and, for GS-14s, oral presentation  exercises simulating the job at the next higher level to measure a  candidate’s performance in a variety of competencies. In 2001, GS-13  special agents were evaluated on 12 competencies in assessment center  simulations while GS-14 special agents were evaluated on 9 competencies.  (See app. III.) The original job simulations were developed following a  content-oriented validation strategy consistent with the Uniform  Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures and the Principles for  Validation and Use of Personnel Selection Procedures. This was done by detailing special agents’ job tasks and the knowledge and abilities required  to perform those tasks, establishing linkages between job tasks and the  knowledge and abilities required, and demonstrating linkages between the  required knowledge and abilities and selection procedures. The 2001  SAPP report noted that there is extensive literature documenting the  validity of job simulations for predicting supervisory and managerial  performance and that simulation measures are viewed as having a  potentially high degree of content validity, thereby reducing the possibility  of discrimination.
DEA special agents trained by the contractor serve as assessors. To  minimize the degree of candidate/assessor familiarity and partiality when  assigning candidates to assessors, the assessment centers director collects  familiarity and partiality ratings from assessors to determine the extent to  which assessors know a promotion candidate and how impartially the  assessors believe they could evaluate the candidate. Another way of  fostering fairness is through the representation of minorities and women  among the assessors. Overall, during the 1997-2001 period, the proportion  of minority and women assessors for both the GS-14 and GS-15 assessment  centers exceeded the proportion of minorities and women participating in  the GS-14 and GS-15 SAPPs. As a check on how assessors carry out  exercises and developed scores, the assessment centers director reviews  videotapes of exercises, evaluates assessors’ notes, and independently  scores candidates’ performances. In addition, the director surveys  candidates and prepares a report on the results of each assessment center.  The report analyzes overall scores for each assessment center and scores  by competency and exercise, comparing the scores of African Americans  and whites and, to a lesser extent, Hispanics and whites, to identify  competencies in which larger and smaller race/national origin effects were  observed and suggest possible areas for concentrating test improvement,  training, and developmental efforts. In this regard, the contractor made a  number of revisions each year from 1997 through 2001 to the assessment  centers exercises in an attempt to reduce differences.
The Working Group plays an integral role in the assessment centers.  Working Group members said that they oversee the development of the  exercises, approve the design of the annual assessment centers, monitor  the proceedings, and review and approve the overall results. As part of  their oversight, they said that they meet with participants to get their  feedback and review videotapes of the role-play exercises to determine if  they were conducted fairly and properly. They described the assessment  centers as first-class operations that meet standards for fair treatment and  valid procedures. They also said that differences in scores among groups  have not been statistically significant and that differences in scores among  the candidates are due to factors other than the testing procedures. The  Working Group members said that the strengths of the assessment centers  are that the exercises appropriately reflect results of job analysis, the  assessors are well trained, the assessors’ ratings and the rating measures  are reliable, and the process is checked for adverse impact using statistical  tests. Overall, they said that the assessment center process is a valid way of  selecting a supervisor because it asks candidates to perform supervisory  tasks. Moreover, OPM has described the SAPP as a “success story” in its  use of leadership competencies in making supervisory selections.
The performance rating and assessment center scores each account for  half in developing an overall SAPP score for each candidate. As table 15  shows, white participants generally had somewhat higher SAPP scores,  although the differences from the other groups were not statistically  significant, according to the Working Group. Men tended to have higher  scores in the GS-14 assessment center, but women tended to have higher  scores in the GS-15 assessment center.
The SAPP scores are used to establish score bands that determine which  special agents make the best-qualified list for GS-14 and GS-15 vacancies.  Under the SAPP, the size of the score band for GS-14 positions is 10 points,  while the score band for GS-15 positions is 11 points. The actual score band  for a particular vacancy is determined by the applicant with the highest  SAPP score. For GS-14 positions, for example, if the highest-scoring  applicant has a SAPP score of 95, the score band for that vacancy is 86 to  95; and applicants with scores of at least 86 would be placed on the best- qualified list. Similarly, if the highest-scoring applicant for a GS-15 vacancy  has a SAPP score of 95, the score band for that vacancy is 85 to 95, and  applicants with scores of at least 85 would be placed on the best-qualified  list.
section_title: SAC/Office Head Recommendations
paragraphs: Once a best-qualified list is assembled for a particular vacancy, it is sent to  the office with the vacancy to obtain the SAC’s (or office head’s)  recommendations for promotion. The SAC’s recommendation is solicited  because DEA believes that he or she is more familiar with the requirements  of the position to be filled and is in a better position to assess candidates’  qualifications from their biographical and other information. A SAC  typically recommends three individuals. The SAC/office head  recommendation process was at the heart of the September 1999 district  court decision that found that the process had not been validated and  resulted in African American applicants receiving recommendations at  statistically significant lower rates that whites. In addition to not having  been validated, there was no format in place at the time of the 1999  decision to assure that SACs evaluated candidates using knowledge, skills,  and abilities relevant to the vacant job. Following the court decision, which  required DEA to either drop the SAC/office head recommendation process  or stop making promotions to GS-14 and GS-15 special agent positions until  the use of the recommendations could be validated as job related, DEA and  the plaintiffs reached a court-approved agreement allowing SAC/office  head recommendations and promotions under certain terms and  conditions until a permanent, validated process could be implemented. The  interim process, which was implemented in January 2000 and was still in  place as of March 2003, requires that a SAC provide information about why  a candidate is better suited for the position under consideration, including  his or her experience and success in job-related competencies (see app.  III), when making recommendations.
Despite the changes to the process, differences in SAC/office head  recommendation rates for applicants seeking promotion to GS-14 and GS- 15 positions continued. For GS-14 and GS-15 vacancy announcements that  resulted in a promotion during fiscal years 2000 and 2001, we analyzed the  number of times applicants on the best-qualified list received SAC/office  head recommendations, compared with the number of times applicants  appeared on best-qualified lists. (An applicant can apply for multiple  positions and appear on multiple best-qualified lists.) We found that for  promotions to GS-14, African American and Hispanic special agents  received SAC/office head recommendations at statistically significant  lower rates than white special agents. For GS-15 positions, African  American special agents received SAC/office head recommendations at  statistically significant lower rates than whites. Table 16 shows the  frequency of applicants on best-qualified lists being recommended by  SACs, 2000-2001.
At the time of our review, DEA, working with members of the Monitoring  Committee and other special agents, had developed a revised  recommendation process. The Working Group approved the revised  process and said that it met the requirements of content validity as  described in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. A  major change under this process requires that a panel of three GS-14, GS- 15, or SES special agents at the location with a vacancy review and rank  applicants on a best-qualified list based on job-related competencies (see  app. III) and any special requirements of the position. The SAC would make  his or her promotion recommendations from this list, providing a  comprehensive justification in recommending an individual not ranked  among the top three applicants. As part of its review and evaluation of the  proposed process, DEA’s plan for oversight of the SAC/office head  recommendation process included tracking the race of each person  (1) appearing on a best qualified list, (2) recommended by a SAC, and  (3) selected for promotion, and report these results periodically to the  Segar plaintiffs’ counsel. However, the plan did not specifically include  tracking results by gender. At the end of our fieldwork, the plaintiffs and  DEA were involved in mediation efforts in order to reach final agreement  on the recommendation process, particularly with regard to procedures for  monitoring the implementation of the process. Approval by the court is  required to complete settlement on this issue.
section_title: Career Board Selections
paragraphs: Promotion decisions for GS-14 and GS-15 special agent positions are made  following deliberations by DEA’s Career Board. The Career Board’s 11  voting members, who are DEA senior executives, make promotion  recommendations by majority vote to the Career Board Chair, who ultimately has responsibility and authority to make the selection decision.  DEA makes promotion decisions on a position-by-position basis when  vacancies become available, with a best-qualified list assembled for each  vacancy based on applicants’ SAPP scores. However, minorities and  women do not appear on a substantial portion of best-qualified lists  because they do not apply for particular vacancies or because their SAPP  scores are not high enough to place them among the best qualified.
We analyzed the results of 641 promotions to GS-14 positions and 204  promotions to GS-15 during fiscal years 1997 through 2001 and found that,  despite differences in SAC/office head recommendation rates, there were  no statistically significant differences in the rates at which the Career  Board selected minorities and women for promotion. Our analysis showed  only small differences in the rates at which African American, Hispanic,  and white special agents were selected for promotion to GS-14 and GS-15  positions. The numbers of Asian/Pacific Islanders and Native Americans  eligible for promotion were too small for statistical analysis. Although  women were somewhat less likely than men to be selected for promotion,  this difference was not statistically significant. Table 17 shows the number  of individuals on best qualified lists from which promotions were made and  the number selected for promotion by EEO group for fiscal years  1997-2001.
section_title: DEA’s Discipline Process Has Been Found to Be Nondiscriminatory
paragraphs: DEA’s centralized disciplinary system was put in place in 1984 and, in 1988,  was found to meet the court’s requirements for being effective and  nondiscriminatory. The three-tiered system separates the responsibilities  for investigating an allegation, proposing disposition, and making a final  agency decision. Our analysis of disciplinary data for fiscal years 1997  through 2001 showed that the proportion of African American, Hispanic,  and women special agents disciplined was substantially higher than their  representation in the DEA special agent workforce. This situation reflects  that African American, Hispanic, and women special agents had a  proportionately higher number of allegations of misconduct lodged against  them and that a higher proportion of these allegations were substantiated  by investigations and resulted in disciplinary action. Nonetheless, the  results of two studies by outside contractors, approved by the Working  Group, found DEA’s disciplinary process to be fair and nondiscriminatory.
subsections: section_title: DEA’s Validated Discipline System
paragraphs: DEA’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) is responsible for  investigating all allegations of integrity violations (illegal or improper  conduct) and the vast majority of allegations of misconduct involving  violations of DEA’s Standards of Conduct. OPR investigations are findings  of fact and do not contain conclusions or recommendations.
The Board of Professional Conduct reviews investigation files in order to  propose a disposition for a matter. In each case, two board members  independently review the investigation report, the employee’s official  personnel record, and how similar cases have been handled, and propose a  disposition using the preponderance of the evidence standard. Board  members are also to consider mitigating and aggravating factors known as  the Douglas factors—derived from a Merit Systems Protection Board  (MSPB) decision—in determining the appropriateness of a disciplinary  action. The board’s chairman reviews their recommendations and the  investigative file and issues the board’s proposed disposition. The board  can propose that a special agent be cleared of alleged charges, receive a  letter of caution, or be disciplined (receive a letter of reprimand, or be  suspended, demoted, or removed).
The final agency decision is made by one of two deciding officials in  headquarters using the preponderance of the evidence standard, after  independently reviewing the proposed action and the investigation file and  consulting with employee relations specialists and the DEA Chief Counsel’s  office. The deciding officials also apply the Douglas factors and other legal  precedents. As part of the final decision process, an employee is provided  the opportunity to review all evidence and make written and/or oral  responses to the disciplinary charges.
section_title: Higher Proportion of African American, Hispanic, and Women Special Agents Disciplined
paragraphs: Our analysis of disciplinary data for fiscal years 1997 to 2001 showed that  the proportion of African American, Hispanic, and women special agents  disciplined was substantially higher than their representation in the DEA  special agent workforce and that this difference was statistically  significant. During this period, African American special agents accounted  for 16.2 percent of the agents disciplined, while making up 8.3 percent of  the special agent workforce; Hispanics were 15.2 percent of agents  disciplined, while making up 8.9 percent of the special agent workforce;  and women were 12.7 percent of special agents disciplined but 7.8 percent  of the special agent workforce. Table 18 shows special agents disciplined,  compared with special agent population, by EEO group for fiscal years  1997-2001.
We identified two factors that help explain why a higher proportion of  African American, Hispanic, and women special agents were disciplined.  One factor is that a proportionately higher number of allegations of  misconduct were lodged against African American, Hispanic, and women,  compared with their representation in the special agent workforce. These  differences, shown in table 19, were statistically significant.
The second factor that helps explain why a higher proportion of African  American, Hispanic, and women special agents are disciplined is that a  higher proportion of allegations levied against them are found after  investigation to have merit and lead to disciplinary action. These  differences, shown in table 20, were statistically significant.
DEA does not know why nor does any study offer a reason why African  American, Hispanic, and women special agents had proportionately higher  numbers of allegations of misconduct lodged against them or why a higher  proportion of these allegations were substantiated by investigations and  resulted in disciplinary actions.
subsections: section_title: Concerns with DEA’s Disciplinary Data
paragraphs: In performing our analysis, we found discrepancies between the  disciplinary data maintained by the DEA Chief Counsel’s office that were reported to us and data the DEA Office of Equal Opportunity reported to  the Monitoring Committee. We brought these discrepancies to DEA’s  attention, and significant time was needed to develop corrected data. The  corrected data showed that data reported by the Chief Counsel’s office  were incomplete while data reported by the Office of Equal Opportunity  counted some cases twice. Accurate and reliable data are important to  DEA monitoring its disciplinary process. At the time of our review, DEA  was looking into but had not developed a process to help ensure accurate  and reliable reporting of disciplinary data.
section_title: Studies Have Found DEA’s Disciplinary Process to Be Fair and Nondiscriminatory
paragraphs: Two studies done by outside contractors, which we found to be  methodologically sound, have found DEA’s disciplinary process to be fair  and nondiscriminatory. The first study, done under a contract awarded by  the Working Group in order for DEA to comply with the court order in the  Segar case, analyzed 318 disciplinary cases for the period September 1982  through June 1986 to determine whether disciplinary action taken was  consistent with the offense or offenses committed and whether special  agents were treated alike regardless of race. Of the 318 cases, 239 cases  (75.2 percent) involved white special agents, 32 (10.1 percent) involved  African Americans, 36 (11.3 percent) involved Hispanics, and 11 (3.5  percent) involved other racial/ethnic groups. The percentage of African  American and Hispanic special agents disciplined was higher than their  representation in the special agent workforce. African Americans, who  were 10.1 percent of the agents disciplined, made up about 8.5 percent of  the special agent workforce during the period, and Hispanics, who were  11.3 percent of the agents disciplined, made up 10.2 percent of the special  agent workforce. Women were 3.2 percent of agents disciplined while  making up 7.6 percent of the special agent workforce.
The study’s results, issued in April 1987 and approved by the Working  Group, concluded that, based on statistical analysis, there appeared to be  no discrimination against minorities in general, and African Americans in  particular, with regard to the number of individuals recommended for  discipline, the severity of the proposed punishment, or the severity of the  actual punishment carried out as related to the severity of the offense. The  study also found a strong relationship between the severity of the charge  and the discipline ultimately meted out. The study found that although  African American special agents were charged on average with more  serious offenses than white special agents, there were no statistically  significant differences in the discipline decisions as a function of the  severity of the charges. Although the study did not identify the cause for  African Americans being charged with more serious offenses, it raised but  did not examine whether, race, type of assignment, or small sample size of  the study could have been factors.
The second study, done at the request of the Monitoring Committee and  Working Group, examined whether there were differences in the discipline  administered to white versus African American special agents during  calendar years 1994-2000. Of 365 disciplinary cases of special agents  during this period, 237 (64.9 percent) involved whites, 58 (15.9 percent)  involved African Americans, 58 (15.9 percent) involved Hispanics, 6 (1.6  percent) involved Asian/Pacific Islanders, and 3 (0.8 percent) involved  Native Americans. There was no race information in 3 cases. In addition, no  breakout by gender was reported. The study methodology was developed  so that the results could be applied to any protected group, but because the  study was done in the context of the Segar case, only discipline  administered to African American and white special agents was analyzed.
According to the report, issued in August 2001 and approved by the  Working Group, there were no statistically significant differences in the  imposition of discipline between African American and white special  agents for any offense or violation category. The study also concluded that  the data “decisively and unequivocally” showed no differences between  African American and white special agents in terms of the severity of the  punishment administered, which the study said confirmed the integrity of  the discipline process. Although the data reported by the study showed that  the percentage of African American special agents disciplined (15.9 percent  of agents disciplined) was higher than the group’s representation in the  workforce (less than 9 percent), the study did not analyze the relationship  between the number of African Americans disciplined and their  representation in the special agent workforce.
The integrity of DEA’s discipline process from a legal perspective was also  evident in MSPB decisions. Employees can appeal removals, demotions,  and suspensions of more than 14 days to MSPB and, during, fiscal years  1997-2001, MSPB decided the cases of 28 DEA special agents. Of the 28  cases, MSPB affirmed DEA’s actions in 24 cases (85.7 percent), affirmed  some or all of the charges and mitigated the penalty in 2 cases (7.1  percent), and reversed DEA’s actions in 2 cases (7.1 percent). In  comparison, governmentwide, MSPB reversed 22 percent of agency  decisions in fiscal year 2001. A Justice Department review of fiscal year  1997 Justice cases before MSPB found that, among department  components, DEA had the highest affirmation rate, which was attributed to  the quality of documentation and evidence supporting charges. The report  said that DEA’s centralized disciplinary system provides for impartiality  and consistency in developing defensible disciplinary actions.
section_title: Employee Views on Promotion and Discipline
paragraphs: As agreed with your office, during our review, we spoke with minority and  women special agents, including members of the Monitoring Committee as  well as members of the Hispanic Advisory and Asian-American Advisory  Committees, to obtain their views on promotion and discipline issues. Our  work has found that high-performing organizations promote a diverse and  inclusive workforce and have workplaces in which perceptions of  unfairness are minimized. However, comments of many of the minority  and female special agents with whom we spoke indicated that they  believed trust and fairness were lacking with regard to the promotion and  discipline processes. For example, members of these committees said they  perceived that their groups were underrepresented in promotions to GS-14  and GS-15 and that selection outcomes were frequently based on “who you  know.” These special agents said that candidates, especially in field  divisions, may have been disadvantaged because of a lack of personal  knowledge of an agent among the board members. The November 2002  change to increase the number of SACs serving as rotating members was  made to address this concern. Another concern the minority special agents  expressed was about the board’s racial, ethnic, and gender representation.  However, in January 2003, the Career Board included two African  Americans, two Hispanics, one Native American, and six whites; one of the  members was a woman. During the 1997-2002 time frame, the board had a  similar makeup.
One additional concern of many of the minority special agents with whom  we spoke was the perceived unfairness in the discipline process. These  agents said that they believed that minorities were subject to more scrutiny  and, as a result, were disproportionately investigated for misconduct. A  number of the agents also said that they perceived that there were  inconsistencies in punishment meted out, with minorities receiving harsher  punishment. Our work showed that African American, Hispanic, and  women special agents had a proportionately higher number of allegations  of misconduct lodged against them and that a higher proportion of these  allegations were substantiated by investigations and resulted in  disciplinary actions. However, the results of two studies by outside  contractors, approved by an oversight group and which we found  methodologically sound, found DEA’s disciplinary process to be fair and  nondiscriminatory.
The perceptions minority and women special agents have with regard to  fairness in promotions and discipline may be driven by an absence of data  and other information. For example, DEA had not shared the racial analysis  of its promotion actions or SAC/office head recommendations with its  special agent workforce, except the Monitoring Committee. Our analysis  of promotions to GS-14 and GS-15 special agent positions for fiscal years  1997 through 2001 showed no statistically significant differences in the  promotion rates among the racial, ethnic, and gender groups. In addition,  DEA only shared the results of the 2001 discipline study, which found no  statistically significant differences in the imposition of discipline between  African American and white special agents, with the Monitoring  Committee. On the other hand, although the study methodology was  developed so that the results could be applied to any protected group, the  study was done in the context of the Segar case and examined only  discipline administered to African American and white special agents.  However, it appears that discipline actions taken against Hispanics were to  have been included in the study, according to a memo from a former DEA  Administrator to the Hispanic Advisory Council. Neither council members  nor DEA officials could explain why this did not occur.
As we discuss in our exposure draft A Model of Strategic Human Capital  Management, our work in the human capital area has shown that leading  organizations promote an inclusive workforce by seeking employee input  and using that input to adjust their human capital approaches. DEA has  taken, or plans to take, some steps in this regard. One step was that, as  DEA’s study of a valid SAC/office head recommendation process  progressed, the agency involved minorities, in addition to Monitoring  Committee representatives that had been involved, and women. Also, the  November 2002 changes to the structure of the Career Board were based  on input from the Monitoring Committee and other special agents, and,  according to the Administrator’s memo announcing the change, were  intended to bring transparency and greater participation to the promotion  process. Furthermore, in March 2002, the Administrator established an  ombudsman office to address workplace conflicts, facilitate fair and  equitable resolutions to concerns, and serve as an advisor and information  and communications resource. The ombudsperson said that she had  handled a variety of matters, mostly involving special agents, including  issues concerning performance appraisals and Career Board decisions to  reassign agents.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: At some steps of DEA’s hiring process, a higher percentage of minorities do  not meet the requirements to become a special agent, with African  American and Hispanic applicants hired at substantially lower rates  compared with white applicants. DEA has not analyzed why some groups  of applicants have lower passing rates and whether alternative procedures  could lessen these differences without compromising the high standards  necessary to perform the job successfully. Furthermore, because a large  number of applicants drop out or do not meet hiring standards, DEA offers  employment to virtually all applicants it finds suitable, leaving the agency  with little choice in whom it hires. DEA has not performed a workforce  analysis that takes into account expected attrition of the special agent  workforce, especially due to retirements, that could help the agency plan  for a sufficiently large pool of suitable special agent candidates with  diverse cultural and skills backgrounds from which it could selectively  hire.
Promotions of special agents to supervisory GS-14 and GS-15 positions  have not shown statistically significant differences among groups.  However, DEA’s rigorous promotion process has been subject to litigation  surrounding the SAC/office head recommendation process, the step in the  overall promotion process that had not been validated. DEA has since  developed a revised recommendation process and proposed a monitoring  process that the agency and the plaintiffs are discussing to reach  agreement about and which still must be court approved. However, the  proposed monitoring process does not take gender into account.
The proportion of African American, Hispanic, and women special agents  disciplined for misconduct was substantially higher than their  representation in the DEA special agent workforce. However, two studies  have found DEA’s discipline process to be valid and fair, but neither of the  studies addressed differences in the rates at which different groups were  disciplined, and the second study compared only disciplinary actions  involving African American and white special agents. Reliable data would  be necessary to carry out a study covering all race, ethnic, and gender  groups, and our analysis of disciplinary actions was delayed by the lack of  reliable data. Although DEA eventually developed corrected data, the  agency has not developed a process to maintain accurate and reliable  disciplinary data.
Finally, minority and female special agents with whom we spoke generally  perceived that the promotion and discipline processes lacked fairness.  Perceptions of unfairness can be almost as corrosive to the workplace as  actual instances of unfair treatment and can undermine trust. Because DEA  did not widely share analyses of promotion and disciplinary actions with its  special agent workforce, agents were hindered in formulating informed  views about the fairness and equity of the promotion and discipline  processes. This situation would continue under DEA’s proposal for  monitoring the promotion process because reporting of outcomes would  be limited to the African American special agents plaintiff group.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Administrator of DEA direct that  a process be initiated to monitor the results of decisions at the various  steps in the hiring process to identify differences in selection rates  among groups, and where substantial differences are found, determine  why they occur and what, if anything, can be done to reduce the  differences while maintaining the high standards necessary for the job  of special agent;  a workforce analysis be done, which takes into account retirement  eligibility, expected retirements, and other attrition, to guide the  development of DEA’s recruiting and hiring plans and strategies;   the plans to monitor the results of the SAC/office head recommendation  process by race and ethnicity be expanded to include monitoring by  gender;   steps be taken to develop, maintain, and ensure the reliability of a  discipline database and that the study of disciplinary actions taken  against African American and white special agents be expanded to  analyze disciplinary actions against all racial, ethnic, and gender groups  of special agents; and  appropriate, aggregate statistical data on the outcomes of the promotion  and discipline processes for all racial, ethnic, and gender groups are  available to its special agent workforce to help special agents formulate  informed views about the fairness and equity of the agency’s promotion  and discipline processes.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, the Acting Administrator of DEA  agreed with our recommendations and said that DEA was acting to  implement them. (See app. IV for the text of the comments.)
Regarding hiring of special agents, DEA said it will monitor the results of  decisions at the various steps in the hiring process to identify differences in  selection rates. DEA’s response said that it would identify differences  among minority groups but did not specifically mention gender differences.  DEA should examine differences in selection rates among all groups,  including gender groups. DEA also said that it will conduct a study to  review each part of the special agent hiring process. The study will include  analysis of processes used by other law enforcement agencies to identify  alternative strategies that might lessen differences in selection rates.
DEA agreed with our recommendation that a workforce analysis be done to  guide the development of recruiting and hiring plans and strategies. DEA  said that it will analyze its workforce to determine the portion eligible for,  or who anticipates, retirement, and to identify other attrition concerns for  the agency and use the results to guide the development of its recruiting  and hiring plans and strategies.
DEA also agreed with our recommendation to monitor the SAC/office head  recommendation process for all EEO groups, including by gender. DEA  said that, if it is put in place, its monitoring plan will include evaluating  results for all demographics of the workforce, including race, ethnicity, and  gender.
Regarding the reliability of discipline data, DEA said that it agreed with our  recommendation and had begun an effort to consolidate multiple discipline  databases. With regard to our recommendation that DEA expand the study  of disciplinary actions taken against African American and white special  agents to analyze disciplinary actions against all racial, ethnic, and gender  groups of special agents, DEA said that it will do so.
Finally, DEA concurred with our recommendation to make statistical data  on the outcomes of the promotion and discipline processes for all racial,  gender, and ethnic groups available to its special agent workforce. DEA  said that it will make available aggregate statistical data concerning  promotion selections and types of misconduct found.
Overall, the actions DEA describes, when fully implemented, should meet  our recommendations. DEA also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated in the report where appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its  date. We will then send copies of this report to the Attorney General, the  Administrator of DEA, and interested congressional committees. We will  also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report  will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If  you or your staff have questions about this report, please call me at (202)  512-6806 or Thomas Dowdal, Assistant Director, on (202) 512-6588. Key  contributors to this assignment were Anthony Lofaro, Domingo Nieves, and  Gregory Wilmoth.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: In her letter of May 25, 2001, Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson  expressed concerns about discrimination in the Drug Enforcement  Administration’s (DEA) hiring, promotion, and discipline processes. Based  on discussions with her office, we agreed to (1) develop information on the  diversity of DEA’s special agent workforce and (2) examine the processes  DEA has put in place to provide for fair and nondiscriminatory hiring,  promotion, and disciplining of special agents and the results that have been  achieved.
subsections: section_title: DEA Special Agent Workforce Diversity
paragraphs: With regard to the diversity of DEA’s special agent workforce, we  developed information by race, ethnicity, and gender for each pay grade,  using data from the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Central  Personnel Data File (CPDF) as of September 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and  2000, and data from DEA as of September 2002. We selected these dates to  show changes, if any, that had occurred in DEA’s special agent workforce  from around the initial decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of  Columbia in 1981 with regard to a class action racial discrimination lawsuit  brought against DEA by the agency’s African American special agents  through the end of fiscal year 2002. To compare the racial, ethnic, and  gender composition of the DEA special agent (criminal investigator job  occupation series 1811) workforce with other criminal investigator  workforces, we used data OPM provided for criminal investigators  governmentwide and the nonfederal law enforcement labor force, a  measure that includes nonfederal law enforcement and security-related  occupations that are considered comparable to the 1811 occupational  series by the OPM, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and  the Department of Labor. In addition, we obtained overall federal  workforce diversity data as of September 2002 from OPM. We determined  based on our past work that the CPDF data are sufficiently reliable for the  purpose used in this report.
section_title: DEA’s Hiring, Promotion, and Discipline Processes
paragraphs: To determine the DEA processes for hiring, promoting, and disciplining  special agents and the results that have been achieved, we reviewed  relevant DEA policies and procedures and interviewed knowledgeable  DEA officials. In addition, we spoke with employee representatives,  including members of the Monitoring Committee, a court-established group  of African American special agents representing plaintiff class members;  the Hispanic Advisory Council; and the Asian-American Advisory Counsel.  Further, we spoke with the members of the Working Group that was  established to help ensure that the orders of the court are carried out and  that DEA’s personnel practices are nondiscriminatory. With regard to  developing information about the job-relatedness of DEA’s hiring,  promotion, and discipline processes, we spoke with DEA officials, Working  Group members, and contractors who had studied the processes and  reviewed available studies and other documentation.
In analyzing results, we compared each racial and ethnic group and  compared men of all races/ethnicities with women of all races/ethnicities.  In addition to this level of analysis, where there were a sufficient number of  individuals, we analyzed data for men and women within each race and  ethnic group. In analyzing differences in how racial, ethnic, and gender  groups fared in DEA’s hiring process, we used the 80 percent rule set out in  the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. Under this  rule, a selection rate for any race, ethnic, or gender group that is less than  80 percent of the selection rate for the group with the highest rate is  generally considered a substantially different rate of selection. In analyzing  promotion and disciplinary actions, we applied standard statistical tests to  determine if there were statistically significant differences among the  racial, ethnic, and gender groups. We used statistical techniques in these  analyses to be consistent with how other studies of DEA’s promotion and  discipline process were conducted. Our analyses generally covered fiscal  years 1997-2001, except as noted below, and were not designed to prove or  disprove discrimination. Rather, they were designed to provide information  about race, ethnicity, and gender differences in DEA’s hiring, promotion,  and disciplinary actions.
subsections: section_title: Hiring Results
paragraphs: We analyzed the results of DEA’s screening of special agent applicants at  each step of the hiring process on applications received under two vacancy  announcements—BA-98-01, which was open from October 15, 1997,  through March 7, 2000, and BA-20-00, which opened on May 8, 2000, and  remained open during our review. We selected these two announcements to  facilitate an analysis of (1) the effect of changes to eligibility criteria and  written assessment scoring beginning with BA-20-00 and (2) final hiring  rates. We examined DEA’s screening actions on applicants from October 15,  1997, through March 31, 2002, analyzing the data by race, ethnicity, and  gender. Data we analyzed were provided by DEA from the agency’s Agent  Recruiting and Tracking System (ARTS), which tracks applications  received, the status of applicants, decisions on applicant eligibility at each  step of the hiring process, and final hiring decision. We examined ARTS  data and concluded that the data were reliable for our purposes because  the disposition of applications reconciled with applications processed.
With regard to suitability determinations DEA made on applicants based on  the results of psychological and polygraph examinations and background  investigations, we reviewed two sets of data. First, we reviewed data  recorded in ARTS to provide an overall picture on the outcomes of  suitability determinations. Because about 80 percent of suitability  determinations are made by a three-person panel, we reviewed data  maintained by the panel on its decisions. However, because the panel’s  database had only been initiated for decisions on or after September 29,  2000, we only reviewed panel decisions from September 29, 2000, through  May 7, 2002. To gain an understanding of materials the panel considers in  making its determinations, we reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of  applicant suitability determination case files.
section_title: Promotion Results
paragraphs: Our analysis of promotions focused on competitive promotions to General  Schedule grade levels 14 and 15 special agent positions. We reviewed three  elements of the promotion process: the Special Agent Promotion Program  (SAPP), which uses performance ratings and job simulation exercises to  measure knowledge and abilities to perform at the next grade level;  promotion recommendations that Special Agents in Charge or other office  heads make to the Career Board, the body that makes final promotion  recommendations and whose chair makes the final selections; and the final  selections. We analyzed data by race, ethnicity, and gender. With regard to  the SAPP, we analyzed data contained in annual reports on the SAPP for  1997 through 2001. SAPP results and the reports had been reviewed and  approved by the Working Group. For recommendations and selections, we  examined actions related to best-qualified certificates for vacancies from  which promotions were made for fiscal years 1997 through 2001. We  obtained data from DEA on the number and demographic profile of  applicants on the best-qualified lists, the number of them who received  recommendations, and the number selected. Because applicants can  appear on multiple best-qualified lists, we also obtained an unduplicated  count of the number of applicants on the best-qualified lists and the  number who received recommendations. To check the reliability of the  data DEA provided to us, we compared the minutes of Career Board  deliberations on promotion decisions to data reported to the Monitoring  Committee.
section_title: Discipline Results
paragraphs: With regard to disciplinary actions, we analyzed data by race, ethnicity, and  gender for cases resolved during fiscal years 1997 through 2001. For these  cases, we determined the number and demographic profile of special  agents against whom allegations of misconduct were made, the disposition  of their cases, and the nature of disciplinary actions taken. However, in  performing our analysis, we found discrepancies between the data  maintained by DEA’s Chief Counsel’s office that were reported to us and the  data the Office of Equal Opportunity reported to the Monitoring  Committee. We brought these discrepancies to DEA’s attention. After some  delay, DEA provided us with corrected data. We performed a limited  verification of the corrected data and found them to be reliable. In addition  to our analysis of disciplinary data, we reviewed the two studies of DEA’s  disciplinary process performed by contractors as well as a report prepared  by the Justice Department. In addition, we reviewed the disposition of  appeals by special agents to the Merit Systems Protection Board.
We performed our work from September 2001 through February 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Physical Task Test Minimum Requirements
paragraphs: The minimum requirements in each of the six tasks that applicants for Drug  Enforcement Administration (DEA) special agent positions must meet to  pass the physical task test are shown in table 21.
section_title: Competencies in Assessing GS-13 and GS-14 Special Agents for Promotion
subsections: section_title: GS-13 and GS-14 Special Agents
paragraphs: In the Special Agent Promotion Program (SAPP) performance rating,  General Schedule (GS) grade 13 special agents are evaluated on seven  competencies and GS-14 special agents are evaluated on eight  competencies, as table 22 shows.
section_title: Competencies Measured by Assessment Center Job Simulations
paragraphs: In 2001, GS-13 special agents were evaluated on 12 competencies in SAPP  assessment center simulations, while GS-14 special agents were evaluated  on 9 competencies, as table 23 shows.
section_title: Interim Special Agent in Charge/Office Head Recommendation Process
paragraphs: The interim recommendation process, which was implemented in January  2000 and was still in place as of December 2002, requires that a special  agent in charge (SAC) or office head, when making promotion  recommendations to the Career Board, provide information about the  personal characteristics, traits, or attributes that make a candidate better  suited to the position under consideration and how a candidate’s past or  present experiences or demonstrated success makes him or her a top  candidate. The latter requirement covers seven specific areas:  directing enforcement and/or investigative-related programs;  managing, motivating, and mentoring subordinates;  working in a team environment;  building and maintaining coalitions; and   acquiring or possessing technical knowledge, education, and special  skills, or training peculiar to or required by the position.
section_title: Proposed SAC/Office Head Recommendation Process
paragraphs: Among the changes under a proposed recommendation process are that  applicants for promotions would be asked to provide a summary of their  major accomplishments and how they are best qualified for the position  applied for, including technical knowledge, education, special skills, or  training specified in the vacancy announcement, and provide a narrative  describing their achievements in the following competencies:  directing enforcement and/or investigative-related programs or other  appropriate managerial experience in a law enforcement setting;  managing, motivating, mentoring, and/or training personnel;  working in a team environment of mutual cooperation and assistance;  building and maintaining coalitions with other personnel and entities  internal and external to the agency; and  for applicants for GS-15 positions, managing agency resources.
section_title: Comments from the Drug Enforcement Administration
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