Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source Recovery Effort and Apply Lessons Learned to Future Recovery Missions
Published: 2005-09-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, concerns were raised about the security of Iraq's radiological sources. Such sources are used in medicine, industry, and research, but unsecured sources could pose risks of radiation exposure, and terrorists could use them to make "dirty bombs." This report provides information on (1) the readiness of the Department of Defense (DOD) to collect and secure sources, (2) the number of sources DOD collected and secured, (3) U.S. assistance to help regulate sources in Iraq, and (4) the lessons DOD and the Department of Energy learned.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD was not ready to collect and secure radiological sources when the war began in March 2003 and for about 6 months thereafter. Before DOD could collect radiological sources, it had to specify criteria for which sources should be collected and how to safely collect them, coordinate within DOD, coordinate assistance from the Department of Energy (DOE), and resolve contract issues. DOD did not issue guidance for collecting and securing sources until July 2003 and did not finalize the terms of the contract to collect sources until September 2003. Until radiological sources could be collected, some sources were looted and scattered, and some troops were diverted from their regular combat duties to guard sources in diverse places. In June 2004, DOD removed about 1,000 of the 1,400 radiological sources collected in Iraq and sent them to the United States for disposal. DOD left in place approximately 700 additional sources that it had judged were adequately secured and being used properly by Iraqis. According to DOD and Department of State officials, however, the total number of radiological sources in Iraq remains unknown. The United States assisted in establishing an Iraqi agency to regulate radiological sources. Since June 2004, State and DOE have helped this new agency develop an action plan with assistance from the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, according to State officials, because of uncertainties associated with the continuing formation of the Iraqi government, State will have to monitor Iraqi efforts to ensure the continued growth and success of an independent, competent, and sustainable regulatory authority for the control of radioactive sources and materials. Both DOD and DOE are considering improvements based on their Iraq experiences. A 2004 study of lessons learned, requested by DOD, recommended that DOD develop the capability to quickly eliminate weapons of mass destruction in hostile environments, but it did not focus on the narrower radiological source mission. In contrast, DOE has contracted for a study to examine lessons from its role in removing radiological sources from Iraq.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In March 2003, citing the failure of Iraq to live up to agreements to disarm  itself of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and other concerns, the  United States and its coalition allies invaded Iraq. This conflict is known as  Operation Iraqi Freedom. During late 2002 and early 2003, the U.S.  Department of Defense (DOD) had made plans to find and eliminate the  suspected WMD. DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) was to  be responsible for hiring a contractor to dispose of WMD and their  component materials, such as biological agents, chemicals, and radioactive  materials. The radioactive materials included (1) nuclear materials, such  as processed uranium, which could be used in a nuclear weapon, and (2)  radiological sources, which are widely used throughout the world in  medicine, agriculture, research, and industry and could be combined with  conventional explosives to create a radiological dispersion device, a  weapon known as a “dirty bomb.” Thus, DOD’s plan to eliminate WMD  included the removal of radiological sources, which are not weapons but  could be improvised by terrorists into dirty bombs.
The Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of State also had  responsibilities in the mission to secure radiological sources in Iraq. By  early 2003, DOD was planning for DOE to be involved in both removing and  disposing of sources from Iraq. After the transfer of power from the  Coalition Provisional Authority to the interim Iraqi government in June  2004, State had lead responsibility for helping Iraq regulate the radiological  sources remaining in the country.
Although the United States did not find stockpiles of WMD in Iraq, U.S.  forces found partially processed uranium and radiological sources that the  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had previously secured at  nuclear facilities. In addition, U.S. forces found radiological sources  throughout Iraq, many of which were unsecured and in danger of being  looted. Citing media reports of looting at nuclear sites, IAEA and Members  of the Congress raised concerns about the security of nuclear materials and  radiological sources. Reflecting these concerns, during a July 2003 Senate  Armed Services hearing, the Ranking Minority Member of the Readiness  and Management Support Subcommittee asked the Secretary of Defense  about the security of radiological sources in Iraq. DOD replied in a January  2004 letter that numerous sources had been collected and that efforts were  under way to identify and secure others.
Shortly thereafter, the Ranking Minority Member’s office asked us for an  update on the security of radiological sources in Iraq, and we initiated a  review of the effort to collect and secure these sources. Because of the  broad interest in this issue, we conducted this work under the authority of  the Comptroller General and are issuing this report to the Senate and  House Committees on Armed Services. This report (1) assesses DOD  readiness to collect and secure radiological sources in Iraq from the start of  the 2003 war; (2) presents information on the number of radiological  sources DTRA had secured by the time of the June 2004 transition to the  interim Iraqi government; (3) describes the assistance the United States has  provided, and plans to provide in the future, to the Iraqi government to help  regulate radiological sources in Iraq; and (4) examines DOD and DOE  actions to assess their experiences in Iraq and apply any lessons learned to  possible future radiological source collection missions.
To assess DOD’s readiness to collect and secure radiological sources, we  reviewed available policy guidance and reports on individual missions to  collect sources and interviewed DOD and contractor officials. To present  information on the number of radiological sources secured, we reviewed  DOD inventories of sources left in Iraq and sources collected, interviewed  officials about the reliability of these inventories, and reviewed available  mission guidance and other documents. We assessed the reliability of  DTRA’s inventories of radiological sources, including independently  corroborating the information when possible, based on discussions with  those responsible for the inventories. With one exception, we determined  that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To  describe U.S. efforts to help the interim Iraqi government regulate sources,  we examined the Department of State’s planning documents and a  Coalition Provisional Authority order to establish an Iraqi agency to  regulate radiological sources. We also discussed plans for assistance with  State and DOE officials as well as with Iraqi officials visiting the United  States. Finally, to describe what DOD and DOE have done to learn from  their experience in Iraq, and how such lessons might be applied in the  future, we interviewed DOD and DOE officials about their efforts to  identify and document lessons learned and examined draft and published  documents on the mission to dispose of Iraqi WMD. Because of the  continuing hostilities, we did not travel to Iraq. We performed our work  from May 2004 through August 2005 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Details of our methodology are provided in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Widespread looting—including looting of radiological sources—became a  major problem in Iraq after the March 2003 coalition forces invasion,  complicating U.S. efforts to secure and collect radiological sources. Media  reports of the looting at Iraq’s Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, for  example, brought public attention to the scattering of radioactive materials  throughout populated areas, posing health and safety risks to Iraqis. In May  2003, the IAEA, which had inventoried nuclear and radiological materials at  Tuwaitha, raised concerns about Iraqi citizens’ exposure to radiation and  publicly asked the United States to secure these materials.
Given the extensive looting, DOD could not assume that facilities and items  within them, including radiological sources, would remain intact or in place  for later collection without being secured. Many facilities that were no  longer under the control of Iraqis, such as abandoned government research  facilities and industrial complexes, were looted. For example, a 2004  government report on the search for WMD stated that looters often  destroyed sites after a coalition military unit moved through an area, since  the coalition did not have the forces available to secure the various sites  thought to be associated with WMD. According to one DTRA official, the  looting was more extensive than he had ever seen before. The looting was  reported to have included removing wiring and pipes from walls and from  the ground; stealing desks, windows, sinks, and floors; and even  dismantling and removing whole buildings. While some looting may have  been done to thwart the U.S. mission, according to DTRA officials, most of  it seemed to be related to selling or reusing common materials such as  scrap metal rather than seeking radiological or nuclear materials. At the  Tuwaitha facility, for example, looters dumped partially processed uranium  ore from large containers onto the floor and took the containers.
DOD found that fully securing sources from looters was challenging  because of their persistence. According to a DTRA official’s personal  assessment, no amount of forces could have controlled the rampant  looting. At the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, DOD concentrated  security in those areas where radiological and nuclear materials were  stored, but looters continued to penetrate the less secure areas of  Tuwaitha, a large complex of over 90 buildings.
The scattering of radiological sources by looters complicated the later  collection of those sources. In one dramatic instance, looters stole large  cobalt sources from an Iraqi radiological test site in early September 2003,  when U.S. troops were guarding the site. The large, open site, which was  apparently designed for carrying out radiation exposure experiments in the  surrounding areas, contained eight metal pillars, each with a pulley system  to raise a cobalt source from a concrete storage pit to the pillar’s top.  Looters tore down and removed three of these pillars and also took the  cobalt sources from two of them. (See fig. 1.) After several days of  extensive searches in the area, DTRA recovered both stolen sources.  According to a DTRA official, the metal pillars were probably the looters’  intended target, and the sources may have been taken unintentionally when  they became caught in the pulley mechanisms.
section_title: DOD Was Not Ready to Collect and Secure Radiological Sources in Iraq at the Start of the Hostilities in March 2003
paragraphs: For about the first 6 months after the war began in March 2003, military  commanders had insufficient guidance and equipment appropriate for  collecting and securing radiological sources that they discovered. As a  result, they were forced to make ad hoc decisions about recovering and  securing these sources. During this time, DTRA—the agency DOD had  assigned to the WMD elimination mission 12 days before the war  began—was working to fill gaps in preparations for the mission to collect  and secure radiological sources. It was not until September 2003 that DTRA  finalized the terms of the contract for collecting the radiological sources  and collections began throughout Iraq.
subsections: section_title: Insufficient Guidance and Equipment Left Military Commanders to Make Ad Hoc Decisions about Collecting Radiological Sources from March to September 2003
paragraphs: Military commanders in Iraq initially had no policy guidance on which  radiological sources to collect, and what to do with them once they were  collected. DOD did have some specialized teams with radiological  expertise, such as the 11-person Nuclear Disablement Team, which had  been set up to disable WMD and associated production facilities in Iraq.  This team had the expertise to move radiological sources, including  packaging radioactive material and designing safety procedures to  minimize radiation exposure. However, military commanders lacked  sufficient equipment appropriate for safely collecting and moving  radiological sources.
Without adequate official guidance and equipment to handle the  radiological sources they encountered in Iraq, military commanders were  left to make ad hoc decisions about recovering and securing the sources.  They acted because they were concerned about the inherent health and  safety risks of radiological sources to coalition soldiers and the Iraqi  populace, as well as the potential for enemy or terrorist forces to use the  sources to construct dirty bombs. For example, lacking the proper  radiation shielding equipment, the Nuclear Disablement Team moved a  radiological source to Tuwaitha with improvised shielding because an  officer judged that the unshielded source posed the risk of radiation  exposure to Iraqis working in the vicinity. The team created what was  described as “field expedient” packaging by lining an ice chest with lead  bricks that were brought from the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center.  However, the container did not sufficiently shield the driver of the military  vehicle carrying the source from radiation exposure. Therefore, the team  further improvised shielding by placing metal sheets salvaged at the site  between the driver and the container in the back of the vehicle. This  additional shielding reduced the radiation at the driver’s seat to a level that  just met the team’s safety standard for exposure. However, the radiation in  the back of the vehicle still exceeded that standard. Consequently, a second  military vehicle followed the loaded vehicle at a safe distance to prevent  occupants of any other vehicles from following so closely that they would  be exposed to unsafe levels of radiation. On the basis of his assessment of  the team’s experience with moving the source described above, the  commander of the Nuclear Disablement Team decided it was too risky to  allow his troops to move any more sources without proper handling  equipment and containers.
Because some military officers were reluctant to move radiological sources  to a single consolidation site without adequate handling and packaging  equipment or official guidance, coalition forces had their troops guarding  sources around Iraq. In some cases this posed health risks—for example,  some sources were secured in bases where U.S. troops were already  stationed, creating the need to protect the troops from accidental exposure  to radiation. When sources were secured outside controlled areas,  however, security risks resulted. For example, according to a DTRA  official, field commanders complained to him after he arrived in July 2003  that protecting radiological sources in some field locations exposed their  troops to increased risks of attacks. Estimates of how many soldiers were  removed from their military duties to guard sources were not available, but  we were told of instances in which troops were left guarding sources for  several months. According to a DOE expert involved in DTRA’s later  collections, for example, a small group of troops had guarded sources at an  oil drilling operation from May until early September 2003.
section_title: While Military Commanders Improvised, DTRA Worked to Complete Preparations for Collecting Radiological Sources
paragraphs: Between March and September 2003, as individual military commanders  acted independently to collect or secure radiological sources when they  discovered them, DTRA was working to fill gaps in preparations for the  mission to collect and secure radiological sources. According to DTRA  officials, they only gradually became concentrated on radiological sources  as their initial focus on eliminating WMD diminished because stockpiles of  chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons were not found. First, DTRA  tried to establish much-needed guidance on which radiological sources to  collect and where to consolidate them. According to a DTRA official, these  and other issues had been discussed in prewar planning in late 2002, but  guidance had not been issued. In July 2003, the DOD Office of Policy issued  guidance on collecting and securing radiological sources for field  commanders, which a DTRA official told us was all the policy guidance that  DTRA needed. However, DTRA still needed to specify standards for health  and safety as well as for transportation for its collection missions.  According to the DTRA commander who set up collection operations in  Iraq, DTRA used U.S. standards to ensure safety, but these standards were  modified for the Iraq situation. For example, instead of using radioactive  cargo placards on vehicles, which would be required by U.S. standards but  might attract an insurgent attack, DTRA notified local military  commanders along the route of its cargo when moving sources.
In addition, DTRA engaged in extensive, and ultimately unsuccessful,  coordination within DOD to provide protection for its contractor at the  Tuwaitha storage site through a contracted security force, but eventually  obtained protection for its collection mission through coalition forces  headquarters. This security force stood by for deployment to Iraq while the  Department of Defense General Counsel, DOD’s Central Command, and  coalition military headquarters considered DTRA’s request to arm this  force. When this request was denied, DTRA decided in late 2003 that  sufficient protection could be provided by military forces. For each  collection mission, DTRA coordinated protection through the coalition  forces headquarters, and could draw upon a military police platoon for a  security escort.
Also, starting in March 2003, DTRA worked to coordinate arrangements  with DOE for its assistance with collecting radiological sources. DOE was  to send both technical experts from one of its national laboratories and  shipping containers to Iraq for the collection effort. However, the  arrangements were complicated by DOE’s concerns about potential  disposal of collected sources at its U.S. facilities and about the safety of  DOE experts working in Iraq, as well as by communication difficulties.  DOE had concerns about potential lawsuits arising from disposing of  sources at its U.S. facilities. A DOE official told us that mislabeled or  improperly packaged containers could lead to lawsuits if, for example, a  source in a container was mislabeled and turned out to be a source that  DOE’s U.S. site was not licensed to possess, or if poor packaging led to  radiation leakage in the United States. Consequently, DOE insisted that its  technical experts be present when the sources were collected to identify  and package them in Iraq, before they were transported to DOE’s U.S.  facilities, and DTRA agreed. When collections began, however, the danger  of packaging sources in a hostile environment led DTRA to instead use  temporary packaging in the field, followed by interim packaging at the  Tuwaitha facility. The final packaging of the sources did not occur until  May 2004 when DOE experts packaged them for shipment to the United  States.
DOE also had concerns about the safety of its experts while overseeing the  packaging of the sources in Iraq. Consequently, DOE proposed a contract  provision that required DTRA to make every reasonable effort to evacuate  DOE experts to a safe area if hostilities broke out. DTRA initially said it  could not accept this contract provision because it did not control the  troops who could provide such protection. Eventually the contract said  that the DOE experts would not be exposed to unreasonable risks, but,  according to a DOE official, the discussion about a military protection  clause held up the contract for a couple of weeks.
Unclear communications also affected the negotiations between DTRA and  DOE. For example, according to a DOE official, at one meeting DTRA told  DOE that DTRA either had shipping containers or could get them. But a  few weeks later, DTRA asked DOE to provide the containers. Then  communication about the number of containers needed became an issue  because DTRA could not know the number or type of radiological sources  that would need to be transported. Finally, the DOE expert preparing a  contract proposal had difficulty defining the scope of services to be  provided to DTRA because DTRA’s plan was not clear to him. For example,  he was not initially aware that the DOE experts would have only an  oversight role and that DTRA was planning to use a contractor to do the  collection work.
In addition, between March and September 2003, DTRA was also  negotiating with its contractor to collect sources. This process was delayed  in large part by the contractor’s refusal to begin work until it obtained  protection from legal claims for damages that could result from their  work—that is, until they were given indemnification. Resolving this legal  indemnification issue was delayed, in part, because DTRA contracting  officials, who were uncertain about the infrequently used procedures for  granting indemnification for work done under potentially hostile  conditions, asked the contractor to provide what turned out to be  unnecessary detail on the various damage scenarios that indemnification  would cover. For example, one concern was that a convoy truck loaded  with radiological sources would be fired upon, resulting in the radiological  contamination of the area. In the end, DTRA decided that the  indemnification language would be general and provided the contractor  with indemnification in September 2003. Getting DOE experts working in  Iraq was also delayed by indemnification issues, but their indemnification  was settled earlier.
The contractor’s acquisition of equipment, such as helmets and body armor,  was also delayed, although not as long as the indemnification. The State  Department approves the export of such U.S.-origin defense products to  other countries under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations;  approval took over 50 days in the case of one request by the DTRA  contractor. According to a State official, this delay occurred despite  procedures to expedite approval of export applications for Operation Iraqi  Freedom because this particular approval required congressional  notification, a requirement State could not meet until Congress returned to  session. As a result of these delays, according to a DTRA official, DTRA’s  contractor wore helmets obtained from other countries because the  helmets could be obtained sooner. In addition, the contractor, which was  responsible for obtaining all needed equipment for the collection mission,  initially lacked some equipment. According to a DTRA official, in one  instance, the contractor did not allow its workers to perform a mission  because of concerns that heat at the work site exceeded safety standards  even though the contractor lacked the monitoring equipment to make that  determination. According to the contractor’s project manager, some  necessary items were forgotten because the contractor team, which was  being created for the first time, did not have an established standard  equipment list for this mission.
Finally, DTRA’s efforts to subcontract with Iraqis to help with collections  also took time. In July 2003, because of security concerns, DOD’s Office of  Policy stopped Iraqis from the former Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission  from independently collecting sources and rescinded their access to the  secured bunker at Tuwaitha. By October 2003, DOD had decided to  authorize, and encourage the use of, experienced Iraqis to locate sources,  leave them secured in place when possible, and move unsecured sources to  Tuwaitha, but this was an unsuccessful strategy for quickly increasing  collection efforts. According to a DTRA official, DTRA tried unsuccessfully  to get Iraq’s Coalition Provisional Authority to fund Iraqis from the Ministry  of Science and Technology to collect sources, but restrictions on the  Coalition Provisional Authority’s funds did not allow this. Eventually,  DTRA arranged for its contractor that was collecting sources to  subcontract some tasks to these Iraqis, but it took time to work out hiring,  training, and procedures. For example, DTRA told us that subcontracting  with the Iraqis was challenging because of difficulties with establishing  banking procedures to ensure they got paid. By the time procedures were  developed, training was finished, and the Iraqis began collection missions,  it was February 2004, and DTRA’s collection mission was in its final  months.
section_title: DTRA Recovered or Left Secure in Place about 2,100 Radiological Sources, but the Number of Unsecured Sources Remaining in Iraq Is Unknown
paragraphs: Between September 2003 and May 2004, DTRA collected and secured about  1,400 radiological sources from sites throughout Iraq and left in place  another 700 that it deemed secure. To further secure the most dangerous  sources it had collected, in June 2004, DTRA and DOE together removed  about 1,000 of the 1,400 previously collected sources from Iraq. Despite  DTRA’s efforts, however, the total number of radiological sources in Iraq  remains unknown.
subsections: section_title: DTRA Collected and Secured about 1,400 Radiological Sources and Left about 700 Sources in Place after Judging Them to Be Secure
paragraphs: During approximately 140 collection missions conducted between  September 2003 and May 2004, DTRA and its contractor collected about  1,400 unsecured radiological sources and inventoried and left in place  about 700 sources that DTRA deemed secure. To collect the 1,400 sources,  DTRA identified their locations, traveled to those locations and found the  sources, determined which sources to remove, transported those selected  for removal to Tuwaitha, and secured them in a bunker there. According to  DTRA officials, the collection missions were conducted safely, despite  increasing insurgent hostilities and exposure risks associated with  handling radioactive material.
About 450 of the 1,400 sources ultimately collected were removed from  radioactive lightning arrestors. Unlike conventional lightning arrestors,  radioactive ones use radiological sources to enhance the attraction of  lightning. One or more sources sat in a metal cylinder at the top of each of  the metal arrestor poles. Iraq had located these arrestors around its  munitions dumps, military bases, and industrial complexes to protect them  from lightning strikes. If these facilities were abandoned, the lightning  arrestors—including the radiological sources—would have been easily  accessible to looters. Coalition forces also found sources used in  commercial activities, such as oil exploration, agriculture, and scientific  research. The uses of many other unsecured sources DTRA collected were  unknown.
As figure 2 shows, DTRA collected unsecured radiological sources from  locations across Iraq, from the north at the Turkish border to the south  near Al Basrah. However, many of the sources were collected at the  Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, located about 25 miles from DTRA’s  base camp near Baghdad International Airport.
Upon arrival at locations, the radiological sources were sometimes not  where DTRA and its contractor expected to find them. For example, on one  mission, a radiological source from a lightning arrestor was found outside  its metal cylinder under about 2 inches of debris. A DTRA official told us  that looters apparently valued the metal lightning arrestor poles and copper  wire inside them more than the radiological sources. At other times, DTRA  and its contractor did not find the expected sources at all, which the  contractor’s mission reports sometimes attributed to faulty intelligence or  looting.
If the radiological sources DTRA found were at an abandoned site or  otherwise not under legitimate control of the Iraqis, DTRA collected them.  For example, DTRA collected two large cesium sources from a factory that  was largely abandoned. Similarly, if a lightning arrestor was damaged and  the radiological source potentially subject to looting, DTRA would collect  the source, according to a DTRA commander.
After collecting and packaging the radiological sources, DTRA secured  them by transporting them to a protected bunker at Tuwaitha. According to  DTRA officials, DTRA had found a bunker at Tuwaitha that had blast-proof  doors. DTRA further improved the bunker’s security, investing over $1  million in improvements such as a chain link fence, gate, and security  system. In addition, DTRA placed an armored unit outside the bunker to  guard it. Figure 3 shows the protected bunker, under a mound of earth at  the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center.
In addition to the about 1,400 radiological sources DTRA collected during  its mission, DTRA left about 700 sources or source devices in place after it  determined that they were properly secured and in the custody of  responsible personnel. According to DOD’s guidance, coalition forces and  DTRA could leave sources in place if they   had medical, agricultural, industrial, or other peaceful uses;  were properly contained and adequately secured; and   were in the custody of trained personnel acting in a professional  capacity, such as hospital staff or agricultural ministry personnel.
DTRA relied on this guidance to determine whether radiological sources it  found could be left in place. In line with the guidance, when DTRA left  sources in place, it recorded information such as location, use, and  responsible institution or individual. Although the guidance did not  elaborate on the standard for adequate security, a DTRA commander told  us that the guidance was sufficient for DTRA to decide which sources were  secure enough to be left in place.
DTRA’s initial planning had assumed that the war would be over when its  contractor went to work and, therefore, it would be collecting sources in a  peaceful environment. Instead, with insurgent attacks continuing after  major combat operations were declared over, the contractor’s staff was  consistently exposed to danger. In fact, insurgent attacks throughout Iraq  significantly increased during the collection period and generally became  more sophisticated, widespread, and effective (see fig. 4).
Although some areas were known as particularly dangerous for travel,  attacks were unpredictable and occurred in many places. For example,  according to a DTRA commander, during the first day of a mission in the  Sunni triangle, the DTRA team came under mortar and sniper attack;  during the second day, a helicopter involved in the mission experienced a  rocket-propelled grenade attack. On another occasion, a DTRA convoy  traveling through Baghdad was delayed by an explosion that left a burning  vehicle in the road. Even within the relative security of the Tuwaitha  Nuclear Research Center, DTRA’s contractor reported hearing shots fired  and found an improvised bomb on the road.
To help decrease the danger, DTRA planned armed security for each of its  missions. DTRA officers told us they assessed the potential danger  associated with a particular mission and, if the anticipated security risk  was higher than usual, they increased the size of the security force. For  example, the number of vehicles with mounted weapons might be  increased from two to four. When the risks seemed particularly high,  missions were at times postponed. DTRA’s security plan also specified the  route of the convoy, so its location could be tracked with a communication  system and a quick-response military team could be sent if needed. In  addition, military troops sometimes secured the area around the source  before the arrival of DTRA’s contractor staff.
Despite the attacks and the risk of exposure to radiation when collecting  radiological sources, DTRA officials reported that the agency’s missions to  collect and secure radiological sources from September 2003 to May 2004  were conducted safely. According to DTRA officials, although the risks  from hostilities were often greater than the risks from handling the  radiological sources, DTRA’s team did not sustain casualties during its  collection missions. However, two contractor staff were injured—one  seriously—in a mortar attack at DTRA’s home base near Baghdad  International Airport, but not during a collection mission. With regard to  radiation exposure, the contractor’s plan called for keeping the effect of  individual exposures on a person as low as reasonably achievable and  cumulative exposures over the mission below specified limits. Although six  team members’ hands or feet were contaminated with radioactive powder  in one instance, according to DTRA and contractor officials, DTRA  personnel and contractor staff remained under the cumulative standard  throughout the overall mission.
section_title: DOE and DTRA Removed about 1,000 of the Most Dangerous Sources from Iraq
paragraphs: In March 2004, a National Security Council interagency policy committee  that included DOD and DOE made the final decision to remove the most  dangerous radiological sources from Iraq before the Coalition Provisional  Authority handed power over to the interim Iraqi government at the end of  June 2004. In the case of Iraq, DOE selected radiological sources for  removal based on its criteria for determining which radioactive material  posed a significant risk as dirty bomb material. Normally, DOE applies its  criteria to individual sources in determining the risk. In this case, DOE  consolidated some of these sources that, individually would not have met  the risk criteria, but did meet the criteria once they were consolidated into  waste shipment containers. According to a DOE official, using the criteria  this way was warranted because the consolidation of the sources in the  storage bunker created a potential public health risk or a target for theft,  and Iraq had ongoing hostilities. As a result of applying its criteria in this  way, DOE removed from Iraq about 1,000 of the 1,400 collected sources,  accounting for a total of almost 2,000 curies, or over 99 percent of the  radioactivity of the collected sources. The remaining radiological sources  were generally small, accounting for a few curies of radioactivity in total.
After the National Security Council approved the removal mission in March  2004, final preparations for the mission were completed in about 2-1/2  months and the mission was finished in about 1 month. In late May 2004,  DOE sent a team of 20 experts to Iraq to identify the type and radioactive  strength of each collected source and package the sources for shipment to  the United States. Given the escalating hostilities, DTRA hired a contractor  to create a protected living area for the DOE team at the Tuwaitha site to  reduce the exposure to attacks that would have resulted from traveling  daily from a base camp to work at Tuwaitha. Figure 5 shows this living area  and the concrete barriers placed at the perimeter.
DOE had difficulties coordinating with DTRA to get all the information  needed to determine the number and types of shipping containers for the  source recovery mission. DTRA constructed its inventory information on  radiological sources collected at the Tuwaitha bunker to try to meet DOE’s  needs. However, DOE experts told us DTRA’s information never fully met  DOE’s expectations. Specifically, DOE wanted comprehensive information  on the type of isotope and radioactivity of the sources to determine the  number and types of containers needed to safely ship the sources to the  United States, as well as to do other planning tasks, such as an  environmental impact assessment. According to DOE experts, DTRA could  never provide, for example, complete and accurate information on  radioactivity. Deciding that full information would not be forthcoming, the  DOE experts overestimated radioactivity to ensure that DOE would bring  enough containers from the United States to ship the radiological sources  back safely.
Ultimately, DTRA and DOE were able to complete the task of analyzing,  packaging, and loading the containers into trucks in about 25 days. DTRA  and DOE successfully removed about 1,000 radiological sources and about  1.7 metric tons of low-enriched uranium from Iraq on June 23, 2004, 5 days  before the transfer of power from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the  interim Iraqi government. DTRA and DOE transported the sources in a  heavily guarded convoy to a military airfield, and then departed from Iraq  by military air transport. These materials were taken to a DOE site within  the United States and are being evaluated for either reuse or permanent  disposal. The disposal activities, funded by both DTRA and DOE at an  estimated $4.2 million, are expected to continue through late fiscal year  2006.
According to DOE officials, the final disposition of the radiological  materials removed from Iraq may take longer and cost more than estimated  because a legal determination is needed regarding whether the United  States government owns the material or is merely serving as its custodian.  Currently, DOE is storing the sources temporarily at one of its sites, but it is  waiting for an interagency determination before deciding on how to  dispose of the material. According to DOE officials, they raised this issue of  ownership when the removal mission was being planned, but it was never  resolved. As of mid-April 2005, DOE was prepared to start shipping sources  to disposal facilities, but DOE disposal facilities are unwilling to take  possession of the sources until ownership has been determined. Thus, DOE  will hold the sources in temporary storage longer than anticipated, leading  to increased storage costs.
section_title: An Unknown Number of Radiological Sources Remain Unsecured In Iraq
paragraphs: Although DTRA’s effort to collect unsecured sources and leave secured  sources in place identified about 2,100 radiological sources in Iraq, it is  likely that other sources remain unsecured in Iraq for three reasons. First,  the number and location of all sources in Iraq before the war were not  known. Second, DOD did not search in all places in Iraq where sources  might be found. Third, since the end of DTRA’s mission in June 2004, other  unsecured sources have been found, including at Iraq’s borders.
The number of sources in Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom was not  precisely known because the former government of Iraq did not maintain  an inventory of radiological sources around the country. Around the time  that major combat operations were declared over in May 2003, DOD  received information on radiological sources in Iraq, but DOD and State  officials told us that this information was not reliable for the purpose of  locating and securing sources. For instance, DTRA officials told us that the  information on sources and their locations was not precise because the  names of locations were not clear, some sources were reported twice at the  same location, and the information was sometimes outdated. However,  DTRA used this information as a general guide to where sources might be  found. Lacking more reliable information about the number and location of  sources in Iraq at the beginning of the war, DTRA first collected sources  discovered by coalition forces and then searched for other sources.
Because DOD and DTRA did not search all locations where radiological  sources might be found, it is likely that unknown sources remain  unsecured in Iraq. One DTRA official told us that DTRA was not tasked to  search all locations where sources might be found. In addition, DTRA  found evidence that sources had been taken from some locations before  DTRA arrived. According to State officials, neighboring countries detected  elevated radiation readings from cargo on trucks leaving Iraq starting at  least by September 2003, and some of these trucks were turned back at the  border. Although many of these incidents involved radioactively  contaminated scrap metal, some cargo included sources. State officials  said they did not know where the trucks and their cargo went after  returning to Iraq, but the State Department sought to improve coordination  with neighboring countries to manage these border incidents. Because of  the lack of a complete search for sources in Iraq, officials of the interim  Iraqi government told us that it intended to perform a more comprehensive  search.
Finally, sources continued to be found in Iraq and at its border after DTRA  completed its collection and removal mission in June 2004. In addition,  according to State officials, radioactive materials, primarily contaminated  scrap metal but also some sources, continued to be detected on trucks  leaving Iraq after that time. Separately, in August and September 2004, for  example, a country bordering Iraq found radioactive sources on trucks  leaving Iraq. Also, a U.S. Army officer responsible for nuclear, biological,  chemical, and radiological issues in Iraq told us that, in at least one case, an  unsecured source or sources from lightning arrestors had been discovered  by U.S. troops since the end of DTRA’s mission in Iraq.
section_title: The United States Helped Create an Iraqi Agency to Regulate Sources, but Future Assistance Is Uncertain
paragraphs: The Department of State supported the Coalition Provisional Authority in  creating an independent Iraqi agency, the Iraqi Radiological Source  Regulatory Authority (IRSRA), to regulate sources, and State and DOE are  assisting the new agency by providing equipment, technical assistance, and  funding. However, the evolving Iraqi government—including the  transitional government formed after the January 2005 election and the  permanent government to be formed through an upcoming election—and  the ongoing insurgency are creating uncertainties for both IRSRA and U.S.  assistance.
subsections: section_title: State Facilitated the Creation of an Iraqi Radiological Source Regulatory Agency
paragraphs: Before the transition to the interim Iraqi government in June 2004, State’s  Bureau of Nonproliferation encouraged the creation of IRSRA. It saw this  effort as an extension of U.S. support for international standards for safe  and secure management of radiological sources, such as those coordinated  and administered by IAEA. Specifically, IRSRA will further several U.S.  foreign policy goals. First, an Iraqi agency that controls radiological  materials will promote the health and safety of Iraqis, as well as provide the  capability for Iraq to meet international commitments for the safe and  secure management of radiological sources. Second, an effective Iraqi  agency for regulating sources will promote U.S. national security goals by  decreasing the likelihood of terrorists trafficking in or deliberately  releasing radioactive material. Third, the new agency will employ former  Iraqi scientists who might otherwise seek employment with terrorists or  countries seeking WMD expertise.
State officials enlisted Iraqi officials within the Coalition Provisional  Authority to support the formation of IRSRA. In particular, State negotiated  with the Minister of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), who  played a leading part in supporting the creation of IRSRA. The Minister  agreed to allow IRSRA to regulate Iraq’s radiological sources, while MOST  will retain ownership and control of secured nuclear and radiological  materials at research facilities. The Minister also agreed to continue  DTRA’s efforts to find and collect unsecured radioactive sources, but under  contract with IRSRA. The Minister further agreed that IRSRA would be  legally and financially independent—a key element in State’s plan for  IRSRA. According to State officials, IRSRA was designed as an independent  agency to avoid conflicts of interest. While Iraqi ministries, such as the  Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Oil, and MOST, own or track many of the  radiological sources in Iraq, their activities will be subject to the regulation  of IRSRA, which will inspect, inventory, and regulate all sources in Iraq.
In addition, through discussions with Iraqi and Coalition Provisional  Authority officials, State helped draft the 2004 budget plan and the  organizational structure of IRSRA. The plan included providing $7.5 million  to the new agency within the Iraqi Government Budget developed by the  Coalition Provisional Authority for fiscal year 2004. These funds are to be  spent on salaries, the search for sources, assistance from U.S. experts,  office space, and facility security. State’s organizational plans for IRSRA  identified the departments and staffing needed to accomplish agency tasks,  such as regulating radiological sources in use, managing unwanted  radiological sources, and creating regulations in cooperation with IAEA  and other experts. In addition, to further State’s efforts, DTRA trained  Iraqis to collect, store, and secure radiological sources during its own  collection operations and subsequently provided Iraqis with an upgraded  secure storage facility and its inventories of sources removed from the  country, left at the facility, or identified around Iraq.
In June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued an order  establishing IRSRA. According to the order, IRSRA will promulgate and  enforce regulations to allow for beneficial uses of radioactive sources,  provide for adequate protection of humans against the harmful effects of  radiation, and ensure the safety and security of radiological sources. For  example, it will require hospitals, universities, oil production facilities, and  others to obtain licenses to possess radiological sources, which will enable  the agency to maintain records on radiological sources in the country.  Licensees will be obliged to follow procedures and regulations that define  how they will secure, inventory, and work with their licensed radiological  sources. In addition, IRSRA is responsible for collecting unsecured sources  when they are found, creating radiation health and safety criteria, and  researching the possibility of constructing a low-level radioactive waste  disposal facility in Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded  shortly after it created IRSRA, but its order will continue to have legal  authority in Iraq until it is amended or changed by the Iraqi government,  according to State officials.
By the summer of 2005, State officials told us, they perceived signs that  IRSRA was beginning to function and was becoming more established as  part of the Iraqi government. For example, IRSRA had started drafting  regulations and was requiring ministries to notify it about their radiological  sources. Moreover, it had an appointed chairman, developed a budget, and  obtained its own building and office space, as well as about 50 staff.
section_title: State and DOE Are Providing Assistance to the New Regulatory Agency
paragraphs: In addition, State and DOE are assisting IRSRA by providing equipment,  facilitating technical assistance, and providing funding. First, to help the  Iraqis collect unsecured sources under the direction of IRSRA, State has  initiated an effort to transfer to Iraqi agencies equipment that had been  purchased by DTRA to collect sources. This equipment includes  radiological handling, measurement, and protective equipment, such as  radiation meters, respirators, and protective clothing. According to State  officials, preparations for the transfer of this equipment began in mid-2004;  as of early 2005, State and DOD were discussing how this equipment would  be transferred to the Iraqis. In the meantime, this equipment has been made  available to MOST for collecting radiological materials.
State is also facilitating technical assistance. With funding and logistical  support from DOE, State coordinated several meetings in Amman, Jordan,  in December 2004 to provide IRSRA personnel training by IAEA staff and to  help them draft an action plan for regulating radiological sources. IRSRA’s  action plan is based on the IAEA Model Project program, through which  IAEA is helping about 100 developing countries establish effective  regulatory controls for radioactive sources. Under the Model Project  program, developing countries adopt action plans to help them establish or  strengthen radiation protection infrastructures in order to meet  international standards and to follow the guidance in the IAEA Code of  Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
Under the action plan, which was finalized in March 2005 meetings in  Washington, D.C., IRSRA will establish a regulatory framework; work to  control radiation exposure in occupational, medical, and public settings;  and set up emergency preparedness and response capabilities. IAEA plans  to provide expert assistance to help IRSRA meet these goals. In addition, to  help IRSRA find unsecured sources, IAEA will offer radiation detection  equipment and training in border control. To complement the action plan,  IAEA is sharing with IRSRA a computer program designed to track  information about radiological sources’ locations, radioactive strengths,  licensing, and responsible parties. IRSRA intends to use this program to  manage information it gathers on Iraqi radiological sources.
In addition, in coordination with IRSRA’s action plan, DOE is offering  IRSRA technical assistance to help ensure the security of radiological  sources. For example, DOE plans to provide experts to review draft Iraqi  laws and regulations for their relevance to security. DOE also plans to  assist IRSRA with facility upgrades to address security vulnerabilities of  sources used for medical, industrial, or other peaceful purposes. Moreover,  in conjunction with IAEA, DOE may also offer field equipment and training  workshops for inspecting the security of sources.
Finally, to financially support IRSRA’s action plan, State intends to use  $1.25 million from its Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, which  provides funding for projects to prevent the spread of WMD. State plans to  provide part of these funds to IAEA for training and other assistance to  IRSRA, including an IAEA review of Iraq’s draft laws and regulations. State  plans to also use the funds to purchase a specially equipped vehicle that  can be driven through neighborhoods to detect unsecured radiological  sources. In addition, State plans to hire a contractor to coordinate security  matters with coalition forces to minimize the risk of attacks, while the  Iraqis are working to control sources.
section_title: Iraq’s Political Transition and Continuing Hostilities Are Creating Uncertainties for IRSRA and U.S. Assistance
paragraphs: According to State officials, because of uncertainties associated with the  continuing formation of the Iraqi government, State will have to monitor  Iraqi efforts to ensure the continued growth and success of an independent,  competent, and sustainable regulatory authority for the control of  radioactive sources and materials. According to these officials, the ongoing  formation of the Iraqi government could affect the future of IRSRA in  several ways. First, potential changes to the government’s organization or  personnel could affect IRSRA’s funding and enforcement powers. For  example, the transitional government formed from the January 2005  election chose new government ministers—including replacing the  Minister of Science and Technology, who had aided the formation of  IRSRA. In addition, according to State and Iraqi officials, in early 2005, the  Iraqi government froze all new expenditures until the transitional  government takes action on the budget. Therefore, the funds for the IRSRA  contract with the ministry to search and recover sources were not  available. However, State officials told us the collection missions are  important for public safety and would go forward in anticipation of later  payment. Finally, the Iraqi government will have to enact the laws and  regulations that IRSRA will be drafting under its action plan.
In addition, State officials told us that the evolving relationship of the  northern Kurdish-controlled territories with the rest of Iraq could affect  IRSRA’s operation. Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Kurds enjoyed  some independence from the former Iraqi regime, and State officials told us  that this partial independence has continued. IRSRA and Kurdish officials  will be discussing whether and how IRSRA will operate in  Kurdish-controlled territory. According to the Chairman of IRSRA, Kurdish  officials are likely to accept a proposal to create a branch office of IRSRA  in Kurdish territory. This proposed office would be staffed by Kurds, but  IRSRA would provide equipment, training, and protocols.
Finally, the continuing insurgency is hindering IRSRA’s ability to find and  collect unsecured radiological sources as well as the ability of the United  States to provide assistance. Iraqi and State officials are concerned that  insurgents will target Iraqis who are seen associating with coalition forces  on their official duties. For example, a MOST official told us that Iraqi  workers entering a U.S. military base to collect sources would likely be  ambushed by insurgents upon leaving the military base. The hostile  environment also impairs the ability of the United States to provide certain  kinds of assistance. For example, DOE has decided not to send its experts  into Iraq because of the ongoing hostilities, according to a DOE official.  However, State and DOE are devising ways to assist without going to Iraq,  such as organizing training for Iraqis at sites outside of the country.
section_title: DOD Has Not Assessed Its Source Recovery Effort, but DOE Is Considering Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Although DOD has assessed its overall WMD mission in Iraq, the agency  has not assessed its narrower mission to collect and secure radiological  sources. In contrast, DOE has considered actions to address specific  lessons learned from its experience in removing radiological sources from  Iraq.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Assessed Its Broader WMD Mission but Has Not Focused on the Radiological Sources Effort
paragraphs: DOD asked its National Defense University (NDU) to study DOD’s overall  mission to find and eliminate WMD in Iraq, determine what lessons could  be learned from it, and recommend improvements. The resulting report  stated that DOD had not sufficiently planned and prepared for the WMD  mission; had shortfalls in the needed transportation, military security, and  logistics resources; and had operational difficulties arising from the  extensive looting, public disorder, and hostile security environment. The  report recommended that DOD develop the capability to quickly eliminate  WMD in hostile environments and establish a permanent organization for  eliminating WMD. (See app. II for more information on the report.) DOD is  responding to the report, in part, by seeking stronger planning and capacity  for eliminating WMD, which a DOD Joint Staff officer told us would include  the elimination of radiological materials. Specifically, DOD’s Strategic  Command, which was assigned responsibility for this planning in January  2005 by the Secretary of Defense, will first determine the needed  capacities.
The NDU report did not, however, offer any observations or  recommendations regarding the narrower mission to collect and secure  radiological sources in Iraq, in part because this was not the main focus of  the original WMD mission in Iraq. Nevertheless, the author of the NDU  report and a DOD Joint Staff officer told us that DOD’s efforts to solve  overarching issues with its preparation for eliminating WMD will also  address problems experienced with the mission to collect and dispose of  radiological sources.
section_title: DOE Is Considering Lessons Learned from Removal of Iraqi Radiological Sources
paragraphs: DOE asked its contractor at one of its national laboratories to analyze the  removal mission to identify lessons learned and recommend  improvements. The resulting analysis highlights the lessons that timing of  funds and availability of equipment hindered rapid preparation for the  mission. First, the contractor noted that the short amount of time between  when the project was funded and when the team left for Iraq meant that  almost every preparation task had to be conducted in emergency mode.  DTRA funding became available in March 2004 after the National Security  Council approved the mission, leaving less than 2-1/2 months for the team  of DOE experts to complete all preparations in the United States. Needed  preparations included establishing a liaison with DTRA in Iraq; determining  the list of sources to be removed based on DTRA’s inventory; developing  safety and handling procedures for those specific sources; completing  safety assessments for those procedures; determining the need for, and  obtaining, a National Security Exemption to bring some of the radioactive  sources to the United States; recruiting the remainder of the team  members; cross training team members to be able to complete another  member’s work if necessary; getting the DOD training and authority  necessary for the team to enter Iraq; obtaining contractor indemnification  for the mission; preparing a U.S. staging facility for equipment; and  procuring, testing, and packaging such equipment as protective clothing,  tents, and communication equipment.
In addition, according to the contractor, preparation for the mission was  almost critically delayed by difficulties in acquiring containers for  transporting the radiological sources. DOE and its laboratories did not  have a sufficient number and variety to meet the projected needs of the  removal mission—a shortfall that proved challenging to overcome in time  to successfully conduct the mission. Specifically, certain special containers  could not be procured in time from U.S. domestic suppliers as a result of  shortages. Consequently, DOE arranged to lease four of these special  containers from a foreign company by agreeing to provide the company  blanket indemnity with up to approximately $1 billion in liability coverage  in case of an accident involving the containers. The containers arrived a  few days before the team and its equipment were to leave for Iraq.  According to the contractor, if DOE’s negotiations to get the special  containers had failed, the removal mission would have been delayed, and it  is likely that many radiological sources with high radiation levels would not  have been able to be removed.
To support timely action in future removal operations, the contractor  recommended that DOE seek ways to ensure the existence of advanced  funding and maintain a small fleet of versatile containers. DOE officials  told us they saw merit in having a way to quickly fund future missions,  although their agency’s funding—used solely for the disposal rather than  the removal of the sources—was available early enough in the case of Iraq.  With regard to maintaining a reserve of containers and other equipment,  the officials solicited proposals and cost estimates from their national  laboratories and have determined they cannot pursue this option given  current budget constraints.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Because DOD has not comprehensively reviewed its experiences in  collecting and securing radiological sources in Iraq, its current efforts to  improve its preparations to secure or destroy WMD in future missions will  not benefit from important lessons learned from its radiological source  mission. Reviewing such experiences and identifying lessons learned  would help prepare for any future missions involving similar  circumstances.
In addition, DOD’s lack of readiness to quickly collect and secure sources  after the war began indicates that additional planning and preparation  could have been completed in advance of the mission. Specifically, DOD  had not  planned to collect sources in a hostile environment and thus had to act  during the operation to integrate the objective of collecting and securing  sources with military combat objectives;  established criteria to determine which radiological sources needed to  be collected, which were being properly used and thus could be left in  place, and which posed minimal threat and thus did not need to be  collected;  specified health and safety standards for handling, securing,  transporting, and disposing of sources;  specified the organization responsible for collecting and securing  sources in Iraq until shortly before the invasion of Iraq, nor established  agreements within DOD regarding issues such as using armed private  security forces to protect contractors involved in collecting and  securing sources;  established agreements or points of contact with DOE to determine the  support that DOE could provide, including the type of expertise,  equipment, and disposal facilities;  identified and addressed the legal and contractual issues associated  with using private contractors to assist in collecting and securing  sources, including using such contractors in hostile environments; and   established guidelines to utilize the skills and address security concerns  associated with the use of Iraqi radiological experts.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that the types of problems experienced with the planning and  preparing for securing Iraqi radiological sources do not recur, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense comprehensively review DOD’s  experience for lessons learned for potential future missions.
In addition, to ensure that planning and preparing for potential future  missions is carried out in advance, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense provide specific guidance for collecting and securing radiological  sources, including   integrating the objective of collecting and securing radiological sources  with military combat objectives, including specifying how security  protection, if needed, would be provided to the organization with  responsibility for managing radiological sources and whether combat  troops would be required to secure sources and provide protection for  operations to collect and secure radiological sources;   determining criteria to define which radiological sources (1) are of  greatest risk and should be collected, (2) are being properly used and  secured and thus can be left in place, and (3) pose minimal threat and  thus do not need to be collected;   specifying the health and safety standards, after considering how U.S.  standards for handling, securing, transporting, and disposing of  radiological sources were modified for use in Iraq;  officially designating the organization responsible within DOD for  collecting, securing, and disposing of sources and establishing  agreements between that organization and other DOD organizations  that may be involved with these efforts;   establishing agreements and points of contact with DOE and other  federal agencies, as needed, to specify the coordination, technical  expertise, equipment, and facilities that may be needed to collect and  secure sources in, or remove them from, a foreign country;   identifying under which circumstances and for what purposes DOD will  contract with private firms to conduct activities to collect and secure  radiological sources, and address legal and contracting issues to ensure  the timely use of contractors; and  establishing guidelines concerning the role of radiological experts from  the country where sources need to be collected and secured.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy with draft  copies of this report for their review and comment.
DOD agreed with four of our recommendations, partially concurred with  two, and did not concur with two. DOD stated that it had previously  addressed a number of issues identified in the recommendations and is  currently addressing the others. DOD also stated that the draft report did  not adequately address those efforts of the Nuclear Disablement Team  (NDT) during the earlier operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom involving  radiological source recovery operations. DOD stated that the focus of the  draft report appeared to be largely on the elimination phase of the  operation and that it accepted our recommendations in that area. Our  report assessed all phases of DOD’s planning and preparing for this  mission, including the experiences of the NDT and its decision to forgo  collecting sources because it lacked the proper equipment. We believe our  report was appropriately focused on the elimination phase because that  was when most sources were collected from around Iraq.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop lessons  learned, indicating that lessons learned have been developed from the  NDT’s experiences for the phase of the operation before DTRA began to  collect sources. That effort is in line with our recommendation, but unless  DOD completes a more comprehensive review, we are concerned that it  will miss the experience of all relevant DOD organizations and the full  range of lessons learned.
DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation about integrating  the objective for securing radiological sources with military combat  objectives, saying that this recommendation applies only to the later phase  involving DTRA’s work. However, we disagree that our recommendation  applies only to DTRA’s work. As our report points out, there were problems  with integrating the mission of collecting and securing sources with  military combat objectives during the NDT phase of operations as well.  Specifically, our report notes that during the NDT phase of operations,  military commanders were left to make ad hoc decisions about recovering  and securing sources, including using combat troops to guard sources.  DOD’s response to this recommendation also noted problems DOD  encountered in obtaining support from DOE. We believe our report  adequately discusses problems DOD encountered in obtaining DOE  assistance in collecting radiological sources—these problems stemmed  from the lack of advanced coordination that our report recommends DOD  resolve prior to any future missions. DOD also commented that our  recommendation demonstrated a lack of understanding by suggesting that  combat troops should be involved in handling radioactive materials. We  revised our recommendation to more clearly indicate that DOD should  decide whether combat troops would again be required to secure sources  and protect missions to collect sources, as they did in Iraq.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation concerning health and  safety criteria and suggested that our recommendation was too broad and  ill defined. DOD’s rationale for this response is not clear. First, DOD said  that guidance is and always has been available. Then, DOD said that since  Operation Iraqi Freedom was the first time in recent history that a  capability was developed and deployed to counter a WMD threat, no unit  level standard operating procedures existed. DOD then said that the NDT  did develop procedures to “address all these issues” and that the NDT  continues to work to develop changes to existing regulations to “address all  these particulars.” We have clarified our recommendation to indicate that  DOD, in specifying health and safety standards, should consider how U.S.  health and safety standards were modified in Iraq during the mission to  collect and secure sources. We continue to believe that DOD should fully  implement our recommendation.
Finally, DOD did not concur with our recommendation to establish the  organization responsible within DOD for collecting, securing, and  disposing of sources. DOD said that it had already identified this  organization as the NDT and that the Commander of Strategic Command  has overall responsibility for issues related to WMD, a subset of which is  collecting, securing, and disposing of sources. However, based on a  conversation we had in August 2005 with a DOD Joint Staff officer,  Strategic Command has not yet issued its plan for combating WMD, in  which the specific organization responsible for collecting, securing, and  disposing of sources will be officially designated. DOD’s complete  comments are reprinted in appendix III.
State suggested clarifications of its current outlook for U.S. assistance to  Iraq for radioactive source regulation and the reason for the delay in State’s  approval of export licensing, which we have incorporated into this report.  Separately, State provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate. State’s written comments are reproduced in appendix IV.
DOE had no written comments on the report but did state that it will work  with DOD to determine criteria to define which radiological sources are of  greatest risk.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, and interested congressional  committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: This report (1) assesses Department of Defense (DOD) readiness to collect  and secure radiological sources in Iraq from the start of the 2003 war, (2) presents information on the number of radiological sources the Defense  Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) secured by the time of the June 2004  transition to the interim Iraqi government, (3) describes the assistance the  United States has provided, and plans to provide in the future, to the Iraqi  government to help regulate radiological sources in Iraq, and (4) examines  DOD and Department of Energy (DOE) actions to assess their experiences  in Iraq and apply any lessons learned to possible future radiological source  collection missions.
For our first objective, to assess DOD’s readiness to collect and secure  radiological sources, we reviewed planning efforts before the war began in  March 2003; concerns and efforts regarding radiological sources before  DTRA began its collection mission in late 2003; relevant policy guidance;  and DTRA’s preparations to collect unsecured sources in Iraq. To  understand DTRA’s prewar plans, we interviewed a division chief of DTRA’s  Combat Support Directorate, who prepared these plans, and other DOD  officials involved in planning before the war. For concerns and efforts  before DTRA began to collect sources, we interviewed the Nuclear  Disablement Team commander and other team members and reviewed an  unclassified report on their activities in Iraq. We also interviewed the senior  chemical officer for the commander of coalition land forces who secured  radiological sources in Iraq. For policy guidance, we examined two DOD  policy memorandums on radiological sources in Iraq and interviewed  DTRA and DOD officials involved with the development of the guidance.  For specific preparations to collect sources, we interviewed DTRA officials  who prepared for the mission, including the two commanders who  sequentially prepared for the mission in Iraq and the DTRA director  responsible for the mission. We also reviewed the contract between DTRA  and its contractor, and the contract agreement between DTRA and DOE.  We interviewed DTRA officials who developed and managed the contract,  the DOE official who facilitated the development and execution of the  contracts, and contractor’s project managers and staff.
For our second objective, to present information on the number of  radiological sources secured, we assessed the data reliability of five  inventories of radiological sources in Iraq and summary data about the  sources’ radioactivity. We asked those responsible for creating or  maintaining the inventories a series of questions focused on data reliability,  covering issues such as internal control procedures and the accuracy and  completeness of the data. Our assessment follows: 1. We assessed the reliability of an inventory of the location, number, and  type of sources in Iraq at the beginning of the war that DTRA received  during its mission, and based on our work, we determined that these  data were not sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report to  specify the number of sources at the beginning of the war. Because the  source of this information is sensitive, we did not report its origin.  DTRA officials told us they found this data to be unreliable, but it did  match well with sources found at some sites. For our assessment of the  data, we reviewed the inventory and interviewed key DTRA and  contractor staff who worked with this information. We found major  discrepancies, including duplications resulting in multiple counts of the  same sources and evidence of incomplete data. Therefore, we did not  use this data in our report. 2. We assessed the reliability of a May 2004 inventory of sources collected  in Iraq that DTRA had created before the removal mission, and we  determined that, for the purposes of this report, the inventory was not  sufficiently reliable to ascertain the number and types of sources, but  the inventory was reliable enough to identify the general locations of  places where sources were found. To assess this data, we obtained  responses to questions regarding data reliability by interviewing key  DTRA and contractor staff who worked with this information. We also  corroborated the data whenever possible with DOE experts and DOE’s  inventories of collected sources taken to the United States and those  left in Iraq. DTRA’s contractor staff told us they were unable to open  some containers and counted each of them as one source. However,  when DOE experts opened these containers, they found that some  containers held multiple sources, increasing the count of sources from  about 700 sources to about 1,400 sources. Also in the DTRA inventory,  the type of radiological material was misidentified for some sources,  according to DOE experts and documents. Therefore, we reported the  number of sources based on DOE’s work.  3. We assessed the reliability of DOE’s inventory of the approximately  1,000 sources collected in Iraq and taken to the United States, and  determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  this report. To assess this data, we obtained responses to questions  regarding data reliability by interviewing key DOE experts who worked  with this information. We were told that the number of sources taken to  the United States may be a close approximation, due to some instances  where DOE experts relied on counts by DTRA, and therefore we  reported them approximately.  4. We assessed the reliability of a DOE inventory of the approximately 400  sources collected in Iraq and remaining in Iraqi custody, and  determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  this report. To assess this data, we obtained responses to questions  regarding data reliability by interviewing key DOE experts who worked  with this information. They told us that the number is a close  approximation, and therefore we reported it approximately.  5. We assessed the reliability of a DTRA inventory of the approximately  700 sources determined to be secured and in use in Iraq, and  determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  this report. To assess this data, we obtained responses to questions  regarding data reliability by interviewing key DTRA and contractor  staff who worked with this information. DTRA’s contractor staff told us  they did not open the devices that contained sources and, therefore,  depended on the labeling and documentation of the devices, if  available, to record information about their number, type, and  radioactive strength. The inventory assumed that there was one source  per device, but contractor staff told us that some of these devices may  have had multiple sources, and therefore we reported them  approximately.
To report the radioactivity of sources collected in Iraq and taken to the  United States or remaining in Iraq, we depended on information provided  to us in a DOE summary of the sources removed from Iraq, and determined  that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We  discussed this data with DOE experts who worked with this information.  They told us that the radioactivity of the sources taken from Iraq was  accurate to within 10 percent to 20 percent of the total reported, and we  therefore reported the total approximately. They also told us that the  radioactivity of the collected sources remaining in Iraq was somewhat  more accurate because these less-radioactive sources could be handled  and measured individually, but that the total was an approximation.  Therefore, we reported the total approximately.
To present information on the missions performed to collect and remove  radiological sources, we examined the available contractor reports on the  approximately 140 missions to find and collect sources in Iraq, as well as  contractor reports on the mission to remove sources from Iraq. We  interviewed DTRA officers and staff and DOE experts who accompanied  these missions. We also interviewed contractor staff who performed this  mission and the contractor’s project manager for the mission in Iraq.
For our third objective, to describe U.S. efforts to help the new Iraqi  government regulate sources, we examined Department of State planning  documents and a Coalition Provisional Authority order to establish an Iraqi  agency to regulate radiological sources. We discussed assistance, as well as  uncertainties and challenges for assisting Iraq, with officials from State and  DOE. In addition, we discussed DTRA’s actions to support State’s effort to  assist Iraq with DTRA officials. We also discussed efforts to secure  radiological sources with the Chairman of the Iraqi Radiological Source  Regulatory Authority during his visit to Washington, D.C., in March 2005; at  the same meeting, we discussed efforts to search for unsecured sources  with an Iraqi program director from the Ministry of Science and  Technology. We interviewed State and DOE officials about their current  and intended contributions to the action plan drafted in December 2004  and further discussed in March 2005 meetings.
For our fourth objective, to describe what DOD and DOE have done to  learn from their experience in Iraq, and how such lessons might be applied  in the future, we interviewed DOD and DOE officials about their efforts to  document lessons learned. We also reviewed a February 2004 National  Defense University study of lessons learned from the mission to eliminate  weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and discussed the study with its  author. We discussed DOD’s work to assess its capability to interdict and  eliminate WMD materials, including radiological sources, and reviewed the  DOD memorandum initiating this effort, and held discussions with DOD  planning officials. We also examined DOE’s preliminary analysis of lessons  learned with DOE officials and interviewed the DOE expert who prepared  it.
Because of the continuing hostilities, we did not travel to Iraq. We  performed our work from May 2004 through August 2005 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: The National Defense University Study
paragraphs: The Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Center) at  the National Defense University (NDU) has developed lessons and  recommendations for WMD elimination operations, as the result of the  Department of Defense’s (DOD) request for this study in late 2002. The  WMD Center conducted meetings with DOD and interagency personnel to  discuss elimination operations, and also examined prewar planning and its  execution in Iraq. In February 2004, the WMD Center hosted a conference  with those who had been engaged in the elimination mission in Iraq to  identify lessons learned and ways to institutionalize WMD elimination  capacity for the future. Major findings and key recommendations from the  study were subsequently published in an NDU report.
The NDU report suggests three wrong lessons from the Iraq experience  that should be avoided to arrive at the correct lessons. A first wrong lesson  is that Iraq is a rare situation. According to the report, since most of the  United States’ potential adversaries have actual or suspected WMD  capabilities and terrorists appear committed to acquiring WMD from weak,  poor, or failed states, the U.S. military will likely confront WMD elimination  missions as often as it engages in war. A second wrong lesson is that the  failure of intelligence on WMD explains all of the failures of the WMD  elimination mission. While faulty intelligence contributed to problems, the  Iraq experience revealed substantial problems with DOD’s ability to  eliminate WMD, including problems in planning, training and exercises,  capabilities, and resources. A third wrong lesson is that elimination should  not be a DOD mission, but rather should mostly be done by civilian or  international organizations with the proper expertise after the military  minimally secures WMD sites. Instead, the Iraq experience suggests that  the U.S. military must quickly attend to finding, securing, and disposing of  WMD to prevent the loss of information about WMD programs and the  potential dispersal of WMD occurring in the chaos following an invasion.
Even though WMD was not found, the report suggests that the Iraq  experience reveals that major improvements must be made if the United  States is to succeed in a possible future WMD elimination mission. For  example, according to the study, DOD had not sufficiently planned and  prepared for the mission to locate, secure, and dispose of WMD, in part,  because DOD only began to rapidly plan for operations and develop  capacities for the elimination mission in late 2002. Before the end of major  combat operations, the study observed that the teams searching for WMD  experienced important operational problems. One key problem was that  operations had to be adjusted because existing intelligence was directing  teams to suspected sites that proved to have little evidence of WMD  activity. Operations thus shifted from the expected focus on WMD to a  more geographically dispersed investigation of potential WMD sites.  Operations also shifted toward gathering information about WMD  programs, but most teams lacked sufficient training and expertise for  retrieving important information contained in documents and computers as  well as for interviewing Iraqis who might be knowledgeable about WMD  programs. Further, the organization responsible for searching for WMD  was dependent on other military commands for capabilities such as  transportation, logistics, communications, linguists, and security. When  these other military commands experienced competing priorities for these  capabilities, shortfalls for these capabilities occurred and the search for  WMD was delayed. Additionally, the extensive looting, public disorder, and  uncertain security environment made the search for WMD complex,  resource intensive, and dangerous.
Based on the Iraq experience, the NDU report recommended that DOD  develop and maintain the capability to quickly eliminate WMD in hostile  environments. More specifically, the report included eight key  recommendations: (1) DOD should institutionalize the WMD elimination  mission, embedding it into the planning and budget process along with  other tasks undertaken in combat operations. (2) To have a clear  organization responsibility, DOD should create a standing military  organization that is ready to perform the WMD elimination mission,  including in a combat situation. Although this organization should be  military, it should develop strong links with interagency and international  partners, civilian experts, and the private sector. (3) DOD should be  prepared to conduct this mission in an inhospitable environment and as  quickly as possibly—concurrently with major combat operations, if  necessary. (4) Elimination planning must assume imperfect intelligence on  WMD, operations should be prepared to respond to emerging intelligence,  and intelligence sharing must be improved. (5) To test plans as well as  identify and address problems with procedures, the organization with  WMD elimination responsibility should conduct training and exercises. (6)  Rather than focusing on WMD sites, as initially occurred in Iraq, future  elimination missions should target WMD programs, using a balanced  examination of WMD sites, people, and documentation. (7) DOD should  seek technical innovations to improve the efficiency, speed, and overall  effectiveness of elimination operations. The objective is to reduce the  needed manpower because it is in extreme demand before, during, and  after a war, as shown in Iraq, and to address technical issues in Iraq  operations, such as false readings on chemical detectors and electronic  communication limitations. (8) Finally, senior-level government advocates  are necessary to ensure adequate and sustained funding and prioritization  to develop a significant WMD elimination capacity.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Lee Carroll, Nancy Crothers, Davi M. D’Agostino, Dan Feehan, Peter Grana, Terry Hanford, Dave Maurer,  Judy Pagano, and Keith Rhodes (GAO’s Chief Technologist) made key  contributions to this report.