Personnel Security Clearances: Overall Progress Has Been Made to Reform the Governmentwide Security Clearance Process
Published: 2010-12-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony discusses our key findings and recommendations in our report that we are releasing today on some aspects of personnel security clearance reforms. We conducted our review in response to a congressional request. This is the fourth in a series of hearings, in which Congress has asked GAO to testify; and this Subcommittee's continued oversight has helped focus attention on the need for personnel security reform. Personnel security clearances allow government and industry personnel to gain access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. The July 2010 and subsequent October 2010 recent unauthorized leak of almost 500,000 classified documents posted to the Internet related to the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq provides a cogent example of the inherent risks involved when granting an individual a security clearance. To ameliorate these risks, government agencies rely on a multiphased personnel security clearance process. However, with the increase in demand over the past decade for personnel with security clearances, we and others have identified problems with the security clearance process with respect to delays and incomplete documentation. As a result, we have designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) clearance program--which represents a vast majority of the initial security clearances adjudicated by the federal government--as a high-risk area since 2005. In light of longstanding concerns regarding delays in processing clearances and other issues, Congress set objectives and established requirements for improving the clearance process in section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). IRTPA established objectives for timeliness, requirements for reciprocity--an agency's acceptance of a background investigation or clearance determination completed by any authorized investigative or adjudicative agency--and an integrated, secure database to house clearance information. In 2007, DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) formed the Joint Security Clearance Process Reform Team, known as the Joint Reform Team, to transform the security clearance process governmentwide. In the following year, Executive Order 13467 was issued, establishing a Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (Performance Accountability Council) that is responsible for driving the implementation of reform and is accountable to the President for achieving the reform effort's goals. This governance structure was put in place, in part, to sustain the momentum of clearance reforms. We have previously noted that top leadership must be committed to organizational transformation. To this end, committed executive leadership has worked to reform the personnel security clearance process by improving timeliness and developing quality measures. Congressional oversight through hearings held by this subcommittee in February, July and September 2008, and in October 2009 has helped focus attention on the need for security clearance reform. In addition, the recently passed Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires reports by the President on the security clearance process, including information on timeliness and quality. This statement highlights the key findings and recommendations from the report we are issuing today. Specifically, it will focus on the extent to which select executive branch agencies (1) investigate and adjudicate initial personnel security clearance applications for civilian, military, and industry personnel in a timely manner; (2) honor previously granted personnel security clearances and the challenges, if any, that exist related to reciprocity; and (3) share personnel clearance information in a single, integrated database.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: (1) Significant overall progress has been made to improve timeliness, largely due to DOD, which comprises the vast majority of clearances. IRTPA established an objective for each authorized adjudicative agency to "make a determination on at least 90 percent of all applications for a personnel security clearance within an average of 60 days from the date of receipt of the completed application by an authorized investigative agency" by December 17, 2009. This means that under the current statutory timeliness objective, the executive branch can exclude the slowest 10 percent and then report on an average of the remaining clearances. IRTPA includes 40 days for investigations and 20 days for adjudications within this 60-day average period. As shown in figure 2, DOD, the Department of Energy, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency met the 60-day timeliness objective in all three quarters of fiscal year 2010. (2) Agency officials stated that they routinely take steps to honor previously granted security clearances; however, there are no governmentwide metrics to comprehensively track when and why reciprocity is granted or denied. IRTPA generally requires that all security clearance investigations and determinations be accepted by all agencies, with limited exceptions when necessary for national security purposes. Further, ODNI guidance signed in October 2008 amplifies this reciprocity requirement, stating that except in limited circumstances, all Intelligence Community elements are to "accept all in-scope security clearance or access determinations." Similarly, the OMB issued guidance requiring agencies to reciprocally accept clearances when the prior clearance is current, in-scope, and there is no new derogatory information, among other things. However, agency officials stated that in some cases, they find it necessary to take additional steps to address limitations with available information before granting a reciprocal clearance. Moreover, because of the different types of background investigations required by individual agencies, agencies may perform additional investigative work or request a new background investigation. (3) Although there are no plans to develop a single, integrated database as called for in IRTPA, the Performance Accountability Council is focusing on leveraging existing systems and increasing information sharing by developing a single search capability through OPM's system, the Central Verification System. IRTPA required that no later than 12 months after the date of its enactment, the Director of OPM and the Director of OMB establish and commence operating and maintaining a single, integrated database of security clearance information. This database was to house information regarding the granting, denial, or revocation of security clearances or access pertaining to military, civilian, and contractor personnel, from all authorized investigative and adjudicative agencies. However, the Performance Accountability Council is not pursuing a single, integrated database, according to our analysis of a series of recent reports that the Joint Reform Team issued from 2008 through 2010. Similarly, according to the most recent annual report to Congress, the reform efforts are focused on leveraging OPM's existing system--the Central Verification System--to enable access to records on investigations and adjudications. Agency officials from both OPM and ODNI confirmed that there are no plans to create a new single, integrated database and explained that establishing, operating, and maintaining a single, integrated database is not a viable option because of concerns related to privacy, security, and data ownership. Privacy concerns involve the unintentional disclosure of personal identifying information, such as names and Social Security numbers. Merging different systems into one database could result in the unintentional disclosure of personal identifying information that could compromise security.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our key findings  and recommendations in our report that we are releasing today on some  aspects of personnel security clearance reforms. As you know, we  conducted our review in response to a request from you, Madam  Chairwoman, and Mr. Holt. This is the fourth in a series of hearings, in  which you have asked GAO to testify; and this Subcommittee’s continued  oversight has helped focus attention on the need for personnel security  reform.
Personnel security clearances allow government and industry personnel to  gain access to classified information that, through unauthorized  disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S.  national security. The July 2010 and subsequent October 2010 recent  unauthorized leak of almost 500,000 classified documents posted to the  Internet related to the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq provides a  cogent example of the inherent risks involved when granting an individual  a security clearance. To ameliorate these risks, government agencies rely  on a multiphased personnel security clearance process. However, with the  increase in demand over the past decade for personnel with security  clearances, we and others have identified problems with the security  clearance process with respect to delays and incomplete documentation.  As a result, we have designated the Department of Defense’s (DOD)  clearance program—which represents a vast majority of the initial security  clearances adjudicated by the federal government—as a high-risk area  since 2005.
In light of longstanding concerns regarding delays in processing  clearances and other issues, Congress set objectives and established  requirements for improving the clearance process in section 3001 of the  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).  IRTPA established objectives for timeliness, requirements for  reciprocity—an agency’s acceptance of a background investigation or  clearance determination completed by any authorized investigative or  adjudicative agency—and an integrated, secure database to house  clearance information. In 2007, DOD and the Office of the Director of  National Intelligence (ODNI) formed the Joint Security Clearance Process  Reform Team, known as the Joint Reform Team, to transform the security  clearance process governmentwide. In the following year, Executive  Order 13467 was issued, establishing a Suitability and Security Clearance  Performance Accountability Council (Performance Accountability  Council) that is responsible for driving the implementation of reform and  is accountable to the President for achieving the reform effort’s goals. This  governance structure was put in place, in part, to sustain the momentum  of clearance reforms. (See fig. 1 for key events related to security  clearance reform.)
We have previously noted that top leadership must be committed to  organizational transformation. To this end, committed executive  leadership has worked to reform the personnel security clearance process  by improving timeliness and developing quality measures. Congressional  oversight through hearings held by this subcommittee in February, July  and September 2008, and in October 2009 has helped focus attention on  the need for security clearance reform. In addition, the recently passed  Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires reports by the  President on the security clearance process, including information on  timeliness and quality.
As noted earlier, my statement today will highlight the key findings and  recommendations from the report we are issuing today. Specifically, I will  focus on the extent to which select executive branch agencies (1)  investigate and adjudicate initial personnel security clearance applications  for civilian, military, and industry personnel in a timely manner; (2) honor  previously granted personnel security clearances and the challenges, if  any, that exist related to reciprocity; and (3) share personnel clearance  information in a single, integrated database.
The scope of our audit work included DOD, select agencies within the  Intelligence Community, and a nonprobability sample of six executive  branch agencies that use the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to  conduct background investigations. The agencies we selected in our  review account for approximately 98 percent of initial clearance cases  governmentwide annually. To assess timeliness, reciprocity, and the  sharing of information in a single, integrated database, we reviewed the  requirements specified in IRTPA related to timeliness, reciprocity, and the  creation of a single database; obtained and reviewed first, second and  third quarter data for fiscal year 2010 on executive branch agencies,  including Intelligence Community agencies, provided by the Performance  Accountability Council Subcommittee on Performance Measurements and  Management, which were current as of August 2010; obtained and  reviewed quarterly data for the executive branch agencies provided by  OPM for the same time periods; and analyzed executive branch reports to  Congress, executive orders, OPM memorandums, and agency guidance  related to security clearances. To supplement our analysis, we also  interviewed agency officials, security managers, and adjudicators from our  selected list of agencies that are knowledgeable about timeliness,  reciprocity and security clearance databases.  We assessed the reliability  of the data and determined that the data are sufficiently reliable for our  purposes. Our review was performed from October 2009 through  November 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our objectives.
subsections: section_title: Significant Overall Progress has been Made to Improve Timeliness, but Some Agencies Continue to Face Challenges in Meeting Timeliness Objectives
paragraphs: As we note in our report, significant overall progress has been made to  improve timeliness, largely due to DOD, which comprises the vast majority  of clearances. IRTPA established an objective for each authorized  adjudicative agency to “make a determination on at least 90 percent of all  applications for a personnel security clearance within an average of 60  days from the date of receipt of the completed application by an  authorized investigative agency” by December 17, 2009. This means that  under the current statutory timeliness objective, the executive branch can  exclude the slowest 10 percent and then report on an average of the  remaining clearances. IRTPA includes 40 days for investigations and 20  days for adjudications within this 60-day average period. As shown in  figure 2, DOD, the Department of Energy, and the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency met the 60-day timeliness objective in all three  quarters of fiscal year 2010. We also found that timeliness varied widely  among executive branch agencies. During the first three quarters of fiscal  year 2010, the average for the fastest 90 percent of cases adjudicated by  the 14 agencies included in our review ranged from 22 to 96 days for  investigation timeliness, 2 to 59 days for adjudication timeliness, and 30 to  154 days for combined timeliness.
Based on our discussions with agency officials, we identified a number of  challenges to agencies meeting IRTPA timeliness objectives, including  variances among the agencies in adopting information technology due to  resource and personnel limitations, and additional agency-specific  requirements that must be met before granting a security clearance. For  example, agency officials with whom we spoke explained that there is a  variance in agencies’ adoption of the Electronic Questionnaires for  Investigations Processing (e-QIP). According to these officials, e-QIP has  sped up investigation timeliness for agencies that have adopted this  technology because it provides OPM with more complete and better  quality data earlier in the process. However, resource constraints are a  limiting factor in agencies’ adoption of this type of technology. In addition,  agency-specific requirements can affect timeliness. For example,  timeliness for the Intelligence Community has varied because of unique  issues related to conditions of employment that require polygraphs or  psychological evaluations that extend beyond the standard background  investigation.
The Performance Accountability Council is responsible for driving  implementation of the reform effort and ensuring accountability, but has  not reported on the impediments to meeting timeliness objectives or plans  to address impediments. IRTPA’s security clearance reform provision  requires annual reports to the appropriate congressional committees— through 2011—on the progress made during the preceding year toward  meeting its requirements, including timeliness data and a discussion of any  impediments to the smooth and timely functioning of its requirements.  However, in its most recent report to Congress, the Performance  Accountability Council did not provide information on the impediments  agencies face in meeting timeliness objectives or plans to address  impediments. While the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, in  its capacity as Security Executive Agent, has performed a limited number  of oversight audits, according to officials we met with at four agencies, the  Performance Accountability Council has not met with them to identify the  impediments to meeting the timeliness objectives. The Performance  Accountability Council has focused its efforts on DOD due, in part, to the  DOD security clearance program’s designation as one of GAO’s high-risk  areas, as well as the fact that DOD clearances comprise the vast majority  of clearance cases that are processed annually. We found that because of  the relative size of DOD’s clearance program, DOD’s progress toward  meeting IRTPA’s timeliness objectives is a significant factor in reducing  the average time required for clearance processing for the government as a  whole. However, the Performance Accountability Council’s February 2010  annual report to Congress lacked an identification of the impediments  other agencies face to meeting timeliness objectives and did not identify  mitigation strategies or action plans. Furthermore, the Performance  Accountability Council officials stated that they began conducting one-on- one meetings with individual agencies in September 2010 to enhance  communication, assist in implementation planning, and provide a  feedback mechanism for agency stakeholders to communicate information  and needs to the Joint Reform Team.
To further improve timeliness across the federal government, we  recommended that the Deputy Director of Management, Office of  Management and Budget (OMB), in the capacity as Chair of the  Performance Accountability council, collaborate with agencies that are  not meeting timeliness objectives to take the following actions: (1) identify  challenges to timeliness; (2) develop mitigation strategies to enable each  agency to comply with the IRTPA timeliness objectives; (3) set timelines  for accomplishing the required actions; (4) monitor agency progress; and  (5) report on these plans and progress in the annual reports to Congress.  OMB concurred with our recommendation, noting through oral comments  that the Performance Accountability Council was committed to the  timeliness goals of IRTPA and that it was working with agencies currently  not meeting the IRTPA timeliness goals by taking steps to assist these  agencies. As noted in my statement today, we are strongly encouraged by  the progress that the Performance Accountability Council has made over  the last few years to reduce overall timeliness. If implemented in  accordance with our recommendations, the Performance Accountability  Council’s actions to assist the agencies in developing plans to implement  the reformed approach appear to be a positive step in helping sustain the  momentum of security clearance reform.
section_title: Executive Agencies Often Grant Reciprocity, Although Challenges Exist to Measuring and Tracking Reciprocity
paragraphs: Agency officials stated that they routinely take steps to honor previously  granted security clearances; however, there are no governmentwide  metrics to comprehensively track when and why reciprocity is granted or  denied. IRTPA generally requires that all security clearance investigations  and determinations be accepted by all agencies, with limited exceptions  when necessary for national security purposes. Further, ODNI guidance  signed in October 2008 amplifies this reciprocity requirement, stating that  except in limited circumstances, all Intelligence Community elements are  to “accept all in-scope security clearance or access determinations.”  Similarly, the OMB issued guidance requiring agencies to reciprocally  accept clearances when the prior clearance is current, in-scope, and  there is no new derogatory information, among other things. However,  agency officials stated that in some cases, they find it necessary to take  additional steps to address limitations with available information before  granting a reciprocal clearance. For example, although no single,  integrated database exists and information currently being shared  between agencies may be insufficient, agencies request additional  information, such as copies of the original background investigation.  Moreover, because of the different types of background investigations  required by individual agencies, agencies may perform additional  investigative work or request a new background investigation.
In addition to addressing limitations with available information, agency  officials reported that additional steps must sometimes be taken to  conduct suitability determinations or ensure that a prior clearance  investigation and adjudication meet their quality expectations before  granting reciprocity. All federal agencies conduct basic suitability  determinations to ensure that the applicant’s character or conduct is  appropriate for the position in question, but some agencies take additional  actions to determine the suitability of applicants before they reciprocate a  security clearance. For example, the Department of Justice must take  steps to ensure that applicants for jobs with the Drug Enforcement  Administration have not used drugs, according to agency officials.  Similarly, the Intelligence Community requires a polygraph evaluation,  among other things, to determine suitability for most positions, according  to intelligence officials. Some agencies take steps to ensure that a prior  clearance meets their quality expectations. Most agency officials stated  that the lack of governmentwide standardized training and certification for  investigators and adjudicators is a challenge to immediately reciprocating  a security clearance. Without governmentwide standardized training and  certification, agencies cannot be certain that a subject’s prior clearance  investigation and adjudication meet the quality expectations of the  inquiring agency. Consequently, as we have previously reported, agencies  are reluctant to be accountable for investigations and/or adjudications  conducted by other agencies or organizations. Although OPM has  developed some training, security clearance investigators and adjudicators  are not required to complete a certain type or number of classes. However,  the annual reports to Congress indicate that the Performance  Accountability Council is taking steps to make investigations and  adjudications more consistent across the government by standardizing the  training of investigators and adjudicators.
While the Performance Accountability Council has identified reciprocity  as a governmentwide strategic goal, there is no clear evidence to show the  extent to which reciprocity is granted because agencies lack  comprehensive, standardized metrics to track reciprocity. We previously  reported that developing metrics for assessing and regularly monitoring all  aspects of the clearance process could add value in current and future  reform efforts as well as supply better information for greater  congressional oversight. However, we found that agencies do not  consistently document the additional steps they have taken prior to  granting a reciprocal clearance. For example, the Navy keeps electronic  documentation, the Department of Energy and the Department of the  Treasury keep paper documentation, and the Army and the Air Force do  not maintain any documentation on the additional steps taken to accept a  previously granted security clearance. Consequently, there is no consistent  tracking of the amount of staff time spent on the additional actions that  are taken to honor a previously granted security clearance. In addition,  agencies do not consistently and comprehensively track the extent to  which reciprocity is granted. While OPM has a metric to track reciprocity,  this metric captures limited information, such as numbers of requested  and rejected investigations, but not the number of cases in which a  previously granted security clearance was or was not honored. Similarly,  the metrics proposed by the Performance Accountability Council do not  track the extent to which reciprocity is or is not ultimately honored. For  example, metrics proposed by the Performance Accountability Council,  such as the number of duplicate requests for investigations, percentage of  applications submitted electronically, number of electronic applications  submitted by applicants but rejected by OPM as unacceptable because of  missing information or forms, and percentage of fingerprint submissions  determined to be “unclassifiable” by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,  provide useful information but do not track the extent to which reciprocity  is or is not ultimately honored. Without comprehensive, standardized  metrics to track reciprocity, and documentation of the process, decision  makers lack a complete picture of the extent to which reciprocity is  granted and the challenges to honoring previously granted security  clearances.
To further improve governmentwide reciprocity, we recommended that  the Deputy Director of Management, Office of Management and Budget, in  the capacity as Chair of the Performance Accountability Council, develop  comprehensive metrics to track reciprocity and then report the findings  from the expanded tracking to Congress. OMB concurred with our  recommendation, stating that the Performance Accountability Council is  working to develop these additional metrics. We are encouraged by the  Performance Accountability Council’s development of quality metrics,  which include some metrics for tracking reciprocity. Although these are  positive steps that can contribute to greater visibility over the clearance  process, these measures have not yet been fully implemented and we are  continuing to examine these efforts as part of our ongoing work.
section_title: Although There are No Plans to Develop a Single, Integrated Database, Steps Have Been Taken to Upgrade Existing Systems and Increase Information Sharing
paragraphs: Although there are no plans to develop a single, integrated database as  called for in IRTPA, the Performance Accountability Council is focusing  on leveraging existing systems and increasing information sharing by  developing a single search capability through OPM’s system, the Central  Verification System. IRTPA required that no later than 12 months after the  date of its enactment, the Director of OPM and the Director of OMB  establish and commence operating and maintaining a single, integrated  database of security clearance information. This database was to house  information regarding the granting, denial, or revocation of security  clearances or access pertaining to military, civilian, and contractor  personnel, from all authorized investigative and adjudicative agencies.  However, the Performance Accountability Council is not pursuing a single,  integrated database, according to our analysis of a series of recent reports  that the Joint Reform Team issued from 2008 through 2010. For example,  according to the Joint Reform Team’s Enterprise Information Technology  Strategy, the Performance Accountability Council has opted to pursue an  approach that leverages existing systems and involves the development of  new tools when necessary. Similarly, according to the most recent annual  report to Congress, the reform efforts are focused on leveraging OPM’s  existing system—the Central Verification System—to enable access to  records on investigations and adjudications. Agency officials from both  OPM and ODNI confirmed that there are no plans to create a new single,  integrated database and explained that establishing, operating, and  maintaining a single, integrated database is not a viable option because of  concerns related to privacy, security, and data ownership. Privacy  concerns involve the unintentional disclosure of personal identifying  information, such as names and Social Security numbers. Merging  different systems into one database could result in the unintentional  disclosure of personal identifying information that could compromise  security. For example, since the Intelligence Community’s database is  classified and separate from the databases used by nonintelligence  agencies, even an aggregation of unclassified information from its  database could lead to unintentional disclosure of personal identifying  information that could compromise security. Moreover, breaches in the  system could compromise security. For example, some officials mentioned  an enhanced threat from hackers if there were consolidation of multiple  information technology systems.
Although there are no plans to create a new governmentwide database,  officials representing nonintelligence executive branch agencies in our  review stated that they are sharing information about personnel who hold  or are seeking security clearances through two main databases that can be  accessed through a single entry point. Two primary databases are used by  nonintelligence agencies to store investigative and adjudicative  information, and according to the Performance Accountability Council,  they account for decisions on about 90 percent of all security clearance  holders in the federal government. Data are stored in either OPM’s Central  Verification System or DOD’s Joint Personnel Adjudication System. The  Central Verification System includes security clearance data for all non- Intelligence Community, non-DOD executive branch agencies. The Joint  Personnel Adjudication System is a repository for security clearance  information on both DOD civilian and military personnel, as well as  determinations of contractor clearance eligibility and access for the  National Industrial Security Program. Data from the two databases can be  searched and obtained from a single entry point in the Central Verification  System.
Officials representing Intelligence Community agencies reported that they  are sharing information with one another through a separate classified  database known as Scattered Castles. Scattered Castles is a repository for  records from all intelligence agencies by which each agency uploads  relevant information from individual agency databases. All personnel who  have access to Sensitive Compartmented Information are listed in  Scattered Castles. This system is not linked to OPM’s Central Verification  System because of concerns about protecting classified information.  According to ODNI officials, the system has not been linked to  nonintelligence databases because of the need to protect information on  covert personnel. However, officials representing Intelligence Community  agencies stated that they do enter some information from DOD’s Joint  Personnel Adjudication System into Scattered Castles.
Although the Intelligence Community maintains a separate database, most  of the nonintelligence agencies included in our review had some access to  Scattered Castles and the Intelligence Community is exploring alternatives  to expand information sharing with nonintelligence agencies.  Nonintelligence agencies may have access to Scattered Castles through a  Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility located in their agency.  All of the military services, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also had  some access. Moreover, according to agency officials, DOD adjudicators  with the appropriate clearance and need to know will have access to a  Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility with access to Scattered  Castles when DOD colocates all of its clearance adjudication facilities at  Fort Meade in Maryland as part of the DOD base realignment and closure  process in 2011. According to Performance Accountability Council  officials, the Performance Accountability Council is exploring ways to  enhance information sharing between the Intelligence Community  agencies and the nonintelligence agencies. This working group is studying  alternatives to support a single-access point from which to search  clearance information and plans to complete its review in December 2010.
In summary, Madam Chairwoman, our overall observations of the current  reform efforts are that they represent positive steps to improve the  clearance process. As we noted in our report, continued personnel  security clearance reform relies on strong committed executive leadership  to sustain the momentum created by the current reform effort. This type of  leadership, in turn, helps provide oversight and accountability for the  improvement process. Key to these efforts has been the Performance  Accountability Council, which has provided direction for the clearance  reform across the federal government. We are encouraged that the  Performance Accountability Council’s efforts during the past year have  included several actions to improve the process. Timeliness data— particularly at DOD—have improved, there has been focus on honoring  reciprocity of existing clearances, and steps have been taken to improve  information sharing. However, while agencies are moving closer to  meeting the objectives and requirements of IRTPA, continued oversight  and accountability for personnel security clearance reform is still needed.
Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my prepared statement, and I would  be pleased to respond to any questions that you or members of the  subcommittee may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact me at (202)  512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this  testimony are Liz McNally, Assistant Director; James Ashley; Joseph M.  Capuano; Sara Cradic; Cindy Gilbert; Linda Keefer; James Krustapentus;  Greg Marchand; Richard Powelson; Jillena Roberts; and Amie Steele.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s  Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues. GAO-11- 185T. Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2010.
Privacy: OPM Should Better Monitor Implementation of Privacy- Related Policies and Procedures for Background Investigations.  GAO-10-849. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2010.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and  Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would  Provide Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process.  GAO-10- 117T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce  Delays but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and  Sustain Reform Efforts. GAO-09-684T. Washington, D.C.: September  15, 2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is  Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance  Process.  GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting,  Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are  Needed to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400.  Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.:  January 2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations about  Timeliness and Quality. GAO-09-261R. Washington, D.C.:  December 19, 2008.
Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint  Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance  Eligibility Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Questions for the Record Regarding  Security Clearance Reform. GAO-08-965R. Washington, D.C.: July  14, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security  Clearance Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.
Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and  DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement.  GAO-08-551T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions for the Record Related to the  Quality and Timeliness of Clearances. GAO-08-580R. Washington,  D.C.: March 25, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its  Efforts to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel.  GAO-08-470T. Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to  Reform Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington,  D.C.: February 27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would  Enable More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350.  Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate  Documentation Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T.  Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007.
High-risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.:  January 2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to  Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington,  D.C.: September 28, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record  Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the  Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-693R. Washington, D.C.: June  14, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of  Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other  Impediments Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06- 747T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security  Clearance Program and the Government Plan for Improving the  Clearance Process. GAO-06-323R. Washington, D.C.: January 17,  2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some  Longstanding Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns  Remain. GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but  Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s  High-Risk Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28,  2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.:  January 2005.
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