Hazardous Materials Rail Shipments: A Review of Emergency Response Information in Selected Train Documents
Published: 2016-12-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In November 2012, a train derailed in Paulsboro, New Jersey, releasing about 20,000 gallons of vinyl chloride, a hazardous material. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found, among other issues, that the supplemental information in the train's documents on responding to emergencies involving vinyl chloride was inconsistent with and less protective than emergency response guidance in the ERG . Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to evaluate the differences between the emergency response information carried by trains transporting hazardous materials and the ERG guidance. This report examines (1) what emergency response information is carried on trains by selected railroads transporting hazardous materials and how responders use it, and (2) how selected railroads' supplemental emergency response information compares to information in the ERG .
GAO reviewed the ERG and other relevant literature and met with DOT and NTSB officials, among others. GAO interviewed all 7 larger Class I railroads and 11 smaller Class II and III railroads that carried hazardous materials in 2015. GAO compared the supplemental emergency response information with ERG information for 72 frequently shipped hazardous materials from a nonprobability sample of train documents provided by 10 of the 18 selected railroads.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: To help emergency responders safely handle rail accidents involving hazardous materials, selected railroads transporting hazardous materials typically carry two sources of information: the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Emergency Response Guidebook ( ERG ) and information in the trains' documents. Federal Hazardous Material Regulations require railroads and other hazardous material transporters to carry emergency response information that describes immediate hazards to health and risks of fire or explosion, among other things. Representatives from all 18 railroads GAO interviewed told us that they carry the ERG on their trains. According to DOT officials, the ERG's use is not required by regulation, but the rail industry views it as a national standard for emergency response information. Our review of selected train documents showed that they always have a basic description of each hazardous material being transported, including the identification number and proper shipping name, as well as an emergency response telephone number. Six of the 7 Class I railroads and 5 of the 11 selected Class II and III railroads also included emergency response information in these documents. According to four emergency response associations, in the first 30 minutes after a rail incident, emergency responders primarily use the train documents to locate and identify hazardous materials and use the ERG to identify potential response actions.
ERG differed from the supplemental emergency response information which is provided by the Association of American Railroads' (AAR) Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Database. AAR decided in August 2016 to discontinue the database, removing the potential for discrepancies between the ERG and the supplemental emergency response information from AAR going forward.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making recommendations. DOT and NTSB provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: According to AAR, freight railroads operating in the United States  transported approximately 2.35-million carloads of hazardous materials in  2015. In November 2012, a train derailed while traveling over a bridge in  Paulsboro, New Jersey, releasing about 20,000 gallons of vinyl chloride,  a hazardous material and human carcinogen. Damage estimates were  $451,000 for equipment and about $30 million for emergency response  and remediation. During investigation of the incident, the National  Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found, among other issues, that the  supplemental emergency response information for handling vinyl chloride  that was contained in the train documents was inconsistent with and less  protective than emergency response guidance in the Emergency  Response Guidebook (ERG), a manual published by the Department of  Transportation (DOT), that emergency responders refer to when  responding to hazardous materials incidents. NTSB concluded that such  railroad-provided supplemental emergency response information that  deviates from nationally recognized ERG information has the potential to  confuse emergency responders faced with making timely decisions in  response to hazardous materials releases, including decisions regarding  distances from a release to protect people from vapors resulting from  spills involving hazardous materials. Recent rail accidents, such as those  in Mosier, Oregon, and Lac Mégantic, Quebec, have led to questions  about the safety of rail shipments of hazardous materials and the  resources and information available to local emergency responders in  rural areas to allow them to take swift protective actions in the immediate  aftermath of a serious accident.
Within DOT, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration  (PHMSA) has lead responsibility for ensuring the safe movement of  hazardous materials across all transportation modes by issuing and  enforcing safety regulations—including requirements for carriers and  shippers, including railroads—to carry certain types of emergency  response information. PHMSA coordinates with the Federal Railroad  Administration (FRA) in developing hazardous materials transportation  regulations and interpreting how they apply to rail transportation and FRA  enforces these regulations.
The Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act included a  provision for GAO to evaluate the differences between the emergency  response information carried by train crews transporting hazardous  materials and the emergency response guidance provided in the ERG.  This report examines (1) what emergency response information is carried  on trains by selected railroads that transport hazardous materials and  how responders use it, and (2) how the supplemental emergency  response information carried on trains of these railroads compares to the  information in the ERG.
To address both of our objectives, we reviewed relevant literature,  including the NTSB report on the Paulsboro, New Jersey, incident, the  ERG, PHMSA’s Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR), the  Association of American Railroads’ (AAR) United States Hazardous  Materials Instructions for Rail, and a prior GAO report on emergency  response to rail incidents. Additionally, we interviewed officials from  PHMSA and FRA within DOT and NTSB to understand their roles in  developing, regulating, and making recommendations regarding  emergency response information on trains.
To identify what emergency response information is carried on trains by  selected railroads that transport hazardous materials and how responders  use it, we interviewed two railroad associations, AAR and the American  Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA), all seven Class  I railroads, five Class II railroads, and six Class III railroads. ASLRRA  told us it represents approximately 450 of the about 550 Class II and III  railroads, of which 300 to 400 transport hazardous materials. We initially  selected seven Class II and seven Class III railroads that carry hazardous  materials and are ASLRRA members for interviews, but three did not  respond to our requests for an interview. We selected these Class II and  Class III railroads by searching PHMSA’s Office of Hazardous Materials  Safety Incident Reports Database for rail incidents involving hazardous  materials in transit during 2015 and cross-referencing the carriers’ names  with ASLRRA’s member list. The railroads we selected are also  geographically distributed across the United States. The results of the  interviews cannot be generalized to the entire population of Class II and  Class III railroads. As described below, we also reviewed information on  hazardous materials in selected train documents from some of these  railroads. We interviewed local emergency responders from Montgomery County, MD; Westmoreland County, PA; and Culbertson, MT. We  selected the first based on proximity to the audit team in Washington,  D.C., and the other two because of their involvement in responding to rail  incidents involving hazardous materials in 2014 and 2015, respectively.  Additionally, based on its criteria and resources, CHEMTREC identified  and we spoke with three of the five largest shippers of hazardous  materials in the United States. We also interviewed other  stakeholders—including four emergency response associations, two train  crew unions, and CHEMTREC—to learn their perspective on the  emergency response information carried on trains and how and when  emergency responders use the information.
To understand how the supplemental emergency response information  carried on trains of selected railroads compares to the information in the  ERG, we analyzed information on a nonprobability sample of hazardous  materials discussed in the ERG and in selected train documents. We  asked each of the 18 railroads that we interviewed to provide us with a  nonprobability sample of their train documents, including the “train  consist” and any supplemental emergency response information, for 15  trains carrying at least two different hazardous materials and traveling  between May 12, 2016, and June 30, 2016. Eleven of the 18 railroads  included the supplemental information in their train documents, and for  our sample, we selected 72 individual hazardous materials across 70  unique sets of train documents from 10 (6 Class Is, 2 Class IIs, and 2  Class IIIs) of these 11 railroads. We selected hazardous materials that  fell within either AAR’s list of top 125 most frequently transported by tank  cars or top 25 most frequently transported by non-tank cars (e.g.,  intermodal trailers or containers on flat cars) in 2014. To make the  comparisons, we first determined which parts of the ERG and the  supplemental emergency response information in the train documents  contained information associated with seven requirements for emergency  response information outlined in the HMR. We then examined the  relevant information associated with each hazardous material in the  sample and determined where there were similarities and dissimilarities,  as well as any conflicting information. Furthermore, AAR provided us  access to its Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Database,  which is the source for all of the supplemental emergency information in  the selected train documents, and we compared the supplemental  emergency response information in the train documents to the database  to identify any discrepancies. We determined that the supplemental  emergency response information associated with the sample of  hazardous materials in the train documents from the 10 railroads we  reviewed was reliable for the purposes of our report and objectives  because all of the information came from the AAR Hazardous Materials  Emergency Response Database. The results of our analysis are not  generalizable to all train documents or all hazardous materials in the ERG  or AAR’s Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Database. For  further details on our scope and methodology, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2016 to December  2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: According to AAR, hazardous materials comprise about 8 percent of  commodities shipped by rail in North America—about 2.35 million out of  29.4 million annual carloads shipped in 2015. According to the most  recent Bureau of Transportation Statistics data available (2012), railroads  ship about 4 percent of the hazardous materials in the United States by  tonnage, but railroad shipments account for about 28 percent of distance  traveled by hazardous materials. The freight railroad industry is  dominated by the seven Class I railroads, which transport the majority of  freight—including hazardous materials—in freight containers, portable  tanks, and other types of rail cars, including tank cars that travel across a  network of 140,000 miles of track. In addition, numerous Class II and  hundreds of Class III railroads have essential roles in moving freight,  typically linking rural communities to the larger railroad network. Often  providing “first mile” and “last mile” movements, these smaller railroads,  taken together, operate on 50,000 miles of track or nearly 40 percent of  the national railroad network and handle in origination or destination one  of every four cars moving on the national system.
PHMSA, through its Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, regulates  shippers and railroads transporting hazardous materials by rail and other  modes. One way PHMSA fulfills this mission is through the promulgation  of the HMR for the safe transport of hazardous materials. These  regulations pertain to the classifying, handling, and packaging of  shipments of hazardous materials, including rail shipments, and include  seven requirements that emergency response information must include  for each hazardous material being shipped. These are:  1.   The basic description and technical name of the hazardous material.  2.   Immediate hazards to health.  3.   Risks of fire or explosion.  4.   Immediate precautions to be taken in the event of an accident.  5.   Immediate methods for handling fires.  6.   Initial methods for handling spills or leaks in the absence of fire.  7.   Preliminary first aid measures.
The HMR also require railroads to have a document, often referred to as  the train consist, that identifies basic information about the position in the  train of each rail car containing hazardous materials. The consist also  typically includes information on the train’s contents, including basic  descriptions of the hazardous materials transported, and their  destinations, and may include supplemental emergency response  information, such as details on how to respond to releases of specific  hazardous materials.
FRA provides regulatory oversight for passenger and freight rail, issuing  and enforcing safety regulations through its Office of Railroad Safety.  FRA enforces the HMR and its own regulations through inspections and  audits by FRA officials, including about 400 federal safety inspectors and  state partners in some states. For example, according to DOT officials,  FRA conducts inspections to ensure that railroads carry the required  emergency response information mentioned above as well as an  emergency response telephone number in train documentation and  conduct and keep records of required general-awareness and function-  specific hazardous material training for train crews.
When a rail accident occurs, local emergency responders—police,  emergency medical technicians, and firefighters—and railroad train crews  are typically first on the scene of, and often provide the initial response to,  a rail accident involving hazardous materials. For example, local and  sometimes regional officials may be responsible for advising the public on  taking shelter-in-place actions or conducting evacuations of affected  populations. In addition, assuming the crews are not affected by an accident, railroad train crews are expected to provide local emergency  responders with information about the position, type, and quantity of  hazardous materials on the train as well as written emergency-response  and contact information for the specific commodities (see fig. 1). The  HMR also requires railroads to provide immediate notice of certain  hazardous materials accidents to the National Response Center.
The ERG, published every 4 years by PHMSA, is a 400-page document  that contains emergency response information for thousands of  hazardous materials and for all modes of transportation. It is intended to  help first responders identify the characteristics of the hazardous  materials involved in an accident through a table of markings, labels, and  placards, specific risks associated with the hazardous materials how first  responders can protect themselves, and procedures for containing the  accident as quickly and safely as possible. The ERG is organized into  four color-coded sections to help users navigate the document. For  example, the orange section of the ERG divides hazardous materials into  63 categories—such as flammable liquids-toxic, flammable gases, and  oxidizers —with an individual guide for each that provides information on  types of potential hazards each category poses, including health, fire, or  explosion hazards. The green section provides specific information,  such as initial isolation and protective action distances for small or large  spills occurring during the day or night, for hazardous materials that are  considered to be a toxic inhalation hazard (see fig. 2).
To assist railroads in complying with the HMR, AAR, with the input of  railroads, develops and makes available to all subscribing railroads the  United States Hazardous Materials Instructions for Rail, which provides  general guidelines to the train crew on handling hazardous material  shipments or incidents safely and efficiently and in accordance with local,  state, and federal regulations. For example, this document provides  information on required emergency response information, how the train  crew and emergency responders are to interact, and what to do when a  fire or vapor cloud is visible. This document also recommends that train  crews carry the ERG.
section_title: Selected Railroads Carry the ERG and Train Documents; Responders Use This Information and Additional Sources to Determine How to Take Action
subsections: section_title: All Selected Railroads Told Us They Carry the ERG, While Some Also Carry Supplemental Information
paragraphs: Selected railroads typically carry two sources of emergency response  information—the train documents and the ERG—to meet the emergency  response information requirements in federal regulations. Our review of  selected train documents determined that they always contained the  position and content of rail cars and the basic descriptions of hazardous  materials on board the train. In addition, our analysis determined that the  train documents sometimes included supplemental emergency response  information. Fifteen of the 18 railroads we spoke with told us that they use  AAR’s United States Hazardous Materials Instructions for Rail as their  guidance for meeting train documentation requirements, including  emergency response information. According to the train crews’ unions,  the ERG and the train documents are kept in the locomotive of the train  by the train crew, usually a conductor and an engineer. According to FRA  and PHMSA officials, the ERG’s use is not required by regulation, but is  viewed by the rail industry as a national standard for emergency response  information requirements. All railroads that we interviewed told us that  the ERG is carried aboard its trains as a source of emergency response  information.
For shipments of hazardous materials, the HMR requires the train crew to  carry documents with specific information about the hazardous materials  on board. Our review of selected train documents showed that the  selected railroads included this information in their train documents.  Additionally, most of the selected railroads included the information in  their train consist, which identifies the position in the train of each rail car  and includes other information about the rail car, such as its contents and  destination. This information includes a basic description of each  hazardous material being transported on that train, including the  identification number and proper shipping name, as well as an emergency  response telephone number, which is provided by the shipper of the  regulated hazardous material (see fig. 3). This telephone number is  required to be located on documentation carried by the train crew on the  shipping documents for transportation of the material. This basic  description of the hazardous material the train is transporting meets the  first of seven emergency-response information requirements in the HMR.
Our review revealed that some railroads also include supplemental  emergency response information for each hazardous material on the train  at the end of the train consist or in a separate document. According to  AAR, it provides this information to some railroads from its Hazardous  Materials Emergency Response Database, which AAR develops and  maintains. Six of the 7 Class I railroads and 5 of the 11 selected Class II  and III railroads included this supplemental information in their trains’  documents. Our analysis showed that the amount and content of the  supplemental emergency response information varied depending on the  number and type of hazardous materials being transported on a train. For  each hazardous material on the train, the information can include 5 to 10  paragraphs, covering 1 to 2 pages of paper. Supplemental emergency  response information may include information on how to handle fires;  precautions to be taken in the event of an accident; first aid responses; or  how to handle air, water, or land spills for that particular hazardous  material (rather than groups of hazardous materials as with the ERG).  AAR told us the railroads carry this information because, prior to the  development of the ERG, it was the only source of emergency response  information carried on trains. However, as discussed later, AAR plans to  discontinue the use of this database because, among other reasons, new  sources of information, along with the ERG, have become available to  emergency responders that contain this type of information.
section_title: According to Emergency Response Stakeholders, Emergency Responders Primarily Use the Train Documents and the ERG in the First 30 Minutes of a Rail Incident before Obtaining More Specific Emergency Response Information
paragraphs: According to the four emergency response associations we spoke to,  when responding to a rail accident involving hazardous materials,  emergency responders primarily rely on information from the train  documents and the ERG during the first 30 minutes. These associations  and two local responders we spoke to told us that responders will want to  immediately learn what hazardous materials are on the train and their  exact location. There are a couple of ways a responder might begin to  identify what is on the train. According to all selected responders, if the  train crew is located quickly, responders would use the train documents to  identify and locate the hazardous materials on the train. If the train crew is  incapacitated or cannot be found right away, responders could use  placards, labels, or markings on the train to identify the hazardous  materials, according to one emergency response association. According  to four emergency response associations, responders then may consult  the ERG to gather more information about the hazardous materials.  PHMSA, the four emergency response associations, and one local  responder told us that the ERG is the go-to source for first responders  during the first 30 minutes or initial phase of an accident. In addition, two  selected responders told us that the train documents are the best source  for the most updated list of the hazardous materials on the train and their  locations.
According to officials from two emergency response associations,  emergency response should be thought of in terms of an accident  timeline. According to these officials, the goal of emergency responders is  to obtain more specific and detailed information as time goes on, beyond  the first 30 minutes. During the management of an accident, emergency  responders move from having unknowns to knowns. According to four  emergency response associations and two local responders we  interviewed, as the incident timeline matures, a responder should be  seeking more comprehensive sources of information on the hazardous  materials involved in the incident (see fig. 4). One emergency response  association told us that a responder might consult CHEMTREC, the  Wireless Information System for Emergency Responders (WISER)  application, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health  (NIOSH) Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, or hotlines for the  hazardous materials shippers themselves to obtain more specific  information on chemical properties or tactical information. Below is an  example of a sequence of actions a responder might take in the event of  a hazardous materials accident, according to our analysis and interviews:
A responder must first identify the hazardous material involved and its  location. This could occur using the train documents from the train  crew if they are located quickly, or if the train crew is incapacitated or  cannot be found right away, using placards, labels, or markings on the  train.
Next, the responder determines initial response actions. Using the  ERG, the responder might locate the material in the ERG and  determine which of the 63 guides (orange section) applies. These  guides provide the basic hazardous material information that a  responder might want to know immediately, such as evacuation  distances, risks of fire or explosions, potential health hazards, or  protective clothing to wear. If the hazardous material is a toxic  inhalation hazard, the ERG would direct a responder to its green  section to gather additional information on isolation and protective  action distances for small and large spills during the day or night.
After locating the train crew and the train documents, a responder  might also consult the supplemental emergency-response information  in the train’s documents for specifics about the hazardous materials  involved in the accident. The new AskRail app, developed by AAR  with data from all the Class I railroads, is another tool that provides  first responders immediate access to information about the hazardous  materials on the train. It provides access to real-time train consist  information and corresponds directly to the emergency response  information in the ERG associated with each hazardous material on  the train.
Later, after the material has been identified and initial response  actions have been taken, a responder could consult previously  mentioned sources such as WISER or CHEMTREC about the  reactivity of the chemical, suggested environmental response  measures, or suggested first aid measures for that particular  hazardous material rather than a group of hazardous materials.
The interaction between the train crew and emergency responders after a  rail accident is important because it is the train crew who must provide  train documents to the responders that lets them know the rail car order,  the contents of the rail cars, and emergency response information for any  hazardous materials that the train is transporting. The United States  Hazardous Materials Instructions for Rail provides guidelines for how this  interaction between the train crew and responders is to occur. Each  railroad may modify parts of the United States Hazardous Materials  Instructions for Rail to reflect their individual policies. Our analysis of the  instructions provided by selected Class I, II, and III railroads found that  they had generally consistent guidance on train crew cooperation with  emergency responders. In each of the instructions that we reviewed, the  train crew is expected to immediately share any requested information  from the train documents with emergency response personnel. In  addition, the train crews are instructed to help emergency response  personnel identify the rail cars and commodities involved, using train  documents or observation from a safe distance. Five of the seven Class I  railroads added information to their hazardous materials instructions on  the process for sharing information with emergency responders. As an  example, the guidance of one Class I railroad says, “If an extra copy is  not available, share (DO NOT SURRENDER) the copy you have with the  emergency response personnel.” One Class II railroad asks its  employees to note the time, along with the name and title of the person  provided with the (emergency response) information.
Training received by emergency responders informs the emergency  response actions taken following a rail hazardous materials accident.  For example, according to one emergency response association we  interviewed, emergency responders with basic training, called awareness  level training, receive training on the ERG, how to read train documents,  and the other sources of emergency response information that provide  more specific information on hazardous materials. On the other hand,  according to one emergency response association and one local  responder, responders with more advanced training may consult other  sources of information even in the first 30 minutes of a response. For  example, a hazardous materials technician for a local responder in  Montgomery County, MD, told us that he does not use the ERG, but  instead relies on the NIOSH pocket guide in the first 30 minutes of an  incident because it provides more precise information than the ERG.
Training for emergency responders may be provided by emergency  response associations, railroads, or state and local emergency  management agencies, among others. According to PHMSA, PHMSA  also conducts outreach to emergency responders to train them on the  ERG, including any changes to the ERG if a new version is forthcoming.  For example, PHMSA officials visited 46 firehouses in fiscal year 2016—  including visits in Olympia, WA, Houston, TX, and Greenville, SC— to  provide training on the ERG. PHMSA also developed a new online  training program in April 2016 that introduces emergency responders to  the hazardous materials regulations and that may also be used to meet  the requirements for awareness level training, or as the basis for  developing more advanced training programs.
section_title: Supplemental Emergency Response Information on Reviewed Train Documents Was Generally Similar to ERG Information
subsections: section_title: While Generally Similar, the Reviewed Information in Places Provided Different Levels of Specificity and Types of Information
paragraphs: The content in the ERG and the supplemental emergency response  information in the train documents we reviewed was generally similar,  largely aligning with the seven categories of required emergency  response information for hazardous materials shipments set forth in the  HMR (see table 1). We used the seven requirements in the code of  federal regulations as a baseline by which to compare the ERG and  supplemental emergency response information. The specific content was  the same in certain instances. For example, both sources recommended  that, in response to an incident involving propane, responders move  victims to fresh air and give them artificial respiration if they are not  breathing. The existence of identical content was, in part, because the  ERG was one of the sources for the information in the AAR Hazardous  Materials Emergency Response Database, which, as discussed earlier,  was the source of the supplemental emergency response information in  the train documents we reviewed. While the general content and certain  information in the ERG and the supplemental emergency response  information we reviewed was similar, the ERG mostly provided  emergency response information for groups of hazardous materials  based on their general hazards, while the supplemental emergency  response information was specific to each hazardous material onboard  the train (see table 1).
The supplemental emergency response information that we reviewed was  intended to augment the ERG and provided more specificity in certain  areas.
For example, for an incident involving chlorine, the supplemental  emergency response information we reviewed recommended digging  a pit, pond, lagoon, or holding area to contain the spill, while the ERG  generally recommended preventing entry of the spill into waterways,  sewers, basements, or confined areas, but did not offer a specific  means by which to do so.
Additionally, for an incident involving sodium hydroxide solution— which is commonly present in commercial drain and oven cleaners— the supplemental emergency response information we reviewed  recommended the use of specific materials for protective clothing,  such as butyl rubber and neoprene, while the ERG generally  recommended wearing protective clothing recommended by the  manufacturer of the hazardous material.
The supplemental emergency response information we reviewed also  provided information that went beyond what is required by federal  regulations and included in the ERG, such as physical characteristics  of the hazardous material, uses, water solubility, and environmental  hazards.
However, in one area, the ERG often provided more detail than the  supplemental emergency response information we reviewed. The ERG  provided specific initial isolation and evacuation distances for incidents  involving groups of hazardous materials, while the supplemental  information offered no distance recommendations or deferred to the ERG  in most of the train documents we reviewed. For example, for a large spill  of gasoline, the ERG recommended an initial downwind evacuation of at  least 300 meters, while the supplemental emergency response  information we reviewed said to consult the ERG for all evacuation  distances.
The ERG and the supplemental emergency response information we  reviewed also at times differed on the type of information that was given  for certain emergency response recommendations. For example, for  handling spills or leaks, the ERG often provided recommendations  according to the size of the incident, such as small or large spills, while  the supplemental information we reviewed often provided  recommendations according to the environment, such as air, land, or  water spills.
section_title: We Found Several Inconsistencies in Prescribed Evacuation Distances, but Recent AAR Plans Would Eliminate Potential for Similar Discrepancies
paragraphs: In reviewing the ERG and train documents in our nonprobability sample  belonging to our selected Class I, II, and III railroads, we found  inconsistent information for 8 of the 72 hazardous materials we selected.
Two inconsistencies involved differences in a first aid response  recommendation regarding the amount of time to flush skin or eyes  with running water in case of contact with the substance. The  differences were 5 minutes in one instance and 10 minutes in another.
Six inconsistencies involved discrepancies between the  recommended evacuation distances in the two sources.  o  For four of the six hazardous materials with evacuation distance  inconsistencies, the supplemental emergency response  information recommended an evacuation distance of a half mile  for an incident involving fire, while the ERG recommended one  mile. These four hazardous materials were all labeled as United  Nations identification number 1075, which represents multiple  liquefied petroleum gases.  o  For another of the hazardous materials, sodium chlorate, the ERG  recommended an evacuation distance of a half mile, while the  supplemental emergency response information recommended the  same distance, but only if the resulting fire was uncontrollable.  o  For the final hazardous material, ammonium nitrate, the ERG  recommended an evacuation distance of a half mile in all  directions for an incident involving fire, while the supplemental  emergency response information recommended one mile for an  uncontrollable fire.
The NTSB report on the Paulsboro, New Jersey, incident highlighted  inconsistencies between recommended evacuation distances in the  supplemental emergency response information in the train documents  and the ERG for two of the hazardous materials on the train, chlorine and  vinyl chloride. This finding led to NTSB’s recommendation that AAR  update its database to ensure that its guidance is consistent with and at  least as protective as the ERG. In response to NTSB’s recommendation, AAR replaced all existing evacuation distance  statements in its Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Database,  effective August 1, 2014, with a statement to consult the ERG for  protective action considerations, including initial isolation or evacuation  distances and shelter-in-place recommendations. Additionally, AAR made  other changes to the database effective December 1, 2014. NTSB found  AAR’s response actions to be unacceptable because AAR did not revise  emergency response information that was less conservative than the  equivalent precautions contained in the ERG.
As described above, our analysis showed that some railroads did not  capture these changes, including the new evacuation distance  recommendations, and continued to provide specific evacuation distances  for hazardous materials in their train documents that were inconsistent  with the ERG. AAR is planning a change that is intended to remove the  potential for such discrepancies. Specifically, according to AAR, AAR  hazardous materials committee members—which consist of  representatives of the 7 Class I railroads—unanimously voted in August  2016 to discontinue the support, production, and distribution of the AAR  Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Database. According to AAR,  although the Class II and III railroads did not vote on the change, the  database will no longer be supported, produced, or distributed, making it  effective for all railroads. Since emergency responders have access to  the ERG and other resources with more specific information than the  ERG—such as WISER, the NIOSH pocket guide, safety data sheets,  CHEMTREC, and the shipper—the supplemental emergency response  information has become obsolete, according to one AAR official.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOT and NTSB for their review and  comment. DOT provided a technical comment about hazardous material  training requirements, which we incorporated. NTSB provided a technical  comment about AAR’s response to their recommendation to revise  discrepancies between emergency response information found in AAR’s  database and the ERG, which we incorporated.
We will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and to the Secretary of Transportation and the Chairman of  the National Transportation Safety Board. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  Susan Fleming at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are  listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to examine: (1) what emergency response  information is carried on trains by selected railroads that transport  hazardous materials and how responders use it and (2) how the  supplemental emergency response information carried on trains of these  railroads compares to the information in the Emergency Response  Guidebook (ERG).
To inform both of our objectives, we reviewed relevant literature, including  the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report on the  Paulsboro, New Jersey incident, the ERG, and a prior GAO report on  emergency response to rail incidents. We reviewed the Association of  American Railroads’ (AAR) United States Hazardous Materials  Instructions for Rail, to understand industry guidelines on how to meet  federal hazardous material regulations, including the emergency  response information to be carried on trains and how railroad personnel  are expected to interact with first responders. We also examined relevant  sections of the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) to determine  requirements for railroads related to emergency response information  carried on trains transporting hazardous materials. Additionally, we  interviewed officials from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety  Administration (PHMSA) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)  within the Department of Transportation (DOT) and NTSB to understand  their roles in developing, regulating, and making recommendations  regarding emergency response information on trains.
To identify what emergency response information is carried on trains by  selected railroads that transport hazardous materials and how responders  use it, we interviewed two railroad associations, AAR and the American  Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA), and all seven  Class I railroads. ASLRRA told us it represents approximately 450 of the  about 550 Class II and III railroads, of which 300 to 400 transport  hazardous materials. We selected seven Class II and seven Class III  railroads that carry hazardous materials and are ASLRRA members,  using PHMSA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety Incident Reports  Database and a member list provided by ASLRRA. We searched  PHMSA’s database for railroads that experienced an incident in transit  during 2015, which resulted in a list of railroads that carry hazardous  materials that we could cross-reference with the ASLRRA member list.  The railroads we selected are also geographically distributed across the  United States. Of those fourteen selected Class II and III railroads, we  spoke with representatives of five Class II and six Class III railroads. The  other three did not respond to our requests for an interview. The results of  the interviews cannot be generalized to the entire population of Class II  and Class III railroads. As described below, we also reviewed information  on hazardous materials in selected train documents from some of these  railroads. Fifteen (7 Class Is, 4 Class IIs, and 4 Class IIIs) of the 18  railroads we interviewed provided us with at least one set of train  documents. We selected one set of train documents from each of those  railroads to determine how the basic description and technical name of  hazardous materials the train is transporting and the emergency response  telephone number are displayed. The results of the analysis are not  generalizable to all of the train documents of the selected railroads or all  railroads. We also spoke with CHEMTREC regarding its role in providing  information to first responders. Additionally, we interviewed three of the  five largest shippers of hazardous materials in the United States—Exxon- Mobil, Dow Chemical Company, and BASF—to determine what  emergency response information they provide to railroads and emergency  responders. CHEMTREC identified and provided the contact information  for the three shippers based on their criteria and resources.
We also interviewed local emergency responders in Montgomery County,  MD, Westmoreland County, PA, and Culbertson, MT to learn their  perspective on the emergency response information carried on trains and  how and when emergency responders use the information. We chose the  first organization because of its proximity to the audit team in Washington,  D.C. and the other two because of their involvement in responding to rail  incidents involving hazardous materials in 2014 and 2015, respectively.  We determined their involvement by searching PHMSA’s Incident Reports  Database for serious rail incidents in transit over the last 5 years that  resulted in a hazardous materials’ release and talking to the first  responders associated with the city or county listed in the database. We  also interviewed representatives from four emergency response  associations—three national associations representing local emergency  responders, including the International Association of Fire Chiefs,  International Association of Firefighters, and the National Volunteer Fire  Council, as well as the National Fire Protection Association, which  develops, among other things, standards for emergency response to  hazardous materials incidents. Additionally, we spoke with two train crew  unions—the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen and the  International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation  Workers—to understand the role of the train crews in emergency  response and how they interact with emergency responders following a  rail incident.
To understand how the supplemental emergency-response information  carried on trains of selected railroads compares to the information in the  ERG, we analyzed information on a nonprobability sample of hazardous  materials discussed in the ERG and in train documents. We used the  2012 ERG, as opposed to the recently released 2016 ERG, because not  all of selected railroads had begun using the 2016 version during the  timeframe that the sample was taken. We asked each of the 18 railroads  that we interviewed to provide us with a nonprobability sample of their  train documents, including the “train consist” and any supplemental  emergency response information, for 15 trains carrying at least two  different hazardous materials and traveling between May 12, 2016, and  June 30, 2016. Eleven of the 18 railroads (6 Class Is, 2 Class IIs, and 3  Class IIIs) provided train documents that contained supplemental  emergency response information. From those train documents, we  selected a sample of 72 unique hazardous materials that were in either  the AAR’s top 125 hazardous commodities list as measured by loaded  tank car originations or top 25 hazardous commodities list as measured  by loaded non-tank-car originations (e.g., intermodal trailers or containers  on flat cars) in 2014. The sample represented 70 unique sets of train  documents from 10 of the 11 railroads that carried the supplemental  emergency response information. The sample included 10 hazardous  materials in 10 sets of train documents from five of the six Class I  railroads, 10 in 8 sets of train documents from the sixth Class I railroad,  5 in 5 sets of train documents from both Class II railroads, and 1 in 1 set  of train documents from two of the three Class III railroads.
To make the comparisons, we first determined which parts of the ERG  and the supplemental emergency response information in the train  documents contained information that is associated with the seven  requirements for emergency response information outlined in the HMR.  We then examined each hazardous material in the sample by comparing  the relevant sections in each source and determining where there are  similarities and differences, as well as any conflicting information. The  results of our analysis are not generalizable to all train documents or all  hazardous materials in the ERG. Furthermore, AAR provided us access  to its Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Database. We  determined that the supplemental emergency response information  associated with the sample of hazardous materials in the reviewed train  documents from the 10 railroads was reliable for the purposes of our  report and objectives because all of the information came from the AAR  Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Database. We determined  that the database was the appropriate source of the information in the  reviewed train documents through interviews with officials from each of  the 10 railroads. We compared the supplemental emergency response  information on the sample of hazardous materials in the reviewed train  documents to the information on those hazardous materials in the source  database for the time period reflected by the dates of the train documents  (May 12, 2016, to June 30, 2016). The results of our analysis are not  generalizable to all train documents or all hazardous materials in the AAR  Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Database. We also  interviewed supply chain software providers ShipXpress and GE  Transportation to learn how the Class II and Class III railroads receive  access to the AAR Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Database.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2016 through  December 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual name above, Nancy Lueke (Assistant  Director), Kieran McCarthy (Analyst in Charge), Moira Lenox, Garrett  Riba, Josh Ormond, William Egar, Dave Hooper, Delwen Jones, Reuben  Montes de Oca, and Kelly Rubin made key contributions to this report.