Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries
Published: 2006-03-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there were 662 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials. Three U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State (State), have programs that provide radiation detection equipment and training to border security personnel in other countries. GAO examined the (1) progress U.S. programs have made in providing radiation detection equipment to foreign governments, including the current and expected costs of these programs; (2) challenges U.S. programs face in this effort; and (3) steps being taken to coordinate U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other countries.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have provided radiation detection equipment to 36 countries as part of the overall U.S. effort to combat nuclear smuggling. Through the end of fiscal year 2005, these agencies had spent about $178 million on this assistance through seven different programs. Primary among these programs is DOE's Second Line of Defense "Core" program, which has installed equipment mostly in Russia since 1998. U.S. efforts to install and effectively operate radiation detection equipment in other countries face a number of challenges including: corruption of some foreign border security officials, technical limitations of some radiation detection equipment, inadequate maintenance of some equipment, and the lack of supporting infrastructure at some border sites. DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are concerned that corrupt foreign border security personnel could compromise the effectiveness of U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment by either turning off equipment or ignoring alarms. In addition, State and other agencies have installed equipment at some sites that is less effective than equipment installed by DOE. Since 2002, DOE has maintained the equipment but has only upgraded one site. As a result, these border sites are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than sites with more sophisticated equipment. Further, while DOE assumed responsibility for maintaining most U.S.-funded equipment, some handheld equipment provided by State and DOD has not been maintained. Lastly, many border sites are located in remote areas that often lack infrastructure essential to operate radiation detection equipment. As the lead interagency coordinator of all U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance overseas, State has taken some steps to coordinate U.S. efforts. However, its ability to carry out its role as lead coordinator is limited by shortcomings in the strategic plan for interagency coordination. Additionally, State has not maintained an interagency master list of all U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment overseas. Without such a list, program managers at DOE, DOD, and State cannot accurately assess if equipment is operational and being used as intended; determine the equipment needs of countries where they plan to provide assistance; or detect if an agency has unknowingly supplied duplicative equipment.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and  2004, there were 662 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and  radiological materials, and the number of reported cases has risen  dramatically since 2002. Many of these cases involved material that could  be used to produce either a nuclear weapon or a device that uses  conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a “dirty  bomb,” or radiological dispersal device). Especially in the aftermath of the  attacks on September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists  may try to smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United  States. If terrorists were to accomplish this, the consequences could be  devastating to our national and economic interests. In April 2004, the  United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling for every  member state to put in place appropriate effective border controls and law  enforcement to detect, deter, prevent, and combat the illicit trafficking and  brokering in nuclear materials and other items related to weapons of mass  destruction.
In response to the growing concern about nuclear smuggling, three U.S.  agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State  (State), have programs that provide radiation detection equipment and  related training to border security personnel and customs officials in other  countries. Initial concerns about the threat posed by nuclear smuggling  were focused on nuclear materials originating in the former Soviet Union.  As a result, the first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling  concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in  countries of the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Beginning in  the mid-1990s, DOD and State provided fixed radiation detection  equipment, known as radiation portal monitors, and handheld radiation  detection equipment to a number of countries in this region. In 1998, DOE  established the Second Line of Defense “Core” (SLD-Core) program, which  has primarily worked to help Russia detect illicit nuclear materials  trafficking by providing radiation detection equipment to the Federal  Customs Service of Russia. In coordination with State, DOE, through its  National Nuclear Security Administration, has recently expanded its  efforts in the SLD-Core program to include countries other than Russia,  including installing radiation detection equipment at border sites in Greece  as part of the overall U.S. effort to provide security assistance prior to the  2004 Olympic Games. In addition to DOE’s efforts through the SLD-Core  program, six other programs—one at DOE, two at DOD, and three at  State—have provided radiation detection equipment to assist foreign  governments in combating nuclear smuggling. Further, State is the lead  interagency coordinator of U.S. nuclear detection assistance overseas.
As agreed with your offices, this report addresses U.S. efforts to combat  nuclear smuggling by examining (1) the progress U.S. programs have made  in providing radiation detection equipment to foreign governments,  including the current and expected costs of these programs; (2) the  challenges U.S. programs face in deploying or operating radiation detection  equipment in foreign countries; and (3) the steps being taken to coordinate  U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other countries. To address  these objectives, we analyzed documentation on U.S. efforts to combat  nuclear smuggling from DOE and its contractors, both at DOE’s national  laboratories and in the private sector; DOD and its contractors; State; and  DHS and conducted interviews with key program officials at each of these  agencies. We also visited six countries (Georgia, Greece, Macedonia,  Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan), where U.S. agencies have provided  radiation detection equipment, to observe U.S.-funded radiation detection  equipment in operation and to discuss the implementation of U.S. programs  with foreign officials. In addition, we analyzed cost and budgetary  information from DOE, DOD, State, and DHS; performed a data reliability  assessment of this data; and interviewed knowledgeable agency officials on  the reliability of the data. We determined these data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report. More details on our scope and  methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our review from  April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since our May 2002 report on nuclear smuggling, the International Atomic  Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported 481 additional confirmed cases of the  smuggling of nuclear and/or radiological materials. One of these cases  involved nuclear material suitable for use in a nuclear weapon. The  majority of new cases IAEA reported involved radiological sources, which  could be combined with conventional explosives to create a “dirty bomb.”  According to IAEA, the majority of all reported incidents with radiological  sources involved criminal activity, most frequently theft. Radiological  sources and devices in which they are used can be attractive for thieves  because of their perceived high resale value or the value of their ability to  shield or encapsulate illegally shipped materials within legal shipments of  radioactive materials. Some of the reported cases indicate a perceived  demand for radioactive materials on the black market, according to IAEA.  From 2003 to 2004, the number of incidents reported by IAEA substantially  increased. IAEA indicated that improved reporting may, in part, account for  this increase. As of December 2004, 82 of IAEA’s Member States were  participating in contributing to the database.
Detecting actual cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear material is  complicated because one of the materials of greatest concern—highly  enriched uranium—is among the most difficult materials to detect because  of its relatively low level of radioactivity. Uranium emits only gamma  radiation so detection equipment, which generally contains both gamma  and neutron detection capabilities, only detects uranium from the gamma  detector. However, gamma radiation emissions can be shielded by encasing  nuclear material within another high density material, such as lead.  Another nuclear material of great concern is plutonium, which emits both  gamma and neutron radiation. However, shielding nuclear material  generally does not prevent the detection of neutron radiation and, as a  result, plutonium can be detected by neutron detectors regardless of the  amount of shielding from high density material. According to DOE officials,  neutron radiation alarms are only caused by man-made materials, such as  plutonium, while gamma radiation alarms are caused by a variety of  naturally occurring sources including commercial goods such as bananas,  ceramic tiles, and fertilizer, in addition to dangerous nuclear materials,  such as uranium and plutonium.
The most common types of radiation detection equipment are radiation  portal monitors; handheld equipment, including both survey meters and  radioactive isotope identification devices; and radiation pagers. The  radiation detection equipment that U.S. programs provide to foreign  countries is commercially available, off-the-shelf technology. Radiation  portal monitors are stationary pieces of equipment designed to detect  radioactive materials being carried by vehicles, pedestrians, or railcars.  Radiation portal monitors currently being provided by U.S. agencies have  the ability to detect both gamma and neutron radiation, which is important  for detecting highly enriched uranium and plutonium, respectively.  According to DOE, radiation portal monitors with both gamma and neutron  detectors cost between about $28,000 and $55,000, plus the additional costs  associated with installing the equipment and communication systems  necessary to operate it. Figure 1 shows a picture of radiation portal  monitors with both gamma and neutron detectors.
In 2002, we reported that some U.S. agencies, primarily State, provided  radiation portal monitors that did not have the ability to detect neutron  radiation to foreign governments. Because this equipment is capable of  detecting only gamma radiation, it is less effective in detecting certain  nuclear material, such as plutonium that has been shielded with high  density material. Replacement cost for similar equipment (capable of  detecting only gamma radiation), is about $5,000, not including installation  costs, according to DOE officials. Figure 2 shows an example of such a  radiation portal monitor.
Handheld radiation detection equipment, such as survey meters and  radioactive isotope identification devices, are used by customs officials  and border guards to conduct secondary inspections, the aim of which is  to localize the source of an alarm and determine the nature of the material  present. Survey meters can be used to detect the level of radiation by  providing a count of the radiation level in the area. Radioactive isotope  identification devices, commonly known as RIIDs, identify the specific  isotope of the radioactive source detected. In addition, U.S. programs often  provide radiation pagers, which are small radiation detection devices worn  on belts by border security personnel to continuously monitor levels of  radiation in the area. Pagers are considered personal safety devices and,  therefore, should not be relied upon to implement secondary inspections.
section_title: Three U.S. Agencies Have Spent About $178 Million to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to 36 Countries, but Future Spending Requirements for Some Programs Are Uncertain
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million  to provide radiation detection equipment to 36 countries as part of the  overall U.S. effort to combat nuclear smuggling. However, because some  U.S. agencies provide radiation detection equipment to foreign countries  on an as needed basis, future U.S. government spending requirements for  such assistance are uncertain.
subsections: section_title: DOE, DOD, and State Had Spent a Combined Total of About $178 Million through the End of Fiscal Year 2005 to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to 36 Countries
paragraphs: DOE has spent about $131 million to provide radiation detection equipment  and training to 12 countries and to maintain certain types of equipment  previously installed by other U.S. agencies in 23 countries. DOD has also  spent almost $22 million to provide radiation portal monitors, handheld  radiation detection devices, and radiation detection training to 8 countries  in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Similarly, State has spent  about $25 million to provide various types of radiation detection equipment  and related training to 31 countries. (See table 1.)
Since fiscal year 1998, DOE has spent about $130 million through its SLD- Core program to provide radiation detection equipment and training at 83  border sites in Russia, Greece, and Lithuania and to maintain certain types  of equipment previously installed by State and other U.S. agencies in 23  countries. DOE recently signed implementing agreements with the  governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Slovenia, and Ukraine and will begin  work in those countries in fiscal year 2006. Through its SLD-Core program,  DOE currently plans to install radiation detection equipment at a total of  about 350 sites in 31 countries by 2012 at an estimated total cost of $570  million.
In addition, DOE spent about $1 million to provide radiation detection  equipment to nine countries through its Cooperative Radiological  Instrument Transfer project (CRITr), which began in 2004. Through CRITr,  DOE refurbishes previously decommissioned handheld radiation detection  equipment located at various DOE sites and provides this equipment to  foreign law enforcement officers. DOE plans to provide handheld  equipment to six additional countries through the CRITr project in fiscal  year 2006.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Spent About $22 Million to Provide Handheld Radiation Detection Devices to Eight Countries and to Install Portal Monitors in Uzbekistan
paragraphs: Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOD had spent about $22 million  through two programs to provide handheld radiation detection devices to  eight countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and to  install fixed radiation portal monitors in Uzbekistan. Specifically, through  its Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD- PPI), DOD spent about $0.2 million to provide various types of handheld  radiation detection equipment to three countries and about $6.4 million to  install radiation portal monitors at 11 sites in Uzbekistan. DOD plans to  complete installation at 6 more sites in Uzbekistan by the end of fiscal year  2006 and to finish all associated radiation detection work in Uzbekistan by  fiscal year 2009 at a total cost of about $54 million. In fiscal year 2006, DOD  plans to transfer responsibility for maintenance of the equipment it has  provided to Uzbekistan to DOE’s SLD-Core program.
Through its International Counterproliferation Program (ICP), DOD has  spent about $15 million to provide handheld radiation detection equipment  and training on weapons of mass destruction proliferation prevention to 6  countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In addition, DOD  has provided a variety of training on weapons of mass destruction  proliferation to 17 additional countries. Through ICP, DOD plans to  continue to provide limited amounts of handheld radiation detection  equipment to other countries in the future.
section_title: State Has Spent About $25 Million to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment and Related Training to 31 Countries
paragraphs: The Department of State, through three programs—the Export Control and  Related Border Security program (EXBS), the Nonproliferation and  Disarmament Fund (NDF), and the Georgia Border Security and Law  Enforcement program (GBSLE)—has spent about $25 million since fiscal  year 1994 to provide radiation detection equipment and related training to  31 foreign countries. State’s EXBS program has spent approximately $15.4  million to provide radiation portal monitors, various types of handheld  radiation detection devices, X-ray vans equipped with radiation detectors,  and training on how to use this equipment to 30 countries mainly in the  former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Similarly, through NDF, State  spent about $9.1 million from fiscal year 1994 through 2001 to, among other  things, install portal monitors in countries other than Russia, provide  handheld radiation detectors, and provide vans equipped with X-ray  machines to countries, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  Lastly, through its GBSLE program, State spent $0.2 million in 1999 to  provide border guards and customs officials in the Republic of Georgia  with 137 radiation pagers. State has not provided any additional radiation  detection equipment assistance through NDF since 2001 or through its  GBSLE program since 1999.
section_title: Future U.S. Spending on Radiation Detection Assistance Is Uncertain
paragraphs: Because some U.S. programs provide radiation detection equipment to  foreign countries on an as needed basis and DOE has yet to gain  agreements with all of the countries where it would like to install  equipment, future U.S. government spending requirements for radiation  detection assistance remain uncertain. For example, although DOE is the  primary U.S. agency responsible for installing radiation portal monitors in  foreign countries, State selectively funds projects to provide radiation  portal monitors to foreign countries through its EXBS program. State  officials told us that State coordinates its work in this area with DOE to  avoid duplication, and it conducts these projects on an as needed basis to  provide a quick response to emerging nuclear smuggling threats. For  example, in December 2005, State installed portal monitors and provided  handheld radiation detection equipment to one site in Armenia at a cost of  about $0.5 million, in part because it believed that the threat of nuclear  smuggling warranted immediate installation of this equipment. State  officials we spoke with told us that they coordinated with DOE to ensure  State’s work in Armenia is consistent with overall U.S. goals and that the  specific equipment installed met minimum detection standards.  Furthermore, State officials also told us that the newly installed radiation  portal monitors at this site in Armenia provide a redundant layer of security  with DOE’s planned work to install equipment on the opposite side of the  border in the Republic of Georgia.
Because State selectively funds portal monitor projects through its EXBS  program to provide a quick U.S. government response to emerging security  threats of nuclear smuggling, it is uncertain how many other projects State  will fund in this area, in what countries these projects will be conducted, or  how much they will cost. Additionally, State officials also told us that they  have yet to determine whether or not they will fund any future projects to  provide radiation detection equipment assistance to foreign countries  through the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund or the Georgia  Border Security and Law Enforcement program. As a result, it is uncertain  how many other projects State will fund through either of these two  programs or how much they will cost.
DOE currently plans to install equipment at a total of about 350 sites in 31  countries by 2012 at an estimated cost of $570 million based on a strategy  that analyzes and prioritizes countries for receiving installations. However,  it cannot be certain which countries will be included in the SLD-Core  program until it signs the necessary agreements with these countries’  governments. For example, DOE planned to complete installations in  Georgia, Kazakhstan, Slovenia, and Ukraine in fiscal year 2005. However,  installations in Georgia, Slovenia, and Ukraine will not be completed until  at least fiscal year 2006 because of delays in signing implementing  agreements with these countries. Additionally, DOE is still in the process of  trying to reach agreement with Kazakhstan. In fiscal year 2004, DOE  reallocated a portion of its funding to directly fund its planned work at  certain border sites in Kazakhstan. However, difficulty in reaching  agreement with Kazakhstan continues to delay this work. If DOE continues  to experience delays in signing agreements with foreign countries, or  cannot reach agreements with all of the countries where it currently plans  to install equipment, it may need to alter its planned scope of work and  overall cost estimates for the program. Furthermore, once DOE reaches  agreement with a certain country, it still needs to conduct individual site  assessments to determine at which sites providing radiation detection  equipment will be cost-effective, as well as the amount of equipment each  site will require. Therefore, DOE is limited in its ability to determine the  total cost of the SLD-Core program until it signs implementing agreements  with the governments of countries where it plans to work and conducts  assessments to determine which specific sites within those countries  require radiation detection equipment and in what amounts.
section_title: The Threat of Corruption, Technological Limitations, Maintenance Problems, and Site Infrastructure Issues Challenge U.S. Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
paragraphs: U.S. programs that provide radiation detection equipment to foreign  governments face a number of challenges that affect the installation and  effective operation of radiation detection equipment, including: the threat  of corruption of border security officials in some foreign countries,  technical limitations of radiation detection equipment previously deployed  by State and other agencies, inadequate maintenance of some handheld  equipment, and the lack of infrastructure necessary to operate radiation  detection equipment and harsh environmental conditions at some border  sites. DOE, DOD, and State have taken some steps to address these  challenges, such as providing multitiered communications systems to  mitigate corruption so that alarm data can be simultaneously viewed at  several levels of authority and supplying protective casings for radiation  portal monitors to prevent damage from vandals or extreme heat.
subsections: section_title: Possible Corruption of Border Guards Poses a Threat to the Effective Operation of U.S.-Funded Radiation Detection Equipment
paragraphs: According to U.S. and foreign government officials, corruption is a  pervasive problem within the ranks of border security organizations.  Specifically, because foreign border guards are often poorly paid and  geographically isolated, there are concerns that foreign officials could be  bribed and turn off the radiation detection equipment and allow nuclear  smuggling to occur. For example, an official might turn off the equipment  to allow a nuclear smuggler to pass through a border crossing. According  to a Russian press report, in October 2004, a Russian customs agent at a  site in western Russia was fired because he was aiding a smuggling ring.  Additionally, in July 2005, after the newly elected President of Ukraine took  office, he reorganized many agencies within the government, including the  Customs Service, because of concerns about corruption.
DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are concerned that corrupt  foreign border security personnel could compromise the effectiveness of  U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment by either turning off equipment  or ignoring alarms. As a result, U.S. programs that provide fixed radiation  portal monitors are taking some steps to evaluate the degree to which  corruption is present in the countries and regions where they are working  or plan to work. For example, DOE’s SLD-Core program commissioned  three studies to better understand corruption and the challenges that it  could bring to the program. Additionally, DOE includes countrywide  corruption assessments as part of its efforts to help program officials  prioritize countries to include in the SLD-Core program. In addition, DOD  and State also include anticorruption courses as part of the radiation  detection training they provide to foreign border security personnel.
Some U.S. programs also have taken or plan to take other specific steps to  mitigate the threat of corruption, such as (1) providing multitiered  communications systems so that alarm data can be simultaneously viewed  at several levels of authority, (2) implementing programs to combat some  of the underlying issues that can lead to corruption through periodic  screening of border security personnel, and (3) installing radiation portal  monitors on both sides of a particular border if there are concerns about  corruption of personnel in these countries. For example, DOE and DOD are  deploying communication systems that link the activities at individual  border sites with regional and national command centers. By doing so,  alarm data can be simultaneously evaluated by officials both at the site and  up the chain of command, thus establishing redundant layers of  accountability for responding to alarms. As a result, if a local official turns  off the radiation detection equipment at a site, higher level officials can  quickly be made aware of the incident and investigate the reasons for the  alarm. Additionally, DOD plans to implement an Employee Dependability  Program in Uzbekistan that includes background checks, personal  interviews of applicants, monitoring of performance and behavior, and  annual refresher training to combat some of the underlying issues that can  lead to corruption among border security personnel. DOE officials told us  that they are considering implementing such a screening program in some  countries where the SLD-Core program works. Lastly, U.S. programs are  installing radiation portal monitors on both sides of some borders to create  redundant coverage to increase the likelihood of detection and  interdiction. In fiscal year 2006, DOE plans to install radiation portal  monitors at a number of sites in Georgia. At one site in Armenia, across the  border from a planned DOE installation, State installed radiation portal  monitors in December 2005, in part, because of concerns about corruption  on both sides of the border at this location. DOE is also considering  employing this type of redundant coverage at other locations throughout  Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
While DOE has taken steps to determine the level of corruption in some  countries and regions where it works and includes countrywide corruption  assessments as part of its prioritization model, DOE is still in the process of  determining in what countries it will provide specific anticorruption  measures and how much it will cost to do so based on its analysis of the  corruption threat. For example, DOE estimates that it will spend about $1  million to provide radiation detection equipment and related  communications systems at a typical foreign border crossing. DOE officials  noted that the standard communication systems the SLD-Core program  provides with radiation portal monitors have some anticorruption value  because radiation alarms require more than one official to review and close  out before the system can be reset. However, DOE has not included the  costs associated with other specific anticorruption measures in the long- term cost estimates for its SLD-Core program.
section_title: Some Border Crossings Remain More Vulnerable to Nuclear Smuggling Because DOE Has Not Upgraded Less Sophisticated Equipment Installed by Other U.S. Agencies
paragraphs: In 2002, DOE assumed responsibility for maintaining some radiation  detection equipment previously installed by State and other U.S. agencies  in 23 countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. However,  DOE has not upgraded any of this less sophisticated equipment, with the  exception of one site in Azerbaijan. Through an interagency agreement,  DOE assumed responsibility for ensuring the long-term sustainability and  continued operation of radiation portal monitors and X-ray vans equipped  with radiation detectors that State and other U.S. agencies provided to  these countries. Through this agreement, DOE provides spare parts,  preventative maintenance, and repairs for the equipment through regularly  scheduled maintenance visits. Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE  had conducted maintenance and sustainability activities for equipment in  21 of the 23 countries where equipment had been provided. DOE officials  told us that, although Belarus received a significant amount of radiation  detection equipment from DOD, DOE is currently prohibited from  maintaining this equipment by restrictions placed on U.S. assistance to  Belarus. As a result, the maintenance status of the 38 portal monitors and  almost 200 pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment DOD  provided to Belarus is unknown. Additionally, at the request of the Turkish  government, DOE no longer maintains 41 portal monitors and over 150  pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment State previously  provided to Turkey.
As we originally reported in 2002, at some sites in foreign countries, State  and other U.S. agencies installed portal monitors that contained only  gamma radiation detectors, which are less effective in detecting certain  nuclear material, such as plutonium, than detectors with both gamma and  neutron detection capability. Although State’s current policy is to install  radiation detection equipment with both gamma and neutron detection  capability, according to DOE officials, because of their configuration and  sensitivity, these older portal monitors are less likely to detect small  quantities of highly enriched uranium or nuclear material that is shielded,  for example, by a lead container or certain parts of a vehicle. When it  assumed responsibility for maintaining this equipment, DOE conducted an  initial assessment of these portal monitors to determine whether they were  functional and what maintenance was required. During the course of this  analysis, DOE found that much of the equipment was damaged and  required total replacement or major repairs. In such cases, DOE installed  similar equipment with gamma radiation detectors but chose not to  upgrade the equipment with newer portal monitors that would be capable  of detecting both gamma and neutron radiation. DOE’s policy was to  replace this equipment in-kind and wait to upgrade the equipment as part of  a countrywide deployment through the SLD-Core program. However,  according to SLD-Core program officials, DOE did not have funds  earmarked for upgrading the equipment in the absence of a countrywide  deployment through the SLD-Core program.
Additionally, SLD-Core program officials stated that DOE would need to  sign new agreements with the appropriate ministries or agencies within the  governments of the countries where State and other agencies had  previously installed equipment before DOE could invest “substantial  resources” to upgrade the equipment. DOE officials noted that replacing  the less sophisticated portal monitors with similar equipment usually costs  less than $5,000, plus installation costs, while deploying a comprehensive  system comprised of portal monitors that can detect both gamma and  neutron radiation, associated communication systems, and related training  can cost up to $1 million per site. The agreements are important because  they exempt DOE from payment of host government taxes, customs duties,  or other charges per congressional guidance. In addition, these agreements  require the host government to provide DOE with data on detections of  illicit trafficking in nuclear materials gathered as a result of assistance DOE  provided through the SLD-Core program. Though the SLD-Core program  has signed agreements with some countries where the less sophisticated  equipment was installed, such as Ukraine, DOE has yet to upgrade any of  the equipment in these countries, with the exception of one site in  Azerbaijan, primarily because the details of the countrywide installations  are still being determined. According to DOE officials, as countries with  older equipment sign agreements with DOE to implement the full SLD-Core  program, sites in these countries with less sophisticated equipment will be  upgraded.
In November 2005, DOE completed an assessment of the maintenance  activities it performs on equipment provided by other U.S. agencies. DOE  found that equipment failures at many of these sites go unattended, often  for months. DOE determined that its maintenance of X-ray vans previously  provided by State was not critical to the mission of the SLD-Core program.  As a result, DOE is planning to phase out its maintenance of X-ray vans  after fiscal year 2007. According to DOE officials, the budget of the SLD- Core program cannot sustain what DOE considers “non-mission critical  work.” In fiscal year 2005, DOE bore the full financial responsibility for all  maintenance activities because State provided no funding to DOE for this  work. In addition to the X-ray vans, DOE evaluated the sites where portal  monitors were previously installed by State and other agencies and  identified those monitors that should no longer be supported by the SLD- Core program. DOE assessed each location where less sophisticated portal  monitors are maintained and prioritized which sites should receive  upgraded equipment. DOE plans to work with State to upgrade selected  sites and decommission some sites that have equipment that is not being  used or is beyond repair.
section_title: Concerns Exist About Maintenance of Some Handheld Radiation Detection Equipment
paragraphs: DOE and State signed an interagency agreement in 2002 giving  responsibility for maintaining most radiation detection equipment  previously installed by State and other U.S. agencies to DOE. However, this  agreement did not make DOE responsible for maintaining handheld  radiation detection equipment previously deployed by these agencies. State  has also not assumed responsibility for maintaining about 1,000 handheld  radiation detectors provided by its programs that are vital to border  officials for conducting secondary inspections of vehicles and pedestrians,  and, as a result, much of this equipment is in disrepair. For example, at  one site in Georgia, we observed border guards performing secondary  inspections with a handheld radiation detector, previously provided by  State, which had not been calibrated since 1997 (see fig. 3). According to  the detector’s manufacturer, yearly recalibration is necessary to ensure that  the detector functions properly. Furthermore, DOE officials we spoke with  told us that—similar to radiation portal monitors—handheld radiation  detection devices require periodic maintenance checks and recalibration to  ensure that they remain operable and continue to meet minimum detection  standards.
Batteries used in some handheld radiation detection equipment typically  need to be replaced every 2 years and some types of handhelds are fragile  and can be easily broken, requiring that replacement devices or spare parts  be readily available. At the request of State, DOE is currently evaluating the  costs associated with maintaining this handheld equipment. Specifically,  DOE has asked its contractor currently responsible for maintaining the  portal monitors and X-ray vans in these countries to develop a proposal for  assuming responsibility for maintenance of the handheld equipment as  well. According to DOE officials, maintenance of handheld equipment  could be conducted during regularly scheduled visits for maintenance of portal monitors and X-ray vans. As a result, DOE officials believe that no  additional travel funds would be required for this activity. However, DOE  officials also told us that if they were to assume full responsibility for  maintaining the handheld equipment at sites where they are maintaining  radiation portal monitors installed by State and other agencies they would  need additional funding for labor and to provide replacement equipment  and spare parts.
section_title: Limited Infrastructure and Harsh Environmental Conditions at Some Border Sites Pose Equipment Problems
paragraphs: Limited infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions at some foreign  border sites create challenges to the installation and operation of radiation  detection equipment. For example, many border sites are located in remote  areas, which often do not have access to reliable supplies of electricity,  fiber optic lines, and other infrastructure needed to operate radiation  portal monitors and associated communication systems. Prior to providing  radiation portal monitors, U.S. programs typically perform site  assessments to determine the details surrounding how radiation detection  equipment will be installed at a given site. The assessment includes the  operational needs of the equipment depending on the infrastructure  available at the site. To address the needs identified, DOE, DOD, and State  provide generators at some sites to supply electricity to the radiation  detection equipment because the electric power supply shuts down  periodically or may be very low at these remote sites. Additionally, the  communication systems that are provided to report activities from the  radiation detectors require fiber optic cabling for their operation. If no  cabling exists, underground cabling or radio wave operated  communication systems must be installed to perform this function. Finally,  at some border sites, the radiation portal monitors are located significant  distances from the control and communication system center. U.S.  program officials we spoke with expressed concern that theft could occur  because of the remote location of this equipment. To prevent such  interference with the equipment, antitampering measures such as  protective cages are used to protect the integrity of the portal monitors  (see fig. 4).
Additionally, environmental conditions at some sites, such as extreme heat,  can compromise the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment.  Extreme heat can accelerate the degradation of components within radiation detection equipment and, as a result, can affect the performance  and long-term sustainability of the equipment. DOD placed a protective  casing around the radiation portal monitors it installed in Uzbekistan as a  heat shield to ensure the effective long-term operation of the equipment  (see fig. 5).
section_title: State’s Efforts to Coordinate U.S. Assistance Are Limited by Deficiencies in the Interagency Strategic Plan and the Lack of a Comprehensive List of Equipment Provided by U.S. Programs
paragraphs: State coordinates U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance overseas  through an interagency working group and in-country advisors. However,  its ability to carry out its role as lead interagency coordinator is limited by  deficiencies in the strategic plan for interagency coordination and by its  lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation detection assistance.  Specifically, the interagency strategic plan lacks key components, such as  overall program cost estimates, projected time frames for program  completion, and specific performance measures. Additionally, State has not  maintained accurate information on the operational status and location of  all radiation detection equipment provided by U.S. programs.
subsections: section_title: State Coordinates U.S. Radiation Detection Equipment Assistance through an Interagency Working Group and In- Country Advisors
paragraphs: As the lead coordinator of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance  overseas, State has taken some steps to coordinate the efforts of U.S.  programs that provide this type of assistance to foreign countries. State’s  coordination takes place primarily through two methods: an interagency  working group and State’s in-country advisors. The main coordination  mechanism for U.S. radiation detection assistance programs is the  interagency working group, chaired by State, which consists of program  representatives from DOE, DOD, State, and DHS. According to State, this  working group holds meetings about once every 2 months to coordinate the  activities of U.S. programs that provide radiation detection equipment and  export control assistance overseas. These interagency meetings attempt to  identify and prevent overlap among the various U.S. programs through  discussion of such issues as funding, upcoming program activities, and  recent trips to countries receiving U.S. assistance. Meetings are attended  by program managers responsible for overseeing and implementing  radiation detection equipment assistance programs in foreign countries.  While DOD and DOE officials we spoke with told us that these interagency  meetings are somewhat beneficial, they stated that meetings primarily  facilitate coordination at a high level and typically lack the specific detail  necessary to identify and prevent program overlap within countries and  regions where multiple U.S. programs provide radiation detection  equipment assistance. Through this working group, State also maintains an  interagency schedule that provides information on planned activities,  training, and site visits of U.S. programs.
State also coordinates U.S. programs through in-country advisors,  stationed in more than 20 foreign countries. While State funds these  advisors, State officials told us that they work on behalf of all U.S.  programs that provide nuclear detection assistance in their respective  countries. According to State officials, these advisors serve as the on-the- ground coordinators of U.S. export control and border security assistance  and are the primary sources of information concerning past and present  provision of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance in their  respective countries. State officials also noted that frequent informal  coordination takes place between program managers at State and their  counterparts in Washington, D.C., at other federal agencies.
In addition to State’s coordination efforts, DHS recently created the  Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) with responsibilities including  coordinating nuclear detection research and developing a global nuclear  detection architecture. According to DHS, though DNDO is principally  focused on domestic detection, its coordinating work will enhance U.S.  efforts overseas through the design of a global nuclear detection  architecture implemented under current agency responsibilities. Equally,  while detection technologies developed by DNDO will be directed  primarily by operational requirements for domestic applications, many  technologies developed could have application in overseas radiation  detection equipment assistance programs. However, DOE, DOD, and State  officials we spoke with were unclear on what specific future role DNDO  would play in coordinating activities of U.S. programs that provide  radiation detection equipment assistance to foreign countries. These  agencies are working with DNDO to clarify the future role that the office  will play.
section_title: The Interagency Strategic Plan to Coordinate U.S. Radiation Detection Equipment Assistance Overseas Lacks Key Components
paragraphs: In 2002, we reported that U.S. efforts to help other countries combat  nuclear smuggling needed strengthened coordination and planning to link  U.S. programs through common goals and objectives, strategies and time  frames for providing assistance, and performance measures for evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. assistance. State, as the lead coordinator of U.S.  nuclear detection assistance overseas, led the development of a  governmentwide interagency strategic plan to guide the efforts of U.S.  programs that provide this assistance. The plan broadly defines a set of  interagency goals and objectives, establishes minimum technological  standards for radiation detection equipment that U.S. programs provide,  and outlines the roles and responsibilities of each agency. However, the  plan does not include several elements necessary to effectively link U.S.  programs together, prevent duplication, and guide their efforts toward  completion.
While the plan provides U.S. agencies with a broad framework for  coordinating this type of assistance by defining a set of interagency goals  and outlining the roles and responsibilities of each agency, it does not  include specific performance measures, overall program cost estimates, or  projected time frames for program completion. Without incorporating  these key elements into its plan, State will be limited in its ability, as lead  coordinator, to effectively link U.S. programs and guide their efforts toward  achieving interagency goals. For example, a primary goal in its plan is that  recipient countries possess a comprehensive capability to detect and  interdict illicitly trafficked nuclear and radiological material. However,  without incorporating specific performance measures into its plan, State  has no transparent way to effectively measure the performance of U.S.  programs in this regard or to determine the degree to which they are  reaching this or other interagency goals discussed in its plan. Finally,  without incorporating overall program cost estimates and time frames for  program completion into its plan, State cannot effectively determine the  amount of U.S. government resources that will be required to achieve  interagency goals and objectives or under what time frames these  resources will be required. If State does not take steps to include these key  elements in its plan, it will continue to be limited in its ability to effectively  track the progress of U.S. programs, measure their performance toward  achieving interagency goals and objectives, and determine the amount of  funding required to achieve these goals and under what time frames these  resources will be needed.
section_title: State Has Not Maintained Accurate Information on All Previously Provided Handheld Equipment, Which Inhibits Its Ability to Effectively Coordinate U.S. Assistance
paragraphs: State, in its role as lead interagency coordinator, has not maintained  accurate information on the operational status and location of all the  handheld radiation detection equipment previously provided by U.S.  programs. While DOE has taken responsibility for maintaining information  on previously deployed U.S.-funded radiation portal monitors, State  primarily works through its in-country advisors and its interagency  working group to gather and maintain information on handheld radiation  detection equipment provided by U.S. programs. State, through its EXBS  program, assumed direct management of the in-country advisors from DHS  in February 2005. As part of their duties, State’s in-country advisors are  required to maintain a record of the transfer of all U.S.-provided  export/border control equipment, including radiation detection equipment,  within their respective countries and to follow up to ensure it is at the  locations specified by the recipient government and is properly maintained.  However, four of the nine advisors we spoke with, who are stationed in  countries that have received a combined total of about 1,000 pieces of  handheld radiation detection equipment from U.S. programs,  acknowledged that they did not have up-to-date information regarding the  present operational status or location of this equipment. Additionally, five  of nine advisors we spoke with were unaware that, as part of their duties,  they are required to maintain a record of all U.S.-provided equipment  within their country. However, some advisors we spoke with stated that  they attempt to determine this information but are sometimes limited in  their ability to do so because other U.S. programs have not always  coordinated with them before providing equipment in their country. As a  result, it is necessary for some advisors to follow up with the host  government to determine the status and location of U.S.-provided radiation  detection equipment. According to some advisors, however, host  governments may not always provide accurate information on what  equipment has been provided in the past, where it is currently located, and  its current operational status.
According to State officials, there is no comprehensive interagency list of  radiation detection equipment that has been previously provided to foreign  governments by U.S. programs. In 2002, we recommended that State, as the  lead interagency coordinator, work with DOE and DOD to develop such a  list. Officials we spoke with at DOE and DOD stated that having access to  accurate information on past provisions of all radiation detection  equipment provided by U.S. programs is essential to interagency  coordination, preventing overlap among programs, as well as appropriately  assessing a specific country’s equipment needs. During the course of our  review, program officials at DOE, DOD, and State provided us with lists of  radiation detection equipment their programs had provided to other  countries. According to information we received from program managers  at DOE, DOD, and State, more than 7,000 pieces of handheld radiation  detection equipment, including radiation pagers and radioactive isotope  identification devices, had been provided to 36 foreign countries through  the end of fiscal year 2005. Because much of this equipment was provided  to the same countries by multiple agencies and programs, it is difficult to  determine the degree to which duplication of effort has occurred. For  example, since fiscal year 1994, a total of 17 different countries have  received handheld radiation detection equipment from more than one U.S.  agency. However, although DOE, DOD, and State programs each maintain  their own lists of radiation detection equipment provided to foreign  countries, officials at these agencies told us that they do not regularly share  such information with each other. Without the development of a  comprehensive interagency list of U.S.-funded radiation detection  equipment, program managers at DOE, DOD, and State cannot accurately  assess the equipment needs of countries where they plan to provide  assistance, may unknowingly provide duplicative sets of equipment, and  cannot determine if the equipment is being used for its intended purpose or  is in need of maintenance and repair.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Since the mid-1990s, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million to  provide a variety of radiation detection equipment to countries around the  world, and it is important that this equipment be properly maintained so  that it can be effectively used to combat nuclear smuggling overseas. Since  taking over responsibility for maintaining portal monitors deployed by  other agencies in 2002, DOE has worked to ensure that this equipment is  functioning and being used as intended. However, because DOE’s  interagency maintenance agreement with State did not include maintaining  handheld radiation detection equipment previously provided by State and  other agencies, much of this equipment may not be properly functioning.  Handheld radiation detection equipment is vital for border officials to  conduct secondary inspections of vehicles or pedestrians. Without taking  steps to ensure that all previously provided radiation detection equipment,  specifically handheld equipment, is adequately maintained and remains  operational, State cannot ensure the continued effectiveness or long-term  sustainability of this equipment.
Because corrupt officials could undermine the effectiveness of U.S.  radiation detection assistance programs overseas by turning off radiation  detection equipment or not properly responding to alarms, it is important  for U.S. programs to employ anticorruption efforts, such as multitiered  communication systems for radiation alarms, training, employee  dependability programs, and redundant installations of equipment when  providing such assistance. While we are encouraged that DOE, DOD, and  State employ some corruption mitigation measures in their programs, DOE  is still in the process of determining in which countries it will provide these  specific anticorruption measures and how much such assistance would  cost to implement.
In addition, though DOE has maintained less sophisticated radiation portal  monitors previously deployed by other agencies since 2002, it has not  upgraded the equipment at any of these sites. As a result, border sites with  less sophisticated radiation portal monitors are more vulnerable to nuclear  smuggling than sites with equipment that can detect both gamma and  neutron radiation. We originally reported on this problem in our May 2002  report. In its official comments on that report, DOE stated that these less  sophisticated monitors “are not as reliable [as monitors with both gamma  and neutron radiation detection capabilities], and have limited or no ability  to detect shielded plutonium.” Although it is encouraging that DOE has  recently undertaken an assessment of the equipment it maintains that was  installed by other U.S. agencies, DOE has not yet improved the neutron  detection capabilities of any of these less sophisticated monitors, with the  exception of one site in Azerbaijan. As a result, these sites remain just as  vulnerable to certain types of nuclear smuggling as they were when we first  reported this deficiency in May 2002.
Finally, we believe that, unless key components such as overall program  cost estimates, projected time frames for completion, and specific  performance measures are incorporated into the interagency strategic  plan, State will be limited in its ability to determine the amount of  resources and time needed to achieve the broader interagency goals  discussed in its plan or to effectively measure U.S. programs’ progress  toward achieving these goals. Furthermore, without accurate information  on the current status and location of radiation detection equipment  previously provided by U.S. programs, State cannot effectively fulfill its  role as interagency coordinator of U.S. assistance. Because there are at  least seven U.S. programs at three federal agencies that provide radiation  detection equipment to foreign countries, program managers at DOE, DOD,  and State need access to a “master list” that shows the status and location  of all U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance to more accurately  determine the needs of specific countries and to avoid duplication of effort  among U.S. programs. Without such a list, the potential exists for programs  to provide duplicative sets of radiation detection equipment to the same  country.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To strengthen program management and effectiveness, we recommend that  the Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National  Nuclear Security Administration, take the following two actions:  Integrate projected spending on specific anticorruption measures into  the long-term cost estimates for the SLD-Core program.
Upgrade less sophisticated portal monitors previously installed by other  U.S. agencies where DOE has determined this to be appropriate as soon  as possible and include funding to accomplish this in DOE’s planning  and budgeting process.
To strengthen accountability of U.S. radiation detection equipment  assistance programs, we recommend that the Secretary of State, working  with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the Administrator of the  National Nuclear Security Administration, take the following three actions:  Ensure continued maintenance of all radiation detection equipment  provided to foreign governments, including all handheld equipment  previously provided by State and other agencies.
Strengthen the Strategic Plan for Interagency Coordination of U.S.
Government Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas by including in the  plan (1) specific performance measures to more effectively track and  measure the progress U.S. programs are making toward achievement of  interagency goals and objectives and (2) overall cost estimates and  projected time frames for completion of U.S. radiation detection  equipment assistance efforts to determine the amount of U.S.  government resources required to achieve interagency goals and  objectives and under what time frames these resources will be required.
To the extent possible, account for all U.S.-funded radiation detection  equipment provided to foreign governments, especially handheld  equipment, by creating, maintaining, and sharing among all agencies a  comprehensive list of such assistance.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOE and State agreed in general with our conclusions and  recommendations. DOD had no written comments on our report. DOE,  DOD, and State provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.
In its comments, DOE wrote that it does not believe that our report  adequately reflects the department’s efforts to maintain handheld radiation  detection equipment provided by State and other agencies because DOE  has a process in place to identify and replace handheld equipment used at  sites where DOE maintains radiation portal monitors installed by State and  other agencies. However, we believe that the extent of DOE’s program is  fairly presented because this effort does not cover all handheld equipment  previously provided by State and other agencies—only equipment at the  selected sites visited by DOE’s maintenance teams is maintained. Further,  the current operational status of the vast majority of handheld radiation  detection equipment previously deployed by State and other agencies  cannot be determined, in large part, because State has not maintained a  comprehensive list of such equipment.
In its comments, State disagreed with our lack of emphasis on the  “informal coordination role played by the department’s front-line country  program officers.” State considers informal consultations between these  officials and their interagency counterparts to be the “primary means of  coordination of its efforts concerning radiation detection equipment  provisions.” State believes that such informal coordination is “much more  important than coordination through the interagency working group or  with State’s in-country advisors.” We have added language to our report  noting the role of informal coordination in these programs. However,  State’s emphasis on them as its primary means of coordinating radiation  detection assistance programs conflicts with its own planning documents.  In its Strategic Plan for Interagency Coordination of U.S. Government  Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas, State claims that “a standing sub- working group, the International Nuclear Detection Interagency Working  Group, will routinely coordinate nuclear detection, interdiction, and  investigation assistance provided by U.S. government agencies.” State’s  plan emphasizes the role of the interagency working group and states that  such coordination is “vital to the overall success of U.S. nuclear detection  assistance efforts.” State’s plan does not, however, emphasize or even  mention informal coordination mechanisms as a method for State’s  coordination of U.S. radiation detection assistance programs.
State also believes that its in-country advisors are unfairly criticized for not  maintaining comprehensive lists of radiation detection equipment in  countries where they are responsible. State cited competing claims on the  advisors’ time, their many responsibilities within the EXBS program, and  the limited resources at their disposal. However, State’s own guidance to its  in-country advisors states that the advisors’ “general duties  include…maintaining a record of the transfer of all U.S. government- provided nonproliferation export/border control equipment, and following- up to ensure that it is operational, being used for intended purposes at the  locations previously specified by the recipient government, and in  accordance with U.S. laws and policies.”
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. We will then send copies of this report to the Secretary of  Energy; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of  Homeland Security; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security  Administration; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and  interested congressional committees. We also will make copies available to  others upon request. In addition, the report will be made available at no  charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors to this report include R. Stockton  Butler, Julie Chamberlain, Nancy Crothers, Chris Ferencik, Gregory  Marchand, and Jim Shafer.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We performed our review of U.S. programs that provide radiation detection  equipment assistance to foreign countries at the Departments of Energy  (DOE), Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), and State (State) in  Washington, D.C.; Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New  Mexico; and Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico.  Additionally, we also visited a “nonprobability” sample of six countries  (Georgia, Greece, Macedonia, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) where U.S.  agencies have provided radiation detection equipment. We visited these  six countries to observe U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment in  operation and to discuss the implementation of U.S. programs with foreign  officials. We determined which specific countries to visit based on several  criteria, such as historic U.S. government spending to provide radiation  detection equipment within that country; countries receiving radiation  detection equipment from multiple U.S. agencies and programs; countries  receiving significant amounts of handheld equipment; countries with an in- country advisor stationed at a U.S. Embassy; countries where DOE  maintains radiation detection equipment previously installed by State and  other U.S. agencies; the current political environment within the country;  and our ability to travel from country to county within a reasonable amount  of time.
To address the progress U.S. programs have made in providing radiation  detection equipment assistance to foreign countries, we reviewed  documents and had discussions with officials from DOE’s Second Line of  Defense “Core” (SLD-Core) program, Cooperative Radiological Instrument  Transfer project, and International Nuclear Export Control program; DOE’s  Office of General Counsel; and DOE’s private sector contractors—SI  International, Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler, Bechtel-Nevada, TSA Systems,  and Miratek. We also reviewed documents and interviewed relevant  officials from DHS’s Customs and Border Protection; State’s Export  Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program, Nonproliferation  and Disarmament Fund, and Georgia Border Security and Law  Enforcement program; DOD’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation  Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI), International Counterproliferation  Program (ICP), and Defense Threat Reduction Agency; DOD’s private  sector contractor—Washington Group International; Los Alamos National  Laboratory; Sandia National Laboratories; and Oak Ridge National  Laboratory.
In addition, in October 2004, we visited Greece and Macedonia to interview  Greek and Macedonian officials and to see U.S. radiation detection  assistance provided in each country. In August 2005, we visited Georgia,  Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan to see where U.S. agencies have provided  radiation detection equipment, to observe U.S.-funded radiation detection  equipment in operation, and to discuss the implementation of U.S.  programs with foreign officials. We also visited Belgium to meet with  officials from the European Union to discuss radiation detection equipment  assistance provided to foreign countries by that organization. During our  visit to Greece, we spoke with Greek officials from the Greek Atomic  Energy Commission; the Greek Ministry of Economy and Finance; and  Customs Directorate General (Greek Customs Service). While in Greece,  we toured two border crossings where DOE had installed radiation  detection equipment through the SLD-Core program, SLD-Core  installations at Athens International Airport, and a small research reactor  in Athens that received physical security upgrades from DOE prior to the  2004 Olympic Games. While in Macedonia, we interviewed Macedonian  officials and toured one border site where radiation detection equipment  had previously been provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency  and the Department of State.
While in Russia, we spoke with officials from the Federal Customs Service  of Russia, ASPECT (a Russian company that develops radiation detection  equipment), and DOE officials responsible for implementing the SLD-Core  program in Russia. During our visit to Russia, we toured DOE installations  at three airports and one seaport, the Federal Customs Service Central  Command Center where Russian Customs officials gather and respond to  portal monitor alarm data, and the Federal Customs Service Training  Academy in Saint Petersburg. While in Uzbekistan, we spoke with officials  from DOD’s WMD-PPI program, Washington Group International, State and  DOD officials at the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan’s Institute of  Nuclear Physics, and the Uzbek State Customs Committee. While in  Uzbekistan, we toured the Tashkent Airport and a land border crossing  where DOD had provided radiation detection equipment assistance  through the WMD-PPI program. We also toured a small research reactor in  Uzbekistan that previously received physical security upgrades from DOE,  such as barbed-wire fences and video surveillance cameras. During our  visit to Georgia, we spoke with officials from State’s Georgia Border  Security and Law Enforcement program, Department of Georgian State  Border Defense, Georgia Border Security Coordinating Group, and  Georgia’s Andronikashvili Institute of Nuclear Physics. We toured a land  border crossing where State had previously provided radiation detection  equipment and visited the Georgian Border Guard Training Academy. While  in Ukraine, we spoke with DOE, DOD, and State officials at the U.S.  Embassy in Kiev, Ukraine’s Border Security Coordinating Group, Ukraine’s  Border Guard Service, and toured a land border crossing where State had  previously provided radiation detection equipment that DOE currently  maintains.
We discussed coordination issues with U.S. in-country advisors stationed in  countries receiving U.S. assistance, including Armenia, Azerbaijan,  Georgia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. We  developed a structured interview guide with a standard set of questions,  which we asked all of our interviewees. We designed our interview guide  with the assistance of a GAO methodologist. The practical difficulties of  asking questions may introduce other types of errors. For example,  differences in how a particular question is interpreted or the sources of  information available to respondents can introduce unwanted variability  into the responses, so we included steps to minimize such errors. We  pretested the content and format of the interview guide with two  individuals and made minor changes as appropriate.
We chose which specific in-country advisors to interview based on several  criteria that include advisors who are stationed in the countries we would  be visiting, advisors who are stationed in countries receiving significant  amounts of radiation detection equipment from multiple U.S. agencies and  programs, and advisors who are stationed in countries where DOE  maintains radiation detection equipment previously installed by State and  other U.S. agencies. Once we determined which specific advisors to  interview, we created a list, which we then randomly ordered to provide an  unbiased approach to conducting our interviews. Our goal was to talk with  all the advisors on the list, but we knew that circumstances might prevent  that so we used a randomized list to provide the order of contacting the  advisors. We initiated contact with each advisor from this list, but if we  could not establish contact with that advisor, we attempted to establish  contact with the next advisor on our list. In some instances, we slightly  modified our list due to unforeseen developments. For example, during our  visit to the Republic of Georgia, we became aware of a Department of State  project to install radiation detection equipment in Armenia opposite the  Georgian border. Since this met our criteria for including a country in our  pool of interviewees, we agreed it was appropriate, for the purposes of this  review, to add Armenia. We then contacted the in-country advisor stationed  in Armenia to learn more about this project. In addition, we removed the  responses from the advisor in Russia from our total list of advisors because  he failed to respond to more than half of our questions and stated that his  role in coordinating this type of assistance in Russia is nonexistent because  DOE, through its SLD-Core program, conducts and coordinates radiation  detection assistance provided to Russia. Lastly, we interviewed the advisor  responsible for overseeing implementation of U.S. assistance to the  Republic of Georgia because Georgia has received radiation detection  equipment in the past from multiple U.S. programs. To obtain responses to  our structured interview questions, we generally used e-mail and phone  interviews. However, during our visits to Georgia and Ukraine, we were  able to meet with the in-country advisors to obtain responses to our  questions.
To assess the current and expected future costs of U.S. programs that  provide radiation detection equipment assistance to foreign countries, we  reviewed documents from DOE, DOD, State, and DHS detailing program  expenditures, projected costs, and schedule estimates. We reviewed  contract data for expenditures through the end of fiscal year 2005 and met  numerous times with officials from DOE, DOD, State, and DHS to discuss  the data. We obtained responses from key database officials to a number of  questions focused on data reliability covering issues such as data entry  access, internal control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of  the data. Follow-up questions were added whenever necessary. Caveats  and limitations to the data were noted in the documentation where  necessary. For example, in our discussions with the DOD official who  manages its financial database, she stated that program support costs were  prorated between WMD-PPI’s projects based on usage. Therefore, the  expenditure amount added for the program support cost for Uzbekistan is a  reasonable approximation but may not be exact. We determined that the  data we received were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report  based on work we performed.
To identify challenges U.S. programs face in deploying and operating  radiation detection equipment in foreign countries, we examined  documents and spoke with officials from DOE, DOD, State, DHS, Los  Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Washington  Group International, and several nongovernmental entities, including the  Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at American University.  Additionally, during our visits to Georgia, Greece, Macedonia, Russia,  Ukraine, and Uzbekistan we spoke with various foreign officials to better  understand the challenges they face in operating radiation detection  equipment provided by U.S. programs. We also attended a National  Academies of Science conference on nonintrusive technologies for  improving the security of containerized maritime cargo and the National  Cargo Security Council conference on radiation detection and screening.
To understand the steps U.S. programs take to coordinate radiation  detection equipment assistance provided by multiple U.S. programs, we  met with program officials from each of the agencies providing assistance  and reviewed pertinent documents, including individual agency’s  assistance plans and State’s Strategic Plan for Interagency Coordination  of U.S. Government Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas. We also  assessed coordination through the interagency group headed by State and  met with the lead official of that effort—the Director of Export Control and  Cooperation—and members of his staff. We discussed coordination issues  with U.S. advisors stationed in countries receiving U.S. assistance including  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Moldova, Poland,  Romania, and Ukraine. Several of these advisors were responsible for  tracking assistance efforts in more than one country. For example, the  advisor stationed in Poland is also responsible for Estonia, Latvia, and  Lithuania. Finally, we relied on our previous reviews of the U.S.  nonproliferation programs within DOE, DOD, and State. At State, we  interviewed the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia and  met with officials from the Bureau of International Security and  Nonproliferation. We also relied on related prior GAO reports. We  performed our review from April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance Programs at the Department of Energy
paragraphs: The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Second Line of Defense “Core”  program provides comprehensive radiation detection equipment packages  to foreign countries to combat nuclear smuggling. Its associated  maintenance program focuses on maintaining equipment previously  provided by the Department of State and other U.S. agencies. In addition,  DOE implements another program within its Office of Global Threat  Reduction that provides handheld radiation detection equipment to foreign  countries.
subsections: section_title: Second Line of Defense “Core” Program
paragraphs: In 1998, DOE established the Second Line of Defense “Core” (SLD-Core)  program, which has primarily worked to help Russia detect illicit nuclear  materials trafficking by providing radiation detection equipment to the  Federal Customs Service of Russia. DOE recently expanded its efforts in  the SLD-Core program to include countries other than Russia. SLD-Core  activities focus on providing radiation detection equipment, software and  hardware communications equipment and support, and training/processes  to foreign countries’ border sites. The radiation detection equipment DOE  provides is U.S.-made, except in Russia where Russian-made equipment is  installed. The communication systems DOE installs provide important  information on the radiation detector alarms, such as the radiation profile  of the substance detected. In addition to training at sites where equipment  is installed, DOE provides other training courses at the Hazardous  Materials Management and Emergency Response training center at Pacific  Northwest National Laboratory.
Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE’s SLD-Core program had  completed installation of radiation portal monitors at 83 sites in Greece,  Lithuania, and Russia at a cost of about $130 million. In fiscal year 2005,  DOE planned to complete 29 sites in seven countries: Azerbaijan, Georgia,  Kazakhstan, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. However, due to delays in  signing implementing agreements with the governments of some of these  countries, many of these sites were not completed. As of December 2005,  DOE had signed implementing agreements with Azerbaijan, Georgia,  Slovenia, and Ukraine, and plans to commence work in these countries in  fiscal year 2006 (see fig. 6). Additionally, the SLD-Core program will be  installing radiation detection equipment at some foreign ports, referred to  as “feeder” ports, to assist the work done by DOE’s Megaports Initiative.
DOE has been cooperating with the Federal Customs Service of Russia  since 1998, and, coupled with the large number of sites where Russia has  installed equipment on its own, the nature of DOE’s work through the SLD- Core program in Russia is evolving. DOE is transitioning its activities in  Russia from installation of new equipment to sustainability of equipment it  has previously installed. DOE and the Federal Customs Service of Russia  signed an agreement in April 2005 that details plans for the long-term  sustainability of radiation detection equipment DOE has provided to  Russia. DOE is also now supporting other activities in Russia, such as  regional radiation alarm response exercises and rechecks of previously  installed equipment.
Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE spent about $66 million installing  radiation portal monitors at 78 border sites in Russia, 4 sites in Greece, 1  site in Lithuania, and to conduct preliminary site assessments in other  countries. DOE spent about $50 million on various program integration  activities, which are costs not directly associated with installing equipment  at a particular site within a specific country. Of this amount, about $15  million was spent on advanced equipment procurement activities, which  include the purchase and storage of portal monitors and associated spare  parts for use at future installations. DOE also spent almost $16 million on  program oversight activities, such as program cost and schedule  estimating, technical assistance provided by participating national  laboratories, and translation services. In addition, DOE spent over $5  million to develop and maintain its prioritization model for the SLD-Core  program, maintained by Los Alamos National Laboratory, which is used to  rank foreign countries, as well as specific sites within a country, in terms of  their attractiveness to a potential nuclear material smuggler. DOE also  spent about $4 million on equipment testing and evaluation to test the  effectiveness and performance of the radiation detection equipment that it  provides through the program. DOE spent over $8 million on the  development of materials and curricula for training foreign customs agents  on the use of radiation detection equipment. Finally, DOE spent almost $2  million on other program integration activities. See figure 7 for more  information on program integration expenditures.
Other countries ($5.4)
Program oversight ($16.1)
Maintenance ($8.4)
Other ($1.8)
Equipment testing  and evaluation ($3.9)
Prioritization model ($5.1)
Program integration costs ($50.2)
Training ($8.4)
Russia, Greece, and Lithuania ($65.5)
Advanced equipment procurement ($15.0)
subsections: section_title: DOE’s Maintenance of Equipment Previously Installed by Other U.S. Agencies
paragraphs: In 2002, DOE assumed the responsibility for maintaining certain radiation  detection equipment, such as radiation portal monitors and X-ray vans with  gamma radiation detection capability, previously installed in 23 countries  by State and other U.S. agencies (see fig. 8). Through the end of fiscal year  2005, DOE has successfully conducted maintenance and sustainability  activities for this equipment in 21 of 23 countries. DOE contractors service  these radiation portal monitors annually and X-ray vans biannually. Since  2002, DOE has spent about $8 million to provide spare parts, preventative maintenance, and repairs for this equipment. DOE anticipates that the  future scope of the maintenance program will be reduced as the SLD-Core  program expands into countries where equipment was previously installed  by other U.S. agencies.
If DOE is notified that there are problems with the radiation portal  monitors in a certain country, they will add this repair onto a scheduled  maintenance trip of a nearby country. According to the DOE maintenance  contractor, this occurs 5-6 times a year. However, DOE officials often are  not made aware of specific problems with equipment prior to arriving at  the site to conduct regular servicing. As a result, DOE’s maintenance teams  must be equipped with a wide variety of components in the event that  major repairs are required. At times, maintenance teams have had to  improvise temporary repairs for equipment due to a lack of necessary  replacement parts. For example, during our visit to a border site in  Ukraine, DOE’s maintenance team discovered that a truck had struck and  damaged a pole holding the wiring for the radiation detection equipment’s  communication systems. The truck’s impact caused the wiring to snap in  numerous places. Because the maintenance team was unaware of this  damage prior to our arrival at the site, it had to repair the cable using  connectors rather than replacing the entire wire as they would have  preferred to do. DOE officials told us that, during the next scheduled  maintenance visit to this site, the wiring will be replaced.
section_title: Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer Project
paragraphs: In 2004, DOE established the Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer  project (CRITr) within its Global Threat Reduction Initiative. In this  project, DOE partners with Interpol, which provides knowledge of foreign  law enforcement to determine the countries to select for assistance and  coordinates all CRITr training logistics within its member countries.  Through the CRITr project, DOE collects and refurbishes handheld  radiation detection devices deemed surplus by DOE national laboratories  and provides this equipment to first responders in foreign countries. The  handheld radiation detection equipment DOE provides through CRITr consists mostly of survey meters and does not include radiation pagers. In  addition to providing radiation detection equipment through the CRITr  project, DOE provides training for foreign officials on how to use the  equipment. DOE originally provided assistance through the CRITr project  in Greece by providing over 100 handheld radiation detection devices prior  to the Olympic Games in 2004. According to DOE officials, in fiscal year  2004, with Interpol’s assistance, DOE selected seven additional countries to  receive assistance through the project: Croatia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,  Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Uzbekistan (see fig. 9). DOE also provided  radiation detection equipment to Tanzania in fiscal year 2005. Through the  CRITr project, DOE spent almost $0.5 million in fiscal year 2004 and almost  $0.6 million in fiscal year 2005, according to DOE officials. DOE has  budgeted almost $0.4 million for fiscal year 2006 to supply instruments and  training to law enforcement officials in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,  Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Uganda and to provide  additional equipment to Tanzania.
section_title: Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance Programs at the Department of Defense
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) implements two programs that assist  other countries in combating nuclear smuggling: the Weapons of Mass  Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI) and the  International Counterproliferation Program (ICP). As figure 10 shows,  DOD spent about $22 million on these programs between fiscal years 1994  and 2005.
subsections: section_title: Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative
paragraphs: WMD-PPI was created as a project within the Cooperative Threat  Reduction Program and is implemented by DOD’s Defense Threat  Reduction Agency with oversight and policy guidance from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. In the 2003 National Defense  Authorization Act, the Congress created WMD-PPI with a $40 million  budget to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)  and related materials and technologies from the former Soviet Union.  WMD-PPI seeks to accomplish this mission through three projects: the  Uzbekistan Land Border project, the Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation  Prevention project in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine Land  and Maritime Border projects.
In Uzbekistan, DOD is installing radiation portal monitors at 17 sites; 11  of which were completed by the end of fiscal year 2005. To date, WMD- PPI has spent over $6 million to install radiation portal monitors in  Uzbekistan. However, this spending total is misleading because DOD  has obligated over $19 million to three contracts for program costs  associated with installing radiation detection equipment, such as  communication systems and training. Because DOD only executes  spending on these contracts after all work has been completed, these  contracts were not paid in fiscal year 2005. DOD projects that the  Uzbekistan Portal Monitoring project will cost about $54 million and be  completed in fiscal year 2009. Once these portal monitors are installed  in fiscal year 2006, DOE will maintain the equipment within its Second  Line of Defense “Core” program.
The Caspian Sea project focuses on improving command and control,  surveillance, detection and interception of WMD, operation, and  sustainability along the Caspian Sea border by providing training and  associated equipment, including handheld radiation detection devices.  In Azerbaijan, the project’s cost is estimated at $63.4 million and, in  Kazakhstan, it is estimated at $60.6 million.
In Ukraine, WMD-PPI is implementing a similar project along the Black  Sea border. The Maritime Border Security Project in Ukraine is expected  to cost over $39 million and will be finished in fiscal year 2009. The  Ukrainian Land Border Forces Proliferation Prevention project focuses  on securing the points of entry and the green border—border that is not  a formal crossing point between countries—between Moldova and  Ukraine. It seeks to improve Ukraine’s capabilities to detect and  interdict WMD and related materials by providing equipment and  training. Radiation detection equipment, such as pagers, is included in  this equipment assistance. DOD expects this project will cost over $51  million and be completed in fiscal year 2008.
section_title: International Counterproliferation Program
paragraphs: The 1995 National Defense Authorization Act directed DOD and the  Federal Bureau of Investigation to establish a program to improve efforts  to deter the possible proliferation and acquisition of WMD and related  materials across the borders and through the former Soviet Union, the  Baltic region, and Eastern Europe. Similarly, the 1997 National Defense  Authorization Act directed DOD to work with U.S. Customs to carry out  programs to assist customs officials and border guards in those regions in  preventing unauthorized transfer and transportation of WMD and related  materials. DOD established ICP in response to these requirements. The  program is implemented by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.  According to DOD officials, ICP policy guidance comes from DOD’s  Eurasia Department because of its strong ties and contacts within the  regional scope of the program. Through ICP, DOD provides a range of law  enforcement and border security training and equipment, including  handheld radiation detection equipment, to foreign law enforcement  officials in participating countries. According to an ICP official, the  program does not currently provide much radiation detection equipment  because, in many countries, other U.S. programs have already provided  such equipment. ICP coordinates with the Federal Bureau of Investigation  to conduct training of foreign government personnel. In some participating  countries, ICP provides both equipment and training, and in others it  provides only training, depending upon the needs of the country.
Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOD had spent over $14 million to  provide radiation detection equipment and radiation detection training to  foreign countries through ICP. Of this amount, DOD spent over $0.5 million  to provide handheld radiation detection equipment to six countries (see fig.  12). The remaining funds were spent on a variety of training related to  radiation detection, WMD interdiction, and crime scene investigation.  Figure 13 shows the flowchart of training DOD provides to participating  countries through ICP.
According to ICP officials, the program has worked in 23 countries,  including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and  Montenegro, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. In the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2005, DOD was given permission by the  Congress to expand ICP’s scope outside of the original region. According to  a DOD official, ICP plans to initiate programs in Malaysia, Singapore, and  Pakistan.
section_title: Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance Programs at the Department of State
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 1994, the Department of State (State) has provided various  types of radiation detection equipment assistance to 31 foreign countries.  State has provided this assistance, primarily through three programs (1)  the Export Control and Related Border Security program (EXBS), (2) the  Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), and (3) the Georgia  Border Security and Law Enforcement program (GBSLE). As figure 14  shows, State spent about $25 million from fiscal year 1994 through fiscal  year 2005 on radiation detection equipment assistance to foreign countries.
subsections: section_title: Export Control and Related Border Security Program
paragraphs: State’s Export Control and Related Border Security program, which began  in 1998, is a comprehensive U.S. government effort to help foreign  countries improve their export controls and border security capabilities.  The program provides a broad array of assistance to foreign countries,  such as workshops to assist foreign countries draft and implement new  export control laws and regulations, as well as various types of equipment  and training for foreign border control agencies. Assistance provided  through the program focuses on five core areas: (1) laws and regulations,  (2) licensing, (3) enforcement, (4) government and industry cooperation,  and (5) interagency cooperation and coordination. While the original focus  of the program was to provide assistance to potential “source countries” in  the former Soviet Union or to countries that produce munitions or dual-use  items, State later expanded the program’s focus to include states on  potential smuggling routes in Eastern and Central Europe, East Asia,  Central Asia, the Caucasus, Latin America, and Africa, as well as potential  “source countries” in South Asia and countries with major transshipment  hubs in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Through the  end of fiscal year 2005, State has spent $15.4 million to provide a variety of  radiation detection equipment assistance to 30 countries (see fig. 15).
In addition, State also provided funding to the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (formerly known as U.S.  Customs) to implement certain types of radiation detection equipment  assistance on behalf of its Export Control and Related Border Security  program. Specifically, from fiscal year 1999 through 2005, DHS and its  predecessor organizations spent about $10.5 million to provide radiation  detection equipment and training to 30 countries. This equipment included,  among other things, radiation pagers that border officials wear on their  belts and radioactive isotope identification devices. Training provided by  DHS included assistance in operating the X-ray vans equipped with  radiation detectors, hands-on instruction in using radiation detection  equipment to detect nuclear smuggling, teaching techniques for  investigating smuggling operations, and tracking the movements of  smugglers between ports of entry. In addition, DHS also stationed 22 in- country advisors covering 25 countries, on behalf of the program, to assist  in implementing and coordinating U.S. government assistance in these  countries. In February 2005, State, through its EXBS program, assumed  direct responsibility of the in-country advisors from DHS. According to  State officials, this management change was done to better address  coordination and responsiveness issues in the advisor program.
subsections: section_title: Russian Federal Customs Service Central Command Center
paragraphs: In addition to providing radiation detection equipment assistance to foreign  countries, State has also provided other types of assistance designed to  better ensure the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment previously  provided to foreign countries through U.S. programs. Specifically, in fiscal  year 2005, State, through its EXBS program, spent about $1.5 million to  fund construction of a national command center for the Federal Customs  Service of Russia. Through this project, portal monitors located at various  Russian border sites can be directly linked to a national command center,  located at Federal Customs Service headquarters in Moscow. By doing so,  alarm data can be simultaneously evaluated by Russian officials both at the  site and up the chain of command, thus establishing redundant layers of  accountability for responding to alarms. For example, when a portal  monitor alarms at a specific land border site, airport, or seaport,  information will immediately be sent from the site directly to the command  center enabling Russian officials to identify which specific site an alarm  occurred at, quickly analyze it, and respond appropriately. Prior to the  initiation of this project, the Federal Customs Service did not have an  effective way to coordinate and integrate all of the information at its  borders. While the total scope of work to be done at the command center  has not been clearly defined yet, State officials told us that the primary  activity will be to maintain and respond to alarm data from the various  border sites. State officials we spoke with stated that linking alarm data  from the local alarm station at individual border sites to a centrally located  command center will enhance Russia’s ability to (1) ensure that U.S.  provided equipment is being properly operated, (2) mitigate the possibility  of corruption or other nefarious acts being committed by its border guards,  and (3) effectively respond to any alarms and/or seizures of illicitly  trafficked nuclear or radiological materials.
section_title: Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
paragraphs: State’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund spent approximately $9.1  million, from fiscal year 1994 through 2001, to provide various types of  radiation detection equipment assistance to 21 countries (see fig. 16). This  assistance included vehicle portal monitors, mobile vans equipped with X- ray machines and radiation detection equipment, handheld radiation  detectors, dosimeters, and radiation pagers. For example, in fiscal year  2001, State approved a $1.3 million NDF project to install vehicle portal  monitors at 16 sites in one country, and a $0.5 million project to assist  another country’s upgrading its domestically produced portal monitors in  order to better detect nuclear material. State also provided $0.8 million to  DHS to provide radiation detection equipment and training to seven  countries under a project called “Project Amber.” Of this amount, DHS  spent $0.6 million to implement the project in these countries. In fiscal year  2001, State began to consolidate its assistance provided to foreign  countries for the purposes of combating nuclear smuggling under its EXBS  program. However, State officials told us that they have not yet determined  whether or not they will fund any future projects to provide radiation  detection equipment to foreign countries through NDF. As a result, it is  uncertain how many other projects State will fund through NDF, in what  countries these projects will be conducted, or how much they will cost.
section_title: Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement Program
paragraphs: State’s Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program focuses on  developing the Republic of Georgia’s border infrastructure by assisting the  Georgian Customs Administration and Georgian Border Guards in gaining  control of the country’s borders and seacoast and strengthening its border  security against any type of crime. The program primarily focuses on  establishing a transparent land border regime with Azerbaijan, Armenia,  and Turkey and strengthening border security against nuclear smuggling.  As such, the program has provided assistance to enhance the Georgian  Border Guards’ capabilities to prevent, deter, and detect potential weapons  of mass destruction smuggling. Through the program, State has provided a  limited amount of radiation detection equipment assistance. Specifically, in  fiscal year 1999, State spent $0.2 million to provide 137 radiation detection  pagers to Georgia. According to State officials, no radiation detection  equipment has been provided through the program since fiscal year 1999.  However, State officials also told us that they have not yet determined if  they will provide any additional radiation detection equipment assistance  through the program to the Republic of Georgia in the future. As a result, it  is uncertain what additional equipment State might provide or how much it  will cost.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying  Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns  Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection  Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T.  Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Olympic Security: U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides Lessons for  Future Olympics. GAO-05-547. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2005.
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in  Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign  Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better  Integration. GAO-05-157. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.
Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection  Equipment. GAO-03-235T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling.  GAO-02-989T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat  Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO- 02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.