Mine Safety: MSHA's Programs for Ensuring the Safety and Health of Coal Miners Could Be Strengthened
Published: 2006-01-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Chairman, Subcommittee on Labor, HHS and Education, Senate Committee on Appropriations, asked GAO to submit a statement for the record highlighting findings from our 2003 report on how well the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) oversees its process for reviewing and approving critical types of mine plans and the extent to which MSHA's inspections and accident investigations processes help ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As of 2003, to help ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners, MSHA staff reviewed and approved mine plans, conducted inspections, and investigated serious accidents. In these three areas, MSHA had extensive procedures and qualified staff. However, we concluded that MSHA could improve its oversight, guidance, and human-capital-planning efforts. We found that MSHA was not effectively monitoring a few key areas. MSHA headquarters did not ensure that 6-month inspections of ventilation and roof support plans were being completed on a timely basis. This failure could have led to mines operating without up-to-date plans or mine operators not following all requirements of the plans. Additionally, MSHA officials did not always ensure that hazards found during inspections were corrected promptly. Gaps were found in the information that MSHA used to monitor fatal and nonfatal injuries, limiting trend analysis and agency oversight. Specifically, the agency did not collect information on hours worked by independent contractors staff needed to compute fatality and nonfatal injury rates for specific mines, and it was difficult to link information on accidents at underground coal mines with MSHA's investigations. We also concluded that the guidance provided by MSHA management to agency employees could be strengthened. Some inspections procedures were unclear and were contained in many sources, leading to differing interpretations by mine inspectors. The guidance on coordinating inspections conducted by specialists and regular inspectors was also unclear, resulting in some duplication of effort. Finally, as of 2003, although about 44 percent of MSHA's underground coal mine inspectors were going to be eligible to retire within 5 years, the agency had no plan for replacing them or using other human capital flexibilities available to retain its highly qualified and trained inspectors.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to have the opportunity to comment on important issues  related to the recent tragedies in the coal mining community. The  oversight that the Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health  Administration (MSHA) provides over coal mines is an essential element  of properly safeguarding the lives of the thousands of workers who  provide us with much of the fuel needed to meet the increasing energy  needs of our country.
In 1977, Congress gave much of the responsibility for ensuring the safety  and health of mine workers to MSHA. Since that time, the nation’s mines  have become much safer—the number of deaths dropped dramatically in  the past 25 years and injury rates are also lower. However, despite these  trends, mining remains a dangerous industry, as the recent tragic deaths  illustrate. Data collected by MSHA on serious injuries (those involving  days away from work) shows that coal mining remains one of the most  dangerous industries in the United States.
My statement is based on work we reported in September 2003 and  presents key findings and recommendations from that report. That work  was completed in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
In summary, we reported in 2003 that
Although MSHA devoted substantial effort to reviewing and approving  mine plans, it did not provide adequate oversight of the plan approval  process. MSHA had extensive procedures for approving mine plans  and, for two of the three types of plans we reviewed—ventilation and  roof support plans—assigns highly qualified staff to the review and  approval process. However, MSHA headquarters did not verify that  mine operators were updating the plans as required. As a result, some  mines may have been operating without adequate ventilation or roof  support plans, which could have directly affected the safety and health  of mine workers.
MSHA had extensive procedures for conducting inspections of mines,  had highly trained and experienced staff, and conducted most mine  inspections as required. However, the extent to which the inspections  process helped ensure the safety and health of mine workers was  limited by several factors. For example, we found that, from 1993 to  2002, MSHA headquarters did not provide adequate oversight to ensure  that mine operators corrected hazards identified during inspections. In  addition, as of 2003, MSHA had no plan for addressing the fact that  about 44 percent of its inspectors were going to be eligible to retire  within 5 years.
MSHA had a comprehensive process for conducting investigations of  mine accidents, but it did not use the process to the fullest extent  possible to improve the future safety and health of mine workers.   Weaknesses in the databases MSHA used to track mine accidents and  accident investigations limited its ability to monitor trends in mine  hazards and ensure that all serious accidents were investigated.
We made a number of recommendations to the Secretary of Labor  designed improve MSHA’s ability to protect the safety and health of coal  miners by providing better oversight over its operations and improving its  mine plan review and approval, inspections, and accident investigation  processes. We are pleased that MSHA has taken action to implement these  recommendations. We have not, however, examined the effectiveness of  the agency’s actions or the extent to which these actions have addressed  the issues we reported in 2003.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In passing the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the “Mine  Act”), Congress gave much of the responsibility for ensuring the safety and  health of mine workers to MSHA. Under the stringent requirements of the  Mine Act, MSHA must protect the health and safety of miners by  thoroughly inspecting each underground coal mine at least four times a  year, citing mine operators for violations of the Mine Act, ensuring that  hazards are quickly corrected, restricting operations or closing mines for  more serious violations, and investigating serious mine accidents. In  addition, MSHA must approve the initial plans that mine operators prepare  for essential systems that protect mine workers—such as ventilation and  roof support systems—and revisions to the plans. To carry out these  responsibilities, in 2003, MSHA had approximately 350 inspectors and 210  specialists in eleven district offices.
At the end of 2002, the United States had approximately 2,050 coal  mines—about 700 underground coal mines and 1,350 surface mines. From  1993 to 2002, the number of underground and surface coal mines in the  United States declined and the number of mine workers decreased.  Despite this decrease in the number of mines and miners, production  remained constant because of the increased use of mechanized mining  equipment and more efficient mining techniques. In addition, over the past  several decades, coal production has shifted from primarily underground  mines to large surface mines, including mines in Wyoming and other areas  west of the Mississippi that produce millions of tons of coal annually.
Underground coal mines are more dangerous than surface mines for  several reasons. One critical factor that contributes to the hazardous  working conditions is highly explosive methane gas, which is often  produced in large quantities when coal is extracted from underground  mines. Additional factors are the geological conditions in many areas of  the country that make the roofs of mines unstable, the danger posed by  fire in an underground mine, coal and silica dust that can cause silicosis  and pneumoconiosis (black lung disease), and the close proximity of  unknown areas of abandoned mines, which can lead to flooding of the  mine. As shown in figure 1, for the 10-year period from 1993 to 2002,  fatality rates for underground coal mines were much higher than those for  surface mines.
subsections: section_title: MSHA Devoted Substantial Effort to Approving Mine Plans, but Did Not Provide Adequate Oversight of the Approval Process
paragraphs: MSHA had extensive procedures and highly qualified staff for approving  two of the three types of plans we reviewed—ventilation and roof support  plans—and most of these plans were reviewed and approved on a timely  basis. However, MSHA headquarters did not adequately monitor  completion of required inspections of the ventilation and roof support  plans; data maintained by the district offices indicates that some districts  were not completing these inspections as required. In addition, MSHA  headquarters had not provided clear guidance to the districts on  coordinating inspections related to mine plans with quarterly inspections  of underground coal mines in order to avoid duplication of effort by  district staff. Finally, staffing shortages prevented MSHA from reviewing  and approving plans for containing debris produced by the mines on a  timely basis.
MSHA had extensive procedures for approving ventilation and roof  support plans. Mine operators were required to submit their initial  ventilation and roof support plans to the MSHA district in which the mine  was located for approval prior to operating a mine and were required to  submit revised plans to the district for approval at least every 6 months.  The district managers were ultimately responsible for approving  ventilation and roof support plans submitted to their districts. Generally,  districts were required to approve ventilation and roof support plans  within 45 days of receipt unless problems are found that must be resolved.  In some of the districts we visited, state mine agencies were also required  to approve the mine plans. We reviewed this information for a 5-year  period, 1998 to 2002, and found that most districts approved these plans  on a timely basis.
However, MSHA headquarters did not adequately monitor completion of  required inspections of ventilation and roof support plans by the district  offices. Districts were required to conduct inspections at least once every  6 months of the ventilation and roof support plans in order to ensure that  mine operators were following the requirements of the plans and that they  were updating the plans to reflect changes in the ventilation and roof  support systems. The specialists who reviewed the mine plans during the  approval process also conducted many of these inspections. Our analysis  of the information submitted by the district offices to MSHA headquarters  on the completion of these inspections for the 5-year period from 1998 to  2002 indicated that several districts had not completed the inspections as  required. As a result of districts not completing these inspections, some  mines may have been operating without adequate ventilation or roof  support plans.
Inspections of the mines’ ventilation and roof support plans are essential  in ensuring adequate airflow and controlling the accumulation of dust  particles in underground coal mines as well as ensuring that the roofs are  adequately supported. Inadequate ventilation systems or roof support  systems can directly affect the safety and health of mine workers. For  example, our review of MSHA’s data on fatalities at underground coal  mines from 1998 to 2002 showed that problems related to ventilation and  roof support systems accounted for high proportions of fatalities in  underground coal mines. For this 5-year period, ignitions or explosions  from excessive gas or coal dust accounted for the third largest percentage  of all fatalities—14 percent—and roof falls accounted for the largest  percentage—34 percent.
In addition, MSHA did not always effectively coordinate its inspections of  mine plans with the comprehensive quarterly inspections of underground  coal mines in order to avoid duplication of effort by district staff.  In two  of the five districts we visited, we found that, in some instances, the  specialists who conduct the inspections of mine plans and inspectors who  conduct quarterly inspections were duplicating each other’s work,  resulting in an inefficient use of MSHA’s resources.
MSHA is also responsible for approving plans for containing mine debris,  called impoundment plans. As of 2003, MSHA had responsibility for  approximately 600 coal impoundments. Many of these plans are extremely  complex and require highly qualified engineers who are familiar with  technical areas such as dam building techniques, hydrology, and soil  conditions. Failure of an impoundment can be devastating to nearby  communities, which may be flooded with water and sludge, and to the  environment, affecting streams and water supplies for years afterwards.  Because of the potential for failure, such as the impoundment dam failure  in 1972 in Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, in which 125 people were killed  and 500 homes were destroyed, MSHA is extremely careful about  approving impoundment plans.
At the time of our 2003 report, MSHA had conducted two reviews of its  procedures for approving impoundment plans, and has begun to take steps  for improving the process. One review identified several weaknesses in the  procedures, including the need for the agency to develop guidance for  determining which impoundment plans should receive expedited review  as well as evaluating the staffing levels needed to ensure timely and  complete review of the plans. MSHA officials acknowledged that the  delays in the review and approval of impoundment plans had been a  problem for a number of years. They also told us that they had taken a  number of steps to alleviate these delays, such as hiring additional  engineers to review impoundment plans and provide assistance to staff in  its district offices.
section_title: MSHA Had Extensive Procedures, Highly Qualified Staff, and Conducted Most Quarterly Inspections as Required, but Its Inspection Process Could Have Been Improved
paragraphs: MSHA’s procedures for conducting inspections of underground coal mines  were comprehensive; its inspectors were highly qualified; and it conducted  almost all quarterly inspections as required, but the agency’s inspection  process could be improved in a number of ways. Although MSHA had  extensive inspection procedures, some of them were unclear, while others  were difficult to locate because they were contained in so many different  sources. In addition, MSHA conducted over 96 percent of required  quarterly inspections each year over the 10-year period from 1993 to 2002,  but MSHA headquarters did not provide adequate oversight to ensure that  its district offices followed through to make sure that unsafe conditions  identified during inspections were corrected by the deadlines set by  inspectors. And, although MSHA had highly qualified inspectors, as of  2003, it had no plan for addressing the fact that about a large percentage of  them (44 percent) were going to be eligible to retire within 5 years. Finally,  MSHA did not collect all of the information it needed to assess the  effectiveness of its enforcement efforts because it did not collect data on  contractor staff who work at each mine.
Although MSHA had extensive inspection procedures, we found that some  of them were unclear and were located in so many different sources that  they could be difficult to find. Some procedures did not clearly specify the  criteria inspectors should use in citing violations. For example, several  district officials in two of the districts we visited told us that the lack of  specific criteria for floating coal dust made it difficult to determine what  was an allowable level. As a result, mine inspectors had to rely on their  own experience and personal opinion to determine if the accumulation of  floating coal dust was a safety hazard that constituted a violation. In some  instances, according to the inspectors and district managers, this led to  inconsistencies in inspectors’ interpretations of the procedures; inspectors  have cited violations for levels of floating coal dust that have not brought  citations from other inspectors. In addition, the inspections procedures  were located in so many different handbooks, manuals, policy bulletins,  policy letters, and memorandums that it could be difficult for inspectors to  make sure that they were using the most recent guidance and procedures.  MSHA headquarters officials told us that they were working to clarify the  agency’s procedures and consolidate the number of sources in which they  were located.
MSHA’s data on its quarterly inspection completion rates indicated that,  from fiscal year 1993 to 2002, its district offices completed over 96 percent  of these inspections as required. However, MSHA headquarters did not  monitor district office performance to ensure that inspectors followed up  with mine operators to determine that unsafe conditions identified during  these inspections were corrected. The deadlines that inspectors set for  mine operators to correct safety and health hazards varied based on a  number of factors, including the degree of danger to miners affected by  the violation. They ranged from 15 minutes from the time the inspector  wrote the citation to 27 days afterwards. MSHA’s procedures required  inspectors to follow up with mine operators within the deadline set or to  extend the deadline. Inspectors could extend the deadlines under certain  circumstances, such as when a mine had temporarily shut down its  operations or when a mine operator was unable to obtain a part needed to  correct a violation cited for a piece of equipment.
Our analysis of MSHA’s data for the 10-year period from 1993 to 2002  showed that, for almost half of the 536,966 citations for which a deadline  was established, inspectors did not follow up in a timely manner to make  sure mine operators had corrected the hazards. However, as shown in  figure 2, of the citations for which the inspectors did not follow up on a  timely basis, they followed up on most within 4 days of the deadline and,  for all but 11 percent of the citations, they followed up within 14 days.
The more serious type of violations—“significant and substantial”  violations—accounted for a significant proportion of the citations for  which inspectors did not follow up by the deadlines. For the over 235,447  significant and substantial violations from 1993 to 2002 for which a  deadline was specified, inspectors did not follow up on more than 48  percent of the citations by the deadline. However, inspectors followed up  on all but about 10 percent of the citations for significant and substantial  violations within 14 days of the deadline.
MSHA headquarters and district officials told us that there were many  different reasons why inspectors may not have followed up by the  deadlines specified in their citations.  One of these, according to several  district officials, was scheduling conflicts that prevented inspectors from  visiting the mine within the specified deadline. In addition, there were  circumstances in which inspectors were not able to follow up, such as  when a mine operator suspended a mine’s operations. However, in these  instances, the inspector should have updated the database to show that  the deadline was extended.
In addition, although we found that, as of 2003, about 44 percent of  MSHA’s highly trained and experienced underground coal mine inspectors  would be eligible to retire within 5 years—and the agency’s historic  attrition rates indicated that many of them would actually retire—the  agency had not developed a plan for replacing these inspectors. MSHA  also had fewer inspector trainees on board than vacancies that would need  to be filled when inspectors retired. MSHA headquarters officials told us  that it would be difficult for them quickly hire and train replacements for  the inspectors who retired. In addition to the fact that at least 18 months  were needed to train each new inspector, it took the agency several  months from the date an individual retired to advertise and fill each vacant  position. As a result of losing these inspectors, MSHA may find it difficult  to complete all quarterly inspections of underground coal mines.
MSHA also did not collect all of the information on contractor staff who  work in underground coal mines needed to assess the effectiveness of its  enforcement activities. Because MSHA does not collect information on  injuries to or hours worked by contractor staff who mine coal in each  underground coal mine, it cannot calculate accurate fatality or nonfatal  injury rates for mines that use contractor staff to mine coal—rates used to  evaluate the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts. In addition, MSHA  could not track trends in fatal or nonfatal injury rates at specific mines to  use to target its enforcement resources. The fact that MSHA did not track  the number of contractor staff who worked in each mine was important  because the proportion of miners who work for contractors had grown  significantly since 1981, when they represented only 5 percent of all mine  workers. Our analysis showed that the percentage of underground coal  miners who work for contractors increased from 13 percent in 1993 to 18  percent in 2002, and the percentage who incurred nonfatal injuries also  increased over this period.
section_title: MSHA Had a Comprehensive Process for Conducting Accident Investigations, but Did Not Fully Utilize It to Prevent Future Accidents
paragraphs: MSHA had extensive guidance and thorough procedures for conducting  accident investigations, but it did not use these investigations to the fullest  extent to improve the future safety of mine workers. Although MSHA had  detailed policies and rigorous requirements for how investigations must be  conducted and reported, weaknesses in its databases made it difficult for  MSHA to track key data on mine hazards and potentially useful indicators  of its own performance.
We made several recommendations in our report designed to improve  MSHA’s operations. We recommended that the Secretary of Labor direct  the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to monitor the timeliness of inspections of ventilation and roof control  plans to ensure that all inspections are completed by district offices as  required; monitor follow-up actions taken by its district offices to ensure that  mine operators are correcting hazards identified during inspections on  a timely basis; update and consolidate guidance provided to its district offices on plan  approval and inspections to eliminate inconsistencies and outdated  instructions, including clarifying guidance on coordinating regular  quarterly inspections of mines with other inspections; develop a plan for addressing anticipated shortages in the number of  qualified inspectors due to upcoming retirements, including  considering options such as streamlining the agency’s hiring process  and offering retention allowances; amend the guidance provided to independent contractors engaged in  high-hazard activities requiring them to report information on the  number of hours worked by their staff at specific mines so that MSHA  can use this information to compute the injury and fatality rates used  to measure the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts; and  revise the systems MSHA uses to collect information on accidents and  investigations to provide better data on accidents and make it easier to  link injuries, accidents, and investigations.
MSHA did not comment on the recommendations in its written response  to the report and disagreed with some of our findings. However, MSHA  later agreed to implement all of the recommendations and provided us  with information on how it had implemented or was in the process of  implementing them. We are pleased that MSHA has taken action to  implement these recommendations but note that we have not examined  the effectiveness of the agency’s actions or the extent to which these  actions have addressed the issues we reported in 2003.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information, please contact Robert E. Robertson at (202) 512- 7215. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include  Revae Moran and Karen Brown.
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