Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved Planning and Controls
Published: 2005-11-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has undergone a number of changes in recent years, including a 2003 transfer from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau (ICE), and a 2005 transfer from ICE back to TSA. A key aspect of federal air marshals' operating procedures is the discreet movement through airports as they check in for their flight, transit screening checkpoints, and board the aircraft. This report discusses FAMS's (1) transfer to ICE and key practices that could facilitate its return to TSA, and (2) management of mission-related incidents that affect air marshals' ability to operate discreetly.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DHS made limited progress in achieving the intended objectives of its transfer of FAMS to ICE, which included (1) developing a "surge" capacity through cross-training ICE agents, and (2) enhancing federal air marshals' career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge capacity by cross-training a number of ICE agents but suspended these efforts in October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the cross-training was an ineffective use of resources and training. DHS indicated that it would continue to support the surge effort, but had not determined whether and when it would resume cross-training to support this initiative. Further, although DHS recognized that federal air marshals' career opportunities were limited, it had not developed plans to expand them through investigative or other duties. Moreover, DHS had not determined how these transition objectives would be met because it had not developed an overall strategy to include implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections--a key practice for a successful transformation. DHS also had not developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress on the transition to employees and other stakeholders--another key practice. With its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS's prior experience in transferring FAMS to ICE can provide useful information on key practices to consider in effecting a successful transition. FAMS lacks adequate management controls to help ensure that mission-related incidents that affect air marshals' ability to operate discreetly are recorded, tracked, and addressed. For example, FAMS has not developed a written policy that establishes criteria for when and how federal air marshals are to complete mission reports on incidents they encounter during their missions. In addition, FAMS lacks adequate controls to ensure that the outcome of actions taken to address these incidents was communicated to the federal air marshals who originally reported them. Not providing such information may serve to discourage federal air marshals from submitting future reports. FAMS officials have acknowledged that FAMS lacks written policies to govern the use and management of mission reports and stated that FAMS plans to develop such policies in the near future.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: With approximately 25,000 flights arriving or departing the United States  each day, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) plays a critical role in  securing our nation’s commercial aviation system by detecting, deterring,  and defeating hostile acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers,  and crews. In recent years, FAMS has undergone a number of significant  changes to its organizational structure, workforce, and mission. In  response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FAMS was faced  with the formidable task of ramping up its workforce—from an agency  with fewer than 50 federal air marshals to thousands—and expanding its  mission to include the protection of both domestic and international  flights. Pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act  (ATSA)—enacted in November 2001—authority over FAMS shifted from  the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to the Transportation Security  Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT).  Over the next 2 years, FAMS transferred two more times. FAMS’s most  recent transfer during that timeframe occurred in November 2003, when  FAMS moved from TSA to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement  Bureau (ICE)—the largest law enforcement component within the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
There were two stated objectives related to FAMS’s transfer to ICE.  According to the then-Secretary of Homeland Security, the first objective  involved cross-training customs agents and immigration officers to  function as federal air marshals during heightened threat levels, thereby  providing a “surge” capability that could be deployed in response to an  increased threat. In announcing the second objective, the Secretary stated  that the transfer would also provide federal air marshals a greater range of  law enforcement career options within a single agency. That is, because of  the limited number of nonairborne (i.e., ground-based) positions within  FAMS, federal air marshals had few career opportunities, which, if left  unaddressed, could lead to morale and retention issues. Nearly 2 years  after FAMS transferred to ICE—in July 2005—the newly appointed  Secretary of DHS announced that FAMS would be transferred back to TSA  to increase operational coordination and strengthen efforts to meet the  common goal of aviation security. This transfer became effective in  October 2005.
To carry out its mission, FAMS deploys specially trained and armed  federal air marshals on board aircraft to protect passengers, crew, and  aircraft from terrorist activities. According to FAMS’s mission deployment  procedures, federal air marshals are to operate as “discreet” (semicovert)  professionals when checking-in at airports, passing through security  screening checkpoints, and boarding the aircraft during their missions. In  doing so, federal air marshals are to blend in with passengers while  covering high-risk domestic and international flights on U.S. aircraft. While  FAMS’s procedures focus on discretion, there are times when federal air  marshals encounter mission-related situations (i.e., incidents) that affect  their ability to conduct their missions discreetly. Such incidents may  include miscommunication between a federal air marshal and an airline  staff regarding the manner in which the federal air marshal can board the  aircraft.
In this report, we address: (1) the progress DHS made in achieving its  stated objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE and the key practices that  could facilitate its efforts to return FAMS to TSA and (2) the extent to  which FAMS has adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents  that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate discreetly. Some  information related to FAMS and federal air marshals’ ability to operate  discreetly is considered sensitive security information. Accordingly, we  issued a separate restricted version of this report containing that  information.
To answer these questions, we reviewed applicable laws, regulations,  operational policies and procedures, and other relevant documentation.  We also interviewed officials from DHS, ICE, BTS, TSA, and FAMS to  discuss FAMS’s transfer to ICE. Additionally, we considered our prior  work on key practices used by public and private sector organizations that  have undergone successful mergers and transformations. The nine key  practices are described in greater detail in appendix II. We did not conduct  an in-depth analysis comparing all of these practices with the transfer of  FAMS to ICE. However, using the documentation provided and interviews  we conducted, we examined the information gathered in light of two of the  nine transformation practices to determine the extent to which the agency  (1) established an overall strategy with implementation goals and a  timeline to guide the integration effort into ICE, and (2) employed a  communication strategy to keep employees informed of the progress of  the integration. We selected these two practices as criteria for this review  because they are especially important to ensuring that DHS has the  planning framework necessary to guide and monitor its transformation  efforts—which we have also underscored in our previous work on DHS.
In addition, we interviewed 19 federal air marshals and 5 FAMS Special  Agents in Charge (SAC) in 5 selected field locations around the country.  Generally, we chose these locations on the basis of geographical  dispersion. They included: Washington, D.C.; Dallas, Texas; New York,  New York; Atlanta, Georgia; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Federal air  marshals at these locations fly throughout the nation so their experiences  potentially cover airports throughout the United States. During these  interviews, we obtained information on a range of issues related to the  transfer of FAMS to ICE. Through these interviews, we also gained a more  complete understanding of federal air marshals’ mission deployment  procedures and their experiences regarding incidents that affect their  ability to operate discreetly during their mission. However, the  information we obtained during these interviews cannot be generalized to  all federal air marshals. A more detailed description of our scope and  methodology is contained in appendix I. We conducted our work from  June 2004 through August 2005 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
In July 2005, after we had completed most of this review, the Secretary of  Homeland Security announced that FAMS would be transferred back to  TSA. This transfer became effective in October 2005. We believe that  DHS’s prior experience in transferring FAMS to ICE can provide useful  information in identifying key practices for DHS to consider in effecting a  successful transition to TSA. Accordingly, this report addresses key  lessons learned from the earlier transition to help facilitate FAMS’s  movement back to TSA.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Originally established as the Sky Marshal program in the 1970s to counter  hijackers, FAMS was expanded in response to the September 11, 2001,  terrorist attacks through the passage of ATSA. This law required a  dramatic increase in FAMS’s mission and workforce and mandated the  deployment of federal air marshals on all high security risk flights. To  create an expanded workforce, FAA began an intensive effort on  September 17, 2001, to recruit federal air marshals in unprecedented  numbers. Until FAA could hire, train, and deploy the first few classes of  federal air marshals, other federal agencies made law enforcement officers  available to augment FAMS. Since that time, FAMS has grown from a  relatively centralized organization with one office to a highly decentralized  agency with thousands of federal air marshals assigned to 21 field  offices—each headed by a Special Agent in Charge, or SAC—throughout  the United States.
In addition to changes in its size and mission, FAMS has also undergone  several organizational transformations since September 11, 2001, moving  from FAA to TSA in November 2001, and from DOT to DHS in March 2003.  Several months later—in November 2003—FAMS was transferred from  TSA to ICE, based, in part, on the conclusions reached by a BTS- commissioned internal working group. Tasked with determining the  merits of a potential transfer, the working group concluded that  transferring FAMS to ICE could improve the security of the nation’s  aviation system by providing a surge capability during times of increased  aviation threats by augmenting federal air marshals with ICE agents. The  working group also concluded that FAMS’s transfer to ICE could provide  federal air marshals with the same type of law enforcement career options  that were available to ICE agents. In July 2005—nearly 2 years after its  transfer of FAMS from TSA to ICE—DHS announced that FAMS would be  returned to TSA to increase operational coordination and strengthen  efforts to meet the common goal of aviation security. This transfer became  effective in October 2005.
To carry out its mission, FAMS deploys federal air marshals on board  flights either destined for or originating in the United States, based on  FAMS’s Concept of Operations. Deployed to passenger flights, federal air  marshals dress in plain clothes to blend in with other passengers and  perform their duties discreetly in an effort to avoid drawing undue  attention to themselves. Federal air marshals are subject to FAMS  procedures for checking-in for their flights, passing through security  screening checkpoints, and boarding aircraft. According to FAMS, these  procedures were designed to enable federal air marshals to carry out their  missions in a discreet manner in order to help protect their identities,  while facilitating coordination and communication with crew and airline  staff.
While FAMS’s mission deployment procedures focus on discretion, federal  air marshals may encounter mission-related incidents that affect their  ability to conduct their missions discreetly. FAMS has directed that, in  the event that federal air marshals encounter such incidents, they should  contact the FAMS Mission Operations Center, to the extent they believe  that the incident could be evidence of a systemic problem. As we discuss  later in this report, federal air marshals are not required to file a “mission  report” for every incident they encounter. That is, the Mission Operations  Center staff may or may not request that the federal air marshal who  encountered the incident file a written mission report.
section_title: DHS Made Limited Progress in Achieving Its Stated Objectives in Transferring FAMS to ICE and Could Benefit from Key Transformation Practices in Returning FAMS to TSA
paragraphs: In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS had made limited  progress in achieving its stated objectives to develop a surge capacity  through cross-training ICE agents and to enhance federal air marshals’  career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge  capacity by cross-training a number of ICE agents, but suspended these  efforts in October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the  cross-training was an ineffective use of resources and training. DHS  indicated that it would continue to support the surge effort, but had not  determined whether and when it would resume cross-training to support  this initiative. Further, although DHS recognized that federal air marshals’  career opportunities were limited, it had not developed plans to expand  them by providing additional opportunities through investigative or other  duties. Moreover, DHS had not determined how these stated transition  objectives would be met because it had not developed an overall strategy  to include implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target  performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections, including any  needed adjustments to future goals and milestones—a key practice for a  successful merger and transformation effort. In addition, DHS had not  developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations within  the organization and report related progress on the transition to  employees and other stakeholders—another key practice. Our previous  reports have underscored the importance of DHS’s adopting similar  practices to facilitate its transformation efforts. With its return of FAMS  to TSA, DHS has an opportunity to learn from its experience, including  how these key practices can facilitate FAMS’s transfer back to TSA.
subsections: section_title: Some Surge Capacity Had Been Developed, but DHS Suspended Efforts to Cross-Train ICE Agents
paragraphs: One of DHS’s objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE was to create a  “surge capacity;” that is, strengthening aviation security in a heightened  threat environment by tactically deploying ICE agents to supplement  FAMS’s existing deployments of federal air marshals on U.S. aircraft. The  Secretary of DHS announced in December 2003 that this surge capacity  would be achieved through training the over 5,000 ICE agents from ICE’s  Office of Investigations. Specifically, these agents, who typically conduct  immigration and customs-related investigations, could also be deployed to  supplement federal air marshals on commercial airlines, thereby providing  a manpower reserve from which DHS could draw upon when heightened  threat conditions warranted increased flight coverage. In March 2004, the  Assistant Secretary for ICE testified before the Appropriations  Committees that ICE anticipated providing this cross-training to no less  than 800 ICE agents by the end of fiscal year 2004.
Between December 2003 and October 2004, a number of ICE agents  received cross-training in the skills necessary to supplement federal air  marshals during a heightened threat level. Some of those agents were  deployed and temporarily assigned to augment federal air marshals on  flights in response to a heightened threat alert. According to FAMS, these  ICE agents were chosen for surge deployment based on their previous  FAMS training—including extensive firearms training—and flying  experience as temporary federal air marshals. That is, these agents,  employees of the former U.S. Customs Service, had been among the law  enforcement officers who had previously flown as temporary federal air  marshals to augment FAMS following the September 11, 2001, attacks,  from October 2001 through May 2002. To prepare for the surge  deployment, these ICE agents received a 3-day refresher training in  current FAMS’s procedures, policies, and updated firearms techniques.
Following the surge deployment in January 2004, FAMS developed and  implemented a 40-hour cross-training curriculum for ICE agents so they  could supplement federal air marshals during a surge deployment. This  training was substantially similar to the training provided to federal air  marshals, which included instruction in areas such as the use of firearms  and boarding procedures.
In October 2004, ICE suspended its cross-training efforts in response to  congressional concerns that the cross-training was an ineffective use of  resources and training. Specifically, in a June 2004 House Appropriations  Committee report, the Committee expressed concerns regarding how ICE  agents would maintain their skills as federal air marshals since they did  not regularly perform federal air marshal duties. The Committee directed  that each cross-trained ICE agent fly missions with a federal air marshal  for a minimum of 24 hours per quarter, beginning October 1, 2004.  However, in the October 2004 report that accompanied the fiscal year 2005  DHS Appropriations Act, the Conference Committee suggested that the  cross-training provided to ICE agents was an ineffective use of resources.  The Committee further suggested that the training of ICE agents to serve  as federal air marshals in a surge capacity be discontinued. In response,  DHS suspended its cross-training efforts at that time. ICE later stated that  it would continue to support the surge effort, but had not determined  whether and when it would resume cross-training to support this initiative.  With DHS’s transfer of FAMS to TSA, it is unclear whether or how cross- training will be used to augment federal air marshals during heightened  threat levels.
section_title: DHS Recognized That Federal Air Marshals’ Career Opportunities Were Limited but Had Not Developed Plans to Expand Them
paragraphs: Another of DHS’s objectives in its transfer of FAMS from TSA to ICE was  to expand career opportunities for federal air marshals. Both FAMS and  ICE officials have stated that the transfer was intended to provide federal  air marshals with ground-based assignments, such as nonflying  supervisory or other positions and thus establish additional career  opportunities for federal air marshals. These officials told us that federal  air marshals cannot sustain a career in an airborne position, based on such  factors as the frequency of flying, their irregular schedules, and the  monotony of flying repetitive assignments.
A study commissioned by ICE in March 2004 reflected concerns over  federal air marshals’ limited career opportunities. Specifically, ICE  commissioned IBM to determine, among other things, the current status of  federal air marshals’ career development and advancement opportunities.  The study found that the overwhelming majority of federal air marshals  were expected to reach the highest pay level in their job position by  August 2004, and that FAMS had only a limited number of supervisory  opportunities beyond that pay level. The study concluded that without  career development and promotion opportunities, FAMS could experience  a decline in employee morale and an increase in attrition rates.
As a means of providing expanded career opportunities, FAMS  management has advocated that federal air marshals’ current position as a  “civil aviation security specialist” be re-classified to that of a criminal  investigator. Recognizing that career paths for criminal investigators  provide greater opportunity for movement than civil aviation security  specialists, FAMS commissioned a study by a private contractor to  determine the feasibility of such a conversion. Among other things, the  study concluded that because the mission of air marshals had changed  after September 11, 2001—from enforcing FAA regulations onboard  aircraft, to detecting, deterring, and defeating criminal acts in the aviation  domain—federal air marshals satisfied the requirements of a criminal  investigator position. The study further stated that career opportunities  were more prevalent for those qualified as criminal investigators because  these positions possess knowledge, skills, and abilities that are  interchangeable across different agencies. In addition, the study found that  criminal investigators could more successfully compete for similar  positions in other law enforcement agencies and enjoyed greater  opportunities for advancement and higher compensation in the federal  government.
In January 2005, FAMS presented the results of the study to the  management of DHS’s Border and Transportation Security (BTS)  directorate for their consideration. In reviewing the study’s findings and  additional research conducted by ICE’s legal and human resources staff,  BTS, along with ICE management, concluded that the reclassification of  federal air marshals from an aviation security specialist position to a  criminal investigator position was not an appropriate course of action. In  addressing the study’s conclusions, officials maintained that the primary  duties of a federal air marshal—to protect passengers, crews, and aircraft  from terrorist activities—were “not investigative in nature” and were  inconsistent with the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM)  classification standards for the criminal investigator series. DHS also  concluded that without any significant changes in the duties of federal air  marshals, it did not see a basis for the conversion.
In January 2005, ICE formed an Advisory Board to address issues related  to FAMS’s transfer to ICE, including expanding federal air marshals’  career opportunities. ICE senior management officials, who served as  members of the board, stated that they would have liked to expand career  opportunities for federal air marshals if FAMS were to continue to reside  in ICE, such as creating additional ground-based mission assignments. One  of these officials said that federal air marshals could have potentially  assumed a limited intelligence and surveillance role, such as assessing  aircraft vulnerability and interdicting drugs and/or contraband aboard  aircraft. As of June 2005, however, ICE had not developed any plans for  doing so. With FAMS’s transition to TSA, it is unclear whether or how  federal air marshals’ career opportunities may be expanded.
section_title: Key Practices Could Facilitate FAMS’s Return to TSA
paragraphs: In light of its announcement to return FAMS to TSA, DHS has an  opportunity to learn from its experience in transferring FAMS to ICE,  including the importance that key practices can have in leading to  successful transformation efforts within public and private sector  organizations. Our July 2003 report on implementation steps to assist  mergers and transformations identified nine key practices followed by  public and private sector organizations that have led to successful  transformations. All nine key practices and associated implementation  steps are shown in appendix II. While all nine practices are important, we  identified two practices that, in our view, could have enhanced DHS’s  efforts to meet its stated objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE. These  practices are (1) developing an overall strategy with implementation goals  and a timeline to build momentum and show progress, and (2) establishing  a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related  progress. We believe these practices would be particularly helpful for DHS  and could increase its likelihood for a successful transformation effort in  returning FAMS to TSA.
As we discussed earlier, one of DHS’s stated objectives in transferring  FAMS to ICE was to create a surge capacity during heightened threat  levels. However, while DHS had indicated that it would train no less than  800 ICE agents by the end of fiscal year 2004, it did not have an overall  strategy to identify how it would sustain a surge capacity. Such a strategy  could have contained implementation goals, measures, and milestones to  help target performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections.  Another of DHS’s stated objectives was to expand career opportunities for  federal air marshals. However, DHS had not identified any implementation  goals nor time frames for how and when it planned to develop these career  opportunities, such as the types of opportunities to be provided or when  federal air marshals could expect these opportunities to become available.
Establishing implementation goals and associated timelines are critical to  ensuring a successful integration as well as pinpointing performance  shortfalls and gaps and suggesting midcourse corrections. Such goals and  timelines could be contained in an overall integration strategy for a merger  or transformation effort. Further, such a strategy typically goes beyond  what is contained in an agency strategic plan and provides more specific  operational and tactical information to manage a sustained effort. Our  previous work has also underscored the importance of DHS adopting  similar practices to help guide its overall management integration effort.
Further, DHS had not developed a communication strategy to create  shared expectations within the organization and report related progress on  FAMS’s transition into ICE to employees and other stakeholders—another  key practice of a successful merger or transformation. ICE officials shared  with us various forms of communications they had issued to employees  over the period of a few months, between September and December 2003.  Those communications included e-mails, broadcast messages, and agency  press releases. Officials also provided us with an agenda for a televised  roundtable discussion that had been broadcast to ICE employees at  various times in October 2003 regarding aspects of the transition. The  discussion centered on an exchange between the Director of FAMS and  the Acting Assistant Secretary of ICE to address, among other things,  issues related to personnel and the cross-training of ICE agents and  federal air marshals. Beyond these efforts, ICE could not identify any  subsequent communications made to keep ICE employees informed about  the progress of the transition—specifically, what employees could expect  and by when. Further, 14 of the 19 federal air marshals we interviewed  during our review felt that ICE management had not kept them adequately  informed about the progress of the transition. Also, 13 of the 19 federal air  marshals said they were unclear or confused about how they would  become integrated into ICE.
Creating an effective, ongoing communication strategy is essential to  implementing a merger or transformation. Organizations should develop a  communication strategy that reaches out to employees and seeks to  genuinely engage them in the merger and transformation process and not  just “push the message out.” For example, communication should help  employees understand how the changes from the transformation will  affect them and how their responsibilities might change with the new  organization. In addition, a communication strategy is especially crucial in  the public sector where policy-making and program management demands  transparency. For example, such a strategy should include not only what  results are to be achieved, but also which processes are to be used to  achieve those results.
section_title: FAMS Lacks Adequate Controls to Manage Incidents That Affect Federal Air Marshals’ Ability to Operate Discreetly
paragraphs: FAMS lacks adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents that  affect air marshals’ ability to operate discreetly. Internal controls comprise  the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet organizations’ missions,  goals, and objectives. Federal standards for internal control define the  minimum level of quality acceptable for internal control in the federal  government. Accordingly, these standards provide that: (1) internal  controls and all transactions and other significant events be clearly  documented, (2) controls be generally designed to ensure that ongoing  monitoring occurs during the course of normal operations, and   (3) pertinent information be communicated throughout an organization to  allow employees to perform their duties efficiently. Our review of FAMS’s  mission reporting process noted weaknesses in each of these control  areas.
FAMS lacks adequate controls to help ensure that incidents federal air  marshals encounter that affect their ability to operate discreetly are  recorded. Specifically, FAMS officials stated that FAMS does not maintain  a record of these types of incidents unless a mission report is filed.  Standards for internal control in the federal government require that all  transactions and other significant events be clearly documented in a  manner that is complete, accurate, and useful to managers and others  involved in evaluating operations. FAMS has directed that, in the event  that federal air marshals encounter incidents affecting their ability to  operate discreetly, they are to contact the Mission Operations Center to  the extent the air marshals believe that the incident could be evidence of a  systemic problem. In contacting the Operations Center, the federal air  marshal is to request guidance for resolving the incident. The Operations  Center may then ask the federal air marshal to submit a mission report to  FAMS’s Office of Field Operations (Field Operations) to describe the  incident in greater detail. However, if the federal air marshal does not  submit a mission report, FAMS does not maintain a record of the incident.  In addition, FAMS has not developed a written policy that establishes  criteria for when and how mission reports are to be completed and filed.  According to FAMS, instruction in the use and completion of mission  reports is communicated orally through FAMS training and not through  formal written guidance. Without a means for ensuring that all incidents  are recorded, and absent written criteria that defines when and how  mission reports are to be completed, FAMS cannot provide reasonable  assurance that it is aware of the full extent of incidents that federal air  marshals encounter.
FAMS also lacks controls to help ensure that reported incidents are  systematically tracked so that it can retrieve and analyze data on reported  incidents, thereby ensuring ongoing monitoring of incidents. Federal  standards for internal control require that controls generally be designed  to ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs during the course of normal  operations. FAMS has acknowledged that it lacks a tool to capture and  retrieve data on mission reports. The absence of such a tool limits FAMS’s  ability to track and analyze relevant information and monitor trends to  identify operational areas in need of improvement based on the reported  incidents and thereby preventing potential incidents.
In addition, while FAMS has developed a process for reviewing and  addressing incidents identified in mission reports once filed, and issued  guidance to its field offices that outlines this process, it has not  established formal written policies and procedures to document the  process. Federal standards for internal control require that internal  controls are to be documented and the documentation be readily available  for examination. According to FAMS, its process for reviewing and  addressing incidents identified in mission reports involves Field  Operations’ review of the mission reports to determine if further action is  warranted on the incident. FAMS officials stated that, as part of this  review, Field Operations may deem some incidents as “local issues;” for  example, miscommunication between a federal air marshal and an airline  staff regarding the manner in which the air marshal can board the aircraft.  Mission reports involving local issues are forwarded to the relevant FAMS  field office and may be resolved through the on-site airport liaisons or the  local Special Agent in Charge for the airport where the incident occurred.  Field Operations may also deem some incidents as “national issues;” that  is, incidents that are not unique to a specific airport, such as an incident  involving the flight crew of a particular airline. These types of incidents  are forwarded to FAMS’s Liaison Division (located within the Office of  Flight Operations). In attempting to address the issue, the Liaison Division  may contact TSA or the airline’s corporate security office, depending on  whether the incident involved check-in, security checkpoint, or boarding  procedures.
Furthermore, FAMS lacks controls to help ensure that the results of  actions taken to address incidents identified in mission reports are  communicated to the federal air marshals who originally filed the reports.  Not providing such information may serve to discourage federal air  marshals from submitting future reports. Standards for internal control  state that pertinent information should be communicated throughout an  organization to allow employees to perform their duties efficiently.  According to FAMS, Field Operations provides feedback to the relevant  field office SAC on actions taken to resolve incidents in the mission  reports. The SAC’s communication of these results to the federal air  marshals in the particular office is discretionary. Of the 15 federal air  marshals we interviewed who said they had filed a mission report, 12 said  they had not received feedback on the outcome of the report. Some  federal air marshals identified the importance of having feedback on the  outcome of the reports, noting that not having feedback discourages them  from filing future reports. For example, one federal air marshal stated that  he and other federal air marshals in his office had stopped filing mission  reports because they did not receive feedback on the outcome of the  reports they had previously filed. Another federal air marshal said that  federal air marshals in his field office were generally dissatisfied with the  lack of feedback on the mission reports they had filed.
FAMS officials stated that they recognize the importance of written  policies to govern the use and management of these reports, and stated  that FAMS is in the process of developing such policies to include how  FAMS will review and address incidents identified in the reports and  provide feedback on the outcome of these incidents in a timely manner.  Although FAMS identified plans to strengthen controls over the  management of these incidents, they did not identify time frames for when  these would be completed.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS made only limited  progress in achieving its stated transition objectives of creating a surge  capacity and enhancing federal air marshals’ career opportunities. With its  return of FAMS to TSA, DHS has an opportunity to learn from its  experiences and adopt key practices for successful mergers and  transformations to assist its efforts to transfer FAMS back into TSA. Such  key practices include developing an overall strategy to include  implementation goals, measures, and milestones to track the  organization’s progress in achieving its goals. By showing progress  towards these goals, DHS could build momentum and demonstrate that  real progress is being made. In addition, having a strategy with  implementation goals and milestones could help target performance  shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse corrections, including any  needed adjustments to future goals and milestones. In addition, developing  a communication strategy would help to inform employees about the  status of the transition and provide transparency about specific actions to  be taken and time frames for their completion. In light of the number of  transformations FAMS has undergone in recent years, providing open  communication to create shared expectations among all staff and  stakeholders takes on added significance.
Further, with its critical role in helping to secure the nation’s commercial  aviation system, it is important that FAMS has adequate controls to  manage information regarding incidents federal air marshals encounter  during their missions that could compromise their mission. Such controls  take on added importance in light of FAMS’s growth from a small,  centralized organization with only one office and the ability to cover a few  missions to a larger decentralized organization with thousands of federal  air marshals and a capacity to provide significantly expanded coverage.  Absent adequate management controls, FAMS does not have a full account  of reported incidents or a means for tracking, analyzing, and monitoring  these incidents. Such information is necessary for identifying the full  extent of reported incidents and for determining the operational areas in  need of improvement. In addition, such controls would help to ensure that  actions taken to resolve these incidents are reported to the federal air  marshals who filed them.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that the Department of Homeland Security has the  planning framework necessary to guide and monitor its efforts to merge  the Federal Air Marshal Service with the Transportation Security  Administration, we are recommending that the Secretary of the  Department of Homeland Security adopt key practices that have led to  successful transformation efforts within public and private sector  organizations by taking the following two actions:    Develop an overall strategy with implementation goals and a timeline to  build momentum and show progress.
Develop a communication strategy to share expectations and report  related progress.
In addition, to facilitate the Federal Air Marshal Service’s management of  incidents that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate discreetly  during their missions, we are recommending that the Secretary of the  Department of Homeland Security direct the Director of the Federal Air  Marshal Service to take the following four actions:    Develop a means for recording all incidents reported to the Mission  Operations Center that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate  discreetly and criteria for determining which incidents require federal air  marshals to complete a mission report.
Develop a means for tracking and retrieving data on mission reports to  enable FAMS to analyze and monitor reported and systemic incidents.
Establish written policies and procedures for reviewing and addressing  reported incidents.
Establish a means for providing feedback on the status and outcome of  FAMS mission reports to the federal air marshals who submit them.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. On  November 7, 2005, we received written comments on the draft report,  which are reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS agreed with the findings  and recommendations in the report and described actions it had started or  planned to take to implement them. With regard to our two  recommendations related to key practices that have led to successful  transformation efforts, DHS stated that FAMS and TSA will work closely  with DHS’s Under Secretary for Policy and Assistant Secretary for  Strategic Planning to develop a comprehensive strategy with achievable  goals and a timeline to assure progress. DHS also stated that FAMS will  work with TSA and DHS leadership to develop a communication strategy  intended to facilitate shared expectations and report progress. In addition,  regarding our recommendations related to FAMS’s management of  incidents that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate discreetly  during their missions, DHS stated that FAMS is in the process of drafting a  written directive to establish policies and procedures for reporting and  managing mission incidents. The directive is intended to restructure  FAMS’s management of mission reports to enable timely dissemination of  and access to information, including feedback to management and  employees. The directive will also establish a formalized tracking system  for reporting incidents. Shortly after receiving comments from DHS, FAMS  provided us with an official written directive that establishes policies and  procedures for reporting and managing mission incidents. We reviewed  this directive and believe that it addresses our recommendations related to  (1) developing a means for recording all incidents reported to the Mission  Operations Center that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate  discreetly and criteria for determining which incidents require federal air  marshals to complete a mission report and (2) establishing written policies  and procedures for reviewing and addressing reported incidents.
In addition to commenting on our findings and recommendations, DHS  provided technical comments on the report under separate cover, and we  revised the draft report where appropriate.
We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security,  the TSA Administrator, and interested congressional committees as  appropriate. We will also make copies available to others on request. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to discuss  it further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or berrickc@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made  major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of this report were to determine: (1) the progress DHS  made in achieving its stated objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE and  the key practices that could facilitate its efforts to return FAMS to TSA;  and (2) the extent to which FAMS has adequate controls to manage  mission-related incidents that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate  discreetly. To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant regulations,  internal planning documents, agency policies and procedures, and federal  air marshal mission reports, and interviewed a variety of federal officials  and federal air marshals in selected field office locations. Some  information related to FAMS and federal air marshals’ ability to operate  discreetly is considered Sensitive Security Information. Accordingly, we  issued a separate restricted version of this report.
To determine the progress DHS made in achieving its stated objectives in  transferring FAMS to ICE, we reviewed and analyzed key documents  about the transition effort as well as interviewed key officials from BTS,  FAMS, and ICE management. Key documents included, but were not  limited to, agency memorandums, various transition documents, materials  from offices involved with implementing the transition effort, and studies  that addressed issues related to career opportunities for federal air  marshals. We also analyzed surge training information on the number of  ICE agents cross-trained between December 2003 and October 2004 by  geographical location. In addition, we spoke with officials at DHS, BTS,  ICE, and FAMS to discuss the purpose and progress related to the  transition of FAMS to ICE, including creating a surge capacity and  enhancing federal air marshals’ career opportunities. Further, we assessed  DHS’s progress in meeting its stated objectives by using key practices  consistently found at the center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and  transformations. These practices were identified to assist DHS in its  consolidation before the department was created and were based on  useful practices and lessons learned from major private and public sector  organizational mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. We selected  two of these nine key practices as criteria for this review because they are  especially important to ensuring that DHS has the planning framework  necessary to guide and monitor its efforts—which we have also  underscored in our previous work on DHS—and to facilitating trust and  transparency within the organization. The two selected practices were:  setting implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show  progress from day one and establishing a communication strategy that will  serve to create shared expectations within the organization and at the  same time report related progress on the merger.
In addition, we interviewed FAMS officials at their headquarters offices in  Reston, Virginia, and their Mission Operations Center in Herndon, Virginia.  Specifically, we spoke with officials in FAMS’ Mission Support, Flight  Operations, Training and Development, and Field Operations offices to  discuss the types of mission-related incidents that federal air marshals  encounter during the course of their mission and how FAMS manages  these incidents. Further, to determine the extent to which FAMS has  adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents that affect federal  air marshals’ ability to operate discreetly, we used our Standards for  Internal Controls in the Federal Government and Internal Control  Management and Evaluation Tool.
Furthermore, in accomplishing our objectives, we conducted structured  interviews with FAMS officials—including 5 SACS—and 19 federal air  marshals in 5 of FAMS’s 21 field offices. Generally, we chose these offices  on the basis of geographical dispersion. They included: Washington, D.C.;  Dallas, Texas; New York, New York; Atlanta, Georgia; and Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania. Among other things, we asked questions about the federal  air marshals’ understanding of the transition of FAMS to ICE, including  whether their roles and mission had changed as a result of the transition.  We also asked the federal air marshals in these interviews a series of  questions related to their mission experience at various airports. For  example, we asked about the check-in, screening, and boarding practices  that they have experienced while carrying out their missions. The results  of these interviews provide examples of FAMS officials’ and federal air  marshals’ experiences and perspectives and cannot be generalized beyond  those we interviewed because we did not use statistical sampling  techniques in selecting the field offices, officials, and federal air marshals.  We conducted these interviews between October and November 2004 and  in April 2005. We also made some follow-up calls in May and July of 2005.  We conducted our work from June 2004 through August 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and Organizational Transformations
subsections: section_title: Ensure top leadership drives the transformation.
paragraphs: Define and articulate a succinct and compelling reason for change.
Balance continued delivery of services with merger and  transformation activities.
Establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to  guide the transformation.
Adopt leading practices for results-oriented strategic planning and  reporting.
Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of  the transformation.
Embed core values in every aspect of the organization to reinforce  the new culture.
Set implementation goals and a timeline to build  momentum and show progress from day one.
Make public implementation goals and timeline.
Seek and monitor employee attitudes and take appropriate  follow-up actions.
Identify cultural features of merging organizations to increase  understanding of former work environments.
Attract and retain key talent.
Establish an organizationwide knowledge and skills inventory  to allow knowledge exchange among merging organizations.
Dedicate an implementation team to manage the  transformation process.
Establish networks to support implementation team.
Select high-performing team members.
Use the performance management system to define the  responsibility and assure accountability for change.
Adopt leading practices to implement effective performance  management systems with adequate safeguards.
Establish a communication strategy to create shared  expectations and report related progress.
Communicate early and often to build trust.
Ensure consistency of message.
Encourage two-way communication.
Provide information to meet specific needs of employees.
Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain ownership  for the transformation.
Use employee teams.
Involve employees in planning and sharing performance  information.
Incorporate employee feedback into new policies and procedures.
Delegate authority to appropriate organizational levels.
Adopt leading practices to build a world-class organization.
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Leo Barbour, Steve Caldwell,  Grace Coleman, Joel Grossman, Wilfred Holloway, Charles Johnson,  Thomas Lombardi, Brenda Rabinowitz, Minette Richardson, Jack Schulze,  Angela Thomas, Sarah Veale, and Keith Wandtke made key contributions  to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not  Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight  Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notices, but Has Recently Taken  Steps to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.:  July 22, 2005.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of  Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.:  July 13, 2005.
Aviation Security: TSA Screener Training and Performance  Measurement Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457.  Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way,  but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed.   GAO-05-356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.  Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Impact of Using  Commercial Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324.  Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize  Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA’s Progress to Allow  Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services.   GAO-05-126. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but  Continued Partnership with the Private Sector is Critical to Long-Term  Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of  Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728.  Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention Needed  to Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington, D.C.: May  28, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies.   GAO-04-785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to  Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519.  Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility  to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T. Washington, D.C.:  April 22, 2004.
Budget Issues: Reprogramming of Federal Air Marshal Service Funds in  Fiscal Year 2003. GAO-04-577R. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation  Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer- Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.:  March 17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the  Transportation Security Administration’s Efforts to Secure Aerial  Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System  Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington,  D.C.: February 12, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing  Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington,  D.C.: February 12, 2004.
The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a  Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development  Program. GAO-04-341R. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen  Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges  of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.  GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address  Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress  Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.:  September 24, 2003.
Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the  Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security  Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address  Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides  Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T.  Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover  Airports’ Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.:  February 25, 2003.
Transportation Security Administration: Action and Plans to Build a  Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: January 17,  2003.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and  DOT’s Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January 10,  2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the  Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and  Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22,  2002.
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has  Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27.  Washington, D.C.:  October 15, 2002.
Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses  Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces  Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.:  July 25, 2002.
Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots. GAO-02-822R.   Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard  Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.:  September 25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for  Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:  September 21, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s  Efforts. GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve  Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.:  September 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in  Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.