Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in Other Countries and in the United States
Published: 2006-03-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: GAO is releasing two reports today on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries and in the United States. Together with the March 2005 report on the Department of Energy's Megaports Initiative, these reports represent GAO's analysis of the U.S. effort to deploy radiation detection equipment worldwide. In my testimony, I will discuss (1) the progress made and challenges faced by the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State in providing radiation detection equipment to foreign countries and (2) the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to install radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry and challenges it faces.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Regarding the deployment of radiation detection equipment in foreign countries, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million since fiscal year 1994 to provide equipment and related training to 36 countries. For example, through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE's Second Line of Defense program had completed installation of equipment at 83 sites, mostly in Russia. However, these agencies face a number of challenges that could compromise their efforts, including corruption of foreign border security officials, technical limitations and inadequate maintenance of some equipment, and the lack of supporting infrastructure at some border sites. To address these challenges, U.S. agencies plan to take a number of steps, including combating corruption by installing multitiered communications systems that establish redundant layers of accountability for alarm response. State coordinates U.S. programs to limit overlap and duplication of effort. However, State's ability to carry out this role has been limited by deficiencies in its interagency strategic plan and its lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation detection equipment provided to other countries. Domestically, DHS had installed about 670 radiation portal monitors through December 2005 and provided complementary handheld radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry at a cost of about $286 million. DHS plans to install a total of 3,034 radiation portal monitors by the end of fiscal year 2009 at a total cost of $1.3 billion. However, the final costs and deployment schedule are highly uncertain because of delays in releasing appropriated funds to contractors, difficulties in negotiating with seaport operators, and uncertainties in the type and cost of radiation detection equipment DHS plans to deploy. Overall, GAO found that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers have made progress in using radiation detection equipment correctly and adhering to inspection guidelines, but CBP's secondary inspection procedures could be improved. For example, GAO recommended that DHS require its officers to open containers and inspect them for nuclear and radioactive materials when they cannot make a determination from an external inspection and that DHS work with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to institute procedures by which inspectors can validate NRC licenses at U.S. ports of entry.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on U.S. government  programs to combat nuclear smuggling through the deployment of  radiation detection equipment at border crossings and other ports of entry  both in foreign countries and in the United States. According to the  International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there were  662 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological  materials worldwide. Twenty-one of these cases involved material that  could be used to produce a nuclear weapon, and over 400 involved  materials that could be used to produce a device that uses conventional  explosives with radioactive material (known as a “dirty bomb”). Especially  in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, there is heightened  concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear material or a nuclear  weapon into the United States. This could happen in several ways: nuclear  materials could be hidden in a car, train, or ship; sent through the mail;  carried in personal luggage through an airport; or walked across an  unprotected border. If terrorists were to accomplish this, the  consequences could be devastating to our national and economic  interests.
In response to these threats, four U.S. agencies, the Departments of  Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), State (State), and Homeland Security  (DHS), implement programs to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign  countries and in the United States. Regarding U.S. efforts in other  countries, the first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling during  the 1990s concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at  borders in countries of the former Soviet Union. One of the main U.S.  programs providing radiation detection equipment to foreign governments  is DOE’s Second Line of Defense program, which began installing  equipment at key sites in Russia in 1998. In 2003, DOE began a second  program, the Megaports Initiative, to combat nuclear smuggling at major  foreign seaports. In addition to DOE’s efforts, two DOD programs have  provided radiation portal monitors, handheld equipment, and radiation  detection training to 8 countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern  Europe. Similarly, three State programs have provided radiation detection  equipment and training to 31 countries since fiscal year 1994.
Regarding efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in the United States, DHS  is responsible for providing radiation detection capabilities at U.S. ports of  entry. Until April 2005, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)  managed this program. However, on April 15, 2005, the President directed  the establishment, within DHS, of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office  (DNDO), whose duties include acquiring and supporting the deployment  of radiation detection equipment. CBP continues its traditional screening  function at ports of entry to prevent illegal immigration and interdict  contraband, including the operation of radiation detection equipment.  DHS is deploying portal monitors in five phases: international mail and  express courier facilities; northern border crossings; major seaports;  southwestern border crossings; and all other categories, including  international airports and remaining border crossings, seaports, and rail  crossings. Generally, CBP prioritized these categories according to their  perceived vulnerability to the threat of nuclear smuggling (rather than  through a formal risk assessment).
My testimony summarizes the findings of our two reports being released  today on U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling. Specifically, I will  discuss (1) the progress made by the various federal agencies tasked with  installing radiation detection equipment at ports of entry in foreign  countries and the challenges these agencies face and (2) DHS’s efforts to  install radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry and challenges  DHS faces in completing its program.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Detecting illicit trafficking in nuclear material is complicated because one  of the materials of greatest concern—highly enriched uranium—has a  relatively low level of radioactivity and is, therefore, among the most  difficult to detect. In contrast, medical and industrial radioactive sources,  which could be used to construct a dirty bomb, are highly radioactive and,  therefore, easier to detect. Although their levels of radioactivity differ,  uranium and radioactive sources are similar in that they generally emit  only gamma radiation, which is relatively easily shielded when encased in  high-density material, such as lead. For example, we reported in March  2005 that a cargo container containing a radioactive source passed  through radiation detection equipment DOE had installed at a foreign  seaport without being detected because the source was surrounded by  large amounts of scrap metal in the container.
Plutonium, another nuclear material of great concern, emits both gamma  and neutron radiation. Although most currently fielded radiation detection  equipment has the capability to detect both gamma and neutron radiation,  shielding neutron radiation can be more difficult than shielding gamma  radiation. Consequently, plutonium can usually be detected by a neutron  detector regardless of the amount of shielding from high-density material.  According to DOE officials, neutron radiation alarms are caused only by  man-made materials, such as plutonium, while gamma radiation alarms are  caused by a variety of naturally occurring sources, including commercial  goods such as bananas, ceramic tiles, and fertilizer, as well as by  dangerous nuclear materials, such as uranium and plutonium.
Because of the complexities of detecting and identifying nuclear material,  customs officers and border guards who are responsible for operating  detection equipment must be trained in using handheld radiation detectors  to pinpoint the source of an alarm, identify false alarms, and properly  respond to cases of nuclear smuggling. The manner in which radiation  detection equipment is deployed, operated, and maintained can also limit  its effectiveness. Given the difficulties in detecting certain nuclear  materials and the inherent limitations of currently deployed radiation  detection equipment, it is important that the equipment be installed,  operated, and maintained in a way that optimizes authorities’ ability to  interdict illicit nuclear materials.
Although efforts to combat nuclear smuggling through the installation of  radiation detection equipment are important, the United States should not  and does not rely upon radiation detection equipment at U.S. or foreign  borders as its sole means for preventing nuclear materials or a nuclear  warhead from reaching the United States. Recognizing the need for a  broad approach to the problem, the U.S. government has multiple  initiatives that are designed to complement each other that provide a  layered defense against nuclear terrorism. For example, DOE works to  secure nuclear material and warheads at their sources through programs  that improve the physical security at nuclear facilities in the former Soviet  Union and in other countries. In addition, DHS has other initiatives to  identify containers at foreign seaports that are considered high risk for  containing smuggled goods, such as nuclear and other dangerous  materials. Supporting all of these programs is intelligence information that  can give advanced notice of nuclear material smuggling and is a critical  component to prevent dangerous materials from entering the United  States.
section_title: U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries Face Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Challenges
paragraphs: One of the main U.S. efforts providing radiation detection equipment to  foreign governments is DOE’s Second Line of Defense program, which  began installing equipment at key sites in Russia in 1998. According to  DOE, through the end of fiscal year 2005, the program had spent about  $130 million to complete installations at 83 sites, mostly in Russia.  Ultimately, DOE plans to install radiation detection equipment at a total of  about 350 sites in 31 countries by 2012 at a total cost of about $570 million.  In addition to DOE’s efforts, other U.S. agencies also have programs that  provide radiation detection equipment and training to foreign  governments. Two programs at DOD—the International  Counterproliferation Program and Weapons of Mass Destruction  Proliferation Prevention Initiative—have provided equipment and related  training to eight countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe  at a cost of about $22 million. Similarly, three programs at State—the  Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, Georgia Border Security and  Law Enforcement program, and Export Control and Related Border  Security program—have spent about $25 million to provide radiation  detection equipment and training to 31 countries.
However, these agencies face a number of challenges that could  compromise their programs’ effectiveness, including (1) corruption of  foreign border security officials, (2) technical limitations of equipment at  some foreign sites, (3) problems with maintenance of handheld equipment,  and (4) the lack of infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions at  some border sites. First, according to officials from several recipient  countries we visited, corruption is a pervasive problem within the ranks of  border security organizations. DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they  are concerned that corrupt foreign border security personnel could  compromise the effectiveness of U.S.-funded radiation detection  equipment by either turning off equipment or ignoring alarms. To mitigate  this threat, DOE and DOD plan to deploy communications links between  individual border sites and national command centers so that alarm data  can be simultaneously evaluated by multiple officials, thus establishing  redundant layers of accountability for alarm response. In addition, DOD  plans to implement a program in Uzbekistan to combat some of the  underlying issues that can lead to corruption through periodic screening of  border security personnel.
Second, some radiation portal monitors that State and other U.S. agencies  previously installed have technical limitations: they can detect only gamma  radiation, making them less effective at detecting some nuclear material  than equipment with both gamma and neutron radiation detection  capabilities. Through an interagency agreement, DOE assumed  responsibility for ensuring the long-term sustainability and continued  operation of radiation portal monitors and X-ray vans equipped with  radiation detectors that State and other U.S. agencies provided to 23  countries. Through this agreement, DOE provides spare parts,  preventative maintenance, and repairs for the equipment through regularly  scheduled maintenance visits. Since 2002, DOE has maintained this  equipment but has not upgraded any of it, with the exception of at one site  in Azerbaijan. According to DOE officials, new implementing agreements  with the appropriate ministries or agencies within the governments of  each of the countries where the old equipment is located are needed  before DOE can install more sophisticated equipment.
Third, since 2002, DOE has been responsible for maintaining certain  radiation detection equipment previously deployed by State and other  agencies in 23 countries. However, DOE is not responsible for maintaining  handheld radiation detection equipment provided by these agencies. As a  result, many pieces of handheld equipment, which are vital for border  officials to conduct secondary inspections of vehicles or pedestrians, may  not function properly. For example, in Georgia, we observed border  guards performing secondary inspections with a handheld radiation  detector that had not been calibrated (adjusted to conform with  measurement standards) since 1997. According to the detector’s  manufacturer, yearly recalibration is necessary to ensure that the detector  functions properly.
Finally, many border sites are located in remote areas that often do not  have access to reliable supplies of electricity, fiber optic lines, and other  infrastructure essential to operate radiation detection equipment and  associated communication systems. Additionally, environmental  conditions at some sites, such as extreme heat, can affect the performance  of equipment. To mitigate these concerns, DOE, DOD, and State have  provided generators and other equipment at remote border sites to ensure  stable supplies of electricity and, when appropriate, heat shields or other  protection to ensure the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment.
We also reported that State’s ability to carry out its role as lead  interagency coordinator of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance  has been limited by deficiencies in its strategic plan for interagency  coordination and by its lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation  detection equipment assistance. In response to a recommendation we  made in 2002, State led the development of a governmentwide plan to  coordinate U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance overseas. This  plan broadly defines a set of interagency goals and outlines the roles and  responsibilities of participating agencies. However, the plan lacks key  components, including overall program cost estimates, projected time  frames for program completion, and specific performance measures.  Without these elements in the plan, State will be limited in its ability to  effectively measure U.S. programs’ progress toward achieving the  interagency goals.
Additionally, in its role as lead interagency coordinator, State has not  maintained accurate information on the operational status and location of  all radiation detection equipment provided by U.S. programs. While DOE,  DOD, and State each maintain lists of radiation detection equipment  provided by their programs, they do not regularly share such information,  and no comprehensive list of all equipment provided by U.S. programs  exists. For example, according to information we received from program  managers at DOE, DOD, and State, more than 7,000 pieces of handheld  radiation detection equipment had been provided to 36 foreign countries  through the end of fiscal year 2005. Because much of this equipment was  provided to the same countries by multiple agencies and programs, it is  difficult to determine the degree to which duplication of effort has  occurred. Without a coordinated master list of all U.S.-funded equipment,  program managers at DOE, DOD, and State cannot accurately assess if  equipment is operational and being used as intended, determine the  equipment needs of countries where they plan to provide assistance, or  detect whether an agency has unknowingly supplied duplicative  equipment.
section_title: DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns Remain
paragraphs: Through December 2005, DHS had installed about 670 radiation portal  monitors nationwide— about 22 percent of the portal monitors DHS plans  to deploy—at international mail and express courier facilities, land border  crossings, and seaports in the United States. DHS has completed portal  monitor deployments at international mail and express courier facilities  and the first phase of northern border sites—57 and 217 portal monitors,  respectively. In addition, by December 2005, DHS had deployed 143 of 495  portal monitors at seaports and 244 of 360 at southern border sites. As of  February 2006, CBP estimated that, with these deployments, it has the  ability to screen about 62 percent of all containerized shipments entering  the United States (but only 32 percent of all containerized seaborne  shipments) and roughly 77 percent of all private vehicles. DHS plans to  deploy 3,034 portal monitors by September 2009 at a cost of $1.3 billion.  However, the final costs and deployment schedule are highly uncertain  because of delays in releasing appropriated funds to contractors,  difficulties in negotiating with seaport operators, and uncertainties in the  type and cost of radiation detection equipment DHS plans to deploy.  Further, to meet this goal, DHS would have to deploy about 52 portal  monitors a month for the next 4 years—a rate that far exceeds the 2005  rate of about 22 per month.
In particular, several factors have contributed to the delay in the  deployment schedule. First, DHS provides the Congress with information  on portal monitor acquisitions and deployments before releasing any  funds. However, DHS’s cumbersome review process has consistently  caused delays in providing such information to the Congress. For example,  according to the House Appropriations Committee report on DHS’s fiscal  year 2005 budget, CBP should provide the Congress with an acquisition  and deployment plan for the portal monitor program prior to funding its  contractors. This plan took many months to finalize, mostly because it  required multiple approvals within DHS and the Office of Management and  Budget prior to being submitted to the Congress. The lengthy review  process delayed the release of funds and, in some cases, disrupted and  delayed deployment.
Second, difficult negotiations with seaport operators about placement of  portal monitors and screening of railcars have delayed deployments at  U.S. seaports. Many seaport operators are concerned that radiation  detection equipment may inhibit the flow of commerce through their  ports. In addition, seaports are much larger than land border crossings,  consist of multiple terminals, and may have multiple exits, which may  require a greater number of portal monitors. Further, devising an effective  way to conduct secondary inspections of rail traffic as it departs seaports  without disrupting commerce has delayed deployments. This problem may  worsen because the Department of Transportation has forecast that the  use of rail transit out of seaports will probably increase in the near future.
Finally, DHS’s $1.3 billion estimate for the project is highly uncertain, in  part, because of uncertainties in the type and cost of radiation detection  equipment that DHS plans to deploy. The estimate is based on DHS’s plans  for widespread deployment of advanced technology portal monitors,  which are currently being developed. However, the prototypes of this  equipment have not yet been shown to be more effective than the portal  monitors now in use, and DHS officials say they will not purchase the  advanced portal monitors unless they are proven to be clearly superior.  Moreover, when advanced technology portal monitors become  commercially available, experts estimate that they will cost between about  $330,000 and $460,000 each, far more than the currently used portal  monitors whose costs range from about $49,000 to $60,000. Even if future  test results indicate better detection capabilities, without a detailed  comparison of the two technologies’ capabilities it would not be clear that  the dramatically higher cost for this new equipment would be worth the  investment.
We also identified potential issues with the procedures CBP inspectors use  to perform secondary inspections that, if addressed, could strengthen the  nation’s defenses against nuclear smuggling. For example, CBP’s  procedures require only that officers locate, isolate, and identify  radiological material. Typically, officers perform an external examination  by scanning the sides of cargo containers with handheld radiation  detection equipment during secondary inspections. CBP’s guidance does  not specifically require officers to open containers and inspect their  interiors, even when their external examination cannot unambiguously  resolve the alarm. However, under some circumstances, opening  containers can improve security by increasing the chances that the source  of radioactivity that originally set off the alarm will be correctly located  and identified. The second potential issue with CBP’s procedures involves  NRC documentation. Individuals and organizations shipping radiological  materials to the United States must generally acquire a NRC license, but  according to NRC officials, the license does not have to accompany the  shipment. Although inspectors examine such licenses when these  shipments arrive at U.S. ports of entry, CBP officers are not required to  verify that shippers of radiological material actually obtained required  licenses and to authenticate licenses that accompany shipments. We found  that CBP inspectors lack access to NRC license data that could be used to  authenticate a license at the border.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to  any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202)  512-3841 or at aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. R. Stockton Butler, Nancy Crothers, Jim Shafer, and  Eugene Wisnoski made key contributions to this statement.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying  Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns  Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and  Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation  Detection Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.:  March 14, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection  Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T.  Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in  Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign  Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New  Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November  18, 2002.
Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection  Equipment. GAO-03-235T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling.  GAO-02-989T Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat  Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning.  GAO-02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.
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