NASA: Challenges in Completing and Sustaining the International Space Station
Published: 2008-04-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The International Space Station (ISS), the most complex scientific space project ever attempted, remains incomplete. NASA expects the station's final construction cost will be $31 billion and expects sustainment costs through the station's planned retirement in fiscal year 2016 to total $11 billion. The space shuttle, the only vehicle capable of transporting large segments of the station into orbit, is critical to its completion. NASA plans to complete ISS assembly and retire the shuttle in 2010 in order to pursue a new generation of space flight vehicles, which will not begin to be available until 2015. To provide crew rotation and logistical support during this 5-year gap, NASA plans to rely on spacecraft developed by the commercial sector and other countries. In light of these circumstances, GAO examined the risks and challenges NASA faces in (1) completing assembly of the ISS by 2010 and (2) providing logistics and maintenance to the ISS after 2010. GAO's work to accomplish this included reviewing budget, planning, and other documents from NASA; reviewing NASA officials' testimonies; and interviewing NASA and foreign space program officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NASA faces significant challenges in its plans to complete assembly of the International Space Station (ISS) prior to the scheduled retirement of the space shuttle in 2010. Since GAO testified on this issue in July 2007, the shuttle flight schedule has remained aggressive--slating the same number of launches in a shorter period. While NASA thinks the proposed schedule is still achievable, the schedule (1) is only slightly less demanding than it was prior to the Columbia disaster when the agency launched a shuttle every other month with a larger shuttle fleet and (2) leaves little room for the kinds of weather-related, technical, and logistical problems that have delayed flights in the past. Unanticipated delays could result in changes to the station's configuration, that is, some components may not be delivered. We have previously testified that such changes could limit the extent of scientific research that can be conducted on board the ISS. After assembly is completed and the shuttle retires, NASA's ability to rotate crew and supply the ISS will be impaired because of the absence of a vehicle capable of carrying the 114,199 pounds of additional supplies and spares needed to sustain the station until its planned retirement in 2016. For crew rotation and logistics, NASA plans to rely on Russian, European and Japanese vehicles--these vehicles were designed to augment the capabilities of the shuttle, not replace them, and have far less capacity to haul cargo. Furthermore, aside from a single Russian vehicle that can bring back 132 pounds of cargo, no vehicle can return cargo from the ISS after the shuttle is retired; and Commercially developed vehicles--NASA has pledged approximately $500 million for the development of commercial vehicles. NASA expects these vehicles will be ready for cargo use in 2010 and crew use in 2012, even though none of the vehicles currently under development has been launched into orbit yet and their aggressive development schedule leaves little room for the unexpected. If one of these vehicles cannot be delivered according to NASA's current expectations, NASA will have to rely on Russian vehicles to maintain U.S. crew presence on the ISS until the new generation of U.S. spacecraft becomes available.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here to discuss challenges that the National Aeronautics  and Space Administration (NASA) faces in completing and sustaining the  International Space Station (ISS). After delays and redesigns, efforts are  under way for a long-envisioned expansion of the station so it can support  a larger crew and more scientific research. NASA officials estimate the  entire cost to complete the station will total $31 billion, and another $11  billion will be needed to sustain it through its planned decommissioning in  fiscal year 2016.
The space shuttle has been and is critical to completion of the space  station and re-supplying the station. The shuttle remains the only vehicle  capable of transporting large segments of the station into orbit for  assembly. NASA plans to complete ISS assembly duties and retire the  shuttle fleet in 2010 in order to pursue a new generation of space flight  vehicles for exploration. To that end, NASA has begun the process of  making key decisions on suppliers that will no longer be needed. NASA  officials told us that in many cases, restarting suppliers after these  decisions are made would be cost prohibitive and time consuming.  However, a new NASA vehicle will not be available until 2015 at the  earliest, when the Crew Launch Vehicle (Ares I) and Crew Exploration  Vehicle (Orion) are expected to fly. To fill the gap following retirement of  the shuttle and provide crew rotation and logistical support, NASA plans  to rely on a variety of spacecraft developed by the commercial sector and  other countries.
In July 2007, we testified on a number of challenges NASA was facing with  regard to completing the ISS within the time constraints created by the  shuttle’s retirement. Those challenges are still relevant. In light of these  issues, we examined the risks and challenges NASA faces in (1)  completing assembly of the ISS by 2010, and (2) providing logistics and  maintenance support to the ISS after 2010.
In short, our work continued to find that NASA’s plans to complete  assembly of the International Space Station prior to the scheduled  retirement of the  space shuttle at end of fiscal year 2010 require much to  happen and very little to go wrong. While NASA believes the schedule is  still achievable, the flight rate that NASA is projecting is only slightly less  aggressive than it was prior to the Columbia disaster when, from 1992 to  2003, the agency launched a shuttle every other month. At that time, NASA  used four vehicles to maintain its flight schedule. To complete the station  by 2010, NASA will need to maintain a similar flight rate with fewer  shuttles and with a shuttle fleet that is aging and continuing to face fuel  sensor challenges. NASA remains confident that the current manifest can  be accomplished within the given time, and in fact, it has several months  of reserve time in its manifest.  However, agency officials readily admit  that the schedule is aggressive. If delays continue, NASA may need to  reduce the number of flights to the station, which could prevent delivery  of items currently scheduled for assembly and the pre-positioning of  critical spares. Further, while NASA still expects to be able to increase  crew capacity from three to six persons, changes it may need to make to  the space station’s configuration could limit the extent of scientific  research that can be conducted onboard the ISS or quality of life for the  crew.
After assembly is completed and the shuttle is retired, NASA’s ability to  rotate crew and supply the ISS will be impaired because of the absence of  a vehicle capable of carrying the 114,199 pounds (or 51.8 metric tons) of  additional supplies needed to sustain the station until its planned  retirement in fiscal year 2016. NASA plans to rely on Russian, European  and Japanese vehicles to service the station. Even with these vehicles, this  shortfall remains. While the Russian vehicles are already in service, the  European vehicle just completed its first operational test flight, and  development efforts are still under way on the Japanese vehicle. In  addition, these vehicles were designed to augment the capabilities of the  shuttle, not replace them. Both the European and Japanese vehicles were  designed to deliver supplies to the station but their capacities are not  equal to the shuttle’s 37,864 pounds of capacity. Furthermore, aside from a  single Russian vehicle that can bring back 132 pounds of cargo and rotate  crew, no vehicle can return cargo from the International Space Station  after the shuttle is retired. NASA plans to rely on commercially developed  vehicles to address some of these shortfalls and has pledged  approximately $500 million for their development. NASA expects one of  these vehicles will be ready for cargo use in 2010 and crew use in 2012.  However, no vehicle has successfully been launched into orbit and their  development schedules may leave little room for the unexpected. If these  vehicles cannot be delivered according to NASA’s current expectations,  NASA will have to rely on Russian vehicles to maintain U.S. crew on the  International Space Station until the new generation of U.S. spacecraft  becomes available.
To conduct our work, we reviewed documents and testimonies by NASA  officials relating to the challenges associated with ISS completion, the  delivery schedule for ISS assembly and replacement units, and the space  shuttle manifest. We reviewed key ISS budget and strategic maintenance  plans, the ISS Independent Safety Task Force Report, and previous GAO  reports relating to the ISS. We visited and interviewed officials responsible  for ISS operations at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C., and the  Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. At NASA Headquarters, we met  with officials from the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate and the  Space Operations Mission Directorate, including representatives from the  International Space Station and space shuttle programs. We met with ISS  and space shuttle officials at the Johnson Space Center. We also talked to  a commercial developer of space vehicles and met with representatives of  foreign space efforts. Complete details of our scope and methodology can  be found in appendix I. We conducted this performance audit from July  2007 to April 2008, in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The International Space Station program began in 1993 with several  partner countries: Canada, the 11 member nations of the European Space  Agency (ESA), Japan, and Russia. The ISS has served and is intended to  expand its service as a laboratory for exploring basic questions in a variety  of fields, including commercial, scientific, and engineering research. The  first assembly flight of the station, in which the space shuttle Endeavor  attached the U.S. laboratory module to the Russian laboratory module,  occurred in early December of 1998. However, since the program’s  inception, NASA has struggled with cost growth, schedule delays and re- designs of the station. As we reported in the past, these challenges were  largely due to poorly defined requirements, changes in program content  and inadequate program oversight. Due to these challenges, the  configuration of the station has devolved over time. In the spring of 2001,  NASA announced that it would make major changes in the final  configuration of the ISS to address cost overruns. In 2003, the National  Academies reported that this reconfiguration greatly affected the overall  ability of the ISS to support science. NASA estimates that assembly and  operating costs of the ISS will be between $2.1 billion to $2.4 billion  annually for FY2009-FY2012. The ISS as of February 19, 2008, is  approximately 65 percent complete.
The shuttle program and the ISS program are inherently intertwined. The  shuttle has unique capabilities in that it can lift and return more cargo to  and from orbit than any other current or planned space vehicle. Figure 1  shows the capabilities of the shuttle in various configurations. Most  segments of ISS cannot be delivered by any other vehicle. For example,  the Columbia disaster in 2003 put ISS assembly on hiatus as NASA ceased  shuttle launches for 2½ years while it investigated the safety of the fleet.  During this period, the Russian Soyuz became the means of transportation  for crewmembers traveling to and returning from the ISS.
In a major space policy address on January 14, 2004, President Bush  announced his “Vision for U.S. Space Exploration” (Vision) and directed  NASA to focus its future human space exploration activities on a return to  the Moon as prelude to future human missions to Mars and beyond. As  part of the Vision, NASA is developing new crew and cargo vehicles, with  the first crew vehicle currently scheduled to be available in 2015. The  President also directed NASA to retire the space shuttle after completion  of the ISS, which is planned for the end of the decade. Based on that  directive, NASA officials told us that they developed a manifest consisting  of 17 shuttle launches to support ISS assembly and supply between 2005  and 2010. Nine of these have taken place. In response to the President’s  Vision, NASA formally set September 30, 2010, as the date that the shuttle  program will cease because agency officials believe that continuing the  program beyond that date will slow development of the agency’s new  vehicles—specifically, the agency budget cannot support both programs at  costs of $2.5 billion to $4 billion above current budget. As shown in Table  1, the shuttle program costs NASA several billion dollars annually and  projected funding is phased out in fiscal year 2011. NASA officials stated  that the majority of shuttle program cost is fixed at roughly $3 billion a  year whether it flies or not. NASA officials stated that the average cost per  flight is $150 million to $200 million.
The 2005 NASA Authorization Act designated the U.S segment of the ISS  as a national laboratory and directed NASA to develop a plan to increase  the utilization of the ISS by other federal entities and the private sector. In  response, NASA has been pursuing relationships with these entities. NASA  expects that as the nation’s newest national laboratory, the ISS will  strengthen NASA’s relationships with other federal entities and private  sector leaders in the pursuit of national priorities for the advancement of  science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. The ISS National  Laboratory is also intended to open new paths for the exploration and  economic development of space.
section_title: The Retirement of the Shuttle Poses Challenges to NASA’s Ability to Complete the International Space Station
paragraphs: It will be a challenge for NASA to complete the space station by 2010 given  the compressed nature of the schedule, maintenance and safety concerns,  as well as events beyond its control such as weather. Any of these factors  can cause delays that may require NASA to re-evaluate and reconstitute  the assembly sequence. NASA remains confident that the current manifest  can be accomplished within the given time and there are tradeoffs NASA  can make in terms of what it can take up to support and sustain the station  should unanticipated delays occur. However, failure to complete assembly  as currently planned would further reduce the station’s ability to fulfill its  research objectives and short the station of critical spare parts that only  the shuttle can currently deliver.
subsections: section_title: Shuttle Flight Schedule Is Aggressive
paragraphs: In our July 2007 testimony, we reported that NASA planned to launch a  shuttle once every 2.7 months. The plan for launches remains aggressive,  partly because NASA plans on completing the ISS with the last assembly  mission in April 2010, with two contingency flights in February and July  2010 to deliver key replacement units. The 5 months between the last  assembly launch and shuttle retirement in September 2010 act as a  schedule reserve, which can be used to address delays. There are 8 shuttle  flights left to complete the station and two contingency flights left to  deliver key components necessary to sustain the ISS after the retirement  of the shuttle. There is an average of 2 ½ months between each shuttle  launch. Table 2 shows the current shuttle manifest.
NASA has launched shuttles at this rate in the past. In fact, the agency  launched a shuttle, on average, every two months from 1992 through the  Columbia disaster in 2003. However, at that time the agency was launching  a fleet of four shuttles. The shuttles require maintenance and refurbishing  that can last four to five months before they can be re-launched.  Launching at such a rate means that the rotation schedule can handle few  significant delays, such as those previously experienced due to weather  and fuel sensor difficulties. Lastly, NASA officials said that Shuttle  Atlantis, which was to go out of service after the Hubble mission, will  return to servicing the ISS for two more flights, which NASA believes will  add more schedule flexibility.
section_title: Potential Launch Delays Remain
paragraphs: NASA officials stated repeatedly that NASA is committed to safely flying  the shuttle until its retirement and will not succumb to schedule pressure.  However, the compressed nature of the manifest will continue to test that  commitment. Fuel sensor challenges continue to surface in the shuttle  fleet. For example, the recent shuttle Atlantis launch was delayed two  months while NASA addressed a fuel sensor problem associated with the  shuttle’s liquid hydrogen tank. This is the same system that caused a 2- week delay in the launch of the shuttle Discovery in 2005.
There are also challenges associated with the shuttle launch window.  NASA officials told us that the duration of that window is dependent on a  number of factors, which include changes in the position of the earth and  spacecraft traffic restrictions. NASA must consider its traffic model  constraints for vehicles docking at the space station. According to the  traffic model for ISS, no other vehicle can dock while the shuttle is  docked, and each vehicle has constraints on how long it can stay docked.  For example, the shuttle can dock for a maximum of 10 days, while the  Soyuz can dock a maximum of 200 days. The docking of these two  vehicles must be coordinated and meet other technical restrictions.
In addition, the shuttle has experienced delays due to severe weather,  such as when Atlantis’s external tank was damaged by a hailstorm in 2007.  In this case the delay was about three months. Figure 3 shows the delays  in recent shuttle launches related to weather and other causes.
section_title: Completion of ISS Needed to Expand Scientific Research
paragraphs: The ISS is scheduled to support a six-person crew as early as 2009 and  maintain that capability through 2016. NASA officials said that equipment  essential to support a six-person crew, such as systems for oxygen  recycling, removal of carbon dioxide and transforming urine into water as  well as an exercise machine will be delivered to the station this fall.  In  addition, there are two components that have been planned to hold this  and other equipment needed for the six-person crew, which are scheduled  to go up in April 2010.  If unanticipated delays occur, NASA may need to  hold back these two components—known as the Node 3 and the Cupola— which could constrain the ability to conduct research and the quality of  life on the station for the crew.
NASA officials emphasized that NASA’s intent was to have most science  conducted on ISS only after the assembly of the ISS was completed. The  ISS currently supports three crewmembers. NASA stated that the majority  of the crew’s time is spent maintaining the station, rather than conducting  scientific study. According to NASA, the crew spends no more than 3  hours per week on science. Completion of the ISS would allow NASA to  expand to a six-person crew who could conduct more research.
Since the ISS is designated as a national laboratory, the expectation is that  it will support scientific experimentation. NASA is in the process of  negotiating agreements with scientific organizations to support scientific  research on the ISS. NASA officials told us that they are negotiating a  Memorandum of Understanding with the National Institutes of Health to  explore the possibility of scientific experimentation onboard the ISS.  These officials also told us that NASA is in the process of negotiating with  at least two other agencies.
section_title: The Need to Pre-Position Replacement Units to Sustain the ISS May Also Affect Assembly
paragraphs: NASA’s efforts to complete the ISS are further complicated by the need to  put replacement units—the spare parts that are essential to sustaining the  ISS—into position before the shuttle retires. The two contingency flights  of the shuttle have been designated to deliver these key replacement units,  which only the shuttle is capable of carrying. According to NASA, the  original approach to deal with these key components (also known as  orbital replacement units—ORU) was to take the ones that failed or  reached the end of their lifetime back to Earth on the shuttle, refurbish  them and launch them back to ISS for use. As a result of the shuttle  retirement, NASA will no longer be bringing down ORUs to fix. Instead,  NASA officials stated they have adopted a “build and burn” philosophy,  which means that after the shuttle retires, instead of being brought down  to be refurbished, ORUs will be discarded and disintegrate upon re-entry  into the atmosphere. To determine how many replacement units need to  be positioned at the station, NASA officials told us they are using data  modeling that has been very effective in determining how long ORUs will  last. Table 3 illustrates the shuttle manifest. This includes elements needed  for the planned configuration to complete the station and delivery of  critical spares.
NASA currently plans to use two contingency flights for these  replacements because all other flights are planned with assembly cargo.  Recently, the NASA Administrator publicly stated that these flights are  considered necessary to sustain the ISS and have been scheduled to carry  key spare units.
section_title: Alternative Vehicle Options to Service the International Space Station Pose Challenges
paragraphs: In the event that NASA completes assembly of the ISS on schedule and  prepositions an adequate number of critical spares, the agency still faces a  myriad of challenges in sustaining the research facility until its retirement,  currently planned for fiscal year 2016. Without the shuttle, NASA officials  told us that they face a significant cargo supply shortfall and very limited  crew rotation capabilities. NASA will rely on an assortment of vehicles in  order to provide the necessary logistical support and crew rotation  capabilities required by the station. Some of these vehicles are already  supporting the station. Others are being developed by international  partners, the commercial sector, and NASA. (See Figure 4) Furthermore,  some of these transportation services may face legal restrictions, and still  others face cost, schedule, and performance issues that raise serious  questions about their development and utilization. These issues will  challenge NASA’s ability to close the sustainment gap between the  retirement of the shuttle in 2010 and the availability of the Crew  Exploration Vehicle (CEV) in 2015. Failure of any or some of these efforts  would also seriously restrict NASA’s options to sustain and maintain a  viable space station.
subsections: section_title: Russian Vehicles
paragraphs: With the exception of the Shuttle and the recently completed  demonstration flight of the ATV, the only vehicles currently capable of  supporting the space station are the Russian Progress and Soyuz vehicles.  NASA officials stated that both of these vehicles have provided reliable  service to the ISS. From the Columbia disaster in 2003 until return to flight  in 2005, the Russian vehicles were the sole source of logistical support and  crew rotation capability for the station. The Progress provides  atmospheric gas, propellant, water, and pressurized cargo. It also has the  capability to use its thrusters to change the Station’s altitude and  orientation. The Soyuz provides crew delivery and rescue capability for  three crew members. Progress vehicles are expendable and offer no  recoverable return capability, but provide important trash removal  capabilities. Soyuz vehicles have a limited recoverable cargo capacity.  However, some NASA officials have suggested that their limited  capabilities restrict the capacity of the station to move to a six-member  crew and significantly limit the scientific research because the vehicles  cannot bring experiments to earth for assessment.  NASA currently purchases crew and cargo transport services from Russia  through a contract with the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos).
NASA officials told us that after the initial ISS contract between  Roscosmos and NASA expired, NASA entered into another contract that  runs through 2011. However, according to NASA, the Iran Nonproliferation  Act of 2000 restricted certain payments in connection to the ISS that may  be made to the Russian government. In 2005, NASA requested relief from  the restrictions of the Act, and Congress amended the Act. Through this  amendment, NASA and Roscosmos have negotiated quantities and prices  for services through January 1, 2012.
NASA officials anticipate the use of 4 Soyuz flights per year and  approximately 6 Progress flights beginning in approximately 2010. While  NASA officials stated that they are making every effort to limit amount of  fees they pay for usage of Russian vehicles, to date, NASA officials told us  that they anticipate that from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2012, NASA  will spend $589 million on cargo and crew services from the Russians.  NASA officials also told us that the Roscosmos has suggested that it will  charge NASA higher fees for usage of its vehicles.
section_title: European and Japanese Vehicles
paragraphs: NASA has stated it will use its international partners’ vehicles to conduct  some supply activities. Specifically, Japan’s Aerospace Exploration  Agency (JAXA) H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV) and the European Space  Agency’s (ESA) Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) vehicles will be used  for bringing up cargo. NASA’s reliance on the ATV and HTV assumes that  these vehicles will be ready to service the ISS by the time the shuttle stops  flying in 2010.
The new vehicles being developed by the European and Japanese space  agencies are very complex. The ATV had a development timeline of 20  years. Its first operational test flight to the ISS was in March 2008. NASA  has stated that both the European and Japanese vehicle development  programs experienced technical hurdles and budgetary constraints, but  are committed to fulfilling their roles as partners in the ISS program.  NASA officials told us they have confidence the European vehicle will be  available for ISS operations before retirement of the shuttle, but they are  not as confident about the Japanese vehicle’s being ready by that time. The  Japanese vehicle is still under development and has faced some setbacks.  NASA officials told us that the HTV’s first test launch is planned for July  2009.
section_title: International Partner Vehicles Have Constraints in Ability to Ferry Crew and Cargo to and from the ISS in Comparison to the Shuttle
paragraphs: In addition to potential development challenges, the international partner  vehicles have constraints in terms of what they can take to and from the  ISS in comparison to the shuttle. NASA’s current plans to manage the gap  after the shuttle retirement do not take into account the possibility of  delays in the development of these vehicles, and even if they do come on  line on time, NASA officials estimate that there will be a significant  shortfall to the ISS of at least 114,199 pounds (or 51.8 metric tons) in cargo  re-supply capability. These vehicles were designed to augment the  capabilities of the shuttle and have significantly less capability to deliver  cargo to the ISS. The shuttle can carry a maximum cargo of close to 38,000  pounds (17,175 kg.). In comparison, the European ATV’s maximum  capability is 16,535 pounds (7,500 kg.) and the Japanese HTV’s average  capability is 13,228 pounds (6,000 kg.). The HTV and ATV are expendable  vehicles. NASA can use them for trash removal, but cannot carry cargo or  scientific experiments back to earth because the vehicles disintegrate  when re-entering the atmosphere.
The Russian Progress and Soyuz vehicles also have very limited cargo  capacity. For example, the Progress has an average capability of 5,732  pounds (2,600 kg.)—roughly one-seventh the shuttle’s capability. The  Progress, like the ATV and HTV, is an expendable vehicle. The Soyuz can  transport three crew persons to the ISS and can serve as a rescue vehicle  capable of taking three crew members back to earth. Unlike the ATV and  HTV, the Soyuz does have the capacity to bring down cargo—roughly 132  pounds (60 kg.). NASA officials have stated that until NASA deploys its  new crew exploration vehicles or commercial vehicles become available,  NASA will be dependent on the Russian vehicles for crew transportation  services and on the Japanese and European vehicles for limited cargo  services whenever they become available.
Figure 7 compares the up mass capabilities of the various vehicles.
section_title: Commercial Vehicles
paragraphs: NASA is working with the commercial space sector through its  Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program to develop  and produce vehicles that can take equipment and crew to and from the  space station. NASA expects that these vehicles will be ready for cargo use  in 2010 and crew use in 2012. However, these vehicles have yet to be  successfully launched into orbit, and some NASA officials have  acknowledged that their development schedules leave little room for the  unexpected.
Under the COTS program, NASA has pledged $500 million to promote  commercial opportunities for space transportation vehicles. Using Space  Act agreements instead of traditional contracting mechanisms, NASA will  make payments to companies based on the achievement of key milestones  during the development of their vehicles. These agreements are both  funded and unfunded. For the two funded agreements that have been  reached, NASA stated that the commercial suppliers for space  transportation services will have customers outside of ISS, including  NASA’s Constellation program, which plans to send humans back to the  moon and eventually Mars. The COTS program will occur in phases. In the  first phase companies will demonstrate the vehicle launch and docking  capabilities with the ISS. The second phase is the procurement of services  for transportation of cargo and crew to the ISS, which is scheduled to  begin sometime in the 2010 timeframe.
NASA had seven COTS agreements through the Space Act. NASA signed  five unfunded Space Act agreements, which facilitate the sharing of  technical and ISS integration information between commercial companies  and NASA. NASA has funded two companies, Rocketplane Kistler (RpK)  and Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX). NASA officials stated that  through the funded Space Act agreements, SpaceX has received $139  million for its project and is still working on successfully launching a  vehicle that can reach low-Earth orbit. The company successfully  completed a critical design review in August 2007 and told us that it is  planning its first orbital demonstration test flight for June 2009. NASA  officials told us that RpK received $37 million in funding, but then forfeited  the remainder of its share because it did not meet certain financial  development milestones. When NASA began to redistribute these forfeited  funds, RpK filed a bid protest with GAO, which GAO denied. NASA  officials then moved forward and awarded $170 million to Orbital Sciences  Corporation in February 2008.
NASA officials acted quickly to award the forfeited money and expect that  SpaceX will have cargo capability available in 2010 (by the time the shuttle  is retired) and crew capability in 2012. While Space X has been meeting  key milestones in the development of its vehicle, some officials at the  Johnson Space Center were skeptical that COTS would be available on the  current projected schedule. Additionally, the International Space Station  Independent Safety Task Force (IISTF) reported that design, development  and certification of the new COTS program was just beginning and that “if  similar to other new program development activities, it most likely will  take much longer than expected and will cost more than anticipated.” In  our opinion, the schedule is optimistic when compared to other  government and commercial space programs we have studied. We will be  studying the COTS program and schedules in more detail in response to a  request of members of congress.
section_title: Ares I and Orion
paragraphs: NASA is under pressure to develop its own vehicles quickly as the space  shuttle’s retirement in 2010 means that there could be at least a 5-year gap  in our nation’s ability to send humans to space. Among the first major  items of NASA’s development efforts to implement the Vision program are  the development of new space flight systems—including the Ares I Crew  Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle. Ares I and Orion  are currently targeted for operation no later than 2015. NASA plans to use  these vehicles as they become available to service the space station.
However, we recently testified that there are considerable unknowns as to  whether NASA’s plans for the Ares I and Orion vehicles can be executed  within schedule goals, as well as what these efforts will ultimately cost.  This is primarily because NASA is still in the process of defining many of  the project’s performance requirements and some of these uncertainties  could affect the mass, loads, and weight requirements for the vehicles.  Such uncertainty has created knowledge gaps that are affecting many  aspects of both projects. For example, a design analysis cycle completed  in May 2007 revealed an unexpected increase in ascent loads (the physical  strain on the spacecraft during launch) that could result in increases to the  weight of the Orion vehicle and both stages of the Ares I.
NASA recognizes the risks involved with its approach and it is taking steps  to mitigate those risks. However, given the complexity of the Orion and  Ares I efforts and their interdependencies, any significant requirements  changes can have reverberating effects and make it extremely difficult to  establish firm cost estimates and schedule baselines. If knowledge gaps  persist, programs will cost more, fail to meet their schedules, or deliver  less than originally envisioned. Ultimately, NASA’s aggressive schedule  leaves little room for the unexpected. If something goes wrong with the  development of the Crew Launch Vehicle or the Crew Exploration Vehicle,  the entire Constellation Program could be thrown off course and the  return to human spaceflight further delayed.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: The decision to retire the space shuttle in 2010 has had profound effects  on the ISS program. It leaves little flexibility in the shuttle schedule. Any  delays could require NASA to choose between completing the station as  planned and the pre-positioning of needed critical spares. The decision  also leaves NASA dependent on Russia for crew rotation services until  other vehicles are developed and demonstrated. And even with the  development of these vehicles, NASA still faces a significant capacity  shortfall in its ability to provide logistical support to the station. The  shortfall may well impact support for a six person crew and the quality of  research that can be conducted on the ISS.  At the same time, it also  provides opportunities to commercial suppliers to demonstrate  capabilities that could have long-term benefits for future U.S. space  exploration and development.  We are not making recommendations as a  result of our review as NASA is well aware of the predicament it faces with  the station and has weighed options and trade-offs for the remainder of  the schedule manifest.  However, it is important that flexibility continue to  be maintained as events impacting schedule occur and that decisions be  made with the goal of maximizing safety and results.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or the other members may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further questions about this statement, please contact Cristina T.  Chaplain at (202) 512-4841. Individuals making key contributions to this  statement include James L. Morrison, Greg Campbell, Brendan S. Culley,  Masha P. Pastuhov-Purdie, Keo Vongvanith, and Alyssa B. Weir.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify the risks and challenges NASA faces in completing assembly of  the International Space Station by 2010, we    analyzed key documents and testimonies by NASA officials relating to the  challenges associated with ISS completion. This included: the delivery  schedule for ISS parts for assembly and the delivery schedule for  replacement units, the space shuttle manifest, budget documents and the  strategic maintenance plan, the ISS Independent Safety Task Force  Report, and previous GAO reports relating to the ISS.  interviewed NASA mission officials to obtain information on the status of  the ISS. We also discussed these issues with the International Partners  (Canadian Space Agency, European Space Agency and Japan Aerospace  Exploration Agency) to get their perspectives.
To determine the risks and challenges NASA faces in providing logistics  and maintenance support to the International Space Station after 2010, we    analyzed documents related to the up-mass and down-mass capabilities of  the International Partners and SpaceX vehicles, the shortfall in ISS up- mass for re-supply and sustainment, the new vehicles that will support ISS  NASA’s plans for using Russian vehicles to support ISS through what  NASA refers to as its “exemption,” and the impacts to the utilization of the  ISS.
We interviewed key NASA officials from NASA Headquarters, the Space  Operations Mission Directorate, NASA’s Commercial Orbital  Transportation Services program, and the ISS program officials, and  interviewed officials representing the International Partners To accomplish our work, we visited and interviewed officials responsible  for the ISS operations at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C., and the  Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. At NASA Headquarters, we met  with officials from the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate and the  Space Operations Mission Directorate, including representatives from the  International Space Station and space shuttle programs. We also met with  ISS and space shuttle mission officials at the Johnson Space Center.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to April 2008, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
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