Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions
Published: 2004-11-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the global war on terrorism have triggered the largest activation of National Guard forces since World War II. As of June 2004, over one-half of the National Guard's 457,000 personnel had been activated for overseas warfighting or domestic homeland security missions in federal and state active duty roles. In addition to increased usage, the Guard has also experienced long deployments and high demand for personnel with specific skills, such as military police. The high pace of operations and the Guard's expanded role since September 11 have raised concerns about whether the Guard is capable of successfully performing its multiple missions within existing and expected resource levels, especially given the challenges it faces in meeting future requirements. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the Guard is: (1) adapting to meet warfighting requirements in the post-September 11 security environment and (2) supporting immediate and emerging homeland security needs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army and the Air National Guard have begun adapting their forces to meet new warfighting requirements since the September 11 attacks, but some measures taken to meet short-term requirements have degraded the readiness of nondeployed units, particularly in the Army National Guard. To deploy ready units for overseas missions, the Army National Guard has had to transfer equipment and personnel from nondeploying units. Between September 11, 2001, and July 2004, the Army National Guard had performed over 74,000 personnel transfers. Similarly, as of May 2004, the Army National Guard had transferred over 35,000 equipment items to prepare deploying units, leaving nondeployed Army National Guard units short one-third of the critical equipment they need for war. The Army has developed plans, such as the Army Campaign Plan, to restructure its forces to better prepare them for future missions. However, it has not finalized detailed plans identifying equipment needs and costs for restructuring Guard units. Moreover, the Army is still structured and funded according to a resourcing plan that does not provide Guard units all the personnel and equipment they need to deploy in wartime, so the Army National Guard will be challenged to continue to provide ready units for operations expected in the next 3 to 5 years. The Air National Guard is also adapting to meet new warfighting requirements, but it has not been as negatively affected as the Army National Guard because it has not been required to sustain the same high level of operations. In addition, the Air National Guard generally maintains fully manned and equipped units. While the Army and the Air National Guard have, thus far, also supported the nation's homeland security needs, the Guard's preparedness to perform homeland security missions that may be needed in the future is unknown because requirements and readiness standards and measures have not been defined. Without this information, policy makers are not in the best position to manage the risks to the nation's homeland security by targeting investments to the highest priority needs and ensuring that the investments are having the desired effect. Since September 11, the Guard has been performing several unanticipated homeland missions, such as flying patrols over U.S. cities and guarding critical infrastructure. However, states have concerns about the preparedness and availability of Guard forces for domestic needs and natural disasters while overseas deployments continue at a high pace. The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to publish a comprehensive strategy for homeland security missions that DOD will lead. However, DOD has not reached agreement with multiple federal and state authorities on the Guard's role in such missions. Also, the National Guard Bureau has proposed initiatives to strengthen the Guard's homeland security capabilities. However, many of these initiatives are at an early stage and will require coordination and approval from other stakeholders, such as DOD and the states. In the absence of clear homeland security requirements, the Guard's preparedness to perform missions at home cannot be measured to determine whether it needs additional assets or training.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent launch of the  global war on terrorism have resulted in the largest activation of National  Guard forces—both Army and Air—since World War II. Within 1 month of  the September 11 attacks, the number of Army National Guard members  activated for federal missions more than quadrupled, from about 5,500 to  about 23,000. By June 2004, over 50 percent of the National Guard’s nearly  350,000 Army and 107,000 Air National Guard members had been activated  for overseas warfighting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, peacekeeping  operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, or homeland missions, such as guarding  active Air Force bases. These operations have resulted in a high demand  for Guard members overall and especially for those trained with certain  skills, such as security personnel and tanker pilots. As a result, National  Guard personnel have experienced lengthy and repeated deployments  since the September 11 terrorist attacks.
The National Guard holds a unique dual status in that it performs federal  missions under the command of the President and state missions under  the command of the state’s governor. After September 11, the Guard’s  duties were expanded to include supporting new homeland missions,  such as flying combat air patrols over U.S. cities, securing borders,  providing radar coverage for the continental United States, and protecting  civilian airports, Air Force bases, and other critical infrastructure.  Governors also activated the Guard to perform additional missions, such  as guarding bridges and nuclear power plants. Guard involvement in state  missions almost tripled in the year after the attacks, and it has remained  well above pre-September 11 levels. The Guard spent about 236,000 days  performing state missions in fiscal year 2001, and that number increased to  about 645,000 days in fiscal year 2002. State mission involvement  subsequently declined to almost 433,000 days in fiscal year 2003, more  than twice the level before September 11. This high pace of operations  has raised concerns about the National Guard’s ability to perform  warfighting and homeland missions successfully within its existing  resources and the challenges it faces in meeting these requirements in the  future.
The objectives of this report are to assess the extent to which the  National Guard is (1) adapting to meet current and future overseas  warfighting requirements in the post-September 11 security  environment and (2) supporting immediate and emerging homeland  security needs. We testified before the Committee on Government Reform  on April 29, 2004, and provided observations on high Guard usage and the  challenges the Guard faces in adapting to the demands of the new security  environment. This report updates information contained in our testimony  and concludes our work in response to your request.
To assess the objectives, we analyzed data on National Guard utilization  and readiness prior to and after September 11, 2001. We interviewed  officials in the Departments of Defense (DOD), Army, and Air Force and  the National Guard Bureau and supplemented this information with visits  to Army and Air Force commands and Army mobilization stations. We  also developed case studies of recent federal and state National Guard  operations in four states—Georgia, New Jersey, Oregon, and Texas. We  selected these states because they represent a mix of geographic areas,  Army and Air National Guard units with different specialties, and units  that had been or were expected to be activated for federal and/or state  missions. In each of these states, we visited the Adjutant General and  National Guard headquarters, as well as Army and Air National Guard  units that had been or will be involved in overseas or domestic missions.  We also reviewed documents on planned changes to the Army Guard’s  force structure, such as the Army Campaign Plan and the Army  Transformation Roadmap. We conducted our review in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards between April 2003 and  September 2004 and determined that the data used were sufficiently  reliable for our objectives. The scope and methodology used in our review  are described in further detail in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The National Guard of the United States, which performs both federal and  state missions, represents about 52 percent of the armed services’ selected  reserve and consists of approximately 457,000 members: about 350,000 in  the Army National Guard and about 107,000 in the Air National Guard.  Overall, the Army National Guard makes up more than one-half of the  Army’s ground combat forces and one-third of its support forces  (e.g., military police or transportation units) and has units in more  than 3,000 armories and bases in all 50 states and 4 U.S. territories.  Air National Guard personnel make up 20 percent of the total Air Force,  with 88 flying units and 579 mission support units at more than  170 installations throughout the United States. The majority of Guard  members are employed on a part-time basis, typically training 1 weekend  per month and 2 weeks per year. The Guard also employs some full-time  personnel who assist unit commanders in administrative, training, and  maintenance tasks. The National Guard Bureau is the federal entity  responsible for the administration of the National Guard.
National Guard personnel may be ordered to perform duty under three  different authorities: Title 10 or Title 32 of the United State Code or  pursuant to state law in a state active duty status. Personnel in a Title 10  status are federally funded and under federal command and control.  Personnel may enter Title 10 status by being ordered to active duty in their  status as federal Reserves, either voluntarily or under appropriate  circumstances involuntarily (i.e., mobilization). Personnel in Title 32 status  are federally funded but under state control. Title 32 is the status in which  National Guard personnel typically perform training for their federal  mission. Personnel performing state active duty are state-funded and  under state command and control. Under state law, the governor may  order National Guard soldiers to perform state active duty to respond to  emergencies, disasters, civil disturbances, and for other reasons  authorized by state law.
subsections: section_title: National Guard Federal Missions
paragraphs: The Guard is organized, trained, and equipped for its federal missions,  which take priority over state missions. As we reported in our April 2004  testimony, the National Guard’s involvement in federal operations has  increased substantially since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Three  days after the attacks, the President, under Title 10, authorized reservists  to be activated for up to 2 years. This authority was subsequently used to  activate reservists for overseas warfighting and stabilization missions in  Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as well as  for domestic missions, such as flying patrols and supporting federal  civilian agencies in guarding the nation’s borders. As figure 1 illustrates, as  of May 2004, about 102,800 Army and Air National Guard members—the  vast majority of whom were Army National Guard members—were on  active duty. Although both Army and Air National Guard activations  increased in the aftermath of September 11, the Air National Guard  activations had declined to pre-September 11 levels by October 2003, while  Army National Guard activations continued to rise.
When activated under Title 10, the National Guard is subject to the Posse  Comitatus Act, which prohibits the military from law enforcement  activities unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or law.
The Army and the Air Force have different strategies for structuring and  providing resources for their Guard components that reflect each service’s  planned use and available resources. While the Army National Guard’s  structure requires 375,000 personnel to be fully manned, in fiscal year  2004, the Army National Guard was authorized 350,000 soldiers resulting in  many units being manned below wartime requirements. Using DOD  planning guidance, Army National Guard units are provided varying levels  of resources according to the priority assigned to their warfighting  missions. Because much of the Army National Guard was expected to be  used as a follow-on force in the event of an extended conflict, many of its  units were structured with fewer personnel and lesser amounts of  equipment than they would need to deploy, with the assumption that there  would be time to supply additional personnel, equipment, and training  before these units would be needed. For example, Army National Guard  divisions, which include over 117,000 soldiers and provide the majority of  the combat capability in the Army National Guard, are supplied with 65 to  74 percent of their required personnel and 65 to 79 percent of their  required equipment, and are less ready for their missions. This approach to  managing limited resources is referred to as “tiered readiness.” In contrast,  the Air National Guard was integrated into the Air Force’s operational  force and maintained at readiness levels comparable to its active  component counterparts. This approach enables the Air National Guard to  be ready to deploy on short notice.
section_title: National Guard State Missions
paragraphs: Since September 11, Guard members have also been activated for missions  under the authority of state governors in both Title 32 and state active duty  statuses. Title 32 status is generally used to train National Guard units and  personnel to perform their federal mission. National Guard personnel also  may perform operational (nontraining) missions in Title 32 status when  authorized by federal statute.  According to DOD, after September 11, the  Guard performed other operational (nontraining) duties such as providing  airport security in Title 32 status in response to presidential direction.  National Guard personnel in Title 32 status have also provided support for  events such as the G-8 Summit and the Democratic and Republican  National Conventions. Also, National Guard personnel have served in a  state active duty status in response to natural disasters.
Additionally, the National Guard performs state missions under the  command and control of the governor, with costs for these missions  borne by the state. Guard missions typically performed in this status  include providing assistance in response to natural disasters such as  fires and storms that have not been declared federal disasters.
Since September 11, governors have increasingly used this authority to  activate Guard members to protect key assets in the states.
section_title: National Guard Has Been Adapting to Meet Current Warfighting Requirements, but Readiness Challenges Remain for Future Operations
paragraphs: Both at home and overseas, the Army and the Air National Guard have  been adapting in several ways to meet the demands of current warfighting  requirements, but some of the measures taken may challenge the Army  National Guard’s efforts to provide ready forces for future operations.  While the Army National Guard has met new warfighting requirements by  retraining some units to acquire in-demand skills, tailoring others to  provide particular capabilities, changing unit missions in some cases, and  transferring personnel and equipment to meet combatant commander  needs, these adaptations have reduced the readiness of its nondeployed  units, in turn challenging the Army National Guard to prepare for future  operations. The Army recognizes the need to restructure its active,  Reserve, and Guard forces to respond more effectively to the new global  security environment and is in the process of developing plans to make its  forces more modular. However, its plans for restructuring Army National  Guard forces are not finalized and do not provide detailed information on  time frames for restructuring all the Guard’s units, whether the Guard’s  equipment will be compatible with that of active units, or the costs of  implementing these plans. The Air National Guard has also adapted to  meet new warfighting requirements, but its readiness has not been as  negatively affected because it has not experienced continued high usage  as the Army National Guard has and because its units are more fully  equipped and manned for war.
subsections: section_title: Army National Guard Adaptation to Warfighting Requirements Reduced Readiness of Nondeployed Units
paragraphs: The Army National Guard has been adapting to the demands of current  warfighting requirements but faces future challenges in providing ready  forces for future operations. The recent increased and expanded use of  the National Guard illustrates the shift from the post-cold war military  planning strategy, in which much of the Guard represented a force to  follow the active military in the event of extended conflict, to an  operational force similar to the Air National Guard. Using this strategy, the  Army has generally maintained most Army National Guard units at lower  readiness levels under the assumption that additional personnel and  equipment would be provided prior to deployment. While the Army  National Guard’s adaptations since September 11 were intended to make  deploying units more useful for current operations, these adaptations have  caused the overall readiness of nondeployed Guard units to decline, which  may hamper the Guard’s ability to meet the requirements of future  warfighting operations overseas, particularly in Iraq.
subsections: section_title: Army Has Retrained Some Guard Units and Made Other Adjustments
paragraphs: To meet the high demand for Army National Guard personnel for recent  operations, the Army has alerted or mobilized over one-half of the Army  National Guard’s personnel since September 11. In June 2004, Army  National Guard activations peaked with almost 81,000 Army National  Guard members—more than one-quarter of the Army National Guard’s  force—activated for overseas military operations such as in Afghanistan  and Iraq. Personnel with certain skills have been in particularly high  demand. For example, as of June 2004, 95 percent of military police units  had deployed, with 23 percent having deployed more than once, and at  least 50 percent of units with specialties such as transportation, aviation,  medical, and special operations had been activated.
To alleviate the stress on these forces, the Army has retrained personnel in  units with less needed skills, such as field artillery, to provide skills in  higher demand. For example, the Army recently changed the mission of  27 artillery units and retrained over 7,000 personnel to meet the need for  additional military police and security forces. Some of these soldiers have  already deployed to Iraq to perform missions such as convoy security.
The Army has also adapted Guard units to meet the specific requirements  of current overseas missions by tailoring units for particular purposes.  In some cases, the Army took personnel with key capabilities from  existing units and created new, smaller units whose personnel had  skills specifically tailored to provide the capabilities required by the  combatant commander. For example, the Army extracted 55 soldiers  with military police skills from an armored battalion of about 600 soldiers  to perform a security mission at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. More than  35,000 Army National Guard soldiers—almost one-fifth of all soldiers  utilized—deployed in these newly created, tailored units to support  recent military operations. Over one-half of these tailored units (about  57 percent) were small, containing 10 or fewer soldiers. In addition to  extracting key capabilities, tailored units have also been used to address  personnel shortages in deploying units.
The Army has also changed the mission, organization, and tactics of some  deploying units, issuing them new or different equipment and adding  personnel to meet combatant commander requirements. For example, the  30th Infantry (Mechanized), an enhanced separate brigade that deployed  to Iraq in the spring of 2004, was directed to deploy as a motorized brigade  combat team with humvees instead of with all of its assigned heavy- tracked equipment such as Bradley fighting vehicles and tanks. To  accomplish this change, the unit required an infusion of personnel because  “light” units require more personnel than “heavy” units. In addition, the  unit underwent additional training on operating and maintaining the newly  issued equipment. This unit was operating in Iraq in its new, lighter  configuration at the time of this report.
section_title: Personnel Transfers into Deploying Units Have Degraded Personnel Readiness for Future Operations
paragraphs: To ready deploying units, the Army National Guard had to transfer  personnel from nondeploying units, but in doing so, it has degraded their  readiness. This, in turn, challenges the Guard’s efforts to provide ready  forces for future operations. To be ready to deploy, units need to have a  sufficient number of soldiers who are qualified to deploy. According to the  tiered-readiness policy, many National Guard units do not have all the  qualified soldiers they need to be ready for their missions. However, in  recent operations, the Army’s deployment goal for Guard combat units has  been to be fully manned and for unit personnel to be fully qualified for  their positions. To meet the requirements for units fully manned with  qualified personnel, the Guard transferred qualified soldiers from  nondeployed units. By July 2004, the National Guard had initiated over  74,000 personnel transfers to meet the combatant commander’s needs.
There are a number of reasons that Army National Guard units may not  have all of the personnel they need to deploy for their warfighting  missions. First, the Army National Guard is not funded to fully man all  its units to deployment standards. Second, some soldiers assigned to a  unit may not have completed required training. As of May 2004, over  71,000 Army National Guard soldiers were not fully trained for their  positions. Finally, soldiers may be unable to deploy overseas for personal  reasons, such as medical or dental problems, family issues, or legal  difficulties. As of June 2004, there were over 9,000 soldiers in the Army  National Guard who were identified as nondeployable. When two of the  Army National Guard’s enhanced separate brigades, some of its most  ready units, were activated for rotation to Iraq in 2003, only 74 percent of  their required personnel were qualified for their assigned positions and  deployable, leaving a shortfall of over 2,100 soldiers that had to be filled  from other units.
To minimize transfers of qualified soldiers from other units, the Army  Guard ordered 700 untrained soldiers between April and June 2004 to  report for training so they could become fully qualified in their positions  before their units were activated for overseas operations. However, the  Guard has not been able to address all of its shortfalls in this manner.  For example, the Army National Guard is preparing a combat division  headquarters and a number of its support units for deployment to Iraq in  2005. When the 42nd Infantry Division was alerted, it lacked 783 qualified  personnel—about 18 percent of the total personnel required—to meet  deployment requirements. As of June 2004, the National Guard was only  able to fill 415 of these positions through transfers of personnel from other  units, leaving 368 positions unfilled. Army National Guard officials expect  that the active Army will have to find personnel to address these shortfalls.  According to National Guard officials, additional soldiers with medical,  dental, legal, or family issues may be identified as nondeployable after  they are mobilized, so the number of personnel needed may rise.
As overseas operations continue, it is becoming increasingly challenging  for the Army National Guard to ready units because the number of soldiers  who have not been deployed and are available for future deployments has  decreased and the practice of transferring qualified personnel to deploying  units has degraded readiness of nondeployed units. Our analysis of the  decline in Army National Guard readiness between September 2001 and  April 2004 showed that the most frequently cited reasons for the decline in  personnel readiness of nondeployed units were that personnel were  already deployed or not available for deployment. Of the almost  162,000 soldiers who are available for future deployments, almost 36,000  are in nondeployable units that provide maintenance, medical, and legal  support to the Army National Guard. Approximately 9,000 additional  soldiers have medical or other conditions that prevent deployment, and  about 28,000 soldiers will need required training before they will be  available for deployment. This leaves approximately 89,000 soldiers who  are currently available to deploy for overseas operations. Because DOD  expects the high pace of operations to continue for the next 3 to 5 years  and estimates that operations will require 100,000 to 150,000 National  Guard and reserve personnel each year, the Army National Guard will  likely have to alert and mobilize personnel who have been previously  deployed.
section_title: Equipment Transfers to Deploying Units Have Degraded Equipment Readiness for Future Operations
paragraphs: Because the combatant commander has required Army National Guard  units to have modern, capable, and compatible equipment for recent  operations, the Army National Guard adapted its units and transferred  equipment to deploying units from nondeploying units. However, this  adaptation has made equipping units for future operations more  challenging. The Army equips units according to when it expects them to  be needed in combat; thus, the “first to fight” units are given the priority  for modern equipment. Based on post-cold war plans, it was assumed that  most Army National Guard units would follow active units and that there  would be sufficient time to provide them with the equipment they need for  their missions before they deployed. However, when National Guard units  were alerted for recent operations, they generally did not have sufficient  amounts of equipment or equipment that was modern enough to be  compatible with active units and to meet combatant commander  requirements.
For recent operations, the Army National Guard has had to fill the  shortages of equipment among deploying units by transferring equipment  from nondeploying units. National Guard data showed that in order to  ready units deploying to support operations in Iraq between September  2002 and May 2004, the National Guard transferred over 18,000 night vision  goggles, 1,700 chemical monitors, 900 wheeled vehicles, 700 radios, and  500 machine guns, among other items, from nondeploying units. As a  result, by June 2004, the Army National Guard had transferred more than  35,000 pieces of equipment and had critical shortagesof about 480  different types of items, including machine guns and heavy trucks. In total,  the Army National Guard’s nondeployed force lacks 33 percent of its  essential items and, as of June 2004, its stocks had been depleted to the  point where it had to request that the Army provide about 13,000 pieces of  equipment for its deploying units.
Equipment shortages were worsened when the combatant commander  and the National Guard Bureau barred Army National Guard units from  deploying with items that were incompatible with active Army equipment  or that could not be supported with spare parts in the area of operations.  For example, Army National Guard units equipped with 20 to 30-year-old  radios were barred from taking them to the Iraqi area of operations  because they cannot communicate with the Single Channel Ground Air  Radio System (SINCGARS) used by other Army units. Likewise, some of  the older rifles the Guard uses for training have been barred because they  use different ammunition than those of the active Army units. Moreover,  Guard units alerted for the earlier deployments were not equipped with  the most modern body armor and night vision goggles that the combatant  commander subsequently required for deploying units. After units were  identified for mobilization and deployment, the Army took some steps to  augment existing Guard equipment using supplemental wartime funding.
Our analysis of DOD data showed that the equipment readiness of  nondeployed units has continued to decline and, as overseas operations  continue, it has become increasingly challenging for the National Guard to  ready deploying units to meet warfighting requirements. As reported by  the National Guard, 87 percent of the 1,527 reporting units in fiscal year  2001 met their peacetime equipment readiness goals, which are often  lower than wartime requirements. By fiscal year 2002, only 71 percent of  the nondeployed reporting units met their peacetime equipment goals.  The report attributed this decrease in readiness posture to equipment  shortages and transfers among nondeployed units to fill shortages in  other units.
Initially, the Guard managed these transfers so that nondeploying units  shared the burden of providing resources to deploying units and could  remain at their planned readiness levels. However, this became  increasingly difficult as the number of activations mounted, and, in  November 2003, the Director of the Army National Guard issued a  memorandum to the states directing them to transfer equipment to  deploying units regardless of the impact on the readiness of remaining  units.
section_title: Plans to Restructure Army National Guard Are Not Fully Developed or Funded and May Not Address Future Readiness Challenges
paragraphs: The Army and the National Guard have recognized that the  post-September 11 security environment requires changes to the Guard’s  structure and an improvement in its readiness posture. However, in the  near term, the Army National Guard will have difficulty improving its  readiness for projected operations over the next 3 to 5 years under current  plans, which assume the Guard will be funded at peacetime readiness  levels. Over the longer term, DOD, the Army, and the National Guard have  initiated, but not completed, several restructuring efforts, including  moving some positions with high-demand skills out of the Guard and into  the active force, creating new standardized modular units that are flexible  to respond to combatant commander needs, and establishing predictable  deployments for units. To improve readiness, the Army National Guard  seeks to increase the amount of full-time support and qualified personnel  in its units. However, these measures will require additional funding. At  this time, it is not clear whether these planned actions will fully address  the difficulties the Army National Guard has experienced in supplying the  numbers and types of fully ready forces needed for the global war on  terrorism.
The Guard may be challenged in the near term to deploy units and sustain  the high pace of operations required by the global war on terrorism with  its current resources. While the costs of activated Army National Guard  units in wartime are borne by the active Army with funds provided  through supplemental appropriations, for recent operations the Guard has  had to ready its forces for mobilization using its existing resources. The  Army National Guard received $175 million in supplemental funding in  fiscal year 2003, for personnel and operation and maintenance, but it did  not receive additional fiscal year 2004 funding to ready nondeployed units  so they can train and gain proficiency before they are mobilized. In fiscal  year 2004, $111 million was reprogrammed from Army National Guard  personnel to Army National Guard operation and maintenance  appropriation accounts to support requirements for units before they were  mobilized. These funds were available because mobilized Army National  Guard personnel are paid by the active Army military personnel  appropriation. The 2005 President’s budget submission and long-term  funding plan are still based on the tiered-readiness approach. Because the  Army is in the process of developing a new budget and long-term funding  plan, it is not clear at this time whether future budget submissions will  include funding to support increased readiness levels.
For the long term, DOD and the Army are changing some units’ missions  to increase the availability of certain high-demand Army National Guard  units, such as military police and transportation units. They have also  taken steps to rebalance skills among the active and reserve forces to  decrease the burden of repeated deployments on reserve personnel who  have skills that are in great demand. To make more efficient use of its  forces, DOD is also planning to move military personnel out of positions  involving duties that can be performed by civilians or contractors and into  high-demand specialties, as well as taking advantage of technological  advances to reduce personnel needs. However, these initiatives are in the  early stages of implementation and the extent to which they will alleviate  the strain on Army National Guard forces due to the continuing high pace  of operations is uncertain.
In April 2004, the Army published The Army Campaign Plan that sets out  some specific objectives and assigns responsibilities for actions to be  taken to plan and execute ongoing operations and transform forces for the  future. A key element of the Army’s plan to transform its forces, including  National Guard units, is to restructure into “modular” units that can be  tailored to the specific needs of combatant commanders in future  operations. After restructuring, the Army National Guard expects to have  34 smaller, lighter brigades instead of its current 38 brigades. Current  plans call for converting Army National Guard units as they return from  overseas operations into brigades that share a common basic organization  with their active counterparts by 2010. Further, the Army has a goal of  restructuring its forces so that units will be authorized the qualified  personnel they require. However, the Army’s current plans do not  completely address how the Guard’s equipment will be modernized to  make it compatible with active Army equipment or include a detailed  schedule and funding needs for restructuring all Guard units, including  support units.
In addition, one of the Army National Guard’s initiatives to improve  readiness by increasing the amount of full-time support personnel within  its units is still based on its tiered-readiness model, which resources some  Guard units well below requirements. With this initiative, the Army  National Guard plans to increase the percentage of full-time personnel  gradually to about 71 percent of the personnel it needs by 2012. Full-time  Guard members enhance unit readiness by performing tasks such as  monitoring soldiers’ readiness, recruiting and training personnel, and  maintaining aircraft, supplies, and equipment. However, for fiscal year  2003, the Army National Guard was only funded for 59 percent of the  full-time personnel it needs to be fully manned, as compared to the Air  National Guard, which is staffed at 100 percent of its required full-time  support personnel. Without sufficient full-time personnel, these tasks,  which are critical to unit readiness, suffer.
The Army National Guard also has plans to increase the number of  qualified personnel in each unit by spreading its soldiers over fewer, in  some cases smaller, units. According to Army National Guard officials,  using this strategy could increase the number of qualified personnel to an  estimated 85 percent of unit requirements. However, Army deployment  goals for combat units are for 100 percent of deploying soldiers to be  qualified in their positions. Therefore, the Guard will likely still need to  transfer personnel when units are called to deploy.
To avoid overtaxing the force and improve deployment predictability, the  Army has developed a proposal to establish a rotational deployment cycle  for its Army National Guard units that would meet the Secretary of  Defense’s goal of no more than one deployment every 6 years. In  conjunction with this proposal, preliminary Army plans propose equipping  Guard units that are 4 to 5 years away from an expected deployment well  below wartime readiness standards. However, this model may be difficult  to achieve while the high pace of operations continues.
section_title: Air National Guard Efforts to Adapt to New Warfighting Requirements Facilitated by Its Structure and Funding at High-Readiness Levels
paragraphs: The Air National Guard, like the Army National Guard, has also adapted to  meet new warfighting requirements since September 11. It made several  adjustments to accommodate the higher pace of operations, including  extending tours of duty for some Guard personnel, calling up others  earlier than expected, and recently extending its rotational cycle to  lengthen the amount of time personnel are available for deployment.  However, the demands of ongoing operations have not been as detrimental  to the Air National Guard for two reasons. First, along with the Air Force  Reserve, the Air National Guard is funded to maintain readiness levels  similar to that of the active Air Force and is expected to be able to deploy  within 72 hours. Second, the Air National Guard has not been required to  sustain the same high level of activations as the Army National Guard.  Air National Guard activations declined to pre-September 11 levels of  about 10,000 by October 2003, and have since declined to about 6,000,  while the Army National Guard’s activations have continued to rise.  Between 2001 and 2003, the Air National Guard unit readiness declined as  a result of its high utilization of personnel and equipment, but Congress  provided additional funding to stabilize Air National Guard readiness.
To meet increased personnel requirements during the initial phases of  current operations, Air National Guard officials activated and deployed  personnel earlier than planned under their standard rotational deployment  cycle. In January 2003, Air Force officials said that over 320 personnel,  including some Air National Guard members, deployed about 45 days  earlier than usual. In addition, the Air Force also disrupted the normal  rotation cycle by extending tour lengths to meet increased requirements.  Air Force officials extended the duty tours of selected Air National Guard  personnel from the usual 90 days up to 179 days. For example, during the  preparation phase for Operation Iraqi Freedom the Air Force extended  the tours of almost 2,400 personnel, including some Air National Guard  personnel. To accommodate ongoing operational requirements, in  June 2004, the Air Force announced that most Air National Guard  personnel scheduled to deploy in future cycles would spend 120 days in  the deployment phase of their cycle. To accommodate the increased tour  lengths, the new rotational cycle will be 20 months in length, and Guard  personnel will train for 16 months and be eligible for deployment for  4 months.
Overall, Air National Guard unit readiness has declined since  September 2001 due to the increased demands for people and usage of  equipment. Our analysis of DOD data showed that commanders attributed  this decline in readiness primarily to personnel and equipment shortages,  damaged or inoperative equipment, and incomplete training. In addition,  Air National Guard officials in states we visited told us that meeting  current operational demands has resulted in fewer aircraft available to be  used for training at home and increased maintenance requirements on  aircraft being used in current operations. However, Air National Guard  officials told us that equipment readiness rates have remained steady  during fiscal year 2004, and they attributed this stabilization to  supplemental funding of $20 million in fiscal 2003 and $214 million in  fiscal year 2004 for operation and maintenance activities.
section_title: National Guard Has Supported Homeland Security Needs, but Its Readiness for Future Homeland Missions Is Not Measured
paragraphs: While Army and Air National Guard forces have, thus far, supported the  nation’s homeland security needs, the Guard’s preparedness to perform  homeland defense and civil support missions that may be needed in the  future cannot be measured because its role in these missions is not  defined, requirements have not been identified, and standards have not  been developed against which to measure preparedness. Since September  11, the Guard has performed a number of missions, including flying patrols  over U.S. cities and guarding critical infrastructure. However, state and  National Guard officials voiced concerns about preparedness and  availability of Guard forces as overseas deployments continue at a high  pace. Even though plans and requirements for the homeland missions the  Guard will support are not fully developed, DOD and the National Guard  Bureau have taken some actions to address potential needs.
subsections: section_title: Guard Forces Have Supported Homeland Security Missions, but States Have Concerns about Readiness for Future Missions
paragraphs: Since September 11, Army and Air National Guard forces have supported a  range of homeland security missions, primarily with the equipment DOD  has provided for their federal missions. For example, Army National  Guard units helped guard the nation’s borders and airports in the  aftermath of September 11, and they continue to guard key assets such  as nuclear power plants. Also, the Army National Guard is currently  providing security at U.S. military installations, including about 5,500 Army  National Guard soldiers guarding Air Force bases in the United States as  of June 2004. Similarly, Air National Guard units continue to fly patrol  missions over the United States.
We performed case studies in four states to examine how the Guard has  supported new homeland security missions. In all four states we visited  (New Jersey, Oregon, Georgia, and Texas), Guard officials reported that  their units supported homeland tasks for both state governors and federal  authorities. The following are examples of how the Army National Guard  has supported homeland missions since September 11:    The New Jersey Army National Guard provided security for bridges,  tunnels, and nuclear power plants for the state governor during 2003 and  continues to provide security at two nuclear power plants.
The Oregon Army National Guard provided security at federal  installations, such as the Umatilla Chemical Depot and Fort Lewis,  Washington, in 2002 and 2003.
The Texas Army National Guard performed border security, assisting  U.S. Customs agents from October 2001 to November 2002, and provided  security at Air Force installations and state nuclear power plants from  October 2001 to October 2002.
The Georgia Army National Guard provided airport security almost  immediately after September 11 and was still guarding Army bases and Air  Force facilities at the time of our visit in December 2003.
The Air National Guard has also been called on to perform new missions,  such as air patrols and providing radar coverage for the continental United  States. Air National Guard units in the states we visited played key roles in  homeland defense missions. For example:    The 177th Fighter Wing in New Jersey, which is strategically located near  major cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, and  Washington, D.C., took on the additional mission of flying patrols over  these cities. Through early November 2003, the 177th had flown 1,458 air  patrol missions.
The 147th Fighter Wing in Texas flew a total of 284 patrol missions over  New York City and Washington, D.C., between December 2001 and March  2002. Since September 11, the unit has also flown patrols over Houston,  the Gulf Coast, and in support of special events such as the Super Bowl  and the Winter Olympics.
Despite the Guard’s response to homeland needs, officials in all of the  states we visited expressed concerns about their Guards’ preparedness for  homeland security missions, especially given the high level of National  Guard deployments to operations outside of the United States. As figure 2  illustrates, at the beginning of June 2004, one-half of the 50 states and  4 territories had more than 40 percent of their Army National Guard forces  alerted, mobilized, or deployed for federal missions. Montana and Idaho  both had high numbers of soldiers alerted, mobilized, or deployed with  80 percent and 96 percent, respectively.
13 Vt. 78 N.H. 34 Mass. 47 R.I. 29 Conn. 59 N.J. 28 Del. 18 Md. 29 D.C. 30 P.R.
24 V.I.
Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of Air National Guard personnel who  volunteered or were mobilized or deployed as of the end of May 2004. In  contrast to the Army National Guard, only two states, New Hampshire and  Nevada, had more than 20 percent of their Air National Guard mobilized or  deployed, while 43 of the 54 states and territories had less than 10 percent  of their Air National Guard activated.
8 Vt. 26 N.H. 3 Mass. 8 R.I. 0 Conn. 4 N.J. 19 Del. 3 Md. 0 D.C. 2 P.R.
0 V.I.
Some Guard officials also expressed concerns that their states’ Guards had  not received additional federal funding to support homeland security  missions, even as homeland security missions are continuing and as the  homeland security advisory system threat level has risen. While the states  have funded some homeland security activities, such as guarding critical  infrastructure, and purchased some equipment, such as decontamination  equipment, officials said that homeland security requirements must  compete with other needs in limited state budgets. Furthermore, state  officials said that the Guard is not generally eligible for funding from the  Department of Homeland Security because its grants are limited to “first  responders,” such as police or firefighters. Officials in all four states we  visited raised concerns about their Guards’ readiness for homeland  security and other state missions. For example:    New Jersey Guard units that responded to a terrorist threat alert in  December 2003 reported that they lacked some essential equipment,  such as humvees, night vision equipment, cold weather gear, chemical  protective suits, and nerve agent antidote. The state paid for some  essential equipment for its Guard forces during this time on an emergency  basis. At the time of our visit, New Jersey was preparing to deploy large  numbers of its state Guard personnel overseas and was determining how it  would respond to another terrorist threat with almost 60 percent of its  forces unavailable.
Georgia officials told us that hosting the 2004 International Economic  Summit of Eight Industrialized Nations, known as the G-8 Summit, in June  2004, increased Georgia’s security missions such as aerial reconnaissance  and surveillance, at a time when its Army National Guard aviation units  were deployed overseas. National Guard units from 12 other states  participated. The state also received federal funds for the G-8 Summit,  which reimbursed the state for costs of activating Guard personnel. In  addition, recognizing the Guard’s unique role in homeland security, active  component forces were commanded by a National Guard general for this  operation—a new arrangement designed to provide unity of command for  homeland missions that defense officials stated might serve as a model for  the future.  In 2002, the state of Oregon called up more than 1,400 Army National  Guard soldiers to respond to one of the worst forest fire seasons in a  century. Oregon officials said that because many of the state’s Guard  forces and equipment were deployed and the state had only limited  engineering capability left, it would not be able to provide the same level  of support to civilian authorities if similar circumstances were to occur.
All of the Texas Guard’s aviation assets that would be needed to fight fires  and all of the state’s military police were deployed at the time of our visit.  However, Texas officials said that the state had been able to meet their  homeland security needs, even at the height of its Guard’s overseas  deployments, because its largest Army National Guard unit had not been  fully deployed and, as a large state, it had ample state emergency response  capability.
States are developing plans and examining resources currently available  to them to address homeland security needs. For example, each state is  developing a plan for protecting its infrastructure sites. Additionally, most  states have entered into mutual assistance agreements that may provide  them access to another state’s National Guard forces in times of need.  These agreements, known as Emergency Management Assistance  Compacts, are typically used to facilitate access to additional forces for  natural disaster response. However, it is not clear whether these  arrangements will always meet the states’ needs for forces or capabilities  for homeland security because, under Emergency Management Assistance  Compacts, states can withhold their forces if they are needed in their  home state. This situation occurred in one of our case study states.  According to state officials, New Jersey has faced an elevated terrorist  threat due to specific threats against the state as well as its proximity to  New York City. The officials said they requested access to another state’s  Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team on three occasions prior  to 2004. On two occasions, the request was not granted because officials in  the team’s home state determined that it was needed at home. When New  Jersey made a third request, in response to a specific and credible terrorist  threat, access was approved.
section_title: DOD Lacks Plans and Requirements to Measure Preparedness for Homeland Missions but Is Taking Some Actions to Prepare
paragraphs: DOD’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense  and the Northern Command are charged with leading DOD’s efforts in  homeland defense, and while they have taken some actions, they have not  completed developing requirements or preparedness standards and  measures for the homeland missions in which the National Guard is  expected to participate. DOD plans to publish a comprehensive strategy  for the homeland defense. Until the strategy is finalized, the Northern  Command will not be able to complete its planning to identify the full  range of forces and resources needed for the homeland missions it may  lead or civil support missions in which active or reserve forces should be  prepared to assist federal or state civilian authorities. Without this  information, policy makers are not in the best position to manage risks to  the nation’s homeland security by targeting investments to the highest  priority needs and ensuring that the investments are having the desired  effect.
While the Guard has traditionally undertaken a wide variety of missions  for states, it is organized, trained, and equipped to perform a warfighting  mission. DOD measures the readiness of its forces for combat missions  by identifying the personnel and equipment required to successfully  undertake the mission and assessing the extent to which units have the  resources they need. Typically, Guard forces are expected to perform civil  support missions with either the resources supplied for their warfighting  missions or the equipment supplied by the state. Guard officials said that  units have supported state missions with capabilities such as aviation,  military police, medical, and others, as needs have arisen.
However, in the post-September 11 environment, Guard forces may be  expected to perform missions that differ greatly from their warfighting or  traditional state missions and may require different equipment, training,  and specialized capabilities than they currently possess. Homeland  missions, such as providing large-scale critical infrastructure protection or  responding to weapons of mass destruction events in the United States,  could differ substantially from conditions expected on the battlefield or  from more traditional state missions, such as responding to natural  disasters or civil disturbances. For example, New Jersey units that  responded to a terrorist threat alert in December 2003 reported that they  lacked some essential equipment such as humvees, night vision  equipment, cold weather gear, chemical protective suits, and nerve agent  antidote. In addition, state officials said that other items, such as pepper  spray, which are not routinely supplied to all types of units for their  warfighting mission, might be useful for potential homeland missions  involving crowd control. New Jersey subsequently paid for some essential  equipment for its forces during this time on an emergency basis. Until the  requirements for personnel and equipment are better defined, DOD cannot  measure how prepared Guard forces are for the missions they may be  called to undertake. To finalize its plans, the Northern Command will have  to coordinate with federal agencies, such as the Department of Homeland  Security, and state emergency management offices to ascertain their needs  for Guard support. Furthermore, it will have to balance the needs for  National Guard forces at home and overseas.
Since 1999, DOD has maintained full-time Guard forces in Weapons of  Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams that are dedicated to homeland  security missions. These teams are comprised of 22 full-time personnel  and are maintained at the highest readiness levels and can respond rapidly  to support civil authorities in an event involving a weapon of mass  destruction. Their role is to assist local officials in determining the nature  of the attack, provide medical and technical advice, and help to identify  follow-on federal and state assets that might be needed. Congress has  authorized at least one team for each state and territory. Currently,  32 teams are fully operational, with the remaining 23 estimated to be  operational by 2007. These teams are federally funded and trained but  perform their mission under the command and control of the state  governor.
The National Guard Bureau has proposed some additional initiatives that  are in varied stages of implementation, which are intended to further  prepare states for meeting homeland security needs. For example, the  National Guard Bureau has:    Set up a pilot program in April 2004 in 6 states (California, Colorado,  Georgia, Minnesota, New York, and West Virginia) to jointly assess with  state officials critical infrastructure protection policy, tactics, procedures,  and implementation.
Established a regional task force to provide the capability for 12 states  to respond to a weapon of mass destruction event. These Guard forces  are designed to locate and extract victims from a contaminated  environment, perform mass casualty/patient decontamination, and  provide medical triage and treatment in response to one of these events.
The 12 participating states are New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,  West Virginia, Illinois, Missouri, Florida, Texas, Colorado, California,  Washington, and Hawaii.
Proposed an initiative to distribute Guard personnel with key capabilities,  including aviation, military police, engineering, transportation, medical,  chemical, and ordnance, to each state and territory. When stationing  personnel with these capabilities in a state or territory is not possible, the  National Guard Bureau will try to maintain all capabilities within the  geographical region.
Developed a proposal for rotational deployment of Guard forces that  would enable each state to retain 50 percent of its Guard in the state to  respond to homeland security missions and to support civil authorities,  while 25 percent of the state’s forces deploy, and 25 percent prepare for  future deployments.
While these initiatives would provide enhanced capability for homeland  security in the National Guard, they will require coordination with the  Army and the Air Force as well as with the states, and they might face  implementation challenges. For example, the Chief of the National Guard  Bureau has developed a proposal to station a mix of forces with skills  useful for state missions within each state and presented the proposal to  state governors. However, the Army, the Air Force, Congress, and others  are also involved in making such decisions. Similarly, implementing the  National Guard’s proposal to retain 50 percent of a state’s Guard at  home for homeland security and civil support missions has not been  implemented and could be difficult to achieve during periods of  high-military operations. Officials from the U.S. Army Forces Command,  the Army command that selects Army Guard personnel for federal  activation, said that while they try to minimize the impact of federal  mobilizations on the states, this becomes more and more difficult as the  level of federal activations increases.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The September 11 terrorist attacks and the global war on terrorism have  placed new demands for ready forces on the National Guard—especially  the Army National Guard—for overseas, homeland security, and homeland  defense operations. At the same time, it is apparent that the Army National  Guard’s structure as a follow-on force to the active Army is not consistent  with its current use as an operational force. The current demands for large  numbers of fully manned and equipped forces to support overseas  operations have forced the Guard to transfer personnel and equipment  from nondeploying units to deploying units, degrading the readiness of the  nondeployed units. This continued decline in readiness of nondeployed  units hinders the Army National Guard’s ability to continue to provide the  ready forces in the short term that DOD estimates will be needed to meet  operational needs over the next 3 to 5 years. However, DOD’s current  budget continues to fund the Guard at peacetime levels, and it is not clear  whether future budgets will include funding to improve readiness. In the  longer term, while DOD is reevaluating its strategy for the new security  environment, it is important for it to decide what the role of the National  Guard will be in the 21st century. This decision is important because it  will determine the missions for which the Guard will have to prepare,  the number and types of units it will need, and how much personnel,  equipment, and training it should be provided. Furthermore, until DOD  establishes the Guard’s role in the post-September 11 environment and  develops a strategy to prepare its forces to meet new demands, it cannot  be sure that it is best managing risks by investing its resources to target  the highest priority needs and Congress, in turn, will not have detailed  information on which to base funding and policy decisions. Continuing to  structure and fund the Guard under current policy will result in continued  personnel transfers and readiness declines for its units that may hamper  its ability to sustain much needed Guard involvement in the global war on  terrorism over the long term.
At the same time that the Guard’s overseas missions have increased— reducing the personnel and equipment available for state missions— homeland security needs have also increased. However, DOD has not fully  defined what role the National Guard will have in the homeland missions  DOD will lead or support and how it will balance this role with its  increased participation in overseas operations. Absent a clearly defined  role for all its homeland missions, the Guard cannot identify requirements  for successfully executing this role and the standards and measures it will  use to assess preparedness for all its homeland missions. Until it has these  standards and measures, DOD does not have the means to determine  whether the Guard is prepared to meet homeland security needs with its  current structure and assets. As such, policy makers are not in the best  position to manage the risks to the nation’s homeland security by targeting  investments to the highest priority needs and ensuring that they are having  the desired effect.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army to develop and submit to Congress a strategy that addresses the  Army National Guard’s needs for the global war on terrorism, including  the Army National Guard’s anticipated role, missions, and requirements  for personnel and equipment in both the near and long term. The  near-term portion of the strategy should address the current decline in  readiness for overseas missions and the Army National Guard’s plans to  provide the ready forces needed for the global war on terrorism over the  next 3 to 5 years. Specifically it should include    an analysis of how support for current operations will affect the readiness  of nondeployed Army National Guard forces for future overseas and  domestic missions and    a plan to manage the risk associated with the declining readiness of  nondeployed Army National Guard forces, including identifying funding  for any personnel and equipment required to mitigate unacceptable levels  of risk.
The long-term portion of the strategy should detail how the Army plans to  restructure and provide the Guard resources—personnel, equipment, and  training—consistent with its 21st century role, including    how the Army National Guard will be restructured to support future  missions and ensure operational compatibility with active forces and  the time frames for implementing restructuring actions, the resources  needed to achieve compatibility with active forces and the appropriate  level of readiness for their missions.
As DOD completes its homeland defense strategy and the Northern  Command refines its concept and operational plans for homeland defense  and support to civil authorities and defines requirements, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretaries of Defense for  Policy and for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the Chairman  of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander of the U.S. Northern Command,  Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, the Chiefs of the Army and the  Air Force, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and appropriate  officials in the Department of Homeland Security, to take the following  four actions:    Establish the full range of the National Guard’s homeland missions,  including those led by DOD and those conducted in support of civilian  authorities.
Identify the National Guard’s capabilities to perform these missions and  any shortfalls in personnel, equipment, and training needed to perform  these missions successfully.
Develop a plan that addresses any shortfalls of personnel, equipment, and  training, assigns responsibility for actions, establishes time frames for  implementing the plan, and identifies required funding.
Establish readiness standards and measures for the Guard’s homeland  security missions so that the readiness for these missions can be  systematically measured and accurately reported.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written  comments on a draft of this report. The department generally agreed with  our recommendations and cited actions it is taking to implement them.  DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that DOD develop and  submit to Congress a strategy that addresses the Army National Guard’s  short- and long-term needs for the global war on terrorism, including the  Army National Guard’s role, missions, and requirements for personnel and  equipment, and its plans to manage the risk associated with the declining  readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard forces. In its comments,  DOD said that the Army has conducted the recommended analysis,  developed a plan as outlined in the Army Campaign Plan, and  communicated its plan to numerous members of Congress. We agree  that the Army Campaign Plan is a significant step in planning to address  National Guard readiness problems because it identifies goals and  objectives and assigns responsibilities for actions to plan for transforming  its forces. However, we believe the Army Campaign Plan does not fully  meet the intent of our recommendation because it lacks specificity about  how the Army will address the readiness of nondeployed Army National  Guard forces in the near term, how all Guard units will be converted to the  modular design, or how the Guard’s equipment will be modernized to  make it compatible with active Army equipment. Furthermore, DOD has  not identified the funding needed for restructuring all Guard units,  including support units. Therefore, we believe the Army should develop  more detailed plans to fully implement our recommendation. In its  comments, DOD said that the Army agrees that it should continue its  analysis to identify and minimize readiness impacts to the current force.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish the full range of the  National Guard’s homeland missions, to identify the capabilities needed to  perform those missions and develop a plan to address any shortfalls, and  to establish readiness standards and measures for the Guard’s homeland  security missions. However, in its comments, DOD said it would take a  different approach to accomplishing the tasks than we recommended.  Rather than having the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense take the  lead in all four areas as we recommended, DOD said that the Under  Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness, working in close coordination, should take the  lead in implementing the actions we recommended. We believe the  approach DOD proposes meets the intent of our recommendation, and we  have modified the wording of our recommendation to reflect the proposed  change in organizational responsibilities.
As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents  of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 7 days from  the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Secretary of  Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force; the Chief, National  Guard Bureau; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We  will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this  report will be available at no charge on the GAO Website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-4402. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We interviewed officials in the Army National Guard, the Air National  Guard, the National Guard Bureau, and the Department of the Army  and Department of the Air Force headquarters. We supplemented this  information with visits to several Department of Defense (DOD) offices,  including the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve  Affairs; the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Joint  Force Headquarters, Homeland Security. We also developed case  studies of recent federal and state National Guard operations in  four states—Georgia, New Jersey, Oregon, and Texas. The states were  chosen to represent a mix of geographic areas, Air and Army National  Guard units with different specialties, and units that had been or expected  to be activated for state or federal missions. In each state we visited the  Adjutant General and offices within the Joint National Guard  headquarters. We also interviewed leaders from a field artillery battalion,  an armor battalion, two enhanced brigades, an air control wing, an airlift  wing, an air-refueling wing, and three fighter wings.
To examine the National Guard’s warfighting requirements in this  post-September 11, 2001 security environment, we obtained and analyzed  data on state and federal activations of the Army and the Air National  Guard before and after September 11, 2001. We supplemented this with  interviews, briefings, and documentation from officials from the four case  study states and from the National Guard Bureau, the U.S. Army Forces  Command, First Air Force, and the U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command  and Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center. To examine the ways in  which the National Guard has adapted for its new missions, we  interviewed officials in the four case study states and officials at Army  mobilization stations at Fort Hood, Texas, Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort  Dix, New Jersey, and at the First and Fifth Continental United States  Armies. To identify Guard usage trends and stressed capabilities, we  analyzed DOD’s personnel tempo database, Army National Guard and Air  National Guard data on the types of units mobilized, and information from  the Army National Guard on the transformation of field artillery and other  support units into military police and security force units. We obtained  information on personnel and equipment transfers from the National  Guard Bureau and information on equipment shortages from DOD  publications and reports. We reviewed equipment data, interviewed data  sources, and obtained information on data collection methods and internal  control measures applied to the data. We determined the equipment data  were sufficiently reliable for our objectives. We also reviewed documents  on planned changes to the Army Guard’s force structure, such as the Army  Campaign Plan and the Army Transformation Roadmap. We also discussed  personnel, training, and equipment issues with unit, state, Guard Bureau,  and mobilization station officials and force providers.
To assess the National Guard’s emerging homeland security needs, in each  of the four case study states we interviewed Guard homeland security  officials and leaders from Army and Air National Guard units with recent  homeland security experience. We also met with officials from the  National Guard Bureau (Homeland Defense), the Department of the Army,  three Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, the Air Combat  Command and Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center, the Army  Forces Command, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Reserve Affairs (Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities) (now part  of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)), the Joint  Director of Military Support, and the Joint Task Force, Civil Support.  We also obtained information from the U.S. Joint Forces Command  and reviewed unclassified, publicly available documents from the  U.S. Northern Command. In addition, we reviewed the National Guard’s  role in rotation plans for future operations. We identified the challenges  facing DOD, the states, and Congress in organizing and equipping the  Guard for both overseas and homeland security missions based upon  our analysis of the Guard’s current status and discussions with National  Guard officials.
We conducted our review between April 2003 and September 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our  objectives. For example, we interviewed data sources about how they  ensured their own data accuracy and reviewed their data collection  methods, standard operating procedures, and other internal control  measures. We reviewed available data for inconsistencies, and, when  applicable, performed computer testing to assess data validity and  reliability.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the persons named above Suzanne Wren, Barbara Gannon,  James Lewis, Tina Morgan, Jacquelyn Randolph, V. Malvern Saavedra,  Alissa Czyz, Kenneth Patton, Jennifer Popovic, and Jay Smale also made  major contributions to this report.
section_title: GAO’s Mission
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subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
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