Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed a Strategic Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain
Published: 2011-07-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony discusses our past work examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and efforts in planning, developing, and deploying its global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA). The overall mission of the GNDA is to use an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. Terrorists smuggling nuclear or radiological material into the United States could use these materials to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device (also called a "dirty bomb"). The detonation of a nuclear device in an urban setting could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and devastate buildings and physical infrastructure for miles. While not as damaging, a radiological dispersal device could nonetheless cause hundreds of millions of dollars in socioeconomic costs as a large part of a city would have to be evacuated--and possibly remain inaccessible--until an extensive radiological decontamination effort was completed. Accordingly, the GNDA remains our country's principal strategy in protecting the homeland from the consequences of nuclear terrorism. The GNDA is a multi-departmental effort coordinated by DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). DNDO is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. Federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings. However, DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection strategies along other potential pathways and has identified several gaps in the GNDA, including (1) land border areas between ports of entry into the United States; (2) international general aviation; and (3) small maritime craft, such as recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels. Developing strategies, technologies, and resources to address these gaps remains one of the key challenges in deploying the GNDA. Some progress has been made, but DHS and other federal agencies have yet to fully address gaps in the global nuclear detection architecture. Specifically, this testimony discusses DHS's efforts to (1) address our prior recommendations to develop a strategic plan for the GNDA, including developing strategies to prevent smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials via the critical gaps DNDO identified, (2) complete the deployment of radiation detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the United States at ports of entry, and (3) develop new technologies to detect nuclear or radioactive materials. This testimony is based on our prior work on U.S. government efforts to detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials issued from October 2002 through September 2010. We updated this information in July 2011 to reflect DHS's efforts to address our prior recommendations by meeting with DNDO officials and reviewing recent DNDO documents, such as the 2010 GNDA Strategic Plan and the 2011 GNDA Joint Annual Interagency Review.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In summary, since December 2010, DNDO has issued both a strategic plan to guide the development of the GNDA and an annual report on the current status of the GNDA. The new strategic plan addressed some key components of what we previously recommended be included in a strategic plan, such as identifying the roles and responsibilities for meeting strategic objectives. However, neither the plan nor the annual report identifies funding needed to achieve the strategic plan's objectives or employs monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic progress and identify needed improvements. DHS officials informed us that they will address these missing elements in an implementation plan, which they plan to issue before the end of this year. As we reported in September 2010, DHS has made progress in deploying both radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo entering the United States through land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials. For example, according to DHS officials, the department scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the United States through land borders and major seaports. However, as we reported in July 2011, DHS has experienced challenges in developing new technologies to detect nuclear and radiological materials, such as developing and meeting key performance requirements. DHS has plans to enhance its development and acquisition of new technologies, although it is still too early to assess their impact on addressing the challenges we identified in our past work.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We are pleased to be here today to discuss our past work examining the  Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) progress and efforts in  planning, developing, and deploying its global nuclear detection  architecture (GNDA). The overall mission of the GNDA is to use an  integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction  activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S.  border, and inside the United States. Terrorists smuggling nuclear or  radiological material into the United States could use these materials to  make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device  (also called a “dirty bomb”). The detonation of a nuclear device in an  urban setting could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and  devastate buildings and physical infrastructure for miles. While not as  damaging, a radiological dispersal device could nonetheless cause  hundreds of millions of dollars in socioeconomic costs as a large part of a  city would have to be evacuated—and possibly remain inaccessible—until  an extensive radiological decontamination effort was completed.  Accordingly, the GNDA remains our country’s principal strategy in  protecting the homeland from the consequences of nuclear terrorism.
The GNDA is a multi-departmental effort coordinated by DHS’s Domestic  Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). DNDO is also responsible for  developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment to  support the efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. Federal efforts to  combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of  entry, such as seaports and land border crossings. However, DNDO has  also been examining nuclear detection strategies along other potential  pathways and has identified several gaps in the GNDA, including (1) land  border areas between ports of entry into the United States; (2)  international general aviation; and (3) small maritime craft, such as  recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels. Developing strategies,  technologies, and resources to address these gaps remains one of the  key challenges in deploying the GNDA.
Even before DNDO’s inception in 2005, we were highlighting the need  for a more comprehensive strategy for nuclear detection. In 2002, we  reported on the need for a comprehensive plan for installing radiation  detection equipment, such as radiation portal monitors, at all U.S. border  crossings and ports of entry. We reported that this plan should (1)  address vulnerabilities and risks; (2) identify the complement of radiation  detection equipment that should be used at each type of border entry  point—air, rail, land, and sea—and whether equipment could be  immediately deployed; (3) identify longer-term radiation detection needs;  and (4) develop measures to ensure that the equipment is adequately  maintained. More recently, in July 2008, we testified that DNDO had not  developed an overarching strategic plan and recommended that DHS  coordinate with the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State to  develop one. In January 2009, we recommended that the Secretary of  Homeland Security develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the  global nuclear detection strategy to help ensure the success of initiatives  aimed at closing gaps and vulnerabilities in the United States. We stated  that this plan should focus on, among other things, establishing time  frames and costs for the three gaps DNDO had identified—land border  areas between ports of entry, aviation, and small maritime vessels. DHS  agreed with the recommendation that we made in our 2008 testimony on  the need for an overarching strategic plan to guide future efforts to  combat nuclear smuggling and move toward a more comprehensive  global nuclear detection strategy. DHS did not comment on our 2009  recommendation to develop a plan for the domestic portion of the GNDA  but noted that it aligned with DNDO’s past, present, and future actions.
As we will discuss today, some progress has been made, but DHS and  other federal agencies have yet to fully address gaps in the global nuclear  detection architecture. Specifically, this testimony discusses DHS’s efforts  to (1) address our prior recommendations to develop a strategic plan for  the GNDA, including developing strategies to prevent smuggling of  nuclear or radiological materials via the critical gaps DNDO identified, (2)  complete the deployment of radiation detection equipment to scan all  cargo and conveyances entering the United States at ports of entry, and  (3) develop new technologies to detect nuclear or radioactive materials.
This testimony is based on our prior work on U.S. government efforts to  detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials  issued from October 2002 through September 2010. We updated this  information in July 2011 to reflect DHS’s efforts to address our prior  recommendations by meeting with DNDO officials and reviewing recent  DNDO documents, such as the 2010 GNDA Strategic Plan and the 2011  GNDA Joint Annual Interagency Review. Our comments on DNDO’s  efforts to develop new technologies to detect nuclear material are based  on our prior work on DHS’s progress and challenges developing and  acquiring new technologies issued from May 2009 through July 2011.  Details on the scope and methodology for those reviews are available in  our published reports. We conducted this work in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary, since December 2010, DNDO has issued both a strategic  plan to guide the development of the GNDA and an annual report on the  current status of the GNDA. The new strategic plan addressed some key  components of what we previously recommended be included in a  strategic plan, such as identifying the roles and responsibilities for  meeting strategic objectives. However, neither the plan nor the annual  report identifies funding needed to achieve the strategic plan’s objectives  or employs monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic progress  and identify needed improvements. DHS officials informed us that they  will address these missing elements in an implementation plan, which  they plan to issue before the end of this year.
As we reported in September 2010, DHS has made progress in deploying  both radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan  cargo entering the United States through land and sea ports of entry for  nuclear and radiological materials. For example, according to DHS  officials, the department scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and  conveyances entering the United States through land borders and major  seaports. However, as we reported in July 2011, DHS has experienced  challenges in developing new technologies to detect nuclear and  radiological materials, such as developing and meeting key performance  requirements. DHS has plans to enhance its development and  acquisition of new technologies, although it is still too early to assess their  impact on addressing the challenges we identified in our past work.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Developed a Strategic Plan for GNDA, but It Does Not Yet Discuss Key Elements for Addressing Gaps
paragraphs: In our past work on GNDA, we made recommendations about the need  for a strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA. Among other  things, in July 2008, we recommended that DHS develop an overall  strategic plan for the GNDA that (1) clearly defines the objectives to be  accomplished, (2) identifies the roles and responsibilities for meeting  each objective, (3) identifies the funding necessary to achieve those  objectives, and (4) employs monitoring mechanisms to determine  programmatic progress and identify needed improvements. In January  2009, we also recommended that DHS develop strategies to guide the  domestic aspects of the GNDA including establishing time frames and  costs for addressing previously identified gaps in the GNDA—land border  areas between ports of entry, international general aviation, and small  maritime vessels. DHS concurred with our 2008 recommendation to  develop an overall strategic plan and did not comment on our 2009  recommendation to develop a plan for the domestic portion of the GNDA,  but noted that it aligned with DNDO’s past, present, and future actions.
In December 2010, DNDO issued a strategic plan for the GNDA. The  strategic plan establishes a broad vision for the GNDA, identifies cross- cutting issues, defines several objectives, and assigns mission roles and  responsibilities to the various federal entities that contribute to the GNDA.  For example, the Department of Energy has the lead for several aspects  of enhancing international capabilities for detecting nuclear materials  abroad, DHS has the lead for detecting nuclear materials as they cross  the border into the United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission has the lead on reporting and sharing information on lost or  stolen domestic radiological material. In addition, earlier this year, DNDO  released the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Joint Annual  Interagency Review 2011. This review describes the current status of  GNDA and includes information about the multiple federal programs that  collectively seek to prevent nuclear terrorism in the United States.
However, neither the strategic plan nor the 2011 interagency review  identifies funding needed to achieve the strategic plan’s objectives nor  establishes monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic progress  and identify needed improvements—key elements of a strategic plan that  we previously identified in our recommendations. Furthermore, while the  plan and the 2011 interagency review discuss previously identified gaps  in the domestic portion of the architecture, neither discusses strategies,  priorities, timeframes, or costs for addressing these gaps.
In our view, one of the key benefits of a strategic plan is that it is a  comprehensive means of establishing priorities, and using these priorities  to allocate resources so that the greatest needs are being addressed. In  times of tight budgets, allocating resources to address the highest  priorities becomes even more important. Accordingly, while DNDO’s new  strategic plan represents an important step forward in guiding the  development of the GNDA, DNDO could do more to articulate strategies,  priorities, timeframes and costs in addressing gaps and further deploying  the GNDA in order to protect the homeland from the consequences of  nuclear terrorism. In discussing these issues with DHS officials, they  indicated that they will be producing a GNDA implementation plan later  this year that will address several of these issues.
section_title: DHS Continues to Make Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment
paragraphs: As we reported in June 2010, DHS has made significant progress in  deploying both radiation detection equipment and developing procedures  to scan cargo and conveyances entering the United States through fixed  land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials,  deploying nearly two-thirds of the radiation portal monitors identified in its  deployment plan. According to DHS officials, the department scans nearly  100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the United States  through land borders and major seaports. However, as we reported, DHS  has made less progress scanning for radiation in (1) railcars entering the  United States from Canada and Mexico; (2) international air cargo; and  (3) international commercial aviation aircraft, passengers, or baggage.
subsections: section_title: Fixed Land and Sea Ports of Entry
paragraphs: According to DHS officials, since November 2009, almost all non-rail land  ports of entry have been equipped with one or more radiation detection  portal monitors and 100 percent of all cargo, conveyances, drivers, and  passengers driving into the United States through commercial lanes at  land borders are scanned for radiation, as are more than 99 percent of all  personally operated vehicles (non commercial passenger cars and light  trucks), drivers, and passengers. Similarly, at major seaports, according  to DHS officials, the department scans nearly all containerized cargo  entering U.S. seaports for nuclear and radiological materials. DHS has  deployed radiation portal monitors to major American seaports that  account for the majority of cargo entering the United States. However,  some smaller seaports that receive cargo may not be equipped with these  portal monitors. DHS officials stated that current deployment plans have  been in place to address all the remaining gaps in the deployment of  portal monitors to seaports but that current and future budget realities  require a re-planning of the deployment schedule.
section_title: International Rail
paragraphs: DHS has made much less progress scanning international rail. As we  reported in June 2010, there is limited systematic radiation scanning of  the roughly 4,800 loaded railcars entering the United States each day  from Canada and Mexico. Much of the scanning for radioactive materials  that takes place at these ports of entry is conducted with portable, hand- held radioactive isotope identification devices. According to DHS officials,  international rail traffic represents one of the most difficult challenges for  radiation detection systems due to the nature of trains and the need to  develop close cooperation with officials in Mexico and Canada. In  addition, DHS officials told us that rail companies resist doing things that  might slow down rail traffic and typically own the land where DHS would  need to establish stations for primary and secondary screening. DHS is in  the early stages of developing procedures and technology to feasibly  scan international rail traffic.
section_title: International Air Cargo and Commercial Aviation
paragraphs: As we reported in 2010, DHS is in the early stages of addressing the  challenges of scanning for radioactive materials presented by air cargo  and commercial aviation. DHS officials are also developing plans to  increase their capacity to scan for radioactive materials in international air  cargo conveyed on commercial airlines. DHS officials stated that their  experience in scanning air cargo at a few major international airports in  the United States has helped them develop scanning procedures and  inform current and future deployment strategies for both fixed and mobile  radiation detection equipment. These officials said that they believe that  further operational experience and research is necessary before they can  develop practical mobile scanning strategies and procedures. DHS is also  developing plans to effectively scan commercial aviation aircraft,  passengers, and baggage for radioactive materials.
section_title: DHS Has Had Difficulty in Developing New Technologies to Detect Nuclear Materials
paragraphs: Since 2006, we have reported that DHS faces difficulties in developing  new technologies to detect nuclear and radiological materials.  Specifically, we have reported on longstanding problems with DNDO’s  efforts to deploy advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) radiation detection  monitors. The ASP is a more advanced and significantly more expensive  type of radiation detection portal monitor to replace the polyvinyl toluene  (PVT) portal monitors in many locations that the Customs and Border  Protection (CBP), an agency within DHS, currently uses to screen cargo  at ports of entry. We have issued numerous reports regarding problems  with the cost and performance of the ASPs and the lack of rigor in testing  this equipment. For example, we found that tests DNDO conducted in  early 2007 used biased test methods that enhanced the apparent  performance of ASPs and did not use critical CBP operating procedures  that are fundamental to the performance of current radiation detectors.  In addition, in 2008 we estimated the lifecycle cost of each standard  cargo version of the ASP (including deployment costs) to be about  $822,000, compared with about $308,000 for the PVT portal monitor, and  the total program cost for DNDO’s latest plan for deploying radiation  portal monitors to be about $2 billion. Based in part on our work, DHS  informed this Committee in February 2010, after spending over $280  million, that the department had scaled back its plans for the development  and use of ASP technology.
In September 2010, we also reported that DNDO was simultaneously  engaged in the research and development phase while planning for the  acquisition phase of its cargo advanced automated radiography system  (CAARS) to detect certain nuclear materials in vehicles and containers at  CBP ports of entry. DNDO pursued the deployment of CAARS without  fully understanding that it would not fit within existing inspection lanes at  ports of entry and would slow down the flow of commerce through these  lanes, causing significant delays. DHS spent $113 million on the program  since 2005 and cancelled the acquisition phase of the program in 2007.  As we reported in September 2010, no CAARS machines had been  deployed, and CAARS machines from various vendors were either  disassembled or sitting idle without being tested in a port environment.
DNDO’s problems developing the ASP and CAARS technologies are  examples of broader challenges DHS faces in developing and acquiring  new technologies to meet homeland security needs. Earlier this month,  we testified that DHS has experienced challenges managing its  multibillion-dollar acquisition efforts, including implementing technologies  that did not meet intended requirements and were not appropriately  tested and evaluated, and has not consistently completed analysis of  costs and benefits before technologies were implemented. In June  2011, DHS reported to us that it is taking steps to strengthen its  investment and acquisition management processes across the  department. For example, DHS plans to establish a new model for  managing departmentwide investments, establish new councils and  boards to help ensure that test and evaluation methods are appropriately  considered, and is working to improve the quality and accuracy of  program cost estimates. As we testified, we believe these are positive  steps and, if implemented effectively, could help the department address  many of its acquisition challenges. However, it is still too early to assess  the impact of DHS’s efforts to address these challenges. Going forward,  we believe DHS will need to demonstrate measurable, sustained  progress in effectively implementing these actions.
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact David C. Maurer at  (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov or Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841  or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this  statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement include  Ned Woodward and Kevin Tarmann.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and  Development of New Technologies, GAO-11-829T (Washington, D.C.:  July 15, 2011).
DHS Science and Technology: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Test  and Evaluation Requirements Are Met, GAO-11-596 (Washington, D.C.:  June 15, 2011).
Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container  Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational  Scenarios To Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended,  GAO-10-887 (Washington D.C.: Sept. 29, 2010).
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication and  Oversight Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography  System to Detect Nuclear Materials, GAO-10-1041T (Washington D.C.:  Sept. 15, 2010).
Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex  Acquisitions. GAO-10-588SP (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010).
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from DHS Testing of  Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, GAO-09-804T  (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2009).
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced  Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show Limits  of the New Technology. GAO-09-655 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2009).
Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve  Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities, GAO-09-257  (Washington D.C.: Jan. 29, 2009).
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Program to Procure and Deploy  Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed the  Department’s Previous Cost Estimates, GAO-08-1108R (Washington DC:  Sept. 22, 2008).
Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the Domestic Nuclear  Detection Office’s Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear Detection  Architecture, GAO-08-999T (Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2008).
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure  Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment,  GAO-07-1247T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007).
Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection  Equipment, GAO-03-235T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2002).
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