Border Security: DHS Has Made Progress in Planning for a Biometric Air Exit System and Reporting Overstays, but Challenges Remain
Published: 2017-02-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States. Overstays are individuals lawfully admitted on a temporary basis who then remain in the country beyond their authorized period of admission. DHS has primary responsibility for identifying and addressing overstays. In 2004, DHS was required to develop a plan to accelerate full implementation of an automated biometric entry-exit system. In various reports, GAO identified a range of long-standing challenges DHS has faced in its efforts to develop and deploy this capability and to use entry and exit data to identify overstays. For example, in 2013, GAO recommended that DHS establish timeframes and milestones for a biometric air exit evaluation framework and document the reliability of its overstay data. DHS concurred with the recommendations and addressed them.
GAO was asked to review DHS's progress in developing a biometric exit capability. This report examines DHS's efforts since GAO's 2013 report to (1) develop and implement a biometric exit capability and (2) report on and address potential overstays. GAO reviewed statutes and DHS documents and interviewed DHS officials about biometric exit capability development and overstays reporting. GAO also observed four biometric entry and exit pilot programs and analyzed overstay data for fiscal years 2013 through 2015 (most recent at time of review). GAO is not making any new recommendations in this report. In its comments, DHS stated that it is using a biometric verification system to confirm the departure of selected travelers at one airport and plans to release its 2016 overstays report in late February 2017.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since GAO's 2013 report on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to develop a biometric exit capability to collect biometric data, such as fingerprints, from individuals exiting the United States, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has conducted four pilot programs to inform the development and implementation of a biometric exit system. CBP has made progress in testing biometric exit capabilities, but various longstanding planning, infrastructure, and staffing challenges continue to affect CBP's efforts to develop and implement a biometric exit system. CBP set 2018 as the goal for initial implementation of a biometric exit capability in at least one airport and is working with airlines and airports on strategies for using public/private partnerships to reduce costs and give industry more control over how a biometric exit capability is implemented at airport gates. However, the agency cannot complete the planning process until these partnership agreements and implementation decisions are finalized. As GAO has also previously reported, infrastructure limitations are a challenge to implementing a biometric air exit capability. For example, CBP noted that U.S. airports generally do not have outbound designated secure areas for exiting travelers where biometric information could be captured by U.S. immigration officers. CBP recognizes these challenges and intends to use the information gained from the pilot programs to identify biometric exit technology and staffing processes that are effective in the airport environment. As CBP is in the process of finalizing its approach, it is too early to assess the agency's plans for developing and implementing a biometric exit capability and the extent to which those plans will address identified challenges.
Since GAO's 2013 report, DHS has reported some required information on potential overstays—individuals who are admitted to the country under a specific nonimmigrant category but exceed their lawful admission period—and has not changed its enforcement priorities for potential overstays. In January 2016, DHS issued its first report on estimated overstay rates that covered fiscal year 2015, which included some but not all overstay information required by statute. The report described expected overstay rates by country for foreign visitors lawfully admitted for business or pleasure through air and sea ports of entry (POE) who were expected to depart the United States in fiscal year 2015. However, because of data reliability concerns, the report did not include all information required by law, including overstay rates for foreign visitors who entered the country through land POEs or under other nonimmigrant categories. According to DHS officials, the report for fiscal year 2016 will include reliable overstay rates on foreign students arriving through air and sea POEs. DHS expects to start reporting overstay rates for foreign visitors who entered the country through land POEs in the report for fiscal year 2017. DHS has improved overstays reporting by, among other things, enhancing the systems it uses to process entry and exit biographic data for potential overstays and is exploring options to collect information from land POEs. DHS has not changed its enforcement priorities with respect to potential overstays, continuing to focus its enforcement actions on individuals that may pose a national security or public safety risk. Specifically, in fiscal years 2013 through 2015, the agency reviewed approximately 2.7 million overstay leads and sent 26,982 of them (about 1 percent) to field offices for further investigation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Each year, millions of visitors legally enter the United States on a  temporary basis either with a nonimmigrant visa or, in some cases, as  visitors who were allowed to enter without a visa. Overstays are  individuals who were lawfully admitted into the United States on a  temporary basis but then unlawfully remain in the country beyond their  authorized admission period by failing to depart the country and not  obtaining an extension or other valid immigration status or protection prior  to the expiration of their authorized period of stay; or by otherwise not  abiding by the terms of their specific nonimmigrant category during their  stay. We have previously reported that most overstays are likely  motivated by economic opportunities to stay in the United States beyond  their authorized periods of admission. However, overstays could pose  significant homeland security risks. For example, 5 of the 19 September  11, 2001, hijackers were overstays.
Since 1996, a series of federal statutes has required that the federal  government develop and implement, and report to Congress on  implementation of, an entry and exit data system to match records,  including biographic and biometric identifiers, of foreign nationals entering  and leaving the country and to identify overstays. The Intelligence  Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the Secretary of  Homeland Security to develop a plan to accelerate full implementation of  an automated biometric entry and exit data system that matches available  information provided by foreign nationals upon their arrival in and  departure from the United States. In 2003, the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) initiated the legacy United States Visitor and Immigrant  Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to develop a system to  collect biographic data (such as name and date of birth) and biometric  data (such as fingerprints) from foreign nationals at U.S. ports of entry.
Since 2004, DHS has tracked foreign nationals’ entries into the United  States as part of an effort to comply with legislative requirements, and  since December 2006, a biometric entry capability has been fully  operational at all air, sea, and land ports of entry. However, in various  reports, we have identified a range of long-standing challenges that DHS  has faced in its efforts to develop and deploy a biometric exit capability to  track foreign nationals when they depart the country and to use entry and  exit data to identify overstays. For example, in July 2013, we reported on  DHS’s progress in developing and implementing a biometric exit system,  as well as DHS’s efforts to identify and address potential overstays. In the  2013 report, we made recommendations to help ensure that a biometric  exit capability was planned, designed, developed, and implemented in an  effective and efficient manner and to strengthen DHS’s efforts to identify  and address overstays. DHS generally agreed with our recommendations  and implemented actions which addressed them, as discussed later in  this report.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, required that DHS develop a  comprehensive plan for implementation of a biometric entry and exit  system and issue a report on overstay data. It also provided an  appropriation of up to $1 billion for DHS to develop and implement  biometric entry and exit capabilities starting in fiscal year 2017. In  response to this requirement, in April 2016 DHS issued a biometric  entry/exit plan in which the Secretary of Homeland Security stated he had  directed U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to begin  implementing a biometric exit system, starting at airports, in 2018. In  January 2016, DHS issued a report with data on estimated overstay rates  for certain categories of foreign nationals for fiscal year 2015, which we  discuss in more detail later in this report.
DHS has primary responsibility for implementing an entry and exit data  system and using the data obtained to identify and address potential  overstays. Within DHS, CBP is tasked with, among other duties,  inspecting all people seeking entry or applying for admission into the  United States to determine their admissibility into the country. CBP is also  the DHS lead for entry-exit policy and operations, including  implementation of a biometric exit program. CBP collects biographic and  biometric information to document nonimmigrants’ entry into the country  and biographic information to document their exit. In 2013, legacy US-VISIT’s biometric identity management functions were transferred into the  newly created Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) within  DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate. OBIM manages  the Automated Biometric Identification System, which maintains biometric  information that DHS collects from nonimmigrants upon their entry into  the United States. DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement  (ICE) is the lead agency for enforcing immigration law in the interior of the  United States and is primarily responsible for overstay enforcement.
You asked us to review DHS’s progress in developing a biometric exit  system and in identifying and addressing overstays, since our 2013  report. This report examines DHS’s efforts since our 2013 report to (1)  develop and implement a biometric exit capability and (2) report on and  address potential overstays.
To address the first objective, we reviewed statutory requirements for a  biometric exit system and analyzed CBP documents, including schedules  and an evaluation of CBP’s various biometric pilot programs and draft  schedules for the acquisition of a biometric exit system. We compared the  status of CBP’s efforts against statutory requirements, DHS goals for  deployment of the system, and agency guidance for major acquisitions.  We observed the operation of the four CBP biometric pilot programs  initiated since our 2013 report, conducted at Los Angeles International  Airport, the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, John F.  Kennedy International Airport, and the Otay Mesa Port of Entry (POE)  near San Diego, California. Finally, we interviewed officials from CBP’s  Office of Field Operations Exit/Entry Transformation Office (EXT) and  Office of Acquisitions regarding the ongoing efforts to acquire and deploy  a biometric exit system by 2018.
To address the second objective, we compared DHS’s fiscal year 2015  overstay report to statutory requirements to determine the extent to which  required elements were included in the report. We reviewed  documentation and interviewed officials from CBP and ICE regarding any  changes made since our 2013 report to DHS systems used for identifying  and reporting potential overstays and any actions taken related to the  reliability of the information in the DHS 2015 overstays report. We also  interviewed CBP officials regarding efforts to produce the fiscal year 2016  overstay report to identify any additional information that they plan to  include in the report. To determine the actions taken by DHS to address  potential overstays since our 2013 report, we interviewed ICE officials  and reviewed ICE documentation, including data on ICE’s enforcement  actions related to overstays for fiscal years 2013 through 2015, the most  recent year for which data was available. To assess the reliability of ICE  data on overstays and enforcement actions, we reviewed documentation  on these data and interviewed DHS officials familiar with the data. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2016 to February 2017 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Biometric Exit System Development and Implementation
paragraphs: In 1996, federal law required the development of an automated entry and  exit control system to match arrival and departure records for foreign  nationals entering and leaving the United States, and to enable  identification of overstays. Subsequently, the Immigration and  Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000  required implementation of an integrated entry and exit data system for  foreign nationals. The system was to provide access to and integrate  arrival and departure data that are authorized or required to be created or  collected under law and are in an electronic format in certain databases,  such as those used at POEs and U.S. consulates abroad, and assist in  identifying nonimmigrant visa overstays. In 2003, DHS initiated the US- VISIT program to develop a comprehensive entry and exit system to  collect biometric data from foreign nationals entering or exiting the  country through POEs. In 2004, US-VISIT initiated the first step of this  program by collecting biometric data on foreign nationals entering the  United States at 115 airports and 14 seaports.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required  the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to accelerate full  implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit data system that  matches available information provided by foreign nationals upon their  arrival in and departure from the United States. In fiscal year 2016,  Congress reiterated its requirement for DHS to submit a plan to  implement a biometric entry and exit capability and established a funding  mechanism available to the Secretary of Homeland Security beginning in  fiscal year 2017 to develop and implement a biometric entry and exit  system. Specifically, fifty percent of amounts collected pursuant to  temporary fee increases for L-1 and H-1B visas, which began in fiscal  year 2016 and will expire at the end of fiscal year 2025, up to a total of $1  billion, shall be deposited into the 9-11 Response and Biometric Exit  Account for DHS to implement the biometric entry and exit data system.
Since 2009, DHS has been exploring various biometric exit capabilities  through laboratory and field testing. For instance, in 2009, the legacy US- VISIT program, in partnership with CBP and the Transportation Security  Administration (TSA), deployed two biometric exit pilot programs in U.S.  airports. In 2014, CBP also collaborated with the DHS Science and  Technology Directorate to test possible biometric solutions in simulated  operational conditions, using the results to inform subsequent CBP  biometric efforts. Although this effort informed later biometric exit pilot  programs, it did not test potential biometric capabilities in a real-world  setting. Figure 1 demonstrates key actions taken by Congress and DHS  to pursue biometric entry and exit capabilities from 1996 through 2016.
section_title: Overstay Reporting and Enforcement
paragraphs: Federal law also requires that DHS implement a program to collect data,  for each fiscal year, regarding the total number of foreign visitors who  overstayed their lawful admission period in the United States; and submit  an annual report to Congress providing numerical estimates of the  number of foreign nationals from each country in each nonimmigrant  classification who remained in the country beyond their authorized period  of stay. Two DHS components—CBP and ICE—are primarily  responsible for collecting and maintaining overstay data, issuing reports  on overstays, and addressing potential overstays, as shown in table 1.  Further, the Office of Biometric Identity Management, which was created  in March 2013 and replaced US-VISIT, is responsible for storing biometric  data for the department. In addition, the State Department is responsible  for ensuring that individuals who have previously overstayed and are  ineligible for a visa do not receive one when applying for a visa to the  United States at consular offices overseas.
section_title: CBP Has Made Progress Testing and Evaluating Biometric Exit Capabilities since 2013, but It is Too Early to Assess Whether Current Implementation Plans Address Long- Standing Challenges
subsections: section_title: CBP Has Conducted Biometric Pilot Programs to Inform Planning for a Biometric Exit System
paragraphs: Since our 2013 report on DHS’s efforts to develop a biometric exit  capability, CBP has conducted four biometric pilot programs intended to  inform the acquisition of a biometric exit system: (1) Biometric Exit Mobile  Air Test (BE-Mobile) (mobile fingerprint reader); (2) 1 to 1 Facial  Comparison Project (facial recognition upon entry); (3) Departure  Information Systems Test (matching on-site facial scan to a gallery of  photographs); and (4) the Southwest Border Pedestrian Exit Field Test  (face and iris scanning at pedestrian exit from the United States). As of  September 2016, CBP reported that it had obligated nearly $13 million  developing, implementing, and evaluating these four pilot programs, as  illustrated in table 2. This amount includes over $3.5 million to install  secure Wi-Fi systems for supporting the BE-Mobile pilots in three of the  test airports.
BE-Mobile. In summer of 2015, CBP began deploying the BE-Mobile pilot  at the 10 highest international passenger volume airports in the United  States. Under this pilot, CBP officers stationed at the passenger loading  bridges of selected flights used a handheld mobile device to scan  fingerprints and passports for certain foreign nationals at the time of  departure from the United States at identified airports. The biometric  and biographic data collected by the BE-Mobile device was matched  against data such as departures and arrivals in the United States, criminal  histories, and visa status. The goal of the BE-Mobile pilot was to evaluate  the viability of using the technology to collect biometric exit data from a  sample population on randomly selected flights, as well as to evaluate the  viability of implementing biometric exit in conjunction with CBP’s  outbound enforcement operations. See figure 2 for a representation of  the BE-Mobile device.
During our observations, CBP officials noted that the BE-Mobile pilot  demonstrated that while the technology can effectively capture biometric  data and match that data against DHS databases, it requires too much  time and manpower to be a solution for biometric exit capabilities on all flights departing the United States—a statement consistent with our own  observations of BE-Mobile at two airports. According to CBP officials, the  pilot program established that the manifest data provided by the carriers  in the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) are accurate and  reliable. However, using BE-Mobile to screen outgoing passengers is time  consuming. For example, in May 2016, we observed CBP’s use of BE- Mobile at Los Angeles International Airport to capture biometric  information on categories of passengers included in the pilot  (approximately 75 individuals) on one flight departing for Mexico. We  observed that the outbound process using BE-Mobile took six CBP  officers—who constitute a CBP tactical operations team—approximately  45 minutes to complete. CBP officials noted that when those six officers  are conducting outbound enforcement operations using BE-Mobile, they  are not conducting inspections or operations on inbound cargo and  passengers.
CBP officials also noted that the BE-Mobile system provided some  benefits to the officers checking foreign nationals leaving the country. For  instance, BE-Mobile allows officers to identify travelers who have  suspicious travel histories or other derogatory information for further  investigation by searching databases that detail individuals’ travel  patterns, visa status, and criminal records. For instance, during our  observation of the program at Los Angeles International Airport, one  officer used BE-Mobile to identify an individual whose travel pattern may  have indicated drug trafficking, so the individual was examined more  closely before being allowed to board a plane to Mexico. Similarly, BE- Mobile can identify travelers exiting the country who do not have  corresponding entry information, indicating that they potentially entered  the country without inspection. Finally, BE-Mobile may identify individuals  who have overstayed their period of admission, allowing CBP to collect  more accurate overstay information. During our observation of BE-Mobile  at John F. Kennedy International Airport, an officer identified one traveler  as having overstayed a student visa, and noted the violation in the  traveler’s Student and Exchange Visitor Information System record.  According to CBP officials, CBP is currently maintaining the BE-Mobile  program at the original 10 airports as an enforcement tool for use by CBP  officers. These officials also said BE-Mobile may be a viable solution for  smaller airports with relatively few outbound international flights at which  officers could utilize BE-Mobile to obtain biometric information from  exiting passengers at times when no international travelers are arriving.  1 to 1 Facial Comparison. Between March and May 2015, CBP tested  the 1 to 1 Facial Comparison Project at Dulles International Airport. This  pilot was intended to assist CBP officers in confirming the identity of U.S.  citizens entering the United States against the travel document being  presented. After the conclusion of the pilot program, the technology was  deployed for use at both Dulles International Airport and John F. Kennedy  International Airport. The technology compares a photograph taken of the  U.S. citizen by a CBP officer to the photograph stored on the traveler’s  passport chip to assess whether the individual applying for entry into the  United States was the same person to whom the U.S. passport was  legally issued. Although the capability was tested at entries to the  United States, the information gathered through the pilot is intended to  also inform the acquisition of a biometric exit capability, according to CBP  officials. According to an evaluation conducted by CBP, the results of the  pilot showed that biometric facial matching can increase the confidence  with which CBP officers verify individuals’ identities without a negative  impact to port of entry operations and traveler wait times. When we  observed CBP officers at John F. Kennedy International Airport  processing passengers using this technology in July 2016, they said that  the facial recognition process added approximately 20 to 30 seconds to  the processing time for each passenger. However, agency officials stated  that the technology is not yet integrated with CBP systems, and will not  impact wait times once it is fully integrated. See figure 3 for a  representation of the 1 to 1 Facial Recognition use and equipment.
Departure Information Systems Test. From June to September 2016,  CBP deployed the Departure Information Systems Test pilot at Atlanta’s  Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. The goal of the pilot was to  evaluate the effectiveness of biometric facial recognition matching of a  real-time photograph of an individual to a gallery of facial images stored in  a database. Photographs of travelers taken during boarding were  compared against photographs taken previously (U.S. passport, U.S.  visa, and DHS encounters) that had been stored in the gallery based on  names on the outbound flight manifest. The biometric capture device  includes a camera, document reader and display tablet. The display tablet  instructs travelers to present their boarding pass to the reader as they  approach the unit. Once the boarding pass is scanned, an image of the  traveler’s face is captured. The system matches the photograph to all  images in the gallery of photographs, at which point a green light appears  and the traveler is instructed to proceed to board the plane. After the flight  has departed, the system compares the captured images to the images in  the gallery to determine the system’s effectiveness at matching  photographs taken to those in the gallery. CBP officials told us that the  capability to match one photograph to a gallery of photographs will be  critical in developing a biometric exit solution for deployment on a  nationwide scale because the agency already has access to one or more  photographs on record of each person exiting the country, if they entered  legally. As of November 2016, CBP had not yet completed the formal  evaluation of the test. They added that a second biometric indicator, such  as fingerprints, would also be useful in cases where the facial recognition  software cannot match the live image to the images in the gallery.
For this pilot test, CBP deployed the capability at one gate and used it to  obtain biometric information from passengers on a daily nonstop flight  from Atlanta to Tokyo. We observed this capability collecting biometric  information from passengers in August 2016. CBP officials told us that  this flight was selected because it departed from a gate with ample  physical space every day, which allowed CBP to set up its equipment to  collect photographs. In addition, the flight departed at a time when few  international flights were arriving or departing, so CBP did not have to  divert officers from inspecting departing or incoming travelers to operate  the pilot. See figure 4 for a representation of the biometric capture device.
Southwest Border Pedestrian Exit Field Test. From February to May  2016, CBP initiated a pilot program to test facial and iris scanning  technology at the Otay Mesa POE south of San Diego, California. The  purpose of the test was to determine if biometric technology could be  effectively used in an outdoor land environment without significant impact  to operations and wait times, and to determine if collecting biometrics in  conjunction with biographic data upon exit will assist CBP in identifying  individuals who have overstayed their period of admission. Under this  pilot program, CBP collected biographic data from all travelers departing  the United States at the Otay Mesa POE and biometrics (facial images  and/or iris scans) from certain foreign nationals entering and departing  the Otay Mesa POE on foot. To exit the country, travelers scanned their  passports at a radio frequency identification-enabled kiosk, as shown in  the picture on the left in figure 5. One collection lane was equipped with  facial and iris scanning equipment that required the traveler to pause for  biometric data collection, as pictured in the middle picture shown in figure  5. Another lane was equipped with technology that collected facial and iris  images while the traveler continued through the lane without pausing, as  shown in the picture on the right in figure 5.
Although CBP had not completed its formal evaluation of the pedestrian  exit field test as of November 2016, CBP officials told us the pilot  provided information about the physical challenges to implementing face  and iris scanning technology at land POEs. The officials noted that the  conditions at Otay Mesa POE were “ideal” in terms of space availability  and weather conditions compared with other land POEs. Specifically, the  Otay Mesa POE had sufficient space to install and operate the kiosks and  cameras to collect biometric data from departing pedestrians. In addition,  the location generally had favorable weather and climate conditions that  were less likely to affect the biometric collection machines stationed  outside, though the officials told us that the technology did need to be  under a roof or canopy, both to protect it from the rain and to prevent sun  glare from affecting the quality of the images captured. However, the  officials said that while rain and wind are not a significant issue at Otay  Mesa’s location in southern California, other land POE locations, such as  those in southern Texas, may experience challenges such as heavy  storms or dust. They added that the pilot program had highlighted the  need for biometric scanning equipment to be located inside for protection  from the elements, but that some land POEs do not have sufficient space  for such infrastructure.
section_title: DHS Continues to Face Long-Standing Challenges Implementing a Biometric Exit System but It is Too Early to Assess Current Implementation Plans
paragraphs: While DHS has made progress testing and evaluating biometric exit  capabilities through the pilot programs described above, DHS continues  to face challenges in developing and deploying a biometric exit system,  many of which are longstanding. In particular, we and DHS have  identified challenges in the areas of planning, infrastructure, and staffing  that have affected DHS’s efforts to develop and implement a biometric  exit capability. DHS has recognized these challenges and, according to  CBP officials, is working to address them as part of its current planning  process for a biometric exit system. Under this current process, as of  November 2016, CBP plans to implement a biometric exit capability in at  least one major airport by 2018, but has not yet finalized the approach it  will take to deploy this capability in airports. As a result, it is too early to  assess CBP’s current plans and how the department will address the  challenges we and DHS have identified.
Planning process. We and DHS have identified challenges in CBP’s  planning efforts to develop and implement a biometric exit capability. For  example, in our July 2013 report we found that DHS had a high-level plan  for a biometric air exit capability, but it did not clearly define the steps,  time-frames, and milestones needed to develop and implement an  evaluation framework, as is standard in project management. As a result,  we recommended that DHS establish time-frames and milestones for  developing and implementing an evaluation framework to be used in  conducting the department’s assessment of biometric exit options. DHS  concurred with this recommendation and finalized goals and implemented  actions to address it. Specifically, in June 2016, CBP provided us with the  evaluation framework as well as expected time-frames and milestones for  implementing the biometric exit system.
CBP has also previously faced challenges in meeting the timeframes it  has identified for deploying a biometric exit capability at airports. For  instance, in July 2014, a DHS document stated that the department’s goal  was to deploy a biometric exit capability to the top 20 airports—selected  by international passenger departure volume—between 2015 and 2018.  However, as of November 2016, CBP’s planned timeframe was to begin  deployment of a biometric exit capability at one airport by the end of  2018, and additional airports in subsequent months. CBP officials told us  this change in schedule was because funds from the appropriation funds  established by Congress in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, to  develop and implement the system were not available until October 2016.
In November 2016, CBP officials also told us the agency had changed its  approach to the biometric exit capability and was working with airlines  and airports on strategies for using public/private partnerships to both  reduce the cost to taxpayers and give industry more control over how a  biometric exit capability is implemented at airport gates. CBP’s previous  planned approach had been for CBP to acquire and deploy biometric  technology at airports, and to be responsible for collecting biometric  information from passengers. Developing a biometric exit system in  collaboration with airlines and airports, if implemented, would represent a  change in CBP’s acquisition strategy because it would rely on airlines and  airports to collect biometric information from passengers by acquiring  biometric exit technology, such as cameras to collect facial images or  equipment for fingerprinting. CBP would then be responsible for  transmitting, storing, and analyzing this biometric information in order to  pursue enforcement actions, such as the apprehension of individuals with  warrants for their arrests, or recording the presence of individuals who  entered the country illegally. Under this scenario, the airlines could  integrate this biometric collection process into their existing boarding  procedures, potentially resulting in minimal disruption to the flow of  passengers during boarding, according to CBP officials. For instance,  CBP officials suggested facial images or iris scans could be collected as  travelers’ boarding passes are being scanned, and the biometrics could  eventually be used in the place of boarding passes.
CBP officials said that this new approach did not change the timelines for  initial implementation of a biometric exit capability, but officials noted that  the approach or approaches selected will affect timelines and costs for  future implementation. As of November 2016, CBP officials told us they  had not finalized any partnership agreements with airports or airlines  providing international service; and the agency cannot complete the  planning process, including cost and schedule estimates, until these  partnership agreements and key implementation decisions are finalized.  Going forward, CBP intends to finalize its plans and approach for  developing and implementing a biometric exit capability. Given these  considerations, it is too early to assess CBP’s plan for including airlines  and airports in the development and implementation of the biometric exit  system or the cost to CBP of this system.
Infrastructure. We and CBP officials have also identified limitations in  infrastructure as a significant challenge to implementing a biometric exit  capability at airports as well as at land POEs. For example, CBP officials  pointed out that U.S. airports generally do not have designated and  secure exit areas for conducting outbound immigration inspections, nor  are there checkpoints for travelers to pass through where their departure  is recorded by a U.S. immigration officer and where biometric information  could be captured. According to CBP officials, for a biometric exit  program to be effective, the collection of biometric information must take  place at the gate or on the jetway to ensure that the traveler actually  departs the country. To address these challenges, CBP intends to use the  information gained from the pilot programs to identify biometric exit  technology and processes that are effective in the airport environment  and minimize the impact on passenger flow and airport operations.
At land POEs, there are also longstanding infrastructure and operational  challenges to implementing a biometric exit capability to collect traveler  information upon departure from the United States. In 2006 we reported  that establishing a biometric exit capability at land POEs faced a number  of challenges, including space constraints complicated by the logistics of  processing high volumes of visitors and associated traffic congestion.  For example, travelers may arrive at land POEs on foot or via a variety of  vehicles—including cars, trucks, trains, buses, ferries, and bicycles—and  many land POEs do not have sufficient space to deploy equipment and  staff for obtaining biometric information from individuals leaving the  country. Given the current capabilities of biometric capture devices,  applying biometric capabilities to vehicle passengers would be more  difficult than doing so for those crossing on foot, because, according to  CBP officials, biometric capabilities currently available would require all  passengers to stop and exit their vehicle to be photographed or scanned.  In addition to the large amount of space this process would require, DHS  officials stated that it would cause extensive delays at vehicle POEs. CBP  officials said they intend to use the information from the pedestrian exit  field test at Otay Mesa to inform any future solution. The officials also told  us that they entered into an agreement with Oak Ridge National  Laboratory beginning in June 2016 to explore options for applying  biometric capabilities to vehicle passengers exiting the country. Given  these challenges, CBP does not plan to implement a biometric exit  capability at land POEs until 2020.
Staffing. In addition, CBP officials stated that implementing a biometric  exit capability will likely require additional CBP officers at each POE. The  biometric exit pilot programs we observed required CBP staff to assist  travelers with using the biometric technology and also for any  enforcement actions that may be needed. However, CBP officials noted  that they are exploring biometric exit capabilities that minimize the  involvement of CBP officials, either by having the collection of biometric  information done automatically through facial recognition technology or  using airline personnel to process passengers. In either case, the CBP  officials said that any biometric exit capability will require additional  officers to support increased enforcement operations involving individuals  departing the country that result from a biometric exit system. For  example, individuals with warrants for their arrest may be prevented from  departing the country so they can be tried for a crime. CBP officials told  us that they have developed staffing estimates for each of the 20 busiest  airports in the United States and that the estimates will be reviewed by  DHS management and the Office of Management and Budget. However,  CBP officials also told us they are still developing enforcement policies  and priorities for foreign visitors departing the United States, so it is  difficult to determine the extent to which enforcement actions would  increase or how many additional CBP officers may be needed at each  airport or land port of entry.
section_title: DHS Included Some Required Information in Its First Overstay Report and Plans to Include More Information in Future Reports, and DHS Overstay Enforcement Priorities Have Not Changed Since 2013 DHS Overstay Report Includes Some Required Information, and DHS Officials Expect Future Reports to Include Additional Information
paragraphs: In January 2016, DHS issued its first report on estimated overstay rates  that covered fiscal year 2015, which included some but not all information  required by statute. DHS had not previously reported required overstay  estimates to Congress on an annual basis, as required, because of DHS  and legacy INS concerns about the reliability of the data available on  overstays. In April 2011, we reported that DHS officials stated that the  department had not reported overstay estimates because it did not have  sufficient confidence in the quality of its overstay data. In our July 2013  report, we found that although DHS had taken action to strengthen its  overstay data, DHS had not yet validated or tested the reliability of those  actions and challenges to reporting reliable overstay data remained. We  recommended that DHS assess and document the extent to which the  reliability of the data used to develop any overstay estimates has  improved and any remaining limitations in how the data can be used.  DHS concurred, and in the 2015 overstay report, DHS noted which data  were used to compile the overstay estimates in the report and identified  limitations with other data sources, thus addressing our recommendation.  To identify overstays, CBP matches arrival and departure data on foreign  nationals in the Arrival and Departure Information System. These  overstays are then checked against other DHS immigration databases to  identify persons who have departed the United States or obtained an  extension, or other valid immigration status or protection, and thus are not  potential overstays.
DHS’s fiscal year 2015 overstay report describes expected overstays  rates by country for foreign nationals lawfully admitted into the United  States for business or pleasure through air and sea POEs and who were  supposed to depart the United States in fiscal year 2015, as required.  According to the overstay report, 527,127 of the nearly 45 million foreign  nationals admitted for business or pleasure through air and sea POEs  that were expected to depart the United States in fiscal year 2015  overstayed their period of admission, for a total overstay rate of 1.17  percent (see table 3). This number represents 85 percent of all the foreign  visitors who arrived through air and sea POEs and who were expected to  depart the country in fiscal year 2015, according to the report. DHS  classifies individuals as overstays by matching departure and status  change records to arrival records collected during the admission process.
DHS distinguishes two groups of foreign visitors who overstayed their  period of admission: (1) foreign nationals who are “out of country  overstays” because their departure records show they departed the  United States after their lawful admission period expired, and (2) foreign  nationals who are “suspected in-country overstays” because they have no  departure records nor did they obtain an extension, or other valid  immigration status or protection, prior to the end of their authorized  admission period. For example, 482,781 of the 527,127 foreign visitors  who overstayed their period of admission in fiscal year 2015 were  suspected in-country overstays because CBP did not have a departure  record for them so they appeared to have remained in the country, a  suspected in-country overstay rate of 1.07 percent, as illustrated in table  3.
However, the DHS overstay report does not include all required  information. Specifically, because of data reliability concerns, the overstay  report does not include required information on expected departures,  overstays, and overstay rates for foreign nationals who entered the  country under nonimmigrant visa categories other than for business and  pleasure, such as those covering, for example, foreign students and their  families (F, M, and J visas). DHS officials noted that the department is  working to improve the reliability of the overstay information on foreign  nationals who entered the country under student visa categories by,  among other things, adding data on each visa holder’s last date of  compliance and modernizing the database that contains data on  individuals holding student visas. DHS officials stated that the fiscal year  2016 overstay report—which they expect to be issued in early 2017— will  include reliable overstays estimates for these foreign student visa  categories.
The fiscal year 2015 overstay report also did not include information on  foreign visitors who entered the United States from Canada and Mexico  using land POEs because of unreliable collection of departure data at  these POEs. The collection of departure information at land POEs is more  difficult than at air and sea POEs because of the lack of electronically  captured biographic information of foreign nationals departing the country  using land POEs. Specifically, land POEs do not receive information on  anticipated arrivals or departures, because travel across these POEs is  often on foot or in private vehicles rather than through a transportation company that provides CBP with advance passenger manifests, such as  an airline or passenger ship operator.
To address this limitation for the land POEs at the northern border  specifically, DHS and Canada’s Border Service Agency implemented the  Beyond the Border agreement in October 2012 under which they  exchange entry records for land crossings between the two countries so  that an entry into one is recorded as an exit from the other. However,  according to DHS, the southwest border with Mexico does not present the  same opportunities as the border with Canada because Mexico’s border  infrastructure and data collection capabilities are more limited. As a result,  DHS officials noted that they have started discussions with Mexican  government officials to set up a land pilot on the Mexican side of the  border to capture information from travelers entering Mexico, similar to  the information captured and exchanged under the Beyond the Border  initiative with Canada. DHS has also been exploring other methods and  technologies for obtaining biographic and biometric data from travelers  departing the country through land POEs on the border with Mexico, such  as the pedestrian biometric exit field test at the Otay Mesa border  crossing near San Diego discussed earlier. DHS expects to start reporting  overstay rates for foreign visitors who entered the country through land  POEs in the fiscal year 2017 report.
subsections: section_title: DHS’s Overstay Enforcement Priorities Have Remained the Same Since 2013
paragraphs: Since our July 2013 report, DHS has not changed its enforcement  priorities with respect to potential overstays, focusing its enforcement  actions on individuals that may pose a national security or public safety  risk. Within ICE, the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)  Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) oversees the  program for investigating nonimmigrant visa violators who may pose a  national security risk. CTCEU receives system-generated lists of overstay  leads from the Arrival and Departure Information System, which is  produced by matching arrival and departure data on foreign nationals. On  a weekly basis, CTCEU also receives information on overstay leads from  the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System on foreign students  who have remained in the United States beyond their authorized periods  of admission. Once these leads are received, CTCEU analysts then  determine whether the individuals from these lists meet DHS’s overstay  enforcement priorities based on national security and public safety  criteria.
CTCEU prioritizes investigation of overstay leads based on the perceived  risk each lead is likely to pose to national security and public safety as  determined by threat analysis. To prioritize investigation of overstay  leads, CTCEU uses an automated system to assign each overstay lead a  priority ranking based on threat intelligence information. For the records  that meet DHS’s overstay enforcement priorities, CTCEU analysts then  conduct manual searches of other databases to determine, for example, if  the individual obtained an extension, or other valid immigration status or  protection and is therefore not an overstay. For their priority records, if  CTCEU analysts are unable to identify evidence of a change in status or  a departure, they search for the nonimmigrant’s current U.S. address, and  if they are able to identify an address, they send the lead to the relevant  HSI field office for investigation. In addition, starting in 2014, CTCEU has  been using social media and open source information to locate and track  individuals. HSI field offices only investigate a case if they have  derogatory information on an individual or if they have viable location  information, according to ICE officials. CTCEU sends overstay leads who  do not meet DHS’s enforcement priorities to ICE’s ERO for potential  enforcement action.
According to ICE data, between fiscal years 2013 and 2015, CTCEU  reviewed approximately 2.7 million overstay leads, and closed 871,463  leads (about 32 percent) through their vetting process (see table 4). The  most common reasons for closure were subsequent departure from the  United States or pending immigration benefits. CTCEU had 155,182  overstays leads (about 6 percent) open under continuous monitoring.  CTCEU sent 26,982 overstay leads (about 1 percent) to HSI field offices  for further investigation because they represented national security or  public safety threats. The majority of overstay leads CTCEU reviewed  during this time period did not meet DHS’s priorities and were referred to  ERO for potential enforcement action (over 60 percent).
According to ICE data, CTCEU’s overstay enforcement efforts resulted in  about 5,000 administrative arrests, 369 criminal arrests, 333 indictments,  and 300 convictions from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2015, as  shown in table 5.
Of the more than 1.6 million overstay lead referrals sent by CTCEU to  ERO between fiscal years 2013 and 2015, ERO did not send any leads to  field offices for further investigation or enforcement action. ERO conducts  reviews of the CTCEU overstay leads referrals to determine whether they  meet DHS’s priorities and maintains the records of these referrals for  reference and periodic reviews. ERO did not send any of the CTCEU’s  referrals to ICE field offices for enforcement action because the overstay  lead referrals did not meet DHS’s enforcement priorities. Specifically, ERO officials said that in most cases, overstay lead referrals do not have  criminal convictions required to classify the referrals as DHS’s  enforcement priority. As a result, based on current DHS’s priorities, ICE’s  overstay enforcement efforts are limited to potential overstays involving  national security and public safety threats.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS  provided written comments, which are noted below and reproduced in full  in appendix II, and technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.
In its comments, DHS stated that CBP has made progress testing and  evaluating biometric exit capabilities since our work was completed. DHS  noted that it plans to develop a biometric exit system at airports based on  the facial recognition pilot program conducted at the Hartsfield-Jackson  Atlanta International Airport. In December 2016, this system became the  Biometric Verification System, which is biometrically confirming selected  travelers departing the United States at the airport.  DHS further noted  that CBP will continue to test different facial image capture devices and  work with airlines to more fully integrate the Biometric Verification System  into the airline boarding process at additional airport locations. To support  this effort, DHS reported that CBP has made progress in developing the  documentation needed to designate Biometric Exit as a "program of  record," indicating that it has met certain thresholds to allow for  procurements and execution of funds. DHS also reported that CBP is  developing a spend plan describing the execution of up to $1 billion that  will accrue pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, for  implementation of a biometric entry and exit system.
In addition, DHS reported that CBP drafted an overstay report for fiscal  year 2016, which it expects to release by the end of February 2017. DHS  stated that the report addresses over 95 percent of all nonimmigrants  admitted by air to the United States, and will include student visa  categories. DHS stated that it plans to report these numbers annually, as  required.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, appropriate congressional committees and members, and other  interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any  questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or  gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix  III.
section_title: Appendix I: Previous GAO Reports and Recommendations Related to Biometric Exit Development
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Adam Hoffman (Assistant  Director), Juan Tapia-Videla (Analyst-In-Charge), Miriam Hill, Megan  Erwin, Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi, Amanda Miller, Adam Vogt, Eric Hauswirth,  Richard Hung, and Nathan Tranquilli made significant contributions to this  report.