Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation's Borders at Two Locations
Published: 2006-07-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Given today's unprecedented terrorism threat environment and the resulting widespread congressional and public interest in the security of our nation's borders, GAO conducted an investigation testing whether radioactive sources could be smuggled across U.S. borders. Most travelers enter the United States through the nation's 154 land border ports of entry. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors at ports of entry are responsible for the primary inspection of travelers to determine their admissibility into the United States and to enforce laws related to preventing the entry of contraband, such as drugs and weapons of mass destruction. GAO's testimony provides the results of undercover tests made by its investigators to determine whether monitors at U.S. ports of entry detect radioactive sources in vehicles attempting to enter the United States. GAO also provides observations regarding the procedures that CBP inspectors followed during its investigation. GAO has also issued a report on the results of this investigation (GAO-06-545R).
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: For the purposes of this undercover investigation, GAO purchased a small amount of radioactive sources and one secure container used to safely store and transport the material from a commercial source over the telephone. One of GAO's investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company located in Washington, D.C., stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation detection pagers. The purchase was not challenged because suppliers are not required to determine whether prospective buyers have legitimate uses for radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask a buyer to produce an NRC document when purchasing in small quantities. The amount of radioactive sources GAO's investigator sought to purchase did not require an NRC document. Subsequently, the company mailed the radioactive sources to an address in Washington D.C. The radiation portal monitors properly signaled the presence of radioactive material when our two teams of investigators conducted simultaneous border crossings. Our investigators' vehicles were inspected in accordance with most of the CBP policy at both the northern and southern borders. However, GAO's investigators, using counterfeit documents, were able to enter the United States with enough radioactive sources in the trunks of their vehicles to make two dirty bombs. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a dirty bomb is a mix of explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive powder or pellets. When the dynamite or other explosives are set off, the blast carries radioactive material into the surrounding area. The direct costs of cleanup and the indirect losses in trade and business in the contaminated areas could be large. Hence, dirty bombs are generally considered to be weapons of mass disruption instead of weapons of mass destruction. GAO investigators were able to successfully represent themselves as employees of a fictitious company present a counterfeit bill of lading and a counterfeit NRC document during the secondary inspections at both locations. The CBP inspectors never questioned the authenticity of the investigators' counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document authorizing them to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our investigation of potential  security weaknesses associated with the installation of radiation detection  equipment at U.S. ports of entry. To address the threat of dirty bombs and  other nuclear material, the federal government has programs in place that  regulate the transportation of radioactive sources and to prevent illegal  transport of radioactive sources across our nation’s borders. The  Department of Homeland Security through the U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) uses radiation detection equipment at ports of entry to  prevent such illicit entry of radioactive sources. The goal of CBP’s  inspection program is to “…thwart the operations of terrorist  organizations by detecting, disrupting, and preventing the cross-border  travel of terrorists, terrorist funding, and terrorist implements, including  Weapons of Mass Destruction and their precursors.” Deploying radiation  detection equipment is part of CBP’s strategy for thwarting radiological  terrorism and CBP is using a range of such equipment to meet its goal of  screening all cargo, vehicles, and individuals coming into the United  States.
Most travelers enter the United States through the nation’s 154 land border  ports of entry. CBP inspectors at ports of entry are responsible for the  primary inspection of travelers to determine their admissibility into the  United States and to enforce laws related to preventing the entry of  contraband, such as drugs and weapons of mass destruction.
Our investigation was conducted as a result of widespread congressional  and public interest in the security of our nation’s borders, given today’s  unprecedented terrorism threat environment. Our investigation was  conducted under the premise that given today’s security environment, our  nation’s borders must be protected from the smuggling of radioactive  sources by terrorists.
This testimony will provide the results of our work related to testing  whether the radiation portal monitors installed at the U.S. ports of entry  would detect radioactive sources transported in vehicles attempting to  enter the United States. We will also provide our observations regarding  the procedures that CBP inspectors followed when the radiation portal  monitors detected such material.  In addition, at the request of the  Chairman of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,  Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, we issued in  March 2006 a detailed report with corrective action briefings to CBP and  the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on the results of our  undercover border crossing tests.
We selected two land ports of entry that had radiation portal monitors  installed: one at the U.S.-Canadian border and one at the U.S.-Mexican  border. Radiation portal monitors are large pieces of stationary equipment  that CBP uses as part of its overall strategy to thwart radiological  terrorism by detecting the presence of radioactive sources by screening  people, vehicles, and cargo as they pass through ports of entry. In order to  safely plan and execute our undercover operation, several of our  investigators attended training at the National Institute of Standards and  Technology (NIST) in Gaithersburg, Maryland. Our investigators received  training on the safe handling, storage, and transport of radioactive  sources.
When considering the type of radioactive sources to use in our undercover  operation, we decided to use one of the most common radioisotopes used  in industry for its strong radioactivity and also used in medical therapy to  treat cancer. After consulting with an outside expert, we used an amount  of radioactive sources that we determined was sufficient to manufacture a  dirty bomb. A dirty bomb would most likely result in small radiation  exposures and would typically not contain enough radiation to kill people  or cause severe illnesses. However, by scattering the radioactive material,  the dirty bomb has the effect of contaminating an area. The extent of local  contamination depends on several factors, including the size of the  explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material used, and weather  conditions. While there could be an increase in the cancer risk among  those exposed to radiation from a dirty bomb, the more significant effect  of a dirty bomb could be the closing of contaminated areas. The direct  costs of cleanup and the indirect losses in trade and business in the  contaminated areas could be large. Hence, dirty bombs are generally  considered to be weapons of mass disruption instead of weapons of mass  destruction.
As part of our investigation, we purchased a small quantity of the  radioactive sources from a commercial source by posing as an employee  of a fictitious company. This was to demonstrate that anyone can purchase  small quantities of radioactive sources for stockpiling because suppliers  are not required to exercise due diligence to determine whether the buyer  has a legitimate use for the radioactive sources and suppliers are not  required to ask the buyer to produce an NRC document when making  purchases in small quantities. We then deployed two teams of  investigators to the field to make simultaneous border crossings at the  northern and southern borders in an attempt to transport radioactive  sources into the United States.
While making our simultaneous crossings, we focused our investigation on  whether the radiation portal monitors would detect the radioactive  sources we carried and whether CBP inspectors exercised due diligence to  determine the authenticity of paperwork presented by individuals  attempting to transport radioactive sources across our borders. Although  we offer observations on the procedures that CBP inspectors followed for  our two border crossings, we did not evaluate the adequacy of the design  or effectiveness of those procedures. Our investigation also tested whether  an NRC document could be counterfeited using data easily accessible and  available to the public. We conducted our investigation from July 2005  through December 2005 in accordance with quality standards for  investigations as set forth by the President’s Council on Integrity and  Efficiency.
subsections: section_title: Documentation Was Produced to Support Undercover Investigation
paragraphs: As part of our undercover investigation, we produced counterfeit  documents before sending our two teams of investigators out to the field.  We found two NRC documents and a few examples of the documents by  searching the Internet. We subsequently used commercial, off-the-shelf  computer software to produce two counterfeit NRC documents  authorizing the individual to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer  radioactive sources.
To support our investigators’ purported reason for having radioactive  sources in their possession when making their simultaneous border  crossings, a GAO graphic artist designed a logo for our fictitious company  and produced a bill of lading using computer software.
section_title: With Ease, Investigators Purchased, Received, and Transported Radioactive Sources Across Both Borders
paragraphs: Our two teams of investigators each transported an amount of radioactive  sources sufficient to manufacture a dirty bomb when making their recent,  simultaneous border crossings. In support of our earlier work, we had  obtained an NRC document and had purchased radioactive sources as well  as two containers to store and transport the material.
For the purposes of this undercover investigation, we purchased a small  amount of radioactive sources and one container for storing and  transporting the material from a commercial source over the telephone.  One of our investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company,  stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources  to calibrate personal radiation detectors. Suppliers are not required to  exercise any due diligence in determining whether the buyer has a  legitimate use for the radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask  the buyer to produce an NRC document when making purchases in small  quantities. The amount of radioactive sources our investigator sought to  purchase did not require an NRC document. The company mailed the  radioactive sources to an address in Washington, D.C.
section_title: Two Teams of Investigators Conducted Simultaneous Crossings at the U.S.- Canadian Border and U.S.-Mexican Border
subsections: section_title: Northern Border Crossing
paragraphs: On December 14, 2005, our investigators placed two containers of  radioactive sources into the trunk of their rental vehicle. Our investigators  – acting in an undercover capacity – drove to an official port of entry  between Canada and the United States. They also had in their possession a  counterfeit bill of lading in the name of a fictitious company and a  counterfeit NRC document.
At the primary checkpoint, our investigators were signaled to drive  through the radiation portal monitors and to meet the CBP inspector at the  booth for their primary inspection. As our investigators drove past the  radiation portal monitors and approached the primary checkpoint booth,  they observed the CBP inspector look down and reach to his right side of  his booth. Our investigators assumed that the radiation portal monitors  had activated and signaled the presence of radioactive sources. The CBP  inspector asked our investigators for identification and asked them where  they lived. One of our investigators on the two-man undercover team  handed the CBP inspector both of their passports and told him that he  lived in Maryland while the second investigator told the CBP inspector  that he lived in Virginia.
The CBP inspector also asked our investigators to identify what they were  transporting in their vehicle. One of our investigators told the CBP  inspector that they were transporting specialized equipment back to the  United States. A second CBP inspector, who had come over to assist the  first inspector, asked what else our investigators were transporting. One of  our investigators told the CBP inspectors that they were transporting  radioactive sources for the specialized equipment. The CBP inspector in  the primary checkpoint booth appeared to be writing down the  information. Our investigators were then directed to park in a secondary  inspection zone, while the CBP inspector conducted further inspections of  the vehicle.
During the secondary inspection, our investigators told the CBP inspector  that they had an NRC document and a bill of lading for the radioactive  sources. The CBP inspector asked if he could make copies of our  investigators’ counterfeit bill of lading on letterhead stationery as well as  their counterfeit NRC document. Although the CBP inspector took the  documents to the copier, our investigators did not observe him retrieving  any copies from the copier.
Our investigators watched the CBP inspector use a handheld Radiation  Isotope Identifier Device (RIID), which he said is used to identify the  source of radioactive sources, to examine the investigators’ vehicle. He  told our investigators that he had to perform additional inspections. After  determining that the investigators were not transporting additional  sources of radiation, the CBP inspector made copies of our investigators’  drivers’ licenses, returned their drivers’ licenses to them, and our  investigators were then allowed to enter the United States. At no time did  the CBP inspector question the validity of the counterfeit bill of lading or  the counterfeit NRC document.
section_title: Southern Border Crossing
paragraphs: On December 14, 2005, our investigators placed two containers of  radioactive sources into the trunk of their vehicle. Our investigators drove  to an official port of entry at the southern border. They also had in their  possession a counterfeit bill of lading in the name of a fictitious company  and a counterfeit NRC document.
At the primary checkpoint, our two-person undercover team was signaled  by means of a traffic light signal to drive through the radiation portal  monitors and stopped at the primary checkpoint for their primary  inspection. As our investigators drove past the portal monitors and  approached the primary checkpoint, they observed that the CBP inspector  remained in the primary checkpoint for several moments prior to  approaching our investigators’ vehicle. Our investigators assumed that the  radiation portal monitors had activated and signaled the presence of  radioactive sources.
The CBP inspector asked our investigators for identification and asked  them if they were American citizens. Our investigators told the CBP  inspector that they were both American citizens and handed him their  state-issued drivers’ licenses. The CBP inspector also asked our  investigators about the purpose of their trip to Mexico and asked whether  they were bringing anything into the United States from Mexico. Our  investigators told the CBP inspector that they were returning from a  business trip in Mexico and were not bringing anything into the United  States from Mexico.
While our investigators remained inside their vehicle, the CBP inspector  used what appeared to be a RIID to scan the outside of the vehicle. One of  our investigators told him that they were transporting specialized  equipment. The CBP inspector asked one of our investigators to open the  trunk of the rental vehicle and to show him the specialized equipment. Our  investigator told the CBP inspector that they were transporting radioactive  sources in addition to the specialized equipment. The primary CBP  inspector then directed our investigators to park in a secondary inspection  zone for further inspection.
During the secondary inspection, the CBP inspector said he needed to  verify the type of material our investigators were transporting, and another  CBP inspector approached with what appeared to be a RIID to scan the  cardboard boxes where the radioactive sources was placed. The  instrumentation confirmed the presence of radioactive sources.
When asked again about the purpose of their visit to Mexico, one of our  investigators told the CBP inspector that they had used the radioactive  sources in a demonstration designed to secure additional business for  their company. The CBP inspector asked for paperwork authorizing them  to transport the equipment to Mexico. One of our investigators provided  the counterfeit bill of lading on letterhead stationery, as well as their  counterfeit NRC document. The CBP inspector took the paperwork  provided by our investigators and walked into the CBP station. He  returned several minutes later and returned the paperwork. At no time did  the CBP inspector question the validity of the counterfeit bill of lading or  the counterfeit NRC document.
section_title: Corrective Action Briefings
paragraphs: We conducted corrective action briefings with CBP and NRC officials  shortly after completing our undercover operations. On December 21,  2005, we briefed CBP officials about the results of our border crossing  tests. CBP officials agreed to work with the NRC and CBP’s Laboratories  and Scientific Services to come up with a way to verify the authenticity of  NRC materials documents.
We conducted two corrective action briefings with NRC officials on  January 12 and January 24, 2006, about the results of our border crossing  tests. NRC officials disagreed with the amount of radioactive material we  determined was needed to produce a dirty bomb, noting that NRC’s  “concern threshold” is significantly higher. We continue to believe that our  purchase of radioactive sources and our ability to counterfeit an NRC  document are matters that NRC should address. We could have purchased  all of the radioactive sources used in our two undercover border crossings  by making multiple purchases from different suppliers, using similarly  convincing cover stories, using false identities, and had all of the  radioactive sources conveniently shipped to our nation’s capital.
Further, we believe that the amount of radioactive sources that we were  able to transport into the United States during our operation would be  sufficient to produce two dirty bombs, which could be used as weapons of  mass disruption. Finally, NRC officials told us that they are aware of the  potential problems of counterfeiting documents and that they are working  to resolve these issues.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my  statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other  members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D.  Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this testimony.
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