National Mall: Steps Identified by Stakeholders Facilitate Design and Approval of Security Enhancements
Published: 2005-06-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The National Mall in Washington, D.C., encompasses some of our country's most treasured icons and serves as a public gathering place for millions of visitors each year. The National Air and Space Museum, for example, was the most visited museum worldwide in 2003, hosting 9.4 million visitors. Federal agencies with facilities on the National Mall have begun implementing physical security enhancements to protect their facilities and the visiting public. This report responds to Congressional interest in the efforts and expenditures pertaining to these security enhancements and discusses (1) the physical security enhancements that have been implemented on the National Mall since September 11, 2001, the additional enhancements planned, and the costs of these enhancements; (2) the considerations given to incorporating access and aesthetics into the design and approval of these security enhancements, and how issues of access and aesthetics are perceived by visitors in relation to these enhancements; and (3) examples of how federal agencies are using key practices to implement the enhancements, and any challenges the agencies are experiencing in using these key practices. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Smithsonian Institution, Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, and National Gallery of Art provided clarifying and technical comments, which were incorporated into this report where appropriate.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, federal agencies on the National Mall have obligated about $132 million for physical security enhancements, with the National Park Service and the Smithsonian accounting for about 75 percent of the total obligations. Security enhancements include additional security personnel, facility upgrades, and equipment and technology. Planned enhancements include the installation of permanent security barriers to protect against vehicle bombs. Public access and aesthetic considerations are integral to the design and approval of security enhancements on the National Mall. Federal agencies must coordinate with reviewing organizations, such as the National Capital Planning Commission, and consider aesthetics, historic preservation, urban design, urban planning, and environmental effects when implementing security enhancements. Although federal agencies reported that the review process can be time-consuming, review organizations noted that early and frequent consultation with them helps to ensure a smoother, more efficient, and expeditious review process. GAO's survey of about 300 visitors to the National Mall, and reports from federal agencies, indicate that visitors value access to and the appearance of the National Mall and generally find the current level of security enhancements acceptable. GAO's survey results also suggest that visitors regard access and aesthetics as important priorities when adding security enhancements to the National Mall. Federal agencies on the National Mall reported using five of the six key practices identified by GAO--allocating resources using risk management, leveraging technology, information-sharing and coordination, performance management and testing, and strategic management of human capital--in implementing physical security enhancements. However, none of the federal agencies on the National Mall reported using the key practice of aligning assets to mission in implementing security measures because they believe they do not have excess or underutilized facilities or consider the practice applicable to property under their jurisdiction. Agencies identified balancing ongoing mission priorities with the need for security as a common challenge in using key practices to implement physical security enhancements.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, increased attention has  been given to protecting our nation’s key assets, whose destruction could  result not only in the loss of life, but in the loss of irreplaceable items from  American history and of structures that have come to symbolize America  worldwide. The National Mall in Washington, D.C., encompasses some of  our country’s most treasured icons and serves as a public gathering place  for millions of visitors each year. The National Air and Space Museum, for  example, was the world’s most frequently visited museum in 2003, with 9.4  million visitors. As such, federal agencies and entities with facilities on the  National Mall—the National Park Service, Smithsonian Institution,  National Gallery of Art, Department of Agriculture, and U.S. Botanic  Garden—have implemented and are continuing to implement physical  security enhancements to protect their facilities, employees, and the  visiting public. To assist in financing the anticipated costs of designing and  implementing new security enhancements, Congress provided  supplemental appropriations to most of these federal agencies in fiscal year  2002. In addition, the agencies have funded security enhancements from  their annual appropriations acts.
We have issued several reports on the physical security of federal facilities.  For example, in November 2004, we identified a set of key practices that  can provide a framework for guiding federal agencies’ facility protection  efforts. To assist the Committee in its oversight role, this report discusses  (1) the physical security enhancements that have been implemented on the  National Mall since September 11, the additional enhancements planned,  and the costs of these enhancements; (2) the considerations given to  incorporating access and aesthetics in designing and approving physical  security enhancements on the National Mall, and how issues of access and  aesthetics are perceived by visitors in relation to these enhancements; and  (3) examples of how federal agencies are using key practices to implement  physical security enhancements on the National Mall, and any challenges  the agencies are experiencing in using these key practices.
To accomplish all of these objectives, we reviewed historical plans for the  design, expansion, and maintenance of the National Mall; appropriations  acts and accompanying legislative material; statutory and regulatory  provisions related to security enhancements of the National Mall grounds;  and federal agency proposals for implementing physical security  enhancements on the National Mall. We also received information about  obligations and costs associated with physical security enhancements on  the National Mall since the terrorist attacks of September 11. We  interviewed officials of the National Park Service, U.S. Park Police,  Smithsonian Institution, National Gallery of Art, Department of  Agriculture, U.S. Botanic Garden, U.S. Capitol Police, National Capital  Planning Commission, U.S. Commission of Fine Arts, Advisory Council for  Historic Preservation, District of Columbia’s Historic Preservation Office,  Department of Homeland Security, and National Coalition to Save Our Mall.  Furthermore, we surveyed about 300 visitors to the National Mall on 5 days  in October and November 2004 to obtain reactions about security  enhancements. We performed our work from August 2004 through May  2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. (See app. I for a more detailed discussion of the report’s scope  and methodology; also see app. II for the results of our National Mall Visitor  Survey.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The National Mall in Washington, D.C., traces its history in part to plans  developed by Pierre Charles L’Enfant and the U.S. Senate’s Park  Commission of the District of Columbia—commonly known as the  McMillan Commission. The L’Enfant Plan of 1791 envisioned the National  Mall as a grand avenue beginning at the U.S. Capitol and extending west to  the current site of the Washington Monument. The McMillan Commission  Plan of 1901-1902 extended the National Mall further west and south to the  future sites of the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials. Multiple geographic  definitions of the National Mall exist. For example, the narrowest definition  of the National Mall encompasses the area between 1st and 14th Streets and  Constitution and Independence Avenues. Broader definitions of the  National Mall extend its boundaries to include the grounds of the  Washington Monument and the grounds of the Lincoln and Jefferson  Memorials, while other definitions also include the U.S. Capitol, the White  House, the Ellipse, and West Potomac Park. For the purposes of our report,  we defined the National Mall as the area extending from the foot of the U.S.  Capitol grounds west to the Washington Monument and proceeding further  west and southeast to include the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials. It also  includes the area between Constitution and Independence Avenues  between 1st and 14th Streets (see fig. 1).
The open spaces of the National Mall, along with the Washington  Monument, the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials, and other memorials, are  (1) administered and maintained by the National Capital Parks unit of the  National Park Service (Park Service), which is within the Department of  the Interior (Interior), and (2) patrolled by the U.S. Park Police. In addition,  other federal agencies control and maintain various facilities located on the  National Mall, as described below:   Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian): Created as a trust  instrumentality of the United States by an act of Congress in 1846, the  Smithsonian is considered the world’s largest museum and research  complex, featuring 11 facilities on the National Mall—that is, the  Smithsonian Castle, Arts and Industries Building, Freer Gallery of Art,  Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden, National Air and Space  Museum, National Museum of African Art, National Museum of  American History, National Museum of the American Indian, National  Museum of Natural History, Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, and S. Dillon  Ripley Center.
National Gallery of Art (National Gallery):  With the gift of Andrew W.
Mellon’s collection of paintings and works of sculptures, the National  Gallery was created by a joint resolution of Congress in 1937. Located at  the northeast corner of the National Mall, the National Gallery today  maintains two buildings—the West and East Buildings, opened in 1941  and 1978, respectively—and an outdoor Sculpture Garden, opened to  the public in 1999.
Department of Agriculture (USDA):  The only cabinet-level agency  building located on the National Mall is the USDA’s Whitten Building. In  1995, this building was named for former U.S. Representative Jamie L.  Whitten.
U.S. Botanic Garden (USBG):  Tracing its origins as far back as 1816,  USBG is managed under the direction of the Joint Committee on the  Library, with the Architect of the Capitol responsible for the garden’s  operations and maintenance. USBG’s Conservatory and the adjacent  outdoor National Garden (currently under construction) are situated on  the southeast corner of the National Mall. Security for USBG is provided  by the U.S. Capitol Police.
Along with the federal agencies that manage facilities on the National Mall,  several governmental and other entities have an oversight, advisory, or  advocacy role related to the construction, renovation, or modification of  facilities, including the implementation of security enhancements, on the  National Mall and throughout Washington, D.C. These entities include the  following:  National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC):  NCPC, which is the  federal government’s central planning agency for the National Capital  Region, provides planning guidance for the development of federal land  and buildings in the city. NCPC and federal agencies must comply with  both the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National  Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). These laws require that federal  agencies consider the effects of their undertakings on environmental  quality and historic properties, respectively, and allow for public  participation and comment. NCPC’s policies and procedures are meant  to ensure compliance with these laws during its review process. NCPC  also reviews the design of federal construction projects, oversees long- range planning for development, and monitors capital investment by  federal agencies.
Commission of Fine Arts (CFA):  CFA provides advice to federal and  D.C. government agencies on matters of art and architecture that affect  the appearance of the capital city.
D.C. State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) and Advisory Council  on Historic Preservation (ACHP):  Federal agencies that undertake the  construction or renovation of properties in Washington, D.C., are  required by law to assess whether there may be effects to designated  historic properties, engage in consultation with the SHPO on effects to  historic properties, and provide ACHP with an opportunity to comment.  ACHP promotes the preservation, enhancement, and productive use of  the nation’s historic resources and reviews federal programs and  policies to promote effectiveness, coordination, and consistency with  national preservation policies.
National Coalition to Save Our Mall:  Founded in 2000, the coalition is  made up of professional and civic organizations and concerned artists,  historians, and citizens to provide a national constituency dedicated to  the protection and preservation of the National Mall in Washington, D.C.  The coalition’s mission is to “defend our national gathering place and  symbol of Constitutional principles against threats posed by recent and  ongoing proposals—for new memorials, security barriers, service  buildings and roads—that would encroach on the Mall’s historical and  cultural integrity, its open spaces and sweeping vistas, and its  significance in American public life.”
The physical security of federal facilities, including those on the National  Mall, has been a more urgent governmentwide concern since the 1995  bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,  Oklahoma. The vulnerability of our nation’s infrastructure was further  highlighted after the terrorist attacks of September 11. Since the September  11 attacks, actions have been taken to better protect our critical  infrastructure and key assets from future attacks of terrorism. In 2002, the  Administration’s Office of Homeland Security issued The National Strategy  for Homeland Security, which recognized the potential for attacks on  national monuments and icons and identified Interior as the lead federal  agency with jurisdiction over these key assets. The Administration  outlined actions that Interior should take to protect national icons and  monuments in The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of  Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets in 2003. Furthermore, the  Administration issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 in  December 2003, establishing a national policy for federal agencies to  identify and prioritize U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources and to  protect them from terrorist attacks.
In response to the effects of what were viewed as makeshift security  measures that affected the historic design and streetscape of Washington,  D.C., NCPC’s Interagency Task Force issued a report in October 2001— Designing for Security in the Nation’s Capital—identifying design  strategies to improve mobility and aesthetic conditions throughout  Washington, D.C. The following year, NCPC released a design framework  and implementation strategy for Washington’s “monumental core” and  downtown area, National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan, which  provided a summary of building perimeter security considerations;  streetscape design concepts that incorporate security components; and an  implementation strategy for the design, construction, funding,  maintenance, and operations of security installations in Washington, D.C.  (See the bibliography for additional reports related to this topic.)
Likewise, improving the physical security of federal facilities has been the  subject of several GAO reports, including our November 2004 report. In  that report, we assessed the actions of the federal government’s  Interagency Security Committee in coordinating federal facility protection  efforts and delineated a set of six key practices emerging from the  collective practices of federal agencies to provide a framework for guiding  agencies’ facility protection efforts (see fig. 2). As previously mentioned,  these key practices are allocating resources using risk management,  leveraging technology, information-sharing and coordination, performance  measurement and testing, aligning assets to mission, and strategic  management of human capital.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Obligated about $132 Million for Physical Security Enhancements on the National Mall since September 11, and Additional Measures Are Planned
paragraphs: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, about $132 million has been  obligated for physical security enhancements by federal agencies for  facilities on the National Mall. Overall, the Park Service and the  Smithsonian have incurred higher levels of obligations for physical security  enhancements than other agencies because they manage most of the  facilities on the National Mall (see table 1). Federal agencies obligated  funds for physical security enhancements from funds made available  through annual and supplemental appropriations.
The implementation of physical security enhancements on the National  Mall is shaped, in part, by the availability of funds and the costs of  enhancements. Federal agencies often adjust their security plans on the  basis of available funding. The remaining text in this section describes the  physical security enhancements for which these agencies told us they have  obligated funds, as well as some of the costs associated with implementing  these enhancements. Additional planned physical security enhancements  for each of the agencies are also discussed.
subsections: section_title: National Park Service and U.S. Park Police
paragraphs: The Park Service and the Park Police told us they obligated over $57  million for physical security enhancements, including security personnel,  on the National Mall during fiscal years 2002 through 2004, primarily at the  Washington Monument and the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials. For  each of these monuments and memorials, the Park Service incurred such  obligations to conduct site surveys; develop security proposals; comply  with environmental, historical, and design guidelines; hire construction  managers; and replace temporary security measures with permanent  security enhancements. Perimeter security construction was under way at  both the Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial during our  review, while designs for perimeter security at the Jefferson Memorial have  not been finalized. The following text provides some examples of perimeter  security enhancements implemented and planned at each of these national  icons.
The Washington Monument: After September 11, the Park Service  installed closed-circuit television cameras, in addition to temporary  security measures, such as a ring of jersey barriers and a visitor  screening facility at the Washington Monument. During our review, the  Monument was closed to the public because of construction to replace  these temporary security features with permanent security  enhancements. The Monument reopened in April 2005, and the grounds  are expected to reopen in early summer. The grounds will be regraded,  and 30-inch retaining walls, serving as both vehicle barriers and visitor  seating, will surround the Monument. In addition, pedestrian pathways,  upgraded lighting, and seating benches are expected to be installed on  the Monument grounds. The total cost of constructing these permanent  physical security enhancements is estimated at $12.2 million. The Park  Service also told us it is considering the installation of a remote visitor  screening facility; however, implementation of this security  enhancement had not been approved or scheduled.
The Lincoln Memorial: After September 11, concrete jersey barriers and  planters were installed around the Lincoln Memorial ring and the  circular drive east of the memorial was closed to all traffic. Construction  is expected to be completed in spring 2006, at which time a 35-inch  retaining wall will serve as a perimeter vehicle barrier around the north,  west, and south sides of the memorial. In addition, bollards (short  posts) will be installed on the east side of the circle to complete the  vehicle barrier system. Construction costs for the vehicle barrier system  are estimated at $5.1 million.
The Lincoln Memorial is currently surrounded  by temporary security enhancements that were  installed shortly after September 11, 2001.  These enhancements include the placement  of jersey barriers along the circumference of  the circular roadway surrounding the memorial.  The chain-link fence shown in the above  photograph has since been removed.
The Park Service currently proposes to  connect the approved and under construction  retaining wall that will protect the north, west,  and south sides of the Lincoln Memorial with  a line of bollards on the inner curb of the east  side of the circular roadway. These bollards  will be at the foot of the steps leading from  the memorial to the circular roadway. The  choice of materials, metal or stone, as well as  the design, has not been finalized.
The Jefferson Memorial: Since the September 11 terrorist attacks,  temporary concrete jersey barriers have been in place around the  Jefferson Memorial, and the U-shaped drive on the south side of the  memorial has been closed to traffic. In addition, the parking lot adjacent  to the memorial has been closed to the public. The construction of a  permanent vehicle barrier system, still in the design stage, is expected to  begin in the winter of 2005 and to be completed in the winter of 2006 at  an estimated cost of $4.1 million.
In addition to funds specifically obligated at these national icons, the Park  Service obligated funds in fiscal year 2002 for closed-circuit television  cameras at various memorials located within the National Mall.  Furthermore, the Park Police obligated funds during this time for security  personnel and equipment support, such as X-ray machines, body armor,  and vehicles. The Park Service told us the completion of permanent vehicle  barriers and the installation of equipment and technology upgrades, such  as permanent security cameras at each monument and memorial, were the  only additional physical security enhancements planned on the National  Mall at the time of our review.
The proposed security barrier around the  Jefferson Memorial consists of a combination  of freestanding walls, reinforced decorative  fencing, and bollards. Where possible, the  barrier system will run along the park road  to the south of the memorial. Thirty percent of  the parking lost with the closure of the  existing parking lot will be added just outside  the barrier system, and an additional 200  parking spaces are available within 600 yards  of the memorial.
In fiscal years 2002 through 2004, the Smithsonian obligated approximately  $42 million for numerous physical security enhancements, such as  additional security personnel, periodic risk assessments, perimeter vehicle  barriers, blast mitigation film, closed-circuit television cameras, emergency  voice systems, and electronic screening of the public and mail at its  National Mall facilities. Some of these security enhancements were already  completed at the time of our review. In other cases, enhancements already  existed in a facility or are planned to be implemented during future  renovations. Smithsonian officials noted that they have established  priorities for the implementation of physical security enhancements,  identifying as their top priorities the installation of perimeter security  barriers and of blast protection film on their facilities’ windows. The  Smithsonian plans to obligate an additional $72 million to implement these  and other security enhancements between fiscal years 2006 through 2012.
Perimeter vehicle barriers:  Permanent barriers around the exterior of  each of the Smithsonian’s National Mall facilities will replace existing  temporary barriers to provide protection from vehicle bombs.  According to the Smithsonian, this security measure, which is to be  implemented in three phases, is one of its highest priorities. The first  phase, the construction of a perimeter barrier around the National Air  and Space Museum, has already begun and is expected to be completed  in February 2006. The second phase, the construction of perimeter  barriers around the Smithsonian’s National Museum of American  History and National Museum of Natural History is expected to begin in  July 2006 and to be completed in June 2008. The final phase, addressing  perimeter security for the remaining Smithsonian facilities on the  National Mall, will be implemented between April 2008 and April 2010.  Smithsonian officials told us that $11 million was obligated for this  project in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and that an additional $24.7 million  is planned for obligation through fiscal year 2008.
Blast-resistant window system enhancement:  For this enhancement,  which is designed to prevent or reduce the number of deaths or injuries  from flying glass, the Smithsonian obligated a total of $1.8 million in  fiscal years 2003 and 2004 and plans to obligate an additional $44.9  million through fiscal year 2012 to implement this measure.
Perimeter closed-circuit television cameras:  Providing surveillance of  the grounds adjacent to the Smithsonian’s National Mall facilities to  detect suspicious activities, this enhancement has been implemented by  the Smithsonian at 3 of its facilities on the National Mall, resulting in  obligations totaling $660,000 in fiscal year 2002. The Smithsonian  canceled the implementation of this security enhancement at some of its  other National Mall facilities but plans to implement the measure during  future security upgrades or capital renovation projects.
Emergency voice systems:  This enhancement, intended to enable  emergency response staff to broadcast disaster- or emergency-related  information to affected Smithsonian staff and visitors, was in place at  three museums on the National Mall prior to September 11. To  implement this enhancement at the remainder of its facilities, the  Smithsonian obligated $2.9 million in fiscal year 2002.
Electronic screening of the public and mail:  According to the  Smithsonian, this enhancement is designed to prevent a terrorist from  carrying an explosive device or firearm into a Smithsonian facility, or to  mitigate the effects of such a weapon’s use. The enhancement also is  designed to detect explosives or biological agents delivered through the  mail system. Although lack of space for screening equipment will limit  the use of this security enhancement at its National Mall facilities, the  Smithsonian does plan to implement this measure at some of its  facilities. However, in some cases, renovations are required to install an  adequate number of screening stations. The Smithsonian has deferred  renovations to fully implement this measure until it can address higher  priority security enhancements. In the meantime, several facilities have  received full magnetometer screening and bag searches to limit the  potential for explosive devices or firearms to enter a Smithsonian  facility. The Smithsonian obligated $2.2 million in fiscal year 2002 for  this enhancement.
Besides funding the enhancements previously identified, the Smithsonian  obligated about $20 million for additional security personnel and $1 million  for risk assessments for its facilities during fiscal years 2002 through 2004.  Furthermore, the Smithsonian has requested $700,000 for electronic access  control measures and $2 million to deter, detect, or prevent the  introduction of chemical, biological, or radiological agents into air intakes  at its National Mall facilities.
section_title: National Gallery of Art
paragraphs: Officials from the National Gallery told us it has obligated over $7 million to  implement physical security enhancements at its East and West Buildings  and Sculpture Garden since September 11. Funds have been obligated at  both the East and West Buildings and for equipment and technology, such  as magnetometers, X-ray machines, closed-circuit television cameras, and  body armor. In addition, the National Gallery installed streetscape and  landscape barriers, such as trees and boulders, along the exterior of the  East Building; constructed a security guardhouse and modified the service  entrance at the West Building; and deployed temporary barricades to be  used during heightened security alerts. Finally, the National Gallery has  obligated funds for an Integrated Security Management System, the review  of its disaster management plan, and the review of vulnerability  assessments for security against explosive devices. Although  implementation of future security enhancements is subject to available  funding, the following text describes some examples of security  enhancements planned by the National Gallery:  The National Gallery plans to conduct additional studies to evaluate its  camera system and the need for an Emergency Operations Center  (EOC). By determining the number and location of cameras currently in  use throughout the National Gallery, this study will provide the gallery  with the most comprehensive surveillance system possible. The EOC  study will determine the National Gallery’s need for an off-site space to  conduct security operations in the event of a large-scale emergency  affecting the National Mall. The estimated cost of the studies is $350,000.
The National Gallery plans to upgrade perimeter security through  additional protections against explosions and hazardous agents. These  measures include erecting bollards and retractable steel plates around  the perimeter of the East and West Buildings and Sculpture Garden to  protect against unauthorized vehicles, adding window film to windows  in the entire East Building and part of the West Building, and installing  air intake protection sensors in the West Building to protect against  biological agents or other materials. The estimated cost of implementing  these enhancements is $1.4 million.
The National Gallery plans to install additional equipment and  technology, such as improved access controls and biometrics, perimeter  cameras, and screening devices. For example, new employee  identification badges (smart cards) will be authenticated and  electronically tracked through the National Gallery’s Integrated Security  Management System to protect against fraud. In addition, the National  Gallery intends to improve security and access controls through the use  of biometric systems. Additional external cameras will improve  surveillance of the East and West Buildings and Sculpture Garden.  Finally, X-ray machines and magnetometers that are already in use at  some public entrances will be added at closed entrances at the West  Building to improve visitor access during heightened security. The  estimated cost of implementing these enhancements is $580,000.
section_title: Department of Agriculture
paragraphs: USDA has obligated about $25 million for physical security enhancements  for its facilities on or adjacent to the National Mall since September 11.   USDA conducted blast assessment studies, hired additional security  personnel, and began installing window protection measures and a public  address system at each of its Washington, D.C., facilities, in addition to  developing a perimeter streetscape security master plan for the four- building headquarters complex. USDA also obligated funds for a situation  room and a heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning (HVAC) air intake  study at the Whitten Building located on the National Mall.
USDA plans to continue installing blast resistant windows for the South  Building under its overall modernization project and safety drapes in  additional locations in the four-building headquarters complex; it also plans  to undertake major HVAC improvements against bioterrorism. However,  the implementation of these measures is dependent on available funding  and the priority given to these measures by USDA. In some cases, the  security enhancements will be coordinated with major renovations of its  facilities. Beginning in fiscal year 2006, USDA also plans to improve  security around its facilities by implementing perimeter security barriers  that it developed for the Whitten Building and adjacent facilities. USDA  plans to implement this project in four phases based on funding availability  and USDA’s assessment of each building’s location, vulnerability, and other  factors (see fig. 3). Each phase can be subdivided and adjusted according  to funding availability. The proposed security elements include a  combination of bollards, fences, planters, tree well enclosures, and  retaining and freestanding walls located primarily at the buildings’  roadways, curbs, and driveways. Specifically, at the Whitten Building facing  the National Mall, USDA plans to install a combination of bollards and  planters to create a 50-foot stand-off distance from the facility. The overall  estimated cost of implementing these perimeter security enhancements is  between $13 million and $14 million.
section_title: U.S. Botanic Garden
paragraphs: The U.S. Capitol Police is responsible for security at USBG. The physical  security enhancements implemented at USBG include a visitor screening  facility at the entrance of the Conservatory to detect weapons and  explosives, security cameras, card readers throughout the Conservatory, an  alarm system, and the addition of four security officers when the  Conservatory is open to the public. The U.S. Capitol Police obligated  $600,000 in fiscal year 2003 to implement these enhancements. U.S. Capitol  Police officials told us they do not anticipate a need for additional funding  for security enhancements at USBG.
section_title: Security Enhancements Have Incorporated Considerations of Public Access and Aesthetics and Have Been Generally Accepted by Visitors
paragraphs: Public access and aesthetics are vital to the design and approval of physical  security enhancements to sites on the National Mall. Agencies are required  to coordinate with reviewing organizations and consider aesthetics,  historic preservation, urban design, urban planning, and environmental  impacts when implementing physical security enhancements. Reports from  federal agencies, along with responses to our own survey of National Mall  visitors, indicate that visitors have found the current level of public access  and the aesthetics of temporary and permanent physical security  enhancements acceptable. The majority of survey respondents also  indicated that aesthetics and public access should be given high priorities  when adding security enhancements to the National Mall.
subsections: section_title: Access and Aesthetics Are Critical to the Design and Approval of Physical Security Enhancements on the National Mall
paragraphs: Agency officials told us that they consider public access and aesthetics in  developing and designing physical security enhancements for their  facilities on the National Mall. These officials noted that maintaining the  cultural and historic character of their facilities is important, and that  providing visitors with access to their facilities is fundamental to their  educational and commemorative missions. For example, officials of the  Smithsonian and National Gallery stated the importance of ensuring the  public’s access to their collections and exhibits when implementing  security enhancements. Park Service officials noted that they want visitors  to be able to access the monuments and memorials as they did before  security enhancements were implemented. Similarly, in terms of aesthetics,  officials of the Smithsonian and National Gallery told us that in designing  smaller security projects, they use exhibit and design specialists to ensure  that the security projects are implemented according to consistent  standards throughout their facilities. For larger security projects, they also  work with security consultants, design specialists, and architecture and  engineering firms to ensure that aesthetics are incorporated into their  security designs. USBG works with the U.S. Capitol Police to incorporate  aesthetics into security enhancements. For example, additional  surveillance cameras were reinstalled in less visible sites, while  maintaining their overall security function.
In the case of a facility that is under construction, such as the  Smithsonian’s National Museum of the American Indian, security features  can be integrated directly into the design of the structure without the need  for the subsequent installation of potentially more conspicuous and  obtrusive features (see fig. 4). After September 11, the Smithsonian altered  the landscaping plan for the National Museum of the American Indian to  integrate additional security enhancements into the design of the facility.  Specifically, four substantial “grandfather rocks” were repositioned to  locations where they could serve as a vehicle barrier, while maintaining the  cultural and aesthetic significance of these objects.
In most cases, however, agencies have had to develop and design physical  security enhancements for facilities already in place on the National Mall.  Still, officials of these agencies told us that public access and aesthetics are  critical elements in the design of security enhancements. For example,  officials of the Smithsonian noted that the perimeter vehicle barriers that  will be constructed around each of its museums on the National Mall have  been designed with an eye toward integrating the architectural design and  characteristics of the museums into the barriers. In addition, they noted  that the height of the barriers will be adjusted in certain locations to  achieve a better appearance and scale, improve pedestrian movement and  accessibility, and provide space for visitors to sit on the barriers  themselves. Similarly, the physical security enhancements to the  Washington Monument that were under construction during our review  were designed to ensure consistency in the historical landscaping of the  grounds and in the spaces for visitors’ recreation. Although the Park  Service developed alternative design proposals, including the one depicted  in the figure below (right), the selected design includes a regrading of the  Monument grounds and the construction of retaining walls that are  intended to disappear into the landscape (see fig. 5).
section_title: Multiple Organizations Work with National Mall Agencies to Design and Review Security Enhancements
paragraphs: Several organizations work with the agencies that have facilities on the  National Mall to ensure that security enhancements reflect access and  aesthetic concerns. Specifically, the SHPO and ACHP, as well as NCPC and  CFA, coordinate with the agencies that have facilities on the National Mall.  Such coordination is designed to ensure that architecture, urban design,  urban planning, aesthetics, historic preservation, and environmental  impacts are considered when implementing physical security  enhancements.
For example, federal agencies must prepare an environmental assessment  to determine the effects of proposed security enhancements on the human  environment as part of the NEPA process. In addition, because security  enhancements may affect the historic character of properties on the  National Mall, federal agencies are required to follow the NHPA’s Section  106 review process. This process has federal agencies consider the effects  of their actions on historic property and address “adverse effects” that  could diminish the integrity of the property. Federal agencies are  responsible for initiating the review process and for consulting with the  SHPO on measures to deal with any adverse effects. In addition, ACHP is  given a reasonable opportunity to comment as part of the NHPA process.  Federal agencies are also required to solicit public input as part of both the  NEPA and NHPA review processes.
Finally, agencies must submit those designs that fall under the NCPC and  CFA statutory authorities to these review organizations before security  enhancements can be implemented. NCPC officials told us that they  examine security projects comprehensively from a broad design and urban  planning perspective to ensure the project’s consistency with the  commission’s comprehensive urban design and planning documents, such  as the Comprehensive Plan for the National Capital and the Urban Design  and Security Plan. NCPC must give approval before a security  enhancement project can be implemented. CFA officials told us they focus  on visual appearance and on how security enhancements can be physically  integrated into the urban environment. Although agencies must submit  security designs to CFA, the commission plays an advisory role in  reviewing security projects and cannot enforce agencies to implement its  recommendations. Projects are generally submitted to NCPC and CFA after  the completion of most, if not all, of the NEPA and NHPA processes. These  processes must be completed before NCPC approves the final design.
section_title: National Mall Agencies and Review Organizations Identified Challenges in Designing and Approving Security Enhancements
paragraphs: Although aesthetic and public access considerations are seen as critical  elements in the design and approval of physical security enhancements to  facilities on the National Mall, agency officials also told us that the process  applicable to all construction and renovation projects in Washington,  D.C.—requiring consultation, review, and approval with multiple review  organizations—adds to project costs and can be both time-consuming and  inefficient. Of particular concern, officials of these agencies noted the   seeming overlap in consultations and reviews of projects required among  the review organizations. For example, Park Service officials told us that in  submitting a security proposal, one review organization might request a  particular change to the design, and another organization might request an  entirely different change. Sometimes, consensus on the design of a security  project had been reached at the staff level within a review organization, but  the commissioners within that organization then had different ideas about  the project’s design. For example, designs for security enhancements for  the eastern portion of the Lincoln Memorial have gone before the CFA’s  commissioners several times for their review. Furthermore, some agency  officials noted that the commissioners from CFA and NCPC might disagree  on a particular security design. According to officials from the Park  Service, there is currently no guidance available to assist agencies in  moving forward on proposals that receive contradictory direction. These  officials suggested that in such cases, commissioners, rather than staff,  from both review organizations should consult with one another to resolve  their differences and provide guidance to the agency on moving forward.  While CFA officials acknowledged that there is no formal process for  resolving disagreements between commissions, they noted several options  for reconciling such differences. For example, in some cases, agencies may  be able to circulate revised drawings to the commissions in between formal  meetings, or the commissions might delegate approval authority to the staff  level, pending modifications. Finally, the public can comment on security  proposals affecting the National Mall. As a result of competing stakeholder  interests, it can take months or even years to go through the review  process.
The perimeter security designs for the Washington Monument illustrate the  effects multiple stakeholders can have on a proposed security project’s  design and schedule. Officials from the Park Service told us that a  preliminary design for the Washington Monument was selected in  December 2001. The design consisted primarily of landscape barriers that  would provide perimeter security and an underground visitor screening  facility. The Park Service submitted its design to CFA at this time, and,  according to both parties, CFA approved the vehicular barrier portion of  the design with only minor changes. In addition, Park Service officials  told us that they submitted the security design to NCPC in January 2002  and received final approval for the perimeter security portion of the design  in June 2003. Park Service officials noted the approval process for the  Washington Monument design was relatively quick. However, the design for  the underground screening facility did not receive final approval from CFA  and received only preliminary approval from NCPC before the  underground screening facility project was canceled. According to CFA  officials, the screening facility as planned would have drastically changed  how visitors accessed the Monument, and it was not an effective security  proposal. CFA officials told us they proposed a number of alternatives for  this portion of the project, but the Park Service rejected them. According to  CFA officials, they have not recently discussed this project with the Park  Service. Park Service officials told us that the concept for the underground  screening facility was abandoned because of significant resistance from a  number of stakeholders and because Congress never approved funding for  the measure. Park Service officials told us the temporary screening facility  that was in place before the Washington Monument was under construction  will be put back until a permanent screening facility is designed.
Review organizations also identified challenges in the review process for  implementing security enhancements on the National Mall. Review  organizations said they have concerns about their budgets and staff  resources. Officials from these organizations told us that the number of   security projects submitted for their review has greatly increased since the  September 11 terrorist attacks. However, officials noted that they have not  received additional funding or staff to respond to the increase in proposals.  In addition, officials from CFA and NCPC noted that some agencies do not  always justify the need for a particular security enhancement or identify  the threat that the agency is trying to protect against. Officials from CFA  noted that this type of information is helpful in developing a design that  meets the needs of both the agency and the review organization.  Furthermore, officials from CFA also noted that when applicants come to  them after a project already has been designed, the applicant is often  reluctant to make any changes or consider alternative approaches because  of the time and money already invested. Finally, both federal agencies and  the review organizations noted that the limited number of security designs  available to secure facilities in an urban environment presents a challenge  in implementing security enhancements. Park Service officials noted that  the technology available for perimeter security consists primarily of vehicle  barrier systems (e.g., bollards, walls, and strengthened street furniture).  However, these officials noted that the review organizations often do not  approve security designs that exclusively consist of bollards.
section_title: National Mall Agencies and Review Organizations Identified Steps That Can Make the Review Process More Efficient
paragraphs: Several agency officials, along with the review organizations, stated that  early and frequent consultation helps to ensure a smoother, more efficient  review process. Both the agencies and the review organizations noted that  informal consultations between all parties should continue throughout the  design of the security project. Informal consultations can begin before  “putting pen to paper” and should occur during the project’s preliminary  design phase. According to these officials, security proposals, in particular,  benefit from these early consultations because of their importance and  sensitivity. Both the review organizations and the federal agencies  identified the following additional actions that could lead to a more  efficient review process:  Consult early and frequently with all relevant stakeholders: Consulting  with all of the review organizations that play a role in the design and  approval of security enhancements at the same time not only facilitates  a more efficient review process, but doing so can also improve relations  between agencies and review organizations over time. In addition,  consulting with all stakeholders allows for the expression of everyone’s  views and concerns up front. Moreover, consultation with the staff and,  in some cases with the commissioners of the review organizations,  allows them to react informally to a proposed design, thereby giving  agencies the opportunity to incorporate their opinions into the proposal.  Officials from NCPC told us that their commissioners and CFA’s  commissioners might disagree on a design proposal because they are  providing a first reaction to a design that was not previously discussed  during informal consultations. In such cases, agencies may have to go  back through the review process to meet everyone’s needs, which can  take several additional months or even years, in addition to costing the  agency financial and staff resources. However, officials from the review  organizations noted that disagreements between the two commissions  occur infrequently, perhaps once a year. According to the Park Service,  disagreements between the two commissions seem to occur more often  with security projects that include some of our nation’s memorials. For  example, Park Service officials noted that they have received different  direction from the two commissions on the Washington Monument,  Lincoln Memorial, and Jefferson Memorial security projects.
In considering a design for its perimeter security projects, the  Smithsonian consulted with all of the review organizations before  developing a concept design. The parties discussed different design  options, and the Smithsonian was able to incorporate the review  organizations’ comments and suggestions into its proposal. According  to CFA, the Smithsonian also selected a designer that considered the  needs of the agency and the balance between security and access and  urban design. Smithsonian officials believe that the success of their  efforts hinged on bringing to the table experts from their offices of  Protection Services; Historic Preservation; and Engineering, Design,  and Construction who were willing to engage in dialogue and answer  questions from the review organizations. As a result, the Smithsonian  received favorable reviews of their preliminary design for security  enhancements from all of the stakeholders. According to Smithsonian  officials, the Smithsonian continues to consult with the SHPO, NCPC,  and CFA during the ongoing development of its final perimeter security  designs.
Be flexible and open to the review process and possible changes:  Officials from some of the agencies and the review organizations  discussed the importance of being open and flexible to alternatives  throughout the design process for security enhancements. In particular,  some officials stressed the importance of taking time to develop a  security solution built on the opinions and consensus of all  stakeholders. According to these officials, this approach will ultimately  result in stronger working relationships and a design solution that takes  both security and urban design issues into consideration.
Officials from CFA told us that the Departments of Energy and  Education developed successful security designs because they  consulted early and were open to considering alternative proposals.  For  example, according to CFA, Energy’s ideas for security designs at one of  its Washington, D.C., facilities were not appropriate for an urban  environment. However, through consultations with the review  organizations, Energy was able to design a better security project that  will be less costly than the one it originally designed. Similarly,  Education developed a proposal for renovating its plaza but did not  incorporate any security enhancements into the design. However,  because Education consulted with the review organizations before  going too far in the design process, it was able to incorporate security  features into the design. As a result, Education avoided later costly  revisions to the project.
Consult urban planning documents such as NCPC’s submission  guidelines and Urban Design and Security Plan: Agencies submitting  project proposals to NCPC for review and approval are required to  follow NCPC’s submission guidelines. The guidelines include NCPC’s  requirements for various phases of project proposals as well as NCPC’s  environmental and historic preservation procedures. The submission  guidelines also outline suggestions for coordinating stages of the review  process. For example, agencies can initiate the NEPA and NHPA review  processes simultaneously and plan their public participation, analysis,  and review so as to meet the purposes and requirements of both statutes  in a timely and efficient manner. The Security Plan provides a  framework for planning, designing, and implementing security  enhancements and focuses exclusively on incorporating perimeter  security measures into existing streetscape or landscape features. The  Security Plan also identifies security design solutions that are  appropriate to the character of areas within the Monumental Core,  including the National Mall and the Washington Monument and Lincoln  and Jefferson Memorials.
Several of the agencies on the National Mall told us they actively  participated in the development of the Security Plan, and they are  using the plan to help them balance perimeter security issues with  considerations of aesthetics and access to the National Mall. For  example, Park Service officials told us they used the plan to develop  concept designs for the Washington Monument as well as the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials. Similarly, the Smithsonian developed plans  to replace planter pots, industrial-looking vehicle barriers, and other  temporary security measures with custom-designed elements,  including benches, light poles, urns, and bollards, that complement the  historic surroundings of the National Mall (see fig. 6). Smithsonian  officials noted that the Security Plan provides constructive ideas for  what NCPC does and does not look for in designs for security  enhancements. As a result, NCPC has praised the Smithsonian on its  efforts to balance necessary security enhancements with public access  and aesthetics.
Furthermore, according to USDA, its proposed security project was  designed to address both minimum USDA perimeter security requirements  and the goals of the NCPC plan. Proposed security enhancements for the  Whitten Building include landscape bollards that sit well within the  generous “front lawn” of the building, and that are designed to respect the  significant and historic open character of the National Mall.
section_title: Effects of Enhancements on Access and Appearance Are Generally Acceptable to Visitors
paragraphs: Visitors value access to and the appearance of the National Mall and  generally find security enhancements acceptable. A number of agencies on  the National Mall told us that they have received very few complaints about  difficulty in accessing sites on the National Mall. Officials from the  Smithsonian further told us that a survey they conducted of visitors to their  museums in fiscal year 2002 suggests that visitors do not consider the time  standing in line to pass security checkpoints at museum entrances  problematic, provided the wait is less than 15 minutes. Moreover, some  agencies we interviewed also reported very few complaints about the  appearance of sites that are being or have been modified to accommodate  physical security enhancements.
Our survey of about 300 visitors to the National Mall found that these  visitors did not view the security enhancements on the National Mall,  which included both temporary and permanent enhancements, as having  unacceptable effects on access or appearance. Seventy-eight percent of  respondents indicated that security enhancements had no effect on public  access to sites on the National Mall, or made access easier. In addition, 64  percent of those surveyed said the security enhancements had no effect or  a positive effect on the appearance of the National Mall  (see fig. 7).
The majority of survey respondents also said the security enhancements  they encountered would have no effect on whether they will return for a  visit. However, results differed between residents of the Washington, D.C.,  metropolitan area and those who reside in other areas. Washington, D.C.,  metropolitan-area residents were almost twice as likely as U.S. residents  from outside the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area to report that  security measures have had a negative effect on access to and appearance  of sites on the National Mall. Furthermore, although visitors reported that  current levels of public access and appearance are satisfactory, the survey  results also suggest that visitors regard access and aesthetics as important  priorities when adding security measures to the National Mall. The majority  of respondents (85 percent) said both access and aesthetics should be  considered a medium to high priority when implementing additional  security enhancements. Overall, these results suggest that in terms of  public access and aesthetics, visitors to the National Mall find the existing  temporary and permanent security enhancements acceptable.
section_title: Federal Agencies Report Using Most Key Practices, but Balancing Mission Priorities with the Need for Physical Security Enhancements Poses Common Challenge
subsections: section_title: Agencies Report Using Most Key Practices to Implement Physical Security Enhancements
paragraphs: In our November 2004 report, we identified six key practices that have  emerged from the increased attention to facilities protection given by  federal agencies in recent years. We noted that, collectively, these key  practices could provide a framework for guiding federal agencies’ ongoing  facility protection efforts. These practices are allocating resources using  risk management; leveraging security technology; sharing information and  coordinating protection efforts with other stakeholders; measuring  program performance and testing security initiatives; implementing  strategic human capital management to ensure that agencies are well- equipped to recruit and retain high-performing security professionals; and  aligning assets to mission, thereby reducing vulnerabilities.
Throughout our review, agencies with facilities on the National Mall  reported using all but one of these key practices when implementing  security enhancements. For example, the Smithsonian told us it leverages  technology by using closed-circuit television cameras to extend the  capabilities of its security staff. Closed-circuit television cameras enable  security staff to quickly identify and respond to a security incident for  investigative purposes. In addition, the Smithsonian told us it conducts  periodic risk assessments of all its properties to determine how to allocate  resources to mitigate the greatest risks first. The Park Service told us that it  is including performance measures in its draft strategic plan, and that it  conducts regular security inspections of national icons. The Park Service  also told us that it is providing new training programs for security  personnel, including in-service training for officers of the Park Police. To  attract a more qualified pool of applicants for security positions, the  National Gallery reported strengthening its recruitment process and  reported a new emphasis on antiterrorism training for its security  personnel. The National Gallery also told us it has implemented, or plans to  implement, a number of advanced security technologies to provide a more  comprehensive security assessment of its facilities. Finally, federal  agencies also reported meeting periodically to discuss upcoming events,  intelligence information, and criminal activities. However, none of the  federal agencies reported using one key practice—aligning assets to  mission—to implement physical security enhancements because they do  not believe that they have excess or underutilized facilities on the National  Mall or elsewhere or consider the practice applicable to properties under  their jurisdiction.
subsections: section_title: Allocating Resources Using Risk Management
paragraphs: Allocating resources using risk management entails the systematic and  analytical process of considering the likelihood that a threat will endanger  an asset—that is, a structure, individual, or function—and identifying  actions that can reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences. As part of  its Disaster Management Program, the Smithsonian performs risk  assessments of all its properties every 3 to 5 years to determine the need  for security enhancements. Smithsonian officials told us that their last risk  assessment was performed in fiscal year 2002, but another multihazard risk  assessment—addressing both man-made and natural disasters—was  occurring during our review. According to Smithsonian officials, the  current effort will update the last risk assessment and provide a ranked  listing of risks, with proposed mitigation actions and costs, across the  entire portfolio of the Smithsonian’s facilities. In accordance with the  intent of this key practice, Smithsonian officials said the updated risk  assessment will allow the institution to use resources more efficiently to  mitigate the greatest risks first.
Park Service officials also told us that risk management is a key practice  used to determine the need for physical security enhancements to their  facilities on the National Mall. They noted that risk assessments were  completed in the late 1990s by three outside entities, and internal reviews  were performed by Park Police and Park Service officials. After September  11, the Park Service worked with a private security firm to assess the risk  of terrorist attacks at monuments on the National Mall. This assessment  examined potential threats—including the distance from which explosives  could potentially destroy any of the National Mall’s structures—and  alternative methods of both prevention and protection. Additionally, the  Park Service identified specific protection criteria and designated key  areas with the highest vulnerability as priorities, including areas of the  National Mall. The Park Service told us it has used the security firm’s report  findings to determine where to allocate appropriated funds and implement  security upgrades for high-risk structures.  Park Service officials also told  us that they rely on risk assessments as well as intelligence assessments,  reviews of latest terror trends, visitor needs, and reviews of criminal and  service incidents to allocate resources to respond to identified risks.
Since June 2004, Interior has applied its National Monuments and Icons  Assessment Methodology (NM&I Methodology) to assets that fall under the  purview of the Park Service. The NM&I Methodology provides a uniform  risk assessment and ranking methodology and was developed in response  to the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7’s requirement that  Interior formulate a plan for identifying, assessing, prioritizing, and  developing protective programs for critical assets within the national icons  and monuments sector. According to information from Interior, the NM&I  Methodology is specifically designed to quantify risk, identify needed  security enhancements, and measure risk-reduction benefits at icon and  monument assets.
National Gallery officials told us that it assesses potential risks to the  physical security of its facilities through the use of technical consultants  with specialized experience in security areas, such as blast analysis. The  National Gallery uses the results of such studies to form a basis for  developing specific projects or operational policies to mitigate the  identified risks. For example, National Gallery officials told us that targeted  risk assessments, such as the blast analysis on the exterior wall of the East  Building, identified the need for window security film and various types of  physical barriers.
section_title: Leveraging Security Technology
paragraphs: By efficiently using technology to supplement and reinforce other security  measures, agencies can more effectively apply the appropriate  countermeasures to vulnerabilities identified through the risk management  process. Our previous work reported that prior to a significant investment  in a project, a detailed analysis should be conducted to determine whether  the benefits of a technology outweigh its costs. In addition, we reported  that agencies should decide how a technology will be used and whether to  use a technology at all to address vulnerabilities before implementation.  The implementation costs of technologies in facilities protection can be  high, particularly if infrastructure modifications are necessary. Therefore,  in some cases, a lesser technological solution may be more effective and  less costly than more advanced technologies.
Several of the agency officials we spoke with identified steps they have  taken to make efficient use of technology to supplement and reinforce  other security enhancements. For example, the Smithsonian uses closed- circuit television cameras in several of its museums on the National Mall.  These cameras are low-cost security technologies that extend the  capabilities of the Smithsonian’s security staff by providing an immediate  assessment of information for investigative purposes. The Smithsonian  also identified the need for electronic screening facilities at some of its  facilities on the National Mall. However, because the museums would need  to undergo costly renovations to make enough space for the screening  equipment, these museums are using magnetometer screening and bag  searches until other, higher priority security enhancements have been  implemented.
The National Gallery has also implemented, and plans to implement, a  number of security technologies at its facilities on the National Mall.  Currently, the National Gallery uses magnetometers, X-ray machines, and  closed-circuit television cameras to improve its perimeter protection. The  National Gallery plans to undertake a risk analysis of its security camera  configuration to determine whether the number of cameras currently in use  provides the most comprehensive surveillance system possible. In addition,  the National Gallery plans to improve its access control through new  employee identification badges that can be rapidly authenticated and  tracked electronically through an Integrated Security Management System.  According to the National Gallery, comprehensively integrating a number  of new technologies provides more complete security for its facilities and  improves its operating efficiencies.
Finally, Park Service officials stated that closed-circuit television cameras  are in extensive use at the national icons on the National Mall and are a  critical component to the security of the area. Park Service officials also  noted that they are constantly reviewing developing security technologies  to determine the most cost-effective methods for upgrades.
section_title: Information-Sharing and Coordination
paragraphs: All agencies said they obtain and share information on potential threats to  facilities to better understand risks and more effectively determine  preventive measures. Among the agencies with facilities on the National  Mall, meetings are held quarterly to discuss upcoming events, intelligence  information, and criminal activities. Numerous other forums of  information-sharing and coordination also occur:  Park Service officials told us that Park Police officers are assigned to  the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Joint Task Force and  participate in meetings with the U.S. Attorneys, the D.C. Metropolitan  Police Department, and their own intelligence unit. In addition, we were  told that the Park Service relies on information gathered from officers  and rangers assigned to the National Mall area, who relay such  information to other entities as appropriate; and that coordination  routinely occurs between the Park Police and the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS).
Smithsonian officials said that they meet with the Park Police twice per  month to discuss security issues, and again monthly to receive crime  and terrorism intelligence from the Park Police, and on a daily basis to  coordinate police activities on the National Mall. In addition,  Smithsonian security officials meet and coordinate with the FBI and  receive daily general information on terrorist and other disaster-related  activity from DHS.
According to officials of the National Gallery, they attend meetings and  briefings with the FBI, the Mayor’s Special Events Task Group, and the  U.S. Park Police. Further, National Gallery officials said they coordinate  regularly with these entities, as well as the Federal Emergency  Management Agency (FEMA), D.C. Metropolitan Police Department,  DHS, U.S. Attorneys Office, U.S. Secret Service, Smithsonian, Library of  Congress, National Archives, Federal Trade Commission, Federal  Protective Service, and the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing  Arts.
USDA officials noted they share information and coordinate with the  Smithsonian, their immediate neighbor on the National Mall. USDA  officials also told us they coordinate with the Federal Protective Service  and the Park Police for general physical security and law enforcement  activities. In addition, USDA officials noted they coordinate matters  pertaining to national security, threats and emergency response directly  with DHS, FEMA, the FBI, and the U.S. Secret Service, as applicable.  Dignitary protection and the security of high-risk personnel are  coordinated with the U.S. Secret Service and the Department of State.  Finally, USDA officials told us they participate on the Southeast Area  Security Chiefs Council and other forums to exchange and develop  information pertaining to security and law enforcement.
As previously noted, another source of coordination on physical security  enhancements occurred through the NCPC Interagency Security Task  Force. Made up of representatives of 75 stakeholder agencies, the task  force’s efforts resulted in two reports that have guided agencies throughout  the city in devising and implementing physical security enhancements.  Both the Smithsonian and USDA’s perimeter security projects relied heavily  on the task force’s National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan.
section_title: Performance Measurement and Testing
paragraphs: This key practice encompasses two components to ensure the  effectiveness of physical security enhancements implemented by agencies:  linking security goals to broader agency mission goals, and inspecting and  assessing physical security enhancements. Park Service officials indicated  that they use both parts of this key practice because they (1) include  performance measures in the U.S. Park Police’s draft strategic plan and (2)  conduct regular and frequent inspections of the national icons by the Park  Police and routinely update and discuss security issues with Park Police  officials. Smithsonian officials also told us they use both parts of this key  practice in performing risk assessments of their facilities; implementing  risk assessment recommendations for facility upgrades, adding staff,  adding equipment, and using operational procedures as performance  metrics; and including physical security measures in the Smithsonian’s  broader performance measurements. USDA also said it uses both parts of  this key practice by linking security goals to the broader agency goal of  providing a safe and functional workplace to support staff in carrying out  their public service missions and through an established program to  inspect and periodically reassess the physical security stature of all USDA  properties, including the properties near the National Mall, and to effect  corrective actions as appropriate.
section_title: Strategic Human Capital Management
paragraphs: Strategic management of human capital involves implementing strategies  to help individuals maximize their full potential, having the capability to  recruit and retain high-performing security and law enforcement  professionals, and ensuring that personnel are well exercised and exhibit  good judgment in following security procedures. We found that most of the  agencies on the National Mall are implementing this key practice primarily  by offering new training programs for security personnel. Specifically, Park  Service officials told us that they have sponsored training for employees of  all affected parks as well as in-service training for officers of the Park  Police. Similarly, the Smithsonian has instituted training courses on  terrorism awareness, emergency procedure, and shelter-in-place  procedures, among others, for its security staff. The National Gallery has  also focused its efforts on training, with particular emphasis on  antiterrorism training, such as shelter-in-place and evacuation drills. In  addition, to attract a more qualified pool of applicants for security  positions, the National Gallery reported strengthening its recruitment  process. USDA constructed an emergency operations center, which is  staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to monitor and respond to  emergencies.
section_title: Aligning Assets to Mission
paragraphs: Aligning assets to mission involves the reduction of underutilized or excess  property at federal agencies in order to better reflect agencies’ missions  and reduce vulnerabilities by decreasing the number of assets that need to  be protected. Our previous work reported that to the extent that agencies  are expending resources to maintain and protect facilities that are not  needed, funds available to protect critical assets may be lessened. In  addition, we noted that funds no longer spent securing and maintaining  excess property could be put to other uses, such as enhancing protection at  critical assets that are tied to agencies’ missions. For example, we reported  in January 2003 that the Department of Defense estimates it is spending $3  billion to $4 billion each year maintaining facilities that are not needed. In  another example, costs associated with excess Energy facilities, primarily  for security and maintenance, were estimated by Energy’s Office of the  Inspector General in April 2002 to exceed $70 million annually. One  building that illustrates this problem is the former Chicago main post  office. In October 2003, we testified that this building, a massive 2.5 million  square foot structure located near the Sears Tower, is vacant and costing  USPS $2 million annually in holding costs. It is likely that agencies that  continue to hold excess or underutilized property are also incurring  significant holdings costs for services, including security and maintenance.  Finally, we recently recommended that the Chair of the Interagency  Security Committee consider our work as a starting point for establishing a  framework of key practices that could guide agencies’ efforts in the facility  protection area.
None of the federal agencies reported using this key practice to implement  physical security enhancements on the National Mall because they do not  believe that they have excess or underutilized facilities or consider this  practice applicable to property under their jurisdiction. For example,  Smithsonian officials told us that they do not have any excess property on  the National Mall or elsewhere. Officials stated that all of the Smithsonian’s  facilities, including its gardens, are needed for research, education, and  exhibition purposes to execute its mission of increasing and diffusing  knowledge. The Smithsonian believes that any closures of its facilities  would therefore be inconsistent with its mission. Similarly, according to the  Park Service, land reserved or dedicated for national park purposes,  including land under its jurisdiction, by law is not considered excess or  underutilized property.
section_title: Balancing Mission Priorities with the Need for Physical Security Enhancements Poses Common Challenge
paragraphs: Although we found that agencies on the National Mall are using most of the  key practices we identified for the protection of facilities, officials from  most of these agencies identified a common challenge in using these  practices and, in fact, in implementing all types of physical security  enhancements. That common challenge is balancing their ongoing mission  priorities with the emergent need to implement physical security  enhancements. Some officials described the challenge as inadequate  funding for security enhancements, or as competition for limited resources  between any new requirements for security enhancements and more  traditional functions and operations. Officials described the challenge as a  more subtle need to ensure that physical security enhancements are not  inconsistent with the agencies’ mission. For example, one official told us  that planning for security enhancements necessitates the involvement of  key facilities personnel to ensure that part of the agency’s mission—public  access—is maintained. Another official we spoke with noted that careful  planning and coordination for implementing physical security  enhancements is essential to avoid compromising both programs and  public access. Similarly, some officials suggested that the multiple levels of  consultation and review required for projects that involve construction or  renovation on federal property could be an obstacle to the use of key  practices. Finally, officials from one agency noted that a lack of reliable,  quantitative risk assessment data and little consistency in interpreting  information and intelligence obtained from various sources create a  challenge in using key practices to implement security measures.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: The security of our nation’s critical infrastructure remains a heightened  concern in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. On the  National Mall, federal agencies are in the early stages of designing and  implementing permanent perimeter security barriers to protect their  facilities and the visiting public. In doing so, agencies have coordinated  with a number of review organizations that consider the impact of  proposed security designs on the urban environment and the symbolic  nature of the National Mall, its icons, and its museums. Multiple  stakeholder viewpoints on the design of security enhancements present a  challenge for an efficient review process. In some cases, agencies involved  stakeholders after investing time and resources in a particular security  design. As a result, these agencies sometimes had to go through multiple  iterations of the review process, which can strain the already limited  financial and staff resources of all stakeholders.
As agencies continue developing security proposals for their facilities on  the National Mall, several steps, such as early and frequent consultation  with all stakeholders, can result in a more efficient review process.  Specifically, consultation in the preliminary design phase allows for the  consideration of multiple viewpoints and alternative design solutions,  thereby mitigating the potential for later costly and time-consuming  revisions. Such early consultation could also expedite the implementation  of security enhancements to protect facilities and visitors on the National  Mall.
Key practices, such as allocating resources using risk management,  coordinating protection efforts with other stakeholders, and aligning assets  to mission, have clear implications for the facility protection area. As we  have recently recommended, it is important that agencies give attention to  these practices and consider them collectively as a framework for guiding  their ongoing efforts in implementing security measures on the National  Mall and in their overall facility protection areas.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided draft copies of this report to the Smithsonian, Interior, USDA,  and National Gallery for their review and comment. USDA officials  generally agreed with the report’s findings and concluding observations  and provided clarifying comments. Officials from the other agencies also  provided clarifying and technical comments, which we incorporated into  this report where appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to other  interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of Agriculture, the  Interior, and Smithsonian; and the Director of the National Gallery. We will  also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report  will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me on  (202) 512-2834 or at goldsteinm@gao.gov or Susan Fleming, Assistant  Director, on (202) 512-4431 or at flemings@gao.gov.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to assess (1) physical security enhancements that have  been implemented on the National Mall since September 11, 2001, the  additional enhancements planned, and the costs of these enhancements;  (2) the considerations given to incorporating access and aesthetics in  designing and approving physical security enhancements on the National  Mall, and how issues of access and aesthetics are perceived by visitors in  relation to these enhancements; and (3) examples of how federal agencies  are using key practices to implement physical security enhancements on  the National Mall, and any challenges the agencies are experiencing in  using these key practices.
For all of these objectives, we researched historical plans for the design,  expansion, and maintenance of the National Mall; appropriations acts and  accompanying legislative material; statutory and regulatory provisions  related to security enhancements of the National Mall grounds; and  proposals for implementing physical security enhancements on the  National Mall. We also interviewed officials of the National Park Service  (Park Service), U.S. Park Police, Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian),  National Gallery of Art (National Gallery), Department of Agriculture  (USDA), U.S. Botanic Garden (USBG), U.S. Capitol Police, National Capital  Planning Commission, U.S. Commission of Fine Arts, Advisory Council for  Historic Preservation, District of Columbia’s Historic Preservation Office,  Department of Homeland Security, and National Coalition to Save Our Mall.
While multiple geographic definitions of the National Mall exist, we defined  the area of the National Mall, for purposes of our report, as extending from  the foot of the U.S. Capitol grounds west to the Washington Monument and  proceeding farther west and southeast to include the Lincoln and Jefferson  Memorials. It also includes the area between Constitution and  Independence Avenues between 1st and 14th Streets. We did not include the  White House or the U.S. Capitol Building because security enhancements  for these buildings fall under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Secret Service and  the U.S. Capitol Police, respectively.
In addition, for our first objective, we reviewed federal appropriations law  and accompanying legislative materials, budget reports, and federal  agencies’ and entities’ budget submissions related to physical security  enhancements on the National Mall; we also received information about  obligations and costs associated with physical security enhancements on  the National Mall since the terrorist attacks of September 11. Agencies on  the National Mall provided us with obligation data only for their facilities  located on the National Mall, where possible. In some cases, obligations  incurred for facilities on the National Mall could not be separated from  obligations incurred for an agency’s facilities located adjacent to the  National Mall. To assess the reliability of the obligation and cost data  received by these agencies, we developed a template for agencies on the  National Mall to obtain consistency in the data provided by each of the  agencies; interviewed knowledgeable agency officials to clarify any  questions; provided the agencies with a spreadsheet we developed that  organized obligations for security enhancements by fiscal year to make  sure that we accurately used the data provided and asked agencies to  identify the source of the obligations incurred; and further clarified any  discrepancies in these data. From this assessment, we determined that  these data are sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report.
For our second objective, we also reviewed the law, planning and review  criteria, reports, and documentation related to specific proposals for  physical security enhancements on the National Mall. In addition, we  conducted a 3-minute intercept survey of visitors to the National Mall to  determine (1) the extent to which visitors to the National Mall feel that  security measures on the National Mall affect access to sites on the  National Mall and the appearance of the National Mall; (2) the extent to  which visitors to the National Mall feel that additional security measures  are needed; (3) the priority that National Mall visitors would assign access  to the National Mall and the appearance of the National Mall, in the event  that additional security measures are added; and (4) whether security  measures affect the likelihood that National Mall visitors will return.
To develop the questions for the 3-minute survey, we identified the key  information necessary to gain a general understanding of (1) how visitors  to the National Mall assess the effects of security measures on access to  and the appearance of the National Mall and (2) the priority that visitors  assign to the National Mall’s accessibility and appearance. After initially  developing, reviewing, and modifying the survey questions, we conducted a  total of nine pretests—four cognitive pretests with GAO employees who  were not associated with this review and five with visitors to the National  Mall.
We provided GAO employee pretest participants (internal participants)  with an overview of the engagement and the intercept survey methodology  to be utilized. Subsequently, we showed internal participants the map of the  National Mall and then asked them to respond to the survey questions.  Upon completion of the survey, we asked for specific comments on each  question and encouraged participants to share their thoughts and ideas  regarding the structure of the survey and the extent to which the questions  seemed clear and easy to answer.
The five external pretests were conducted by GAO team members on the  National Mall, near the Smithsonian Metro Station. Following the intercept  survey protocol, our interviewers approached respondents asking if they  would like to answer a short survey on physical security measures on the  National Mall area. Five out of 15 potential respondents approached  participated in the survey. Nonrespondents consisted of those unwilling to  participate, those who had not yet seen anything on the National Mall  because they had just arrived, and those unable to speak the English  language. Respondents were first shown the map of the National Mall and  then were asked to respond to the survey questions. Interviewers noted  questions, comments, and any lack of clarity to the questions on the part of  external pretest respondents. The final changes to the survey were made  on the basis of the combined observations from the pretests with GAO  employees and pretests with visitors to the National Mall.
The population for the survey was National Mall visitors. We chose survey  sites to cover the geographic range of the National Mall and conducted  interviews between 1:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on Monday, October 18;  Monday, October 25; Tuesday, October 26; Friday, November 5; and Sunday,  November 7, 2004. We chose to interview National Mall visitors during  these hours for two reasons: (1) to make it more likely that visitors stopped  for the survey had been on the National Mall long enough to visit one or  more sites on the National Mall and (2) to reduce the chances of surveying  government employees on the National Mall during their lunch break.
We identified 300 as the target size for our sample, on the basis of balancing  the advantages and costs associated with a larger sample size, considering  that a sample of this size allows for some analysis of subgroups but is small  enough to limit survey costs. We stratified the sample by choosing survey  sites to cover the geographic range of the National Mall. To avoid any bias  by gender, ethnicity, or other individual differences, we systematically  approached the fifth person who passed by a particular landmark (e.g., a  park bench, tree, or light pole); first, from the time interviewing  commenced and, thereafter, immediately following the completion of an  interview.
In counting potential respondents, we excluded several types of individuals  as out of scope. Specifically, we excluded persons who did not speak  English, who appeared to be younger than 18 years old, who were  exercising on the National Mall, who were talking on a cell phone, who  were leading a group of people on the National Mall, or who had just  arrived on the National Mall and had not yet visited any sites. Of 667  National Mall visitors approached and asked to complete the survey, 537  were found to be in scope. Of these 537 visitors, 229 declined to complete  the survey, yielding a 57 percent response rate.
Although we took measures to avoid sample bias, our survey sample is a  nonprobability sample. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be  used to make inferences about a population because in a nonprobability  sample, some elements of the population being studied have no chance or  an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.
GAO employees conducted the interviews. A GAO employee showed  respondents a map of the National Mall, asked the survey questions, and  marked responses on the survey. The survey first asked respondents to  specify which sites and what types of security measures they had seen in  their visit to the National Mall. To help with site identification, the map that  the respondents received clearly labeled the museums and monuments.  The survey then posed a series of questions about the effects of the security  measures on access to National Mall sites and the appearance of the  National Mall, the extent to which additional security is needed on the  National Mall, and the priority respondents would assign to the  accessibility and appearance of National Mall sites, in the event that further  security measures are added. The survey concluded by asking whether the  security measures affect respondents’ likelihood of returning to visit the  National Mall.
For our third objective, we also reviewed and analyzed GAO and other  governmental reports on the protection of federal facilities and homeland  security. We also developed a structured interview guide with questions  about the key practices for implementing security enhancements and sent  the guide to the Smithsonian, Park Service, USDA, and National Gallery. We  then incorporated their responses into the report without independent  verification.
We conducted our review from August 2004 through May 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Federal agency officials provided much of the data and other information  used in this report. Overall, we found no discrepancies with these data and,  therefore, determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purpose of this report. We requested official comments on this report from  the Smithsonian, the Department of the Interior, USDA, and the National  Gallery.
section_title: Results of National Mall Visitor Survey
paragraphs: I’m ______ from the GAO.  Would you have a few minutes today to answer a short survey for Congress about security measures at  the National Mall?  (IF NEEDED:  This survey asks for your thoughts about whether security measures put in place since 9/11 have affected the mall’s appearance or your ability to access buildings, monuments, memorials, and public places.)
1.   Looking at this map of the National Mall, which monuments, museums, or other parts of the  Mall have you visited today or recently? (73) (44) (119) (18) (48) (16) (48) (16) (85) (8) (88) (44) (163) (35) (66) (16) (78) (26)
Other (SPECIFY) (75) (23) (11) (88)
subsections: section_title: 2. I’m going to read through a list of security measures that you may or may not have
paragraphs: encountered or seen today or recently.  For each measure, please answer yes or no,  as to whether or not you encountered these measures.
A)  Fences that limited access  (212) (94) (2) (213) (89) (6) (259) (48) (1) (189) (117) (2) (34) (273) (1) (183) (125) (0)
2a.  Did you see any other types of security  measures, anything that’s not on our list?
Other (SPECIFY) (26) (282) (0)  3.  Did these security measures make it easy or difficult to access sites on the Mall, or  did they have no effect at all?
Would that be very difficult  or somewhat easy? or somewhat difficult?
4% (10)
Very difficult  6% (18)
3% (8)
16% (46)
71% (205) 4.  Did these security measures have a positive or negative effect on the overall  appearance of the National Mall, or                                                                                             did they have no effect at all?    positive? negative?
Very positive  10% (29)
Very negative  9% (27)
9% (25)
27% (77)
45% (130)  5.  Overall, do you think additional security measures on the National Mall . . .  are definitely needed    may be needed  may not be needed  are definitely not needed?
11% (29)  37% (101)  31% (84)  22% (60)  (Note to interviewer: if respondent asks “compared to what,” say “compared to what you’ve  6.  If additional security measures are added to the National Mall, what priority - low  medium or high - would you give the following:  A)  Overall public access to the National  16% (47)
27% (82)  58% (175)
B)  Overall appearance of the National Mall  15% (45)
31% (93)  54% (162) 7.   Do you currently live in the Washington metropolitan area, another state, or another  country?
Washington D.C. area   Another state, please list:         Another country, please list:     21% (65)  72% (221)  7% (22)  8.   Would you say that the security measures you encountered today make it less likely  that you will return for a visit, more likely that you will return for a visit, or do they  have no effect at all?
Less likely to return for a visit   More likely to return for a visit    No effect at all  5% (15)  12% (38)  83% (255)
END:  Thank you so much for participating.  23% (70) 20% (61)  17% (53)  14% (42)  27% (82)
Survey Location:   Museum of Natural History  14% (44)  23% (70)  23% (72)  23% (72)  11% (33)  6% (17)
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Dennis J. Amari, Virginia Chanley,  Sandra J. DePaulis, Robert V. Dolson, Colin Fallon, Denise M. Fantone,  H. Brandon Haller, Anne Izod, Jason Kelly, Nancy J. Lueke, David Sausville,  and Susan Michal-Smith made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Bibliography
subsections: section_title: Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
paragraphs: Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. Protecting Historic Properties:  A Citizen’s Guide to Section 106 Review. Washington, D.C.: 2002.
section_title: Department of the Interior
paragraphs: Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Homeland  Security: Protection of Critical Infrastructure Systems – Assessment 2:  Critical Infrastructure Systems (2002-I-0053). Washington, D.C.:  September 2002.
Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Homeland  Security: Protection of Critical Infrastructure Facilities and National  Icons—Assessment 1: Supplemental Funding – Plans and Progress (2002- I-0039). Washington, D.C.: June 2002.
Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Progress  Report: Secretary’s Directives for Implementing Law Enforcement  Reform in Department of the Interior (2003-I-0062). Washington, D.C.:  August 28, 2003.
Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Review of  National Icon Park Security (2003-I-0063). Washington, D.C.: August 2003.
section_title: National Capital Planning Commission
paragraphs: National Capital Planning Commission. Comprehensive Plan for the  National Capital: Federal Elements. Washington, D.C.: August 2004.
Interagency Task Force of the National Capital Planning Commission.  Designing for Security in the Nation’s Capital. Washington, D.C.:    October 2001.
National Capital Planning Commission. National Capital Urban Design  and Security Plan. Washington, D.C.: July 2002.
National Capital Planning Commission. Memorials and Museums Master  Plan. Washington, D.C.: September 2001.
section_title: National Coalition to Save Our Mall
paragraphs: National Coalition to Save Our Mall. First Annual State of the Mall Report:   The Current Condition of the National Mall. Rockville, MD: October 2002.