2000 Census: Coverage Measurement Programs' Results, Costs, and Lessons Learned
Published: 2003-01-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: To help measure the quality of the 2000 Census and to possibly adjust for any errors, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) conducted the Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation (A.C.E.) program. However, after obligating around $207 million for A.C.E. and its predecessor program, Integrated Coverage Measurement (I.C.M.), from fiscal years 1996 through 2001, the Bureau did not use either program to adjust the census numbers. Concerned about the amount of money the Bureau spent on I.C.M. and A.C.E. programs and what was produced in return, the subcommittee asked us to review the objectives and results of the programs, the costs of consultants, and how best to track future coverage measurement activities.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The two programs the Bureau employed to measure the quality of the 2000 Census population data did not meet their objectives. The A.C.E. program achieved results other than those laid out in the Bureau's formal objectives that highlight important lessons learned. They include (1) developing a coverage measurement methodology that is both operationally and technically feasible, (2) determining the level of geography at which coverage measurement is intended, (3) keeping stakeholders, particularly Congress, informed of the Bureau's plans, and (4) adequately testing coverage measurement methodologies. It will be important for the Bureau to consider these as its current plans for the 2010 Census include coverage evaluation to measure the accuracy of the census but not necessarily to adjust the results. Of the roughly $207 million the Bureau obligated for I.C.M./A.C.E. programs from fiscal years 1996 through 2001, we identified about $22.3 million that was obligated for contracts involving over 170 vendors. We could not identify any obligations prior to 1996 in part because the Bureau included them with its general research and development efforts and did not assign the I.C.M./A.C.E. operations unique project codes in its financial management system. To track these costs in the future, it will be important for the Bureau to (1) have a financial management system that has specific project codes to capture coverage measurement costs, (2) establish the project codes as early in the planning process as possible, and (3) monitor the usage of the codes to ensure that they are properly charged.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: To assess the quality of population data for the 2000 Census and to possibly  adjust for any errors, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) conducted the  Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation (A.C.E.) program. The A.C.E. program  was first included in Bureau program documents in November 1998 and  funded for fiscal years 2000 through 2002 with proposed funding through  December 31, 2002. Its predecessor, Integrated Coverage Measurement  (I.C.M.), began in May 1995 and was funded by the Bureau for fiscal years  1996 through 1999. The Bureau obligated about $207 million to both  programs from fiscal years 1996 through 2001, which was about 3 percent  of the $6.5 billion total estimated cost of the 2000 Census. However, neither  program was used to adjust the 2000 Census population count.
Concerned about the amount of money the Bureau spent on both programs  as well as what was received in return for its investment, you and former  Vice Chairman Dan Miller asked us to examine (1) the Bureau’s objectives  for the I.C.M./A.C.E. programs and the extent to which those objectives  were met, (2) the cost of consultants and technical studies, and (3) ways to  track the costs of coverage measurement activities in future censuses. This  report responds to that request.
In October 2002, we issued a report that provides additional information on  the cost of the I.C.M./A.C.E. programs. Both reports are part of our  ongoing series on the results of the 2000 Census and the lessons learned for  planning a more cost-effective census in 2010. (See the Related GAO  Products section at the end of this report for the assessments issued to  date.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Bureau puts forth tremendous effort to conduct a complete and  accurate count of the nation’s population. However, some degree of error in  the form of persons missed or counted more than once is inevitable  because of limitations in census-taking methods. Because census results  are used, among other purposes, to apportion Congress, redraw  congressional districts, and allocate federal aid to state and local  governments, the size and demographic composition of these coverage  errors have become increasingly sensitive since the Bureau was first able  to generate detailed data on them during the 1980 Census. However, the  Bureau has never used the results of its coverage measurements to correct  estimated coverage errors.
The Bureau first attempted to measure the accuracy of the census in the  1940s when it compared the census numbers to birth and death certificates  and other administrative data using a procedure called demographic  analysis. Modern coverage measurement began with the 1980 Census when  the Bureau compared census figures to the results of an independent  sample survey of the population. Using statistical methods, the Bureau  generated detailed measures of the differences among undercounts of  particular ethnic, racial, and other groups. In the months that followed,  many lawsuits were filed, most contending that the results of the 1980  coverage measurement should have been used to adjust the census.  However, the Bureau designed the evaluation to measure errors, not to  correct the census results, and the Director of the Census Bureau decided  against adopting the adjusted numbers, as they were deemed flawed due to  missing and inaccurate data.
The quality of the coverage measurement data improved for the 1990  Census, and the Bureau recommended statistically adjusting the results.  However, the Secretary of Commerce determined that the evidence to  support an adjustment was inconclusive and decided not to adjust the 1990  Census. The adjustment decision was complicated by the fact that the 1990  Census figures had already been released when the coverage measurement  results became available in the spring of 1991. The Secretary of Commerce  was concerned that two sets of numbers—the actual census results and the  adjusted figures—could create confusion and might allow political  considerations to play a part in choosing between sets of numbers when  the outcome of the choices, such as congressional apportionment, could be  known in advance of a decision.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the objectives of 2000 Census I.C.M./A.C.E. programs and  their results, we reviewed Bureau and other documents that included  Federal Register notices; Census Operational Plans; reports to Congress;  internal memorandums; research and feasibility studies; and reports of the  Executive Steering Committee for Accuracy and Coverage Policy (ESCAP)  I and II, which assessed the results of the A.C.E. program and  recommended how they should be used.
To determine costs for consultants and technical studies for 2000 Census  I.C.M./A.C.E. programs, we focused on object class code 25 from the  financial management reports to obtain contract data. With Bureau  assistance, we identified I.C.M./A.C.E. project accounts and analyzed  amounts by fiscal year using the financial management reports generated  by the Department of Commerce’s Administrative Management System  (CAMS). We reviewed and analyzed obligated and expended data for all  coverage measurement programs that existed during the 2000 Census for  fiscal years 1991 to 2003. We did not audit financial data provided by the  Bureau.
To determine ways to track future costs, we reviewed current Bureau  financial management reports and considered established standards of  accounting, auditing, and internal controls.
In addition, we met with key Bureau officials to discuss the results of our  analysis and obtain their observations and perspectives. The limitations we  encountered in the scope of our work on this assignment are as follows.
We were unable to determine the complete contractual and technical  studies costs of the I.C.M./A.C.E. programs because the Bureau  considered any I.C.M./A.C.E.-related costs from fiscal years 1991  through 1995 as part of its general research and development programs  and thus did not separately track these costs. Although some costs were  tracked in fiscal year 1996, the Bureau still considered these costs as  research and development and did not include these costs as  I.C.M./A.C.E. program costs.
We were unable to identify I.C.M./A.C.E. portions of costs from projects  that covered the entire census, such as the 2000 Census Evaluation  program.
We did not evaluate the propriety of contracts for I.C.M./A.C.E.  programs.
Our work was performed in Washington, D.C., and at U.S. Census Bureau  headquarters in Suitland, Maryland, from June 2002 through October 2002  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. On  January 7, 2003, the Secretary of Commerce provided written comments on  a draft of this report. We address these comments in the “Agency  Comments and Our Evaluation” section, and have reprinted them in  appendix I.
section_title: Coverage Measurement Programs for the 2000 Census Did Not Meet Bureau Objectives
paragraphs: In planning the 2000 Census, the Bureau developed a new coverage  measurement program, I.C.M., that was designed to address the major  shortcomings of the 1990 coverage measurement program. However, as  shown in table 1, much like similar programs in earlier censuses, the  Bureau did not use I.C.M. and its successor program, A.C.E., to adjust the  census because of legal challenges, technical obstacles, and the inability to  resolve uncertainties in the data in time to meet the deadlines for releasing  the data.
subsections: section_title: The Bureau Canceled I.C.M. in Response to a Supreme Court Ruling
paragraphs: In designing I.C.M., the Bureau’s goal was to produce a single, consolidated  count or “one-number” census and thus avoid the controversy of having  two sets of census results as occurred during the 1990 Census. Thus, as  shown in table 1, the objectives of I.C.M. were to (1) measure census  coverage, (2) generate, using statistical sampling and estimation methods,  the detailed data required for apportionment, congressional redistricting,  and federal program purposes, and (3) produce a one-number census.
The Bureau’s plans for I.C.M. emerged in response to the unsatisfactory  results of the 1990 Census. Although the 1990 headcount was, at that time,  the most costly in U.S. history, it produced data that were less accurate  than those from the 1980 Census. The disappointing outcome was due in  large part to the Bureau’s efforts to count housing units that did not mail  back their census questionnaires. The operation, known as nonresponse  follow-up, where enumerators visited and collected information from each  nonresponding housing unit, proved to be costly and error-prone when a  higher-than-expected workload and a shortage of enumerators caused the  operation to fall behind schedule. The final stages of nonresponse follow- up were particularly problematic. Indeed, while enumerators finished 90  percent of the follow-up workload within 8 weeks (2 weeks behind  schedule), it took another 6 weeks to resolve the remaining 10 percent.  Moreover, in trying to complete the last portion of nonresponse follow-up  cases, the Bureau accepted less complete responses and information from  nonhousehold members such as neighbors, which may have reduced the  quality of the data.
In the years following the 1990 Census, Congress, the Bureau, several  organizations, and GAO, concluded that fundamental design changes were  needed to reduce census costs and improve the quality of the data. In  response, the Bureau reengineered a number of operations for the 2000  Census.
For example, to save time and reduce its nonresponse follow-up workload,  the Bureau planned to enumerate a sample of the last remaining portion of  nonresponse follow-up cases instead of visiting every nonresponding  household as it had done in previous censuses. To adjust for enumeration  errors, the Bureau developed I.C.M., which was intended to reconcile the  original census figures with data obtained from a separate, independent  count of a sample of 750,000 housing units using a statistical process called  Dual System Estimation. The Bureau believed that this approach offered  the best combination of reduced costs, improved accuracy expected at  various geographic levels, and operational feasibility.
However, concerned about the legality of the Bureau’s planned use of  sampling and estimation, members of Congress challenged the Bureau’s  use of I.C.M. in court. In January 1999, the Supreme Court ruled that the  Census Act prohibited the use of statistical sampling to generate  population data for reapportioning the House of Representatives.
section_title: A.C.E. Did Not Meet Bureau Objectives
paragraphs: Following the Supreme Court ruling, the Bureau planned to produce  apportionment numbers using traditional census-taking methods, and  provide statistically adjusted numbers for nonapportionment uses of the  data such as congressional redistricting and allocating federal funds. The  Bureau initiated the A.C.E. program, which was designed to take a national  sample of approximately 300,000 housing units to evaluate coverage errors  among different population groups and statistically correct for them. Thus,  as shown in table 1, the Bureau’s objectives for A.C.E. were to (1) measure  how many people were missed in the census and how many were  erroneously included and (2) produce the detailed data required in time for  redistricting and federal program purposes.
However, while the Bureau generally conducted A.C.E. in accordance with  its plans, the Bureau later determined that the A.C.E. results did not  provide a reliable measure of census accuracy and could not be used to  adjust the nonapportionment census data.
The first decision against A.C.E. occurred in March 2001, when the Acting  Director of the Census Bureau recommended to the Secretary of  Commerce that the unadjusted census data be used for redistricting  purposes. He cited as a primary reason an apparent inconsistency between  the population growth over the prior decade, as implied by A.C.E. results,  and demographic analysis, which estimated the population using birth,  death, and other administrative records. The inconsistency raised the  possibility of an unidentified error in either the A.C.E. or census numbers.  He reported that the inconsistency could not be resolved prior to April 1,  2001, the legally mandated deadline for releasing redistricting data.
The second decision against A.C.E. came in October 2001 when, based on a  large body of additional research, ESCAP decided against adjusting census  data for allocating federal aid and other purposes, because A.C.E. failed to  identify a significant number of people erroneously included in the census,  and other remaining uncertainties. According to Bureau officials, it might  be possible to use adjusted data to produce intercensal population  estimates for federal programs that require this information; however, the  Bureau would need to revise the A.C.E. results before any use of the data  could be considered.
section_title: The Bureau’s Experience in Implementing Coverage Measurement Programs Highlights Important Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Although I.C.M. and A.C.E. did not meet their formal objectives, they did  produce a body of important lessons learned. As the Bureau’s current  approach for the 2010 Census includes coverage measurement to assess  the accuracy of the census (but not necessarily to adjust the numbers  themselves), it will be important for the Bureau to consider these lessons  as its planning efforts continue. The lessons include (1) developing a  coverage measurement methodology that is both technically and  operationally feasible, (2) determining the level of geography at which  coverage measurement is intended, (3) keeping stakeholders, particularly  Congress, informed of the Bureau’s plans, and (4) adequately testing the  eventual coverage measurement program. 1. A.C.E. demonstrated operational, but not technical feasibility.
According to Bureau officials, an important result of the A.C.E.  program was that it demonstrated, from an operational perspective  only, the feasibility of conducting a large independent field check on  the quality of the census. The Bureau canvassed the entire A.C.E.  sample area to develop an address list, collected census response data  for persons living in the sample areas on census day, and conducted an  operation to try and match A.C.E. respondents to census respondents,  all independent of the regular census operations and within required  time frames.
Our separate reviews of two of these operations—interviewing  respondents and matching A.C.E. and census data—while raising  questions about the impact on final A.C.E. results due to apparently  small operational deviations, also concluded that the Bureau  implemented those two operations largely as planned.
Nevertheless, while the Bureau demonstrated that it could execute  A.C.E. field operations using available resources within required time  frames, as the Bureau has noted, feasibility also consists of a technical  component—that is, whether the A.C.E. methodology would improve  the accuracy of the census. Although the Bureau clearly stated in its  justification for A.C.E. that the effort would make the census more  accurate, as noted earlier, because of unresolved data discrepancies, its  experience in 2000 proved otherwise. Moreover, according to the  Bureau, because the A.C.E. was designed to correct a census with a net  coverage error similar to that observed in previous censuses, the  Bureau commented that applying the methodology to the historically  low levels of net error observed in the 2000 Census represented a  unique and unanticipated challenge for A.C.E. Thus, it will be important  for the Bureau to refine its coverage measurement methodology to  ensure that it is technically feasible.  2. The level of geography at which the Bureau can successfully measure  coverage is unclear. Since the October 2001 decision to not rely on  adjusted census data for nonapportionment and nonredistricting  purposes, Bureau officials have told us that they now doubt whether  census data can reliably be improved down to the level of geography  for which A.C.E. was intended to improve the accuracy—the census  tract level (neighborhoods that typically contain around 1,700 housing  units and 4,000 people). The Bureau’s current position differs from that  taken in 2000, when it reported to Congress that it expected accuracy at  the tract level to be improved, on average, by A.C.E. statistically  adjusting numbers at an even lower level of geography—the census  block level. Uncertainty in the level of geography at which accuracy is  to be measured or improved can affect the overall design of coverage  measurement, as well as its technical feasibility. Therefore, it will be  important for the Bureau to determine the level of geography at which  it intends to measure accuracy as it decides the role and design of  future coverage measurement programs. 3. Keeping stakeholders informed is essential. Throughout the 1990s,  Congress and other stakeholders, including GAO, expressed concerns  about the Bureau’s planned use of sampling and statistical estimation  procedures to adjust the census. A key cause of this skepticism was the  Bureau’s failure to provide sufficiently detailed data on the effects that  I.C.M. would have at different levels of geographic detail. Information  was also lacking on the various design alternatives being considered,  their likely implications, and the basis for certain decisions. As a result,  it was difficult for Congress and other stakeholders to support the  Bureau’s coverage measurement initiatives.
For example, on September 24, 1996, the House Committee on  Government Reform and Oversight issued a report that criticized the  Bureau’s initiatives for sampling and statistical estimation. Among  other things, the Committee found that the Bureau had not clarified  issues of accuracy, particularly for small geographic areas, raised by the  sampling initiative. Congress’s perspective on the process was later  reflected in its enactment of legislation in 1997 that included provisions  requiring the Department of Commerce to provide Congress with  comprehensive information on its planned use of statistical estimation  within 30 days.4. Adequate testing of coverage measurement methodologies is critical.
Although the Bureau conducted a dress rehearsal for the census in  three locations across the country that was intended to demonstrate  the overall design of the census, the 1998 operation did not reveal the  problems that the Bureau encountered in dealing with the  discrepancies between the 2000 A.C.E. results and its benchmarks.  According to Bureau officials, this was partly because the sites were  not representative of the nation at large. Additionally, as a result of a  compromise between Congress and the administration to  simultaneously prepare for a nonsampling census, the I.C.M. was tested  at only two of the three dress rehearsal sites—an urban area and an  Indian reservation—but was not tested in a rural location as was  originally planned. An earlier test in 1995 was also not comprehensive  in that it did not test a sampling operation designed to help determine  whether nonresponse follow-up of the magnitude projected by the  Bureau’s current plan could be completed in time for the I.C.M to be  done on schedule.
section_title: I.C.M./A.C.E. Contractor Costs Are Not Complete
paragraphs: From fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2001, the Bureau obligated about  $207 million for I.C.M./A.C.E. activities. As shown in table 2, of that  $207 million, we identified about $22.3 million (11 percent) in obligated  amounts for contracts involving more than 170 vendors. These contracts  were primarily for technical advisory and assistant services, computer  systems support, and training. ($2) (10) (130) (130)
Although the Bureau tracked some costs of contracts for the I.C.M./A.C.E.  programs, we found that the $22.3 million did not represent the complete  contractor costs of the programs because of the following three factors.
First, the Bureau only tracked the contractor costs associated with  conducting the I.C.M./A.C.E. programs, which covers the period from  fiscal year 1997 through 2003. Although life cycle costs for the 2000  Census cover a 13-year period from fiscal years 1991 through 2003,  senior Bureau officials said that the I.C.M./A.C.E. program was not  viable for implementation until fiscal year 1997. Therefore, the Bureau  considered contractor costs from earlier years as part of its general  research and development programs, and the Bureau did not assign  unique project codes to identify I.C.M./A.C.E. programs and related  costs in its financial management system.
Second, although $182,000 of fiscal year 1996 obligated contractor costs  were identifiable in the Bureau’s financial management system as an  I.C.M. special test, the Bureau did not consider these costs as part of the  I.C.M./A.C.E. programs. Instead, these costs were considered general  research and development. However, because the Bureau separately  identified these costs as I.C.M. program contractor costs, we have  included the $182,000 as part of the I.C.M./A.C.E. program contractor  costs in this report.
Finally, we were unable to identify the I.C.M./A.C.E. portions of costs  that were part of other programs. For example, in late fiscal year 2000  and after, the Bureau did not separate A.C.E. evaluations from its other  2000 Census evaluations in its financial management systems. Bureau  officials stated that the contracts for evaluations included overall 2000  Census and A.C.E. evaluations, and did not have a separate code  identifying A.C.E. costs.
section_title: Tracking Future Coverage Measurement Costs
paragraphs: During the 2000 Census, the Bureau, its auditors, and GAO, found extensive  weaknesses in the Bureau’s financial management system, the components  of which include hardware, software, and associated personnel. The  weaknesses included difficulties in providing reliable and timely financial  information to manage current government operations and preparing  financial statements and other reports. Together, they affected the  completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of data needed for informed  management decisions and effective oversight. In light of these  weaknesses, the Bureau’s ability to track future costs of coverage  measurement activities will largely depend on three factors.
First, a sound financial management system is critical. As discussed in  our December 2001 report, the Bureau’s core financial management  system, CAMS, had persistent internal control weaknesses in fiscal year  2000. In its latest financial report, the Bureau indicated that these  weaknesses have continued through fiscal year 2001. The Bureau  expects to issue its fiscal year 2002 financial report shortly.
Second, it would be important to set up project codes to capture  coverage measurement activities as early in the planning process as  possible. The Bureau did not set up a specific project code to identify  I.C.M. program costs until 1996 because, according to Bureau officials,  the I.C.M. program was not viable until 1997 and all costs up to this  point were considered general research.
Finally, it would be important for Bureau personnel to correctly charge  the project codes established for the coverage measurement program  activities. During the 2000 Census, for example, while the Bureau  established a project code and a budget for the remote Alaska  enumeration, the project costs were erroneously charged to and  commingled with a project code for enumerating special populations. As  a result, the actual costs for remote Alaska enumeration were reported  by the Bureau’s financial management system as zero and are unknown,  while enumerating special population costs are overstated.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Bureau’s 2000 Census coverage measurement programs did not  achieve their primary objectives of measuring the accuracy of the census  and adjusting the results because of legal challenges, technical hurdles, and  questionable data. However, beyond these formal objectives, there  emerged several important lessons learned that Bureau managers should  consider because current plans for the 2010 Census include coverage  measurement. At the same time, it will also be important for the Bureau to  be capable of fully tracking the money it spends on coverage measurement  and other census activities so that Congress and other stakeholders can  hold the Bureau accountable for achieving intended results.
Although the Bureau has never used the results of its coverage  measurement programs to adjust census numbers, we believe that an  evaluation of the accuracy and completeness of the census is critical given  the many uses of census data, the importance of identifying the magnitude  and characteristics of any under- and overcounts, and the cost of the  census overall. Less clear is whether the results of the coverage  measurement should be used to adjust the census. Any Bureau decisions  on this matter should involve close consultation with Congress and other  stakeholders, and be based on detailed data and a convincing  demonstration of the feasibility of the Bureau's proposed approach.  Whatever the decision, it is imperative that it be made soon so that the  Bureau can design appropriate procedures and concentrate on the business  of counting the nation’s population. The longer the 2010 planning process  proceeds without a firm decision on the role of coverage measurement, the  greater the risk of wasted resources and disappointing results.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that any future coverage measurement efforts achieve their  intended objectives and costs can be properly tracked, we recommend that  the Secretary of Commerce direct the Bureau to   in conjunction with Congress and other stakeholders, come to a  decision soon on whether and how coverage measurement will be used  in the 2010 Census;  consider incorporating lessons learned from its coverage measurement  experience during the 2000 Census, such as (1) demonstrating both the  operational and technical feasibility of its coverage measurement  methods, (2) determining the level of geography at which coverage can  be reliably measured, (3) keeping Congress and other stakeholders  informed of its plans, and (4) adequately testing coverage measurement  prior to full implementation; and  ensure that the Bureau’s financial management systems can capture and  report program activities early in the decennial process and ensure that  project costs are monitored for accuracy and completeness.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Secretary of Commerce forwarded written comments from the Census  Bureau on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in appendix I. The  Bureau agreed with our recommendations highlighting the steps that  should be followed in the development of a coverage measurement  methodology for the 2010 Census and acknowledged their importance.  However, the Bureau maintained that it followed most of these steps for  the 2000 Census including (1) keeping stakeholders, particularly Congress,  informed of the Bureau’s plans, (2) determining the level of geography at  which coverage measurement is intended, and (3) adequately testing  coverage measurement methodologies. The Bureau also maintained that  throughout the 1990s, it had an open and transparent process for  implementing the coverage measurement program, including the levels of  geography to which its results would be applied.
We disagree. As we stated in our report, the Bureau’s failure to provide  important information was a key cause of congressional skepticism over  the Bureau’s coverage measurement plans. In fact, Congress was so  concerned about the lack of comprehensive information on the Bureau’s  proposed approach that in July 1997, it passed a law that included  provisions requiring the Department of Commerce to provide detailed data  on the Bureau’s planned use of statistical estimation within 30 days. We  revised the report to include this, and provide other examples to further  support our position that the Bureau’s I.C.M. and A.C.E. planning and  development processes were less than fully open and transparent.
The Bureau also commented that each major component of the  I.C.M./A.C.E. program underwent “rigorous” testing in the middle of the  decade as well as during the dress rehearsal for the 2000 Census held in  1998. We believe this overstates what actually occurred. As we noted in the  report, the dress rehearsal failed to detect the problems that A.C.E.  encountered during the 2000 Census because the sites were not  representative of the nation. Additionally, because of an agreement  between Congress and the administration to simultaneously prepare for a  census that did not include sampling, the I.C.M. was only tested at two of  the three dress rehearsal sites—an urban area and an Indian reservation— but was not tested in a rural location as was originally planned. We made  this and other revisions to strengthen our point.
Because the A.C.E. was designed to correct a census with a net coverage  error similar to that observed in previous censuses, the Bureau commented  that applying the methodology to the historically low levels of net error  observed in the 2000 Census represented a unique and unexpected  challenge for A.C.E. We revised the report to reflect this additional context.
The Bureau took exception to the way we presented our conclusions  concerning its ability to properly classify certain costs associated with the  development of the Bureau’s coverage measurement programs. The Bureau  noted that it decided not to separately track coverage measurement  development costs in 1994, because there was no internal or external  request for a separate cost accounting of the program.
Our report does not make interpretive conclusions or qualitative judgments  about which coverage measurement program costs the Bureau decided to  track. Instead, the report (1) points out that we could not identify all of the  contractor costs associated with the I.C.M./A.C.E. programs because of the  three factors described in the report, and (2) underscores the importance  of a sound financial management system for tracking, planning, and  development costs for the 2010 Census.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of the U.S.  Census Bureau. Copies will be made available to others upon request. This  report will also be available at no charge on GAO’s home page at  http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact Patricia A. Dalton on (202) 512-6806 or by E-mail at  daltonp@gao.gov if you have any questions. Other key contributors to this  report were Robert Goldenkoff, Roger Stoltz, Carolyn Samuels, Cindy  Brown-Barnes, Ty Mitchell, and Linda Brigham.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: 2000 Census: Complete Costs of Coverage Evaluation Programs Are Not  Available. GAO-03-41. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2002. 2000 Census: Lessons Learned for Planning a More Cost-Effective 2010  Census. GAO-03-40. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2002. 2000 Census: Refinements to Full Count Review Program Could Improve  Future Data Quality. GAO-02-562. Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2002. 2000 Census: Coverage Evaluation Matching Implemented as Planned,  but Census Bureau Should Evaluate Lessons Learned. GAO-02-297.  Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2002. 2000 Census: Best Practices and Lessons Learned for More Cost-Effective  Nonresponse Follow-up. GAO-02-196. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 2002. 2000 Census: Coverage Evaluation Interviewing Overcame Challenges,  but Further Research Needed. GAO-02-26. Washington, D.C.:  December 31, 2001. 2000 Census: Analysis of Fiscal Year 2000 Budget and Internal Control  Weaknesses at the U.S. Census Bureau. GAO-02-30. Washington, D.C.:  December 28, 2001. 2000 Census: Significant Increase in Cost Per Housing Unit Compared  to 1990 Census. GAO-02-31. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2001. 2000 Census: Better Productivity Data Needed for Future Planning and  Budgeting. GAO-02-4. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2001. 2000 Census: Review of Partnership Program Highlights Best Practices  for Future Operations. GAO-01-579. Washington, D.C.: August 20, 2001.
Decennial Censuses: Historical Data on Enumerator Productivity Are  Limited. GAO-01-208R. Washington, D.C.: January 5, 2001. 2000 Census: Information on Short- and Long-Form Response Rates.  GAO/GGD-00-127R. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2000.
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