Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to Demonstrate Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships
Published: 2005-03-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: To conduct operations in littorals--shallow coastal waters--the Navy plans to build a new class of surface warship: the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). LCS is being designed to accomplish its missions through systems operating at a distance from the ship, such as helicopters and unmanned vehicles, and that will be contained in interchangeable mission packages. The Navy is using an accelerated approach to buy the LCS, building the ships in "flights." Flight 0, consisting of four ships, will provide limited capability and test the LCS concept. The schedule allows 12 months between the delivery of the first Flight 0 ship and the start of detailed design and construction for Flight 1 ships. Estimated procurement cost of the Flight 0 ships is $1.5 billion. The Congress directed GAO to review the LCS program. This report assesses the analytical basis of LCS requirements; the Navy's progress in defining the concept of operations; the technical maturity of the mission packages; and the basis of recurring costs for LCS.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The formal analysis of requirements for U.S. littoral combat operations--conducted after the Navy established the LCS program--examined a number of options, such as the extent to which existing fleet assets or joint capabilities could be used. While the Navy concluded that the LCS remained the best option, it focused on LCS requirements for combating small boats. The Navy did not conduct an analysis of the impact of larger surface threats LCS may face. Such threats may increase the risk to LCS operations when no other nearby U.S. forces are available to help. The Navy has developed both a broad concept and more detailed plans on how the LCS will be employed. It has also identified a number of challenges that could put the LCS concept at risk, such as manning, logistics, and communications. For example, reduced manning--a key goal of the LCS program--may not be achievable because maintaining and operating the ship's mission packages, such as the MH-60 helicopter, may require more sailors than the current design allows. Further, the Navy has not yet incorporated the numbers of helicopters that will be needed to fulfill LCS's concept of operation into its force structure and procurement plans. If the Navy's efforts to meet these challenges are not successful, the Navy may not have sufficient time to experiment with the Flight 0 ships and integrate lessons learned into planning and designing for follow-on ships. While the Navy designed the first LCS to rely on proven technologies and systems, a number of technologies to be used in LCS's mission packages have yet to be sufficiently matured--that is, they have not been demonstrated in an operational environment--increasing the risk of cost and schedule increases if the technologies do not work as intended. Technologies must also be demonstrated for systems on the LCS seaframe. Other factors may affect the availability of mature technologies and subsystems, such as making the modifications necessary for adaptation to the LCS and transitioning projects from the laboratory to production. Collectively, these technology issues pose an additional challenge to the Navy's ability to sufficiently experiment with Flight 0 ships in time to inform the design efforts for follow-on ships. Procurement costs for the Flight 0 ships remain uncertain. The basis for the seaframe cost target--$220 million--appears to be more defined than for the mission packages, as the Navy has performed various cost analyses that consider the challenges in detailed design and construction. The Navy seeks to meet the cost target by trading between capability and cost. Cost data for the Flight 0 mission packages are not as firm in part because of the uncertainties associated with immature technologies.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Navy has begun to build a new class of surface warship—the Littoral  Combat Ship (LCS)—to address the challenges of operating U.S. military  forces in the shallow waters close to shore, known as the littorals. The  three principal threats it is expected to address are from mines, small  surface boat attacks, and submarines. The LCS differs from existing types  of Navy surface warships in two critical ways. First, it will accomplish its  mine, antisubmarine, and surface warfare missions primarily through the  use of helicopters, unmanned vehicles and other systems that operate at a  distance from the ship itself. Second, the systems used to conduct each  main or focused mission will be contained in mission packages; for  example, one mission package will consist of the systems needed for  detecting, engaging, and neutralizing mines. The mission packages will be  interchangeable, so that the LCS can be rapidly reconfigured for different  missions. Similar to the concept for an aircraft airframe that can change  missions depending on the systems carried, the Navy refers to the LCS hull  as a seaframe. The concept of mission packages and the ability to shift  among the three focused missions of the ship concentrates each LCS on a  single focused mission at a time as opposed to larger multimission surface  ships, such as the Arleigh Burke guided missile destroyers and  Ticonderoga guided missile cruisers. However, the Navy envisions that,  like other surface ships, the LCS will be capable of conducting certain core  missions and functions, such as self defense, regardless of the mission  package on board.
The Navy seeks to rapidly build and deploy LCS and has developed an  accelerated acquisition schedule that includes delivery of four ships, two  each of different designs, between fiscal years 2007 and 2009 with delivery  of follow-on ships of a single design beginning in fiscal year 2010. The  Congress recently inserted a year into the schedule between the  construction of the first and second ship of each design, which may affect  the schedule for all subsequent ships. The Navy is developing LCS using an  evolutionary acquisition approach. Capabilities are delivered by “flight”  with the first four ships referred to as Flight 0 and the next increment of  capability as Flight 1. Flight 0 will provide an initial limited capability and  platforms to experiment with the critical mission technologies and test the  overall concept. Flight 1 will provide greater capability and serve as the  basis for learning lessons that will be incorporated into additional follow- on ships. The Navy has not decided how many total ships it will build,  though currently it estimates that between 50 and 60 ships may be built.  The Navy’s cost target for each of the four Flight 0 ships is approximately  $370 million. This includes $220 million for the seaframe and  approximately $150 million for mission packages (the cost of six packages  averaged over four ships).
The Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2004 and the House of Representatives report  accompanying the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2005 directed that we assess four key areas of the LCS  program. Accordingly, this report assesses (1) the analytical basis of LCS  requirements; (2) the Navy’s progress in defining the concept of  operations; (3) the technical maturity of the mission package systems; and  (4) the basis of recurring costs for the seaframe and mission packages.
To assess the four key areas of the LCS program, we held discussions and  reviewed documents at a number of Navy offices, including the program  offices for LCS and its supporting mission package systems, Navy  headquarters, the Naval War College, and Navy Warfare Development  Command. We identified and analyzed key Navy documents, including  those related to capability gaps; requirements; concepts; acquisition  planning; consideration of critical doctrinal, logistical, and operational  considerations; technology assessment and maturity plans; and cost  analyses. Our analyses of technology maturity and costs focused on Flight  0. Details of the costs and technologies for the seaframe are sensitive, due  to the ongoing competition. We therefore do not discuss these at length.  Further details on our scope and methodology are in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: According to Navy guidance, the Navy is required to project power from  the sea and maintain assured access in the littoral regions, which for naval  vessels refers specifically to the transition between open ocean to more  constrictive shallower waters close to shore—the littorals. “Anti-access”  threats from mines, submarines, and surface forces threaten the Navy’s  ability to assure access to the littorals. The LCS is being developed to  address these missions. The LCS design concept consists of two distinct  parts, the ship itself and the mission package it carries and deploys. For  LCS, the ship is referred to as the “seaframe” and consists of the hull,  command and control systems, launch and recovery systems, and certain  core systems like the radar and gun. A core crew will be responsible for  the seaframe’s basic functions. Operating with these systems alone offers  some capability to perform general or inherent missions, such as support  of special operations forces or maritime intercept operations. The LCS’s  focused missions are mine warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and surface  warfare. The majority of the capabilities for these missions will come from  mission packages. These packages are intended to be modular in that they  will be interchangeable on the seaframe. Each mission package consists of  systems made up of manned and unmanned vehicles and the subsystems  these vehicles use in their missions. Additional crew will be needed to  operate these systems. Each mission package is envisioned as being self  contained and interchangeable, allowing tailoring of LCS to meet specific  threats. Table 1 shows examples of LCS’s focused and inherent missions.
subsections: section_title: Navy Plans an Aggressive Schedule for LCS
paragraphs: The Navy characterizes the schedule for acquisition and deployment of  LCS as aggressive. To meet this schedule, the Navy is pursuing an  evolutionary acquisition strategy. Rather than initially delivering a full  capability, the program is structured to deliver incremental capabilities to  the warfighter. To support this, LCS acquisition is broken into “flights” for  the seaframe and “spirals” for mission packages in order to develop  improvements while fielding technologies as they become available. The  initial flight of ships, referred to as Flight 0, will serve two main purposes:  provide a limited operational capability and provide input to the Flight 1  design through experimentation with operations and mission packages.  Flight 1 will provide more complete capabilities but is not intended to  serve as the sole design for the more than 50 LCS the Navy plans to  ultimately buy. Further flights will likely round out these numbers. Flight 0  will consist of four ships of two different designs and will be procured in  parallel with the first increment of mission packages—Spiral Alpha. Flight  0 ships are currently being designed, and construction on the first ship will  begin in 2005. Due to the accelerated schedule, Spiral Alpha will consist  primarily of existing technologies and systems. Spiral Bravo mission  packages will be improvements upon these systems and are intended to be  introduced with the Flight 1 ships. Figure 1 shows the two designs chosen  by the Navy for Flight 0, one by Lockheed Martin and one by General  Dynamics.
The Navy and Lockheed Martin signed a contract for detailed design and  construction of the first Flight 0 ship in December 2004, and the ship  builder is expected to deliver the ship to the Navy in fiscal year 2007. The  Navy will then begin testing and experimenting with the ship, using the  first mission package—mine warfare. A date for any deployment with the  fleet has not been determined. Detailed design and construction for the  first General Dynamics design ship is scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2006  and delivery is scheduled for fiscal year 2008. The delivery of the first  antisubmarine and surface warfare mission packages are aligned with the  delivery of the second Flight 0 ship. Figure 2 shows the Navy’s current  acquisition timeline for Flight 0, Flight 1, and their mission packages.
The development of Flight 1 will proceed concurrently with the design and  construction of Flight 0. In early fiscal year 2006 the Navy will begin  consideration of several preliminary designs for Flight 1. The Navy will  choose designs for further development in fiscal year 2007. Selection of a  design to start construction of the first Flight 1 ship will be in early fiscal  year 2008. Flight 1 and future follow-on designs will be the basis for the  LCS class of ships, which the Navy currently estimates could number  between 50 and 60. Under the current acquisition strategy, detailed design  and construction of the first Flight 1 ship will begin about 12 months after  delivery of the first Flight 0 ship. The last two Flight 0 ships will not be  available before detailed design and construction of Flight 1 begins. The  second Flight 0 ship and the first mission packages for antisubmarine and  surface warfare will be delivered just as detailed design and construction  of Flight 1 is set to begin. Delivery of the first mission packages in Spiral  Bravo will be aligned with delivery of the first Flight 1 ship.
section_title: Navy Conducted Detailed Analysis of LCS Requirements, but Surface Threat Risk Is Unclear
paragraphs: Recognizing that it lacks a number of key warfighting capabilities to  operate in the littorals, the Navy began to develop the concept of LCS as a  potential weapon system before it had completed formal requirements.  Normally, a major acquisition program should include an examination of  basic requirements and an analysis of potential solutions before a new  system is decided upon. The Navy eventually conducted a requirements  development process and analyzed a number of alternative solutions to a  new ship but concluded that the LCS remained the best option. However,  the Navy’s analysis of one area of littoral operations—the surface threats  facing U.S. forces in littoral waters—did not include consideration of the  potential impact of all threats the LCS is likely to face.
subsections: section_title: Navy Began to Develop LCS before Fully Examining Alternatives
paragraphs: The Navy has known about the capability gaps in the littorals for some  time, particularly threats from mines and submarines in shallow waters. As  we previously reported, the Navy has acknowledged that it lacks a number  of key warfighting capabilities it needs for operations in the littoral  environs. For example, it does not have a means for effectively breaching  enemy sea mines in the surf zone or detecting and neutralizing enemy  submarines in shallow water. The Navy has had programs under way to  improve its capabilities in each of these areas for many years, such as  systems designed to provide the fleet with mine detection and limited  clearing capabilities, but progress has been slow. Additionally, the Navy  has identified the threat of small boats, such as the kind that attacked the  U.S.S. Cole in 2000, as a potential hindrance to operations in the littorals.  The Navy has decided that the LCS is to accomplish these three critical  littoral missions.
After recognizing the need to address known capability gaps in the  littorals, the Navy conducted a series of wargames to test new concepts  for surface combatant ships. One such concept, a very small surface  combatant ship called Streetfighter, was incorporated into the Global 1999  war game. The concept was envisaged as a small, fast, stealthy, and  reconfigurable ship, which included many characteristics similar to LCS.  The Navy’s war-fighting assessment processes confirmed gaps in  capabilities for mine warfare, shallow water antisubmarine warfare, and  surface warfare against small boats. In July 2001, the Global 2001 war  game further examined the concepts and potential benefits of  modularity—such as using mission packages—and use of unmanned  vehicles for littoral missions. As a result of the wargames the Navy  continued the process of analyzing a variety of new surface combatant  ship concepts to address the threats in the littorals.
In 2002, the Navy established an LCS program office as it began to further  identify concepts and characteristics for a new surface combatant ship. In  December 2001, the Naval War College was asked to develop and define  characteristics that would be desirable in a littoral combat ship. The  college used a series of workshops that included operational and technical  experts from throughout the Navy to compare three types and sizes of  surface combatant ships and describe desirable characteristics that such a  ship should have. The experts examined such characteristics as speed,  range, manning, and the ability to operate helicopters and unmanned  vehicles. The workshop participants also concluded that a potential  littoral ship should    be capable of networking with other platforms and sensors,    be useful across the spectrum of conflict,    be able to contribute to sustained forward naval presence,    be capable of operating manned vertical lift aircraft,    be capable of operating with optimized manning,    have an open architecture and modularity,    be capable of operating manned and unmanned vehicles, and    have organic self defense capabilities.
The results of the Naval War College study, which was completed in July  2002, were used as a baseline for further developing the concepts for LCS.
At this point the Navy’s analysis was focused on a single solution to  address littoral capability gaps—a new warship along the lines of LCS.  Between April 2002 and January 2004, the Navy conducted an analysis of  multiple concepts to further define the concept that would address gaps in  the littorals. The analysis began by examining five different ship concepts  for LCS (later focusing on three concepts for another stage) and provided  the Navy with insight into the trade-offs between features such as size,  speed, endurance, and self defense needs. The analysis was performed by  the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, and drew upon  expertise throughout the Navy.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff were concerned  that the Navy’s focus on a single solution did not adequately consider  other ways to address littoral capability gaps. Based on these concerns, in  early 2004, the Navy was required to more fully consider other potential  solutions. The publication of new guidance on joint capabilities  development in June 2003, also led the Navy to expand its analysis beyond  the single solution of the proposed new ship to include other potential  solutions to littoral challenges.
As part of its resulting analysis, the Navy defined littoral capability gaps,  developed requirements to address those gaps, and identified and  examined 11 nonmateriel and 3 materiel solutions across the joint forces  that could be used to mitigate gaps in the littorals. Nonmateriel solutions  refer to the use of different operational concepts or methods to meet  requirements without buying new assets such as additional ships; materiel  solutions are those which involve developing equipment or systems, such  as ships and aircraft. The solutions were analyzed to determine the  feasibility and risk in mitigating the gaps. The Navy’s assessment of  feasibility centered on the extent to which each solution addressed the  mine, antisubmarine, and surface capability gaps. The Navy’s assessment  of risk centered on the impacts of each solution on (1) the success of  potential operations in the littorals, (2) the sensitivity of diplomatic  considerations, such as the military support of other nations, and (3) the  financial considerations involved in choosing that solution.
Two additional materiel solutions, that centered on maritime patrol  aircraft and modified DDG-51 destroyers, were added to the Navy’s  analysis as a result of input from the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s  Program Analysis and Evaluation office and the Acquisition, Technology  and Logistics office. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint  Staff also provided specific questions to the Navy for further clarification  of the Navy’s ongoing analysis. With these additions, the Program Analysis  and Evaluation office approved the Navy’s completed analysis as  satisfactory to meet the requirements of a full analysis of alternatives for  the LCS program. Table 2 shows the materiel and nonmateriel solutions  presented in the Navy’s requirements analysis and the results of the Navy’s  analysis of operational feasibility, as well as operational, diplomatic, and  financial risk.
Based on its analysis, the Navy concluded that the materiel and  nonmateriel solutions they examined would not provide better operational  and cost effective solutions than the proposed LCS to perform the littoral  missions. A number of factors were analyzed, including the feasibility of  using other surface and non-surface force solutions and the risk  associated with those options. Four nonmateriel solutions were  considered to be partially feasible for mitigating the gaps in the littorals,  while seven other solutions were considered not to be feasible. Partially  feasible nonmateriel solutions included the use of maritime patrol aircraft,  submarines, and a mix of air and sea assets from carrier and expeditionary  strike groups. The most feasible solution considered using a combination  of existing forces from carrier and expeditionary strike groups. However,  the Navy determined that during a major combat operation, this solution  would not be feasible because other mission objectives focused on  directing operations onto shore would take a higher priority. Some of the  materiel solutions included expanding existing forces, upgrading existing  forces, or procuring a new class of platforms tailored for focused  missions.
Using a number of studies of threats and analyses of potential military  operations in the littoral regions, the Navy developed requirements for the  LCS that addressed the identified capability gaps and likely threats in the  littorals. This analysis supported revised DOD and Joint Chiefs of Staff  requirements for shipbuilding acquisition programs. The Navy identified  capability gaps in the littorals by measuring the ability of the current and  programmed joint forces to accomplish a number of tasks across a range  of operating conditions and standards. The Navy concluded that based on  completing the tasks in the littorals under the established measures of  effectiveness, it lacked sufficient assets and technology to fully mitigate  the gaps. For example, under mine warfare the task for clearing routes for  transit lanes covering a specific area within a 7 day period creates a  capability gap because the Navy concluded that its force structure lacked  the number of assets (mine countermeasures ships, destroyers with  remote mine-hunting systems, and the appropriate mine countermeasures  helicopters) to fully mitigate the gap in the littorals under the operational  timeline of seven days. Table 3 shows examples of tasks for each focused  mission, the measures of effectiveness, and the capability gap that exists  under the current and programmed force structure.
section_title: LCS Requirements Analysis Did Not Cover Some Threats LCS May Face
paragraphs: We analyzed the requirements the Navy developed to address littoral  capability gaps and used to support the LCS program, tracking each  requirement in the mine, antisubmarine, and surface warfare areas back to  the capability gaps and threats identified by the Navy in their requirements  development process. We found no inconsistencies in the specific  requirements for LCS illustrated in the documents required as part of the  joint capabilities integration and development system. However, the  requirements the Navy arrived at for LCS’s surface warfare capabilities  were focused on small boats, and this did not include an analysis of the  impact of larger surface threats in the littorals. The Navy focused the  surface threat on swarms of small boats, characterized as Boston Whalers,  capable of operating at high speeds and employing shoulder mounted or  crew served weapons, such as light machine guns. These boats can  conduct surprise, simultaneous, short range attacks from or near  shorelines. The Navy measured its current and programmed capabilities  against defeating swarms of small boats in high numbers. For example, to  determine the capability gaps and measures of effectiveness for escorting  ships through choke points, the Navy measured its force structure against  defeating large numbers of small boats. However, larger threats, such as  missile-armed patrol boats and frigates, are also identified in the Navy’s  LCS concept of operations and threat studies as threats that LCS may face  in the littorals. Such vessels may be armed with medium caliber guns,  torpedoes, and antiship missiles. These threats could present additional  risk to LCS operations.
Some DOD and Navy officials have raised concerns about the extent to  which the LCS may face larger threats than it is capable of defending  against. Navy officials agreed that the surface threat was focused  exclusively on swarms of small boats and told us that LCS is not intended  to combat larger threats. The Navy found no capability gap with respect to  the larger surface threat, because there is sufficient capability in the  existing fleet to counter the threat. Further, Navy officials stated that if a  larger surface threat were encountered, LCS would be able to call upon  the assistance of other U.S. forces in the area, such as tactical aviation or  larger surface warships. In a major combat operation, LCS squadrons  would be able to draw upon assistance of those nearby Navy or joint  forces in the face of a larger surface threat in the area. However, according  to the LCS concept of operations, in addition to operating with other U.S  forces on a regular basis, LCS is intended to operate independently of  those forces, depending on the type of mission and circumstance. When  operating independently, such as during routine deployments to littoral  waters, LCS may not be able to call upon assistance from larger U.S.  forces. This may impede LCS operations, such as forcing the LCS to  withdraw from an operating area, a situation contrary to the Navy’s goals.  Since the Navy did not analyze the impact of larger surface threats on LCS  operations, the extent of the risk and the impact on U.S. operations is not  known.
section_title: A Detailed Concept of Operations Has Been Developed for LCS but Faces a Number of Challenges in Implementation
paragraphs: Although there are no formal criteria for developing a concept of  operations, the Navy has developed both a broad concept and more  detailed plans as to how the LCS and its mission systems will be used to  meet requirements. The concept of operations also includes several  challenges that, if not met, may increase the risk in actual LCS operations.  However, the Navy has not yet fully considered the LCS concept of  operations in the force structure and procurement plans for the MH-60  helicopter, which is critical to all LCS missions. The Navy has recognized  these risks and is attempting to address them. However, if these efforts are  not successful within the time constraints of the schedule, the Flight 0  ships may not provide the planned capability or the level of  experimentation needed to inform the Flight 1 design.
The Navy has developed a broad concept of operations document for LCS.  Though there are no formal guidelines that describe how the concept of  operations should be written or the level of detail it should contain, it is a  high level requirements document that describes how the user (in this  case, the Navy) will use the weapon system to address mission needs. The  concept of operations can also be used as guidance in developing testable  system and software requirements specifications. In particular, the LCS  concept of operations describes how the ship will contribute to U.S. Joint  Force operations in countering threats in the littorals. These include mine  warfare (detecting and neutralizing mines), antisubmarine warfare  (detecting and engaging hostile submarines), and surface warfare (detect,  track, and engage surface threats). In addition to these focused missions,  the LCS concept of operations discusses how the LCS can perform  inherent missions, such as support for special operations forces, maritime  interception operations and supporting homeland defense related  missions. For example, the LCS concept of operations for maritime  interception operations envisages use of the ship’s core crew, and any  additional personnel in case of operations in higher threat areas, to  provide boat crews and boarding teams to board suspect vessels as well as  using an embarked helicopter for assistance. The concept of operations is  directed at Flight 0 but also provides a vision for follow-on ships. The  document has also been used to build consensus among warfighters, the  acquisition community, and the various industry teams involved in  building LCS as to how the ship is intended to be used.
The development process for the LCS concept of operations began with  the Navy Warfare Development Command in late 2002 when it created the  first version of the Concept. The document described the projected threat  context, capabilities, and operational employment of LCS to help industry  with their designs. The Command based this version of the concept of  operations on their experience with various pre-LCS studies and war  games that employed fast, small ships with modular payloads. The Navy  subsequently updated and expanded the concept of operations with new  information that related to critical areas that impact, and are impacted by,  LCS operations, including doctrine, training, and personnel. The Navy  approved the LCS concept of operations in December 2004.
The Navy is also continuing to refine concepts for how LCS and its mission  systems will be used to address anti-access threats. These efforts include a  Concept of Employment, which describes the way mission package  systems are intended to be used to meet warfare requirements, and an  analysis of performance data for individual systems in order to inform  experiments on the actual operation of LCS mission systems. In addition,  the Navy will incorporate lessons learned from Flight 0 operations into  future versions of the LCS concept of operations.
We compared the LCS concept of operations to the approved requirements  for the ship and the capability gaps identified by the Navy and found that  each of the capability gaps and LCS mission requirements were addressed  in the concept of operations. For example, the requirements to address the  mine warfare capability gap call for mines to be detected, identified, and  neutralized. The concept of operations discusses how the LCS will address  these requirements by using a combination of helicopters and unmanned  vehicles to detect and identify mines, and either a helicopter or an  explosive ordinance disposal detachment with unmanned underwater  vehicles to neutralize mines.
The LCS concept of operations includes several operational and logistical  challenges that may increase the operational risk for LCS. One challenge is  to reduce the numbers of sailors required to operate the ship’s critical  mission systems. This challenge is exacerbated by the limited space on the  ship. If this cannot be achieved, the Navy may have to make significant  changes to the design or capability of follow-on ships. Another challenge is  the logistics support required to meet the Navy’s goal of changing LCS  mission packages within 4 days of arriving at an appropriate facility. A  number of factors frame this challenge, including where packages are to  be stored, how they are to be transported, and the proximity of LCS  operating areas to ports required to swap mission packages. Any of these  factors could increase the time required for a change in LCS mission  packages once the decision has been made to do so. Other challenges  include training; command, control, communications, computers, and  intelligence; survivability; and the impact on the Navy’s force structure.
The two versions of the MH-60 helicopter intended for use with LCS  embody a number of these challenges. The helicopter is vital to each of the  LCS’s focused missions as well as some of the ship’s inherent missions,  such as maritime intercept operations. In order to operate a helicopter  from LCS, a detachment of flight and maintenance personnel are required.  The Navy’s current helicopter detachments on surface warships each  number at least 20 people. When combined with the ship’s core mission  crew, this number could exceed the capacity of LCS to house crews,  thereby limiting the ability of LCS to operate other mission package  systems and reducing the ship’s operational effectiveness.
Additionally, the Navy’s plans for buying and fielding MH-60s do not yet  include the quantities needed for the numbers of follow-on LCS ships the  Navy intends to buy. Since the helicopter is critical for LCS’s concept of  operations, the ship’s operations will be significantly limited if the  helicopters are not bought and made available. To do this, the Navy needs  to plan for the numbers of helicopters needed, modify its procurement  plans, obtain the funds, build the helicopters, deliver them, conduct  operational evaluations, and train the crews.
The Navy recognizes these risk areas and has mitigation efforts underway  in each area. For example, in the risk area of manning reduction, the Navy  is using the “Sea Warrior” program to cross train sailors so that they are  more able to multitask and perform a wider set of duties. The Navy is also  conducting additional analysis to validate the maximum number of  crewmembers needed and will make changes to crew accommodations if  necessary. Further, the Navy is analyzing ways to reduce the size of  helicopter detachments and is currently reevaluating its helicopter force  structure and procurement plans to provide the MH-60s needed for LCS. In  addition, the Navy has established an LCS risk management board to track  and manage each of the risk areas as well as monitor the effectiveness of  risk mitigation efforts. Table 4 lists the challenges for LCS and examples of  Navy mitigation efforts.
None of these challenges are insurmountable, given enough time and other  resources to address them. However, if the Navy is unsuccessful in  mitigating the risk areas by the time the first Flight 0 ships are delivered,  LCS may be unable to meet even the limited mission capability planned for  Flight 0. The Navy plans for a period of about 12 months between the time  of delivery of the first Flight 0 ship and the start of construction for the  first Flight 1 ship, provided the first Flight 0 ship is available on time.  Further, only one mission package (mine warfare) will be available for  testing and experimentation during that time. The last two Flight 0 ships  will not be available before detailed design and construction of Flight 1  begins. The second Flight 0 ship and the first mission packages for  antisubmarine and surface warfare will be delivered just before detailed  design and construction of Flight 1 begins. Delays caused by any of the  risk areas discussed above might further reduce the already limited time to  adequately experiment with one Flight 0 ship in order to integrate lessons  learned into planning and designing for Flight 1.
section_title: Immaturity in Mission Package Technologies Could Decrease the Experimental and Operational Utility of Flight 0 Ships
paragraphs: A number of the technologies chosen for the LCS mission packages are  not mature, increasing the risk that the first ships will be of limited utility  and not allow sufficient time for experimentation to influence design for  follow-on ships. Our work has shown that when key technologies are  immature at the start of development, programs are at higher risk of being  unable to deliver on schedule and within estimated costs. The remaining  technologies are mature although some may require alterations to operate  from LCS. Other issues beyond technology maturity could prevent some  systems from being available in time for the first ship. Some technologies  still in development face challenges going to production, while other  mature technologies may not be available for LCS due to other Navy  priorities. Challenges remain for technologies included on the LCS  seaframe, including those for communications, software, launch and  recovery, and command and control of off-board systems. As a result, the  first Flight 0 ships may not be able to provide even the limited amount of  mission capability envisaged for them. These factors could also impair the  Navy’s ability to experiment with the Flight 0 ships and adequately gather  and incorporate lessons learned into the designs for the Flight 1 ships.
In order to perform its focused missions of finding and neutralizing mines,  submarines, and small boats in the littorals, LCS will deploy mission  packages consisting of helicopters and unmanned vehicles with a variety  of sensors and weapons. Each of the interchangeable mission packages is  tailored to a specific mission and is optimized for operations in the  littorals. By using a mix of manned and unmanned vehicles, program  officials hope to increase the areas covered and decrease the time required  by existing systems. The use of multiple mission packages is to be enabled  by the design of the ship itself which will use a number of common  connections or interfaces that will work regardless of the individual  technologies or systems used in the mission packages.
In order to speed the development of the first LCS, the Navy planned for  the mission packages to comprise technologies that are either already  demonstrated in an operational environment and used by the Navy, and  therefore fully mature, or very close to the end of the development cycle  and near full maturity. However, in some cases the program office chose  technologies that have not completed testing and are not considered  mature. Some of these technologies will be delivered to LCS as prototypes  or engineering development models and may not be fully mature. The  program office has used an informed process in choosing which  technologies to pursue for Flight 0, tracking the maturity of technologies  and the plans for further development. Those technologies selected by the  program that lack maturity are being monitored and decisions about their  inclusion are made based on results of further testing. Once initial choices  were made, the Navy used an independent panel of experts, consisting of  Navy and industry technology experts, to reassess the maturity of  technologies and the efforts needed for risk reduction. The assessment  paid particular attention to technologies at low levels of readiness, such as  the Non-Line-Of-Sight missile launching system (also referred to as  NetFires) and the environment in which the technologies are to be used.
The first mission package to be developed will focus on mine warfare and  will align with the delivery of the first ship in January 2007. The systems  within this mission package contain both mature and immature  technologies, although some mature technologies, like the remote mine- hunting vehicle, may need modifications to operate from LCS. Table 5  shows the maturity and availability of mission package technologies for  mine warfare, based on the Navy’s current assessment. The first mission  package is intended to be delivered with the first Flight 0 ship in fiscal  year 2007.
A number of critical mine warfare systems are not mature or will not be  ready due to the unavailability or immaturity of subsystems. This could  have a negative effect on LCS as the loss of certain technologies leads to a  decrease in capabilities. The MH-60S helicopter is a key system for mine  warfare employing technologies for both the detection and the  neutralization of mines in shallow water. While the helicopter has proven  its ability to detect mines, two of the technologies for neutralization lack  maturity. Testing on neutralization technologies continues but is not  expected to complete until after delivery of the first ship, limiting the  ability of LCS to destroy sea based mines. One system which could fill the  gap in this area, the unmanned surface vehicle, also lacks maturity in key  systems and ultimately may not be available.
The first systems for antisubmarine and surface warfare packages of Spiral  Alpha are scheduled to be available at the time the second Flight 0 ship is  delivered in fiscal year 2008. Of these technologies, few are currently  mature. Two of the systems used for detecting submarines, the unmanned  surface vehicle and remote mine-hunting vehicle, lack maturity in key  subsystems and will be delivered to LCS while still experimental. If these  systems fail to meet requirements, LCS may have to depend on the MH- 60R helicopter to find submarines. The MH-60R is an important system in  both these missions, and while fully mature in the antisubmarine warfare  configuration, it has not yet completed testing for surface warfare and is  not expected to do so until September 2005. The helicopter has potential  capability in both detecting and neutralizing surface targets, such as small  boats, due to the types of sensors and weapons it carries. Tables 6 and 7  show the maturity and availability of mission package technologies for  antisubmarine and surface warfare, respectively. These packages are  scheduled to be delivered with the second Flight 0 ship in fiscal year 2008.
In addition to challenges posed by the lack of mature technologies, there  may be other challenges in obtaining some mission package systems in  time for the first ships. The unmanned surface vehicle, a system used in all  three mission packages, is being developed through an advanced concept  technology demonstration and does not yet have a planned production  schedule. The current development program for the unmanned surface  vessel ends in fiscal year 2005 and seeks only to prove the military utility  of the vehicle. In order to procure the systems needed for LCS, a new  program will have to be established to conclude development, finalize  design and start production of vehicles.
Other technologies have planned production schedules but need to  complete significant demonstrations and tests before they are able to  deploy operationally. The vertical takeoff unmanned aerial vehicle,  another system used in all mission packages, underwent a major redesign,  and the first deliveries to LCS will not represent a final design. The remote  mine-hunting vehicle only recently began development as an  antisubmarine warfare platform and remains in development as an  advanced concept technology demonstration. These factors could  jeopardize the dates established for the delivery of the LCS mission  packages and may ultimately affect the ability of LCS to execute many of  the missions assigned to it.
Other technologies, while mature, may not be available to LCS in time for  the ship’s deployment due to other Navy priorities. For example, the MH- 60 helicopters, in both the MH-60R and MH-60S configurations, are  scheduled to complete testing in fiscal year 2007, but may not be fully  available until fiscal year 2009, assuming the Navy makes them available  for LCS, because of training requirements. This could have an impact on  LCS capabilities in all missions. The MH-60S is a key system for mine  warfare, and the lack of this helicopter results in the loss of some  capability, in terms of detecting some mines, and limitations in the ability  to neutralize others. While LCS will still be capable of detecting and  destroying mines in littorals without the helicopter, it will do so more  slowly, which minimizes operational effectiveness. If the MH-60R is  unavailable, the ability to neutralize submarines from LCS is severely  compromised as no other mission package system is planned to provide a  neutralization capacity. Older, less capable, versions of the MH-60  helicopter can be used in this mission but changes would be needed in the  ship’s communications systems. The Navy acknowledges that no  helicopters will be available for LCS operations until fiscal year 2009 and  are working to align crew training schedules to permit operations with  LCS.
Challenges also remain for systems on the LCS seaframe, including  technologies for communications, software, launch and recovery, and  command and control of off-board systems. Further tests of these systems  are expected before ship installation.
In addition to limiting the operational capability of the Flight 0 ships,  technology maturity and availability issues could limit the time available  for the Navy to adequately experiment with operation of the seaframe and  mission packages and gather valuable lessons for incorporation into Flight  1 ships. Detailed design and construction of the first Flight 1 ship is  currently scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2008. Spiral Alpha mission  packages for antisubmarine warfare and surface warfare are not  scheduled for delivery to the Flight 0 ships until fiscal year 2008, just as  detailed design and construction for Flight 1 is set to begin. If technology  immaturity causes any of the mission packages systems to slip to later  delivery dates, the opportunity to experiment and gather lessons learned  from these systems aboard the Flight 0 ships would be lost, unless the time  allowed for such experimentation is extended. If the helicopters are not  available for operations until fiscal year 2009, input on the full impact of  their operations could be lost as well.
section_title: Procurement Cost Estimates Are Uncertain
paragraphs: The cost to procure the first flight of LCS ships remains uncertain,  particularly regarding the mission packages. The basis of the procurement  costs for the LCS seaframe appears to be more defined because the Navy  has conducted a series of cost analyses to investigate the challenges in  detailed design and construction. The Navy seeks to stabilize seaframe  costs by establishing a $220 million cost target and working to meet this  target by trading between capability and cost while assuring that seaframe  performance meets threshold requirements. Nevertheless, seaframe costs  could be affected by changes to ship design and materials that might be  necessary as a result of changes to naval ship standards. As many of the  systems for the mission packages lack maturity, cost data for these  technologies are not as firm. Other mission package costs are not covered  by LCS program cost analyses. For programs like LCS, an independent  cost estimate by the Office of the Secretary of Defense normally provides  additional confidence in program cost estimates, but such an estimate will  not be done on LCS until Flight 1. In addition to issues with procurement  costs, nonrecurring development costs for the LCS could expand, as  systems both in the mission packages and the seaframe remain in  development.
The Navy’s procurement cost target for Flight 0 is about $1.5 billion (fiscal  year 2005 dollars). The cost target for each of the four Flight 0 ships is  approximately $370 million. This includes $220 million for the seaframe  and approximately $150 million for mission packages (the cost of six  packages averaged over four ships).
The Navy currently estimates that the mission packages for Flight 0 will  cost approximately $548 million, which is approximately $137 million for  the six packages averaged over four ships. This is about $13 million below  the mission package target. Table 8 shows the current cost estimates for  the mission packages for Flight 0. The estimated cost for seaframe detailed  design and construction is considered competition sensitive and is not  discussed in detail in this report.
The Navy has conducted a number of cost reviews for procurement of the  LCS seaframe and mission packages to support decision making at key  points in the program. One of the most detailed of these reviews took the  form of a cost assessment used to support the program’s initiation. In this  assessment the program office analyzed cost data, provided by the  contractor, to establish a preliminary cost and challenged some  assumptions behind these costs. The Cost Analysis and Improvement  Group of the Office of the Secretary of Defense also performed cost  assessments for Flight 0. More recently, a cost estimate for procuring the  seaframe and mission packages of Flight 0 was performed by the Navy and  became the official program estimate. A cost estimate differs from an  assessment in that it goes into greater depth in challenging assumptions  behind costs provided by the contractors and may use different  methodologies and assumptions to arrive at a final number. As a result, the  program estimate may differ from the price provided by contractors and  offers a more detailed cost analysis for decision making.
The basis of the procurement costs for the LCS seaframe appears to have  become more defined over time as successive cost analyses have been  developed to anticipate the challenges in detailed design and construction.  Analyses included recommendations to add funds to mitigate changes to  seaframe design as well as firm fixed price quotes for some materials. In  addition, the Navy seeks to manage seaframe costs by establishing a $150  to $220 million cost range, which the Navy considers aggressive, and has  been working to meet this range by trading between capability and cost  while assuring that seaframe performance meets requirements. Any  capabilities in the seaframe that exceed the requirements established by  the Navy are considered trade space areas, in which less expensive  systems may be substituted at the cost of lower performance. Each trade  is analyzed for impact to cost and operational capability by a team of  program officials and is fully vetted through the chain of command.
One factor that increases risk to seaframe cost estimates is applying the  current changes in the naval vessel rules for design and construction of  surface ships. The unconventional hull designs and materials used in both  Flight 0 LCS designs reflect new types of ships the Navy has not hitherto  built. Changes to the rules are occurring at the same time as development  of the LCS. The process of meeting these rules could lead to changes in the  designs and materials used. Such changes may increase uncertainty in  seaframe procurement and life-cycle costs.
The costs for the first spiral of mission packages are less defined, as many  of the technologies are not mature. For example, the unmanned surface  vehicle remains in an advanced concept technology demonstration  program into fiscal year 2005. This program seeks only to prove the  military utility of the vehicle. Any cost data that emerges as a result of  tests and construction of test vehicles does not accurately represent the  final cost of the system and is thereby preliminary. The vehicle may also  use different subsystems or have different capabilities when used on LCS.  This would further change actual procurement costs.
Additional confidence in a program’s costs is usually gained through an  independent cost estimate done outside the Navy. According to a DOD  acquisition instruction, an independent cost estimate should be completed  as part of the process that normally authorizes the lead ship, referred to as  the Milestone B decision. For programs like LCS, an independent group,  like the Cost Analysis and Improvement Group, is required to perform  such an estimate. While this group performed assessments of Flight 0  costs, it has not yet performed a cost estimate for LCS. On the LCS  program, the Flight 0 ships are considered to be predecessors to the  Milestone B decision. The Milestone B decision will authorize the first  Flight 1 ship. The Navy considers this to be the point at which an  independent estimate is required. An independent cost estimate is thus  planned for authorization of Flight 1 in January of 2007. While DOD would  not have been prevented from conducting an independent estimate for  Flight 0, given the short time in which the Navy solicited and selected  designs for Flight 0, it is unclear whether there was enough time to do so.
Other mission package costs are not covered by LCS program cost  analyses but could have an effect on the broader Navy budget. For  example, mission package costs do not include procurement costs for the  MH-60R and MH-60S helicopters utilized in LCS operations. The Navy  estimates that the procurement cost for each MH-60R is about $36 million  and the cost for each MH-60S is about $23 million. The number of  helicopters acquired by the Navy is determined by the helicopter concept  of operations, which has not yet been modified to reflect the deployment  of LCS. Given the reliance of LCS mission packages on these platforms,  costs for these systems, or number needed for operations, could increase.
The developmental nature of the mission package technologies may affect  more than the procurement, or recurring, costs of LCS. Development and  integration of technologies on many of the mission package systems is not  complete. Testing for these systems will continue, in some cases, up to the  delivery date of the mission packages. Should these tests not go as  planned, or if more time and money is needed for integration and  demonstration, development costs could rise. Since the development of  mission package systems is only partially funded by LCS, the costs for  continued development could spread to other programs. Alternately, the  decision maybe made to reduce the quantities of certain technologies  aboard LCS, as was the case with the Advanced Deployable system. Some  seaframe technologies remain developmental as well, such as the launch  and recovery systems. Unlike the mission packages, the LCS program  office would assume any increase in development funding that occurs on  seaframe systems.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Navy has embarked on a plan to construct four Flight 0 ships,  complete development and procure multiple mission packages,  experiment with the new ships, and commit to the construction of follow- on ships in a span of only four years. The Flight 1 and follow-on designs  form the basis of a class of ships that may eventually total more than 50. At  this point, we see three risks that could affect the success of the program.
First, because the Navy focused the surface warfare threat and  requirements analysis exclusively on small boat swarms, the risks posed  by larger surface threats when the LCS operates independently from  nearby supporting U.S. forces have not yet been assessed.
Second is the availability of the MH-60 helicopter in light of its criticality to  all LCS missions. Experimentation with the MH-60 will provide key  information on mission performance, operations issues such as manning,  and technology maturity. Thus, it is essential that the helicopters,  equipped with the systems needed for LCS missions, be available for  testing on the Flight 0 ships. In addition, if the quantities of MH-60s are not  available for the Flight 1 ships the Navy’s ability to deploy these ships  operationally as intended, would be reduced. Making the MH-60s available  requires meeting a number of challenges, including developing  requirements, force structure planning, budgeting, delivering, and training  air crews.
Third, the Navy intends to begin considering multiple designs for Flight 1  in fiscal year 2006 and to begin detailed design and construction of a single  design in fiscal year 2008. By 2007, only one Flight 0 ship will be delivered,  and only one mission package will be available, providing there are no  delays for either ship or mission package. While maturing technologies  and evaluating potential designs for Flight 1 while Flight 0 ships are being  delivered could be beneficial, committing to a single design for follow-on  ships before gaining the benefit of tests and experiments with the two  Flight 0 designs increases the risk to the Flight 1 design. The current  schedule allows about 12 months for the Navy to conduct operational  experiments to evaluate the first Flight 0 seaframe design; the mine  warfare mission package; and the doctrinal, logistics, technology maturity  and other operational challenges the Navy has identified before  committing to production of follow-on ships. The Navy’s schedule does  not allow for operational experimentation with the other three ships or the  antisubmarine or surface warfare mission packages before Flight 1 is  begun. Setbacks in any of these areas further increases the risk that the  Navy will not be able to sufficiently evaluate and experiment with Flight 0  ships and incorporate lessons learned into the design and construction of  the Flight 1 ships.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help the Navy assess and mitigate operational, force structure, and  technology risks associated with LCS, we are making the following three  recommendations:
To determine whether surface threats larger than small boats do  pose risks to the LCS when operating independently and to  mitigate any risks the Navy subsequently identifies, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to  conduct an analysis of the effect of a surface threat larger than  small boats on LCS operations and the impact on other naval  forces in support of those operations.
To address challenges associated with integrating the MH-60  helicopter into LCS operations, we recommend that the Secretary  of Defense direct that the Navy include in its ongoing evaluation of  helicopter integration with LCS (1) evaluation of the numbers and  budget impact of helicopters required to support future LCS ships  and (2) examination of how to address manning, technology, and  logistical challenges of operating the helicopters from LCS.
To allow the Navy to take full advantage of the technical and  operational maturation of the Flight 0 ships before committing to  the much larger purchases of follow-on ships, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense direct the Navy to revise its acquisition  strategy to ensure that it has sufficiently experimented with both  Flight 0 ship designs, captured lessons learned from Flight 0  operations with more than one of the mission packages, and  mitigated operational and technology risks before selection of the  design for an award of a detailed design and construction contract  for Flight 1 is authorized.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Review
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with  the intent of our recommendations. DOD discussed steps it is currently  taking as well as actions it plans to take to address these  recommendations.
In response to our recommendation that the Navy analyze the effect of a  larger surface threat on LCS operations, DOD indicated that, in addition to  efforts it already has underway to analyze elements of the threats facing  LCS, the Navy will assess the impact of larger surface threats on LCS as  part of the capabilities development process for Flight 1. Using the  analyses required in this process should help the Navy clarify the extent to  which a larger surface threat poses a risk to LCS operations.
In commenting on its plans to address helicopters’ needs and challenges,  DOD indicated that it is currently assessing the helicopter force structure  including both manned and unmanned aerial vehicles. While this may  clarify the Navy’s helicopter force structure requirements, we continue to  believe that due to the importance of helicopters to LCS operations and  the numbers of LCS the Navy plans to acquire, the Navy should also  analyze the budgetary impact of potential helicopter force structure  changes.
In response to our recommendation that the Navy revise its acquisition  strategy to ensure time to experiment with Flight 0 designs, DOD stated  that, before award of Flight 1 contracts, it will review the acquisition  strategy to ensure the strategy adequately provides for experimentation,  lessons learned, and risk mitigation. DOD stated that it is balancing the  acquisition risks with the risk of delaying closure of warfighting gaps that  LCS will fill. It also stated that mission package systems will potentially be  spiraled with a different cycle time than the historically more stable hull  and systems that comprise the seaframe. We believe the separation of  development spirals for the mission packages and seaframe has merit.  However, decisions leading to the award of a detailed design contract for  the Flight 1 seaframe must go beyond technology risks. Because the Navy  plans to begin design of the Flight 1 seaframe with a new development  effort and competition, it is important to gain experience with the two  Flight 0 seaframe designs that are being acquired so that the benefits of  this experimentation can be realized in the design and development of a  new seaframe. Experimentation with Flight 0 in terms of basic mission  performance, swapping mission packages, actual manning demands, and  operations with multiple LCS are all factors that could have a significant  effect on the Flight 1 ship design.
DOD also noted that its plan for acquiring LCS provides for multiple  flights. Under this strategy, DOD would have more opportunities beyond  the fiscal year 2008 Flight 1 decision to upgrade mission packages and  seaframes as the 50 or so remaining ships are bought.  We have made  changes in the report to reflect this strategy.  However, we do not believe  it lessens the value of incorporating experience from Flight 0 operations  into the design for Flight 1.
DOD’s written comments are included in their entirety in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy. We  will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the  report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact Paul Francis at (202) 512-2811; or Karen Zuckerstein, Assistant  Director, at (202) 512-6785. Key staff members that contributed to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the basis of the LCS requirements and the concept of operations,  we obtained and analyzed Navy wargames and operational plans,  requirements documents, and other sources used by the Navy to identify  capability gaps in the littoral waters. We conducted our own analysis of all  critical concept, requirements, and acquisition documents required as part  of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development system to determine  the extent to which the Navy (1) developed specific requirements to  address capability gaps and examined materiel and nonmateriel solutions  to meet those requirements; and (2) developed a concept of operations  that addressed each of the identified requirements as well as critical  doctrinal, logistical, and operational considerations. We compared the  sources of the requirements for the LCS, such as analyses of military  operations based on specific scenarios and threat assessments to the final  validated requirements document (Capabilities Development Document),  and highlighted each capability gap. We identified the capability gaps in  the Navy’s functional analysis for each of the warfare missions—mine  warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare. This included  looking at the Navy’s standards that were used to measure how well the  current and programmed joint forces could mitigate the warfare threats in  the littorals during a major combat operation. We then reviewed the  materiel and nonmateriel solutions identified by the Navy that could be  used as alternative solutions for mitigating the gaps. We also conducted a  comparative analysis of the Initial Capabilities Document with the  validated requirements in the Capabilities Development Document to  highlight additional gaps. We also compared the requirements, as  developed in the CDD and the Preliminary Design Interim Requirements  Document to the LCS operating concepts and capabilities, as developed in  the Navy’s two versions of the concept of operations.
To assess the Navy’s progress in defining the concept of operations we  used a gap analysis, similar to the one used for the requirements, to trace  the extent to which the concept of operations were developed. GAO  compared the LCS concept of operations to the ship’s requirements  (specifically the Capabilities Development Document) and the identified  capability gaps to determine if the LCS concept of operations fulfilled the  requirements. We also discussed with Navy officials the extent to which  they included doctrinal and operational challenges and the Navy’s  assessment of where the risks are stemming from these challenges and  their mitigation efforts.
To assess the progress of technology development in LCS mission  packages, we reviewed the basis of the Navy’s estimation of technology  readiness and plans to bring these technologies to full maturity. As a part  of this assessment we analyzed the Technology Readiness Assessment  performed by the Navy and reviewed development and testing plans  developed by the program offices. As a measure of technology maturity we  utilized Technology Readiness Levels, the same metric used by the Navy in  the Technology Readiness Assessment. The standard we used for  assessing technology maturity is the demonstration of form, fit, and  function in an operational environment. This standard is based on defined  technology readiness levels developed by the National Aeronautic and  Space Administration and adopted by DOD.
Our analysis was supplemented by interviews with officials from the LCS  program offices and other Navy programs supporting the mission  packages. Our audit focused on technologies for Flight 0, as technologies  for Flight 1 have not been selected.
To assess the basis of LCS costs we reviewed the cost analyses prepared  by the contractors and the LCS program office. We analyzed the basis of  costs for design and construction of the seaframe as well as the  development and procurement costs of mission packages for Flight 0. Our  analysis was supplemented by interviews with the program offices and  contractors involved in LCS. Costs for operation of Flight 0 and  procurement of Flight 1 have not been estimated. Details of the costs and  technologies for the seaframe are sensitive, due to the ongoing  competition. We therefore do not discuss these at length.
To address our objectives, we visited and interviewed officials from Navy  headquarters’ surface warfare requirements office; LCS program offices;  mine warfare program office; the MH-60 program office; the Unmanned  Aerial Vehicles program office; the Naval Surface Warfare Center,  Dahlgren Division; the Naval Undersea Warfare Center; the Naval War  College; and the Navy Warfare Development Command. We also  interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Program  Analysis and Evaluation division, General Dynamics, and Lockheed  Martin.
We conducted our review from July 2004 through December 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Richard G. Payne, Jerome A. Brown,   J. Kristopher Keener, Joseph W. Kirschbaum, James C. Lawson,   Jodie M. Sandel, Angela D. Thomas, Roderick W. Rodgers, and   Bethann E. Ritter made key contributions to this report.