Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems
Published: 2002-09-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Over a year has passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, realigned national priorities. Although most of the early attention following the attacks focused on airport security, emphasis on the other modes of transportation has since grown. Addressing transit safety and security concerns is complicated by the nature and scope of transit in the United States. About 6,000 agencies provide transit services, and each workday, 14 million Americans ride on some form of transit. Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems secure. Certain characteristics make them both vulnerable and difficult to secure. The high ridership of some transit agencies makes them attractive targets for terrorists but also makes certain security measures, like metal detectors, impractical. Another challenge is funding identified security enhancements. Despite the formidable challenges in securing transit systems, transit agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of their systems. Transit agencies visited by GAO were implementing strategies to improve both safety and security prior to September 11; however, the events of September 11 elevated the importance of security-related activity. Many agencies assessed vulnerabilities, provided additional training on emergency preparedness, revised emergency plans, and conducted multiple emergency drills. The federal government's role in transit security is evolving. Although the Federal Transit Administration has limited authority to oversee and regulate transit security, it launched a multipart security initiative and increased funding for its safety and security activities since September 11. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation and gave it responsibility for transit security; however, TSA has yet to assume full responsibility for the security of any transportation mode other than aviation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today about mass transit  safety and security in the United States. Over a year has passed since the  terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, realigned our national priorities.  While most of the early attention following the September 11 terrorist  attacks focused on airport security, emphasis on the other modes of  transportation has since grown. Moreover, terrorist events around the  world have shown that mass transit systems, like other modes of  transportation, are often targets of attack. For example, roughly one-third  of terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation systems, and transit  systems are the mode most commonly attacked.  In May 2002, the  Department of Transportation issued a terrorist threat advisory to the  transit industry indicating that subway systems were a possible target and  that the industry should remain in a heightened state of alert.
Addressing transit safety and security concerns is complicated by the  nature and scope of transit in the United States. About 6,000 agencies  provide transit services, such as buses, subways, ferries, and light rail in the  United States. Each workday, about 14 million Americans ride on some  form of transit. Because the effectiveness of transit systems depends on  their accessibility, security measures common in aviation are difficult to  apply. Furthermore, government agencies at the federal, state, and local  levels and private companies share responsibility for transit safety and  security and are involved in making transit decisions.
As you requested, my testimony today focuses on (1) challenges in securing  mass transit systems, (2) steps transit agencies have taken to enhance  safety and security, and (3) the federal role in transit safety and security.  My comments are based on our ongoing work for the full committee and a  body of work GAO has undertaken since September 11, 2001, on homeland  security and combating terrorism.  For our ongoing work, we conducted 10 site visits at transit agencies across the country and surveyed about 200  transit agencies, among other things.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 2000, mass transit systems provided over 9 billion passenger trips and  employed about 350,000 people. The nation’s transit systems include all  multiple-occupancy-vehicle services designed to transport customers on  local and regional routes, such as bus, trolley bus, commuter rail, vanpool,  ferry boat, and light rail services, and are valued at a trillion dollars. As  figure 1 shows, buses are the most utilized form of transit, providing almost  two-thirds of all passenger trips.
A number of organizations are involved in the delivery of transit services in  the United States including federal, state, and local governments and the  private sector. In particular:  FTA provides financial assistance to transit agencies to plan and  develop new transit systems and operate, maintain, and improve  existing systems. FTA is responsible for ensuring that the recipients of  federal transit funds follow federal mandates and administrative  requirements. FTA’s Office of Safety and Security is the agency’s focal  point for transit safety (freedom from unintentional danger) and  security (freedom from intentional danger).
State and local governments also provide a significant amount of  funding for transit services. As figure 2 shows, state and local  governments provide funding for over 40 percent of transit agencies’  operating expenses and about a quarter of their capital expenses.  According to statute, states are also responsible for establishing State  Safety Oversight Agencies to oversee the safety of rail systems of transit  agencies.
Transit agencies, which can be public or private entities, are  responsible for administering and managing transit activities and  services. Transit agencies can directly operate transit service or contract  for all or part of the total transit service provided. About 6,000 agencies  provide transit services in the United States, and the majority of these  agencies provide more than one mode of service. Although all levels of  government are involved in transit security, the primary responsibility  for securing transit systems rests with the transit agencies.
Legislation also affects transit services, including transit safety and  security. In particular, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century  (TEA-21) is the legislation authorizing current federal transit programs.   TEA-21 authorized about $36 billion for federal transit programs from fiscal  year 1998 through fiscal year 2003. The largest federal transit program is  the urbanized area formula grant program, which accounts for almost one- half of TEA-21’s total authorizations for all transit programs. The urbanized  area formula grant program provides federal funds to urbanized areas  (jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more) for transit capital  investments, operating expenses, and transportation-related planning.
However, TEA-21 prohibits transit agencies that serve urbanized areas with  populations of 200,000 or more from using urbanized area formula funding  for operating expenses. Recipients of urbanized area formula funds are  also required to spend at least 1 percent of these funds to improve the  security of existing or planned mass transportation systems unless the  transit agencies certify that such expenses are unnecessary.  Additionally,  the Aviation and Transportation Security Act created TSA within the  Department of Transportation and gave it responsibility for the security of  all transportation modes, including transit.  The act also assigns regulatory  authority to TSA for all transportation modes.
Throughout the world, public surface transportation systems have been the  target of terrorist attacks. For example, the first large-scale terrorist use of  a chemical weapon occurred in 1995 on the Toyko subway system. In this  attack, a terrorist group released sarin gas on a subway train, killing 11  people and injuring about 5,500.  In addition, according to the Mineta  Transportation Institute, surface transportation systems were the target of  more than 195 terrorist attacks from 1997 through 2000. As figure 3  illustrates, buses were the most common target during this period.
section_title: Transit Agencies Face Challenges in Making Transit Systems Secure
paragraphs: Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems secure.  Certain characteristics of transit systems, such as their high ridership and  open access, make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure.   The high costs of transit security improvements, coupled with tight  budgets, competing needs, and a restriction on using federal funds for  operating expenses in large urban areas also creates a challenge for transit  agencies. Moreover, because of the numerous stakeholders involved in  transit security, effective coordination can become a problem.
subsections: section_title: Characteristics of Transit Systems Pose Security Challenges
paragraphs: According to transit officials and transit security experts, certain  characteristics of transit systems make them inherently vulnerable to  terrorist attacks and difficult to secure. By design, transit systems are open  (i.e., have multiple access points and, in some cases, no barriers) so that  they can move large numbers of people quickly. However, the openness of  transit systems can leave them vulnerable because transit officials cannot  monitor or control who enters or leaves the systems. In addition, other  characteristics of some transit systems—high ridership, expensive  infrastructure, economic importance, and location (e.g., large metropolitan  areas or tourist destinations)—also make them potentially attractive  targets. Moreover, some of these characteristics make transit agencies  difficult to secure. For example, the number of riders that pass through a  transit system—especially during peak hours—make some security  measures, such as metal detectors, impractical. In addition, the multiple  access points along extended routes make the costs of securing each  location prohibitive.
Further complicating transit security is the need for transit agencies to  balance security concerns with accessibility, convenience, and  affordability. Because transit riders often could choose another means of  transportation, such as a personal automobile, transit agencies must  compete for riders. To remain competitive, transit agencies must offer  convenient, inexpensive, and quality service. Therefore, security measures  that limit accessibility, cause delays, increase fares, or otherwise cause  inconvenience could push people away from transit and back into their  cars. Our discussions with transit agency officials and our preliminary  survey results indicate that striking the right balance between security and  these other needs is difficult. For example, a number of survey respondents  reported that balancing riders’ need for accessibility with security  measures is a significant barrier to making their transit systems as safe and  secure as possible.
section_title: Funding Security Improvements Is A Key Challenge
paragraphs: Funding security improvements is a key challenge for transit agencies. Our  preliminary survey results and our interviews with transit agency officials  indicate that insufficient funding is the most significant challenge in  making their systems as safe and secure as possible. Moreover, our  preliminary survey results indicate that the most common reason for not  addressing items identified as needing attention through safety and  security assessments is insufficient funding. Factors contributing to  funding challenges include high security costs, tight budgets, competing  budget priorities, and a prohibition on transit agencies in large urban areas  from using FTA funds for operating expenses.
Transit security investments can be quite expensive. While some security  improvements are inexpensive, such as removing trashcans from subway  platforms, most require substantial funding. For example, one transit  agency estimated that an intrusion alarm and closed circuit television  system for only one of its portals would cost approximately $250,000.  According to our preliminary survey results, the top three safety and  security funding priorities of transit agencies are enhanced communication  systems, surveillance equipment, and additional training. The transit  agencies we visited have identified or are identifying needed security  improvements, such as upgraded communication systems, additional  fencing, surveillance equipment, and redundant or mobile command  centers. Of the 10 transit agencies we visited, 8 agencies had developed  cost estimates of their identified improvements. The total estimated cost of  the identified security improvements at the 8 agencies is about $711  million.  The total cost of all needed transit security improvements  throughout the country is unknown; however, given the scope of the  nation’s transit systems and the cost estimate for 8 agencies, it could easily  amount to billions of dollars.
Transit agency officials told us that they are facing tight budgets, which  make it more difficult for these agencies to pay for expensive security  improvements.  According to most of the agencies we visited, the  weakened economy has negatively affected their revenue base by lowering  both ridership and/or tax revenues dedicated to transit. In particular, 8  agencies we visited reported that ridership has dropped this year, primarily  because of the slow economy. The decreased ridership levels have lowered  fare box revenue. In addition, state and local sales taxes, which provide  revenue for many transit agencies, have declined with the stalled economy  and reduced the transit agencies’ revenue, according to a number of transit  agency officials.
Other competing funding needs also present a challenge for transit  agencies. Given the tight budget environment, transit agencies must make  difficult trade-offs between security investments and other needs, such as  service expansion and equipment upgrades. For example, an official at one  transit agency stated that budget shortfalls and expenditures for security  improvements have delayed some needed capital projects and reduced the  budgets for all departments—except the safety and security budget.  Similarly, an official at another agency reported that his agency is funding  security improvements with money that was budgeted for nonsecurity  projects. According to our preliminary survey results, a number of agencies  view balancing safety and security priorities against other priorities as a  significant challenge in making their systems as safe and secure as  possible.
Another reported challenge in funding some security improvements is a  statutory limitation on using FTA funds for operating expenses.  Specifically, TEA-21 prohibits transit agencies in large urbanized areas  from using urbanized formula funding for most operating expenses. This  prohibition limits many agencies’ ability to use FTA funds for some  security-related expenses, such as salaries for additional security  personnel and training. For example, officials from a number of agencies  said this prohibition was a significant barrier to funding needed security  improvements. However, several agency officials noted that the elimination  of this prohibition would be helpful only if additional funding were also  provided.
section_title: Coordination Is Key to Transit Security but Presents Challenges
paragraphs: Coordination among all stakeholders is integral to enhancing transit  security, but it can create additional challenges. Numerous stakeholders  are involved in decisions that affect transit security, such as decisions  about its operations and funding. For example, states are responsible for  establishing agencies that oversee the safety of transit systems with rail. As  we have noted in previous reports, coordination among all levels of  government and the private sector is critical to homeland security efforts,  and a lack of coordination can create problems, such as duplication of  effort.  In addition, the national strategy for homeland security recognizes  the challenges associated with intergovernmental coordination but  emphasizes the need for such coordination.  According to our discussions  with transit agency and local government officials and our preliminary  survey results, coordination on emergency planning is generally taking  place between transit agencies and local governments despite some  challenges, but appears to be minimal between transit agencies and  governments at the regional, state, and federal levels.
According to our site visits and preliminary survey results, transit agencies  and local governments are coordinating their emergency planning efforts.
Our preliminary survey results indicate that the majority of transit agencies  have directly coordinated emergency planning at the local level and believe  they have been sufficiently integrated into their local government’s  emergency plans. Likewise, 9 of the 10 transit agencies we visited said they  are well integrated into their local government’s emergency planning.  Officials from these 9 transit agencies noted that their agencies are  included in their local government’s emergency planning activities, such as  emergency drills, tabletop exercises, planning meetings, and task forces.  For example, when Minneapolis held an emergency drill that simulated a  biological attack on the city, Metro Transit transported “victims” to  hospitals, even taking some victims to out-of-state hospitals because the  local hospitals were at capacity.  Transit agency and local government  officials said their past experiences with weather emergencies and/or  special events, like Super Bowl celebrations, helped establish their good  working relationships. According to the officials, these past experiences  have demonstrated the types of support services transit agencies can  provide during emergencies, including evacuation, triage centers, victim  transport and shelters. However, officials said these working relationships  are usually informal and undocumented. For example, the majority of the  transit agencies we visited did not have a memorandum of understanding  with their local government.
Although transit agencies are generally active participants in emergency  planning at the local level, they nevertheless face some coordination  challenges.  According to our preliminary survey results, among the most  significant challenges in coordinating emergency planning at the local level  are insufficient funding, limited awareness of terrorist threats to transit,  lack of coordination among various local agencies, and lack of time.   Similar concerns were often raised during our meetings with transit  agencies. For example, one agency official noted that his agency operates  in over 40 jurisdictions and that coordinating with all of these local  governments is very time consuming.
In contrast to coordination at the local level, coordination among transit  agencies and governments at the regional, state, and federal levels on  emergency planning appears to be minimal.  Most of the transit agencies  we visited reported limited coordination with governments outside of their  local governments. In addition, our preliminary survey results indicate that  the majority of survey respondents have not directly coordinated  emergency planning at the regional, state, or federal levels. As we have  reported in past reports on homeland security, lack of coordination among  stakeholders could result in communication problems, duplication, and  fragmentation. Without coordination, transit agencies and governments  also miss opportunities to systematically identify the unique resources and  capacities that each can provide in emergencies.
section_title: Transit Agencies Are Taking Steps to Secure Systems
paragraphs: Prior to September 11, all 10 transit agencies we visited were implementing  measures to enhance transit safety and security, such as revising  emergency plans and training employees on emergency preparedness.  Transit agency officials often noted that the 1995 sarin gas attack on the  Tokyo subway system or their agency’s experiences during natural  disasters had served as catalysts for focusing on safety and security.  Although safety and security were both priorities, the events of September  11 elevated the importance of security.
Since September 11, transit agencies we visited have taken steps to further  improve transit safety and security. All of the transit agencies we visited  have been operating at a heightened state of security since last September.  According to officials from the agencies we visited, their agencies have also  initiated a number of safety and security measures, including:  Vulnerability assessments:  External or internal vulnerability  assessments have been conducted. The purpose of these assessments is  to identify potential vulnerabilities and corrective actions or needed  security improvements. Improved communication systems, more  controlled access to facilities, and additional training are some of the  needs identified in the assessments of the agencies we visited.
Fast-track security improvements:  Security improvements planned  or in process prior to September 11, were moved up on the agenda or  finished early. For example, one agency, which was putting alarms on  access points to the subway ventilation system before September 11,  completed the process early.
Immediate, inexpensive security improvements:  Agencies  implemented immediate and inexpensive security improvements.  Removing bike lockers and trashcans from populated areas, locking  underground restrooms, and closing bus doors at night are among the  immediate and inexpensive improvements that agencies have made.
Intensified security presence:  Many agencies have increased the  number of police or security personnel who patrol their systems.  Surveillance equipment, alarms, or security personnel have been placed  at access points to subway tunnels, bus yards, and other nonpublic  places. Employees have also been required to wear identification cards  or bright colored vests for increased visibility.
Increased emergency drills:  Many agencies have increased the  frequency of emergency drilling—both full-scale drills and tabletop  exercises. For example, one agency we visited has conducted four drills  since September 11. Agencies stressed the importance of emergency  drilling as a means to test their emergency plans, identify problems, and  develop corrective actions.
Revised emergency plans:  Agencies reviewed their emergency plans  to determine what changes, if any, needed to be made. Some agencies  updated their emergency plans to include terrorist incident protocols  and response plans.
Additional training:  Agencies participated in and conducted  additional training on antiterrorism. For example, all 10 of the agencies  we visited had participated in the antiterrorism seminars sponsored by  FTA or the American Public Transportation Association. In addition, one  agency’s police force has received training on al Queda attack behavior  patterns.
section_title: Federal Government’s Role in Transit Security Is Evolving
paragraphs: The federal government’s role in transit security is evolving. For example,  FTA has expanded its role in transit security since September 11 by  launching a multipart security initiative and increasing the funding for its  safety and security activities. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation  Security Act gave TSA responsibility for transit security; however, TSA’s  role and responsibilities have not yet been defined. Although the transit  agencies we visited were generally pleased with FTA’s assistance since  September 11, they would like the federal government to provide more  assistance, including providing more information and funding. As the  federal government’s role in transit safety and security initiatives evolves,  policymakers will need to address several issues, including (1) federal  funding criteria, (2) the roles of stakeholders in funding transit security,  and (3) the appropriate federal policy instrument to deliver assistance  deemed appropriate.
subsections: section_title: FTA Has Limited Authority but Has Initiated a Variety of Transit Safety and Security Activities
paragraphs: FTA has limited authority to regulate and oversee safety and security at  transit agencies. According to statute, FTA cannot regulate safety and  security operations at transit agencies.  However, FTA may institute  nonregulatory safety and security activities, including safety- and security- related training, research, and demonstration projects. In addition, FTA  may promote safety and security through its grant-making authority.  Specifically, FTA or legislation may stipulate conditions of grants, such as  certain safety and security requirements, and FTA may withhold funds for  noncompliance with the conditions of a grant. For example, transit  agencies must spend 1 percent of their urbanized area formula funds on  security improvements. FTA is to verify that agencies comply with this  requirement and may withhold funding if it finds agencies that are not in  compliance. FTA officials stated that FTA’s authority to sponsor  nonregulatory activities and to stipulate the conditions of grants is  sufficient for the safety and security work they need to accomplish.
Despite its limited authority, FTA established a number of safety and  security programs prior to September 11. For example, FTA offered  voluntary security assessments, sponsored training at the Transportation  Safety Institute, issued written guidelines to improve emergency response  planning, and partially funded a chemical detection demonstration project,  called PROTECT, at the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.  Although FTA maintained both safety and security programs prior to  September 11, its primary focus was on the safety rather than the security  programs. This focus changed after September 11.
In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, FTA launched a  multipart transit security initiative last fall. The initiative includes security  assessments, planning, drilling, training, and technology:    Security assessments:  FTA deployed teams to assess security at 36  transit agencies. FTA chose the 36 agencies on the basis of their  ridership, vulnerability, and the potential consequences of an attack.  Each assessment is to include a threat and vulnerability analysis, an  evaluation of security and emergency plans, and a focused review of the  agency’s unified command structure with external emergency  responders. FTA plans to extend the assessments to additional agencies  after the first 36 assessments are complete.
Emergency response planning: FTA is providing technical assistance  to the top 60 transit agencies on security and emergency plans, and  emergency response drills.
Emergency response drills:  FTA offered transit agencies grants (up  to $50,000) for organizing and conducting emergency preparedness  drills. According to FTA officials, FTA has awarded $3.4 million to over  80 transit agencies through these grants.
Security training:  FTA is offering free emergency preparedness and  security training to transit agencies through its Connecting  Communities Forums. These forums are being offered throughout the  country and are designed to bring together small and medium-sized  transit agency personnel with their local emergency responders, like  local fire and police. The purpose of the forums is to give the  participants a better understanding of the roles played by transit  agencies and emergency responders and allow the participants to begin  developing the plans, tools, and relationships necessary to respond  effectively in an emergency. In addition, FTA is working with the  National Transit Institute and the Transportation Safety Institute to  expand safety and security course offerings. For example, the National  Transit Institute is now offering a security awareness course to front  line transit employees free of charge.
Research and development:  FTA increased the funding of its safety-  and security-related technology research and has accelerated the  deployment of the PROTECT system.
FTA also increased the funding of its safety and security activities after the  attacks of September 11. For example, FTA reprioritized fiscal year 2002  funds from its other programs to its safety and security activities after the  attacks. In addition, the Department of Defense and Emergency  Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2002 (DOD supplemental) provided  $23.5 million for (1) the replacement of buses and kiosks in New York  destroyed in the terrorist attacks, (2) emergency response drills, (3)  security training for transit operators, and (4) the acceleration and  expansion of chemical detection technology for transit stations.  Specifically, $4.8 million of the DOD supplemental was provided for new  buses and kiosks in New York and $4 million was allocated to the  continued development of chemical detection technology. FTA used the  remainder of the DOD supplemental to fund its multipart security initiative.  Finally, FTA sought additional funding for its safety and security activities  in its fiscal year 2003 budget request. As figure 4 shows, if FTA receives the  amount of funding it requested for fiscal year 2003, its funding of safety and  security activities will have increased over 100 percent from fiscal year  2000 through fiscal year 2003—increasing from $8.1 million to $17.9  million.
section_title: TSA’s Role In Transit Security Has Yet to Be Defined
paragraphs: TSA is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation, including  transit. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act created TSA within  the Department of Transportation and defined its primary responsibility as  ensuring security in all modes of transportation. The act also provides TSA  regulatory authority over transit security, which FTA currently does not  possess. Since its creation last November, TSA has primarily focused on  improving aviation security in order to meet the deadlines established in  the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.  As a result, TSA has not yet  assumed full responsibility for security in other modes of transportation,  such as transit.
TSA’s role in transit security is evolving. For transit security, the Aviation  and Transportation Security Act does not specify TSA’s role and  responsibilities as it did for aviation security. For example, the act does not  set deadlines for TSA to implement certain transit security requirements.  Similarly, although the President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security  states that the federal government will work with the private sector to  upgrade security in all modes of transportation and utilize existing modal  relationships and systems to implement unified, national standards for  transportation security, it does not outline TSA’s or the proposed  Department of Homeland Security’s role in transit security. The strategy  only states that TSA is responsible for securing our nation’s transportation  systems and that under the President’s proposal TSA will become part of  the Department of Homeland Security.
To help define its role in transit security, TSA is currently working with FTA  to develop a memorandum of understanding. The memorandum of  understanding will define the roles and responsibilities of each agency in  transit security. TSA and FTA officials expect the memorandum of  understanding to be completed by mid-September. According to a TSA  official, the memorandum of understanding between FTA and TSA would  likely remain intact if TSA moves to the proposed Department of Homeland  Security, although the final decision would be up to the new Secretary of  Homeland Security.
section_title: Transit Agencies Said the Federal Government Should Provide More Information and Assistance
paragraphs: The transit agencies we visited were generally pleased with the assistance  FTA has provided since September 11. However, officials from these  agencies said the federal government could do more in helping them secure  their transit systems. They suggested, for example, that the federal  government provide additional information on a number of issues; help  with security clearances; supply increased funding for security  improvements; and invest more in security-related research and  development.
Officials from the transit agencies we visited reported a need for the federal  government to disseminate additional information on topics ranging from  available federal grants to appropriate security levels for individual  agencies. A recurring theme was for the federal government to establish a  clearinghouse or similar mechanism that maintains and disseminates the  identified information. Specifically, officials expressed a need for the  federal government to provide additional information on the following  topics:  Federal grants:  Officials from several transit agencies stated that  information on available grants that can be used for transit safety and  security improvements would be useful, noting that it is challenging and  time consuming to locate these grants. For example, an assistant  general manager stated that she spends too much of her time searching  the internet for grants available for transit.
Cutting-edge technology:  Officials from a number of agencies said  the federal government should provide information on the latest  security technologies. For example, officials from one agency said this  is needed because they have been bombarded by vendors selling  security technology since September 11; however, the officials said they  were unsure about the quality of the products, whether the products  were needed, or whether the products would be outdated next year.
Best practices: A number of officials said that information on transit  security best practices would be beneficial. According to FTA officials,  the assessments of the 36 transit agencies are helping them identify best  practices and FTA plans to develop a mechanism to share such practices  with the transit industry.
Intelligence: Transit officials from a number of agencies stated that the  federal government should provide additional information on threats to  their transit agencies or cities. Officials also commented that “real time”  information on attacks against other transit agencies would be useful.   According to an FTA official, FTA is currently developing a system to  share timely intelligence with transit agencies.
Level of security:  Transit officials from a few agencies told us that it  would be helpful for the federal government to provide information on  the appropriate level of security for their agencies. For example,  officials at one agency questioned whether they needed to continue to  post guards—24 hours a day, 7 days a week—at the entrance and exit of  their tunnel, a practice instituted when the Department of  Transportation issued a threat advisory to the transit industry in May  2002. Similarly, our preliminary survey results indicate that uncertainty  about what level of security is appropriate is a challenge for transit  agencies.
Decontamination practices:  Several transit agency officials stated  that they need information on decontamination protocols. For example,  one agency official noted that information is needed on how to  determine if the system is “clean” after a chemical or biological attack.
A number of transit officials also expressed a need for the federal  government to help them obtain security clearances. As we have reported  in our previous work on homeland security, the lack of security clearances  among state and local officials has been reported as a barrier to obtaining  critical intelligence information. The inability to receive any classified  threat information could hamper agencies’ emergency preparedness  capability. This was illustrated by an incident at one of the transit agencies  we visited. In this incident, a bomb threat was made against a major  building in the transit agency’s city. However, because the transit agency  officials did not have necessary security clearances, the FBI did not inform  them of this threat until about 40 minutes before the agency was requested  to help evacuate the building. According to transit agency officials, the lack  of advance notice negatively affected their agency’s ability to respond.  Fortunately, in this case, the threat was not carried out. Proposed  legislation (H.R 3483) provides that the Attorney General expeditiously  grant security clearances to governors who apply for them and to state and  local officials who participate in federal counterterrorism working groups  or regional task forces.
Officials from the transit agencies we visited also said additional federal  funding is needed. As noted earlier, many of the transit agencies we visited  are experiencing tightened budget environments, which makes it more  difficult to fund safety and security needs. Moreover, according to our  preliminary survey results, insufficient funding is the most significant  obstacle agencies face in trying to make their systems more safe and  secure. Congress has already made additional funding available for transit  security purposes—about $24 million through the fiscal year 2002 DOD  supplemental. The majority of this amount—about $18 million—funded  FTA’s multipart security initiative.
On a similar note, officials from several of the agencies we met with said  the federal government should be investing more in security-related  research and development. Agency officials noted that individual transit  agencies do not have the resources to devote to research and development.  Moreover, the officials said this is an appropriate role for the federal  government, since the products of research and development endeavors  will likely benefit the entire transit community, not just individual agencies.  Currently, FTA’s Office of Technology is the agency’s focal point for  research and development and is responsible for identifying and supporting  technological innovations, including safety and security innovations.  According to FTA documents, the Office of Technology’s obligations for  safety and security technologies have increased from $680,000 in fiscal year  2000 to an estimated $1.1 million in fiscal year 2002. FTA’s fiscal year 2003  budget request includes about $4.2 million for the Office of Technology’s  safety and security technologies, representing a 272 percent increase from  fiscal year 2002.
section_title: Critical Decisions Remain About Federal Government’s Role in Funding Transit Security Improvements
paragraphs: Important funding decisions for transit safety and security initiatives  remain. As discussed earlier, some transit security enhancements are  expensive, and transit agencies have limited funds to pay for these  improvements. Consequently, the federal government will likely be viewed  as a source of funding for at least some of these improvements. These  improvements join the growing list of security initiatives competing for  federal assistance. In considering the federal government’s role in funding  transit safety and security initiatives, policymakers will need to address  several issues. These issues include developing federal funding criteria,  determining the roles of stakeholders in funding transit security, and  selecting the appropriate federal policy instrument to deliver assistance.
Because requests for federal dollars for transit security improvements may  exceed available resources, criteria for distributing federal funds will also  be needed. The total cost of all the needed transit security improvements  throughout the country is unknown. However, given the size of the nation’s  transit systems, it could easily cost billions of dollars. Transit agency  officials we met with identified a number of possible federal funding  criteria that could be used to distribute federal funding, including ridership  levels, the population of the city the transit agency serves, identified  vulnerabilities of the agency, potential for mass casualties, and assets of the  agency (e.g., tunnels and bridges). In general, the transit agency officials  we spoke to believed the funding criteria should direct federal dollars to  agencies that are most at risk and/or most vulnerable to a terrorist attack.
The identified criteria are in line with using a risk management approach— a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and the criticality  (or relative importance) of assets to better support key decisions linking  resources with prioritized efforts for results. We have advocated using a  risk management approach to guide federal programs and responses to  better prepare against terrorism and other threats and to better direct finite  national resources to areas of highest priority. FTA has not developed  criteria or an approach to distribute federal funds for transit security  improvements.
The roles of stakeholders in funding transit safety and security will also  need to be established. Because all levels of government and the private  sector are concerned about transit safety and security, it may be difficult to  determine who should finance security activities. Given the importance of  transit to our nation’s economic infrastructure, some have argued that the  federal government should pay for protective measures for transit. Transit  officials we spoke with said that the federal government should provide  additional funding for security needs. In contrast, some of the benefits of  transit systems, such as employment and reduced congestion, remain  within the locality or region. In addition, private companies that own  transit systems could directly benefit from security measures because  steps designed to thwart terrorists could also prevent others from stealing  goods or causing other kinds of economic damage.
Another important consideration is the design of policy instruments to  deliver assistance. Our previous work on federal programs suggests that  the choice and design of policy instruments have important consequences  for performance and accountability. The federal government has a variety  of policy tools, including grants, loan guarantees, tax incentives, and  partnerships, to motivate or mandate other lower levels of government or  the private sector to help address security concerns. The choice and design  of policy tools can enhance the government’s capacity to (1) target the  areas of highest risk to better ensure that scarce federal resources address  the most pressing needs, (2) promote shared responsibilities by all parties,  and (3) track and assess progress toward achieving national goals.  Regardless of the tool selected, however, specific safeguards and clear  accountability requirements, such as establishing the terms and conditions  of federal participation, are needed to protect federal interests.
section_title: Observations
paragraphs: In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, securing the nation’s transit system is not a  short-term or easy task. Many challenges must be overcome. FTA and the  transit agencies we visited have made a good start in enhancing transit  security, but more work is needed. Transit agencies’ calls for increased  funding join the list of competing claims for federal dollars and difficult  trade-offs will have to be made to ensure that finite resources are directed  to the areas of highest priority. Next year’s reauthorization of TEA-21  provides an opportunity to examine the federal government’s role in  funding transit security improvements. Because requests for federal  assistance will probably exceed available resources, criteria will be needed  for determining which transit security improvements merit federal funds.  In addition, the federal government could take additional actions to assist  transit agencies as they press forward with their security improvements,  such as providing additional information on security matters and removing  the prohibition on using urbanized area formula funds for operating  expenses. We will continue to monitor these issues for the committee and  expect to issue our final report in January 2003, which may include  recommendations on actions that the federal government and/or the other  transit stakeholders can take to improve transit security.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address our objectives, we visited 10 transit agencies across the country,  including the Bay Area Rapid Transit in Oakland; Municipal Railway in San  Francisco; Metropolitan Transportation Authority in Los Angeles; Regional  Transportation District in Denver; Metro Transit in Minneapolis; Chicago  Transit Authority in Chicago; Capital Metro in Austin; New York City  Transit in New York; Central Florida Regional Transit Authority in Orlando;  and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority in the District of  Columbia. We selected these agencies because they represent different  geographical areas and operate transit systems of different sizes and  modes. During our site visits, we interviewed key officials from the transit  agencies and the respective cities’ government and reviewed the transit  agencies’ emergency plans. In addition, we surveyed a random sample  (about 200) of all transit agencies throughout the nation that are eligible to receive federal urbanized area formula funds to obtain additional  information on safety and security issues. To date, we have a response rate  of over 70 percent. We are currently analyzing our survey results;  therefore,survey data presented in this statement are preliminary.  Additionally, we analyzed FTA budget data, safety and security documents,  and applicable statutes and regulations. We also reviewed research on  terrorism and attended transit security forums sponsored by the American  Public Transportation Association and FTA. Finally, we interviewed FTA,  TSA, and Department of Transportation officials and representatives from  the American Pubic Transportation Association, National Governors  Association, the Mineta Transportation Institute, RAND, the University of  California at Los Angeles, and the Amalgamated Transit Union.
We conducted our review from May 2002 through September 2002 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to  any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have.
For information about this testimony, please contact Peter Guerrero,  Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, on (202) 512-2834. Individuals  making key contributions to this testimony included Karin Bolwahnn,  Nikki Clowers, Michelle Dresben, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Michele Fejfar,  Susan Fleming, David Hooper, Wyatt Hundrup, Hiroshi Ishikawa, and Sara  Ann Moessbauer.
section_title: Related GAO Products
subsections: section_title: Homeland Security
paragraphs: Homeland Security:  Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to  Success.  GAO-02-1013T.  Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002.
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New  Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.
Chemical Safety:  Emergency Response Community Views on the  Adequacy of Federally Required Chemical Information.  GAO-02-799.   Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2002.
Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. GAO-02-957T.  Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002.
Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. GAO-02- 927T. Washington, D.C.:  July 9, 2002.
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnerships Will Be  Critical to Success. GAO-02-899T.  Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2002.
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May  Complicate Priority Setting. GAO-02-893T.  Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, but Implementation  Will be Pivotal to Success.  GAO-02-886T.  Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002.
Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but Uncertainty  Remains. GAO-02-610.  Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and  Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy.  GAO-02- 811T.  Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving National  Goals. GAO-02-627T.  Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector  Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security. GAO- 02-621T.  Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.
Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership Sought.  GAO-02-490T.  Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002.
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and Long- Term National Needs.  GAO-02-160T.  Washington, D.C.: November 7, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness  Efforts. GAO-02-208T.  Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach.   GAO-02- 150T.  Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues.  GAO-01- 1158T.  Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
section_title: Combating Terrorism
paragraphs: Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force  Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports.  GAO-02-955T.   Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a  National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness.  GAO-02-550T.   Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships through a National Preparedness  Strategy.  GAO-02-549T.  Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance  State and Local Preparedness.  GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.: March 25,  2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National Strategy to  Enhance State and Local Preparedness.  GAO-02-547T.  Washington, D.C.:  March 22, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State and  Local Preparedness.  GAO-02-473T.  Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical and  Biological Preparedness.   GAO-01-162T.  Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations. GAO- 01-822.  Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.