Warfighter Support: DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation
Published: 2011-03-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced significant risks of mission failure and loss of life due to rapidly changing enemy threats. In response, the Department of Defense (DOD) established urgent operational needs processes to rapidly develop, modify, and field new capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) technology, and counter-improvised explosive devices (IED) systems. However, GAO, the Defense Science Board, and others have raised concerns about the effectiveness, efficiency, and oversight of DOD's various urgent needs processes. GAO conducted this review to determine (1) what various entities exist within DOD for responding to urgent operational needs, and the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication; (2) the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent needs activities; and (3) the extent to which DOD has evaluated the potential for consolidations. To conduct this review, GAO examined DOD's urgent needs processes and collected and analyzed data from urgent needs entities.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Over the past two decades, the fulfillment of urgent needs has evolved as a set of complex processes within the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, each of the military services, and the combatant commands to rapidly develop, equip, and field solutions and critical capabilities to the warfighter. GAO identified at least 31 entities that manage urgent needs and expedite the development of solutions to address them. Moreover, GAO found that some overlap exists. For example, there are numerous points of entry for the warfighter to submit a request for an urgently needed capability, including through the Joint Staff and each military service. Additionally, several entities have focused on developing solutions for the same subject areas, such as counter-IED and ISR capabilities, potentially resulting in duplication of efforts. For example, both the Army and the Marine Corps had their own separate efforts to develop counter-IED mine rollers. DOD has taken steps to improve its fulfillment of urgent needs, but the department does not have a comprehensive approach to manage and oversee the breadth of its activities to address capability gaps identified by warfighters in-theater. Steps DOD has taken include developing policy to guide joint urgent need efforts and working to establish a senior oversight council to help synchronize DOD's efforts. Federal internal control standards require detailed policies, procedures, and practices to help program managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public resources. However, DOD does not have a comprehensive, DOD-wide policy that establishes a baseline and provides a common approach for how all joint and military service urgent needs are to be addressed. Moreover, DOD lacks visibility over the full range of its urgent needs efforts. For example, DOD cannot readily identify the cost of its departmentwide urgent needs efforts, which is at least $76.9 billion based on GAO's analysis. Additionally, DOD does not have a senior-level focal point to lead the department's efforts to fulfill validated urgent needs requirements. Without DOD-wide guidance and a focal point to lead its efforts, DOD risks having duplicative, overlapping, and fragmented efforts, which can result in avoidable costs. DOD also has not comprehensively evaluated opportunities for consolidation across the department. GAO's Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide establishes that such a comprehensive analysis of alternative processes should be performed, to include a performance-based, risk-adjusted analysis of benefits and costs for each alternative. In an effort to examine various ways the department might improve its fulfillment of urgent needs, GAO identified and analyzed several potential consolidation options, ranging from consolidation of all DOD urgent needs entities to more limited consolidation of key functions. Until DOD comprehensively evaluates its strategic direction on urgent needs, it will be unaware of opportunities for consolidation as well as opportunities for increased efficiencies in its fulfillment of urgent needs.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD develop comprehensive guidance that, among other things, defines roles, responsibilities, and authorities across the department and designates a focal point to lead urgent needs efforts. GAO also recommends that DOD evaluate potential options for consolidation. DOD concurred with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have  encountered changing adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures,  which challenged the Department of Defense (DOD) to quickly develop  and provide new equipment and new capabilities to address evolving  threats. Further, U.S. troops faced shortages of critical items, including  body armor, tires, and batteries. DOD’s goal was to provide solutions to  urgent warfighter needs as quickly as possible to prevent loss of life or  mission failure. DOD had to look beyond traditional acquisition  procedures, to expand the use of existing processes to meet urgent needs,  and to develop new processes and entities designed to be as responsive as  possible to urgent warfighter requests. In addition to requests for  equipment from DOD’s existing stocks, warfighters have requested new  capabilities, such as: technology to counter improvised explosive devices  (IED); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technology to  provide increased situational awareness; and command and control  equipment to enhance operations on the battlefield.
In meeting urgent needs, it is important for DOD to efficiently use the  department’s financial resources. Our past work on weapons acquisition  has shown that the department has often pursued more programs than its  resources can support. Our work also has shown that DOD has had  difficulty translating needs into programs, which often has led to cost  growth and delayed delivery of needed capabilities to the warfighter.
Over the past 5 years, DOD has sponsored several reviews of its abilities to  rapidly respond to and field urgently needed capabilities in the 21st  century security environment. One completed by the Defense Science  Board in July 2009 identified more than 20 rapid-reaction programs and  organizations addressing DOD urgent warfighter needs. Another study,  completed by the Defense Science Board in September 2009, estimated  that these programs spent more than $50 billion over the period 2005 to  2009. Moreover, the Defense Science Board found that DOD had done  little to adopt urgent needs as a critical, ongoing DOD institutional  capability essential to addressing future threats, and it provided DOD with  recommendations on potential organizational and programmatic  consolidations in July and September 2009.
DOD’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review cited that the department’s  institutions and processes needed reforms to better support the urgent  needs of the warfighter; buy weapons that are usable, affordable, and truly  needed; and ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and responsibly.  In addition, in 2007 DOD established a Chief Management Officer position  to ensure that core business operations are optimally aligned to support  the department’s warfighting mission and that performance goals and  measures are established for improving and evaluating overall economy,  efficiency, and effectiveness of the department, among other functions.  Also, in August 2010, the Secretary of Defense initiated a major effort to  instill a culture of savings, and set a goal to identify $100 billion in savings  over a 5-year period.
Our previous work has highlighted challenges with the department’s  management and oversight of its urgent operational needs organizations  and processes. In April 2010, we reported that DOD’s guidance over its  joint urgent needs processes was fragmented and outdated, and the  department was unable to fully assess how well those processes addressed  critical deficiencies or to measure the effectiveness of fielded solutions.  Likewise, in October 2009, we reported and testified on DOD’s need to  improve visibility and coordination of its counter-IED efforts.
We conducted this review under the authority of the Comptroller General  to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, in light of continuing  congressional interest in the department’s ability to adequately fulfill  urgent needs and our prior findings regarding the department’s oversight  and management of its urgent needs processes.  In addition, Title II of  Public Law Number 111-139 requires GAO to identify government  programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals and  activities and to report those findings to Congress. Our objectives for this  review were to determine (1) what entities exist within DOD for  responding to urgent operational needs and to what extent, if any, there is  fragmentation, overlap, or duplication in their missions, roles, and  responsibilities; (2) to what extent DOD has a comprehensive approach  for managing and overseeing its various activities to address urgent needs  identified by warfighters in-theater; and (3) to what extent has DOD  comprehensively evaluated its urgent needs entities and processes and  identified potential for consolidations.
To determine and describe the various entities within DOD that respond to  urgent operational needs and to what extent, if any, there is fragmentation,  overlap, or duplication, we used a data-collection instrument to obtain  information from DOD and military service entities identified in our scope  regarding their role in the urgent needs process, including how urgent  needs are submitted, validated, funded, and tracked, and how fielded  capabilities are sustained, transitioned, or terminated. We also analyzed  prior Defense Science Board reports that identified entities involved in the  process, and interviewed DOD and military service officials to gain an  understanding of mission, role, and responsibility as well as to gain insight  into other entities that may have a role in the fulfillment of urgent needs.  To determine the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive approach for  managing all of its various urgent needs processes, we analyzed strategic  management guidance as well as conducted comparative analysis of DOD  and military service policies for meeting urgent operational needs. We  interviewed DOD and military service officials to gain an understanding of  the department’s efforts to satisfy urgent warfighter requirements as well  as the metrics used to evaluate the effectiveness of urgent needs solutions.  To determine the extent to which DOD has comprehensively evaluated its  urgent needs entities and processes, we interviewed key officials from  various DOD and military service entities as well as officials from selected  combatant commands to gain an understanding of how joint urgent  operational needs and service-based urgent needs are fulfilled. Using this  information, together with analysis of prior reports and studies and the  responses from our data-collection instrument, we developed potential  consolidation options for the department to consider. We analyzed these  options in terms of their potential capacity to gain increased efficiencies in  the visibility, coordination, management, and oversight of the  department’s urgent needs processes as well as to reduce the potential for  duplication, overlap, and fragmentation.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2010 through March  2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. For additional details on  how we performed our review, see appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Evolving Threats in Iraq and Afghanistan Highlighted Need for DOD to Fill Capability Gaps Rapidly
paragraphs: As evidenced by evolving threats in Iraq and Afghanistan, enemy forces  have exploited capability gaps in the technology, systems, and equipment  used by U.S. forces. Such tactics made it evident that U.S. warfighters  were not always equipped to deal with the fast-changing tactics,  techniques, and procedures of the enemy. For example, one of the most  publicized of these adversarial capabilities was the use of IEDs. While U.S.  forces responded initially by changing tactics and techniques by  purchasing equipment locally, the department then determined it needed  to more quickly develop and deploy new capabilities. Some of DOD’s  efforts to rapidly address counter-IED and other significant capability gaps  include the following:    Counter-IED Solutions—Congress provides funding for joint urgent needs  related to countering IEDs through the Joint Improvised Explosive Device  Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), an organization that reports directly to the  Deputy Secretary of Defense. Congress has appropriated nearly $16 billion  through fiscal year 2009 to JIEDDO. JIEDDO has funded many counter- IED solutions to support the warfighter, including electronic jammers to  block radio-frequency signals that detonate IEDs. However, in our prior  work, we found that JIEDDO lacked full visibility over all counter-IED  initiatives throughout DOD, faced difficulties with transitioning its  counter-IED initiatives to the military services, and lacked criteria for  selecting which counter-IED training initiatives it will fund, which affect  its training investment decisions. We recommended that DOD improve its  visibility over all of DOD’s counter-IED efforts, work with the military  services to develop a complete transition plan for initiatives, and define  criteria for funding training initiatives. DOD agreed with these  recommendations and identified several actions it had taken or planned to  take to address them.  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Technology—DOD’s  ISR systems—including manned and unmanned airborne, space-borne,  maritime, and terrestrial systems—play critical roles in supporting military  operations and national security missions. Effective ISR data can provide  early warning of enemy threats as well as enable U.S. military forces to  increase effectiveness, coordination, and lethality, and demand has  increased for ISR capabilities to support ongoing military operations. To  meet this growing demand, DOD is making sizeable investments in ISR  systems and related ISR capabilities. We have reported since 2005 that  DOD’s ISR activities are not always well integrated and efficient,  effectiveness may be compromised by lack of visibility into operational  use of ISR assets, and agencies could better collaborate in the acquisition  of new capabilities. In January 2010, we recommended that DOD develop  overarching guidance for sharing intelligence information and that the  military services develop plans with timelines that prioritize and identify  the types of ISR data they will share. DOD agreed with these  recommendations and noted actions it planned to take to address them.
Command and Control Equipment—Urgently needed assets may include,  but are not limited to, satellite communication equipment for military  personnel who require a method for communicating with each other in  remote areas without established infrastructure, or distributed tactical  communication systems for warfighters in Afghanistan because current  handset devices do not operate adequately in the mountainous terrain. To  meet this demand, solutions are being sought from various sources that  include commercial off-the-shelf technology, other types of technology,  and other sources. We have reported on the challenges associated with  availability of such technology, including lengthy delays in the approval  and order processes. To address these and other urgent needs–related  challenges, we made several recommendations to improve DOD’s ability to  assess how well its processes are meeting critical warfighter needs,  address challenges with training, make decisions about when to use its  rapid acquisition authority, and make reprogramming decisions to  expedite fielding of solutions. DOD generally concurred with our  recommendations and agreed to take several actions to address them.
section_title: The Department’s Processes to Fulfill Urgent Needs Have Evolved
paragraphs: Over the past two decades, the fulfillment of urgent needs has evolved as a  set of complex processes—within the Joint Staff, the Office of the  Secretary of Defense (OSD), each of the military services, as well as the  combatant commands—to rapidly develop, equip, and field solutions and  critical capabilities to the warfighter. DOD’s experience in Iraq and  Afghanistan led to the expanded use of existing urgent needs processes,  the creation of new policies, and the establishment of new organizations  intended to be more responsive to urgent warfighter requests.
As shown in table 1 below, significant events in the expansion of DOD’s  efforts to respond to and fulfill urgent operational needs began in the late  1980s but increased rapidly after the onset of the Global War on Terrorism  in late 2001.
As table 1 indicates, many of these newly established entities and  processes were created, in part, because the department had not  anticipated the accelerated pace of change in enemy tactics and  techniques that ultimately heightened the need for a rapid response to new  threats in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to the Defense Science Board,  while DOD, the military services, and combatant commands took actions  to respond more quickly to demands to fulfill urgent needs, it became  apparent that within the last half decade the department, as well as the  acquisition community it depends on, has struggled in their ability to field  new capabilities in a disciplined, efficient, and effective way. While many  entities started as ad hoc organizations, several have been permanently  established.
section_title: Meeting Urgent Needs Involves a Breadth of Activities
paragraphs: Although each of the services’ and Joint Staff’s urgent needs processes is  distinct, we identified six broad activities involved after the submission of  an urgent need statement. These activities are shown in table 2 below.
section_title: Congressional Interest in DOD’s Approach to Urgent Operational Needs and the Need for Improvement
paragraphs: Over the past 5 years, there have been several reviews of the department’s  ability to rapidly respond and field urgently needed capabilities in the 21st  century security environment. Some of these studies were initiated at the  direction of Congress. In fiscal year 2009, the House Armed Services  Committee approved the department’s designation of a process  improvement officer who was tasked with applying Lean Six Sigma  process improvement techniques to the business practices of the  department. The committee recommended that the process improvement  officer examine the processes for rapid acquisition activities that have  been established since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began and  determine whether there were lessons learned that might be integrated  into the department’s main acquisition process. The department  conducted the study and found (1) significant variability in response time  at the beginning of the process, indicating unnecessary delays; (2) senior  leadership involvement in the process enables rapid decision making; (3)  shorter decision processes and focused organizations enable quicker  response than under normal requirements; and (4) reprogramming  authority is cumbersome and adds time to the urgent needs process.  Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2009  included a provision that would require best practices and process  improvements to ensure that urgent operational needs statements and  joint urgent operational needs statements are presented to appropriate  authorities for review and validation not later than 60 days after the  documents are submitted. Specifically, the committee report noted that  over the last several years, operational commanders in Iraq had identified  urgent operational needs for MRAP vehicles, nonlethal laser dazzlers, and  other critical equipment. Further, the committee stated it was aware of  allegations that requests for some of these items not only went unmet, but  were not even presented for more than a year to the senior officials  responsible for validating the requests. In 2009, Congress required the  Secretary of Defense to commission a study by an independent  commission or a federally funded research and development center to  assess and report on the effectiveness of the processes used by DOD for  the generation of urgent operational need requirements, and the  acquisition processes used to fulfill such requirements. In response to  this requirement, the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology  and Logistics, asked the Defense Science Board to establish a task force to  conduct a study on the effectiveness of the processes used by the  department for the generation of urgent operational needs requirements  and the acquisition processes used to fulfill such requirements. In July  2009, the Defense Science Board released its report with  recommendations on potential consolidations necessary to rapidly field  new capabilities for the warfighter in a systematic and effective manner.
Moreover, Section 803 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (the FY 2011 NDAA) amended the existing rapid  acquisition authority.  Previously, the authority could be used to eliminate  deficiencies that resulted in combat fatalities. The amended section now  permits the use of the authority to acquire and deploy certain supplies to  eliminate deficiencies that result in combat casualties, rather than just  combat fatalities. The amendment also increased from $100 million to $200  million the amount that can be used annually to acquire the supplies  necessary to address such deficiencies.
Additionally, Section 804 of the FY 2011 NDAA, among other things,  requires the Secretary of Defense to review the processes for the fielding  of capabilities in response to urgent operational needs, consider  improvements to those processes, and report to the congressional defense  committees in January 2012.
section_title: Fulfillment of Urgent Needs Involves a Number of Entities and Processes, Resulting in Fragmentation and Some Overlap of Efforts
paragraphs: The fulfillment of urgent needs involves numerous joint, OSD and military  service entities, which have increased over time. We identified areas  where some overlap exists among urgent needs entities, such as the  submission, validation, and processing of urgent needs requirements. In  addition, our analysis identified multiple entities with a role in responding  to similar types of urgently needed capabilities, such as ISR and counter- IED, resulting in the potential for duplication of efforts.
subsections: section_title: Numerous DOD and Military Service Entities Play a Key Role in the Fulfillment of Urgent Needs
paragraphs: The department has many entities that respond to the large number of  urgent needs requests submitted by the combatant commands and military  services. As previously reported by us and DOD, a complex set of  processes has evolved over time, involving numerous joint, OSD, and  military service entities over the past decade as the department seeks to  fulfill the capability gaps identified by warfighters. On the basis of DOD’s  and our analysis, we have identified at least 31 entities that play a  significant role in the various urgent needs processes. Table 3 below  shows the 31 entities we identified and when they were established.
Further analysis shows that these entities have three different missions  with respect to fulfilling urgent needs. First, some entities identify and  provide a quick response to threats presented by adaptive enemies, but  not always in support of urgent needs. Often these entities engage in  experimentation and rapid prototyping to accelerate the transition of  technologies to the warfighter. For example, the Rapid Reaction  Technology Office does not directly receive or validate joint or service  urgent needs, but rather anticipates disruptive threats and in response  funds solutions and new capabilities, some of which have fulfilled  validated joint urgent operational needs. Second, some entities specifically  process urgent needs and are generally involved from validation to  sourcing. For example, the joint urgent operational needs process is  overseen by Joint Staff J8, which receives and validates urgent need  requests, and the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, which facilitates a rapid  solution. In the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, various entities exist to  validate, facilitate, and source urgent needs for their respective processes.  Third, some entities focus on developing solutions in response to urgent  needs requests that have been validated, facilitated, and sourced by other  entities. These solution-development entities are mostly acquisition  program offices, such as Program Executive Office Night Vision /  Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition, which also develop  solutions in response to nonurgent needs as well as manage existing  systems. Finally, some entities are involved in two or more of the three  types of missions described above. For example, JIEDDO anticipates  threats, processes urgent needs requests, and develops solutions.
section_title: Overlap Exists among the Numerous Entities Involved in Processing Urgent Requirements and Expediting Solutions
paragraphs: Our analysis shows that overlap exists among urgent needs entities in the  roles they play as well as the capabilities for which they are responsible.  Table 4 shows the roles played by the various organizations in relation to  the activities involved in meeting urgent needs identified earlier.
DOD entities at the joint level, and each of the services, also have their  own policies for meeting urgent needs. These policies result in seven  different processes for the fulfillment of urgent needs; additionally, the  Army Rapid Equipping Force also has an urgent needs process. For  example, warfighters may submit urgent needs, depending on their  military service and the type of need, to Joint Staff J8, JIEDDO, Army  Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7, Army Rapid Equipping Force, Navy Fleet  Forces Command or Commander Pacific Fleet, Marine Corps Deputy  Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Air Force Major  Commands, or Special Operations Command J8. These entities then  validate the submitted urgent need request and thus allow it to proceed  through their specific process. This contrasts with traditional  requirements and needs, which are generally processed under the Joint  Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). JCIDS was  established to provide the department with an integrated, collaborative  process to identify and guide development of a broad set of new  capabilities that address the current and emerging security environment.
Moreover, within some of the services, multiple processes and validation  points exist. For example, in the Army, urgent needs can be submitted via  two routes: (1) the warfighter can make a request to the Rapid Equipping  Force for approval by its Director; or (2) the warfighter can submit an  operational needs statement, documenting the urgent need to the Deputy  Chief of Staff for the Army G-3/5/7, Current and Future Warfighting  Capabilities Division, for validation and prioritization. In the Air Force,  urgent needs are handled by the various major commands; however, Air  Force headquarters also has a process and an entity that can process  urgent needs that do not get fulfilled by the major commands.
Furthermore, at the joint level, six entities facilitate urgent needs requests  and five entities provide sourcing support for urgent needs requests.  Officials from two combatant commands have expressed frustration with  the number of entities involved in the processing of urgent needs requests  and suggested that streamlining of the validation, facilitation, sourcing,  and funding processes would improve the timeliness of solutions.  Additionally, many entities track the fulfillment of urgent needs requests  and their solutions; however, most entities with a role in tracking focus  only on specific requests they process or solutions they developed. The  overlap created by numerous entities involved in processing urgent  requirements and expediting solutions may create fragmented efforts and  overall inefficiencies within DOD.
section_title: Multiple Entities Respond to Requests for Similar Capabilities, Resulting in Potential Duplication of Efforts
paragraphs: Multiple entities we surveyed reported a role in responding to similar  categories of urgently needed capabilities. We identified eight entities with  a role in responding to ISR capabilities, five entities with a role in  responding to counter-IED capabilities, and six entities with a role in  responding to communications, command and control, and computer  technology, among others.
Over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, multiple organizations  have been created to handle specific types of urgently needed capabilities  for urgent operational needs and these organizations also experience  overlap. For example, JIEDDO initially was established as an Army task  force and was changed to a DOD task force to meet urgent counter-IED  needs; however, counter-IED is not handled exclusively by JIEDDO, and  we have previously reported that JIEDDO and the services lack full  visibility over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD and are at risk of  duplicating efforts. Similarly, we previously reported that many  biometrics activities are dispersed throughout DOD at many organizational  levels and that DOD has been focusing most of its efforts on quickly  fielding biometrics systems, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, to  address DOD’s immediate warfighting needs without guidance to prevent  duplication of biometrics-related efforts. In 2010, the Army Biometrics  Task force was institutionalized as the Biometrics Identity Management  Agency to lead DOD activities to program, coordinate, integrate, and  synchronize biometrics technologies and capabilities. However, our  ongoing work has identified instances of potential duplication. For  example:    Both the Army and the Marine Corps continue to develop their own  counter-IED mine rollers with full or partial JIEDDO funding. The Marine  Corps’ mine roller per unit cost is about $85,000 versus a cost range of  $77,000 to $225,000 per unit for the Army mine roller. However, officials  disagree about which system is most effective, and DOD has not  conducted comparative testing and evaluation of the two systems. Further,  JIEDDO officials said that JIEDDO cannot compel the services to buy one  solution over the other.
The Navy developed a directed-energy technology to fill a critical theater  capability gap, yet JIEDDO later underwrote the Air Force’s development  of the same technology to create a more powerful and faster-moving  equipment item than the Navy had developed. However, the Air Force has  now determined that its system will not meet requirements and has  deferred fielding the technology pending further study. This may have a  negative effect on the continued development of this technology by the  Navy or others for use in theater. For example, according to DOD officials,  during the recent testing of the Air Force’s system, safety concerns were  noted unique to that system that may limit the warfighter’s willingness to  accept the technology. However, according to Navy officials, the Navy  plans to begin fielding its system in 2011.
While our review did find the potential for duplication, we also found  some cases where various entities took the initiative to work together,  resulting in collaboration to satisfy urgent needs. For example, the Joint  Rapid Acquisition Cell received eight validated joint urgent operational  needs requirements, and facilitated the integration of the eight separate,  but very much related, ISR and force-protection needs. Specifically, this  coordination involved the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, U.S. Central  Command, JIEDDO, and the Army to consolidate the validated  requirements, find a sponsor, and develop a solution. Approximately 6  months from the date of funding, the Army PEO–Intelligence, Electronic  Warfare & Sensors, specifically Night Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance  and Target Acquisition, developed and fielded the Base Expeditionary  Targeting and Surveillance Sensors–Combined, a flexible, moveable,  adjustable, scalable, and expeditionary base defense system for persistent  ground targeting and surveillance.
section_title: DOD Does Not Have Comprehensive Guidance and Full Visibility to Effectively Manage and Oversee Its Urgent Needs
paragraphs: DOD has taken several steps to improve the management and oversight of  its urgent needs. While these efforts have shown some progress, the  department does not have comprehensive policy and guidance for  directing efforts across DOD, the military services, and combatant  commands to effectively manage and oversee the fulfillment of its urgent  needs. Moreover, the department lacks full visibility over the full range of  urgent needs efforts from funding to measuring results achieved.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Improve Management and Oversight of Urgent Needs Requests
paragraphs: In response to our April 2010 finding that DOD’s urgent needs guidance  was fragmented, Joint Staff officials stated that they were in the process of  revising the Joint Staff instruction on the joint urgent needs process to  better align with the department’s strategic plan for urgent needs.  Moreover, OSD has been drafting Directive-Type Memorandum 10-002 to  establish policy, assign responsibilities, and outline procedures for the  resolution of joint urgent operational needs. The draft directive-type  memorandum seeks to provide guidance on a range of issues, including  rapid-acquisition authority, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell’s role as the  DOD focal point for tracking and coordinating joint urgent operational  needs resolution, as well as clearly defining the responsibilities of those  involved in the processing of urgent needs. A senior DOD official  explained that after review by the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, senior DOD officials decided to  expand the draft memorandum to include the services’ urgent operational  needs—as well as joint urgent operational needs—to increase visibility.  According to senior DOD officials, the department expects the  memorandum to be issued in 2011.
Furthermore, in 2009, the department established the Rapid Fielding  Directorate within the office of the Director, Defense Research and  Engineering, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics, and reorganized the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, the Rapid  Reaction Technology Office, and the Joint Capability Technology  Demonstrations under this new office to better align similar missions  related to accelerating capabilities to the warfighter. Rapid Fielding  Directorate officials stated that one of the first imperatives is to accelerate  the delivery of capabilities to the warfighter, emphasizing the ability to  efficiently collaborate directly with the military services. Additionally,  officials from the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell stated that they are working  to address a number of challenges, including applying their definition of  urgent need to validate requirements, prioritizing the urgency of needs  identified by the warfighter, developing universal metrics to track and  evaluate urgent needs, and formalizing the department’s urgent needs  processes. Finally, to address concerns of senior-level leadership  regarding the management of its urgent needs, the department is planning  to establish a senior-level oversight council in Directive-Type  Memorandum 10-002. According to a senior OSD official, this council may  include three- and four-star-level representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff,  and the military services to ensure that all efforts across the department  are synchronized to rapidly acquire and field materiel solutions to urgent  needs.
section_title: DOD Does Not Have a Comprehensive Policy for Guiding All Parts of the Process for Addressing Warfighters’ Urgent Needs Requests
paragraphs: Despite these actions, DOD does not have departmentwide guidance that  provides a common departmentwide approach for how all urgent needs  are to be addressed. Guidance for issues that affect all the defense  components originates at the DOD level, typically either through a  directive or instruction. A directive is a broad policy document that  assigns responsibility and delegates authority to the DOD components.  Directives establish policy that applies across all the services, combatant  commands, and DOD components. An instruction implements the policy,  or prescribes the manner for carrying out the policy, for operating a  program or activity, and for assigning responsibilities. According to federal  best practices reported in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government, management is responsible for developing detailed  policies, procedures, and practices to help program managers achieve  desired results through effective stewardship of public resources.  However, DOD has not issued any such directives or instructions that  provide policy and guidance over all of its urgent needs processes. DOD is  in the process of developing guidance concerning its urgent needs  processes through the Directive-Type Memorandum 10-002. However, it  remains in draft form, so it is not clear to what extent this guidance will  establish such a common approach for service and other urgent needs  processes. Additionally, our analysis found that DOD has a fragmented  approach in managing all of its urgent needs submissions and validated  requirements. For example, the Joint Staff, JIEDDO, the military services,  and the Special Operations Command have issued their own guidance  outlining activities involved in processing and meeting their specific  urgent needs. Through comparative analysis of policies issued by the Joint  Staff, each military service, JIEDDO, and the Special Operations Command  for managing the various urgent needs processes, we identified that the  policies often varied. Moreover, we found that Joint Staff, Navy, and Air  Force policies do not define roles and responsibilities for some activities  involved, as shown in table 5.
As indicated in table 5, some policies include each of the activities  involved in the processing and fulfillment of urgent needs. However,  Special Operations Command, Joint Staff, Navy, and Air Force policies do  not include guidance on all the activities included in the process. For  example, we determined the following:    Joint Staff policy did not address how to provide feedback on urgent  needs that are not validated. Officials from one combatant command  expressed frustration that they received no feedback as to why joint  urgent operational needs they submitted were not validated and lacked  adequate insight to understand the decision process. However, other  policies addressed this issue. For example, Navy guidance stated that  urgent needs that were not validated would be returned to the requester  with rationale as to why or with recommendations on how to revise the  request, or both.
The Joint Staff, Navy, and Air Force policies did not define roles and  responsibilities involved in the decision to transition, transfer, or  terminate the capability solution provided. Furthermore, Special  Operations Command, Joint Staff, and Navy policies did not address how  validated requirements would be tracked as a capability solution was  being developed.
Also, DOD’s urgent needs policies varied for transitioning or transferring  capabilities. For example:  It is JIEDDO’s policy to decide within 2 years whether to transition or  transfer the capability over to a service or agency or to terminate it.
The Special Operations Command determines at the 1-year mark  whether the capability is still needed in-theater, and if so, defines out- year funding requirements and how the funding will be obtained.
While the Army has a process in place for transitioning urgent needs, it  is applicable only to those urgent needs that are nominated to go  through the Army’s Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition  process. However, this process identifies and approves only certain  capabilities that have been nominated for sustainment, rather than  tracking all capabilities fielded for the Army’s urgent needs.
During our review, numerous officials stated the need for overarching,  uniform guidance to all entities involved in urgent needs processes. Senior  officials we spoke with stated that the department needs to provide more  comprehensive management and oversight over all of its urgent needs.  Additionally, combatant command, Joint Staff, and service officials stated  a need for policies to be explicit regarding the necessary activities that  must be addressed within the urgent needs process. For example, officials  at one combatant command stated that when submitting an urgent need  through the joint urgent operational needs process, they lacked insight  into the validation process and metrics used by the Joint Staff, as well as  guidance on how joint urgent operational needs are evaluated across the  combatant commands. An official at a different combatant command  emphasized the importance of defining which requests truly qualify as an  urgent need, and noted that the Joint Staff’s requirements process lacks a  method to verify that requirements are properly defined. Moreover, Joint  Staff officials discussed the importance of defining a joint urgent  operational need, as well as criteria for what qualifies as an urgent need in  their guidance that is currently undergoing revisions. Army officials  noted that inconsistency exists regarding rapid acquisition guidance  between the Joint Staff, Army, and Air Force policies. And finally, Air  Force officials stated that urgent needs policy should include guidance on  which steps within the acquisition process should and can be waived,  deferred, or tailored in order to rapidly acquire capabilities, which would  allow acquisition personnel to more quickly address urgent needs.  Because DOD does not have baseline DOD-wide guidance that applies to  urgent operational needs processes across the department clearly defining  the roles and responsibilities of how urgent needs should be assessed,  processed, and managed—including activities such as tracking the status  of a validated requirement—the department continues to maintain a  fragmented approach to managing its urgent needs processes. As a result,  the department risks inefficiently responding to urgent needs and  potentially duplicating efforts.
section_title: DOD Lacks Full Visibility over Urgent Needs Efforts, Challenging DOD’s Ability to Manage and Oversee Its Processes
paragraphs: DOD lacks full visibility over the full range of urgent needs efforts—from  funding to measuring results. This includes the lack of a single senior-level  focal point to help bring cohesion to DOD’s urgent needs processes. It also  includes the lack of a system and metrics to facilitate coordinating,  monitoring, and tracking progress and measuring results.
subsections: section_title: Funding Estimated at More Than $76 Billion over 6 Years
paragraphs: The department lacks full visibility to readily identify the total cost of its  urgent needs efforts. However, we obtained data from the majority of  entities in our analysis on how much funding was made available to them  for the fulfillment of urgent needs. On the basis of the data submitted to us  in response to our data-collection instrument, the total funding for the  fulfillment of urgent needs is at least $76.9 billion from fiscal years 2005  through 2010. As indicated in figure 1 below, funding is spread unevenly  among many urgent needs entities because the entities have different roles  in the fulfillment of urgent needs. In addition, some entities like JIEDDO  and the Rapid Reaction Technology Office have access to special funds  for the fulfillment of urgent needs, while others rely on different sources  such as funding through the annual budget process or the reprogramming  or transfer of funds from other DOD programs and activities.
Of the $76.9 billion in urgent needs funds represented in figure 1, $67.1  billion or 87.2 percent has been assigned to OSD entities, $9.5 billion or  12.4 percent to Army entities, $259 million or less than 1 percent to Navy  entities, and $33.0 million or less than 1 tenth of 1 percent to Air Force  entities. The amounts reported in figure 1 may underestimate the actual  total amounts expended on urgent needs for the given years because the  list of entities is not exhaustive. Further, the data are self-reported and not  all entities we identified provided funding data. Without full visibility of  its urgent needs efforts and costs, the department is not fully able to  identify key improvements and is inhibited in its ability to build agile,  adaptive, and innovative structures capable of quickly identifying  emerging gaps and adjusting program and budgetary priorities to rapidly  equip and field capabilities that will mitigate those gaps.
section_title: Disparate Tracking Systems Limit DOD’s Visibility over Its Urgent Needs Process and Can Hamper Improvement Efforts
paragraphs: DOD cannot readily identify the totality of its urgent needs efforts as well  as the cost of such efforts because it has limited visibility over all urgent  needs submitted by warfighters—both from joint and service-specific  sources. DOD and service officials cited two impediments to full visibility:  the lack of a comprehensive tracking system to manage and oversee all  urgent needs identified by the warfighter and a lack of clearly defined  roles. Specifically, DOD and the services have disparate ways of tracking  urgent needs; some have formal databases to input information while  others use more informal methods such as e-mailing to solicit feedback.  For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and each of the military services  utilize electronic databases to track capability solutions as they move  through the urgent needs process. However, more than a third of the  entities involved in the process did not collect or provide the necessary  information for the joint or service-based systems to track those solutions.  Rather, there was confusion over whose role it was to collect and input  data into these tracking systems. For example, one program office that  develops urgent needs solutions uses a metric of operational readiness  levels to track the effectiveness of its solutions. However, the program  office does not provide these data to the joint or services’ electronic  databases. Rather, program office officials stated they believed it was the  responsibility of the combatant command, Joint Staff, or service offices  that maintain the databases to maintain this information. However,  officials from the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, which maintains the joint  database, stated they obtain data from the other individual databases  based on what the DOD components input.
DOD and military service officials stated the need for improvements to  tracking urgent needs. For example, some senior DOD officials stated that  they would like senior acquisition executives and other oversight officials  to review every 4 to 6 weeks how joint and service urgent needs are  progressing. Combatant command officials stated that while they have  visibility into the database for tracking joint urgent operational needs, they  do not have the same visibility into the services’ databases. Specifically,  officials at one combatant command, who stated they have zero visibility  into the urgent needs being addressed by the services, cited the value in  having a global database of all service and joint urgent needs as they  develop and transition, transfer, or terminate fielded solutions.  Additionally, Army officials recognized the need for improved visibility.  Specifically the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army issued a memorandum in  April 2010 to develop a rapid acquisition / rapid equipping common  operating picture and collaboration tool as a means to increase efficiency  and transparency of Army urgent need processes. Stakeholders include  various Army entities as well as numerous other entities involved in the  process. Without full visibility into all of its urgent needs, the department,  military services, and combatant commands risk the potential for overlap  or duplication in developing capabilities to respond to urgent needs. This  reinforces the need for a single focal point at a sufficiently high level to  bring greater cohesion to these disparate efforts.
According to DOD officials, the need for improved oversight was an  important factor in the decision to revise the Directive-Type Memorandum  10-002. Furthermore, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell officials stated the draft  Directive-Type Memorandum 10-002 would require DOD components to  provide visibility to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell of urgent needs  managed through the DOD entities’ processes.
section_title: DOD Has Not Established a Universal Set of Metrics for Evaluating the Effectiveness and Tracking the Status of Solutions Provided to the Warfighter
paragraphs: Our analysis found that the feedback mechanisms across DOD, the Joint  Staff, the military services, JIEDDO, and the Special Operations Command  are varied and fragmented. In April 2010, we recommended that DOD  develop an established, formal feedback mechanism or channel for the  military services to provide feedback to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint  Rapid Acquisition Cell on how well fielded solutions met urgent needs.  The department concurred with the recommendation and stated that it  would develop new DOD policy and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would  update the Chairman’s instruction to establish requirements for oversight  and management of the fulfillment of urgent needs. The majority of DOD  urgent needs entities we surveyed reported that they do not collect all the  data needed to determine how well these solutions are performing. For  example, one entity reported that information on whether a deployed  solution was successful is largely anecdotal and there is no uniformity in  the way such data are collected and reported. Additionally, while the Air  Force uses its requirements database to track the progress of systems or  solutions under development, it has not formalized metrics to assess the  performance of deployed systems or solutions, or for reporting such  performance to senior leadership.
In April 2010, we also recommended that DOD develop and implement  standards for accurately tracking and documenting key process milestones  such as funding, acquisition, fielding, and assessment, and for updating  data management systems to create activity reports to facilitate  management review and external oversight of the process. DOD agreed  with these recommendations and noted actions it planned to take to  address them. However, our analysis found that the department lacked a  method or metric to track the status of a validated urgent requirement  across the services and DOD components, such as whether a requirement  currently in development could be applicable to another service.  Specifically, officials from one combatant command stated that they do  not have visibility into the urgent needs being addressed at the service  level, which could be beneficial to have so that the combatant command  would have awareness of capabilities being developed and could  communicate with that particular service if the combatant command saw  it as a solution to an urgent need. In addition, officials within the Joint  Staff recognize the importance of establishing tracking in an urgent needs  system and plan to include language in revisions to their policy on joint  urgent operational needs. With the establishment of a metric or  mechanism to track the status of a validated requirement, the department  would gain improved awareness of urgent needs as they move through the  process.
section_title: DOD Lacks a Focal Point Responsible for Managing, Overseeing, and Maintaining Full Visibility over All the Department’s Urgent Needs Efforts
paragraphs: DOD’s lack of visibility over all urgent needs requests is due in part to the  lack of a senior-level focal point (i.e., gatekeeper) that has the  responsibility to manage, oversee, and have full visibility to track and  monitor all emerging capability gaps being identified by warfighters in- theater. At present, the department has not established a senior-level focal  point to (1) lead the department’s efforts to fulfill validated urgent needs  requirements, (2) develop and implement DOD-wide policy on the  processing of urgent needs or rapid acquisition, or (3) maintain full  visibility over its urgent needs efforts and the costs of those efforts. We  have previously testified and reported on the benefits of establishing a  single point of focus at a sufficiently senior level to coordinate and  integrate various DOD efforts to address concerns, such as with  counterterrorism and the transformation of military capabilities.  Moreover, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review seeks to further reform  the department’s institutions and processes to support the urgent needs of  the warfighter, buy weapons that are usable, affordable, and truly needed,  and ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and responsibly.  Similarly, the Secretary of Defense initiated major efforts in August 2010 to  significantly reduce excess costs and apply savings achieved by reducing  duplication and overhead, and set a goal to find $100 billion in savings  over a 5-year period. Without establishment of a senior-level focal point,  DOD officials may be unable to identify areas for improvement, including  consolidation, to prioritize validated but unfunded requirements, to  identify funding challenges and a means to address such challenges, or  ensure collaboration to modify capabilities in development to meet several  similar urgent needs requirements—and may be unable to reduce any  overlap or duplication that may exist as solutions are developed or  modified.
section_title: Opportunities Exist for Consolidating Urgent Needs Processes and Entities
paragraphs: In addition to not having a comprehensive approach for managing and  overseeing its urgent needs efforts, DOD has not conducted a  comprehensive evaluation of its urgent needs processes and entities to  identify opportunities for consolidation. Given the overlap and potential  for duplication we identified in this review, coupled with similar concerns  raised by other studies, there may be opportunities for DOD to further  improve its urgent needs processes through consolidation. On the basis of  our discussions with DOD officials as well as our analysis of prior reports  and studies and the responses from our data-collection instrument, we  identified several options that the department might consider in an effort  to evaluate the merits of consolidating its urgent needs processes and  entities.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Not Comprehensively Evaluated Opportunities for Consolidation across the Department
paragraphs: Despite various reports by the Defense Science Board, GAO, and others— that raised concerns about the numbers and roles of the various entities  and processes involved and the potential of overlap and duplication—DOD  has not comprehensively evaluated opportunities for consolidation across  the department. For example, the Defense Science Board Task Force  found that DOD has done little to adopt urgent needs as a critical, ongoing  DOD institutional capability essential to addressing future threats, and it  twice provided recommendations to the department about potential  consolidations. Specifically, in July 2009, the task force identified a  number of critical actions to address the situation, including a dual  acquisition path that separates “rapid” and “deliberate” acquisitions as well  as the establishment of a new agency to implement this separation, called  the Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency. Further, the Task Force stated  that this new agency should (1) be focused on acquiring new solutions to  joint urgent operational needs; (2) work with the combatant commands to  anticipate future needs; and (3) oversee and coordinate tracking of all  urgent need statements in conjunction with the services and the service  components. Contrary to these recommendations, some DOD officials  whom we interviewed across the department expressed their concern with  the creation of a new agency since the Secretary of Defense publicly  questioned why it was “necessary to bypass existing institutions and  procedures to get the capabilities needed to protect U.S. troops and fight  ongoing wars.”
According to senior OSD officials, the department has conducted studies,  including a Lean Six Sigma study, to determine lessons learned from  several independent urgent needs processes that might be integrated into  the department’s main acquisition process. Briefings have been presented  to the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, making  the business case to standardize the department’s urgent needs processes,  improve support to the warfighter, and achieve greater collaboration  across the department. However, DOD has not developed or implemented  any courses of action to address the findings of these studies. Many DOD  and military service officials stated that higher-level senior leadership  needs to take decisive action to improve and formalize its urgent needs  processes, thus reducing unnecessary duplication in staff, IT, support, and  funding. Until the department comprehensively evaluates its strategic  direction on urgent needs, it will be unaware of opportunities for  consolidation across the department as well as opportunities for improved  coordination, or other actions to achieve savings or increased efficiencies  in its fulfillment of urgent needs.
DOD Directive 5105.02 directs the Deputy Secretary of Defense to serve as  the Chief Management Officer of the department with the responsibility  and function, among others, to establish performance goals and measures  for improving and evaluating overall economy, efficiency, and  effectiveness and monitor and measure the progress of the department.  Moreover, the department’s Strategic Management Plan outlines the five  top-level business priorities of DOD, including “Reform the DoD  Acquisition and Support Processes” as its third business priority. A goal  of this priority is to focus research and development to address  warfighting requirements in an effort to speed technology transitions  focused on warfighting needs. Furthermore, GAO’s Business Process  Reengineering Assessment Guide establishes that a comprehensive  analysis of alternative processes should include a performance-based, risk- adjusted analysis of benefits and costs for each alternative. Our prior  work on business process reengineering has demonstrated the importance  of exploring available options, including the potential of each option to  achieve the desired goals as well as to determine the benefits, costs, and  risks of each.
section_title: Other Options Aimed at Consolidation and Increased Efficiencies
paragraphs: Given the overlap and potential for duplication we identified in this  review, coupled with similar concerns raised by other studies, we  identified and analyzed a number of options aimed at potential  consolidations in an effort to provide ideas for the department to consider  in streamlining its urgent needs entities and processes. The options are  presented in table 6 below. Using information and documentation  provided by DOD officials, prior reports and studies, and the responses  from our data-collection instrument, we analyzed each option in terms of  its potential capacity to (1) reduce overlap or duplication or both, if any, in  the mission, roles, and key activities; (2) reduce fragmentation and  potential gaps in the processes; (3) increase coordination and visibility;  and (4) increase efficiencies. We also assessed the advantages and  disadvantages of each option. Additionally, while title 10, U.S. Code,  provides that the military services are responsible for equipping and  training their own forces, DOD officials indicated that title 10 would not  preclude consolidating or otherwise streamlining the processing of urgent  operational needs to maximize efficiency and response to the warfighter.
The options we identified are not meant to be exhaustive or mutually  exclusive. Rather, DOD would need to perform its own analysis, carefully  weighing the advantages and disadvantages of options it identifies to  determine the optimal course of action. Additionally, it must be recognized  that many entities involved in the fulfillment of urgent needs have other  roles as well. For example, while the Biometrics Information Management  Agency may respond directly to an urgent need, it also has the mission to  lead the department’s activities to program, integrate, and synchronize  biometric technologies and capabilities. Furthermore, several DOD  officials also pointed out that although efficiency is important, the speed  of development and effectiveness of solutions are generally a higher  priority for urgent needs.
In sharing our analysis of options with DOD and military service officials,  they agreed that such an analysis considering all the advantages and  disadvantages of consolidation is a necessary step to improving the  department’s fulfillment of urgent needs. Given the increasing number of  urgent needs and the escalating fiscal challenges, it is critical for DOD to  reevaluate the current status of how it fulfills its urgent needs and whether  there is potential to reduce duplication, fragmentation, and overlap to  achieve increased efficiencies or cost savings, or both. Without a  comprehensive evaluation of its urgent needs entities and processes, DOD  will not be in a position to know if it is fulfilling urgent needs in the most  efficient and effective manner as well as accomplishing its strategic  management objectives.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD has issued guidance that addresses several aspects of the process for  warfighter needs, but the entities aiding warfighters’ needs do not have  DOD-wide guidance in such areas as clearly defining roles and  responsibilities and minimum requirements for processing requests.  Additionally, DOD and military service officials have limited awareness of  all urgent needs—including how well those needs are being met—which  can hamper their ability to effectively manage and identify areas where  overlap and duplication exist, in accordance with the department’s  strategic and long-term goals. Yet DOD does not have a focal point to  provide visibility into the totality of these urgent needs activities. Without  DOD-wide guidance on the department’s urgent needs processes and a  focal point to lead its overall efforts on urgent operational needs and to act  as an advocate within the department for issues related to the  department’s ability to rapidly respond to urgent needs, DOD is likely to  continue to risk duplicative, overlapping, and fragmented efforts, which  contributes to inefficiency and loss of potential financial savings.  Additionally, without full visibility and the establishment of a metric or  mechanism to track the status of a validated requirement, including its  transition, the department may not be able to identify key improvements.  Moreover, without a formal feedback mechanism or channel for the  military services to provide feedback, the department is likely to be  unaware of how well fielded solutions are performing. Finally, we  acknowledge that rapid response to urgent needs has a high priority, but  on the basis of our analyses we believe there are still opportunities to  achieve efficiencies without sacrificing response to the warfighter.  Without one DOD office—such as the Chief Management Officer—taking a  leadership role to analyze options for consolidating urgent needs  processes and entities, there are both real and potential risks of  duplication, overlap, and fragmentation in the efforts, as well as the risk  that DOD may not address urgent warfighter needs in the most efficient  and cost-effective manner.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To promote a more comprehensive approach to planning, management,  and oversight of the department’s fulfillment of urgent operational needs,  we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five  actions:    Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics to develop and promulgate DOD-wide guidance across all urgent  needs processes that  establishes baseline policy for the fulfillment of urgent operational  needs;  clearly defines common terms as well as the roles, responsibilities, and  authorities of the OSD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands,  and military services for all phases of the urgent needs process,  including, but not limited to, generation, validation, funding, execution,  tracking, and management of the transition, termination, or transfer  process and that incorporates all available expedited acquisition  procedures;    designates a focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (such as the Rapid  Fielding Directorate, or other entity as deemed appropriate) with the  appropriate authority and resources, dedicated to leading the  department’s urgent needs efforts, including, but not limited to: (1)  acting as an advocate within the department for issues related to  DOD’s ability to rapidly respond to urgent needs; (2) improving  visibility across all urgent needs entities and processes; and (3)  ensuring tools and mechanisms are used to track, monitor, and  manage the status of urgent needs, from validation through the  transition, including a formal feedback mechanism or channel for  military services to provide feedback on how well fielded solutions  met urgent needs; and    directs the DOD Components to establish minimum processes and  requirements for each of the above phases of the process.
Direct DOD’s Chief Management Officer to evaluate potential options for  consolidation to reduce overlap, duplication, and fragmentation, and take  appropriate action.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully concurred with all  five of our recommendations. However, DOD stated that specific actions it  will take to address these recommendations will be identified in a report  on its urgent needs processes required by the Ike Skelton National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 and due to Congress in  January 2012. This act requires DOD to review its processes for the  fielding of capabilities in response to urgent operational needs and  consider such improvements as providing a streamlined and expedited  approach, clearly defining the roles and responsibilities for carrying out all  phases of the process, and establishing a formal feedback mechanism.  Although DOD noted in its comments that actions to be taken would be  identified in its subsequent congressionally mandated report, it did  provide some actions it planned to take. For example, DOD agreed to issue  guidance to address our recommendations that DOD develop and  promulgate DOD-wide guidance across all urgent needs processes that  establishes a baseline policy and directs DOD components to establish  minimum processes and requirements across the urgent needs process.  DOD stated this policy will permit DOD components to operate their own  processes, but would maintain a sufficient baseline commonality to  maintain DOD oversight. We agree that nothing in our recommendations  preclude the DOD components from maintaining their own urgent needs  processes, but as we reported, these processes should be part of a  comprehensive DOD-wide approach for how all urgent needs should be  addressed.
Additionally, with regard to our recommendation that DOD develop  guidance that identifies a focal point to lead the department’s urgent needs  efforts, DOD stated that the Director of the JRAC would act in this  capacity pending the outcome of the congressionally mandated study. We  agree that this would be a good step towards addressing our  recommendation until DOD completes its review. Finally, in concurring  with our recommendation that DOD evaluate potential options for  consolidation, DOD stated that the Deputy Chief Management Officer and  the military services’ Chief Management Officers would provide oversight  and assistance in DOD’s review of the end-to-end process with regard to  utilizing process improvement techniques and tools. Providing this DOD  review specifically includes an evaluation of potential consolidation  options, we agree that it would address our recommendation. Technical  comments were provided separately and incorporated as appropriate. The  department’s written comments are reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees and the Secretary of Defense. This report will be available at  no charge on GAO’s website, http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-8365 or by e-mail at SolisW@gao.gov. Contact information for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on   the last page of this report. GAO staff who have made major contributions  to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine what entities exist within the Department of Defense (DOD)  for responding to urgent operational needs and to what extent, if any,  there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication in their missions, roles, and  responsibilities, we reviewed the Defense Science Board Task Force  report and used it as our starting point to identify the joint and service  entities involved in the fulfillment of urgent operational needs. We  interviewed officials from the Defense Science Board Task Force to gain  an understanding of their methodology, their findings, and their  recommendations. We developed a 46-question data-collection instrument  to collect information from the urgent needs entities identified by the  Defense Science Board report to determine the entities’ roles and the  extent of their involvement in the various activities of the urgent needs  processes. For example, for each entity, we collected general information  on the mission, role, and responsibility, organizational structure, and  impetus for creation; the roles and processes the entity employs with  respect to urgent needs; and specifically how the entity is involved in the  vetting, funding, tracking, and transitioning of urgent needs. Prior to  fielding the data-collection instrument, we tested it with two entities and  adjusted the questions and layout based on the feedback we received.  Moreover, in an effort to identify any additional urgent needs entities not  captured by the Defense Science Board Task Force or by us in our  background research, we employed a “snowball” sampling technique,  whereby we included our list of urgent needs entities and asked each  entity (1) if it was aware of any others that are involved in the response  and fulfillment of urgent operational needs and (2) if it interfaces with any  other organizations or programs with regards to managing the urgent  operational needs process. We then contacted those entities that the  respondents had identified to better understand the population of urgent  needs related entities. After analyzing data provided as well as interviews  with DOD, military service, selected combatant command, and entity  officials, we judgmentally selected the entities included in our analysis to  exclude entities that did not meet our definition of an urgent needs  organization. For example, we did not include the department’s  Commander’s Emergency Response Program after reviewing its mission  and purpose. After the urgent needs entities responded to the data- collection instruments, we created a database and analyzed the variables  to gain an understanding of the mission, roles, and responsibilities, as well  as the organizational structure, and impetus for creation of the entity, and  the roles and processes the entity employs with respect to urgent needs.  On the basis of this data as well as our analyses of DOD’s urgent needs  policies and guidance, the Defense Science Board Task Force report, and  other relevant documents, we identified six broad urgent needs activities  involved after the submission of an urgent needs statement: validation,  facilitation, sourcing, execution, tracking, and transition, transfer, or  termination. We then analyzed the data obtained through the data- collection instrument and other documentation to identify the prevalence  of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication in response to urgent needs  between and among the entities and within DOD more generally. In order  to present the cost analysis for each urgent needs entity in consistent  terms, all cost data in this report are in fiscal year 2010 dollars. We  converted cost information to fiscal year 2010 dollars using conversion  factors from the DOD Comptroller’s National Defense Budget Estimates  for Fiscal Year 2010.
To determine the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive approach for  managing and overseeing its various activities to address urgent needs  identified by warfighters in-theater, we reviewed key documents including  the Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD’s Strategic Management Plan, prior  National Defense Authorization Acts, and other public laws. We examined  these documents to gain an understanding of the department’s strategic  goals as well as to examine any potential effects each had on the  department’s rapid acquisition and urgent needs processes. We analyzed  joint and military service policies pertaining to the fulfillment of urgent  operational needs, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  Instruction 3470.01; Army Regulation 71-9; Air Force Instructions 63-114  and 10-601; Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2C and Secretary of the  Navy Notice 5000; Marine Corps Order 3900.17; DOD Joint Improvised  Explosive Device Defeat Organization Instruction 5000.01; and U.S. Special  Operations Command Directives 70-1 and 71-4, to gain an understanding of  roles and responsibilities involved in fulfilling urgent needs, what  constitutes an urgent need, and to assess whether the department has  comprehensive departmentwide policy for establishing a baseline on how  urgent needs are to be addressed, including key aspects of the process  such as generation, validation, or tracking. Likewise, we analyzed  forthcoming DOD policies, including the department’s Directive-Type  Memorandum 10-002, which seeks to establish policy, assign  responsibilities, and outline procedures for the resolution of joint urgent  operational needs. We conducted comparative analysis of the policies to  identify the differences between the varying policies to identify the extent  of any fragmentation. We interviewed relevant DOD officials, including  senior defense officials within the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, including the Rapid  Fielding Directorate, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost  Assessment and Program Evaluation to gain an understanding of the  totality of the department’s efforts to satisfy urgent warfighter  requirements as well as on the metrics used to evaluate the effectiveness  of the capability solutions developed to address urgent needs. Likewise,  we interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, selected combatant  commands, and each military service, including acquisition and Program  Management / Program Executive Officials to further our understanding of  how urgent needs are fulfilled; how the processes are managed and  overseen; and what improvements, if any, are warranted. In addition, we  interviewed officials at each entity we identified to gain an understanding  of their mission, role, and responsibilities, how data on their joint or  service-specific fulfillment of urgent needs is tracked and reported to  senior level officials, and what improvements, if any, are warranted.
To determine the extent to which DOD comprehensively evaluated its  urgent needs entities and processes and identified potential for  consolidations, we contacted senior defense officials within the Office of  the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation, selected combatant commands, and the military services to  identify and obtain any studies, reports, or analysis conducted by the  department on its fulfillment of urgent needs. Using this information,  together with analysis of prior reports and studies and the responses from  our data-collection instrument, we developed several options that DOD  may wish to consider, including a variety of consolidation options for the  entities and processes responsible for responding to urgent operational  needs. We tested and analyzed these options in terms of their potential  capacity to gain increased efficiencies in the visibility, coordination,  management, and oversight of the department’s urgent needs process as  well as to reduce duplication, overlap, and fragmentation, if any.
We visited or contacted the following offices during our review:  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Task Force, Washington,  D.C.
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Washington, D.C.    Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle Task Force, Washington, D.C.
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and  Assessment Directorate (J8), Washington, D.C.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation, Washington, D.C.
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics, Washington, D.C.
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Office   Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell    Rapid Fielding Directorate    Complex Systems, Joint Capability Technology Demonstration    U.S. Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration Office, Washington,  D.C.
Defense Science Board, Washington, D.C.
Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7, Washington, D.C.    Asymmetric Warfare Group, Fort Meade, Maryland    Biometrics Identity Management Agency, Washington, D.C.    Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Capability  Integration Division, Washington, D.C.
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics,  and Technology, Army Science Board, Arlington, Virginia    Program Executive Office—Command, Control, and Communications– Tactical, Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Program Directorate, Fort  Monmouth, New Jersey    Program Executive Office—Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors,  Night Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition, Fort  Belvoir, Virginia    Program Executive Office—Soldier, Directorate of Logistics (G4)  (formerly known as Rapid Fielding Initiative Directorate), Fort Belvoir,  Virginia    Rapid Equipping Force, Fort Belvoir, Virginia    Research, Development, and Engineering Command, Aberdeen Proving    Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize, Washington, D.C.    Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia    Army Capabilities Integration Center    Human Terrain System    Chief of Naval Operations, N81D, Washington, D.C.    Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Expeditionary Warfare,  Washington, D.C.
Navy Comptroller’s Office, Washington, D.C.    Office of Naval Research, Office of Transition, Rapid Development and  Deployment Program, Arlington, Virginia   Combat Development Command, Capabilities Development Directorate,    Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition,  Washington, D.C.
Requirements Policy & Process Division, Directorate of Operational  Capability Requirements, Washington, D.C.
Air Force Comptroller’s Office, Washington, D.C.    Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois    645th Aeronautical Systems Group (Big Safari), Wright-Patterson Air  Force Base, Dayton, Ohio    Rapid Capabilities Office, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida    U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany    U.S. Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs,    U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa,    U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois  We conducted this performance audit from February 2010 to March 2011  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Cary B. Russell (Assistant  Director), Usman Ahmad, Laura G. Czohara, Lonnie McAllister II, John  Ortiz, Richard Powelson, Steve Pruitt, Amie Steele, Ryan Stott, John  Strong, Tristan To, Nicole Vahlkamp, Elizabeth Wood, Delia P. Zee, and  Karen Zuckerstein made key contributions to this report.