Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Should Improve Outcomes, but Progress Is Still Lagging Overall
Published: 2011-03-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is critical for recapitalizing tactical air forces and will require a long-term commitment to very large annual funding outlays. The estimated total investment cost is currently about $385 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft. Because of a history of relatively poor cost and schedule outcomes, defense leadership over the past year has directed a comprehensive restructuring of the JSF program that is continuing. This testimony draws substantially from our extensive body of work on the JSF, including the current annual review mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84 244 (2009). Our draft report is being reviewed by the Department and we expect to issue it early next month. That report and this testimony discusses (1) program cost and schedule changes and their implications on affordability; (2) progress made during 2010; (3) design and manufacturing maturity; and (4) test plans and progress. GAO's work included analyses of a wide range of program documents and interviews with defense and contractor officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD continues to restructure the JSF program, taking positive, substantial actions that should lead to more achievable and predictable outcomes. Restructuring has consequences--higher up-front development costs, fewer aircraft bought in the near term, training delays, and extended times for testing and delivering capabilities to warfighters. Total development funding is now estimated at $56.4 billion to complete in 2018, a 26 percent cost increase and a 5-year schedule slip from the current baseline. DOD also reduced procurement quantities by 246 aircraft through 2016, but has not calculated the net effects of restructuring on total procurement costs nor approved a new baseline. Affordability for the U.S. and partners is challenged by a near doubling in average unit prices since program start and higher estimated life-cycle costs. Going forward, the JSF requires unprecedented funding levels in a period of more austere defense budgets. The program had mixed success in 2010, achieving 6 of 12 major goals and progressing in varying degrees on the rest. Successes included the first flight of the carrier variant, award of a fixed-price aircraft procurement contract, and an accelerated pace in development flight tests that accomplished three times as many flights in 2010 as the previous 3 years combined. However, the program did not deliver as many aircraft to test and training sites as planned and made only a partial release of software capabilities. The short takeoff and landing (STOVL) variant had significant technical problems and deficient flight test performance. DOD directed a 2-year period to evaluate and engineer STOVL solutions. After more than 9 years in development and 4 in production, the JSF program has not fully demonstrated that the aircraft design is stable, manufacturing processes are mature, and the system is reliable. Engineering drawings are still being released to the manufacturing floor and design changes continue at higher rates than desired. More changes are expected as testing accelerates. Test and production aircraft cost more and are taking longer to deliver than expected. Manufacturers are improving operations and implemented 8 of 20 recommendations from an expert panel, but have not yet demonstrated a capacity to efficiently produce at higher production rates. Substantial improvements in factory throughput and the global supply chain are needed. Development testing is still early in demonstrating that aircraft will work as intended and meet warfighter requirements. About 4 percent of JSF capabilities have been completely verified by flight tests, lab results, or both. Only 3 of the extensive network of 32 ground test labs and simulation models are fully accredited to ensure the fidelity of results. Software development--essential for achieving about 80 percent of the JSF functionality--is significantly behind schedule as it enters its most challenging phase.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and members of the Tactical  Air and Land Forces Subcommittee:  Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the F-35 Lightning  II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The JSF is the Department  of Defense’s (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking  to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air  Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is the  core of DOD’s long-term tactical aircraft recapitalization plans as it is  intended to replace hundreds of legacy aircraft. Total planned U.S.  investment in JSF is now about $385 billion to develop and acquire 2,457  aircraft through 2035. With such a substantial funding commitment  amidst  pressing warfighter requirements for this next generation capability, DOD  has lately recognized numerous technical, financial, and management  shortcomings and continues to significantly restructure the program,  adding more time and money and making other changes that we support.
GAO has reported on the JSF acquisition program for a number of years.  Our March 2010 report discussed additional cost and schedule pressures,  unsatisfactory performance in manufacturing and delivering aircraft, and  concerns about not meeting warfighter requirements on time and in  quantity. We concluded that DOD’s plans to restructure the JSF program,  just announced before our report was issued, were well-founded, if  overdue. Also in March 2010, the Department declared that the program  experienced a breach of the critical cost growth statutory threshold and  subsequently certified to Congress in June 2010 that the JSF program  should continue. Appendix I summarizes the evolution of JSF cost and  schedule estimates at key junctures in its acquisition history through the  Nunn-McCurdy certification. Since then, in January 2011, the Secretary of  Defense announced additional development cost increases and further  changes consequent to the ongoing restructure, but has not yet established  a new approved acquisition program baseline.
My comments today are focused largely on our latest review. Our draft  report is with DOD for comment and we expect to issue it early next  month. This will be the second annual JSF report under our current  mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.  For our latest report, we (1) evaluated program cost and schedule changes  and their implications on affordability; (2) identified progress made in  2010 against established goals; (3) assessed elements of design stability  and manufacturing maturity and reviewed production results; and (4)  reported the status of development testing and technical challenges facing  the program. To conduct this work, we evaluated DOD’s restructuring  actions and impacts on the program, tracked cost and schedule changes,  and determined factors driving the changes. We reviewed program status  reports, manufacturing data, test plans, and internal DOD analyses. We  discussed results to date and future plans to complete JSF development  and move further into procurement with officials from DOD, the JSF  program office, contractor officials, and members of the independent  review teams. We toured aircraft and engine manufacturing plants,  obtained production and supply performance indicators, and discussed  improvements underway with contractors. We conducted this  performance audit from May 2010 to March 2011 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: JSF Restructuring Improves Program, but Affordability Is Challenged by Rising Costs and Delays
paragraphs: Over the past year, DOD has substantially restructured the JSF program,  taking positive actions that should lead to more achievable and  predictable outcomes. Restructuring has consequences—higher  development costs, fewer aircraft in the near term, training delays, and  extended times for testing and delivering capabilities to warfighters. Key  restructuring changes include the following:    The total system development cost estimate rose to $56.4 billion and  its schedule was extended to 2018. This represents a 26 percent  increase in cost and a 5-year slip in schedule compared to the current  approved program baseline established in 2007.
Resources and time were added to development testing. Testing plans  were made more robust by adding another development test aircraft  and the use of several production aircraft; increasing the number of  test flights by one-third; extending development testing to 2016; and  reducing its overlap with initial operational testing.
Near-term procurement quantities were reduced by 246 aircraft  through 2016; the annual rate of increase in production was lowered;  and the full-rate production decision moved to 2018, a 5-year slip from  the current baseline.
The military services were directed to reexamine their initial  operational capability (IOC) requirements, the critical need dates when  the warfighter must have in place the first increment of operational  forces available for combat. We expect the Marine Corps’ IOC will slip  significantly from its current 2012 date and that the Air Force’s and  Navy’s IOC dates will also slip from the current dates in 2016.
To address technical problems and test deficiencies for the short  takeoff and landing (STOVL) variant, the Department significantly  scaled back its procurement quantities and directed a 2-year period for  evaluating and engineering technical solutions to inform future  decisions on this variant. DOD also “decoupled” STOVL testing from  the other two variants so as not to delay them and to allow all three to  proceed at their own speeds.
The fiscal year 2012 Defense Budget reflects the financial effects from  restructuring actions through fiscal year 2016. The net effect was  increased development funding and decreased procurement funding in the  near term. For example, compared to last year’s estimate for the same  year, DOD for fiscal year 2012 requested an increase of $520 million for  JSF development and a decrease of $2.6 billion for procurement, reflecting  the reduction of 13 aircraft and associated spares. Table 1 summarizes the  revised procurement funding requirements and annual quantities during  this 5-year period following the Secretary’s reductions. Even after  decreasing annual quantities and lowering the production rate of increase,  JSF procurement still escalates significantly. Annual procurement funding  levels more than double and quantities more than triple during this period.  These numbers do not include the additional orders expected from the  international partners.
DOD does not yet know the full impact from restructuring actions on  future procurement funding requirements beyond this 5-year period. Cost  analysts are still calculating the net effects from deferring the near-term  procurement of 246 aircraft to future years and from lowering the annual  rate of increased procurement. After a Nunn-McCurdy breach of the  critical cost growth threshold and DOD certification, the most recent  milestone must be rescinded, the program restructured to address the  cause of the breach, and a new acquisition program baseline must be  approved that reflects the certification approved by the milestone decision  authority. The Secretary has not yet granted new milestone B approval for  the JSF nor approved a new acquisition program baseline. Future funding  requirements could be higher than projected and the quantities, which are  considered affordable by the U.S. and allies, could be reduced, further  driving up unit costs.
Affordability—in terms of the investment costs to acquire the JSF, the  continuing costs to operate and maintain it over the life-cycle, and its  impact on other defense programs—is a challenging issue. Including the  funding added by the restructuring actions, system development cost  estimates have increased 64 percent since program start. (App. II  summarizes the increases in target prices on development contracts, and  major cost drivers contributing to increased system development funding  requirements.) Also, the estimated average unit procurement price for the  JSF has about doubled since program start and current forecasts indicate  that life-cycle costs will be substantially higher than the legacy aircraft it  replaces. Rising JSF costs erode buying power and may make it difficult  for the U.S. and its allies to buy and sustain as many aircraft as planned.
Going forward, the JSF will require unprecedented demands for funding in  a period of more austere defense budgets where it will have to annually  compete with other defense and nondefense priorities for the  discretionary federal dollar. Figure 1 illustrates the substantive annual  development and procurement funding requirements—almost $11 billion  on average through program completion in 2035. This reflects the  program’s estimate at the time of the fiscal year 2011 budget submission.  These funding levels do not include additional funding increases pursuant  to the June 2010 Nunn-McCurdy certification nor funding changes in the  fiscal year 2012 budget request. As discussed earlier, defense cost analysts  are still computing the long-term procurement funding requirements  reflecting the deferral of aircraft to future years.
section_title: Progress In Achieving the JSF Program’s 2010 Goals Was Mixed
paragraphs: The JSF program established 12 clearly stated goals in testing, contracting,  and manufacturing for completion in calendar year 2010. It had mixed  success, achieving 6 goals and making varying degrees of progress on the  other 6. For example, the program exceeded its goal for the number of  development flight tests but did not deliver as many test and production  aircraft as planned. Also, the program awarded its first fixed-price contract  on its fourth lot of production aircraft, but did not award the fixed-price  engine contract in 2010 as planned. Table 2 summarizes JSF goals and  accomplishments for 2010.
Although still hampered by the late delivery of test aircraft to testing sites,  the development flight test program significantly ramped up operations in  2010, accomplishing 3 times as many test flights as the previous 3 years  combined. The Air Force conventional takeoff and landing variant  significantly exceeded the annual plan while initial limited testing of the  Navy’s carrier variant was judged satisfactory, below plans for the number  and hours of flight but ahead on flight test points flown. The Marine  Corps STOVL, however, substantially underperformed in flight tests,  experienced significant down times for maintenance, and was challenged  by several technical issues unique to this variant that could add to its  weight and cost. The STOVL’s problems were a major factor in the  Secretary’s decision to give the STOVL a 2-year period to solve engineer issues, assess impacts, and inform a future decision as to whether and h to proceed with this variant. Table 3 summarizes 2010 flight test results fo each variant.
section_title: Program Has Still Not Fully Demonstrated a Stable Design and Mature Manufacturing Processes as It Enters Its Fifth Year of Production
paragraphs: After completing 9 years of system development and 4 years of  overlapping production activities, the JSF program has been slow to gain  adequate knowledge to ensure its design is stable and the manufacturing  process ready for greater levels of annual production. The JSF program  still lags in achieving critical indicators of success expected from well- performing acquisition programs. Specifically, the program has not yet  stabilized aircraft designs—engineering changes continue at higher than  expected rates long after critical design reviews and well into  procurement, and more changes are expected as testing accelerates. Also,  manufacturing cost increases and delays in delivering test and production  aircraft indicate need for substantial improvements in factory throughput  and performance of the global supply chain.
Engineering drawings released since design review and the number and  rate of design changes exceed those planned at program outset and are  not in line with best practices. Critical design reviews were completed on  the three aircraft variants in 2006 and 2007 and the designs declared  mature, but the program continues to experience numerous changes.  Since 2007, the program has produced 20,000 additional engineering  drawings, a 50-percent increase in total drawings and about five times  more than best practices suggest. In addition, changes to drawings have  not yet decreased and leveled off as planned. Figure 2 tracks and  compares monthly design changes and future forecasts against contractor  plans in 2007.
The monthly rate in 2009 and 2010 was higher than expected and the  program now anticipates more changes over a longer period of time— about 10,000 more changes through January 2016. With most of  development testing still ahead for the JSF, the risk and impact from  required design changes are significant. In addition, emerging concerns  about the STOVL lift fan and drive shaft, fatigue cracks in a ground test  article, and stealth-related issues may drive additional and substantive  design changes.
As in prior years, lingering management inefficiencies, including  substantial out-of-station work and part shortages, continued to increase  the labor needed to manufacture test aircraft. Although there have been  improvements in these factors, final acceptance and delivery of test jets  were still delayed. Total labor hours required to produce the test aircraft  increased over time. The cumulative actual labor hours through 2010 to  complete the 12 test aircraft exceeded the budgeted hours estimated in  2007 by more than 1.5 million hours, a 75 percent increase. Figure 3  depicts forecasted and actual labor hours for building test jets.
DOD began procuring production jets in 2007 and has now ordered 58  aircraft on the first four low-rate initial production lots. The JSF program  anticipated the delivery of 14 production aircraft through 2010, but none  have been delivered. Delivery of the first two production jets has been  delayed several times since the contract was signed and is now expected in April 2011. The prices on the first three cost-reimbursable production  contracts have increased from amounts negotiated at contract award an the completion dates for delivering aircraft have been extended over 9  months on average. We are encouraged by DOD’s award of a fixed-price  incentive fee contract for lot 4 production and the prospects for the cos t  study to inform lot 5 negotiations, but we have not examined cont specifications. Accumulating a large backlog of jets on order but  undelivered is not an efficient use of federal funds, tying up millions of  dollars in  produce.  obligations ahead of the ability of the manufacturing process to  The aircraft and engine manufacturers now have significantly more ite in production flow compared to prior years and are making efforts to implement restructuring actions and recommendations from expert  defense teams assembled to evaluate and improve production and su operations. Eight of 20 key recommendations from the independent  manufacturing review team have been implemented as of Septemb Until improvements are fully implemented and demonstrated, the  restructuring actions to reduce near term procurement quantities and  establish a more achievable ramp rate are appropriate and will provide  more time to fully mature manufacturing and supply processes and catch up with aircraft backlogs. Improving factory throughput and controlling  costs—driving down labor and material costs and delivering on time— are o the warfighter  essential for efficient manufacturing and timely delivery t at the increased production rates planned for the future.  er 2010.
section_title: Testing Has Been Slow and Has Not Demonstrated That the Aircraft Wil in Its Intended
paragraphs: Since the first flight in December 2006, only about 4 percent of JSF  capabilities have been completely verified by flight tests, lab results,  both. The pace of flight testing accelerated significantly in 2010, but  overall progress is still much below plans forecast several years ago.  Furthermore, only a small portion of the extensive network of ground te labs and simulation models are fully accredited to ensure the fidelity of  results. Software development—essential for achieving about 80 percent is significantly behind schedule as it enters its  of the JSF functionality— most challenging phase.
Development flight testing was much more active in 2010 than prior ye and had some notable successes, but cumulatively still lagged behind  previous expectations. The continuing effects from late delivery of test  aircraft and an inability to achieve the planned flying rates per aircraft  ars  substantially reduced the amount and pace of testing planned previously.  Consequently, even though the flight test program accelerated its pace la year, the total number of flights accomplished during the first 4 years ofthe test program significantly lagged expectations when the program’s  2007 baseline was established. Figure 4 shows that the cumulative numbe of flights accomplished by the end of 2010 was only number forecast by this time in the 2007 test plan.
By the end of 2010, about 10 percent of more than 50,000 planned flight  test points had been completed. The majority of the points were earned on airworthiness tests (basic airframe handling characteristics) and in  ferrying the planes to test sites. Remaining test points include more  complex and stringent requirements, such as mission systems, ship  suitability, and weapons integration that have yet to be demonstrated.
The JSF test program relies much more heavily than previous weapon  systems on its modeling and simulation labs to test and verify aircraft  design and subsystem performance. However, only 3 of 32 labs and models  have been fully accredited to date. The program had planned to accred it 11  labs and models by now. Accreditation is essential to validate that the  models accurately reflect aircraft performance and it largely depends upo flight test data to ground testing for some flight testing is unproven. Contracting officials  told us that early results are providing good correlation between ground  and flight tests.   verify lab results. Moreover, the ability to substitute  Software providing essential JSF capability is not mature and releases  the test program are behind schedule. Officials underestimated the time  and effort needed to develop and integrate the software, substantially  nd  contributing to the program’s overall cost and schedule problems a testing delays, and requiring the retention of engineers for longer periods Significant learning and development work remains before the program  can demonstrate the mature software capabilities needed to meet  warfighter requirements. The JSF software development effort is one of  the largest and most complex in DOD history, providing functionality  essential to capabilities such as sensor fusion, weapons and fire control,  maintenance diagnostics, and propulsion. JSF depends on millions more  lines of software code than the F-22A Raptor and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet lines  While good progress has been reported on the writing of code, total . . of code have grown by 40 percent since preliminary design review and 13 cal design review. The amount of code needed will  percent since the criti likely increase as integration and testing efforts intensify. A second  software integration line added as part of the restructuring will impr capacity and output.
Delays in developing, integrating, and releasing software to the te program have cascading effects hampering flight tests, training, and lab  accreditation. While progress is being made, a substantial amount of  software work remains before the program can demonstrate full  warfighting capability. The program released its second block, or  increment, to flight test nearly 2 years later than the plan set in 2006,  largely due to integration problems. Each of the remaining three blocks— providing full mission systems and warfighting capabilities—are now  projected to slip more than 3 years compared to the 2006 plan. Figure 5  st  ates the actual and projected slips for each of the 5 software blocks  g software to the test program.
section_title: Concluding Remarks
paragraphs: The JSF program is at a critical juncture—9 years in development and      4 years in limited production–but still early in flight testing to verify  aircraft design and performance. If effectively implemented and sustaine the restructuring DOD is conducting should place the JSF program on a  firmer footing and lead to more achievable and predictable outcomes.  However, restructuring comes with a price—higher development costs,  fewer aircraft received in the near term, training delays, prolonged times  for testing and delivering the capabilities required by the warfighter, and  impacts on other defense programs and priorities. Reducing near-term  d,  procurement quantities lessens, but does not eliminate the still substant and risky concurrency of development and production. Development testing activities will now overlap 11 years of procurement. Flight testing and production activities are increasing and contractors are improving  supply and manufacturing processes, but deliveries are still lagging.  Slowed deliveries have led to a growing backlog of jets on order but not  delivered. This is not a good use of federal funds, obligating millions of  dollars well before the manufacturing process can deliver aircraft.
We agree with defense leadership that a renewed and sustained focus on  affordability by contractors and the government is critical to mo ving this  important program forward and enabling our military services and our  allies to acquire and sustain JSF forces in needed quantities. Maintainin senior leadership’s increased focus on program results, holding  government and contractors accountable for improving performance bringing a more responsible management approach to the JSF to “live  within its means” may help limit future cost growth and the consequence for other programs in the portfolio. The JSF acquisition demands an  unprecedented share of the Department’s future investment funding. The  program’s size and priority are such that its cost overruns and extended  schedules must either be borne by funding cuts to other programs or else  drive increases in the top line of defense spending; the latter may not be  n a period of more austere budgets. Given the other priorities that  option i DOD must address in a finite budget, JSF affordability is critical and DOD  m future.  ust plan ahead to address and manage JSF challenges and risks in the  Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and members of the Tactical  Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, this completes my prepared  statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this statement, please contact Michael Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement  are Bruce Fairbairn, Charlie Shivers, Julie Hadley, W. Kendal Roberts,  LeAnna Parkey, and Matt Lea.
section_title: Appendix I: Changes in Reported JSF Program Cost, Quantities, and Deliveries
paragraphs: development start)
December 2003 (2004  replan) baseline)
April 2010  (initial program  restructure)
June 2010 (Nunn-McCurdy)
Cost estimates (then-year dollars in billions)
Unit cost estimates (then-year dollars in millions)
section_title: Appendix II: Systems Development Contracts Target Price History and Engine Schedules
paragraphs: Projected costs for three contracts comprise about 80 percent of total  system development funding requirements. The airframe and primary  engine development contracts have experienced significant price  increases since contract awards—79 percent and 69 percent respectively.  The alternate, or second, engine contract price has increased about 12  percent. By design, it began about 4 years after the primary engine  contract and has a more limited scope. The primary engine contract  includes development of both the common engine and the STOVL lift  system while the alternate engine contract develops its version of the  conventional common engine. Figures 6, 7, and 8 depict the price histories  for these three contracts and the reasons behind major price increases.
Table 4 shows changes in engine development schedules. The initial  service release milestone usually coincides with low rate initial  production. The engine should have completed required verification  activities and meet specification requirements. The operational capability  release milestone is generally associated with the start of full-rate  production when the engine is acceptable for full production release.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Fighter Force Structure Reports Generally  Addressed Congressional Mandates, but Reflected Dated Plans and  Guidance, and Limited Analyses. GAO-11-323R. Washington, D.C.:  February 24, 2011.
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Monitor and Assess Corrective  Actions Resulting from Its Corrosion Study of the F-35 Joint Strike  Fighter. GAO-11-171R. Washington D.C.: December 16, 2010.
Joint Strike Fighter: Assessment of DOD’s Funding Projection for the  F136 Alternate Engine. GAO-10-1020R. Washington, D.C.: September 15,  2010.
Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Ability to Meet Future Requirements is  Uncertain, with Key Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment  Decisions. GAO-10-789. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2010.
Joint Strike Fighter: Significant Challenges and Decisions Ahead.   GAO-10-478T. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2010.
Joint Strike Fighter: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not Meeting  Warfighter Requirements on Time. GAO-10-382. Washington, D.C.:      March 19, 2010.
Joint Strike Fighter: Significant Challenges Remain as DOD  Restructures Program. GAO-10-520T. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2010.
Joint Strike Fighter: Strong Risk Management Essential as Program  Enters Most Challenging Phase. GAO-09-711T. Washington, D.C.: May 20,  2009.
Joint Strike Fighter: Accelerating Procurement before Completing  Development Increases the Government's Financial Risk. GAO-09-303.  Washington D.C.: March 12, 2009.
Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on Program Risks.  GAO-08-569T. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.
Joint Strike Fighter: Recent Decisions by DOD Add to Program Risks.  GAO-08-388. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.
Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment  Strategy. GAO-07-415. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.
Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain. GAO-07-360.  Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter  Alternate Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis.  GAO-06-717R. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience  Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD’s Revised Policy. GAO-06-368.  Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Get Better Results on Weapons  Systems Investments. GAO-06-585T. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2006.
Tactical Aircraft: Recapitalization Goals Are Not Supported by  Knowledge-Based F-22A and JSF Business Cases. GAO-06-487T.  Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2006.
Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing  Demonstrates Acceptable Performance. GAO-06-356. Washington, D.C.:  March 15, 2006.
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