Overseas Presence: Conditions of Overseas Diplomatic Facilities
Published: 2003-03-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The 1998 terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed more than 220 people and injured 4,000, highlighted the compelling need for safe and secure overseas facilities. In November 1999, an independent advisory group, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, said that thousands of Americans representing our nation abroad faced an unacceptable level of risk from terrorist attacks and other threats. The panel called for accelerating the process of addressing security risks to provide overseas staff with the safest working environment, consistent with the nation's resources and the demands of their missions. Moreover, the panel concluded that many U.S. overseas facilities were insecure, decrepit, deteriorating, overcrowded, and "shockingly shabby," and it recommended major capital improvements to redress these problems. GAO was asked to (1) assess the current conditions of overseas diplomatic facilities, including security, maintenance, office space, and information technology; and (2) provide some preliminary observations regarding State's efforts to improve facility conditions by replacing existing buildings with new, secure embassy compounds.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The State Department has done much over the last 4 years to improve physical security at overseas posts. For example, State has constructed perimeter walls, anti-ram barriers, and access controls at many facilities. However, even with these improvements, most office facilities do not meet security standards. As of December 2002, the primary office building at 232 posts lacked desired security because it did not meet one or more of State's five key current security standards of (1) 100-foot setback between office facilities and uncontrolled areas; (2) perimeter walls and/or fencing; (3) anti-ram barriers; (4) blast-resistant construction techniques and materials; and (5) controlled access at the perimeter of the compound. Only 12 posts have a primary building that meets all five standards. As a result, thousands of U.S. government and foreign national employees may be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Moreover, many of the primary office buildings at embassies and consulates are in poor condition. In fact, the primary office building at more than half of the posts does not meet certain fire/life safety standards. State estimates that there is a backlog of about $730 million in maintenance at overseas facilities; officials stated that maintenance costs would increase over time because of the age of many buildings. At least 96 posts have reported serious overcrowding. While State continues to fund some security upgrades at embassies and consulates, State is shifting its resources from these upgrades toward constructing new buildings and substantially retrofitting existing, newly acquired, or leased buildings. Funding for these capital projects has increased from $9.5 million in fiscal year 1998 to a requested $890 million in fiscal year 2004. In addition to completing ongoing construction projects, State believes it needs to replace facilities at about 160 posts at an estimated cost of $16 billion. At the proposed fiscal year 2004 rate of funding, it will take more than 20 years to fully fund and build replacement facilities. While GAO has not fully analyzed State's performance in the early stages of this large-scale building program, GAO has observed that State has taken a number of positive steps to improve its program management. Because of the high costs and importance of this program, GAO believes the program merits extensive oversight.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The 1998 terrorist bombings of the  U.S. embassies in Kenya and  Tanzania, which killed more than  220 people and injured 4,000,  highlighted the compelling need for  safe and secure overseas facilities.   In November 1999, an independent  advisory group, the Overseas  Presence Advisory Panel, said that  thousands of Americans  representing our nation abroad  faced an unacceptable level of risk  from terrorist attacks and other  threats.  The panel called for  accelerating the process of  addressing security risks to provide  overseas staff with the safest  working environment, consistent  with the nation’s resources and the  demands of their missions.   Moreover, the panel concluded that  many U.S. overseas facilities were  insecure, decrepit, deteriorating,  overcrowded, and “shockingly  shabby,” and it recommended  major capital improvements to  redress these problems.
The State Department has done much over the last 4 years to improve  physical security at overseas posts.  For example, State has constructed  perimeter walls, anti-ram barriers, and access controls at many facilities.   However, even with these improvements, most office facilities do not meet  security standards.  As of December 2002, the primary office building at 232  posts lacked desired security because it did not meet one or more of State’s  five key current security standards of (1) 100-foot setback between office  facilities and uncontrolled areas; 2) perimeter walls and/or fencing; (3) anti- ram barriers; (4) blast-resistant construction techniques and materials; and  (5) controlled access at the perimeter of the compound.  Only 12 posts have  a primary building that meets all 5 standards.  As a result, thousands of U.S.  government and foreign national employees may be vulnerable to terrorist  attacks.  Moreover, many of the primary office buildings at embassies and  consulates are in poor condition.  In fact, the primary office building at more  than half of the posts does not meet certain fire/life safety standards.  State  estimates that there is a backlog of about $730 million in maintenance at  overseas facilities; officials stated that maintenance costs would increase  over time because of the age of many buildings.  At least 96 posts have  reported serious overcrowding.
GAO was asked to (1) assess the  current conditions of overseas  diplomatic facilities, including  security, maintenance, office space,  and information technology; and  (2) provide some preliminary  observations regarding State’s  efforts to improve facility  conditions by replacing existing  buildings with new, secure  embassy compounds.
While State continues to fund some security upgrades at embassies and  consulates, State is shifting its resources from these upgrades toward  constructing new buildings and substantially retrofitting existing, newly  acquired, or leased buildings.  Funding for these capital projects has  increased from $9.5 million in fiscal year 1998 to a requested $890 million in  fiscal year 2004.  In addition to completing ongoing construction projects,  State believes it needs to replace facilities at about 160 posts at an estimated  cost of $16 billion.  At the proposed fiscal year 2004 rate of funding, it will  take more than 20 years to fully fund and build replacement facilities.  While  GAO has not fully analyzed State’s performance in the early stages of this  large-scale building program, GAO has observed that State has taken a  number of positive steps to improve its program management.  Because of  the high costs and importance of this program, GAO believes the program  merits extensive oversight.
Number of Physical Security Standards Met by Primary Facilities   www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-557T.
To view the full report, including the scope  and methodology, click on the link above.  For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at  (202) 512-4128, or fordj@gao.gov.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am pleased to be here to discuss our work on the security and overall  conditions of U.S. embassy and consulate facilities around the world.  The  1998 terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,  which killed more than 220 people and injured 4,000, highlighted the  compelling need for safe and secure overseas facilities.  Following the  bombings, three high-level independent groups cited physical security  problems at numerous overseas facilities.  In November 1999, one of these  groups, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, said that thousands of  Americans representing our nation abroad faced an unacceptable level of  risk from terrorist attacks and other threats.  The panel called for  accelerating the process of addressing security risks to provide overseas  staff with the safest working environment, consistent with the nation’s  resources and the demands of their missions.  Moreover, the panel  concluded that many U.S. overseas facilities were insecure, decrepit,  deteriorating, overcrowded, and “shockingly shabby,” and it recommended  major capital improvements to redress these problems.  You asked us to  assess current facility conditions and what the State Department is doing  to improve them.
Today I will focus my comments on the security conditions at U.S.  embassies and consulates.  I will also discuss building maintenance, office  space, and information technology conditions.  Our observations are based  on an analysis of data from the State Department’s Bureaus of Diplomatic  Security, Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), and Information  Resources Management, and our visits last month to four posts where we  examined how facility conditions affect security risks and mission  effectiveness.  For security reasons, I will not be identifying these posts.   Finally, I will discuss some preliminary observations regarding State’s  efforts to improve facility conditions by replacing existing buildings with  new, secure embassy compounds.  These observations are based on our  ongoing review of State’s multibillion-dollar embassy and consulate  construction program on which we will report later this year.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The United States maintains more than 250 diplomatic posts, including  embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic offices, located around the  world.  More than 60,000 personnel—U.S. and foreign service nationals— work at these locations.  About 50 government agencies and subagencies  operate overseas, including the Departments of State, Defense, and  Justice; and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
Since the 1970s, U.S. diplomatic personnel overseas have been  increasingly at risk from terrorist attacks and other acts of violence.  In  response, the State Department in 1986 began a substantial embassy  construction program, known as the Inman program, to protect U.S.  personnel and facilities.  In 1991, we reported that State was unable to  complete as many projects as originally planned due to systemic  weaknesses in program management, as well as subsequent funding  limitations.  This construction program suffered from delays and cost  increases due to, among other things, poor program planning, difficulties  in acquiring sites, changes in security requirements, and inadequate  contractor performance.  Following the demise of the Inman program in  the early 1990s, the State Department initiated very few new construction  projects until the Africa embassy bombings in August 1998 prompted  additional funding.
In the 1998 bombings, terrorists attacked the U.S. embassies in Nairobi,  Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.  These large-scale truck bombings  killed more than 220 people, including 12 American U.S. government  employees and family members, 32 Kenyan national U.S. government  employees, and 8 Tanzanian national U.S. government employees.  In  addition, the bombings injured more than 4,000 Kenyans, Tanzanians, and  Americans.  Figures 1 and 2 show pictures of the embassy in Tanzania  before and after the bombings.
Since these embassy bombings, U.S. facilities and personnel have faced  continued threats from terrorist and other attacks.  Embassy and  consulate employees are on the front lines, often serving in dangerous  locations, and must rely heavily on the protection provided by the law  enforcement and security measures of the foreign country in which they  are located.  From 1998 through 2002, there were 30 terrorist attacks  against overseas posts, personnel, and diplomatic residences.  During that  same period, overseas posts were forced to evacuate personnel or suspend  operations 83 times in response to direct threats or unstable security  situations in the host country.  (See table 1.)  During the first 2 months of  2003, overseas posts authorized the departures of personnel and/or their  families a total of 11 times due to security concerns.
subsections: section_title: Security Standards
paragraphs: Before I discuss the results of our work, I want to explain some of State’s  security standards and why they are important.  State identified five key  security standards for overseas diplomatic office facilities to protect them  against terrorism and other dangers.  First, State believes that office  facilities should be at least 100 feet from uncontrolled areas, such as a  street where vehicles can pass without first being checked by security  officials.  Therefore, this distance helps to protect the buildings and  occupants against bomb blasts, mob attacks, and other threats.  In  establishing the setback standard, the State Department determined that at  100 feet, the effects of a bomb blast have diminished to the point where  the cost of site acquisition and construction to protect against the  remaining blast effects are relatively affordable.  State notes that  additional setback may not be practical at many locations.  Exhibit 1 is a  video clip from the State Department showing a test blast from 100 feet  away.
The second and third standards are strong perimeter walls and anti-ram  barriers to ensure that vehicles cannot breach the facility perimeter to get  close to the building prior to detonating a bomb.  Exhibits 2 and 3 are  video clips from the State Department showing the effectiveness of these  walls and barriers.
The fourth standard requires blast-resistant construction techniques and  materials.  Among other things, these materials include reinforced  concrete and steel construction and blast-resistant windows.  Diplomatic  Security officials state that flying glass is a primary cause of injuries and  deaths in a blast.  Coupled with a 100-foot setback, blast-resistant  construction provides the best possible protection against a vehicle bomb  attack, according to Diplomatic Security officials.  Combined, these four  standards mitigate the effect of a vehicle bomb attack and prevent the  building from suffering catastrophic collapse and complete destruction.
State’s fifth security standard is controlled access at the perimeter to the  compound.  At this control access point, guards can screen personnel and  visitors before they enter the embassy compound to verify that they have  no weapons and that they should be allowed to enter, and can fully search  vehicles before they are permitted to enter the compound.
section_title: State Has Done Much to Improve Facility Security but Most Facilities Still Do Not Meet Security Standards
paragraphs: Over the last 4 years, State has accomplished much in improving posts’  security through various security upgrades.  These upgrades include the  installation of Mylar shatter-resistant window film and forced  entry/ballistic-resistant doors; the construction of perimeter security walls  and fences, jersey barriers, and compound access controls; and the  stationing of additional police and security guards.  In June 2002, a bomb  attack against the U.S. consulate in Karachi demonstrated the  effectiveness of recent security upgrades to the compound.  As shown in  figure 3, physical damage to the building was minimized by these  upgrades.  As of September 30, 2002, State had completed security  upgrades at 113 posts and had installed Mylar window film barriers and  forced entry/ballistic-resistant doors at 242 posts.
Further, to address security concerns at some of the buildings without a  100-foot setback, State has secured host government cooperation in either  closing adjacent streets and/or posting local police officers as guards to  monitor and control surrounding streets.  State has also acquired adjacent  land at 34 posts to increase setback since the 1998 embassy bombings.   For example, State purchased a gas station next to an office annex  building in Athens, Greece, and closed the gas station, thus increasing  setback and improving security.
At all four posts we visited, we observed that recent security upgrades  have enhanced security.  At three of these posts, local authorities have  permitted closing off streets to public traffic in order to protect U.S.  facilities.  However, Diplomatic Security officials acknowledged that it is  not feasible to increase setback by acquiring land and closing off nearby  streets at many locations.  Furthermore, these officials also told us that  security upgrades were partial fixes that did not bring the buildings up to  physical security standards.  As a result, many buildings and their  occupants remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks.  Exhibit 4 is a video clip  from the State Department that illustrates this vulnerability.  It shows the  effect of a blast 100 feet away on an office that does not meet the standard  for blast-resistant construction.  The windows have been treated with  Mylar sheeting, a standard upgrade that mitigates the effects of glass  shattering in a blast.  Although Mylar provides some protection, the non- blast-resistant window construction may allow glass to be forced into the  building at a high rate of speed.
To assess the security of embassy and consulate facilities, we analyzed  State Department data to determine if the primary facilities meet State’s  five key standards that I discussed earlier.  Figure 4 shows the portion of  posts where the primary office building meets or does not meet four of the  five security standards:  setback, perimeter wall or fence, anti-ram barrier,  and compound access control.  At the request of Diplomatic Security  officials, we will not discuss details on the remaining standard, blast- resistant construction, due to its sensitivity.  We can say, however, that  facilities completed since the late 1980s are considered to be blast  resistant.  Figure 5 shows the number of primary facilities that meet one,  two, three, four, or five of the physical security standards.  For example, it  shows that the primary office facility at 81 posts met none of the five  standards.  Of these, 36 facilities are in locations that the State Department  has designated as posing a high or critical threat level.
subsections: section_title: Setback
paragraphs: As shown in figure 4, only 28, or 11 percent, of the primary buildings meet  the 100-foot setback standard.  More than half of the primary buildings  have less than 15 feet of setback—these buildings are virtually perched on  the street.  Figure 6 is an example of a post with limited setback.
At the four posts we visited, all of the primary office buildings have limited  setback from the street and several annex buildings have no setback.  As  shown in figure 7, one of these buildings is adjacent to a public gas station,  which could exacerbate the effects of a bomb attack.
Another building, with little setback, is located next to a main  thoroughfare.  Consequently, public traffic, including trucks and buses,  routinely travels within feet of U.S. government office space.  At three of  the four posts we visited, the embassy had secured host government  cooperation in closing at least one street surrounding the primary office  building; however, embassy officials at one location noted that these  agreements were temporary and could be revoked at any time.  Moreover,  the embassies had not been able to close streets running next to all of their  facilities, such as office annexes.  For example, figure 8 depicts the view  from a senior official’s office in an annex building where post officials  were unable to close the main thoroughfare that runs directly in front of  the building.
section_title: Perimeter Walls or Fences and Anti-ram Barriers
paragraphs: Perimeter walls or fences and anti-ram barriers are two standards that  work together to protect facilities.  We found that 120 primary facilities  lack an adequate perimeter wall/fence, while 147 lack adequate anti-ram  barriers.  Diplomatic Security officials explained that in many cases, posts  are unable to install these upgrades due to host country limitations, such  as their impact on traffic flow, parking, and the operation of adjoining  residences and commercial buildings.  Diplomatic Security officials stated  that perimeter upgrades have been installed at all posts that are able to  accommodate them.
section_title: Compound Access Control
paragraphs: We also found that 108 posts either lack or have inadequate compound  access control, a system of gates, barriers, and guard booths that is used to  pre-screen personnel and vehicles before entering the embassy grounds.   At one embassy we visited, visa applicants could gain access to the  embassy building prior to undergoing proper screening, which would be a  serious concern in the case of a terrorist action.  Figure 9 depicts an  inadequate compound access control booth, which is located within the  embassy compound.  The Security Officer acknowledged that this was a  serious weakness and that visitors were not screened adequately before  entering the embassy building.  Construction of a new compound access  control system is scheduled to begin in May 2003.  Figure 10 depicts a  newly upgraded compound access control system that facilitates full  screening of all vehicles and persons prior to their gaining access to the  compound.
Ambassadors and security officers at three of the four posts we visited  emphasized that in addition to facilities not meeting standards, there were  security difficulties associated with the number of office facilities at their  post that were spread out around the city.  Three of the four posts we  visited had more than five locations, and post managers were concerned  that this made it extraordinarily difficult and expensive to implement  security measures.  Officials also stated that dispersion of facilities  complicates emergency action planning.  We note that frequent travel  between dispersed facilities may also pose security risks to personnel  because terrorists and criminals can target them while they are in transit.   In the construction of new embassy compounds, all U.S. government  offices are required to be located on the compound.
section_title: Buildings Are in Poor Condition
paragraphs: State Department data show that many buildings are in poor condition.  At  133 posts, the primary office building has certain fire/life safety  deficiencies.  At one post we visited, the fire escape for the 6th floor of the  chancery was a chain-link ladder strapped to a heating radiator (fig. 11).   OBO fire officials explained that a number of posts were unable to meet  fire standards, such as sprinkler systems and proper number of exits, due  to the structural limitations of the building.  This underscores the  Department’s position that many buildings are in a condition that will not  allow a security and safety upgrade.
Another safety problem is the seismic condition of buildings.  Although the  State Department does not have data on seismic conditions at all facilities,  it acknowledges that embassy and consular employees at some locations  may be working in buildings that do not protect against earthquakes.  At  one of the posts we visited, located in an earthquake region, the consular  building has a very poor seismic rating.  The State Department has been  unable to locate a suitable temporary facility that can house the consular  services while the landlord makes seismic improvements to the current  building.  The landlord has absolved himself from any responsibility in the  event of earthquake damage.
subsections: section_title: Maintenance Is Serious Concern
paragraphs: Maintenance is a serious concern because “essential maintenance and  repair requirements have long been unfunded,” according to OBO  documents.  In May 2002, State estimated that its repair backlog to be  about $736 million.  For the primary office buildings alone, maintenance  needs exceed $316 million, with the primary building at more than one- third of all posts having more than $1 million in maintenance  requirements.  OBO projects that maintenance costs will increase over  time because many of the facilities are so old and antiquated, some dating  back to the late 19th and early 20th century.  Our visits to four posts  provided numerous examples of maintenance problems.  All of the posts  we visited had buildings with serious maintenance concerns that are  common to old and deteriorating buildings, such as sinking foundations,  crumbling walls, bursting pipes, and electrical overloads.
section_title: Office Space Is Crowded
paragraphs: Although there are no specific criteria to measure the adequacy of office  space, OBO has provided posts a questionnaire to help them evaluate  space needs.  Based on post inputs, OBO’s Long-range Overseas Buildings  Plan describes space conditions at posts where it plans a new facility or  major rehabilitation.  We counted 96 posts mentioned in the plan where  OBO described the office space as being crowded or poorly configured.   During our post visits, we verified that crowded and poorly configured  office space is a problem.  This was particularly true in the controlled  access areas of the embassies where classified information is stored and  processed.  Because of the special requirements of these areas, it is  generally not feasible to lease additional space as the embassies have done  to expand office space for unclassified work.  One post had severe  overcrowding in its chancery.  To cope, the post resorted to creating  workspaces under a stairway and in storage areas.  One office stacked a  printer on top of shelving that can only be accessed with a stepladder in  order to make room for another small workstation.  This post used trailers  located behind the chancery to augment office space.  In addition, all of  the posts expressed concern that the crowded conditions would get worse  because they anticipate staff increases to handle additional  responsibilities, such as performing more rigorous screening of visa  applicants.  Several ambassadors told us that the dispersion of office space  in multiple buildings hindered operational efficiency.  This is because  personnel spend significant amounts of time going from one facility to  another to conduct daily business.
section_title: Information Technology Issues
paragraphs: I will now briefly discuss information technology capabilities at overseas  posts, which, along with office facilities, are an important part of  diplomatic readiness.  State has long been plagued by poor information  technology capabilities.  In 1999, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel  reported that many posts are equipped with obsolete systems that prevent  effective interagency information sharing.
The Secretary of State has made a major commitment to modernizing  information technology.  According to State officials, the department  invested $236 million in fiscal year 2002 on key modernization initiatives  for overseas posts and plans to spend $262 million over fiscal years 2003  and 2004.  State reports that its information technology is in the best shape  it has ever been, and embassy personnel at the four posts we visited  agreed, noting that they now have improved Internet access and upgraded  computer equipment.  State is now working to replace its antiquated cable  system with the State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset (SMART),  a new integrated messaging and retrieval system.
We have raised a number of concerns regarding State’s management of  information technology programs, and believe that State’s information  technology modernization efforts warrant management attention and  oversight to ensure that State is following effective management practices.   In 2001, we reported that State was not following proven system  acquisition and investment practices in attempting to deploy a common  overseas knowledge management system.  State canceled this initiative  because it could not get buy-in from other foreign affairs agencies.  In  2001, we reported on State’s information security problems, including  weaknesses in access control that place information resources at risk of  unauthorized access.  As State continues to modernize information  technology at overseas posts, it is important that it employs rigorous and  disciplined management processes on each of its projects and that it  addresses its information security weaknesses.  This is particularly  important on the SMART system, which State acknowledges is an  ambitious effort.  The Office of Management and Budget recently reduced  funding for the system because of concerns that State was not employing  effective management processes.
section_title: Replacing Buildings Is State’s Long-term Solution to Physical Security Problems
paragraphs: State continues to make security upgrades at some posts, but it is shifting  its resources toward replacing existing facilities with new, secure embassy  compounds or substantially retrofitting existing, newly acquired, or leased  buildings.  As shown in figure 12, funding for State’s capital projects has  increased from $9.5 million in fiscal year 1998 to a requested $890 million  in fiscal year 2004.  State is still in the early phase of this multiyear,  multibillion-dollar construction program.  I will discuss this program  briefly and then make several preliminary observations regarding State’s  management of this program.
subsections: section_title: Summary of State’s Requirements and Plans for Future Construction
paragraphs: Following the 1998 east Africa bombings, State identified about 185 posts  needing replacement facilities in order to meet security standards.  As of  February 10, 2003, State had begun to replace 25 of these posts with new  or retrofitted embassy and consulate compounds.  From fiscal year 1999  through fiscal year 2003, State has received approximately $2.7 billion for  its new construction program.  OBO officials estimated that beginning in  fiscal year 2004, it will cost an additional $16 billion to replace facilities at  the remaining 160 posts.  OBO plans to construct these replacement  facilities on embassy/consulate compounds that will contain the main  office building, all support buildings, and, where necessary, a building for  the U.S. Agency for International Development.
To help manage this large-scale construction program, OBO developed the  Long-range Overseas Buildings Plan, first published in July 2001 and most  recently updated in April 2002.  The latest version of the plan outlines and  prioritizes proposed capital projects over 6 years, from fiscal year 2002  through fiscal year 2007, based on input from State’s Bureau of Diplomatic  Security, regional bureaus, and agencies with overseas presence.
According to the April 2002 plan, State plans to fund the replacement of  facilities at 81 posts at an estimated cost of $7.9 billion from fiscal year  2002 through fiscal year 2007.  As shown in figure 13, the majority of these  projects are planned for Africa and Europe.  OBO plans to release the next  update of the Long-range Overseas Buildings Plan by the end of March  2003.
Of State’s 25 post replacement projects funded after the 1998 embassy  bombings, State has completed the construction of 2 new embassy  compounds and major retrofits of 2 newly acquired buildings that will  serve as embassies.  The remaining 21 projects are currently in the  construction process.  These consist of 18 new embassy and consulate  compounds, 1 consulate compound renovation, and 2 newly acquired  buildings undergoing major retrofitting for use as embassies (see fig. 14).   State plans to initiate another 7 post replacement projects in fiscal year  2003 and 8 post replacement projects in fiscal year 2004.  These projects  will be completed in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, respectively, if they adhere  to State’s planned 2-year construction schedule.
Regarding the four posts we visited, a replacement facility is under  construction at one post and fiscal year 2006 funding is scheduled for  replacement facilities at two posts.  The replacement facility for the fourth  post is not currently scheduled; however, post officials told us that a  replacement facility at their location would be included in OBO’s March  2003 update of the Long-range Overseas Buildings Plan.  Assuming that  funding were made available to replace facilities for the three posts in  fiscal year 2006, construction would not be completed until about 2009.   Ambassadors at two of these posts expressed concern that it would be  difficult to wait that long for a solution to their facility needs and that  interim measures were needed.
section_title: State’s Management of the Recently Expanded Construction Program
paragraphs: We are currently reviewing State’s capacity and performance in  implementing its large-scale construction program.  Two important  questions for program oversight by this and other committees are:  (1) Is  the construction of embassies and consulates proceeding on time and on  budget?  (2) Do OBO and its contractors have the capacity to properly  manage the program and ensure that funds are used wisely?  State is in the  early stages of its expanded construction program and, therefore, has not  yet established a clear track record that would provide complete answers  to these questions.  However, we do have several observations based on  our ongoing work.
First, OBO has made a number of positive changes in its management of  capital projects as the construction program has expanded over the past  few years.  As mentioned earlier, OBO developed the Long-range Overseas  Buildings Plan in July 2001, an action we had previously recommended.   This plan represents a major improvement in the management of embassy  construction because it provides decision makers with an overall sense of  proposed project scope and funding needs, and sets performance targets  that can be compared with actual performance.  Further, in February 2002,  OBO leadership convened the Industry Advisory Panel.  The panel consists  of volunteer industry representatives who meet quarterly to discuss issues  related to OBO’s construction program and advise OBO management on  industry’s best practices.  Moreover, senior OBO management has  increased its oversight of ongoing capital and other projects.  For example,  each month, the OBO Director holds a 2-day Project Performance Review  meeting to review the progress and problems of all ongoing OBO projects  in detail.  In addition, OBO is requiring contract administration training for  all senior field staff who are to supervise new embassy and consulate  construction.
Second, State is taking steps to accelerate the construction process,  reduce construction costs, and further enhance physical security  conditions of new buildings.  For example, OBO has developed a standard  embassy design for use in most projects and has moved away from a  “design-bid-build” method of contracting toward a “design-build” method.   Use of a standard design and design-build contracting has the potential to  reduce project costs and the time taken to implement projects.  Table 2  provides details of the three standard designs that OBO has developed for  small, medium, and large posts.  OBO has set a goal of a 2-year design and  construction period for its standard embassy design buildings, which, if  met, would reduce the amount of time spent in design and construction by  almost a year.
In addition, OBO and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security are actively  seeking to incorporate advanced technologies into the construction  program.  Exhibit 5, a video clip from the State Department showing the  performance of new windows and building materials, indicates that these  technologies show promise of providing an even greater level of physical  security for personnel operating in new buildings.
While OBO has taken positive steps, we do have concerns regarding  requirements for staffing levels at locations where OBO is planning to  build a new embassy compound.  We believe that improvements are  needed in how the State Department and other agencies project staffing  requirements for new embassies.  In April 2003, we will report to the  Chairman of the House Government Reform Committee’s Subcommittee  on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations that  staffing projections for new embassy compounds are developed without a  systematic approach or comprehensive assessments of the number and  types of staff who would be needed in the future.  Without adhering to a  systematic process for developing future staffing needs at U.S. embassies  and consulates, the U.S. government risks building the wrong-sized  facilities, which could lead to security concerns, additional costs, and  other work inefficiencies.
subsections: section_title: Funding and Timelines for Completing the Construction Program
paragraphs: State’s timeline for completing the replacement of all 160 remaining posts  will depend on the amount of funding it receives for the construction  program.  For fiscal year 2004, State’s Long-range Overseas Buildings Plan  called for almost $2 billion to fund the design and/or construction of 19  capital projects; in contrast, the President’s proposed fiscal year 2004  budget requested $890 million for 8 new diplomatic posts.  As shown in  figure 15, at the proposed fiscal year 2004 rate of replacement, it would  take about 20 years to fund and 22 years to complete construction of the  estimated 160 remaining posts (assuming a 2-year design and construction  period).  Figure 15 also shows that this timeline would be shortened if  State receives more funds annually.  According to an OBO projection, the  program to replace the remaining 160 posts could be completed in 12  years if OBO receives $1.4 billion annually for new capital projects.