Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern Command's Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau, but Gaps Remain
Published: 2008-04-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland defense and civil support missions on U.S. soil. It is particularly important that NORTHCOM coordinate with the National Guard Bureau (NGB), because NGB has experience dealing with state and local authorities during incidents and functions as NORTHCOM's formal link to the states. GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to coordinate with the states and NGB in planning, exercises and other preparedness activities and (2) identify the extent to which there are any gaps in this coordination. To do this, GAO surveyed the state adjutants general, the highest ranking guardsman in each state, and received a 100 percent response rate, and reviewed interagency coordination plans and guidance.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NORTHCOM has several ongoing efforts to improve coordination with the states and NGB in planning for its missions and responding to requests for civil support. For example, during hurricane season NORTHCOM facilitates weekly conferences with the relevant local, state, and federal emergency management officials, through which it has begun to build more productive relationships. NORTHCOM also conducted two large-scale exercises and participated in over 25 smaller regional, state, and local exercises annually to help responders prepare for man-made and natural disasters. In addition, NORTHCOM has been informally including NGB in reviewing its plans. We identified gaps in coordination between NORTHCOM, the states, and NGB in three areas: (1) NORTHCOM officials minimally involved the states in the development of its homeland defense and civil support plans. Less than 25 percent of the state adjutants general reported that they were involved in developing and reviewing these plans. For civil support, NORTHCOM officials told us that they are reaching out directly to states to better understand states' plans and capabilities, but for homeland defense, they rely on NGB to provide states perspectives. (2) NORTHCOM was not familiar with state emergency response plans and has no process for obtaining this information. Fifty-four percent of the state adjutants general reported that they believed that NORTHCOM was not at all or only slightly familiar with their states' emergency response plans. This may be attributable, in part, to the fact that NORTHCOM does not have an established and thorough process for cooperating and interacting with the states. By not obtaining and using information on states' plans and capabilities, NORTHCOM increases the risk that it will not be prepared to respond to an incident with the needed resources to support civil authorities. (3) A 2005 agreement, which is intended to provide the procedures by which NORTHCOM and NGB interact, does not fully or clearly define each agency's roles and responsibilities for planning for homeland defense and civil support. The lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities has resulted in confusion and duplicative or wasted efforts. For example, as required in NORTHCOM's homeland defense plan, NGB compiled the states' homeland defense plans and made them available to NORTHCOM; however, NORTHCOM planners told us that they neither requested nor needed access to this information. Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, there is a risk that NORTHCOM's and NGB's responses to an event could be fragmented and uncoordinated. Addressing these gaps could help integrate intergovernmental planning for catastrophic incidents, enhance overall coordination, and help ensure that NORTHCOM's plans for its missions and responses to incidents are as effective as possible.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United States homeland continues to face an uncertain, complex  security environment with the potential for terrorist incidents and natural  disasters. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the President  established the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to provide and  manage homeland defense and civil support. The Department of Defense  (DOD) considers homeland defense to be NORTHCOM’s primary mission  and defines it as the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic  population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and  aggression against the United States. Civil support or defense support of  civil authorities includes the use of federal military forces, the  department’s career civilian and contractor personnel, and DOD agency  and component assets for domestic emergencies and for designated law  enforcement and other activities. DOD is not the primary federal agency  for such missions (unless designated so by the President) and thus  operates in support of civil authorities only when directed to do so by the  President or the Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility  for its homeland defense mission includes the contiguous United States,  Alaska, Canada, and Mexico. NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility for its  civil support mission includes the contiguous United States, Alaska, and  U.S. territorial waters.
NORTHCOM faces the critical and unique challenge of preparing for its  missions within the legal and historical limits of the constitutional federal- state structure that includes the 49 North American U.S. states and the  District of Columbia. Numerous local, state, and federal agencies and  organizations, including the National Guard Bureau (NGB), have  jurisdiction over or can coordinate resources within the homeland and,  therefore, may be involved in a response to an incident. Because  protecting and defending the homeland is a shared responsibility with  states potentially requiring assistance from federal agencies and  organizations, effective coordination and integrated planning across all  levels are critical for an effective national response. We have previously  reported that to facilitate rapid and effective decision making during a  crisis, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at  all government levels must be clearly defined, effectively communicated,  and well understood. NORTHCOM also recognizes the importance of  coordination with other federal agencies and states for its missions,  especially in support of civil authorities, stating that such coordination will  facilitate the creation and implementation of coordinated policies,  collaborative plans, and unified operations.
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and, more recently, the  uncoordinated national response to Hurricane Katrina, Congress and other  organizations have emphasized the need to improve the national response  to an incident. For example, the Commission on the National Guard and  Reserves found that reform is necessary to increase coordination among  DOD entities and commands—including NGB and NORTHCOM—to  ensure better national security outcomes. The relationship of  NORTHCOM and NGB is even more important with Congress’s recent  passing of legislation to elevate NGB to a joint activity of DOD and expand  NGB’s functions to include assisting the Secretary of Defense with  coordinating the use of National Guard forces and resources with other  federal agencies, the adjutants general of the states, U.S. Joint Forces  Command, and NORTHCOM for their use in operations conducted under  Title 32 or in support of state missions. Although NGB is NORTHCOM’s  formal channel of coordination with states for National Guard related  matters, NORTHCOM also coordinates with the states through the state  adjutants general, known as TAGs—the highest-ranking guardsman in  each state. As the commander of the state’s National Guard units, the  governor of each state commands the National Guard through the TAG.
To better understand NORTHCOM’s efforts to effectively prepare for its  homeland defense and civil support missions, we were asked to review  NORTHCOM’s processes for planning for, coordinating, and executing its  missions. For this report, our objectives were to (1) determine the extent  to which NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to coordinate with the states  and NGB in planning exercises and other preparedness activities and       (2) identify the extent to which there are any gaps in this coordination. We  prepared a separate report to address (1) the status of NORTHCOM’s  plans and the challenges it faces in planning and conducting operations,  (2) the adequacy of planning personnel, and (3) the extent to which  NORTHCOM coordinates with other federal agencies.
In conducting this review, we focused our scope on NORTHCOM’s  coordination with the states and NGB in planning and preparing for its  homeland defense and civil support missions. Our review focused on  NORTHCOM’s coordination efforts since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. To  determine the states’ perspectives on the extent to which NORTHCOM is  coordinating with the states and identify any gaps, we surveyed the TAGs  who are within NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility. When we discuss  NORTHCOM’s coordination with the states, we are primarily referring to  coordination with the TAGs. The survey questionnaire and results can be  found in appendix I. The survey was administered via electronic mail to  the TAGs and their chiefs of staff, and responses were collected from April  through September 2007; we had a 100 percent response rate. We also  reviewed documents and conducted interviews with the TAGS from  Florida, Indiana, Nebraska, and Washington. To augment the information  we obtained from the TAGs, we reviewed documents and conducted  interviews with officials from NORTHCOM and several of its subordinate  commands, including Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), Joint Force  Headquarters National Capital Region, and Army Forces North, as well as  officials from NGB headquarters and the NORTHCOM National Guard  Office. In addition, we conducted interviews with officials from the  Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of  Homeland Security’s (DHS) interagency Incident Management Planning  Team. We conducted our review from April 2007 to April 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. Appendix II is a detailed discussion of our  scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOD realized the need  for a more integrated civilian and military response capability for any  future attack on the United States. In response, DOD established  NORTHCOM in October 2002 to provide command and control in  homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil  authorities within its area of responsibility (see fig. 1).
NORTHCOM’s mission consists of (1) homeland defense and (2) civil  support. It is important to understand the relationships between  NORTHCOM’s missions and homeland security. Homeland defense and  homeland security are not synonymous. Homeland security is a concerted  national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce  America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover  from attacks that do occur. The DHS is the primary federal agency for  homeland security issues. DHS’s responsibilities extend beyond terrorism  to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a wide  range of matter domestic disasters and other emergencies. DOD  contributes to homeland security through its military missions overseas  and homeland defense and civil support operations.
While the terrorism portion of homeland security is concerned with  preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, DOD’s concerns  include responding to conventional and unconventional attacks by any  adversary as well as terrorists. When DOD is designated as the primary  federal agency by the President or Secretary of Defense for conducting  military missions to defend the people or territory of the homeland, it is  considered to be homeland defense. Homeland defense is the protection of  U.S territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical defense  infrastructure against external threats and aggression. DOD activity in  support of a National Response Framework primary or coordinating  agency is considered to be civil support. Civil support is DOD support to  U.S. civilian authorities, such as DHS, for domestic emergencies, both  natural and man-made, and includes the use of DOD personnel—federal  military forces and DOD’s career civilian and contractor personnel—and  DOD agency and component resources. Because these missions are  complex and interrelated, they require significant interagency  coordination.
subsections: section_title: NORTHCOM’s Homeland Defense Mission
paragraphs: To carry out its homeland defense mission, NORTHCOM is to conduct  operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at  the United States. According to Joint Publication 3-27, DOD is the primary  federal agency for homeland defense operations, and NORTHCOM is the  combatant command responsible for commanding and coordinating a  response to a homeland defense incident. In this case, the chain of  command is relatively straightforward: other DOD commands and federal  agencies provide support to NORTHCOM for homeland defense  operations (see fig. 2). Although NORTHCOM has few forces assigned to  its command, during an incident it requests forces through the Joint Staff.
The Joint Staff will direct Joint Forces Command, which is DOD’s joint  force provider, to assign appropriate and available forces to  NORTHCOM. The President may decide to federalize National Guard  units in order to provide these forces.
While the states do not have an operational role in homeland defense,  NORTHCOM’s homeland defense mission includes protecting the territory  or domestic population of the United States as well as the infrastructure or  other assets determined by the Secretary of Defense to be critical to  national security. In order to protect these critical assets, NORTHCOM  must maintain awareness of the environment in which it may be operating,  including critical infrastructure locations relevant to its operations.
section_title: NORTHCOM’s Civil Support Mission
paragraphs: NORTHCOM’s second mission is civil support or defense support of civil  authorities. Civil support missions include domestic disaster relief  operations for incidents such as fires, hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes.  Such support also includes counterdrug operations and management of  the consequences of a terrorist incident employing a weapon of mass  destruction. DOD is not the primary federal agency for such missions  (unless so designated by the President) and thus provides defense support  of civil authorities only when (1) state, local, and other federal resources  are overwhelmed or unique military capabilities are required;                     (2) assistance is requested by the primary federal agency; and                    (3) NORTHCOM is directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of  Defense.
Civil support is based on a tiered response to an incident; that is, incidents  must be managed at the lowest jurisdictional levels and supported by  additional response capabilities when needed (see fig. 3). Local and  county governments respond to emergencies daily using their own  resources and rely on mutual aid agreements and other types of assistance  agreements with neighboring governments when they need additional  resources. For example, county and local authorities are likely to have the  resources needed to adequately respond to a small-scale incident, such as  a local flood, and therefore will not request additional resources. For  larger-scale incidents, when resources are overwhelmed, local and county  governments will request assistance from the state. States have  capabilities, such as the National Guard, that can help communities  respond and recover. If additional resources are required, the state may  request assistance from other states through interstate mutual aid  agreements, such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact  (EMAC). If an incident is beyond the community and state capabilities,  the governor can seek federal assistance. The federal government has a  wide array of capabilities and resources that can be made available to  assist state and local agencies to respond to incidents.
Overall coordination of federal incident management activities, other than  those conducted for homeland defense, is generally the responsibility of  DHS. Within DHS and as an executive agent for the National Preparedness  System, FEMA is responsible for coordinating and integrating the  preparedness of federal, state, local, tribal, and nongovernmental entities.
In accordance with the National Response Framework and applicable  laws including the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency  Assistance Act (Stafford Act), various federal departments or agencies  may play primary, coordinating, or supporting roles, based on their  authorities and resources and the nature of the threat or incident. In some  instances, national defense assets may be needed to assist FEMA or  another agency in the national response to an incident. Defense resources  are committed after approval by the Secretary of Defense or at the  direction of the President. When deciding to commit defense resources,  officials consider military readiness, appropriateness of the  circumstances, and whether the response is in accordance with the law.  For example, the Posse Comitatus Act allows military forces to provide  civil support, but these forces generally cannot become directly involved  in law enforcement.
When it is determined that defense assistance is appropriate and is  requested by FEMA, NORTHCOM is responsible for leading DOD’s  response. In the same manner as is applicable to homeland defense,  NORTHCOM generally operates through established joint task forces that  are subordinate to the command. In most cases, support will be localized,  limited, and specific. When the scope of the disaster is reduced to the  point where the primary federal agency can again assume full control and  management without military assistance, NORTHCOM will exit.
section_title: NORTHCOM’s Planning for Homeland Defense and Support of Civil Authorities
paragraphs: In order to prepare for its homeland defense and civil support missions,  NORTHCOM has developed plans based on various incident scenarios,  including 14 of DHS’s 15 national planning scenarios. NORTHCOM  develops contingency plans to outline its role in potential disaster  situations. NORTHCOM currently develops strategic-level concept plans  rather than more detailed operational plans, because the potential threats  that it is planning for are varied and nonspecific, ranging from terrorist  threats to hurricanes and wildfires. NORTHCOM uses the adaptive  planning process for developing its plans—that is, the joint capability to  create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances  require. Interagency coordination is a key part of the plan development  process in adaptive planning.
section_title: States’ and NGB’s Roles in Preparing for Homeland Defense and Civil Support
paragraphs: In each state, the National Guard plays a crucial role in preparing for both  homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities, in its dual roles  as a national reserve force for the Army and Air Force and as a state  militia. As the only military force shared by the states and the federal  government, the National Guard provides a natural and effective bridge to  accomplish collaboration between NORTHCOM and key state partners.  The National Guard’s federal mission is to provide trained units available  for active duty in the armed forces, in the time of war or national  emergency, and at such times as national security may require.  NORTHCOM is responsible for the planning, exercising, and command and  control of the National Guard for its federal missions conducted under the  command and control of the President within its area of responsibility.
As a state militia, the National Guard of each state responds to state  emergencies, including natural disasters, civil disturbances, and acts of  terrorism, and provides support to law enforcement in the war on drugs  under the command and control of the state governor. The governor  commands the National Guard through the TAG, who heads the joint force  headquarters of the state. According to NGB officials, the state’s joint  force headquarters’ mission is to maintain trained and equipped National  Guard forces and to provide expertise and situational awareness to  facilitate the integration of federal and state activities.
NGB is a joint activity of DOD, with unique statutory, regulatory, and  policy-based responsibilities and authorities, including serving as the  official channel of communications between the Departments of the Army  and the Air Force and the states on National Guard matters. NGB  administers DOD, Department of the Army, and Department of the Air  Force policies, programs, and plans pertaining to National Guard matters  and facilitates the integration of federal and state activities, including  facilitating mutual support among the states. Although NGB does not  command or control forces, it assists the states in the organization,  maintenance, and operation of their Army National Guard and Air National  Guard units located in the states and coordinates the movement of  nonfederalized National Guard forces. NGB also maintains and provides  information on National Guard matters affecting homeland defense and  civil support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the combatant  commands, including NORTHCOM; and others. During civil support  missions, NGB provides policy guidance and facilitates National Guard  assistance to the TAGs. Because of their interrelated missions,  coordination between NORTHCOM and NGB is critical in planning for  homeland defense and civil support.
section_title: NORTHCOM Has Ongoing Efforts to Improve Coordination with the States and NGB in Planning for Its Missions
paragraphs: In analyzing the survey results as well as during meetings with  NORTHCOM and NGB officials, we found that NORTHCOM has ongoing  efforts to improve coordination with the states and NGB in planning for its  missions and responding to requests for civil support missions. As part of  NORTHCOM’s strategic vision, its goal is to facilitate the synchronization  of national, state, and local assets and capabilities to defend the nation  and support civilian authorities. We found six areas in which  NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to improve coordination with the states  and NGB, ranging from including states in its exercises to a new state  engagement strategy for reaching out directly to state leaders. Some of  these efforts are intended to help NORTHCOM plan for both of its  missions, while others are intended to improve how it responds to  requests for civil support.
subsections: section_title: States’ Participation in NORTHCOM’s Exercises Enhances Coordination
paragraphs: NORTHCOM conducts or participates in training exercises to improve  planning for its missions and responses to requests for civil support. The  command conducts two large-scale exercises—Ardent Sentry and Vigilant  Shield—and participates in over 30 smaller regional, state, and local  exercises annually to help potential responders prepare for man-made and  natural disasters. Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield alternate between  emphasizing the homeland defense mission and the civil support mission.  Each training event exercises one of the key missions while at the same  time including elements of the other. Practicing and training for  emergency responses together not only helps to identify problem areas or  lessons learned, but also helps state responders to build relationships with  NORTHCOM and improve coordination. One TAG told us that he did not  have any communications with NORTHCOM prior to his state’s  participation in Ardent Sentry, but has since developed a close working  relationship with NORTHCOM officials. Table 1 shows the percentage of  states participating in Ardent Sentry, Vigilant Shield, or other events,  according to our survey of TAGs.
NORTHCOM’s Training and Exercise Directorate continues to work with  state and National Guard entities to plan and conduct exercises and to  develop a robust Vigilant Guard regional exercise program.
section_title: Including NGB in the Development of NORTHCOM’s Plans Provides National Guard Perspective
paragraphs: NORTHCOM has been informally including NGB in reviewing its plans, in  the early stages, during concept development workshops, and during final  coordination. NGB officials told us that regularly scheduled conferences  between the planning directorates at NORTHCOM and NGB have greatly  enhanced coordination over the past few months. In addition, NGB  officials confirmed that NORTHCOM has been routinely providing its draft  plans to them for comment/review to get the National Guard’s  perspectives. This review process will be formalized in the next few  months, when NGB becomes an officially recognized member of the Joint  Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). JPEC coordinates DOD  efforts and ensures unity in the planning and execution of joint operations,  and includes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, the  combatant commands and their component commands, sub-unified  commands, joint task forces, and defense agencies.
section_title: Participation of TAGs and Their Staffs in Joint Force Orientation Program Provides Information on NORTHCOM’s Supporting Role to the States
paragraphs: NORTHCOM has also established a Joint Force Orientation Program to  improve the states’ knowledge on NORTHCOM’s role in response to  requests for civil support. Several TAGs reported that their and their staffs’  involvement in this program enhanced coordination with NORTHCOM.  The primary objectives of this program are to facilitate a mutual  understanding of joint operational concepts and information sharing  between NORTHCOM and the states to help clarify NORTHCOM’s  supporting role to the states and to improve overall coordination. At the  time of our audit, the Joint Force Orientation Program was organized into  three phases. The first phase included an overall command briefing and  individual briefings from each NORTHCOM directorate, including  discussions about NORTHCOM’s training and exercise programs. The  second phase of the Joint Force Orientation Program discussed more in- depth information about NORTHCOM, NGB, and the Joint Forces  Command. This phase generally covers warfighter doctrine and  operational application, including joint concepts and terminology, joint  operational environment, command relationships, joint planning, and joint  logistics. The third phase of the program is designed to be state specific,  where the process for requesting federal assistance is reviewed and  issues—such as intelligence sharing and oversight, mobile  communications, planning, and logistics—are discussed in more detail.  NORTHCOM provided us with the most recent participation data, and we  found that all of the states within NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility  have received the first phase of Joint Force Orientation Program training,  46 states have received phase 2 training, and 19 states have received phase  3 training. NORTHCOM told us that it is working toward providing phase  3 training to the remaining states. The willingness of the TAGs to  participate and send their staffs to this training shows how useful the  information exchanged and relationships developed with NORTHCOM  during the training are to them.
section_title: Hurricane and Wildfire Conferences Are Beginning to Build Effective Relationships between Participating Officials
paragraphs: Other ongoing efforts include NORTHCOM’s weekly teleconferences  throughout the hurricane season to coordinate with local, state, and  federal partners and discuss potential storms; available resources,  including EMAC; and potential needs or unique capabilities that DOD  may be asked to provide. For instance, if a hurricane is projected to affect  the mid-Atlantic states, officials in those states may inquire about  resources potentially needed—such as helicopters, trucks, or other  equipment—in advance of the incident, thereby helping affected states to  more effectively plan their responses. Similarly, NORTHCOM monitors  wildfire activity and sets up teleconferences with the National Interagency  Fire Center—which includes state emergency response officials—if it  appears NORTHCOM may need to assist in fighting the fires. As a result of  this frequent interaction, NORTHCOM has begun to build more productive  and effective relationships with the participating states and agencies.
section_title: Locating Defense Coordinating Officers in the FEMA Regional Offices Improves NORTHCOM’s Relationship with State and Local Officials
paragraphs: As part of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, NORTHCOM has  placed a defense coordinating officer (DCO) in each of FEMA’s 10 regional  offices and placed greater emphasis on the DCOs’ mission (see fig. 4).  DCOs are senior-level military officers with joint experience and training  on the National Response Framework, defense support to civil  authorities, and DHS’s National Incident Management System. They are  responsible for assisting civil authorities when requested by FEMA,  providing liaison support and requirements validation, and serving as  single points of contact for state, local, and other federal authorities that  need DOD support. DCOs work closely with federal, state, and local  officials to determine what unique DOD capabilities can be used to assist  in mitigating the effects of a natural or man-made disaster. According to  TAGs, FEMA, and NORTHCOM officials, placing DCOs in all of the FEMA  regional offices and emphasizing the DCOs’ mission has improved  NORTHCOM’s relationships and coordination with state and local  officials, as well as with FEMA in day-to-day planning and when an  incident occurs. For example, in response to FEMA’s request during the  California wildfires in October 2007, NORTHCOM’s subordinate command,  Army Forces North, deployed the Region 9 DCO to support the Joint Field  Office in Pasadena, California and assess and coordinate defense support  of civil authorities with FEMA. Based on the requirements identified by  state and federal officials in consultation with the DCO, DOD and the  National Guard deployed six aircraft equipped with the Modular Air  Firefighting System to California to assist in fighting wildfires.
U.S.
section_title: NORTHCOM’s New State Engagement Strategy Is Intended to Build Relationships with States
paragraphs: While NORTHCOM relies on NGB as its channel of communications for  National Guard matters, NORTHCOM’s commander believes that  developing relationships directly with states will contribute to success in  saving lives, protecting infrastructure, and promoting a resilient society.   NORTHCOM is currently developing a state engagement strategy to build  relationships with appropriate state leadership, including governors,  TAGs, state homeland security advisors, and emergency managers of  major metropolitan areas. As part of this strategy, NORTHCOM’s  Commander has personally met with several state governors and TAGs to  discuss NORTHCOM’s roles and missions and determine how they can  coordinate when responding to an incident. For example, the Commander  met with TAGs from the northeast region in November 2007 to discuss  both military coordination and interagency coordination for regional  domestic operations. The draft strategy also recognizes the importance of  NORTHCOM working with the states in close coordination with the  organizations such as NGB and DHS/FEMA, which are responsible for  coordinating with the states regarding federal matters related to incident  management. NGB officials told us that working with the states will  provide NORTHCOM with a greater appreciation for the role and authority  of the governor and sensitivity to the sovereignty and rights of states.  While the strategy is designed to build the relationships needed for  national planning and execution, it does not include established and  thorough processes for involving states in the development of  NORTHCOM’s plans, obtaining state emergency response plans, or  facilitating integrated intergovernmental planning.
section_title: Gaps Remain in NORTHCOM’s Coordination with the States and NGB
paragraphs: We identified three areas in which there are gaps in coordination with the  states and NGB. First, NORTHCOM officials involve the states minimally  in the development of NORTHCOM’s major homeland defense and civil  support plans, and they are not required to do so. Second, NORTHCOM  generally was not familiar with state emergency response plans and  capabilities and has no established and thorough process for gaining  access to this information. Third, a 2005 memorandum of agreement,  which is intended to provide the procedures by which NORTHCOM and  NGB interact, does not clearly define each agency’s roles and  responsibilities for planning for homeland defense and civil support.  Improvements in these areas may help to effectively align NORTHCOM’s  efforts with other national efforts, as required by the new annex to  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on national planning; help  NORTHCOM to manage its overall risk; and better ensure that it will be  able to fully respond when called upon to perform either of its missions.
subsections: section_title: NORTHCOM Only Minimally Involves States in Planning
paragraphs: Although the majority of TAGs are familiar to varying degrees with  NORTHCOM’s homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities  plans (see table 2), in our survey less than 25 percent reported that they  were involved in developing and reviewing these plans (see table 3).  NORTHCOM is not required by DOD specifically to involve states in the  development and review of its homeland defense and support of civil  authorities plans. However, its strategic vision set forth in its Concept of  Operations and the recent annex to Homeland Security Presidential  Directive 8 emphasize that plans and capabilities should be synchronized  at the national, state, and local levels. According to several TAGs,  NORTHCOM should coordinate more with state and local organizations,  particularly with the National Guard, to develop a good planning and  operational relationship and to enhance the ability of all organizations to  plan and respond rapidly in a crisis. We previously reported on the need to  include state and local jurisdictions in the development of response plans  because they are key stakeholders and would be on the front lines if an  incident occurs.
In the case of homeland defense, NORTHCOM planners told us that, as the  official channel of communication for National Guard related matters,  NGB provides the states’ perspectives when commenting on  NORTHCOM’s plans. The planners also said that further state involvement  in the development of NORTHCOM’s plan is not required because (1) this  is a strategic-level concept plan that does not require such detail and      (2) NORTHCOM is the lead during a homeland defense incident. NGB  officials told us that as requested in NORTHCOM homeland defense plan,  they have collected and reviewed states’ supporting homeland defense  plans and, to the extent possible, have attempted to represent these  perspectives when commenting on NORTHCOM’s homeland defense  plan. However, an NGB planning official told us that the states have  differing perspectives, and NORTHCOM could better learn about these  differences by reviewing the individual state plans. In addition, while NGB  provides information of National Guard capabilities, the states may have  other capabilities and requirements that NORTHCOM should be aware of.  By only relying on NGB, NORTHCOM may not be able to maintain  awareness of the environment in which the command may be operating,  including critical infrastructure locations relevant to its operations, which  is important to fully carrying out its homeland defense mission.
In the case of civil support and as outlined in the National Response  Framework, because NORTHCOM plays a supporting role to other federal  agencies and subsequently to state and local governments, NORTHCOM  officials told us that they are starting to reach out directly to states to  obtain their perspectives and incorporate these into future revisions of  NORTHCOM’s defense support of civil authorities plan. In order to  effectively develop a civil support plan, NORTHCOM needs to know what  its requirements may be. DOD recognizes that these requirements are  driven both by the capabilities gaps of the primary federal agencies and  those of the state and local governments. In either homeland defense or  civil support, increasing the current level of state involvement in the  development of NORTHCOM’s plans could help integrate  intergovernmental planning for catastrophic incidents, enhance overall  coordination, and help ensure that NORTHCOM’s plans for its missions  and responses to incidents are as effective as possible.
section_title: NORTHCOM Lacks Familiarity with State Emergency Response Plans and May Not Be Aware of Capabilities and Potential Gaps
paragraphs: We found that NORTHCOM generally was not familiar with state  emergency response plans and has not obtained detailed information on  states’ plans and capabilities to determine the specific challenges it may  face in conducting homeland defense or civil support operations.  According to our survey, 54 percent of the TAGs believe that NORTHCOM  is not at all or only slightly familiar with their states’ plan (see table 4). In  written comments in our survey, several TAGs reported that NORTHCOM  should be more familiar with state emergency response plans, and should  determine how best to support the states’ plans and, where appropriate,  incorporate these plans to ensure a unified effort. Developing a  synchronized and coordinated planning capability at all levels of  government is important for a coordinated national response to domestic  incidents. In part, NORTHCOM is not more familiar with these plans  because it has no established and thorough process regarding  coordination with the states or for gaining access to emergency response  plans, and it is not specifically required by DOD to obtain information on  state emergency response plans or determine state and local capabilities  and potential resource gaps. NORTHCOM planners told us that they do  not need access to state emergency response plans because they are doing  strategic-level concept plans and this level of detail would be more  appropriate for tactical level planning, such as planning done by  NORTHCOM’s subordinate commands, like Army Forces North.  However, NGB and FEMA officials told us that one of NORTHCOM’s  biggest challenges is its current inability to anticipate the capabilities and  requirements of state and local governments during a civil support  incident because of the lack of advanced planning and coordination  between NORTHCOM, states, and local governments. Furthermore,  NORTHCOM officials told us that the complexity of the planning involved  for a large-scale disaster is such that even if states can adequately plan for  the resources they will need, they do not always have adequate multistate  plans to integrate the state, local, federal, and nongovernmental responses.  By not obtaining and using information on state plans and capabilities,  NORTHCOM increases the risk that it will not be adequately prepared to  respond to an incident with the needed resources, including the types,  numbers, and timing of capabilities (trained personnel and equipment).
One of NORTHCOM’s subordinate commands, JTF-CS, has been  collecting state emergency response plans so that if called upon to provide  assistance in a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield  explosive (CBRNE) incident, its Commander will have as much advance  information as possible regarding state plans, resources, and potential  areas where assistance may be required. JTF-CS found that some state and  local governments are reluctant to share their plans because they fear that  DOD will “grade” their plans or that potential capability gaps will be made  public, with an accompanying political cost. A NORTHCOM official told us  that there will always be some tension between the states and DOD and  other federal agencies as a result of the nation’s constitutional structure.  JTF-CS is therefore extremely careful about how it shares its emergency  plan analyses and has made progress in gaining access to these plans  through DHS.
DHS has collected and assessed state emergency response plans as part of  a nationwide plan review to determine the status of catastrophic planning  for states and 75 of the nation’s largest urban areas. Participation in the  review was a prerequisite for receipt of fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland  security grant funds. The review concluded that no individual plan or  resource base can fully absorb and respond to a catastrophe and that  unsystematic planning and the absence of an integrated planning system is  a national operational vulnerability. The annex to Homeland Security  Presidential Directive 8, issued in December 2007, directs the  establishment of a comprehensive approach to national planning through  an integrated planning system. This system is to include, among other  things, a description of the process that (1) links regional, state, local, and  tribal plans, planning cycles, and processes and allows these plans to  inform the development of federal plans and (2) fosters the integration of  such plans and allows for state, local, and tribal capability assessments to  feed into federal plans. DHS may, therefore, be one source from which  NORTHCOM could obtain information on state emergency response plans  and capabilities.
Given its relationship with the states, NGB could also be a conduit for  NORTHCOM to share its plans with states and obtain information on  states plans and capabilities. In addition, NGB officials suggested that  emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLO) could be a potential  conduit for NORTHCOM and states to share plans. EPLOs are senior  reserve officers from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps who  represent the federal military in each state and in each of the 10 FEMA  regional offices. EPLOs coordinate the provision of military personnel,  equipment, and supplies to support the emergency relief and cleanup  efforts of civil authorities. According to NGB officials, expanding the  EPLO program to include sharing plans with states would provide a closer  link between NORTHCOM and the states without the sensitivity of state  sovereignty issues. The DCOs who are also located in FEMA’s 10 regional  offices could potentially serve as NORTHCOM’s points of contact for the  EPLOs.
NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve the coordination of its  homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal  agencies. However, in its role either in support of other federal agencies  or as the primary agency in homeland defense incidents, NORTHCOM  does not have adequate information on states’ plans and capabilities. By  minimally involving the states in its homeland defense and civil support  plans and not becoming familiar with information on states’ emergency  response plans and capabilities, NORTHCOM increases the risk that it may  not be prepared with the needed resources to respond to an incident.  These gaps may be attributable in part to the fact that NORTHCOM does  not have an established and thorough process for cooperating and  interacting with the states. One model of such a process is NORTHCOM’s  security cooperation plans with Canada and Mexico, since the states are  each separate governments within the federal system. For example,  NORTHCOM’s cooperation plan with Canada and Mexico outlines a  strategy for planning, assessing, and executing security objectives and  other strategic priorities. These objectives include advancing common  interests, reducing impediments to cooperation, encouraging improved  capabilities and willingness to operate in coalition, and improving  combined homeland defense capabilities. Without a similar kind of  cooperation plan for the states within its area of responsibility,  NORTHCOM cannot optimally involve the TAGs and other state or local  officials in its planning activities and develop a process for obtaining and  using information on state emergency plans and capabilities. Moreover,  without such a cooperation plan, NORTHCOM is not likely to reduce  confusion, facilitate effective planning, and facilitate effective and efficient  responses to incidents.
section_title: NORTHCOM and NGB Responsibilities for Homeland Defense and Civil Support Are Not Clearly Defined
paragraphs: DHS’s National Response Framework and NORTHCOM’s Concept of  Operations both emphasize that NORTHCOM should coordinate with  federal, state, and local partners before, during, and after an incident.  Coordination with NGB is particularly important, because NGB has  experience working with state and local authorities during incidents and it  functions as NORTHCOM’s formal link to the states. We previously  reported that as with preparing for and responding to any type of disaster,  leadership roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined, effectively  communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and effective  decision making. Furthermore, we reported that without clearly defined  roles and responsibilities, the potential remains for confusion and gaps or  duplication by the combatant commands relative to other agencies. The  National Strategy for Homeland Security also emphasizes that a lack of  clarity regarding roles and responsibilities across all levels of government  can lead to gaps in the national response and delay the ability to provide  life-saving support when needed.
In July 2005, NORTHCOM and NGB signed a memorandum of agreement  outlining their command and coordination relationship. This  memorandum, which is intended to provide the procedures by which the  two entities interact, broadly establishes that NORTHCOM and NGB “will  coordinate on policy, program and planning actions related to missions  and requirements affecting the National Guard.” The memorandum further  provides for the location of a small NGB office at NORTHCOM to advise  NORTHCOM’s Commander regarding National Guard-related issues. The  mission of this office is to advise and assist NORTHCOM’s Commander on  all matters involving the National Guard, provide a conduit to NGB leaders  and staff, and promote integration of National Guard priorities and  capabilities into NORTHCOM’s plans and operations. The staff members of  this office provide input to numerous requests for information from  NORTHCOM. This office is not intended to serve as the only point of  coordination between NORTHCOM and NGB. Officials told us that there is  no formal process in place for the NORTHCOM National Guard Office to  coordinate with NGB headquarters. Such a process could improve  coordination between the NGB liaison office and NGB headquarters.
Our analysis of the memorandum, NORTHCOM’s Concept of Operations,  the regulation describing the organization and function of NGB, and other  documents showed that there is no detailed guidance on NORTHCOM’s  and NGB’s roles and responsibilities for homeland defense and defense  support of civil authorities. Clearly defined responsibilities help to ensure  unity of effort, prevent duplication, and enable efficient use of resources.  As a result of the lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities between  NORTHCOM and NGB, we found several instances in which there was  confusion and duplicate or potentially wasted efforts. For example, some  TAGs survey responses indicated that because responsibilities are not  clearly defined, both NGB and NORTHCOM are requesting the same  information during an incident. In addition, NORTHCOM’s homeland  defense plan required NGB to collect state homeland defense plans and  make them available to NORTHCOM. NGB compiled and reviewed these  plans from the states and territories within NORTHCOM’s area of  responsibility and made them available to NORTHCOM on its Web portal.  However, NORTHCOM planning officials told us that they did not request  that NGB compile these plans and that, in fact, they do not have a need for  state supporting plans because such plans will not affect how  NORTHCOM’s strategic-level homeland defense concept plan is written.  Nevertheless, NGB spent resources collecting information that has not  been used by NORTHCOM. As discussed above, we believe NORTHCOM  officials should be reviewing these plans to ensure that they have  sufficient awareness of the environment in which they may be operating to  fully carry out the command’s homeland defense mission.
In addition, we found that NGB has developed a Joint Capabilities  Database that includes all National Guard capabilities and has made this  database available for NORTHCOM’s use. However, NORTHCOM officials  told us that rather than use the database, they prefer to rely on NGB staff  to provide them National Guard readiness and capabilities data. NGB  officials also told us that they have not encouraged NORTHCOM to use the  database thus far because they are still finalizing the procedure for  maintaining and updating the database with information from all states  and territories. The officials said that they expect to have these issues  worked out within the next few months in advance of the hurricane  season and to begin to encourage NORTHCOM to make use of the  database. NGB’s goal with the database is to provide a national look at the  National Guard’s capabilities.
Without clearly defined lines of coordination and roles and responsibility,  federal efforts may not be used in the most effective and efficient manner.  This is increasingly important as DOD is currently developing a database  of federal emergency response capabilities, including those for active and  reserve DOD units and National Guard capabilities in each state, and  FEMA is currently developing a list of organizations and functions within  DOD that may be used to provide support to civil authorities during  natural or man-made disasters. Coordinating all of these efforts will be  critical to ensuring the efficient use of federal resources as well as to  reduce the risk of potential capabilities gaps.
An NGB official told us that NORTHCOM and NGB have not revised the  2005 memorandum of agreement to more clearly define their  responsibilities because they were waiting for the National Guard  Empowerment Act, which was partially incorporated into the National  Defense Authorization Act for 2008, to be signed into law and,  subsequently, for a new NGB charter to be developed and issued by the  Secretary of Defense. The National Guard Empowerment Act includes  provisions that may enhance the level of coordination between  NORTHCOM and NGB. For example, the Secretary of Defense is required  to prepare a plan coordinating the use of the National Guard and members  of the armed forces on active duty when responding to an incident and  include protocols for DOD, NGB, and the governors of the states to carry  out operations in coordination with one another. An NGB official told us  that the process of preparing this plan will require more coordination  between NORTHCOM and NGB. More important, NGB’s charter, which is  currently undergoing revision based on the new act, potentially could  resolve a number of ambiguities by more clearly defining the roles and  responsibilities of NGB and its relationships with other agencies, such as  NORTHCOM. Further, the NGB official told us that the revised charter will  greatly simplify negotiations of a revised memorandum between the two  agencies. Without clearly defined responsibilities for NORTHCOM and  NGB, there is the potential for a lack of effective coordination between the  two agencies and duplicative or wasted efforts. Clearly identifying roles  and responsibilities is increasingly important because responding to a  major disaster in the United States—natural or man-made—is a shared  responsibility of many agencies across all levels of government and cannot  be effectively accomplished by one agency. Without effective interagency  coordination and planning and clearly defined roles and responsibilities,  there is a risk that NORTHCOM’s, NGB’s, and other nationwide efforts to  respond to an incident may be fragmented and uncoordinated, such as in  the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Within the federal government, there is an increasing realization that the  nation needs to integrate not just the response to an incident, but also the  plans of many entities at all the levels involved in responding to such  incidents. This planning integration will help ensure that when the federal  government responds, its response will be as effective as possible.  NORTHCOM’s recent efforts to coordinate with states and NGB have  helped address some of the uncertainty in the homeland defense and civil  support planning process and have improved NORTHCOM’s ability to  coordinate in the event of an actual incident. However, without an  established and thorough process for requesting, obtaining, and using  information on state emergency plans and capabilities—whether from  coordination with DHS or NGB or from direct interaction with states— NORTHCOM may be missing opportunities to better plan its missions and  manage its risk in a more informed manner. Moreover, NORTHCOM may  not be fully prepared to support states, resulting in ineffective planning  and fragmented, uncoordinated responses to incidents.
Given that NORTHCOM and NGB both have increasingly important  responsibilities for homeland defense and defense support of civil  authorities, it is imperative that these entities work together to effectively  prepare for DOD’s response to an incident. Without fully and clearly  defined responsibilities for NORTHCOM and NGB, confusion and  duplicative or potentially wasted efforts may result, causing an inefficient  use of DOD resources during a time of increased military operations and a  growing fiscal imbalance. Further, without clear guidance on their  responsibilities, the risk is increased that these agencies’ responses to an  incident may be ineffective and inefficient, potentially increasing response  time and risking the safety of the U.S. population and infrastructure.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve NORTHCOM’s coordination with the states, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense direct NORTHCOM to develop an  established and thorough process to guide its coordination with the states,  including provisions for  involving the states in NORTHCOM’s planning processes,   obtaining information on state emergency response plans and capabilities,    using such information to improve the development and execution of its  concept plans.
To improve NORTHCOM’s coordination with NGB, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense direct NORTHCOM and NGB to revise the  memorandum of agreement or develop an alternate document to include  fully and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for NORTHCOM, NGB,  and the NORTHCOM National Guard Office.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with the  intent of our recommendations and discussed steps it is taking and  planning to take to address the recommendations. DOD and FEMA also  provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report  where appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that NORTHCOM develop an  established and thorough process to guide its coordination with the states,  DOD agreed that such a process should be developed to guide the  coordination between local, state, and federal governments. Homeland  Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1 requires that DHS develop an  integrated planning system consisting of a synchronized system of plans  that integrates federal, state, and local operational capabilities to affect a  coordinated national response. DOD told us that the Office of the Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security  Affairs, the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, and NGB are currently in  coordination with DHS in developing the integrated planning system. We  believe that developing this system would meet the intent of our  recommendation if it provides NORTHCOM with an established and  thorough process for requesting, obtaining, and using information on state  emergency plans and capabilities and improves the development and  execution of their concept plans, thereby helping NORTHCOM to manage  its risk in a more informed manner.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that NORTHCOM and NGB revise  their memorandum of agreement or develop an alternate document to  include fully and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for  NORTHCOM, NGB, and the NORTHCOM National Guard Office and stated  that a revision to the memorandum is currently being coordinated. We  believe that providing clear guidance on roles and responsibilities will help  to ensure that these agencies’ responses to an incident will be effective  and efficient, potentially reducing response time and enhancing the safety  of the U.S. population and infrastructure.
DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and other  interested parties. We will also make copies available to others on request.  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Questionnaire and Survey Results
section_title: Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In conducting this review, we focused our scope on U.S. Northern  Command’s (NORTHCOM) coordination with the states and the National  Guard Bureau (NGB). We excluded NORTHCOM’s coordination with other  federal agencies and organizations and nongovernmental organizations  because this is addressed in a companion report. Our review focused on  NORTHCOM’s coordination efforts occurring since Hurricane Katrina in  2005. In addressing our objectives, we interviewed and obtained  information and related documents from officials at the following  locations:    NORTHCOM Headquarters, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs,    Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia    The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.
The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.
Joint Task Force-Civil Support, Fort Monroe, Virginia    U.S. Army North, Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas    Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region, Fort McNair,  Washington, D.C.
NGB, Arlington, Virginia    Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Washington, D.C.
U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, D.C.
We also conducted semistructured telephone interviews with the state  adjutants general, also known as TAGs, from Florida, Indiana, Nebraska,  and Washington.
To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM is coordinating with the  states, we surveyed the TAGs who are within NORTHCOM’s area of  responsibility. We asked respondents about their familiarity and  involvement in NORTHCOM’s homeland defense plan and the defense  support of civil authorities plan. We also asked about their experiences in  working and communicating with NORTHCOM, including their  participation in NORTHCOM exercises and involvement of NORTHCOM in  their state exercises. The questionnaire and survey responses can be found  in appendix I. We sent a questionnaire to TAGs of all 49 states in  NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility and the District of Columbia.
The self-administered electronic survey was sent via electronic mail to the  TAGs and their chiefs of staff. More specifically, we sent the questionnaire  by e-mail in an attached Microsoft Word form that respondents could  return electronically after marking checkboxes or entering narrative  responses into open answer boxes. Alternatively, respondents could  return it by mail after printing the form and completing it by hand. We sent  the original electronic questionnaire on April 4, 2007. We sent out  reminder e-mail messages, with replacement surveys, at different time  intervals to all nonrespondents in order to encourage a higher response  rate. In addition, we made several courtesy telephone calls to  nonrespondents to encourage their completion. All questionnaires were  returned by September 19, 2007. We achieved a 100 percent response rate.
The survey used was not a sample survey because it included the universe  of respondents. Therefore, the survey has no sampling errors. However,  the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors,  commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in  interpreting a particular question, sources of information available to  respondents, or entering data into a database or analyzing them can  introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps in  developing the questionnaire, collecting the data, and analyzing them to  minimize such nonsampling errors. For example, social science survey  specialists designed the questionnaire in collaboration with GAO staff who  had subject matter expertise. In addition to an internal expert technical  review by GAO’s Survey Coordination Group, we pretested the survey with  two TAGs by telephone to ensure that the questions were relevant, clearly  stated, and easy to understand. Since there were relatively few changes  based on the pretests and we were conducting surveys with the universe  of respondents, we did not find it necessary to conduct additional pretests.  Instead, changes to the content and format of the questionnaire were made  after the pretests based on the feedback we received. When we analyzed  the data, an independent analyst checked all computer programs. All data  were double keyed during the data-entry process, and GAO staff verified a  sample of the resulting data to ensure accuracy.
In addition to analyzing the frequency and distribution of marked  checkbox survey responses, we also analyzed the open-ended narrative  survey responses for trends and recurring themes. For instance, although  we did not directly ask a question about the defense coordinating officers  (DCO) now located in each FEMA region, the DCOs were cited several  times by TAGs as improving their communications with NORTHCOM.  When the TAGs were not in agreement or had different perspectives on  issues, we also summarized conflicting responses to illustrate the  complexity of NORTHCOM’s unique relationship with the states and any  ongoing efforts to resolve these issues. For example, some TAGs believed  that NGB should be the state’s primary channel of communication with  NORTHCOM, but others disagreed.
To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM is coordinating with the  states and NGB, we reviewed plans, guidance, and other documents,  including the memorandum of agreement between NORTHCOM and NGB.   In addition, we conducted semistructured interviews with officials from  NORTHCOM and several of its subordinate commands, including the Joint  Task Force-Civil Support, Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol  Region, and Army Forces North, as well as officials from NGB  headquarters and the NORTHCOM National Guard Office. We also  conducted interviews with the officials from FEMA and DHS’s interagency  Incident Management Planning Team. Additionally, we observed a major  exercise (Ardent Sentry/Northern Edge) in the Indianapolis area in May  2007.
We conducted our review from April 2007 to April 2008 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Lorelei St. James, Assistant  Director; Yecenia Camarillo; Joanna Chan; Angela Jacobs; David Keefer;  Joseph Kirschbaum; Joanne Landesman; Erin Noel; Terry Richardson; and  Jena Whitley made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but  Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other  Issues. GAO-08-251. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.
Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs’  Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs’ Impact  on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge. GAO-08-488T.  Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made in Implementation of  Management and Mission Functions, but More Work Remains.   GAO-08-457T. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.
Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Address Critical  Infrastructure Protection Challenges That Require Federal and Private  Sector Coordination. GAO-08-36. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2007.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to  Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion  Centers. GAO-07-1241T. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2007.
Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Clarify Federal Leadership  Roles and Improve Pandemic Planning. GAO-07-1257T. Washington, D.C.:  September 26, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation  of Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-1240T. Washington, D.C.:  September 18, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare  for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address  Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington,  D.C.: July 31, 2007.
Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands’ Preparedness Efforts  Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk  Mitigation. GAO-07-696. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic  Equipment Requirements and Readiness. GAO-07-60. Washington, D.C.:  January 26, 2007.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to  Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated  National Priorities. GAO-07-143. Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for  21st Century Challenges. GAO-06-1109T. Washington, D.C.: September 21,  2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and  Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,  D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery  Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.:    July 31, 2006.
Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil  Support Teams’ Mission and Address Management Challenges. GAO-06- 498. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the  Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-808T.  Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the  Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643.  Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:  March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges  Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,  D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and  Equipment Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, D.C.:  October 20, 2005.
Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All- Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.:  July 11, 2005.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for  Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. GAO-05-21. Washington, D.C.:  November 10, 2004.
Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas  and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T.  Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2004.
Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally  Chartered Commissions. GAO-04-591. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for  Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related  Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.