NextGen Air Transportation System: FAA Has Made Some Progress in Midterm Implementation, but Ongoing Challenges Limit Expected Benefits
Published: 2013-04-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: FAA, collaborating with other federal agencies and the aviation industry, is implementing NextGen, an advanced technology air-traffic management system that FAA anticipates will replace the current ground-radar-based system. At an expected cost of $18 billion through 2018, NextGen is expected to enhance safety, increase capacity, and reduce congestion in the national airspace system. To deliver some of these benefits in the midterm, FAA is implementing operational improvements using available technologies. Delivering midterm benefits could build support for future industry investments, but a task force identified obstacles, such as FAA's lengthy approval processes.
GAO was asked to review FAA's midterm NextGen efforts. GAO examined (1) key operational improvements FAA is pursuing through 2018, (2) the extent to which FAA is addressing known obstacles to the implementation of NextGen operational improvements, and (3) the extent to which FAA is measuring and demonstrating midterm benefits. GAO reviewed FAA documents, as well as the task force's recommendations to FAA, and interviewed FAA and airport officials and aviation experts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is pursuing key operational improvements to implement the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) in the "midterm," which is 2013 through 2018. These improvements focus on establishing Performance Based Navigation (PBN) procedures at key airports, but benefits could be limited in the midterm. PBN uses satellite-based guidance to improve air-traffic control routes (known as "procedures"). These procedures can deliver benefits to airlines, such as fuel savings and increased efficiency, particularly in congested airspace. To deliver benefits more quickly, FAA made trade-offs in selecting sites and in the scope of proposed improvements. For example, FAA is not implementing procedures that will trigger lengthy environmental reviews. These trade-offs, with which airlines and other stakeholders generally agree, will likely limit benefits from these PBN initiatives early in the midterm. FAA has also made some progress in other key operational improvement areas, such as upgrading traffic management systems and revising standards to improve aircraft flow in congested airspace. However, FAA has not fully integrated implementation of all of its operational improvement efforts at airports. Because of the interdependency of improvements, their limited integration could also limit benefits in the midterm.
FAA has efforts under way to help overcome overarching obstacles to NextGen implementation identified by an advisory task force, but challenges remain, and many of these efforts are scheduled to take a number of years. FAA efforts include, for example, a new process for focused and concise environmental reviews for some proposed actions (e.g., new procedures), where a detailed analysis of the environmental impacts is limited to only those categories involving potentially significant impacts, such as increased noise or emissions. Some of these efforts do not, however, fully address previously identified obstacles. FAA has not fully addressed obstacles to selecting new PBN procedures that will best relieve congestion and improve efficiency, for example. FAA continues to rely on requests for new procedures from airlines and other stakeholders. This reliance may or may not result in procedures that maximize benefits to the national airspace system. Not addressing remaining challenges could delay NextGen implementation and limit potential benefits.
FAA has made progress in developing NextGen performance metrics, but according to key stakeholders, FAA currently provides limited data to demonstrate its progress in implementing midterm improvements and the associated benefits. FAA is in the process of harmonizing performance metrics across all agency programs to ensure that metrics align with agency targets and goals. However, information is incomplete on the midterm improvements and their benefits at selected airports, and airlines and others lack access to needed information to make fully informed investment decisions. FAA has developed a website to report on NextGen implementation, but published information is not fully tied to FAA's implementation goals. FAA's plans also provide limited information about future implementation, such as locations and expected benefits. Better performance and planning information would provide airlines with a stronger basis for making decisions to invest an estimated $6.6 billion on NextGen technology through 2018.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: FAA should, among other things, better integrate NextGen efforts; develop processes for selecting new PBN procedures; and ensure that stakeholders have needed information on NextGen progress to facilitate investment decisions. DOT did not agree or disagree with GAO's recommendations, but provided technical comments.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is transforming the nation’s  ground-based air-traffic control system to an air-traffic management  system using satellite-based navigation and other advanced technology.  This transformation is referred to as the Next Generation Air  Transportation System (NextGen). FAA released its first plan for NextGen   FAA has since issued a  in 2004 after Congress passed Vision 100.number of documents to guide NextGen’s implementation, including  annual updates to implementation plans since 2008. NextGen is intended  to enhance airspace safety, reduce delays experienced by airlines and  passengers, save fuel, and reduce carbon dioxide emissions and other  adverse environmental impacts. NextGen improvements are projected to  keep airport delays from getting worse than would be expected without  implementation of the improvements. By 2020, the agency estimates that  NextGen improvements, if implemented, could result in a cumulative  reduction in fuel consumption of 1.46-billion gallons and a cumulative  reduction in carbon dioxide emissions of 16-million metric tons. FAA  estimates that these benefits, combined with a projected 41 percent  reduction in aircraft delays, will generate $38 billion in savings through  2020 for aircraft operators, the traveling public, and FAA, as compared  with a scenario where no further NextGen improvements were made.  However FAA does not expect that NextGen improvements alone will be  sufficient to meet the capacity needs of certain busy, complex airports in   FAA’s modeling indicates that even  the national airspace system (NAS).if all ongoing and planned NextGen technologies are implemented, some  of the busiest airports may not be able to meet the projected increases in  demand and will need additional capacity, which may require the  construction of new runways or other infrastructure improvements. FAA  believes that ongoing runway development programs are still needed at  airports such as Chicago-O'Hare and Philadelphia International to meet  long-term demand. NextGen improvements will complement these  runway programs. Full implementation of NextGen will necessitate  investment by airlines and others in new technologies. Airlines and other  stakeholders, however, have expressed skepticism about the progress  made to date by FAA, which, in turn, has affected their confidence about  whether benefits will justify these investments. In addition to involving  aviation stakeholders, the numerous improvements required for full  NextGen implementation involve many parts of FAA and, in many cases,  are mutually dependent in order to attain the full projected benefits. For  example, the benefits of more efficient air-traffic control routes (called  “procedures”) may be limited if air traffic controllers do not have access to  tools to better manage airborne traffic.
See RTCA, NextGen Mid-Term Implementation Task Force Report (Sept. 9, 2009). capabilities in the “midterm,” which is 2013 through 2018. In 2012, at the  request of FAA, the Integrated Capabilities Work Group of the NextGen  Advisory Committee (NAC) reaffirmed the RTCA task force’s  recommendations and developed a subset of priority operational  improvements for major airports and multi-airport airspace  (“metroplexes”) that have either the greatest need for improvements or  offer the greatest potential benefit to the NAS in the midterm.NextGen operational improvement is a description of a specific  operational change to the NAS, such as the implementation of improved  air-traffic control procedures. The priority improvements included  capabilities that are deemed to be of high value by industry stakeholders  (particularly airlines), leverage existing airline equipage, and have the  potential to accelerate the delivery of tangible benefits.
In addition to identifying priority NextGen operational improvements for  the midterm, the RTCA task force also highlighted overarching  recommendations to help FAA overcome challenges it has faced  implementing and using those improvements. In 2012, FAA also worked  with air traffic controllers to identify obstacles specific to the  implementation and usage of existing high-performance NextGen air-  FAA has undertaken some efforts to address  traffic control procedures.challenges identified by the RTCA task force and FAA’s obstacles study.
Given questions you raised about challenges identified by RTCA, you  asked that we review the implementation of NextGen. This report  addresses the following questions: 1) What key operational improvements  is FAA pursuing to deliver NextGen benefits with existing technologies  through 2018? 2) To what extent is FAA addressing known obstacles to  the implementation and usage of NextGen’s operational improvements?  3) To what extent is FAA measuring and demonstrating midterm NextGen  benefits and assessing outcomes?
To address these three questions, we reviewed agency-provided  documentation, including planning documents such as FAA’s 2012  NextGen Implementation Plan, internal reports related to NextGen  initiatives, and FAA process and procedure documentation. We met with  FAA officials across multiple offices that have a role in implementing  NextGen, including units within the NextGen Office, the Office of Aviation  Safety, and Air Traffic Organization (ATO). We also interviewed aviation  stakeholders and experts with knowledge and experience related to  NextGen implementation, including representatives from industry  associations (such as RTCA and Airlines for America), airlines, airports,  avionics and aircraft manufacturers, and other aviation vendors, as well  as air traffic controllers.
To identify key NextGen operational improvements that use existing  technology to deliver benefits through 2018, we reviewed the  recommendations made by the RTCA task force report and by the NAC  work group. These recommendations identify operational improvements  FAA should prioritize and where those improvements should be  implemented in the midterm, but do not include all operational  improvements in FAA’s 2012 NextGen Implementation Plan. Based on  our analysis of these recommendations, we focused our evaluation on  three broad areas of NextGen operational improvements and assessed  the status of FAA’s implementation of key operational improvements in  those areas, the potential benefits to be achieved, and identified  challenges to the full implementation of those key operational  improvements.
To determine how FAA is addressing known obstacles to the  implementation of NextGen operational improvements, we reviewed our  prior work, FAA studies, and recommendations made by the RTCA task  force and the NAC work group. These sources identified obstacles to  developing, implementing, or fully using prioritized NextGen  improvements—such as the limited involvement of stakeholders,  including airport representatives, and the cumbersome process to  implement flight procedures. We spoke with officials from relevant  program offices and facilities within FAA to obtain information about  efforts designed to address these obstacles. We also interviewed industry  experts and stakeholders and assessed certain FAA efforts against  established criteria, including best practices for stakeholder involvement  from the Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) organizational goal setting and performance measurement.
See Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Airport Cooperative  Research Program Report 15, Aircraft Noise: A Toolkit for Managing Community  Expectations (Washington, D.C.: 2009). stakeholder confidence and encourage airlines to invest in NextGen  equipage.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 through April  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. For more information on  our scope and methodology, including a listing of FAA divisions and  industry stakeholders we interviewed, see appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: FAA’s planning for the midterm includes improvements based on existing  technologies that respond to recommendations made in 2009 by the  RTCA task force. The agency seeks to demonstrate tangible NextGen  benefits to build industry support and encourage future needed  investments from airlines and others to complete the transformation of the  air-traffic control system. Industry investments can be significant; for  example, FAA estimates that it would cost $260,000 in 2011 dollars to  equip—or $525,000 to retrofit—a commercial aircraft with a Required  Navigation Performance (RNP) package, which allows precision curved  flight paths. In 2012, 50 percent of the domestic commercial aircraft fleet  was RNP equipped. In 2011, RTCA reported that 80 percent of the  airline fleet at high-density airports might need to be RNP equipped to  accrue significant benefits for operators. In total, FAA estimates that  airlines will need to invest $6.6 billion—of the estimated $18.1-billion  overall implementation cost shared between airlines and FAA—on  avionics through 2018 to realize the full potential benefits from NextGen  capabilities.
The RTCA task force and the NAC work group identified priority  operational improvements that could provide substantive benefits and are  viewed as feasible to implement between now and the end of 2018, and  we grouped these into three improvement areas:
Performance Based Navigation (PBN), which uses satellite-based  guidance to route aircraft and improve approaches at airports. There  are two main types of PBN procedures, including Area Navigation  (RNAV) and RNP, which vary in the level of precision guidance they  can provide.
Enhanced airborne and surface traffic management, which includes  tools that help air traffic controllers merge and sequence planes in the  air and on the ground.
Additional or revised aviation safety standards, such as those that  establish the minimum required distances between aircraft in the air or  minimum visibility distances to the ground. These changes are made  possible by leveraging advances in technology and are anticipated to  maintain or enhance safety.
FAA and the aviation industry have emphasized the interrelated nature of  NextGen’s many components (see fig. 1). Although NextGen  improvements in each of these three areas offer some benefits when  implemented individually, they achieve the greatest benefits when  integrated, according to FAA officials, air traffic controllers, and other  industry stakeholders, including airline representatives.
Through 2018, FAA’s implementation of key NextGen operational  improvement areas is focused on 30 core airports and key air-traffic  control facilities. These air-traffic control facilities include terminal radar- approach control (TRACON) facilities and the 20 traffic control centers  that manage enroute traffic throughout the NAS. In an effort to help FAA  prioritize the implementation of NextGen, in 2012 the NAC work group  identified seven priority multi-airport metroplexes based on an  assessment of operational need (see fig. 2). Because of the integrated  nature of the NAS, improvements or changes to a portion of the airspace  or at one airport can affect other parts of the system.
A number of offices within FAA, including ATO, the Office of Aviation  Safety, and the Aeronautical Navigation Product Group (AeroNav  Products), are involved in the management and implementation of  NextGen, as well as the NextGen Office, which oversees implementation  and reports directly to the Deputy Administrator. The NextGen Office is  tasked with linking NextGen’s strategic objectives with operational  requirements in an effort to ensure integration and implementation across  FAA program offices. The NextGen Office includes a Performance and  Outreach Office that is tasked with providing information on  implementation progress, enabling successful collaboration and decision  making with internal and external stakeholders, and reporting on  performance measurements. At present, the position heading the  NextGen office is vacant, which is further discussed later in this report.  FAA’s Office of Environment and Energy develops and coordinates policy  relating to NextGen’s environmental impact, including noise and  emissions. In 2011, this office developed a new NextGen National  Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Plan to help ensure timely, effective,  and efficient environmental review of proposed NextGen improvements.
To address the majority of current flight delays throughout the NAS, the  RTCA task force identified the implementation of new PBN procedures as  a high priority initiative. Requests for new air-traffic control procedures,  including PBN procedures, can come from a variety of sources, including  airlines, airports, Congress, or individual air-traffic control facilities.  According to FAA, there are core steps and processes that are common  to the development of most procedures and involve a number of offices  within the agency.
ATO designs and develops procedures and conducts environmental  reviews. According to FAA officials, environmental reviews typically  take from 30 days to 2 years, depending on project factors such as  the presence of sensitive environmental resources (e.g., national  parks) and the potential for significant impacts such as noise or  emissions. ATO also helps implement new procedures once they  have been published by providing needed documentation or training  to air traffic controllers.
The Office of Aviation Safety establishes design criteriaprocedures and conducts safety testing, such as flight simulations  testing that includes controllers and pilots. It also grants operations  approval and certification for aircraft equipment used to fly air-traffic  control procedures.
AeroNav Products tests new procedures against design criteria and  includes new procedures on published charts for pilots. AeroNav  Products also maintains existing procedures, which need to be  assessed every 2 years to assure that they still meet criteria and that  conditions have not changed to render the existing procedures  unsafe.
The other priority operational improvements, including those related to  airborne and surface traffic management and enhanced standards, are  largely managed by offices within ATO and the Office of Aviation Safety.
The conditions around an airport may change over time, making procedures unsafe. For  example, new construction may result in taller structures around an airport or other  changes that would affect minimal altitude requirements. categorical exclusion—then the agency generally need not prepare an  environmental assessment or environmental impact statement.
For the development of new flight procedures, FAA assesses the  potential environmental impacts of proposed changes, including changes  to carbon dioxide emissions and noise levels for communities below the  new or changed routes.  New or revised routes above 3,000 feet above  ground level (AGL) typically qualify for categorical exclusion in the  absence of extraordinary circumstances. Additionally, the FAA  Modernization and Reform Act introduced two new categorical  exclusions, one of which categorically excluded RNAV and RNP  procedures below 3,000 feet AGL at core airports and certain other  airports, absent extraordinary circumstances.extraordinary circumstances would include significant increases in noise  over noise-sensitive areas (e.g., homes, schools, hospitals) under the  new or changed flight path. Noise screening and carbon dioxide  emissions analysis are required for procedures from 3,000 feet AGL to  7,000 feet AGL for arrivals and up to 10,000 feet AGL for departures.  Noise screening may be required up to 18,000 feet AGL for special  resources, such as national parks or wilderness areas. For changes  closer to the ground, below 3,000 feet AGL, more environmental review  may be required because of the potential for significant noise or  emissions increases. Figure 3 illustrates the appropriate level of NEPA  review needed for actions at various heights AGL.
section_title: Operational Improvements Largely Target Key Airports for Benefits, but Lack Integration and Have Limited Results to Date
paragraphs: FAA is concentrating its operational improvement efforts at key airports  and metropolitan areas and focusing primarily on PBN procedures,  including in its Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex  (OAPM) initiative and another effort in the Seattle metropolitan area  called “Greener Skies over Seattle” (Greener Skies). Increasing the  number and use of PBN procedures is viewed as a way to accelerate the  delivery of benefits, such as fuel savings, to airlines in some of the most- congested metroplex areas. To deliver benefits more quickly and avoid  some obstacles that have hampered prior NextGen efforts, FAA has  made trade-offs in selecting sites and the scope of proposed  improvements, concentrating on those projects that can demonstrate  some benefits in the midterm and leaving more time-consuming but  potentially higher benefit-yielding projects for the longer term. The agency  has also made some progress in the other key operational improvement  areas, such as upgrading airborne traffic management to enhance the  flow of aircraft in congested airspace and revising standards to enhance  airport capacity. By contrast, FAA has made more limited progress  enhancing surface traffic management at airports, which will likely limit  overall benefits in the midterm. Finally, there has been little integration of  key operational improvements, which limits the potential benefits offered  by any single improvement as well as the potential impacts on the NAS.
subsections: section_title: FAA Has Made Certain Trade-offs in Designing and Implementing PBN Efforts to Deliver Midterm Benefits
paragraphs: FAA’s primary effort to implement new PBN procedures in the midterm is  the OAPM initiative, which focuses on priority metroplexes with airport  operations that have a large effect on the overall efficiency of the NAS.  This initiative is also designed to provide benefits to airlines and airports  in those metroplexes. If OAPM proceeds as planned, FAA expects to  begin to demonstrate benefits at the eight sites that are currently active  by the end of 2015. (See fig. 4.) Projects at five additional sites are  expected to be fully operational before the end of 2017, according to  current FAA plans. With the exception of the Houston project, each  OAPM project has about a 3-year implementation time frame, which  includes 12 to 18 months for the environment assessment process.
OAPM focuses primarily on implementing PBN procedures—long viewed  as a cornerstone of NextGen—and any necessary airspace redesign for  deployment of the new procedures.foundation for flight paths, airspace design, route separation, and  obstacle clearance. (See fig. 5 for an illustration of these procedures.)  Potential PBN benefits include shorter, more direct flight paths, reduced  aircraft fuel burned—and resulting reductions in carbon dioxide  emissions—and reduced noise in surrounding communities. The following  are the key types of PBN procedures.
RNAV procedures, which are enabled by technology available on  nearly all commercial aircraft in the United States, provide aircraft with  routing flexibility and more efficient flight paths than conventional  procedures, and can allow improved access to airports in congested  airspace or in bad weather. In 2011, 96 percent of the domestic commercial fleet was equipped for RNAV. As of January 10, 2013,  there were over 12,500 public RNAV procedures available for all  aircraft capable of flying them.
RNP procedures (a subset of RNAV) add additional onboard-aircraft  performance monitoring and alerting and require additional equipment  as well as specialized crew training. In some cases, RNP can  increase aircraft access to airports in adverse weather and terrain and  help air traffic controllers keep aircraft operations at one airport from  interfering with aircraft operations at adjacent airports by using curved  flight paths. As mentioned above, in 2012, approximately 50 percent  of the domestic commercial fleet was equipped for RNP. As of  January 10, 2013, 352 public RNP procedures are included on charts  for pilots.
Optimized Profile Descent (OPD) procedures allow aircraft to descend  from cruise altitude to final approach more efficiently, eliminating or  reducing the level offs or step downs of a traditional descent. Low or  idle engine power settings save fuel and reduce emissions. OPD  procedures also require less dialogue between air traffic controllers  and pilots, which may improve safety by reducing the potential for  miscommunications.
According to reports by teams planning OAPM implementation, OAPM’s  benefits for airspace users will stem mostly from implementing OPD  procedures enabled through the use of RNAV and the resulting  reductions to fuel use and associated fuel costs. (See fig. 6.) For  example, FAA projected that shorter routes and OPDs at its eight active  sites could save at least 29-million gallons of fuel and reduce carbon  dioxide emissions by 299,000 metric tons annually when fully  implemented. In turn, improved efficiency and predictability at key  metroplexes is expected to improve the efficiency of the NAS. FAA  estimated total annual benefits resulting from new OAPM procedures and  associated airspace changes using aircraft simulators. As previously  mentioned, all eight active sites are predicted to begin demonstrating  benefits in the 2013 through 2015 time frame.
To achieve the time frames of its OAPM initiative, FAA has made trade- offs, which are summarized below, between procedures that yield some  benefits and can be implemented relatively quickly and those that could  result in greater benefits but would take much longer to implement.
Excluded new procedures that would require route changes below  3,000 feet AGL or very close in to the airport. Although all new flight  procedures require NEPA review, those deemed to have  extraordinary circumstances such as significant environmental  impacts—including a significant increase in noise or emissions around  an airport—would require a full environmental impact statement,  which can take several years to complete. By excluding changes  closer to the airport, FAA is seeking to avoid the lengthy  environmental reviews that have delayed the implementation of some  other FAA efforts. For example, we previously reported that FAA’s  airspace redesign effort in the New York, New Jersey, and  Philadelphia area has provoked significant community opposition,  including legal challenges to the environmental review process used  by FAA. That effort, which began in 1998, is currently scheduled for  completion in 2016. Representatives from airlines, equipment  manufacturers, and industry associations that we spoke with  acknowledged that there could be additional efficiency benefits from  new PBN procedures closer to the airport. For example, new  procedures that would allow for tight turns for the arrival into the  airport can reduce flight times and associated fuel use and costs and  facilitate the flow of air traffic flying into or out of different airports in a  metroplex, as well as increasing predictability of flight schedules.  Nonetheless, most of these stakeholders did not believe that these  potential additional benefits warranted the longer project timeframes  that would be necessary to complete more detailed environmental  reviews.
Excluded new procedures that would require new design criteria. FAA  officials explained that having to wait for new design criteria for  procedures could jeopardize the OAPM time frames. Outside of the  OAPM initiative, FAA acknowledged that its staff had at times initiated  work on a requested PBN procedure only to discover that the design  criteria—which ensure the safety of procedures—do not yet exist for  the desired procedure. FAA officials stated that new design criteria  would be needed to more widely deploy PBN procedures, but that  effort is being undertaken independently of the OAPM initiative.
Excluded sites with ongoing airspace redesign projects. Concerns  about potential implementation delays also factored into FAA’s  decision about which metroplexes to address in the midterm. Some  industry stakeholders have voiced concerns that FAA did not include  in its current OAPM plans the New York/Philadelphia metroplex,  which is the nation’s most congested airspace and contributes to over  half of domestic flight delays. However, FAA decided to exclude that  metroplex in light of the Record of Decision for the existing  environmental reviews for FAA’s ongoing airspace redesign work for  that area, because the agency did not want to initiate a new  environmental review process.
In addition to the OAPM initiative, FAA has other PBN initiatives that aim  to deliver midterm benefits in less congested areas. For example, FAA’s  Greener Skies project, which was initiated by Alaska Airlines, aims to  deliver benefits to the Seattle metroplex beginning in 2013, and was  shaped by local considerations. new set of PBN procedures planned for implementation in March 2013.
Greener Skies was initiated by Alaska Airlines in collaboration with Boeing, other  airlines, and the Port of Seattle, which operates Seattle-Tacoma International Airport.  Greener Skies became an FAA-sponsored NextGen initiative in 2010.
The procedures are designed to shorten flight tracks and route aircraft  over water. FAA estimates that the new Greener Skies procedures would  reduce annual fuel consumption by 112,420 barrels annually, resulting in  potential annual savings of $13.5 million. To facilitate implementation of  the project, a number of potentially beneficial procedures were scoped  out of the Greener Skies effort based on local concerns. For example,  FAA officials and other Greener Skies participants stated that new  procedures to the east of the airport were not included because of known  community concerns about new aviation noise in those areas and to  avoid any changes that could violate noise commitments made in a  recent Record of Decision. In addition to Greener Skies, FAA also has  non-OAPM PBN efforts in place in Denver and Minneapolis.
According to analysis done by Alaska Airlines, of the 27 RNP charts that are carried by  the airline’s flight crews, 5 of the routes in Alaska were flown more than 40 percent of the  time, while at least 11 of the routes in the lower 48 states were flown less than 1 percent  of the time. number of times by air traffic controllers. Southwest Airlines has  expressed similar concerns about not being able to obtain projected  benefits of new PBN procedures. For example, in 2011 the airline  reported that its usage of RNP procedures had dropped, in part, because  approval to use existing procedures was often not granted by air traffic  controllers. Some controllers told us that using new PBN procedures  can be difficult for a number of reasons, including a lack of guidance and  tools, which will be further discussed later in this report. Finally, in some  cases, pilots prefer to fly traditional routes—particularly if the PBN route is  longer or less efficient than a shortcut that may be approved by an air  traffic controller on a traditional procedure when conditions allow it.  According to FAA officials, when conditions do not allow for such  shortcuts, pilots can use the PBN procedures.
FAA does not currently have a system to track the use of PBN  procedures, and is unable to provide information on the extent to which  existing procedures are either unused or are used on a limited basis.  There are currently no automatic data collection systems to track the use  of procedures, either on the aircraft flying the routes or at the air-traffic  control facilities managing those aircraft. FAA officials stated that current  efforts to track the use of procedures through pilot reporting have been  hindered by insufficient and unreliable data. Without a way to  systematically measure the use of particular procedures, the agency may  not recognize routes that need to be revised to ensure that airlines are  able to get expected benefits such as reduced fuel use or improved  access in bad weather. As we have previously reported, critical success  factors for goal setting and performance management by leading  organizations include systematically measuring their performance to  guide goal-setting, managerial decision-making, resource allocations, and  day-to-day operations.
section_title: Mixed Progress in Other Key NextGen Improvement Areas Could Limit Benefits
subsections: section_title: Airborne and Surface Traffic Management
paragraphs: Through 2018, FAA is focusing on updating its Traffic Management  Advisor (TMA), which is an airborne arrival-sequencing program that  assigns times when aircraft destined for the same airport should cross  certain points in order to reach the destination airport at a specific time  and in an efficient order. TMA can enhance the effectiveness of new PBN  procedures, particularly when controllers are mixing traffic using different  types of procedures and aircraft with different levels of equipment (e.g.,  RNP equipped mixed with non-RNP equipped aircraft). For example,  controllers can better merge aircraft on conventional, straight flight paths  with those on PBN curved approaches and obtain a clearer picture of  traffic on the ground and in terminal airspace when TMA is used with  surface management tools (see fig. 7). Currently, TMA is primarily used  for arrival sequencing by certain air-traffic control facilities at times when  the demand for arrivals exceeds the capacity of a specific airspace or  airport. The upgrades could allow for TMA to be used more often, for  more purposes (e.g., sequencing aircraft further away from the airport),  and at additional facilities.
Many of the active OAPM teams recommended upgrades to TMA’s  capabilities for their respective air-traffic control facilities; such upgrades  could provide significant benefits to priority metroplexes, as well as at  core airports faced with similar congestion issues. For example, the North  Texas OAPM study team recommended separating the traffic to  Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport from Dallas Love Field’s airport  traffic more efficiently, largely through TMA upgrades. North Texas OAPM  team members told us that implementation of the procedures they are  developing would depend principally on planned TMA upgrades.  Likewise, the Houston OAPM study team recommended that arrival  procedures it identified for the Houston metroplex to increase efficiency  be managed using an enhanced TMA system. FAA has worked to align  its plans for upgrading the TMA system with issues and concerns raised   For example, FAA plans to launch a new time-based  by OAPM teams.metering capability for PBN, which could help facilitate the corresponding  launch of new PBN procedures in four priority metroplexes.
As part of its upgrades to airborne traffic management, FAA is also  deploying a system to improve air traffic management in metroplexes by  sharing information between adjoining air-traffic control facilities. The new  system allows these facilities to share information and workload. It has  been deployed at air-traffic control facilities for key metroplexes— including Atlanta, Los Angeles, Newark, and San Francisco—and FAA  plans to complete the installation at at least three other sites by the end of  2014. Finally, FAA is implementing a system that will enable the  sequencing of aircraft further from the destination airport—current  sequencing typically occurs at the border between the enroute and  terminal airspace. This system is to be implemented at one site in 2014,  and the agency plans to subsequently install it at all others, but locations  and timeframes have not been specified.
FAA-led surface-traffic management enhancements are not expected to  begin to be implemented until 2015 at the earliest, mostly through the  greater use of automated departure-queue management programs that   These existing  are already in place at a number of metroplex airports.programs include queue-managements programs currently in use at John  F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York and in Memphis, for  example, which allow pilots to put their aircraft into a virtual departure  queue before leaving the gate or ramp area instead of taxiing out and  waiting on the runway for takeoff. Fuel savings, reduced taxiway  congestion, and enhanced safety are among the benefits. FAA is working  to determine which surface-traffic management capabilities to implement  through testing with air traffic controllers, airlines, general aviation, and  airport operators. While the airports have not yet been identified and the  capabilities are still being determined, according to FAA officials, the  agency tentatively plans to complete the rollout of enhanced surface- traffic management improvements by the end of the midterm.
FAA is also developing a new surface-management capability system, the  Terminal Flight Data Manager, but does not plan to implement it until at  least 2017, which will likely limit potential midterm benefits. According to  FAA, reductions in surface traffic congestion largely depend on the new  system’s implementation. Further, the Terminal Flight Data Manager is  also key to producing desired efficiency benefits—that is increasing  arrivals and departures at busy metroplex airports where demand for  runway capacity is high or where there are multiple runways with  conflicting traffic. As a result, the agency will not be able to manage traffic  throughout all phases of a flight—referred to as “end-to-end metering”— until these improvements are completed, including the integration of TMA  enhancements with the Tower Flight Data Manager.envisioned for the midterm, end-to-end metering is now scheduled to be  implemented in the long term (by 2025).
FAA has already implemented systems to increase the safety of surface  traffic. To improve safety for taxi and surface movement at airports, for  example, FAA installed Airport Surface Detection Equipment–Model X  (ASDE-X)—a ground monitoring system—for 35 major airports from 2003  to 2011. FAA is also installing Airport Surface Surveillance Capability  (ASSC) for another 9 busy and complex airports. These operational  improvements were prioritized by the RTCA task force and enhance  safety and traffic flow on runways, taxiways, and some ramps and allow  for collaborative decision making among air traffic controllers and pilots.
FAA has recently approved a few revisions to existing standards, which  should benefit a handful of airports in the midterm, but further revisions  are required before the envisioned efficiency and capacity benefits of  midterm NextGen improvements can be fully realized. A key component  of FAA’s NextGen plans involves updating separation and other flight  safety standards to better accommodate modern aircraft and advances in  technology. Separation standards—required minimum distances used for  safely spacing aircraft from other aircraft, terrain, and objects—have a  large effect on airport capacity and the overall capacity of the NAS.  Consequently, according to FAA and industry stakeholders, updating  separation and other standards could increase the efficiency, capacity,  and predictability of the NAS. By contrast, if standards are not updated to  facilitate the use of new technologies and procedures, projected NextGen  benefits might not be achievable to the same degree. Such revisions to  standards can be time intensive because safety assessments are  required to ensure the safety of the changes. Figure 8 provides examples  of key additional or revised standards that FAA is pursuing through  2018.
Recent work completed by FAA’s Closely Spaced Parallel Operations  working groupairport and several smaller airports. In 2008, the working group initiated a   could soon provide benefits to one large metroplex  series of research studies to investigate the potential for reducing runway  separation standards—the required distance between runway centerlines  for simultaneous use—to provide increased arrival and departure capacity  in all weather conditions. After a lengthy safety assessment, the working  group determined in 2011 that this standard could be reduced from 4300  feet to 3600 feet. FAA is proceeding with the implementation of the new  standard. According to FAA officials, once this new standard is  implemented, it will benefit four airports immediately. FAA’s 2012  NextGen Implementation Plan indicates that such reductions in runway  separation standards should improve overall capability on runways,  especially during poor weather conditions, but does not provide any  quantitative estimates of benefits from this new standard.
FAA has also recently revised standards in two key metroplex areas in an  effort to increase capacity and efficiency.
In October 2011, FAA implemented a new standard that decreases  the required angle of divergence between aircraft using RNAV  departure procedures on the same or parallel runways at Hartsfield- Jackson Atlanta International Airport—the busiest airport in the NAS.  According to FAA, this reduction has given controllers the ability to  allow between 8 and 12 additional aircraft to depart the airport every  hour and is expected to save airlines $10 million annually from  reduced fuel burn on taxiways.
Throughout 2011 and 2012, FAA implemented several revised  standards at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) that FAA  officials said could improve airport efficiency. An FAA official and  industry representatives who participated in this initiative noted that  these revisions should help address capacity issues at the airport  created by regional wind and fog patterns. Revised standards include  a lower visibility minimum for certain types of approaches, as well as  departures. FAA also increased the use of the airport’s optimal  runway configurations during various wind conditions.
section_title: Integration of Improvements Is Minimal
paragraphs: FAA has had varying success in integrating its NextGen implementation  efforts, and stakeholders see opportunities for additional integration to  better deliver benefits in the midterm. In 2010, the NAC approved of  FAA’s plans to focus its early OAPM efforts on new PBN procedures and  airspace changes to expedite the delivery of benefits for operators, but  suggested that FAA incorporate additional operational improvements— such as revised standards—into future OAPM efforts. In 2012, the NAC  recommended that FAA incorporate into future OAPM efforts additional  midterm operational improvements, such as enhanced airborne and  surface-traffic management tools and other capabilities to enhance the  capacity of metroplex areas. FAA has coordinated the development of  PBN procedures with the implementation of airborne-traffic management  tools in some OAPM projects when study teams identified improvements  that would facilitate the implementation or usage of new PBN routes, but  this integration has not been systematic for current OAPM efforts. For  example, in response to a request from the North California OAPM team,  FAA has added the San Francisco metroplex to the list of metroplexes  that will receive an upgraded TMA system, which would allow the enroute  center to manage traffic in concert with those air-traffic control facilities  that manage surrounding airspace. The consideration of other non-PBN  improvements, however, has been done at the discretion of OAPM  teams—rather than being included as a goal of the overall OAPM effort— and has been largely limited to enhancements to TMA.
More broadly, FAA’s obstacles study pointed to the lack of airborne  management tools as a key obstacle to the use of existing PBN  procedures, including tools that help air traffic controllers sequence  aircraft and better predict and visualize the flight trajectories of aircraft on  PBN procedures. These tools are needed to fully use RNP curved  approaches in congested metroplex areas, according to the study. One  such tool will not be operationally available until 2016, according to FAA’s  2012 NextGen Implementation Plan, and the plan did not clearly indicate  how or where this capability would be rolled out. Stakeholders have  raised concerns that the lack of some key tools will slow the potential  benefits of PBN efforts, including those associated with the OAPM  initiative. Likewise, as mentioned above, the rollout of surface-traffic  management improvements are scheduled to begin in 2015 at a few  airports, which may hinder FAA’s ability to deliver the full benefits of its  other improvement efforts, including PBN.
section_title: FAA Is Addressing Some Obstacles, but Project Prioritization, Stakeholder Participation, and Consistent NextGen Leadership Remain Challenges
paragraphs: As noted above, FAA’s current operational improvement efforts have  involved certain trade-offs to achieve some near and midterm benefits, in  large part, because of the context within which these improvements are  being made. FAA has long-established processes and requirements in  place that have made the U.S. airspace among the safest in the world. A  number of those processes are, however, complex, lengthy, and at times,  unclear as they relate to new technologies, procedures, and capabilities.  FAA has a number of efforts under way to help overcome previously  identified, overarching obstacles to NextGen implementation, such as  streamlining processes and updating the air traffic controller handbook   Many of these efforts are scheduled to  and procedure design criteria.take a number of years, particularly when proposed changes must be  evaluated to ensure that they will maintain, if not enhance, the system’s  current level of safety. Some, such as those aimed at increasing  stakeholder involvement in planning and implementation of PBN  procedures, do not, however, fully address previously identified obstacles.  Nor do they change FAA’s overall approach to identifying potential PBN  procedures for development or amendment, which relies on requests  from airlines and other stakeholders without determining their impact on  improving efficiency in the NAS. Finally, continued uncertainty about the  FAA’s leadership of NextGen affects the agency’s ability to manage and  oversee the various improvements and efforts needed to achieve the full  implementation of NextGen.
subsections: section_title: Flight Procedure Implementation Process Is Being Streamlined, but Impact Will Not Be Known for Several Years
paragraphs: FAA and others have identified the process for developing PBN and other  new flight procedures as a challenge. For example, in 2009 the RTCA  task force recommended streamlining the operational approval and  certification processes for new flight procedures. Likewise, an FAA report  described the existing process as a bundle of interconnected,  overlapping, and sometimes competing processes. It also found  variations and contradictions in existing guidance on procedure  development and implementation, which result in a process that is “far  from optimal, frequently generates rework, and on occasion results in the  implementation of low- or no-benefit procedures.” To address these  challenges, FAA initiated the Navigation Lean (NAV Lean) initiative to  focus on streamlining the implementation and amendment processes for  all flight procedures, releasing a report with planned improvements in  2010. FAA anticipates that the initiative will cumulatively cut 40 percent  off the time needed to implement new procedures (assuming a full  environmental impact statement is not required), though it acknowledged  that it will be difficult to measure actual time saved. ATO and the Office of  Aviation Safety share responsibility for overseeing the initiative, which  began with the identification of overarching issues that negatively affect  procedure implementation efficiency. The NAV Lean working groups  identified nine issue areas with 21 associated recommendations, which  focus, among other things, on minimizing the workload and delayed  implementation associated with minor amendments of procedures,  amending agency guidance to clarify and promote preparation of focused  environmental assessments, and overcoming challenges to the  development and implementation of criteria for flight procedures. (See fig.  9.)
According to the NAV Lean implementation plan, all planned  improvements are scheduled to be completed from 2013 through 2015.  FAA envisions that some are likely to produce benefits soon after  implementation. However, FAA has acknowledged that it will have  difficulty setting a baseline from which to measure many of the NAV Lean  improvements. Agency officials, for example, told us that it would not be  possible to determine how long the current PBN procedure  implementation process takes both because the process varies for each  effort and because agency databases do not track the amount of time  taken for individual steps in the process. They explained that the more  than 40 percent cumulative NAV Lean timesaving estimate was  developed by asking officials the amount of time they expected to save in  the procedure development process. In February 2013, FAA reported that  it had made progress on all but one of the recommendations and had  completed work on three recommendations, including a recommendation  regarding the use of focused NEPA reviews in some circumstances.  However, it is too early to determine outcomes associated with the  implementation of these recommendations such as developing more  procedures in less time.
As part of addressing concerns about the length of its environmental  review process, FAA released guidance on preparing concise and  focused environmental assessments for proposed FAA actions (including  new procedures) in January 2011. Lengthy environmental reviews have  been identified as an obstacle to the timely implementation of PBN by  FAA and others. Environmental considerations were frequently not  addressed until late in the procedure development process. The NAV  Lean working group found that previous FAA guidance on the preparation  of environmental assessments did not adequately address circumstances  where the environment analysis could be more narrowly focused on only  certain potential environmental impacts. In those circumstances, FAA  offices should be preparing environmental assessments that consider all  impact categories for applicability and significance, but focus the analysis  only on the impact categories (e.g., noise) where there is potential for  significant impacts caused by the proposed action (i.e., procedures). FAA  anticipates that for small, non-OAPM projects involving one airport,  “focused” environmental assessments could potentially take from 3 to 6  months, with a cost of $300,000 or less. For more complex OAPM  projects—involving multiple airports and the assessment of numerous  new flight procedures—focused environmental assessments generally will  have 12- to 18-month time frames. By contrast, FAA officials estimate that  non-focused environmental assessments traditionally take 6 months to 2  years for new flight procedures and cost $300,000 to over $1 million.
Although FAA has used focused environmental assessments for other  types of proposed agency actions, FAA is first applying the new guidance  to procedure-related actions for projects in Houston and Denver.  Thereafter, the agency intends to use the new guidance at select OAPM  sites (i.e., based on their complexity, number of potential environmental  impacts, local considerations, and where proposed changes would not  qualify for a categorical exclusion under NEPA), and will apply this  approach to other projects as appropriate. FAA is also working to  enhance or integrate several environmental screening and modeling  tools—by including fuel burn analysis in its noise screening tools and  incorporating environmental screening into a traffic simulator used to  design PBN procedures. These screening tools allow procedure  developers to evaluate environmental implications early in the design  process and determine the potential for extraordinary circumstances that  would warrant environmental assessments rather than categorical  exclusions. FAA has also been developing a new tool—the Aviation  Environmental Design Tool—to facilitate its environmental assessment  process.
The FAA reauthorization act included a second new categorical exclusion  for new PBN procedures that would result in measurable reductions in  fuel consumption, carbon dioxide emissions, and noise, on a per-flight  basis, as compared to aircraft operations that follow existing  procedures. cumulatively for all flights, and FAA has not yet identified an approach for  such per-flight assessments. According to FAA officials, no currently  available methodology resolves the technical problems involved in  making such a determination, so the agency has not applied this new  categorical exclusion. FAA officials have requested NAC’s input on how  to address these technical challenges.
Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 213(c)(1), (2), 126 Stat., 49 (2012). amendments from the regional and national prioritization processes. This  would allow FAA to make minor changes to existing—but potentially  underused—RNAV arrival and departure procedures more expeditiously.  This could be an efficient and cost-effective way for FAA to increase PBN  usage.
While NAV Lean does not assign one FAA office responsibility for  developing and implementing new procedures, implementation of several  NAV Lean recommendations will provide additional tools to allow for  better coordination among ATO, the Office of Aviation Safety, AeroNav  Products, and others involved in the process. In 2012, FAA’s obstacles  study pointed to the lack of an accountable FAA office for the  development of PBN to oversee a coherent design, development,  production, and implementation strategy for new procedures. FAA is  developing a web-based system to allow each interested party to access  procedure designs and suggest improvements or mitigate potential  problems throughout the development process. This is expected to result  in a more cohesive procedure-development process when implemented  in 2015. Furthermore, NAV Lean efforts are also intended to strengthen  the role of the United States Instrument Flight Procedures Panel to  improve coordination among parties responsible for the development and  implementation of procedure design criteria.
section_title: New Efforts May Better Address New Procedure Requests, but Do Not Proactively Identify Needs
paragraphs: The RTCA task force and the NAC work group have pointed to the  importance of prioritizing the implementation of key operational  improvements, including focusing on the most appropriate PBN options  such as RNAV or RNP. FAA officials said that they are in the early stages  of developing a toolbox for those requesting new procedures, which  would match solutions to identified problems and allow the agency to  better target its efforts. FAA does not currently assess individual  procedure requests—which can be made by a number of parties,  including airlines—to determine if the proposed new procedures would  generate expected benefits or resolve problems for airports or airspace.  Rather, once a request for a new PBN procedure is received it is  prioritized for development as requested on a first-come, first-served  basis. Requests for new RNP procedures do not currently trigger an  assessment by FAA (or by the requester) of the potential to use a less- costly option to resolve the underlying problem or gain the expected  benefits.procedures could be used by more aircraft and pilots than the more  precise RNP curved routes that were being or had been developed. Over  90 percent of commercial aircraft are equipped for RNAV procedures— which also allow for curved flight paths—and the RTCA task force  recommended that FAA should focus on leveraging RNAV and reserve  RNP to locations where tighter turns are needed.
FAA officials noted that, in some cases, new RNAV  Industry stakeholders have argued that third parties could play a greater  role in the development of flight procedures, a move that would help FAA  respond to the current demand for new PBN procedures in the face of   The FAA reauthorization act called for the  limited agency resources. agency to establish a program for qualified third parties to develop, test,  and maintain flight procedures. In May 2012, FAA awarded a $2.8- million contract to GE’s Naverus and a partner to develop two RNP  approach procedures each at five mid-sized airports. The contractors  are to design, evaluate, and maintain these RNP approaches and be  responsible for providing environmental data and analysis to FAA to  support categorical exclusions and for drafting any required NEPA  reviews, for review and approval by FAA. According to FAA officials, the  pilot project will allow FAA to assess the potential for third parties to have  an expanded role in helping address those PBN procedures that FAA,   FAA has  because of a lack of resources, may be unable to address.made progress in recent years in developing a framework plan for  leveraging third-party procedure developers and overseeing them. The  potential of third party procedure development may be limited, however,  given that there are currently two third-party procedure developers—GE’s  Naverus and Boeing’s Jeppesen—that are eligible to develop public RNP  approach procedures. The use of third-party developers may be more  costly than the in-house FAA development and maintenance of  procedures. FAA officials estimate that new RNP procedures cost  $58,100 on average to develop, conduct safety testing, and implement— and $2,300 per year to maintain—when these efforts are undertaken in  house. This total is significantly less than the $280,000 average cost for  each of the 10 procedures that are being developed by the third party,  although these FAA procedure-development costs do not include  additional expenses for any NEPA reviews above a categorical exclusion.  If an environmental assessment is required, then FAA costs could exceed  $58,100, as the cost of conducting a focused environmental assessment  can range from $0 to $300,000.
Despite efforts to streamline the development of flight procedures, FAA  does not have a process to proactively identify those PBN procedures  that would best further NextGen goals. Much of the work done by the  RTCA task force and the NAC work group has focused on prioritizing  improvements, and the identification of needed new routes might prove  beneficial in easing congestion in the NAS and key airspace, or in solving  local problems that have ripple effects across the NAS. OAPM was  designed, in part, to fill this void, but for airspace or airports that are not  included in the initiative, FAA depends on stakeholders to initiate  requests. Once requests are made, however, they are added to the  procedure-development queue, and are not assessed against other PBN  procedures in the queue to determine their respective potential to benefit  the NAS or to resolve problems at specific airports. Further, requests may  be driven by where a requesting airline flies and not where new  procedures are most needed. In 2012, Airlines for America, an airline  trade organization, led an effort—called 20/20—to identify those 20 new  procedures most wanted by airlines, as well as the 20 procedures they  viewed as most in need of amendment. Four of the identified new  procedures were at airports included in the OAPM initiative, so  participating airlines agreed that FAA should address those new  procedures through ongoing airspace redesign efforts. Of the remaining  16 identified procedures, 13 were found to already be under development  by FAA. Similarly, for procedures needing revision, FAA found that 13 of  the 20 identified procedures were already in the process of being revised.  In the absence of a procedure-development tracking tool, such as is  being developed as part of NAV Lean, airlines were not able to monitor  FAA’s procedure development process for these routes. In response to  the 20/20 effort, FAA agreed to track the development of the 16 desired  new routes on its website, although it is not tracking those procedures   Without a systematic  that were identified for revision on the website.means to identify procedures that are most critical to achieving NextGen  goals and sharing information about its plans and progress in developing  needed new procedures, it will be difficult for FAA to provide reasonable  assurance that its efforts are efficiently delivering benefits.
OAPM or similar efforts may present an opportunity to assess the utility of  some existing, but underused, conventional air-traffic control routes in a  more efficient, systematic way. FAA maintains more than 22,000 PBN  and conventional procedures in the NAS, and the agency is looking to  cancel underused or redundant flight procedures. As noted, these procedures cost $2,300 or more per year to maintain and may be used  only occasionally, if at all.unneeded routes, in a 2011 report, the Flight Safety Foundation proposed  a process to identify 800 such procedures for potential elimination,  representing a 12 percent reduction in the total number of ground-based  approach procedures and a 4 percent reduction in the total number of  procedures. Identifying these procedures for decommissioning could  result in savings of approximately $1.8 million per year—or about $18  million over 10 years—in maintenance costs. An official with AeroNav  Products pointed out that when OAPM teams assess current needs within  a metroplex’s airspace, they are ideally positioned to identify some of the  existing procedures that could be decommissioned, although they are not  currently tasked with assessing the continued utility of existing routes.  Once good candidates for route decommissioning are identified, FAA  could further assess these routes and begin the public-notification  process that leads to decommissioning.
section_title: Standards and the Air Traffic Controller Handbook Are Being Amended
paragraphs: The lack of design criteria can impede the development of new  procedures. FAA’s obstacles study, for example, notes that AeroNav  Products is often unable to design a requested procedure because the  criteria for the procedure have yet to be developed by the Office of  Aviation Safety. According to the report, this lack of a coherent design,  development, production, and implementation strategy slows down the  process and creates frustration among air traffic controllers and system  users, such as airlines. FAA officials in the Office of Aviation Safety  responsible for developing PBN criteria told us that their units have made  progress in recent years in updating the design criteria to better use the  capabilities of PBN to respond to requests for new procedures. They also  told us that they are currently focused on clarifying and consolidating all  the PBN criteria into one document to make it easier for air traffic  controllers and others, and have in place several efforts related to specific  design criteria, such as updating the criteria for holding—a maneuver  used to delay an aircraft already in flight—for RNAV and RNP  procedures. However, officials in the Office of Aviation Safety and other  FAA officials acknowledged that much work remains to be done to  develop new criteria before PBN can be deployed nationwide. Several  officials also acknowledged that it can be difficult to meet user requests  for new PBN design criteria given variations in terrain and changing  technology, especially because the safety tests that are often required for  changing or amending the design criteria can be time and labor intensive.
RTCA has pointed to the potential for changes in the way FAA tracks and assesses any  errors—notably losses of separation where aircraft come in closer proximity than  allowed—made by air traffic controllers to encourage closer adherence to existing  standards by eliminating incentives to add buffers between planes. For example, the  RTCA task force recommended and FAA implemented a non-punitive reporting system for  losses of separation. For more information about FAA’s new systems for assessing losses  of separation caused by controllers, see GAO, Aviation Safety: Enhanced Oversight and  Improved Availability of Risk- Based Data Could Further Improve Safety, GAO-12-24  (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 5, 2011). procedures to parallel runways. Potential solutions are then forwarded  to FAA for consideration, such as a 2011 proposal that would better  leverage the safety benefits of PBN to change certain separation  standards for the use of parallel runways based on safety assessments  conducted by the Greener Skies team.
FAA’s primary effort to address issues with the air traffic controller  handbook is also part of the Greener Skies initiative. The Greener Skies  team has identified 95 needed changes in FAA orders and regulations to  date to address obstacles that have contributed to limiting the usage of  PBN procedures. FAA’s obstacles study noted that the lack of standard  language for controllers and pilots for certain types of PBN procedures  could create uncertainty in communications, which would require such a  change to the handbook. Officials we interviewed at a Seattle-area air- traffic control facility acknowledged that they had known for years before  the Greener Skies project began that the handbook was outdated.  According to these officials, although FAA has published many PBN  routes throughout the NAS, from a controllers’ perspective, there were  few rules in place for using those procedures. For example, under the  current handbook there is little guidance on how to safely give less than  the standard separation for merging planes—as is often done for  traditional procedures in clear weather conditions—even if the aircraft are  on precise paths. The separation standards heavily influence the  guidance in the controller handbook, because much of a controllers’  responsibility is to keep safe distances between aircraft. According to  FAA’s obstacles study, these concerns have led controllers to not  approve the use of PBN procedures, in some cases.
FAA and others have also pointed to the need for additional training of air  traffic controllers as a potential obstacle to the use of PBN procedures,  and FAA’s obstacles study suggested developing a national training plan  for PBN operations. While we did not look at the extent of training  provided when PBN procedures are implemented at individual airports,  the larger-scale initiatives in our review have included time and resources  for controller training. For example, OAPM plans dedicate from 9 to 15  months to the implementation phase, which includes controller training.  Officials with the North Texas team told us that some new OAPM  procedures, such as OPDs, would require significant changes from the  way local controllers traditionally managed aircraft, so adequate training  would be especially important for the successful implementation of their  OAPM procedures. Likewise, officials from the Seattle-area TRACON  noted that it had taken them about 2 months to develop the controller  training for using new Greener Skies procedures.
section_title: FAA Has Involved More Stakeholders, but Is Not Fully Engaging Airports
paragraphs: FAA is making progress in systematically involving industry stakeholders,  air traffic controllers, and other key subject matter experts in its initiatives,  including OAPM and Greener Skies, as well as surface-traffic  management initiatives. As we have previously reported, collaboration  has been an ongoing challenge for FAA. For example, officials with the  Port Authority of New York and New Jersey told us that the failure to  include controllers early in the procedure design process for the airspace  redesign effort for the New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia area— some of the most complex and congested airspace in the world— contributed to the 4-year-plus implementation delay, because some  proposed routes had to be amended following controller input. As such,  we as well as others have made numerous recommendations that FAA  should collaborate better with key stakeholders to facilitate the  implementation of NextGen and enhance results. Many of these key  stakeholders are also involved in other efforts to improve capacity in the  NAS, such as the development of new or expanded runways, which are  or will be pursued concurrently with NextGen. FAA officials, local  controllers, airline officials, and others generally agreed that FAA has  made significant progress in recent years in its ability to collaborate to  achieve results. For example, FAA officials and industry stakeholders  emphasized that OAPM is highly collaborative, as the study teams and  design teams include local air traffic controllers and airline officials, FAA  officials with experience in airspace redesign and other fields,  environmental specialists, and others. The following are among the  anticipated benefits of this collaborative approach.
Enhances PBN usage: A number of FAA officials and air traffic  controllers told us that FAA now recognizes that new procedures are  much less likely to be used if controllers are not involved in the  design. New procedures developed without controller input may not  be feasible from an operational or safety perspective, and controllers  may not see that the new routes are advantageous. Controllers  serving the Seattle metroplex told us that their level of involvement in  Greener Skies was more extensive and occurred earlier than in any  previous procedure or airspace project. According to FAA officials and  airline representatives, the inclusion of airline stakeholders in the  design process also helped keep industry informed and involved and  helps assure that the proposed procedures can be flown by  participating airlines.
Addresses community concerns: We have previously reported that the  inclusion of airports in PBN procedure development and other projects  can help address potentially adverse environmental—often noise- related—community impacts, since these entities often have primary  responsibility for addressing community concerns and are likely more  familiar than FAA with the airport’s environmental impacts and the  surrounding communities. According to best practices established  by ACRP regarding community involvement in airport projects, trust  and respect are the keys to a long-term relationship between  stakeholders—in this case between FAA and airport representatives,  who are responsible for addressing community concerns about  airport-related noise.
While FAA has made progress involving airports in NextGen projects,  several FAA officials, a representative of Airport Councils International- North America (ACI-NA), and officials from several airports said that FAA  is not fully leveraging the expertise of airport officials about local  community concerns, although the ACI-NA representative noted that FAA  has begun to involve airports earlier as the OAPM effort has continued.  Airport officials in one OAPM metroplex told us that FAA had not  adequately included them in early planning for new PBN routes.  Consequently, the airport hired environmental consultants to analyze,  among other things, the potential noise impacts of proposed PBN  procedures and submitted concerns to FAA. In addition, although the Port  of Seattle was initially involved in designing procedures for Greener  Skies, airport officials told us that they were concerned that FAA had not  included them during the environmental assessment process or in  conducting local outreach. The project has raised some community  concerns about aircraft noise from new flight paths, and some  neighborhoods have expressed concerns that FAA had not clearly  explained the potential noise impact on their neighborhoods. New  aviation noise is one of the largest obstacles to NextGen implementation,  according to FAA officials and others. It can be difficult to address  community concerns about aviation noise, but FAA may be able to  mitigate such concerns by involving airport officials more closely in  procedure design and community outreach efforts. FAA officials  involved in another OAPM team, for example, noted that local airport  officials, who were not included in initial route planning for the metroplex,  later provided information about potential community impacts that FAA  had not anticipated. Information provided by FAA on establishing OAPM  study teams, however, does not include guidance on the timely  involvement of airport representatives on these teams, if such  involvement is appropriate; rather the information indicates that OAPM  teams should brief airport authorities as the process continues. This is in  contrast to the best practices established by ACRP, which state that  educating—in this case briefing—interested stakeholders after the fact is  not sufficient for effective involvement; rather, proactive involvement is  required. A collaborative approach for NextGen that involves key  stakeholders, such as airport officials, would better position FAA to fully  leverage those stakeholders’ expertise, help identify possible solutions,  and facilitate implementation of NextGen improvements.
section_title: Consistent NextGen Leadership Remains a Challenge
paragraphs: Although the RTCA task force and NAC work group did not make  recommendations regarding NextGen organizational issues, more  broadly, FAA has struggled to have the leadership in place to manage  and oversee NextGen implementation. In the past, industry stakeholders  have expressed concerns about the fragmentation of authority and lack of  accountability for NextGen, two factors that could delay its  implementation. Leading practices of successful organizations reflect that  programs can be implemented most efficiently when managers are  empowered to make critical decisions and are held accountable for  results. To ensure accountability for NextGen results, several  stakeholders suggested that an office was needed that would report  directly to the FAA Administrator or the Secretary of Transportation. FAA  has made organizational changes in the past in an effort to address these  concerns.
Beginning in 2011, FAA made additional changes to its NextGen  organizational structure to address NextGen leadership issues.  Specifically, FAA reorganized the structure of the office responsible for  carrying out NextGen implementation, moving the office from within the  ATO to under FAA’s Deputy Administrator. According to FAA, this change  increased NextGen’s visibility within and outside the agency and created  a direct line of authority and responsibility for NextGen. In addition, in  February 2012, the FAA reauthorization act designated that the Director  of JPDO—who is responsible for NextGen planning and coordination—  and created a new leadership  report directly to the FAA Administrator position—the Chief NextGen Officer.
While these changes indicate a positive step towards addressing  accountability issues, FAA continues to work to fill NextGen leadership  positions. As of February 2013, FAA had not yet made all the  organizational changes called for by the FAA reauthorization act. The  Administrator has indicated that the new Deputy Administrator will serve  as Chief NextGen Officer and that a search is on for qualified candidates  for both the Deputy Administrator and Assistant Administrator of NextGen  positions. The Administrator, who was sworn-in to the office in January  2013, has not yet clearly defined the relationship between the JPDO  Director and other NextGen officials. Appointing a new Deputy  Administrator to also serve as Chief NextGen Officer and concluding its  candidate search for the Assistant Administrator of NextGen position,  would better position FAA to resolve these remaining leadership  challenges.
section_title: FAA Has Limited Data to Demonstrate Midterm NextGen Benefits, and More Information Is Needed in NextGen Plans
subsections: section_title: Performance Metrics Are Being Developed and Linked to Targets
paragraphs: FAA has made some progress developing performance metrics, which we  recommended that the agency do in 2010. The NAC recommended in  2011 that FAA adopt performance areas used by ICAO and, as of  February 2013, FAA had adopted 6 of the 11 ICAO performance areas.FAA provided information about 5 of these performance areas— Environment, Safety, Efficiency, Capacity, and Cost Effectiveness—and  the metrics associated with these areas. Performance metrics for the  sixth performance area—Predictability—are being developed. As we  have reported in the past, having performance measures is important,  because they allow an agency to track its progress in achieving intended  results and develop contingency plans if milestones to complete tasks are  not met, both of which can be particularly important during the  implementation stage of a new program. Performance metrics would  also enable stakeholders, such as airlines, to hold FAA accountable for  results, as well as to make their own business decisions about whether to  invest in equipment needed to enable the use of NextGen technologies  and procedures.
FAA is currently conducting an agency-wide effort to review and  harmonize its performance metrics to bring order, consistency, and  accuracy to metrics reporting across its lines of business. The agency  began this effort to address several problems, including managing and  monitoring an increasing number of metrics and inconsistent metrics  names and definitions. Once the harmonization is complete, ATO will  create a website to display the harmonized metrics, which, according to  FAA officials, will provide information for many FAA activities, including  the implementation of NextGen. The ongoing modifications to performance metrics must be completed before FAA can establish  baselines from which it can measure progress. Baselines are essential to  compare past performance to current performance. For some established  metrics for which FAA already has extensive data, establishing a baseline  is not expected to be a challenge. By contrast, establishing a baseline for  new metrics for which FAA has not yet collected data may present  challenges and is expected to take time.
FAA is also developing additional NextGen performance metrics in  response to the FAA reauthorization act, in addition to responding to the  NAC recommendations. FAA was mandated to establish and, beginning  in 2013, to track 12 performance metrics to measure progress for  implementing some NextGen capabilities and improvements. Although  these new reauthorization metrics do not clearly link to the existing  NextGen key performance areas mentioned above, some of the  reauthorization metrics are similar to and reflect the same information that  is already expected to be measured. According to FAA officials, 7 of the  reauthorization performance metrics are already established, however the  agency faces some challenges in developing 5 of the remaining metrics.  For example, FAA is working with the NAC to identify a technically  feasible way to measure and report on the amount of fuel used between  key city-to-city (city-pair) markets—one of the required new metrics. It is  not known at this time if these key city pairs will include some or all  locations where midterm NextGen operational improvements are being  implemented.
FAA has made minimal progress in developing goals for NextGen, which  we also recommended in our 2010 report. FAA’s Destination 2025 report  establishes cross-cutting agency-wide goals for the midterm, although  these are not all related to the implementation of NextGen. Agency officials emphasized that Destination 2025 goals were intended to be  aspirational and that FAA business plans, which are developed by each  individual business office, would provide NextGen targets and goals.  However, agency officials in the NextGen Office acknowledged that  individual business offices are still developing their respective targets.  When FAA provided information to us in January 2013 about its efforts to  align goals and performance metrics, the goals included in Destination  2025 were used as the source for many of the included metrics. As we  reported in 2010, having goals and performance measures in place will  enable FAA to provide stakeholders, interested parties, Congress, and  the American people with a clear picture of where implementation stands  at any given time, and whether the technologies, capabilities, and  operational improvements that are being implemented are resulting in  positive outcomes and improved performance for operators and  passengers. Thus, we continue to believe that fully addressing our  2010 recommendations has merit. (See app. II for more information about  performance areas and metrics.)
section_title: Information on Some Costs and Benefits Is Available, but Insufficient to Encourage Airline Investments in the Midterm
paragraphs: FAA has begun to report on implementation progress and benefits at  certain airports and metroplexes, as well as for some capabilities, but  implementation and benefits information is incomplete. In March 2012,  FAA made publically available the NextGen Performance Snapshot  website to provide post-implementation performance data. The website  is designed to emphasize the link between NextGen investments and  benefits. To date, information on the website provides performance  progress on the near-term implementation of some, but not all, locations  and initiatives where FAA has implemented NextGen capabilities.January 2013, the website had information on established metrics for  three performance areas—efficiency, environment, and access. Efficiency  is reported at the core 30 airports; environment and access are reported   As of  at the NAS-wide level. For example, the NextGen Performance Snapshot  website reports some efficiency data, such as the average number of  minutes that it takes flights to taxi-in and taxi-out at each of the core 30  airports, and environmental data, such as NAS-wide noise exposure data  for the U.S. population. In the absence of specific NextGen targets, we  looked to track FAA’s progress vis-à-vis the NextGen-related goals in  Destination 2025 on FAA’s NextGen Performance Snapshot website, but  found it difficult to do so. Information presented was in many cases  neither in the same format nor on the same scale as goals in Destination  2025. For example, one goal in Destination 2025 is to improve throughput  at core airports during adverse weather by 14 percent through 2018, but  the NextGen Performance Snapshot website tracking progress did not  include this information either as an average or for individual core  airports. Likewise, another Destination 2025 goal is to reduce the amount  of fuel burned per miles flown by at least 2 percent annually—which  corresponds to international objectives accepted by ICAO—but  information provided showed changes in the cumulative amount of fuel  burned per kilometers flown. According to agency officials, the NextGen  Performance Snapshot website is currently undergoing improvements  that will include more meaningful measures and additional reporting  levels—such as metroplex and key city-pair views—to more fully  demonstrate progress at core airports, prioritized metroplexes, and  across the NAS. An updated NextGen Performance Snapshot website  has the potential to help stakeholders—such as airports and airlines—and  the public understand the progress and some benefits occurring at  various airports and metroplexes across the nation in a more systematic  way, as well as providing a link between these benefits and the  investments made in NextGen by FAA and others.
FAA is also developing a PBN assessment tool—the PBN dashboard—to  enable FAA to assess the PBN capabilities at individual airports and  within the NAS. According to FAA officials and the contractors developing  the dashboard, it will be able to measure PBN usage and impacts and  changes to conditions (fleet, equipage, etc.). Representatives from one  airline we spoke with said that they currently do not collect the information  on procedure usage that FAA needs for the dashboard. In response to  industry stakeholders’ aforementioned concerns and perceptions that  some published PBN procedures have provided limited benefits or have  not been sufficiently used, FAA had undertaken some analyses to  determine how often published PBN procedures are being used. This  analysis of flight track data for airspace around some airports showed that  more aircraft were following the airborne routes of published PBN  procedures than was being reported by airlines or air-traffic control  facilities. However, the analysis was unable to determine whether the  aircraft were actually flying the published PBN procedure or merely  following the same track on the conventional procedure. FAA officials  stated that the dashboard could help FAA better assess the extent to  which the fleet is able to use existing procedures. The OAPM study team  for South/Central Florida used the dashboard to determine the  percentage of operations at each airport in the metroplex that would  benefit from proposed new procedures. It is unclear the extent to which  the dashboard will be used to measure the impact of improvements or  assess progress toward overarching NextGen goals. FAA officials do not  plan to use the dashboard to proactively identify additional needed  procedures at individual airports or make the dashboard available to  external stakeholders, such as airlines, that may want to identify  additional needed procedures.
RTCA, NextGen Equipage: User Business Case Gaps (Sept. 2011). is currently equipped. For example, RTCA noted that FAA’s long-range  implementation plans should provide information on the roll out of RNP  procedures at specific airports—the type of information that would be  useful for airlines that are considering investing in this technology.  However, RTCA found that the plans lacked such information. Nor do  FAA implementation plans identify criteria with which additional sites  would be selected in the case of demonstration projects. Without greater  certainty on when and where NextGen improvements are planned,  airlines and others are unlikely to invest in the equipage (and conduct the  associated staffing and training) that will help achieve the full benefits of  NextGen implementation. FAA has estimated that total industry  equipage could cost $6.6 billion—compared to $11.5 billion in NextGen  implementation costs for FAA—through 2018. Deciding whether to  invest in most of that equipage is at each airline’s discretion.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The implementation of NextGen is expected to enhance safety, improve  efficiency, and result in a reduction in the environmental costs of aviation.  Achieving the benefits of NextGen is a collaborative task that not only  relies on timely and reliable information on progress implementing  NextGen, but also depends heavily on airlines’ and other stakeholders’  continued or increased investments in NextGen technology and training.  The improvements included in NextGen plans are often interrelated, with  benefits in one area dependent on the full implementation of other  operational improvements.
FAA does not have a system for systematically tracking the use of  existing PBN procedures. As a result, FAA is unable to assure that  investment in these routes is worthwhile or that they justify the cost to  develop and maintain them. In the absence of data on the use of existing  PBN routes, airlines and other stakeholders remain unconvinced that the  investments needed for the full implementation of NextGen will be  justified. Such information could help the agency demonstrate the value  of PBN technologies and any resulting benefits, as well as allow the  agency to identify routes that need to be revised to increase their use.
Without a process for proactively identifying new PBN procedures based  on NextGen goals and targets, requests for new PBN procedures largely  originate from outside FAA. While the agency has attempted to work with  industry stakeholders, such as airlines in the 20/20 effort, to identify  needed routes, results have been mixed. The use of criteria to proactively  identify needed routes at individual airports, such as criteria used by the  NAC to prioritize metroplexes, could enable FAA to identify routes that  can maximize benefits for the NAS. Furthermore, FAA does not assess  requests received to determine whether the requested route or type of  procedure (e.g., RNAV or RNP) maximizes potential benefits. Since  requestors, such as airlines, may have their own reasons for requesting  routes at certain locations or using specific technologies, their requests  may not correspond with NextGen goals or result in the most efficient use  of resources for PBN implementation or vis-à-vis the needs of other  users.
The NAC work group recommended that FAA develop an integrated  approach to increase airspace efficiency in key metroplexes, including  OAPM sites. While FAA has consistently emphasized the importance of  integrating key operational improvements to maximize NextGen benefits,  FAA has primarily focused its midterm efforts on PBN and has not  systematically integrated airborne- and surface traffic management and  revised standards into these efforts. FAA officials explained that non-PBN  improvements were not systematically included in the first round of  OAPM, in part, to achieve OAPM time frames. However, with the  implementation of some first round improvements, as well as progress  made in developing and deploying some non-PBN improvements, FAA is  better positioned to systematically integrate PBN and other improvements  going forward. Insufficient integration of key improvements decreases  midterm NextGen benefits, since these benefits are interdependent.
Furthermore, by not including the identification of unused flight routes for  decommissioning in OAPM and similar efforts, FAA could be missing an  opportunity to leverage the expertise of participating stakeholders.  Decommissioning unused or little-used conventional, non-PBN  procedures could allow FAA to make better use of its resources by  reducing maintenance costs.
FAA has made progress in recent years in ensuring the inclusion of  stakeholders in NextGen efforts, especially air traffic controllers. Some  airport officials, however, expressed concern that FAA had not fully  involved them in current efforts or involved them too late in the process,  although a representative with ACI-NA noted that FAA has recently begun  to involve airports more significantly in NextGen design and  implementation efforts. However, FAA has not developed guidelines for  the timely and consistent inclusion of these stakeholders. Some FAA  officials told us that they had not fully appreciated the potential value that  airport officials could provide. A collaborative approach that timely  involves key stakeholders—including the agency, airport officials, air  traffic controllers, and airlines—enables FAA to fully leverage the  expertise of these stakeholders, helps identify the best possible solutions,  and facilitates the implementation of those improvements.
FAA has made some progress in developing and aligning performance  metrics and goals since we recommended these actions in 2010. It is  important for FAA to complete this work to measure progress and  demonstrate benefits across the NAS, gain confidence, and engender  needed investments to support the full implementation of NextGen.  Furthermore, RTCA and others have pointed to the importance of having  stable, long-term implementation plans for NextGen capabilities and  determining specific location benefits and implementation dates, but  FAA’s NextGen implementation plans do not detail such deployment  information. As a consequence, airlines and other stakeholders have  been reluctant to invest in expensive avionics, including RNP equipage.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that NextGen operational improvements are fully  implemented in the midterm, we recommend that the Secretary of  Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the following five  actions: work with airlines and other users to develop and implement a system  to systematically track the use of existing PBN procedures; develop processes to proactively identify new PBN procedures for the  NAS, based on NextGen goals and targets, and evaluate external  requests so that FAA can select appropriate solutions;  require consideration of other key operational improvements in  planning for NextGen improvements, including PBN projects at  metroplexes such as OAPM, as well as the identification of unused  flight routes for decommissioning; develop and implement guidelines for ensuring timely inclusion of  appropriate stakeholders, including airport representatives, in the  planning and implementation of NextGen improvement efforts; and assure that NextGen planning documents provide stakeholders  information on how and when operational improvements are expected  to achieve NextGen goals and targets.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided the Department of Transportation (DOT) with a draft of this  report for review and comment. DOT responded by email and did not  agree or disagree with our recommendations, but provided technical  clarifications, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.
We are sending copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the  Secretary of Transportation, and interested parties. In addition, this report  will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me on (202) 512-2834 or at dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objective was to assess the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA)  progress implementing key Next Generation Air Transportation System  (NextGen) operational improvements in the midterm and demonstrating  benefits from these improvements. To do so, we addressed the following  questions: 1) What key operational improvements is FAA pursuing to  deliver NextGen benefits with existing technologies through 2018? 2) To  what extent is FAA addressing known obstacles to the implementation  and usage of NextGen operational improvements? 3) To what extent is  FAA measuring and demonstrating midterm NextGen benefits and  assessing outcomes?
To address these three questions, we reviewed our prior reports, met with  FAA officials with a role in implementing NextGen, including units within  the NextGen Office, the Office of Aviation Safety, the Air Traffic  Organization (ATO), Aeronautical Navigation Products (AeroNav  Products), and the Office of Environment and Energy. We reviewed FAA  planning documents for NextGen, including the 2012 NextGen  Implementation Plan and work plans for individual lines of business within  FAA, as well as FAA reports and briefings related to ongoing NextGen  efforts, including the Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the  Metroplex (OAPM) initiative, and FAA process and procedure  documentation. We also interviewed aviation stakeholders and experts  with knowledge and experience related to NextGen implementation:  representatives from industry associations, including RTCA, Airlines  for America, and the Airports Council International–North America; airlines, including Alaska Airlines and Southwest Airlines, which have  both advocated for the increased use of Performance Based  Navigation (PBN) procedures; airports involved in OAPM efforts in North Texas and Southern  California, in the Greener Skies over Seattle (Greener Skies)   initiative, and in surface improvement efforts for airports in New York  and New Jersey; avionics and aircraft manufacturers and other aviation vendors,  including Boeing, Honeywell, and Raytheon; and air traffic controllers with the National Air Traffic Controllers  Association (NATCA) and at individual air-traffic control facilities,  including facilities involved in the OAPM effort in North Texas and the  Greener Skies initiative.
To assess the status of FAA’s implementation of key operational  improvements and the potential benefits to be achieved, and identify  challenges to the full implementation of those key operational  improvements, we assessed FAA implementation progress for  operational improvements that were recommended by RTCA’s Midterm  Implementation Task Force (RTCA task force) in 2009 and those that  were prioritized by the Integrated Working Capabilities Work Group of the  NextGen Advisory Council (NAC work group) in 2012. (See table 1.)  RTCA’s recommendations are the basis for a number of FAA’s policy,  program, and regulatory decisions, and have been incorporated into  FAA’s current NextGen implementation plans. Likewise, the NAC—which  includes representatives from industry and FAA’s senior leadership— advises FAA on the implementation of NextGen. The recommendations  made by the RTCA task force and NAC work group represent consensus  views in the aviation community regarding which operational  improvements FAA should prioritize and where those improvements  should be implemented in the midterm—through 2018—but do not  include all operational improvements in FAA’s implementation plans.  They are limited to those improvements that use existing technologies.  We grouped these operational improvements into three key improvement  areas for midterm NextGen implementation:  1.  Performance Based Navigation (PBN),  2.  enhanced airborne and surface traffic management, and  3.  additional or revised aviation safety standards.
Table 1 provides a listing of the operational improvements recommended  by the RTCA task force and NAC work group. Operational improvements  are grouped by the implementation portfolios used by FAA in its planning  documents.
To determine how FAA is addressing known obstacles to the  implementation of NextGen operational improvements, we identified  obstacles and challenges to developing, implementing, or fully using key  NextGen improvements primarily from findings and recommendations  made by the RTCA task force and an FAA study on obstacles to PBN  implementation. To obtain information about FAA efforts to address  these obstacles, we reviewed agency reports and documents, including  FAA’s report on efforts to streamline the process for developing and  implementing flight procedures, and spoke with officials from relevant  program offices and facilities, including environmental review specialists  and air-traffic control facilities. To assess agency progress toward  addressing these obstacles and identify ongoing challenges, we spoke  with industry experts and stakeholders, including airport officials, airline  representatives, avionics manufacturers, members of the NAC work  group and the Performance Based Operations Aviation Rulemaking  Committee, and air traffic controllers. We also assessed certain FAA  efforts against established criteria, including best practices for  stakeholder involvement from the Airport Cooperative Research Program  (ACRP) and for organizational goal-setting and performance  measurement.
See GAO, NextGen Air Transportation System: FAA’s Metrics Can Be Used to Report on  Status of Individual Programs, but Not of Overall NextGen Implementation or Outcomes,  GAO-10-629 (Washington, D.C: July 27, 2010). This report assessed FAA’s progress in  developing performance goals and metrics against criteria established by GAO, Tax  Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance  Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002). and Outreach Office. We also interviewed NAC officials. To evaluate the  consistency and meaningful output that would be provided by the  NextGen key performance areas, metrics, and measures, we compared  and analyzed information that was provided in FAA agency-wide reports  and metrics documentation, the NextGen Performance Snapshot website,  and the FAA reauthorization act. We reviewed FAA reports, NextGen  business case documentation, and the publicly available information on  NextGen implementation and expected benefits. We also interviewed  industry stakeholders, including representatives from airports, airlines,  and equipment manufacturers to assess the extent to which available  information builds confidence and buy-in toward full NextGen  implementation. Finally, we compared available information with best  practices for performance plans.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 through April  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: FAA Performance Areas and Metrics
paragraphs: The following table provides the description of FAA performance areas  and metrics. Although some of the performance metrics contained in this  table have been established, FAA may continue to refine these metrics to  ensure that the measurements align with agency targets and goals. FAA  also has a few new metrics under development, and the agency is  working to identify a technically feasible way to implement them.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Ed Laughlin, Assistant Director;  Russ Burnett; Jessica Bryant-Bertail; Aisha Cabrer; Tim Guinane; Bert  Japikse; Delwen Jones; Molly Laster; and Josh Ormond made key  contributions to this report.