Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance Program Are Needed
Published: 2008-07-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Afghan government, the United States, and other donors consider road reconstruction a top development priority for Afghanistan. Almost 20 percent of the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) $5.9 billion in assistance to Afghanistan has been for roads. The Department of Defense (Defense) has committed about $560 million for roads, of which Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds account for over half. GAO examined (1) the status of road reconstruction and challenges affecting project implementation, (2) U.S. agencies' efforts to evaluate the impact of road projects, and (3) efforts to develop a sustainable road maintenance program. GAO reviewed U.S. and Afghan governments' planning, evaluation, and funding documents and interviewed relevant stakeholders in Afghanistan.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The United States and other donors have completed construction of several regional and national highways since 2002, but the status of other roads is uncertain and various challenges have delayed construction. The Afghan government and international donors planned to complete the high-priority regional highways by the end of 2008, and as of February 2008, about 60 percent of these roads were built. USAID has completed its portion, but completion of other portions is not expected until late 2009. Donors have committed to construct over 30 percent of national highways, which connect provincial capitals to the regional highways, and only USAID has completed portions of these highways. Detailed information on the status of provincial and rural roads is lacking. Although Defense reported committing CERP funds for 1,600 kilometers of roads, data on the roads were incomplete and Defense has not reported information on these roads to USAID, as required. Poor security, project implementer limitations, and starting construction with limited planning have contributed to project delays and cost increases. U.S. agencies have not conducted sound impact evaluations to determine the degree to which projects achieved the objective of economic development. Limitations of USAID's funding, data collection, and frameworks to assess results have impeded its ability to evaluate project impact. Defense has not conducted any impact evaluations and lacks clear guidance on project evaluation. However, agency officials have noted some anecdotal examples of road construction impact, such as reduced travel times and increased commerce. Moreover, no other donor has performed impact evaluations. A sustainable road maintenance program has not been established, although it is a goal of the Afghan government and international donors. The Afghan government's support of this goal has been limited due to factors such as a lack of resources and a fragmented institutional organization. As a result, international donors have agreed to temporarily fund road maintenance to protect their investments. While USAID plans to maintain about 1,500 kilometers of roads it built, it did not meet its 2007 target to maintain 100 kilometers of reconstructed roads.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Almost three decades of war largely destroyed Afghanistan’s roads and  other infrastructure. The remaining roads were only partially usable  because of years without basic maintenance. In late 2001, approximately  16 percent of Afghanistan’s roads had been paved, in comparison with  over 80 percent in neighboring Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  After the United States and its allies removed the Taliban regime, the  Afghan government and international donors identified road  reconstruction as a top priority to spur economic development, promote  governance, and improve security. As a result, the United States, through  the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), provided about  $5.9 billion in development aid to Afghanistan from fiscal year 2002 to  fiscal year 2007, of which almost 20 percent has been committed to  reconstruct roads. Additionally, the Department of Defense (Defense) has  obligated about $600 million in Commander’s Emergency Response  Program (CERP) funds for civilian projects, of which about $300 million is  for roads. Defense has also funded about $260 million in roads for military  purposes.
In this report, we (1) examine the status of donor-funded road  reconstruction projects since 2002 and challenges affecting donors’ ability  to implement projects as planned, (2) assess U.S. agencies’ efforts to  evaluate the impact of road reconstruction projects, and (3) assess efforts  to develop a sustainable maintenance program for donor-funded roads.
To address these objectives, we reviewed USAID, Defense, and Afghan  government strategic planning, funding, and evaluation documents relating  to road reconstruction projects. We interviewed USAID and Defense  officials and road program implementers, including the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers (USACE) and private contractors, in Washington, D.C., and  Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, we also visited road construction sites in  Badakhshan, Nangarhar, and Khost provinces, and interviewed Afghan  government officials, U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team officials, and  other international donors. We assessed the reliability of the data on road  funding and project status provided to us, and used data that we  determined to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted this  performance audit from July 2007 through July 2008 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. (See app. I for a complete description of our scope and  methodology.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 2001, when the United States and its allies removed the Taliban regime,  Afghanistan was in economic crisis. The nation’s roads had deteriorated,  limiting economic growth and access to resources and services for its  citizens. The Afghan government has recognized that improving the  country’s roads is an important element in lifting the population from  poverty. It considers a viable major road network essential to becoming a  transport and trading hub in Central Asia. Additionally, road access for  rural areas would help to promote licit crops and broaden access to health  and education. In 2003, the Afghan government and international donors  proposed a road network for Afghanistan, which they hoped to complete  by 2015. The proposed network (as shown in fig. 1) identifies the country’s  major roads, including the ring road, which links Afghanistan’s major  cities of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif.
subsections: section_title: Afghanistan National Development Strategy
paragraphs: In February 2006, the Afghan government introduced the interim  Afghanistan National Development Strategy and its accompanying  implementation plan, the Afghanistan Compact. The compact included  two benchmarks for roads: (1) a fully upgraded ring road as well as roads  connecting the ring road to neighboring countries by the end of 2008, and  (2) a fiscally sustainable system for road maintenance by the end of 2007.
The Afghan government and international donors established the Joint  Coordination and Monitoring Board to oversee the implementation of  compact benchmarks. In addition, representatives of relevant government  ministries, agencies, and the international community have formed groups  to address implementation issues. For example, the group working on  roads is commonly referred to as the Consultative Group for the Transport  Sector.
section_title: Afghan Ministries
paragraphs: Several Afghan ministries have transportation sector-related functions.  The two ministries with road construction and maintenance  responsibilities are the Ministry of Public Works, which has jurisdiction  over highways and provincial roads, and the Ministry of Rural  Rehabilitation and Development, which oversees the rural roads. The  Ministries of Transportation and Civil Aviation, Finance, Commerce,  Interior, and Foreign Affairs collect fees or tolls associated with the  transportation sector. Additionally, the Ministry of Finance disburses  funds to other ministries for road maintenance and operations. The  Ministry of Economy is responsible for all government procurement,  including for road maintenance.
section_title: Road Types
paragraphs: Since 2005, the Ministry of Public Works has attempted to standardize the  nomenclature of roads in its Interim Road and Highway Standards, and  estimated the length of roads in the Road Sector Master Plan. The four  broad categories of Afghan roads are regional highways, national  highways, provincial roads, and rural roads (see fig. 2).
section_title: U.S.-Funded Afghan Road Projects
paragraphs: The United States, through USAID and Defense, has committed about $1.7  billion for road reconstruction in Afghanistan between fiscal years 2002  and 2007. USAID, whose commitments represent 67 percent of the total  U.S. assistance, has funded highways and provincial roads through its  infrastructure program. In addition, USAID has funded rural roads through  its Agriculture, Alternative Development, and Quick Impact Project  programs, as well as the World Bank-led National Emergency Rural Access  Project. Defense, whose funding accounts for the remaining 33 percent of  the total U.S. assistance, has committed CERP funds for civilian road  projects, and Military Construction and Military Engineering funds for  roads for military purposes (see fig. 3).
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Since 2002, USAID and Defense have implemented road projects using  contracts and grant awards. For its major infrastructure projects, USAID  awarded contracts to the Louis Berger Group (LBG) in 2002 and to LBG- Black & Veatch Joint Venture (LBG/B&V) in 2006, and a grant to the  United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in 2004. Defense has  awarded contracts for CERP-funded road projects to USACE or directly to  local contractors through the U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams  between 2004 and 2007. Table 1 lists U.S. government awards for road  reconstruction in Afghanistan.
section_title: International Donor Funding for Afghan Highways
paragraphs: The United States and other international donors have committed over  $2.2 billion for reconstruction of the regional and national highways  identified in the Afghan government’s Road Sector Master Plan. Of the  total donor commitment for these roads, the United States (through  USAID) has committed about 42 percent (over $960 million), followed by  the Asian Development Bank (24 percent), Japan, and the World Bank (6  percent each) (see fig. 4). The government of Afghanistan has also  committed approximately $47 million for the construction of highways.
section_title: Donors Have Made Progress in Building Highways, but Status of Other Roads Is Uncertain and Challenges Have Delayed Road Construction
paragraphs: The United States and other donors have completed construction of about  2,700 kilometers of regional and national highways in Afghanistan since  2002, but limited information is available on the status of provincial and  rural roads and various challenges have delayed road construction. The  Afghan government and international donors established the goal to  complete Afghanistan’s regional highway network by the end of 2008, and  as of February 2008, about 60 percent of the network was complete. The  United States, through USAID, has completed its commitment of 715  kilometers, but the entire network is not expected to be completed by the  end of 2008, as planned. The United States has also completed  construction of 726 kilometers of national highways and construction of  an additional 917 kilometers of these highways, for which the United  States and other donors have committed funds, is ongoing or not yet  started. Limited information is available on the status of provincial and  rural roads, as donors have not reported these data to the joint Afghan  government and international donor group that collects data on all Afghan  road projects. Although Defense reported completing construction of 155  out of about 1,600 kilometers of CERP-funded civilian roads, project data  are incomplete, and according to officials, they cannot identify the  location of some CERP-funded roads. Moreover, Defense has not reported  project data on CERP-funded roads for inclusion in a USAID database, as  required by guidance. Donors have made progress, but road construction  is behind schedule and, in some cases, has cost more than expected. For  example, USAID has not met its annual completion targets for roads for  2006 and 2007. Challenges including poor security conditions, limited  capacity of project implementers, and implementation without adequate  planning have contributed to project delays and cost increases.
subsections: section_title: The United States and International Donors Have Built or Committed Funds for Afghan Highways, but Data on Other Roads Are Limited
paragraphs: The United States and other donors have completed portions of the  regional and national highways (see fig. 5). While the donors have also  committed funds for the construction of provincial and rural roads, the  overall status of these roads is uncertain because of the lack of available  data.
Although more than half of the regional highway network in Afghanistan  has been completed, construction is behind schedule. In its Afghanistan  National Development Strategy, the Afghan government, in conjunction  with international donors, established the goal of completing a fully  upgraded regional highway network by the end of 2008. The construction  of the regional highways is a top road reconstruction priority of the  Afghan government and international donors, as these roads are expected  to foster regional trade and contribute to Afghanistan’s economic  development. The United States and other donors have committed more  than $1.5 billion for the over-3,200-kilometers-long regional highway  network and had completed about 60 percent (1,954 kilometers) of these  highways as of February 2008 (see figs. 6 and 7). The United States,  through USAID, has completed the construction of the 715 kilometers of  the regional highways it funded. In addition, it also managed the  construction for the 115-kilometer-long Saudi-funded section, which is  complete. However, construction of an additional 29 percent (932  kilometers) of the regional highway network is ongoing and donors have  committed funding but have yet to start construction of the remaining 11  percent (354 kilometers).  Completion of at least 300 kilometers of the  regional highway network is not expected until December 2009, in part  because funding was not committed until September 2006.
International donors have completed 44 percent (726 kilometers) of the  1,600 kilometers of national highways for which they have committed  approximately $716 million. The national highways are expected to  connect the capitals of all 34 Afghan provinces to regional highways.
USAID has completed construction of 726 kilometers of national highways  and has committed funds for an additional 300 kilometers, which is under  construction. Other donors, consisting of the Asian Development Bank,  the World Bank, and Italy, have committed funds to construct about 600  kilometers of national highways, but none of these roads is complete (see  app. II for the status of regional and national highway projects).
subsections: section_title: Limited Information Is Available on Construction of Provincial and Rural Roads; Defense Has Not Reported Data on Its Civilian Roads, as Required
paragraphs: The status of provincial and rural road construction is uncertain because  donors have not reported this information to the group collecting road  project data for all Afghan roads. Additionally, Defense has not reported  project details on its CERP-funded roads for inclusion in a USAID  database, as required by CERP guidance.
Limited Information on the Status of Provincial and Rural Roads  Afghanistan’s Road Sector Master Plan identifies about 9,700 kilometers of  provincial roads and an estimated 17,000 kilometers of rural roads, and the  United States and international donors have funded and built some of  these roads. However, limited information is available on donors’ funding  commitments and completion status for these roads. The Consultative  Group for the Transport Sector, which includes officials from donor  agencies and Afghan ministries involved in the transportation sector, is  responsible for collecting information on all road projects. However,  information on some provincial and all rural roads, which are under the  jurisdiction of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, is  currently not reported to the group, according to the official who collects  road project data. The official noted that international donors have  reported only road project information for roads that are under the  jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Works.
According to USAID, it has completed construction of 237 kilometers of  provincial roads, and construction of over 185 additional kilometers is  under way. In addition, it has constructed over 1,000 kilometers of rural  roads, such as labor-intensive cobblestone roads and farm-to-market  roads, as part of its Agriculture and Alternative Development programs.  However, the agency could not provide the kilometers of roads  constructed through its Quick Impact Project, which included  construction of small roads during the early phase of reconstruction in  Afghanistan.
Defense Has Not Reported Data on Its Civilian Roads  Although Defense has provided CERP funding for road reconstruction  since 2004, its project status data are incomplete. According to Defense  officials in Afghanistan, Defense has committed CERP funds to construct  approximately 1,600 kilometers of provincial and rural roads for civilian  use, of which about 155 kilometers are reported as complete. In addition  to civilian roads, Defense officials reported that about 540 kilometers of  roads are under construction for military purposes, including 400  kilometers of roads that have been paved to prevent insurgents from  planting improvised explosive devices. However, Defense’s information  on CERP-funded roads may not accurately represent kilometers of roads  under construction or completed, as the project data provided to us were  incomplete. For example, according to Defense officials in Washington,  about $6 million of CERP funds was provided for roads in the provinces of  Farah and Helmand (see app. III for CERP funding by province). However,  as shown in figure 8, project location information provided by Defense  officials in Afghanistan does not show any CERP roads in these provinces.
Although Defense is required by CERP guidance to report on the status of  road projects to a USAID-maintained database, it has not done so. The  2006 CERP guidance requires data for all construction projects to be  reported for inclusion in a USAID database. However, according to USAID,  no CERP project data have been reported into the database. Furthermore,  according to Defense officials in Afghanistan, Defense’s data collection  systems often change when a new military command takes charge, and  project information is lost during the transition. They said that because of  missing documentation and frequent staff rotation, they do not know  where some CERP-funded roads were built prior to fiscal year 2006. As a  result, a comprehensive database of all U.S.-funded road projects does not  exist.
section_title: Several Challenges Have Contributed to Delays and Cost Increases
paragraphs: Despite progress in building roads, construction is behind schedule. For  instance, USAID did not meet its annual targets for kilometers of roads  constructed as established in its Afghanistan Performance Management  Plan (2006-2008). Specifically, for fiscal year 2006, the agency set a target  to complete 550 kilometers of roads, but completed only 393 kilometers. In  2007, its initial target of 580 kilometers was later decreased to 423  kilometers, but the agency completed only 228 kilometers. It has also  decreased the target for the current fiscal year from 550 kilometers to 314  kilometers.
U.S. agencies and other donors have faced several challenges in  implementing road projects, such as poor security conditions, limitations  of project implementers, and starting construction with limited planning.  These factors have contributed to project delays and cost increases.
subsections: section_title: Poor Security Conditions
paragraphs: According to U.S. government and other donor officials, poor security is  the most difficult challenge they face in implementing road projects. The  security situation in some parts of the country has delayed road  construction projects and increased costs. For example, USAID signed a  contract for about $8 million to construct the Kajaki road in May 2007.  According to USAID, this road is important as it connects the Kajaki dam,  a source of water and power in southern Afghanistan, to the ring road.  However, because attacks prevented contractors from working on the  project, it was terminated in 2008 after USAID had spent about $5 million.  USAID’s first Afghan infrastructure program also experienced cost  increases due to deteriorating security. According to a USAID Office of the  Inspector General report, almost $9 million of a proposed ceiling increase  to the contract was directly attributable to increased security costs.  Additionally, according to USACE road project data and officials, security  issues resulted in frequent schedule delays for roads. For example, a  contractor in Zabul province had six employees kidnapped, and as of May  2008, work on the project had not progressed for almost 60 days.
According to donors we spoke with in Afghanistan, security is a major  concern in the south and the east, and is also becoming a concern in the  north. Due to deteriorating security conditions, as of February 2008, Japan  has been able to complete construction of only 12 percent of a 114- kilometer-long section of the Kandahar-Herat road in southern  Afghanistan. This road section was originally estimated to be completed  by July 2006. According to a Japanese official, the construction costs for  this section have increased to more than three times the initial estimate.  Additionally, because the Japanese contractor responsible for this section  left due to increasingly dangerous conditions, Japan has re-awarded a  contract for 50 kilometers of this road section to a local contractor.
In addition to monetary costs, attacks in areas where roads are being  reconstructed have resulted in loss of life and injuries among workers. As  of March 2008, 162 contractors associated with USAID roads programs  have been killed and 202 have been injured or disabled in attacks since  2003. There are more casualties associated with road programs than with  any other USAID program in Afghanistan, according to USAID data.  Defense contractors have also suffered casualties. For example, one  project was delayed by at least 30 days while the contractor organized a  new team after 18 workers were killed in an attack, according to a USACE  official.
section_title: Project Implementer Limitations
paragraphs: Limited capacity of local project implementers has impeded donors’  efforts to complete road construction projects on time and within budget.  According to donor officials we spoke to, the list of capable local  contractors is growing, but it still remains small. According to USACE  officials, one of their objectives is to build local capacity by using Afghan  contractors. However, the agency has had difficulties with poor  subcontractor performance, which, according to USACE officials, has  resulted in time delays. For example, although USACE planned to  complete its first road project in June 2007, it was not until March 2008  that USACE officials signed a letter documenting project completion.  When we visited the project in October 2007, the contract cost had  increased by about 45 percent and the completion date had been extended  by over a year. USACE officials said they rejected work done on the  project because of “poor contractor methods” and required the contractor  to redo work.
Additionally, according to USAID officials and a report on USAID’s first  major road program, LBG terminated multiple subcontracts during  construction of the Jalalabad-Asmar road because of poor performance,  which resulted in an estimated 3- to 4-month delay for each termination.  Moreover, USAID paid over $7 million for the construction of several  segments of this road, all of which required rework. In an end-of-year  progress report to USAID, UNOPS stated that it had terminated 10  contracts in 2005 due to poor contractor performance that had resulted in  construction delays. According to USAID officials, one of the reasons they  opted to award funds to UNOPS was to support their capacity building of  local contractors, even though USAID officials knew it would likely result  in delays and additional cost. Each terminated contract results in cost  overruns due to the recurrent cost of getting the contractor’s equipment  and materials to the construction site and building a new construction  camp, according to a USAID official.
USAID’s concerns about UNOPS’s performance led to the termination of  the grant agreement after USAID had awarded over $365 million (see app.  IV for more details). USAID officials expressed concern about UNOPS’s  financial management of grant funds and, in July 2007, required UNOPS to  have an independent financial audit done as a condition to approving  funds to cover cost overruns. In December 2007, USAID terminated the  grant due to “serious shortcomings in  financial and technical  management” of the grant, according to USAID’s technical officer for the  grant. At the time of the grant’s termination, construction of one major  road project was only 60 percent complete, although grant funds were  depleted.
section_title: Starting Construction with Limited Planning
paragraphs: Limited planning by donors prior to starting construction has resulted in  increased costs. According to a senior Ministry of Public Works official,  there have been several instances of cost increases because donors have  started construction without adequate planning, such as completing  engineering studies prior to construction. For example, according to the  ministry official, the cost of a regional highway section that the Asian  Development Bank funded increased from $28 million to $56 million  because detailed design work had not been completed prior to project  implementation. As a result of this cost increase, the project had to be put  on hold for up to 3 years. The official stated that other donors, including  Italy and the United States, have also faced similar challenges.
According to a USAID official, detailed planning, including engineering  and feasibility studies, can take 1 year or more and such studies may not  be feasible due to deteriorating security conditions. Additionally, long time  frames for projects have not been acceptable in Afghanistan due to  pressure from donors and the Afghan government to show faster results,  according to USAID officials. As a result, USAID has not completed  project designs before beginning construction of its road projects. For  example, in a memo approving an expansion of the UNOPS grant, USAID  officials stated that the political context necessitated having some roads  under contract within weeks and under construction “as soon as possible.”  In some cases, UNOPS was unable to develop complete project  descriptions and corresponding cost estimates before it awarded  contracts. In another case, according to a USAID Office of Inspector  General report, a detailed assessment of bridges and an old road had not  been done when USAID awarded the construction contract for the  Kandahar-Herat road. As a result, work plans were modified during  construction, contributing to a 43 percent cost increase. Our review of  contract file documentation for one of the four U.S.-built sections of the  Kandahar-Herat road showed a net increase of over $10 million, due in  part to revisions of construction requirements of bridges.
section_title: Little Is Known about the Impact of Road Projects in Afghanistan
paragraphs: U.S. agencies involved in road reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan know  little about the impact of road projects, since they have not conducted  assessments to determine the degree to which the projects have achieved  economic development and humanitarian assistance goals. While agencies  reported some examples of positive impact, these are based on limited  data, a qualitative evaluation, or anecdotal information, and therefore  cannot be generalized. Several factors have limited agencies’ abilities to  conduct impact assessments. For USAID, these include limited attention  to the design of impact evaluations prior to project implementation, lack  of timely data collection for its two major road projects, and deficiencies  in the frameworks for assessing results of Afghanistan road projects. For  Defense, they include failure to assess the results of its road projects and  lack of clear guidance on the evaluation of its CERP-funded projects.  Moreover, since no other donor has conducted impact evaluation of its  road projects in Afghanistan, little is known about the impact of other road  reconstruction as well. Completing sound impact evaluations in  coordination with other donors involved in road reconstruction is vital to  ensure that the assistance provided by the United States and other  international donors is achieving the intended results and desired  outcomes.
subsections: section_title: USAID Has Not Performed Sound Impact Assessments; Examples of Impact Are Mostly Anecdotal
paragraphs: USAID has not performed a sound impact assessment of its completed  road projects in Afghanistan. Because of this, there is limited evidence of  the positive impact of U.S.-funded road projects. In some cases the limited  evidence comes from a USAID-funded qualitative study, while in other  cases it is based on rough estimates, anecdotes, or impressions. Neither  the qualitative study nor the anecdotes shared by U.S. officials are  representative and therefore the results are not generalizable. Examples of  positive results reported in the qualitative study or via anecdotes and  impressions include the following:   According to USAID, the ring road is being heavily used and travel times  have decreased. Additionally, USAID estimates that 3,500 labor days are  produced for each kilometer of road constructed. However, it could not  provide us data to support this estimate.
Defense officials told us that they observed that traffic increased  significantly when a new road is built. According to these officials, new  roads have led to an increase in the number of gas stations, which is  evidence of an increase in commerce. Moreover, according to these  officials, roads have opened lines of communication among districts,  provinces, and the central government, thereby improving local  governance. Because they did not quantify these changes, they cannot  demonstrate the extent to which these projects led to observed impacts.
According to some local elders we spoke with in a village close to  Jalalabad, Nangarhar province, the cobblestone road constructed with  USAID funds had enabled access to markets for agricultural products, as  well as to clinics and hospitals for the local population; generated  employment for daily laborers during road construction; increased  commerce as new shops have been constructed along the road; and  promoted community participation as locals contributed their land to  widen the road.
UNOPS performed a qualitative study, funded by USAID, of the impact of  rehabilitated district roads and concluded that improvements to these  roads led to increased employment opportunities, reduced transport costs,  and increased traffic flows. In addition, the road improvements helped to  raise land values and encourage the development of a marketing network.  The results of this study were based on discussions with a  nonrepresentative group of respondents and did not include a comparison,  for example, of how employment opportunities changed for a comparable  location that did not benefit from a new road.
LBG provided some estimates of the reductions in travel time and cost  savings from USAID’s completed road projects. The road reconstruction  led to a reduction in travel time between 30 and 50 percent, and in vehicle  operating cost savings between 25 and 62 percent, according to the  estimates. These estimates are based on surveys by LBG’s engineers.  However, LBG officials could not verify the accuracy of these numbers,  and to date, USAID has not financed a follow-up study of its completed  projects to support them.
section_title: Limitations in USAID’s Planning Efforts Impede Its Ability to Assess Impact
paragraphs: Limitations in planning for evaluation prior to project implementation,  problems with data collection, and weaknesses associated with USAID’s  Afghanistan-specific results frameworks have impeded impact  assessments of its road projects.
subsections: section_title: Limitations in Funding and Data Collection
paragraphs: USAID’s plans show that the agency focused little attention and funding on  the design of impact assessment for its first road reconstruction program  prior to project implementation. Sound evaluation design includes plans to  collect data before, during, and after project implementation. Although  its first large road reconstruction program was launched in 2002, USAID  did not issue a task order to perform a socioeconomic impact assessment  for this program until October 2006. Although an assessment was planned  for spring 2008, no assessments for transport infrastructure projects have  been completed under this task order.
Additionally, USAID officials did not collect data for the two major  completed road projects, the Kabul-Kandahar and Kandahar-Herat  highways, in a timely manner to allow them to accurately measure impact  over time. Baseline data on project beneficiaries and a control group  collected before project implementation are used for comparison with  data collected after the project is completed to assess the project’s net  results. Two baseline studies were conducted, one each for the USAID- funded sections of the Kabul-Kandahar and Kandahar-Herat roads.  However, the baseline study for the Kabul-Kandahar road was undertaken  after considerable work had already been done, so an evaluation  comparing conditions before and after this project is likely to understate  its impact. While USAID conducted the baseline study for the Kandahar- Herat road before starting construction, it has not collected follow-up data  since the project’s December 2006 completion. Although USAID officials  have not completed a baseline study for any projects in its latest roads  program, they intend to collect baseline data for six road projects and  have begun efforts for one of them.
section_title: Limitations in Frameworks Linking Reconstruction Activities to Impact
paragraphs: While USAID recently designed a framework that links reconstruction  activities in Afghanistan to expected impacts, weaknesses in Afghanistan- wide and program-specific frameworks also impede assessment of the  efficient use of resources and evaluation of project impact.
Although USAID has developed an Afghanistan-specific framework to  assess results, it does not clearly explain how road reconstruction will  lead to the agency’s strategic objective. In its Afghanistan Performance  Management Plan (2006-2008), developed following a 2005 GAO  recommendation, USAID lays out a logical framework to link road  reconstruction activities to its strategic objective of a licit thriving  economy led by the private sector. The framework includes objectives,  indicators to identify how progress will be measured, and annual targets  as numeric goals that help to assess progress toward objectives (see fig.  9). However, the plan does not explain how the kilometers of roads  constructed (output) would lead to impacts such as an increase in foreign  direct investment and income from the private sector. Specifically, the  plan does not include outcome indicators (such as cost and time savings)  that would link the outputs to impact indicators.
USAID also established a program-specific framework to link projects that  are part of USAID’s most recent road program, IRP, to USAID’s strategic  objectives, though the framework does not include output indicators and  associated targets to assess progress. Unlike the countrywide plan, the  IRP framework contains outcome indicators such as vehicle operating  costs and time savings (see fig. 10). These indicators measure progress  toward intermediate objectives, which link to the strategic objectives of a  licit economy led by the private sector and improving health and education  of Afghans. However, the framework does not include output indicators  and associated targets that would allow the agency to assess progress  annually.
Because the IRP framework for assessing impact was not fully based on  the estimated benefits in the cost-benefit analysis used to select road  projects, USAID cannot verify that IRP projects will lead to the estimated  benefits and expected impact. A cost-benefit analysis should be the basis  for setting indicators and their target values in a framework linking the  project to expected impact. USAID’s cost-benefit analysis identified the  indicators used in the framework and the target values that could be used  to measure annual progress toward those indicators. However, USAID  did not include those measurable targets in its results framework for IRP.  In its monitoring and evaluation plan for IRP, USAID stated that targets  would be set based on baseline studies for individual projects by the end  of 2007. However, baseline studies have not been completed and no  targets have been set to date. Therefore, the estimated benefits from  USAID’s cost-benefit analysis used to select IRP road projects may differ  from the expected impact identified by the IRP framework.
section_title: Defense Has Not Assessed the Impact of and Lacks Clear Guidance for CERP Projects
paragraphs: Defense has not conducted any impact assessment of its civilian road  projects. Defense’s objective for CERP is to enable local U.S. military  commanders to respond to small-scale, urgent humanitarian relief and  reconstruction requirements. Because CERP is used for urgent local needs  such as small roads, the impact of such projects may be difficult to  quantify. Although CERP-funded projects contain measures of desired  impact—such as improved public sentiment toward local and national  governments, increased jobs and economic growth, and increased local  support to deter terrorist recruitment—it is not stated how these  indicators will be measured and what data collection efforts are planned.  Additionally, while CERP guidance for Afghanistan requires project  proposals to have an “adequate” plan to measure success in achieving the  desired impact, it does not contain criteria for developing such a plan for  performance measurement and evaluation.
section_title: No Other Donors Have Performed Impact Evaluations
paragraphs: No other donors that we spoke to have performed impact evaluations of  their road projects, and therefore little is known about the impact of road  reconstruction in Afghanistan. Representatives from Japan, the European  Commission, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank said they  had not performed any evaluations to assess the impact of roads they  funded. Because various donors are constructing different parts of an  interconnected road network, attributing impact to a specific donor’s road  project is difficult. Therefore, conducting impact evaluations in  coordination with other donors is vital to ensure that the assistance  provided by the United States and other international donors is achieving  the desired outcomes.
The World Bank has, however, taken some steps to allow for future impact  evaluations. For example, the bank developed a rough cost-benefit  analysis for its emergency infrastructure project in Afghanistan, which  allows for a framework to assess the outcomes of its project. For its  National Emergency Rural Access Program, which includes the  construction of rural roads, the bank plans to undertake a rigorous impact  evaluation.
section_title: A Fiscally Sustainable Road Maintenance Program for Afghan Roads Has Not Been Established
paragraphs: A fiscally sustainable program for road maintenance has not been  established, although the Afghan government and international donors set  a goal to do so by the end of 2007. Several factors have contributed to the  Afghan government’s maintenance shortfall, including (1) its lack of  human and financial resources, (2) a fragmented institutional organization,  and (3) the lack of a comprehensive legal framework and means to  enforce fee collection for the transportation sector in Afghanistan. Since  2005, various plans have estimated that road maintenance would cost  between about $70 million and $90 million annually. Because the Afghan  government has not been able to maintain newly reconstructed roads, the  European Commission and USAID have agreed to fund maintenance on a  temporary basis for the roads they built. However, USAID did not meet its  2007 target to maintain 100 kilometers of reconstructed roads.
subsections: section_title: The Target Date for Achieving a Fiscally Sustainable Road Maintenance Program Has Not Been Met due to Various Limitations
paragraphs: The target to establish a fiscally sustainable road maintenance program for  Afghanistan by the end of 2007 was not met. The Afghan government, in  conjunction with international donors, established this target in the  interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Although the target  date was subsequently extended to March 2008, according to an official  from the Consultative Group for Transport Sector, a maintenance program  has not been established. Moreover, while the final Afghanistan National  Development Strategy, issued in April 2008, still includes the goal of  establishing a maintenance program, it does not include a date by which  the program should be established.
Several factors have limited the Afghan government’s support for road  maintenance activities. These include (1) resource constraints such as a  lack of human and financial resources and weak private sector capacity,  (2) a fragmented institutional organization, and (3) the lack of a  comprehensive legal framework and means to enforce road-related fee  collection.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Resources
paragraphs: According to the Transport Sector Strategy (2008-2013), ministries and  institutions involved in the transportation sector lack human capacity and  organization to carry out tasks such as budgeting, procurement, and  contract administration, which are necessary to implement a road  maintenance program. Donor officials we spoke to in Afghanistan stated  that the Afghan government is not able to attract young workers due to  low wages. According to a March 2008 United Nations report, low salaries  place many working Afghans, including government employees, at risk of  falling below the poverty line. A senior official at the Ministry of Public  Works with whom we spoke noted that his ministry cannot pay adequate  salaries to its engineers and technical staff. For example, the general  director for maintenance is paid only about $200 per month, while a  person with similar qualifications could earn five times that salary in the  private sector, according to the official.
According to a USAID official and a senior Afghan government official, the  Afghan government also lacks financial resources to cover road  maintenance costs. The Ministry of Public Works’ Road Sector Master Plan  estimated in 2005 that the total maintenance cost for regional and national  highways and provincial roads would be $38 million for 2007. In October  2007, a senior ministry official told us that while the Ministry of Public  Works estimated that it needed $30 million to maintain roads in 2007, the  Ministry of Finance had allocated only $8 million. Thus, the Ministry of  Public Works planned only to undertake routine maintenance, and  postpone more expensive periodic maintenance work.
Weak private sector capacity has also hindered the Afghan government’s  ability to carry out road maintenance. Many donors have recommended  that the Ministry of Public Works involve more private sector entities in its  road maintenance efforts. However, according to a senior official at the  ministry, the private sector still lacks the capacity to undertake and  complete road maintenance projects. For example, in 2006, the Ministry of  Public Works requested bids for maintenance of the Kabul-Kandahar road  three times without receiving a single bid. In its 2005 assessment of road  maintenance needs in Afghanistan, the World Bank recommended that  Ministry of Public Works staff perform urgent maintenance until private  sector contractors have the capacity to do so. According to a USAID needs  assessment of the transportation sector, the Afghan private sector’s  participation is also limited due to a lack of available cash and debt  financing. This lack of initial funding hinders local companies from  bidding for costly road projects, as road contractors usually get paid later  in the life of the contract, thus requiring them to have the resources to  finance project start-up costs.
section_title: Fragmented Institutional Organization
paragraphs: The Afghan government’s participation in road maintenance has also been  limited by a fragmented organization of the transportation sector and the  lack of a comprehensive legal framework for this sector. Numerous  ministries are involved in road operations and maintenance (see table 2).  According to officials from USAID and the European Commission, donors  affiliated with the Consultative Group for the Transport Sector consider  this fragmented governance a major impediment to effective management,  and they recommended consolidating the transportation sector under a  single ministry in the draft Transport Sector Strategy. However, USAID  officials and a Ministry of Finance official said that ministries with a stake  in the transportation sector are expected to oppose such a  recommendation. The Transport Sector Strategy finalized in February 2008  includes a recommendation to establish an interministry working group  for the transportation sector, but falls short of recommending  consolidation of transportation sector functions under one ministry.  Additionally, donors have recommended that, in accordance with  international best practices, a road fund be established to ensure that  revenues from road user charges are used only for road operations and  maintenance. However, the Ministry of Finance, which currently receives  revenues from road-related charges, has opposed this.
The government also lacks a comprehensive legal framework for the  transportation sector. According to the Transport Sector Strategy and  USAID needs assessment of transportation sector capacity, the existing  decrees and laws do not clearly delineate the responsibilities of various  Afghan ministries involved in the transportation sector. For example, as  shown in table 2, more than one ministry collects fees from and issues  permits to commercial vehicles. Consequently, there are overlapping  jurisdictions and functions. Additionally, according to these documents,  transportation sector laws are incomplete. For example, while there is a  traffic regulation law that defines restrictions on drivers and regulates the  weight of vehicles, it does not set the penalties for vehicle overloading,  according to the strategy. Overloaded vehicles cause the most serious  damage to roads in Afghanistan, according to USAID’s needs assessment.
Additionally, the Afghan government has not been able to generate  sufficient revenues for road maintenance due, in part, to ineffective  enforcement of tolls and fee collection. For instance, according to a  USAID needs assessment, the Ministry of Finance started a new system of  issuing stickers for a fee based on vehicle size to drivers who use toll  roads. However, the ministry had no mechanism to ensure that vehicles  passing through road checkpoints had the stickers that allowed them to  use the toll road. According to the assessment, the Ministry of Finance did  not appear to have coordinated its efforts with the Ministry of Interior,  which controls the Afghan National Police who man the checkpoints and  have enforcement authority. Consequently, the effort failed. A senior  Ministry of Public Works official confirmed that the sticker system had  failed to generate expected toll revenues. Moreover, the Afghan  Parliament as well as the Ministry of Public Works have opposed a fuel tax  as a revenue generation option on the grounds that it is difficult to  implement and may adversely affect the poor or those who use fuel for  electricity generators.
section_title: Plans Estimate Costs and Funding Options for Road Maintenance
paragraphs: A variety of donor-funded plans have estimated costs and funding options  for road maintenance. Some of the funding options are already being used  by Afghan ministries, but with limited success. Additionally, the estimates  of maintenance costs do not include rural roads.
In May 2005, the World Bank issued the Afghanistan Road Maintenance  Note, which identified maintenance costs as about $72 million annually for  major roads by the year 2011, when the regional and priority national  highways were expected to be completed. The document recommended  that the Afghan government develop clear policies for road maintenance  and prepare a maintenance program for the World Bank-funded  emergency road project that was implemented during the early stage of  reconstruction in Afghanistan.
In April 2006, the Asian Development Bank-funded Road Sector Master  Plan estimated the cost of road maintenance to be $85 million to $90  million annually between 2011 and 2015 once construction of the currently  funded road network is completed. This cost estimate does not include  maintenance costs for rural roads. The plan presented several options to  fund road maintenance, such as a fuel tax, vehicle registration fees, and  road tolls. Various Afghan ministries were already using some of these  mechanisms, such as road tolls and vehicle registration fees; however,  these methods have been plagued by problems such as lack of  enforcement and corruption. As a result, revenues from these sources  were less than $4 million in 2004.
In April 2007, the Ministry of Public Works published the final draft of its  strategic plan, with funding and technical assistance from USAID. The plan  estimated road maintenance costs for the next 5 years at about $400  million (or an average of $80 million annually) for 7,000 kilometers of  highways and provincial roads. It articulated goals and measures as well as  proposed activities such as developing public and private sector capacity,  standards for road maintenance, and a revenue generation system (see  table 3). However, this plan only covers roads and activities under the  Ministry of Public Works’ jurisdiction, and does not include rural roads  that are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and  Development.
section_title: Donors Have Recently Started Maintenance Programs for Sections of the Major Roads; USAID Did Not Meet its 2007 Maintenance Target
paragraphs: Since 2006, the European Commission and USAID started separate 3-year  road maintenance programs that would cover over 1,600 kilometers of the  regional highways they built. However, USAID did not meet its 2007 target  to maintain 100 kilometers of reconstructed roads.
In June 2006, the European Commission initiated a road maintenance  program for the 150-kilometer section of the regional highway from Kabul  to Jalalabad, the construction of which it had previously funded. USAID  signed a task order under the IRP contract effective in November 2007 for  an estimated cost of $33 million for a 3-year road maintenance program  covering about 1,500 kilometers of roads it has completed. Additionally,  Defense has provided ad hoc assistance for road maintenance using CERP  funding. For example, CERP funds have been used to provide road  maintenance equipment to local governments and to undertake some  urgent winter maintenance.
USAID’s road maintenance program includes establishing a Road  Maintenance Unit housed in the Ministry of Public Works to implement  maintenance projects with the assistance of a contractor. Additionally, the  contractor will establish new management procedures and develop  manuals on maintenance-related topics such as planning, budgeting,  contracting, and performance monitoring.
In its Performance Management Plan (2006-2008), USAID identified  kilometers of reconstructed road maintained as the indicator to measure  progress toward road maintenance and established yearly targets for fiscal  years 2007 and 2008. However, because USAID had not started any  maintenance, it did not meet its target of 100 kilometers of reconstructed  roads maintained for fiscal year 2007. Additionally, while USAID proposed  measuring Afghan government contributions toward road maintenance by  calculating the increase in the Ministry of Public Works’ budget for this  purpose, our review of the Performance Management Plan found that it  did not include annual targets or report on actual contributions of the  ministry. Therefore, it is not clear whether or to what extent the Afghan  government has increased its support for road maintenance.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The United States and other international donors have committed billions  of dollars toward road reconstruction in Afghanistan to promote economic  and social development as well as security and stability. While some have  noted that reconstructed roads contribute positively to economic and  social conditions in Afghanistan, there is currently little evidence based on  sound impact assessments that these projects have resulted in expected  benefits. Because donors are building an interconnected road network,  coordination in planning and conducting impact assessments would  complement individual donors’ efforts to assess the impact of their own  projects and could result in more efficient use of resources. Moreover,  without a sustainable road maintenance program, newly constructed roads  will ultimately deteriorate, expected benefits will not materialize, and the  billions of dollars spent on road reconstruction would be wasted. There is  a lack of comprehensive information on all donor-funded road projects in  Afghanistan, as donors are not reporting road project data systematically  and regularly to the Consultative Group for the Transport Sector, a joint  Afghan government and donor group responsible for collecting these data.  Furthermore, there is a lack of comprehensive data on U.S.-funded road  projects, as agencies are not reporting information for all their civilian  road projects to a USAID database. In the absence of complete  information on all road projects in Afghanistan, the Afghan government  and international donors will not be able to efficiently coordinate their  efforts and better plan future road projects. Additionally, due to lack of  coordination among Afghan ministries involved in the transportation  sector, it is not clear whether or when the Afghan government will be able  to assume greater responsibility for its road construction and maintenance  activities. Improvements in efforts to assess, maintain, and document road  reconstruction projects are necessary for USAID and Defense to provide  better assurance that their efforts will achieve U.S. and Afghan  government road reconstruction goals.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve evaluation as well as efficiency and effectiveness of USAID- funded road reconstruction projects, we recommend that the  Administrator of USAID take the following actions:  improve the results framework to ensure that it is based on expected  benefits from a cost-benefit analysis with clearly stated goals, indicators,  and targets and in coordination with other donors, consider building impact evaluations  into project design and perform such evaluations after project  implementation.
To ensure the evaluation of CERP-funded roads, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense require impact evaluations of these projects where  applicable.
Until the Afghan government is able to establish a road maintenance  program, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID    work with the Afghan government to take steps to address urgent  maintenance needs, such as formulating and enforcing vehicle weight  standards, while continuing to take steps to address long-term  maintenance needs, such as by developing a maintenance implementation  plan and require that future agreements for road reconstruction projects include  plans detailing options for funding road maintenance.
To ensure that Defense and USAID officials have adequate information to  make effective future project management decisions, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense require that data for Defense’s CERP-funded road  projects be reported for inclusion in USAID’s database, as required by  CERP guidance.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: USAID and Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report,  which are reproduced in appendixes V and VI, respectively. USAID and  Defense agreed with our findings, conclusions, and recommendations. In  response to our recommendations, USAID stated that it is conducting an  assessment of the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat road, which will be completed by  early fall 2008, and will revise its results framework for road  reconstruction projects to include goals, indicators, and targets, and to  link it to a cost-benefit analysis. USAID also indicated it will introduce the  issue of impact evaluations to the joint government-donor forum for road  sector policy coordination. USAID also stated that it will offer a technical  assistance package to the Afghan government to help draft road  regulations needed to maintain Afghanistan’s roads, and highlighted plans  to follow through with the $33 million it committed in fiscal year 2008 for  road maintenance while longer-term solutions for road maintenance are  being developed. Defense indicated that its CERP guidance has been  revised to include a requirement that proposals for CERP projects include  performance metrics and indicators for evaluating projects. The guidance  also requires Defense to transfer project data to all required databases,  including USAID’s, as part of CERP project closeouts. USAID and Defense  also reviewed a draft of this report for technical accuracy. Defense  provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees. We will also make copies available to others on request. In  addition, this report is available on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.  If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To review the status of donor-funded road projects, we obtained road  project data on international donors from the Consultative Group for the  Transport Sector, a coordination body that includes donor representatives  and Afghan officials from relevant ministries. For U.S.-funded roads, we  obtained relevant data from the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and  the Department of Defense’s (Defense) Army Budget Office as well as the  Combined Joint Task Force in Afghanistan.
To assess the reliability of the data on the commitments made by  international donors, we (1) interviewed the USAID-funded contractor at  the Consultative Group for the Transportation Sector who is responsible  for compiling these data on a monthly basis based on information  provided by all the donors and the government of Afghanistan, and (2)  performed some basic reasonableness checks of the data against other  sources of information. We determined that the data are sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of (1) assessing the status of road projects, and  (2) making a broad comparison of the United States’ contributions to  those of other major donors. However, the data have various limitations,  including the fact that they are largely self-reported by donor nations to  the Afghan government, are affected by differences in exchange rates, and  may not represent all road projects. Due to these limitations and the fact  that we could not contact each of the donors, we were unable to  determine the reliability of the most current status of projects and the  precise dollar amounts committed by every donor. Nevertheless, because  these are the best available data on donor-funded road reconstruction  projects, we present the status and funding amounts reported by each  donor in appendix II.
For USAID road projects, we primarily used data from its database called  Geobase. These data were for two USAID departments involved in road  construction: the Office of Infrastructure, Engineering and Energy and the  office of the Provincial Reconstruction Team. While we received  comprehensive information for Office of Infrastructure, Engineering and  Energy roads, we obtained Provincial Reconstruction Team road data only  for completed Quick Impact Projects and not for current road projects.  The amount of funding for the current road projects is very small,  according to USAID officials.
For Defense road projects, we obtained data from several departments  and agencies. For USACE-implemented projects, which include a number  of Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)-funded road  projects and all Military Construction-funded roads, we obtained detailed  data directly from the agency. Defense officials in Afghanistan provided  data for projects that used CERP, Military Construction, and Military  Engineering funds. CERP and Military Construction project data included  kilometers of roads for completed and ongoing projects. However, funding  information for a large number of CERP projects was missing.  Consequently, we obtained funding data for CERP from the Army Budget  Office at the Pentagon. Last, due to sensitivity of Military Engineering  roads, Defense officials provided only the aggregate funds committed for  these projects.
To assess challenges in implementing road reconstruction projects, we  interviewed agency officials from USAID and Defense in Washington, D.C.,  and in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, we met with officials in Kabul and  Bagram. We also met with U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team officials  during site visits to road projects in Badakhshan, Nangarhar, and Khost  provinces. We reviewed USAID’s major contract and grant agreements and  select Defense CERP contracts and analyzed contract file documents, such  as agency memorandums, modifications to contracts, and contract  summary reports where appropriate and available. We also reviewed  construction industry best practices and USAID and Defense Inspector  General reports relating to road construction.
To examine USAID and Defense’s assessment of impact of road  reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, we reviewed documentation  including agencywide guidance for monitoring and evaluation,  performance monitoring plan, and documents for USAID’s Rehabilitation  of Economic Facilities and Services (REFS) program and Infrastructure  and Rehabilitation Program (IRP) projects and Defense’s CERP projects.  We limited our review of results frameworks to USAID’s overall  Performance Management Plan, and its REFS and IRP programs. We did  not assess the framework for the projects implemented under the United  Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) grant. We assessed the  documents for the following elements: a logical framework to assess  results; statement of strategic and intermediate goals; output, outcome,  and impact indicators; and targets for these indicators. Additionally, we  reviewed the explanation of how targets were selected and if they were  met. We also reviewed articles and books on monitoring and evaluation  that provided us tools to assess impact evaluation of the completed road  projects and helped identify methodological challenges in the design and  implementation of such evaluations.
To assess the extent of road maintenance for newly constructed roads, we  reviewed pertinent strategic and planning documents, and interviewed  Afghan and donor officials during our fieldwork. To identify the national  goal for road maintenance and progress on this goal, we reviewed the  Afghan Compact, the interim and final Afghan National Development  Strategy, and the periodic Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board  reports. To identify USAID’s maintenance goals and progress on these, we  reviewed USAID’s Afghanistan Performance Management Plan (2006-2008)  and the agency’s reporting on these goals. To identify the extent to which  donors and the Afghan government have discussed and planned for road  maintenance, we reviewed key documents including the World Bank’s  Road Maintenance Note, Road Sector Master Plan for Afghanistan,  Ministry of Public Works Strategic Plan, draft and final Transport Sector  Strategy, and Needs Assessment for Transport Sector for USAID-funded  road projects. To assess USAID’s project for road maintenance, we  reviewed the relevant contract to identify details of the plan.
section_title: Appendix II: USAID and Other Donor Road Project Data
paragraphs: Appendix II: USAID and Other Donor Road  Project Data Donor (Implementer) in millions)
Kabul-Kandahar (Sections B to F)
USAID (LBG)
USAID (implementer)
USAID (LBG)
USAID (LBG and UNOPS)
USAID (LBG/B&V)
USAID (UNOPS)
USAID (UNOPS)
USAID (UNOPS)
Donor (Implementer) in millions)
USAID (UNOPS)
USAID (UNOPS)
USAID (LBG/B&V)
USAID (UNOPS)
USAID (LBG/B&V)
USAID (UNOPS)
USAID (UNOPS)
USAID (LBG/B&V)
USAID (UNOPS)
USAID (USACE)
USAID (UNOPS)
USAID (UNOPS)
USAID (LBG and UNOPS)
The government of Afghanistan is in negotiations with the Asian Development Bank for an additional  $10 million for the reconstruction of this road section.
The government of Afghanistan will contribute an additional $4 million to this project.
Funding data have been rounded and therefore may not precisely match the total.
These road projects have been terminated due to poor security conditions.
section_title: Appendix III: CERP Funding Data for Road Projects by Province in Afghanistan
paragraphs: Appendix III: CERP Funding Data for Road  Projects by Province in Afghanistan No.
No.
section_title: Appendix IV: USAID’s Grant Agreement with UNOPS for Road Reconstruction in Afghanistan
paragraphs: Throughout the life of its road reconstruction grant with UNOPS, USAID  increased its size over 10 times, from $35 million to over $365 million,  adding nearly 700 kilometers of roads to the original 300, and extending  the period of performance by nearly 3 years (see fig. 11). USAID  transferred several roads from REFS to UNOPS because REFS hit its  contract ceiling. According to USAID officials, they did not want to use  LBG as the prime contractor for all of their major infrastructure projects in  Afghanistan, especially in light of “congressional and private sector”  criticism of LBG’s management of other Afghan infrastructure projects.  However, USAID required UNOPS to subcontract engineering  responsibilities for the transferred roads to LBG, adding an extra layer of  management. After the termination of the grant due to concerns about  UNOPS’s financial management, five senior UNOPS officials associated  with the USAID program resigned or were released, according to a USAID  official.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant Director),  Jaime Allentuck, Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott, Gergana Danailova-Trainor, Karen  Deans, Etana Finkler, and Mona Sehgal made key contributions to this  report. Michael Armes, Timothy DiNapoli, Mark Dowling, Cindy Gilbert,  John Hutton, and Jena Sinkfield also provided technical assistance.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to  Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable  Afghan National Security Forces. GAO-08-661. Washington, D.C.: June 18,  2008.
Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police  Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help  Ensure Accountability. GAO-08-883T. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for  Congressional Oversight. GAO-07-801SP. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007.
Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating  Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals. GAO-07-78. Washington, D.C.:  Nov. 15, 2006.
Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating  Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S.  Goals. GAO-05-742. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005.
Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made  Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined. GAO-05-575.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited  Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy  Needed. GAO-04-403. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2004.
Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to  Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan’s Stability. GAO-03-607.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.