Drug Control: International Programs Face Significant Challenges Reducing the Supply of Illegal Drugs but Support Broad U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives
Published: 2010-07-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The overall goal of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy, prepared by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), is to reduce illicit drug use in the United States. GAO has issued more than 20 products since 2000 examining U.S.-funded international programs aimed at reducing the supply of drugs. These programs have been implemented primarily in drug source countries, such as Colombia and Afghanistan as well drug transit countries, such as Mexico, Guatemala, and Venezuela. They have included interdiction of maritime drug shipments on the high seas, support for foreign military and civilian institutions engaged in drug eradication, detection, and interdiction; and rule of law assistance aimed at helping foreign legal institutions investigate and prosecute drug trafficking, money laundering, and other drug-related crimes.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO's work on U.S.-funded international counternarcotics-related programswork has centered on four major topics: (1) Counternarcotics-related programs have had mixed results. In Afghanistan, Colombia, and drug transit countries, the United States and partner nations have only partially met established targets for reducing the drug supply. In Afghanistan, opium poppy eradication efforts have consistently fallen short of targets. Plan Colombia has met its goals for reducing opium and heroin but not coca crops, although recent data suggest that U.S.-supported crop eradication efforts over time may have caused a significant decline in potential cocaine production. Data also indicate an increase in coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia that may eventually offset these declines. Interdiction programs have missed their performance targets each year since goals were established in 2007. (2) Several factors have limited program effectiveness. Various factors have hindered these programs' ability to reduce the supply of illegal drugs. In some cases, we found that U.S. agencies had not planned for the sustainment of programs, particularly those providing interdiction boats in transit countries. External factors include limited cooperation from partner nations due to corruption or lack of political support, and the highly adaptive nature of drug producers and traffickers. (3) Counternarcotics-related programs often advance broader foreign policy objectives. The value of these programs cannot be assessed based only on their impact on the drug supply. Many have supported other U.S. foreign policy objectives relating to security and stabilization, counterinsurgency, and strengthening democracy and governance. For example, in Afghanistan, the United States has combined counternarcotics efforts with military operations to combat insurgents as well as drug traffickers. U.S. support for Plan Colombia has significantly strengthened Colombia's security environment, which may eventually make counterdrug programs, such as alternative agricultural development, more effective. In several cases, U.S. rule of law assistance, such as supporting courts, prosecutors, and law enforcement organizations, has furthered both democracy-building and counterdrug objectives. (4) Judging the effectiveness of some programs is difficult. U.S. agencies often lack reliable performance measurement and results reporting needed to assess all the impacts of counterdrug programs. In Afghanistan, opium eradication measures alone were insufficient for a comprehensive assessment of U.S. efforts. Also, the State Department has not regularly reported outcome-related information for over half of its programs in major drug transit countries. Furthermore, DOD's counternarcotics-related measures were generally not useful for assessing program effectiveness or making management decisions.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO has made recommendations to the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and other agencies to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. counternarcotics- related programs. In particular, GAO has recommended that these agencies develop plans to sustain these programs. GAO has also recommended that they improve performance measurement and results reporting to assess program impacts and to aid in decision making. Agencies have efforts under way to implement some of these recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here to discuss our analysis of the United States’  international counternarcotics effort over the past several years. Since  2000, we have published over 20 reports on U.S. international  counternarcotics programs and other international programs related to  counternarcotics. Today, I will discuss the overall findings from these  reports and some of the recommendations we have made. Specifically, I  will focus on four major topics with regard to U.S. international  counternarcotics-related programs: (1) their results in reducing the supply  of illegal drugs; (2) factors limiting their effectiveness; (3) their alignment  with broad U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as counterinsurgency and  the promotion of political stability, and democracy, and (4) difficulties in  judging their effectiveness, given a lack of reliable performance  measurement and results reporting.
My statement today is based on our extensive body of work examining  U.S. efforts to reduce the flow of drugs into this country (see app. I). We  have conducted extensive on-the-ground work in the United States as well  as in major illicit drug producing countries, such as Afghanistan,  Colombia, and Peru, and major drug transit countries, such as the  Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico Panama, and  Venezuela. Our reports incorporate information we obtained and analyzed  from foreign officials in these countries as well as U.S. officials posted  both overseas and in Washington, D.C., from the Departments of Defense  (DOD), Homeland Security, State (State), Justice, Treasury; the U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID); the Defense Intelligence  Agency; the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Office of  National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). In the United States we also  obtained information from U.S. officials at other agencies and  organizations involved in international drug control and interdiction, such  as the U.S. Southern Command and the Joint Interagency Task Force- South in Florida and the El Paso Information Center in Texas, and the  Central Intelligence Agency’s Crime and Narcotics Center in Virginia. Our  work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence we obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: During the past decade, the overarching goal of the U.S. National Drug  Control Strategy has been to reduce illegal drug use in the United States.   A main priority of the strategy has been to disrupt illegal drug trade and  production abroad in the transit zone and production countries by  attacking the power structures and finances of international criminal  organizations and aiding countries with eradication and interdiction  efforts. This involves seizing large quantities of narcotics from  transporters, disrupting major drug trafficking organizations, arresting  their leaders, and seizing their assets. The strategy also called for the  United States to support democratic institutions and the rule of law in  allied nations both in the transit zone and in drug producing countries,  strengthening of these nations’ prosecutorial efforts, and the prosecution  of foreign traffickers and producers. According to State’s International  Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the goal of U.S. counternarcotics  assistance to other countries is to help their governments become full and  self-sustaining partners in the fight against drugs.
The updated U.S. National Drug Control Strategy, released in May 2010,  endorses a balance of drug abuse prevention, drug treatment, and law  enforcement. International efforts in the strategy include collaborating  with international partners to disrupt the drug trade, supporting the drug  control efforts of major drug source and transit countries, and attacking  key vulnerabilities of drug-trafficking organizations.
section_title: Counternarcotics- Related Programs Have Had Mixed Results in Meeting Supply Reduction and Interdiction Goals
paragraphs: Our work in Afghanistan, Colombia, and the transit zone has shown that  the United States and its partner nations have partially met established  targets for reducing the supply of illicit drugs. Most programs designed to  reduce cultivation, production, and trafficking of drugs have missed their  performance targets.
subsections: section_title: Some Afghan Opium Poppy Reduction Targets Have Been Achieved
paragraphs: In Afghanistan, one of the original indicators of success of the U.S.-funded  counternarcotics effort was the reduction of opium poppy cultivation in  the country, and for each year from 2005 to 2008, State established a new  cultivation reduction target. According to State, the targets were met for  some but not all of these years. We recently reported that cultivation data  show increases from 2005 to 2007 and decreases from 2007 to 2009 and  that 20 of the 34 Afghan provinces are now poppy-free. However, the U.S.  and Afghan opium poppy eradication strategy did not achieve its stated  objectives, as the amounts of poppy eradicated consistently fell short of  the annual targeted amounts. For example, based on the most recent data  we analyzed-for 2008-2009-slightly more than one-quarter of the total  eradication goal for that year was achieved: of the 20,000 hectares  targeted, only 5,350 hectares were successfully eradicated.
These eradication and cultivation goals were not met due to a number of  factors, including lack of political will on the part of Afghan central and  provincial governments. In 2009, the United States revamped its  counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan to deemphasize eradication  efforts and shift to interdiction and increased agricultural assistance.
section_title: Plan Colombia Partially Met Six-Year Drug Supply Reduction Goals and Recent Data Suggest More Improvements Have Been Made
paragraphs: In 2008, we reported that Plan Colombia’s goal of reducing the cultivation  and production of illegal drugs by 50 percent in 6 years was partially  achieved. From 2001 to 2006, Colombian opium poppy cultivation and  heroin production decreased by about 50 percent to meet established  goals. However, estimated coca cultivation rose by 15 percent with an  estimated 157,000 hectares cultivated in 2006 compared to 136,200  hectares in 2000. State officials noted that extensive aerial and manual  eradication efforts during this period were not sufficient to overcome  countermeasures taken by coca farmers. U.S. officials also noted the  increase in estimated coca cultivation levels from 2005 through 2007 may  have been due, at least in part, to the U.S. government’s decision to  increase the size of the coca cultivation survey areas in Colombia  beginning in 2004. Furthermore, in 2008 we reported that estimated  cocaine production was about 4 percent greater in 2006 than in 2000, with  550 metric tons produced in 2006 compared to 530 metric tons in 2000.
Since our 2008 report, ONDCP has provided additional data that suggests  significant reductions in the potential cocaine production in Colombia  despite the rising cultivation and estimated production numbers we had  cited. ONDCP officials have noted that U.S.-supported eradication efforts  had degraded coca fields, so that less cocaine was being produced per  hectare of cultivated coca. According to ONDCP data, potential cocaine  production overall has dropped from 700 metric tons in 2001 to 295 metric  tons in 2008—a 57 percent decrease. According to ONDCP officials,  decreases in cocaine purity and in the amount of cocaine seized at the  Southwest Border since 2006 tend to corroborate the lower potential  cocaine production figures.
In interpreting this additional ONDCP data, a number of facts and  mitigating circumstances should be considered. First, increasing  effectiveness of coca eradication efforts may not be the only explanation  for the data that ONDCP provided. Other factors, such as dry weather  conditions, may be contributing to these decreases in potential cocaine  production. Also, other factors, such as increases in cocaine flow to West  Africa and Europe could be contributing to decreased availability and  purity of cocaine in U.S. markets. Additionally, ONDCP officials cautioned  about the longer-term prospects for these apparent eradication  achievements, because weakened economic conditions in both the U.S.  and Colombia could hamper the Colombian government’s sustainment of  eradication programs and curtail the gains made. Moreover, as we noted in  2008, reductions in Colombia’s estimated cocaine production have been  partially offset by increases in cocaine production in Peru and, to a lesser  extent, Bolivia. Although It remains to be seen whether cocaine  production in Peru and Bolivia will continue to increase and these whether  Peru will return to being the primary coca producing country that it was  through the 1980’s and into the 1990’s.
section_title: Cocaine Interdiction Programs in the Transit Zone Has Fallen Short of Targets
paragraphs: According to ONDCP data, the United States has fallen slightly short of its  cocaine interdiction targets each year since the targets were established in  2007. The national interdiction goal calls for the removal of 40 percent of  the cocaine moving through the transit zone annually by 2015. The goal  included interim annual targets of 25 percent in 2008 and 27 percent in  2009. However, since 2006, cocaine removal rates have declined and have  not reached any of the annual targets to date. The removal rate dropped to  23 percent in 2007 and 20 percent in 2008 (5 percentage points short of the  target for that year) then rose to 25 percent in 2009 (2.5 percentage points  short of the target for that year). ONDCP has cited aging interdiction  assets, such as U.S. Coast Guard vessels, the redirection of interdiction  capacity to wars overseas, and budget constraints, as contributing factors  to these lower-than-desired success rates. Moreover, the increasing flow of  illicit narcotics through Venezuela and the continuing flow through Mexico  pose significant challenges to U.S. counternarcotics interdiction efforts.
section_title: Several Factors Have Limited the Effectiveness of U.S. Programs
paragraphs: A number of factors to counternarcotics-related programs have limited the  effectiveness of U.S. counternarcotic efforts. These factors include a lack  of planning by U.S. agencies to sustain some U.S.-funded programs over  the longer term, limited cooperation from partner nations, and the  adaptability of drug producers and traffickers.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Planning by U.S. Agencies to Sustain Some Programs
paragraphs: U.S. agencies had not developed plans for how to sustain some programs,  particularly those programs providing assets, such as boats, to partner  nations to conduct interdiction efforts. Some counternarcotics initiatives  we reviewed were hampered by a shortage of resources made available by  partner nations to sustain these programs. We found that many partner  nations in the transit zone had limited resources to devote to  counternarcotics, and many initiatives depended on U.S. support.  Programs aimed at building maritime interdiction capacity were  particularly affected, as partner nations, including Haiti, Guatemala,  Jamaica, Panama and the Dominican Republic, were unable to use U.S.- provided boats for patrol or interdiction operations due to a lack of  funding for fuel and maintenance. Despite continued efforts by DOD and  State to provide these countries with boats, these agencies had not  developed plans to address long-term sustainability of these assets over  their expected operating life.
Also, we found in 2006 that the availability of some key U.S. assets for  interdiction operations, such as maritime patrol aircraft, was declining,  and the United States had not planned for how to replace them. According  to JIATF-South and other cognizant officials, the declining availability of  P-3 maritime patrol aircraft was the most critical challenge to the success  of future interdiction operations. Since then, DOD has taken steps to  address the issue of declining availability of ships and aircraft for transit  zone interdiction operations by using other forms of aerial surveillance  and extending the useful life of P-3 aircraft. Recently, DOD’s Southern  Command officials told us that they plan to rely increasingly upon U.S.- supported partner nations for detection and monitoring efforts as DOD  capabilities in this area diminish. However, given the concerns we have  reported about the ability of some partner nations to sustain  counternarcotics-related assets, it remains to be seen whether this  contingency is viable.
section_title: Limited Cooperation Between the United States and Partner Nations
paragraphs: Our work in Colombia, Mexico, and drug transit countries has shown that  cooperative working relationships between U.S. officials and their foreign  counterparts is essential to implementing effective counternarcotics  programs. The United States has agreed-upon strategies with both  Colombia and Mexico to achieve counternarcotics-related objectives and  has worked extensively to strengthen those countries’ capacity to combat  illicit drug production and trafficking. For example, to detect and intercept  illegal air traffic in Colombian air space the United States and Colombia  collaborated to operate the Air Bridge Denial Program, which the  Colombian Air Force now operates independently. Also, in Mexico,  increased cooperation with the United States led to a rise in extraditions  of high-level cartel members, demonstrating a stronger commitment by the  Mexican government to work closely with U.S. agencies to combat drug  trafficking problems. Similarly, in 2008 we reported that in most major  drug transit countries, close and improving cooperation has yielded a  variety of benefits for the counternarcotics effort. In particular, partner  nations have shared information and intelligence leading to arrests and  drug seizures, participated in counternarcotics operations both at sea and  on land, and cooperated in the prosecution of drug traffickers.
However, corruption within the governments of partner nations can  seriously limit cooperation. For example, in 2002, the U.S. government  suspended major joint operations in Guatemala when the antinarcotics  police unit in that country was disbanded in response to reports of  widespread corruption within the agency and its general lack of  effectiveness in combating the country’s drug problem. In the Bahamas,  State reported in 2003 that it was reluctant to include Bahamian defense  personnel in drug interdiction operations and to share sensitive law  enforcement information with them due to corruption concerns.
Corruption has also hampered Dominican Republic-based, money- laundering investigations, according to DEA.
Afghan officials objected to aerial eradication efforts and the use of  chemicals in Afghanistan, forcing eradication to be done with tractors, all- terrain vehicles, and manually with sticks, making the effort less efficient.  Furthermore, Afghan governors had been slow to grant permission to  eradicate poppy fields until the concept for the central government’s  eradication force was changed in 2008 so that this force could operate  without governor permission in areas where governors either would not or  could not launch eradication efforts themselves.
Deteriorating relations with Venezuela have stalled the progress of several  cooperative counternarcotics initiatives intended to slow drug trafficking  through that country. In 2007, Venezuela began denying visas for U.S.  officials to serve in Venezuela, which complicated efforts to cooperate.  Additionally, the overall number of counternarcotics projects supported  by both the United States in Venezuela has fallen since 2005. For example,  the Government of Venezuela withdrew support from the Prosecutor’s  Drug Task Force in 2005 and a port security program in 2006.
section_title: Highly Adaptive Nature of Drug Traffickers and Producers
paragraphs: Drug trafficking organizations and associated criminal networks have  been extremely adaptive and resourceful, shifting routes and operating  methods quickly in response to pressure from law enforcement  organizations or rival traffickers. In 2008, we reported that drug traffickers  typically used go-fast boats and fishing vessels to smuggle cocaine from  Colombia to Central America and Mexico en route to the United States.  These boats, capable of traveling at speeds over 40 knots, were difficult to  detect in open water and were often used at night or painted blue and used  during the day, becoming virtually impossible to see. Traffickers have also  used “mother ships” in concert with fishing vessels to transport illicit  drugs into open waters and then distribute the load among smaller boats  at sea. In addition, traffickers have used evasive maritime routes and  changed them frequently. Some boats have traveled as far southwest as  the Galapagos Islands in the Pacific Ocean before heading north toward  Mexico, while others travel through Central America’s littoral waters,  close to shore, where they could hide among legitimate maritime traffic.  Furthermore, the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South),  under DOD’s U.S. Southern Command, reported an increase in suspicious  flights—particularly departing from Venezuela. Traffickers have flown  loads of cocaine to remote, ungoverned spaces and abandoned the planes  after landing. Traffickers have also used increasingly sophisticated  concealment methods. For example, they have built fiberglass  semisubmersible craft that could avoid both visual- and sonar-detection,  hidden cocaine within the hulls of boats, and transported liquefied cocaine  in fuel tanks.
According to DOD officials, these shifts in drug trafficking patterns and  methods have likely taken place largely in response to U.S. and  international counternarcotics efforts in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean,  although measuring causes and effects is imprecise. In addition, according  to DOD, drug trafficking organizations and associated criminal networks  commonly enjoy greater financial and material resources (including  weapons as well as communication, navigation, and other technologies)  than do governments in the transit zone.
In addition to maritime operations, drug trafficking organizations have  adopted increasingly sophisticated smuggling techniques on the ground.  For example, from 2000 to 2006, U.S. border officials found 45 tunnels— several built primarily for narcotics smuggling. According to DEA and  Defense Intelligence Agency officials, the tunnels found were longer,  deeper, and more discrete than in prior years. One such tunnel found in  2006 was a half-mile long. It was the longest cross border tunnel  discovered, reaching a depth of more than nine stories below ground and  featuring ventilation and groundwater drainage systems, cement flooring,  lighting, and a pulley system.
In production countries, such as Colombia, drug producers also proved to  be highly adaptive. In 2009 we reported that coca farmers adopted a  number of effective countermeasures to U.S. supported eradication and  aerial spray efforts. These measures included pruning coca plants after  spraying; replanting with younger coca plants or plant grafts; decreasing  the size of coca plots; interspersing coca with legitimate crops to avoid  detection; moving coca cultivation to areas of the country off-limits to  spray aircraft, such as the national parks and a 10 kilometer area along  Colombia’s border with Ecuador; and moving coca crops to more remote  parts of the country—a development that created a “dispersal effect.”  While these measures allowed coca farmers to continue cultivation, they  also increased the coca farmers and traffickers’ cost of doing business.
section_title: Counternarcotics Initiatives Have Been Closely Aligned with Broad U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives
paragraphs: U.S. counternarcotics programs have been closely aligned with the  achievement of other U.S. foreign policy goals. U.S. assistance under Plan  Colombia is a key example where counternarcotic goals and foreign policy  objectives intersect. While, as of 2007, Plan Colombia had not clearly  attained its cocaine supply reduction goals, the country did improve its  security climate through systematic military and police engagements with  illegal armed groups and degradation of these group’s finances. Colombia  saw a significant drop in homicides and kidnappings and increased use of  Colombian public roads during Plan Colombia’s six years. In addition,  insurgency groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia  (FARC) saw a decline in capabilities and finances. While these  accomplishments have not necessarily led to a decrease in drug  production and trafficking, they signaled an improved security climate,  which is one of the pillars of Plan Colombia.
In Afghanistan, we recently reported that the U.S. counternarcotics  strategy has become more integrated with the broad counterinsurgency  effort over time. Prior to 2008, counterinsurgency and counternarcotics  policies were largely separated and officials noted that this division  ignored a nexus between the narcotics trade and the insurgency. For  example, DEA drug raids yielded weapons caches and explosives used by  insurgents, as well as suspects listed on Defense military target lists, and  military raids on insurgent compounds also yielded illicit narcotics and  narcotics processing equipment. DOD changed its rules of engagement in  November 2008 to permit the targeting of persons by the military  (including drug traffickers) who provide material support to insurgent or  terrorist groups. Additionally, in December 2008, DOD clarified its policy  to allow the military to accompany and provide force protection to U.S.  and host nation law enforcement personnel on counternarcotics field  operations. DEA and DOD officials stated that these changes enabled  higher levels of interdiction operations in areas previously inaccessible  due to security problems. DEA conducted 82 interdiction operations in  Afghanistan during fiscal year 2009 (compared with 42 in fiscal year 2008),  often with support from U.S. military and other coalition forces. These  operations include, among other things, raiding drug laboratories;  destroying storage sites; arresting drug traffickers; conducting roadblock  operations; and seizing chemicals and drugs. The U.S. military and  International Security and Assistance Force are also targeting narcotics  trafficking and processing as part of regular counterinsurgency  operations. In addition, DEA efforts to build the Counternarcotics Police  of Afghanistan (CNPA) has contributed to the goals of heightening  security in Afghanistan. The DEA has worked with specialized units of the  CNPA to conduct investigations, build cases, arrest drug traffickers, and  conduct undercover drug purchases, while also working to build Afghan  law enforcement capacity by mentoring CNPA specialized units. By  putting pressure on drug traffickers, counternarcotics efforts can bring  stabilization to areas subject to heavy drug activity.
Many counternarcotics-related programs involve supporting democracy  and the rule of law in partner nations, which is itself a U.S. foreign policy  objective worldwide. In Colombia , assistance for rule of law and judicial  reform have expanded access to the democratic process for Colombian  citizens, including the consolidation of state authority and the established  government institutions and public services in many areas reclaimed from  illegal armed groups. Support for legal institutions, such as courts,  attorneys general, and law enforcement organizations, in drug source and  transit countries is not only an important part of the U.S. counternarcotic  strategy but also advance State’s strategic objectives relating to  democracy and governance.
section_title: Judging the Effectiveness of Some Counternarcotics- Related Programs is Difficult
paragraphs: In many of our reviews of international counternarcotic-related programs,  we found that determining program effectiveness has been challenging.  Performance measures and other information about program results were  often not useful or comprehensive enough to assess progress in achieving  program goals.
subsections: section_title: Existing Performance Measures and Results Reporting Are Often Not Useful for Assessing Progress in Achieving Program Goals
paragraphs: The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal  agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in achieving  their goals and to communicate their results to the Congress. The act  requires agencies to set multiyear strategic goals in their strategic plans  and corresponding annual goals in their performance plans, measure  performance toward the achievement of those goals, and report on their  progress in their annual performance reports. These reports are intended  to provide important information to agency managers, policymakers, and  the public on what each agency accomplished with the resources it was  given. Moreover, the act calls for agencies to develop performance goals  that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable, and to establish  performance measures that adequately indicate progress toward achieving  those goals. Our previous work has noted that the lack of clear,  measurable goals makes it difficult for program managers and staff to link  their day-to-day efforts to achieving the agency’s intended mission.
subsections: section_title: Performance Measures Established for Afghanistan Do Not Reflect the Full Impact of Counternarcotics Programs
paragraphs: In Afghanistan, we have reported that the use of poppy cultivation and  eradication statistics as the principal measures of effectiveness does not  capture all aspects of the counternarcotics effort in the country. For  example, these measures overlook potential gains in security from the  removal of drug operations from an area and do not take into account  potential rises in other drug related activity such as trafficking and  processing of opium. Some provinces that are now poppy-free may still  contain high levels of drug trafficking or processing. Additionally,  according to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the  use of opium poppy cultivation as a measure of overall success led to an  over-emphasis on eradication activities, which, due to their focus on  farmers, could undermine the larger counterinsurgency campaign. ONDCP  officials also criticized using total opium poppy cultivation as the sole  measure of success, stating that measures of success should relate to  security, such as public safety and terrorist attacks.
section_title: Alternative Development Performance Measures in Colombia Do Not Capture Programs’ Effect on Drug Supply
paragraphs: For Plan Colombia, several programs we reviewed were focused on root  causes of the drug problem and their impact on drug activity was difficult  to assess. In 2008 we reported that the United States provided nearly $1.3  billion for nonmilitary assistance in Colombia, focusing on economic and  social progress and the rule of law, including judicial reform. The largest  share of U.S. nonmilitary assistance went toward alternative development,  which has been a key element of U.S. counternarcotics assistance and has  reportedly improved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Colombians.  Other social programs have assisted thousands of internally displaced  persons and more than 30,000 former combatants. We reported that  progress tracking of alternative development programs, in particular,  needed improvement. USAID collected data on 15 indicators that measure  progress on alternative development; however, none of these indicators  measured progress toward USAID’s goal of reducing illicit narcotics  production through the creation of sustainable economic projects. Rather,  USAID collected data on program indicators such as the number of  families benefited and hectares of legal crops planted. While this  information helps USAID track the progress of projects, it does not help  with assessing USAID’s progress in reducing illicit crop production or its  ability to create sustainable projects.
section_title: State Does Not Measure Performance or Report Results for Most Transit Zone Programs
paragraphs: In 2008 we reported that U.S.-funded transit zone counternarcotics  assistance encompasses a wide variety of initiatives across many  countries, but State and other agencies have collected limited information  on results. Records we obtained from State and DEA, including State’s  annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports and End Use  Monitoring Reports, provide information on outcomes of some of these  initiatives but do not do so comprehensively. For example, in our review  of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports for 2003 to  2007, we identified over 120 counternarcotics initiatives in the countries  we reviewed, but for over half of these initiatives, the outcomes were  unclear or not addressed at all in the reports. State has attempted to  measure the outcomes of counternarcotics programs in its annual mission  performance reports, which report on a set of performance indicators for  each country. However, these indicators have not been consistent over  time or among countries. In our review of mission performance reports for  four major drug transit countries covering fiscal years 2002 through 2006,  we identified 86 performance indicators directly and indirectly related to  counternarcotics efforts; however, over 60 percent of these indicators  were used in only one or two annual reporting cycles, making it difficult to  discern performance trends over time. Moreover, nearly 80 percent of  these performance indicators were used for only one country, making it  difficult to compare program results among countries.
section_title: DOD and DEA Performance Measures Do Not Reflect the Results of Key Efforts
paragraphs: Based on our report on DOD performance measures released today, we  found that DOD has developed performance measures for its  counternarcotics activities as well as a database to collect performance  information, including measures, targets, and results. However, we have  found that these performance measures lacked a number of the attributes  that we consider key to being successful, such as being clearly stated and  having measurable targets. It is also unclear to what extent DOD uses the  performance information it collects through its database to manage its  counternarcotics activities.
In 2008, we reported that DEA’s strategic planning and performance  measurement framework, while improved over previous efforts, had not  been updated and did not reflect some key new and ongoing efforts. While  DEA had assisted in counterterrorism efforts through information  collection and referrals to intelligence community partners, DEA’s  strategic plan had not been updated since 2003 to reflect these efforts. As  such, the strategic plan did not fully reflect the intended purpose of  providing a template for ensuring measurable results and operational  accountability. The performance measures that were to be included in  DEA’s 2009 annual performance report did not provide a basis for  assessing the results of DEA’s counterterrorism efforts—efforts that  include giving top priority to counternarcotics cases with links to  terrorism and pursuing narcoterrorists.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: We have made many recommendations in past reports regarding  counternarcotics programs. Several of our more recent recommendations  were aimed at improving two key management challenges that I have  discussed in my testimony today—planning for the sustainment of  counternarcotics assets and assessing the effectiveness of  counternarcotics-related programs.
Improved planning for sustainment of counternarcotics assets. In  our 2008 report on U.S. assistance to transit zone countries, we  recommended that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the  Secretary of Defense (1) develop a plan to ensure that partner nations in  the transit zone could effectively operate and maintain all  counternarcotics assets that the United States had provided, including  boats and other vehicles and equipment, for their remaining useful life and  (2) ensure that, before providing a counternarcotics asset to a partner  nation, agencies determined the total operations and maintenance cost  over its useful life and, with the recipient nation, develop a plan for  funding this cost.
More consistent results reporting. In our report on U.S. assistance to  transit zone countries, we recommended that the Secretary of State, in  consultation with the Director of ONDCP, the Secretaries of Defense and  Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Administrator of  USAID, report the results of U.S.-funded counternarcotics initiatives more  comprehensively and consistently for each country in the annual  International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.
Improved performance measures. Several agencies we reviewed did  not have sufficient performance measures in place to accurately assess the  effectiveness of counternarcotics programs. In our DOD report released  today, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take steps to improve  DOD’s counternarcotics performance measurement system by (1) revising  its performance measures, and (2) applying practices to better facilitate  the use of performance data to manage its counternarcotics activities. For  Colombia, we recommended that the Director of Foreign Assistance and  Administrator of USAID develop performance measurements that will help  USAID (1) assess whether alternative development assistance is reducing  the production of illicit narcotics, and (2) determine to what extent the  agency’s alternative development projects are self-sustaining. The  existence of such measures would allow for a greater comprehension of  program effectiveness. For Afghanistan, we recommended that the  Secretary of Defense develop performance targets to measure interim  results of efforts to train the CNPA. We also recommended to the  Secretary of the State that measures and interim targets be adopted to  assess Afghan capacity to independently conduct public information  activities. Lastly, we recommended that the Secretary of State, in  consultation with the Administrator of DEA and the Attorney General,  establish clear definitions for low-, mid-, and high-level traffickers that  would improve the ability of the U.S. and Afghan governments to track the  level of drug traffickers arrested and convicted.
In most cases, the agencies involved have generally agreed with our  recommendations and have either implemented them or have efforts  underway to address them.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, this concludes my prepared  statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Drug Control: Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts.  GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Washington, D.C. February 27, 1997.
Drug Control: U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts Face Difficult  Challenges. GAO/NSIAD-98-154. Washington D.C., June 30, 1998.
Drug Control: Narcotics Threat From Colombia Continues to Grow.  GAO/NSIAD-99-136. Washington D.C., June 22, 1999.
Drug Control: Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply  Have Declined. GAO/NSIAD-00-9. Washington D.C., December 21, 1999  Drug Control: U.S. Efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean.  GAO/NSIAD-00-90R. Washington D.C., February 18, 2000.
Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce  Results. GAO-01-126. Washington D.C., October 17, 2000.
International Counterdrug Sites Being Developed. GAO-01-63BR.  Washington D.C., December 28, 2000.
Drug Control: State Department Provides Required Aviation Program  Oversight, but Safety and Security Should be Enhanced. GAO-01-1021.  Washington D.C., September 14, 2001.
Drug Control: Difficulties in Measuring Costs and Results of Transit Zone  Interdiction Efforts. GAO-02-13. January 25, 2002.
Drug Control: Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit Crops in  Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles.  GAO-02-291. Washington D.C., February 8, 2002.
Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia.  GAO-03-319R. Washington D.C., January 8, 2003.
Drug Control: Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term Costs for  U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not Been Developed. GAO-03-783.  Washington, D.C., June 16, 2003.
Drug Control: Aviation Program Safety Concerns in Colombia Are Being  Addressed, but State’s Planning and Budgeting Process Can Be Improved.  GAO-04-918. Washington D.C., July 29, 2004.
Drug Control: Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has Implemented  New Safeguards, but Its Effect on Drug Trafficking Is Not Clear.  GAO-05-970. Washington, D.C., September 6, 2005.
Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug  Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit  Zone Operations. GAO-06-200. Washington, D.C., November 15, 2005.
Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating  Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals. GAO-07-78. Washington D.C.,  November 15, 2006.
State Department: State Has Initiated a More Systematic Approach for  Managing Its Aviation Fleet. GAO-07-264. Washington D.C., February 2,  2007.
Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotic  Efforts, But Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow into the United States.  GAO-07-1018. Washington D.C., August 17, 2007.
Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics  Efforts, But the Flow of Illicit Drugs Into the United States Remains High.  GAO-08-215T. Washington D.C., October 25, 2007.
Drug Control: Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries Has  Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are  Needed. GAO-08-784. Washington D.C., July 15, 2008.
Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security  Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing  Assistance. GAO-09-71. Washington D.C., October 6, 2008.
Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland  Security and An Updated Accountability Framework Can Further Enhance  DEA’s Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities. GAO-09-63. Washington  D.C., March 20, 2009.
Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to  Rebuilding Efforts Should be Addressed in U.S. Strategies. GAO-09-476T.  Washington D.C., March 25, 2009.
Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Cooperation with Venezuela Has  Declined. GAO-09-806. Washington D.C., July 20, 2009.
Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative. GAO-10-235R. Washington D.C.,  December 3, 2009.
Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but  Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts  Needed. GAO-10-291. Washington D.C., March 9, 2010.
Preliminary Observations on the Department of Defense’s  Counternarcotics Performance Measurement System. GAO-10-594R.  Washington, D.C., April 30, 2010.
Drug Control: DOD Needs to Improve Its Performance Measurement  System to Better Manage and Oversee Its Counternarcotic Activities.  GAO-10-835. Washington, D.C., July 21, 2010.
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