Civil Support: DOD Is Taking Action to Strengthen Support of Civil Authorities
Published: 2015-06-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Threats to the homeland and major disasters and emergencies, such as hurricanes and wildfires, are frequently unpredictable or occur with little or no notice. DOD is often expected to play a prominent role supporting civil authorities and must be prepared to provide rapid response when called upon during disasters and declared emergencies (both natural and man-made). DOD also must provide support for restoring public health and services and civil order; support for national special security events; and periodic planned support. DOD provides this support to the American people through its defense support of civil authorities mission.
In this statement, GAO describes progress DOD has made in implementing recommendations to strengthen (1) DOD's strategy, plans, and guidance; (2) interagency coordination; and, (3) capabilities to support civil authorities. This testimony is primarily based on GAO products issued from March 2010 through December 2014 that examined DOD's support of civil authorities mission. In June 2015 GAO obtained selected updates about DOD's support of civil authorities mission.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken action to address GAO's prior recommendations to strengthen its strategy, plans and guidance for support of civil authorities. As GAO has reported, clear, current, and complete strategies, plans, and guidance are important for reflecting the direction of the department's leadership, defining DOD policies and responsibilities, and sharing practices that could facilitate effective support of civil authorities. In October 2012, GAO found DOD had not developed guidance for the use of dual-status commanders (active-duty military or National Guard officers who were authorized to command both state and federal personnel) for incidents affecting multiple states and territories. For example, DOD had no specific criteria and conditions for when and how state governors and the Secretary of Defense would mutually appoint a commander. In September 2013, GAO found that DOD did not have a clear command-and-control structure for managing complex catastrophes across multiple states because DOD had not identified roles, responsibilities, and relationships among command elements. GAO recommended in both reports that DOD update and implement better guidance. DOD has partially addressed GAO's recommendations by updating its strategy and guidance, and the department is drafting an instruction on dual-status commanders.
DOD also has taken action to address GAO's prior recommendations to strengthen the department's interagency coordination. It is critical that DOD proactively and regularly engage with a broad range of interagency partners it may need to support, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Customs and Border Protection. Previously, GAO has reported on three areas DOD can focus on to enhance interagency coordination: clearly defining roles and responsibilities, communicating DOD's approach toward interagency partners, and implementing key practices for managing liaisons with partners. GAO found that roles and responsibilities for support to law enforcement—including Joint Task Force-North, which provides civil support along U.S. borders—were unclear. GAO also found that DOD did not have complete situational awareness of 110 liaisons detailed to the Department of Homeland Security headquarters. To improve interagency coordination, GAO recommended that DOD issue and update civil-support guidance. Subsequently, DOD addressed GAO's recommendations by issuing a series of guidance and other documents, such as the 2011 Interagency Partner Guide.
Additionally, DOD has taken action to address GAO's prior recommendations to improve its identification of capabilities for support of civil authorities. In the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review , DOD notes that the key pillar of protecting the homeland includes sustaining capabilities to assist U.S. civil authorities. In 2013, GAO found two combatant commands had not identified civil-support capabilities because they were waiting until FEMA completed planning efforts in 2018. GAO recommended that DOD develop an interim set of specific capabilities that could be provided to prepare for and respond to complex catastrophes. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation and DOD officials reported in June 2015 that Northern Command and Pacific Command had updated their plans to incorporate complex catastrophes, including identifying capabilities that would be available to the lead federal agency during such an event.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO previously made recommendations to help DOD address management challenges or gaps in guidance regarding support of civil authorities. In response, the agency has taken some steps and plans to do more.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss progress and challenges in the  Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to serve the American people  through its defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) mission. The  United States continues to face an uncertain, complex security  environment with the potential for major disasters and emergencies, such  as Hurricane Sandy in 2012. The 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense  and Defense Support of Civil Authorities recognizes DOD is often  expected to play a prominent role supporting civil authorities and must be  prepared to provide rapid response when called upon. DOD must  coordinate with a number of other agencies on its civil support mission,  which include providing support during disasters and declared  emergencies (both natural and man-made); providing support for  restoring public health and services and civil order; providing support for  national special security events; and periodic planned support. Examples  of such DOD coordination with civil authorities include aiding the  identification and interdiction of suspected transnational criminal  organizations’ activities conducted within and along the approaches to the  continental United States; assisting the Federal Emergency Management  Agency (FEMA) during the annual hurricane season; assisting the  Department of Transportation after the I-35 bridge collapse in Minnesota  in 2007; and supporting the U.S. Secret Service regarding Presidential  inaugurations. In these and other events, DOD offered a broad array of  resources that were developed for its warfighting mission but were  brought to bear when civilian-response capabilities were overwhelmed or  exhausted—or in instances where DOD offered unique capabilities.
In an effort to facilitate defense support of civil authorities across the  nation and at all organizational levels, DOD has assigned responsibilities  within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (such as the Office of the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global  Security), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, various combatant commands (such  as Northern Command and Pacific Command), the National Guard  Bureau, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Defense Logistics  Agency, joint task forces (such as Joint Task Force-North), the  intelligence agencies (such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence  Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency), and regional interagency  liaisons (such as the Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency  Preparedness Liaison Officers).
My testimony is based on reports we issued from March 2010 through  December 2014 that examined DOD’s DSCA mission, and discusses  DOD’s progress in implementing recommendations that we made to  strengthen (1) DOD’s strategy, plans, and guidance documents; (2)  interagency coordination; and, (3) capabilities to support civil authorities.
This statement is based on the following reports that are cited throughout and include  GAO, Emergency Preparedness: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Interagency  Assessments and Accountability for Closing Capability Gaps, GAO-15-20 (Washington,  D.C.: Dec. 4, 2014); Civil Support: Actions Are Needed to Improve DOD’s Planning for a  Complex Catastrophe, GAO-13-763 (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 30, 2013); Homeland  Defense: DOD Needs to Address Gaps in Homeland Defense and Civil Support  Guidance, GAO-13-128 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2012); Homeland Defense: DOD Can  Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities during Disasters,  GAO-10-386 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010); and, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to  Take Actions to Enhance Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil  Support Missions, GAO-10-364 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010).
This statement includes selected updates that we conducted in June  2015 on DOD’s DSCA mission. Our reports contained information that we  obtained from reviewing and analyzing relevant DOD documents,  including the 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support  of Civil Authorities; The DOD Cyber Strategy from 2015; Northern  Command and Pacific Command planning documents; DOD directives,  instructions, and doctrine; and Northern Command capability  assessments. We also conducted interviews with DOD officials within the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant commands,  military services, defense agencies, and Reserve officials. We also  conducted interviews with other federal officials from organizations such  as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FEMA, Customs and  Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Federal  Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, Centers for Disease  Control and Prevention, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and  officials located in the El Paso Intelligence Center. More detailed  information about our scope and methodology can be found in our  reports. For the updates, we collected information from DOD officials on  actions the department has taken to address findings and  recommendations made in our prior reports. The work upon which this  testimony is based was conducted in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: DOD Continues to Take Action to Strengthen Its DSCA Strategy, Plans, and Guidance
paragraphs: Since 2010, DOD has taken action to address many of
DOD updated its strategy and doctrine for civil support. In 2010,  and then again in 2012, we found that DOD’s 2005 Strategy for  Homeland Defense and Civil Support had not been updated to reflect  the current environment in which DOD supports civil authorities. For  example, while the strategy primarily discusses DOD’s DSCA mission  in the context of the department’s response to a weapon of mass  destruction—DOD’s primary focus after the 2001 terrorist attacks—it  did not address the breadth of DSCA missions that DOD must be  prepared to support subsequent to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Based  on our recommendation that DOD should update its strategy, in  February 2013 DOD issued an updated Strategy for Homeland  Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. In this update, DOD  acknowledged that national security threats, hazards, vulnerabilities,  strategic guidance, and political and economic factors had evolved  since the 2005 strategy, and recognized that its support to civil  authorities included a broader set of missions—to include catastrophic  natural or man-made disasters, pre-planned National Special Security  Events (like summits and high-profile sports events), cyberattacks,  and the southwest border counterdrug efforts. We also reported in  2012 that DOD had not updated its joint publication for DSCA and  recommended that the department needed to do so. DOD agreed with  our recommendation and in July 2013, DOD updated its joint  publication for Defense Support for Civil Authorities. In this update, among other things, DOD described more fully the National Response  Framework, which is a framework based on a tiered, graduated  response to major disasters and emergencies where incidents are  managed at the lowest jurisdictional level and are supported by  additional response capabilities, as needed.
DOD has reported that it has updated its DSCA plans. In  September 2013, we found that DOD did not have a clear  command-and-control structure for federal military services during  complex catastrophes. We found that DOD had not identified the  roles, responsibilities, and relationships among command elements  that may be involved in responding to such incidents across multiple  states. This issue was illustrated by events such as National Level  Exercise 2011 that examined DOD’s response to a complex  catastrophe. Similarly, DOD’s after-action reports on Hurricane Sandy  in 2012 found that the command-and-control structure for federal  military forces was not clearly defined, resulting in the degradation of  situational awareness and unity of effort, and the execution of  missions without proper approval. Northern Command officials agreed  with our findings and stated that they would address this issue and the  associated recommendation we made in our report by updating their  DSCA plans. As of June 2015, DOD reported that Northern Command  and Pacific Command had updated their DSCA plans to address our  recommendation.
DOD implementation guidance on the use of dual-status  commanders is in development. DOD established the dual-status  commander structure—active-duty military or National Guard officers  who command state and federal responses to civil-support incidents  and events—and has used this structure for certain events. For  example, DOD used the dual-status commander structure for the  2012 Colorado wildfire response and the Hurricane Sandy response.  In October 2012, we reported that DOD had not developed guidance  for the use of dual-status commanders for incidents affecting multiple  states and territories. For example, DOD had not developed specific  criteria and conditions for when and how state governors and the  Secretary of Defense would mutually appoint a commander.  Consequently, we recommended and DOD concurred that the  department develop implementation guidance on the use of dual- status commanders. In June 2015, Northern Command officials  reported that an instruction about dual-status commanders was being  drafted in coordination with DOD, Northern Command, and the  National Guard Bureau.
DOD has agreed to take steps to align cyber-support roles and  responsibilities. In October 2012, we found that DOD had not  updated its DSCA guidance, such as joint doctrine, to ensure that it  was consistent with national plans and preparations for domestic  cyber incidents. We recommended that DOD align guidance on  preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents with  national-level guidance to include roles and responsibilities. DOD  partially concurred with this recommendation. However, the  department has not yet taken action that meets the intent of the  recommendation.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Action to Strengthen Interagency Coordination for Support of Civil Authorities
paragraphs: DOD has and continues to take action to address our prior  recommendations to strengthen the department’s interagency  coordination for support of civil authorities. As numerous events within the  homeland in the last decade have pointed out, it is critical that DOD  coordinate, integrate, and synchronize its DSCA mission with a broad  range of interagency partners that the department may need to support.  Such partners can include FEMA, Federal Bureau of Investigation,  Customs and Border Protection, Animal and Plant Health Inspection  Service, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. As we have  previously reported, there are three key areas that DOD needs to focus  on to enhance and institutionalize its interagency coordination efforts.  DOD has since taken action to address these areas:
DOD has better defined interagency roles and responsibilities.  Previous GAO work, the National Response Framework, and DOD  strategic guidance identify the need for clearly defined roles and  responsibilities to enhance interagency coordination. In our 2010  review of DOD’s interagency coordination efforts, we found that the  key documents used to define roles and responsibilities were  outdated, not fully integrated, or were not comprehensive. We found  that DOD’s series of civil-support policies and guidance, such as a  1997 DOD directive on military assistance to civil authorities, were  outdated and did not reflect changes that occurred subsequent to their  issuance. For example, the guidance documents did not refer to DHS,  the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland  Defense, Northern Command, or roles and responsibilities under the  National Response Framework. Similarly, we found that roles and  responsibilities for support to law enforcement—including Joint Task  Force-North, which provides defense support of civilian law  enforcement agencies along U.S. borders—were unclear as were the  roles and responsibilities between the Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Health Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Homeland Defense. Consequently, we recommended and DOD  concurred that the department should update key documents that  outline roles and responsibilities. Subsequently, DOD has, for the  most part, issued new guidance documents or updated older  guidance to better define roles and responsibilities within the  department for interagency coordination.
DOD has issued an interagency partner guide. DOD’s joint  doctrine on interagency coordination and support of civil authorities  notes that a unified “whole-of-government” approach to national  security issues requires federal partner agencies to understand core  competencies, roles, and missions and that sharing information is  critical for the success of interagency coordination between federal  agencies. To support interagency coordination on DSCA, DOD has  taken action to communicate with its federal partners through  conferences and other forums and multiple documents. In our 2010  review of DOD’s interagency coordination efforts, we found that  DOD’s approach to communicating with federal partners could be  improved, and the department had not clearly identified the roles and  responsibilities and day-to-day coordination processes with its federal  partners through a single, readily accessible source. Specifically,  DOD, DHS, and the Department of Justice officials told us that the  benefits gained through interagency forums, such as Homeland  Security Council meetings and annual National Interagency Fire  Center conferences, are transient because they depend on personnel  who rotate out of their positions frequently. The National Interagency  Fire Center had addressed this challenge by creating a partner  handbook that identified key information. DOD had not developed a  similar vehicle for institutionalizing its information sharing efforts so  that federal partners could maintain knowledge and have readily  accessible information about key issues, such as the different DOD  entities that have DSCA missions. For those cases where DOD  internally documented its missions, roles, and responsibilities, we  found the information was dispersed among multiple sources; also,  the documents may not have always been readily accessible to  federal partners, and they may have been written in a manner that led  to unclear expectations. Therefore, we recommended that DOD  develop and issue a partner guide that identifies the roles and  responsibilities of DOD entities, processes, and agreed-upon  approaches for interagency coordination for homeland defense and  civil-support efforts. DOD concurred with our recommendation and, in  November 2011, issued its Defense Support of Civil Authorities  Interagency Partner Guide.
DOD has taken action to implement key practices for managing  some liaisons the department exchanges with its federal  partners. Prior GAO reports and DOD guidance recognize that  leading organizations employ key practices for effective and efficient  workforce planning, such as situational awareness, staffing-needs  assessments, position descriptions, training, and performance  assessments. However, in our 2010 report, we found that DOD had  not implemented such key practices. For example, DOD did not  have complete situational awareness of all the liaisons detailed to its  interagency partners. According to DOD records, in 2009, there were  only 2 DOD personnel at DHS headquarters—yet an informal survey  by the representative for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Homeland Defense to DHS found that more than 110  DOD personnel, from a variety of DOD entities, were working at DHS  as liaisons, subject-matter experts, or in other capacities.we recommended and DOD agreed that DOD develop and issue  additional workforce management policy and guidance regarding  DOD liaisons to other federal agencies, as well as other federal  agencies’ liaisons to DOD. In October 2013, the Deputy Secretary of  Defense and the Acting Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security   Therefore,  signed an updated memorandum of agreement that outlines ways in  which DOD and DHS will incorporate key practices for managing  liaisons in the national capital region.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Action to Identify Needs and Address Capability Gaps Regarding Its Support of Civil Authorities
paragraphs: In response to our prior recommendations, DOD has taken action to  identify needs and address capability gaps for its DSCA mission. In the  2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD notes that the key pillar of  protecting the homeland includes sustaining capabilities to assist U.S.  civil authorities in protecting U.S. airspace, shores, and borders, and in  responding effectively to domestic man-made and natural disasters. In  2008, DOD conducted a capabilities-based assessment of its homeland  defense and civil support missions to enable improvements for DOD  homeland defense and civil-support policy, evaluate existing DOD  capabilities and identify capability gaps, improve DOD’s integration with  interagency mission partners, and recommend further action to promote  future capability development. In 2010, we found that DOD and DHS had  undertaken initiatives to address gaps in strategic planning that should  assist DOD in identifying its capability requirements for the DSCA  mission. For example, DOD and DHS issued catastrophic plans for  responding to and recovering from a category 4 hurricane in Hawaii. In  addition, DHS had established a pilot initiative entitled Task Force for  Emergency Readiness pilot initiative that sought to integrate federal and  state planning efforts for catastrophic events, which in turn would assist  DOD in determining the capabilities it may be asked to provide. However,  we found that DOD’s DSCA policy and guidance was outdated, which  limited DOD’s ability to address capability gaps. We therefore made a  recommendation and DOD concurred that the department should update  its DSCA guidance. Since then, DOD has updated or replaced several  DSCA guidance documents, such as DOD Directive 3025.18. By  updating this guidance, DOD addressed our recommendation and DOD is  in a better position to address remaining capability gaps.
Additionally, we found in 2013 that DOD had not taken all of the  necessary steps to identify capabilities for DSCA. Specifically, we found  that Northern Command and Pacific Command were updating their DSCA  plans to include a scenario for a complex catastrophe; however, the  commands delayed identification of capabilities that could be provided to  execute the plans in light of FEMA’s plan to complete its regional planning  efforts in 2018. We recommended that the commanders work through the  defense coordinating officers to develop an interim set of specific  capabilities that could be provided to prepare for and respond to complex  catastrophes while FEMA completes its plans. DOD concurred with our  recommendation and, in May 2014, according to DOD officials, Northern  Command and Pacific Command had updated their plans to incorporate  complex catastrophes, including identifying capabilities that would be  available to the lead federal agency during such an event. Specifically,  DOD officials told us, in June 2015, that planning had been completed,  covering issues such as complex catastrophes; wildland firefighting; and  chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response. Additionally,  DOD officials told us that future planning efforts will include additional  branch plans addressing issues such as pandemic influenza and  infectious diseases and civil disturbance operations.
Under the National Response Framework, the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers serves as the coordinator for the ‘Public Works and  Engineering’ emergency support function—1 of 14 emergency support  functions that serve as the federal government’s primary coordinating  structure for building, sustaining, and delivering response capabilities.The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in its emergency support function  coordinator role, is responsible for engaging in appropriate planning and  preparedness activities, which could include establishing capability  requirements, cataloguing current capabilities, and conducting capability  gap analyses that might be needed if the federal government is asked to  support local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area government  response operations during a disaster. In a recent assessment of the  federal preparedness to respond to no-notice catastrophic disasters, such  as improvised nuclear device attacks and major earthquakes, we found  that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had taken an insular approach to  identifying, cataloguing, and analyzing gaps for public works and  engineering capabilities. Since we concluded that the U.S. Army Corps  of Engineers’ actions—as well as actions by other non-DOD agencies  that serve as coordinators for different emergency support functions— were attributable to unclear guidance, and recommended that FEMA  issue supplemental guidance to the agencies that serve as coordinators  for the different emergency support functions.recommendation and estimated that it would complete this supplemental  guidance by June 30, 2015.
In conclusion, threats to the homeland and major disasters and  emergencies, such as cyber attacks and earthquakes, frequently are  unpredictable or occur with little or no notice. DOD’s 2014 Quadrennial  Defense Review emphasizes protecting the homeland, including deterring  and defeating attacks on the United States and supporting civil authorities  in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters, as the  first of the defense strategy’s three pillars. DOD has made significant  progress in improving strategy, plans, and guidance; interagency  coordination; and capabilities needed for DSCA. Our work also shows  that there remains room for improvement and that DOD recognizes this  and intends to fully address the remaining recommendations from our  prior reports. We continue to believe that their implementation will  buttress the advanced planning and interagency coordination effort DOD  requires to support civil authorities in responding to the myriad threats  and challenges we face. On that note, looking ahead, we will continue to  monitor and evaluate (1) DOD’s cyber civil support, (2) the status of the  homeland response forces, (3) DOD’s preparedness for civil support in  the event of a pandemic, and (4) coordination with federal agencies to  counter improvised explosive devices in the United States.
Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and members of the  subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I am happy to  answer any questions you may have.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you or your staff have any questions about this statement, please  contact me at (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key  contributions to this statement include Tommy Baril (Assistant Director),  Jennifer Andreone, Gina Flacco, Brent Helt, Amber Lopez Roberts,  Randy Neice, Richard Powelson, and Bethann Ritter Snyder. Elizabeth  Morris, Terry Richardson, Jennifer Spence, Michael Willems, and John  Van Schaik provided additional support.
section_title: Related GAO Reports
paragraphs: Emergency Preparedness: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Interagency  Assessments and Accountability for Closing Capability Gaps. GAO-15-20.  Washington, D.C.: December 4, 2014.
Civil Support: Actions Are Needed to Improve DOD’s Planning for a  Complex Catastrophe. GAO-13-763. Washington, D.C.: September 30,  2013.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Address Gaps in Homeland Defense  and Civil Support Guidance. GAO-13-128. Washington, D.C.: October 24,  2012.
Border Security: Observations on Costs, Benefits, and Challenges of a  Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land  Border. GAO-12-657T. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2012.
Homeland Defense and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Steps  Could Enhance the Effectiveness of the National Guard’s Life-Saving  Response Forces. GAO-12-114. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 2011.
Justice and Law Enforcement: Observations on the Costs and Benefits of  an Increased Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the  Southwest Land Border. GAO-11-856R. Washington, D.C.: September  12, 2011.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic,  Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness.  GAO-11-621. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2011.
Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to  Support Civil Authorities During Disasters. GAO-10-386. Washington,  D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency  Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions.  GAO-10-364. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise  Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be  Improved. GAO-09-849. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but  Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other  Issues. GAO-08-251. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.
Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern  Command’s Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau, but  Gaps Remain. GAO-08-252. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.
Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil  Support Missions May Depend on DOD’s Implementation of the 2008  National Defense Authorization Act. GAO-08-311. Washington, D.C.: April  16, 2008.
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