Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Key Emergency Response Facilities Could Be Strengthened
Published: 2007-11-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains emergency response capabilities and assets to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological threats in the United States. These capabilities are primarily found at DOE's two key emergency response facilities--the Remote Sensing Laboratories at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. These capabilities took on increased significance after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because of heightened concern that terrorists may try to detonate a nuclear or radiological device in a major U.S. city. DOE is not the only federal agency responsible for addressing nuclear and radiological threats. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for preparing the country to prevent and respond to a potential nuclear or radiological attack. This testimony discusses (1) the benefits of using DOE's aerial background radiation surveys to enhance emergency response capabilities and (2) the physical security measures in place at DOE's two key emergency response facilities and whether they are consistent with DOE guidance. It is based on GAO's report on DOE's nuclear and radiological emergency response capabilities, issued in September 2006 (Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could be Strengthened [Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2006]).
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. One of these unique capabilities is the ability to conduct aerial background radiation surveys. These surveys can be used to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, only one major city has been surveyed. Neither DOE nor DHS has mission responsibility for conducting these surveys. DOE and DHS disagree about which department is responsible for informing cities about the surveys, and funding and conducting surveys if cities request them. In the absence of clear mission responsibility, DOE and DHS have not informed cities about the surveys and have not conducted any additional surveys. DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies have been dispersed across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a number of critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and whose loss would significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency. These capabilities include the most highly trained teams for minimizing the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack and the only helicopters and planes than can readily help locate nuclear or radiological devices or measure contamination levels after a radiological attack. Because these capabilities and assets have not been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Energy’s  (DOE) use of aerial background radiation surveys, and physical security  measures at DOE’s two key emergency response facilities. DOE has long  maintained an emergency response capability to quickly respond to  potential nuclear and radiological threats in the United States. This  capability took on increased significance after the attacks of September  11, 2001, because of heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle  nuclear or radiological materials into the United States and detonate a  nuclear or a radiological dispersal device, otherwise known as a dirty  bomb, in a major U.S. city. Detonating either type of device would have  serious consequences for our national and economic interests, including  potentially causing numerous deaths and undermining citizens’ confidence  in the government’s ability to protect the homeland.
To respond to such threats, DOE has developed the technical expertise to  search for and locate potential nuclear and radiological threats in U.S.  cities and also to help minimize the consequences of a radiological  incident by, among other things, measuring the extent of contamination.  One of DOE’s unique capabilities is the ability to conduct aerial  background radiation surveys. Helicopters or planes equipped with  radiation detectors fly over an area and collect information on existing  background radiation sources, such as granite statues in a city or medical  isotopes located at hospitals. This exercise can help DOE establish  baseline radiation levels against which future radiation levels can be  compared in order to more easily detect new radiation sources that may  pose a security or public health threat.
After September 11, 2001, DOE began dispersing its emergency response  capabilities across the country. However, a number of critical capabilities  and assets are primarily concentrated at two key facilities, known as  Remote Sensing Laboratories, located at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada,  and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. These two facilities house, among  other things, specialized search teams that locate and identify nuclear and  radiological devices; planes and helicopters used to measure  contamination; and research and development laboratories that design  specialized equipment. DOE requires that these facilities be adequately  protected with security measures to defend against potential terrorist  attacks.
DOE is not the only federal agency responsible for detecting nuclear and  radiological materials. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a  Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) that is responsible for  developing, testing, and deploying radiation detection equipment to detect  and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials at U.S.  points of entry, such as seaports and border crossings. DNDO is also  responsible for helping state and local governments improve their  capability to detect and identify illicit nuclear and radiological materials.  DHS also provides grants to state and local governments to help them  better prepare and respond to a potential terrorist attack. DHS has  provided $11.6 billion in grants to state and local governments in the last 6  fiscal years—from fiscal years 2002 to 2007. If DHS cannot prevent the  smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials into the United States, it  relies on DOE’s emergency response capabilities to search for and locate  the materials.
For this testimony, you asked us to discuss (1) the benefits of using DOE’s  two key emergency response facilities and whether they are consistent  with DOE guidance and (2) the physical security measures in place at  DOE’s two key emergency response facilities and whether they are  consistent with DOE guidance. My remarks will focus on our September  2006 report on DOE’s nuclear and radiological emergency response  efforts. To update this information, we also collected documentation and  interviewed officials from DOE’s Office of Emergency Response, DHS’s  Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DOE’s Remote Sensing Laboratory at  Nellis Air Force Base, and the Counter Terrorism Bureau of the New York  City Police Department. We conducted our work in November 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOE’s predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), established a  program to prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies in  1974 after an extortionist threatened to detonate a nuclear device in  Boston unless he received $200,000. Even though the threat turned out to  be a hoax, AEC recognized that it lacked the capability to quickly respond  to a nuclear or radiological incident. To address this deficiency, AEC  established the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) to provide  technical assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the  Department of State, which is the lead federal agency for terrorism  response outside the United States. Under the Atomic Energy Act, the FBI  is responsible for investigating illegal activities involving the use of  nuclear materials within the United States, including terrorist threats. The  NEST program was designed to assist the FBI in searching for, identifying,  and deactivating nuclear and radiological devices. However, the  deployments of search teams were large scale and often slow because they  were designed to respond to threats, such as extortion, when there was  time to find the device.
With the threat of nuclear terrorism and the events of September 11, 2001,  DOE’s capabilities have evolved to more rapidly respond to nuclear and  radiological threats. While NEST activities to prevent terrorists from  detonating a nuclear or radiological device remain the core mission, DOE’s  emergency response activities have expanded to include actions to  minimize the consequences of a nuclear or radiological incident. For  example, DOE maintains an aerial capability to detect, measure, and track  radioactive material to determine contamination levels at the site of an  emergency. DOE has used this capability to conduct background radiation  surveys of most nuclear power plants in the country for the Environmental  Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In the event  of an accident at a nuclear power plant, a new radiation survey could be  performed to help determine the location and amount of contamination.
Currently, about 950 scientists, engineers, and technicians from the  national laboratories and the Remote Sensing Laboratories are dedicated  to preventing and responding to a nuclear or radiological threat. In fiscal  year 2006, DOE had a budget of about $100 million for emergency  response activities. Under the National Nuclear Security Administration  (NNSA), the Office of Emergency Response manages DOE’s efforts to  prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that  terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials into the  United States. These materials could be used to produce either an  improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device, known as a  dirty bomb. An improvised nuclear device is a crude nuclear bomb made  with highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Nonproliferation experts  estimate that a successful improvised nuclear device could have yields in  the 10 to 20 kiloton range (the equivalent to 10,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT).  A 20-kiloton yield would be the equivalent of the yield of the bomb that  destroyed Nagasaki and could devastate the heart of a medium-size U.S.  city and result in thousands of casualties and radiation contamination over  a wider area.
A dirty bomb combines conventional explosives, such as dynamite, with  radioactive material, using explosive force to disperse the radioactive  material over a large area, such as multiple city blocks. The extent of  contamination would depend on a number of factors, including the size of  the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material used, and  weather conditions. While much less destructive than an improvised  nuclear device, the dispersed radioactive material could cause radiation  sickness for people nearby and produce serious economic costs and  psychological and social disruption associated with the evacuation and  subsequent cleanup of the contaminated areas. While no terrorists have  detonated a dirty bomb in a city, Chechen separatists placed a canister  containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park in the mid-1990s. Although the  device was not detonated and no radioactive material was dispersed, the  incident demonstrated that terrorists have the capability and willingness  to use radiological materials as weapons of terrorism.
section_title: Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, They Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE nor DHS Has Mission Responsibility for Funding and Conducting Them
paragraphs: There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation  surveys of U.S. cities. Once surveys are complete, they can later be used to  compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats  in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure radiation levels after a  radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts.  Despite the benefits, only one major U.S. city has been surveyed. Since  neither DOE nor DHS has mission responsibility for funding and  conducting surveys, they have not conducted additional surveys nor  informed cities about their benefits.
subsections: section_title: Completing Baseline Aerial Surveys Can Later Help to Detect Radiological Threats in U.S. Cities and Measure Radiation Levels in the Event of a Radiological Attack
paragraphs: DOE can conduct aerial background radiation surveys to record the  location of radiation sources and produce maps showing existing radiation  levels within U.S. cities. Background radiation can come from a variety of  sources, such as rock quarries, granite found in buildings, statues, or  cemeteries; medical isotopes used at hospitals; and areas treated with high  amounts of fertilizer, such as golf courses. DOE uses helicopters mounted  with external radiation detectors and equipped with a global position  system to fly over an area and gather data in a systematic grid pattern.  Figure 1 illustrates a helicopter conducting an aerial survey and collecting  information on radiation sources in a city.
Onboard computers record radiation levels and the position of the  helicopter. This initial, or baseline, survey allows DOE technicians and  scientists to produce maps of a city showing the locations of high  radiation concentrations, also known as “hot spots.” DOE uses helicopters  rather than airplanes because their lower altitude and lower speed permit  a more precise reading. While conducting the baseline survey, DOE  ground teams and law enforcement officials can investigate these hot  spots to determine whether the source of radiation is used for industrial,  medical or other routine purposes. DOE officials told us that this baseline  information would be beneficial for all major cities because law  enforcement officials could immediately investigate any potentially  dangerous nuclear or radiological source and DOE could later use the data  in the event of an emergency to find a device more quickly or assist in  cleanup efforts. For example, in 2002, DOE conducted a survey of the  National Mall in Washington, D.C., just prior to July Fourth celebrations.  Law enforcement officials used the survey to investigate unusual radiation  sources and ensure the Mall area was safe for the public.
Data from the baseline survey would help DOE and law enforcement  detect new radiological threats more quickly. In the event of a dirty-bomb  threat, DOE could conduct a new, or follow-up, survey and compare that  radiation data to the baseline survey data to identify locations with new  sources of radiation. Law enforcement officials looking for a nuclear or  radiological device would focus their attention on these new locations and  might be able to distinguish between pre-existing sources and potential  threats in order to locate a dirty bomb or nuclear device more quickly.  Conducting baseline surveys also provides a training opportunity for DOE  personnel. DOE officials told us that regular deployments helped to keep  job performance standards high for pilots, field detection specialists, and  the technicians who analyze the data.
DOE can also use a baseline radiation survey to assess changes in  radiation levels after a radiological attack to assist with cleanup efforts. A  follow-up survey could be taken afterward to compare changes against the  baseline radiation levels. This information can be used to determine which  areas need to be cleaned and to what levels. In 2004, DOD funded a survey  of the area around the Pentagon in Northern Virginia in order to assist  with cleanup efforts in case of nuclear or radiological attack. While no  study has reliably determined the cleanup costs of a dirty-bomb explosion  in an urban area, DOE estimates that cleaning up after the detonation of a  small to medium-size radiological device may cost tens or even hundreds  of millions of dollars. DOE officials estimated that information from  background radiation surveys could save several million dollars in cleanup  costs because cleanup efforts could be focused on decontaminating  buildings and other areas to pre-existing levels of radiation. Without a  baseline radiation survey, cleanup crews would not know the extent to  which they would have to decontaminate the area. Efforts to completely  clean areas with levels of pre-existing radiation, such as granite buildings  or hospitals, would be wasteful and expensive.
DOE officials cautioned that background radiation surveys have  limitations and cannot be relied upon to detect all nuclear or radiological  devices. Aerial surveys may not be able to detect certain nuclear or well- shielded radiological materials. Weather conditions and the type of  building being surveyed may also reduce the effectiveness of detection  systems. Furthermore, DOE may have to rely on good intelligence to find a  device. Law enforcement officials would need intelligence information to  narrow the search to a specific part of a city. Lastly, according to DOE  officials, baseline background radiation surveys may need to be conducted  periodically because radiation sources may change over time, especially in  urban areas. For example, new construction using granite, the installation  of medical equipment, or the heavy use of fertilizer all could change a  city’s radiation background. Despite these limitations, without baseline  survey information, law enforcement officials may lose valuable time  when searching for nuclear or radiological threats by investigating pre- existing sources of radiation that are not harmful. In addition, if there  were a nuclear or radiological attack, a lack of baseline radiological data  would likely make the cleanup more costly and time consuming.
section_title: DOE Has Conducted a Survey of Only One Major City
paragraphs: In 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked DOE to  survey the New York City metro area. NYPD officials were aware that  DOE had the capability to measure background radiation and locate hot  spots by helicopter because DOE had used this capability at the World  Trade Center site in the days following September 11, 2001. DHS provided  the city with about $30 million in grant money to develop a regional  radiological detection and monitoring system. NYPD decided to spend part  of this money on a complete aerial survey of all five boroughs. DOE  conducted the survey in about 4 weeks in the summer of 2005, requiring  over 100 flight hours to complete at a cost of about $800,000.
According to NYPD officials, the aerial background radiation survey  exceeded their expectations, and they cited a number of significant  benefits that may help them better respond to a radiological incident.  First, NYPD officials said that in the course of conducting the survey, they  identified over 80 locations with unexplained radiological sources. Teams  of NYPD officers accompanied by DOE scientists and technicians  investigated each of these hot spots and determined whether they posed a  danger to the public. While most of these hot spots were medical isotopes  located at medical facilities and hospitals, according to NYPD officials,  awareness of these locations will allow them to distinguish false alarms  from real radiological threats and locate a radiological device more  quickly. Second, NYPD officers are now trained in investigating hot spots  and they have real-life experience in locating radiological sources. Third,  NYPD officials now have a baseline radiological survey of the city to assist  with cleanup efforts in the event of a radiological release.
In addition to identifying potential terrorist threats, a secondary benefit of  the survey was identifying threats to public health. One of the over 80  locations with a radiological signature was a local park that was once the  site of an industrial plant. According to NYPD officials, the survey  disclosed that the soil there was contaminated by large quantities of  radium. Brush fires in the area posed an imminent threat to public health  because traditional fire mitigation tactics of pushing flammable debris into  the middle of the park could release radiological contamination into the  air. Investigating locations with unexplained radiological sources  identified by the aerial background radiation survey alerted NYPD officials  to this threat, and they were able to prevent public exposure to the  material.
Because the extent to which the background radiation of a city changes  over time is not clear, NYPD officials have requested that DHS provide  money to fund a survey every year. With periodic surveys, NYPD hopes to  get a better understanding of how and to what extent background  radiation changes over time. NYPD officials also want to continue  identifying radiological sources in the city and to provide relevant training  to their officers.
section_title: Despite the Benefits, Neither DOE nor DHS Has Mission Responsibility for Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, Which Has Discouraged Both Agencies from Developing a Strategy to Inform Cities about the Surveys
paragraphs: Despite the benefits of aerial background radiation surveys, neither DOE  nor DHS has embraced mission responsibility for funding and conducting  surveys. While DOE and DHS have taken some steps toward making  greater use of aerial surveys, they still have not developed a strategy to  notify city officials that such a capability exists, explained the benefits and  limitations of aerial surveys, and determined how to pay for the surveys.  According to DOE and DHS officials, New York City is the only city where  a background radiation survey has been completed.
As we reported in September 2006, we found that neither DOE nor DHS  was notifying city officials of the potential benefits of aerial surveys or of  the availability of such a capability. In addition, neither department had  evaluated the costs, benefits, or limitations of the aerial surveys to help  cities decide whether to request a survey. As a result, we recommended  that DOE and DHS conduct such an evaluation. After completing this  evaluation, we then recommended that DOE and DHS develop a strategy  to notify state and local government officials about the benefits and  limitations of the surveys so government officials could decide whether  they would benefit from the surveys. According to DOE officials, in April  2007, DOE began meeting with DHS to conduct the evaluation and the  departments are drafting a document that would describe the benefits and  limitations. They plan to distribute this document to state and local  governments to inform them about the surveys. However, the departments  have no specific timeframe for completing this document. In addition,  DOE and DHS notified one city—Chicago—about the benefits of the  surveys since we issued our report. DOE and DHS are working with the  Chicago Police Department to install radiation detection equipment on  planes or helicopters owned by the Chicago Police Department to conduct  aerial background radiation surveys. DOE officials told us that this  approach may be less costly and state and local governments may be able  respond more quickly to an emergency by using their own aircraft. If this  approach is successful, DOE officials told us they would recommend that  other cities also purchase and install radiation detection equipment on  their own aircraft. However, DOE officials did not provide a timeframe for  completing this project.
DOE officials told us that the department is reluctant to conduct large  numbers of additional surveys if cities request them because they have a  limited number of helicopters, and these are needed to prevent and  respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies. Furthermore, they assert  that DOE does not have sufficient funding to conduct aerial background  radiation surveys. In fiscal year 2006, the emergency response budget for  aerial radiation detection was approximately $11 million for costs such as  aircraft maintenance, personnel, fuel, and detection equipment. DOE relies  on federal agencies and cities to reimburse them for the costs of surveys.  However, even if DHS funded cities to pay for surveys, as it did in New  York’s case, DOE officials stated that payment would need to include costs  associated with the wear and tear on the helicopters. Furthermore, the  extra costs could not be completely recovered by increasing the charges to  the city because, according to DOE officials, DOE cannot accumulate  money from year to year to pay for future lump-sum repairs. In addition,  DOE officials view background radiation surveys as part of the homeland  security mission to prepare state and local officials against terrorist  attacks, not as part of DOE’s emergency response mission. However, DOE  officials told us that because they possess the assets and expertise, they  would be willing to conduct additional surveys if DHS funded the full cost  of the surveys and covered the wear and tear on DOE’s equipment.
DHS officials told us that it is not DHS’s responsibility to conduct aerial  background radiation surveys or to develop such a capability. According  to DNDO, it does not have the expertise or capability to conduct surveys,  which are DOE’s responsibility. However, DNDO is responsible for  assisting state and local governments’ efforts to detect and identify illicit  nuclear and radiological materials, develop mobile detection systems, and  advise cities about different radiation detection technology to help state  and local officials decide which technologies would be most beneficial.  DNDO does not plan to conduct background surveys as part of this effort,  but it plans to work with DOE to advise cities and states on the potential  benefits of background surveys.
DHS also has a grant program to improve the capacity of state and local  governments to prevent and respond to terrorist and catastrophic events,  including nuclear and radiological attacks. In fiscal year 2007, about $1.7  billion was available in grant funding for state and local governments. DHS  officials told us that this grant funding could be used for radiation surveys  if cities requested them. However, according to DHS officials, the agency  has not received any requests for funding other than the 2005 request by  New York City. While it is DHS’s responsibility to inform state and local  governments about radiation detection technology, it has neither an  outreach effort nor does it maintain a central database for informing cities  and states about background radiation surveys. Instead, DHS maintains a  lessons-learned information-sharing database, which is a national online  network of best practices and lessons learned to help plan and prepare for  a terrorist attack. State and local governments can enter information into  this database, and DHS officials told us they were not aware if New York  City officials had done so.
More than a year after we issued our report, the status on background  radiation surveys remains largely unchanged. In short, in the absence of  clear mission responsibility, neither DOE nor DHS has any plans to  conduct additional surveys. In addition, no other city has requested one, in  part, because DOE and DHS have informed only one city—Chicago— about the benefits of these surveys.
section_title: DOE’s Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to Protect Its Key Emergency Response Facilities
paragraphs: DOE’s two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level  of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE,  their emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed  across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. However,  we found a number of critical emergency response capabilities and assets  are available only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and whose loss  would significantly hamper DOE’s ability to quickly respond to a nuclear  or radiological threat. Because these capabilities and assets have not been  fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient  for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack.
subsections: section_title: DOE Is Protecting Its Key Emergency Response Facilities with the Lowest Level of Physical Security Measures Allowed under Its Guidance Because Some Capabilities and Assets Have Been Dispersed
paragraphs: DOE is protecting its two Remote Sensing Laboratories at the lowest level  of physical security allowed under DOE guidance. According to DOE  officials, the lowest level of security is adequate because emergency  response assets and capabilities have been dispersed across the country  and are no longer concentrated at these facilities. DOE’s November 2005  policy guidance for safeguarding and securing facilities required a review  of facilities protected at the lowest level of physical security to determine  whether they were “mission critical.” Mission-critical facilities have  capabilities and assets that are not available at any other location and  cannot be easily and quickly reconstituted. Under DOE guidance, facilities  designated as mission critical must be protected at a higher level of  physical security. For example, DOE headquarters was designated as  mission critical because the loss of decision makers during an emergency  would impair the deployment and coordination of DOE resources. As a  result, DOE strengthened the physical security measures around DOE  headquarters by, among other things, adding vehicle barriers around the  facility.
In April 2006, the Office of Emergency Response reviewed the capabilities  and assets at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and determined that they  were not mission critical because if either one or both laboratories were  attacked and destroyed, DOE would be able to easily reconstitute their  capabilities and assets to meet mission requirements. Since September 11,  2001, DOE has dispersed some of the assets and capabilities once found  exclusively at the Remote Sensing Laboratories. Specifically, DOE has  expanded its search mission to include Radiological Assistance Program  (RAP) teams that are located at eight sites across the country. These  teams receive training and equipment similar to the search teams at the  Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as radiation detectors mounted in  backpacks and vehicles. They have also participated in a number of search  missions, including addressing potential threats at sporting events and  national political conventions, or assisting customs officials with  investigating cargo entering ports and border crossings.
section_title: DOE Has Not Fully Dispersed the Capabilities and Assets at The Two Facilities, and Their Loss Would Significantly Hamper DOE’s Ability to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats
paragraphs: Contrary to DOE’s assessment that the Remote Sensing Laboratories’  capabilities and assets have been fully dispersed to other parts of the  country, we found that the laboratories housed a number of unique  emergency response capabilities and assets whose loss would significantly  undermine DOE’s ability to respond to a nuclear or radiological threat.  The critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the laboratories  include (1) teams that help minimize the consequences of a nuclear or  radiological attack, (2) planes and helicopters designed to measure  contamination levels and assist search teams in locating nuclear or  radiological devices, and (3) a sophisticated mapping system that tracks  contamination and the location of radiological sources in U.S. cities.  Furthermore, while the RAP teams have assumed a greater role in  searching for nuclear or radiological devices, the teams at the Remote  Sensing Laboratories remain the most highly trained and experienced  search teams.
The consequence management teams that would respond within the first  24 hours of a nuclear or radiological attack are located at the Remote  Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams have specialized  equipment for monitoring and assessing the type, amount, and extent of  contamination. These teams are responsible for establishing an operations  center near the site of contamination to coordinate all of DOE’s  radiological monitoring and assessment activities and to analyze  information coming from the field, including aerial survey data provided  by helicopters, planes, and ground teams monitoring radiation levels.
At these two laboratories, the teams also have specialized equipment— emergency response planes and helicopters—that are designed to detect,  measure, and track radioactive material at the site of a nuclear or  radiological release to determine contamination levels. DOE has a limited  number of planes and helicopters designed for this mission at the Remote  Sensing Laboratories. The planes and helicopters use a sophisticated  radiation detection system to gather radiological information and produce  maps of radiation exposure and concentrations. It is anticipated that the  planes would arrive at an emergency scene first and be used to determine  the location and extent of ground contamination. The helicopters would  then be used to perform more detailed surveys of any contamination.  According to DOE officials, the planes and helicopters can gather  information on a wide area, in a shorter amount of time, without placing  ground teams at risk. Without this capability, DOE could not quickly  obtain comprehensive information about the extent of contamination. The  helicopters can also be used by search teams to locate nuclear or  radiological devices in U.S. cities. The helicopters can cover a larger area  in a shorter amount of time than teams on foot or in vehicles. The ground  search teams can conduct secondary inspections of locations with unusual  radiation levels identified by the helicopters.
The Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base also maintains a  sophisticated mapping system that can be used by consequence  management teams to track contamination in U.S. cities after a nuclear or  radiological attack. DOE collects information from its planes and  helicopters, ground monitoring teams, and computer modeling and uses  this system to provide detailed maps of the extent and level of  contamination in a city. Without this system, DOE would not be able to  quickly analyze the information collected by various emergency response  capabilities and determine how to respond most effectively to a nuclear or  radiological attack. This mapping system can also be used to help find  nuclear or radiological devices more quickly before they are detonated.
DOE officials told us the loss of these capabilities and assets that are  unique to the Remote Sensing Laboratories would devastate DOE’s ability  to respond to a nuclear or radiological attack. State and local governments  would not receive information—such as the location and extent of  contamination—that they need in a timely manner in order to manage the  consequences of an attack and reduce the harm to public health and  property. Despite the importance of these capabilities and assets, DOE has  not developed contingency plans identifying capabilities and assets at  other locations that could be used in the event that one or both Remote  Sensing Laboratories were attacked. Specifically, DOE has not identified  which RAP team would assume responsibility for coordinating  contamination monitoring and assessment activities in the place of the  consequence management teams from Nellis. During an emergency, the  lack of clearly defined roles may hamper emergency response efforts.
DOE officials told us that in the event that the capabilities and assets of  both Remote Sensing Laboratories were destroyed, they could mobilize  and deploy personnel and equipment from the RAP teams or national  laboratories. The RAP teams and some national laboratories, such as  Sandia, have similar equipment that could be used to measure  contamination in a limited area. However, if both Remote Sensing  Laboratories were destroyed, the RAP teams and the national laboratories  would not have planes and helicopters to conduct large-scale  contamination monitoring and assessment. The RAP teams also do not  have the equipment or expertise to set up an operations center and  analyze data that field teams would collect on contamination levels. In  April 2006, DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight, which is responsible  for independently evaluating, among other things, the effectiveness of  DOE’s programs, reported that during performance tests, the RAP teams  could not quickly provide state and local governments with  recommendations on what actions to take to avoid or reduce the public’s  exposure to radiation and whether to evacuate contaminated areas. In  addition, DOE officials told us, based on training exercises, the demands  of responding to two simultaneous nuclear or radiological events strained  all of DOE’s capabilities to manage the consequences. According to DOE  officials, if the consequence management teams at Nellis could not  respond and there were multiple, simultaneous attacks, DOE’s capabilities  to minimize the impact of a nuclear or radiological attack would be  significantly hampered.
DOE officials also told us that if Nellis Air Force Base were attacked, their  aerial contamination measuring assets would not be lost unless the aircraft  at Andrews Air Force Base were also destroyed. However, DOE policy  generally requires that some of its aerial assets stationed at Andrews  remain in the Washington, D.C., area to protect top government decision  makers and other key government assets. During a nuclear or radiological  emergency, DOE would need to rely on a limited airborne capability to  measure contamination levels. In addition, if there were multiple  simultaneous events, there would be considerable delay in providing  information to state and local governments about the extent of  contamination because DOE could assist only one city at a time.
Some DOE officials suggested that if DOE helicopters were not available  to provide assistance, DOE could request another helicopter and fit it with  radiation detectors. However, during an emergency, we found that DOE  would face a number of challenges in equipping a helicopter not designed  for measuring contamination. DOE officials told us that DOE has a  memorandum of understanding with the Department of Defense and other  federal and state agencies to use their helicopters and planes for transport  and other mission requirements, but that it is unlikely that DOD or any  other agency would provide them with aircraft during an emergency  because those agencies’ priority would be to carry out their own missions,  not to assist DOE. Even if DOE were provided with helicopters, it does not  have spare radiation detectors like those found on its own helicopters, and  even if it did have spares, it would not have time to mount radiation  detectors on the exterior of the aircraft. DOE officials told us that  radiation detectors, like those found on their vehicles, could be placed  inside an airplane or helicopter, but the ability to measure contamination  would be significantly reduced compared with an exterior-mounted  detector.
Furthermore, DOE does not conduct training exercises to simulate the  actions necessary to reconstitute the capabilities and assets unique to the  Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as placing radiation detectors on  helicopters or testing the ability of RAP teams to conduct large-scale  contamination monitoring and assessment without the assistance of the  consequence management teams from Nellis. DOE officials told us that all  of their training scenarios and exercises involve the use of consequence  management teams and the planes and helicopters from the Remote  Sensing Laboratories. As a result, DOE does not know whether it would be  able to accomplish mission objectives without the capabilities and assets  of the Remote Sensing Laboratories.
Lastly, while the RAP teams have assumed a greater role in searching for  nuclear or radiological devices, Remote Sensing Laboratories have the  most highly trained and experienced search teams. For example, the  search teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories are the only teams  trained to conduct physically demanding maritime searches to locate  potential nuclear or radiological devices at sea before they arrive at a U.S.  port. The search teams can also repair radiation equipment for search  missions in the field. Furthermore, these search teams are more prepared  than the RAP teams to enter environments where there is a threat of  hazards other than those associated with radiological materials, such as  explosives. If there is a threat of explosives in an area where a search  mission would be conducted, these teams have specialized equipment to  detect explosives and can more quickly request FBI ordnance disposal  assistance in order to complete their search mission. In April 2006, the  Office of Independent Oversight reported that the RAP teams did not  always complete their search missions when there was a high level of risk  to the lives of the RAP team members from explosives. The Office also  reported that some RAP teams refused to perform the mission unless all  risk from explosives around a device was removed and others completed  the mission only after certain safety criteria were met. According to this  study, leaders of the RAP teams had to make on-the-spot judgments  weighing the safety of RAP team members against their ability to complete  the search mission because there was a lack of guidance on how to  respond.
Because of these concerns, we recommended in September 2006 that DOE  review the physical security measures at the Remote Sensing Laboratories  and determine whether additional measures should be taken to protect the  facilities against a loss of critical emergency response capabilities or  whether it was more cost-effective to fully disperse its capabilities and  assets to multiple areas of the country. Since we issued our report, DOE  has not made any upgrades or other changes to security at the Remote  Sensing Laboratories. In written comments responding to our  recommendations, DOE concluded that it was not cost-effective to further  disperse emergency response capabilities. In addition, DOE noted that it  would not be making any changes to the security of the Remote Sensing  Laboratories because the security measures were reviewed separately by  the Associate Administrator for Emergency Response and the Associate  Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security and they agreed that security  measures were adequate. While DOE may have reviewed the physical  security measures at the Remote Sensing Laboratories, it did not  specifically address the security issues we raised. We continue to believe  that these measures may not be sufficient to protect unique and critical  emergency response capabilities at these facilities.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased  to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee  may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Gene Aloise at  (202) 512-3841. Leland Cogliani, Omari Norman, Carol Herrnstadt  Shulman, and Ned Woodward made key contributions to this testimony.
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