Force Structure: Ship Rotational Crewing Initiatives Would Benefit from Top-Level Leadership, Navy-wide Guidance, Comprehensive Analysis, and Improved Lessons-Learned Sharing
Published: 2008-05-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Navy faces affordability challenges as it supports a high pace of operations and increasing ship procurement costs. The Navy has used multiple crews on some submarines and surface ships and has shown it to increase a ship's operational availability. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which the Navy, for ship rotational crewing, has (1) employed a comprehensive management approach, (2) developed and implemented guidance, (3) systematically collected, analyzed data, and reported findings, and (4) systematically collected and used lessons learned. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy documentation and best practices for transformation, conducted focus groups, and interviewed DOD and Navy officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Rotational crewing represents a transformational cultural change for the Navy. While the Navy has provided leadership in some rotational crewing programs, the Navy has not fully established a comprehensive management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing efforts across the department and among various types of ships. GAO's prior work showed that sound management practices for implementing transformational programs include ensuring top leadership drives the change and dedicating an implementation team. The Navy has not assigned clear leadership and accountability for rotational crewing or designated an implementation team to ensure that rotational crewing receives the attention necessary to be effective. Without a comprehensive management approach, the Navy may not be able to lead a successful transformation of its crewing culture. The Navy has promulgated crew exchange instructions for some types of ships that have provided some specific guidance and increased accountability. However, the Navy has not developed an overarching instruction that provides high-level guidance for rotational crewing initiatives and it has not consistently addressed rotational crewing in individual ship-class concepts of operations. Defense best practices hold that key aspects of a concept of operations include how a set of capabilities may be employed to achieve objectives and identifies by whom, where, and how it is to be accomplished. The Navy has conducted some analyses of rotational crewing; however, it has not developed a systematic method for analyzing, assessing and reporting findings on the potential for rotational crewing on current and future ships. Despite using a comprehensive data-collection and analysis plan in the Atlantic Fleet Guided Missile Destroyer Sea Swap, the Navy has not developed a standardized data-collection plan that would be used to analyze all types of rotational crewing, and life-cycle costs of rotational crewing alternatives have not been evaluated. The Navy has also not adequately assessed rotational crewing options for future ships. As new ships are in development, DOD guidance requires that an analysis of alternatives be completed. These analyses generally include an evaluation of the operational effectiveness and estimated costs of alternatives. In recent surface ship acquisitions, the Navy has not consistently assessed rotational crewing options. In the absence of this, cost-effective force structure assessments are incomplete and the Navy does not have a complete picture of the number of ships it needs to acquire. The Navy has collected and disseminated lessons learned from some rotational crewing experiences; however, some ship communities have relied on informal processes. The Atlantic Sea Swap initiative used a systematic process to capture lessons learned. However, in other ship communities the actions were not systematic and did not use the Navy Lessons Learned System. By not systematically recording and sharing lessons learned from rotational crewing efforts, the Navy risks repeating mistakes and could miss opportunities to more effectively implement crew rotations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: At a time when the federal government is facing a large and growing fiscal  imbalance, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress will be asked  to make important program and investment decisions on Navy surface  ships. At costs ranging from $500 million to $5 billion each, the Navy’s  surface combatants represent a significant capital investment. The Navy  consistently faces affordability challenges as it attempts to provide  necessary forward presence while supporting a high pace of operations,  rising personnel costs, and cost growth in new ship classes. The Navy has  traditionally maintained overseas presence by using standard deployments  whereby individual ships and their permanently assigned crews are  deployed for approximately 6 months out of a 27-month cycle that  includes time for training and ship maintenance. To maximize its return on  investment while maintaining forward presence, the Navy is examining  different means for employing its surface ships. Rotational crewing is one  of many alternatives the Navy is pursuing to increase the utilization and  operational availability of Navy ships. Recently, the Chief of Naval  Operations cited rotational crewing as a cost-effective means of increasing  forward presence while maintaining current force structure levels.
Rotational crewing has been and is a part of today’s Navy; however, this  practice is not widespread and is still evolving. Since the 1960s, the Navy  has used “Blue-Gold” rotational crewing on its ballistic missile  submarines, whereby two complete crews are assigned to a single ship,  and they rotate deployments. The Navy also uses this “Blue-Gold”  rotational crewing alternative on its high speed vessel (HSV) experimental  ship, the HSV-2 Swift, and plans on using this crewing alternative for its  four newly converted guided missile submarines. In recent years, the  United States Pacific and Atlantic Fleets have both completed “Sea Swap”  efforts that demonstrated the ability to rotate the crews of destroyers. The  “Sea Swap” crewing alternative uses one deploying ship but multiple  sequentially deploying crews. Newly deploying crews swap ships with the  crew on the forward-deployed ship and nondeployed crews train and  perform maintenance on a ship in the home port. Currently, the Navy uses  similar rotational crews to employ mine warfare and patrol coastal ships  in the Persian Gulf. The Navy also plans to rotationally crew its new  Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class, implementing a “Blue-Gold” alternative  on the first two ships and additional approaches in the future. Appendix I  provides a description of all the ships included in our evaluation.
In a November 2004 report, we examined the Navy’s implementation of  rotational crewing in the U.S. Pacific Fleet Destroyer Sea Swap effort, as  well as the Navy’s other ongoing rotational crewing programs. Our report  found that the Navy had not (1) established an analytical framework for  evaluating rotational crewing efforts, (2) provided effective guidance,   (3) systematically leveraged lessons learned to support rotational crewing  implementation, and (4) fully assessed the effect on ship maintenance on  ships with extended deployments with rotating crews. Recognizing the  Navy’s need to explore ways to improve the use of its surface ships and its  plan to employ rotational crews on several types of surface ships in the  current and planned force, the John Warner National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 directed us to report on the Navy’s  Atlantic guided missile destroyer (DDG) Sea Swap initiative as well as  lessons learned from recent ship rotational crew experiments and the  extent to which these lessons are systematically collected and shared. The  mandate refers specifically to the Atlantic Fleet Sea Swap demonstrations,  but at times collectively refers to other rotational crewing efforts, current  or planned. We provided a briefing to the Committee on Armed Services of  the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of  Representatives to meet the mandate on March 4, 2008. In this report we  assess the extent to which the Navy has: (1) employed a comprehensive  management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing  efforts; (2) developed and implemented guidance and concepts of  operations for rotational crewing; (3) systematically collected and  analyzed data on rotational crewing efforts for current and future ships;  and (4) collected and used lessons learned.
To assess the extent to which the Navy employed a comprehensive  management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing  efforts, we compared the Navy’s approach with our prior work on best  practices for organizational transformations; reviewed relevant Navy  practices; and interviewed DOD, Navy, and fleet headquarters officials. To  assess the extent to which the Navy has developed, disseminated, and  implemented guidance and concepts of operations for rotational crewing  on surface ships, we obtained and analyzed relevant documentation  including, but not limited to, concepts of operations, directives,  instructions, and procedures from the Navy, and we interviewed fleet and  Navy headquarters officials. To assess the extent to which the Navy has  analyzed, evaluated, and assessed potential rotational crewing efforts for  current and future ships, we reviewed and analyzed the Atlantic Fleet DDG  Sea Swap data-collection and analysis plan and final report; collected and  analyzed recent ship-class acquisition documents, including analyses of  alternatives; interviewed fleet and Navy headquarters officials; and  conducted 19 focus groups with rotational crews. To assess the extent to  which the Navy has systematically collected, disseminated, and capitalized  on lessons learned from past and current rotational crewing experiences,  we obtained and reviewed Navy Lessons Learned System instructions,  queried the Navy Lessons Learned System, and interviewed Navy officials.  We assessed the Navy Lessons Learned System data and determined the  data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We conducted this  performance audit from February 2007 to May 2008, in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. The scope and methodology used in our review are  described in further detail in appendix II.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Rotational Crewing Proven to Provide Greater Forward Presence
paragraphs: Maintaining an overseas military presence that is prepared to deter threats  and engage enemies remains an enduring tenet of U.S. national military  strategy and priorities. For example, the National Military Strategy notes  that an overseas presence supports the ability of the United States to  project power against threats and support establishment of an  environment that reduces the conditions that foster extremist ideologies.  By being forward-deployed, maritime forces can enable familiarity with  the environment and behavior patterns of regional actors. The Navy has  traditionally maintained overseas presence by using standard deployments  whereby individual ships and their permanently assigned crews are  deployed for approximately 6 months out of a 27-month cycle. However,  the amount of time a ship ultimately spends forward-deployed in a theater  of operations is affected by several factors in its employment cycle. These  factors include length of deployment, transit speeds to and from operating  areas, port calls, crew training and certification, ship maintenance  requirements, and maintaining sufficient readiness for surging forces  during nondeployed periods. The result is that a ship homeported in the  United States and deploying to the Persian Gulf area for 6 months will  normally spend less than 20 percent of its 27 month cycle in-theater and  that the Navy would need about six ships to maintain a continuous  presence in the region over a 2-year period.
Rotational crewing has been proven to provide greater forward presence  for Navy ships by eliminating ship transits and maintaining more on- station time in distant operating areas. Specifically, the 2004 Pacific Fleet  Destroyer Sea Swap initiative demonstrated that rotational crewing  provides more forward presence with fewer ships. For example, one  Pacific Fleet destroyer, rotationally crewed with three sequentially- deployed crews, produced an additional 16 days of forward presence  compared with a standard four-ship/four-crew deployment. The Atlantic  Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative produced similar results. For example, one  Atlantic Fleet destroyer, rotationally crewed with three crews, produced  25 days more of forward presence than a standard four-ship/four-crew  deployment. Assessments completed by the Center for Naval Analyses and  the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations confirmed the results of the  Pacific and Atlantic Sea Swap initiatives. Using the Blue-Gold alternative,  the HSV-2 Swift has achieved an operations tempo of more than 80  percent and the four newly converted guided missile submarines expect to  spend two-thirds of their operational cycles forward-deployed in the  operations area.
section_title: Pressure on Shipbuilding Procurement
paragraphs: At costs ranging from $500 million to $5 billion each, the Navy’s surface  combatants represent a significant capital investment. Facing cost growth  in new ship classes and federal fiscal challenges, rotational crewing may  be one alternative the Navy could utilize to meet mission requirements and  mitigate the effects of cost growth on ship requirements as embodied in  the Navy’s long-range shipbuilding plan and maritime strategy. The  Congressional Budget Office and Center for Naval Analysis have also  noted the procurement savings achieved as a result of using rotational  crewing on ships. In 2007, the Chief of Naval Operations recognized the  challenge of accomplishing the Navy’s missions within its budget. The  Chief of Naval Operations explained that there is extraordinary pressure  to balance the Navy’s personnel, operations, and procurement accounts in  today’s fiscal environment. Meanwhile, the Navy has faced increased  criticism for rising shipbuilding costs. The increasing cost of surface ships  has led the Navy to reduce procurements, and the resulting loss of  economies of scale has driven costs of individual surface ships even  higher. We have reported that significant cost growth and long schedule  delays are persistent problems in both new and follow-on ships. We also  reported that the Navy has developed and implemented several initiatives  to increase the operational availability of Navy and Marine Corps fleet  forces, including the Fleet Response Plan and rotational crewing. Navy  officials have cited these initiatives as ways to increase readiness and  reduce the numbers of ships needed in the Navy’s force structure, thereby  freeing funding for other priorities.
section_title: Life-Cycle Costs Are Determined Early in a System’s Development
paragraphs: Decisions made in setting requirements very early in a ship’s development  have enormous effect on the cost of the system over its life. Life-cycle  costs include the costs to research, develop, acquire, own, operate,  maintain, and dispose of weapon and support systems. These costs include  the facilities and training equipment, such as simulators, unique to the  system. Navy analyses show that by the second acquisition milestone  (which assesses whether a system is ready to advance to the system  development and demonstration phase), roughly 85 percent of a ship’s life- cycle cost has been “locked in” by design, production quantity, and  schedule decisions while less than 10 percent of its total costs has actually  been expended. (See fig. 1.)
Figure 1 depicts the relative apportionment of research and development,  procurement, and operating and support costs over the typical life cycle of  a ship program (the complete life cycle of a ship, from concept  development through disposal, typically ranges from 40 to 60 years).  Research and development funds are spent at program initiation and  generally constitute only a small fraction of a new ship’s costs. Then, in  the next acquisition phase, procurement funds are spent to acquire the  new ship. The vast majority of the life-cycle costs is comprised of  operating and support costs and is incurred over the life of the ship.
section_title: Defense Acquisition Policy Requires Setting Goals to Optimize Performance and Minimize Cost
paragraphs: Recognizing that fiscal constraints pose a long-term challenge, DOD policy  states that life-cycle costs of new military systems should be identified and  that all participants shall plan programs based on realistic projections of  the dollars and manpower likely to be available in future years. This  approach, referred to as treating cost as an independent variable, requires  program managers to consider cost-performance trade-offs in setting  program goals. During the acquisition process, program managers are held  accountable for making progress toward meeting established goals and  requirements at checkpoints, or milestones, over a program’s life cycle.  These goals and requirements are contained in several key documents,  including the initial capabilities document and the analysis of alternatives.  An initial capabilities document describes an operational gap or  deficiency, or opportunity to provide new capabilities, in operational  terms and identifies possible material and nonmaterial solutions, including  approaches involving, among other things, personnel and training, that  may be used to satisfy the need. These capabilities and constraints are  examined during a study called the analysis of alternatives.
The DOD instruction outlining the process on how to acquire major  weapons systems establishes the requirement for developing an analysis of  alternatives to support major acquisition milestones and decision  reviews. An analysis of alternatives is a documented analytical evaluation  of the performance, operational effectiveness, operational suitability, and  estimated costs (including full life-cycle costs) of alternative systems to  meet a mission capability that has been identified through the  department’s capabilities and requirements process. Preparation of an  analysis of alternatives is generally required during the Concept  Refinement Phase, which is early in the defense acquisition process—even  prior to formal initiation of a program—as shown in figure 2. An analysis  of alternatives is required at an early stage to ensure that all potential  alternative means of satisfying the stated capability are considered. The  analysis of alternatives assesses the advantages and disadvantages of  various alternatives being considered to satisfy the needed capability,  including the sensitivity of each alternative to possible changes to key  assumptions (e.g., threat) or variables (e.g., performance capabilities). The  analysis is intended to aid decision makers in judging whether or not any  of the proposed alternatives to an existing system offer sufficient military  or economic benefit, or both, to be worth the cost. In preparation for  subsequent milestones, the analysis is updated, or a new one conducted,  depending on then-existing circumstances. Additionally, the Department  of the Navy has issued guidance containing mandatory procedures for  implementation of DOD’s acquisition instruction and process. The Navy’s  guidance requires an analysis of alternatives to include an analysis of  doctrine, organization, training, materiel, management, leadership,  personnel, and facilities as well as joint implications.  initiation)
section_title: Ship-Crewing Alternatives
paragraphs: In addition to the standard ship and crew employment cycle, the range of  Navy crewing alternatives falls into three major categories: (1) Sea Swap,  (2) Horizon, and (3) Blue-Gold. Each of these alternatives can be  implemented in varying ways and may have different advantages and  disadvantages and effects on life-cycle costs, but the Navy’s actual  experience with nonstandard crewing alternatives on surface ships is  limited. Sea Swap is the only crewing alternative that has been used on  ships as large as surface combatants.
subsections: section_title: Standard Crew
paragraphs: Standard crews use one crew per ship. Most of the crewmembers are  assigned to the ship for 4 years, and it is common for crewmembers to  deploy overseas on the same ship more than once. Ships deploy to forward  operating areas for periods of 6 or more months on average. On a 6 month  deployment to the Arabian Gulf ships spend 3 to 4 months of that  deployment actually on station depending on whether the ship deploys  from the east or west coast of the United States. When not deployed, the  ships fulfill surge deployment requirements, undergo maintenance  availabilities and conduct training and certifications to maintain mission  capability. Most Navy ships and their crews employ the standard crew  deployment option.
section_title: Sea Swap
paragraphs: The Sea Swap option uses one deploying ship but multiple sequentially  deploying crews. Newly deploying crews swap ships with the crew on the  forward-deployed ship. Nondeployed crews train and perform  maintenance on a ship in the home port. Sea Swap normally operates in a  multiple of two, three, or four ships and crews. The crews rotate through  the ships in the assigned group. Notionally under this option, one of the  ships deploys two, three, or four times longer than the standard time by  rotating crews every 6 months at an overseas location. Ideally, all of the  Sea Swap ships share an identical configuration, so crew performance and  capability are not degraded because of ship differences. Because crews  do not return to the ships on which they trained, under a four-ship Sea  Swap option, some crews could serve on three different ships in just over  6 months and be expected to demonstrate combat proficiency on each  one. A limited number of destroyers have employed the Sea Swap option  in recent years.
section_title: Horizon
paragraphs: The Horizon option involves one or two more crews than ships, such as  four crews for three ships or five crews for three ships. Crews serve for no  more than 6 months on ships that are deployed for 18 months or more.  Under a three-ship Horizon option, crews could serve on at least two ships  in just over 6 months and be expected to demonstrate combat proficiency  on each one. In addition, each crew would be without a ship for a period  of time and stay ashore at a readiness, or training, center. This crewing  option was employed on mine countermeasure and patrol coastal ships in  recent years.
section_title: Blue-Gold
paragraphs: The Blue-Gold option assigns two complete crews, designated “Blue” and  “Gold,” to a single ship. Most of the crewmembers are assigned to a ship  for several years, and it is common for them to deploy overseas on the  same ship more than once. Crew deployments would not exceed 6 months  and are often of much shorter duration. An advantage with this option  includes the crews’ familiarity with the ship. However, a disadvantage is  that the proficiency can degrade since crews sometimes do not have a ship  on which to train when not deployed and must rely on mock-ups and  simulators at a training facility. The strategic and guided missile  submarine forces and the HSV-2 Swift have employed the Blue-Gold  alternative.
section_title: History of Rotational Crewing Initiatives
paragraphs: Rotational crewing has been a part of the Navy for over 40 years, but the  Navy’s experience with this crewing concept on its surface fleet has been  more recent and limited to a small number of ships and ship types. The  Navy has used the Blue-Gold crewing approach on its ballistic missile  submarines since the 1960s; however, until the mid-1990s, rotational  crewing was not practiced on surface ships. In the mid-1990s, the Navy  was in search of a new operational approach that allowed the Navy to  meet forward-presence requirements and surge capability. The Navy  developed the Horizon approach that sustained readiness by maintaining  people and platforms in a continually ready state. This concept was  originally used on Mine Countermeasure ships in the mid-1990s, and was  later adopted by coastal minehunter and patrol coastal ships in 2003. In  the same year, the Navy employed the Blue-Gold rotational crewing  approach on the HSV-2 Swift. Beginning in 2007 with the U.S.S. Ohio’s  deployment as a guided missile submarine, the Navy has implemented the  Blue-Gold rotational crewing alternative on the four Ohio-class strategic  missile submarines converted to guided missile submarines. Rotational  crewing experiments have also been conducted on Navy destroyers in the  Pacific and Atlantic Fleets. Beginning in 2002, seven Pacific Fleet  destroyers and their crews participated in the Sea Swap rotational crewing  demonstration. This rotational crewing approach was tested again in 2005,  this time using three of its 22 Atlantic Fleet destroyers in what is known as  the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative. Rotational crewing has not  been used on the Navy’s cruisers, amphibious ships, aircraft carriers, or  support ships (other than the HSV-2 Swift). Table 1 shows the rotational  crewing alternatives employed by the Navy during the 1990s and through  the present.
section_title: The Navy Has Not Fully Established a Comprehensive Management Approach to Coordinate and Integrate Rotational Crewing Efforts
paragraphs: Although the Navy has taken action to provide leadership in specific  rotational crewing programs and transform its ship-crewing culture, the  Navy has not fully established a comprehensive management approach to  coordinate and integrate rotational crewing efforts throughout the  department. Specifically, the Navy has not fully incorporated key  management practices to manage the transformation of the Navy’s ship- crewing culture—such as providing top-down leadership and dedicating  an overarching implementation team—that our prior work has shown  critical to successful transformations.
subsections: section_title: Rotational Crewing Is a Transformational Cultural Change
paragraphs: Rotational crewing represents a transformational cultural change for the  Navy. An organization’s culture encompasses the values and behaviors  that characterize its work environment. The Navy has a long history  devoted to the one crew, one ship model whereby individual ships and  their permanently assigned crews are deployed approximately 6 months  out of a 27-month cycle. Rotational crewing on surface ships is a relatively  new concept for the Navy, with only one use before 2002. Sailors in several  focus groups told us that rotational crewing stands in stark contrast to the  normal deployment cycle of the Navy. They added that, in order to be  successful, the Navy’s crewing culture would have to be transformed.  Then–Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark echoed this message  in 2005, stating that rotational crewing has changed the face of the Navy,  and that in any organizational transformation, people are almost always  not in favor of change. If rotational crewing efforts are not properly  managed, rotational crewing can have a negative effect on mission  performance and retention. For example, we reported in 2004 that the  Pacific Sea Swap experiments lacked proper management, including  effective guidance and oversight. Focus groups with Pacific Sea Swap  sailors reported training deficiencies, increased maintenance tasks, and a  degraded quality of life. Further, lower reenlistments rates were found for  sailors with less than 6 years of service. Successful rotational crewing  efforts require management practices that lead a transformation of the  Navy’s ship-crewing culture.
section_title: Navy Has Not Assigned Responsibility for Overall Management of Rotational Crewing
paragraphs: While the Navy has provided leadership in some specific rotational  crewing programs, the Navy has not provided top-down leadership to  manage and integrate all rotational crewing efforts throughout the  Department of the Navy. We reported in 2003 that key practices and  implementation steps for successful transformations include ensuring top  leadership drives the transformation. The Commander, Naval Surface  Forces, has been clearly and personally involved in leading the  transformation of the Navy’s ship-crewing culture in the implementation of  Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) rotational crewing. The Commander has set  the direction, pace, and tone for the transformation, while  institutionalizing accountability. For example, the Commander has  instituted a set of cardinal rules that emphasize seizing the opportunity  and embracing change as part of the transformation. One of these cardinal  rules is not to compare the LCS to legacy platforms because the LCS  cannot be manned, trained, equipped, maintained, or tactically employed  in the same way. Further, the Commander has presented a clear and  compelling picture of what the LCS community needs to achieve, helping  to build morale and commitment to the rotational crewing concept. For  example, the Commander has articulated a succinct and compelling  reason for adopting rotational crewing, demonstrating conviction to  making the change. Command officials explained that this has helped  sailors and personnel throughout the LCS and Surface Forces command  understand and share the Commander’s expectations, engendering both  their cooperation and ownership of these outcomes. In addition, the Vice  Chief of Naval Operations provided top-down leadership in the Atlantic  Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative, recognizing shortcomings in the Pacific Sea  Swap initiative. Citing recommended actions in our 2004 report on the  Pacific Sea Swap, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed Naval  Surface Forces Atlantic to develop goals, standardized guidance, metrics,  and a comprehensive strategy for future rotational crewing initiatives.
This transformational leadership, however, has been limited to the  implementation of the LCS and Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap rotational  crewing efforts. The Navy has not provided top-down, sustained  leadership to manage and integrate all rotational crewing efforts. The  Chief of Naval Operations has noted the success of rotational crewing  programs and their potential to increase forward presence without buying  more ships. However, with six rotational crewing efforts currently  underway, Navy leadership has not assigned clear leadership and  accountability for managing rotational crewing efforts, including  designating responsibility for integrating and applying program results to  the fleet, an action necessary to guide the transformation of the Navy’s  ship-crewing culture. For example, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap  initiative successfully increased forward presence and generated total  operational cost savings of nearly $10 million. However, Fleet Forces  Command, in its final report on the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap  initiative, stated that no future Sea Swaps are planned. The report states  that only if an expansion of missions and roles for the destroyer class  (such as the addition of a missile defense capability) decreased the total  number of destroyers available, would rotational crewing be considered.  According to Navy sailors and officials, Navy leadership also has not  identified incentives for rotational crewing necessary to lead the  transformation. Several sailors in focus groups with rotational crews  reported that port calls and defined employment periods were critical to  successful rotational crewing programs. To date, Navy leadership has not  consistently managed these incentives and implemented them in each  rotational crewing program. For example, mine warfare ship sailors in  focus groups reported that their deployment schedules were  unpredictable, resulting in poor quality of life. The Navy does not have top- down leadership because the Navy does not have overarching guidance for  rotational crewing that assigns leadership within the Chief of Naval  Operations. Without top-down, sustained Navy leadership, including  assigning responsibility for managing rotational crewing efforts, the Navy  cannot be assured that rotational crewing is developed in an efficient or  sustainable manner.
section_title: Navy Has Not Established an Implementation Team for Rotational Crewing
paragraphs: Although the Navy has established implementation teams for selected  rotational crewing initiatives, it has not established an implementation  team for managing all rotational crewing programs. We reported in 2003  that key practices for successful transformations include that an  implementation team should be responsible for the day-to-day  management of transformation to ensure various initiatives are  integrated. Such a team would ensure that rotational crewing receives the  focused, full-time attention necessary to be sustained and effective by  keeping efforts coordinated, and integrating and applying implementation  results to the fleet. The LCS community demonstrates the structure of an  implementation team. The LCS team is led by an Oversight Board, chaired  by the Commander, Naval Surface Forces, with executive-level  representatives from program executive offices, program sponsors, and  other major stakeholders. Two cross-functional teams report directly to  the Oversight Board: one addresses manning and training issues, and the  other addresses logistics and maintenance issues. Additional LCS team  members include representatives from the LCS community, Naval Surface  Forces Pacific, other appropriate functional disciplines, and a senior level  executive working group, the Council of Captains (see fig. 3).
Naval Surface Forces officials explained that, together, the  implementation team groups review issues and barriers associated with  the LCS program and jointly develop solutions. The process is documented  in detailed Plans of Action and Milestones that list barriers, solutions, and  planning goals.
Other rotational crewing initiatives have benefited from implementation  teams. For example, Naval Surface Forces established an implementation  team to coordinate all involved activities and organizations in the Atlantic  Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative. The team included Naval Surface Forces  Atlantic staff from multiple directorates, regional support organization  representatives, ship commanding and executive officers, Board of  Inspection and Survey members, a public affairs officer, and others. The  team ensured that the execution of the initiative ran smoothly and  provided a communications structure to facilitate coordination among all  participants and support organizations. Submarine Group Trident  command officials also benefited from implementation teams in preparing  for swapping Blue and Gold crews overseas to support newly converted  guided missile submarines. Submarine Group Trident command officials  explained that they conducted multiple tabletop exercises to address  maintenance support teams, overseas repairs, and travel logistics.  Command officials further noted that working groups were formed to  address specific challenges associated with forward-deployed crew swaps,  such as selecting the type of aircraft to move the crews and procedures for  storing spare parts, and to develop a preexercise plan. Drawing on the  tabletop exercises, working group preparation, and the preexercise plan,  the guided missile submarine U.S.S. Ohio completed the first forward- deployed submarine crew swap in over 15 years, successfully transporting  supplies, paperwork, and the crew.
Implementation teams, however, have not been utilized in all rotational  crewing initiatives. Navy officials explained that no implementation team  exists to manage the patrol coastal or mine warfare ship rotational  crewing efforts. In focus groups, patrol coastal and mine warfare ship  sailors reported poor quality of life, insufficient training and professional  development time, inconsistent accountability during ship turnovers, and  little, if any, support for the crewing transformation. Without an  implementation team to devote focused attention, provide a  communication structure, and apply lessons from other rotational crewing  efforts, the Navy may not effectively resolve these issues on patrol coastal  and mine warfare ships.
There are several groups within the Navy with key roles in rotational  crewing programs; however, none of these groups has the overall  authority, responsibility, and accountability to coordinate and integrate all  rotational crewing efforts. For example, Fleet Forces Command serves as  the single voice for fleet requirements and coordinates standardized policy  for manning, training, and maintaining fleet operating forces. A key  strategic priority for Fleet Forces Command is delivering optimal  readiness and operational availability of forces at best cost, managed  through best practices and shared information supporting informed  decisions by Commanders. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,  Integration of Capabilities and Resources directorate, is responsible for  optimizing Navy investments through centralized coordination of Navy  warfighting and warfighting support analysis and assessments, Navy  capability development and integration, joint and Navy requirements  development, and resource programming. Naval Sea Systems Command  builds, buys, and maintains the Navy’s ships and submarines and their  combat systems, as well as directs resources from program sponsors into  the proper mix of manpower and resources to properly equip the fleet.  Recently established Class Squadrons are functional command  organizations specific to particular ship classes (e.g., Patrol Coastal, LCS)  and are responsible for the manning, training, equipping and maintaining  processes. Class Squadrons use metric-based analysis to assess readiness,  examine class trends, establish lessons learned, and provide  recommendations and solutions. Other groups with critical involvement in  the implementation of rotational crewing efforts include Naval Surface  Forces, Naval Submarine Forces, and many others. However, none of  these groups has the overall authority, responsibility, and accountability to  coordinate and integrate all rotational crewing efforts because the Navy  has not specified how this will be accomplished in an overarching  guidance document for rotational crewing. Without formally designating  an overarching implementation team with diverse representation to  provide day-to-day management oversight of rotational crewing efforts,  the Navy can not be assured that rotational crewing programs will be  coordinated and integrated, and their results applied to the rest of the  fleet. As a result, the Navy may fail to lead a successful transformation of  its ship-crewing culture.
section_title: Navy’s Development, Dissemination, and Implementation of Rotational Crewing Guidance Has Been Inconsistent
paragraphs: The Navy’s development, dissemination, and implementation of rotational  crewing guidance has been inconsistent, which could hinder rotational  crewing efforts. The Navy has not developed an overarching directive that  provides high-level vision and guidance for rotational crewing initiatives  and has been inconsistent in addressing rotational crewing in individual  ship-class concepts of operations. However, the Navy has developed and  promulgated crew-exchange instructions that have provided some specific  guidance for crew turnovers and increased accountability.
subsections: section_title: The Navy Lacks an Overarching Directive to Guide All Rotational Crewing Efforts
paragraphs: The Navy has not developed and promulgated an overarching directive  that provides the high-level vision and guidance needed to ensure that all  rotational crewing efforts are effectively managed, thoroughly evaluated,  and successfully implemented. Some communities involved in rotational  crewing efforts have developed policies and procedures specific to their  community; whereas others have implemented rotational crewing without  the benefit of these instructions. For example, the Navy established  specific policies and procedures for the execution of the Atlantic Fleet  DDG Sea Swap initiative. However, as discussed throughout this report,  there is no Navy-wide vision or policy on when and why to consider  rotational crewing as an alternative; how to develop implementation plans;  and how to share and use lessons learned. As a result, rotational crewing  has been inconsistently implemented and assessed across the Navy.
According to DOD guidance on directives, an overarching directive for  rotational crewing should provide essential policy and guidance to achieve  the desired outcome and should delegate authority and assign  responsibilities. According to Navy guidance, a directive could be used to  do a number of things including: assign a mission, function, or task;  initiate or govern a course of action or conduct; establish a procedure,  technique, standard, guide, or method of performing a duty, function, or  operation; and establish a reporting requirement. Without this overarching  directive, the Navy may not have the high-level guidance to effectively  manage, implement, and evaluate rotational crewing as a means of  increasing capabilities and reducing costs.
section_title: Inconsistent Development and Implementation of Concept of Operations Could Hinder Rotational Crewing Efforts
paragraphs: The Navy has inconsistently addressed rotational crewing in concepts of  operations for ship classes employing rotational crewing. A concept of  operations is an important leadership and management tool because it  provides critical high-level information that describes how a set of  capabilities may be employed to achieve desired objectives or a particular  end state for a specific scenario and identifies with whom, where, and  most importantly, how an activity or function should be accomplished,  employed, and executed. In addition, determination of these details  enables the development of metrics that support rigorous assessment of  the real or proposed capabilities. While the guided missile submarine,  LCS, and DDG communities relied on a concept of operations, other  commands supporting operations conducted by rotationally crewed  surface ships have not developed or used a concept of operations. The  guided missile submarine community relied on a concept of operations  that addressed the platform’s operational capabilities and challenges while  indicating the importance of leveraging the existing maintenance and  training infrastructure. This concept of operations also described how  operational availability would be increased by using two alternating crews  and the special factors that need to be considered in a ship’s employment.  The Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations provided  stakeholders with a high-level description of the rotational crewing  alternative it employed, the principles that drove its execution, the  rationale behind key decisions, and the roles and responsibilities of  individual decision makers, managers, and leaders involved in its  execution.
Although the guided missile submarine, LCS, and DDG communities  utilized concept of operations, the Patrol Coastal and Mine  Countermeasures ship communities lacked the benefit of a concept of  operations. While these communities relied on existing policies and  procedures to address some aspects of rotational crewing, such as the  exchange of command guidance, they did not have a concept of operations  that articulated the vision, purpose, and plan for rotationally crewed  surface ships and their crews. They also did not benefit from access to the  high-level information and guidance needed specifically for rotational  crewing to address critical personnel, supply, maintenance, and training  issues. During focus group discussions with crewmembers representing  both surface-ship communities, discontent was voiced about the lack of  training, particularly the lack of advanced schools needed to increase  technical proficiency; personnel shortages that affected crew  cohesiveness; minimal maintenance support provided by teams overseas;  and inadequate supply support that was to deliver critical equipment when  it was needed.
These inconsistencies in developing concepts of operations that address  rotational crewing have occurred because the Navy does not have  overarching guidance for rotational crewing and because it has not  developed concepts of operations to guide individual rotational crewing  initiatives. Without Navy-wide overarching guidance on rotational crewing  and individual ship-class concepts of operations to ensure effective  management, execution, and evaluation of rotational crewing efforts,  current and potential surface ship rotational crewing initiatives may not be  efficiently and effectively implemented. As a result, the Navy increases the  risk that it will be unable to effectively communicate its vision of this  transformational effort, and will be unable to effectively implement,  manage, and institutionalize rotational crewing.
section_title: Crew Exchange Instructions Promulgated for Increased Guidance and Accountability
paragraphs: In February 2005, the Commander of Naval Surface Forces promulgated  specific guidance detailing how the crew exchange process should be  conducted to ensure accountability during crew exchanges and for  individual ship communities to use as a model for developing instructions  tailored to their specific needs. By developing, disseminating, and  implementing an exchange of command instruction, the Navy recognized  that effective guidance is a key management tool needed to overcome  challenges associated with change such as rotational crewing on surface  ships and to facilitate efficient operations while establishing and  maintaining oversight and accountability. The guidance stipulated that   (1) the crew exchange process should nominally take 4 days; (2) the crews  involved in the transition process should familiarize themselves with  turnover guidance well in advance of the actual transition; and (3) when  possible, an advance team should complete as much of the turnover  process as possible before the crew exchange begins. Additionally, to  promote accountability and to ensure that individuals assuming duties on  a new ship are properly prepared to discharge their responsibilities, the  guidance requires the commanding officer transitioning off the ship to  initiate an exchange of command letter that addresses specific issues,  including the material condition of the ship; equipment issues and  deficiencies noted in casualty reports; inspection results; logistical issues,  including the status of shipboard equipment identified in the ship’s  consolidated shipboard allowance list; classified material inventories; and  supply and budgetary issues affecting the ship’s financial posture.
Furthermore, individual commands involved in or preparing to engage in  rotational crewing on surface ships also have developed or are in the  process of developing guidance, similar in format and content to the Naval  Surface Forces crew exchange guidance, but tailored to their specific  needs (for example, their unique missions, operations, or equipment). For  example, the Mine Warfare Command issued an instruction addressing  crew swap checklists to be used during crew rotations conducted aboard  HSV-2 Swift. Likewise, Mine Countermeasures Squadron Two issued  detailed guidance to address crew rotations occurring aboard Mine  Countermeasures Ships, and the Patrol Coastal Class Squadron issued  guidance to provide procedures covering crew rotations. These  instructions addressed the unique requirements associated with  rotationally crewed surface ships by discussing multicrew training,  advance correspondence between crews, and training exercises needed to  prepare crews to effectively conduct operations within a specific  operational area. In addition, LCS squadron officials are overseeing the  creation of a combined directives manual containing directives,  procedures, and policies that address issues such as the rotational crewing  turnover process, training, maintenance, and logistical requirements. The  LCS guidance intends to divide responsibilities for those stationed ashore  and afloat, define daily operations, promote teamwork, and support  continuity of command. These crew exchange instructions have addressed  some of the unique requirements associated with rotational crewing, but  without overarching guidance and individual ship-class concepts of  operations to ensure effective management, execution, and evaluation of  rotational crewing efforts, the Navy increases the risk that it will not  effectively implement current and future surface-ship rotational crewing  initiatives.
section_title: The Navy Has Not Implemented a Systematic Approach for Analyzing Rotational Crewing on Current and Future Ships
paragraphs: The Navy has completed some analyses of rotational crewing for its  surface ships; however, unlike the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative,  the Navy has not developed a systematic method for data collection and  analysis, assessment, and reporting of rotational crewing on current  surface ships, including the cost-effectiveness of rotational crewing  options. Additionally, the Navy has not fully analyzed or systematically  assessed rotational crewing options in the analysis of alternatives for  surface ships in development, including life-cycle costs.
subsections: section_title: The Navy Has Not Developed a Systematic Method for Data Collection, Analysis, and Reporting of Rotational Crewing on Current Surface Ships
paragraphs: The Atlantic DDG Sea Swap initiative used a comprehensive data- collection and analysis plan for collecting, analyzing, and evaluating data  and for reporting results. However, other Navy rotational crewing  initiatives have not developed data-collection and analysis plans, collected  and analyzed that data, and reported their findings. According to military  best practices, developing a data-collection and analysis plan is essential  to any experimental initiative by determining what needs to measured,  what data will be necessary to collect, and how the data are to be  analyzed. A data-collection and analysis plan consists of all data to be  collected, the content of the data (type, periodicity, and format), the  collection mechanism (automated or nonautomated processes, time  frame, location, and method), the data handling procedures, and  relationships of the data to the initiative itself. Additionally, data-collection  and analysis plans are important to transformational initiatives because  they ensure valid and reliable data are captured and understood, and that  the analysis undertaken addresses the key issues in the initiative. If  properly prepared and implemented, the data-collection and analysis plan  aids subsequent analysis efforts and helps analysts maintain the focus  needed to transform data collected into information that supports future  decisions. In accordance with military best practices, the Atlantic Fleet  DDG Sea Swap Experiment Analysis Plan identified areas that needed  to be measured (for example, morale and retention, training proficiency,  operational performance, operational performance for supporting the  Fleet Response Plan, long-term effect on ships’ material condition, cost of  implementation, and cost-performance trade offs), specific areas from  which to collect the data (Navy reports, messages, and survey data), and  how the data were to be analyzed (issues and subissues). Additionally, the  Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap plan identified overarching goals and key  analysis issues; developed an experimental design; and defined measures  and metrics. As a result, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap final report  was well organized, thoughtfully designed, and provided the reader  relevant information based on the original data-collection and analysis  plan. By clearly identifying the areas needed for measurement,  determining specific issues and subissues to be analyzed for each area,  and systematically collecting data in accordance with the original analysis  approach, the plan provided analysts and decision makers most of the data  needed to conduct comparative analyses and support future decisions.
Although the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Experiment Analysis Plan  was nearly comprehensive it did not include a thorough cost-effectiveness  analysis of the Sea Swap alternative, or any forms of rotational crewing.  The plan included a marginal-cost analysis that examined shorter-term  trade-offs between the Sea Swap concept and more traditional crewing  concepts; however, it did not specify a comprehensive cost-effectiveness  analysis that would determine the least costly crewing method to satisfy  Navy requirements. According to best practices, cost-effectiveness is a  method used by organizations seeking to gain the best value for their  money and to achieve operational requirements while balancing costs,  schedules, performance, and risks. The best value is often not readily  apparent and requires an analysis to maximize value. A cost-effectiveness  analysis is used where benefits cannot be expressed in monetary terms  but, rather, in “units of benefit,” for example, days of forward presence.  According to Office of Management and Budget guidance, a  comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis would include a comparison of  alternatives, in this case, crewing options, based on a life-cycle cost  analysis of each alternative. The plan called for a cost analysis using  categories based on the major issues it identified in the plan; however, the  plan acknowledges that these costs are limited, and a more detailed cost  model is needed so costs that differ between crewing options can be  identified and broken out for comparison. Additionally, the plan did not  call for an analysis of full life-cycle cost data, although it stated that future  rotational crewing concept analyses should consider life-cycle or total  ownership costs as a part of examining future force structure options.
While the Navy is collecting and compiling some data for the current  surface ships involved in rotational crewing initiatives (patrol coastal  ships, mine countermeasure ships, and HSV-2 Swift), there are no  systematic metrics or methods for collecting and evaluating rotational  crewing specific data similar to the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap  Experiment Analysis Plan. According to Navy officials, the Navy  routinely collects retention, morale, material condition, training, cost,  operational performance, and Fleet Response Plan–related data for all  surface ships. Data collection and analysis for surface ships falls under the  direction of the Surface Warfare Enterprise, an arm of the Commander,  Naval Surface Forces. One of the major tenets of the Surface Warfare  Enterprise and its cross-functional teams is to help recapitalize the future  Navy by managing with metrics, and reducing the total cost of doing  business. To that end, high-ranking Navy officials led by the Commander,  Naval Surface Forces, meet monthly to review and discuss the  effectiveness of various manning, training, equipping, and maintaining  processes. Although much of these data are similar to those collected in  the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap plan, the data are not as comprehensive  and are not consistent from initiative to initiative. Additionally, the Surface  Warfare Enterprise data collection and analyses did not link to the  effectiveness of different crewing alternatives. Currently, there are no  standard metrics or systematic methods for collecting rotational crewing– related data from surface ships because the Navy has not developed and  promulgated overarching guidance that requires a systematic data- collection, analysis, and reporting methodology. Consequently, the  potential value of rotational crewing is unknown and the Navy is hindering  its ability to determine optimal crewing concepts for ship classes.
section_title: The Navy Has Not Fully Analyzed or Systematically Assessed Rotational Crewing Options in the Analysis of Alternatives for Surface Ships in Development, Including Life-Cycle Costs
paragraphs: Navy surface-ship classes currently under development, the LCS, Joint  High Speed Vessel, and the DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class guided missile  destroyer, have not fully analyzed or systematically assessed rotational  crewing in their analysis of alternatives. Early in the development of a  new weapons system, DOD and the Navy require that an analysis of  alternatives be completed that identifies the most promising alternatives.  The analysis of alternatives process is intended to refine the initial weapon  systems concept and requires an evaluation of the performance,  operational effectiveness, operational suitability, and estimated costs,  including full life-cycle costs, of alternatives that satisfy established  capability needs. The analysis of alternatives assesses the advantages and  disadvantages of alternatives being considered to satisfy capabilities,  including the sensitivity of each alternative to possible changes in key  assumptions or variables. In at least three recent surface-ship acquisitions,  the Navy has not consistently applied these principles because it did not  thoroughly analyze and evaluate rotational crewing options and because  the Navy’s acquisition instruction does not explicitly require evaluating  rotational crewing in the Navy’s ship analysis of alternatives. However,  according to the Navy’s acquisition instruction, all analysis of alternatives  should include analysis of doctrine, organization, training, materiel,  management, leadership, personnel, and facilities as well as joint  implications. An evaluation of rotational crewing alternatives could affect  all of these things, including force-structure requirements. A  comprehensive evaluation could also show whether rotational crewing  meets forward presence requirements with fewer ships and lower life- cycle costs. Additionally, the Navy did not have specific overarching  rotational crewing guidance that would require such analysis and  assessments. As a result, Navy officials will not have sufficient information  to make informed investment decisions affecting future obligations of  billions of dollars.
The Navy identified rotational crewing as a crewing option for the LCS  early in the acquisition process; however, the Navy did not complete any  comprehensive analyses of rotational crewing alternatives in the ship’s  analysis of alternatives. The LCS analysis of alternatives included  assumptions that rotational crewing would be used on the ship; however,  the analysis did not identify and assess a range of rotational crewing  alternatives. Because the analysis did not identify a range of alternative  crewing options the Navy was not in position to assess the relative  operational effectiveness, suitability, and life-cycle costs of the rotational  crewing alternatives. For example, the Navy did not evaluate and compare  the relative forward presence and warfighting capabilities for standard and  rotational crewing alternatives and the potential effects on manpower,  training, and facilities. Without adequately analyzing and systematically  assessing different rotational crewing alternatives in the analysis of  alternatives, the Navy was not able to determine the optimal crewing  alternative for fulfilling its operational needs and maximizing returns on  investment. Additionally, without considering rotational crewing options  as part of the analysis of alternatives, cost-effective force structure  assessments are incomplete.
The Joint High Speed Vessel, a ship based on the operational successes of  other high-speed surface ships, including the HSV-2 Swift, did not include  rotational crewing in its analysis of alternatives despite highly successful  experiences with rotational crews on the Swift, an explicit need for  forward presence, and its classification as a high-demand, low-density  asset. The Swift has employed Blue-Gold rotational crewing while  conducting a range of missions, including experimentation, humanitarian  operations, and Global Fleet Station deployments. According to focus  groups, HSV-2 Swift sailors praised the predictability of the operating  cycle and Blue-Gold rotational crewing. Additionally, Fleet Commanders  and the commanding officers of the HSV-2 Swift Blue and Gold crews  provided positive feedback on the Swift mission performance. High  demand for the ship and its capabilities has been met because rotational  crewing enabled the ship to maintain a high operational availability and a  sustained forward presence. The Joint High Speed Vessel analysis of  alternatives considered some data and specifications from the Swift  design and operational experiences. However, the Joint High Speed Vessel  analysis of alternatives does not include any discussion of the Swift’s  rotational crewing experiences, despite their successes with maintaining a  very high operational availability. In the analysis of alternatives, the Joint  High Speed Vessel force structure requirements and basing options are  driven by forward presence and the need for critical response time, but  rotational crewing was not included as an option that may increase Joint  High Speed Vessel forward presence.
During the analysis of alternatives for the DDG-1000 guided missile  destroyer, rotational crewing was not thoroughly analyzed despite  statements by Navy officials early in the acquisition process and in the  original operational requirements document that linked rotational  crewing to the ship. The analysis of alternatives for the DDG-1000  compared the effects of rotational crewing and traditional crewing on the  number of ships required to generate forward presence requirements. The  evaluation showed that using rotational crewing alternatives, in place of  the traditional single crew approach, produces a higher forward presence  with fewer ships. Although the analysis of alternatives acknowledged that  rotational crewing met forward presence requirements, while requiring  fewer ships, the analysis of alternatives omitted further analyses of  rotational crewing for DDG-1000. Furthermore, the analysis of alternatives  addressed the rotational crewing concept, but did not analyze the effect of  different rotational crewing schemes on force structure, training, materiel,  and other aspects that would affect overall life-cycle costs. With a total of  seven planned ships, the DDG-1000 destroyer meets the high-demand, low- density benchmark for rotational crewing recommended by Naval Surface  Forces in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap report. According to Navy  officials, the Navy has no plans to utilize rotational crewing on the DDG- 1000, despite a lack of thorough analyses and the acknowledgement that  rotational crewing meets operational requirements with the use of fewer  ships. Without analyzing the costs and benefits of rotational crewing  alternatives, as compared to the traditional single crewing approach, the  Navy will not be able to make informed decisions about DDG-1000  procurements and future force structure.
Lastly, the analysis of alternatives for the next generation guided missile  cruiser, CG(X), is currently in the review process and had not been  released as of April 2008. Navy officials have identified the CG(X) ship as  a good candidate to be rotationally crewed. According to DOD  documentation, the analysis of alternatives for the CG(X) ship will analyze  and document major sustainment alternatives including variations in  service life, reliability, operating profiles, maintenance concepts,  manpower and crewing concepts (including crew rotation and Sea Swap),  and other relevant sustainment factors to fully characterize the range of  sustainment options. Although it is planned that the analysis of  alternatives for CG(X) will analyze different crewing options, a Naval Sea  Systems Command official could not provide us any information as to the  content of the study until it is completed.
section_title: Some Actions Have Been Taken to Collect and Use Lessons Learned from Rotational Crewing Experiences
paragraphs: The Navy has taken some actions to collect and use lessons-learned from  rotational crewing experiences. For example, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea  Swap initiative developed and implemented a robust lessons-learned plan.  Despite some progress in collecting and sharing lessons learned within  individual ship communities, the Navy’s efforts in many cases were not  systematic and did not use the Navy Lessons Learned System.  Additionally, the Navy has not developed overarching processes for the  systematic collection and dissemination of lessons learned pertaining  specifically to rotational crewing.
subsections: section_title: The Navy Has Taken Actions to Collect, Disseminate, and Capitalize on Lessons Learned from Rotational Crewing Experiences
paragraphs: The Navy has taken actions to collect, disseminate, and capitalize on  lessons learned pertaining to rotational crewing within individual  commands, using methods both formal and informal. For example, as part  of the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative, the Navy implemented a  robust lessons learned plan to actively collect feedback from destroyer  crews. The plan outlined a formal lessons learned process and established  a team to collect, review, and analyze lessons learned and ensure that they  were incorporated into policies and procedures. The team systematically  collected lessons learned from destroyer rotational crews by, among other  things, conducting interviews with crew members, reviewing ship message  traffic, and examining turnover observation reports. According to the  Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative report, draft lessons-learned  submissions underwent a well-defined review process to ensure quality,  completeness, and consistency. Lessons learned that were of immediate  utility were disseminated to Sea Swap initiative crews. Those relating to  management and oversight were vetted with the goal of supporting future  rotational crewing decision making and policy development. In addition,  the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative leveraged lessons learned from  the 2002–2004 Pacific Fleet Destroyer Sea Swap effort, incorporating them  into the development of operational plans.
Other ship communities, using less systematic processes, have also  captured and shared lessons learned within their communities. For  example, the mine warfare community compiled lessons learned following  a crew turnover in February 2007, when this community began using a  “Blue-Gold” rotational crewing alternative. The guided missile submarine  community, in planning for its implementation of rotational crewing,  developed lessons learned from a crew rotation exercise in Hawaii. These  lessons learned were disseminated to command officials and other ships  within this community and also can be accessed from an internal  submarine forces Web site’s lessons-learned page. In addition, LCS  officials stated that the LCS community shares lessons learned within the  command through direct feedback from crew members and in class  squadron, cross-functional team, and Oversight Board meetings. These  meetings provide a forum to identify potential barriers and propose  actions to resolve them, resulting in the development of lessons learned.  The LCS community also has conducted a series of crew swap exercises to  collect lessons learned regarding logistical support requirements in  forward-deployed locations. Officials stated that the lessons learned would  be incorporated into LCS standard operating procedures.
Lessons learned were shared between individual ship communities  through direct interaction and, on a more limited basis, the Navy Lessons  Learned System. Individual ship communities collected and shared lessons  learned primarily through direct interaction, such as meetings and site  visits. Table 2 highlights examples of direct actions taken to collect and  leverage lessons learned from rotational crewing experiences between  ship communities. In addition, lessons learned were collected and  disseminated through the Navy Lessons Learned System, which is a  central repository for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned  and a means to correct problems identified from fleet operations. The  Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative lessons-learned plan explicitly  incorporated into its goals the submission of lessons learned into this  system. Twenty-six lessons learned were recorded in the system, which  can be accessed by Navy personnel ashore and at sea through a classified  Internet site.
section_title: Despite Progress in Collecting and Sharing Lessons Learned, the Navy’s Efforts in Many Cases Were Not Systematic and Did Not Use the Navy Lessons Learned System
paragraphs: Despite the Navy’s progress in collecting and sharing lessons learned  within ship communities, its efforts in many cases were not systematic and  did not use the Navy’s Lessons Learned System. Instead, the development  and sharing of lessons learned relied on informal processes that are left to  individual ship commands, and thus were not done consistently across all  ship communities that use rotational crewing. For example, the mine  warfare and patrol coastal communities lack formal written processes to  collect lessons learned related specifically to rotational crewing, according  to command officials. Focus group responses from both these  communities indicate that efforts to gather lessons learned from  crewmembers and communicate them up the chain of command have  been inconsistent. A mine warfare community official stated that the  collection of lessons learned is largely dependent on the commanding  officer and is typically shared by word of mouth or e-mail. Furthermore,  while the LCS and guided missile submarine communities have taken  steps to collect and capitalize upon lessons learned before they  operationally deploy, officials stated that these communities have yet to  develop formal processes—such as written procedures or data-collection  plans—to gather and share lessons learned specifically related to  rotational crewing within their ship communities. LCS officials stated that  their community is small at present, allowing lessons learned to be  effectively shared informally, but acknowledged the need for formal  processes in the future. Without formal processes, the LCS and guided  missile submarine communities may be less likely to systematically collect  lessons learned—similar to the mine warfare and patrol coastal  communities—and therefore, miss opportunities to improve rotational  crewing implementation.
While ship communities have collected lessons learned among individual  commands through direct interaction, such as meetings and site visits,  they have not fully used the Navy Lessons Learned System to enhance  knowledge sharing. As of October 30, 2007, lessons learned directly related  to rotational crewing have yet to be recorded in the Navy Lessons Learned  System by the mine warfare, patrol coastal, HSV-2 Swift, guided missile  submarine, and LCS communities. In addition, ship command officials  from the mine warfare, patrol coastal, and LCS commands have indicated  that they have not used the Navy Lessons Learned System to access  lessons learned pertaining to rotational crewing. The following are  examples where difficulties experienced by current rotational crewing  efforts may have been addressed in previous lessons learned:  Issues such as personnel gaps and training deficiencies, lack of  accountable inventory control measures during the crew turnovers,  mitigating ship configuration differences, and the effect of limited port  visits on crew morale were identified as problem areas in focus group  discussions with mine warfare, patrol coastal, and guided missile  submarine rotational crews. However, lessons learned recorded by the  Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative in the Navy Lessons Learned  System had already addressed these issues.
As previously mentioned in this report, rotational crewing efforts have  been implemented in separate, disjointed efforts across ship  communities without top-down leadership because the Navy has not  established a management team to oversee and integrate rotational  crewing efforts. However, lessons learned from the Atlantic Fleet DDG  Sea Swap initiative recommended the creation of a management team  to, among other things, help define performance measures for  rotational crewing efforts and ensure that lessons learned are  documented and incorporated into existing policies and procedures.
The LCS community is trying to resolve barriers in transportation  logistics that are addressed by lessons learned from the guided missile  submarine community’s exercise to help solve transportation logistics  issues for forward-deployed crew turnovers. However, guided missile  submarine community officials stated that they have not entered  lessons learned from their rotational crewing experiences into the  Navy Lessons Learned System. Consequently, the LCS community has  not been able to capitalize on these lessons learned in its efforts to  address transportation logistics issues. Officials from both the guided  missile submarine and LCS communities stated that their experiences  are likely to be pertinent to current and future ship classes and  recognized the importance of recording lessons learned in the system  to benefit the rest of the Navy.
As the above examples demonstrate, by not fully utilizing the Navy  Lessons Learned System, the Navy may continue to experience difficulties  similar to those that previously recorded lessons learned sought to  correct. Until the system is used to leverage past lessons learned, ship  communities may miss opportunities to more effectively plan and conduct  crew rotations, and may be unable to potentially prevent problems that  were addressed in past rotational crewing experiences.
section_title: The Navy Has Not Developed Overarching Processes for the Systematic Collection and Dissemination of Lessons Learned Pertaining Specifically to Rotational Crewing
paragraphs: Lessons learned are not developed and shared consistently across all ship  communities that use rotational crewing because the Navy has not  developed overarching processes to help ensure that ship commands  systematically collect and disseminate lessons learned from their  rotational crewing experiences. While the Chief of Naval Operations  instruction for the Navy Lessons Learned System establishes a process  for the collection, validation, and distribution of unit feedback, Navy  Lessons Learned Program officials stated that the collection and sharing of  lessons learned is not required and, instead, is left to the discretion of  individual ship commands. Nonetheless, the Navy Warfare Development  Command, which is responsible for administering the Navy’s system, has  launched an initiative to actively collect lessons learned for major exercise  and events, using, for example, a lessons learned team and data-collection  plan to collect information. Navy Warfare Development Command officials  stated that, with the proper resources, it would be possible to employ  similar active collection methods specifically for rotational crewing  efforts. However, aside from the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative,  the Navy has not developed processes to guide the active and systematic  collection of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational crewing.  The initiative’s concept of operations stressed the importance of high- quality lessons learned in implementing new crewing concepts. It also  expressly incorporated the Navy Lessons Learned System into lessons  learned processes. However, these processes applied only to the Atlantic  Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative and were not used in other ship  communities. According to the concept of operations, the risks of not  taking a proactive approach to lessons learned include failing to document  policy changes and preserve process improvements, which is important  given the high turnover of personnel during the time frame of the initiative.  Similar turnover issues may apply to other ship communities that employ  rotational crewing. Without overarching guidance to promote the  systematic collection and dissemination of lessons learned across all ship  communities, knowledge about rotational crewing may be lost and crews  will be unable to benefit from the Navy’s collective experiences.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Given the fiscal environment facing the Navy and the rest of the federal  government, decision makers must make investment decisions that  maximize return on investment at the best value for the taxpayer.  Rotational crewing can be a viable alternative to mitigate affordability  challenges in the Navy while supporting a high pace of operations and an  array of mission requirements. As a result, the Navy must be in a better  position to make informed decisions about the potential for applying  rotational crewing to current and future ships. As new ships become  increasingly expensive it is imperative that rotational crewing alternatives  are fully considered early in the acquisition process when the department  conducts analysis of alternatives. Without comprehensive analysis of  alternatives, cost-effective force structure assessments are incomplete and  the Navy does not have a complete picture of the number of ships it needs  to acquire.
While the Navy has made progress in refining rotational crewing concepts,  the Navy has not taken all of the steps that would be helpful to effectively  manage rotational crewing efforts and assess crewing options for current  and future ships. The Navy has made significant progress since our  November 2004 report on rotational crewing. For example, the Atlantic  Fleet DDG Sea Swap benefited from an implementation team that  developed and implemented a nearly comprehensive experiment analysis  plan, promulgated a detailed concept of operations, and recorded and  disseminated lessons learned. Further, several ship commands have  promulgated their own crew-exchange instructions and concepts of  operations.
Progress has been limited, however, to specific rotational crewing efforts  and has not been systematically integrated across the Navy. Without a  comprehensive management approach that includes top-level leadership  and an implementation team to guide and assess rotational crewing, the  Navy can not be assured that rotational crewing efforts are coordinated  and integrated as it attempts to lead a successful transformation of its  ship-crewing culture. Further, without an overarching instruction to guide  rotational crewing initiatives, the Navy may limit the potential for  successfully managing, implementing, and evaluating rotational crewing as  a transformational means of increasing capabilities in a cost-effective  manner.
The Navy has also not developed a systematic approach to analyzing  rotational crewing alternatives or collecting and sharing related lessons  learned. Without a systematic approach to analyzing rotational crewing  alternatives on current and future ships, the Navy may not be able to  determine if particular alternatives are successful in, or have the potential  for, fulfilling operational needs and maximizing return on investment. As a  result, the Navy may not develop and procure the most cost-effective mix  of ships to meet operational needs. Additionally, by not systematically  collecting and using lessons learned from rotational crewing experiences,  the Navy risks repeating mistakes and could miss opportunities to more  effectively plan and conduct crew rotations.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To facilitate the successful transformation of the Navy’s ship-crewing  culture, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary  of the Navy to take the following three actions:    assign clear leadership and accountability for managing rotational    establish an overarching implementation team to provide day-to-day  management oversight of rotational crewing efforts, coordinate and  integrate efforts, and apply their results to the fleet; and   develop and promulgate overarching guidance to provide the high-level  vision and guidance needed to consistently and effectively manage,  implement, and evaluate all rotational crewing efforts.
To ensure effective management, implementation, and evaluation of  rotational crewing efforts, we recommend that the Commander, U.S. Fleet  Forces, direct the development and promulgation of concepts of  operations by all ship communities using or planning to use rotational  crewing, that include a description of how rotational crewing may be  employed and the details of by whom, where, and how it is to be  accomplished, employed, and executed.
To ensure that the Navy assesses the potential of different rotational  crewing alternatives for improving performance and reducing costs for  ship classes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretary of the Navy, under the purview of the implementation team, to  take the following two actions:    develop a standardized, systematic method for data collection and  analysis, assessment, and reporting on the results of rotational crewing  efforts, including a comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis that  includes life-cycle costs, for all rotational crewing efforts; and  require, as part of the mandatory analysis of alternatives in the concept  refinement phase of the defense acquisition process, assessments of  potential rotational crewing options for each class of surface ship in  development, including full life-cycle costs of each crewing option.
To ensure that the Navy effectively leverages lessons learned, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy  to take the following two actions:    develop overarching guidance to ensure the systematic collection and  dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational  crewing; and incorporate components of the lessons-learned approach outlined in  the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations, including,  among other things, establishing a lessons-learned team, developing a  data-collection plan, and increasing use of the Navy Lessons Learned  System.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: Because DOD disagreed with our recommendations dealing with assigning  clear leadership, establishing an implementation team, developing and  promulgating overarching guidance, and improving the use of lessons  learned, we are suggesting that Congress consider requiring the Secretary  of Defense to direct the Secretary of the Navy to    assign clear leadership and accountability for managing rotational crewing    establish an overarching implementation team to provide day-to-day  management oversight of rotational crewing efforts, coordinate and  integrate efforts, and apply their results to the fleet;     develop and promulgate overarching guidance to provide the high-level  vision and guidance needed to consistently and effectively manage,  implement, and evaluate all rotational crewing efforts;     develop overarching guidance to ensure the systematic collection and  dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational  crewing; and   incorporate components of the lessons-learned approach outlined in the  Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations, including, among  other things, establishing a lessons-learned team, developing a data- collection plan, and increasing use of the Navy Lessons Learned System.
Congress should also consider requiring Secretary of Defense to direct the  Secretary of the Navy to report to Congress on its progress when the  President’s budget for fiscal year 2010 is submitted to Congress.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD, in its comments on a draft of this report, partially agreed with our  three recommendations regarding concepts of operations, data collection  and analysis, and rotational crewing assessments during surface-ship  analysis of alternatives. DOD disagreed with our five other  recommendations that would assign clear leadership and accountability  for managing rotational crewing efforts; establish an overarching  implementation team; develop and promulgate overarching guidance to  provide the high-level vision and guidance needed to consistently and  effectively manage, implement, and evaluate all rotational crewing efforts;  ensure the systematic collection and dissemination of lessons learned  pertaining specifically to rotational crewing; and incorporate components  of the lessons-learned approach outlined in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea  Swap Concept of Operations. DOD stated that measures are already in  place to manage ship and submarine manning, training, and equipping.  However, as discussed below, we do not believe that the Navy’s actions go  far enough in providing leadership, management, and guidance in  transforming the Navy’s surface-ship-crewing culture; collecting data,  analyzing, reporting, and integrating the results of different rotational  crewing efforts; and in documenting and acting on lessons it has learned  during implementation of different rotational crewing alternatives. As  such, the Navy may be missing opportunities to improve its  transformational capabilities and cost-effectively increase surface-ship  operational availability. Therefore, we are suggesting that Congress  consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to direct the Secretary of the  Navy to implement our recommendations and report to Congress on its  progress when the President’s budget for fiscal year 2010 is submitted to  Congress. The department also provided technical comments which were  incorporated as appropriate. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their  entirety in appendix III. Our specific comments follow.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Navy facilitate the  successful transformation of its ship-crewing culture by assigning clear  leadership and accountability for managing rotational crewing efforts.  DOD stated that the Department of the Navy has existing clear leadership  and accountability for the manning of ships and submarines and that this  management structure includes oversight and leadership within both  operational and administrative chains of command. It further noted that  additional organizational structure dedicated to rotational crewing is  unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. We have identified several  key management practices at the center of implementing transformational  programs, which include ensuring that top leadership drives the  transformation. While the Navy has administrative and operational  management structures, there is not a designated leader to manage all  rotational crewing efforts in the Department of the Navy. As a result,  numerous separate rotational crewing efforts continue with little, if any,  top-down leadership and coordination, and no team or steering group  exists within the Navy to manage the transformation of the Navy’s ship- crewing culture. We continue to believe that our recommendation merits  further action and have included this issue in a matter for congressional  consideration.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Navy should establish  an overarching implementation team to provide day-to-day management  oversight of rotational crewing efforts, coordinate and integrate efforts,  and apply their results to the Fleet. DOD stated that the Navy already  exercises day-to-day management to support ship and submarine manning  and training and that an implementation team dedicated to rotational  crewing is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. We reported in  2003 that key practices for successful transformations include that an  implementation team should be responsible for the day-to-day  management of transformation to ensure various initiatives are integrated.  Although the Navy has established implementation teams for selected  rotational crewing initiatives and has other existing management  structures, it has not established an implementation team for managing all  rotational crewing programs to ensure successful transformation of the  Navy’s ship-crewing culture. As a result, the Navy does not have a  dedicated team or steering group that can devote focused attention,  provide a communication structure, apply lessons learned, and execute  other key practices that would build on its successful efforts and ensure  consistent management of rotational crewing across the fleet. We continue  to believe that our recommendation merits further action and have  included this issue in a matter for congressional consideration.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Navy should develop  and promulgate overarching guidance to provide the high-level vision and  guidance needed to consistently and effectively manage, implement, and  evaluate all rotational crewing efforts. DOD stated that the Navy has  sufficient guidance in place to provide the high-level vision necessary to  manage ship and submarine manning. As discussed in the report, the Navy  has developed guidance for some rotational crewing efforts. However, the  development, dissemination, and implementation of rotational crewing  guidance has been inconsistent and fragmented. As noted in this report, an  overarching directive for rotational crewing would provide essential and  consistent Navy-wide policy and guidance on rotational crewing efforts;  establish leadership, delegate authority, and assign responsibilities; assign  missions, functions, or tasks; and establish a reporting requirement. DOD  also stated that, although rotational crewing includes some unique crew  considerations and support requirements, the training and support of  sailors involved in rotational crewing are little different than those for  sailors in the standard crewing process. We agree that the goals and  objectives of ship and crew training and support are little different  between rotational and standard crews. However, as shown in some of the  concepts of operations and in the Navy Lessons Learned System, crew  exchange guidance for rotational crewing and the execution of training  and support for rotational crewing efforts can provide many unique  challenges for sailors, in addition to the challenge of adapting sailors to a  change in ship-crewing culture. We continue to believe that our  recommendation merits further action and have included this issue in a  matter for congressional consideration.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Commander, U.S.  Fleet Forces, direct the development and promulgation of concepts of  operations by all ship communities using or planning to use rotational  crewing. DOD stated that the Navy already uses appropriate concepts for  fleet operations and, when or if additional rotational crewing is warranted,  the Navy will issue specific guidance, instructions, and concepts of  operations. While we strongly support the Navy’s efforts to develop  concepts of operations that guide fleet rotational crewing efforts, its  efforts have been inconsistent. For example, ship communities, such as  patrol coastal and mine warfare, have experienced implementation  challenges because they lacked key information such as the roles and  responsibilities of individual decision makers, managers, and leaders  involved in rotational crewing execution. For these reasons, we continue  to believe that our recommendation merits further action and that the  Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces, should direct the development and  promulgation of concepts of operations by all ship communities using or  planning to use rotational crewing, using the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap  Concept of Operations as a model for other rotational crewing initiatives.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Navy develop a  standardized, systematic method for data collection and analysis,  assessment, and reporting on the results of rotational crewing efforts,  including a comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis that includes life- cycle costs, for all rotational crewing efforts. DOD stated that the Navy has  no plans for broad general application of rotational crewing to all ship  classes, and a standing implementation team and data collection is  unnecessary. DOD also stated that the Navy will conduct appropriate  studies to determine if and when additional rotational crewing is  appropriate based on cost effectiveness. While we support DOD’s efforts  to proactively conduct studies, based on cost effectiveness, to determine if  and when rotational crewing is appropriate to use on surface ships, we  urge the Navy to take steps to develop a standardized, systematic method  for collecting data and analyzing, assessing, and reporting results,  including cost-effectiveness analysis, on all rotational crewing efforts,  including those currently underway. As discussed in the report, the  Surface Warfare Enterprise is collecting data from surface ships, including  those participating in rotational crewing initiatives; however, the data they  collect is not consistent from initiative to initiative, and none of the data  are tied to the effectiveness of different crewing schemes or rotational  versus traditional crewing schemes. DOD also stated that the LCS is the  only new ship class that currently plans on implementing rotational  crewing. While we agree that the LCS is the only new ship class with  definitive plans to rotationally crew its ships, several other future ship  classes, including the Joint High Speed Vessel, DDG-1000, and CG(X), still  fit the requirements of potential rotationally crewed ships, as described by  Fleet Forces Command. Therefore, we continue to believe, as we have  recommended, that DOD should direct the Navy to develop a standardized,  systematic method for data collection and analysis, assessment, and  reporting on the results of rotational crewing efforts, including a  comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis that includes life-cycle costs, so  that the potential value of rotational crewing will be known and the Navy  will be able to determine optimal crewing concepts for current and future  ship classes.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Navy require, as  part of the mandatory analysis of alternatives in the concept refinement  phase of the defense acquisition process, assessments of potential  rotational crewing options for each class of surface ship in development,  including full life-cycle costs of each crewing option. DOD agreed that all  feasible crewing options should be considered during the concept  refinement phase of the defense acquisition process. Ships determined to  have a potential advantageous rotational crewing application will assess  and include this option among the various crewing alternatives reported  by the analysis of alternatives. We support DOD’s assessment that all  feasible rotational crewing options should be considered during the  concept refinement phase in the analysis of alternatives.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Navy develop  overarching guidance to ensure the systematic collection and  dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational  crewing. DOD stated that the Navy already uses “lessons learned” tools as  part of the rotational crewing and that further guidance to use these tools  is not needed. We support the progress the Navy has made in collecting  lessons learned and documenting these lessons in the Navy Lessons  Learned System. However, as discussed in the report, most ship  communities did not submit or draw on lessons in the Navy Lessons  Learned System to enhance knowledge sharing or learn from others’  experiences. For example, the mine warfare, patrol coastal, LCS, and  guided missile submarine communities lack formal written processes to  collect lessons learned related specifically to rotational crewing. Without  guidance to ensure collection and dissemination of lessons learned, the  Navy unnecessarily risks repeating past mistakes and could miss  opportunities to more effectively plan and conduct crew rotations.  Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendation merits further  action and have included this issue in a matter for congressional  consideration.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Navy incorporate  components of the lessons-learned approach outlined in the Atlantic Fleet  DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations, including, among other things,  establishing a lessons-learned team, developing a data-collection plan, and  increasing use of the Navy Lessons Learned System. DOD stated that the  Navy already relies on data collection and analysis from ships and that  requiring already implemented rotational crewing efforts to adopt  experimental data collection procedures is unnecessary. DOD further  stated that procedures are already in place for crews, rotational or  standard, to provide data to the chain of command to identify  improvements. As discussed in the report, the Navy has taken some  actions to collect, disseminate, and capitalize on lessons learned from its  crew rotation experiences. However, despite some progress in collecting  and sharing lessons learned within individual ship communities, the  Navy’s efforts in many cases were not systematic and did not use the Navy  Lessons Learned System. Instead, the development and sharing of lessons  learned relied on informal processes that are left to individual ship  commands, and thus were not done consistently across all ship  communities that use rotational crewing. The initiative ensured  documentation of lessons learned by outlining a requirement and a  process in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations. The  concept of operations also noted that the risks of not taking a proactive  approach to lessons learned include failing to document policy changes  and preserve process improvements, which is important given the high  turnover of personnel during the time frame of the initiative. We believe  that our recommendation merits further action and have included this  issue in a matter for congressional consideration.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretary of the Navy; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the  Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies  available to other congressional committees and interested parties on  request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation
subsections: section_title: Ohio-class Ballistic Missile Submarine
paragraphs: Nuclear-powered Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, also known as  Trident submarines, provide the sea-based leg of the triad of U.S. strategic  deterrent forces and the most survivable nuclear strike capability. The  ballistic missile submarine force consists of 14 submarines—6 homeported  in Kings Bay, Georgia, and 8 in Bangor, Washington. Each submarine has  about 15 officers and 140 enlisted personnel.
To maintain a constant at-sea presence, a Blue-Gold rotational crewing  concept is employed on these submarines. Each ship has a “Blue” Crew  and a “Gold” Crew, each with its own respective ship command. The ship  deploys with one of these crews for 77 days, followed by a 2- to 3-day crew  turnover and a 35-day maintenance period. For example, after a Blue Crew  deployment, the Gold Crew takes command of the boat following a 3-day  turnover process. The Blue Crew assists the Gold Crew in conducting  maintenance repairs. During the Gold Crew’s patrol, the Blue Crew stands  down and enters a training cycle in its homeport.
section_title: Ohio-class Guided Missile Submarine
paragraphs: The first four of the Ohio-class Trident fleet ballistic missile submarines  are being converted to nuclear-powered guided missile and special- operations submarines. Two submarines will be homeported in Kings Bay,  Georgia, and two will be homeported in Bangor, Washington. Each  submarine has about 15 officers and 144 enlisted personnel and can carry  up to 66 Special Operations Forces personnel.
According to Navy officials, in order to provide greater operational  availability, Blue-Gold rotational crewing is employed on these  submarines. Each submarine has a “Blue” crew and a “Gold” crew and  each crew has its own respective command. The operating cycle consists  of four alternating Blue and Gold crew deployments averaging about 73  days followed by a homeport maintenance period of 100 days. Two- to 3- day crew turnovers will take place overseas at sites such as Guam and  Diego Garcia and coincide with a 23-day voyage-repair period.
section_title: Arleigh Burke–class Guided Missile Destroyer
paragraphs: The Arleigh Burke–class guided missile destroyers provide multimission  offensive and defensive capabilities, operating independently or as part of  other naval formations. The guided missile destroyer force consists of 52  ships—with primary homeports in San Diego, California, and Norfolk,  Virginia. Each destroyer has about 24 officers and 250 enlisted personnel.
The Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, conducted a  Sea Swap initiative during 2005–2007, as a follow-on to the 2002–2004  proof-of-concept demonstration conducted by the Commander, Naval  Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Both Sea Swap experiments involved  three guided missile destroyers and three crews, with crews rotating every  6 months to the forward-deployed ship.
section_title: Cyclone-class Patrol Coastal
paragraphs: The Cyclone-class patrol coastal ships are small Navy vessels used to  conduct surveillance and shallow-water interdiction operations in support  of maritime homeland security operations and coastal patrol of foreign  shores. The patrol coastal force consists of eight ships—five homeported  in Bahrain and three in Little Creek, Virginia. Five additional ships will be  returned from loan to the U.S. Coast Guard over the next 3 years. Each  patrol coastal has about 4 officers and 26 enlisted personnel.
According to Navy officials, the Navy is using a Horizon rotational crewing  model on patrol coastal ships in which 13 crews rotate among the eight  ships in order to increase operation days in the Arabian Gulf. Each crew  spends 6 months deployed to Bahrain and then 10 months training in  homeport in Virginia.
section_title: Avenger-class Mine Countermeasure
paragraphs: The Avenger-class mine countermeasure ships are mine hunter-killers  capable of finding, classifying, and destroying moored and bottom mines.  The mine countermeasure ship force consists of 14 ships—8 homeported  in Ingleside, Texas, 4 homeported in Bahrain, and 2 homeported in Sasebo,  Japan. Each mine countermeasure ship has about 8 officers and 76  enlisted personnel.
According to Navy officials, in order to increase operation days in the  Arabian Gulf, the Navy utilizes a Blue-Gold-Silver rotational crewing  model on mine countermeasure ships. A “Blue” crew and a “Gold” crew  are assigned to each of the four ships in Bahrain and four of the eight ships  in Texas. The “Blue” and “Gold” crews rotate by spending 4 months  deployed in Bahrain and then 4 months back in Texas. Four remaining  crews in Texas make up “Silver” crews assigned to the other four ships in  Texas.
section_title: High Speed Vessel (HSV) 2 Swift
paragraphs: The HSV-2 Swift is a high-speed wave-piercing aluminum-hulled  catamaran that was acquired as an interim mine warfare command and  support ship and a platform for conducting joint experimentation,  including Littoral Combat Ship program development. The Swift has about  45 crew members (officer and enlisted). The Navy leased and accepted  delivery of the Swift from the builder, Bollinger/Incat, in August 2003.
The Swift utilizes Blue-Gold crewing to maximize operational availability.  The “Blue” crew is based in Ingleside, Texas, and the “Gold” crew in Little  Creek, Virginia. Each crew operates the ship for about 117 days, with 3–4  day crew exchanges occurring wherever the ship happens to be at the end  of that period whether homeport or at overseas locations.
section_title: Littoral Combat Ship
paragraphs: The Littoral Combat Ship is a new class of Navy surface combatants that is  intended to be fast, agile, and tailorable to the specific missions of  antisurface warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and mine warfare in heavily  contested littoral and near-shore waters. Interchangeable mission  packages will be used to assure access to the littorals for Navy forces in  the face of threats from surface craft, submarines, and mines. The Navy  plans to build 55 of these ships over the life of the program, as well as 24  mine-warfare mission packages, 24 surface-warfare mission packages, and  16 anti-submarine-warfare mission packages. The Littoral Combat Ship  core crew, which will man the seaframe, will have 40 crewmembers while  each mission package will have a maximum of 15 personnel onboard, and  the aviation detachment will have 23.
In order to increase operational availability, the Navy is exploring various  rotational crewing options. The first two ships now under construction  will utilize the Blue-Gold rotational crewing model. As more ships are  commissioned, the Navy plans to use a rotational crewing concept similar  to the one employed on mine warfare ships. Specifically, the Navy  envisions using four crews to operate three ships based in the continental  United States, of which one ship would be forward-deployed at any given  time.
section_title: DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class Multimission Destroyer
paragraphs: Developed under the DD(X) destroyer program, the DDG-1000 Zumwalt is  the lead ship of a class of next-generation multimission destroyers tailored  for land attack and littoral dominance. The Zumwalt-class will provide  forward presence and deterrence, and operate as an integral part of joint  and combined expeditionary forces. The ship has not been built, but the  first ship is planned for delivery to the Navy in 2013. The planned  procurement of the DDG-1000 will be completed by fiscal year 2013 with a  total of seven ships. Current DDG-1000 plans anticipate a crew size of 148  people including a 28 person aviation detachment.
The Navy currently plans to utilize the standard one-ship, one-crew model  on the DDG-1000. However, in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap report,  Fleet Forces Command notes that rotational crewing models are being  considered for the DDG-1000, likely due to their role as a high-demand,  low-density asset.
section_title: Joint High Speed Vessel
paragraphs: The Joint High Speed Vessel will provide combatant commanders high- speed intratheater sealift mobility with inherent cargo handling and the  capability of transporting personnel, equipment, and supplies over  operational distances in support of maneuver and sustainment operations.  The ship has not been built, but the first ship is planned for delivery to the  Navy in 2011. According to Navy officials, there are eight ships in the  current program of record—3 Navy and 5 Army. Current Navy plans  anticipate a crew size of about 40 persons. Naval Sea Systems Command  officials explained that crewing alternatives for the Joint High Speed  Vessel are still under development. Officials also explained that the Navy  has not selected a material solution for the Joint High Speed Vessel and is  in source selection for multiple concept designs.
section_title: CG(X)-class Cruiser
paragraphs: The Navy is currently developing technologies and studying design options  for a planned new air- and missile-defense surface combatant, the CG(X)  cruiser. The Navy is currently reviewing an analysis of alternatives to  determine what capabilities and design the CG(X) will have, including  nuclear power options. The Navy intends to begin buying the CG(X)  cruiser in 2011 and amass a total ship force of 19 ships. Crew size has not  been determined. Naval Sea Systems Command officials explained that  crewing alternatives for the CG(X) are still under development. Officials  also explained that the Navy has not selected a material solution for  CG(X), as it is premilestone A and the Analysis of Alternatives is in review  within the Navy.
section_title: Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which the Navy employed a comprehensive  management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing  efforts and transform its ship-crewing culture, we interviewed officials  from the Department of the Navy, Fleet headquarters, and the private  sector; reviewed relevant Navy practices and speeches by Navy leadership;  received briefings from relevant officials; and compared the Navy’s  approach with our prior work on best practices for managing and  implementing organizational transformations. To identify these best  practices, we reviewed our prior work including GAO, Results-Oriented  Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational  Transformations. We reviewed key documents including the Littoral  Combat Ship Platform Wholeness Concept of Operations and the U.S.  Fleet Forces DDG Sea Swap Initiative Final Report. We also conducted  focus groups with crews participating in rotational crewing initiatives to  obtain views, insights, and feelings of Navy submarine and ship officers  and enlisted personnel, as well as to determine the extent to which the  Navy had transformed its ship-crewing culture. In addition, we examined  key documents from the Navy’s Fleet Training area to demonstrate the  architecture of an overarching implementation team.
To assess the extent to which the Navy has developed, disseminated, and  implemented guidance for rotational crewing on surface ships, we  interviewed officials from the U.S. Fleet Forces Command; Commander,  Naval Surface Forces; and Commander, Naval Submarine Forces. We also  interviewed officials from the Patrol Coastal Class Squadron; Mine  Countermeasures Squadrons One, Two, and Three; Submarine Group  Trident; HSV-2 Swift; and the Littoral Combat Ship Class Squadron. In  addition, we obtained and reviewed exchange of command guidance  issued by Commander, Naval Surface Forces, and its subordinate  commands, including the Commander, Mine Warfare Command,  Commander Mine Countermeasures Squadron Two, Patrol Coastal Class  Squadron, and Regional Support Organization Norfolk that provided  oversight of the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap ships and crews. We also  obtained and reviewed concept of operations for the Atlantic Fleet DDG  Sea Swap, the Littoral Combat Ship, and guided missile submarine  program. To assess the potential usefulness and application of concepts of  operations we reviewed best practices guidance in the Navy, Department  of Defense, and the Department of Transportation.
To assess the extent to which the Navy has analyzed, evaluated, and  assessed potential rotational crewing efforts for current and future ships,  we interviewed officials from the Department of the Navy, Fleet  headquarters, and the private sector; and received briefings from relevant  officials. We reviewed and analyzed the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap  Experiment Analysis Plan and the U.S. Fleet Forces DDG Sea Swap  Initiative Final Report. We also reviewed the analysis of alternatives  guidance contained in DOD and Navy acquisition instructions and the  Defense Acquisition Guidebook. We also obtained and analyzed the  analysis of alternatives for several ships in development, including the  DDG-1000, Littoral Combat Ship, and Joint High Speed Vessel. To  determine military best practices for data collection and evaluation, we  reviewed several key documents including the Guide for Understanding  and Implementing Defense Experimentation and the Navy Warfare  Development Command’s Analysis in Sea Trial Experimentation, and  prior GAO reports. In addition, we conducted focus groups with crews  participating in rotational crewing initiatives to obtain views, insights, and  feelings of Navy submarine and surface-ship officers and enlisted  personnel, as well as to determine the extent to which the Navy collects,  analyzes, and evaluates rotational crewing data.
To assess the extent to which the Navy has systematically collected,  disseminated, and capitalized on lessons learned from past and current  rotational crewing experiences, we interviewed officials from the  following Navy commands: Navy Warfare Development Command, Naval  Surface Forces Command, Mine Countermeasure Class Squadron, Patrol  Coastal Class Squadron; from the guided missile submarine, HSV-2 Swift,  and LCS communities; and we conducted 19 focus group meetings with  rotational crews. We also obtained and reviewed the Atlantic Fleet DDG  Sea Swap Experiment Analysis Plan, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap  Concept of Operations, the U.S. Fleet Forces DDG Sea Swap Initiative  Final Report, the Littoral Combat Ship Platform Wholeness Concept of  Operations, and documentation of lessons learned from the guided missile  destroyer (DDG), mine warfare, and guided missile submarine  communities. In addition, we queried the Navy Lessons Learned System  for lessons learned pertaining directly to rotational crewing and reviewed  Navy Lessons Learned System guidance. We assessed the Navy Lessons  Learned System by interviewing program officials, requesting data queries  by these officials and comparing the results of these queries with our own  data queries, and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our  analysis.
subsections: section_title: Washington, D.C.
section_title: Norfolk, Virginia
section_title: Little Creek, Virginia
section_title: San Diego, California
section_title: Ingleside, Texas
paragraphs: Commander, Mine Countermeasure Class Squadron    Squadron One, Squadron Two, and Squadron Three    U.S.S. Chief (MCM-14)
section_title: Bangor, Washington
paragraphs: Commander, Submarine Group Trident    Naval Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Pacific Northwest  (formerly Trident Refit Facility)
Trident Training Facility    U.S.S. Ohio (SSGN-726)
section_title: Focus Groups with Crews on Rotational Crewing Ships
paragraphs: We conducted focus group meetings with Navy submarine and ship  officers and enlisted personnel who were involved in crew rotations.  Focus groups involve structured small group discussions designed to gain  more in-depth information about specific issues that cannot easily be  obtained from single or serial interviews. As with typical focus group  methodologies, our design included multiple groups with varying group  characteristics but some homogeneity—such as rank and responsibility— within groups. Most groups involved 7 to 10 participants. Discussions were  held in a structured manner, guided by a moderator who used a  standardized list of questions to encourage participants to share their  thoughts and experiences. Our overall objective in using a focus group  approach was to obtain views, insights, and feelings of Navy submarine  and ship officers and enlisted personnel involved in crew rotations.
section_title: Scope of Our Focus Groups
paragraphs: To gain broad perspectives, we conducted 19 separate focus group  sessions with multiple groups of Navy ship officers and enlisted personnel  involved in crew rotations on a broad range of ship types, from small  focused mission ships such as patrol coastals to larger, more complex  ships such as nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed strategic missile  submarines. Table 3 identifies the composition of the focus groups on  each of the vessels. Across focus groups, participants were selected to  ensure a wide distribution of officers, enlisted personnel, seniority, and  ship departments. GAO analysts traveled to three naval stations to conduct  the focus groups.
section_title: Methodology for Our Focus Groups
paragraphs: We conducted focus groups with all ship communities currently  participating in rotational crewing. The number of focus groups we  conducted varied by ship community depending upon ship crew sizes, the  types of crew member responsibilities (e.g., command, engineering, and  maintenance) and the experience level of the crew members. We  developed a guide to assist the moderator in leading the discussions. The  guide helped the moderator address several topics related to crew  rotations: training, maintenance, infrastructure and operations,  management and oversight, readiness, crew characteristics, quality of life,  lessons learned, and overall satisfaction with the rotational crewing  experience. We assured participants anonymity of their responses, in that  names would not be directly linked to their responses.
section_title: Limitations of Focus Groups
paragraphs: Methodologically, focus groups are not designed to (1) demonstrate the  extent of a problem or to generalize results to a larger population,   (2) develop a consensus to arrive at an agreed-upon plan or make  decisions about what actions to take, or (3) provide statistically  representative samples or reliable quantitative estimates. Instead, they are  intended to generate in-depth information about the focus group  participants’ reasons for the attitudes held toward specific topics and to  offer insights into the range of concerns and support for an issue.
The projectability of the information produced by our focus groups is  limited for several reasons. First, they represent the responses of Navy  ship officers and enlisted personnel from the 19 selected groups. Second,  while the composition of the groups was designed to assure a distribution  of Navy officers, enlisted personnel, seniority, and ship departments, the  groups were not randomly sampled. Third, participants were asked  questions about their specific experiences with crew rotations. The  experiences of other Navy ship officers and personnel involved in crew  rotations, who did not participate in our focus group, may have varied.
Because of these limitations, we did not rely entirely on focus groups, but  rather used several different methodologies to corroborate and support  our conclusions.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
paragraphs: GAO DRAFT REPORT – DATED APRIL 8, 2008  “FORCE STRUCTURE:  Ship Rotational Crewing Initiatives Would Benefit   From Top Level Leadership, Navywide Guidance, Comprehensive Analysis   and Improved Lessons Learned Sharing”
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Navy to assign clear leadership and accountability for managing  rotational crewing efforts.
DOD RESPONSE:  Non-concur.   The Department of the Navy has clear leadership and  accountability for the manning of ships and submarines.  This management structure  includes oversight and leadership within both operational and administrative chains of  command.  These organizational structures provide for manning, training and equipping  all Navy ships and submarines regardless of crewing concept.  Additional organizational  structure dedicated to rotational crewing is unnecessary and potentially  counterproductive.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Navy to establish an overarching implementation team to provide  day-to-day management oversight of rotational crewing efforts, coordinate and integrate  efforts, and apply their results to the Fleet.
DOD RESPONSE:   Non-concur.  The Navy already exercises day-to-day management  to support ship and submarine manning and training.  An implementation team dedicated  to rotational crewing is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Navy to develop and promulgate overarching guidance to provide the  high-level vision and guidance needed to consistently and effectively manage,  implement, and evaluate all rotational crewing efforts.
DoD RESPONSE: Non-concur.   The Navy has sufficient guidance in place to provide  the high-level vision necessary to manage ship and submarine manning.  Although  rotational crewing includes some unique crew considerations and support requirements,  the training and support of Sailors involved in rotational crewing are little different than  those for Sailors in the standard crewing process.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommends that the Commander, U.S. Fleet  Forces direct the development and promulgation of concepts of operations by all ship  communities, using or planning to use rotational crewing, that include a description of  how rotational crewing may be employed and the details of by whom, where, and how it  is to be accomplished, employed, and executed.
DoD RESPONSE: Partial concur.  The Navy already uses appropriate concepts for Fleet  operations.  When or if additional rotational crewing is warranted, the Navy will issue  specific guidance, instructions, and/or concepts of operations.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Navy, under the purview of the implementation team, to develop a  standardized, systematic method for data collection and analysis, assessment and  reporting on the results of rotational crewing efforts, including a comprehensive cost- effectiveness analysis that includes life cycle costs, for all rotational crewing efforts.
DoD RESPONSE: Partial concur.  The Littoral Combat Ship is the only new ship class  that currently plans on implementing rotational crewing. The Navy has no plans for broad  general application of rotational crewing to all ship classes, and a standing  implementation team and data collection is unnecessary.  The Navy will conduct  appropriate studies to determine if and when additional rotational crewing is appropriate  based on cost effectiveness.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Navy, under the purview of the implementation team, to require as  part of the mandatory analysis of alternatives in the concept refinement phase of the  defense acquisition process, assessments of potential rotational crewing options for each  class of surface ship in development, including full life cycle costs of each crewing  option.
DoD RESPONSE: Partial concur.  The Department of Defense agrees that all feasible  crewing options should be considered during the concept refinement phase of the defense  acquisition process.  Ships determined to have a potential advantageous rotational  crewing application will assess and include this option among the various crewing  alternatives reported by the Analysis of Alternatives.
RECOMMENDATION 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Navy to develop overarching guidance to ensure the systematic  collection and dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational  crewing.
DoD RESPONSE: Non-concur.   The Navy already uses “lessons learned” tools as part  of the rotational crewing.  Further guidance to use these tools is not needed.
RECOMMENDATION 8: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Navy to incorporate components of the lessons learned approach  outlined in the Atlantic Fleet  DDG Sea Swap initiative concept  of operations, including, among other things, establishing a lessons learned team,  developing a data collection plan, and increasing use of the Navy Lessons Learned  System.
DoD RESPONSE: Non-concur.  The Department of the Navy already relies on data  collection and analysis from ships.  Requiring already implemented rotational crewing  efforts to adopt experimental data collection procedures is unnecessary.  Procedures are  already in place for crews, rotational or standard, to provide data to the chain of  command to identify improvements.
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Patricia Lentini, Assistant  Director; James R. Bancroft; Renee S. Brown; Karen (Nicole) Harms;  Jeffrey R. Hubbard; Roderick W. Rodgers; Rebecca Shea; Christopher T.  Watson; and Johanna Wong made significant contributions to this report.