Emergency Preparedness: Improved Planning and Coordination Necessary for Modernization and Integration of Public Alert and Warning System
Published: 2009-09-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: A comprehensive system to alert the American people in times of hazard allows people to take action to save lives. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for the current Emergency Alert System (EAS) and the development of the new Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS). In this requested report, GAO examined (1) the current status of EAS, (2) the progress made by FEMA in implementing an integrated alert and warning system, and (3) the challenges involved in implementing an integrated alert and warning system. GAO conducted a survey of states, reviewed FEMA and other documentation, and interviewed industry stakeholders and officials from federal agencies responsible for public alerting.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As the primary national-level public warning system, EAS is an important alert tool, but it exhibits longstanding weaknesses that limit its effectiveness. EAS allows state and local officials limited ability to produce public alerts via television and radio. Weaknesses with EAS include lack of reliability of the message distribution system; gaps in coverage; insufficient testing; and inadequate training of personnel. Further, EAS provides little capability to alert specific geographic areas. EAS does not ensure message delivery for individuals with hearing and vision disabilities, and non-English speakers. FEMA has projects under way to address some of these weaknesses with EAS. However, to date, little progress has been made and EAS remains largely unchanged since GAO's previous review, completed in March 2007. As a result, EAS does not fulfill the need for a reliable, comprehensive alert system. Initiated in 2004, FEMA's IPAWS program is intended to integrate new and existing alert capabilities, including EAS, into a comprehensive "system of systems." However, national-level alert capabilities have remained unchanged and new technologies have not been adopted. IPAWS efforts have been affected by shifting program goals, lack of continuity in planning, staff turnover, and poorly organized program information from which to make management decisions. The vision of IPAWS has changed twice over the course of the program and strategic goals and milestones are not clearly defined, as IPAWS operated without an implementation plan from early 2007 through June 2009. Consequently, as state and local governments are forging ahead with their own alert systems, IPAWS program implementation has stalled and many of the functional goals of IPAWS, such as geo-targeting of messages and dissemination through redundant pathways to multiple devices, have yet to reach operational capacity. FEMA conducted a series of pilot projects without systematically assessing outcomes or lessons learned and without substantially advancing alert and warning systems. FEMA does not periodically report on IPAWS progress, therefore, program transparency and accountability are lacking. FEMA faces coordination issues and technical challenges in developing and implementing IPAWS. Effective public warning depends on the cooperation of stakeholders, such as emergency managers and the telecommunications industry, yet many stakeholders GAO contacted knew little about IPAWS and expressed the need for better coordination with FEMA. FEMA has taken steps to improve its coordination efforts, but the scope of stakeholder involvement is limited. FEMA also faces technical challenges related to systems integration, standards development, the development of geo-targeted and multilingual alerts, and alerts for individuals with disabilities. For example, the standard intended to facilitate integration of systems is still under development and is not widely used. As a result of these coordination and technical hurdles, integration with state and local systems will likely be a significant challenge due to potential incompatibility, and FEMA does not yet have logistical plans to integrate these systems.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: A comprehensive system to warn Americans about public safety  emergencies allows people to take actions designed to save lives and  reduce damage. The current Emergency Alert System (EAS) provides the  President and authorized officials with limited capability to transmit  emergency messages to the public via television and radio. The antiquated  methods employed by EAS date back to 1963, exposing the system to  weaknesses, including questionable reliability and versatility. In 2006, an  executive order gave the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the  responsibility of modernizing the public alert and warning systems to  ensure the capability of distributing alerts through varied  telecommunications modes and based on factors such as geography. The  Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the entity within DHS  responsible for the program, is working on the Integrated Public Alert and  Warning System (IPAWS), which is intended to eventually integrate EAS  into a larger warning network. When completed, EAS is expected to be  superseded by the IPAWS “system of systems,” which will form the  country’s comprehensive public alert system. In March 2007, we reported  on identified limitations of EAS and the challenges of developing the new  integrated system. Building on our previous work, you asked us to  provide information on the status of the nation’s emergency alert and  public warning systems and FEMA’s IPAWS program. For this report, we  examined (1) the current status of EAS, (2) the progress made in FEMA’s  efforts to modernize and integrate alert and warning systems, and (3) the  issues and challenges involved in implementing an integrated public alert  and warning system.
To meet these objectives, we conducted a Web-based survey of emergency  management directors in all 50 states and the District of Columbia in  March and April 2009, with 46 states and the District of Columbia  responding for an overall response rate of 92 percent. The survey asked  questions regarding public alert capabilities at the state and local level, the  FEMA IPAWS program, and stakeholder coordination. This report  contains selected results from the survey. To view the survey and a more  complete tabulation of the results, access the following link:  http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-880SP. We met with officials  from FEMA, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), DHS, and  the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). We also  interviewed representatives of state and local emergency management  offices; industry stakeholder organizations; public and private sector alert  and warning experts; and private sector stakeholders, including  broadcasters, the wireless industry, emergency alert technology  companies, emergency management associations, and consumer advocacy  groups. In addition, we conducted interviews with state participants in  FEMA’s IPAWS pilot programs. We examined federal agency  documentation including planning, program status, and financial  information; agency orders and rules; testimony statements; and briefings  from FEMA, FCC, and NOAA. We also reviewed relevant literature on  public alert and warning from public and private stakeholders.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 through  September 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more detailed  discussion of our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: EAS, the nation’s primary alerting system, provides capacity for the United  States to issue alerts and warnings to the public in response to  emergencies. FEMA is responsible for administering EAS at the national  level, while FCC manages EAS participation by media-related  communications service providers. FCC provides technical standards and  support for EAS, rules for its operation, and enforcement within the over- the-air broadcast, cable, and satellite broadcasting industries. Presidential,  or national-level, EAS alerts use a hierarchical distribution system to relay  important emergency messages. As the entry point for national level EAS  messages, FEMA is responsible for distributing presidential EAS alerts to  National Primary stations, often referred to as Primary Entry Point (PEP)  stations. Broadcasts of these national-level alerts are relayed by the PEP  stations across the country to radio and television stations that  rebroadcast the message to other broadcast stations and cable systems  until all EAS participants have been alerted. This retransmission of alerts  from EAS participant to EAS participant is commonly referred to as a  “daisy chain” distribution system. FCC rules require EAS participants to  install FCC-certified EAS equipment. Radio and television broadcast  stations, cable companies, wireless cable companies, direct broadcast  satellite, and satellite radio generally must participate in the system and  transmit alerts initiated by the President. State and local governments  determine the content and transmission procedures of their alerts, in  conjunction with local broadcast radio and television stations. These  procedures are specified in state EAS plans filed with FCC. In 2007, FCC  adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to explore EAS-related  issues, such as how non-English speakers may best be served by national,  state, and local EAS; and to reexamine the best way to make EAS  accessible to persons with disabilities.
Organizations that participate in EAS planning and administration include  the Primary Entry Point Administrative Council (PEPAC), the Society of  Broadcast Engineers, and associations such as the National Association of  Broadcasters and individual state broadcasting associations. States and  localities organize emergency communications committees whose  members often include representatives from broadcasters or local  television and radio stations. These committees agree on the chain of  command and other procedures for activating EAS alerts.
In June 2006, the President issued Executive Order 13407, entitled Public  Alert and Warning System, effecting a policy that the U.S. have a  comprehensive integrated alert and warning system, and detailing the  responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security in meeting this  requirement. The order also specified the level of support expected from  other departments and agencies in meeting the requirements for a more  robust federal warning system. The Secretary of Homeland Security was  ordered to “ensure an orderly and effective transition” from current  capabilities to the system described by the executive order, and to report  on the implementation of the system within 90 days of the order, and on at  least a yearly basis, thereafter. The FEMA IPAWS program was initiated in  2004 and the development and implementation of IPAWS has become the  programmatic mechanism to carry out the executive order. IPAWS is  defined by FEMA as a “system of systems,” which is intended to eventually  integrate existing and new alert systems, including EAS. That is, EAS is  expected to be superseded as the nation’s primary alert function by  IPAWS, with EAS acting as one of its component parts and as one of  IPAWS’s mechanisms to disseminate alerts. Another intended partner  system is NOAA’s National Weather Radio (NWR). NWR broadcasts  National Weather Service forecasts and all-hazard warnings. Non-weather  emergency messages are broadcast over NWR at the request of federal,  state, and local officials in time-critical situations when public safety is  involved.
The Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act of 2006 (WARN Act)  required FCC to adopt relevant technical standards, protocols, procedures,  and other technical requirements to enable commercial mobile service  providers (wireless providers) to issue emergency alerts. The act  established an advisory panel called the Commercial Mobile Service Alert  Advisory Committee (CMSAAC), to recommend the technical  specifications and protocols that will govern wireless providers that  participate in emergency alerting. The CMSAAC was chaired by then-FCC  Chairman Kevin J. Martin and included 42 other members, representing  stakeholders in all levels of government and the private sector. FCC  adopted most of the recommendations made by the committee regarding  the required capabilities of wireless providers to transmit alerts, as well as  the proposal to develop a Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS).
Figure 1 displays the conceptual architecture of IPAWS, with EAS, NWR,  and CMAS as mechanisms for disseminating alerts.
The Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) is an open, non-proprietary digital  message format being used as a standard for new, digitized alert networks  using multiple technologies. CAP is compatible with multiple applications  and telecommunication methods, and has been developed for use by  emergency management officials in sending all types of alert messages.  CAP can be used as a single input to activate multiple warning systems,  and is capable of geographic targeting and multilingual messaging.  FEMA—required by the executive order to adopt alert standards and  protocols—intends to adopt CAP and to publish its IPAWS CAP v1.1-EAS  Profile (CAP Profile) standard. In an FCC report and order released in July  2007, FCC promulgated new rules, including a requirement for all  mandatory EAS participants to accept messages using CAP, no later than  180 days after FEMA adopts the CAP standard.
section_title: EAS Remains the Nation’s Primary Public Alert and Warning System, But Unaddressed Weaknesses Limit its Effectiveness
paragraphs: EAS remains the primary national-level public alert system and serves as a  valuable public alert and warning tool. It remains available as a  mechanism for the President to issue national warnings, and it allows state  and local governments to generate weather warnings, America’s Missing:  Broadcast Emergency Response (AMBER) Alerts, and other public  emergency communications. Nonetheless, as we previously reported, EAS  exhibits longstanding weaknesses that continue to limit its effectiveness.  In particular, the reliability of the national-level relay system—which  would be critical if the President were to issue a national-level alert— remains questionable due to a lack of redundancy among key  broadcasters, gaps in coverage, insufficient testing of the relay system, and  inadequate training of personnel. Further, EAS alerts have limited  coverage, dissemination means, and geographical specificity. FEMA has  several projects under way to address some of these weaknesses, but little  progress has been made and EAS remains effectively unchanged since our  last report, issued in March 2007.
subsections: section_title: EAS Remains Available as a Means to Broadcast National-Level Alerts, but Is Primarily Used by State and Local Governments
paragraphs: Although EAS was established to allow the President to communicate with  the public, it primarily serves as a means of disseminating emergency alert  and warning information at the state and local level. EAS has never been  used to transmit a national-level alert, but instead has evolved into an  important public alert and warning tool for state and local governments.  State and local emergency operations managers can request activation of  EAS for state and local public alert and warning needs. EAS participants  transmit state and local alerts via radio and television or other media  facilities, such as cable or satellite. These alerts include weather warnings,  AMBER Alerts, or other emergency communications, such as evacuation  notices. EAS participants may decide individually whether to transmit  alerts that originate at the state or local level. Approximately 90 percent of  all EAS messages are weather alerts generated by NOAA’s National  Weather Service (NWS). NWS broadcasts forecasts, warnings, watches,  and other non-weather hazard information, and supplies such information  to broadcast and cable entry points designated in approved EAS state and  local plans.
section_title: Weaknesses in Alert Distribution and Dissemination Hinder EAS
paragraphs: EAS has longstanding weaknesses that have not been resolved since we  reported on them in March 2007. These weaknesses continue to limit the  effectiveness of EAS and include (1) a lack of redundancy, (2) gaps in  coverage, (3) a lack of testing, and (4) inadequate training for EAS  participants. In addition to these weaknesses, EAS is also hampered by  how alerts are disseminated to the public.
Lack of redundancy. FEMA lacks alternative means of reaching EAS  participants should its primary connection fail. Specifically, FEMA can  distribute national-level alerts to 35 PEP stations (which serve as the entry  points for Presidential alerts) and to 860 public radio stations across the  country via EAS phone lines and satellite connectivity, respectively.  However, FEMA lacks an alternative means of reaching these participants  if those primary connections fail. Furthermore, if a primary connection to  a PEP station failed, all of the other EAS participants that rely on that  station via the daisy chain relay system would fail to receive alerts. This  lack of redundancy could have serious consequences. For example, if a  PEP station were disabled during a disaster in a major metropolitan area,  an EAS alert would likely fail to reach a sizable portion of the population  because FEMA, potentially, would not have access to other stations in that  area.
Gaps in coverage. Gaps in PEP station broadcast coverage could hinder  the successful dissemination of EAS alerts, as some broadcast stations  might have difficulty in monitoring their assigned PEP station because the  station is geographically distant. Some states, such as Maine, are not  covered at all by the PEP system and would have to pick up a national- level message from an alternate source, such as Public Radio. This might  not be a fully reliable option, however. Unlike PEP stations, public radio  stations do not necessarily have extra fuel and generators on-site to help  ensure continuous operations following a disaster. Some broadcasters we  contacted expressed concern that other factors might impede their ability  to receive alerts from PEP stations. For example, some PEP broadcast  signals are too weak to overcome geographical impediments, such as  mountains; due to interference, broadcast signals generally do not travel  as well during the day as at night and, therefore, have inconsistent EAS  coverage; and high definition radio signals can overpower or distort PEP  broadcast signals. Some states, such as Washington, have developed  systems to augment the PEP network to ensure that EAS messages are  disseminated throughout the state, but not every state has taken such  action. As shown in figure 2, PEP daytime broadcast coverage leaves large  geographic areas uncovered by EAS. FEMA officials noted that there is a  significant difference between daytime and nighttime coverage. FEMA  estimated that 82 percent and 75 percent of the population are covered by  nighttime and daytime PEP signals, respectively.
Lack of testing. FEMA does not perform ongoing national-level tests of the  daisy chain relay system to ensure that it would work as intended during a  national-level alert. FCC requires stations to test their EAS equipment  and FEMA is required to perform weekly tests of connections to the 35  PEP stations, but there is no requirement for a national-level test of the  relay system. In January 2007, in response to our ongoing work at that  time, FEMA conducted a national-level EAS test. According to FEMA, the  test demonstrated an effective satellite connection to public radio stations.  However, three PEP stations failed to receive and effectively rebroadcast  the national-level test message due to hardware and software issues,  which FEMA stated have since been resolved. FEMA has not held another  test since 2007, although DHS agreed with the intent of our previous  recommendation that FEMA develop and implement a plan to verify the  dependability and effectiveness of the relay distribution system. DHS had  also stated that FEMA would begin to conduct new quarterly “over-the-air”  tests, but these have not taken place. In addition, FEMA has no plans for  testing the relay distribution system. Consequently, there is no assurance  the national-level relay would work should the President need to activate  EAS to communicate with the American people. The recent failure of an  accidental national-level alert suggests that problems remain in the relay  system. In this incident, a national-level (Presidential) alert, intended as a  test, was inadvertently initiated in Illinois. Despite this false alarm, as  intended for a national-level alert, the broadcast airways were “seized.”  However, the alert failed to be properly disseminated by all EAS  participants. In particular, cable companies, which should disseminate  such an alert in an emergency situation, failed to receive it. According to  FEMA officials and industry stakeholders, the failure was due to a  malfunction of cable providers’ EAS equipment. While FEMA officials say  this situation has since been rectified, no testing has been done to confirm  that the equipment used by cable companies would work properly.  Coupled with the results from the January 2007 test, these events raise  concerns about the national-level relay system and further highlight the  need for additional testing.
Inadequate training for EAS participants. Another longstanding  weakness of EAS is inadequate training for EAS participants, both in using  EAS equipment and in drafting EAS messages. In 2007, we reported that  several EAS stakeholders, including state and local officials, identified  inadequate training as a limitation of EAS and cited a need for additional  instruction in equipment use and message creation. Our current work  indicates that such training is still lacking. For example, a state official  told us that users and message originators need additional training to  know how to properly craft and initiate a message, especially since  emergency managers vary in their level of expertise. Similarly, a number of  respondents to our state survey of emergency managers cited a need for  training. For example, one state emergency management representative  suggested that training courses be established for emergency managers,  broadcasters, and cable providers. To address training inadequacies, we  previously recommended that FEMA develop a plan to verify that EAS  participants have the training and technical skills to issue effective EAS  alerts. DHS agreed with the intent of the recommendation and noted that  FEMA would improve training for EAS operators, as well as make the  system more user-friendly. According to FEMA, it is currently analyzing  and assessing EAS operator training needs, but it has not yet implemented  any new training initiatives.
In addition to the aforementioned weaknesses, EAS is also hampered by  how alerts are disseminated to the public. Much as gaps exist with PEP- station coverage and through weaknesses in EAS participants’  distribution, large portions of the population remain uncovered because  EAS relies on certain media, such as radio and television broadcast, to  provide alerts. Specifically, EAS’s reliance on broadcast and other media  currently exclude other communications devices, such as cell phones. In  addition, it remains difficult for EAS to reach distinct segments of the  population. For example, alerts are typically provided only in English and  alerting mechanisms provide unequal access for persons with disabilities.  In particular, individuals with hearing and vision disabilities may be  subject to inconsistent aural and visual information in EAS alerts. Further,  effective public alerting via EAS is also hindered by its limited ability to  target alert messages to specific geographic locations. For example, a local  emergency manager told us that a message generated by his county would  be automatically sent to 10 neighboring counties, potentially causing  unnecessary alarm for alert recipients in surrounding areas.
section_title: FEMA Has Introduced Projects to Address Some of EAS’s Operational Weaknesses, but Little Progress Has Been Made
paragraphs: FEMA officials stated that projects are under way to address some of  EAS’s operational weaknesses. For example, to improve EAS coverage,  FEMA is planning to expand the number of PEP stations from 35 to 69 by  2011. However, since the PEP expansion effort was initiated in 2006, of  three PEP stations scheduled for addition in 2007, FEMA completed only  one in 2008, with the other two only partially completed. At the time of  our review, FEMA had selected six additional area locations for new PEP  stations and initiated negotiations with radio stations in three of the areas.  FEMA cited several challenges in expanding the number of PEPs.  Specifically, officials told us that the process is often slowed by  negotiations with broadcast stations, soil sampling, and construction. In  addition, PEPAC representatives said regulatory procedures, such as those  requiring stations to house fuel on-site, lengthen the process.
To add redundancy and improve the reliability of the relay system, FEMA  is also developing the Digital Emergency Alert System (DEAS). DEAS is  expected to provide additional connections with EAS entry points—the  PEP stations—and provide for the direct transmission of a voice, video, or  text alert to stations using the public broadcast system satellite network.  According to FEMA, DEAS was successfully piloted twice. However,  despite concluding the pilots in 2007, FEMA had not begun implementing  DEAS at the time of our review. FEMA planned to deploy DEAS in 2008 to  13 states and 1 territory, including those that participated in the second  pilot; followed in 2009 by a deployment to 16 additional states prone to  weather hazards, and then to all states. However, DEAS deployment did  not occur and FEMA did not provide an explanation for this delay.  Currently, FEMA plans to implement DEAS using a phased approach  beginning in mid-2009.
Other FEMA initiatives related to EAS include the integration of XM  satellite transmission paths and the implementation of CAP. Specifically,  FEMA plans to deliver national-level EAS messages from FEMA to PEP  stations by establishing a satellite connection via XM Satellite Radio to  complement its existing phone connection. FEMA targeted completion of  XM satellite connectivity to key EAS sites by 2007; however, it is now  scheduled for completion in 2009. While no reason was provided for the  apparent delay, FEMA noted that it is currently working on certification  and accreditation issues. Separately, FEMA is working to develop and  implement the CAP Profile; however, FEMA has not defined how CAP will  work within EAS, including how EAS participants will rebroadcast a CAP  message. Further, CAP is not currently capable of carrying a live audio  message. Alternatively, to satisfy the requirement to carry a presidential  message, EAS participants will be required to link to a FEMA server to  stream audio messages. Finally, broadcasters expressed concern that CAP  is not ready to be used with EAS, thereby leading broadcasters to question  its utility, as well as the necessity of obtaining CAP-compliant equipment.
section_title: While FEMA Has IPAWS Initiatives Under Way, Progress in Implementing an Integrated Alert System Has Been Limited
paragraphs: FEMA began initiatives related to IPAWS in 2004, yet national-level alert  capabilities have remained unchanged and new standards and  technologies have not been adopted. IPAWS has operated without a  consistent strategic vision and has been adversely affected by shifting  program vision, lack of continuity in planning and program direction, and  poorly organized program information from which to make management  decisions. Therefore, as state and local governments are forging ahead  with their own alert systems, IPAWS program implementation has stalled  and many of its functional goals have yet to reach operational capacity.  Additionally, FEMA’s investment in the IPAWS pilot projects—seed  initiatives intended to test alert technologies and form the foundation of  IPAWS—has resulted in few lessons learned and few advances in alert and  warning systems. Furthermore, FEMA does not report on IPAWS spending  or progress in achieving goals, which limits transparency and  accountability for program results.
subsections: section_title: FEMA Has Begun Some Projects, but Has Yet to Integrate Alert Systems or Adopt New Technologies and Standards
paragraphs: Although IPAWS has existed since 2004 with the original objective of  modernizing and integrating public alert and emergency warning systems  across federal, state, and local governments, national-level alert system  capabilities remain unchanged and have yet to be integrated. In June 2006,  Executive Order 13407 specified the responsibilities of DHS and FEMA  with respect to a public alert and warning system, establishing 10  functions for the Secretary of Homeland Security. Since the executive  order, FEMA has launched or continued, under the IPAWS program,  several projects intended to address the 10 functions specified in the  order. Table 1 displays the functions of the executive order, FEMA’s  ongoing projects aimed at satisfying those functions, and the status and  progress of the projects.
While there are IPAWS projects under way designed to meet the  requirements of the executive order, these projects have shown little  progress. Many IPAWS initiatives have been ongoing for several years with  little functional contribution to the improvement or modernization of  public alert and warning. In fact, some of the projects cited by FEMA as  initiatives satisfying the requirements of the executive order have been  under development since the inception of IPAWS and have yet to be  completed. For example, one intention of IPAWS is to integrate various  alert systems into a “system of systems.” There are both federally- and  locally-operated alert systems, which are to be integrated under IPAWS.  On the federal level, NOAA directs the NWS alerting network; and at the  state level, 42 emergency management directors who responded to our  survey reported existing or planned systems in their state. According to  FEMA briefings and documents, it is the intention that local, state, and  tribal systems be interoperable with IPAWS; however, states and localities  operate their own distinct systems. In fact, of the 42 state survey  respondents with alert systems, only 11 have systems that have been  integrated with or are automatically triggered by the existing EAS. At  present, the extent of efforts to integrate state and local systems is a  nationwide inventory of systems and there are not yet any architectural or  logistical plans to integrate these systems. In effect, as deployment of state  and local alert systems continues, integration into the IPAWS system could  become increasingly complicated and difficult.
As another example, FEMA’s efforts to have IPAWS deliver warnings  through diverse media have been limited. As early as 2005, FEMA planned  efforts to provide warning messages to subscribers via email and to  telephones, text message devices, cell phones, pagers, and Internet  desktops. These capabilities were tested under various IPAWS pilot  projects, but the development and implementation of the methods were  discontinued when the pilots were completed. At present, IPAWS efforts  to expand alert dissemination through methods other than standard radio  and television broadcast are limited to participation in CMAS, a cellular  broadcast text alert initiative. FEMA has accepted the responsibility for  collecting and disseminating alerts, but it is unclear, at this point, how  CMAS will be integrated with IPAWS.
FEMA has missed numerous timelines that it set for IPAWS initiatives.  Various projects were originally intended to be completed to form the  foundation of IPAWS, but have experienced delays and are still not yet  functional. Figure 3 demonstrates some of the IPAWS programs whose  timelines were surpassed and have still yet to be realized.
Aside from implementing an integrated public alert and warning system,  FEMA has responsibility for providing training on and testing of alert and  warning systems; public education on use and access to the system; and  consultation, coordination, and cooperation with public and private sector  stakeholders. According to emergency management and industry  stakeholders, FEMA has not sufficiently met this responsibility. About half  of the state survey respondents reported that FEMA had not provided  them with a clear understanding of the IPAWS vision or program goals and  66 percent were somewhat or very dissatisfied with FEMA’s level of  consultation and coordination. Ultimately, among states, there is a general  lack of satisfaction with FEMA’s outreach and a clouded understanding of  what IPAWS actually is. Although survey respondents generally evaluated  FEMA as having done little to no outreach, education, and coordination,  FEMA has made recent progress in these efforts. FEMA officials have  convened federal, industry, and practitioners’ “working groups” to discuss  the adoption of the CAP Profile, which they plan to expand to include  broader discussions about public alert and warning. In interviews, public  and private sector stakeholders have expressed frustration with the lack of  communication and coordination with IPAWS in the past, but have also  noted recent improvements.
section_title: Shifting Program Vision and Lack of Continuity in Planning Have Adversely Affected Efforts to Modernize and Integrate Alerts
paragraphs: FEMA’s efforts to create an integrated and modernized alert and warning  system have been affected by (1) shifting program vision, (2) a lack of  continuity in planning and program direction, (3) a lack of collection or  organization of program information from which to make management  decisions, and (4) staff turnover.
Shifting program vision. The IPAWS program vision has changed several  times, slowing progress toward an integrated system. FEMA originally  planned to build an infrastructure to deliver state and local alerts through  multiple pathways. However, according to FEMA officials, in the second  quarter of calendar year 2007, the vision changed to focus exclusively on  dissemination of presidential messages and setting alert and warning  technical standards. In early 2009, the vision of the program shifted to  again focus on a comprehensive system that included infrastructure for  state and local alerts. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the IPAWS vision.
Lack of continuity in planning and program direction. FEMA’s efforts to  create an integrated and modernized alert and warning system have  encountered difficulties in program planning and management. As we have  reported, effective project planning involves establishing and maintaining  plans; defining the project mission, scope and activities; and determining  overall budget and schedule, key deliverables, and milestones for key  deliverables. It also involves ensuring that the project team has the skills  and knowledge needed to manage the project and obtaining stakeholder  commitment to the project plan. Furthermore, agencies can use  performance information to make various types of management decisions  to improve programs and results. Although the executive order requires  an implementation plan to be updated yearly, from early 2007 through  June 2009, the IPAWS effort operated without a designated  implementation plan and no specific processes for systems development  and deployment. The current implementation plan, completed in June  2009, does not adequately satisfy the project management and planning  practices essential for effective program execution. In contrast to the plan  from 2006, this plan provides few program details. Additionally, the new  plan includes only a vague overview of IPAWS initiatives, few definitive  milestones toward reaching program goals, and a lack of clarity in how  IPAWS systems will be integrated. Other planning documentation that  exist—consisting mostly of briefing slides outlining IPAWS initiatives or  broad, conceptual program requirements—indicate a lack of continuous  overall strategic vision with disparate projects not tied together by a  cohesive plan.
Lack of collection or organization of program information from which  to make management decisions. We found organized IPAWS program  information that officials might use for decisionmaking and establishing  project plans is also lacking. Throughout the course of our work, FEMA  officials told us that many key IPAWS documents did not exist or were  irretrievable. Moreover, a consultant at FEMA who is assessing IPAWS  has found that there is no cogent organization system to locate program  information, that information exists in multiple locations across FEMA  office spaces, and that data searches on program information take an  inordinate amount of time and effort. The consultant also found more  robust and realistic documented internal controls are necessary.
We requested documentation on FEMA and DHS reporting requirements  or performance measures for which the IPAWS program prepared  documented updates of its progress. However, neither FEMA nor DHS  regularly report on IPAWS. FEMA was able to provide a performance  information worksheet and spreadsheet, but this documentation provided  only vague program parameters, without progress updates on reaching  specific goals or milestones. FEMA has taken steps to assess the IPAWS  program and has contracted with a consultant to perform a full  assessment of the IPAWS program and to implement internal controls and  performance measures. However, the absence of accurate periodic  reporting on IPAWS leaves valuable program information unavailable.  Such information would help increase program transparency, establish  greater program accountability, and assure a reasonable assessment of  return on financial investments. Additionally, periodic reporting on IPAWS  would provide FEMA’s private sector partners and those in government at  the federal, state, and local level with information necessary to help  establish an integrated alert and warning system. Such reporting would  also assist the Congress as it oversees issues related to public alert and  warning.
Staff turnover. Progress toward an integrated alert system has also been  slowed by frequent changes in organizational leadership of the IPAWS  program office and other staffing related issues. During our review, IPAWS  was operating under an acting director—its third director since the  program began—and at the time of our review was searching for a  permanent director. According to FEMA, a new director took charge of the  program on August 3, 2009. Additionally, according to FEMA officials, high  turnover of program staff has made it difficult to consistently manage  IPAWS programs. FEMA’s heavy use of contract employees has also  resulted in concerns from stakeholders. In one state, emergency  management officials participated in an IPAWS project, relying solely on  contract staff without actually knowing that FEMA was involved. Another  state official said that IPAWS is dominated with outside contractors who  do not fully understand alert and warning needs. At the program office  itself, there is a preponderance of contract staff. As of June 2009, 27  contractor staff and 5 FEMA IPAWS staff positions were filled out of 11  noncontract full-time equivalent positions that were available.
section_title: Limited Program Accountability for IPAWS Projects Has Contributed to Inconclusive Results and Lessons Learned
paragraphs: To demonstrate the integration and expansion of new alerting  technologies, and to work toward the functionality described in the  executive order, FEMA has implemented a series of IPAWS pilot projects,  but they have ended inconclusively, with few documented lessons learned.  The IPAWS pilots were first introduced in 2004, prior to Executive Order  13407, and focused on testing various alerting systems in different areas of  the country with the intent that successfully piloted technologies could  eventually be used in a fully integrated “system of systems.” At various  stages of our work, FEMA provided different accounts of the number and  breadth of the pilot projects, as well as inconsistent documentation on the  goals, costs, and results of the full IPAWS pilot programs. Specifically,  FEMA documents and interviews revealed inconsistent information on the  purpose of the pilot programs and how they supported broader IPAWS  goals. According to FEMA officials, the pilot projects were intended to be  discrete tests of alert capability, with clear goals and specified durations.  However, there is a dearth of documentation describing the actual plans  and results of the pilots. Although we requested reports documenting the  plans, lessons learned, and technological or operational outcomes, for  most pilot projects, such formal documentation was never produced.  Rather, the extent of the documentation FEMA provided on the pilots  includes general briefing slides with broad program descriptions. FEMA  equipment deployed during the pilots was left, for the most part, unused  with pilot participants. According to FEMA officials, there is an inventory  accounting for the equipment and the equipment is intended to be  repurposed in the future. As a result of the lack of project assessments,  reporting, and documentation, it is unclear which aspects of the IPAWS  projects, if any, are currently being utilized or are planned to be utilized in  the future or whether the projects informed actions or decisions with  respect to IPAWS programming. Initial findings from an IPAWS program  assessment, performed by a FEMA consultant, revealed that, in most  cases, key project deliverables, for which the government contracted,  could not be accounted for. FEMA’s consultant was unable to locate or  verify the status of deliverables for 18 of the 28 projects it identified. The  consultant was able to verify only partial completion of 6 other projects,  while the status of deliverables for the 4 other projects was incomplete,  ongoing, not available, or unknown.
Responses from our survey of state emergency management directors  indicate that most of the 12 states that reported participating in the pilot  projects reacted unfavorably when asked about the outcomes and lessons  learned from the pilots. Lack of coordination, poor management,  incomplete execution, and short project duration were cited, among other  things, as lessons learned or outcomes from the pilots. Figure 5 identifies  the states who reported participating in IPAWS pilot projects, including  select open-ended feedback provided by states.
Some states cited positive outcomes and were generally more optimistic  about their participation. For example, one state was encouraged by the  promise of new alerting technology being pilot tested and said that the  pilot technologies proved effective and reliable and should be components  of an overall strategy. Another emphasized the need for additional  capabilities to alert and warn citizens during emergencies.
section_title: FEMA Faces Coordination Issues and Technical Challenges in Implementing IPAWS
paragraphs: FEMA faces coordination issues in successfully implementing IPAWS.  While there is broad consensus regarding the need for coordination among  diverse stakeholders, many stakeholders we contacted generally lack  specific knowledge of IPAWS and would like more opportunities to  interact with FEMA on public alert and warning issues. FEMA also faces  technical challenges related to integrating state and local systems;  adopting standards; and the development of geo-targeted, risk-based,  multilingual, and disabled population alerting capabilities. These elements  are required aspects of the public alert and warning system and are crucial  to IPAWS implementation, yet remain largely unresolved.
subsections: section_title: Coordination Among Diverse Stakeholders is Necessary, but Has Been Insufficient According to Many Stakeholders
paragraphs: To effectively develop and implement IPAWS, FEMA depends on the  efforts and expertise of diverse stakeholders, yet coordination was cited  as the primary challenge facing the implementation of IPAWS. Specifically,  FEMA relies on partners such as the DHS Directorate for Science and  Technology, NOAA, the Organization for Advancement of Structured  Information Standards, and CTIA - The Wireless Association, an  association of wireless telecommunications providers, which is involved in  the development of CMAS. In addition, given that the IPAWS vision relies  heavily upon state and local investment in CAP-based warning systems,  organizations at these levels of government have a range of interests in  IPAWS planning efforts. In fact, many respondents to our state survey seek  opportunities to contribute to IPAWS planning and consider collaboration  among all levels of government to be imperative to the delivery of public  alerts and warnings.
Executive Order 13407, in laying out FEMA’s IPAWS role, recognized the  need for stakeholder involvement for an effective alert system to work and  required FEMA to “consult, coordinate, and cooperate with the private  sector, including communications media organizations, and federal, state,  territorial, tribal and local governmental authorities, including emergency  response providers.” Many stakeholders we contacted from various levels  of government and the private sector expressed support for a  collaborative, consensus-based forum that could increase the flow of  information and best represent stakeholder interests. In March 2007, we  recommended that FEMA establish a forum for stakeholders involved with  emergency communications to discuss issues related to IPAWS, with  representation from federal agencies, state and local governments, private  industry, and the affected consumer community. DHS agreed with the  intent of this recommendation, noting that FEMA would continue to work  with stakeholders through meetings, conferences, and other forums. As  recently as May 2008, FEMA said it intended to create a stakeholder  subcommittee under an appropriate DHS departmental advisory  committee in compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act  (FACA). Also, FEMA informed us of plans to establish state advisory  committees. However, FEMA subsequently told us that neither the federal  advisory subcommittee nor state advisory committees have been  implemented and there are no current plans to establish such groups.
While there is broad consensus regarding the need for coordination,  FEMA’s efforts to date have been insufficient, according to many  stakeholders we contacted. For example, broadcaster associations and  local government officials were unaware of IPAWS program goals and  milestones. Also, the majority of our state survey respondents received  little to no information from FEMA and communicated with FEMA to little  or no extent. Further, only one survey respondent indicated that FEMA’s  communication and coordination efforts have provided him with a clear  understanding of the IPAWS vision and program goals, with the majority  of respondents having little or no understanding of the program. Local  officials we contacted had little to no communication with FEMA, were  generally unaware of the IPAWS program, and overall, lacked an  understanding of the CAP alert standard.
FEMA officials acknowledged that they have, thus far, insufficiently  engaged state-level stakeholders and have recently taken steps to increase  their communication and collaboration efforts. Many of FEMA’s recent  initiatives are driven by its July 2008 – September 2009 IPAWS Stakeholder  Engagement Plan, which describes FEMA’s strategy for establishing,  developing, and maintaining partnerships with alert and warning  stakeholders. Among other things, this plan details FEMA’s intent to  continue its participation in alert and warning and emergency  management conferences; to engage relevant congressional committees;  to build relationships with FEMA Regions, which can pass information to  state and local government officials; and to build relationships with other  organizations and media outlets. In addition, FEMA launched an updated  Web site in March 2009, which allows users to submit questions regarding  the IPAWS program. The Web site lacks detailed program information,  however.
In figure 6, we display the survey responses of state emergency  management directors on the extent to which they believe FEMA officials  adequately communicated or coordinated with state and local  governments with respect to public alert and warning programs. States  largely reported inadequate levels of training, testing, and alert exercises,  as well as inadequate public education efforts. The survey results indicate  that a set of stakeholders crucial to establishing a public alert and warning  system do not believe FEMA is communicating and collaborating  adequately.
According to our survey results, overall, 31 states were either somewhat  dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the level of consultation,  coordination, and communication shown by FEMA with respect to its  public alert and warning programs. Many stakeholders we contacted and  respondents to our state survey desire greater dialogue with FEMA and  want FEMA to better coordinate its efforts with public and private  partners. Some of these sentiments were echoed by federal partners, such  as NOAA, which noted that coordination could be improved. The DHS  Office of Science and Technology, which cited its relationship with FEMA  as a primary challenge to developing an integrated alert system, told us  that FEMA’s frequent periods of transition made planning difficult. To  improve federal coordination and assert its lead role in federal alert and  warning programs, FEMA has established memorandums of agreement  and understanding with federal partners and meets regularly with them.  The IPAWS stakeholder engagement plans call for FEMA to host annual  alert and warning summits with its federal partners, starting as soon as the  first quarter of fiscal year 2009, and FEMA also formed three working  groups to review and validate requirements for the CAP Profile. FEMA  said it plans to eventually expand the scope of these working groups  beyond CAP to solicit feedback on the continued development and  implementation of IPAWS.
Although some of FEMA’s communication and coordination efforts appear  promising, their effectiveness is not yet clear. For example, one survey  respondent has been encouraged by his state’s inclusion in FEMA’s  Practitioner’s Working Group, yet nonetheless reported a lack of  communication and coordination with FEMA. The scope and range of  stakeholder involvement in each new effort is limited and, as such, FEMA  remains without a mechanism to bring together all interested  stakeholders. This raises the possibility that many stakeholders will  remain uninformed of FEMA’s efforts pertaining to IPAWS and leaves  FEMA without a means to thoroughly collaborate on a range of alert and  warning issues.
section_title: Technical and Other Challenges Have Not Been Fully Addressed
paragraphs: FEMA faces an array of technical and other challenges in developing and  implementing IPAWS that have not been fully addressed. These challenges  include (1) integrating systems; (2) adopting CAP standards; and (3)  developing and implementing geo-targeted and risk-based alerting, alerts  for individuals with disabilities, and multilingual alerts.
Integrating IPAWS with state and local systems. As states and local  governments develop and deploy their own alert systems, a key challenge,  according to stakeholders, is the integration of IPAWS with these  disparate alert systems. In our survey, 42 states responded that they have  implemented or plan to implement alternate methods to disseminate  emergency alert information outside of EAS, such as email or text alerts.  Current and planned capabilities vary widely, however. In addition, 20  state respondents indicated that their states have no plans to wait for  information or guidance from the federal government before investing in  emergency alert and warning systems. States that are moving ahead  without federal guidance and investing in alert methods cited a  responsibility to provide their citizens with emergency communications.  The prevalence of alternate alerting methods at the state level that lack  compatibility with federal investments could lead to increased diversity  among systems, making future integration more difficult. To address  challenges related to integrating IPAWS with state and local alert systems,  FEMA is planning to inventory and evaluate federal, state, local, territorial,  and tribal alert and warning capabilities by surveying approximately 3,500  emergency operations centers. This effort, initiated in late 2008, is required  by the 2006 executive order, and will be carried out over a 3-year period  ending in 2012, according to FEMA.
Adopting CAP standards. Integration of IPAWS and state and local  systems hinges largely on whether these systems use the same alert  standards. FEMA intends to adopt CAP as the standard by which  information will be transported among alerting systems. Currently, only 10  respondents to our state survey are using CAP, indicating that the prospect  for seamless integration of existing systems may be limited. However, 42  states responding to our survey plan to use CAP in future investments in  emergency alert and warning equipment, suggesting that the use of CAP  will expand. Several survey respondents cited funding as an obstacle to  CAP usage and system integration, reporting that further investment  would be required to make necessary system upgrades. Additional  challenges to integration exist at the local level due to the potential  diversity among systems and similar financial constraints. For example,  one state survey respondent indicated that cities are purchasing  notification systems, yet the state has set no standards for such systems.  FEMA officials acknowledged that federal grant programs would likely be  necessary to support IPAWS deployment, and are currently exploring the  use of grant programs to make funding available to states and local  jurisdictions for the procurement of CAP-compliant equipment.
Developing and implementing tailored alerting: geo-targeted and risk- based alerting, alerts for individuals with disabilities, and multilingual  alerts. CAP messages can be disseminated with the multiple streams of  information necessary to facilitate tailored alerting, and according to  FEMA, adoption of the CAP Profile is the first step in developing the  flexibility to provide such alerts. However, the current CAP Profile under  consideration does not address multiple languages or special needs. Risk- based alerting—that is, the capability to tailor alerts based on a person’s  threat risk or level of danger—is a requirement of the executive order, yet  FEMA does not have plans to address this functionality. FEMA noted that  state and local practitioners have developed innovative warning systems  and methods for alerting those with disabilities and non-English speakers.  To address these challenges, in 2009 and 2010, FEMA intends to plan,  engineer, and implement capabilities to extend alerts to these groups.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Emergency communications are critical in crisis management and for  protecting the public in situations of war, terrorist attack, or natural  disaster; yet, FEMA has made limited progress in implementing a  comprehensive, integrated alert system as is the policy of the federal  government. Management turnover, inadequate planning, and a lack of  stakeholder coordination have delayed implementation of IPAWS and left  the nation dependent on an antiquated, unreliable national alert system.  FEMA’s delays also appear to have made IPAWS implementation more  difficult in the absence of federal leadership as states have forged ahead  and invested in their own alert and warning systems.
The IPAWS program has been slowed and has suffered setbacks due to a  lack of consistent program goals, clear performance measures, and  program management information. In the absence of systematic  performance measures, project milestones and schedules have been left  undefined and little progress has been made in achieving the objectives of  Executive Order 13407, which called for a comprehensive solution in the  way public alert and warning is conducted in the United States. In order  that IPAWS achieve the federal government’s public alert and warning  goals, it is essential that FEMA define the specific steps necessary in  realizing a modernized and integrated alert system. While the executive  order requires an implementation plan to be updated yearly, separately,  periodic reporting on progress toward achieving an integrated public alert  and warning system would improve program transparency and  accountability. Such reporting would match program goals to their  respective timelines and provide government and private sector  stakeholders with information necessary to help establish an integrated  alert and warning system.
EAS, one of the mainstays for public alerting, and the only operational  aspect of IPAWS, has remained largely unchanged since our previous  review in 2007. Although projects are under way to address longstanding  weaknesses, the lack of reliability of alert distribution and dissemination  functions to the public limits EAS’s effectiveness. Specifically, a lack of  training and national-level testing raises questions about whether the relay  system would actually work during a national-level emergency. Previously,  we recommended that FEMA work in conjunction with FCC to develop  and implement a plan to verify (1) the dependability and effectiveness of  the EAS relay distribution system, which is used to disseminate national- level alerts; and (2) that EAS participants have the training and technical  skills to issue effective EAS alerts. As sufficient action on EAS testing and  training has not been taken and since IPAWS is years away from full  implementation, these recommendations remain applicable to help ensure  EAS is capable of operating as intended. Further, as IPAWS is developed  and deployed, it is important that the dependability of those systems be  verified and that IPAWS participants are adequately trained.
Effectively implementing an integrated alert system will require  collaboration among a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including those at  the federal, state, and local levels; private industry; and the affected  consumer community. Executive Order 13407 requires such collaboration.  As states and localities invest in their own alert systems in advance of  IPAWS deployment, it is critical that FEMA coordinate with stakeholders  to help facilitate the integration of these alert systems. We previously  recommended that FEMA establish a forum for the diverse stakeholders  involved with emergency communications to discuss emerging and other  issues related to the implementation of an integrated public alert and  warning system. While FEMA has established stakeholder “working  groups,” a robust forum of diverse public alert stakeholders does not exist  and further action on stakeholder engagement is necessary. As technology  continues to evolve and states implement their own systems, it is all the  more relevant that a permanent collaborative body be put in place to  support the development and implementation of IPAWS.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order that the public alert and warning system be conceived of,  designed, and implemented, we recommend that the Secretary of  Homeland Security direct the Administrator, FEMA to take the following  actions:    To improve program management and align IPAWS’s vision with the  requirements established in the executive order, implement processes for  systems development and deployment, including (1) updating IPAWS  strategic goals and milestones, implementation plans, and performance  measures; (2) prioritizing projects in consultation with stakeholders; and  (3) creating the necessary documentation on system design and specific  release schedules for IPAWS.
To improve program transparency and accountability, report periodically  to the Congress and the Secretary of Homeland Security on progress  toward achieving an integrated public alert and warning system. The  report should include information on ongoing IPAWS projects, financial  information on program expenditures, and status updates in achieving  performance measures and reaching milestones.
To help ensure system dependability, as IPAWS is developed and  deployed, establish and implement a plan to verify (1) the dependability  and effectiveness of systems used to disseminate alerts, and (2) that  IPAWS participants have the training and technical skills to make use of  IPAWS infrastructure and to issue effective public alerts.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS and FCC for their review and  comment. In its comments, DHS focused on the report’s recommendations  and indicated that it agrees with all our recommendations to improve  public alert and warning. DHS provided examples of actions aimed at  addressing our recommendations. In particular, FEMA said it is developing  an IPAWS Strategic Plan and that existing plans have been modified to  align IPAWS with the requirements of Executive Order 13407. FEMA  believes IPAWS has documentation and processes for system design and  that detailed requirements for specific IPAWS components have been  coordinated extensively with federal, industry, and public stakeholders.  FEMA noted that it will continue to brief Congress on IPAWS and provide  project status updates to DHS on its progress in achieving milestones.  FEMA also said as IPAWS is developed, it plans to include testing methods  to ensure deployed systems are dependable and effective, and to  coordinate with FCC on enforcing new testing procedures without placing  an undue burden on industry. FEMA further said that it is working with its  Emergency Management Institute to develop specific training for  stakeholders.
Although FEMA noted preexisting IPAWS actions as addressing  documentation and processes on system design, our performance audit  concluded that such actions do not amount to a specific definition of the  steps necessary in realizing a modernized and integrated alert system.  Additionally, the actions detailed in DHS’s response do not fully address  the need for documented plans and a schedule for IPAWS’s  implementation. Regarding previous reporting on IPAWS projects,  expenditures, and status in achieving performance measures and reaching  milestones, while FEMA noted that they brief House and Senate  appropriation subcommittees, we found during our review that briefing  information about IPAWS’s overall progress, project status, and program  expenditures was vague or non-existent. Given the important role that  state and local governments and private-sector stakeholders have in  IPAWS, the intent of our recommendation is that periodic reporting  information on IPAWS be more broadly available so that stakeholders are  fully aware of the IPAWS program’s direction and progress. See appendix  II for written comments from DHS. In addition to the above comments,  DHS and FCC both provided technical comments that we incorporated  into the report as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary  of DHS, the Chairman of the FCC, and interested congressional  committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on our  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of this report are to provide information on issues relating  to public alert and warning, the Emergency Alert System (EAS), and the  Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Integrated Public Alert  and Warning program (IPAWS); specifically, (1) the operational capability  of the nation’s current EAS, (2) the progress made in FEMA’s efforts to  modernize and integrate alert and warning systems, and (3) the issues and  challenges involved in implementing an integrated public alert and  warning system.
To obtain information related to all three objectives of this report, we  conducted a Web-based survey of state emergency management directors.  We asked them questions related to public alert and warning capabilities  at the state or local level, the current status and integration of EAS with  other alert capabilities, the use of the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP),  the FEMA IPAWS program, and the level of coordination between FEMA  and state officials. The survey was deployed by email to all 50 states and  the District of Columbia and was conducted in March and April 2009.  Contact information for each state was provided by the National  Emergency Management Association (NEMA). We obtained contact  information for state directors for whom NEMA did not have correct  contact information directly from state departments. We obtained  responses from 47 survey recipients (92 percent). Despite repeated  inquiries, the emergency management directors from California, New  Mexico, Tennessee, and Texas did not respond to the survey. The survey  was also deployed, in text form, to select local emergency management  agency officials whose contact information was provided to us as a part of  the state survey. The results of local surveys were not included in the state  survey results in this report. Additionally, this report does not contain all  of the results from the survey. The survey and a more complete tabulation  of the results can be viewed by accessing the following link:  http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-880SP.
To obtain information on the operational capability of the current EAS and  the progress that has been made in FEMA’s efforts to plan and implement  a modernized and integrated alert and warning system, we reviewed and  analyzed relevant documentation and literature, interviewed public and  private sector stakeholders, and collected information from our survey of  state emergency management agencies. We examined federal agency  documentation, including planning, program status, and financial  documents; agency orders and rules; testimony statements; and briefings  from FEMA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  (NOAA). We also reviewed relevant literature on public alert and warning  from public and private sector stakeholders, including the Congressional  Research Service and various industry consortia. We interviewed federal  officials from FEMA, FCC, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),  and NOAA. We also spoke with representatives of state and local  emergency management offices, industry stakeholder organizations, and  public and private sector alert and warning experts. Stakeholders we  interviewed included the Society of Broadcast Engineers, the Primary  Entry Point Advisory Committee, the National Center for Accessible  Media, the Association of Public Safety Communications Officers, the  Emergency Interoperability Consortium, the EAS-CAP Industry Group, the  Association of Public Television Stations, the Telecommunications  Industry Association, and CTIA - The Wireless Association.
To obtain information on the challenges of implementing FEMA’s IPAWS,  we interviewed a broad set of government and industry stakeholders, as  indicated above, and obtained information through our survey of state of  emergency management directors. In addition to stakeholders previously  mentioned, we conducted interviews with state and local officials and with  organizations involved with the public alert and warning, such as the  International Association of Emergency Managers. We also conducted  interviews with officials from state participants in FEMA’s IPAWS pilot  programs and state emergency managers. Additionally, we interviewed  private sector stakeholders and participants in public alert and warning,  including broadcasters, the wireless industry, emergency alert technology  companies, and consumer advocacy groups. Information on IPAWS  challenges from each state was collected as part of our survey of state  emergency management directors and select local emergency  management officials.
We conducted this review from September 2008 to September 2009, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient  and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our review objectives. We believe that the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact above, other key contributors to this report were  Sally Moino, Assistant Director; Ryan D’Amore; Simon Galed; Andrew  Stavisky; and Mindi Weisenbloom.