Security Force Assistance: More Detailed Planning and Improved Access to Information Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in Afghanistan
Published: 2013-04-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: ISAF's mission in Afghanistan has shifted from a combat role to focus more on preparing ANSF units to assume lead security responsibility by the end of 2014. A key element in advising and assisting the ANSF is SFA advisor teams, provided by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. A House Armed Services Committee report accompanying its version of the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to review DOD's establishment and use of SFA advisor teams. Specifically, GAO evaluated the extent to which (1) DOD, in conjunction with ISAF, has defined SFA advisor team missions, goals, and objectives; (2) the Army and Marine Corps have been able to provide teams; and (3) the Army and Marine Corps have developed programs to train teams for their specific missions. GAO reviewed doctrine and guidance, analyzed advisor requirements, reviewed training curricula, and interviewed Army, Marine Corps, theater command, and SFA advisor team officials in the U.S. and Afghanistan.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have defined the mission and broad goals for Security Force Assistance (SFA) advisor teams; however, teams varied in the extent to which their approaches for developing their Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) units identified activities based on specific objectives or end states that were clearly linked with established goals. SFA guidance states that to be successful, advisors must have an end or goal in mind, and establish objectives that support higher-command plans. Theater commanders have outlined goals aimed at strengthening specific capabilities such as logistics, and it is largely left to the teams to then develop their approach for working with their counterparts. GAO found some advisor teams had developed structured advising approaches drawing from these goals, such as identifying monthly objectives and milestones for their team. Other teams GAO met with used less structured approaches, such as relying on interactions with ANSF counterparts to identify priorities and using this input to develop activities on an ad hoc basis, rather than as part of a longer-term, more structured approach to achieve broad goals. Officials from several teams stated that the guidance they received lacked specificity regarding desired end states for the development of their ANSF counterpart units. Without a more structured approach with clear linkages between end states, objectives, and milestones that are in support of broad goals for ANSF units, theater commanders cannot be assured that the advisor team activities are making progress toward these goals.
The Army and Marine Corps have been able to fill requests for SFA advisor teams, using various approaches such as tasking non-deployed brigades to form advisor teams or creating teams using personnel already deployed in Afghanistan. According to Army and Marine Corps officials, the ability to substitute an individual at one rank above or below the request has helped the services meet rank and skill requirements. The Army's reliance on brigades to provide a portion of their personnel to form advisor teams has enabled them to meet requirements but resulted in leaving large numbers of personnel at the brigades' home stations. To manage these large rear detachments, brigades undertook significant planning to ensure that enough stay-behind leadership existed to maintain a sufficient command structure and provide certain training.
The Army and Marine Corps have developed training programs for SFA advisor teams, but teams varied in the extent to which they had specific information to help prepare them for their mission prior to deployment. SFA guidance states that an in-depth understanding of the operational environment and of foreign security force capabilities is critical to planning and conducting effective SFA. Advisor teams may access such information from a variety of sources such as conducting video teleconferences with the teams they will replace, using secure networks to gather information, or sending personnel on predeployment site surveys, although teams varied in the extent to which they were actually able to gain access to these sources. For example, GAO found that while teams had access to a certain secure network at training sites, only some had access at home station, enabling them to shape their training and mission analysis earlier in predeployment training or after training but prior to deploying. Having limited access to this information prior to arriving in Afghanistan may result in advisor teams needing more time after deploying to maximize their impact as advisors.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that theater commanders take steps to work with brigade commanders and advisor teams to identify end states, objectives, and milestones for the development of their ANSF counterpart units in support of the regional commands broad goals, and that the Army and Marine Corps improve availability of mission-specific information prior to advisor teams deployment. DOD partially concurred with GAOs recommendations and identified actions to further prepare SFA advisor teams for their missions.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In November 2010, the Afghan government and North Atlantic Treaty  Organization (NATO) agreed upon a plan for transferring lead security  responsibilities from the NATO-led International Security Assistance  Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by the end  of 2014 while drawing down international forces. As part of this transition,  the focus of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is shifting from a combat role  to a security force assistance (SFA) role more focused on advising and  assisting the ANSF. For the U.S. contribution, the Department of Defense  (DOD) has used a variety of approaches to provide U.S. forces to carry  out the advise-and-assist mission. For example, in early 2012, the U.S.  Army and Marine Corps began to deploy small teams of advisors with  specialized capabilities—referred to as SFA advisor teams—that are  located throughout Afghanistan to work with Afghan army and police  units. Our past work has identified challenges DOD has faced in  supporting the advising mission, such as providing and training advisor  personnel, balancing advising activities with other missions, and defining  command relationships.
The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying its version  of the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act directed us to  report on DOD’s establishment of SFA advisor teams and the use of  these teams to further develop the capabilities of the ANSF. To address  this requirement, this report evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD, in  conjunction with ISAF, has defined SFA advisor team missions, goals,  and objectives, (2) the Army and Marine Corps have been able to provide  SFA advisor teams, and (3) the Army and Marine Corps have developed  programs to train SFA advisor teams for their specific missions in  Afghanistan.
To address these objectives, we reviewed doctrine, guidance, and key  planning documents from NATO, the Army, Marine Corps, and ISAF and  U.S. theater commanders pertaining to SFA advisor team missions, goals  and objectives, as well as staffing and training of the teams. This  documentation included the Army’s Field Manual for Security Force  Assistance,  the ISAF SFA Concept and Implementation Guidance,  requests for forces, ISAF minimum training requirements, and lessons  learned from SFA advisor teams. Additionally, we met with officials from  relevant organizations in the United States, such as the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, Department of the Army, Headquarters Marine  Corps, U.S. Central Command, Army Forces Command, and Army and  Marine Corps training organizations, as well as officials from  organizations in Afghanistan, including U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, ISAF,  division and brigade headquarters, and 23 SFA advisor teams. Although  many ISAF coalition countries deploy SFA advisor teams, the scope of  this review included only U.S. SFA advisor teams.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to April 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains additional  information about our scope and methodology.
Department of the Army, Army Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance (May 1,  2009).
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since 2001, the United States and its NATO partners have been  responsible for securing Afghanistan and leading the effort to secure,  stabilize, and rebuild Afghanistan. In 2010, the United States, NATO, and  other coalition partners agreed to transition lead security responsibility for  Afghanistan from NATO to the Afghan government by the end of 2014.  Specifically, the Afghan government and ISAF—including the United  States—agreed to a transition process that emphasizes a shift in ISAF’s  role from leading combat missions to advising and assisting the ANSF,  resulting in ISAF shifting to a security force assistance mission. Lead  security responsibility in Afghanistan is defined as responsibility and  accountability for planning and conducting operations within a designated  area, with ISAF support as required. At the same time, overall U.S. force  levels are planned to draw down over the next year to about 34,000 with  additional decisions on drawdown of remaining U.S. forces yet to be  determined.
ISAF is a NATO-led mission in Afghanistan established by the United  Nations Security Council in December 2001. The ISAF coalition currently  consists of 28 NATO nations, including the United States, and 22  partnering nations with forces deployed across Afghanistan. ISAF is  divided into six regional commands across Afghanistan, each with a  specific geographic area of responsibility—North, East, South, Southwest,  West, and the Kabul area (known as Regional Command–Capital). The  United States leads three of these commands—East, South, and  Southwest.
In addition to conducting security operations, ISAF forces have long been  training and advising the ANSF both in training centers and at unit  locations after they have been formed and fielded. For the U.S.  contribution, DOD has used a variety of approaches to provide U.S.  forces to carry out the advise-and-assist mission. For example, prior to  2010, the advising mission in Afghanistan was primarily conducted with  transition teams. These teams did not exist as units in any of the services’  force structures and were instead comprised of company- and field-grade  officers and senior non-commissioned officers who were centrally  identified and individually selected based on rank and specialty. As we  have previously reported, the demand for these leaders created  challenges for the services because, among other things, the leaders  were generally pulled from other units or commands, which then were left  to perform their missions while understaffed. In part as a means of  alleviating these challenges, the Army developed the concept of  augmenting brigade combat teams with specialized personnel to execute  the advising mission, and began deploying these augmented brigades in  2010. In early 2012, based on requests from ISAF as part of its shift to a  security force assistance mission, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps began  to deploy small teams of advisors with specialized capabilities, referred to  as SFA advisor teams, which are located throughout Afghanistan, to work  with Afghan army and police units from the headquarters to the battalion  level, and advise them in areas such as command and control,  intelligence, and logistics. More recently, the Army began tailoring the  composition and mission of its brigade combat teams to further focus on  advising efforts.
U.S. advisor teams are under the command and control of U.S.  commanders within ISAF’s regional commands.have overall responsibility for operations in their geographic area,  including setting goals for the advising mission. ISAF establishes the  requirements for advisor teams, including force needs, and training  requirements. To meet the U.S. share of these requirements, the Army  and Marine Corps are responsible for providing advisor personnel,  establishing service-specific training requirements, and conducting  training prior to deployment.
section_title: SFA Advisor Team Mission and Goals Are Broadly Defined; Advisor Teams Varied in the Extent to Which Their Approaches Identified Specific Objectives and Activities Linked to Goals
paragraphs: DOD and ISAF have defined the mission and broad goals for advisor  teams based on the type of ANSF (e.g., army, police) and the type of unit,  from the headquarters to the battalion level. Advisor teams varied in the  extent to which their approaches for developing their ANSF counterparts  identified activities based on specific end states, objectives, and  milestones that are in support of the regional command’s broad goals.
subsections: section_title: DOD and ISAF Have Defined the Mission and Broad Goals for Advisor Teams for Various Types of ANSF Units
paragraphs: The mission for advisor teams for various types of ANSF units are defined  in multiple ISAF and DOD plans, directives, and orders. According to  DOD documentation, SFA advisor teams provide training, advising,  assisting, and development functions to prepare ANSF units to assume  full security responsibility by December 31, 2014. Missions also have  been defined for SFA advisor teams based on the type of ANSF unit they  advise, specifically:
Afghan National Army advisor teams are expected to advise and  assist those units, act as liaisons to ISAF units, and support the  operational planning and employment of the Afghan unit as part of  helping to develop a self-sufficient, competent, and professional unit  capable of autonomous operations.
Afghan National Police advisor teams are expected to advise those  units, act as liaisons to ISAF units, and support the operational  planning and employment of the Afghan unit as part of helping to  develop a self-sufficient, competent and professional unit capable of  maintaining public order, security, and rule of law.
Operational Coordination Center advisor teams are expected to  advise those units, act as liaisons to ISAF units and support the  development of a coherent security coordination structure.
The regional commands have amplified this guidance for advisor teams  by providing key advising goals based on the developmental needs of the  ANSF in their region. For example, Regional Command-South identified  their top-five advising goals, aimed at strengthening ANSF capabilities  such as logistics, countering improvised explosive devices, and medical  evacuation. Regional Command-East had a similar set of top-five  advising goals.
section_title: Advisor Teams Varied in the Extent to Which Their Approaches Identified Activities Based on Specific Objectives Linked to ANSF Development Goals
paragraphs: While ISAF and the regional commands have defined the mission and  broad goals for the advisor teams, it is largely left to the teams, in  coordination with the regional command and brigade commander for their  area of operations, to develop their approach for working with their ANSF  counterpart units. According to multi-service guidance on advising, in  order to successfully exert influence, advisors have an end or goal in  mind. Similarly, the Army’s Field Manual for Security Force Assistance  states that, in order to be successful, advisors have an end or goal in  mind and should establish objectives and milestones that support higher- command plans and can be achieved during their deployment.addition, advisor teams must balance the priorities of their commands  with those of their counterpart units. Specifically, DOD officials  emphasized that advisor teams need some flexibility to tailor their  approaches to the respective needs of their ANSF counterpart units while  still working towards regional command goals. Advisor teams we spoke  with were generally familiar with the broad goals established by ISAF and  regional commands, but used various approaches to develop their ANSF  counterpart units, which varied in the extent to which they resulted in the  identification of activities based on specific objectives or end states that  were clearly linked with established goals.
Some teams we spoke with had taken the initiative to develop structured  approaches that identified objectives or end states and milestones,  drawing from the regional command’s broader goals to guide their  advising efforts. For example, one team stated they worked directly from  the regional commander’s top-five goals, developing a planning process  to identify monthly objectives and milestones for each advising area (e.g.,  personnel, intelligence, logistics) that support these goals, and then  regularly assessing where they are in terms of progress towards the  commander’s goals and in what areas they should continue to focus.  Using this process, the advisor team identified a training need for an  ANSF brigade related to the regional commander’s broad goal of  developing the ANSF’s counter improvised explosive device capabilities  and arranged for a U.S. Explosive Ordinance Disposal unit to provide this  training. In another instance, a logistics advisor team identified a need for  its ANSF counterpart to be capable of repairing items such as cranes and  fuel distribution equipment to help achieve the regional command’s broad  goal of developing general level maintenance capability. To achieve this  objective, the team created a training program to develop this capability.  Another team leader we spoke with stated he developed advising plans  based on the regional command’s high level goals and informed by an  assessment of their ANSF counterpart unit, to identify tasks and timelines  to train their counterparts on basic skills such as map reading in order to  improve their ability to plan and conduct operations.
Other advisor teams we met with were familiar with the broad goals for  ANSF development and had identified activities to develop their ANSF  counterpart units, but used less structured approaches to guide their  advising efforts. For example, advisor teams in multiple regional  commands stated their approach was to rely on interactions with their  ANSF counterparts to identify priorities, using this input to develop  activities on an ad hoc basis. Similarly, according to a brigade  commander serving as an advisor team leader, his team and other  advisor teams from his brigade generally identified development activities  in reaction to situations as they arose rather than as part of a longer-term,  more structured approach to achieve broad goals. According to several  advisor teams, while they received input from various higher  headquarters, that input lacked specificity regarding end states they  should be trying to achieve for their ANSF units, leading them to use less  structured approaches to guide their efforts. For example, the deputy  team leader of an advisor team for a high-level Afghan National Army unit  with visibility over the efforts of several advisor teams for subordinate  ANSF units stated that while his team was able to develop activities  intended to enable his counterpart unit to operate independently, he  believed that guidance from the regional command did not clearly define  the overall desired end state for the ANSF, which made it difficult to  determine where to focus their particular advising efforts. Similarly,  officials responsible for collecting best practices and lessons learned from  SFA advisor teams in one regional command said that, in talking with  teams, they found a lack of direction for advisor teams from higher  headquarters resulted in what they characterized as a collection of good  activities conducted by individual teams over time without a synchronized  approach driving towards a tangible end state. Without a more structured  approach with clear linkages between objectives or end states linked to  development goals for ANSF units, regional commanders cannot be  assured that the activities of individual advisor teams are in fact making  progress toward established goals. Moreover, having such an approach  would help with continuity of effort from one advisor team to the next,  since advisor teams typically deploy for 9 months.
section_title: The Army and Marine Corps Have Provided the Required Number of SFA Advisor Teams While Managing Ongoing Challenges
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps have provided the required number of SFA  advisor teams to Afghanistan based on theater commanders’ requests.  Recognizing that high ranks and skill specialties were required for advisor  teams, theater commander guidance allowed for some substitutions when  specific ranks or skills were unavailable, which enabled the Army and  Marine Corps to provide the appropriate personnel. The Army’s use of  brigades to form advisor teams has enabled them to meet requirements  but has resulted in leaving large numbers of brigade personnel at their  home station locations. To manage these large rear detachments,  brigade leadership undertook significant planning to ensure enough stay- behind leadership existed to maintain a sufficient command structure and  provide certain training and exercises.
subsections: section_title: The Army and Marine Corps Have Provided the Required Number of SFA Advisor Teams Based on Theater Commanders’ Requests
paragraphs: In late 2011, ISAF and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan established  requirements for coalition and U.S. SFA advisor teams, including  specifying the number of teams required, team composition and  capabilities, and assignment to ANSF units. Although the numbers of  teams have changed over time, according to ISAF, the Army and Marine  Corps have provided the required number of SFA advisor teams based  on these requests and, as of December 2012, approximately 250 U.S.  advisor teams were operating in Afghanistan. SFA advisor teams are  generally comprised of 9 to 18 advisor personnel—made up of a mix of  company- and field-grade officers, and senior non-commissioned  officers—with specific specialties such as military intelligence, military  police, and signal officers. The composition of advisor teams is tailored to  match the needs of their ANSF counterpart. For example, teams at higher  echelons of the ANSF (e.g., corps or provincial headquarters) have a  higher rank requirement for the advisor team leader and police advisor  teams include requirements for military police personnel. According to  ISAF, Army, and Marine Corps officials, advisor teams are generally  expected to remain with the same ANSF unit for the duration of their  approximately 9-month deployments. According to DOD and ISAF  officials, the requirement for advisor teams has fluctuated as additional  ANSF units have been fielded, and the overall requirement for advisor  teams is expected to change as the development of ANSF units  progresses. For example, according to ISAF officials, SFA advisor teams  currently advise down to the battalion level, but as U.S. forces draw down  in Afghanistan and the capability of the ANSF increases, the U.S.  advising effort could shift to a brigade-and-higher focus, which could  affect the overall number and size of the teams.
U.S. SFA advisor teams began deploying to Afghanistan in early 2012,  and the Army and Marine Corps have used a variety of approaches to  provide these teams.
To meet its requirements for the first set of advisor team deployments,  the Army tasked three non-deployed brigades to form the bulk of the  advisor teams using personnel from their units, with additional non- deployed units tasked to form the remaining teams. These advisor  teams then deployed to Afghanistan and were attached to combat  brigades already in theater. More recently, the Army shifted its  sourcing approach by tailoring the composition and mission of  brigades deploying to Afghanistan to further focus on the SFA  mission, and began deploying these SFA brigades (SFABs) in  November 2012. According to ISAF officials, SFABs include advisor  teams that are primarily created using personnel from within the  brigade. According to Army officials, as of January 2013, three SFABs  have deployed in place of combat brigades, and at least four more  U.S. brigades in Afghanistan have been identified to be replaced by  SFABs. According to Army officials, the Army will continue to provide  some advisor teams using personnel from non-deployed active and  reserve units that will join the remaining combat brigades in  Afghanistan. Additionally, planning for the remaining brigades and  overall force levels in Afghanistan is ongoing and by late 2013 all  deploying U.S. brigades may be SFABs.
To meet the initial deployment of SFA advisor teams beginning in  early 2012, the Marine Corps created some teams out of personnel  already deployed in Afghanistan and created additional teams using  non-deployed personnel generally from the I and II Marine  Expeditionary Forces, according to Marine Corps officials. For  subsequent deployments of teams, the Marine Corps has created  teams using non-deployed personnel from across the Marine  Expeditionary Forces that then deploy to Afghanistan as formed  teams.
section_title: The Army and Marine Corps Used Substitution Allowances and Individual Augmentees to Address Challenges in Meeting Rank and Skill Requirements
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps have been able to fill SFA advisor teams, but  they continue to face challenges meeting specific rank and skill  requirements. In 2011, we reported on challenges the Army was  experiencing providing high-ranking personnel with specialized skills for  the advising mission in Afghanistan. According to Army and Marine  Corps officials, meeting the rank and skills required for SFA advisor  teams, including those as part of SFABs, continues to present a  challenge given the limited availability of such personnel across the  services. To help address these challenges, theater commanders, in  coordination with the Army and Marine Corps, have outlined a set of  substitution guidelines, to allow flexibility in the rank and skill  requirements. For instance, specific rank requirements can generally be  substituted with an individual one rank above or below the requirement.  Similarly, there are guidelines for different skills and specialties that may  be substituted for one another. For example, a team may have a  requirement for a specific type of intelligence officer, but the substitution  guidance identified other types of intelligence personnel that could be  used to meet this requirement such as a counterintelligence or signals  intelligence analyst. Army Forces Command officials told us that because  the required number of ranks and specialties for SFA advisor teams  exceeds the total number of such personnel that exist in a typical brigade,  the ability to substitute certain ranks and skills with other available  personnel was critical to meeting the requirement for most advisor teams  and for all three of the first deploying SFABs. Army officials recognized  that substitutions would need to occur both within and among brigades.  According to sourcing officials and officials from one of the brigades  tasked to provide the first set of advisor teams, The following are  examples:
While 40 majors were required to fill the specified number of teams,  the brigade had only 25 majors on hand. Recognizing this, the Army’s  plan called for substituting captains for majors in order to meet the  requirement.
The requirement for certain intelligence officers exceeded that which  existed in the brigade. Therefore, brigade leadership used lower  ranking military intelligence officers or other officers with sufficient  related experience.
According to Army officials, the rank and skill requirements, as well as the  reliance on substitutions, are expected to continue with the use of SFABs.  As the Army and Marine Corps began to form the teams, they also  worked with their force providers in order to utilize individual augmentees  from active and reserve non-deployed units to help meet the rank and  skill requirements for SFA advisor teams. For example, an official from a  Marine Expeditionary Force responsible for providing many of the first  advisor teams stated that the unit used reservists to fill over 130 advisor  slots, and the Marine Corps expects to continue to use them to fill  subsequent teams.
section_title: The Army Is Taking Steps to Manage Large Rear Detachments That Result from SFA Advisor Team Sourcing Approaches
paragraphs: The Army’s sourcing approaches enabled it to meet theater requirements  for SFA advisor teams, but resulted in brigades leaving large numbers of  personnel at home station locations. For the first set of Army  deployments, the three brigades identified to source the bulk of the teams  left the majority of their personnel at home station. For example,  according to brigade officials, one brigade deployed approximately 370  people to create advisor teams, leaving approximately 3,100 personnel  (approximately 90 percent) behind at home station. According to Army  officials, SFABs reduce the size of the rear detachments because a larger  percentage of the brigade’s personnel are to be deployed, although they  recognized SFABs would continue to result in large rear detachments.  For example, two of the first SFABs to deploy each left roughly 2,000  personnel at home station. Because the advisor team requirement calls  for high numbers of company- and field-grade officers and senior non- commissioned officers, as well as specific skill specialties, staffing the  teams required the brigades to deploy a significant portion of their  leadership and expertise, including the brigade commanders and many  battalion, company, and platoon commanders, for the advisor mission. As  a result, according to Army Forces Command officials and officials from  two brigades, brigade leadership had to undertake significant planning to  ensure that enough stay-behind leadership existed to maintain a sufficient  command structure and the unit leadership needed to conduct certain  training, such as artillery and other live-fire exercises. In order to help  brigades in this planning, Army Forces Command has issued guidance  for the training and employment of rear detachments during advisor team  deployments, including missions the force may be assigned to, training  expectations, and equipment maintenance responsibilities. For example,  one brigade that deployed many of the first set of advisor teams  consolidated its rear detachment into smaller numbers of more fully  manned platoons to ensure appropriate leadership existed for each  platoon. In addition, the brigade leadership developed a training plan for  the rear detachment to maintain proficiency in critical tasks while awaiting  reintegration of deployed personnel.
section_title: The Army and Marine Corps Have Developed Programs to Train Advisor Teams, but Teams Differed in the Extent to Which They Had Mission-Specific Information Prior to Deployment
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps have developed standardized  predeployment training programs for SFA advisor teams in Afghanistan,  but teams varied in the extent to which they had access to mission- specific information prior to deploying that they believed would help them  prepare for their specific advising missions.
subsections: section_title: The Army and Marine Corps Have Developed Predeployment Training Programs for SFA Advisor Teams
paragraphs: SFA advisor teams take part in a broad set of training activities both at  home station and at training centers in the months leading up to their  deployment. ISAF has established minimum training requirements for  SFA advisor teams from all coalition countries, including the United  States. These training requirements include both individual advisor  knowledge and skills, such as understanding how to work through an  interpreter, and collective team knowledge and skills, such as how the  advisor team will assess ANSF unit capabilities and provide force  protection and sustainment. ISAF envisions that this training will be  conducted using a combination of individual and team-based training. In  accordance with these requirements, the Army and Marine Corps have  each developed a program of instruction for predeployment training,  which generally occurs in three stages.
Home-Station Training. Home-station training includes individual  and team-level combat skills training provided to all deploying forces  to Afghanistan. Typically, SFA advisor teams are formed prior to the  beginning of this training. Topics include combat lifesaver training,  various weapons and driving qualifications, and countering improvised  explosive devices. During this period, teams also begin to gather  information regarding their specific advising assignment in order to  conduct mission analysis, shape the next two stages of their training,  and establish their initial plan for their advising missions. For  example, officials at the Joint Readiness Training Center Operations  Group, which conducts culminating training exercises for Army  advisor teams and SFABs, told us that it is during this time that they  begin to work with commanders to design their culminating training  exercise.
Advisor-Specific Training. Advisor-specific training is focused on  language, culture, counterinsurgency, and advisor skills. Army advisor  teams generally receive advisor-specific training during an 8-day  course provided by the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade.  Marine  Corps teams receive training at the Advisor Training Cells at their  respective Marine Expeditionary Force home stations, as well as the  Advisor Training Group at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat  Center. such as overviews of Afghan security force institutions, how to use an  interpreter, and techniques for building rapport. The training also  utilizes role players in practical exercises to simulate engagements  with key Afghan civilian and military leaders in different situations.
Culminating Training Exercise. This training includes situational   Both the Army and Marine Corps training includes courses  training exercises and a culminating training exercise that integrates  ANSF role players into a simulated deployed environment in order to  exercise the advisor teams’ ability to advise their ANSF counterpart  units. For Army advisor teams, this exercise is incorporated into the  culminating training exercise of the brigade under which they will  operate in Afghanistan, when possible, and is conducted at the Joint  Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, or other combat  training centers. These exercises include training based on the level  (e.g., brigade, battalion) and type (e.g., army, police) of the ANSF unit  that teams will be advising and their specific areas of responsibility in  Afghanistan, individual and team proficiency assessments, and live- fire drills, such as combat patrols. Marine Corps advisor teams  receive similar training at the Advisor Training Group, though this  training does not include the combat unit with which they will be  operating in Afghanistan.
The Army, Marine Corps, and ISAF have established mechanisms to  gather feedback on predeployment training from advisor teams in  Afghanistan in order to update and refine training for the advisor mission.  Both the Army and Marine Corps centers for lessons learned have  ongoing efforts in Afghanistan to collect observations and best practices  for SFA advisor teams. Additionally, the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade  employs liaison officers at ISAF and the regional commands, among  other places, to collect lessons learned and after-action reports from  advisor teams in Afghanistan, which are then incorporated into advisor  training. Officials from the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade said that,  based in part on this feedback, the advisor training has changed  significantly since the first SFA advisor teams began going through the  training in January 2012, and that the program of instruction will continue  to evolve. For example, officials from two of the first SFA advisor teams  told us that the advisor training was too focused on classroom instruction.  Officials from the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade said that they had  heard similar concerns, and later iterations of SFA advisor team training  was updated to provide greater balance between classroom training and  practical exercises that use cultural role players. Further, between August  2012 and October 2012, ISAF conducted a survey of U.S. and coalition  nation SFA advisor team personnel on predeployment training in order to  provide advisor insights to U.S. and NATO training centers and made  several recommendations to improve predeployment training. For  example, ISAF recommended that advisor teams contact the unit they will  be replacing to fine tune their training in order to meet the challenges they  will face upon deployment.
section_title: Advisor Teams Varied in the Extent to Which They Had Access to Information to Help Prepare for Their Specific Advising Missions Prior to Deployment
paragraphs: ISAF’s minimum training requirements direct advisor teams to conduct  mission analysis prior to deployment in order to develop plans for  advising their ANSF counterpart unit. Further, the Army’s Field Manual for  Security Force Assistance, states that an in-depth understanding of the  operational environment—including a clear understanding of the theater,  population, and the foreign security forces and capabilities with which  they are working—is critical to planning and conducting effective SFA.  According to some advisor team officials and ISAF officials tasked with  gathering lessons learned from advisor teams and identifying potential  challenges, the personalities and capabilities of each ANSF unit and  district are unique, and advisor teams need specific information on their  ANSF counterpart unit as well as the efforts of the advisor teams currently  working with the unit prior to deployment in order to be successful. In  addition, some advisors stated that having specific information about the  operational environment where teams will be deployed would be  beneficial in determining where to place emphasis during training. For  example, some advisor teams we spoke with are able to walk to their  counterpart unit’s headquarters, while other teams had to travel longer  distances to accompany their counterpart units. Having this type of  specific information about their operating environment could be helpful for  advisor teams in tailoring some of their more general combat training at  home station.
Advisor teams varied in the extent to which they had access to  information to help prepare for their specific advising missions prior to  deployment. Advisor teams may gain access to this information through a  variety of ways. For example, officials from the 162nd Infantry Training  Brigade said that they coordinate video teleconferences between advisor  teams going through advisor training and deployed advisor teams with the  goal that advisor teams are able to talk to the SFA advisor team that they  will replace to help the deploying team better understand its specific  mission and the unit that it will be advising. Advisor teams can also utilize  secure networks to gather mission-specific information. For example,  much of the information on advising and general operations in  Afghanistan (e.g., daily and weekly update briefs, details of the advisor  teams’ interactions with ANSF units, and regional command campaign  plans) is stored and shared on the Combined Enterprise Regional  Information Exchange System-ISAF (CENTRIXS-I) network—a network  that is widely used by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, but with  limited access in the United States. Additionally, advisor teams may take  part in predeployment site surveys in which commanders take staff  members to theater and meet with the units they will be replacing to learn  more about the mission they will support. According to the Army Field  Manual for Security Force Assistance, the predeployment site survey  should, among other things, provide information on the organization,  leadership, and capabilities of the foreign unit that will be advised, as well  as an overview of the operational area. ISAF minimum training  requirements also require that advisor teams conduct predeployment site  surveys as part of their SFA mission analysis and planning.
We found differences in the extent to which advisor teams were actually  able to gain access to mission-specific information throughout their  predeployment training. For example,
While some SFA advisor teams told us that mission-specific  information shared on CENTRIXS-I is beneficial in shaping their  predeployment training and mission analysis, we found that advisor  teams varied in the extent to which they were able access this system  and thus the information contained therein throughout their  predeployment training. Some advisor teams had access to  CENTRIXS-I at home station. For example, officials from one brigade  that provided SFA advisor teams said that they recognized the value  of CENTRIXS-I in gathering specific information from units on the  ground in order for teams to conduct their mission analysis and early  planning, and proactively took steps to gain access to the network at  home station early on in predeployment training, and were able to  obtain access for its SFA advisor teams 5 months prior to deploying.  However, other advisor teams said that they had limited or no access  to this network at their home stations, thus limiting the information  available to the teams to shape training, conduct mission research,  and develop situational awareness before arriving in Afghanistan.  Advisor teams are able to access CENTRIXS-I once they arrive at the  162nd Infantry Training Brigade and the Advisor Training Group  training sites. However, teams are at these locations for a short time  (i.e., less than 30 days) in the mid-to-late stages of training. Advisor  teams with limited or no access to CENTRIXS-I at home station may  be unable to fully leverage mission-specific information to (1) either  shape their training prior to going to these locations or (2) continue to  fully maximize the up-to-date information contained therein to prepare  for their missions after they leave the training sites.
Advisor teams varied in their ability to send representatives on  predeployment site surveys to Afghanistan. Unit commanders and  theater commands determine the numbers of personnel that take part  in the survey, taking into consideration limitations on the ability of  certain locations to provide transportation, housing, and other support.  According to an ISAF official, units tasked with the advising mission  are encouraged to take some representatives from their advisor  teams on these surveys. According to a U.S. Forces–Afghanistan  official, there has been at least one recent case where a  predeployment site survey team sent to Afghanistan was augmented  with additional personnel in order to accommodate the need to visit  multiple locations. In contrast, some advisor teams we spoke with said  that they did not send representatives from their individual teams on  these site surveys, which limited their ability to shape their training  and their understanding of the environment in which they would be  operating. For example, one advisor team said that it did not know the  specifics of the operating environment when conducting home station  training, such as details about security and movement, and that the  opportunity to conduct a predeployment site survey would have been  helpful for the team’s mission preparation. Another unit that was  organized into three advisor teams reported that they did not take part  in a predeployment site survey and thus faced significant challenges  during their first 45 days of deployment because they were unaware  that logistic support arrangements for the teams in Afghanistan had  not been established.
DOD officials acknowledged that increased information prior to  deployment would benefit advisor teams, but added that resource  constraints are a consideration in determining how to expand access to  certain information sources. Nonetheless, without a more complete  understanding of the capabilities of the ANSF counterpart units to be  advised and the operating environment in which they will be advising prior  to deploying, it may take advisor teams more time after deploying to  maximize their impact as advisors.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The use of SFA advisor teams to develop and support the ANSF are a  key element of the U.S. and ISAF strategy to transition lead security  responsibility to Afghanistan while drawing down combat forces. By  ensuring that SFA advisor teams have structured approaches with clear  linkages between end states, objectives, and milestones that are in  support of broad goals for ANSF units, theater commanders can enhance  the ability of advisor teams to develop their ANSF counterparts. In  addition, this will enable theater commanders to better gauge an ANSF  unit’s progress towards their broader development goals and facilitate  continuity of effort from one advisor team to the next. Lastly, by improving  the availability of mission-specific information prior to deployment, the  Army and the Marine Corps will ensure that SFA advisor team have the  information necessary on their specific ANSF counterpart and the  operational environment to better inform training. Moreover, such  information would enhance the ability of advisor teams to prepare for and  undertake their efforts immediately upon deployment.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that the activities of individual advisor teams are more clearly  linked to ISAF and regional command goals for overall ANSF  development, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in  consultation with the commander of U.S. Central Command, direct  theater commanders in Afghanistan to work with brigade commanders  and advisor teams to identify specific end states, objectives and  milestones for developing their ANSF counterparts that are in support of  the broad theater goals to guide their advising efforts during their  deployment.
To enhance the ability of SFA advisor teams to prepare for and execute  their mission, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army and the  Commandant of the Marine Corps take steps to improve the availability of  mission-specific information during predeployment training. Such steps  could include:
Expanded access to the data and information contained in  CENTRIXS-I; and,  Increased opportunities, in coordination with U.S. Central Command,  for advisor team leaders to participate in predeployment site surveys  with the teams they are expected to replace.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with  our recommendations. The full text of DOD’s written comments is  reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments, which  we incorporated where appropriate.
In its comments, DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation  that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the commander of U.S.  Central Command, direct theater commanders in Afghanistan to work  with brigade commanders and advisor teams to identify specific end  states, objectives, and milestones for developing their ANSF counterparts  that are in support of the broad theater goals to guide their advising  efforts during their deployment. Also, DOD provided comments regarding  the command relationships and guidance affecting the advisor teams.  Specifically, DOD stated that the issue of linking advisor teams with  regional commanders and the theater commander to identify specific end  states, objectives, and milestones resides within the operational level and  not at the strategic level with the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Central  Command. The department further stated that the Commander,  International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF), is the theater  commander and produces the operation plans for Afghanistan, which  provide the end states, objectives, and milestones for the campaign,  including efforts to develop the ANSF and ministerial-level agencies.  COMISAF also issues guidance for developing the ANSF and ministerial  agencies to include end states, objectives, and milestones. Further, DOD  noted that regional commanders receive their guidance and direction in  part through the OPLANs and other guidance issued by COMISAF. The  department also stated that brigade commanders, SFABs, and SFA  advisor teams are operationally and/or tactically controlled by the regional  commanders. DOD stated that guidance from the regional commanders  for these subordinate elements should include the guidance provided by  COMISAF regarding development of the ANSF. Lastly, DOD stated that  individual ANSF elements advised by SFA advisor teams and SFABs  have different levels of capabilities and unique circumstances involved in  developing those capabilities. Therefore, DOD stated that commanders at  the operational and tactical level should have sole responsibility for  directing the development of the individual ANSF elements.
We agree that it is the responsibility of commanders, particularly regional  commanders, at the operational and tactical level, to direct SFA advisor  teams to develop individual ANSF elements. As we noted in our report,  regional commands have overall responsibility for operations in their  geographic area, including setting goals for the advising mission. We  further noted that the missions for advisor teams are defined in multiple  ISAF and DOD plans, directives, and orders and that the regional  commands amplify this guidance by providing key advising goals based  on the developmental needs of the ANSF in each region. However, we  found that it is largely left to advisor teams to develop their approach for  working with their ANSF counterpart units and that advisor teams varied  in the extent to which their approaches identified activities based upon  specific objectives linked to ANSF development goals. Therefore, we  recommended that theater commanders in Afghanistan should work with  brigade commanders and advisor teams to identify specific end states,  objectives and milestones for developing their ANSF counterparts that are  in support of the broad theater goals to guide their advising efforts during  their deployment. We agree with the department’s view that directing the  development of the individual ANSF elements should be the sole  responsibility of commanders at the operational and tactical level. We  believe that our recommendation does not conflict with this principle but  rather calls for the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the  Commander of U.S. Central Command, to direct the operational  commander to ensure that these actions are taken.
Regarding our second recommendation, we recommended that the  Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps take  steps to improve the availability of mission-specific information during  predeployment training, and provided two examples of such steps for  illustrative purposes. DOD commented separately on these examples.  Specifically, with respect to the step calling for expanded access to the  data and information contained in CENTRIXS-I, DOD concurred and  noted that actions had been taken to install CENTRIXS-I kiosks at U.S  bases and overseas locations and plans were underway to install  additional kiosks. Also, DOD  noted that while CENTRIXS-I is a specific  capability, it appears that the intent of our recommendation is to expand  information flow by any means available, and DOD suggested that we  rephrase the first step to read: “Expand access to secure networks in  order to gather data and information.” We agree that the intent of our  recommendation is to expand information flow and to recognize, as noted  in our report, that other information sources exist beyond CENTRIXS-I.  Based on our discussions with command and advisor team personnel,  CENTRIXS-I was cited as an important information source and therefore  we cited it as an example in our report. We believe that, as currently  worded, our recommendation provides flexibility for the department to  determine a range of options for improving the availability of information  to advisor teams.
With respect to the step calling for increased opportunities for advisor  team leaders to participate in predeployment site surveys, DOD partially  concurred. The department stated that advisor teams and the leadership  of brigades must collaborate and use the site survey as well as the  brigade’s intelligence infrastructure to support the teams in getting  situational awareness. Further, DOD further noted that space and  logistical constraints may limit participation in a brigade’s site survey.  Given the critical nature of the SFA advisor team mission, DOD noted that  team leaders should be given priority to participate in a predeployment  site survey, but that a balance must be met regarding the comprehensive  nature of the mission in Afghanistan. Additionally, the department stated  that while the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine  Corps can explore timing opportunities for advisor team leaders to  participate in predeployment site surveys, the Afghanistan theater of  operations has responsibility for ultimate approval for a site-survey visit  request. As a result, the department recommended that we rephrase the  second step to include the wording "in coordination with U.S. Central  Command.” We agree that various factors can affect the composition of  the personnel participating in the site surveys and that the theater of  operations has responsibility to approve visit requests. Our report  specifically notes that unit commanders and theater commands determine  the numbers of personnel that take part in the predeployment site survey,  and take into consideration limitations on the ability of certain locations to  provide transportation, housing, and other support. Based on DOD’s  comments, we modified the text of our second step as DOD suggested.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense; the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Secretary of the Army; the  Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Commander of U.S. Central  Command. In addition, the report will also be available on our website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD), in  conjunction with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), has  defined Security Force Assistance (SFA) advisor team missions, goals,  and objectives, we reviewed doctrine and guidance from the Army,  Marine Corps, and theater commanders, including the Army Field Manual  3-07.1 Security Force Assistance and the ISAF SFA Concept and  Implementation Guidance. We also examined key planning documents,  such as operational plans and orders, theater commanders’ requests for  forces, and select advisor team mission briefs and after-action reports.  Additionally, we interviewed officials in the United States from the Office  of the Secretary of Defense, Department of the Army, Headquarters  Marine Corps, as well as officials in Afghanistan from ISAF, ISAF Joint  Command, regional commands, and U.S. Army and Marine Corps advisor  teams.
To determine the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have been  able to provide SFA advisor teams, we reviewed documents such as  theater and combatant commanders’ requests for forces that establish  personnel requirements for SFA advisor teams and Army and Marine  Corps sourcing documents, including execution orders and other manning  guidance. We also examined ISAF, ISAF Joint Command, and Army and  Marine documents detailing the structure and composition of the SFA  advisor teams, including the ISAF SFA Concept and Implementation  Guidance, theater commander operational and fragmentary orders, and  unit and advisor team briefings. Additionally, in addition to the officials  mentioned above, we also interviewed officials in the United States from  Army Forces Command, Marine Corps Central Command, 1st Marine  Expeditionary Force, U.S. Central Command, officials from Army brigades  that provided SFA advisor teams, and U.S. Army and Marine Corps  advisor team personnel in the United States and Afghanistan.
To determine the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have  developed programs to train SFA advisor teams for their specific missions  in Afghanistan, we reviewed theater commanders’ and service training  requirements for SFA advisor teams, such as U.S. Central Command  theater training requirements, ISAF minimum training requirements for  SFA advisor teams, and Army and Marine Corps training requirements for  SFA advisor teams. We also examined documents detailing Army and  Marine Corps advisor training programs, such as concept briefs and  curriculum documents from the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade, the Joint  Readiness Training Center, the Marine Corps Advisor Training Group,  and Marine Corps Advisor Training Cell. We also reviewed after-action  reports and lessons-learned documents from SFA advisor teams.
Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Army 162nd Infantry  Training Brigade, Joint Readiness Training Center, 1st Marine  Expeditionary Force Advisor Training Cell, Marine Corps Advisor Training  Group, and U.S. Army and Marine Corps advisor personnel conducting  training in the United States and deployed in Afghanistan, as well as from  those organizations mentioned earlier.
We visited or contacted officials from the following organizations in the  United States and Afghanistan during our review:  DOD Organizations in the United States
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Arlington, Virginia
U.S. Central Command, Tampa, Florida
U.S. Army
Department of the Army Headquarters, Arlington, Virginia
U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
162nd Infantry Training Brigade, Fort Polk, Louisiana
Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana
101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Headquarters, Marine Corps, Arlington, Virginia
Marine Corps Central Command, Tampa, Florida
1st Marine Expeditionary Force, including its Advisor Training Cell,
Advisor Training Group, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center,  DOD and International Entities in Afghanistan
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) entities, including the  ISAF, ISAF Commander’s Advisory and Assistance Team, and  ISAF Joint Command, Kabul, Afghanistan
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan
Regional Command headquarters and staff:
Regional Command–East (Commanded by 1st Infantry  Division, U.S. Army), Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan
Regional Command–South (Commanded by 3rd Infantry  Division, U.S. Army), Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan
Regional Command–Southwest (Commanded by 1st Marine  Expeditionary Force (Fwd), U.S. Marine Corps), Camp  Leatherneck, Afghanistan
U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan
U.S. Army and Marine Corps Units, Personnel, and Advisor Teams  deployed in Afghanistan:
4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, U.S. Army
2nd Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, U.S. Army
162nd Infantry Training Brigade training liaison officers
23 SFA advisor teams in Afghanistan, including the following:
7 Army advisor teams in Regional Command–East
10 Army advisor teams in Regional Command–South
5 Marine Corps advisor teams in Regional Command–
1 Army advisor team in Regional Command–West  As part of this review, we selected an illustrative, non-generalizable  sample of deployed U.S. Army and Marine Corps SFA advisor teams in  Afghanistan. We worked with theater commands in Afghanistan to identify  and meet with a selection of advisor teams that included both Army and  Marine Corps advisor teams, advisor teams operating in different regional  commands, and advisor teams assigned to various types (e.g., army,  police, operational coordination center, etc.) and levels (e.g., corps,  brigade, battalion, etc.) of the ANSF. Ultimately, we met with 23 deployed  U.S. advisor teams in Afghanistan operating in four different regional  commands’ areas of operations—18 Army teams and 5 Marine Corps  teams.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to April 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, James A. Reynolds, Assistant  Director; Virginia Chanley; Carole Coffey; Grace Coleman; Mark Dowling;  Kasea Hamar; Marcus Oliver; Luis Rodriguez; and Sally Williamson made  key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage  Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation.  GAO-13-335T. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2013.
Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues.GAO-13-218SP. Washington,  D.C.: February 11, 2013.
Afghanistan Security: Security Transition. GAO-12-598C. Washington,  D.C.: September 11, 2012.
Observations on U.S. Military Capabilities to Support Transition of Lead  Security Responsibility to Afghan National Security Forces.  GAO-12-734C. Washington, D.C.: August 3, 2012.
Afghanistan Security: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and  Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces. GAO-12-951T.  Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2012.
Interim Results on U.S.-NATO Efforts to Transition Lead Security  Responsibility to Afghan Forces. GAO-12-607C. Washington, D.C.: May  18, 2012.
Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide  Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts. GAO-12-556.  Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012.
Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army  Brigades to Support the Advising Mission. GAO-11-760. Washington,  D.C.: August 2, 2011.