Military Enlisted Aides: DOD's Report Met Most Statutory Requirements, but Aide Allocation Could Be Improved
Published: 2016-02-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Enlisted aides assist general and flag officers with tasks, such as uniform care, that might otherwise interfere with accomplishing their official duties. Section 504 of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA required DOD to submit to Congress a report specifying enlisted aide duties and allocation procedures; justifying aide authorizations and assignments; recommending changes to the statutory method of calculating aide authorizations; and reducing the overall number of enlisted aides by 40.
The fiscal year 2015 NDAA also included a provision for GAO to review DOD's report. This report examines the extent to which (1) DOD's report on enlisted aides addressed statutory reporting requirements; (2) DOD's methodologies for identifying enlisted aide duties, allocating enlisted aides, and justifying their necessity are consistent with relevant statutes and DOD guidance; and (3) DOD used reliable data to support its report conclusions. GAO assessed DOD's June 2015 report against statutory requirements, compared methodologies against statute and DOD guidance, analyzed fiscal years 2014 and 2015 data on aide numbers, and interviewed DOD officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense's (DOD) June 2015 report on enlisted aides fully addressed five of the six statutory reporting requirements contained in section 504 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015 and partially addressed the remaining requirement. DOD's report addressed, among other things, the requirement to describe procedures for allocating enlisted aide authorizations, and the objective to reduce by 40 the maximum number of enlisted aides authorized and allocated. GAO determined that DOD partially addressed the requirement to justify enlisted aide authorizations on a billet-by-billet basis because DOD did not provide an explanation for each individual enlisted aide, and because some data were not from September 30, 2014, as was required.
DOD's methodology for identifying enlisted aide duties is consistent with guidance, and its methodology for allocating enlisted aides is consistent with relevant statute. However, DOD's methodologies for allocating and justifying aides are not consistent with all DOD guidance. DOD's stated methodology for allocating enlisted aide authorizations is consistent with the authorization formula and cap in 10 U.S.C. § 981 by first satisfying Joint Staff needs and then allocating the remaining authorizations among the military services according to a “fair share” percentage basis. However, this methodology is not based on validated personnel requirements, as DOD guidance requires, and DOD has not applied it to reallocate enlisted aide authorizations since 2010, resulting in a disproportionate distribution of authorizations. DOD officials stated that they have not assessed DOD-wide requirements in part due to the limited timeframe for developing DOD's report, and that they have not reallocated authorizations since 2010 because they were rewriting their enlisted aide guidance and anticipated changes to the statutory formula for determining enlisted aide authorizations. Without periodically assessing enlisted aide requirements and updating allocations, DOD cannot reasonably ensure that these resources are properly matched to its changing needs. In addition, the justifications included in DOD's report vary and are subjective, and it is unclear how duties and workload support enlisted aide assignments. For instance, a 4-star Joint Staff general hosts 150-200 official representational events per year and is assigned one enlisted aide, while a 3-star Army general hosts 3 events per year but is also assigned one aide. Without additional guidance to determine enlisted aide workload, military service and Joint Staff decisions regarding authorizations and assignments may not be consistent and transparent.
Certain data DOD used in its report were inaccurate or incomplete and therefore not reliable. For example, justification data from the Army, the Navy, and the Joint Staff did not reflect enlisted aide authorizations and assignments as of September 30, 2014, as was required. Also, several justifications did not align with the number of aides authorized or assigned to a general or flag officer billet. DOD officials stated they had no reason to doubt military service and Joint Staff data, but without a process for assessing reliability DOD does not have reasonable assurance that data it used to determine enlisted aide reductions were accurate, and Congress and senior DOD leaders may not have reliable data in future enlisted aide reports on which to base decisions on enlisted aides.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD assess DOD-wide enlisted aide requirements, reallocate enlisted aide authorizations, establish criteria for determining enlisted aide workload, and establish a process for assessing the reliability of data in future enlisted aide reports. DOD concurred, but raised some concerns. GAO addresses these concerns in this report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. military has been providing enlisted aides to officers since the  Revolutionary War, and the Department of Defense (DOD) has reported  that its enlisted aide program remains a vital tool in assisting general and  flag officers (GFO) with meeting social requirements related to building  partnerships and cultural and political ties throughout the world, as well as  enhancing community relations. Enlisted aides are a resource to assist  GFOs with minor tasks—such as maintaining uniforms—that if performed  by the officers themselves would be at the expense of the officers’  primary military and official duties and responsibilities. Congressional  committees have previously raised questions over the costs of sustaining  the GFO population—including those costs associated with enlisted  aides—and Congress has imposed a ceiling on the total number of  enlisted personnel who may be assigned or detailed as enlisted aides on  the personal staffs of GFOs. In September 2014, we found that the  military services track the numbers and costs associated with enlisted  aides to varying extents and recommended that DOD finalize a biannual  reporting requirement related to the tracking of these aides within the  department. DOD concurred with this recommendation and included a  reporting requirement related to the tracking of enlisted aides in its  updated enlisted aide instruction. Subsequently, section 504 of the Carl  Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act  (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015 required DOD to produce and submit to the  Committees on Armed Services a series of reports on enlisted aides.
DOD’s annual enlisted aide report, due no later than March 1 of each  year, is to specify the number of enlisted aides authorized and  allocated—as of September 30 of the previous year—to GFOs of the  Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Joint Staff, and  to justify on a billet-by-billet basis the authorization and assignment of  each enlisted aide to each GFO position. A second, one-time report, due  no later than June 30, 2015, was to include a list of authorized and  necessary official military and official representational duties for enlisted  aides in the military services and the Joint Staff, procedures for allocating  enlisted aides among and within the military services and the Joint Staff,  a billet-by-billet justification for the authorization and assignment of each  enlisted aide to each GFO position, and recommendations for changing  the statutory method for calculating the authorized number of enlisted  aides. Congress further directed DOD as an overall reporting objective to  reduce by 40 the maximum number of enlisted aides authorized and  allocated to GFOs, subject to a validation of duties and billet-by-billet  justifications. DOD responded to this reporting requirement by submitting  a report on June 30, 2015, to the congressional defense committees.
Section 504 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2015 also included a provision for  us to review DOD’s June 2015 enlisted aide report. This report examines  the extent to which (1) DOD’s report on enlisted aides addressed  statutory reporting requirements; (2) DOD’s methodologies for identifying  enlisted aide duties, allocating enlisted aides, and justifying their  necessity are consistent with relevant statutes and DOD guidance; and  (3) DOD used reliable data to support its report conclusions.
For our first objective, we assessed DOD’s report against the statutory  reporting requirements in section 504 of the Fiscal Year 2015 NDAA to  determine whether each requirement was fully addressed, partially  addressed, or not addressed. To ensure accuracy, one GAO analyst  conducted the initial review, and another analyst then reviewed each  requirement. We determined that DOD’s report fully addressed a statutory  reporting requirement if it addressed each element of that requirement.  We determined that DOD’s report partially addressed a statutory reporting  requirement if it addressed at least one—but not all—elements of a  reporting requirement. We determined that DOD’s report did not address  a statutory reporting requirement if it did not address at least one element  of the reporting requirement. Any disagreements in the coding were  discussed and reconciled by the analysts, and all decisions were  reviewed by a GAO attorney.
For our second objective, we reviewed steps taken by DOD, the military  services, and the Joint Staff to produce report information against  relevant statutes and DOD and military service guidance related to aide  duties, allocation procedures, authorizations, and assignments. To  assess the duties that are authorized and considered necessary for  enlisted aides to perform, we compared the duties specified in DOD’s  report to DOD and military service guidance. This analysis was performed  by one GAO analyst, who coded the information and entered it into a  spreadsheet, and checked for accuracy by another analyst. Any  disagreements were reconciled by the analysts, and the analysis was  then reviewed by an attorney.
To assess DOD’s methodologies for describing enlisted aide allocation  procedures between and within the military services and the Joint Staff,  we compared the allocation procedures specified in DOD’s report against  sections 525, 526, and 981 of Title 10 of the United States Code and  DOD and military service guidance. The analysis of allocation procedures  was performed by one GAO analyst and reviewed by an attorney for  accuracy. We interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary  of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD P&R), each of the  military services, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and enlisted aides from the  Navy, to obtain additional information on enlisted aide duties as well as  DOD’s current approach to allocating aide authorizations. We compared  DOD’s current allocation practice to the procedures described in DOD’s  report as well as a DOD manpower management directive and strategic  human capital practices. To assess DOD’s methodology for the billet- by-billet justifications, we compared enlisted aide authorizations and  assignments to those presented elsewhere in DOD’s report and analyzed  justifications against authorization and assignment criteria in DOD  guidance related to manpower management and GFO housing and  qualifying representational events. To ensure accuracy, each  justification was reviewed by two GAO analysts, who discussed and  reconciled any disagreements, and reviewed by a GAO methodologist.
For our third objective, we assessed the data supporting DOD’s report  conclusions related to aide reductions and changing the statutory method  of calculating the maximum number of aide authorizations against internal  control standards and leading practices for human capital management  that relate to using reliable data to make decisions. Specifically, we  analyzed fiscal years 2014 and 2015 GFO population data and enlisted  aide authorization, assignment, and justification data from DOD’s report  to determine whether these data are complete and accurate, and  compared these data to relevant data presented elsewhere in DOD’s  report and to data and information provided by the military services and  the Joint Staff. These comparisons were conducted by one GAO analyst  and checked for accuracy by a second analyst. We also interviewed  officials from OUSD P&R, each of the military services, and the Joint  Chiefs of Staff to identify processes for collecting, maintaining, and  reporting data and ensuring its accuracy and completeness, and to  determine the extent to which military service and Joint Staff perspectives  were factored into DOD’s conclusions.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2015 to February 2016 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: General and Flag Officers
paragraphs: GFOs are senior officers who are in the four ranks of brigadier general  and above (for the Navy, rear admiral (lower half) and above), and have  high-level interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational  responsibilities. These officers plan and implement military operations by  integrated military forces across the domains of land, sea, air, and space.  Table 1 displays the pay grade, title of rank, and insignia worn by GFOs.
GFOs are subject to statutory limits and are assigned based on DOD’s  requirements. Congress established statutory limits on the number and  distribution across each grade of GFOs for each of the military services  and the Joint Staff, which are periodically revised. In fiscal year 2015,  the statutory service-specific ceilings totaled 652 active duty GFOs for all  services. In addition to the service-specific GFO positions, the statute  also authorizes up to 310 GFO positions to be designated by the  Secretary of Defense for joint duty positions. These latter positions are  not included in the service ceilings. Also, certain GFO positions are  exempt from the limitations, which allow the department to exceed  statutory limits on the numbers of GFOs. For example, GFOs on terminal  leave immediately prior to retirement are generally exempt from statutory  limits. Additionally, 10 U.S.C. § 527 provides the President with authority  to suspend the statutory limits on GFO numbers in time of war or national  emergency.
section_title: Enlisted Aides
paragraphs: In the early days of the enlisted aide program, all commissioned officers  were eligible to be assigned enlisted aides. In 1972, there were 1,915  enlisted aides authorized. In 1974, Congress began to impose ceilings on  the authorized number of enlisted aides, and in 1976 reduced the ceiling  to its current level of 300. Following the congressionally imposed  reduction in 1974, DOD eliminated the assignment of enlisted aides to  officers below the rank of GFO. Currently, enlisted aides are assigned to  and support only authorized GFOs, not spouses, other family members,  or staff of the GFO. Officers may also be detailed as officer aides to the  personal staffs of GFOs.
Enlisted aide programs in the military services differ somewhat in terms of  eligibility, military occupational specialty, and training. However, enlisted  aides in each of the military services must be volunteers. Table 2  provides information related to enlisted aides in each of the military  services in terms of eligibility, occupational specialty, and required  training. Enlisted aides assigned to GFOs in the Joint Staff are drawn  from the military services’ pools and therefore reflect their respective  services in terms of background and training, according to Joint Staff  officials.
The duties of enlisted aides relate to the military and other official duties  and responsibilities of GFOs, to include assisting GFOs in discharging the  DOD representational responsibilities associated with their positions.  Official representational duties are those assigned duties and  responsibilities that serve to uphold the standing and prestige of the  United States and DOD through the extension of official courtesies to  authorized officials and dignitaries of the United States and foreign  countries. The propriety of enlisted aide duties is governed by the official  purpose that they serve rather than the nature of the duties.
Some examples of enlisted aide duties include (1) maintaining the care of  GFO military uniforms; (2) planning, preparing, and conducting qualifying  representational events; (3) purchasing and preparing meals for GFOs  during the enlisted aides’ normal duty work schedules; (4) performing  general yard maintenance, including lawn care; and (5) accomplishing  tasks that aid the GFO in the performance of his or her military or other  official duties and responsibilities, including certain related errands.  Activities that do not have a substantive connection to the GFOs’ military  or other official duties and responsibilities or that contribute solely to the  personal benefit of the GFO or their family members are explicitly  unauthorized. These include activities such as pet care, caregiving,  maintenance of privately owned recreational or sport equipment, and care  or cleaning in military housing that contributes solely to the personal  benefit of the GFO or the GFO’s dependents, such as making beds and  cleaning private areas. Appendix I provides additional information  regarding the official military and representational duties authorized and  unauthorized by DOD guidance, as well as some of the additional duties  authorized by the military services.
subsections: section_title: Authorization and Assignment of Enlisted Aides
paragraphs: Section 981 of Title 10 of the United States Code places a ceiling on the  total number of enlisted personnel who may be assigned or otherwise  detailed as enlisted aides on the personal staffs of GFOs. The DOD  enlisted aide ceiling is determined in accordance with section 981 or set  at a lower number as determined by the USD P&R. A DOD instruction  requires that enlisted aides be allocated to the military services only after  consideration is given to the Joint pool requirements and that military  service allocations be computed based on a percentage of the DOD  enlisted aide ceiling. Within the military services and the Joint Staff,  authorizations are based on whether the official duties and responsibilities  of the GFO position, including representational duties, warrant enlisted  aide support—not solely on grade or title of the GFO.
A DOD instruction also provides rules for the assignment and use of  enlisted aides. For example, to be eligible for the assignment of an  enlisted aide, a GFO must occupy qualifying military housing or reside in  off-base quarters arranged for the GFO outside the continental United  States. Also, only a GFO who is authorized an enlisted aide may use an  enlisted aide, unless a GFO who is not authorized an enlisted aide is  representing the GFO who is authorized an enlisted aide at a qualifying  representational event. The sharing or loaning of enlisted aides to another  GFO who is serving in a position authorized the use of an enlisted aide is  permitted in order to support a qualifying representational event. In the  event that an enlisted aide is loaned to another GFO, the duty hours of  the enlisted aide may be adjusted to support the qualifying  representational event. According to OUSD P&R officials, geographic  proximity is a key factor considered in approving the sharing or loaning of  enlisted aides in support of qualifying representational events.
section_title: Roles and Responsibilities for Managing Enlisted Aides
paragraphs: DOD Instruction 1315.09 establishes policy and assigns responsibilities  for the managing of enlisted aides. Such responsibilities are assigned to  the USD P&R, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. USD P&R is responsible for  establishing and publishing the enlisted aide ceiling and determining  military service and Joint Staff enlisted allocations. USD P&R also  prepares the annual enlisted aide report required by section 981 of Title  10 of the United States Code. The Secretary of each military department  is responsible for, among other things, implementing DOD’s enlisted aide  instruction within their respective military department; determining the  specific GFO positions to be authorized enlisted aides; and determining  the specific number of enlisted aides to be assigned to each GFO position  within their respective military service allocations. The Secretaries are  also responsible for providing to the USD P&R copies of reports reflecting  enlisted aide authorizations, allocations, and justifications for the  authorizations based on duties and responsibilities of GFO positions from  the previous fiscal year. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  similarly determines, among other things, which GFO positions are to be  authorized enlisted aides and the number of enlisted aides to be assigned  to each GFO position within the joint duty authorizations.
Various organizations within the military services and the Joint Staff  manage enlisted aides, according to military service and Joint Staff  officials. In the Army, the Office of the Director of Army Staff serves as the  proponent of the program and manages the enlisted aide selection and  assignment processes. Additionally, the Army Human Resources  Command manages enlisted aide orders, and the Joint Culinary Center of  Excellence trains future enlisted aides. In the Air Force, an enlisted aide  Program Manager in the Air Force General Officer Management Office  manages the enlisted aide program. In the Navy, the Navy Personnel  Command is responsible for the recruitment and assignment of enlisted  aides; the Chief of the Navy Supply Corps Command has overall  responsibility for enlisted aide training; the Navy Flag Matters Office  determines quotas and overall enlisted aide allocations; and the Chief of  Naval Operations and Vice Chief of Naval Operations determine which  flag officers receive enlisted aides. In the Marine Corps, the Enlisted Aide  Program Office is responsible for most aspects of the enlisted aide  program, including the recruitment, training, and assignment of enlisted  aides. To execute these responsibilities, this Office also coordinates with  the Marine Corps’ Logistics Office and the Manpower and Reserve Affairs  Department. In the Joint Staff, the General and Flag Officer Management  Office manages enlisted aide authorizations, and the Manpower and  Personnel Directorate provides limited administrative support to enlisted  aides assigned to the Joint Staff.
section_title: Guidance on the Use of Enlisted Aides
paragraphs: DOD Instruction 1315.09 is the principal document governing the  management and use of enlisted aides. In March 2015, DOD completed  an update to this instruction, which was last issued in October 2007.  OUSD P&R officials described this update as the most significant update  to the enlisted aide program in the last 25 to 30 years, noting that it was  comprehensive, and that it clarified many aspects of the enlisted aide  program, including authorized duties. Among other things, the March  2015 version modified the department’s procedures for allocating enlisted  aide authorizations across the military services and the Joint Staff;  updated the definition of enlisted aide management responsibilities for the  USD P&R, the secretaries of the military departments, and the Chairman  of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; modified requirements for reporting on enlisted  aide authorizations, allocations, and justifications; and provided a list of  authorized and unauthorized enlisted aide duties, along with illustrative  examples. The new version of DOD Instruction 1315.09 also defined what  constitutes a “qualifying representational event” and provides for the  sharing or loaning of enlisted aides between GFOs, as discussed above.
section_title: DOD’s Report on Enlisted Aides Fully Addressed Most Statutory Reporting Requirements
paragraphs: DOD’s June 2015 enlisted aide report fully addressed five of the six  statutory reporting requirements contained in section 504 of the Fiscal  Year 2015 NDAA and partially addressed the remaining requirement.  DOD’s report addressed requirements related to (1) submitting the report,  (2) listing official military and representational duties that enlisted aides  are authorized to perform, (3) describing procedures for allocating  enlisted aide authorizations between and within the military services and  the Joint Staff, (4) recommending changes to the statutory method of  calculating enlisted aide authorizations, and (5) the objective of reducing  by 40 the maximum number of enlisted aides authorized and allocated,  subject to certain conditions. DOD partially addressed the requirement to  justify enlisted aide authorizations and assignments on a billet-by-billet  basis. Table 3 summarizes our assessment of the extent to which DOD’s  report addressed the statutory reporting requirements.
section_title: DOD’s Report Methodologies Are Consistent with Relevant Statute, but Some Are Not Consistent with All DOD Guidance
paragraphs: DOD’s methodology for identifying enlisted aide duties in its report to  Congress is consistent with guidance, and its methodology for allocating  enlisted aides is consistent with relevant statute. However, DOD’s  methodologies for allocating and justifying enlisted aides are not  consistent with all DOD guidance.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Report Identified Enlisted Aide Duties Consistent with Relevant Guidance
paragraphs: Our review found that the official military and representational duties  identified in DOD’s report as authorized and considered necessary for  enlisted aides to perform in each of the military services are consistent  with enlisted aide duties and parameters on their use specified in DOD or  military service guidance. DOD and military service guidance explicitly  authorize and prohibit certain activities. For example, DOD Instruction  1315.09 authorizes enlisted aides to maintain areas of military housing  used for qualifying representational events but prohibits enlisted aides  from performing care or cleaning duties in military housing that contribute  solely to the personal benefit of GFOs and their dependents, such as  making beds, cleaning private areas, and organizing personal effects.  Similarly, DOD Instruction 1315.09 authorizes enlisted aides to perform  general yard maintenance, to include lawn care and removing debris and  litter, but prohibits enlisted aides from performing landscaping or grounds- keeping activities—such as trimming trees and planting flowers—in areas  not commonly used for qualifying representational events. To compile  each military service list for the June 2015 report, OUSD P&R  recommended that the military services use the duties specified in DOD  Instruction 1315.09 as a starting point and that they add any additional  service activities. Officials from the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine  Corps stated that they used either DOD or military service guidance to  compile their lists, while officials from the Navy stated that they conducted  polling of enlisted aides and the flag officers who use them.
Officials we spoke with from the military services and the Joint Staff  generally agreed that the duties specified in DOD Instruction 1315.09 are  sufficient to guide enlisted aide activities and that necessary activities can  differ depending on individual GFO responsibilities or preferences. These  officials also cited existing mechanisms, such as the use of ethics  counselors, as being sufficient to determine whether activities not  specified in DOD’s guidance are permitted. Enlisted aides we spoke with  from the Navy similarly agreed that, while they must sometimes exercise  judgment in determining whether an activity is acceptable, there is a  resource for them to use to obtain clarification on whether or not a  particular activity is authorized. Appendix I provides additional information  regarding the official military and representational duties authorized and  unauthorized by DOD guidance, as well as some of the additional duties  authorized by the military services.
section_title: DOD’s Stated Methodology for Allocating Enlisted Aides Is Consistent with the Relevant Statute, but It Is Not Based on Personnel Requirements, and DOD Has Not Reallocated Aides Since 2010
paragraphs: DOD describes in its report a methodology for allocating enlisted aide  authorizations across the military services and the Joint Staff that is  consistent with relevant statute, but we found that DOD’s methodology is  not based on personnel requirements. Further, DOD has not applied its  stated methodology to reallocate enlisted aide authorizations since 2010.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Allocation Methodology Is Consistent with the Relevant Statute
paragraphs: DOD’s stated methodology for allocating enlisted aide authorizations  across the military services and the Joint Staff is consistent with 10  U.S.C. § 981, which limits enlisted aide numbers. Under 10 U.S.C. § 981,  the number of enlisted aides assigned or otherwise detailed to duty on the  personal staffs of officers in the military services in a given fiscal year is  limited to the lesser of (a) the sum of (1) four times the number of officers  serving on active duty at the end of the preceding fiscal year in the grade  of general or admiral and (2) two times the number of officers serving on  active duty at the end of the preceding fiscal year in the grade of  lieutenant general or vice admiral, or (b) 300 enlisted members at any  given time.
DOD’s stated methodology is to distribute enlisted aide authorizations  under the cap established by section 981(b) by first satisfying Joint Staff  needs and then distributing the authorizations remaining under the  statutory cap on a “fair share” percentage basis predicated on the formula  in section 981(a). Specifically, according to OUSD P&R officials, DOD’s  stated methodology is to use the 981(a) formula to determine what each  military service’s maximum authorization would be if not for the DOD-wide  300-aide cap and then provide each military service with approximately  the same percentage of its hypothetical maximum enlisted aide  authorization. Officials from OUSD P&R stated that the intent is to provide  each military service with a percentage of its maximum authorization that  is within 2 percentage points of the other military services’ allocations in  relation to their own maximum authorizations. For example, in a given  year, each military service may receive between 65 percent and 67  percent of its hypothetical maximum authorization according to the  section 981(a) formula. Because DOD’s stated methodology is based on  the formula in section 981(a)—which provides that authorizations change  as the number of active duty 3-star and 4-star GFOs changes— hypothetical maximum authorizations may change from year-to-year. The  application of the section 981(a) formula to allocation among the military  services, combined with the assignment of enlisted aides to the Joint  Staff, results in the full statutory limit of 300 enlisted aides being assigned  that year.
section_title: DOD’s Allocation Methodology Is Not Based on Enlisted Aide Personnel Requirements, and DOD Has Not Reallocated Enlisted Aides Since 2010
paragraphs: DOD’s methodology for allocating enlisted aide authorizations across the  military services and the Joint Staff is not based on validated personnel  requirements, and DOD has not applied its methodology to reallocate  enlisted aide authorizations since 2010. DOD guidance for personnel  management requires, among other things, that military and civilian  personnel resources (1) be programmed in accordance with validated  requirements and (2) be based on policies and procedures that are  periodically evaluated. In addition, leading practices for strategic human  capital management state that high-performing organizations periodically  evaluate their human capital practices to ensure that resources are  properly matched to the needs of today’s environment. As previously  noted, DOD’s stated methodology for allocating enlisted aides is to satisfy  Joint Staff needs and then distribute the authorizations remaining under  the statutory cap of 300 aides on a “fair share” percentage basis  according to the formula in 10 U.S.C. § 981(a)—which bases maximum  authorizations on the number of 3-star and 4-star GFOs on active duty in  the previous fiscal year.
DOD’s stated methodology does not account for enlisted aide  requirements. For example, it does not align with the military services’  and the Joint Staff’s practice of assigning enlisted aides to 1-star and 2- star GFOs. Additionally, OUSD P&R officials stated that the Joint Staff  allocation fully addresses Joint Staff enlisted aide needs, but Joint Staff  officials told us that their allocation has not changed since 2009 and that it  was based on the number of 3-star and 4-star GFOs in the Joint Staff at  that time. According to OUSD P&R officials, the department has not  conducted an assessment of DOD-wide enlisted aide requirements in part  due to the limited timeframe it had to develop DOD’s enlisted aide report  and in part because an objective of the report was to reduce enlisted  aides by 40, subject to certain conditions, and a requirements  assessment would likely demonstrate a need for additional enlisted aides.
In addition to not basing its stated methodology on validated enlisted aide  requirements, DOD has not applied its methodology to reallocate its  enlisted aide authorizations since 2010, resulting in a disproportionate  distribution of authorizations in relation to the military services’  hypothetical maximum authorizations under section 981(a). For example,  in fiscal year 2010, DOD allocated the Army (81 of 122) and the Marine  Corps (21 of 32) approximately 66 percent of their hypothetical maximum  enlisted aide authorizations under DOD’s fair share methodology. By  fiscal year 2014, a lower number of active duty 3-star and 4-star GFOs in  the Army in the preceding fiscal year had caused the Army’s hypothetical  maximum authorization to drop from 122 to 84, while the Marine Corps’  remained at 32. However, OUSD P&R kept the allocations for the Army  (81) and Marine Corps (21) the same as in fiscal year 2010, resulting in  the Army receiving approximately 96 percent of its hypothetical maximum  authorization for fiscal year 2014. OUSD P&R officials told us that they  have not reallocated enlisted aide authorizations since 2010 because  they were revising their primary enlisted aide instruction and because  they anticipated changes to the statutory formula for determining  maximum enlisted aide authorizations. Figure 1 depicts the Joint Staff’s  and each of the military services fiscal year 2014 allocations—unchanged  since the fiscal year 2010 allocation—under the statutory cap in relation  to its hypothetical maximum authorizations in fiscal year 2014, according  to the formula in 10 U.S.C. §981(a).
As previously mentioned, DOD’s report calls for the reduction of 48  enlisted aides and for lowering the statutory cap of enlisted aides from  300 to 252. Specifically, DOD’s proposal would reduce the number of  enlisted aides in the Navy, the Army, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff by  between 10 and 14 positions each; the Marine Corps would not be  affected. According to an OUSD P&R official, the proposed reductions  would be made gradually over a 3-year period so as to not disrupt the  military services’ abilities to support GFOs and maintain the needed  number of enlisted aides. Figure 2 shows DOD’s proposed allocation of  enlisted aide authorizations under its proposed cap of 252 aides.
According to DOD’s June report, the proposed reduction was based on  extensive reviews of the billet-by-billet justifications by each military  service and the Joint Staff and additional input from members of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, an OUSD P&R official stated that the billet- by-billet justification process now in place for its annual enlisted aide  reports may create future opportunities to adjust military service  allocations. However, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2015 required billet-by- billet justifications for enlisted aide authorizations and assignments as of  September 30, 2014—not total enlisted aide requirements. Additionally,  DOD’s proposed enlisted aide reduction and allocation were based on its  existing “fair share” allocation, which has not been updated since 2010  and does not include an assessment of total DOD-wide enlisted aide  requirements.
OUSD P&R officials stated that the military services expressed support  for receiving the proposed standard cap of enlisted aides over basing  allocations on requirements because it would provide continuity in year- to-year planning. Officials we spoke with from the Army, the Air Force,  and the Joint Staff confirmed their preference for a standard cap on the  number of enlisted aides allocated to their organizations, but officials from  the Navy and the Marine Corps stated that they would prefer a  requirements-based approach that better reflects service-level enlisted  aide needs. Specifically, Navy officials told us that they did not concur  with the department’s proposed reduction and allocation because they  were based on the current enlisted aide allocation methodology—which is  not consistent with how the military services assign enlisted aides—and  because they focused on justifying current inventories and reducing  overall numbers instead of assessing requirements. Similarly, an official  from the Marine Corps stated that enlisted aide requirements should be  considered when determining enlisted aide allocations and that DOD  should quantify its enlisted aide needs.
OUSD P&R officials stated that they are continuing to operate under the  existing statutory cap of 300 enlisted aides for fiscal year 2016, as well as  the same allocation of enlisted aides across the Joint Staff and the  military services. These officials noted also that all options are under  review for the next allocation and that they anticipate congressional input  to that process. As noted, the current statutory enlisted aide cap of 300  has been in place since 1976, at which point GFO authorizations stood at  1,141. Since that time, GFO authorizations have fallen to 962 in fiscal  year 2015, thus increasing the ratio of enlisted aides to GFOs. At the  same time, in recent years, DOD has created new organizations, such as  U.S. Cyber Command (2010) and the Defense Health Agency (2013),  which require additional GFOs for senior leadership positions. The U.S.  military has also reduced its presence in countries such as Iraq and  Afghanistan, but emerging challenges may continue to affect the level  and location of enlisted aide support needed to assist GFOs with meeting  their responsibilities related to building partnerships and ties throughout  the world. Such changes suggest that the current allocation and fair share  methodology may not be in line with actual enlisted aide requirements.  Without an assessment of enlisted aide requirements and periodic  reallocations of enlisted aide authorizations under the statutory cap, the  department cannot reasonably ensure that these resources are properly  matched to the needs of today’s environment by equitably distributing  them across the military services and the Joint Staff and ensuring their  efficient and effective use.
section_title: Military Service and Joint Staff Justifications for Allocating Enlisted Aides Vary and Are Subjective
paragraphs: Military service and Joint Staff justifications for enlisted aide  authorizations and assignments vary and are subjective, and it is unclear  how duties and workload support enlisted aide assignments, particularly  in cases where more than one enlisted aide is assigned to a single GFO.  DOD guidance for personnel management states that personnel  requirements should be driven by workload and established at the  minimum levels necessary to accomplish mission and performance  objectives. DOD’s enlisted aide guidance generally requires that GFOs  reside in military housing in order to be assigned an enlisted aide and  describes enlisted aide duties as relating principally to maintaining the  care and cleanliness of GFO military housing and supporting qualifying  representational events. This guidance states also that the military  services and the Joint Staff should only authorize enlisted aides if the  official duties of the GFO position, including representational duties,  warrant enlisted aide support and that enlisted aide authorizations should  not be based solely on grade or title of a GFO position. OUSD P&R  instructed the military services and the Joint Staff to cite, to the extent  possible, the number of qualifying representational events and the size of  military housing used for hosting qualifying representational events when  developing their justifications for the June 2015 report. The billet-by- billet justifications in DOD’s report commonly cited qualifying  representational events and GFO housing as reasons for enlisted aide  authorizations or assignments, but they did so inconsistently. For  example,  Justifications varied in whether they explicitly addressed GFO military  housing, qualifying representational events, or both.
Justifications covering 289 of 290 assigned enlisted aides across  the military services and the Joint Staff mentioned enlisted aide  duties associated with qualifying representational events, but  justifications covering 78 enlisted aide assignments either did not  discuss housing or referenced it indirectly by discussing duties  associated with areas used for qualifying representational events,  which can be hosted inside or outside of the home, according to  OUSD P&R officials.
Justifications varied in whether they quantified the size of GFO  military housing or number of qualifying representational events.
Justifications for 76 of the Army’s 79 enlisted aide assignments  specified the square footage of GFO housing, but justifications for  5 of 58 Navy enlisted aide assignments and 2 of 57 Joint Staff  enlisted aide assignments specified the square footage of GFO  housing.
All 75 of the Air Force’s assignment justifications specified the  number of qualifying representational events held annually by the  GFO, while the Joint Staff specified this number in 41 of its 57  assignment justifications.
Justifications varied in how they supported enlisted aide assignments  based on the size of GFO military housing or the number of qualifying  representational events.
Within the Army, two 4-star generals were each assigned two  enlisted aides, though one hosts 128 qualifying representational  events per year and resides in an 8,500-square-foot home, while  the other hosts 65 qualifying representational events and resides  in a 4,912-square-foot home. Similarly, two 2-star Army generals  were assigned one enlisted aide each, though one hosted 144  qualifying representational events and resided in a 3,957-square- foot home, and the other hosted 8 qualifying representational  events and resided in a 3,429-square-foot home.
Within the Air Force, two 1-star generals were assigned one  enlisted aide each, though one hosts approximately 10 events per  year and resides in a 2,297-square-foot house, and the other  hosts 72 qualifying representational events per year and resides in  an 11,000-square-foot house.
A 4-star general assigned to the Joint Staff hosts 150-200  qualifying representational events per year and is assigned one  enlisted aide, while an Army 3-star general hosts 3 qualifying  representational events per year but is also assigned one enlisted  aide.
A 3-star Army general who resides in a 16,000-square-foot home  has two assigned enlisted aides, while a 4-star general officer  assigned to the Joint Staff resides in a 3,115-square-foot home  but also has two enlisted aides.
OUSD P&R officials stated that they did not use specific criteria—such as  quantitative thresholds—to assess the sufficiency of justifications  submitted for DOD’s June report and that authorization and assignment  decisions are subjective. An OUSD P&R official also stated that each of  the military services quantifies its enlisted aide needs differently, thus  complicating comparisons of military service justifications. Citing the  subjective nature of these decisions, officials from two of the military  services stated that there is a need for additional criteria for determining  enlisted aide authorizations or assignments. For example, Navy officials  stated that authorization and assignment determinations should be based  on factors such as the square footage of military housing, maintenance  hours, and the quantification and qualification (type of event and number  of attendees) of qualifying representational events. Similarly, a Marine  Corps official told us that the Marine Corps had proposed a working group  comprising military service representatives to identify weighted criteria for  the purpose of informing enlisted aide authorization and assignment  decisions.
An OUSD P&R official stated that in developing the June 2015 report  OUSD P&R had considered developing a formula to help guide enlisted  aide authorization and assignment decisions but that doing so proved to  be too complicated because of the range of decisions that would have to  be made on the selection and weighting of potential criteria, such as the  number and nature of qualifying representational events, the square  footage of military housing, and GFO responsibilities. OUSD P&R officials  also stated that the revised DOD Instruction 1315.09 addressed the need  for criteria for determining enlisted aide requirements, for example by  tying authorization and assignment determinations to official  representational duties. However, DOD’s Instruction—which specifies one  criterion (housing) for enlisted aide assignments and ties enlisted aide  authorizations to the duties of GFO positions, including representational  duties—does not include criteria to make clear how factors such as the  number of qualifying representational events and size of military housing  translate into enlisted aide workload for the purpose of identifying enlisted  aide requirements and informing authorization and assignment decisions.  Without additional guidance on how to determine enlisted aide workload  in relation to factors such as housing and GFO official representational  duties, military service and Joint Staff decisions regarding enlisted aide  authorizations and assignments may not be consistent and transparent.
section_title: Certain Data DOD Used to Reach Conclusions in Its Enlisted Aides Report Were Not Reliable
paragraphs: DOD used data—including justifications for the authorization and  assignment of enlisted aides—to reach its conclusions regarding enlisted  aide reductions and a statutory cap on enlisted aide authorizations, but  our review determined that certain data were inaccurate or incomplete  and, therefore, not reliable. For example, justification data covered all 290  enlisted aides assigned to GFOs across the department, but we identified  several areas where the data were not reliable.
Some data were from different time periods—Enlisted aide  authorization and assignment justifications for the Air Force and the  Marine Corps reflected enlisted aide authorizations and assignments  as of September 30, 2014, as required by section 504 of the fiscal  year 2015 NDAA, according to Air Force and Marine Corps officials.  However, officials from the Army, the Navy, and the Joint Staff stated  that their justifications reflected enlisted aide authorizations and  assignments as of February or March 2015. These officials also  stated that the data they submitted for the report were compiled in  response to a February 13, 2015, tasking memorandum from the USD  P&R and that they used data current at that time because they did not  maintain historical data regarding enlisted aide assignments and  justifications. OUSD P&R officials stated that a tasking memo they  provided to the military services and the Joint Staff provided clear  instructions that the data for the report should be as of September 30,  2014. Further, these officials stated that they had no reason to doubt  the accuracy of the information provided by the military services or the  Joint Staff.
Some data conflicted—Certain data conflicted with related data  elsewhere in DOD’s June 2015 report or with the source information  we collected from the military services, suggesting that there were  inaccuracies in the data. Examples we found include the following:
The Army provided justifications for the authorization or  assignment of enlisted aides to 36 3-star generals, and the Marine  Corps provided the same for 13 3-star generals. However, DOD’s  report stated elsewhere that the Army had 30 3-star generals on  active duty, and the Marine Corps had 12. OUSD P&R officials  stated that the Army discrepancy could be attributed to the Army  having authorized enlisted aides for four Joint Staff GFOs beyond  what the Joint Staff had been authorized, and to two Army 3-star  billets that were temporarily vacant but did not warrant the  removal or reassignment of an enlisted aide. However, these  officials could not identify all of the Joint Staff GFOs who had been  authorized Army aides, and the enlisted aides assigned by the  Army to these joint GFO billets were not included in the overall  number of enlisted aides reported by DOD as being assigned to  the Joint Staff. As a result, the actual number of enlisted aides  assigned to the Joint Staff exceeded the number reported by  DOD.
Several justifications did not align with the number of enlisted  aides authorized or assigned to a GFO billet, or authorization and  assignment justifications conflicted. For example, the billet  justification section listed an enlisted aide assigned to a certain  Army general, but the corresponding narrative stated that an  enlisted aide was not authorized for that position because the  general did not live in military housing or host qualifying  representational events. Similarly, the justification associated  with a GFO assigned to the Joint Staff, who was not assigned an  enlisted aide, stated that an aide was assigned to the GFO. Also,  three separate assignment justifications for the Joint Staff stated  that enlisted aides were authorized to assist the officer with myriad  official duties and qualifying representational events, but the  corresponding authorization justifications stated that the subject  GFO hosted qualifying representational events on occasion and  did not provide any detail regarding the officer’s official duties.
The number of 3-star GFOs assigned to the Joint Staff differed by  one from the number of 3-star GFOs in corresponding source data  we collected from the military services. This difference would have  resulted in a different hypothetical maximum aide authorization for  the Joint Staff.
Both the Navy and the Joint Staff counted an enlisted aide  assigned by the Navy to the Joint Staff on a temporary basis,  resulting in a reported total of 290 assigned enlisted aides instead  of 289. As a result, the actual total number of enlisted aides in  either the Navy or the Joint Staff is lower than the number  reported by one—depending on how this aide is counted—as is  the total number of assigned aides across the department.
Some data were incomplete—Narratives covering 78 assigned  enlisted aides either did not discuss housing or mentioned housing  indirectly by discussing duties associated with areas used for  qualifying representational events. OUSD P&R officials stated in  relation to the incomplete justifications that each did not need to be  exact. However, as previously mentioned, DOD’s enlisted aide  instruction generally requires that GFOs occupy military housing in  order to be eligible for the assignment of an enlisted aide, and OUSD  P&R instructed the military services and the Joint Staff to cite the size  of military housing used for qualifying representational events to the  extent possible when developing their justifications for the June 2015  report.
Federal internal control standards state that agencies should have  relevant, reliable, and timely information for decision-making and external  reporting purposes. Leading human capital practices similarly state that  high-performing organizations use complete and reliable data to ensure  that resources are properly matched to the needs of the environment.  OUSD P&R officials stated that they took some steps to ensure the  accuracy of military service and Joint Staff data by reviewing data for  completeness and anomalies, and officials from each of the four military  services and the Joint Staff informed us that they take actions to help  ensure the accuracy of their data. These actions include access  restrictions and quality checks, such as reviewing for anomalies.  However, OUSD P&R officials stated that they did not have a process to  assess the reliability of submitted data or the military services’ and the  Joint Staff’s data collection and reporting methods and noted that they did  not question the data because it had been approved by the service  Secretaries. These same officials also noted that producing the enlisted  aides report was a new process and that they will be better positioned to  refine the process when producing future annual enlisted aide reports.
Our review found that some of the justification data presented in DOD’s  June 2015 report were inaccurate because the Army, the Navy, and the  Joint Staff did not maintain historical data on enlisted aides and,  therefore, as noted above, could not produce data regarding their  authorizations, assignments, and justifications as of September 30, 2014,  as required by section 504 of the Fiscal Year 2015 NDAA. The collection  of these data will likely be improved by DOD’s updated Instruction  1315.09, which requires that the military services and the Joint Staff  report to OUSD P&R on similar data. However, this requirement does not  provide reasonable assurance that enlisted aide data will be fully accurate  and complete. Without a process to assess the reliability of enlisted aide  data submitted by the military services and the Joint Staff, DOD does not  have reasonable assurance that the data it used to determine enlisted  aide reductions were accurate, and Congress and senior DOD leaders  may not have reliable data in future enlisted aide reports on which to base  decisions on enlisted aides.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The military services’ and Joint Staff’s longstanding practice of assigning  enlisted aides to GFOs has reduced the burden on GFOs of  accomplishing minor but necessary tasks that otherwise might be done at  the expense of the officers’ primary military and official duties and  responsibilities. However, in light of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA’s reporting  objective to reduce the total number of assigned enlisted aides across the  department by 40, certain actions could better position DOD to assign  aides more effectively and efficiently. For instance, the application of  DOD’s fair share methodology, while consistent with statute, does not  account for enlisted aide personnel requirements or changing  circumstances faced by the military services and Joint Staff in recent  years. Without periodically assessing department-wide enlisted aide  requirements DOD cannot determine the equitable allocation of enlisted  aide authorizations across the department. Such an assessment— followed by a reallocation on the basis of its results—would better align  the process for distributing enlisted aide allocations with the department’s  human capital management guidance and help ensure the effective and  efficient use of the allowable total authorizations. In addition, decision  makers need relevant information to guide them in determining  requirements and allocations. Without providing guidance on criteria to  determine enlisted aide workload, military service and Joint Staff  decisions regarding enlisted aide authorizations and assignments may  not be consistent and transparent, and those exercising oversight in DOD  and Congress will lack reasonable assurance that these decisions are  being made in relation to factors that drive enlisted aide workload.
Enhanced congressional understanding of authorizations, allocations, and  billet-by-billet justifications also depends on providing reliable data in  DOD’s annual enlisted aide reports. Without a process to assess the  reliability of data submitted by the military services and Joint Staff for  future reports, DOD cannot reasonably assure decision makers that its  decisions will be based on quality information and that they will properly  match resources to the needs of the environment. At a time of heightened  resource concerns across the department and federal government,  actions such as these would position DOD to allocate its enlisted aides in  a manner that would better allow these personnel to provide GFOs with  support where most needed.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four  actions:  (1)  To help determine the equitable allocation of enlisted aide  authorizations across the military services and the Joint Staff, direct  the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in  coordination with the secretaries of the military departments and the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct an assessment of  DOD-wide enlisted aide requirements and determine circumstances  under which subsequent periodic updates should occur.  (2)  To help ensure the efficient and effective use of enlisted aides, direct  the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to  reallocate enlisted aide authorizations across the military services and  the Joint Staff, under the statutory cap, based on its assessments of  total enlisted aide requirements.  (3)  To help ensure consistency and transparency in military service and  Joint Staff enlisted aide authorization and assignment decisions and  to help determine enlisted aide requirements, direct the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in  coordination with the military services and Joint Staff, to establish  criteria for determining enlisted aide workload and include these  criteria in relevant enlisted aide guidance.  (4)  To help ensure the reliability of enlisted aide authorization,  assignment, and justification data used in DOD’s future annual  enlisted aide reports and improve DOD’s ability to make informed  decisions about the enlisted aide program, direct the Under Secretary  of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to establish a process to  assess the reliability of data submitted by the military services and the  Joint Staff for future enlisted aide reports.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In  written comments, DOD concurred, with comment, on each of our four  recommendations. DOD’s comments are summarized below and  reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments on the  draft report, which we incorporated as appropriate.
DOD concurred, with comment, on our first recommendation related to  conducting an assessment of DOD-wide enlisted aide requirements,  stating that it would appear to call for duplication of the annual,  department-wide billet-by-billet review of enlisted aide authorization and  assignment required by 10 U.S.C. § 981(c). DOD further noted that going  forward, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff will identify their respective total enlisted aide  requirements, including requirements that, if authorized, would cause the  department to exceed the ceiling on the number of enlisted aides  authorized by law. DOD’s annual enlisted aide report, required by 10  U.S.C. § 981, is to specify the number of enlisted aides authorized and  allocated—as of September 30 of the previous year—to GFOs of the  Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Joint Staff, and  to justify on a billet-by-billet basis the authorization and assignment of  each enlisted aide to each GFO position. DOD did not include the billet- by-billet justifications in the first installment of its annual report, stating  that additional time was needed to prepare the justifications and that the  information would be included in the June 2015 report. As noted in our  report, DOD’s June 2015 enlisted aides report partially addressed the  requirement to include billet-by-billet justifications for enlisted aide  authorizations and assignments as of September 30, 2014, but these  justifications were based on the department’s existing allocation and did  not constitute an assessment of total DOD-wide enlisted aide  requirements. DOD officials told us during our review that such an  assessment would likely demonstrate a need for additional enlisted aides.  As a result, we do not believe that the assessment of total enlisted aide  requirements duplicates the process mandated by 10 U.S.C. § 981.  However, by identifying and including requirements in future annual  reviews that, if authorized, would cause the department to exceed the  ceiling on the number of enlisted aides authorized by law, DOD should  meet the intent of our recommendation and therefore better position itself  to equitably distribute these resources across the military services and  the Joint Staff and ensure their efficient and effective use.
DOD concurred, with comment, on the second recommendation to  reallocate enlisted aides across the military services and the Joint Staff  based on its assessments of total enlisted aide requirements, noting that  the department “froze” the past two allocation reviews to allow a period of  stabilization following the implementation of a new guiding document on  enlisted aides, coordination on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  “13 Professional Character Initiatives,” and feedback and dialogue with  Congress on the reports submitted in March and June of 2015. As noted  in our report, DOD has not reallocated its enlisted aide authorizations  since 2010, and DOD’s enlisted aide Instruction and reports were issued  in 2015. We are encouraged, however, that DOD also stated in its  comments that it will endeavor to improve the allocation process to better  support actual service and joint requirements. By reallocating enlisted  aide authorizations, under the statutory cap, based on its assessments of  total enlisted aide requirements, DOD should meet the intent of our  recommendation and more reasonably ensure that these resources are  properly matched to the needs of today’s environment.
DOD concurred, with comment, on our third recommendation, that it  establish criteria for determining enlisted aide workload and include these  criteria in relevant enlisted aide guidance. Specifically, DOD stated that  the workload of an enlisted aide is unique to each position and area of  responsibility, and that establishing a fixed set of workload criteria would  significantly limit the flexibility of the department and “tremendously  increase” the management investment associated with a discrete  program comprising 300 or fewer personnel. As noted in our report,  DOD’s enlisted aides Instruction specifies military housing as the lone  eligibility criterion for enlisted aide assignments and ties enlisted aide  authorizations to the official duties of GFO positions, including  representational duties. Additionally, OUSD P&R instructed the military  services and the Joint Staff to cite, to the extent possible, the number of  qualifying representational events and the size of military housing used  for hosting qualifying representational events when developing their  justifications for the June 2015 report. However, DOD’s Instruction does  not include criteria to make clear how factors such as the number of  qualifying representational events and size of military housing translate  into enlisted aide workload for the purpose of identifying enlisted aide  requirements and informing authorization and assignment decisions. As a  result, justifications for enlisted aide authorizations vary and are  subjective, and it is unclear how duties and workload support enlisted  aide assignments. Accordingly, we continue to believe that, without  additional guidance on how to determine enlisted aide workload in  relation to factors such as housing and GFO official representational  duties, military service and Joint Staff decisions regarding enlisted aide  authorizations and assignments may not be consistent and transparent,  and those exercising oversight in DOD and Congress will lack reasonable  assurance that these decisions are being made in relation to factors that  drive enlisted aide workload. Further, with enlisted aide duties already  tied principally to housing and official representational duties, we do not  believe that establishing workload criteria would significantly limit the  flexibility of the department or significantly increase its management  investment in enlisted aides.
DOD concurred, with comment, on our fourth recommendation, that it  establish a process to assess the reliability of data submitted by the  military services and the Joint Staff for future enlisted aide reports.  Specifically, DOD stated that they expect that each submission is already  subject to intense scrutiny and high-level review prior to its aggregation  and delivery to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and that the review  process within the Office will continue to analyze those reports closely, in  the interests of consistency and transparency, and to resolve potential  anomalies prior to submission to Congress. However, as noted in this  report, our review determined that, while DOD took some steps to ensure  the accuracy of military service and Joint Staff data, it did not have a  process to assess the reliability of submitted data, and that certain data  were inaccurate or incomplete, and therefore, not reliable. We continue to  maintain that, without establishing a process to assess the reliability of  enlisted aide data submitted by the military services and the Joint Staff,  DOD does not have reasonable assurance that the data it used to  determine enlisted aide reductions were accurate, and Congress and  senior DOD leaders may not have reliable data in future enlisted aide  reports on which to base decisions on enlisted aides.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of  Staff; the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Commandant  of the U.S. Marine Corps. The report also is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Enlisted Aide Duties
paragraphs: Table 4 shows enlisted aide duties that DOD has authorized and duties  that it has deemed unauthorized in DOD Instruction 1315.09, along with  some additional duties specified by the military services in DOD’s June  2015 enlisted aides report. DOD Instruction 1315.09 states that its lists  of authorized and unauthorized duties provide examples of such activities  and therefore are not exhaustive.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Bev Schladt, Assistant Director;  Ryan D’Amore; Alexandra Gebhard; Amie Lesser; Richard Powelson;  Michael Silver; Patrick Tierney; Erik Wilkins-McKee; and Michael Willems  made key contributions to this report.