Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense
Published: 2006-05-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $91 billion since the mid-1980s to develop a capability to destroy incoming ballistic missiles. In 2002, recognizing the new security environment after the September 11 attacks, President Bush directed that an initial set of defensive ballistic missile capabilities be put in place in 2004. Although DOD is developing the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to meet an urgent need, preparing to operate and support a system under continuous development poses significant challenges. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) DOD has made progress in planning to operate the BMDS, and (2) the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) provides complete and transparent data on BMDS operational costs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has made progress in planning to operate BMDS; however, it has not established criteria that would have to be met before declaring BMDS operational, nor has DOD resolved security issues or completed training and personnel plans. DOD officials agree that operational criteria are typically established and met prior to declaring a system operational, and that planning for new systems includes identifying personnel requirements, developing training programs, and identifying logistics and maintenance requirements. DOD has developed BMDS procedures and guidance, created an organization to integrate planning and operational support, and conducted some training and exercises. However, DOD has not established formal criteria for declaring that limited defensive operations or subsequent blocks of capability are operational or completed planning for security, training, and personnel. DOD has not done this because it is developing BMDS in a unique way and BMDS is exempted from traditional requirements guidance. Without specific operational criteria, the Secretary of Defense will not be in a sound position to objectively assess combatant commands' and services' preparations to conduct BMDS operations nor have a transparent basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and Congress considers requests to fund operations. Without adequate planning, clear criteria, and identification of responsibility for ensuring necessary actions have been completed, it may be difficult for DOD to identify and prioritize actions, assure itself or Congress that the necessary pieces are in place before declaring the system operational, and determine whether the return on its significant development investment in BMDS can be realized. The FYDP, a major source of budget information, does not provide complete and transparent data on ballistic missile defense operational costs. DOD and GAO have repeatedly recognized the need to link resources to capabilities to facilitate decision making and oversight. However, complete and transparent ballistic missile defense operational costs are not visible in the FYDP because the FYDP's structure does not provide a way to identify and aggregate these costs. Four primary factors impair the visibility of ballistic missile defense operational costs in the current FYDP structure: (1) operational costs are included in many program elements and there is no mechanism to link and compile these costs, (2) the Missile Defense Agency is authorized to use research and development funds to pay for operational costs, (3) DOD has not included all known operational costs in its budget estimates, and (4) DOD has not identified all costs associated with the New Triad, of which BMDS is an important part. Without the ability to identify and assess total ballistic missile defense operational costs, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress has complete information to make funding and trade-off decisions among competing priorities; provide assurance that ballistic missile defense capabilities are affordable over time; and assess the costs of employing the New Triad.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $91 billion since the  mid-1980s to develop the capability to intercept and destroy incoming  ballistic missiles. DOD initially focused its attention exclusively on  research and development activities. In 2002, recognizing the changed  security environment after the terrorist attacks of September 11, President  Bush directed that an initial set of capabilities be put in place in 2004 to  defend against ballistic missiles that may carry weapons of mass  destruction. This missile defense capability is a major part of DOD’s New  Triad of capabilities, which also includes offensive nuclear and  conventional capabilities and a revitalized defense infrastructure to  provide more options to address future contingencies. In 2003, the U.S.  Strategic Command was assigned responsibility for coordinating global  ballistic missile defense operations. Each combatant command is  responsible for ballistic missile operations in their geographic area and  individual ballistic missile defense elements will be operated by the  services or the Missile Defense Agency.
Acknowledging that hostile states are investing resources to develop  ballistic missiles that could be used against the United States and its  friends and allies, the President directed in 2002 that this initial set of  capabilities be available to the warfighter on an emergency or contingency  basis as the system’s development continues. To expedite development,  the Secretary of Defense exempted ballistic missile defense development  from the traditional requirements guidance. DOD refers to this initial  capability as limited defensive operations, with the development and  fielding of additional capabilities planned in 2-year blocks.
In an era of increased fiscal challenges, DOD and Congress face difficult  decisions concerning how to allocate available defense resources to  provide for the range of capabilities needed to meet 21st century threats.  The ballistic missile defense mission involves a substantial investment  prior to achieving operational status as well as significant ongoing costs to  operate and sustain this capability. Complete information on planned  defense spending for the ballistic missile defense system can assist  decision makers in making choices among the competing demands for  DOD’s resources. The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), a  centralized report to Congress consisting of the budget year and the 4  succeeding years, is one of the principal tools used to inform DOD senior  leaders and Congress about resources planned to support various  programs, and reflects DOD decisions in allocating federal resources.
You asked us to assess the extent to which (1) DOD has made progress in  planning to operate the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS), and (2)  the FYDP provides complete and transparent data on ballistic missile  defense operational costs. During this review, we focused on the  warfighter’s preparations to operate the ballistic missile defense system.  Specifically, to assess DOD’s planning to operate the ballistic missile  defense system, we compared the planning DOD had completed for  operating BMDS with plans and actions that DOD generally performs for  new weapon systems and discussed the results of our comparison with  DOD officials. In this report, our discussion of declaring BMDS  operational refers to both limited defensive operations and subsequent  blocks of capability. To assess the extent to which the FYDP provides  complete and transparent data for ballistic missile defense operational  costs, we assessed the FYDP structure to determine if it could be used to  identify program elements related to BMDS operations. We also  corroborated our methodology and data with agency officials and  determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We  conducted our work between January 2005 and February 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See  appendix I for a more complete description of our scope and  methodology.
This report is one in a series of reports that we have issued on ballistic  missile defense (see the list of related GAO products at the end of this  report). During this review, we did not evaluate DOD’s testing plans,  research and development programs, or the technical effectiveness of  individual elements. Rather, we focused on assessing issues DOD faces in  planning to operate BMDS such as operational criteria, training, security,  and cost transparency. However, we have issued two reports on the status  of BMDS that included assessments of program goals, testing plans, and  progress in developing each element. Our March 2005 report found that  system performance remains uncertain and unverified because DOD has  not successfully conducted an end-to-end flight test using operationally  representative hardware and software. We also reported in September  2005 on DOD’s criteria for transferring missile defense elements to the  services and the need to ensure operational costs are included in future  budgets.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In response to the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction, in  December 2002 President Bush signed National Security Presidential  Directive 23, which stated an initial ballistic missile defense capability to  defend the United States and deployed forces should be deployed in 2004.  Also in 2002, the Secretary of Defense created the Missile Defense Agency  to develop an integrated system that would have the ability to intercept  incoming missiles in all phases of their flight. The Secretary of Defense’s  goals for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) included using  prototypes and test assets to provide an early capability and enable the  services to field elements of the system as soon as possible. In order to  develop a system that can more readily respond to a changing threat and  be more easily modified to enhance system performance using new  technologies, the Secretary of Defense exempted the Missile Defense  Agency from the traditional requirements processes.
subsections: section_title: BMDS Capabilities and Elements
paragraphs: Ballistic missile defense is a challenging mission for DOD, simultaneously  involving multiple combatant commands and services employing complex  capabilities that require the development of many elements. Figure 1  shows how a notional scenario to engage an incoming ballistic missile,  including the commands and services involved, could unfold.
BMDS is eventually intended to be capable of defeating ballistic missiles  during all three phases of a missile’s flight. However, the initial capability  is intended to have the capability to intercept missiles in the midcourse  and terminal phases. BMDS requires a unique combination of elements— space-based sensors, surveillance and tracking radars, advanced  interceptors, command and control, and reliable communications— working together as an integrated system. Table 1 below explains the role  of the BMDS elements that DOD plans to be available to the warfighter  between fiscal years 2006-11.
section_title: BMDS Development and Force Structure
paragraphs: In developing BMDS, the Missile Defense Agency is using an incremental  development and acquisition process to field militarily useful capabilities  as they become available. Under this process, the Missile Defense Agency  will develop ballistic missile defense elements and then transition  elements to the military services for operation after approval by DOD  senior leadership. In preparing for each element’s transition, the Missile  Defense Agency is expected to collaborate with the services to develop  agreements explaining each organization’s responsibilities, including  which organization will pay for operational costs. Most of these transition  plans are currently being drafted. The only BMDS element that has  transferred to a service is the Patriot, which was transferred to the Army  in 2003.
The Missile Defense Agency plans to develop and field capabilities in 2- year blocks. The configuration of a given block is intended to build on the  work completed in previous blocks. Block 2004, which was scheduled to  be deployed during calendar years 2004-2005, is the first biennial  increment of BMDS that is intended to provide an integrated set of  capabilities. Table 2 below shows, for each block of capability, the  cumulative total number of each element that the Missile Defense Agency  plans to deliver. The capabilities in bolded text show cumulative totals and  show new or additional capabilities from the previous block.
DOD’s framework for BMDS ground and flight testing through block 2006  (December 2007) is established in the Integrated Master Test Plan. This  plan defines the test plans for the BMDS and its elements and identifies  test objectives. In 2006, the Missile Defense Agency plans to conduct 10  flight tests—3 for the Aegis ballistic missile defense element, 4 for the  Terminal High Altitude Area Defense element, and 3 for the Ground-based  Midcourse Defense element. We reported last year that the Missile  Defense Agency has conducted a variety of tests that provide some degree  of confidence that the limited defensive operations will operate as  intended. However, we also pointed out that some elements have not been  fully tested and that performance of the system remains uncertain because  the Missile Defense Agency has not conducted an end-to-end flight test  using operationally representative hardware and software. In addition,  DOD’s fiscal year 2005 annual test report states that “…there is insufficient  evidence to support a confident assessment of Limited Defensive  Operations…”
Whereas the Missile Defense Agency is the developer of BMDS, the U.S.  Strategic Command is responsible for coordinating ballistic missile  defense operations that will be conducted by multiple commands, such as  U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command. Strategic Command  developed an overall strategic concept of operations for ballistic missile  defense in November 2003 that explains how all aspects of the system are  to be integrated. Strategic Command is also tasked with directing,  coordinating, and reporting Military Utility Assessments of the ballistic  missile defense system. Military Utility Assessments are iterative, event- driven assessments that document the combatant commanders’ views on  the expected military utility of the system. These assessments are intended  to independently examine the degree to which delivered capabilities  support the warfighter’s ability to execute the missile defense mission,  record all data and results from flight tests, ground tests, and  wargame/exercises, and focus on the overall ballistic missile defense  system rather than the individual elements. As of January 2006, one  assessment had been completed (April 2005) and the scope was limited  due to the system’s immaturity at that time.
section_title: Weapon System Operational Costs
paragraphs: Operations and support costs (hereafter called operational costs) are the  resources required to operate and support a weapon system and include  maintenance of equipment/infrastructure, operations of forces, training  and readiness, base operations, personnel, and logistics. Operational costs  for weapons systems typically account for 72 percent of a weapon  system’s total life-cycle cost and can generally be found in the Future  Years Defense Program (FYDP). The FYDP is a DOD centralized report  consisting of thousands of program elements that provides information  on DOD’s current and planned budget requests. It is one of DOD’s  principal tools to manage the spending for its capabilities and is available  to help inform DOD and Congress about spending plans for the next 5  years and to make resource decisions in light of competing priorities. The  FYDP is a report that resides in an automated database, which is updated  and published to coincide with DOD’s annual budget submission to  Congress. It provides projections of DOD’s near and midterm funding  needs and reflects the total resources programmed by DOD, by fiscal year.
section_title: DOD Has Made Progress in Planning to Operate BDMS but Planning Is Incomplete
paragraphs: DOD has made progress in planning to operate BMDS, but aside from  testing issues we have previously reported on, planning is incomplete in  that it lacks several critical elements such as establishing operational  criteria, resolving security issues, and completing training plans. DOD has  developed procedures and guidance, created an organization to integrate  contingency plans, and planned and conducted some training and  exercises. However, this planning lacks critical elements such as  development of operational criteria, resolution of security issues,  completion of training plans, and approval of dual status for the  commanders of the National Guard units responsible for operating the  ground-based element. DOD’s operational planning is incomplete because  it is developing BMDS in a unique way and exempted BMDS from the  department’s traditional requirements guidance. DOD officials agreed that  planning for new weapon systems generally includes critical planning  elements such as development of training plans, assessment of military  specialties, identifying support requirements, and successful operational  testing. U.S. Strategic Command officials agreed that this level of detailed  planning is necessary but has not been done because BMDS is being  developed in a nontraditional way, and further stated that warfighters are  ready to use the system on an emergency basis. However, without a  comprehensive plan establishing what needs to be accomplished before  declaring BMDS operational and assigning responsibility for doing such  planning, the Secretary of Defense may not have a transparent basis for  declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important as  capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and Congress considers  requests to fund operations. Moreover, it may be difficult for DOD to  identify and prioritize actions and determine whether the return on its  significant development investment can be realized.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Made Progress in Planning to Operate the Ballistic Missile Defense System
paragraphs: DOD has taken positive steps in planning to operate the BMDS. For  example, some operating plans and guidance are either in development or  in place. In addition, the U.S. Strategic Command has created a  subcommand, the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated  Missile Defense, to integrate planning and operational support for missile  defense. The Missile Defense Agency and the combatant commands have  also been actively planning and conducting training and exercises.
subsections: section_title: Some Operational Planning Has Taken Place
paragraphs: DOD has developed some operational plans, established guidance, and  conducted capability demonstrations to refine operating procedures. In  2003, the U.S. Strategic Command was assigned responsibility for  planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense operations  including developing a concept of operations. Since then, U.S. Strategic  Command has coordinated development of plans and orders that explain  how the ballistic missile defense mission will be conducted, including  command relationships, who authorizes missile launches, and other  policies. For example, some combatant commands have developed plans  that specify how they will defend against incoming ballistic missiles and  how they will support other combatant commands in doing so. DOD has  also developed tactics, techniques, and procedures for how the ballistic  missile defense mission would be conducted. Strategic Command’s  subcommand for missile defense is working with the combatant  commands to ensure these plans are integrated. The services have also  published service doctrine and DOD is currently developing joint doctrine  that will explain concepts for planning, coordinating, and conducting the  ballistic missile defense mission. The doctrine will be revised as BMDS  capabilities increase and as procedures for conducting the mission evolve.
In addition to developing plans, DOD has established some policy  guidance clarifying command and control for the ballistic missile defense  mission. The Joint Staff has issued several orders providing guidance for  ballistic missile defense mission planning which reflect policy decisions  made by senior DOD leadership. For example, orders issued in fall 2005  resolved policy issues regarding weapons release authority, defined  various system readiness conditions and defense priorities, and explained  the rules of engagement and the relationships between combatant  commands.
Since the fall of 2004, DOD has been in a transitional period (called  “shakedown”) to move from development to operations. As part of this  process, the Missile Defense Agency, in conjunction with operational  commanders and contractors, has completed 11 capability demonstrations  and U.S. Strategic Command’s subcommand for missile defense is  planning the twelfth for March 2006. The capability demonstrations are  being conducted to practice and refine procedures for transitioning BMDS  from a developmental configuration to an operational configuration and  maintain the system in the operational configuration for a specific time  period. The purpose behind these demonstrations is to reduce operational  risks by demonstrating capabilities prior to combat use, using trained  military personnel to exercise procedures in an operational environment.  According to officials, there is no plan to conduct a specific number of  these capability demonstrations; rather, they will be conducted as needed.  In addition, U.S. Strategic Command officials said that the subcommand  for missile defense will conduct readiness exercises to practice and refine  warfighter tactics and procedures.
section_title: U.S. Strategic Command Created a Subcommand to Plan and Integrate Ballistic Missile Defense Operations
paragraphs: Because U.S. Strategic Command has several other broad missions in  addition to missile defense, it created a subcommand to integrate planning  and operational support for ballistic missile defense. This subcommand,  called the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile  Defense, was created in early 2005 for the purpose of integrating and  globally synchronizing missile defense plans to meet strategic objectives.  This subcommand is drafting a global concept of operations for ballistic  missile defense and is working with other combatant commands to  integrate their ballistic missile defense operating plans. The subcommand  is also operating the BMDS asset management process, which is a tool for  scheduling and tracking the status of each ballistic missile defense  element. This process uses a real-time database that shows when each  BMDS element is being used for testing, exercises, maintenance,  development, or operations. The asset management process schedules  activities for the coming fiscal year and is updated throughout the year.
section_title: Missile Defense Agency and Combatant Commands Have Planned and Conducted Some Training and Exercises
paragraphs: The Missile Defense Agency and combatant commands have planned and  conducted some training and exercises for ballistic missile defense to  practice and refine command and control, tactics, procedures, and firing  doctrine specified in the contingency and supporting plans. The Missile  Defense Agency works with the combatant commands to incorporate  ballistic missile defense training into each other’s exercises. For example,  the combatant commands will include training on their mission-essential  tasks during the Missile Defense Agency’s exercise and wargame program,  and the Missile Defense Agency will try to incorporate ballistic missile  defense training into the exercises scheduled by the combatant  commands. For example, U.S. Strategic Command integrated ballistic  missile defense with all of its other missions in its fall 2005 command  exercise and will include ballistic missile defense to  a limited extent in the  command’s upcoming spring exercise for the first time.
The Missile Defense Agency also provides some ballistic missile defense  training programs and course development for individuals, units, and  combatant command staffs. The Missile Defense Agency provides initial  operator training on specific elements and the crews are subsequently  certified by their unit commanders. The agency also provides training to  combatant command staffs on BMDS policy and procedures and command  and control. For example, during an exercise we observed at the training  center in Colorado, the Northern Command staff, Army crews from the  battalion in Alaska, and Navy crews from the Aegis training center in  Virginia were linked electronically. In the future, this type of training will  be enhanced via the Distributed Multi-echelon Training System, which will  enable warfighters to participate in live, virtual, and integrated training  from their duty station. The Missile Defense Agency also cochairs the  Integrated Training Working Group with U.S. Strategic Command to  address training and education goals, objectives, roles, missions, and  policy decisions among the combatant commands and services.
section_title: Some Aspects of Planning to Operate the Ballistic Missile Defense System Are Incomplete
paragraphs: Despite the progress made since 2002, DOD’s planning to operate BMDS is  incomplete and lacks several critical elements. DOD officials agreed that  planning for new weapon systems articulated in requirements guidance  generally includes critical planning elements such as establishing  operational criteria, identifying personnel requirements, developing  training programs, completing successful testing, and establishing  readiness reporting. However, DOD’s BMDS planning is missing several of  these critical elements, such as specific operational criteria for the overall  BMDS and most of the system’s elements that must be met before  declaring that either limited defensive operations or subsequent blocks of  capability are operational. Furthermore, security issues involving  responsibility for and funding of necessary security remain unresolved and  training plans are still evolving. In addition, DOD has not approved dual  status for the commanders of the National Guard units responsible for  operating the ground-based element. U.S. Strategic Command officials  agreed that this level of detailed planning is necessary but has not been  done because BMDS is being developed in a nontraditional way and  further stated that warfighters are ready to use the system. However,  without comprehensive planning laying out steps that need to be  completed before declaring the system operational, development of  operational criteria, and assigning responsibility for doing such planning,  DOD may face uncertainty about the basis that will be used to declare  BMDS operational. This, in turn, may make it difficult for DOD to identify  and prioritize actions needed to achieve this end effectively and efficiently.  Moreover, the Secretary of Defense and Congress may not have a sound  basis for assessing the system’s status and progress toward an operational  capability.
subsections: section_title: Planning for New Weapon Systems Generally Includes Identifying Specific Actions and Criteria
paragraphs: Prior to initially employing a new weapon system, DOD customarily  prepares planning documents that identify actions that must be taken and  criteria that must be met before the system can be declared operational.  DOD officials agree that requirements guidance states that these planning  documents identify any changes needed to doctrine, organizations,  training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. Our  prior work on successful management of complex defense programs  shows that such planning provides a basis for knowing what steps need to  be completed before a weapon system can be declared operational.
As part of the planning for new weapon systems, DOD guidance, as well as  DOD practices based on discussions with defense officials, requires initial  operating capability criteria (hereafter called operational criteria) to be  met to ensure that necessary planning has been completed to initially  employ a new weapon system. These operational criteria include critical  elements such as:    an assessment of the military specialties needed;  identification of personnel requirements;    development of individual, unit, and joint training programs;    system supportability, including identifying logistics and maintenance    successful operational testing; and  the ability to report system and unit readiness.
If the new system is a part of a system of systems, then these operational  criteria are to be integrated with those of the related system elements.  DOD officials told us that these operational criteria also describe actions  that the services typically take to prepare to operate a new system.
Likewise, the services have developed instructions that embody these  principles for new systems. For example, an Air Force instruction states  that an initial operating capability can be declared for a system when it has  successfully completed operational testing, key logistics support is in  place, and the personnel necessary to operate, maintain, and support the  system are trained. This instruction further states that the following items  should be met before declaring that operational capability has been  achieved: concept of operations, system training plan, personnel plan,  operational protection guide, logistics support plan, system security  design, successful operational testing and completion of a successful trial  period, and the ability to report readiness at a certain level. Army and  Navy regulations also specify operational criteria. For example, new Army  weapon systems must have adequately trained operators who are  equipped and supported to execute the mission before the system can be  declared operational. Furthermore, a Navy instruction states that a logistic  support strategy, identification of personnel requirements, manpower  estimates, and a plan for training shall be developed for new weapon  systems.
section_title: DOD Has Not Developed Operational Criteria for the Overall BMDS
paragraphs: As of February 2006, according to DOD officials, DOD had not yet  developed any overarching operational criteria to be met before declaring  the overall BMDS operational either for limited defensive operations or  subsequent blocks of capability. Instead, officials stated that the Secretary  of Defense will declare BMDS operational based on test results,  confidence in the system, threat, and recommendations from the  Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, the Commander of the  subcommand for missile defense, commanders of other combatant  commands, and the Director, Missile Defense Agency. Additionally, the  Missile Defense Support Group, which was formed to advise senior DOD  leaders on policy, operations, acquisition, and resources for BMDS, has  not defined any criteria with which to make recommendations about  operational capability. DOD officials have told us that while operational  criteria describe actions that services customarily take to prepare to  operate a new system, these actions have not been taken for BMDS. Some  DOD officials have suggested that DOD should not have to meet  operational criteria due to the urgency of emplacing a ballistic missile  capability as soon as possible.
DOD has done some assessments in which warfighters raised issues in  areas that the operational criteria are intended to address. For example,  combatant commanders have raised concerns about security and  personnel. Recognizing that there may be planning gaps, the Army Space  and Missile Defense Command has begun to identify what actions need to  be taken—such as security planning, force design analysis, personnel  requirements, training sustainment program, and system training plan—for  the warfighter to use the BMDS and some of the elements. The officials  acknowledged that, ideally, a master plan should be developed to track  these actions. However, even though the Army Space and Missile Defense  Command’s preliminary analysis and the other DOD assessments may  provide a foundation for developing operational criteria, the Command  officials stated they are not responsible for doing so and have not been  tasked with ensuring that the services do so when an element is  transitioned to the service.
In August 2005, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command recognized that  as BMDS approached operational status, DOD needed to take necessary  actions to put the ballistic missile defense elements in the hands of the  warfighters that would address base operations, manning, force  protection, and other aspects of military support. The Commander  recommended a lead service be named for each BMDS element. This lead  service would be responsible for developing doctrine, training,  organizations, and personnel. This concept was briefed to the Joint Staff in  November 2005 and in January 2006. The Joint Staff recommended that the  Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics name a lead service for only two elements—Army was  recommended to be lead service for the forward-based radar and the Air  Force was recommended to be lead service for the ballistic missile  defense mission of the Cobra Dane radar. On February 11, 2006, the  Deputy Secretary of Defense approved this recommendation.
section_title: DOD Has Not Developed Operational Criteria for Most Ballistic Missile Defense System Elements
paragraphs: According to DOD officials, operational criteria also have not been  developed for most BMDS elements. As shown in table 3, DOD has not  developed any operational criteria for five of eight ballistic missile defense  elements and criteria for two more are being drafted.
DOD has developed and approved operational criteria for only one BMDS  element, the Patriot PAC-3 Missile System. The Army developed  operational criteria to ensure the Army was prepared to operate Patriot  and specified these criteria in two capabilities documents (dated  November 2000 and July 2003). These documents included criteria in  areas such as support equipment, training and training support for system  users, a logistics support concept and logistics standards, security,  maintenance planning, and personnel. The Army determined these criteria  were met and declared operational capability was achieved in June 2004  after the system transferred to the Army from the Missile Defense Agency  in 2003.
Although DOD is developing plans to transition some BMDS elements to  the services, these plans, according to DOD officials, are not required to  include operational criteria. However, the Air Force and the Army have  elected to develop operational criteria for two BMDS elements as part of  the transition plans. For example, Air Force Space Command officials  stated they have drafted operational criteria for the Upgraded Early  Warning Radar that include:  testing to demonstrate the radar meets required performance standards  for existing missions and the ballistic missile defense mission;  training for operators, maintainers, and logistics support personnel;    a successful trial period to validate system performance; and    adequate support capability and sufficient spare parts.
The draft plan to transition the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense  element to the Army is also supposed to include operational criteria such  as:    system training plan and identification of leader development courses;    system security requirements;    supportability strategy;    manpower estimate; and    development of a Capabilities Development Document which, according  to DOD guidance, typically includes operational criteria.
DOD officials stated that operational criteria—such as the criteria in DOD  guidance required to be met before initially employing a new weapon  system—for some elements may not be developed. For example,  operational criteria will probably not be developed for elements that either  are not likely to transition from the Missile Defense Agency to a service or  are expected to be contractor operated, such as the sea-based radar and  the forward-based radar. Moreover, the Navy has not developed  operational criteria for the Aegis ballistic missile defense element. Navy  officials stated that they would only develop operational criteria and  establish a timeline for achieving an initial capability if the Navy decides to  buy ballistic missile defense capability for more ships than the Missile  Defense Agency currently plans to buy.
section_title: DOD Has Unresolved Security Issues
paragraphs: Although DOD has developed security policies specifically for BMDS,  unresolved security issues remain and it is not clear when these issues will  be resolved. Specifically, DOD has not resolved issues of who is  responsible for security of BMDS elements and which organization is  financially responsible for funding required security. In addition, DOD may  have difficulty meeting security requirements at some locations because  not all the funding has been allocated. Despite this situation, Joint Staff  and combatant command officials stated that a decision to declare BMDS  operational does not necessarily depend on resolving these issues.
In July 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the highest  security level for BMDS when it is operational because damage to this  system would harm the strategic capability of the United States. The  Deputy Secretary also designated U.S. Strategic Command as the oversight  authority responsible for coordinating security issues with other  combatant commands, the services, and the Missile Defense Agency. This  was done, in part, to identify budget requirements. This policy was further  clarified in a May 2005 memo stating that the Commander, U.S. Strategic  Command has the authority to designate the security level for each BMDS  element and is responsible for developing security standards, policies, and  procedures for BMDS. In October 2005, U.S. Strategic Command issued a  directive specifying the standards for BMDS security and setting the  security level for each BMDS element.
Despite these directives, however, combatant commands have expressed  concerns about which DOD commands are responsible for actually  providing and paying for BMDS security, particularly for those elements  that will be contractor operated and are expected to be available to the  warfighter in fiscal year 2006. According to U.S. Strategic Command  officials, BMDS elements at the highest security level require, for example,  two lines of defensive security, including sensor fences and sufficient  personnel to achieve a specific response rate; integrated electronic  security systems; entry control; and access delay and denial systems.  These measures are expensive—the Missile Defense Agency estimated  that security measures for three BMDS elements will cost about $350  million over fiscal years 2006-2011. However, Office of the Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Joint Staff, and other  DOD officials said that service estimates of security requirements  (personnel and costs) are generally higher and that some of these costs are  not budgeted by either the services or the Missile Defense Agency.  Furthermore, although U.S. Strategic Command has oversight  responsibility and has conducted some security inspections, Command  officials told us that ensuring security requirements are met will actually  be done by a service or the combatant command where the element is  located.
As discussed above, the U.S. Strategic Command and the Joint Staff  recommended that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics assign a “lead service” for each  BMDS element that would be responsible for providing security, ensuring  security standards are met, and budgeting for any associated costs in the  next Future Years Defense Program (which will be for fiscal years 2008- 13). Although negotiations on this issue are ongoing, the Missile Defense  Agency agreed in December 2005 to fund the sea-based radar and forward- based radar costs for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, Air Force Cobra Dane  radar costs for fiscal year 2007, and contractor logistic support through  fiscal year 2013. However, DOD officials stated that there are significant  disagreements between the services and the Missile Defense Agency over  the levels of support and force protection required. Further, the services  and the Missile Defense Agency have not resolved disagreements over  which organization will fund operational costs or which organization will  provide and fund force protection beyond fiscal year 2007. It is not clear  whether the recent designation of lead service for only two BMDS  elements will help resolve these issues in time to be reflected in the  development of the fiscal years 2008-13 Future Years Defense Program.
Funding issues could prevent DOD from meeting security requirements at  some locations before the system is declared operational. For example,  both Vandenberg and Schreiver Air Force Bases require a combination of  additional security personnel and technology improvements to meet  security requirements. Although some personnel were recently added and  the Air Force has requested funding for the technology improvements, as  of February 8, 2006, not all the required personnel and technology were in  place. The Army also had to increase the military police unit to protect the  missile fields at Fort Greely, Alaska, and the cost for snow removal is  nearly a million dollars a year. Security will become increasingly important  and costly as additional BMDS elements are placed in more locations,  particularly those outside the continental United States (see table 2). For  example, DOD is planning a third site for the ground-based element and is  planning for four forward-based radars, and officials have noted that the  estimated cost for protecting the forward-based radar could double for  austere locations.
section_title: Combatant Commands’ Training Plans and Readiness Assessments for BMDS Are Evolving
paragraphs: Although DOD has made progress in developing some training, the training  plans prepared by the combatant commands under the Joint Training  System are evolving as are readiness assessments for BMDS. The Joint  Training System is DOD’s authoritative process for combatant commands  and others to develop training plans, conduct training, and assess  proficiency. This system requires combatant commands to develop annual  training plans based on the mission-essential tasks required to perform  assigned missions. The Joint Training System also includes an automated,  Web-based system to track progress. The mission-essential tasks are also  the basis for DOD readiness assessments such as the Defense Readiness  Reporting System and the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review.
DOD has not yet completed all the planning as part of the Joint Training  System for ballistic missile defense. For example, the U.S. Strategic  Command subcommand for missile defense is developing but has not yet  completed an annual training plan and a list of mission-essential tasks  under the Joint Training System. Although some combatant commands  have individually drafted some mission-essential tasks for ballistic missile  defense, the subcommand’s efforts are intended to develop a list that will  be standardized and integrated across combatant commands. Once  developed, these mission-essential tasks need to be entered into the Joint  Training System’s Web-based tracking system, which currently does not  include ballistic missile defense tasks.
The roles of organizations involved in ballistic mission defense training are  evolving and DOD is still developing some important aspects of its training  program. The Missile Defense Agency has done a lot of work to develop  BMDS element and command training as well as develop and conduct  exercises for the combatant commands and services. However, the U.S.  Strategic Command’s subcommand is beginning to assume more  responsibilities for training, such as developing the annual training plan  and mission-essential tasks. The two organizations are negotiating which  organization will assume which training functions, but, as of November  2005, according to DOD officials, no final decisions had been made. The  subcommand, with a supporting working group, is working on several  important aspects of ballistic missile defense training that are not yet  complete even though additional elements, such as the forward-based  radar and the sea-based radar, are expected to be made available to the  warfighter in 2006. The subcommand and working group are also  developing:    an overarching training vision,    a global BMDS employment guide for how to “fight the system” with more  elements than just the ground-based element,    a method to systematically integrate ballistic missile defense into the Joint  Staff’s exercise program and crosswalk these exercises with the ballistic  missile defense annual training plan, and    a training and certification program for nonservice-owned elements such  as the sea-based radar and the forward-based radar.
Development of a standardized list of joint mission-essential tasks will  form the basis for DOD readiness assessments such as the Defense  Readiness Reporting System and the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review.  Joint Staff officials told us that in some of the recent quarterly reviews,  U.S. Strategic Command submitted a subjective evaluation of ballistic  missile defense as part of the review. However, the officials said that the  Joint Staff could not assess the Command’s input during the review  because there is not yet an approved, common list of mission tasks and the  system has not been declared operational; thus, there was no “yardstick”  for them to use to assess the readiness to conduct the ballistic missile  defense mission. Regarding input into the Defense Readiness Reporting  System, U.S. Strategic Command officials stated that inputs are usually  based on the mission-essential tasks, which are assessed using objective  effectiveness measures and some subjective commander’s judgment.  However, since the mission-essential tasks are evolving and the combatant  commands are just beginning to develop measures of effectiveness, the  inputs into this system are currently limited and predominantly subjective.
section_title: DOD Has Not Approved Dual Status for National Guard Unit Commanders
paragraphs: Although the Secretary of the Army recently approved the model for using  National Guard units to operate the ground-based BMDS element, DOD  has not approved dual status for the commanders of these units, according  to DOD officials. The Army decided in 1999 to establish National Guard  units to perform the ballistic missile defense mission. In 2003, the Army  assigned National Guard soldiers to the Colorado Army National Guard  100th Missile Defense Brigade and the Alaska Army National Guard 49th  Missile Defense Battalion.
The model for using these National Guard units and roles/responsibilities  of all parties involved are specified in a memorandum of agreement  between the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command, National Guard  Bureau, and the Colorado and Alaska State Adjutants General, which was  signed in December 2005. The model states that once BMDS is declared  operational, the National Guard soldiers will serve in a federal status when  performing ballistic missile defense mission duties, including controlling,  operating, maintaining, securing, or defending the ground-based element  or site. Otherwise, the soldiers will serve in a state status and be  responsible for performing National Guard duties, such as organizing,  administering, recruiting, instructing, or training reserve components.  Until BMDS is declared operational, the National Guard soldiers are in a  state status all of the time. The Secretary of the Army approved this  model on March 3, 2006.
The model states that the commanders of these National Guard units will  serve in a dual status—meaning they can command soldiers in either a  federal or state status. According to an official in the Secretary of the  Army’s office, the governors of Colorado and Alaska have signed the  document authorizing dual status of the unit commanders. However,  according to Army officials, either the Secretary of Defense or the  President must sign approval for dual-status authority. As of March 3,  2006, this had not been done. However, DOD officials stressed that these  National Guard soldiers are trained and certified by their unit commanders  and are thus prepared to operate the ground-based BMDS element  whenever the system is declared operational.
section_title: Incomplete Planning Creates Uncertainty About the Basis for Declaring the BMDS Operational
paragraphs: DOD’s incomplete planning to operate BMDS has created uncertainty  about the basis that will be used to declare the system operational. DOD  does not have a comprehensive plan laying out steps that need to be taken  and criteria that should be met before declaring that either the limited  defensive operations or subsequent system blocks are operational. DOD  officials agreed that planning for new weapon systems articulated in  requirements guidance generally includes critical planning elements such  as development of operational criteria, a plan to adequately staff units,  provide security, and complete training and personnel plans. However, no  organization has been officially assigned responsibility for developing a  comprehensive plan—to include operational criteria—specifying what  needs to be accomplished before declaring that BMDS is operational  either for limited defensive operations or subsequent blocks of capability.  Although DOD has conducted some assessments that could be used to  form the basis for developing operational criteria, no organization is  clearly in charge of developing such criteria and ensuring they are met.  Some DOD officials have suggested that the “lead service” could do this  planning, but DOD has not clearly defined lead service responsibilities and  has not fully implemented this proposal.
Without comprehensive planning, the services and the combatant  commands may not be as well prepared to operate the complex, integrated  BMDS as they are for other new weapon systems for which DOD  establishes criteria for achieving operational capability. Without  operational criteria, it may be difficult for the Secretary of Defense to  objectively assess combatant commands’ and services’ preparations to  conduct BMDS operations, and the Secretary may not have a transparent  basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important  as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks. Further, operational  criteria are important because they specify actions that need to be  completed for users to be prepared to use the system, such as security,  training, and personnel. Without resolving the outstanding security issues,  there is uncertainty about personnel requirements, and which organization  will provide security for each element and pay the related costs. Without  complete training plans, it is unknown how training for the integrated  BMDS and some elements will be conducted, particularly the radars that  will be fielded in 2006. Furthermore, it is not clear which mission-essential  tasks will be used in DOD readiness assessments. The absence of  comprehensive planning to operate BMDS may result in uncertainty about  the basis that will be used to declare the system operational for limited  defensive operation and subsequent blocks of capability. Thus, it may be  difficult for DOD to identify and prioritize actions across the department  needed to achieve this end effectively and efficiently and identify specific  DOD organizations responsible and accountable for making this happen.  As a result, the Secretary of Defense and Congress may not have the  information to assess the system’s status and progress toward an  operational capability as they consider funding requests from DOD.
section_title: The Future Years Defense Program Does Not Provide Complete and Transparent Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Costs
paragraphs: The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) does not provide complete and  transparent ballistic missile defense operational costs for use by either  DOD or Congress. The FYDP is a major source of budget information that  reports projected spending for the current budget year and at least 4  succeeding years. We and DOD have repeatedly recognized the need to  link resources to capabilities to facilitate DOD’s decision making and  congressional oversight. However, complete and transparent ballistic  missile defense operational costs are not visible in the FYDP because the  FYDP’s structure does not provide a way to identify and aggregate these  costs, even though DOD plans to field an increasing number of elements  between fiscal years 2006-2011. Several factors impair the visibility of  ballistic missile defense operational costs. For example, we have reported  that although expected operational costs for fiscal years 2005-2011 total  $1.7 billion, DOD has not included all known operational costs in its  budget. Also, these operational costs are contained in many program  elements throughout the FYDP and are not linked in any way, making it  difficult to compile these costs. Without the ability to clearly identify and  assess the total ballistic missile defense operational costs, neither the  Secretary of Defense nor Congress has complete information to use when  making funding and trade-off decisions among competing priorities;  provide assurance that DOD’s plans to field ballistic missile defense  capabilities are affordable over time; and assess the costs of operating the  New Triad.
subsections: section_title: Complete and Transparent Budget Information Facilitates Decision Making and Oversight
paragraphs: Complete and transparent budget information facilitates the ability of  DOD officials to make informed resource decisions, which is increasingly  important given the current strategic environment and growing demand  for resources at a time when the department is facing significant  affordability challenges. DOD acknowledged in its fiscal year 2004  Performance and Accountability Report that transparent budget  submissions will facilitate DOD leaders’ ability to make better-informed  resource decisions. In addition, DOD has acknowledged that defense  decision making requires accurate, consistent computation of costs for  each type of military capability and thus has modified the FYDP over time  to capture the resources associated with particular areas of interest, such  as space activities. Moreover, we have previously recommended DOD take  actions designed to provide greater visibility of projected spending and  future investments. For example, our report on DOD’s New Triad  explained that ballistic missile defense is an important element of the New  Triad and the current FYDP structure does not readily identify and  aggregate New Triad–related costs. We recommended in June 2005 that  DOD establish a virtual major force program to identify New Triad costs.  Subsequently, because DOD disagreed with our recommendation in its  comments on our report, we also recommended that Congress consider  requiring the Secretary of Defense to establish a virtual major force  program to identify New Triad costs and report annually on these funding  levels.
Complete and transparent budget information also facilitates  congressional oversight of DOD programs. To this end, we recommended  in 2004 that DOD enhance its FYDP report to provide better information  for congressional decision makers’ use during budget deliberations. Also,  a congressional committee has expressed specific interest in obtaining  ballistic missile defense cost data. For example, in the Report of the House  Committee on Appropriations on the Department of Defense  Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2006, congressional committee  members noted that the large level of funding in individual program  elements “obscures funding details and creates significant oversight  issues.” Another committee also expressed frustration with the lack of  transparency in budgeting and, in the Conference Report on the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (December 18, 2005)  directed the Comptroller General to conduct a study of the current  program element structure (for research, development, test, and  evaluation projects), particularly those that employ the system of systems  concept.
section_title: Complete and Transparent Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Costs Are Not Visible in DOD’s FYDP
paragraphs: Complete costs to operate ballistic missile defense elements that will be  fielded between fiscal years 2006-2011 are not visible to DOD or Congress  in the FYDP because the current FYDP structure does not provide a way  to identify and aggregate all ballistic missile defense system operational  costs. Officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller and  Program, Analysis, and Evaluation agreed that such data are necessary in  making fully informed resource decisions and will become more important  as more ballistic missile defense elements are fielded over time; however,  these officials also agreed that these data are not transparent in the FYDP  and that they have not developed a new structure for capturing these  costs.
We analyzed the fiscal year 2006 FYDP to determine whether the program  elements related to ballistic missile defense operations could be identified.  In 1995, DOD’s Office of Program, Analysis, and Evaluation created a  defense mission category structure in the FYDP to identify resources  devoted to different military missions, because this type of data was not  available from the FYDP. This defense mission category structure can be  used to identify the program elements and costs for various missions such  as suppression of enemy air defenses because they are linked to related  program elements in the FYDP. Our analysis showed, and a Program,  Analysis, and Evaluation official agreed, that neither the current FYDP  structure nor its associated defense mission categories provides a way to  effectively identify and aggregate ballistic missile defense operational  costs.
In our analysis, we identified eight defense mission categories related to  ballistic missile defense such as “ballistic missile defense forces” and  “theater missile defense”. Even though our analysis identified 135 ballistic  missile defense program elements that were linked to these ballistic  missile defense mission categories, our analysis also showed that these  program elements did not provide a complete and accurate list for  identifying and aggregating ballistic missile defense operational costs. For  example, 88 of the 135 (65 percent) program elements linked to ballistic  missile defense mission categories were not related to the current  BMDS—for example, one of these was for Special Operations Command.  Also, the 135 program elements identified did not include some programs  that are part of the BMDS such as the upgraded early warning radar. In  addition, the 135 program elements did not include many program  elements that service officials said contain BMDS operational costs.  Specifically, we documented 28 BMDS-related program elements from the  services, such as those for sensors and radars supported by the Air Force,  ground-based missile defense supported by the Army, and the Aegis  ballistic missile defense radar supported by the Navy. When we compared  this list of program elements to the 135 we identified using the FYDP  defense mission categories, we found that 24 of the 28 service-provided  program elements did not match any of the 135 identified via our analysis  of FYDP defense mission categories for ballistic missile defense.
We discussed the results of our analysis with officials from the Office of  Secretary of Defense, Comptroller and Program, Analysis and Evaluation,  and they agreed that our methodology was reasonable. They also agreed  that our analysis showed that complete and transparent ballistic missile  defense operational costs are not visible in the FYDP. Since there is no  structure in the FYDP to accurately identify and aggregate ballistic missile  defense operational costs, the Comptroller’s office must request these data  from each service and the Missile Defense Agency. The data are added  together to determine an estimate of the total operational cost for the  ballistic missile defense system. The Comptroller’s office estimated that  the services’ operational costs for fiscal years 2004-2006 totaled   $259 million. However, the officials acknowledged that these data may not  have been gathered consistently across all these organizations, because  there is no standardized methodology specifying which costs to include.
section_title: Several Factors Impair the Completeness and Transparency of Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Costs
paragraphs: The completeness and transparency of operational costs for ballistic  missile defense system elements are impaired by four primary factors:   (1) operational costs are included in many program elements and there is  no mechanism to link and compile these costs, (2) the Missile Defense  Agency is authorized to use research and development funds to pay for  operational costs, (3) DOD has not included all known operational costs in  its budget estimates, and (4) DOD has not yet identified all costs  associated with the New Triad, of which the ballistic missile defense  system is an important part. Officials from the Office of Secretary of  Defense, Comptroller and Program, Analysis and Evaluation agreed that  complete and transparent ballistic missile defense operational costs are  not visible in the FYDP for the reasons cited above.
First, operational costs are included in many program elements  throughout the FYDP and there is no mechanism to link the FYDP  program elements together so that total operational costs can be  compiled. A further complication is that some of these program elements  also include costs for items that are not related to ballistic missile defense.  For example, one program element entitled Theater Missile Defense is  defined as including costs for theater missiles of all classes, including  tactical, cruise, and air-to-surface missiles. Another program element  includes all costs for all the Navy’s destroyers, and does not distinguish  the 15 destroyers that DOD will operate to perform the ballistic missile  defense mission. Even though there is no FYDP structure to identify and  aggregate ballistic missile defense operational costs, there is no plan to  modify the FYDP structure to allow identification of ballistic missile  defense program elements, according to an official in the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation, because they  have not received direction to do so.
Second, the Missile Defense Agency is authorized by statute to use  research and development funds to pay for some operational costs.  However, officials we spoke with from the Office of Secretary of Defense,  Comptroller and Program, Analysis, and Evaluation said that this practice  makes it much more difficult to derive an accurate estimate of operational  costs, because the research and development funds come from a different  appropriation and are not typically used to pay operational costs. These  officials told us that operational costs are usually paid from the operations  and maintenance appropriation, not the research and development  appropriation.
Third, we reported in September 2005 that operational costs for fiscal  years 2005-2011 totaled $1.7 billion but that DOD has not included all  known operational costs for BMDS in its budget. Further, we reported that  the Missile Defense Agency and the services disagreed as to which  organization should pay operational costs for developmental assets, even  though these assets may be available for operational use. In discussing  our analysis with officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,  Comptroller, and Program, Analysis, and Evaluation, the officials noted  that DOD’s estimate of ballistic missile defense operational costs does not  reflect total costs, because it does not include combatant commanders  costs such as the costs for the new Strategic Command subcommand for  missile defense. In addition, an official in the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, Comptroller stated that their estimate of operational costs over  fiscal years 2006-2011 is not complete because the services and the Missile  Defense Agency are negotiating who will pay operational costs in the  future.
Fourth, as we previously reported, DOD has not identified all costs  associated with the New Triad, of which ballistic missile defense is an  important part. We reported that the current FYDP structure does not  expressly identify and aggregate New Triad program elements that would  allow identification of New Triad spending. Since ballistic missile defense  is a part of the New Triad, DOD would need to be able to identify these  costs as part of the New Triad. In fact, the Commander of the U.S.  Strategic Command suggested that creating a virtual major force program  could be necessary for each of the New Triad legs because of the diversity  and scope of New Triad capabilities.
section_title: Lack of Complete and Transparent Budget Information Impairs Decision Making
paragraphs: The lack of complete and transparent budget information about ballistic  missile defense operational costs impairs the ability of DOD officials to  make informed resource decisions. DOD officials agreed that complete  and transparent data on ballistic missile defense operational costs are  necessary to make informed funding and trade-off decisions among  competing priorities. Without the ability to identify and assess total BMDS  operational costs, neither DOD nor Congress has complete information to  know whether DOD’s plans to field ballistic missile defense capabilities  are affordable over time. Furthermore, if the funds budgeted for BMDS  support turn out to be insufficient since not all costs are included, DOD  will either have to take funds from other programs or spend less on missile  defense and potentially accept risks in security, training, personnel, or  other areas. This is particularly important when considering the Missile  Defense Agency’s plans to deliver an increasing number of systems and  units over fiscal years 2006 -2011. The Missile Defense Agency may face  increasing budget pressure because, although it will be supporting more  BMDS elements, the agency’s budget for contractor logistic support is  expected to remain relatively constant. Finally, we reported in 2005 that  decision makers need complete data about the resources being allocated  to the New Triad—of which ballistic missile defense is a part—in making  trade-offs among efforts to develop capabilities. Without these cost data,  DOD will be limited in its ability to guide and direct its efforts to integrate  New Triad capabilities and Congress will not have full visibility of the  resources being allocated to these efforts.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Preparing to perform the ballistic missile defense mission is highly  complex, involves many different DOD organizations, and requires  seamless integration across multiple combatant commands. At the same  time that the warfighters are developing and refining their training,  operations, and security plans, the Missile Defense Agency continues to  develop blocks of BMDS capabilities. Although DOD faces the twin  challenges of simultaneously developing the system and beginning  operations, comprehensive planning could alleviate users’ concerns before  declaring that either limited operations or each subsequent block of  capability is operational. Although DOD has plans for additional tests that  are designed to resolve technical performance issues, the absence of a  comprehensive plan for operational issues creates uncertainty across DOD  on what remains to be done and how remaining actions should be  prioritized before the department declares BMDS operational. Without  operational criteria, it may be difficult for the Secretary of Defense to  objectively assess combatant commands’ and services’ preparations to  conduct BMDS operations and the Secretary may not have a transparent  basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important  as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and Congress considers  requests to fund operations. Until an organization is assigned  responsibility for developing a comprehensive plan that includes  operational criteria, DOD may be hindered in its ability to identify and  prioritize actions across the department effectively and efficiently.  Considering that DOD guidance generally includes this type of planning  and operational criteria to be developed for new weapon systems such as  radars or fighter aircraft, it is even more important to bring discipline into  the process for the highly complex and integrated BMDS. Considering the  significant changes DOD plans for each block of BMDS, this disciplined  approach is important to apply not only to the initial capabilities, but to  each subsequent block. Without adequate planning, clear criteria, and  identifying responsibility for ensuring necessary actions, it may be difficult  for DOD to identify and prioritize actions and assure itself or Congress  that all of the necessary pieces will be in place before declaring either  limited defense operations or subsequent blocks of capability operational.  In addition, it will be difficult for DOD to determine whether the return on  its significant development investment in BMDS can be realized.
Complete and transparent information on expected costs for important  missions (such as ballistic missile defense) and investment efforts (such as  the New Triad) facilitates DOD and congressional decision making when  allocating resources. Complete and reliable data are needed to assess and  understand cost trends over time, which is particularly important as  warfighters begin to use ballistic missile defense elements and as an  increasing number of elements are fielded over fiscal years 2006-2011.  However, because the FYDP is currently not structured to transparently  identify and aggregate ballistic missile defense operational costs, DOD’s  ability to make strategic investment decisions based on knowledge of  complete BMDS operational costs is impaired. In addition, the  consequences of not having this information means that neither DOD nor  Congress has the benefit of complete and adequate data to make fully  informed trade-off decisions in a resource-constrained environment. As a  result, the investment decisions made may not truly reflect the desired  relative priority of ballistic missile defense within DOD’s overall defense  strategy.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making the following two recommendations for executive action.  First, to help DOD identify and prioritize actions across the department  needed to declare limited defensive operations as well as each subsequent  block of capability operational, and to dispel uncertainty and bring needed  discipline to the process, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  take the following actions in consultation with the Commander, U.S.  Strategic Command, the services, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:    Develop operational criteria for each ballistic missile defense element and  the overall BMDS system for limited defensive operations and each  subsequent block of capability. These criteria should be comparable to the  operational criteria that are currently developed for new weapon systems.
Assign responsibility to specific organizations and hold these  organizations accountable for developing the criteria and ensuring these  criteria are met before operational capability is declared.
Develop a comprehensive plan specifying actions that must be completed  with completion deadlines. The plan should cover the range of doctrine,  organization, training, personnel, and facilities actions that are normally  required to be developed and in place for new weapon systems, should  integrate these actions across elements, and should address actions  needed for the overall, integrated BMDS.
Second, to provide decision makers in Congress and DOD with complete,  transparent data on the resources required to operate the ballistic missile  defense system and to clearly identify costs for an important piece of the  New Triad, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Director, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation, in consultation with the  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the services, to develop a  structure within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile defense  operational costs, which can be included as part of an annual report on the  funding levels for New Triad activities that GAO recommended DOD  provide annually to Congress.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: Given the significance of BMDS to national defense and the billions of  dollars spent in developing this system, Congress should consider  requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop:    A comprehensive plan (including operational criteria) specifying actions  that must be completed by the services and combatant commands before  declaring BMDS operational for limited defensive operations or  subsequent blocks of capability.
A structure within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile defense  operational costs which can be included as part of an annual report on the  funding levels for New Triad activities.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense  concurred or partially concurred with our recommendations. The  department’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III. The  department also provided technical comments, which we have  incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendations to develop operational  criteria and a comprehensive plan specifying actions that must be  completed before declaring BMDS operational and also agreed with our  recommendation to assign responsibility for doing so to a specific  organization which would be held accountable for completing these tasks.  However, while DOD’s response addressed the warfighters’ role in  providing input to the Missile Defense Agency to guide the system’s  technical development, it did not address the need for operational criteria  prior to declaring the BMDS or elements of the system operational.  Moreover, DOD’s comments do not indicate what, if any, process it plans  to use to develop operational criteria for assessing combatant commands’  and services’ preparedness to conduct BMDS operations or whether it  plans to assign responsibility. We continue to believe that the warfighters,  specifically the combatant commands and services under the leadership of  U.S. Strategic Command, should have the lead in developing and ensuring  operational criteria are met as opposed to the developers—the Missile  Defense Agency and system development program offices. Without  comprehensive planning and objective operational criteria, the services  and the combatant commands may not be as well prepared to operate the  complex, integrated BMDS as they are for other new weapon systems.  Furthermore, such planning and criteria would provide an objective basis  for assessing combatant commands’ and services’ preparedness to  conduct BMDS operations and provide a transparent basis for declaring  BMDS operational. In addition, without an organization assigned  responsibility for developing a comprehensive plan which includes  operational criteria, DOD may be hindered in its ability to identify and  prioritize actions across the department effectively and efficiently.
DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation to develop a  structure within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile defense  operational costs that could be included as part of an annual report on  New Triad funding that we had previously recommended DOD provide  annually to Congress. Considering that there is no common methodology  to identify and aggregate BMDS operational costs, we continue to believe  that corrective action is needed so that Congress and DOD have adequate  information to assess whether DOD’s plans to field ballistic missile  defense capabilities are affordable. Complete and transparent BMDS  operational cost information is important to assess cost trends over time,  particularly as an increasing number of BMDS elements are fielded during  the next several years. Without this information, neither DOD nor  Congress will have the benefit of complete and adequate data to make  fully informed trade-off decisions within projected defense spending  levels. With respect to DOD’s nonconcurrence on our previous  recommendation to account for New Triad costs in the FYDP, we note that  the Report of the House Armed Services Committee on the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 directed the Secretary of  Defense to modify the FYDP to identify and aggregate program elements  associated with the New Triad which, as we state in this report, includes  ballistic missile defense.
We continue to believe that the specific actions we recommended are  needed for DOD to prepare for conducting BMDS operations and to assist  in DOD and congressional oversight of ballistic missile defense  operational costs. Because DOD did not indicate that it plans to implement  our recommendations, we have added a matter for Congress to consider  directing DOD to develop a comprehensive plan which includes  operational criteria and to develop a structure within the FYDP to identify  all ballistic missile defense operational costs.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; the Commander, U.S. Northern  Command; and the Director, Missile Defense Agency. We will make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at  no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202) 512-4402.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff members who  made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  made progress in planning to operate the Ballistic Missile Defense System  (BMDS), and to determine whether the Future Years Defense Program  (FYDP) provides complete and transparent data on total ballistic missile  defense operational costs, we conducted various analyses, reviewed key  documentation, and interviewed relevant DOD officials. During this  review, we focused on assessing issues DOD faces in planning to operate  the BMDS such as operational criteria, training, security, and cost  transparency. We did not evaluate DOD’s testing plans, research and  development programs, or the technical effectiveness of individual  elements as we have addressed these issues in other reports. Specifically,  we have issued two reports on the status of BMDS that included  assessments of program goals, testing plans, and progress in developing  each element. Our March 2005 report found that system performance  remains uncertain and unverified because DOD has not successfully  conducted an end-to-end flight test using operationally representative  hardware and software.
To assess DOD’s progress in planning to operate the BMDS, we obtained  and reviewed relevant documents on ballistic missile defense operations  such as the National Security Presidential Directive 23 dated December  16, 2002; the Unified Command Plan dated January 10, 2003; various  combatant command contingency plans; BMDS Tactical Handbook;  various Joint Staff orders; DOD, Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, and  service instructions and regulations; DOD memoranda providing guidance  for implementing the ballistic missile defense program; Integrated Training  Working Group briefings; Missile Defense Agency briefings and documents  explaining program status and plans; and briefings by DOD officials. We  also observed an exercise that involved the services and combatant  commands.
To identify areas where planning was incomplete, we compared what DOD  had done with the planning principles for new weapon systems embodied   in DOD acquisition and requirements guidance and service instructions  and training plans explained in DOD’s Joint Training System. We then  discussed the results of our comparisons with officials in the U.S. Strategic  Command; the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command; Office of the  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Joint  Staff; and Missile Defense Agency.
To determine the extent to which the FYDP provides complete and  transparent data on ballistic missile defense operational costs, we  analyzed the FYDP structure to determine whether it was designed to  readily identify the program elements that contain ballistic missile defense  operational costs and assessed whether these FYDP program elements  included all BMDS elements. In addition, we obtained and reviewed  documentation at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Army,  Navy, and Air Force to identify program elements that would include  ballistic missile defense operational costs. We met with DOD officials from  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Office of the  Director, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation, and the Office of the  Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to  discuss our approach and they agreed it was reasonable. We assessed the  reliability of the data by corroborating our list of defense mission  categories and some program elements with knowledgeable agency  officials. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our  purposes.
In addition, other organizations we visited to gain an understanding of  their roles in operating elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System  included the Joint Staff, U.S. Army Headquarters and Space and Missile  Defense Command, the office of the Chief of Naval Operations’ Surface  Warfare division, Air Force Headquarters and Space Command, the office  of the National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard, and the Air  National Guard. To document how various commands would employ  BMDS in performing the ballistic missile defense mission, we met with  officials from the U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, and the  U.S. Northern Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and observed an  exercise.
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for their review and  incorporated their comments where appropriate. Our review was  conducted between January 2005 and February 2006 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Assistant  Director, Brenda M. Waterfield, Pat L. Bohan, Amy J. Anderson, Jeffrey R.  Hubbard, John E. Trubey, and Renee S. Brown made key contributions to  this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: Actions needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for  Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System.  GAO-05-817. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly  Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment  Approach. GAO-05-962R. Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly  Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment  Approach. GAO-05-540. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in  2004. GAO-05-243. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve  Transparency of DOD’s Projected Resource Needs. GAO-04-514.  Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and  Accountability. GAO-04-409. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing  Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. GAO-04-254.  Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2004.
Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for  Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. GAO-03-600. Washington, D.C.: August  21, 2003.
Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and  Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. GAO-03-597. Washington,  D.C.: May 23, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but  Risks Remain. GAO-03-441. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce  Risks in Developing Airborne Laser. GAO-02-631. Washington, D.C.: July  12, 2002.
Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early National  Missile Defense Flight Test. GAO-02-124. Washington, D.C.: February 28,  2002.
Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New  Patriot Missiles to Buy. GAO/NSIAD-00-153. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2000.
Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be  Revised to Reduce Risk. GAO/NSIAD-00-131. Washington, D.C.: May 31,  2000.