Maritime Security: Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving
Published: 2006-07-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Sharing information with nonfederal officials is an important tool in federal efforts to secure the nation's ports against a potential terrorist attack. The Coast Guard has lead responsibility in coordinating maritime information sharing efforts. The Coast Guard has established area maritime security committees--forums that involve federal and nonfederal officials who identify and address risks in a port. The Coast Guard and other agencies have sought to further enhance information sharing and port security operations by establishing interagency operational centers--command centers that tie together the efforts of federal and nonfederal participants. This testimony is a summary and update to our April 2005 report, Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention, GAO-05-394 . It discusses the impact the committees and interagency operational centers have had on improving information sharing and identifies any barriers that have hindered information sharing.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Area maritime security committees provide a structure that has improved information sharing among port security stakeholders. At the four port locations GAO visited, federal and nonfederal stakeholders said that the newly formed committees were an improvement over previous information-sharing efforts. The types of information shared included assessments of vulnerabilities at port locations and strategies the Coast Guard intends to use in protecting key infrastructure. GAO's ongoing work indicates that these committees continue to be useful forums for information sharing. Interagency operational centers also allow for even greater information sharing because the centers operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis, and they receive real-time information from data sources such as radars and sensors. The Coast Guard has developed its own centers--called sector command centers--at 35 port locations to monitor information and to support its operations planned for the future. As of today, the relationship between the interagency operational centers and the sector command centers remains to be determined. In April 2005 the major barrier hindering information sharing was the lack of federal security clearances for nonfederal members of committees or centers. In April 2005, Coast Guard issued guidance to field offices that clarified their role in obtaining clearances for nonfederal members of committees or centers. In addition, the Coast Guard did not have formal procedures that called for the use of data to monitor application trends. As of June 2006, guidance was put in place and according to the Coast Guard, was responsible for an increase in security clearance applications under consideration by the Coast Guard. Specifically, as of June 2006, 188 out of 467 nonfederal members of area maritime security committees with a need to know received some type of security clearance. This is an improvement from February 2005, when no security clearances were issued to 359 nonfederal members of area maritime security committees members with a need to know security information.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the improvements made in the  practice of sharing maritime-related security information. Securing the  nation’s ports against a potential terrorist attack has become one of the  nation’s security priorities since the terrorist attacks of September 11,  2001. Factors that make ports vulnerable to a terrorist attack include their  location near major urban centers, their inclusion of critical  infrastructures such as oil refineries and terminals, and their importance  to the nation’s economy and trade. Although no port-related terrorist  attacks have occurred in the United States, terrorists overseas have  demonstrated their ability to access and destroy infrastructure, assets, and  lives in and around seaports.
Ports are sprawling enterprises that often cross jurisdictional boundaries;  therefore, the need to share information among federal, state, and local  agencies is central to effective prevention and response. Since the  September 11 terrorist attacks, the federal government has taken a  number of approaches designed to enhance information sharing. One of  these approaches provides the Coast Guard with the authority to create  area maritime security committees at the port level. These committees— with representatives from the federal, state, local, and private sectors— offer a venue to identify and deal with vulnerabilities in and around ports,  as well as a forum for sharing information on issues related to port  security. Another approach developed to share information is the creation  of interagency operational centers at certain port locations. These centers  are command posts that tie together intelligence and operational efforts of  various federal and nonfederal participants. Often information regarding  port security is classified, and requires security clearances for those who  need access to this information. Lacking access to such information  through a security clearance can disadvantage officials in their efforts to  respond to or combat a terrorist threat.
My testimony today is a summary of and update to our April 2005 report,  Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information  Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention,  GAO-05-394. That report provides additional background and examples  related to our findings. Specifically, my testimony provides an examination  of the efforts that the Coast Guard and other federal agencies have made  in improving information sharing among federal, state, local, and industry  stakeholders, including (1) the impact of area maritime security  committees on information sharing, (2) the impact of interagency  operational centers on information sharing, and (3) the barriers, if any,  that have hindered improvements in information sharing among port  security stakeholders.
To obtain this information, we reviewed the activities of area maritime  security committees at four ports, selected to provide a diverse sample of  security environments and perspectives. The ports were Baltimore,  Maryland; Charleston, South Carolina; Houston, Texas; and Seattle,  Washington. To review the activities of the interagency operational  centers, we visited and interviewed participants at the three centers in  operation at the time of our published report. We also discussed  information-sharing issues with nonfederal stakeholders, including private  sector officials, officials from port authorities, and local law enforcement.  We examined the Coast Guard’s procedures for processing security  clearances for members of area maritime security committees. We  reviewed legislation and congressional committee reports related to  information sharing, interviewed agency officials, and reviewed numerous  other documents and reports on the issue. We interviewed Coast Guard  officials involved in sharing information and received updated information  about their efforts in 2006. All of our work has been conducted in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Ports Are Important and Vulnerable
paragraphs: Ports play an important role in the nation’s economy and security. Ports  are used to import and export cargo worth hundreds of billions of dollars;  generating jobs, both directly and indirectly, for Americans and our  trading partners. Ports, which include inland waterways, are used to move  cargo containers, and bulk agricultural, mineral, petroleum, and paper  products. Ports are also important to national security by hosting naval  bases and vessels and facilitating the movement of military equipment and  supplying troops deployed overseas.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the nation’s 361 seaports have  been increasingly viewed as potential targets for future terrorist attacks.  Ports are vulnerable because they are sprawling, interwoven with complex  transportation networks, close to crowded metropolitan areas, and easily  accessible. Ports contain a number of specific facilities that could be  targeted by terrorists, including military vessels and bases, cruise ships,  passenger ferries, terminals, dams and locks, factories, office buildings,  power plants, refineries, sports complexes, and other critical  infrastructure.
section_title: Multiple Jurisdictions Are Involved
paragraphs: The responsibility for protecting ports from a terrorist attack is a shared  responsibility that crosses jurisdictional boundaries, with federal, state,  and local organizations involved. For example, at the federal level, the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has overall homeland security  responsibility, and the Coast Guard, an agency of the department, has lead  responsibility for maritime security. Port authorities provide protection  through designated port police forces, private security companies, and  coordination with local law enforcement agencies. Private sector  stakeholders play a major role in identifying and addressing the  vulnerabilities in and around their facilities, which may include oil  refineries, cargo facilities, and other property adjacent to navigable  waterways.
section_title: Information Sharing Is Important
paragraphs: Information sharing among federal, state, and local officials is central to  port security activities. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 recognizes that  the federal government relies on state and local personnel to help protect  against terrorist attacks, and these officials need homeland security  information to prevent and prepare for such attacks.
Information sharing between federal officials and nonfederal officials can  involve information collected by federal intelligence agencies. In order to  gain access to classified information, state and local law enforcement  officials generally need to apply for and receive approval to have a federal  security clearance. As implemented by the Coast Guard, the primary  criterion for granting access to classified information is an individual’s  need to know, which is defined as the determination made by an  authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient  requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or  assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function. To obtain a  security clearance, an applicant must complete a detailed questionnaire  that asks for information on all previous employment, residences, and  foreign travel and contacts that reach back 7 years. After submitting the  questionnaire, the applicant then undergoes a variety of screenings and  checks.
section_title: Area Maritime Security Committees
paragraphs: The Maritime Transportation Security Act, passed in the aftermath of the  September 11 attacks and with the recognition that ports contain many  potential security targets, provided for area maritime security  committees—composed of federal, state, local, and industry members—to  be established by the Coast Guard at ports across the country. A primary  goal of these committees is to assist the local Captain of the Port—the  senior Coast Guard officer who leads the committee—to develop a  security plan—called an area maritime security plan—to address the  vulnerabilities and risks in that port zone. The committees also serve as a  link for communicating threats and disseminating security information to  port stakeholders. As of June 2006, the Coast Guard organized 46 area  maritime security committees, covering the nation’s 361 ports.
section_title: Interagency Operational Centers
paragraphs: Another approach at improving information sharing and port security  operations involves interagency operational centers—command centers  that bring together the intelligence and operational efforts of various  federal and nonfederal participants. These centers are to provide  intelligence information and real-time operational data from sensors,  radars, and cameras at one location to federal and nonfederal participants  24 hours a day.  These interagency operational centers represent an effort  to improve awareness of incoming vessels, port facilities, and port  operations. In general, these centers are jointly operated by federal and  nonfederal law enforcement officials. The centers can have command and  control capabilities that can be used to communicate information to  vessels, aircraft, and other vehicles and stations involved in port security  operations.
section_title: Port-Level Information Sharing Supported by National-Level Intelligence
paragraphs: While area maritime security committees and interagency operational  centers are port-level organizations, they are supported by, and provide  support to, a national-level intelligence infrastructure. National-level  departments and agencies in the intelligence and law enforcement  communities may offer information that ultimately could be useful to  members of area maritime security committees or interagency operational  centers at the port level. These intelligence and law enforcement agencies  conduct maritime threat identification and dissemination efforts in  support of tactical and operational maritime and port security efforts, but  most have missions broader than maritime activities as well. In addition,  some agencies also have regional or field offices involved in information  gathering and sharing.
section_title: Area Maritime Security Committees Have Improved Information Sharing
subsections: section_title: Ports Reviewed Showed Improvements in Timeliness, Completeness, and Usefulness of Shared Information
paragraphs: Area maritime security committees have provided a structure to improve  the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information sharing. A  primary function served by the committees was to develop security plans  for port areas—called area maritime security plans. The goal of these  plans was to identify vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack in and around a  port location and to develop strategies for protecting a wide range of  facilities and infrastructure. In doing so, the committees established new  procedures for sharing information by holding meetings on a regular basis,  issuing electronic bulletins on suspicious activities around port facilities,  and sharing key documents, including vulnerability assessments and the  portwide security plan itself, according to committee participants. Also,  participants noted that these committees allowed for both formal and  informal stakeholder networking, which contributes to improvements in  information sharing.
Our continuing work on the Coast Guard and maritime security, while not  specifically focused on information sharing, has continued to indicate that  area maritime security committees are a useful tool for exchanging  information.  For example, we have done work at eight additional ports  and found that stakeholders were still using the committees as a  structured means to regularly share information about threat conditions  and operational issues. In addition, Coast Guard personnel and port  stakeholders are using the area maritime security committees to  coordinate security and response training and exercises. Also, in the wake  of Hurricane Katrina, Coast Guard officials shared information  collaboratively through their area maritime security committees to  determine when it was appropriate to close and then reopen a port for  commerce.
section_title: Committees Have Flexibility in Their Structure and in the Way in Which They Share Information
paragraphs: While the committees are required to follow the same guidance regarding  their structure, purpose, and processes, each of the committees is allowed  the flexibility to assemble and operate in a way that reflects the needs of  its port area. Each port is unique in many ways, including the geographic  area covered and the type of operations that take place there. These port- specific differences influence the number of members that participate, the  types of state and local organizations that members represent, and the way  in which information is shared.
section_title: Interagency Operational Centers Have Also Improved Information Sharing
subsections: section_title: Centers Process and Share Information on Operations
paragraphs: Information sharing at interagency operational centers represents a step  toward further improving information sharing, according to participants at  the centers we visited. They said maritime security committees have  improved information sharing primarily through a planning process that  identifies vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies, as well as through  development of two-way communication mechanisms to share threat  information on an as-needed basis. In contrast, interagency operational  centers can provide a continuous flow of information about maritime  activities and involve various agencies directly in operational decisions  using this information. Radar, sensors, and cameras offer representations  of vessels and facilities. Other data are available from intelligence sources  and include data on vessels, cargo, and crew.
Greater information sharing among participants at these centers has also  enhanced operational collaboration, according to participants. Unlike the  area maritime security committees, these centers are operational in  nature—that is, they have a unified or joint command structure designed  to receive information and act on it. At the centers we visited,  representatives from the various agencies work side by side, each having  access to databases and other sources of information from their respective  agencies. Officials said such centers help leverage the resources and  authorities of the respective agencies. For example, if the Coast Guard  determines that a vessel should be boarded and inspected, other federal  and nonfederal agencies might join in the boarding to assess the vessel or  its cargo, crew, or passengers for violations relating to their areas of  jurisdiction or responsibility.
section_title: Variations across Centers Affect Information Sharing
paragraphs: The types of information and the way information is shared vary at the  centers we visited, depending on their purpose and mission, leadership  and organization, membership, technology, and resources, according to  officials at the centers. In our report of April 2005, we detailed three  interagency operational centers at Charleston, South Carolina; Norfolk,  Virginia; and San Diego, California. As of June 2006, the Coast Guard has  two additional interagency command centers under construction in  Jacksonville, Florida, and Seattle, Washington. Both are being established  as Sector Command Centers—joint with the U.S. Navy—and are expected  to be operational in 2006.
Of the interagency centers we visited, the Charleston center had a port  security purpose, so its missions were all security related. It was led by  DOJ, and its membership included 4 federal agencies and 16 state and  local agencies. The San Diego center had a more general purpose, so it had  multiple missions to include not just port security, but search and rescue,  environmental response, drug interdiction, and other law enforcement  activities. It was led by the Coast Guard, and its membership included 2  federal agencies and 1 local agency. The Norfolk center had a port security  purpose, but its mission was focused primarily on force protection for the  Navy. It was led by the Coast Guard, and its membership included 2  federal agencies and no state or local agencies. As a result, the Charleston  center shared information that focused on law enforcement and  intelligence related to port security among a very broad group of federal,  state, and local agency officials. The San Diego center shared information  on a broader scope of activities (beyond security) among a smaller group  of federal and local agency officials. The Norfolk center shared the most  focused information (security information related to force protection)  among two federal agencies.
The centers also shared different information because of their  technologies and resources. The San Diego and Norfolk centers had an  array of standard and new Coast Guard technology systems and access to  Coast Guard and various national databases, while the Charleston center  had these as well as additional systems and databases. For example, the  Charleston center had access to and shared information on Customs and  Border Protection’s databases on incoming cargo containers from the  National Targeting Center. In addition, Charleston had a pilot project with  the Department of Energy to test radiation detection technology that  provided additional information to share. The Charleston center was  funded by a special appropriation that allowed it to use federal funds to  pay for state and local agency salaries. This arrangement boosted the  participation of state and local agencies, and thus information sharing  beyond the federal government, according to port stakeholders in  Charleston. While the San Diego center also had 24-hour participation by  the local harbor patrol, that agency was paying its own salaries.
section_title: Coast Guard Continues to Develop Sector Command Centers at Ports
paragraphs: In April 2005, we reported that the Coast Guard planned to develop up to  40 of its own operational centers—called sector command centers—at  additional ports. These command centers would provide local port  activities with a unified command and improve awareness of the maritime  domain through a variety of technologies. As of June 2006, the Coast  Guard reported to us that 35 sector command centers have been created,  and that these centers are the primary conduit for daily collaboration and  coordination between the Coast Guard and its port partner agencies. The  Coast Guard also reported that it has implemented a maritime monitoring  system—known as the Common Operating Picture system—that fuses  data from different sources. According to the Coast Guard, this system is  the primary tool for Coast Guard commanders in the field to attain  maritime domain awareness.
In April 2005, we also reported that the Coast Guard requested in fiscal  year 2006 over $5 million in funding to improve awareness of the maritime  domain by continuing to evaluate the potential expansion of sector  command centers to other port locations, and requested additional  funding to train personnel in Common Operating Picture deployment at  command centers and to modify facilities to implement the picture in  command centers. In June 2006, the Coast Guard reported to us that no  additional funding for this program was requested for fiscal year 2007.
section_title: Coast Guard Report on Interagency Operational Centers
paragraphs: Congress directed the Coast Guard to report on the existing interagency  operational centers, covering such matters as the composition and  operational characteristics of existing centers and the number, location,  and cost of such new centers as may be required to implement maritime  transportation security plans and maritime intelligence activities. This  report, called for by February 2005, was issued by the Coast Guard in April  2005. While the report addresses the information sought by Congress, the  report did not define the relationship between interagency operational  centers and the Coast Guard’s own sector command centers.
Port stakeholders reported to us the following issues as important factors  to consider in any expansion of interagency operational centers: (1)  purpose and mission—the centers could serve a variety of overall  purposes, as well as support a wide number of specific missions; (2)  leadership and organization—the centers could be led by several potential  departments or agencies and be organized a variety of ways; (3)  membership—the centers could vary in membership in terms of federal,  state, local, or private sector participants and their level of involvement;  (4) technology deployed—the centers could deploy a variety of  technologies in terms of networks, computers, communications, sensors,  and databases; and (5) resource requirements—the centers could also vary  in terms of resource requirements, which agency funds the resources, and  how resources are prioritized.
section_title: Other Ad Hoc Arrangements for Interagency Information- Sharing
paragraphs: Our work identified other interagency arrangements that facilitate  information sharing and interagency operations in the maritime  environment. One example is a predesignated single-mission task force,  which becomes operational when needed. DHS established the Homeland  Security Task Force, South-East—a working group consisting of federal  and nonfederal agencies with appropriate geographic and jurisdictional  responsibilities that have the mission to respond to any mass migration of  immigrants affecting southeast Florida. When a mass migration event  occurs, the task force is activated and becomes a full-time interagency  effort to share information and coordinate operations to implement a  contingency plan.
Another example of an interagency arrangement for information sharing  can occur in single-agency operational centers that become interagency to  respond to specific events. For example, the Coast Guard has its own  command centers for both District Seven and Sector Miami, located in  Miami, Florida. While these centers normally focus on a variety of Coast  Guard missions and are not normally interagency in structure, they have  established protocols with other federal agencies, such as the U.S.  Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement, to activate a unified or incident command structure should  it be needed. These Coast Guard centers make it possible to host  interagency operations because they have extra space and equipment that  allow for surge capabilities and virtual connectivity with each partner  agency.
section_title: Interagency Information- Sharing Concerns Go Beyond Maritime Area
paragraphs: While our findings on maritime information sharing are generally positive,  we have some concerns regarding interagency information sharing that go  far beyond the maritime issue area. In January 2005, we designated  information sharing for homeland security as a high-risk area because the  federal government still faces formidable challenges in gathering,  identifying, analyzing, and disseminating key information within and  among federal and nonfederal entities. While we recognize the efforts  that some agencies have undertaken to break out of information “silos”  and better share information, we reported in 2006 that more than 4 years  after September 11, the nation still lacks comprehensive policies and  processes to improve the sharing of information that is critical to  protecting our homeland.  We made several recommendations to the  Director of National Intelligence, who is now primarily responsible for this  effort, to ensure effective implementation of congressional information  sharing mandates.
We continue to review agencies and programs that have the goal of  improving information sharing among federal, state, and local partners.  For example, we have ongoing work assessing DHS’ efforts to enhance  coordination and collaboration among interagency operations centers that  operate around the clock to provide situational awareness. We plan to  report on this later this year. Also, we have just begun work on state  fusion centers--which are locations where homeland security-related  information can be collected and analyzed--and their links to their relevant  federal counterparts, which we plan to report on in 2007.
section_title: Coast Guard Making Progress Granting Security Clearances
subsections: section_title: Lack of Security Clearances May Limit Ability to Confront Terrorist Threats
paragraphs: According to the Coast Guard and state and local officials we contacted  for our 2005 report, the shared partnership between the federal  government and state and local entities may fall short of its potential to  fight terrorism because of the lack of security clearances. If state and local  officials lack security clearances, the information they possess may be  incomplete. According to Coast Guard and nonfederal officials, the lack of  access to classified information may limit these officials’ ability to deter,  prevent, and respond to a potential terrorist attack.
While security clearances for nonfederal officials who participate in  interagency operational centers are sponsored by DOJ and DHS, the Coast  Guard sponsors security clearances for members of area maritime security  committees. For the purposes of our 2005 report, we examined in more  detail the Coast Guard’s efforts to address the lack of security clearances  among members of area maritime security committees.
section_title: Coast Guard Continues to Take Steps to Grant Additional Clearances to State, Local, and Industry Officials
paragraphs: In April 2005, we reported that as part of its effort to improve information  sharing at ports, the Coast Guard initiated a program in July 2004 to  sponsor security clearances for members of area maritime security  committees, but nonfederal officials have been slow in submitting their  applications for a security clearance. We also reported that as of February  2005, only 28 of 359 nonfederal committee members who had a need to  know had submitted the application forms for a security clearance. As  shown in table 1, as of June 2006, of the 467 nonfederal committee  members who had a need to know, 197 had submitted security clearance  applications—20 received interim clearances, and 168 were granted a final  clearance, which allows access to classified material.
section_title: Data Are Being Used to More Effectively Manage the Security Clearance Program
paragraphs: A key component of a good management system is to have relevant,  reliable, and timely information available to assess performance over time  and to correct deficiencies as they occur. The Coast Guard has two  databases that contain information on the status of security clearances for  state, local, and industry officials. The first database is a commercial off- the-shelf system that contains information on the status of all applications  that have been submitted to the Coast Guard Security Center, such as  whether a security clearance has been issued or whether personnel  security investigations have been conducted. We reported in April 2005  that the Coast Guard was testing the database for use by field staff, but  had not granted field staff access to the database. As of June 2006, the  Coast Guard granted access to this database—named Checkmate—to   field staff. The second database—an internally developed spreadsheet on  the area maritime committee participants—summarizes information on  the status of the security clearance program, such as whether officials  have submitted their application forms and whether they have received  their clearances.
We reported in 2005 that these Coast Guard has databases could be used  to manage the state, local, and industry security clearance program, but  that formal procedures for using the data as a management tool to follow  up on possible problems at the national or local level to verify the status of  clearances had not been developed by the Coast Guard. While it is unclear  that the Coast Guard developed formal procedures, as of June 2006, the  Coast Guard reported that it has developed guidance for using its data on  committee participants. According to the Coast Guard, the guidance  released to field commands regarding the state, local, and industry  security clearance program clarified the process for nonfederal area  maritime security committee members to receive clearances and  specifically outlined responsibilities for working with applicants on  completing required paperwork, including the application packages.  The  Coast Guard reported that as a result of this guidance, the number of  received and processed security clearance packages for area maritime  security committee members has increased.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: As we reported in April 2005, and reaffirm today, effective information  sharing among members of area maritime security committees and  participants in interagency operational centers can enhance the  partnership between federal and nonfederal officials, and it can improve  the leveraging of resources across jurisdictional boundaries for deterring,  preventing, or responding to a possible terrorist attack at the nation’s  ports. The Coast Guard has recognized the importance of granting security  clearances to nonfederal officials as a means to improve information  sharing, and although we reported in 2005 that progress in moving these  officials through the application process had been slow, it appears that as  of June 2006 the Coast Guard’s efforts to process security clearances to  nonfederal officials has improved considerably. However, continued  management attention and guidance about the security clearance process  would strengthen the program, and it would reduce the risk that  nonfederal officials may have incomplete information as they carry out  their law enforcement activities.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this completes my  prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you  or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For information about this testimony, please contact Stephen L. Caldwell  Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-9610,  or at caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found at the last page of this  statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include  Susan Quinlan, David Alexander, Neil Asaba, Juliana Bahus, Christine  Davis, Kevin Heinz, Lori Kmetz, Emily Pickrell, Albert Schmidt, Amy  Sheller, Stan Stenersen, and April Thompson.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and  Future Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and  Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information  Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention.  GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006  Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and  Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January  31, 2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport  Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.:  January 14, 2005.
Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime  Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.:  December 10, 2004.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective  Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.:  September 30, 2004.
Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and  Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System.  GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New  Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year  2005 and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting  Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington,  D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target  Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington,  D.C.: December 16, 2003.
Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security.   GAO-04-315R. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003.
Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime  Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be  Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington D.C.: August 27, 2003.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require  Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,  D.C.: July 25, 2003.
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland  Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation  Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New  Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in  Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports.   GAO-02-955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.
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