Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying Less-than-Lethal Weapons
Published: 2006-05-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has authority to approve air carrier requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, onboard commercial aircraft to thwart an attack. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, one air carrier received approval to deploy electric stun devices. To address concerns regarding reports of injuries after the use of these devices and to ensure that the impacts of these devices onboard aircraft have been fully evaluated, this report answers the following: (1) What analyses has the federal government conducted to assess the safety and effectiveness of these devices onboard commercial aircraft? (2) What controls does TSA have in place to help ensure uniform and timely review of air carrier requests to deploy these devices onboard commercial aircraft?
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have conducted reviews addressing the effect of electric stun devices on aircraft. Plus, various federal as well as other organizations examined the health effects that electric stun devices have on individuals. But, no studies of health effects have been conducted in an in-flight environment. Moreover, according to NIJ, although electric stun devices have been used successfully many times to subdue suspects, certain compromised populations, such as the elderly and those with a history drug and alcohol abuse, may be at risk for negative outcomes. In April 2002, NIJ concluded that the use of electric stun devices in accordance with appropriate policies and training may be an effective means for flight deck crews to thwart an attack but should not be deployed without further testing. Similarly, in a 2003 report to Congress, TSA generally concurred with NIJ's conclusions. But, neither review included in-flight testing or empirical testing of these devices that would demonstrate that they would enhance security. TSA's position is that empirical data, particularly in an aircraft environment, is necessary to determine if these devices can be used safely and effectively. TSA lacks key internal controls, to help ensure uniformity in decision making and a transparent process to review requests to deploy electric stun devices onboard commercial aircraft. Specifically, TSA (1) lacks a well-defined organizational area with responsibility to receive and review requests, (2) has not established formal criteria for decision making to approve requests and has not communicated criteria to external stakeholders, and (3) maintained little documentation of its decision making and activities to account for its handling of past requests. Without clearly defined approval criteria and a point of contact, TSA cannot reasonably assure that its decision making is uniform and consistent, nor can it provide a transparent request and approval process for air carriers.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has authority to  approve air carrier requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons, including  electric stun devices on board commercial aircraft for the purposes of  thwarting an attack. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 2001,  two domestic and one foreign air carrier requested approval to deploy  electric stun devices on board their commercial aircraft. The two domestic  air carriers sought approval to deploy these devices for flight deck crew  (the pilot and others within the cockpit) but after approximately   18 months without a disposition from TSA, primarily citing confusion with  the review process chose to no longer pursue their requests. The foreign  air carrier, which sought approval to deploy the devices on international  flights to the United States for use by government law enforcement  officers and specially trained flight attendants, also experienced extended  delays before ultimately receiving approval in December 2004 to deploy  electric stun devices in its passenger cabins. According to air carrier  officials we spoke to, since the establishment of additional security  measures such as an expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Service,  hardened cockpit doors, 100 percent passenger and baggage screening,  and particularly initiation of the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO)  program, air carrier interest in deploying electric stun devices to enhance  security has diminished. Notwithstanding the current lack of  demonstrated interest, it is possible that demand among air carriers to  deploy these devices could resume in the future.
Due in part to recent reports regarding injuries after the use of electric  stun devices and the lack of regulations governing their general use, the  House Subcommittee on Aviation wants to ensure that the impacts of  using electric stun devices on board commercial aircraft have been fully  evaluated. Given this concern, this report addresses the following  questions:    What analysis has the federal government conducted to assess the safety  and effectiveness of electric stun devices on board commercial aircraft?
What controls does TSA have in place to help ensure uniform and timely  review of air carrier requests to deploy electric stun devices on board  commercial aircraft?
subsections: section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine what analysis the federal government had conducted to  assess the safety and effectiveness of electric stun devices on board  commercial aircraft, we conducted a literature search to identify the  extent of past research that had been done by various federal agencies on  the safety and effectiveness of deploying these devices on board  commercial aircraft. We also conducted a literature search of existing  studies addressing the health effects of these devices. We currently have a  separate ongoing engagement that is evaluating the extent to which claims  regarding the safety and effectiveness of electric stun devices are  supported by currently available scientific data. The results of our  literature searches were limited because no federal studies or reviews  examining the use of electric stun devices on board commercial aircraft  have been published since May 2003, and no studies have been published  examining the potential health effects of these devices on individuals who  are on board commercial aircraft. We examined reviews produced by the  Department of Justice’s National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and by  Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security  Laboratory (TSL) as well as a TSA report to Congress regarding the use of  less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, on board  commercial aircraft and reviewed the methodologies employed and the  conclusions drawn. We also examined Federal Aviation Administration  (FAA) reviews of test data submitted by a commercial air carrier and  spoke to the individual at FAA who produced those reviews.
To assess what controls TSA put in place to help ensure uniform and  timely review of air carrier requests to deploy electric stun devices on  board commercial aircraft, we reviewed TSA’s handling of these requests  and compared this process to our Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government. Specifically, to determine how TSA ensures uniform  and timely review of air carrier requests, we interviewed cognizant TSA  officials regarding their processing of past requests and reviewed related  documentation. Our ability to obtain complete information at TSA was  limited because, according to TSA officials, individuals involved in  reviewing past requests from air carriers were no longer with the agency  and only limited documentation of the review process or supporting  materials was retained by TSA. However, we were able to obtain copies of  some TSA correspondence and other documents regarding the review  process from private sector officials involved in the requests. We  interviewed officials from FAA regarding their role and activities in  reviewing requests from commercial air carriers wishing to deploy less- than-lethal weapons. We also interviewed officials from a nonprobability  sample of eight domestic air carriers selected based on number of flights  per year, two of which had requested permission from TSA to deploy  electric stun devices on board their aircraft. Because this is a  nonprobability sample, results of these interviews cannot be generalized  to the universe of air carriers. We also interviewed officials from the one  foreign air carrier that had requested and received permission to deploy  these devices on their aircraft. In instances where air carriers had  requested approval to deploy these devices, we asked them to assess their  experience with TSA regarding any guidance provided and responsiveness  to their requests. We also interviewed officials from five domestic air  industry associations and obtained the views of two foreign air carrier  associations to determine their views on the general efficacy of using  electric stun devices on commercial aircraft.
We conducted our work between June 2005 and April 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Background
paragraphs: According to NIJ—the research, development, and evaluation agency  within DOJ—less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, are  designed to incapacitate, confuse, delay, or restrain an adversary in a  variety of situations. Less-than-lethal weapons can be grouped into six  general categories: electric stun, chemical, impact projectile, physical  restraint, light, and acoustic. Preliminary reviews conducted by NIJ and  TSL identified that of the six different less-than-lethal weapon categories,  electric stun devices showed the most promise for use on board  commercial aircraft.
There are two types of electric stun devices that have potential use in  commercial aircraft according to a May 2003 TSA report. The first is a  handheld device with two probes that, when pressed against the skin or  clothing of an attacker and activated by the operator, produces a high  (50,000) voltage but low current discharge. When contact is made between  the attacker and the activated device, a circuit is completed, and the  subject receives a debilitating shock. The second type of electric stun  device is technically referred to as an electro-muscular disruption device  (EMDD). An EMDD fires two barbs connected to trailing wires that lead  back to the operator. When the barbs penetrate the subject’s skin or  clothing, an electrical circuit is completed, and an electrical discharge,  similar to the direct contact device discharge, automatically results  causing an immediate loss of the person’s neuromuscular control and the  ability to perform coordinated action for the duration of the impulse. This  barb type EMDD device, shown in figure 1, is similar to the type  considered for use by air carriers and is hereafter referred to in this report  as an electric stun device.
TSA may provide air carriers operating to, from, or within the United  States with authorization to use less-than-lethal weapons, including  electric stun devices, on board their aircraft subject to legal and regulatory  considerations. For example, TSA must follow the requirements of   49 U.S.C. § 44903(i) before granting an air carrier request to arm members  of the flight deck crew with electric stun devices. Similarly, air carriers  that request permission to allow the use of such devices by persons other  than flight deck crew (such as government law enforcement officers and  flight attendants—persons situated outside of the cockpit), as was the  case with the foreign air carrier, must seek an amendment to its TSA- approved security program. In the case of a foreign air carrier, TSA may  approve such an amendment if it finds that the security program, as  amended, continues to provide a level of protection similar to the level  provided by U.S. air carriers servicing the same airports.
FAA also plays a collateral role in the determination of whether electric  stun devices can be deployed on board commercial aircraft. FAA has the  ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safe operation of aircraft within  the United States. According to FAA officials, FAA certifies the  airworthiness of all domestic aircraft before they are put into service and  performs periodic safety inspections as part of FAA’s safety oversight  responsibilities. FAA’s airworthiness certifications, however, would not  address the use of electric stun devices because, according to FAA, such  devices fall within the category of portable electronic devices that are not  considered part of the aircraft itself. FAA’s regulations generally require  the operator of the aircraft to determine whether a portable electronic  device will interfere with the safe operation of the aircraft before allowing  its operation on board. Consequently, FAA does not formally approve the  use of portable electronic devices and would not for electric stun  devices. According to FAA officials, if asked by an air carrier and  resources permitting, the agency could render a technical opinion on the  safety of such devices, but it is up to the air carrier to prove that the device  will not interfere, disturb, interrupt, or cause catastrophic failure to the  avionics of the aircraft. If FAA’s review of the air carrier’s testing indicates  that these devices may have some adverse affect on aircraft avionics, FAA  would bring it to the air carrier’s attention. According to FAA officials, the  FAA does not issue any documentation of approval or certification  regarding the use of portable electronic devices on aircraft. In particular,  FAA officials told us that it would not be appropriate for the agency to  provide TSA written approval for the use of any type of portable electric  devices, including less-than-lethal devices. Further, according to FAA  officials, the agency has no specific safety standard for less-than-lethal  devices. Officials added that for any electric stun devices actually  deployed on commercial aircraft, FAA would consider any safety issues as  part of its normal oversight inspections.
Officials from each of the eight domestic air carriers we interviewed stated  that after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, they reassessed their  security procedures in an effort to upgrade their security posture. Among  the security initiatives each air carrier considered, was arming pilots with  electric stun devices. Representatives from the air carriers had mixed  views on whether electric stun devices or firearms would be their  preferred security measure within the cockpit. However, none of the  domestic air carrier officials we interviewed said their airlines had  considered having electric stun devices available for use by flight  attendants in the cabin, primarily because they believed carrying these  devices is incompatible with flight attendants’ customer-service role.  Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, two domestic air  carriers sought TSA approval to allow flight-deck crews to use these  devices. In addition, one foreign air carrier made two separate requests  and ultimately received TSA approval in 2004 to deploy electric stun  devices to government law enforcement officers and specially trained  flight attendants situated in the passenger cabin of its aircraft.
Domestic air carrier trade associations we interviewed generally favored  the use of firearms over electric stun devices on the flight deck due to  perceived vulnerabilities of the electric stun devices against multiple  attackers as well as the temporary effect that the device may have.  Similarly, the associations we interviewed expressed concerns about  possible failures of the devices at critical times and simple  countermeasures that could be used to limit their effectiveness. Since the  establishment of additional security measures after the terrorist attacks of  September 2001, such as an expanded Federal Air Marshal Service,  hardened cockpit doors, 100 percent passenger and baggage screening,  and particularly the voluntary arming of pilots through the FFDO program,  air carrier interest in deploying electric stun devices to enhance security  has diminished. Officials from some air carriers we spoke to stated that  the high cost of deployment of electric stun devices as well as liability  concerns, compared to the liability relief afforded through the FFDO  program, made the use of electric stun devices relatively less attractive.  According to the Association of European Airlines, it is its general position  that the presence of weapons on board aircraft, be they lethal or nonlethal,  be they on the flight deck or in the passenger cabin, should be prohibited.  Similarly, the Association of Asian Pacific Airlines said its member airlines  are generally adamant about not arming the cabin crew with any weapon  on board an aircraft and are more in favor of ground-based security  approaches.
section_title: Existing Reviews and Studies Do Not Provide Definitive Evidence of the Safety and Security Effectiveness of Electric Stun Devices on board Commercial Aircraft
paragraphs: The federal government has conducted limited reviews addressing the  effect of electric stun devices on individuals or aircraft avionics and on  their security effectiveness, none of which was supported by empirical  analysis or testing in an aircraft environment. Although various federal and  other organizations have reviewed the health effects that electric stun  devices have on individuals, studies have not been conducted in an in- flight environment. Moreover, according to an NIJ official, there is no  independent research to indicate whether these electric stun devices  would be either safe or unsafe regarding certain potentially susceptible  populations. TSL and FAA each reviewed a study conducted by an air  carrier regarding the effect of one model of electric stun device on aircraft  avionics and concurred with its conclusion that the device tested would be  unlikely to harm aircraft avionics. The TSL review cautioned, however,  that the results for the one type of device tested do not necessarily reflect  how other brands and models of electric stun devices may perform under  similar circumstances. NIJ concluded that the use of these devices in  accordance with appropriate policies and training may be an effective  means for flight deck crews to thwart an attack. Similarly, in a report to  Congress issued in May 2003, TSA generally concurred with NIJ’s  conclusion and further concluded that commercial aviation security may  be enhanced through deployment of these devices. However, it concluded  that electric stun devices should not be deployed in aircraft until extensive  testing has been completed in realistic settings and on various types of  aircraft.
subsections: section_title: Federal and Other Organizations Have Reviewed Health Effects of Electric Stun Devices, but NIJ Officials Recommended More Study
paragraphs: Federal agencies and other organizations have conducted reviews  addressing the health effects of electric stun devices on individuals.   Moreover, according to an NIJ official, although electric stun devices have  been used successfully many times to subdue suspects, including  individuals who may fall into certain potentially susceptible populations,  there is no independent research to indicate whether these electric stun  devices would be either safe or unsafe. However, some susceptible  populations such as the elderly and those who have a sustained history of  alcohol and illicit drug use may be at greater risk for negative outcomes.  NIJ recommended that study of these issues be conducted and has  initiated several projects in this area.
section_title: The Federal Government Has Conducted Limited Analysis on the Effects of Electric Stun Devices on Critical Aircraft Avionics
paragraphs: The federal government has conducted limited analysis to determine if  electric stun devices would adversely affect aircraft avionics. In April 2002,  FAA, in its role of ensuring the safe operation of aircraft, within the United  States, reviewed test data submitted by a domestic air carrier, regarding  one specific electric stun device and its potential effect on aircraft avionic  systems. FAA officials told us that they did not publish any results of this  preliminary review but did communicate to TSA that based on the air  carriers’ test results; it did not believe the particular device tested would  have an adverse affect on aircraft avionics. FAA officials added that if  electric stun devices were actually deployed on commercial aircraft, FAA  would consider any safety issues as part of its normal oversight  inspections. Similarly, TSL published a review of the same test data in  September 2002. TSL’s review focused on technical and airworthiness  factors including potential levels of electromagnetic interference from  discharging the electric stun device. Although FAA and TSL have not  performed any in-flight testing of their own, both concurred with the  conclusion of the air carrier study that the one type of 50,000 volt electric  stun device tested would be unlikely to harm aircraft avionics. The TSL  review cautioned, however, that the results for the one type of device  tested do not necessarily reflect how other brands and models of electric  stun devices may perform under similar circumstances. For example,  according to the TSL review, it is likely that devices exceeding 100,000  volts would be unsuitable for use on aircraft.
section_title: Federal Reviews Conclude Electric Stun Devices May Enhance Commercial Aviation Security, but Supporting Analysis Is Limited
paragraphs: In its April 2002 report, NIJ concluded that electric stun devices, used in  accordance with appropriate policies and training, may have the potential  to allow flight deck crews to thwart an attack while an aircraft is in  flight—i.e. interrupt an attack, control an aggressor, or delay an attack  while the flight crew safely lands the aircraft. However, the report did not  include any empirical testing of electric stun devices in an aircraft setting  to demonstrate how they would enhance security. Rather, information for  its report was derived by reviewing existing information on electric stun  devices as well as meeting with experts from the aviation industry and  persons experienced in the design and use of less-than-lethal technology in  settings other than aircraft. To determine whether electric stun devices  have the potential to enhance aviation security, NIJ first identified certain  desirable characteristics in less-than-lethal weapons given the  environment that exists in an aircraft. Specifically, in commercial aircraft  (1) sensitive critical flight instruments are in continual use; and   (2) passenger and crew spaces are crowded and confined. According to  NIJ, given this environment, less-than-lethal weapons that would be used  to thwart attacks on board commercial aircraft should exhibit the  following characteristics  immediately incapacitate an aggressor;    have quickly reversible and controllable effects;    be usable in a confined space;    be simple to operate;    have multishot capability; and    not damage critical avionics (navigational, etc.).
Next, NIJ compared various categories of less-than-lethal weapons,  including electric stun devices, against these criteria. It concluded that  electric stun devices showed the most promise for use by flight deck  crews.
TSL, in a report issued in September 2002, concurred with NIJ’s earlier  findings and similarly concluded that less-than-lethal weapons may  provide an additional layer of security and deterrence in the aviation  environment. However, the report focused primarily on the effects on  airworthiness and technical issues associated with electric stun devices.  References in the TSL report regarding the security benefits associated  with these weapons were based primarily on work previously conducted  by NIJ.
In a separate report to Congress issued in May 2003, TSA concluded that  commercial aviation security could be enhanced through the deployment  of electric stun devices. Although this report provided a conceptual  framework for evaluating the suitability of different categories of less- than-lethal weapons for use in an aircraft environment, like the NIJ study,  no weapons were tested against various threat scenarios including air  piracy threats. TSA officials told us that this report was hurriedly put  together to meet a congressional mandate and that it relied primarily on  the earlier NIJ study and a review of other literature. When asked about  their current position regarding the use of electric stun devices on board  aircraft, TSA officials told us that empirical data and operational case  studies, particularly in the aircraft environment, would be necessary to  determine whether these devices can be deployed safely, effectively, and  in a tactically reasonable manner.
Similar to NIJ, TSA, to conduct its review, assessed the characteristics of  various categories of less-than-lethal weapons—including electric stun  devices, chemical (conventional), chemical (sedative), impact projectile,  physical restraint, light, and acoustic and malodorous weapons—against a  predetermined set of criteria to determine their suitability for use in a  commercial aircraft environment. These criteria covered the following  aspects related to the devices    currently used in law enforcement;    potential to cause collateral damage;    potential to cause catastrophic aircraft failure;    how quickly effects occur;   reversibility of effects;    potential for unintended consequences or other deployment concerns; and  relative effectiveness to deter or defeat threats.
After comparing each category of less-than-lethal weapon to the criteria,  like NIJ, TSA concluded that only electric stun devices may be suitable for  aircraft deployment.
section_title: The National Institute of Justice Identified Areas for Further Research Regarding Electric Stun Devices
paragraphs: In its April 2002 report, NIJ concluded that each type of less-than-lethal  weapon poses either safety or effectiveness issues that should be tested  further in multiple aircraft settings before any deployment. It also  concluded that systematic testing of the weapons’ effects on critical  aircraft avionics is essential to ensure they will not damage or disable  flight systems. Further, the report noted that the most important unknown  with these devices is the potential effect of a high-voltage electrical  discharge on aircraft avionics. Therefore, NIJ concluded that electric stun  devices should not be deployed in aircraft until extensive testing has been  completed in realistic settings and on various types of aircraft.
section_title: TSA Has Not Established Internal Controls to Help Ensure Uniform and Timely Review Regarding Requests for Use of Electric Stun Devices
paragraphs: TSA has not established processes and procedures for reviewing requests  from air carriers to deploy electric stun devices on board their aircraft that  include (1) well defined key areas of authority and responsibility,   (2) clearly communicated information regarding decision-making criteria  to TSA decision makers and their external stakeholders, and (3) a records  system to account for handling of requests and supporting  documentation—three key internal controls called for by the Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government. TSA officials were not able to  tell us specifically why these controls were not in place when prior  applications were being reviewed. TSA officials stated that they currently  do not plan to establish these controls because air carriers have not  expressed an interest to TSA in deploying these devices since October  2004, and officials do not anticipate additional air carrier requests.
subsections: section_title: A Lack of Well-Defined Areas of Responsibility Led to Air Carriers’ Confusion Regarding the Status of Their Requests
paragraphs: TSA does not have a well-defined organizational area or individual with  responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests from air carriers  interested in requesting approval to deploy electric stun devices on board  their aircraft to enhance security. Internal control standards in the federal  government state that to have an effective control environment it is  important for agencies to clearly define key areas of authority and  responsibility. Officials from all three air carriers that had submitted  requests to TSA to deploy electric stun devices on board commercial  aircraft told us that they had experienced confusion regarding the status  and disposition of their requests and were unaware to whom they should  have directed inquiries. For example, an official from one domestic air  carrier stated that it was in contact with multiple TSA personnel but were  not sure which individual was in charge of reviewing electric stun device  requests or whether the information it received from TSA was accurate  and authoritative. We also noted during our review of TSA documentation  that in at least one instance, a TSA official requested information from an  air carrier that had previously been received by the agency.
As the National Strategy for Homeland Security indicates and as we have  reported in previous work, securing the nation requires effective  partnerships with the private sector. Air carriers that seek to enhance  security measures on board their aircraft offer an opportunity for such  partnership. However, without a clearly defined organizational area or  individual within TSA to review requests and communicate effectively  with the requesting air carrier officials, TSA cannot be a responsive and  effective partner.
According to TSA officials, there is currently no organizational area or  individual responsible for receipt or review of requests from air carriers  that may wish to deploy electric stun devices on board their aircraft  because of the lack of demonstrated interest from air carriers.
section_title: TSA Has Not Established and Clearly Communicated Formal Criteria or Guidelines for Decision Making to Internal or External Stakeholders
paragraphs: TSA has not established and communicated a formalized set of criteria to  evaluate air carriers’ requests to deploy electric stun devices as a security  measure on board their aircraft. Internal control standards in the federal  government state that for a federal agency or private sector entity to run  and control its operations effectively, it must have relevant, reliable, and  timely communications relating to internal as well as external events.  Although TSA received requests from three air carriers to deploy these  devices, it did not have criteria established within the agency and  communicated to air carriers that would (1) help ensure uniform decision  making and (2) make requirements for approval clear to all parties.
The lack of established and well-communicated criteria resulted in  inefficient handling of requests that made the process more difficult for  the air carriers. In particular, TSA made multiple requests for nearly a year  and a half for information from the two domestic air carriers that  requested permission to deploy electric stun devices, without clearly  communicating what would be required for approving their requests or  clearly explaining why additional information was being requested.  Ultimately, one domestic air carrier withdrew its request to use electric  stun devices in June 2003, primarily citing confusion over TSA’s protracted  approval process. The other domestic air carrier that had requested  permission to deploy the devices did not formally withdraw its request,  but also made the decision in June 2003 not to further pursue the initiative.  One of these air carriers also cited mitigating security measures such as  the FFDO program and reinforced cockpit doors that had been  implemented as an additional reason why it did not continue pursuing the  deployment of electric stun devices and also the additional costs of  implementing a less-than-lethal weapons program.
In its May 2003 report to Congress, TSA proposed a number of key criteria  for evaluating requests from air carriers to deploy less-than-lethal devices  on board their aircraft. Among these criteria was the need for (1) an  appropriate training regimen, (2) procedures of use, and (3) assurance  from the air carriers that the devices would provide passenger safety.  However, these criteria were not formally established for use by TSA  decision makers when evaluating air carrier requests nor communicated to  air carriers interested in requesting permission to use these devices. We  have included a list of these proposed criteria in appendix I of this report.  In addition to making the request process consistent and clear,  establishing criteria can help the agency ensure that any approvals for the  use of electric stun devices on board commercial aircraft are compatible  with TSA’s mission to ensure the security of the nation’s transportation  system and the traveling public. For example, in the case of criteria  governing training, we have previously reported that any civilian electric- stun-device training curriculum should have a very explicit use-of-force  policy. Unlike police officers, civilians are not generally experienced in  deciding whether the use of force is justified and, if so, to what extent.  Therefore, it should be the goal of any training curricula for persons  authorized to utilize electric stun devices, such as aircraft flight deck or  cabin crew members, to involve as many scenarios as possible so that the  trainee understands what level of force is appropriate.
Although TSA has no supporting documentation of having applied the  criteria proposed in its 2003 report to requests submitted by commercial  air carriers, according to agency officials, TSA took into account these  considerations when ultimately approving the foreign air carrier request in  December 2004. TSA officials further told us that any additional requests  would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis using similar considerations.  However, without establishing and clearly communicating criteria and  information needs both internally and externally, TSA cannot have  reasonable assurance that its decision making will be uniform, consistent,  compatible with its mission and clear and transparent for air carriers  seeking approval to deploy these devices. TSA officials stated that they  still consider the criteria contained in the May 2003 report to the Congress  appropriate and current for use in handling any requests by air carriers to  implement a less-than-lethal weapons program.
TSA officials said that they could not fully explain the delays in addressing  the early requests from the air carriers because the persons involved with  the initial request reviews are no longer with the agency. Officials stated  that at the time of the initial requests, there was a high rate of turnover and  a rapid rate of change associated with the formation of TSA as a new  agency. Officials further stated that the agency was not fully ready to  address requests to deploy electric stun devices before the time the  foreign air carrier request was reviewed in 2004. Even at that point, TSA  officials said that they planned to review each application that was  received on a case-by-case basis since they did not expect a high demand  from air carriers to deploy these devices. According to TSA officials, since  2004, no other carriers have expressed an interest in electric stun devices  as a security measure. TSA officials told us that because of this lack of  interest, no program requirements or criteria were ever formalized  regarding the use of electric stun devices on commercial aircraft; however,  if future requests are received, TSA would take steps to formalize these  criteria into specific guidelines for the application review process.
We asked TSA officials how they planned to address any potential future  requests from air carriers to deploy less-than-lethal weapons including  electric stun devices on board their aircraft. They stated that the TSA  Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM) Airlines office would  take the lead for any requests from domestic air carriers. For foreign air  carriers, TSNM’s International Division will take the lead. Further, a  working evaluation group, consisting of the Federal Air Marshal Service,  Office of Chief Counsel, and other program offices at the discretion of the  administrator will be involved in the review process. According to TSA,  this group will provide their respective expertise and recommendations to  the lead office. Each lead office will be responsible for resolving  differences, keeping diligent records of the review process, the ultimate  approval or disapproval decision, and responding to the requesting air  carriers in a timely manner.
section_title: TSA Has Not Maintained Documentation of Its Activities and Key Decisions Related to Electric Stun Device Requests
paragraphs: For the three requests submitted, TSA did not record (1) the rationale for  and outcome of its decision making regarding requests to deploy electric  stun devices or (2) the information and documentation exchanged  between the agency and air carriers. According to the Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government, agency activities should be  promptly recorded to maintain their relevance and value to management  in controlling operations and making decisions. This applies to the entire  process, from initiation and authorization through final classification.  Moreover, to help ensure accountability and internal oversight, this  documentation should be readily available for examination by TSA  management, Congress, and other appropriate external parties. Although,  in its 2003 report to Congress, TSA stated that its Office of Aviation  Operations would maintain a system of records for requests to deploy  electric stun devices, few records were kept. Agency officials told us that  they maintained only limited documentation regarding the foreign air  carrier’s request and maintained no documentation regarding the receipt  and review of request materials submitted by the two domestic air  carriers. Without a system of documentation, TSA management will not be  able to review decisions to help ensure consistency and responsiveness to  air carriers making requests, nor will TSA be able to readily make  documentation available for examination by Congress and other  appropriate external parties. As we noted above, TSA told us that, in the  future, it plans to keep diligent records of the review process and ultimate  approval or disapproval decisions for all requests from air carriers.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Due primarily to other enhancements in aviation security since 2001, there  appears to be no demonstrated interest on the part of air carriers to  introduce less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, on  their aircraft. However, should interest in such measures resume, federal  government reviews to date have identified areas in need of further study  before these devices are deployed on board commercial aircraft. In  particular, it would be important for TSA to know the appropriateness of  the devices in an aircraft environment, effects on the safe operation of the  aircraft, effects on passenger safety, and how such devices would enhance  security.
Also, should interest in using less-than-lethal devices on aircraft resume,  TSA would not be in the best position to address new requests in an  efficient and effective manner. Without internal controls to govern its  process for receiving and reviewing requests from air carriers, TSA would  lack assurance that its decision making is appropriate and necessary and  serves the public interest. Specifically, without a well-defined  organizational area or individual with responsibility for receiving and  reviewing requests, TSA cannot be a responsive and effective partner with  private sector air carriers. In addition, it will not be able to provide a clear  and transparent request process for air carriers. Without established and  clearly communicated information regarding decision-making criteria,  within TSA and for its external stakeholders, TSA lacks reasonable  assurance that its decision making will be uniform, consistent, and  compatible with its mission. Although TSA outlined criteria in a 2003  Report to Congress for use in examining requests from air carriers, the  agency never formalized any criteria for use by decision makers, nor did it  communicate clear criteria to air carriers making requests for approval.  Finally, without documentation of key activities and decisions related to  less-than-lethal device requests, TSA cannot ensure accountability in  handling such requests and the availability of documentation for  examination by Congress and other external parties.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order to help ensure TSA’s review and approval process for the use of  any less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, is  responsive, uniform, accountable, consistently applied and serves the  public interest, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security  direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, to  take the following two actions, should commercial air carrier interest in  deploying these devices resume:    Ensure that there is sufficiently reliable research supporting the use of  less-than-lethal devices being requested that, at a minimum, address the  appropriateness of their usage in the unique aircraft environment,  including passenger safety, how the use of these devices would enhance  security, and the effects of these devices on the safe operation of the  aircraft.
Establish appropriate internal controls to govern air carriers’ requests to  deploy less-than-lethal weapons including electric stun devices on board  their aircraft, including (1) clearly defining the organizational area or  individual within TSA with the authority and responsibility for receiving  and reviewing requests; (2) establishing a records system to help ensure  accountability; and (3) formalizing and clearly communicating criteria for  approving requests both within the responsible area of TSA and to  interested air carriers.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We requested comments on a draft of this report from DHS, FAA and NIJ.  FAA and NIJ provided technical comments, which have been incorporated  in this report where appropriate. We received written comments from DHS  on May 5, 2006. DHS agreed with our report and recommendations stating  that our findings and recommendations will aid in the development of a  more effective and efficient review process if interest by air carriers in  less-than-lethal (LTL) weapons resumes at a future date. According to  DHS, since our review, TSA has begun to establish the framework for a  review process if additional applications for LTL weapons are received.  For future LTL weapons applications, the Transportation Sector Network  Management (TSNM) Airlines Division or the TSNM International Division  will take the lead for domestic and international applications respectively.  An evaluation working group, consisting of the Federal Air Marshal  Service, Office of Chief Counsel, and other program offices, at the  discretion of the administrator, will be involved in the review process. This  group will provide their respective expertise and recommendations, with  the lead office responsible for ensuring progress, resolving differences,  and keeping diligent records of the review and ultimate approval or  disapproval. The full text of DHS’s comments is included as appendix II.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 18 days from the  date of this report.  At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Secretary of Homeland Security; the Director, Office Management and  Budget; and any other interested parties. We will also make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at  no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report or wish to discuss it further,  please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or at berrickc@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. See appendix III for a list of major  contributors to this report.
section_title: Appendix I: TSA’s Proposed List of Criteria for Evaluating Less-than-Lethal Weapons requests
paragraphs: Separate requests—There must be a separate request (application) for  each type of LTL device that is proposed for use.
Method of deployment must be articulated—Where and how will the LTL  device be transported, utilized, and stored aboard aircraft.
Aircrew selection—What are the air carrier’s procedures to ensure that an  unqualified crew member does not obtain access to the LTL devices? This  would include crew members identified in need of anger management  assistance.
Well-documented incoming information—Incoming correspondence must  be well documented and articulate clearly why a device that is being  submitted for approval. The information contained must, at the very least,  provide evidence that the product is known to the industry, with viable  and recent studies and research supporting its use in the aircraft  environment and that the product meets safety standards set by the  Federal Aviation Administration.
Threshold of protection—The correspondence must contain language that  enumerates how an LTL device meets the threshold of protection for the  cockpit, aircraft and passenger safety. It must include any completed  studies on LTL devices and their use in the cockpit and cabin of the  aircraft, the appropriateness for their usage in this unique environment  and how it would not produce catastrophic failure of the aircraft.
Enumerate procedures—The air carrier must clearly state its policy and  the procedures it will employ, including legal considerations and similar  issues. The air carrier would articulate the escalation/de-escalation for the  use of force (Common Strategy and DOJ Use of Force Policy). This could  include awareness of problem, deterrence, avoidance, verbalization, empty  hand control, intermediate device (LTL device) and any other self-defense  techniques.
Procedures for the LTL device—The procedures for the use of an LTL  device must accompany any written request explaining the process for use  of a product. Details of procedures to ensure that any LTL device is not  deployed on aircraft destined for international venues must be included.
Training regimen—The air carrier must be able to articulate its training  regimen and the manner in which pilots and/or flight attendants have been  educated and trained on the requested device to be used and re- certification protocols. TSA’s Office of Training and Quality Performance  will review any proposal, make recommendations, and in conjunction with  Office of Aviation Operations, approve training manuals and processes  associated with initial and re-certification training as a part of the carrier’s  request to employ LTL devices.
Provide documented evidence—The requesting air carrier must provide  documentary evidence, including testimony about the devices by subject  matter experts. These should be attached to the carrier’s proposal.
Provide documentation of FAA approval—A letter from the FAA  approving the use of an less-than-lethal device based on its meeting safety  standards imposed by the FAA demonstrating that the device will not  interfere, disturb, interrupt, or cause catastrophic failure to the avionics of  the aircraft. (Foregoing is TSA text.)
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments