State Department: Preliminary Observations on the Bureau of Counterterrorism's Resources, Performance, and Coordination
Published: 2015-06-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a global threat, and combating these at home and abroad remains a top priority for the U.S. government. In 2010, the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), conducted at the direction of the Secretary of State, highlighted these global threats and, among other actions, recommended that State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism be elevated to bureau status. According to the 2010 QDDR report, the elevation of this office to a bureau would enhance State's ability to, among other things, counter violent extremism, build foreign partner capacity, and engage in counterterrorism diplomacy. In addition, the report stated that the bureau's new status would enable more effective coordination with other U.S. government agencies.
On the basis of preliminary results of ongoing work that GAO is conducting for this subcommittee and other congressional requesters, this testimony provides observations on (1) how the bureau's staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the extent to which the bureau's coordination with U.S. government entities on select programs is in line with key collaboration practices. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed and analyzed State and other U.S. government agency information and interviewed U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C. GAO expects to issue a final report on this work in July 2015, along with any related recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO's preliminary analysis shows that the Department of State's (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism has had an annual increase in authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) positions since fiscal year 2011 and has recently undertaken efforts to reduce a persistent staffing gap. The number of FTEs for the bureau increased from 66 in fiscal year 2011 to 96 in fiscal year 2015, and over the same period the percentage of FTE vacancies ranged from 17 to 23 percent. The vacancies have included both staff-level and management positions. During GAO's ongoing work, the bureau indicated that the gaps between authorized and filled positions were due to several factors. These included an increase in FTEs that the bureau was authorized when it was established and postponement of some staffing decisions until the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, who assumed her position in 2014, had sufficient time to assess the bureau's needs and priorities. The bureau has recently made progress in filling vacant positions and reported having 10 FTE vacancies as of the end of May 2015.
GAO's preliminary analysis has found that the bureau assessed its progress toward achieving its foreign assistance-related goals but has not established time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. Specifically, the bureau established indicators and targets for its foreign assistance-related goals identified in the bureau's first multiyear strategic plan, and it reported results achieved toward each indicator. Since its elevation to a bureau in fiscal year 2012, the bureau has also completed four evaluations of counterterrorism-related programs it oversees, resulting in 60 recommendations. GAO's preliminary results show that the bureau had addressed about half of the recommendations (28 of 60) as of April 2015 but had not established time frames for addressing the remaining recommendations.
GAO's preliminary analysis has also found that the bureau's coordination within State and with other federal agencies on the Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism Finance programs generally reflects key practices for collaboration. For example, with regard to identifying resources, in cases where the bureau funded other U.S. agencies partnering on these programs, the funding mechanism was clear and laid out in interagency agreements.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity today to discuss our preliminary  observations from our ongoing work looking at the Department of State’s  (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT Bureau).
Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a global threat, and  countering terrorism both at home and abroad remains a top priority for  the U.S. government. In 2010, the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and  Development Review (QDDR) conducted by State and the United States  Agency for International Development (USAID) focused on these global  threats by recommending that State’s Office of the Coordinator for  Counterterrorism (CT Office) be elevated to a bureau. According to the  2010 QDDR report, the elevation of the CT Office to a bureau would  enhance State’s ability to, among other things, counter violent extremism,  build foreign partner capacity, and engage in counterterrorism diplomacy.  In addition, the QDDR report stated that elevating the office’s status  would enable more effective coordination with other U.S. government  agencies.
This testimony discusses our preliminary observations on (1) how the CT  Bureau’s staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to  which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the  extent to which the bureau’s coordination with U.S. government entities  on select programs is in line with key collaboration practices.
To examine how the CT Bureau’s staffing resources changed since 2011,  we reviewed and analyzed State data from fiscal years 2011 to 2015. We  also interviewed State officials from the CT Bureau, Office of Inspector  General, Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, and the Bureaus  of Human Resources, Comptroller and Global Financial Services,  Budgeting and Planning, and Administration. To assess the reliability of  the staffing data, we compared information provided by State with staffing  information in State’s Congressional Budget Justifications and spoke to  State officials regarding the processes they use to collect and verify the  staffing data. Based on the checks we performed, we determined that  these data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement.  To examine the extent to which the CT Bureau has assessed its  performance since 2011, we reviewed bureau strategic plans,  performance reports, program evaluation reports, and action plans for  evaluation recommendations, as well as State policy and guidance  documents outlining performance reporting and evaluation requirements  for bureaus. We also interviewed CT Bureau officials responsible for  strategic planning and program monitoring and evaluation and  interviewed or obtained written responses from State officials responsible  for overseeing implementation of State’s performance reporting and  evaluation policies. To examine the extent to which the CT Bureau’s  coordination with U.S. government entities on select programs is in line  with key collaboration practices, we reviewed agency documents and  interviewed officials from various State regional and functional bureaus;  from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and the  Treasury; and from USAID, the National Counterterrorism Center, and the  United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. We focused on the  CT Bureau’s Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Counterterrorism  Finance (CTF) programs because these programs involve coordination  with large numbers of agencies and also represent strategic priorities for  the CT Bureau. We used GAO’s key features of collaboration  mechanisms that agencies should consider when collaborating within and  across the U.S. government to evaluate the extent and nature of  collaboration between the CT Bureau and other bureaus within State and  other U.S. government agencies.
Our preliminary analysis is based on our ongoing work, which is being  conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Evolution of State’s CT Office to CT Bureau
paragraphs: In December 2010, the QDDR recommended the creation of the CT  Bureau, to supersede the CT Office. State elevated the CT Office to the  CT Bureau in January 2012. According to State, one reason for elevating  the CT Office to a bureau was that the office’s responsibilities for  counterterrorism strategy, policy, operations, and programs had grown far  beyond the original coordinating mission. In the transition from CT Office  to CT Bureau in 2012, some initial organizational changes occurred, such  as a reduction from five to four Deputy Coordinators who oversee  counterterrorism issue areas within the bureau as well as the creation of  an executive office to provide management support to the bureau. The  initial organizational changes also elevated the role of strategic planning  and metrics and established a new policy and guidance unit.
Our preliminary information shows that additional changes to the CT  Bureau’s organizational structure occurred starting in 2014, after the  current Ambassador was confirmed as the Coordinator for  Counterterrorism in February 2014. According to bureau officials, the  Ambassador initiated a strategic review of the bureau’s programs and  what they were accomplishing to help form a clear picture of priorities,  threats, and where the bureau’s efforts and funding should be directed.  The strategic review, which was completed in November 2014, led to a  reorganization of the bureau and a shift in overall focus to a regional or  geographic approach. As a result of the strategic review, the portfolio of  the CT Bureau’s Office of Programs has changed to reflect a more  regional approach rather than an approach based on funding streams.  According to CT Bureau officials, the shift is intended to encourage and  facilitate cross-bureau discussions across the entire CT Bureau.  Specifically, the portfolios of program officials have been broadened by  requiring a cross-cutting look at programs across their assigned region.  Figure 1 shows how the CT Office has evolved over the last two decades.
Our preliminary information shows other changes to the bureau’s  organizational structure stemming from the strategic review, such as the  changes in names of directorates and offices, their portfolios, or both to  better reflect the new strategic approach and priorities of the bureau. For  example, the portfolio for the multilateral affairs office was shifted and  combined with the portfolio for the regional affairs office. In addition, a  new office and two new units were created: (1) the Office of Strategy,  Plans, and Initiatives; (2) the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Unit; and (3) the  Countering Violent Extremism Unit. Appendix I depicts the organizational  structure of the CT Bureau, as of May 2015.
section_title: CT Bureau Programs, Activities, and Funding Allocations
paragraphs: The CT Bureau manages a range of programs and activities to assist  partner nations around the world to combat terrorism, primarily through  the following six programs:
Antiterrorism Assistance: in partnership with the Bureau of  Diplomatic Security as the primary implementer, provides U.S.  government antiterrorism training and equipment to law enforcement  agencies of partner nations.
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): entails programs and  activities that work with partner nation civil society sectors and  governments to undermine terrorist ideology and to address the  underlying local grievances that drive at-risk individuals into violent  extremism.
Counterterrorism Engagement: entails programs and activities to  build political will for counterterrorism at senior levels in partner  nations.
Counterterrorism Finance (CTF): entails programs and activities to  build foreign partner capacity and to implement significant parts of the  U.S. government’s strategy to cut off financial support to terrorists.
Terrorist Interdiction Program: provides the immigration and border  control authorities of partner nations with a computer database  system that enables identification of suspected terrorists attempting to  transit air, land, or sea ports of entry.
Regional Strategic Initiative: meets transnational terrorist threats  with regional responses coordinated by each region’s U.S.  ambassadors in the field.
Our preliminary analysis shows that from fiscal years 2011 through 2014,  the CT Bureau was allocated a cumulative total of $539.1 million for these  six counterterrorism-related programs, as shown in figure 2.of these allocations are from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism,  Demining, and Related Programs account, which funds all six programs.  Allocations from the Economic Support Fund support those Countering  Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism Engagement program activities  that do not involve law enforcement entities.
Our preliminary analysis shows that, in addition to the foreign assistance  programming that the CT Bureau oversees and manages, the bureau’s  allocated resources include funding for the operations of the bureau. The  CT Bureau receives funds from two sources to fund its core operations:  the Diplomatic and Consular Programs and the Worldwide Security  Programs accounts. Figure 3 shows our preliminary analysis of the  bureau’s total allocations for its overall operations since fiscal year 2012.  These allocations increased from $11.7 million in fiscal year 2012 to  $14.7 million in fiscal year 2013, as the bureau was being established.  The allocations then decreased to $13.1 million in fiscal year 2014.
section_title: CT Bureau’s Authorized Staffing Has Increased since Fiscal Year 2011; Recent Efforts Have Been Made to Reduce Staffing Gap
paragraphs: Our preliminary analysis indicates that the CT Bureau’s number of  authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) positions has grown annually, and  the bureau has recently undertaken efforts to reduce a persistent staffing  gap. The bureau’s number of FTEs grew from 66 in fiscal year 2011 to 96  in fiscal year 2015, which is an increase of more than 45 percent. Figure  4 shows the number of FTEs within the bureau for fiscal years 2011 to  2015, along with the number of positions that were filled. While the  bureau’s current authorized level of FTEs for fiscal year 2015 is 96  positions, it had 22 vacancies as of October 31, 2014.analysis also shows that the percentage of vacancies in FTE positions in  the bureau has ranged from 17 percent to 23 percent in fiscal years 2011  to 2015. According to the CT Bureau, these vacancies have included both  staff-level and management positions. As of the end of May 2015, the  number of FTE vacancies in the bureau had been reduced to 10  positions, most of which are in the Office of Programs, according to the  CT Bureau.
section_title: CT Bureau Has Assessed Its Performance but Has Not Defined Time Frames for Addressing Evaluation Recommendations
paragraphs: The CT Bureau utilized various means to assess its performance in fiscal  years 2011 through 2014, including performance assessments and  program evaluations. Our preliminary analysis indicates that the CT  Bureau assessed its progress toward its foreign assistance-related goals  but has not established time frames for addressing recommendations  from program evaluations.
Our preliminary analysis shows that the CT Bureau assessed its progress  toward achieving its foreign assistance-related goals in fiscal years 2012  and 2013, as required by State policy. That policy requires bureaus to  respond to an annual department-wide data call for foreign assistance- related performance information. Specifically, bureaus must identify  indicators and targets for their foreign assistance-related goals, as  defined in their multiyear strategic plans, and report results achieved  toward each indicator for the prior fiscal year.CT Bureau identified four foreign assistance-related goals in its first  multiyear strategic plan and established quantitative indicators and   As shown in table 1, the  corresponding targets for each of those goals. It also reported results  achieved for each indicator.
In addition to having assessed its progress toward achieving its foreign  assistance-related goals, our preliminary analysis shows that since being  elevated to a bureau in fiscal year 2012, the CT Bureau has completed  four evaluations of counterterrorism-related programs it oversees. The  number of completed evaluations meets the number of evaluations  required by State’s February 2012 evaluation policy. As shown in table  2, the CT Bureau completed these evaluations during fiscal years 2013  and 2014 and focused primarily on evaluating programs providing training  courses to law enforcement officials of partner nations, such as the  Antiterrorism Assistance program in Morocco and Bangladesh. CT  Bureau officials noted that, when deciding what programs to evaluate, the  bureau took into consideration whether the evaluation would inform the  priority programming and objectives of the bureau and produce results  the bureau could use in future programming decisions and evaluation  designs. To date, the CT Bureau has not evaluated the CVE program,  which has been identified as a priority goal for the bureau.
Our preliminary analysis indicates that the CT Bureau has not established  time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations.  The four program evaluations the CT Bureau completed during fiscal  years 2013 and 2014 resulted in 60 recommendations; however,  according to bureau officials, the bureau does not have a system for  assigning time frames for the implementation of recommendations. The  officials said program officers are assigned responsibility for following up  on recommendations that impact their portfolio; however, the bureau does  not have any policy or other guidance outlining the timing for addressing  recommendations from evaluations. In response to questions during the  course of our review, CT Bureau officials developed action plans to  describe the status of efforts to address the 60 recommendations.the basis of our review of these action plans, the CT Bureau reported  having implemented about half of the recommendations (28 of 60) made   On  in the evaluations, as of April 2015. The bureau had put on hold or  decided not to implement 4 recommendations; the remaining 28 were still  being considered or were in the process of being implemented, or the  bureau had made a commitment to implement them.
While the action plans are a positive first step to help the bureau monitor  and track its progress in implementing recommendations, they do not  address the need for the bureau to establish time frames for addressing  recommendations from evaluations. Without specific time frames for  completing actions in response to recommendations from evaluations, it  may be difficult for the bureau to ensure that needed programmatic  improvements are made in a timely manner or to hold its implementing  partners accountable for doing so.
section_title: CT Bureau Collaboration on CVE and CTF Programs Is Generally Consistent with Key Practices
paragraphs: Our preliminary analysis shows that activities between the CT Bureau and  other bureaus within State as well as with other U.S. government  agencies on counterterrorism programs, specifically the Countering  Violent Extremism (CVE) and Counterterrorism Finance (CTF) programs,  were generally consistent with key practices that GAO has identified for  interagency collaboration in the areas of (1) outcomes and accountability,  (2) bridging organizational cultures, (3) leadership, (4) clarity of roles and  responsibilities, (5) resources, and (6) written guidance and  agreements.
Outcomes and accountability.
GAO-12-1022. Having defined outcomes and mechanisms to track progress can help  shape a collaborative vision and goals. specific requests across regional or functional bureaus or messages  defining and assigning specific tasks. We also identified accountability  mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results or outcomes  of counterterrorism programming.
Bridging organizational cultures.
Our preliminary analysis shows  that while terminology may differ when discussing CVE, within State,  some regional and functional bureau officials we spoke with said that  they use a common definition for CVE and apply the CVE strategy  and policy that the CT Bureau has developed for CVE programming.  Similarly, some officials in other U.S. government agencies told us  they agree on common terms and outcomes of counterterrorism  programming as ideas are discussed between the CT Bureau and the  implementing agency, if the bureau funds a program or grant. Our  preliminary analysis also shows that there was frequent  communication among collaborating agencies, including as it relates  to CVE programs. Specifically, we found that frequency of  communication between the CT Bureau and other State bureaus as  well as other U.S. government agencies varied depending on the  project or activity and ranged from daily to monthly interactions.
Leadership.
Our preliminary analysis shows that for CVE and to  some extent CTF, officials at State and other U.S. government  agencies were generally aware of the agency or individual with  leadership responsibility for the particular counterterrorism program.  Officials in State’s regional bureaus stated that they are generally  aware of when the CT Bureau would have the lead on  counterterrorism issues versus the regional bureaus. In addition,  officials noted that they receive relevant and timely information on  CVE-related programming from the bureau. For the CTF program, our  preliminary analysis indicates that there was some uncertainty among  officials as to whom they should be working with on CTF  programming, due to the recent reorganization of the CT Bureau.
Clarity of roles and responsibilities.shows that there was general clarity on the roles and responsibilities  of the participants collaborating on CVE and CTF programs with the  CT Bureau. For example, several State officials mentioned that for  questions related to programs, such as CVE, they knew their point of  contact in the CT Bureau and also what that person’s portfolio  encompassed.
Resources.
Our preliminary analysis indicates that, in cases where  the CT Bureau funded U.S. government agencies on CVE or CTF  programming, the funding mechanism was clear and laid out in the  interagency agreements. Some agency officials told us that these  agreements provide a standard process for providing funding from the  CT Bureau to other agencies.
Written guidance and agreements.shows that many of the agencies we spoke with had formal  interagency agreements with the CT Bureau on CVE- or CTF-related  programming or activities. The agreements described, among other  things, the service to be provided, roles and responsibilities of each  party, method and frequency of performance reporting, and  accounting information for funding of the service provided. We found  that most of the State bureaus we spoke with that coordinate with the  CT Bureau on CVE and CTF programs did not have written  agreements laying out the terms of the collaboration, but several State  officials said that formalized agreements were not necessary because  collaboration between bureaus within State is routine and the CT  Bureau has been effective in sharing information pertaining to the  CVE program.
Thank you again for the opportunity to assist with the oversight of State’s  Bureau of Counterterrorism. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating,  and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared  statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may  have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information regarding this statement, please contact Charles  Michael Johnson, Jr., Director, International Affairs and Trade at (202)  512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony  included Jason Bair, Assistant Director; Andrea Riba Miller, Analyst-in  Charge; and Esther Toledo. Technical support was provided by Ashley  Alley, Mason Calhoun, Tina Cheng, David Dayton, Martin De Alteriis, and  Sarah Veale.
section_title: Appendix I: Organizational Chart of the Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism, as of May 2015
paragraphs: Appendix I: Organizational Chart of the  Department of State Bureau of  Counterterrorism, as of May 2015 This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.