Hazardous Materials Rail Shipments: Emergency Responders Receive Support, but DOT Could Improve Oversight of Information Sharing
Published: 2016-11-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Recent rail accidents involving hazardous materials, such as crude oil, have raised questions about local emergency responders' ability to take protective actions in the aftermath of such accidents. Along with FRA, PHMSA is responsible for ensuring the safe transportation of hazardous materials by rail through issuing and enforcing railroad- and shipper-safety regulations.
GAO was asked to review efforts that enhance preparedness for hazardous materials rail accidents. This report examines: (1) the factors selected local emergency planners report affect preparedness; (2) the actions selected railroads have taken to support preparedness; and (3) the actions DOT has taken to support emergency planners.
GAO reviewed laws and regulations and surveyed (1) emergency planners representing 25 counties and 17 states with the highest volumes of hazardous materials rail shipments and (2) all seven Class I railroads and four smaller railroads selected because they operate in the counties where GAO surveyed local emergency planners.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Emergency planners from most of the 25 selected counties in 17 states that GAO surveyed reported that training for responders and information about rail shipments of hazardous materials affect preparedness. Emergency planners from almost all of the selected counties reported that a majority of the emergency response personnel, such as fire fighters, who arrive first at an accident receive basic training that would enable them to take initial protective actions, including recognizing hazardous materials and calling for assistance in the event of a rail accident involving crude oil and other hazardous materials. Emergency planners from most counties reported that training related to rail hazardous materials was useful in preparing for accidents. Emergency planners reported that some factors present obstacles to responders' receiving training, such as neglecting one's professional duties to take time off for training. Emergency planners from most counties reported that railroads in their jurisdictions have provided them with information about hazardous material shipments and that this information is useful in preparing for potential accidents.
All seven of the largest railroads (called Class I railroads) and some of the four smaller railroads that GAO surveyed reported providing training and information about hazardous materials to local emergency responders and planners in recent years. The Class I railroads reported training through a variety of means, including locally delivered training exercises or off-site at industry-recognized training centers. In addition, railroads reported providing information about hazardous material shipments to state and local emergency planners in part due to a May 2014 Department of Transportation (DOT) Emergency Order requiring notification of state emergency-planning agencies about shipments of crude oil from North Dakota and Montana where the Bakken shale deposit is located. This information was intended to reach local emergency responders so that they could better prepare for rail accidents involving crude oil.
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) within DOT have taken multiple actions to support emergency preparedness for rail incidents involving hazardous materials; some actions focused specifically on trains carrying Bakken crude oil. For example, PHMSA developed a web-based training curriculum on how to prepare for hazardous materials incidents, and FRA determined whether railroads provided information about Bakken crude-oil shipments to states. However, PHMSA learned that some states did not provide the information about Bakken crude oil shipments to local emergency planners, as called for in the Emergency Order. Recently enacted legislation expands FRA's oversight of railroads' actions moving forward; for example, railroads will be required to notify states of large shipments of other hazardous materials. However, FRA and PHMSA have not taken steps to understand whether the shipment information railroads are required to share with states is consistently disseminated to local emergency planners. Therefore, the extent to which DOT's information-sharing requirements have the potential to improve local preparedness for rail accidents involving hazardous materials is unclear.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOT develop a process for regularly collecting information from state emergency- planning agencies about their distribution of railroad-provided hazardous materials shipping information to local emergency planning entities. DOT concurred with our recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Each year, freight railroads safely transport thousands of commodities,  including hazardous materials, across the country. However, over the last  several years, accidents involving crude oil, a hazardous flammable  liquid, have occurred. For example, in June 2016 a derailment occurred  near Mosier, Oregon, resulting in 47,000 gallons of crude oil being  released near the Columbia River Gorge. Furthermore, in July 2013, a  derailment in Lac Mégantic, Quebec, resulted in the deaths of 47 people  and extensive damage to the city’s downtown area. These accidents have  occurred as railroads have increasingly been used to transport crude oil  from certain regions, such as North Dakota and Montana, where the  Bakken shale deposit lies. According to the Energy Information  Administration, monthly shipments of crude oil transported by rail climbed  from about 1-million barrels in January 2010 to nearly 36-million barrels in  October 2014. Although rail shipments of crude oil have declined overall  recently as domestic production levels have slowed, questions have been  raised about the ability of railroads and local emergency responders to  prepare for and take protective actions in the immediate aftermath of a  serious accident, particularly in rural areas where there may be fewer  resources to respond.
In light of these questions, the Department of Transportation (DOT)  issued—and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has since  enforced—an Emergency Restriction/Prohibition Order (Emergency  Order) in May of 2014 requiring railroads transporting large volumes of  Bakken crude oil to notify states about their estimated operations in an  effort to enhance local emergency responder preparedness. Also within  DOT, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration  (PHMSA) has lead responsibility for ensuring the safe movement of hazardous materials across all transportation modes by issuing and  enforcing safety regulations, including requirements for carriers and  shippers to provide emergency response information and report accidents  involving hazardous materials. PHMSA coordinates with FRA in  developing and interpreting hazardous-materials transportation  regulations related to rail transportation and FRA enforces these  regulations.
You asked us to review efforts to enhance preparedness for accidents  involving the transportation of crude oil and other hazardous materials by  rail. This report examines:  (1) the factors that selected local emergency  planners reported as affecting preparedness for rail accidents involving  hazardous materials, (2) the actions that Class I and selected other  railroads reported taking to support local emergency planners’  preparedness for rail accidents involving hazardous materials, and (3) the  actions that DOT has taken to support state and local emergency  planners’ preparedness for rail accidents involving hazardous materials  and additional actions, if any, that DOT could take. The scope of our  review was limited to emergency planning and preparedness for rail  accidents involving hazardous materials, and did not focus on other  phases of emergency response for an accident, such as mitigation and  clean-up activities, which are largely the responsibility of federal agencies  other than DOT.
To inform all of our objectives, we reviewed relevant literature about rail  accidents involving hazardous materials and the response to such  accidents, including journal articles and reports, as well as prior GAO  reports on the transportation of hazardous materials by rail. We also  reviewed relevant statutes, such as the Fixing America’s Surface  Transportation (FAST) Act of 2015 and the Emergency Planning and  Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA) and regulations, such  as the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) to determine  requirements for DOT and railroads related to transporting hazardous  materials by rail, as well as requirements for federal agencies, states, and  localities regarding emergency planning and reporting related to  hazardous materials. In addition, we interviewed officials at DOT  (including FRA and PHMSA officials), the Federal Emergency  Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland  Security, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the National  Transportation Safety Board to understand the roles and responsibilities  of federal, state, and local stakeholders in emergency preparedness and  response to rail accidents involving hazardous materials.
To identify views of selected local emergency planners on factors that  affect preparedness, we conducted structured interviews with, and  provided a questionnaire to a nonprobability sample of 25 local  emergency planners, primarily from local emergency planning committees  (LEPC)—the groups responsible for implementing emergency response  plans and managing preparedness activities. We identified LEPCs to  interview that were located in the three urban and three rural counties that  had the highest volumes of hazardous materials in each of the five  PHMSA regions and were able to contact LEPCs in 25 of the 30 counties.  To estimate the volumes of crude oil and other hazardous materials  transported by rail, we used the Surface Transportation Board’s 2013  Waybill Sample, the most recent data at the time of the review. These  data contain information on the origin and destination for a nationally  representative sample of rail shipments. To determine the reliability of the  data, we reviewed the documentation provided by the Surface  Transportation Board on how the sample was taken and did electronic  testing to ensure that we received the complete file. We determined that  the data used in this report were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our  review. We received completed questionnaires from emergency planners  in 24 of 25 counties and interviewed all 25 across 17 states. We then  conducted an analysis of responses provided by these officials to the  questionnaire and structured interview questions. Because our work was  based on a nonprobability sample of counties, the information we  obtained and present in this report should not be regarded as an  exhaustive list of factors local emergency planners may consider as  affecting preparedness for rail incidents involving hazardous materials.  Similarly, the information and perspectives that we obtained from these  local emergency planners are not generalizable to other local planners or  counties. Furthermore, we interviewed representatives from associations  representing local emergency responders, such as the International  Association of Fire Chiefs. We also reviewed training standards for first  responders to understand hazardous materials training levels.
To understand the actions selected railroads have taken to support  emergency preparedness, we developed a questionnaire and  administered it to all seven Class I railroads and six smaller regional and  short line railroads, known as Class II and Class III railroads  respectively. The Class II and Class III railroads were selected because  they operate in counties where we conducted structured interviews with  local emergency planners and to obtain variation in railroads operating in  urban and rural counties. We sent our questionnaire to two Class II  railroads and four Class III railroads, and received responses from both  Class II railroads and two Class III railroads. We also interviewed officials  from 5 of 7 Class I railroads, the Association of American Railroads  (AAR), and the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and  Transportation Workers. Because our work was based on a  nonprobability sample of Class II and Class III railroads, the results of the  questionnaires with the smaller railroads cannot be generalized to the  entire population of Class II and Class III railroads.
To understand DOT’s actions to support preparedness for rail accidents  involving hazardous materials and additional actions, if any, it could take,  we reviewed pertinent FRA and PHMSA documents related to these  actions, including training materials and guidance, grant program  documentation, and documentation on efforts to oversee the  implementation of requirements for railroads to share information on train contents and movements. We compared the agencies’ efforts to oversee  the implementation of information-sharing requirements for railroads with  pertinent Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. We  also interviewed emergency planners from 17 selected state emergency  response commissions (SERC) on the use of PHMSA grants to support  preparedness and response efforts. These SERCs were chosen  because their state coincided with the geographic location of the local  emergency planners we selected. Because our work was based on a  nonprobability sample, the information and perspectives we obtained from  these state emergency planners is not generalizable to other state  planners. See appendix I for a more detailed description of our objectives,  scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to November 2016  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In the past several years, rail has increasingly been used to ship crude  oil, a flammable liquid. Even though crude oil shipments by rail have  declined in the past year, from January 2010 to October 2014 shipments  increased over 30 times, peaking at almost 36 million barrels or about  51,000 rail carloads in October 2014 (see fig. 1). This increase is due to  pipeline capacity constraints in certain areas of the country, including the  Bakken shale region in North Dakota. As shipments of crude oil have  increased, the number of rail accidents involving crude oil has also  increased, even as rail accidents involving all hazardous materials have  declined. From 2006 to 2010, there were 19 rail incidents involving  crude oil, 4 of which were designated by PHMSA as serious rail  incidents—compared with 399 crude oil rail incidents from 2011 to 2015— 21 of which were designated by PHMSA as serious. Serious accidents  can involve derailments, collisions, and release of materials. Depending  on the commodities a train is carrying, releases can involve not only  crude oil, which is flammable, but also a variety of chemicals such as  sodium hydroxide which can irritate the eyes and burn the skin.
The railroad industry is dominated by the seven largest railroads, known  as Class I railroads, which transport the majority of rail freight—including  hazardous materials—across a network of 200,000 miles of track, mostly  in rural areas. In addition, numerous Class II and hundreds of Class III  railroads have essential roles in moving freight, typically linking rural  communities to the larger railroad network. According to DOT, about 18  percent of all Class I carload freight originates or terminates on a Class II  or Class III railroad, often called “first mile” and “last mile” movements.
Federal, state, and local entities all play a role related to emergency  preparedness for rail accidents involving crude oil and other hazardous  materials. For example, DOT oversees compliance with safety regulations  applicable to the rail transportation of hazardous materials. Specifically,  PHMSA—through its Office of Hazardous Materials Safety—issues  regulations that apply to shippers and railroads transporting hazardous  materials, like crude oil. PHMSA also provides grants to states to fund  training for local responders. As mentioned previously, DOT issued an  Emergency Order in May 2014 that requires railroads planning to operate  trains transporting 1-million gallons or more of Bakken crude oil to notify  states of the expected movement along the routes. The Emergency Order  focused on ensuring that state and local emergency responders know the  frequency and number of Bakken crude-oil trains moving through their  jurisdictions. FRA provides regulatory oversight for both passenger and  freight rail, issuing and enforcing safety regulations. FRA enforces its  own regulations and the HMR, through its inspections and audits  conducted by FRA officials and state partners in some states. In addition,  state officials, local emergency planners, and the railroads also play  specific roles in planning and preparing for emergencies, specifically:
Based on EPCRA, each state is required to establish a SERC that  acts as the emergency-planning focal point and that is responsible for  designating emergency-planning districts and appointing LEPCs for  each district. The SERC supervises the activities of the LEPCs.  LEPC membership includes representatives from police, fire, civil  defense, health, transportation (including rail), environmental  agencies, among others. These entities plan, gather, and share  information about emergency preparedness and arrange for  emergency responders’ training.
Local emergency-planning agencies prepare local emergency plans  that include emergency response plans, training requirements for  emergency responders (e.g., police officers, firefighters, and  emergency medical technicians), and other vital hazardous material  response information. Local emergency-planning agencies may also  prepare commodity flow studies. Most U.S. firefighters are  volunteers.
Under DOT’s Emergency Order, the railroads support emergency  responders by providing SERCs with information about expected  movements of trains carrying Bakken crude oil. In addition, since  1996, railroads that ship oil in containers exceeding 3,500 gallons  must prepare response plans that document that they have trained  personnel, placed equipment, and established procedures to respond  to an oil spill. PHMSA has recently proposed in coordination with  FRA, expanding the oil-spill response-planning requirements to  require railroads to obtain FRA approval for more detailed,  comprehensive oil-spill response plans for high-hazard flammable  trains carrying petroleum oil.
Recently enacted legislation may change the responsibilities of some  stakeholders. In December 2015, President Obama signed into law the  FAST Act, which requires DOT to codify and expand the information  sharing requirement relative to the existing Emergency Order’s  notification requirements for trains carrying 1-million gallons or more of  Bakken crude oil. In accordance with the FAST Act, in July 2016  PHMSA proposed regulations (the same as mentioned above) to require  railroads to share information on a monthly basis about high-hazard  flammable trains’ operations with state (i.e., SERC) and tribal emergency  response commissions. “High hazard flammable trains” are those that  transport (1) 20 or more tank cars loaded with a Class 3 flammable liquid  in a continuous block or (2) a total of 35 or more tank cars carrying such  materials. The FAST Act also directs DOT to require railroads to  provide, through the applicable fusion center, emergency responders  with real-time access to information about the train’s hazardous materials  shipments in the case of a train accident.
While planning is conducted by a range of participants, local emergency  responders and railroad train crews are typically first on the scene in the  immediate aftermath of this type of accident. Firefighters, police, and  emergency medical technicians assess and secure the scene, as  described in figure 2. For example, local and sometimes regional officials  may be responsible for advising the public on taking shelter-in-place  actions or conducting evacuations of affected populations. In addition,  assuming they are not affected by an accident, railroad train crews are  expected to provide local emergency responders with information about  the type and quantity of hazardous materials on the train, the position of  the train’s contents, and the emergency contact information (referred to  as hazardous materials documentation), as described in figure 2.  According to the HMR, railroads are required to provide notice of certain  hazardous materials accidents to the National Response Center.
After the initial response, local emergency responders and railroads as  well as state and federal agencies have various responsibilities for  mitigating and investigating an accident (see fig. 2 above).
Mitigation: According to AAR, railroads have hazardous materials  accident management personnel and employ hazardous materials  response contractors and environmental consultants that provide spill  response tools and equipment. Federal and state environmental  agencies are responsible for assisting this effort and monitoring and  evaluating the environmental damage. States are required to notify  EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard, which may send representatives to  the accident scene to assist in or direct response activities resulting  from a hazardous materials release or discharge.
Investigation: FRA monitors train accidents and investigates their  causes and compliance with existing safety laws and regulations. Per  its discretion, the National Transportation Safety Board investigates  some railroad accidents and issues safety recommendations aimed at  preventing future accidents.
Training is a key aspect of planning and preparing for emergency  response and mitigation. Federal regulations require that firefighters and  other responders receive hazardous-materials emergency response  training. When such training is provided, federal statutes regarding  occupational health and safety indicate that it must be based on training  standards set by a recognized, standard-setting organization, such as the  National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA standards detail the  specific knowledge that trainees must have to be considered competent  to provide varying levels of response to hazardous materials accidents,  as we describe later in this report. Additionally, DOT officials stated that  FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute serves as the national focal  point for the development and delivery of emergency management  training to enhance the capabilities of state, local, and tribal government  officials, volunteer organizations, FEMA’s disaster workforce, federal  agencies, and the public and private sectors to minimize the impact of  disasters and emergencies.
subsections: section_title: Selected Emergency Planners Reported That Responder Training and Railroads’ Information Sharing Affect Preparedness Emergency Planners Reported That Responder Training for Rail Hazardous Materials Accidents Is Useful, but Some Encounter Impediments to Participating in Training
paragraphs: Local emergency planners from almost all of the counties we contacted  reported that their emergency responders participated in training,  exercises, or drills (“training”) to prepare for responding to rail hazardous  materials incidents. Specifically, emergency planners from 21 of 22  counties (13 urban and 8 rural) indicated that emergency responders  had participated in rail hazardous materials classroom or hands-on  training and 20 reported their emergency responders had participated in  rail hazardous materials exercises or drills. About half of the emergency  planners (13 of 22) reported that their emergency responders had  received rail hazardous-materials training by independent study or  webinar. Hazardous materials training may be provided by state or local  emergency management agencies, colleges and associations with  specialized programs, chemical producers, and railroads, among others.  As discussed later, PHMSA provides grants to states to fund training for  local responders. Also, as noted earlier, FEMA’s Emergency  Management Institute serves as a national focal point for emergency  management training.
Most local emergency planners reported that the rail hazardous-materials  training was useful for helping their emergency responders prepare for  and respond to rail hazardous materials incidents. Local emergency  planners from 18 counties (9 urban and 9 rural) reported that such  training was very useful, 4 reported it was somewhat useful, and 3  reported they were uncertain about its usefulness. Some emergency  planners told us that training that involved “hands on” experience was  particularly helpful because it facilitated direct interaction with devices and  props that emergency responders would not normally encounter except in  a real-world incident. Other emergency planners told us that training  provides a way for emergency responders to interact face to face with  some of the stakeholders they might normally encounter in an incident,  such as railroad hazardous materials experts and personnel from other  fire departments. Such interaction can facilitate relationships among  stakeholders by increasing familiarity and building trust. For example, one  local emergency planner told us that the first responders from his county  attended a railroad-sponsored hazardous materials exercise that was  coincidentally held a week before a hazardous materials train derailment.  The emergency planner noted that when the accident happened,  responders were already familiar with the railroad and stakeholders,  familiarity that facilitated cooperation and trust.
Local emergency planners reported on the percentage of their first  responders who received various levels of hazardous-materials response  training, from basic to more advanced. Generally, as discussed below, a  greater percentage of these first responders received basic training than  received more advanced levels of training, according to responses to the  questionnaires we received. As described previously, there are federal  requirements that firefighters and other responders receive hazardous- materials emergency response training, and when such training is  provided, it must adhere to federal requirements and must be based on  training standards set by a recognized, standards-setting organization,  such as the NFPA. NFPA’s standards identify the types of training  needed to achieve professional competence at four levels, from  “awareness”, the most basic level, to “incident commander,” the most  advanced (see table 1).
Local emergency planners from most counties (20 of 22) reported that  more than 60 percent of their first responders were trained at the  awareness level, which enables first responders to recognize that they  are dealing with a hazardous materials incident and call for trained  response personnel. However, emergency planners from few (6 of 23)  counties reported that more than 60 percent of their first responders were  trained at the operational level, which allows first responders to take  defensive action in the event of a hazardous materials release.  Emergency planners from even fewer counties reported emergency  responders trained at the technician and incident command levels, a  finding that is to be expected given that these advance levels of  competency require additional hours of training and certification (see fig.  3).
Local emergency planners in select urban and rural counties reported that  various obstacles impede their emergency responders’ participation in  training activities—activities that would help prepare them to take  defensive action to a rail accident involving hazardous materials. Factors  such as dedicating time for training, taking unpaid time off of work, and  being able to get off from their regular duties may discourage participation  in training (see fig. 4).
Local emergency planners from 23 counties reported that the leading  factor discouraging participation in rail hazardous-materials training was  the time commitment to attend a training activity. As one emergency  planner put it, despite the fact that the state developed a variety of rail  hazardous materials training and exercises for a county’s emergency  responders, the ability to make use of the training opportunities ultimately  rests on emergency responders’ being able to attend without neglecting  other professional and personal responsibilities. Local emergency  planners from rural counties with largely volunteer firefighter workforce  (i.e., unpaid) reported the dilemma of having to take unpaid leave from  their primary workplace to attend training. One emergency planner told us  that some training providers recognize this limitation and try to schedule  training for periods when volunteers may be more available, such as  evenings and weekends. However, even when training is offered during  weekends or non-work hours, emergency planners told us that it can be  difficult to get participants because of family commitments and other  responsibilities. Along this same line, FRA officials told us that  communities can be unwilling to send employees to training because they  do not want the employees to be away from their professional duties,  despite the fact that the cost of the training itself may be covered by other  entities, such as a railroad, and free to the employer.
Local emergency planners reported another obstacle to participating in  training is that of backfill—the situation where a replacement worker  needs to cover the shift of the person attending training. As indicated  above, 12 of 23 emergency planners reported that emergency responders  sometimes are not able to get off their regular duties to attend training  because, for example, a replacement cannot be found. Emergency  planners reported that backfill can be difficult and expensive. According to  one emergency planner from an urban county, most fire departments  operate with the bare minimum workforce so sending anyone away to  training has a big impact on the budget because the county may need to  pay existing staff overtime to work an additional shift. One described  backfill as being cost prohibitive, noting that replacing absent workers can  cost up to three times as much as the cost of the training itself.  Emergency planners also told us that a consequence of such obstacles is  that fire departments are not able to train their entire force at one point in  time and that their responders have varying levels of training. Whether  the workforce is comprised of volunteers or career fire fighters, planners  told us that sending their entire force to training is cost prohibitive and  otherwise impractical. In addition, an emergency planner illustrated this  by stating that in a recent railroad scenario-based exercise, only one shift  participated.
Most emergency planners viewed their emergency responders as  prepared to take defensive actions, such as evacuating affected  populations, sheltering in place, and setting up an incident command post  in the event of a rail hazardous materials accident. Emergency planners  from 22 of 25 counties reported their emergency responders as very (9  counties) or somewhat (13 counties) prepared for taking such actions.  Emergency planners told us that there were differences in preparedness  level within their counties, stating that some jurisdictions place a higher  priority on preparedness than others. One emergency planner indicated a  distinction between urban and rural locations, explaining that urban areas  may have a heightened awareness to hazardous materials by rail  because of the steady presence of trains on their rails. Other planners  attributed a greater level of preparedness to a heightened awareness of  rail accidents in recent years and to increased training. In a related issue,  local emergency planners from all selected counties reported having  mutual aid agreements—pre-established agreements in which first  responders call for assistance from other fire departments—in place.  Such agreements can increase a county’s preparedness since they  increase the resources (and in some instances expertise level) available  for immediate response.
section_title: Emergency Planners from Most Counties Reported That Information from Railroads and SERCs Is Useful for Hazardous Response Planning and Preparedness
paragraphs: Local emergency planners from most of the selected counties reported  that railroads and SERCs have provided them with a variety of  information for planning and preparing for hazardous materials accidents  and that this information is useful. The types of information provided  include:
Railroads’ emergency-response-planning guides: Emergency  planners from two-thirds of the counties (16 of 24) reported railroads  operating in their jurisdictions provided them a copy—or copies if  provided by multiple railroads—of their emergency-response-planning  guides. (Emergency planners from 8 counties reported that they had  not been provided guides.) Railroads’ emergency-response-planning  guides may include information about critical railroad contacts and  railroad incident response guidelines. Emergency planners from most  of the counties that received guides described the guides as being  useful or very useful for preparing for a potential rail accident because  they contained information about what the railroads’ response  activities would be. One planner told us that a guide typically includes  information that can be readily incorporated into a local entity’s own  hazardous-materials response plan. Emergency planners from three  counties told us about deficiencies with the guides and one noted that  the information was not particularly useful because the plan  referenced the national rail network rather than the locality and  focused more on pollution response than on life safety planning.  Another told us that the plans had information that was redacted or  included such strict non-disclosure statements as to prevent  incorporating it into local emergency-planning documents.
Hazardous materials information: Local emergency planners from  most counties (22 of 24) reported having been provided information  about hazardous materials transported through their areas, including  a few that told us their SERCs provided them with information about  Bakken crude-oil shipments. In addition, most (14 of 20) indicated  having no difficulty getting information. (As discussed below,  emergency planners from six counties indicated they had difficulty  getting information.) According to DOT, besides obtaining information  about planned Bakken crude-oil shipments through the May 2014  Emergency Order, bona fide emergency responders are able to obtain  information on other types of hazardous materials moving through  their community by requesting the information from the railroad.  Emergency planners from 11 counties reported that railroads provided  such information upon request, 6 reported that railroads voluntarily  provided them with such information, and some reported they  received information from SERCs and other entities such as the U.S.  Coast Guard or the Army Corps of Engineers. Some emergency  planners reported receiving information from multiple sources.  Emergency planners from 17 counties reported finding the information  somewhat to very useful and 4 not useful for planning and preparing  for potential accidents involving hazardous materials transported by  rail. One local emergency planner told us that having this information  in advance of an accident helped in putting the appropriate response  plans in place when a derailment involving ethanol and propane  occurred. Some local emergency planners described incorporating the  hazardous materials information into plans and guidance, such as  emergency response plans, commodity flow studies, and county  hazardous-materials plans. One said the information was used to fine  tune the hazardous materials team’s training exercise by focusing on  the use of fire suppression foam since the information indicated an  uptick in the volume of crude oil shipments. In addition, some  emergency planners reported discussing the information with local  emergency responders in order to increase their awareness of  hazardous materials shipments.
Emergency planners from some (6 of 20) counties reported difficulty  getting information about hazardous materials shipments from the  railroads or SERCs. In describing the behaviors that impeded information  sharing, one emergency planner told us that the railroad was reluctant to  release information because it considered the information security  sensitive. Another noted that the formal process for requesting  information from railroads gets bogged down, perhaps because it is  administered by a different office than the personnel with whom informal  relationships were developed.
With respect to DOT’s Emergency Order related to railroads transporting  Bakken crude oil, emergency planners from 9 of 25 counties told us that  the Emergency Order improved their access or had other positive  outcomes, while 11 of 25 counties told us that the Emergency Order had  little or no impact on their ability to access hazardous materials  information. Emergency planners from five counties told us that the effect  of the Emergency Order was unclear. Of the emergency planners who  told us that the Emergency Order improved access to information from  the railroads, one told us that the railroad not only provided information  about Bakken crude shipments but information about the 10 most shipped  commodities as well. Other positive outcomes were related to providing a  broader view of hazmat shipments and improving situational awareness.  Emergency planners reporting little or no impact explained that in some  situations they had adequate access to information prior to the  Emergency Order. A couple of planners told us that the Bakken crude  information is very generic and provides only generalities that they could  ascertain just as readily by observing the train traffic. One emergency  planner told us that the information is already accessible because at least  one state provides the Bakken crude-oil information on its website for the  public to access and review.
The hazardous materials information described above is used by local  emergency planners from railroads and other entities to develop  commodity flow studies. As mentioned previously, these studies describe  the types and amounts of hazardous materials transported through a  specified geographic area and the modes of transportation. Ten  emergency planners told us that information provided by commodity flow  studies were particularly useful as comprehensive reference guides.  According to one emergency planner, a commodity flow study helps  responders focus on the right response based on the potential hazard. A  recent transportation study found that local emergency planners use this  information as part of their all-hazards-planning process, in which  understanding the risks posed by transporting hazardous materials  through a community is a key component.
section_title: Emergency Planners Reported That Information on Hazardous Materials Shipments Is Important for Response
paragraphs: Local emergency planners in the 24 counties who responded to this  question told us that once a rail accident involving hazardous materials  has occurred the most important information for first responders is the  type and volume of hazardous materials involved—information that is  found in the train’s hazardous materials documentation. In addition,  emergency planners from five counties reported it was useful to know the order of the train cars. Train crews are required to make train  documentation showing the current position of each rail car in the train  immediately available to first responders in the event of an accident.
As discussed in more detail later, AAR has developed a smart phone  application and railroads are beginning to make it available to assist  responders in identifying train cars’ contents. Nearly all emergency  planners in urban counties (13 of 14) and about half of the planners from  rural counties (6 of 11) reported being familiar with this application.  Emergency planners from 15 counties reported that their responders  have access to the AskRail application, and 12 found it to be very useful.  However, some emergency planners described some concerns about the  adequacy of cellular connectivity. Emergency planners in one urban  county told us they had a preference for a hard copy of a train’s  hazardous materials documentation because of the difficulty of reading  such detailed information on a cell phone.
section_title: Class I Railroads and Selected Class II and III Railroads Reported Supporting Preparedness for Rail Accidents Involving Hazardous Materials Class I Railroads Reported Increasing Training and Support of Emergency Responders in Recent Years
paragraphs: Although not required by DOT, all seven Class I railroads we surveyed  reported that they have provided training in the past 5 years to local  emergency responders related to emergency preparedness for and  response to rail accidents involving hazardous materials. Class I railroads  reported directly providing or funding a variety of training, including  classroom and hands-on training delivered at designated training sites  and brought to responders’ locations, as well as scenario-based  discussions and full-scale emergency preparedness exercises. For  example, one Class I railroad told us that it provides training to fire departments using props such as tank cars. Five Class I railroads  reported targeting training resources to communities based on such  things as the type of hazardous materials being transported in their area,  the volume of such materials, and the train routes. Six Class I railroads  told us that awareness- and operational-level training comprised from 50  to 80 percent of the training they offer. Railroads told us that they  advertise their training to emergency planners and responders in a variety  of ways, including:  (1) directly to local fire departments, LEPCs, and  county emergency management agencies; (2) to emergency responder  organizations, conferences, and training organizations; and (3) to state  agencies, including SERCs, emergency management agencies, and  states’ fire marshal offices. All seven Class I railroads reported providing  at least part of their training through third-party organizations, such as  Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency Response  (TRANSCAER) or the Security and Emergency Response Training  Center (SERTC), which are industry recognized and known for providing  hazardous material planning and preparedness training.
Class I railroads reported having significantly increased their training  related to hazardous materials in terms of dollars spent since 2011.  According to data provided by five Class I railroads, their combined total  spending on training increased from about $1.5 million in 2011 to $4.6  million in 2015—an increase of more than 200 percent (see table 2  below). AAR officials attributed the increase in spending in part to a  response to a call to action by the Secretary of Transportation in January  2014, after which Class I railroads provided $5 million to develop  additional curriculum specifically on emergency response to crude oil  derailments and train first responders. In addition, AAR officials told us  that Class I railroads significantly increased their hazardous materials  training efforts over the last several years in part because of the  tremendous increase in the volume of Bakken crude oil shipped by rail  and high-profile accidents, such as the one in Lac Mégantic, Quebec.
Relatedly, railroads reported having trained more responders since 2011.  The seven Class I railroads reported training more than 40,000 first  responders and other emergency officials in 2015, an increase of over 80  percent from 2011 (see table 3 below).
Class II and III railroads can also provide training on preparing for and  responding to hazardous materials rail accidents. Of the four Class II and  III railroads we surveyed, two reported providing training to local  emergency responders. According to officials from the American Short  Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA), its member railroads  reach out to local emergency responders and have offered training on  hazardous materials in response to recent accidents. However, according  to ASLRRA officials, Class II and III railroads generally have fewer  resources than Class I railroads to provide training to emergency responders and others. The officials told us that frequently the most  effective way for Class II and III railroads to provide training to local  emergency responders is for them to collaborate with Class I railroads.  For example, an official from one short-line holding company (i.e., a  company with a controlling interest in multiple Class II and III railroads)  we interviewed told us that one of its railroads recently partnered with a  Class I railroad to gain access to tank car training equipment so that  responders along its line could undergo training on how to respond to an  accident involving a tank car.
subsections: section_title: Class I and Selected Class II and Class III Railroads Report Providing More Information Than Required to States and Conducting Community Outreach
paragraphs: All Class I railroads reported complying with the Emergency Order by  reporting the Bakken crude-oil shipment information to the relevant  SERCs. The Class I railroads also told us that they maintain accurate  hazardous materials documents, an HMR requirement, with most doing  so through paper records and new electronic systems. As discussed later,  FRA officials told us that that the agency contacted railroads to confirm  that the railroads shared the information about Bakken crude-oil  shipments and did not find evidence that any railroad failed to comply.
In addition to responding to these DOT requirements, Class I and  selected Class II and III railroads described taking the following actions in  the area of information sharing to support emergency responders’  preparedness and response for rail accidents involving hazardous  materials:
Providing additional information about hazardous materials: All seven  Class I railroads reported they also provide additional information— upon request from bona fide emergency planners and responders— on hazardous materials shipped by rail through their communities.  Two of the smaller railroads (one Class II and one Class III) reported  they provide information on hazardous materials. This practice follows  industry-accepted operating procedures that railroads provide  information on hazardous commodities, as well as work to improve  community awareness, emergency planning, and incident response to  rail hazardous-materials accidents.  The seven Class I railroads  reported receiving between 17 and 225 such requests from LEPCs in  2015. Two of the four smaller railroads (one Class II and one Class III  railroads) reported receiving one to five requests in 2015. While five of  the Class I railroads reported an increase in requests over the last 3  years and three reported an increase of 100 percent or greater, the  number of requests appears low relative to the number of counties  and communities through which these materials are transported. For  example, in 2015, six of the railroads received requests from less than  a third of counties where they own track, with the seventh railroad  receiving requests equaling just over a third. While the Class I  railroads reported that they actively advertise the availability of the  hazardous materials information to bona fide entities, AAR officials  agreed that the number of requests was low, but did not know the  reason why.
Making emergency response information available electronically: All 7  Class I railroads reported they make information on train’s contents  available electronically to emergency responders via smart phone  applications, such as AAR’s AskRail application or their own mobile  application. AAR officials said that AskRail—the system used by all  seven Class I railroads—offers access to emergency response  information similar to that on a train’s hazardous materials  documents. AAR officials reported that from the initial rollout in  October 2014 through March 2016, 13,000 responders had been  invited to download the AskRail application and 6,500 had done so.  However, not all responders have access to this application, as  discussed previously. According to AAR, future iterations of the  application could include making it available on other platforms, such  as web-based devices. The four Class II and III railroads reported that  they do not provide electronic information on train contents; one Class  II and one Class III reported that they had not received requests to do  so.
Conducting community outreach: Six of seven Class I railroads told us  about various methods to contact emergency-planning and response  agencies regarding preparedness for a rail accident, such as by letter,  Internet, telephone, providing an emergency response planning guide,  or through presentations, training, or training materials or LEPC  meetings. Five railroads told us that they contact all communities  along their railroad, covering between 10 percent and 100 percent of  the communities along their respective lines each year; another said it  does not have enough resources under its current program to contact  all communities but is developing a digital program to improve  contact. Furthermore, all seven Class I railroads reported engaging in  relationship-building activities with communities, such as participating  in LEPC meetings or meetings with local and state officials and  training events such as classes and table top exercises. One Class II  and one Class III railroad reported they contact emergency  responders to discuss their preparedness for a rail accident and  another (Class II) indicated it planned to begin an outreach program  this year. The fourth railroad (Class III) did not conduct outreach  except by making its emergency response guide available upon  request.
Developing emergency response planning guides: All seven Class I  railroads reported that they had developed emergency response-  planning guides that include information for communities. However,  most of the seven railroads restrict access to their respective  emergency response planning guides or do not produce it in written  form. Only one of the Class I railroads reported sending the guide to  all communities along its lines without being requested to do so and  provided a means to order the guide on its website. Two other  railroads told us that they made their guides available on their  websites, while three railroads told us that they shared them at  training events and one said the guide was also available through  other communications. One railroad said it provides this information  orally, but does not share it in written form. Two of the four Class II  and III railroads (one Class II and one Class III) reported having  emergency-planning guides that responders must request and the  other two (one Class II and one Class III) did not have guides. As we  discussed above, local emergency planners from most of the counties  we contacted found these guides, when provided, useful in planning  and preparing for hazardous materials accidents.
section_title: DOT Has Taken Multiple Actions to Support Preparedness for Rail Accidents Involving Hazardous Materials but Could Improve Oversight of Information Sharing
paragraphs: DOT has taken multiple actions to improve emergency preparedness for  rail accidents involving hazardous materials, with some of the actions  recent and focused specifically on rail-transported Bakken crude oil. For  example, DOT enforces the requirement that train crews maintain  accurate hazardous materials documentation detailing shipments’  contents and containing other information that is critical for emergency  responders in an accident. In addition, as previously discussed, DOT  issued an Emergency Order in May 2014 requiring railroads expecting to  carry large volumes of Bakken crude oil to notify officials in states along  the routes. DOT’s contact with SERCs has expanded in recent years as  DOT fulfills its regulatory role of ensuring railroads followed the  Emergency Order. DOT expects to expand the information-sharing  requirements further with proposed regulations (consistent with the FAST  Act) to include all high-hazard flammable train operations, not just trains  carrying crude oil from Bakken sources, steps that will affect its oversight  of railroads’ actions moving forward. Although DOT is working to finalize  these regulations, it is not clear that the information that railroads are  currently required to share with SERCs on shipments of Bakken crude oil  is consistently reaching local first responders.
subsections: section_title: PHMSA Has Developed Training Materials and Published Guidance Related to Rail Accidents Involving Hazardous Materials
paragraphs: PHMSA has produced a variety of training and other materials for  emergency planners and responders, most of them in the past 2 years,  intended to improve emergency preparedness for rail accidents involving  hazardous materials in general and Bakken crude oil in particular (see  table 4).
Although we did not ask local emergency planners from selected counties  about their specific experiences with the TRIPR training or the crude-oil  reference sheet, we did inquire about their views about the usefulness of  the ERG. Local emergency planners from all of the counties we contacted  who provided a response reported that the ERG was useful—with all but  one (23 of 24) finding it very useful. Local emergency planners from a few  counties also told us that the guide is particularly useful for the initial first  response and contains information not commonly known, but critical, for  responding to hazardous materials accidents.
section_title: PHMSA and FRA Provide Grants to Support Emergency Preparedness
paragraphs: PHMSA administers the Hazardous Materials Grant Program, which  distributes a series of grants that support state and local emergency-  response planning and training activities related to the transportation of  hazardous materials for all modes, including rail. Established by the  Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990, this  program is funded by registration fees collected from shippers and  carriers that transport hazardous materials and consists of three types of  grants, the largest of which are Hazardous Materials Emergency  Preparedness (HMEP) planning and training grants. In fiscal year 2015,  PHMSA awarded $19.9 million in these grants to states, territories, and  Native American tribes, allowing them to be used to design and  implement planning and training programs according to need. For  example, SERCs can use the HMEP funds to conduct commodity flow  studies, support training exercises, or to send responders to hazardous  materials conferences or provide grants to LEPCs for the similar  activities. The Hazardous Materials Grant Program also includes (1)  Hazardous Materials Instructor Training grants ($3.3 million in fiscal year  2015) to train instructors who then are able to train hazardous materials  employees in their area and (2) Supplemental Public Sector Training  grants ($927,000 in fiscal year 2015), which support trainer instruction for  hazardous materials response educators.
Some state and local emergency planners have reported that HMEP  grants—which can be used in a variety of ways as previously discussed— have helped them to improve their emergency preparedness. State  emergency planners we interviewed stated that they have used a portion  of their HMEP grant allocation for state-wide activities in addition to  making funds available to LEPCs or tribal organizations. For example, in  2015, DOT reported that one state emergency planner said funds were  recently used to conduct a state-wide study of hazardous materials  travelling through the state’s communities in 2014, while another state  used its funds to train 3,100 emergency responders about hazardous  materials preparedness. Local emergency planners from 8 of 24 counties  reported that they have received HMEP funding from their SERCs in the  past few years and that the funds improved their ability to plan, prepare  for, and respond to rail accidents involving hazardous materials.
PHMSA and FRA have also recently introduced other grant programs that  support state and local emergency preparedness efforts (see table 5).
section_title: DOT Has Established Information Sharing Requirements for Railroads but Could Better Understand Whether Shipping Information Will Reach Local Emergency Planners Hazardous Materials Documentation Requirements for Trains
paragraphs: As previously discussed, DOT has required that train crews operating  trains carrying hazardous materials maintain information on the nature  and location of those materials that can be shared with responders at the  scene, should an accident occur. As railroads continue to ship large  quantities of crude oil and other hazardous materials across the nation,  emergency responders need to be aware of the location and the nature of  the hazardous materials present at the scene of an accident so they are  able to be properly equipped to protect themselves and their community.  As discussed earlier, local emergency planners from the 24 counties who  provided a response told us that the type and quantity of hazardous  materials are the most important pieces of information for first responders  at the scene of an accident. The HMR requires that a train crew carry  hazardous materials documentation including both “shipping papers”— information about the hazardous materials being carried and the shipper’s  emergency contact information—and the train’s “consist”—a document  detailing the current position and contents of the cars carrying hazardous  materials. According to officials from AAR, this documentation is the  official record of the order of a train’s cars and its contents, and train  crews will update this copy as the train’s order or contents change along  its route. DOT officials explained that the HMR also requires train crews  to provide their hazardous material documentation to the local emergency  responders in the event of an accident to help them identify the location of  hazardous materials on a train and inform appropriate defensive  response actions (e.g., wearing proper protective equipment and  establishing a safe perimeter). FRA conducts inspections to determine  railroads’ compliance with safety regulations including those related to  hazardous materials documentation. FRA officials told us that as part of  FRA’s routine inspections of railroads’ compliance with safety regulations,  inspectors collect information on whether or not train crews are in  possession of the required hazardous material documentation and  whether the documentation is accurate. If the documentation is not  accurate or is missing, FRA may cite the railroad for failing to comply with  the requirements by citing a defect or issuing a violation and assessing  fines.
subsections: section_title: Information Sharing Requirements for Trains Carrying Bakken Crude Oil and Other Flammable Liquids
paragraphs: As previously discussed, in the wake of railroad accidents involving crude  oil, DOT issued the Emergency Order in 2014 to improve information  sharing between railroads and emergency planners by requiring railroads  to provide advance notification of Bakken crude oil train movements  through states. Prior to the Emergency Order , railroads could provide  information about the types of hazardous materials moving through local  communities to bona fide emergency response authorities upon request,  as described previously. Thus, unless they requested information, state  and local emergency planners may not have known if, or how many such  trains carrying large quantities of Bakken crude oil were moving through  their jurisdiction until after an accident was reported. However, the  Emergency Order has since required each railroad transporting 1-million  gallons or more of Bakken crude oil in a single train to provide the  following information in writing to the SERC for each state in which it  operates such a train: a reasonable estimate of the number of high-hazard flammable trains  expected to travel through each county within a state per week;  the routes of these high-hazard flammable trains; a description of the materials shipped; all applicable emergency-response information; and a point of contact at the railroad.
Furthermore, the Emergency Order requires railroads to update this  information whenever their reported volumes vary by more than 25  percent, and calls on SERCs—entities that the Emergency Order  indicates are best situated—to convey the information about shipments of  Bakken crude oil to LEPCs in affected counties. This basic information  was meant to inform local emergency responders about the presence of  trains carrying Bakken crude oil.
By issuing the Emergency Order, DOT required railroads to take action to  assist emergency responders in preparing for rail accidents involving  crude oil by providing information important for local emergency  preparedness. Specifically, the Emergency Order explained that it is  essential that local responders be well informed about the presence of  trains carrying Bakken crude oil because they are typically the first to  arrive on the accident scene. Similarly, it states that local responders  should be as well informed as possible prior to an accident involving a  train carrying Bakken crude oil, and, without the requirement established  by the Emergency Order, local emergency responders may not know to  prepare for potential accidents involving these trains. Furthermore, as  previously discussed, our review found that local emergency planners find  this type of information useful. Specifically, local emergency planners  from 17 of 21 counties reported that information about hazardous  materials shipments was useful for planning and preparing for accidents.  For example, local emergency planners told us that the type of  information that is most useful for planning and preparing for a potential  rail accident involving hazardous materials includes information about the  type of hazardous material (including hazard classification and toxicity  level), quantity of hazardous material, route of the shipments, and railroad  emergency contact’s name and phone number.
However, the extent that this information actually reaches local  emergency planners is not clear. FRA officials said the agency contacted  railroads and SERCs to confirm that railroads had shared the required  information within 30 days of the Emergency Order’s issuance in 2014,  and then again in 2015, and did not find any evidence that any railroad  had failed to comply. However, FRA officials told us that they did not  collect information about whether the SERCs distributed the information  to local planners. In 2015, PHMSA gathered some limited information  from states about their efforts to distribute the information to local  emergency planners and determined that some states did not share the  information. Specifically, PHMSA participated in discussions with state  officials from 48 states and the District of Columbia as part of an EPA-led  initiative in January 2015. Among the topics discussed was the extent to  which state agencies passed the Bakken crude oil shipment information  to local communities. According to PHMSA officials, although states  indicated that they shared the railroad-provided information with local  communities, some states indicated the information was heavily redacted.  PHMSA officials also learned that some states did not provide any  information to local communities because of varying interpretations about  whether and how much information could be made publicly available. The  extent that this occurred is unclear, however, because neither PHMSA  nor FRA took steps to systematically collect additional information from  SERCs about whether they disseminated the information required by the  Emergency Order.
This lack of clarity notwithstanding, in July 2016, PHMSA proposed  expanding the information-sharing requirement so that railroads would  have to provide advance notification for all high hazard flammable trains  and would continue to make the SERC the information focal point  consistent with the FAST Act. PHMSA’s proposed rulemaking effectively  codifies the Emergency Order but broadens it by requiring railroads to  provide monthly reports to SERCs on high-hazard flammable trains,  which carry other flammable liquids besides Bakken crude oil. The  impending broadening of the Emergency Order is likely to expand its  applicability beyond only states through which Bakken crude oil is  transported by rail, and affect more railroads. The Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government state that agencies should design and  implement control activities so that they are aligned with their objectives  and review control activities after any significant changes to activities to  determine that the changes are designed and implemented  appropriately. As FRA is responsible for enforcing PHMSA’s regulations in the rail mode, the proposed new reporting requirement would represent  an expansion in FRA’s activities and oversight; therefore, it will be  important to determine if the activities are properly implemented.
Given the proposed expansion of the Emergency Order, this may be an  opportune time for DOT to consider how it can determine whether the  information-sharing requirements will reach their intended audience.  Although increasing the number of trains to which this requirement will  apply may increase the administrative burden to railroads—and, to a  lesser extent, FRA—the agency is currently unaware whether SERCs  have disseminated railroad-provided information to local emergency  planners—information that can facilitate preparedness—as intended.  However, PHMSA’s January 2015 conversations with state officials  demonstrated a shared-interest in enhancing preparedness to rail  accidents and a willingness to share information with federal partners.  Without an understanding of the extent to which the required railroad- provided information has been received by local emergency planners, it is  unclear whether requiring railroads to share this information has the  potential to improve emergency preparedness for a rail accident.  Furthermore, without information on how consistently SERCs share  information, it is possible that some LEPCs will not receive information  on, and be unaware of, large shipments of flammable materials that  would help them improve their preparedness for a potential accident.  Finally, DOT has implemented a requirement without ensuring that the  information reaches the intended audience—the emergency planners in  local communities.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOT has recently taken actions to enhance emergency preparedness in  light of recent accidents involving Bakken crude oil. For example, DOT  issued the Emergency Order to increase awareness of large shipments of  Bakken crude oil. However, the extent to which local emergency planners  in affected communities have received the information about these  shipments is unclear because DOT has not taken steps to understand  whether SERCs provided the information to local emergency planners,  who in turn could use the information in preparing for potential rail  accidents involving hazardous materials. Without knowing whether the  states provided the information, it is unclear whether requiring railroads to  share this information has improved emergency preparedness for such  accidents. DOT has proposed regulations codifying the Emergency Order  in accordance with the FAST Act. This proposal would expand the  requirement for railroads to share information on planned large shipments  of other hazardous materials with affected SERCs. However, without a  process for understanding whether SERCs are providing the information  to local planning entities, DOT cannot be assured that the information will  ultimately reach the communities where it is needed or would be useful in  preparing local responders for rail accidents involving selected hazardous  materials. Furthermore, the agency may be missing an opportunity to  optimize this requirement in a way that the information provided best  meets the needs of emergency responders. Given that the expanded  information-sharing requirement will likely include more railroads and  hazardous materials shipments, monitoring whether emergency planners  receive this information will become even more important in the future.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To continue the agency’s efforts to improve state and local emergency  preparedness for rail accidents involving hazardous materials, we  recommend that the Secretary of Transportation: after the rulemaking is finalized, develop a process for regularly  collecting information from SERCs on the distribution of the railroad- provided hazardous-materials-shipping information to local planning  entities.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this product to DOT, the Department of Homeland  Security, EPA, NTSB, and the Surface Transportation Board for their  review and comment. We received written comments from DOT, which  are reprinted in appendix II.
DOT concurred with our recommendation to develop a process for  regularly collecting information from SERCs on the distribution of railroad- provided hazardous-materials-shipping information to local planning  entities. DOT also highlighted recent actions it has taken to improve the  ability of communities to prepare for and respond to accidents involving  the transportation of crude oil and other hazardous materials, including  the publication of proposed regulations in July 2016 that would require  railroads to share information on high-hazard flammable train operations  with SERCs and tribal emergency response commissions in accordance  with the FAST Act. DOT also plans to issue regulations, also in  accordance with the FAST Act, requiring Class I railroads that transport  hazardous materials to generate and share real-time electronic consist  information with applicable fusion centers. Finally, in October 2016, DOT  awarded $20.4 million in HMEP grants to states, territories, and Native  American tribes to enhance their ability to respond to hazardous materials  incidents.
The Department of Homeland Security and EPA provided technical  comments, which we incorporated in the report, as appropriate.  NTSB  and the Surface Transportation Board reviewed our report, but did not  provide comments.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and  other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to examine: (1) the factors selected local emergency  planners report as affecting their preparedness for rail accidents involving  hazardous materials; (2) the actions that Class I and selected other  railroads report taking to support local emergency planners’ preparedness  for rail accidents involving hazardous materials; and (3) the actions that  the Department of Transportation (DOT) has taken to support state and  local emergency planners’ preparedness for rail accidents involving  hazardous materials and additional actions, if any, that DOT could take.  The scope of the work was limited to emergency planning and  preparedness for rail incidents involving hazardous materials, and did not  focus on other phases of emergency response to an accident, such as  mitigation and investigation, that are largely the responsibility of other  federal agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency  (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security, the Environmental  Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Coast Guard.
To inform all of our objectives, we reviewed relevant literature, including  journal articles and reports about rail accidents involving hazardous  materials and the response to such accidents, as well as prior GAO  reports on the transportation of hazardous materials by rail. We also  reviewed relevant laws, such as the Fixing America’s Surface  Transportation (FAST) Act of 2015, the Emergency Planning and  Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), and regulations, such  as the Hazardous Materials Regulations, to determine requirements for  DOT and railroads related to transporting hazardous materials by rail, as  well as requirements for federal agencies, states, and localities regarding  emergency planning and reporting related to hazardous materials. In  addition, we interviewed officials from the Federal Railroad Administration  (FRA) and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration  (PHMSA) within DOT; FEMA; EPA; and the National Transportation  Safety Board to inform our understanding about the roles and  responsibilities of federal, state, and local stakeholders in emergency  preparedness and response to rail accidents involving hazardous  materials.
To identify views of selected local emergency planners on factors that  affect their preparedness for rail accidents involving hazardous materials,  we conducted structured interviews with, and provided a questionnaire to  a nonprobability sample of 25 local emergency planners, primarily from  local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) affiliated with county  agencies—the groups responsible for developing and implementing  emergency response plans and managing preparedness activities. We  developed a questionnaire and structured interview guide based on our  analysis of information gathered from interviews with stakeholders—such  as Class I railroads, National Volunteer Fire Council, a state emergency  response commission (SERC), and two LEPCs, among others—who  were knowledgeable about emergency preparedness and hazardous  materials rail accidents. We reviewed the National Fire Protection  Association training standards for first responders to hazardous materials  accidents to understand the levels of hazardous materials training for  responders. After developing and pre-testing a questionnaire and  structured interview guide with local emergency planners and responders  in 2 counties, we administered the questionnaires and conducted  structured interviews with a nonprobability sample of local emergency  planners, primarily from LEPCs, and conducted an analysis of open- ended questions provided by these officials in response to the  questionnaire and structured interview questions. For some open-ended  questions, we conducted a more detailed content analysis, and for other  questions, we summarized the results or provided examples of  responses.
We selected LEPCs as the primary contacts for our questionnaire and  interviews because (1) they are responsible for implementing  requirements established in EPCRA, including the development of  emergency response plans that identify transportation routes of extremely  hazardous substances; (2) because they include representatives from  local emergency responders; and (3) because the DOT Emergency  Order required railroads to report Bakken crude oil information to SERCs,  based on the idea that they are best positioned to convey the information  to LEPCs in affected counties.
To arrive at samples of local emergency-planning officials, we used  Geographical Information System software to analyze all rail lines across  the 48 contiguous states, the location of county lines, and the estimated  amount (in tons) and routes of hazardous materials transported in 2013,  based on the Surface Transportation Board’s Carload Waybill Sample.  (The 2013 Waybill Sample was the most recent at the time of our review.)  To determine the reliability of the data, we reviewed the documentation  provided by the Surface Transportation Board on how the sample was  taken and did electronic testing to ensure that we received the complete  file. Because the waybill data only contain origins, destinations, and  selected transfer points, we used the TRAGIS routing model developed  by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory to estimate the rail routes for  hazardous materials and determined that the data were reliable for the  purposes of identifying counties with high volumes of hazardous materials  and crude oil transported by rail. Using this analysis, we identified the 10  counties with the highest volumes of crude oil and other hazardous  materials transported by rail within each of the five PHMSA regions in four  categories: (1) urban counties with carloads of crude oil, (2) rural counties  with carloads of crude oil, (3) urban counties with carloads of hazardous  materials other than crude oil, and (4) rural counties with carloads of other  hazmat. From this list, we identified 30 counties (three urban and three  rural in each of the five PHMSA regions) to interview and were able to  contact local emergency planning officials from LEPCs in 25 of the 30 counties. (Five counties did not respond to our requests for interviews.)  We received completed questionnaires from 24 of 25 counties and  interviewed local emergency planners from 25 counties—specifically at  least two urban and at least two rural counties across all but one PHMSA  region for a total of 25 local emergency planners across 17 states.  Because our work was based on a nonprobability sample of counties, the  information we obtained and present in this report should not be regarded  as an exhaustive list of factors local emergency planners may consider as  affecting preparedness for rail incidents involving hazardous materials.  Similarly, the information and perspectives that we obtained from these  local emergency planners are not generalizable to other local planners or  counties.
We identified the 17 SERCs to interview based on the location of the four  urban and four rural counties that had the highest volumes of hazardous  materials in each of the 5 PHMSA regions we selected. Finally, we  interviewed representatives from associations representing local  emergency responders, such as the International Association of Fire  Chiefs, the National Volunteer Fire Council, and the International  Association of Fire Fighters about factors affecting preparedness.
To understand the actions Class I and selected other railroads report  having taken to support local emergency planners’ preparedness for rail  accidents involving hazardous materials, we developed a questionnaire  and administered it to all seven Class I railroads and to six smaller  regional and short line railroads, known as Class II and Class III  railroads. We interviewed 5 of 7 Class I railroads (selected in no priority order but which could be scheduled soonest) to develop an  understanding of the types of training and other resources railroads  provide to local emergency responders. We developed the  questionnaire based on our analysis of information gathered from  interviews with stakeholders—such as five of seven Class I railroads, the  Association of American Railroads (AAR), American Short Line and  Regional Railroad Association, a SERC, two LEPCs, and FRA, among  others—who were knowledgeable about hazardous materials information  sharing, emergency preparedness and response training, community  awareness efforts, and railroad response to hazardous materials  accidents. The Class II and Class III railroads were selected using the  Surface Transportation Board’s 2013 Carload Waybill sample to identify  those railroads that operate in counties where we conducted structured  interviews with local emergency planners and to obtain variation in  railroads operating in urban and rural counties. We sent our questionnaire  to two Class II railroads and four Class III railroads and received  responses from both Class II railroads and two Class III railroads.  Because our work was based on a nonprobability sample of Class II and  Class III railroads, the results of the questionnaires with the smaller  railroads cannot be generalized to the entire population of Class II and  Class III railroads. We also reviewed AAR’s Recommended Railroad  Operating Practices for Transportation of Hazardous Materials and  railroad documents such as emergency planning guides, examples of  reports railroads sent to emergency planners, responder requests for  information about hazardous commodities transported in their  communities, and training and outreach material provided to local  emergency responders such as the Transportation Community  Awareness and Emergency Response training program. We also  interviewed officials from AAR, the American Short Line and Regional  Railroad Association, and the International Association of Sheet Metal,  Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers about railroad requirements and  actions for emergency preparedness and response to hazardous  materials accidents, such as the development of electronic applications  that can be used by emergency responders to identify commodities in the  event of a hazardous materials accident. We also reviewed information  on railroad websites, which are used to provide information to  communities about hazardous materials and railroad response to  accidents.
To understand DOT’s actions to support preparedness for rail accidents  involving hazardous materials and additional actions, if any, it could take,  we reviewed pertinent FRA and PHMSA documents related to these  actions, including training materials and guidance, grant program  documentation, and documentation on efforts to oversee the  implementation of requirements for railroads to share information on train  contents and movements related to the May 2014 Emergency  Restriction/Prohibition Order (Emergency Order). We also reviewed  comments the agency received related to the Emergency Order as part of  its Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational  Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains rulemaking. We compared  the agency’s efforts to oversee implementation of information-sharing  requirements for railroads with pertinent Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government and identified criteria about how agencies  should review internal control activities to ensure they are implemented  properly, particularly after a program change. In addition, we analyzed  information obtained from interviews with local emergency planners on  how they used the information provided by railroads and with emergency  planners from SERCs, including information provided in response to the  Emergency Order, and their views on the usefulness of the information to  support preparedness and response efforts. We also reviewed PHMSA  guidance on Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP)  planning and training grants, Hazardous Materials Instructor Training  grants, and Supplemental Public Sector Training grants. We analyzed  information obtained from interviews with SERC emergency planners on  how they used the PHMSA’s HMEP grants. These stakeholders were  chosen because their state coincided with the geographic location of the  local emergency planners we selected, as discussed above. We also  interviewed PHMSA and FRA officials about recent DOT actions to  support emergency preparedness and response to rail hazardous  materials accidents, such as the development of the crude oil reference  sheet, the Transportation Rail Incident Preparedness and Response  training program, and the Assistance for Local Emergency Response  Training and Community Safety Grants grant programs.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 through November  2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Transportation
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual name above, Nancy Lueke (Assistant  Director), Chris Keisling, Gail Marnik (Analyst in Charge), David Hooper,  John Mingus, Joshua Ormond, Jaclyn Nelson, Amy Rosewarne, Kelly  Rubin, Jim Russell, and Chad Williams made key contributions to this  report.