Iraq: DOD Needs to Improve Visibility and Accountability Over Equipment Provided to Iraq's Security Forces
Published: 2017-05-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:
The United States has provided over $2 billion in equipment to Iraq's security forces through the Iraq Train and Equip Fund to counter the expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
However, the Department of Defense does not collect timely and accurate transportation information about the equipment purchased through the fund. As a result, DOD can't demonstrate that this equipment reached its intended destinations in Iraq. We recommended that DOD improve its systems and procedures (such as how it records key transportation data) to better track this equipment.

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2014, Congress authorized the creation of ITEF to provide equipment and other assistance to Iraq's security forces, including the Kurdistan Regional Government forces, to counter the expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. As of December 2016, DOD had disbursed about $2 billion of the $2.3 billion Congress appropriated for ITEF in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 to purchase, for example, personal protective equipment, weapons, and vehicles for these forces. DOD's web-based SCIP provides U.S. government personnel and others transportation information on DOD equipment imported from other DOD data systems or reported by SCIP users.
GAO was asked to review DOD's accountability of ITEF-funded equipment. This report assesses the extent to which DOD maintains visibility and accountability of ITEF-funded equipment from acquisition through transfer to the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government. GAO analyzed DOD guidance, procedures, SCIP data, and transfer documentation and interviewed officials from DOD agencies with a role in the ITEF equipping process in the United States, Kuwait, and Iraq.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains limited visibility and accountability over equipment funded by the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF). Specifically, DOD is not ensuring that the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) is consistently capturing key transportation dates of ITEF-funded equipment. DOD guidance states that DOD components should use SCIP to identify the status and track the transportation of all building partner capacity materiel, such as ITEF. DOD also issued an order in October 2016 requiring DOD components to ensure that equipment transfer dates are recorded in SCIP. The process for providing the equipment to Iraq's security forces generally falls into three phases: (1) acquisition and shipment, (2) staging in Kuwait and Iraq, and (3) transfer to the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government. However, for the 566 ITEF-funded requisitions marked as complete in SCIP's management reporting system as of February 2017, GAO found that the system captured one of two key transportation dates for 256 of the requisitions in phase 1, and none of the transportation dates for these requisitions in phase 2 or phase 3 (see figure).
DOD officials attributed the lack of key transportation dates in SCIP's management reporting system to potential interoperability and data reporting issues in all three equipping phases.
Interoperability issues. DOD officials said that SCIP's management reporting system may not be importing transportation data correctly from other DOD data systems or from another shipment tracking system feature in SCIP.
Data reporting issues. DOD officials said they are not reporting the arrival dates of equipment to Kuwait or Iraq because they rely on other DOD data systems and are not required to do so. DOD officials said they have had difficulty ensuring that SCIP has captured equipment transfer dates.
In addition, DOD cannot fully account for ITEF-funded equipment transfers because of missing or incomplete transfer documentation. Without timely and accurate transit information, DOD cannot ensure that the equipment has reached its intended destination, nor can program managers conduct effective oversight of ITEF-funded equipment.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is making four recommendations that include identifying the root causes for addressing why DOD is not capturing ITEF-funded equipment transportation dates in SCIP and developing an action plan to address these issues. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and stated that it would develop a plan.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 2013 and 2014, the self-declared Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)  seized control of large areas of territory in Iraq and Syria, emerging as a  major threat to both countries and to U.S. interests in the region. In fiscal  years 2015 and 2016, Congress appropriated $2.3 billion to the  Department of Defense (DOD) for the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)  to provide assistance, including equipment, to military and other security  forces of or associated with the government of Iraq. These forces  included the government of Iraq’s Army, Counter Terrorism Service, and  Tribal Security Forces and the Kurdistan Regional Government’s  Peshmerga. The Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent  Resolve (CJTF-OIR), located in Kuwait and Iraq, manages and executes  ITEF-funded assistance in coordination with the Department of State’s  Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I). Multiple other DOD  components, such as the 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1st TSC),  are responsible for providing information on the status of the equipment at  different phases of the ITEF equipping process from acquisition through  its transfer to government of Iraq or Kurdistan Regional Government  officials. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) maintains a  secure web-based Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) to,  among other things, provide U.S. government personnel and others  transportation information on DOD-purchased equipment for foreign  governments.
You asked us to review DOD’s ability to account for ITEF-funded  equipment intended for Iraq’s security forces. This report examines the  extent to which DOD maintains visibility and accountability over ITEF- funded equipment from acquisition through transfer to the government of  Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government. According to DOD’s Strategy  for Improving Asset Visibility, asset visibility provides commanders and  planners with “one stop shopping” for timely and accurate information on  the location, movement, and status of equipment and supplies, among  other things. We have previously reported that limitations in DOD’s  visibility of equipment and supplies in transit, such as incomplete delivery  data for many surface shipments and inadequate radio-frequency  identification information to track cargo movements, have made it difficult  for DOD to obtain timely and accurate information on these assets.
To determine the extent to which DOD maintains visibility and  accountability over ITEF-funded equipment, we reviewed DOD guidance.  We also interviewed DOD officials from DOD components responsible for  tracking ITEF-funded equipment during different phases of the equipping  process in the United States, Kuwait, and Iraq, and the Department of  State’s OSC-I. We reviewed ITEF-funded equipment tracking reports from  the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), the U.S. Army  TACOM Life Cycle Management Command, and the U.S. Army Joint  Munitions Command. We examined ITEF-funded equipment requisitions  marked as “supply/services complete” in SCIP to determine whether key  transportation dates of these requisitions were captured in SCIP. DOD  considers “supply/services complete” when all items and services have  been delivered and performed. It was beyond the scope of this review to  determine the extent to which the ITEF-funded equipment requisitions  had been correctly marked as complete for supply and services.  However, we did report where ITEF-funded equipment requisitions  marked as complete for supply and services were lacking key information.  In the body of this report, we detail how the lack of complete key  information means that these data cannot be used to maintain visibility  and accountability of ITEF-funded equipment. We determined the extent  to which DOD accounts for ITEF-funded equipment transferred to the  government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government by reviewing  the 1st TSC’s standard operating procedures for ensuring the  accountability of the ITEF-funded equipment and transfer documentation  provided by the 1st TSC between March 2015 and April 2016. We also  interviewed 1st TSC officials. For more information on our objectives,  scope, and methodology, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2016 to May 2017  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: ITEF Equipment-Related Authorization and Funding
paragraphs: Congress authorized ITEF in December 2014 to provide assistance,  including training and equipment, to military and other security forces of,  or associated with, the government of Iraq, including Kurdish and Tribal  Security Forces or other local security forces with a national security  mission. As of December 31, 2016, DOD had obligated about $2.2 billion  of the $2.3 billion Congress appropriated for ITEF in fiscal years 2015 and  2016 and had disbursed about $2 billion. See figure 1 for examples of  equipment that DOD purchased with these funds, according to DOD  documents.
section_title: ITEF Equipping Process and Responsibilities of DOD Components
paragraphs: The process for providing ITEF-funded equipment to Iraq’s security forces  generally falls into three phases: (1) acquisition and shipment, (2) staging  in Kuwait and Iraq, and (3) transfer to the government of Iraq or the  Kurdistan Regional Government (see fig. 2).
Multiple DOD components are responsible for ensuring the visibility and  accountability of ITEF-funded equipment throughout the ITEF equipping  process up until U.S. personnel in Iraq transfer the equipment to vetted  officials from the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional  Government. For example:  In addition to maintaining SCIP, DSCA oversees program  administration for the ITEF program and provides overall guidance to  DOD components through its Security Assistance Management  Manual (SAMM) and associated policy memos.
CJTF-OIR manages the ITEF program for the U.S. Central Command  (USCENTCOM) and maintains overall responsibility for providing  ITEF assistance to Iraq’s security forces.
DOD’s primary implementing agency, USASAC—supported by other  DOD agencies—maintains overall responsibility for case  development, execution, and closure.
The Department of State’s OSC-I supports CJTF-OIR through each  phase of the ITEF equipping process. It is also responsible for  communicating ITEF program objectives to government of Iraq or  Kurdistan Regional Government officials.
The 1st TSC, in coordination with CJTF-OIR and OSC-I, receives,  stages, and transports ITEF-funded equipment in Kuwait and Iraq and  oversees the transfer of the equipment to vetted government of Iraq or  Kurdistan Regional Government officials in Iraq.
section_title: ITEF Case Management
paragraphs: DOD generally administers ITEF-funded equipment purchases as  individual building partnership capacity cases within the U.S.  government’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) infrastructure. An individual  case may have multiple—sometimes thousands—of requisitions or  procurement actions. DOD assigns a unique case identification number  for each case so that DOD entities can track the case throughout the  equipping process.
section_title: Use of Security Cooperation Information Portal
paragraphs: According to DSCA documents, SCIP is designed to provide end-to-end  transit visibility, including the status of defense articles and services, of  FMS and building partner capacity cases to designated U.S. government  personnel and representatives of foreign countries. It consolidates case  data, including transportation information, into one place so that  customers and program managers can have readily available information  on the status of their cases. The portal imports case-related data from  other DOD data systems containing logistics and transportation  information, and SCIP users can also report data directly in SCIP. It is  accessible over the Internet to authorized users anywhere in the world.
SCIP includes a variety of different features for tracking defense articles  and services, including equipment, which are organized into 13 different  groups. Two of these 13 groups are the Security Cooperation  Management Suite (SCMS) group and the Case Execution group (see fig.  3).
The SCMS group—SCIP’s management reporting system—provides   program managers and participants for Iraq and other countries with  customizable and ad hoc management reports on the status of FMS  and building partnership capacity cases. SCMS is populated with data  from other groups within SCIP, DOD external data systems, and SCIP  users.
The Case Execution group contains the Enhanced Freight Tracking  System (EFTS), a tracking system within SCIP containing building  partner capacity and FMS shipment information. DSCA designed  EFTS to serve as the single, authoritative tracking system for FMS  and building partner capacity shipments. EFTS supplements and pulls  shipment information from external DOD data systems. DOD  personnel can also report shipment information, including transfer  dates of equipment to the foreign government, directly in EFTS.  According to a DSCA official, EFTS data should be captured in  SCMS.
Figure 3 below shows the relationship between EFTS and SCMS,  including how each is populated.
section_title: DOD Maintains Limited Visibility and Accountability of ITEF-funded Equipment Using SCIP
paragraphs: DOD components do not ensure that SCIP consistently captures key  transportation dates of equipment funded by ITEF during each of the  three phases of the ITEF equipping process. According to the DSCA  SAMM, DOD components should use SCIP to identify the status and  track the transportation of all building partner capacity materiel, such as  ITEF. Furthermore, USCENTCOM ordered the 1st TSC, in coordination  with a USASAC program manager, to ensure that ITEF-funded equipment  transfer information is properly recorded in SCIP. Our analysis of  completed ITEF-funded requisitions in SCMS, SCIP’s management  reporting system, found that SCMS captured about 11 percent of 2,264  key transportation dates in all three equipping phases. DOD officials said  that SCMS is not capturing such dates because of potential  interoperability and data reporting issues in SCIP and other DOD data  systems. Although DOD officials in Kuwait stated that they had begun to  report some ITEF-funded equipment transfer dates in SCIP, DOD officials  and contractors have had difficulty locating these dates in SCIP. DOD  also could not fully account for ITEF-funded equipment transferred to the  government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government because of  missing or incomplete transfer documentation.
subsections: section_title: DOD Does Not Consistently Capture in SCIP Key Transportation Dates of ITEF-Funded Equipment in Phase 1 of the ITEF Equipping Process
paragraphs: Our analysis of 566 completed ITEF-funded equipment requisitions  recorded in SCIP’s SCMS found that DOD components are not following  the SAMM to consistently capture key transportation dates of ITEF- funded equipment in phase 1 of the ITEF equipping process in SCIP.  For example, we found that only 256 of the 1,132 key transportation dates  in phase 1 (about 23 percent) were captured in SCIP’s SCMS as of  February 10, 2017. Specifically, 256 of the 566 requisitions included the  date the equipment arrived at the last point of departure in the United  States, and none of the 566 requisitions included the date the equipment  was shipped from the United States to Kuwait or Iraq (see fig. 4).
DSCA officials responsible for the management of SCIP’s SCMS  attributed this lack of data to three potential issues related to  interoperability in SCIP and external DOD data systems and data  reporting in SCIP. First, SCMS may not be importing data correctly from  other DOD data systems used by DOD components to track ITEF-funded  equipment in phase 1. Second, SCMS may not be importing transportation data correctly from EFTS within SCIP as intended. Third,  DOD components may not be reporting key transportation dates in EFTS  or SCMS. For example, according to USASAC officials, USASAC does  not report any ITEF-funded transportation dates in EFTS or SCMS  because they rely on other DOD data systems for this information which  officials said should be captured in SCIP. While USASAC provides some  visibility on the transportation of ITEF-funded equipment to Kuwait or Iraq  by case in daily tracking reports it produces based on information from  other DOD data systems, these reports do not provide end-to-end transit  visibility of the equipment from acquisition to transfer to the government of  Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government. We did not independently  determine the root cause for why these key transportation dates were not  consistently captured in SCMS. By not ensuring that these key  transportation dates in phase 1 are captured in SCIP’s SCMS, DOD  components do not have readily available information to maintain visibility  over and account for all ITEF-funded equipment.
section_title: DOD Is Not Capturing in SCIP Arrival Dates of ITEF-Funded Equipment to Kuwait and Iraq in Phase 2 of the ITEF Equipping Process
paragraphs: Our analysis of 566 completed ITEF-funded requisitions recorded in  SCIP’s SCMS as of February 10, 2017 found that DOD components are  not following the SAMM to capture the arrival dates of ITEF-funded  equipment to Kuwait or Iraq in phase 2 of the ITEF equipping process in  SCIP. Specifically, none of the 566 requisitions included the date the  equipment arrived at U.S. staging facilities in Kuwait or Iraq (see fig. 5).
DSCA officials responsible for managing SCIP’s SCMS said that they did  not know why the arrival dates of ITEF-funded equipment were not being  captured in SCMS and cited the same potential interoperability and data  reporting issues for the lack of data in phase 2 as they did in phase 1.  Also, USASAC officials responsible for overseeing the delivery of ITEF- funded equipment to Kuwait or Iraq said that they do not report the arrival  dates of the equipment in SCIP, as they rely on other DOD data systems  for this information, which they said should feed into SCIP. USASAC’s  daily tracking reports contain some information on the arrival dates of  ITEF-funded equipment that officials said they obtain from other DOD  data systems, but this information is not captured in SCMS and therefore  is not readily accessible to DOD program managers. USASAC officials  said that they do not track ITEF-funded equipment beyond its arrival to  Kuwait or Iraq as they consider shipment complete once it arrives in  Kuwait or Iraq and the 1st TSC, in coordination with CJTF-OIR, receives  the equipment.
According to 1st TSC officials responsible for the receiving, storing, and  transporting of ITEF-funded equipment in Kuwait and Iraq, the 1st TSC  does not report in SCIP and has no plans to report the arrival dates of  ITEF-funded equipment to Kuwait or Iraq because it is not required to do  so. These officials said that guidance in the SAMM does not assign  specific responsibilities to the 1st TSC, and that the 1st TSC has not been  directed by USCENTCOM to implement any policies or procedures  outlined in the SAMM. 1st TSC officials said that they use their own  internal spreadsheets to account for on-hand quantities of equipment at  U.S. staging facilities in Kuwait and Iraq. In March 2017, 1st TSC officials  said that they implemented the U.S. Army’s automated Global Combat  Support System—a logistics and financial management system that does  not feed into SCIP, according to 1st TSC officials—to account for the on- hand quantities of ITEF-funded equipment in Kuwait and Iraq. A  September 2016 DOD Inspector General report found that DOD did not  have accurate, up-to-date records on the quantity and location of ITEF- funded equipment in Kuwait and Iraq and lacked effective controls for  maintaining visibility and accountability of ITEF-funded equipment in  Kuwait and Iraq. The DOD Inspector General recommended that the 1st  TSC use automated systems to account for and provide complete  visibility of ITEF-funded equipment. We did not independently determine  the root cause for why the arrival dates of ITEF-funded equipment to  Kuwait or Iraq were not consistently captured in SCMS. Without up-to- date information in SCIP’s SCMS on the arrival dates of ITEF-funded  equipment, DOD components will not have access to timely and relevant  management information at a key stage of the ITEF equipping process.
section_title: DOD Is Not Consistently Capturing in SCIP ITEF- Funded Equipment Transfer Dates to the Government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government in Phase 3 of the ITEF Equipping Process
paragraphs: Our analysis of 566 completed ITEF-funded requisitions recorded in  SCIP’s SCMS as of February 10, 2017 found that DOD components had  not consistently followed the SAMM or a USCENTCOM order to capture  the transfer dates of ITEF-funded equipment to the government of Iraq or  the Kurdistan Regional Government in phase 3 of the ITEF equipping  process in SCIP. Specifically, none of the 566 requisitions included the  transfer date of the equipment to the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan  Regional Government (see fig. 6).
Between August 2016 and April 2017, DOD took steps to report the  transfer dates of some ITEF-funded equipment in EFTS as required by  the DSCA SAMM; however, DOD officials and contractors have had  difficulty locating these dates in EFTS because of a lack of clear  procedures for reporting these dates. In August 2016, after we informed  OSC-I officials of a reporting requirement in the DSCA SAMM, 1st TSC  officials said that they began reporting ITEF-funded equipment transfer  dates to the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government of  previously transferred equipment in EFTS within SCIP. Soon thereafter,  in October 2016, USCENTCOM issued an order requiring the 1st TSC, in  coordination with a USASAC program manager, to ensure that ITEF- funded equipment transfer information is properly recorded in EFTS.  According to 1st TSC officials, in late December 2016, 1st TSC began  reporting the transfer dates of any new equipment transfers in EFTS as  they occurred, in addition to continuing to report the transfer dates of  previously transferred equipment in EFTS.
In February 2017, however, when we asked the DSCA contractor  responsible for the management of EFTS to provide us with the transfer  dates of ITEF-funded equipment that 1st TSC officials said they had  reported in EFTS, the contractor could not locate the transfer dates. The  DSCA contractor said that EFTS does not contain a dedicated data field  for capturing the transfer dates of building partnership capacity materiel,  including ITEF-funded equipment, and DSCA has not provided guidance  on what data field should be used to capture these dates. As a result, he  did not know which data field the 1st TSC had used to report the transfer  dates. In addition, our review of the 1st TSC’s written procedures for  ensuring the accountability and transferring of ITEF-funded equipment  found that they did not specify under which data field ITEF-funded  equipment transfer dates should be reported. In April 2017, 1st TSC  officials identified the data field in EFTS that they were using to report the  transfer dates of ITEF-funded equipment and provided evidence that they  had reported transfer dates for about 5,000 ITEF-funded equipment  requisitions in EFTS as of March 2017. According to DSCA officials,  SCMS should automatically capture all transfer dates of equipment  reported in EFTS. DSCA officials responsible for the management of  SCMS said that SCMS may not importing the transfer dates from EFTS  as intended because of interoperability issues with EFTS. By not  capturing the transfer dates of ITEF-funded equipment in SCMS or EFTS,  DOD components’ visibility over the amount of ITEF-funded equipment  transferred to the government of Iraq is limited.
Furthermore, DSCA officials said that SCIP users may need additional  guidance for reporting all key transportation dates in SCIP. These officials  said that they held a symposium in January 2017 to discuss general  interoperability and reporting issues within SCIP and planned to provide  additional guidance on the roles of DOD components for reporting data to  EFTS and SCMS but did not specify a time frame for doing so.
section_title: DOD Cannot Fully Account for ITEF-Funded Equipment Transferred to the Government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government
paragraphs: The 1st TSC cannot fully account for ITEF-funded equipment transferred  to the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government because  of missing or incomplete transfer documentation. 1st TSC officials said  that they are missing an unknown number of hand-completed U.S.  transfer and receipt forms used to document the transfer of ITEF-funded  equipment. According to the 1st TSC’s standard operating procedures for  ensuring the accountability of ITEF-funded equipment, 1st TSC officials  are required to complete a U.S. transfer and receipt form to document the  transfer of ITEF-funded equipment to a government of Iraq or Kurdistan  Regional Government official. The command developed these procedures  in November 2015—about 6 months after ITEF-funded equipment began  arriving in Kuwait and Iraq, according to 1st TSC officials—and updated  the procedures in April 2016 and November 2016. In January 2017, 1st  TSC officials said that they were missing the required U.S. transfer and  receipt forms for some equipment transfers, based on their review of the  transfer documentation. 1st TSC officials said that they would not know  the amount of equipment with missing transfer and receipt forms until  they completed their analysis of the documents, which 1st TSC officials  and a USASAC program manager located in Kuwait estimated could take  until the summer of 2017.
Moreover, we found that the majority of the U.S. transfer and receipt  forms the 1st TSC had on hand as of April 2016 were not complete. We  reviewed all of the U.S. transfer and receipt forms documenting ITEF- funded equipment transfers that the 1st TSC had on hand as of April  2016. Of the 284 U.S. transfer and receipt forms dated between March  2015 and April 2016 that we reviewed, we found that almost all of the  forms were signed by a government of Iraq or Kurdistan Regional  Government official but more than half of the forms did not contain the  date of transfer of the equipment (see fig. 7).
The 1st TSC also provided 48 internal memos dated between October  2015 and February 2016 from a 1st TSC official seeking to reconcile  discrepancies he found in the documentation, such as missing serial  numbers for weapons. In one memo, the official said that the required  U.S. transfer and receipt form documenting the transfer of ammunition  was missing. 1st TSC officials acknowledged that they did not know  whether these forms represented the total number of ITEF-funded  equipment items transferred to the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan  Regional Government as of April 2016. Without complete transfer  documentation, 1st TSC officials cannot accurately determine how much  ITEF-funded equipment has been transferred to the government of Iraq or  the Kurdistan Regional Government, nor can they ensure that this  equipment was transferred to the appropriate foreign official.
In addition, we found that most of the transfer documentation lacked case  identifier information, which would help ensure that DOD personnel are  able to track ITEF-funded equipment throughout the equipment process.  Of the 284 U.S. transfer and receipt forms we reviewed, only 95  contained unique case identifier information. The director of the 1st TSC’s  equipping team said that the lack of case identifier information on the  transfer documentation has significantly slowed his team’s progress in  reporting the transfer dates of previously transferred ITEF-funded  equipment to EFTS. As a result, the director said that he issued a verbal  order in August 2016 requiring 1st TSC personnel to include case  identifier information on the transfer and receipt forms documenting the  transfer of equipment as well as on DOD orders to move ITEF-funded  equipment within Kuwait and Iraq. He said that including the case  identifier information would help ensure that 1st TSC personnel could link  equipment items with their case information in SCIP.
The 1st TSC’s Standard Operating Procedures for ensuring the  accountability of ITEF-funded equipment, however, do not include this  requirement. The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government require management to complete timely reviews of  significant changes to an entity’s process and procedures and ensure that  the entity’s policies and procedures achieve its objectives. 1st TSC  officials said in March 2017 that they would begin the process of updating  their Standard Operating Procedures to reflect their recent  implementation of the U.S. Army’s Global Combat Support System for  accounting for ITEF-funded equipment in late April 2017. 1st TSC  personnel rotate in and out of Kuwait and Iraq about every 9 months with  the last rotation of 1st TSC personnel having occurred in December 2016,  according to 1st TSC officials. Without accurate and up-to-date written  procedures, new personnel may not be aware of the verbal order, thus  increasing the risk that they will not follow the order and limiting the 1st  TSC’s ability to account for the equipment.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: ISIS continues to be a major threat to both Iraq and Syria and to U.S.  interests in the region. The congressional appropriation of $2.3 billion for  ITEF in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 has enabled DOD to provide critical  equipment to Iraq’s security forces for their counter-ISIS efforts. However,  DOD’s ability to maintain visibility and accountability over ITEF-funded  equipment remains limited. DOD designed SCIP to help DOD  components maintain end-to-end visibility of DOD equipment, including  ITEF-funded equipment, but DOD components do not use SCIP as  intended because of potential interoperability and data reporting issues  within SCIP and other DOD data systems. In addition, missing and  incomplete ITEF-funded equipment transfer documentation further affects  DOD’s ability to maintain complete visibility and accountability over ITEF- funded equipment. Since 1st TSC personnel rotate about every 9 months,  it is essential that the 1st TSC maintain updated standard operating  procedures that reflect significant changes to its processes for ensuring  the accountability of ITEF-funded equipment, including documenting a  verbal order that unique case identifiers be included on transfer  documentation so that 1st TSC personnel are able to properly record  ITEF-funded transfer dates in SCIP. Without timely and accurate transit  information on the status of ITEF-funded equipment, DOD cannot ensure  that the equipment has reached its intended destination, nor can DOD  program managers conduct effective oversight of the ITEF program.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that DOD program managers have the necessary information  to maintain complete visibility and accountability of ITEF-funded  equipment in SCIP, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take  the following four actions:  1.  Identify the root causes, such as potential interoperability and data  reporting issues within SCIP and other DOD data systems, for why  DOD components are not ensuring that ITEF-funded equipment  transportation dates are captured in SCIP.  2.  Develop an action plan with associated milestones and time frames  for addressing the root causes for why DOD components are not  ensuring that ITEF-funded equipment transportation dates are  captured in SCIP.  3.  Develop written procedures that specify under which data field ITEF- funded equipment transfer dates should be captured in EFTS in SCIP.  4.  Update the 1st TSC’s written standard operating procedures to  include the 1st TSC commander’s verbal order requiring the inclusion  of unique equipment case identifier information for ITEF-funded  equipment on transfer documentation.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its  written comments, reproduced in appendix II, DOD concurred with three  recommendations and partially concurred with a fourth recommendation.  DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate. DOD concurred with our first two recommendations, to  identify why DOD components are not ensuring that ITEF-funded  equipment transportation dates are captured in SCIP and to develop an  action plan for addressing these issues. The department commented that  it had begun identifying the root causes of the data reporting issues in  SCIP and would provide GAO the reasons for these issues within 30 days  of the issuance of GAO’s report. The department also commented that it  would develop an action plan with a timeline to measure progress in  addressing the root causes and would notify GAO when these were  addressed. DOD also concurred with the recommendation that the 1st  TSC update its written standard operating procedures to include a verbal  order requiring the inclusion of unique equipment case identifier  information for ITEF-funded equipment transfer documentation. The  department said that the 1st TSC planned to update its written  procedures to include this verbal order by May 31, 2017.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that DOD develop  written procedures for reporting ITEF-funded equipment transfer dates in  EFTS in SCIP. The department commented that the relevant  organizations have most, if not all, of the written procedures that are  necessary for reporting these dates in EFTS. However, the department  said it would coordinate with all interested parties to ensure that the  required written procedures exist and to update those documents if  needed. GAO continues to believe that additional written procedures are  needed and modified the language of our recommendation to specify that  DOD include in its written procedures the EFTS data field in which ITEF- funded equipment transfer dates should be captured. Although the 1st  TSC has written procedures on how personnel can upload some transfer  information into SCIP, the procedures do not clearly state which data field  in EFTS should be used to capture the transfer dates of ITEF-funded  equipment to the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional  Government. As a result, DOD personnel and contractors have had  difficulty locating these dates, which 1st TSC officials said they have  uploaded to EFTS. Providing clear procedures on the data field to be  used to capture ITEF-funded equipment transfer dates would help ensure  that DOD personnel responsible for managing ITEF are able to locate  these dates in EFTS as needed.
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If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-6991 or farbj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff members who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope & Methodology
paragraphs: This review examines the extent to which the Department of Defense  (DOD) maintains visibility and accountability over Iraq Train and Equip  (ITEF)-funded equipment from acquisition through transfer to the  government of Iraq or Kurdistan Regional Government.
To examine the extent to which DOD maintains visibility and  accountability of ITEF-funded equipment, we reviewed DOD guidance in  the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)’s Security Assistance  Management Manual (SAMM), including a requirement to report the  transfer dates of building partner capacity materiel in the Enhanced  Freight Tracking System (EFTS) within the Security Cooperation  Information Portal (SCIP) or to DSCA. We interviewed DOD officials from  DOD components responsible for managing or tracking ITEF-funded  equipment through different phases of the equipping process to  understand their processes for providing visibility over ITEF-funded  equipment. These components included the Combined Joint Task Force- Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), U.S. Army Security Assistance  Command (USASAC), U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management  Command, and the 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1st TSC). We  reviewed USASAC, U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management  Command, and U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command’s status reports on  ITEF-funded equipment. We also interviewed officials from the  Department of State’s Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq to understand  their role in providing visibility of ITEF-funded equipment.
In addition, to determine the extent to which DOD components ensured  that SCIP captured key transportation dates of ITEF-funded equipment,  we analyzed data from SCIP’s Security Cooperation Management Suite  (SCMS) by running two reports from SCMS on February 10, 2017.
First, we ran a report to determine the total universe of cases and  their corresponding requisitions for which ITEF funds had been  obligated. We determined that this universe consisted of 13,674 ITEF- funded equipment requisitions.
Second, we ran a report to determine how many of the 13,674 ITEF- funded equipment requisitions had all items and services delivered  and performed. Specifically, we ran a report of cases and their  corresponding requisitions that DOD had marked in SCMS as  “supply/services complete” because DOD considered all of the items  and services delivered and performed for these requisitions. Using  this designation, we determined that 566 ITEF-funded equipment  requisitions were marked as “supply/services complete.”
In using the term requisitions, we mean lines of data entries in SCMS by  case that contain a unique combination of requisition numbers and/or  transportation control numbers. In our analysis, we noted some  requisition numbers that applied to multiple lines of entries as well as  some transportation control numbers that applied to multiple lines of  entries; however, we found no exact duplicates by entry. Our analysis  focused on completeness of these records, which is where we found the  deficiencies noted in the body of this report. It was beyond the scope of  this review to assess the accuracy of the requisition numbers,  transportation control numbers, and any dates entered into SCMS. In  addition, we were not able to determine the extent to which ITEF-funded  equipment cases and their corresponding requisitions were properly  marked as “supply/services complete” in SCMS. One reason why DOD  only marked 566 of the 13,674 ITEF-funded equipment lines of  requisitions as “supply/services complete” could be that DOD had one or  more requisitions on a case that had not yet been delivered or performed,  which prevented DOD from closing the case and marking all of the  requisitions associated with the case as “supply/services complete.” Also,  DOD may have had some ITEF-funded equipment cases and  corresponding requisitions that should have been marked as  “supply/services complete” but were not. We determined that we could  proceed with assessing the extent to which the 566 ITEF-funded  equipment requisitions that had been marked as “supply/services  complete” in SCMS had recorded key transportation dates of equipment  in SCMS for each of the three phases of the ITEF equipping process  because DOD considered all of the items and services delivered and  performed for these requisitions. We selected data fields in SCMS for  each requisition that would capture key transportation dates of ITEF- funded equipment in each of the three phases of the ITEF equipping  process. These included:  “Arrive Port of Embarkation” data field to determine whether SCMS  captured the arrival date of equipment at the last point of departure in  the United States in phase 1 of the ITEF equipping process,  “Depart Port of Embarkation” data field to determine whether SCMS  captured the departure date for equipment shipped from the United  States in phase 1 of the ITEF equipping process,  “Arrive Country” data field to determine whether SCMS captured the  arrival date of equipment in Kuwait or Iraq, and  “Customer Receipt” data field to determine whether SCMS captured  the transfer date of equipment to the government of Iraq or the  Kurdistan Regional Government.
We verified that our selection and interpretation of these data fields were  correct by reviewing DSCA-issued guidance on SCIP and consulting with  DSCA officials. In addition, we probed the 1st TSC officials’ assertion that  they had reported about 2,000 ITEF-funded equipment requisition transfer  dates in SCIP between August 2016 and January 2017 by interviewing  the contractor responsible for SCIP’s EFTS, in which these dates would  have been reported. We also reviewed additional data from him. It was  beyond the scope of this review to determine the extent to which the  13,674 ITEF-funded equipment requisitions had been correctly marked as  complete for supply and services, as such an analysis would have  required a reconciliation of SCIP computerized records against source  documents and other supporting materials. However, we did determine  that the 566 requisitions marked as complete for supply and services  were lacking key information, which we reported. In the body of this  report, we detail how the lack of complete key information means that  these data cannot be used to maintain visibility and accountability of  ITEF-funded equipment.
To determine the extent to which DOD accounts for ITEF-funded  equipment transferred to the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan  Regional Government, we reviewed 1st TSC transfer documentation. We  requested all U.S. transfer and receipt forms that the 1st TSC used to  document ITEF-funded equipment transfers to the government of Iraq or  the Kurdistan Regional Government and were provided with 284 forms  dated between March 2015 and April 2016. We reviewed these 284  forms to check whether they contained key information, such as  signatures and unique case identifiers. When determining whether the  forms contained transfer dates, we created a decision rule of only  counting those dates that were legible because the purpose of this review  was to assess DOD’s accountability over the equipment transferred. We  were unable to determine whether we were provided with all the  equipment transfer and receipt forms for this period because DOD does  not maintain the information that would have allowed us to do this.  Specifically, the data problems that we have noted in SCIP, in particular  the problem of missing entries, prevented us from making that  determination. We also reviewed the 1st TSC’s November 2015, April  2016, and November 2016 standard operating procedures for ensuring  the accountability of ITEF-funded equipment as well as CJTF-OIR’s June  2016 standard operating procedures for the management of ITEF. In  addition, we traveled to Kuwait and Iraq to interview DOD officials from  the 1st TSC and CJTF-OIR to understand their roles, responsibilities, and  processes for ensuring the accountability of ITEF-funded equipment.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2016 to May 2017  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Judy McCloskey (Assistant  Director), Kira Self (Analyst in Charge), Ashley Alley, Martin De Alteriis,  Lynn Cothern, Neil Doherty, Mattias Fenton, B. Patrick Hickey, and Jeff  Isaacs made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Iraq: Status of DOD Efforts to Train and Equip Iraq’s Security Forces.  GAO-17-32C. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2017.
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Footprint Poses Challenges for the Advise  and Assist Mission in Iraq. GAO-17-220C. Washington, D.C.: November  22, 2016.
Iraq: State and DOD Need to Improve Documentation and Record  Keeping for Vetting of Iraq’s Security Forces. GAO-16-658C. Washington,  D.C.: September 30, 2016.
Countering ISIS: DOD Should Develop Plans for Responding to Risks  and for Using Stockpiled Equipment No Longer Intended for Syria Train  and Equip Program. GAO-16-670C. Washington, D.C.: September 9,  2016.
Defense Logistics: DOD Has Addressed Most Reporting Requirements  and Continues to Refine Its Asset Visibility Strategy. GAO-16-88.  Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2015.
Yemen: DOD Should Improve Accuracy of Its Data on Congressional  Clearance of Projects as it Reevaluates Counterterrorism Assistance.  GAO-15-493. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2015.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-15-290. Washington, D.C.: February  11, 2015.
Countering Overseas Threats: DOD and State Need to Address Gaps in  Monitoring of Security Equipment Transferred to Lebanon. GAO-14-161.  Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2014.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-13-283. Washington, D.C.: February  2013.
Security Assistance: DOD’s Ongoing Reforms Address Some  Challenges, but Additional Information is Needed to Further Enhance  Program Management. GAO-13-84. Washington, D.C.: November 16,  2012.