2020 Census: Sustained Attention to Innovations, IT Systems, and Cost Estimation Is Needed
Published: 2017-05-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:
The 2010 Census was the costliest in the nation's history—roughly $12.3 billion.
The U.S. Census Bureau is planning innovations for the 2020 Census which may lower costs, including re-engineering field operations and allowing the public to respond using the Internet. While these innovations show promise for controlling costs, their novelty also introduces new risks.
In today's testimony we discuss the Bureau's need to fully test these new procedures, as well as the need to address challenges related to IT programs and systems supporting the 2020 Census. We also found the Bureau's cost estimate for the upcoming census to be unreliable.

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: One of the most important functions of the Bureau is conducting a complete and accurate decennial census of the U.S. population, which is mandated by the Constitution and provides vital data for the nation. A complete count of the nation's population is an enormous challenge as the Bureau seeks to control the cost of the census, implement operational innovations, and use new and modified IT systems. In recent years, GAO has identified challenges that raise serious concerns about the Bureau's ability to conduct a cost-effective enumeration. For these reasons, GAO added the 2020 Census to the High-Risk List in February 2017.
In this statement, GAO discusses three challenges: (1) implementing new innovations, (2) implementing and securing critical IT systems (3) and ensuring the reliability of the Bureau's cost estimate for the 2020 Census.
The information in this testimony is based primarily on GAO's previous reports on the Bureau's planning efforts for 2020. GAO also collected and reviewed new information on the following Bureau activities: (1) recent decisions on preparations for the 2020 Census, (2) IT security testing leading up to the 2017 Census Test, (3) progress on key systems to be used for the 2018 Census Test, and (4) efforts to update its life-cycle cost estimate.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) is planning many innovations for the 2020 Census, including re-engineering field operations, using administrative records to supplement census data, verifying addresses in-office using on screen imagery, and allowing the public to respond using the Internet. These innovations show promise for controlling costs, but they also introduce new risks, in part because they include new procedures and technologies that have not been used extensively in earlier decennials, if at all. It will be important for the Bureau to fully test these activities under census-like conditions during the 2018 End-to-End Test scheduled to begin August 2017 and make appropriate modifications.
The Bureau continues to face challenges in managing and overseeing the information technology (IT) programs, systems, and contracts supporting the decennial census. These challenges include managing internal coordination and governance, contracts, schedule, scope, and IT costs. For example, GAO expects that the IT costs will rise due to increases in the scope of work for the integration contract. In addition, the Bureau needs to address several security risks and challenges to secure its systems and data, including ensuring that security assessments are completed in a timely manner. Given that the 2018 End-to-End test begins in August 2017, it will be important that the agency work to address these challenges quickly. GAO has ongoing work that is reviewing each of these challenges.
The Bureau's October 2015 cost estimate for the 2020 Census does not fully reflect characteristics of a high-quality estimate and cannot be considered reliable. Overall, GAO found that the cost estimate partially met the characteristics of two best practices (comprehensive and accurate) and minimally met the other two (well-documented and credible). Additionally, the Bureau has not published an update to its October 2015 cost estimate, yet several events since then including changes to the census design suggest that the cost of the current design (around $12.5 billion in 2020 constant dollars) could be higher than planned.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO has previously made a number of recommendations to address issues raised in this testimony, many of which have not yet been implemented.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We are pleased to be here today to discuss the U.S. Census Bureau’s  (Bureau) progress in preparing for the 2020 Decennial Census. One of  the most important functions of the Bureau is conducting the decennial  census of the U.S. population, which is mandated by the Constitution and  provides vital data for the nation. The information that the census collects  is used to apportion the seats of the U.S. House of Representatives;  redraw congressional districts; allocate billions of dollars each year in  federal financial assistance; and provide a social, demographic, and  economic profile of the nation’s people to guide policy decisions at each  level of government. Further, businesses use census data to market new  services and products and to tailor existing ones to demographic  changes.
For 2020, a complete count of the nation’s population is an enormous  challenge as the Bureau seeks to control the cost of the census while it  implements several innovations and manages the processes of acquiring  and developing new and modified information technology (IT) systems. In  recent years, we have identified challenges that raise serious concerns  about the Bureau’s ability to conduct a cost-effective count of the nation.  For these reasons we added the 2020 Decennial Census to the High-Risk  List in February 2017. Our testimony today focuses on three challenges:  (1) implementing new innovations, (2) implementing and securing critical  IT systems, and (3) and ensuring the reliability of the Bureau’s cost  estimate for the 2020 Census.
The information in this testimony is based primarily on our previous  reports on the Bureau’s planning efforts for 2020. For this work, we,  among other things, reviewed relevant Bureau documentation, including  operational plans, and cost information and interviewed knowledgeable  Bureau staff. We also collected and reviewed new information on the  following Bureau activities: (1) recent decisions on preparations for the  2020 Census, (2) IT security testing leading up to the 2017 Census Test,  (3) progress on key systems to be used for the 2018 Census Test, and  (4) efforts to update its life-cycle cost estimate. We provided a copy of the  new information we are reporting in this testimony to the Bureau for  comment on April 21, 2017. The Bureau provided technical comments,  which we addressed as appropriate. More detail on our scope and  methodology is provided in each published report on which this testimony  is based. We conducted our work in support of this testimony during April  and May 2017.
We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The cost of the census has been escalating over the last several  decennials. The 2010 decennial was the costliest U.S. Census in history  at about $12.3 billion, and was about 31 percent more costly than the  $9.4 billion 2000 Census (in 2020 dollars). The average cost for counting  a housing unit increased from about $16 in 1970 to around $92 in 2010  (in 2020 dollars). According to the Bureau, the total estimated cost of the  2020 Census is approximately $12.5 billion dollars (in 2020 dollars).  Meanwhile, the return of census questionnaires by mail (the primary  mode of data collection) declined over this period from 78 percent in 1970  to 63 percent in 2010 (see figure 1).
Declining mail response rates—a key indicator of a cost-effective  census—are significant and lead to higher costs. This is because the  Bureau sends temporary workers to each non-responding household to  obtain census data. As a result, non-response follow-up is the Bureau’s  largest and most costly field operation. In many ways, the Bureau has  had to invest substantially more resources each decade to match the  results of prior enumerations.
The 2020 Decennial Census is not the first decennial census to be on  GAO’s High- Risk-List. Both the 2000 and the 2010 Decennial Censuses  were also high-risk areas. All three of these censuses have had issues  related to technology and design changes.
Achieving a complete and accurate census is becoming an increasingly  daunting task, in part because the nation’s population is growing larger,  more diverse, and more reluctant to participate. When the census misses  a person who should have been included, it results in an undercount; an  overcount occurs when an individual  is counted more than once. Such  errors are particularly problematic because of their differential impact on  various subgroups. Minorities, renters, and children, for example, are  more likely to be undercounted by the census.
The Bureau faces an additional challenge of locating unconventional and  hidden housing units, such as converted basements and attics. For  example, as shown in figure 2, what appears to be a small, single-family  house could contain an apartment, as suggested by its two doorbells. If  an address is not in the Bureau’s address file, its residents are less likely  to be included in the census. The Bureau estimated a net undercount of  790,000 housing units in 2010.
subsections: section_title: The Bureau Has Redesigned the 2020 Census to Help Control Costs
paragraphs: The basic design of the enumeration—mail out and mail back of the  census questionnaire with in-person follow-up for non-respondents—has  been in use since 1970. A key lesson learned from 2010 and earlier  enumerations is that this “traditional” design is no longer capable of cost- effectively counting the population. In response to its own assessments,  our recommendations, and studies by other organizations, the Bureau  has fundamentally reexamined its approach for conducting the 2020  Census. Its plan for 2020 includes four broad innovation areas (re- engineered field operations, administrative records, verifying addresses  in-office, and the Internet self-response option). The Bureau believes  these innovations will save it over $5 billion (2020 dollars) when  compared to what it estimates conducting the census with traditional  methods would cost. However, in June 2016, we reported that the  Bureau’s life-cycle cost estimate of $12.5 billion cost was not reliable and  did not adequately account for risk.
To help drive these innovations, the Bureau plans to rely on about 50 IT  systems that are being developed or are already in production. Eleven of  these systems are expected to be provided by an enterprise-wide  initiative called Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing  (CEDCaP),  which is managed within the Bureau’s IT Directorate. This  initiative is a large and complex modernization program intended to  deliver a system-of-systems to support all the Bureau’s survey data  collection and processing functions, rather than continuing to rely on  unique, survey-specific systems with redundant capabilities. According to  Bureau officials, the 39 other systems (referred to as non-CEDCaP  systems) are to be provided by the 2020 Census Directorate or other  Bureau divisions.
section_title: The Bureau Needs to Manage Risks of Implementing Innovations
subsections: section_title: The Bureau Is Planning Many Previously Unused Innovations for the 2020 Census
paragraphs: The four innovation areas the Bureau plans for 2020 show promise for a  more cost-effective head count (see table 1). However, they also  introduce new risks, in part because they include new procedures and  technology that have not been used extensively in earlier decennials, if at  all. As a result, it will be imperative that the Bureau conduct a robust  testing program culminating in the 2018 End-to-End Test that is to  demonstrate the systems and operations that will be used for 2020 under  operational conditions.
On October 18, 2016, the Bureau decided to stop two field test operations  planned for fiscal year 2017 in order to mitigate risks from funding  uncertainty. Specifically, the Bureau said it would stop all planned field  activity, including local outreach and hiring, at its test sites in Puerto Rico,  North and South Dakota, and Washington State. The Bureau is not  carrying out the planned field tests of its mail-out strategy and follow up  for non-response in Puerto Rico or its door-to-door enumeration.
However, the Bureau is continuing with other planned testing in fiscal  year 2017, such as tests focusing on systems readiness and Internet  response. One of these tests, which began in March 2017, included 28 of  the roughly 50 systems to be used in 2020 operations. Further, the  Bureau said it would consider incorporating the canceled field activities  elements within the 2018 End-to-End Test, which is expected to begin in  August 2017. The Bureau maintains that stopping the 2017 Field Test will  help prioritize readiness for the 2018 End-to-End Test and mitigate risk.  Nevertheless, as we reported in November 2016, it also represents a lost  opportunity to test, refine, and integrate operations and systems, and it  puts more pressure on the 2018 test to demonstrate that enumeration  activities will function as needed for 2020.
section_title: New Uses of Administrative Records Are Promising but Introduce Challenges
paragraphs: Administrative records—information already provided to the government  as it administers other programs, such as mail collection by the U.S.  Postal Service—have been discussed and used for the decennial census  since the 1970s, but the Bureau plans a more significant role for them for  2020 to reduce fieldwork and control costs. For example, the Bureau  plans to use administrative records to help determine vacant and  occupied housing units and thus improve the efficiency of following-up  with non-respondents. The Bureau has estimated that using these  records could save up to $1.4 billion compared to traditional census  methods. In 2015, we found that the Bureau has already demonstrated  the feasibility of using administrative records. However, it still faces  challenges with using them for the 2020 Census. For example, although  the Bureau has no control over the accuracy of data provided to it by  other agencies, it is responsible for ensuring that data it uses for the 2020  Census are of sufficient quality for their planned uses.
Another challenge we identified is the extent to which the public will  accept government agencies sharing personal data for the purposes of  the census. Related concerns involve trust in the government and  perceptions about burden on respondents as well the social benefits of  agencies sharing data. Moreover, in addition to using administrative  records to reduce fieldwork, the Bureau is considering several additional  opportunities to leverage administrative records to help improve the cost  and quality of the 2020 Census. It will be important for the Bureau to set  deadlines for deciding which records it will use and for which purposes for  those records. In this way, the Bureau can monitor its progress and  prioritize which activities—or records—to continue pursuing, or to  abandon, if time becomes a constraint.
section_title: The Bureau Needs to Identify and Analyze Root Causes of Non-interviews During Testing
paragraphs: When households do not respond to the census and when the Bureau  does not obtain information about the household while knocking on doors  during its non-response follow-up operation, the Bureau may have to  impute attributes of the household based on the demographic  characteristics of surrounding housing units as well as on administrative  records. We reported in 2016 that during the Bureau’s 2016 Census Site  Test, the Bureau experienced about 20 and 30 percent of its test  workload as non-interviews at its two test sites in Harris County, Texas,  and Los Angeles County, California, respectively. According to the  Bureau, non-interviews are cases where no data or insufficient data are  collected, either because enumerators make six attempted visits without  success (the maximum number the Bureau allows), or interviews are not  completed due to, for example, language barriers or dangerous  situations. Identifying  root causes of problems is something we look for  when determining progress within a high-risk area. Accordingly, while the  2016 Census Test non-interview rate is not necessarily a precursor to the  2020 non-interview rate, because of its relationship to the cost and quality  of the census, it will be important for the Bureau to better understand the  factors contributing to it.
section_title: The Bureau Is Not Fully Prepared to Implement Key IT Capabilities
subsections: section_title: The Bureau Continues to Face Challenges in Managing and Overseeing IT Programs, Systems, and Contractors Supporting the Decennial
paragraphs: The Bureau is managing the acquisition and development of new and  modified IT systems, which adds complexity to the design of the census.  We have previously reported that the Bureau has faced challenges in  managing internal coordination and governance, contracts, schedule,  scope, and costs for its IT systems, and we have ongoing work reviewing  each of these challenges:  Internal coordination and governance. Different divisions are  responsible for acquiring and developing different systems and technology supporting the 2020 Decennial Census. Eleven of the roughly 50 systems planned to be used in the 2018 End-to-End test are being delivered by the Chief Information Officer’s (CIO) IT Directorate through the CEDCaP program, with the other 39 being managed and developed within the 2020 Census Directorate or other Bureau divisions. We have reported the Bureau has had challenges in coordinating and governing between these divisions. In August 2016 we reported that the two programs lacked effective processes for managing their schedule, risk, and requirements interdependencies.We stated that until the two programs establish schedules that are completely aligned, develop an integrated list of all interdependent risks, and finalize processes for managing requirements, both  programs are at risk of not delivering their programs as expected.
Effective IT governance can drive change, provide oversight, and ensure accountability for results. Further, effective IT governance was what Congress had in mind when it enacted the provisions known as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA), which reinforced the role of the agency CIO. To ensure executive-level oversight of the key systems and technology, the Bureau’s CIO (or a representative) is a member of governance boards that oversee all of the operations and technology for the 2020 Census. Moving forward, it will be important that the CIO and other agency executives continue to use a collaborative governance approach to effectively manage risks and ensure that the IT solutions meet the needs of the agency within cost and schedule.
Contract management. The Bureau is relying on contractor support  in many key areas of the 2020 Census, including for integrating all of  the key systems and infrastructure and developing many of the key  data collection systems. In August 2016, the Bureau hired a  contractor to integrate the 2020 Census systems and infrastructure.  The contractor’s work was to include evaluating the systems and  infrastructure and acquiring the infrastructure (e.g., cloud or data  center) to meet the Bureau’s scalability and performance needs. It  was also to include integrating all of the systems, supporting technical  testing activities, and developing plans for ensuring the continuity of  operations. Since the contract was awarded, the scope has grown to  also include assisting with operational testing activities, conducting  performance testing for two Internet self-response systems, and  technical support for the implementation of the paper data capture  system.
In addition, the Bureau is relying on contractors to develop a number  of key systems and components of the IT infrastructure. These  activities include (1) developing the IT platform that is to be used to  collect data from a majority of respondents—those using the Internet,  telephone, and non-response follow-up activities; (2) procuring the  mobile devices and cellular service to be used for non-response  follow-up; and (3) developing the IT infrastructure in the field offices.  As we reported in November 2016, a greater reliance on contractors  for these key components of the 2020 Census requires the Bureau to  focus on sound management and oversight of the key contracts,  projects, and systems.
Schedule management. In November 2016, we noted that a great  deal of development work remained to be completed for the roughly  50 systems and that the Bureau was still developing the plans and  schedules for the integration and testing of these systems leading up  to the 2018 End-to-End test. This is still the case. In addition, the  Bureau has delayed key milestone dates by about 2 months due to  issues with developing the systems. This delay reduces the time  available for the integration and security testing activities leading up to  the 2018 End-to-End test. The Bureau is evaluating options to  decrease the impact on those testing activities, and we have ongoing  work reviewing the Bureau’s schedule changes and the impacts of  those changes.
Scope and requirements management. The Bureau is still in the  midst of determining the full complement of systems to be used for the  2018 End-to-End Test (beginning in August 2017) as well as the 2020  Census. For example, the Bureau is evaluating whether to remove  several systems from the End-to-End Test. In addition, the agency is  evaluating whether to change direction on certain systems and  capabilities for the 2018 End-to-End Test. For example, it is  evaluating whether to use the newly developed internet self-response  system or a legacy prototype. Time is running out before the 2018  End-to-End Test begins, so it will be important for the Bureau to make  these decisions with enough time to implement the chosen solutions.  IT cost growth. The Bureau has identified at least $2 billion in IT  costs for the 2020 program. These costs are associated with (among  other things) contracts for the integration of 50 systems into a “system  of systems,” the infrastructure on which these systems reside, the call  centers for phone responses, the mobile devices and cellular service  for field staff who conduct the door-to-door enumeration, and a portion  of the costs for the CEDCaP program.
However, our ongoing work suggests that IT costs are likely to rise.  For example, the scope of work for the integration contract has  increased since the contract was awarded in August 2016, and the  corresponding costs are likely to rise as well. Also, the Bureau  recently reported that the overall costs for the CEDCaP program are  expected to increase by at least 10 percent. In addition, the program  is still trying to determine the full complement of systems for the 2018  test and 2020 operations, so these costs may also change. Bureau  officials reported that the agency is developing a new cost estimate  for the entire 2020 Census program, which they expect to publish later  in the spring of 2017.
section_title: The Bureau’s Information Security Challenges Have Been Exacerbated by Short Time Frames
paragraphs: In November 2016, we described the significant challenges that the  Bureau faced in securing systems and data, and we noted that tight time  frames could exacerbate these challenges. One such challenge was  making certain that security assessments were completed in a timely  manner and that risks were at an acceptable level.
To determine the level of risk present in a system, guidance from the  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) states that, as  part of their information security programs, agencies should develop  security plans, assess security controls, and develop plans of action and  milestones to address any deficiencies. The security plans, assessment  results, and plans to address deficiencies are key artifacts that  authorizing officials use to determine if the risks are acceptable. By  issuing an authorization to operate, the authorizing official accepts both  the plans to reduce identified deficiencies and any residual risk (e.g.,  unaddressed vulnerabilities) remaining from unaddressed deficiencies.  Each of the systems that the 2020 Census IT architecture plans to rely on  will need to develop security plans that identify controls to be  implemented, undergo a full security assessment, remediate critical  deficiencies, and obtain authorization to operate before being used for the  2020 Census.
However, development and acquisition delays compressed the time to  conduct the security reviews and approvals for the 28 systems being  used in the 2017 test. For 2 of the 28 systems in the test, the authorizing  officials (the CIO and the Associate Director for Decennial Census  Programs) accepted security risks and uncertainty due to these  compressed time frames. For one of the systems, Bureau officials noted  that they did not have time to thoroughly assess the low-impact  components. The officials stated that, as a result, they had low  confidence in the confidentiality, integrity, and availability  of these  components. To mitigate the risk, Bureau officials stated that they secured these components in a private network with limited user access.  In another case, the Bureau did not have the time to complete penetration  testing prior to the 2017 test. According to Bureau officials, the  authorizing officials accepted these risks because they wanted to meet  the deadline of March 20, 2017, to begin the test in order to meet the  Census Day of April 1, 2017. Bureau officials noted that they were  informed of the security situation and were comfortable with the approach  and mitigations proposed to authorize these systems for the 2017 test.
Because many of the systems that will be a part of the 2018 End-to-End  test are not yet fully developed, the Bureau has not finalized all of the  controls to be implemented; assessed those controls; developed plans to  remediate control weaknesses; and determined whether there is time to  fully remediate any deficiencies before the system test. As we previously  reported, while the large-scale technological changes (such as Internet  self-response) introduce great potential for efficiency and effectiveness  gains, they also introduce many information security challenges. Thus, it  will be important that these security assessments are completed in a  timely manner and that risks are at an acceptable level before the  systems are deployed.
section_title: The Bureau Needs to Improve the Reliability of Its 2020 Cost Estimate
subsections: section_title: Estimation Does Not Conform to Best Practices
paragraphs: In June 2016, we reported that the Bureau’s October 2015 update of the  life-cycle cost estimate for the 2020 Census did not conform to the four  characteristics that constitute best practices, and, as a result, the  estimate was unreliable. Cost estimates that appropriately account for risks facing an agency can help an agency manage large, complex  activities like the 2020 Census, as well as help Congress make funding  decisions and provide oversight. Cost estimates are also necessary to  inform decisions to fund one program over another, to develop annual  budget requests, to determine what resources are needed, and to  develop baselines for measuring performance.
In 2016, we reported that although the Bureau had taken significant steps  to improve its capacity to carry out an effective cost estimate, such as  establishing an independent cost estimation office, its October 2015  version of the estimate for the 2020 Census only partially met the  characteristics of two best practices (comprehensive and accurate) and  minimally met the other two (well-documented and credible). All four  characteristics need to be substantially met in order for an estimate to be  deemed high-quality.
For example, to be comprehensive an estimate should have enough  detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor double- counted, and all cost-influencing assumptions are detailed in the  estimate’s documentation, among other things, according to best  practices. In June 2016, we reported that while Bureau officials were  able to provide us with several documents that included projections and  assumptions that were used in the cost estimate, we found the estimate  to be partially comprehensive because it is unclear if all life-cycle costs  are included in the estimate or if the cost estimate completely defines the  program.
Accurate estimates are unbiased and contain few mathematical mistakes.  We reported that the estimate partially met best practices for this  characteristic, in part because we could not independently  verify the  calculations the Bureau used within its cost model, which the Bureau did  not have documented or explained outside its cost model. The Bureau’s  cost-estimate was also not well-documented. Cost estimates are  considered valid if they are well-documented to the point they can be  easily repeated or updated and can be traced to original sources through  auditing, according to best practices. In 2016, we reported that while the  Bureau provided some documentation of supporting data, it did not  describe how the source data were incorporated.
Finally, credible cost estimates must clearly identify limitations due to  uncertainty or bias surrounding the data or assumptions, according to  best practices. In June 2016 we reported that the estimate minimally met  best practices for this characteristic in part because the Bureau carried  out its risk and uncertainty analysis only for about $4.6 billion (37 percent)  of the $12.5 billion total estimated life-cycle cost, excluding, for example,  consideration of uncertainty over what the decennial census’s estimated  part will be of the total cost of CEDCaP. In June 2016, we also reported  that risks were not properly accounted for in the cost estimate and  recommended that the Bureau properly account for risk.to ensure there  are appropriate levels for budgeted contingencies and those  recommendations have not yet been implemented. In April 2017, Bureau  officials told us they were making progress toward implementing our  recommendations and would provide us with that documentation when it  is finalized.
section_title: Several Events Indicate That the Cost of Some Elements of the 2020 Census Design Are Increasing
paragraphs: The Bureau has not published an update to its October 2015 cost  estimate, yet several events since then suggest that the cost of the  current design could be higher. We believe that recent Bureau actions  indicate that the current design will have more expensive cost elements  that include the following:
According to Bureau official, in August an $886 million IT integration  contract was awarded. According to Bureau officials, there was no  reference to this contract in the documentation for the planned  contract costs supporting the October 2015 life-cycle cost estimate.
In January 2017, the Bureau suspended part of how it is verifying  addresses “in-office” procedures using on-screen imagery—one of its  four key design innovations intended to control the cost of the 2020  Census. According to Bureau officials, the suspension of the one part  of in-office canvassing will increase the workload of the more  expensive in-field (door-to door address identification) by at least five  percentage points over what had been assumed as part of the earlier  cost estimate.
In April 2017, Bureau officials informed us that they are preparing  additional reporting to the Department of Commerce and Office of  Management and Budget because the CEDCaP program is now  expected to exceed the original total contract by more than 10  percent.
According to Bureau officials these changes will be reflected in the next  life-cycle cost estimate.
It is critical for the Bureau to have better oversight and control of its cost  estimation process, particularly as the design of key cost elements  continues to evolve, and we have recommended that the Bureau ensure  its cost estimate is consistent with our best practices. The Bureau agreed  with our recommendations and has told us it is making progress towards  addressing them. Moreover, Bureau officials told us that they are  finalizing an update to the life-cycle cost estimate that should be released  this spring. However, until we are able to review the life-cycle cost  estimate along with supporting documentation we are unable to  determine whether the Bureau is fully addressing our recommendations,  meeting best practices, and properly accounting for all costs associated  with the 2020 Census.
In summary, while the Bureau has made substantial progress in  revamping its approach to the census and testing the new design,  considerable challenges and uncertainties remain in (1) implementing the  cost-saving innovations; (2) managing key IT systems, including ensuring  their security, to support the census; and (3) developing a quality cost  estimate for the 2020 Census. For these reasons the 2020 Census is a  GAO high-risk area. Continued management attention and congressional  oversight will be important for ensuring risks are mitigated, the Bureau’s  preparations stay on track, and Bureau officials are held accountable for  implementing the enumeration as planned. We will continue to assess the  Bureau’s efforts to conduct a cost-effective enumeration and look forward  to keeping Congress informed of the Bureau’s progress.
Chairman Culberson, Ranking Member Serrano, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes our prepared statement. We would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you have any questions on matters discussed in this statement, please  contact Robert Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2757 or by e-mail at  goldenkoffr@gao.gov  or David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail  at pownerd@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this testimony include Ty  Mitchell, Assistant Director; Colleen Phillips, Assistant Director; Justine  Augeri; Brian Bothwell, Robert Gebhart; Jason Lee, Lisa Pearson; Kayla  Robinson, Robert Robinson; Kathleen Sharkey; Andrea Starosciak;  Umesh Thakkar; and Katherine Wulff.
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