GAO'S 2015 High-Risk Series: An Update
Published: 2015-02-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The federal government is one of the world's largest and most complex entities; about $3.5 trillion in outlays in fiscal year 2014 funded a broad array of programs and operations. GAO maintains a program to focus attention on government operations that it identifies as high risk due to their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges.
Since 1990, more than one-third of the areas previously designated as high risk have been removed from the list because sufficient progress was made in addressing the problems identified. The five criteria for removal are: (1) leadership commitment, (2) agency capacity, (3) an action plan, (4) monitoring efforts, and (5) demonstrated progress.
This biennial update describes the status of high-risk areas listed in 2013 and identifies new high-risk areas needing attention by Congress and the executive branch. Solutions to high-risk problems offer the potential to save billions of dollars, improve service to the public, and strengthen government performance and accountability.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Solid, steady progress has been made in the vast majority of the high-risk areas. Eighteen of the 30 areas on the 2013 list at least partially met all of the criteria for removal from the high risk list. Of those, 11 met at least one of the criteria for removal and partially met all others. Sufficient progress was made to narrow the scope of two high-risk issues— Protecting Public Health through Enhanced Oversight of Medical Products and DOD Contract Management. Overall, progress has been possible through the concerted actions of Congress, leadership and staff in agencies, and the Office of Management and Budget.
This year GAO is adding 2 areas, bringing the total to 32.
Managing Risks and Improving Veterans Affairs (VA) Health Care. GAO has reported since 2000 about VA facilities' failure to provide timely health care. In some cases, these delays or VA's failure to provide care at all have reportedly harmed veterans. Although VA has taken actions to address some GAO recommendations, more than 100 of GAO's recommendations have not been fully addressed, including recommendations related to the following areas: (1) ambiguous policies and inconsistent processes, (2) inadequate oversight and accountability, (3) information technology challenges, (4) inadequate training for VA staff, and (5) unclear resource needs and allocation priorities. The recently enacted Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act included provisions to help VA address systemic weaknesses. VA must effectively implement the act.
Improving the Management of Information Technology (IT) Acquisitions and Operations. Congress has passed legislation and the administration has undertaken numerous initiatives to better manage IT investments. Nonetheless, federal IT investments too frequently fail to be completed or incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. GAO has found that the federal government spent billions of dollars on failed and poorly performing IT investments which often suffered from ineffective management, such as project planning, requirements definition, and program oversight and governance. Over the past 5 years, GAO made more than 730 recommendations; however, only about 23 percent had been fully implemented as of January 2015.
GAO is also expanding two areas due to evolving high-risk issues.
Enforcement of Tax Laws. This area is expanded to include IRS's efforts to address tax refund fraud due to identify theft. IRS estimates it paid out $5.8 billion (the exact number is uncertain) in fraudulent refunds in tax year 2013 due to identity theft. This occurs when a thief files a fraudulent return using a legitimate taxpayer's identifying information and claims a refund.
Ensuring the Security of Federal Information Systems and Cyber Critical Infrastructure and Protecting the Privacy of Personally Identifiable Information (PII). This risk area is expanded because of the challenges to ensuring the privacy of personally identifiable information posed by advances in technology. These advances have allowed both government and private sector entities to collect and process extensive amounts of PII more effectively. The number of reported security incidents involving PII at federal agencies has increased dramatically in recent years.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: This report contains GAO's views on progress made and what remains to be done to bring about lasting solutions for each high-risk area. Perseverance by the executive branch in implementing GAO's recommended solutions and continued oversight and action by Congress are essential to achieving greater progress.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our 2015 high-risk update.Since 1990, we have regularly reported on government operations that  we have identified as high risk due to their greater vulnerability to fraud,  waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the need for transformation to  address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. Our high-risk  program, supported by this Committee and the House Committee on  Oversight and Government Reform, has brought much-needed focus to  problems impeding effective government and costing billions of dollars  each year.
Since our last high-risk update in 2013, solid, steady progress has been  made in the vast majority of areas that remain on the list. Since 1990,  more than one-third of the areas previously designated as high risk have  been removed from the High Risk List because sufficient progress was  made in addressing the problems identified. Nonetheless, 11 issues have  been on the High Risk List since the 1990s and 6 of these were on our  original list of 14 areas in 1990.
Congressional oversight and legislative action have been critical to the  progress that has been made. Congress passed numerous laws targeting  both specific problems and the high-risk areas overall. In addition, top  administration officials have continued to show their commitment to  ensuring that high-risk areas receive attention and oversight. The Office  of Management and Budget (OMB) regularly convenes meetings with  agency leaders and GAO to discuss progress updates on high-risk  issues. This year, due to significant progress made, we narrowed the  high-risk designation for two areas—Protecting Public Health Through  Enhanced Oversight of Medical Products and DOD Contract  Management.
We also designated two new high-risk areas this year—Managing Risks  and Improving VA Health Care and Improving the Management of IT  Acquisitions and Operations. Lasting solutions to these and the other 30  high-risk areas offer the potential to save billions of dollars, dramatically  improve service to the American public, and strengthen public confidence  and trust in the performance and accountability of our national  government.
While there has been notable progress, much remains to be done to  address the 32 high-risk issues that are currently on our High Risk List.  Our high risk update report and website provide details for each of these  issues, describing the nature of the risks, what actions have been taken  to address them, and what remains to be done to make further progress.The details in our report, along with successful implementation by  agencies and continued oversight by Congress, can form a solid  foundation for progress to address risks and improve programs and  operations.
subsections: section_title: New High-Risk Areas for 2015
paragraphs: To determine which federal government programs and functions should  be added to the High Risk List, we consider whether the program or  function is of national significance or is key to government performance  and accountability. Further, we consider qualitative factors, such as  whether the risk  involves public health or safety, service delivery, national security,  national defense, economic growth, or privacy or citizens’ rights, or  could result in significant impaired service, program failure, injury or  loss of life, or significantly reduced economy, efficiency, or  effectiveness.
In addition, we also review the exposure to loss in quantitative terms such  as the value of major assets being impaired, revenue sources not being  realized, or major agency assets being lost, stolen, damaged, or wasted.  We also consider corrective measures planned or under way to resolve a  material control weakness and the status and effectiveness of these  actions.
This year, we added two new areas, delineated below, to the High Risk  List based on those criteria.
subsections: section_title: Managing Risks and Improving VA Health Care
paragraphs: In response to serious and long-standing problems with veterans’ access  to care, which were highlighted in a series of congressional hearings in  the spring and summer of 2014, Congress enacted the Veterans Access,  Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014 (Pub. L. No. 113-146, 128 Stat.  1754), which provides $15 billion in new funding for Department of  Veterans Affairs (VA) health care. Generally, this law requires VA to offer  veterans the option to receive hospital care and medical services from a  non-VA provider when a VA facility cannot provide an appointment within  30 days, or when veterans reside more than 40 miles from the nearest VA  facility. Under the law, VA received $10 billion to cover the expected  increase in utilization of non-VA providers to deliver health care services  to veterans. The $10 billion is available until expended and is meant to  supplement VA’s current budgetary resources for medical care. Further,  the law appropriated $5 billion to increase veterans’ access to care by  expanding VA’s capacity to deliver care to veterans by hiring additional  clinicians and improving the physical infrastructure of VA’s facilities. It is  therefore critical that VA ensures its resources are being used in a cost- effective manner to improve veterans’ timely access to health care.
We have categorized our concerns about VA’s ability to ensure the  timeliness, cost-effectiveness, quality, and safety of the health care the  department provides into five broad areas: (1) ambiguous policies and  inconsistent processes, (2) inadequate oversight and accountability, (3)  information technology challenges, (4) inadequate training for VA staff,  and (5) unclear resource needs and allocation priorities. We have made  numerous recommendations that aim to address weaknesses in VA’s  management of its health care system—more than 100 of which have yet  to be fully resolved. For example, to ensure that its facilities are carrying  out processes at the local level more consistently—such as scheduling  veterans’ medical appointments and collecting data on veteran suicides— VA needs to clarify its existing policies. VA also needs to strengthen  oversight and accountability across its facilities by conducting more  systematic, independent assessments of processes that are carried out at  the local level, including how VA facilities are resolving specialty care  consults, processing claims for non-VA care, and establishing  performance pay goals for their providers. We also have recommended  that VA work with the Department of Defense (DOD) to address the  administrative burdens created by the lack of interoperability between  their two IT systems. A number of our recommendations aim to improve  training for staff at VA facilities, to address issues such as how staff are  cleaning, disinfecting, and sterilizing reusable medical equipment, and to  more clearly align training on VA’s new nurse staffing methodology with  the needs of staff responsible for developing nurse staffing plans. Finally,  we have recommended that VA improve its methods for identifying VA  facilities’ resource needs and for analyzing the cost-effectiveness of VA  health care.
The recently enacted Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act  included a number of provisions intended to help VA address systemic  weaknesses. For example, the law requires VA to contract with an  independent entity to (1) assess VA’s capacity to meet the current and  projected demographics and needs of veterans who use the VA health  care system, (2) examine VA’s clinical staffing levels and productivity, and  (3) review VA’s IT strategies and business processes, among other  things. The new law also establishes a 15-member commission, to be  appointed primarily by bipartisan congressional leadership, which will  examine how best to organize the VA health care system, locate health  care resources, and deliver health care to veterans. It is critical for VA  leaders to act on the findings of this independent contractor and  congressional commission, as well as on those of VA’s Office of the  Inspector General, GAO, and others, and to fully commit themselves to  developing long-term solutions that mitigate risks to the timeliness, cost- effectiveness, quality, and safety of the VA health care system.
It is also critical that Congress maintains its focus on oversight of VA  health care. In the spring and summer of 2014, congressional committees  held more than 20 hearings to address identified weaknesses in the VA  health care system. Sustained congressional attention to these issues will  help ensure that VA continues to make progress in improving the delivery  of health care services to veterans.
We plan to continue monitoring VA’s efforts to improve the timeliness,  cost-effectiveness, quality, and safety of veterans’ health care. To this  end, we have ongoing work focusing on topics such as veterans’ access  to primary care and mental health services; primary care productivity;  nurse recruitment and retention; monitoring and oversight of VA spending  on training programs for health care professionals; mechanisms VA uses  to monitor quality of care; and VA and DOD investments in Centers of  Excellence—which are intended to produce better health outcomes for  veterans and service members.
section_title: Improving the Management of IT Acquisitions and Operations
paragraphs: Although the executive branch has undertaken numerous initiatives to  better manage the more than $80 billion that is annually invested in  information technology (IT), federal IT investments too frequently fail or  incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to  mission-related outcomes. We have previously testified that the federal  government has spent billions of dollars on failed IT investments. These  and other failed IT projects often suffered from a lack of disciplined and  effective management, such as project planning, requirements definition,  and program oversight and governance. In many instances, agencies  have not consistently applied best practices that are critical to  successfully acquiring IT investments.
We have identified nine critical factors underlying successful major  acquisitions that support the objective of improving the management of  large-scale IT acquisitions across the federal government: (1) program  officials actively engaging with stakeholders; (2) program staff having the  necessary knowledge and skills; (3) senior department and agency  executives supporting the programs; (4) end users and stakeholders  involved in the development of requirements; (5) end users participating  in testing of system functionality prior to end user acceptance testing; (6)  government and contractor staff being stable and consistent; (7) program  staff prioritizing requirements; (8) program officials maintaining regular  communication with the prime contractor; and (9) programs receiving  sufficient funding.
While there have been numerous executive branch initiatives aimed at  addressing these issues, implementation has been inconsistent. Over the  past 5 years, we have reported numerous times on shortcomings with IT  acquisitions and operations and have made about 737 related  recommendations, 361 of which were to the Office of Management and  Budget (OMB) and agencies to improve the implementation of the recent  initiatives and other government-wide, cross-cutting efforts. As of January  2015, about 23 percent of the 737 recommendations had been fully  implemented.
Given the federal government’s continued experience with failed and  troubled IT projects, coupled with the fact that OMB initiatives to help  address such problems have not been fully implemented, the government  will likely continue to produce disappointing results and will miss  opportunities to improve IT management, reduce costs, and improve  services to the public, unless needed actions are taken. Further, it will be  more difficult for stakeholders, including Congress and the public, to  monitor agencies’ progress and hold them accountable for reducing  duplication and achieving cost savings.
Recognizing the severity of issues related to government-wide  management of IT, in December 2014 the Federal Information  Technology Acquisition Reform provisions were enacted as a part of the  Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2015. I want to acknowledge the leadership of this  Committee and the House Committee on Oversight and Government  Reform in leading efforts to enact this important legislation. To help  address the management of IT investments, OMB and federal agencies  should expeditiously implement the requirements of the December 2014  statutory provisions promoting IT acquisition reform. Doing so should (1)  improve the transparency and management of IT acquisitions and  operations across the government, and (2) strengthen the authority of  chief information officers to provide needed direction and oversight. To  help ensure that these improvements are achieved, congressional  oversight of agencies’ implementation efforts is essential.
Beyond implementing the recently enacted law, OMB and agencies need  to continue to implement our previous recommendations in order to  improve their ability to effectively and efficiently invest in IT. Several of  these are critical, such as  conducting TechStat reviews for at-risk investments, updating the public version of the IT Dashboard throughout the year, developing comprehensive inventories of federal agencies’ software  licenses.
To ensure accountability, OMB and agencies should also demonstrate  measurable government-wide progress in the following key areas:
OMB and agencies should, within 4 years, implement at least 80  percent of our recommendations related to the management of IT  acquisitions and operations.
Agencies should ensure that a minimum of 80 percent of the  government’s major acquisitions should deliver functionality every 12  months.
Agencies should achieve no less than 80 percent of the over $6 billion  in planned PortfolioStat savings and 80 percent of the more than $5  billion in savings planned for data center consolidation.
section_title: Expanding High-Risk Areas
paragraphs: In the 2 years since the last high-risk update, two areas have expanded in  scope. Enforcement of Tax Laws has been expanded to include IRS’s  efforts to address tax refund fraud due to identity theft. Ensuring the  Security of Federal Information Systems and Cyber Critical Infrastructure  has been expanded to include the federal government’s protection of  personally identifiable information and is now called Ensuring the Security  of Federal Information Systems and Cyber Critical Infrastructure and  Protecting Personally Identifiable Information (PII).
subsections: section_title: Enforcement of Tax Laws
paragraphs: Since 1990, we have designated one or more aspects of Enforcement of  Tax Laws as high risk. The focus of the Enforcement of Tax Laws high- risk area is on the estimated $385 billion net tax gap—the difference  between taxes owed and taxes paid—and IRS’s and Congress’s efforts to  address it. Given current and emerging risks, we are expanding the  Enforcement of Tax Laws area to include IRS’s efforts to address tax  refund fraud due to identity theft (IDT), which occurs when an identity thief  files a fraudulent tax return using a legitimate taxpayer’s identifying  information and claims a refund. While acknowledging that the numbers  are uncertain, IRS estimated paying about $5.8 billion in fraudulent IDT  refunds while preventing $24.2 billion during the 2013 tax filing season.
While there are no simple solutions to combating IDT refund fraud, we  have identified various options that could help, some of which would  require legislative action. Because some of these options represent a  significant change to the tax system that could likely burden taxpayers  and impose significant costs to IRS for systems changes, it is important  for IRS to assess the relative costs and benefits of the options. This  assessment will help ensure an informed discussion among IRS and  relevant stakeholders—including Congress—on the best option (or set of  options) for preventing IDT refund fraud.
section_title: Ensuring the Security of Federal Information Systems and Cyber Critical Infrastructure and Protecting the Privacy of Personally Identifiable Information
paragraphs: Since 1997, we have designated the security of our federal cyber assets  as a high-risk area. In 2003, we expanded this high-risk area to include  the protection of critical cyber infrastructure.
The White House and federal agencies have taken steps toward  improving the protection of our cyber assets. However, advances in  technology which have dramatically enhanced the ability of both  government and private sector entities to collect and process extensive  amounts of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) pose challenges to  ensuring the privacy of such information. The number of reported security  incidents involving PII at federal agencies has increased dramatically in  recent years. In addition, high-profile PII breaches at commercial entities  have heightened concerns that personal privacy is not being adequately  protected. Finally, both federal agencies and private companies collect  detailed information about the activities of individuals–raising concerns  about the potential for significant erosion of personal privacy. We have  suggested, among other things, that Congress consider amending privacy  laws to cover all PII collected, used, and maintained by the federal  government and recommended that the federal agencies we reviewed  take steps to protect personal privacy and improve their responses to  breaches of PII. For these reasons, we added the protection of privacy to  this high-risk area this year.
section_title: Essential Elements for Addressing High- Risk Areas
paragraphs: Our experience with the high-risk series over the past 25 years has  shown that five broad elements are essential to make progress.criteria for removal are as follows:
Leadership commitment. Demonstrated strong commitment and top  leadership support.
Capacity. Agency has the capacity (i.e., people and resources) to  resolve the risk(s).
Action plan. A corrective action plan exists that defines the root  cause and solutions and that provides for substantially completing  corrective measures, including steps necessary to implement  solutions we recommended.
Monitoring. A program has been instituted to monitor and  independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of  corrective measures.
Demonstrated progress. Ability to demonstrate progress in  implementing corrective measures and in resolving the high-risk area.
These five criteria form a road map for efforts to improve and ultimately  address high-risk issues. Addressing some of the criteria leads to  progress, while satisfying all of the criteria is central to removal from the  list. Figure 1 shows the five criteria and examples of actions taken by  agencies to address the criteria. Throughout my statement and in our  high-risk update report, we have detailed many actions taken to address  the high-risk areas aligned with the five criteria as well as additional steps  that need to be addressed.
In each of our high-risk updates, for more than a decade, we have  assessed progress to address the five criteria for removing the high-risk  areas from the list. In this high-risk update, we are adding additional  clarity and specificity to our assessments by rating each high-risk area’s  progress on the criteria, using the following definitions:
Met. Actions have been taken that meet the criterion. There are no  significant actions that need to be taken to further address this  criterion.
Partially met. Some, but not all, actions necessary to meet the  criterion have been taken.
Not met. Few, if any, actions towards meeting the criterion have been  taken.
Figure 2 is a visual representation of varying degrees of progress in each  of the five criteria for a high-risk area. Each point of the star represents  one of the five criteria for removal from the High Risk List and each ring  represents one of the three designations: not met, partially met, or met.
The progress ratings used to address the high-risk criteria are an  important part of our efforts to provide greater transparency and  specificity to agency leaders as they seek to address high-risk areas.  Beginning in the spring of 2014 leading up to this high-risk update, we  met with agency leaders across government to discuss preliminary  progress ratings. These meetings focused on actions taken and on  additional actions that need to be taken to address the high-risk issues.  Several agency leaders told us that the additional clarity provided by the  progress rating helped them better target their improvement efforts.
section_title: Continued Progress
paragraphs: Since our last high-risk update in 2013, there has been solid and steady  progress on the vast majority of the 30 high-risk areas from our 2013 list.  Progress has been possible through the concerted actions and efforts of  Congress and the leadership and staff in agencies and OMB. As shown in  table 1, 18 high-risk areas have met or partially met all criteria for removal  from the list; 11 of these areas also fully met at least one criterion. Of the  11 areas that have been on the High Risk List since the 1990s, 7 have at  least met or partially met all of the criteria for removal and 1 area—DOD  Contract Management—is 1 of the 2 areas that has made enough  progress to remove subcategories of the high-risk area. Overall, 28 high- risk areas were rated against the five criteria, totaling a possible 140 high- risk area criteria ratings. Of these, 122 (or 87 percent) were rated as met  or partially met. On the other hand, 13 of the areas have not met any of  the five criteria; 3 of those—DOD Business Systems Modernization, DOD  Support Infrastructure Management, and DOD Financial Management— have been on the High Risk List since the 1990’s.
Throughout the history of the high-risk program, Congress played an  important role through its oversight and (where appropriate) through  legislative action targeting both specific problems and the high-risk areas  overall. Since our last high-risk report, several high-risk areas have  received congressional oversight and legislation needed to make  progress in addressing risks. Table 2 provides examples of congressional  actions and of high-level administration initiatives—discussed in more  detail throughout our report—that have led to progress in addressing  high-risk areas. Additional congressional actions and administrative  initiatives are also included in the individual high-risk areas discussed in  this report.
subsections: section_title: Narrowing High Risk Areas
paragraphs: Since our 2013 update, sufficient progress has been made to narrow the  scope of the following two areas.
subsections: section_title: Protecting Public Health through Enhanced Oversight of Medical Products
paragraphs: Our work has identified the following high-risk issues related to the Food  and Drug Administration’s (FDA) efforts to oversee medical products: (1)  oversight of medical device recalls, (2) implementation of the Safe  Medical Devices Act of 1990, (3) the effects of globalization on medical  product safety, and (4) shortages of medically necessary drugs. We  added the oversight of medical products to our High Risk List in 2009.  Since our 2013 high-risk update, FDA has made substantial progress  addressing the first two areas; therefore, we have narrowed this area to  remove these issues from our High Risk List. However, the second two  issues, globalization and drug shortages, remain pressing concerns.
FDA has greatly improved its oversight of medical device recalls by fully  implementing all of the recommendations made in our 2011 report on this  topic. Recalls provide an important tool to mitigate serious health  consequences associated with defective or unsafe medical devices. We  found that FDA had not routinely analyzed recall data to determine  whether there are systemic problems underlying trends in device recalls.  We made specific recommendations to the agency that it enhance its  oversight of recalls. FDA is fully implementing our recommendations and  has developed a detailed action plan to improve the recall process,  analyzed 10 years of medical device recall trend data, and established  explicit criteria and set thresholds for determining whether recalling firms  have performed effective corrections or removals of defective products.  These actions have addressed this high-risk issue.
The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 requires FDA to determine the  appropriate process for reviewing certain high-risk devices—either  reclassifying certain high-risk medical device types to a lower-risk class or  establishing a schedule for such devices to be reviewed through its most  stringent premarket approval process. We found that FDA’s progress was  slow and that it had never established a timetable for its reclassification or  re-review process. As a result, many high-risk devices—including device  types that FDA has identified as implantable, life sustaining, or posing a  significant risk to the health, safety, or welfare of a patient—still entered  the market through FDA’s less stringent premarket review process. We  recommended that FDA expedite its implementation of the act. Since  then, FDA has made good progress and began posting the status of its  reviews on its website. FDA has developed an action plan with a goal of  fully implementing the provisions of the act by the second quarter of  calendar year 2015. While FDA has more work to do, it has made  sufficient progress to address this high-risk issue.
section_title: DOD Contract Management
paragraphs: Based on our reviews of DOD’s contract management activities over  many years, we placed this area on our High Risk List in 1992. For the  past decade, our work and that of others has identified challenges DOD  faces within four segments of contract management: (1) the acquisition  workforce, (2) contracting techniques and approaches, (3) service  acquisitions, and (4) operational contract support. DOD has made  sufficient progress in one of the four segments—its management and  oversight of contracting techniques and approaches—to warrant its  removal as a separate segment within the overall DOD contract  management high-risk area. Significant challenges still remain in the  other three segments.
We made numerous recommendations to address the specific issues we  identified. DOD leadership has generally taken actions to address our  recommendations. For example, DOD promulgated regulations to better  manage its use of time-and-materials contracts and undefinitized contract  actions (which authorize contractors to begin work before reaching a final  agreement on contract terms). In addition, OMB directed agencies to take  action to reduce the use of noncompetitive and time-and-materials  contracts. Similarly, Congress has enacted legislation to limit the length of  noncompetitive contracts and require DOD to issue guidance to link  award fees to acquisition outcomes.
Over the past several years, DOD’s top leadership has taken significant  steps to plan and monitor progress in the management and oversight of  contracting techniques and approaches. For example, through its Better  Buying Power initiatives DOD leadership identified a number of actions to  promote effective competition and to better utilize specific contracting  techniques and approaches. In that regard, in 2010 DOD issued a policy  containing new requirements for competed contracts that received only  one offer—a situation OMB has noted deprives agencies of the ability to  consider alternative solutions in a reasoned and structured manner and  which DOD has termed “ineffective competition.” These changes were  codified in DOD’s acquisition regulations in 2012. In May 2014, we  concluded that DOD’s regulations help decrease some of the risks of one  offer awards, but also that DOD needed to take additional steps to  continue to enhance competition, such as establishing guidance for when  contracting officers should assess and document the reasons only one  offer was received. DOD concurred with the two recommendations we  made in our report and has since implemented one of them.
DOD also has been using its Business Senior Integration Group (BSIG)— an executive-level leadership forum—for providing oversight in the  planning, execution, and implementation of these initiatives. In March  2014, the Director of the Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition  Policy presented an assessment of DOD competition trends that provided  information on competition rates across DOD and for selected commands  within each military department and proposed specific actions to improve  competition. The BSIG forum provides a mechanism by which DOD can  address ongoing and emerging weaknesses in contracting techniques  and approaches and by which DOD can monitor the effectiveness of its  efforts. Further, in June 2014, DOD issued its second annual assessment  of the performance of the defense acquisition system. The assessment,  included data on the system’s competition rate and goals, assessments of  the effect of contract type on cost and schedule control, and the impact of  competition on the cost of major weapon systems.
An institution as large, complex, and diverse as DOD, and one that  obligates hundreds of billions of dollars under contracts each year, will  continue to face challenges with its contracting techniques and  approaches. We will maintain our focus on identifying these challenges  and proposing solutions. However, at this point DOD’s continued  commitment and demonstrated progress in this area—including the  establishment of a framework by which DOD can address ongoing and  emerging issues associated with the appropriate use of contracting  techniques and approaches—provide a sufficient basis to remove this  segment from the DOD contract management high-risk area.
section_title: Progress in Selected High-Risk Areas
paragraphs: In addition to the two areas that we narrowed—Protecting Public Health  through Enhanced Oversight of Medical Products and DOD Contract  Management—nine other areas met at least one of the criteria for  removal from the High Risk List and were rated at least partially met for  all four of the remaining criteria. These areas serve as examples of solid  progress made to address high-risk issues through implementation of our  recommendations and through targeted corrective actions. Further, each  example underscores the importance of high-level attention given to high- risk areas within the context of our criteria by the administration and by  congressional action. To sustain progress in these areas and to make  progress in other high-risk areas—including eventual removal from the  High Risk List—focused leadership attention and ongoing oversight will  be needed.
subsections: section_title: NASA Acquisition Management
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) acquisition  management was included on the original High Risk List in 1990. NASA’s  continued efforts to strengthen and integrate its acquisition management  functions have resulted in the agency meeting three criteria for removal  from our High Risk List—leadership commitment, a corrective action plan,  and monitoring. For example, NASA has completed the implementation of  its corrective action plan, which was managed by the Deputy  Administrator, with the Chief Engineer, the Chief Financial Officer, and  the agency’s Associate Administrator having led implementation of the   The plan identified metrics to assess the progress of  individual initiatives.implementation, which NASA continues to track and report semi-annually.  These metrics include cost and schedule performance indicators for  NASA’s major development projects. We have found that NASA’s  performance metrics generally reflect improved performance. For  example, average cost and schedule growth for NASA’s major projects  has declined since 2011 and most of NASA’s major projects are tracking  metrics, which we recommended in 2011 to better assess design stability  and decrease risk. In addition, NASA has taken action in response to our  recommendations to improve the use of earned value management—a  tool designed to help project managers monitor progress—such as by  conducting a gap analysis to determine whether each center has the  requisite skills to effectively utilize earned value management.
These actions have helped NASA to create better baseline estimates and  track performance so that NASA has been able to launch more projects  on time and within cost estimates. However, we found that NASA needs  to continue its efforts to increase agency capacity to address ongoing  issues through additional guidance and training of personnel. Such efforts  should help maximize improvements and demonstrate that the improved  cost and schedule performance will be sustained, even for the agency’s  most expensive and complex projects.
Recently, a few of NASA’s major projects are rebaselining their cost,  schedule, or both in light of management and technical issues, which is  tempering the progress of the whole portfolio. In addition, several of  NASA’s largest and most complex projects, such as NASA’s human  spaceflight projects, are at critical points in implementation. We have  reported on several challenges that may further impact NASA’s ability to  demonstrate progress in improving acquisition management.
section_title: Establishing Effective Mechanisms for Sharing and Managing Terrorism-Related Information to Protect the Homeland
paragraphs: The federal government has made significant progress in promoting the  sharing of information on terrorist threats since we added this issue to the  High Risk List in 2003. As a result, the federal government has met our  criteria for leadership commitment and capacity and has partially met the  remaining criteria for this high-risk area. Significant progress was made in  this area by developing a more structured approach to achieving the  Information Sharing Environment (Environment) and by defining the  highest priority initiatives to accomplish. In December 2012, the President  released the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding  (Strategy), which provides guidance on the implementation of policies,  standards, and technologies that promote secure and responsible  national security information sharing. In 2013, in response to the Strategy,  the Program Manager for the Environment released the Strategic  Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Information Sharing and  Safeguarding (Implementation Plan).
The Implementation Plan provides a roadmap for the implementation of  the priority objectives in the Strategy. The Implementation Plan also  assigns stewards to coordinate each priority objective—in most cases, a  senior department official—and provides time frames and milestones for  achieving the outcomes in each objective. Adding to this progress is the  work the Environment has done to address our previous  recommendations. In our 2011 report on the Environment, we  recommended that key departments better define incremental costs for  information sharing activities and establish an enterprise architecture  management plan. Since then, senior officials in each key department  reported that any incremental costs related to implementing the  Environment are now embedded within each department’s mission  activities and operations and do not require separate funding. Further, the  2013 Implementation Plan includes actions for developing aspects of an  architecture for the Environment. In 2014, the program manager issued  the Information Interoperability Framework, which begins to describe key  elements intended to help link systems across departments to enable  information sharing.
Going forward, in addition to maintaining leadership commitment and  capacity, the program manager and key departments will need to  continue working to address remaining action items informed by our five  high-risk criteria, thereby helping to reduce risks and enhance the sharing  and management of terrorism-related information.
section_title: Strengthening Department of Homeland Security Management Functions
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has continued efforts to  strengthen and integrate its management functions since those issues  were placed on the High Risk List in 2003. These efforts resulted in the  department meeting two criteria for removal from the High Risk List  (leadership commitment and a corrective action plan) and partially  meeting the remaining three criteria (capacity, a framework to monitor  progress, and demonstrated, sustained progress). DHS’s top leadership,  including the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, have  continued to demonstrate exemplary commitment and support for  addressing the department’s management challenges. For instance, the  Department’s Under Secretary for Management and other senior  management officials have routinely met with us to discuss the  department’s plans and progress, which helps ensure a common  understanding of the remaining work needed to address our high-risk  designation.
In April 2014, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued Strengthening  Departmental Unity of Effort, a memorandum committing the agency to,  among other things, improving DHS’s planning, programming, budgeting,  and execution processes through strengthened departmental structures  and increased capability. In addition, DHS has continued to provide  updates to the report Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management,  demonstrating a continued focus on addressing its high-risk designation.  The integrated strategy includes key management initiatives and related  corrective action plans for achieving 30 actions and outcomes, which we  identified and DHS agreed are critical to addressing the challenges within  the department’s management areas and to integrating those functions  across the department. Further, DHS has demonstrated progress to fully  address nine of these actions and outcomes, five of which it has  sustained as fully implemented for at least 2 years. For example, DHS  fully addressed two outcomes because it received a clean audit opinion  on its financial statements for 2 consecutive fiscal years, 2013 and 2014.  In addition, the department strengthened its enterprise architecture  program (or technology blueprint) to guide IT acquisitions by, among  other things, largely addressing our prior recommendations aimed at  adding needed architectural depth and breadth.
DHS needs to continue implementing its Integrated Strategy for High Risk  Management and show measurable, sustainable progress in  implementing its key management initiatives and corrective actions and  achieving outcomes. In doing so, it will be important for DHS to identify  and work to mitigate any resource gaps, and prioritize initiatives as  needed to ensure it can implement and sustain its corrective actions,  closely track and independently validate the effectiveness and  sustainability of its corrective actions and make midcourse adjustments  as needed; and make continued progress in achieving the 21 actions and  outcomes it has not fully addressed, and demonstrate that systems,  personnel, and policies are in place to ensure that progress can be  sustained over time.
section_title: DOD Supply Chain Management
paragraphs: DOD supply chain management is one of the six issues that has been on  the High Risk List since 1990. DOD has made progress in addressing  weaknesses in all three dimensions of its supply chain management  areas: inventory management, materiel distribution, and asset visibility.  With respect to inventory management, DOD has demonstrated  considerable progress in implementing its statutorily mandated corrective  action plan. This plan is intended to reduce excess inventory and improve  inventory management practices. Additionally, DOD has established a  performance management framework, including metrics and milestones,  to track the implementation and effectiveness of its corrective action plan  and has demonstrated considerable progress in reducing its excess  inventory and improving its inventory management. For example, DOD  reported that its percentage of on-order excess inventory dropped from  9.5 percent in fiscal year 2009 to 7.9 percent in fiscal year 2013. DOD  calculates the percentage by dividing the amount of on-order excess  inventory by the total amount of on-order inventory. In response to our  2012 recommendations on the implementation of the plan, DOD  continues to re-examine its goals for reducing excess inventory, has  revised its goal for reducing on-hand excess inventory (it achieved its  original goal early), and is in the process of institutionalizing its inventory  management metrics in policy.
DOD has also made progress in addressing its materiel distribution  challenges. Specifically, DOD has implemented, or is implementing,  distribution-related initiatives that could serve as a basis for a corrective  action plan. For example, DOD developed its Defense Logistics Agency  Distribution Effectiveness Initiative, formerly called Strategic Network  Optimization, to improve logistics efficiencies in DOD’s distribution  network and to reduce transportation costs. This initiative accomplishes  these objectives by storing materiel at strategically located Defense  Logistics Agency supply sites.
Further, DOD has demonstrated significant progress in addressing its  asset visibility weaknesses by taking steps to implement our February  2013 recommendation that DOD develop a strategy and execution plans  that contain all the elements of a comprehensive strategic plan, including,  among other elements, performance measures for gauging results. The  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 required that  DOD’s strategy and implementation plans for asset visibility, which were  in development, incorporate, among other things, the missing elements  that we identified. DOD’s January 2014 Strategy for Improving DOD  Asset Visibility represents a corrective action plan and contains goals and  objectives—as well as supporting execution plans—outlining specific  objectives intended to improve asset visibility. DOD’s Strategy calls for  organizations to identify at least one outcome or key performance  indicator for assessing performance in implementing the initiatives  intended to improve asset visibility. DOD has also established a structure,  including its Asset Visibility Working Group, for monitoring implementation  of its asset visibility improvement initiatives.
Moving forward, the removal of DOD supply chain management from  GAO’s High Risk List will require DOD to take several steps. For  inventory management, DOD needs to demonstrate sustained progress  by continuing to reduce its on-order and on-hand excess inventory,  developing corrective actions to improve demand forecast accuracy, and  implementing methodologies to set inventory levels for reparable items  (i.e., items that can be repaired) with low or highly variable demand. For  materiel distribution, DOD needs to develop a corrective action plan that  includes reliable metrics for, among other things, identifying gaps and  measuring distribution performance across the entire distribution pipeline.  For asset visibility, DOD needs to (1) specify the linkage between the  goals and objectives in its Strategy and the initiatives intended to  implement it and (2) refine, as appropriate, its metrics to ensure they  assess progress towards achievement of those goals and objectives.
section_title: DOD Weapon Systems Acquisition
paragraphs: DOD weapon systems acquisition has also been on the High-Risk List  since 1990. Congress and DOD have long sought to improve the  acquisition of major weapon systems, yet many DOD programs are still  falling short of cost, schedule, and performance expectations. The results  are unanticipated cost overruns, reduced buying power, and in some  cases delays or reductions in the capability ultimately delivered to the  warfighter.
Our past work and prior high-risk updates have identified multiple  weaknesses in the way DOD acquires the weapon systems it delivers to  the warfighter and we have made numerous recommendations on how to  address these weaknesses. Recent actions taken by top leadership at  DOD indicate a firm commitment to improving the acquisition of weapon  systems as demonstrated by the release and implementation of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics’  “Better Buying Power” initiatives. These initiatives include measures such  as setting and enforcing affordability constraints, instituting a long-term  investment plan for portfolios of weapon systems, implementing “should  cost” management to control contract costs, eliminating redundancies  within portfolios, and emphasizing the need to adequately grow and train  the acquisition workforce.
DOD also has made progress in its efforts to assess the root causes of  poor weapon system acquisition outcomes and in monitoring the  effectiveness of its actions to improve its management of weapon  systems acquisition. Through changes to acquisition policies and  procedures, DOD has made demonstrable progress and, if these reforms  are fully implemented, acquisition outcomes should improve. At this point,  there is a need to build on existing reforms by tackling the incentives that  drive the process and behaviors. In addition, further progress must be  made in applying best practices to the acquisition process, attracting and  empowering acquisition personnel, reinforcing desirable principles at the  beginning of the program, and improving the budget process to allow  better alignment of programs and their risks and needs. While DOD has  made real progress on the issues we have identified in this area, with the  prospect of slowly growing or flat defense budgets for years to come, the  department must continue this progress and get better returns on its  weapon system investments than it has in the past.
DOD has made some progress in updating its policies to enable better  weapon systems outcomes. However, even with this call for change we  remain concerned about the full implementation of proposed reforms as  DOD has, in the past, failed to convert policy into practice. In addition,  although we reported in March 2014 on the progress many DOD  programs are making in reducing their cost in the near term, individual  weapon programs are still failing to conform to best practices for  acquisition or to implement key acquisition reforms and initiatives that  could prevent long-term cost and schedule growth.
section_title: Ensuring the Security of Federal Information Systems and Cyber Critical Infrastructure and Protecting the Privacy of Personally Identifiable Information
paragraphs: We added this high-risk area in 1997 and expanded it this year to include  protection of PII. Although significant challenges remain, the federal  government has made progress toward improving the security of its cyber  assets. For example, Congress, as part of its ongoing oversight, passed  five bills, which became law, for improving the security of cyber assets.    The first, The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, revises the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 and  clarifies roles and responsibilities for overseeing and implementing  federal agencies’ information security programs. The second law, the  Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act, requires DHS to assess its  cybersecurity workforce and develop a strategy for addressing workforce  gaps. The third, the Homeland Security Cybersecurity Workforce  Assessment Act, requires DHS to identify all of its cybersecurity  positions and calls for the department to identify specialty areas of critical  need in its cybersecurity workforce. The fourth, the National  Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, codifies the role of DHS’ National  Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center as the nexus of  cyber and communications integration for the federal government,  intelligence community, and law enforcement. The fifth, the Cybersecurity  Enhancement Act of 2014,through the National Institute of Standards and Technology, to facilitate  and support the development of voluntary standards to reduce cyber risks  to critical infrastructure.   authorizes the Department of Commerce,  The White House and senior leaders at DHS have also committed to  securing critical cyber assets. Specifically, the President has signed  legislation and issued strategy documents for improving aspects of  cybersecurity, as well as an executive order and a policy directive for  improving the security and resilience of critical cyber infrastructure. In  addition, DHS and its senior leaders have committed time and resources  to advancing cybersecurity efforts at federal agencies and to promoting  critical infrastructure sectors’ use of a cybersecurity framework.
However, securing cyber assets remains a challenge for federal  agencies. Continuing challenges, such as shortages in qualified  cybersecurity personnel and effective monitoring of, and continued  weaknesses in, agencies’ information security programs need to be  addressed.
Until the White House and executive branch agencies implement the  hundreds of recommendations that we and agency inspectors general  have made to address cyber challenges, resolve identified deficiencies,  and fully implement effective security programs and privacy practices, a  broad array of federal assets and operations may remain at risk of fraud,  misuse, and disruption, and the nation’s most critical federal and private  sector infrastructure systems will remain at increased risk of attack from  adversaries. In addition to the recently passed laws addressing  cybersecurity and the protection of critical infrastructures, Congress  should also consider amending applicable laws, such as the Privacy Act  and E-Government Act, to more fully protect PII collected, used, and  maintained by the federal government.
section_title: Management of Federal Oil and Gas Resources
paragraphs: The Department of the Interior’s (Interior) continued efforts to improve its  management of federal oil and gas resources since we placed these  issues on the High Risk List in 2011 have resulted in the department  meeting one of the criteria for removal from our High Risk List— leadership commitment. Interior has implemented a number of strategies  and corrective measures to help ensure the department collects its share  of revenue from oil and gas produced on federal lands and waters.  Additionally, Interior is developing a comprehensive approach to address  its ongoing human capital challenges. In November 2014, Interior senior  leaders briefed us on the department’s commitment to address the high- risk issue area by describing the following corrective actions.
To help ensure Interior collects revenues from oil and gas produced  on federal lands and waters, Interior has taken steps to strengthen its  efforts to improve the measurement of oil and gas produced on  federal leases by ensuring a link between what happens in the field  (measurement and operations) and what is reported to Interior’s  Office of Natural Resources Revenue or ONRR (production volumes  and dispositions). To ensure that federal oil and gas leases are  inspected, Interior is hiring inspectors and engineers with an  understanding of metering equipment and measurement accuracy.  The department has several efforts under way to assure that oil and  gas are accurately measured and reported. For example, ONRR  contracted for a study to automate data collection from production  metering systems. In 2012, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental  Enforcement hired and provided measurement training to a new  measurement inspection team. To better ensure a fair return to the  federal government from leasing and production activities from federal  offshore leases, Interior raised royalty rates, minimum bids, and rental  rates. For onshore federal leases, according to Interior’s November  2014 briefing document, ONRR’s Economic Analysis Office will  provide the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) monthly analyses of  global and domestic market conditions as BLM initiates a rulemaking  effort to provide greater flexibility in setting onshore royalty rates.
To address the department’s ongoing human capital challenges,  Interior is working with the Office of Personnel Management to  establish permanent special pay rates for critical energy occupations  in key regions, such as the Gulf of Mexico. Bureau managers are  being trained on the use of recruitment, relocation, and retention  incentives to improve hiring and retention. Bureaus are implementing  or have implemented data systems to support the accurate capture of  hiring data to address delays in the hiring process. Finally, Interior is  developing strategic workforce plans to assess the critical skills and  competencies needed to achieve current and future program goals.
To address its revenue collection challenges, Interior will need to identify  the staffing resources necessary to consistently meet its annual goals for  oil and gas production verification inspections. Interior needs to continue  meeting its time frames for updating regulations related to oil and gas  measurement and onshore royalty rates. It will also need to provide  reasonable assurance that oil and gas produced from federal leases is  accurately measured and that the federal government is getting an  appropriate share of oil and gas revenues.
To address its human capital challenges, Interior needs to consider how it  will address staffing shortfalls over time in view of continuing hiring and  retention challenges. It will also need to implement its plans to hire  additional staff with expertise in inspections and engineering. Interior  needs to ensure that it collects and maintains complete and accurate data  on hiring times—such as the time required to prepare a job description,  announce the vacancy, create a list of qualified candidates, conduct  interviews, and perform background and security checks—to effectively  implement changes to expedite its hiring process.
section_title: Medicare Improper Payments
paragraphs: The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), in the Department  of Health and Human Services (HHS), administers Medicare, which has  been on the High Risk List since 1990. CMS has continued to focus on  reducing improper payments in the Medicare program, which has resulted  in the agency meeting our leadership commitment criterion for removal  from the High Risk List and partially meeting our other four criteria. HHS  has demonstrated top leadership support for addressing this risk area by  continuing to designate “strengthened program integrity through improper  payment reduction and fighting fraud” an HHS strategic priority and,  through its dedicated Center for Program Integrity, CMS has taken  multiple actions to improve in this area. For example, as we  recommended in November 2012, CMS centralized the development and  implementation of automated edits—prepayment controls used to deny  Medicare claims that should not be paid—based on a type of national  policy called national coverage determinations. Such action will ensure  greater consistency in paying only those Medicare claims that are  consistent with national policies.
In addition, CMS has taken action to implement provisions of the Patient  Protection and Affordable Care Act that Congress enacted to combat  fraud, waste, and abuse in Medicare. For instance, in March 2014, CMS  awarded a contract to a Federal Bureau of Investigation-approved  contractor that will enable the agency to conduct fingerprint-based  criminal history checks of high-risk providers and suppliers. This and  other provider screening procedures will help block the enrollment of  entities intent on committing fraud.
CMS made positive strides, but more needs to be done to fully meet our  criteria. For example, CMS has demonstrated leadership commitment by  taking actions such as strengthening provider and supplier enrollment  provisions, and improving its prepayment and postpayment claims review   However, all parts of the  process in the fee-for-service (FFS) program.Medicare program are on the Office of Management and Budget’s list of  high-error programs, suggesting additional actions are needed. By  implementing our open recommendations, CMS may be able to reduce  improper payments and make progress toward fulfilling the four  outstanding criteria to remove Medicare improper payments from our  High Risk List. The following summarizes open recommendations and  procedures authorized by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act  that CMS should implement to make progress toward fulfilling the four  outstanding criteria to remove Medicare improper payments from our  High Risk List. CMS should  require a surety bond for certain types of at-risk providers and  suppliers; publish a proposed rule for increased disclosures of prior actions  taken against providers and suppliers enrolling or revalidating  enrollment in Medicare, such as whether the provider or supplier has  been subject to a payment suspension from a federal health care  program; establish core elements of compliance programs for providers and  improve automated edits that identify services billed in medically  unlikely amounts; develop performance measures for the Zone Program Integrity  Contractors who explicitly link their work to the agency’s Medicare  FFS program integrity performance measures and improper payment  reduction goals;  reduce differences between contractor postpayment review  requirements, when possible; monitor the database used to track Recovery Auditors’ activities to  ensure that all postpayment review contractors are submitting  required data and that the data the database contains are accurate  and complete;  require Medicare administrative contractors to share information about  the underlying policies and savings related to their most effective  edits; and efficiently and cost-effectively identify, design, develop, and  implement an information technology solution that addresses the  removal of Social Security numbers from Medicare beneficiaries’  health insurance cards.
section_title: Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data
paragraphs: The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has made  progress toward improving its ability to mitigate gaps in weather satellite  data since the issue was placed on the High Risk List in 2013. NOAA has  demonstrated leadership on both its polar-orbiting and geostationary  satellite programs by making decisions on how it plans to mitigate  anticipated and potential gaps, and in making progress on multiple  mitigation-related activities. In addition, the agency implemented our  recommendations to improve its polar-orbiting and geostationary satellite  gap contingency plans. Specifically, in September 2013, we  recommended that NOAA establish a comprehensive contingency plan  for potential polar satellite data gaps that was consistent with contingency  planning best practices. In February 2014, NOAA issued an updated plan  that addressed many, but not all, of the best practices. For example, the  updated plan includes additional contingency alternatives; accounts for  additional gap scenarios; identifies mitigation strategies to be executed;  and identifies specific activities for implementing those strategies along  with associated roles and responsibilities, triggers, and deadlines.
In addition, in September 2013, we reported that while NOAA had  established contingency plans for the loss of geostationary satellites,  these plans did not address user concerns over potential reductions in  capability and did not identify alternative solutions and timelines for  preventing a delay in the Geostationary Operational Environmental  Satellite-R (GOES-R) launch date. We recommended the agency revise  its contingency plans to address these weaknesses. In February 2014,  NOAA released a new satellite contingency plan that improved in many,  but not all, of the best practices. For example, the updated plan clarified  requirements for notifying users regarding outages and impacts and  provided detailed information on responsibilities for each action in the  plan.
NOAA has demonstrated leadership commitment in addressing data gaps  of its polar-orbiting and geostationary weather satellites by making  decisions about how to mitigate potential gaps and by making progress in  implementing multiple mitigation activities. However, capacity concerns— including computing resources needed for some polar satellite mitigation  activities and the limited time available for integration and testing prior to  the scheduled launch of the next geostationary satellite—continue to  present challenges. In addition, while both programs have updated their  satellite contingency plans, work remains to implement and oversee  efforts to ensure that mitigation plans will be viable if and when they are  needed.
section_title: Sustaining Attention on High-Risk Programs
paragraphs: Overall, the government continues to take high-risk problems seriously  and is making long-needed progress toward correcting them. Congress  has acted to address several individual high-risk areas through hearings  and legislation. Our high-risk update and high-risk website,  http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/, can help inform the oversight agenda for the  114th Congress and guide efforts of the administration and agencies to  improve government performance and reduce waste and risks. In support  of Congress and to further progress to address high-risk issues, we  continue to review efforts and make recommendations to address high- risk areas. Continued perseverance in addressing high-risk areas will  ultimately yield significant benefits.
Thank you, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members  of the Committee. This concludes my testimony. I would be pleased to  answer any questions.
For further information on this testimony, please contact J. Christopher  Mihm at (202) 512-6806 or mihmj@gao.gov. Contact points for the  individual high-risk areas are listed in the report and on our high-risk web  site. Contact points for our Congressional Relations and Public Affairs  offices may be found on the last page of this statement.
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