Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Planning and Coordination for Maritime Operations
Published: 2011-06-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Recent events, such as the seaborne terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008 and the pirate attack on the Quest in February 2011, highlight maritime threats to the United States. The maritime domain presents a range of potential security threats--including naval forces of adversary nations, piracy, and the use of vessels to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons--which could harm the United States and its interests. The Department of Defense (DOD) has also identified homeland defense as one of its highest priorities. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which DOD has (1) planned to conduct maritime homeland defense operations, (2) identified and addressed capability gaps in maritime homeland defense, and (3) made progress with interagency partners, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, in addressing information sharing challenges related to maritime domain awareness. To conduct this work, GAO examined national and DOD guidance and interviewed officials from DOD, Joint Staff, combatant commands, the military services, and others.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. Northern Command, as the command responsible for homeland defense for the continental United States, has undertaken a number of homeland defense planning efforts, but it does not have a key detailed supporting plan for responding to maritime threats. Northern Command requires supporting DOD organizations to develop plans to support its homeland defense plan. The current, 2008 version of the plan requires a supporting plan from the commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, who is designated as the joint force maritime component commander for Northern Command. Fleet Forces Command has undertaken some planning efforts, but has not developed a supporting plan. Because the Northern Command homeland defense plan is a concept plan, which are less detailed than operation plans, and because the command does not have naval forces routinely under its operational control, supporting plans provide critical details on how operations are to be conducted and allow Northern Command to assess the extent to which subordinate commands are prepared to support the maritime homeland defense mission. DOD has identified maritime homeland defense capability gaps and determined actions necessary to address them, but it has not adequately assessed the extent to which those actions have been implemented. One way DOD identifies capability gaps that affect mission execution is through capabilities-based assessments. A 2008 assessment identified three capability gaps specific to the maritime homeland defense mission--such as engaging and defeating maritime threats--and eight other gaps that affect a number of missions, including maritime homeland defense--such as information management and sharing. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed the findings and requested relevant DOD organizations to take action to close identified gaps. However, the responsible organizations did not provide implementation plans or other documentation of actions taken or under way to address these gaps. Without documentation on progress in implementing recommended actions, Northern Command cannot be assured that it has full and accurate information about the extent to which other organizations have taken action to close these gaps. National and DOD documents have identified challenges to the sharing of maritime domain information, such as international coordination, policy and processes, technology, legal restrictions, and cultural barriers. DOD and interagency partners, such as the Coast Guard, have efforts under way to address many of these challenges. One effort, the interagency National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture, is intended to improve data management by establishing data standards, providing common terminology, and developing supporting technology. It is intended to leverage the interagency National Information Exchange Model, an effort currently under way to establish data standards, facilitate the accessibility of common data across the maritime community, and allow stakeholders to focus on configuring the display of information to best meet their specific missions, whether through data analysis capabilities or geographic displays.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that Fleet Forces Command develop a plan to support Northern Command and that responsible DOD organizations provide Northern Command with implementation plans for the actions identified by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. DOD partially concurred and agreed to take actions on each recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United States faces a range of security threats in the maritime domain,  including the naval forces of adversary nations, piracy, and the use of  vessels to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons. Recent events, such as the  seaborne terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008 and the pirate attack on the  Quest in February 2011, highlight the potential for maritime threats to  cause harm to the United States and its interests. The Department of  Defense (DOD) has identified homeland defense as one of its highest  priorities. Maritime homeland defense is an essential component of DOD’s  broader homeland defense mission—the protection of U.S. sovereignty,  territory, domestic population, and defense critical infrastructure against  external threats. DOD is the lead agency for the maritime homeland  defense effort in defending against traditional external threats, but this  mission involves global coordination between DOD components and  interagency partners, including the U.S. Coast Guard, across areas where  the military is actively deployed and in the maritime approaches to and  territorial waters of the United States. Maritime domain awareness—the  effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain  that could affect the security, safety, economy, or environment of the  United States—has been identified as a key national security requirement  and a critical enabler for DOD’s maritime homeland defense mission. DOD  Directive 2005.02E designated the Secretary of the Navy as the DOD  Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness.
For the purposes of this report, we focused our analysis of maritime  homeland defense planning on the U.S. Northern Command, because it is  the primary command responsible for that mission for the continental  United States. This report supplements prior GAO work on DOD’s  homeland defense planning and capabilities. It also supplements prior  GAO work on maritime domain awareness. Some of our prior work  relating to maritime domain awareness focused on the role of the Coast  Guard, which uses maritime domain awareness particularly to protect U.S.  ports and waterways. In addition, we previously examined the extent to  which DOD has developed a strategy to manage its maritime domain  awareness efforts and the extent to which a risk-based approach was used  to inform these efforts. See related GAO products listed at the end of this  report. In response to your request, this report addresses (1) the extent to  which DOD has conducted maritime homeland defense planning, (2) the  extent to which DOD has identified and addressed maritime homeland  defense capability gaps, and (3) progress DOD has made with its  interagency partners in addressing information sharing challenges related  to maritime domain awareness.
To determine the extent to which DOD has conducted maritime homeland  defense planning, we documented the status of DOD’s relevant planning  efforts and compared this information to DOD strategy and guidance— such as DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support—as  well as joint doctrine on contingency planning, operational exercises, and  the execution of maritime homeland defense operations. We focused on  the extent to which required planning documents had been developed by  Northern Command and other DOD organizations. We also interviewed or  received written responses to questions from Joint Staff officials and  officials from combatant commands whose areas of responsibility include  United States territorial waters—primarily Northern Command and U.S.  Pacific Command—and relevant supporting commands. Further, we  discussed maritime homeland defense preparedness with representatives  of the Coast Guard. To assess the extent to which DOD has identified and  addressed maritime homeland defense capability gaps, we reviewed DOD  studies of maritime homeland defense capabilities and actions necessary  for closing any identified capability gaps. We discussed the results of those  studies with DOD staff involved in undertaking them as well as  representatives responsible for addressing the identified capability gaps.  To evaluate DOD’s progress in addressing information sharing challenges  related to maritime domain awareness with its interagency partners, we  examined national guidance such as National Security Presidential  Directive 41 and the National Strategy for Maritime Security. We also  interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Policy, the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness, the  Joint Staff, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks  and Information Integration / DOD Chief Information Officer, the  Department of the Navy, U.S. Strategic Command, and the National  Maritime Domain Awareness Coordination Office. Given our previous  work on DOD’s management of maritime domain awareness, we relied on,  and updated where available, information on identified capability gaps in  DOD’s information sharing and situational awareness efforts. We also  discussed these capability gaps with offices responsible for addressing  them. Appendix I contains additional details regarding the scope and  methodology of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2010 through June  2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD strategic guidance and joint doctrine documents state that homeland  defense is the department’s highest priority. Joint doctrine identifies  defense of the maritime domain as an essential component of the broader  homeland defense mission. In furtherance of this mission, DOD employs a  layered defense approach in which it attempts to mitigate threats across  three areas, or layers, where maritime operations may be conducted. The  first layer, referred to as the “forward regions,” includes foreign land areas  and sovereign waters outside the homeland. In this layer, the objective is  to mitigate or prevent those threats from reaching the homeland. The  second layer, referred to as the approaches, includes the waters extending  from the limits of the homeland to the forward regions. The third layer, the  homeland itself, includes the United States, its territories and possessions,  and the surrounding territorial waters. Joint doctrine on homeland defense  operations notes that DOD components maintain a high state of readiness  and the flexible capabilities necessary for responding to threats of varying  scale in the maritime approaches and the maritime homeland domain. In  addition, DOD components must coordinate with interagency partners— such as the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection—who  also have responsibility for ensuring the protection of the homeland from  threats in the maritime domain. The principal means by which the U.S.  government facilitates interagency coordination in determining primary  and supporting agency responsibilities for maritime operations, including  maritime homeland defense, is contained in the Maritime Operational  Threat Response plan. The Maritime Operational Threat Response process  is generally required to be used as maritime threats arise and provides a  forum in which agency stakeholders can share information and coordinate  an effective response that reflects the desired national outcome.
Northern Command is the unified military command responsible for  planning, organizing, and executing DOD’s homeland defense mission  within the continental United States, Alaska, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin  Islands, and U.S. territorial waters. Pacific Command has similar  responsibilities in the Hawaiian Islands and U.S. territories in the Pacific.  Both combatant commands receive support from a variety of commands  and organizations in their direct chain of command and throughout DOD.  Given that the area of responsibility of Northern Command includes the  continental United States and many of its maritime approaches, this  command plays a key role in defending the homeland by conducting  operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at  the United States. Northern Command does not have an assigned Navy  service component or naval forces routinely under its operational control,  but the commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command is a supporting  commander and is designated as the joint force maritime component  commander for Northern Command. Further, Northern Command must  coordinate response operations with a number of other DOD and  interagency stakeholders—such as Pacific Command and the Coast Guard.
DOD identifies and develops capabilities needed by combatant  commanders through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development  System process. This system was established to provide the department  with an integrated, collaborative process to identify and guide  development of new capabilities that address the current and emerging  security environment. One method by which this process starts is with  the development of a capabilities-based assessment. Such an assessme nt  identifies the capabilities required to successfully execute missions such  as the homeland defense mission, the shortfalls in existing systems to  deliver those capabilities, and the possible solutions for the capability  shortfalls. Next, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council—the body  responsible for overseeing the military requirements system—may validate  the findings from such assessments and direct relevant DOD organizations  to undertake actions to close any capability gaps that are identified. After  the validation of the findings from a capabilities-based assessment, the  council may determine that (1) an identified gap presents an acceptable  level of risk to operations and no further action is needed to address it, (2)  the risk presented by a capability gap requires the development of a  nonmateriel solution, such as changes to DOD doctrine; or (3) the risk  presented by a capability gap requires a materiel solution—such as a new  acquisition program.
If materiel solutions are to be pursued, an initial capabilities document is produced. If  only nonmateriel solutions are recommended or a nonmateriel solution can be  implemented independent of proposed materiel needs, a joint doctrine, organization,  training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, or facilities Change  Recommendation is produced. which directed the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to  jointly lead an interagency effort to prepare a National Strategy for  Maritime Security. In 2005 the National Strategy for Maritime Security  provided broad strategic objectives and identified strategic actions to be  taken to enhance maritime domain awareness efforts. The strategy  required DOD and the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and  State to lead U.S. efforts to integrate and align all U.S. maritime security  programs into a comprehensive, cohesive national effort that includes the  appropriate state and local agencies, the private sector, and other nations.  The Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation each  appointed an executive agent for maritime domain awareness to assist in  coordinating efforts and informing maritime policy within and among  federal agencies in order to enhance national maritime domain awareness  efforts.
Building on national guidance, DOD policy has established broad roles and  responsibilities for maritime domain awareness efforts within the  department but recognizes, as does national guidance, that enhancing  maritime domain awareness must be a combined effort. DOD established  some roles and responsibilities for departmental maritime domain  awareness efforts in DOD Directive 2005.02E. This directive designates the  Secretary of the Navy as the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain  Awareness and designates the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to  oversee the activities of the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain  Awareness. The directive also establishes several management functions  for the Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness to conduct in  coordination with relevant partners, such as the Under Secretary of  Defense for Policy and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.  Required management functions outlined in the directive include  overseeing the execution of DOD maritime domain awareness initiatives;  developing and distributing goals, objectives, and desired effects for  maritime domain awareness; identifying and updating maritime domain  awareness requirements and resources; and recommending DOD-wide  maritime domain awareness planning and programming guidance. An  additional DOD instruction on maritime domain awareness from the  Secretary of the Navy, in 2009, assigned the Chief of Naval Operations  responsibility for achieving maritime domain awareness within the Navy.  This responsibility includes aligning Navy guidance with DOD policy  guidance and coordinating with the Joint Staff to ensure that combatant  commands have the necessary Navy resources to support their respective  maritime domain awareness requirements.
DOD has made efforts to enhance maritime domain awareness within the  department, but recognizes that no single department, agency, or entity  holds all of the authorities and capabilities necessary to fully achieve  effective maritime domain awareness. For example the process of  allocating sufficient resources to maritime domain awareness efforts is  complicated because the cost associated with maritime domain awareness  efforts is spread across multiple agencies; this also makes the total cost of  maritime domain awareness efforts difficult to determine. Resources and  funding for maritime capabilities can come from a number of sources,  including national intelligence funding, military intelligence funding,  military service funding, and funding from other interagency partners such  as the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and the Maritime  Administration. Coordination challenges such as resource allocation  among agencies are common for interagency efforts like maritime domain  awareness.
DOD faces challenges unique to the maritime domain as well as challenges  common to interagency coordination efforts in general. Challenges unique  to the maritime domain include the need for international cooperation to  ensure improved transparency in the registration of vessels and  identification of ownership, cargoes, and crew of the world’s  multinational, multiflag merchant marine. Environmental factors unique to  the maritime domain also contribute to maritime domain awareness  challenges, such as the vastness of the oceans, the great length of  shorelines, and the size of port areas that can provide concealment and  numerous access points to the land. Additionally, the fluid nature of  crewing and operational activities of most vessels offers additional  opportunities for concealment and challenges for those attempting to  maintain maritime security. In addition to challenges unique to the  maritime domain are the challenges DOD faces that are common to other  interagency coordination efforts. In 2009 we reported on common  interagency coordination challenges for efforts such as achieving maritime  domain awareness that included agencies not always sharing relevant  information and challenges inherent in managing and integrating  information drawn from multiple sources. As we previously reported,  agencies may not always share information because of concerns about  another agency’s ability to protect shared information or to use the  information properly; cultural factors or political concerns; a lack of clear  guidelines, policies, or agreements with other agencies; or security  clearance issues. Challenges posed by managing and integrating  information drawn from multiple sources include managing redundancies  in the information after it is integrated; unclear roles and responsibilities;  and data not being comparable across agencies. We have previously  recommended that agencies involved in interagency collaboration efforts  need to enhance efforts to develop and implement overarching strategies,  create collaborative organizations, develop a well-trained workforce, and  share and integrate national security information across agencies.  Agencies generally agreed with our recommendations and, in some cases,  identified planned actions or actions that were under way to address the  recommendations.
In a recent report, we reviewed DOD efforts to enhance maritime domain  awareness and determined that DOD did not have a departmentwide  strategy for maritime domain awareness. We concluded that in the  absence of such a comprehensive strategy, DOD may not be effectively  managing its maritime domain awareness efforts. In order to improve  DOD’s ability to manage implementation of maritime domain awareness  across DOD, we recommended that DOD develop and implement a  departmentwide strategy for maritime domain awareness that identifies  DOD objectives and roles and responsibilities within DOD for achieving  maritime domain awareness and aligns efforts and objectives with DOD’s  corporate process for determining requirements and allocating resources.  Additionally, we recommended that the strategy identify responsibilities  for resourcing capability areas and include performance measures for  assessing the progress of the overall strategy that will assist in the  implementation of maritime domain awareness efforts. An overarching  maritime domain awareness strategy would also enhance interagency  collaboration efforts. DOD concurred with our recommendation for an  overarching maritime domain awareness strategy and has notified us that  it is working on producing such a strategy.
section_title: Northern Command Has Undertaken Maritime Homeland Defense Planning but Faces Increased Uncertainty about Mission Execution
paragraphs: Northern Command, as the command responsible for homeland defense  for the continental United States, has undertaken a number of homeland  defense planning efforts, but it does not have a key detailed supporting  plan for responding to maritime threats. Northern Command routinely  conducts planning and exercises to prepare for execution of its maritime  homeland defense mission. As part of its planning efforts, Northern  Command requires supporting DOD organizations and subordinate  commands to develop supporting plans to its homeland defense plan. The  current, 2008 version of the Northern Command homeland defense plan  requires such a supporting plan from a number of supporting commands,  including the commander of Fleet Forces Command, who is Northern  Command’s supporting commander and also Northern Command’s joint  force maritime component commander. Fleet Forces Command has  developed an execute order that contains some elements that would be  addressed in a supporting plan. This execute order also provides general  details about types and numbers of forces that would be made available to  Northern Command to execute the maritime homeland defense mission.  Nonetheless, without a complete supporting plan, Northern Command  faces increased uncertainty about its ability to execute its maritime  homeland defense responsibilities.
subsections: section_title: Northern Command Conducts Maritime Homeland Defense Planning
paragraphs: DOD provides guidance for developing contingency plans and establishing  objectives, and identifying capabilities needed to achieve the objectives in  a given environment. The planning process is meant to ensure mission  success and to reduce the risks inherent in military operations.  Contingency plans receive extensive DOD review and can take several  forms, from very detailed operation plans to broad and less detailed  concept plans. For example, operation plans are developed for possible  contingencies across the range of military operations. Such plans may be  developed for military operations dictated by a specific foreign threat or  scenario, such as a scenario in which it is necessary to oppose a landward  invasion of the territory of a U.S. ally by a hostile nation, while concept  plans are prepared for less specific threat scenarios, such as disaster  relief, humanitarian assistance, or peace operations. Operation plans  identify the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to  execute the plan. Some concept plans may similarly provide detailed lists  of military forces that would provide required capabilities; however, not  all concept plans must include such information.
DOD guidance requires Northern Command to develop a homeland  defense plan that prepares it to employ military force in response to  unforeseen events, such as terrorist threats. The specific contingencies for  which Northern Command should plan are directed by the President and  the Secretary of Defense. Northern Command follows several sets of  strategies and guidance when developing homeland defense plans—such  as the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, the  Unified Command Plan, and Contingency Planning Guidance. Given  that the potential threats to the homeland are broad, the Northern  Command homeland defense plan is a general concept plan—as opposed  to a detailed operation plan developed based on a specific threat or  scenario. The current version of Northern Command’s homeland defense  plan, which was approved by DOD in 2008, contains a discussion of the  maritime homeland defense mission area. The current version of the  homeland defense concept plan does not contain detailed lists of military  forces that would provide required capabilities in order to execute the  plan.
The Northern Command homeland defense plan requires supporting DOD  organizations and subordinate commands to develop supporting plans to  assist Northern Command in responding to homeland defense events.  These organizations include Northern Command’s subordinate commands,  such as Joint Task Force Alaska and Joint Force Headquarters National  Capitol Region; component commands, such as Army Forces North, Air  Forces North, and Marine Forces North; supporting commands, such as  Fleet Forces Command and U.S. Transportation Command; and DOD  agencies, such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Defense  Intelligence Agency. The homeland defense plan provides its subordinate,  component, and supporting commands and agencies with planning  guidance, including types of incidents to prepare for and what kinds of  plans to prepare to support Northern Command’s homeland defense plan.  Because the Northern Command homeland defense plan is a concept plan,  which are by definition less detailed than operation plans, and because the  command does not have naval forces routinely under its operational  control, these supporting plans provide critical details on how operations  are to be conducted and allow Northern Command to assess the extent to  which these organizations and subordinate commands are prepared to  support the homeland defense mission. For example, the supporting plan  allows the supported commander to assess the extent to which the  supporting command is prepared to address all appropriate areas of the  broader plan. Supporting plans must adhere to the same joint doctrine  standards as the base plans and should contain objectives, assumptions  and constraints, and sections on such areas as command and control, task  organization, intelligence, and logistics. Further, supporting plans can help  guide subsequent specific actions that can enhance preparedness—such as  the development of execute orders and training and readiness measures.  Collectively, these supporting plans should help to facilitate preparedness  for and adequate response to an incident in the homeland.
Additional means by which Northern Command and DOD plan for  executing maritime homeland defense operations include the use of  standing execute orders and exercises to test the maritime component of  the Northern Command homeland defense plan. DOD has developed  standing execute orders in the homeland defense area to identify the  general types and numbers of forces necessary to execute missions,  including maritime homeland defense. According to DOD officials, these  execute orders provide the authority for Northern Command to request  allocation of additional forces needed to conduct maritime homeland  defense missions. Additionally, Fleet Forces Command tracks and  provides information to Northern Command on the ability of naval forces  to satisfy requirements identified in the specific execute order.
Exercises play an instrumental role in preparing for maritime homeland  defense operations by providing opportunities to test plans, improve  proficiency, assess capabilities and readiness, and clarify roles and  responsibilities. Short of performance in actual operations, exercises  provide the best means to assess the effectiveness of organizations in  achieving mission preparedness. Exercises also provide an ideal  opportunity to enhance preparedness by collecting, developing,  implementing, and disseminating lessons learned and verifying corrective  actions that have been taken to resolve previously identified issues.  Northern Command established a maritime exercise branch in 2009, which  focuses on exercising maritime homeland defense, maritime security, and  maritime events related to defense support to civil authorities. Northern  Command conducts maritime exercises in conjunction with other, larger- scale exercises.
section_title: Fleet Forces Command Has Not Developed a Supporting Plan
paragraphs: The 2008 Northern Command homeland defense plan requires a number of  supporting entities—including the commander of Fleet Forces Command  in his role as the joint force maritime component commander—to develop  supporting plans within 60 days of the completion of Northern Command’s  2008 plan. Fleet Forces Command did not provide such a supporting plan.  The command developed a maritime homeland defense execute order,  which in the view of Fleet Forces officials outlines a robust command and  control structure for maritime operations and enables the execution of the  maritime homeland defense mission in Northern Command’s area of  responsibility. The execute order addresses some elements that would be  included in a supporting plan, such as reflecting the command  relationships and concept of operations in Northern Command’s homeland  defense concept plan. The execute order also identifies the types of naval  units that would respond to a maritime homeland defense threat and  provides the authorities for these forces to be transferred to Northern  Command control when needed. A revision to the Northern Command  concept plan for homeland defense is currently under review and,  according to Northern Command officials, a similar requirement for a  supporting plan from Fleet Forces Command is expected to be included. A  complete supporting plan would provide additional details that are not  generally present in execute orders. For example, according to DOD  planning guidance, execute orders focus specifically on allocating forces  and directing the initiation of military operations—whereas supporting  plans contain information on objectives; assumptions and constraints;  sections on such areas as command and control, task organization,  intelligence, and logistics; and other details requested and required by the  combatant commander. By completing a supporting plan, Fleet Forces  Command would expand on the operations planning already done for the  maritime homeland defense execute order and help Northern Command  further mitigate planning, operations, and command and control  challenges to the maritime homeland defense mission.
section_title: Northern Command Has Assessed Its Maritime Homeland Defense Capabilities, but Identified Gaps May Persist Due to Insufficient DOD Oversight
paragraphs: DOD identifies and develops capabilities needed by combatant  commanders through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development  System process. One method by which this process starts is the  development of a systematic study—referred to as a capabilities-based  assessment—that identifies the capabilities required to successfully  execute a mission, capability gaps and associated operational risks, and  possible solutions for the capability shortfalls. The Joint Requirements  Oversight Council—the body responsible for overseeing the military  requirements process—may validate the findings from such assessments  and direct relevant DOD organizations to undertake actions to close any  capability gaps that are identified. At the direction of the Deputy Secretary  of Defense and in response to a request from the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, Northern  Command agreed to lead a departmentwide, capabilities-based assessment  for DOD’s homeland defense and civil support missions. The strategic  goals of the effort were to enable improvement in DOD homeland defense  and civil support policy, evaluate existing DOD capabilities and identify  DOD capability gaps, improve DOD’s integration with interagency mission  partners, and recommend further action to promote future capability  development for the homeland defense and civil support missions. The  Deputy Secretary of Defense identified this capabilities-based assessment  as one of DOD’s top 25 transformational priorities to be completed or  advanced to a major milestone by December 2008 and an important effort  for determining future resource allocation.
DOD conducted the capabilities-based assessment between September  2007 and October 2008, in accordance with DOD processes. DOD agencies,  the combatant commands, the military services, the National Guard  Bureau, the Department of Homeland Security, and other key federal  interagency partners participated in the assessment, which identified 31  capability gaps for DOD’s homeland defense and civil support missions.  According to our analysis, the assessment identified three gaps specific to  the maritime homeland defense mission area—such as engaging and  defeating maritime threats—and eight gaps—such as information  management and sharing—in capabilities that enable a number of  missions, including maritime homeland defense. The three maritime  homeland defense capability gaps may affect DOD’s ability to coordinate  maritime operations with relevant interagency stakeholders and respond  to the full range of potential threats in the Northern Command maritime  area of responsibility. For example, the assessment noted that the  command lacked a robust understanding of the roles and responsibilities  of its interagency partners, thus limiting the extent to which it could  effectively coordinate interagency operations in response to maritime  threats. Further, the assessment noted that the command’s ability to  respond to certain threats without timely warning might be inadequate.
In 2009, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed the  capabilities-based assessment and requested relevant DOD  organizations—including the Navy; the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Policy; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; DOD’s Biometrics Task Force; and  the Defense Threat Reduction Agency—to undertake specific actions to  address the identified capability gaps. Thirteen recommendations were  directed at addressing the three capability gaps in the maritime homeland  defense mission area. For example, Northern Command, with the support  of Joint Forces Command, the U.S. Navy, and Joint Staff, was to review the  reorganization of forces to assign a permanent naval component to  Northern Command. In addition, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,  with the support of Strategic Command and the Domestic Nuclear  Detection Office, was to integrate some nuclear detection efforts. The  council requested that each organization responsible for undertaking  recommended actions provide an implementation plan to Northern  Command—thus facilitating the efforts of Northern Command and the  council to track organizations’ progress in implementing  recommendations.
However, the responsible organizations did not provide Northern  Command with implementation plans or other forms of documentation  regarding actions taken or under way. Northern Command officials  informed us that they requested information from these organizations to  assess their progress and stated that Northern Command does not have  the authority to compel those organizations to provide implementation  plans. They noted that in the absence of implementation plans they relied  on self-reported progress updates to document—where possible—the  extent to which responsible organizations had taken the recommended  actions. A Northern Command document used to track progress in  implementing the recommended actions noted that of the 13  recommendations focused on maritime homeland defense, 2 had been  implemented, 6 were in the process of being implemented, 4 had not yet  been addressed, and there was no information available on the progress of  the remaining recommendation. For example, one of the  recommendations that had not yet been addressed related to assessing  Navy and Coast Guard roles and responsibilities to ensure DOD’s ability to  respond to the full spectrum of homeland defense threats in the maritime  domain. Without implementation plans or other forms of documentation  on progress in implementing recommended actions, Northern Command  cannot be assured that it has full and accurate information about the  extent to which the responsible organizations have implemented actions  to address maritime homeland defense capability gaps. Without such  documentation, DOD’s efforts to effectively identify and direct necessary  resources to meet maritime homeland defense needs may be further  complicated.
section_title: DOD Has Made Progress with Interagency Partners in Addressing Information Sharing Challenges to Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness, but Challenges Remain
paragraphs: Because of its dedicated resources and presence in the maritime domain,  DOD plays a key role in leading efforts to enhance maritime domain  awareness and has identified challenges and initiated efforts to address  these challenges in the domain. The 2005 National Plan to Achieve  Maritime Domain Awareness, a national strategy document, states in its  guiding principles that maritime domain awareness depends on extensive  information sharing among government agencies, international partners  (such as foreign governments and the International Maritime  Organization), and private-sector stakeholders (such as the Customs-Trade  Partnership Against Terrorism). Improved information sharing would  enable DOD and its interagency partners, such as the Coast Guard,  Customs and Border Protection, and the Maritime Administration, to  better leverage existing data that have already been collected within the  federal government, promote a shared awareness of potential threats, and  facilitate a coordinated response to any identified national security threat.  To improve information sharing, DOD has identified the need to adopt  shared data standards that can translate legacy maritime data sources into  a common information pool, making currently inaccessible data available.  One effort, the National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture, is  focusing on creating a common pool of data and establishing data  standards.
The National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture, an effort led by  the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness, is intended to  improve data management and integration through establishing data  standards, providing a common maritime language, and developing  supporting technology. This effort is expected to leverage the existing  National Information Exchange Model—an effort under way at DOD and  the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice to establish data  standards including some applicable to the maritime domain—and provide  supporting standards and guidance at a more detailed level. The National  Information Exchange Model has defined terms. For example, it defines  “length,” as a numeric determination of measure that is recorded as six  digits. The National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture is intended  to go beyond the National Information Exchange Model effort by  determining which partners will have access to what information and  defining how to query for automated responses—for example, by naming a  port of interest, vessel type, and estimated time of arrival to attain specific  information on what vessels are arriving at a particular port. Interagency  participation in this effort is robust; the coordination office for Maritime  Operational Threat Response has already agreed to adopt the standards.  DOD officials told us that a number of countries—including France,  England, and Canada—and organizations such as the North Atlantic  Treaty Organization already are considering adopting the standards once  they are developed. The first version of the standards has been published  and is expected to be tested through summer exercises. As a result of this  effort, access to information is expected to improve, and the amount of  information available to inform analysts and operational commanders is  expected to increase as information becomes easier to develop and share.  One DOD official equated the anticipated expansion of available,  displayable data with that of smart phone applications: once the  infrastructure is in place, smart phone applications become easy to create  and subscribe to. In this analogy, the infrastructure could potentially be  provided through the National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture  effort. Rather than focusing on the development of one national common  operational picture—presenting a single, unified display of maritime  information—the National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture may  facilitate the accessibility of common data across the maritime community  and allow stakeholders to focus on configuring the display of information  to best meet their specific missions, whether through data analysis  capabilities or geographic displays. DOD officials involved in the National  Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture believe that if the effort is  successful, maritime domain awareness for the nation and our partners  would be enhanced.
However, challenges would remain. National and DOD documents identify  challenges affecting the sharing of maritime domain information, such as  international coordination, policy and processes, technology, legal  restrictions, and cultural barriers. DOD and interagency partners have  efforts under way to address many of these challenges.
International coordination: A DOD and interagency working group has  noted that the sharing of passenger, crew, and cargo information is  inhibited by a lack of international policy agreements. The existing  information sharing environment, made up of a collection of networks,  limits situational awareness and collaboration among maritime partners.  To address these challenges, DOD is working with other international  partners such as Singapore to improve vessel-tracking procedures and  Micronesia, Malaysia, and Indonesia to improve sharing of relevant vessel  tracking data; DOD is also supporting the Maritime Safety and Security  Information System—a ship-tracking information sharing capability with  over 60 participating nations.
Policies and processes: DOD recognizes that multiple agencies and  organizations have been collecting and storing identical information— either because agencies have been unaware of others’ efforts or because  agencies have been unable to share relevant information with other  organizations in the absence of information sharing standards,  agreements, policies, or processes to facilitate such sharing. Challenges  such as these may be addressed through efforts like the Joint Integration  of Maritime Domain Awareness, a 3-year joint test at Northern Command.  This effort will identify policy and procedural improvements that could  enhance information sharing between Northern Command and its  supporting operational commands and is expected to be expandable to all  combatant commands.
Technology: DOD has identified uncoordinated data and incompatible  technology systems as technological challenges to efforts to enhance  maritime domain awareness. Without data standards, data such as the date  an event occurred can be difficult to communicate, because this  information can be recorded in several different ways depending on  agency and personal preferences. The National Information Exchange  Model is one effort under way to address data standardization. Another  effort, the National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture, is to  establish a technology architecture that will allow currently incompatible  technology systems to communicate and access common data.
Legal restrictions: The National Concept of Operations for Maritime  Domain Awareness notes that there are legal restrictions on the sharing of  public-private information, classified material, protected critical  infrastructure information, and sensitive industry or government data.
There are also privacy concerns that arise regarding the sharing of  information, such as the sharing of certain information from passenger  lists.
Cultural barriers: DOD recognizes that the culture of overprotecting  information impedes the transfer and sharing of information in a lawful  manner. For example, some data providers are reluctant to share detailed  information due to concerns that the information will not be appropriately  protected. Building relationships—such as the colocation of defense, law  enforcement, and international partners at Joint Interagency Task Force- South—and direct, real-time communication help to alleviate this cultural  challenge. The Maritime Operational Threat Response process is another  good example of overcoming cultural barriers; it provides a venue for  direct, real-time communication among key decision makers during  specific maritime threat events in order to quickly coordinate a national  response to a maritime threat.
While efforts under way may enhance national maritime domain  awareness, DOD recognizes that opportunities for improvement remain.  For example, the Office of the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain  Awareness noted that DOD lacks the ability to assess progress and  investments in maritime domain awareness as a whole, align maritime  domain awareness initiatives and advancements across DOD components  and with other interagency efforts, and make informed planning and  programming recommendations to align resources to requirements and  priorities. We recommended in a prior report, and DOD agreed, that DOD  should develop and implement a strategy for maritime domain awareness  that establishes objectives, roles, and responsibilities for maritime domain  awareness and includes performance measures. Such a strategy would  enhance interagency coordination and assist in leveraging and aligning  existing and ongoing information sharing and dissemination efforts in the  maritime domain.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD has recognized defense of the homeland as one of its key  responsibilities. In meeting this responsibility with regard to the maritime  domain—which presents a range of threats—DOD must work with  interagency partners to both improve the awareness of these threats and  effectively coordinate an appropriate response. Northern Command has a  unique role in preparing for and conducting homeland defense missions  and the command has worked to improve its coordination with its  interagency, state, local, and international partners. As Northern  Command’s command and control relationships may rely on increased  coordination with these partners and other DOD supporting components,  efforts to improve its preparedness through planning and exercising with  these other organizations and working together to address identified  capability gaps are important to ensure that the command can effectively  deal with maritime threats as they occur. DOD uses its planning and  exercising processes to increase the level of assuredness that threats can  be neutralized should they arise. These processes allow the department to  assess its preparedness to address various contingencies. Northern  Command and its partners inside and outside of DOD continue to improve  planning and preparedness for maritime homeland defense. With the  completion of the joint force maritime component commander’s  supporting plan, Northern Command and its partners can further  capitalize on these efforts and better inform each other and decision  makers about their preparedness for this mission. As DOD and the rest of  government face increasing demand and competition for resources,  policymakers will confront difficult decisions on funding priorities.  Planning undertaken by Northern Command and its supporting commands  also informs the department’s resourcing and investment decisions by  identifying the types and numbers of forces, as well as other capabilities,  necessary to meet a variety of threats. DOD’s identification of capability  gaps affecting its homeland defense mission, as well as subsequent actions  to address these gaps, helps the department understand its preparedness  to conduct this mission. However, without completed implementation  plans, the department does not have a means of verifying that these  actions have been taken and these gaps have been addressed. The  completion of these implementation plans would provide Northern  Command and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council with the ability  to monitor progress made in addressing these gaps and would serve as an  additional source of information to inform resourcing and investment  decisions and assist DOD in making the best use of resources in a fiscally  constrained environment.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve DOD’s preparedness to conduct maritime homeland defense  missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following  two actions:    To ensure that Northern Command is sufficiently prepared to conduct  maritime homeland defense operations, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the commander of Fleet Forces Command  to develop a complete supporting plan for the Northern Command  homeland defense plan, currently under review, once it is approved.
To enable Northern Command to monitor progress toward addressing  maritime homeland defense capability gaps—including the three  specific to maritime homeland defense as well as the others that affect  the mission—identified in the Northern Command homeland defense  and civil support capabilities-based assessment, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense direct responsible DOD organizations to  provide Northern Command with implementation plans for  undertaking the actions identified by the Joint Requirements Oversight  Council.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred  with our recommendations and discussed actions it is taking—or plans to  take—related to the issues raised by our recommendations. Regarding our  recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the commander of  Fleet Forces Command to develop a complete supporting plan to the  revised Northern Command homeland defense plan as soon as the revision  is approved, DOD indicated that in addition to participating in the  development of the current draft of Northern Command’s homeland  defense concept plan, Fleet Forces Command will prepare a supporting  plan in accordance with the requirement. DOD stated that further  direction from the Secretary of Defense to a service subordinate command  was neither appropriate nor required. In this report we cite the importance  of complete supporting plans to DOD’s joint operation planning process.  The completion of a supporting plan from the joint force maritime  component commander, as was requested in the 2008 homeland defense  plan and is expected to be requested again in the new version of the plan,  will further aid Northern Command and DOD in capitalizing on other  important prior and ongoing efforts by Fleet Forces Command and others.  If Fleet Forces Command—as the joint force maritime component  commander for Northern Command—develops a complete homeland  defense supporting plan, this will satisfy the recommendation and we  believe this will improve the department’s overall preparedness to conduct  maritime homeland defense.
DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation that the  responsible department organizations provide Northern Command with  implementation plans for undertaking the actions identified by the Joint  Requirements Oversight Council. In its comments, DOD stated that  Northern Command will identify actions yet to be completed, ascertain the  utility in completing those actions, and close out recommendations that  may no longer be required. The department also stated that Northern  Command had diligently tracked the implementation of the identified  actions, although implementation plans were not received from the myriad  organizations responsible for these actions. According to DOD, Northern  Command suspended its follow-up on these recommended actions when a  substantial portion of the total recommended actions had been completed,  were on track for completion, or where the remaining actions were  unlikely to result in further progress. The department indicated that  Northern Command would now assess the utility of completing  outstanding actions. In our report, we discuss the fact that Northern  Command did not have implementation plans or other documentation to  assess the extent to which the responsible organizations have  implemented the recommended actions. Given that (1) these actions were  recommended to address identified gaps in the department’s ability to  conduct civil support and homeland defense missions and (2) not taking  actions to close these gaps may present significant operational risks to  DOD, we continue to believe assessing whether the recommended actions  related to maritime homeland defense capability gaps have been fully  implemented would be an important step in minimizing risk to such  operations. If—as indicated by DOD’s response—Northern Command  assesses the utility of completing actions identified by the Joint  Requirements Oversight Council and fully assesses progress toward those  actions, that would satisfy our recommendation.
DOD’s written comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. The  Department of Homeland Security also provided written comments on the  draft in which the department highlighted some of its continuing efforts to  improve the awareness and response to maritime-related threats in  coordination with DOD and other interagency partners. These comments  are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III. DOD and the Department of  Homeland Security also provided separate technical comments, which we  have incorporated into the report where appropriate.
We are sending copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the  Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact information for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  conducted maritime homeland defense planning, we examined DOD’s  Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support as well as joint  doctrine on contingency planning, operational exercises, and the  execution of maritime homeland defense operations. We also interviewed  officials of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the  Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command, North American Aerospace  Defense Command/U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Fleet Forces Command,  and the U.S. Coast Guard. Further, we received written responses from  U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Pacific Fleet related to maritime homeland  defense planning efforts in the Pacific Command area of responsibility.  For the purposes of this report, we focused on the extent to which  required maritime homeland defense planning documents had been  developed by Northern Command and other DOD organizations. We  compared these planning documents to joint doctrine and other DOD  planning guidance.
To assess the extent to which DOD has identified and addressed maritime  homeland defense capability gaps, we analyzed maritime homeland  defense-related gaps identified in DOD’s Homeland Defense and Civil  Support Capabilities-Based Assessment and a 2009 DOD Joint  Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum on the assessment. We  also interviewed officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  for Policy, the Joint Staff, and Northern Command to discuss the maritime  homeland defense-related components of the study and the status of  actions taken to address relevant capability gaps.
To evaluate progress DOD has made with its interagency partners in  addressing information sharing challenges related to maritime domain  awareness, we obtained and analyzed relevant national, interagency, and  DOD-level documentation—such as National Security Presidential  Directive-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13, Maritime  Security Policy, National Strategy for Maritime Security, National Plan  to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, Maritime Domain Awareness  Interagency Solutions Analysis Current State Report, and the 2010  assessment of maritime domain awareness plans conducted by the DOD  Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness. Given our previous  work on DOD’s management of maritime domain awareness, we relied on,  and updated where available, information on identified capability gaps in  DOD’s information sharing and situational awareness efforts. In addition,  we interviewed officials from the following DOD components and  interagency partners to discuss these capability gaps as well as other  issues related to maritime domain awareness information sharing:    Office of the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness,    Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and  Information Integration / DOD Chief Information Officer,    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,   Joint Staff,    Combatant Commands,    North American Aerospace Defense Command /U.S. Northern    U.S. Pacific Command, and    U.S. Strategic Command,    U.S. Department of the Navy,    Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,    Office of the Chief Information Officer,    U.S. Pacific Fleet, and    U.S. Fleet Forces Command,    Global Maritime Operational Threat Response Coordination    National Maritime Domain Awareness Coordination Office.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2010 through June  2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Joseph Kirschbaum (Assistant  Director), Alisa Beyninson, Christy Bilardo, John Dell’Osso, Gina Flacco,  Brent Helt, Joanne Landesman, Katherine Lenane, Gregory Marchand, and  Kendal Robinson made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic,  Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness.  GAO-11-621. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2011.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency  Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions.  GAO-10-364. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise  Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be  Improved. GAO-09-849. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information,  but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. GAO-09-337.  Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2009.
Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were  Generally Well- Developed and Are Being Implemented. GAO-08-672.  Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2008.
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but  Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other  Issues. GAO-08-251. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for  Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003.