Biscuit Fire Recovery Project: Analysis of Project Development, Salvage Sales, and Other Activities
Published: 2006-09-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2002, the Biscuit Fire burned almost 500,000 acres of the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest in southwestern Oregon. In its wake, the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project (Project) is one of the largest, most complex postfire recovery projects undertaken by the Forest Service. Considerable controversy exists over the Project and its salvage sales to harvest dead trees. GAO was asked to determine (1) how the Project compares with the Forest Service's general approach to postfire recovery, (2) the status of the Project's salvage sales and how the reported financial and economic results of the sales compare with initial estimates, (3) the status of other Project activities, and (4) the extent of reported improper logging and the agency's response. To answer these objectives, GAO reviewed Project environmental analysis documents, plans, and activity reports and interviewed agency officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff followed the Forest Service's general approach to postfire recovery in developing the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project, but several unique circumstances affected the time taken and the alternatives it included. For example, the size of the burned area--and, subsequently, the size of the Project--complicated the environmental analysis and increased the time needed to complete and review it. Also, the regulations and guidance governing timber harvest and road building in the forest's inventoried roadless areas changed several times, in part due to litigation, affecting the amount of timber available for harvest. As of December 2005, the forest staff had nearly completed 12 salvage sales; however, incomplete sales and a lack of comparable economic data, among other things, make comparing the financial and economic results with the agency's initial estimates difficult. For fiscal years 2003 through 2005, the Forest Service and other agencies spent about $5 million on the sales and related activities. In the next several years, the Forest Service also plans to spend an additional $5.7 million to remove brush and reforest the sale areas. In return, the agency collected about $8.8 million from the sales. While the agency estimated that the salvage sales would generate about $19.6 million for restoration, 6,900 local jobs, and $240 million in regional economic activity, it is premature to compare these estimates with the results because the sales are not complete. The Forest Service will generate additional expenditures, revenues, and economic activity from two sales sold in the summer of 2006. Even when complete sales' results are available, however, a comparison will be complicated by a lack of comparable financial and economic data. Through December 2005, the forest staff began work on most of the other activities identified in the Project but completing them depends on the amount of salvage harvest, funding sources, and work schedules. For example, the amount of brush disposal work--estimated at 18,939 acres--will be reduced because the acres of salvage harvest have been reduced. Other activities, such as establishing fuel management zones to help fight future fires, depend on the Forest Service funding and scheduling the work over many years. In addition, a large-scale study and monitoring activities are still being planned and yet unfunded. Although the forest staff identified the importance of making Project results available to the public, they do not separately report on Project activities and results from other programs. During salvage harvest operations in 2004 and 2005, the Forest Service reported three incidents of improper logging and took action to prevent such occurrences in the future. Two of the incidents were caused by Forest Service errors in marking its boundaries. Forest staff have since developed procedures to better mark boundaries of sale areas. A third incident was caused by an error on the part of the company that purchased the sale; the company was fined $24,000, and the trees were left on the ground.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Biscuit Fire Recovery Project (Project), a large-scale project to recover  areas of the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest burned by the Biscuit  Fire, is one of the largest and most complex postfire recovery projects the  Forest Service has ever undertaken. The Biscuit Fire burned almost 500,000  acres of federal land in Oregon and California in 2002, making it the largest  fire in the nation outside of Alaska since 1997. In the last decade, the  nation has experienced many large fires that have burned increasing  numbers of acres. The 2002 fire season, one of the nation’s worst fire  seasons in the last 50 years, burned 6.9 million acres of public and private  forests and rangelands in the United States—more than any other year  except 2000 and 2005.
After large fires on federal lands, federal land managers identify activities  and projects that they believe will help recover forest resources such as  trees and vegetation, roads, recreation facilities, wildlife habitat, and  streams and rivers. Specifically, the Forest Service within the Department  of Agriculture—and other federal land management agencies—have  defined recovery activities to include emergency stabilization,  rehabilitation, and restoration. Emergency stabilization is conducted  within 1 year of a fire through the Burned Area Emergency Response  program to address threats to life, property, or resources; it includes work such as seeding and mulching to reduce soil erosion and runoff.  Rehabilitation is conducted within 3 years of a fire and includes such work  as repairing roads or trails, reforesting or planting trees, and restoring  wildlife habitat. Restoration continues such rehabilitation activities as  reforesting beyond the first 3 years after a fire. The Biscuit Fire Recovery  Project focuses on the long-term rehabilitation and restoration of the fire  area, not emergency stabilization or Burned Area Emergency Response  activities.
During the postfire process, the Forest Service may also consider whether  to leave burned trees and allow the burned area to recover naturally or to  harvest some of the dead and dying trees—called salvage harvesting—with  the intention of generating jobs and economic development, and generating  funds to help pay for the recovery of natural resources or Forest Service  infrastructure, such as roads and trails. According to the Forest Service,  salvage harvesting should be done relatively quickly after a fire, before the  trees begin to decay, which makes the wood less usable and valuable.  Generally, smaller trees lose their commercial value after about 2 years,  and larger trees lose most of their commercial value after 3 or 4 years.  However, considerable scientific controversy exists about whether and  how quickly harvested areas recover compared with unharvested areas,  and experts disagree about whether salvage harvesting the burned timber  provides economic development and generates funding for recovery in  addition to that needed to pay for planning, preparing, and administering  sales. For this reason, we recently recommended that the Forest Service  pursue additional research on the effects of salvage harvesting.
While the Forest Service does not have a discrete program or agencywide  guidance for managing postfire rehabilitation and restoration activities, its  general approach begins with an evaluation of the condition of forest  resources. For large fires, Forest Service staff can use photographs and  images taken from airplanes or satellites—collectively called remote  sensing data—to identify burned and unburned areas. Then, staff identify  activities that they believe will help rehabilitate and restore damaged  resources, as well as opportunities for salvage harvest. Depending on how  severely or intensely an area is burned, the effects to trees, water, wildlife,  and other resources can vary. According to agency officials, they may  determine that no rehabilitation or restoration work is needed because  natural recovery may be sufficient or the fire may have benefited some  resources that are adapted to wildland fire. Further, some areas that have  burned, such as wilderness areas, may limit management activities.  However, when the staff identify activities they want to undertake and  determine that the activities will significantly impact the environment, they  develop an environmental impact statement (EIS), as required by the  National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The EIS identifies the  significant environmental effects of the proposed action and a range of  reasonable alternative actions. If the proposed action includes salvage  sales, the staff conduct a financial and economic analyses of the sales for  each alternative in the EIS; the financial analysis estimates the agency’s  expenditures and revenues, and the economic analysis estimates the jobs  and economic income generated. They then issue a record of decision  stating the agency’s decision and identifying the alternatives considered  and begin to implement and monitor the selected alternative. Project  activities are typically implemented by the appropriate forest program,  such as Forest Products, Engineering, or Fish and Wildlife, as part of each  program’s annual workload.
The Biscuit Fire burned nearly half of the Siskiyou National Forest, which  was administratively joined with the Rogue River National Forest in 2004,  and almost all of the Kalmiopsis Wilderness, which lies within the Siskiyou  forest. The area lies within the Klamath-Siskiyou ecoregion, an area  renowned for its abundant ecological diversity and rugged geological  features, as well as being one of the largest areas without roads in the  Pacific Northwest. These areas are managed under the Siskiyou National  Forest Land and Resource Management Plan (forest plan), as amended by  the Northwest Forest Plan—a plan designed to protect species that rely on  old-growth forests, while also producing a sustainable level of timber from  the national forests of the Pacific Northwest. The Northwest Forest Plan  designates land allocations, or areas that must be managed for designated  purposes in accordance with specified standards and guidelines. These  allocations include late-successional reserves—areas designed to serve as  habitat for species, such as the Northern spotted owl, that depend on  late-successional and old-growth trees—as well as areas called “matrix”  lands in which most commercial timber harvest is to take place. The  Siskiyou forest plan designates some of these lands as inventoried roadless  areas—areas without roads that were identified by the Forest Service in  wilderness planning efforts. They are managed according to underlying  land allocations, some of which restrict road construction and timber  harvesting.
After the Biscuit Fire, the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff  developed the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project and an accompanying EIS. In  July 2004, the Forest Supervisor signed three records of decision for the  Project, one covering activities within inventoried roadless areas, one  covering activities in late-successional reserves outside roadless areas, and  one covering activities in matrix lands outside inventoried roadless areas.  In accordance with the Forest Service’s decentralized management  structure—which includes 155 national forests, nine regions, and a  Washington Office—the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest Supervisor  decided which of the alternative actions to implement. The activities in the  records of decision included almost 20,000 acres of salvage logging with  367 million board feet of timber; almost 20,000 acres of brush  disposal—removal of branches and other postharvest debris in the sale  areas; 285 miles of fuel management zones—areas in which trees and brush  have been removed to reduce “fuel” that might burn in future fires; almost  30,000 acres of reforestation, including harvested acres; and about 7,500  acres of wildlife habitat rehabilitation. The records of decision also called  for the Forest Service to monitor certain resource conditions, such as  water quality, and conduct a large-scale study of the effects of fire on  late-successional reserve habitat and the effect of various management  actions on postfire recovery.
The Forest Service’s decision to include salvage harvest in the recovery  project, particularly in late-successional reserves and inventoried roadless  areas, was controversial. Experts disagreed on the amount of timber to  harvest, with some asserting that there were large amounts of timber  available to harvest in the fire area, and others asserting that any salvage  harvest would damage the forest. Numerous lawsuits challenged different  aspects of the NEPA analysis, including the adequacy of the Forest  Service’s economic analysis of the sales; these suits are still pending.  Meanwhile, a timber industry group was concerned about the time taken to  conduct the EIS and salvage harvest, while environmental groups said any  delay was attributable to the time taken to analyze additional salvage  harvest. In addition, the Forest Service’s implementation of the Project’s  salvage sales is controversial. As of the end of 2005, the Forest Service had  sold burnt timber in the matrix and late-successional reserve areas, as well  as roadside trees that were considered hazardous because they could fall.  Although the forest staff identified the sale boundaries and visited the sale  sites during harvest operations, instances of improper salvage harvest  occurred. In particular, environmental groups reported that salvage harvest  occurred in a botanical area adjacent to one of the salvage sale areas and  stated that this indicated poor management of the sales by the forest staff.  These groups also dispute the Forest Service’s financial and economic  estimates for the salvage sales.
In this context, you asked us to determine (1) how the development of the  Biscuit Fire Recovery Project compared with the Forest Service’s general  approach to postfire recovery, (2) the status of the Biscuit Fire Recovery  Project salvage sales and how the reported financial and economic results  of the sales compared with the Forest Service’s initial estimates, (3) the  status of other activities identified in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project, and  (4) the extent and cause of improper logging within the Biscuit Fire  Recovery Project, as reported by the Forest Service, and changes the  agency made to prevent such occurrences in the future.
In conducting our work, we reviewed minutes, briefings, and other forest  documents from the administrative file for the Biscuit Fire Recovery  Project and developed a time line of the decisions made by the Rogue  River-Siskiyou National Forest staff. We discussed the time line with  officials and decision makers at the Forest Service’s Rogue River-Siskiyou  National Forest, Pacific Northwest Region, and Washington Office and the  Department of Agriculture to further elaborate on events that affected the  time frames and alternatives considered for the Project. To determine the  status of the Project’s activities, we reviewed contracts for work that had  been accomplished, reviewed plans for work not yet accomplished, and  discussed both the contracts and the plans with the forest staff to reconcile  any differences. We reviewed financial and economic analyses of the  salvage sales in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project EIS and discussed them  with the Forest Service’s Regional Economist. However, because of  ongoing litigation, we did not evaluate the adequacy of the economic  analysis. We obtained and analyzed Forest Service expenditures and  receipts from the Biscuit Fire salvage sales, as well as expenditure data  from the Department of Justice and Department of Agriculture’s Office of  General Counsel, which provided legal services related to the salvage sales.  We obtained expenditure data for fiscal years 2003 through 2005 and  receipts through December 2005, the last year for which complete data  were available. Finally, we examined internal and investigative reports on  improper logging and interviewed responsible officials about their  responses. As appropriate, we assessed the reliability of the data and  determined that it was sufficient for this report. We performed our work  between November 2005 and July 2006 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I provides a more  detailed description of our objectives, scope, and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Biscuit Fire began in July 2002 as 5 separate fires in southwest Oregon  in the Siskiyou National Forest, which was administratively joined with the  Rogue River National Forest in 2004. The fire was one of 12 or 13 large fires  that burned throughout the Pacific Northwest Region in 2002 due to severe  drought conditions; in addition to the Biscuit Fire, fires burned in the  Deschutes, Umpqua, Malheur, and other forests in the region. In Oregon,  the Biscuit Fire burned mostly within the Siskiyou Forest, which  encompasses more than 1 million acres of diverse, steep, and rugged  landscape made up of the Klamath Mountains, the Coast Ranges, the  180,000-acre Kalmiopsis Wilderness, and many roadless areas. By  September 2002, the fire was being controlled, and Forest Service staff  were conducting Burned Area Emergency Response program projects to  stabilize the most severely burned areas. By November 2002, the fire was  declared controlled, and the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff  were beginning their postfire recovery efforts.
In evaluating conditions after the fire, the Rogue River-Siskiyou National  Forest staff determined that some areas were not so severely burned as to  warrant management action. However, in some instances, the forest staff  identified areas that were severely burned and resources that would not  recover as quickly as desired without forest intervention. The fire burned in  a mosaic pattern, with about 30 percent of the area burned lightly, with  little vegetation killed, and about 44 percent burned intensely, with more  than 75 percent of vegetation killed; the remaining acreage burned with  mixed intensity and mixed results (see fig. 1).
In evaluating postfire recovery projects and activities, the following laws  and regulations affect the approach that the Forest Service generally takes:   The National Forest Management Act of 1976 requires the Forest  Service to, among other things, (1) develop a plan to manage the lands  and resources of each national forest in coordination with the land  management planning process of other federal agencies, states, and  localities and (2) revise each plan at least every 15 years. Each forest  plan—called a Land and Resource Management Plan—establishes how  land areas within a forest may be used and governs individual projects  or activities that occur within the forest. Individual projects or activities,  such as building a road or harvesting timber, may take place only if they  are consistent with the plan and after site-specific environmental  review, which often includes public notice, comment, and  administrative appeal.
Under NEPA, agencies such as the Forest Service generally evaluate the  likely effects of projects they propose using a relatively brief  environmental assessment to determine if an EIS is needed. If the action  would be likely to significantly affect the environment, a more detailed  EIS is required. An agency may exclude categories of actions having no  significant environmental impact—called categorical exclusions—from  the requirement to prepare an EIS. One purpose of the EIS is to ensure  that agencies have detailed information available to inform their  decision making. Agencies such as the Forest Service give the public an  opportunity to comment on draft environmental assessments and  impact statements. In addition, the Forest Service has established  procedures for administrative appeal of its decisions concerning  projects and activities on National Forest System lands. As a general  rule, once the administrative appeals process is complete, the public can  litigate in a federal court a decision about a particular project.
In 2001, the Forest Service issued a rule for managing its inventoried  roadless areas, which generally include areas without roads that are  5,000 acres or larger, or smaller areas contiguous to designated  wilderness areas. This rule, which was intended to provide lasting  protection for inventoried roadless areas within the National Forest  System, generally prohibited road construction, road reconstruction,  and timber harvesting. However, U.S. District Court for the District of  Wyoming found the rule unlawful and struck it down in 2003. The  government did not appeal this decision and issued a new rule related to  the roadless areas in 2005, also now in litigation. The new rule allows  states to petition the Forest Service to issue regulations establishing  management requirements for inventoried roadless areas within their  states. The opportunity for submitting state petitions is available until  November 13, 2006.
Projects involving salvage harvests are governed by the Forest Service’s  timber sales regulations and procedures. To sell timber, the forest staff  identify the areas that they want to harvest—called sale units—identify  the unit boundaries, and develop a timber sale contract that contains  many standard provisions, such as limits on which trees can be  harvested and requirements to prevent and control erosion. Sale units  can be located along roads to allow access by logging trucks and  equipment; logs are cut and hauled from the slopes by tractors or pulled  by cables suspended above the ground. Sale units that are located  farther away from roads—such as roadless areas—can be logged using  helicopters. In such cases, loggers cut the trees and the logs are then  flown out by helicopter. Timber sales are laid out by timber planners and  the sales are monitored by a timber sale administrator that visits the site  to review contract provisions and harvest operations.
A large fire such as the Biscuit Fire can cause major changes to a forest’s  resources and planned program of work such as the amount of timber to be  sold and harvested, campgrounds and trails to be maintained, and areas of  vegetation to be removed or reduced to help avoid future fires. The  Siskiyou forest plan establishes goals and objectives for the desired future  conditions of the forest that describe management of forest resources and  activities such as timber, grazing, recreation, wilderness, and others. As  with all land management activities, postfire recovery projects must be  consistent with the forest plan. In the case of the Biscuit Fire, postfire  recovery projects need to comply with the Siskiyou forest plan, which was  approved in 1989. The projects also need to comply with the Northwest  Forest Plan, a comprehensive document amending several forest plans  adopted in 1994 for the management of federal forest land in Washington,  Oregon, and northern California. Old-growth forests are valued as habitat  that includes large standing, dead, and down—fallen—trees in various  stages of decay. The plan includes a combination of land allocations  managed to protect and enhance habitat for late-successional and  old-growth related species, while providing a sustainable level of timber  sales, as well as standards and guidelines for the management of these land  allocations. These standards and guidelines include requirements for  retaining dead and decaying trees on the ground, as well as standing dead  trees, called snags, that are essential habitat for many wildlife species. The  standards and guidelines also impose restrictions on timber harvesting and  road building in riparian areas—areas along streams, ponds, reservoirs,  and wetlands—to limit the amount of sediment running into them.
Postfire recovery projects are funded by various sources, principally  appropriations and trust funds. The Forest Service conducts its  rehabilitation and restoration activities through existing programs,  including its forest management, watershed, recreation, wilderness, and  construction programs, among others. To fund such activities, the agency  uses appropriations from sources that include its National Forest System,  capital improvement and maintenance, and wildland fire management accounts. In addition, the Forest Service uses the Knutson-Vandenberg  (K-V) trust fund that collects receipts generated from timber sales to pay  for reforestation and timber stand improvement in areas harvested for  timber, as well as wildlife habitat and other improvements in sale areas. It  also uses the Salvage Sale Fund, which collects receipts generated from  salvage sales, to pay for future salvage sales. Other sources of funds, such  as gifts, bequests, and partnerships, also fund postfire recovery projects.
section_title: Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest Staff Followed the Forest Service’s Postfire Recovery Approach, but Unique Circumstances Affected the Time Taken and Alternatives Considered for the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project
paragraphs: In developing the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project, the Rogue River-Siskiyou  National Forest staff followed the Forest Service’s general approach for  postfire recovery efforts, but several unique circumstances, combined,  affected the time taken to develop the Project and the alternatives included  in it. First, the size of the burned area—and subsequently the  Project—complicated the environmental analysis and the time needed to  complete and review it. For example, to assess resource conditions, such  as identifying the extent of dead trees, the forest staff had to rely on remote  sensing data that were difficult to interpret and time-consuming to verify.  Changes in the remote sensing data throughout the development of the  Project caused the salvage sale volumes in the different EIS alternatives to  change. Second, before, during, and after the development of the Project  and the EIS, the regulations and guidance governing activities that could  occur in the inventoried roadless areas changed several times, in part due  to litigation. Changes that allowed salvage harvest in the inventoried  roadless areas directly affected the alternatives considered in the EIS and  the time needed to develop them. Third, during development of the EIS, the  forest staff were reorganized and downsized, although the effect on the EIS  is difficult to quantify. According to the forest staff, the changes increased  their workload and limited the amount of time they could devote to  developing and implementing the Project. However, according to the  Forest Supervisor and other managers, the forest had enough staff to  develop and implement the various alternatives identified in the EIS.
subsections: section_title: Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest Staff Followed the Forest Service’s General Approach for Planning the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project
paragraphs: In the wake of the Biscuit Fire, the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest  staff followed the Forest Service’s general approach to postfire recovery  planning for large fires. The Forest Service does not have a national  program directing postfire recovery efforts or nationwide guidance on the  development of recovery projects after a fire. However, according to Forest  Service officials, regions and forests that had experienced past large fires  with severe damage to their resources followed a general approach of  assessing the conditions of forest resources after the fire, identifying  projects needed to rehabilitate and restore damaged resources and  opportunities for salvage harvest, and following the steps documented in  the Forest Service’s NEPA manual, which include implementing and  monitoring the chosen project. Figure 2 shows the time line of events in the  development of the Project compared with the Forest Service’s general  approach.
Generally, to determine management actions to recover a burned area,  forest staff assess the postfire conditions and evaluate various actions that  could help to achieve their forest plan’s desired conditions. For large fires  and recovery projects specifically, as shown in figure 2, forest staff (1)  assess the resources in the burned areas; (2) develop a proposed action to  recover resources, which can include multiple activities; (3) issue a Notice  of Intent (NOI) to prepare an EIS; (4) develop and analyze alternatives to  the proposed action; (5) issue a draft EIS and solicit public comments on  the draft; and (6) issue a final EIS and record of decision to make a formal  decision about the project. At this point, the forest staff implement and  monitor the project, although it may be appealed or subject to litigation.  Some projects can be finished within a few years after the fire; others may  be implemented years after the fire.
In the case of the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project, the forest staff wrote a  formal postfire assessment, published in January 2003, 3 months after the  fire was declared controlled. The Biscuit postfire assessment was  conducted by a team of forest resource specialists, with expertise in  forestry, recreation, engineering, hydrology, soil science, and fish and  wildlife. The team visited key areas burned by the fire to view and measure  the effects of the fire and to determine how severe the effects were on  different resources. They then identified potential work to repair damaged  resources. During this assessment, the team also held multiple meetings to  gather the public’s input on what to do to repair the damage caused by the  fire.
In January 2003, after the Biscuit postfire assessment was completed,  forest officials began the NEPA process by identifying members of an  interdisciplinary team made up of about 30 resource specialists from the  Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest and other units of the Forest Service.  Over the next few months, the team developed the purpose and need for  the recovery work and then developed a proposed action, or a set of  activities to be conducted in the area. In March 2003, the forest staff  published an NOI in the Federal Register announcing that it would prepare  an EIS for the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project. In it, the forest staff identified  the purpose and need for action in the Biscuit Fire area: recovery of  potential economic value through salvage harvest; restoration of vegetation  altered by the fire—in particular, reforestation; protection of late  successional habitat from future fire and insect damage; protection from  future fire through hazardous fuel reduction; and learning about postfire  management activities. The Project originally proposed in the NOI included  salvage harvest on about 7,000 acres of matrix lands, totaling 90 million  board feet; fuel reduction on 16,000 acres including late-successional  reserve lands; meadow habitat treatments; road closures and repair; and  reforestation on about 30,000 acres.
As shown in figure 2, from March through October 2003, the  interdisciplinary team developed alternatives for the proposed action and  analyzed their effects on the environment. According to forest and regional  officials, the team sought to develop a range of alternatives that were  reasonable, including a range of salvage options, fuel reduction  alternatives, and other activities. According to the Department of  Agriculture’s Office of General Counsel, the agency is given discretion in  developing a reasonable range of alternatives but typically develops two or  more alternative ways of meeting the purpose and need of the proposal—in  addition to an alternative that considers no action. During the process of  developing alternatives, the team also identified projects in the Biscuit Fire  area that could be conducted under categorical exclusion, including  repairing recreational trails and sites; road maintenance such as replacing  culverts; reforestation of burned areas identified as plantations—areas  managed for harvest; and salvage harvesting trees that posed a hazard  along roads. The team and the forest staff documented these categorically  excluded projects separately and conducted them in 2003 and 2004 as the  EIS for the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project was being developed. In addition,  the forest staff held “deck” sales in which they sold trees that had been cut  by firefighters during suppression activities and piled up or “decked.”  According to Forest Service officials, because the environmental effects of  cutting the trees occurred during the firefighting, an emergency activity,  and the hauling would have limited environmental effects, the deck sales  were not subject to a NEPA analysis.
The Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff issued its draft EIS for the  Biscuit Fire Recovery Project in November 2003, a year after the fire was  controlled, and allowed public comment through January 2004, as shown in  figure 2. Approximately 23,000 public comments were received,  summarized, and incorporated into the final EIS, which was issued in June  2004. A month later, in July 2004, the forest staff issued three records of  decision—one each for the inventoried roadless areas, the matrix areas  outside inventoried roadless areas, and late-successional reserves outside  inventoried roadless areas. According to Forest Service officials, the  decision to issue three records of decision was made to separate the more  controversial projects—specifically the salvage sales in the inventoried  roadless areas—from the less controversial projects to allow the latter to  move forward without appeal and litigation. With the issuance of the final  EIS and records of decision, an emergency situation determination  approved by the Pacific Northwest Regional Forester in June 2004 became  effective for the salvage sales in the matrix and late-successional reserve  areas. The determination stated that the government would lose  approximately $3.3 million if the sales were delayed for the full 105-day  appeal period. The decision did not apply to the inventoried roadless area  sales because, according to agency officials, the forest staff were not ready  to conduct these sales at the time of the decision. Although the region was  the first in the country to define an emergency under the economic criteria  in the Forest Service regulations, the Biscuit Fire was not the first recovery  project to which the region applied this argument.
Overall, the general approach to postfire recovery efforts does not have  specific time frames associated with it. According to Pacific Northwest  Region officials, the NEPA analyses conducted in the region can take from  1 to 3 years to complete. Figure 2 shows that the development of the  Biscuit Fire Recovery Project took about 1 ¾ years, after the fire was  controlled, to complete, from November 2002 through July 2004. The  records of decision were issued in July 2004, and the forest staff awarded  the first of several salvage sales the same month. The emergency situation  determination allowed the forest staff to begin implementing the Project  immediately, without waiting up to 105 days for the appeal process to  conclude. However, according to Forest Service officials, because the  harvest season in this region typically ends in September, the purchasers  did not have time to schedule the Biscuit Fire harvest into their workloads,  and most of the salvage sale harvest occurred in 2005—3 years after the  fire. This delay in the salvage harvest concerned all parties involved  because of the additional loss of the commercial value of the trees. One of  the key lessons identified in a regional evaluation after the 2002 fire season  was that the identification of potential salvage sales should begin  immediately after a fire. At the national level, in December 2004, an  interregional committee published a strategy for postfire recovery, which  identified challenges for managing postfire environments and proposed  potential actions to improve the identification of salvage sales after large  fires. According to Forest Service Washington Office officials, these actions  have not yet been implemented because the agency has instead been  focused on formulating broader restoration policy that encompasses  postfire recovery actions.
section_title: Unique Circumstances Affected the Time Taken and Alternatives Considered for the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project
paragraphs: While the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff followed the general  approach for postfire recovery on Forest Service lands, three unique  circumstances affected the time taken to develop the Project EIS and the  alternatives that were included in it. First, the size of the fire and proposed  recovery activities increased the complexity of the analysis and review of  the overall Project. Second, changes in the regulations and guidance for  inventoried roadless areas that occurred during development of the Project  caused alternatives to be added to the analysis and increased the time  taken for the analysis. Third, the forest staff planned and implemented a  major reorganization and downsizing during the development of the  Project. Combined, these unique circumstances affected the time taken to  develop the Project EIS, although it is difficult to distinguish the individual  effect of each circumstance. In addition, the size of the fire and the changes  to the management activities allowed in the inventoried roadless rules  caused changes in the amount of timber considered for salvage sale in the  Project alternatives and added two alternatives to the EIS. Figure 3 shows  the events surrounding each unique circumstance compared with the  events in the development of the Project.
The first circumstance unique to the Biscuit Fire that affected development  of the Project was the size of the area burned by the fire and, subsequently,  the size of the area included in the Project. The size increased the  complexity and amount of work needed to analyze and review resource  conditions, Project alternatives, and potential impacts. While the fire  burned almost 500,000 acres, the forest staff excluded the Kalmiopsis  Wilderness in the postfire recovery work, leaving about 320,000 acres of  nonwilderness area for evaluation. Normally, to assess the conditions of  resources burned in a fire, forest staff conduct site visits, take  measurements and samples of different resources and conditions, and  identify potential rehabilitation and restoration activities. For large fires,  they can use aerial photographs and satellite images. However, the Biscuit  Fire was much larger than other fires that were considered large, causing  the forest staff to conduct the postfire assessment and to use different  sources of remote sensing data to assess the condition of forest resources.  The size of the fire and Project also increased the attention and amount of  review the Project received.
The forest staff decided to conduct a postfire assessment of the Biscuit Fire  because of the large area that had been burned and needed to be assessed  to determine what recovery actions were needed. However, according to  forest and regional officials, while the data gathered and analyzed during  the assessment were useful in moving forward with recovery, writing the  formal report added time to the process. Forest officials involved in the  Biscuit postfire assessment stated that because the fire was so large, and  access was limited due to the lack of roads and steep terrain, they could  only conduct limited site visits to gather information on the condition of  forest resources that had been burned and those that remained unburned.  The assessment, according to the officials, was useful for the purposes of  getting a head start on gathering data on these resource conditions, which  were ultimately useful in the NEPA analysis. At the same time, forest and  regional officials acknowledged that the assessment did not help them  narrow the range of projects to be conducted and was time-consuming and  expensive, causing several weeks of delay in the NEPA analysis. According  to these officials, the postfire assessment—while useful in soliciting public  comments about what should be done to recover the burned  area—contained a wish list of projects that could be done regardless of  funding sources and schedules. As such, the assessment may have set  expectations too high about what could be practically accomplished, given  funding and time. According to the Forest Supervisor, the postfire  assessment should have focused on time-sensitive projects to facilitate the  NEPA process. In response to the lessons learned from the 2002 fire  season, the region will conduct postfire assessments separately from the  assessment of salvage opportunities and will deploy a rapid assessment  team to quickly identify salvage opportunities after a fire to prevent delay  and decay of trees that can be harvested.
The size of the burned area and the increased complexity of the assessment  was also reflected in the need to use remote sensing data to adequately  assess the resources in such a large area. Changes to the sources of data  added time to the EIS development and affected the salvage harvest  volumes being considered in different alternatives. Given the size of the  burned area and Project area, the forest staff used aerial and remote  sensing data, in addition to site visits to verify the data, to assist in the  analysis of vegetation conditions, burned timber available for salvage, and  wildlife habitat conditions. Overall, the data helped the staff in covering a  large area but also required additional analysis work that added to the time  needed to develop the EIS. The interdisciplinary team started using aerial  photographs taken at the end of the fire, as shown in figure 3, to identify  potential areas for salvage harvest. The team used these photographs to  identify patches of dead trees that were a certain size and density; however,  because the locations seen in the photographs were inaccurately identified  and details were insufficient at times, the forest crews did not always find  enough dead trees when they visited the sites. By June 2003, the wildlife  staff on the team determined that satellite images taken of the burned area  more clearly showed areas of dead timber than the aerial photographs.  Because the team did not want to use two sets of data—the aerial  photographs and the satellite images—the team selected the satellite  images as the data set for the EIS analysis. This added time to change the  underlying maps in its Geographic Information System, which the forest  staff used to prepare maps for the EIS analysis. In addition to adding time  for analysis, the data changes had an effect on the EIS alternatives being  considered by the team. For example, the maximum amount of timber  estimated as available for salvage harvest decreased from about 1 billion  board feet in the draft EIS issued in November 2003 to about 600 million  board feet in the final EIS issued in June 2004, due to the use of more  accurate satellite data, more field verification of data, and application of  strict salvage guidelines for the late-successional reserves.
Finally, the size of both the fire area and the Project resulted in additional  review by Forest Service regional officials and Department of Agriculture  officials, as well as increased attention by state officials. The additional  review included two evaluations by the region’s Environmental Review  Committee—a group responsible for examining more complicated EIS  documents in the region for substantive concerns and to ensure  compliance with Forest Service regulations. The Environmental Review  Committee reviewed the EIS in February 2004 and again in April 2004  before its issuance. According to regional staff, the evaluations identified  the need to revise the document, and these revisions required a few  additional weeks to complete. In addition, the review included visits and  several briefings for the Undersecretary and Deputy Undersecretary of  Agriculture for Natural Resources and Environment and key state and  tribal officials to apprise them of the status of the EIS (see fig. 3).  According to the Undersecretary, large, controversial fires and recovery  projects such as the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project elicit additional  attention from department officials because of increased congressional  interest. These briefings took some time, but according to the Forest  Supervisor, did not affect the time needed to produce the EIS.
subsections: section_title: Authorized Management Activities in Inventoried Roadless Areas Changed over the Course of Planning for the Project
paragraphs: The second circumstance unique to the Biscuit Fire that affected the  development of the Project was the uncertainty of the regulations and  guidance governing road building and salvage harvest activities in  inventoried roadless areas, which affected the alternatives in the Project  EIS and the time needed to analyze them. Figure 4 shows the inventoried  roadless areas in the fire area.
As can be seen from figure 3, the regulations and guidance governing  activities in inventoried roadless areas changed several times. The first  change occurred in December 2002. Regulations promulgated in 2001  would have limited road building and timber harvest in inventoried  roadless areas; however, in May 2001, the U.S. District Court for the District  of Idaho prohibited the Forest Service from implementing the regulations.  Subsequently that year, to help provide guidance for addressing road and  timber management activities until land and resource management plans  are amended or revised, the Forest Service issued an interim directive that  allowed some road building and timber harvest activities in the areas with  the approval of the Chief of the Forest Service or a Regional Forester. In  December 2002, immediately after the fire was controlled and as the forest  staff developed the postfire assessment, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the  Ninth Circuit reversed the Idaho district court’s decision, effectively  reinstating the 2001 regulations. The plaintiffs petitioned the appellate  court to rehear the case, which the court denied in April 2003. During this  time, the interdisciplinary team was developing its proposed action and  began developing its EIS alternatives. In April 2003, the team had identified  seven alternatives, the largest of which included 386 million board feet of  salvage harvest from matrix, late-successional reserve, and inventoried  roadless areas. However, by May 2003, after the appellate court declined to  rehear the plaintiff’s case, the team narrowed the alternatives to five, the  largest of which included 104 million board feet from matrix lands and fuel  reduction work and did not include salvage harvest in the inventoried  roadless areas.
In July 2003, a convergence of events led the forest staff to develop two  new alternatives with larger salvage harvest amounts, including amounts in  the inventoried roadless areas. That month, the 2001 regulations were again  enjoined, this time by the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming.  Second, the Forest Service’s interim directive on inventoried roadless areas  expired and was not reinstated until July 2004. During this time, forest  supervisors were authorized to make road and timber management  decisions within inventoried roadless areas consistent with the applicable  land management plan. And third, an Oregon State University report  identified 2 billion board feet as available for salvage harvest in the Biscuit  Fire area, many times greater than the largest draft EIS estimate. According  to Forest Service officials, the amounts differed because the purpose of the  Oregon State University report was to identify all timber available for  salvage regardless of legal or other restrictions on harvest. The district  court’s decision came a week after the Oregon State University report and  during the same week that the Forest Supervisor and Project leader visited  Washington to brief Forest Service Washington Office staff, Oregon  congressional delegation members, and Department of Agriculture officials  on the five alternatives in its EIS—none of which included salvage harvest  in the inventoried roadless areas. The forest officials providing the briefing  received several comments about the need for more logging that would  include harvest in the inventoried roadless areas. According to forest and  regional officials, the failure to consider at least one alternative proposing  salvage harvest within inventoried roadless areas might have made the EIS  vulnerable to legal challenges based on the idea that the alternatives the  Forest Service considered did not include a reasonable range of  alternatives. Despite concerns about completing the EIS quickly to allow  any salvage harvest to occur as quickly as possible, forest and regional  officials determined that an estimated 8-week delay to conduct the analysis  of new alternatives would be acceptable. Between the end of July and  October 2003, the interdisciplinary team developed two additional  alternatives that included about 1 billion board feet and about 500 million  board feet of salvage harvest respectively for the draft EIS.
section_title: Forest Reorganization and Downsizing Began during Planning for the Project
paragraphs: The third circumstance unique to the Biscuit Fire that affected the  development of the Project was a reorganization and downsizing of the  Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff. Since the 1990s—before and  after the two forests were administratively combined—the Siskiyou and  Rogue River National Forest workforce declined as timber harvest  amounts declined. Their annual operating budget dropped from $33.6  million in fiscal year 2001 to $25.1 million in fiscal year 2006. The number of  staff also dropped, falling from 619 at the beginning of fiscal year 2002 to  400 at the start of fiscal year 2005.
Beginning in January 2003, just as the forest staff issued its postfire  assessment, the staff reorganized to address decreasing budgets and staff  numbers. As shown in figure 3, the forest staff issued a strategic business  plan in November 2003, just as the draft EIS was released and the two  forests joined as one administrative unit. More than 150 positions were  identified that could be officially abolished to achieve the reorganization  option the Forest Supervisor selected. The forest staff began identifying  positions to be abolished in August 2002, identifying 35 positions to be  placed on the Forest Service’s Workforce Reduction and Placement System  list, which allows the employees to receive priority in moving to vacant  positions elsewhere in the Forest Service. After its strategic business plan  was issued, the forest staff began officially abolishing positions in June  2004. From that month through October 2004, 48 positions were abolished.
The effect of this downsizing and reorganization on the development of the  EIS is difficult to quantify. According to forest staff involved with the  interdisciplinary team that developed the EIS, they worked on both the EIS  and Project in addition to their ongoing daily responsibilities. They  contrasted this experience with a previous large fire on the forest’s  lands—the Silver Fire in 1987—for which there was dedicated staff for the  EIS and recovery project. However, according to the Forest Supervisor and  other managers, the forest had enough staff to develop and implement the  various alternatives identified in the EIS. The Forest Supervisor stated that  he directed staff to place priority on the Project and, according to the  Regional Forester, additional staff were available to help the team, if  needed.
section_title: Salvage Sales Are Nearly Complete, but a Full Comparison of Financial and Economic Results with Initial Estimates Is Difficult
paragraphs: As of December 2005, the forest staff had nearly completed 12 salvage sales  in the matrix and late-successional reserve areas; however, incomplete  sales information and a lack of comparable economic data make a  comparison of the financial and economic results of the sales with the  agency’s initial estimates difficult. For the sales conducted through 2005,  purchasers harvested almost 60 million board feet, which is much less than  the 367 million board feet proposed for sale in the EIS. Forest staff  overestimated the timber available for harvest and, in addition, some  timber decayed during the preparation of the EIS and salvage sales, further  reducing the volume of available timber. For fiscal years 2003 through 2005,  the Forest Service and other agencies spent about $5 million on the sales  and related activities such as law enforcement. In return, the agency  collected about $8.8 million from the sales. From these receipts, the Forest  Service plans to spend an additional $5.7 million in the next several years to  remove brush, reforest, and conduct other work in sale areas. In the EIS,  the sale expenditures and receipts were estimated to be about $24 million  and $19.6 million, respectively, and the salvage harvest was expected to  generate about 6,900 local jobs and $240 million in regional economic  activity. However, it is premature to compare the results through 2005 with  the estimates because the Forest Service will generate additional  expenditures, revenues, and potential economic activity from two sales in  June and August 2006. Even if complete sale results were available,  methodological differences and a lack of comparable economic data  complicate the comparison of the salvage sale results and EIS estimates.  For example, the financial comparison is complicated by the fact that the  EIS expenditure estimates are based on different activities than the  reported expenditures through fiscal year 2005; adjustments can be made  to allow a comparison, but they are complicated. Similarly, the economic  comparison is complicated by the fact that the Forest Service does not  report the economic results of sales. The analysis needed to report such  data can be done, but according to Forest Service officials, the agency does  not conduct this type of analysis because the primary reason for preparing  EIS estimates is to compare the relative economic effects of salvage  alternatives and not to provide a precise prediction of the outcomes of the  sales.
subsections: section_title: Forest Service Has Nearly Completed 12 Salvage Sales, but the Volume Harvested through 2005 Was Substantially Less Than Estimated
paragraphs: As of December 2005, the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff  completed 12 salvage sales identified in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project  EIS and records of decision. After the EIS and records of decision were  released in July 2004, the forest staff finished preparing and completed 12  sales totaling about 67 million board feet of timber on almost 3,700 acres of  land in the matrix and late-successional reserve areas, as shown in figure 5.
One sale occurred in 2004; the others occurred in 2005. Although several  lawsuits were filed against the sales, they generally did not delay the  implementation of the salvage sales in the matrix areas. A timber industry  trade association and timber companies filed the first case against the  Project alleging, among other things, that the Project violated the National  Forest Management Act by failing to implement required reforestation  activities. Environmental groups also filed lawsuits against the Project  alleging, among other things, that the Forest Service: (1) allowed  unauthorized personnel to mark trees for harvest, (2) performed an  inadequate NEPA analysis, and (3) lacked authority to issue the emergency  situation determination. Two court orders stemming from this collection  of cases affected the timing of Project activities. First, the U.S. District  Court for the District of Oregon issued a preliminary injunction on August  3, 2004, prohibiting certain salvage activities from proceeding because the  sales contracts failed to require Forest Service personnel—rather than  purchasers—to identify standing dead trees within the sale area that were  not to be harvested for environmental reasons. The court lifted this  injunction on August 20, 2004, after the agency amended the contracts.  Second, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an  emergency stay prohibiting the late-successional reserve sales from  proceeding pending resolution of an environmental group’s appeal of a  district court ruling in favor of the Forest Service. The emergency order  was in effect from September 7, 2004, through March 7, 2005. This period  included the winter months during which sales activity can be impossible  because of weather conditions and, when possible, may be restricted to  limit the risk of spreading a particular fungus along wet roads. The forest  staff provided a waiver to begin harvesting in March 2005 rather than June,  the usual end of the restrictions on salvage harvest activities.
Table 1 shows the volume of timber sold and harvested on the 12 sales as of  December 2005. According to Forest Service staff, the majority of the  timber volume harvested occurred in 2005. In general, the volume  harvested was less than the volume sold because the sales were “scaled”  sales that allowed the purchasers—with the concurrence of the timber sale  administrator—to leave trees that did not have good timber and pay only  for the timber removed from the sale units. In the case of the Horse sale,  the harvested volume was greater than the sale volume because additional  trees died after the sale contract was awarded but before the harvest was  complete. According to a forest official, these trees posed a hazard to the  loggers in the sale unit, so the timber sale administrator added them to the  sale contract.
Through 2005, the agency had sold nothing in the inventoried roadless  areas but decided in spring 2006 that it would offer two sales—Mike’s  Gulch and Blackberry—in these areas. In the records of decision, the forest  staff had identified salvage harvest units in the inventoried roadless areas  of the forest with a total of 194 million board feet available. In laying out  salvage sales, the forest staff planned to offer about 38.1 million board feet  in the two sales and determined that the remaining harvest units did not  have enough merchantable timber left for sale. The forest staff selected the  sale areas that had the better timber volume and would have the least effect  on roadless and potential future wilderness values. Mike’s Gulch was  advertised and sold in June 2006; the forest staff sold 261 acres with about  9.3 million board feet for about $300,000. In August 2006, the forest staff  sold almost 7.9 million board feet on 274 acres in the Blackberry sale for  almost $1.7 million.
In addition to the salvage sales that resulted from the Biscuit Fire Recovery  Project EIS and records of decision, the forest staff completed eight  salvage sales of timber using a categorical exclusion that did not require  the preparation of an EIS. These sales involved trees that the forest staff  identified as hazardous because they could fall on roads. In addition, the  forest conducted six deck tree sales. The hazard and deck tree sales were  sold in 2003, while the development of the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project  was ongoing. The deck sales were completed in 2003, while the hazardous  trees were harvested primarily in 2004. Table 2 shows the individual sales  and timber volumes harvested.
Although all salvage sales planned in the EIS and records of decision are  not complete, the acres and amount of timber salvaged in the matrix and  late-successional reserve areas were much less than anticipated by the  forest staff in the EIS. In the records of decision, the forest staff estimated  that it would sell about 367 million board feet of salvage timber, which  would be removed from 18,939 acres. Through December 2005, 44 million  board feet have been removed from 3,700 acres, and an additional 15  million board feet have been removed from the hazard and deck tree sales.  In a March 2006 report, the forest staff identified the following two  reasons that the amount sold is much less than they had estimated:   Overestimation: The original amount of timber available for harvest  was overestimated for three reasons. First, the forest staff had difficulty  applying the legal requirements in the Northwest Forest Plan to protect  late-successional reserve habitat and riparian corridors. The staff had  adjusted the timber volume estimates in the EIS to remove  late-successional reserve habitat and riparian reserves. After the  issuance of the EIS and records of decision, when the staff planned the  sales, they discovered more riparian areas that needed protection and  identified more trees that they needed to leave to meet habitat  requirements. Second, the forest staff discovered that the hazard  salvage sale volumes had not been removed from the EIS volumes.  Third, the volume estimates based on remote sensing data were  inaccurate—when the forest staff visited the sale sites and viewed the  actual trees rather than photos or images, the trees were either alive or  not large enough for sale.
Decay: The amount of timber that would be lost to decay was  underestimated. Although the forest staff estimated decay rates  accurately, the EIS estimate was based on one-third of the timber  harvest occurring in 2004 rather than 2005, when most of the salvage  harvesting actually occurred. In planning the sales, the forest staff  determined that more trees had decayed than they had estimated in the  EIS. As such, they removed some sale units and acres because the trees  no longer had commercial value or there were too few trees with  remaining value to make the sale unit economical to harvest.
In addition, the March 2006 report identified 8,174 acres from inventoried  roadless areas that had not been harvested due to ongoing litigation. In  April 2005, the Forest Service agreed with plaintiffs in one of the cases  pending before the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon not to  harvest in the inventoried roadless areas until a new roadless rule had been  finalized. The rule was finalized in May 2005. In August 2005, the state of  Oregon and two other states—California and New Mexico—filed a lawsuit  asserting that the Forest Service rescinded the 2001 roadless rule without  carrying out the environmental analysis NEPA requires. Throughout 2005,  the Forest Service held ongoing discussions with the Governor of Oregon  to delay action on inventoried roadless area sales to await a decision on  one of several lawsuits before the U.S. District Court for the District of  Oregon challenging the adequacy of the EIS for the Biscuit Fire Recovery  Project. According to Forest Service officials, they were trying to avoid  further litigation concerning the roadless area sales. In February 2006, the  district court rejected the challenge. In June 2006, after the forest staff  auctioned the first inventoried roadless area sale—Mike’s Gulch—an  environmental group challenged this sale in district court, alleging that the  Forest Service violated NEPA by not preparing a supplemental EIS to  review significant new information concerning adverse environmental  effects of salvage logging within inventoried roadless areas. The court  refused to issue a preliminary injunction against the sale, holding that the  environmental group was unlikely to prevail. In July 2006, the plaintiffs in  the states’ roadless rule case moved for a temporary restraining order  against the sale. After the Mike’s Gulch purchaser agreed not to start  operations until August 4, 2006, the plaintiffs withdrew the motion. The  purchaser began harvesting on August 7, 2006. The purchaser of the  Blackberry sale began harvest on August 28, 2006.
section_title: Forest Service and Other Agencies Spent an Estimated $5 Million for the Biscuit Fire Salvage Sales from Fiscal Years 2003 through 2005, and Forest Service Plans to Spend $5.7 Million of the $8.8 Million in Receipts from Sales
paragraphs: From fiscal years 2003 through 2005, the Forest Service reported that it  spent an estimated $4.6 million to plan, prepare, and administer the salvage  sales in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project, while other agencies spent an  estimated $350,000. Forest Service expenditures include NEPA planning,  salvage sale preparation, and administration for fiscal years 2003 through  2005, and indirect activities that support the Forest Products  program—such as information technology, budget, financial, and public  affairs activities. Other agencies’ expenditures were for activities related  to Biscuit Fire salvage sales, including Department of Agriculture and  Department of Justice attorneys’ legal services in litigation over the salvage  sales through 2005. Table 3 shows the Forest Service’s and other agencies’  estimated expenditures on the Project salvage sales by fiscal year.  Appendix I discusses the methodology used to estimate Forest Service  expenditures.
As the Project’s salvage sales are not complete and work will continue  through at least fiscal year 2006, additional expenditures for the salvage  sales can be expected. Also, the forest staff plans to spend $5.7 million in  the next several years to remove brush, reforest the sale areas, and repair  and maintain roads. This figure is based on collections of salvage sale  receipts collected and deposited into the K-V Fund, Brush Disposal Fund,  road maintenance account, and other accounts to pay for work in the  Biscuit Fire salvage sale areas. The Brush Disposal Fund is a permanent  fund created to allow the deposit of funds to pay for certain brush disposal  work on all timber sales, including salvage sales. Forest Service staff  complete brush disposal work using funds collected as an additional  charge to the purchaser based on the amounts paid for the trees harvested.  The funds are deposited in the Brush Disposal Fund, and the agency  generally seeks to spend them within 3 years of the completion of the sale.  The road maintenance account is a trust fund created with purchasers’  deposits for roadwork that is then conducted by the Forest Service.
In total, for the 12 salvage sales and 14 hazard and deck sales completed  through 2005, the forest staff collected more than $8.8 million. Of this  amount, about $3.7 million was collected from the Project’s salvage sales,  while more than $5.1 million was collected from the sale of hazard and  deck trees. Table 4 shows the revenues generated for the Project’s sales, as  well as the hazard and deck tree sales.
Of the total receipts collected, about $6.8 million was collected as revenue  for the sales, and about $2.1 million was collected as deposits for brush  disposal, road maintenance, and other work. From the $6.8 million, the  forest staff deposited $3.7 million into the K-V Fund for reforestation and  other rehabilitation work associated with the sale and the fire; most of the  remaining funds were deposited into the Salvage Sale Fund to support  future salvage sales in the region. Of the $2.1 million in deposits, about $1.2  million was deposited into the Brush Disposal Fund, $538,000 was  deposited for road maintenance, and about $290,000 was deposited for  other purposes that include contracts for companies that weigh and  measure the harvested trees—called scaling contracts.
section_title: A Comparison of the Financial and Economic Results with EIS Estimates Is Difficult
paragraphs: While the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project contains estimates of the financial  and economic results of the salvage sales for each proposed alternative, a  comparison of the estimates with the results is difficult. First, the  incomplete sales mean that financial and economic data for the salvage  sales are also incomplete, which makes a comparison of the sales’ financial  and economic results with the EIS results premature. Furthermore, even  with complete sales data, the comparison of the estimates with final sales’  results is complicated by methodological differences related to the way the  expenditure estimates and results are calculated and a lack of comparable  economic data.
The Biscuit Fire Recovery Project EIS estimated that the salvage sales  planned under the alternative selected by the Forest Supervisor would cost  about $24 million to prepare, administer, and reforest and would generate  about $19.6 million in revenues for the government—about $13 million  from sales receipts and $6.6 million for brush disposal deposits. These  funds, according to the Project EIS, would be available to help pay for  postfire recovery activities. In addition to financial revenues for the federal  government, the EIS estimated the economic effects of the salvage sales for  each alternative. The Project EIS estimated the direct and indirect  economic effects of the sales in each alternative for five counties in  southwest Oregon—Coos, Curry, Douglas, Jackson, and Josephine—and  examined the economic sectors affected by the salvage sales, such as wood  manufacturing, construction, and retail trade. The EIS estimated that the  salvage logging in the selected alternative of the EIS would generate about  6,900 local jobs and $240 million to the regional economy related to the  harvesting and processing of the timber.
Because the Forest Service held two additional salvage sales for the Project  in 2006, it is premature to compare the forest’s financial and economic  results with the estimates in the EIS. With additional sales, the Forest  Service will have additional, unknown expenditures and revenues, making  the total results on all sales unknown and incomparable with the estimated  results. A comparison of the results through 2005 with the EIS estimates  could be made if the estimates were available on a sale-by-sale basis;  however, according to a Forest Service official, the EIS estimates are  averaged across the sales and are reported as a total only, not separately  for each sale. Unlike typical timber sales that have well-defined units and  volumes, the EIS estimates were necessarily formulated using several  broad assumptions about the salvage sale units and the timber volume  available in them, as well as harvesting methods and average purchaser  costs. Because the forest staff ultimately ended up changing sale units and  recombining units in different sales, the units in the EIS estimate differ  from those ultimately sold. According to a Forest Service official, these  assumptions and average prices would cause the estimate to be less  precise, but they had to be made because the size of the fire and the  number of sales prevented the forest staff from making more precise  estimates. Similarly, the economic estimates cannot be compared with the  sale results because the appropriate regional data, such as jobs created by  salvage sales, cannot be calculated until the sales are complete.
Although a comparison of the financial results of the Project’s salvage sales  is premature because the sale results are incomplete, an examination of the  volume and prices paid—both components of revenue—indicates that the  EIS overestimated volume and underestimated prices received for  potential sales. The amount of timber volume sold and removed from the  12 salvage sales was much less than the EIS estimated was available. The  EIS estimated that 173 million board feet out of the total 367 million board  feet, or 47 percent of the total timber volume estimated for sale, would be  available in the matrix and late-successional reserve areas, while the  remaining 194 million board feet would be available in the inventoried  roadless areas. By the end of 2005, the forest staff had sold 67 million board  feet from the matrix and late-successional reserves. With regard to price,  the EIS estimated that the timber sales would generate receipts of $37 per  thousand board feet. The actual price received for the 12 salvage sales  averaged $47 per thousand board feet, while the actual price received for  the hazard sales averaged $293 per thousand board feet and for the deck  sales averaged $397 per thousand board feet. The difference in prices  received reflects some difference in quality due to the fact that the hazard  and deck trees were removed a year or so earlier. It also reflects the fact  that the hazard sales are near a road and deck sales are already logged,  which would mean a purchaser would have minimal or no logging costs.
Even when the salvage sales are complete and final data are available on  sale expenditures, revenues, and economic results, certain methodological  factors complicate the comparison of the sale results with the EIS  estimates. Specifically, the Forest Service’s estimated expenditures and  those estimated in the EIS were calculated for different purposes and,  therefore, do not contain the same items. For example, the EIS estimates  do not include expenditures on NEPA, indirect costs, or law enforcement  and litigation, while the forest’s estimated expenditures for fiscal years  2003 through 2005 do include these expenditures. According to a Forest  Service official, the purpose of the EIS is to compare alternatives and  assess the differences among alternatives, therefore certain costs that are  the same for each alternative, such as NEPA and indirect costs, are not  included. On the other hand, the expenditures reported by the forest staff  for fiscal years 2003 through 2005 include those expenditures that can be  allotted to salvage sales—such as NEPA expenditures—for the purpose of  showing full expenditures related to the Biscuit Fire salvage sales. A  comparison of these amounts would be complicated by adjustments and  assumptions that would need to be made to facilitate the comparison.
With regard to the economic analysis, even at the completion of the sales,  the Forest Service does not conduct the type of analysis needed to report  the actual economic results of the sales, which would allow a comparison  with the estimates. The needed analysis would require the collection of  appropriate economic data, as well as formulation of appropriate economic  models to clearly separate the effects of salvage sales on jobs and on the  economy of the region from effects of other concurrent regional and  national factors. This retrospective analysis is difficult but could be done;  however, according to a Forest Service official, the agency does not  typically conduct the analysis needed to report these results because the  primary reason for preparing EIS estimates is to compare the relative  economic effects of salvage alternatives and not to provide a precise  prediction of the results of the sales. However, given that the volume of  timber sold through December 2005 is substantially less than the volume of  sales assumed in the EIS for the selected alternative, we would expect the  actual economic results of the sales to be less than the EIS estimate, all else  being equal.
section_title: Other Biscuit Fire Recovery Project Activities Are Under Way, but Depend on Harvest Activity, Schedules, Sale Revenues, and Other Funding
paragraphs: The Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff have begun implementing  other activities in the Project’s records of decision but completing these  activities depends on the extent of salvage sales, workload schedules,  salvage sale revenues, and other funding. In the Project’s records of  decision, the forest staff included numerous activities to help burned areas  recover, including postsale activities such as reforestation that would be  conducted in salvage sale areas. Table 5 shows the key activities included  in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project records of decision and the amount of  work planned and completed for each through December 2005. The forest  staff have begun work on reforestation, brush disposal, and road  maintenance but the extent of this work depends, in large part, on the  amount of salvage harvest activity that occurs. The forest staff have also  begun work on fuel management zones and wildlife habitat  activities—which are planned for both within and outside the salvage sale  areas—but completing this work depends on uncertain schedules and  funding sources. In addition to the activities in table 5, the records of  decision for the Project proposed a large-scale study of postfire  management activities such as salvage harvest and fuel management zones,  and monitoring of the Project’s activities. The forest staff are still planning  these activities, which are not yet funded.
subsections: section_title: Work Under Way on Brush Disposal, Reforestation, and Road Maintenance Activities, but Extent of Work Needed Depends on Levels of Harvest
paragraphs: Through December 2005, forest staff had begun work on brush disposal,  reforestation, and road maintenance activities. These activities have  funding sources because the Forest Service collects and deposits sale  revenues for brush disposal and reforestation activities and because much  of the road maintenance work is conducted by the sale purchaser.  However, the amount of work that the forest planned to accomplish for  each of these activities has changed as a result of the amount of timber sold  and harvested in the Biscuit Fire salvage sales. For example, the amount of  brush disposal work—an estimated 18,939 acres in the records of  decision—will be reduced because the acres where salvage harvest will be  done have been reduced.
subsections: section_title: Brush Disposal
paragraphs: As shown in table 5, the forest staff have accomplished 554 acres of brush  disposal, also referred to as slash disposal or activity fuel treatment. After a  salvage sale, forest staff are responsible for brush disposal, which usually  entails burning piles or areas that are covered with vegetative debris from  the sale such as stumps, chunks of wood, broken tree tops, tree limbs and  branches, rotten wood, or damaged brush resulting from salvage logging  operations. In general, under the Biscuit Fire salvage sale contracts, the  purchasers were required to create piles of such debris on the acres logged  before the forest staff conducted their brush disposal work.
While the forest staff had planned to accomplish almost 18,939 acres of  brush disposal, they have revised the total amount needed to about 3,000  acres because the acres sold for salvage harvest were much less than  anticipated—about 3,700 acres through December 2005. The forest staff do  not need to conduct brush disposal if the anticipated salvage sales do not  occur. In addition, the forest staff said that they will not conduct work on  every single acre of a salvage sale unit because, in some cases, the  treatment is not needed. As of the end of December 2005, the forest staff  have collected $826,000 in the Brush Disposal Fund for the Biscuit Fire  salvage sales.
section_title: Reforestation
paragraphs: As of December 2005, the forest staff had planted 706 acres of trees. The  Forest Service plants trees to help reforest areas where trees have been  removed by natural events such as wildland fire, or by timber harvest, that  might not recover naturally. In the Project records of decision, the forest  staff estimated that they would plant trees on about 30,000 acres, including  18,939 acres in the areas that would be salvage harvested, and about 11,000  acres that had been burned but not harvested. On the harvested acres, the  forest staff plan to conduct reforestation work after the salvage sales are  closed and brush disposal is completed. The estimated 30,000 acres of  planting will be reduced because the forest staff will not need to plant acres  that were planned for salvage but will not be harvested. In addition to the  reforestation activity identified in the Project records of decision, the  forest staff replanted 8,935 acres through 2005 under a categorical  exclusion to restore plantations—areas to be managed for future timber  harvest—destroyed by the Biscuit Fire. This work was funded from  appropriated funds and reforestation trust funds.
In general, planting work that occurs in salvage sale areas is funded from  sale revenues collected and deposited into the K-V Fund, while planting  outside of sale areas is funded through the forest’s appropriated funds for  vegetation management. For sale area reforestation, the K-V plans  identified about $4.6 million worth of work to plant the harvested areas.  About $2.7 million was deposited into the K-V Fund for planting activities,  although the plans are not yet final and, according to forest staff, funds can  be shifted to projects needing them until the plans are final. The Forest  Service retains these funds for use in the salvage sale area and generally  uses them within 5 years after the sale is closed to complete reforestation.  During the 5 years after a sale is completed, forest staff inspect the areas to  determine the extent of growth of planted seedlings and naturally grown  seedlings. In some cases, the Forest Service determines that sufficient  numbers of trees have grown in the area naturally, and the planned  reforestation work will not be needed. According to agency guidance, if  this occurs before the sale is administratively closed, the K-V funds can be used to fund other activities planned for the sale area, such as wildlife  habitat restoration.
section_title: Road Maintenance
paragraphs: As of December 2005, 307 miles of the 559 miles of road maintenance had  been completed. Road maintenance activities, which include blading,  grading, and gravel replacement on Forest Service roads, were conducted  by the purchasers as part of the salvage sale contracts. The 559 miles  identified in the records of decision include all the roads in the forest’s road  system; however, according to forest engineers, not all roads will receive  treatment because only the roads used by purchasers while they are  harvesting the Biscuit Fire salvage sales are maintained under contract.  Furthermore, some roads may receive two or more treatments because  roads that are used for two or more sales are maintained under each  contract. In addition to the road maintenance planned for the Project, 176  miles of roads were maintained by the purchasers during and after the  hazard and deck sales—some of them the same roads that were treated  under the Project sales.
In addition to the maintenance performed by the purchaser, the purchasers  made deposits into a road maintenance account. The forest staff will use  these deposits to pay for work, such as asphalt resurfacing, on roads used  by multiple purchasers. The deposits were collected in addition to the price  paid for the salvage sale and were based, in part, on the volume of timber  harvested from each sale. As of December 2005, more than $360,000 had  been deposited in the road maintenance account to be used to maintain  roads in the future.
section_title: Work Is Under Way on Fuel Management Zones and Wildlife Rehabilitation, but Funding and Schedules Are Uncertain
paragraphs: As of the end of 2005, the forest staff had also begun fuel management and  wildlife rehabilitation activities identified in the Biscuit Fire Recovery  Project records of decision, but completing these activities will depend on  the Forest Service funding and scheduling the work over many years (see  table 5). As of June 2006, the forest staff have not specified funding sources  or work schedules for completing these activities.
subsections: section_title: Fuel Management Zones
paragraphs: As shown in table 5, by the end of 2005, the forest staff had completed  almost 15 miles of fuel management zones. These fuel management zones  are concentrated along roads and ridges, as well as the perimeter of the  Biscuit Fire. They are areas where vegetation or fuels—trees and brush  that act as fuel for wildland fires—have been reduced to help create a  space where firefighters can be more successful suppressing future fires.  Maintaining them requires periodic efforts to burn or cut down brush and  trees that grow in the areas. The Project’s records of decision show that the  forest staff plan to maintain about 285 miles of these fuel reduction zones  in the matrix, late-successional reserves, and inventoried roadless areas, as  shown in figure 6.
The forest staff do not have a schedule for developing fuel management  zones and have not requested additional funds for the work. According to a  forest official, most of the work to date has been incidental to salvage sale  work in areas where salvage sales touched on identified fuel management  zone areas. The official explained that creating and maintaining fuel  management zones identified in the records of decision must be done in  addition to fuel reduction work needed in areas adjoining developed or  urban areas, called the wildland-urban interface. The official stated that  funding priorities for fuel reduction work are concentrated in the  wildland-urban interface because this is where human life and high value  property are most at risk. The forest staff has identified numerous projects  in this area that need to be completed, and the fuel management zone work  would not have as high a priority for funding.
section_title: Wildlife Habitat Rehabilitation
paragraphs: By the end of 2005, the forest staff had accomplished 715 acres of  seeding—scattering grass seeds in meadows to increase the amount of  vegetation and enhance native grasses—to improve wildlife habitat. In  addition to seeding, wildlife restoration work can involve removing trees  and shrubs to reduce their encroachment into grasslands and meadows.  Such work provides forage for grazing wildlife, including deer and elk, and  provides habitat for birds such as the purple martin.
In the Project records of decision, the forest wildlife staff planned to  accomplish 6,800 acres of seeding and 700 acres of meadow encroachment  work. As with fuel management zones, the forest staff have not scheduled  or requested additional appropriated funds to accomplish the work. While  the staff included about $1.3 million of projects in K-V plans for the Biscuit  Fire salvage sales, salvage sale revenues were sufficient to fund about  one-third of the planned work. Forest staff stated that it is still possible for  K-V funds to become available to fund wildlife projects if the funds are not  used for reforestation or planting work; however, if K-V funds are not  available, the wildlife projects planned for the Biscuit Fire area will  compete for funding with other wildlife projects outside the fire area.
section_title: Research and Monitoring Are Being Planned, but Funding and Schedules Are Uncertain
paragraphs: The Project records of decision include a large-scale adaptive management  study of postfire activities, such as salvage harvest and prescribed burns,  and monitoring of the progress and results of the Project. These activities  will be implemented over many years and depend on other activities to be  accomplished. The forest staff are still planning these activities and  completing them depends on schedules and funding sources. Although the  staff have developed a tentative schedule for the monitoring program, they  have not developed a schedule for the adaptive management study. The  study includes some activities that are part of the forest’s regular work but  also includes work that would be desirable if funding can be identified.  Similarly, while some monitoring work was intended to be conducted as  part of the forest’s regular program work, several of the monitoring items  have been designated as desirable depending on funding sources.
subsections: section_title: Adaptive Management Study
paragraphs: At the time of our review, the forest staff had just begun planning for the  large-scale adaptive management study included in the Project. The study  includes a management experiment to learn about and adapt different  management actions in postfire vegetation across a broad landscape. The  objectives of the study are to compare the results of different postfire  management strategies designed to restore and protect habitat for  late-successional reserves and old-growth related species. With the help of  Forest Service researchers, a study plan was written to design the study,  identify comparable areas of the forest in which to conduct different  treatments, design the vegetation treatments, and identify monitoring  needed for the projects. The treatments include salvage and replanting,  natural recovery, and prescribed burns, which will set the areas on  different pathways for recovery that will be monitored for significant  differences.
Completion of the study depends on the completion of other Project  activities. The treatments cannot be completed unless other  activities—namely the salvage sales and fuel management zones—are  completed. In addition, one of the treatments included in the study involves  prescribed burning, but the forest staff have not yet issued a record of  decision for prescribed burning activities that it studied in the EIS.  Completion also depends on activities being conducted in the areas chosen  for the study. The EIS identified 12 areas of about 3,000 acres each as  locations for the study. At the time of our review, because the acres of  salvage sale had been reduced, about half of the study areas were available.  According to the researchers who designed the work, the study is still  viable, despite the reduction in areas subject to different treatments.
Implementing the study depends on the forest staff scheduling the  activities identified as needed and determining which forest program will  conduct and fund the work. The Project EIS outlined the study’s activities  and identified those that the forest staff could undertake in their normal  workload and additional activities that should be accomplished but were  not funded. The Pacific Northwest Research Station paid for and  conducted initial work in the area by gathering remote sensing data of the  burned area to establish a baseline for future assessments of vegetation  conditions and how the three different treatments may affect the  vegetation differently. While there is still time to set up the study, the  Pacific Northwest Research Station recommended that a committee or  board be established to ensure that the needed activities are conducted.  The forest officials had not taken action on this recommendation at the  time of our review.
section_title: Monitoring
paragraphs: The Biscuit Fire Recovery Project records of decision identify a number of  monitoring activities, with three purposes: (1) to assure that all aspects of  the Project are implemented as intended, (2) to determine that certain  critical activities have the desired effect, and (3) to allow changes to occur  if activities are found to have been implemented incorrectly or have  undesired effects. The records of decision and the final EIS identify some  of the monitoring activities, as required to meet policy or standards, while  the final EIS identifies other monitoring activities as desired, which refers  to monitoring that would provide important information for future projects  and administrative studies.
At the time of our review, the forest staff reported that they had conducted  some of the monitoring associated with salvage sales from the records of  decision, which included monitoring  planting sites and site preparation,  the number of snags and down trees retained on salvage sale sites,  activities to mitigate the effect of noxious weeds,  marking used during salvage sales to ensure compliance with harvest  requirements and marking guides,  activities to mitigate threats to threatened and endangered species, and  specific aspects of activities identified for protecting threatened and  endangered species.
According to forest staff, this monitoring is carried out by timber sale  administrators as they visit and inspect sale sites. Their findings are  included in inspection reports that are part of the timber sale contract files.  The administrators can also determine whether best management practices  have been followed for the timber sales, which include actions to reduce  soil erosion and runoff from sale areas. According to forest staff, these  practices can be separate activities or they can be part of the design of the  timber sale. For example, a best management practice can include  designing a timber sale to use cable or helicopter logging rather than  tractor logging to reduce soil disturbance and erosion.
For the other monitoring identified in the records of decision, the forest  staff have drafted a plan that states whether each activity is required to  meet policy or standards, suggests the frequency with which monitoring  should take place, and outlines monitoring parameters and techniques. For  example, the plan identifies the need to monitor noxious weed treatments  after 1 to 5 years and after 5 to 10 years by using field visits to examine  treated sites to determine whether treatments have removed populations of  weeds. The plan does not, however, identify which forest staff will conduct  the monitoring or which forest funds will be used to accomplish the work.
The Project records of decision stated that monitoring results would be  made available to the public. The unique nature of the Biscuit Fire and the  significance of the Project activities underscore the importance of this  information for showing the Congress and the public the extent of recovery  work accomplished and remaining to be done. However, monitoring the  status of the Project’s activities is not included in the monitoring plan.  Further, the forest staff do not report annual accomplishments for the  Biscuit Fire separately from their other program accomplishments. The  activities in the Project are being implemented by the forest’s regular  programs, including Forest Products, Natural Resources, and others.  Although a forest monitoring report for 2004 includes activities conducted  in the Biscuit Fire, forest staff did not comprehensively report on the status  of activities in the Project such as salvage sales, reforestation, road  maintenance, wildlife habitat rehabilitation, fuel management zones, and  others. Without such information, the forest staff cannot report on the  status and results of the Project, as described in the records of decision.
section_title: Forest Made Operational Changes and Assessed Fines to Address Improper Logging That Occurred in Three Locations
paragraphs: During the hazard and salvage sales conducted in areas burned by the  Biscuit Fire, the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff received and  investigated numerous complaints of logging in areas where it should not  have occurred. The forest staff confirmed three instances of improper  logging and determined that two were the result of errors on the part of the  forest staff, and one was an error by the timber purchaser. The forest staff  attributed most of the other alleged cases of improper logging to  disagreements over the definition of a riparian area and, after further  review, dismissed them. Forest Service officials admit that the confirmed  cases of improper logging were serious errors and have taken steps to  prevent such occurrences on future salvage sales.
subsections: section_title: Forest Staff Made Mistakes Leading to Two Incidents of Improper Logging but Plan to Better Mark Boundaries
paragraphs: The forest staff acknowledge that mistakes resulted in improper logging in  two cases, one that occurred in the Babyfoot Lake Botanical Area adjacent  to the Fiddler salvage sale—one of the 12 salvage sales in the Biscuit Fire  Recovery Project—and another in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area adjacent  to the Bald Bear hazard sale. In both cases, forest officials identified  actions to improve the marking of boundaries for timber and salvage sales.
subsections: section_title: Babyfoot Lake Botanical Area—Fiddler Salvage Sale
paragraphs: Babyfoot Lake is a 350-acre area within the Siskiyou National Forest  designated as a botanical area because it contains several rare species such  as Brewer’s spruce, a spruce that grows in southwest Oregon and northern  California. Botanical areas are specific management areas designated in  forest plans that require natural management and allow researchers to  study plants in their natural state. As such, timber harvest should not occur  in the area. However, during the Fiddler salvage sale, about 16 acres of the  botanical area adjacent to the sale were harvested. This incursion was  discovered by members of a local environmental group in August 2005. A  total of 292 tree stumps were counted within the area.
According to the District Ranger in whose area the incident occurred and  who investigated the incident, a series of occurrences led to the improper  logging:  During the fall of 2003 and spring of 2004, the Fiddler sale was being  planned on maps and on the ground. In December 2003, the timber  officer responsible for the Fiddler sale left the forest staff and from that  time through January 2005, the position was filled by two detailees from  different ranger districts and by the District Ranger.
In the fall of 2003, the Forest Service staff used maps and a global  positioning system to paint and flag the boundary of the Fiddler sale  units, including a unit near Babyfoot Lake. During the winter, the timber  staff discovered that the botanical area was included in the sale unit on  the map. The boundary that should have followed a ridge top next to a  road was instead drawn farther down the hill in the botanical area. The  map was corrected, and the timber staff determined that they would  need to repaint and remove flags from the unit boundaries in the spring  when the weather improved and they could visit the site.
In the spring of 2004, the correct boundary of the Fiddler sale units was  painted by helicopter—a new technique that was being tested on the  Biscuit Fire areas—following the correct boundary from the map.  However, no one removed the flags and paint from the incorrect  boundary, resulting in two boundaries marked on the sale unit. The  timber sale administrator—the staff person responsible for monitoring  the sale units during the salvage operations—did not notice this  discrepancy while reviewing the sale units just before the sale.
During harvest operations in 2004, the timber sale administrator and the  purchaser followed the flags and painted trees, not the  helicopter-painted boundary, which was the correct one.
The District Ranger determined that this was a mistake on the part of the  timber staff and that the amount of communication among the timber staff  and oversight over the salvage sales were insufficient. She stated that the  staff were working quickly to plan sales and to prepare for sales as soon as  the records of decision with an emergency situation determination were  signed. The sales were sold 2 weeks after the records of decision were  signed.
The District Ranger stated that several simple actions were needed to avoid  similar problems in the future. In a report to the Forest Supervisor, she  stated that future sales should ensure that botanical areas are marked on  the sale map and flagged to distinguish them from the sale boundaries. It  was further suggested that timber sale procedures include a checklist of  items—such as botanical areas—for timber sale administrators’ reviews. In  November 2005, the Department of Agriculture’s Office of Inspector  General confirmed the error on the part of the forest staff and stated that  the proposed solutions sounded reasonable. According to forest timber  staff, the staff used an updated checklist to review the layout of the Mike’s  Gulch sale held in June 2006. The sale units did not contain a botanical area  but bordered a research natural area that is to be marked.
The District Ranger also asked for an assessment of actions that could be  taken to mitigate the damage that occurred from the salvage cutting and  has implemented some actions already. For example, the Forest Service did  not burn the slash in the area, as it normally would after a salvage harvest,  leaving the trees to decay naturally. As of June 2006, the assessment and  several actions had been recommended. For example, one of the  recommendations is to expand the boundaries of the botanical area to  include several areas of live Brewer’s spruce outside the current boundary;  agency officials say this action would require the preparation of an  environmental analysis or EIS and perhaps an amendment to the Siskiyou  forest plan.
section_title: Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area—Bald Bear Hazard Sale
paragraphs: In 2003, the Forest Service sold hazardous trees along roads in the Biscuit  Fire area. One of the sales—the Bald Bear sale—occurred along a road on  the boundary of the Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area. Although timber harvest  and mechanized activities such as the use of chain saws are not allowed in  wilderness areas, about 16 trees within the Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area  were cut during the hazard sale. The District Ranger who investigated this  incident found the following:  The road in the Bald Bear sale runs along the boundary of the  Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area; the boundary follows a ridgeline but where  the terrain flattens, the boundary is along the road. The boundary signs  were burned and difficult to see.
The timber staff that marked the boundary for the sale called the forest  staff to verify the boundary and were told it was on the ridge. The timber  staff followed a line through the flat area, rather than the road, and  included a portion of wilderness in the sale area.
The timber officer did not confirm at the site that the boundary was  accurate, which was important given its close proximity to the  Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area.
An outside researcher informed forest staff about the boundary error.
The timber sale administrator directed the purchaser not to cut the area  until the boundary could be checked; however, when the administrator  arrived at the site, the trees had already been cut.
The District Ranger stated that the logging was a result of mistakes on the  part of the forest staff and the purchaser. Specifically, she noted that  checking the boundary was the timber officer’s responsibility and  acknowledged that the timber staff did not discuss the proximity of the  Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area with the purchaser. Either of these activities  might have identified the mismarked boundary. In addition, she said the  purchaser failed to control its workforce after receiving notification of the  mistake.
The District Ranger asked the timber staff to identify actions to prevent this  problem in the future. She noted that the regional staff issued a letter in  2004, prior to the incident, emphasizing the need to better identify forest  boundaries. According to forest timber staff, in marking the Mike’s Gulch  sale in June 2006, the forest staff used surveyors to identify the forest’s  boundaries with private lands, and planned to have the surveyor mark the  boundaries of the research natural area. The District Ranger stated that she  had her staff prepare a range of options to mitigate the damage caused by  the improper logging and, as of June 2006, had decided to leave the trees  and stumps untouched since they are near the road and not part of the  pristine environment.
section_title: Timber Purchaser Improperly Cut Trees That Were Not Burned, and Forest Staff Followed Contract Procedures in Fining Company
paragraphs: During the Wafer sale—another of the 12 salvage sales from the Project  records of decision—the purchaser cut 120 live, or “green,” trees in error.  The purchaser caught the mistake and brought it to the attention of the  Forest Service timber sale administrator. The timber sale administrator  halted the sale and put the purchaser in breach of contract. The purchaser  stated that the cutting crew was inexperienced and, therefore, made the  mistake. The forest’s contracting office required the purchaser to pay $200  per tree, or $24,000, in penalties, and the green trees were left in the forest.
This incident of improper logging was investigated by a Forest Service law  enforcement officer. According to the law enforcement official, because  the purchaser reported the improper logging, it is not likely that the  purchaser was attempting to steal the green trees. In addition, the forest  staff took action in response to the improper logging by putting the  purchaser in breach of contract. The sale contract clearly stated that all  green trees were to be protected. However, according to Forest Service  officials, accidental harvest of green trees can sometimes occur in large  salvage sale operations. While timber sale administrators inspect sales  periodically, they neither inspect the cutting operations on a day-to-day  basis nor control the purchaser’s operations.
section_title: Forest Service Pursued Other Claims of Improper Logging
paragraphs: In addition to these three incidents, Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest  officials received numerous reports of improper logging from local  environmental groups who monitored the salvage sale operations.  According to a forest official, timber sale administrators and other forest  staff investigated these claims. The majority of these claims involved  logging in riparian reserves, which are 174-foot buffers on each side of a  stream or waterway that protect riparian habitat and water quality. Forest  officials stated that the agency’s definition of a riparian area differs from  the definition used by the environmental groups. The Forest Service  defines a riparian area to be a channel with some evidence of sediment  having been moved, while the environmental groups identify a riparian area  as a depression in which water may flow. In reviewing these areas, forest  staff said they identified one riparian area that had been salvage harvested  and should not have been. However, it is difficult to know when the stream  appeared because according to forest staff, after logging, the runoff from  rain and precipitation is much higher and new “streams” are created. Also,  during wet years, more streams are created from the increased runoff.
Another claim of improper logging had to do with salvage harvesting in a  botanical area. The same environmental group that discovered the  Babyfoot Lake harvest reported to the Forest Service that logging from the  Steed sale overlapped into the Sourgame Botanical Area. The forest staff  investigated this incident and determined that the environmental group had  used the larger of two boundaries, identified as alternatives, in the EIS for  the Siskiyou forest plan. The record of decision for the plan chose the  smaller area as the botanical area.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Biscuit Fire Recovery Project generated considerable public interest  and controversy, particularly over treatment of the postfire landscape. With  the near completion of the Project’s salvage sales, it is apparent that much  less was sold and removed through the salvage sales, changing the need for  such projects as brush disposal and reforestation. It remains to be seen  how much of the other recovery work—wildlife habitat rehabilitation, fuel  management zones, monitoring, and the adaptive management study—will  be accomplished given the lack of specific funding and schedules. As the  Project’s activities are implemented over the next several years,  accountability for their accomplishment rests with the Rogue  River-Siskiyou National Forest staff. One of the Project activities with  potentially significant results is the proposed large-scale adaptive  management study, which offers an opportunity to gather scientific  information with broad implications for recovery actions and postfire  salvage harvest elsewhere on Forest Service lands. Successful  implementation of the study and other Project activities will take  commitment on the part of the forest staff to coordinate the work over  several years. In light of the size and unique nature of the Biscuit Fire, and  continuing public interest in the recovery of the area, it is important that  the forest staff communicate the results of the Project to the Congress and  the public. The forest staff—and the Forest Service—recognize the  importance of providing information on the Project’s status and results to  the public but do not report results in such a way that makes the  information readily available. Regular tracking and reporting of the status  of the Project’s activities and results are needed.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help keep the Congress and the public informed on the status of the  Biscuit Fire Recovery Project and the significant research work on the  postfire effects of salvage and nonsalvage management actions, we  recommend that the Chief of the Forest Service direct the Rogue  River-Siskiyou National Forest Supervisor and the Pacific Northwest  Regional Forester to provide an annual public report on the status of the  activities included in the Project. The report should provide an update on  the status of work accomplished and still planned for each of the activities  in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project EIS and records of decision: fuel  treatments, prescribed burning, salvage harvest, vegetation and wildlife  restoration, roads and water quality, and the large-scale study. The agency  should produce such reports until the Project is substantially complete.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided the Departments of Agriculture and Justice with a draft of this  report for review and comment. The Forest Service provided written  comments on behalf of the Department of Agriculture (see app. II). The  Department of Justice had no comments on the draft report. In its  comments, the Forest Service said that the report provided a good view of  the process, events, and Project through December 2005. The agency  generally agreed with our recommendation for the issuance of an annual  update on the status of Biscuit Fire recovery activities but suggested that  the time period for producing the report be limited to the next 3- to 5-year  period. We stated in the recommendation that the reports should be  produced annually until the Project is complete and that may be 5 years or  longer given the nature of some of the recovery activities. For this reason,  we hesitate to provide a specific time limit but believe there is value to  providing the agency with some discretion about when they discontinue  the report. Therefore, we revised the recommendation to state that the  reports should be provided until the Project’s activities are substantially  complete.
The Forest Service also stated that an explanation of the litigation,  controversies, and protests that occurred since December 2005 would  provide the readers an understanding of the complexities of trying to  manage fire projects. The report describes the status of sales through 2006,  the emergency situation determination used to expedite the sales, the  effects of litigation on the sales, and delays in the inventoried roadless area  sales. We believe this discussion is sufficiently descriptive of these events  and, therefore, did not make any changes to the report in response to this  comment. The Forest Service also said that the report does not make it  clear that the planning processes and appeals do greatly reduce the final  timber harvest volumes. While the planning process was a factor in the  time taken to develop the EIS, we did not evaluate the effects of the  process on timber volumes because it was not one of the objectives of this  report. Also, the report does not discuss the appeals process because the  Forest Service used an emergency situation determination, which  eliminated the appeals process for 11 salvage sales. Finally, the Forest  Service also provided several clarifications of technical information that  we incorporated in the report as appropriate.
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If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-3841  or nazzaror@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Public Affairs and  Congressional Relations may be found on the last page of this report. GAO  staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to determine (1) how the development of the Biscuit  Fire Recovery Project compared with the Forest Service’s general  approach to postfire recovery; (2) the status of the Biscuit Fire Recovery  Project salvage sales and how the reported financial and economic results  of the sales compared with the Forest Service’s initial estimates; (3) the  status of other activities identified in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project; and  (4) the extent and cause of improper logging within the Biscuit Fire  Recovery Project, as reported by the Forest Service, and changes the  agency made to prevent such occurrences in the future.
To determine how the development of the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project  compared with the Forest Service’s approach to postfire recovery efforts,  we developed information on the (1) general approach used by the Forest  Service to assess postfire conditions and identify rehabilitation and  restoration projects and (2) detailed process used by the Rogue River- Siskiyou National Forest to develop the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project. To  develop information on the general approach, we first reviewed available  Forest Service guidance and directives on postfire management and  National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). There is no final guidance on  postfire rehabilitation and restoration activities and, therefore, we  reviewed guidance for the Pacific Northwest Region and a draft national  strategy developed by the Interregional Ecosystem Management  Coordination Group to describe the general postfire recovery process. We  also interviewed Forest Service officials at headquarters, the Pacific  Northwest Region, and the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest about the  general approach. To develop the details of Project development, we  reviewed meeting minutes of the Project’s interdisciplinary team and a  forest advisory group during the development of the Project and its  environmental impact statement (EIS) in 2003 and 2004. We also  interviewed forest and regional staff involved in the development and  review of the Project and EIS. To facilitate the interviews, we developed a  time line of key events, which we provided to officials before the  interviews. We also interviewed the key decision makers in the process— the Forest Supervisor, Regional Forester, Deputy Chief for the National  Forest System, and Undersecretary and Deputy Undersecretary of  Agriculture for Natural Resources and Environment to determine their  roles in the process and in the final records of decision for the Project.
To determine the status of the Project’s salvage sales, we obtained and  analyzed information on the sales proposed in the Project’s records of  decision. We gathered sale data from the Forest Service’s Automated  Timber Sale Accounting System including sale name, acres sold, volume  harvested, receipts, and receipts disposition. We also gathered this  information for sales held prior to the issuance of the Project EIS—sales of  hazard trees and trees cut from fire lines during the active fighting of the  Biscuit Fire. We gathered this information as of December 2005 to ensure  that we captured volume harvested and receipts paid for timber harvested  in the fall of 2005 but for which the financial data were captured a month or  two later. To determine whether the timber receipts data were reliable for  our purposes, we interviewed Forest Service financial officials about the  Timber Sale Accounting System and operations and controls over data and  data reliability, as well as reviewing the system documentation. Through  this process, we determined that the data are reliable for reporting the  status of the Biscuit Fire salvage sales and receipts.
To gather information on the Forest Service’s expenditures on the Project’s  salvage sales, we had to identify what activities and budget line items are  related to salvage sales because the Forest Service does not report  financial data on a sale-by-sale basis. We gathered information for fiscal  years 2003 through 2005 because this was the period during which the  Forest Service conducted work to plan and implement the Project and its  salvage sales and because 2005 is the last fiscal year for which complete  financial data are available. To identify what activities are associated with  salvage sales, we reviewed the Forest Service timber sale preparation  handbook that describes what activities to include in the financial analysis  of a timber sale. We also interviewed Forest Service personnel about what  activities and expenditures should be included in a full accounting for a  timber sale, including a salvage harvest sale. Finally, we obtained and  reviewed previous Forest Service reports that referred to the total cost of  its timber sale program and reviewed the activities and expenditures  included in those estimates. We then worked with the financial staff of the  Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest to identify the expenditures for a  range of activities included in these reports: NEPA planning, timber sale  preparation, timber sale administration, reforestation activities, timber stand improvement activities, and forest indirect expenditures. Most of  these expenditures occurred from two budget line items—one for  appropriated timber funds and one for the Salvage Sale Fund. We also  included an estimate of regional and Washington Office expenditures.  Because the Forest Service does not account for the costs of timber sales,  we had no basis to allocate regional and Washington expenditures and as a  result, used the forest’s assessment rate for regional and Washington Office  costs for the Salvage Sale Fund. The rate, 5.2 percent, was charged to all  Salvage Sale Fund plans by the forest staff in fiscal years 2001 through 2005  to collect funding to pay for regional and Washington Office activities.  Finally, because law enforcement and litigation are activities directly  related to salvage sales, we obtained expenditures from the Forest  Service’s law enforcement regional office located in Portland, Oregon, and  from the Department of Agriculture’s Office of General Counsel and the  Department of Justice’s Environment and Natural Resources Division for  their work related to litigation and other legal services for the salvage sales.  The law enforcement expenditures represent overtime and travel  expenditures for officers who worked on the Biscuit Fire salvage sales; the  expenditures for the Departments of Agriculture and Justice represent  salaries for the attorneys involved in litigation and other legal services. To  determine the reliability of the Forest Service data, we interviewed Forest  Service financial officials responsible for the Foundation Financial  Information System and the auditors responsible for reviewing the Forest  Service’s annual financial statements to determine if there were any  material weaknesses relevant to the data. We determined that there were  none and that the data are reliable for our purpose of reporting Biscuit Fire  salvage sale expenditures. We are relying on the reported expenditures of  the Departments of Agriculture and Justice.
We reviewed the Forest Service’s estimated financial and economic results  for the proposed salvage sales in the Project EIS and discussed specific  aspects of the estimates with the Forest Service’s Regional Economist, the  primary official responsible for these analyses. We attempted to compare  the financial results of the actual salvage sales with the Forest Service’s  estimated financial results. However, because during the course of our  analysis the Forest Service held two more salvage sales in the summer of  2006, the financial results—expenditures and receipts—of the sales  available to date were incomplete. We also determined that there are  methodological differences in the calculation of expenditures. We  determined that the Forest Service does not report economic results, and  we could not make the comparison of economic results and estimates,  although such a comparison could be made if the appropriate analysis were  conducted. We attempted to adjust the EIS estimates to make a comparison  based only on the sales conducted through 2005 by disaggregating the EIS  estimates by sale. The disaggregated results would have enabled us to use  only the results of comparable EIS sales as the basis of comparison with  the results of sales actually sold though 2005; however, we determined that  the EIS estimates, which were based on broad averages across the land  types, could not be disaggregated and attributed to individual sales.
To determine the status of other recovery project activities, we interviewed  forest staff responsible for the activities included in the records of decision  and identified the sources of information available to document the status.  Different program staff are responsible for conducting the activities in the  Project, which include planting, seeding, road maintenance, fuel  management zones, research, and monitoring activities. For activities other  than research and monitoring, we compiled and summarized the work  conducted through December 2005, reviewing contracts for planting work,  accomplishment reports for brush disposal work and wildlife rehabilitation  activities, and maps for fuel management zones. Where they were available,  we reviewed plans for work to be accomplished in the future. We presented  this information to the appropriate forest staff and confirmed the data with  them. To determine the status of the landscape-scale research study, we  interviewed the forest and Pacific Northwest Research Station officials  who developed the research proposal in the EIS. The officials provided an  update of the status, which we then confirmed with forest officials. Finally,  we obtained a copy of the most recent monitoring schedule and discussed  the monitoring program with the forest’s timber manager.
To determine the extent and cause of reported improper logging, we  obtained and reviewed Forest Service reports on the three incidents in the  Babyfoot Lake Botanical Area, Kalmiopsis Wilderness, and Wafer sale to  determine the facts of the incidents. We then reviewed an Office of  Inspector General report on the Babyfoot Lake incident and two law  enforcement reports on the wilderness and Wafer sale incidents to  determine other views of the incidents. We visited the Babyfoot Lake site to  view the correct boundary and the improperly harvested area. We  interviewed Forest Service officials responsible for the day-to-day  oversight and operations of timber sales, representatives of a local  environmental group monitoring the salvage sales and responsible for  discovering the Babyfoot Lake incident, and law enforcement and Office of  Inspector General officials who reviewed the cases to determine the Forest  Service’s response to the incidents. To determine the Forest Service’s  response to other claims of improper harvest, we reviewed a file of letters  and agency responses. We also reviewed reports from a third-party monitor  who visited sale sites that had been harvested and viewed the results of  operations.
We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards from November 2005 through July 2006.
section_title: Comments from the Forest Service
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Forest Service’s letter, dated  September 7, 2006.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. We revised the report accordingly. We stated that the EIS is required  rather than needed. 2. We revised the report accordingly. 3. We revised the report accordingly. 4. We revised the report accordingly. 5. We revised the report accordingly. 6. We revised the report accordingly. 7. The report describes the status of sales through 2006, the emergency  situation determination used to expedite the sales, the effects of  litigation on the sales, and delays in the inventoried roadless area sales.  We believe this discussion is sufficiently descriptive of these events  and, therefore, did not make any changes to the report in response to  this comment. While the planning process was a factor in the time  taken to develop the EIS, we did not evaluate the effects of the process  on timber volumes because it was not one of the objectives of this  report. Also, the report does not discuss the appeals process because  the Forest Service used an emergency situation determination, which  eliminated the appeals process for 11 salvage sales.  8. We disagree that the report should be limited to the next 3 to 5 years  because some of the activities in the Project are likely to extend beyond  that period of time. For this reason, we continue to believe that such a  time limit should be based on the Project’s completion. We do believe  there is value to providing the agency with some discretion about when  they discontinue the report. Therefore, we revised the recommendation  to state that the reports should be provided until the Project’s activities  are substantially complete.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, David P. Bixler, Assistant  Director; Susan Iott; Rich Johnson; Mehrzad Nadji; and Dawn Shorey made  key contributions to this report. Joyce Evans, Lisa Knight, John Mingus,  Cynthia Norris, Alison O’Neill, Kim Raheb, Jena Sinkfield, Jay Smale, and  Gail Traynham also made important contributions to this report.