FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities
Published: 2004-03-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks precipitated a shift in how the FBI uses its investigative resources to prevent future terrorist incidents. The attacks led to the FBI's commitment to reorganize and transform itself. Today's testimony discusses the FBI's progress in carrying out its transformation process. Specifically, it addresses FBI's (1) progress in developing a comprehensive transformation plan; (2) efforts to update its strategic plan; (3) development of a strategic human capital plan; (4) information technology management leadership and practices; and (5) realignment of staff resources to priority areas and the impact of the realignments on the FBI's drug and other criminal investigation programs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: We commend the FBI for its progress in some areas of its transformation efforts since we last testified on this subject in June 2003. We believe that commitment from the top, a dedicated implementation team, involvement of employees in the process, and the achievement of key milestones are encouraging signs of progress. However, we continue to encourage the development of a comprehensive transformation plan that would consolidate the crosswalks between the various aspects of transformation. This could help management oversee all aspects of the transformation. The FBI's strategic plan has been completed. Overall we found the plan has important strengths as well as some areas in which improvements could be made. For example, the plan includes key elements of successful strategic plans (i.e. a comprehensive mission statement and results-oriented, longterm goals and objectives.). However, the plan is missing some elements that could have made it more informative. Officials advised us that some of these elements are available elsewhere (i.e. lists of stakeholders and performance measures). The absence of these elements makes the plan less comprehensive and useful. The FBI has also developed a strategic human capital plan that contains many of the principles that we have laid out for an effective human capital system (i.e. the need to fill identified skill gaps by using personnel flexibilities). However, the FBI has yet to hire a human capital officer to manage the implementation of this process and the performance management system for the bulk of FBI personnel remains inadequate to discern meaningful distinctions in performance. The FBI recognizes the importance of information technology (IT) as a transformation enabler, making it an explicit priority in its strategic plan and investing hundreds of millions of dollars in initiatives to expand its systems environment and thereby improve its information analysis and sharing. However, FBI's longstanding approach to managing IT is not fully consistent with the structures and practices of leading organizations. A prime example of the consequences of not employing these structures and practices is the cost and schedule shortfalls being experienced on Trilogy, the centerpiece project to modernize infrastructure and case management applications. Recent FBI proposals, plans, and initiatives indicate that it understands its management challenges and is focused on addressing them. Another key element of the FBI's transformation is the realignment of resources to better focus on the highest priorities--counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber investigations. The FBI resources allocated to priority areas continue to increase and now represent its single largest concentration of field agent resources--36 percent of its fiscal year 2004 field agent positions.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We are pleased to be here today to address this committee regarding  GAO’s work assessing the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI)  transformation efforts. As you are well aware, the September 11, 2001,  terrorist attacks were the most destructive and costly terrorist events that  this country has ever experienced. The event precipitated a shift in how  the FBI uses its investigative resources to prevent future terrorist  incidents and ultimately led to FBI’s commitment to reorganize and  transform itself. Today’s testimony follows up on our June 2003 testimony  before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,  State and the Judiciary and Related Agencies on the FBI’s transformation  efforts.
It also draws on continuing work for the same sub-committee, the House  Select Committee on Intelligence and several individual requestors.
We will discuss the FBI’s:    overall progress in transformation,    efforts to update its strategic plan,    development of a strategic human capital plan,  information technology management capabilities, and realignment of staff resources to priority areas and the impact of the  realignments on the FBI’s drug and other criminal investigation  programs.
In brief, we commend the FBI for its progress in its transformation efforts.  We believe that commitment from the top, a dedicated implementation  team, involvement of employees, and the development of strategic and  human capital plans are encouraging signs of FBI’s reorganization  progress. However, we want to note some activities that may enhance the  value of future planning efforts, reiterate the importance of developing and  tracking measures of progress toward achieving goals, discuss the history  and future of IT efforts, and the shift in resources from the traditional  crime areas to the new priority areas.
Our testimony today is based on interviews with management and  program officials at FBI headquarters during the last 2 years. We also  interviewed management personnel in FBI field offices; and obtained  input from special agents and analysts in FBI field offices last spring.  Additionally, to assess the progress that the FBI has made in its  transformation efforts, we reviewed information from an October 2003 and  March 2004 briefing that the FBI provided to GAO on its transformation  efforts and FBI’s recent strategic plan and strategic human capital plan.  We compared these documents against GAO’s leading practices in the  areas of organizational mergers and transformations, strategic planning,  and strategic human capital management.
We focused on assessing the FBI’s strategic plan for key elements required  by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). GPRA  provides a set of practices for developing a useful and informative  strategic plan that can be applied to any level of the federal government to  improve the quality and informative value of strategic plans to Congress,  other key stakeholders, and the staff charged with achieving the agency’s  strategic goals. To make this assessment we used criteria we developed  for assessing agency strategic plans under GPRA. Our assessment is based  on a review of the FBI’s strategic plan with limited information about the  process the FBI undertook to develop the plan. We acknowledge that the  FBI may be addressing these elements in other ways.
We reviewed FBI’s strategic plan to see how it addressed six key elements:  long-term goals and objectives,  relationship between the long-term goals and annual performance  goals,    approaches or strategies to achieve the goals and objectives,    key external factors that could affect achievement of goals, and    use of program evaluation to establish or revise strategic goals.
Our analysis of the FBI’s information technology (IT) management  capabilities is based on our prior work on the FBI’s enterprise architecture  efforts and follow-up work to determine recent progress, information from  the Justice Inspector General’s work on evaluating the FBI’s IT investment  management process, and recent work on the organizational placement  and authority of the FBI’s Chief Information Officer (CIO). We also used  our prior research of CIO management practices of successful  organizations and our evaluations of large IT modernization efforts similar  to the Trilogy program. Further, we conducted follow up work with the  FBI’s program management office to determine the cost and schedule  overruns for Trilogy.
To address the effect of the FBI’s resource realignments on drug and other  traditional law enforcement efforts, we analyzed FBI budgetary, staffing,  and caseload data and interviewed selected FBI, Drug Enforcement  Administration (DEA), and local law enforcement officials.
We performed our audit work in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: FBI Continues to Make Progress in its Transformation Efforts but Needs a Comprehensive Transformation Plan to Guide Its Efforts
paragraphs: In our June 2003 testimony on the FBI’s reorganization before the House  Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary  and Related Agencies, we reported that the FBI had made progress in its  efforts to transform the agency, but that some major challenges  continued. We also noted that any changes in the FBI must be part of, and  consistent with, broader, government-wide transformation efforts that are  taking place, especially those resulting from the establishment of the  Department of Homeland Security and in connection with the intelligence  community.
We also noted that to effectively meet the challenges of the post- September 11, environment, the FBI needed to consider employing key  practices that have consistently been found at the center of successful  transformation efforts. These key practices are to    ensure that top leadership drives the transformation,    establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the  transformation,  focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the  transformation,    set implementation goals and a time line to build momentum and show  progress from day one,    dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation    use the performance management system to define responsibility and  ensure accountability for change,    establish a communication strategy to create shared expectations and  report related progress,  involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for  the transformation, and    build a world-class organization that continuously seeks to implement  best practices in processes and systems in areas such as information  technology, financial management, acquisition management, and  human capital.
Today, we continue to be encouraged by the progress that the FBI has  made in some areas as it continues its transformation efforts. Specifically  worthy of recognition are the commitment of Director Mueller and senior-  level leadership to the FBI’s reorganization; the FBI’s communication of  priorities; the implementation of core reengineering processes to improve  business practices and assist in the bureau’s transformation efforts; the  dedication of an implementation team to manage the reengineering efforts;  the development of a strategic plan and a human capital plan; the efforts to  involve employees in the strategic planning and reengineering processes;  and the FBI’s efforts to realign its activities, processes, and resources to  focus on a key set of principles and priorities.
While the FBI has embedded crosswalks and timelines in their various  transformation plans that relate one plan to another, we still encourage  the development of an overall transformation plan that will pull all of the  pieces together in one document. This document can be both a  management tool to guide all of the efforts, as well as a communication  vehicle for staff to see and understand the goals of the FBI. It is important  to establish and track intermediate and long-term transformation goals  and establish a timeline to pinpoint performance shortfalls and gaps and  suggest midcourse corrections. By demonstrating progress towards these  goals, the organization builds momentum and demonstrates that real  progress is being made.  We will continue to review this issue.
section_title: FBI Has Developed a Strategic Plan with a Mission, Strategic Goals, and Approaches That Reflect Its New Priorities
paragraphs: When we last testified in June 2003, the FBI was in the process of  compiling the building blocks of a strategic plan. At that time it was  anticipated that the plan would be completed by the start of fiscal year  2004. Although delayed by about 5 months, the FBI has since completed its  strategic plan. FBI officials indicated that the implementation of two staff  reprogrammings and delays in the appropriation of its fiscal year 2003 and  fiscal year 2004 budget, as well as initiatives undertaken to protect the  homeland during the war in Iraq, delayed the completion of the strategic  plan.
Overall we found the plan has some important strengths as well as some  areas in which improvements could be made. The strategic plan includes  key elements of successful strategic plans, including a comprehensive  mission statement; results-oriented, long-term goals and objectives; and  approaches to achieve the goals and objectives. The FBI plan presents 10  strategic goals that appear to cover the FBI’s major functions and  operations, are related to the mission, and generally articulate the results  in terms of outcomes the FBI seeks to achieve. For example, one of the  plan’s strategic goals is “protect the United States from terrorist attack;”  another goal is “reduce the level of significant violent crime.” The plan also  lists strategic objectives and performance goals for each long-term  strategic goal. However, the performance goals do not appear to be  outcomes against which the FBI will measure progress; rather they appear  to describe approaches or be key efforts that FBI will undertake to  achieve its long-term strategic goals and objectives.
Importantly, the plan acknowledges that the FBI faces competing  priorities and clearly articulates its top 10 priorities, in order of priority.  The strategic plan also frequently discusses the role partnerships with  other law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security agencies will  play in achieving the plan’s goals. The plan discusses the FBI’s approach to  building on its internal capacity to accomplish its mission-critical goals by  improving management of human capital, information technology, and  other investigative tools. The plan also discusses the external factors, such  as global and domestic demographic changes and the communications  revolution, which have driven the development of its strategic goals.
subsections: section_title: Strategic Plan Could Be Improved by Discussing Other Key Elements
paragraphs: Although the FBI has addressed several key elements in its strategic plan,  the plan needs more information on other elements of strategic planning  that we have identified as significant to successful achievement of an  organization’s mission and goals. FBI officials indicated that some of these  elements are available in other documents and were not included in the  plan for specific reasons. As the FBI moves forward with its new strategic  planning and execution process, it should consider addressing in its  strategic plan the following key elements:  Involving Key Stakeholders: As we have previously testified, any changes  at the FBI must be part of, and consistent with, broader governmentwide  transformation efforts that are taking place, especially those resulting  from the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and in  connection with changes in the intelligence community. Successful  organizations we studied based their strategic planning, to a large extent,  on the interests and expectations of their stakeholders. Federal agency  stakeholders include Congress and the administration, other federal  agencies, state and local governments, third-party service providers,  interest groups, agency employees, and, of course, the American public.  Involving customers served by the organization—such as the users of the  FBI’s intelligence—is important as well. The FBI strategic plan does not  describe which stakeholders or customers, were involved or consulted  during the plan’s development or the nature of their involvement. Such  information would be useful to understanding the quality of the planning  process FBI has undertaken and the extent to which it reflect the views of  key stakeholders and customers. Consultation provides an important  check for an organization that they are working toward the right goals and  using reasonable approaches to achieve them.
Relationship between Strategic and Annual Goals: Under GPRA, agencies’  long-term strategic goals are to be linked to their annual performance  plans and the day-to-day activities of their managers and staff. OMB  guidance states that a strategic plan should briefly outline (1) the type,  nature, and scope of the performance goals being included in annual  performance plans and (2) how these annual performance goals relate to  the long-term, general goals and their use in helping determine the  achievement of the general goals. Without this linkage, it may not be  possible to determine whether an agency has a clear sense of how it will  assess the progress made toward achieving its intended results.
It is not clear from the plan how the FBI intends to measure its progress in  achieving the long-term strategic goals and objectives because the plan’s  strategic objectives and performance goals are not phrased as  performance measures and the plan does not describe or make reference  to another document that contains annual performance measures. The  plan also lacks a discussion of the systems FBI will have in place to  produce reliable performance and cost data needed to set goals, evaluate  results, and improve performance. According to an FBI official and  documents the FBI provided, the FBI has developed “performance  metrics” for each of its strategic goals.
External and Internal Factors that Could Affect Goal Achievement: While  the plan clearly communicates how its forecast of external drivers helped  to shape the FBI’s strategy, the plan does not discuss the external and  internal factors that might interfere with its ability to accomplish its goals.  External factors could include economic, demographic, social,  technological, or environmental factors. Internal factors could include the  culture of the agency, its management practices, and its business  processes. The identification of such factors would allow FBI to  communicate actions it has planned that could reduce or ameliorate the  potential impact of the external factors. Furthermore, the plan could also  include a discussion of the FBI’ s plans to address internal factors within  its control that could affect achievement of strategic goals. The approach  the FBI plans to take to track its success in achieving change within the  agency should be an integral part of FBI’s strategy. A clear and well- supported discussion of the external and internal factors that could affect  performance could provide a basis for proposing legislative or budgetary  changes that the FBI may need to accomplish the FBI’s goals.
Role of Program Evaluation in Assessing Achievement of Goals and  Effectiveness of Strategies: Program evaluations can be a potentially  critical source of information for Congress and others in ensuring the  validity and reasonableness of goals and strategies, as well as for  identifying factors likely to affect performance. Program evaluations  typically assess the results, impact, or effects of a program or policy, but  can also assess the implementation and results of programs, operating  policies, and practices. The FBI’s strategic plan does not explicitly discuss  the role evaluation played in the development of its strategic plan or its  plans for future evaluations (including scope, key issues, and time frame),  as intended by GPRA. The FBI has redesigned its program evaluation  process and updated the performance metric for each program. This  information could have been, but was not included in the strategic plan. As  discussed elsewhere in this testimony, the FBI has a series of  reengineering efforts under way that relate to six core processes they are  seeking to transform. A discussion of how these reengineering efforts  relate to and support the achievement of the FBI’s strategic goals would be  a useful addition to the FBI’s strategic plan.
We believe that an organization’s strategic plan is a critical communication  tool and the credibility of the plan can be enhanced by discussing, even at  a summary level, the approach the organization took in addressing these  elements.
section_title: FBI Has Involved Employees in the Strategic Planning Process and Communicated its Priorities
paragraphs: As noted earlier, employee involvement in strategic planning, and  transformation in general, is a key practice of a successful agency as it  transforms. FBI executive management seems to have recognized this.  Field office managers and field staff we spoke with last year generally  reported being afforded the opportunity to provide input. For example,  field management in the 14 field offices we visited in 2003 reported that  they had been afforded opportunities to provide input into the FBI’s  strategic planning process. In addition, 68 percent of the special agents  and 24 of the 34 analysts who completed our questionnaire in 2003  reported that they had been afforded the opportunity to provide input to  FBI management regarding FBI strategies, goals, and priorities by, among  others, participating in focus groups or meetings and assisting in the  development of the field offices’ annual reports. FBI managers in the field  offices we visited and 87 percent of the special agents and 31 of the   34 analysts who completed our questionnaire indicated that FBI  management had kept them informed of the FBI’s progress in revising its  strategic plan to reflect changed priorities.
FBI management also seems to have been effective in communicating the  agency’s top three priorities (i.e., counterterrorism, counterintelligence,  and cyber crime investigations) to the staff. In addition to the awareness  of management staff in FBI headquarters and field offices, nearly all of the  special agents and all of the analysts who answered our questionnaire  indicated that FBI executive management (i.e., Director Mueller and  Deputy Director Gebhardt) had communicated the FBI’s priorities to their  field offices. Management and most of the agents we interviewed in the  field were aware of the FBI’s top three priorities. Further, over 90 percent  of special agents and 28 of the 34 analysts who completed our  questionnaire generally or strongly agreed that their field office had made  progress in realigning its goals to be consistent with the FBI’s  transformation efforts and new priorities.
section_title: FBI Has Developed a Strategic Human Capital Plan
paragraphs: In prior testimony, we highlighted the importance of the development of a  strategic human capital plan to the FBI’s transformation efforts, noting  that strategic human capital management is the centerpiece of any  management initiative, including any agency transformation effort.  We  noted that a strategic human capital plan should flow from the strategic  plan and guide an agency to align its workforce needs, goals, and  objectives with its mission-critical functions. We also noted that human  capital planning should include both integrating human capital approaches  in the development of the organizational plans and aligning the human  capital programs with the program goals. In a September 2003 letter to the  FBI director, we specifically recommended that the FBI: (1) hire a human  capital officer to guide the development of a strategic human capital plan  and the implementation of long-term strategic human capital initiatives  and (2) replace its current pass/fail performance management system with  one that makes meaningful distinctions in employee performance.
Although the FBI has not yet hired a human capital officer, it has  developed a strategic human capital plan. This plan contains many of the  principles that we have laid out for an effective human capital system.  For example, it highlights the need for the FBI to fill identified skill gaps,  in such areas as language specialists and intelligence analysts, by using  various personnel flexibilities including recruiting and retention bonuses.  Concerning the hiring of a human capital officer, the FBI has efforts under  way to recruit and hire a qualified candidate.
The FBI said that it recognizes the need to review and revise its  performance management system to be in line with its strategic plan,  including desired outcomes, core values, critical individual competencies,  and agency transformation objectives. It also recognizes that it needs to  ensure that unit and individual performance are linked to organizational  goals. A key initiative that has been undertaken by the FBI in this regard is  the planning of a system for the Senior Executive Service that is based on,  and distinguishes, performance. We have not reviewed the Senior  Executive performance management system, but it should include  expectations to lead and facilitate change and to collaborate both within  and across organizational boundaries are critical elements as agencies  transform themselves. As yet, the performance management system for  the bulk of FBI personnel remains inadequate to identify meaningful  distinctions in performance. The FBI’s human capital plan indicates that  the FBI is moving in the direction of addressing this need, and we are  encouraged by this.
Clearly, the development of a strategic human capital plan is a positive  step in this direction. However, the FBI, like other organizations, will face  challenges as it implements its human capital plan. As we have noted  before, when implementing new human capital authorities, how it is done,  when it is done, and the basis on which it is done can make all the  difference in whether such efforts are successful.
section_title: Effective Information Technology Management Is Critical to the FBI’s Ability to Successfully Transform
paragraphs: Information technology can be a valuable tool in helping organizations  transform and better achieve mission goals and objectives. Our research of  leading private and public sector organizations, as well as our past work at  federal departments and agencies, shows that successful organizations’  executives have embraced the central role of IT as an enabler for  enterprise-wide transformation. As such they adopt a corporate, or  agencywide, approach to managing IT under the leadership and control of  a senior executive—commonly called a chief information officer (CIO)— who operates as a full partner with the organizational leadership team in  charting the strategic direction and making informed IT investment  decisions.
In addition to adopting centralized leadership, these leading organizations  also develop and implement institutional or agencywide IT management  controls aimed at leveraging the vast potential of technology in achieving  mission outcomes. These include using a systems modernization blueprint,  commonly referred to as an enterprise architecture, to guide and  constrain system investments and using a portfolio-based approach to IT  investment decision making. We have also observed that without these  controls, organizations increase the risk that system modernization  projects (1) will experience cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls;   (2) will not reduce system redundancy and overlap; and (3) will not  increase interoperability and effective information sharing.
FBI currently relies extensively on the use of IT to execute its mission  responsibilities, and this reliance is expected to grow. For example, it  develops and maintains computerized systems, such as the Combined  DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) Index System to support forensic  examinations, the Digital Collection System to electronically collect  information on known and suspected terrorists and criminals, and the  National Crime Information Center and the Integrated Automated  Fingerprint Identification System to identify criminals.  It is also in the  midst of a number of initiatives aimed at (1) extending data storage and  retrieval systems to improve information sharing across organizational  components and (2) expanding its IT infrastructure to support new  software applications.  According to FBI estimates, the bureau manages  hundreds of systems and associated networks and databases at an average  annual cost of about $800 million. In addition, the bureau plans to invest  about $255 million and $286 million in fiscal years 2004 and 2005,  respectively, in IT services and systems, such as the Trilogy project.   Trilogy is the bureau’s centerpiece project to (1) replace its system  infrastructure (e.g., wide area network) and (2) consolidate and modernize  key investigative case management applications. The goals of Trilogy  include speeding the transmission of data, linking multiple databases for  quick searching, and improving operational efficiency by replacing paper  with electronic files.
The FBI Director recognizes the importance of IT to transformation, and  as such has made it one of the bureau’s top 10 priorities.  Consistent with  this, the FBI’s strategic plan contains explicit IT-related strategic goals,  objectives, and initiatives (near-term and long-term) to support the  collection, analysis, processing, and dissemination of information.   Further, the FBI’s newly appointed CIO understands the bureau’s  longstanding IT management challenges and is in the process of defining  plans and proposals to effectively execute the FBI’s strategic IT initiatives.   Nevertheless, the bureau’s longstanding approach to managing IT is not  fully consistent with leading practices, as has been previously reported by  us and others. The effect of this, for example, can be seen in the cost and  schedule shortfalls being experienced on Trilogy.
subsections: section_title: FBI Has Not Had Sustained IT Management Leadership with Bureauwide Authority
paragraphs: Our research of private and public sector organizations that effectively  manage IT shows that they have adopted an agencywide approach to  managing IT under the sustained leadership of a CIO or comparable senior  executive who has the responsibility and the authority for managing IT  across the agency. According to the research, these executives function  as members of the leadership team and are instrumental in developing a  shared vision for the role of IT in achieving major improvements in  business processes and operations to effectively optimize mission  performance. In this capacity, leading organizations also provide these  individuals with the authority they need to carry out their diverse  responsibilities by providing budget management control and oversight of  IT programs and initiatives.
Over the last several years, the FBI has not sustained IT management  leadership. Specifically, the bureau’s key leadership and management  positions, including the CIO, have experienced frequent turnover. For  instance, the CIO has changed five times in the past 24 months. The  current CIO, who is also the CIO at the Department of Justice’s Executive  Office of the U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA), is temporarily detailed to the FBI  for 6 months and is serving in an acting capacity while also retaining  selected duties at EOUSA . In addition, the IT official responsible for  developing the bureau’s enterprise architecture, the chief architect, has  changed five times in the past 16 months. As a result, development and  implementation of key management controls, such as enterprise  architecture, have not benefited from sustained management attention and  leadership and thus have lagged, as described in sections below.
In addition, the FBI has not provided its CIO with bureauwide IT  management authority and responsibility. Rather, the authority and  responsibility for managing IT is diffused across and vested in the bureau’s  divisions. As our research and work at other agencies has shown,  managing IT in this manner results in disparate, stove-piped environments  that are unnecessarily expensive to operate and maintain. In the FBI’s  case, it resulted, as reported by Justice’s Inspector General in December  2002, in 234 nonintegrated applications, residing on 187 different servers,  each of which had its own unique databases, unable to share information  with other applications or with other government agencies. According to  the acting CIO, the FBI is considering merging bureauwide authority and  responsibility for IT in the CIO’s office with the goal of having this in place  in time to formulate the bureau’s fiscal year 2006 budget request. In our  view, this proposal, if properly defined and implemented, is a good step  toward implementing the practices of leading organizations. However,  until it is implemented, we remain concerned that the bureau will not be  positioned to effectively leverage IT as an bureauwide resource.
subsections: section_title: FBI Does Not Have an Enterprise Architecture but Is Taking Steps to Develop One
paragraphs: As discussed in our framework for assessing and improving enterprise  architecture management, an architecture is an essential tool for  effectively and efficiently engineering business operations (e.g., processes,  work locations, and information needs and flows) and defining,  implementing, and evolving IT systems in a way that best supports these  operations. It provides systematically derived and captured structural  descriptions—in useful models, diagrams, tables, and narrative—of how a  given entity operates today and how it plans to operate in the future, and it  includes a road map for transitioning from today to tomorrow. Managed  properly, an enterprise architecture can clarify and help optimize the  interdependencies and interrelationships among a given entity’s business  operations and the underlying systems and technical infrastructure that  support these operations; it can also help share information among units  within an organization and between the organization and external  partners. Our experience with federal agencies has shown that attempting  to modernize systems without having an enterprise architecture often  results in systems that are duplicative, not well integrated, unnecessarily  costly to maintain, and limited in terms of optimizing mission  performance.
We reported in September 2003, that the FBI did not have an enterprise  architecture to guide and constrain its ongoing and planned IT  investments. We also reported that the necessary management structures  and processes—the management foundation, if you will—to develop,  maintain, or implement an architecture were not in place. At the time, the  bureau was beginning to build this foundation. For instance, the bureau  had designated a chief architect, established an architecture governance  board as its steering committee, and chosen a framework to guide its  architecture development. However, it had yet to complete critical  activities such as ensuring that business partners are represented on the  architecture governance board, establishing a formal program office,  adopting an architecture development methodology, and defining plans for  developing its architecture. Further, it had not addressed other important  activities, including developing written and approved architecture policy  and integrating architectural alignment, into its IT investment management  process. FBI officials told us then that the architecture was not a top  priority and it had not received adequate resources and management  attention. Consequently, we recommended, among other things, that the  FBI director immediately designate development, maintenance, and  implementation of an enterprise architecture as a bureau priority and  manage it as such.
Since our report, the FBI has made architecture development an explicit  imperative in its strategic plan, and it has made progress toward  establishing an effective architecture program. For instance, the FBI  director issued a requirement that all divisions identify a point of contact  that can authoritatively represent their division in the development of the  architecture. In addition, a project management plan has been drafted that  identifies roles and responsibilities and delineates plans and a set of  actions to develop the architecture. The FBI is also in the process of hiring  a contractor to help develop the architecture. Current plans call for an  initial version of the architecture in June 2004. However, until the  enterprise architecture is developed, the FBI will continue to manage IT  without a bureauwide, authoritative frame of reference to guide and  constrain its continuing and substantial IT investments, putting at risk its  ability to implement modernized systems in a way that minimizes overlap  and duplication and maximizes integration and mission support.
section_title: FBI Is Working to Establish Control over IT Resources and Investments
paragraphs: Federal IT management law provides an important framework for  effective investment management.  It requires federal agencies to focus  more on the results they have achieved through IT investments, while  concurrently improving their acquisition processes. It also introduces  more rigor and structure into how agencies are to select and manage IT  projects. In May 2000, GAO issued a framework that encompasses IT  investment management best practices based on our research at  successful private and public sector organizations. This framework  identifies processes that are critical for successful IT investment, such as  tracking IT assets, identifying business needs for projects, selecting among  competing project proposals using explicit investment criteria, and  overseeing projects to ensure that commitments are met.
Using GAO’s framework, the Inspector General evaluated the FBI’s IT  investment management process in 2002, including a case study of Trilogy,  and concluded that the process at that time was immature and had  hindered the bureau’s ability to effectively manage IT. Specifically, the  Inspector General reported that the bureau lacked a basic investment  management foundation. For instance, the bureau did not have fully  functioning investment boards that were engaged in all phases of  investment management. In addition, the bureau had not yet developed an  IT asset inventory, the first step in tracking and controlling investments  and assets. In a January 2004 follow-on report, the Inspector General  credited the bureau with developing a plan to implement the  recommendations and assigning responsibility to the Project Management  Office to execute it, but noted that the office had not been granted  authority to carry out this task. Project Management Office officials stated  that as of February 24, 2004, they had not yet been provided such  authority. According to the acting CIO, the FBI is currently in the process  of hiring a contractor to assist with implementing all IT investment  management processes bureauwide, including addressing remaining  Inspector General recommendations. Until these steps are completed and  mature investment processes are in place, the FBI will remain challenged  in its ability to effectively minimize risks and maximize the returns of  investments, including ensuring projects do not experience cost, schedule,  and performance shortfalls.
section_title: Until Effective IT Leadership and Management Controls are Implemented, Projects Remain at Risk
paragraphs: As discussed in the previous sections, the FBI has efforts proposed,  planned and under way that, once implemented, are intended to establish  an IT leadership and management controls framework that is consistent  with those used by leading organizations. Until this is accomplished,  however, the bureau will largely be relying on the same management  structures and practices that it used in the past and that produced its  current IT environment and associated challenges. As previously stated,  these practices increase the risk that system modernization projects will  not deliver promised capabilities on time and within budget. A prime  example is Trilogy, the FBI’s ongoing effort to, among other things,  modernize its systems infrastructure and investigate case management  applications.  It consists of three components:    Transportation Network Component, which is communications  network infrastructure (e.g., local area networks and wide area  networks, authorization security, and encryption of data transmissions  and storage),  Information Presentation Component, which is primarily desktop  hardware and software (e.g., scanners, printers, electronic mail, web- browser), and    User Applications Component, which includes the investigative case  management applications ) that are being consolidated and  modernized. This component is commonly referred to as the Virtual  Case File, which when completed, is to allow agents to have multi- media capability that will enable them to among other things scan  documents and photos into electronic case files and share the files with  other agents electronically.
To date, the FBI’s management of Trilogy has resulted in multiple cost  overruns and schedule delays.  The table below details the cost and  schedule shortfalls for each of the three components that comprise  Trilogy.  In summary, the FBI established its original project commitments  in November 2000 but revised them in January 2002 after receiving  additional funding ($78 million) to accelerate the project’s completion.   About this time, the FBI also revised the Trilogy design to introduce more  functionality and capability than original planned.  Based on the January  2002 commitments, the first two components of Trilogy were to be  completed in July 2002, and the third was to be completed in December  2003.  However, the project’s components have collectively experienced  cost overruns and schedule delays totaling about $120 million and at least  21 months, respectively.
These Trilogy shortfalls in meeting cost and schedule commitments can be  in part attributed to the absence of the kind of IT management controls  discussed earlier. Specifically, in its study of the FBI’s investment  management processes which included a case study of Trilogy, the  Inspector General cited the lack of an enterprise architecture and mature  IT investment management processes as the cause for missed Trilogy  milestones and uncertainties associated with the remaining portions of the  project. In our view, a major challenge for FBI going forward will be to  effectively manage the risks associated with developing and acquiring  Trilogy and other system modernization priorities discussed in its strategic  plan, while the bureau is completing and implementing its enterprise  architecture and other IT-related controls and is adopting a more  centralized approach to IT management leadership.
section_title: FBI Continues to Realign Staff Resources to Address Counterterrorism- Related Priorities
paragraphs: As we pointed out in our June 2003 testimony and our follow-up letter to  the FBI in September 2003, a key element of the FBI’s reorganization and  successful transformation is the realignment of resources to better ensure  focus on the highest priorities. Since September 11, the FBI has  permanently realigned a substantial number of its field agents from  traditional criminal investigative programs to work on counterterrorism  and counterintelligence investigations. Additionally, the bureau has had a  continuing need to temporarily redirect special agent and staff resources  from other criminal investigative programs to address higher-priority  needs. Thus, staff continue to be redirected from other programs such as  drug, white collar, and violent crime to address the counterterrorism- related workload demands. The result of this redirection is fewer  investigations in these traditional crime areas.
We want to make clear that we in no way intend to fault the FBI for the  reassignment of agents from drug enforcement, violent crime, and white  collar crime to higher-priority areas. Indeed, these moves are directly in  line with the agency’s priorities and in keeping with the paramount need to  prevent terrorism. In 2002, the FBI Director announced that in keeping  with its new priorities, the agency would move over 500 field agent  positions from its drug, violent crime, and white collar crime programs to  counterterrorism. The FBI has transferred even more agent positions than  it originally announced and has augmented those agents with short-term  reassignment of additional field agents from drug and other law  enforcement areas to work on counterterrorism. As figure 1 shows, about  25 percent of the FBI’s field agent positions were allocated to  counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime programs in prior  to the FBI’s change in priorities. Since that time, as a result of the staff  reprogrammings and funding for additional special agent positions  received through various appropriations, the FBI staffing levels allocated  to the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber program areas  have increased to about 36 percent and now represent the single largest  concentration of FBI resources and the biggest decrease is in organized  crime and drugs.
The FBI’s staff reprogramming plans, carried out since September 11, have  now permanently shifted 674 field agent positions from the drug, white  collar crime, and violent crime program areas to counterterrorism and  counterintelligence. In addition, the FBI established the Cyber program,  which consolidated existing cyber resources.
Despite the reprogramming of agent positions in fiscal year 2003 and the  additional agent positions received through various supplemental  appropriations since September 11, agents from other program areas  continue to be temporarily redirected to work on leads in the priority  areas, including counterterrorism-related leads. This demonstrates a  commitment on the part of the FBI to staff priority areas.
As figure 2 shows, the average number of field agent workyears charged to  investigating counterterrorism-related matters has continually outpaced  the number of agent positions allocated to field offices for  counterterrorism since September 11. The FBI’s current policy is that no  counterterrorism leads will go unaddressed even if addressing them  requires a diversion of resources from other criminal investigative  programs such as the drug, violent, and white collar crime.
As we previously reported, as the FBI gains more experience and  continues assessing risk in a post-September 11 environment, it should  gain more expertise in deciding which matters warrant additional  investigation or investment of investigative resources. However, until the  FBI develops a mechanism to systematically analyze the nature of leads  and their output, the FBI will have to continue its substantial investment  of resources on counterterrorism-related matters to err on the side of  safety. We are not intending to imply that, even with more information  from past experience, that all leads should not be investigated, but more  analytical information about leads could help prioritize them.
Neither the FBI nor we were in a position to determine the right amount of  staff resources needed to address the priority areas. However, the body of  information that might help to make these determinations is growing.  Since the September 11 attacks, the FBI has updated its counterterrorism  threat assessment and has gained additional experience in staffing priority  work. This development, along with an analysis of the nature of all leads  (those that turn out to be significant and those that do not) and the output  from them, could put the bureau in a better position to assess the actual  levels of staff resources that the agency need in counterterrorism,  counterintelligence, and cyber programs. Of course, any new terrorist  incidents would again, upset the balance and require additional staff in the  priority areas.
An FBI counterterrorism manager we spoke with during a recent field  office visit said that to develop a system to determine which terrorist leads  to pursue and which ones to not pursue would be a complex task. He  noted that in the past there would have been some citizen contacts that  the FBI may not have generally pursued, but said that now any lead,  regardless of its nature, is followed up. He observed that following up on  some of these leads have resulted in the arrests and convictions of  terrorists. For example, the FBI manager recounted a telephone lead from  a tour boat operator who reported concerns about a passenger who was  taking photographs of bridges and asking unusual questions about  infrastructure. That lead started an investigation that led to the arrest of,  and criminal charges against, the suspect, who was alleged to be plotting a  terrorist attack.
According to FBI officials, information from leads is collected in a  database that can be searched in a number of ways to help in  investigations. To the extent that more systematic and sophisticated  analysis routines can be developed and applied to these data (or any  expansions of this data set) the FBI may be able to develop richer  information about the relative risk of leads. This information could help  prioritize work and manage scarce resources. While we agree with the FBI  counterterrorism manager we cited above who labeled this a complex  task, the potential value of the output, given that resources are always  limited, seems worth the investment.
subsections: section_title: Counterterrorism Matters Have Continued to Increase
paragraphs: The level of effort in counterterrorism is further reflected in the number of  counterterrorism matters that have been opened following September 11.  As figure 3 shows, the number of newly opened counterterrorism matters  has remained significantly above the pre-September 11 levels, peaking in  the second quarter of fiscal year 2003 and dropping somewhat in the most  recent quarters.
section_title: Reallocation of FBI Resources Has Affected the FBI’s Drug Enforcement and Other Traditional Law Enforcement Efforts
paragraphs: Use of field agent staff resources in other traditional criminal investigative  programs (such as drug enforcement, violent crime, and white collar  crime) has continuously dropped below allocated levels as agents from  these programs have been temporarily reassigned to work on  counterterrorism-related matters. As would be expected, the number of  newly opened drug, violent crime, and white collar crime cases has fallen  in relation to the decline in the number of field agent positions allocated or  assigned to work on these programs.
The change in priorities and the accompanying shift in investigative  resources have affected the FBI’s drug program the most. Nearly half of  the FBI field agent drug positions have been permanently reallocated to  priority program areas. Since September 11, about 40 percent of the  positions allocated to FBI field offices’ drug program have been  reallocated to counterterrorism and counterintelligence priority areas. As  figure 4 shows, just prior to September 11, about two-thirds (or 890) of the  1,378 special agent positions allocated to FBI field offices for drug  program matters were direct-funded. The remaining one-third (or 488) of  the special agent positions was funded by the Organized Crime and Drug  Enforcement Task Force program (OCDETF). As of the first quarter of  fiscal year 2004, the number of direct-funded positions allocated to FBI  field offices for the drug program had decreased over 60 percent, going  from 890 to 337. OCDETF-funded agent positions, which have remained  constant, now account for about 60 percent of the FBI field offices’ drug  program staff resources.
While this reduction represents a substantial decline in the number of field  agent positions allocated to drug work, in fact, the reduction in drug  enforcement workyears was actually larger than these figures reflect.  Specifically, as needs arose for additional agents to work counterterrorism  leads, field agents assigned to drug program squads were temporarily  reassigned to the priority work. As figure 5 shows, at the extreme, during  the first quarter of fiscal year 2002 (just after the events of September 11),  while 1,378 special agent positions were allocated to drug work, only  about half of these staff resources worked in the FBI drug program. In  mid-fiscal year 2003, the allocated number of drug agent positions and the  average number of field agent workyears charged to drug matters started  to converge toward the new targeted levels. Since that time, however, the  FBI has had to redirect additional field agents allocated to its drug  program to counterterrorism and other priority areas. As of the second  quarter of fiscal year 2004, about a quarter (225 of 825) of the agents  assigned to the FBI’s drug program were actually working in higher- priority areas. The reduction in drug enforcement resources has reduced  both the number of drug squads in FBI field offices as well as the number  of FBI agents supporting the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area  (HIDTA) program initiatives, according to FBI officials.
The significant reduction in agent strength in the drug enforcement area is  likely to be an important factor in the smaller number of FBI drug matters  opened in fiscal year 2003 and the first quarter of fiscal year 2004. As  figure 6 shows, the number of newly opened drug matters went from 2420  in fiscal year 1998 to 950 in fiscal year 2002 and to 587 in fiscal year 2003.
The openings for the first quarter of fiscal year 2004 indicate a rate for the  entire year at about fiscal year 2003 levels.
Similarly, as figures 7 and 8 show, the average number of field agent  workyears charged to violent crime and white collar crime matters also  declined below the number of allocated agent workyears as these agents  too have been temporarily redirected to counterterrorism-related matters.
Similarly, as figures 7 and 8 show, the average number of field agent  workyears charged to violent crime and white collar crime matters also  declined below the number of allocated agent workyears as these agents  too have been temporarily redirected to counterterrorism-related matters.
As figures 9 and 10 show, the number of newly opened violent crime and  white collar crime matters has declined since September 11.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The FBI’s transformation effort is driven in part by challenges facing the  federal government as a whole to modernize business processes,  information technology, and human capital management. It is also driven  by the need to make organizational changes to meet changes in its  priorities in the post-September 11 environment. This effort will require a  structure for guiding and continuously evaluating incremental progress of  the FBI’s transformation. It must also be carried out as part of, and  consistent with, broader government-wide transformation efforts that are  taking place, especially those resulting from the establishment of DHS and  in connection with the intelligence community. The FBI has made  substantial progress, as evidenced by the development of both a new  strategic plan and a strategic human capital plan, as well as its realignment  of staff to better address the new priorities. Although the new strategic  plan and strategic human capital plans include cross walks to each other,  we still believe that an overall transformation plan is more valuable in  managing the transformation process. The FBI is also making progress in  strengthening its management of IT, including establishing institutional IT  management controls and considering changes to the scope of CIO’s  authority over IT spending.
Impacts of the FBI shift in field agent resources on crime programs  including the FBI’s drug, white collar, and violent crime programs should  be monitored. Our ongoing work, which we expect to complete later this  year, will provide information on whether other federal and state  resources are replacing lost FBI resources in the traditional crime areas  and on whether reductions in FBI drug program field agents have had an  impact on the price, purity, availability, and use of illegal drugs.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my  prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions you and  the Subcommittee members may have.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact   Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on   (202) 512-8777 or at ekstrandl@gao.gov or Charles Michael Johnson,  Assistant Director, Homeland Security and Justice, on (202) 512-7331 or at  johnsoncm@gao.gov. For further information on governmentwide  Information Technology issues, please contact Randolph C. Hite, Director,  Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues, on (202) 512- 6256 or at hiter@gao.gov. For further information on governmentwide  human capital or transformation issues, please contact J. Christopher  Mihm, Director, Strategic Issues, on (202) 512-6806 or at mihmj@gao.gov.
Major contributors to this testimony included William Bates, R. Rochelle  Burns, Katherine Chu-Hickman, Orlando Copeland, Elizabeth Curda,  Benjamin Jordan, Deborah Knorr, Jessica Lundberg, Paula Moore, Gary  Mountjoy, Lisa Shibata, Sarah E. Veale, and Angela Watson.
section_title: Appendix 1: FBI Reengineering Projects Completed and Underway
paragraphs: Strategic planning and execution (6)  HQ organizational structure  Capital (human and equipment) (17)  Career development/succession planning  Executive development and selection program  (EDSP)
Preparation for legal attaché assignment  Time utililization record keeping system (TURK)
Information management (4)
Investigative programs (6)
Intelligence (2)
Security Management (5)
Continuity of operations planning (COOP)
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