Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States
Published: 2006-08-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Currently, U.S. citizens are not required to present a passport when entering the United States from countries in the Western Hemisphere. However, U.S. citizens are required to establish citizenship to a CBP officer's satisfaction. On its Web site, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) advises U.S. citizens that an officer may ask for identification documents as proof of citizenship, including birth certificates or baptismal records and a photo identification document. In 2003, we testified that CBP officers were not readily capable of identifying whether individuals seeking entry into the United States were using counterfeit identification to prove citizenship. Specifically, our agents were able to easily enter the United States from Canada and Mexico using fictitious names and counterfeit driver's licenses and birth certificates. Later in 2003 and 2004, we continued to be able to successfully enter the United States using counterfeit identification at land border crossings, but were denied entry on one occasion. Because of Congress's concerns that these weaknesses could possibly be exploited by terrorists or others involved in criminal activity, Congress requested that we assess the current status of security at the nation's borders. Specifically, Congress requested that we conduct a follow-up investigation to determine whether the vulnerabilities exposed in our prior work continue to exist.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Agents successfully entered the United States using fictitious driver's licenses and other bogus documentation through nine land ports of entry on the northern and southern borders. CBP officers never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents presented at any of the nine crossings. On three occasions--in California, Texas, and Arizona--agents crossed the border on foot. At two of these locations--Texas and Arizona--CBP allowed the agents entry into the United States without asking for or inspecting any identification documents. After completing our investigation, we briefed officials from CBP on June 9, 2006. CBP agreed that its officers are not able to identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land border crossings and fully supports a new initiative that will require all travelers to present a passport before entering the United States. We did not assess whether this initiative would be effective in preventing terrorists from entering the United States or whether it would fully address the vulnerabilites shown by our work.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our  investigation of the effectiveness of U.S. Customs and Border Protection  (CBP) in screening entrants into the United States at land border  crossings. Currently, U.S. citizens are not required to present a passport  when entering the United States from countries in the Western  Hemisphere. However, U.S. citizens are required to establish citizenship  to a CBP officer’s satisfaction. On its Web site, CBP advises U.S. citizens  that an officer may ask for identification documents as proof of  citizenship, including birth certificates or baptismal records and a photo  identification document.
In 2003, we testified that CBP officers were not readily capable of  identifying whether individuals seeking entry into the United States were  using counterfeit identification to prove citizenship. Specifically, our  agents were able to easily enter the United States from Canada and Mexico  using fictitious names and counterfeit driver’s licenses and birth  certificates. Later in 2003 and 2004, we continued to be able to  successfully enter the United States using counterfeit identification at land  border crossings, but were denied entry on one occasion.
Specifically, agents entered the United States using counterfeit driver’s  licenses at two land crossings in Washington, one in New York, one in  California, and one in Texas. One agent was also able to enter the United  States through both the California and Texas border crossings using an  expired, altered U.S diplomatic passport. At no time did CBP officers  question the authenticity of any of these agents’ identification.  Furthermore, at one of the Washington crossings, agents were able to walk  across the border without passing through any security checkpoints and  without presenting identification. However, at the New York crossing, one  agent was not allowed entry into the United States after presenting as  identification an expired, altered U.S. tourist passport and a counterfeit  driver’s license. CBP officers detained this agent for further screening until  he identified himself as a GAO employee conducting undercover tests.
Because of your concerns that these weaknesses could possibly be  exploited by terrorists or others involved in criminal activity, you  requested that we assess the current status of security at the nation’s  borders. Specifically, you requested that we conduct a follow-up  investigation to determine whether the vulnerabilities exposed in our prior  work continue to exist.
To perform our 2006 follow-up investigation, we created a fictitious  driver’s license and birth certificate with the same name that we used in  the tests conducted for the work we did in 2003. We also created another  fictitious license and birth certificate. To create all these documents, we  used commercial software that is available to the public. As agreed with  your offices, we chose to test a nonrepresentative selection of nine land  crossings at both the northern and southern borders, including one in  California, one in Texas, two in Arizona, one in Michigan, two in New  York, one in Idaho, and one in Washington. We conducted our work from  February 2006 through June 2006 in accordance with the President’s  Council on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Investigations.
subsections: section_title: Southern Border Crossings
paragraphs: The following information provides details about our agents’ experiences  and observations entering the United States from Mexico at border  crossings in California and Texas and at two crossings in Arizona.
California: On February 9, 2006, two agents entered California from  Mexico on foot. One of the agents presented as identification a counterfeit  West Virginia driver’s license and the other presented a counterfeit  Virginia driver’s license. The CBP officers on duty asked both agents if  they were U.S. citizens and both responded that they were. The officers  also asked the agents if they were bringing anything into the United States  from Mexico and both answered that they were not. The CBP officers did  not request any other documents to prove citizenship, and allowed both  agents to enter the United States.
Texas: On February 23, 2006, two agents crossed the border from Mexico  into Texas on foot. When the first agent arrived at the checkpoint, a CBP  officer asked him for his citizenship information; the agent responded that  he was from the United States. The officer also asked if the agent had  brought back anything from Mexico. The agent responded that he had not,  and the officer told him that he could enter the Unites States. At this point,  the agent asked the CBP officer if he wished to see any identification. The  officer replied “OK, that would be good.” The agent began to remove his  counterfeit Virginia driver’s license from his wallet and the inspector said  “That’s fine, you can go.” The CBP officer never looked at the driver’s  license.
When the second agent reached the checkpoint, another CBP officer asked  him for his citizenship information and he responded that he was from the  United States. The CBP officer asked the agent if he had purchased  anything in Mexico and the agent replied that he had not. He was then  asked to show some form of identification and he produced a counterfeit  West Virginia driver’s license. The CBP inspector briefly looked at the  driver’s license and then told the agent he could enter the United States.
Arizona, first crossing: On March 14, 2006, two agents arrived at the  border crossing between Mexico and Arizona in a rental vehicle. Upon  request, the agents gave the CBP officer a counterfeit West Virginia  driver’s license and counterfeit Virginia driver’s license as identification.  As the CBP officer reviewed the licenses, he asked the agents if they were  U.S. citizens and they responded that they were. The officer also asked if  the agents had purchased anything in Mexico and they said they had not.  The CBP officer then requested that agents open the trunk of their vehicle.  The agents heard the inspector tap on several parts of the side of the  vehicle first with his hand and again with what appeared to be a wand. The  officer closed the trunk of the vehicle, returned the agents’ driver’s  licenses, and allowed them to enter the United States.
Arizona, second crossing: On March 15, 2006, two agents again entered  Arizona from Mexico on foot at a different location than the previous day.  One of the agents carried a counterfeit West Virginia driver’s license and a  counterfeit West Virginia birth certificate. The other carried a counterfeit  Virginia driver’s license and a counterfeit New York birth certificate. As  the agents were about to cross the border, another agent who had crossed  the border earlier using his genuine identification phoned to inform them  that the CBP officer on duty had swiped his Virginia driver’s license  through a scanner. Because the counterfeit driver’s licenses the agents  were carrying had fake magnetic strips, the agents decided that in the  event they were questioned about their licenses, they would tell the CBP  officers that the strips had become demagnetized.
When the agents entered the checkpoint area, they saw that they were the  only people crossing the border at that time. The agents observed three  CBP officers on duty; one was manning the checkpoint and the other two  were standing a short distance away. The officer manning the checkpoint  was sitting at a cubicle with a computer and what appeared to be a card  scanner. The agents engaged this officer in conversation to distract him  from scanning their driver’s licenses. After a few moments, the CBP officer  asked the agents if they were both U.S. citizens and they said that they  were. He then asked if they had purchased anything in Mexico and they  said no. He then told them to have a nice day and allowed them to enter  the United States. He never asked for any form of identification.
section_title: Northern Border Crossings
paragraphs: The following information provides details about our agents’ experiences  and observations entering the United States from Canada at Michigan,  New York, Idaho, and Washington border crossings.
Michigan: On May 1, 2006, two agents drove in a rental vehicle to a border  crossing in Michigan. When asked for identification by the CBP officer on  duty, the agents presented a counterfeit West Virginia driver’s license and  a counterfeit Virginia driver’s license. As the CBP officer examined the  licenses, he asked the agents if they were U.S. citizens and they responded  that they were. The CBP officer then asked if the agents had birth  certificates. One agent presented a counterfeit New York birth certificate  and the other presented a counterfeit West Virginia birth certificate. The  agents observed that the CBP officer checked the birth certificates against  the driver’s licenses to see if the dates and names matched. The CBP  officer then asked the agents if they had purchased anything in Canada  and they responded that they had not. The officer also asked what the  agents were doing in Canada and they responded that they had been  visiting a casino in Canada. The CBP officer then returned the agents’  documentation and allowed them to enter the United States.
New York, first crossing: On May 3, 2006, two agents entered New York  in a rental vehicle from Canada. The agents handed the CBP officer on  duty counterfeit driver’s licenses from West Virginia and Virginia. The CBP  officer asked for the agents’ country of citizenship and the agents  responded that they were from the United States. The CBP officer also  asked the agents why they had visited Canada. The agents responded that  they had been gambling in the casinos. The CBP officer told the agents to  have a nice day and allowed them to enter the United States.
New York, second crossing: On the same date, the same two agents  crossed back into Canada and re-entered New York at a different location.  The agents handed the CBP officer at the checkpoint the same two  counterfeit driver’s licenses from West Virginia and Virginia. The officer  asked the agents what they were doing in Canada and they replied that  they been gambling at a casino. The officer then asked the agents how  much money they were bringing back into the country and they told him  they had approximately $325, combined. The officer next asked the agent  driving the car to step out of the vehicle and open the trunk. As the agent  complied, he noticed that the officer placed the two driver’s licenses on  the counter in his booth. The officer asked the agent whose car they were  driving and the agent told him that it was a rental. A second officer then  asked the agent to stand away from the vehicle and take his hands out of  his pockets. The first officer inspected the trunk of the vehicle, which was  empty. At this point, the officer handed back the two driver’s licenses and  told the agents to proceed into the United States.
Idaho: On May 23, 2006, two agents drove in a rental vehicle to a border  crossing in Idaho. The agents handed the CBP officer on duty a counterfeit  West Virginia driver’s license and a counterfeit Virginia driver’s license. As  the CBP officer examined the licenses, he asked the agents if they were  U.S. citizens and they responded that they were. The CBP officer then  asked if the agents had birth certificates. One agent presented a  counterfeit New York birth certificate and the other presented a  counterfeit West Virginia birth certificate. The agents observed that the  CBP officer checked the birth certificates against the driver’s licenses to  see if the dates and names matched. The officer also asked what the  agents were doing in Canada and they responded that they had been  sightseeing. The CBP officer then returned the agents’ documentation and  allowed them to enter the United States.
Washington: On May 24, 2006, two agents drove in a rental vehicle to a  border crossing checkpoint in Washington. When the agents arrived at the  border, they noticed that no one was at the checkpoint booth at the side of  the road. Shortly thereafter, a CBP officer emerged from a building near  the checkpoint booth and asked the agents to state their nationality. The  agents responded that they were Americans. The CBP officer next asked  the agents where they were born, and they responded New York and West  Virginia. The agents then handed the CBP officers their counterfeit West  Virginia and Virginia driver’s licenses. The officer looked at the licenses  briefly and asked the agents why they had visited Canada. The agents  responded that they had a day off from a conference that they were  attending in Washington and decided to do some sightseeing. The CBP  officer returned the agents’ identification and allowed them to enter the  United States.
We conducted a corrective action briefing with officials from CBP on June  9, 2006, about the results of our investigation. CBP agreed its officers are  not able to identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land  border crossings. CBP officials also stated that they fully support the  newly promulgated Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, which will  require all travelers, including U.S. citizens, within the Western  Hemisphere to have a passport or other secure identification deemed  sufficient by the Secretary of Homeland Security to enter or reenter the  United States. The current timeline proposes that the new requirements  will apply to all land border crossings beginning on December 31, 2007.  The proposed timeline was developed pursuant to the Intelligence Reform  and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The act requires the Secretary of  Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to  implement a plan no later than January 1, 2008, to strengthen the border  screening process through the use of passports and other secure  documentation in recognition of the fact that additional safeguards are  needed to ensure that terrorists cannot enter the United States. However,  the Senate recently passed a bill to extend the implementation deadline  from January 1, 2008, to June 1, 2009. Additionally, the Senate bill would  also authorize the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of  Homeland Security, to develop a travel document known as a Passport  Card to facilitate travel of U.S. citizens to Canada, Mexico, the countries  located in the Caribbean, and Bermuda. We did not assess whether this  initiative would be fully implemented by either the January 2008 or June  2009 deadline or whether it would be effective in preventing terrorists  from entering the United States.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: The results of our current work indicate that (1) CBP officers at the nine  land border crossings tested did not detect the counterfeit identification  we used and (2) people who enter the United States via land crossings are  not always asked to present identification. Furthermore, our periodic tests  since 2002 clearly show that CBP officers are unable to effectively identify  counterfeit driver’s licenses, birth certificates, and other documents. This  vulnerability potentially allows terrorists or others involved in criminal  activity to pass freely into the United States from Canada or Mexico with  little or no chance of being detected. It will be critical that the new  initiative requiring travelers within the Western Hemisphere to present  passports or other accepted documents to enter the United States address  the vulnerabilities shown by our work.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my  statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have  at this time.
section_title: Contact
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D.  Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this testimony.
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