Border Security: DHS's Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S. Borders
Published: 2013-03-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: At the end of fiscal year 2004, DHS had about 28,100 personnel assigned to patrol U.S. land borders and inspect travelers at air, land, and sea POEs, at a cost of about $5.9 billion. At the end of fiscal year 2011, DHS had about 41,400 personnel assigned to air, land, and sea POEs and along the border, at a cost of about $11.8 billion. DHS has reported that this stronger enforcement presence was one of several reasons why fewer people were attempting to illegally cross the border. However, challenges remain in securing the border. In recent years, GAO has reported on a variety of DHS border security programs and operations. As requested, this statement addresses some of the key issues and recommendations GAO has made in the following areas: (1) DHS's efforts to secure the border at and between POEs; (2) DHS interagency coordination and oversight of border security information sharing and enforcement efforts; and (3) DHS management of infrastructure, technology, and other assets used to secure the border. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from January 2008 through February 2013, along with selected updates conducted in February 2013. For the selected updates, GAO reviewed information from DHS on actions it has taken to address prior GAO recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has reported progress in stemming illegal cross-border activity, but it could strengthen the assessment of its efforts. For example, since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between ports of entry (POE) as an interim measure for border security. GAO reported in December 2012 that apprehensions decreased across the southwest border from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, which generally mirrored a decrease in estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border sector. CBP attributed this decrease in part to changes in the U.S. economy and increased resources for border security. Data reported by CBP's Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol) show that total apprehensions across the southwest border increased from over 327,000 in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012. It is too early to assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend. GAO reported in December 2012 that the number of apprehensions provides information on activity levels but does not inform program results or resource allocation decisions. Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border between POEs, but it has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them, which GAO recommended that it do. DHS agreed and said that it plans to set a date for establishing such milestones and time frames by November 2013.
DHS law enforcement partners reported improvements in interagency coordination and oversight of intelligence and enforcement operations, but gaps remain. GAO reported in November 2010 that information sharing and communication among federal law enforcement officials had increased; however, gaps remained in ensuring law enforcement officials had access to daily threat information. GAO recommended that relevant federal agencies determine if more guidance is needed for federal land closures and that they ensure interagency agreements for coordinating information and integrating operations are further implemented. These agencies agreed and in January 2011, CBP issued a memorandum affirming the importance of federal partnerships to address border security threats on federal lands. While this is a positive step, to fully satisfy the intent of GAO's recommendation, DHS needs to take further action to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing interagency agreements.
Opportunities exist to improve DHS's management of border security assets. For example, DHS conceived the Secure Border Initiative Network as a surveillance technology and deployed such systems along 53 miles of Arizona's border. In January 2011, in response to performance, cost, and schedule concerns, DHS canceled future procurements, and developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona border. GAO reported in November 2011 that in developing the new Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of alternatives, but it had not documented the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of technologies proposed in the Plan, which GAO recommended that it do. DHS concurred with this recommendation. GAO has ongoing work in this area and expects to issue a report in fall 2013.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: While this statement contains no new recommendations, GAO has previously made recommendations to DHS to enhance border security. DHS has generally concurred with these recommendations and has taken actions, or has actions planned or under way, to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to submit this statement on the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) efforts to secure U.S. borders against threats of  terrorism; the smuggling of drugs, humans, and other contraband; and  illegal migration since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. At the  end of fiscal year 2004, the first full year DHS existed as an agency, it  had about 10,500 agents assigned to patrol the U.S. land borders and  about 17,600 officers inspecting travelers at air, land, and sea ports of  entry (POE), and a total of about $5.9 billion allocated to secure the  entire U.S. border. At the end of fiscal year 2011, both the number of  personnel and amount of resources dedicated to border security had  significantly increased, with approximately 21,400 agents assigned to  patrol the U.S. land borders and more than 20,000 officers assigned to  air, land, and sea POEs, amounting to about $11.8 billion allocated to  secure the entire U.S. border.
DHS has reported that this stronger enforcement presence was one of  several reasons, including changes in the U.S. economy, why fewer  people were attempting to illegally cross the border. However, challenges  remain in securing the border both at and between land POEs. For  example, DHS data have shown that several hundred thousand persons  have entered the country illegally through and between the nation’s  POEs. Further, our analysis of DHS data indicated that across southwest  border sectors, seizures of drugs and other contraband increased 83  percent from fiscal years 2006 through 2011—from 10,321 to 18,898.fiscal year 2012, DHS data indicate that seizures decreased to 17,891  across the southwest border.
OFO is responsible for processing the flow of people and goods that enter the country  through air, land, and sea POEs where CBP officers inspect travelers and goods to  determine whether they may be legally admitted into the country. (3) DHS management of infrastructure, technology, and other assets  used to secure the border.
This statement is based on related reports and testimonies we issued  from January 2008 through February 2013 that examined DHS efforts to  secure the U.S. border (see Related GAO Products at the end of this  statement). It also includes selected updates we conducted in February  2013. Our reports and testimonies incorporated information we obtained  and analyzed from officials from various DHS components; the  Departments of Justice (DOJ), DOI, and USDA; and state and local law  enforcement agencies. More detailed information about our scope and  methodology can be found in our reports and testimonies. For the  updates, we collected information from DHS on actions it has taken to  address recommendations made in prior reports on which this statement  is based. We also reviewed publicly available documents, such as CBP’s  budget justification for fiscal year 2013. We conducted all of this work in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: CBP Has Reported Progress in Stemming Illegal Cross-Border Activity, but Could Strengthen Assessment of Its Efforts
subsections: section_title: Border Patrol Has Reported Some Success in Reducing Illegal Migration, but Challenges Remain in Assessing Efforts
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of  apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim  measure for border security, as reported in its annual performance  reports. As we reported in December 2012, our data analysis showed that  apprehensions across the southwest border decreased 69 percent from  fiscal years 2006 through 2011. These data generally mirrored a  decrease in estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border  sector. As we testified in February 2013, data reported by Border Patrol  following the issuance of our December 2012 report show that total  apprehensions across the southwest border increased from over 327,000  in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012.assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend for Border  Patrol apprehensions across the southwest border. Through fiscal year  2011, Border Patrol attributed decreases in apprehensions across sectors  in part to changes in the U.S. economy, achievement of strategic  objectives, and increased resources for border security.
It is too early to  In addition to collecting data on apprehensions, Border Patrol collects  other types of data that are used by sector management to help inform  assessment of its efforts to secure the border against the threats of illegal  migration and smuggling of drugs and other contraband. These data  show changes, for example, in the (1) percentage of estimated known  illegal entrants who are apprehended, (2) percentage of estimated known  illegal entrants who are apprehended more than once (repeat offenders),   Our analysis  and (3) number of seizures of drugs and other contraband.of these data show that the percentage of estimated known illegal  entrants apprehended from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 varied across  southwest border sectors. The percentage of individuals apprehended  who repeatedly crossed the border illegally declined by 6 percent from  fiscal years 2008 through 2011. Further, the number of seizures of drugs  and other contraband across the border increased from 10,321 in fiscal  year 2006 to 18,898 in fiscal year 2011.
Border Patrol calculates an overall effectiveness rate using a formula in which it adds  the number of apprehensions and turn backs in a specific sector and divides this total by  the total estimated known illegal entries—determined by adding the number of  apprehensions, turn backs, and got aways for the sector. Border Patrol views its border  security efforts as increasing in effectiveness if the number of turn backs as a percentage  of estimated known illegal entries has increased and the number of got aways as a  percentage of estimated known illegal entries has decreased. were not apprehended because they crossed back into Mexico) and got  away data (entrants who illegally crossed the border and continued  traveling into the U.S. interior) used to calculate the overall effectiveness  rate preclude comparing performance results across sectors. Border  Patrol headquarters officials stated that until recently, each Border Patrol  sector decided how it would collect and report turn back and got away  data, and as a result, practices for collecting and reporting the data varied  across sectors and stations based on differences in agent experience and  judgment, resources, and terrain. Border Patrol headquarters officials  issued guidance in September 2012 to provide a more consistent,  standardized approach for the collection and reporting of turn back and  got away data by Border Patrol sectors. Each sector is to be individually  responsible for monitoring adherence to the guidance. According to  Border Patrol officials, it is expected that once the guidance is  implemented, data reliability will improve. This new guidance may allow  for comparison of sector performance and inform decisions regarding  resource deployment for securing the southwest border.
Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance goals and  measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border  between ports of entry and for informing the identification and allocation  of resources needed to secure the border, but has not identified  milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. Since  fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the  southwest border between ports of entry as an interim performance goal  and measure for border security as reported in its annual performance  report. Prior to this, DHS used operational control as its goal and outcome  measure for border security and to assess resource needs to accomplish  this goal. Operational control—also referred to as effective control—was  defined as the number of border miles where Border Patrol had the  capability to detect, respond to, and interdict cross-border illegal activity.  DHS last reported its progress and status in achieving operational control  of the borders in fiscal year 2010. At that time, DHS reported achieving  operational control for 1,107 (13 percent) of 8,607 miles across U.S.  northern, southwest, and coastal borders. Along the southwest border,  DHS reported achieving operational control for 873 (44 percent) of the  about 2,000 border miles. At the beginning of fiscal year 2011, DHS  transitioned from using operational control as its goal and outcome  measure for border security. We testified in May 2012 that the interim  goal and measure of number of apprehensions on the southwest border  between POEs provides information on activity levels but does not inform  program results or resource identification and allocation decisions, and  therefore until new goals and measures are developed, DHS and  Congress could experience reduced oversight and DHS accountability.  Further, studies commissioned by CBP have found that the number of  apprehensions bears little relationship to effectiveness because agency  officials do not compare these numbers with the amount of cross-border  illegal activity.
Border Patrol officials stated that the agency is in the process of  developing performance goals and measures, but has not identified  milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them.  According to Border Patrol officials, establishing milestones and time  frames for the development of performance goals and measures is  contingent on the development of key elements of its new strategic plan,  such as a risk assessment tool, and the agency’s time frames for  implementing these key elements—targeted for fiscal years 2013 and  2014—are subject to change. We recommended that CBP establish  milestones and time frames for developing a performance goal, or goals,  for border security between ports of entry that defines how border security  is to be measured, and a performance measure, or measures, for  assessing progress made in securing the border between ports of entry  and informing resource identification and allocation efforts. DHS  concurred with our recommendations and stated that it plans to set  milestones and timeframes for developing goals and measures by  November 2013.
section_title: CBP Has Taken Action to Strengthen POE Inspection Programs and Officer Training, and Has Additional Actions Planned or Underway
paragraphs: As part of its homeland security and legacy customs missions, CBP  inspects travelers arriving at POEs to counter threats posed by terrorists  and others attempting to enter the country with fraudulent or altered travel  documents and to prevent inadmissible aliens, criminals, and  inadmissible goods from entering the country. In fiscal year 2012, CBP  inspected about 352 million travelers and over 107 million cars, trucks,  buses, trains, vessels, and aircraft at over 329 air, sea, and land POEs.  We have previously identified vulnerabilities in the traveler inspection  program and made recommendations to DHS for addressing these  vulnerabilities, and DHS implemented these recommendations. We  reported in January 2008 on weaknesses in CBP’s inbound traveler  inspection program, including challenges in attaining budgeted staffing  levels because of attrition and lack of officer compliance with screening  procedures, such as those used to determine citizenship and admissibility  of travelers entering the country as required by law and CBP policy.  Contributing factors included a lack of focus, complacency, lack of  supervisory presence, and lack of training. We recommended that CBP  enhance internal controls in the inspection process, implement  performance measures for apprehending inadmissible aliens and other  violators, and establish measures for training provided to CBP officers  and new officer proficiency. DHS concurred with these recommendations  and has implemented them. Specifically, in January 2008, CBP reported,  among other things, that all land port directors are required to monitor and  assess compliance with eight different inspection activities using a self- inspection worksheet that is provided to senior CBP management. At that  time, CBP also established performance measures related to the  effectiveness of CBP interdiction efforts. Additionally, in June 2011, CBP  began conducting additional classroom and on-the-job training, which  incorporated ongoing testing and evaluation of officer proficiency.
In December 2011, we reported that CBP had revised its training program  for newly hired CBP officers in accordance with its own training  development standards.convened a team of subject-matter experts to identify and rank the tasks  that new CBP officers are expected to perform. As a result, the new  curriculum was designed to produce a professional law enforcement  officer capable of protecting the homeland from terrorist, criminal,  biological, and agricultural threats.
Consistent with these standards, CBP  We also reported that CBP took some steps to identify and address the  training needs of its incumbent CBP officers but could do more to ensure  that these officers were fully trained. For example, we examined CBP’s  results of covert tests of document fraud detection at POEs conducted  over more than 2 years and found weaknesses in the CBP inspection  process at the POEs that were tested. In response to these tests, CBP  developed a “Back to Basics” course in March 2010 for incumbent  officers, but had no plans to evaluate the effectiveness of the training.  Additionally, CBP had not conducted an analysis of all the possible  causes or systemic issues that may have contributed to the test results.  We recommended in December 2011 that CBP evaluate the “Back to  Basics” training course and analyze covert tests, and DHS concurred with  these recommendations. In April 2012, CBP officials notified GAO that it  had completed its evaluation of the “Back to Basics” training course and  implemented an updated, subsequent training course. In November 2012,  CBP officials stated they had analyzed the results of covert tests prior to  and since the implementation of the subsequent course. GAO is currently  reviewing CBP’s analysis of the covert test results and other  documentation CBP has provided to determine the extent to which CBP  has addressed this recommendation. Further, in July 2012 CBP  completed a comprehensive analysis of the results of its document fraud  covert tests from fiscal years 2009 to 2011. In addition, we reported that  CBP had not conducted a needs assessment that would identify any gaps  between identified critical skills and incumbent officers’ current skills and  competencies. We recommended in December 2011 that CBP conduct a  training needs assessment. DHS concurred with this recommendation. In  January 2013, CBP notified GAO it had developed a survey of incumbent  officers to seek feedback on possible gaps in training. CBP is currently  analyzing the survey results and preparing a report, which will  recommend a path forward to address training needs. According to CBP,  if an additional training need is identified and funding is available, CBP  will develop or revise the current training program. In February 2013, CBP  officials stated it plans to complete this process by April 15, 2013.
section_title: DHS Law Enforcement Partners Reported Improved Results for Interagency Coordination and Oversight of Intelligence and Enforcement Operations, but Gaps Remain
subsections: section_title: DOI and USDA Reported Improved DHS Coordination to Secure Federal Borderlands, but Critical Gaps Remained in Sharing Intelligence and Communications for Daily Operations
paragraphs: Illegal cross-border activity remains a significant threat to federal lands  protected by DOI and USDA law enforcement personnel on the southwest  and northern borders and can cause damage to natural, historic, and  cultural resources, and put agency personnel and the visiting public at  risk. We reported in November 2010 that information sharing and  communication among DHS, DOI, and USDA law enforcement officials   For example, interagency forums were  had increased in recent years.used to exchange information about border issues, and interagency  liaisons facilitated exchange of operational statistics. However, gaps  remained in implementing interagency agreements to ensure law  enforcement officials had access to daily threat information to better  ensure officer safety and an efficient law enforcement response to illegal  activity. For example, in Border Patrol’s Spokane sector on the northern  border, coordination of intelligence information was particularly important  because of sparse law enforcement presence and technical challenges  that precluded Border Patrol’s ability to fully assess cross-border threats,  such as air smuggling of high-potency marijuana.
We recommended DHS, DOI, and USDA provide oversight and  accountability as needed to further implement interagency agreements for  coordinating information and integrating operations. These agencies  agreed with our recommendations, and in January 2011, CBP issued a  memorandum to all Border Patrol division chiefs and chief patrol agents  emphasizing the importance of USDA and DOI partnerships to address  border security threats on federal lands. While this is a positive step, to  fully satisfy the intent of our recommendation, DHS would need to take  further action to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing  interagency agreements to enhance border security on federal lands.
section_title: Northern Border Partners Reported Interagency Forums Improved Coordination, but DHS Oversight Was Needed to Resolve Interagency Conflict in Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: DHS has stated that partnerships with other federal, state, local, tribal,  and Canadian law enforcement agencies are critical to the success of  northern border security efforts. We reported in December 2010 that DHS  efforts to coordinate with these partners through interagency forums and  joint operations were considered successful, according to a majority of  these partners we interviewed. In addition, DHS component officials  reported that federal agency coordination to secure the northern border  was improved. However, DHS did not provide oversight for the number  and location of forums established by its components, and numerous  federal, state, local, and Canadian partners cited challenges related to the  inability to resource the increasing number of forums, raising concerns  that some efforts may be overlapping. In addition, federal law  enforcement partners in all four locations we visited as part of our work  cited ongoing challenges between Border Patrol and ICE, Border Patrol  and Forest Service, and ICE and DOJ’s Drug Enforcement Administration  in sharing information and resources that compromised daily border  security related to operations and investigations. DHS had established  and updated interagency agreements to address ongoing coordination  challenges; however, oversight by management at the component and  local levels has not ensured consistent compliance with provisions of  these agreements.
We also reported in December 2010 that while Border Patrol’s border  security measures reflected that there was a high reliance on law  enforcement support from outside the border zones, the extent of partner  law enforcement resources that could be leveraged to fill Border Patrol  resource gaps, target coordination efforts, and make more efficient  resource decisions was not reflected in Border Patrol’s processes for  assessing border security and resource requirements. We recommended  that DHS provide guidance and oversight for interagency forums and for  component compliance with interagency agreements, and develop policy  and guidance necessary to integrate partner resources in border security  assessments and resource planning documents. DHS agreed with our  recommendations and has reported taking action to address them. For  example, in June 2012, DHS released a northern border strategy, and in  August 2012, DHS notified us of other cross-border law enforcement and  security efforts taking place with Canada. However, in order to fully satisfy  the intention of our recommendation, DHS would need to develop an  implementation plan that specifies the resources and time frames needed  to achieve the goals set forth in the strategy.
section_title: Opportunities Exist to Improve DHS’s Management of Border Security Assets
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Deployed Assets to Secure the Borders, but Needs to Provide More Information on Plans, Metrics, and Costs
paragraphs: In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a  multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and  reducing illegal immigration. Through this initiative, DHS planned to  develop a comprehensive border protection system using technology,  known as the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet), and tactical  infrastructure—fencing, roads, and lighting. Under this program, CBP  increased the number of southwest border miles with pedestrian and  vehicle fencing from 120 miles in fiscal year 2005 to about 650 miles  presently. We reported in May 2010 that CBP had not accounted for the  impact of its investment in border fencing and infrastructure on border  security. Specifically, CBP had reported an increase in control of  southwest border miles, but could not account separately for the impact of  the border fencing and other infrastructure. In September 2009, we  recommended that CBP determine the contribution of border fencing and  other infrastructure to border security. DHS concurred with our  recommendation and, in response, CBP contracted with the Homeland  Security Studies and Analysis Institute to conduct an analysis of the  impact of tactical infrastructure on border security. CBP reported in  February 2012 that preliminary results from this analysis indicate that an  additional 3 to 5 years are needed to ensure a credible assessment.
Since the launch of SBI in 2005, we have identified a range of challenges  related to schedule delays and performance problems with SBInet.  SBInet was conceived as a surveillance technology to create a “virtual  fence” along the border, and after spending nearly $1 billion, DHS  deployed SBInet systems along 53 miles of Arizona’s border that  represent the highest risk for illegal entry. In January 2011, in response to  concerns regarding SBInet’s performance, cost, and schedule, DHS  canceled future procurements. CBP developed the Arizona Border  Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona  border.
In November 2011, we reported that CBP does not have the information  needed to fully support and implement its Plan in accordance with DHS  and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance. In developing  the Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of alternatives and outreach to  potential vendors. However, CBP did not document the analysis justifying  the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border  surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan. Specifically, according to  CBP officials, CBP used a two-step process to develop the Plan. First,  CBP engaged the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute to  conduct an analysis of alternatives beginning with ones for Arizona.  Second, following the completion of the analysis of alternatives, the  Border Patrol conducted its operational assessment, which included a  comparison of alternative border surveillance technologies and an  analysis of operational judgments to consider both effectiveness and cost.  While the first step in CBP’s process to develop the Plan—the analysis of  alternatives—was well documented, the second step—Border Patrol’s  operational assessment—was not transparent because of the lack of  documentation. As we reported in November 2011, without  documentation of the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and  deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the  Plan, an independent party cannot verify the process followed, identify  how the analysis of alternatives was used, assess the validity of the  decisions made, or justify the funding requested. We also reported that  CBP officials have not yet defined the mission benefits expected from  implementing the new Plan, and defining the expected benefit could help  improve CBP’s ability to assess the effectiveness of the Plan as it is  implemented.
In addition, we reported that CBP’s 10-year life cycle cost estimate for the  Plan of $1.5 billion was based on an approximate order-of-magnitude  analysis, and agency officials were unable to determine a level of  confidence in their estimate, as best practices suggest. Specifically, we  found that the estimate reflected substantial features of best practices,  being both comprehensive and accurate, but it did not sufficiently meet  other characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, such as credibility,  because it did not identify a level of confidence or quantify the impact of  risks. GAO and OMB guidance emphasize that reliable cost estimates are  important for program approval and continued receipt of annual funding.  In addition, because CBP was unable to determine a level of confidence  in its estimate, we reported that it would be difficult for CBP to determine  what levels of contingency funding may be needed to cover risks  associated with implementing new technologies along the remaining  Arizona border.
We recommended in November 2011 that, among other things, CBP  document the analysis justifying the technologies proposed in the Plan,  determine its mission benefits, and determine a more robust life cycle  cost estimate for the Plan. DHS concurred with these recommendations,  and has reported taking action to address some of the recommendations.  For example, in October 2012, CBP officials reported that, through the  operation of two surveillance systems under SBInet’s initial deployment in  high-priority regions of the Arizona border, CBP has identified examples  of mission benefits that could result from implementing technologies  under the Plan. Additionally, CBP initiated action to update its cost  estimate for the Plan by providing revised cost estimates in February and  March 2012 for the Integrated Fixed Towers and Remote Video  Surveillance System, the Plan’s two largest projects. We currently have  ongoing work for congressional requesters to assess CBP’s progress in  this area and expect to issue a report with our final results in the fall of  2013.
In March 2012, we reported that the CBP Office of Air and Marine  (OAM)—which provides aircraft, vessels, and crew at the request of its  customers, primarily Border Patrol—had not documented significant  events, such as its analyses to support its asset mix and placement  across locations, and as a result, lacked a record to help demonstrate  that its decisions to allocate resources were the most effective ones in  fulfilling customer needs and addressing threats. OAM issued various  plans that included strategic goals, mission responsibilities, and threat  information. However, we could not identify the underlying analyses used  to link these factors to the mix and placement of resources across  locations. OAM did not have documentation that clearly linked the  deployment decisions in the plan to mission needs or threats. For  example, while the southwest border was Border Patrol’s highest priority  for resources in fiscal year 2010, it did not receive a higher rate of air  support than the northern border. Similarly, OAM did not document  analyses supporting the current mix and placement of marine assets  across locations. OAM officials said that while they generally documented  final decisions affecting the mix and placement of resources, they did not  have the resources to document assessments and analyses to support  these decisions. However, we reported that such documentation of  significant events could help the office improve the transparency of its  resource allocation decisions to help demonstrate the effectiveness of  these resource decisions in fulfilling its mission needs and addressing  threats. We recommended in March 2012 that CBP document analyses,  including mission requirements and threats, that support decisions on the  mix and placement of OAM’s air and marine resources. DHS concurred  with our recommendation and stated that it plans to provide additional  documentation of its analyses supporting decisions on the mix and  placement of air and marine resources by 2014.
section_title: DHS US-VISIT Program Technology Provides an Opportunity to Identify Illegal Migration through Overstays
paragraphs: DHS took action in 2004 to better monitor and control the entry and exit of  foreign visitors to the United States by establishing the U.S. Visitor and  Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program, which tracks  foreign visitors using biometric information (such as fingerprints) and  biographic information. DHS has incrementally delivered US-VISIT  capabilities to track foreign entries, and a biometrically enabled entry  capability has been fully operational at about 300 air, sea, and land POEs  since December 2006.
Since 2004, however, we have identified a range of DHS management  challenges to fully deploying a biometric exit capability intended, in part,  to track foreigners who had overstayed their visas and remained illegally  in the United States. For example, in November 2009, we reported that  DHS had not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing,  and tracking the work needed to deliver a comprehensive exit solution. In August 2010, we reported that the DHS pilot programs to track the exit  of foreign visitors at air POEs had limitations curtailing the ability to inform  a decision for a long-term exit solution at these POEs.
GAO-10-13.
GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing, and  Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS’s Efforts but Would Have Costs, GAO-11-411  (Washington, D.C. Apr. 15, 2011).
System—a database that contains information on aliens’ entry, exit, and  change of status—and electronically and manually comparing Arrival and  Departure Information System records with information in other  databases to find matches that demonstrate that a nonimmigrant may  have, for instance, departed the country or filed an application to change  status and thus is not an overstay. Additionally, DHS shares overstay  information among its components through various mechanisms, such as  alerts that can inform a CBP primary inspection officer at a POE of a  nonimmigrant’s history as an overstay violator, at which point the officer  can refer the nonimmigrant to secondary inspection for a more in-depth  review of the alien’s record and admissibility. Furthermore, ICE’s  Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit uses data provided by  US-VISIT and various databases to identify leads for overstay cases, take  steps to verify the accuracy of the leads, prioritize leads to focus on those  identified as most likely to pose a threat to national security or public  safety, and conduct field investigations on priority, high-risk leads. From  fiscal years 2006 through 2010, ICE reported devoting a relatively  constant percent of its total field office investigative hours to  Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit overstay investigations,  ranging from 3.1 to 3.4 percent.
We reported in April 2011 that DHS was creating electronic alerts for  certain categories of overstays, such as those who overstay by more than  90 days, but was not creating alerts for those who overstay by less than  90 days to focus efforts on more egregious overstay violators, as  identified by CBP. We recommended in April 2011 that DHS assess the  costs and benefits of creating additional alerts, and DHS concurred with  this recommendation. DHS has since reported that it would begin creating  additional alerts, which could improve the chance that these individuals  are identified as overstays during subsequent encounters with federal  officials. We have additional work ongoing for congressional requesters in  this area regarding DHS’s identification of and enforcement actions  against overstays and expect to issue a report with our final results in the  summer of 2013.
This concludes my statement for the record.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact Rebecca  Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. In addition, contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key  contributions to this statement included Kathryn Bernet, Lacinda Ayers,  and Jeanette Espinola, Assistant Directors; as well as Frances A. Cook,  Alana Finley, Barbara Guffy, Lara Miklozek, and Ashley D. Vaughan.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Border Patrol: Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform Border  Security Status and Resource Needs. GAO-13-330T. Washington, D.C.:  February 26, 2013.
Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to  Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs. GAO-13-25.  Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2012.
Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in Implementation and  Assessment Efforts. GAO-12-688T. Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2012.
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of  DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. GAO-12-518. Washington, D.C.:   March 30, 2012.
Border Security: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Officers are Fully  Trained. GAO-12-269. Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2011.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and  Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.:  November 4, 2011.
Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing,  and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS’s Efforts but Would Have Costs.  GAO-11-411. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2011.
Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures  for the Southwest Border. GAO-11-374T. Washington, D.C.:   February 15, 2011.
Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of  Interagency Coordination is Needed for the Northern Border. GAO-11-97.  Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2010.
Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a  Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands.   GAO-11-177. Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2010.
Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited  Understanding of Air Exit Options. GAO-10-860. Washington, D.C.:  August 10, 2010.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying  Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border. GAO-10-651T.  Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010.
Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of  Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed, GAO-10-13.  Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2009.
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the  Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-896.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections  Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-329T. Washington, D.C.:  January 3, 2008.
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