Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain
Published: 2006-03-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Preventing radioactive material from being smuggled into the United States is a key national security objective. To help address this threat, in October 2002, DHS began deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry. This report reviews recent progress DHS has made (1) deploying radiation detection equipment, (2) using radiation detection equipment, (3) improving the capabilities and testing of this equipment, and (4) increasing cooperation between DHS and other federal agencies in conducting radiation detection programs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress in deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry, but the agency's program goals are unrealistic and the program cost estimate is uncertain. As of December 2005, DHS had deployed 670 portal monitors and over 19,000 pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment. However, the deployment of portal monitors has fallen behind schedule, making DHS's goal of deploying 3,034 by September 2009 unlikely. In particular, two factors have contributed to the schedule delay. First, DHS provides the Congress with information on portal monitor acquisitions and deployments before releasing any funds. However, DHS's lengthy review process has caused delays in providing such information to the Congress. Second, difficult negotiations with seaport operators about placement of portal monitors and how to most efficiently screen rail cars have delayed deployments at seaports. Regarding the uncertainty of the program's cost estimate, DHS would like to deploy advanced technology portals that will likely cost significantly more than the currently deployed portals, but tests have not yet shown that these portals are demonstrably more effective than the current portals. Consequently, it is not clear that the benefits of the new portals would be worth any increased cost to the program. Also, our analysis of the program's costs indicates that DHS may incur a $342 million cost overrun. DHS has improved in using detection equipment and in following the agency's inspection procedures since 2003, but we identified two potential issues in Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspection procedures. First, although radiological materials being transported into the United States are generally required to have a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license, regulations do not require that the license accompany the shipment. Further, CBP officers do not have access to data that could be used to verify that shippers have acquired the necessary documentation. Second, CBP inspection procedures do not require officers to open containers and inspect them, although under some circumstances, doing so could improve security. In addition, DHS has sponsored research, development, and testing activities to address the inherent limitations of currently fielded equipment. However, much work remains to achieve consistently better detection capabilities. DHS seems to have made progress in coordinating with other agencies to conduct radiation detection programs; however, because the DHS office created to achieve the coordination is less than 1 year old, its working relationships with other agencies are in their early stages of development and implementation. In the future, this office plans to develop a "global architecture" to integrate several agencies' radiation detection efforts, including several international programs.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, combating terrorism has been one  of the nation’s highest priorities. As part of that effort, preventing  radioactive material from being smuggled into the United States—perhaps  to be used by terrorists in a nuclear weapon or in a radiological dispersal  device (a “dirty bomb”)—has become a key national security objective. The  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for providing  radiation detection capabilities at U.S. ports-of-entry. Until April 2005, U.S.  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) managed this program. However, on  April 15, 2005, the president directed the establishment, within DHS, of the  Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), whose duties include  acquiring and supporting the deployment of radiation detection  equipment. CBP continues its traditional screening function at ports-of- entry to prevent illegal immigration and to interdict contraband, including  the operation of radiation detection equipment. The Pacific Northwest  National Laboratory (PNNL), one of the Department of Energy’s (DOE)  national laboratories, manages the deployment of radiation detection  equipment for DHS.
DHS’s program to deploy radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of- entry has two goals. The first is to use this equipment to screen all cargo,  vehicles, and individuals coming into the United States. The United States  has over 380 border sites at which DHS plans to deploy radiation detection  equipment. The volume of traffic entering the United States also adds to the  size and complexity of the job. For example, each day, DHS processes  about 64,000 containers arriving in the United States via ships, trucks, and  rail cars; 365,000 vehicles; and more than 1.1 million people. The second  goal of the program is to screen all of this traffic without delaying its  movement into the nation. To illustrate the difficulty of achieving this  second goal, CBP’s port director at the San Ysidro, California, land border  crossing estimated that prior to initiating radiation screening, the volume  of traffic through the port-of-entry was so great that, at times, the wait to  enter the United States from Mexico was about 2.5 hours. He noted that  had radiation detection screening added a mere 20 seconds to the wait of  each vehicle, the wait during those peak times could have increased to  about 3.5 or 4 hours—an unacceptable outcome in his view. DHS’s current  plans call for completing deployments of radiation detection equipment at  U.S. ports-of-entry by September 2009.
To screen commerce for radiation, CBP uses several types of detection  equipment and a system of standard operating procedures. Current  detection equipment includes radiation portal monitors, which can detect  gamma radiation (emitted by all of the materials of greatest concern) and  neutrons (emitted by only a limited number of materials, including  plutonium—a material that can be used to make a nuclear weapon). CBP  officers also carry personal radiation detectors—commonly referred to as  “pagers”—small handheld devices that detect gamma radiation, but not  neutrons. For the most part, pagers are meant to be personal safety  devices, although they are used in some locations to assist with  inspections. Finally, CBP officers also use radioactive isotope identification  devices, which are handheld devices designed to determine the identity of  radioactive material—that is, whether it is a nuclear material used in  medicine or industry, a naturally occurring source of radiation, or weapons- grade material. All of these devices have limitations in their ability to detect  and identify nuclear material.
Generally, CBP’s standard procedures direct vehicles, containers, and  people coming into the country to pass through portal monitors to screen  for the presence of radiation. This “primary inspection” serves to alert CBP  officers that a radioactive threat might be present. All traffic that causes an  alarm during primary inspection is to undergo a “secondary inspection”  that consists of screening with another portal monitor to confirm the  presence of radiation, and includes CBP officers using radiation isotope  identification devices to determine the source of radiation being emitted,  (e.g., harmless sources, such as ceramics, or dangerous sources, such as  weapons-grade nuclear material). If CBP officers identify a nuclear or  radiological threat during a secondary inspection, or if the officers’ pagers  register a dangerously high level of radiation, then officers are to establish  a safe perimeter around the nuclear material and contact scientists in  CBP’s Laboratories and Scientific Services (LSS) for further guidance. In  some cases, CBP identifies incoming sea-bound cargo containers through a  system that targets some containers for inspection based on their  perceived level of risk. In these situations, CBP works with seaport  terminals to have containers moved to an agreed-upon location for  inspection. These inspections include the use of active imaging, such as an  x-ray, and passive radiation detection, such as a radiation isotope  identification device. Typically, if CBP officers find irregularities, physical  examinations are conducted.
In September 2003, we reported on CBP’s progress in completing domestic  deployments. In particular, we reported that certain aspects of CBP’s  installation and use of the equipment diminished its effectiveness and that  coordination among agencies on long-term research issues was limited.  Since the issuance of our 2003 report, questions have arisen about the  efficacy of the detection equipment CBP has deployed—in particular, its  purported inability to distinguish naturally occurring radioactive materials  from a nuclear bomb.
Because of the complexity and importance of these issues, you asked us to  assess the progress made in (1) deploying radiation detection equipment at  U.S. ports-of-entry and any problems associated with that deployment, (2)  using radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry and any  problems associated with that use, (3) improving the capabilities and  testing of this equipment, and (4) increasing the level of cooperation  between DHS and other federal agencies in conducting radiation detection  programs.
To address these objectives, we (1) analyzed CBP’s project plan, including  the project’s costs and deployment schedules, to deploy radiation detection  equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry; (2) visited several ports-of-entry,  including two international mail and express courier facilities, five  seaports, and three land border crossings; (3) participated in radiation  detection training for CBP officers; and (4) visited four national  laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and an Air Force base involved with  testing and deploying radiation detection equipment. We focused primarily  on the issues surrounding radiation portal monitors because they are a  major tool in the federal government’s efforts to thwart nuclear smuggling.  We also focused on this equipment because its procurement and  installation cost far exceeds the cost of procuring and deploying other  radiation detection equipment such as handheld equipment also used at  U.S. ports-of-entry. We reviewed documentation, such as deployment and  cost figures, equipment test plans and results, and agency agreements to  cooperate in detecting radiation. We also interviewed key program officials  at each of these agencies to discuss the deployment of radiation detection  equipment, attempts to improve the equipment’s capabilities, and  cooperation among agencies to protect the United States from nuclear  terrorism. We performed a data reliability assessment of the data we  received, and interviewed knowledgeable agency officials on the reliability  of the data. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report. More details on our scope and methodology appear  in appendix I. We conducted our review from March 2005 to February 2006  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Initial concerns about the threat posed by nuclear smuggling were focused  on nuclear materials originating in the former Soviet Union. As a result, the  first major initiatives concentrated on deploying radiation detection  equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union and in  Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, in 1998, DOE established the  Second Line of Defense program, which, through the end of fiscal year  2005, had installed equipment at 83 sites mostly in Russia. In 2003, DOE  implemented a second program, the Megaports Initiative, to focus on the  threat posed by nuclear smuggling overseas by installing radiation detection equipment at major seaports around the world.In the United  States, the U.S. Customs Service began providing its inspectors with  portable radiation detection devices in 1998. After September 11, 2001, the  agency expanded its efforts to include the deployment of portal monitors— large-scale radiation detectors that can be used to screen vehicles and  cargo. In March 2003, the U.S. Customs Service was transferred to DHS,  and the border inspection functions of the Customs Service, including  radiation detection, became the responsibility of CBP.
Deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. borders is part of DHS’s  strategy for addressing the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism.  DHS’s strategy includes: (1) countering proliferation at the source by  assisting foreign governments in their efforts to detect and interdict  nuclear and radiological smuggling; (2) controlling the illegal export of  technology and equipment from the United States that terrorists could use  to develop a nuclear or radiological weapon; (3) detecting and interdicting  potential smuggling attempts before they reach the United States; and (4)  securing U.S. ports-of-entry through multiple technologies that include  radiation detection and nonintrusive inspections to view images of cargo in  sea containers.
CBP plans to deploy radiation portal monitors in five phases, or “categories  of entry”: (1) international mail and express courier facilities; (2) major  northern border crossings; (3) major seaports; (4) southwestern border  crossings; and (5) all other categories, including international airports,  remaining northern border crossings and seaports, and all rail crossings. In  this final phase, CBP also plans to replace the currently-fielded portal  monitors with newer, more advanced technology. Generally, CBP  prioritized these categories according to their perceived vulnerability to the  threat of nuclear smuggling. CBP did not, however, conduct a formal threat  assessment. International mail and express courier facilities present a  potential vulnerability because mail and packages arrive with no advance  notice or screening. Northern border crossings are also vulnerable,  according to CBP, because of the possible presence of terrorist cells  operating in Canada. The third category, major seaports, is considered  vulnerable because sea cargo containers are suitable for smuggling and  because of the large volume of such cargo. Seaports account for over 95  percent of the cargo entering the United States. Southwestern borders are  vulnerable because of the high volume of traffic and because of the  smuggling that already occurs there. Although airlines can quickly ship and  deliver air cargo, CBP considers air cargo to be a slightly lesser risk  because the industry is highly regulated.
In deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. borders, CBP identified  the types of nuclear materials that might be smuggled, and the equipment  needed to detect its presence. The radiological materials of concern  include assembled nuclear weapons; nuclear material that could be used in  a nuclear weapon but that is not actually assembled into a weapon  (“weapons-grade nuclear material”); radiological disbursal devices,  commonly called “dirty bombs;” and other illicit radioactive material, such  as contaminated steel or inappropriately marked or manifested material.  Detecting actual cases of attempted nuclear smuggling is difficult because  there are many sources of radiation that are legal and not harmful when  used as intended. These materials can trigger alarms (known as “nuisance  alarms”) that are indistinguishable from those alarms that could sound in  the event of a true case of nuclear smuggling. Nuisance alarms are caused  by patients who have recently had radiological treatment; a wide range of  cargo with naturally occurring radiation, such as fertilizer, ceramics, and  food products; and legitimate shipments of radiological sources for use in  medicine and industry. In addition, detecting highly-enriched uranium, in  particular, is difficult because of its relatively low level of radioactivity.  Furthermore, a potential terrorist would likely attempt to shield the  material to reduce the amount of radiation reaching the detector and  thereby decrease the probability of detection.
The process of deploying portal monitors begins with a site survey to  identify the best location at an entry point for installing the equipment.  While in some cases the choice may be obvious, operational considerations  at many entry points require analysis to find a location where all or most of  the cargo and vehicles can pass through the portal monitor without  interfering with the flow of commerce. After identifying the best option,  CBP works with local government and private entities to get their support.  At many U.S. entry points, the federal government does not own the  property and therefore collaborates with these entities to deploy the  equipment. It is CBP’s policy to depend exclusively on such negotiations,  rather than to use any kind of eminent domain or condemnation  proceeding. The actual installation of the portal monitors involves a  number of tasks such as pouring concrete, laying electrical groundwork,  and hooking up the portal monitors to alarm systems that alert officers  when radiation is detected. Finally, PNNL tests the equipment and trains  CBP officers on its operation, including how to respond to alarms.
To coordinate the national effort to protect the United States from nuclear  and radiological threats, in April 2005, the president directed the  establishment of DNDO within DHS. The new office’s mission covers a  broad spectrum of responsibilities and activities, but is focused primarily  on providing a single accountable organization to develop a layered  defense system. This system is intended to integrate the federal  government’s nuclear detection, notification, and response systems. In  addition, under the directive, DNDO is to acquire, develop, and support the  deployment of detection equipment in the United States, as well as to  coordinate the nation’s nuclear detection research and development  efforts. For fiscal year 2006, DNDO’s total budget is approximately $318  million, which includes at least $81 million for research and development  of advanced nuclear detection technologies and $125 million for portal  monitor purchase and deployment.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave DHS responsibility for managing  the research, development, and testing of technologies to improve the U.S.  capability to detect illicit nuclear material. Prior to the creation of DNDO,  DHS’s Science and Technology (S&T) directorate had this responsibility.  DNDO has assumed these responsibilities and works with S&T’s Counter  Measures Test Beds (CMTB) to test radiation detection equipment in New  York and New Jersey. As of January 2006, DNDO has provided $605,000 to  DOE national laboratories that support this effort. Additional funding for  fiscal year 2006 from S&T and DNDO to support test and evaluation  activities at the CMTB is yet to be determined. The Homeland Security Act  also provided DHS the authority to use DOE national laboratories for  research, development, and testing of new technologies to detect nuclear  material.
section_title: DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment, but the Agency’s Program Goals Are Unrealistic and the Cost Estimate Is Uncertain
paragraphs: As of December 2005, DHS had completed deployment of portal monitors  at two categories of entry—a total of 61 ports-of-entry—and has begun  work on two other categories; overall, however, progress has been slower  than planned. According to DHS officials, the slow progress has resulted  from a late disbursal of funds, and delays in negotiating deployment  agreements with seaport operators. Further, we believe the expected cost  of the program is uncertain because DHS’s plans to purchase newer, more  advanced equipment are not yet finalized; also we project that the  program’s final cost will be much higher than CBP currently anticipates.
subsections: section_title: The Program to Install Portal Monitors Has Fallen Behind Schedule
paragraphs: Between October 2000 and October 2005, DHS, mainly through its prime  contractor PNNL, has spent about $286 million to deploy radiation  detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry. As of December 2005, DHS had  deployed 670 of 3,034 radiation portal monitors—about 22 percent of the  portal monitors DHS plans to deploy. The agency has completed portal  monitor deployments at international mail and express courier facilities  and the first phase of northern border sites—57 and 217 portal monitors,  respectively. In addition, by December 2005, DHS had deployed 143 of 495  portal monitors at seaports and 244 of 360 at southern borders. In addition,  three portal monitors had been installed at the Nevada Test Site to analyze  their detection capabilities and four had been retrofitted at express mail  facilities. As of February 2006, CBP estimated that with these deployments  CBP has the ability to screen about 62 percent of all containerized  shipments entering the United States, and roughly 77 percent of all private  vehicles (POVs). Within these total percentages, CBP can screen 32 percent  of all containerized seaborne shipments; 90 percent of commercial trucks  and 80 percent of private vehicles entering from Canada; and  approximately 88 percent of all commercial trucks and 74 percent of all  private vehicles entering from Mexico.
CBP does not maintain a firm schedule for deploying handheld radiation  detectors, such as pagers and radiation isotope identification devices. This  is equipment used mainly to help pinpoint and identify sources of radiation  found during inspections. Instead, according to CBP officials, the agency  acquires and deploys such equipment each fiscal year as needed. The  handheld radiation detectors are procured to coincide with portal monitor  deployments to ensure mission support. Since fiscal year 2001, CBP has  spent about $24.5 million on pagers, and about $6.6 million on radiation  isotope identification devices. At present, CBP can field roughly 12,450  pagers—enough to ensure that all officers conducting primary or  secondary inspections at a given time have one. The agency intends to  deploy about 6,500 additional pagers. Similarly, CBP’s 549 radiation isotope  identification devices are deployed at domestic ports-of-entry. CBP intends  to acquire another 900 to ensure that all needs are met.
Overall, CBP and PNNL have experienced difficulty meeting the portal  monitor deployment schedule. None of the planned portal monitor  deployments has progressed according to schedule, and monthly  deployments would have to increase by almost 230 percent to meet a  September 2009 program completion date. For example, in November 2005,  deployments at land crossings were about 20 months and $1.9 million  behind schedule, while deployments at the first 22 seaports were about 2  years and $24 million behind schedule. Despite these delays, PNNL  reported in November 2005 that the overall project schedule should not  extend beyond its current completion date of September 2009. However,  our analysis indicates that CBP’s deployment schedule is too optimistic.
In fact, for CBP and PNNL to meet the current deployment schedule, they  would have to install about 52 portal monitors per month from November  2005 to September 2009. In our view, this is unlikely because it requires a  rate of deployment that far exceeds recent experience. For example, during  calendar year 2005, PNNL deployed portal monitors at the rate of about 22  per month, and deployments have fallen further and further behind  schedule. Between February and December 2005, for example, PNNL did  not meet any of its scheduled monthly deployments, never deploying more  than 38 portal monitors during any single month. If CBP continues to  deploy portal monitors at its 2005 pace, the last monitor would not be  deployed until about December 2014. Table 1 details the status of portal  monitor deployments, as of December 2005.
Further, we analyzed CBP’s earned value management data as of November  2005 and determined that, although CBP planned for the deployment  program to be 20.5 percent complete by that date, the program is only  about 16 percent complete. In addition, our analysis indicates that since the  program’s inception, work valued at $48.6 million has fallen behind  schedule. Moreover, the trend over the past 14 months shows CBP and  PNNL falling further behind schedule, as seen in figure 1.
There have been at least three major sources of delay that have affected the  portal monitor deployment program: funding issues, negotiations with  seaport terminal operators, and problems in screening rail cars— particularly in a seaport environment.
section_title: Funding Issues
paragraphs: According to CBP and PNNL officials, recurrent difficulties with the  project’s funding are the most important explanations of the schedule  delays. Specifically, according to DHS and PNNL officials, CBP has been  chronically late in providing appropriated funds to PNNL, thereby  hindering its ability to meet program deployment goals. For example,  PNNL did not receive its fiscal year 2005 funding until September 2005.  According to PNNL officials, because of this delay, some contracting  activities in all deployment phases had to be delayed or halted, but the  adverse effects on seaports were especially severe. For example, PNNL  reported in August 2005 that site preparation work at 13 seaports had to  cease because the Laboratory had not yet received its fiscal year 2005  funding allocation. According to senior CBP officials, their agency’s  inability to provide a timely spending plan to the Congress for the portal  monitor deployment program is the main reason for these funding delays.  According to the House Appropriations Committee report on the CBP  portion of DHS’s fiscal year 2005 budget, CBP should provide the Congress  an acquisition and deployment plan for the portal monitor program prior to  funding PNNL. However, these plans typically take many months for CBP  to finalize—in part because CBP requires that the plans undergo several  levels of review—but also because these plans are reviewed by DHS and  OMB before being submitted to the Congress. In fiscal year 2005, this  process was further delayed by the creation of DNDO, uncertainty  regarding DNDO’s responsibilities, and negotiations regarding the  expenditure of the fiscal year 2005 appropriations.
CBP has tried to address this problem by reprogramming funds when  money from other programs is available. In some cases, the amount of  reprogrammed funds has been fairly large. For example, about 15 percent  of fiscal year 2005’s funding included money reprogrammed from other  CBP sources, or almost $14 million. In fiscal year 2004, about $16 million  was reprogrammed—or about a third of the fiscal year’s total. And in fiscal  year 2003, the total of reprogrammed money was about $18 million—about  20 percent.
subsections: section_title: Delays in Gaining Agreements Have Slowed Seaport Deployments
paragraphs: Negotiations with seaport operators have been slow and have also delayed  the portal monitor deployment program. According to CBP and PNNL  officials, one of the primary reasons behind the seaport phase’s substantial  delay in deployments is the difficulty in obtaining contractual agreements  with port and terminal operators at seaports. DHS has not attempted to  impose agreements on seaport operators because, according to officials,  cooperative arrangements with the port operators are more efficient and,  in the long term, probably more timely. According to CBP and PNNL  officials, many operators believe screening for radiation will adversely  affect the flow of commerce through their ports. In addition, deploying  portal monitors in major seaports presents several unique challenges. For  example, seaports are much larger than land border crossings, consist of  multiple terminals, and may have multiple exits. Because of these multiple  exits, seaports require a greater number of portal monitors, which may  entail more negotiations with port and terminal operators. In addition, port  operators at times have insisted on late-stage design changes, requested  various studies prior to proceeding with final designs, insisted on  inefficient construction schedules, and delayed their final review and  approval of project designs. According to CBP and PNNL, these efforts  often reflect the port and terminal operators’ uneasiness with portal  monitor deployments, and their resolve to ensure that the outcome of the  deployment process maintains their businesses’ competitiveness. For  example, port officials at one seaport requested several changes late in the  process, including performing an unscheduled survey for laying cable,  revising portal monitor locations at two gates, and adding a CBP control  booth at a third terminal. According to CBP and PNNL officials, the agency  prefers to accommodate these types of changes, even late in the process  and even if they slow deployment, because in the long term they believe it  is more efficient and effective.
section_title: Screening Rail Cars in Seaports Presents Unique Problems
paragraphs: The difficulty of devising an effective and efficient way to conduct  secondary inspections of rail traffic departing seaports without disrupting  commerce has created operational issues that could further delay  deployments. Four of the five seaports we visited employ rail cars to ship  significant amounts of cargo. In one seaport, the port director estimated  that about 80-85 percent of the cargo shipped through his port departs via  rail. For the other three seaports, the percentages for rail traffic were 5  percent, 13 percent, and 40 percent respectively. According to port  officials, these seaports would like to accommodate CBP’s efforts to install  radiation detection equipment designed to screen rail traffic, but they are  concerned that the logistics of conducting secondary inspections on trains  as they prepare to depart the seaport could back up rail traffic within the  port and disrupt rail schedules throughout the region—potentially costing  the port tens of thousands of dollars in lost revenue. For example, one  senior port authority official told us that his port lacked ample space to  park trains for secondary inspections, or to maneuver trains to decouple  the rail car(s) that may have caused a primary inspection alarm. As a result,  trains that cause a primary alarm would have to wait, in place, for CBP to  conduct a secondary inspection, blocking any other trains from leaving the  port. According to this port official, any delay whatsoever with a train  leaving the port could cause rail problems down the line because track  switches are geared to train schedules. To avoid these kinds of problems,  CBP has delayed deploying portal monitors in this seaport until technical  and operational issues can be overcome. As of December 2005, no portal  monitors had been deployed at this seaport, although according to PNNL’s  schedule, 5 of its 11 terminals—a total of 19 portal monitors—should have  been deployed by October 2005. According to the port director at another  seaport we visited, a port that actually has a rail portal monitor installed,  similar operational issues exist. However, in addition to backing up rail  traffic within the port, trains awaiting secondary inspections at this port  could block the entrance/exit to a nearby military base. The director of the  state’s port authority told us that his solution has been to simply turn off  the portal monitor. According to CBP officials, this was entirely a state  decision, since this portal monitor is the state’s responsibility and not part  of CBP’s deployment. However, these officials also noted that they agreed  with the states and noted that they would not attempt to impose a solution  or deadline on either port. CBP officials noted that most seaport operators  seem willing to accommodate portal monitors, but until a better portal  monitor technology evolves that can help ensure a smooth flow of rail  traffic out of the port, negotiations with seaport operators will continue to  be slow.
According to CBP and port officials, they have considered several potential  solutions. For example, there is widespread agreement that screening sea  cargo containers before they are placed on rail cars offers the best solution,  but this option is operationally difficult in many seaports. Mobile portal  monitors, when commercially available, may also offer a partial solution. In  addition, CBP is optimistic that advanced portal monitors, when they  become commercially available, may help solve some of the problems in  the rail environment by limiting the number of nuisance alarms. However,  according to the CBP and port officials we contacted, screening rail traffic  continues to pose a vexing operational problem for seaports.
The concerns that seaport operators and CBP expressed regarding  screening rail commerce in seaports may increase and intensify in the  future because rail traffic, in general, is expected to increase substantially  by 2020. DOT has forecast that by 2020, rail will transport roughly 699  million tons of international freight—up from 358 million tons carried in  1998. Officials at 3 of the 5 seaports we visited expect rail traffic through  their facilities to increase dramatically during the next 10 to 15 years. As  the volume of trade increases, so too will the economic stakes for the port  and terminal operators, while the regulatory burden for CBP is likely to  increase as well. Delays—for any reason, including radiation detection— are likely to become more costly, and CBP will likely have ever-increasing  numbers of rail cars to screen.
In addition, although CBP is not scheduled to begin deploying portal  monitors to screen rail shipments at land border crossings until 2007, the  agency will likely experience operational challenges at land border  crossing similar to those it is now experiencing at seaports. For example, at  both land border crossings and seaports, if a rail car alarms as it passes  through a portal monitor, that car will possibly have to be separated from  the remaining train—sometimes a mile in length—to undergo a secondary  inspection. Furthermore, because trains transport numerous types of cargo  containing large quantities of naturally occurring radioactive material, CBP  faces the challenge of maintaining a nuisance alarm rate that does not  adversely affect commerce. CBP and PNNL are currently conducting  testing of a prototype rail portal monitor to determine the potential impact  of naturally occurring radioactive material on rail operations at land border  crossings.
section_title: Other Factors Have Delayed Portal Monitor Deployments
paragraphs: Unforeseen design and construction problems have also played a role in  delaying portal monitor deployments. For example, deployments at six  southern border sites have been delayed to coincide with the sites’  expansion activities. According to CBP officials, there are two approaches  to accommodating a port-of-entry’s alterations, both of which may delay  portal monitor deployments. First, CBP and PNNL may decide to delay the  start of portal monitor projects until the port-of-entry completes its  alterations, to make certain that portal monitor placements are properly  located. Second, port-of-entry expansion activities may alter existing traffic  flows and require that PNNL redesign its portal monitor deployments. The  portal monitor deployments at three southern border ports-of-entry has  taken much longer than planned because of the port’s expansion activities.  According to PNNL, there is now considerable schedule uncertainty  associated with these deployments, which may ultimately impact the  completion of the southern land border deployments.
Portal monitor deployments have also been hampered by poor weather.  For example, cold weather at several northern sites caused some  unexpected work stoppages and equipment failures that resulted in  construction delays of 2 to 3 months. Finally, one southern border site has  been delayed because of major flooding problems. The flooding issue must  be resolved before the deployment can be completed.
section_title: DHS’s Portal Monitor Deployment Program Cost Estimate Is Uncertain and Overly Optimistic
paragraphs: DHS’s current estimate to complete the program is $1.3 billion, but this  estimate is highly uncertain and overly optimistic. First, DHS’s cost  estimate is based on a plan to deploy advanced-technology portal monitors  that have so far shown mixed results for detecting radiation compared to  currently-fielded portal monitors.  Since the efficacy of the advanced portal  monitors has not yet been proven conclusively, there is at least some  uncertainty over whether—and, if so, how many—of the new portal  monitors may be deployed. In addition, the final cost of the new portal  monitors has not been established. Second, our analysis of CBP’s earned  value data also suggests that the program will likely cost much more than  planned.
The current deployment plan calls for installing advanced portal monitors  at all cargo primary and secondary inspection locations, at all secondary  inspection locations for private vehicles, and also retrofitting many sites  with the advanced equipment, when it becomes available. However,  according to senior officials at DNDO, the advanced technology must meet  all of DNDO’s performance criteria, and must be proven superior to the  portal monitors already in use, before DNDO will procure it for use in the  United States. Recent tests of the new portal monitors indicate that  DNDO’s criteria have not yet been met. For example, S&T sponsored  research in 2004 that compared the detection capabilities of currently- fielded portal monitors with the advanced portal monitors. The results of  that research suggested that, in some scenarios, the detection abilities of  the two portal monitor types were nearly equivalent. In other scenarios, the  new equipment’s detection capability was significantly better. S&T  concluded that more work remains to be done in optimizing and comparing  portal monitors so as to understand how they can be used to the greatest  effect at U.S. ports-of-entry. In 2005, DNDO sponsored additional research  designed to compare the two types of portal monitor, and determined that  the advanced portal monitors’ detection capabilities were somewhat better  than those of the currently-fielded equipment. In addition, in October 2005,  DNDO completed the first comprehensive tests for these advanced portal  monitors at the Nevada Test Site. This advanced technology combines the  ability to detect radiation and identify its source. According to an official  who helped supervise these tests, the new portal monitors’ performance  did not meet all of DNDO’s expectations with regard to providing  significant detection improvements over currently-fielded equipment in all  scenarios. CBP and DNDO officials also expressed concerns regarding the  advanced portal monitors’ detection capabilities in light of the Nevada test  results. In particular, senior CBP officials questioned whether the advanced  portal monitors would be worth their considerable extra costs, and  emphasized finding the right mix of current and advanced-technology  equipment based on the needs at individual ports-of-entry. According to  DNDO officials, the potential improvement over currently fielded portal  monitors in capability to identify radioactive sources, and hence to detect  actual threats as opposed to simply detecting radiation, has not yet been  quantified. However, these officials believe that the results to date have  been promising, and DNDO intends to continue supporting the advanced  portal monitor’s development and believe the new technology may be ready  for deployment early in calendar year 2007.
There is also considerable uncertainty regarding the eventual cost of the  advanced portal monitors—if they become commercially available, and if  DNDO opts to use them. Experts we contacted estimated that the new  portal monitors could cost between $330,000 and $460,000 each. These  estimates are highly uncertain because advanced portal monitors are not  yet commercially available. As a point of reference, the portal monitors  currently in use typically cost between $49,000 and $60,000. These costs  include only the purchase price of the equipment, not its installation.  According to CBP and PNNL officials, installation costs vary, but average  about $200,000 per portal monitor. Even if future test results indicate that  the new technology exhibits much better detection and identification  capabilities, it would not be clear that the dramatically higher cost for this  new equipment would be worth the considerable investment, without the  agency having first rigorously compared the portal monitors’ capabilities  taking their costs into account. Currently, DNDO and CBP are working  together to determine the most appropriate technologies and concepts of  operation for each port-of-entry site. The two agencies are also trying to  determine the highest priority sites for advanced-technology portal  monitors based on the extent to which the new portal monitors show  improved performance.
In November 2005, PNNL reported that the portal monitor deployment  program could experience an overall cost overrun of $36 million. In  contrast, our analysis of CBP’s earned value data indicates that the agency  should expect a cost overrun of between $88 million and $596 million. We  based our cost overrun projections on the rates at which CBP and PNNL  deployed portal monitors, through November 2005. The more efficient the  agency and its contractor are in deploying portal monitors, the smaller the  cost overruns; conversely, when efficiency declines, cost overruns  increase.
In fact, as shown in figure 2, recent cumulative program cost trends have  been negative, indicating that CBP’s cost overruns are deepening over time.
PNNL noted that its management reserve of $62 million should cover the  anticipated overrun. However, we do not agree. First, we believe the  cumulative cost overrun will far exceed PNNL’s estimate of $36 million. We  believe an overrun of about $342 million, the midpoint of our projected  overrun range, is more likely. Since 1977, we have analyzed over 700  acquisition projects on which EVM techniques have been applied. These  analyses consistently show that once a program is 15 percent complete (as  is the case with this program), cost performance almost never improves  and, in most cases, declines. PNNL’s recent cost trend follows this pattern.  Second, based on these 700-plus studies, our estimate takes a more realistic  view that the portal monitor deployment program’s cost performance most  likely will continue to decline; hence the management reserve will be  consumed over time as the program incurs unexpected expenses. Finally,  to meet the deployment program’s planned costs, PNNL would have to  greatly improve its work efficiency. However, our analysis of prior EVM- based projects indicates that productivity rates nearly always decline over  the course of a project. We determined that PNNL’s efficiency rate for the  most recent 8 months has averaged about 86 percent—PNNL has been  delivering about $.86 worth of work for every dollar spent. In order to  complete the remaining work with available funding, PNNL’s efficiency rate  would have to climb to around 98 percent, a rate of improvement  unprecedented in the 700-plus studies we have analyzed.
section_title: CBP Does Not Know If PNNL’s Cost and Schedule Data Are Reliable
paragraphs: Federal agencies are required by OMB to track the progress of major  systems acquisitions using a validated EVM system and to conduct an  integrated baseline review. We found that PNNL has an EVM system but  has not certified it to show that it complies with guidance developed by the  American National Standards Institute/Electronic Industries Alliance.  This guidance identifies 32 criteria that reliable EVM systems should meet.  In addition, we found that PNNL has not conducted an integrated baseline  review—a necessary step to ensure that the EVM baseline for the portal  monitor program represents all work to be completed, and adequate  resources are available.
However, although the EVM data have not been independently validated,  we examined the EVM data and found that they did not show any  anomalies and were very detailed. Therefore, we used them to analyze the  portal monitor program status and to make independent projections of the  program’s final costs at completion.
section_title: CBP Officers Have Made Progress in Using Radiation Detection Equipment Correctly and Adhering to Inspection Guidelines, but There Are Potential Issues with Agency Procedures
paragraphs: CBP officers we observed conducting primary and secondary inspections  appeared to use radiation detection equipment correctly and to follow the  agency’s inspection procedures. In fact, in some cases, CBP officers  exceeded standard inspection procedure requirements by opening and  entering containers to better identify radiation sources. In contrast, in 2003,  when we issued our last report on domestic radiation detection, CBP  officers sometimes deviated from standard inspection procedures and, at  times, used detection equipment incorrectly. However, the agency’s  inspection procedures could be strengthened.
subsections: section_title: CBP Officers Appeared to Use Equipment Correctly and Follow Procedures
paragraphs: During this review, at the 10 ports-of-entry that we visited, the CBP officers  we observed conducting primary and secondary inspections appeared to  follow inspection procedures and to use radiation detection equipment  correctly. The officers’ current proficiency in these areas follows increases  in training and in CBP’s experience using the detection equipment. In  contrast, in 2003 we reported that CBP officers sometimes used radiation  detection equipment in ways that reduced its effectiveness.
CBP has increased the number of its officers trained to use radiation  detection equipment; in fact, the agency now requires that officers receive  training before they operate radiation detection equipment. As of February  2006, CBP had trained 6,410 officers to use radiation isotope identification  devices, 8,461 to use portal monitors, and 22,180 to use pagers. Many CBP  officers received training on more than one piece of equipment and about  900 have since left the agency. Generally, today CBP officers receive  radiation detection training from 4 sources: the CBP Academy in Glynco,  Georgia; the Border Patrol Academy in Artesia, New Mexico; a DOE- sponsored 3-day training course for interdicting weapons of mass  destruction, in Washington state; and on-the-job training at ports-of-entry.  Training at the Academies in Georgia and New Mexico includes formal  classroom instruction, as well as hands-on exercises on how to use portal  monitors, isotope identifiers, and pagers. This training includes simulated  scenarios in which officers use radiation detection equipment to conduct  searches for nuclear and radiological materials. On-the-job instruction  continues at field locations as senior CBP officers, as well as PNNL and  other DHS contractor staff, work closely with inexperienced officers to  provide them with practical training on how the radiation detection  equipment works and how to respond to alarms. According to senior CBP  officials, all of the instructors that offer training on using radiation  detection equipment are certified in its use. Trainees must demonstrate  proficiency in the use of each system prior to assuming full responsibility  for radiation detection inspections. About 1,600 CBP officers have  participated in DOE’s 3-day training course designed to acquaint CBP  officers with detection equipment. CBP is currently developing refresher  training courses on the use of radiation detection equipment. To further  enhance officers’ ability to effectively respond to real or potential threats,  several of the field locations that we visited conduct “table-top exercises”  that simulate scenarios in which the equipment detects an illicit  radiological source.
According to several of the CBP field supervisors we contacted, many  officers have gained proficiency in following procedures and using  radiation detection equipment through substantial field experience  responding to alarms. The number of alarms officers typically handle varies  according to the size of the site, its location, and type. For example, an  isolated land border site would probably experience fewer alarms than a  major seaport because of the differences in the volume of traffic. However,  it was common for several of the locations we visited to experience 15 to 60  alarms per day. One seaport we visited had 9 terminals, usually with 2  primary and 1 secondary portal monitors. According to CBP officials, each  terminal recorded about 8 to 12 alarms per day. The director of port  security for a major eastern seaport we visited estimated that her facility  records roughly 150 portal monitor alarms each day. Virtually all have been  nuisance alarms, but CBP officials still believe they gained valuable  experience in using the equipment and following procedures.
All of the primary and secondary inspections we witnessed were nuisance  alarms. In all of these cases except one, officers followed CBP’s guidance— as well as local variations meant to address issues unique to the area—and  correctly used detection equipment. The lone exception occurred at a site  whose primary inspection station was staffed by a state port police officer.  After the station’s portal monitor registered an alarm for a truck departing  the site, the police officer did not follow CBP’s procedures. For example,  he did not collect any documentation from the driver. At all other sites we  visited, when a primary portal monitor sounded, CBP officers gathered the  cargo’s manifest, the vehicle registration, and the driver’s license prior to  sending the vehicle through secondary inspection. Officers use these  documents to check the driver and vehicle cargo. The port police officer  told us that he recognized the driver in this case, and so the officer did not  believe it was necessary to collect such information. A CBP officer  performed the secondary inspection in line with agency guidance. In fact,  after using a radiation isotope identification device to conduct an external  inspection and determine the source of the alarm—potassium hydroxide— the officer required that the driver open the back of the truck so she could  make a visual check of the cargo. From the time of the initial alarm, until  the truck departed the site boundary, about 35 minutes elapsed. According  to port and CBP officials, this particular alarm, its resolution, and the  amount of time it took to resolve are typical of the site. We also discussed  the site’s radiation detection efforts with the truck driver, in particular the  delay associated with this alarm. He noted that he considers the delays  experienced at this site to be relatively minor, and that the delays have not  had any adverse effects on his business.
We also visited a seaport that experienced a legitimate alarm in which CBP  officers used the detection equipment correctly and responded according  to procedures. Uranium hexafluoride, a potentially hazardous chemical  containing low levels of radioactivity, caused this alarm. A primary portal  monitor at the seaport sounded as a truck carrying one container  attempted to exit a terminal. Following standard operating procedures, the  truck was diverted to a secondary inspection station, where a secondary  portal monitor also alarmed. A CBP officer then scanned the container and  cab of the truck with an isotope identifier, which indicated that the  radiation source was located in the cab within several metal pails. The  isotope identifier identified two radiation sources, one of which was  uranium-235—potentially a weapons-usable material. The other source was  uranium-238. Again following procedures, CBP officers isolated the  sources of radiation and provided LSS scientists with information collected  by the isotope identifier. Officers also reviewed the driver’s delivery papers;  used various CBP databases to check the driver, importer, and consignee’s  history of transporting goods; and contacted the driver’s dispatcher and the  U.S. consignee to gather information on and assess the legitimacy of the  shipment. The consignee explained that the pails contained trace amounts  of uranium hexafluoride that had been sent to the company’s laboratory for  testing. Following additional investigation, which included an X-ray of the  pails and a review of DOT requirements regarding radiation-warning  placard requirements, CBP determined that the event was not a security  threat and released the driver and conveyance. Senior officials at this  seaport told us that CBP’s radiation detection guidance served as an  effective and successful guide to resolving this alarm.
section_title: Potential Issues in CBP’s Inspection Procedures Could Be Mitigated to Improve Detection Capabilities
paragraphs: We identified two potential issues in CBP’s national inspection procedures  that could increase the nation’s vulnerability to nuclear smuggling. The first  potential issue involves NRC documentation. Generally, NRC requires that  importers obtain an NRC license for their legitimate shipments of  radiological materials into the United States. However, NRC regulations  do not require that the license accompany the shipment, although in some  cases importers choose to voluntarily include the license. According to  CBP officials, CBP lacks access to NRC license data that could be used to  verify that importers actually acquired the necessary licenses or to  authenticate a license at the border. At present, CBP officers employ a  variety of investigative techniques to try to determine if individuals or  organizations are authorized to transport a radiological shipment. For  example, CBP officers review their entry paperwork, such as shipping  papers. Officers also often interview drivers about the details of the  delivery and observe their behavior for any suspicious or unusual signs. At  one land border crossing we visited, officers told us that frequent and  legitimate shippers of radiological material provide advance notice that a  radiological shipment will be transported. This can lead to law  enforcement personnel being called in to escort the shipment through the  port-of-entry.
The second potential issue pertains to CBP’s secondary inspection  guidelines. Generally, CBP’s guidelines require that CBP officers locate,  isolate, and identify the radiation source(s) identified during primary  inspections. Customarily, officers use a radiation isotope identification  device to perform an external examination of cargo containers in these  situations. (See fig. 3.) However, the effectiveness of a radiation isotope  identification device is diminished as its distance from the radioactive  source increases, and by the thickness of the metal container housing the  radioactive source. As a result, secondary inspections that rely solely on  external examinations may not always be able to locate, isolate, and  identify an illicit shipment of nuclear material.
The local procedures at some ports-of-entry we visited go beyond the  requirements established by CBP’s guidelines by having CBP officers open  and, if necessary, enter containers when conducting secondary inspections.  (See fig. 4.) For example, at one high-volume seaport we visited, the local  inspection procedures require officers to open and, if necessary, enter a  container to locate and identify a radiological source if an external  examination with an isotope identifier is unable to do so. Under such  circumstances, the port’s procedures require the officer to open the  container doors, locate the source, and obtain another reading as close to  the source as possible. By entering the container, an officer may be able to  reduce the isotope identifier’s distance from the radioactive source, and  thus obtain a more accurate reading. If the isotope identifier is unable to  detect and identify the source after two readings within the container,  officers must contact LSS for further guidance. Officers at this seaport have  opened containers in the past when the isotope identifier had been unable  to detect naturally occurring radioactive material, such as granite or  ceramic tile, which is low in radioactive emissions. CBP supervisors at this  seaport said that this occurs infrequently and that it adds a very minimal  amount of time to the inspection process. In addition, at a land border  crossing we visited, the local standard operating procedures instruct CBP  officers to conduct a physical examination on vehicles that alarm for the  presence of radiation. Officials at this particular port-of-entry said that they  have entered vehicles with an isotope identifier when the device has been  unable to detect or identify the radioactive source from vehicles’ exterior.  During a physical examination, officers are supposed to open the vehicle  and look for high-density materials, such as lead or steel, which can be  used to shield gamma radiation and solid objects with large quantities of  liquid that could be used to shield neutron radiation. Because the majority  of alarms at this land border crossing are caused by medical isotopes in  people, CBP officers physically inspect vehicles on an infrequent basis.
Finally, we also visited a land border crossing where CBP officers routinely  open and enter commercial trucks to conduct secondary inspections, even  though the site’s local procedures do not require this additional  examination. Officials at this crossing said that they open up containers to  verify that the container’s manifest and reading from the isotope identifier  are consistent with the container’s load. If they are not consistent, CBP  officers are supposed to contact LSS for further guidance. During our visit,  we observed a truck that alarmed at primary and secondary portal  monitors. CBP officers then required the driver to park at a loading dock,  where officers first used an isotope identifier to screen the truck from the  outside; the reading from the isotope identifier was inconclusive, however.  Officers then opened and entered the container with an isotope identifier,  conducted a second reading of the radioactive source, and determined that  the material inside the container was a non-threatening radioactive source  that matched the manifest. A CBP supervisor released the truck. This  inspection, from the time of the original alarm to the truck’s release took  about 25 minutes—slightly greater than the 20-minute average for this site.  According to CBP supervisors, officers at this port-of-entry follow this  practice routinely, even during the site’s peak hours. This approach enables  the officers to get closer to the source and obtain a more accurate reading.  Furthermore, since this practice enables officers to conduct a more  thorough examination of the containers’ contents, it may increase the  likelihood that CBP officers will find any illicit radioactive material.  According to senior CBP officials at this port-of-entry, despite being  implemented at one of the busiest commercial ports-of-entry in the nation,  this additional procedure has had little negative impact on the flow of  commerce and has not increased the cost of CBP inspections.
section_title: DHS Is Working to Improve the Capabilities of Currently-fielded and New Radiation Detection Equipment, but Much Work Remains to Achieve Better Equipment Performance
paragraphs: DHS has managed research, development, and testing activities that  attempt to address the inherent limitations of currently-fielded radiation  detection equipment and to produce new, advanced technologies with even  greater detection capabilities. DHS is enhancing its ability to test detection  equipment by building a new test facility at DOE’s Nevada Test Site. In  addition, DHS tests radiation detection equipment under real-life  conditions at S&T’s CMTB in New York and New Jersey. However, much  work remains for the agency to achieve consistently better detection  capabilities, as the efforts undertaken so far have achieved only mixed  results.
subsections: section_title: Currently-fielded Radiation Detection Equipment Has Inherent Limitations
paragraphs: Currently-fielded radiation portal monitors have two main limitations.  First, they are limited by the physical properties of the radiation they are  designed to detect, specifically with regard to the range of detection (some  radioactive material emits more radiation than others). Further, this  limitation can be exacerbated because sufficient amounts of high-density  materials, such as lead or steel, can shield radiation emissions to prevent  their detection. Second, currently-fielded portal monitors cannot  distinguish between different types of radioactive materials, i.e., they  cannot differentiate naturally occurring radioactive material from  radiological threat materials. CBP officers are required to conduct  secondary inspections on all portal monitor alarms, including nuisance  alarms. According to the CBP field supervisors with whom we spoke,  nuisance alarms comprise almost all of the radiation alerts at their ports-of- entry. Port operators noted a concern that nuisance alarms might become  so numerous that commerce could be impeded, but thus far these alarms  have not greatly slowed the flow of commerce through their ports-of-entry.
CBP’s currently-fielded radiation isotope identification devices also have  inherent limitations. For example, during some secondary inspections,  radiation isotope identification devices are unable to identify radiological  material. In these cases, CBP standard procedures require that officers  consult LSS to conclusively identify the source. According to CBP officers  at two of the ports we visited, this usually lengthens secondary inspections  by 20 to 30 minutes, although in some cases an hour or more was needed to  resolve the alarm. Furthermore, a 2003 Los Alamos National Laboratory  evaluation of seven isotope identifiers, including the one deployed by CBP,  concluded that all devices had difficulty recognizing radioactive material  and correctly identifying the material they did recognize. The Los Alamos  finding is consistent with our field observations, as CBP officers at several  of the ports-of-entry we visited reported similar trouble with their radiation  isotope identification devices.
Laboratory testing of currently-fielded radiation detection equipment has  further demonstrated their limitations in effectively detecting and  identifying nuclear material. For example, in February 2005, DHS  sponsored testing of commercially available portal monitors, isotope  identifiers, and pagers against criteria set out in American National  Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. The ANSI standards provide  performance specifications and test methods for testing radiation detection  equipment, including portal monitors and handheld devices. The actual  testing was performed by four DOE laboratories, with coordination,  technical management, and data evaluation provided by the Department of  Commerce’s National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). The  laboratories tested a total of 14 portal monitors from 8 manufacturers  against 29 performance requirements in the ANSI standards. Overall, none  of the radiation detection equipment, including the portal monitors and  handheld devices deployed by CBP, met all of the performance  requirements in this first round of testing. However, according to S&T  officials, many of the limitations noted in CBP’s equipment were related to  withstanding environmental conditions—not radiation detection or isotope  identification. However, in some tests, the portal monitors that CBP  employs, along with many others, exhibited poor results. For example, in  tests conducted to evaluate the portal monitors’ response to neutron  radiation, of which plutonium is a primary source, almost all monitors,  including a portal monitor fielded by CBP, failed to meet the ANSI  requirement. However, according to S&T officials, the test was conducted  using the manufacturer’s standard configuration, rather than the  configuration CBP uses in its field operations. In another test, one that used  CBP’s typical field parameters rather than the manufacturer’s, the portal  monitor passed all the radiation detection performance requirements. S&T  believes that the portals used by CBP would meet all the radiation  performance requirements if set up with the parameters and configuration  as used in the field. In addition, isotope identifiers displayed weaknesses.  For example, the isotope identifier currently in use by CBP was not able to  simultaneously identify two different isotopes, as required by the ANSI  standards. When tested with barium-133 and plutonium-239, the isotope  identifier was able to recognize the barium but failed to recognize the  plutonium—a weapons-grade nuclear material. As this was a first round of  testing and modifications were made to both the standards and testing  protocols after the procedures were completed, NIST plans to manage  testing of the equipment again in early 2006. The results from both rounds  of testing are intended to provide guidance for federal, state, and local  officials in evaluating and purchasing radiation detection equipment, and to  enable manufacturers to improve their equipment’s performance.
section_title: DHS Has Sponsored Research and Development to Improve the Capabilities of Current Technology and to Develop New Technology but Much Work Remains
paragraphs: DHS has sponsored research efforts designed to improve the detection  capabilities of the currently-fielded portal monitors and to provide them  with the ability to distinguish radiological sources. For example, PNNL  researched, developed, and tested a new software—known as “energy  windowing”—to address the currently-fielded portal monitors’ inability to  distinguish between radiological materials. Energy-windowing is supposed  to identify and screen out material, such as fertilizer or kitty litter, that  cause nuisance alarms and thereby reduce the number of such alarms at  cargo screening facilities, while also improving the portal monitor’s  sensitivity to identify nuclear material of concern. PNNL has activated  energy-windowing on the 556 portal monitors it has deployed at land  border crossings and seaports. At a few ports-of-entry that we visited, CBP  officials said that the software has been effective in significantly reducing  the number of nuisance alarms. However, tests of the software have shown  that its effectiveness in reducing nuisance alarms largely depends on the  types of radiation sources it has been programmed to detect and  differentiate. In tests involving some common, unshielded radiation  sources, such as cobalt-57 and barium-153, the new software has shown  improved detection and discrimination capabilities. However, during  scenarios that target other common, shielded threat sources—such as  those that might be used in a shielded radiological dispersal device or  nuclear weapon—the software has been less able to detect and  discriminate. Experts have recommended further testing to fully explore  the software’s capabilities.
DHS is also sponsoring the development of three new technologies that are  designed to address the main inherent limitations of currently-fielded  portal monitors. CBP’s deployment plan currently calls for the widespread  installation of the first of these technologies, “advanced spectroscopic  portal monitors.” According to DNDO, the advanced spectroscopic  technology uses different detection materials that are capable of both  detecting the presence of radiation and identifying the isotope causing the  alarm. It is hoped that the spectroscopic portal monitor can more quickly  identify the sources of alarms, thereby reducing the number of nuisance  alarms. This increased operational effectiveness may allow the portal  monitors to be set at a lower detection threshold, thus allowing for greater  sensitivity to materials of concern. DHS commissioned PNNL to determine  whether spectroscopic portal monitors provide improved performance  capabilities over the currently-fielded monitors. In July 2004 and July 2005,  PNNL conducted two small-scale preliminary studies to compare the two  types of portal monitors in side-by-side tests using shielded and unshielded  radioactive materials. In the first test, PNNL concluded that the relative  performance of spectroscopic and currently-fielded portal monitors is  highly dependent on variables such as the radioactive sources being  targeted and the analytic methods being used. The results of these tests  were mixed. In some situations, spectroscopic portal monitors  outperformed the current technology; in other cases, they performed  equally well. In the second test, PNNL concluded that the spectroscopic  monitor’s ability to detect the shielded threat sources was equal to, but no  better than, those of the currently-fielded portal monitors. However,  because spectroscopic portal monitors have the ability to identify isotopes,  they produced fewer nuisance alarms than the current portal monitors.  PNNL noted that because the studies were limited in scope, more testing is  needed.
In October 2005, DNDO completed the first round of comprehensive testing  of spectroscopic portal monitors at its testbed at the Nevada Test Site.  DNDO tested 10 spectroscopic portal monitors against 3 currently-fielded  monitors in 7,000 test runs involving the portal monitors’ ability to detect a  variety of radiological materials under many different cargo configurations.  According to senior DNDO officials who supervised these tests,  preliminary analysis of test data indicates that the spectroscopic portal  monitors’ performance demonstrated somewhat mixed results.  Spectroscopic portal monitors outperformed currently-fielded equipment  in detecting numerous small, medium-sized, and threat-like radioactive  objects, and were able to identify and dismiss most naturally occurring  radioactive material. However, as the amount of source material declined  in size, the detection capabilities of both types of portal monitors  converged. Because the data produced by the test runs is voluminous and  complex, NIST and another contractor are still in the process of analyzing  the test data and plan to produce a report summarizing the results of the  testing in 2006. DNDO received responses to the Advanced Spectroscopic  Portal Request for Proposal in February 2006, and intends to use the data  from the Nevada Test Site to help evaluate these responses. In fiscal year  2006, DNDO also intends to award contracts to two or three manufacturers  for further engineering development and production.
The second new technology is “high-Z detection,” which is designed to  better detect high atomic number (high-Z) materials—such as Special  Nuclear Material (SNM)—and shielding materials—such as lead—that  could be used to shield gamma radiation from portal monitors. The Cargo  Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS) program within  DNDO is intended to develop the technologies necessary for automated  detection of high-Z material. DNDO envisions using the advanced portal  monitor technology for the detection of lightly shielded nuclear threats and  radiological dispersal devices, and using CAARS technology for the  detection of high-Z materials.
The third new technology is “active interrogation,” which is designed to  better detect nuclear material, especially shielded sources, and DNDO  expects it to play a role further in the future than advanced portal monitors  and CAARS. DHS and DOE are supporting research at DOE national  laboratories, such as Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore, to develop  these systems. Active interrogation systems probe or “interrogate”  containers with neutron or gamma rays to induce additional radiation  emissions from radioactive material within the container. According to  DNDO, these systems are too large and costly to consider for current use.  In addition, because these systems emit radiation, care will have to be  taken to ensure personnel safety before any deployments are made.
In addition to these relatively near-term research and development efforts,  DNDO intends to solicit proposals from private, public, academic, and  federally funded research centers to pursue radiation detection projects  with a more long-term orientation. The solicitation identifies five areas of  research:  mobile detection systems that can be used to detect potential  radiological threats that are in transit, at fixed locations, and at special  events;  detection systems that can be integrated into ships, trucks, planes, or   active detection technologies, including portal monitors and handheld  devices that can detect and verify the presence of shielded nuclear  materials;   innovative detector materials that provide improved detection and  isotope identification capabilities over existing materials, in addition to  technologies that lead to reductions in the costs to manufacture  detector materials, increasing the size and choice of the shapes of  detector materials without a loss in performance; and   alternate means to detect and identify nuclear material other than  through radiation detection such as mass, density, or temperature.
section_title: DHS Sponsors Test Facilities in Nevada, New York, and New Jersey to Support Efforts to Improve Detection Capabilities
paragraphs: DHS is testing commercially available portal monitors, advanced portal  monitors, and handheld devices at its new Radiological and Nuclear  Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex at the Nevada Test Site  (NTS). DNDO, with assistance from DOE’s National Nuclear Security  Administration, began construction of the complex in 2005. While  construction work is under way, an Interim Test Track was built nearby.   The complex is to support the DNDO’s development, testing, acquisition,  and support of the deployment of radiation detection technologies. When  completed, the complex will be comprised of several operating areas  where testing and evaluation of detection systems will be conducted, such  as a testing facility to evaluate active interrogation technologies; and a  large, instrumented outdoor testing area to test mobile detection systems.  The complex will also have a vehicle choke point where detection systems  for land border crossings, toll plazas, and entrances to tunnels and bridges  can be evaluated. According to DNDO officials, an important advantage of  using NTS is that it provides the necessary facilities to test detection  system capabilities with special nuclear materials in threat-representative  configurations. The complex will be open to other organizations within  DHS, including CBP, S&T, the Transportation Security Administration, and  the U.S. Coast Guard. It will also be open to DOE national laboratories,  universities, and private companies conducting radiation detection  development and production for DHS. The facility is expected to become  fully operational in January 2007.
In addition to the Nevada complex, DHS manages CMTB to test radiation  detection equipment in an operational environment. The CMTB originated  as a DOE funded demonstration project in fiscal year 2003, but transferred  to DHS in August 2003. The scientific, engineering, and technical staff of  the CMTB are drawn predominantly from the national laboratories. The  test bed encompasses various operational settings, such as major seaports,  airports, roadways, and railways. The CMTB deploys commercially  available and advanced radiation detection equipment at these venues to  test and evaluate their performance in real-world situations, to develop  better standard operating procedures, and to assess the impact the  equipment has on the flow of commerce. At present, CMTB is testing portal  monitors at toll crossings of two tunnels and one bridge, two seaport  terminals, and two air cargo facilities. In addition, CMTB is developing  several advanced secondary inspection mobile technologies. (See fig. 5.)  The advanced spectroscopic portal monitors that DNDO is developing will  likely be evaluated at the CMTB, once testing is completed at the Nevada  Test Site.
section_title: The Newly Created Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Is Structured to Improve Coordination of Executive Branch Radiation Detection Programs
paragraphs: DHS works with DOE, DOD, and other federal, state, and local agencies, as  well as the private sector to carry out radiation detection programs. The  newly established DNDO was set up to serve as DHS’s main instrument for  coordinating these efforts. Since its creation in April 2005, DNDO has  entered into working relationships with other agencies and is taking the  lead in developing what it calls a “global architecture,” an integrated  approach to detecting and stopping nuclear smuggling. However, because  DNDO was created so recently, these efforts are in their early stages of  development and implementation.
subsections: section_title: DNDO Attempts to Improve Cooperation Among Other DHS Offices, DOE, DOD, and Other Agencies in Deploying and Operating Equipment
paragraphs: Historically, cooperation among agencies engaged in domestic radiation  detection has been limited. In April 2005, however, the president signed a  joint presidential directive that directed the establishment of DNDO to,  among other things, improve such cooperation by creating a single  accountable organization with the responsibility for establishing strong  linkages across the federal government and with other entities. As  currently envisioned under the directive, DNDO’s mission covers a broad  spectrum of radiological and nuclear protective measures, but focuses  mainly on nuclear detection. The directive includes several provisions  directing DNDO to coordinate its activities with other entities. For  example, DNDO is to work with DOE, DOD, the Departments of State and  Justice, state and local agencies, and the private sector to develop  programs to thwart illicit movements of nuclear materials. In addition,  provisions of the directive require consultation between DNDO, law  enforcement and nonproliferation centers, as well as other related federal  and state agencies. Table 2 provides a summary of the cooperation brought  about by the presidential directive.
According to senior DNDO officials, although the close cooperation called  for in DNDO’s mandate has been difficult to achieve, there are two factors  that may help DNDO succeed in this effort. First, the presidential directive  is explicit in directing other federal agencies to support DNDO’s efforts.  The directive transfers primary responsibility for radiation and nuclear  detection activities in the United States to DNDO, and requires DNDO to  include personnel from other agencies in its organization. For example,  under the directive, DOE will provide DNDO with information received  from overseas programs, including the Megaports Initiative and others, as  well as information from DOE’s international partners involved with  radiological and nuclear detection systems. Second, all of the radiological  and nuclear detection programs and staff of S&T became part of DNDO.
DOE’s Second Line of Defense program supports DNDO efforts by working  with the agency to exchange information, data, and lessons learned from  overseas deployments. According to senior officials at DNDO, the data  from overseas deployments are needed to help DNDO efforts to develop  profiles of potential risks to the United States. In addition, the performance  of these systems, as evidenced by these data, can help improve domestic  portal monitors’ ability to detect radiation. In addition, DOE provides  equipment training opportunities for DHS personnel. In April 2005, DOE  and DHS formalized certain aspects of this cooperation in a memorandum  of understanding. Specifically, the areas of cooperation include, among  other things: discussing procedures for the rapid analysis of cargo and for  operational/emergency responses, training CBP officers, exchanging  technical and lessons learned information, and providing updates on their  respective programs’ implementation.
DHS has also entered into formal agreements with state and local  governments to coordinate their radiation detection efforts. For example,  in April 2005, just prior to DNDO’s creation, DHS and the Port Authority of  New York and New Jersey finalized a memorandum of understanding to  provide services, personnel, and equipment to run the CMTB program.
Specifically, the program is designed to evaluate and assess the role of  threat detection technologies, develop and exercise various concepts of  operation and response tools, integrate lessons learned from field  experiences, and provide detection and monitoring capabilities for testing  and evaluation purposes. The agreement spells out each partner’s  responsibilities, including coordination with other agencies. According to a  senior DNDO official, DNDO now has responsibility for this and other  similar agreements under its authority to develop and evaluate new  radiation detection equipment.
Finally, DNDO officials also believe that the way the agency has been  staffed and organized will aid its cooperation efforts. For example, staff  from DHS, DOD, DOE, the Departments of State and Justice, and other  agencies, have been detailed to DNDO. All of DNDO’s major organizational  units are staffed with personnel from multiple agencies. For example, the  strategic planning staff within the Office of the Director has employees  from DOE, DOD, CBP, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and DHS’s  Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness.  Significantly, DNDO’s Office of Operations Support, which is designed to  provide real-time situational data as well as technical support to field units,  is headed by an FBI executive with senior staff from CBP, DOE, and DHS’s  Transportation Security Administration providing direct management  support. According to a senior DNDO official, having this broad range of  agencies represented in DNDO decision making helps ensure that agencies’  views are heard and fully considered, thereby helping to achieve the  greatest possible consensus even for difficult decisions. Further, agency  personnel detailed to DNDO have the authority to “bind” their respective  agencies, i.e., whatever decisions or agreements are reached under the  auspices of DNDO will bind their agency to comply to the extent permitted  by law. Finally, according to senior officials in DOE and CBP, the current  organizational arrangement appears to be working. Officials noted that  early in DNDO’s history, communication was difficult, but has recently  improved. For example, CBP and DOE officials told us they had hoped to  have greater input into DNDO’s early efforts to develop integrated radiation  detection systems. However, these officials noted that by October 2005,  DNDO seemed to have heard and acted upon their recommendations.  However, although these officials were optimistic about future  collaborations with DNDO, they also noted that DNDO has not yet  completed a large enough body of work to conclude firmly that its  coordination efforts will always be similarly successful.
section_title: DNDO Is Cooperating with Other Agencies to Develop a Global Nuclear Detection System
paragraphs: Among the main purposes in creating the DNDO, according to its Director,  is to develop a global nuclear detection system that he characterized as a  “global architecture.” DNDO’s intention in developing such an approach is  to coordinate other agencies’ efforts, such as the Second Line of Defense  and Container Security Initiative, with the domestic deployment program  to create an integrated, worldwide system. The resulting “global  architecture” would be a multi-layered defense strategy that includes  programs that attempt to secure nuclear materials and detect their  movements overseas; to develop intelligence information on nuclear  materials’ trans-shipments and possible movement to the United States;  and to integrate these elements with domestic efforts undertaken by  governments—federal, state, local, and tribal—and the private sector.  Much of DNDO’s work in terms of acquiring and supporting the deployment  of radiation detection equipment, as well as in supporting research,  development, and testing of new detection equipment supports the office’s  mission to develop the U.S. domestic portion this global architecture.
In addition, DHS, in conjunction with selected state and local  organizations, as well as other federal agencies and the private sector,  began two pilot projects in fiscal year 2003 to demonstrate a layered  defense system designed to protect the United States against radiological  and nuclear threats. DHS’s Radiological Pilot Programs Office coordinated  the projects’ initial efforts, and DNDO assumed responsibility in October  2005. Field work began in fiscal year 2004 and will be completed in fiscal  year 2007. The project leaders expect the final report and lessons learned  to be issued in fiscal year 2007. Both pilot projects featured a broad  selection of federal, state, and local agencies, including state law  enforcement, counter-terrorism, emergency management, transportation,  and port authorities.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DHS has made progress deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S.  ports-of-entry; notably, the department achieved these gains without  greatly impeding the flow of commerce (i.e., the movement of cargo  containers out of ports-of-entry). However, we believe that DHS will find it  difficult under current plans and assumptions to meet its current portal  monitor deployment schedule at U.S. borders because it would have to  increase its current rate of deployment by 230 percent to meet its  September 2009 deadline. Our analysis of CBP’s and PNNL’s earned value  data suggests that millions of dollars worth of work is being deferred each  month and that the work that is completed is costing millions more than  planned. Currently, we estimate that CBP is facing a likely cost overrun of  about $340 million, and that the last portal monitor may not be installed  until late 2014. Unless CBP and PNNL make immediate improvements in  the schedule performance, then additional slippage in the deployment  schedule is likely.
A key overriding cause for these delays is the late disbursal of funds to DHS  contractors. This late dispersal disrupts and delays some ongoing  installation projects. In this regard, DHS approval processes for  documentation requested by the House Appropriations Committee are  lengthy and cumbersome. In one case, for example, funds for fiscal year  2005 were not made available to the DHS contractor until September 2005,  the last month of the fiscal year. This process is taking too long and needs  to be shortened.
Further, the unsure efficacy and uncertain cost associated with the  advanced portal monitor technology means that DHS cannot determine,  with confidence, how much the program will eventually cost. In particular,  even if the advanced portal monitor technology can be shown superior to  current technology—which currently does not seem certain—DHS does  not yet know whether the new technology will be worth its considerable  additional cost. Only after testing of the advanced portal monitors has been  completed and DHS has rigorously compared currently-fielded and  advanced portal monitors, taking into account their differences in cost, will  DHS be able to answer this question.
CBP has experienced difficulty deploying portal monitors at seaports, at  least in part because it has been unable to reach agreements with many  seaport operators, who are concerned that radiation detection efforts may  delay the flow of commerce through their ports. As a result, the agency has  fallen 2 years behind its seaport deployment schedule—and seaports  continue to be vulnerable to nuclear smuggling. Significantly, there is no  clear solution and no reason to be optimistic that progress can be made  soon. CBP’s policy of negotiating deployment agreements with seaport  terminal operators has not yet yielded agreements at many seaports and  this has caused significant delays in the deployment of portal monitors at  some seaports. CBP has chosen not to attempt to force terminal operators  to cooperate. A subset of this issue concerns screening rail traffic leaving  seaports, which is a particularly difficult problem. The operational  concerns of performing secondary rail inspections in seaports are  daunting. Some port operators as well as a national study strongly suggest  that rail transport will increase over the next 10 years. However, unless an  effective and efficient means to screen rail traffic is developed and  deployed, seaports will likely continue to either avoid installing detection  equipment altogether, or simply turn it off when its operation might prove  to be inconvenient. Without more progress on this front, we risk rail cargo  becoming a burgeoning gap in our defenses against nuclear terrorism.
CBP appears to have made progress in using radiation detection equipment  correctly and adhering to inspection procedures. At several ports-of-entry  we visited, CBP officers physically opened and inspected cargo containers  to confirm the nature of the radiological source under certain  circumstances. They did this when they were unable to confirm the type of  radiological material through current approved procedures. Since the  currently deployed handheld equipment is limited in its ability to accurately  identify sources of radiation, opening the container allows CBP officers to  get closer to the source of the alarm and thereby improve their chances of  accurately identifying the source. It also enables officers to verify that the  container’s contents are consistent with the isotope identifier’s initial  reading and the container’s manifest. Furthermore, since DHS and DOE  officials have expressed concerns that illicit radiological material could be  shielded, this practice enables officers to conduct a more thorough  examination of the containers’ contents—thereby increasing the likelihood  that CBP officers will find any illicit radioactive material. Importantly, this  process, according to border security officials, did not impede the progress  of commerce through any port-of-entry.
On the other hand, because CBP officers do not have access to NRC  licensing data, it is difficult for them to verify that shippers have obtained  necessary NRC licenses and to verify the authenticity of any NRC licenses  that may accompany shipments of radioactive materials. As a result, unless  nuclear smugglers in possession of faked license documents raised  suspicions in some other way, CBP officers could follow agency guidelines  yet unwittingly allow them to enter the country with their illegal nuclear  cargo. As we see it, this is a significant gap in CBP’s national procedures  that should be closed.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Since DHS provides the Congress with information concerning the  acquisition and deployment of portal monitors, and since DHS’s procedures  to obtain internal agreement on this information are lengthy and  cumbersome—often resulting in delays—we recommend that the Secretary  of Homeland Security, working with the Director of DNDO and the  Commissioner of CBP, review these approval procedures and take actions  necessary to ensure that DHS submits information to the Congress early in  the fiscal year.
In order to complete the radiation portal monitor deployment program, as  planned, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working  with the Director of DNDO, and in concert with CBP and PNNL, devise a  plan to close the gap between the current deployment rate and the rate  needed to complete deployments by September 2009.
To ensure that DHS’s substantial investment in radiation detection  technology yields the greatest possible level of detection capability at the  lowest possible cost, we recommend that once the costs and capabilities of  advanced technology portal monitors are well understood, and before any  of the new equipment is purchased, the Secretary of Homeland Security  work with the Director of DNDO to analyze the benefits and costs of  deploying advanced portal monitors. This analysis should focus on  determining whether any additional detection capability provided by the  advanced equipment is worth its additional cost. After completing this cost- benefit analysis, the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the  Director of DNDO, should revise its total program cost estimates to reflect  current decisions.
To help speed seaport deployments and to help ensure that future rail  deployments proceed on time, we recommend that the Secretary of  Homeland Security, in cooperation with the Commissioner of CBP, develop  procedures for effectively screening rail containers and develop new  technologies to facilitate inspections.
To increase the chances that CBP officers find illicit radiological material,  we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the  Commissioner of CBP, consider modifying the agency’s standard operating  procedures for secondary inspections to include physically opening cargo  containers during secondary inspections at all ports-of-entry when the  external inspection does not conclusively identify the radiological material  inside.
To further increase the chances that CBP officers identify illicit radiological  material, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working  with the Chairman of NRC, develop a way for CBP border officers to  determine whether radiological shipments have the necessary NRC  licenses and to verify the authenticity of NRC licenses that accompany  such shipments.
To ensure that CBP is receiving reliable cost and schedule data, we  recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct PNNL to have  its earned value management system validated so that it complies with  guidance developed by the American National Standards Institute/  Electronic Industries Alliance. In addition, we recommend the Secretary of  Homeland Security direct CBP and PNNL to conduct an Integrated  Baseline Review to ensure its earned value management data is reliable for  assessing risk and developing alternatives.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for comment. In response, we  received written comments from DHS officials. DHS noted that the report  is factually correct. Further, the Department agreed with our  recommendations and committed to implementing them. DHS officials also  commented that our review did not completely capture the enormity or  complexity of the Radiation Portal Monitor program. We agree that this  program is a massive undertaking, and our original draft reflected this  perspective in several places. In commenting on our recommendation to  develop a better means for CBP border officers to verify NRC license  information, DHS stated that “NRC licenses are required to accompany  certain legitimate shipments of radiological materials…” However,  according to senior NRC officials, no requirement that the license  accompany the shipment exists. Finally, DHS provided some clarifying  comments that we incorporated into this report, as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the congressional  committees with jurisdiction over DHS and its activities; the Secretary of  Homeland Security; the Director of OMB; and interested congressional  committees. We will also make copies of the report available to others  upon request. This report will also be available at no charge on GAO’s home  page at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3841. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations  and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff  who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) progress in  deploying radiation detection equipment, including radiation portal  monitors, radiation isotope identification devices, and pagers at U.S. ports- of-entry and any problems associated with that deployment, we reviewed  documents and interviewed officials from the U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP), Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and Pacific  Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). We focused primarily on the  issues surrounding radiation portal monitors because they are a major tool  in the federal government’s efforts to thwart nuclear smuggling, and  because the budget and other resources devoted to these machines far  exceeds the handheld equipment also used at U.S. ports-of-entry. Further,  we focused on the use of radiation detection equipment in primary and  secondary inspections, but we did not examine their use as a part of CBP’s  targeted inspections. To assess CBP’s current progress in deploying portal  monitors, we compared PNNL’s December 2004 project execution plan for  deploying radiation portal monitors—including the project’s schedule and  estimated cost. We analyzed budget, cost, and deployment data on portal  monitors to determine differences between PNNL’s plan and its current  progress. We also assessed PNNL’s cost and schedule performance using  earned value analysis techniques based on data captured in PNNL’s  contract performance reports. We also developed a forecast of future cost  growth. We based the lower end of our forecast range on the sum of costs  spent to date and the forecast cost of work remaining. The remaining work  was forecast using an average of the current cost performance index  efficiency factor. For the upper end of our cost range, we relied on the  actual costs spent to date added to the forecast of remaining work with an  average monthly cost and schedule performance index.
We also visited a nonprobability sample of CBP ports-of-entry, including  two international mail and express courier facilities, five seaports, and  three land border crossings. We selected these ports-of-entry by using  criteria such as the types of ports-of-entry where CBP plans to deploy  equipment; ports-of-entry with wide geographic coverage; and ports-of- entry where portal monitors have been—or are planned to be—installed.  During each visit, we spoke with CBP inspectors and local port authority  officials on the progress made, and any problems experienced in deploying  the equipment at their locations.
To assess CBP officers’ use of radiation detection equipment, and how  inspection procedures are implemented at U.S. ports-of-entry, and any  problems associated with the use of the equipment, we reviewed CBP’s  standard operating procedures for radiation detection; documents on its  training curriculum; and training materials on how to use the equipment.  We participated in a 3-day hands-on training course for CBP officers at  PNNL on how to use radiation detection equipment. We also interviewed  officials from CBP field and headquarters to discuss problems associated  with the use of the equipment. During our site visits, we toured the  facilities, observed the equipment in use, and interviewed CBP officers  about radiation detection policies and procedures and the deployment of  equipment at their locations. We discussed with CBP officers how they  determine the validity of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licenses  when legitimate shipments of radioactive material enter the nation.
To assess DHS’s progress in improving and testing radiation detection  equipment capabilities, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials  from CBP, DNDO, Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), DOE, PNNL,  and the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). We  reviewed S&T’s April 2005 Program Execution Plan; DHS documentation  on the development of advanced radiation detection technologies; and test  results and assessments of the performance of both commercially available  radiation detection equipment and advanced technologies. We visited four  national laboratories—Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, Pacific  Northwest, and Sandia—that are involved in the research, development,  and testing of radiation detection technologies. In addition, we visited the  Counter Measures Test Bed (CMTB) in New York and New Jersey, the  Nevada Test Site, and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) test site at a U.S.  Air Force base to observe the testing of radiation detection equipment and  discuss progress in improving and testing radiation detection equipment  with onsite experts.
To assess the level of cooperation between DHS and other federal agencies  in conducting radiation detection programs, we interviewed officials from  CBP; S&T; the Transportation Security Administration; DOD’s Defense  Threat Reduction Agency; DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration;  and Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, Pacific Northwest, and Sandia  National Laboratories. We discussed the current extent of coordination and  whether more coordination could result in improvements to DHS’s  deployment, development, and testing of radiation detection equipment  and technologies. We reviewed agency agreements to cooperate, including  a memorandum of understanding between DHS and DOE to exchange  information on radiation detection technologies and deployments, and a  memorandum of understanding between DHS and the Port Authority of  New York and New Jersey to integrate lessons learned into domestic  radiation detection efforts. In addition, we reviewed an organizational  chart from DNDO as well as our past reports on coordination between  federal agencies on deployment and testing.
We received training data from CBP, cost and budget data from CBP, and  deployment data from CBP and PNNL. We obtained responses from key  database officials to a number of questions focused on data reliability  covering issues such as data entry access, internal control procedures, and  the accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined these data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted our review from March 2005 to February 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff knowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Jim Shafer; Nancy Crothers; Emily  Gupta; Brandon Haller; Richard Hung; Winston Le; Greg Marchand; Judy  Pagano; Karen Richey; Keith Rhodes, GAO’s Chief Technologist; and  Eugene Wisnoski made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and  Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation  Detection Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.:  March 14, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection  Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T.  Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved.  GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2005.
Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment  Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts.  GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in  Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign  Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection  Equipment. GAO-03-235T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat  Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO- 02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.