Defense Acquisitions: Better Acquisition Strategy Needed for Successful Development of the Army's Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System
Published: 2006-05-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Through 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend $20 billion on unmanned aircraft systems, including the Army's "Warrior." Because of congressional concerns that some systems have been more costly and taken more time to produce than predicted, GAO reviewed the Warrior program. This report (1) describes the Army's requirements underlying its decision to acquire Warrior instead of existing systems such as the Air Force's Predator, and (2) assesses whether the Army has established a sound acquisition strategy for the Warrior program.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army determined the Warrior is its best option for an unmanned aircraft system directly controlled by field commanders, compared with existing systems such as the Air Force's Predator A. The Army believes that using the Warrior will improve force capability through teaming with other Army assets; using common ground control equipment; and allowing soldiers in the field to operate it. Warrior's key technical features include a heavy fuel engine; automatic take-off and landing system; faster tactical common data link; ethernet; greater carrying capacity for weapons; and avionics with enhanced reliability. The Army projects that Warrior will offer some cost savings over Predator A. In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic schedule, the Army has not yet established a sound, knowledge-based acquisition strategy for Warrior. Two of four of the Warrior's critical technologies were immature at the contract award for system development and demonstration and remain so in early 2006, and the mature technologies still have some risk associated with them because neither has previously been fully integrated onto an unmanned aircraft. The Warrior schedule allows 32 months from award of the development and demonstration contract to the initial production decision. Achieving this schedule will require concurrency of technology and product development, testing, and production. Once developmental aircraft are available for testing, the Army plans to fund procurement of long-lead items in August 2007. Experience shows that these concurrencies can result in design changes during production that can prevent delivery of a system within projected cost and schedule. The Warrior program faces these same risks.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Unmanned aircraft systems are being developed and fielded in growing  numbers and the diversity of designs and applications is also increasing.  Through 2011, the Department of Defense plans to spend $20 billion to  develop, procure, and support a rapidly increasing inventory of such  systems. Among the new developments is the Army’s Extended Range  Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System, also known as “Warrior.” The  Army intends for Warrior to fill what it terms a capability gap for an  unmanned aircraft system at the division level.  Warrior is being developed  and produced by the contractor also involved in the Air Force’s Predator A  and Predator B unmanned aircraft systems.  Warrior is to some degree  similar to those systems, a fact recognized by the Air Force and Army.  In  January 2006, both services signed a memorandum of understanding that  recognized that complementary/joint requirements exist between the  Predator and Warrior systems, and they committed to reaching agreement  on how to develop and use these capabilities.
Because of the growth in requirements and new technologies for  unmanned aircraft systems and your concerns that some unmanned  aircraft systems have not produced the expected cost and schedule  outcomes, you asked us to review the Army’s Warrior program.  Specifically, this report (1) describes the Army’s requirements underlying  its decision to acquire Warrior instead of existing systems such as the Air  Force’s Predator; and (2) assesses whether the Army has established a  sound acquisition strategy for the Warrior program.
To address the first objective, we reviewed Army requirements documents  as well as compared key technical features of the planned Warrior and  Predator. We also reviewed the process the Army used to select the  Warrior system. To address the second objective, we reviewed the Warrior  acquisition strategy and evaluated it according to best practices criteria  utilizing GAO’s “Methodology for Assessing Risks on Major Weapons  Systems Acquisition Programs.” We also analyzed budget-related,  programmatic, and planning information to determine the soundness of  the Army’s acquisition strategy. For both objectives, we interviewed Army  officials and obtained information on Army requirements and acquisition  strategy for Warrior. We also leveraged other recent GAO work on the Air  Force’s Predator system and our overall body of work on best practices of  leading companies. We conducted our review from September 2005 to  April 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Currently, DOD has five major unmanned aircraft systems in use: the Air  Force’s Predator A and Global Hawk, the Marine Corps’ Pioneer, and the  Army’s Hunter and Shadow. The services also have developmental efforts  underway, for example, the Air Force’s Predator B, the Army and Navy’s  vertical take-off and landing system, and the Army’s Warrior. Overall, DOD  now has about 250 unmanned aircraft in inventory and plans to increase  its inventory to 675 by 2010 and 1,400 by 2015. The 2006 Quadrennial  Defense Review reached a number of decisions that would further expand  investments in unmanned systems, including accelerating production of  Predator and Global Hawk. It also established a plan to develop a new  land-based, long-strike capability by 2018 and set a goal that about 45  percent of the future long-range strike force be unmanned.
DOD expects unmanned aircraft systems to transform the battlespace with  innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as take on the so- called “dull, dirty, and dangerous missions” without putting pilots in  harm’s way. Potential missions for unmanned systems have expanded  from the original focus on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to  limited tactical strike capabilities. Projected plans call for unmanned  aircraft systems to perform persistent ground attack, electronic warfare,  and suppression of enemy air defenses.
Unmanned aircraft fly at altitudes ranging from below 10,000 feet up to   50,000 feet and are typically characterized by approximate altitude—“low  altitude” if operating at 10,000 feet or less, “medium altitude” if flying  above 10,000 but below 35,000 feet, and “high altitude” if operating above  35,000 feet. The Army’s classifies Warrior as a medium-altitude system, in  the same category as its Hunter system, its Warrior prototype known as I- GNAT, and the Air Force’s Predator A. The Air Force’s Predator B is  expected to operate at both medium and high altitudes.
The Warrior as envisioned by the Army shares some similarities with the  Air Force’s Predator A and B models. First, all three systems share the  same contractor, General Atomics. Second, Predator A and Warrior are  expected to be somewhat similar in physical characteristics. In particular,  the build of the main fuselage, the location of fuel bays, and design of the  tailspar are alike. According to Army program officials, the Predator B and  Warrior are expected to share the same flight controls and avionics.  Predator A and Warrior are anticipated to perform some similar missions,  including reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition and attack.
The development of the Warrior program began in late 2001 when the  Army started defining requirements for a successor to its Hunter system.  In September 2004, the Army released a request for a “systems capabilities  demonstration” so that companies could demonstrate the capabilities of  their existing aircraft. In December 2004, the Army awarded  demonstration contracts worth $250,000 each to two contractors,  Northrup Grumman and General Atomics. Subsequently, the Army  evaluated, among other things, the demonstrated capabilities of the  competitors’ existing aircraft in relation to Warrior technical requirements.  The Army did not perform a formal analysis of the alternatives comparing  expected capabilities of Warrior with current capabilities offered by  existing systems; rather, its rationale was that the Warrior is needed near- term for commanders’ missions and considered this competition to be a  rigorous analysis of available alternatives.
Based on the competition, the Army concluded that General Atomics’  proposal (based on Warrior) provided the best value solution.  In August  2005, the Army awarded the system development and demonstration  (SDD) contract to General Atomics. The contract is a cost plus incentive  fee contract with an award fee feature.  It has a base value of about $194  million, with approximately another $15 million available to the contractor  in the form of incentive fees, and about an additional $12 million available  as award fees. The time line in figure 1 illustrates the sequence of past and  planned events for the Warrior program.
The Army plans for a full Warrior system to entail 12 aircraft as well as 5  ground control stations, 5 ground data terminals, 1 satellite  communication ground data terminal, 12 air data terminals/air data relays,  6 airborne satellite communication terminals, 2 tactical automatic take-off  and landing systems, 2 portable ground control stations, 2 portable ground  data terminals and associated ground support equipment. The Army  expects to buy 1 developmental system with 17 aircraft and 11 complete  production systems with a total of 132 production aircraft through 2015.  However, the Army has not yet decided on the number of systems it might  buy beyond that date.
The Army is employing an evolutionary acquisition strategy to produce  Warrior. The Army expects the current Warrior program of record to  provide for immediate warfighting needs and plans to build on the  capabilities of this increment as evolving technology allows.
section_title: Warrior Capability Is Targeted to Support Army Commanders’ Needs
paragraphs: The Army has an operational requirement, approved by the Joint  Requirements Oversight Council, for an unmanned aircraft system  dedicated to direct operational control by Army field commanders. The  Army has determined that the Warrior was the best option available to  meet this operational requirement. Army program officials believe that the  Predator is operationally and technically mismatched with Army needs.  The Army expects Warrior to offer key technical features that will better  meet Army operational needs than Predator A.
subsections: section_title: Army Operational Requirement Focuses on Control by Commanders in the Field
paragraphs: According to the Army, the Predator is operationally mismatched with its  division-level needs. Army program officials noted that one of the Army’s  current operational difficulties with Predator is that frontline commanders  cannot directly task the system for support during tactical engagements.  Rather, Predator control is allocated to Theater and Joint Task Force  Commands, and the system’s mission is to satisfy strategic intelligence,  reconnaissance, and surveillance needs as well as joint needs. Army  programmatic and requirements documents maintain that Army division  commanders in the field need direct control of a tactical unmanned  aircraft asset capable of satisfying operational requirements for dedicated  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, communications relay,  teaming with other Army assets, and target acquisition and attack.
Army program officials also indicated that Predator’s time is apportioned  among various users, and the Army typically does not receive a large  portion of that time. According to Warrior program documents, the Army  has historically been able to draw only limited operational support from  theater assets such as Predator. For example, a program office briefing  noted that overall Iraq theater-level support was neither consistent nor  responsive to Army needs, and that division level support was often  denied or cancelled entirely.  The briefing also said that the shortfall was  expected to continue, even with the addition of more Predators and Global  Hawks.
Army program officials also told us that they expect Warrior to enhance  overall force capability in ways that Predator cannot. Specifically, the  Army expects Warrior to support teaming with Army aviation assets and  aid these assets in conducting missions that commanders were previously  reluctant to task to manned platforms. Under this teaming concept,  manned assets, including the Apache helicopter, Army Airspace Command  and Control system, and Aerial Common Sensor, would work jointly with  Warrior to enhance target acquisition and attack capabilities. The Army  plans for the manned platforms to not only receive data and video  communications from Warrior but also control its payloads and flight. The  Army also plans to configure Warrior for interoperability with the Army  One System Ground Control Station, an Army-wide common ground  control network for unmanned aircraft systems. According to Army  documents, Warrior’s incorporation into this network will better support  the Army ground commander by allowing control of Warrior aircraft to be  handed off among ground stations, provide better battlefield coverage for  Joint Forces, and ensure common operator training among unmanned  aircraft systems, including the Army’s Warrior, Shadow, and Hunter and  Marine Corps’ unmanned aircraft systems. Additionally, Army program  officials pointed out that Warrior will be physically controlled by an  enlisted soldier deployed in the theater where Warrior is being used. They  contrast this with Predator, which is typically flown from a location within  the continental United States by a pilot trained to fly manned aircraft.
section_title: Army Expects Warrior to Address Operational Needs with Key Technical Features
paragraphs: The Army believes that the Warrior design will offer key technical features  to address Army operational requirements and maintains that these  features will better meet its operational needs than those found on  Predator A. The technical features include:    multi-role tactical common data link,    ethernet,    heavy fuel engine,    automatic take-off and landing system,    more weapons,   interoperability with Army One System Ground Control Station, and    dual-redundant avionics.
Table 1 shows the respective purpose of each technical feature, describes  whether or not a particular feature is planned for Warrior and exists now  on Predator A, and provides the Army’s assessment of operational impact  provided by each feature.
A February 2006 Warrior program office comparison of costs for Warrior  and Predator A projects that Warrior’s unit cost will be $4.4 million for  each aircraft, including its sensors, satellite communications, and Hellfire  launchers and associated electronics. The cost comparison indicates that  Predator A’s unit cost for the same elements is $4.8 million. Although the  Air Force’s Predator B is planned to be more capable than Warrior in such  areas as physical size and payload and weapons capacity, the Warrior  program office estimates that it will have a unit cost of $9.0 million—about  double the anticipated cost for Warrior. The Army’s cost estimates for the  Warrior are, of course, predicated on Army plans for successful  development and testing.
section_title: Warrior Acquisition Strategy Not Consistent with Best Practices
paragraphs: In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic schedule,  the Army has not yet established a sound, knowledge-based acquisition  strategy for Warrior that is consistent with best practices for successful  acquisition. Warrior is expected to rely on critical technologies that were  not mature at the time of the system development and demonstration  contract award in August 2005 and were still not mature in March 2006.  Furthermore, it appears that the Army may be unable to complete  development of these technologies and achieve overall design stability by  the time of the design readiness review scheduled for July 2006. Moreover,  the Warrior schedule is very aggressive and overlaps technology  development, product development, testing, and production. For example,  the Army plans to consider awarding a contract for procurement of long- lead items at a time when it is still unclear if Warrior will be  technologically mature and have a stable design. Such concurrency adds  more risk, including the potential for costly design changes after  production begins, to the already compressed schedule.
In the last several years, we have undertaken a best practices body of  work on how leading developers in industry and government use a  knowledge-based approach to develop high-quality products on time and  within budget. A knowledge-based approach to product development  employs a process wherein a high level of knowledge about critical facets  of a product is achieved at key junctures known as “knowledge points.”  This event-driven approach, where each point builds on knowledge  attained in the previous point, enables developers to be reasonably certain  that their products are more likely to meet established cost, schedule, and  performance baselines. A key to such successful product development is  an acquisition strategy that matches requirements to resources and  includes, among other elements, a high level of technology maturity in the  product at the start of system development and demonstration, design  maturity at the system’s design readiness review usually held about half- way through the system’s development phase, and adequate time to deliver  the product.
subsections: section_title: Some Warrior Critical Technologies Have Yet to Reach Maturity
paragraphs: Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system  development is an important indicator that a match has been made  between the customer’s requirements and the product developer’s  resources in term of knowledge, money, and time. This means that the  technologies needed to meet essential requirements—known as “critical  technologies”—have been demonstrated to work in their intended  environment. Our best practices work has shown that technology  readiness levels (TRL)  can be used to assess the maturity of individual  technologies and that a TRL of 7—demonstration of a technology in an  operational environment—is the level that constitutes a low risk for  starting a product development program.
As identified by the Army, the Warrior program contains four critical  technologies: (1) ethernet, (2) multi-role tactical common data link, (3)  heavy fuel engine, and (4) automatic take-off and landing system. Two of  the four critical technologies—ethernet and data link—were not mature at  the time the Army awarded the Warrior system development and  demonstration contract in August 2005, and in early 2006 remain immature  at TRLs of 4. Army program officials told us that they project the ethernet  to be at TRL 6 and the data link at TRL 5 or 6 by the time of the design  readiness review scheduled for July 2006. However, it is not certain that  these two technologies will be as mature at design readiness review as the  Army anticipates. Army program officials indicated that the data link  hardware is still in development and expect its integration with other  Warrior components to be a challenge. As such, they rated data link  integration status as a moderate risk to the Warrior program. While they  stated that use of the ethernet has been demonstrated on Army helicopters  and should not be a technical integration challenge, the officials also said  that neither the ethernet nor specific data link technologies to be used on  Warrior has been integrated previously onto an unmanned aircraft  platform. Further, if the technologies are demonstrated at TRL 6 by design  readiness review, they will meet DOD’s standard for maturity  (demonstration in a relevant environment) but not the best practices  maturity standard of TRL 7 (demonstration in an operational  environment).
The Army has technologies in place as backups for the data link and  ethernet, but these technologies would result in a less capable system than  the Army originally planned. According to Army program officials, there  are several potential backups for the data link that could be used on the  Warrior aircraft. Among the backups they cited is the same data link used  on the Predator A–analog C-band. However, as we noted in a report last  year, C-band is congested, suffers from resulting delays in data  transmission and relay, and the Department of Defense has established a  goal of moving Predator payloads from this data link. Similarly, the other  data link backups cited by the officials either had slower data transmission  rates or also were not yet mature. Program officials indicated that the  backup for the ethernet is normal ground station control of the on-board  communication among such components as the payloads, avionics, and  weapons. While they stated that there would be no major performance  penalty if the backup was used, they did note that the ethernet would  significantly improve ease of integrating payloads and of integrating with  other Army assets that might need control of a Warrior payload to support  missions.
The other two critical technologies, the automatic take-off and landing  system and the heavy fuel engine, are mature at respective TRLs of 7 and  9. Nevertheless, some program risk is associated with these technologies  as well. The contractor has never fielded an automatic take-off and landing  component on an unmanned aircraft system. Army program officials told  us that they are confident about the take-off and landing system because a  similar landing system had been fielded on the Shadow unmanned aircraft,  but they also indicated that the take-off component has not been fielded  on an unmanned aircraft. The officials also expressed confidence in the  heavy fuel engine because it is certified by the U.S. Federal Aviation  Administration and is in use on civilian manned aircraft. However, like the  complete take-off and landing system, it has not previously been  integrated onto an unmanned aircraft.
section_title: Warrior Design Stability Uncertain
paragraphs: Best practices for successful acquisition call for a program’s design  stability to be demonstrated by having at least 90 percent of engineering  drawings completed and released to manufacturing at the time of the  design readiness review. If a product’s design is not stable as  demonstrated by meeting this best practice, the product may not meet  customer requirements and cost and schedule targets. For example, as we  reported previously, the Army’s Shadow unmanned aircraft system did not  meet best practices criteria because it had only 67 percent of its design  drawings completed when the system entered low-rate production.  Subsequent testing revealed examples of design immaturity, especially  relating to system reliability, and ultimately the Army delayed Shadow’s  full-rate production by about 6 months.
The Warrior program also faces increased risk if design drawings do not  meet standards for best acquisition practices. The Warrior program office  projects that Warrior’s design will be stable and that 85 percent of  drawings will have been completed and released to manufacturing by the  time of the design readiness review in July 2006. However, it seems  uncertain whether the Warrior program will meet this projection because  percentages of drawings complete for some sub-components were still  quite low in early 2006 and, in some cases, have declined since the system  development and demonstration contract award. For example, according  to an Army program official, the percentage of completed design drawings  for the aircraft and ground control equipment dropped after contract  award because the Army made modifications to the planned aircraft and  also decided that it needed a larger transport vehicle for the Warrior’s  ground control equipment.
section_title: Aggressive Schedule and Concurrent Activities Increase Program Risk
paragraphs: The Warrior program appears driven largely by schedule rather than the  attainment of event-driven knowledge points that would separate  technology development from product development. The latter approach  is characteristic of both best practices and DOD’s own acquisition policy.  Warrior’s schedule is compressed and aggressive and includes  concurrency among technology development, product development,  testing, and production. Concurrency—the overlapping of technology and  product development, testing, and production schedules—is risky because  it can lead to design changes that can be costly and delay delivery of a  useable capability to the warfighter if testing shows design changes are  necessary to achieve expected system performance. As shown in figure 2,  the Warrior schedule overlaps technology development, product  development, testing, and production.
The following examples highlight some of the concurrency issues within  the Warrior program:    Thirty-two months have been allotted from the system development  and demonstration contract award in August 2005 to the low-rate  production decision in April 2008. Out of that, 10 months—from July  2006 to May 2007—are set aside for integrating system components  (including all four critical technologies) into the aircraft. Two of these  technologies are not yet mature (as of early 2006); none of the specific  technologies as planned to be used on Warrior have previously been  fully integrated onto an unmanned aircraft. The Army plans to continue  integration through May 2007 would seem to undermine the design  stability expected to be achieved at the July 2006 design readiness  review. Ideally, system integration is complete by that time.
Delivery of 17 developmental aircraft is to take place within a 12-month  period from April 2007 to April 2008, and the Army plans for them to  undergo developmental testing as they are delivered. It is unclear  whether all components will be fully integrated for this testing, but the  results of some tests should be available when the Army considers  approval of long-lead items for the first lot of low-rate initial  production in August 2007.  The Army is requesting about $31 million in  fiscal 2007 to procure long-lead items, including items associated with  the automatic take-off and landing system, heavy fuel engine assembly,  and ground control. Prior to the planned approval of the first lot in  fiscal 2008, the developmental aircraft will be evaluated in a limited  user test.
The Warrior program office acknowledges that the schedule is high-risk.  Additionally, according to Army program officials, both the program office  and contractor recognize that there are areas of moderate to high risk  within the program, including integration of the tactical common data link  as well as timely availability of a modified Hellfire missile and synthetic  aperture radar used for visibility in poor atmospheric conditions. Army  program officials told us that they are trying to manage Warrior as more of  a knowledge-based, event-driven rather than schedule-driven program. As  an example, they stated that the contractor is currently building two off- contract aircraft to help mitigate risk by proving out design, development,  and manufacturing. However, they also told us that these two aircraft  would not include the tactical common data link, Hellfire missile,  synthetic aperture radar, or satellite communications used for relay  purposes. They noted that some of these items are still in development so  are not expected to be available, but they do plan for the two aircraft to  have the ethernet, heavy fuel engine, and automatic take-off and landing  system.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In concept, the Army has determined that the Warrior will meet its  operational requirements better than available alternatives such as the  Predator.  In practice, however, the Warrior might very well encounter  cost, schedule, and performance problems that would hinder it from  attaining the Army’s goals.  Half of its critical technologies are not yet  mature, and its design is not yet stable.  Compounding this, its aggressive  schedule features extensive concurrency among technology development  and demonstration, design integration, system demonstration and test, and  production, leaving little time to resolve technology maturity and design  stability issues by testing.  If the Warrior program continues forward prior  to attaining adequate technology and design, it may well produce under- performing Warrior aircraft that will not meet program specifications.  The  program may then experience delays in schedule and increased costs.
The next key program event with significant financial implications is the  scheduled approval of long-lead items for the initial lot of Warrior low-rate  initial production in August 2007. That will be the first use of procurement  funding for Warrior.  We believe that is a key point at which the Army  needs to demonstrate that the Warrior program is knowledge-based and  better aligned to meet program goals within available resources than it  currently appears.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Army not approve long-lead items for Warrior  low-rate initial production until it can clearly demonstrate that the  program is proceeding based on accumulated knowledge and not a  predetermined schedule. In particular, we recommend that, prior to  approving the Warrior long-lead items for low-rate initial production, the  Secretary of the Army require that    critical Warrior technologies are fully mature and demonstrated;    Warrior design integration is complete and at least 90 percent of design  drawings be completed and released to manufacturing; and  fully-integrated Warrior developmental aircraft are fabricated and  involved in development testing.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report.  The  comments are reprinted in Appendix I.  DOD concurred with one part of  our recommendation but not with the other two parts.   DOD also  provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
DOD concurred with the part of our recommendation that it should seek  to have at least 90 percent of design drawings completed and released to  manufacturing prior to procuring long-lead items for Warrior's low-rate  initial production.  However, DOD also said that the decision to procure  long-lead items will not be based solely on the percentage of drawings  completed, but also on the schedule impact of unreleased drawings.
DOD did not concur with the rest of our recommendation that, prior to  approval of long-lead items for Warrior's low-rate initial production, the  Secretary of the Army needed to ensure (a) critical Warrior technologies  are fully mature and demonstrated and (b) fully-integrated Warrior  developmental aircraft are fabricated and involved in development testing.   Although DOD agreed that two critical technologies are less mature than  the others within the Warrior system, it also stated that these technologies  are at the correct levels to proceed with integration.  However, the Warrior  program is nearing the end of integration and is about to begin system  demonstration, signified by the July 2006 design readiness review.  In that  review, the design is set to guide the building of developmental aircraft for  testing.  These developmental aircraft will be used to demonstrate the  design in the latter half of System Development and Demonstration.  While  DOD stated that risk mitigation steps are in place, including possible use  of back-up technologies, if either of the two critical technologies is not  ready for integration, the decisions on whether to use back-up  technologies in the design would ideally have been made by the design  readiness review.   Even if the two critical technologies mature by that  point, they would still have to be integrated into the design, as would the  back-up technologies if DOD chose to use those instead.  To the extent  that technology maturation and integration extend beyond the design  readiness review, the program will incur the risk of integrating the design  at the same time it is attempting to build developmental aircraft to  demonstrate the design.  Our recommendation to make the technology  decision before committing to long-lead items provides a reasonable  precaution against letting the technology risks proceed further into the  demonstration of the developmental aircraft and into the purchase of  production items.  Making the technology decision as early as possible is  particularly important given that the program schedule allows no more  than a year to demonstrate the design with the developmental aircraft  before committing to production.    Our past work has shown that  increased costs and schedule slippages may accrue to programs that are  still maturing technologies well into system development when they  should be focused on stabilizing system design and preparing for  production.
With regards to the part of our recommendation that fully integrated  development aircraft are fabricated and involved in developmental testing  prior to approval of long-lead items, DOD indicated that modeling and  simulation, block upgrades, early operational deployments, and early  testing will enable the Department to mitigate design and performance  risks while remaining on schedule.  While we agree that these activities  help reduce risk, the most effective way to reduce risk is to verify the  design through testing of fully-integrated developmental aircraft before  committing to production.  Our recommendation underscores the value of  conducting such testing, which can still be done if technology decisions  are made early.
Our work over the past several years has shown that a knowledge-based  acquisition strategy consistent with best practices can lead to successful  outcomes.  Specifically, proceeding without mature technologies  and a stable design can lead to costly design changes after production is  underway and negatively impact funding in other Department programs,  ultimately affecting DOD’s ability to respond to other warfighter needs.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address the first objective, to identify the requirements that led to the  Army’s decision to acquire Warrior, we reviewed Army operational  requirements, acquisition strategy, and other programmatic documents  and briefings. We did not assess the validity of the Army’s requirements for  Warrior.  We also reviewed the process the Army used in selecting  Warrior. In comparing Warrior to existing unmanned systems in the  inventory, we limited our review to comparable medium-altitude systems  within the military services. To assess differences in operational  capabilities for Warrior and Predator, we reviewed operations-related  documents for Predator A and B. We also reviewed critical technologies as  well as other key technical features of the respective systems that  highlighted differences in Warrior and Predator A capabilities.
To address the second objective, whether the Army established a sound  acquisition strategy for Warrior, we reviewed planning, budget, and  programmatic documents. We also utilized GAO’s “Methodology for  Assessing Risks on Major Weapon System Programs” to assess the Army’s  acquisition strategy with respect to best practices criteria. The  methodology is derived from the best practices and experiences of leading  commercial firms and successful defense acquisition programs. We also  used this methodology to review risks within the Warrior program, but we  did not focus our assessment on all risk areas the Army and Warrior  contractor identified within the program. Instead, we focused on those  risk areas that seemed most critical to the overall soundness of the Army’s  acquisition strategy.
To achieve both objectives, we interviewed Army officials and obtained  their views of the Army’s requirements and soundness of the Army’s  acquisition strategy. We also incorporated information on Warrior from  GAO’s recent Assessments of Major Weapon Programs.
We performed our review from September 2005 to April 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Air Force, and interested  congressional committees.  We will also make copies available to others  upon request.  Additionally, the report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this  report, please contact me on 202-512-7773.  Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report.  Principal contributors to this report were William R.  Graveline, Tana Davis, and Beverly Breen.
section_title: Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense