Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS's Air and Marine Assets
Published: 2012-03-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Within DHS, the U.S. Customs and Border Protections (CBP) OAM deploys the largest law enforcement air force in the world. In support of homeland security missions, OAM provides aircraft, vessels, and crew at the request of the its customers, primarily Border Patrol, which is responsible for enforcing border security, and tracks its ability to meet requests. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which OAM (1) met its customers requests; (2) has taken steps to ensure its mix and placement of resources effectively met mission needs and addressed threats; and (3) coordinated the use of its assets with the USCG, which is to execute its maritime security mission using its assets. GAO reviewed DHS policies, interviewed OAM, Border Patrol, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and USCG officials in headquarters and in 4 field locations selected on factors, such as threats and operating environments. Results from these field visits are not generalizable. GAO analyzed OAM support request data for fiscal year 2010, and surveyed OAM and USCG officials at 86 proximately located units to determine the extent of cooperation between the two agencies. This report is a public version of a law enforcement sensitive report GAO issued in February 2012. Information deemed sensitive has been redacted.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAOs analysis of the Office of Air and Marine (OAM) data found that OAM met 73 percent of the 38,662 air support requests and 88 percent of the 9,913 marine support requests received in fiscal year 2010. The level of support differed by location, customers, and type of mission. For example, in its northern region OAM met air support requests 77 percent of the time and in its southeast region, it met these requests 60 percent of the time. The main reasons for unmet air and marine support requests were maintenance and adverse weather, respectively. OAM has taken actions, such as developing an aircraft modernization plan and purchasing all-weather vessels, to address these issues.
OAM could benefit from taking additional steps to better ensure that its mix and placement of resources meets mission needs and addresses threats. GAOs analysis of OAMs fiscal year 2010 performance results indicate that OAM did not meet its national performance goal to fulfill greater than 95 percent of Border Patrol air support requests and did not provide higher rates of support in locations designated as high priority based on threats. For example, one high-priority Border Patrol sector had the fifth highest support rate across all nine sectors on the southwest border. OAM could benefit from reassessing the mix and placement of its assets and personnel, using performance results to inform these decisions. Such a reassessment could help provide OAM with reasonable assurance that it is most effectively allocating scarce resources and aligning them to fulfill mission needs and related threats. Additionally, OAM has not documented its analyses to support its asset mix and placement across locations. For example, OAMs fiscal year 2010 deployment plan stated that OAM deployed aircraft and maritime vessels to ensure that its forces were positioned to best meet field commanders needs and respond to emerging threats, but OAM did not have documentation that clearly linked the deployment decisions in the plan to these goals. Such documentation could improve transparency to help demonstrate the effectiveness of its decisions in meeting mission needs and addressing threats.
GAOs analysis of OAM and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) air and marine survey responses indicated that they coordinated with their proximately located counterparts more frequently for activities directly related to carrying out their respective agencies missions (mission-related activities) than for mission support activities. For example, within mission-related activities, 54 percent of the 86 respondents reported sharing intelligence on a frequent basis and, within mission-support activities, about 15 percent reported that they frequently coordinated for maintenance requests. Survey respondents, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) analyses, and GAO site visits confirm that opportunities exist to improve certain types of coordination, such as colocating proximate OAM and USCG units, which currently share some marine and no aviation facilities. In addition, DHS does not have an active program office dedicated to the coordination of aviation or maritime issues. DHS could benefit from assessing actions it could take to improve coordination across a range of air and marine activities, including reconstituting departmental oversight councils, to better leverage existing resources, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and enhance efficiencies.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends, among other things, that CBP reassess decisions and document its analyses for its asset mix and placement, and that DHS enhance oversight to ensure effective coordination of OAM and USCG resources, and DHS concurred.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the largest law  enforcement air force in the world and uses these resources to prevent,  detect, and interdict acts of terrorism and other unlawful activity of  persons approaching or crossing the United States borders. In 2004, DHS  consolidated most if its air and marine resources in the Office of Air and  Marine (OAM), a subcomponent of U.S. Customs and Border Protection  (CBP), which has primary responsibility for the management, control, and  protection of the nation’s borders. As of September 2011, OAM had  approximately 267 aircraft, 301 marine vessels, and 1,843 personnel in  70 locations primarily on the southwest, northern, and southeast borders.  From fiscal years 2006 through 2011, OAM allocated about $1.3 billion to  modernize its fleet of aged aircraft and marine vessels with a smaller  variety of more flexible and sustainable assets equipped to support  homeland security missions. For fiscal year 2011, DHS allocated $814.5  million for OAM’s overall operations.
OAM carries out its mission to secure the nation’s borders by providing  aviation and marine support to various DHS components and other  federal, state, and local law enforcement agency customers. Within DHS,  OAM focuses its capabilities on border enforcement support to CBP’s  Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol), which is primarily responsible for  enforcing border security between official ports of entry to the United  States; and investigative support to the U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE), which is the largest DHS investigative entity. OAM  also provides support to combat drug trafficking in the Caribbean and  other foreign areas; provides air and marine security at national events;  provides disaster relief support; and supports other federal, state, and  local law enforcement missions. To support its various customers, it is  critical that CBP has the right mix of air and marine assets located in the  right places for maximum effectiveness and use. This effectiveness can  be enhanced by coordination of its operations with other agencies that  operate air and marine assets in the same geographic area. One such  agency is DHS’s U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), which, among its statutory  missions, is responsible for executing its maritime security mission on or  over the major waterways, including the Great Lakes and 95,000 miles of  U.S. coastline and territorial seas, using its own air and marine assets.  We previously reported on opportunities to increase coordination of OAM  and USCG assets and DHS implemented our recommendations by,  among other things, providing guidance on relative roles and  responsibilities and how asset use should be coordinated to meet border  security needs.
This report responds to your request that we review the extent to which  CBP has assessed that it has the right mix of air and marine assets in the  right locations to meet customer needs, and has coordinated with the  USCG. Specifically, we reviewed the extent that OAM:  (1) met air and marine support requests across locations, customers, and  missions;  (2) has taken steps to ensure that its mix and placement of resources met  its mission needs and addressed threats; and  (3) coordinated the operational use of its air and marine assets and  personnel with the USCG.
This report is a public version of the prior law enforcement sensitive but  unclassified report that we provided to you. DHS has deemed some of the  information in the prior report as law enforcement sensitive, which must  be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits  information describing the numbers of assets and personnel and the  types of activities at the OAM branch level and below, and the specific  operational locations we visited. Otherwise, this report addresses the  same questions and uses the same overall methodology as the sensitive  report.
In conducting our work, we interviewed DHS headquarters officials,  analyzed DHS data and documentation, conducted site visits to selected  air and marine branch locations, and administered a web-based survey to  selected OAM and USCG air and marine units. We visited 4 of the 23  OAM branch offices. We chose these locations because they comprise a  mix of differences across border locations (northern, southwest, and  southeast), threats (terrorism, drug smuggling, and illegal immigration),  and operating environments for air (desert, forest, urban, rural) and  marine (Great Lakes, coastal, intracoastal waterways). In these locations  we interviewed OAM officials and their customers including officials from  Border Patrol, ICE, and some local law enforcement officials. We also  interviewed USCG officials in all locations except one, because a USCG  unit was not located nearby. We also visited OAM’s principal radar center,  the Air and Marine Operations Center, at Riverside, California. While we  cannot generalize our work from these visits to all air and marine  branches, the information we obtained provides examples of the benefits  and challenges in providing air and marine support to customers for  various missions.
To address the first and second objective, we obtained data on the  number and type of requests OAM received for air and marine assets  from OAM’s Air and Marine Operations Reporting (AMOR) system for  fiscal year 2010, and analyzed the extent that OAM met requests for air  and marine support across locations, customers, and missions. We  assessed the reliability of these data by interviewing OAM officials  responsible for overseeing applicable quality control procedures and  reviewing available system documentation, such as user guides, among  other things. We concluded that these data were sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of this report, with one exception. We did not use data  showing marine support by customer because of missing entries and  inconsistent data entry practices, as discussed later in this report. We  discussed differences in the level of OAM support with OAM, Border  Patrol, and ICE officials at headquarters and field locations we visited. We  also assessed OAM’s internal controls related to data management and  compared them against criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government.
To address the second objective, we interviewed DHS, CBP, Border  Patrol, and OAM officials and reviewed documentation available  supporting the mix and placement of assets. We reviewed the extent that  the documentation considered current and future mission needs and  relative threats defined by CBP-designated priority locations. We  analyzed AMOR data for fiscal year 2010 to determine the extent OAM  had provided air and marine support to CBP-designated priority locations,  and was able to meet their performance goal in these locations compared  to others. We also compared data from AMOR to information reported in  CBP’s annual Performance and Accountability Report to determine the  extent that OAM’s performance in providing air support to Border Patrol  was accurately reported.
To address the first and third objective, we developed and administered a  web-based survey to each of 86 proximately located OAM air and marine  branches and units and USCG air and marine stations asking them about  the level of interagency coordination across various mission and mission  support areas, and any results in terms of performance effectiveness,  reduced duplication, and cost savings. Our survey went to senior officers  in 18 OAM air branches or units, 13 USCG air stations, 27 OAM marine  branches or units, and 28 USCG marine stations. Our response rate was  100 percent, although not all respondents answered each question. We  also reviewed past GAO and DHS analyses to identify opportunities for  increased coordination, and interviewed DHS officials and reviewed  documentation to determine the extent to which DHS headquarters  councils were in place to carry out oversight responsibilities outlined in  the council charters to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and  interoperability of air and marine assets.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 through February  2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our  scope and methodology are contained in appendix I. The survey text and  results are contained in appendix II.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: OAM Organization
paragraphs: OAM resources are divided among 70 air and marine locations across  three regions (southeast, southwest, and northern); the National Capital  area; and National Air Security Operations Centers (NASOC) throughout  the continental United States, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands as  shown in figure 1. OAM also has mission support facilities including those  for maintenance, training, and radar-tracking to detect and direct  interdiction of illegal aircraft and maritime vessels. OAM strategic  assumptions in deploying its resources include the ability to provide a 24- hour, 7-day a week response to border penetrations anywhere along the  U.S. border, with a 1-hour response time for areas designated as high  priority. Considerations in OAM allocation decisions include historical  location, congressional direction, and differences in geography and  relative need for air and marine support to address threats. As of May  2011, OAM had placed about half of its air assets on the southwest  border region and the remainder on the northern and southeast regions,  while marine resources were distributed fairly evenly across the northern,  southwest, and southeast regions. OAM has 23 branches and 6  NASOCs across these regions, and within the branches, OAM may have  one or more air or marine units.
OAM performs various missions in response to requests for air and  marine support from other DHS components—primarily Border Patrol and  ICE; as well as other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.  In addition, OAM is a representative on the Joint Interagency Task Force- South, located in Key West, Florida, a unified command sponsored by the  White House Office of National Drug Control Policy that facilitates  transnational cooperative counter-narcotic and counterterrorism efforts  throughout the South America source zone and the Caribbean, eastern  Pacific, Central America, and Mexico transit zone. OAM’s NASOCs  perform specialized missions nationwide and in the Caribbean, eastern  Pacific, and Central America, using unmanned aircraft systems, long- range patrol aircraft, and other aircraft.
Control of OAM resources to respond to these support requests differs by  location. For the northern and southwest regions, OAM branches and  units are under the tactical control of the local Border Patrol sector chief,  who has authority to approve, deny, and prioritize requests for air and  marine support. In contrast, OAM branch directors have the authority to  control how air and marine resources are used in the southeast region— where there is less Border Patrol presence, as well as in the National  Capital area and in NASOCs.
The majority of OAM operations is in support of customer or self-initiated  law enforcement missions.patrols to detect illegal activity; search for illegal aliens; surveillance; and  transport of Border Patrol, ICE, and other law enforcement officers and  their equipment. OAM also performs non-enforcement missions including  those to support maintenance, training, public relations, and to provide  humanitarian aid. Over the last 3 years, the proportion of air and marine  mission hours (flight hours or hours a vessel was on duty) for law  enforcement related missions has increased, as shown in table 1.
section_title: OAM Air and Marine Support Rates Differed by Location, and Some Field Officials Reported Resource Constraints
paragraphs: The percentage of OAM air and marine support requests met differed by  location, customer, and mission type, with unmet air support requests  primarily due to aircraft maintenance and unmet marine requests due to  adverse weather in fiscal year 2010. In addition, OAM, Border Patrol,  and ICE officials reported that OAM resources were constrained in some  locations. Further, although OAM has taken actions to address  challenges in providing air and marine support, its efforts to increase  aircraft availability have not been fully realized.
subsections: section_title: Air Support Differences Were Greater among Locations Than among Customers or Missions
paragraphs: OAM met 73 percent of the 38,662 total air support requests that it  received in fiscal year 2010, according to our analysis of AMOR data.OAM tracks its ability to meet air support requests by location, customer,  and mission in its AMOR system. Our analysis of these data showed that  the percentage of air support requests OAM met differed by region or  branch location, and to a lesser extent, by customer and mission type.  Specifically, the percentage of air support requests met ranged by 29  percentage points across regions (from 60 to 89 percent) and ranged by  over 50 percentage points across branches (from 43 to 96 percent), while  the percentage of requests met across customers ranged by about 14  percentage points (from 76 to 90 percent) and the percentage of requests  met across mission types ranged by 24 percentage points (from 61 to 85  percent).
OAM air support requests met differed by up to 29 percentage points  across five different OAM regional areas of responsibility (i.e., regions).  The highest percentage of support requests met was provided to OAM’s  NASOCs and the lowest percentage of support requests met was  provided to the U.S. southeast region, as shown in figure 2.
The percentage of air support requests met across branches and  NASOCs showed greater differences than across regions, particularly  across branches in the southwest region, as shown in table 2.
There were smaller differences in OAM’s ability to meet requests for air  support across customers than across locations. The overall percentage  of air support requests met across customers ranged from a low of 76  percent for Border Patrol and OAM to a high of 90 percent for all other  federal agencies, as shown in figure 3. Border Patrol has control over  OAM mission support priorities in the northern and southwest regions,  and OAM has control over its priorities in the southeast region. To  increase transparency of ICE support requests, OAM, Border Patrol, and  ICE established a process requiring that ICE requests that are denied at  the field level be elevated to management. Finally, our analysis of  AMOR data showed that there were few concurrent support requests that  resulted in denial of one agency’s request to support another agency. For  example, of the 38,662 requests for air support in fiscal year 2010, 2  percent (915) could not be met due to a competing mission request from  the same or another agency.
OAM headquarters officials gave the following possible explanations as to  why state and local, and all other federal agencies had higher support  rates than Border Patrol or OAM.
State and local support frequently involved OAM diverting a flight  already in progress; in such cases, aircraft availability challenges  were not an issue. As a result, OAM was able to provide the support  to the state and local agency resulting in higher support rates.
Federal agencies (as in the “all other federal agencies” category in  figure 3) and state agencies (as in the “state and local agencies”  category in figure 3) often require types of aircraft that have greater  availability in general.
Standing, daily requests—which were most common to Border  Patrol—were more likely than ad hoc requests to be canceled as a  result of adverse weather, maintenance, or aircraft and personnel  restrictions. As a result, Border Patrol may have more unmet requests  than other agencies.
The difference in percentage of support requests met across mission  categories ranged from 61 to 85 percent, with higher levels of support for  miscellaneous enforcement activities such as reconnaissance,  photography, or information. The percentage of air support was lower for  mission activities classified as search, interdiction, or radar patrol, as  shown in figure 4. OAM officials told us that there were too many  variables, such as budget and resource constraints, weather, and  conflicting mission priorities, to explain why there were differences in  percentages of support requests met for different mission types.
OAM was unable to meet 27 percent, or 10,530 of the 38,662 air support  requests it received from customers in fiscal year 2010. The primary  reason for unmet requests was the unavailability of aircraft in  maintenance, but adverse weather and unavailable aircrew were also  factors, as shown in figure 5.
OAM survey respondents were generally satisfied with the type and  number of air assets they had to perform various missions; however,  some survey respondents and field officials we interviewed identified  capability gaps, such as the lack of maritime patrol aircraft. In addition,  survey respondents and field officials reported general dissatisfaction with  the number of personnel to perform air operations. Finally, OAM has  taken actions to increase aircraft availability—including creating an  aircraft modernization plan and conducting an aged-aircraft  investigation—but these efforts have not been fully realized.
The majority of officials that responded to our survey questions from 18  OAM air locations across the southwest, northern, southeast, and  National Capital regions, and NASOCs generally reported that they were  either satisfied with, or neutral—neither satisfied nor dissatisfied—toward  the type and number of OAM aircraft they had at their locations to perform  various mission activities. For example, 16 of 18 respondents reported  satisfaction with the type of aircraft available for surveillance; and 12 of 18  respondents reported satisfaction with the number of aircraft they have to  perform information gathering. A majority of respondents also expressed  satisfaction or neutrality toward the type and number of aircraft they have  to perform 12 other mission activities. Some respondents, however,  identified capability gaps and resource limitations for certain mission  activities. For example, officials from 7 of the 14 air locations that perform  air-to-water radar patrols reported that they were very dissatisfied with the  type of aircraft available to conduct these missions.respondents from 7 of the 17 air locations that perform interdictions  expressed dissatisfaction with the number of aircraft available to conduct  these missions. One respondent reported that his/her location had no  maritime or air radar interdiction capabilities, despite having a border that  was entirely water. See appendix IV for a summary of survey results by  location for respondents’ satisfaction with the type and number of assets  for various mission activities.
The Northern Border Regional Director said, among other things, he would like to see  an additional interceptor aircraft placed in one branch location, but that the runway is too  short—the current runway is 4,000 feet and a Citation needs at least 7,000 feet. OAM  headquarters officials said that the branch is routinely required to get additional support  from neighboring branches. the maritime environment and that two branches needed more maritime  patrol aircraft. The Southwest Regional Director said he did not have  information regarding what the southwest region’s needs were in terms of  air assets because the southwest region had not performed an  assessment in 2 years.
OAM, Border Patrol and ICE officials at field locations we visited in the  northern, southeast, and southwest regions expressed various levels of  satisfaction with OAM’s air support and capabilities. For example, Border  Patrol and ICE officials in one northern border location said they were  generally satisfied with OAM’s air support. Similarly, the Acting Special  Agent in Charge for the ICE office in the southeast region said he was  generally satisfied with OAM’s air support; however, a Border Patrol  Assistant Chief for a southeast region sector said OAM had not been  responsive to their air support requests. branch officials said the air assets at their location were barely sufficient  to meet support requests for its various missions, and ICE officials said  they would like to see OAM procure better aircraft for their surveillance  needs. In addition, Border Patrol officials in the same southwest location  said that while the sector receives substantial OAM air support, OAM as  an agency is not adequately resourced in budget, facilities, air frames, or  technology to meet operational requirements. Similarly, Border Patrol,  OAM, and ICE field officials in another southwest region location said  OAM lacked the capability to perform effective maritime (air to water)  patrols, and ICE officials in that southwest region location said that  helicopters were often not available on short notice.
A Border Patrol Assistant Chief for one southeast sector said that in some instances,  Border Patrol agents may not have asked for air support in fiscal year 2010 because they  thought they might not receive it. He said that agents are currently encouraged to ask for  support whether or not they believe they will receive it.
Lastly, officials from the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S)  said they were pleased with the support they received from OAM, but  they would like higher levels of support. According to OAM officials, OAM  provided aircraft support to JIATF-S primarily for long-range patrols in the  source zones of South America and the transit zones of the Caribbean,  eastern Pacific, Central America, and Mexico. JIATF-S officials said that  OAM had specialized aircraft that were instrumental to their operations.  While OAM provided more than its committed 7,200 flight hours in fiscal  year 2010 to support the anti-drug mission in this area, JIATF-S officials  said they would like to receive higher levels of OAM support, particularly  as support from Department of Defense and other partners had been  decreasing.
Our survey of 18 OAM air locations found that the majority of respondents  (11 of 18) were either somewhat or very dissatisfied with the extent to  which they had adequate air personnel to effectively meet mission needs.  In addition, field officials we interviewed in the southwest and southeast  regions reported shortages in air personnel.
Although the Northern Border Regional Director told us most air branches  along the northern border were staffed sufficiently to meet mission needs,  the Southeast and Southwest Regional Directors cited shortfalls in the  level of air personnel. The Southeast Regional Director said air staff were  frequently assigned to temporary duty in support of UAS and surge  operations in the higher priority southwest region; and the Southwest  Regional Director said they did not have adequate personnel to be able to  respond 24-hours a day at each of its locations.
OAM officials at the field locations we visited reported shortages in air  personnel. For example, the Director of Air Operations at a northern  border branch said that the branch was originally slated to have 60 pilots,  but instead had 20 pilots. In addition, officials from two branches in the  southwest region told us they lacked personnel due to staff being away  for such reasons as temporary duty assignments, military leave, sick  leave, and training, among other reasons; they said these shortages were  negatively affecting their ability to meet air support requests. Further,  the Deputy Director of Air Operations for one southeast region branch told  us that when they received the new DASH-8 maritime patrol aircraft, they  did not receive the necessary increases in personnel to operate them,  and as a result, the branch could not fully utilize the capabilities of these  technologically advanced aircraft. According to the branch officials,  personnel problems were further exacerbated by budget constraints.
OAM reported that it had taken actions to increase aircraft availability, but  the results of these efforts have not yet been fully realized. OAM created  an aircraft modernization plan in 2006 to replace aging aircraft, and  updated this plan in 2007 with a model of projected investments over the  next 10 years. OAM officials told us that due to changes in mission needs  and changes in the aviation market, as well as limited funding, they have  had to modify the plan and continue to maintain older and less  supportable aircraft, which require more maintenance. OAM officials  reported that because they have not been able to replace aircraft as  postulated, they have not been able to standardize their fleet by reducing  aircraft types—which would reduce costs associated with training  materials and equipment, parts and spares inventories, and personnel   Due to the slow pace of aged aircraft replacement and  qualifications. the prospect of a constrained resource environment, OAM conducted an  aged aircraft investigation in fiscal year 2010 to determine the operating  life limitations of aircraft most at risk. Based on the results of this  investigation, OAM plans to either retire aircraft or create sustainment  regimens for certain aircraft to lengthen their service lives. Finally, OAM  headquarters officials said they still plan to acquire new aircraft and  reduce the number of older aircraft to eventually achieve the needed type  reductions, consistent with available funding.
In its 2006 aircraft modernization plan, OAM planned to reduce the number of aircraft  types from 18 to 8, but as of September 2011, OAM had 20 aircraft types (including  unmanned aircraft systems).
OAM headquarters officials said they have deployed all-weather aircraft  to locations where their capabilities will yield the highest operational  dividends. They also said they would like to acquire additional all- weather aircraft, but current funding structures preclude the acquisition of  more all-weather assets beyond what is currently approved. OAM officials  said they are exploring additional technology and instrumentation  solutions to increase their ability to conduct missions in adverse weather  conditions, and that this is an ongoing process.
OAM headquarters officials stated that they were also limited in their  ability to increase the availability of aircrew due to staff reductions and  budgetary constraints. OAM conducted a re-evaluation of its staffing in  2009, but it was never approved, as OAM had significant reductions to its  work force in fiscal year 2010. Headquarters officials said the effort to  redefine their work force is on hold since future funding projections  prohibit program growth. OAM officials told us they have not increased  staff over the past 2 fiscal years.
section_title: Marine Support Differed across Locations and Missions, and Data Were Unreliable to Assess Differences across Customers
paragraphs: OAM met 88 percent of the 9,913 total marine support requests that it  received in fiscal year 2010, according to our analysis of AMOR data.Similar to our analysis of air support data, our analysis of marine data  showed that the percentage of requests OAM supported differed by  location; specifically, the percentage of marine support requests met  ranged by 9 percentage points across regions (from 84 to 93 percent),  and by as much as 28 percentage points across branches (from 71 to 99  percent). AMOR tracks OAM’s ability to meet marine support requests by  location, customer, and mission; but data by customer were not reliable  for our reporting purposes due to inconsistencies in OAM data entry  practices.
The percentage of marine support requests met ranged from 84 to 93  percent across three OAM regional areas of responsibility. The  percentage of support requests met was fairly similar for the northern and  southwest regions, exceeding 90 percent; however, support was lower  (84 percent) for the southeast region, as shown in figure 6. OAM officials  said possible reasons for the differences in support rates could include  the fact that OAM has placed higher priority on the northern and  southwest regions, and that since 2008 OAM has added assets to these  regions in response to congressional direction.
Within each region, the percentage of marine support requests met  across branches showed disparities, particularly across branches in the  southwest region. Marine support requests met ranged by 15 percentage  points across branches in the southeast region (from 80 to 95 percent),  by about 10 percentage points across branches in the northern region  (from 89 to 99 percent), and by about 28 percentage points across  branches in the southwest region (from 71 to 99 percent).
Our analysis of AMOR data indicated that 94 percent of all support  requests in fiscal year 2010 were for radar patrol missions, while the  remaining 6 percent of requests involved interdiction, surveillance, and  other miscellaneous enforcement missions. The percentage of support  requests met for the remaining 6 percent of requests varied but was 86  percent overall, while the support rate for radar patrol missions was 88  percent.
We were unable to report on the percentage of marine support by  customer due to reliability concerns associated with data in AMOR.  Specifically, when inputting data into the AMOR system for unmet marine  requests, OAM staff left the data field blank that identified the customer  making the request in over 90 percent of the cases in fiscal year 2010.  OAM reported that they are replacing the AMOR system with a web- based system, which officials said will not allow users to leave important  fields blank. Officials also said they are strengthening other internal  controls—such as training and supervisory review of data entry—to  ensure complete and accurate reporting. Such actions, if implemented  effectively, should help improve the reliability of marine customer data— as well as other air and marine operations data—maintained in OAM’s  system.
OAM was unable to meet 12 percent, or 1,176 of the 9,913 marine  support requests they received in fiscal year 2010. OAM officials said one  reason that the percentage of support requests met was higher for marine  support than for air support is because the requirements for launching  aircraft are more stringent than for launching marine vessels, due to the  relative risk of failure. The primary reason for unmet marine requests was  adverse weather (6 percent of total requests),with an additional 4 percent  due to other mission priorities and crew unavailability, as shown in   figure 7.
According to our survey of 27 OAM marine units, respondents reported  they were generally satisfied with the type and number of vessels at their  location. However, OAM Regional Directors and field location officials  cited limitations, such as the lack of platform class vessels to perform  undercover operations and funding for fuel. In addition, survey  respondents and field officials cited shortages in personnel. Lastly, OAM  has taken actions to increase its ability to meet marine requests, including  purchasing “all-weather” vessels and cold-weather marine gear.
Our survey of 27 OAM marine locations across the northern, southwest,  and southeast regions found that respondents were generally satisfied  with the type and number of OAM marine vessels they had at their  locations to perform various mission activities. For example, greater  than 21 of 27 respondents reported that they were satisfied with both the  type and number of vessels they had to perform radar patrol and  interdiction missions. Of the remaining 10 activities we asked about, the  majority of respondents expressed satisfaction toward the type and  number of vessels they had to perform in 7 activities. The activity where  respondents expressed the greatest dissatisfaction with the type and  number of vessels they had was undercover support—with 12 of the 24  marine units that perform undercover support expressing dissatisfaction  with the type of vessels, and 10 of the 24 units expressing dissatisfaction  with the number of vessels. See appendix IV for a summary of survey  results by location for satisfaction with the type and number of assets  provided by mission activity.
OAM Regional Directors expressed differing levels of satisfaction with the  type and number of marine vessels in their regions. The OAM Northern  Regional Director said the northern region had the appropriate number  and type of vessels to meet mission needs. Although the Southeast  Regional Director said the southeast region had the appropriate number  of interceptor vessels to meet mission needs, he also said the southeast  region needed two other types of vessels to increase mission capability.
The Southwest Regional Director said that given the region’s distribution  of personnel, it had the appropriate number of assets; however, he said  the region did not have the appropriate number of qualified marine  personnel to meet mission needs.
Field officials at locations we visited in the northern, southeast, and  southwest regions expressed varied levels of satisfaction with OAM’s  marine support and capabilities. For example, while Border Patrol and  ICE officials in a northern border location said they were satisfied with the  marine support they received from OAM, the Director of Marine  Operations for an OAM branch in the northern region said that it was not  feasible to provide a sufficient number of vessels and crew to ensure full  coverage of the maritime border, and that the greatest need was for  marine radar to queue marine assets to perform interdictions. An OAM  branch official from the southeast region said that while the number and  type of vessels met their needs, for a period of time, they could use their  vessels only about half of each month due to budget constraints limiting  fuel. Finally, officials at an OAM branch in the southwest region told us  one of their chief resource needs was platform vessels to perform  undercover operations.
Our survey of 27 OAM marine units found that the majority of  respondents (18 of 27) reported they were either somewhat or very  dissatisfied with the extent to which they had adequate personnel to  effectively meet mission needs.
The OAM Regional Director for the Northern Region said that marine  personnel levels across his region were adequate; however, Regional  Directors for the Southeast and Southwest Regions cited shortages in  marine personnel. Specifically, the Southeast Regional Director said that  one southeast branch did not have an adequate number of marine  personnel to address increasing threat, and the Southwest Regional  Director said one location in the southwest region did not have an  appropriate number of personnel to meet mission needs.
OAM officials at field locations reported shortages of personnel. For  example, an official at one OAM marine unit in the northern region said  that sometimes the lack of marine personnel affects operational readiness  and that allowing for training and leave are consistently concerns.  Similarly, OAM officials from a southwest branch said that sufficient  numbers of personnel were not always available due to training, sick  days, annual leave, and reservists being called to active duty; and an ICE  official in a southwest border location agreed that OAM needed additional  marine interdiction agents. Lastly, an OAM survey respondent from a  marine unit in the southeast region said that although marine staffing was  increased in the past few years for new locations, the pre-existing  locations were short on manpower and a realignment of personnel was  needed.
OAM headquarters officials reported that they have taken actions to  address capability gaps due to adverse weather. For example, OAM  officials told us that they purchased “all-weather” vessels with enclosed  cabins, and that along with additional vessels acquired from USCG, they  will have sufficient assets to meet mission needs. Officials said that while  enclosed cabins do not enable OAM to launch in rough sea states, they  do enable marine agents to operate in cold weather. They said that while  larger vessels could reduce the impact of adverse weather on marine  operations, these vessels would not be capable of achieving sufficient  speeds to conduct interdictions or, if they were capable of maintaining  sufficient speeds, would be cost prohibitive.said they purchased marine dry suits and cold weather gear to further  address their ability to operate in adverse weather.
In addition, OAM officials  In regards to personnel, OAM officials told us that with the rapid growth in  the marine program during fiscal years 2008 and 2009, OAM will be able  to meet its immediate needs for marine agents, but some of those hired  were still in the process of being trained and certified.
OAM headquarters officials said unmet requests due to other mission  priorities are often the result of exigent and unanticipated requests for  marine support that are outside of the normal mission-tasking process,  and that they continually evaluate the need to re-assign marine assets to  meet evolving mission needs.
section_title: OAM Could Benefit from Reassessing Its Mix and Placement of Resources to Better Address Mission Needs and Threats
paragraphs: OAM has not documented its analyses to support its resource mix and  placement decisions across locations, and challenges in providing higher  rates of support to high priority sectors indicate that a reassessment of its  asset mix and placement may provide benefits. OAM action to document  analyses behind its deployment decisions and reassess where its assets  are deployed using performance results could better ensure transparency  and help provide reasonable assurance that OAM is most effectively  allocating its scarce resources to respond to mission needs and threats.  OAM could also improve public accountability by disclosing data  limitations that hinder the accuracy of OAM’s reported performance  results for fiscal year 2011.
subsections: section_title: OAM Documentation of Analyses to Support Asset Mix and Placement Decisions Could Improve Accountability
paragraphs: OAM has not documented significant events, such as its analyses to  support its asset mix and placement across locations, and as a result,  lacks a record to help demonstrate that its decisions to allocate resources  are the most effective ones in fulfilling customer needs and addressing  threats. To help ensure accountability over an agency’s resource  decisions, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call  for agencies to ensure that all significant events be clearly documented  and readily available for examination. OAM issued a National Strategic  Plan in 2007 that included a 10-year plan for national asset acquisitions,  and a strategic plan briefing the same year that outlined strategic end- states for air assets and personnel across OAM branches.documents included strategic goals, mission responsibilities, and threat  information, we could not identify the underlying analyses used to link  these factors to the mix and placement of resources across locations. The  2010 update to the strategic plan stated that OAM utilized its forces in  areas where they would pay the “highest operational dividends,” but OAM  did not have documentation of how operational dividends were  determined or analyzed to support deployment decisions. Furthermore,  while OAM’s Fiscal Year 2010 Aircraft Deployment Plan stated that OAM  deployed aircraft and maritime vessels to ensure its forces were   While these  positioned to best meet the needs of CBP field commanders and respond  to the latest intelligence on emerging threats, OAM did not have  documentation that clearly linked the deployment decisions in the plan to  mission needs or threats. Similarly, OAM did not document analyses  supporting the current mix and placement of marine assets across  locations. In addition, DHS’s 2005 aviation management directive  requires operating entities to use their aircraft in the most cost-effective  way to meet requirements. Although OAM officials stated that it factored  cost-effectiveness considerations, such as efforts to move similar types of  aircraft to the same locations to help reduce maintenance and training  costs into its deployment decisions, OAM does not have documentation  of analyses it performed to make these decisions.
OAM headquarters officials stated that they made deployment decisions  during formal discussions and ongoing meetings in close collaboration  with Border Patrol, and considered a range of factors such as operational  capability, mission priorities, and threats. OAM officials said that while  they generally documented final decisions affecting the mix and  placement of resources, they did not have the resources to document  assessments and analyses to support these decisions. However, such  documentation of significant events could help OAM improve the  transparency of its resource allocation decisions to help demonstrate the  effectiveness of these resource decisions in fulfilling its mission needs  and addressing threats.
section_title: OAM Reassessment of Resource Mix and Placement Could Better Ensure Customer Support in High Priority Locations
paragraphs: OAM did not meet its national air support goal and did not provide higher  rates of support to locations Border Patrol identified as high priority, which  indicates that a reassessment of OAM’s resource mix and placement  could help ensure that it meets mission needs, addresses threats, and  mitigates risk. According to DHS’s Annual Performance Report for fiscal  years 2008 through 2010, the primary and most important measure for  OAM is its capability to launch an aircraft when a request is made for  aerial support. In addition, DHS’s May 2010 policy for integrated risk  management stated that components should use risk information and  analysis to inform decision making, and a key component of risk  management is measuring and reassessing effectiveness. OAM  assessed its effectiveness through a performance goal to meet greater  than 95 percent of Border Patrol requests for air support in fiscal year  2010, excluding unmet requests due to adverse weather or other factors  OAM considered outside of its control. Our analysis showed that OAM  met 82 percent of the 22,877 Border Patrol air support requests in fiscal  year 2010.
While OAM officials stated that this goal does not apply to specific  locations, we used their stated performance measure methodology to  determine support rates across Border Patrol sectors and found that they  ranged from 54 to 100 percent in fiscal year 2010, and that OAM did not  provide higher rates of support to locations Border Patrol identified as  high priority (see table 3). This occurred at both the regional and sector  levels. For example, while the southwest border was Border Patrol’s  highest priority for resources in fiscal year 2010, it did not receive a higher  rate of OAM air support (80 percent) than the northern border (85  percent). At the sector level, while Border Patrol officials stated that one  sector was a high priority based on the relative threat of cross-border  smuggling, our analysis showed that the  sector had the fifth highest  support rate across all nine sectors on the southwest border. Findings  were similar on the northern border, where the Border Patrol’s and OAM’s  2007 Northern Border Resource Deployment Implementation Plan  prioritized four sectors based on potential terrorist threats.found that two high-priority northern border sectors had lower support  rates than three other sectors in the region that were not designated as  high-priority.
OAM headquarters officials said that they did not use support rate  performance results to assess whether the mix and placement of  resources is appropriate. OAM officials stated that they managed  operations by allocating assets, personnel, and flight hours across  locations, but these factors do not assess the outcomes of their  operations, specifically the extent to which OAM provided air and marine  support when requested to meet mission needs and address threats.
GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and  Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996), and  GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. they will begin to replace the AMOR system in March 2012.headquarters officials expect that the new information system will be  more reliable, user-friendly, and have more robust reporting capabilities;  however, officials stated that they did not have plans to change how they  will use these capabilities to inform resource mix and placement  decisions.
OAM officials stated that while they deployed a majority of resources to  high-priority sectors, budgetary constraints, other national priorities, and  the need to maintain presence across border locations limited overall  increases in resources or the amount of resources they could redeploy  from lower-priority sectors. For example, in fiscal year 2010, 50 percent of  OAM’s assets and 59 percent of OAM’s flight hours were in the southwest  border, Border Patrol’s highest-priority region. While we recognize OAM’s  resource constraints, the agency does not have documentation of  analyses assessing the impact of these constraints and whether actions  could be taken to improve the mix and placement of resources within  them. Thus, it is unclear the extent to which the current deployment of  OAM assets and personnel, including those assigned to the Southwest  border as cited above, most effectively utilizes its constrained resources  to meet mission needs and address threats.
Looking toward the future, Border Patrol, CBP, and DHS have strategic  and technological initiatives under way that will likely affect customer  requirements for air and marine support and the mix and placement of  resources across locations. Border Patrol officials stated that they are  transitioning to a new risk-based approach and Border Patrol National  Strategy in fiscal year 2012 that would likely affect the type and level of  OAM support across locations. Border Patrol officials said that the new  strategy would likely rely more heavily on intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance capabilities to detect illegal activity and increased rapid  mobility capabilities to respond to changing threats along the border.  OAM headquarters officials said that they have received a high-level  briefing of the anticipated changes in June 2011, but have not yet  received information necessary to incorporate these changes into its  current mix and placement of air and marine resources. CBP and DHS  also have ongoing interagency efforts under way to increase air and  marine domain awareness across U.S. borders through deployment of  technology that may decrease Border Patrol’s use of OAM assets for air  and marine domain awareness. Border Patrol officials in one sector, for  example, stated that they prefer deployment of technology to detect illegal  air and marine activity; OAM officials there said that air patrols are used  due to the lack of ground-based radar technology. OAM officials stated  that they will consider how technology capabilities affect the mix and  placement of air and marine resources once such technology has been  deployed.
OAM’s fiscal year 2010 aircraft deployment plan stated that OAM  deployed aircraft and maritime vessels to ensure its forces were  positioned to best meet the needs of CBP Field Commanders and  respond to emerging threats; however, our analysis indicates that OAM  did not provide higher rates of air support in response to customer need  in locations designated as high priority based on threats. In addition, as  discussed, OAM did not use performance results to assess the mix and  placement of resources. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government stresses the need for agencies to provide reasonable  assurance of the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, including the  use of the entity’s resources. As such, to the extent that the benefits  outweigh the costs, reassessing the mix and placement of its assets and  personnel, and using performance results to inform these decisions could  help provide OAM with reasonable assurance that it is most effectively  allocating its scarce resources and aligning them to fulfill its mission  needs and related threats.
section_title: OAM Did Not Disclose Data Limitations Related to the Accuracy of Reported Performance Results
paragraphs: OAM officials continue to use performance data from its AMOR system to  meet requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act  (GPRA), but have not disclosed limitations affecting the accuracy of these  data reported to Congress and the public in CBP’s Performance and  Accountability Report. OAM inaccurately reported its performance  results from fiscal years 2007 to 2010. OAM headquarters officials stated  that they were not aware that they had calculated their performance  results inaccurately—due to limitations with AMOR reporting functions— before we brought it to their attention in July 2010. In fiscal year 2010, for  example, OAM reported that it exceeded its performance goal and met  Border Patrol support requests greater than 98 percent of the time, but  the actual rate of support based on our subsequent analysis was 82  percent. After we informed them of the error, OAM officials stated they  plan to use the same methodology for calculating GPRA performance  results in fiscal year 2011 because they plan to continue to generate the  results from the AMOR system. Thus, OAM’s performance results will  continue to be calculated and reported inaccurately. The GPRA  Modernization Act of 2010 requires that agencies identify (1) the level of  accuracy required for the intended use of the data that measures  progress toward performance goals and (2) any limitations to the data at  the required level of accuracy. Disclosure of the data limitations relating  to the accuracy of OAM’s reported performance results for fiscal year  2011 could help improve transparency for achieving program results and  provide more objective information on the relative effectiveness of the  program, as intended by GPRA. This is also important because, if a  performance goal is not met, GPRA, as amended, requires agencies to  explain why the goal was not met and present plans and schedules for   OAM headquarters officials initially stated that its  achieving the goal.new information system will allow OAM to calculate and analyze  performance results starting in fiscal year 2012; however, this may not be  possible due to the technical problems that have delayed its  implementation to March 2012.
section_title: Further Action to Coordinate Air and Marine Operations Could Provide Benefit
paragraphs: OAM and USCG officials we surveyed across proximately located air and  marine units reported varying levels of coordination across missions,  activities, or resources and that to different extents, the coordination that  occurred between the agencies was effective and resulted in reduced  duplication and cost savings. However, OAM and USCG officials  identified one or more areas where improved coordination was needed,  and several officials identified opportunities to colocate facilities that, if  implemented, could achieve cost savings. DHS oversight to maximize  interagency coordination across locations could better ensure the most  efficient use of resources for mission accomplishment.
subsections: section_title: OAM and USCG Field Units Reported Differences in the Extent of Coordination across Mission-related Activities
paragraphs: Our survey showed that the extent of coordination between OAM and  USCG air and marine units varied by mission activity. We surveyed  officials from 86 OAM and USCG air and marine units that were  proximately located about the frequency of interagency coordination  across five mission-related and four mission support activities.cited a multilayered approach to border security which relies on close  coordination with partner agencies to reduce reliance on any single point  or program that could be compromised and extends the zone of security.  Across mission-related activities, 54 percent of responding units reported  sharing intelligence on a frequent basis and 43 percent reported sharing  schedules, on a frequent basis. For example, personnel from USCG,  Department of Defense, and Federal Aviation Administration are assigned  to OAM’s Air and Marine Operations Center to facilitate interagency   CBP has  coordination.mission activities, such as prioritizing missions (22 percent) and dividing  up mission assignments (20 percent), as shown in figure 8. OAM and  USCG headquarters officials told us that a number of factors may affect  the opportunities and frequency of interagency coordination including the  extent that there is overlap between agency missions and geographic  areas of responsibility. For detailed survey results, see appendix II.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The limited resources that OAM has to provide support to OBP, ICE, and  other customers highlights the importance of effectively assessing the  extent to which the mix and placement of OAM resources best meets  competing needs and addresses threats across locations and  documenting analyses to support those decisions. While OAM has  developed strategic and deployment plans, it did not document analyses  that clearly linked such factors as threats and mission needs to its  resources deployment decisions. Further, while OAM has taken actions  that could increase its ability to meet support requests, our analysis  indicates potential issues with the mix and placement of resources, such  as challenges in meeting its support goal and lower support rates in  locations identified as high priority based on threats. As such,  documenting analyses to support decisions regarding the mix and  placement of OAM assets and personnel could help improve  transparency of OAM’s resource decisions. Moreover, to the extent that  the benefits outweigh the costs, taking action to ensure reassessment of  the mix and placement of its assets could help provide OAM with  reasonable assurance that it is most effectively allocating its scarce  resources and aligning them to fulfill its mission needs and related  threats. Furthermore, while OAM has established a performance measure  to assess support provided to its customers, OAM did not disclose data  limitations relating to the accuracy of its reported performance results for  support provided. Such disclosure could help improve transparency for  achieving program results and provide more objective informative on the  relative effectiveness of the program.
With regard to coordination, survey respondents reported that  coordination that occurred between OAM and USCG, such as intelligence  sharing, was effective and resulted in reduced duplication and cost  savings. However, our survey and interviews also highlighted activities  where additional coordination could help leverage existing resources,  eliminate unnecessary duplication and enhance operational efficiencies,  including an assessment of whether proximate OAM and USCG units  should be colocated. Thus, DHS could benefit from assessing actions it  could take to improve coordination across a range of air and marine  activities, including reconstituting the DHS Aviation Management Council  and Marine Vessel Management Council.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that OAM assets and personnel are best positioned to  effectively meet mission needs and address threats, and improve  transparency in allocating scarce resources, we recommend that the  Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection take the following  three actions: document analyses, including mission requirements and threats, that  support decisions on the mix and placement of OAM’s air and marine  resources;  to the extent that benefits outweigh the costs, reassess the mix and  placement of OAM’s air and marine resources to include mission  requirements, performance results, and anticipated CBP strategic and  technological changes; and disclose data limitations relating to the accuracy of OAM’s reported  performance results for support provided.
To help DHS to better leverage existing resources, eliminate unnecessary  duplication and enhance efficiencies, we further recommend that the DHS  Deputy Secretary assess the feasibility of actions that could be taken to  improve coordination across a range of air and marine activities, including  reconstituting the DHS Aviation Management Council and Marine Vessel  Management Council. Areas under consideration for increased  coordination could include the colocation of proximate OAM and USCG  units and the five activities identified by officials as resulting in cost  savings, including sharing intelligence, dividing up responsibilities for  missions, advance sharing of mission schedules, joint training, and  logistics.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOD for their review and  comment. DOD did not comment on the report, but DHS provided written  comments which are reprinted in Appendix V. In commenting on the draft  report, DHS concurred with the recommendations and described actions  underway or planned to address them. While DHS did not take issue with  the recommendations, DHS provided details in its response that merit  additional discussion in two areas.
In its letter, DHS states that additional context regarding CBP’s processes  and documentation was necessary to provide a more balanced  assessment of the manner in which OAM allocates scarce resources in  support of its air and marine asset deployment and describes the  historical development of OAM as well as its processes for allocating  resources. We believe that the report presents appropriate context,  balanced and fair analyses of the allocation of OAM personnel and flight  hours using OAM’s data, and measures OAM’s performance results using  its primary and most important performance measure for fiscal year  2010—OAM’s capability to launch an aircraft when a request is made for  support. In addition, in commenting on the draft report, DHS also states  CBP was unable to verify or duplicate GAO’s analysis of fiscal year 2010  data from TECS, but was taking steps to confirm actual figures. As the  report states, we worked closely with OAM system officials to extract the  underlying data from the AMOR system and discussed our preliminary  analyses with OAM officials along with the methodology we used in  calculating OAM’s performance results. OAM officials stated that they  could not duplicate our analyses due to limitations with AMOR’s reporting  capabilities. DHS states that OAM has coordinated with the Office of  Information and Technology to develop and test a TECS report following  a methodology that will accurately report performance results within 60  days.
In regard to the recommendation that CBP document analyses, including  mission requirements and threats, that support decision on the mix and  placement of OAM’s air and marine assets, DHS concurred. DHS stated  that CBP is finalizing its Fiscal Year 2012-2013 Aircraft Deployment Plan  and that in the next iteration of this plan, which CBP plans to initiate in the  third quarter of fiscal year 2013; CBP will provide additional  documentation of its analysis supporting decision of the mix and  placement of air and marine resources, including mission requirements  and threats. Such actions should increase transparency and demonstrate  that resource deployment decisions are responsive to customer need and  threat.
DHS also concurred with the recommendation to reassess the mix and  placement of OAM’s air and marine resources to include mission  requirements, performance results, and anticipated CBP strategic and  technological changes to the extent that the benefits outweigh the costs  stating that it planned to complete such actions as part of the next  iteration of the Aircraft Deployment Plan. Further, DHS states that based  on budgetary forecasts, OAM expects that its budget will continue to  decrease and that as a result, OAM will meet a lower percentage of  requests for air support in coming years. We acknowledge these  concerns and believe that a reassessment of the right mix and placement  of resources is particularly important in a constrained budgetary  environment and should provide reasonable assurance that it is most  effectively allocating its scarce resources and aligning them to fulfill its  mission needs and related threats.
Regarding the recommendation to disclose data limitations relating to the  accuracy of OAM’s reported performance results for support provided,  DHS concurred. It also reported that CBP is modifying its performance  measure beginning with the reporting of fiscal year 2011 results and plans  to disclose applicable data limitations related to performance results.  Such actions should improve transparency for achieving program results  and provide more objective information on the relative effectiveness of the  program.
In regard to the recommendation that DHS assess the feasibility of  actions it could take to improve coordination across a range of air and  marine activities, including reconstituting the DHS Aviation Management  Council and Marine Vessel Management Council, DHS concurred and  described multiple initiatives it had underway to improve coordination  across air and marine activities. Such activities included DHS meetings  between CBP and USCG aviation officials to explore options for joint  acquisitions, colocation, air operations, and aviation governance; and a  cost-benefit assessment analyzing potential efficiencies with DHS  aviation activities including maintenance, training, and ground handling  equipment. DHS also identified coordination efforts of its component-level  Boat Commodity Council to transfer used vessels from USCG to CBP.  DHS discussed attendance at a January 2012 interagency meeting  hosted by CBP that discussed helicopter and marine vessel acquisitions,  the P-3 aircraft Service Life Extension Program, potential opportunities for  consolidation of facilities and locations of new support units and the Fiscal  Year 2012-2013 Aircraft Deployment Plan. While these are positive initial  steps and could help improve coordination, we continue to believe that it  will be important for DHS to assess the feasibility of actions to further  improve coordination of air and marine activities on a more permanent  basis, such as reconstituting the DHS Aviation Management Council and  Marine Vessel Management Council, among other possible actions.
DHS also provided technical comments that we incorporated as  appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and interested  congressional committees as appropriate. The report will also be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any further questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
subsections: section_title: Objectives
paragraphs: This report addresses the extent that the U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) has the right mix of air and marine assets in the right  locations to meet customer needs, and effectively coordinated with the  U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). Specifically, we reviewed the extent that the  Office of Air and Marine (OAM):  (1) met air and marine support requests across locations, customers, and  missions,  (2) has taken steps to ensure that its mix and placement of resources met  its mission needs and addressed threats, and  (3) coordinated the operational use of its air and marine assets and  personnel with the USCG.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: For all three objectives, we collected and analyzed relevant operational  documents; annual reports; cooperation agreements and memoranda  among federal agencies; budget information; and other relevant  information issued by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),  DHS’s Program Analysis and Evaluation office, CBP’s Office of Border  Patrol and OAM, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),  USCG, and the Department of Defense (DOD). We also collected  relevant information, data and documentation, such as cooperative  agreements between local agencies, at each of the site visits. We also  interviewed officials from DHS’s Program Analysis and Evaluation office,  Division of the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, as well as  headquarters officials from CBP, OAM, Border Patrol, ICE, and USCG. In  addition, we met with DOD officials responsible for programs intended to  enhance maritime and air domain awareness and obtained relevant  reports and documents on these efforts. We also reviewed past GAO  reports and DHS studies discussing opportunities for increased  coordination and discussed ongoing DHS efforts to increase oversight  over air and marine assets with officials from DHS’s Chief Administrative  Officer. We also conducted a site visit to OAM’s Air and Marine  operations Center at Riverside, California where we interviewed officials  and were provided a briefing on the Air and Marine Operations Center  operations, including a tour of the center.
We conducted site visits to 4 of the 23 OAM branch offices, including air  and marine units associated with those branches. At the site visits, we  conducted semi-structured interviews with personnel from OAM  operational air and marine units, USCG, ICE, and the Border Patrol, as  well as some local law enforcement officials (OAM marine and the USCG  are not present at one location we visited). We selected these 4 locations  because they illustrated OAM operations at both the northern and  southern U.S. borders, a mix of threats (terrorism, drug smuggling, and  illegal immigration), operating environments for air (desert, forest, urban  and rural), as well as marine operations along the coasts, on the Great  Lakes, and, in the case of a southeast location, interactions with the Joint  Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) at Key West, Florida. All 4 also  provide support for ICE and Border Patrol operations in the interior of the  country. In addition, the 4 sites provided coverage in terms of the three  geographic regions into which OAM units are divided administratively  (southwest, southeast, northern). Three of the 4 sites include both OAM  and USCG entities with air and/or marine assets in close geographic  proximity, and the agencies use an array of air and marine assets under  varying operational conditions. We also interviewed officials from JIATF-S  to obtain information on that location’s coordinated operations covering  parts of the Gulf of Mexico, the straits of Florida, the Caribbean and the  Central and South America transit zone for illegal smuggling of persons  and contraband.
To address objectives 1 and 2, we obtained performance data for fiscal  year 2010 covering the time period of October 1, 2007, through  September 30, 2010, from OAM’s system of record—the Air and Marine  Operations Reporting System (AMOR)—which is a module in ICE’s Case  Management System, which is in turn part of TECS, a legacy DHS  system. This performance data primarily included the number of air and  marine support requests that were met and not met, and the reasons why  the requests were not met.
Due to the lack of (1) documentation as to the number and identity of the  AMOR tables, (2) the keys required to join them, (3) the business rules  required to use the data correctly, and (4) AMOR subject matter experts,  we were unable to obtain copies of the AMOR data files. Instead, we  obtained copies of the temporary data extract files produced when  individual reports are requested and produced by the AMOR system for  the following reports:
Enforcement Support Report 02: Support Requests by Agency
Miscellaneous Report 01: No Launch Activities by Branch
Flight Hours Report 06: Flight Hours by Type of Aircraft
Flight Hours Report 09: Flight Hours by Mission
Service Hours Report 03: Service Hours by Type of Vessel  We found that data on unmet air and marine support requests prior to  fiscal year 2010 may not have been entered consistently and only used  data from fiscal year 2010 in our analysis. For example, at two of the four  locations we visited, we found that a number of unmet air support  requests were not entered properly prior to fiscal year 2010. We also  found that many of the data entries for unmet support requests identifying  which agency an activity (e.g., flight) supported were left blank for fiscal  year 2010, including 16 percent in support of requests for air enforcement  activities and 93 percent in support of requests for marine enforcement  activities. In interviews with OAM officials, they said these blank entries  represented unmet support requests most likely in support of OAM.  Based on these limitations, we did not report unmet support requests by  customer for marine activities.
We used the 2010 Air data from Enforcement Support Report 02 and  Miscellaneous Report 01 to replicate OAM’s performance measure  calculation by branch. First, we determined which Miscellaneous Report  01 no launches were in support of Border Patrol (BPL) as follows:  Include only no launches where BPL is listed in any of the five in  support of codes
Exclude the following no launch categories:
39: Canceled by requester
01: Target Legal
03: Lost Target- prior to launch
07: Visual sighting
08: Locate only
11: Insufficient/Inadequate
16: Weather
17: Information not timely
27: Target return to foreign
40: Request did not meet GSA requirements
41: Suspect no show
42: Geographic limitation/Distance too
44: No launch/Ground
45: No launch/NAV violation
46: No country clearance
56: Static display—not operated for display
57: Certificate of Authorization Restrictions  We then determined the number of BPL launches from Enforcement  Report 02 and calculated the OAM performance measure for BPL support  as follows:
Total requests = launches + no launches
Percentage of support requests met = launches / total requests  Finally, we mapped the Border Patrol sectors to the OAM branches as  follows:  As part of our data reliability assessment, we performed electronic data  testing for the data elements in the report extract files that we used;  reviewed available system and user documentation, including user guides  and data dictionaries; compared totals for the same time periods between  similar variables from different reports; and reviewed our preliminary  analyses with knowledgeable OAM officials, including the TECS Systems  Control Officer. We determined that the AMOR data used in the report  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To address objectives 1 and 3, we conducted a web-based, self- administered questionnaire survey about coordination and related issues  with all OAM air, OAM marine, USCG air and USCG marine units  nationwide and in the Caribbean identified as being likely to coordinate  with each other by OAM and USCG headquarters. We asked OAM and  USCG headquarters points of contact to identify the USCG units that  were most likely to be coordinating their operations in some regard with  proximately located OAM air and marine units. A total of 86 OAM and  USCG units were identified by the headquarters’ points of contact and  senior officers from these units were asked to respond.
The survey questions, although nearly identical, were tailored specifically  to each type of unit—OAM air, OAM marine, USCG air and USCG  marine. OAM air and OAM marine were asked about the sufficiency of  their assets to perform certain types of missions; this was not included in  the USCG questionnaires, as it was considered outside the scope of the  engagement. The survey questions and summary results are included in  appendix II. The questionnaire was pre-tested with two OAM air units and  two OAM marine units. In addition, draft versions were reviewed by  cognizant OAM and USCG headquarters’ personnel, and by a survey  methodologist at GAO. We made adjustments to question wording and  order based on pre-test results and review comments we received.
The survey was conducted using a self-administered questionnaire  posted on the web. We contacted intended recipients via e-mail before  the survey to establish that the correct respondent had been identified,  and later with passwords and links to the questionnaire. We made follow- up contacts with nonrespondents by e-mail and phone throughout the  field period. Headquarters (USCG and OAM) points of contact were also  sent email reminders to those not yet responding. The survey data were  collected from May 4 through May 24, 2011. We received completed  questionnaires from all the recipients, for a 100 percent unit-level  response rate, although not all units answered each question in the  survey. Table 5 below shows the proximately located OAM and USCG air  and marine units to which the survey was sent.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 through February  2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Survey Responses
paragraphs: The questions we asked in our survey of OAM and USCG air and marine  units are shown below. Our survey was comprised of closed-ended and  open-ended questions. In this appendix, we include all the survey  questions and aggregate results of responses to the closed-ended  questions; we do not provide responses to the open-ended questions for  ease of reporting. The tables of aggregated response totals to each  question are broken down by branch and type of unit. Not all eligible  respondents answered each question. Questions 16, 17, and 18 were  included only in the OAM surveys. For a more detailed discussion of our  survey methodology see appendix I.
Survey of Coordination of Air Operations and Assets at OAM/USCG  Locations U.S. Government Accountability Office  The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is reviewing the assets  and operations of CBP's Office of Air and Marine (OAM). As part of this  effort, GAO is reviewing the coordination between OAM and the U.S.  Coast Guard (USCG).
This questionnaire gathers information on coordination-related issues  regarding air missions (including air patrols, interdiction of contraband or  other illegal activities, surveillance, etc.), air-related training, determining  air asset requirements, and the extent to which you have the appropriate  resources for mission activities.
If you would like to see or print the questionnaire before completing it  online, click here to open. You will need Adobe Acrobat Reader to view  this. If you do not have this program, click here to download this software.
About You and Your Location  Question 1: Who is the person primarily responsible for completing this questionnaire  whom we can contact in case we need to clarify a response?  Enter text or numbers  in each of the spaces below.  (e.g., Great Lakes Air and Marine Branch)
Coordination of Air/Maritime Mission Activities  Question 2: We realize that different OAM locations may have varying needs for  coordination with the USCG unit there or nearby, and may not need to coordinate if  operating areas and activities do not overlap. The next two questions ask whether  your unit participates in any formal or informal entities intended to enhance or  promote coordination, and in what specific ways, if any, it coordinates with the USCG.
IF OTHER:  Question 4: IF ANY AIR/MARITIME MISSION COORDINATION TAKES PLACE:  What is the one USCG/OAM unit with which your unit has the most coordination?  Please enter approximate distance between your unit and the coordinating unit as a  whole number of miles.
IF NO AIR/MARITIME MISSION COORDINATION IN QUESTIONS 2 AND 3: Click  the link below to skip to question 13, the next applicable question. (If you do  coordinate, continue with next page.)
Click here to skip to Question 13  Question 6A: Are any of the following types of written guidance (including policies,  agreements, MOUs) used to govern, guide or carry out any coordination prior to  air/maritime missions between OAM and USCG at or near your location? Please click  yes or no for each type. agreements - Used?
USCG guidance - Used?
MOU - Used?
Other guidance - Used?
Question 6B: If yes, how helpful are they to furthering coordination on air/maritime  missions?
For those used, please additionally click one "helpfulness" button. [Table II.6 Answers  to Survey Question 6]  Question 7: IF YES TO ANY GUIDANCE:  If an electronic copy of the guidance is available, please upload that file(s) by  browsing to its location on your computer, using the box below. Please only upload  files under 2Mb in size. [Open-ended answers not displayed]  Question 13: In your opinion, should there be more, less, or about the same amount  or frequency of coordination on air/maritime missions, activities, or resources  between OAM and USCG at or near your location in each of the following ways? If  there is currently no coordination in a particular way, and that is the appropriate level,  click "About the same" for that row.
IF OTHER:  [Open-ended answers not displayed]  Question 18: Overall, considering the number, availability, and qualifications of  personnel at your location, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the extent to  which you have adequate personnel to effectively meet mission needs? [Table II.15  Answers to Survey Question 18]       Question 19: Do you have any additional explanations of your answers or comments  on any of the issues in this questionnaire?  [Open-ended answers not displayed]  Question 20: Are you done with this questionnaire?
Clicking "Yes" below tells GAO that your answers are final. We will not use your  answers unless the "Yes" button is checked when you last exit the questionnaire.
section_title: Appendix III: OAM Air and Marine Assets by Region and National Air Security Operations Centers
paragraphs: Figure 14 displays the number of air and marine assets assigned to  OAM’s regions, which include its 23 branches and 6 National Air Security  Operations Centers (NASOCs).
section_title: Appendix IV: Survey Results on OAM Officials’ Frequency of Satisfaction with Type and Number of Assets
paragraphs: In this appendix, survey responses from questions 16 and 17 are  presented. Only Office of Air and Marine (OAM) air and marine units were  surveyed about their satisfaction with aircraft and marine vessels (USCG  was not) respectively. Not all eligible respondents answered all parts of  each question. Respondents who did not report performing a specific type  of mission or who answered “don’t know” to a question about that type of  mission were not included in the response counts. For a more detailed  discussion of our survey methodology see appendix I and for complete  survey responses, see appendix II.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
paragraphs: Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Cindy Ayers (Assistant Director),  Chuck Bausell, Alexander Beata, Richard D. Brown, Frances A. Cook,  Jeff R. Jensen, Nancy Kawahara, Stanley Kostyla, Linda S. Miller, Carl M.  Ramirez, Richard M. Stana, Clarence Tull, Jonathan Tumin, and Johanna  Wong, made significant contributions to this report.