Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam
Published: 2007-09-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Over the next several years, implementation of the Department of Defense's (DOD) Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will result in the realignment of U.S. forces and the construction of new facilities costing billions of dollars at installations overseas. The Senate and House reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to monitor DOD's overseas master plans and to provide congressional defense committees with assessments each year. The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to review DOD's master planning effort for Guam as part of these annual reviews. This report, first, examines how the overseas plans have changed and the extent to which they address the challenges faced by DOD and, second, assesses the status of DOD's planning effort and the challenges associated with the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The fiscal year 2008 overseas master plans, which provide infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the overseas regional commands' area of responsibility, have been updated to reflect U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements as well as GAO's prior recommendations for improving the plans. The plans also address DOD's challenges to a greater extent than they did in previous years. However, two areas continue to be of concern. First, the master plans do not address the issue of residual value--that is, the value of property being turned over to the host nation based on its reuse of property. Although DOD officials believe that residual value cannot be readily predicted and therefore should not be in the master plans, compensation received for U.S capital improvements at installations returned to host nations could affect U.S. funding requirements for overseas construction. Second, the master plan for PACOM, which provides details on the command's training limitations in Japan and several other challenges, does not provide details regarding training limitations for the Air Force in South Korea, which could cause the United States to pursue alternatives, such as training in other locations, downsizing, or relocating that could affect overseas basing plans. Without addressing the residual value issue and providing details on these training challenges, DOD cannot provide Congress a comprehensive view enabling it to make informed decisions regarding funding. GAO has previously recommended that overseas regional commands address residual value issues and that PACOM explain how it plans to address existing training limitations. Because these recommendations have not been fully addressed, GAO considers them to be open and believes that they still have merit. DOD's planning effort for the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam is in its initial stages, with many key decisions and challenges yet to be addressed. Among the challenges to be addressed is completing the required environmental impact statement, initiated in March 2007. According to DOD officials, this statement and associated record of decision could take up to 3 years to complete and will affect many of the key decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of the military infrastructure development--decisions needed to develop a master plan for the military buildup on Guam. DOD and the services are still determining the exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam, needed in order to identify the housing, operational, quality of life, and services support infrastructure required for the Marine Corps realignment and the other services' buildup. DOD officials said that additional time is needed to fully address other challenges associated with the Guam military buildup, including funding requirements, operational requirements, and community impact. Until the environmental assessment and initial planning efforts are completed, Congress will need to be kept abreast of developments and challenges affecting infrastructure and funding decisions to make appropriate funding and oversight decisions.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Over the next several years, the ongoing implementation of the  Department of Defense’s (DOD) integrated global presence and basing  strategy will result in a global realignment of U.S. forces and installations,  including a reduction of the number of troops stationed overseas and a  consolidation of overseas bases. While the strategy is intended to make the  overseas posture of the United States more flexible and efficient, it will  also require new facilities costing billions of dollars, some of the cost to be  borne by the United States and some by other nations, such as Japan and  South Korea. A key component of the U.S. Pacific Command’s (PACOM)  integrated global presence and basing strategy is the proposed military  buildup on the island of Guam—a U.S. territory located in the western  Pacific Ocean. This buildup includes personnel, weapons systems, and  infrastructure of all the military services—Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and  Air Force. The most ambitious undertaking involves moving  approximately 8,000 marines and their estimated 9,000 dependents from  Okinawa, Japan, to Guam.
As plans for overseas basing began to emerge, the Senate Appropriations  Committee expressed concern about the use of military construction  budget authority for projects at overseas bases that may soon be obsolete  or closed because of changes being considered by DOD and the military  services. Accordingly, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2004  military construction appropriation bill directed DOD to prepare detailed,  comprehensive master plans for changing infrastructure requirements at  U.S. military facilities in each of the overseas regional commands. DOD  was required to provide a baseline report on these plans, along with yearly  updates on their status and their implementation with the annual military  construction budget submissions through 2008. Subsequently, the House  conference report accompanying the 2004 military construction  appropriation bill directed the department to prepare comprehensive  master plans with yearly updates through fiscal year 2009. The Senate  report directed that the master plans identify precise facility requirements  and the status of properties being returned to host nations. Additionally,  the Senate report stated that the plans should identify funding  requirements as well as the division of funding responsibilities between  the United States and host nations. The Senate report also directed us to  monitor the master plans developed and implemented for the overseas  regional commands and to provide the congressional defense committees  with assessment reports each year. In July 2006, the Senate report  accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military construction appropriation bill  directed us to review DOD’s master planning effort for Guam as part of  our annual review of the overseas master plans.
This is our fourth report responding to the requirements contained in the  fiscal year 2004 Senate military construction appropriation bill report. Our  prior work found that DOD’s overseas master plans generally exceeded  the reporting requirements established by Congress, but that there were  opportunities for improvement. This report examines, first, how the  overseas master plans have changed since last year, and the extent to  which the plans address the challenges faced by DOD during  implementation. Second, representing our initial examination of DOD’s  planning effort for the Guam military buildup, this report assesses the  status of DOD’s planning effort and the challenges associated with the  buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam.
In conducting our work, we visited overseas regional combatant  commands—PACOM, including U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and U.S. Forces  Japan; U.S. European Command (EUCOM); and U.S. Central Command  (CENTCOM)—to see selected installations and military construction  projects firsthand and to discuss compliance with the Office of the  Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) most recent guidance and the challenges the  commands face in implementing the plans. After the plans were issued,  we reviewed them to determine how the plans have changed since last  year and the extent to which the plans complied with the congressional  reporting requirements. We assessed whether the plans provided  information in a complete, clear, and consistent manner, and we discussed  with OSD and command officials whether improvements in the guidance  and reporting were needed. We generally concluded that a plan was  improved over those of prior years if it included details on base categories,  host nation funding levels, facility requirements and costs, environmental  remediation issues, and other challenges affecting implementation of the  plans. To determine the status of the Guam planning effort, we met with  officials of OSD, PACOM, and the Navy Joint Guam Program Office  (JGPO)—the office established to plan and execute the military  development on Guam—to discuss the status of DOD’s planning effort and  the challenges associated with the buildup of military forces and  infrastructure on Guam. We also visited U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine  Corps Forces, Pacific; U.S. Army Pacific; and Pacific Air Forces to discuss  the various factors that can affect U.S. infrastructure requirements and  costs in Guam, and we reviewed information included in the Guam  Integrated Military Development Plan—a notional document detailing the  future military development on Guam over the next decade and beyond. It  is important to note that DOD considers the Guam Integrated Military  Development Plan to be separate and distinct from the overseas master  plans that it provides Congress annually in response to the Senate report  and House conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military  construction appropriation bill. In Guam, we visited the Naval Base Guam  and Andersen Air Force Base to tour existing installations and facilities  and observe future sites for military construction firsthand and to identify  challenges to these plans. We also met with the Governor of Guam and his  staff, members of the Guam legislature, staff from the Office of the  Delegate of Guam for the House of Representatives, and various  community groups to discuss their perspectives on the challenges  associated with the influx of military personnel and missions to Guam.
We conducted our review from September 2006 through July 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See  appendix I for more information on our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Military construction appropriations fund the planning, design,  construction, alteration, and improvement of military facilities worldwide.  The military construction appropriation request for fiscal year 2008  included approximately $21.3 billion for military construction and family  housing, of which nearly $1.2 billion (5.6 percent) is designated for  specific overseas locations, mostly comprising enduring installations, and  not for new and emerging requirements outside existing basing  structures. As of fiscal year 2006, DOD had 3,731 installations, with 766  installations located overseas.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Global Realignment
paragraphs: In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation to develop a  defense strategy and force structure capable of meeting changing global  threats. As part of its transformation, DOD has been reexamining overseas  basing requirements to allow for greater U.S. military flexibility to combat  conventional and asymmetric threats worldwide. In September 2001, DOD  issued its Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which addressed, among  other issues, reorienting the U.S. military global posture. The report called  for developing a permanent basing system that provides greater flexibility  for U.S. forces in critical areas of the world as well as providing temporary  access to facilities in foreign countries that enable U.S. forces to train and  operate in the absence of permanent ranges and bases.
In August 2004, President Bush announced what has been described as the  most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since  the end of the Korean War. The initiative is intended to close bases no  longer needed to meet Cold War threats, as well as bring home many U.S.  forces while stationing more flexible, deployable capabilities in strategic  locations around the world. The integrated global presence and basing  strategy is the culmination of various DOD studies, including the overseas  basing and requirements study, the overseas presence study, and the U.S.  global posture study.
As a part of DOD’s global realignment, in 2004 the United States and Japan  began a series of sustained security consultations aimed at strengthening  the U.S.-Japan security alliance to better address today’s rapidly changing  global security environment. DOD’s Defense Policy Review Initiative  established a framework for the future of U.S. force structure in Japan  designed to create the conditions to reduce the burden on local Japanese  communities and create a continuing presence for U.S. forces by  relocating units to other areas, including Guam, while repositioning U.S.  forces to respond better to regional crises. This initiative also includes a  significant reduction and reorganization of the Marine Corps posture on  Okinawa, Japan, to include relocating 8,000 marines and their estimated  9,000 dependents to Guam. More than 10,000 marines and their  dependents will remain stationed in Okinawa after this relocation. The  initiatives also include the relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five from Atsugi  Naval Air Facility to Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, Japan; the  replacement of the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station, Japan;  transformation of Army headquarters at Camp Zama, Japan; deployment of  a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan;  deployment of a transportable ballistic missile defense radar system;  relocation of training activities; land returns; and shared use of facilities.
Guam is the westernmost territory of the United States and is strategically  located in the Pacific Ocean approximately 3,810 miles southwest of  Honolulu, Hawaii; 1,600 miles east of Manila, the Philippines; and 1,560  miles southeast of Tokyo, Japan (see fig. 1).
Given its strategic location, Guam is an integral part of DOD’s logistical  support system and serves as an important forward operational hub for a  mix of military mission requirements. According to DOD, Guam provides  strategic flexibility, freedom of action, and prompt global action for the  Global War on Terrorism, peace and wartime engagement, and crisis  response. About 29 percent of the land is controlled by DOD (see fig. 2), 52  percent is privately owned, and 19 percent is under the supervision of the  Government of Guam.
section_title: Requirements for the Overseas Master Plans and a Master Plan for the Military Buildup on Guam
paragraphs: In 2003, the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed concern that the  overseas basing structure had not been updated to reflect the new realities  of the post-Cold War world. The committee has also expressed concern  about the use of military construction budget authority for projects at  bases that may soon be obsolete because of changes being considered in  overseas presence and basing. Consequently, in Senate Report 108-82, the  Senate Appropriations Committee directed DOD to prepare detailed,  comprehensive master plans for the changing infrastructure requirements  for U.S. military facilities in each of its overseas regional commands.  According to the Senate report, at a minimum, the plans are to identify  precise facility requirements and the status of properties being returned to  host nations. In addition, the report stated that the plans should identify  funding requirements and the division of funding responsibilities between  the United States and cognizant host nations. The Senate report also  directed DOD to provide congressional defense committees a report on  the status and implementation of those plans with each yearly military  construction budget submission through fiscal year 2008. Subsequently,  the House conference report accompanying the 2004 military construction  appropriation bill also directed the department to prepare comprehensive  master plans with yearly updates through fiscal year 2009. The first report  was due with the fiscal year 2005 military construction budget submission  and is to be updated each succeeding year to reflect changes to the plans  involving specific construction projects being added, canceled, or  modified, or funding for those projects being redirected to other needs,  and justification for such changes. The Senate report also directed GAO to  monitor the comprehensive master plans being developed and  implemented for the overseas regional commands and to provide the  congressional defense committees with a report each year giving an  assessment of the plans.
As initiatives for expanding U.S. military presence on Guam began to  emerge, the Senate Appropriations Committee noted the ambitiousness of  the military construction program and the need for a well-developed  master plan to efficiently use the available land and infrastructure. In July  2006, the committee recommended deferral of two military construction  projects at Andersen Air Force Base that were included in the President’s  budget request until such time as they can be incorporated into a master  plan for Guam and viewed in that context. To that end, the committee  directed the Secretary of Defense to submit to the appropriations  committees a master plan for Guam by December 29, 2006, and a report  accounting for the United States’ share of this construction program to  project-level detail and the year in which each project is expected to be  funded. The Senate report also directed GAO to review DOD’s master  planning effort for Guam as part of its annual review of DOD’s overseas  master plans.
section_title: DOD Organizations and Responsibilities
paragraphs: Within DOD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics was tasked to prepare the detailed, comprehensive master  plans. In turn, the Under Secretary assigned the overseas regional  combatant commands responsibility for preparing comprehensive master  plans for their areas of responsibility. As shown in figure 3, PACOM  coordinates East Asia and South Asia; EUCOM coordinates much of sub- Saharan Africa and Europe, as well as the Indian Ocean islands off the  coast of southeast Africa; and CENTCOM coordinates efforts in the Middle  East, the Horn of Africa, and Central Asia. Not shown are Northern  Command, which coordinates activities in North America, and Southern  Command, which coordinates activities in South America, Central  America, and the Caribbean. We did not include Northern and Southern  Commands in our review because they have significantly fewer facilities  outside of the United States than the other regional commands in the  Pacific, Europe, and Central Asia. There are also four functional unified  combatant commands that are assigned worldwide functional  responsibilities not bounded by geography: Special Operations Command,  Strategic Command, Joint Forces Command, and Transportation  Command.
Initial implementation details for the movement of U.S. Marines to Guam  and associated military construction projects took place under the  leadership of PACOM. In August 2006, OSD directed the Navy to establish  JGPO to facilitate, manage, and execute requirements associated with the  rebasing of Marine Corps assets from Okinawa to Guam, including master  planning efforts. The office’s responsibilities include integration of  operational support requirements, development, program, and budget  synchronization; oversight of the construction; and coordination of  government and business activities. Specifically, JGPO was tasked to lead  the coordinated planning efforts among the DOD components and other  stakeholders to consolidate, optimize, and integrate the existing DOD  infrastructure capabilities on Guam. The office is expected to work closely  with the Government of Japan and the local Guam government, other  federal agencies, and Congress in order to manage this comprehensive  effort and to develop a master plan. At the time of our review, JGPO and  the Department of the Interior had formed a federal interagency task force  in order to coordinate efforts to address issues relating to commerce,  transportation, environment, and other areas. JGPO falls under the direct  oversight of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and  Environment.
section_title: Prior GAO Work
paragraphs: In our prior work, we found that while DOD’s master plans generally  exceeded the reporting requirements established by Congress,  opportunities existed for the plans to provide more complete, clear, and  consistent information and to present a more definitive picture of future  requirements.
In 2006, we reported that the master plans did not always explain how  their implementation could be affected by other relevant and related  defense plans and activities because there is not a requirement for them to  do so. However without such explanations and linkage, it was difficult to  determine the extent to which the master plans were coordinated and  synchronized with other defense plans and activities and the effects these  other activities have on the master plans in terms of infrastructure and  funding requirements. We also reported that while the plans addressed a  number of challenges that DOD faced in implementation—such as  uncertainties with host nation relations and environmental concerns— PACOM’s plan did not address training limitations in South Korea and  Japan. We explained how some of these challenges could have a  significant effect on infrastructure and funding requirements and, because  the plans did not always describe such challenges and their potential  effects, that Congress lacked the complete picture it needed to evaluate  the annual military construction funding request.
In 2005, we reported that without more complete, clear, and consistent  reporting of various items—host nation agreements and funding levels,  including special bilateral agreements; U.S. funding levels and sources in  addition to military construction funds; environmental remediation and  restoration issues; population levels; and facility requirements and funding  levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular areas in the  Pacific—across the master plans, Congress and other users did not have  the best data available to facilitate their annual review and oversight.  Also, we reported that without the detailed information on individual  construction projects and the anticipated strategic end state of the  command’s overseas basing infrastructure, Congress did not have the best  available and consistent data on which to track progress and changes from  year to year and between commands.
In 2004, before DOD issued its initial overseas master plans, we reported  that various factors, such as residual property value, environmental  remediation, and the availability of multiple U.S. funding sources, could  affect the funding of U.S. infrastructure overseas as well as the  implementation of the plans once they were issued. At that time, we  recommended that the overseas regional commands address these and  other factors in the development of their plans.
section_title: Master Plans Generally Reflect Changes in Overseas Basing Strategies and Requirements, Key Challenges, and Our Prior Recommendations
paragraphs: The fiscal year 2008 master plans, which provide infrastructure  requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the overseas regional  commands’ area of responsibility, reflect changes—to include recent  decisions in the U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and  requirements—and they generally describe the challenges that DOD faces  in implementing the plans as well as our prior recommendations for  improving the plans. The plans generally incorporate key changes  associated with the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing strategies  and provide a more comprehensive description of the challenges DOD  faces in implementing the plans than in previous years. But while this  year’s plans provide information to respond to most of our prior  recommendations, they do not address residual value—that is, the value of  property being turned over to the host nation based on its reuse of  property. Furthermore, PACOM’s master plan does not describe the  challenges the Air Force faces in training in South Korea, although it does  describe for the first time the challenges addressing training limitations in  Japan.
subsections: section_title: Plans Reflect Key Changes in Overseas Basing Strategies and Requirements
paragraphs: This year’s master plans incorporated key changes—including some very  recent changes—associated with the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas  basing strategies and requirements. In the 2008 master plans, OSD  recognized that further changes will result as it continues to implement  the global defense posture decisions. The department reported that as the  overseas political and military environment and strategic landscape  further evolve, global defense posture plans will continue to mature to  address new priorities. Specifically, several changes identified in the  overseas master plans included updated information involving realignment  initiatives in South Korea and Japan, DOD’s efforts to establish missile  defense in Eastern Europe, and the creation of U.S. Africa Command.
PACOM’s master plan discussed the progress of dynamic realignment  initiatives, which will relocate military personnel and facilities in South  Korea and Japan. For example, last year PACOM reported that the U.S.  and Japanese governments had established an interim agreement in  October 2005 involving the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. This year,  PACOM updated this information by indicating that final implementation  documents were approved in May 2006. In addition, PACOM described the  importance of relocating 8,000 marines and their dependents from  Okinawa to Guam, returning additional land to Japan, and retaining a  forward Marine Corps command and control capability to ensure a  balanced, flexible contingency response capacity within the Asia-Pacific  region. With respect to South Korea, PACOM provided information  updating the status of the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan  Relocation Plan, including a list of U.S. military camps and sites returned  to the Government of South Korea, and describing the results from the  October 2006 meeting between the Secretary of Defense and South Korea’s  Minister of Defense.
As a part of DOD’s efforts to establish a U.S. presence in Eastern Europe  through a network of forward operating sites and cooperative security  locations, EUCOM’s master plan stated that the United States signed  individual agreements with the governments of Romania and of Bulgaria in  2005 and 2006, respectively, which will allow DOD access to facilities and  training sites. EUCOM also provided additional details, such as the  mission, planned capabilities, equipment and aircraft, and population.  Furthermore, EUCOM provided a status of ongoing transformation  realignments in its area of responsibility, including listing the return of  facilities to host nations, changes to its basing categories, and the rationale  for these realignments. The master plans also described recent efforts to  proceed with formal negotiations with the governments of Poland and the  Czech Republic on establishing missile defense sites.
This year, DOD forecasted changes for next year’s master plans involving  the development of a new command responsible for Africa, which is  expected to be established by September 30, 2008. The President  announced in February 2007 that the U.S. military will establish a new,  separate U.S. Africa Command to enhance security cooperation, extend  humanitarian assistance, and build partnership capacity on the African  continent. At the time of our review, U.S. involvement in Africa is shared  among three combatant commands. PACOM is responsible for  Madagascar, the Seychelles, and the Indian Ocean area off the African  coast. EUCOM is responsible for the largest swath of the continent: North  Africa; West Africa, including the Gulf of Guinea; and central and southern  Africa. CENTCOM covers the Horn of Africa—including Somalia, Ethiopia,  Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, and Sudan. There are 13 cooperative security  locations throughout Africa that historically have been identified in the  EUCOM master plan. The new U.S. Africa Command eventually will  encompass the entire continent of Africa except for Egypt, which will  continue to fall under CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. Discussions are  ongoing on the possible headquarters location and what kinds of military  forces would be assigned to the command.
This year, the changes identified in the plans provided useful information  on evolving costs and facility requirements in overseas basing. In addition,  the commands continue to focus first on the mission and then on the  infrastructure requirements needed to support the mission. For example,  in CENTCOM’s master plan, the descriptions of each forward operating  site focus first on the mission and then on requirements by providing the  type of mission the site has (such as providing logistical support), the unit  that it could host, and its role in the region (such as supporting the war  against terrorism or strengthening capabilities for rapid and flexible  response in the central Asian states), as well as identifying the  requirements for equipment and facilities to support the mission at the  site. All of the commands provide similar information for their main  operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security  locations.
Even with the department’s effort to update the plans as changes occurred  and decisions were made, the evolution of U.S. overseas defense basing  strategies and requirements continues. Accordingly, OSD and the regional  commands will be faced with more changes in the future, and the changes  occurring after this year’s plans were submitted to Congress will have to  be reflected in next year’s plans.
section_title: Plans Generally Reflected Key Challenges
paragraphs: The fiscal year 2008 master plans discussed a number of challenges that  DOD faces in the implementation of the plans, such as uncertainties with  host nation relations and environmental concerns. In our prior reports, we  explained how these challenges could have an effect on infrastructure and  funding requirements and, because the prior plans did not always describe  such challenges and their potential effects, that Congress lacked the  complete picture it needed to evaluate the annual military construction  funding requests. This year, the plans provided a much more  comprehensive description of challenges and the potential effects on  implementation.
subsections: section_title: This Year’s Plans Provided More Complete Descriptions of Host Nation Relations
paragraphs: All of the regional commands describe to varying degrees the status of  recent negotiations and agreements with host nations in their fiscal year  2008 master plans. In our review of the overseas master plans in 2005, we  found that none of the commands fully explained the status of or  challenges to finalizing host nation agreements and recommended that the  commands briefly explain the status of negotiations with host nations to  provide more complete and clearer plans. These agreements depend  largely on the political environment and economic conditions in host  nations and can affect the extent of host nation support—access to  facilities or funding—to U.S. forces. Accordingly, the resulting agreements  may increase or decrease U.S.-funded costs for future infrastructure  changes. For example, this year:    PACOM’s master plan updated information on the results of the Defense  Policy Review Initiative, including the importance of certain initiatives,  such as the replacement of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in hopes  that it will lessen the effect of military aviation operations on the local  citizens of Japan. In addition, U.S. Forces Japan identified decreasing  funds for the Japanese facilities improvement program, historically the  source of major construction on U.S. bases in Japan. U.S. Forces Japan  anticipates the Government of Japan will continue to decrease these funds  on the basis that in addition to this program and other forms of host nation  support (i.e., utilities and Japanese labor force), the Government of Japan  is also responsible for providing funding for the Defense Policy Review  Initiative. Potential Government of Japan financial constraints may result  in U.S. facilities in Japan requiring more financial support from the U.S.  government than in the past. In addition, USFK provided details on current  realignment efforts, including the Government of South Korea’s approval  of the Land Partnership Plan and Yongsan Relocation Plan and efforts to  coordinate the transfer of U.S.-vacated bases. The plans also discussed  USFK’s efforts to work with South Korea to complete the transition of  wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea in the  future.
EUCOM’s master plan identified specific information on efforts to close or  return installations, such as Naval Air Station Keflavik, Iceland; Naval  Support Activity La Maddalena, Italy; selected sites in Germany, Belgium,  and Turkey; and several classified locations in the region. The plan also  recognized that current U.S. basing may not adequately support either  strategic changes in an expanding North Atlantic Treaty Organization  Alliance or the requirements of a rapidly changing area of responsibility  while seeking to preserve assets with enduring value to its missions, goals,  and national interests. EUCOM also explained that its transformation  execution depends on host nation negotiations, political-military  considerations, base realignment and closure, and fiscal limitations.
CENTCOM’s master plan discussed efforts to solicit host nation  contributions and the amount of coordination and support that is needed  from DOD, the State Department, and Congress. The plan discussed the  challenge of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and CENTCOM’s  intention to sustain long-term access to locations across its area of  responsibility. The plan also reflected land return actions in Kuwait and  Uzbekistan and changes to base category designations, such as  consolidation of a cooperative security location into a forward operating  site, both of which support surge capability for ground force support.
section_title: This Year’s Plans Provided Better Descriptions of Environmental Challenges
paragraphs: All of the commands addressed the extent of their environmental  challenges in this year’s overseas master plans. In contrast, during our  review of the overseas master plans in 2005, none of the commands  identified environmental remediation and restoration issues. This year,  PACOM provided information on remediation actions taken by USFK  before returning installations to South Korea, such as skimming fuel from  groundwater at five camps. Last year, USFK also discussed its efforts to  coordinate with the Government of South Korea on remediation of  vacated U.S. bases; officials expect these efforts will accelerate the return  of vacated facilities and areas to the Government of South Korea and the  relocation of U.S. forces from Seoul and other locations. This year,  EUCOM identified areas for cleanup, groundwater investigation, and  monitoring and discussed contamination at one site that did not present an  unacceptable risk to human health or the mission. Last year, CENTCOM  did not report any environmental issues. Though a senior CENTCOM  official said that there were no environmental issues last year in the  command’s area of responsibility, this year, CENTCOM’s master plan  identified funding requirements for a wastewater treatment plant and a  water treatment and distribution system at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan,  in hopes of avoiding potential environmental problems. The extent to  which the commands provide information involving environmental  activities provides the users of the plans with the ability to compare and  comprehend how costs have varied and how these costs may affect  planned U.S. funding levels.
section_title: Plans Generally Reflect Our Prior Recommendations
paragraphs: The fiscal year 2008 overseas master plans have been updated to reflect  our prior recommendations for improving the plans, though they do not  address the issue of residual value as we recommended in 2004. To  improve the overseas master plans and address our recommendations  from last year, OSD provided additional guidance on October 12, 2006, to  the regional commands in preparing this year’s plans. As a result, the fiscal  year 2008 master plans identify how implementation of the plans could be  affected by other relevant and related defense plans and activities. For  example, PACOM’s force structure plans are linked to the military buildup  on Guam and CENTCOM’s increased troop strength and facilities in Iraq  and Afghanistan are linked to ongoing operations. In addition, the  commands generally provided more detailed information on a variety of  key areas, such as precise facility requirements and costs, time frames for  an end state, base categories, host nation funding levels, and effects of  other defense activities. For example:    Facility requirements and costs. This year, all of the regional  commands identified their precise facility requirements and costs for fiscal  year 2008 and for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and reported estimated  facility sustainment costs for fiscal year 2008. In addition, CENTCOM  provided information on supplemental appropriations for facilities and  projects at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan.
Base categories. This year, all of the commands categorized their  installations into applicable base categories of main operating base,  forward operating site, and cooperative security location, which provided  users a clearer picture of the infrastructure plans and requirements at  these sites. The commands also supplemented the information on base  categories with detailed data on the installations’ capabilities, overall  mission, population, and types of equipment and facilities located at each  site. For example, CENTCOM and EUCOM also identified adjustments to  the base categories, such as redesignating a main operating base as a  forward operating site or consolidating two cooperative security locations  into one. EUCOM also provided specific details on sites no longer  considered cooperative security locations in Bulgaria, Romania, and  Poland, such as sites with no operational importance and a commercial  facility readily available for military use that did not require U.S.  investment or presence.
End state date. This year, all of the commands identified a common  strategic end state date of 2013, which identifies the last fiscal year of the  construction time frame. The strategic end state date of 2013 provides  users a more complete and clearer basis for tracking progress in meeting  the command infrastructure objectives for their areas of responsibility.  Previously, OSD had provided the commands the discretion in choosing an  end date from 2011 to 2015.
Host nation funding levels. This year, all of the commands reported  host nation funding levels at the project level for fiscal year 2008 and at the  aggregate level for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, which provided users a  better basis to determine the extent to which U.S. funding is needed for  facility requirements. Also, PACOM identified host nation funding for its  bilateral agreements in South Korea, such as the Land Partnership Plan  and the Yongsan Relocation Plan. On the other hand, PACOM did not  identify specific host nation funding from the Defense Policy Review  Initiative—while the Government of Japan’s share for the Guam relocation  is $6.1 billion, the Government of Japan has not made an official, public  estimate of the costs for several major realignments within Japan.  Although, in relation to this initiative, the command did identify the need  for U.S. military construction funds to support realignment costs not paid  by the Japanese government. EUCOM provided information on North  Atlantic Treaty Organization contributions and discussed a burden-sharing  arrangement with the Government of Norway. CENTCOM also provided  host nation estimates and explained that its efforts to attain host nation  funding were ongoing.
Effects of other defense activities. This year, all of the commands  described the effects of other defense activities on implementation of their  master plans. Last year, only PACOM’s plan gave some indication of how  its implementation could be affected by another activity—the potential  decrease in traditional Japanese construction funding that would help  Japan offset its Defense Policy Review Initiative costs, such as those  associated with the relocation of U.S. Marines to Guam. This year, PACOM  discussed this topic as well as the progress of bilateral negotiations with  Japan and challenges associated with this realignment. Last year,  EUCOM’s master plan did not explain the potential effect of implementing  base realignment and closure recommendations on the movement of  troops from Germany to bases in the United States, commonly called  overseas rebasing. EUCOM and Army officials told us that any delay in the  implementation of base realignment and closure recommendations would  cause them to delay the movement of Army servicemembers and their  families if facilities were not available at receiving installations in the  United States. This would delay the closings of Army installations in  Europe and increase costs to operate those installations while they remain  open. This year, the overseas master plan identified that the base  realignment and closure recommendations supported overseas  restructuring and that EUCOM’s transformation depends on this effort.  Last year, CENTCOM’s master plan only made general references to  operations in Iraq and did not fully explain the potential effects of such  operations on other installations and facility requirements outside of Iraq  in its area of responsibility. This year, CENTCOM officials emphasized that  infrastructure requirements in their master plan directly supported and  responded to ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, in terms of  increased troop strength and its facilities requirements in theater. In  addition, CENTCOM’s plan identified how future basing and infrastructure  will be defined by ongoing contingencies and global defense posture.
section_title: Two Areas of Concern Continue to Be Overlooked
paragraphs: While the overseas master plans have continued to evolve and have  provided more comprehensive data every year since 2004, two key topics  continue to be omitted from the plans. First, the master plans do not  address the issue of residual value—the value of property being turned  over to the host nation based on its reuse of property. As we reported last  year, residual value was excluded from OSD’s guidance because it is based  on the reuse of property being turned over to the host nation, which is  limited for most categories of military facilities and is often reduced by  actual or anticipated environmental remediation costs. Consequently, as  we have noted in the past, DOD officials believe that residual value  cannot be readily predicted and therefore should not be assumed in the  master plans. However, since these issues vary by host nation and may not  be clear to all users of the plans, we continue to believe that OSD should  require commands, at a minimum, to explain the issues with obtaining  residual value in each host nation and report the implications for U.S.  funding requirements. Also, the U.S. government has received  approximately $592 million since 1989 in residual value and payment-in- kind compensation from property returns in EUCOM’s area of  responsibility, and EUCOM continues to aggressively seek compensation  for U.S. capital improvements at installations returned to host nations. As  EUCOM continues to return facilities in Germany, Italy, and Iceland, this  figure may increase. Accordingly, we continue to believe that residual  value should be addressed in the master plans.
Second, while PACOM’s master plan provided details on other challenges,  it did not describe the challenges the command faces in addressing  training limitations for the Seventh Air Force in South Korea, although  senior officials told us that these limitations could cause the United States  to pursue alternatives, such as training in other locations, downsizing, or  relocating, which could affect overseas basing plans. Specifically, we  found that the PACOM master plan did not point out that the Seventh Air  Force in South Korea may be unable to maintain combat capability in the  long term because of a lack of adequate air-to-surface ranges, according to  senior Air Force and USFK officials. For decades, the Government of  South Korea has attempted to relocate the Koon-Ni range, which had  served as the primary air-to-ground range for the Seventh Air Force. The  air and ground range management of the Koon-Ni training range was  transferred to the Government of South Korea, which closed the range in  August 2005. While there is an agreement with the Government of South  Korea to train at other ranges, according to senior Air Force and USFK  officials, the other ranges do not provide electronic scoring capabilities  necessary to meet the Air Force’s air-to-surface training requirements and  there is difficultly in scheduling these ranges. As a result, the Air Force has  been using ranges in Japan and Alaska to meet its training requirements,  which results in additional transportation costs to the U.S. government. In  May 2007, officials said that some progress had been made in addressing  the Air Force’s training challenges in South Korea and that they expected  the needed upgrades to be completed by mid-2007. In contrast, the  PACOM plan described the training limitations involving bombing and live  fire training ranges and the effects of airspace access restrictions in Japan  on C-130 training. In addition, the plan discusses how noise and land use  sensitivities and maneuver area limitations in Okinawa require U.S. forces  to deploy to other Pacific Rim locations to supplement their training,  which results in additional transportation requirements and costs. The  plan also discussed efforts by U.S. Forces Japan and the Government of  Japan to engage in bilateral discussions to address training shortfalls and  explore solutions.
We have previously recommended that overseas regional commands  address residual value issues and that PACOM explain how it plans to  address existing training limitations in our prior reports. We believe that  identifying these issues would make Congress aware of potential  challenges to obtaining residual value and to training U.S. forces in South  Korea, which may affect facility requirements and funding in this country.  Even though our prior recommendations have not been fully addressed,  we continue to believe that they have merit and that Congress would  benefit from disclosure of this information.
section_title: Planning Effort for Guam Is in Its Initial Stages with Many Key Decisions and Challenges to Be Addressed
paragraphs: DOD’s planning effort for the buildup of military forces and infrastructure  on Guam is in its initial stages, with many key decisions and challenges yet  to be addressed. While the Guam Integrated Military Development Plan  provides information on the projected military population, units, and  infrastructure that may be needed for the Guam realignments, it lacks  specific information and is not intended to be a master plan. Additional  time is needed for DOD to address several challenges before JGPO can  develop a Guam master plan. First, the required environmental impact  statement—which will take up to 3 years to complete, according to DOD  documents and officials—was initiated on March 7, 2007. According to  DOD officials, the results of this environmental impact statement will  influence many of the key decisions on the exact location, size, and  makeup of the military infrastructure development on Guam. Second,  exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam are not yet  identified. Third, DOD officials said that additional time is needed to fully  address the challenges related to funding uncertainties, operational  requirements, and Guam’s unique economic and infrastructure  requirements. At the same time, DOD has not established a comprehensive  and routine process to keep Congress informed on its progress in dealing  with these issues and the overall status of implementing the military  buildup on Guam.
subsections: section_title: Planning Effort Is in Initial Stages
paragraphs: While the Guam Integrated Military Development Plan provides the best  available information on the projected military population, units, and  infrastructure that may be needed for future Guam realignments, DOD  officials told us that their planning effort was still in its initial phases with  many key decisions and challenges yet to be addressed. In July 2006,  PACOM issued its Guam development plan—a notional document  describing the future development of the military services on Guam over  the next decade and beyond. The plan is based upon a notional force  structure that was used to generate land and facility requirements for  basing, operations, logistics, training, and quality of life involving the  Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, Navy, and Special Operations Forces in  Guam. DOD officials told us that the plan was not a master plan because it  did not include specific information on facility requirements, associated  costs, and a timeline for specific actions and was not intended to meet the  requirement to provide a master plan to both congressional appropriations  committees by December 2006. In addition, the development plan does  not direct individual service programming actions or provide for specific  funding requirements. According to DOD documents and officials,  additional detailed service and joint planning will be required to identify  specific facility, infrastructure, and funding requirements and address the  challenges associated with the military buildup.
section_title: Environmental Impact Statement Process Affects Development and Timing of a Guam Master Plan
paragraphs: Among the challenges to be addressed before JGPO can develop a Guam  master plan is to complete the required environmental impact statement.  According to DOD officials, the results of the environmental statement— which could take up 3 years to complete—will affect many of the key  decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of the military  infrastructure development.
On March 7, 2007, the Navy issued a public notice of intent to prepare an  environmental impact statement pursuant to the requirements of the  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), as implemented by  the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations, and Executive Order  12114. The notice of intent in the Federal Register states that the  environmental impact statement will:    Examine the potential environmental effects associated with relocating  Marine Corps command, air, ground, and logistics units (which comprise  approximately 8,000 marines and their estimated 9,000 dependents) from  Okinawa to Guam. The environmental impact statement will examine  potential effects from activities associated with Marine Corps units’  relocation to include operations, training, and infrastructure changes.
Examine the Navy’s plan to enhance the infrastructure, logistic  capabilities, and pier/waterfront facilities to support transient nuclear  aircraft carrier berthing at Naval Base Guam. The environmental impact  statement will examine potential effects of the waterfront improvements  associated with the proposed transient berthing.
Evaluate placing a ballistic missile defense task force (approximately 630  servicemembers and 950 family members) in Guam. The environmental  impact statement will examine potential effects from activities associated  with the task force to include operations, training, and infrastructure  changes.
DOD officials recognize that the results of this environmental assessment  process may affect the development and timing of DOD’s plan for Guam.  Under NEPA and the regulations for implementing NEPA established by  the Council on Environmental Quality, an environmental impact  statement must include a purpose and need statement, a description of all  reasonable project alternatives and their associated environmental  impacts (including a “no action” alternative), a description of the  environment of the area to be affected or created by the alternatives being  considered, and an analysis of the environmental impacts of the proposed  action and each alternative. Further, accurate scientific analysis, expert  agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to implementing  NEPA. For example, federal agencies such as DOD are required to ensure  the professional integrity, including scientific integrity, of the discussions  and analyses in the environmental impact statement. Additionally, after  preparing a draft environmental impact statement, federal agencies such  as DOD are required to obtain the comments of any federal agency that  has jurisdiction by law or certain special expertise and request the  comments of appropriate state and local agencies, Native American tribes,  and any agency that has requested that it receive such statements. Until an  agency issues a final environmental impact statement and record of  decision, it generally may not take any action concerning the proposal that  would either have an adverse environmental impact or limit the choice of  reasonable alternatives. DOD officials stated that performing these  alternative site analyses and cumulative effects analyses will delay the  Guam master plan’s completion. Based on the expected completion of the  environmental impact statement, according to JGPO officials, the master  plan may not be completed until fiscal year 2009.
section_title: Exact Size and Makeup of Forces to Move to Guam Are Not Yet Decided
paragraphs: The exact size and makeup of the forces to move to Guam and the  housing, operational, quality of life, and services support infrastructure  required are not yet fully known and are expected to be identified and  assessed during the parallel environmental analysis and the individual  service and joint planning processes.
While DOD identified some Marine Corps units for relocation as a part of  realignment initiatives, there are assessments still under way to determine  the optimal mix of units in Guam and in Okinawa. The following Marine  Corps units have been identified for relocation to Guam: Third Marine  Expeditionary Forces Command Element, Third Marine Division  Headquarters, Third Marine Logistics Group Headquarters, 1st Marine Air  Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters. The Marine  Corps forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground  Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat  service support, as well as a base support capability. Approximately 10,000  marines plus their dependents are expected to remain on the island of  Okinawa following the realignment of forces to Guam. While these broad  estimates provide a baseline, according to officials we visited, the Marine  Corps is still determining the specific mix of units and capabilities needed  to meet mission requirements on both Guam and Okinawa. The mix of  units is significant because, according to Marine Corps officials, the  functional and base support requirements will be based on the type, size,  and number of units that will relocate to Guam. This determination will  define the training and facility requirements, such as barracks, family  housing, schools, and other infrastructure. In response to the ongoing  assessment by the Marine Corps, a JGPO official said that the office was  initiating a master plan that will reflect the building of flexible  infrastructure that could accommodate any type of military units that may  relocate to Guam. However, in the absence of information on the number  and mix of forces, it will be difficult to provide an accurate assessment of  specific facility requirements to support the Guam realignment actions.
DOD is still determining requirements for berthing a transient aircraft  carrier and the exact size and mix of the Army missile defense task force  as well as the infrastructure requirements. In the future, the Navy is  planning on periodically berthing an aircraft carrier in Guam and the  support facilities needed for this ship are still being determined. According  to Navy officials, a new carrier pier with additional capabilities will need  to be constructed in order to accommodate this plan. Additionally, most of  the aircraft from the aircraft carrier will also require temporary beddown  at Andersen Air Force Base, which may cause additional facilities  requirements. The Army is also planning on basing a ballistic missile  defense task force in Guam, though the size and mix of this task force as  well as the infrastructure requirements are still being determined. At the  time of this review, Army officials projected that the missile defense site  will be located at Andersen Air Force Base but acknowledged that the site  may be located elsewhere depending on the capability that will be brought  to Guam.
section_title: Additional Time Is Needed to Fully Address Several Challenges
paragraphs: DOD faces several significant challenges associated with its master  planning effort for Guam, including funding requirements, operational  challenges, and community impacts that could adversely affect the  development and implementation of the master plan.
subsections: section_title: Funding Requirements
paragraphs: Funding requirements for the military buildup on Guam are yet not fully  identified and may be difficult to meet given other priorities and existing  funding constraints, according to DOD officials. DOD agencies, such as the  Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Education Activity, that will help  support the services’ influx of personnel, missions, and equipment to  Guam will likely incur additional costs that are not yet included in the  current DOD $13 billion cost estimate for military buildup on Guam.  According to DOD officials, this cost estimate includes the costs to move  Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam, to construct a Navy pier for a  transient aircraft carrier, and to station an Army ballistic missile defense  task force. However, it does not include the costs of other defense  agencies to support the additional military personnel and dependents on  Guam. According to JGPO, these costs will eventually be identified once  further information is available on the master plan.
Within the current DOD $13 billion cost estimate, the Marine Corps move  from Okinawa to Guam is estimated to cost about $10.3 billion. Of this  amount for the move, the Government of Japan has agreed to contribute  about $6.1 billion to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam. Nearly  half of Japan’s contribution, or $2.8 billion, is expected to be direct  contributions while the remaining $3.3 billion will consist of investment  incentives for family housing and on-base infrastructure, such as utilities,  which over time could be recouped by Japan in the form of rent or service  charges. For example, the Government of Japan will finance construction  of family housing units in Guam, but these construction costs will be  reimbursed by payments from the servicemembers’ housing allowance  using U.S. funds. Furthermore, the Government of Japan’s funds will not  be made available until it has agreed to specific infrastructure plans for  Guam. In addition, DOD officials recognize that the failure or delay of one  plan outlined in the Defense Policy Review Initiative may affect another,  since various planning variables need to fall into place in order for the  initiative to move forward. For example, DOD officials expect that if the  Futenma replacement facility in Okinawa (a facility intended to replace  the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and estimated to cost from $4  billion to $5 billion) is not built, the Marine Corps relocation to Guam may  be delayed. DOD officials view the success of the Futenma replacement  facility as a key objective of the initiative that will need to be completed in  order for other realignment actions to take place. The Government of  Japan may encounter challenges in funding its share of the Marine Corps  move considering Japan’s other national priorities and its commitments  associated with funding several other major realignments of U.S. forces in  Japan under the Defense Policy Review Initiative. At the time of our  review, the Japanese legislature had approved $228 million for planning  and initial construction funds for force posture realignments, including  efforts for project planning in Guam, and authorized the Japan Bank for  International Cooperation to invest in businesses for Guam development.
DOD officials also expressed concern regarding the department’s ability to  obtain a continuous flow of funds adequate to pay its share of the current  $13 billion cost estimate for military buildup on Guam in light of ongoing  operations and funding constraints and challenges. These officials said  that obtaining funding for the military buildup on Guam at current  estimated levels will be difficult because of the pressures the department  faces in funding other defense priorities and activities, including the  ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and procurement costs for  weapons systems. Also, there are other costs not included in the $13  billion cost estimate associated with the Marine Corps’ move to Guam that  will increase overall costs. Historically, for example, the Government of  Japan has paid a large portion of the operation and maintenance costs of  the Marine Corps in Okinawa in the form of host nation support that will  be borne solely by DOD after the move. For example, the DOD Inspector  General reported that the relocation to Guam will increase the Marine  Corps’ annual funding requirements by $465 million for operations and  maintenance costs currently borne by the Government of Japan and for  the costs of the additional strategic lift needed after the move.
Additional costs will be incurred from building facilities that will house  equipment and aircraft during inclement weather, and there may be  additional incidental maintenance costs as a result of damage from  typhoons and seismic shocks. Guam is located in an area of the Pacific  commonly referred to as Typhoon Alley, where on average 31 tropical  storms develop annually. Also, earthquake risk in Guam is caused by the  island’s proximity to the Mariana Trench, which leads to earthquakes  throughout the region. Marine Corps officials stated that in estimating  Guam facility development costs, DOD took into account that additional  costs will occur when constructing to Guam’s typhoon and seismic  standards—including concrete and structural reinforcement and providing  backup and redundant utility systems. Estimated costs to build  infrastructure in Guam are based on the DOD Facilities Pricing Guide.  The area cost factors identify Guam as one of the more expensive  locations for military construction in comparison with other locations in  the United States and its territories. Specifically, the construction costs for  Guam are 2.64 times more expensive than the baseline average presented  in the DOD Facilities Pricing Guide. The area cost factor is used by  planners to adjust average historical facility costs to a specific project  location, taking into consideration the costs of construction material,  labor, and equipment, along with factors such as weather, climate, seismic  conditions, mobilization, overhead and profit, labor availability, and labor  productivity for each area. In addition, Marine Corps officials expect there  will be additional facility repair costs periodically as a result of damage  from typhoons and seismic shocks.
section_title: Operational Challenges
paragraphs: Several operational challenges, such as providing appropriate mobility  support and training capabilities to meet Marine Corps requirements, have  not been fully addressed. For example, according to Marine Corps Forces,  Pacific, officials, the Marine Corps in Guam will depend on strategic  military sealift and airlift to reach destinations in Asia that will be farther  away than was the case when the units were based in Okinawa. The  Marine Corps depends on strategic lift for its operational and training- related movement needs, including transportation of forces and  equipment. For example, in a contingency operation that requires sealift,  the ships may have to deploy from Sasebo, Japan, or another location to  transport soldiers and equipment in Guam and then return to the area of  responsibility where the contingency is taking place. According to Marine  Corps officials, amphibious shipping capability and airlift capacity are  needed in Guam, which may include expanding staging facilities and  systems support for both sealift and airlift. The Marine Corps estimated  additional costs for strategic lift operating from Guam to be nearly $88  million annually.
Existing training facilities and ranges on Guam are not sufficient to meet  the training requirements of the projected Marine Corps force. A DOD  analysis of training opportunities in Guam concluded that no ranges on  Guam are suitable for the needs of the projected Marine Corps force,  because of inadequacy in size or lack of availability. The services are in the  process of conducting a training study that includes Guam and the  Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to assess the options for  training in the region. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, officials stated that  live fire artillery training, amphibious landings, and tracked vehicle  operations will be challenging because of the combination of factors  associated with the limited size of training areas available on the Northern  Mariana Islands and the associated environmental concerns. Still, they are  optimistic that the study, which will include environmental limitations,  facility requirements, real estate requirements, and estimated costs, will  result in the identification and development of new training areas.
section_title: Economic and Infrastructure Requirements
paragraphs: The effects of the increase in military forces, in terms of population and  military infrastructure, on Guam’s unique economic and infrastructure  requirements have not been fully addressed. The current population of  Guam is estimated to be 171,000, and the projected future military  population could increase it by more than 15 percent. The active duty  military personnel and dependent population is estimated at 14,195 in  Guam, and it is expected to increase to 39,130—an increase of 176 percent  (see table 1).
The population could also swell further because DOD’s estimates do not  include DOD civilians, contractors, or Navy transient personnel from an  aircraft carrier. According to Navy officials, transient personnel from an  aircraft carrier could add as many 5,000 personnel on Guam during a port  call. The sum of these increases is expected to have significant effects on  Guam’s unique economic and infrastructure requirements. For example:    Construction capacity. As a result of Guam realignment actions, the  construction demands for infrastructure will exceed the availability of  local contract labor on the island, though the extent to which the Guam  local community and foreign workers can meet this increase has yet to be  determined. Historically, construction capacity on Guam has been  approximately $800 million per year, as compared with the estimated  construction capacity of more than $3 billion per year projected to be  needed to meet the fiscal year 2014 completion date for realignment  actions. Preliminary analysis indicates that 15,000 to 20,000 workers will  be required to support the development on Guam. Consequently, the  increased demand for workers may require workforce training for the  local population and possibly a need for foreign workers. Foreign workers  would have to temporarily enter the United States on temporary  nonagricultural workers visas, capped at 66,000 per year, and DOD  officials have already indicated that visa waivers might be needed in order  to mitigate limitations on the number of visas allowed into the United  States each year. Other challenges associated with an increase of foreign  workers in Guam include providing support facilities and services, such as  housing and medical care for these workers, as well as possible social  tensions between the local population and foreign workers because of job  competition.
Public infrastructure. The effects of the increased demand on Guam’s  roads, port capabilities, and utility services—such as electrical generation,  wastewater treatment, and solid waste disposal—have not been fully  addressed. DOD and Guam officials recognize that the island’s  infrastructure is inadequate to meet the projected demand and will require  significant funding to address these needs. For example, the Government  of Guam has estimated that it will cost about $2.6 billion to improve the  local infrastructure to accommodate forecasted military and civilian  growth on the island and that federal assistance is needed to meet these  requirements. DOD officials and the Guam Integrated Military  Development Plan identified several infrastructure areas that are in need  of improvements: (1) the two major roads in Guam are in poor condition  and, when ordnance (ammunition and explosives) is unloaded from ships  for the Air Force now and for the Marine Corps in the future, it must be  transported on one of these major roads that runs through highly  populated areas; (2) the Government of Guam plans a number of projects  to upgrade the capability and efficiency of Guam’s port facilities that total  about $155 million with only $56 million funded at the time of our review;  (3) the utilities transmission lines are antiquated and the system is not  reliable, and voltage and frequency fluctuations are common; (4) the  wastewater treatment facilities have a long history of failing and are near  capacity; and (5) the solid waste landfills have a number of unresolved  issues related to discharge of pollutants and are near capacity. Although  the Government of Japan has agreed to provide $700 million for utilities  infrastructure on DOD bases in Guam, this funding is neither intended nor  is it sufficient to improve the infrastructure throughout the island. Future  DOD operations may be constrained on Guam if improvements are not  made to Guam’s infrastructure.
DOD land use on Guam. DOD officials initially told Guam officials that  they could implement force structure plans with currently held land  although they are now reviewing the possibility of using additional land to  prevent future encroachment. For example, the Guam Integrated Military  Development Plan considered both existing and former DOD land areas  for potential use to accommodate realignment actions. In terms of existing  land, DOD owned about 40,000 acres of land in Guam at the time of this  review—approximately 29 percent of the island. Former DOD land areas  have previously been a part of the base realignment and closure process or  released to the Government of Guam. There are political sensitivities to  using former DOD land areas, since local community officials in Guam are  concerned with the community’s reaction to DOD’s possible expansion of  land holdings on the island.
Funding uncertainties, operational challenges, and community impacts  may not only affect the development of the Guam master plan but also  increase costs for the U.S. government. Until DOD provides further  information on how these challenges will be resolved, it will not know the  precise costs of the Guam realignment plans to the U.S. government.  DOD’s has begun efforts to create a successful partnership and coordinate  with other federal departments and agencies, the Government of Guam,  and other organizations, which are important in addressing Guam’s unique  economic and infrastructure requirements. At the same time, DOD has not  established a comprehensive and routine process to keep Congress  informed on its progress dealing with these issues and the overall status of  implementing the military buildup on Guam. In the absence of this  information on how challenges will be addressed in the future, Congress is  not in a position to help ensure the best application of limited federal  funds and the leveraging of all available options for supporting the military  buildup on Guam.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: As U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements continue to  evolve, so do the department’s master plans. The plans continue to  improve each year by providing more complete, clear, and consistent  information and descriptions of the challenges DOD faces overseas.  However, we have previously recommended that overseas regional  commands address the extent to which they are seeking residual value  compensation for U.S. capital improvements at installations returned to  host nations and that PACOM explain how it plans to address existing  training limitations that may affect infrastructure and funding  requirements. We believe that identifying these issues would provide  Congress an awareness of potential challenges of recouping residual value  from host nations and training U.S. forces in South Korea, which may  affect facility requirements and funding in these countries. We continue to  believe that these recommendations have merit and that Congress would  benefit from disclosure of this information.
In July 2006, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military  construction appropriation bill directed DOD to provide a master plan on  the military buildup in Guam. DOD needs several more years to complete a  master plan. Completion of a Guam master plan depends on the outcome  of the environmental impact assessments and statement that could take up  to 3 years to complete, on decisions that finalize the exact size and  makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam, and on efforts that address  challenges associated with the military buildup, including funding,  operational requirements, and local economic and infrastructure needs.  DOD’s planning efforts for Guam are evolving and up-to-date information  on facility requirements and associated costs would be useful for funding  decisions and assessments of all available options to assist DOD, federal  departments and agencies, the Government of Guam, and other  organizations in addressing the challenges associated with the military  buildup.
section_title: Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: GAO is not recommending executive action. However, to further facilitate  annual review and oversight by Congress and other users of the overseas  master plans, Congress should consider requiring the Secretary of Defense  to ensure that (1) future overseas master plans address the extent to  which the regional commands are seeking residual value compensation for  U.S. capital improvements at installations returned to host nations and (2)  future PACOM plans address existing training limitations in its area of  responsibility and the potential effects of those limitations on  infrastructure and funding requirements.
To help ensure the best application of limited federal funds and the  leveraging of all available options for supporting the military buildup on  Guam until DOD prepares a master plan, Congress should consider  requiring the Secretary of Defense to report periodically to all the defense  committees on the status of DOD’s planning efforts for Guam, including  DOD’s efforts to complete its environmental impact statement, identify the  exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam and the  associated infrastructure required, and address the various challenges  associated with the military buildup.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In comments on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of  Defense for Installations and Environment responded that congressional  action is not necessary.
In commenting on our matter for congressional consideration to require  that future overseas master plans address the extent to which commands  are seeking residual value compensation, the Deputy Under Secretary of  Defense stated that DOD already provides status reports on its residual  value negotiations to the Committees on Appropriations and Armed  Services and that prior legislation outlines reporting requirements on the  closure of foreign military installations worldwide, with specific reporting  requirements throughout the residual value negotiation process. While we  were aware of these reporting requirements, these reports do not provide  users of the master plans the kind of information needed to address their  concerns about the status of residual value negotiations or the  implications for U.S. funding. Our recommendation to Congress is  grounded in the fact that residual value issues vary by host nation and the  implications for U.S. funding also vary accordingly and thus may not be  clear enough to all users of the plans. We continue to believe that the  Secretary of Defense should require commands to explain the issues with  obtaining residual value from each host nation and report the implications  for U.S. funding.
In commenting on our matter for congressional consideration that future  PACOM plans address training limitations in its area of responsibility, the  Deputy Under Secretary of Defense responded that the department agrees  that validated training requirements that are affected by force posture  transformation plans should be addressed in overseas master plans. He  further stated that nonprogrammed and nonvalidated training limitations  experienced by service components were not appropriate for inclusion  and would not be addressed in the overseas commands’ risk assessment  for their master plans. While we are not aware of any nonprogrammed and  nonvalidated training limitations, our report discusses only those training  limitations raised by senior command officials during our review. We  assume that if there is a need to make a distinction between nonvalidated  versus validated training limitations, OSD and the overseas commands  would work together to identify those validated limitations that should be  addressed in their master plans. In addition, last year OSD included in its  guidance a requirement for the combatant commands to identify and  discuss risks to their master plans as well as steps taken to mitigate those  risks, including validated training requirements and limitations. In  response to this guidance U.S. Forces Japan provided information on  training limitations, while USFK omitted this information from the  overseas master plan. This inconsistency led to our recommendation that  Congress require such reporting, and we continue to believe that this  information is necessary to provide a complete picture of the potential  effects on infrastructure and funding requirements in South Korea.
In commenting on our matter for congressional consideration that the  Secretary of Defense report periodically to all the defense committees on  the status of DOD’s planning efforts for Guam, the Deputy Under Secretary  of Defense responded that the Guam master plan is scheduled to be  completed in 2008, at which time a copy will be provided to congressional  defense committees. It should be noted that Senate Report 109-286  directed DOD to submit a master plan for the military buildup on Guam by  December 2006; however, DOD did not submit the plan for several reasons  that we discuss in this report. Moreover, because the master plan cannot  be completed until the environmental impact statement is completed, a  process that could take until 2009, Congress may not see the master plan  for another 2 years at least. Also, DOD faces a variety of funding  challenges, operational challenges, and community impacts that may both  affect the development and timing of the Guam master plan and increase  costs for the U.S. government. Thus, in the interim before receiving a  master plan, congressional oversight could be enhanced by Congress  periodically receiving an update on the planning efforts in Guam, including  DOD’s efforts to complete its environmental impact statement, identify the  exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam and the  associated infrastructure required, and address the various challenges  associated with the military buildup.
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense’s comments are reprinted in  appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments on a draft of this  report, which we incorporated where appropriated.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the  Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps;  and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will be made  available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available  at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. The GAO staff members who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the fiscal year 2008 overseas master  plans have changed since last year, and the extent to which the plans  address the challenges faced by the Department of Defense (DOD) during  implementation, we compared the reporting requirements in the  congressional mandate and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)  guidance, which incorporated our prior recommendations. In order to  identify improvements to the overseas master plan, we compared and  contrasted the fiscal year 2007 and 2008 plans. We assessed the quantity  and quality of one plan’s responses for each of the data elements,  including details on base categories, host nation funding levels, facility  requirements and costs, environmental remediation issues, and other  issues affecting the implementation of the plans, and compared them to  equivalent responses in other plans; formed conclusions as to the  completeness, clarity, and consistency of the latest plan’s responses; and  generated observations and recommendations for improving the plans. We  also discussed with DOD officials our observations and recommendations,  specific reporting requirements, and whether improvements in the  guidance and reporting were needed. We also interviewed cognizant  officials from DOD about the various changes and challenges that were  identified within the plans. We met with officials from OSD and each of the  following commands and agencies: U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM); U.S.  Army Pacific; Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine Corps Forces,  Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Forces Korea; U.S. Eighth Army;  Seventh Air Force; Commander, Naval Forces Korea; U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers, Far East District; DOD Education Activity; U.S. Forces Korea  Status of Forces Agreement Office; U.S. Forces Japan; U.S. Army Japan;  U.S. Air Forces Japan; Commander, Naval Forces Japan; U.S. Marine  Forces Japan; Naval Facilities Engineering Command-Pacific, Japan; U.S.  European Command; U.S. Army Europe; Commander, U.S. Naval Forces  Europe; Naval Facilities Engineering Command-Italy; U.S. Air Force  Europe; Army Installation Management Agency, Europe Regional Office;  U.S. Central Command; and Special Operations Command. In general, we  discussed the reporting requirements contained in OSD’s guidance, host  nation agreements and funding levels, U.S. funding levels and sources,  environmental remediation and restoration issues, property returns to host  nations, and training requirements. We also analyzed available reports,  documents, policies, directives, international agreements, guidance, and  media articles to keep abreast of ongoing changes in overseas defense  basing strategies and requirements. To see firsthand the condition of  facilities and status of selected construction projects, we visited and  toured facilities at Camp Schwab, Camp Kinser, Camp Foster, Torii  Station, Camp Zama, Yokosuka Naval Base, and Yokota Air Base, Japan;  Camp Humphreys and Kunsan Air Force Base, South Korea; and Aviano  Air Base, Caserma Ederle, Dal Molin, and Naval Support Activity La  Maddalena, Italy.
To determine the status of DOD’s planning effort for the buildup of forces  and infrastructure on Guam, we met with officials from OSD, the Navy,  PACOM, and the Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO). In general, we  discussed the development of a Guam master plan and the Integrated  Military Development Plan with PACOM and JGPO officials. We also met  with officials from U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific;  U.S. Marine Forces Japan; Third Marine Expeditionary Forces; U.S. Forces  Japan; U.S. Army Pacific; and Pacific Air Forces to discuss the various  factors that can affect U.S. infrastructure requirements and costs  associated with the buildup in Guam. We visited Naval Base Guam and  Andersen Air Force Base in Guam to see the installations and future  military construction sites firsthand. We also reviewed DOD’s military  construction budgets for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 and planned for future  years to identify U.S. funding levels and sources planned for the military  buildup in Guam. To identify challenges associated with the buildup in this  planning effort, we met with the aforementioned DOD officials and other  interested parties in Guam, including the Governor, legislative leaders, the  Chamber of Commerce, the Civil Military Task Force, the Guam Women’s  Group, and the Office of the Delegate from Guam to the U.S. House of  Representatives. We did not evaluate concerns raised by the officials, but  we reviewed relevant federal laws and discussed them with DOD officials.  We also analyzed available reports, documents, international agreements,  and media articles to keep abreast of ongoing activities in Guam pertaining  to challenges that may affect DOD’s development and implementation of a  master plan.
While we met with Special Operations Command officials, its planning  efforts were not specifically required for the master plans in response to  the congressional mandates. In addition, we did not include Southern and  Northern Commands in our analysis because these commands have  significantly fewer facilities overseas than the other regional commands in  the Pacific, Europe, and Central Asia.
We conducted our review from September 2006 through July 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Mark Little, Assistant Director;  Nelsie Alcoser; Kate Lenane; Erika Prochaska; Roger Tomlinson; and  Cheryl Weissman made major contributions to this report.