Coast Guard: Resources Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations in the Transit Zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands
Published: 2014-06-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: One part of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy is to disrupt the flow of cocaine through the transit zone. Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the only U.S. territories located geographically within the transit zone, have served as entry points for cocaine destined for the continental United States. In recent years, federal and local government agencies have cited growing levels of violent crime in these territories and attribute this violence to illicit drug trafficking. Within DHS, the U.S. Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime drug interdiction and a key provider of resources to support drug interdiction operations in the transit zone and the two territories.
GAO was asked to examine the Coast Guard's drug interdiction efforts in the transit zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. This report addresses (1) trends in the Coast Guard's deployment of resources in the transit zone and the extent to which the Coast Guard met its performance targets; and (2) actions taken by the Coast Guard to combat drug smuggling into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and trends in vessel and aircraft deployments. GAO analyzed Coast Guard data for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 on drug interdiction resource deployments and mission performance, and interviewed Coast Guard and DHS officials involved in drug interdiction operations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Coast Guard provided varying levels of resources for drug interdiction operations in the “transit zone”—the area from South America through the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean that is used to transport illicit drugs to the United States—during fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and generally did not meet its performance targets for several reasons. As the figure shows, Coast Guard resources included vessels (cutters), aircraft, and law enforcement detachments. The number of cutter days, aircraft hours, and law enforcement detachment days the Coast Guard provided for drug interdiction operations in the transit zone varied during fiscal years 2009 through 2012, and then sharply declined in fiscal year 2013. For example, in fiscal year 2012, the Coast Guard provided 1,947 cutter days for transit zone operations and in fiscal year 2013 the Coast Guard provided 1,346 days—a 30 percent decline. During fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the Coast Guard met targets for its primary drug interdiction mission performance measure—the removal rate of cocaine from noncommercial vessels in the transit zone—once, in fiscal year 2013. Coast Guard officials cited the declining readiness of its aging vessels, delays in the delivery of replacement vessels, and sequestration as factors affecting Coast Guard resource deployments and the ability to meet its drug interdiction mission performance targets.
In support of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) effort to address the increased violent crime associated with illicit drug smuggling into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Coast Guard has increased vessel and aircraft operations for drug interdiction efforts in these territories by reallocating resources from elsewhere in the Coast Guard. According to Coast Guard officials, these additional resources are drawn from other missions, such as alien migrant interdiction. Beginning in September 2012, the Coast Guard implemented a surge operation to provide additional vessels and aircraft to regularly patrol Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. According to Coast Guard officials, the increased vessel and aircraft deployments have since become the new baseline level of resources to be provided for drug interdiction operations there. According to Coast Guard data, the number of vessel hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in these territories more than tripled from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Similarly, the number of maritime patrol aircraft hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in the territories increased—from about 150 flight hours in fiscal year 2011 to about 1,000 hours in fiscal year 2013.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated, as appropriate.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: One of the priorities of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy is to  disrupt the flow of illicit drugs to the United States. Within the Department  of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Coast Guard is the lead federal  agency for maritime drug interdiction and a major contributor of U.S.  government vessels and aircraft deployed for operations to disrupt the  flow of illicit drugs smuggled from South America to the United States  through the Western Hemisphere transit zone (the transit zone)—a 6  million square mile area of routes drug smugglers use to transport illicit  drugs that includes the eastern Pacific Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the  Caribbean Sea. The Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S),  under the U.S. Southern Command, oversees detection and monitoring  operations of drug smuggling in the transit zone, relying on the vessel and  aircraft resources provided by the Coast Guard, other federal agencies  and allied countries. Cocaine interdiction is a U.S. National Drug Control  Strategy priority, and according to the Office of National Drug Control  Policy (ONDCP), most of the cocaine being smuggled in the transit zone  is being done by noncommercial maritime vessels—with over 80 percent  of the estimated flow by way of routes in the eastern Pacific Ocean and  western Caribbean Sea in fiscal year 2013.
As the only U.S. territories located within the transit zone, Puerto Rico  and the U.S. Virgin Islands have served as entry points for illicit drugs  destined for the continental United States. In recent years, federal reports  and officials from local government agencies have cited growing levels of  violent crime in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands and linked this  violence to illicit drug smuggling, particularly of cocaine. To reduce the  supply of illicit drugs flowing into and through the territories and to  address the growing violence, officials from the territories have sought  increased assistance from federal agencies. The Coast Guard, in  particular, has been tasked by DHS to increase vessel and aircraft  deployments for drug interdiction operations in the area. However, the  Coast Guard faces the challenge of balancing increasing drug interdiction  resource demands for its limited vessels and aircraft in Puerto Rico and  the U.S. Virgin Islands with demands for those it deploys across the  transit zone, while also meeting resource requirements for its other  missions, such as Alien Migrant Interdiction and Search and Rescue.
You asked us to review the Coast Guard’s drug interdiction resource  allocation and mission performance in the transit zone and in Puerto Rico  and the U.S. Virgin Islands. This report addresses the following  questions:
What were the trends in the Coast Guard’s deployments of resources  to the transit zone for drug interdiction operations during fiscal years  2009 through 2013 and to what extent did the Coast Guard meet its  deployment and mission performance targets during this time period?
What actions has the Coast Guard taken to combat illicit drug  smuggling into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands during fiscal  years 2009 through 2013 and what have been the trends in vessel  and aircraft deployments during this time period?
To determine the trends in the Coast Guard’s deployments of resources  to the transit zone, we reviewed Coast Guard documents, including  memorandums and guidance describing the Coast Guard’s drug  interdiction mission and its process for allocating resources to JIATF-S.  We reviewed Coast Guard-provided data on deployments of resources to  JIATF-S during fiscal years 2009 through 2013, which included vessel  and aircraft hours provided for the drug interdiction mission and resource  deployment targets. We also reviewed and analyzed Coast Guard drug  interdiction mission performance data for fiscal years 2009 through 2013  and compared the performance data against mission performance  targets. In addition, we interviewed Coast Guard officials at Coast Guard  headquarters and at field units that are responsible for planning and  conducting drug interdiction operations and tracking deployment and  mission performance. Specifically, we met with officials from the Coast  Guard’s Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands, and the Coast Guard’s  Seventh District (Miami, Florida) and Eleventh District (Alameda,  California). We met with officials from these two districts because these  two districts are the only Coast Guard districts that have operational roles  for drug interdiction and apprehension in the transit zone—with the  Seventh District responsible for Caribbean Sea operations and the  Eleventh District responsible for eastern Pacific Ocean operations. We  also met with officials from the Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination  Center, in Suitland, Maryland, which tracks information on illegal  smuggling events. Further, we met with officials from the DHS Office of  Policy’s Counter Illicit Trafficking Section, which is responsible for  coordinating DHS’s counterdrug strategy, and officials from ONDCP. We  also met with officials from the Department of Justice, who were  responsible for providing prosecutorial and law enforcement assistance  for drug interdiction operations in the transit zone. Finally, we also visited  Key West, Florida, to meet with officials from JIATF-S to obtain  information on U.S. government-wide drug interdiction planning and  operations in the transit zone. We assessed the reliability of Coast Guard  drug interdiction resource deployment and mission performance data we  obtained and analyzed in this report by reviewing the Coast Guard’s data  management practices and interviewing knowledgeable officials about  how the respective data were compiled and the systems that produced  the data. On the basis of our assessments, we determined that the data  provided to us were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To determine the actions the Coast Guard has taken to combat illicit drug  trafficking in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, including resource  deployments during fiscal years 2009 through 2013, we relied on data  prepared by the Coast Guard that tabulate vessel and aircraft mission  hours provided for drug interdiction operations in the Sector San Juan  area of responsibility. We reviewed Coast Guard documents, including  memorandums and operational orders regarding Coast Guard drug  interdiction operations in these territories. We also reviewed Consolidated  Counterdrug Database (CCDB) estimates of the flow of cocaine in the  transit zone provided by the Coast Guard. In prior work, we reported on  the inherent difficulty in obtaining reliable data on an illegal activity.
Notwithstanding such limitations, on the basis of conversations with  cognizant Coast Guard officials, we determined that the data provided to  us were sufficiently reliable to provide estimates of the magnitude of  cocaine destined for the United States (including Puerto Rico and the  U.S. Virgin Islands) from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. We identify  relevant limitations where we present CCDB data later in this report. We  interviewed Coast Guard headquarters officials and commanders from  field units including Coast Guard Sector San Juan—the field unit with  responsibility for conducting drug interdiction and other operations in the  maritime area of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands—and the Coast  Guard’s Seventh District, which is responsible for overseeing operations  and allocating vessels and aircraft for Sector San Juan. We also  interviewed officials from DHS headquarters, including the Office of  Intergovernmental Affairs and the Office of Policy, to obtain information  on DHS-wide efforts to combat illicit drug flows into the territories. We  also met with officials from Sector Miami and Coast Guard Air Station  Miami—key providers of vessels and aircraft, respectively, for drug  interdiction operations in the Caribbean—to obtain information on their  roles in supporting drug interdiction operations conducted in the  Caribbean. We visited Puerto Rico to meet with Coast Guard Sector San  Juan officials responsible for planning and commanding drug interdiction  operations in the Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands areas, and with  officials from other federal agencies conducting counter drug efforts in the  territories, including DHS, and its components including Customs and  Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement  (ICE). During our visit to Puerto Rico, we also visited the locations where  Coast Guard Sector San Juan’s vessels and aircraft are based—in San  Juan and Air Station Borinquen in Aguadilla, respectively—to discuss  drug interdiction operations, including vessel and aircraft deployments. In  addition, to obtain information on challenges faced by the Puerto Rican  and U.S. Virgin Islands governments as a result of illicit drug smuggling  there, we met with local officials, including senior officials from the Puerto  Rico Governors office, Puerto Rico Police Department, Puerto Rico  National Guard, and officials from the U.S. Virgin Islands Governor’s  office and Police Department.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2013 to June 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Drug Interdiction Is a Key Component of ONDCP’s Counterdrug Efforts
paragraphs: According to ONDCP, disrupting the illicit flow of drugs will reduce their  availability, increase their cost, and eventually, reduce the rate of illicit  drug usage. One part of the ONDCP strategy to disrupt the illicit drug  market focuses interdiction efforts on seizing cocaine and other illicit  drugs in the transit zone that are bound for the United States (arrival  zone) from South America (source zone). Virtually all of the cocaine  shipped to the United States travels through the transit zone from South  America—entering Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean en route  to the United States. The transit zone is a 6 million square mile area that  encompasses Central America, Mexico, the eastern Pacific Ocean, the  Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea. The transit zone is divided into  four maritime trafficking routes: Eastern Pacific, Western Caribbean,  Central Caribbean, and Eastern Caribbean. Drug traffickers use go-fast  boats, fishing vessels, submersible vessels, noncommercial aircraft, and  other types of conveyances to smuggle cocaine from the source zone to  Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean en route to the United  States.
ONDCP’s strategy for drug interdiction in the transit zone is focused on  cocaine because ONDCP has identified cocaine as a leading drug threat  to the United States. According to Coast Guard officials, the largest  estimated share of cocaine has been smuggled through the Eastern  Pacific and Western Caribbean routes of the transit zone for nearly two  decades. For example, the principal source of information about cocaine  flow in the transit zone is the CCDB. According to the CCDB, in fiscal  year 2013, approximately 84 percent of the estimated cocaine flow, as  measured in metric tons, was by noncommercial maritime means through  these two routes. Figure 1 shows a map indicating the source, transit, and  arrival zones—with the fiscal year 2013 estimated noncommercial  maritime cocaine flow through the four smuggling routes and the locations  of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands within the transit zone.
As the southernmost points of entry into the United States and the only  U.S. territories within the transit zone, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin  Islands are key entry points for illicit drugs being smuggled into the United  States. Like the continental United States, Puerto Rico and the U.S.  Virgin Islands are considered part of the arrival zone, yet they are located  geographically within the Eastern Caribbean route of the transit zone.  According to a 2011 Department of Justice National Drug Intelligence  Center report, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are attractive  targets for illicit drug smuggling because of their proximity to the source  zone and Puerto Rico’s location within the United States’ Customs  zone. According to Coast Guard officials, the illicit drug flow through the  Central and Eastern Caribbean routes generally consists of maritime  smuggling from South America to the Dominican Republic and eventual  transshipment to Puerto Rico (secondary flow) and, to a lesser extent,  maritime smuggling directly from South America to Puerto Rico and the  U.S. Virgin Islands (primary flow). CCDB drug flow estimates show that in  fiscal year 2013, about 3 percent of the cocaine flow in the transit zone  was smuggled toward Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The  Department of Justice has reported that most of this flow is destined for  the continental United States—with the rest remaining on the islands for  local consumption. However, estimates indicate that illicit cocaine  smuggling toward Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands has increased  each year since fiscal year 2009. For example, according to CCDB  estimates, cocaine flow toward Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands  has more than doubled in recent years, from 6.4 metric tons in fiscal year  2009 to 17.3 metric tons in fiscal year 2013.
Federal and local government officials in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin  Islands have raised concerns about the illicit drug flow and have identified  it as a key contributor to the high levels of murder and other violent crime  on the islands. In particular, homicide rates in the two territories have  risen in recent years, and federal and local officials have linked the rise of  the homicide rates, in part, to illicit cocaine trafficking on the Island.  According to a 2014 study by the United Nations Office on Drugs and  Crime, the 2010 homicide rate in Puerto Rico was about 27 per 100,000  persons and in the U.S. Virgin Islands it was about 53 per 100,000  persons—more than 5 times (Puerto Rico) and 11 times (U.S. Virgin  Islands) the U.S. national rate. According to a 2011 report issued by the  High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area office that oversees the territories,  most of this violence is associated with turf wars for control over the local  drug market.
section_title: Federal Agencies’ Roles in Maritime Drug Interdiction Operations
paragraphs: JIATF-S relies on DHS (Coast Guard and CBP) and the Department of  Defense (Navy) to provide vessels and aircraft for conducting drug  interdiction operations in the transit zone. JIATF-S also receives  operational resources from allied countries, with Canada, the  Netherlands, and the United Kingdom providing maritime detection and  monitoring assistance. According to JIATF-S and Coast Guard officials,  the JIATF-S strategy is to use its available vessel and aircraft resources  to patrol the transit zone far from U.S. shores and close to the source  zone countries in South America in order to increase chances the  interdictions are of larger load sizes and higher purity than would  otherwise be the case and to cause greater disruption to illicit drug- smuggling organizations. JIATF-S officials reported deploying the majority  of available vessels and aircraft to patrol the Eastern Pacific and Western  Caribbean routes of the transit zone because the routes have accounted  for the largest drug flow—and therefore deploying resources to these  routes will have the greatest impact on efforts to disrupt cocaine flow.
The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime drug interdiction  in the transit zone, and its operations with JIATF-S are a key element of  the Coast Guard’s counter-drug efforts. Overall, the Coast Guard is a  major contributor of JIATF-S vessel and aircraft resources. The  resources the Coast Guard provides to JIATF-S generally include major  cutters, maritime patrol aircraft (planes), and helicopters capable of  deploying airborne use of force (AUF). In addition, the Coast Guard  provides JIATF-S with deployable specialized forces—specifically Law  Enforcement Detachments (LEDET)—embarked on U.S. naval and allied  vessels. We discuss AUF and LEDETs in more detail later in this report.
The Coast Guard’s process for allocating drug interdiction resources is  focused on meeting commitments for strategic priorities, such as JIATF-S  transit zone operations, first, before dividing up its remaining resources  between its Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands. According to Coast  Guard guidance and discussions with DHS officials, the Coast Guard  determines the amount of resource levels—targets for the amount of time  selected vessels, aircraft, and LEDETs are provided to JIATF-S—through  an annual operational planning process that considers factors, including  resource requirements for strategic priorities, evolving maritime risks, and  the availability of the Coast Guard’s fleet of vessels and aircraft. JIATF-S  requests for resource requirements specify the capabilities (types of  vessels or aircraft) and corresponding capacities (number of days for  vessels or resource hours for aircraft) for the Coast Guard, CBP, and the  Department of Defense. The Coast Guard reviews JIATF-S resource  requirement requests, sets resource deployment targets for JIATF-S, and  communicates these targets to DHS for inclusion in a DHS-wide  Statement of Intent of planned deployments to JIATF-S. The Coast Guard  then allocates its remaining available resources to the Atlantic and Pacific  Area Commands, which further allocate the resources for implementing  the Coast Guard’s 11 missions, including drug interdiction. See  appendix I for more details on the Coast Guard’s drug interdiction mission  resource allocation process.
Unlike with overall transit zone operations, JIATF-S does not oversee  detection and monitoring efforts for drug smuggling in the U.S.  territories.and coordinating operations to interdict the maritime flow of illicit drugs in  Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands because they are U.S. territories  and part of the arrival zone. In addition to the Coast Guard, CBP’s Puerto  Rico-based Caribbean Air and Marine Branch conducts marine  interdiction and patrol operations using a mix of planes, helicopters, and   Rather, DHS has the lead federal responsibility for planning  small boats for coastal drug interdiction operations, generally within U.S.  territorial waters. The Puerto Rico Police Department also deploys small  boats for drug interdiction operations.
section_title: The Coast Guard’s Resource Deployments for Transit Zone Drug Interdiction Operations Have Varied in Recent Years
paragraphs: Overall, from fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the amount of resources the  Coast Guard provided to JIATF-S—including vessels, aircraft, and  LEDETs—varied. During this period, the Coast Guard generally did not  meet annual targets for its primary drug interdiction mission performance  measure. Coast Guard officials cited the declining readiness of the Coast  Guard’s aging major cutter fleet; delays in the delivery of new, more  capable replacement cutters; and budget constraints, including  sequestration, as key factors affecting the Coast Guard’s ability to meet  its resource deployment and drug interdiction mission performance  targets. Figure 2 shows the key resources the Coast Guard uses to  support drug interdiction operations.
subsections: section_title: The Coast Guard’s Resource Deployments to JIATF-S Varied during Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013
subsections: section_title: Vessels Deployed to JIATF-S
paragraphs: The Coast Guard’s deployment of vessels to JIATF-S to carry out drug  interdiction operations in the transit zone varied during fiscal years 2009  through 2012, and then sharply declined in 2013. Specifically, the Coast  Guard’s coverage targets—the planned number of days major cutters  (national security cutters, high endurance cutters, and medium endurance  cutters) are to operate under JIATF-S tactical control throughout the  year—have varied since fiscal year 2009, and the Coast Guard has not  fully met them. For example, according to Coast Guard documents, in  fiscal year 2009, the Coast Guard’s cutter coverage target was 2,555  days (the equivalent of 7 major cutters under JIATF-S tactical control  throughout the year) and the Coast Guard provided 2,036 days—about  80 percent of its target. In fiscal year 2013, the cutter coverage target was  2,008 days (or 5.5 major cutters) and the Coast Guard provided 1,346  days—about 67 percent of its target. Overall, the Coast Guard met an  average of 76 percent of its annual JIATF-S cutter coverage targets   Figure 3 compares the Coast  during fiscal years 2009 through 2013.Guard’s cutter coverage targets with the actual cutter days provided to  JIATF-S for fiscal years 2009 through 2013.
The Coast Guard’s primary aircraft deployments to JIATF-S are long- range maritime patrol aircraft—generally the HC-130—to detect and  monitor drug smuggling activity in the transit zone. The Coast Guard  also deploys helicopters—generally modified MH-65s—with marksmen on  board in what is known as airborne use of force. AUF-capable  helicopters are deployed aboard major cutters and allied vessels to  conduct short-range patrols and pursuit actions in the transit zone using  marksmen who are trained to shoot out and disable the engines of fleeing  drug-smuggling vessels—a capability JIATF-S and Coast Guard officials  cite as being critical to drug interdiction success.
Maritime patrol aircraft: According to Coast Guard data, the number of  maritime patrol aircraft hours the Coast Guard provided to JIATF-S varied  during fiscal years 2009 through 2012, ending with an overall decline in  2013, although the numbers remained below target levels. As can be  seen in figure 4, since fiscal year 2009, the Coast Guard’s annual  maritime patrol aircraft hour allocation target (the number of hours the  aircraft are to be under JIATF-S tactical control) has been 4,700 hours.  According to Coast Guard data, the Coast Guard approached the target  in fiscal year 2011, when the Coast Guard provided 4,416 resource  hours—or about 94 percent of its target. Since 2011, though, the Coast  Guard has reduced the number of maritime patrol aircraft hours that it has  provided to JIATF-S. Coast Guard officials attributed this reduction to a  smaller HC-130 fleet size and maintenance needs, including  modifications to extend the HC-130s’ airframe life. In fiscal year 2013, the  Coast Guard provided 3,506 maritime patrol aircraft resource hours— roughly 75 percent of its targeted level.
Airborne use of force: The Coast Guard measures its deployment of  AUF to JIATF-S in the number of days AUF-capable helicopters are  deployed under JIATF-S tactical control. Coast Guard data show the  Coast Guard increased its AUF deployments to JIATF-S during fiscal  years 2009 through 2012, before declining in 2013, while remaining below  target levels. Specifically, the Coast Guard’s AUF deployments increased  from 1,030 days in 2009 to 1,232 days in fiscal years 2012, before  declining to 1,169 days in fiscal year 2013. According to Coast Guard  data, in fiscal year 2013, the Coast Guard’s AUF deployment target was  1,460 days and the Coast Guard provided 1,169 days—approximately 80  percent of its AUF days target goal. Figure 5 shows the AUF  deployment day targets compared with actual AUF days provided to  JIATF-S during fiscal years 2009 through 2013.
Beyond vessels and aircraft, the Coast Guard provides JIATF-S with  LEDETs—specially trained personnel who deploy primarily aboard U.S.  Navy and allied vessels to conduct maritime law enforcement operations  such as boarding suspect vessels and taking custody of suspected drug  smugglers in the transit zone. The Coast Guard is the only JIATF-S  resource provider that has law enforcement authority and LEDET  personnel deployed in maritime areas far from U.S. waters. By  deploying LEDETs on Navy and allied vessels, JIATF-S increases the  resources it has available for apprehending suspected drug smugglers,  their contraband, and their vessels.
According to Coast Guard data, and as shown in figure 6, the Coast  Guard’s deployment of LEDETs to JIATF-S (as measured in days) varied  from fiscal years 2009 through 2013, but experienced an overall decline  during this time period. The Coast Guard has not met its LEDET  allocation target levels to JIATF-S since establishing targets in fiscal year  2010. The Coast Guard provided its lowest LEDET allocation to JIATF-S  in fiscal year 2013, when it provided 895 days, or just under half of its  targeted level of 1,825 days. According to Coast Guard officials, the  Coast Guard’s ability to deploy LEDETs to JIATF-S is largely dependent  on the availability of Navy and allied vessels, as discussed later in this  report.
section_title: The Coast Guard Has Generally Not Met Its Drug Interdiction Mission Performance Targets because of Various Factors
subsections: section_title: Drug Interdiction Mission Performance Targets
paragraphs: The Coast Guard has generally not met targets for its primary drug  interdiction performance measure—removal rate for cocaine from  noncommercial vessels in the maritime transit zone. According to Coast  Guard officials, this measure focuses on transit zone drug operations  because the Coast Guard’s drug interdiction mission priority is removing  illicit drugs as close to their origins in South America and as far from U.S.  shores as possible, where drug shipments are in their most concentrated  bulk form. The measure assesses the percentage of cocaine directly  seized or observed being jettisoned, scuttled, or destroyed as a result of  Coast Guard actions relative to the total known flow of cocaine through  the transit zone using noncommercial maritime vessels, as estimated in  the CCDB. According to Coast Guard data, since establishing  performance targets for this measure in fiscal year 2009, the Coast  Guard met its target in 1 year—fiscal year 2013.Coast Guard reported a cocaine removal rate of 15.3 percent in the  transit zone, exceeding its performance target rate of 14.1 percent. Figure  7 shows the Coast Guard’s performance in meeting this primary drug  interdiction performance measure from fiscal years 2009 through 2013.
section_title: The Coast Guard Has Supported Counter- drug Efforts in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands with Increased Asset Deployments
subsections: section_title: The Coast Guard Supports DHS Efforts to Combat Drug Smuggling in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands
paragraphs: The Coast Guard is supporting a DHS-wide effort to combat the growing  level of violence associated with drug trafficking in Puerto Rico and the  U.S. Virgin Islands. Specifically, in September 2012, DHS implemented  Operation Caribbean Guard to address violence and drug trafficking into   The Coast Guard’s  and within Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.role in this DHS-wide effort has been to increase vessel and aircraft  operations to interdict the flow of drugs being trafficked by noncommercial  maritime vessels toward the islands. Since September 2012, the Coast  Guard’s Seventh District has implemented a surge operation, known as  Operation Unified Resolve, which has provided Sector San Juan—the  Coast Guard field unit whose area of responsibility includes Puerto Rico  and the U.S. Virgin Islands—with additional vessels and aircraft to  regularly patrol Puerto Rico and the eastern approaches of the U.S. Virgin  Islands. Operation Unified Resolve initially began as a surge operation,  but in October 2013, the Coast Guard made the surge operation a  standing operation—and, according to Coast Guard officials, established  a new baseline for drug interdiction operations in support of Puerto Rico  and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Under Operation Unified Resolve, the Coast Guard has placed special  emphasis on targeting the primary and secondary flow of illicit drugs from  South America to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. According to  Sector San Juan officials, a key challenge for the Coast Guard is the  relatively short distance between the Dominican Republic and Puerto   Rico. For example, officials noted that it would take approximately 4 hours  for a go-fast vessel to transit the 70 to 80 miles between the Dominican  Republic and Puerto Rico. Coast Guard officials reported that this places  a premium on the need for good intelligence on potential drug-smuggling  vessels and the effective placement of assets to interdict them.
According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard’s decision to provide  additional resources to Sector San Juan resulted from Coast Guard  analyses that found Sector San Juan lacked sufficient vessels and aircraft  to reduce maritime drug smuggling into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin  Islands. For example, according to an August 2012 Coast Guard  memorandum, Sector San Juan’s fleet of vessels faced readiness  concerns and lacked the capability to effectively conduct operations  against the primary drug flow of go-fast boats smuggling illicit drugs from  South America into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Further, the  memorandum notes that the Coast Guard did not have maritime patrol  aircraft permanently assigned to the territories. According to the  memorandum, the only permanently assigned Coast Guard aircraft in  Puerto Rico were helicopters based in the northwest corner of the island  and their endurance and position made them impractical for patrolling the  eastern approaches to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Coast Guard officials reported that the Coast Guard has not received  additional resources to support Operation Unified Resolve. Rather, to  implement the operation, the Coast Guard reported that it supplemented  its annual allocation of vessels and aircraft to Sector San Juan by  reallocating medium endurance cutters and maritime patrol aircraft to  Puerto Rico from other locations within the Coast Guard—largely from the  Coast Guard’s Seventh District. According to Coast Guard officials,  these vessels and aircraft, in general, had previously been allocated for  alien migrant interdiction operations. As noted earlier and as further  described in appendix I, the Coast Guard’s process for allocating drug  interdiction resources is focused on meeting commitments for strategic  priorities, such as JIATF-S transit zone operations, first, before dividing  up its remaining resources among its field locations such as Sector San  Juan. In this way, the Coast Guard reported that the additional resources  provided for Operation Unified Resolve did not come at the expense of its  JIATF-S deployments.
Beyond Operation Unified Resolve, the Coast Guard is scheduled to  modernize Sector San Juan’s vessel fleet. According to Coast Guard  officials, during fiscal years 2015 and 2016, the Coast Guard plans to  replace Sector San Juan’s six 110-foot patrol boats with six new 154-foot  fast response cutters (FRC). According to Coast Guard officials, the  FRCs’ impact on the drug interdiction mission will be significant, as the  FRC is expected to provide (1) increased interdiction capabilities; (2)  improved sea keeping; (3) greater endurance; (4) the ability to deploy a  pursuit-capable small boat; (5) improved weapons systems; and (6)  improved command, control, and communications systems. Coast Guard  officials reported that Sector San Juan would accommodate a mix of the  new FRCs and 110-foot patrol boats until the 110-foot patrol boats are  phased out by the end of fiscal year 2016. According to senior officials  from Sector San Juan, the additional resources Sector San Juan is  utilizing for Operation Unified Resolve, along with the scheduled arrival of  the six FRCs by the end of 2016, will put Sector San Juan in a better  position to meet its mission needs.
section_title: The Coast Guard Has Deployed More Resources for Drug Interdiction in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in Recent Years Vessel Deployments Have Increased
paragraphs: According to Coast Guard data, the total amount of vessel hours in  support of drug interdiction operations in the Sector San Juan area of  responsibility more than tripled in recent years—from 2,051 hours in fiscal  year 2009 to 6,839 hours in fiscal year 2013. According to the data,  much of the increase in vessel drug interdiction operational hours  occurred from fiscal years 2012 through 2013, when the Coast Guard  was implementing Operation Unified Resolve. Coast Guard data show  that medium endurance cutters accounted for a rising share of the drug  interdiction vessel operational hours, increasing from 3 percent in fiscal  year 2011 to 28 percent in fiscal year 2013. In fiscal year 2013, drug  interdiction operations accounted for 40 percent of reported medium  endurance cutter and patrol boat hours in the Sector San Juan area of  responsibility.operational hours in support of the drug interdiction mission has risen  since 2009 in response to increased drug-smuggling events and the  additional resources provided for Operation Unified Resolve beginning in  late fiscal year 2012.
According to Coast Guard officials, the number of vessel  Figure 8 shows the total vessel hours (major cutter and patrol boat hours)  the Coast Guard reported for conducting drug interdiction operations in  the Sector San Juan area of responsibility during fiscal years 2009  through 2013, as well as, the relative share of the vessel hours provided  by Sector San Juan and other Coast Guard locations.
According to Coast Guard data, maritime patrol aircraft resource hours  reported for drug interdiction operations in the Sector San Juan area of  responsibility declined during fiscal years 2009 through 2011, before  increasing considerably in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. For example, in  fiscal year 2011, the Coast Guard reported conducting 148 flight hours  patrolling Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and this number more  than tripled to 502 hours in fiscal year 2012 before doubling to 1,000  hours in fiscal year 2013. The Coast Guard attributes this considerable  increase of flight hours in recent years to increased aircraft provided in  support of Operation Unified Resolve. Since implementing Operation  Unified Resolve in September 2012, the Coast Guard has conducted  surveillance patrols of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands using  maritime patrol aircraft and crews forward deployed from Coast Guard  field locations in the continental United States. Figure 9 shows the Coast  Guard’s maritime patrol aircraft hours in support of drug interdiction  operations in the Sector San Juan area of responsibility during fiscal  years 2009 through 2013.
Coast Guard officials reported that the additional resources the Coast  Guard provided for Operation Unified Resolve have led to increasing  interdictions of illicit drugs being smuggled in and around Puerto Rico and  the U.S. Virgin Islands. According to Coast Guard officials, as of March  25, 2014, Operation Unified Resolve had led to the removal of 32,669  kilograms of cocaine and roughly 11,000 pounds of marijuana. Further,  Coast Guard officials reported that since deploying additional vessels and  aircraft for Operation Unified Resolve in September 2012, the Coast  Guard found the estimated primary flow of cocaine into Puerto Rico to be  considerably higher than previously thought. For example, according to  CCDB data provided by the Coast Guard, the estimated noncommercial  maritime primary flow of cocaine toward Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin  Islands more than doubled, from 7.1 metric tons in fiscal year 2012 to  14.9 metric tons in fiscal year 2013.and secondary noncommercial maritime drug flow toward Puerto Rico  and the U.S. Virgin Islands during fiscal years 2009 through 2013.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided a draft  of this report to DHS, the Department of Justice, ONDCP, and JIATF-S  for review and comment. We received technical comments that we have  incorporated, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and appropriate  congressional committees. In addition, this report is available at no  charge on GAO’s web-site at http://gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Staff acknowledgments are provided in  appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: The Coast Guard’s Process for Allocating Drug Interdiction Resources
paragraphs: This appendix provides a summary of the Coast Guard’s process for  allocating vessels, aircraft, and other resources for its drug interdiction  mission. The Coast Guard’s process for allocating drug interdiction  resources is focused on meeting commitments for strategic priorities,  including for the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S)—a  reporting unit of the Department of Defense’s Southern Command that  oversees detection and monitoring operations of drug-smuggling events  in the transit zone. The Coast Guard allocates drug interdiction resources  for these strategic priorities, first, before dividing up its remaining  resources among its Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands for further  allocation to Coast Guard districts and sectors across the United States.  The Coast Guard determines the targets for the amount of time selected  vessels, aircraft, and law enforcement detachments (LEDET) are  provided to JIATF-S for transit zone operations—through an annual  operational planning process that considers factors including resource  requirements for strategic priorities, evolving maritime risks, and the  availability of vessels and aircraft. Through this process, the Coast Guard  reviews JIATF-S resource requests and sets resource targets. The Coast  Guard then allocates the remaining resources among its field locations  across the United States for implementing 11 missions, including drug  interdiction.
In general, the Coast Guard’s annual drug interdiction resource allocation  planning process includes four steps.
First, JIATF-S submits its resource allocation requirements for  meeting National Drug Control Strategy targets to the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense as directed  by the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan. These  requirements specify the capabilities (types of vessels or aircraft) and  corresponding capacities (number of days for vessels or resource  hours for aircraft). The DHS Office of Policy’s Counter Illicit Trafficking  Section communicates the resource requests to the Coast Guard with  resource hour requests for Coast Guard cutters, boats, aircraft, and  LEDETs.
Second, Coast Guard planners determine the amount of resources  that the Coast Guard intends to provide in the upcoming fiscal year.  The Coast Guard considers its support for JIATF-S drug interdiction  operations as one of three strategic commitment priorities. In this way, Coast Guard planners determine the number of vessel days and  aircraft hours to provide to JIATF-S before allocating remaining  vessels and aircraft to its field locations across the United States for  other missions (as described in more detail below). The Coast Guard  determines its JIATF-S resource targets based on various factors,  including strategic priority and resource availability.
Third, the Coast Guard provides its JIATF-S resource target—or  Statement of Intent—to the DHS Office of Counter Illicit Trafficking,  which liaises with JIATF-S and the Office of National Drug Control  Policy (ONDCP). The Statement of Intent details target levels of  resources the Coast Guard intends to provide to JIATF-S for the next  fiscal year. The Statement of Intent outlines asset availability level  targets for major cutters, maritime patrol aircraft, and other resources,  such as deployable forces. DHS then combines the Coast Guard  Statement of Intent with those of Customs and Border Protection  (CBP) and submits an overall DHS Statement of Intent to ONDCP and  JIATF-S.
Fourth, after allocating resources for JIATF-S and other strategic  commitments, the Coast Guard divides its remaining resource hours  for vessels and aircraft between its Pacific and Atlantic Area  Commands. Coast Guard officials reported that the Coast Guard’s  field units use a greater variety of vessels for coastal drug interdiction  operations than provided to JIATF-S. These generally include the  110-foot patrol boats in addition to a variety of smaller boats. For  example, whereas the Coast Guard generally provides major cutters  to JIATF-S, field units rely on a greater variety of smaller vessels to  conduct coastal drug interdiction operations because the missions are  conducted much closer to shore than are JIATF-S operations.
Outside of JIATF-S, the Coast Guard’s Seventh District (headquartered in  Miami, Florida, and having responsibility for the Caribbean area including  Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands) and Eleventh District  (headquartered in Alameda, California, and having responsibility for the  Eastern Pacific area, including coastal areas from the U.S.-Mexico border  to South America) have accounted for the largest shares of the Coast  Guard’s drug interdiction resource hours. According to Coast Guard  officials, these districts’ areas of responsibility include high drug-trafficking  areas, and therefore drug interdiction accounts for a larger mission focus  than at other Coast Guard districts.
From fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the Coast Guard’s budget included  about $1.2 billion per year for its drug interdiction mission. This mission  accounted for between 10 and 12 percent of the Coast Guard’s budget  during this time. The Coast Guard reported, based on the enacted fiscal  year 2014 budget, that its fiscal year 2014 estimate to perform the drug  interdiction mission is $1,305,271,000. Figure 10 shows the flow of the  Coast Guard drug interdiction resource allocation process.
section_title: Appendix II: Operation Caribbean Guard
paragraphs: This appendix identifies and describes the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) component agencies involved in Operation Caribbean  Guard. In September 2012, DHS implemented Operation Caribbean  Guard to intercept illegal weapons, drugs, and money flowing to and from  Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Operation Caribbean Guard is a  DHS-wide surge effort involving multiple component agencies. Table 2  identifies DHS component agencies involved in Operation Caribbean  Guard and reported examples of actions they have taken.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Conrad (Assistant  Director), Jason Berman, Michele Fejfar, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu,  Tracey King, and Lerone Reid made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Coast Guard: Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Faced in  Developing and Implementing a Common Operational Picture.  GAO-13-784T. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2013.
Coast Guard: Clarifying the Application of Guidance for Common  Operational Picture Development Would Strengthen Program.  GAO-13-321. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2013.
International Affairs: Status of Funding, Equipment, and Training for the  Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. GAO-13-367R. Washington, D.C.:  March 20, 2013  Coast Guard: Portfolio Management Approach Needed to Improve Major  Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-12-918. Washington, D.C.: September 20,  2012.
Coast Guard: Legacy Vessels’ Declining Conditions Reinforce Need for  More Realistic Operational Targets. GAO-12-741. Washington, D.C.: July  31, 2012.
Observations on the Coast Guard’s and the Department of Homeland  Security’s Fleet Studies. GAO-12-751R. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2012.
Coast Guard: Action Needed as Approved Deepwater Program Remains  Unachievable. GAO-11-743. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011.
Coast Guard: Deepwater Requirements, Quantities, and Cost Require  Revalidation to Reflect Knowledge Gained. GAO-10-790. Washington,  D.C.: July 27, 2010.
Drug Control: Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries Has  Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are  Needed. GAO-08-784. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008.
Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug  Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for  Transit Zone Operations. GAO-06-200. Washington, D.C.: November 15,  2005.