Department of Defense: Additional Actions and Data Are Needed to Effectively Manage and Oversee DOD's Acquisition Workforce
Published: 2009-03-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2001, the Department of Defense's (DOD) spending on goods and services has more than doubled to $388 billion in 2008, while the number of civilian and military acquisition personnel has remained relatively stable. To augment its in-house workforce, DOD relies heavily on contractor personnel. If it does not maintain an adequate workforce, DOD places its billion-dollar acquisitions at an increased risk of poor outcomes and vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. GAO was asked to (1) assess DOD's ability to determine whether it has a sufficient acquisition workforce, (2) assess DOD initiatives to improve the management and oversight of its acquisition workforce, and (3) discuss practices of leading organizations that could provide insights for DOD's acquisition workforce oversight. To do this, GAO analyzed key DOD studies, obtained data from 66 major weapon system program offices across DOD, and interviewed officials from 4 program offices. GAO also met with representatives from six companies recognized as leaders in workforce management.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD lacks critical departmentwide information to ensure its acquisition workforce is sufficient to meet its national security mission. First, in its acquisition workforce assessments, DOD does not collect or track information on contractor personnel, despite their being a key segment of the total acquisition workforce. DOD also lacks information on why contractor personnel are used, which limits its ability to determine whether decisions to use contractors to augment the in-house acquisition workforce are appropriate. GAO found that program office decisions to use contractor personnel are often driven by factors such as quicker hiring time frames and civilian staffing limits, rather than by the skills needed or the nature or criticality of the work. Second, DOD's lack of key pieces of information limits its ability to determine gaps in the acquisition workforce it needs to meet current and future missions. For example, DOD lacks information on the use and skill sets of contractor personnel, and lacks complete information on the skill sets of its in-house personnel. Omitting data on contractor personnel and needed skills from DOD's workforce assessments not only skews analyses of workforce gaps, but also limits DOD's ability to make informed workforce allocation decisions and determine whether the total acquisition workforce--in-house and contractor personnel--is sufficient to accomplish its mission. DOD has initiated several recent actions aimed at improving the management and oversight of its acquisition workforce. For example, DOD is developing a plan for managing the civilian acquisition workforce and is establishing practices for overseeing additional hiring, recruiting, and retention activities. It has also taken actions to develop some of the data and tools necessary to monitor the acquisition workforce, such as a competency assessment scheduled to be completed in March 2010. Each military service and agency has also begun, to varying degrees, efforts to assess its workforce at the service level. In addition, some efforts aimed at improving DOD's overall workforce may also provide additional information to support acquisition workforce efforts. However, these initiatives may not provide the comprehensive information DOD needs to manage and oversee its acquisition workforce. To manage their workforces, the leading organizations GAO reviewed (1) identify gaps in their current workforces by assessing the overall competencies needed to achieve business objectives; (2) establish mechanisms to track and evaluate the effectiveness of their initiatives to close these gaps; (3) take a strategic approach in deciding when to use contractor personnel to supplement the workforce, such as limiting the use of contractor personnel to performing noncore-business functions and meeting surges in work demands; and (4) track and analyze data on contractor personnel. These practices could provide insights to DOD as it moves forward with its acquisition workforce initiatives.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) is the largest buying enterprise in the  world. Since fiscal year 2001, DOD’s spending on goods and services more  than doubled to $388 billion in fiscal year 2008, and the number of weapon  system programs has also grown. Despite this substantial increase, the  number of civilian and military personnel in DOD’s acquisition  workforce—which is responsible for planning, executing, and supporting  DOD’s acquisitions—has remained relatively stable. To supplement this in- house acquisition workforce, DOD relies heavily on contractor personnel.  Our prior work has shown that relying on contractor personnel to perform  core missions often creates significant challenges for DOD and other  federal agencies. At the same time, changes in the federal acquisition  environment have created significant challenges to building and sustaining  a capable acquisition workforce across the government. In addition,  federal agencies are facing profound demographic changes in their  workforces, including a potentially large loss of retirement-eligible  personnel and increased competition for a limited pool of highly skilled  talent.
Since January 2001, GAO has designated strategic human capital  management as a governmentwide high-risk area. In addition, the DOD  acquisition workforce is included in another high-risk area—DOD  Contract Management—that GAO designated in 1992. Both GAO and DOD  have noted that if a workforce adequate to manage the department’s  billion-dollar acquisitions is not maintained, there is an increased risk of  poor acquisition outcomes and vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. In  this context, you asked us to review several issues related to the state of  DOD’s acquisition workforce. This report (1) assesses DOD’s ability to  determine whether its acquisition workforce is sufficient to meet its  national security mission, (2) assesses the department’s recent initiatives  to improve the management and oversight of its acquisition workforce,  and (3) discusses practices of leading organizations that could provide  insights for DOD’s acquisition workforce oversight.
To conduct our review, we analyzed key DOD workforce documents,  including the department’s Implementation Report for the DOD Civilian  Human Capital Strategic Plan 2006-2010 and related assessment of the  acquisition workforce. In addition, we met with representatives from the  Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics  (AT&L), the Office of Civilian Personnel Policy within the Office of the  Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, the three military services,  and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). We also gathered data from 66  major weapon system program offices across all DOD components. To  obtain more detailed information, we interviewed officials from 4 program  offices, 1 from each service (Army’s Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile  Defense Elevated Netted Sensor, Air Force’s Reaper, and Navy’s  Presidential Helicopter) and 1 from MDA (Airborne Laser). We selected  the program offices, in part, because they were responsible for developing  and acquiring major weapon systems, mostly in the development phase,  and contained a mix of both contractor and civilian personnel. To better  understand the workforce management practices of leading organizations,  we met with representatives from six companies recognized as leaders for  various aspects of workforce management: Deloitte; General Electric  Company (General Electric); Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed  Martin); Microsoft; Rolls-Royce, PLC (Rolls-Royce); and Valero Energy  Corporation (Valero Energy). We also reviewed research on leading  workforce practices or discussed workforce management issues with  officials at a number of nonprofit and consulting organizations: Aerospace  Industries Association, APQC, IBM Center for The Business of  Government, National Academy of Public Administration, Partnership for  Public Service, and the Society for Human Resource Management.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 to March 2009  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: At the end of fiscal year 2007, the number of civilian and military  personnel in DOD’s acquisition workforce totaled over 126,000—of which  civilian personnel comprised 89 percent. According to DOD, these in- house personnel represent more than 70 percent of the total federal  acquisition workforce. DOD defines its acquisition workforce to include 13  career fields, based on the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement  Act of 1990. From fiscal years 2001 to 2007, the number of civilian and  military acquisition personnel in these 13 fields declined overall by 2.5  percent; however, some career fields have increased substantially, while  others have shown dramatic declines. Table 1 shows the 13 fields, the  number of military and civilian personnel in each of these fields in 2001  and 2007, and the percentage change between those 2 years.
During this same time period, the number of contracting actions valued at  over $100,000 increased by 62 percent and dollars obligated on contracts  increased by 116 percent, according to DOD. Moreover, DOD has reported  that the number of major defense acquisition programs has increased from  70 to 95. To augment its declining in-house acquisition workforce, DOD  has relied more heavily on contractor personnel.
In addition to the overall decline in its in-house acquisition workforce and  an increased workload, DOD faces shifting workforce demographics and a  changing strategic environment. The U.S. workforce as a whole is aging  and experiencing a shift in the labor pool away from persons with science  and technical degrees. According to DOD, advances in technology, such as  the ability to do jobs from almost anywhere in the world, are also driving  workforce changes and increasing global competition for the most highly  educated and skilled personnel. To address these and other challenges— including wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, an evolving mission to combat  threats around the world, and an increased need to collaborate with both  domestic and international partners—DOD has begun to establish a more  centralized management framework for forecasting, recruiting,  developing, and sustaining the talent pool needed to meet its national  security mission.
Several components in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) share  policy and guidance responsibility for the workforce. The Under Secretary  of Defense for Personnel and Readiness serves as the Chief Human Capital  Officer for DOD—both for military and civilian personnel—and has overall  responsibility for the development of the department’s competency-based  workforce planning and its civilian human capital strategic plan. Within  the Office of Personnel and Readiness, the Office of Civilian Personnel  Policy has overall responsibility for managing DOD’s civilian workforce  and has the lead role in developing and overseeing implementation of the  plan. For example, the Implementation Report for the DOD Civilian  Human Capital Strategic Plan 2006-2010 lists enterprisewide skills and  competencies for 25 mission-critical occupations, which the department  has begun to assess in terms of future needs, budget-based projections,  and anticipated gaps. Another OSD component, AT&L, is responsible for  managing DOD’s acquisition workforce, including tailoring policies and  guidance specific to the acquisition workforce and managing the training  and certification of that workforce. As required by the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (2008 NDAA), AT&L has drafted an  addendum for the implementation report for the civilian human capital  strategic plan to specifically address management and oversight of the  acquisition workforce.
Each military service has its own corresponding personnel and acquisition  offices that develop additional service-specific guidance, and provide  management and oversight of its workforce. The services have generally  delegated the determination of workforce needs to the command levels  and their corresponding program offices. Although each service uses a  different management structure, the commands typically make overall  organizational budgetary and personnel allocations, whereas the program  offices identify acquisition workforce needs; make decisions regarding the  civilian, military, and contractor makeup of the workforce; and provide the  day-to-day management of the workforce. In addition, each service  designates organizations aligned by one or more career fields to monitor  and manage career paths and training, and to identify gaps in current skill  sets.
section_title: DOD Lacks the Information Needed to Determine the Sufficiency of Its Acquisition Workforce
paragraphs: DOD lacks critical departmentwide information in several areas necessary  to assess, manage, and oversee the acquisition workforce and help ensure  it has a sufficient acquisition workforce to meet DOD’s national security  mission. Specifically, AT&L does not have key pieces of information  regarding its in-house acquisition workforce, such as complete data on  skill sets, which are needed to accurately identify its workforce gaps. In  addition, it lacks information on the use and skill sets of contractor  personnel performing acquisition-related functions. Omitting these data  from DOD’s assessments not only skews analyses of workforce gaps, but  also limits DOD’s ability to make informed workforce allocation decisions.  Critical success factors for human capital management include collecting  data on workforce competencies and skills mix, and evaluating human  capital approaches—including those for acquiring and retaining talent— for how well they support efforts to achieve program results. Such  efforts, linked to strategic goals and objectives, can enable an agency to  recognize, prepare, and obtain the knowledge, skills, abilities, and size for  the workforce it needs to pursue its current and future missions.
subsections: section_title: AT&L Lacks Information on the Use of Contractor Personnel in Its Acquisition Workforce
paragraphs: DOD has increasingly relied on contractors to perform core missions, but  has yet to develop a workforce strategy for determining the appropriate  mix of contractor and government personnel. Our prior work has noted  the importance of effective human capital management to better ensure  that agencies have the right staff who are doing the right jobs in the right  place at the right time by making flexible use of its internal workforce and  appropriate use of contractors. We have also reported that decisions  regarding the use of contractors should be based on strategic planning  regarding what types of work are best done by the agency or contracted  out.
While DOD planning documents state that the workforce should be  managed from a “total force” perspective—which calls for contractor  personnel to be managed along with civilian and military personnel — DOD does not collect departmentwide data on contractor personnel.  Program offices, however, do have information about contractor  personnel. Data we obtained from 66 program offices show that contractor  personnel comprised more than a third of those programs’ acquisition- related positions (see table 2). According to MDA officials, the agency  collects and uses such data in its agency-level workforce allocation  processes, which in turn has helped inform staffing and resource decisions  at the program office level. Because contractor personnel likely comprise  a substantial part of all personnel supporting program offices, AT&L is  missing information on a key segment of the department’s total acquisition  workforce (in-house and contractor personnel).
DOD also lacks information on factors driving program offices’ decisions  to use contractor personnel rather than hire in-house personnel. DOD  guidance for determining the workforce mix outlines the basis on which  officials should make decisions regarding what type of personnel— military, civilian, or contractor—should fill a given position. The  guidance’s primary emphasis is on whether the work is considered to be  an inherently governmental function, not on whether it is a function that is  needed to ensure institutional capacity.
The guidance also states that using the least costly alternative should be  an important factor when determining the workforce mix. However, of  the 31 program offices that reported information about the reasons for  using contractor personnel, only 1 indicated that reduced cost was a key  factor in the decision to use contractor personnel rather than civilian  personnel. Instead, 25 cited staffing limits, the speed of hiring, or both as  main factors in their decisions to use contractor personnel. Additionally,  22 program offices cited a lack of in-house expertise as a reason for using  contractor personnel, and 17 of those indicated that the particular  expertise sought is generally not hired by the government. In addition, at 3  of the 4 program offices we visited, officials said that they often hire  contractors because they may face limits on the number of civilian  personnel they can hire, and because budgetary provisions may allow  program offices to use program funds to pay for additional contractor  personnel, but not for hiring civilian personnel. Program officials also  cited the lengthy hiring process for civilian personnel as a reason for using  contractor personnel.
section_title: AT&L Lacks Key Pieces of Information Necessary to Conduct Gap Analyses
paragraphs: AT&L’s lack of key pieces of information hinders its ability to determine  gaps in the number and skill sets of acquisition personnel needed to meet  DOD’s current and future missions. At a fundamental level, workforce  gaps are determined by comparing the number and skill sets of the  personnel that an organization has with what it needs. However, AT&L  lacks information on both what it has and what it needs.
With regard to information on the personnel it has, AT&L not only lacks  information on contractor personnel, but it also lacks complete  information on the skill sets of the current acquisition workforce and  whether these skill sets are sufficient to accomplish its missions. AT&L is  currently conducting a competency assessment to identify the skill sets of  its current acquisition workforce. While this assessment will provide  useful information regarding the skill sets of the current in-house  acquisition workforce, it is not designed to determine the size,  composition, and skill sets of an acquisition workforce needed to meet the  department’s missions.
AT&L also lacks complete information on the acquisition workforce  needed to meet DOD’s mission. The personnel numbers that AT&L uses to  reflect needs are derived from the budget. Because these personnel  numbers are constrained by the size of the budget, they likely do not  reflect the full needs of acquisition programs. Of the 66 program offices  that provided data to us, 13 reported that their authorized personnel levels  are lower than those they requested. In a report on DOD’s workforce  management, RAND noted that the mismatch between needs and available  resources means that managers have an incentive to focus on managing  the budget process instead of identifying the resources needed to fulfill the  mission and then allocating resources within the constraints of the  budget.
section_title: Recent Initiatives May Not Yield the Information Needed to Assess, Manage, and Oversee DOD’s Total Acquisition Workforce
paragraphs: AT&L has begun to respond to recent legislative requirements aimed at  improving DOD’s management and oversight of its acquisition workforce,  including developing data, tools, and processes to more fully assess and  monitor its acquisition workforce. Each service has also recently initiated,  to varying degrees, additional efforts to assess its own workforce at the  service level. Some recent DOD efforts aimed at improving the broader  workforce may also provide information to support AT&L’s acquisition  workforce efforts. While it is too early to determine the extent to which  these efforts will improve the department’s management and oversight, the  lack of information on contractor personnel raises concerns about  whether AT&L will have the information it needs to adequately assess,  manage, and oversee the total acquisition workforce.
As required by the 2008 NDAA, AT&L plans to issue an addendum to the  Implementation Report for the DOD Civilian Human Capital Strategic  Plan 2006-2010. According to DOD, this addendum will lay out AT&L’s  strategy for managing and overseeing the acquisition workforce. The  addendum is to provide an analysis of the status of the civilian acquisition  workforce and discuss AT&L’s efforts for implementing the Acquisition  Workforce Development Fund, which the 2008 NDAA required DOD to  establish and fund. AT&L has focused its implementation efforts in three  key areas: (1) recruiting and hiring, (2) training and development, and (3)  retention and recognition. AT&L has established a steering board  responsible for oversight on all aspects of the fund, including the approval  of the use of funds for each proposed initiative. In addition to the  addendum to the implementation report, AT&L created its own human  capital plan in an effort to integrate competencies, training, processes,  tools, policy, and structure for improving the acquisition workforce. AT&L  has also developed some tools and begun initiatives designed to help with  its management of the acquisition workforce, such as its competency  assessment that is scheduled to be completed in March 2010. AT&L  recently established the Defense Acquisition Workforce Joint Assessment  Team tasked with assessing and making recommendations regarding  component workforce size, total force mix, future funding levels, and  other significant workforce issues. According to an AT&L official, the team  will also develop an estimate of the acquisition workforce needed to meet  the department’s mission that is unconstrained by the budget. Table 3  provides a brief description of AT&L’s recent efforts.
Each service has also begun to take a more focused look at its acquisition  workforce by developing service-specific acquisition workforce plans and  designating leads tasked with monitoring career paths and training, and  identifying gaps in current skill sets. For example, responsibility for  different aspects of the Navy’s acquisition workforce has recently been  distributed among a number of corporate-level offices—such as  Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Research, Development, and Acquisition;  and Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education. To illustrate,  Research, Development, and Acquisition will develop and maintain  acquisition strategic guidance and provide management oversight of the  capabilities of the Navy’s acquisition workforce. Table 4 provides  examples of service-level workforce initiatives.
In addition to the AT&L and service-level initiatives, some DOD efforts  aimed at improving the broader workforce may provide information that  can assist AT&L in assessing, managing, and overseeing the acquisition  workforce. Some promising initiatives include the following:    The Office of Civilian Personnel Policy recently established a Civilian  Workforce Capability and Readiness Program, and in November 2008  officially established a corresponding program management office  tasked with monitoring overall civilian workforce trends and  conducting competency assessments and gap analyses.
DOD, through its components, is developing an annual inventory of  contracts for services performed in the preceding fiscal year. This  inventory is required to include, among other things, information  identifying the missions and functions performed by contractors, the  number of full-time contractor personnel equivalents that were paid  for performance of the activity, and the funding source for the  contracted work. The Army issued its first inventory, which  determined the equivalent number of contractor personnel it used in  fiscal year 2007 based on the number of hours of work paid for under  its service contracts.
DOD has issued guidance directing programs to consider using DOD  civilian personnel to perform new functions or functions currently  performed by contractor personnel in cases where those functions  could be performed by DOD civilian personnel. The guidance also  requires that DOD civilian personnel be given special consideration to  perform certain categories of functions, including functions performed  by DOD civilian personnel at any time during the previous 10 years and  those closely associated with the performance of an inherently  governmental function. When the inventory of contracts for services is  completed, DOD is mandated by the 2008 NDAA to use the inventory  as a tool to identify functions currently performed by contractor  personnel that could be performed by DOD civilian personnel. DOD is  developing additional guidance and a tool to assist in developing cost  comparisons for evaluating the use of in-house personnel rather than  contractor personnel.
These initiatives have the potential to enhance DOD’s acquisition  workforce management practices and oversight activities. However, these  efforts may not provide the comprehensive information DOD needs to  manage and oversee its acquisition workforce. For example, although the  Army has issued its first inventory of its service contracts, inventories for  all DOD components are not scheduled to be completed before June 2011.  Further, as currently planned, the inventory will not include information  on the skill sets and functions of contractor personnel.
section_title: Practices of Leading Organizations Could Provide Insights for DOD’s Acquisition Workforce Efforts
paragraphs: As DOD continues to develop and implement departmentwide initiatives  aimed at providing better oversight of the acquisition workforce, some of  the practices employed by leading organizations for managing their  workforces could provide insights for DOD’s efforts. These practices  include:  identifying gaps in the current workforce by assessing the overall  competencies needed to achieve business objectives, compared to  current competencies;  establishing mechanisms to track and evaluate the effectiveness of  initiatives to close workforce gaps;  taking a strategic approach in deciding when and how to use  contractor personnel to supplement the workforce; and  tracking and analyzing data on contractor personnel.
We have previously reported many of these practices as critical factors for  providing good strategic human capital management.
The leading organizations we reviewed develop gap analyses and  workforce plans from estimates of the number and composition of  personnel with specific workforce competencies needed to achieve the  organization’s objectives. For example, Lockheed Martin assesses the skill  mix needed to fulfill future work orders and compares this with the firm’s  current skill mix to identify potential workforce gaps. An official at  Lockheed Martin said one such assessment indicated that the company  needed skill sets different from those needed in the past because it is  receiving more proposals for logistics work associated with support and  delivery contracts, rather than its traditional system development work.  Table 5 provides examples of how companies we reviewed link workforce  assessments to their organizational objectives.
These leading organizations also assess their efforts to close workforce  gaps by tracking data on specific recruiting and retention metrics. For  example, Microsoft assesses the quality of its new hires based on the  performance ratings and retention for their first 2 years with the company.  According to a company official, this allows Microsoft to compare the  results of using its different hiring sources, such as college recruiting and  other entry-level hiring methods. Similarly, Deloitte uses performance  ratings, retention data, and employee satisfaction surveys to help  determine a return on investment from its college recruiting efforts and to  identify schools that tend to supply high-quality talent that the company is  able to retain. Table 6 provides examples of recruiting and retention  metrics used by the companies we reviewed. In addition to tracking data  on metrics, Deloitte uses quantitative models that analyze workforce  demographics and other factors to predict actions of job candidates and  employees. Data from such metrics and models can be used to inform  other workforce decisions and focus limited resources for use where the  greatest benefit is expected.
Finally, the companies we reviewed take a strategic approach to  determining when to use contractor support. Officials from Deloitte,  General Electric, and Rolls Royce said they generally use contractors to  facilitate flexibility and meet peak work demands without hiring  additional, permanent, full-time employees. Some of the companies also  place limits on their use of contractor employees. General Electric, for  example, uses contractor personnel for temporary support and generally  limits their use for a given operation to 1 year in order to prevent the use  of temporary personnel to fill ongoing or permanent roles. Additionally,  General Electric and Lockheed Martin limit the use of contractor  personnel to noncore functions. An official from General Electric said that  it rarely outsources essential, sophisticated, or strategic functions, or large  components of its business. Likewise, Lockheed Martin does not  outsource capabilities that are seen as discriminators that set the company  apart from its market competitors.
Deloitte, General Electric, Lockheed Martin, and Microsoft also maintain  and analyze data on their contractor employees in order to mitigate risks,  ensure compliance with in-house regulations and security requirements, or  to ensure that reliance on contractor support creates value for the  company. An official at Deloitte noted, for example, that if work involving  contractor support continues for an extended period, the business unit  might be advised to request additional full-time employee positions in its  next planning cycle or streamline its process to eliminate the need for  contractor support. At Rolls Royce, an official told us that one unit uses an  algorithm to determine the percentage of work being outsourced by  computing the number of full-time-equivalent personnel needed to  complete the same level of work performed through outsourcing. This  information is important because of the cost of outsourcing. According to  the company official, outsourcing may be more costly—all other factors  being equal—because of the profit consideration for the contractor. As a  result, outsourcing decisions can become a trade-off between multiple  factors, such as cost, quality, capacity, capability, and speed.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Major shifts in workforce demographics and a changing strategic  environment present significant challenges for DOD in assessing and  overseeing an acquisition workforce that has the capacity to acquire  needed goods and services, as well as monitor the work of contractors.  While recent and planned actions of AT&L and other DOD components  could help DOD address many of these challenges, the department has yet  to determine the acquisition workforce that it needs to fulfill its mission or  develop information about contractor personnel. While DOD has begun to  estimate the number of full-time-equivalent contractor personnel through  its inventory of contracts for services, this effort will not identify the skill  sets and functions of contractor personnel performing acquisition-related  work or the length of time for which they are used. At the same time, DOD  lacks guidance on the appropriate circumstances under which contractor  personnel may perform acquisition work. Without such guidance, DOD  runs the risk of not maintaining sufficient institutional capacity to perform  its missions. Until DOD maintains detailed departmentwide information on  its contractor personnel performing acquisition-related work, it will  continue to have insufficient information regarding the composition, range  of skills, and the functions performed by this key component of the  acquisition workforce. Without this information upon which to act, the  department runs the risk of not having the right number and appropriate  mix of civilian, military, and contractor personnel it needs to accomplish  its missions.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better ensure that DOD’s acquisition workforce is the right size with  the right skills and that the department is making the best use of its  resources, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following  four actions:    Collect and track data on contractor personnel who supplement the  acquisition workforce—including their functions performed, skill sets,  and length of service—and conduct analyses using these data to  inform acquisition workforce decisions regarding the appropriate  number and mix of civilian, military, and contractor personnel the  department needs.  Identify and update on an ongoing basis the number and skill sets of  the total acquisition workforce—including civilian, military, and  contractor personnel—that the department needs to fulfill its mission.  DOD should use this information to better inform its resource  allocation decisions.
Review and revise the criteria and guidance for using contractor  personnel to clarify under what circumstances and the extent to which  it is appropriate to use contractor personnel to perform acquisition- related functions.
Develop a tracking mechanism to determine whether the guidance has  been appropriately implemented across the department. The tracking  mechanism should collect information on the reasons contractor  personnel are being used, such as whether they were used because of  civilian staffing limits, civilian hiring time frames, a lack of in-house  expertise, budgetary provisions, cost, or other reasons.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD concurred  with three recommendations and partially concurred with one  recommendation. DOD’s comments appear in appendix I. DOD also  provided technical comments on the draft report which we incorporated  as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with the draft recommendation to collect and  track data on contractor personnel to inform the department’s acquisition  workforce decisions. DOD stated that it agrees that information on  contractor personnel supporting the acquisition mission is necessary for  improved acquisition workforce planning, especially with regard to the  number and the acquisition functions performed. The department also   noted that establishing a contractual requirement to capture more detailed  workforce information, such as skill sets and length of service of  contractor personnel, needs to be carefully considered. We agree that the  manner in which data on contractor personnel are to be collected should  be carefully considered. We continue to believe that comprehensive data  on contractor personnel are needed to accurately identify the  department’s acquisition workforce gaps and inform its decisions on the  appropriate mix of in-house or contractor personnel.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to identify and update on an  ongoing basis the number and skill sets of the total acquisition workforce  that it needs to fulfill its mission and stated that it has an ongoing effort to  accomplish this. DOD states that its ongoing efforts will address this  recommendation; however, the efforts cited in its response improve DOD’s  information only on its in-house acquisition workforce and do not identify  the total acquisition workforce, including contractor personnel, the  department needs to meet its missions. We revised the recommendation to  clarify that DOD’s acquisition workforce management and oversight  should encompass contractor as well as civilian and military personnel.
DOD also concurred with our recommendations to revise the criteria and  guidance for using contractor personnel to perform acquisition-related  functions, and to develop a tracking mechanism to determine whether the  revised guidance is being appropriately implemented across the  department.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense. The  report is also available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-5274 or needhamjk1@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices   of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report  are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Katherine V. Schinasi, Managing  Director; Ann Calvaresi-Barr, Director; Carol Dawn Petersen, Assistant  Director; Ruth “Eli” DeVan; Kristine Heuwinkel; Victoria Klepacz; John  Krump; Teague Lyons; Andrew H. Redd; Ron Schwenn; Karen Sloan; Brian  Smith; Angela D. Thomas; and Adam Yu made key contributions to this  report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Human Capital: Opportunities Exist to Build on Recent Progress to  Strengthen DOD’s Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan. GAO-09-235.  Washington, D.C.: February 10, 2009.
High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January  2009.
Department of Homeland Security: A Strategic Approach Is Needed to  Better Ensure the Acquisition Workforce Can Meet Mission Needs.   GAO-09-30. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2008.
Human Capital: Transforming Federal Recruiting and Hiring Efforts.  GAO-08-762T. Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2008.
Defense Contracting: Army Case Study Delineates Concerns with Use of  Contractors as Contract Specialists. GAO-08-360. Washington, D.C.:  March 26, 2008.
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance  on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight.  GAO-08-572T. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.
Federal Acquisition: Oversight Plan Needed to Help Implement  Acquisition Advisory Panel’s Recommendations. GAO-08-515T.  Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2008.
The Department of Defense’s Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan  Does Not Meet Most Statutory Requirements. GAO-08-439R. Washington,  D.C.: February 6, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Increased Reliance on Service Contractors  Exacerbates Long-standing Challenges. GAO-08-621T. Washington, D.C.:  January 23, 2008.
Department of Homeland Security: Improved Assessment and Oversight  Needed to Manage Risk of Contracting for Selected Services. GAO-07-990.  Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2007.
Federal Acquisitions and Contracting: Systemic Challenges Need  Attention. GAO-07-1098T. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management and Oversight Needed to  Better Control DOD’s Acquisition of Services. GAO-07-832T. Washington,  D.C.: May 10, 2007.
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Federal Acquisition Challenges and  Opportunities in the 21st Century. GAO-07-45SP. Washington, D.C.:  October 2006.
Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function At Federal Agencies.  GAO-05-218G. Washington, D.C.: September 2005.
A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-02-373SP.  Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2002.