Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT's Enforcement Approach
Published: 2003-01-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: When shipments of dangerous goods (hazardous chemical substances that could endanger public safety or the environment, such as flammable liquids or radioactive materials) are not properly packaged and labeled for air transport, they can pose significant threats because there is little room for error when something goes wrong in flight. To better understand the risks posed by improper ("undeclared") air shipments, we assessed what is known about their nature and frequency, what key mechanisms are in place to prevent their occurrence, and what the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Postal Service do to enforce federal regulations for shipping dangerous goods by air.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Little is known about the nature and frequency of undeclared shipments of dangerous goods. While major carriers and the Postal Service believe such shipments are rare, their belief is based mainly on inspections of problem shipments, such as those that leak. Statistically valid, generalizable data are not available and would be difficult to obtain, not only because more inspections would entail costly delays for carriers but also because Constitutional protections limit DOT's and the Postal Service's inspection authority. DOT is seeking greater authority to open potentially problematic shipments for inspection, but its efforts are not limited to air transport and would not enable DOT's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to obtain statistically valid, generalizable data on the nature and frequency of undeclared air shipments. A change in the law requiring that shippers consent to the opening of packages for inspection might be appropriate for air transport and would enable FAA to obtain such data. FAA could then identify the resources and actions needed to address the problem. Federal regulations create a framework for transporting dangerous goods safely, and outreach to shippers and carriers helps to prevent undeclared shipments. Private industry does business primarily with "known shippers" (those that have shown they comply with the regulations). The Postal Service cannot restrict its business to known shippers, but it requires customers to bring packages weighing 16 ounces or more to a post office for screening. Carriers and the Postal Service both train their employees to screen for undeclared shipments. The Postal Service and FAA monitor and enforce compliance with federal regulations for transporting dangerous goods by air. However, the Postal Service cannot fine violators and seldom takes criminal action, since most violations are inadvertent. FAA's enforcement guidance calls for documenting the reasons for any changes in the fines its inspectors initially propose. GAO's review of enforcement case files indicates that the reasons for changes were not always documented. FAA attributes some changes to the results of penalty negotiations. Because FAA is not always following its guidance, it cannot ensure that its fines are appropriate or consistent.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Each day, businesses, individuals, and government agencies package and  ship dangerous goods on ships, trains, trucks, and airplanes. Dangerous  goods are by definition chemical, including infectious, substances (or  anything containing such substances) that pose a threat to public safety or  the environment during transportation. When these goods are properly  packaged, labeled, and stowed onboard, they can be transported safely,  but when they are not, they can pose significant threats to people and  property. Improper, or “undeclared,” shipments of dangerous goods are  particularly dangerous in air transport because there is little room for  error or time to take corrective action if a problem occurs in flight—a  lesson learned tragically in 1996 when a ValuJet plane crashed in Florida  after oxygen generators caught fire in the plane’s cargo compartment.
To better understand the overall risks that undeclared shipments of  dangerous goods can pose to aviation safety, we examined the Department  of Transportation’s (DOT) and the U.S. Postal Service’s monitoring of the  transportation of dangerous goods by commercial cargo and passenger  aircraft, although we focused primarily on cargo aircraft. As agreed with  your office, we addressed three researchable questions:    What do DOT, the Postal Service, and others involved in the commercial  air transport of dangerous goods know about the nature and frequency of  undeclared shipments?
What are the key mechanisms the federal government and private industry  have in place to prevent dangerous goods shipments from compromising  aviation safety?
What do DOT and the Postal Service do to enforce federal regulations for  shipping dangerous goods by air?
We focused our review primarily on the shipments of dangerous goods  onboard cargo aircraft, in part, because more types and quantities of  dangerous goods are permitted on cargo aircraft than on passenger  aircraft. To address these questions, we analyzed recent reports by DOT  on its dangerous goods programs and on the threat that carrying such  goods can pose, particularly when the shipments are undeclared. We  reviewed research on methods that might be used to estimate the  frequency of undeclared shipments, and we consulted with both GAO and  academic experts in these methods. To determine the extent to which  undeclared shipments may occur, we interviewed officials of four major  carriers that handle over 60 percent of annual air freight traffic in the  United States, and we visited the premises of three of these carriers to  review their procedures for identifying and preventing undeclared  dangerous goods shipments. We also reviewed the results of a joint effort  by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the U.S. Customs  Service, which has the authority to inspect and search international  shipments, to detect, among other things, undeclared dangerous goods  shipments. We interviewed Postal Service, FAA, and other DOT officials  with various oversight responsibilities for dangerous goods transportation.  To evaluate FAA’s enforcement strategy, we examined the agency’s  assessments in 30 cases. These cases were randomly selected to fairly  represent the full range of over 2,000 cases in the database. While the  number of cases we tested was too small for us to estimate the extent to  which FAA’s enforcement strategy was followed in the entire database,  our examination allowed us to describe the types of practices that occur at  critical points in the penalty assessment process. Our detailed scope and  methodology appears at the end of this report.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOT regulates tens of thousands of dangerous goods, which can include  poisons, pesticides, radioactive materials, and explosives. About 20  percent of these goods may not travel by air at all. As shown in figure 1,  the remainder may travel on passenger or cargo aircraft, or both.
Using a United Nations classification system, DOT divides all dangerous  goods into nine general classes according to their physical, chemical,  biological, and nuclear properties. Most of the dangerous goods that may  not travel by air at all are the most highly explosive, toxic, oxidizing, self- reactive, or flammable chemical substances or articles in their class. In  addition to prohibiting some types of dangerous goods from being carried  by air at all, DOT restricts the types and amounts of other dangerous  goods that any individual passenger or cargo aircraft may carry. For both  passenger and cargo aircraft, DOT spells out these restrictions in four  ways:    By name—dangerous goods that represent an unacceptable hazard on  aircraft or are known to have caused an aircraft fire or explosion, such as  chemical oxygen generators, are specifically forbidden by name.
By hazard class and subdivision—certain subdivisions of the classes of  dangerous goods are known to be highly reactive or toxic (for example,  most explosives and all spontaneously combustible materials), so DOT  excludes them from passenger flights.
By quantities contained per outer package—DOT restricts on passenger  aircraft the quantity of certain substances or the number of articles that  may be present in the outermost shipping containers in the cargo hold. For  example, DOT allows the carriage of up to 30 liters of certain highly  flammable liquids per outer package on cargo aircraft, but imposes limits  of 1 liter or less on passenger aircraft.
By packaging integrity—dangerous goods must be packaged so as to  protect the integrity of the shipment and safeguard against accidental  leaks or spills.
For passenger aircraft, whose cargo areas are divided into multiple  compartments, DOT also restricts the aggregate quantities of dangerous  goods that may be carried per cargo compartment. Figure 2 shows the  kinds of containers in which dangerous goods typically travel in these  cargo compartments.
Dangerous goods permitted onboard passenger aircraft include dry ice and  solvents; cargo aircraft may also carry materials such as paint or medical  waste. Table 1 provides a complete listing of the nine classes of dangerous  goods, their descriptions, an example for each class, and some of the  restrictions DOT places on the carriage of each by type of aircraft.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s most recent survey on the  movement of hazardous goods in the United States, class 3 dangerous  goods (flammable liquids, such as paint) account for the greatest portion  (by weight) of the nine classes of dangerous goods shipped by air.  However, the vast majority of flammable liquids travel by other modes.  The percentage of total shipments made by air was greatest for radioactive  materials (class 7)—just over 8 percent of the total radioactive tonnage  shipped in 1997 was shipped by air. According to FAA, cargo aircraft, such  as those operated by the major delivery services FedEx and United Parcel  Service, Inc. (UPS), carry about 75 percent of the nation’s dangerous  goods air shipments. The remaining 25 percent travel onboard passenger  aircraft in cargo compartments.
Ensuring the safe transportation of dangerous goods by air is a shared  responsibility of federal agencies, shippers, and airlines—the success of  which ultimately depends on the efforts of thousands of individuals every  day. Within DOT, the following have responsibility for dangerous goods:    The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) regulates the  transportation of dangerous goods by truck, train, ship, pipeline, and  plane. It decides which materials to define as hazardous; writes the rules  for packaging, handling, and carrying them; and prescribes training  requirements for shippers’ and carriers’ dangerous goods employees.  RSPA, along with the other DOT operating administrations that operate  and manage dangerous goods programs, conducts inspections and  investigations to determine compliance with dangerous goods laws and  regulations for all modes of transportation and, where appropriate,  initiates enforcement actions against those it finds not to be in  compliance. RSPA maintains a database for closed dangerous goods  enforcement actions from these operating administrations, and another  database that tracks dangerous goods incidents from these operating  administrations.
The Office of Intermodalism, reporting to the Secretary of Transportation,  is responsible for implementing recommendations from a March 2000  evaluation of DOT’s dangerous goods program, coordinating intermodal  and cross-modal dangerous goods activities, and coordinating DOT-wide  outreach activities. For example, in 2001, to improve awareness of  dangerous goods incidents occurring during shipments, this office sent out  letters to shippers most frequently identified in RSPA’s dangerous goods  incident database.
FAA carries out responsibilities for ensuring compliance with the rules for  transporting dangerous goods by air. In addition, FAA assesses carriers’  operations and investigates dangerous goods incidents or accidents. FAA  also has other responsibilities, including those relating to the prosecution  and adjudication of enforcement actions against those found to have  violated the dangerous goods rules.
The Postal Service is both a carrier and a shipper of dangerous goods  because it not only carries shipments on aircraft that it leases, but it also  sends U.S. mail onboard commercial passenger and cargo airlines. As a  result, the airlines carrying U.S. mail rely on the Postal Service as a first  line of defense in ensuring the safety of the packages they accept for  transport and in preventing the shipment of anything that should not travel  by air.
Shippers—whether they are businesses or individuals—have the primary  responsibility for ensuring the safety of their dangerous goods shipments.  They are required to train their employees to package their shipments  safely and to tell the carriers to whom they deliver these shipments that  they contain dangerous goods. Carriers share some of the responsibility  for the safe transportation of dangerous goods. They do so by training  their employees to handle these shipments properly, to identify likely  instances of improper shipments (such as those containing undeclared  dangerous goods), and to verify that the indirect air carriers from whom  they accept consolidated cargo shipments have FAA-approved security  programs in place to prevent explosive or incendiary devices from being  placed onboard. Carriers are also responsible for reporting to DOT any  instance of noncompliance they discover.
section_title: Shipments of Undeclared Dangerous Goods Can Have Serious Consequences, but Their Nature and Frequency Are Difficult to Estimate
paragraphs: From tragic accidents over the years and day-to-day experience in  handling cargo traffic, DOT and major carriers know that shipments of  undeclared dangerous goods can have disastrous consequences. The  nature and frequency of such shipments—and, by extension, the amount  of effort that should be put into stopping them—are difficult to estimate  because of data limitations. However, the inability of commercially  available screening equipment to detect many types of dangerous goods,  the costs of delaying shipments to inspect them, and restrictions against  opening certain packages may preclude the collection of data.
subsections: section_title: Consequences of Carrying Undeclared Dangerous Goods Have Been Serious and Remain a Concern
paragraphs: Undeclared and other improper shipments of dangerous goods can pose a  high risk because of the nature of air transportation. In recent years, both  RSPA and FAA have expressed concern about undeclared dangerous  goods shipments. In its departmentwide March 2000 evaluation of the  dangerous goods program, DOT reported that the United States has a  relatively good safety record, given the amounts of dangerous goods that  are shipped by all modes of transportation each year. However, DOT  added that the potential still remains for dangerous goods incidents with  catastrophic consequences, and, even though relatively small amounts of  dangerous goods travel by air (compared with other modes of  transportation), a single mishap can have serious consequences. For  example, FAA has reported the following incidents:  In 1996, a major passenger airline carried undeclared dangerous goods— calcium hypochlorite and liquid bleach—on a flight from California to  Jamaica. Upon arrival, airport personnel discovered smoke coming from  the aircraft’s cargo doors and encountered toxic fumes when they opened  the cargo compartment. The box of undeclared dangerous goods was  leaking and burst into flames shortly after the airport personnel removed it  from the cargo hold.
In 1998, an undeclared shipment of electric storage batteries (considered  “wet” because they contain either electrolyte acid or alkaline corrosive  battery fluid) burst into flames while en route by truck to an airport,  where it had been scheduled to be placed aboard a major passenger  carrier’s aircraft.
In 1999, a major cargo carrier transported an undeclared shipment of  liquefied petroleum gas from Portland, Oregon, to New York on a regularly  scheduled cargo flight. One day after arriving in New York, the package  burst into flames at the carrier’s sorting facility.
Three of the four major carriers we interviewed and DOT expressed  concern about the safety of carrying dangerous goods. According to these  three carriers, even though they discover relatively few undeclared  shipments, their greatest safety concern in the air transportation of these  goods is prompted by the undeclared shipments—particularly those they  do not detect before accepting them. They expressed this concern over  not knowing how much of the volume of undeclared dangerous goods they  do not find, because these shipments present a greater risk than do those  that shippers properly declare.
The major cargo carriers we interviewed and the Postal Service agreed  that ignorance or misunderstanding of the rules for transporting  dangerous goods is by far the most common reason why shippers fail to  properly declare their dangerous goods shipments. According to one  carrier, in very limited instances, shippers will deliberately not declare  their shipments even when they know they are breaking the rules.  However, no carrier cited cost as a reason why shippers fail to declare  their shipments, even though shipping costs are usually higher for  dangerous goods than for nondangerous goods. An official from one  carrier stated that he had never seen a case of a shipper willfully failing to  properly declare a dangerous goods shipment because of cost concerns.  Furthermore, at the Postal Service, it is doubtful that cost is a cause of  undeclared shipments, because the Postal Service does not charge more  for carrying these shipments than it does for carrying those that are not  hazardous; all of the Postal Service’s charges are based on weight and  class, regardless of the contents.
section_title: Data Limitations Make Estimates of Undeclared Dangerous Goods Shipments Difficult
paragraphs: According to a 1999 threat assessment published by DOT’s Volpe Center,  three types of data that are needed to thoroughly assess the risks of  carrying declared and undeclared dangerous goods by air were  unavailable. These were    what amounts of dangerous goods are shipped by class and division (for  all modes of transportation),   how often incidents related to dangerous goods involve undeclared    what amounts and what types of undeclared dangerous goods are shipped  by air.
Without these data, the Volpe Center was limited to assessing the threat  from dangerous goods instead of the risk. The danger associated with a  specific item is its “threat,” while the likelihood that the threat will actually  result in harm is its “risk.” Assessing risk, according to the Volpe Center,  requires some indication of the likelihood that dangerous goods will be  present on an aircraft—and the data to determine this likelihood were not  available.
Volpe Center officials attempted to find or compile data sources that  would allow them to estimate the total amount of various dangerous goods  that might be shipped (for example, over the course of a year), but they  were unsuccessful. They found no single source of such data and were not  able to piece together data sources. For example, Volpe Center staff  attempted to compile data from chemical manufacturers to identify the  total amounts of their products that move by air and the related  distribution chain (that is, the amounts that move by other modes); this  information would enable them to identify aggregate amounts of certain  dangerous goods that shippers should be declaring, which would be a first  step in working toward an estimate of undeclared shipments. However,  the industry sources the Volpe Center consulted considered such  information proprietary and would not share it. Volpe Center staff also  considered assembling cargo manifest information from the airlines,  because these records indicate for each flight the amounts and types of  dangerous goods the aircraft is carrying. However, Volpe Center staff said  the airlines informed them that these data are not in a form usable for such  an analysis. Even if the manifest information were available, data on the  overall amounts of dangerous goods shipments (such as the Volpe Center  sought from the chemical industry) would still be necessary before this  manifest information could be useful for estimating undeclared dangerous  goods shipments.
According to Volpe Center staff, the limitations in the amount and quality  of data on dangerous goods shipments make estimating how many  shipments contain undeclared dangerous goods more difficult. Our  experts in applied research and methodology agreed, noting that certain  “hidden populations” methods might be useful for estimating the amount  of undeclared dangerous goods shipments, but only if data limitations  such as those the Volpe Center identified were overcome. A Massachusetts  Institute of Technology expert in transportation research with whom we  met agreed that none of the known methods for estimating hidden  populations would be feasible for undeclared dangerous goods.
The major carriers we interviewed said they most commonly identify  undeclared dangerous goods (after accepting them for shipment) when  some occurrence prompts them to open a package or, in the case of the  Postal Service, to set the package aside for further investigation (because  the Postal Service generally cannot open such a package without a search  warrant). Most often, this happens when a package leaks, spills, breaks  open, or emits an odor, and the carrier or Postal Service employees  identify the occurrence as potentially a dangerous goods incident. One  carrier also indicated that occasionally packages open as a result of  handling or must be opened when they lose their address labels. In some  of these instances, the company has discovered undeclared dangerous  goods. This same company also noted that, on rare occasions, it learns of  undeclared dangerous goods from informants—employees of either the  company that shipped the package or competitors of that company.
The carriers we interviewed reported that, although they have the consent  of shippers to open packages that have been accepted for shipment, they  seldom discover undeclared dangerous goods. Although they did not cite a  specific percentage, they described shipments of undeclared dangerous  goods as “very rare” and “a handful.” The numbers are believed to be  similarly small for the Postal Service—officials estimated that declared  dangerous goods represent less than one-tenth of 1 percent of their  shipments, and the percentage of these shipments that is undeclared is  “very small.” The Volpe Center reported in a 1999 threat assessment that  undeclared dangerous goods shipments made up about 0.05 percent of the  shipments of several large cargo carriers, but this estimate was based on  the recollections of the carriers of how many incidents they typically  report to RSPA.
Because estimates by the Volpe Center, major carriers, and the Postal  Service are based on reported incidents or memory, they are incomplete.  Moreover, these estimates refer only to those undeclared shipments that  resulted in dangerous goods incidents—they do not include undeclared  shipments that never gave carriers cause to open them. As a result,  according to the Volpe Center, there are no valid figures for the numbers  of dangerous goods shipments that do not comply with regulations for  transportation by air.
Additionally, when a carrier reports an incident to DOT, RSPA does not  currently require the carrier to report whether the shipper properly  declared the dangerous goods. Consequently, the estimates of undeclared  shipments reported by the Volpe Center and by carriers to us may not  include all of the incidents carriers discovered, because the estimates are  based on memory and are therefore subject to error. RSPA plans to  remedy this limitation by requiring carriers to report whether dangerous  goods shipments involved in incidents were declared or undeclared. To do  so, RSPA is modifying its incident-reporting paperwork (Form 5800.1) to  more systematically collect and analyze information on undeclared  shipments. RSPA expects to complete this and other ongoing revisions to  its incident-reporting form by spring 2003.
section_title: Technological, Economic, and Legal Hurdles Also Make Estimates of Undeclared Dangerous Goods Shipments Difficult
paragraphs: Technological limitations complicate efforts to estimate the incidence of  undeclared dangerous goods shipments. Ideally, technologies generally  considered to be less intrusive, such as X-ray or explosives-detection  equipment, could be used to identify and characterize undeclared  shipments. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is  currently using this equipment to screen passenger carry-on and checked  baggage for weapons and explosives, and, under the Aviation and  Transportation Security Act, TSA must ensure that a system is in  operation to screen, inspect, or otherwise provide for the security of all air  cargo to be transported in all cargo aircraft as soon as practicable.  However, X-ray and explosives-detection equipment is not designed to  detect many types of dangerous goods. In the future, technology may  enable the rapid, less intrusive screening of packages, but in the near term,  opening packages remains the best way to obtain information on the  nature and frequency of undeclared shipments.
Economic obstacles—particularly the costs of opening packages after  accepting them—also make it difficult to estimate the nature and  frequency of undeclared dangerous goods shipments. According to each of  the major carriers we interviewed, the volume of cargo that these airlines  carry each day is tremendous. For example, the carriers stated that they  carry from at least 1.3 million to more than 2 million shipments each night,  a small fraction of which contain dangerous goods. Because the carriers  typically guarantee delivery on nearly all of the shipments they carry (such  as within 24 hours or 2 business days), anything that slows their ability to  move shipments could compromise their ability to meet their guarantees  to their customers and, as a result, hurt their competitive position in their  industry.
Although the carriers we interviewed told us that they obtain the consent  of shippers to open packages, they also said they seldom do open  packages. Carriers and an association representing cargo and passenger  airlines stressed that they are not in the business of opening packages,  particularly when shippers are primarily responsible for ensuring the  integrity and proper declaration of those packages. The carriers indicated  that they have confidence in and place a great, ongoing emphasis on their  up-front screening to prevent shippers from offering them undeclared  dangerous goods in the first place. Opening packages without probable  cause to do so would also be costly to the carriers because they would be  responsible for repackaging anything they found to be properly declared— and dangerous goods require special, more expensive packaging than  other shipments. Although carriers remain concerned about the possibility  of undeclared shipments they may miss, to date the frequency with which  they discover shipments of undeclared dangerous goods does not, in their  view, justify a step as disruptive and costly as systematically opening a  random or targeted selection of shipments.
Because the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits  unreasonable searches and seizures and neither DOT nor the Postal  Service has obtained the consent of owners to have their packages opened  for inspection, neither agency may conduct or require random or targeted  intrusive inspections of domestic cargo shipments to look for undeclared  dangerous goods. Although FAA may remove a package from an aircraft  and take such emergency actions if it reasonably believes that the package  presents an immediate threat, it has no authority, generally, to open and  inspect a package without a warrant or without the owner’s consent.
The Postal Service may inspect Parcel Post packages. However, packages  sent as First Class or Express mail traveling by air may not be inspected.  The mail classification schedule recommended by the Postal Rate  Commission and adopted by the Postal Service does not distinguish  between letters and packages, treating both as “sealed against inspection”  and protected by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, these packages are  protected to the same extent as letters, and all First Class and Express  mail is treated as protected by the Fourth Amendment.
section_title: DOT Has Teamed with the U.S. Customs Service to Obtain Information on Undeclared Dangerous Goods in International Shipments
paragraphs: To obtain more information on the nature and frequency of undeclared  dangerous goods in air transport, FAA has teamed with the U.S. Customs  Service, which has the authority to inspect and search international cargo  (imports and exports). Specifically, the Customs Service can and does  randomly open and inspect international cargo for purposes such as  ensuring that shippers have paid the proper tariffs. Most recently, in June  and July 2000, the U.S. Customs Service and FAA together conducted  inspections of passenger carry-on and checked bags and cargo aboard  flights that were entering or departing from the United States at 19  domestic airports. This series of inspections found that    8 percent of targeted cargo shipments (those whose tariff codes indicated  that their contents might be hazardous) contained undeclared dangerous  goods,   1 percent of passenger carry-on bags contained undeclared dangerous  just under 0.5 percent of passenger checked baggage contained  undeclared dangerous goods.
The undeclared dangerous goods in the cargo shipments included  flammable liquids, fuel control units, aerosols, fire extinguishers, and  devices powered by flammable liquid. In the passengers’ checked and  carry-on bags, the Customs-FAA teams found aerosols, lighters, flammable  liquids, safety matches, compressed flammable gases, and automotive  batteries. The Customs-FAA team randomly selected the passenger  baggage it inspected, but for the cargo, the team matched tariff codes for  commodity imports and exports with a dangerous goods trigger list to  determine which shipments to inspect.
section_title: Increased Inspection Authority That DOT Is Seeking Would Not Produce Statistically Valid Data and Does Not Distinguish between Air and Other Modes of Transportation
paragraphs: DOT has tried several times to clarify and expand its authority to inspect  and open certain packages when its inspectors suspect a violation of the  dangerous goods regulations. In its 1997, 1999, and 2001 reauthorization  proposal, DOT sought the authority to access, open, examine, and, if need  be, remove a package from transportation if it had an objectively  reasonable and articulable belief that the package might contain  undeclared dangerous goods. According to DOT, this authority, which is  specific to all modes, would require its officers or inspectors to have a  “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting a violation, such as a  pattern of shipping undeclared dangerous goods, in order to open an  unmarked package. DOT further stated that this enhanced authority would  enable it to more effectively detect potential violations and to ensure that  it took the appropriate remedial actions. According to DOT officials, its  reauthorization proposal has not been enacted for reasons unrelated to the  merits of its request for additional inspection authority.
Because DOT’s reauthorization proposal applies equally to all modes of  transportation, it would, if approved, allow DOT to follow up on problem  shippers across the modes. However, the proposal would also extend the  government’s inspection authority without regard to the differences  inherent in transporting dangerous goods by different modes. The same  distinctions between air and the other modes that justify more stringent  regulations for transporting dangerous goods by air might also justify  greater inspection authority for packages shipped by air.
A primary objective of DOT’s reauthorization proposal has been to  improve the ability of its inspectors to monitor and enforce the dangerous  goods regulations. The proposal has not been designed to obtain better  information about the nature and frequency of undeclared air shipments.  Because it would require a “particularized and objective basis” for opening  packages, it would not allow DOT to identify a random sample of packages  and conduct inspections whose results could be generalized to all  packages in air transport. Thus, its usefulness as a tool for gathering data  to estimate the nature and frequency of undeclared air shipments and to  profile and target violators would be limited. DOT officials agree that their  proposal would not generate statistically valid data, and they have  indicated their willingness to modify the proposal so that it would yield  more useful information.
An alternative to DOT’s proposal, based on the premise that additional and  perhaps unique measures are needed to protect air commerce, would  require that shippers consent to DOT’s opening packages shipped by air  for inspection. This would allow the department to select and open a  random sample of packages in order to gather statistically valid data on  undeclared air shipments.
section_title: Government and Industry Rely on Several Mechanisms to Prevent Dangerous Goods Shipments from Compromising Safety
paragraphs: To prevent dangerous goods shipments from compromising aviation  safety, the federal government relies on regulation, research, and  outreach, while private industry depends on policies for dealing with  known shippers, other restrictions, training, and sanctions.
subsections: section_title: The Federal Government Depends on Regulations, Research, and Outreach to Prevent Problems
paragraphs: Federal regulations provide a framework for transporting dangerous  goods safely by air. As discussed in the background section of this report,  these regulations define dangerous goods, identify those that may and may  not travel by air, and specify how the materials are to be packaged,  handled, and carried. In addition, the regulations prescribe initial and  recurrent training for shippers’ and carriers’ employees, and require  shippers and carriers to test their employees’ understanding of the  material covered in the training. The training, which is designed to  increase dangerous goods employees’ safety awareness and to reduce the  frequency of dangerous goods incidents, is important because insufficient  understanding of the rules is often a factor contributing to such incidents.  For example, in 17 of 25 dangerous goods enforcement cases we reviewed  involving businesses, FAA identified employees’ lack of training as a  contributing factor.
To monitor the effectiveness of its regulations in promoting safety, RSPA  collects information on dangerous goods incidents occurring in the air,  water, rail, and truck modes through its Form 5800.1. Nonetheless, the  form is not designed to collect all the information that would be useful in  monitoring the effectiveness of DOT’s dangerous goods regulations. As  previously noted, the form does not ask whether a problem shipment was  declared or undeclared—a key question in assessing effectiveness.  In  addition, the form does not include data fields that precisely identify the  different types of packaging deficiencies. While the form has space for  written comments, there is no mechanism for standardizing and entering  the information from the comments into DOT’s databases. RSPA is  revising the form to overcome these limitations. Once carriers begin  collecting information on dangerous goods incidents using this revised  form, better information on the incidence of undeclared shipments and  reasons for packaging deficiencies should be available to FAA and the  other operating administrations.
In the course of such monitoring, DOT sometimes identifies safety issues  that require further research. For example, DOT is currently evaluating  ways in which it will strengthen the regulations for shipping batteries,  because its analysis indicated that the existing dangerous goods  regulations for these shipments may not be sufficient. Beginning in the  early 1990s, FAA identified a number of incidents associated with  batteries, particularly lithium batteries, aboard aircraft in which the  batteries caused fires, smoke, or extreme heat—precisely the kind of  effects that make dangerous goods dangerous. In response to these and  other concerns, RSPA has taken a number of actions designed to improve  the regulations for the transportation of lithium batteries.
FAA’s monitoring of reports on incidents involving dangerous goods also  led to further work on packaging standards. In examining nearly 3,000  reports from 1998 and 1999, FAA found that 60 percent of the incidents  involved properly declared shipments, indicating that the shipments  complied with the existing packaging standards. Yet just over half (873) of  these properly declared shipments had problems because their packaging  failed—that is, their closures or seals leaked. These data prompted FAA to  attempt to determine the adequacy of packaging standards for air  transportation and the likely causes of leaking closures and seals.  Observing an increase in the number of package failures in the past 3  years, FAA questioned whether the existing test methods simulate the  realistic combined effects of pressure, temperature, and vibration. As a  result, FAA contracted with Michigan State University to study packaging  in air transportation. The results of that study, which FAA recently  received, indicate that closures are continuing to leak in packages marked  as complying with existing packaging standards. Subjecting packages to  both high altitude and vibration resulted in a package failure rate of 50  percent. RSPA is reviewing these results.
To help prevent dangerous goods incidents aboard passenger aircraft, FAA  and RSPA conduct outreach to the public. For example, FAA worked with  RSPA to develop for air travelers a brochure that lists items prohibited in  passenger baggage (see app. I). The brochure also explains that in-flight  variations in temperature and pressure can cause seemingly harmless  items to leak or generate toxic fumes during air travel. RSPA requires that  signs be posted in airport terminals and at check-in counters listing items  prohibited in air travel, some of which passengers may not recognize as  hazardous in air transportation. In addition, FAA has placed kiosks with  information on dangerous goods at 24 major airports to better inform the  general public about items that are considered hazardous onboard aircraft.
The Postal Service also does consumer outreach to better inform the  public about the materials that may and may not be sent through the mail.  According to Postal Service officials, there are posters in all of its facilities  that warn customers about shipping restricted dangerous goods. In  addition, for any customer who ships or requests information about  shipping dangerous goods, Postal Service retail employees provide an  informational brochure summarizing the applicable rules as well as the  shipper’s responsibilities.
section_title: Major Carriers Rely on Known Shipper Policies, Other Restrictions, Training, and Sanctions to Prevent Undeclared Shipments
paragraphs: To prevent undeclared dangerous goods shipments, major carriers limit  their business to known shippers and may impose other restrictions. They  also train their employees to be a first line of defense against undeclared  shipments, and may apply sanctions to shippers who have violated  dangerous goods regulations.
subsections: section_title: Carriers Deal with Known Shippers and Impose Other Restrictions
paragraphs: To ensure that they are dealing with legitimate businesses that are more  likely to properly train their employees to comply with dangerous goods  rules, the major carriers we interviewed rely on TSA’s “known shipper”  requirements or establish formal, contractual relationships with their  shippers that mirror the known shipper requirements. According to  officials of one of the carriers, the steps involved in becoming a known  shipper reduce to an acceptable level the risk that the shipper presents to  the carrier. By contrast, the carriers have found, casual or one-time  shippers are more likely to offer undeclared dangerous goods for  shipment. Three of the four carriers said they try to limit their business  with casual or one-time shippers and do not advertise to them. Rather, two  of the carriers said, they target business-to-business shippers that typically  have experience with shipping high volumes of dangerous goods and may  have long-standing relationships with the carriers. The fourth carrier said  that it does not accept dangerous goods from casual shippers at all and,  for other shippers, requires the establishment of a dangerous goods– shipping agreement, or contract, that spells out obligations for shippers,  such as recurring employee-training requirements. Officials of this carrier  believe that these contractual obligations reduce the incidence of  undeclared shipments.
Besides limiting their business primarily to known shippers, the major  carriers we interviewed may try to prevent undeclared shipments by  limiting the types of materials they will carry and the places where they  will accept dangerous goods shipments. Three of the four carriers said  they accept fewer types of dangerous goods for shipment than DOT  authorizes to travel by air. For example, the carriers said they refuse to  carry materials such as toxic or infectious substances, certain explosives,  and organic peroxides. In addition, one of the carriers said it would not  accept dangerous goods shipments at its retail establishments. This carrier  said it would accept such shipments only when its own drivers picked  them up from established customers. This carrier’s policy is designed to  screen out the casual shippers that might use its retail establishments.  According to the carrier, this policy also allows it to rely on its drivers’  experience with dangerous goods shipments, their training, and their long- standing relationships with established customers as a first line of  screening against undeclared shipments of dangerous goods.
While the Postal Service cannot limit its business to known shippers, it  accepts fewer dangerous goods for shipment than DOT authorizes to  travel by air. In general, the Postal Service limits the dangerous goods it  will accept for shipment to certain quantities of consumer commodities  that typically present a limited hazard in transportation because of their  form, quantity, or packaging.
In addition to limiting what dangerous goods it will carry, the Postal  Service, as part of its aviation mail security program, requires customers  to bring any package weighing 16 ounces or more to a post office for  shipment. The intent of this program is to prevent explosives in the mail,  but Postal Service officials indicated it has a residual benefit in helping to  prevent undeclared shipments of dangerous goods. Specifically, by  requiring customers to bring packages that weigh 16 ounces or more to a  post office for shipment, Postal Service employees can inspect packages,  ask questions about their contents to determine whether they contain  anything prohibited, and ensure proper handling for packages containing  dangerous goods that may be mailed.
section_title: Carriers Train Their Employees to Monitor Compliance with Dangerous Goods Requirements
paragraphs: The major carriers we interviewed emphasized that the training they  provide for their employees is a key component in their efforts to prevent  shippers from offering undeclared dangerous goods, supplementing their  use of restrictions or the known shipper requirements to guard against  such shipments. This training provides information on dangerous goods  requirements and procedures for drivers and employees who handle, sort,  and load shipments. Through this training, the carriers expect that  employees throughout their distribution chain will be able to identify  problems such as declaration paperwork that is missing information about  the contents of a package labeled as dangerous.
Carriers rely particularly on their drivers to draw on their training to, in  effect, extend the known shipper concept to their day-to-day interactions  with shippers. Training, plus a working knowledge of a company’s  established customers, helps the drivers detect inadvertent failures to  properly declare a shipment. For example, a driver picking up a shipment  from a customer who typically sends some dangerous goods would be  expected to raise questions if the customer did not label or declare any of  the packages as dangerous. In such an instance, the shipper may have  made a mistake or forgotten to declare the dangerous goods.
The Postal Service trains its retail employees, who accept packages from  the public, to screen packages and prevent those with undeclared or  improperly packaged dangerous goods from entering the mail system.  According to Postal Service officials, as of August 2002, the agency had  trained all 131,000 of its retail employees in procedures for preventing the  acceptance of any package containing prohibited materials. These  procedures include (1) asking shippers a series of questions about the  contents of their packages, including whether the packages contain  anything hazardous; (2) visually inspecting packages to look for signs of  problems, such as leaks, the lack of a return address, or markings  indicating that a package contains something a shipper may not know is  hazardous; and (3) referring to a reference guide for assistance in  answering shippers’ questions about items that may or may not be  permissible in the U.S. mail. (See app. II for a summary of DOT’s  dangerous goods classes and the materials or quantities from each that are  allowed in the U.S. mail.) While the retail employees may be the first to  deal with shipments entering the mail system, the Postal Service also  provides dangerous goods training to its non-retail employees (such as  postal inspectors or employees at business mail entry units), who also  handle or carry dangerous goods or respond to incidents involving them.
According to the official responsible for the Postal Service’s dangerous  goods program, the agency has to rely on its retail employees to screen out  unacceptable items because it has limited authority to open mail that has  been accepted for shipment. These officials believe that face-to-face  questioning reduces the anonymity associated with depositing a letter in a  mailbox. And reducing anonymity, this official says, improves their  confidence in shippers’ statements about the contents of packages. To test  its retail employees’ performance in specific aspects of customer service,  the Postal Service has an ongoing “mystery shopper” program in which its  employees pose as customers. In late 2001, the Postal Service began  including in the mystery shopper tests a determination of whether the  retail employees were following requirements for asking the question  about dangerous goods. To date, the Postal Service’s tests indicate that the  retail employees asked the required screening question 69 percent of the  time. When the retail employees failed to ask the dangerous goods  question, Postal Service officials said they provided feedback and  retrained the employees. These officials also told us that they provided  this feedback to each postal office manager and have incorporated targets  for improved performance on the mystery shopper tests into the managers’  performance goals. Officials say these results are slowly and steadily  improving.
section_title: Carriers May Impose Sanctions for Shipping Undeclared Dangerous Goods
paragraphs: A shipper who fails to properly declare a dangerous goods shipment can  face serious consequences from a major carrier, particularly if the shipper  is a business or other operation with an ongoing need for the carrier’s  services. Two of the major carriers we interviewed may, depending on the  seriousness of the violation, require a shipper to provide additional  remedial training in shipping dangerous goods; apply more stringent terms  for accepting shipments from the shipper; or, in more serious instances,  permanently terminate the business relationship with the shipper. Officials  from one of the carriers stated that their company’s requirements for  remedial training in these instances exceed DOT’s requirements for  shippers. Similarly, officials from another carrier told us that an  inadvertent violation of the rules governing the declaration of dangerous  goods would, in most cases, result in a minimum suspension of 60 days,  pending the shipper’s completion of training or any other steps the carrier  chose to require before again accepting packages from that shipper. This  same carrier’s officials said that when they suspect that a shipper may  have sent undeclared dangerous goods through their system, they will  begin an investigation to determine whether the shipper knew or should  have known that it was doing so. Until the carrier completes that  investigation, the shipper must agree to let the carrier’s staff open and  inspect every shipment before accepting it. If this carrier determines that  the shipper knowingly offered undeclared dangerous goods, it terminates  its business with that shipper.
section_title: For DOT, Inadequate Documentation, and for the Postal Service, Lack of Civil Penalty Authority Hamper Enforcement of Dangerous Goods Regulations
paragraphs: To evaluate the effectiveness of and to enforce federal regulations for  shipping dangerous goods by air, DOT collects data on dangerous goods  incidents, monitors shippers’ and carriers’ performance, and assesses civil  penalties. Within DOT, FAA is primarily responsible for enforcing the  regulations for transporting dangerous goods by air. To ensure that the  penalties it imposes for violations of dangerous goods regulations are  appropriate to shippers’ and carriers’ complete compliance histories, FAA,  together with DOT’s other affected operating administrations, is required  to consider the compliance history of violators in all modes of  transportation when assessing penalties against them. This guidance was  difficult for FAA and others to follow because, until very recently, with the  exception of RSPA, DOT’s operating administrations were not submitting  their enforcement data in a timely manner to DOT’s centralized  enforcement database. Finally, to further ensure that appropriate civil  penalties are assessed and that similar cases are treated consistently and  fairly, FAA requires that the reasons for any reduction to a recommended  civil penalty be documented. Our analysis of FAA’s enforcement case files  found that FAA is not always documenting its assessments.
Like DOT, the Postal Service collects data on dangerous goods incidents,  but it lacks DOT’s authority to assess civil penalties for violations and  therefore takes few enforcement actions. Legislation proposed by DOT  would allow the Postal Service to assess civil penalties.
subsections: section_title: FAA Collects Data to Monitor and Enforce Compliance
paragraphs: To monitor and enforce compliance with DOT’s dangerous goods  regulations, FAA collects data on dangerous goods air incidents and  discrepancies through its Airport and Air Carrier Information Reporting  System (AAIRS). RSPA’s regulations define incidents as reportable  releases of hazardous materials, including those that are unintended and  unanticipated. “Discrepancies” are defined in the Hazardous Materials  Regulations (HMR) as instances in which dangerous goods are found to be  undeclared, misdeclared, or improperly packaged. In addition, FAA  collects data on closed dangerous goods enforcement cases through its  Enforcement Information System. (See app. III for more information about  FAA’s and DOT’s incident and enforcement databases.)
section_title: FAA Could Not Readily Consider Complete Compliance Histories When Assessing Penalties
paragraphs: To ensure that appropriate civil penalties are assessed, FAA’s enforcement  guidance requires the agency to consider the compliance history of  violators across all modes of transportation. Until recently, FAA had  difficulty complying with this guidance because, with the exception of  RSPA, DOT’s operating administrations were not submitting their closed  enforcement action data in a timely manner to a central database—the  Unified Shipper Enforcement Data System (UNISHIP), maintained by  RSPA. DOT developed this database in response to a 1991 GAO report.
RSPA is working with DOT’s affected operating administrations to ensure  the timely submission of enforcement data. On July 17, 2002, the Office of  the Secretary of Transportation issued a memorandum calling for the  implementation of required procedures for entering data on dangerous  goods enforcement actions into UNISHIP. If the database is kept up to  date, FAA inspectors can obtain compliance information by querying the  central database.
section_title: FAA Is Not Documenting Changes to Recommended Civil Penalties as Required
paragraphs: Our analysis of FAA’s case files indicates that FAA is not always  documenting the reasons for reductions to recommended civil penalties,  as its guidance requires. We found cases in which the proposed civil  penalty was changed, but either no documentation or incomplete  documentation was provided to explain the reasons for the reduction. An  FAA official stated that it was FAA’s policy to include documentation for  civil penalty changes in the case files. To help ensure that appropriate civil  penalties are assessed and that similar cases are treated consistently and  fairly, it is important that FAA document the reasons for any reduction to a  recommended civil penalty.
The enforcement process begins when FAA inspectors obtain indication of  a violation (see fig. 4.). The inspector then determines whether the  violation warrants administrative action (such as a warning notice or letter  of correction), legal enforcement action (such as the imposition of a civil  penalty), or referral for criminal prosecution. When the inspector finds  that a civil penalty is appropriate, he or she must determine the amount of  the civil penalty by consulting FAA’s sanction guidance policy. Legal staff  in the regional office or headquarters then review the strength of the  evidence, the type of enforcement action, and the amount of the civil  penalty, if any. Next, a notice of proposed civil penalty is issued that is  consistent with the inspector’s report and the review. The alleged violator  then has an opportunity to reply to the civil penalty assessed. If the alleged  violator provides convincing evidence that it did not commit the violation,  FAA dismisses the case. If FAA and the alleged violator agree on an  appropriate fine, FAA issues an order assessing a civil penalty that binds  the violator to pay the agreed-upon amount. If no agreement is reached,  the case is litigated.
Figure 3. FAA’s Dangerous Goods Enforcement Process (for Civil Penalty Cases)
FAA inspectors obtain evidence of a  violation.
The inspector then determines whether the  violation calls for a civil penalty or some other  enforcement action.
When the inspector finds that a civil penalty is  appropriate, he or she must determine the amount  of the civil penalty by consulting FAA's sanction  guidance policy.
Legal staff in the regional office or headquarters  then review the case.
A notice of proposed civil penalty is issued.
If the alleged violator  provides convincing  evidence that it did  not commit these  violations, FAA  dismisses the case.
If FAA and the alleged  violator agree on an  appropriate fine, FAA  issues an order  assessing a civil  penalty that binds the  violator to pay the  agreed-upon amount.
If no agreement is  reached, the case is  litigated.
In 15 of the cases we reviewed, the assessed civil penalty differed from the  proposed civil penalty, but FAA included either no documentation or  incomplete documentation in the case files to account for the changes. For  example:  In 2000, the assessed civil penalty on a chemical company for not properly  shipping flammable paint was reduced from $75,000 to $15,000, but no  reason was provided in the file for the change.
In 2000, the assessed civil penalty on a paint company for not properly  shipping flammable paint was reduced from $59,500 to $37,500, but no  reason was provided in the file for the change.
In addition, in one case involving the shipment of an oxygen generator by  an air carrier in 1997, the recommended civil penalty was reduced by 20  percent, even though oxygen generators were responsible for the ValuJet  aircraft crash in 1996. This penalty was reduced for reasons that were not  documented. The reduction was not consistent with the known risks of  oxygen generators.
section_title: Postal Service Lacks Authority to Impose Civil Penalties for Violations
paragraphs: The Postal Service’s standards for mailing dangerous goods are similar to  DOT’s detailed specifications for packaging, marking, and labeling  dangerous goods, although the mail is subject to many additional  limitations and prohibitions, which are imposed by provisions of criminal  statutes. Yet in contrast with DOT, which can assess civil or pursue  criminal penalties for violations of its standards, the Postal Service can  only pursue criminal penalties. This leads to little enforcement, because  many violations are unintentional and involve situations that are  inappropriate for criminal sanctions. At the same time, the high cleanup  and damage costs associated with dangerous goods violations are time- consuming, and damages may be difficult to recover absent authority to  assess civil penalties. For example, in a 1998 incident, the Postal Service  incurred costs of $87,000 and the carrier incurred damages of $1.4 million  when a Priority mail shipment containing four bottles of mercury was  found to be leaking upon removal from the aircraft. Another costly  incident occurred in 2000, when 3 gallons of gasoline were illegally  shipped in a motorcycle gas tank and the tank leaked during the flight,  requiring the plane to be taken out of service and cleaned. As part of its  proposal to reauthorize the hazardous materials transportation program,  DOT has included a provision that would allow the Postal Service to  collect civil penalties and to recover costs and damages for dangerous  goods violations. The Postal Service has been actively working with DOT,  and it supports this provision. Yet others have raised concerns about  possible conflicts between the Postal Service’s current law enforcement  authority and its effect on fair competition between the Postal Service and  other shippers. The question of whether changes should be made  regarding the Postal Service’s law enforcement responsibilities continues  to be discussed as the Congress and others revisit the Postal Service’s  mission and roles as part of broader postal reform efforts.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Without statistically valid, generalizable data on the nature and frequency  of undeclared dangerous goods in air transport, DOT does not know to  what extent such goods pose a threat to aviation safety, or what resources  should be allocated to address that threat. Eventually, affordable  diagnostic screening technologies may enable carriers and DOT to monitor  dangerous goods shipments efficiently and nonintrusively. Until then,  greater inspection authority would enable DOT to randomly select and  open packages; gather statistically valid, generalizable data; and profile  and target potential violators, thereby possibly enhancing aviation safety.  A change in the law requiring that shippers consent to the inspection of  packages shipped by air might help to accomplish these objectives. The  legislation that DOT has proposed seeking greater inspection authority has  not to date been limited to the air mode and has not been designed to  obtain statistically valid data. However, the distinctions between air and  the other modes that justify more stringent regulations for transporting  dangerous goods by air, along with the potential benefits to aviation safety  that could accrue from better data on undeclared air shipments, might  warrant the development of a proposal that would enable DOT to obtain  such data.
The Office of the Secretary’s recent memorandum to the operating  administrations, calling for the timely submission of closed enforcement  action data to DOT’s centralized enforcement database, should strengthen  FAA’s ability to take appropriate enforcement action against violators of  DOT’s dangerous goods regulations. Provided that the operating  administrations continue to follow the memorandum, FAA should be able  to identify high-risk or problem entities, consider their compliance  histories in all modes of transportation as its enforcement policy guidance  requires, and ensure that the penalties it assesses against them are  appropriate to their histories. Yet FAA still needs to do more to  demonstrate that it has assessed appropriate civil penalties. Until it fully  documents the reasons for its assessments, or for changes to its initial  assessments, as its guidance requires, it cannot provide assurance that the  penalties are appropriate or that it has handled similar cases consistently.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order to strengthen DOT’s enforcement of dangerous goods regulations,  we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation determine whether  the unique characteristics of air transport warrant the development of a  legislative proposal that would enhance DOT’s authority to inspect  packages shipped by air.
Depending on the results of his determination, we further recommend that  the Secretary direct the FAA Administrator to develop a legislative  proposal that would require shippers to consent to the opening for  inspection of packages shipped by air. Such a proposal would not only  enhance FAA’s inspection authority but would also enable FAA to obtain  statistically valid, generalizable data on the nature and frequency of  undeclared air shipments of dangerous goods.
Finally, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Administrator to  ensure that FAA better communicate and enforce its requirement to  document the justification for any substantial changes to an initially  proposed penalty before issuing a final order assessing a penalty.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided DOT and the U.S. Postal Service with a draft of this report for  their review and comment. We met with DOT officials, including the  Director of RSPA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Enforcement and the  Manager of FAA’s Dangerous Goods and Cargo Security Enforcement  Program, to receive their comments. The U.S. Postal Service provided  comments via E-mail. DOT and the Postal Service generally agreed with  our report and provided clarifying and technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.
In our draft report, we recommended that the Secretary of Transportation  direct the DOT administrations that operate and manage a dangerous  goods program to submit their enforcement data to RSPA’s centralized  database. According to our audit work, the administrations were not  submitting the data and, therefore, FAA could not readily comply with its  guidance requiring it to consider the compliance history of violators in all  modes of transportation. However, when we discussed the draft report  with DOT officials in October 2002, they provided a July 17, 2002,  memorandum from the Office of the Secretary of Transportation directing  the operating administrations to submit the data. In addition, in October  2002, DOT furnished evidence that three of the five administrations  subsequently provided current data. We therefore deleted this  recommendation from the final report. DOT agreed with our other  recommendations, acknowledging that its legislative proposals seeking  greater inspection authority have not been designed to obtain statistically  valid data on undeclared shipments of dangerous goods. DOT further  noted that FAA’s upcoming reauthorization legislation could serve as a  vehicle for a proposal to expand FAA’s inspection authority, so that the  agency could obtain better data on undeclared air shipments. While  indicating that changes to initially proposed civil penalties sometimes  occur as a result of penalty negotiations, DOT agreed that documenting  the justification for changes is important for providing assurance that final  penalties are appropriate and consistent.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine what DOT, the Postal Service, and others involved in the air  transport of dangerous goods know about undeclared shipments, we  identified relevant studies and interviewed DOT, Postal Service, industry,  and industry association officials. We reviewed the documents and reports  we obtained, visited DOT’s John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems  Center and FAA’s William J. Hughes Technical Center, and conducted  additional interviews with the researchers who had carried out critical  studies. We also interviewed officials at four of the major cargo carriers,  and conducted site visits at three of their facilities.
To determine the key mechanisms that the federal government and private  industry have in place to prevent dangerous goods from compromising  safety, we interviewed agency and industry officials and federal  researchers. We also reviewed relevant reports and documents in order to  identify recent developments in screening technology.
To determine what DOT and the Postal Service do to foster compliance  with federal regulations for shipping dangerous goods by air, we  interviewed agency officials and reviewed reports and documents. We also  examined FAA’s practices for assessing civil penalties by testing 30  randomly selected cases from FAA’s Enforcement Information System,  which contains a database of over 2,000 cases. These cases were  randomly selected to fairly represent the full range of over 2,000 cases in  the database. While the number of cases we tested was too small to enable  us to estimate the extent to which FAA’s enforcement strategy was  followed in the entire database, these 30 cases permit us to describe the  types of practices that occur at critical points in the penalty assessment  process.
We performed our work from September 2001 through November 2002, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the  date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairman and  the Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Transportation  and Infrastructure, and the Chairman of its Subcommittee on Aviation;  other appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of  Transportation; the Postmaster General, United States Postal Service; the  Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, Transportation Security  Administration; the Administrator, Research and Special Programs  Administration; and the Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration.  We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the  report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
Please call me at (202) 512-2384 if you or your staff have any questions  about the information in this report. Key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: FAA’s Dangerous Goods Informational Brochure for Passengers
paragraphs: Fuel, paints, lighter used everyday in the home  or workplace may seem harmless;  however, when transported by air, they  can be very dangerous. In flight, variations     in temperature and pressure can cause items  fuel, scuba tanks, propane tanks, CO cartridges, self-inflating rafts to leak, generate toxic fumes or start a fire.
You must declare your hazardous materials to the airline,  air package carrier, or U.S. Postal Service. Violators of  Federal Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 CFR Parts  171-180) may be subject to a civil penalty of up to  $25,000 for each violation and, in appropriate cases,  a criminal penalty of up to $500,000 and/or imprisonment  of up to 5 years.
section_title: Appendix II: Mailability of Dangerous Goods, by DOT Class
section_title: Appendix III: Data Collected by DOT Agencies on Dangerous Goods Incidents and Enforcement Actions
paragraphs: FAA collects data on dangerous goods air incidents, discrepancies, and  enforcement actions through two databases. Its Airport and Air Carrier  Information Reporting System (AAIRS) collects basic incident and  discrepancy information such as the mode, date, and location of the  incident or discrepancy, the carrier and shipper involved, the hazard class  of the spilled material, and the consequences of the incident or  discrepancy. (See table 1.) FAA’s Enforcement Information System (EIS)  collects information on closed dangerous goods enforcement cases. It  contains data such as the incident date, the regulations violated, the  sanction initially recommended, and the final sanction. These enforcement  data are used to monitor and enforce compliance with DOT’s dangerous  goods regulations.
RSPA collects dangerous goods incident and enforcement data through  two databases. Its Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System  (HMIRS) collects dangerous goods incident information across all  transportation modes, not just the air mode. This information is similar to  that collected in FAA’s AAIRS database, but it does not include  discrepancies. RSPA tracks closed hazardous materials enforcement cases  through its Unified Shipper Enforcement System (UNISHIP). This  database tracks closed enforcement actions across all transportation  operating administrations, not simply air.
RSPA collects data on dangerous goods incidents from all transportation  modes through DOT Form F 5800.1, which captures basic information on  incidents such as the mode, date, and location of the incident; the carrier  and shipper involved; the hazard class and shipping name of the spilled  material; and the consequences of the incident (including deaths, injuries,  product loss, and damage). RSPA uses the data and the information it  collects on dangerous goods incidents to (1) evaluate the effectiveness of  existing regulations, (2) assist in determining the need for regulatory  changes to cover changing transportation safety problems, and (3)  determine major problem areas so that attention can be more suitably  directed to them. In addition, both the government and industry use this  dangerous goods incident information to chart trends and identify training  inadequacies and packaging deficiencies.
In addition to RSPA, UNISHIP serves the enforcement programs of the  Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, the  Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and  the Inspector General by providing a history of compliance for the  companies contained in the system.
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Elizabeth R. Eisenstadt, Arthur L.  James, Bert Japikse, David Laverny-Rafter, Bill MacBlane, Kieran  McCarthy, Richard Scott, and Katherine Wulff made key contributions to  this report.