Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Needs to Assess Risks and Strengthen Oversight of Foreign Students with Employment Authorization
Published: 2014-02-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: As of November 2013, about 100,000 of the approximately 1 million foreign students in the United States were approved to participate in OPT—an employment benefit that allows foreign students to obtain temporary work in their areas of study during and after completing an academic program. ICE is responsible for certifying schools; monitoring foreign students and schools, including their compliance with OPT requirements; and enforcing immigration laws for those that fail to comply.
GAO was asked to review the management of OPT. This report examines the extent to which DHS has (1) identified and assessed risks associated with OPT, and (2) collected information and developed monitoring mechanisms to help ensure students comply with OPT requirements and maintain their legal status. GAO analyzed ICE regulations and policies and data on schools that recommend and foreign students approved for OPT, as of August 2013. GAO interviewed ICE and USCIS officials, including those from 7 of 26 ICE field offices selected based on factors such as OPT-related fraud investigations. Interview results cannot be generalized, but they provided insights about OPT risks.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has not identified or assessed fraud or noncompliance risks posed by schools that recommend and foreign students approved for optional practical training (OPT), in accordance with DHS risk management guidance. ICE's Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) officials consider OPT to be a low-risk employment benefit for foreign students because, in part, they believe foreign students approved for OPT do not have an incentive to jeopardize their legal status in the United States. However, SEVP has not determined potential risks in OPT. Further, officials from the Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU), ICE's investigative unit, and ICE field agents GAO interviewed have identified potential risks involving OPT based on prior and ongoing investigations. For example, ICE field agents identified cases where school officials recommended OPT for foreign students to work outside of their major areas of study, which is not allowed under ICE regulations. In response to a June 2012 GAO recommendation, ICE has taken initial actions to identify risks across SEVP-certified schools but has not identified and assessed OPT risks or determined the extent to which potential OPT risks will be part of its efforts to assess risks SEVP-wide. Further, SEVP has not coordinated with CTCEU, including obtaining and assessing information from CTCEU and ICE field offices regarding OPT risks, as part of its efforts. Identifying and assessing OPT risks, in coordination with CTCEU, could better position SEVP to manage risks in OPT.
ICE has not consistently collected the information and developed the monitoring mechanisms needed to help ensure foreign students comply with OPT requirements, thereby maintaining their legal status in the United States. Foreign students can participate in OPT while attending classes and after graduation for up to 12 months; students studying in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics fields may be eligible for an additional 17 months (29 months total). However, ICE does not have complete information on which foreign students approved for OPT are actively working and whether employment is related to their studies, per ICE regulations. For example, GAO's analysis of ICE data on students engaged in all types of OPT indicates that 38 percent (48,642 of 126,796) of student records do not contain an employer's name. Furthermore, the data do not include the date on which students granted authorization began working. ICE does not require that students and school officials report this information. Without these data, ICE cannot determine whether students with employment authorization are working in jobs related to their studies and not exceeding regulatory limits on unemployment. Collecting and monitoring complete information on foreign students approved for OPT would better position ICE to determine whether these students are maintaining legal status in the United States.
This is a public version of a For Official Use Only/Law Enforcement Sensitive report that GAO issued in January 2014. Information DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that ICE, among other things, identify and assess OPT-related risks and require additional employment information from students and schools. DHS concurred with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: As of November 2013, about 100,000 of the approximately 1 million  foreign students in the United States (or about 10 percent) were approved  to participate in the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) optional  practical training (OPT). OPT is an employment benefit that allows foreign  students to seek temporary work during and after completing an  academic program to gain practical experience in their major areas of  study. The February 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center,  which involved foreign students, drew attention to the need to improve the  monitoring of foreign students by, among other things, moving from a  manual paper-based foreign student tracking and monitoring system to a  computer-based system. Subsequently, the September 2001 terrorist  attacks, as well as the April 2013 terrorist attack on the Boston Marathon,  drew renewed attention to the need to further enhance the monitoring of  foreign students. According to DHS officials, those foreign students who  remain in the United States after completing their program of study by  working under OPT can pose risks. Thus, proper monitoring is important  to ensure that, for example, foreign students who complete an academic  program and any authorized OPT leave the United States as required or  take steps to legally extend their stay in the country to avoid becoming  overstays.
Within DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), through  its Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP), is responsible for  certifying schools to enroll foreign students and managing the  participation of certified schools in the program and nonimmigrant foreign  students in the F and M visa classifications. SEVP oversees F and M  student policy, including OPT requirements, and monitors F and M  student status. According to SEVP’s strategic plan framework, SEVP’s  two primary objectives are to (1) prevent terrorist exploitation of legitimate  student entry paths into the United States, and (2) facilitate legitimate  flows of people and commerce. Specifically, according to the plan, SEVP  is to deny terrorists acceptance into the U.S. academic system, monitor  accepted students and certified schools to identify those that fall out of  compliance with immigration laws, and enforce immigration laws for those  that fail to comply. Also, SEVP manages the Student and Exchange  Visitor Information System (SEVIS), which assists in tracking and  monitoring certified schools and foreign students.
Working with SEVP, designated school officials (DSO) are responsible for  entering and maintaining foreign students’ information in SEVIS, such as  information on students’ courses of study. DSOs are also responsible for recommending eligible foreign students for OPT to DHS’s U.S.  Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which adjudicates foreign  students’ applications for employment authorization. Once a foreign  student receives approval from USCIS for temporary employment under  OPT, the student can start working on the approved starting date. ICE’s  Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU), as the  investigative component of ICE, is responsible for, among other things,  combating the criminal exploitation of the foreign student visa system,  including conducting criminal investigations of school and foreign student  fraud, such as OPT fraud. Further, CTCEU is responsible for locating and  apprehending F and M students who have violated their immigration  status, including those who have done so by failing to comply with OPT  requirements. CTCEU gathers and analyzes leads on nonimmigrants in  the United States to identify potential national security or criminal threats  and ensure compliance with immigration laws.
In April 2011, we reported that some schools had attempted to exploit the  immigration system by knowingly reporting that foreign students were  fulfilling their visa requirements, such as attending school full-time, when  they were not attending school or attending intermittently. In June 2012,  we reported on ICE’s efforts to assess risks of fraud and noncompliance  in SEVP and oversee schools that are certified to accept foreign  students. Specifically, we reported that ICE had not developed a process  to identify and analyze risks across SEVP-certified schools, in  accordance with internal control standards and risk management  guidance. We reported that officials from SEVP and CTCEU had  expressed concerns about the fraud risks posed by schools that do not  comply with requirements. However, we found that SEVP did not have  processes to identify and analyze program risks, including (1) evaluating  prior and suspected cases of school noncompliance and fraud, and (2)  obtaining and assessing information from CTCEU and ICE field offices on  school investigations and outreach. In addition, we found that ICE had not  consistently implemented existing controls, in accordance with federal  internal control standards and fraud prevention practices, to verify  schools’ legitimacy and eligibility during initial SEVP certification and once  schools began accepting foreign students. Further, we found that ICE did  not maintain records to document SEVP-certified schools’ ongoing  compliance with regulatory requirements and that school case files were  incomplete or missing. On the basis of these findings, we recommended  that ICE develop and implement a process to identify and assess risks in  SEVP, consistently implement procedures for ensuring schools’ eligibility,  and establish a process to identify and address all missing school case  files, among other things. DHS concurred with these recommendations  and, as of December 2013, has taken steps to address them. For  example, SEVP has taken initial steps to develop preliminary risk  indicators for certified schools and recover documentation that had been  missing from school case files.
You asked us to review DHS’s management of OPT, including whether  DHS considers risk information in monitoring those schools that  recommend foreign students, and foreign students approved, for this  employment benefit. This report examines the extent to which DHS has  (1) identified and assessed risks associated with OPT, and (2) collected  information and developed monitoring mechanisms to help ensure  students comply with OPT requirements and maintain their legal status in  the United States.
This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we  provided to you. DHS deemed some of the information in the prior report  as For Official Use Only/Law Enforcement Sensitive, which must be  protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive  information on risk indicators related to OPT, specific details on types of  foreign student information maintained and shared in DHS databases,  and specific information on actions DHS could take related to foreign  students’ school transfers. Although the information provided in this report  is more limited in scope, it addresses the same questions as the sensitive  report. Also, the overall methodology used for both reports is the same.
To evaluate the extent to which DHS has identified and assessed risks  associated with OPT, we analyzed documentation such as ICE’s  compliance and watch lists that contain schools that SEVP has identified  as potentially noncompliant or fraudulent. Also, we analyzed ICE news  bulletins from January 2008 to November 2013 to help determine the  magnitude of previous cases of fraud and evaluated information provided  by CTCEU on criminal investigations related to school or student  noncompliance or fraud involving OPT. In addition, we analyzed  documentation CTCEU officials provided regarding risks and  vulnerabilities they have identified in OPT-related policies, procedures,  and regulations during the course of their work. Moreover, we analyzed  SEVIS data on schools that had at least one foreign student approved for  OPT, as of August 2013, to identify examples of schools that pose a  potential risk for fraud or noncompliance involving OPT using a risk  indicator identified by CTCEU. Further, we compared DHS’s risk  management practices related to OPT against DHS’s Policy for Integrated  Risk Management and Risk Management Fundamentals.
To determine the extent to which DHS has collected information and  developed monitoring mechanisms to help ensure students comply with  OPT requirements and maintain their legal status in the United States, we  analyzed the processes ICE uses to collect information on where and  when students are working and to monitor schools’ and students’  compliance with specific requirements for maintenance of their student  visa status. We also assessed the implementation of SEVP’s  management and oversight controls against criteria in Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government as they relate to, among other  things, compliance with applicable laws and regulations. SEVIS data on foreign students approved for OPT as of August 2013, we  analyzed the extent to which foreign student records contained employer  information, included information on whether employment was related to  the major area of study, and indicated the amount of OPT authorized.
GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1  (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999). foreign students engaged in OPT. We also found the data sufficiently  reliable for analyzing student records for compliance with certain  regulatory and policy requirements. In addition, we analyzed USCIS’s  Computer-Linked Application Information Management System 3  (CLAIMS) data on the results of USCIS’s adjudications of requests for  OPT employment authorization from fiscal years 2008 through 2013.assess the reliability of these CLAIMS data, we interviewed agency  officials responsible for managing the data about the data’s sources and  the system’s controls. We found the data to be sufficiently reliable to  report information on the number of, among other things, employment  authorization applications and approvals for foreign students engaged in  OPT.
In addition, to address both objectives, we interviewed officials from  SEVP’s School Certification, Policy, Analysis and Operations Center,  Field Representative, and Systems Management branches and units to  discuss their involvement in OPT. We also interviewed officials from  CTCEU, as well as investigators from 7 of ICE’s 26 Homeland Security  Investigations (HSI) field offices, which allowed us to obtain their  perspectives on any risks associated with OPT.offices based on their experience in investigating previous and ongoing  cases of school or student fraud or noncompliance related to OPT.  Although the results from these interviews cannot be generalized to  officials at all 26 ICE field offices, they provided us with useful insights  into lessons learned from cases related to OPT. We also interviewed  USCIS officials to determine the extent to which USCIS has implemented  processes for ensuring the eligibility of students applying for employment  authorization under OPT. In addition, we interviewed 11 DSOs, and  received a written response from 1 DSO, from schools in and around the  Washington, D.C., area. We selected these officials because, as of July  2013, they composed a group of representatives from SEVP-certified   We selected these  schools of various types and sizes in the Washington, D.C., region that  meets regularly with SEVP to discuss matters such as SEVIS and SEVP  policy and requirements. The results from these interviews cannot be  generalized to all DSOs, but provided us with useful insights into the role  of the DSOs in OPT. Further, we interviewed officials from NAFSA:  Association of International Educators to discuss the organization’s views  on OPT, including the involvement of DSOs in OPT. Appendix I  presents more details about our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to February  2014, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Federal Agencies’ and School Officials’ Roles and Responsibilities Regarding Foreign Students Approved for OPT
paragraphs: Foreign students interested in studying in the United States must first be  admitted to a school or university before applying for a visa at a U.S.  embassy or consulate overseas. DSOs use SEVIS to issue Form I-20s to  students, which enable them to apply for nonimmigrant student visas.The Department of State (State) issues nonimmigrant visas to eligible  foreign students. The process for determining who will be issued or  refused a visa, including F and M visas, contains various steps, including  documentation reviews, in-person interviews, collection of applicants’  fingerprints, and cross-references against State’s name check database.
F visas are for academic study at 2- and 4-year colleges and universities  and other academic institutions. M visas are for nonacademic study at  institutions such as vocational and technical schools. Nonimmigrants  who wish to work temporarily in the United States typically need to obtain  a visa that allows them to work in the United States; F and M visas allow  for limited employment authorization and may not be used in place of visa  classifications designated for temporary employees. F and M visa  holders are not allowed to work in the United States after completing their  program of study unless they receive employment authorization through  OPT.
A visa allows a foreign citizen to travel to a U.S. port of entry and request  permission from an officer with DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) to enter the United States. However, a visa does not  guarantee entry into the country. By interviewing individuals and  examining the validity of their required documentation, CBP officers  determine whether to admit individuals into the United States. Foreign  nationals traveling on student visas are not generally issued specific  dates until which they are authorized to remain in the United States, but  instead are admitted for what is referred to as duration of status. This  means that they may remain in the country so long as they maintain their  student status (such as by enrolling full-time in an academic program or  being approved for OPT after completing their program of study). USCIS  adjudicates, among other things, change-of-status requests from other  classes of nonimmigrants in the United States who wish to become F or  M students. With regard to OPT, in particular, USCIS is responsible for  adjudicating employment authorization requests from the foreign students  who have obtained DSOs’ recommendations to participate in OPT.
Within ICE, SEVP, in conjunction with DSOs, is responsible for  overseeing foreign students approved for OPT and maintaining  information on these students in SEVIS. Also within ICE, CTCEU is  responsible for (1) investigating foreign students who fail to enroll in or  maintain status at their schools, including those foreign students  approved for OPT, and (2) conducting criminal investigations of certified  schools that do not remain in compliance with regulatory requirements.  For example, CTCEU pursues criminal investigations against school  officials who have exploited the system by operating sham institutions,  which are operated solely to admit foreign nationals into the country  without participation in educational programs. CTCEU assigns school and  foreign student fraud-related investigations to ICE field offices; the offices  can also open their own fraud investigations.
section_title: Requirements for Initial Approval and Ongoing Eligibility for OPT
paragraphs: According to ICE regulations and policies, OPT is available to eligible  foreign students (F and M visa holders) who are enrolled in a college,  university, conservatory, seminary, or established vocational or other  recognized nonacademic institution, in a program other than English  language training. Employment under OPT must be in a job directly  related to the foreign student’s major area of study, and foreign students  who apply to participate in OPT must have completed at least 1 academic  school year or, in the case of M visa holders, their entire course of study.  Foreign students on an F visa can temporarily work in the country under  one of three types of OPT. First, foreign students may work part-time  while they are in school or full-time on school breaks (pre-completion  OPT).after completing a program of study (12-month post-completion OPT).
Second, foreign students may work full-time for up to 12 months  Third, foreign students studying in areas of study related to science,  technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) are eligible to work  full-time for an additional 17 months (17-month STEM extension post- completion OPT). Table 1 shows the three types of OPT and their  requirements.
As shown in figure 1, foreign students initiate the OPT application process  by requesting a recommendation for OPT from their DSOs. The DSO is  to ensure that students are eligible for the requested type and length of  OPT and that the students are aware of their responsibilities for  maintaining status while on OPT. ICE regulations do not require that  students have secured employment prior to applying for pre-completion  OPT or 12-month post-completion OPT; therefore, an employer name is  not required to be entered in SEVIS at the time of the application.  Regarding the 17-month STEM extension post-completion OPT, students  must have secured employment prior to applying for this extension and  must provide the employer’s name to the DSO. Prior to recommending  the extension, the DSO must confirm that a student’s degree is a  bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral degree that is in DHS’s STEM- Designated Degree Program list. The DSO makes the recommendation  through SEVIS, which updates the student’s Form I-20 to reflect the  recommendation. The DSO is to update the student’s SEVIS record with  the student’s requested start and end dates of employment, as well as  whether the employment will be part- or full-time. In the case of the 17- month post-completion STEM extension OPT, the DSO is to enter and  update employer information.
After receiving the Form I-20 that notates the DSO’s recommendation for  OPT, the foreign student must file a Form I-765, Application for  Employment Authorization, with USCIS within 30 days of the date the  DSO enters the OPT recommendation into SEVIS and pay the required   USCIS adjudicates all nonimmigrants’ applications for  application fee.employment authorization by determining whether an applicant has  submitted the required information and documentation, such as proof of  the student’s financial support, and whether the applicant is eligible.  Specifically, USCIS adjudicates the application for OPT employment  authorization on the basis of the DSO’s recommendation and other  eligibility considerations, such as whether the student can financially  support himself or herself while on OPT, and for those students applying  for the 17-month STEM post-completion extension, determining whether  the employer is registered with E-Verify. Table 2 presents data on OPT- related employment authorization application receipts and related  adjudication results (approvals, denials, and revocations) from fiscal  years 2008 through 2013. During this period, the data show that USCIS  approved 96 percent of the applications for OPT employment  authorization. In fiscal year 2013, approximately 123,000 foreign students  received approval from USCIS to seek temporary employment through  OPT to complement their academic coursework.
If USCIS approves the application, it issues the student an Employment  Authorization Document, or Form I-766. Employment authorization for  pre-completion OPT, 12-month post-completion OPT, and 17-month  STEM extension post-completion OPT begins on the student’s requested  date or the USCIS-approved date, whichever is later, and ends at the  conclusion of the approved period of OPT.
section_title: ICE Has Not Identified or Assessed Risks in OPT
paragraphs: SEVP has not identified or assessed risks associated with OPT, such as  potential fraud or noncompliance with ICE regulations. Senior SEVP  officials told us they consider OPT to be a low-risk employment benefit for  foreign students because, in part, they believe foreign students under  OPT do not have an incentive to jeopardize their foreign student visa  status and future legal status to stay and work in the United States.  However, SEVP has not developed a process to determine the extent to  which schools that recommend and foreign students approved for OPT  may pose risks.
Further, CTCEU officials and ICE field agents we interviewed at all seven  ICE field offices in our review stated they believe OPT to be at risk for  fraud and noncompliance based on their experience investigating these  types of cases. Specifically, senior CTCEU officials stated that OPT is at  risk for fraud and noncompliance, in part, because it enables eligible  foreign students to work in the United States for extended periods of time  without obtaining a temporary work visa. In addition, ICE field office  agents we interviewed stated that foreign students approved for OPT  present a risk for becoming overstays because they are allowed to work  and remain in the United States for 12 to 31 months after graduation from  school. Also, ICE agents and DSOs we interviewed stated that DSOs  face greater challenges in monitoring foreign students in post-completion  OPT because the students are no longer attending classes. Moreover,  CTCEU officials stated that nonimmigrants are a vulnerable population  that can be exploited by illegitimate companies or organizations that lure  students to the United States with false promises of high-paying jobs and  potential ways to stay in the country. For example, CTCEU officials stated  that a recruiter or other third party may offer to help foreign students find  OPT work for a fee or percentage of the foreign student’s salary once the  student begins work under OPT. Additionally, SEVP’s compliance unit  maintains a log of schools identified as potentially out of compliance with  ICE regulations. As of September 2013, out of the 133 schools on the log,  SEVP had identified 17 schools as potentially noncompliant with ICE  regulations related to OPT.
Further, CTCEU officials and ICE field agents we interviewed described  various cases involving OPT that demonstrate their concerns with the  management and oversight of OPT. For example, in a 2012 case,  according to an ICE investigator, a school charged students for an OPT  recommendation on the Form I-20 and for keeping students in status  once they had entered the country, without requiring school attendance.  In another case, in 2012, ICE investigators initiated an investigation after  they received a complaint about a school’s noncompliance with OPT  requirements, such as students not working in their area of study. In  particular, ICE investigators found that the DSOs at the school would  submit fraudulent Form I-20s to recommend students for OPT; however,  the foreign students were not using OPT to work jobs related to their  areas of study (e.g., a nursing student working in a pizza parlor), which is  not allowed under ICE regulations. In a third case, in 2011, ICE field office  investigators initiated an investigation of a school on the basis of  information received from CBP that indicated that one of the school’s  DSOs was allegedly providing documentation authorizing students to  work in jobs not related to their major areas of study.
Using information obtained through prior ICE field offices’ investigations  of schools’ and students’ noncompliance with ICE regulations and policy  requirements, CTCEU officials have identified potential risk indicators  specifically associated with OPT and stated they have provided this  information to SEVP. Specifically, CTCEU officials stated they provided  position papers on multiple occasions from 2011 through 2013 to SEVP  officials expressing concerns about risks in SEVP in general and OPT in  particular, including recommendations to help mitigate these risks. For  example, in a position paper dated April 2013, CTCEU officials  recommended to SEVP that DSOs enter the date on which USCIS grants  OPT employment authorization in SEVIS to allow ICE and USCIS officials  to compare this date with the date of enrollment to identify potential risks  of students seeking to commit immigration fraud. Also, in April 2013,  CTCEU briefed SEVP’s compliance officials on SEVP- and OPT-related  risk indicators. For example, CTCEU officials identified that a certain  threshold, or percentage, of a school’s foreign student population  approved for OPT may be a potential indicator of fraud involving OPT.According to our analysis of SEVIS data, as of August 2013, of the  approximately 2,650 SEVP-certified schools with at least 1 foreign  student approved for OPT, the percentage of each school’s registered  foreign students approved for OPT met or exceeded the threshold  identified by CTCEU at 193 schools. Of the 193 schools, 100 percent of  registered foreign students were approved for OPT at 60 schools; most of  these schools had 4 or fewer total foreign students, except for 1 school,  where the data show that all 35 of the school’s foreign students were  approved for OPT. The Deputy Director of SEVP agreed that the  percentage of a school’s foreign student population approved for OPT  could be an indicator of potential fraud.
In November 2013, the Deputy Director of SEVP stated that, in response  to the recommendation from our June 2012 report that ICE develop and  implement a process to identify and assess risks in SEVP, SEVP has  taken initial actions to identify potential risks across SEVP-certified  schools by developing a risk scorecard by which to assess schools and  preliminary risk indicators to classify SEVP-certified schools by risk  category. While these are positive steps taken in response to our June  2012 recommendation, SEVP is in the early stages of developing this risk  scorecard and the risk indicators, and these efforts are focused on  identifying potential risks to SEVP overall. As part of these efforts, SEVP  officials have not identified and assessed potential risks specific to OPT  posed by schools and foreign students or determined the extent to which  the office will include potential OPT risks as part of their efforts to assess  risks SEVP-wide. Senior SEVP officials told us they have not identified  and assessed risks specific to OPT because they have not considered  OPT to be a high-risk employment benefit; however, SEVP has not  developed or implemented a risk management process to determine  potential risks in OPT. Furthermore, on the basis of information from ICE  field office investigations, CTCEU officials have identified SEVP- and  OPT-related risks, but, as of November 2013, senior SEVP officials told  us they had not yet incorporated CTCEU’s input, including relevant  information from ICE field offices, into their efforts to assess potential  SEVP-wide risks because they preferred to develop and implement a  process to identify and assess risks in SEVP on their own before  coordinating with CTCEU. DHS’s 2010 Policy for Integrated Risk  Management and 2011 Risk Management Fundamentals establish  DHS’s policy and guidance on risk. They instruct DHS and its  components to incorporate a risk management process to their planning  and management activities that includes, among other things, identifying  the risks associated with goals and objectives, analyzing and assessing  the identified risks, and using risk information and analysis to inform  decision making. Also, DHS’s Policy for Integrated Risk Management is  based on the premise that entities responsible for homeland security can  most effectively manage risks by working together, and emphasizes that  DHS and its components are to effectively communicate with  stakeholders, partners, and customers within and throughout the risk  management process. Without identifying and assessing risks in OPT in  coordination with CTCEU, SEVP is not well positioned to incorporate a  risk management process into its management of OPT. Further, obtaining  and assessing risk information from CTCEU and ICE field offices from  prior noncompliance and fraud cases involving OPT throughout the  development of its process to identify and assess risks in SEVP, to  include OPT, could better position SEVP to manage any risks associated  with OPT.
section_title: ICE Cannot Fully Ensure Foreign Students Working under Optional Practical Training Are Maintaining Their Legal Status in the United States
subsections: section_title: ICE Does Not Consistently Collect Information Needed to Oversee OPT Requirements
paragraphs: ICE does not consistently collect information needed to oversee OPT  requirements related to the type and timing of foreign students’  employment, as ICE regulations do not specifically require the collection  of information on foreign students’ places and dates of employment in  SEVIS. Such information could help ICE to better ensure that foreign  students are maintaining their legal status in the United States and to  identify and assess potential risks to OPT.
As indicated in table 3, SEVIS data on foreign students approved for the  three types of OPT show that 38 percent of student records (48,642 of  126,796) do not contain an employer name, as of August 2013.  Specifically, according to our analysis, the employer’s name is not  included in 65 percent and 48 percent of pre- and 12-month post- completion OPT students’ SEVIS records, respectively. Foreign students  are not required to have secured a job before seeking pre- and 12-month  post-completion OPT, and an employer name is not required of the  student at the time of application. Because 17-month STEM extension  students are required to have employment prior to application and have  ongoing reporting requirements, employer information is more complete,  with less than 1 percent of student records missing the employer name.
In addition to noting the lack of employers’ names, our analysis of SEVIS  data indicates that other information about employers that would be  helpful to identify where foreign students are working, such as the  physical address that can be used to differentiate between two employers  with the same name, is not consistently collected and maintained in  SEVIS. For example, of the 62 percent of student records that have the  employer’s name populated, approximately 5 percent of those records  (3,545 of 78,154) do not include other information on the employer, such  as the employer’s address, state, city, and postal code. In addition, for all  three types of OPT, ICE regulations and policy do not specifically require  students to report to their DSOs when they begin or stop working, and do  not require DSOs to enter those corresponding dates into SEVIS.
Without information on employers or employment start and end dates,  ICE’s ability to oversee requirements for OPT is limited.
Job directly related to major area of study. ICE requires DSOs to  ensure that a student is eligible prior to recommending OPT, and remains  eligible for the duration of OPT, by being employed in a job directly  related to his or her major area of study. ICE regulations and policy state  that DSOs are responsible for reporting in SEVIS subsequent known  changes in a student’s name and address, employer name and address,  and known instances of a student’s failure to report to work. Specifically  for students seeking the 17-month STEM extension of OPT, SEVP and  USCIS require that DSOs enter the students’ employer information in  SEVIS prior to recommending OPT, and SEVP requires regular  confirmation of such students’ personal and employer information  throughout the time of OPT. Although ICE regulations and policy require  DSOs to ensure students’ eligibility and to report known changes in  students’ employer information, they do not require that students report  and DSOs provide students’ initial employer information (name and  address, for example) in SEVIS for students pursuing pre- or 12-month  post-completion OPT. According to SEVP officials, requiring this initial  employer information for pre- and 12-month post-completion could place  an additional burden or requirement on DSOs. Thus, SEVP officials  stated that their office would prefer to make this type of change through  regulation rather than policy. SEVP officials stated that, in general,  changing regulatory language has been difficult and time consuming.  However, previous regulatory changes that created the 17-month STEM  extension, for example, have been implemented and added reporting  requirements in SEVIS for employer information for foreign students  approved for this extension.percent of all OPT students were approved for the STEM extension and,   As of August 2013, approximately 20  according to our analysis of SEVIS data, almost 100 percent of SEVIS  records for those students have the employment information as required  by regulation for OPT students who have been approved for the STEM  extension.
ICE regulations and policy require that DSOs ensure that a foreign  student is eligible for OPT and assume responsibility for maintaining the  student’s SEVIS record for the entire period of authorized OPT. ICE  regulations and policy also require all OPT employment to be in a job that  is directly related to the foreign student’s area of study. However, ICE has  not provided guidance to DSOs to help determine and document whether  the student’s job is related to his or her area of study. Requirements for  DSOs to collect information on how a job is related to an area of study  and guidance on how DSOs should provide such information in SEVIS  could help provide ICE with reasonable assurance that foreign students  engaged in OPT are working in jobs directly related to their area of study,  as required under OPT. In addition to fields for foreign students’ employer  name and address, SEVIS has two fields for DSOs to add comments or  remarks regarding students’ employment; however, ICE does not require  DSOs to provide any information on how DSOs arrived at the  determination that students’ jobs relate to their studies in these SEVIS  fields. According to SEVP officials and the program’s DSO training  materials, DSOs could use these two SEVIS fields to explain how a  student’s employment relates to the student’s program of study.  According to our analysis of the two fields available in SEVIS for DSOs to  enter remarks or comments regarding students’ OPT employment, we  found that 27 percent of foreign students’ records (34,454 of 126,796) did  not have any information in either field, as shown in table 4.
Although information is included in at least one of the employment  comment or remark fields for the majority of student records, this  information may not be relevant to whether students’ employment is  related to their studies. SEVP has not developed or provided guidance for  DSOs on how to determine whether a student’s job is related to his or her  program of study and has provided limited guidance on how to report this  information in SEVIS using the existing fields. Specifically, SEVP’s  guidance on OPT recommends that students maintain evidence for how  each job is related, including a job description, but is limited in that it does  not direct students to report this information to DSOs or DSOs to enter  this information into SEVIS. In addition, SEVP’s DSO training materials  state that DSOs should use the remarks area in SEVIS to explain how the  work relates to the students’ studies. However, the training materials are  limited in that they do not detail both SEVIS fields that are available. In  addition, the materials do not provide guidance on how DSOs should  show that they took steps to help ensure that students’ jobs are related.  Federal internal control standards state that federal agencies should,  among other things, design and document internal control activities, such  as guidance, to help ensure compliance with applicable laws and  regulations. SEVP officials stated that determining whether a job is  directly related to a program of study is not defined in the regulations and  would be too difficult to define in policy because it is a subjective process.  Therefore, ICE has not required DSOs to provide this information in  SEVIS.
Because ICE has not required information on how students’ jobs are  related to their studies and SEVP has provided limited guidance on how  to provide this information in SEVIS, ICE does not have information  needed to oversee OPT even when employer information is included in  SEVIS. For example, we examined those student records for which an  employer name was included for certain industries in which CTCEU  officials were concerned about the potential of students working in  unrelated jobs. According to our analysis, we found cases in which the  SEVIS record indicated that students may not be complying with ICE’s  regulatory requirement.students with degrees in fields such as economics, liberal arts, and  psychology were working in food service and the SEVIS record did not  include information as to how the employment was related to their field of  study. We also found 9 cases in which students with degrees in fields  such as computer science, engineering, and international studies were  working in retail without an explanation included in the SEVIS record.  However, we also found a case in which the student’s SEVIS record  indicated that the individual, who had a degree in music, was working for  a restaurant, but the employment remark field described the student’s  employment as being a member of the restaurant’s house band.  Developing and distributing guidance to DSOs with options on how to  determine whether a job is related to the foreign student’s area of study  and requiring DSOs to provide information in SEVIS to show that they  took steps to help ensure that the work is related could help provide ICE  with the information it could use to oversee OPT requirements.
Specifically, we found 35 cases in which  Limits on unemployment. ICE has set forth limits on unemployment in  its OPT-related regulations. Specifically, 12-month post-completion OPT  students may not exceed 90 days of accrued unemployment during their  authorized employment period, and 17-month STEM extension post- completion OPT students may not exceed 120 days of unemployment  (which includes any unemployment accrued during the initial 12-month  OPT period). These unemployment limits were added to the ICE  regulations in April 2008 to clarify that, if a student accumulates too much  unemployment while remaining in the country under the OPT employment  benefit, the student has violated his or her status. Although ICE policy  provides instruction on how a student and DSO may report and record  dates of employment or unemployment, ICE regulations and policy do not  specifically require foreign students to report to their DSOs when they  begin working or DSOs to enter those corresponding dates in SEVIS.
Furthermore, SEVP’s policy specifically states that DHS maintains  responsibility for determining whether a student has violated his or her  status by exceeding the permissible limit on authorized unemployment.  Federal internal control standards state that federal agencies should,  among other things, design and document internal control activities to  help ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations. The dates  on which authorization for employment from USCIS begins and ends are  included in students’ SEVIS records; however, ICE does not have a  mechanism to capture the date on which a student who was granted  authorization actually started working or data on periods when a student  is unemployed. According to SEVP officials and 12 DSOs with whom we  spoke, it can be difficult for a DSO to maintain contact with students  approved for OPT, particularly if a student engaged in post-completion  OPT is no longer attending classes at the school and works off-campus  for up to more than 2 years in another city or state. However, ICE’s  regulations state that when a DSO recommends a student for OPT, the  school—which includes its DSOs—assumes the added responsibility for  maintaining the SEVIS record of that student for the entire period of  authorized OPT. SEVP officials also stated that ICE’s ability to oversee  foreign students’ unemployment time using SEVIS may be limited  because the system does not systematically capture information from  DSOs that may be used to calculate the accumulation of unemployment  time. However, SEVP officials stated that SEVIS could be used to identify  foreign students on post-completion OPT who have not had an employer  listed for more than 90 or 120 days. According to SEVP officials, this  mechanism would allow SEVP to track the initial unemployment of a  student seeking work after receiving OPT employment authorization. As a  result of not having complete data on foreign students’ initial employment  dates or any subsequent unemployment dates, SEVP officials stated that  they have not fully enforced these regulatory limits on unemployment.  Requiring students to report to DSOs, and DSOs to record in SEVIS,  students’ initial date of employment and any periods of unemployment  could better position ICE to be able to oversee program requirements.
Foreign students approved for OPT, especially those approved for the  two post-completion types of OPT, are allowed to remain in the United  States after the completion of their studies to pursue employment yet  remain on a student visa with the understanding that they are complying  with OPT requirements. Without consistent information on where students  are employed and when students begin employment, ICE is not  positioned to oversee these requirements.
section_title: ICE Does Not Monitor whether Foreign Students’ Authorized Employment Complies with ICE Regulations
paragraphs: ICE has not developed mechanisms to consistently monitor whether  schools and DSOs recommend OPT for foreign students and whether  USCIS authorizes employment for foreign students that is permitted  under ICE regulations. ICE requires DSOs to ensure students are eligible  for the requested type and time of OPT prior to recommending it. After  receiving the DSOs’ recommendation, students apply for and may receive  employment authorization with USCIS. Through this process, DSOs and  USCIS are to provide information on foreign students’ type and period of  OPT in SEVIS. However, ICE does not monitor whether DSOs and  foreign students are complying with requirements that students (1) have  been in their program of study for at least 1 academic year prior to  receiving authorization and (2) complete their OPT within certain time  frames established by the type of OPT.
One full academic year requirement. As previously mentioned, ICE  requires that OPT be authorized only for a student who has been lawfully  enrolled on a full-time basis in a SEVP-certified college, university,  conservatory, or seminary for 1 full academic year in order to ensure that  those seeking OPT employment are primarily in the United States on  student visas to pursue their education. However, ICE regulations and policy do not define and SEVP has not provided OPT-specific guidance to  DSOs on what constitutes 1 full academic year for SEVP-certified  schools. According to SEVP officials, ICE has not developed or provided  specific guidance because the various types of programs have different  academic schedules and any guidance may not apply universally to all  schools. However, SEVP officials stated that they use definitions from the  Department of Education when fielding DSOs’ questions on this issue. In  November 2013, SEVP drafted and released for comment guidance  regarding annual vacations that includes these Department of Education  definitions of how much time typically constitutes 1 full academic year.  However, this draft guidance does not directly apply to the regulatory  requirement of completing 1 full academic year to be eligible for OPT.  Because ICE’s OPT-related regulations and policy do not define 1 full  academic year for the various types of programs and schedules for  SEVP-certified schools, DSOs and USCIS may not be clear as to how the  Department of Education’s definitions specifically apply to approving and  authorizing employment for foreign students seeking OPT. Therefore,  students may be engaging in OPT without having completed the required  time in their programs. Our analysis of SEVIS records as of August 2013  indicates that DSOs marked 556 students’ records as not meeting the  requirement of having completed 1 full academic year prior to engaging in  OPT. Further, according to our analysis of time between the program  start date to employment start date for students authorized for OPT,  1,446 additional students have not been enrolled in their program for at  least 8 months (what we consider to be 1 academic year based on SEVP  officials’ estimates) prior to beginning OPT. On the basis of our two  analyses, over 2,000 foreign students approved for OPT may not have  met the requirement of having completed 1 full academic year. According  to SEVP officials, this requirement applies only once to a foreign student.  For instance, if a student was previously in the United States on another  visa in which he or she could attend school, the time spent in an  educational program would count toward the 1 full academic year  requirement. Also, according to SEVP officials, a student may have met  the requirement thorough a combination of enrollment in a previous  program and his or her current program of study. However, ICE  regulations and policy do not specifically list this type of exemption.
Furthermore, SEVP’s guidance to DSOs specifically states that there is  no exemption to the requirement that a student have been enrolled for 1  full academic year. Furthermore, federal internal control standards state  that federal agencies should design and document guidance that would  help to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
Developing and providing guidance to DSOs and USCIS on what  constitutes 1 full academic year and how to apply this definition to  recommending and authorizing OPT could help ICE better ensure that  foreign students meet eligibility requirements for OPT.
Time frames for post-completion OPT. ICE regulations state that  foreign students may be authorized for 12 months of OPT employment,  which must be completed within 14 months following the completion of   Students engaged in the STEM extension are granted an  their program. additional one-time 17-month period of OPT employment, for a total of 29  months of total approved employment. This STEM extension must be  applied directly following the end of the initially approved 12-month post- completion OPT and be completed in 31 months following the completion  of his or her program. Our analysis of SEVIS student record data as of  August 2013 shows that 9 percent of student records have authorized  post-completion OPT employment dates that exceed the regulatory limits  of total approved OPT and 8 percent of student records will not complete  their OPT employment by the regulatory limits of 14 or 31 months, as  shown in table 5.
Furthermore, our analysis shows 10 percent of students engaged in 17- month STEM extension OPT had work approvals that exceeded the 17  months allowed by ICE regulations and policy, and 10 percent of students  would not complete their OPT within 31 months from the end of their  program. According to SEVP officials, these extended periods of OPT  may be explained by students’ using the cap-gap extension to extend  employment authorization through the fiscal year while petitions filed on  their behalf for a nonimmigrant employment visa are pending.officials stated that if a foreign student was approved for the cap-gap  extension, the student’s SEVIS record should indicate such approval and  the employment end date would be adjusted to include the extension.  This approval, and subsequent extension, may cause the student’s   SEVP  employment authorization dates to potentially exceed the 12- or 17-month  limits. However, our analysis of the SEVIS records shows that those  students, included in table 5, who have periods of employment  authorization exceeding regulatory and policy limits for OPT, did not have  approval for the cap-gap extension.
Although SEVIS shows a student’s current OPT approval, the system  does not display students’ past OPT approvals (previous pre-completion,  for example) for the purpose of determining if a student has exceeded  total limits on accrued work authorization. According to SEVP and USCIS  officials, both rely on DSOs to track a student’s total amount of OPT and  to recommend the appropriate amount of OPT for students depending on  previously accrued OPT so as not to exceed regulatory limits. According  to USCIS officials, it may check previous employment authorization  applications by searching in CLAIMS or the Central Index System for an  individual’s name; however, it relies on DSOs to recommend the allowed   Without developing and implementing a mechanism to  amount of OPT.monitor available information collected in SEVIS to determine total  amounts of approved OPT over the course of students’ duration of stay,  ICE does not have reasonable assurance that DSOs are implementing  and students are complying with the regulatory limits on accrued  employment approval. For example, students who may have engaged in  the full amount of allowed OPT may leave the country, reapply to another  school at the same education level, enter the country under a new I-20  and SEVIS identification number, enroll in a program for 1 academic year,  and apply for OPT with the new program.
Foreign students approved for OPT are allowed to work in the United  States while maintaining their student visa status in order to supplement  their education with practical training with the understanding that these  students, and the schools and DSOs that have responsibility for these  students, are complying with certain OPT requirements. Federal internal  control standards state that agencies should design controls, including  policies and procedures, to ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs in the  course of normal operations. Developing and implementing a mechanism to monitor available information collected in SEVIS about  OPT that DSOs recommend and USCIS authorizes for foreign students  could better position ICE to help ensure that foreign students do not  exceed regulatory limits on the amount of time students are approved for  work.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: OPT, which is an employment benefit, provides certain eligible foreign  students with the opportunity to seek temporary work to gain practical  experience in their major areas of study during and after completing an  academic program. A foreign student in post-completion OPT, in  particular, is not required to leave the United States following graduation  and can remain in the United States for the entire post-completion OPT  period. Effective oversight of schools that recommend and foreign  students who are approved for OPT entails identifying and assessing any  potential risks, including opportunities for criminal exploitation, and being  in a position to mitigate them. ICE has taken initial actions to identify risks  across SEVP-certified schools; however, ICE has not analyzed available  information to identify and assess potential risks specific to OPT posed by  schools and foreign students. Identifying and assessing OPT-specific  risks based on various factors, including risk information from CTCEU,  could better position ICE to determine actions to help prevent OPT- related noncompliance and fraud and to address such noncompliance  and fraud when they occur.
Moreover, ICE could take steps to improve its ability to help ensure that  foreign students working under OPT are complying with OPT  requirements and thereby maintaining their legal status in the United  States. By consistently collecting information in SEVIS that indicates  foreign students’ employers, how employment is related to these  students’ studies, initial date of employment, and any dates of  unemployment, ICE could better position itself to oversee the OPT  requirements that foreign students are actively working in areas related to  their studies and not exceeding limits on unemployment. Furthermore, by  monitoring through analysis other OPT information, ICE could better  ensure that schools and DSOs recommend OPT for foreign students and  USCIS authorizes employment for foreign students that is permissible  under ICE regulations. By collecting the appropriate information in SEVIS  and monitoring such information for compliance, ICE may better position  itself to determine whether foreign students approved for OPT are  maintaining their legal student visa status while supplementing their  education with employment directly related to their areas of study in the  United States. Moreover, having more complete data in SEVIS on foreign  students working under OPT could help strengthen ICE’s efforts to  identify and assess potential risks to OPT.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To strengthen ICE’s efforts to develop and implement a process to  identify and assess risks in SEVP, we recommend that the Director of ICE  direct SEVP, in coordination with CTCEU, to identify and assess potential  risks in OPT, including obtaining and assessing relevant information from  CTCEU and ICE field offices.
To better ensure DSOs’ and students’ compliance with OPT  requirements, and strengthen efforts to identify and assess potential risks  in OPT, we recommend that the Director of ICE direct SEVP to take the  following five actions:  require that pre-completion and 12-month post-completion OPT  students report to DSOs, and DSOs record in SEVIS, students’  employer information, including the employer’s name and address; develop and distribute guidance to DSOs on how to determine  whether a job is related to a student’s area of study and require DSOs  to provide information in SEVIS to show that they took steps, based  on this guidance, to help ensure that the student’s work is related to  the area of study; require that students report to DSOs, and DSOs record in SEVIS,  students’ initial date of employment and any periods of  unemployment; develop and provide guidance to DSOs and USCIS on how much time  constitutes 1 full academic year for the purposes of recommending  and authorizing OPT; and develop and implement a mechanism to monitor available information  in SEVIS to determine if foreign students are accruing more OPT than  allowed by ICE regulations.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS and the Department of State for  their review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are  reproduced in full in appendix II. DHS concurred with our six  recommendations and described actions under way or planned to  address them. For example, DHS indicated that, as part of ongoing efforts  to develop an overall risk management program, SEVP will work with  CTCEU in developing factors to identify risks for schools and students  associated with OPT. Also, DHS noted that the functionality to track OPT  employment information, including the employer’s name and address,  dates of employment, and any periods of unemployment, have been  incorporated into SEVIS and that the software that includes the required  data fields is scheduled to be released in 2014. In addition, DHS indicated  that SEVP will issue guidance to assist DSOs in collecting information on  students’ employment for reporting in SEVIS and to clarify what periods of  enrollment qualify as 1 full academic year. These and other actions noted  in DHS’s written comments should help address the intent of our  recommendations. DHS also provided technical comments, which were  incorporated as appropriate.
The Department of State did not have formal comments on our draft  report.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until thirty days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of  Homeland Security and State, and appropriate congressional committees.  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made significant  contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report examines the extent to which the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) has (1) identified and assessed risks associated with  optional practical training (OPT), and (2) collected information and  developed monitoring mechanisms to help ensure students comply with  OPT requirements and maintain their legal status in the United States.
To determine the extent to which DHS’s Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE) has identified and assessed risks in ICE’s Student and  Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) specifically related to OPT, we  analyzed program documentation, analyzed data, and interviewed  officials from DHS and its relevant components, including U.S. Citizenship  and Immigration Services (USCIS) and ICE. In particular, we analyzed  ICE and SEVP documentation, such as standard operating procedures,  policy statements, and guidance for agency officials and designated  school officials (DSO), to determine how ICE’s processes identify and  assess risk related to OPT in SEVP.
In addition, to evaluate the extent to which ICE has identified and  assessed risks related to OPT, we collected and evaluated information on  SEVP compliance and watch lists that contain schools that SEVP has  identified as potentially noncompliant or fraudulent and previous cases of  OPT-related fraud through obtaining and analyzing documents and  interviewing investigators from ICE’s Counterterrorism and Compliance  Enforcement Unit (CTCEU). Also, we analyzed documentation CTCEU  officials provided regarding risks and vulnerabilities they have identified in  OPT-related policies, procedures, and regulations during the course of  their work. In addition, we analyzed ICE news bulletins from January  2008 to November 2013 to help determine the magnitude of previous  cases of fraud and evaluated information provided by CTCEU on criminal  investigations related to school or student noncompliance or fraud  involving OPT. Moreover, we collected and analyzed Student and  Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) data on schools that had at  least one foreign student approved for OPT, as of August 2013, to identify  examples of schools that pose a potential risk for fraud or noncompliance  involving OPT using a risk indicator identified by CTCEU. Also, we  interviewed officials from CTCEU and investigators from 7 of ICE’s 26  Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) field offices. Specifically, we  conducted telephone interviews with ICE field offices located in Atlanta,  Georgia; Boston, Massachusetts; Los Angeles and San Francisco,  California; Newark, New Jersey; and New York, New York. We also  conducted a telephone interview with an official from the ICE resident  agent in charge field office in Charleston, West Virginia, which is under  the supervision of the ICE field office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. We  selected these locations based on the following criteria: (1) CTCEU  officials identified the ICE field office as having previous or ongoing  experience with school fraud and (2) SEVP identified the ICE field office  as currently investigating a school in SEVP’s compliance case log. As we  did not select a probability sample of ICE field offices to interview, the  results of these interviews cannot be projected to all of ICE’s 26 field  offices. While the information we obtained from officials at these locations  cannot be generalized, the interviews provided us with the perspectives of  ICE officials responsible for conducting school and student fraud  investigations, including their views on the management and oversight  SEVP has established for schools and students involved in OPT and any  challenges ICE field offices have faced in their investigations. We also  evaluated the extent to which ICE’s practices were consistent with DHS’s  2010 Policy for Integrated Risk Management and 2011 Risk Management  Fundamentals.
To determine the extent to which ICE has collected information and  developed monitoring mechanisms to help ensure students comply with  OPT requirements and maintain their legal status in the United States, we  also analyzed program documentation, analyzed data, and interviewed  officials from DHS and its components. As part of our effort to evaluate  these processes that SEVP uses to manage and oversee students  approved for OPT, we reviewed applicable regulations, such as those  governing nonimmigrant visa classes and schools recommending  students engaging in OPT. policy and guidance documents specifically concerning management and  oversight of OPT. We compared these policies with criteria established in  regulations, as well as with criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government.
The regulations governing nonimmigrant classes and OPT are found in 8 C.F.R. pt. 214. existing documentation on the controls in the system and the policies for  ensuring data reliability; (2) interviewing agency officials about the data’s  sources, the system’s controls, and any quality assurance steps  performed after data are entered into the system; and (3) testing the data  for missing data, outliers, or obvious errors. We identified several  limitations to the data resulting from ICE’s process by which schools’  DSOs are responsible for data entry and updates. SEVIS is used by  schools to apply for and receive SEVP certification, as well as for DSOs  to keep records of individual students who enter the United States on F  and M visas. Although SEVP officials may make edits to a student’s  SEVIS record in some cases, all data or information entries on students  are the responsibility of DSOs. Therefore, data elements that are not  required may be missing or invalidly entered. For example, entries for  schools’ physical locations may not be valid U.S. postal addresses.  Furthermore, some SEVIS records may be duplicated because of  students changing from one type of OPT to another. However, we were  able to address this issue with duplicates by removing the record that was  less accurate and up to date. While we identified such limitations, we  found the data to be sufficiently reliable for providing descriptive  information on the population of SEVP-certified schools that have  recommended OPT and of foreign students engaged in OPT. We also  found the data to be sufficiently reliable for analyzing student records for  compliance with certain regulatory and policy requirements. We focused  our analysis on several SEVIS fields related to management and  oversight of foreign students engaged in OPT: (1) employer name and  location, (2) remarks and comments on employment, and (3) dates of  program of study and authorized OPT employment.
We also analyzed student records for which an employer name was  included and belonged in industries such as food service and retail,  industries in which CTCEU officials were concerned about the potential of  students working in unrelated jobs. We analyzed a sample of 158 student  records in which the employer name field indicated the student worked in  select food service or retail industries. This is a select sample and is not  representative of all records indicating a student is working in the food  service or retail industries. We identified this sample by searching the  SEVIS data of foreign students authorized to engage in OPT as of August  2013 for employers names with key words such as “restaurant,” “café,”  “coffee,” “pizza,” and “burger,” as well as for select retailers. This search  returned 207 student records, which we reviewed and subsequently made  the determination to exclude 49 records based on the employer name  including one of these search terms but belonging to a business outside  of the food service or retail industries. For example, we excluded an  employer that is a printing company with the word “café” in its name.  From the sample of 158, we determined that 44 student records did not  include additional employment information in the SEVIS employment  comment or employment remark fields that explained how the job was  related to the field of study and the records did not indicate a potentially  related degree.
In addition to document and data collection and analysis, we interviewed  SEVP officials to evaluate the extent to which their program has  implemented controls related to OPT. We met with senior officials from  SEVP, including SEVP’s Deputy Director, and management and staff for  the five of seven branches involved in managing OPT—School  Certification, Policy, Analysis and Operations Center, Field  Representative Program, and Systems Management. We met with  officials from CTCEU to understand the criminal enforcement perspective  of managing and overseeing OPT. We interviewed USCIS officials to  determine the extent to which USCIS has implemented processes for  ensuring eligibility of students applying for employment authorization  under OPT. In addition, we analyzed USCIS’s Computer-Linked  Application Information Management System 3 (CLAIMS) data on OPT  adjudication results from fiscal years 2008 to 2013. To assess the  reliability of the CLAIMS data on foreign student OPT adjudications, we  interviewed agency officials responsible for managing the data about the  data’s sources and the system’s controls. We found the data to be  sufficiently reliable for providing descriptive information on the number of  employment authorization applications and approvals for foreign students  engaged in OPT. Furthermore, we interviewed 11 DSOs, and received a  written response from 1 DSO, who are employed by schools in  Washington, D.C., and surrounding areas on their roles and  responsibilities related to foreign students seeking or authorized for OPT  and on any challenges in the management and oversight of these foreign  students. We selected these officials because, as of July 2013, they  composed a group of representatives from SEVP-certified schools of  various types and sizes in the Washington, D.C., region that meets  regularly with SEVP to discuss matters such as SEVIS and SEVP policy  and requirements. As we did not select a probability sample of DSOs to  interview, the information we obtained from these school officials cannot  be generalized. The interviews provided us with the perspectives of DSOs  responsible for overseeing students engaged in OPT. Further, we  interviewed officials from NAFSA: Association of International Educators  to discuss the organization’s views on OPT, including the involvement of  DSOs in OPT.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to February  2014, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet, Assistant  Director; Jennifer Bryant; Frances Cook; Lorraine Ettaro; Cynthia Grant;  Kirsten Lauber; Elizabeth Luke; Lara Miklozek; Linda Miller; and Juan  Tapia-Videla made significant contributions to this work.