Nuclear Safety: Convention on Nuclear Safety Is Viewed by Most Member Countries as Strengthening Safety Worldwide
Published: 2010-04-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Currently, 437 civilian nuclear power reactors are operating in 29 countries, and 56 more are under construction. After the Chernobyl accident, representatives of over 50 nations, including the United States, participated in the development of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, a treaty that seeks to promote the safety of civilian nuclear power reactors. The Convention has been in force since 1996. GAO was asked to assess (1) parties' views on the benefits and limitations of the Convention, (2) efforts to improve implementation of the Convention, and (3) how International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) programs complement the Convention's safety goals. GAO surveyed the 64 parties to the Convention for which it was in force at the time of GAO's review and analyzed the responses of the 32 that completed it, analyzed relevant documents, and interviewed U.S. and foreign officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Convention on Nuclear Safety plays a useful role in strengthening the safety of civilian nuclear power reactors worldwide, according to most parties to the Convention that responded to GAO's survey and representatives of parties GAO interviewed. In particular, parties indicated that the Convention's obligations to (1) establish effective legislative and regulatory frameworks and strong, independent nuclear regulatory bodies and (2) prepare a national report every 3 years that describes the measures the country has taken to achieve the Convention's nuclear safety goals, are among its most useful contributions. The countries present their national reports at review meetings, address questions that may arise about the reports, and assess and ask questions about the reports of other parties. This is known as the peer review process. Some concerns were raised about limited public access to Convention proceedings, some countries' lack of resources to fully participate in the review meetings, and the absence of performance metrics in the national reports to gauge progress toward meeting safety goals and objectives. Half of the parties responding to GAO's survey stated that the lack of performance metrics limited the usefulness of the Convention. Neither the Department of State nor the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has formally proposed the adoption of performance metrics. However, NRC officials told GAO that performance metrics could be useful. In addition, the number of parties posting their national reports to IAEA's public Web site has declined since 2005. NRC and Department of State officials told GAO that the United States has always made its national report available on the Internet. However, the U.S. approach has been to lead by example rather than taking an active role in encouraging other parties to post their reports. Further, universal participation would advance achievement of the Convention's goals. Several representatives from countries who are parties to the Convention told GAO that Iran should ratify the Convention. In their view, without Iran's participation, the international community has limited or no insight on, or access to, Iran's civilian nuclear power program. Russia, which is helping Iran build the nuclear reactor at Bushehr, may condition continued assistance on Iran becoming a party to the Convention, according to Russian officials. The parties have taken some actions to improve the Convention's implementation, and more proposals are being considered. Steps have been taken to make the process for asking questions during peer review meetings more open and to increase the amount of time available for preparing for the review meetings. IAEA nuclear safety programs, which predate the Convention, complement the Convention's safety goals through the Technical Cooperation program, safety standards, and peer review missions. The Technical Cooperation program supports, among other things, the development of nuclear power. IAEA has established nuclear safety standards and also promotes nuclear safety through peer review missions that evaluate the operations of a member state's nuclear regulatory system and nuclear power plant operational safety

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: There are currently 437 civilian nuclear power reactors operating in 29  countries, generating about 14 percent of the world’s electricity, and 56  more nuclear power reactors are currently under construction. The safe  operation of nuclear power reactors worldwide has been a long-standing  concern of the international community. In the aftermath of the Chernobyl  accident, representatives of over 50 nations, including the United States,  participated in the development of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (the  Convention), a multilateral treaty that seeks to strengthen the safety of  civilian nuclear power reactors. Established in the mid-1990s, the  Convention seeks to achieve its safety objectives through countries’  adherence to general safety principles rather than through technical  standards. Officials describe the Convention as incentive-oriented,  designed to maximize the number of countries that will support and sign  it, with the goal of making it acceptable and useful to countries with  potentially unsafe power reactors in Eastern Europe and the countries of  the former Soviet Union. According to U.S. officials, the main purpose of  the Convention is to get these countries, as well as developing nations, to  make commitments to improve their reactors and develop a safety  culture.
Currently, 65 countries and 1 international organization are parties to the  Convention, including all countries that currently operate civilian nuclear  power reactors. For the purpose of this report, we refer to countries that  have ratified, accepted, or approved the Convention as parties. The United  States ratified the Convention in 1999.
The Convention calls on parties to, among other things, (1) establish and  maintain a legislative framework and an independent regulatory body to  govern the safety of nuclear installations; (2) establish procedures to  ensure that technical aspects of safety, such as the siting, design,  construction, and operation of nuclear power reactors, are adequately  considered; (3) maintain an acceptable level of safety throughout the life  of the installations by, for example, considering safety to be a priority and  establishing a quality assurance program; and (4) prepare and routinely  test emergency plans. The Convention does not impose sanctions when  countries do not follow these safety principles.
Under the terms of the Convention, each country—regardless of whether  it operates nuclear power plants or not—is required to submit a national  report that identifies the measures taken to implement each of the nuclear  safety obligations contained in the Convention. Obligations cover such  points as siting, design, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear  power installations. The parties to the Convention have also established  detailed guidance to help parties prepare their national reports. The  purpose of the guidance is to encourage parties to describe the steps they  are taking to meet the Convention’s obligations and to facilitate other  parties’ review of the national reports of other countries. The countries  meet every 3 years in Vienna, Austria, to present their national report,  address questions that may arise about the report, and assess and ask  questions about the reports of other parties. This is known as the peer  review process, and it is considered central to the Convention’s success  because it is the means by which the parties assess the steps being taken  to meet safety obligations. As part of this peer review process, countries  meet in six groups composed primarily on the basis of the number of  reactors that each country operates. This process ensures that the six  countries with the most reactors—the United States, France, Japan,  Russia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom—are never in the same  group. Within this confidential group setting, all member countries have  the opportunity to examine and review what each country reports it is  doing to meet its nuclear safety obligations. These meetings are hosted by  the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which serves as the  Convention’s secretariat and provides administrative support. To date,  four review meetings have taken place, and the fifth is scheduled for April  2011.
The Convention has taken on increased significance in recent years as  countries are either expanding their existing nuclear power capacity or  planning to establish new programs. In 2009, IAEA estimated that by 2030  the world’s capacity for nuclear electricity production will significantly  increase. Most of this increase in capacity is expected to occur in  countries that have established civilian nuclear power programs, such as  China, Japan, and South Korea. China, for example, has announced its  intention to spend $50 billion to build 32 new nuclear plants by 2020 and  currently has 21 plants under construction. Both India and Pakistan are  also moving forward with plans to significantly increase their production  of nuclear power, building plants that will more than double their  production of nuclear energy in the next decade.
In addition, countries such as Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, which  do not yet have civilian nuclear power programs, are actively moving to  build the necessary regulatory infrastructure for such programs as they  explore agreements with the world’s leading nuclear reactor vendors. The  United Arab Emirates, for example, recently signed a $20 billion  agreement with a consortium of South Korean vendors to begin  construction of four 1,400-megawatt nuclear power reactors in 2012. Other  countries, such as Indonesia, Libya, Thailand, and Vietnam, have  expressed their intent to build civilian nuclear power plants. Still others,  such as Algeria, Belarus, Egypt, Nigeria, and Yemen, are considering  moving forward with civilian nuclear power programs.
To assist Congress in its deliberations in the past, we identified some  limitations of the Convention. Specifically, we noted that (1) public  access to the peer review process was unclear and (2) the effectiveness the peer review process was uncertain because of concerns about how  well the country groups formed for peer review meetings would function. We also pointed out that the Convention lacked an enforcement  mechanism.
Now that the Convention has been in force for more than a decade, you  y goal:  asked us to evaluate the extent to which it is achieving its primar promoting the safe operation of civilian nuclear power reactors  worldwide. Accordingly, we assessed (1) parties’ views on the perceived  benefits and limitations of the Convention, (2) efforts to improve implementation of the Convention, and (3) how IAEA progr complement the Convention’s safety goals and objectives.
To assess parties’ views on the perceived benefits and limitations of the Convention for improving the safety of civilian nuclear power reactors  worldwide, we administered a Web-based survey—which can be v GAO-10-550SP—to 64 parties to the Convention and analyzed the  responses of the 32 that completed it. This report does not contain all th results from the survey. To assess the potential for nonrespo our survey results, we compared selected characteristics of  nonresponding countries, such as (1) length of time as a party to the  Convention, (2) nuclear power status and number of nuclear power pla (3) region, (4) countries that operate Soviet-designed reactors, and (5)  European Union (EU) membership, to those of the responding parties. The  distribution of these characteristics among responding and nonrespond ing  parties was well-balanced. To encourage respondents to complete the  survey, we sent an e-mail reminder to each nonrespondent about 2 week s  after our initial e-mail message and followed up with additional e- and telephone calls. Additionally, to encourage honest and open  responses, in the introduction to the survey, we pledged that we would  report information in the aggregate and not report data that could identify  a particular respondent. We also interviewed representatives of 17 nucl ear  and nonnuclear parties to the Convention, including officials from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of State  (State) who represent the United States at the Convention. Of the 17 we  interviewed, 9 completed the survey, and 8 did not. In total, we obtai ned  the views of 40 parties to the Convention. We also analyzed various  Convention-related documents from NRC and State as well as from I and the EU. To assess efforts to improve the implementation of the  Convention, we reviewed Convention documents and interviewed NRC  and State officials who have attended Convention organizational, workin group, and review meetings where such efforts have been discussed. To  assess the extent to which IAEA programs complement the Convention’s  safety goals and objectives, we analyzed, among other things, Conventio minutes of meetings and rules of procedure. We also interviewed IAEA  officials, U.S. officials at the U.S. Missions in Vienna and Brussels, and the representatives of 17 parties to the Convention. To determine the cost t the United States to participate in the Convention and IAEA’s cost support the Convention for one 3-year cycle, we analyzed budget s to  information from NRC, State, and IAEA. We also assessed the reliability of the data we obtained and interviewed knowledgeable NRC, Department of Energy (DOE), State, EU, and IAEA officials on the reliability of the data.  s  We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this report. Appendix III explains our methodology in greater detail.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Convention is one of a number of cooperative efforts by the  international community to improve nuclear safety worldwide and is  meant to complement these other efforts. For example, as we previou sly  reported, the United States and 20 other countries and internationa organizations contributed $1.9 billion to improve nuclear safety in  countries operating Soviet-designed nuclear reactors. The United States  alone has spent over $770 million since the Chernobyl accident on nuclear  safety assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and several  other countries through DOE and NRC programs. According to an agency  official, DOE’s nuclear safety assistance programs have focused on  physical safety enhancements to Soviet-designed reactors, while NRC has  worked to increase the capacity and stature of recipient countries’  regulatory bodies to ensure the continuing operational safety of such  reactors. In addition, a separate fund was established to help stabilize the  damaged reactor at Chernobyl by constructing a new containment  structure. As we reported, the estimated cost of this effort was $1.2 billion  as of 2007, of which the United States pledged $203 million. Since 1991  the EU has spent over $1.9 billion on international nuclear safety  assistance. See appendix II for more information about U.S. and EU  expenditures to promote international nuclear safety. These expenditures  are not used to support the implementation of the Convention. Matters  pertaining to U.S. financial support to the Convention are contained on  page 28 of this report.
In addition to the Convention, other multilateral organizations—t Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), the Western European Nuclear  Regulators’ Association (WENRA), the European Nuclear Safety  Regulators Group (ENSREG),  and the EU—are making efforts to  advance the safety of civilian nuclear power. All member or obse rver  countries of the NEA, WENRA, ENSREG, and the EU are also partie the Convention. The NEA, for example, has created several specialized  committees to facilitate exchanges of technical information and to  organize joint research projects to improve national safety practices.  WENRA works to develop common approaches to nuclear safety among  the chief nuclear regulators in Europe. ENSREG, among other things, aims  to maintain and continuously improve the safety of nuclear installations in  the EU. In June 2009, the EU adopted a directive creating a framework f or  (1) maintaining and promoting the continuous improvement of nuclear  safety and its regulation and (2) ensuring that EU member states prov high level of nuclear safety to protect workers and the public against  radiation from nuclear installations. This framework is based in par IAEA safety documents and the obligations of the Convention. EU  members are required to incorporate legislation by June 2011.   the directive into their national  Other conventions have been established to advance international nuclear  safety and are administered by IAEA’s Department of Safety and  Security.  Two “emergency conventions” obligate parties to provide early  notification of a nuclear accident and to render assistance in the event of  such an accident or a radiological emergency, and two other conventions  waste and to  obligate parties to safely manage spent fuel and radioactive  take effective action to physically protect nuclear material.
section_title: The Majority of Parties We Survey and Interviewed Reported That the Convention Has Strengthened Nucl Safety Worldwide
subsections: section_title: The Convention Has Strengthened Nuclear Safety by Promoting Improved Regulatory Capabilities and Requiring National Reports
paragraphs: Nearly all parties responding to our survey reported that the Convention  has been very useful or somewhat useful in helping to strengthen nuclear  safety both in their country and worldwide. In all, these parties operate  404—or more than 92 percent—of the world’s 437 operating civilian  nuclear power reactors. In addition, we also interviewed representatives  from IAEA member states, nuclear regulatory organizations, and the EU  (17 in all) who expressed similar views about the Convention. Survey  respondents and parties we interviewed identified several Convention  obligations as having helped strengthen the safety of civilian nuclear  power programs. The obligations cited most frequently were (1)  establishing an effective legislative and regulatory framework (laws and  regulations) and a strong, effective, and independent nuclear regulatory  body and (2) preparing a national report every 3 years that describes the  measures the country has taken to achieve the Convention’s safety goals.
In addition, some of the 17 parties we interviewed stated that the  Convention has contributed to and promoted the independence and  effectiveness of their country’s nuclear regulatory bodies. For example, an  Austrian nuclear regulator told us he thought that this promotion of  effective regulatory capacity is one of the Convention’s greatest  contributions to international nuclear safety. Moreover, representatives of  China and Pakistan told us that the Convention was influential in leading  their countries to increase the independence and effectiveness of their  nuclear regulators. NRC officials expressed a similar view, noting that  parties to the Convention have taken many steps to develop more effective  laws and regulations and increase the capacities and independence of  their nuclear regulators.
The requirement to prepare a national report describing the steps parties  have taken to meet the Convention’s nuclear safety obligations also plays a  large role in strengthening the safety of civilian nuclear power programs,  according to survey respondents. Almost all survey respondents indicated  that the presentation of national reports in country groups was a very or  somewhat effective way for sharing best safety practices. Most survey  respondents reported that preparing the national report has either greatly  or somewhat improved opportunities to examine their country’s civilian  nuclear power program. A number of parties we interviewed also said that  this national report has been helpful in strengthening nuclear safety  worldwide. NRC officials told us one effect of a national report is that  nuclear regulators and plant operators are forced to think about even  routine safety procedures and policies because the reports will be  scrutinized by their peers. For example, as a result of questions raised by  other parties on the national report prepared for the 2008 review meeting,  the United States agreed to discuss with state governments and NRC  licensees the benefits and costs of adopting stricter standards for  protecting nuclear power plant workers and the public from exposure to  radiation.
In our survey, we also asked some additional questions about parties’  perceptions about how the peer review process affected the preparation of  the 2008 reports. Specifically, among other things, we asked how likely  parties thought reports were to include (1) comprehensive, detailed  descriptions of measures taken to strengthen safety; (2) evidence that  safety issues discussed in one review meeting were revisited in the next  meeting and that the actions taken to address the issues were discussed in  sufficient detail for parties to evaluate whether the safety concerns had  been adequately addressed; and (3) sufficient technical detail to  understand specific safety concerns. In each case, most survey  respondents indicated that they thought reports were very or somewhat  likely to include such information. We also asked how effectively the peer  review process encouraged parties to provide detailed information in their  2008 national reports. Overall, most survey respondents indicated that the  peer review process was very or somewhat likely to encourage parties to  include detailed, comprehensive, and accurate information in their  national reports.
section_title: According to Parties We Surveyed and Interviewed, the Convention Has Also Improved Communication and Promoted Sharing of Technical Information about Nuclear Safety Issues
paragraphs: According to both survey respondents and parties we interviewed, the  Convention has increased communication and encouraged the sharing of  technical information to improve nuclear safety worldwide. There was  wide agreement among the survey respondents that the Convention has  improved communication among nuclear regulators; nuclear power plant  operators; and other national organizations involved in the civilian nuclear  power industry, such as, in the case of the United States, the Institute of  Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). More than half of the respondents to  our survey indicated the Convention had “greatly” improved  communication about safety issues affecting civilian nuclear power  reactors. Most respondents to our survey agreed that the Convention had  improved opportunities for sharing technical solutions to improve safety,  such as reactor design improvements or fire safety enhancements. Russian  and Ukrainian officials we spoke to provided examples of how the  Convention has led to the sharing of nuclear safety information. Following  are some examples:    Russian nuclear regulatory officials told us that the Convention has played  a useful role in promoting technical solutions to problems shared by  countries operating similar types of reactors. Specifically, Russia and  Finland have been developing a system to improve communication  between their plant operators based on discussions that began with  contacts made at Convention review meetings.
A Ukrainian official told us his country’s participation in the Convention  has increased other countries’ awareness of the safety problems  confronting Ukraine’s aging Soviet-designed nuclear reactors. He further  noted that the Convention is one of many forums that Ukraine participates  in that supports the strengthening of nuclear safety.
section_title: Confidentiality among the Parties to the Convention Has Been Key to the Success of the Peer Review Process
paragraphs: According to most parties we surveyed and interviewed, maintaining the  confidentiality of information obtained during the Convention’s meetings  is critical to the peer review process. Most party representatives we spoke  with agree that confidentiality should be preserved. For example, when  asked if the public should be allowed to directly observe review  meetings—and thereby gain direct access to a party’s national report and  any concerns or questions raised about it by other parties—approximately  two-thirds of survey respondents said the public probably or definitely  should not be given such access. Some parties we interviewed told us that,  as a result of the confidentiality of the peer review process, their country’s  national reports have become more comprehensive. Three-quarters of  survey respondents indicated that the quality of national reports prepared  for review meetings had improved in the past 10 years.
section_title: Concerns Exist about Some Aspects of the Convention’s Implementation
paragraphs: While the parties’ perceptions of the value of the Convention are generally  very positive, some concerns were raised about the lack of information  provided to the general public about the Convention’s proceedings, some  countries’ lack of resources to fully participate in the review meetings, and  the absence of performance metrics. In addition, parties emphasize that  without the participation of all countries with nuclear power programs in  the Convention, the international community will have limited access and  insight into countries’—such as Iran—civilian nuclear power programs.
subsections: section_title: Limited Public Access to the Convention’s Proceedings
paragraphs: Notwithstanding the general agreement that preserving the confidentiality  of the peer review process is important, most parties responding to our  survey would like to see more public access to the results of review  meetings. We have testified that, according to some experts familiar with  international agreements that rely primarily on peer review, the public  dissemination of information about parties’ progress in meeting the terms  of the Convention can play a key role in influencing compliance with the  Convention’s nuclear safety obligations. Currently, only summary  information of the peer review meeting is released to the public. This  summary provides a brief introduction containing background on the  Convention, an overview of the review process, and a synopsis of what the  parties agree were the most important points discussed at the meeting. For  example, the public report on the fourth review meeting, which took place  in 2008, briefly summarizes the discussions of the parties on many topics  discussed at the meeting, including parties’ efforts to meet the challenges  of maintaining adequate staffing and competence levels and ongoing  concerns about the degree of independence of some parties’ regulatory  bodies. Any further details about any party’s national report or questions  and answers on the report remain confidential unless the party voluntarily  releases it.
French officials in particular have expressed an especially strong view  regarding public access to information about the Convention’s  proceedings. In July 2009, in written responses to our questions, French  officials stated that parties to the Convention should consider making the  opening and closing sessions of review meetings open to the media.  Further, a Norwegian official we spoke with suggested that some  nongovernmental organizations should be allowed to attend review  meetings as observers.
One way that some parties have attempted to increase public access to the  Convention’s proceedings is by posting their national reports and answers  to written questions received on their national reports to IAEA’s public  Web site. While the number of parties to the Convention making their  national reports available in this way has increased since the first review  meeting was held in 1999, it has not increased significantly in several years  and actually declined between the third review meeting in 2005 and the  fourth review meeting in 2008. Specifically, 26 parties—about 43 percent  of the 60 parties for whom the Convention had come into force by the due  date for submitting the national report—posted their national report  prepared for the 2008 review meeting. This was down from the 30  parties—or about 55 percent of parties to the Convention— posting  reports prepared for the 2005 review meeting. In fact, eight countries that  posted their national reports prepared for the 2005 review meeting— Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, the Slovak Republic,  and South Korea—did not do so for the report prepared for the 2008  review meeting. However, three parties posted their national reports for  the first time in 2008—Estonia and India, which had recently become  parties to the Convention, and Pakistan, which became a party in the  1990s. Figure 1 shows the number of countries that posted their national  reports to the IAEA public Web site for the four review meetings held thus  far.
Officials from NRC and State told us that the United States has always  made its national report available on the Internet. However, the U.S.  approach has been to lead by example rather than taking an active role in  encouraging other parties to the Convention to post their national reports  to the Internet. IAEA officials told us it was important for parties to make  as much information about their civilian nuclear power programs  accessible as possible, but that it was for each party to determine how  much information should be made public and how much should remain  confidential. In addition to its public Web site, IAEA also maintains a  secure, members-only Web site where parties are encouraged to post their  national reports. According to NRC officials, parties have improved their  participation in posting their reports to this Web site. Parties posted 17, 22,  57, and 61 national reports in 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008, respectively.
The overwhelming majority of parties have never posted their answers to  written questions about their nuclear power programs to the IAEA public  Web site. The written questions and answers provide a great deal of  information about each country’s nuclear power program. According to an  IAEA official, over 4,000 questions were prepared for the 2008 review  meeting, and almost all were answered. As figure 2 shows, 3 countries  posted these questions and answers to the IAEA public Web site for the  first review meeting in 1999. While 11 countries posted questions and their  answers to the IAEA’s public Web site for the second review meeting,  including the United States, 6 did so for the third review meeting, and 5 did  so for the 2008 meeting. Only Slovenia and Switzerland—both nuclear  power countries—have posted these questions and answers for all four  meetings; the United Kingdom and Canada— the sixth and eighth largest  nuclear power countries as measured by the number of operating reactors,  respectively—have done so since 2002. The United States had not posted  its answers to written questions received on its national report to IAEA’s  public Web site since 2002, although NRC officials stated that they have  always posted them to the NRC Web site. We also found that other nuclear  power countries such as Finland, Germany, Japan, and Spain have not  posted their answers to written questions to the IAEA’s public Web site  since 2002, either. In 2008, Luxembourg became the first, and thus far only,  nonnuclear party to post the answers to questions it received on its  national report. Luxembourg’s responses focused primarily on how it  would respond to a nuclear accident in a neighboring country.
We met with NRC officials on March 15, 2010, to discuss an early draft of  this report. At that time, we informed them that their answers to written  questions on U.S. national reports were not available on IAEA’s public  Web site. NRC officials acknowledged that these responses were not  readily accessible and said they would take steps to post them. On March  17, 2010, NRC informed us of the availability of their responses, and we  verified that they were now on IAEA’s public Web site.
Some respondents to our survey reported the lack of resources to fully  participate in the review meetings. Specifically, almost half of the survey  respondents—ranging from parties with well-established civilian nuclear  power programs to those with no nuclear power programs—report that a  lack of resources has limited their country’s ability to develop their  national report. As we noted in our March 1999 testimony, NRC officials  anticipated this lack of staff resources and/or travel money could be a  problem. We reported that NRC officials told us that, because of  differences in parties’ nuclear safety programs and available resources,  they anticipated unevenness in the quality and detail of some national  reports. In addition, half of the parties responding to our survey reported  that a lack of resources has limited their ability to attend review meetings,  and more than three-quarters indicated that a lack of resources has  inhibited their ability to send representatives to all of the country group  meetings. According to NRC officials, this is important because the  country groups meet simultaneously, and it is in these meetings where the  national reports are presented and questions about them are addressed.
Not being able to attend country group meetings reduces opportunities to  learn from other parties’ nuclear safety experiences. In addition, NRC  officials recently told us that since much of the peer review of national  reports can occur in the 7 months before the review meeting, limited  resources may reduce the ability of some parties to take full advantage of  this opportunity. That is, according to NRC officials, some countries do  not have the staff resources to devote to preparing for review meetings by  reading national reports, formulating and submitting written questions,  and reviewing the parties’ written responses to the written questions.
section_title: Lack of Performance Metrics to Gauge Progress in Strengthening Safety
paragraphs: The Convention does not include performance metrics to gauge its impact  on improving safety. As a result, it provides no systematic way to measure  where and how progress in improving safety in each country has been  made. During the course of this review, we asked parties if the lack of  performance metrics limited the usefulness of the Convention. Half the  parties responding to our survey indicated that it did. Performance  indicators and benchmarks are currently being used to track safety in  civilian nuclear power plants that could be adapted to help countries  enhance safety. For example, the World Association of Nuclear Operators  (WANO) publishes quantitative indicators of nuclear plant performance  for 11 key areas, including industrial safety accidents and unplanned  automatic shutdowns of nuclear power plants. Although the Convention  itself lacks performance metrics, one-quarter of parties responding to our  survey reported that they themselves measure progress toward  Convention goals using performance metrics—specifically, in some cases,  by comparing their activities with the results of IAEA safety review  missions to countries that request them and actions taken in response to  questions and comments from other parties at Convention review  meetings.
Neither State nor NRC has formally proposed the adoption of performance  metrics. However, NRC officials told us that performance metrics could  play a useful role in helping parties measure their progress toward meeting  safety obligations and that they could be introduced through a  modification to the rules and procedures governing the Convention.  Specifically, Article 22 of the Convention provides for the preparation of  guidelines by the parties regarding the form and structure of their national  reports. The guidelines can be revised by consensus at review meetings.  The guidelines provide only suggestions for drafting the reports; parties  remain free to structure their reports as they see fit. However, the  suggestions provided are very detailed and touch upon more than just  form and structure. For example, the guidelines provide detailed  suggestions on the content of the national reports. They also contain an  appendix detailing voluntary practices that parties are encouraged to  engage in regarding the public availability of their national reports.
section_title: Universal Participation Would Advance Achievement of the Convention’s Goals
paragraphs: The Convention is designed to maximize the number of countries that will  participate in order to achieve its goal of promoting the safe operation of  civilian nuclear power reactors worldwide; however, it is voluntary in  nature. By and large, this approach has worked. Since 2009, three  countries that are considering developing civilian nuclear power  programs—Libya, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates—have become  parties to the Convention. Two others—Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia— approved the Convention in 2010 and are expected to become parties to it  later this year. An overwhelming majority of the parties we surveyed and  interviewed said that all countries should be encouraged to join as soon as  possible after making the decision to consider developing a nuclear power  program. At present, all countries with such programs—except Iran—are  parties to the Convention. Several parties we interviewed told us that Iran,  which is on the verge of commissioning civilian nuclear power reactors,  should ratify the Convention in order to benefit from the safety expertise  that participation provides. In their view, without Iran’s participation in  the Convention, the international community has limited or no insight on,  or access to, how Iran is developing, operating, and maintaining its  burgeoning civilian nuclear power program. Russian officials with whom  we spoke agreed that greater international access to Iran’s civilian nuclear  power program is needed and that the Convention could play a role in  providing that access. Russia is helping Iran build the civilian nuclear  power reactor at Bushehr, which is expected to be commissioned in the  near future. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials told us that  Russia’s continued assistance to Iran’s civilian nuclear program may be  conditioned on Iran’s becoming a party to the Convention.
section_title: The Convention Is Not a Mechanism for Shutting Down Unsafe Reactors
paragraphs: The Convention does not require that unsafe reactors be closed down. As  noted in our 1999 testimony, the Convention neither provides sanctions  for noncompliance with any of its safety obligations nor does it require the  closing of any unsafe nuclear reactors. However, more than 13 years after  the Convention came into force, Russia continues to operate 11  Chernobyl-style RBMK reactors. These reactors pose the highest risk,  according to Western safety experts, because of their inherent design  deficiencies, including their lack of a containment structure. The  containment structure, generally a steel-lined concrete dome, serves as the  ultimate barrier to the release of radioactive material in the event of a  severe accident. Russian nuclear regulators told us that adequate safety  upgrades have been made to all 11 RBMK reactors and that they will  continue to operate for the foreseeable future. We also discussed the  matter of shutdown of Soviet-designed reactors with EU officials, who told  us that the Convention was never intended to be a mechanism for closing  unsafe Soviet-designed reactors. The European Union has used a different  strategy to accomplish shutdown of the unsafe nuclear reactors in its  member countries: making EU membership contingent upon the closure of  these reactors. As a result, all eight RBMK and first-generation VVER 440  Model 230 reactors in Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Slovakia have been  permanently shut down in order for these countries to obtain EU  membership.
According to NRC officials, as is the case in other international law on  reactor safety, under the Convention each country is responsible for  regulating the safety of its own reactors. In addition, NRC noted that the  Convention relies on the peer review process, that it cannot obligate  countries to comply with safety standards, and that it does not provide for  sanctions such as the closing of any unsafe nuclear power plants.  State  expressed a similar view.  State pointed out that the Convention was never  meant to have the authority to require that unsafe reactors be shut down.   According to State, it is the position of IAEA and its member states that  each country operating nuclear power plants should have its own nuclear  regulatory agency that would have the authority to shut down plants.
section_title: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve the Convention’s Peer Review Process, and Additional Proposals Are Being Considered
paragraphs: The parties to the Convention generally agree that it would be difficult to  amend the Convention. Consequently, several parties have taken the lead  in making changes to the Convention’s rules and procedures. To date,  some steps have been taken to improve the Convention’s peer review  process, and parties are considering several additional proposals.
subsections: section_title: Changes Have Been Adopted to Improve the Peer Review Process
paragraphs: Several parties have focused on improving the workings of the  Convention’s peer review process. The most significant change they have  made, in our view, is to allow the parties to more freely ask questions  about each others’ national reports. NRC expressed concern in our  January 1997 report about the rules governing how parties’ country group  assignments affect the parties’ ability to discuss and seek clarification  about other parties’ national reports at review meetings. According to  NRC officials, in the past, parties assigned to a particular country group  could ask questions about other parties’ nuclear programs that were  assigned to that group during the question-and-answer session following  the presentation of a national report. However, parties that were not  assigned to that country group could not ask questions unless they  submitted a written question several months in advance of the review  meeting. This restrictive practice began to change during the 2005 review  meeting, when at least one country group allowed parties that were not  assigned to it to ask questions. At the next review meeting in 2008,  according to NRC officials who attended both meetings, no restrictions  were placed on any parties’ ability to ask questions about the national  reports of any other parties. An NRC official told us that this change has  made the process more open and accessible to all of the parties.
Another notable change to the rules and procedures of the peer review  process is the recent decision to move up the date for the organizational  meeting and the selection of officers for the upcoming review meeting by  almost a year and to advance by a few weeks the deadlines for submitting  national reports and written questions for the peer review process. The  purposes of the organizational meeting, among other things, are to elect  the officers for the upcoming review meeting, adopt a provisional agenda  for the meeting, assign parties to particular country groups, and identify  which proposals for enhancing the peer review process should be  considered at the upcoming meeting. Previously, organizational meetings  were held about 7 months before the upcoming review meeting. However,  the parties at the 2008 review meeting agreed to hold the organizational  meeting for the 2011 review meeting in September 2009—19 months in  advance. According to NRC officials, the purpose of the scheduling change  was to put officers in place earlier to give them more time to plan for the  next meeting and to promote greater continuity from one meeting to the  next. Moving up the deadlines for submitting national reports and written  questions for peer review is intended to give countries more time to both  review the national reports of other parties and answer any written  questions submitted.
section_title: Parties Are Considering Additional Proposals to Improve the Implementation of the Convention
paragraphs: Additional proposals to improve the implementation of the Convention are  currently under consideration by the parties. Specifically, these proposals  include (1) allocating more country group meeting time to discuss, among  other things, the national reports of countries with emerging nuclear  programs; (2) expediting the process for calling a special meeting between  review meetings to discuss urgent safety issues; and (3) changing the  process for assigning parties to country groups.
subsections: section_title: Allocating More Time to Countries with Emerging Nuclear Programs
paragraphs: Some parties have suggested the peer review process might be more  effective if more review meeting time were allocated to discussing the  national reports of countries with emerging nuclear power programs or  topics of general concern and less time presenting and discussing the  national reports of parties with well-established nuclear programs. For  example, according to NRC officials, the United Arab Emirates, which has  only recently become a party to the Convention, is rapidly moving to  establish its nuclear regulatory infrastructure and is soon to begin  construction of several nuclear power reactors. Because its civilian  nuclear power program is so new, the United Arab Emirates could benefit  from more time to present its national report during the peer review  process. NRC officials told us that the United States, in contrast, does not  need as much time as it is allocated to present its national report.  Similarly, according to a senior NRC official, the United States has  proposed that more time at review meetings might also be allocated to  discuss topics of general concern—such as the safety challenges of dealing  with aging reactors or the challenges parties face in maintaining adequate  staffing and competence levels in both the regulatory bodies and at  nuclear power plants.
section_title: Expediting the Process for Calling Special Meetings
paragraphs: Another proposal to be considered would create a more efficient process  for calling a meeting to discuss topical or urgent nuclear safety issues that  parties feel cannot wait until the next review meeting. Currently, in order  to have such a meeting, a majority of parties are required to support the  call for a meeting. One way of streamlining this process, according to an  NRC official, would be to empower the officers elected for the most recent  or upcoming review meeting to call a special meeting. An urgent issue  might be, for example, a nuclear power plant accident. If such an accident  occurred, parties might wish to convene a special meeting to discuss the  causes of the accident and what might be done to avoid a similar accident.
section_title: Changing the Process for Assigning Parties to Country Groups
paragraphs: Finally, to promote greater variation in the composition of country groups  from meeting to meeting, amending the method for assigning countries to  the six country groups is being considered. Specifically, the experience  of the first four review meetings has been that the country groups hav e  remained relatively static—that is, there has been little variation in the  membership of each group among the nuclear power countries. According  to NRC officials, it would be useful if the composition of the groups were  more varied from meeting to meeting. While each group would still be  anchored by a country with a large number of operating civilian nuclear  power reactors, the remainder of the group would consist of a more varied  mix of countries. This type of mix would provide greater opportunities for  more information sharing among a more diverse group of countries. An  NRC official told us that many parties are generally in favor of some  adjustment to the existing process but that there is not yet sufficient  agreement on how to accomplish this change.
section_title: IAEA’s Assistance Programs to Member States Complement the Convention’s Safety Goals and Objectives
paragraphs: IAEA has a long history of serving as a technical advisor to member states  to promote the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Although this role  predates the establishment of the Convention, and regulating nuclear  safety is a national responsibility, the Convention complements the role  the agency plays in these matters. IAEA promotes the Convention’s  nuclear safety goals and objectives largely through its Technical  Cooperation (TC) Program, safety standards, and peer review missions,  which together help countries improve their nuclear regulatory bodies and  the safety performance of their civilian nuclear power plants. Most survey  respondents reported that they found IAEA effective in serving as a  technical advisor. In addition, almost all parties responding to our survey  consider IAEA to be effective in its role as secretariat to the Convention.
subsections: section_title: IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program, Safety Standards, and Peer Review Missions Play an Important and Growing Role in Promoting Nuclear Safety Worldwide
paragraphs: IAEA provides assistance to its member states to promote peaceful uses of  nuclear energy in several ways, including providing technical cooperation,  establishing safety standards, and conducting advisory and peer review  missions. The importance of its role in providing this type of assistance  was corroborated by our survey results. A majority of survey respondents  reported that IAEA was either very effective or somewhat effective in  serving as a technical advisor to countries requesting assistance to  improve civilian nuclear power safety. IAEA’s TC program supports,  among other things, nuclear safety and the development of nuclear  power. For the 2009-2011 activities under the TC program, nuclear safety  remains one of the top three priorities for IAEA member states. IAEA  currently conducts 551 TC projects in 115 countries and territories, and  program activities are tailored to the needs of each region. Specific TC  projects have included activities to extend the operating life of nuclear  power plants and establishing safety culture in nuclear facilities. TC  projects that support member states considering or developing nuclear  power also include strengthening nuclear regulatory authorities and  preparing an emergency plan for a nuclear power plant. In 2007, IAEA  disbursed approximately $5.6 million to support the safety of civilian  nuclear installations worldwide through the TC program. In addition to its  TC program budget, IAEA plans to spend approximately $15.1 million in  2010 on other efforts to promote nuclear safety, such as strengthening  countries’ abilities to respond to nuclear incidents and emergencies and to  assess the safety of the siting and design of nuclear installations. The role  and importance of IAEA in promoting nuclear safety will likely grow if the  cost of fossil fuels and the threat of climate change spur a nuclear  renaissance, as an independent commission assessing the role of IAEA to  2020 and beyond reported recently. According to this independent  commission, this growing role may involve (1) leading an international  effort to establish a global nuclear safety network, (2) helping countries  with emerging nuclear power programs put in place the infrastructure  needed to develop nuclear energy safely, and (3) ensuring that critical  safety knowledge is widely shared among IAEA member states.
In addition, IAEA has established safety standards that provide a  framework for fundamental safety principles, requirements, and guidance  for member states. The standards, which reflect international consensus,  cover a wide range of topics, including nuclear power plant design and  operation, site evaluation, and emergency preparedness and response.  Committees of senior experts from IAEA member states use an open and  transparent process to develop the standards and any subsequent  revisions. The guidelines governing the drafting of national reports state  that IAEA safety standards can give valuable guidance on how to meet the  Convention’s safety obligations.
IAEA also promotes nuclear safety through advisory and voluntary peer  review missions—the most prominent are Integrated Regulatory Review  Service (IRRS) missions and Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)  missions. These missions evaluate the operations of a member state’s  nuclear regulatory system and civilian nuclear power plant operational  safety, respectively. IRRS missions assess the safety practices of the  requesting country through an examination of its regulatory framework  and organization and compare the country’s practices with IAEA safety  standards. Since 1992, IAEA has conducted 44 IRRS missions in 26  countries, with 15 of these missions taking place in countries that have  operated—and in some cases continue to operate—Soviet-designed  reactors. Table 1 shows the number of IRRS missions that member  countries had hosted through 2009. The United States has sent  approximately 20 experts on IRRS missions and has agreed to host an  IRRS mission in October 2010.
Some parties that responded to our survey reported that they found IRRS  and OSART missions effective at improving civilian nuclear power safety.  In addition, according to the summary report of the Convention’s fourth  meeting in 2008, many parties reported that they had positive experiences  with IRRS and OSART missions, and parties who had not already hosted  one of these missions were encouraged to do so. In February and March  2010, IAEA conducted an IRRS mission to Iran, which included a site visit  to the nearly completed Bushehr nuclear power plant. IAEA  recommended, among other things, that Iran join the Convention.
According to a senior Swedish official who was involved in drafting the  Convention, these missions are increasingly being used to measure the  safety standards of parties to the Convention. Parties face peer pressure to  submit to these voluntary missions, as they provide a way for a country to  show its commitment to enhancing safety. For example, ENSREG has  promoted the use of IRRS missions by EU countries. Describing the  missions as “well established and well respected,” ENSREG has  encouraged all EU member states to participate in one to obtain advice on  improvements and to learn from the best practices of others.
IAEA also manages the OSART missions through which teams of experts  drawn from IAEA member countries—including the United States, which  has sent over 100 experts on missions—review operational safety at  specific nuclear power plants. IAEA has conducted over 150 OSART  missions in 32 countries since 1983, and has 9 more scheduled through the  end of 2011. Table 2 shows the number of OSART missions that member  countries had hosted through 2009.
As table 2 shows, the 2 countries that have hosted the most OSART  missions are France and Ukraine, 21 and 14, respectively. Combined, those  2 countries have 73 reactors. China and the Czech Republic have hosted  the second most missions, 10 and 8, respectively. These countries have a  combined total of 17 operating reactors. Japan, which has 54 reactors, has  hosted 5 OSART missions. Russia, which has 32 operating reactors, has  hosted 6, and the United States, which has 104 operating reactors, has also  hosted 6 missions. The only countries with operating civilian nuclear  power programs that have not hosted OSART missions are Armenia and  India, which operate 1 and 18 reactors, respectively.
While recommendations that result from safety review services such as  IRRS and OSART missions are not mandates, IAEA officials told us that  the agency nevertheless sees a high rate of implementation of those  recommendations. IAEA also makes available on its public Web site a  compilation of best practices learned from recent OSART missions, as well  as the mission reports as authorized by the member states. This  compilation serves to help member states improve the operational safety  of their power plants and includes emergency plans and preparedness,  training, and maintenance.
Finally, IAEA also promotes civilian nuclear safety through other means.  For example, IAEA offers additional review services to member states by  focusing on issues such as siting, seismic safety, research reactor safety,  fuel cycle facilities’ safety, power plant accident management, and safety  culture assessments. IAEA also promotes education and training in  nuclear safety through Web-based courses, electronic textbooks, and  workshops. This training covers topics such as basic safety concepts,  regulatory control of nuclear power plants, and instruction on IAEA safety  standards. Much of this information is available to the public to download  from IAEA’s Web site. One survey respondent from Eastern Europe  commented that the training courses and workshops had contributed  significantly to the promotion of high safety standards and best practices.  Moreover, IAEA regularly holds conferences and symposia on issues  related to nuclear safety, with some event summaries available online.  Recent topics have included promoting safety education and training for  countries with new or expanding nuclear programs, ensuring safety for  sustainable nuclear development, and managing nuclear power plant life.
section_title: IAEA Is Effective as the Convention’s Secretariat, according to Almost All Survey Respondents and Parties We Interviewed
paragraphs: Almost all parties responding to our survey and parties we interviewed  reported that IAEA effectively carries out its role as secretariat as outlined  in the Convention. In this capacity, IAEA hosts the review meetings in  Vienna, Austria; prepares documents; and provides translation and  interpretation services. There was widespread agreement among the  respondents that the agency is effective in convening, preparing, and  servicing the meetings and at transmitting information received or  prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.
Some survey respondents and parties we interviewed called for more  IAEA support during the Convention’s review meetings in such areas as  more translation services for all country group sessions and more  administrative assistance for parties to the Convention. The Convention  permits IAEA to provide other services in support of the review meetings,  if the parties reach consensus. Finally, some survey respondents reported  that IAEA should play a more active role in the following areas:    helping prepare national reports,    providing other assistance to help prepare for the next review meeting,    providing other technical support to improve safety, and    helping address concerns about a country’s civilian nuclear power  program.
IAEA estimates its costs to support the last review meeting in 2008 at  nearly $118,000 and expects to spend approximately $130,000 for the fifth  review meeting scheduled for April 2011. The costs associated with the  review meetings are modest for the U.S. government as well. NRC and  State spent approximately $725,000 preparing for and participating in the  2008 review meeting and estimate they will spend $825,000 for the next  review meeting.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Convention plays an important role in strengthening nuclear safety  and enjoys broad support among the parties we surveyed and interviewed.  Support for the Convention continues to grow as evidenced by the  increasing number of countries that have joined it, particularly those with  emerging nuclear programs, such as the United Arab Emirates. Many  parties to the Convention told us that all countries that are considering  embarking on a nuclear power program—or currently operating civilian  nuclear power reactors— should be encouraged to join the Convention,  including Iran.
We are encouraged that the parties have taken steps to improve the  Convention’s peer review process. However, the Convention does not  require parties to include performance metrics in their national reports,  which makes it difficult to gauge its impact on improving nuclear safety.  Without such metrics there is no systematic way to measure where and  how progress has been made in improving safety in each country that  operates civilian nuclear power reactors. In addition, more than half of the  survey respondents reported that the lack of metrics hampers the  Convention’s usefulness, and NRC has noted that it would be feasible to  add performance metrics into the guidelines that implement that national  report process called for by the Convention. There are already  international organizations that use such indicators to track nuclear safety  improvements and which could perhaps be incorporated into the  guidelines as voluntary practices that parties are encouraged to  implement. Further, public awareness about parties’ progress toward  meeting the terms of the Convention can play a key role in influencing  compliance with the Convention’s nuclear safety obligations. However, to  date the public has had limited access to parties’ national reports and  written answers to questions about their nuclear power programs. More  than half of the national reports prepared for the 2008 review meeting are  not posted to IAEA’s public Web site, and even fewer parties make their  answers to written questions received on their national reports available  on IAEA’s public Web site. Putting this information on the Web site could  increase public awareness of the nuclear safety issues facing countries and  how they are addressing them.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To further enhance the usefulness of the Convention in promoting the  safety of civilian nuclear power programs worldwide, we recommend that  the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Chairman of the Nuclear  Regulatory Commission, work with other parties to the Convention to take  the following three actions:    Encourage parties to include performance metrics in national reports to  better track safety in civilian nuclear power plants and help countries  more systematically measure where and how they have made progress in  improving safety.
Expand efforts to increase the number of parties’ national reports made  available to the public by posting them to IAEA’s public Web site.
Promote greater public dissemination of parties’ written answers to  questions about their nuclear power programs by posting this information  to IAEA’s public Web site.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to NRC and State for comment. We also  provided IAEA with a detailed summary of facts contained in the draft  report. State and NRC provided written comments on the draft report,  which are presented in appendixes IV and V, respectively. IAEA, State, and  NRC also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.
NRC generally agreed with our report but did not specifically agree or  disagree with the report’s recommendations, and State generally agreed  with the recommendations to (1) encourage parties to the Convention to  include performance metrics in their national reports to better track safety  in civilian nuclear power plants, (2) increase the number of parties’  national reports made available to the public by posting them to IAEA’s  public Web site, and (3) promote greater public dissemination of parties’  written answers to questions about their nuclear power programs by  posting this information to IAEA’s public Web site. In its written  comments, however, State provided some clarifications concerning the  recommendations. First, State noted that it might be difficult to achieve  metrics that would be meaningful across so many countries’ nuclear  power programs and to agree on the specific metrics to be used. Second,  State noted that initiatives to increase public access to information would  run counter to strong concerns regarding confidentiality of information on  civilian nuclear power plants held by many parties. In addition, State  asserted that the report somewhat mischaracterizes the Convention by  noting that the Convention does not require that unsafe reactors be shut  down. State noted that the Convention was never meant to have that  authority, which would be contrary to IAEA practice and policy. It is the  position of IAEA and member states that each country operating nuclear  power plants should have its own national regulatory agency that would  have the authority to shut down plants.
Regarding the first point, while it might be challenging to establish a  common set of performance metrics, we believe there are already  examples of standard metrics being used, such as those published by  WANO. We believe that WANO’s metrics, for instance, could be used as a  benchmark for parties to follow in measuring safety progress when  developing their national reports. With regard to encouraging public  dissemination of information about the Convention, we agree that  maintaining confidentiality of sensitive information about what is  discussed among the parties during the peer review process should be  maintained. However, we also believe that increasing public awareness of  the Convention’s proceedings—even on an incremental basis—through the  posting of national reports to IAEA’s public Web site is a worthwhile goal  and should be encouraged to the extent practicable.
Finally, with respect to the issue of unsafe reactors, we have not  mischaracterized the Convention. Rather, we pointed out in the report—as  we have previously reported—that the Convention does not require the  closing of any unsafe nuclear reactors. We also noted in this report that  nuclear safety is a national responsibility and have not suggested or  implied that the Convention is flawed because it does not require unsafe  reactors to be closed. The fact remains, however, that Russia, which has  ratified the Convention, continues to operate numerous nuclear power  plants that pose a safety risk according to Western safety experts.  However, based on State’s comments, we have clarified the text regarding  this issue.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the  Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and other interested parties. The report  also will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety
paragraphs: Appendix I: Parties to the Convention on  Nuclear Safety 11 November 2009  437     , 2010. By the terms of the Convention, it will enter into force for Saudi  Arabia 90 days after the date of deposit of the instrument of accession.
section_title: Appendix II: Information on U.S. and European Union Funding to Promote International Nuclear Safety
subsections: section_title: United States
paragraphs: Table 3 reflects the cumulative amount of nuclear reactor safety assistance  funds provided by the Department of Energy (DOE) from the inception of  these programs.
Table 4 reflects the cumulative amount of nuclear reactor safety assistance  funds provided by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) from the  inception of these programs.
section_title: European Union
paragraphs: Table 5 reflects nuclear safety expenditures from the European Union’s  Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States  program.
section_title: Appendix III: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of our review were to evaluate the extent to which the  Convention on Nuclear Safety is achieving its primary goal: promoting the  safe operation of civilian nuclear power reactors worldwide. Specifically,  we assessed (1) parties’ views on the perceived benefits and limitations of  the Convention; (2) efforts to improve the implementation of the  Convention; and (3) how International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  programs complement the Convention’s safety goals and objectives. In  addition, we are providing information in appendix II about funding  provided by the United States and the EU to promote international nuclear  safety since the early 1990s.
To assess parties’ views of the perceived benefits and limitations of the  Convention and efforts to improve implementation, we (1) interviewed  representatives of 17 nuclear and nonnuclear parties to the Convention as  well as officials from NRC and State responsible for representing the  United States at the Convention; (2) analyzed various Convention-related  documents from NRC, State, IAEA, and EU; and (3) conducted a Web- based survey of 64 parties to the Convention. To encourage honest and  open responses to our survey, we pledged member countries  confidentiality in their responses and indicated that we would report only  aggregate information or examples that would not identify a particular  party. The survey included questions about the usefulness of the  Convention, the effectiveness of Convention activities, and the role of  IAEA in the Convention.
To develop the survey questions, we analyzed the text of the Convention  itself, as well as related rules and procedures. We also interviewed parties  to the Convention and other experts to identify issues related to the  Convention. Finally, we reviewed previous GAO reports to identify past  issues and concerns related to the Convention and developed survey  questions to gauge whether these issues were still relevant. The survey  was pretested to ensure that (1) the questions were clear and  unambiguous, especially to nonnative English-speaking respondents;       (2) the terms we used were precise; (3) the survey did not place an undue  burden on the officials completing it; and (4) the survey was independent  and unbiased. In addition, the survey was reviewed by an independent,  internal survey expert and by NRC.
The survey was conducted using self-administered electronic  questionnaires posted on the World Wide Web. We sent e-mail  notifications to 64 parties to the Convention to alert them that we were  conducting the survey and would be sending them log-in information in a  separate e-mail. We also e-mailed each potential respondent a unique  password and username to ensure that only members of the target  population could participate in the survey. To encourage respondents to  complete the survey, we sent an e-mail reminder to each nonrespondent  about 2 weeks after our initial e-mail message. We also sent an additional  e-mail reminder that extended the deadline to complete the survey. In  addition to these e-mails, we also conducted extensive telephone and  personalized e-mail follow-up to encourage those parties who contacted us  with questions about the survey and to encourage the nonrespondents  from the 17 parties whose representatives we interviewed to complete the  survey. The survey data were collected from October 2009 through  December 2009. Half (32) of the 64 parties to the Convention responded to  the survey. To assess the potential for nonresponse bias in our survey  results, we compared selected characteristics of nonresponding countries,  such as (1) length of time as a party to the Convention, (2) nuclear power  status and number of nuclear power plants, (3) region, (4) former Soviet  bloc alignment, and (5) EU membership, to those of the responding  parties. The distribution of these characteristics among responding and  nonresponding parties was well-balanced. For example, 3 of the 32  respondents have been parties to the Convention for 2 years or less, 2  respondents for 3 to 9 years, and 27 respondents for 10 or more years. In  addition, we also received responses from 13 nonnuclear countries and 19  nuclear countries and 17 EU-member countries and 15 nonmember  countries. To eliminate data-processing errors, we independently verified  the computer program that generated the survey results. This report does  not contain all the results from the survey; the survey and a more complete  tabulation of the results are provided in an electronic supplement to this  report (this supplement can be viewed online at GAO-10-550SP).
To assess how IAEA programs complement the Convention’s safety goals  and objectives, we analyzed budget and other relevant documents from  the Convention, such as meeting minutes and rules of procedure. We also  interviewed IAEA officials; U.S. officials at the U.S. Missions in Vienna and  Brussels; and the representatives of 17 parties to the Convention in  Vienna, Brussels, Moscow, and Washington, D.C. To determine the amount  of money the United States has spent promoting nuclear safety from the  early 1990s through September 30, 2009, we obtained expenditure  information from DOE and NRC. To assess the reliability of the  information provided, we interviewed knowledgeable officials from each  agency to understand (1) how they had developed the estimates and   (2) what supporting documentation had been used to develop them; we  determined the information provided was sufficiently reliable for our  purposes. To determine the amount of money the EU has spent promoting  nuclear safety from 1991 through 2006, and the amount they have  budgeted to spend from 2007 to 2013, we obtained budget information  from EU officials. However, the reliability of these EU estimates is  undetermined because we did not receive responses to our data reliability  questions. Given these limitations, we characterize these costs as  estimates, and we use them only as background. Because the EU budget  information was provided in euros, we converted the original values to  dollars. In all instances, when converting euros to dollars, we used  nominal and purchasing power parity average annual exchange rates from  the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. When  converting euro values for future projections into dollars, we used the  latest available annual exchange rate. In addition, to determine the amount  of money IAEA has budgeted for nuclear safety in 2010, we obtained  information from the agency’s Programme and Budget for 2010-11. These  IAEA budget figures—which we converted to dollars from euros—are also  of undetermined reliability because we were unable to obtain sufficient  detail about how they developed the estimates or the data sources that  supported them. To determine the cost to the United States to participate  in the Convention, and IAEA’s costs to support the Convention for one   3-year cycle, we obtained expenditure information from NRC, State, and  IAEA. To assess the reliability of this information, we also interviewed  knowledgeable officials from each agency to understand (1) how they had  developed the estimates and (2) what supporting documentation had been  used to develop them.  We determined the information provided by NRC  was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. However, the reliability of the  State and IAEA information is undetermined. The reliability of State  estimates are unknown because staff typically combined work and travel  related to the Convention with other work duties, so it is not possible to  accurately determine the amount of money spent exclusively on  Convention participation. IAEA estimates—which we converted to dollars  from euros—are of undetermined reliability because they do not formally  track costs to run the review meetings.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2009 to April 2010, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Glen Levis, Assistant Director;  Dr. Timothy Persons, Chief Scientist; Antoinette Capaccio; Frederick  Childers; Nancy Crothers; Bridget Grimes; Kirsten Lauber; Rebecca Shea;  and Kevin Tarmann made key contributions to this report.