Influenza Pandemic: Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to Pandemic Preparedness
Published: 2007-09-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The federal executive boards (FEB) bring together federal agency and community leaders in major metropolitan areas outside Washington, D.C., to discuss issues of common interest, including pandemic influenza. This testimony addresses the FEBs' emergency support roles and responsibilities, their potential role in pandemic influenza preparedness, and some of the key challenges they face in providing emergency support services. The issues discussed in the testimony are based on the GAO report, The Federal Workforce: Additional Steps Needed to Take Advantage of Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to Emergency Operations (GAO-07- 515, May 2007). GAO selected 14 of the 28 FEBs for review because they coordinate the greatest number of federal employees or had recent emergency management experience. In this report, GAO recommended that the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to formally define the FEBs' role in emergency planning and response. In completing the FEB strategic plan, OPM should also establish accountability for the boards' emergency support activities and develop a proposal to address the uncertainty of funding sources for the boards. While not commenting specifically on the recommendations, OPM said it is building a business case through which to address the resources FEBs need to continue operations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Located in 28 cities with a large federal presence, the FEBs are interagency coordinating groups designed to strengthen federal management practices and improve intergovernmental relations. The FEBs bring together the federal agency leaders in their service areas and have a long history of establishing and maintaining communications links, coordinating intergovernmental activities, identifying common ground, and building cooperative relationships. The boards also partner with community organizations and participate as a unified federal force in local civic affairs. OPM, which provides direction to the FEBs, and the boards have designated emergency preparedness, security, and safety as an FEB core function and are continuing to work on a strategic plan that will include a common set of performance standards for their emergency support activities. Although not all FEB representatives agreed that the boards should play an expanded role in emergency service support, many of the FEB representatives cited a positive and beneficial working relationship with FEMA. As one of their emergency support activities, the FEBs and FEMA, often working with the General Services Administration, host emergency planning exercises and training for federal agencies in the field. The FEBs' emergency support role with its regional focus may make the boards a valuable asset in pandemic preparedness and response. The distributed nature of a pandemic and the burden of disease across the nation dictate that the response will be largely addressed by each community it affects. As a natural outgrowth of their general civic activities and through activities such as hosting emergency preparedness training, some of the boards have established relationships with, for example, federal, state, and local governments; emergency management officials; first responders; and health officials in their communities. Some of the FEBs are already building capacity for pandemic influenza response within their member agencies and community organizations by hosting pandemic influenza training and exercises. The communications function of the FEBs is also a key part of their emergency support activities and could be an important asset for pandemic preparedness and response. The FEBs, however, face key challenges in providing emergency support, and these interrelated issues limit the capacity of the FEBs to provide a consistent and sustained contribution to emergency preparedness and response. First, their role is not defined in national emergency plans, which may contribute to federal agency officials being unfamiliar with their capabilities. In addition, with no congressional appropriations, the FEBs depend on host agencies and other member agencies for their resources. This has resulted in inconsistent funding for the FEBs nationwide and creates uncertainty for the boards in planning and committing to provide emergency support services.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the federal executive boards  (FEB) and, in particular, their ability to contribute to the nation’s efforts to  prepare for a potential influenza pandemic and help protect federal  employees, approximately 85 percent of whom work outside the greater  Washington, D.C., area. Located in 28 cities with a large federal presence,  the FEBs are interagency coordinating groups designed to strengthen  federal management practices and improve intergovernmental relations.  FEBs bring together the federal agency leaders in their service areas and  have a long history of establishing and maintaining communication links,  coordinating intergovernmental activities, identifying common ground,  and building cooperative relationships. The boards also partner with  community organizations and participate as a unified federal force in local  civic affairs.
In a recent report to you, we examined the FEBs and concluded that the  regional focus of the FEBs’ emergency support services could aid in  pandemic influenza planning and preparedness efforts. We also observed  that the boards face several key challenges in carrying out their emergency  support role. My statement today will review our findings and present the  actions we believe need to be taken to take better advantage of these  unique organizations.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The nature of pandemic influenza presents distinctive challenges. Unlike  incidents that are discretely bounded in space or time (e.g., most natural  or man-made disasters), a pandemic is not a singular event, but is likely to  come in waves, each lasting weeks or months, and pass through  communities of all sizes across the nation and the world simultaneously.  While a pandemic will not directly damage physical infrastructure, such as  power lines or computer systems, it will threaten the operation of critical  systems by potentially removing from the workplace the essential  personnel needed to operate them. According to the National Strategy for  Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, the center of gravity of the  pandemic response will be in communities. The distributed nature of a  pandemic, as well as the sheer burden of disease across the nation over a  period of months or longer, means that the federal government’s support  to any particular state, tribal nation, or community will be limited in  comparison to the aid it mobilizes for disasters such as earthquakes or  hurricanes, which strike a more confined geographic area over a shorter  period of time. This makes it essential to have joint and integrated  planning across all levels of government and the private sector to ensure  that available plans and response actions are complementary, compatible,  and coordinated.
Created by a Presidential Directive in 1961, the FEBs are composed of the  federal field office agency heads and military commanders in the FEBs’  areas of service. The FEBs’ overall mission over the past 46 years has  included supporting and promoting national initiatives and responding to  the local needs of federal agencies and their communities through  activities such as the Combined Federal Campaign and local scholarship  programs. The regulations that guide the boards describe emergency  operations as one of their functions, although the boards are not intended  to be first responders. The regulations also state that the Director of the  Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is responsible for overseeing and  directing the operations of all of the FEBs consistent with the law and  with the directives of the President. Research has shown that systems like  the FEBs have proven to be valuable public management tools because  they can operate horizontally, across agencies in this case, and integrate  the strengths and resources of a variety of organizations in the public,  private, and nonprofit sectors to effectively address critical public  problems, such as pandemic influenza.
However, determining the appropriate emergency operations for the FEBs  to provide is challenging because of several limitations. Although  membership by agency heads on the boards is required, active  participation is voluntary in practice, and the boards operate with no  independent authority. The FEBs also have no congressional charter and  receive no congressional appropriation but rather depend on voluntary  contributions from their member agencies. The boards also rely on a host  agency, generally the one with the greatest number of employees in the  area, to provide staff, usually one or two full-time personnel, including an  executive director.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: This statement is based on our May 4, 2007, report, requested by the  Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal  Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Homeland  Security and Governmental Affairs. Our objectives in that report were to  (1) identify the actions FEBs have taken to fulfill their emergency  preparedness and response roles and responsibilities, (2) describe the key  challenges facing the FEBs in fulfilling these roles and responsibilities, and  (3) evaluate the extent to which the FEBs can contribute to emergency  preparedness and response to pandemic influenza. We selected 14 of the  28 FEBs for review because they coordinated the greatest number of  federal employees or had recent emergency management experience. The  selected FEBs were Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Dallas-Fort  Worth, Denver, Minnesota, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York City,  Oklahoma, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Seattle. We interviewed at  least two key FEB representatives, including the chairs or vice chairs and  the executive directors from the 14 selected boards. Additionally, we  reviewed FEB documents, such as annual reports, monthly activity  reports, minutes, and correspondence, at the selected sites. We also  interviewed OPM and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)  officials at their headquarters in Washington, D.C., and two FEMA regional  directors based in Chicago, Illinois, and Denton, Texas. We conducted our  work from March 2006 through February 2007 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: FEB Emergency Preparedness and Response Roles and Responsibilities Are Being Developed as a Core Function of the Boards
paragraphs: To assist in standardizing emergency activities across the FEB system,  OPM and the boards are developing a multiyear strategic plan that will  include a core function for the FEBs called emergency preparedness,  security, and employee safety. The plan will increase accountability by  including expectations and measures to assess how well each FEB is  performing the activities. OPM officials recognize that the FEBs can add  value to regional preparedness efforts as vehicles for communication,  coordination, and capacity building but acknowledge that the emergency  activities of the FEBs have varied from board to board. The inclusion of  the emergency support function in the strategic plan is intended to provide  a more consistent delivery of FEB emergency preparedness and response  programs and activities for the federal workforce across the system of 28  boards.
At the time of our review, all of the 14 boards in our study had some type  of emergency communications network and emergency preparedness  council in place. The FEBs are charged with providing timely and relevant  information to support emergency preparedness and response  coordination, and OPM expects the boards to establish notification  networks and communications plans to be used in emergency and  nonemergency situations. The boards are also expected to disseminate  relevant information received from OPM and other agencies regarding  emergency preparedness information and to relay local emergency  situation information to parties such as OPM, FEB members, media, and  state and local government authorities.
According to OPM, the FEB role in emergency service support also  includes coordination activities. For example, OPM reported that it  expects the boards to serve as federal liaisons for state and local  emergency officials and to assess local emergency situations in  cooperation with federal, state, and local officials. Although all of the  boards reported some involvement of state and local officials in their  emergency activities, the degree of board connections with state and local  officials varied. The Minnesota FEB and the Oklahoma FEB, for example,  reported strong relationships with state and local government officials,  state and local emergency management leaders, and private sector  businesses. The Dallas-Fort Worth FEB executive director reported that  the board partners with state and local government representatives, the  private sector, law enforcement, and first responders, all of which are key  players in assessing local emergency situations. On the other hand, the  Chicago FEB executive director said that because Chicago is so large, the  board has few established relationships with state and local officials. The  chair of the Boston FEB said its board had 24-hour contact numbers for  some state officials but not city officials.
The FEBs have played a role in responding to past emergencies. For  example, when the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building was bombed  on April 19, 1995, the FEB staff knew all of the agencies in the Murrah  Building; the home telephone numbers of critical staff; the city, county,  and state principals in Oklahoma City; and which federal agencies were  available to provide immediate relief and support. During hurricanes  Katrina and Rita, according to a FEMA official, the New Orleans FEB  executive director established and maintained an essential communication  link between FEMA’s Office of National Security Coordination and OPM.  The New Orleans FEB also served as a conduit for information between  Washington and local federal agencies and was able to provide status  updates to identify common needs or problems that agency leaders were  facing that required expedited assistance to resolve. As another example,  during nonemergency but disruptive events, such as political conventions  or rallies, the FEBs in the affected areas have helped to contain the  potential disturbance to federal agencies’ operations.
Looking ahead, however, representatives from 14 of the 28 FEBs disagreed  on the role the boards should play in emergency service support,  particularly during an emergency. Without adequate staff and resources,  some of the executive directors expressed concern that they will not be  able to meet expectations. One executive director, for example,  commented that there was a general expectation within his board’s  metropolitan federal community that the FEB will assume a significant  leadership role during a possible future emergency. He observed, however,  that limited and declining funding does not provide for an effective  communication system. Consequently, he felt that this expectation was  unrealistic and may contribute to major misunderstandings in the event of  a significant emergency. On the other hand, several of the executive  directors felt that the FEBs would be able to accomplish much more in  this area with additional resources. For example, one executive director,  with an emergency operations background, emphasized that if the boards  were given dependable funding and increased stature within the federal  government by formal recognition of their emergency support role, their  return on investment in terms of emergency support functions would be  substantial.
Despite the varying perspectives on an expanded emergency support role  for the FEBs, many of the executive directors or chairs from the boards  cited a positive and beneficial working relationship with FEMA. An  important FEB emergency support responsibility is facilitating continuity  of operations (COOP) and other emergency planning, and the FEBs work  with FEMA and the General Services Administration (GSA) to develop and  strengthen agency COOP and other emergency plans. For example, most  of the boards have COOP working groups or emergency committees, often  lead by FEMA and GSA, which help conduct various emergency exercises.  The exercises are designed to provide insight and guidance that can be  used to develop specific action plans that address interruptions in services  provided by their agencies. For example, a FEMA official testified in May  2006 that the COOP working groups established with the FEBs in New  Orleans, Houston, and Miami prior to the hurricanes of 2005 and the many  COOP training and exercise activities conducted by these organizations  were instrumental in facilitating federal agency recovery and  reconstitution efforts following hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.  According to a FEMA director, many of the agencies in the field have  COOP policies, procedures, and planning in place in part because the  FEBs have assisted FEMA in accomplishing its responsibilities as lead  agent for federal executive branch COOP programs.
section_title: FEBs’ Unique Role in the Local Federal Community Can Aid in Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response
paragraphs: As mentioned previously, the nature of pandemic influenza, which  presents different concerns than localized natural disasters, may make the  FEBs a valuable asset in pandemic preparedness and response. The  distributed nature of a pandemic and the burden of disease across the  nation dictate that the response will be largely addressed by each  community it affects. The FEBs’ connections to their local communities  could play an important part, as predisaster relationship building and  planning are often the cornerstones of this type of incident management.
Many of the FEBs have cultivated relationships within their federal, state,  and local governments and their metropolitan area community  organizations as a natural outgrowth of their general activities. For  example, FEB activities, such as the Combined Federal Campaign and  scholarship programs, bring the boards into contact with local charities  and school boards. Through activities such as hosting emergency  preparedness training or through participation in certain committees,  some of the FEBs have established relationships with emergency  management officials, first responders, and health officials in their  communities. In addition, through their facilitation of COOP exercises and  training, the FEBs bring together government leaders, health officials, and  first responders in a venue where the parties can share ideas, discuss  plans, and coordinate approaches.
In terms of current pandemic planning, some of the FEBs are already  building capacity for pandemic influenza response within their member  agencies and community organizations by hosting pandemic influenza  training and exercises. For example, some of the boards have been  involved in pandemic influenza-related activities that range from  informational briefings to coordinating pandemic exercises that included  nonprofit organizations, the private sector, and government. A number of  FEBs have held pandemic influenza tabletop exercises. Pandemic  influenza tabletop exercises are based on a series of possible events that  could occur during an outbreak of pandemic influenza with scenarios  constructed to facilitate problem solving and to provoke thinking about  gaps and vulnerabilities. For example, the Boston FEB, together with the  Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency and FEMA, held a  pandemic influenza tabletop exercise in November 2006. The exercise  objectives included goals such as helping to increase the awareness of  federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies of the requirement to  incorporate pandemic influenza procedures into COOP planning and  identifying special considerations for protecting the health and safety of  employees and maintaining essential government functions and services  during a pandemic outbreak. The Seattle FEB, with the assistance of  FEMA and the City of Seattle, sponsored an all-day conference in October  2006 called “Pandemic Flu: Get Smart, Get Ready! Conversation Tools and  Tips.”
The Minnesota FEB has been a leader among the boards in pandemic  influenza planning. Using a tabletop exercise it created, the board hosted  its first pandemic influenza exercise in February 2006, with a follow-up  exercise in October 2006. The October exercise included approximately  180 participants from 100 organizations within federal agencies, state and  local government, and the private sector. The Minnesota FEB executive  director noted that Minnesota has excellent state and local government  relationships, which help to facilitate planning of this nature. Examples of  partnerships the board has with state and local entities include those with  the State of Minnesota Division of Homeland Security and Emergency  Management, the Minnesota Department of Health, the St. Paul Chamber  of Commerce, and the American Red Cross. In addition, the Minnesota  FEB executive director serves on the board of directors of the Association  of Minnesota Emergency Managers as the federal agency liaison, a newly  created partnership with the organization.
The communications function of the boards is also a key part of their  emergency support activities and could be an important asset for  pandemic preparedness and response. For example, many of the FEBs are  already active in disseminating pandemic influenza preparedness  materials. The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation  Plan also emphasizes that government and public health officials must  communicate clearly and continuously with the public throughout a  pandemic, and the plan recognized that timely, accurate, credible, and  coordinated messages will be necessary. For example, when asked about  the role they envision the FEBs playing in the response to a pandemic, the  Dallas-Fort Worth FEB representatives said that because the board is  viewed by its member agencies as a credible source of information, the  board’s role should be to coordinate communications among member  agencies. They gave the example of the Department of Health and Human  Services working through the board to disseminate medical information to  the local community.
During pandemic influenza, the FEBs have the potential to broaden the  situational awareness of member agency leaders and emergency  coordinators and provide a forum to inform their decisions, similar to  what the FEBs provide for other hazards, such as inclement weather  conditions. A FEMA official noted that FEBs have vital knowledge of the  federal agencies in their jurisdictions, which can provide valuable  situational awareness to community emergency responders.
Finally, some of the FEBs are considering the role they can play during  pandemic influenza in assisting member agencies by supporting human  capital functions, such as supporting the federal workforce and  coordinating the deployment of personnel among member agencies as may  be appropriate. Several FEB representatives said, for example, that they  were considering how they could provide assistance in coordinating  support to federal agencies responding to pandemic influenza, such as  addressing personnel shortages by locating available resources among  member agencies.
section_title: The FEBs Face Key Challenges in Providing Emergency Support Services
paragraphs: The FEBs face key challenges in carrying out their emergency support  role. Several interrelated issues limit the capacity of FEBs to provide a  consistent and sustained contribution to emergency preparedness and  response.
First, their role is not defined in national emergency plans. According to  both FEB directors and FEMA officials, the FEBs could carry out their  emergency support role more effectively if their role was included in  national emergency management plans. FEMA officials from two different  regions said they felt the boards could be used more effectively and that  they add value to the nation’s emergency operations. They agreed with  several of the FEB executive directors we interviewed who said the  boards lack recognition within the federal government’s emergency  response structure and their value in emergency support was often  overlooked by federal agency officials unfamiliar with their capabilities. A  FEMA regional director noted that it is very important that the FEB  emergency support role is understood, and he believed including the  boards in emergency management plans was an opportunity to  communicate the role of the FEBs and how they could contribute in  emergencies involving the federal workforce.
In addition, varying FEB capabilities test the boards’ ability to provide  consistent levels of emergency support services across the country. The  FEBs differ substantially in the size of their formal jurisdictions and in the  number of federal employees and agencies served by each board. The map  in appendix I shows the varying service areas of the 28 boards, and the  table in appendix II shows how the number of federal employees and  agencies served varies by FEB. As noted earlier, the FEBs also have no  congressional charter and receive no congressional appropriation but  rather rely on voluntary contributions from their member agencies. This  has resulted in inconsistent funding for the FEBs nationwide, and the  levels of support provided to the boards in terms of operating expenses,  personnel, and equipment vary considerably.
The FEBs’ dependence on host agencies and other member agencies for  their resources also creates uncertainty for the boards in planning and  committing to provide emergency support services. The lack of funding in  a particular year may curtail the amount of emergency support an  individual board could provide. Many of the FEB representatives  characterized the board funding structure as dysfunctional, and some  expressed concern that their activities will be further affected by reduced  agency funding and resource support as agency budgets grow more  constrained. When boards’ funding is precarious, the executive directors  spend the majority of their time soliciting resources from member  agencies, without adequate time or resources to focus on mission-related  activities. Some federal agencies that have voluntarily funded FEB  positions in the past have begun to withdraw their funding support.  Several FEB representatives felt the uncertainty about the funding of the  FEBs raises questions as to the survivability of the system and its ability to  fulfill its emergency support function.
To address these challenges, our report recommended that OPM work  with FEMA to develop a memorandum of understanding, or some similar  mechanism, that formally defines the FEB role in emergency planning and  response. We also recommended that OPM initiate discussion with the  Department of Homeland Security and other responsible stakeholders to  consider the feasibility of integrating the FEB emergency support  responsibilities into the established emergency response framework, such  as the National Response Plan. Finally, we recommended that OPM  continue its efforts to establish measures and accountability for the FEBs’  emergency support responsibilities and develop a proposal for an  alternative to the current voluntary contribution mechanism that would  address the uncertainty of funding sources for the boards. OPM’s work on  a strategic plan with the FEBs affords the opportunity to complete the  development of clear expectations for the FEBs in emergency operations  and to develop appropriate performance measures for these expectations.  OPM also has an opportunity, as part of this planning process, to consider  alternative funding arrangements that would better match the roles  envisioned for the FEBs. OPM said it is building a business case through  which to address the resources FEBs need to continue operations and that  institutionalized relationships with partners such as FEMA can help  address funding issues.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my  statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you might  have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Bernice  Steinhardt, Director, Strategic Issues, at (202) 512-6806 or  steinhardtb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this  testimony. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include  William J. Doherty, Assistant Director, and Judith C. Kordahl.
section_title: Appendix I: Jurisdictional Boundaries of the 28 FEBs
paragraphs: Includes civilian agencies in Guam.
section_title: Appendix II: Number of Federal Employees and Agencies Served by Each FEB in Descending Order of Employees Served
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