Wildland Fire Management: Federal Agencies Lack Key Long- and Short-Term Management Strategies for Using Program Funds Effectively
Published: 2008-02-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The nation's wildland fire problems have worsened over the past decade. Recent years have seen dramatic increases in the number of acres burned and the dollars spent on preparing for and responding to wildland fires. As GAO has previously reported, a number of factors have contributed to worsening fire seasons and increased firefighting expenditures, including an accumulation of fuels due to past land management practices; drought and other stresses, in part related to climate change; and an increase in human development in or near wildlands. Recent GAO reports have identified shortcomings in the approach to wildland fire management taken by the responsible federal agencies--the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and four agencies within the Department of the Interior. GAO was asked to testify on agency efforts to (1) develop a cohesive strategy for preparing for and responding to wildland fire, (2) contain federal expenditures related to wildland fire, and (3) improve the processes used to allocate funds for reducing accumulated fuels and to select fuel reduction projects. GAO also is providing preliminary findings from its ongoing review of an interagency budget allocation and planning model known as fire program analysis (FPA). This testimony is based on issued GAO reports, reviews of agency documents related to the development of FPA, and discussions with agency officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In recent years, GAO has recommended a number of actions federal wildland fire agencies should take to better diagnose the extent of the nation's wildland fire problems and develop a strategic approach for addressing them. The agencies have taken some steps to respond to GAO's recommendations, but have not completed other needed steps. Specifically, the agencies should: (1) recommit to developing a cohesive strategy that identifies options and associated funding to reduce fuels and address wildland fire problems. In several reports dating to 1999, GAO recommended that a cohesive strategy be developed that identifies the available long-term options and associated funding for reducing hazardous fuels and for responding to wildland fires. Such a strategy would assist Congress and the agencies in making informed decisions about effective and affordable long-term approaches to addressing the nation's wildland fire problems. As of January 2008, the agencies had not developed such a strategy and, in fact, had retreated from earlier commitments to do so. (2) Establish clear goals and a strategy to help contain wildland fire costs. In 2007, GAO reported that the agencies had taken several steps to contain wildland fire costs, including developing new decision support tools to help officials select the most appropriate strategy for fighting wildland fires, but lacked clearly defined cost-containment goals and a strategy for achieving them. As a result, we believe managers in the field lacked a clear understanding of the relative importance agency leadership placed on containing costs and were therefore likely to select firefighting strategies without duly considering the costs of suppression. Although the agencies have continued to implement individual cost-containment steps, they still have not developed clear goals or a strategy for achieving them. (3) Continue to improve their processes for allocating fuel reduction funds and selecting fuel reduction projects. Also in 2007, GAO recommended several improvements to the agencies' processes for allocating fuel reduction funds to field units and selecting projects. Specifically, GAO recommended that the agencies use a more systematic allocation process, improve the information they use to make allocation decisions, and clarify the relative importance of the various factors they consider when allocating funds. The agencies are currently taking steps to implement these improvements, although none have yet been completed. In addition, GAO's ongoing review of FPA suggests that the current model, which the agencies expect to complete in June 2008, may not allow the agencies to meet all of the key goals established for FPA. Specifically, preliminary results from GAO's review suggest that the model will not allow the agencies to analyze long-term trade-offs between annual fuel reduction treatments and future expected suppression costs for large fires. GAO intends to conduct a full assessment of FPA once it is completed.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss key actions that we believe the  federal wildland fire agencies—the Forest Service within the Department  of Agriculture and four agencies within the Department of the Interior  (Interior)—should take to improve their management of wildland fires and  help contain the rising costs of preparing for and responding to fires. Our  nation’s wildland fire problems have worsened in the past decade.  Appropriations for wildland fire management activities tripled from about  $1 billion in fiscal year 1999 to more than $3 billion in fiscal year 2007,  while, on average, the acreage burned annually by wildland fires has  increased by approximately 70 percent since the 1990s. As we have  previously reported, a number of factors have contributed to worsening  wildland fires and the increasing cost of managing fires, including an  accumulation of fuels due in part to past fire suppression policies; severe  weather and drought in some areas of the country, related in part to  climate change; and growing numbers of homes built in or near wildlands,  an area often called the wildland-urban interface. Concerns about the  increasing cost of managing wildland fires, along with growing recognition  of the long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation, have led Congress,  GAO, and others to focus attention on ways to contain growing fire  expenditures and to ensure that the agencies’ wildland fire activities are  appropriate and carried out in a cost-effective and efficient manner.
My testimony today summarizes findings from several of our recent  reports, which identified key weaknesses in the agencies’ management of  wildland fires and recommended actions the agencies should take if they  are to respond effectively. Specifically, I will focus on the agencies’ efforts  to (1) develop a cohesive strategy for preparing for and responding to  wildland fires, (2) contain federal expenditures for preparing for and  responding to wildland fires, and (3) set priorities and allocate funds for  fuel reduction treatments. I will also discuss preliminary results from our  ongoing work on the agencies’ efforts to complete the interagency budget  allocation and planning model known as fire program analysis (FPA), a  key component of a cohesive strategy.
To evaluate these issues, we reviewed selected reports we have issued  since 1999, and interviewed agency officials to identify recent actions the  agencies have taken in the areas discussed in these reports. We also  reviewed pertinent agency plans, policies, reports, and other documents,  and interviewed federal and nonfederal officials, to obtain information on  the development and status of FPA. The previous reports we reviewed,  and our current performance audit—which was conducted from  September 2007 to February 2008—were conducted in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Although its effect on communities can be devastating, wildland fire is a  natural and necessary process that provides many benefits to ecosystems,  such as maintaining habitat diversity, recycling soil nutrients, limiting the  spread of insects and disease, and promoting new growth by causing the  seeds of fire-dependent species to germinate. Wildland fire also  periodically removes brush, small trees, and other vegetation that can  otherwise accumulate and increase the size, intensity, and duration of  subsequent fires. Over the past century, however, various management  practices—including fire suppression, grazing, and timber harvest—have  reduced the normal frequency of fires in many forest and rangeland  ecosystems and contributed to abnormally dense, continuous  accumulations of vegetation, which can fuel uncharacteristically large or  severe wildland fires. Federal researchers have estimated that unnaturally  dense fuel accumulations on 90 million to 200 million acres of federal  lands in the contiguous United States place these lands at an elevated risk  of severe wildland fire.
In response to the growing wildland fire problem, the five federal agencies  responsible for managing wildland fires—the Forest Service in the  Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of  Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service in  the Department of the Interior—adopted the 1995 federal wildland fire  management policy, which formally recognized the essential role that fire  plays in maintaining natural systems. This policy was subsequently  reaffirmed and updated in 2001. Two important implications of the new  policy are that the agencies recognized that (1) they needed to reduce  accumulated vegetation that could fuel intense wildland fires and (2) it  was not appropriate to continue attempting to suppress all fires.
Acknowledging the problem caused by accumulated fuels, Congress  substantially increased appropriations for fuel reduction treatments— appropriating more than $3.2 billion to the Forest Service and Interior  since 2001—and, in 2003, passed the Healthy Forests Restoration Act,  with the stated purpose of, among other things, reducing wildland fire risk  to communities, municipal water supplies, and other at-risk federal land.  After receiving its annual appropriation, the Forest Service allocates funds  to its nine regional offices, which in turn allocate funds to individual  national forests and grasslands. Interior, upon receiving its annual  appropriation, allocates funds to its four fire management agencies—with  the Bureau of Land Management receiving the largest share, about 50  percent of Interior’s funding. Interior’s agencies then allocate funds to  their regional or state offices, which in turn allocate funds to individual  field units, such as national parks or wildlife refuges. Forest Service and  Interior agency field units are generally responsible for selecting individual  fuel reduction projects to undertake, which are typically conducted  through mechanical treatments (using chainsaws, chippers, mowers, and  the like) or by using prescribed fire (which land managers deliberately set  to restore or maintain desired vegetative conditions). The agencies used  the tools and fuel reduction funding provided by Congress to treat more  than 18 million acres from 2001 through August 2007.
Over the last decade, Congress, the Office of Management and Budget,  federal agency officials, and others have expressed concerns about  mounting federal wildland fire expenditures. These concerns have led  GAO, the Department of Agriculture’s Office of Inspector General, the  Forest Service, Interior, and others to conduct numerous reviews of the  federal wildland fire program. These reviews identified many issues the  agencies needed to address if they are to contain costs—issues generally  related to reducing accumulated fuels, acquiring and using firefighting  personnel and equipment, and selecting firefighting strategies.
Land managers and incident management teams (specialized fire-response  teams that include personnel to handle command, planning, logistics,  operations, and finance functions) have a wide spectrum of strategies  available to them when responding to wildland fires, some of which can be  significantly more costly than others. These strategies range from having a  few personnel monitor a fire while allowing it to burn to achieve  ecological benefits—a practice known as wildland fire use—to mobilizing  all available personnel and equipment to try to control the entire perimeter  of a fire or otherwise suppress it as quickly as possible. In selecting a  strategy for a particular fire, land managers are required to consider the  cost of suppression, the value of structures and other resources  threatened by the fire, and the potential ecological effects of the fire. The  agencies use the term “appropriate management response” for a strategy  that considers these factors. Recent reports by GAO and others, however,  have identified barriers to the agencies increasing their use of less  aggressive strategies, which often cost less.
section_title: Agencies Need a Cohesive Wildland Fire Strategy to Manage Limited Resources Effectively, but Have Retreated from Their Commitment to Develop One
paragraphs: If the agencies and Congress are to make informed decisions about an  effective and affordable long-term approach for addressing wildland fire,  the agencies need a cohesive strategy that identifies the long-term options  and associated funding for reducing excess vegetation and responding to  fires. We first recommended the development of a cohesive strategy for  addressing excess vegetation in 1999. By 2005, the agencies had yet to  develop such a strategy, and that year we reiterated the need for such a  strategy and broadened our recommendation’s focus to include options  not only for reducing fuels but also for responding to wildland fires when  they do occur, in order to better address the interrelated nature of the two  activities. We repeated our call for a cohesive strategy in 2006 and 2007.
Although the agencies had consistently concurred with our  recommendation to develop a cohesive strategy, in 2007 they retreated  from their commitment to develop one. The Department of Agriculture’s  Under Secretary for Natural Resources and Environment testified before  the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources in January 2007,  and before the House Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Public  Lands in June 2007, that he did not think it useful to provide specific  funding estimates for fuel treatments years into the future because  conditions on the ground change over time and may change priorities in  future years. Forest Service and Interior officials subsequently told us in  January 2008 that they have no plans to develop a cohesive strategy that  identifies long-term options and associated funding requirements.
Despite the agencies’ retreat from their commitment to develop a cohesive  strategy, a strategy of this sort nevertheless remains fundamental if the  agencies and Congress are to fully understand the potential choices, and  associated costs, for addressing wildland fire problems. We also believe  the agencies have mischaracterized our recommendation to develop long- term options, and associated funding, for reducing fuels. Our intent was  not to have the agencies identify the specific areas they would treat each  year into the future, but rather that they develop broad options for  reducing fuels, including estimated costs, and analyze the effects of the  different options on the predicted costs of preparing for and responding to  wildland fires in the future. One such analysis was developed in 2002 by a  team of Forest Service and Interior experts, who produced an estimate of  the funds needed to implement each of eight different fuel reduction  options for protecting communities and ecosystems across the nation over  the next century. The team determined that effectively reducing the risks  to communities and ecosystems across the nation could require an  approximate tripling of fuel reduction funding, to about $1.4 billion  annually, for an initial period of several years. These initially higher costs  for fuel reduction would decline after fuels had been sufficiently reduced  to allow less-expensive prescribed burning methods in many areas. More  importantly, the team estimated that the reduction in fuels would allow the  agencies to suppress more fires at lower cost and would reduce total  wildland fire management costs and risk after 15 years. Alternately, the  team concluded that maintaining the then-current level of investment in  fuel reduction would increase costs as well as risks to communities and  ecosystems in the long term. However, the Office of Management and  Budget raised concerns about the accuracy of the long-term funding  estimates used by the study; as a result, agency officials told us in 2006  that they needed to improve the data before they could develop a cohesive  strategy. Now, however—and despite agency efforts to improve their  data—this concern appears to be moot, as the agencies have abandoned  their commitment to develop the strategy.
section_title: Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Contain the Costs of Fighting Fires
paragraphs: We reported in 2007 that although the Forest Service and Interior agencies  had taken several steps intended to help contain wildland fire costs, they  had not clearly defined their cost-containment goals or developed a  strategy for achieving those goals—steps that are fundamental to sound  program management. As we reported, the agencies are implementing a  number of steps designed to help them contain wildland fire costs—such  as improving how they acquire and use firefighting assets, updating  policies to require officials to consider the full spectrum of available  strategies when selecting a firefighting strategy, and developing new  decision support tools that help officials select the most appropriate  strategy. However, we also found that the agencies had neither clearly  defined the goals of their cost-containment efforts nor developed a clear  plan for how the various steps they are taking to help contain costs fit  together. Without such a strategy, we believe the agencies will have  difficulty determining whether they are taking the most important steps  first, as well as the extent to which the steps they are taking will help  contain costs.
As a result, we recommended that the agencies take several steps to  improve the management of their cost-containment efforts, including  establishing clearly defined goals and measurable objectives and a strategy  to achieve them. Because of the importance of these actions and  continuing concerns about the agencies’ response to the increasing cost of  wildland fires—and so that the agencies could use the results of these  actions to prepare for the 2008 fire season—we recommended the  agencies provide Congress with this information no later than November  2007, a step they have yet to take. The Forest Service and Interior, in  commenting on a draft of that report, generally disagreed with the  characterization of many of our findings, but they neither agreed nor  disagreed with our recommendations. In particular, they identified several  agency documents that they argue provide clearly defined goals and  objectives and that make up their strategy to contain costs. Although the  documents cited by the agencies provide overarching goals and objectives,  they lack the clarity and specificity needed by land management and  firefighting officials in the field to help manage and contain wildland fire  costs. Agency policy, for example, established an overarching goal of  suppressing wildland fires at minimum cost, considering firefighter and  public safety and the importance of resources being protected, but the  agencies have established neither clear criteria by which to weigh the  relative importance of the often-competing elements of this broad goal nor  measurable objectives by which to determine if the agencies are meeting  the goal. As a result, despite improvements the agencies continue to make  to policy, decision support tools, and oversight, we believe that managers  in the field lack a clear understanding of the relative importance that the  agencies’ leadership places on containing costs, and—as we concluded in  our 2007 report—are therefore likely to continue to select firefighting  strategies without due consideration of the costs of suppression. We  continue to believe that our recommendations, if effectively implemented,  would help the agencies better manage their cost-containment efforts and  improve their ability to contain wildland fire costs.
section_title: Better Information and a Systematic Process Would Improve Agencies’ Approach to Allocating Fuel Reduction Funds
paragraphs: In 2007, we also identified several shortcomings in the agencies’ processes  for allocating fuel reduction funds to field units and selecting fuel  reduction projects, which the agencies should correct in order to use their  fuel reduction funds more effectively. Specifically, we noted that the  agencies (1) did not consistently use systematic allocation processes—that  is, processes that are based on criteria and applied consistently—in all  agencies or at all levels, often relying instead on historical funding levels  and professional judgment to allocate funds and select projects; (2) did  not consistently consider the potential risk from wildland fire or the  potential effectiveness of fuel reduction treatments when allocating funds  and selecting projects; and (3) had not clarified the relative importance of  the numerous factors they consider when allocating funds and selecting  projects, including factors (such as funding stability or the use of forest  products resulting from fuel reduction treatments) unrelated to risk or  effectiveness.
Accordingly, we recommended that the agencies improve their allocation  processes in three areas. First, we recommended that the agencies develop  and routinely use a systematic allocation process that is based on criteria,  applied consistently, and common to all the agencies. Second, we  recommended that the agencies work to improve the information they use  to make allocation decisions, particularly information on wildland fire risk  and fuel treatment effectiveness. Third, we recommended that the  agencies clarify the relative importance of the various factors they  consider when allocating funds. Without improvements in these three  areas, we noted that the agencies would likely continue relying on  “allocation by tradition”—that is, allocating fuel reduction funds on the  basis of past funding levels rather than on calculated need.
Some agencies have begun implementing systematic processes for  allocating funds. In 2007, the Forest Service began using a computer model  to influence funding allocations to its nine regions, and it continues to  refine and expand its use of the model, including introducing improved  data about the likelihood of fire in a particular area. In addition, all nine  Forest Service regions are required, beginning in 2008, to use the model as  part of their process for allocating funds to national forests. Interior is  developing a similar computer model for allocating funds to its agencies,  in part based on the Forest Service’s model. For fiscal year 2007, Interior  allocated 5 percent of its fuel reduction project funds to its four agencies  using the model; for fiscal year 2008, according to an Interior official,  Interior will use the model to allocate all of its fuel reduction project funds  to its four agencies, within constraints designed to reduce the potential  impact of funding changes. Officials from both the Forest Service and  Interior told us that the agencies are working closely with each other on  model development. Of Interior’s agencies, the Bureau of Land  Management is developing a model similar to Interior’s for allocating funds  to its state offices; the Fish and Wildlife Service uses its own computer  model when allocating funds to regional offices; the Bureau of Indian  Affairs allocates funds to its regions using a formula that considers past  performance and proposed work; and the National Park Service allocates  funds to its regions primarily on the basis of historical funding levels.  However, Interior is working to standardize the allocation process within  these agencies as well; a department official told us that Interior plans to  use its model to allocate funds down to the agencies’ state and regional  levels in fiscal year 2009.
Although the models some of the agencies are developing represent  substantial steps forward in systematically allocating funds, these steps  are incomplete and not fully coordinated. Specifically, not all the agencies  have models; none consistently uses models at the national, regional, and  local levels; and the models that are in use are not common to all agencies.  Further, the models, even where used, often exert only a small influence  on allocation decisions, partly because the agencies do not yet have full  confidence in the models’ data. Until the models serve as the foundation  for allocation decisions, such decisions will continue to rely mainly on  historical funding patterns and professional judgment. Accordingly, we  urge the agencies to continue developing an allocation process that is  systematic and that is common to all agencies.
The agencies are also continuing to investigate ways to develop and use  measures of risk and treatment effectiveness. Forest Service and Interior  officials told us, for example, that researchers are looking at areas burned  in past wildland fires to assess the extent to which fuel treatments altered  fire behavior. Although efforts such as these are likely to be long-term  undertakings and involve considerable research investment and activity,  developing such measures would improve the agencies’ ability to assess  and compare the cost-effectiveness of potential treatments in deciding  how to optimally allocate scarce funds. Finally, such information could  also help the agencies address our third recommendation—that is, to  clarify the relative importance of the various factors they consider when  allocating funds. Such an effort is already under way at Interior, according  to an Interior official, and the agency hopes to complete its work before  the 2008 fire season. A Forest Service official stated that the Forest  Service is also working to prioritize the various factors, but did not  provide a timetable for completing this effort.
section_title: Agencies Plan to Complete the FPA Model in 2008, but the Extent to Which It Will Help Ensure Cost-Effective Fire Management Decisions Is Uncertain
paragraphs: Agency officials plan to complete the FPA model by June 30, 2008, but  preliminary results from our ongoing review raise questions about the  extent to which the current model will be able to meet all of the key goals  established for FPA. FPA—a common interagency performance-based  system for program planning and budgeting for the full scope of fire  management activities, including preparedness, large fire suppression, and  fuel reduction treatments—was proposed and funded to address  shortcomings that Congress, GAO, and the Office of Management and  Budget identified in the agencies’ existing budget allocation frameworks.  FPA also is critical to developing and implementing a cohesive strategy,  and to the agencies’ efforts to contain wildland fire costs. Development of  FPA commenced in 2002. According to a 2001 report commissioned by the  agencies that serves as the foundation of FPA, FPA was intended to  establish a common framework for the agencies to    determine national budget needs by analyzing budget alternatives at the  local level—using a common, interagency process for fire management  planning and budgeting—and aggregating the results;   determine the relative costs and benefits for the full scope of fire  management activities, including potential trade-offs among investments  in fuel reduction, fire preparedness, and fire suppression activities; and identify, for any given budget level, the most cost-effective mix of  personnel and equipment to carry out these activities.
In addition, because responding to wildland fires often requires  coordination and collaboration among federal, state, tribal, and local  firefighting entities to effectively protect lives, homes, and resources, the  agencies were directed to develop FPA in conjunction with their  nonfederal partners and to recognize the availability of adjacent  nonfederal firefighting resources when determining the appropriate  amount and location of federal resources.
FPA program and senior agency officials told us that, when completed,  FPA will allow the agencies to meet the key goals established for it, but  preliminary results from our ongoing review have raised questions about  FPA’s ability to do so. In particular, FPA likely will analyze only 5 years of  fuel reduction treatments when modeling the effect such treatments will  have on future large fire events, according to FPA program officials,  although they have not yet made a final determination on the number of  years to be analyzed. The officials said that it is not possible to identify  fuel treatment projects more than 5 years into the future with sufficient  accuracy to include in the analysis. Such a limited time frame, however,  substantially impairs the ability of the model to analyze long-term trade- offs between annual fuel reduction treatment costs and future expected  suppression costs for large fires, a key goal of FPA. Officials say that the  FPA model expected to be completed in 2008 is the first step in an iterative  development process and can be improved to increase its capability to  analyze the trade-offs, but they could not provide a time frame for doing  so.
In addition, in 2006, after 4 years of model development, the agencies  initiated substantial changes to the process FPA will use to analyze needed  firefighting resources and determine where best to locate these resources;  they are also still deciding how senior officials will use the model’s output  to allocate funds between agencies and geographic regions of the country.  It is not clear at this time the extent to which FPA will meet the key goal of  identifying the most cost-effective allocation of resources for a given  budget level, because the agencies are still developing the FPA model and  determining how it will be used. A full assessment of FPA cannot be  conducted, however, until the agencies complete the model; at that time,  we plan on assessing the extent to which FPA will meet the key goals  established.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Faced with an incendiary mix of accumulated fuels, climate change, and  burgeoning development in fire-prone areas, and constrained by our  nation’s long-term fiscal outlook, the federal wildland fire agencies need to  commit to a more considered, long-term approach to managing their  resources in order to address the wildland fire problem more effectively  and efficiently. They have taken an important first step by establishing and  updating federal wildland fire policy. Development of strategies and  management tools for agency officials to use in achieving the policy’s  vision, however, has been uneven. The agencies are making progress in  certain areas, including improving funding allocation processes for  reducing fuels and requiring appropriate management response to fires  that occur. In addition, the agencies are continuing to develop FPA, which,  if implemented appropriately, could significantly improve the agencies’  ability to allocate their resources effectively. But broader efforts have  stalled—as in the development of cost containment goals and objectives— or even lost ground, as evidenced by the agencies’ retreat from their  earlier commitment to develop the cohesive wildland fire strategy we have  called for. If the agencies are to achieve lasting results in their efforts to  address the wildland fire problem, they will need a sustained commitment  by agency leadership to developing both a long-term strategy that  identifies potential options (and their costs) for managing wildland fires  and the tools for carrying out such a strategy.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased  to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee  may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202)  512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Steve Gaty, Assistant Director; David P. Bixler; Ellen W.  Chu; Jonathan Dent; and Richard Johnson made key contributions to this  statement.
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