U.S. Secret Service: Data Analyses Could Better Inform the Domestic Field Office Structure
Published: 2016-02-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Commonly known for protecting the President, the Secret Service also plays a role in investigating and preventing a variety of financial and electronic crimes (e.g., counterfeiting). To execute its dual investigative and protective missions, the Secret Service operates a domestic field office structure of 115 offices in 42 districts.
GAO was asked to review the Secret Service's domestic field office structure. This report evaluates (1) the costs of the Secret Service's domestic field office structure and to what extent the data are reliable, (2) how domestic offices enable the Secret Service to accomplish its missions, and (3) the extent to which the Secret Service uses available data to ensure that its domestic field office structure meets its mission needs and what data reliability challenges, if any, exist.
GAO analyzed the Secret Service's cost, performance, and travel data for fiscal years 2009 through 2014, including a regression analysis of cost to performance. GAO also interviewed Secret Service headquarters officials; officials from 12 domestic offices selected based on size, performance and mission focus; and 15 of the agency's law enforcement partners.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: From fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the annual cost of the U.S. Secret Service's domestic field office structure—including 115 field offices, resident offices, and resident agencies—ranged from $500 million to $549 million, but the Secret Service did not accurately record cost data for some offices. GAO determined that although the Secret Service's cost data were reasonably reliable in the aggregate, salary and benefit costs may not have been accurately recorded in the agency's time and attendance system for 21 of 73 of the agency's smaller offices. Specifically,
thirteen resident offices and resident agencies likely had their salaries and benefits costs attributed to the field offices in their districts, and
eight had higher than expected salaries and benefits costs that may include the salaries and benefits of personnel in field offices.
By implementing a review process to ensure time and attendance charge codes for cost data are correctly established, the Secret Service could reliably determine the cost of each of its domestic offices.
The Secret Service's domestic offices predominately carry out the agency's investigative mission of various financial and electronic crimes and play an integral role in providing protection. GAO's analysis of Secret Service data from fiscal years 2009 through 2014 found that domestic offices removed at least $18 million in counterfeit funds from circulation annually, and coordinated with state and local partners to support between 5,597 and 6,386 protective visits each year. The Secret Service has developed a performance system, which aligns with its missions, to assess domestic office contributions to the agency's missions, which vary by office.
GAO also found that the Secret Service uses data to adjust staffing for the domestic offices, but the agency does not fully use all available data to analyze its domestic field office structure. For example, the Secret Service has not compared domestic field office districts' costs relative to performance or used personnel travel data to analyze whether the domestic offices are optimally located and sized to best meet the agency's mission needs. GAO's analyses of cost, performance, and travel data indicated that some field office districts were more efficient than others and personnel from four domestic offices frequently traveled to non-Secret Service office locations for investigations, potentially indicating the need for a Secret Service presence in these locations. This type of analysis could help the Secret Service determine if its field office structure is responsive to changing conditions and if an adjustment to the structure is warranted. By conducting an analysis of its domestic offices using cost and performance data, among other data as appropriate, the Secret Service could be better positioned to ensure that its domestic field office structure is meeting its mission needs.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in November 2015. Information that the Secret Service deemed sensitive has been removed.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends, among other things, that the Secret Service implement a review process to ensure it accurately records cost data, and conduct an analysis of its domestic field office structure using cost and performance data. The Department of Homeland Security concurred.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Commonly known for protecting the President, the U.S. Secret Service  plays a leading role in investigating and preventing a variety of financial  and electronic crimes. In fiscal year 2014 alone, the Secret Service  reported over 5,000 arrests, nearly 7,000 cases closed, and over $3  billion in financial loss prevention. To execute its dual investigative and  protective missions, the Secret Service—a component agency of the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) since 2003—operates a  domestic field office structure consisting of 115 offices. The structure is  intended to provide the Secret Service with flexibility to carry out its two  missions.
The primary role of the domestic offices is to support the Secret Service’s  investigative mission. Special agents conduct investigations to identify,  locate, and apprehend criminal organizations and individuals targeting the  nation’s critical financial infrastructure and payment systems. Criminal  investigation activities encompass financial and electronic crimes,  including identity theft; counterfeiting; computer fraud; and computer- based attacks on the nation’s financial, banking, and telecommunications  infrastructure, among other areas. In addition to investigating financial  and electronic crimes, special agents conduct protective intelligence— investigating threats against protected persons, including the President,  and protected facilities, such as protectee residences. Special agents in  domestic offices also often provide manpower, on a temporary basis, to  fulfill the Secret Service’s priority mission, protection, which includes  ensuring the safety and security of the President, Vice President, their  families, former presidents, major candidates for those offices, and  foreign dignitaries, among others. Specifically, domestic offices facilitate  the advance work done prior to the visit of any Secret Service protectee  and provide the staffing to secure each protected site. In addition to the  protection of designated individuals, the Secret Service is responsible for  certain security activities such as National Special Security Events, which  include presidential inaugurations and national conventions.
You requested that we review the Secret Service’s domestic field office  structure. Specifically, this report addresses the following questions:  1.  What are the costs of the Secret Service’s domestic field office  structure and to what extent are the data reliable?  2.  How do the domestic offices contribute to accomplishing the Secret  Service’s missions?  3.  To what extent does the Secret Service use available data to ensure  that its domestic field office structure meets its mission needs, and  what data reliability challenges, if any, exist?
This report is a public version of a prior sensitive report that we provided  to you. The Secret Service deemed some of the information in the prior  report Law Enforcement Sensitive, which must be protected from public  disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive information regarding the  performance rank of individual offices and investigative travel patterns,  among other things. The information provided in this report is more limited  in scope, as it excludes such sensitive information, but it addresses the  same questions as the sensitive report and the overall methodology used  for both reports is the same.
To determine the costs of the Secret Service’s domestic field office  structure, we obtained data from the Secret Service on the costs for each  domestic office by category (e.g., salaries and benefits and parking). We  collected data for fiscal years 2009 through 2014—the 6 most recent  fiscal years for which full-year data were available at the time of our  review. To assess the reliability of the Secret Service’s cost data, we  discussed with Secret Service officials how the data are entered and  maintained in the Secret Service’s financial system of record. We also  reviewed the data for any obvious errors and anomalies. We identified  inaccurate salary and benefit data and determined that the cost data were  sufficiently reliable in the aggregate for our purposes, but not at the  individual office level. We compared the Secret Service’s practices for  reviewing the reliability of its cost data against standards in Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government, which state that control  activities should be effective and efficient in accomplishing the agency’s  objectives. As a result of the cost data limitation at the individual office  level, we compared the costs of the Secret Service’s 42 domestic field  office districts rather than individual offices. In addition, to account for the  disparity in the size of domestic offices, we compared the costs of field  office districts per full-time equivalent (FTE). We assessed the reliability  of the Secret Service’s fiscal years 2009 through 2014 FTE data by  interviewing Secret Service officials about how the data are captured from  the agency’s time and attendance system. We determined that the FTE  data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
To describe the ways in which domestic offices contribute to the Secret  Service’s missions, we obtained and analyzed domestic office  performance metric outcome data and agency-wide statistics for fiscal  years 2009 through 2014. We assessed the reliability of both sets of data  by interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data and by  obtaining written responses from the agency regarding (1) the agency’s  methods of data collection and quality control reviews, (2) practices and  controls over data entry, and (3) any limitations. We determined that the  data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Additionally, we compared  the Secret Service’s performance metrics against agency and department  strategic plans, statutes governing the Secret Service’s areas of  responsibility, and measures developed under the Government  Performance and Results Act. We found that the Secret Service’s  performance metrics align with the agency’s investigative and protective  missions. We also gathered information on Secret Service domestic  offices’ contributions to the missions through semistructured interviews  with a nongeneralizable sample of 12 domestic offices from 6 districts.  We selected these offices based on fiscal year 2014 data—the most  recent data available—to represent a range of sizes, performance ranks  relative to those of other offices, and mission focus. To gain an  understanding of how domestic offices work with local and state law  enforcement partners, we also conducted semistructured interviews with  15 law enforcement agencies. We selected at least one local and one  state partner, such as a municipal or state law enforcement agency, from  each district using lists provided by the domestic offices to represent  partners that had long-term relationships with the Secret Service.
To determine the extent to which the Secret Service uses available data  to ensure its domestic field office structure enables the agency to meet its  mission needs, we interviewed Secret Service officials about how the  agency has historically made decisions to open and close offices, and the  methodology behind those decisions. We used Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government to assess the agency’s efforts to  ensure that its domestic field office structure meets its mission needs.  Since we determined the Secret Service had not used its available data to  analyze its field office structure, we analyzed Secret Service–provided  cost, performance, and travel data to demonstrate how such analyses  could position the Secret Service to better ensure that its domestic field  office structure is responsive to changing conditions and that the agency  is able to identify specific actions that need to be taken to meet mission  needs. Specifically, we conducted two cost-performance analyses,  including a regression analysis, to identify those Secret Service field  office districts with relatively high costs and lower performance, and  conversely low costs and higher performance. We analyzed, as part of  the regression analysis, the costs of the Secret Service’s 42 domestic  field office districts rather than individual offices as a result of the cost  data limitation previously discussed. Finally, we analyzed domestic  offices’ fiscal years 2009 through 2014 travel data to identify the purposes  of travel—protection, investigation, training, and support—as well as  travel patterns that may warrant an adjustment of the domestic field office  structure. On the basis of our discussions with Secret Service officials, we  determined data on travel for the purposes of protection and support to be  sufficiently reliable for our purposes. However, data on travel for the  purposes of investigations and training were unreliable because some  investigative travel was inaccurately recorded as training travel. As a  result, we were unable to distinguish the number of trips taken by  domestic field office personnel for the purpose of investigations and  training; therefore, these categories are combined in our analyses by  travel purpose. Additional details regarding our scope and methodology  are provided in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2014 through  February 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Secret Service Organization
paragraphs: Secret Service headquarters is organized into a series of offices with  different responsibilities. The Secret Service’s Office of Investigations  (INV) oversees the agency’s criminal investigation mission and the field  office structure. Although agents in the field support protective operations  as needed, a separate cadre of agents is responsible for permanent  protective details. Specifically, the Presidential Protective and Uniformed  Divisions, within the Office of Protective Operations, carry out permanent  protective details and assignments. The Presidential Protective Division is  dedicated to the protection of the President. The Uniformed Division,  subject to the supervision of the Secretary of Homeland Security, is to  perform duties, as prescribed by the Director of the Secret Service, in  connection with the protection of certain facilities, including the White  House and the Treasury Building, among others. Figure 1 shows the  Secret Service’s organizational chart.
section_title: Domestic Office Types and Locations
paragraphs: The Secret Service’s Office of Investigations operates four tiers of offices  that make up districts. Specifically, there are 42 domestic districts, each  led by a field office. The 42 districts are also composed of a total of 60  resident offices, 13 resident agencies, and 26 domiciles (see fig. 2).
The four categories of offices are defined as follows:
Field office—The largest of all the offices, field offices are located in  metropolitan areas, travel hubs, and populous areas where there is  generally a high demand for protective and investigative services,  according to Secret Service officials. These offices are to be led by a  special agent-in-charge who is also responsible for the management  and staffing of contingent offices within the field office’s district.
Resident office—The next largest office after a field office in size. A  resident agent-in-charge is to supervise the office, which is to be  staffed by at least 3 special agents, in addition to an office manager,  and typically an investigative assistant.
Resident agency—Generally located in more remote areas where a  field or resident office is not economically feasible. A resident agency  is to be led by a senior special agent (resident agent), and staffed by  additional special agents as dictated by the workload, and one or  more administrative employees.
Domicile—Typically a single special agent who works out of his or her  residence. According to Secret Service officials, in some instances,  the special agent works out of another agency’s office space, such as  that of a U.S. Attorney’s Office or local police department.
section_title: Cost and Performance Data Collection
paragraphs: The Secret Service collects data on the cost and performance of its  individual field offices, resident offices, and resident agencies.
Cost. In general, each domestic office has its own organizational code,  which allows the agency to identify costs for individual offices. Office  costs include  salaries and benefits—regular salaries and wages (including those  paid for annual, sick, and compensatory leave), geographic  differentials, overtime pay, holiday pay, cash incentive awards, and  relocation expenses, among others;  infrastructure—rent for office and antenna space, parking, tenant  improvements (office expansions or remodeling), Federal Protective  Service fees, utilities, and repairs;  travel—travel for protective details, investigative cases, training, and  support (including conferences, office inspections, and recruitment);  and other—equipment (e.g., furniture and telephones), supplies, training  and services, and rental and postage.
Secret Service headquarters centrally manages domestic office costs,  except for those included in the “other” category, which are managed  directly by the domestic offices. Specifically, Secret Service headquarters  performs the budgeting for salary and benefits across the agency as well  as infrastructure and travel costs. Domestic offices have their own small  budgets from which to purchase items and services, such as postage and  repairs to government vehicles.
Performance. The Secret Service requires field offices, resident offices,  and resident agencies to report on their operational activities. The Offices  of Investigations and Strategic Planning and Policy use the reported data  to award points to each office in accordance with 20 performance metrics.  These metrics are related to the agency’s criminal investigation and  protection missions (see app. II for the list of metrics and points).  According to the Secret Service, the points assigned to each metric are  based, in part, on the agency’s strategic plan, mission priorities, and the  Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.
section_title: The Domestic Field Office Structure Costs Over $500 Million Annually, but the Secret Service Does Not Accurately Record Cost Data for Some Offices
subsections: section_title: The Domestic Field Office Structure Costs Over $500 Million per Year
paragraphs: From fiscal years 2009 through 2014, annual domestic office costs  ranged from a low of $500 million in fiscal year 2010 to a high of $549  million in fiscal year 2012 (see fig. 3). The cost of the domestic field office  structure accounted for approximately 29 percent of the Secret Service’s  total budget, on average, across all 6 fiscal years.
In fiscal year 2012, when domestic office costs peaked at $549 million,  costs increased by $37.6 million when compared with costs for the prior  year. Specifically, salaries and benefits increased by $20.1 million and  travel costs by $18.7 million, primarily, according to Secret Service  officials, because of protective duties associated with political campaigns  and the general election in 2012. Over the 2 fiscal years following the  election year, 2013 and 2014, salaries and benefits costs decreased by  about $30.9 million and travel costs decreased by about $12.0 million.  During those 2 fiscal years, the Secret Service’s domestic office  workforce was reduced by 351 FTEs. According to Secret Service  officials, the agency had grown to a historically high number of personnel  in fiscal year 2011, with more than 7,000 total FTEs and could not sustain  the size of its workforce because of increases in pay and rising health  care costs. As a result, the agency had to limit hiring and allow attrition to  gradually reduce the workforce.
From fiscal years 2009 through 2014, salaries and benefits were the main  cost driver, accounting for $416.3 million (81 percent) of the average  annual total cost of domestic offices (see fig. 4). Infrastructure, travel, and  other costs accounted for the remaining $100.1 million (19 percent) of the  average annual total cost. Infrastructure costs accounted for $55.3 million  (11 percent) of the average annual total cost of domestic offices. The key  driver of infrastructure costs was leased office space, accounting for $43  million (78 percent). Travel costs accounted for $38.4 million (7 percent)  of the average annual total cost of domestic offices. Other costs made up  $6.4 million (1 percent) of the average annual total cost of domestic  offices.
From fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the average annual cost of each of  the Secret Service’s 42 domestic field office districts ranged from $3  million (Little Rock) to $67 million (New York) (see fig. 5). The average  annual cost per FTE in the 42 domestic field office districts ranged from  $167,550 to $261,448. The variation among districts’ FTE costs can be  explained by costs associated with infrastructure and travel. For example,  on average, from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the least expensive  district per FTE spent almost $8,000 per FTE on infrastructure compared  with the most expensive district per FTE, which spent about $28,000 per  FTE given the greater cost of rent and parking. Similarly, the least  expensive district per FTE spent about $9,000 per FTE on travel  compared with the most expensive district per FTE, which spent about  $56,000 per FTE, given the greater frequency of travel and cost of travel.
Of note, from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, 51 percent of the average  annual total costs of all districts are attributable to 7 of the 42 districts— New York; Washington, D.C.; Los Angeles; Chicago; Miami; Dallas; and  Houston. These 7 districts also represent 49 percent of the total FTEs in  domestic districts. Table 1 shows the 7 most expensive field office  districts by average annual total cost.
section_title: Secret Service Did Not Accurately Record Salaries and Benefits Cost Data for Some Offices
paragraphs: From fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the Secret Service did not  accurately record salary and benefit data at the individual office level, but  the data are reasonably reliable at the district level and in the aggregate.  According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,  control activities are an integral part of an entity’s planning, implementing,  reviewing, and accountability for stewardship of government resources  and achieving effective results. Although control activities can vary by  agency, categories of control activities that are common to all agencies  include accurate and timely recording of transactions and events, which  helps to ensure that all transactions are completely and accurately  recorded.
On the basis of our analysis, salaries and benefits costs may not have  been accurately recorded for 21 of 73 resident offices and agencies from  fiscal years 2009 through 2014. Specifically,
13 resident offices and resident agencies likely had their salaries and  benefits costs attributed to their “parent” field offices. For example,  in fiscal year 2014, the Saginaw Resident Office’s reported salaries  and benefits per FTE were $15,588, far below the domestic office  average of $152,918. Conversely, Saginaw’s parent field office,  Detroit, had higher than expected salaries and benefits at $225,767  per FTE in the same year, and
8 resident offices and resident agencies had higher than expected  salaries and benefits costs that may include the salaries and benefits  of personnel in their parent field office. For example, the Tulsa  Resident Office had salaries and benefits costs of about $483,000 per  FTE in fiscal year 2011. In the same year, the Oklahoma City Field  Office, Tulsa’s parent office, had salaries and benefits costs of about  $45,000 per FTE.
According to Secret Service officials, salaries and benefits costs were  incorrectly attributed to certain offices because the codes that determine  the office where the costs were recorded were not always set up correctly  in the agency’s time and attendance system. For example, the codes in  the time cards may have been established using the organizational code  for the parent field office, not realizing a subcode specific to the  subordinate resident agency or resident office was needed. Officials  added that they believe the organizational codes were not changed in the  time and attendance system when some agents transferred offices.  According to a senior Secret Service official, the budget division performs  a biweekly review of part of the code structure for compliance, but not for  the organizational code.
On the basis of our analysis, ineffective controls resulted in costs being  inconsistently recorded at the office level from fiscal years 2009 through  2014, which yielded inaccurate cost data for certain offices. Specifically,  the Secret Service lacks effective controls for recording time and  attendance transactions for each office and has not employed an effective  review process for ensuring time and attendance codes for cost data are  correctly established and appropriately linked to resources. Without  accurate data, the Secret Service is unable to reliably determine the cost  of each of its domestic offices. Secret Service officials agreed that its cost  data should be reliable at the individual office level. By implementing a  review process to ensure time and attendance codes for cost data are  correctly established and appropriately attributed to the correct office, the  Secret Service could reliably determine the cost of each of its domestic  offices to assist in assessing their cost-effectiveness.
section_title: Domestic Offices Enable the Secret Service to Carry Out Its Investigative and Protective Missions, but Contributions Vary by Office
subsections: section_title: Secret Service’s Domestic Offices Investigate Financial and Electronic Crimes and Play an Integral Role in Providing Protection and Recruiting Agents
subsections: section_title: Electronic and Financial Crime Investigations
paragraphs: The Secret Service’s domestic offices predominately carry out the  agency’s investigative mission by investigating financial crimes, which  include access device fraud; financial institution fraud; identity theft;  mortgage fraud; bank fraud; and electronic crimes, including cyber fraud  and computer-based attacks on financial, banking, telecommunications,  and other critical infrastructure. On the basis of our analysis of Secret  Service data, from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, domestic office  investigations resulted in an estimated $67.3 million to $346.2 million per  year in assets seized (see fig. 6) and $18.3 million to $28.3 million per  year in counterfeit funds removed from circulation (see fig. 7).
During the same time period, domestic offices made an average of about  7,300 state, local, military, and federal arrests annually (see fig. 8).  According to Secret Service officials, total arrests declined in fiscal year  2012 as a result of the need for increased protection related to the  general election. Arrests further declined in fiscal years 2013 and 2014  because of decreases in the number of special agents in domestic  offices. Secret Service officials reported that investigative  accomplishments decrease commensurate with reductions in staff  because it is necessary to scale back investigations while maintaining the  same level of commitment to the protective mission.
To further facilitate financial and electronic crimes investigations,  domestic field office districts host 81 financial or electronic crime task  forces. By leveraging locally fostered relationships, field offices create  task forces composed of detailees from multiple federal, state, and local  law enforcement agencies, among others. These detailees contribute to  Secret Service investigations by providing local knowledge as well as  resources and manpower.
Local knowledge. Officials at 8 of the 12 domestic offices we spoke with  said that state and local law enforcement partners provide expertise and  contacts because they are more familiar with local persons of interest and  the culture. One Secret Service official added that when pursuing leads  on financial crime, local police departments add value to the investigative  process as they are often more aware of and connected to street-level  contacts and confidential informants than Secret Service agents. In  addition, officials from 1 domestic office we spoke with noted that making  connections with task force members provides Secret Service agents with  greater awareness of investigations being pursued by local law  enforcement agencies, which can inform the Secret Service’s  investigative operations.
Resources and manpower. In the field executive summaries submitted  by each domestic field office, we found that approximately one-third of  domestic offices noted that state and local law enforcement partners  provided assistance with investigations, including forensics. Secret  Service agents in 2 domestic offices we spoke with use local police  department forensics labs, while a third domestic office noted that state  and local law enforcement partners provide manpower support to the  Secret Service on a weekly basis. Officials in 5 of the 12 Secret Service  offices and 3 of the 15 partner agencies we spoke with also stated that  the existence of task forces and close investigative relationships allows  partners to maintain momentum on investigations when Secret Service  agents have to postpone them in order to perform protective duties. For  instance, 1 office reported that task force members maintain  investigations, including forensics investigations, and liaise with other  partners when agents are occupied with protection duties.
To strengthen their partnerships with state and local law enforcement  agencies, Secret Service officials reported that the agency also assists  state and local law enforcement partners with investigations and provides  training and resources. For example, 1 domestic office pointed out that it  can assist state and local partners with electronic crime cases that reach  outside their cities, counties, and states by calling on other domestic  offices throughout the country. The Secret Service also provides training  for state and local law enforcement partners. On the basis of our review  of field executive summaries for fiscal year 2014, over half of Secret  Service domestic offices noted that they had provided training on financial  crime investigations and forensics for state and local partners through  local trainings or the National Computer Forensics Institute in Hoover,  Alabama. Providing training opportunities for state and local law  enforcement partners not only strengthens these relationships, but allows  the partners to be more effective in assisting the Secret Service with its  investigations, according to Secret Service officials. For instance, 1  domestic office reported that when its special agents trained through the  Electronic Crimes Special Agent Program were transferred to other  offices, it relied heavily on its local law enforcement partners, which had  been trained by the Secret Service to conduct computer forensic  examinations.
section_title: Protective Mission
paragraphs: Secret Service domestic offices contribute to protecting the President,  Vice President, their families, foreign dignitaries, and other individuals in  need of protection, and conduct protective intelligence investigations into  threats against the President and other protectees. According to Secret  Service officials, a key benefit of the agency’s domestic field office  structure is the placement of its offices across the country, positioning the  Secret Service to support its protective mission. Domestic offices allow  the Secret Service to maintain real-time knowledge of local activities that  may affect security during a presidential or dignitary visit. Further, they  provide a venue for developing and maintaining relationships with state  and local law enforcement agencies that are vital for ensuring each  protectee’s safety.
Domestic office officials told us that when special agents are required for  a protective mission, the protective mission takes priority over ongoing  investigations, with the exception of threat investigations. Domestic  offices are responsible for coordinating the logistics and operations of  protectee visits to their jurisdictions. Secret Service officials stated that for  a visit from the President or Vice President, an advance team dedicated  to that individual travels to the location prior to the visit to work with the  local domestic office in planning the protective mission. In such cases,  special agents assigned to the domestic office facilitate coordination  between the advance team, special agents from other offices and state  and local law enforcement partners. When an individual with no dedicated  advance team visits a domestic office district, the office is responsible for  all aspects of planning for protection. On the basis of our analysis, during  fiscal years 2009 through 2014, individuals receiving protection from the  Secret Service made between 5,597 and 6,386 visits per year, consisting  of over 10,000 days (on average) in domestic office jurisdictions annually  (see fig. 9).
Special agents assigned to domestic offices also travel to assist with  protective missions in other locations. Each office is generally required to  provide headquarters a list of 35 percent of its special agents available for  travel to other locations for protective and investigative missions, but the  majority of this travel is spent on protective missions.
Relationships built by domestic offices with state and local law  enforcement partners through assistance on investigations and  coordination on electronic crime cases facilitate not only the agency’s  investigative mission but also its protective mission, according to Secret  Service officials. Domestic offices draw on these local relationships with  state and local law enforcement agencies to ensure that protective visits  are adequately supported with manpower and other necessary resources.  Because of the scope of its protective mission, agents in each of the 12  domestic offices we interviewed emphasized that it would not be possible  to protect visiting dignitaries without extensive assistance from state and  local law enforcement partners. Secret Service officials stated that the  domestic offices are critical to ensuring the success of protective  assignments because of these relationships. Similarly, in interviews and  field executive summaries for fiscal year 2014, Secret Service officials  cited relationship development and maintenance as a significant benefit  of their locations in the field. For example, officials pointed out that the  Secret Service makes substantial use of manpower, equipment, and  other resources provided by state and local partners for protective visits  at no cost to the agency. One domestic office said it has used 150 to 200  local law enforcement officers (or 2,400 man-hours) for a single visit.  Other offices reported that state and local law enforcement partners  provide equipment, such as helicopters, vehicles, and communication  equipment during dignitary visits.
State and local law enforcement officials provide resources to protective  missions based, in part, on the relationships and training provided to their  agencies by the Secret Service domestic offices. Of the 13 state and local  partners we spoke with that provide assistance with protective missions,  12 said that they are willing to provide any resources needed by the  Secret Service. Five of those partners noted that they provide assistance  to the Secret Service because the agency contributes substantially to  their investigations. They also said that they provide manpower and  resources to protective missions on account of the assistance and  training Secret Service provides them. For instance, 3 local law  enforcement agencies noted that their officers receive on-the-job training  when working with the Secret Service on protection. In addition, the  Secret Service reported that over 1,000 state and local partners attended  dignitary protection training at the Secret Service’s James J. Rowley  Training Center in Maryland from fiscal years 2009 through 2014. This  investment in training by the Secret Service is mutually beneficial,  according to Secret Service domestic office officials and their partners, as  it allows the Secret Service to utilize state and local law enforcement as a  force multiplier while providing state and local law enforcement officials  with training they can use in their day-to-day responsibilities.
section_title: Recruitment and Hiring
paragraphs: While contributing to the investigative and protective missions of the  Secret Service, domestic offices also play a substantial role in the  recruitment and hiring of new agents. In field executive summaries for  fiscal year 2014, over half of the domestic offices reported attending job  fairs, working closely with local colleges, or conducting interviews and  examinations of applicants. They also noted that they recruit talented  investigators from their state and local partners, allowing the Secret  Service to gain experienced agents who are already familiar with law  enforcement. Secret Service officials at 5 of the 12 domestic offices we  spoke with cited recruitment as a significant activity for their agents.  Officials at 1 domestic office noted that it administers the special agent  entrance exam and other agent testing, as well as certification for panel  interviews, security interviews, and background investigations necessary  to complete the hiring process. Officials at another domestic office  emphasized that the Secret Service’s cadre of domestic offices across  the United States helps its recruiting efforts, as it helps introduce qualified  candidates from diverse locations and backgrounds to the Secret Service  who might not have otherwise considered it an option.
section_title: Offices’ Contributions to the Agency’s Investigative and Protective Missions Vary
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2009, the Secret Service has used performance metrics  to assess its domestic offices. Over the years, the Secret Service has  made changes to these metrics in order to better assess the contributions  of individual offices to the agency’s missions, according to Secret Service  officials. For instance, in fiscal year 2013, the agency added a metric for  the time special agents spend liaising with law enforcement agencies and  other stakeholders. GAO analysis indicates that of the 20 metrics used in  fiscal years 2013 and 2014, 6 relate solely to the agency’s protective  mission, 11 to the investigative mission, and the remaining 3 serve both  the investigative and protective missions (see app. II). For example, in  regard to protection, domestic offices report on the number of protective  intelligence cases in which they completed investigations of threats  against protected persons or facilities. In regard to both missions,  domestic offices report the number of polygraph examinations conducted  on persons of interest, among others. Our analysis comparing Secret  Service performance metrics to agency and department strategic plans,  statutes governing the Secret Service’s areas of responsibility, and  measures developed under the Government Performance and Results  Act indicate that the Secret Service’s performance metrics align with the  agency’s investigative and protective missions. For example, metrics  related to the protective mission, such as man-hours for protection,  number of protective visits, and providing protection for National Special  Security Events correspond to the Secret Service’s mandate to protect  individuals as laid out in statute, the DHS Quadrennial Review, and the  agency’s own strategic plan.
Since fiscal year 2013, the Secret Service has ranked each of its offices  and field office districts utilizing a point system, in which points are  assigned to each unit of each metric (see app. II). In addition to ranking  each office and district as a whole, the Secret Service also calculates a  per agent rank, by dividing each office’s and district’s points by the  number of nonsupervisory agents, to compensate for the variation in  office and district size. An INV official told us that as of July 2015, the  Secret Service had not determined how, if at all, it planned to use  performance data to inform its field office structure. Officials also noted  that offices’ overall rankings also have to be reviewed in conjunction with  their per agent rankings since larger offices tend to be ranked higher  overall simply because they have more special agents to accomplish  more work. For example, one office was ranked in the top 5 among all  offices in both fiscal years 2013 and 2014. However, on a per agent  basis, which is an indication of the efficiency of the office, this office was  ranked 108 in fiscal year 2013 and 123 in fiscal year 2014 out of a total of  137 offices. Conversely, an office that was ranked as relatively low- performing, 120 out of 137 in fiscal year 2014, had a per agent rank of 16  out of 137, indicating that its low office-level ranking may be a function of  being a smaller office, rather than poor performance.
The contribution of individual domestic field office districts to the Secret  Service’s investigative mission versus its protective mission varies widely.  For example, in fiscal year 2014, investigative points ranged from 35  percent of a district’s total points to nearly 98 percent. Points for  protective activities contributed between 2 and 55 percent of districts’  points. In fiscal year 2013, investigative points contributed between 34  and 97 percent, and protective points contributed between 1 and 65  percent. INV officials we spoke with noted that although districts can take  action to increase their investigative contributions, they have little control  over protection needs within their jurisdictions. As a result, in line with the  primary role of domestic offices, INV has weighted metrics related to  investigations more heavily than those related to the agency’s protective  mission. Therefore, offices with low levels of protective activity can still  rank highly in the performance system. For instance, in fiscal years 2013  and 2014, one district drew over 97 percent of its points from metrics  related to the investigative mission or both missions and had a district  rank of 8 and 4 in those years (and agent rank of 3 and 2), respectively.  Conversely, another district, which has a disproportionately large share of  the agency’s protective mission, drew 65 percent of its points in fiscal  year 2013 and 55 percent in fiscal year 2014 from metrics related to  protection.
section_title: The Secret Service Uses Data to Adjust Staffing, but Could Do More to Ensure That Its Domestic Field Office Structure Best Meets Mission Needs
subsections: section_title: The Secret Service Uses Performance Data to Adjust Staffing, but Does Not Fully Use Available Cost, Performance, and Travel Data to Analyze Its Field Office Structure
paragraphs: According to senior Office of Investigations officials, the Secret Service  has an ongoing process for evaluating and adjusting staffing levels  among its domestic offices. However, the Secret Service has not  conducted an analysis of its domestic field office structure, including an  assessment of office location and size. According to Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government, an agency’s organizational  structure provides management’s framework for planning, directing, and  controlling operations to achieve agency objectives. In addition, an  agency’s internal controls should provide reasonable assurances that  operations are effective and efficient, and that agencies should use  information and data to ensure effective and efficient use of resources.  Internal control guidance also suggests that management periodically  evaluate the organizational structure and make changes as necessary in  response to changing conditions. The standards further note that all  documentation and records should be properly managed and maintained.
INV officials reported that they do not know when the Secret Service last  formally analyzed its domestic field office structure or if it has reviewed  the structure because they were unable to find documentation indicating  such a review had been conducted. In October 2014, the agency began  to develop a plan to review the domestic field office structure in 2015,  according to INV officials. However, according to INV officials, this  planned review is now to be conducted as part of the Director’s  comprehensive bottom-to-top review of the entire agency. As of August  2015, INV officials reported that they have not received any guidance on  how the review is to be conducted or what it will include with respect to  the domestic field office structure.
Cost and performance data. INV officials reported that the Secret  Service uses performance metric data to evaluate the quarterly  performance of the domestic offices and as one of the factors in  determining the office staffing levels. Staffing decisions, according to INV  officials, often involve reviewing several variables related to the  geopolitical climate as it pertains to the protective and investigative  missions. Also taken into account are the experience level of agents in a  particular office, protective stops within a particular district, whether a  protectee has a private residence within a district, and an agent’s  specialty training certifications (i.e., polygraph and cyber forensics).  Additionally, field office staffing level variables take into account individual  agents’ protective, investigative, and training requirements. However,  officials from INV and the Management and Organization Division (MNO)  stated that they do not use cost and performance metric data together to  formally analyze—via a comparison of costs with performance metric  outcomes—the location and size of its domestic offices. According to  these same officials, the Secret Service does not compare domestic  office costs with performance metric data because it is difficult to (1)  assign benefits to protective activities in which the elimination of a  threat—no outcome—is the desired outcome, and (2) capture costs and  results of more complex investigations spanning different domestic offices  over multiple years. However, the Secret Service can take steps to  mitigate these challenges, as we did in our analysis comparing cost  relative to performance of the field office districts. Specifically, to address  the challenge of assigning benefits to protective activities, we used the  Secret Service’s protection related performance metrics of protective  intelligence cases closed, protective travel stops, and protective man- hours to assign benefits to protective activities. To mitigate the issue of  accurately capturing costs and results of more complex investigations, we  analyzed 4 years of data to account for investigations that span multiple  years and do not produce results within a single fiscal year. To address  the challenge of investigations that involve multiple domestic offices, we  used the Secret Service’s performance review reports for each office,  which, according to MNO officials, provide each involved office points for  its contributions, unlike the agency’s official statistics which provide credit  to a single office.
Our comparative analysis of the Secret Service’s cost-to-performance  data indicates that certain field office districts may be less cost-effective  than others. Also, six performance metrics—(1) federal arrests, (2)  protective travel stops, (3) protective intelligence investigations (cases  closed), (4) amount of seized counterfeit currency, (5) value of actual  financial crimes loss, and (6) critical systems protection advances—had a  statistically significant relationship with field office district costs. We  analyzed the cost and performance of the Secret Service’s domestic field  office districts to demonstrate the utility of such an analysis for evaluating  the field office structure. Our analysis was conducted at the field office  district level rather than individual office level because of limitations in the  Secret Service’s cost data, as previously discussed. This analysis  compares the cost per special agent with the performance metric  outcomes from fiscal years 2011 through 2014 to identify trends in cost  and performance over these 4 years.
On the basis of our analysis of Secret Service–provided cost and  performance data for fiscal years 2011 through 2014, we determined that  the San Diego, Boston, Pittsburgh, Honolulu, and Houston Field Office  Districts had the highest average cost per special agent relative to their  performance. Comparatively, the Richmond, St. Louis, Baltimore, Little  Rock, Birmingham, and Indianapolis Field Office Districts had the lowest  average cost per special agent. In terms of cost relative to performance,  the highest average cost district on a per agent basis (San Diego) cost  1.7 times more than the lowest average cost district (Richmond).  Overall, this indicates that compared with their peers, districts with higher  average costs per agent could become more efficient at meeting the  agency’s needs given expended resources, and there may be  opportunities to leverage practices from districts with lower average costs  per agent.
According to INV and MNO officials, the Pittsburgh and San Diego Field  Office Districts may not be as cost-effective as the other districts because  of the limited number of cases prosecuted at the federal level. For  instance, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the San Diego District, according to  these same officials, prioritizes narcotics and immigration cases over  financial and electronic crime cases. INV and MNO officials reported that  the Richmond and Baltimore Field Office Districts likely had lower costs  per special agent because in addition to the high number of background  investigations they conduct, they also receive several performance points  for the high volume of protection events and visits they handle in support  of the Washington, D.C., District. By identifying the districts with higher  and lower costs per special agent, the Secret Service could examine how  to further maximize its domestic field office structure and ensure that its  mission needs are not only effectively, but efficiently, met as well. For  example, the Secret Service could use these insights on the efficiency of  special agents in these districts gained from this type of an analysis to  inform decisions it makes regarding the placement and size of its  domestic offices. INV officials agreed that this type of an analysis may be  useful in assessing its domestic field office structure.
We also compared the cost per special agent with the points accumulated  per special agent for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 to determine the cost per  agent point earned. This comparison measures how efficiently special  agents are meeting the agency’s mission needs. Since we were limited to  2 fiscal years, we could not identify any trends over multiple years.  However, this type of an analysis could be of greater use to the Secret  Service, as it collects additional performance metric data in the future to  identify any trends warranting an adjustment of the field office structure.  For instance, the Secret Service could use this type of an analysis, upon  collecting additional data, to identify the higher- and lower-cost districts by  special agent point to inform decisions it makes regarding the placement  and size of its domestic offices. See appendix III for a description of this  analysis and findings.
Travel data. According to INV officials, the Secret Service considers the  number of protective travel stops in a district and agent hours traveling  out of district when evaluating domestic office staffing levels. However,  according to INV and MNO officials, the Secret Service does not use  travel data on the geographic locations domestic personnel are traveling  to or from to analyze the domestic field office structure. These officials  noted that such an analysis is not conducted because the majority of  domestic office travel is dependent on external factors, such as election  campaigns; visiting foreign dignitaries; and natural disasters, among other  factors, that are difficult to predict and beyond the agency’s control. While  these factors may be difficult to predict and outside of the Secret  Service’s direct control, further analysis of past and planned travel needs  may assist the Secret Service in determining office placement and use of  staff. For example, our analysis of frequent investigative travel patterns  may indicate the need for the agency to establish a permanent Secret  Service presence at certain non-Secret Service office locations. Given the  dynamic nature of domestic office travel because of the protection  demands cited by INV and MNO officials, it is important to analyze travel  patterns to determine if the domestic field office structure is responsive to  these changing conditions, as needed.
Our analysis of the Secret Service’s travel data from fiscal years 2009  through 2014 shows that, overall, personnel in certain domestic offices  traveled more often than personnel in others. However, on a per FTE  basis, certain smaller offices may be contributing a greater share of their  resources to travel. Our analysis further shows that domestic office  personnel traveled to certain locations more frequently than to others to  achieve the agency’s protective and investigative missions. The travel is  geographically dispersed, with concentrations in key geographic areas,  and certain nonoffice locations have required frequent repeat travel from  selected domestic offices to carry out the investigative mission.
From fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the number of trips taken by Secret  Service personnel in domestic offices ranged from a low of 12,404 in  fiscal year 2014 to a high of 28,678 in fiscal year 2012 (see fig.10). On  average, from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the Secret Service spent at  least $38 million on travel per year, with travel for protection accounting  for the majority of travel taken by domestic field office personnel.
Overall, the domestic offices that had personnel who traveled the most  often for any purpose from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, on the basis  of our analysis, were the Los Angeles Field Office with 7,470 trips,  followed by the New York, Miami, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., Field  Offices. INV and MNO officials explained that these offices have the most  special agents and as a result they are often used to provide agents for  protection duties. However, further analysis of the trips taken per  domestic office FTE shows that certain smaller offices may actually be  contributing a greater share of their resources to travel. For example, we  found that in fiscal year 2014, personnel in three smaller resident offices  took 13 to 15 trips per FTE. This was well above the average of 7 trips  per FTE in fiscal year 2014 for all domestic offices. By analyzing the  number of trips taken per FTE at each domestic office, the Secret Service  could have greater insight into identifying how the agency is utilizing its  domestic office FTEs and whether an adjustment in the field office  structure is warranted to gain travel efficiencies. This type of analysis  could be used by the Secret Service to inform decisions regarding  domestic office staffing as well as the structure of the domestic offices.
subsections: section_title: Protective Travel
paragraphs: On the basis of our analysis of travel taken in support of the Secret  Service’s protective mission, we found that domestic office personnel  visited 787 different U.S. cities during fiscal years 2009 through 2014.  These personnel most often visited Washington, D.C. (11,087); New York  (8,523); Wilmington, Delaware (3,051); Chicago (2,516); and Boston  (1,653). According to INV and MNO officials, frequent travel to these  destinations is largely because of the high number of protectee- and  foreign dignitary-attended events, such as the United Nations General  Assembly and other international summits, and current and past  presidential residences. Figure 11 shows all of the U.S. locations visited  by domestic office personnel for the purpose of carrying out protective  duties and the frequency of those visits during fiscal years 2009 through  2014.
As shown in figure 12, the domestic offices that had agents who traveled  the most often for protection, on the basis of our analysis, were the Los  Angeles Field Office, with the highest number of trips—6,328—from fiscal  years 2009 through 2014, followed by the New York; Chicago; Miami; and  Washington, D.C., Field Offices. Protective travel between these offices  accounted for 8 percent of all total protective travel from fiscal years 2009  through 2014. Additionally, in the case of the Dallas, Houston, and Atlanta  Field Offices, the frequent protection travel patterns reflect travel between  protectee residences—former presidents Bush and Carter—and  Washington, D.C. The Tyler Resident Agency in Texas had agents who  traveled the least often for protection, with 50 trips taken from fiscal years  2009 through 2014, followed by the Anchorage, Alaska; Akron, Ohio;  Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Roanoke, Virginia; and Wilmington, Delaware  offices.
On the basis of our analysis of investigative travel, we found that  personnel from four domestic offices each made 73 or more trips to the  same geographic locations where there is no Secret Service office, from  fiscal years 2009 through 2014. For example, one field office had  personnel who traveled a total of 241 times to the same geographic  location, with a minimum of 29 trips in fiscal year 2013 and a maximum of  54 in fiscal year 2010. INV officials explained that frequent travel for these  four domestic offices was the result of joint investigations, favorable  prosecution rates for Secret Service cases, and providing assistance with  major fraud investigations. Given the staffing levels at these offices—an  average of 20 or fewer FTEs from fiscal years 2009 through 2014—and  frequent travel, this could indicate a need to adjust staffing levels at these  offices or establish a permanent agency presence at non-Secret Service  office locations.
Conducting an analysis of its domestic field office structure, inclusive of  cost and performance, and other meaningful indicators of resource need,  such as travel data, could provide the Secret Service with greater  assurance that its domestic field office structure is responsive to changing  conditions, as needed, and that the agency is able to identify specific  actions that need to be taken to meet mission needs. Specifically, a  comparative analysis using cost and performance and travel data could,  among other things, help the Secret Service identify inefficiencies in its  domestic field office structure, including the cost relative to the  performance of particular offices and the location and size of offices, and  serve as a basis for allocating personnel. Additionally, this type of  analysis could also assist the agency with determining and justifying its  budgetary needs based on projected domestic field office activities. By  analyzing the travel patterns of its domestic field office personnel— purpose and locations traveled to—the agency could determine if there  are geographic areas that are under-or over-represented in terms of field  office coverage, thus warranting a potential adjustment of the domestic  field office structure. Further, maintaining a record of such analysis and  results could help ensure that key decisions and management directives  resulting from this analysis are carried out, and serve as a baseline for  future analyses.
section_title: Secret Service Has Not Accurately Recorded the Purpose of Travel for Investigations and Training on a Consistent Basis
paragraphs: Inconsistencies in how Secret Service personnel in domestic offices  recorded the purpose of investigative- and training-related travel from  fiscal years 2009 through 2014 adversely affected the reliability of the  agency’s travel data. According to Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government, control activities are an integral part of an entity’s  planning, implementing, reviewing, and accountability for stewardship of  government resources and achieving effective results. Although control  activities can vary by agency, categories of control activities that are  common to all agencies include the accurate and timely recording of  transactions and events.
According to INV officials, the purpose of travel to some of the geographic  locations most often visited—identified as 100 or more visits—for the  purpose of investigations from fiscal years 2009 through 2014 was likely  for training rather than investigations, as recorded. For example,  according to INV officials, locations such as Las Vegas, Nevada; San  Antonio, Texas; and Orlando, Florida, are popular destinations for law  enforcement conferences on investigations. Secret Service agents often  attend the conferences as presenters or students. Similarly, the Secret  Service named Birmingham, Alabama; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Brunswick,  Georgia; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, as examples of locations likely  traveled to for training rather than investigations. These are, according to  Secret Service officials, locations that host training and academic  facilities. Accordingly, domestic office personnel travel to these locations  to instruct or attend training courses. According to Secret Service officials,  however, since investigations may have been the topic of the conferences  or training courses, domestic office personnel likely recorded these trips  as investigative instead of training on their travel request forms.
INV and Financial Management Division officials reported that they  require all personnel to identify the purpose of travel on their travel  request forms using the purpose of travel provided to them through e- mail. Further, each travel request must be reviewed and authorized by the  traveler’s first-line supervisor. However, individuals may make mistakes  when identifying the purpose of travel in their travel request forms, and  supervisors may not be aware of the purpose the traveling employee was  directed to use. Accordingly, the appropriate travel purpose may not be  recorded.
As a result of ineffective controls to ensure that the purpose of  investigative- and training-related travel is accurately recorded, the Secret  Service is unable to reliably determine the cost and number of trips taken  for the purpose of investigations—one of its two core missions. This  further limits the Secret Service’s ability to fully analyze investigative  travel data to determine if its domestic offices are optimally located to  meet its mission needs. By ensuring that supervisors are aware of the  travel purpose that is to be used and reviewing the travel request forms to  confirm that that the correct travel purpose is recorded, the Secret  Service will be able to enhance its travel request and approval process.  As a result, the Secret Service will be able to reliably report on travel cost  information and be better positioned to inform the budgetary needs of its  domestic offices and assess related travel data that may inform its efforts  to determine if its domestic offices are optimally located to meet its  mission needs.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Secret Service plays a vital role by protecting our nation’s leaders,  including the President; ensuring the safety of foreign dignitaries visiting  the United States; and investigating crimes against our financial, banking,  and telecommunications infrastructure, among other important activities.  The Secret Service’s domestic field offices are essential to the agency  accomplishing its investigative mission and successfully executing its  protective mission. Given the significant contributions the domestic field  offices make in carrying out the agency’s missions, it is critical that the  offices be strategically positioned, in terms of both geography and  resources. The Secret Service’s institutional knowledge and subject- matter expertise are important for informing the domestic field office  structure. Having the right data and using them to inform the structure is  also important, as having the right data can provide agency leadership an  important basis for ensuring the Secret Service is best positioned to carry  out its mission given available resources. However, making effective  data-driven decisions is dependent on using reliable data. The Secret  Service does not currently have reliable salary and benefits cost data for  each of its offices. Correcting this will provide the Secret Service with an  accurate representation of how much each office costs, and serve as a  reliable basis for understanding resources allocated to each domestic  field office.
Further, conducting and documenting an analysis of its field office  structure could provide the Secret Service with greater assurance that its  domestic offices are best positioned to achieve its mission needs. The  Secret Service has made a significant investment in developing metrics  for understanding contributions made by its domestic field offices, and  has collected related performance data since at least 2009. Conducting a  comparative cost and performance analysis of its domestic field offices  can enhance the information agency leadership has available for decision  making. Importantly, the analysis can provide the Secret Service with  greater insight on the cost relative to performance of each office, help  identify inefficiencies and best practices, and provide valuable data for  informing future budget requests. In addition, by analyzing other  meaningful indicators of resource need, such as travel data, the Secret  Service could leverage additional information to ensure that its domestic  offices are optimally located to meet its mission needs, and better  understand the extent to which agents in each office travel and for what  purpose. Finally, taking steps to ensure that the purpose of travel by  domestic office personnel is accurately recorded will allow the agency to  reliably determine the costs associated with the investigative mission,  which is critical to assessing how resources are used in the domestic field  offices to meet the agency’s mission needs.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that the Secret Service accurately records salaries and  benefits cost data for its domestic offices, we recommend that the  Director of the Secret Service implement a review process to ensure time  and attendance codes used for recording cost data at each domestic  office are correctly established and appropriately attributed to the correct  office.
To better ensure that the Secret Service’s domestic field office structure is  enabling the Secret Service to best meet its mission needs, we  recommend that the Director of the Secret Service  conduct an analysis using cost and performance data and consider  using other data, such as travel data, to assess and inform its  domestic field office structure, and maintain a record of the analyses performed and the results.
To help ensure that the Secret Service has reliable information on the  number and cost of trips for its domestic field office personnel for  investigative and training purposes, we recommend that the Director of  the Secret Service enhance its travel request and approval process to  ensure that the trip purpose is accurately documented, effectively  reviewed and approved, and accurately recorded.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS for its  review and comment. DHS provided technical comments, which have  been incorporated into this report, as appropriate. DHS also provided  written comments, which are reprinted in appendix IV. In its comments,  DHS concurred with the report’s four recommendations and described  actions it has under way or planned to address the recommendations by  September 30, 2016.
DHS concurred with the first recommendation, to implement a review  process for domestic office time and attendance codes and stated that  the Secret Service’s Office of Human Resources will generate monthly  reports to ensure employee office codes in the time and attendance  system align with the office codes in the payroll system of record. If  implemented as planned, this action should help address the intent of the  recommendation and ensure cost data are attributed to the correct office.
DHS concurred with the second recommendation, that it conduct an  analysis using cost and performance data and consider using other data,  such as travel data, to assess and inform its domestic field office  structure. DHS stated that the Secret Service will develop a methodology  for incorporating cost data into its analysis of the field office structure.  However, DHS cited challenges to comparing cost to performance data,  including investigations that span multiple jurisdictions and fiscal years.  We acknowledged those challenges in this report and identified ways in  which we were able to mitigate them when conducting our own cost-to- performance analyses of the Secret Service’s domestic field office  structure. We believe that an analysis that combines both the Secret  Service’s cost and performance data will help ensure that the domestic  field office structure is enabling the Secret Service to best meet its  mission needs. As illustrated in our report, such an analysis can help the  Secret Service identify the offices yielding the greatest performance given  cost over a period of time. Such information can serve as a basis for  encouraging effective mission-driven practices at lower performing  locations. The data can also serve to uncover locations where fewer  resources should be allocated given the lack of mission-driven activities  and high cost for achieving them. In other words, performing a cost-to- performance analysis, as we recommend, yields the Secret Service a  “bang for the buck” assessment to inform the agency’s allocation of  scarce resources.
It is further important to note that our second recommendation focuses on  the Secret Service comparing cost-to-performance data, among other  data, as part of an analysis. We agree that other factors, such as travel  patterns and associated resource use, as well as location-specific crime  data, among other things, should be assessed as part of the analysis.  However, undertaking a cost-to-performance analysis to inform the  assessment of the field office structure would help efforts to ensure  resources are best positioned to meet the Secret Service’s mission  needs.
DHS concurred with the third recommendation to record the results of the  analyses performed and stated that the Secret Service’s Office of  Strategic Planning and Policy will maintain any analyses completed.
Finally, DHS concurred with the fourth recommendation, to enhance its  travel request and approval process and stated that the Secret Service’s  Risk Management and Assurance Branch will conduct validity tests to  ensure trip purposes are accurately documented, effectively reviewed and  approved, and accurately recorded. Additionally, any deficiencies found  during testing of the travel request and approval process will be  corrected. If implemented as planned, these actions should help address  the intent of the recommendation and ensure each trip purpose is  accurately documented.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of  Homeland Security, Director of the Secret Service, and other interested  parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report addresses the U.S. Secret Service’s domestic field office  structure. Specifically, our objectives were to examine the following  questions:  1.  What are the costs of the Secret Service’s domestic field office  structure and to what extent are the data reliable?  2.  How do the domestic offices contribute to accomplishing the Secret  Service’s missions?  3.  To what extent does the Secret Service use available data to ensure  that its domestic field office structure meets its mission needs, and  what data reliability challenges, if any, exist?
To determine the costs of the Secret Service’s domestic field office  structure, we obtained data from the Secret Service on the costs for each  domestic field office, resident office, and resident agency by cost  category. We collected data for fiscal years 2009 through 2014—the 6  most recent fiscal years for which full-year data were available at the time  of our review. We analyzed the total cost of the field office structure in  addition to costs associated with four categories we identified—salaries  and benefits, infrastructure, travel, and other (e.g., supplies)—among all  the categories provided by the Secret Service. The Secret Service was  unable to provide some cost data—lodging for protective travel, vehicle  purchases, working capital funds, information technology,  telecommunications, and insurance claims—for the field office structure  because these costs are not tracked in a manner in which they can be  attributed to domestic offices.
To assess the reliability of the Secret Service’s cost data, we discussed  with Financial Management Division and Management and Organization  Division officials, among others, how the data are entered and maintained  in the Secret Service’s official financial system of record—Travel  Manager, Oracle, PRISM, Sunflower system (referred to as TOPS)— which is used to disburse salaries, operating expenses, and travel costs.  We also reviewed the data for any obvious errors and anomalies and  identified inaccurate salary and benefit data because these costs were  attributed to the wrong office within the same district of the office where  the costs were incurred (e.g., the salary and benefit costs of a resident  office were assigned to its parent field office). As a result, we determined  that the cost data were sufficiently reliable in the aggregate, but not at the  individual office level. We compared the Secret Service’s practices for  reviewing the reliability of its cost data against standards in Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government, which state that control  activities should be effective and efficient in accomplishing the agency’s  objectives and help ensure that all transactions are completely and  accurately recorded.
To address the cost data limitation at the individual office level, we  compared the costs of the Secret Service’s 42 domestic field office  districts rather than individual offices. In addition, to account for the  disparity in the size of domestic offices, we also compared the costs of  field office districts per full-time equivalent (FTE), which is inclusive of all  personnel. We assessed the reliability of the Secret Service’s fiscal year  2009 through 2014 FTE data by interviewing Secret Service officials in  the Office of Investigations and Workplace Planning Division about how  the data are captured from the agency’s time and attendance system.  According to a Secret Service official, the data do not reflect a small  number of FTEs from two divisions that place personnel in domestic  offices, such as polygraph examiners. Although the Secret Service does  not know how many of these staff are in each of the domestic offices, we  determined the FTE data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes  because the costs associated with these personnel were not included in  the Secret Service’s cost data.
To address our second question and describe the ways in which domestic  offices contribute to the Secret Service’s missions, we obtained and  analyzed data provided by the agency on domestic office contributions  from fiscal years 2009 through 2014. Specifically, the Secret Service  provided two sets of data on domestic office contributions: (1)  performance review reports used to assess performance during fiscal  years 2009 through 2014, and (2) official statistics for the same years. We  compared the Secret Service’s performance metrics with agency and  department strategic plans, statutes governing the Secret Service’s areas  of responsibility, and measures developed under the Government  Performance and Results Act. We found that the Secret Service’s  performance metrics align with the agency’s investigative and protective  missions. The performance review reports were formulated to give all  contributing domestic offices credit for accomplishments (e.g., if several  offices contributed to an arrest, each would get credit), whereas the  official statistics published in the Secret Service’s annual report count  each accomplishment for only the main contributing office, to correctly  reflect the agency’s accomplishments. We utilized the performance  review reports in cases where we were assessing accomplishments on a  domestic office or field office district basis, and used the official statistics  in instances where we assessed the domestic offices’ contributions as a  whole. We assessed the reliability of both sets of data by interviewing  agency officials knowledgeable about the data and by obtaining written  responses from the agency regarding (1) the agency’s methods of data  collection and quality control reviews, (2) practices and controls over data  entry, and (3) any limitations of the data. We determined that the data  were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also systematically  reviewed the Secret Service’s Field Executive Summaries for fiscal year  2014—narratives that accompany each domestic office’s performance  review reports to identify types of reported performance and provide  examples of the office’s accomplishments.
Finally, we gathered information on Secret Service domestic offices’  contributions to the missions through semistructured interviews with a  nongeneralizable sample of 12 domestic offices in 6 districts led by field  offices in Atlanta, Georgia; Charlotte, North Carolina; Los Angeles,  California; Memphis, Tennessee; Miami, Florida; and Oklahoma City,  Oklahoma. We selected the offices based on fiscal year 2014 data—the  most recent data available—to represent a range of sizes, performance  ranks, and mission focus. To gain an understanding of how domestic  offices work with local and state law enforcement partners, we also  conducted semistructured interviews with at least one local and one state  partner for each selected district. The 15 law enforcement agencies were  selected from lists provided by the domestic offices to represent partners  that had long-term relationships with the Secret Service.
To address the third question, regarding the extent to which the Secret  Service uses available data to ensure its domestic field office structure  enables the agency to meet its mission needs, we interviewed officials  from the Office of Investigations, Management and Organization Division,  and Administration Operations Division about how the agency has  historically made decisions to open and close offices, and the  methodology behind those decisions. We used Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government to assess the agency’s efforts to  ensure that its domestic field office structure meets its mission needs.  Since we determined the Secret Service had not used its available data to  analyze its field office structure, we analyzed Secret Service–provided  cost, performance, and travel data to demonstrate how such analyses  could position the Secret Service to better ensure that its domestic field  office structure is responsive to changing conditions and that the agency  is able to identify specific actions that need to be taken to meet mission  needs.
To identify those districts with high costs and lower performance and  conversely low costs and higher performance, we conducted a regression  analysis of the 42 field office districts comparing cost with performance.  Specifically, we used variable district costs—total costs, except for rent— and all of the performance metrics that the Secret Service used during  fiscal years 2011 through 2014, with the exception of the protective  intelligence cases closed metric. This metric was excluded because of  how closely correlated it is with the protective intelligence cases opened  metric. Since the cost data at the individual field office level were not  reliable as previously discussed, we used variable costs at the district  level and then determined the average district cost per (1) special agent  from fiscal year 2011 through 2014, and (2) special agent point for fiscal  years 2013 and 2014. All performance metrics and cost variables were  normalized by the number of special agents per district to account for the  varying size of domestic offices within a district. We were not able to  make cost-of-living adjustments across localities, since the analyses had  to be performed at the district level and a Secret Service district can cover  more than one locality depending on the number and location of offices.  For example, the Atlanta District includes the Atlanta Field Office, and  Albany and Savannah Resident Offices. We evaluated cost and  performance data for the fiscal year 2011 through 2014 time frame  because the data on the number of special agents assigned to each field  office district were available for this time frame. We also analyzed the  average district cost per special agent point for fiscal years 2013 and  2014 because 2013 was the first year the Secret Service used the point  system.
Model. The following equation presents the model to be estimated where:  = The total variable cost per agent, excluding rent, incurred by district i in  year t.  = an intercept.  = a group of 12 performance metrics per agent identified and used by  Secret Service. The metrics consist of travel days, physical protection  hours, federal arrests, state arrests, cases closed, counterfeit seized  value, asset forfeiture, potential loss, actual loss, in-custody responses  closed, critical systems protections, and protective intelligence cases  closed by district i in year t.  = indicator variables for fiscal years 2011, 2012 and 2013.  = district indicator variables for each of the 41 districts where Richmond is  used as the reference district.  = error term assumed to be possibly heteroskedastic and auto-correlated.
Results. Table 2 shows the regression results, which we used to  determine the average cost per special agent and special agent point.  The district ranking is estimated from this table by adding the average  cost differential from each district to Richmond’s average cost per agent.
We analyzed the Secret Service’s travel data to identify travel patterns  that may warrant an adjustment of the domestic field office structure.  Specifically, we analyzed travel voucher data from the Secret Service’s  Travel Manager System for all domestic office personnel—special agents  and administrative personnel—who traveled from fiscal years 2009  through 2014. Using a Geographic Information System to synthesize and  analyze all trips taken by originating domestic office and destination by  fiscal year, we determined the following:  the purpose of all domestic office travel—protective, investigative and  training, and support travel; all locations that domestic office personnel traveled to for the purpose  of protection, both those with a Secret Service office and those  without a Secret Service office; and domestic offices that took the greatest number of total trips and trips  per FTE.
We used the travel data to assess whether the domestic offices are  optimally located given the Secret Service’s travel patterns to geographic  locations with or without a Secret Service office. To determine the  reliability of these data, we discussed with Financial Management  Division and Management and Organization Division officials, among  others, how the data are entered and maintained in the Secret Service’s  Travel Manager System, which is used to disburse travel costs. We also  reviewed the data for any obvious errors and anomalies. We determined  that the travel data were unreliable for determining the number of trips  taken for the purposes of investigations and training because some  investigative travel was, according to Office of Investigations officials,  inaccurately recorded as training travel. As a result, we combined  investigative and training travel in our analyses by purpose. Travel data  for the purposes of protection and support were sufficiently reliable for our  purposes.
To understand how manpower resources are diverted from domestic  offices, we treated multileg trips as separate visits in our analyses. For  instance, a multileg trip from Chicago to Los Angeles with a stop in  Spokane was treated as two separate visits to capture the actual location  of the traveling employee: Chicago to Los Angeles and Chicago to  Spokane. We did not evaluate travel costs since the voucher data do not  contain lodging costs, according to Management and Organization  Division officials, for protection-related travel, which is the majority of  domestic office personnel travel. Additionally, we did not analyze the  length of trips and distance traveled because the primary purpose of this  analysis was to identify the locations domestic office personnel were  traveling to and for what purpose.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2014 through  February 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Metrics Used by the Secret Service to Assess Performance of Domestic Offices
paragraphs: Table 3 lists the metrics, by mission, used by the Secret Service in fiscal  years 2009 through 2014 to assess the performance of its domestic  offices. Over the years, the Secret Service has made changes to these  metrics in order to best assess the contributions of individual offices to the  agency’s missions, according to Secret Service officials. We developed  the descriptions below using Secret Service guidance and interviews with  Secret Service officials. Table 4 shows the number of points that can be  earned by an office for each performance metric in fiscal years 2013 and  2014—the years in which points were awarded.
section_title: Appendix III: Average Cost per Special Agent Point Analysis
paragraphs: In alignment with agency mission priorities, the Secret Service  established a point system and weighted metrics for use in fiscal years  2013 and 2014 when assessing the performance of both its domestic  offices and special agents. Using the resulting data, we conducted a  comparative analysis of the associated performance data against cost.  Specifically, we analyzed the variable cost per special agent point earned  for all 20 performance metrics defined by the Secret Service. Since we  were limited to 2 fiscal years of performance data, we could not yet  identify any trends that may warrant an adjustment to the field office  structure. However, the Secret Service could build on this type of analysis  as it collects additional performance metric data in the coming years.
On the basis of our analysis, as shown in figure 13, we determined that  the New Orleans Field Office District was among the 5 districts with the  highest variable cost per special agent point in both fiscal years 2014 and  2013. We also found when comparing this analysis with the average cost  per special agent analysis that the Pittsburgh and San Diego Field Office  Districts had some of the highest costs per special agent and special  agent point. Specifically, we determined that  the Pittsburgh, Tampa, New Orleans, Denver, and Boston Field Office  Districts had the highest cost per special agent point in fiscal year  2014. The Orlando, Honolulu, New Orleans, Memphis, and San Diego  Field Office Districts had the highest cost per special agent point in  fiscal year 2013.
The Washington, D.C.; Atlanta; Dallas; Richmond; and Little Rock  Field Office Districts had the lowest cost per special agent point in  fiscal year 2014. The Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Kansas City,  Miami, and Dallas Field Office Districts had the lowest cost per special  agent point in fiscal year 2013.
Office of Investigations (INV) and Management and Organization Division  (MNO) officials explained that the variance in cost per special agent  points from fiscal years 2013 to 2014 could be the result of lengthier,  multiyear investigations that do not show results (e.g., cases closed or  value of asset forfeiture) until the following year or years.
Further, we found, on the basis of our analysis of changes in the cost per  special agent point from fiscal years 2013 to 2014, that 35 of the 42 field  office districts experienced an increase in the cost per special agent point  from fiscal years 2013 to 2014, with the increases ranging from $1,507 to  $100,546. Specifically, we found the following:
The Denver, Kansas City, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore Field  Office Districts had the highest increases in cost per special agent  point from fiscal years 2013 to 2014, ranging from $60,664 to  $100,546.
The Minneapolis, Oklahoma City, Charlotte, Seattle, and Cincinnati  Field Office Districts had the lowest increases in cost per special  agent point from fiscal years 2013 to 2014, ranging from $1,507 to  $7,798.
Since special agent points are a direct reflection of how the special  agents are meeting the agency’s mission needs, determining those  districts with higher and lower costs per special agent point is a key  indicator of whether the agency is maximizing its domestic office  resources. Further, as the Secret Service collects additional special agent  point data over the coming years, this type of analysis could allow the  agency to capture best practices for those districts with lower costs per  special agent point that could be shared with costlier districts.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Joseph P. Cruz (Assistant  Director), Lisa Canini, Miriam Hill, Robin Nye, and Zachary Sivo made  key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were Pedro  Almoguera, Billy Commons, Dominick Dale, Patricia Donahue, Emily  Gunn, Michele Fejfar, Eric Hauswirth, John Mingus, Ben Nelson, and  Jerry Sandau.