Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain for Future Brigades
Published: 2003-12-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Army continues to transform units, known as Stryker brigades, into lighter, rapidly deployable, and more capable forces. Because Stryker brigades are an entirely new design, the fiscal year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act required the Army to conduct an evaluation of the design, to include deployment of the brigade and execution of combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats. The act also required the Secretary of Defense to certify that the evaluation results indicate the design is both operationally effective and suitable. As one in a series of reviews of Army transformation, GAO monitored the evaluation to assess (1) whether the Army and the Secretary of Defense met legislative requirements, (2) how the Army evaluated both the operational effectiveness and suitability of the brigade's design, (3) what the brigade's performance was during the evaluation, and (4) how the Army plans to mitigate issues identified during the evaluation.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) met the legislative requirements of the fiscal year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act. The Army developed a plan for conducting an operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade; obtained the plan's approval from the Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; and from April through May 2003, the brigade deployed to the evaluation sites and conducted combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats--from major theater of war to security and stability operations. In September 2003, OSD certified to Congress that the brigade design is both operationally effective and suitable. The Army has deployed the first Stryker brigade to Iraq. The Army developed an evaluation plan and established a control cell that used independent evaluators to monitor and collect data on the brigade's performance. The cell compiled and analyzed the data and submitted a report to the I Corps commander, who declared the design as operationally effective and operationally suitable. The commander noted that performance difficulties were due to an accelerated fielding schedule and inadequate training time. The U.S. Forces Command endorsed the report. GAO determined, based on its observations and analyses, that the brigade's performance showed strengths and weaknesses. The brigade could perform as designed but did not consistently demonstrate its capabilities. The brigade's strengths were its ability to conduct combat missions, including deployment using different transportation modes and the ability to use the Stryker vehicle's speed and agility. The weaknesses related to staff planning, digital system usage, sustainment, and executing company-level combat missions. Contractors were also used ineffectively. GAO concluded that the primary cause of the weaknesses was insufficient training proficiency. The Army is implementing a plan to mitigate most operational evaluation issues. The Army concluded that the issues were largely training related, although some were related to design or equipment. The brigade, in preparation for deployment to Iraq, conducted additional training to address the issues the Army and GAO identified. The brigade's training performance indicates that these issues are being mitigated. The Army is addressing the training and equipment issues for the first Stryker brigade; however, it has deferred some critical issues that have implications for future brigades.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: During fiscal year 2003, the Army continued to transform its force to one  that is lighter, more rapidly deployable, and able to effectively operate in  various environments and across the full spectrum of threats from small- scale contingencies to a major theater of war. Two of six planned Stryker  Brigade Combat Teams are currently undergoing the Army’s initial  transformation efforts—one brigade, which has been deployed to Iraq, and  another brigade, which is co-located at Fort Lewis, Washington. The  brigades are an entirely new organizational design, and questions have  arisen regarding their combat effectiveness. In the fiscal year 2002  National Defense Authorization Act, Congress required  the Secretary of the Army to conduct an operational evaluation of the  brigade that includes deployment of the brigade to the evaluation site  and brigade execution of combat missions across the full spectrum of  potential threats and operational scenarios;  the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of  Defense to approve the operational evaluation plan; and  the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a report on the  operational evaluation.
The statute further limited deployment of the brigade and procurement of  vehicles beyond the third brigade until 30 days after the Secretary of  Defense submits the report and certifies that the results of the operational  evaluation indicate that the design for the Stryker Brigade Combat Team is  operationally effective and operationally suitable. (See appendix I for the  statutory provisions concerning these limitations on Army transformation  actions.)
On the basis of the authority of the Comptroller General, we monitored  and assessed the Army’s efforts to conduct an operational evaluation of  the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team — the Third Brigade of the Second  Infantry Division — as required by the fiscal year 2002 National Defense  Authorization Act. Our objectives were to assess (1) whether the Army and  the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) met legislative requirements,  (2) how the Army evaluated both the operational effectiveness and the  operational suitability of the brigade’s design, (3) what the brigade’s  performance was during the operational evaluation, and (4) how the Army  plans to mitigate issues identified during the operational evaluation.
In our assessment of the Army’s Stryker brigade operational evaluation,  we reviewed the Army’s operational evaluation plan and its associated  execution plan, and we observed the exercises held at the National  Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness Training  Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. We observed the deployment of the Stryker  brigade, as well as execution of certain combat missions. Upon  completion of the operational evaluation and the Army’s compilation of its  data sources, we reviewed and analyzed the Army’s database that  consisted primarily of evaluator comments to assess the brigade’s  performance. (See appendix II for the full text of the scope and  methodology.) We are providing this report, another in a planned series  related to Army transformation, to you because of your committees’  oversight responsibility. Related GAO products concerning transformation  are listed at the end of this report.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Army continues to transform its forces toward its goal to be more  strategically responsive and to dominate across the full spectrum of  military operations — from small-scale contingencies to a major theater  war. The transformation efforts, which began in 1999, attempted to  balance lethality, mobility, and survivability with the capabilities required  for responsiveness, deployability, sustainability, and a reduced in-theater  footprint. The Army chose an armored wheeled vehicle, designated as the  Stryker, as its primary combat platform and began to transform six  existing brigades to Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The Third Brigade of  the Second Infantry Division was selected as the initial Stryker Brigade  Combat Team.
According to the Army, the core qualities of the new brigade design are  high mobility at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels; an ability to  achieve decisive action through the use of dismounted infantry that is  supported by organic direct and indirect fire platforms; and an enhanced  situational understanding of the battlefield. As an early-entry force, the  brigade is expected to have sufficient built-in combat power to conduct  immediate combat operations upon arrival in theater if required. Also, the  brigade was designed to accept additional forces that can expand the core  tasks and functions that already reside within the brigade or that execute  tasks that do not reside within the brigade (e.g., adding armor, field  artillery, air defense, additional engineers, or aviation). The brigade was  also designed to adopt a new training regimen that allows a faster  deployment to any type of contingency; in contrast, current Army units  receive an alert for a mission, train for the mission-specific requirements,  and then deploy.
Congress has supported the Army’s transformation efforts, but since the  Stryker brigade is an entirely new design, members of the Senate and  House Committees on Armed Services agreed that the Army must conduct  an evaluation that indicated that the brigade’s design is operationally  effective and operationally suitable. The requirement for an operational  evaluation was formalized in the fiscal year 2002 National Defense  Authorization Act. For the evaluation, the Army modified an existing  training exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk,  Louisiana, and added a data collection apparatus, a deployment schedule,  and an additional training event at the National Training Center at Fort  Irwin, California. The Army uses training exercises at the Joint Readiness  Training Center and the National Training Center to increase the combat  proficiency of its units and to identify training deficiencies that need to be  addressed. The training exercises are conducted under stressful  conditions against an opposing force emulating combat scenarios  anticipated in war. By Army regulation, training deficiencies identified  during the rotations and subsequent retraining are not indicators of unit  failure. The Army conducted the evaluation from April through May 2003.
section_title: The Army and OSD Met the Requirements of the Act to Assess the Stryker Brigade
paragraphs: The Army and OSD met the requirements of the fiscal year 2002 National  Defense Authorization Act to, respectively, plan and conduct an  operational evaluation of the Stryker brigade and certify the evaluation  results. The Army met the requirements by (1) obtaining approval of the  evaluation plan by the Department of Defense Director of Operational Test  and Evaluation, (2) deploying the brigade to the evaluation site, and (3)  conducting combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats.  The act also made additional vehicle procurement and brigade deployment  contingent upon a certification that the brigade’s design is operationally  effective and operationally suitable. OSD has provided the certification to  Congress.
The Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation  approved the Army’s operational evaluation plan on March 28, 2003. The  Army’s primary objective was to comply with the legislation by assessing  the initial Stryker brigade’s design for operational effectiveness and  operational suitability according to the unit’s organizational and  operational concept and its current modified table of organization and  equipment. A secondary objective was to conduct a readiness assessment  of the unit’s ability to conduct combat operations according to Army  doctrine.
The Army deployed to the operational evaluation site when it conducted a  multimodal movement from Fort Lewis to the National Training Center,  Fort Irwin, and onto the Joint Readiness Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana.  The operational evaluation was held from April 1, 2003, through May 28,  2003. To accomplish these strategic and operational moves, the Army used  various methods, including rail, sea, air, and ground movements. Due to  current world military operations and the limited number of available  aircraft, the Army was restricted from moving the entire brigade combat  team by air.
During the operational evaluation, the brigade conducted combat missions  across the full spectrum of potential threats. The evaluation’s scope  included the brigade field training exercise at the National Training Center  and a certification exercise during a Joint Readiness Training Center  rotation. The evaluation was constructed so that the brigade conducted a  series of combat missions against an opposing force in both major theater  of war and small-scale contingency environments. For example, the  scenario at the National Training Center was optimized for the higher end  of combat where the brigade conducted operations against mechanized  forces. At the Joint Readiness Training Center, the brigade’s mission was  optimized for small-scale contingencies where the brigade conducted  operations in noncontiguous areas and in complex urban terrain.  Throughout the operational evaluation’s events, the brigade was  augmented with aviation, military police, and armor.
On August 19, 2003, the Acting Secretary of the Army forwarded a  memorandum requesting that the Secretary of Defense submit to Congress  the operational evaluation report prepared by the Army following the  evaluation and certify that the results of the evaluation indicate that the  Third Brigade, Second Infantry Division’s design is operationally effective  and operationally suitable. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, on  September 17, 2003, certified to Congress that the results of the  operational evaluation indicated the design for the initial Stryker brigade  is operationally effective and operationally suitable. The Army has  deployed the first Stryker brigade to Iraq.
section_title: Army Evaluated Key Operational Aspects and Used Subject Matter Experts to Assess Effectiveness and Suitability of the Brigade’s Design
paragraphs: The Army developed an evaluation plan that assessed key organizational  parameters, mission training plans, and key operational capabilities. The  Army also established an Operational Evaluation Control Cell (Control  Cell) to coordinate the assessment activities and used subject matter  experts and observers as independent evaluators to assess the operational  effectiveness and suitability of the brigade.
According to the Army, the key organizational parameters and operational  capabilities were the essential elements in assessing the brigade’s design  for operational effectiveness and operational suitability. The mission  training plans provided the tasks, conditions, and standards to assess  operational readiness as defined by the key operational capabilities. The  eight key organizational parameters are    achieve balance between capabilities for strategic responsiveness and  requirements for battle-space dominance,    balanced full spectrum utility,    minimize the brigade’s personnel and logistical footprint,    commonality of vehicular platforms,    embedded unit-based capabilities, and  internetted combined arms to company-team level.
The nine key operational capabilities are    mobility,    dismounted assault and the close fight,    enhanced situational understanding and information superiority,    holistic force protection and survivability,  lethality,  force effectiveness,  reach/reach-back,  joint/multinational/interagency interoperability, and  full spectrum flexibility and augmentation.
The key organizational parameters and operational capabilities are defined  by the brigade’s organizational and operational concept document of June  2000.
The evaluation linked these key characteristics to the brigade’s six critical  training requirements and then to the brigade’s mission training plans.  Army planners had determined that for an effective operational evaluation,  the events must focus on 10 specific brigade level tasks extracted from the  brigade mission training plans. Appendixes III, IV, and V illustrate the  evaluation’s integration of key organizational parameters and operational  capabilities, mission training plans, and critical training requirements. (See  appendix VI for the definition of key organizational parameters and  operational capabilities.)
The Army established a Control Cell to manage the activities needed to  conduct the evaluation. Participants included individuals from the I Corps  staff, the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command’s Brigade Coordination  Cell, the Army Test and Evaluation Command, and a team of contractors.  The Control Cell developed an execution plan and provided it to the  Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation for  review.
During development of the operational evaluation execution plan, the  Department of the Army provided additional guidance to Forces  Command and directed that the evaluation also assess the ability of the  Stryker brigade to receive logistical support from echelon above brigade  support elements. Initially, the Army had planned to informally assess this  capability. However, after we recommended to the Secretary of Defense  that external logistics support be an element of the evaluation, the Army  included this in its execution plan. To address these concerns, the Control  Cell’s execution plan included an evaluation of the echelon above brigade  support elements, including the logistics concepts such as contractor  support, reach-back, and configured loads. Real-world events limited the  number of assets available to allow for continuous aerial resupply, so the  Control Cell compensated by using limited aerial resupply and, when  aircraft were not available, used notional aerial resupply that included the  use of time delays to replicate transport time. For both types of resupply,  the echelon above brigade elements would distribute supplies in  configured loads to the Stryker brigade for disbursement.
Prior to the conduct of the operational evaluation, the Control Cell  instructed and certified subject matter experts from proponent schools  and observer-controllers from the training centers as primary data  collectors. The instruction familiarized the data collectors on the Stryker  brigade organization, capabilities and doctrine, and the combat training  centers’ rules of engagement and safety guidelines. Officials from the  Army’s Test and Evaluation Command provided instruction on data  collection procedures and use of data collection tools such as personal  digital assistants. Additionally, the Control Cell formed a team composed  of members of the Training and Doctrine Command’s Brigade  Coordination Cell that also collected data throughout the operational  evaluation.
Data collected for the operational evaluation included observations and  comments from subject matter experts, observer-controllers, and team  members from the Brigade Coordination Cell. These observations and  comments occurred while the data collectors observed the brigade’s  performance during the various combat missions. Additional data sources  included after-action reviews, surveys, and key personnel interviews. The  Army’s Operational Test Command also retrieved digital instrumentation  data. All of these data sources were retrieved every 24 hours and validated  by officials of the Army’s Operational Test Command and the Control Cell.  The Control Cell established a review group to authenticate the data and  develop initial insights based on observations that emerged as the events  progressed.
Upon completion of the operational evaluation, the Control Cell analyzed  all the data sources and submitted a report of its findings to the I Corps  commander. The I Corps commander concluded that the brigade had met  or adequately met each of the requirements associated with the key  organizational parameters and key operational capabilities. The Army  defined “adequately met” as the brigade’s design was operationally  effective and operationally suitable but had some deficiencies, or issues.  The report was submitted to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces  Command, who endorsed the report’s findings. Although the I Corps  commander assessed the brigade’s design as operationally both effective  and suitable, the operational evaluation report noted that the Stryker  brigade experienced difficulties in demonstrating some of the key  operational capabilities, which were primarily attributed to an accelerated  fielding schedule and a lack of adequate training time.
section_title: Stryker Brigade Demonstrated Both Strengths and Weaknesses during the Operational Evaluation
paragraphs: Based on our observations of the brigade’s performance at the two combat  training centers and our analysis of data collected during the evaluation,  the brigade performed as designed but did not consistently demonstrate its  capabilities, indicating both strengths and weaknesses. In certain areas,  the Stryker brigade demonstrated its strengths, including both the ability  to conduct strategic and operational deployments and to maneuver about  the battlefield using the Stryker vehicle. The operational evaluation also  demonstrated weaknesses in the areas of staff planning, usage of digital  systems, sustainment of the brigade, and established company-level  combat procedures. Civilian contractors were also used ineffectively to  support the units. Our analysis indicated that the Stryker brigade’s training  proficiency was the primary cause of these weaknesses.
subsections: section_title: Stryker Brigade Demonstrated That It Is Deployable
paragraphs: Our observations and analysis of the data indicated that the Stryker  brigade demonstrated the ability to conduct strategic and tactical  deployments using different transportation systems such as rail, ground,  and various sea vessels and aircraft. Upon arrival at each destination, the  brigade showed the ability to reassemble into a combat configuration in a  timely manner. Once reconfigured, units of the Stryker brigade also  demonstrated the ability to conduct immediate combat operations. It  should be noted, however, that while the tactical deployment of the  Stryker vehicle by C-130 aircraft was demonstrated, the Army has yet to  demonstrate under various environmental conditions, such as air  temperature and airfield altitude, just how far Stryker vehicles can be  tactically deployed by C-130 aircraft.
The brigade used commercial air, rail, and ground transportation to move  personnel and equipment from Fort Lewis to Fort Irwin. While at the  National Training Center, we observed the brigade conduct a tactical  movement by moving a Stryker infantry company with its personnel,  supplies, and 21 Stryker vehicles via C-130 aircraft from Southern  California Logistics Airfield to an austere desert airfield on Fort Irwin  about 70 miles away. (Figure 1 shows a Stryker vehicle being loaded at the  Southern California Logistics Airfield, and figure 2 shows the Stryker  exiting from a C-130 aircraft at the National Training Center.) Upon  landing, the infantry company unloaded the vehicles from the aircraft,  reconfigured them for combat missions, and moved onward to a staging  area. All Stryker variants could reconfigure into combat capable modes  within their designated time standard, except the medical variant. Based  on our observation of the event, we agree with the Army that the  insufficient crew size was the reason why the medical variant, with its  extra external boxes, could not be reconfigured within the time standard.  However, if the brigade had trained to reconfigure the Stryker variants,  this situation would have been apparent and should not have occurred.
The Stryker brigade demonstrated strategic movement when it deployed  brigade elements by rail, sealift, and C-17 aircraft from the National  Training Center to a staging area located at Chennault Industrial Airpark,  located in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Two battalion equipment sets moved  by Fast Sealift Ship from San Diego, California, to Lake Charles Seaport,  while a third battalion’s equipment, including all current Stryker variants,  moved by C-17 aircraft from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to a staging area at the  England Air Park in Alexandria, Louisiana. (Figure 3 shows a Stryker being  unloaded from a Fast Sealift Ship.) Elements of the Stryker brigade that  unloaded at the Lake Charles Seaport moved to the Chennault Industrial  Airpark and then conducted a road march to the Joint Readiness Training  Center to begin combat operations. We observed the staging area as the  brigade assembled and prepared for its road movement to the training  center. Figure 4 shows the road march to the training center.
Tactical deployment was demonstrated when C-17 aircraft transported an  infantry company from Lake Charles to Geronimo forward landing strip,  an austere dirt airfield at the Joint Readiness Training Center. The C-17  aircraft landed at the forward landing strip, and the infantry company  demonstrated the ability to quickly unload its vehicles and personnel by  moving to the tactical assembly area in about 10 minutes. (Figure 5 shows  a C-17 aircraft at Geronimo forward landing strip.) A Stryker infantry  company also demonstrated the ability to travel into combat operations in  a C-130 aircraft. (Figure 6 shows the loading of an infantry company and  its vehicles onto C-130 aircraft at Geronimo forward landing strip.) The  Stryker infantry company—consisting of 21 Strykers and 5 other trucks  and trailers; 188 soldiers; and 3 days of food, water, ammunition, and fuel  to support the company—traveled from Geronimo to Essler airfield using  7 C-130s flying 25 sorties over a distance of about 100 miles. Upon landing  at the Essler airfield, the company moved to a tactical assembly area and  onward to conduct a combat operation.
section_title: Stryker Brigade Demonstrated Its Ability to Quickly Maneuver about the Battlefield
paragraphs: The Stryker vehicle demonstrated speed, agility, and extensive  maneuverability during the execution of the brigade’s combat missions  during the operational evaluation. Because of its maneuverability, the  Stryker vehicle allowed individual units to react and move around the  battlefield much more quickly than light and mechanized infantry units,  allowing individual units to accomplish tasks in minutes compared to  hours. When used properly, the Stryker vehicle enabled the brigade to  outmaneuver and overpower opposing forces. The performance of the  Stryker brigade at both training centers indicated that with its vehicles, it  could move faster as compared to both conventional and/or nonmotorized  infantry as well as infantry units equipped with the Bradley fighting  vehicle.
At the Joint Readiness Training Center, the Stryker vehicle performed well  in urban areas and in wooded terrain. (Figure 7 shows the Stryker  maneuvering in wooded terrain.) The speed of the vehicle enabled the  infantry companies to quickly arrive in urban areas, giving them the ability  to surprise the enemy and overcome urban objectives. The attack on the  “town” of Shugart-Gordon illustrated that the Stryker was able to move  quickly using a route that included very restrictive terrain. (Figure 8 shows  the town of Shugart-Gordon.) The Stryker easily moved through the rough  terrain and made it to the objective, giving the company commander the  ability to rapidly transport soldiers during the assault. The speed of the  Stryker allowed one particular company to arrive at the objective early  and surprise the enemy. In another instance, the capabilities of the vehicle  allowed Stryker units to rapidly pursue and decisively engage  unconventional forces that were more mobile than U.S. Army light infantry  units. The Stryker vehicles’ speed allowed the infantry units to fix and  destroy the enemy, despite the enemy’s efforts to leave the battlefield.
At the National Training Center, the Stryker vehicle demonstrated its  ability to accelerate quickly and maneuver over the desert terrain to  deliver infantry personnel to their objective. Our analysis shows that the  Stryker vehicle moved more quickly and much quieter than the opposing  forces’ vehicles, giving the brigade a substantial tactical advantage over  the enemy. When operating in extremely rugged and steep terrain, the  Stryker did lose some of its mobility advantage and had difficulty in  maneuvering as quickly as the opposing forces’ vehicles. Despite the loss  of this advantage, the Stryker vehicle was nonetheless mobile enough to  allow a company to quickly reposition and destroy a platoon of guerrilla  forces running through rough terrain. The Stryker’s speed enabled the  infantry unit to quickly move into its attack position after changes in the  battlefield. Because of this speed, the vehicle potentially provides a  commander more time to react since less time is spent moving from one  location to another.
section_title: Brigade’s Staff Performance Was Inconsistent
paragraphs: On the basis of our analysis of the data, as a collective organization, the  brigade staff was unable to consistently perform in accordance with  Army doctrine, hindering the ability of the Stryker brigade to first fully see  and then understand the battle space. Staff processes, both the integration  of the entire staff and those internal to specific sections, affected the  ability of the brigade to produce and execute synchronized plans. The  Stryker brigade did display the ability to integrate and collect information,  but not consistently. The observer-controllers generally identified training  time as the primary cause for the weaknesses.
Army doctrine prescribes a manner in which staffs should develop battle  plans. This military decision-making process requires incorporation of all  staff elements in a collective effort to synchronize all of the brigade’s  assets. Although the brigade staff gained experience and improved by  going through the process over the course of the evaluation, they did not  consistently integrate all of the staff sections and key subsections,  including information operations, fire support, and intelligence. Because  all of these assets were not incorporated into the planning process, the  brigade had difficulty in using its capabilities according to doctrine.
The Stryker brigade displayed the ability to integrate information from  multiple sources. However, managing the flow of the information and  disseminating it throughout the brigade was difficult. For example, the  brigade Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition squadron  provided more information than the brigade staff could process. Because  the staff’s proficiency level to manage the information was low, the ability  to analyze and present a common operational picture was reduced.
The staff’s performance affected all units within the brigade. Commanders  were not given well-developed planning products, including an accurate  initial picture of the enemy and the enemy’s anticipated actions, as well as  tools that enabled the application of all of the brigade’s organic combat  capability. Although they were still able to conduct combat missions, the  brigade did not perform to the best of its capabilities.
Synchronization of the brigade’s intelligence collection effort was  inconsistent. Unlike traditional Army units, the Stryker brigade has a very  robust intelligence collection capability that includes unique tools such as  unmanned aerial vehicles; nonlethal effects capabilities such as civil  affairs, psychological operations, and legal personnel; and a  Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition squadron. Because  the efforts were not synchronized, intelligence collection assets were not  consistently used in an efficient manner, resulting in areas not being  observed or other areas receiving redundant coverage. Also, the  reconnaissance squadron sometimes operated independently of the  brigade’s guidance, resulting in a failure to obtain needed information.
section_title: Using the Digital Systems Proved Difficult for the Brigade
paragraphs: The operational evaluation demonstrated that the brigade had not  mastered the use of its digital systems. The proper use and employment of  the various digital systems increase the commanders’ ability to position  troops and conduct combat operations. However, our analysis shows that  a combination of either not using established procedures or not having  established procedures, as well as a lack of familiarity with the systems,  prevented full exploitation of the systems’ capabilities.
During the evaluation, a lack of familiarity with the systems and a lack of  standardized procedures contributed to the brigade’s inability to fully  maximize the capabilities of its digital systems. Brigade leaders and staff  struggled with acquiring data and interpreting it in a timely manner. If the  staff had properly used the various digital systems, the commanders’  ability to position troops and conduct combat operations would have been  increased.
Digital systems were not available for all elements of the brigade,  including augmenting units. Not all staff sections and subsections  possessed the FBCB2 system, hindering staff planning operations. At the  platoon level, only the platoon leader and platoon sergeant Stryker  vehicles are equipped with the FBCB2 system. Further, when infantry  personnel dismount, they have no direct digital connectivity to the FBCB2  system. As a result, the non-FBCB2-equipped Stryker vehicles and  dismounted infantry did not possess the same level of situational  awareness that Stryker vehicles equipped with the FBCB2 system did.  Additionally, augmenting units such as armor and aviation did not arrive  with the FBCB2 system, so the brigade attached a liaison element  equipped with the system. Because the augmenting units did not have the  system, the Stryker brigade had to provide analog control measures so that  the augmenting unit would know the brigade’s plan.
The FBCB2 system was not consistently updated to provide a current view  of the battle space. Although the FBCB2 system automatically tracks the  location of vehicles equipped with the system, enemy positions and the  location of friendly dismounted infantry must be entered manually. While  this capability exists, updating this information was not consistently done.
The brigade did not consistently use predesignated formats in the FBCB2  system, affecting the information flow into other systems. To  communicate with the Army Battle Command System, the FBCB2 system  has a predesignated message format. Units found these formats  cumbersome and opted instead to use either analog means or the free-text  feature in the system. Not using the predesignated format made updating  the other systems inefficient, because operators had to transfer  information from the free text into the Army Battle Command System.  Additionally, because free text did not automatically update the  information in the other systems, the view of the battle space was  inaccurate.
Not using the information available in the FBCB2 system was also an  issue. For example, there were several instances where individual Stryker  vehicles and an entire Stryker unit conducted movement through a  minefield that had been entered into the system. These movements either  delayed combat operations or resulted in casualties. Another example was  movement of unit vehicles down a route that was congested. The system  provided the unit information that the route was congested; yet the driver  ignored the information and moved down the route.
section_title: Sustaining the Brigade Was Challenging
paragraphs: During the evaluation, the brigade experienced difficulties in conducting  supply operations because components within the brigade did not or were  unable to follow the established procedures. Support to the Stryker  brigade is distribution based, meaning that instead of keeping supplies on  hand, the brigade is designed to receive a near-continuous flow of  anticipated supplies through the supply chain. The areas of the supply  chain assessed were the organic sustainment provided by the brigade  support battalion and the external logistics support provided by the  echelon above brigade. Because these two support areas are linked,  supply requests from the brigade impact the ability of the echelon above  brigade elements to provide the necessary anticipatory logistics.  Conversely, incorrect supplies sent from the echelon above brigade  elements to the brigade affected the ability of the brigade to distribute  supplies to its units. When units made proper requests, the process  worked correctly. However, the inability to make proper requests affected  the ability of the entire supply chain to provide support to the brigade.
Difficulties in maintaining a flow of supplies began at the individual unit  level and affected the entire logistics flow. We determined through our  analysis of the observer-controller comments that units had difficulty  adapting to the just-in-time system. Commanders were uncomfortable  maintaining supplies below 50 percent of their full operational  requirement and, during those situations, often placed emergency resupply  requests to the brigade support battalion. Units also had difficulty using  the digital systems to request resupply because they lacked familiarity  with the systems, connectivity issues impeded performance, or reporting  formats did not adequately address their logistics needs. While the units  were able, at times, to adopt work-around solutions, the effect was a  disruption of the intended flow of supplies.
The brigade support battalion struggled to perform its dual function of  acting as a conduit for its requests and the distribution point for supplies  between the echelon above brigade support structure and the brigade. One  difficulty faced by the support battalion was the need to reconfigure  supplies received from the echelon above brigade support structure. Unit  supply requests did not adequately reflect its needs; therefore, the  anticipatory loads sent from the echelon above brigade support structure  did not contain the correct supplies in the correct amounts and  configurations. As a result, the brigade support battalion had to  reconfigure the supplies it had available as well as those that it had  received. Supply distribution occurred as available, as opposed to a set  schedule, resulting in the support battalion having insufficient  transportation assets to deliver all needed supplies in a timely manner.  Figure 9 shows the brigade support battalion at the National Training  Center.
The brigade also had difficulty providing supplies to units when the  support battalion was moving to a new location. The evaluation showed  that when stationary, the support battalion successfully established  alternate supply points for brigade units. (Figure 10 shows an example of  an alternate supply point at the National Training Center.) However, when  the support battalion moved, the brigade did not adequately provide for  alternate distribution points. Had this issue been addressed, the brigade  would have had the ability to adequately supply its units during the  support battalion’s relocation.
section_title: Stryker Companies Had Problems Executing Combat Missions
paragraphs: Although Stryker companies were able to exercise and achieve some  degree of success conducting combat operations at both training centers,  many of their capabilities were not consistently used. Areas of concern  included tracking dismounted infantry, performance of antitank systems,  and challenges linking fire support elements to the artillery battalion. Our  analysis of the data showed that limited training time and a lack of  standard operating procedures contributed to the companies’ inability to  consistently use their combat capabilities. Placing more emphasis on the  planning and rehearsal of operations, as well as developing and practicing  internal tactics, techniques, and procedures, could mitigate these  deficiencies.
Tracking dismounted infantry was an area of concern. Dismounted  infantry squads do not carry digital systems, so units can only maintain  awareness of dismounted infantry locations by entering reports from  analog systems into digital systems. Uncertainty about the location of  dismounts hindered the ability of companies to use their mortars, reducing  the overall application of their combat power. Despite the inability to  track dismounts noted in observer-controller comments, one unit at the  National Training Center was able to rapidly update the location of  dismounts into the digital systems by using a process it had developed,  indicating that this issue can be corrected.
Performance of antitank systems had mixed results. At the National  Training Center, observer-controller comments were overwhelmingly  supportive of the Javelin system, noting how it provided the dismounted  infantry the capability to destroy armored forces. However, at the same  time, observer-controllers at both training centers expressed concerns that  the brigade antitank company and the organic mobile gun system platoon,  consisting of a substitute Stryker antitank system, were not positioned  properly to optimize their capability. The cause for this was attributed to a  lack of situational understanding.
Fire support elements, the link between infantry units and the field  artillery battalion, also faced challenges in requesting and delivering  brigade-level indirect fires. At both training centers, brigade units were not  using their digital capabilities. Instead of using the digitized artillery  command, control, and communication system, fire supporters were using  radios and plain text messages on the FBCB2 system to call for fires,  which required soldiers at the receiving end of the request to enter the  information manually and increased the time to deliver fires. Observer- controllers at both training centers identified contributing factors such as  a lack of a detailed digital standard operating procedure for fire supporters  and the lack of familiarity and experience with the digitized artillery  command and control system.
section_title: Contractors Were Not Always Used Effectively
paragraphs: Although in most instances contractor contributions were positive, our  analysis identified instances where the contractors were used ineffectively  because units used them improperly or did not provide the support  necessary to ensure their effective use.
Unit personnel perform regularly scheduled routine maintenance on their  vehicles and equipment systems according to Army standardized  maintenance manuals and unit operating procedures. However, the  Stryker brigade requires a significant use of contractors to maintain and  repair the unit’s newest systems, such as the Stryker vehicles and their  remote weapon systems, and the digitized FBCB2 system. Use of  contractors to maintain and repair the Army’s newest systems is not  unique to the Stryker brigade. For example, we previously reported that  the 4th Infantry Division deployed to Iraq with around 60 contractors to  support the division’s digitized equipment. Within the Stryker brigade,  contractors are placed in combat repair teams and generally co-located  with the individual battalions and in sections within the brigade support  battalion with the primary mission of maintaining specific systems  according to the support contract awarded. The brigade is to provide the  contractors with necessary support, including rations, water, and  equipment items such as night vision goggles and protective clothing.
During the evaluation, contractors assigned to the battalion combat repair  teams responded quickly to maintenance issues. These personnel were  commended for their ability to quickly fix damaged Stryker vehicles and  for reducing the amount of time a vehicle was unavailable to the unit for  combat operations. As a result of the contractors’ responsiveness, some  units relaxed their emphasis on unit-level maintenance and became overly  dependent on the contractors. In analyzing the data, we found instances  where contractors were used ineffectively. For example, we found that  some units bypassed standard Army maintenance procedures and  requested contractor support to conduct maintenance that should have  been conducted by the unit’s organic maintenance personnel.
We also noted that transporting the contractors to support the  reconnaissance squadron proved difficult because the squadron was  spread across the battlefield and was responsible for the largest  operational area. The brigade placed contractors in combat repair teams  that were, in turn, attached to the individual battalions. The battalions are  responsible for the contractors’ security, logistics, and transportation. The  location of the combat repair teams on the battlefield determines the  ability of the contractors to get quickly to where they are needed.
Also, contractors could not be used in some instances because the brigade  did not provide the contractors with night vision goggles, impeding their  ability to move to units during periods of limited visibility. Additionally,  protective clothing and equipment for the contractors were not provided,  which precluded the contractors from performing their responsibilities  after chemical attacks. The mitigation plan addresses those issues relating  to not using contractors effectively.
section_title: Insufficient Training Proficiency Primary Reason for Operational Evaluation Weaknesses
paragraphs: Our analysis of the data collected during the operational evaluation  indicated that the brigade’s training proficiency was insufficient to fully  demonstrate the brigade’s entire capabilities across the full spectrum of  combat missions. The comments from the observer-controllers and  subject matter experts confirmed this conclusion because their comments  generally identified training as a major contributor to the identified  weaknesses. Moreover, the Army’s final operational evaluation report  identified training as a limitation of the operational evaluation. The  brigade had never trained as a brigade-sized unit until it reached the  National Training Center and only three of six battalions had undergone an  external evaluation prior to the rotation. According to the Army, the  Stryker brigade needed 15 weeks of unit training after receiving its last  vehicles and this did not occur. In fact, the brigade was still receiving  Stryker variants at the end of the National Training Center exercise.
In May 2002, we reported that Fort Lewis training officials would have  preferred a full 6 months to train after receiving most of the new Stryker  vehicles. This also did not occur. Most brigades in the Army begin training  for their deployment to a combat training center, such as the National  Training Center, 4 to 6 months ahead of time. We also reported that the  need to train Stryker brigade soldiers in digital systems was posing a  challenge because the brigade’s design requires digitization to maintain the  critical situational awareness capability. These systems use sophisticated  technology that allows the soldiers to achieve superior battlefield  information enabling them to engage the enemy long before coming into  contact. Our analysis of the operational evaluation concludes that 1 year  later, the brigade still had not mastered the use of its digital systems.
section_title: Army Risk Management Plan Will Mitigate Most Operational Evaluation Issues, but Deferred Issues Have Implications for Future Brigades
paragraphs: The Army is implementing a risk management plan to mitigate most issues  identified in the operational evaluation, which generally correspond with  the weaknesses we identified. The Army concluded that the issues were  largely training related, but it also identified a few as design or equipment  related. Although the Army developed, and is implementing, a plan that  will mitigate most of the identified issues, the Army’s immediate focus was  to resolve those training and equipment issues that affected the brigade’s  ability to deploy to Iraq. It deferred for future consideration the remaining  issues and decisions that have implications for the future brigades.
Based on its analysis of the operational evaluation report, the Army first  developed a matrix that assigned a risk level to issues and determined  whether issues would preclude the Stryker brigade from a scheduled  deployment or could be addressed in the future. It then developed a  mitigation plan to address all issues identified.
To mitigate the identified training issues and to prepare for the brigade’s  deployment to Iraq, I Corps developed and implemented an 8-week  modular predeployment training event that included a command post  exercise to train the staff and a brigade field training exercise that  emphasized platoon and company operations. The training addressed four  general issues identified from the operational evaluation:    Army Battle Command System interoperability and connectivity,    staff operations and synchronization,    application of doctrine in unit operations, and    subordinate unit specific training.
Furthermore, the command post and field training post exercises were to  ensure that the brigade    was proficient in stability and support operation tasks as specified by    validated the interoperability of newly fielded systems and equipment,    validated the integration of newly assigned soldiers and leaders and  attached units such as the assigned aviation task force,    exercised the staff planning and battle command process using the  digital and communications systems to refine the staff planning  process,    exercised distributed logistics in a complex environment, and    exercised force protection and accountability of contractors on the  battlefield.
To help the brigade achieve the training objectives, U.S. Forces Command  provided observer-controllers from the Joint Readiness Training Center to  provide feedback and conduct informal after-action reviews focused on  lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. A senior training center  official stated that 40 to 50 percent of the observer-controllers had  participated in the operational evaluation segment held at the Joint  Readiness Training Center. During the command post exercise, the  observer-controllers viewed the planning and execution of the brigade and  battalion staffs, and during the field training exercise, they viewed the  conduct of assigned company-level combat missions.
After completing the training, the brigade commander assessed the  brigade as fully trained to perform its combat tasks. The brigade  commander concluded the brigade was    completely retrained on those issues identified from the operational  evaluation with a focus on applicability to planned missions in Iraq and  fully prepared to deploy.
After the training events were completed, we discussed the brigade’s level  of training and readiness with the brigade commander and senior Army  officials responsible for Stryker brigade transformation. All reported no  reservations regarding the proficiency of the brigade and its ability to  deploy and conduct combat operations in Iraq. One senior training official  opined that the Stryker brigade is as well trained as any unit he has  observed and that the unit can operate in any threat environment.  Moreover, the issues the Army identified in its risk management matrix  and exercised during its predeployment training addressed the  weaknesses we identified in our observations and analysis of the  operational evaluation. The brigade’s performance indicates that the  issues and weaknesses are being mitigated.
However, the Army is not fully addressing the potential brigade design and  the brigade equipment issues identified from the operational evaluation,  which were not included in the predeployment training, although the  issues have implications for future brigades. According to the Army staff,  the issues that were nondeployment related are still under consideration.  One identified design issue that has both deployment and long-term  implications was associated with the mobility and survivability of the  reconnaissance squadron operations officer. Currently, this staff officer’s  mobile command post is a High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle. The  operational evaluation concluded that the operations officer could not  sustain the mobility pace of the reconnaissance commander and the  commander’s Stryker vehicle. The evaluation also concluded that the  threat requires armored protection for this key individual. The short-term  solution is to consider providing a Stryker vehicle to the operations officer  from brigade maintenance spares or other sources, such as another unit in  the brigade. The mitigation plan includes no long-term solution, including  purchasing additional Strykers. This issue is being considered through  normal Army processes to determine a long-term solution that may affect  requirements for future brigades.
An equipment issue that is not addressed in the mitigation plan, but has  implications for future brigades, is that not all Stryker vehicles are  equipped with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. Only two  of the four Stryker vehicles in each platoon are currently equipped with  the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. The operational  evaluation concluded that all infantry platoon Stryker vehicles need to be  equipped with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. The Army  had previously recognized the need because the brigade’s modified table  of organization and equipment currently authorizes the equipment.  However, the Army’s mitigation plan calls for procuring sufficient sets for  only the initial Stryker brigade; it does not address plans for the follow-on  brigades.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The operational evaluation provided the Army its first opportunity to  exercise and evaluate the capabilities of the Stryker brigade as a whole. By  completing the evaluation and certifying the design, the Army and OSD  met the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal  year 2002. However, as the results of the operational evaluation illustrated,  issues with the brigade’s training, design, and equipment exist. The  training issues arose because operating with a new unit design requires  time to develop skills, which the accelerated fielding schedule did not  allow. In preparation for deployment to Iraq, the Army mitigated most of  these training issues, but it deferred resolution of some design and  equipment issues and their respective decisions for future consideration. It  is important that all issues be resolved, including those that affect future  brigades, such as provision of Stryker vehicles for reconnaissance  squadron operations officers and procurement of FBCB2 systems and  other digitized equipment for the infantry platoons’ Stryker vehicles.  Passing on lessons learned from the operational evaluation provides the  Army the opportunity to ease the transformation process for future  Stryker brigades by ensuring that the units have the proper training and all  necessary equipment. As we have stated previously, taking action now to  address such issues and passing on the remedies learned could enhance  the chances that future brigade formations will be accomplished smoothly.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To assist the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams’ transformation efforts, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army  to    develop a plan that completes the mitigation efforts on those issues not  addressed prior to deploying the brigade and    apply, as applicable, adjustments made to the training, design, and  equipment of the brigade to future Stryker brigades.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense  concurred with our recommendations and outlined actions the Army is  taking in implementing them.
In responding to our recommendation that the Army develop a plan to  complete mitigation efforts on those issues not addressed prior to  deploying the brigade, the department stated that the Army has developed  and is executing plans for the various issues identified in the operational  evaluation and that once the armor installation is completed in November- December 2003 in Kuwait, the Army will have completed all of the  mitigation efforts identified in our report.
With regard to our recommendation that adjustments made to the training,  design, and equipment of the first brigade are applied, as applicable, to  future brigades, the department concurred that adjustments were  necessary and would be applied to future Stryker brigades. The  department stated the Army had created a Third Brigade, Second Infantry  Division deployment team, comprised of representatives from across the  Army, and that its scope included material requirements for the First  Brigade, Twenty-Fifth Infantry Division (the Army’s next Stryker brigade)  and future Stryker brigades. Regarding proposed changes to the Stryker  brigade’s structure, the Army is reviewing possible design changes through  its Documentation Assistance and Review Team to determine the  appropriate solution. The department states that the Army will use this  same process regarding issues identified from Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The department also commented that the Army designated Fort Lewis,  Washington, as the Army’s Center of Excellence responsible for concept  development, lessons learned, and the source for technical and tactical  expertise for future Stryker brigades and to assist the Army in distributing  lessons learned from the Stryker brigades.
Appendix VII contains the full text of the department’s comments.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Acting Secretary of the Army, and the Director, Office of Management and  Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please call me at (202) 512- 8365. Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Leo B.  Sullivan, Robert Ackley, Timothy A. Burke, M. Jane Hunt, and Jim Melton.
section_title: Appendix I: Provisions from Public Law 107- 107 Concerning Limitations on Army Transformation Actions
paragraphs: Public Law 107-107-Dec. 28, 2001  SEC. 113. LIMITATIONS ON ACQUISITION OF INTERIM   ARMORED VEHICLES AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERIM   BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS.  (h) OPERATIONAL EVALUATION – (1) The Secretary of the Army shall  conduct an operational evaluation of the initial interim brigade combat  team. The evaluation shall include deployment of the team to the  evaluation site and team execution of combat missions across the full  spectrum of potential threats and operational scenarios.  (2) The operational evaluation under paragraph (1) may not be conducted  until the plan for such evaluation is approved by the Director of  Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of Defense.  (i) LIMITATION ON PROCUREMENT OF INTERIM ARMORED  VEHICLES AND DEPLOYMENT OF IBCTs. – (1) The actions described in  paragraph (2) may not be taken until the date that is 30 days after the date  on which the Secretary of Defense –  (A) submits to Congress a report on the operational evaluation carried out  under subsection (h); and  (B) certifies to Congress that the results of that operational evaluation  indicate that the design for the interim brigade combat team is  operationally effective and operationally suitable.  (2) The limitation in paragraph (1) applies to the following actions:  (A) Procurement of interim armored vehicles in addition to those  necessary for equipping the first three interim brigade combat teams.  (B) Deployment of any interim brigade combat team outside the United  States.  (3) The Secretary of Defense may waive the applicability of paragraph (1)  to a deployment described in paragraph (2)(B) if the Secretary –  (A) determines that the deployment is in the national security interests of  the United States; and  (B) submits to Congress, in writing, a notification of the waiver together  with a discussion of the reasons for the waiver.
section_title: Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine whether the Army’s conduct of the Stryker brigade’s  operational evaluation met the legislative requirements, we focused our  efforts on understanding the operational evaluation plan and its  implementation. We obtained and analyzed the Army’s operational  evaluation plan and its associated execution plan. We interviewed officials  and analysts involved in both the design and evaluation of the plan from  the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Office of the Secretary of the Army;  Headquarters, Department of the Army; Army Forces Command; Army  Training and Doctrine Command; Army Test and Evaluation Command;  and I Corps, Fort Lewis. We held discussions with the Commanders of the  Operations Groups at the National Training Center and the Joint  Readiness Training Center to discuss their perspective regarding the  operational evaluation.
To determine how the Army conducted the operational evaluation, we  used information from the Army’s operational evaluation plan and  execution plan and monitored the conduct of the operational evaluation.  We reviewed the training procedures and attended the training sessions  for the data collectors and subject matter experts administering the  training events at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness  Training Center. We also reviewed the data collection, transfer, and  validation processes. We attended nightly briefings that were provided to  the I Corps leadership from officials of each of the two training centers.  We observed various training activities such as an attack at the National  Training Center and the tactical movements by ground and air  deployments at the Joint Readiness Training Center, as well as other  events such as the commander’s combined arms rehearsal prior to the  brigade moving to the training site at the Joint Readiness Training Center.
To assess the brigade’s performance during the operational evaluation, we  evaluated information from the Army’s data collectors and from our visits  to the two training centers to observe training events. For the deployment  portion of the evaluation, we observed various deployment events  including the loading and unloading of Stryker vehicles from C-130 aircraft  at the National Training Center; the brigade staging area at Lake Charles,  Louisiana; and the unloading of Stryker vehicles from C-17 aircraft at the  Joint Readiness Training Center. We also observed the loading of a Stryker  company’s personnel, vehicles, and supplies into C-130 aircraft as the  personnel conducted intratheater movement to a different training area at  the Joint Readiness Training Center. Because of their doctrinal expertise  and the fact that they provide feedback to all Army units that go through  the training centers, we monitored transmissions and attended meetings  held by observer-controllers and operations officials at both training  centers. During these meetings, discussions were held regarding the  performance of the brigade and any difficulties the brigade was  experiencing. To gain perspective on the Army’s analytical process, we  attended and participated in scheduled insight meetings that discussed the  training events and observations that occurred over the previous 24 hours.  We also discussed the evaluation events with officials from the Army’s  Test and Evaluation Command, as well as representatives from the  Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and  the Institute for Defense Analysis.
We obtained and analyzed the database that the Army used to draw its  conclusions. Using the database, we determined that the most direct  commentary on the Stryker brigade’s performance of its individual key  operating capabilities came from observer-controller comments. We  reviewed the comments as grouped by the individual operational  capabilities and, after identifying the most salient issues, developed seven  themes that incorporated all nine of the key operating capabilities. These  themes are ability of the Stryker brigade to deploy, mobility of the Stryker  vehicle, brigade and battalion staff performance, use of digital systems,  employment of the new sustainment concept, execution of combat  missions, and contractor support.
Regarding the Army’s actions to mitigate the identified operational  evaluation training deficiencies, we reviewed the training methodology  developed to overcome the deficiencies and held a discussion with senior  Army officials regarding the brigade’s operational readiness. We did not  observe the activities conducted during the command post exercise or the  field training exercise. However, we discussed the results of the exercises  with senior Army officials.
Our review was performed from October 2002 to October 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government audit standards.
section_title: Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Organizational Parameters and Operational Capabilities by Critical Tasks
paragraphs: X = annotates Parameter and Capability represented by Critical Training Task List (CTTL).
section_title: Appendix IV: Mission Training Plan Tasks Compared to Critical Tasks
paragraphs: Distributed Offense &  Defensive Operations  X = annotates central tasks represented by the 10 essential mission training plan tasks.
section_title: Appendix V: Stryker Brigade Parameters and Capabilities Compared to Essential Mission Training Plan Tasks
subsections: section_title: Full Spectrum Flexibility and Augmentation
paragraphs: X= annotates Parameter and Capability represented by Mission Training Plan Essential task.
section_title: Appendix VI: Definitions of Key Organizational Parameters and Key Operational Capabilities
paragraphs: The Stryker brigade’s organizational and operational concept document  defines the unit’s essential organizational characteristics, or parameters,  that the brigade was evaluated against. The document also defines the  unit’s essential operational characteristics, or capabilities, that the brigade  was evaluated against.
The eight key organizational parameters are defined below.
Achieve Balance Between Capabilities for Strategic Responsiveness  and Requirements for Battle-Space Dominance: The organization must  balance deployability, sustainability, and its in-theater personnel  footprint against its combat requirement for lethality, mobility, and  survivability. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team must approach the  deployability standards of a light brigade while arriving with the punch  and staying power approaching that of a mechanized formation.
Balanced Full Spectrum Utility: The Stryker brigade is deliberately  optimized for early entry small-scale contingencies, but it also is  required to be prepared to participate as a “guarantor combat force” in  stability and support operations to permit peacekeeping and stability  forces to carry out their missions in a secure environment. Similarly,  the Stryker brigade must be prepared to fight as a component within a  division or corps structure in a major theater of war.
Reduced Sustainment Requirements: The Stryker brigade must have  sustainment requirements well below that of a heavy force.
Minimize Brigade’s Personnel and Logistical Footprint: There is an  imperative for expanding the combat elements and reducing the  support capabilities. Strategic deployability and demand reduction  must be enhanced, while maintaining a robust combat capability.
Commonality of Vehicular Platforms: A common platform for combat,  combat support, and combat service support echelons enables  deployability, demand reduction, and sustainment efficiency. Common  platforms must also be highly mobile and capable of intratheater  deployment by C-130 aircraft.
Reach-back: To enable the Stryker brigade to maintain a deployable  structure with a minimized logistics footprint, it must be able to reach- back and access those functions that can be accomplished by higher- echelon or out-of-theater organizations. It is both an organizational and  operational principle.
Embedded Unit-Based Capabilities: Military intelligence, signal,  engineer, antitank, artillery, and combat service support elements have  been tailored specifically to the unique requirements of the unit’s  mission set. For the Stryker brigade, analysis demonstrates that  mission capabilities are best enhanced if they are embedded within the  unit’s organic organization. Attaching divisional elements to a Stryker  brigade unnecessarily enlarges the brigade’s deployment requirements  and theater footprint and introduces different vehicle types and  equipment sets into the structure, violating the principle of  commonality and increasing sustainment and infrastructure  requirements.
Internetted Combined Arms to Company-Team Level: An operational  analysis for the Stryker brigade indicates that, within the environment  of complex/urban terrain, force effectiveness is best enhanced and the  requirement for responsive mutual support is best satisfied through  internetted combined arms to company-team level, i.e., to a degree  beyond traditional practice.
The nine key operational capabilities are defined below.
Strategic – Organized, equipped, and configured to support a goal of  deploying the brigade in 96 hours from first wheels up. (Ninety-six  hours was originally a requirement.)
Operational – Capable of intratheater lift by ground/sea or by U.S.  Air Force family of tactical aircraft. (Concept document specifies   C-130 aircraft.)
Dismounted Assault and the Close Fight: Achieves tactical decision by  means of combined arms at the company/team level focused on  dismounted assault, supported by direct fires, and on the integration of  mortars, artillery, mobility support, and joint fires/effects.
Enhanced Situational Understanding and Information Superiority:  This is the fundamental force enabler across all Stryker brigade  battlefield operating systems and the foundation of risk mitigation with  respect to brigade vulnerabilities, particularly the lack of armor  protection.
Holistic Force Protection and Survivability: Overall, the Stryker  brigade must meet force protection challenges through the holistic  application of a variety of capabilities, including early warning;  situational understanding; avoidance of surprise; deception; rapid  mobility; signature control; nontemplateable operations; avoidances of  enemy fires; mutual support; use of cover and concealment; and  implementation of innovative tactic, techniques, and procedures.
Lethality: The Stryker brigade possesses a robust array of direct and  indirect fire systems to shape the battle space and achieve decision in  the close fight inherent within complex and urban terrain, greater than  current light brigades.
Force Effectiveness: Although the Stryker brigade must have the  capability to achieve/maintain information superiority, it will not  always enjoy combat platform superiority. The Stryker brigade will  offset the platform limitations of its medium-weight platforms through  the holistic integration of all other capabilities, particularly the  internetted actions of the combined arms company teams.
Reach/Reach-back: The capability of the Stryker brigade to exploit a  multitude of nonorganic resources to accomplish its assigned missions.  The Stryker brigade executes reach-back on a routine, deliberate basis  as a combat power and sustainment multiplier in five primary areas:  fires and effects, intelligence and information, planning and analysis,  force protection, and sustainment.
Joint/Multinational/Interagency Interoperability: The Stryker brigade  will benefit from exploiting the knowledge and capabilities residing  within multinational forces; U.S. interagency organizations operating in  the theater; and other international, local, nongovernmental, and  private organizations involved in the crisis, conflict, or instability.
Full Spectrum Flexibility and Augmentation: The Stryker brigade will  have the requisite capabilities to achieve decision in conjunction with  the joint fight in low-end contingencies such as current operations in  the Balkans. If conditions escalate, requiring additional capabilities that  do not reside within the Stryker brigade, it will receive augmentation.  The Stryker brigade may participate in major theater of war operations  as a subordinate element within a division. Again, adjustments to the  task organization, including augmentation, will be required in a major  theater of war environment.
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for  Army Stryker Brigades. GAO-03-801. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Military Transformation: Army’s Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3  Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily  Mandated Comparison. GAO-03-671. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003.
Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistic Support Should  Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army’s  Operational Evaluation Plan. GAO-03-484R. Washington, D.C.: March 28,  2003.
Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation  of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO-02-442. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2002.
Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for  Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO-02-96.  Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2001.
Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems  Challenges. GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001.