Iraqi Refugee Assistance: Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress, Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an International Strategic Plan
Published: 2009-04-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Iraqi refugees are one of the largest urban populations the UN has been called on to assist. The UN reports government estimates of up to 4.8 million Iraqis displaced within the last 5 years, with 2 million fleeing, primarily to Syria and Jordan. GAO examined challenges in (1) measuring and monitoring progress in achieving U.S. goals for assisting Iraqi refugees, (2) providing humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees, (3) offering solutions for Iraqi refugees, and (4) developing an international strategic plan to address the Iraqi refugee situation. GAO analyzed reports and data; met with officials from the U.S. government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), international organizations, and NGOs; and did fieldwork in Jordan and Syria.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: To implement its 2008 goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees, State primarily funded and monitored the efforts of its implementing partners, which include international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). These activities provided Iraqi refugees and host country populations with education, vocational training, health care, food, and financial support. However, State did not clearly link program achievements to its stated goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees. As a result, State has limited information to assess and report its progress in reaching its goal and objectives and improve program effectiveness. Insufficient numbers of staff to monitor projects, difficulties gaining access to projects and refugees, and the lack of reliable data have challenged State's efforts to ensure that projects help the intended beneficiaries. U.S. and international efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries are impeded by the lack of reliable estimates on the needs of Iraqi refugees and data on the funding targeted at Iraqi refugee programs. Iraqi refugees live interspersed among the local urban populations and are not easily identified. Official government estimates on the number of Iraqi refugees in each country may be overstated. It is also difficult to determine the amount of funding provided for Iraqi refugee programs because the U.S. government and UNHCR, the largest bilateral and multilateral funding sources, do not report funding for Iraqi refugee programs separately from that provided for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance. The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges in offering solutions for Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the preferred solution, but conditions in Iraq are not yet suitable for Iraqis to return. According to the International Organization for Migration, the Iraqi government has cited improvements in security and offered financial incentives to returning refugee families. Although another solution is integration and settlement in host countries, Syria and Jordan consider Iraqi refugees "guests" who should return to Iraq once the security situation improves. The U.S. government has made progress in resettling Iraqi refugees under its U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, with 15,431 refugees resettled in the United States in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. According to U.S., UN, foreign government, and NGO officials, the international community lacks a comprehensive international strategy to address the Iraqi refugee situation. Although the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal showed progress in strategic planning, the UN and international community continue to lack a longer-term approach. First, the international community lacks a comprehensive independent assessment of the needs of vulnerable Iraqi refugees and the populations that host them. Second, State, UNHCR, and NGOs do not have a strategy that addresses factors that may affect assistance efforts. Third, the international community has lacked a coordination mechanism that involves all stakeholders.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: According to the United Nations (UN), Iraqi refugees represent one of the  largest urban refugee populations the organization has been called upon to  assist and pose an unprecedented burden on the countries hosting them.  The UN reports that regional governments estimate that over the last 5  years about 4.8 million Iraqis have been displaced from their homes in  search of safety, with about 2 million fleeing to neighboring countries,  primarily Syria and Jordan. According to the Department of State (State),  because of its unique role in Iraq, the United States has recognized the  need to take the lead in mitigating the effects of this humanitarian crisis.
GAO is assessing U.S. and international efforts to protect and assist Iraqi  refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP). In this report, we  examine challenges in (1) measuring and monitoring progress in achieving  U.S. goals for assisting Iraqi refugees, (2) providing humanitarian  assistance to Iraqi refugees, (3) offering solutions for Iraqi refugees, and  (4) developing an international strategic plan to address the Iraqi refugee  situation. In addition, we reviewed the progress made in implementing  special immigrant visa programs for Iraqis, which may also benefit some  refugees but are not designed specifically for them (see app. I). We plan a  subsequent review that will examine challenges faced in assisting  internally displaced Iraqis. Because of broad congressional interest in the  U.S. engagement in Iraq, we are completing this report under the  Comptroller General’s authority to conduct evaluations on his own  initiative.
To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed reports and data  from the U.S. government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees  (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), other UN  agencies, foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGO),  and research institutes. During our fieldwork in Washington, D.C., we met  with officials from State and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  regarding refugee assistance, refugee admissions, and special immigrant  visa programs and the challenges they have encountered. We also met with  research institutions and NGOs and held discussion groups with NGOs  conducting work in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq to discuss strategic planning  and program implementation challenges. Through our fieldwork in  Geneva, Switzerland; Rome, Italy; Amman, Jordan; and Damascus, Syria,  we met with officials from the U.S., Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi  governments; UNHCR and other UN umbrella agencies, including the  World Food Program and IOM; international and local NGOs; and research  institutions. Also, with the help of UNHCR, we held discussion groups  with Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria to discuss their situations, needs,  assistance received, and challenges encountered. We toured and observed  assistance projects and activities in resettlement processing centers. We  analyzed U.S. funding, refugee admissions, and visa data, and found the  data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Appendix II  contains a more detailed description of our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to January 2009  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: According to IOM, the bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samara in  February 2006 triggered sectarian violence that increased the number of  displaced Iraqis. Although military operations, crime, and general  insecurity remained factors, sectarian violence became the primary driver  for population displacement. As displayed in figure 1, many Iraqis fled  their country and immigrated to neighboring countries, particularly to  Syria and Jordan.
According to UNHCR, the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of  Refugees and its 1967 Protocol provide the foundation for modern refugee  protection. According to the Convention, a refugee is someone who,  “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,  religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political  opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or, owing to  such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.…”
The 1951 Convention does not apply to persons who have committed  crimes against peace, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. UNHCR  recognizes and registers as refugees both those persons who fall within  the 1951 Convention criteria and those falling within the extended  definition of persons fleeing generalized armed conflict or civil unrest.  Registration allows UNHCR to identify Iraqis in need of protection, offer  them assistance, and screen them for possible resettlement. According to  the UN, of the countries hosting Iraqi refugees in the Middle East, only  Turkey, Egypt, and Iran are parties to the 1951 Convention. Syria and  Jordan, the two countries hosting the largest number of Iraqi refugees,  have not signed the 1951 Convention. As a result, according to the UN,  although the refugees have been able to access public services, they have  not been able to obtain legal employment and may face deportation if they  do not comply with visa requirements, which have become more  restrictive over the years. According to UNHCR, the identification,  registration, intervention in detention and deportation, and monitoring of  access to asylum are important UNHCR functions for refugees.
UNHCR coordinates the provision and delivery of shelter, food, water,  sanitation, and medical care to refugees throughout the world. UNHCR is  also mandated to find solutions to the plight of refugees. According to  UNHCR, three solutions are available:  First, voluntary repatriation is the preferred solution for the majority of  refugees. Most refugees prefer to return home as soon as circumstances  permit (generally when a conflict has ended and a degree of stability has  been restored). UNHCR promotes, supports, and facilitates voluntary  repatriation as the best solution for displaced people, provided it is safe  and reintegration is viable.
Second, UNHCR may help refugees integrate and settle in the “asylum,” or  host, country where they reside as refugees. Some refugees cannot or are  unwilling to return because they would face persecution. According to  UNHCR, relatively few countries allow refugees to settle.
Third, UNHCR may assist refugees in permanently resettling in third  countries. According to UNHCR, only a small number of nations take part  in UNHCR resettlement programs worldwide and accept annual quotas of  refugees. According to State, historically, less than 1 percent of registered  refugees are resettled in third countries.
Within the U.S. government, the Department of State’s Bureau of  Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has primary responsibility for  formulating U.S. foreign policy on population issues, protection and  assistance to refugees and conflict victims, and international migration. It  also administers U.S. refugee assistance and admission programs. In this  capacity, PRM has the lead role within the department in responding to  complex humanitarian emergencies around the world and in working to  resolve protracted refugee situations. According to State, to protect and  assist Iraqi refugees, PRM works closely with regional bureaus, U.S.  embassies, and U.S. missions to provide guidance to its international  organization and NGO implementing partners and to engage with other  donor countries and countries hosting Iraqi refugees. PRM primarily  implements its U.S. humanitarian assistance goals for Iraqi refugees by  funding and monitoring international organization and nongovernmental  organization projects. USAID also provides some humanitarian assistance  that benefits Iraqi refugees, but according to State and USAID, most of its  programs focus on efforts within Iraq. PRM is also responsible for  managing the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). Within this  program, DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is  responsible for interviewing refugees and adjudicating their applications  for resettlement in the United States.
section_title: Iraqis Benefit from Assistance, but State Has Not Measured Progress in Meeting Its Overall Goals, and State and Its Partners Face Monitoring Challenges
paragraphs: The Department of State and its international partners, including UN  agencies and NGOs, have funded and implemented a number of programs  and projects that benefit Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan. However,  although State has established a broad goal and objectives for its 2008  efforts to protect and assist Iraqi refugees, it did not establish performance  measures for assessing progress in achieving them. In addition, State and  its implementing partners face challenges in monitoring their Iraqi refugee  assistance projects.
subsections: section_title: State Department and UN Fund Assistance to Support Iraqi Refugees
paragraphs: To implement its goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees, State primarily  funds and monitors the activities of its implementing partners, which  include international organizations and NGOs. According to State, U.S.  funding through these organizations has supported the most vulnerable  refugees and host country populations. UNHCR, other international  humanitarian organizations, and NGO partners provided education, health  care, food, financial assistance, and other assistance to Iraqi refugees and  vulnerable host country populations (see fig. 2).
For example, in Syria, UNHCR and the World Food Program provided food  rations and nonfood items such as mattresses, blankets, and household  items to Iraqi refugees. Additionally, in Syria and Jordan, UNHCR provided  monthly cash assistance primarily to vulnerable Iraqi refugees, including  single female heads of households. In Syria, for example, the heads of  households received approximately $100 per month, with an additional  $10 for each dependent. Appendix V provides more details on the number  of Iraqis who benefited from UNHCR assistance in 2008.
In terms of health care, we visited a clinic in Jordan, funded through the  State Department’s PRM bureau, which assisted Iraqi refugees, and met  with outreach workers. According to the program manager, the project  provided health care to Iraqis and stipends for some Iraqi women  conducting community outreach. (See fig. 3, showing an Iraqi volunteer  conducting outreach.)
In Syria, we visited another PRM-funded project that provided medical  assistance to Iraqi refugees and vulnerable host country populations (see  fig. 4). According to the program manager, the clinic provided primary  health care, child health screening, chronic noncommunicable disease  care, maternal health care, and health education. We toured the pharmacy,  the dental unit, and the laboratory where basic tests are performed.
At another NGO project site in Syria, we visited a summer school program  for Iraqi refugee children. According to the program manager, in addition  to the academic lessons provided in Arabic, English, math, and science,  Iraqi students participate in summer camp activities. During our visit, we  observed children participating in various camp activities, including arts  and crafts and a musical production. According to the program manager,  all of the participants were Iraqi children. He also stated that the children  received meals while attending the activities. The program manager stated  that these activities were designed to promote the Iraqi students’  emotional and social well-being.
section_title: The State Department Has Not Linked Progress to Overall Goals and Objectives
paragraphs: It is difficult to determine the progress of U.S. efforts to assist and protect  Iraqi refugees because State’s 2008 goal and regional objectives were  broad and difficult to measure. In addition, State did not have  corresponding performance measures that clearly linked the achievements  of its Iraqi refugee activities to progress in meeting its overall 2008 goal  and objectives for Iraqi refugees. Prior GAO work suggests that leading  organizations promote accountability by establishing results-oriented  goals and corresponding performance measures by which to gauge  progress. Measuring performance allows organizations to track the  progress they are making toward their goals and give managers crucial  information on which to base their organizational and management  decisions. Figure 5 provides more information on State’s 2008  performance management efforts for Iraqi refugee assistance compared  with leading results-oriented practices.
As shown in figure 5, State established a goal and objectives for its 2008  efforts concerning Iraqi refugee efforts as part of its overall goals and  objectives for its efforts to assist refugees, internally displaced persons,  and other conflict victims. However, on the basis of our review of State’s  assessment of progress achieved in fiscal year 2008, it was difficult to  determine the extent to which State achieved its overall goal and  objectives. Although State reported progress achieved in 2008 by sector  and at the country level, it did not aggregate these data to demonstrate  how these activities that it funded helped State meet its overall goal of  assisting and protecting Iraqi refugees. Similarly, State did not develop  corresponding performance measures and milestones, nor did it compile  and aggregate the data it needed to assess and report on its progress in  achieving its objectives to expand engagement through funding of NGOs  and international organizations, contribute to regional security by  channeling humanitarian assistance through primary international  organization partners, promote UNHCR to achieve solutions for Iraqi  refugees, or ensure greater burden sharing.
State measures PRM’s bureauwide progress for humanitarian assistance at  the global level, but this effort does not include specific performance  measures for assessing progress toward its goal and objectives for Iraqi  refugees. According to State officials, the goal and objectives for Iraqi  refugees are in line with the PRM bureau’s overall humanitarian response  strategic goal for fiscal year 2008 and with its performance goals for global  refugee protection, solutions, and assistance. State officials said that  progress on its global efforts is measured through bureauwide indicators,  including acute malnutrition and crude mortality rates. Similarly, progress  on protection efforts by PRM partners is measured at the global level  through performance relating to “non-refoulement,” as reported in  UNHCR’s annual protection reports. However, these indicators are not  generally applicable to specific programs targeting Iraqi refugees.  According to State, global acute malnutrition, for example, is used as a  proxy of the overall health and well-being of a population. PRM monitors  situations where more than 10 percent of refugee children are suffering  from wasting; where this occurs, high malnutrition levels indicate a  serious humanitarian crisis. However, according to State officials, the  absence of reports of acute malnutrition occurring among Iraqi refugee  children makes this indicator a poor choice for assessing the effectiveness  of State’s Iraqi refugee programs.
State’s implementing partners reported progress against agreed-upon  performance indicators for assessing Iraqi refugee-related activities.  However, State did not aggregate individual project or program  performance so that it could measure progress toward its overall goal and  objectives. GAO previously reported that leading organizations seeking to  become more results-oriented clearly define desired outcomes, measure  performance to gauge progress, and use performance information as a  basis for decision making. For example, in its 2008 and 2009 policy  papers on Iraqi refugees, State reported on a number of individual projects  but did not specifically report how these project-level accomplishments  helped State achieve its overall goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees. In  addition, on the basis of our review of NGO monitoring reports, State  received information on its partners’ achievements but did not identify  how it would use these data to measure and report on overall progress for  its Iraqi refugee goal and objectives. For example, in its NGO guidelines,  State generally requires that a project demonstrate that at least 50 percent  of beneficiaries are Iraqi refugees. According to State officials, NGO  partners are required to submit beneficiary statistics by objectives and  indicators. Our review of the 13 available final NGO reports showed that in  10 cases NGOs reported that 50 percent or more of beneficiaries were Iraqi  refugees, while in 3 cases less than 50 percent were Iraqi refugees.  However, these data were not aggregated or reported as a measure of  progress in meeting the U.S. goal and objectives for assisting Iraqi  refugees.
For 2009, State has made progress in articulating more results-oriented  goals and objectives; however, the elements that State identified as  corresponding performance indicators are not clearly linked to the  objectives and are not consistently measurable. State reported that, on  the basis of discussions with GAO, it established more detailed objectives  and indicators for fiscal year 2009 to measure progress in providing  assistance and protection to Iraqi refugees, internally displaced persons,  and conflict victims. According to State, it has developed a spreadsheet to  track progress toward these objectives and indicators throughout the year.
section_title: State Department and Its Partners Face Challenges in Project Monitoring
paragraphs: The Department of State and its implementing partners use a number of  methods to monitor their refugee programs and activities; however,  according to State and its implementing partners, a lack of resources,  difficulty gaining physical access to projects and refugees, and a lack of  reliable data create challenges to their monitoring and evaluation efforts.  According to State officials, they monitor their partners’ programs and  projects by conducting site visits, reviewing progress and final reports,  reviewing NGO project beneficiary statistics, meeting and conducting  follow-up with program managers, and consulting other donors and  humanitarian organizations. According to UNHCR officials, they have an  extensive monitoring system that includes field monitoring, program  evaluations, and financial account and document reviews. State is working  with its partners to improve their monitoring and evaluation efforts. A  Framework for Cooperation between State and UNHCR noted that  enhancement of the quality of monitoring and evaluation activities that  UNHCR undertakes deserved particular attention. Additionally, in State’s  Framework for Cooperation with IOM, both parties committed to  strengthening monitoring and evaluation capacity and to quantify program  results and impact more effectively.
While there are challenges to monitoring and evaluation, State has taken  steps to improve its oversight of NGO projects. For example, in the fiscal  year 2007 NGO cooperative agreements, State required NGOs to provide  two reports. The first report covered the first 4 months of the project, and  the second report covered the last 8 months of the project. However, for  NGOs funded in fiscal year 2008, State revised the formal reporting  requirements included in the cooperative agreements. As a result, NGOs  are required to provide quarterly reports on project progress, including  progress against objectives and indicators. Additionally, State reported  that it has expanded the template used to track the progress made by  NGOs on a quarterly basis.
However, according to State and implementing partner officials,  monitoring continues to be impeded by the following challenges.
Insufficient monitoring resources: In April 2008, State reported that  UNHCR effectively monitored approximately 40 to 59 percent of its  implementing partners’ program activity sites in Jordan. State noted that  it faced the same challenges, given that program activities are conducted  at more than 200 sites and that PRM’s officer would be able to visit only a  fraction of these activities over the course of a year. During our visit to a  small project site in Jordan, the embassy official responsible for  monitoring in Jordan noted that this was the first visit to the site, given  that it was one of the smaller projects and embassy staff had limited time  to make site visits. Moreover, State reported that it expected the problem  to increase for UNHCR as it continued with plans to decentralize its  services to Iraqi refugees to 18 locations throughout Jordan. In  commenting on a draft of this report, UNHCR noted that it has taken steps  to mitigate the lack of monitoring resources in Jordan. In Syria,  monitoring efforts are limited by a lack of PRM monitoring staff at the U.S.  embassy. In August 2008, a senior U.S. embassy official in Syria stated that  the U.S. embassy had limited staffing resources to monitor all Iraqi refugee  program activities. According to State, monitoring efforts for Syria,  Lebanon, and Jordan are carried out by two PRM staff based at the U.S.  embassy in Jordan and visiting PRM staff from Washington, D.C.
Difficulty gaining physical access to projects: In November 2008, State  reported that the refugee coordinator did not complete annual reviews of  UNHCR programs in Syria and Lebanon because of difficulties getting into  each country because of visa and security restrictions. According to State  officials, the United States is constrained in monitoring its assistance  efforts in Syria because of its poor relationship with the government of  Syria and resulting restrictions on the visas of U.S. government visitors. In  addition, according to two interim program evaluations, State personnel  were unable to monitor the two NGO projects in Lebanon because of  security constraints. The U.S. embassy in Beirut operates under strict  security protocols that limit the ability and flexibility of the mission to host  visitors. State monitoring officials planned to travel to Beirut in May 2008,  but this trip was canceled after violence escalated.
Lack of reliable data: According to the UN, in both Syria and Jordan,  difficulty obtaining reliable data in the education and health sectors has  hindered efforts to monitor progress. For example, according to the UN,  student attendance data in Jordan are not disaggregated by gender and  age. According to the UN, information management systems in the Syrian  and Jordanian health sector need improvement to collect more reliable  data on beneficiaries served.
section_title: Lack of Reliable Needs Estimates and Funding Data Affects U.S. and UNHCR Efforts to Assist Iraqi Refugees
paragraphs: U.S. and UNHCR efforts to provide sufficient humanitarian assistance to  Iraqi refugees are challenged by the lack of reliable needs estimates and  data on funding targeted at Iraqi refugee programs. Without a  comprehensive assessment of the number and needs of Iraqi refugees in  Jordan and Syria, it is difficult to prioritize and fund efforts to help ensure  sufficient assistance and protection efforts. Donor countries are resistant  to providing funds without further information on the needs. According to  UN and donor representatives, they are also resistant because they believe  the United States and Iraq should fund the majority of assistance efforts.
subsections: section_title: The Number of Iraqi Refugees and the Extent of Their Needs Are Unknown
paragraphs: Efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees are hindered  by the lack of reliable information on their number, the extent of their  needs, and the needs of the countries hosting them. Iraqi refugees  primarily live interspersed among the local urban populations, rather than  concentrated in camps, and are not easily identified. According to the UN,  statistics on the number of Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries vary  and are difficult to verify. The UN further notes that efforts are needed to  improve data collection on Iraqi refugees across the region. In contrast to  official host government estimates of Iraqi refugees, a significantly smaller  number of refugees have registered with UNHCR for protection and  assistance (see table 1). However, UNHCR officials stated that the  registration numbers may not be a true proxy of the number of Iraqi  refugees in each country because an unknown number of refugees do not  register or seek assistance. The actual number of Iraqi refugees in need  may be somewhere in between these figures.
Further, neither Jordan nor Syria, the countries reporting the largest  number of Iraqi refugees, has enabled an independent, comprehensive  survey of refugees to be undertaken. As shown in table 1, as of September  30, 2008, UNHCR reported that the estimated number of refugees, as  provided by the governments of Syria and Jordan, was 1.2 million to 1.5  million in Syria and 450,000 to 500,000 in Jordan. However, State, NGOs,  and international organizations have questioned these high numbers. In  2007, the Jordanian government tasked Fafo, a Norwegian research  institute, to estimate the number of Iraqi refugees living in the country.  After Fafo estimated that 161,000 Iraqi refugees resided in Jordan, the  Jordanian government disagreed with the institute’s findings, citing  conflicting estimates. Fafo conducted further work with the Jordanian  government that resulted in an estimate of 450,000 to 500,000 Iraqi  refugees as of May 2007. According to State, while some NGOs agree with  this estimate, others believe the number may be as low as 200,000. State  further reported that although the Jordanian government initially  approved a UNHCR proposal for a joint study to assess Iraqi refugee needs  in September 2008, it has yet to take any action to initiate the required  work. In Syria, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)  produced a preliminary study in January 2008 that was intended to analyze  the Syrian economy since 2003 and assess the macroeconomic impact of  Iraqi refugees. However, the report, which included estimates of the  numbers of Iraqi refugees in Syria, has not been released to the public.  According to a UNDP official, the study was only a preliminary report  pending the commissioning of a survey on the number, geographic  location, and socioeconomic characteristics of Iraqis in Syria. UNDP  received comments from the Syrian government and agreed to incorporate  them into the final report. UNDP also found that some of the results were  contradicted by other studies and agreed with the Syrian government on  the need to further analyze and validate the preliminary results once a  survey is conducted.
Moreover, government officials in Jordan and Syria stress that their most  vulnerable citizens as well as refugees need assistance. As a result, both  countries prohibit parallel assistance systems that would provide refugees  with increased aid and potentially create resentment within their  respective populations. Both countries have primarily based their requests  for international assistance on their countries’ overall health and  education needs rather than on the numbers of Iraqi refugees. In the 2009  UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region, the UN notes that host  countries have drawn on their existing social services to assist Iraqi  refugees. The UN concludes that, therefore, efforts should continue to  reinforce basic needs such as health and education, among others, for all  refugees and local populations. Although the figure has been debated,  according to State, the Jordanian government contends that Iraqi  migration into Jordan has cost it about $2 billion over the last 3 years  because of increased stress on its health, education, and water  infrastructure in Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid.
However, the extent to which Iraqi refugees affect these sectors is not  clear, government numbers are not clearly supported, and supporting  government assessments are not publicly available. For example,  according to State, the Jordanian government stated that a total of 24,000  Iraqis enrolled in public and private schools during the 2007 to 2008 school  year, but some NGOs estimated that the public school attendance figure  may have been as low as 9,000 students. Both State and the UN have  reported that the Jordanian government has not made disaggregated  figures available and has declined to allow independent confirmation of  the number of students in the public school system. Further, NGOs  reported that outreach efforts in Syria were discouraged by the Syrian  government, limiting the ability to obtain information to better understand  the needs of Iraqi refugees in Syria. Similarly, according to State, the  Jordanian government has withheld permission from UNHCR to conduct  mobile registration drives and public outreach campaigns.
In the absence of a comprehensive survey of the needs of all Iraqi refugees  and a transparent assessment of the impact of Iraqis on host countries, the  UN relied on available information to identify refugee needs. In 2008, the  UN expanded the efforts of its working groups and relied on the UNHCR  central registration system as the most effective means for UN agencies to  assess needs, estimate refugee movements, and understand the changing  circumstances of the Iraqi refugee community. The UN also considered  other information, such as public studies, limited surveys, and host  government data. As a result of its working groups’ assessments, in its  2009 Consolidated Appeal, the UN targeted assistance in areas such as  protection, health, education, sexual and gender-based violence, food,  psychosocial support and mental health, and skills development. The UN  tailored programs for what was known at the time about the situation in  each host country. According to UNHCR and NGO officials, to ensure that  these programs reach Iraqi refugees, they target their assistance programs  in Jordan and Syria in poor and underserved areas where Iraqi refugees  are known to live. However, according to the UN, a growing number of  Iraqi refugees are leaving costly urban areas, resulting in a more dispersed  population and creating the need for further outreach.
section_title: The United States, Donors, and Iraq Have Funded Programs Benefiting Iraqi Refugees, but the Total Amount of Funding Explicitly for Iraqi Refugee Programs Is Unavailable
paragraphs: The amount of U.S., UN, and other funding spent to assist Iraqi refugees is  not readily available. The U.S. government and UNHCR, reportedly the  largest bilateral and multilateral funding sources, do not always designate  and report funding solely for Iraqi refugee programs, which target refugees  and the vulnerable populations of the countries that host them. Instead,  the U.S. government reports funding for all Iraq-related humanitarian  assistance that may include assistance to Iraqi refugees, internally  displaced Iraqis, and other vulnerable populations in Iraq and host  countries. According to funding data provided by State and USAID, for  fiscal years 2003 through 2008, the U.S. government has apportioned about  $1.6 billion, obligated about $1.5 billion, and expended about $1.2 billion  for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance (see app. III).
Similarly, UNHCR includes Iraqi refugees in its Iraq Operation and obtains  funding through a number of funding appeals made to the international  community. Some appeals, such as the 2008 UN Iraq Consolidated Appeal,  were for efforts inside Iraq; others, such as the 2008 UNHCR Iraq Situation  Supplementary Appeal, were intended for programs that benefit Iraqi  refugees, internally displaced persons in Iraq, non-Iraqi refugees in Iraq  (such as Palestinian refugees in Iraq), and Iraqi returnees. For calendar  years 2003 through 2008, UNHCR appeals for its Iraq operation, including  Iraqi refugees, totaled about $730 million and resulted in about $542  million in contributions (see app. IV). The United States contributed about  58 percent of the donor contributions to these appeals.
Moreover, in addition to providing UNHCR funding, donor countries also  fund the appeals and efforts of other UN agencies and international  organizations that assist Iraqis and other conflict victims in the region.  Because of the number of overlapping appeals, it is difficult to track the  amount requested and funded for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance.  To better coordinate efforts among UN agencies, humanitarian  organizations, and donors, in December 2008, for the first time, the UN  consolidated all of its Iraq-related appeals for UN agencies and over 15  NGOs. The 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region requests  $547.3 million, of which $355 million is requested for efforts to assist Iraqi  refugees and host country populations and $192.3 million is requested for  efforts within Iraq.
In addition to multilateral funding, an unknown amount of bilateral  funding and private contributions is made to programs benefiting Iraqi  refugees and others. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian  Affairs reports data on multilateral and bilateral contributions. However, it  relies primarily on self-reporting, and the data may be incomplete.  According to State, all donations from other countries meet a small  fraction of the needs inside and out of Iraq. State officials also noted that  the department demarched both the Gulf States and traditional donors in  2007 and 2008, asking for greater support. However, representatives of  donor countries raised concerns regarding the uncertain numbers of Iraqi  refugees and the extent of their needs, and they noted that the lack of  objective and complete information made it difficult to garner support for  funding. Some also noted that the United States, given its role in the Iraqi  humanitarian crisis, and Iraq, given its budget surplus and that the  refugees are its citizens, should bear most of the funding costs.
Although the Iraqi government pledged funds in 2007 to support the  assistance of Iraqi refugees in neighboring host countries, it is unclear  whether additional funds will be provided. The Iraqi government pledged  $25 million to assist neighboring countries hosting Iraqi refugees. Of this  amount, the government provided $15 million to Syria, $2 million to  Lebanon, and $8 million to UNHCR in Jordan. For efforts within Iraq, the  Iraqi government donated $40 million, left over from the Oil for Food  Program, to the World Food Program through the UN’s 2008 Iraq  Consolidated Appeal. In August 2008, Iraq’s Council of Representatives  passed a supplemental budget that included an additional $208 million  primarily for IDPs and Iraqi returnees. It is unclear whether any of these  funds are intended for or have been expended for Iraqi refugees. Iraqi  officials noted that the government is reluctant to fund programs for Iraqi  refugees because improving refugee conditions in neighboring countries  may discourage refugees from returning to Iraq. Instead, the Iraqi  government’s position is to improve conditions in Iraq to encourage  returns and focus government resources on those Iraqis who are displaced  within the country. According to the UN, in 2009, the Iraqi government  plans to direct more of its resources to the poorest Iraqi families in Iraq.
section_title: The U.S. Government and UNHCR Face Challenges in Offering Permanent Solutions for Iraqi Refugees
paragraphs: The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges in offering permanent  solutions for Iraqi refugees. Conditions in Iraq are not suitable for their  return, and host countries such as Jordan and Syria prefer that the  refugees return to Iraq. Although the United States is making progress  resettling Iraqi refugees in the United States, a limited number of Iraqi  refugees are being resettled abroad.
subsections: section_title: Conditions Are Not Suitable for Repatriation, and Neighboring Host Countries Resist Integrating Refugees
paragraphs: According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the preferred permanent  solution for the majority of refugees worldwide. However, in the case of  Iraq, according to the UN and the IDP Working Group, the conditions for  their return are not yet suitable. According to IOM, the Iraqi government  has cited improvements in security and offered financial incentives (about  1 million Iraqi dinars) to returning refugee families. However, while the  UN notes that some improvements have been made, the UN cites major  obstacles to large-scale returns, including the uncertain security  situation, lack of a mechanism for restoring ownership of property, lack  of access to basic services, and the need for reconciliation among ethno- religious groups and political solutions. According to the U.S. Senior  Coordinator for Iraqi Refugees and IDP Affairs, the most critical challenge  is the uncertain security environment. According to the UN, although  voluntary return is the preferred solution, Iraqi refugees should not be  encouraged to return until the security situation allows for large-scale  return and sufficient monitoring.
Nonetheless, according to the UN, a limited number of Iraqis may be  returning, but it may be more due to increasing hardship in the host  country and some recent improvements in security rather than significant  improvements in Iraq. According to UNHCR, there is no clear trend  regarding the number of Iraqis returning to or leaving their country. In  Jordan and Syria, difficulties in renewing visas and a lack of funds,  employment, and public services affect Iraqi refugees’ decisions to stay or  return to Iraq. Moreover, according to UNHCR, refugees may return to Iraq  for religious holidays and school breaks or to visit family and property.  Returning refugees may become internally displaced if their homes have  been destroyed or occupied. In early August 2008, the Iraqi Chairman of  the Committee for the Displaced noted the difficulties in removing the  current occupants of homes owned by Iraqi refugees who want to return.  According to UNHCR and the IDP Working Group, returnees primarily  return to neighborhoods, districts, and governates under control of the  sects to which they belong, and as of August 2008, few families had  returned to areas under the control of another sect. Moreover, some  refugees, including many with whom we met in Jordan and Syria, will not  leave because they fear that they will be unable to return to their host  country, if needed, because of the tightening of borders since they left  Iraq. Others fear they cannot safely return to Iraq because of their ethnic  or religious identity or employment by coalition forces. Although the Iraqi  government, with the support of UNHCR and others in the international  community, has initiated planning for the return of refugees, some  international organizations reported that it is unknown whether the Iraqi  government has the capacity to implement such plans.
Meanwhile, according to the UN, the continued willingness of countries in  the region to host Iraqi refugees is essential to ensuring refugee protection;  however, opportunities for local integration in neighboring countries are  limited for Iraqi refugees. The governments of Syria and Jordan consider  Iraqi refugees to be “guests” and have stated their preference that the  refugees return to Iraq once the security situation in Iraq improves rather  than integrate and settle in their countries. On the one hand, a tradition of  hosting and protecting Arab nationals provides a political and moral  imperative to accept Iraqis in need of refuge, according to the UN and the  international community. On the other hand, Syria and Jordan are  determined not to establish arrangements that might lead to permanence,  such as officially allowing employment of Iraqi refugees, according to  UNHCR. According to Jordanian and Syrian government officials, neither  government anticipated a long-term Iraqi presence. According to the UN,  most countries in the region have provided Iraqi refugees with access to  education and health care even though social services and infrastructure  were already strained meeting the needs of the local population.
Although the international community has commended both Syria and  Jordan—Syria in particular—for initially opening their borders to refugees,  both countries have now tightened their borders because of security and  economic factors and their own capacity to address the situation.  According to State, UNHCR, and host government officials, both  governments are concerned that the past Palestinian refugee experience  may repeat itself. According to State, UNHCR, and host government  officials, parallel assistance systems or institutions, such as schools,  camps, and social services that were created to serve the Palestinian  population became an incentive for Palestinians to stay in Jordan or Syria.  These parallel structures created resentment among the host population,  which led to a strong desire for these governments not to do the same for  the Iraqis. State reported that the Jordanian government wishes to avoid  the perception that Iraqis, like Palestinians, intend to stay in Jordan and  compete with Jordanians for jobs and resources.
section_title: The United States Has Made Recent Progress in Resettlement Efforts, but Limited Numbers of Refugees May Be Resettled Worldwide
paragraphs: The U.S. government has made progress in resettling Iraqi refugees under  its U.S. Refugee Admissions Program; however, only a limited number of  other countries have admitted Iraqi refugees through resettlement  programs. Once the program was announced, in February 2007, State  estimated that if USRAP became fully operational, then the U.S.  government would be able to admit 2,000 to 3,000 refugees in fiscal year  2007. For fiscal year 2008, the U.S. administration formally established an  admission goal of 12,000 Iraqi refugees. Although the U.S. government did  not meet State’s fiscal year 2007 goal, admitting 1,608 Iraqi refugees, it  surpassed its fiscal year 2008 goal, admitting 13,823 Iraqi refugees as of  September 30, 2008 (see table 2 for processing steps and progress made).
PRM is responsible for managing USRAP. PRM’s regional refugee  coordinator accepts referrals from UNHCR, embassies, and certain NGOs  and provides them to an overseas processing entity (OPE). Certain  categories of Iraqis with U.S. affiliations may apply directly for  consideration under the USRAP program in Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq. The  OPEs, working under a cooperative agreement with State, prescreen cases  by collecting and verifying personal and family information, details of  persecution or feared harm, and information for security name checks.  State has cooperative agreements with IOM, which operates processing  centers in Damascus, Amman, Cairo, and Baghdad, and the International  Catholic Migration Commission, which operates centers in Istanbul and  Beirut. Once the OPE prescreens the case, it is then provided to USCIS,  of DHS, which makes periodic visits to the regions to interview refugees  and adjudicate their applications for resettlement in the United States.  Once USCIS approves or conditionally approves cases, they are returned  to the OPE, which coordinates outprocessing, including security  clearances, medical examinations, cultural orientation, and travel  arrangements. Once the security background check and medical  examination are completed with no adverse findings, then the refugee and  eligible family members are cleared for departure to the United States.
The U.S. government and UNHCR acknowledged that they initially faced  challenges setting up and expanding their resettlement programs for Iraqi  refugees. State’s Office of Inspector General reported that State had little  processing infrastructure in place in the region when the Iraqi resettlement  program was announced in February 2007. According to the Inspector  General, State had no permanent OPE presence in Damascus or Amman,  UNHCR was not actively engaged in registering refugees, and USCIS had  no permanent presence in the region. According to DHS and State, one  reason for initial delays in processing resettlement referrals in Syria was  the Syrian government’s delays in approving visas for DHS officials and  limitations set on IOM staffing and operations. However, according to  UNHCR and State, a significant increase in the number of resettlement  departures to the United States has occurred since June 2008. According  to State and IOM officials, this has been due to increased processing  capabilities after the initial expansion of the U.S. refugee-processing  program. According to the Inspector General, on average, the total  processing time from case creation to arrival in the United States for Iraqi  refugee cases is 222 days. This is less than the average of 452 days for all  other refugee cases worldwide. According to State officials, every case  moves through USRAP at a different pace and can be delayed at any step  along the way; however, if serious delays occur in any one case, they are  generally due to the time it takes to complete security clearances.
In contrast to U.S. efforts, only a small number of nations take part in  resettlement programs and accept annual quotas of refugees from around  the world, according to UNHCR. UNHCR refers cases to potential  resettlement countries. According to State officials, most of its USRAP  applicants come to the program through UNHCR referrals. According to  UNHCR, the numbers referred to each country are negotiated based on the  numbers each country is willing to consider for resettlement. In August  2008, UNHCR reported that since the first quarter of calendar year 2007, of  the more than 40,000 Iraqis referred for resettlement, about 30,000 were  referred to the United States. According to UNHCR, for calendar years  2007 and 2008, the United States had resettled a total of 15,170 Iraqi  refugees, while other countries had resettled 5,852 Iraqi refugees, as of  September 30, 2008 (see table 3).
section_title: Lack of Comprehensive International Strategic Planning Has Hindered Efforts to Assist and Protect Iraqi Refugees
paragraphs: According to U.S., UN, foreign government, and NGO officials, the  international community lacks a comprehensive strategy to address the  Iraqi refugee situation. We previously reported that strategic planning is a  key element in results-oriented management. A strategic plan should  contain long-term goals that cover a period of not less than 5 years from  the year it is submitted and should be updated and revised at least every 3  years. Although the international community has recognized the need to  strategically plan for the Iraqi refugee situation, it has often focused on the  crisis within Iraq and annual planning efforts while deferring strategic  planning for the refugee situation. Specifically, the international  community lacks a comprehensive international strategy that fully  identifies and aligns the need with resources, identifies and addresses  factors that may affect planning efforts, and ensures coordination among  stakeholders.
subsections: section_title: UN Continues to Recognize Need for Comprehensive Strategic Planning for Iraqi Refugees, but Focus Remains on Annual Country Operations Plans and Funding Appeals
paragraphs: Although the international community has recognized the need for  international strategic planning to address the Iraqi refugee situation, its  strategic planning efforts have focused on the situation in Iraq while  calling for more to be done for Iraqi refugees. In January 2007, UNHCR  stated that its operational and contingency plans must be revised and  undertaken as part of a wider effort that involves other UN agencies and  government and NGO stakeholders. UNHCR further noted that the  security, political, social, and financial impact on Iraq, the region, and  beyond would be felt for many years and that the response to Iraqi  displacement must incorporate a long-term perspective to ensure  protection for Iraqis and other displaced groups and overall stability in the  region. According to the UN, beginning in January 2007, a series of high- level and technical consultations took place, involving key humanitarian  agencies, UN headquarters, and UN member states, including the Iraqi  government. These consultations resulted in the broad recognition that a  humanitarian crisis was unfolding in Iraq and that a multisector  interagency response was required.
Accordingly, in April 2007, the UN Country Team for Iraq, under the  leadership of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, developed the Strategic  Framework for Humanitarian Action in Iraq as a basis for a coordinated  response by the international community. However, this framework  solely focused on the immediate measures needed to expedite  humanitarian assistance inside Iraq. It also called for a comprehensive  approach to addressing the concerns of the Iraqi population displaced to  neighboring countries, particularly Jordan and Syria. Moreover, when  governments in the region, donors, international organizations, and NGOs  convened in April 2007 at a UNHCR-initiated international humanitarian  conference on displaced Iraqis, the NGOs called for a multifaceted  international strategy to address the Iraqi refugee situation. However, a  comprehensive long term approach has yet to be developed.
UNHCR and State have focused on UNHCR’s annual planning efforts for  UNHCR and its implementing partners and myriad funding appeals rather  than on a comprehensive international strategic plan. State and UNHCR  note that planning for Iraqi and other refugees is done through the annual  UNHCR country operations plans. Each year, with donor input, UNHCR  develops country operations plans that provide a summary of UNHCR’s  program goals and objectives for refugees in each country in which it  operates. However, these plans, focusing on the efforts of UNHCR and its  implementing partners, do not contain a mechanism to measure longer  term progress in achieving strategic goals. Further, the complete plan has  not always been made public. In January 2008, UNHCR issued its Iraq  Situation Supplementary Appeal, which sought funds and support to  address the immediate protection and assistance needs of Iraqi refugees,  internally displaced Iraqis, refugees returning to Iraq, and refugees from  other countries living in Iraq. Although the appeal provided information on  activities, objectives, and targets, it did not prioritize efforts for funding  and sets targets only for the immediate appeal. In February 2008, UNHCR  stated that the international community needed to develop strategies and  allocate resources that not only address immediate and medium-term  needs, but also acknowledge that, over the long term, a significant portion  of displaced Iraqis may never return. According to the 2007 study by Fafo,  a Norwegian research institute, only one in five Iraqis in Jordan had  concrete plans to immigrate to a third country.
With the release of its 2009 Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region in  December 2008, the UN has shown progress in its strategic planning  efforts for Iraqi refugees. However, the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal is a  1-year funding request and plan and does not include or refer to strategic  plans for the longer term. According to the UN, the 2009 UN Consolidated  Appeal’s Pillar II, which focuses on Iraqi refugees, targets Iraqi refugee  needs in accordance with priorities agreed to by all concerned  humanitarian actors and, for the first time, presents a comprehensive  statement of their planned response. Rather than have separate and  sometimes overlapping appeals and strategies as in the past, UN agencies  came together, and with NGO and donor input, developed one funding  appeal and plan for the Iraqi refugee situation. Pillar II states the mission,  and the objectives of the humanitarian action plans for each host country  are clearly aligned with the strategic objectives for the year and with  UNHCR’s overall goals to protect and assist refugees. The UN expects its  2009 Consolidated Appeal to serve as a framework for UN and NGO  collaboration across the region. The 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal also  includes a monitoring and evaluation plan and notes that there will be a  midyear progress report in June 2009. However, the 2009 UN Consolidated  Appeal lacks long term goals, and while it uses available information to  assess needs, it is not based on a comprehensive needs assessment and is  unclear on how efforts will be prioritized if the appeal is not fully funded.  Further, the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal relies on existing coordination  mechanisms that the NGOs stated were problematic.
section_title: Lack of International Strategic Planning Has Hindered Efforts to Assist Iraqi Refugees in Neighboring Host Countries
paragraphs: According to NGOs, the lack of a comprehensive international strategy has  hindered efforts to effectively assist Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria.  Specifically, the international community lacks a strategic planning effort  for the assistance of Iraqi refugees that includes (1) a comprehensive  assessment of the needs of Iraqi refugees and vulnerable host government  populations and uses this assessment to prioritize activities for funding;  (2) a discussion of the limitations of annual budget cycles and efforts to  mitigate these limitations; and (3) a coordination mechanism involving all  stakeholders, including host country governments, international  organizations, international and local NGOs (including local churches),  and donor countries.
First, the international community lacks a comprehensive assessment of  the needs of vulnerable Iraqi refugees and the economically vulnerable  populations that host them that would establish a baseline for strategic  planning. Without a comprehensive needs assessment in host countries  such as Jordan and Syria, it is difficult to determine the scope of the  problem and to appropriately prioritize and align resources to address the  Iraqi refugee situation. This is particularly important given the limited  amount of funding and resources, as well as the decision to avoid  developing parallel systems. However, to date, host countries’  unwillingness to enable completion of these assessments impedes  strategic planning.
Second, State, UNHCR, and NGOs do not have a strategy that addresses  concerns raised about factors that may impact assistance efforts, such as  the limitations of working with annual budget cycles and efforts to  mitigate these limitations. According to State, UNHCR, and NGOs, the  annual budget cycle of UNHCR and State’s annual funding determinations  for NGOs impede strategic planning efforts. According to State, planning is  constrained by a reliance on donors whose contributions are inconsistent  from year to year and whose annual budget cycles undermine multiyear  planning on the part of UNHCR and other international humanitarian  organizations. According to a UNHCR official, the organization is  constrained by a supplementary budget process that has to be approved  and renewed each year, thus forcing UNHCR to focus on annual objectives  and targets. According to NGOs, the annual budget focus of UNHCR and  key donor countries, including the United States, makes it difficult for  them to conduct longer-term planning because they do not know whether  their efforts will be funded from one year to the next. Thus, they may  focus on shorter term efforts in lieu of more effective long term efforts.
Third, NGOs noted that a comprehensive international strategy with long- term goals is needed to improve coordination among all stakeholders to  provide humanitarian assistance, effectively use the limited resources  available, and prevent duplication of effort. On the basis of discussions  with NGOs and UNHCR and a review of NGO progress reports and State’s  interim progress evaluations of its NGO implementing partners, we found  that the lack of coordination among stakeholders has hindered progress.  For example, according to interviews and reporting, the international  community in Syria lacks an adequate coordination mechanism. UNHCR,  to maintain a good working relationship with Syrian authorities, will  officially meet and coordinate only with NGOs formally approved to work  in the country by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC). According to U.S.,  UNHCR, and NGO officials, the SARC registration process is lengthy and  nontransparent. Few NGOs have obtained formal SARC approval,  although the number of approvals is increasing. According to NGOs,  unapproved NGOs are not invited to UN coordination meetings and  attempts to meet with UN agencies in Syria and develop formal beneficiary  referral processes have been unsuccessful, even for those implementing  U.S. programs.
Moreover, NGOs in Syria further stated that there is limited information  sharing between church and other humanitarian organizations and  UNHCR and relevant UN organizations. The Syrian government has not  required SARC approval for assistance provided by churches in Syria.  Church officials stated that they were unaware of UNHCR coordination  meetings. According to UNHCR, its religious organization partners are  aware of coordination meetings but may not attend because they want to  maintain a low profile. An NGO that was approved by SARC reported to  State that the lack of full NGO participation, including that of churches,  means that coordination meetings do not include all NGO activities  assisting Iraqis in Syria. According to a State official, the department  ensures coordination among its NGO implementing partners. NGOs noted  that more needs to be done to coordinate efforts in Syria as the number of  NGOs increases.
In Jordan, UNHCR reported that implementing partners do not speak  directly with each other to coordinate areas and types of coverage. For  example, UNHCR reported in its Annual Program Interim Report for 2008  that its effort to decentralize the delivery of essential services and  humanitarian assistance in 17 geographical areas in Jordan was not fully  implemented and was delayed because of operational constraints and lack  of coordination among implementing partners. As a result, UNHCR  decided to decentralize fewer services in fewer locations and conduct  outreach to other locations. Also, according to NGOs in Jordan,  coordination is made difficult by the large number of NGOs operating in  Jordan on similar programs. NGO officials stated that at one point, the  same beneficiaries were attending multiple programs offering the same  services and that NGOs were competing for and taking beneficiaries from  each other’s programs. UNHCR commented that as soon as the  organization became aware of the situation, it took immediate action.  According to NGOs, they are now working by sector (health, education,  etc.) in conjunction with UN agencies to prevent duplication that may  have occurred among their programs. UNHCR is also developing a  database of beneficiaries in Jordan—the Beneficiary Information  System—that is intended to make enrollment in NGO programs more  transparent. However, UNHCR encountered difficulties establishing the  new system, including delays in data entry, inconsistent use of the system,  and noncompliance with established procedures and guidelines on the  part of implementing partners. According to UNHCR’s 2008 annual interim  program report, it has provided additional data entry staff and training for  implementing partners to address these issues.
According to international organization, NGO, and State officials, it may be  difficult to engage countries hosting Iraqi refugees in international  strategic planning efforts because these countries want the refugees to be  repatriated as soon as feasible. According to Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi  government officials, they did not initially expect the refugee situation to  be a long term problem. However, Jordanian and Syrian government  officials spoke of the long term needs of their education and health  sectors, which they said were most affected by the refugee situation. In  accordance with host country requirements that parallel assistance  systems not be developed, refugee assistance programs have been targeted  to both refugees and vulnerable populations in each country. Moreover,  according to UNHCR, although repatriation is the primary goal, the return  of refugees to Iraq will need to be phased in over time. While NGOs praise  Syria and Jordan for hosting refugees, they also note that more needs to be  done to coordinate efforts to register refugees and facilitate the work of  relief and resettlement organizations.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: The global community is looking to the United States to address the Iraqi  refugee situation. However, without a comprehensive assessment of the  number and needs of Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria, it is difficult to  prioritize and fund efforts to help ensure assistance and protection for  these refugees. Given that programs and funding currently target both  refugees and vulnerable host country populations, the lack of transparent  and complete assessments of the impact of the refugees on critical sectors,  such as health and education, further exacerbates planning efforts.  Similarly, the lack of transparent data on funding complicates efforts to  make decisions regarding the assistance to be provided for neighboring  countries. Further, without performance measures that assess overall  progress in achieving U.S. goals and objectives for Iraqi refugees, it is not  possible to show the full impact of U.S. assistance efforts. Moreover,  without a comprehensive international strategy with long-term goals and  the involvement of all stakeholders, it is difficult to effectively use the  limited resources available.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance the ability of the Department of State to evaluate and report  progress toward its stated goals and objectives to assist Iraqi refugees, we  recommend that the Secretary of State develop performance measures to  fully assess and report progress in achieving U.S. goals and objectives for  Iraqi refugees. Performance measures and indicators should be clearly  linked to progress in achieving stated goals and objectives. Performance  goals, objectives, and measures should clearly and transparently address  the extent to which programs should target refugees and host government  populations, respectively, to the extent practicable.
To provide more transparency in funding provided for Iraqi refugee  programs and help Congress and the Administration consider funding  requests for neighboring countries, we recommend that the Secretary of  State and the USAID Administrator develop systems to separately track  and report funding apportioned, obligated, and expended for Iraqi refugee  programs in each host country, to the extent practicable.
To enhance the ability of the U.S. government and the international  community to plan their assistance programs based on need and provide  longer term solutions for Iraqi refugees, we recommend that the Secretary  of State take the following two actions:  1.  Work with UNHCR and the governments of Jordan, Syria, and other  relevant host governments to expedite efforts to conduct independent  comprehensive assessments of the number and needs of Iraqi refugees  and the related needs of the countries hosting them.  2.  In conjunction with relevant U. S. agencies and in coordination with  the donor community, work with UNHCR and the governments of Iraq,  Jordan, Syria, and other relevant host governments to build on the  efforts in the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region and  develop a comprehensive international strategy for providing  assistance and solutions for Iraqi refugees.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and  Homeland Security, USAID, and UNHCR. State and USAID provided  written comments, which are reprinted in appendixes VI and VII,  respectively. State, DHS, and UNHCR provided technical comments, which  we incorporated where appropriate.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State generally agreed with our  recommendations regarding the need for improvements in measuring  progress, assessing needs, tracking and reporting funding, and developing  an international strategic plan for Iraqi refugees. However, State  commented that it does not measure progress for specific refugee  populations because such specificity runs counter to State’s principles of  universality and impartiality. We recognize throughout the report that  State’s refugee programs help both Iraqi refugees and vulnerable  populations in the host countries. However, State’s NGO guidelines  generally require that its projects demonstrate that at least 50 percent of  beneficiaries are Iraqi refugees. Given the importance of the Iraqi refugee  situation to the United States, and the fact that State established goals and  objectives specifically for Iraqi refugees and efforts within Iraq for 2008  and 2009, we believe that it is important that State establish performance  measures and indicators that are clearly linked to its goals and objectives.
Additionally, regarding our recommendation to track and report U.S.  funding for Iraqi refugee programs, State noted that it is not practicable to  track and report multilateral contributions for Iraqi refugees at the country  level. We realize that State may not always be able to specifically track and  report funding that is comingled by multilateral and international  organizations before being apportioned to projects in each host country.  However, State could provide Congress with information on the large  percentage of U.S. contributions to UNHCR appeals and information from  UNHCR on projects funded in each country. In addition, State should track  and report bilateral funding for neighboring countries hosting Iraqi  refugees, funding for its NGO implementing partners, and funding for  specific multilateral and international organization projects. As a result,  Congress and the Administration would be better able to assess funding  requests from Iraq’s neighboring countries and incorporate funding data  into future planning efforts.
In response to our recommendation that the USAID Administrator develop  systems to separately track and report funding for Iraqi refugee programs,  USAID noted that the issue was resolved because the agency no longer  provides assistance to Iraqi refugees. We continue to believe that USAID  needs improvement in tracking and reporting funding for Iraqi refugee  assistance. First, based on data that USAID provided, it appears that the  agency is still expending funds on Iraqi refugee programs. Second, the  agency had considerable difficulty tracking, reporting, and verifying the  accuracy of its funding data when GAO requested the information,  resulting in a protracted effort that extended over a period of months.  USAID had difficulty reconciling its funding data with amounts it  previously reported to State as Iraq-related humanitarian assistance.  USAID officials stated that the agency does not have a centralized system  for tracking funding for Iraq-related humanitarian assistance. To help  Congress and the Administration consider funding requests for  neighboring countries and to better incorporate these requests into  planning efforts, USAID should develop a system for tracking and  reporting funding for Iraqi refugee assistance.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland  Security, and the Administrator for USAID. We will also make copies  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you  or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VIII.
section_title: Appendix I: Special Immigrant Visa Programs
paragraphs: Two U.S. special immigrant visa (SIV) programs afford qualified Iraqis  with opportunities to immigrate to the United States. Some Iraqi refugees  may qualify under these programs. The first SIV program, established in  fiscal year 2006, targeted Iraqi and Afghan translators and their  dependents and resulted in 2,130 visas issued in fiscal years 2007 and  2008. The second SIV program, established in fiscal year 2008, targeted  certain Iraqis who had been U.S. government employees, contractors, or  subcontractors and their dependents. This program resulted in a total of  705 visas issued in fiscal year 2008.
subsections: section_title: Management and Processing of Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqis
paragraphs: The Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Consular Affairs administers  laws, formulates regulations, and implements policies relating to consular  services and immigration. Consular Affairs administers two SIV programs,  in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to  further assist Iraqis wanting to permanently immigrate to the United  States. Principal applicants and their families who meet the conditions  may file a petition (Form I-360) with DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services (USCIS). The petition is to include information  about the petitioners and their immediate family members, proof of  nationality, a favorable recommendation documenting their service, and  other supporting documents. USCIS examiners evaluate the petition and, if  it is approved, send it to State’s National Visa Center. The center contacts  the applicants and sets an embassy or consulate location for a visa  interview, informs the applicant about the materials and documents  required, verifies by e-mail that applicants have collected all required  documents, and may request a security advisory opinion. The applicants  and family members formally submit their application to a consular officer  in person at the embassy or consulate. Consular officers interview  applicants and review documents submitted and security and medical  clearances and issue an immigrant visa if candidates satisfy all criteria.  Iraqi SIV recipients are eligible for the same resettlement assistance,  entitlement programs, and other benefits as Iraqi refugees admitted under  the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). Finally, DHS officers  verify the entire SIV package upon the applicants’ arrival in the United  States before granting individuals admission as lawful permanent resident  aliens. Recipients of SIVs have lawful permanent residence status upon  entry into the United States and are eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship  after residing for 5 years in the United States.
section_title: State and DHS Implemented Two Special Immigrant Visa Programs That Were Available to Qualified Iraqi Refugees and Others
paragraphs: The Departments of State and Homeland Security have implemented two  SIV programs, established by Congress, to further assist qualified Iraqis  who worked for the U.S. government and want to immigrate to the United  States. Qualifying Iraqi refugees may apply for these programs. However,  the Departments of State and Defense have not maintained a complete  record of Iraqis working for the U.S. government. In August 2008, the  Congressional Budget Office reported that between 2003 and 2007, an  estimated 70,500 Iraqi nationals worked as contractors for the U.S.  government. However, this number does not include Iraqi subcontractors  because the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International  Development could not provide this information.
The first SIV program, established under section 1059 of the National  Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2006, targeted Iraqi and Afghan  translators and their dependents and resulted in a total of 2,130 visas  issued in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, as of September 30, 2008. In January  2006, Congress authorized that up to 50 Iraqi or Afghan translators who  worked directly with U.S. armed forces and met other conditions as  outlined in the law could receive SIVs during any fiscal year. Those who  qualified are known as principal applicants. Spouses and children of  principal applicants could also receive SIVs, but they were not counted  against the authorized cap. In June 2007, Congress amended the program,  authorizing an increase in the limit to 500 SIVs for each fiscal year 2007  and 2008 and expanding it to cover both translators and interpreters who  worked directly for the U.S. armed forces and those that worked under the  chief of mission authority. According to State, given that Congress  increased the limit late in the fiscal year, the department had little time to  notify and process an additional 450 applicants. Therefore, according to  State, it exercised its authority, under section 203(g) of the Immigration  and Nationality Act, as amended, to estimate and anticipate the future  number of visa approvals and thus scheduled far more applicants for  interviews than the available number of SIVs. According to State, this was  done on the assumptions that some would not appear for the interview,  clearances would not be received, or some might not qualify. State  officials said that while a cutoff date is usually imposed for other  immigrant visa categories, it was not imposed for this program because  these applicants faced imminent danger and State did not want to fall  short of the cap. The result was that State exceeded its 500 limit in fiscal  year 2007 by issuing 526 SIVs for principal applicants and in fiscal year  2008 by issuing 560 SIVs for principal applicants (see table 4).
The second SIV program, established under section 1244 of the National  Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008, targets certain Iraqis who have  been U.S. government employees, contractors, or subcontractors and their  dependents. This program had resulted in 705 visas issued in fiscal year 2008.  In January 2008, Congress authorized up to 5,000 Iraqis, per year for the next  5 fiscal years, who worked for or on behalf of the U.S. government in Iraq and  had experienced or are experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a  consequence of that employment and who meet other conditions outlined in  the law, could receive SIVs. Further, the law allowed that if the 5,000 ceiling  was not met in any given year, the unused authorized amounts could be  carried over to the following year. Additionally, spouses and children of  principal applicants are also eligible to receive SIVs, although these are not  counted against the 5,000 cap. In June 2008, Congress amended section 1244  to allow processing to begin immediately and authorized State to convert  approved section 1059 SIV petitions filed before October 1, 2008, for which a  visa was not immediately available, to section 1244 SIV petitions. As of  September 30, 2008, State had issued 371 visas to Iraqi and Afghan principal  applicants under section 1244, all of which were converted from section 1059  petitions (see table 5).
According to a May 2008 State Department Office of Inspector General  report, several challenges may delay processing of Iraqi employees under  the second SIV program. Officials we spoke with reiterated two key  challenges:    Eligibility screening takes time because no central repository or database  containing the names of the thousands of Iraqis that have been employed  on behalf of the U.S. government since March 2003 is available.
Embassies in Amman, Baghdad, and Damascus will require additional staff  and physical changes to their workspaces to accommodate the increased  workload, according to the Office of Inspector General and consular  officers we spoke with in Amman, Baghdad, and Damascus. According to  State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, since the publication of the Office of  Inspector General report, it has (1) added an officer in Amman and is  working with the embassy to add additional interview space and an  interviewing window, and (2) authorized an additional officer and two  locally employed staff for the consular section in Baghdad.
section_title: Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine efforts to protect and assist Iraqi refugees, we assessed  challenges in (1) measuring and monitoring progress in achieving U.S.  goals for assisting Iraqi refugees, (2) providing humanitarian assistance to  Iraqi refugees, (3) offering solutions for Iraqi refugees, and (4) developing  an international strategic plan to address the Iraqi refugee situation. In  addition, we reviewed the progress made in implementing special  immigrant visa (SIV) programs for Iraqis, which may also benefit some  refugees but are not designed specifically for them (see app. I). We also  conducted fieldwork in Washington, D.C.; Geneva, Switzerland; Rome,  Italy; Amman, Jordan; Damascus, Syria; and, to a limited extent, Iraq.
To assess progress in achieving U.S. goals for Iraqi refugees, we  interviewed officials from the Department of State (State), the United  Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and their  implementing partners and reviewed their policies, strategies, planning,  programming, progress reporting, and monitoring documents. We also  reviewed 13 Department of State interim program evaluation reports and  13 final nongovernmental organization (NGO) reports to assess progress in  meeting goals. In Washington, D.C., we met with officials within State’s  Population, Refugee, and Migration (PRM) bureau from the Office of  Policy and Resource Planning and the Office of Assistance for Asia and the  Near East. We obtained and assessed information on the general  management of refugee assistance programs, coordination with  international partners, and progress and program performance reporting.  In Jordan and Syria, we interviewed U.S. embassy officials responsible for  monitoring the programs and their implementing partners, including  UNHCR and nongovernmental organizations. We also toured U.S. and  UNHCR projects and met with project implementers. We discussed  implementation and monitoring challenges with NGOs in Washington,  D.C.; Jordan; and Syria.
To assess U.S. government and international efforts to provide  humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees and to assess international  strategic planning efforts to address the Iraqi refugee situation, we  interviewed officials of the U.S., Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi governments;  UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and other  United Nations (UN) agencies; nongovernmental organizations; and  research institutes. We reviewed and analyzed relevant strategies, funding  appeals, planning and reporting documentation, studies, and other related  documents. We also held discussion groups with NGOs with a presence in  Jordan, Syria, and/or Iraq to discuss program and overarching challenges  and held discussion groups with Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria to  discuss their situations, needs, assistance received, and challenges  encountered. To further assess the numbers and needs of Iraqi refugees,  we reviewed and assessed the reliability of available assessments and  report data. To identify the nature and extent of U.S. and international  funding, we reviewed funding data provided by State’s PRM, the U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID), the UN, UNHCR, and the  Iraqi government. According to PRM, its official data were obtained from  its Global Financial Management System. USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign  Disaster Assistance provided its official data from its Abacus and Phoenix  systems, and USAID’s Food for Peace program provided its data from its  Food for Peace Information System, New Management System, and  Phoenix system. UNHCR’s Donor Relations & Resource Mobilization  Service, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and  State’s PRM bureau provided funding data for the UNHCR appeals and  contributions received by the United States and other donors. To verify  our summarization of the funding data, we sent out draft tables to agency  and UN contributors and made supported changes.
To assess the key challenges the U.S. government and UNHCR face in  offering solutions for Iraqi refugees and the special immigrant visa  program, we interviewed and assessed documentation from State’s PRM;  State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs; State’s Office of Inspector General; the  Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration  Services (USCIS); U.S. embassy officials in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq;  UNHCR, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, IOM, and  other UN agencies; nongovernmental organizations; and research  institutes. In the United States, we held discussion sessions with  nongovernmental organizations with a presence in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan.  In Jordan and Syria, we held discussion sessions with Iraqi refugees and  visited U.S.- and UN-funded programs. To further assess the U.S. Refugee  Admissions program, we obtained and assessed data from State’s  Worldwide Refugee Admissions Program System. We toured State’s  overseas processing entities managed by IOM and reviewed processing  steps and data with IOM, USCIS, State, and U.S. embassy officials,  including refugee coordinators. We analyzed U.S. admissions data and  found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To  further address the SIV programs, we reviewed the legislative  requirements for the two SIV programs found in Section 1059 of the Fiscal  Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act and Section 1244 of the  Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. We reviewed  relevant documents from the Bureau of Consular Affairs concerning Iraqi  interpreter/translator SIV program planning, processes, resources, and  implementation. Also, we met with Consular Affairs officials in  Washington, D.C.; Iraq; Syria; and Jordan, who provided information on  general consular management and oversight, visa processing and  procedures, staffing, and resource needs. We analyzed SIV data and found  the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to January 2009  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Status of U.S. Appropriation Funds Apportioned to Iraq-Related Humanitarian Assistance, and Intended Beneficiaries, as of September 30, 2008
subsections: section_title: Agency/ program
paragraphs: State/ Population,  Refugees, and  Migration Bureau  (PRM)
USAID/Office of U.S.  Foreign Disaster  Assistance (OFDA)
In region: government of Jordan  to meet the needs of Iraqi  refugees and host country  population  48.8  In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable  In region: Iraqi refugees and host  country populations  26.3  In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable  5.7  In Iraq: IDPs  According to USAID, in 2003, USAID’s Food for Peace Program received $191.1 million, which was  reallocated from funds originally appropriated in P.L. 108-7 to Development Assistance, Economic  Support Fund, Child Survival and Health, and International Disaster and Famine Assistance  accounts.
The U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) fund is drawn upon by the  President to meet unexpected urgent refugee and migration needs whenever the President  determines that it is in the U.S. national interest to do so. Funds are appropriated annually to the  ERMA fund and remain available until expended.
section_title: Appendix IV: U.S. Contributions to UNHCR Appeals for Iraq-Related Humanitarian Assistance, and Intended Beneficiaries, Calendar Years 2003 through 2008
subsections: section_title: Amount of
paragraphs: U.S. portion of  new  contributions  (percentage)
In region: Iraqi refugees  and host country  populations  In Iraq: IDPs and  vulnerable populations  In region: Iraqi refugees  and host country  populations  applicable The 2003 UNHCR Iraq Revised Appeal reduced the original appeal from $154.1 million to $90.6  million.
The 2007 UNHCR Iraq Situation Response appeal increased the appeal from $59.7 million to $123.7  million. UNHCR’s portion of a 2007 Joint Health Sector Appeal and contributions made were folded  into the 2007 UNHCR Iraq Situation Response appeal.
The UNICEF portion of the Joint Education Appeal included additional funding requirements for  $31.0 million. The amount of this portion of the appeal that was funded was $9.4 million, including  $9.0 million in contributions from the United States, representing 95.7 percent of total contributions to  the UNICEF portion of the Joint Education Appeal.
Contributions to the 2008 UNHCR Iraq Situation Supplementary Appeal included here are as of  December 10, 2008.
section_title: Appendix V: Individual Iraqi Refugee Beneficiaries of UNHCR Assistance in Syria and Jordan, Calendar Year 2008
paragraphs: Syria (individuals)  Jordan (individuals)
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We added text in the background to describe other components of  PRM’s work.  2.  As stated in the draft of this report, in April 2008, State reported that  UNHCR “effectively monitors 40 to 59 percent of its partners.” In  State’s written and technical comments, the department notes that the  statement in its document should have read “implementing partners’  program activity sites.” We have revised this report to correct State’s  reporting error. Further, despite our requests for an updated  evaluation, State did not provide updated percentages of site visits.  UNHCR, in its technical comments on the draft, provided evidence on  the steps it has taken in 2009 to mitigate this challenge. We  incorporated this information, as appropriate.   3.  This statement was deleted from the text. 4.  We added a footnote to provide information on the 1244 program’s  requirement for Chief of Mission approval and the approval process.
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition, Audrey Solis, Assistant Director; Minty Abraham; Lynn  Cothern; David Dornisch; Timothy Fairbanks; Kathleen Monahan; Mary  Moutsos; Andrew Stavisky; and Heather Whitehead made key  contributions to this report. Technical assistance was provided by Shirley  Brothwell, Elizabeth Curda, Aniruddha Dasgupta, Etana Finkler, David  Hancock, and Jeremy Sebest.