Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve DOD's Oversight of Power Source Investments
Published: 2010-12-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Virtually all Department of Defense (DOD) weapon systems and equipment rely on power sources, such as batteries. In response to a mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, GAO determined (1) DOD's approximate investment in power sources, (2) the extent to which DOD coordinates its power source investments, and (3) the extent to which DOD's policies facilitate the use of standard power sources. To address these objectives, GAO obtained and analyzed DOD investment data, met with DOD officials and industry representatives, and attended DOD conferences aimed at facilitating power source coordination.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO determined that DOD has invested at least $2.1 billion in power sources from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010. However, DOD lacks comprehensive, departmentwide data for its total investment in the power sources area. Availability of complete data varies across the three investment categories: science and technology (S&T), logistics support, and acquisition programs. While DOD appears to have adequate departmentwide data on S&T efforts, it does not have departmentwide data for all logistics support investments. DOD lacks sufficient data on its investments in power sources when they are developed or purchased for acquisition programs. The $2.1 billion amount includes investments in S&T and logistics support that GAO was able to identify, but not power source investments as part of acquisition programs because of the difficulty in obtaining investment data in that area. This lack of complete, departmentwide investment data hinders DOD's oversight and future planning in the power sources area, adversely affecting its ability to ensure basic accountability, anticipate future funding, and measure performance. DOD's mechanisms for coordinating power source S&T--including interagency working groups, conferences, informal networks, and information technology resources--are generally effective. However, in some of these activities participation by pertinent member agencies is voluntary and could be more complete. Agencies may be missing opportunities to coordinate activities--such as avoiding initiation of similar research projects--and leverage resources because agency participation is voluntary and the level of participation by pertinent agencies varies. In addition, DOD's strategic planning process to facilitate the allocation of S&T funds for power source technologies could be improved. The S&T planning efforts can also be complicated by external factors, such as the additions Congress makes to DOD's budget. Although DOD power source experts GAO staff spoke with agree that the department needs to increase its emphasis on power source standardization, DOD lacks departmentwide policies to help emphasize power source standardization. Existing policies have demonstrated limited effectiveness because of compliance problems and because they may only apply to specific power source applications. Although it is generally more economical to address standardization early in the acquisition process, according to DOD officials, power sources are generally not considered early in the process, potentially hindering standardization efforts. DOD has also not evaluated departmentwide opportunities for retrofitting deployed weapon systems and equipment with standard or other preferred power sources when cost effective.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: To increase oversight of power source investments, GAO recommends that DOD consider how to best aggregate departmentwide investment data. To improve interagency coordination of S&T projects, DOD should determine ways to strengthen agency participation in coordination mechanisms. To increase emphasis on standardization, DOD should develop a standardization plan and enforceable departmentwide policies and identify opportunities to retrofit existing systems with standard power sources when cost effective. DOD concurred with the first recommendation and partially concurred with the other four. It was unclear from DOD's response what actions it plans to take in response to GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Virtually all Department of Defense (DOD) weapon systems and  equipment rely on power sources such as batteries. We estimate that DOD  invested at least $2.1 billion in power sources from fiscal year 2006  through fiscal year 2010 in three investment areas: science and technology  (S&T) activities such as research, logistics support such as providing the  warfighter with supplies, and acquisition programs such as those for  weapon systems or equipment. This amount will likely rise because of  growing warfighter energy and power demands as well as interest in  smaller, lighter, and more capable power sources. Power sources are a  mission-critical technology and may ultimately affect the warfighter if  DOD is unable to meet demand. For example, severe shortages of some  types of batteries during initial combat operations in Iraq threatened to  significantly degrade the operational capabilities of the United States  military. During the shortages, caused in part by industrial base  limitations and initial reliance on one supplier, the Marines reported  having less than a 2-day supply of certain mission-critical batteries rather  than the required 30-day supply.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 mandated  that GAO determine DOD’s power source investments and coordination  efforts. In this report, our specific objectives were to (1) determine, as  completely as possible, DOD’s total investment in power sources;   (2) assess the extent to which DOD coordinates power source S&T  investments departmentwide as well as with the Department of Energy  (DOE); and (3) assess the extent to which DOD has policies that facilitate  power source standardization. In consultation with congressional staff, we  limited the scope of the term power sources to include tactical power  sources used for soldier-carried equipment and vehicle applications as  well as power sources for munitions (e.g., missiles) and satellites. Our  scope excludes power sources used to support installations such as  temporary or permanent military facilities. In terms of specific  technologies, we focused on batteries, fuel cells, and capacitors. This was  based on the predominance of batteries among tactically deployed power  sources, the level of investment in fuel cells, and congressional interest in  capacitors.
To determine DOD’s total investment in power sources for S&T, logistics  support, and acquisition programs, we interviewed officials within the  Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and across DOD component  organizations to determine an appropriate methodology for collecting the  most complete set of investment data possible. We analyzed DOD  investment data extracted from DOD research and logistics support  databases and also other data that we gathered from pertinent DOD  components. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of providing approximate or minimum investment amounts in  S&T and logistics support in this report. To assess the extent to which  DOD coordinates power source S&T investments, we interviewed officials  across the military services, other pertinent DOD components, DOE, and  the power source industry. In addition, we attended private sector and  federal government conferences related to power sources, took part in  training sessions related to DOD-wide information-sharing resources, and  collected information from the membership of a power sources industry  association. We also drew extensively on other GAO work related to  interagency coordination. In order to assess the extent to which DOD’s  policies facilitate power source standardization, we interviewed officials  across the military services and other pertinent DOD components and  reviewed existing policies and standardization efforts. A more detailed  description of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to December  2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD invests in power sources such as batteries, fuel cells, and capacitors  to support the warfighting effort by powering weapon systems and  equipment. DOD’s power source investment is expected to rise because  of an increased reliance on advanced weapon systems and equipment an ongoing efforts to develop new technologies that are smaller, lighter, and   Batteries are devices that convert chemical energy  more power dense. into electrical energy. The two main types of batteries are primary (non- rechargeable) and secondary (rechargeable). Primary batteries, which are  discarded after their charge has been depleted, are the most common  battery type for soldier-carried applications. A subclass of primary  d  batteries called thermal batteries is used for short-term, high-power  applications (e.g., missiles). While primary batteries typically self- discharge available energy when not in use, thermal batteries have a  longer shelf life because they remain inert until activated. Secondary  batteries, which can be reenergized after their charge has been depleted,  are less commonly used by deployed units than primary batteries.  However, the Army has undertaken educational campaigns to increase  their use in light of some cost efficiencies and operational advantages— including overall weight reduction of soldiers’ equipment. Further, the  military services are interested in transitioning from non-rechargeable  batteries to secondary batteries because their use by deployed units may  decrease the number of vehicle convoys needed to supply batteries in war  zones. DOD is also interested in limiting the proliferation of battery types  to reduce the number of different battery types the soldiers have to carry  and limit soldier confusion over which battery is required to operate a  device—thus simplifying operations and resupply. See figure 1 for a  sample of DOD’s power source inventory.
In general, fuel cells and capacitors are less mature technologies than  batteries with respect to defense applications. Fuel cells are  electrochemical devices that convert the chemical energy in a fuel, such as  hydrogen, into electrical energy. Fuel cells look and function very similar  to batteries. However, the available energy of a battery is stored within the  battery—and its performance will decline as that energy is depleted— while a fuel cell continues to convert chemical energy to electricity as long  as it has a supply of fuel. Capacitors are passive electrical components  that store energy and may be used for a wide range of commercial and  defense applications. Although most capacitors are used for small,  primarily consumer-oriented electronic devices, they are increasingly  being developed for high-power weaponry. DOD research organizations  have ongoing S&T efforts focused on maturing fuel cell and capacitor  technologies so they can be deployed. Given the developmental nature of  these technologies—as well as the predominance of batteries among  tactically deployed power sources—this report principally discusses  batteries.
DOD invests in power sources in three broad, interrelated investment  categories: (1) S&T efforts related to developing and improving power  source technologies, (2) purchasing power sources for logistics support as  part of routine warfighter resupply, and (3) developing or purchasing  power sources for integration into a weapon system or equipment as part  of an acquisition program. Ideally, technologies developed as part of S&T  efforts will ultimately be incorporated into new or existing weapon  systems or equipment. These three investment categories are described  below.  1.  S&T: DOD research, development, test and evaluation investment is  separated into seven discrete investment categories known as budget  activities. The first three categories represent basic and applied  research and technology development activities and are collectively  known as S&T activities. These can include activities such as  developing or improving upon different chemical combinations that  enhance energy storage or power output capabilities, developing  lighter components, and identifying and incorporating novel material  components. This research may be conducted by many different  entities, including DOD research centers and other government  laboratories, power sources manufacturers, and academic institutions.  According to DOD officials, these projects may be funded through a  variety of mechanisms, including a DOD component’s base budget;  small business programs, such as the Small Business Innovation  Research (SBIR) program; and additions Congress makes to DOD’s  budget (i.e., congressional add-ons).  2.  Logistics support: This category includes the provision of logistical  services, materiel, and transportation required to support the military  in the continental United States and worldwide. Power sources are like  any other materiel requirements of military units, such as food and  clothing, in that they are a consumable commodity that must be  reordered and resupplied according to military service needs. Power  sources for logistics support are typically purchased through the  Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which is the primary supplying agent  for DOD.  3.  Acquisition programs: This category includes the selection of a  military standard power source, the selection of a commercial-off-the- shelf (COTS) power source, or the design, development, and  production of a program-unique power source as part of a DOD  acquisition program. This process may be managed by the program  office responsible for the weapon system or equipment acquisition, the  contractor developing the system, or both. Since virtually all weapon  systems and equipment include a power source, most acquisition  programs have to undergo this process.
For the purpose of this report, we define coordination as any joint activity  by two or more organizations that is intended to produce more public  value than could be produced when the organizations act alone. As we  have previously reported, interagency coordination is important to avoid  carrying out programs in a fragmented, uncoordinated way in areas where  multiple agencies address a similar mission. Standardization, which is a  form of coordination, includes efforts to expand the use of common or  interchangeable parts by developing and agreeing on compatible  standards. With respect to power sources, this may include developing  standard shapes to facilitate the use of common, nonproprietary power  sources in a range of weapon systems and equipment.
section_title: DOD Lacks Comprehensive, Departmentwide Data on Some Power Source Investments
paragraphs: DOD lacks comprehensive, departmentwide data for its total investment in  the power sources area and no single DOD office aggregates these data  across all investment categories. Further, availability of complete data  varies across the three investment categories: S&T, logistics support, and  acquisition programs. We determined that DOD invested at least   $2.1 billion in power sources from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year  2010. While DOD appears to have adequate departmentwide data on S&T  efforts, it does not have departmentwide data for all logistics support  investments. DOD has limited data on its investments in power sources  when they are developed or purchased for acquisition programs. The $2.1  billion amount includes the investments in S&T and logistics support that  we were able to identify but not power source investments as part of  acquisition programs because of the difficulty in obtaining investment data  in that area. In general, a lack of investment information can adversely  affect DOD’s ability to avoid unnecessary duplication; control costs;  ensure basic accountability; anticipate future costs and claims on the  budget; measure performance; maintain funds control; prevent and detect  fraud, waste, and abuse; and address pressing management issues.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has a High Level of Data on Power Source S&T Investments
paragraphs: We determined that from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010 DOD  invested approximately $868 million in the development of power source  technologies through many individual power source S&T projects.  However, this amount is approximate as it may not include all power  source S&T project funding. Figure 2 depicts DOD’s approximate  investment in power sources S&T by DOD component. In the period from  fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010, the Army was the largest investor  with a total investment of about $361 million and the Navy was the second  largest investor with a total investment of about $342 million. During that  same time period, the Air Force invested about $90 million, the Defense  Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) invested about $51 million,  and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) invested about $26 million.
DOD’s investment is largely concentrated within two power source  technology areas: batteries and fuel cells. There is also significant  investment in projects that involve more than one type of technology,  which we refer to in figure 3 as multiple types. We found that the total  investment for capacitor-related research was small relative to the other  areas. This may be because capacitors for high-power defense applications  are an emerging and still immature technology. Officials informed us that  DOD-wide interest in capacitors has increased along with an interest in  high-power weaponry. As shown in figure 3, the largest investment—about  36 percent of the total for fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010—was in  fuel cells.
We identified a suite of DOD-wide information technology resources that  includes a database used for tracking DOD-wide S&T activities. This  database does not categorize projects in such a way that one could readily  and reliably extract all activities for a certain research area (such as  batteries). Despite these limitations, we were able to obtain suitable data  from each research organization, which enabled us to present an  approximate investment figure.
section_title: DOD Has Data on Some Logistics Support Investments, but Not All Investments Are Tracked
paragraphs: We found that DOD invested at least $1.2 billion in power sources for  logistics support from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010. Though  DLA supplies the nation’s military services with critical resources needed  to accomplish their worldwide missions, there are additional methods  outside of DLA’s procurement processes by which the military services  may purchase power sources. For example, a service might purchase a  power source outside of DLA’s procurement processes if that service is  the only consumer of the power source item. However, we found no DOD  effort to aggregate and analyze these investments, even though DLA and  military service logistics databases track investments using a standard  governmentwide federal supply coding system that could be used for this  purpose.
We collected data from DLA and military service databases for  investments in power sources for logistics support from fiscal year 2006  through fiscal year 2010. We determined that military service purchases  through DLA likely account for the majority of logistics support  investments captured by DOD databases.  However, while the $1.2 billion  investment amount we compiled includes data from these databases, DOD  officials informed us that not all of these databases track power source  purchases made as part of contractor-performed maintenance for weapon  systems and equipment—known as contract logistic support. As we have  previously reported, DOD has extensively relied on contractors for  activities such as logistics support. Thus, the minimum investment  amount we generated does not include what is likely a substantial amount  of power source investments for logistics support. Figure 4 depicts DOD’s  gistics support. Figure 4 depicts DOD’s  minimum investment in power sources for logistics support.  minimum investment in power sources for logistics support.
section_title: DOD Lacks Sufficient Data on Its Total Investment in Power Sources for Acquisition Programs
paragraphs: Though virtually all DOD weapon systems and equipment rely on a power  source, DOD has little data on its total investment in power sources for  acquisition programs. DOD officials told us that neither the department  nor individual DOD components have information showing the total  amount invested in power sources for acquisition programs, although this  information may be retained by individual program offices. We asked  some program offices if they could provide basic cost information on the  principal power sources used by their programs. Some program offices  provided this information, but others did not. Some offices that could not  provide this information provided an explanation; for example, one  program office told us that the cost for the power source was built into the  overall cost for the system and thus was not broken out as a specific  expense. Other program offices simply provided no cost data and no  explanation.
We also asked a number of senior DOD officials—including officials from  OSD and from the services at the assistant or deputy assistant secretary  level—whether they could provide data on total investment in power  sources for acquisition programs at the departmentwide or service levels,  but none were able to do so. Officials from the Office of the Director of  Operational Energy Plans and Programs, an office within OSD that serves  as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and others regarding  operational energy, concurred. They stated that since these costs are not  aggregated, DOD would have to require each acquisition program office to  identify power source investments and then consolidate them. They stated  that this would be a labor-intensive data collection effort given the large  number of DOD acquisition programs.
In order to gain an understanding of how some acquisition programs  determined which power sources would be used by their programs, we  asked several Army, Navy, and Air Force acquisition program offices to  provide us with information on this process. Although these offices  provided responses with varying levels of detail, we determined that there  are several methods by which a program office may acquire power  sources. For example:    Selection of existing military standard power sources: The  program office for the V-22 Osprey, a tilt rotor aircraft developed by  the Navy in the 1980s, followed a mandatory Navy specification for  rotary aircraft that required the use of government-furnished batteries  made to DOD military standards. According to the program office, the  V-22 program tested two military standard batteries already used in  two other aircraft and determined that they met the power source  requirements of the V-22. As such, the program selected these two  batteries for use by the V-22. Because the V-22 selected preexisting  batteries, the program incurred no development costs; the combined  unit costs provided were $3,688.
Selection of COTS power sources: Officials from the Navy’s P-8A  Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft told us the program uses a COTS  battery as the principal power source for its electronics systems. The  P-8A is derived from a Boeing 737 commercial aircraft and has roles in  antisubmarine and antisurface warfare as well as intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance. The program office assessed the  suitability of the power source used by the Boeing 737 and found that  this COTS solution met their requirements and selected it for use by  the program. Because the P-8A selected a preexisting COTS battery,  the program incurred no development costs associated with program- unique power sources. The unit cost provided was $11,500.
Development of program-unique power sources: Officials in the  Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile program office told us that they  determined that the program required the design, development, and  production of a program-unique thermal battery because of the  missile’s strict design parameters in terms of internal space available  for the power source. The program developed a new battery, but the  program office was only able to provide limited cost information  because the costs involved were included in the overall cost of the  missile. The unit cost provided was $3,775.
section_title: S&T Coordination Mechanisms Are Generally Effective, Though Opportunities Exist to Improve Strategic Planning
paragraphs: DOD coordination mechanisms for power source S&T activities are  generally effective in facilitating coordination across pertinent DOD  components and with DOE, but opportunities exist for improvement. We  also found that DOD’s strategic planning process for appropriately  directing S&T investment for power source technologies could be  improved. DOD also generally has deficiencies in strategic planning for  critical technologies, processes for technology transition, and tools that  support transition. Further, S&T planning efforts can be complicated by  external factors. For example, congressional additions to DOD’s budget  account for just over half of the total S&T funding we identified for power  sources. Since this process can be informal and lack transparency,  outcomes in this area may be unpredictable and difficult to incorporate  into strategic plans.
subsections: section_title: S&T Coordination Mechanisms Are Generally Effective
paragraphs: DOD uses various mechanisms to facilitate the coordination of power  source S&T activities across pertinent DOD components, DOE, and in  some cases industry. According to DOD power source researchers, the  principal means for coordinating is the Chemical Working Group of the  Interagency Advanced Power Group (IAPG). The Chemical Working  Group is part of the long-standing IAPG interagency working group and  brings together researchers from relevant DOD components, DOE, and  other federal stakeholders to exchange information about power source  projects and avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. In addition, the  Defense Technical Information Center—an organization responsible for  providing information services to DOD—has a number of information  technology resources related to S&T that were developed to facilitate  information sharing between stakeholders across the DOD research and  engineering community. Table 1 lists the principal ways DOD coordinates  S&T projects.
As an example of the efficacy of these mechanisms, no power source  projects presented at the 2010 annual Chemical Working Group meeting  were identified as involving duplicative research within DOD or between  DOD and DOE, though the meetings have been effective in identifying  instances of project duplication in the past. Additionally, both DOD and  DOE participate in several other coordinating groups together to leverage  common efforts, and in July 2010 DOD and DOE signed a memorandum of  understanding developing a framework for cooperation and partnership  on energy issues. Both organizations agreed to collaborate on S&T  projects at research institutions sponsored by either agency, to  synchronize S&T to expand complementary efforts, and to develop joint  initiatives for major energy S&T programs of mutual interest.
Though we found these mechanisms to be generally effective, agencies  may miss opportunities to fully coordinate because attendance at these  interagency groups and conferences is voluntary and the level of agency  participation varies. Further, conversations with officials from DOD  component organizations suggest that there may be limited awareness  within the DOD power sources community of the coordination services  available through the Defense Technical Information Center. In areas  where multiple agencies address a similar mission, interagency  coordination is important to collectively meet common goals and avoid  carrying out programs in a fragmented, uncoordinated way. As we have  previously reported, this lack of coordination can waste scarce funds,  confuse and frustrate program customers, and limit the overall  effectiveness of the federal effort. Agency officials informed us that the  community of power source experts from the federal government,  industry, and academia is small and well-connected by interpersonal  relationships. Although it is not possible to accurately estimate the impact  of these often informal relationships, officials believed that such  relationships facilitate information sharing, which is beneficial to DOD- wide power source S&T.
section_title: S&T Strategic Planning Could Be Improved
paragraphs: We found that though DOD has generally effective S&T coordination  mechanisms, its strategic planning process to facilitate the allocation of  S&T funds for power source technologies could be improved. Most DOD  components generate strategic plans to guide S&T investments, though we  found no current Air Force plan. We found that existing military service- level S&T strategic plans are not specific and typically do not discuss  investments in power sources in depth, if at all. There have also been  several technology roadmaps developed or initiated specifically for the  power sources area. However, we have been told by DOD researchers  that these roadmaps may quickly become irrelevant without frequent  updating because necessary investment levels and the maturity of the  pertinent technologies may evolve over time. Further, unless roadmapping  efforts are coordinated, DOD cannot be assured that they will be  complementary and fully assist agencies in addressing shared  technological challenges. Additionally, though DOD has established the  Energy and Power Community of Interest to focus on power source issues  as part of its broader Reliance 21 program, representatives of this group  told us that it is a relatively new organization and is still finalizing  organizational planning. They said that the community of interest will  develop strategic planning documents specific to power sources that will  enable DOD to better plan in this area.
We have previously reported that DOD lacked a single executive-level OSD  official who is accountable for operational energy matters and  recommended that one be designated. We also noted that DOD lacked a  comprehensive strategic plan for operational energy. As a result, in  October 2009 DOD established the Director of Operational Energy Plans  and Programs. According to officials from this office, they will, among  other things, coordinate departmentwide policy, planning, and program  activities related to operational energy demand and relevant technologies.  Further, officials told us that this office will also include power source  technologies in its purview. The Director was recently confirmed, and the  office is currently working to gather the personnel required to support its  efforts. The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2009 requires the office to submit an Annual DOD Energy  Management Report on departmentwide operational energy.
We have previously reported that DOD generally faces problems with  deficiencies in strategic planning for critical technologies, processes for  technology development and transition, and tools that support transition.  Similarly, some DOD officials told us about challenges in transitioning a  new power source technology from the laboratory to an acquisition  program. We identified some efforts that support power source technology  transition within the services. However, DOD researchers said that the  overall problem still occurs in this area and that promising technologies  may be forgotten or overlooked if they are not transitioned into an  acquisition program. In addition, DOD’s lack of oversight and  comprehensive data on power source investments for acquisition  programs may further complicate technology transition efforts.
section_title: External Factors Can Pose Planning Challenges
paragraphs: S&T planning efforts can be complicated by external factors. We found  that DOD investments in power source S&T come from several sources,  including base budget funds, small business programs (such as the SBIR  program), and congressional add-ons—that is, additions Congress makes  to DOD’s budget. From the data we collected, we determined that  congressional add-ons account for approximately 55 percent of the DOD  total investment we identified in power source S&T from fiscal year 2006  through fiscal year 2010. While these add-ons provide funding for S&T,  officials at DOD research organizations told us that these add-ons may  pose a challenge to strategic planning for two reasons. First, research  organizations may lack complete discretion over how to apply the funds— while they may be able to accept or decline an add-on, these add-ons do  not give them full control over the project. Second, since this process can  be informal and lack transparency, outcomes in this area may be  unpredictable and difficult to incorporate into strategic plans.
section_title: DOD’s Power Source Standardization Efforts Are Not Departmentwide and Lack Robust Enforcement
paragraphs: Though DOD officials agree that the department needs to increase its  emphasis on power source standardization, it lacks a departmentwide  policy to emphasize or compel early consideration of standard power  sources. Absent emphasis on early standardization, profit incentives can  often lead companies to develop unique, proprietary power sources. The  Army has a policy to encourage standardization, but the other services  lack comparable policies. Although it is generally more economical to  address standardization early in the acquisition process and prior to the  deployment of weapon systems or equipment to the field, opportunities  may exist to increase standardization by retrofitting weapon systems or  equipment for which a proprietary power source has already been  developed. This was recently done successfully with the TALON bomb  disposal robot. DOD’s lack of emphasis on power source standardization  limits opportunities to obtain potential benefits, including reduced item  unit costs and a smaller logistical footprint.
subsections: section_title: Efforts to Standardize Lack Sufficient Emphasis and Oversight
paragraphs: It is important to emphasize standardization early in a program before  certain system decisions are made. Without early consideration of the  available standard power source, the design parameters of a system may  become more constrained as other parts are developed and integrated. As  a result, remaining space may not be sufficient to fit the shape of  appropriate standard power sources. Although in some cases developing a  program-unique power source is necessary because of legitimate  constraints, such as necessary limitations on the space available for a  power source, officials told us that companies may develop program- unique power sources unnecessarily. Not requiring power source  standardization can result in unnecessary proliferation that may ultimately  have downstream implications in terms of resupplying the warfighter.  DOD officials we spoke with agree that the department needs to increase  its emphasis on power source standardization. However, DOD lacks a  departmentwide policy to help emphasize power source standardization  and compel early consideration of standard power sources. We found that  without policies requiring standardization, programs may choose to  develop or select nonstandard power sources when an existing military  standard or other preferred item could have been used, potentially  hindering standardization efforts.
DOD and industry officials told us that power sources are often not  considered by program offices, or are thought of by acquisition officials as  a peripheral concern because of the low costs relative to overall program  costs. Additionally, according to the Defense Standardization Program,  DOD’s performance-based acquisition policies give contractors primary  responsibility for recommending the use of standard components to meet  performance requirements. DOD officials and power source company  representatives have told us that program managers may choose not to  exercise oversight of these contractor decisions. Further, during these  discussions, we were told that companies have a profit motive to develop  proprietary power sources as part of the acquisition of a weapon system or  equipment because they would prefer to be sole-source suppliers. Thus,  they may not consider standard options that would provide more optimal  solutions for DOD customers.
According to DOD officials, an instance of a contractor choosing a  proprietary power source over an existing battery occurred with the  batteries for two radio systems used by the Army and the Marine Corps— the AN/PRC-148 Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio and the AN/PRC-152  Falcon radio. Though the radios are functionally similar, they each use a  program-unique proprietary battery instead of an existing battery or a  battery common to both radios. Further, although the batteries are very  similar in design and each will fit in the other device, a superficial design  characteristic on one battery prohibits the battery from powering the  other manufacturer’s radio. In addition, the charger interfaces are not  compatible, so the batteries cannot be charged using a single charger  without modification, such as through an adapter. As a result, the service  users of the two radios must manage inventories for two types of batteries  and chargers, and the soldiers in the field have to ensure that they take the  correct battery for their radio since the other battery will not be  compatible. Also, the military services are unable to competitively procure  the batteries because each is a proprietary device and the services must  rely on the sole-source supplier of each battery—potentially increasing the  risk of item shortages or delays.
Though DOD officials we spoke with in the power sources area agree that  the department needs to increase emphasis on power source  standardization early in programs, existing organizational efforts lack  authority and resources to implement any policies. For example, DOD’s  Defense Standardization Program established the Joint Standardization  Board for Power Source Systems to focus specifically on power source  standardization. According to the board’s charter, it serves as a standing  technical group for power source standardization efforts. Its specific role  is to participate in the development of an overarching DOD  standardization strategy for power sources and to promote commonality  of component parts or interfaces by facilitating a coordinated approach  with joint programs. However, the Chairman of the Joint Standardization  Board for Power Source Systems told us that though the board is part of  the Defense Standardization Program, it does not have the funding it needs  to function and thus has had little impact. He added that other joint  standardization boards have significant user funding because particular  acquisition program managers, or sponsors, have a vested interest in the  results of their work.
Officials from this board also noted that while emphasizing  standardization early in acquisition programs will undoubtedly yield future  benefits, DOD lacks a comprehensive plan for creating an appropriate  level of emphasis on power source standardization and that DOD also  lacks a policy for ensuring the achievement of standardization goals.  Accordingly, these officials recommended in a Defense Standardization  Program publication that DOD establish a plan (in conjunction with power  source experts from throughout the federal government, industry, and  academia) to create an appropriate level of DOD-wide emphasis on  standardization. Further, they recommended that DOD create a policy that  addresses the use of nonstandard power sources and that might articulate  a process of senior-level review to determine if requests to use  nonstandard power sources are justified.
section_title: Army Policy Encourages Standardization, but Other Services Lack Comparable Policies
paragraphs: The most significant DOD power source standardization policy we found  related to acquisition programs is section 8.8 of Army Regulation (AR) 70- 1. Two main objectives of this policy are to decrease the number and  types of batteries the Army uses and limit the development of unique  batteries except where necessary. The regulation prioritizes use of military  or commercial standard rechargeable batteries in acquisition programs,  with a particular emphasis on using rechargeable batteries. Program  managers are supposed to coordinate system battery requirements with  Army power source subject matter experts, who we were told are  currently in the Army Power Division. For programs where military or  commercial standard rechargeable battery types are not practical,  program offices can choose from a list of military-preferred batteries. The  regulation requires that program managers obtain an Army acquisition  executive approval—which we were told is the responsibility of the  Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and  Technology—if a program manager intends to use batteries other than  those articulated in the regulation. This approval is based on a favorable  technical evaluation by Army Power Division officials.
Army Power Division officials stated that there are several difficulties  associated with ensuring that acquisition programs consistently follow the  regulation. They said that section 8.8 of AR 70-1 can only succeed if there  is an effective mechanism for ensuring that acquisition programs comply  with it, and they identified challenges that may compromise effective  implementation of the regulation. First, Army Power Division officials told  us that program managers might not be aware of the requirements. They  said that they do not know how many Army acquisition programs comply  with section 8.8 of AR 70-1 since they are only aware of the programs to  which they provide consulting services as part of the regulation. They  could not tell us if any programs did not comply with the regulation and  therefore did not request a technical evaluation before developing a  program-unique battery.
Second, they said that program managers may not comply with AR 70-1  because they do not understand the potential downstream logistical issues  that can occur when battery decisions are not made early in the  acquisition process. Army Power Division officials said they prefer to get  involved with an acquisition program early in the process so they can help  identify the best battery solution before system decisions restrict potential  choices. They said that to do so they have to earn the respect and trust of  program managers so that these programs will seek technical consultation  early in the process. They added that the Army Power Division proactively  tries to establish and maintain good relationships with the different Army  program offices that might have battery needs.
Third, the Army Power Division receives approximately half of its funding  via customer reimbursement, meaning that it receives funding from  program offices when it provides consultative services. These variables  put the Army Power Division in a difficult position when current and  potential acquisition program customers of their technical services request  a favorable technical evaluation to support use of a program-unique  battery. Army Power Division officials told us that their evaluation may be  influenced by their desire to avoid compromising existing relationships  with program offices. They added that an unfavorable evaluation may lead  the program manager to forgo consultation with the Army Power Division  in the future, meaning the Army Power Division would lose a customer  and associated funding. Further, these officials told us that if a program  were to request an evaluation of a nonstandard battery late in the weapon  system or equipment development process (such as right before the start  of production), the Army Power Division might suggest approval of the  battery to the Army acquisition executive to avoid delaying production.
While Army officials acknowledge compliance issues, the Program  Manager-Mobile Electric Power has recently established the position  Product Director for Batteries to help facilitate central coordination to  reduce battery proliferation in the Army based on a perceived lack of  central coordination in the Army on battery issues. This position has just  been established and thus has not yet had much impact, but the Product  Director for Batteries told us that pending approval he intends to  eventually take over and update section 8.8 of AR 70-1—including  enforcement and approving or denying of waiver applications—as well as  any other Army battery standardization efforts. He told us that because he  is a program manager he will have more authority than the Army Power  Division to promulgate and enforce policies applicable to increasing the  emphasis on standardization.
Aside from the Army efforts, we found limited power source  standardization efforts in the other military services. In general, they are  limited to specific applications, such as aircraft, and are not applicable to  the whole service or are not departmentwide. The Navy has several  platform-specific efforts within the Naval Air Systems Command to  develop military performance specifications for multiple battery types to  limit proliferation of aircraft battery types. The Marine Corps Systems  Command has developed an interactive computer-adaptive tool to help  acquisition personnel in selecting appropriate, existing batteries for their  programs. Also, the Marine Corps Systems Command has a topic paper on  electrical connectors—including connectors for batteries—that is  intended to reduce proliferation of the connectors that connect the battery  to weapon systems or equipment. However, use of these tools is voluntary.  We did not find any Air Force-wide processes for encouraging the use of  existing standard or other preferred power sources.
section_title: DOD Has Not Evaluated Departmentwide Opportunities to Standardize Power Sources in Deployed Weapon Systems and Equipment
paragraphs: Although it is generally more economical to address standardization early  in the acquisition process and prior to the deployment of weapon systems  or equipment to the field, opportunities may exist to increase  standardization by retrofitting weapon systems or equipment for which a  proprietary power source has already been developed. However, DOD has  not undertaken a departmentwide assessment to identify other weapon  systems or equipment that use a nonstandard power source but that could  be retrofitted with a more efficient and lower-cost standard power source  with a relatively small investment. Such efforts may provide significant  cost savings and operational benefits. For example, Army and Navy  research organizations replaced the expensive proprietary batteries used  by TALON bomb disposal robots with military standard batteries that are  already in the DLA inventory. Army officials noted that their  standardization effort for the TALON robot generated a cost savings of  about $7,000 per unit of the system. A Navy effort to retrofit TALON robots  with military standard batteries extended the robot’s battery life by 23  percent. Because of the success of the standardization effort in terms of  cost and operational advantages, the Marine Corps and the Army replaced  proprietary battery packs with the retrofitted military standard batteries  for deployed units of the system.
section_title: Standardization May Provide Benefits to Both DOD and the Industrial Base
paragraphs: DOD’s lack of emphasis on power source standardization limits  opportunities to obtain potential benefits, including reduced item unit  costs and a smaller logistical footprint. According to a Defense  Standardization Program case study of an effort by the Army to  standardize batteries, standardization may enable DOD components to  offer manufacturers greater production volumes and avoid reliance on  sole-source suppliers for mission-critical items, which may result in a  healthier industrial base and improved operational readiness. In general,  the military battery industrial base in the United States is characterized by  small and midsized companies that operate in an environment with lower  sales volume compared to the commercial battery industry. One study of  the industry characterized the United States military battery industry as  struggling for survival with some companies relying solely on government  sales for income. Further, DOD demand is irregular because of  fluctuations based on periods of increased or decreased military activity.  For example, a surge in demand for some non-rechargeable batteries  related to the initiation of combat operations in Iraq exceeded the amount  that the industrial base could produce—which threatened to reduce  military capability. Though representatives from a major DOD battery  supplier told us that they would prefer to develop and be the sole-source  supplier of proprietary power sources, they noted that absent this option  they would prefer a scenario where companies could compete to produce  standard power sources in order to stabilize their production volumes and  revenue. Actions that could contribute to the health of the industrial  base—such as providing for greater production volumes through  increased standardization—could be beneficial to DOD in ensuring the  continued availability of military battery producers and mitigating future  potential production and supply shortfalls.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The goal of any acquisition program is to provide the warfighter with the  best possible weapon system or equipment. However, in light of increasing  dependence on power sources, supporting the warfighter’s power needs  with more power, longer life, and less weight—as well as ease and  sufficiency of supply—is also crucial. The proliferation of unique battery  types could become more pronounced and ultimately affect the warfighter  as military power demands increase. The current manner in which DOD  manages its power source investments and translates them into products  that meet warfighter needs is less than optimal. Specifically, DOD is not  able to efficiently and effectively plan future investments if it lacks  strategic investment knowledge of its total power source investment in  S&T, logistics support, and acquisition programs. Further, while DOD  mechanisms for coordinating S&T power source projects appear effective,  their success depends on voluntary participation by all pertinent agencies.  DOD agencies not fully participating in coordination mechanisms limit  opportunities to leverage common efforts. Though DOD has some  standardization efforts, decisions on what power sources will be put into  new equipment and ultimately the hands of the warfighter and the supply  system are often not made by DOD program managers and hence these  programs may unnecessarily use proprietary power sources. Improving  management and coordination of the power sources area could help DOD  achieve optimal return on its investment. Without sufficient,  departmentwide investment data; more effectively coordinated  investments; and increased power source standardization, optimal DOD  outcomes in this area cannot be expected.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To increase oversight of power source investments and to allow for  enhanced strategic planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  consider how to best aggregate departmentwide investment data (from  S&T, logistics support, and acquisition programs) in the power sources  area and develop a mechanism to aggregate power source investment data  across these investment categories at a level sufficient to guide decisions  and policy.
To ensure a high level of interagency participation and coordination in the  power sources S&T area, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  determine methods to strengthen pertinent member agency participation  in interagency coordination mechanisms.
To increase DOD-wide emphasis on power source standardization both  during design of weapon systems and equipment as well as for deployed  systems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense identify and direct  the appropriate office(s) to take the following actions:    Develop a plan to optimize use of standard power sources for weapon  system or equipment types that are more amenable to such  standardization.
Develop a DOD-wide policy—based on the above standardization  plan—similar to section 8.8 of Army AR 70-1 that requires senior  acquisition executive approval before allowing acquisition programs to  use a power source that is not standard or preferred. As part of this  new policy, consider requiring an independent review of the  appropriateness of using the nonstandard or nonpreferred power  source.
Identify opportunities to cost effectively retrofit deployed weapon  systems and equipment that use a proprietary power source with an  existing military standard or other preferred power source.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with one of  our five recommendations and partially concurred with four. The  department stated that it had already taken or plans to take specific  actions in response to our recommendations, but it is unclear from DOD’s  response what these actions entail.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  consider how to best aggregate departmentwide investment data (from  S&T, logistics support, and acquisition programs) in the power sources  area and develop a mechanism to aggregate power source investment data  across these investment categories at a level sufficient to guide decisions  and policy. We believe that aggregating these data is important to inform  decision making and investment in the power sources area.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense determine methods to strengthen pertinent member agency  participation in interagency coordination mechanisms. DOD commented  that existing coordination mechanisms are generally effective and have  been improving since the office of the Director, Operational Energy Plans  and Programs (DOEPP) was established. DOD added that the DOEPP  office will continue to seek ways to strengthen interagency coordination.  However, DOD did not provide specific information on how it believes  coordination mechanisms have improved or what additional methods  might be used to strengthen coordination. Our review identified voluntary  attendance and varying participation in interagency groups that if  enhanced could further improve coordination.
DOD also partially concurred with three recommendations related to  power source standardization, namely, that the Secretary of Defense   (1) identify and direct appropriate office(s) to develop a plan to optimize  use of standard power sources for weapon systems or equipment types  more amenable to standardization; (2) develop a DOD-wide policy similar  to section 8.8 of Army AR 70-1 that requires senior acquisition executive  approval before allowing acquisition programs to use a power source that  is not standard or preferred; and (3) identify opportunities to cost  effectively retrofit deployed weapons systems and equipment that use a  proprietary power source with an existing military standard or other  preferred power source. DOD indicated that ongoing activities led by the  DOEPP office are adequately addressing all these needs and no expansion  of effort is necessary. However, DOD did not provide any details related to  specific, ongoing DOEPP activities addressing these needs, and we found  no evidence of any such DOD or DOEPP actions while conducting our  review. While DOD established the DOEPP office in October 2009, it has  only had a Director since June 2010. In late August 2010, DOEPP office  officials informed us that they were still writing position descriptions and  working to gather the personnel required to support their efforts, but gave  no indication that any substantive work had been undertaken. Our review  revealed there is no DOD-wide plan or policy to emphasize power source  standardization, even though DOD officials told us that DOD needs further  emphasis in this area. Without a departmentwide plan to emphasize or  compel early consideration of standard power sources, the use of unique,  proprietary power sources will likely continue and DOD will not be able to  obtain the full benefits of standardization, such as reduced item unit costs  and a smaller logistical footprint.
By not identifying specific actions the department has taken or plans to  take to implement our recommendations, we believe that DOD may not  have appropriately considered our recommendations, and as a result we  are concerned that in the coming months it will not seek ways to fully  implement these recommendations.
DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,  and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director, Office  of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. The report also is  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: For the purposes of this report, we limited “power sources” to tactical  power sources used for soldier-portable and vehicle applications (e.g.,  motorized land vehicles, aircraft, and ships) as well as munitions and  satellite power sources. We excluded power sources for operational or  strategic applications, including power sources used to support  installations such as temporary or permanent military facilities, because of  the size and complexity of the tactical power sources portfolio and its  significance to the efforts of the warfighter. We focused on batteries, fuel  cells, and capacitors based on (1) language in the congressional mandate,  (2) predominance of batteries among tactically deployed power sources,  and (3) the recommendations of Department of Defense (DOD) experts.
To determine DOD’s total investment in power sources, we met with  officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and across  DOD component organizations to determine an appropriate methodology  for collecting as complete a set of investment data as possible. We divided  investment into three categories generally based on the three main defense  technology life cycle areas: (1) science and technology (S&T); (2) logistics  support, or the provision of logistics, materiel, and transportation  according to military needs; and (3) power sources for DOD weapon  systems or equipment acquisition programs. Based on a review of the  budget and on discussions with OSD officials, we found that there was no  central repository for DOD investments in power source S&T. DOD  officials told us that one would have to request the data from each  pertinent S&T organization. As a result, we developed a data collection  instrument asking each research organization to provide data on all power  source projects within our scope. Specifically, we requested project-level  information, including the project name, purpose, budget activity, and  funding history from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010. We also  requested data on projected future funding, but not all organizations were  able to provide this information. The Office of Naval Research (ONR)  compiled the data for the Navy since ONR manages all Department of the  Navy S&T funds, including those for the Marine Corps. The Army Deputy  Director for Technology from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the  Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology’s Research and  Technology Division compiled the data from the Army research  organizations. The Air Force Research Laboratory compiled data for Air  Force power source S&T projects. We assessed the reliability of these S&T  data by (1) performing electronic testing of required data elements and (2)  obtaining responses from agency officials knowledgeable about the data.  We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  presenting an approximate total of S&T investments in this report. This  investment amount is approximate because creating an exhaustive list of  all power source S&T projects was not possible because of the lack of  centralized DOD management of this area and the fact that we had to rely  on data gathered by each research organization. Additionally, since some  organizations involved in this area are funded by other DOD customers, it  is difficult to accurately track the precise amounts of funding for specific  projects.
We also interviewed officials from each service and its component  research organizations about S&T efforts in the power sources area. For  the Army, we met with the Army Deputy Director for Technology from the  Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and  Technology, Research and Technology Division; officials from the Army  Research, Development, and Engineering Command; officials from the  Army Research Laboratory; officials from the Army Communications- Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center’s Army Power  Division; and the Program Manager-Mobile Electric Power Product  Director for Batteries. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for  Installations and Environment, and the Army Tank Automotive Research,  Development and Engineering Center both provided written responses to  our questions. For the Navy, we spoke with officials from ONR; Navy  Surface Warfare Center Crane Division; the Naval Undersea Warfare  Center Newport Division; the Naval Air Systems Command’s Power and  Energy Division; and the Marine Corps Systems Command. The Assistant  Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment provided  written responses to our questions. For the Air Force, we spoke with  officials from the Air Force Research Laboratory, and we obtained written  responses from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for  Energy, Environment, Safety and Occupational Health and the Air Force  Materiel Command. We also obtained written responses from the Defense  Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). We also spoke with  officials from U.S. Special Operations Command and obtained data on  their power sources S&T investments.
To assess the involvement of the defense power sources industry in DOD  investments in power source S&T, we met with representatives of Saft  America Inc. (Saft), Advanced Thermal Batteries, and EaglePicher  Technologies, LLC (EaglePicher). According to the companies, Saft and  EaglePicher are two large DOD battery suppliers. We also attended an  annual power sources technology conference as well as two meetings of  the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Military Power  Sources Committee and spoke with representatives from additional  companies, including Alion Science and Technology, Dow Kokam, and  Yardney Technical Products. We also gathered information through  interviews with and written responses from the membership of the NDIA  Military Power Sources Committee in order to gain additional perspective  from the industry. We also met with members of the South Carolina  Research Authority’s Defense Advanced Battery Manufacturing Coalition.
To determine DOD’s investments in power sources as part of a DOD  weapon systems or equipment acquisition programs, we initially searched  DOD budget requests to locate power source investment data related to  acquisition programs. This method demonstrated that power sources are  typically not broken out as specific cost elements of budget request line  items related to acquisition programs. We were told by cognizant DOD  officials that this information was not available in an aggregated format.  Though we judged that the scope of DOD’s existing acquisition programs,  which includes around 100 major defense acquisition programs and  smaller programs, was too large for us to obtain information from every  program, we decided to obtain information from selected programs. We  did not assess the reliability of acquisition program data because we  determined that it would not be feasible for DOD to generate these data to  enable us to determine the investment in this area for this report. We  selected weapon systems and equipment from each of the military services  to provide a cross section of weapon system and equipment types (e.g.,  aircraft, satellites, ships, vehicles, and portable electronics). As part of this  effort, we spoke with program office officials and obtained data from the  following programs:    Army: Patriot/MEADS missile and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.    Navy: Joint Program Executive Office for the Joint Tactical Radio  System, DDG 1000 destroyer, AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation  Guided Missile, P-8A Poseidon, Joint Multi-mission Submersible, Mine- Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, and the V-22 Osprey program  offices.
Air Force: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, Navstar Global  Positioning System (GPS) GPS III, and Advanced Extremely High  Frequency satellites program offices.
To determine DOD’s investments in logistics support, we requested  Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) data on sales of power sources to the  military from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010. Though these data  do not include power sources that DLA might have procured as part of its  inventory management processes, they do include all power sources that  the military services bought from DLA during this period. To obtain data  on military service power source procurements that occur outside of DLA,  we obtained data from the Air Force Materiel Command, the Naval Supply  Systems Command, and the Army Materiel Command. We assessed the  reliability of logistics support data by (1) performing electronic testing of  required data elements and (2) obtaining responses from agency officials  knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of presenting a minimum investment  in this area in this report. Our investment total for logistics support  represents a minimum amount because, as DOD officials informed us, the  data we obtained from DLA and military service logistics databases do not  capture power source purchases made as part of contract logistics  support—a type of contracting activity on which DOD has relied  extensively.
To assess the degree to which DOD coordinates power source  investments, we spoke with cognizant officials from each of the military  services, research organizations across DOD, and DLA—including DLA’s  Battery Network group. For information on coordination of S&T  investments, we spoke with the Army Deputy Director for Technology  from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,  Logistics and Technology, Research and Technology Division; officials  from the Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command;  officials from the Army Research Laboratory; officials from the Army  Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering  Center’s Army Power Division; and the Program Manager-Mobile Electric  Power’s Product Director for Batteries. The Assistant Secretary of the  Army for Installations and Environment and the Army Tank Automotive  Research, Development and Engineering Center both provided written  responses to our questions. For the Navy, we spoke with officials from the  ONR, the Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division, the Naval  Undersea Warfare Center Newport Division, the Naval Air Systems  Command’s Power and Energy Division, and the Marine Corps Systems  Command. We also received written responses to our questions from the  Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and  Environment. For the Air Force, we spoke with officials from the Air  Force Research Laboratory, and we obtained written responses from the  Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Energy, Environment,  Safety and Occupational Health. In addition, we obtained written  responses from DARPA. We also spoke to officials from the DOD ManTech  office and officials involved with the DOD Reliance 21 program and the  Energy and Power Community of Interest. We also took part in a training  session related to DOD-wide information-sharing resources.
To assess the effectiveness of some of DOD’s coordinating mechanisms,  we attended the 44th Power Sources Conference where industry,  academic, and DOD power source researchers and other experts  discussed ongoing power source S&T efforts. We attended the annual  meeting of the Chemical Working Group of the Interagency Advanced  Power Group as well as a meeting of the Power Sources Technology  Working Group. In addition, we spoke with members of the Lithium  Battery Technical/Safety Group. To assess DOD coordination with the  Department of Energy (DOE), we spoke with representatives of the Joint  DOD/DOE Munitions Technology Development Program and the DOE  Office of Vehicle Technologies. We also drew extensively on other GAO  work related to interagency coordination.
To assess the extent to which DOD’s policies facilitate the use of standard  power sources, we met with cognizant officials from each of the military  services, including officials from the Army Communications-Electronics  Research, Development and Engineering Center and the Program  Manager-Mobile Electric Power’s Product Director for Batteries. We  received written responses to questions from an official from the Defense  Standardization Program’s Joint Standardization Board for Power Source  Systems. We also received written responses from the Assistant Secretary  of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment; the Assistant  Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment; and the Deputy  Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Energy, Environment, Safety and  Occupational Health. We also reviewed applicable standardization policies  and regulations.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to December  2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: DOD Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Budget Activities
paragraphs: Systematic study directed toward greater knowledge or understanding of  fundamental aspects of phenomena without specific applications toward  processes or products in mind.
Systematic study to understand the means to meet a recognized and specific  need.
Development of subsystems and components and efforts to integrate  subsystems and components into system prototypes for field experiments,  tests in a simulated environment, or both.
Efforts necessary to evaluate integrated technologies, representative modes  or prototype systems in a high-fidelity and realistic operating environment.
Conducting engineering and manufacturing development tasks aimed at  meeting validated requirements prior to full-rate production.
RDT&E efforts and funds to sustain, modernize, or both, the installations or  operations required for general RDT&E.
Development efforts to upgrade systems that have been fielded or have  received approval for full-rate production and anticipate production funding in  the current or subsequent fiscal year.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Art Gallegos, Assistant Director;  John Oppenheim, Assistant Director; Frederick K. Childers; John  Dell’Osso; Rosa Johnson; John Krump; C. James Madar; Bill Solis; Don  Springman; Bob Swierczek; and Mark Viehman made key contributions to  this report.