Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address Challenges
Published: 2003-11-05T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: It has been 2 years since the attacks of September 11,2001, exposed vulnerabilities in the nation's aviation system. Since then, billions of dollars have been spent on a wide range of initiatives designed to enhance the security of commercial aviation. However, vulnerabilities in aviation security continue to exist. As a result, questions have been raised regarding the effectiveness of established initiatives in protecting commercial aircraft from threat objects, and whether additional measures are needed to further enhance security. Accordingly, GAO was asked to describe the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to (1) measure the effectiveness of its aviation security initiatives, particularly its passenger screening program; (2) implement a risk management approach to prioritize efforts and focus resources; and (3) address key challenges to further enhance aviation security.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: TSA has implemented numerous initiatives designed to enhance aviation security, but has collected limited information on the effectiveness of these initiatives in protecting commercial aircraft. Our recent work on passenger screening found that little testing or other data exist that measures the performance of screeners in detecting threat objects. However, TSA is taking steps to collect data on the effectiveness of its security initiatives, including developing a 5-year performance plan detailing numerous performance measures, as well as implementing several efforts to collect performance data on the effectiveness of passenger screening--such as fielding the Threat Image Projection System and increasing screener testing. TSA has developed a risk management approach to prioritize efforts, assess threats, and focus resources related to its aviation security initiatives as we previously recommended, but has not yet fully implemented this approach. A risk management approach is a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and the criticality (or relative importance) of assets to better support key decisions. TSA is developing and implementing both a criticality and a vulnerability assessment tool to provide a basis for risk-based decision-making. TSA is currently using some components of these tools and plans to fully implement its risk management approach by the summer 2004. TSA faces a number of programmatic and management challenges as it continues to enhance aviation security. These include the implementation of the new computer-assisted passenger prescreening system, as well as strengthening baggage screening, airport perimeter and access controls, air cargo, and general aviation security. TSA also must manage the costs associated with aviation security and address human capital challenges, such as sizing its workforce as efficiency is improved with security-enhancing technologies--including the integration of explosive detection systems into in-line baggage-handling systems. Further challenges in sizing its workforce may be encountered if airports are granted permission to opt out of using federal screeners.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the  security of our nation’s aviation system. It has been more than 2 years  since the attacks of September 11, 2001, exposed vulnerabilities in  commercial aviation. Since then, billions of dollars have been spent and a  wide range of programs and initiatives have been implemented to enhance  aviation security. However, recent reviews and covert testing conducted  by GAO and Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector  General, as well as media reports, revealed continuing weaknesses and  vulnerabilities in aviation security. For example, the recent incident  involving a college student who placed box cutters, clay resembling plastic  explosives, and bleach on commercial aircraft illustrated that aviation  security can still be compromised. As a result of these challenges, the  Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which is responsible for  ensuring the security of aviation, is faced with the daunting task of  determining how to allocate its limited resources to have the greatest  impact in addressing threats and enhancing security.
My testimony today focuses on three areas that are fundamental to TSA’s  success in allocating its resources and enhancing aviation security. These  areas are (1) the need to measure the effectiveness of TSA’s aviation  security initiatives that have already been implemented, particularly its  passenger screening program; (2) the need to implement a risk  management approach to prioritize efforts, assess threats, and focus  resources; and (3) the need to address key programmatic and management  challenges that must be overcome to further enhance aviation security.  This testimony is based on our prior work, reviews of TSA documentation,  and discussions with TSA officials.
Although TSA has implemented numerous programs and initiatives to  enhance aviation security, it has collected limited information on the  effectiveness of these programs and initiatives. Our recent work on TSA’s  passenger screening program showed that although TSA has made  numerous enhancements in passenger screening, it has collected limited  information on how effective these enhancements have been in improving  screeners’ ability to detect threat objects. The Aviation and Transportation  Security Act (ATSA), which was enacted with the primary goal of  strengthening the security of the nation’s aviation system, requires that  TSA establish acceptable levels of performance for aviation security  initiatives and develop annual performance plans and reports to measure  and document the effectiveness of those initiatives. Although TSA has  developed an annual performance plan and report as required by ATSA, to  date these tools have focused on TSA’s progress in meeting deadlines to  implement programs and initiatives mandated by ATSA, rather than on the  effectiveness of these programs and initiatives. TSA has recognized that its  data on the effectiveness of its aviation security initiatives are limited and  is taking steps to collect objective data to assess its performance, which is  to be incorporated in DHS’s 5-year performance plan.
TSA has developed a risk management approach to prioritize efforts,  assess threats, and focus resources related to its aviation security  initiatives as recommended by GAO, but has not yet fully implemented this  approach. TSA’s aviation security efforts are varied and vast, and its  resources are fixed. As a result, a risk management approach is needed to  better support key decisions, linking resources with prioritized efforts.TSA has not yet fully implemented its risk management tools because until  recently its resources and efforts were largely focused on meeting the  aviation security mandates included in ATSA. TSA has acknowledged the  need for a risk management approach and expects to complete the  development and automation of its risk management tools by September  2004.
TSA faces a number of programmatic and management challenges as it  continues to address threats to our nation’s aviation system. These  challenges include implementing various aviation security programs, such  as the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System—CAPPS II—  and addressing broader security concerns related to the security of air  cargo and general aviation. TSA also faces challenges in managing the  costs of aviation security and in strategically managing its workforce of  about 60,000 people, most of whom are deployed at airports to detect  weapons and explosives. TSA has been addressing these and other  challenges through a variety of efforts. We have work in progress that is  examining TSA’s efforts in addressing many of these challenges.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Ensuring the security of our nation’s commercial aviation system has been  a long-standing concern. As demonstrated by the 1988 bombing of a U.S.  airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, and the 1995 plot to blow up as many as  12 U.S. aircraft in the Pacific region discovered by Philippine authorities,  U.S. aircraft have long been a target for terrorist attacks. Many efforts  have been made to improve aviation security, but as we and others have  documented in numerous reports and studies, weaknesses in the system  continue to exist. It was these weaknesses that terrorist exploited to  hijack four commercial aircraft in September 2001, with tragic results.
On November 19, 2001, the President signed into law the Aviation and  Transportation Security Act, with the primary goal of strengthening the  security of the nation’s aviation system. ATSA created TSA as an agency  within the Department of Transportation with responsibility for securing  all modes of transportation, including aviation. ATSA mandated specific  improvements to aviation security and established deadlines for  completing many of them. TSA’s main focus during its first year of  operation was on meeting these ambitious deadlines, particularly  federalizing the screener workforce at commercial airports nationwide by  November 19, 2002, while at the same time establishing a new federal  organization from the ground up. The Homeland Security Act, signed into  law on November 25, 2002, transferred TSA from the Department of  Transportation to the new Department of Homeland Security.
Virtually all aviation security responsibilities now reside with TSA,  including the screening of air passengers and baggage, a function that had  previously been the responsibility of air carriers. TSA is also responsible  for ensuring the security of air cargo and overseeing security measures at  airports to limit access to restricted areas, secure airport perimeters, and  conduct background checks for airport personnel with access to secure  areas, among other responsibilities.
section_title: Limited Information Exists on the Effectiveness of Aviation Security Initiatives
paragraphs: TSA has implemented numerous initiatives designed to enhance aviation  security but has collected little information on the effectiveness of these  initiatives. ATSA requires that TSA establish acceptable levels of  performance and develop annual performance plans and reports to  measure and document the effectiveness of its security initiatives.Although TSA has developed these performance tools, as required by  ATSA, it currently focuses on progress toward meeting ATSA deadlines,  rather than on the effectiveness of its programs and initiatives. However,  TSA is taking steps to collect objective data to assess its performance.
subsections: section_title: Evaluation of Program Effectiveness
paragraphs: TSA currently has limited information on the effectiveness of its aviation  security initiatives. As we reported in September 2003, the primary source  of information collected on screeners’ ability to detect threat objects is the  covert testing conducted by TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program  Review. However, TSA does not consider the results of these covert tests  to be a measure of performance but rather a “snapshot” of a screener’s  ability to detect threat objects at a particular point in time, and as a  system-wide performance indicator. At the time we issued our report, the  Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review had conducted 733 covert  tests of passenger screeners at 92 airports. Therefore, only about 1 percent  of TSA’s nearly 50,000 screeners had been subject to a covert test.
In addition to conducting covert tests at screening checkpoints, TSA  conducts tests to determine whether the current Computer-Assisted  Passenger Screening System is working as designed, threat objects are  detected during the screening of checked baggage, and access to restricted  areas of the airport is limited only to authorized personnel. While the  Office of Internal Affairs has conducted about 2,000 access tests, it has  conducted only 168 Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening System and  checked baggage tests. Based on an anticipated increase in staff from  about 100 in fiscal year 2003 to 200 in fiscal year 2004, the Office of  Internal Affairs and Program Review plans to conduct twice as many  covert tests next year.
Another key source of data on screener performance in detecting threat  objects is the Threat Image Projection (TIP) system, which places images  of threat objects on the X-ray screen during actual operations and records  whether screeners identify the threat object. The Federal Aviation  Administration began deploying TIP in late 1999 to continuously measure  screener performance and to train screeners in becoming more adept at  detecting hard-to-spot threat objects. However, TIP was shut down  immediately following the September 11 terrorist attacks because of  concerns that it would result in screening delays and panic, as screeners  might think that they were actually viewing a threat object. Although TSA  officials recognized that TIP is a key tool in measuring, maintaining, and  enhancing screener performance, they only recently began reactivating  TIP on wide-scale basis because of competing priorities, a lack of training,  and a lack of resources needed to deploy TIP activation teams. Once TIP is  fully deployed and operational at every checkpoint at all airports, as it is  expected to be in April 2004, TSA headquarters and federal security  directors will have the capability to analyze this performance data in a  number of ways, including by individual screeners, checkpoints, terminals,  and airports.
When fully deployed, the annual screener recertification test results will  provide another source of data on screener performance. ATSA requires  that TSA collect performance information on each screener through  conducting an annual proficiency review to ensure he or she continues to  meet all qualifications and standards required to perform the screening  function. Although TSA began deploying federal screeners to airports in  April 2002, TSA only recently began implementing the annual  recertification program and does not expect to complete testing at all  airports until March 2004. The recertification testing is comprised of three  components: (1) image recognition; (2) knowledge of standard operating  procedures; and (3) practical demonstration of skills, to be administered  by a contractor. TSA officials consider about 28,000 screeners as having  already completed the first two components because they successfully  passed competency tests TSA administered at many airports as part of a  screener workforce reduction effort. However, these competency tests did  not include the third component of TSA’s planned annual screener  recertification program—the practical demonstration of skills. TSA  officials awarded a contract for this component of the annual proficiency  reviews in September 2003.
TSA’s Performance Management Information System for passenger and  baggage screening operations is designed to collect performance data, but  it currently contains little information on screener performance in  detecting threat objects. The Performance Management Information  System collects a wide variety of metrics on workload, staffing, and  equipment and is used to identify some performance indicators, such as  the level of absenteeism, the average time for equipment repairs, and the  status of TSA’s efforts to meet goals for 100 percent electronic baggage  screening. However, the system does not contain any performance  metrics related to the effectiveness of passenger screeners. TSA is  planning to integrate performance information from various systems into  the Performance Management Information System to assist the agency in  making strategic decisions. TSA further plans to continually enhance the  system as it learns what data are needed to best manage the agency. In  addition to making improvements to the Performance Management  Information System, TSA is currently developing performance indexes for  both individual screeners and the screening system as a whole. The  screener performance index will be based on data such as the results of  performance evaluations and recertification tests, and the index for the  screening system will be based on information such as covert test results  and screener effectiveness measures. TSA has not yet fully established its  methodology for developing the indexes, but it expects to have the  indexes developed by the end of fiscal year 2004.
In conjunction with measuring the performance of its passenger screening  operations, TSA must also assess the performance of the five pilot airports  that are currently using contract screeners to determine the feasibility of  using private screening companies instead of federal screeners. Although  ATSA allows airports to apply to opt out of using federal screeners  beginning in November 2004, TSA has not yet determined how to evaluate  and measure the performance of the pilot program. In early October 2003,  TSA awarded a contract to BearingPoint, Inc., to compare the  performance of pilot screening with federal screening, including the  overall strengths and weaknesses of both systems, and determine the  reasons for any differences. The evaluation is scheduled to be completed  by March 31, 2004. TSA has acknowledged that designing an effective  evaluation of the screeners at the pilot airports will be challenging because  key operational areas, including training, assessment, compensation, and  equipment, have to a large extent been held constant across all airports,  and therefore are not within the control of the private screening  companies. In its request for proposal for the pilot airport evaluation,  TSA identified several data sources for the evaluation, including the  Performance Management Information System and the Office of Internal  Affairs and Program Review’s covert testing of passenger screeners.  However, as we recently reported, data from both of these systems in  measuring the effectiveness of screening operations is limited. As a result,  it will be a challenge for TSA to effectively compare the performance of  the contract pilot airports with the performance of airports using federal  screeners.
section_title: TSA Is Developing Performance Evaluation Tools
paragraphs: TSA has recognized the need to strengthen the assessment of its  performance, and has initiated efforts to develop and implement strategic  and performance plans to clarify goals, establish performance measures,  and measure the performance of its security initiatives. Strategic plans are  the starting point for an agency’s planning and performance measurement  efforts. Strategic plans include a comprehensive mission statement based  on the agency’s statutory requirements, a set of outcome-related strategic  goals, and a description of how the agency intends to achieve these goals.  The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) establishes a  framework for strategic plans that requires agencies to clearly establish results-oriented performance goals in strategic and  annual performance plans for which they will be held accountable, measure progress toward achieving those goals, determine the strategies and resources to effectively accomplish the use performance information to make programmatic decisions  necessary to improve performance, and  formally communicate results in performance reports.
Although the Department of Homeland Security plans to issue one  strategic plan for the Department, it plans to incorporate strategic  planning efforts from each of its component agencies. TSA recently  completed a draft of its input into the Department of Homeland Security’s  strategic plan. TSA officials stated that the draft is designed to ensure their  security initiatives are aligned with the agency’s goals and objectives, and  that these initiatives represent the most efficient use of their resources.  TSA officials submitted the draft plan to stakeholders in September 2003  for their review and comment. The Department of Homeland Security  plans to issue its strategic plan by the end of the year.
In addition to developing a strategic plan, TSA is developing a  performance plan to help it evaluate the current effectiveness and levels of  improvement in its programs, based on established performance  measures. TSA submitted to the Congress a short-term performance plan  in May 2003, as required by ATSA, that included performance goals and  objectives. The plan also included an initial set of 32 performance  measures, including the percentage of bags screened by explosive  detection systems and the percentage of screeners in compliance with  training standards. However, these measures were primarily output-based  (measuring whether specific activities were achieved) and did not  measure the effectiveness of TSA’s security initiatives. TSA officials  acknowledge that the goals and measures included in the report were  narrowly focused, and that in moving forward additional performance- based measures are needed.
In addition to developing a short-term performance plan, ATSA also  requires that TSA develop a 5-year performance plan and annual  performance report, including an evaluation of the extent to which its  goals and objectives were met. TSA is currently developing performance  goals and measures as part of its annual planning process and will collect  baseline data throughout fiscal year 2004 to serve as a foundation for its  performance targets. TSA also plans to increase its focus on measuring the  effectiveness of various aspects of the aviation security system in its 5- year performance plan. According to TSA’s current draft strategic plan,  which outlines its overall goals and strategies for fiscal years 2003 through  2008, its efforts to measure the effectiveness of the aviation security  system will include random and scheduled reviews of the efficiency and effectiveness of oversight of compliance with security standards and approved  programs through a combination of inspections, testing, interviews,  and record reviews—to include TIP; measurement of performance against standards to ensure expected  standards are met and to drive process improvements; and collection and communication of performance data using a state-of-the- art data collection and reporting system.
In our January 2003 report on TSA’s actions and plans to build a results- oriented culture, we recommended next steps that TSA should take to  strengthen its strategic planning efforts. These steps include establishing  security performance goals and measures for all modes of transportation  that involves stakeholders, and applying practices that have been shown to  provide useful information in agency performance plans. We also  identified practices that TSA can apply to ensure the usefulness of its  required 5-year performance plan to TSA managers, the Congress, and  other decision makers or interested parties. Table 1 outlines the practices  we identified for TSA.
TSA agreed with our recommendation and plans to incorporate these  principles into the data it provides DHS for the department’s 5-year  performance plan and annual performance report. DHS plans to complete  its 5-year performance plan and annual performance report by February  2004, as required by GPRA.
The Congress has also recognized the need for TSA to collect performance  data and, as part of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA)  reauthorization act—Vision 100: Century of Aviation Reauthorization  Act—is currently considering a provision that would require the Secretary  of the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a study of the  effectiveness of the aviation security system.
section_title: Risk Management Approach Needed To Focus Security Efforts
paragraphs: As TSA moves forward in addressing aviation security concerns, it needs  adequate tools to ensure that its efforts are appropriately focused,  strategically sound, and achieving expected results. Because of limited  funding, TSA needs to set priorities so that its resources can be focused  and directed to those aviation security enhancements most in need of  implementation. In recent years, we have consistently advocated the use  of a risk management approach to respond to various national security  and terrorism challenges, and have recommended that TSA apply this  approach to strengthen security in aviation as well as in other modes of  transportation. TSA agreed with our recommendation and is adopting a  risk management approach.
Risk management is a systematic and analytical process to consider the  likelihood that a threat will endanger an asset, an individual, or a function  and to identify actions to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of  an attack. Risk management principles acknowledge that while risk  cannot be eliminated, enhancing protection from existing or potential  threats can help reduce it. Accordingly, a risk management approach is a  systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and the criticality  (or relative importance) of assets to better support key decisions. The  purpose of this approach is to link resources with efforts that are of the  highest priority. Figure 1 describes the risk management approach.
A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the basis  of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities. This  assessment represents a systematic approach to identifying potential  threats before they materialize, and is based on threat information  gathered from both the intelligence and law enforcement communities.  However, even if updated often, a threat assessment might not adequately  capture some emerging threats. The risk management approach, therefore,  uses vulnerability and criticality assessments as additional input to the  decision-making process.
A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited  by identified threats and suggests options to address those weaknesses. In  general, a vulnerability assessment is conducted by a team of experts  skilled in such areas as engineering, intelligence, security, information  systems, finance, and other disciplines.
A criticality assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions in  terms of specific criteria, such as their importance to public safety and the  economy. The assessment provides a basis for identifying which structures  or processes are relatively more important to protect from attack. As such,  it helps managers to determine operational requirements and target  resources at their highest priorities, while reducing the potential for  targeting resources at lower priorities.
Figure 2 illustrates how the risk management approach can guide decision  making and shows that the highest risks and priorities emerge where the  three elements of risk management overlap.
For example, an airport that is determined to be a critical asset, vulnerable  to attack, and a likely target would be at most risk and therefore would be  a higher priority for funding compared with an airport that is only  vulnerable to attack. In this vein, aviation security measures shown to  reduce the risk to the most critical assets would provide the greatest  protection for the cost.
Over the past several years, we have concluded that comprehensive threat,  vulnerability, and criticality assessments are key in better preparing  against terrorist attacks, and we have recommended that TSA apply this  risk management approach to strengthen security in aviation. TSA agreed  with our recommendation and is adopting a risk management approach in  an attempt to enhance security across all modes of transportation.  According to TSA officials, once established, risk management principles  will drive all decisions—from standard setting to funding priorities to  staffing. TSA has not yet fully implemented its risk management approach,  but it has taken steps in this direction. Specifically, TSA’s Office of Threat  Assessment and Risk Management is developing four assessment tools  that will help assess threats, criticality, and vulnerabilities. Figure 3  illustrates TSA’s threat assessment and risk management approach.
The first tool, which will assess criticality, will determine a criticality  score for a facility or transportation asset by incorporating factors such as  the number of fatalities that could occur during an attack and the  economic and sociopolitical importance of the facility or asset. This score  will enable TSA, in conjunction with transportation stakeholders, to rank  facilities and assets within each mode and thus focus resources on those  that are deemed most important. TSA is working with another Department  of Homeland Security office—the Information and Analysis Protection  Directorate—to ensure that the criticality tool will be consistent with the  Department’s overall approach for managing critical infrastructure.
A second tool—the Transportation Risk Assessment and Vulnerability  Tool (TRAVEL)—will assess threats and analyze vulnerabilities at those  transportation assets TSA determines to be nationally critical. The tool  will be used in a TSA-led and facilitated assessment that will be conducted  on the site of the transportation asset. Specifically, the tool will assess an  asset’s baseline security system and that system’s effectiveness in  detecting, deterring, and preventing various threat scenarios, and it will  produce a relative risk score for potential attacks against a transportation  asset or facility. In addition, TRAVEL will include a cost-benefit  component that compares the cost of implementing a given  countermeasure with the reduction in relative risk to that countermeasure.  TSA is working with economists to develop the cost-benefit component of  this model and with the TSA Intelligence Service to develop relevant threat  scenarios for transportation assets and facilities. According to TSA  officials, a standard threat and vulnerability assessment tool is needed so  that TSA can identify and compare threats and vulnerabilities across  transportation modes. If different methodologies are used in assessing the  threats and vulnerabilities, comparisons could be problematic. However, a  standard assessment tool would ensure consistent methodology.
A third tool—the Transportation Self-Assessment Risk Module (TSARM)—  will be used to assess and analyze vulnerabilities for assets that the  criticality assessment determines to be less critical. The self-assessment  tool included in TSARM will guide a user through a series of security- related questions in order to develop a comprehensive security baseline of  a transportation entity and will provide mitigating strategies for when the  threat level increases. For example, as the threat level increases from  yellow to orange, as determined by the Department of Homeland Security,  the assessment tool might advise an entity to take increased security  measures, such as erecting barriers and closing selected entrances. TSA  had deployed one self-assessment module in support of targeted maritime  vessel and facility categories.
The fourth risk management tool that TSA is currently developing is the  TSA Vulnerability Assessment Management System (TVAMS).  TVAMS is  TSA’s intended repository of criticality, threat, and vulnerability  assessment data.  TVAMS will maintain the results of all vulnerability  assessments across all modes of transportation.  This repository will  provide TSA with data analysis and reporting capabilities.  TVAMS is  currently in the conceptual stage and requirements are still being gathered.
TSA is now using components of these risk management tools and is  automating others so that the components can be used remotely by  stakeholders, such as small airports, to assess their risks. For example,  according to TSA officials, TSA has conducted assessments at 9 of 443  commercial airports using components of its TRAVEL tool. Three of these  assessments were conducted at category X airports (the largest and  busiest airports), and the remaining 6 assessments were conducted at  airports in lower categories. TSA plans to conduct approximately 100  additional assessments of commercial airports in 2004 using TRAVEL and  plans to begin compiling data on security vulnerability trends in 2005.  Additionally, TSA plans to fully implement and automate its risk  management approach by September 2004.
section_title: TSA Faces Additional Programmatic And Management Challenges
paragraphs: In addition to collecting performance data and implementing a risk  management approach, TSA faces a number of other programmatic and  management challenges in strengthening aviation security. These  challenges include implementing the new Computer-Assisted Passenger  Prescreening System; strengthening baggage screening, airport perimeter  and access controls, air cargo, and general aviation security; managing the  costs of aviation security initiatives; and managing human capital. TSA has  been addressing these challenges through a variety of efforts. We have  work in progress that is examining TSA’s efforts in most of these areas,  and we will be reporting on TSA’s progress in the future.
subsections: section_title: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II)
paragraphs: ATSA authorized TSA to develop a new Computer-Assisted Passenger  Prescreening System, or CAPPS II. This system is intended to replace the  current Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening program, which was  developed in the mid-1990s by the Federal Aviation Administration to  enable air carriers to identify passengers requiring additional security  attention. The current system is maintained as a part of the airlines’  reservation systems and, operating under federal guidelines, uses a  number of behavioral characteristics to select passengers for additional  screening.
In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a number of  weaknesses in the current prescreening program were exposed. For  example, although the characteristics used to identify passengers for  additional screening are classified, several have become public knowledge  through the press or on the Internet. Although enhancements have been  made to address some of these weaknesses, the behavioral traits used in  the system may not reflect current intelligence information. It is also  difficult to quickly modify the system to respond to real-time changes in  threats. Additionally, because the current system operates independently  within each air carrier reservation system, changes to each air carrier’s  system to modify the prescreening system can be costly and time- consuming.
In contrast, CAPPS II is planned to be a government-run program that will  provide real–time risk assessment for all airline passengers. Unlike the  current system, TSA is designing CAPPS II to identify and compare  personal information with commercially available data to confirm a  passenger’s identity. The system will then run the identifying information  against government databases and generate a “risk” score for the  passenger. The risk score will determine the level of screening that the  passenger will undergo before boarding. TSA currently estimates that  initial implementation of CAPPS II will occur during the fall of 2004, with  full implementation expected by the fall of 2005.
TSA faces a number of challenges that could impede their ability to  implement CAPPS II. Among the most significant are the following: concerns about travelers’ privacy rights and the safeguards established  to protect passenger data; the accuracy of the databases being used by the CAPPS II system and  whether inaccuracies could generate a high number of false positives  and erroneously prevent or delay passengers from boarding their  flights;  the length of time that data will be retained by TSA; the availability of a redress process through which passengers could  get erroneous information corrected; concerns that identify theft, in which someone steals relevant data and  impersonates another individual to obtain that person’s low risk score,  may not be detected and thereby negate the security benefits of the  system; and obtaining the international cooperation needed for CAPPS II to be fully  effective, as some countries consider the passenger information  required by CAPPS II as a potential violation of their privacy laws.
We are currently assessing these and other challenges in the development  and implementation of the CAPPS II system and expect to issue a final  report on our work in early 2004.
section_title: Checked Baggage Screening
paragraphs: Checked baggage represents a significant security concern, as explosive  devices in baggage can, and have, been placed in aircraft holds. ATSA  required screening of all checked baggage on commercial aircraft by  December 31, 2002, using explosive detection systems to electronically  scan baggage for explosives. According to TSA, electronic screening can  be accomplished by bulk explosives detection systems (EDS) or  Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) systems. However, TSA faced  challenges in meeting the mandated implementation date. First, the  production capabilities of EDS manufacturers were insufficient to produce  the number of units needed. Additionally, according to TSA, it was not  possible to undertake all of the airport modifications necessary to  accommodate the EDS equipment in each airport’s baggage handling area.  In order to ensure that all checked baggage is screened, TSA established a  program that uses alternative measures, including explosives sniffing dogs,  positive passenger bag match, and physical hand searches at airports  where sufficient EDS or ETD technology is not available. TSA was granted  an extension for screening all checked baggage electronically, using  explosives detection systems, until December 31, 2003.
Although TSA has made progress in implementing EDS technology at  more airports, it has reported that it will not meet the revised mandate for  100 percent electronic screening of all checked baggage. Specifically, as of  October 2003, TSA reported that it will not meet the deadline for  electronic screening by December 31, 2003, at five airports. Airport  representatives with whom we spoke expressed concern that there has not  been enough time to produce, install, and integrate all of the systems  required to meet the deadline.
In addition to fielding the EDS systems at airports, difficulties exist in  integrating these systems into airport baggage handling systems. For those  airports that have installed EDS equipment, many have been located in  airport lobbies as stand-alone systems. The chief drawback of stand-alone  systems is that because of their size and weight there is a limit to the  number of units that can be placed in airport lobbies, and numerous  screeners are required to handle the checked bags because each bag must  be physically conveyed to the EDS machines and then moved back to the  conveyor system for transport to the baggage handling room in the air  terminal. Some airports are in the process of integrating the EDS  equipment in-line with the conveyor belts that transport baggage from the  ticket counter to the baggage handling area; however, the reconfiguring of  airports for in-line checked baggage screening can be extensive and  costly. TSA has reported that in-line EDS equipment installation costs  range from $1 million to $3 million per piece of equipment. In February  2003, we identified letters of intent as a funding option that has been  successfully used to leverage private sources of funding. TSA has since  written letters of intent covering seven airports promising multiyear  financial support totaling over $770 million for in-line integration of EDS  equipment. Further, TSA officials have stated that they have identified 25  to 35 airports as candidates for further letters of intent pending  Congressional authorization of funding. We are examining TSA’s baggage  screening program, including its issuance of letters of intent, in an ongoing  assignment.
section_title: Perimeter and Access Controls
paragraphs: Prior to September 2001, work performed by GAO, and others, highlighted  the vulnerabilities in controls for limiting access to secure airport areas. In  one report, we noted that GAO special agents were able to use fictitious  law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas,  bypass security checkpoints, and walk unescorted to aircraft departure  gates. The agents, who had been issued tickets and boarding passes,  could have carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects onto  aircraft. Concerns over the adequacy of the vetting process for airport  workers who have unescorted access to secure airport areas have also  arisen, in part, as a result of federal agency airport security sweeps that  uncovered hundreds of instances in which airport workers lied about their  criminal history, or immigration status, or provided false or inaccurate  Social Security numbers on their application for security clearances to  obtain employment.
ATSA contains provisions to improve perimeter access security at the  nation’s airports and strengthen background checks for employees  working in secure airport areas, and TSA has made some progress in this  area. For example, federal mandates were issued to strengthen airport  perimeter security by limiting the number of airport access points, and  they require random screening of individuals, vehicles, and property  before entry at the remaining perimeter access points. Further, TSA made  criminal history checks mandatory for employees with access to secure or  sterile airport areas. To date, TSA has conducted approximately 1 million  of these checks. TSA also has plans to develop a pilot airport security  program and is reviewing security technologies in the areas of biometrics  access control identification systems (i.e., fingerprints or iris scans), anti- piggybacking technologies (to prevent more than one employee from  entering a secure area at a time), and video monitoring systems for  perimeter security. TSA solicited commercial airport participation in the  program. It is currently reviewing information from interested airports and  plans to select 20 airports for the program.
Although progress has been made, challenges remain with perimeter  security and access controls at commercial airports. Specifically, ATSA  contains numerous requirements for strengthening perimeter security and  access controls, some of which contained deadlines, which TSA is  working to meet. In addition, a significant concern is the possibility of  terrorists using shoulder-fired portable missiles from locations near the  airport. We reported in June 2003 that airport operators have increased  their patrols of airport perimeters since September 2001, but industry  officials stated that they do not have enough resources to completely  protect against missile attacks. A number of technologies could be used  to secure and monitor airport perimeters, including barriers, motion  sensors, and closed-circuit television. Airport representatives have  cautioned that as security enhancements are made to airport perimeters, it  will be important for TSA to coordinate with the Federal Aviation  Administration and the airport operators to ensure that any enhancements  do not pose safety risks for aircraft. To further examine these threats and  challenges, we have ongoing work assessing TSA’s progress in meeting  ATSA provisions related to improving perimeter security, access controls,  and background checks for airport employees and other individuals with  access to secure areas of the airport, as well as the nature and extent of  the threat from shoulder-fired missiles.
section_title: Air Cargo Security
paragraphs: As we and the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General have  reported, vulnerabilities exist in ensuring the security of cargo carried  aboard commercial passenger and all-cargo aircraft. TSA has reported that  an estimated 12.5 million tons of cargo are transported each year—9.7  million tons on all-cargo planes and 2.8 million tons on passenger planes.  Potential security risks are associated with the transport of air cargo—  including the introduction of undetected explosive and incendiary devices  in cargo placed aboard aircraft. To reduce these risks, ATSA requires that  all cargo carried aboard commercial passenger aircraft be screened and  that TSA have a system in place as soon as practicable to screen, inspect,  or otherwise ensure the security of cargo on all-cargo aircraft. Despite  these requirements, it has been reported that less than 5 percent of cargo  placed on passenger airplanes is physically screened. TSA’s primary  approach to ensuring air cargo security and safety is to ensure compliance  with the “known shipper” program—which allows shippers that have  established business histories with air carriers or freight forwarders to  ship cargo on planes. However, we and the Department of  Transportation’s Inspector General have identified weaknesses in the  known shipper program and in TSA’s procedures for approving freight  forwarders, such as possible tampering with freight at various handoff  points before it is loaded into an aircraft.
Since September 2001, TSA has taken a number of actions to enhance  cargo security, such as implementing a database of known shippers in  October 2002. The database is the first phase in developing a cargo  profiling system similar to the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening  System. However, in December 2002, we reported that additional  operational and technological measures, such as checking the identity of  individuals making cargo deliveries, have the potential to improve air  cargo security in the near term. We further reported that TSA lacks a  comprehensive plan with long-term goals and performance targets for  cargo security, time frames for completing security improvements, and  risk-based criteria for prioritizing actions to achieve those goals.  Accordingly, we recommended that TSA develop a comprehensive plan for  air cargo security that incorporates a risk management approach, includes  a list of security priorities, and sets deadlines for completing actions. TSA  agreed with this recommendation and expects to develop such a plan by  the end of 2003. It will be important that this plan include a timetable for  implementation to help ensure that vulnerabilities in this area are reduced.
section_title: General Aviation Security
paragraphs: Since September 2001, TSA has taken limited action to improve general  aviation security, leaving general aviation far more open and potentially  vulnerable than commercial aviation. General aviation is vulnerable  because general aviation pilots and passengers are not screened before  takeoff and the contents of general aviation planes are not screened at any  point. General aviation includes more than 200,000 privately owned  airplanes, which are located in every state at more than 19,000 airports.More than 550 of these airports also provide commercial service. In the  last 5 years, about 70 aircraft have been stolen from general aviation  airports, indicating a potential weakness that could be exploited by  terrorists. This vulnerability was demonstrated in January 2002, when a  teenage flight student stole and crashed a single-engine airplane into a  Tampa, Florida skyscraper. Moreover, general aviation aircraft could be  used in other types of terrorist acts. It was reported that the September  11th hijackers researched the use of crop dusters to spread biological or  chemical agents.
We reported in September 2003 that TSA chartered a working group on  general aviation within the existing Aviation Security Advisory  Committee. The working group consists of industry stakeholders and is  designed to identify and recommend actions to close potential security  gaps in general aviation. On October 1, 2003, the working group issued a  report that included a number of recommendations for general aviation  airport operators’ voluntary use in evaluating airports’ security  requirements. These recommendations are both broad in scope and  generic in their application, with the intent that every general aviation  airport and landing facility operators may use them to evaluate that  facility’s physical security, procedures, infrastructure, and resources. TSA  is taking some additional action to strengthen security at general aviation  airports, including developing a risk-based self-assessment tool for general  aviation airports to use in identifying security concerns. We have ongoing  work that is examining general aviation security in further detail.
section_title: Aviation Security Funding
paragraphs: TSA faces two key funding and accountability challenges in securing the  commercial aviation system: (1) paying for increased aviation security and  (2) ensuring that these costs are controlled. The costs associated with the  equipment and personnel needed to screen passengers and their baggage  alone are huge. The Department of Homeland Security appropriation  includes $3.7 billion for aviation security for fiscal year 2004, with about  $1.8 billion for passenger screening and $1.3 billion for baggage screening.  ATSA created a passenger security fee to pay for the costs of aviation  security, but the fee has not generated enough money to do so. The  Department of Transportation’s Inspector General reported that the  security fees are estimated to generate only about $1.7 billion during fiscal  year 2004.
A major funding challenge is paying for the purchase and installation of  the remaining explosives detection systems, including integration into  airport baggage-handling systems. Integrating the equipment with the  baggage-handling systems is expected to be costly because it will require  major facility modifications. For example, modifications needed to  integrate the equipment at Boston’s Logan International Airport are  estimated to cost $146 million. Modifications for Dallas/Fort Worth  International Airport are estimated to cost $193 million. According to TSA  and the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General, the cost of  integrating the equipment nationwide could be $3 billion.
A key question that must be addressed is how to pay for these installation  costs. The Federal Aviation Administration’s Airport Improvement  Program (AIP) and passenger facility charges have been eligible sources  for funding this work. During fiscal year 2002, AIP grant funds totaling  $561 million were used for terminal modifications to enhance security.  However, using these funds for security reduced the funding available for  other airport development and rehabilitation projects. To provide financial  assistance to airports for security-related capital investments, such as the  installation of explosives detection equipment, proposed aviation  reauthorization legislation would establish an aviation security capital  fund that would authorize $2 billion over the next 4 years. The funding  would be made available to airports in letters of intent, and large and  medium hub airports would be expected to provide a match of 10 percent  of a project’s costs. A 5 percent match would be required for all other  airports.
In February 2003, we identified letters of intent as a funding option that  has been successfully used to leverage private sources of funding. TSA  has since signed letters of intent covering seven airports—Boston Logan,  Dallas/Fort Worth, Denver, Los Angeles, McCarran (Las Vegas), Ontario  (California), and Seattle/Tacoma international airports. Under the  agreements, TSA will pay 75 percent of the cost of integrating the  explosives detection equipment into the baggage-handling systems. The  payments will stretch out over 3 to 4 years. TSA officials have identified  more airports that would be candidates for similar agreements.
Another challenge is ensuring continued investment in transportation  research and development. For fiscal year 2003, TSA was appropriated  about $110 million for research and development, of which $75 million  was designated for the next-generation explosives detection systems.  However, TSA proposed to reprogram $61.2 million of these funds to be  used for other purposes, leaving about $12.7 million to be spent on  research and development in that year. This proposed reprogramming  could limit TSA’s ability to sustain and strengthen aviation security by  continuing to invest in research and development for more effective  equipment to screen passengers, their carry-on and checked baggage, and  cargo. In ongoing work, we are examining the nature and scope of  research and development work by TSA and the Department of Homeland  Security, including their strategy for accelerating the development of  transportation security technologies.
section_title: Human Capital Management
paragraphs: As it organizes itself to protect the nation’s transportation system, TSA  faces the challenge of strategically managing its workforce of about 60,000  people—more than 80 percent of whom are passenger and baggage  screeners. Additionally, over the next several years, TSA faces the  challenge of sizing and managing this workforce as efficiency is improved  with new security-enhancing technologies, processes, and procedures. For  example, as explosives detection systems are integrated with baggage- handling systems, the use of more labor-intensive screening methods, such  as trace detection techniques and manual bag searches, can be reduced.  Other planned security enhancements, such as CAPPS II and the  registered traveler program, also have the potential to make screening  more efficient. Further, if airports opt out of the federal screener program  and use their own or contract employees to provide screening instead of  TSA screeners, a significant impact on TSA staffing could occur.
To assist agencies in managing their human capital more strategically, we  have developed a model that identifies cornerstones and related critical  success factors that agencies should apply and steps they can take. Our  model is designed to help agency leaders effectively lead and manage their  people and integrate human capital considerations into daily decision  making and the program results they seek to achieve. In January 2003, we  reported that TSA was addressing some critical human capital success  factors by using a wide range of tools available for hiring, and beginning to  link individual performance to organizational goals. However, concerns  remain about the size and training of that workforce, the adequacy of the  initial background checks for screeners, and TSA’s progress in setting up a  performance management system. TSA is currently developing a human  capital strategy, which it expects to be completed by the end of this year.
TSA has proposed cutting the screener workforce by an additional 3,000  during fiscal year 2004. This planned reduction has raised concerns about  passenger delays at airports and has led TSA to begin hiring part-time  screeners to make more flexible and efficient use of its workforce. In  addition, TSA used an abbreviated background check process to hire and  deploy enough screeners to meet ATSA’s screening deadlines during 2002.  After obtaining additional background information, TSA terminated the  employment of some of these screeners. TSA reported 1,208 terminations  as of May 31, 2003, that it ascribed to a variety of reasons, including  criminal offenses and failures to pass alcohol and drug tests. Furthermore,  the national media have reported allegations of operational and  management control problems that emerged with the expansion of the  Federal Air Marshal Service, including inadequate background checks and  training, uneven scheduling, and inadequate policies and procedures. We  reported in January 2003 that TSA had taken the initial steps in  establishing a performance management system linked to organizational  goals. Such a system will be critical for TSA to motivate and manage staff,  ensure the quality of screeners’ performance, and, ultimately, restore  public confidence in air travel. In ongoing work, we are examining the  effectiveness of TSA’s efforts to train, equip, and supervise passenger  screeners, and we are assessing the effects of expansion on the Federal  Air Marshal Service.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: As TSA moves forward in addressing aviation security concerns, it needs  the information and tools necessary to ensure that its efforts are  appropriately focused, strategically sound, and achieving expected results.  Without knowledge about the effectiveness of its programs and a process  for prioritizing planned security initiatives, TSA and the public have little  assurance regarding the level of security provided, and whether TSA is  using its resources to maximize security benefits. Additionally, as TSA  implements new security initiatives and addresses associated challenges,  measuring program effectiveness and prioritizing efforts will help it focus  on the areas of greatest importance. We are encouraged that TSA is  undertaking efforts to develop the information and tools needed to  measure its performance and focus its efforts on those areas of greatest  need.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have.
section_title: Contact Information
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.  Berrick at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to this  testimony include Mike Bollinger, Lisa Brown, Jack Schulze, Maria  Strudwick, and Susan Zimmerman.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress  Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.:  September 24, 2003.
Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, and the  Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003  Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address  Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Aviation Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot  Certification Process. GAO-03-248NI. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2003  (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION).
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the  Air Cargo System. GAO-03-286NI. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002  (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION).
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the  Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerability of Commercial Aviation to Attacks by  Terrorists Using Dangerous Goods. GAO-03-30C. Washington, D.C.:  December 3, 2002  Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and  Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22,  2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces  Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-03-971T. Washington, D.C.:  July 25, 2002.
Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial  Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection  Equipment. GAO-02-713C. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2002 (CLASSIFIED).
Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation’s Air  Transportation System. GAO-01-1164T. Washington, D.C.: September 26,  2001 (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION).
Aviation Security: Information on the Nation’s Air Transportation  System Vulnerabilities. GAO-01-1174T. Washington, D.C.: September 26,  2001 (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION).
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard  Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.:  September 25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for  Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:  September 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve  Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.:  September 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in  Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access  Security Improvements. GAO-01-1069R. Washington, D.C.: August 31,  2001.
Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access  Security Improvements. GAO-01-1068R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001  (RESTRICTED).
FAA Computer Security: Recommendations to Address Continuing  Weaknesses. GAO-01-171. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2000.
Aviation Security: Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in  Carriage of Weapons Regulations. GAO/RCED-00-181. Washington, D.C.:  September 29, 2000.
FAA Computer Security: Actions Needed to Address Critical Weaknesses  That Jeopardize Aviation Operations. GAO/T-AIMD-00-330. Washington,  D.C.: September 27, 2000.
FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain due to Personnel and Other  Continuing Weaknesses. GAO/AIMD-00-252. Washington, D.C.: August 16,  2000.
Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’  Performance. GAO/RCED-00-75. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000.
Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Serious Problems  Detecting Dangerous Objects. GAO/RCED-00-159. Washington, D.C.: June  22, 2000 (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION).
Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports. GAO-OSI-00-10.  Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000.
Aviation Security: Screener Performance in Detecting Dangerous  Objects during FAA Testing Is Not Adequate. GAO/T-RCED-00-143.  Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000 (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION).
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further  permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or  other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to  reproduce this material separately.