Security Assistance: Guidance Needed for Completing Required Impact Assessments Prior to Presidential Drawdowns
Published: 2016-10-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The President has special legal authorities that allow him to direct the “drawdown” of defense articles and services to provide assistance in response to an international crisis. Examples of this aid include deliveries of vehicles, food, and medical equipment, and the use of military airlift, among other articles and services. The President may authorize up to $325 million each year in drawdowns under three authorities in the Foreign Assistance Act.
A House Armed Services Committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision for GAO to review drawdown authorities. This report (1) describes the use of drawdown authorities to provide security assistance and build partner capacity and (2) evaluates the extent to which State and DOD followed their stated processes for planning and implementing drawdowns. GAO reviewed guidance and documents relevant to drawdowns, analyzed drawdown data from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, and interviewed State and DOD officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the President authorized 13 drawdowns to provide security assistance and build foreign partner capacity to France, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Ukraine, and countries in West and Central Africa (see fig.). According to Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (State) data, the total value of articles and services authorized for these drawdowns was $321.5 million.
State and DOD implemented some, but not all, steps in their stated processes for planning and implementing drawdowns, but the military departments did not conduct required impact assessments. State implemented three steps in the process for which it was responsible, such as preparing justification packages for planned drawdowns. DOD implemented some parts of its stated process. For example, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which is the lead DOD entity for drawdowns, worked with the military departments to identify resources for the drawdowns from fiscal years 2011 through 2015. However, the Army and Air Force—which together delivered about 96 percent of the dollar amount of drawdown aid during that time—did not conduct required impact assessments. Specifically, the two military departments had not assessed the potential impact of drawdowns on military readiness and budgets during drawdown planning, as required by DOD guidance. Neither of the military departments has assigned responsibility for conducting the assessments, and DSCA did not determine whether the assessments had been completed. Without these assessments, DOD is not in a position to identify and, if needed, mitigate potential negative impacts of a drawdown on military readiness.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that (1) the Secretaries of the military departments develop guidance that assigns responsibility for the preparation of impact assessments, and (2) the Director, DSCA, develop an internal control mechanism to determine whether the military departments have completed the required impact assessments before moving forward with drawdown planning and execution. DOD concurred with each of GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 1961, the President has had special statutory authority to order the  drawdown of defense articles and services from the stocks of the  Department of Defense (DOD) when it is vital to the security of the United  States. Drawdowns give the President the ability to respond to U.S.  foreign policy and national security objectives, such as unforeseen  military and nonmilitary emergencies, by providing assistance without first  seeking additional legislative authority or appropriations from Congress.  This aid could include providing security assistance and building foreign  partner capacity. An interagency process involving executive branch  agencies, including the Department of State (State) and DOD, guides the  planning and decision making for drawdowns. Drawdowns of defense  articles may include items such as vehicles, spare parts, clothing, food,  and medical equipment. Defense services may include a range of efforts,  such as airlift support, and drawdowns may also provide for military  education and training to aid recipients.
A House Armed Services Committee report accompanying a bill for the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a  provision for us to conduct a review of drawdown authorities. This report  (1) describes the use of drawdown authorities to provide security  assistance and build foreign partner capacity and (2) evaluates the extent  to which State and DOD followed their stated processes for planning and  implementing drawdowns, including completion of assessments by DOD  on the impact of drawdowns on military readiness and budgets.
To address both of the objectives for this review, we focused on  drawdowns authorized from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the most  recent years for which data were available. To describe the use of  drawdown authorities to provide security assistance and build foreign  partner capacity since 2011, we reviewed Presidential Determinations,  DOD Execute Orders (EXORD), and other documentation associated with  the 13 individual drawdowns authorized from fiscal years 2011 through  2015. We obtained and analyzed State and DOD data identifying the  types and cost of articles and services provided during these drawdowns.  To assess the reliability of the data, we interviewed cognizant officials at  DOD and compared similar data in the Federal Register  to the data we  obtained from DOD. We found these data to be reliable for the purposes  of identifying the extent to which State and DOD have reported using  available drawdown authorities. We also interviewed State and DOD  officials about the use of drawdown assistance provided.
To evaluate the extent to which State and DOD followed their stated  processes for planning and implementing drawdowns, we reviewed  requirements in the Foreign Assistance Act and DOD guidance in the  Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) and the Defense  Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Handbook. We reviewed available  documentation of drawdowns and discussed the processes followed for  planning and implementing drawdowns with State and DOD officials. We  developed what we describe as the State and DOD stated processes  through our analysis of these legal requirements and guidance  documents, as well as our discussions with agency officials, and then  confirmed the accuracy of our description of the stated processes with  agency officials. Where appropriate, we evaluated their processes against  federal internal control standards. At State, we conducted work at the  Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. At DOD, we conducted work at DSCA,  the Army, the Air Force, and U.S. Transportation Command. With respect  to the military departments’ processes for planning and implementing  drawdowns, we focused on the Army and Air Force because they  provided 96 percent of the dollar amount of all articles and services for  drawdowns authorized from fiscal years 2011 through 2015.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to October 2016 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Statutory Authorities for Drawdowns
paragraphs: Certain authorities in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,  enable the President to draw down articles and services from the  inventory and resources of U.S. government agencies.
Section 506(a)(1): Allows for drawdowns of defense articles from the  stocks of DOD, defense services of DOD, and military education and  training to a foreign country or international organization in emergency  situations. Before exercising this authority, the President must determine  and report to Congress that an unforeseen emergency exists, requiring  immediate military assistance that cannot be met under any other law.  The maximum aggregate value of drawdowns under Section 506(a)(1)  cannot exceed $100 million in any fiscal year.
Section 506(a)(2): Authorizes the President to draw down articles and  services from the inventory and resources of any U.S. government  agency and military education and training from DOD and use them to  assist foreign countries or international organizations in a number of  nonemergency situations. Before exercising this authority, the President  must first determine and report to Congress that any such drawdown is in  the national interest of the United States. The maximum aggregate value  of drawdowns under Section 506(a)(2) is $200 million in any fiscal year,  with no more than $75 million provided from DOD inventory and  resources.
Section 552(c)(2): Authorizes the President to direct the drawdown of  commodities and services from the inventory and resources of any U.S.  government agency for the purpose of carrying out peacekeeping  operations. In order to exercise this authority, the President must  determine that an unforeseen emergency exists, that providing assistance  in amounts in excess of funds otherwise available is important to the  national interests of the United States, and that the unforeseen  emergency requires the immediate provision of such assistance. The  maximum aggregate value of drawdowns under Section 552(c)(2) in any  fiscal year is $25 million.
section_title: State and DOD Roles in Planning and Implementing Drawdowns
paragraphs: State and DOD are the U.S. government agencies primarily engaged in  planning and executing uses of drawdown authority. State’s Bureau of  Political-Military Affairs, DOD’s DSCA, the National Security Council, the  Executive Office of the President, and in some cases other executive  branch agencies participate in an interagency process to develop a  recommendation for articles and services that the U.S. government  should provide under the drawdown authorities. When a crisis occurs, the  agencies work together to determine that a drawdown is required. The  interagency process also determines which articles and services should  be provided, depending on need and availability, and the maximum value  of the drawdown that will be authorized within the statutory limits. If a  decision is made to proceed with the drawdown, State prepares a  Memorandum of Justification and Presidential Determination for the  President’s signature. In addition, the Foreign Assistance Act requires the  President to notify Congress before the President intends to exercise the  authority provided.
Within DOD, DSCA prepares and issues an EXORD identifying the  articles and services to be provided under the drawdown. The military  departments receive the EXORD and specify the assistance to be  provided and the estimated cost of executing the drawdown. According to  the SAMM and DSCA Handbook, new procurement is not authorized for a  drawdown, and no new funds may be placed on existing contracts, with  the exception of transportation and related services where new contracts  would cost less than providing such services using DOD assets. As a  result, the military departments take the items from on-hand inventories  and pay the costs of the drawdown using existing appropriations— typically from their Operation and Maintenance (O&M) accounts. Upon  receipt of the EXORD, the executing agencies or organizations within the  military departments then provide the articles and services to the  drawdown recipient or recipients. The SAMM and DSCA Handbook  provide guidance for DSCA, the military departments, and other DOD  components to follow when planning and executing drawdowns.
section_title: Prior GAO Work on Presidential Drawdowns
paragraphs: We previously reported in April 2016 on additional provisions included in  the House Armed Services Committee report. In that report, we found  that, inconsistent with federal internal control standards, State lacked  readily available documents related to drawdowns, and there was no  mechanism to centrally manage key drawdown documents within State.
Further, DOD had not submitted certain reports to Congress since 2011,  despite a legal requirement to keep Congress fully and currently informed  regarding assistance provided through drawdowns under one specific  authority. We recommended that (1) State should assign responsibility or  establish a mechanism to maintain key drawdown documents and (2)  DOD report more frequently on defense articles and services provided  through drawdowns. State did not agree with the finding and did not  concur with our recommendation to establish a mechanism to maintain  documents but subsequently stated that the department does believe it  would be helpful to compile all documentation concerning security-related  drawdowns in a single repository and that the appropriate office had  established an electronic shared file folder for this purpose. DOD agreed  that it should report more frequently on drawdowns.
We also previously reported in 2002 on the use of drawdowns. At that  time, DOD officials told us that drawdowns have potential impacts on  military readiness and budgets. Specifically, DOD and military service  officials stated that unreimbursed costs associated with a drawdown  negatively affect the readiness of the U.S. military services. However,  those officials could not provide any examples of programs forgone or  specific deficiencies in unit readiness. We also found that the military  services, in 2000, had reported to DSCA on the effect on readiness of  drawdowns for counternarcotics efforts. Generally, the military services  had characterized the effect as dollars spent on unplanned contingencies  and, therefore, not available to support other requirements. In that report,  we did not make recommendations with regard to the potential impacts of  drawdowns on readiness and budgets.
According to DSCA officials, the SAMM was updated in 2003 to state that  when developing the interagency drawdown package, the military  departments are to assess their ability to meet interagency-proposed  requirements and are to review the impact of the drawdown on  operational readiness and O&M budgets. DSCA officials said that this  requirement was added after DSCA surveyed members of the DOD  security cooperation community about what changes they would like to  see in the 2003 update to the SAMM. Community members responded  that they would like for the SAMM to provide more information on  drawdowns, which resulted in a summary of the drawdown process being  added to the SAMM. The requirement for readiness and budget impact  assessments was added as part of the drawdown process.
section_title: The President Has Authorized 13 Drawdowns since 2011 to Provide Security Assistance and Build Foreign Partner Capacity
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2011, the President has authorized 13 drawdowns to  provide security assistance and build foreign partner capacity to France,  Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, and West and Central Africa (see fig. 1). According  to State and DOD data, the total value of articles and services authorized  for these drawdowns for fiscal years 2011 through 2015 was $321.5  million. State and DOD reported that the total value of articles and  services delivered was approximately $194.8 million as of August 2016  (see table 1). The drawdowns of articles and services were under  Sections 506(a)(1) and 552(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act. None of  these drawdowns used the Section 506(a)(2) authority.
Since fiscal year 2013, the President authorized five drawdowns under  Section 506(a)(1) to provide airlift and aerial refueling support, as well as  other defense support, toward countering terrorists and violent extremists  in West and Central Africa. These five authorizations totaled $200 million  and are in various stages of execution. As of August 2016, the value of  articles and services delivered was approximately $125.0 million,  constituting about 64 percent of all articles and services delivered under  the 13 total drawdowns. The drawdown efforts have been in three areas:  (1) airlift and aerial refueling assistance to France and Chad in their  efforts to secure Mali from terrorists and violent extremists; (2) defense  articles and support to countries supporting the African Union-led  International Support Mission in the Central African Republic; and (3)  defense services, including airlift and military education and training, to  support Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria in their efforts to  defeat the terrorist group Boko Haram. State officials stated that these  drawdowns provided just-in-time defense and helped peacekeeping on  the African continent while furthering the security and foreign policy goals  of the United States. For example, State officials said that the airlift  facilitated the deployment of thousands of peacekeeping troops and that  defense articles such as barriers facilitated the creation of headquarters  for the international forces in the Central African Republic.
In fiscal years 2014 and 2015, the President authorized a total of four  drawdowns to provide military assistance, improve peacekeeping  operations, and provide defense articles and services and nonlethal  commodities in Ukraine. These four authorizations—including two under  Section 506(a)(1) and two under Section 552(c)(2)—totaled $46.5 million,  with $31.8 million of the authority used as of August 2016. DOD records  show that for the 2014 drawdowns, the military departments provided  vehicles, power generators, medical supplies, clothing, and plumbing and  heating equipment. For the 2015 drawdowns, DOD records show that the  military services provided radar systems with test equipment and spare  parts.
The President also authorized four drawdowns that supported countries  experiencing political instability, such as in Libya, and to combat the  Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in Iraq and provide assistance to the  Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Syrian Opposition’s Supreme Military  Council. In fiscal year 2011, a drawdown of $25 million was authorized  under Section 552(c)(2) to provide commodities and services to Libya to  support efforts to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under  threat of attack. As of August 2016, approximately $15.6 million of the  authority had been used for items such as clothing, medical and dental  supplies, portable structures, and the transportation costs incurred in  delivering these items.
In fiscal year 2013, the President authorized two drawdowns totaling $25  million under Section 552(c)(2) to support the Syrian Opposition Coalition  and the Syrian Opposition’s Supreme Military Council for nonlethal  commodities and services. As of August 2016, approximately $5.9 million  of the $10 million authorized for one drawdown had been used for food,  dental and medical supplies, and airlift costs and, according to State  officials, $750,000 of the $15 million authorized for the second drawdown  had been used for food, medical equipment, and office materials.  According to State officials, the political situation in Syria caused the  cessation of these transfers.
In fiscal year 2014, the President authorized a drawdown of $25 million in  defense articles and services under Section 506(a)(1) to provide  immediate military assistance to the Government of Iraq, including the  Kurdistan Regional Government, to aid their efforts to combat the Islamic  State of Iraq and Syria. As of August 2016, approximately $15.7 million of  this authority had been used, with the bulk of the funding used for the  delivery of 50 mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles with minefield  detectors.
section_title: State and DOD Implemented Some but Not All Steps for Planning and Executing Drawdowns
paragraphs: State and DOD implemented some but not all steps in their stated  processes for planning and implementing drawdowns authorized from  fiscal years 2011 through 2015, but the military departments did not  conduct required impact assessments. As a key player in planning  drawdowns, State implemented steps such as preparing justification  packages and providing notifications to Congress. DSCA, which takes the  lead for drawdowns within DOD, worked with the military departments to  plan and implement drawdowns consistent with the guidance in the  SAMM and DSCA Handbook. However, the Army and Air Force—which  provided 96 percent of the dollar amount of all articles and services for  drawdowns authorized from fiscal years 2011 through 2015—did not  assess the impact of drawdowns on readiness and budgets as required  by the guidance.
subsections: section_title: State Implemented Steps in the Drawdown Planning Process
paragraphs: On the basis of available documentation and interviews with officials, we  found that State had implemented three steps in the drawdown planning  process for which it was responsible (see fig. 2).
In the first step of the process, State, working with DOD and other  agencies, agrees to use drawdown authorities in response to an  international crisis. Section 506(a)(1)(B) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as  amended, provides that the drawdown authority can be used only when  the President determines and reports to Congress that the emergency  requirement cannot be met under the authority of the Arms Export Control  Act or any other provision. Section 552(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance  Act, as amended, states that, as the result of an unforeseen emergency,  the provision of assistance under this part of the Act in amounts in excess  of funds otherwise available for such assistance is important to the  national interests of the United States and that such unforeseen  emergency requires the immediate provision of assistance under this part  of the Act. State officials said that the determination as required by these  drawdown authorities is documented in a Memorandum of Justification  and in the Presidential Determination, which is signed by the President  and published in the Federal Register. State provided Memoranda of  Justification, Presidential Determination letters, and other related  documents for each of the 13 drawdowns for fiscal years 2011 through  2015.
State officials said that when they are considering whether to use a  drawdown authority, they perform a review of various authorities and  funding sources to determine whether the use of a drawdown authority is  appropriate. State officials noted that there are many foreign assistance  authorities intended for various purposes. Drawdown authorities in  particular can allow State to provide assistance in emergency situations  outside of the regular 3-year budget cycle. The officials noted that the  drawdown authorities were particularly useful for providing airlift support  in Africa, as there are not many other authorities that can be used for this  purpose. The officials also noted that there are other authorities available  in emergency situations, and these authorities have been used instead of  drawdowns. For example, during the Ebola crisis in West Africa in 2014,  State requested over $2 billion in emergency funds but did not use  drawdown authority. In addition, State provided signed congressional  notifications to us for all of the drawdowns, showing it had completed this  step in the process.
section_title: DOD Implemented Drawdowns, but the Army and Air Force Did Not Assess the Impact of Drawdowns on Readiness and Budgets
paragraphs: Consistent with the drawdown process identified in the SAMM and DSCA  Handbook, DSCA worked with the military departments to implement  drawdowns. The guidance calls for DSCA to work with the military  departments to identify available resources for drawdowns, develop an  EXORD that guides the drawdown, and maintain data on the execution of  the drawdown. We found that DSCA fulfilled these steps. For example,  DSCA officials said they work with the military departments and other  DOD entities to determine what specific assistance the military  departments will provide and which military department will provide it.  According to officials, this coordination occurs by e-mail and phone.  Based on those determinations, the appropriate DSCA Country Program  Director develops an EXORD—which may be subsequently updated with  additional guidance—that provides direction to the various DOD  components involved. We found that DSCA had developed EXORDs for  the 12 drawdowns authorized from fiscal years 2011 through 2015 for  which DOD provided articles and services. Finally, DSCA tracks the  execution of the drawdown by maintaining data on articles and services,  along with their value, in an automated database, the DSCA 1000  System. The military departments provide execution data to DSCA, and  DSCA enters the data into its 1000 System. We found DSCA maintained  execution data on the 12 drawdowns for which it provided articles and  services, as discussed earlier in this report. As we noted in our April 2016  report, DSCA has not reported to Congress on any of the instances in  which drawdown authorities have been used since 2011. In its comments  on that report, DOD agreed that it should report more frequently on  drawdowns.
However, during the planning process and prior to implementing  drawdowns, the Army and Air Force did not assess the potential impact of  drawdowns to readiness and budgets as required by the SAMM and  DSCA Handbook. The SAMM and DSCA Handbook state that the military  departments are to review the potential impact of each planned  drawdown on operational readiness and O&M budgets prior to  authorization and execution. The SAMM and DSCA Handbook direct  DSCA to coordinate any readiness impacts that are identified by the  military departments with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, if  required, refer questions regarding readiness impacts to the Secretary of  Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense. With respect to budget impacts,  drawdown costs are to be balanced among the military departments as  much as possible, and DSCA is to serve as an “honest broker” for the  equitable distribution of requirements.
Army and Air Force officials we spoke with told us they had not conducted  readiness and budget impact assessments prior to drawdowns. Although  officials from both military departments stated that they use the SAMM  and DSCA Handbook as guidance for planning and executing  drawdowns, no officials we spoke with said they were familiar with the  requirement to conduct impact assessments. Officials from Army and Air  Force organizations that plan and implement drawdowns were not aware  of any impact assessments and told us that, if these assessments were to  be done, they would be done by readiness officials. Army and Air Force  readiness officials told us they were not aware of the drawdowns until we  shared information on these drawdowns with them, and they stated that  they have not been tasked with assessing their readiness impacts. They  added that the traditional readiness reporting they oversee is not suited to  capturing such assessments.
The impact assessments were not conducted, in part, because neither  the Army nor the Air Force has issued department-specific guidance that  assigns responsibility and identifies the steps to be taken for conducting  impact assessments. According to Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government, management should design control activities to  achieve objectives and respond to risk. Examples of control activities  include reviews of performance by management at the functional or  activity level and appropriate documentation of internal control. In  addition, management should establish and operate monitoring activities  to assess the quality of performance over time. By not following DOD  guidance for conducting readiness and budget impact assessments, the  Army and Air Force are not in a position to identify and mitigate potential  negative impacts that could result from providing the defense articles and  services under consideration for inclusion in a drawdown package.
Another contributing factor is that DSCA does not determine whether the  military departments have completed the required impact assessments.  DSCA officials told us they do not ask for or review impact assessments  from the military departments before proceeding with the drawdowns.  According to the officials, assessing operational readiness and managing  budgets are the responsibility of the military departments, and they do not  consider oversight of such activities part of their role when planning for  drawdowns. In addition, the officials said they were not aware of any  readiness impacts within recent years that had been raised to the level of  the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense for  consideration. However, the DSCA Handbook states that one of the key  roles of the DCSA Country Program Directors is to ensure that impacts of  the drawdown are balanced among the services as much as possible. In  addition, as noted earlier, federal internal control standards state that  management should design control activities to achieve objectives and  respond to risk. Examples of common categories of control activities  include reviews by management at the functional or activity level,  establishment and review of performance measures and indicators, and  appropriate documentation of internal control. DSCA does not have an  internal control mechanism for determining whether the required impact  statements have been completed before moving forward with drawdown  planning and execution.
Some military department organizations involved in drawdown execution  have standard operating procedures they follow that are designed to  facilitate drawdown execution, but none include impact assessments for  the planning stage. Some of the officials who facilitate drawdown  execution told us that since they do not work on drawdown execution on a  regular basis, it helps to have standard operating procedures that they  can refer to when a drawdown occurs. The standard operating  procedures that we reviewed included the steps for ensuring that all  articles and services were delivered to the drawdown recipient and how to  report delivery status and costs to DSCA. According to officials, some  mechanisms are built in to executing organizations’ existing processes  and procedures that help mitigate a potential readiness impact or inability  to implement a drawdown. For example, U.S. Transportation Command  and the Air Force have mechanisms built into the planning for airlift and  aerial refueling missions that reprioritize drawdown missions if resources  are needed for a higher priority mission.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: State implemented steps for which it was responsible in the executive  branch’s process for providing assistance using drawdown authorities.  DOD implemented most steps in the drawdown process, but the Army  and Air Force—which provided the most assistance from fiscal years  2011 through 2015—did not implement DOD’s requirement to complete  impact assessments of the drawdown assistance during drawdown  planning. Neither military department has guidance that assigns  responsibility and provides direction for carrying out this step, and DSCA  has not checked whether such impact assessments are completed. In the  absence of impact assessments, DOD is not in a position to identify and,  if needed, mitigate potential negative impacts on military readiness that  could result from providing the defense articles and services under  consideration for inclusion in a drawdown package.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To implement DOD guidance requiring the military departments to  prepare readiness and O&M budget impact assessments during  drawdown planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take  the following two actions:
Direct the Secretaries of the military departments to develop guidance  that assigns responsibility for the preparation of impact assessments  and includes direction on how such assessments should be  conducted as part of drawdown planning.
Direct the Director, DSCA, to develop an internal control mechanism  to determine whether the military departments have completed the  required impact assessments before moving forward with drawdown  planning and execution.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our two  recommendations to implement DOD guidance requiring the military  departments to prepare readiness and O&M budget impact assessments  during drawdown planning. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix I.  State did not provide comments on the draft. DOD and State also  provided us with technical comments, which we have incorporated into  the report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  Zina Merritt at (202) 512-5257 or merrittz@gao.gov, or Charles Johnson  at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff members who made key contributions to  this report are listed in Appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contacts named above, Tom Gosling (Assistant  Director), Jeff Phillips (Assistant Director), David Dayton, Martin de  Alteriis, Leah DeWolf, Neil Doherty, Susannah Hawthorne, Jeff Isaacs,  Eddie Uyekawa, Jose Watkins, and Alex Welsh made key contributions to  this report.