Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Use of Contract Guards Requires Reassessment and More Oversight
Published: 2010-04-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: To accomplish its mission of protecting about 9,000 federal facilities, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) currently has a budget of about $1 billion, about 1,225 full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract security guards. FPS obligated $659 million for guard services in fiscal year 2009. This testimony is based on our report issued on April 13, 2010, and discusses challenges FPS continues to face in (1) managing its guard contractors and (2) overseeing guards deployed at federal facilities, and (3) the actions FPS has taken to address these challenges. To address these objectives, GAO conducted site visits at 6 of FPS's 11 regions; interviewed FPS officials, guards, and contractors, and analyzed FPS's contract files. GAO also reviewed new contract guard program guidance issued since our July 2009 report and observed guard inspections and penetration testing done by FPS.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: FPS faces a number of challenges in managing its guard contractors that hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. FPS requires contractors to provide guards who have met training and certification requirements. FPS's guard contract also states that a contractor who does not comply with the contract is subject to enforcement action. GAO reviewed the official contract files for the seven contractors who, as GAO testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts with expired certification and training requirements to determine what action, if any, FPS had taken against these contractors for contract noncompliance. These contractors had been awarded several multiyear contracts totaling $406 million to provide guards at federal facilities in 13 states and Washington, D.C. FPS did not take any enforcement actions against these seven contractors for noncompliance. In fact, FPS exercised the option to extend their contracts. FPS also did not comply with its requirement that a performance evaluation of each contractor be completed annually and that these evaluations and other performance-related data be included in the contract file. FPS plans to provide additional training and hold staff responsible for completing these evaluations more accountable. FPS also faces challenges in ensuring that many of the 15,000 guards have the required training and certification to be deployed at a federal facility. In July 2009, GAO reported that since 2004, FPS had not provided X-ray and magnetometer training to about 1,500 guards in 1 region. As of January 2010, these guards had not received this training and continued to work at federal facilities in this region. X-ray and magnetometer training is important because guards control access points at federal facilities. FPS currently does not have a fully reliable system for monitoring and verifying whether its 15,000 guards have the certifications and training to stand post at federal facilities. FPS developed a new Risk Assessment and Program Management system to help monitor and track guard certifications and training. However, FPS is experiencing difficulties with this system and has suspended its use. In addition, once guards are deployed to a federal facility, they are not always complying with assigned responsibilities (post orders). Since July 2009, FPS has conducted 53 penetration tests in the 6 regions we visited, and in over half of these tests some guards did not identify prohibited items, such as guns and knives. In response to GAO's July 2009 testimony, FPS has taken a number of actions that, once fully implemented, could help address challenges it faces in managing its contract guard program. For example, FPS has increased the number of guard inspections at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas. FPS also revised its X-ray and magnetometer training; however, all guards will not be fully trained until the end of 2010, although they are deployed at federal facilities. Despite FPS's recent actions, it continues to face challenges in ensuring that its $659 million guard program is effective in protecting federal facilities. Thus, among other things, FPS needs to reassess how it protects federal facilities and rigorously enforce the terms of the contracts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We are pleased to be here to discuss the results of our report on the  Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) contract guard program, issued April  13, 2010. As you are aware, FPS—within the National Protection and  Programs Directorate (NPPD) of the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS)—is responsible for protecting the buildings, grounds, and property  that are under the control and custody of the General Services  Administration (GSA), as well as the persons on the property; authorized  to enforce federal laws and regulations aimed at protecting GSA buildings  and persons on the property; and authorized to investigate offenses  against these buildings and persons. To accomplish its mission of  protecting federal facilities, FPS currently has a budget of about $1   billion,  about 1,225 full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract  security guards (guards) deployed at about 2,360 federal facilities across  the country. In fiscal year 2009, FPS obligated $659 million for guard  services, which represents the single largest item in its budget.
FPS’s contract guard program is the most visible component of its  operations as well as the first public contact for individuals entering a  federal facility. FPS relies heavily on its guards and considers them to be  the agency’s “eyes and ears” while performing their duties. Guards are  primarily responsible for controlling access to federal facilities by (1)  checking the identification of government employees as well as members  of the public who work in and visit federal facilities, and (2) operating  security equipment, such as X-ray machines and magnetometers to screen  for prohibited materials, such as firearms, knives, explosives, or items  intended to be used to fabricate an explosive or incendiary device.  Guards do not have arrest authority but can detain individuals who are being disruptive or pose a danger to public safety.
This testimony, based on our report, discusses challenges FPS continues  to face in (1) managing its guard contractors, (2) overseeing guards  deployed at federal facilities, and (3) actions FPS has taken to address  these challenges. Our methodology included site visits to 6 of FPS’s 11  regions. To select these 6 regions, we considered the number of FPS  guards, contractors, and federal facilities, and the geographic dispersion of  the regions across the United States. At each region, we observed FPS’s  guard inspection process and interviewed FPS’s regional manager,  contract guard program managers, inspectors who are responsible for  conducting guard inspections; guards, and contractors. We also randomly  selected 663 out of approximately 15,000 guard training records that were  maintained in FPS’s Contract Guard Employment Requirements Tracking  System (CERTS) and/or by the guard contractor and validated them  against the contractual requirements that were in effect at the time of our  review. We also reviewed the contract files for 7 of FPS’s 38 guard  contractors. We selected these 7 contractors because our previous work  showed that they had contract compliance issues. In addition, we analyzed  a random sample of 99 FPS contractor evaluations to determine how FPS  evaluated the performance of its contractors on an annual basis.
We also reviewed new contract guard program guidance issued since our  July 2009 testimony and observed guard inspections and covert testing  done by FPS in August and November 2009. Because of the sensitivity of  some of the information in our report, we cannot provide information  about the specific locations of the incidents discussed. We conducted this  performance audit from July 2008 to February 2010 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: FPS Faces Challenges Managing Its Guard Contractors That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities
subsections: section_title: Some FPS Guard Contractors Did Not Always Comply with the Terms of Contracts and FPS Has Not Taken Actions against Them
paragraphs: FPS has not taken actions against some guard contractors that did not  comply with the terms of the contracts. According to FPS guard contracts,  a contractor has not complied with the terms of the contract if the  contractor has a guard working without valid certifications or background  suitability investigations, falsifies a guard’s training records, does not have  a guard at a post, or has an unarmed guard working at a post at which the  guard should be armed. If FPS determines that a contractor does not  comply with these contract requirements, it can—among other things— assess a financial deduction for nonperformed work, elect not to exercise  a contract option, or terminate the contract for default or cause.
We reviewed the official contract files for the 7 contractors who, as we  testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts with expired  certification and training requirements to determine what action, if any,  FPS had taken against these contractors for contract noncompliance. The  7 contractors we reviewed had been awarded several multiyear contracts  totaling $406 million to provide guards at federal facilities in 13 states and  Washington, D.C.
According to the documentation in the contract files, FPS did not take any  enforcement action against the 7 contractors for not complying with the  terms of the contract, a finding consistent with DHS’s Inspector General’s  2009 report. In fact, FPS exercised the option to extend the contracts of  these 7 contractors. FPS contracting officials told us that the contracting  officer who is responsible for enforcing the terms of the contract  considers the appropriate course of action among the available  contractual remedies on a case-by-case basis. For example, the decision of  whether to assess financial deductions is a subjective assessment in which  the contracting officer and the contracting officer technical representative  (COTR) take into account the value of the nonperformance and the  seriousness of the deficiency, according to FPS contracting officials.
section_title: FPS Did Not Always Comply with Its Procedures for Completing Annual Performance Evaluations of Its Guard Contractors
paragraphs: FPS requires an annual performance evaluation of each contractor and at  the conclusion of contracts exceeding $100,000, and requires that these  evaluations and other performance-related documentation be included in  the contract file. Contractor performance evaluations are one of the most  important tools available for ensuring compliance with contract terms.  Moreover, given that other federal agencies rely on many of the same  contractors to provide security services, completing accurate evaluations  of a contractor’s past performance is critical. However, we found that  FPS’s contracting officers and COTRs did not always evaluate contractors’  performance as required, and some evaluations were incomplete and not  consistent with contractors’ performance.
We reviewed a random sample of 99 contract performance evaluations  from calendar year 2006 through June 2009. These evaluations were for 38  contractors. Eighty-two of the 99 contract performance evaluations  showed that FPS assessed the quality of services provided by the majority  of its guard contractors as satisfactory, very good, or exceptional. For the  remaining 17 evaluations, 11 showed that the contractor’s performance  was marginal, 1 as unsatisfactory, and assessments for 5 contractors were  not complete. According to applicable guidance, a contractor must meet  contractual requirements to obtain a satisfactory evaluation and a  contractor should receive an unsatisfactory evaluation if its performance  does not meet most contract requirements and recovery in a timely  manner is not likely.
Nevertheless, we found instances where some contractors received a  satisfactory or better rating although they had not met some of the terms  of the contract. For example, contractors receiving satisfactory or better  ratings included the 7 contractors discussed above that had guards with  expired certification and training records working at federal facilities. In  addition, some performance evaluations that we reviewed did not include  a justification for the rating and there was no other supporting  documentation in the official contract file to explain the rating. Moreover,  there was no information in the contract file that indicated that the COTR  had communicated any performance problems to the contracting officer.
section_title: FPS Continues to Face Challenges with Overseeing Guards That Raise Concern about Protection of Federal Facilities
subsections: section_title: FPS Is Not Providing All Guards with X-ray and Magnetometer Training in Some Regions
paragraphs: As of February 2010, FPS had yet to provide some of its guards with all of  the required X-ray or magnetometer training. For example, we reported in  July 2009 that in one region, FPS has not provided the required X-ray or  magnetometer training to 1,500 guards since 2004. FPS officials  subsequently told us that the contract for this region requires that only  guards who are assigned to work on posts that contain screening  equipment are required to have 8 hours of X-ray and magnetometer  training. However, in response to our July 2009 testimony, FPS now  requires all guards to receive 16 hours of X-ray and magnetometer training.  As of February 2010, these 1,500 guards had not received the 16 hours of  training but continued to work at federal facilities in this region. FPS plans  to provide X-ray and magnetometer training to all guards by December  2010. X-ray and magnetometer training is important because the majority  of the guards are primarily responsible for using this equipment to monitor  and control access points at federal facilities. Controlling access to a  facility helps ensure that only authorized personnel, vehicles, and  materials are allowed to enter, move within, and leave the facility.
section_title: FPS Lacks Assurance That Its Guards Have Required Certifications and Training
paragraphs: FPS currently does not have a fully reliable system for monitoring and  verifying whether its 15,000 guards have the certifications and training to  stand post at federal facilities. FPS is developing a new system—Risk  Assessment and Management Program (RAMP)—to help it monitor and  verify the status of guard certifications and training. However, in our July  2009 report, we raised concerns about the accuracy and reliability of the  information that will be entered into RAMP. Since that time, FPS has taken  steps to review and update all guard training and certification records. For  example, FPS is conducting an internal audit of its CERTS database.  However, as of February 2010, the results of that audit showed that FPS  was able to verify that about 8,600 of its 15,000 guards met the training and  certification requirements. FPS is experiencing difficulty verifying the  status of the remaining 6,400 guards. FPS has also received about 1,500  complaints from inspectors regarding a number of problems with RAMP.  For example, some inspectors said it was difficult and sometimes  impossible to find guard information in RAMP and to download guard  inspection reports. Thus they were completing the inspections manually.  Other inspectors have said it takes almost 2 hours to log on to RAMP.  Consequently, on March 18, 2010, FPS suspended the use of RAMP until it  resolves these issues. FPS is currently working on resolving issues with  RAMP.
section_title: FPS Continues to Have Limited Assurance That Guards Are Complying with Post Orders once They Are Deployed to Federal Facilities
paragraphs: Once guards are deployed to a federal facility, guards are not always  complying with assigned responsibilities (post orders). As we testified in  July 2009, we identified substantial security vulnerabilities related to FPS’s  guard program. FPS also continues to find instances where guards are not  complying with post orders. For example, 2 days after our July 2009  hearing, a guard fired his firearm in a restroom in a level IV facility while  practicing drawing his weapon. In addition, FPS’s own penetration  testing—similar to the covert testing we conducted in May 2009—showed  that guards continued to experience problems with complying with post  orders. Since July 2009, FPS conducted 53 similar penetration tests at  federal facilities in the 6 regions we visited, and in over 66 percent of these  tests, guards allowed prohibited items into federal facilities. We  accompanied FPS on two penetration tests in August and November 2009,  and guards at these level IV facilities failed to identify a fake bomb, gun,  and knife during X-ray and magnetometer screening at access control  points. During the first test we observed in August 2009, FPS agents placed  a bag containing a fake gun and knife on the X-ray machine belt. The guard  failed to identify the gun and knife on the X-ray screen, and the  undercover FPS official was able to retrieve his bag and proceed to the  check-in desk without incident. During a second test, a knife was hidden  on an FPS officer. During the test, the magnetometer detected the knife, as  did the hand wand, but the guard failed to locate the knife and the FPS  officer was able to gain access to the facility. According to the FPS officer,  the guards who failed the test had not been provided the required X-ray  and magnetometer training. Upon further investigation, only 2 of the 11  guards at the facility had the required X-ray and magnetometer training. In  response to the results of this test, FPS debriefed the contractor and  moved one of the guard posts to improve access control.
In November 2009, we accompanied FPS on another test of security  countermeasures at a different level IV facility. As in the previous test, an  FPS agent placed a bag containing a fake bomb on the X-ray machine belt.  The guard operating the X-ray machine did not identify the fake bomb and  the inspector was allowed to enter the facility with it. In a second test, an  FPS inspector placed a bag containing a fake gun on the X-ray belt. The  guard identified the gun and the FPS inspector was detained. However, the  FPS inspector was told to stand in a corner and was not handcuffed or  searched as required. In addition, while all the guards were focusing on  the individual with the fake gun, a second FPS inspector walked through  the security checkpoint with two knives without being screened. In  response to the results of this test, FPS suspended 2 guards and provided  additional training to 2 guards.
section_title: Recent Actions Taken by FPS May Help Improve Oversight of the Contract Guard Program
paragraphs: In response to our July 2009 testimony, FPS has taken a number of actions  that, once fully implemented, could help address the challenges the agency  faces in managing its contract guard program. For example, FPS  Increased guard inspections at facilities in some metropolitan areas.  FPS has increased the number of guard inspections to two a week at  federal facilities in some metropolitan areas. Prior to this new  requirement, FPS did not have a national requirement for guard  inspections, and each region we visited had requirements that ranged from  no inspection requirements to each inspector having to conduct five  inspections per month.
Increased X-ray and magnetometer training requirements for inspectors  and guards. FPS has increased its X-ray and magnetometer training for  inspectors and guards from 8 hours to 16 hours. In July 2009, FPS also  required each guard to watch a government-provided digital video disc  (DVD) on bomb component detection by August 20, 2009. According to  FPS, as of January 2010, approximately 78 percent, or 11,711 of the 15,000  guards had been certified as having watched the DVD.
Implementing a new system to monitor guard training and  certifications. As mentioned earlier, FPS is also implementing RAMP.  According to FPS, RAMP will provide it with the capability to monitor and  track guard training and certifications and enhance its ability to conduct  and track guard inspections. RAMP is also designed to be a central  database for capturing and managing facility security information,  including the risks posed to federal facilities and the countermeasures that  are in place to mitigate risk. It is also expected to enable FPS to manage  guard certifications and to conduct and track guard inspections  electronically as opposed to manually. However, as mentioned earlier, as  of March 18, 2010, FPS suspended the use of RAMP until it can resolve  existing issues.
Despite FPS’s recent actions, it continues to face challenges in ensuring  that its $659 million guard program is effective in protecting federal  facilities. While the changes FPS has made to its X-ray and magnetometer  training will help to address some of the problems we found, there are  some weaknesses in the guard training. For example, many of the 15,000  guards will not be fully trained until the end of 2010. In addition, one  contractor told us that one of the weaknesses associated with FPS’s guard  training program is that it focuses primarily on prevention and detection  but does not adequately address challenge and response. This contractor  has developed specific scenario training and provides its guards on other  contracts with an additional 12 hours of training on scenario-based  examples, such as how to control a suicide bomber or active shooter  situation, evacuation, and shelter in place. The contractor, who has  multiple contracts with government agencies, does not provide this  scenario-based training to its guards on FPS contracts because FPS does  not require it. We also found that some guards were still not provided  building-specific training, such as what actions to take during a building  evacuation or a building emergency. According to guards we spoke to in  one region, guards receive very little training on building emergency  procedures during basic training or the refresher training. These guards  also said that the only time they receive building emergency training is  once they are on post. Consequently, some guards do not know how to  operate basic building equipment, such as the locks or the building  ventilation system, which is important in a building evacuation or building  emergency.
FPS’s decision to increase guard inspections at federal facilities in  metropolitan areas is a step in the right direction. However, it does not  address issues with guard inspections at federal facilities outside  metropolitan areas, which are equally vulnerable. Thus, without routine  inspections of guards at these facilities, FPS has no assurance that guards  are complying with their post orders.
We believe that FPS continues to struggle with managing its contract  guard program in part because, although it has used guards to supplement  the agency’s workforce since the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah  Federal Building, it has not undertaken a comprehensive review of its use  of guards to protect federal facilities to determine whether other options  and approaches would be more cost-beneficial. FPS also has not acted  diligently in ensuring that its guard contractors meet the terms of the  contract and taking enforcement action when noncompliance occurs. We  also believe that completing the required contract performance  evaluations for its contractors and maintaining contract files will put FPS  in a better position to determine whether it should continue to exercise  contract options with some contractors. Moreover, maintaining accurate  and reliable data on whether the 15,000 guards deployed at federal  facilities have met the training and certification requirements is important  for a number of reasons. First, without accurate and reliable data, FPS  cannot consistently ensure compliance with contract requirements and  lacks information critical for effective oversight of its guard program.  Second, given that other federal agencies rely on many of the same  contractors to provide security services, completing accurate evaluations  of a contractor’s past performance is critical to future contract awards.
Thus, in our report we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland  Security direct the Under Secretary of NPPD and the Director of FPS to  take the following eight actions:  identify other approaches and options that would be most beneficial and  financially feasible for protecting federal buildings; rigorously and consistently monitor guard contractors’ and guards’  performance and step up enforcement against contractors that are not  complying with the terms of the contract;   complete all contract performance evaluations in accordance with FPS  and Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements;  issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure that contract files  have required documentation;   develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards at federal facilities    provide building-specific and scenario-based training and guidance to its    develop and implement a management tool for ensuring that reliable,  comprehensive data on the contract guard program are available on a real- time basis; and   verify the accuracy of all guard certification and training data before  entering them into RAMP, and periodically test the accuracy and reliability  of RAMP data to ensure that FPS management has the information needed  to effectively oversee its guard program.
DHS concurred with seven of our eight recommendations. Regarding our  recommendation to issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure  that contract files have required documentation, DHS concurred that  contract files must have required documentation but did not concur that a  new record-keeping format should be issued. DHS commented that  written procedures already exist and are required for use by all DHS’s  Office of Procurement Operations staff and the components it serves,  including NPPD. We believe that the policies referenced by DHS are a step  in the right direction in ensuring that contract files have required  documentation; however, although these policies exist, we found a lack of  standardization and consistency in the contract files we reviewed among  the three Consolidated Contract Groups.
Overall, we are also concerned about some of the steps FPS plans to take  to address our recommendations. For example, FPS commented that to  provide routine oversight of guards in remote regions it will use an  employee of a tenant agency (referred to as an Agency Technical  Representative) who has authority to act as a representative of a COTR for  day-to-day monitoring of contract guards. However, several FPS regional  officials told us that the Agency Technical Representatives were not fully  trained and did not have an understanding of the guards’ roles and  responsibilities. These officials also said that the program may not be  appropriate for all federal facilities. We believe that if FPS plans to use  Agency Tenant Representatives to oversee guards, it is important that the  agency ensure that the representatives are knowledgeable of the guard’s  responsibilities and are trained on how and when to conduct guard  inspections as well as how to evacuate facilities during an emergency.  Furthermore, while we support FPS’s overall plans to better manage its  contract guard program, we believe it is also important for FPS to have  appropriate performance metrics to evaluate whether its planned actions  are fully implemented and are effective in addressing the challenges it  faces managing its contract guard program.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony. We are pleased to answer any  questions you might have.
section_title: Contact Information
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Mark L.  Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or by e-mail at goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key  contributions to this testimony include Tammy Conquest, Assistant  Director; Tida Barakat; and Jonathan Carver.
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