Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts
Published: 2007-02-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The 2005 London subway bombings and 2006 rail attacks in Mumbai, India highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail and other surface transportation systems to terrorist attack and demonstrated the need for greater focus on securing these systems. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 passenger rail security report and selected program updates obtained in January 2007. Specifically, it addressees (1) the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system and developed a strategy based on risk assessment for securing all modes of transportation, including passenger rail; (2) the actions that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and other federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of the U.S. passenger rail system, improve federal coordination, and develop industry partnerships; and (3) the security practices that domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators have implemented to enhance security.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The DHS Office of Grants and Training and TSA have begun to assess the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system. However, we reported in September 2005 that TSA had not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of passenger rail assets. We found that, until TSA does so, the agency may be limited in its ability to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investments. We also reported that DHS had begun, but not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks among and across various critical sectors. Since that time, TSA has reported taking additional steps to assess the risks to the passenger rail system. However, TSA has not yet issued the required Transportation Sector Specific Plan and supporting plans that address passenger rail and other surface transportation modes, based on a risk assessment. Until TSA does so, the agency lacks a clear strategy with goals and objectives for securing the overall transportation sector, including passenger rail. After September 11, DOT initiated efforts to strengthen passenger rail security. TSA has also taken actions to strengthen rail security, including issuing security directives, testing security technologies, developing security training, and issuing a proposed rule for passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent to which TSA's directives were based on industry best practices. TSA has also taken steps to better coordinate with DOT and develop partnerships with industry stakeholders. DHS and DOT have updated their memorandum of understanding to clarify their respective security-related roles and responsibilities for passenger rail. TSA also established an Office of Transportation Sector Network Management and offices for each mode of transportation to develop security policies and work to strengthen partnerships with industry stakeholders for passenger rail and other surface modes. U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators GAO visited have also taken actions to secure their rail systems. Most had implemented customer security awareness programs, increased security personnel, increased the use of canines to detect explosives, and enhanced employee training programs. GAO also observed security practices among foreign passenger rail systems that are not currently used by U.S. rail operators or by the U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the U.S. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers or use covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats. While introducing these security practices in the U.S may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they warrant further examination. TSA has reported taking steps to identify foreign best practices for rail security.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing on federal rail  and public transportation security efforts. Since September 11, 2001, TSA  has focused much of its efforts and resources on meeting legislative  mandates to strengthen commercial aviation security. However, TSA has  recently placed additional focus on securing surface modes of  transportation, particularly in the area of passenger rail. Surface modes of  transportation, which include passenger and freight rail, mass transit,  highways, including commercial vehicles, and pipelines, are inherently  open and difficult to secure. One of the critical challenges facing federal  agencies and the rail system operators they oversee or support is finding  ways to protect these systems from potential terrorist attacks without  compromising the accessibility and efficiency of rail travel. The Madrid  commuter rail attacks in March 2004, London rail bombings in July 2005,  and Mumbai, India train bombings just last year, highlight the  vulnerabilities of passenger rail and other surface transportation systems  and made clear that even when security precautions are put into place,  these systems remain vulnerable to attack. Securing rail and surface  transportation systems is a daunting task, requiring that the federal  government develop a clear strategy, including goals and objectives, for  strengthening the security of these systems. As part of that strategy, it is  also critical to assess the risks facing these systems so that limited  resources and security efforts can be prioritized to the areas of greatest  need. Furthermore, because the responsibility for securing rail and other  transportation modes is shared between federal, state, and local  governments and the private sector, it is critical that the federal  government develop partnerships and coordinate its security efforts with  transportation industry stakeholders.
As we have reported previously, the sheer number of stakeholders  involved in securing surface transportation modes, including passenger  rail, can sometimes lead to communication challenges, duplication of  effort, and confusion about roles and responsibilities. Regarding passenger  rail security, key Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stakeholders  with critical roles include the Transportation Security Administration  (TSA), which is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation,  including developing a national strategy and plan for securing the  transportation sector as well as supporting plans for each transportation  mode. In addition, the DHS Office for Grants and Training (OGT) provides  grant funds to rail operators and conducts risk assessments for passenger  rail agencies. Within the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Federal  Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)  have responsibilities for passenger and freight rail safety and security. In  addition, public and private passenger rail operators are also responsible  for securing their rail systems.
At the federal level, another significant challenge related to securing  passenger rail systems involves allocating resources based on risk. Within  and among all modes of transportation, there is competition for resources,  as federal, state, and local agencies and transportation operators seek to  identify and invest in appropriate security measures to safeguard these  systems while also investing in other capital and operational  improvements. Moreover, given competing priorities and limited homeland  security resources, difficult policy decisions have to be made by Congress  and the executive branch to prioritize security efforts and direct resources  to the areas of greatest risk within and among transportation modes and  across other nationally critical sectors.
In this regard, to help federal decision makers determine how to best  allocate limited resources, we have advocated, the National Commission  on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) has  recommended, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act  of 2004 provides that a risk management approach be employed to guide  decision making related to homeland security resources. A risk  management approach entails a continuous process of managing risks  through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and objectives,  assessing and quantifying risks, evaluating alternative security measures,  selecting which measures to undertake, and implementing and monitoring  those measures.
My testimony today focuses on the progress federal agencies and domestic  passenger rail operators have made in developing and implementing  security strategies and setting security priorities in the wake of September  11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and the security practices implemented by  foreign passenger rail operators. In particular, my testimony highlights  three key areas: (1) the extent to which DHS has assessed the risks facing  the U.S. passenger rail system and developed a strategy based on risk  assessment for securing all modes of transportation, including passenger  rail; (2) the actions that TSA and other federal agencies have taken to  enhance the security of the U.S. passenger rail system, improve federal  coordination, and develop industry partnerships; and (3) the security  practices that domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators have  implemented to enhance security. My comments today are based on GAO’s  September 2005 report addressing the security of the U.S. passenger rail  system. This report was based on work conducted at DHS, DOT, and  Amtrak, as well as 32 passenger rail operators in the U.S., and   13 passenger rail operators in 7 European and Asian countries. In addition,  in January 2007, we obtained selected updates from DHS regarding its  efforts to secure passenger rail systems. We conducted our work in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We have been requested by this Committee to conduct a follow-on review  of passenger rail security, which we expect to initiate in the near future. In  addition, we have been requested to assess the security of other surface  modes of transportation—including freight rail, commercial vehicles, and  highway infrastructure—which we have underway or will initiate later this  year.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Overview of the Passenger Rail System
paragraphs: Each weekday, 11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas and   22 states use some form of rail transit (commuter, heavy, or light rail).  Commuter rail systems typically operate on railroad tracks and provide  regional service between a central city and adjacent suburbs. Commuter  rail systems are traditionally associated with older industrial cities, such  as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. Heavy rail systems— subway systems like New York City’s transit system and Washington,  D.C.’s Metro—typically operate on fixed rail lines within a metropolitan  area and have the capacity for a heavy volume of traffic. Amtrak operates  the nation’s primary intercity passenger rail service over a 22,000-mile  network, primarily over freight railroad tracks. Amtrak serves more than  500 stations (240 of which are staffed) in 46 states and the District of  Columbia, and it carried more than 25 million passengers during FY 2005.
section_title: Passenger Rail Systems Are Inherently Vulnerable to Terrorist Attacks
paragraphs: Certain characteristics of domestic and foreign passenger rail systems  make them inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks and therefore difficult  to secure. By design, passenger rail systems are open, have multiple access  points, are hubs serving multiple carriers, and, in some cases, have no  barriers so that they can move large numbers of people quickly. In  contrast, the U.S. commercial aviation system is housed in closed and  controlled locations with few entry points. The openness of passenger rail  systems can leave them vulnerable because operator personnel cannot  completely monitor or control who enters or leaves the systems. In  addition, other characteristics of some passenger rail systems—high  ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance, and location  (large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)—also make them  attractive targets for terrorists because of the potential for mass casualties  and economic damage and disruption. Moreover, some of these same  characteristics make passenger rail systems difficult to secure. For  example, the numbers of riders that pass through a subway system— especially during peak hours—may make the sustained use of some  security measures, such as metal detectors, difficult because they could  result in long lines that disrupt scheduled service. In addition, multiple  access points along extended routes could make the cost of securing each  location prohibitive. Balancing the potential economic impact of security  enhancements with the benefits of such measures is a difficult challenge.
section_title: Multiple Stakeholders Share Responsibility for Securing Passenger Rail Systems
paragraphs: Securing the nation’s passenger rail systems is a shared responsibility  requiring coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local  governments; the private sector; and rail passengers who ride these  systems. Since the September 11th attacks, the role of federal agencies in  securing the nation’s transportation systems, including passenger rail,  have continued to evolve. Prior to September 11th, FTA and FRA, within  DOT, were the primary federal entities involved in passenger rail security  matters. In response to the attacks of September 11th, Congress passed  the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which created TSA  within DOT and defined its primary responsibility as ensuring the security  of all modes of transportation, although its provisions focus primarily on  aviation security. The act also gives TSA regulatory authority for security  over all transportation modes. With the passage of the Homeland Security  Act of 2002, TSA was transferred, along with over 20 other agencies, to the  Department of Homeland Security. The Intelligence Reform and  Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires the Secretary of Homeland  Security, working jointly with the Secretary of Transportation, to develop  a National Strategy for Transportation Security and transportation modal  security plans. TSA issued the National Strategy for Transportation  Security in 2005. In addition, the DHS National Infrastructure Protection  Plan (NIPP) required the development of a Transportation Sector Specific  Plan. In accordance with the NIPP, a December 2006 Executive Order  required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a TSSP by  December 31, 2006, and supporting plans for each mode of surface  transportation not later than 90 days after completion of the TSSP.  According to the NIPP, sector specific plans should, among other things,  define the goals and objectives to secure the sector, assess the risks facing  the sector, identify the critical assets and infrastructure and develop  programs to protect them, and develop security partnerships with industry  stakeholders within the sector. As of February 2007, TSA had not yet  completed the TSSP or the supporting plans for each surface  transportation mode.
Within DHS, OGT, formerly the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP),  has become the federal source for security funding of passenger rail  systems. OGT is the principal component of DHS responsible for  preparing the United States against acts of terrorism and has primary  responsibility within the executive branch for assisting and supporting  DHS, in coordination with other directorates and entities outside of the  department, in conducting risk analysis and risk management activities of  state and local governments. In carrying out its mission, OGT provides  training, funds for the purchase of equipment, support for the planning and  execution of exercises, technical assistance, and other support to assist  states, local jurisdictions, and the private sector to prevent, prepare for,  and respond to acts of terrorism. OGT created and is administering two  grant programs focused specifically on transportation security, the Transit  Security Grant Program and the Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant  Program. These programs provide financial assistance to address security  preparedness and enhancements for passenger rail and transit systems.  During fiscal year 2006, OGT provided $110 million to passenger rail  transit agencies through the Transit Security Grant Program and about   $7 million to Amtrak through the Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant  Program. During fiscal year 2007, OGT plans to distribute $156 million of  for rail and bus security grants and $8 million to Amtrak.
While TSA is the lead federal agency for ensuring the security of all  transportation modes, FTA conducts safety and security activities,  including training, research, technical assistance, and demonstration  projects. In addition, FTA promotes safety and security through its grant- making authority. FRA has regulatory authority for rail safety over  commuter rail operators and Amtrak, and employs over 400 rail inspectors  that periodically monitor the implementation of safety and security plans  at these systems.
State and local governments, passenger rail operators, and private industry  are also important stakeholders in the nation’s rail security efforts. State  and local governments may own or operate a significant portion of the  passenger rail system. Passenger rail operators, which can be public or  private entities, are responsible for administering and managing passenger  rail activities and services. Passenger rail operators can directly operate  the service provided or contract for all or part of the total service.  Although all levels of government are involved in passenger rail security,  the primary responsibility for securing passenger rail systems rests with  passenger rail operators.
section_title: Assessing and Managing Risks to Rail Infrastructure Using a Risk Management Approach
paragraphs: Risk management is a tool for informing policy makers’ decisions about  assessing risks, allocating resources, and taking actions under conditions  of uncertainty. In recent years, the President, through Homeland Security  Presidential Directives (HSPD), and Congress, through the Intelligence  Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, provided for federal  agencies with homeland security responsibilities to apply risk-based  principles to inform their decision making regarding allocating limited  resources and prioritizing security activities. The 9/11 Commission  recommended that the U.S. government should identify and evaluate the  transportation assets that need to be protected, set risk-based priorities  for defending them, select the most practical and cost-effective ways of  doing so, and then develop a plan, budget, and funding to implement the  effort. We have previously reported that a risk management approach can  help to prioritize and focus the programs designed to combat terrorism.  Risk management, as applied in the homeland security context, can help  federal decision-makers determine where and how to invest limited  resources within and among the various modes of transportation.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also directed the department’s  Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection to use  risk management principles in coordinating the nation’s critical  infrastructure protection efforts. This includes integrating relevant  information, analysis, and vulnerability assessments to identify priorities  for protective and support measures by the department, other federal  agencies, state and local government agencies and authorities, the private  sector, and other entities. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 and  the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 further  define and establish critical infrastructure protection responsibilities for  DHS and those federal agencies given responsibility for particular industry  sectors, such as transportation. In June 2006, DHS issued the NIPP, which  named TSA as the primary federal agency responsible for coordinating  critical infrastructure protection efforts within the transportation sector.  In fulfilling its responsibilities under the NIPP, TSA must conduct and  facilitate risk assessments in order to identify, prioritize, and coordinate  the protection of critical transportation systems infrastructure, as well as  develop risk based priorities for the transportation sector.
To provide guidance to agency decision makers, we have created a risk  management framework, which is intended to be a starting point for  applying risk based principles. Our risk management framework entails a  continuous process of managing risk through a series of actions, including  setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, evaluating  alternatives, selecting initiatives to undertake, and implementing and  monitoring those initiatives. DHS’s NIPP describes a risk management  process that closely mirrors our risk management framework.
Setting strategic goals, objectives, and constraints is a key first step in  applying risk management principles and helps to ensure that management  decisions are focused on achieving a purpose. These decisions should take  place in the context of an agency’s strategic plan that includes goals and  objectives that are clear and concise. These goals and objectives should  identify resource issues and external factors to achieving the goals.  Further, the goals and objectives of an agency should link to a  department’s overall strategic plan. The ability to achieve strategic goals  depends, in part, on how well an agency manages risk. The agency’s  strategic plan should address risk related issues that are central to the  agency’s overall mission.
Risk assessment, an important element of a risk based approach, helps  decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that  countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate  the effects of the risks. Risk assessment is a qualitative and/or quantitative  determination of the likelihood of an adverse event occurring and the  severity, or impact, of its consequences. Risk assessment in a homeland  security application often involves assessing three key elements—threat,  vulnerability, and criticality or consequence. A threat assessment identifies  and evaluates potential threats on the basis of factors such as capabilities,  intentions, and past activities. A vulnerability assessment identifies  weaknesses that may be exploited by identified threats and suggests  options to address those weaknesses. A criticality or consequence  assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions in terms of  specific criteria, such as their importance to public safety and the  economy, as a basis for identifying which structures or processes are  relatively more important to protect from attack. Information from these  three assessments contributes to an overall risk assessment that  characterizes risks on a scale such as high, medium, or low and provides  input for evaluating alternatives and management prioritization of security  initiatives. The risk assessment element in the overall risk management  cycle may be the largest change from standard management steps and can  be important to informing the remaining steps of the cycle.
section_title: DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risk to Passenger Rail Systems, but Has Not Completed a Strategy for Securing the Transportation Sector
paragraphs: DHS has made progress in assessing the risks facing the U.S. passenger  rail system, but has not completed a plan based on that risk assessment for  securing the entire transportation sector and supporting plans for each  mode of transportation, including passenger rail. The DHS OGT developed  and implemented a risk assessment methodology to help passenger rail  operators better respond to terrorist attacks and prioritize security  measures. Passenger rail operators must have completed a risk  assessment to be eligible for financial assistance through the fiscal year  2007 OGT Transit Security Grant Program, which includes funding for  passenger rail. To receive grant funding, rail operators are also required to  have a security and emergency preparedness plan that identifies how the  operator intends to respond to security gaps identified by risk  assessments. As of February 2007, OGT had completed or planned to  conduct risk assessments of most passenger rail operators. According to  rail operators, OGT’s risk assessment process enabled them to prioritize  investments based on risk and allowed them to target and allocate  resources towards security measures that will have the greatest impact on  reducing risk across their rail systems.
Further, we reported in September 2005 that TSA had not completed a  comprehensive risk assessment of the entire passenger rail system. TSA  had begun to assess risks to the passenger rail system, including  completing an overall threat assessment for both mass transit and  passenger and freight rail modes. TSA also conducted criticality  assessments of nearly 700 passenger rail stations and had begun  conducting assessments for other passenger rail assets such as bridges  and tunnels. TSA reported that it planned to rely on asset criticality  rankings to prioritize which assets it would focus on in conducting  vulnerability assessments to determine which passenger rail assets are  vulnerable to attack. For assets that are deemed to be less critical, TSA  has developed a software tool that it has made available to passenger rail  and other transportation operators for them to use on a voluntary basis to  assess the vulnerability of their assets. We reported that, until all three  assessments of passenger rail systems—threat, criticality, and  vulnerability—have been completed, and until TSA determined how to use  the results of these assessments to analyze and characterize the level of  risk (high, medium, or low), it will be difficult to prioritize passenger rail  assets and guide investment decisions about protecting them.
More recently, in January 2007, TSA reported taking additional actions to  assess the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system. For example, TSA  reported that its surface transportation security inspectors are working  with rail transit agencies to update risk assessments that FTA and FRA  conducted after September 11, and is also conducting additional security  assessments of rail transit agencies. TSA also expected that the 50 largest  rail transit agencies would complete security self assessments in early  2007. According to TSA, the agency is using the results of these  assessments to set priorities and identify baseline security standards for  the passenger rail industry. For example, the agency recently reported that  it has identified underground and underwater rail infrastructure and high  density passenger rail stations as the critical assets most at risk. According  to TSA, the agency prioritized a list of the underwater rail tunnels deemed  to be at highest risk, and plans to conduct assessments of high-risk rail  tunnels.
We also reported in September 2005 that DHS was developing, but had not  yet completed, a framework intended to help TSA, OGT, and other federal  agencies work with their stakeholders to assess risk. This framework is  intended to help the private sector and state and local governments  develop a consistent approach to analyzing risk and vulnerability across  infrastructure types and across entire economic sectors, develop  consistent terminology, and foster consistent results. The framework is  also intended to enable a federal-level assessment of risk in general, and  comparisons among risks, for purposes of resource allocation and  response planning. DHS reported that this framework will provide  overarching guidance to sector-specific agencies on how various risk  assessment methodologies may be used to analyze, normalize, and  prioritize risk within and among sectors. We plan to assess DHS and DOT’s  progress in enhancing their risk assessment efforts during our follow-on  review of passenger rail security.
Finalizing a methodology for assessing risk to passenger rail and other  transportation modes and conducting risk assessments to determine the  areas of greatest need are key steps required in developing a strategy for  securing the overall transportation sector and each mode of transportation  individually. However, TSA has not completed the required TSSP and  supporting plans for securing each mode of transportation. According to  TSA, the TSSP and supporting modal plans are in draft, but must be  reviewed by DHS and the White House Homeland Security Council before  they can be finalized. Until TSA issues the TSSP and modal plans, the  agency lacks a clear strategy with goals and objectives for securing the  overall transportation sector, including passenger rail.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Passenger Rail Security, Improve Federal Coordination, and Develop Industry Partnerships
paragraphs: In addition to ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security  conducted by the FTA and FRA before and after September 11, 2001, TSA  issued security directives to passenger rail operators after the March 2004  terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid. However, federal and rail  industry stakeholders have questioned the extent that these directives  were based on industry best practices and expressed confusion about how  TSA would monitor compliance with the directives. Since the completion  of our work on passenger rail security, TSA has reported taking additional  actions to strengthen the security of the passenger rail system. For  example, TSA tested rail security technologies, developed training tools  for rail workers, and issued a proposed rule in December 2006 regarding  passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. TSA has also  taken steps to better coordinate with DOT regarding rail security roles and  responsibilities and has worked to develop more effective partnerships  with industry stakeholders. The memorandum of understanding between  DHS and DOT was updated to include specific agreements between TSA  and FTA in September 2005 and between TSA and FRA in September 2006  to delineate security-related roles and responsibilities, among other things,  for passenger rail and mass transit. In addition, TSA established an Office  of Transportation Sector Network Management and offices for each mode  of transportation to develop security policies and partnerships with  industry stakeholders, including passenger rail and other surface modes.
subsections: section_title: DOT Agencies Led Initial Efforts to Enhance Passenger Rail Security
paragraphs: Prior to the creation of TSA in November 2001, FTA and FRA, within DOT,  were primarily responsible for the security of passenger rail systems.  These agencies undertook a number of initiatives to enhance the security  of passenger rail systems after the September 11th attacks that are still in  place today. Specifically, FTA launched a transit security initiative in 2002  that included security readiness assessments, technical assistance, grants  for emergency response drills, and training. FTA also instituted the Transit  Watch campaign in 2003—a nationwide safety and security awareness  program designed to encourage the participation of transit passengers and  employees in maintaining a safe transit environment. The program  provides information and instructions to transit passengers and employees  so that they know what to do and whom to contact in the event of an  emergency in a transit setting. FTA plans to continue this initiative, in  partnership with TSA and OGT, and offer additional security awareness  materials that address unattended bags and emergency evacuation  procedures for transit agencies. In addition, in November 2003, FTA issued  its Top 20 Security Program Action Items for Transit Agencies, which  recommended measures for passenger rail operators to include into their  security programs to improve both security and emergency preparedness.
FTA has also used research and development funds to develop guidance  for security design strategies to reduce the vulnerability of transit systems  to acts of terrorism. Further, in November 2004, FTA provided rail  operators with security considerations for transportation infrastructure.  This guidance provides recommendations intended to help operators deter  and minimize attacks against their facilities, riders, and employees by  incorporating security features into the design of rail infrastructure.
FRA has also taken a number of actions to enhance passenger rail security  since September 11, 2001. For example, it has assisted commuter railroads  in developing security plans, reviewed Amtrak’s security plans, and helped  fund FTA security readiness assessments for commuter railroads. In the  wake of the Madrid terrorist bombings in March 2004, nearly 200 FRA  inspectors, in cooperation with TSA, conducted inspections of each of the  18 commuter railroads and Amtrak to determine what additional security  measures had been put into place to prevent a similar occurrence in the  United States. FRA also conducted research and development projects  related to passenger rail security. These projects included rail  infrastructure security and trespasser monitoring systems and passenger  screening and manifest projects, including explosives detection. Although  FTA and FRA now play a supporting role in transportation security  matters since the creation of TSA, they remain important partners in the  federal government’s efforts to strengthen rail security, given their role in  funding and regulating the safety of passenger rail systems. Moreover, as  TSA moves ahead with its passenger rail security initiatives, FTA and FRA  are continuing their passenger rail security efforts.
section_title: TSA Issued Rail Security Directives, but Faces Challenges Related to Compliance and Enforcement
paragraphs: In May 2004, TSA issued security directives to the passenger rail industry  to establish standard security measures for all passenger rail operators,  including Amtrak. However, as we previously reported, it was unclear  how TSA developed the requirements in the directives, how TSA planned  to monitor and ensure compliance, how rail operators were to implement  the measures, and which entities were responsible for their  implementation. According to TSA, the directives were based upon FTA  and American Public Transportation Association best practices for rail  security. Specifically, TSA stated that it consulted a list of the top 20  actions FTA identified that rail operators can take to strengthen security.
While some of the directives’ requirements correlate to information  contained in the FTA guidance, the source for many of the requirements is  unclear. Amtrak and FRA officials also raised concerns about some of the  directives. For example, FRA officials stated that current FRA safety  regulations requiring engineer compartment doors be kept unlocked to  facilitate emergency escapes conflicts with the TSA security directive  requirement that doors equipped with locking mechanisms be kept locked.  Other passenger rail operators we spoke with during our review stated  that TSA did not adequately consult with the rail industry prior to  developing and issuing these directives. In January 2007, TSA stated that it  recognizes the need to closely partner with the passenger rail industry to  develop security standards and directives.
As we reported in September 2005, rail operators are required to allow  TSA and DHS to perform inspections, evaluations, or tests based on  execution of the directives at any time or location. However, we reported  that some passenger rail operators have expressed confusion and concern  about the role of TSA’s inspectors and the potential that TSA inspections  could be duplicative of other federal and state rail inspections, such as  FRA inspections. Since we issued our report, TSA officials reported that  the agency has hired 100 surface transportation inspectors, whose stated  mission is to, among other duties, monitor and enforce compliance with  TSA’s rail security directives. Further, in September 2006, FRA’s and TSA’s  roles and responsibilities for compliance inspections were outlined in an  annex to the existing memorandum of understanding between DHS and  DOT. The annex provides that when an FRA inspector observes a security  issue during an inspection, this information will be provided to TSA.  Similarly, if a TSA inspector observes a safety issue, this information will  be provided to FRA. According to TSA, since the initial deployment of  surface inspectors, these inspectors have developed relationships with  security officials in passenger rail and transit systems, coordinated access  to operations centers, participated in emergency exercises, and provided  assistance in enhancing security. We will continue to assess TSA’s efforts  to enforce compliance with rail security requirements, such as those  included in the December 2006 proposed rule on rail security, during our  follow-on review of passenger rail security that has been requested by  your Committee Chairman.
section_title: TSA Has Reported Taking Additional Actions to Strengthen Passenger Rail Security, Improve Coordination with DOT, and Develop Industry Partnerships
paragraphs: In January 2007, TSA identified additional actions they had taken to  strengthen passenger rail security. We have not verified or evaluated these  actions. These actions include:  National explosive canine detection teams: Since late 2005, TSA  reported that it has trained and deployed 53 canine teams to 13 mass  transit systems to help detect explosives in the passenger rail system and  serve as a deterrent to potential terrorists.
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams: This program is  intended to provide teams of law enforcement, canines, and inspection  personnel to mass transit and passenger rail systems to deter and detect  potential terrorist actions. Since the program’s inception in December  2005, TSA reported conducting more than 25 exercises at mass transit and  passenger rail systems throughout the nation.
Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Security Information Sharing  Network: According to TSA, the agency initiated this program in August  2005 to develop information sharing and dissemination processes  regarding passenger rail and mass transit security across the federal  government, state and local governments, and rail operators.
National Transit Resource Center: TSA officials stated that they are  working with FTA and DHS OGT to develop this center, which will provide  transit agencies nationwide with pertinent information related to transit  security, including recent suspicious activities, promising security  practices, new security technologies, and other information.
National Security Awareness Training Program for Railroad  Employees: TSA officials stated that the agency has contracted to  develop and distribute computer based training for passenger rail, rail  transit, and freight rail employees. The training will include information on  identifying security threats, observing and reporting suspicious activities  and objects, mitigating security incidents, and other related information.  According to TSA, the training will be distributed to all passenger and  freight rail systems.
Transit Terrorist Tool and Tactics: This training course is funded  through the Transit Security Grant Program and teaches transit employees  how to prevent and respond to a chemical, biological, radiological,  nuclear, or explosive attack. According to TSA, this course was offered for  the first time during the fall of 2006.
National Tunnel Security Initiative: This DHS and DOT initiative aims  to identify and assess risks to underwater tunnels, prioritize security  funding to the most critical areas, and develop technologies to better  secure underwater tunnels. According to TSA, this initiative has identified  a list of 29 critical underwater rail transit tunnels.
DHS and TSA have also sought to enhance passenger rail security by  conducting research on technologies related to screening passengers and  checked baggage in the passenger rail environment. For example, TSA  conducted a Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot, a $1.5 million effort to test  the feasibility of using existing and emerging technologies to screen  passengers, carry-on items, checked baggage, cargo, and parcels for  explosives. According to TSA, the agency completed this pilot in July 2004.  TSA officials told us that based upon preliminary analyses, the screening  technologies and processes tested would be very difficult to implement on  heavily used passenger rail systems because these systems carry high  volumes of passengers and have multiple points of entry. However, TSA  officials added that the screening processes used in the pilot may be useful  on certain long-distance intercity train routes, which make fewer stops.  Further, TSA officials stated that screening could be used either randomly  or for all passengers during certain high-risk events or in areas where a  particular terrorist threat is known to exist. For example, screening  technology similar to that used in the pilot was used by TSA to screen  certain passengers and belongings in Boston and New York rail stations  during the 2004 Democratic and Republican national conventions.  According to TSA, the agency is also researching and developing other  passenger rail security technologies, including closed circuit television  systems that can detect suspicious behavior, mobile passenger screening  checkpoints to be used at rail stations, bomb resistant trash cans, and  explosive detection equipment for use in the rail environment. Finally,  TSA recently reported that the DHS Science and Technology (S&T)  Directorate conducted a rail security pilot, which tested the effectiveness  of explosive detection technologies in partnership with the Port Authority  of New York and New Jersey.
In December 2006, TSA issued a proposed rule regarding passenger and  freight rail security requirements. TSA’s proposed rule would require that  passenger and freight rail operators, certain facilities that ship or receive  hazardous materials by rail, and rail transit systems take the following  actions:    Designate a rail security coordinator to be available to TSA on a   24 hour, seven day a week basis to serve as the primary contact for the  receipt of intelligence and other security related information.  Immediately report incidents, potential threats, and security concerns  to TSA.
Allow TSA and DHS officials to enter and conduct inspections, test,  and perform other duties within their rail systems.
Provide TSA, upon request, with the location and shipping information  of rail cars that contain a specific category and quantity of hazardous  materials within one hour of receiving the request from TSA.    Provide for a secure chain of custody and control of rail cars  containing a specified quantity and type of hazardous material.
The period for public comment on the proposed rule is scheduled to close  in February 2007. TSA plans to review these comments and issue a final  rule in the future.
With multiple DHS and DOT stakeholders involved in securing the U.S.  passenger rail system and inherent relationships between security and  safety, the need to improve coordination between the two agencies has  been a consistent theme in our prior work in this area. In response to a  previous recommendation we made, DHS and DOT signed a  memorandum of understanding (MOU) to develop procedures by which  the two departments could improve their cooperation and coordination for  promoting the safe, secure, and efficient movement of people and goods  throughout the transportation system. The MOU defines broad areas of  responsibility for each department. For example, it states that DHS, in  consultation with DOT and affected stakeholders, will identify, prioritize,  and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure. The MOU between  DHS and DOT represents an overall framework for cooperation that is to  be supplemented by additional signed agreements, or annexes, between  the departments. These annexes are to delineate the specific security  related roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments for mass  transit, rail, research and development, and other matters. TSA signed  annexes to the MOU with FRA in September 2006 and FTA in September  2005 describing the roles and responsibilities of each agency regarding  passenger rail security. These annexes also describe how TSA and these  DOT agencies will coordinate security related efforts, avoid duplicating  efforts, and improve coordination and communication with industry  stakeholders.
In addition to the federal government, public and private rail operators  share responsibility for securing passenger rail systems. As such, the need  for TSA and other federal agencies to develop partnerships and coordinate  their efforts with these operators is critical. To better coordinate and  develop partnerships with industry stakeholders, TSA has established an  Office of Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM), which  includes offices for each mode of transportation, such as mass transit  (includes passenger rail), highways, including commercial vehicles, and  pipelines. According to TSA, the TSNM Mass Transit Division coordinates  federal security activities in the mass transit and passenger rail modes and  works to develop partnerships with passenger rail operators, federal  agencies, and industry associations. TSA also reports that it is working  with industry partners to develop baseline security standards for  passenger rail and other surface modes. We will continue to assess TSA’s  efforts in strengthening federal and private sector partnerships during our  follow-on work on passenger rail security.
section_title: U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Have Taken Similar Actions to Secure Rail Systems, and Opportunities for Additional Domestic Security Actions May Exist
paragraphs: U.S. passenger rail operators have taken numerous actions to secure their  rail systems since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United  States, and the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid. These actions included  both improvements to system operations and capital enhancements to a  system’s facilities, such as tracks, buildings, and train cars. All of the U.S.  passenger rail operators we contacted have implemented some types of  security measures—such as increased numbers and visibility of security  personnel and customer awareness programs—that were generally  consistent with those we observed in select countries in Europe and Asia.  We also identified three rail security practices—covert testing, random  screening of passengers and their baggage, and centralized research and  testing—utilized by foreign operators or their governments that were not  utilized, at the time of our review, by domestic rail operators or the U.S.  government.
subsections: section_title: U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Employ Similar Security Practices
paragraphs: Both U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have  implemented similar improvements to enhance the security of their  systems. A summary of these efforts follows.
Customer awareness: Customer awareness programs we observed used  signage and announcements to encourage riders to alert train staff if they  observed suspicious packages, persons, or behavior. Of the 32 domestic  rail operators we interviewed, 30 had implemented a customer awareness  program or made enhancements to an existing program. Foreign rail  operators we visited also attempted to enhance customer awareness. For  example, 11 of the 13 operators we interviewed had implemented a  customer awareness program.
Increased number and visibility of security personnel: Of the 32 U.S.  rail operators we interviewed, 23 had increased the number of security  personnel they utilized since September 11th, to provide security  throughout their system or had taken steps to increase the visibility of  their security personnel. Several U.S. and foreign rail operators we spoke  with had instituted policies such as requiring their security staff, in  brightly colored vests, to patrol trains or stations more frequently, so they  were more visible to customers and potential terrorists or criminals.  Operators believed that these policies made it easier for customers to  contact security personnel in the event of an emergency, or if they spotted  a suspicious item or person. At foreign sites we visited, 10 of the   13 operators had increased the number of their security officers  throughout their systems in recent years because of the perceived increase  in risk of a terrorist attack.
Increased use of canine teams: Of the 32 U.S. passenger rail operators  we contacted, 21 were using canines to patrol their facilities or trains.  Often, these units are used to detect the presence of explosives, and may  be called in when a suspicious package is detected. In foreign countries  we visited, passenger rail operators’ use of canines varied. In some Asian  countries, canines were not culturally accepted by the public and thus  were not used for rail security purposes. As in the United States, and in  contrast to Asia, most European passenger rail operators used canines for  explosive detection or as deterrents.
Employee training: All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we  interviewed had provided some type of security training to their staff,  either through in-house personnel or an external provider. In many cases,  this training consisted of ways to identify suspicious items and persons  and how to respond to events once they occur. For example, the London  Underground and the British Transport Police developed the “HOT”  method for its employees to use to identify suspicious items in the rail  system. In the HOT method, employees are trained to look for packages or  items that are Hidden, Obviously suspicious, and not Typical of the  environment.
Passenger and baggage screening practices: Some domestic and  foreign rail operators have trained employees to recognize suspicious  behavior as a means of screening passengers. Eight U.S. passenger rail  operators we contacted were utilizing some form of behavioral screening.  Abroad, we found that 4 of 13 operators we interviewed had implemented  forms of behavioral screening. All of the domestic and foreign rail  operators we contacted have ruled out an airport-style screening system  for daily use in heavy traffic, where each passenger and the passenger’s  baggage are screened by a magnetometer or X-ray machine, based on cost,  staffing, and customer convenience factors, among other reasons.
Upgrading technology: Many rail operators we interviewed had  embarked on programs designed to upgrade their existing security  technology. For example, we found that 29 of the 32 U.S. operators had  implemented a form of closed circuit television (CCTV) to monitor their  stations, yards, or trains. While these cameras cannot be monitored closely  at all times, because of the large number of staff that would be required,  many rail operators felt that the cameras acted as a deterrent, assisted  security personnel in determining how to respond to incidents that had  already occurred, and could be monitored if an operator had received  information that an incident may occur at a certain time or place in their  system. Abroad, all 13 of the foreign rail operators we visited had CCTV  systems in place. In addition, 18 of the 32 U.S. rail operators we  interviewed had installed new emergency phones or enhanced the  visibility of the intercom systems they already had. As in the United States,  a few foreign operators had implemented chemical or biological detection  devices at these rail stations, but their use was not widespread. Two of the  13 foreign operators we interviewed had implemented these sensors, and  both were doing so on an experimental basis. In addition, police officers  from the British Transport Police—responsible for policing the rail system  in the United Kingdom—were equipped with pagers to detect chemical,  biological, or radiological elements in the air, allowing them to respond  quickly in case of a terrorist attack using one of these methods.
Access control: Tightening access control procedures at key facilities or  rights-of-way is another way many rail operators have attempted to  enhance security. A majority of domestic and selected foreign passenger  rail operators had invested in enhanced systems to control unauthorized  access at employee facilities and stations. Specifically, 23 of the 32 U.S.  operators had installed a form of access control at key facilities and  stations. All 13 foreign operators had implemented some form of access  control to their critical facilities or rights-of-way.
Rail system design and configuration: In an effort to reduce  vulnerabilities to terrorist attack and increase security, passenger rail  operators in the United States and abroad have been, or are now beginning  to, incorporate security features into the design of new and existing rail  infrastructure, primarily rail stations. For example, of the 32 domestic rail  operators we contacted, 22 of them had removed their conventional trash  bins entirely, or replaced them with transparent or bomb-resistant trash  bins, as TSA instructed in its May 2004 security directives. Foreign rail  operators had also taken steps to remove traditional trash bins from their  systems. Of the 13 operators we visited, 8 had either removed their trash  bins entirely or replaced them with blast-resistant cans or transparent  receptacles.
Many foreign rail operators are also incorporating aspects of security into  the design of their rail infrastructure. Of the 13 operators we visited,   11 had attempted to design new facilities with security in mind and had  retrofitted older facilities to incorporate security-related modifications.  For example, one foreign operator we visited was retrofitting its train cars  with windows that passengers could open in the event of a chemical  attack. In addition, the London Underground incorporates security into the  design of all its new stations as well as when existing stations are  modified. We observed several security features in the design of  Underground stations, such as using vending machines that have no holes  that someone could use to hide a bomb, and sloped tops to reduce the  likelihood that a bomb can be placed on top of the machine. In addition,  stations are designed to provide staff with clear lines of sight to all areas of  the station, such as underneath benches or ticket machines, and station  designers try to eliminate or restrict access to any recessed areas where a  bomb could be hidden.
Figure 1 shows a diagram of several security measures that we observed in  passenger rail stations both in the United States and abroad.
K-9 patrol unit(s)
section_title: Amtrak Faces Challenges Specific to Intercity Passenger Rail in Securing Its System
paragraphs: In our past work, we found that Amtrak faces security challenges unique  to intercity passenger rail systems. First, Amtrak operates over thousands  of miles, often far from large population centers. This makes its route  system more difficult to patrol and monitor than one contained in a  particular metropolitan region, and it causes delays in responding to  incidents when they occur in remote areas. Also, outside the Northeast  Corridor, Amtrak operates almost exclusively on tracks and in stations  owned by freight rail companies. This means that Amtrak often cannot  make security improvements to others’ rights-of-way or station facilities  and that it is reliant on the staff of other organizations to patrol their  facilities and respond to incidents that may occur. Furthermore, with over  500 stations, only half of which are staffed, screening even a small portion  of the passengers and baggage boarding Amtrak trains is difficult. Finally,  Amtrak’s financial condition has never been strong—Amtrak has been on  the edge of bankruptcy several times.
We reported in September 2005 that Amtrak had taken some actions to  enhance security throughout its intercity passenger rail system. For  example, Amtrak initiated a passenger awareness campaign, began  enforcing restrictions on carry-on luggage that limit passengers to two  carry-on bags, not exceeding 50 pounds; began requiring passengers to  show identification after boarding trains; increased the number of canine  units patrolling its system looking for explosives or narcotics; and  assigned some of its police to ride trains in the Northeast Corridor. Also,  Amtrak instituted a policy of randomly inspecting checked baggage on its  trains. Amtrak was also making improvements to the emergency exits in  certain tunnels to make evacuating trains in the tunnels easier in the event  of a crash or terrorist attack. More recently, in January 2007, FRA reported  that a systematic review of Amtrak’s security policies and programs had  been completed. According to FRA, the agency is currently working with  Amtrak to implement the recommendations of this review.
section_title: Three Foreign Rail Security Practices Were Not Used in the United States
paragraphs: While many of the security practices we observed in foreign rail systems  are similar to those U.S. passenger rail operators are implementing, we  identified three foreign practices that were not currently in use among the  U.S. passenger rail operators we contacted as of September 2005, nor were  they performed by the U.S. government. These practices are as follows.
Covert testing: Two of the 13 foreign rail systems we visited utilized  covert testing to keep employees alert about their security responsibilities.  Covert testing involves security staff staging unannounced events to test  the response of railroad staff to incidents such as suspicious packages or  setting off alarms. In one European system, this covert testing involves  security staff placing suspicious items throughout their system to see how  long it takes operating staff to respond to the item. Similarly, one Asian  rail operator’s security staff will break security seals on fire extinguishers  and open alarmed emergency doors randomly to see how long it takes  staff to respond. TSA conducts covert testing of passenger and baggage  screening in aviation, but has not conducted such testing in the rail  environment.
Random screening: Of the 13 foreign operators we interviewed, 2 have  some form of random screening of passengers and their baggage in place.  Prior to the July 2005 London bombings, no passenger rail operators in the  United States were practicing random passengers or baggage screening.  However, during the Democratic National Convention in 2004, the  Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority instituted a system of  random screening of passengers.
National government clearinghouse on technologies and best  practices: According to passenger rail operators in five countries we  visited, their national governments had centralized the process for  performing research and development of passenger rail security  technologies and maintained a clearinghouse of technologies and security  best practices for passenger rail operators. We reported in September 2005  that no U.S. federal agency had compiled or disseminated information on  research and development and other best practices for U.S. rail operators.
Implementing covert testing, random screening, or a government- sponsored clearinghouse for technologies and best practices in the U.S.  could pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges because of the  differences between the U.S. and these foreign nations. Many foreign  nations have dealt with terrorist attacks on their public transportation  systems for decades, compared with the United States, where rail has not  been specifically targeted by terrorists. According to foreign rail operators,  these experiences have resulted in greater acceptance of certain security  practices, such as random searches, which the U.S. public may view as a  violation of their civil liberties or which may discourage them from using  public transportation. The impact of security measures on passengers is an  important consideration for domestic rail operators, since most  passengers could choose another means of transportation, such as a  personal automobile. As such, security measures that limit accessibility,  cause delays, increase fares, or otherwise cause inconvenience could push  people away from rail and into their cars. In contrast, the citizens of the  European and Asian countries we visited are more dependent on public  transportation than most U.S. residents and therefore may be more willing  to accept intrusive security measures. Nevertheless, in order to identify  innovative security measures that could help further mitigate terrorism-  risks to rail assets—especially as part of a broader risk management  approach discussed earlier—it is important to consider the feasibility and  costs and benefits of implementing the three rail security practices we  identified in foreign countries. Officials from DHS, DOT, passenger rail  industry associations, and rail systems we interviewed told us that  operators would benefit from such an evaluation. Since our report on  passenger rail security was issued, TSA has reported taking steps to  coordinate with foreign passenger rail operators and governments to  identify security best practices. For example, TSA reported working with  British rail security officials to identify best practices for detecting and  handling suspicious packages in rail systems. In addition, in January 2007,  a TSA official stated that the agency was developing a clearinghouse of  transportation security technologies, but a completion date for this effort  was not currently available.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In conclusion, Madam Chairwoman, the 2005 London rail bombings and  the 2006 rail attacks in Mumbai, India highlight the inherent vulnerability  of passenger rail and other surface transportation systems to terrorist  attack. Moreover, securing rail and other surface transportation systems is  a daunting task, requiring that the federal government develop clear  strategies that are based on an assessment of the risks to the security of  the systems, including goals and objectives, for strengthening the security  of these systems. Since our September 2005 report, DHS components have  taken steps to assess the risks to the passenger rail system, such as  working with rail operators to update prior risk assessments and  facilitating rail operator security self assessments. According to TSA, the  agency plans to use these assessment results to set priorities for securing  rail assets deemed most at risk, such as underground and underwater rail  infrastructure and high density passenger rail stations. A comprehensive  assessment of the risks facing the transportation sector and each mode,  including passenger rail, will be a key component of the TSSP and  supporting plans for each mode of transportation. Until TSA completes  these plans, however, the agency lacks a strategy with goals and objectives  for securing the overall transportation sector and each mode of  transportation, including passenger rail. TSA has also taken steps improve  coordination with federal, state, and local governments, and has reported  taking steps to strengthen partnerships with passenger rail industry  stakeholders to enhance the security of the passenger rail system. As TSA  moves forward to complete the TSSP and supporting plans for each mode  of transportation, it will be important that the agency articulate its strategy  for securing rail and other modes to those government agencies and  industry stakeholders that share the responsibility for securing these  systems. We will continue to assess DHS and DOT’s efforts to secure the  U.S. passenger rail system during follow-on work to be initiated later this  year.
Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to  answer any questions that you or other members of the Committee may  have at this time.
section_title: Contact Information
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.  Berrick at (202) 512- 3404. Individuals making key contributions to this  testimony include John Hansen, Assistant Director, Chris Currie, and   Tom Lombardi.
section_title: Related GAO Products Released Since September 11, 2001
paragraphs: Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to  Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-225T. Washington, D.C.:  January 18, 2007.
Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and  Risk Can Help Guide Security Efforts. GAO-06-557T. Washington, D.C.:  March 29, 2006.
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to  Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-06-181T. Washington, D.C.:  October 20, 2005.
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to  Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-05-851. Washington, D.C.:  September 9 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize  Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.
Rail Security: Some Actions Taken to Enhance Passenger and Freight  Rail Security, but Significant Challenges Remain. GAO-04-598T.  Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2004.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security  Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address  Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail  Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed. GAO-03-435. Washington, D.C.:  April 30, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-term  Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address  Security Challenges. GAO-03-263. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002.
Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems. GAO-02-1075T.  Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2002.
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