Defense Acquisitions: DOD Must Prioritize Its Weapon System Acquisitions and Balance Them with Available Resources
Published: 2009-03-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2000, the Department of Defense (DOD) has significantly increased the number of major defense acquisition programs and its overall investment in them. However, acquisition outcomes have not improved. Over the next 5 years, DOD expects to invest $357 billion on the development and procurement of major defense acquisition programs and billions more on their operation and maintenance. Last year, we reported that the total acquisition cost of DOD's portfolio of major defense programs under development or in production has grown by $295 billion (in fiscal year 2008 dollars). In most cases, the programs we assessed failed to deliver capabilities when promised--often forcing warfighters to spend additional funds on maintaining legacy systems. Continued cost growth results in less funding being available for other DOD priorities and programs, while continued failure to deliver weapon systems on time delays providing critical capabilities to the warfighter. This testimony describes the systemic problems that have contributed to poor cost and schedule outcomes in DOD's acquisition of major weapon systems; recent actions DOD has taken to address these problems; and steps that Congress and DOD need to take to improve the future performance of DOD's major weapon programs. The testimony is drawn from GAO's body of work on DOD's acquisition, requirements, and funding processes.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since 1990, GAO has consistently designated DOD's management of its major weapon acquisitions as a high-risk area. A broad consensus exists that weapon system problems are serious, but efforts at reform have had limited effect. For several years, GAO's work has highlighted a number of strategic- and program-level causes for cost, schedule, and performance problems in DOD's weapon system programs. At the strategic level, DOD's processes for identifying warfighter needs, allocating resources, and developing and procuring weapon systems, which together define the department's overall weapon system investment strategy, are fragmented. As a result, DOD fails to balance the competing needs of the services with those of the joint warfighter and commits to more programs than resources can support. At the program level, DOD allows programs to begin development without a full understanding of requirements and the resources needed to execute them. The lack of early systems engineering, acceptance of unreliable cost estimates based on overly optimistic assumptions, failure to commit full funding, and the addition of new requirements well into the acquisition cycle all contribute to poor outcomes. Moreover, DOD officials are rarely held accountable for poor decisions or poor program outcomes. Recent changes to the DOD acquisition system could begin to improve weapon program outcomes. However, DOD must take additional actions to reinforce the initiatives in practice including (1) making better decisions about which programs should be pursued or not pursued given existing and expected funding; (2) developing an analytical approach to better prioritize capability needs; (3) requiring new programs to have manageable development cycles; (4) requiring programs to establish knowledge-based cost and schedule estimates; and (5) requiring contractors to perform detailed systems engineering analysis before proceeding to system development. Recently proposed acquisition reform legislation addresses some of these areas. However, while legislation and policy revisions may lead to improvements, they will not be effective without changes to the overall acquisition environment. DOD has tough decisions to make about its weapon systems portfolio, and stakeholders, including the DOD Comptroller, the military services, industry, and Congress, have to play a constructive role in the process of bringing balance to it.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) fiscal year 2010 budget and its acquisition of major weapon  systems. While the programmatic details of the President’s Budget have  not been released, its recognition of the need for reforming DOD weapon  system acquisition is a positive first step. This area has been on GAO’s  high-risk list since 1990, however now there is momentum from the  administration, including the Secretary of Defense, and key congressional  committees to address this issue. While the combat effectiveness of DOD  weapon systems is unparalleled, major weapon programs continue to cost  more, take longer, and deliver fewer quantities and capabilities than  originally planned. Last year we reported that the cumulative cost growth  in DOD’s portfolio of 95 major defense acquisition programs was  $295 billion and the average delay in delivering promised capabilities to  the warfighter was 21 months. Clearly, some problems are to be expected  in developing weapon systems given the technical risks and complexities  involved. However, all too often, we have found that cost and schedule  problems are rooted in poor planning, execution, and oversight.
DOD is entrusted with more taxpayer dollars than any other federal  agency, representing the largest part of the discretionary spending in the  U.S. budget. Congress provided DOD with about $512 billion in annual  appropriations for fiscal year 2009 and the administration is requesting  almost $534 billion for 2010. Effective management of this substantial  investment is critical as competition for funding has increased  dramatically within the department and across the government. DOD faces  a number of fiscal pressures, such as the ongoing military campaigns in  Afghanistan and Iraq, rising personnel costs, the rebuilding and  modernization of the force, and cost overruns in its major defense  acquisition programs. At a time when the federal budget is strained by  spending needs for a growing number of national priorities, it is important  that DOD get the best value for every dollar it invests in weapon system  programs. Every dollar wasted during the development and acquisition of  weapon systems is money not available for other priorities within DOD  and elsewhere in the government.
Today, I will discuss (1) the systemic problems that have contributed to  poor cost and schedule outcomes in DOD’s acquisition of major weapon  systems, (2) recent actions DOD has taken to address these problems, and  (3) steps that Congress and DOD need to take to improve the future  performance of DOD’s major weapon programs. The statement draws  from our extensive body of work on DOD’s acquisition of weapon systems.
A list of our key products is provided at the end of this testimony. This  work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: For almost two decades, we have reported on pervasive and long-standing  weaknesses in DOD’s business operations. In January 2009, we released  our high-risk series update for the 111th Congress. This series emphasizes  federal programs and operations that are at high risk because of  vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement and has also  evolved to draw attention to areas associated with broad-based  transformation needed to achieve greater efficiency, effectiveness, and  sustainability. Solutions to high-risk problems offer the potential to save  billions of dollars, dramatically improve service to the public, strengthen  confidence and trust in the performance and accountability of the U.S.  government, and ensure the ability of government to deliver on its  promises. Since our high-risk program began, the government has taken  these problems seriously and has made progress toward correcting them.  Of the 30 high-risk areas identified by GAO across the government, DOD  bears sole responsibility for 8 high-risk areas, including weapon systems  acquisition, and shares responsibility for 7 other high-risk areas (see  table 1).
In addition to monitoring these high-risk areas, we also monitor actions  that DOD has taken in response to our findings, conclusions, and  recommendations. During fiscal years 2001 through 2007, we issued  637 reports to DOD that included a total of 2,726 recommendations. In  December 2008, we reported to this committee on the implementation  status of these recommendations and related financial accomplishments.  As of October 2008, 1,682 or 62 percent of the recommendations we made  were reported as were closed and implemented, 758 or 28 percent were  open, and 286 or 10 percent were closed, but not implemented for a variety  of reasons. Consistent with past experience that shows it takes agencies  some time to implement recommendations, we found most  recommendations from fiscal year 2001 have been implemented while  most recommendations from fiscal year 2007 remain open. During this  same period, we recorded over $89 billion in financial benefits associated  with our work involving DOD. Besides financial accomplishments, our  recommendations also produce many nonfinancial benefits and  accomplishments, such as DOD actions taken to improve operations or  management oversight. Both types of benefits result from our efforts to  provide information to the Congress that helped to (1) change laws and  regulations, (2) improve services to the public, and (3) promote sound  agency and governmentwide management.
For fiscal year 2007, 74 of our 313 recommendations to DOD were related  to improving weapon system acquisition programs. In addition, for fiscal  year 2007, we reported $2.6 billion in financial benefits related to weapon  system acquisition programs. The financial benefits claimed result from  the actions taken by Congress or DOD that are based on findings,  conclusions, or recommendations contained in our products. Such actions  include congressional reductions to the President’s annual budget  requests, cost reductions due to greater efficiency, or cost reductions due  to program cancellations or program delays. For example, the fiscal year  2007 budget request for the Army’s Future Combat System was reduced by  $254 million based in part on our testimony about the program’s  development risks. Over the next 5 years, DOD plans to spend more than  $357 billion on the development and procurement of major defense  acquisition programs. We will continue to seek to improve the efficiency  and effectiveness of DOD’s weapon system investments through our work  on individual programs and crosscutting areas that affect acquisition  outcomes.
section_title: Failure to Match Requirements with Technology and Other Resources Underlie Poor Weapon Program Outcomes and Undermine Accountability
paragraphs: Over the past several years our work has highlighted a number of  underlying systemic causes for cost growth and schedule delays at both  the strategic and program levels. At the strategic level, DOD’s processes  for identifying warfighter needs, allocating resources, and developing and  procuring weapon systems—which together define DOD’s overall weapon  system investment strategy—are fragmented. As a result, DOD fails to  effectively address joint warfighting needs and commits to more programs  than it has resources for, thus creating unhealthy competition for funding.  At the program level, a military service typically establishes and DOD  approves a business case containing requirements that are not fully  understood and cost and schedule estimates that are based on overly  optimistic assumptions rather than on sufficient knowledge. Once a  program begins, it too often moves forward with inadequate technology,  design, testing, and manufacturing knowledge, making it impossible to  successfully execute the program within established cost, schedule, and  performance targets. Furthermore, DOD officials are rarely held  accountable for poor decisions or poor program outcomes.
subsections: section_title: DOD Lacks an Integrated Approach to Balance Weapon System Investments
paragraphs: At the strategic level, DOD largely continues to define warfighting needs  and make investment decisions on a service-by-service and individual  platform basis, using fragmented decision-making processes. This  approach makes it difficult for the department to achieve a balanced mix  of weapon systems that are affordable and feasible and that provide the  best military value to the joint warfighter. In contrast, we have found that  successful commercial enterprises use an integrated portfolio  management approach to focus early investment decisions on products  collectively at the enterprise level and ensure that there is a sound basis to  justify the commitment of resources. By following a disciplined,  integrated process—during which the relative pros and cons of competing  product proposals are assessed based on strategic objectives, customer  needs, and available resources, and where tough decisions about which  investments to pursue and not to pursue are made—companies minimize  duplication between business units, move away from organizational  stovepipes, and effectively support each new development program. To be  effective, integrated portfolio management must have strong, committed  leadership; empowered portfolio managers; and accountability at all levels  of the organization.
DOD determines its capability needs through the Joint Capabilities and  Integration Development System (JCIDS). While JCIDS provides a  framework for reviewing and validating needs, it does not adequately  prioritize those needs from a joint, departmentwide perspective and lacks  the agility to meet changing warfighter demands. We recently reviewed  JCIDS documentation related to new capability proposals and found that  almost 70 percent were sponsored by the military services with little  involvement from the joint community, including the combatant  commands, which are responsible for planning and carrying out military  operations. By continuing to rely on capability needs defined primarily by  the services, DOD may be losing opportunities for improving joint  warfighting capabilities and reducing the duplication of capabilities in  some areas. The JCIDS process has also proven to be lengthy and  cumbersome—taking on average up to 10 months to validate a need—thus  undermining the department’s efforts to effectively respond to the needs  of the warfighter, especially those needs that are near term. Furthermore,  the vast majority of capability proposals that enter the JCIDS process are  validated or approved without accounting for the resources or  technologies that will be needed to acquire the desired capabilities.  Ultimately, the process produces more demand for new weapon system  programs than available resources can support.
The funding of proposed programs takes place through a separate process,  the department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution  (PPBE) system, which is not fully synchronized with JCIDS. While JCIDS  is a continuous, need-driven process that unfolds in response to capability  proposals as they are submitted by sponsors, PPBE is a calendar-driven  process comprising phases occurring over a 2-year cycle, which can lead  to resource decisions for proposed programs that may occur several years  later. We recently reviewed the effect of the PPBE process on major  defense acquisition programs and found that the process does not produce  an accurate picture of the department’s resource needs for weapon system  programs. The cost of many of the programs we reviewed exceeded the  funding levels planned for and reflected in the Future Years Defense  Program (FYDP)—the department’s long-term investment strategy (see  fig. 1). Rather than limit the number and size of programs or adjust  requirements, DOD opts to push the real costs of programs to the future.  With too many programs under way for the available resources and high  cost growth occurring in many programs, the department must make up  for funding shortfalls by shifting funds from one program to pay for  another, reducing system capabilities, cutting procurement quantities, or  in rare cases terminating programs. Such actions not only create instability  in DOD’s weapon system portfolio, they further obscure the true future  costs of current commitments, making it difficult to make informed  investment decisions.
section_title: Initiating Programs with Inadequate Knowledge of Requirements and Resources Often Results in Poor Outcomes
paragraphs: At the program level, the key cause of poor outcomes is the approval of  programs with business cases that contain inadequate knowledge about  requirements and the resources—funding, time, technologies, and  people—needed to execute them. Our work in best practices has found  that an executable business case for a program demonstrated evidence  that (1) the identified needs are real and necessary and that they can best  be met with the chosen concept and (2) the chosen concept can be  developed and produced within existing resources. Over the past several  years, we have found no evidence of the widespread adoption of such an  approach for major acquisition programs in the department. Our annual  assessments of major weapon systems have consistently found that the  vast majority of programs began system development without mature  technologies and moved into system demonstration without design  stability.
The chief reason for these problems is the encouragement within the  acquisition environment of overly ambitious and lengthy product  developments that embody too many technical unknowns and not enough  knowledge about the performance and production risks they entail. The  knowledge gaps are largely the result of a lack of early and disciplined  systems engineering analysis of a weapon system’s requirements prior to  beginning system development. Systems engineering translates customer  needs into specific product requirements for which requisite  technological, software, engineering, and production capabilities can be  identified through requirements analysis, design, and testing. Early  systems engineering provides the knowledge a product developer needs to  identify and resolve performance and resource gaps before product  development begins by either reducing requirements, deferring them to  the future, or increasing the estimated cost for the weapon system’s  development. Because the government often does not perform the proper  up-front requirements analysis to determine whether the program will  meet its needs, significant contract cost increases can and do occur as the  scope of the requirements changes or becomes better understood by the  government and contractor. Not only does DOD not conduct disciplined  systems engineering prior to the beginning of system development, it has  allowed new requirements to be added well into the acquisition cycle. We  have reported on the negative effect that poor systems engineering  practices have had on several programs, such as the Global Hawk  Unmanned Aircraft System, F-22A, Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, and  Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile.
With high levels of uncertainty about requirements, technologies, and  design, program cost estimates and related funding needs are often  understated, effectively setting programs up for cost and schedule growth.  We recently assessed the service and independent cost estimates for 20  major weapon system programs and found that while the independent  estimates were somewhat higher, both estimates were too low in most  cases. In some of the programs we reviewed, cost estimates have been off  by billions of dollars. For example, the Army’s initial cost estimate for the  development of the Future Combat System (FCS) was about $20 billion,  while DOD’s Cost Analysis and Improvement Group’s estimate was $27  billion. The department began the program using the $20 billion estimate,  but development costs for the FCS are now estimated to be $28 billion and  the program is still dealing with significant technical risk. Estimates this  far off the mark do not provide the necessary foundation for sufficient  funding commitments and realistic long-term planning.
The programs we reviewed frequently lacked the knowledge needed to  develop realistic cost estimates. For example, program Cost Analysis  Requirements Description documents—used to build the program cost  estimate—often lack sufficient detail about planned program content for  developing sound cost estimates. Without this knowledge, cost estimators  must rely heavily on parametric analysis and assumptions about system  requirements, technologies, design maturity, and the time and funding  needed. A cost estimate is then usually presented to decision makers as a  single, or point, estimate that is expected to represent the most likely cost  of the program but provides no information about the range of risk and  uncertainty or level of confidence associated with the estimate.
section_title: Lack of Accountability for Making Weapon System Decisions Hinders Achieving Successful Outcomes
paragraphs: DOD’s requirements, resource allocation, and acquisition processes are led  by different organizations, thus making it difficult to hold any one person  or organization accountable for saying no to a proposed program or for  ensuring that the department’s portfolio of programs is balanced. DOD’s  2006 Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment study observed that  these processes are not connected organizationally at any level below the  Deputy Secretary of Defense and concluded that this weak structure  induces instability and inhibits accountability. Frequent turnover in  leadership positions in the department exacerbates the problem. The  average tenure, for example, of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics over the past 22 years has been only  about 20 months.
When DOD’s strategic processes fail to balance needs with resources and  allow unsound, unexecutable programs to move forward, program  managers cannot be held accountable when the programs they are handed  already have a low probability of success. Program managers are also not  empowered to make go or no-go decisions, have little control over  funding, cannot veto new requirements, and have little authority over  staffing. At the same time, program managers frequently change during a  program’s development, making it difficult to hold them accountable for  the business cases that they are entrusted to manage and deliver.
section_title: Recent DOD Policy Changes Could Improve Future Performance of Weapon System Programs
paragraphs: DOD understands many of the problems that affect acquisition programs  and has recently taken steps to remedy them. It has revised its acquisition  policy and introduced several initiatives based in part on direction from  Congress and recommendations from GAO that could provide a  foundation for establishing sound, knowledge-based business cases for  individual acquisition programs. However, to improve outcomes, DOD  must ensure that its policy changes are consistently implemented and  reflected in decisions on individual programs—not only new program  starts but also ongoing programs. In the past, inconsistent implementation  of existing policy has hindered DOD’s efforts to execute acquisition  programs effectively. Moreover, while policy improvements are necessary,  they may be insufficient unless the broader strategic issues associated  with the department’s fragmented approach to managing its portfolio of  weapon system investments are also addressed.
In December 2008, DOD revised its policy governing major defense  acquisition programs in ways intended to provide key department leaders  with the knowledge needed to make informed decisions before a program  starts and to maintain disciplined development once it begins. The revised  policy recommends the completion of key systems engineering activities  before the start of development, includes a requirement for early  prototyping, and establishes review boards to evaluate the effect of  potential requirements changes on ongoing programs. The policy also  establishes early reviews for programs going through the pre–systems  acquisition phase. In the past, DOD’s acquisition policy may have  encouraged programs to rush into systems development without sufficient  knowledge, in part because no formal milestone reviews were required  before system development. If implemented, these policy changes could  help programs replace risk with knowledge, thereby increasing the  chances of developing weapon systems within cost and schedule targets  while meeting user needs.
As part of its strategy for enhancing the roles of program managers in  major weapon system acquisitions, DOD has established a policy that  requires formal agreements among program managers, their acquisition  executives, and the user community setting forth common program goals.  According to DOD, these agreements are intended to be binding and to  detail the progress the program is expected to make during the year and  the resources the program will be provided to reach these goals. DOD also  requires program managers to sign tenure agreements so that their tenure  will correspond to the next major milestone review closest to 4 years.  DOD acknowledges that any actions taken to improve accountability must  be based on a foundation whereby program managers can launch and  manage programs toward successful performance, rather than focusing on  maintaining support and funding for individual programs. DOD acquisition  leaders have also stated that any improvements to program managers’  performance depend on the department’s ability to promote requirements  and resource stability over weapon system investments.
Over the past few years, DOD has also been testing portfolio management  approaches in selected capability areas—command and control, net- centric operations, battlespace awareness, and logistics—to facilitate  more strategic choices for resource allocation across programs. The  department recently formalized the concept of capability portfolio  management, issuing a directive in 2008 that established policy and  assigned responsibilities for portfolio management. The directive  established nine joint capability-area portfolios, each to be managed by  civilian and military coleads. While the portfolios have no independent  decision-making authority over requirements determination and resource  allocation, according to some DOD officials, they provided key input and  recommendations in this year’s budget process. However, without  portfolios in which managers have authority and control over resources,  the department is at risk of continuing to develop and acquire systems in a  stovepiped manner and of not knowing if its systems are being developed  within available resources.
section_title: Concluding Observations on What Remains to Be Done
paragraphs: A broad consensus exists that weapon system problems are serious and  that their resolution is overdue. With the federal budget under increasing  strain from the nation’s economic crisis and long-term fiscal challenges  looming, the time for change is now. Achieving successful and lasting  improvements in weapon program outcomes will require changes to the  overall acquisition environment and the incentives that drive it.  Acquisition problems are likely to persist until DOD’s approach to  managing its weapon system portfolio (1) prioritizes needs with available  resources, thus eliminating unhealthy competition for funding and the  incentives for making programs look affordable when they are not; (2)  ensures that programs that are started can be executed by matching  requirements with resources; and (3) balances the near-term needs of the  joint warfighter with the long-term need to modernize the force.  Establishing a single point of accountability for managing DOD’s weapon  system portfolio could help the department make these changes. Congress  can also support change though its own decisions about whether to  authorize and appropriate funds for individual weapon programs.
From an acquisition policy perspective, DOD is off to a good start with its  recent policy revisions. However, DOD could do more in this regard too by  requiring new programs to have manageable development cycles, requiring  programs to establish knowledge-based cost and schedule estimates, and  requiring contractors to perform detailed systems engineering analysis  before proceeding to system development. Limiting the length of  development cycles would make it easier to more accurately estimate  costs, predict the future funding needs, effectively allocate resources, and  hold decision makers accountable. DOD’s conventional acquisition  process often requires as many as 10 or 15 years to get from program start  to production as programs strive to provide revolutionary capability.  Constraining cycle times to 5 or 6 years would force programs to adopt  more realistic requirements and lend itself to fully funding programs to  completion, thereby increasing stability and the likelihood that capability  can be delivered to the warfighter within established time frames and  available resources.
Recently proposed acquisition reform legislation addresses some of these  areas. Provisions increasing the emphasis on systems engineering,  requiring early preliminary design reviews, and strengthening independent  cost estimates and technology readiness assessments should make the  critical front end of the acquisition process more disciplined. Establishing  a termination criterion for critical cost breaches could help prevent the  acceptance of unrealistic cost estimates at program initiation. Having  greater combatant command involvement in determining requirements  and greater consultation between the requirements, budget, and  acquisition processes could help improve the department’s efforts to  balance its portfolio of weapon system programs. However, while  legislation and policy revisions may lead to improvements, they will not be  effective without changes to the overall acquisition environment. The  department has tough decisions to make about its weapon systems and  portfolio, and stakeholders, including the DOD Comptroller, military  services, industry, and Congress, have to play a constructive role in the  process toward change. It will also require strong leadership and  accountability within the department.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  answer any questions you may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact Michael J.  Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this  statement include Ann Borseth, Dayna Foster, Matt Lea, Susan Neill, John  Oppenheim, Ken Patton, Sharon Pickup, Ron Schwenn, Charlie Shivers,  Bruce Thomas, and Alyssa Weir.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: DOD Must Balance Its Needs with Available  Resources and Follow an Incremental Approach to Acquiring Weapon  Systems. GAO-09-413T. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Perspectives on Potential Changes to DOD’s  Acquisition Management Framework. GAO-09-295R. Washington, D.C.:  February 27, 2009.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Overcome Long-standing  Challenges with Weapon Systems Acquisition and Service Contract  Management. GAO-09-362T. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 2009.
Status of Recommendations to the Department of Defense (Fiscal Years  2001-2007). GAO-09-201R. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Fundamental Changes Are Needed to Improve  Weapon Program Outcomes. GAO-08-1159T. Washington, D.C.: September  25, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Requirements Determination Process Has  Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities. GAO-08-1060.  Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could  Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes. GAO-08-619.  Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Better Weapon Program Outcomes Require  Discipline, Accountability, and Fundamental Changes in the  Acquisition Environment. GAO-08-782T. Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-08-467SP. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2008.
Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed  to Improve DOD’s Acquisition Environment and Weapon System  Quality. GAO-08-294. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2008.
Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon  System Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes.  GAO-07-388. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience  Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD’s Revised Policy. GAO-06-368.  Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2006.
Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers  Needed to Improve Outcomes. GAO-06-110. Washington, D.C.: November 1,  2005.
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