Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve
Published: 2005-07-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The events of September 11, 2001, have resulted in a greater focus on the role of first responders in carrying out the nation's emergency management efforts. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the primary federal entity responsible for ensuring that first responders, such as police, fire, emergency medical, and public health personnel, have the capabilities needed to provide a coordinated, comprehensive response to any large-scale crisis. In the last 4 years DHS has awarded $11.3 billion to state and local governments to enhance capabilities, primarily to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism. Presidential directives instruct DHS to develop a national all-hazards approach--preparing all sectors of society for any emergency event including terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters. This report addresses the following questions: (1) What actions has DHS taken to provide policies and strategies that promote the development of the all-hazards emergency management capabilities of first responders? (2) How do first responders' emergency management capabilities for terrorist attacks differ to capabilities needed for natural or accidental disasters? (3) What emphasis has DHS placed on funding awarded to state and local first responders to enhance all-hazards emergency management capabilities?
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DHS has undertaken three major policy initiatives aimed at creating a national, all-hazards coordinated and comprehensive response to large-scale incidents: (1) a national response plan (what needs to be done); (2) a command and management process (how it needs to be done); and (3) a national preparedness goal (how well it should be done). GAO reviewed these products and determined that each supports a national, all-hazards approach. DHS has developed plans to implement three related programs to enhance first responder capabilities: (1) to assess and report on the status of first responders' capabilities; (2) to prioritize national resource investments; and (3) to establish a national training and exercise program. Implementing these programs will likely pose a number of challenges for DHS including integrating internal and external assessment approaches, assessing state and local risks in a national context to effectively prioritize investments, and establishing common training requirements across responder disciplines. Because terrorist attacks share some common characteristics with natural and accidental disasters, 30 of DHS' 36 capabilities first responders need to support preparedness and response efforts are similar. GAO's analysis found that the baseline capabilities required for terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters are more similar for response and recovery and differ most for prevention. Because terrorist attacks are planned, intentional acts, all of DHS' prevention capabilities focus on terrorist attacks, while almost all other baseline capabilities focus on all hazards. Legislation and presidential directives call for DHS to place special emphasis on preparedness for terrorism and DHS has directed that the majority of first responder grant funding be used to enhance first responder capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. Nonetheless, grants funds can have all-hazards applications.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been concern among  senior federal officials that another terrorist attack on U.S. soil could  occur. According to testimony by the Director of the Central Intelligence  Agency, it may be only a matter of time before a terrorist group tries to use  chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons in the United States.  Concerns like these have prompted increased federal attention on national  emergency preparedness—that is, the nation’s ability to prevent, protect  against, respond to, and recover from large-scale emergency events.  Through legislation and Presidential directives, the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) has become the primary federal entity  responsible for ensuring that first responders, such as police, fire,  emergency medical, and public health personnel, have the capabilities  needed to provide a coordinated, comprehensive response to any large- scale crisis and to mount a swift and effective recovery effort. In the last 4  years, DHS agencies have awarded $11.3 billion to state and local  governments to enhance their national emergency preparedness  capabilities, primarily for terrorist attacks.
Long before the events of September 11, 2001, terrorism preparedness was  included in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s planning  approach to prepare for all types of emergency events, commonly referred  to as an all-hazards approach. Since the attacks, the intensified federal  attention and federal spending for national preparedness has largely  emphasized preparedness for terrorist attacks. However, the nation’s  recent experience with large-scale natural disasters, for example, wildfires  in California in 2003, hurricanes in Florida in 2004, and floods in New  Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York in 2005 provides a justification for  taking an all-hazards approach to national preparedness that considers the  risks of natural and accidental disasters, as well as terrorism.
Consistent with this approach, two Homeland Security Presidential  Directives (HSPD) issued in 2003 require DHS to take an all-hazards focus  in implementing the directives. HSPD-5, issued in February 2003, required  DHS to establish a single, comprehensive approach to and plans for the  management of emergency events whether the result of terrorist attacks or  large-scale natural or accidental disasters. Appendix I contains the text of  HSPD-5. HSPD-8, issued in December 2003, established policies to  strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond  to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks and large-scale natural  or accidental disasters. Among other things, it required DHS to coordinate  the development of a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal that  would establish measurable readiness priorities and targets that  appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist  attacks and large-scale natural or accidental disasters with the resources  required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them. The directive also  designated the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal federal  official for coordinating the implementation of all-hazards preparedness in  the United States. Appendix II contains the text of HSPD-8.
Because of the nation’s increased focus on preparedness for terrorist  attacks as a result of the events of September 11, 2001, you requested that  we examine the extent to which DHS has considered all types of  emergency events, including both terrorist attacks and natural or  accidental disasters, in developing and implementing its approach to  enhance and sustain first responder capabilities. This report explores the  following questions:  1.  What actions has DHS taken to provide policies and strategies that  promote the development of all-hazards emergency management  capabilities of first responders?  2.  How do first responders’ emergency management capabilities for  terrorist attacks differ from capabilities needed for natural or  accidental disasters?  3.  What emphasis has DHS placed on funding awarded to state and local  first responders to enhance all-hazards emergency management  capabilities?
The scope of our work was focused on the extent to which the actions  taken by DHS to enhance first responder skills and abilities encompassed  all hazards, whether the result of nature, accident, or terrorist action. To  address these objectives, we analyzed DHS’s efforts to implement HSPD-5  and HSPD-8, including the process used to develop national preparedness  policies and the plans, goals, and standards resulting from the process, as  well as grant programs to enhance the preparedness of first responders.  We interviewed DHS officials from the Emergency Preparedness and  Response Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Office  for Domestic Preparedness, and the Office of State and Local Government  Coordination and Preparedness to obtain their views regarding the  process and its products, along with information on DHS assistance  programs. To obtain the views of first responders, we interviewed officials  from professional organizations that represent first responders on a  national level and reviewed relevant reports and studies on homeland  security and domestic preparedness. Finally, we conducted structured  interviews with 69 first responder departments and state level emergency  management officials in ten states, selected by non-probability sampling to  include metropolitan areas that crossed state boundaries, tribal  governments, states that face a variety of hazards, sparsely and densely  populated states, and states with townships and city government  structures, among other criteria. These first responder departments  responded to the questions in our structure interview guide and provided  additional observations during the course of our interviews. The results of  these interviews cannot be generalized to first responders not  participating in the interviews. An expanded discussion of our scope and  methodology is presented in appendix III. We conducted our work from  May 2004 through May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Prior to September 11, 2001, the federal government’s role in supporting  emergency preparedness and management was limited primarily to  providing resources before large-scale disasters like floods, hurricanes,  and earthquakes, and response and recovery assistance after such  disasters. Historically, FEMA developed mitigation programs designed to  minimize risk to property or individuals from natural or manmade hazards.  These mitigation programs included the post-disaster Hazard Mitigation  Grant Program and the pre-disaster Project Impact program. In addition,  the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as  amended, established the process for states to request a presidential  disaster declaration in order to respond and recover from a large-scale  emergency event. However, in response to the events of September 11,  2001, the federal government has provided billions of dollars to state and  local governments for planning, equipment, and training to enhance the  capabilities of first responders to respond to terrorist attacks and, to a  lesser extent, natural and accidental disasters. These extensive resources  reflect a growing federal role in promoting emergency preparedness.
subsections: section_title: First Responders are Responsible for Carrying out Emergency Management Efforts
paragraphs: The nation’s first responders have the lead responsibilities for carrying out  emergency management efforts. The role of first responders is to prevent,  protect against, respond to, and assist in the recovery from emergency  events. Traditionally, first responders have been trained and equipped, in  the event of an emergency—natural or accidental disasters and terrorist  attacks—to arrive on the scene and take action immediately. In the first  hours of an event, first responders from various disciplines, which could  include police, fire, emergency medical personnel and public works, must  attempt to enter the scene, set up a command center, establish a safe and  secure perimeter around the site in order to save lives and protect  property, evacuate those within or near the site, tend to the injured and  dead and transport them to care centers or morgues, restrict and redirect  traffic and pedestrians, reroute and restore public utilities, remove debris,  and begin the process of recovery.
Since September 11, 2001, the roles and responsibilities for first  responders to prevent emergency events and protect the public and  property have expanded. In July 2002, prior to the creation of DHS, the  President developed a National Strategy for Homeland Security which  recommended steps that federal, state and local governments, private  companies and organizations, and individual Americans should take to  improve homeland security. The National Strategy identified the need to  improve tactical counterterrorist capabilities of the various federal, state,  and local response assets that can intercede and prevent terrorists from  carrying out attacks. These assets include state and local law enforcement  and emergency response personnel which the National Strategy considers  crucial to preemption of terrorists, no matter if they are part of the local  SWAT team or the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team.
First responder organizations across the county are to various degrees,  trained, staffed, and equipped to prepare for and respond to various  events. These organizations may differ in governmental role, size,  structure, and capabilities. For example, activities of local law  enforcement departments in smaller communities may be limited to day- to-day law enforcement while, in larger communities, departments may  include specialized teams such as bomb squads or special weapons and  tactics units. Likewise, local fire departments may be volunteer operations  with basic firefighting capabilities or, in larger communities, may include  teams specializing in hazardous materials response, search and rescue, or  structural collapse. The local public health system can consist of public or  private emergency medical services that provide immediate victim care  and transport victims to the area’s public or private hospitals to receive  patient care, along with the state and local medical staff that monitor and  detect disease outbreaks. Supporting the response and recovery efforts of  first responders are other state and local officials who provide  preparedness planning, administration, and the communications systems  needed to command and control activities on the scene.
Natural and accidental disasters have provided all levels of government in  many locations with experience in preparing for different types of  emergency events. However, terrorist attacks potentially impose a  relatively new level of fiscal, economic, and social disruption within this  nation’s boundaries. Today’s threat environment includes not only the  traditional spectrum of large-scale manmade and natural hazards— wilderness and urban fires, floods, oil spills, hazardous materials releases,  transportation accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, pandemics,  and accidental or natural disruptions to the nation’s energy and  information technology infrastructure—but also the deadly and  devastating arsenal of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high- yield explosive weapons as exemplified by the attacks on New York City  and Oklahoma City. These attacks have resulted in greater public and  governmental focus on the role of first responders and their capabilities to  respond to large-scale emergency events.
section_title: DHS Is Responsible for Leading National Emergency Preparedness Efforts
paragraphs: Two DHS organizational units have the primary responsibilities for leading  national emergency preparedness efforts—the Emergency Preparedness  and Response Directorate and the Office of State and Local Government  Coordination and Preparedness. The Homeland Security Act assigned  responsibility to the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate,  which includes the Federal Emergency Management Agency, for building a  comprehensive national incident management system that defines the  roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments, and the  various first responder disciplines at each level during an emergency  event. The Act also charged the directorate with consolidating existing  federal government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated  national response plan, as called for by HSPD-5. DHS assigned  responsibility for developing a national preparedness goal to its Office of  State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, which  includes the Office for Domestic Preparedness. The Office of State and  Local Government Coordination and Preparedness also awards and  administers the majority of DHS’s first responder preparedness federal  grant programs. In large part these grants are directed to the governor of  each state, who in turn makes these funds available to local jurisdictions  within the state.
section_title: DHS Has All-Hazards Policy Initiatives and National Strategies Under Development and Faces Challenges in Enhancing First Responders’ Emergency Management Capabilities
paragraphs: To comply with HSPD-5 and HSPD-8, DHS has established a national plan  for emergency event response, a national management system to be used  during emergency events, and an interim national preparedness goal. DHS  also plans to develop national strategies for assessing and reporting the  status of first responders’ capabilities, prioritizing federal, state, and local  resource investments to enhance these capabilities, and standardizing  training and exercise programs for first responders to practice and  improve emergency response capabilities. The presidential directives on  which these efforts are based correspond to the major initiatives first  developed in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. Our analysis of  the documents resulting from, and plans for, these efforts showed that  DHS has taken an all-hazards approach to promote first responders’  emergency management capabilities. Figure 2 illustrates the timeline of  DHS’s efforts to develop these national initiatives and identifies the  anticipated results.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Developed All- Hazards Policies to Guide Response to Emergency Events
paragraphs: To comply with the initiatives of the National Strategy and the timeframes  and requirements established in HSPD-5, DHS implemented an integrated  all-hazards approach to emergency event management by establishing the  National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response  Plan (NRP). NIMS is a policy document that defines roles and  responsibilities of federal, state and local first responders during  emergency events. The intent of this system described in the document is  to establish a core set of concepts, principles, terminology and  organizational processes to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative  emergency event management at all levels. These concepts, principles, and  processes are designed to improve the ability of different jurisdictions and  first-responder disciplines (e.g., fire and police) to work together in  various areas—command, resource management, training, and  communications. The NRP is designed to integrate federal government  domestic prevention, protection, response, and recovery plans into a  single operational plan for all hazards and all emergency response  disciplines. Using the framework provided by NIMS, the NRP describes  operational procedures for federal support to state, local, and tribal  emergency managers and defines situations where the federal authorities  are to provide support and situations where the federal authorities are to  assume control. The NRP organizes capabilities and staffing and  equipment resources in terms of functions that are most likely to be  needed during emergency events, describes common processes and  specific administrative requirements (e.g., public affairs, financial  management, public health, etc.), and outlines core procedures. The NRP  also augments NIMS by defining roles and responsibilities for specific  types of emergencies.
To develop NIMS and NRP, DHS assembled a variety of stakeholders from  federal, state, and local levels such as national professional associations,  and state and local responders representing the full range of response  disciplines. During the development of NIMS, stakeholder groups reacted  to initial drafts developed by DHS. The final draft of NIMS incorporated, in  part, key elements of a widely-used, interdisciplinary system of  command—first used in conjunction with wildfires in California during the  1960s—into a standardized, national system that would apply across all  emergency response disciplines and levels of government. Similarly, the  NRP was based on a consensus among stakeholders of best practices to  apply in integrating prevention, protection, response, and recovery plans  into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan.
HSPD-5 requires all federal departments and agencies to adopt and use  NIMS in their individual preparedness efforts, as well as in support of all  actions taken to assist state and local governments. Further, the directive  requires federal departments and agencies to make adoption of NIMS by  states a condition, to the extent permitted by law, of federal preparedness  assistance beginning in fiscal year 2005. For fiscal year 2005 DHS required  states and other jurisdictions that receive direct funding to incorporate  NIMS into existing training programs and exercises, emergency operations  plans, and intrastate mutual aid agreements; to institutionalize the use of  the Incident Command System; and will require states and other  jurisdictions to certify as part of their fiscal year 2006 grant applications  that they have met the fiscal year 2005 NIMS requirements. However, final  requirements for fiscal year 2006 self certification have not been  formulated, according to DHS officials. DHS encouraged, but did not  require, local governments to implement these activities to the maximum  extent possible.
We assessed NIMS and NRP to determine the extent to which the policy  documents discuss and emphasize different types of emergency events.  Our analysis showed that both documents had been developed in a  manner that reflects an all-hazards approach. For example, both NIMS and  NRP use the generic term “incident management” rather than specifying  the cause(s) of events, such as a terrorist act, accident, or natural disaster.  Moreover, NIMS and NRP are designed to promote interdisciplinary efforts  that consider the involvement of multiple jurisdictions and multiple  responders. The common processes and specific administrative  requirements listed in NRP also are described in terms that are not specific  to any type of threat or emergency. For example, according to NRP, the  plan is to be implemented during “incidents of national significance.”
First responders we visited affirmed that NIMS and the NRP do take an all  hazards approach—that is, they apply to natural and accidental disasters,  as well as terrorist attacks. For example, 12 first responder officials we  interviewed told us that they have long used the incident command system  upon which NIMS was based for a variety of emergency events. Similarly,  one homeland security director in a large urban city said NIMS had only  had a moderate impact on their operations because the city has already  been using an incident command system in its all-hazards approach.
section_title: DHS Is Developing an All- Hazards National Preparedness Goal and Related Products Using Capabilities-Based Planning
paragraphs: To comply with the requirements established in HSPD-8, DHS is  developing a National Preparedness Goal. While NIMS defines “how” to  manage a large-scale emergency event and NRP defines “what” needs to be  done, the National Preparedness Goal is intended to generally define “how  well” it needs to be done. DHS issued an interim version of the goal in  March 2005. The interim version will remain in effect until superseded by  the Final National Preparedness Goal, which DHS intends to issue in  October 2005. According to officials from DHS’s Office of State and Local  Government Coordination and Preparedness, the final version is expected  to remain largely the same as the interim; however, the office is working  with its state and local government stakeholders to define appropriate  jurisdictional tiers, and plans to add this information to the final version of  the goal. According to the Interim National Preparedness Goal, the  primary purpose of establishing tiers is to account for reasonable  differences in target levels of capability (or system-specific elements of  capability) among groups of jurisdictions based on differences in risk  factors such as total population, population density, and critical  infrastructure. Our review of the interim goal indicates that it reflects an  all-hazards focus by consistently citing both natural and accidental  disasters and terrorist attacks as emergencies and the extent to which the  nation’s first responders must develop their capabilities to address all  hazards.
To develop the goal and determine the tasks and capabilities needed by  first responders on a nation-wide basis, DHS is using an approach known  as capabilities-based planning. The purpose of this approach is to provide  capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards, in an  environment of uncertainty and within an economic framework that  necessitates prioritization for allocation of finite resources, according to  DHS. As figure 3 shows, DHS’s application of the capabilities-based  planning process model to the development of the goal and related  products involves three stages: (1) defining target levels of capability;   (2) achieving target levels of capability; and (3) assessing preparedness.
DHS began the first stage of the capabilities-based planning process  identifying concerns using 15 National Planning Scenarios that were  developed by the Homeland Security Council, as illustrated in table 1.
The 15 scenarios include 12 terrorist attacks (incorporating chemical,  biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive, and cyber attacks) and   3 natural disasters—an earthquake, a hurricane and a pandemic influenza  outbreak. According to DHS, the Homeland Security Council excluded  scenarios for which they considered well-developed and tested response  capabilities to be already available and scenarios where the set of  response capabilities would be a subset of one of the 15 scenarios chosen.  Examples of excluded scenarios are industrial and transportation  accidents and frequently occurring natural disasters, such as floods, the  nation’s most frequent natural disaster. According to DHS officials, there  was less concern about planning for natural disasters because there is a  tremendous amount of experience, actuarial data, geographical and  seasonal patterns, and other information that is not available in the  context of terrorism. Officials told us that the department chose to focus  the identification of its concerns on event consequences rather than event  probabilities, given the high degree of uncertainty related to preparing for  terrorist events.
According to DHS’s National Preparedness Guidance, the planning  scenarios are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale,  catastrophic emergency events for which the nation needs to be prepared.  Some state and local officials and experts in the field of emergency  preparedness said that the scenarios did not appear to reflect an  assessment of risk or a relative ranking related to risk. As a result, they  questioned whether the scenarios were appropriate inputs for  preparedness planning, particularly in terms of their plausibility and the  number of scenarios (12 of 15) that are based on terrorist attacks.  Officials in DHS’s Office of State and Local Government Coordination and  Preparedness said that the scenarios were not ranked according to risk,  noting that this was unnecessary given the purposes for which the  scenarios were developed. They stated that the 15 planning scenarios are  not meant to be proscriptive, predictive, or exhaustive nor were they  intended to be ranked according to risk. According to DHS’s National  Preparedness Guidance, the objective of developing the scenarios was to  provide a minimum number of credible scenarios that covered the range of  response requirements. DHS’s executive summaries of the planning  scenarios state that the scenarios were not ranked according to risk and  probability because they were developed to test the full range of response  capabilities and resources for federal, state, and local governments as well  as the private sector, each of which could have different risks and  rankings.
As it moved to the step in the process to develop a sense of preparedness  needs and potential capabilities, DHS created a list of tasks that would be  required to manage each of the 15 National Planning Scenarios. Then, in  consultation with federal, state, and local emergency response  stakeholders, it consolidated the list to eliminate redundancies and create  a Universal Task List of over 1,600 discrete tasks. This list was further  refined to identify critical tasks that would need to be performed at  various levels of government to prevent, protect against, respond to, and  recover from large-scale emergency events. Next, DHS identified target  capabilities that encompassed these critical tasks. The relationship  between the scenarios, tasks, and capabilities is shown in figure 4.
According to DHS, the Universal Task List is intended to include all  unique, potential tasks at all levels of government that are needed to  prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all large-scale  emergency events, although every task would not necessarily be  applicable to each of the 15 planning scenarios and no single jurisdiction  or agency would be expected to perform every task. From this universe of  potential tasks, DHS worked with stakeholders to identify a subset of  about 300 critical tasks that must be performed during a large-scale event  to reduce loss of life or serious injuries, mitigate significant property  damage, or are essential to the success of a homeland security mission.
The final step of the first stage of DHS’s planning process is to decide  goals, requirements, and metrics. To complete this step, DHS, working  with its stakeholders, developed a Target Capabilities List that identifies  36 capabilities needed to perform the critical tasks for the events  illustrated by the 15 scenarios. An example of a desired outcome for the  target capability of mass prophylaxis—prevention of or protective  treatment for disease—is to effectively reach an entire affected population  in time to prevent loss of life and injury. The relationship between the  Universal Task List, critical tasks, and target capabilities for the pandemic  flu scenario is illustrated in figure 5.
The Target Capabilities List, according the National Preparedness Goal,  provides guidance on the specific capabilities and levels of capability that  federal, state, local, and tribal first responders will be expected to develop  and maintain. DHS has defined these capabilities generically and  expressed them in terms of desired operational outcomes and essential  characteristics, rather than dictating specific, quantifiable responsibilities  to the various jurisdictions. In the final version of the National  Preparedness Goal, DHS plans to organize classes of jurisdictions that  share similar characteristics such as total population, population density,  and critical infrastructure into tiers to account for reasonable differences  in capability levels among groups of jurisdictions. According to the Interim  National Preparedness Goal, the purpose of defining these groups of  jurisdictions is to be able to appropriately apportion responsibility for  development and maintenance of capabilities among levels of government  and across these jurisdictional tiers, because both the risk and the  resource base vary considerably among jurisdictions across the United  States.
According to observations from 12 of the first responder departments we  interviewed, radiological and biological attacks are among potential  emergency events they may face which they are least prepared for and  most concerned about their capabilities. However, because these types of  attacks may require that a greater number of capabilities be exercised  simultaneously or that a greater number or wider variety of first  responders be employed to provide specific capabilities, these capabilities  would necessarily be drawn from regional, federal, or private resources. In  this regard the National Response Plan defines the roles and  responsibilities of federal, state, local, private-sector, and  nongovernmental organizations and citizens involved in support of  domestic incident management, noting particularly that when state  resources and capabilities are overwhelmed, state governors are  responsible for requesting federal assistance when it becomes clear that  state or tribal capabilities will be insufficient or have been exceeded or  exhausted.
As we have previously reported, state and local resources alone will likely  be insufficient to meet the terrorist threat, given the specialized resources  that are necessary to address some types of terrorist attacks, the range of  governmental services that could be affected, and the vital role played by  private entities in preparing for and mitigating risks. Because no single  jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform every task,  possession of a target capability could involve enhancing and maintaining  local resources, ensuring access to regional and federal resources, or some  combination of the two. DHS encourages planning for regional  cooperation and notes in the NRP that mutual aid agreements provide  mechanisms to mobilize and employ resources from neighboring  jurisdictions to support the incident command. Facilitating effective  regional coordination may present some challenges. For example, our  work in the National Capital Region found that no regional coordination  methods had been developed for planning for the use of 15 of the   16 funding sources we reviewed. While the National Capital Region has  experience with working together for regional emergency preparedness  and response, officials from the National Capital Region told us that they  had not worked together to develop plans and coordinate expenditures for  the use of federal funds.
DHS also issued National Preparedness Guidance in April 2005 that  provides information, instructions and examples on how to prepare for  implementation of the goal at the federal, state and local levels of  government. The guidance identifies the most urgent needs for enhancing  national first responder preparedness capabilities in terms of 7 national  priorities: (1) implementation of NRP and NIMS; (2) implementation of the  interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan; (3) expanding regional  cooperation; (4) strengthening capabilities in interoperable  communications; (5) strengthening capabilities in information sharing and  collaboration; (6) strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass  prophylaxis; (7) strengthening capabilities in detection and response for  chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons. Our  review also indicated that the National Preparedness Guidance largely  reflects an all-hazards approach and was developed in a manner that  recognizes a range of possible threats and origins. Six of the 7 national  priorities established and described by the guidance are generally  applicable to all hazards. In addition to implementation of the 7 national  priorities, the guidance identifies other all-hazards planning requirements  for federal, state, and local governments.
section_title: DHS’s Implementation Plans May Address the Need for a Risk-Based, Strategic National Approach to Enhancing First Responders’ All- Hazards Capabilities, But It Faces Implementation Challenges
paragraphs: We reported in our 21st century challenges work that federal investments  in national preparedness have not been guided by a clear, risk-based  strategic plan. The objective of the second stage of DHS’s capabilities  based planning process is to develop such a plan by creating a decision  framework that will allow first responders at all levels of government to  assess needs, update preparedness strategies, and allocate resources to  address capability gaps and make the greatest improvements in  preparedness. To support its planning efforts in the second stage of  implementing HSPD-8, DHS has developed program implementation plans  for (1) a national assessment and reporting of capability status, (2) an  approach for balancing national investments in capabilities, and  (3) programs for national training, national exercises, and collection and  dissemination of lessons learned and best practices.
To develop these program implementation plans, DHS established task  teams composed of various stakeholders from within DHS as well as  representatives from state and local first responders and representatives  from their professional associations such as the International Association  of Fire Chiefs and Chiefs of Police, and the International Association of  Emergency Managers. These stakeholder groups, called Integrated  Concept Teams, developed the three program implementation requirement  plans. According to DHS, implementation will be led by designated DHS  program management offices along with stakeholders comprised of  federal, state, local, tribal officials and private sector advisors; operational  tasks will be performed by contractors. DHS plans to issue contracts  during fiscal year 2005, to develop systems to meet the goals of the  implementation plans, and complete implementation of the three national  systems by September 30, 2008.
subsections: section_title: National Preparedness Assessment and Reporting Program Implementation Plan
paragraphs: According to DHS’s Assessment and Reporting Implementation Plan, DHS  intends to implement an assessment and reporting system to collect  preparedness data to inform decision-makers at all levels on the  capabilities of the federal government, states, local jurisdictions, and the  private sector. According to the plan, DHS intends to collect data from all  governmental recipients of direct funding, using states to collect data from  local jurisdictions and using federal regulatory agencies and other  appropriate sources to collect private-sector data. According to DHS,  aggregating this data at all levels will provide information needed to  allocate resources, execute training and exercises, and develop an annual  status report on the nation’s preparedness. The purpose of the assessment  and reporting system is to provide information about the baseline status of  national preparedness and to serve as the third stage of DHS’s capability- based planning approach to ensure that state and local first responder  capabilities fully support the National Preparedness Goal. The proposed  system is to include the following components:    Capability assessment: Using target capabilities, first responders would  be able to assess their preparedness to identify gaps, excesses, or  deficiencies in their existing capabilities or capabilities they will be  expected to access through mutual aid. In addition, this information is to  measure the readiness of federal civil response assets and the use of  federal assistance at the state and local level and provide a means of  assessing how federal assistance programs are supporting the National  Preparedness Goal.
Compliance assessment: By establishing a mechanism for monitoring  compliance with mandated guidance such as compliance with NIMS, and  conformity with guidance on the preparation of homeland security  strategies and grants, the compliance assessment is intended to serve as a  check and balance on the self-reported information in the capability  assessment.
Performance assessment: By using a standardized reporting that  documents performance in specific tasks relevant to the target  capabilities, first responders will be expected to demonstrate  accomplishments in exercises and real-world operations. Part of the  performance assessment is to include corrective action plans to highlight  and address areas in need of improvement.
As DHS implements the assessment and reporting system, it may  encounter several challenges, which were identified by the assessment and  reporting concept team in developing the implementation plan. These  challenges include:    Determining how to aggregate data from federal state, local, and tribal  governments; private sector owners/operators; non-profit agencies; and  citizen volunteers;   Determining assessment timeframes (i.e., snapshot, annual, real time), and  when and how often they should take place; Integrating self-assessment and external assessment approaches; and    Resolving security classification limitations on information sharing among  participants.
section_title: National Balanced Investment Implementation Plan
paragraphs: According to DHS’s National Balanced Investment Implementation Plan,  DHS intends to establish an approach to support improved investment  decision-making, using the capability, compliance, and performance  information provided by the assessment and reporting system. The  purpose of the balanced investment program, according to the plan, will  be to direct federal preparedness assistance to the highest priority  capability gaps, balanced by significant risk factors. The proposed system  is to include the following components:    All-Hazards Needs Assessment: Using information on preparedness gaps  and redundancies identified by the assessment and reporting system, DHS  intends to use state-developed needs assessments to identify and quantify  planning, equipment, training and exercises, and other organizational  needs. These needs assessments are to include input from the first  responder community, the private sector, the research and academic  community, citizen groups, and tribal entities. DHS plans to direct the  states to prioritize the needs they identify in the needs assessments based  on various factors, including threats and vulnerabilities, tiers, universal  tasks, probability, impact, risk, and cost/benefit analysis. Then, DHS  expects to use the needs assessments to develop guidance, specifically  tailored to state and local funding recipients, to guide the allocation of  federal funding and resources in order to fill capability gaps.
All-Hazards Preparedness Strategies: Needs assessments will provide a  consistent basis for developing preparedness strategies for federal,  regional, state, urban area, local and tribal first responders. DHS plans to  develop and provide guidance and requirements so that strategies at all  levels will align with the National Preparedness Goal and facilitate  cooperation, mutual aid, and standardization across jurisdictions.
All-Hazards Decision Framework: DHS intends to design a framework for  allocating resources to implement federal, regional, state, urban area, local  and tribal first responders’ strategies. Using a structured process to  estimate the relative impact of alternative investments and identify the  optimal mix of investments for funding, DHS plans to assess, prioritize and  develop optimized ranking of potential investments based on factors such  as population concentrations, critical infrastructure and other significant  risk factors.
In the implementation of its balanced investment program DHS intends to  devise a process to prioritize investments in planning, personnel,  equipment, training, and exercises to close capability gaps identified by  the national assessment and reporting system. A key challenge will be  establishing a standardized approach for measuring and reporting the risks  faced by diverse states and localities in order to effectively prioritize and  allocate federal resources. Given that the 15 national planning scenarios  DHS used to identify capability gaps were selected without regard to  relative risk (i.e. probability of occurrence), it is not yet clear how DHS  will prioritize investments in capability gaps on a national level. We have  consistently advocated a risk management approach as a basis for  ensuring that specific programs and related expenditures are prioritized  and properly focused. Although risk management is an evolving practice,  we have encouraged the application of certain key elements of a risk  management approach, including a risk assessment that defines risks  based on the likelihood that they will occur and the consequences of their  occurrence. Another key element of the risk management approach we  have advocated is the identification of risk mitigation alternatives and the  ability to select among those alternatives based on risk, cost, and  effectiveness. The intent of DHS’s planned all-hazards decision framework  to prioritize and optimize investments based on population, critical  infrastructure, and other significant risk factors appears to offer the  opportunity for such an approach to managing risk. However, as DHS does  not expect to fully implement its balanced investment program before  October 2008, it continues to operate its federal preparedness assistance  programs without a solid risk-based decision framework, and we were  unable to evaluate whether and the extent to which such a framework will  incorporate these key elements of risk management. For example, it is not  clear how DHS will use the data collected in the all-hazards needs  assessment to consistently and comprehensively prioritize resource  allocations based on national threats and vulnerabilities or how the  department will define acceptable risks as it sets priorities.
section_title: National Training and Exercise and Lessons Learned Plan
paragraphs: According to DHS’s National Training and Exercises and Lessons Learned  Implementation Plan, DHS intends to implement a system to develop and  maintain state and local responders’ all-hazards capabilities. The goal of  this system is to provide integrated national programs for training,  exercise, and lessons-learned that will reorient existing initiatives at all  government levels in order to develop, achieve, and sustain the  capabilities that are required to achieve the National Preparedness Goal.  The proposed system is to include the following components:    National training program: Based on training needs defined by the  Universal Task List, Target Capabilities List, and the National Incident  Management System, the program is intended to provide criteria for  accreditation of training courses, a national directory of accredited  training providers, and a National Minimum Qualification Standards  Guide.
National exercise program: This program is intended to reorient the  existing National Exercise Program to incorporate the capabilities-based  planning process and provide standardized guidance and methodologies to  schedule, design, develop, execute, and evaluate exercises at all levels of  government. This program is also intended to provide requirements for the  number and type of exercises that communities of varying sizes should  conduct to meet the National Preparedness Goal.
National lessons-learned program: This program is intended to create a  centralized source for sharing lessons learned information that will be  reviewed and validated at a national level using a standardized reporting  format and process.
DHS faces challenges to coordinate this effort across the many state and  local jurisdictions and among the variety of first responder disciplines.  According to this integrated concept team’s meeting minutes, its efforts  were essential in order to develop a management system to ensure there  are standard processes across all agencies. Among other things, DHS faces  challenges related to:    Disparate training requirements across disciplines,    Different processes to manage training and exercises, and    Different terms and definitions among disciplines related to emergency  response functions.
section_title: Most Preparedness Capabilities Apply to All Emergency Events, but Prevention of Terrorist Attacks Requires Unique Capabilities
paragraphs: Terrorist attacks share many common characteristics with natural and  accidental disasters. Our analysis of DHS’s Target Capabilities List and our  discussions with first responders and other emergency management  stakeholders revealed that the capabilities required to address terrorist  attacks and to address natural and accidental disasters are most similar  for protection, response, and recovery, and differ most for prevention.  More specifically, 30 of the 36 target capabilities yielded by DHS’s  capabilities based planning process apply across all types of emergency  events. It is possible that terrorist attacks could be prevented through  actionable intelligence (i.e., information that can lead to stopping or  apprehending terrorists), but there is no known way to prevent natural  disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and tornadoes. Natural or  accidental disasters differ from terrorist attacks in that they are  unintentional and unplanned rather than the result of deliberate, planned  action. It is the deliberate, planned nature of terrorist attacks that makes  preventive efforts for such attacks principally the responsibility of  intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
subsections: section_title: Terrorist Attacks Share Common Characteristics with Natural and Accidental Disasters, and Most Preparedness Capabilities are Similar for All Emergency Events
paragraphs: Because terrorist attacks share many common characteristics with natural  and accidental disasters, many of the capabilities first responders need to  support national preparedness efforts are similar. As shown in table 2,  many terrorist attacks are analogous to natural and accidental disasters.
For example, chemical attacks would resemble hazardous materials spills  that release similar chemicals on highways or accidents that cause toxic  gases to leak from rail cars, a small-scale biological attack using a  common disease organism would resemble a natural outbreak, the tasks  required to respond following large explosions are analogous to those  necessary for responding to the aftermath of tornadoes, and preparedness  for “dirty bomb” attacks requires practices that responders whose  jurisdictions encompass nuclear power plants regularly exercise,  according to other emergency professionals we consulted and the  observations of selected officials from first responder departments we  interviewed. As one expert explained, managing the Pentagon scene on  September 11, 2001, consisted of five interrelated all-hazards response  routines: plane crash, building fire, collapsed structure, crime scene, and  crowd control. According to DHS officials, their analysis of the Homeland  Security Council’s 15 scenarios revealed that approximately 80 percent of  necessary tasks would need to be performed regardless of the scenario. To  achieve the performance of critical homeland security tasks, DHS has  adopted an approach to the implementation of HSPD-8 that centers on  building specific prevention, protection, response, and recovery  capabilities within and among four related homeland security mission  areas. Table 3 describes each mission area.
Because of the similarities between the effects of terrorist attacks and  natural or accidental disasters, much of the planning, personnel, training,  and equipment that form the basis of protection, response, and recovery  capabilities are similar across all emergency events, though certain  mission areas are more similar than others. Specifically, our analysis of  DHS’s detailed definitions and descriptions of the 36 target capabilities  showed that only 6 of the capabilities are described as being specific to  terrorist attacks. Five of these 6 capabilities fall into DHS’s prevention  mission area, and one is in the protection mission area. The remaining   30 capabilities address preparedness for all hazards. DHS officials  reviewed our analysis and agreed with our assessment of the relative  applicability of the 36 target capabilities to various hazards. Table 4 lists  the 36 target capabilities, the respective homeland security mission area  where the capability is found, and the extent to which the various  components of the capability address preparedness for all hazards.
Although almost all target capabilities in the areas of protection, response,  and recovery are similar across emergency events, terrorist attacks could  require that more of the specific prevention, protection, response, or  recovery capabilities be exercised simultaneously, or that a greater  number or wider variety of capability elements (e.g., personnel, planning,  and equipment) could be employed to provide the capability. Nonetheless,  many emergency response representatives we consulted agreed that  substantial overlap exists between capabilities that are needed for natural  and accidental disasters and those that are needed for terrorist attacks.  These shared capabilities would allow for the performance of broad tasks  such as controlling entry to emergency areas, recovering victims, treating  the ill and injured, providing basic living needs for survivors and their  families, transporting the dead, restoring essential services, handling  public inquiries, providing a basis for recovery, and maintaining law and  order.
section_title: Prevention Capabilities Differ for Terrorism Because of a Reliance on Actionable Intelligence
paragraphs: Terrorist attacks differ from natural and accidental disasters because they  are intentionally perpetrated acts that could possibly be prevented or  deterred. As a result, all five of the prevention capabilities on DHS’s target  capabilities list focus exclusively on terrorist attacks. Although first  responders from the law enforcement community are active in the  prevention of crime, and all terrorist attacks are crimes, the prevention of  terrorist attacks differs from traditional crime prevention in its heavy  reliance on actionable intelligence—information that can lead to stopping  or apprehending terrorists. Reflecting this reliance within the prevention  mission area are the capabilities to collect information of value to  counterterrorism and analyze this intelligence for possible threats;  recognize the wider threat picture and potentially harmful patterns that  may emerge from collected intelligence; and share this intelligence across  disciplines and jurisdictions. Reliance on actionable intelligence also is  used within the prevention mission area to support investigation of  terrorist activities and to interdict weapons of mass destruction by  preventing the import, transport, manufacture, or release of chemical,  biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive materials. During our  interviews, 29 of 52 first responder departments who replied to a question  about the extent to which prevention capabilities differ between terrorist  and other emergencies said that terrorism prevention is either more  different than similar or very different.
section_title: Protection Capabilities for Terrorist Attacks and Natural or Accidental Disasters Are Similar, Even Though DHS Identifies Protection of Critical Infrastructure in Terms of Terrorist Attacks
paragraphs: Although the Target Capabilities List states that the purpose of protection  capabilities is to reduce the likelihood of attack and to limit the damage  should an attack occur, four of the five capabilities that compose this  mission area could also be applied to limit the damage from natural and  accidental disasters. For example, the protection mission area includes  capabilities such as the identification and prioritization of hazards,  vulnerabilities, and risks; the identification and eradication of  contaminants in the nation’s food supply; the investigation of disease  outbreaks, both deliberate and naturally occurring; and the involvement of  citizens in exercises and ongoing volunteer programs.
The only protection capability that DHS links exclusively to terrorist  attacks is Critical Infrastructure Protection. This capability is intended to  reduce the threat to and vulnerability of high-risk targets such as the  nation’s infrastructure. The capability summary states that this capability  applies to all terrorist attack scenarios. However, many of the critical  tasks that compose this capability are traditional mitigation activities:    pre-event actions that involve lasting, often permanent reduction of the  exposure to, probability of, or potential loss from a variety of emergency  events. These actions could include tasks as simple as fastening  bookshelves to walls to keep them from falling during earthquakes or as  involved as rewriting building codes and zoning ordinances to minimize  future flood damage. These types of actions are applicable to multiple  emergency scenarios—for example, installing shatterproof glass protects  against damage and injury from flying glass in the event of both a heavy  storm and a terrorist bombing. Similarly, taking protective measures to  improve the safety of rail cars in a mass transit system—an example of a  vital system as described in the Critical Infrastructure Protection  capability—could reduce the damage from terrorist attacks while also  mitigating the effects of accidental collisions.
section_title: Response Capabilities Apply Across All Emergency Types
paragraphs: DHS’s response mission area includes 21 response capabilities that are  each applicable to terrorist attacks and to natural and accidental disasters.  Examples of response capabilities include the ability to: manage an  emergency operations center; relocate affected and at-risk members of the  population to safer areas through emergency evacuation; advise and  update citizens through emergency public information; conduct and  support fire suppression operations; isolate and quarantine individuals  who are ill, exposed, or likely to be exposed during a contagious disease  outbreak; provide mass prophylaxis following the onset of a biological  event; distribute medical supplies and provide adequate medical  evaluation and care during events that exceed the limits of the normal  medical capacity of an affected community—referred to as medical surge;  direct and control an emergency event site through an incident command  system; coordinate and conduct search and rescue operations in collapsed  structures; and protect first responder health and safety during a response.  During our interviews, 37 of 54 first responder departments who replied to  a question about the extent to which response differs between terrorist  incidents and natural or accidental disasters stated that terrorism  response is either more similar than different or very similar.
For example, the capability to distribute medical supplies and manage a  medical surge could be needed in both a terrorist attack and a natural  disaster. According to the Homeland Security Council, the number of  uninjured or “worried well” who sought medical treatment after the   9/11 World Trade Center attack was approximately 15 times the number of  people who sought medical treatment due to smoke inhalation. According  to one public health official we interviewed, physicians would observe a  similar “worried well” phenomenon in non-terrorism scenarios, for  example, among otherwise healthy patients who incorrectly attribute  common symptoms to a feared severe acute respiratory syndrome or  SARS infection.
The capability to successfully disrupt and dispose of an explosive device,  though generally directed toward an intentional act, is not limited to  terrorism preparedness. Eliminating explosive devices of varying sizes and  sophistication is part of a police department’s regular operations, and  many public safety agencies had bomb squads dedicated to this purpose  before the attacks of September, 11, 2001, focused the nation’s attention  on terrorism.
One of the capabilities in the response mission area—Weapons of Mass  Destruction/Hazardous Incident Response and Decontamination— explicitly includes weapons of mass destruction in its title, indicating that  the capability may be terrorism-focused. However, this capability is  combined with the capability to respond to all hazardous materials sites.  Therefore, it is by definition an all-hazards capability. In the case of  weapons of mass destruction, however, depending upon the size of the  weapon, an emergency event could require that a host of related response  and recovery capabilities be exercised simultaneously and that a greater  number or wider variety of first responders be asked to deliver these  capabilities than might typically occur during a natural or accidental  disaster.
Initial awareness of the possibility of terrorist involvement has become  part of first responders’ protocols for responding to any event. For  example, officials from 5 first responder departments we met with said  that they have developed protocols for entering the site of an incident and  have heightened their awareness of secondary devices or attacks. These  protocols have increasingly become part of the standard response to any  emergency event because responders must consider attacks that are  intended to kill and injure response personnel and to otherwise impede  response efforts. One fire department official explained that the events of  September 11, 2001, raised the department’s general awareness level and  that, in the post-9/11 environment, response personnel are likely to think  of terrorism first when a catastrophic event occurs, which may lead to a  greater assessment of the situation before entering the scene. Moreover,  according to local fire department officials we visited in several locations,  fire departments have long been aware of secondary events, like  explosions or collapsing structures; the difference now is the possible  presence of intent, which means that these secondary events may be  targeted instead of random, and thus may be more likely to kill, injure, and  destroy.
section_title: Recovery Capabilities for Terrorist Attacks Apply Across All Emergency Types
paragraphs: There are three capabilities that compose DHS’s recovery mission area,  and all three are all-hazards in nature. They consist of the capability to:  conduct damage and safety assessments in public and private structures;  restore transportation, communication, utilities, and other essential  services; and implement short-term and long-term economic and  community recovery processes. During our interviews, 31 of 51 first  responder departments who replied to the question about the extent to  which recovery differs between terrorist incidents and natural or  accidental disasters said that recovery capabilities were either more  similar than different or very similar. For example, a community’s  buildings would need to be assessed after an earthquake or after a terrorist  attack that topples multiple structures. The capability to restore  transportation services would also be necessary whether a city’s bus  service has been suspended due to a winter storm or to a terrorist  bombing. Long-term recovery processes may be necessary in the case of  terrorist events that result in long-term or permanent evacuation from a  geographic area: for example, an intentional radiological release could  contaminate the surrounding area in the same way that accidental releases  have done in past radiological events. In this way, the aftermath of large- scale terrorist events could be similar to the long-term or permanent  evacuation from flood zones and environmentally-compromised hazardous  waste sites.
section_title: Federal Funding For Enhancing First Responders’ Preparedness Capabilities Emphasizes Terrorism but Can Be Applied to All Hazards
paragraphs: Federal grant funding since September 11, 2001, has largely emphasized  enhancing first responders’ capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks.  Legislative language has directed DHS to use these funds chiefly to  prevent, protect, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism.  Additionally, HSPD-8 directs DHS to take an all-hazards approach to  national emergency preparedness with a special emphasis on terrorism. As  a result, DHS grant guidance has contained, in large part, explicit direction  that state and local grant recipients use the funds to enhance first  responders’ capabilities for terrorist attacks. State preparedness officials  and local first responders we interviewed said that DHS’s emphasis for  grant funding was too heavily focused on terrorism; rather, they preferred  to invest in dual use equipment and training (i.e., could be used for all  hazards, whether the source was a terrorist act or a natural or accidental  disaster.) In response, DHS promoted flexibility to allow such dual usage  within the grant program requirements for fiscal year 2005, according to  DHS officials. To ensure grant funds are used for their designated purpose,  the states and localities we visited reported they all have financial controls  methods and monitoring procedures in place designed to ensure that  whatever flexibilities for dual uses exist, they remain within DHS’s  program guidelines.
subsections: section_title: DHS Grant Funding for First Responders Has Focused on Terrorism
paragraphs: DHS grant programs have largely focused on enhancing first responders’  capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks based on HSPD-8 and  legislation that emphasize preparedness assistance for catastrophic  terrorism as the highest priority for federal funding. For example,   HSPD-8 directs DHS to take an all-hazards approach to national  emergency preparedness assistance and directs the department to place  special emphasis on terrorism in doing so. Moreover, legislative  requirements associated with the larger grant programs for first  responders focus on terrorist attacks, while smaller grant programs focus  on all-hazards preparedness. For example, the legislative requirements  associated with the 3 largest grant programs specify that funds be used for  preparedness against terrorist attacks:    State Homeland Security Grant program funds are to be used to enhance  the capability of state and local jurisdictions to prepare, for and respond  to, acts of terrorism, including those involving the use of chemical,  biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive weapons.
Urban Area Security Initiative grant funds are to be used to enhance high  threat, high density urban areas’ ability to prepare for and respond to  threats or acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.
The Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program is, as its name  suggests, to provide funds to assist state and local law enforcement  communities in their activities to prevent terrorist attacks.
The only other first responder grant programs that received an  appropriation of greater than $100 million in fiscal year 2005 were two  long standing programs that have historically had an all-hazards focus:    The Emergency Management Performance Grant program was authorized  to provide emergency management planning and assistance to states for  multi-hazard preparedness and mitigation.
The Assistance to Firefighters Grant program provides assistance to fire  departments for the purpose of protecting the health and safety of the  public and firefighting personnel against fire and fire-related hazards,  including incidents of terrorism or use of weapons of mass destruction.
As shown in figure 6, almost 3 of every 4 grant dollars appropriated to DHS  for first responders in fiscal year 2005 were for 3 primary programs that  had an explicit focus on terrorism. Congress appropriated almost   $2.4 billion in fiscal year 2005 for the three largest grant programs: the  State Homeland Security Grant program (about $1.1 billion), the Urban  Area Security Initiative ($885 million) and the Law Enforcement Terrorism  Prevention Program ($400 million). Congress appropriated about   $960 million in fiscal year 2005 for all-hazards grant programs: the  Emergency Management Performance Grant program ($180 million), the  Assistance to Firefighters Grant program ($715 million), and other grant  programs ($65 million)—such as Citizen Corps and the Metropolitan  Medical Response System.
Our analysis of appropriations between fiscal years 2001 and 2005 for  these key first responder grant programs showed that while funding for all  grant programs increased substantially, funding for grant programs with  an all-hazards emergency management focus increased at a lesser rate  than funding for terrorism-specific programs, as shown in figure 7. This  increase in terrorism-focused funding was due mainly to the funding  increases for appropriated programs related to the State Homeland  Security Grant program and the Urban Area Security Initiative grant  program, which increased from about $109 million and $21 million,  respectively, in fiscal year 2001, to almost $1.1 billion and $885 million,  respectively, in fiscal year 2005.
For fiscal year 2006, the Administration has proposed spending almost   $3.4 billion for homeland security preparedness grants, continuing DHS’s  emphasis on terrorism and spending about 3 of every 4 dollars or about  $2.6 billion for terrorism-focused grant programs. About $720 million  would go toward those grant programs with an all-hazards emergency  management focus. The Administration’s budget request also proposes to  merge the program activities currently under the terrorism-focused grant  programs by merging the program activities under the Law Enforcement  Terrorism Prevention Program into the State Homeland Security Grant  and the Urban Area Security Initiative. Under this proposal states and  localities would be required to earmark no less than 20 percent of their  spending under these programs toward terrorism prevention activities.  Finally, the fiscal year 2006 budget request reflects a continuation of  decreased funding for the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. In  fiscal year 2006, the proposed budget for this program is $500 million  compared to $715 million in fiscal year 2005 and $750 million in fiscal year  2004.
More than 87,000 state and local jurisdictions across the nation are  potentially eligible to receive first responder grants funds. Legislative  funding criteria affect allocation of these funds to states who in turn  allocate funds to local first responders. For example, the fiscal year   2005 Homeland Security Grant Program, allocated a minimum of   0.75 percent of the available first-responder funding to each state, which  accounted for 40 percent of the total allocations for this program.  Alternative approaches for the formula to allocate State Homeland  Security Program grants with varying degrees of attention to the risks and  threats of terrorism and natural or accidental disasters are being  considered by Congress. For example, one proposed change in this  formula would focus mainly on higher population areas with critical  infrastructure that may be more attractive to terrorists. This approach is  currently the basis for the Urban Area Security Initiative program funds  that are provided to 50 selected urban areas that are chosen on the basis of  population, population density, presence of critical national infrastructure,  threat and presence of mutual aid compacts.
section_title: Some First Responders Disagreed With Emphasis of Federal Grant Programs on Terror and Expressed Concerns about Current and Future Funding
paragraphs: The priorities of some first responders we interviewed did not align with  DHS’s priorities for enhancing capabilities. For example, during our  interviews, 31 of 39 first responder departments who replied to a question  about DHS’s training programs, exercise activities and grant funds,  disagreed that these were focused on all-hazards. In addition, officials  from four first responder departments went on to say that DHS required  too much emphasis on terrorism-related activities in requests for  equipment and training—for example, combating weapons of mass  destruction and preventing and responding to terrorist attacks using  chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive materials.  However, responders said that they had a greater need for assistance  preparing for natural and accidental disasters. During our interviews, 37 of  the 69 first responder departments who responded to a question about the  programmatic challenges they face cited the need for additional flexibility  from DHS or state agencies in order to use grant funds to enhance their  ability to respond to events that were more likely to occur in their  jurisdictions. State and local officials said they have been able to identify  uses for most of the training and equipment they receive that include both  terrorism and other hazards. Moreover, local first responder departments  and state officials we interviewed also noted that they favored dual-use  purchases for many reasons: to prevent equipment from “rotting on the  shelf,” according to one official; to maintain a level of comfort and  proficiency with equipment on hand for counterterrorism by using it for  everyday responses; and to build stronger all-hazards capabilities that will  allow them to better respond to terrorist attacks.
We have reported in the past that achieving national preparedness and  response goals hinges on the federal government’s ability to form effective  partnerships with nonfederal stakeholders. By working collectively with  state and local governments, the federal government gains the resources  and expertise of the people closest to the challenge. Just as partnerships  offer opportunities, they also create challenges based upon the different  interests reflected by each partner. From the federal perspective, there is  the concern that state and local governments may not share the same  priorities for use of federal funds. For example, in 10 first responder  departments we interviewed, officials pointed out that they were much  more likely to face the threat of hurricanes, floods, or wildland fires than  an attack by terrorists using weapons of mass destruction or chemical,  biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive materials and that their  priorities focused on fortifying their efforts to deal with these natural and  accidental disasters. In addition, 61 first responder departments we  interviewed reported that their emergency operations plans and  procedures are all-hazards plans and structured around the full range of  potential emergencies, incidents and risks.
In response, DHS promoted flexibility to allow such dual usage within the  grant program requirements for fiscal year 2005, according to DHS  officials. Officials from the Office of State and Local Government  Coordination and Preparedness said that the majority of the assistance  they offer to state and local first responders is required to be linked to  emergency management tasks related to terrorist attacks but that some  authorized equipment, training, and exercises can be used for emergencies  that are not related to terrorism. Officials stated, even prior to fiscal year  2005, grant requirements allowed for dual usage and state grantees are  responsible for contacting DHS when questions regarding application of  grant guidelines arise. They also said that although the DHS equipment list  was not created with the intention that equipment would be used for non- terrorism purposes, flexibility for dual use was reasonable, acceptable,  and expected. Given that DHS now defines its targets for protection,  response and recovery capabilities in terms of all-hazards applicability,  approved training and equipment that are intended to enhance these  capabilities of first responders inherently have an all-hazards applicability.
First responders we interviewed also expressed concerns about both  current and sustained future funding for the personnel, training, and  equipment they need to respond to large-scale emergency events. In  addition to the start-up costs—the initial investment in new equipment and  training needed to enhance first responders’ capabilities—the costs of  maintaining equipment, providing ongoing training and exercises for  responders, and replenishing perishable supplies and stock are also likely  to be significant. During our interviews, 48 of 69 first responder  departments who replied to a question about challenges said their  departments faced funding challenges for personnel, maintenance,  equipment, training, and multi-year funding sources for sustaining  preparedness capabilities. In addition, in 59 of 69 first responder  departments we visited first responders cited multi-year funding as one of  their top program challenges. For example, officials from three state and  local departments we interviewed observed that a connection exists  between multi-year funding and sustainability because without multi-year  funding, local first responders cannot commit to sustaining the equipment  purchased on an ongoing basis. One first responder official worried that  their department is buying new equipment but were concerned that DHS  might not provide future funding for them to sustain the equipment. In  another locality, officials told us that equipment they had purchased could  not be maintained without continued DHS assistance. In response to these  types of concerns, state and local officials have different options to ensure  that capabilities can be sustained; for example, contracts for equipment  purchases could be designed to include maintenance during the useful life  of the equipment, according to DHS.
section_title: States and Localities Report Having Financial Controls and Procedures to Ensure Compliance with Program Guidelines
paragraphs: The states and localities we visited reported they have financial controls  and procedures in place designed to ensure that whatever flexibilities for  dual uses exist, they remain within DHS’s program guidelines. State  governments and local first responders we visited identified various  purchasing controls and monitoring procedures that are in place at  different levels of government to review the purchase of goods and  services. For example, first responder departments that we met with said  they are required to submit their grant requests to other local, state or  regional government bodies, or steering committees. In some cases these  interagency committees were made up of multiple jurisdictions and  multiple first responder disciplines working collaboratively to develop the  annual list of equipment and training programs to be acquired for those  jurisdictions. State preparedness agencies and local first responders also  identified internal review processes that exist within the state’s  administrative agency for homeland security grants and local internal  controls. We have previously reported on the management of first  responder grant programs and efforts to improve accountability and have  examined these procedures and processes in greater detail. In February  2005, we reported that in fiscal year 2004, DHS completed site visits to   44 of 56 states and territories that received grants as part of its monitoring  of states’ grant reporting and state homeland security strategy  implementation. We also reported that in fiscal year 2004 DHS revised its  method of reporting on grant expenditures, moving away from requiring  itemized lists of expenditures toward a more results-based approach  where grant managers must demonstrate how grant expenditures link to  larger projects that support one or more goals in the states’ homeland  security strategies. Finally, in the absence of some basic, comparable  standards for first responder performance, it has been difficult to assess  the effect of grant expenditures on first responder capabilities and  performance.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Prior to September 11, 2001, the federal government’s role in supporting  emergency preparedness and management was limited primarily to  providing guidance and grants for planning, mitigation, and equipment  before large-scale disasters like floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, and  response and recovery assistance after such disasters.  Since September  11, 2001, the federal government has awarded billions of dollars to state  and local governments for planning, equipment, and training to enhance  the capabilities of first responders to respond to terrorist attacks and, to a  lesser extent, natural and accidental disasters. These extensive resources  reflect a growing federal role in promoting emergency preparedness.  However, as we reported in our 21st century challenges work, this federal  financial assistance has not been guided by a clear, risk-based strategic  plan that would provide a basis for realistic budgeting and resource  planning. Ultimately, the federal government must determine how much  developing and maintaining the national emergency preparedness  capabilities needed for homeland security will cost and what the nation’s  federal, state and local governments can afford to pay. DHS, as the  primary executive department with responsibilities for national emergency  preparedness efforts, faces the challenge of working with state and local  governments to coordinate preparedness activities and formulate realistic  budgets and resource plans to share these costs and support and sustain  implementation of an efficient and effective an all-hazards national  preparedness program.
DHS’s development of an all-hazards national preparedness goal, along  with related products and program implementation plans and  requirements, if properly planned and executed, may help guide the  development of realistic budget and resource plans. However, DHS may  confront several challenges in its attempts to fully realize the preparedness  goal and implement the three programs described by its program  implementation plans. For example, DHS’s assessment and reporting  implementation plan, intended to accurately identify the status of  capabilities at the state, regional, and local levels is vital for establishing a  baseline and providing an ongoing feedback loop, upon which decisions at  these multiple levels of government about preparedness needs will rest.  However, DHS plans to rely extensively on self-reported data. Therefore,  as the team that devised DHS’s assessment and reporting implementation  plan pointed out, it is likely to be a challenge for DHS to determine how to  aggregate data from multiple governmental and nongovernmental  emergency preparedness actors. An effective assessment system will also  have to balance self-assessment approaches with appropriate external  assessment checks in order to provide consistent and accurate data that  can drive these budgeting and resource planning decisions.
A related challenge DHS may face is in continuing to coordinate efforts to  enhance first responder all-hazards capabilities among and across various  states and jurisdictions and to manage stakeholder expectations. First,  DHS’s tiered approach to defining first responders’ required capabilities— either to possess or to secure access—suggests that finding effective  approaches for local jurisdictions to work together to develop funding  plans and coordinate expenditures for the use of federal funds for regional  emergency preparedness and response will be an important step in the  process of developing a realistic budget. However, as our work on  emergency preparedness in the National Capital Region demonstrates,  facilitating effective regional coordination can be particularly challenging.  Additionally, as we have reported, achieving national preparedness and  response goals hinges on the federal government’s ability to work  collectively with state and local governments in order to leverage  resources and expertise. Inconsistent expectations about dual use and  concerns about how to coordinate the national training and exercise  program, among other things, illustrate the importance of careful attention  to establishing and maintaining strong nonfederal partnerships.
Finally, DHS’s proposal for a national system to balance resource  investments may help to provide a strategic, risk-based approach to  prioritize federal, state and local resource investments, to the extent that  the department uses a systematic, comprehensive risk management  approach. We have consistently advocated such a risk based approach to  guide federal investments in homeland security that would consider  threats, vulnerabilities, and criticalities, as well as the expected value of  investments in developing first responders’ capabilities to prevent terrorist  attacks and to protect critical infrastructure balanced with the potential  costs of developing and maintaining capabilities for responding and  recovering from all types of emergency events. Such an approach could  provide a basis to formulate realistic budget and resource plans at the  national level. The intent of DHS’s planned all-hazards decision framework  to prioritize and optimize investments based on population, critical  infrastructure, and other significant risk factors appears to offer the  opportunity for such an approach to managing risk; however establishing a  standardized approach for measuring and reporting the risks faced by  diverse states and localities in order to effectively prioritize and allocate  federal resources will be a key challenge. Moreover, as DHS does not  expect to fully implement its balanced investment program before 2008, it  continues to operate its federal preparedness assistance programs without  a solid risk-based decision framework, and it is not yet clear whether and  to what extent, when established, the proposed framework will  incorporate the key elements of risk management that we recommend.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS, which had no comments or  concerns with the information included in this report. DHS also provided  technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate.
As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents  of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days  from the date of this letter. We then plan to provide copies of this report to  the Secretary of DHS. Copies of this report will also be made available to  others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge  on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report is  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5
section_title: Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8
section_title: Appendix III: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: This report addresses the following questions: 1) What actions has DHS  taken to provide policies and strategies that promote the development of  the all-hazards emergency management capabilities of first responders?  2) How do first responders’ emergency management capabilities for  terrorist attacks compare to capabilities needed for natural or accidental  disasters? 3) What emphasis has DHS placed on funding awarded to state  and local first responders to enhance all-hazards emergency management  capabilities?
To address these questions, we met with local first responder officials in  ten states (California, Florida, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New  Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Washington) and   31 local jurisdictions with a total of 69 first responder departments. We  selected states and localities to reflect variations in dimensions such as:  geographic diversity; population density including metropolitan and non- metropolitan locations; fiscal capacity differences between states; critical  infrastructure issues such as ports and international borders;  governmental structure differences at the local level (local focus versus  strong county government structure); differences in the states’ homeland  security/emergency management organization and leadership models; and  a sample of states containing sovereign American Indian tribal lands.  Within each state we selected a sample of two to three localities, such as a  combination of jurisdictions for our visits, in order to maximize the range  of dimension described above. For example, we visited one of the large  urban areas within the state along with an adjacent suburban jurisdiction.  We also visited medium, small cities, rural jurisdictions or Indian tribes.  These local site visits included seven localities that received Urban Area  Security Initiative funding for fiscal years 2004 and 2005—Detroit,  Michigan; Charlotte, North Carolina; Kansas City, Missouri; San Diego,  California; Tampa, Florida; New York, New York; and Seattle,  Washington—that we identified after selecting which states to visit. At the  local jurisdictions we visited, we requested to meet with first responder  officials from the following departments: fire and emergency medical  services, law enforcement, emergency management, public health and  public works. We also selected two American Indian tribes that possessed  their own public safety departments—police and fire—to identify some of  the challenges and issues that these jurisdictions face. Our selection of  localities was to some extent dependent on the availability of officials to  meet with us, travel schedule limitations, and our effort to avoid any  respondent’s bias due to overlaps with recent and current GAO  engagement teams. Because of the manner in which we selected our  locations, our results, however, cannot be generalized beyond the  individual locations.
Using a structured interview guide, we solicited local first responder  officials’ insights and perspectives on a variety of topics, including: the  extent to which DHS uses an all-hazards approach in assisting state and  local first responders’ emergency management capabilities, how DHS  coordinates its activities, how locations use federal homeland security  grant funds, what mechanisms DHS has in place to ensure that grant funds  are spent in accordance with grant guidelines, how local departments  assess and report their preparedness status, what gaps, if any, they believe  exist between current and needed capabilities in selected locations, and  what challenges, if any, they face in their emergency management  responsibilities.
Using a similar structured interview guide, we asked similar questions to  states’ office of emergency management, their homeland security office,  their State Administrative Agency point of contact who is the official  recipient of DHS grants, and state-level public health officials.
In addition, we met with officials from various professional organizations  that represent state government organizations and first responders to  capture their insights and perspectives on the extent to which DHS has  used an all-hazards approach in assisting state and local first responders’  emergency management capabilities, and how DHS coordinates these  activities externally with state and local first responders.
To determine what actions DHS has taken to provide policies and  strategies that promote the development of the all-hazards emergency  management capabilities of first responders, we reviewed DHS products  developed to comply with Presidential Homeland Security Directives 5 and  8. We reviewed the final documents for the National Incident Management  System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP). We also obtained  and analyzed documents related to the development of the National  Preparedness Goal and its related products that were developed by DHS  and the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and  Preparedness in order to implement HSPD-8. These documents include the  National Planning Scenarios, Universal Task List and Target Capabilities  List, the Interim National Preparedness Goal, National Preparedness  Guidance and program implementation plans for balancing national  investments and resources, training and exercises, and assessment and  reporting. Our work did not include assessing either the appropriateness  of the scenarios used to identify needed first responder capabilities or the  tasks and capabilities developed based on neither those scenarios, nor  DHS’s process and resulting work on the three program implementation  plans.
In addition, we met with DHS officials from the Office of State and Local  Government Coordination and Preparedness, including the Office for  Domestic Preparedness. We also met with officials from DHS’s Emergency  Preparedness and Response directorate, which includes the Federal  Emergency Management Agency. Finally, we met with officials from 3 of  the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 10 regional offices— Atlanta, Kansas City and Seattle—selected in order to capture one regional  office in an eastern, central and western location, and selected based on  the states and localities we selected for our site visits.
To determine how first responders’ emergency management capabilities  for terrorist attacks differ from capabilities needed for natural or  accidental disasters, we reviewed relevant research on homeland security  and domestic preparedness developed by professional organizations and  other subject matter experts and research organizations. We also reviewed  the documents developed by DHS’s Office of State and Local Government  Coordination and Preparedness designed to establish a National  Preparedness Goal. These included various drafts of the National  Preparedness Goal and Guidance, the Target Capabilities List, the  Universal Task List, and the National Planning Scenarios. We also met  with officials from first responder departments and professional  associations, as described above, to address this question.
To determine the emphasis on grant funding awarded to state and local  first responders to enhance all-hazards emergency management  capabilities, we reviewed DHS budget information and authorizing and  appropriations legislation. We also asked first responders a series of  questions related to DHS funding and their perceptions of DHS grant  guidance and, at our meetings with the professional organizations that  represent state government organizations and first responders, we asked  similar questions to obtain their views on these issues.
We conducted our work from May 2004 through May 2005 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Mr. Christopher Keisling was the Assistant Director for this report. In  addition to the contact named above, David A. Brown, James Cook,   Alice Feldsman, Kathryn Godfrey, Wil Holloway, Dawn Locke,   Nettie Richards, and John Vocino made key contributions to this report.