State Department: Pervasive Passport Fraud Not Identified, but Cases of Potentially Fraudulent and High-Risk Issuances Are under Review
Published: 2014-05-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Fraudulent passports pose a significant risk because they can be used to conceal the true identity of the user and potentially facilitate other crimes, such as international terrorism and drug trafficking. State issued over 13.5 million passports during fiscal year 2013.
GAO was asked to assess potential fraud in State's passport program. This report examines select cases of potentially fraudulent or high-risk issuances among passports issued during fiscal years 2009 and 2010—the most recently available data at the time GAO began its review. GAO matched State's passport data from fiscal years 2009 and 2010 for approximately 28 million issuances to databases with information about individuals who were deceased, incarcerated in state and federal prison facilities, or who had an active warrant at the time of issuance. GAO also analyzed the passport data to identify issuances to applicants who provided a likely invalid SSN, which had not been assigned at the time of the passport application, or had been publically disclosed. From each of these five populations, GAO selected nongeneralizable samples for additional review. GAO also randomly selected a generalizable sample from a population of passport issuances to applicants who used only the SSN of a deceased individual. GAO reviewed State's adjudication policies, and examined passport applications for these populations to further assess whether there were potentially fraudulent or high-risk issuances. State provided technical comments and generally agreed with our findings. This report contains no recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Of the approximately 28 million passports issued in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 that GAO reviewed, it found issuances to applicants who used the identifying information of deceased or incarcerated individuals, had active felony warrants, or used an incorrect Social Security number (SSN); however, GAO did not identify pervasive fraud in these populations. The Department of State (State) has taken steps to improve its detection of passport applicants using identifying information of deceased or incarcerated individuals. In addition, State modified its process for identifying applicants with active warrants, and has expanded measures to verify SSNs in real time. GAO referred, and State is reviewing, matches from this analysis. The following summarizes GAO's findings:
Deceased individuals. As shown in the figure, GAO identified at least 1 case of potential fraud in the sample of 15 cases, as well as likely data errors. State reviewed the cases referred by GAO, and indicated fraud could likely be ruled out in 9 of the 15 cases; State plans to further review 6 cases.
State prisoners. GAO found 7 cases of potential fraud among the sample of 14 state prisoner cases. State noted fraud could likely be ruled out in 10 of the 14 cases, and intends to conduct additional reviews of 4 cases.
Federal prisoners. None of the 15 cases in this sample had fraud indicators, since all individuals were not actually in prison when applying for passports.
Individuals with active warrants. GAO found five cases where State identified the warrant and resolved it prior to issuance. As the figure shows, GAO also identified three cases with warrants that State was not aware of or alerted to, but should have been in State's system for detection during adjudication.
In addition, GAO found 13,470 passport issuances to individuals who used the SSN, but not the name, of a deceased person, as well as 24,278 issuances to applicants who used a likely invalid SSN. GAO reviewed a 140-case generalizable sample and a 15-case nongeneralizable sample for these two populations, respectively, and determined the cases were likely data errors. State has taken steps to capture correct SSN information more consistently.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Fraudulent passports pose a significant risk because they can be used to  conceal the true identity of the user. In addition, according to the  Department of State (State), passport and visa fraud are often committed  in connection with crimes such as international terrorism, drug trafficking,  organized crime, alien smuggling, money laundering, pedophilia, and  murder. As a result, even a few instances of passport fraud can have far- reaching effects. A passport is an official government document that  conveys certain benefits, such as certifying an individual’s identity,  permitting a citizen to travel abroad, proving citizenship, assisting with  loan applications, and fulfilling other needs not related to international  travel. State issued over 13.5 million passport cards and books during  fiscal year 2013.
Since May 2005, we have issued several reports identifying fraud  vulnerabilities in the passport issuance process. In 2005 and 2007, we  reported on weaknesses in State’s information sharing with other federal  agencies, such as the Social Security Administration (SSA), as well as  opportunities to improve the agency’s oversight of passport acceptance  facilities. In 2010, we tested State’s passport issuance procedures by  using counterfeit documents and the identities of fictitious or deceased  individuals, inducing State to issue five genuine U.S. passports. State  identified two of our seven applications as fraudulent during its  adjudication process; however, we were able to obtain passports using  counterfeit documents in three cases. We have made several  recommendations beginning in 2005 designed to help reduce passport  fraud, including that State improve information sharing with other federal  agencies, improve execution of passport fraud-detection efforts, and  strengthen internal controls at its passport-acceptance facilities. State  generally concurred with our recommendations and has taken steps to  address them.
You asked that we assess potential fraud in State’s passport program.  This report examines select cases of potentially fraudulent or high-risk  issuances among passports issued during fiscal years 2009 and 2010.
To examine potentially fraudulent or high-risk passport issuances in fiscal  years 2009 and 2010, we matched State’s passport-issuance data for  approximately 28 million passport issuances (including passport books  and cards) to databases containing information about individuals who  were (1) deceased, (2) incarcerated in a state prison facility, (3) in the  custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), or (4) the subject of an  active warrant at the time of the passport issuance. We conducted this  matching on the basis of common data elements including Social Security  number (SSN), name, and date of birth. We also analyzed the passport  data to identify issuances to applicants who provided an invalid SSN,  which was defined as an SSN that had not been assigned at the time of  the passport application, or had a high risk of misuse. From each of  these five populations, we selected nongeneralizable samples for further  review. In addition, from a population of 13,470 passport issuances to  applicants who used the SSN, but not the name, of a deceased individual,  we selected a generalizable stratified random sample of 140 passport  issuances, including 70 passport issuances from both fiscal years 2009  and 2010. We analyzed these cases to determine whether the applicant  provided the correct SSN and State recorded it incorrectly, or whether the  applicant provided the wrong SSN and State recorded the incorrect SSN  in its system. Figure 1 summarizes the focus of our matching analysis  and the related sample sizes selected for further review.
As highlighted in figure 1, we selected a total of 214 passport issuances  for additional review from our five nongeneralizable and one  generalizable samples. For each of the 214 passport issuances selected,  we reviewed a copy of the original passport application, submitted the  SSN from State’s passport data to SSA for verification, and obtained  records of the passport holder’s travel activity from the Financial Crimes  Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the U.S. Department of the  Treasury. We also reviewed State’s documentation of additional  investigative steps the agency took, if any, to resolve fraud indicators  during the adjudication of the passports. Where applicable, we obtained  additional documentation about the death, incarceration, or fugitive status  of applicants from federal and state agencies. For this review, we  included only issued passports; we did not examine passport applications  that were rejected by State or abandoned by the applicant. Furthermore,  we did not attempt to identify all possible types of passport fraud.
We assessed the reliability of State’s passport data, TECS travel-activity  data provided by FinCEN, SSA’s full death file, state and federal prisoner  data, and data on individuals with open warrants provided by the U.S.  Marshals Service by reviewing relevant documentation, interviewing  knowledgeable agency officials, and examining the data for obvious  errors and inconsistencies. With the exception of prisoner data from five  states, which we did not use, we concluded that all of the data we used  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We examined  State’s policies, guidance, including the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM),  and other materials provided to passport specialists. We reviewed  changes to State’s controls since fiscal years 2009 and 2010 with respect  to preventing certain fraudulent or high-risk passport issuances. We also  interviewed State officials, observed the adjudication process at a  passport facility, and reviewed the 214 passport applications in our  samples to further assess whether there were potentially fraudulent or  high risk issuances. For a more-detailed description of our objectives,  scope, and methodology, see appendix I.
We performed this audit from March 2010 through May 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objective.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Passport Application Process
paragraphs: According to agency officials and guidance posted on State’s public  website, applicants can apply for a U.S. passport in one of three ways: in  person at an acceptance facility, by mail (for renewal applications), or at a  passport facility that offers acceptance services (typically expedited  applications). Applicants submit documents, such as a birth certificate or  driver’s license, to passport acceptance agents to provide evidence of  citizenship, or noncitizen nationality, and proof of identity. The acceptance  agents are to watch the applicant sign the application, review submitted  documents for completeness, and check for application inconsistencies.  For example, acceptance agents are to assess whether photographs and  descriptions in the identification documents match the applicant. If an  acceptance agent suspects that an applicant has submitted fraudulent  information or exhibits nervous behavior, the acceptance agent is  instructed to accept the application and complete a checklist indicating  the reason for suspected fraud. The agents are to then send the  application, checklist, and photocopy of the identification to State’s Fraud  Prevention Manager (FPM). Acceptance agents are not State employees;  however, State provides training, as well as detailed guidance that  governs their work. State also conducts periodic inspections and audits of  acceptance facilities to ensure compliance with regulations and policies.
According to State officials, the most common way to renew a passport is  by mail. An individual with a passport issued during the previous 15 years  may renew it by submitting a mail-in application, along with the previously  issued passport, a recent photograph, and documentation of a name  change, if applicable. Applications submitted by mail or at an acceptance  facility are sent to a Department of the Treasury contracted lockbox  service provider for data entry and payment processing. The lockbox  service provider converts handwritten or typed text into electronic data  and deposits passport fees paid by the applicant. Once the lockbox data  entry and payment are complete, the electronic data and paper passport  application are sent to passport-issuing facilities around the United States  for adjudication.
Applicants who demonstrate a need for in-person expedited service for  either a first-time issuance or a renewal may submit their applications  directly to a passport-issuing facility. State employees at these facilities  accept passport fees and enter application data directly into State’s  electronic processing system, called the Travel Document Issuance  System (TDIS), before forwarding the application for expedited  adjudication.
Figure 2 provides an overview of the passport application and  adjudication process for applications received in person at an acceptance  facility, by mail, or at a passport facility that offers acceptance services  (see app. 2 for static version of this figure).
section_title: Passport Adjudication Process
paragraphs: As we have noted in previous products, each passport application is to be  individually reviewed by a passport specialist during a process known as  adjudication. State’s FAM specifies the steps passport specialists must  take to address various fraud indicators. According to State documents,  specialists are responsible for reviewing applications and documents  establishing the applicants’ identity and citizenship, as well as conducting  various checks, as described below. Depending on the results of the  adjudication, passport specialists may approve or deny the passport  issuance, conduct additional checks, request more information from the  applicant, or forward the application for additional review by their  supervisor, the FPM, or by offices in Passport Headquarters. Once a  passport has been issued, the application is scanned and archived.  Passports issued to individuals 16 years or older are generally valid for 10  years.
Several federal statutes and regulations either require or permit State to  withhold a passport from an applicant in certain situations. For example,  State must withhold passports from individuals who are in default on  certain U.S. loans, who are in arrears of child support in an amount  determined by statute, or who are imprisoned, on parole, or on  supervised release as a result of certain types of violations of the  Controlled Substances Act, Bank Secrecy Act, and some state-level drug  laws. Likewise, State may choose to refuse a passport to applicants  who are the subject of an outstanding local, state, or federal warrant of  arrest for a felony, or the subject of probation conditions or criminal court  orders that forbid the applicant from leaving the country and the violation  of which could result in the issuance of a federal arrest warrant.
During the adjudication process, passport specialists are to review  applications and results of checks against various databases to detect  fraud and suspicious activity, and for other purposes. Application data are  entered into TDIS, State’s electronic processing system. TDIS  automatically checks applicants’ names against a number of sources,  including SSA’s death records and a database of warrants. For example,  TDIS automatically checks key identifying information of all passport  applicants against SSA’s full death file, as well as a database of felony  warrants for certain crimes. Passport specialists are to compare the  application to the information in TDIS to make sure it was entered  properly and to identify missing information.
Passport specialists are also to review the results of automatic checks  during a process State refers to as “the front-end” process of adjudication.  For instance, during this process, passport specialists are to determine  whether an applicant currently holds a passport, has a history of lost or  stolen passports, or has already submitted a passport application.  According to State officials, such checks are intended to facilitate the  identification of suspicious activity and prevent multiple passport  issuances to the same person. Passport specialists also are to consider  the results from facial recognition technology which is used to help  prevent the issuance of passports to individuals using false identities and  people who should be denied passports for other legal reasons, such as  terrorists in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) terrorist   In addition, passport specialists may employ commercial  database.databases and other tools during the adjudication process to assist in  confirming an applicant’s identity or citizenship.
section_title: Selected Controls for Detecting Potentially Fraudulent and High-Risk Issuances
subsections: section_title: SSN Verification and Data Checks for Deceased Individuals
paragraphs: In April 2007, State and SSA signed an information-exchange agreement  that allows State to query SSA’s records for verifying applicants’ identities  and identifying deceased individuals. In accordance with this agreement,  State’s TDIS automatically queries SSA’s Enumeration Verification  System (EVS) to verify that a passport applicant’s SSN, name, and date  of birth match the records at SSA. EVS includes a death indicator based  on SSA’s full death file of approximately 98 million records, which aids  State in identifying applicants using the identity of a deceased individual  to apply for a passport. In most cases, State’s controls will not flag an  applicant as deceased unless certain fields such as the SSN, name, and  date of birth all match the identifying information of a deceased individual.  According to State’s procedures, passport specialists must refer any  applications with a positive death indicator to State’s FPM for additional  review, since the match may indicate a case of stolen identity. The FPM  reviews all applications referred to it by passport specialists to determine  whether the identifying information on the passport application is in fact  associated with a deceased individual. The FPM can approve the  passport application once it has reviewed and resolved any indicators of  potential fraud. See appendix III for additional details on State’s use of  SSA’s records for death checks.
section_title: Data Checks for Incarcerated Individuals
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the years of passport issuances we  reviewed, State did not have access to federal and state prisoner  databases in order to check whether applicants’ identities matched those  of incarcerated individuals. Since then, State has taken steps to explore  access to such databases. For example, in June 2013, State entered into  a data-sharing agreement with the BOP in order to access federal  prisoner data. In addition, officials told us that in December 2013, State  completed the first phase of a pilot project using prisoner data from two  states, Florida and Rhode Island, to identify whether applicants are  fraudulently using identities of state prisoners. We provide additional  details on State’s initiatives to improve data checks for incarcerated  individuals in a subsequent section.
section_title: Data Checks for Individuals with Active Warrants
paragraphs: In 2002, the Marshals Service began transmitting certain warrant data to  State for use during the passport adjudication process. Since then, the  information State receives has changed to include additional warrants  from the FBI, as described in detail below. To help State determine  whether an applicant may have an active warrant for a felony charge,  TDIS automatically checks applicants’ identifying information in State’s  Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), a database that   TDIS indicates a possible match if certain data  maintains warrant data.elements from the passport application, such as the name, SSN, date of  birth, place of birth, or gender, matches information in CLASS within  certain parameters. State’s policies require that passport specialists refer  likely matches in CLASS to State’s passport legal office. Officials said  paralegals in the passport legal office are to review the information and  contact the warrant issuer to confirm the identity of the subject in the  warrant against the passport applicant, verify that the warrant is active  and related to a felony charge, and further coordinate, as necessary. The  passport legal office may also use commercial databases, or photographs  obtained from the warrant issuer, to confirm applicants’ identities. In  technical comments, State officials clarified that the passport legal office  is authorized to deny the passport issuance when it determines, or is  informed by a competent authority, that the applicant is the subject of an  outstanding federal, state, or local warrant of arrest for a felony crime. In  addition, the passport legal office can authorize the passport issuance if it  determines, upon additional review, that there was not in fact a legitimate  match in CLASS. The legal office may approve an issuance in cases  where the warrant was closed, associated with a misdemeanor charge, or  for other reasons, such as a request by law enforcement agencies.
section_title: Examples of Potentially Fraudulent or High-Risk Passport Issuances Found, but Pervasive Fraud Not Identified
paragraphs: Of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances we  reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we found instances of  issuances to individuals who applied for passports using identifying  information of deceased or incarcerated individuals, as well as applicants  with active felony warrants. The total number of cases we identified  represented a small percentage of all issuances during the two fiscal  years, indicating that fraudulent or high-risk issuances were not  pervasive. We also determined that State’s data contained inaccurate  SSN information for thousands of passport recipients. Most of the  instances in which there was inaccurate SSN information appeared to be  applicant or State data-entry errors, rather than fraud. Since fiscal years  2009 and 2010, State has taken steps to improve its detection of passport  applicants using the identifying information of deceased or incarcerated  individuals. In addition, State modified its process for identifying  applicants with active warrants, and has expanded measures to verify  SSNs in real time.
subsections: section_title: Passport Issuances to Applicants Associated with Deceased Individuals, Prisoners, and Individuals with Active Warrants
subsections: section_title: Issuances to Applicants Using Identifying Information of Deceased Individuals
paragraphs: Out of a combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances  we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 181  passports issued to individuals whose name and SSN both appeared in  SSA’s full death file, suggesting that the applicant may have  inappropriately used the identity of a deceased person. To ensure that  our matches did not contain legitimate applicants who died shortly after  submitting their applications, we included only individuals who had died  more than 120 days before the passport issuance.our matching analysis and sample results.
It is not possible to determine from data matching alone whether the  passport issuance was appropriate or fraudulent without reviewing the  facts and circumstances for each individual case from the 181 passport  issuances. Thus, we randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample of 15  cases for additional analysis. For each case, we attempted to verify death  information from SSA’s full death file by obtaining a copy of the death  certificate and confirming that SSA’s most-current records listed the  individual as deceased. We also requested TECS travel data from  FinCEN and reviewed open-source information to search for additional  fraud indicators. The following information provides additional details on  the 15 cases.
In one case, the applicant applied for and received an expedited  passport by mail in January 2009 using the SSN, name, and date of  birth of a deceased individual. The SSA’s full death file and the death  certificate indicated that the purported applicant had died in May  2008. According to TECS travel data, the passport was used in June  2009 to fly to the United States from Mexico and had not been used  again as of June 2013. As a result of information we provided, State  reviewed this case in 2013 and determined that the applicant  appeared to be an imposter. State officials noted that the application  should have been referred to the FPM during adjudication, because it  contained multiple fraud indicators. State officials said this case  should be referred to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) for  further investigation.
In another case, the applicant’s passport issuance was delayed by  more than a year because her name mistakenly appeared in SSA’s  full death file. In our May 2013 testimony, we found that SSA’s data  contained a small number of inaccurate records, and SSA has stated,  in rare instances, it is possible for the records of a person who is not  deceased to be included erroneously in the death file.where a living individual is inappropriately listed as deceased in SSA’s  records can create a hardship for the person who has been falsely  identified as deceased. This case highlights one of the challenges  State encounters when querying SSA’s full death file, and illustrates  why State reviews applicants with death indicators on a case-by-case  basis.
In 4 of the 15 cases, the applicant used a similar name to, as well as  the same SSN as, a deceased individual. For each of the four cases,  we verified the death information in SSA’s full death file by obtaining a  copy of the deceased person’s death certificate. However, State  officials said fraud could likely be ruled out in all four cases for various  reasons, such as the inadvertent use of an incorrect SSN.
In 9 of the 15 cases, we could not verify the death of the applicants  because we were unable to identify the state in which the individual’s  death was recorded (possibly because the applicant was not  deceased) or because state officials would not or could not provide  the death certificate to us. State’s subsequent review of these cases  indicated that fraud could likely be ruled out in four cases, and that  five of the cases should be referred to DS for further investigation.
As of May 2014, we have referred all 181 passport issuances we  identified from our matching analysis using SSA’s full death file, including  the 15 cases we examined in more detail, to State for further review and  investigation.
section_title: Issuances to Applicants Using the Identifying Information of State and Federal Prisoners
paragraphs: Out of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances  we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 68 issuances  to individuals who used an SSN, name, and in some cases, date of birth  of a state prisoner on their passport application. Without reviewing the  facts and circumstances for each case, it is not possible on the basis of  data matching alone to determine the extent to which these instances  represent fraudulent issuances. Thus, from the group of individuals  related to the 68 issuances, we selected 14 cases for further review.each sample case, we obtained additional documentation from state  departments of corrections to verify key data fields for these passport  recipients. Figure 4 summarizes our matching analysis and sample  results.
From our nongeneralizable sample of 14 cases, we identified seven  passport applicants who may have fraudulently used the identities of state  prisoners, since the incarcerated individuals could not have physically  appeared at a passport facility to submit their applications. The seven remaining cases in our state prisoner sample of 14 individuals were either  not incarcerated at the time of application submission, applied for  passports using mail-in applications, or represented possible identity theft  by the prisoner prior to incarceration. Federal regulations do not prohibit  State from issuing passports to prisoners; however, according to officials,  State’s policy is to deny passport issuances to individuals who are  incarcerated at the time of application submission.
We could not conclusively determine that all our sample cases or  matches represented passport fraud, because for instance, it is possible  that the state prisoner may have stolen the identity of the applicant prior  to incarceration. For example, we identified two cases involving data from  the same prison facility in which the prisoner had an alias name, in  addition to an SSN and date of birth, that matched the information of the  passport applicant. We provided information on all our matches, including  the 14 state prisoner cases in our sample, to State for review. According  to officials, State’s review of these cases included, but was not limited to,  an assessment of fraud indicators in the passport applications, and  review of the applicants’ information in commercial and internal  databases. State determined that fraud could likely be ruled out in eight  cases. Officials initially said they should refer the remaining six cases to  DS for further investigation. In their technical comments on a draft of this  report, State officials said they conducted a second review of the six  remaining cases and determined that two individuals used their true  identities on their passport applications, and they ultimately referred four  cases to DS for investigation.
Of the four cases in our state prisoner sample that State officials referred  to DS, we identified three instances where the passport was used to  cross an international border during the prisoners’ periods of  incarceration. These cases highlighted the active use of passports  obtained by potentially fraudulent means. We verified this travel activity  by comparing the names, dates of birth, and passport numbers in State’s  passport data for these cases with TECS travel data provided by FinCEN.  The TECS travel log for the three cases showed that the individuals used  the passports for international travel at least once during the prisoners’  periods of incarceration. In one case, an individual used the passport  obtained by potentially fraudulent means to cross the U.S.-Mexico border  more than 300 times.
In addition to our analysis of state prisoners, we also identified 206  passport issuances to individuals who used an SSN, name, and date of  birth in their applications that matched identifying information in the BOP’s  federal prisoner data. However, the data we received included individuals  residing in halfway houses. Unless otherwise stated in the conditions of  release for parole, passport issuances to individuals living in halfway  houses are legally permissible. Since we focused our in-depth analysis on  a nongeneralizable sample of 15 cases, we did not determine the extent  to which the 206 cases represented individuals in federal prison facilities  as opposed to halfway houses. Figure 5 summarizes our matching  analysis and sample of 15 cases.
From our sample of 15 cases, we did not identify any individuals who  applied for a passport using the identity of a federal prisoner in their  passport application. We determined that at least 9 of the 15 individuals  were living in BOP halfway houses when the passport application was  submitted. Moreover, we did not find any indications of identity theft. The  other six individuals were either not in a halfway house at the time of  application submission, or we were unable to determine, on the basis of  the information provided, their location after they were released from a  federal prison facility. However, the documentation for these six  individuals indicated that they were not incarcerated when the application  was submitted.
In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, officials said State did not have access to  federal and state prisoner databases in order to check whether  applicants’ identities matched those of incarcerated individuals. In June  2013, State entered into a data-sharing agreement with the BOP that will  allow it to access federal prisoner data, including information about  individuals incarcerated in federal facilities or halfway houses. In addition,  State obtained data-sharing agreements with two individual state  departments of corrections, Florida and Rhode Island, as part of a pilot  project to identify whether applicants fraudulently used the identities of  state prisoners. State officials said these states represent different  geographical regions and a large and small inmate population, and both  had technical capabilities to transfer data efficiently and securely to State  for adjudication purposes. Officials said in their technical comments that  State completed the first phase of the pilot project in December 2013.  This phase included the development of search criteria for detecting the  fraudulent use of prisoners’ identities. According to officials, State referred  three potential fraud cases to DS for further investigation as a result of  this effort. Officials also reported in their technical comments that State  plans to acquire prisoner data from other states, and that it is developing  best practices for obtaining such data. In addition, officials noted that  State is in the early stages of planning a second phase of the pilot project.
State officials highlighted various challenges with respect to using  prisoner data during adjudication, including technical requirements and  issues related to data transmission, as well as potential legal limitations.
For example, according to BOP officials, State and the BOP will have to  develop a technical infrastructure to facilitate sharing of federal prisoner  data, which officials expected to occur no later than the end of fiscal year  2014. Similarly, with respect to state prisoner data, State officials noted  that data from state departments of corrections would need to be  automatically transmitted to allow for the updating of information on a  consistent basis. In technical comments, State officials clarified that they  would prefer to receive data from individual state departments of  corrections on a real-time basis; however, the frequency with which State  receives these data is not a factor in determining whether State enters  into a data-sharing agreement with a department of corrections. State  officials also highlighted issues regarding the compatibility of systems  from various states, as well as concerns about poor data that could lead  to false matches and delays in processing passport applications.  Moreover, State officials told us legal limitations may prevent the transfer  of state-level inmate data; however, State did not report having such  challenges working with Florida and Rhode Island during its pilot project.
section_title: Issuances to Individuals with Active Warrants
paragraphs: Out of a combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances  we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 486  issuances to individuals using the SSN, name or alias, and date of birth of  people with active warrants on their passport applications. We could not  determine from matching analysis alone whether all warrants were  associated with felonies, but our analysis excluded warrants with a  description of either a “traffic crime” or “misdemeanor” in data provided by  the Marshals Service (see app. IV for additional details). The type of  warrant data State has received for detecting active felony warrants  through CLASS has changed over time. In 2002, the Marshals Service  began providing State with certain warrant information in CLASS. These  only included Class 1 warrants, which is a designation for warrants the  Marshals Service enters and maintains in the National Crime Information  Center (NCIC) database, a criminal database that provides the warrant  data to CLASS.State with federal felony warrants in 2005 for use during the adjudication   According to State officials, the FBI began providing  process. In late July 2009, officials said State began receiving state and  local warrants from the FBI for crimes of varying degrees of severity,  including misdemeanors, serious felonies, and nonserious felonies.
According to State officials, the high volume of warrant cases was  unmanageable and State had no authority to take action on misdemeanor  warrants. Thus, in November 2010, State officials said they updated  CLASS so that it included only state or local warrants connected to more- serious felonies they selected. Officials also said CLASS is updated daily  with information provided by the Marshals Service and the FBI, and  currently contains information for federal, state, and local felony warrants  related to State’s selected felony charges. Figure 6 illustrates the  evolution in State’s data checks for warrants.
From the population of 486 issuances with active warrants that we  identified through matching, we randomly selected a nongeneralizable  sample of 15 individuals for additional analysis. Figure 7 summarizes our  matching analysis and sample results.
According to the Marshals Service, all 15 of the individuals in our  nongeneralizable sample had warrants related to felony charges, 3 of  which the Marshals Service was responsible for executing. Fugitives with  felony warrants may pose a risk to public safety, and passports could help  them evade capture by law enforcement agencies. State may choose to  refuse a passport to applicants who are the subject of an outstanding  felony warrant. In our analysis of the 15 cases, we took into account the  evolution in State’s controls. Figure 8 summarizes our review of the cases  in our sample.
Among the 13 applicants we reviewed in detail, we found five cases with  warrants that State identified during the adjudication process. For  instance, after detecting the warrant in one case, State’s passport legal  office ultimately determined the passport applicant was a victim of identity  theft and was not the subject of the warrant. In another case, State  identified a warrant at the state or local level for an applicant who applied  for a passport at a time when State’s controls had begun checking for  such warrants. In this case, State’s passport legal office authorized the  passport issuance to the individual after concluding the associated charge  was for a misdemeanor crime, as opposed to a felony offense. We also  identified five cases where the applicants had outstanding state or local  felony warrants on the application date, and State’s CLASS did not have  data for such warrants when the individuals applied. In the other 3 of the  13 sample cases we reviewed, we found no indications that State was  aware of or alerted to the individuals’ warrants at the time they applied for  passports, even though it appeared that CLASS should have included the   We referred all passport issuances we identified from our  warrant data.matching analysis, including our sample cases, to State for further review  and investigation.
section_title: State’s Records Contained Erroneous SSNs for Thousands of Passport Issuances as a Result of Applicant or State Data- Entry Error
paragraphs: Out of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances  we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we found 13,470 passport  issuances to individuals who submitted an SSN associated with a  deceased individual, but where the name used in the passport  application did not match the name of the deceased individual. As we  previously noted, we analyzed these cases to determine whether the  applicant provided the correct SSN and State recorded it incorrectly, or  whether the applicant provided the wrong SSN and State recorded the  incorrect SSN its system. Specifically, from this population, we selected a  stratified random sample that consisted of 140 passport issuances,  evenly divided between fiscal years 2009 and 2010 (see fig. 9). We refer  to these cases below as deceased-SSN errors.
We estimated that approximately 50 percent of the 13,470 cases with  deceased-SSN errors were instances where the applicant provided an  SSN that did not belong to him or her. We did not identify any other  evidence of potential fraud in this group of cases, which suggests that  applicants may have made mistakes in filling out the passport application.  We estimated that in approximately 44 percent of the 13,470 cases with  deceased-SSN errors applicants provided the correct SSNs, but State  entered them incorrectly into TDIS. State officials could not provide an  explanation for the errors related to these cases, which included  applications with handwritten SSNs that were difficult to read, as well as  typed SSNs. The remaining 6 percent of cases did not fall into either of  these categories. Such cases included instances where the applicant did  not provide an SSN, or where we were unable to ascertain the applicant’s  actual SSN. Figure 10 summarizes the issuances we reviewed involving  deceased-SSN errors.
State may issue multiple passports to the same individual, such as when the applicant  applies for both a passport book and a passport card. These 24,278 passport issuances  were associated with 22,543 unique SSNs. In some cases, more than one individual used  the same likely invalid SSN to apply for a passport. have included an applicant who used that SSN in this population. We  randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample of 15 cases from the  population of unique, likely invalid SSNs for additional review (see fig.  11). In seven cases, State improperly recorded the applicants’ SSNs in  TDIS. In six cases, the applicant provided an incorrect SSN, five of which  were close to the applicant’s actual SSN.cause of the invalid SSNs in the remaining two cases, because they  involved minors for whom we could not ascertain the passport recipient’s  actual SSNs.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to State and the Department of Justice  for comment. State provided technical comments, which we incorporated  into the report, as appropriate. The Department of Justice did not have  any comments.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General. In addition,  the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-6722 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: You asked that we assess potential fraud in the Department of State’s  (State) passport program. This report examines potentially fraudulent or  high-risk issuances among passports issued during fiscal years 2009 and  2010.
To examine potentially fraudulent and high-risk passport issuances in  fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we matched State’s passport-issuance data  for approximately 28 million passport issuances to databases containing  information about individuals who were (1) deceased, (2) incarcerated in  a state prison facility, (3) in the custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons  (BOP), or (4) the subject of an active warrant at the time of the passport   We conducted this matching on the basis of common data  issuance.elements including Social Security number (SSN), name, and date of  birth. We also analyzed the passport data to identify issuances to  applicants who provided an invalid SSN, which was defined as an SSN  that had not been assigned at the time of the passport application, or had  a high risk of misuse. Because our review focused on passport issuances  with certain fraud indicators, we did not review other types of passport  fraud, such as identity theft involving individuals who were not deceased  or imprisoned. Similarly, since we focused on high-risk issuances  involving applicants with active warrants, we did not match the passport  data against all databases with individuals at risk of misusing a passport,  such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Screening Center  data. We only reviewed data with passport issuances, therefore we did  not examine passport applications that were rejected or abandoned by  the applicant. In addition, our unit of analysis was passport issuances,  instead of passport holders. Some individuals in our sample may have  been issued multiple passports.
In addition, we examined policies, guidance, including the Foreign Affairs  Manual, and other materials provided to passport specialists. We  reviewed changes to State’s controls since fiscal years 2009 and 2010  with respect to preventing certain fraudulent or high-risk passport  issuances. We also assessed the reliability of State’s passport data,  TECS travel activity data provided by the Financial Crimes Enforcement  Network (FinCEN), the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) full death  file, prisoner databases provided by the BOP and by departments of  corrections in 15 selected states, as well as data on individuals with open  warrants provided by the Marshals Service, by reviewing relevant  documentation, interviewing knowledgeable agency officials, and  examining the data for obvious errors and inconsistencies. We concluded  that all but four of these databases were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report. Through data tests and interviews, we concluded  that state prisoner data from Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, and  Pennsylvania were not sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We did not  assess the reliability of state prisoner data from North Carolina because  they were not provided in time to be included in our analysis.
To identify individuals using the SSN of a deceased individual, we  matched State passport data to SSA’s full death file as of September  2011. The full death file contains all of SSA’s death records, including  state-reported death information. We included only those individuals who  died more than 120 days before the passport was issued to ensure that  our matches did not include legitimate applicants who died shortly after  submitting an application. We further divided these passport applications  into two groups on the basis of whether the name in the passport file  matched the name in the corresponding death file record.
From 13,470 passport records with names that did not match the  corresponding record in the full death file, we selected a stratified random  sample that consisted of 140 passport issuances, evenly divided between  fiscal years 2009 and 2010. For each case, we examined a copy of the  original passport application and submitted the SSN from State’s passport  data to SSA for verification. We analyzed these cases to determine  whether the applicant provided the correct SSN and State recorded it  incorrectly, or whether the applicant provided the wrong SSN and State  recorded the incorrect SSN in its system. Our estimates had a margin of  error of at most +/-9 percentage points for the entire population, at the 95  percent confidence level.
From 181 passport records with names that matched the corresponding  record in the death file, we randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample  of 15 records for additional analysis. To verify that these individuals were  deceased at the time their identity was used to apply for a passport, we  attempted to obtain a death certificate for each applicant. In some cases,  we were unable to obtain a death certificate because we could not identify  the state in which the individual’s death was recorded or because state  officials could not or would not provide the death certificate to us. The  results of this sample are not generalizable to the entire population of  applicants using the SSN and name of a deceased person.
To identify individuals incarcerated at the time of passport issuance, we  matched State passport data to a database of federal prisoners provided  by the BOP and prisoner databases from Alabama, Arizona, California,  Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia.  Federal prisoner data included individuals incarcerated during fiscal years  2009 and 2010. State prisoner data included individuals incarcerated as  of the date the state provided data to us, which ranged from May to  November 2011. We identified records for which the passport applicant’s  SSN, name, and date of birth matched that of a person who was  incarcerated on the date of passport issuance. State prisoner data from  Florida, New York, and Texas did not contain dates of birth. For these  states, we matched passport data to state prison data by SSN and name  only. From our matches, we randomly selected 15 federal prisoners and  up to 2 prisoners incarcerated in each of the states for additional analysis.  If a state had two or fewer valid matches, we selected all matches from  that state, for a total of 14 cases from eight different states. Three states  did not have any matches. We obtained documentation from BOP and  prison officials from the eight states to confirm that the selected  individuals were incarcerated on the dates of passport application and  issuance. The results of these samples are not generalizable to the entire  population of applicants using the name, SSN, or date of birth of an  incarcerated person. However, the cases offered insights on applicants  who potentially used the identity of prisoners to apply for passports, and  related efforts by State to identify such individuals.
To identify individuals with active warrants at the time they applied for a  passport, we matched State passport data to warrant data provided by  the Marshals Service. We identified records for which the passport  applicant’s SSN, name (or alias), and date of birth matched that of an  individual with an open warrant on the date of passport issuance. From  this population, we randomly selected 15 warrants for crimes other than  misdemeanors and traffic violations for additional analysis. We confirmed  with the Marshals Service that all 15 individuals had warrants related to  felony charges. In addition, we referred to documentation provided by the  Marshals Service that had warrant information for each case. We  compared the warrant dates, the SSNs, names, and dates of birth, if  available, in the warrant data we received from the Marshals Service for  our matching analysis to the hard-copy documentation. For all 15 cases,  the warrant issuance dates, as well as the names and fugitive unique  identifiers, in the hard-copy documentation matched the information in the  warrant data we used to match with the passport database. In addition,  for 12 cases, at least one date of birth and SSN noted in the hard-copy  documentation matched the warrant data used for our matching analysis.  The dates of birth and SSNs in the documentation for 3 of the 15  individuals were redacted, and therefore the match was based on name  and unique identifier only. The results of this sample are not generalizable  to the entire population of applicants using the name (or alias), SSN, and  date of birth of a fugitive, but provided insights about State’s efforts to  identify such individuals during the adjudication process.
Because we matched passport data to databases of deceased  individuals, prisoners, and fugitives using two or more identifiers—SSN,  name, date of birth—we are generally confident in the accuracy of our  results. However, in some cases, our matches may include applicants  who were not deceased, incarcerated, or the subject of an active warrant.  This can occur when a passport applicant has an SSN, name, and date of  birth that are similar to an individual listed in one of the other databases  or when the applicant is listed in the other database erroneously. In  addition, our matches may be understated because we may not have  detected applicants whose identifying information in the passport data  differed slightly from their identifying information in other databases.  Moreover, federal warrant data do not contain information on all  individuals with an open warrant issued by a state court.
We analyzed State passport data to identify issuances to individuals  using an invalid SSN. We defined invalid SSNs as SSNs that had not  been issued as of fiscal year 2010 or commonly misused SSNs. SSNs  with certain digit combinations, such as those starting with 000 or 666,  had never been issued as of fiscal year 2010. Commonly misused SSNs  include single-character SSNs, or SSNs that have been publically  disclosed in advertisements. From this population, we selected 15 cases  for additional analysis. The results of this sample are not generalizable to  the entire population of applicants using an invalid SSN, but the cases  provided insights on State’s controls related to identifying inaccurate  SSNs on passport applications. In total, we selected 214 cases for  additional analysis, as shown in figure 12.
In all, we selected a total of 214 passport issuances for additional review  for our five nongeneralizable and one generalizable samples. For each of  the 214 passport issuances selected, we reviewed a copy of the original  passport application, verified the SSN in State’s passport data using  SSA’s database, and obtained records of the passport holder’s travel  activity from FinCEN. We also reviewed State documentation of additional  investigative activities taken in any of our cases. Where applicable, we  obtained additional documentation about the death, incarceration, or  fugitive status of applicants from federal and state agencies, and follow- up actions planned or taken by State. We could not determine whether  the passport issuance was inappropriate or fraudulent without additional  investigation of the facts and circumstances for each individual case. We  were not able to perform these investigations due to restrictions on the  use of State’s passport data. The period required for our review was a  result of various factors, including a data-sharing negotiation with State,  time required to receive requested data and documentation, extensive  data preparation and analysis involving multiple databases, and the  necessity for resource-intensive reviews of information on-site, given the  sensitivity of certain information.
We performed this audit from March 2010 through May 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Passport Application and Adjudication Process
paragraphs: This figure is a printable version of the interactive graphic presented  above, which provides an overview of the passport application and  adjudication process.
section_title: Appendix III: The Department of State’s (State) Use of the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) Records for Death Checks
paragraphs: In April 2007, State and SSA signed an information-exchange agreement  that allows State to automatically query SSA’s Enumeration Verification  System records for verifying applicants’ identities and identifying  deceased individuals. SSA provides State the death status of an applicant  when all identifying fields—the Social Security number (SSN), name, and  date of birth on the passport application—match an SSA record.  However, if one of these identifying elements does not match, SSA will  not provide a response with respect to death status. For example, SSA  would not provide State a death status if an applicant submitted the SSN  of a deceased individual but used a different name. Figure 14  summarizes the potential responses State receives from SSA.
section_title: Appendix IV: Description of Warrant- Matching Analysis
paragraphs: Out of the approximately 28 million combined passport issuances we  reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 1,096 individuals  whose Social Security number (SSN), name, and date of birth were  associated with 1,309 warrants in data provided by the Marshals Service  from the Justice Detainee Information Center database. Of these 1,309  warrants, we identified 486 passport issuances to individuals who may  have had active felony warrants at the time of application submission.  Over half of the 1,309 warrants were for offenses such as misdemeanors  and traffic violations. According to officials at the Department of State  (State), the department has no regulatory authority to take action on  misdemeanor warrants.
Officials from the Marshals Service said the agency tracks other warrants  for federal agencies, including those related to misdemeanors and traffic  offenses, as well as cases at the state level that require the assistance of  the Marshals Service. Officials of the Marshals Service also said they do  not have responsibility for entering information about such warrants into  the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, and therefore  such warrants are classified as non–Class 1 warrants. On the other hand,  Class 1 warrants are those that the Marshals Service is responsible for  entering into NCIC and that it transmits to State’s Consular Lookout and  Support System (CLASS) for adjudication.
Marshals Service officials told us that of the 1,309 warrants we identified  in our matching analysis, 111 (9 percent) were Class 1 warrants. Because  the Marshals Service only transmits Class 1 warrants into CLASS, State  would have identified the non–Class 1 warrants only if it received them  from another source, such as warrants provided by the Federal Bureau of  Investigation. Table 1 lists the types of open warrants we identified from  our matching analysis.
Some of the 1,309 passport issuances we identified with active warrants  were associated with felony offenses, including violent crimes ranging  from assault to homicide. Ten of the warrants were associated with  border and immigration crimes such as smuggling aliens and immigration  violations. State may have identified and reviewed these warrants during  the adjudication process, and decided to issue the passport after  reviewing and resolving the circumstances of the case. We referred all  our matches to State for further review and investigation.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact above, Heather Dunahoo (Assistant Director);  Hiwotte Amare; James Ashley; Patricia Donahue; Richard Hillman; Leslie  Kirsch; Maria McMullen; Sandra Moore; Anthony Moran; James Murphy;  Rebecca Shea; and Gavin Ugale made key contributions to this report.