Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities during Disasters
Published: 2010-03-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In addition to its primary mission of warfighting, the Department of Defense (DOD) plays an important role in civil support. Four years after the poorly coordinated national response to Hurricane Katrina, issues remain about DOD's progress in identifying its capability requirements for supporting a coordinated civilian-military response to a catastrophic domestic event. This report addresses the extent to which DOD (1) has identified and addressed its capability gaps for its civil support mission; (2) has clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and relationships and identified appropriate levels and types of personnel to assign to the FEMA regions; and (3) shares and tracks information concerning its civil support requirements response process with civil authorities. To do this, GAO analyzed DOD civil support guidance and plans and met with DOD and FEMA officials regarding the support that civilian authorities may request during a catastrophic incident.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has identified capability gaps for its civil support mission by completing a capabilities-based assessment, but key DOD policies and guidance for the civil support mission are outdated, limiting DOD's ability to fully address capability gaps. DOD's strategic guidance requires that it anticipate requests for civil support by identifying capability gaps. However, inconsistency and misalignment across DOD's policies, strategy, and doctrine for civil support make it difficult for DOD to address capability gaps and pre-position equipment and supplies. GAO found this was due to outdated key DOD policies and guidance that do not reflect DOD's current organizational framework for providing assistance to civil authorities. If DOD updates key policies for civil support, it will be better able to address capability gaps and provide timely and appropriate support to civil authorities. DOD has increased its personnel dedicated to coordinate civilian requests for assistance, but it has not clearly defined their roles, responsibilities, and relationships, and its staffing is not based upon a staffing assessment by FEMA region. DOD guidance calls for coordination with federal and state authorities on military capabilities for civil support. However, while the Defense Coordinating Officer program has improved civil authorities' overall awareness of DOD's capabilities, roles, and responsibilities, command and control and coordination among the Defense Coordinating Officers and the military services' liaison officers have been confusing and sometimes problematic because DOD's civil support guidance is outdated. Further, DOD officials noted that staffing of the Defense Coordinating Officer program should reflect its multiservice environment and the unique challenges of each FEMA region. Different FEMA regions are prone to different disasters and have varying needs for DOD support, but the size and composition of the Defense Coordinating Officers' staff--nearly all from the Army--were not based on a staffing needs assessment. Therefore, they do not necessarily reflect variations in the support needs of the regions. As a result, DOD may be missing an opportunity to optimize its ability to provide a coordinated response to civil authorities with appropriate multiservice capabilities. While DOD follows established processes in responding to requests for assistance from civil authorities, it has not established a system to track civilian requests that is accessible to DOD's interagency partners. The National Response Framework broadly identifies how DOD responds to requests for assistance, and DOD guidance further specifies DOD's processes. However, civil authorities are not fully aware of the length of this process. While DOD has several different tracking systems in use by different DOD components for the civil support mission, it lacks a formal, interoperable, and unclassified system for tracking all requests for assistance across DOD. Without such a system, gaps will remain in gaining real-time situational awareness and maintaining a common operational picture of DOD support for all federal partners in disaster-response missions including DOD.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United States continues to face an uncertain, complex security  environment with the potential for natural disasters and terrorist attacks.  After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Department of Defense  (DOD) established the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in October  2002 to provide for and manage DOD’s homeland defense and civil support  missions in the continental United States and Alaska. The poorly  coordinated national response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 further  highlighted the need for a more coordinated and integrated civilian and  military response to a major domestic incident. Eight years after the  September 11 attacks, nearly 4 years after Hurricane Katrina, and while  engaging in two major overseas operations, issues remain about DOD’s  ability to provide defense support to civil authorities. Specifically, two  issues are whether DOD has made progress in understanding the  requirements for DOD capabilities needed to support civil authorities in  the event of catastrophic incidents, as well as recognizing the capabilities  of local, tribal, state, territorial, and federal civilian authorities—a key  component in identifying any DOD shortfalls or capability gaps.
While DOD is the primary federal agency for homeland defense, it is not  the primary federal agency for civil support; rather, it serves as a  supporting federal agency to the Federal Emergency Management Agency  (FEMA) and other federal civilian agencies in domestic disaster situations  in which local, tribal, state, territorial, and other federal resources are  overwhelmed. As the combatant commands charged with carrying out  DOD’s domestic civil support mission, NORTHCOM and U.S. Pacific  Command (PACOM) face a unique challenge in planning for and  coordinating civil support missions, because they must work with and  respond to the needs of 56 separate and often unique state and territorial  governments. Additionally, NORTHCOM and PACOM have to coordinate  with numerous federal agencies that also have roles in planning for and  responding to a wide variety of incidents in the homeland, as reflected in  the National Response Framework. However, DOD operates in support of  civil authorities only when directed to do so by the President or the  Secretary of Defense. In such instances, NORTHCOM (or PACOM) would  command only the federal military portion of such operations in direct  support of another federal agency, such as FEMA or the U.S. Secret  Service.
Since the establishment of NORTHCOM in 2002, we have periodically  evaluated and reported on issues related to its ability to carry out its  missions. Most recently, we evaluated NORTHCOM’s exercise program,  identifying the program’s strengths as well as gaps in areas such as  planning, coordination with states and interagency partners, and ways to  improve NORTHCOM’s participation in the National Exercise Program.  We also recently reported on planning, resourcing, and training challenges  for DOD’s response to domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,  and high-yield explosive incidents (CBRNE).
While DOD plays an important role in civil support, warfighting remains its  primary mission. Therefore, with the exception of key specialized  capabilities for its CBRNE consequence-management mission, DOD relies  on its “dual-mission forces” to provide all other civil support capabilities in  addition to existing overseas missions. Additionally, unlike some  combatant commands such as European Command, NORTHCOM has few  forces permanently assigned to it; therefore, like all commands that have  few forces assigned to them, NORTHCOM must request forces from Joint  Forces Command, through the Joint Staff, in order to perform its civil  support mission. To plan, prepare for, and carry out their civil support  mission, NORTHCOM and PACOM may rely on other DOD organizations  and commands for assistance.
Both NORTHCOM and PACOM have established, primarily under their  respective Army component commands, Defense Coordinating Officers  with staff known as Defense Coordinating Elements, to serve as DOD  representatives to civilian authorities in the 10 FEMA regions. The  Defense Coordinating Officers and Elements are colocated with the FEMA  regional staff and they attend meetings, planning conferences, exercises,  and other activities within their assigned regions and states. In that way  they can develop relationships with civilian authorities and gain an  understanding, or situational awareness, of civilian capabilities so that  DOD will know what, if anything, it may be called upon to provide in the  event of a disaster or other incident.
You asked us to examine a broad range of planning and operational  considerations related to DOD’s and NORTHCOM’s homeland defense and  civil support missions. This report addresses the extent to which DOD     (1) has identified and addressed its capability gaps for its civil support  mission; (2) has clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and relationships  and identified appropriate levels and types of personnel to assign to the  FEMA regions; and (3) shares and tracks information concerning its civil  support requirements response process with civil authorities. As agreed  with your offices, this report focuses on DOD’s support of civil authorities  for natural disasters. We did not address issues pertaining to civil support  for CBRNE consequence management, as these issues are addressed in  other GAO work. We are reporting separately to you on DOD’s  interagency coordination efforts with U.S. federal agencies for its  homeland defense and civil support missions.
To address our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed DOD, NORTHCOM,  and PACOM civil support guidance and plans, as well as DOD’s March  2009 Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based  Assessment. We met with officials in the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM,  PACOM, U.S. Transportation Command, and their component and  supporting commands to discuss the work and analysis that DOD has  conducted in order to understand what support civilian authorities may  ask the department to provide during a catastrophic incident. Additionally,  we met with FEMA officials at both the national and regional levels to  understand how they work with DOD both in identifying capability gaps  during planning stages and in channeling state and federal requests-for- assistance to DOD during an actual incident. During our visits to 4 of the  10 FEMA regions, we met with the Defense Coordinating Officers and  Defense Coordinating Elements in those regions to discuss their roles as  DOD’s representatives to FEMA, other civilian authorities, and the  National Guard in their assigned states and regions. We conducted  telephone interviews with all 10 NORTHCOM Defense Coordinating  Officers and a survey with the 2 PACOM Defense Coordinating Officers,  which allowed us to gain a broad picture of DOD’s civil support activities  across the country. We used the results of these interviews and surveys,  our meetings with DOD and FEMA officials, and our review of documents  and guidance to identify areas for improvement in DOD’s ability to provide  support to and respond to requests-for-assistance from civil authorities.  Additional information on our scope and methodology appears in  appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2009 to March 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Framework for Disaster Response
paragraphs: To assist in integrating state and federal responses to domestic  emergencies, the Homeland Security Council developed 15 national  planning scenarios in 2004 whose purpose was to form the basis for  identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of  emergencies. The scenarios focus on the consequences that federal, state,  and local first responders may have to address, and they are intended to  illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic  emergencies for which the nation needs to be prepared. These include a  wide range of terrorist attacks involving nuclear, biological, and chemical  agents, as well as catastrophic natural disasters, such as an earthquake or  hurricane. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was  established in 2002 to, among other purposes, reduce America’s  vulnerability to terrorism, is the lead federal agency responsible for  preventing, preparing for, and responding to a wide range of major  domestic disasters and other emergencies. Then-President George W.  Bush designated DHS and its Secretary as the lead federal representative  responsible for domestic incident management and coordination of all- hazards preparedness. In 2008, DHS issued its National Response  Framework, which provides a framework for federal, state, and local  agencies to use in planning for emergencies and establishes standardized  doctrine, terminology, processes, and an integrated system for federal  response activities. Overall coordination of federal incident-management  activities, other than those conducted for homeland defense, is generally  the responsibility of DHS. Within DHS and as the executive agent for the  National Preparedness System, FEMA is responsible for coordinating and  integrating the preparedness of federal, state, local, tribal, and  nongovernmental entities.
Response to disasters or other catastrophic events in the United States is  guided by the National Response Framework and is based on a tiered  response to an incident; that is, incidents must be managed at the lowest  jurisdictional levels and supported by additional response capabilities as  needed (see fig. 1). Local and county governments respond to emergencies  daily using their own resources and rely on mutual aid agreements and  other types of assistance agreements with neighboring governments when  they need additional resources. For example, county and local authorities  are likely to have the resources needed to adequately respond to a small- scale incident, such as a local flood, and therefore will not request  additional resources. For larger-scale incidents, when resources are  overwhelmed, local and county governments will request assistance from  the state. States have capabilities, such as the National Guard, that can  help communities respond and recover. If additional resources are  required, the state may request assistance from other states through  interstate mutual aid agreements, such as the Emergency Management  Assistance Compact. If an incident surpasses community and state  capabilities, the governor can seek federal assistance. The federal  government has a wide array of capabilities and resources that can be  made available to assist state and local agencies to respond to incidents.
In accordance with the National Response Framework and applicable laws  including the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance  Act (Stafford Act) various federal departments or agencies may play  primary, coordinating, or supporting roles, based on their authorities and  resources and the nature of the threat or incident. In some instances,  national defense assets may be needed to assist FEMA or another agency  in the national response to an incident. Defense resources are committed  following approval by the Secretary of Defense or at the direction of the  President.
section_title: Military Mission and Organization
paragraphs: One of DOD’s missions is civil support, which includes domestic disaster  relief operations for incidents such as fires, hurricanes, floods,  earthquakes, National Special Security Events (for example, the opening  of the United Nations General Assembly, or the Democratic and  Republican National Conventions), counterdrug operations, and  consequence management for CBRNE events. As noted earlier, DOD is  not the primary federal agency for such missions (unless so designated by  the President) and thus it provides defense support of civil authorities only  when (1) state, local, and other federal resources are overwhelmed or  unique military capabilities are required; (2) assistance is requested by the  primary federal agency; and (3) either NORTHCOM or PACOM, the two  combatant commands with responsibility for civil support missions, is  directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense. When  deciding to commit defense resources, among other factors, defense  officials consider military readiness, appropriateness of the  circumstances, and whether the response is in accordance with the law.  For example, the Posse Comitatus Act allows military forces to provide  civil support, but these forces generally cannot become directly involved  in law enforcement. When they are called upon to support civil authorities,  NORTHCOM and PACOM generally operate through established joint task  forces that are subordinate to the command. In most cases, support will be  localized, limited, and specific. When the scope of the disaster is reduced  to the point where the primary federal agency can again assume full  control and management without military assistance, NORTHCOM and  PACOM will exit.
DOD established the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs to oversee homeland  defense and civil support activities for DOD, under the authority of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and, as appropriate, in coordination  with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This office develops  policies, conducts analysis, provides advice, and makes recommendations  on homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities, emergency  preparedness, and domestic crisis-management matters within the  department. The Assistant Secretary assists the Secretary of Defense in  providing policy directions to NORTHCOM and other applicable  combatant commands to guide the development and execution of  homeland defense plans and activities. This direction is provided through  the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This office is also responsible for  coordinating with DHS. While most of the National Guard’s roles and  responsibilities in the disaster-response area are not federal ones, the  Chief of the National Guard Bureau is a principal advisor to the Secretary  of Defense on matters involving nonfederalized National Guard forces. In  this role, the National Guard Bureau provides NORTHCOM, PACOM, and  other DOD organizations with information on National Guard capabilities  available in the states for disaster response so that DOD can better  anticipate what, if any, additional capabilities it may be asked to provide.
The process whereby DOD provides capabilities to assist civil authorities  has changed over the past 5 years. In 2004, a series of four hurricanes  struck Florida, and DOD received a large number of civil requests-for- assistance that all had to be approved by the Secretary of Defense. DOD  and others concluded that the process was time-consuming and  complicated. To streamline the process, the Joint Staff developed  operational guidance for DOD commands—referred to as an Execute  Order—modeled after the Execute Order for Operation Noble Eagle, the  North American Aerospace Defense Command’s activities to defend  American skies begun in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist  attacks. A standing Defense Support of Civil Authorities Execute Order  has been several times, but an important purpose has been to pre-identify  forces that NORTHCOM and PACOM can request from the Secretary of  Defense in the event of a disaster. The Execute Order places DOD  capabilities into four categories. Category 1 comprises capabilities  assigned to the combatant command (that is, the Defense Coordinating  Officer and staff, service component command staff, command and  control personnel, and communication capabilities). Category 2 comprises  pre-identified capabilities, such as helicopters for rapid area assessments,  C-130 aircraft that can refuel helicopters, and capabilities for search and  rescue, that NORTHCOM and PACOM can place on 24-hour prepare-to- deploy status after notifying the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of  Defense. Category 3 comprises capabilities for DOD use (for example,  combat camera, or public affairs). Category 4 comprises large-scale  response forces (rarely used except for large-scale disasters such as  Hurricane Katrina).
Finally, local installation and unit commanders have the authority to  respond to localized events as requested by local civilian authorities.  These responses, conducted under immediate response authority, do not  normally exceed 72 hours and require notification of the relevant service  commands as well as the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, local  installations may establish mutual aid agreements for things such as fire  and ambulance support with the communities surrounding their  installations. NORTHCOM and PACOM are not involved in either of these  responses. However, depending on the nature of the local incident,  including possibility of media involvement, NORTHCOM and PACOM may  receive a spot report regarding the local incident as part of the process of  informing DOD senior leadership.
section_title: Combatant Commands
paragraphs: NORTHCOM is the unified military command responsible for planning,  organizing, and executing DOD’s homeland defense and federal military  support to civil authorities’ missions within the continental United States,  Alaska, and U.S. territorial waters. PACOM has these responsibilities for  the Hawaiian Islands and U.S. territories in the Pacific. Both combatant  commands receive support from a variety of commands and organizations  in their direct chain of command and throughout DOD. Table 1 shows  examples of these commands.
section_title: DOD Civil Support Personnel
paragraphs: As part of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, NORTHCOM has  placed a Defense Coordinating Officer with associated support staff,  known as the Defense Coordinating Element, in each of FEMA’s 10  regional offices, placing greater emphasis on the Defense Coordinating  Officers’ mission. Figure 2 shows the 10 FEMA regions. Prior to October 1,  2006, the Defense Coordinating Officers had full-time jobs commanding  training units for the First and Fifth Continental U.S. Armies. The Defense  Coordinating Officers, along with their 40-person training staff, served  part-time as Defense Coordinating Officers and only did so when  requested by FEMA or another federal agency. Upon establishment of  Fifth U.S. Army as the Army component to NORTHCOM, 10 full-time  regional Defense Coordinating Officers were established and located in  the FEMA regional offices. Defense Coordinating Officers are senior-level  military officers (typically Army colonels) with joint experience and  training on the National Response Framework, defense support of civil  authorities, and DHS’s National Incident Management System. They are  responsible for assisting the primary federal agency when requested by  FEMA; they provide liaison support and requirements validation; and they  serve as single points of contact for state, local, and other federal  authorities that need DOD support. Defense Coordinating Officers work  closely with federal, state, and local officials to determine what unique  DOD capabilities can be used to assist in mitigating the effects of a natural  or man-made disaster. Since FEMA region IX is split between NORTHCOM  and PACOM, NORTHCOM has a Defense Coordinating Officer assigned to  the FEMA regional office in California and PACOM has established two  Defense Coordinating Officers within its area of operations. Currently,  there is a Navy civilian Defense Coordinating Officer for Guam and the  Northern Mariana Islands and a part-time, Army Reserve Defense  Coordinating Officer for Hawaii and American Samoa.
D.C.
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Additionally, the military services have Emergency Preparedness Liaison  Officers. These are senior Reserve officers (typically colonels or Navy  captains) from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps who  represent the federal military in each of the 10 FEMA regional offices and  in the states and territories. While they have some service-specific  responsibilities, Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers’ civil support  responsibilities include assisting the Defense Coordinating Officers with  service subject-matter expertise and coordinating the provision of military  personnel, equipment, and supplies to support the emergency relief and  cleanup efforts of civil authorities.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Actions to Identify Capability Gaps, but Key Policies and Guidance Are Outdated
subsections: section_title: NORTHCOM Led a Capabilities-Based Assessment That Identified DOD Capability Gaps for the Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions
paragraphs: DOD planning documents for its civil support mission require that DOD  maintain continuous situational awareness of its civil support operating  environment by identifying shortfalls in capabilities, planning, exercising,  and coordinating DOD efforts with its interagency partners. Further, in its  Vision 2020 statement, NORTHCOM identifies a strategic goal of  providing timely and effective civil support by anticipating requests for  support and providing military capabilities at the right place and the right  time. Accordingly, at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense  and in response to a request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, NORTHCOM agreed to  lead a department-wide, capabilities-based assessment for DOD’s  homeland defense and civil support missions. The strategic goals of the  effort were to enable improvement in DOD homeland defense and civil  support policy, evaluate existing DOD capabilities and identify DOD  capability gaps, improve DOD’s integration with interagency mission  partners, and recommend further action to promote future capability  development for the homeland defense and civil support missions. The  Deputy Secretary of Defense identified the capabilities-based assessment  as one of DOD’s top 25 transformational priorities to be completed or  advanced to a major milestone by December 2008. DOD conducted the  assessment between September 2007 and October 2008 in accordance with  DOD processes. DOD agencies, the combatant commands, the military  services, the National Guard Bureau, DHS, and other key federal  interagency partners participated in the assessment. The assessment did  not include participants from state and local governments.
The recently completed capabilities-based assessment identified 31  capability gaps for DOD’s homeland defense and civil support missions.  The 31 capability gaps were derived from an initial identification of 2,192  capabilities, tasks, and statements of required activity that define and  describe the homeland defense and civil support missions. According to  our analysis, the assessment identified 14 capability gaps related to the  civil support mission, 4 of which are CBRNE or law enforcement related,  and 17 gaps related to the homeland defense mission or mission assurance  function. The 10 civil support gaps related to natural disasters were:    Common Operational Picture,    Operational Intelligence Analysis and Dissemination,   Information Management and Sharing,    DOD Interagency Planning,    DOD Interagency Operations,    DOD Transportation Support,    Mass Care Support,    Assured Access to Electromagnetic Spectrum,    Logistical Health Medical Support, and  Isolation and Quarantine Support.
The capabilities-based assessment was limited in that (1) the nature of its  assumptions may have hidden other capability gaps and (2) DOD has not  received precise information from civil authorities on the capabilities it  will be asked to provide. First, one of the strategic assumptions guiding  the capabilities-based assessment is that DOD will provide a total force  (combined active and reserve component) response to support civil  authorities for domestic emergencies and other activities as directed.  However, as we have reported in prior work and raised as a matter for  congressional consideration, DOD has no legal authority to order Reserve  personnel to involuntary active duty service for the purpose of providing  civil support in the response to a natural disaster, which may limit DOD’s  ability to provide the capabilities requested by civil authorities in a timely  manner. For example, according to U.S. Transportation Command  officials, this lack of authority has made it difficult to access the personnel  it needs to perform its civil support operations, especially since about 88  percent of DOD’s capabilities for aeromedical evacuation operations are  assigned to the reserve component. U.S. Transportation Command  officials said they have been able to rely on volunteers from the service  Reserves to meet their civil support requirements thus far, but they noted  that, in the event of multiple disaster requirements that overwhelm state  capabilities, U.S. Transportation Command might not be able to provide  the capabilities requested due to the lack of authority to order service  Reservists to active duty service to respond to disasters. DOD officials we  interviewed told us that the department has advocated a change to this  legislative status, but that the states have opposed the change due to  issues involving state sovereignty.
Second, while the assessment provided a general discussion of the civil  support capability shortfalls it identified, it concluded that a precise scope  of many of these shortfalls could not be determined because several  strategic policy questions remained unanswered. There is a lack of  interagency understanding and agreement on the extent of capabilities  requested by civil authorities that DOD is expected to provide, and on how  quickly DOD is expected to provide them. For example, Emergency  Support Function #8: Public Health and Medical Services Annex to the  National Response Framework, requests that DOD provide support for  evacuating seriously ill or injured patients, but it does not provide  specifics on the amount of capabilities that DOD should provide, or the  timeliness of DOD’s response for providing these capabilities. We  previously reported that NORTHCOM has difficulty identifying  requirements for capabilities it may need in part because NORTHCOM  does not have more detailed information from DHS and the states on the  specific requirements needed from the military in the event of a disaster.  For DOD’s civil support mission, the requirements are established by the  needs of the federal, state, and local agencies and organizations that DOD  would be supporting in an actual event. In January 2008, the Commission  on the National Guard and Reserves noted that DHS had not defined the  requirements that DOD must meet to adequately perform its civil support  mission. Several DOD officials we spoke with said that one of the biggest  challenges in providing defense support of civil authorities is that civil  authorities have not yet defined the capability requirements that DOD  might be requested to provide in the event of a disaster. FEMA is  responsible for establishing a comprehensive system to assess the nation’s  prevention capabilities and overall preparedness. However, our prior work  has shown that FEMA faces methodological and coordination challenges  in completing the system and issuing required reports on national  preparedness.
DOD and DHS have undertaken some recent initiatives to address gaps in  strategic planning that should assist DOD in identifying its capability  requirements for the civil support mission. For example, during the course  of our work, DOD and DHS were implementing the Integrated Planning  System, which includes a process for fostering integration of federal,  state, local, and tribal plans that allows for state, local, and tribal  capability assessments to feed into federal plans. In conjunction with  officials from federal, state, and local government as well as the private  sector, DOD and DHS recently issued catastrophic plans for responding to  and recovering from a category 4 hurricane in Hawaii. These plans were  developed in accordance with the Integrated Planning System. DOD and  FEMA officials in Hawaii with whom we spoke said that this was an  important milestone because it represented the first time that DOD’s  capability requirements had been identified and formally agreed to by  interagency stakeholders. As another example, DHS has also established a  Task Force for Emergency Readiness pilot initiative that seeks to integrate  federal and state planning efforts for catastrophic events. Five states are  currently participating in the initiative, and officials from the Office of the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’  Security Affairs told us that the initiative should assist the states in  identifying their capability requirements for catastrophic events, which in  turn should assist DOD in determining the capabilities it may be asked to  provide. As a third example, the National Guard Bureau recently  completed an assessment of National Guard capabilities for domestic  missions by conducting a series of regional war games. A major goal of the  effort was to identify National Guard capability gaps and provide  recommendations on how to address these gaps.
section_title: Key Policies and Guidance for DOD’s Civil Support Mission Are Outdated, Inconsistent, and Unclear
subsections: section_title: DOD Policies Are Outdated
paragraphs: DOD’s capabilities-based assessment highlighted a lack of alignment  across DOD’s policies, strategy, and doctrine for its civil support mission,  making it difficult to determine DOD’s capability requirements. We  determined that this is due, in part, to outdated key policy directives. In  many cases, DOD’s policy guidance does not reflect widely accepted  terminology or the organizational structure that DOD has developed for  providing assistance to civil authorities. For example, DOD Directive  3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities,” which defines disaster  response and outlines the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  Unified Commands, and other DOD components and military services that  respond to a civil emergency, was issued in January 1993—almost 10 years  prior to the establishment of NORTHCOM. DOD’s implementing guidance  for this directive, 3025.1-M, “Manual for Civil Emergencies,” was issued in  1994 and DOD Directive 3025.15, “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities,”  which establishes DOD policy for evaluating requests for disaster  assistance, was issued in February 1997. This guidance further states that  the Department of the Army is the DOD executive agent for military  support to civil authorities, and is responsible for developing planning  guidance, plans, and procedures on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.  Since NORTHCOM’s creation, the 2008 Unified Command Plan and the  Forces for Unified Command Memorandum state that both NORTHCOM  and PACOM, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are  responsible for providing support to civil authorities within their areas of  responsibility.
Moreover, a 2009 DOD directive, DOD Directive 5111.13, established the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’  Security Affairs as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for  DOD’s civil support mission. The DOD policy directives are not aligned  with DOD and national-level guidance in that they use outdated  terminology. For example, the 1993 and 1997 DOD directives use the terms  “military support” and “military assistance” to describe the types of  support DOD provides to civil authorities, but DOD currently uses the  term “defense support of civil authorities.” The latter term has been widely  accepted by the defense community and is part of current strategy,  doctrine, and plans, including the Strategy for Homeland Defense and  Civil Support, as well as interagency documents, such as the National  Response Framework. DOD is considering a new draft directive for  defense support of civil authorities that will supersede the old policy  directives and provide overarching policy guidance for its civil support  mission. However, the draft directive has been under review for about 4  years and has yet to be finalized. According to officials from the Office of  the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’  Security Affairs, the draft directive has taken longer to finalize than  expected because of the evolving nature of DOD’s civil support mission.  These officials noted that defense support of civil authorities has been  difficult to define because DOD’s civil support mission has shifted from a  military service-centric to a more unified, joint effort, as exemplified by  the establishment of NORTHCOM.
section_title: DOD Policies Are Inconsistent and Unclear
paragraphs: The military services’ implementing guidance for DOD’s civil support  mission, DOD 3025.1-M, is based on the DOD directives that were issued in  1993 and 1997, but DOD joint doctrine and planning documents reference  the draft DOD directive. While DOD recognizes that there are  circumstances in which new doctrine would influence policy, the normal  progression is for policy to drive doctrine and thereby influence training  and the conduct of operations. Thus, we note that incomplete DOD policy  guidance for its civil support mission may lead to confusion and  misunderstanding among the military services and other DOD components  regarding the proper employment of defense capabilities in support of civil  authorities.
One of the chief examples of the confusion caused by DOD’s outdated  policies and their lack of alignment with other published documents is the  disparate perceptions of the components as to the importance of the civil  support mission. According to the DOD homeland defense and civil  support capabilities-based assessment, DOD strategy and joint doctrine  recognize the department’s civil support mission, but DOD policy prohibits  the DOD components from procuring or maintaining any supplies,  materiel, or equipment exclusively for their civil support mission, unless  otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. The capabilities-based  assessment noted that some DOD components have interpreted this policy  statement to signify that DOD does not program or budget for civil support  capabilities. We found this view was prevalent among DOD officials we  interviewed, even though DOD policy does not preclude DOD agencies  from programming and budgeting for civil support capabilities—rather, it  requires that they obtain direction from the Secretary of Defense to do  so. Further, strategy and joint guidance also do not provide clarity about  funding and priority of the civil support mission. The DOD Strategy for  Homeland Defense and Civil Support states that DOD will maintain  capabilities to assist civil authorities in responding to catastrophic  incidents. However, while the strategy implies that DOD will program and  budget for capabilities for responding to catastrophic incidents, it does not  directly state this for the civil support mission. Additionally, Joint  Publication 3-28, Civil Support, recognizes civil support as a DOD mission  but states that civil support capabilities are derived from DOD warfighting  capabilities that could be applied to domestic assistance and law  enforcement support.
The capabilities-based assessment concluded that lack of alignment across  a range of policy, strategy, and doctrinal actions have made it difficult to  develop and implement coherent recommendations regarding capabilities  for DOD’s civil support mission. According to NORTHCOM and U.S.  Transportation Command officials, these inconsistencies in policy,  strategy, and doctrine and in DOD officials’ interpretation of them may  limit DOD’s ability to pre-position forces and equipment for life-saving  missions, such as aeromedical evacuations prior to a hurricane making  landfall along the coastal United States. These officials cited the  importance of pre-positioning forces, because aeromedical and patient  evacuation operations are to be concluded no later than 18 hours before a  major hurricane’s landfall. They said that it is difficult for DOD to spend  money to alert the personnel who are needed to perform these missions.  According to U.S. Transportation Command officials, DOD and FEMA  have agreed on a prescripted mission assignment that would provide DOD  with an estimated $986,388 in “surge” funding for these operations.  However, U.S. Transportation Command officials said that additional  funds are still needed to alert personnel and pre-position forces, and  thereby ensure that they can perform the life-saving mission successfully.
We also found that DOD has not fully exercised available funding  authorities to support its civil support operations. Congress has  established a Defense Emergency Response Fund to reimburse DOD for  providing disaster or emergency assistance to other federal agencies and  to state and local governments in anticipation of reimbursable requests.  However, a June 2008 report from the DOD Inspector General found that  DOD had not used any funds from this account for domestic disaster or  emergency relief assistance since it was established in November 1989.  An official from DOD’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs acknowledged that the  Defense Emergency Response Fund could be a source of funding but did  not know why the fund has not been used for civil support operations.
section_title: DOD Has Personnel to Coordinate DOD Capabilities for Civil Support, but Roles, Responsibilities, and Command Relationships Are Not Clearly Defined, and DOD Has Not Assessed Its Staff Needs
subsections: section_title: Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers Constitute Important DOD Capabilities for Civil Support
paragraphs: DOD guidance and the National Response Framework state that the  Defense Coordinating Officer, when requested by civil authorities and  approved by DOD, serves as the single point of contact for DOD at the  FEMA regions, and is responsible for coordinating with federal and state  authorities on the use of military capabilities for defense support of civil  authorities. DOD Directive 3025.1 (1993), and the implementing guidance  for this directive, 3025.1-M, “Manual for Civil Emergencies” (1994), define  the roles and responsibilities of the Defense Coordinating Officers.  According to this guidance, Defense Coordinating Officer responsibilities  require knowledge of military capabilities and of how to access military  assets to support validated requirements.
As of 2006, DOD permanently assigned 10 full-time Defense Coordinating  Officers, along with a full-time supporting staff known as the Defense  Coordinating Element, to each FEMA region, and colocated all of them  with the FEMA regional headquarters. FEMA officials we interviewed said  that these actions have greatly improved coordination among DOD, FEMA,  and other civil authorities; previously, they said, their understanding of  DOD capabilities was limited because they had only infrequent contact  with the Defense Coordinating Officers. These FEMA officials said that the  Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense Coordinating Elements,  especially the Defense Coordinating Element’s planners, have improved  civilian authorities’ awareness of DOD’s capabilities by providing disaster  planning expertise to civil authorities and by routinely participating in  disaster exercises, planning conferences, and workshops throughout the  FEMA regions. For example, they said, Defense Coordinating Officers  have especially improved FEMA’s awareness of DOD’s logistical  capabilities by informing FEMA about DOD installations and bases,  located throughout the FEMA regions, that could be used as staging areas  to pre-position commodities and supplies. Defense Coordinating Officers  and Defense Coordinating Elements told us that having a full-time  presence in the FEMA regions has allowed them to build effective  relationships and establish trust with civil authorities. According to  NORTHCOM officials, the Defense Coordinating Officers are a key means  of gaining insight into civil authorities’ capabilities, thus assisting  NORTHCOM in better anticipating civil support requirements.
The military services’ Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers assist the  Defense Coordinating Officers in executing their civil support  responsibilities. DOD Directive 3025.16, “Military Emergency  Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Program” (2000), establishes DOD  policy for the management of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer  program and creates additional points of contact within the military  services for federal and state coordination of resources for emergency  response. This policy directive states that the military services are  responsible for ensuring that Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers  are trained and equipped to meet the requirements of DOD’s civil support  mission. Additionally, DOD’s 3025.1-M, “Manual for Civil Emergencies,”  establishes doctrinal procedures necessary for implementation of the  Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer program to provide civil support  under DOD Directive 3025.1. It provides for the establishment of  Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer teams at the FEMA regions and  states, and it defines the roles and responsibilities of the Emergency  Preparedness Liaison Officers. Defense Coordinating Officers told us that  the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers play a critical role in  assisting them in day-to-day operations; in exercises that are designed to  simulate a real-life disaster; and in disasters. For example, the Emergency  Preparedness Liaison Officers routinely provide situational awareness at  both the state and FEMA regional levels by participating in meetings,  planning workshops, and conferences; by establishing relationships with  federal and state disaster-management officials, including the National  Guard; and by reviewing state and federal agency disaster plans. Several of  the Defense Coordinating Officers told us that the Emergency  Preparedness Liaison Officers are their key source of information on state  capabilities. During exercises and actual disasters, the Emergency  Preparedness Liaison Officers will deploy to the State Joint Force  Headquarters, state emergency operation centers, Joint Field Offices, or  FEMA’s Regional Response Coordination Centers and assist the Defense  Coordinating Officer in validating requests-for-assistance. They provide  the Defense Coordinating Officer with expertise on the capabilities that  are available from their respective military services, and they serve as  liaisons between the Defense Coordinating Officer and their military  services, the federal agencies responsible for the Emergency Support  Function activities, state emergency management officials, and National  Guard officials. Almost all of the Defense Coordinating Officers indicated  to us that the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers were important to  a great or moderate extent for gaining knowledge of gaps in state disaster  capabilities.
section_title: DOD Has Not Clearly Defined Roles, Responsibilities, or Command and Control Relationships for DOD’s Civil Support Coordination Personnel
paragraphs: DOD has not updated or clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of  the Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness Liaison  Officers that it has assigned to the FEMA regions, due to gaps in policy  and guidance for its civil support mission. As we have previously stated,  DOD has not updated its key policies and guidance for the civil support  mission, namely DOD Directive 3025.1 (1993), or the implementing  guidance for this directive, 3025.1-M, “Manual for Civil Emergencies.” This  guidance continues to define the roles and responsibilities of the Defense  Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, even  though significant changes have occurred in DOD’s command  responsibilities and organizational structure for executing its civil support  mission. Most notably, NORTHCOM and PACOM now have the  responsibility for executing the civil support mission within their areas of  responsibility, something not accounted for in the earlier guidance.  Furthermore, DOD Directive 3025.16, DOD’s guidance for the Emergency  Preparedness Liaison Officer program, has not been updated since 2000— about 2 years prior to the establishment of NORTHCOM.
Since DOD has permanently assigned the Defense Coordinating Officers to  the FEMA regions, their roles and responsibilities for the civil support  mission have expanded, yet the existing guidance does not reflect their  additional responsibilities. For example, DOD guidance defines the roles  and responsibilities of the Defense Coordinating Officers only after they  have been activated—even though Defense Coordinating Officers perform  many activities prior to being activated, in an effort to assist NORTHCOM  in anticipating civil support requirements. These activities may include  establishing liaison among military, state, and other federal agencies;  coordinating with service officials regarding the potential use of military  service installations and bases for civil support operations; participating in  federal, regional, state, and local disaster exercises, planning workshops,  and conferences; and providing disaster planning expertise to civil  authorities. In addition, according to a Defense Coordinating Officer we  interviewed, the Defense Coordinating Officers will routinely provide  assistance to civil authorities prior to being officially activated when it  appears that a disaster declaration may be imminent.
subsections: section_title: Command and Control Challenges
paragraphs: Further, DOD lacks guidance on how the Defense Coordinating Officers  are to work with the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers for the civil  support mission. DOD’s Joint Staff Defense Support of Civil Authorities  Standing Execute Order identifies the Emergency Preparedness Liaison  Officers as military service assets that may be activated by the military  service Secretaries in response to a disaster. It also states that the Defense  Coordinating Officer has tactical control of the Emergency Preparedness  Liaison Officers requested by NORTHCOM. According to a NORTHCOM  official, this operational framework is improvised as needed, and has not  been included in any other DOD guidance. The command relationship  between Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness  Liaison Officers is therefore not clearly understood throughout the DOD  organizations responsible for planning and executing civil support  missions.
These gaps in guidance that we have identified may limit the ability of the  Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness Liaison  Officers to fully and effectively coordinate and provide DOD capabilities to  civil authorities. For example, according to several Defense Coordinating  Officers we interviewed, service officials, and a DOD Inspector General  September 2008 report, in some instances the military services have not  been willing to activate their Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers to  participate in training and exercises with the Defense Coordinating  Officers. Further, some military service officials told us that their  Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers are required to meet training  and exercise requirements established by their military services, and these  requirements can sometimes conflict with the training and exercise  requirements identified by the Defense Coordinating Officers. DOD  officials also told us that there has been friction and confusion between  the military services and the Defense Coordinating Officers regarding the  proper employment of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers. For  example, military service officials told us that Defense Coordinating  Officers have attempted to exert command and control over their military  service Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers before they were  officially activated. Although Defense Coordinating Officers and  NORTHCOM officials said that the Defense Coordinating Officer and  Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer relationship has been generally  cooperative, they noted that Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers on  occasion have not provided assistance when requested by the Defense  Coordinating Officers. DOD officials told us that the command and control  relationship between the Defense Coordinating Officers—who are nearly  all Army personnel—and the Army’s Emergency Preparedness Liaison  Officers is clearer, resulting in less friction. This is because the Army has  delegated operational control over the Army Emergency Preparedness  Liaison Officers to the Defense Coordinating Officers on a day-to-day  basis. However, the other military services have not done so; prior to  activation for an event or exercise, the Defense Coordinating Officers have  only coordinating relationships with the Emergency Preparedness Liaison  Officers from the other services. Figure 3 shows an organizational chart of  the Defense Coordinating Officer and Emergency Preparedness Liaison  Officer team.
The command and control and coordination challenges we have described  exist because the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers are under the  operational command and control of their respective military services,  while the Defense Coordinating Officers remain under the operational  command and control of the combatant commands—NORTHCOM and  PACOM. A 2008 report by the DOD Inspector General highlighted  inefficiencies regarding coordination in DOD disaster training and  exercises due, in part, to a lack of Emergency Preparedness Liaison  Officer participation, and recommended that NORTHCOM determine  whether the DOD 3025 series of directives provides adequate authority to  Defense Coordinating Officers to ensure that DOD maintains an  adequately trained and exercised Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer  program. In recognition of their critical role in planning, coordinating,  and executing DOD’s civil support mission, NORTHCOM has attempted to  establish standard requirements for the Emergency Preparedness Liaison  Officers in the following seven general areas: organization and structure;  roles and responsibilities; qualification, selection, and administration;  equipping and resourcing; training and professional development;  operations and command and control; and reporting. However, the  military services have opposed this NORTHCOM initiative, on the grounds  that their Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers have additional duties  to their respective services aside from assisting the Defense Coordinating  Officers. NORTHCOM officials maintain their view that, because of the  lack of consistency in the military services’ training and equipment  requirements for their Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, it cannot  be determined whether these personnel are adequately trained and  equipped to perform the civil support mission. Without updated and clear  guidance on the roles and responsibilities of the Defense Coordinating  Officers and the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, friction and  confusion between DOD commands and the services is likely to continue  and potentially hamper the effectiveness of DOD’s civil support mission  planning and preparedness.
section_title: Staff Composition of the Defense Coordinating Officer Program Is Not Based on a Staffing Needs Assessment
paragraphs: The size and composition of the Defense Coordinating Officer program is  not based on a staffing needs assessment and therefore does not  necessarily reflect the unique characteristics or disaster needs of the  several FEMA regions. Disasters such as hurricanes, wildfires, and  flooding occur in some regions more often than others. For instance, in 3  fiscal years of 2007 through 2009 there were only five disaster declarations  throughout FEMA Region III, while there were 97 disaster declarations in  Region VI. These events in Region VI represented nearly 25 percent of all  disaster declarations nationwide for those 3 years. Figures 4 and 5  illustrate the combined relative risk of earthquakes and hurricanes across  the United States. As figures 4 and 5 show, different FEMA regions are  prone to different disasters, with some regions facing greater risk of  catastrophic disasters than others; therefore they may require different  levels of personnel and types of expertise from DOD both in preparing for  and responding to natural disasters. For example, one of the Defense  Coordinating Officers told us that he could use more specialists,  particularly in logistics and aviation.
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Although DOD recognizes that its civil support mission requires a joint  effort from all the military services, its Defense Coordinating Officer  program continues to be staffed only by Army personnel, except for  PACOM’s Navy Defense Coordinating Officer in Guam. Several DOD  officials told us that the Defense Coordinating Officer program should be  more reflective of the multiservice environment in which it operates.  However, as we have noted above, there is a lack of DOD guidance that  delineates the roles and responsibilities of the Defense Coordinating  Officers prior to their activation, including how they are to coordinate  with the military services’ Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers with  emergency preparedness activities. A September 2008 DOD Inspector  General report found that NORTHCOM has not obtained an equal and  adequate level of effort from all the military services to jointly establish  the Defense Coordinating Officer program, and recommended that the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop an implementation plan to  migrate the staffing of Defense Coordinating Officer positions from the  Army to all the military services and other DOD components, as  appropriate. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred with the  recommendation, and the Joint Chiefs plan to implement actions to  address the recommendation by fiscal year 2010. A NORTHCOM official  acknowledged to us that a jointly staffed Defense Coordinating Officer  program would be a good idea, and said that NORTHCOM has discussed  the proposal with the military services. The DOD Homeland Defense and  Civil Support Joint Operating Concept states that civil support  operations are inherently joint endeavors, and that changes in DOD  concepts, policies, authorities, and organizations may be required to  ensure an effective and integrated DOD response.
Although DOD has improved its support of civil authorities through  improvements in the Defense Coordinating Officer program, its outdated,  inconsistent, and unclear guidance on roles, responsibilities, and  command and control relationships; and lack of a staffing needs  assessment increase the risk that DOD may not be appropriately staffed to  meet the varying needs of the FEMA regions, thus potentially limiting its  ability to provide an optimally coordinated response to civil authorities  with appropriate multiservice capabilities.
section_title: DOD Has Established Processes to Respond to Civil Authorities, but It Has Not Established a Comprehensive System to Track Requests-for- Assistance
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Established Processes to Respond to Civil Authorities
paragraphs: The National Response Framework broadly calls for DOD and other  federal agencies to respond to requests-for-assistance from state and local  civilian authorities, and DOD follows an internal process to respond to  these requests-for-assistance when both state and other federal civilian  resources have been exhausted or are unavailable. How DOD handles  these requests-for-assistance depends on various factors, such as whether  the request is a Stafford Act or non-Stafford Act request; how much time  has elapsed since the incident occurred; and the identity of the originator  of the request. DOD’s Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support, lays out the  department’s internal process for reviewing and sourcing—that is,  providing military resources—for requests-for-assistance from other  federal agencies.
The process by which the requests-for-assistance are conducted is  complex. The primary federal agency—usually FEMA, working in  conjunction with the Defense Coordinating Officer and Defense  Coordinating Element—will initiate the request-for-assistance. To validate  the request, according to Joint Publication 3-28, the Defense Coordinating  Officer should ensure that it is readily understandable and clearly  describes the requirement or capability that is needed. If the Defense  Coordinating Officer finds that the request-for-assistance calls for a  specific asset rather than a capability, the response process will be  lengthened as the officer and staff coordinate with the requesting agency  to revise the request language. Further, the Defense Coordinating  Officer/Element must evaluate all requests based on the six criteria  established in DOD’s Joint Publication 3-28, which are applied at all levels  of DOD review. These criteria are as follows:    Cost: Who pays, and what is the effect on the DOD budget?    Appropriateness: Is the requested mission in the interest of DOD to  conduct? Who normally performs this mission, and who may be better  suited to fill the request?
Readiness: How does the request affect DOD’s primary warfighting  mission?
Risk: Does it place DOD’s forces in harm’s way?    Legality: Is the request in compliance with laws and Presidential  directives?
Lethality: Is the potential use of force by or against DOD forces  expected?
The internal DOD request-for-assistance review and sourcing process is  presented below in figure 6. This process takes place after local, state, and  federal capabilities are exhausted or otherwise unavailable as shown in  the National Response Framework in figure 1.
After the Defense Coordinating Officer validates the request-for- assistance, it is simultaneously forwarded, along with the Defense  Coordinating Officer’s recommendation for action, to NORTHCOM’s  Operations Center. The Joint Directors of Military Support at the Joint  Staff is copied on the request so it can initiate parallel coordination and  planning efforts. At this point, NORTHCOM then coordinates with the  appropriate supporting service commands, force provider, the National  Guard Bureau, or any other federal or DOD stakeholder, depending on the  nature of the incident and the requested capability. Once NORTHCOM  reviews and approves the request, it goes to the Joint Directors for Military  Support for approval before being sent up to the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland  Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs for policy review. Finally, the  request-for-assistance is forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for his  approval. Upon approval by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Directors  of Military Support will issue an Execute Order to designate a command  structure and to task the appropriate commands, services, and DOD  agencies to provide support.
NORTHCOM and DOD have developed two methods to expedite the  request-for-assistance review and sourcing process.
First, NORTHCOM has worked with FEMA and DOD officials to  develop prescripted mission assignments, which are descriptions of a  set of the capabilities civil authorities might need from DOD. The  prescripted mission assignments are developed so as to provide a  common understanding of a capability, and they also serve as a  template for drafting mission assignments. Most of the Defense  Coordinating Officers told us that they use the prescripted mission  assignments to a great extent to execute their civil support mission.  For example, several of the Defense Coordinating Officers found the  prescripted mission assignments useful for outlining cost information  or language as they prepared to write mission assignments. However,  one Defense Coordinating Officer said their usefulness for expediting  requests-for-assistance is limited, because the requests still have to go  through the regular process.
Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed the Defense Support  of Civil Authorities Standing Execute Order, which pre-identifies  forces that a supported combatant commander may use based upon  historical requests for DOD assistance. Many of the Defense  Coordinating Officers said this order is an important piece of guidance,  because it identifies the DOD capabilities that are most readily  available to assist civil authorities during an event. However, if the  requested item is not listed in the Execute Order, the request must be  channeled through the standard internal DOD request-for-assistance  process, so it will take longer. According to DOD officials, in some  emergency cases, DOD allows for the immediate activation of certain  assets on vocal orders from the Secretary of Defense, with the regular  process to be performed later.
section_title: Civil Authorities Are Not Fully Aware of DOD’s Processes for Responding to Requests-for-Assistance
paragraphs: While DOD has developed a process to respond to requests-for-assistance  and has published portions of a description of its internal process as part  of an annex to the National Response Framework, the lead civilian  authorities may not be fully aware of the details or length of this process.  For example, service and Defense Coordinating Element officials told us  that their biggest challenge is responding to incidents when civil  authorities request assistance too late for DOD to respond due to  unrealistic expectations about DOD response times. An official at  NORTHCOM concurred, saying that the only situations in which  NORTHCOM cannot respond are those for which the request comes too  late. Further, FEMA’s Liaison Officer to NORTHCOM acknowledged that  FEMA officials do not recognize how lengthy the DOD review and  sourcing process is. According to several service and Defense  Coordinating Element officials, civil authorities have the perception that  DOD can respond immediately to a request; they do not realize that it  takes time to identify, activate, and deploy military units in response to a  request-for-assistance. This perception can be especially dangerous when  aeromedical evacuation of patients is needed in advance of a hurricane’s  landfall. These patients have special medical needs, and a crew of  specially trained nurses and physicians must be assembled to care for  them. A U.S. Transportation Command official told us that requests for  aeromedical evacuation assistance must be made early, as it takes at least  72 hours to activate the personnel with the skills needed to execute this  mission. Further, this official stated that these crews can safely operate no  later than 18 hours before a hurricane makes landfall. DOD’s capabilities- based assessment for homeland defense and civil support identified the  response timeliness of DOD transportation support—including  aeromedical evacuation—as a capability shortfall. The assessment noted  that although civil authorities have identified a need for DOD  transportation support within 24 hours of a catastrophic incident, DOD  has limited capability to respond sooner than 72 hours after the incident. A  NORTHCOM official suggested that educating state decision makers (i.e.  governors and state emergency management officials) about DOD’s  response times and processes may help expedite their disaster declaration  process so that NORTHCOM can respond before it is too late to do so.  Without shared, comprehensive guidance outlining DOD’s internal review  and sourcing process, state and federal decision makers may overestimate  the speed of DOD’s response and therefore not request assistance in a  timely manner. DOD could help to mitigate this issue by incorporating its  internal processes for responding to requests-for-assistance in the partner  guide that we recommended in a recent report. Doing so would provide  DOD’s interagency partners with information on the complexity of its  internal review and sourcing process for civilian requests-for-assistance.
section_title: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive and Formal System That Tracks All Civilian Requests-for-Assistance
paragraphs: While DOD has developed a Web-based system to track incoming requests- for-assistance from civilian authorities, this system is not comprehensive  and is not accessible to all of DOD’s interagency partners. During  Hurricane Katrina, DOD was unable to efficiently manage or track a large  number of requests-for-assistance. Following Hurricane Katrina, U.S. Army  North developed the DOD Defense Support of Civil Authorities Automated  Support System (the tracking system) to monitor the approval, sourcing,  cost, and progress of requests-for-assistance from FEMA. NORTHCOM  approved the tracking system in March 2007.
According to a 2008 DOD Inspector General Report, the tracking system  should enable DOD users to monitor the approval, sourcing, and progress  of civilian requests-for-assistance. Some Defense Coordinating Officers,  Defense Coordinating Elements, and service officials agree about the need  for a tracking system, and others recognize benefits provided by the  current system. However, we have identified gaps in the tracking system’s  ability to maintain a common operational picture and provide real-time  situational awareness. Furthermore, the current system is not an official  DOD program to track civilian requests-for-assistance. Its use is voluntary;  there are no requirements mandating that requests-for-assistance and  associated information be entered into the system. DOD officials indicated  to us that the system is available to all DOD components and interagency  partners who request and are granted access.
While PACOM and NORTHCOM have agreed to use the system and they  require their components to use it, the DOD force providers—Joint Forces  Command and its components (such as Air Combat Command and Marine  Forces Command)—are not utilizing the sourcing section of the system.  Instead, Joint Forces Command and its components use classified  systems, like Global Force Management and the Joint Capability  Requirements Manager, to resource their civil support requirements.  Those systems are not compatible with the unclassified tracking system.  When asked about the DOD Defense Support of Civil Authorities  Automated Support System, officials at Air Combat Command told us that  they were unaware of its existence. Additionally, service and Defense  Coordinating Element officials noted that information is not always  entered into the system accurately, thus limiting the system’s utility.  Further, a Defense Coordinating Officer told us that the architects of the  current system did not ask civil support stakeholders what they thought  should be included in a request-for-assistance tracking system.
During the course of our audit work, we found that other DOD information  technology systems have the potential to enhance situational awareness  and provide a common operating picture for both DOD and the civilian  authorities it is assisting. For example, Air Force North has developed the  unclassified Defense Support for Civil Authorities Collaboration Suite for  its Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers. While this Air Force system  can perform all of the same functions as the current unclassified tracking  system, it ties in additional features to provide a single information  collaboration system, such as a section noting available capabilities at  each Base Support Installation; all state emergency management points of  contact; anticipated requests-for-assistance based upon lessons learned  and historical requests; a Google Earth section that maps weather and the  locations of Air Force bases; and a section showing “shared situational  awareness,” including threat assessments and continuous updates of  current operations. Similarly, PACOM’s Joint Task Force-Homeland  Defense has leveraged the All Hazards Decision Support System, an  unclassified system developed by the Pacific Disaster Center. This system  uses geospatial mapping and modeling capabilities to identify locations  and critical areas of vulnerability for potential disasters. In addition, the  Pacific Disaster Center’s system provides a common operating picture by  allowing interoperability among agencies, and it is accessible to all  stakeholders in the disaster-management community.
Further, despite recommendations in the April 2009 DOD Information  Sharing Implementation Plan regarding the establishment of  authentication and access standards across unclassified systems to allow  DOD and its external mission partners to achieve an appropriate level of  access to information concerning civil support operations, the DOD  Defense Support of Civil Authorities Automated Support System does not  provide a common operating picture for DOD and the lead civilian  agencies. That is because the system is an internal NORTHCOM system  and not a DOD-wide program, and attempts to link the system with those  in other agencies, such as FEMA, have been unsuccessful in terms of  interoperability. Therefore, FEMA and the other lead federal agencies,  such as the U.S. Secret Service, do not necessarily have visibility into the  system. According to FEMA officials, that lack of visibility constitutes a  major shortfall in FEMA’s ability to see the status of its requests.
Finally, although there should be situational awareness among DOD and  its interagency partners, DOD has acknowledged in its homeland defense  and civil support capabilities-based assessment that such situational  awareness is lacking. DOD’s Defense Support of Civil Authorities  Automated Support System is not comprehensive; it includes only those  requests-for-assistance issued to DOD by FEMA and the National  Interagency Fire Center. The system does not include all requests issued  by the other federal agencies that have lead roles in specific cases. For  example, the DOD Defense Support of Civil Authorities Automated  Support System did not include requests-for-assistance from the U.S.  Secret Service—the lead agency for pre-planned National Special Security  Events—for the annual United Nations General Assembly, the 2008  Presidential Nominating Conventions, or the 2009 G-20 Summit. In  September 2009, DOD was tasked to provide air support, bomb detection,  search and rescue, and medical assistance to support the Secret Service  for the G-20 Summit held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. However, the  current tracking system contained no record of this request.
Without a comprehensive, unclassified system that tracks requests-for- assistance from, and is shared with, all of DOD’s interagency partners,  gaps will remain in gaining real-time situational awareness and in  maintaining a common operational picture of DOD’s assistance for all  participants involved in disaster-response missions.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD, through both NORTHCOM and PACOM, has taken concrete steps to  develop and enhance its defense support of civil authorities mission in  such ways as conducting an assessment of the DOD capabilities needed to  assist civil authorities and designating full-time personnel to coordinate  with federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local civil authorities. These  efforts improve DOD’s overall ability to assist federal, state, and local  authorities in the shared responsibility of responding to natural disasters  in the United States. But this improvement has been limited by outdated  and inconsistent DOD policies, guidance, and doctrine pertaining to the  civil support mission. Unless and until these issues are addressed,  challenges will remain in the ability of DOD commands and personnel,  specifically the Defense Coordinating Officers and their staffs, to provide  the support requested by civil authorities during disasters. Without clear  roles, responsibilities, effective command and control structures, shared  guidance, and an assessment of DOD staffing needs in the FEMA regions,  DOD will be missing an opportunity to further enhance its ability to  support civil authorities with the kind of coordinated and integrated  civilian and military response to disasters that is intended by the National  Response Framework. While DOD can address policy and guidance issues,  there are obstacles over which it has no control, such as a statutory  restriction on DOD’s authority to order Reserve personnel to involuntary  active duty service for catastrophic disaster relief, which we raised as  matter for congressional consideration in 1993 and again in 2006. We  continue to believe that this statutory restriction impedes DOD’s ability to  respond to and assist civilians during catastrophic natural disasters. To  some degree, DOD will always face challenges and risks in this mission  area because it has to be prepared for a wide variety of incidents that can  range from a regional flood to a catastrophic tsunami or hurricane, while  maintaining focus on its warfighting mission. However, DOD can make  further improvements to mitigate these challenges and facilitate and  strengthen its relationships with federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local  civil authorities.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve DOD’s ability to conduct its civil support missions, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions:    Direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and  Americas’ Security Affairs to update DOD policy and guidance for civil  support (i.e., DOD directive and instruction 3025 series) to reflect  current doctrine, terminology, funding policy, practices, and DOD’s  organizational framework for providing civil support, to include  clarifying NORTHCOM and PACOM roles and responsibilities for civil  support missions; and establish time frames for completion.
Direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and  Americas’ Security Affairs, in coordination with the Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff, to:  clarify roles and responsibilities, including command and control  relationships for the Defense Coordinating Officers, Defense  Coordinating Elements, and Emergency Preparedness Liaison  Officers;  identify the extent to which NORTHCOM and PACOM should set  training and equipping requirements for the Defense Coordinating  Officers, Defense Coordinating Elements, and Emergency  Preparedness Liaison Officers; and    conduct a review of staffing requirements for the Defense  Coordinating Officers, Defense Coordinating Elements, and  Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers in both the NORTHCOM  and PACOM areas of responsibility that includes but is not limited  to an assessment of staff size, subject-matter expertise, and military  service composition by FEMA region.
Direct the Joint Staff in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Networks and Information Integration / Chief Information  Officer to identify and establish an official, DOD-wide, unclassified  tracking system for all incoming requests-for-assistance from federal  agencies regarding civil support missions. This system should at a  minimum include:  requirements and guidance to ensure that the system is  comprehensive and captures request-for-assistance data that can  be used to anticipate civil support requirements;    access for FEMA and other lead federal agencies, to provide them  with real-time situational awareness; and  time frames for the system’s development and implementation.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our  recommendations and discussed some of the steps it is taking and  planning to take to address these recommendations. DOD also provided  technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report where  appropriate. DHS and FEMA did not provide comments on this report.
In response to our recommendation that DOD clarify roles and  responsibilities, including command and control relationships, and identify  the extent to which NORTHCOM and PACOM should set training and  equipping requirements for the Defense Coordinating Officers, Defense  Coordinating Elements, and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers,  DOD said that new guidance is in coordination to describe roles and  responsibilities for DOD entities for homeland defense and civil support.  Further, DOD said that NORTHCOM is reviewing the staffing, training, and  equipment requirements for the Defense Coordinating Elements in each  FEMA region. However, it was unclear from DOD’s comments whether  and how the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers’ roles,  responsibilities, training and equipment requirements will be addressed in  the new issuance or in the NORTHCOM review. We continue to believe the  inclusion of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers in these efforts  is important to enhance DOD’s ability to support civil authorities with the  kind of coordinated and integrated civilian and military response to  disasters that is intended by the National Response Framework.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its  date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security,  and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no  charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contacts points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix  III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) (1) has  identified and addressed its capability gaps for its civil support mission,  (2) has clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and relationships and  identified appropriate levels and types of personnel to assign to the FEMA  regions, and (3) shares and tracks information concerning its civil support  requirements response process with civil authorities, we reviewed and  analyzed available DOD, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and U.S.  Pacific Command (PACOM) civil support guidance and 4 of the 20 civil  support operational plans, as well as DOD’s March 2009 Homeland  Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based Assessment.
To address all of our objectives, we compared the DOD civil support  guidance and policies currently in place to the relevant DOD doctrine,  which, when compared with anecdotal evidence provided by DOD and  civilian officials, allowed us to identify the various policy and guidance  issues raised in the report and their associated operational effects. To  examine the extent to which DOD has identified and addressed its civil  support capability gaps, we reviewed DOD’s March 2009 Homeland  Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based Assessment and held  discussions with NORTHCOM and other DOD officials about how the  assessment was conducted, how NORTHCOM identified relevant  capabilities, and how NORTHCOM and DOD plan to use the assessment in  the future.
We met with knowledgeable officials across a range of DOD offices and  commands, as illustrated in table 2. At these meetings, we held discussions  about the work and analysis that DOD has conducted in order to  understand what forms of support civilian authorities may ask the  department to provide during a catastrophic incident. We also held  discussions with these officials about the policies and guidance that exist  to provide structure to DOD’s civil support mission set. Further, officials  in these offices provided us with information on the day-to-day roles and  responsibilities that are a part of the civil support mission as they work to  prepare to support civil authorities with a wide range of potential  disasters.
We met with FEMA officials at both the national and regional levels to  understand how they work with DOD both in identifying capability gaps  during planning stages and how they channel state and federal requests- for-assistance to DOD during an actual incident. They discussed with us  the evolution of the FEMA-DOD relationship, as well as relationships  between DOD officials and state and local civil authorities. Table 3 shows  the federal civilian offices and agencies with whom we met.
In the course of our audit work we visited four FEMA regions (FEMA  regions III, IV, VII, and IX) that were selected because they deal with a  range of National Special Security Events such as the Olympics, political  conventions, and the Super Bowl, as well as a variety of natural disasters  including hurricanes, earthquakes, wildland fires, and floods. During our  visits to these FEMA regions we not only met with FEMA officials, but  with the Defense Coordinating Officers and their staff in those regions to  discuss their role as DOD’s representatives to FEMA, other civilian  authorities, and other military officials (including the National Guard) in  their assigned states and regions. They provided us with anecdotal and  documentary evidence on their roles, responsibilities, and relationships in  their respective regions. When they were available, we also met with some  of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, who are military service  representatives. Specifically, we met with an Army Emergency  Preparedness Liaison Officer in Region III, one Emergency Preparedness  Liaison Officer from the Army, one from the Air Force, and one from the  Navy in Region IV, and one Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer from  each of the four services in Region IX.
Subsequent to our meetings with DOD, FEMA, and other federal civilian  officials, we reviewed the guidance, policies, and other documentation we  obtained from them and compared it with the anecdotal information that  those officials shared with us during our meetings in support of all of our  objectives. We noted discrepancies and areas of concern, then followed up  with military and civilian officials as appropriate. Additionally, we  reviewed previous GAO and DOD Inspector General reports to identify  what, if any, progress and changes had occurred in the area of defense  support of civil authorities over the last several years, specifically since  Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Following our visits to Defense Coordinating Officers in four of the FEMA  regions, we decided to contact the Defense Coordinating Officers in all 10  FEMA regions to obtain a nationwide perspective of our objectives. In  order to obtain detailed information about the extent to which DOD has  identified and addressed its capability gaps for its civil support mission;  identified and defined roles, responsibilities, and relationships of  personnel assigned to the FEMA regions; and shares and tracks  information concerning its civil support requirements response process  with civil authorities, we developed a structured questionnaire and sent it  to all 12 Defense Coordinating Officers assigned to the PACOM and  NORTHCOM areas of responsibility. The questionnaire included a variety  of questions, covering issues ranging from the guidance the Defense  Coordinating Officers use to execute their civil support mission to the  methods and mediums (such as regional exercises or planning  conferences) they use to identify capability gaps in their region. The  questionnaire also asked what challenges, if any, the Defense Coordinating  Officers face when anticipating and responding to requests-for-assistance  and in identifying capability gaps at both the federal and state levels.
Since we intended to survey the universe of Defense Coordinating Officers  at PACOM and NORTHCOM, our survey was not a sample survey and  therefore had no sampling errors. However, the practical difficulties of  conducting any survey may introduce other types of errors, commonly  referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in interpreting  a particular question, sources of information available to respondents, or  entering data into a database or analyzing them can introduce unwanted  variability into the survey results. We took steps in developing the  questionnaire, collecting the data, and analyzing them to minimize such  nonsampling errors. For example, a social science survey methodologist  helped design the questionnaire in collaboration with GAO staff that had  subject-matter expertise. The questionnaire was also reviewed by an  independent GAO survey specialist. The survey asked a combination of  questions that allowed for open-ended and close-ended responses. We  pretested the content and format of the questionnaire with two Defense  Coordinating Officers to ensure that the questions were relevant, clearly  stated, and easy to understand. During the pretests, we asked questions to  determine whether (1) the survey questions were clear, (2) the terms we  used were precise, (3) the questionnaire did not place an undue burden on  the respondents, and (4) the questions were unbiased. We received input  on the survey and made changes to the content and format of the final  questionnaire based on our pretest results. Since there were relatively few  changes based on the pretests and we were conducting surveys with the  universe of respondents—all PACOM and NORTHCOM Defense  Coordinating Officers—we did not find it necessary to conduct additional  pretests.
Data analysis was conducted by a GAO data analyst working directly with  GAO staff with subject-matter expertise. A second independent analyst  checked all of the computer programs for accuracy.
Following this extensive work on developing a questionnaire to collect  data in a standardized and structured manner, we sent the questionnaire  by e-mail on October 8, 2009, in an attached Microsoft Word form that  respondents could return electronically after marking checkboxes or  entering narrative responses into open-answer boxes. Alternatively,  respondents could return the survey by mail after printing the form and  completing it by hand. Both PACOM Defense Coordinating Officers  returned the completed surveys to GAO electronically. However,  NORTHCOM Defense Coordinating Officers were told by their command  leadership not to send the completed surveys to GAO, but instead route  them through the NORTHCOM headquarters Inspector General. Since this  position posed both considerable methodological problems for the  integrity of the data we wanted to analyze and would not allow for  anonymity and transparency in responses, we instead elected to conduct  structured interviews with all 10 NORTHCOM Defense Coordinating  Officers individually over the phone using the same questionnaire to  promote candid discussions that may not have been obtained through a  NORTHCOM screening process.
We combined the information gathered from the telephonic interviews and  analyzed the frequency and distribution of marked checkbox responses.  We also analyzed the open-ended narrative responses for trends and  recurring themes. For instance, although we did not directly ask about the  extent to which personnel coordinating DOD’s civil support mission are  joint, several Defense Coordinating Officers said that the Defense  Coordinating Officer and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer  programs were not joint and that this made their work more challenging  than it needed to be. When the Defense Coordinating Officers were not in  agreement or had different perspectives on issues, we summarized  conflicting responses to illustrate the complexity of the Defense  Coordinating Officers’ mission and the unique challenges found in each  region. For example, some Defense Coordinating Officers told us they  were sufficiently staffed with their current personnel, when others said  they badly need more staff to assist them with their mission and to engage  with the states within their regions. We compiled this information and  used it in conjunction with the interviews from the four FEMA region  visits, our meetings with DOD and FEMA officials, and our review of  documents and guidance to identify areas for improvement in DOD’s  ability to provide support to civil authorities and respond to requests-for- assistance.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2009 to March 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director,  Homeland Security and Justice; Lorelei St. James, Acting Director; Joseph  W. Kirschbaum, Assistant Director; Nicholas Benne; Grace Coleman;  Michael Hanson; David Lysy; Lonnie J. McAllister; Eric E. Petersen; Terry  Richardson; Bethann E. Ritter; Wesley Sholtes; Cheryl Weissman; and Jena  Whitley made key contributions to this report.