Vendor Payments: Inadequate Management Oversight Hampers the Navy's Ability to Effectively Manage Its Telecommunication Program
Published: 2004-06-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Problems with management oversight and control of DOD's purchase card program led to concerns that similar issues exist for DOD's vendor payments. As a result, this report focuses on the Navy's telecommunication program and whether (1) the Navy has the basic cost and inventory information needed to oversee and manage these purchases and (2) selected Navy sites have adequate control to provide reasonable assurance that goods and services are purchased cost effectively and payments are made only for valid charges.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Navy did not know how much it spent on telecommunications and did not have detailed cost and inventory data needed to evaluate spending patterns and to leverage its buying power. Obtaining knowledge of current requirements and usage, as well as developing forecasts of future telecommunication needs, would assist Navy's acquisition planning to ensure future needs were met in a more cost-effective manner. At the four case study sites we audited, management oversight of telecommunication purchases did not provide reasonable assurance that requirements were met in the most cost-effective manner. For local and long-distance services, these sites did not follow policies to biennially review and revalidate these requirements. As a result, they paid for services no longer required. Also, the Navy lacks policies to provide assurance that cell phone requirements are met in the most cost-effective manner. Cell phone usage at three sites was not monitored to determine whether plan minutes met users' needs. Consequently, these sites overpaid for cell phone services. Also, none of the sites had adequate controls over review of invoices to provide assurance of payments for only valid charges. These sites failed to detect erroneous charges and potentially improper use of these services. In addition, the Navy lacks specific policies and processes addressing the administration and management of calling cards. Consequently, some sites did not know they owned and were being billed for calling cards. Other sites allowed calling cards to be shared and were unable to determine the legitimacy of the calls, and thus paid for potentially fraudulent or abusive long-distance charges. On one card alone, in a 3-month period, the Navy paid over $17,000. However, because no one was regularly monitoring the activity on this card, the unit was unaware of potentially fraudulent charges. Not until the vendor's fraud unit raised questions about more than $11,000 in charges incurred during the first 6 days of July 2003 was the card suspended.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: As you are aware, we have conducted a series of audits and investigations  of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) purchase card program and found  substantial breakdowns in internal controls that resulted in fraud, waste,  and abuse. Concerned that similar problems may plague DOD’s vendor pay  processes through which approximately $112 billion was spent and  obligated in fiscal year 2003, you asked us to evaluate the effectiveness of  DOD’s management oversight and controls in this area. As agreed with your  staff, the scope of our audit included our assessment of the Navy’s  oversight and controls over vendor purchases and payments for  telecommunication service—including local and long-distance services,  calling cards, and cellular phone service.
This report provides you with our assessment of whether (1) the Navy has  the basic cost and inventory information needed to manage and oversee its  purchases from telecommunication vendors and (2) selected Navy sites  have effective internal control to provide reasonable assurance that  telecommunication goods and services are purchased cost effectively and  payments are made only for valid telecommunication charges. Because the  Navy was unable to provide us with a complete population of  telecommunication expenditures from which we could sample, test, and  discuss in this report as being control weaknesses, as agreed with your  staff, we used a case-study approach to assess the adequacy of internal  controls over vendor purchases and payments at four Navy locations,  instead of on a Navy-wide basis. We were unable to perform statistical  testing at these case study locations because the local databases were often  incomplete, or they had insufficient, inconsistent, or inaccurate data. As a  result, we evaluated the design of controls in place and relied on  nonrepresentative selections to evaluate the effectiveness of case study  locations’ internal controls over telecommunication programs.
We were able to evaluate the availability of cost and inventory information  Navy-wide, working at the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)  and Naval Network and Space Operations Command (NNSOC), and  evaluated the adequacy of the Navy’s expenditure reporting systems. In  general, our assessment of purchasing and receipt and acceptance controls  was limited to four Navy units from the following commands: (1) SPAWAR  Systems Center, Charleston, South Carolina (SPAWAR Charleston); (2)  Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Patuxent, Maryland (NAVAIR  Patuxent); (3) Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, Indiana (NAVSEA  Crane); and (4) Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia  (CINCLANTFLT Norfolk). We also performed limited work at HQ DISA and  its major contracting organization—the Defense Information Technology  Contracting Organization (DITCO Scott), and DISA CONUS (organizational  element functionally responsible for the review and revalidation (R&R)  process), both located at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, pertaining to the  review and revalidation of telephone services, and at the Naval Computer  and Telecommunication Area Master Station Atlantic (NCTAM, Norfolk)  related to purchasing controls. In addition, we used data-mining techniques  to identify possible control weaknesses associated with the purchase and  use of long-distance calling cards. This data-mining effort prompted us to  audit selected calling card transactions at seven locations—discussed in  detail in our objectives, scope, and methodology contained in appendix I.  We conducted our work from May 2003 through February 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We  requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of the  Navy or his designee. We received written comments, which are reprinted  in appendix II. In addition, DOD provided some technical comments, which  we incorporated in the report as appropriate.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The military services and DOD have long procured and operated multiple  types of telecommunication services to meet their individual mission  needs. DOD guidance defines telecommunications as circuits or  equipment used to transmit or receive information via voice, data, video,  integrated telecommunication transmission, wire, or radio.  Telecommunication equipment and services collectively include such items  as telephones, switching systems and circuit termination equipment.  Overall, telecommunications can be thought of broadly in two categories—  base and long-haul telecommunications. Also, DOD has been using and  paying for some special category types of services—cell phones and calling  cards—that can usually be used to access either the base or long-haul  infrastructure or both.
DOD defines base telecommunications as facilities, equipment, and  services used to support the distribution, transmission, or reception of  information via voice, data, video, integrated telecommunications, wire, or  radio within the confines of an area, such as an installation. This may  include local interconnecting lines to the first commercial central office  providing service to the local community and to other DOD component  facilities in the local area. Calls originating and ending within the local  calling area are considered local service calls and activities pay a flat  monthly fee for such service. The fee that is paid to vendors is based upon  the number of circuits billed and not the number of calls made. DISA does  not have direct responsibility for acquiring and managing base  telecommunication equipment and services, although it does have some  oversight responsibilities.
Long-haul telecommunications are the facilities, equipment, and services  (in addition to those described for base telecommunications) that are used  for the transmission or receipt of information that crosses the boundary of  a facility’s local calling community. DOD service components are required  to contract for their long-haul services through DITCO, DISA’s contracting  organization. DITCO charges the components the actual costs for the  services it provides them, plus a surcharge (which is currently 2 percent) to  cover DITCO’s cost of administering the program.
Cell phones allow DOD personnel, including Navy personnel, to make  official calls when other alternatives are unavailable or are uneconomical.  They can be used to access a local as well as a long-distance network, but it  is generally more economical to use other service for local service, when  possible. Navy activities generally either contract directly for cellular  phone service or procure the phones under an already established GSA  negotiated contract. Vendors normally offer various service plan packages  to their customers with a range of rates, depending on the types of service  and options provided. Items that can cause rates to vary are geographical  location, the user’s calling area, and the number of telephones requested.
Cellular phones differ from conventional telephone systems in the way  charges for calls accrue. For cellular phones, activities are usually charged  a fixed fee for a specific plan package, which includes a limited number of  available minutes. After using all of the available minutes in a month,  activities then pay a per-minute charge for any excess minutes, not  included in the contracted amount. When callers exceed the number of  minutes allowed in the plan package, they generally pay a very high  premium per minute for the minutes in excess of the plan. Generally,  charges for cellular phone services include (1) charges for airtime for all  completed outgoing and incoming calls and (2) charges (known as roaming  charges) for calls made when the caller is outside his or her home service  area. In addition, cellular phones may incur long-distance charges for calls  made where the number called is outside the local area in which the caller  is physically located or if this service is not included in the service contract.
Calling cards are used to access telecommunication services at a location  where DOD-owned services are unavailable or where it is desired that the  calls be charged to an account other than the one from which the calls are  being made. Navy calling cards are issued to individual Navy employees for  their official use in conducting government business. The card provides the  user with access to the Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) and  offers a variety of available services. Navy activities generally procure the  calling cards through DITCO in bulk and they are stored by the activities  until issued. DITCO obtains the calling cards through a prenegotiated GSA  contract. The cards incur no charges until issued and activated. The Navy  activities are responsible for issuing the cards to individuals and the  individuals activate the cards. Once issued, the activities are responsible  for reviewing and certifying the calling card charges, just as they are for all  other types of telecommunication service charges.
DOD and its components have long acquired telecommunication systems  to meet their individual mission needs, resulting in a fragmented and  redundant telecommunication environment. To eliminate costly  duplication and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its  communication services, in 1991 DOD began to plan and implement the  Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) as the common-user, long­ haul telecommunication network for all DOD components. Under the  DISN program, DOD’s service components and Defense agencies are still  responsible for acquiring local base telecommunication services for their  local bases and installations; however, DISA is to be the sole provider of  long-haul telecommunication services for all DOD components.
To improve the interoperability of DOD’s long-haul telecommunication  networks and service as well as to reduce costs, the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence  (ASD/C3I)established policies and procedures that (1) directed DOD  components to develop comprehensive inventories of their own long-haul  telecommunication networks and directed DISA to develop a Defense-wide  inventory of long-haul networks; (2) directed DISA to report annually on  telecommunication services, acquisitions, trends, and associated costs; (3)  mandated components to use common-user networks such as DISN or FTS  2000 for long-haul communications; (4) directed DISA to establish a waiver  process to let components procure independent networks when their  telecommunication needs could not be met by common-user networks; and  (5) directed DOD components to periodically review and revalidate their  long-haul telecommunication requirements. In a previous review of the  DISN program,and during our work on this audit, we found that DOD had  not effectively implemented any of these directives. In response, DOD  agreed to address our concerns and to implement these policies and  procedures. However, as discussed in this report, the Navy has not yet  established an accurate and complete telecommunication inventory or  created a database of information on acquisition, trends, and associated  costs, which are necessary to plan for future growth and cost effectively  purchase new telecommunication equipment and services.
section_title: The Navy Lacked Strategic Knowledge of Expenditures to More Efficiently Purchase Telecommunication Services
paragraphs: The Navy did not know exactly how much it was spending on  telecommunication services nor did it know much about its  telecommunication service vendors. The Navy’s lack of detailed cost data  prevented us from analyzing its telecommunication expenditures on an  aggregate level. For this reason, we were unable to comprehensively  sample and test the adequacy of the Navy’s controls or perform effective  data mining of its telecommunication expenditures. More importantly, this  lack of adequate information also prevented the Navy from obtaining the  knowledge needed to take steps to leverage its buying power, even though  it is a large customer for telecommunication services. Moreover, obtaining  knowledge of current requirements and usage, as well as developing  forecasts of users’ future telecommunication needs, would assist Navy  acquisition planning to ensure those future needs can be met in a more  cost-effective manner.
Our past work has identified specific practices that can be employed by  DOD agencies to manage services acquisitions—including  telecommunication services—from a more strategic perspective, thereby  enabling DOD organizations to leverage buying power and achieve  significant savings.These include establishing a central agent or manager  for acquiring services, gaining visibility over spending, and revising  business processes to enable the organization to leverage its buying power.  Our past work showed that leading organizations that applied a strategic  approach to their purchases of services found it necessary to develop new  “spend analysis” information systems that could provide them with reliable  data in a timely fashion. Spend analysis is a tool that answers basic  questions about how much is being spent for what goods and services and  helps to identify both buyers and suppliers, as well as opportunities to  leverage buying, save money, and improve performance.
Having the type of information discussed above would enable the Navy to  perform spend analysis on the purchase and use of its telecommunication  assets, which would provide the Navy with a complete picture of what is  being spent on telecommunications—the cornerstone to identifying what  can be done to improve the purchasing process and to leverage the Navy’s  buying power. The task of gaining accurate visibility over spending will be  difficult for the Navy given the lack of information systems available to  provide spending data and the magnitude, breadth, and complexity of  spending involved with multiple types and sources of telecommunication  services. However, leading companies we studied that developed formal,  centralized spend analysis programs found that they could overcome  similar difficulties of piecing together incomplete and inaccurate data from  various information systems through the use of key processes involving  automating, extracting, supplementing, organizing, and analyzing data.Currently, the Navy lacks the needed information to perform effective  cost/spend analysis.
Recognizing that the best practices experiences of leading companies  could help improve the cost effectiveness of DOD’s acquisition of services,  Congress includedprovisions in the National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2002that require, among other things, that DOD establish  an automated system to collect and analyze data to support management  decisions in contracting for services. The provisions were intended to put  DOD in a position to gain visibility over services contract spending and  more effectively leverage its buying power, thus (1) improving the  performance of its service contractors, (2) organizing its supplier base, and  (3) achieving significant savings and ensuring that its dollars are used more  effectively. Although DOD is in the early stages of responding to these  legislative requirements, DOD has a departmentwide spend analysis pilot  underway and has called on agencies to embrace a strategic approach for  acquiring services.Based on our assessment of the Navy’s payment and  expenditure reporting systems, the Navy’s current process for acquiring  telecommunication services is not strategic and its ability to use spend  analysis to support a strategic approach is hampered by the lack of  centrally available and detailed telecommunications expenditure data.  Because the Navy does not budget or account for telecommunication  requirements separately from other nontelecommunication requirements,  the Navy’s automated systems are not designed to track the cost associated  with purchasing telecommunication services in total or by network or by  type of service provided. Consequently, the Navy is unable to perform the  kind of meaningful spend analysis envisioned by the act.
The Navy has yet to take steps to perform the kind of meaningful spend  analysis employed by leading companies to better manage its purchasing of  telecommunication services. Much earlier, in 1991, DOD directed DISA to  establish a central inventory of all long-haul telecommunication equipment  and services and directed the heads of DOD components to establish and  maintain an inventory of all base telecommunication equipment and  services. However, we found in several instances that DISA’s long-haul  database was incomplete and contained numerous errors and that the Navy  had yet to establish a base communications database as directed.  Specifically, we found that (1) the DISA database did not track long-haul  equipment and services that were purchased outside of DISA channels, (2)  networks and services were still reflected in the DISA database long after  they had been discontinued, and (3) point of contact or ownership  information often had not been updated in years. In addition, some of the  Navy locations we audited did not maintain an accurate inventory of the  number of calling cards and cell phones currently in use or maintain  adequate records of to whom the cards and phones were issued. As  discussed later, our case-study work at four Navy locations demonstrated  that this lack of reliable inventory data combined with other breakdowns in  basic controls creates a fertile environment for fraud, waste, and abuse.
section_title: Navy Sites Lacked Controls Needed to Ensure Appropriate Oversight and Payment of Telecommunication Services
paragraphs: Although DOD established a policy in 1991 requiring that DOD components  biennially review and revalidate their local and long-distance  telecommunication requirements, none of the four Navy locations we  visited or DITCO Scott had established effective review and revalidation  programs to ensure that they were not paying for capacity or services they  no longer needed or they were not paying too much for the needed services  used. In addition, the Navy did not have policies to ensure the cost-effective  purchase and use of cell phone services. Consequently, we found that the  four Navy sites we audited had established their own policies for the  procurement and management of cellular services and equipment. These  policies varied greatly, due to the differences in size, capability, and  requirements of the cellular program at each site, which resulted in some of  these sites paying more for these equipment and services than was  necessary. Further, although DOD financial management regulations  require proper receipt and acceptance of goods and services and the  reconciliation of bills prior to payment, we found that the Navy activities  we visited were improperly approving payments for telecommunication  services without appropriate review. Failure to properly reconcile the bills  has allowed payment to be made for inappropriate and irregular local and  long-distance charges and has allowed the activities to improperly make  overpayments and duplicate payment to telecommunication vendors.  Finally, we found that the Navy does not have policies addressing the  administration and management of calling cards. This has resulted in either  inconsistent policies or a total lack of policies from one command to the  next. Because of this lack of control, we identified several instances where  the Navy had paid bills for calling card services that appeared to us to be  potentially fraudulent or abusive, a situation that will likely be repeated  unless changes are made.
subsections: section_title: Navy Sites Were Not Performing Effective Review and Revalidation of Local and Long-Distance Requirements
paragraphs: The review and revalidation process is important because it enables an  activity to determine, based on empirical data, whether it is meeting its  local and long-distance telecommunication needs in the most cost-effective  means possible. According to DOD instructionsthis involves (1) assessing  telecommunication traffic or usage to determine whether  telecommunication services are still needed, (2) conducting market  surveys to determine if current telecommunication contracts provide the  most cost-effective solution for satisfying usage requirements, and  (3) updating the appropriate inventory database to indicate that the  requirement for the local and long-distance lines has been revalidated. It is  particularly important that Navy personnel routinely review and revalidate  their needs for the local and long-distance services they currently have and  are paying for, and that they promptly cancel any unnecessary lines to  avoid paying monthly usage fees for unneeded services. Activities are  assessed fees for a line based either on the usage, a flat rate regardless of  usage, or a combination of both. Therefore, if lines are not promptly  canceled and if they have a monthly charge, the Navy will continue to  receive and pay for these services indefinitely until they are canceled.
None of the Navy sites we visited or DITCO Scott had effectively  implemented existing policies to perform all three of the review and  revalidation procedures mentioned earlier. At NAVSEA Crane, officials had  recently assessed their telecommunication traffic to determine whether the  services for which they were currently contracted were still needed.  However, they had not conducted a market survey and, therefore, had no  assurance that they were meeting their telecommunication needs in the  most economical way possible. Two other sites, NAVAIR Patuxent and  SPAWAR Charleston, had assessed their telecommunication traffic and  performed a market survey but had failed to update the database to reflect  that they had taken the required actions. As mentioned previously, these  failures undermine DISA’s ability to monitor and effectively manage the  DISN program and to maintain the quality of the database. For example,  according to DISA’s long-haul database, as of February 17, 2004,  approximately 3,100 of the Navy’s 26,000 long-haul lines had either not been  revalidated in over 2 years or had not been properly updated. Some of these  records indicated that the lines had been past due for revalidation for  decades—in one case since March 1969. According to agency officials, as a  result of our review, both NAVAIR Patuxent and SPAWAR Charleston have  implemented corrective actions to ensure that the appropriate inventory  database is updated whenever they revalidate their local and long-distance  lines.
As shown in table 1, at two of the four sites, we identified 37 long-distance  lines that had not been reviewed and revalidated in over 2 years. When we  asked the appropriate Navy personnel to review these 37 long-distance  lines to determine if they were still needed, they found that 8 of the 37 lines  for which they had been paying a total monthly usage fee of $4,969 were no  longer needed. We relied on the accuracy of their responses and did not  perform an independent review to determine their validity.
Subsequent to our inquiry, Navy officials told us that the 8 lines shown in  table 1 have now been disconnected. For these 8 lines, they were unable to  quantify the total unnecessary cost that had been incurred to operate them  because they were unable to determine exactly how long the lines had been  operating without a valid need. To further demonstrate the risk of not  promptly reviewing and revalidating existing lines, DITCO Scott officials  were able to tell us that 4 of their 18 past-due lines for revalidation should  have been discontinued in fiscal year 2000 or 2001. Instead, they continued  to incur and pay monthly charges of $917 for 3 of these lines for about 3  years—incurring about $36,000 in unnecessary charges—until we raised  the issue in fiscal year 2003 and the lines were discontinued. For the fourth  line, DITCO was unable to quantify the cost for unnecessary usage.
Similarly, two of the four Navy sites we audited had not reviewed or  revalidated their base communication networks as required; however, the  immediate financial impact of not doing so is not as evident. Base  telecommunication networks are the equipment or services used to  support the transmission of data within the confines of an installation.  According to a Navy official, because a unit is not charged specifically for  individual base communication lines, there are no unit cost savings  associated with the deletion of a few unused individual lines. However,  over time, the number of unused lines may become significant enough to  warrant resizing a unit’s base communication network. For this reason, it is  important that the Navy also implement an effective review and  revalidation program for its base as well as its long-distance  telecommunications. When we asked Navy officials at the two sites why  they were not routinely reviewing and revalidating their  telecommunication needs, we found that they were not aware of the  requirement or did not see it as a top priority. The remaining two locations,  NAVSEA Crane and NAVAIR Patuxent, had reviewed and revalidated their  base communication network as required.
section_title: The Navy Lacked Policies for the Cost-Effective Purchase and Usage of Cell Phone Services
paragraphs: The Navy’s use of cell phones has increased dramatically in recent years,  allowing Navy personnel to make official calls when other alternatives are  unavailable or uneconomical. In 1997, on the basis of a recommendation of  the Naval Audit Service, NCTC, in conjunction with the Chief of Navy  Operations, agreed to develop and issue specific guidelines and procedures  relating to acquisition, accountability, and use of cellular phones. However,  at the time we did our work for this assignment, neither DOD nor the Navy  had taken the required actions to establish comprehensive policies or  guidance governing the purchase and use of cell phone services, including  guidance on (1) using prenegotiated or centrally negotiated rates or (2)  requiring periodic assessment of cell phone usage to determine if plan  packages provide the most cost-effective means to satisfy its usage  requirements. Consequently, three of the four sites we audited were either  paying retail prices for their cell phones when lower prenegotiated rates  were available or were paying too much for cell phone services because  they were not monitoring the use and thus had no basis for aligning the  contracts with expected use.
In the absence of DOD- and Navy-wide policies and procedures for the  purchase of cell phones, individual Navy units have had to develop their  own approaches for the procurement and management of cellular services  and equipment. While three of the four sites we visited made a concerted  effort to either (1) purchase cell phones at the GSA-negotiated rate—  currently 12 percent discount off retail—or (2) establish their own  negotiated contract with local cellular service providers, the remaining  location, NAVSEA Crane, did neither. Instead, at NAVSEA Crane,  individuals responsible for the procurement as well as cell phone users  themselves bought their cell phones directly from retail sources using their  purchase cards. As a result, NAVSEA Crane in some instances was paying a  higher rate for cell phones—12 percent higher—than that established by  GSA and in some cases paying taxes that should not be paid by government  entities.
In contrast, CINCLANFLT Norfolk negotiated a contract with one vendor  using a shared minute plan, which allows multiple individuals to be on the  same plan using an allocated number of minutes. The advantage of this  plan is that if one individual goes over his or her allocated number of  minutes and another individual uses fewer than his or her allotted number  of minutes, charges for additional usage are not incurred. As a result of this  plan, excess minutes were eliminated and CINCLANFLT Norfolk’s monthly  access charges were reduced from $45.65 to $33.19. To take it one step  further, the NAVAIR Command was able to achieve a large saving for all  seven of its subcommands because it leveraged its buying power as a  command to negotiate a better deal with a single service provider. Under  this contract, NAVAIR Patuxent, a participating subcommand, received a 23  percent discount off retail—almost twice the amount of the GSA­ negotiated discount rate—and free standard cell phones. NAVAIR  Command was able to negotiate such a favorable contract because it had  the information it needed on its cell phone users, allowing it to negotiate  with different local vendors and select the vendor with the best rate. This  information included such factors as the number of cell phone users, the  total number of plan minutes used, and the amount spent annually for cell  phone equipment and services. As a result of the negotiated contract,  NAVAIR Patuxent estimated that it saved approximately $110,000 in fiscal  year 2003 and projects that it will save over $200,000 in fiscal year 2004 for  its cell phone services and equipment requirements. The differences in the  three procurement methods illustrated show that even on a small level,  information consolidation and centralization is the foundation for  implementing cost-effective methods for procuring cell phones and related  services. Realizing this, NAVSEA Crane is currently developing a  centralized procurement contract with a local vendor.
In addition, three of the four Navy locations we audited paid too much for  cell phone services because they were not monitoring individual plan  usage. As shown in table 2, we identified selected cases at three of the four  sites we audited where cell phone users were either (1) consistently  exceeding their monthly allotment of minutes, thus incurring excessive  charges for extra minutes (overutilization); or (2) consistently using only a  small portion of their allotted minutes, thus incurring high charges per  minute actually used because they contracted for substantially more  minutes than needed (underutilization). At the fourth location, as  previously mentioned, CINCLANFLT Norfolk negotiated a contract with  one vendor using the shared minute plan, which allows multiple individuals  to be on the same plan using an allocated amount of minutes—eliminating  their charges for over- and underutilization of cellular plans.
Overutilization of cellular plans can result in considerable additional costs  to the government. We found that management personnel at these sites  were not routinely comparing cell phone plans and usage to identify  possible savings. For example, we found at one unit listed in table 2 that for  some cellular plans, excess minute charges ranged from 20 to 35 cents per  minute. This is more than twice the cost of the plans’ allowable per minute  charges, which ranged from 7 to 15 cents per minute. For the 15  overutilized plans, these two sites incurred over $34,000 in excess minute  charges in fiscal year 2002. Officials at NAVAIR Patuxent, concerned over  our finding regarding the overutilization of cellular plans at their site,  implemented a quarterly review process where they monitor cell phone  usage with respect to allotted minutes and modify individual cell phone  plans to achieve maximum cost effectiveness. According to these officials,  for the first quarter of fiscal year 2004, NAVAIR Patuxent saw a reduction of  39 percent in its excess minute costs. Similarly, SPAWAR Charleston is in  the process of negotiating a contract with a vendor for shared pool minutes  to reduce its excess minute costs.
While the monetary impact of underutilizing cell phone minutes is not as  significant as consistently exceeding plan minutes, at one site in  particular—NAVSEA Crane—using data-mining techniques on vendor  invoices, we found instances where cell phone users were paying $95 per  month for service plans in which they were using less than an average of 2  percent of their allotted monthly minutes for fiscal year 2002. As shown in  table 3, the average cost per minute on these underutilized cell phone plans  was extremely high.
When we saw similar issues at SPAWAR Charleston, officials reviewed the  usage requirements for 71 of their 1,900 cell phone users and determined  that these users had either significant over- or underutilization. They  further determined that they could save over $59,000 annually on these 71  plans alone if they changed the individual users to plans that more  accurately matched their actual usage. According to these officials, they  intended to review the remaining plans to achieve additional savings.
section_title: Vendor Payments Approved Without Appropriate Review
paragraphs: None of the four sites we audited had consistently implemented  procedures that complied with DOD policies regarding reconciliation of  telecommunication invoices. DOD regulations require that payments on  invoices be supported by documentation that reflects the receipt of  services and goods and that those goods and services conform to the  contractual requirements. These documents must be reconciled prior to  payment unless special circumstances warrant otherwise. For  telecommunication, this reconciliation process involves reviewing  telecommunication invoices and reconciling invoice charges with an  accurate inventory of telecommunication lines, circuits, networks, and  services currently in operation and verifying that the billing rates used to  calculate the charges are valid. However, we found that two of the Navy  sites we audited had few or no controls in place, while the other two sites  were not consistently implementing their established controls to review  vendor invoices prior to certification of payment. Consequently, approving  officials at these sites failed to detect inappropriate and irregular  telecommunication charges, which allowed overpayments and duplicate  payments to be made to vendors.
Two of the four sites we audited had few or no controls in place to review  and reconcile vendor invoices prior to certification of payment. At NAVSEA  Crane, we reviewed the payment information for fiscal year 2002 and the  first 6 months of fiscal year 2003 and found that officials reviewed the total  amount billed per invoice and did not review specific charges to determine  whether the charges were valid. Consequently, NAVSEA Crane paid almost  $1,700 in vendor-assessed late fees. According to agency officials, only  DFAS can approve late fees for past due Navy payments, and therefore  NAVSEA Crane failed to ensure that any review of late fees was completed  prior to payment. The other site, CINCLANFLT Norfolk, which procured its  local and long-distance services via NCTAMS, had its invoices certified for  payment by NCTAMS for more than 1 year without proper review. This  occurred because CINCLANFLT Norfolk had not received billing  information from NCTAMS that would allow it to review and reconcile its  detailed charges with the services currently in operation.
According to NCTAMS officials, billing information, such as service  charges and long-distance call details, is e-mailed to the respective units’  contact point using the same e-mail address used by the vendor. However,  NCTAMS officials did not confirm that the units were receiving the billing  information or if the e-mail address was correct. Instead, these officials  stated that they assumed the billing information was correct unless they  were contacted by the activity within 15 days. However, relying on negative  assurance prevents these sites from properly reviewing and reconciling  invoices in accordance with DOD policies. For example, at NCTAMS, we  found 52 long-distance calls on a July 2003 invoice that were 24 hours or  over in length. These calls included 4-day, 10-day, and 12-day phone calls,  which all originated from different phone numbers at different times. The  length of these calls alone should have prompted further investigation but,  because the invoice was never properly reviewed, the billing errors went  unnoticed until we called the issue to the attention of NCTAMS officials. As  shown in table 4, we further investigated 10 of the 52 calls to determine  what caused the apparent billing errors. In 7 of the 10 cases, NCTAMS  officials who approved the invoices could neither provide us with an  explanation for the length of the calls nor could they provide us with valid  points of contact for the activities responsible for the calls.
The other two sites, SPAWAR Charleston and NAVAIR Patuxent, had  procedures in place to review and reconcile telecommunication invoices  prior to payment, but these procedures were not consistently implemented.  As a result, we found these reviewing officials had not detected irregular  charges, which resulted in overpayments and duplicate payments being  made to vendors. For example, at SPAWAR Charleston, officials paid $5,600  over a 5-month period for services that had been discontinued. Further, we  found that both SPAWAR Charleston and NAVAIR Patuxent had made  duplicate payments on invoices because they did not follow the procedures  in place to pay only the current charges on an invoice. Instead, on two  occasions, these units paid the total balance due. As a result, officials at  both of these two sites paid a total of $17,855 (SPAWAR, Charleston-­ $17,382 and NAVAIR Patuxent--$473) in duplicate payments for prior  months’ charges, which had been previously paid. If SPAWAR Charleston  and NAVAIR Patuxent had consistently followed their procedures for  reviewing and reconciling telecommunication invoices, the overpayments  would not have occurred.
These examples illustrate the types of potential billing errors that  telecommunication managers should be able to avoid with more detailed  reviews of invoices. According to some Navy officials, reviewing and  reconciling detailed telecommunication charges each month is time­ consuming and impractical given the number of telecommunication local  and long-distance transactions occurring monthly. In addition, they stated  that the rate structures used to calculate the invoice charges were often so  complex that they were unable to determine how the final charges were  calculated or whether they were, in fact, correct.
section_title: Controls over Issuance and Use of Calling Cards Were Inadequate
paragraphs: As part of their long-haul service contract provided through DISA, DOD  components may also order and receive long-distance calling card services.  Long-distance calling card charges are then billed, along with other long­ haul services, on the components’ monthly invoices. According to an MCI  official, each calling card with its respective PIN should be issued to and  used only by one individual in order to assist in monitoring calling card  usage. Additionally, calling cards should be tracked to determine who is  accountable for each card’s usage, and invoices should be reviewed to  detect and prevent unauthorized calling card use. However, some of the  Navy sites we audited were unaware they owned calling cards.  Furthermore, neither DOD nor the Navy had specific policies addressing  the administration and management of calling cards. This lack of policies,  combined with the ineffective controls over payments to  telecommunication vendors, discussed previously, creates a fertile  environment for fraud, waste, and abuse.
To identify possible calling card misuse, we analyzed 3 months of the  Navy’s calling card activity and used data-mining techniques to select seven  calling card accounts from seven Navy activities that had either  overlapping calls (two or more calls occurring at the same time with  different originating numbers) or calls originating from different  geographic locations at approximately the same time—using the same  calling card number. Such cases would indicate calling cards that were  being shared and/or compromised. As shown in table 5, five of the seven  cards had been compromised.
When we contacted the Navy officials and account owners responsible for  managing and reviewing telecommunication invoices, we found that for  four of the five calling cards shown in table 5, they were unaware that their  unit owned or used calling cards. Further, according to these officials, they  had not receive detailed information on calling card charges from either the  vendor or from NACTAMS and therefore did not know that they were  paying for these charges. Consequently, these officials could not determine  if the calling cards had been compromised because they did not know who  had possession of the cards and many did not have documentation  supporting the use of these cards for the time period in question. Also,  NCTSSD and MCB Camp Pendleton were unaware that in July 2003 the  vendor’s fraud detection unit had suspended the calling cards we reviewed.
As a result of our review, NCTAMS Norfolk, NCTSSD, and MCB Camp  Pendleton identified and cancelled a total of 52 calling cards, including the  3 we selected, which they were unaware that they owned. However, neither  MCI nor DISA was able to tell us how many dollars of charges had been  made on these 52 calling cards since the cards had been activated. The  remaining two units either canceled their card due to an MCI fraud alert as  mentioned above or an internal investigation.
Although the account owners for the two remaining calling card accounts  we audited were aware that their unit owned and used calling cards, they  did not have policies restricting the sharing of the cards. In many cases,  card users within the same units shared the same calling cards and PIN.  For example, at NAVAIR Patuxent, officials told us that they believed the  selected card’s transactions were due to shared use and as a result of our  review have changed their local calling card policies to prevent the sharing  of calling cards in the future and to hold individuals accountable if  unauthorized usage is found. At BCO Philadelphia, agency officials told us  that the cards were shared because the unit’s cell phones were down.  However, after the cell phones were reactivated, the sharing of calling  cards was discontinued. As a result of the sharing of calling cards, officials  at both of these locations could not subsequently determine whether these  two calling cards were used for legitimate business reasons and whether all  the charges were accurate. Further, because these cards were shared and  thus the numbers compromised, these officials could not identify the  responsible party for the questionable calls.
Overall, these seven units lacked effective management oversight and  adequate internal controls, which left them vulnerable to potential  fraudulent and abusive calling card transactions. For example, an official at  the USS Mitscher said that he routinely provided the same card number and  PIN to several of his officers, as needed, but he did not know how many  officers he had given the numbers to or how many currently had possession  of the numbers. For this one card alone, between April and June of 2003,  the Navy paid over $17,000 in long-distance charges. However, because no  one was monitoring the activity on this card regularly, the unit was  unaware of the excessive charges. Instead, it was not until the vendor’s  fraud unit raised questions about more than $11,000 in charges during the  first 6 days of July 2003 that the card was suspended. As shown in figure 1,  on July 6, 2003, the card had 189 calls that originated from 12 different  cities in five different states and Canada to 12 different countries for a total  of over $5,000. In this 24-hour period, the card incurred over 55 hours of  calling card charges.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: The lack of management oversight and accountability combined with  inadequate internal controls over payments to telecommunication vendors  has created an environment that is vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse.  Until the Navy enforces existing policies related to maintaining accurate  inventory data and designs automated systems capable of tracking cost  data, the Navy has no assurance that telecommunication goods and  services are purchased in the most cost-effective way possible. Further, the  failure of the units we audited to follow existing policies related to  reviewing and revalidating telecommunication requirements and  performing adequate receipt and acceptance procedures puts these units at  risk of making payments for erroneous or improper telecommunication  charges. Finally, although we performed audit work only at selected units,  the Navy’s lack of comprehensive policies and guidance governing the  purchase, issuance, and use of cell phone and calling card services  increases the likelihood that the problems we identified at these units may  exist elsewhere within the Navy.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the Navy’s management oversight of its telecommunication  program, we recommend that the Secretary of the Navy take eight  corrective actions and the CNO take three corrective actions.
We recommend that the Secretary of the Navy direct the CNO to ensure  that existing policies are enforced. Specifically, the CNO should ensure that  the Navy: develops and maintains a comprehensive inventory of the Navy’s base  telecommunication equipment and services; supports DISA efforts to track acquisitions of telecommunication  services throughout DOD, actual costs of those services, and trends in  usage (that is, the volume and types of traffic that networks carry).
We further recommend that the Secretary of the Navy direct the CNO to  establish comprehensive policies and guidance governing the purchase and  use of: cell phone services, which should include (1) the use of prenegotiated or  centrally negotiated rates and (2) periodic assessment of cell phone  usage to determine if plan packages provide the most cost-effective  means to satisfy the Navy’s usage requirements; and calling card services, which should include policies about  accountability, the proper review of invoices, and the prohibition of  sharing of calling cards.
To strengthen the Navy’s ability to acquire telecommunication services  effectively and efficiently, we recommend that the Secretary of the Navy  direct the CNO to develop, in coordination with the Navy commands, a  strategic management framework for improving the acquisition of  telecommunication services. This framework should include provisions for  inventorying current and potential users of telecommunication services  to determine existing and future requirements;  identifying and exploiting opportunities to consolidate requirements  among Navy commands; and adopting, when appropriate, commonly used commercial practices,  such as conducting spend analyses and competing and negotiating  pricing discounts based on overall Navy volume, to strengthen the  Navy’s bargaining position in acquiring telecommunication services.
To ensure the successful implementation of this strategic management  framework and to better leverage Navy buying power, we recommend that  the Secretary of the Navy direct the CNO to strengthen analysis of  telecommunication service requirements, spending, and the capabilities of  telecommunication service providers by enhancing core internal technical  expertise and information systems.
At the selected units that we audited, we recommend that the CNO direct  the commanders to provide assurance that existing policies are enforced  and fully evaluate the internal controls over the review and revalidation of telecommunication requirements, reconciliation of telecommunication invoices with a current inventory  of telecommunication equipment and services, and distribution and use of calling cards and cancellation of cards that are  not properly controlled.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are  reprinted in appendix II.
DOD concurred with 9 of our 11 recommendations and partially concurred  with the remaining 2 recommendations. These latter recommendations  were that the Navy (1) support DISA efforts to track acquisitions of  telecommunication services, the actual cost of those services, and trends in  usage of telecommunication services throughout DOD; and (2) strengthen  the analysis of telecommunication services requirements, spending, and  the capabilities of telecommunication service providers by enhancing core  internal technical expertise and information systems. Although the Navy  said it plans to take actions on these 2 recommendations, it was unclear  whether these planned actions will satisfy our recommendations. The  department also provided technical comments, which we have  incorporated in the report as appropriate.
Concerning Navy support of DISA efforts to track acquisition of  telecommunication services throughout DOD, the actual costs of those  services, and trends in usage, DOD responded that the Secretary of the  Navy will direct cognizant senior Department of the Navy officials to  support DISA tracking efforts to the maximum extent practicable. Such  measures are an important aspect of the management of  telecommunication programs and appear to be responsive to our  recommendation. However, since we are uncertain of the meaning of  “maximum extent practicable”, we cannot evaluate the extent to which  DOD plans to implement this recommendation. We continue to strongly  encourage the Navy to track all acquisitions of telecommunication  equipment and services in order to enable it, in conjunction with DISA, to  successfully develop an enterprisewide governance process for  telecommunication, meet DOD expectations for major management  reform, and obtain the maximum savings in its procurement services.
Regarding the Navy enhancing core internal technical expertise and  information systems, DOD stated that requirements would be analyzed and  considered as part of DOD’s efforts to develop a management framework  for improving the efficiency of the Navy’s acquisition and use of  telecommunication services. Although it appears the DOD’s response may  address the intent of this recommendation, the extent of its efforts is  unclear. We continue to believe that the Navy could benefit from a  strengthened analysis of its telecommunication service requirements,  spending, and the capabilities of its service providers, which could be aided  by enhancing its core technical expertise and information systems.
As agreed with your office, unless you announce the contents of this report  earlier, we will not distribute it until 30 days from its issuance date. At that  time, we will send copies of this report to other interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and  the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management (Comptroller) for the  Navy. Copies will be made available to others upon request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-9505 or kutzg@gao.gov if you or your staffs have any questions about this report. Other GAO contacts and key  contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: We reviewed selected aspects of DOD’s and the Navy’s management of their  telecommunication programs. We modified the scope of our work, in  process, because in some cases the information needed to perform  comprehensive analyses was lacking and in other cases the data were so  fragmented that they could not be analyzed in the aggregate. Thus, in many  cases, we had to rely on case studies and nonrepresentative selections of  transactions to illustrate the internal control problems we identified.
This assignment originated because of congressional concerns that DOD’s  vendor pay process, which accounted for approximately $112 billion in  fiscal year 2003, might suffer from many of the same types of pervasive  problems that we uncovered during our previous work on DOD’s purchase  card program. Specifically, we were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of  DOD’s management oversight and controls of payments to its vendors.  Initially, we intended to assess DOD’s oversight and controls over vendor  purchases and payments for telecommunication goods and services—  including local and long-distance services, calling cards, and cellular phone  services. However, because it was not feasible to provide a comprehensive  assessment of the adequacy of all 17 of DOD’s vendor payment systems or  the multitude of varying controls and processes over the  telecommunication purchases and processes that we encountered, we  subsequently focused our effort primarily on the Navy. Then, because the  Navy was unable to provide us with a complete population of  telecommunication expenditures from which to perform statistical  sampling and testing of transactions, we used a case-study approach to  assess the adequacy of management oversight and internal controls. This  lack of information with which to do statistical sampling and testing  applied at all levels, including the unit level. Even at the case study  locations selected, we were unable to perform statistical testing because  the local databases were often incomplete, or they had insufficient,  inconsistent, or inaccurate data. Because of this, we evaluated the design  of controls in place and relied on nonrepresentative selections to evaluate  the effectiveness of the case study locations’ internal controls of their  telecommunication programs. Consequently, we were unable to gauge the  extent of the problem from a DOD, Navy, or even unit perspective.
Our objectives were to determine (1) whether the Navy has the basic cost  and inventory information needed to oversee and manage its purchases  from telecommunication vendors and (2) whether selected Navy sites have  adequate controls to provide reasonable assurance that telecommunication  goods and services are purchased cost effectively and payments are made  only for valid telecommunication charges. We reviewed current DOD and  Navy guidance contained in applicable regulations, directives, instructions,  or other guidance concerning the procurement, management, and use of  common-user networks. We also reviewed our own prior reports as well as  prior DOD Inspector General and other DOD military audit services’  reports. We met and had numerous discussions with officials from DISA—  DOD’s major telecommunication manager—and at DITCO Scott, the  primary contracting organization in DISA.
To determine whether the Navy’s controls of expenditures are adequate to  provide reasonable assurance that telecommunication goods and services  are purchased cost effectively and that payments are made only for valid  transactions, we audited the effectiveness of the Navy’s internal controls  over its fiscal year 2002 telecommunication transactions at selected sites.  Because the Navy lacked a consolidated source for telecommunication  data, we were unable to obtain complete and accurate information for  telecommunication disbursements Navy-wide. Instead, we identified the  approximate amount spent by the Navy on telecommunications for fiscal  year 2002 by manually identifying known telecommunication vendors and  matching this list against the information contained in the Standard  Accounting and Reporting System (STARS), the Financial Accounting  Budget System (FABS), and the purchase card accounting database.
Using these three databases, we were able to determine that the Navy paid  at least $271 million to telecommunication vendors in 2002. Because the  STARS database contained the highest dollar amount of  telecommunication payments, we summarized the STARS payments by the  Authorized Accounting Activity (AAA) code to identify the organizations  having responsibility for providing the funding for the payments. However,  these accounting organizations were not necessarily the users of the goods  and services for which they made payments. Using the information  developed from this methodology, we identified the four major commands  having the largest telecommunication payments in 2002. They were the  Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), the Naval  Network and Space Operations Command (NNSOC),the Naval Air  Systems Command (NAVAIR), and the Naval Sea Systems Command  (NAVSEA). We then selected one activity (or subactivity, if necessary)  within each command at which to do further detailed work. Using our  methodology, the four major commands selected accounted for about $114  million of the Navy’s total $271 million in telecommunication payments, or  42 percent of fiscal year 2002 Navy telecommunication payments. (These  amounts may include tactical and nontactical telecommunication.) The  four activities selected accounted for $63 million of the $114 million (55  percent) of the total for the four commands.
At the four navy activities, we used a case study approach. At the sites, we  obtained and reviewed information from directives, policies, and  procedures governing their telecommunication programs. We evaluated the  documentation provided and had numerous meetings and follow-up  discussions with personnel responsible for various aspects of the  telecommunication programs at the sites we visited as well as at remote  locations, if applicable.
To assess the overall control environment governing telecommunications  to determine if it provides reasonable assurance that telecommunication  goods and services are purchased and paid for cost effectively, the primary  criteria we used were applicable laws and regulations; our Standards for  Internal Control in Federal Government (GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, November  1999); and our Internal Control Standards: Internal Control Management  and Evaluation Tool (GAO-01-1008G, August 2001). To assess the  management control environment, we evaluated DOD and Navy  management practices using the fundamental concepts and standards  contained in GAO’s Internal Control Standards. To test the  implementation of key control activities during fiscal year 2002 at the four  installations we audited, we performed the following detailed testing.
Base Communications—At each site visited, we obtained a database  or list of base (local service) circuits. For each base circuit, we  requested information such as the installation date, the validation date,  the service end date, and the discontinue date (if applicable), the  physical location of the circuit (building), the responsible point of  contact and organization, the vendor, and billing information for fiscal  year 2002 and the first 6 months of fiscal year 2003. From each local  database, we selected nonrepresentative selections of base circuits to  test for compliance with DOD, Navy, and local policies. For each  selected transaction, we compared the total number of circuits and total  disbursements for selected months in order to perform a reconciliation  of the invoice totals. For months in which the totals did not agree, we  analyzed detailed information in the reconciliation and invoices to test  for (1) inaccuracy of data, (2) payment for items not currently owned or  being used, (3) differences in invoice amounts versus reconciliation and  database amounts, and (4) payments for excess lines. We also analyzed  invoices after circuits had been discontinued to determine whether the  vendor was still charging for disconnected circuits, and we analyzed  selected invoices to determine if the vendor had assessed late fees and  whether those late fees had been certified for payment by the selected  case study sites.
Long-Haul Communications—Using the DISA database, we obtained  a list of circuits with past due validation dates as of July 9, 2003, for the  activities and major commands. We compared the long-haul inventory  information in DISA’s database to the installation’s long-haul inventory  information in order to determine (1) if long-haul circuits were being  reviewed and revalidated every 2 years, as required by regulation; (2)  the accuracy of DITCO’s long-haul inventory information; and (3)  whether the installations had procured long-haul services or equipment  without going through DITCO. We spoke with numerous agency officials  on site and in follow-up discussions in order to try to resolve any  discrepancies.
Cell Phones—Further, at three of the four case study sites, we  determined if cell phones were monitored to detect significant over- or  underuse of plan minutes and for compliance with DOD, Navy, and local  policies. To determine if cell phones were being monitored for over- or  underuse of plan minutes, we first obtained a list of cell phone users.  Next, we obtained detailed monthly billing for each user selected for  fiscal year 2002 and May 2003 and through data mining compared the  monthly minutes used to cell plan minutes to identify if the cellular plan  was being under- or over utilized. To test for compliance, we selected a  nonrepresentative selection of cell phone transactions (request for  service, authorization, receipt and acceptance, and payment) and  compared the transactions against DOD, Navy, and local policies.
Calling Cards—We analyzed the DISA/DITCO Columbus calling card  transactional database, which contained DOD’s calling card transactions  from April through June 2003. However, due to the scope of our audit,  we focused our review only on the Navy’s calling card transactions.  Through data mining, we identified Navy calling card numbers that (1)  had overlapping calls or calls from different geographical areas within  an hour. From this population, we selected seven calling card accounts  and spoke with officials from the following seven activities and the  telecommunication vendor, MCI, to determine why there were  overlapping calls or calls placed from different geographical areas. The  seven activities were (1) NCTAMS Norfolk, (2) Base Communications  Office (BCO) Philadelphia, (3) Naval Computer and Telecommunication  Station San Diego (NCTSSD), (4) Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp  Pendleton, (5) USS Mitscher, (6) Naval Air Lakehurst, and (7) NAWCAD  Patuxent. At these locations, we spoke with Navy officials and their  telecommunications vendor, MCI, to determine why there were  overlapping calls or calls placed from different geographical areas at  almost the same time.
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of the  Navy or his designee. DOD provided written comments, which are  presented and evaluated in the “Agency Comments and Our Evaluation”  section and are reprinted in appendix II. We conducted our work from May  2003 through February 2004 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Art Brouk, Michael Chambless, Francine  DelVecchio, Johnny Clark, Carmen Harris, John Ledford, and John Ryan  made key contributions to this report.
section_title: GAO’s Mission
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subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Public Affairs