Federal Protective Service: Better Data on Facility Jurisdictions Needed to Enhance Collaboration with State and Local Law Enforcement
Published: 2012-03-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) protects over 9,000 federal facilities under the custody and control of the General Services Administration (GSA). In 2007, FPS adopted an inspector-based workforce approach and indicated it would increase its reliance on state and local law enforcement agencies to respond to incidents at these facilities. These facilities range from facilities of proprietary or concurrent jurisdictionwhere authority is shared by federal and state and local policeto facilities of exclusive jurisdiction, where only federal law enforcement has authority. As requested, this report assesses FPSs efforts to collaborate with state and local law enforcement for assistance in responding to incidents at these federal facilities. GAO reviewed documents on collaboration, GSA and FPS facility data, and GAOs work on key collaboration practices and internal control standards. GAO also contacted 73 selected state and local law enforcement agencies from geographic jurisdictions of varying population sizes and FPS buildings throughout the United States and interviewed FPS and GSA officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: To collaborate with state and local law enforcement, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) uses memorandums of understanding (MOU), long-standing working relationships, written guidance to FPS staff, joint operations, and other initiatives. For example, FPS has MOUs ranging from sharing radio frequency usage in Alabama, to a mutual aid agreement with the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority in Georgia. In some jurisdictions, such as the suburbs of the District of Columbia, FPS has no MOUs but has regular contact and long-standing mutual aid relationships with state and local law enforcement. To collaborate with state and local law enforcement, FPS has guidance that addresses issues such as the scope of law enforcement authorities on federal property and information sharing among jurisdictions. FPS established regional staff positions intended to improve collaboration with other organizations and has engaged in joint operations with state and local law enforcement. By comparison, other federal organizations with law enforcement responsibilities similar to FPS also use a variety of methods, ranging from the Department of Veterans Affairs policy to seek MOUs with state and local law enforcement to the Smithsonian Institutions established relationships with the Metropolitan D.C. Police and others.
GAO found that state and local law enforcement organizations it contacted are generally willing to assist with incidents at federal facilities. For example, 48 of 52 respondents from state and local law enforcement agencies GAO contacted about this issue said that they would respond to a call at a federally owned facility; 27 said they had done so since 2007. Overall, the variety of efforts FPS has under way is consistent with the key collaboration practices GAO has previously identified and reflects a reasonable approach to collaboration, especially when combined with the willingness of state and local law enforcement to assist.
Although FPS has a reasonable approach to state and local collaboration, GAO found issues related to the quality of data exchanged between GSA and FPS on buildings and their locations. Through working groups, GSA is working with FPS to address these data inconsistency issues and is establishing a permanent GSA liaison at FPSs headquarters to improve data coordination. But as of the end of GAOs review, FPS still lacked complete data from GSA on the jurisdiction of about one third of the buildings it protects. GSA officials informed GAO that they are making progress with identifying building jurisdictions but were not yet in a position to provide complete information to FPS. These data are important because state and local law enforcement generally has no authority to enforce state and local law on properties of exclusive federal jurisdiction. An additional effect of not having these data is that FPS lacks assurance that in relying on state and local law enforcement to respond to incidents at federal facilities, it is not creating a situation where these entities may be exercising police authority where they lack such authority. As a result, incomplete jurisdictional data leaves FPS and state and local law enforcement less equipped to define and agree to respective roles and responsibilities when there are incidents at federal facilities.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: In conjunction with the revised MOU that is being developed between GSA and FPS, GAO recommends the administrator of GSA ensure that efforts to identify the jurisdictions of all GSA buildings are completed and that these data are provided to FPS. GSA concurred with the recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Protective  Service (FPS) protects over 9,000 federal facilities under the custody and  control of the General Services Administration (GSA) by delivering  integrated law enforcement and security services. To secure these  buildings and safeguard their occupants, FPS employs about 1,225  federal staff, including law enforcement officers, investigators, and  administrative personnel, and is responsible for management and  oversight of approximately 14,000 contract security guards. These federal  facilities range from facilities of proprietary or concurrent jurisdiction—in  which authority is shared by federal and state and local police—to  facilities of exclusive jurisdiction in which only federal law enforcement  has authority. FPS conducts its mission by providing security services  through two types of activities: (1) physical security activities, such as  conducting risk assessments of GSA facilities and recommending risk- based countermeasures to GSA and tenant agencies aimed at reducing  the likelihood and severity of incidents at facilities, and (2) law  enforcement activities, such as responding to incidents, conducting  criminal investigations, and exercising arrest authority. In order for FPS to  track the continuous changes in the inventory of buildings that it  protects—including new construction, disposed buildings, and over 8,000  leases—GSA, through its Public Buildings Service, provides building  data to FPS weekly from GSA’s building property system.
In 2007, FPS adopted an inspector-based workforce approach to protect  GSA-controlled facilities. In testimony to Congress that same year, a  DHS senior official stated that the agency was increasing its reliance on  state and local law enforcement agencies to assist in responding to law  enforcement incidents at these facilities as a way of ensuring that GSA  buildings are adequately protected. While FPS is statutorily responsible  for enforcing federal laws and regulations for the protection of federal  property and persons located on federal property regardless of the  location, state and local law enforcement agencies are responsible for  enforcing state laws and local ordinances within the particular state on  concurrent and proprietary jurisdiction locations. In 2008, we  recommended that FPS clarify roles and responsibilities of local law  enforcement agencies in responding to incidents at GSA-controlled  facilities. Since this report was issued, FPS has issued specific agency  instructions regarding coordination, hired new personnel to oversee  coordination in the regions, and pursued additional memorandums of  understanding (MOU) when needed, such as in the case of clarifying  roles and responsibilities between FPS and state and local law  enforcement.
You asked us to provide an update on these issues. This report assesses  FPS’s efforts to collaborate with state and local law enforcement for  assistance in responding to incidents at federal facilities. To meet this  objective, we reviewed relevant documentation on federal facility building  data from GSA. In addition, we emailed a self-administered set of 22  structured questions to the heads of 73 state and local law enforcement  agencies in jurisdictions throughout the United States that we determined  had FPS-protected buildings. Our non-random selection of locations  included varying population sizes served by the state and local law  enforcement agencies located in a mixture of urban and rural areas as  defined by the United States Department of Agriculture. We used the  most recent Rural-Urban Continuum Codes. We followed up our emails  with phone calls to these state and local law enforcement agencies to  obtain clarification of the responses as needed. Not every respondent  answered every question. Although the results of our structured  questionnaires cannot be generalized to the universe of jurisdictions that  interact with FPS, the results provide key insights and illustrate how these  organizations can help FPS respond to incidents.
In 2000, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) transitioned all alarm-monitoring and  dispatching capabilities from several regional control centers to four MegaCenters.  Currently, each MegaCenter monitors multiple types of alarm systems, closed circuit  television, and wireless dispatch communications within federal facilities throughout the  nation. These centers—located in Michigan, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Maryland—are  equipped with state-of-the-art communication systems and operate continuously. assessed the quality and completeness of these data. Collectively, this  multifaceted approach enabled us to make conclusions about whether  FPS’s collaboration approach is reasonable. Appendix I contains more  information on our objective, scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 to March 2012  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: FPS—located within the National Protection and Programs Directorate of  DHS—protects the over 9,000 federal facilities that are under the control  and custody of GSA, as well as the persons on those properties. FPS  headquarters is located in Washington, D.C.; regional offices are located  in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Denver, Chicago, San  Francisco, Seattle, Fort Worth, Kansas City, and the District of Columbia.  FPS is authorized to enforce federal laws and regulations aimed at  protecting GSA buildings and persons on the property and to investigate  offenses against these buildings and persons.include buildings of exclusive, concurrent, and proprietary jurisdictions.
Exclusive: Under exclusive federal jurisdiction, the federal  government—and federal law enforcement entities—have all of the  legislative authority within the land area in question, while the state— and its state and local law enforcement entities—have no residual  police powers.
Concurrent: In concurrent jurisdiction facilities, both federal and state  governments—and law enforcement entities—have jurisdiction over  the property.
Proprietary: Under proprietary jurisdiction, the federal government has  rights—similar to a private landowner—but also maintains its  authorities and responsibilities as the federal government. Under  proprietary jurisdiction, the local government is the principal municipal  police authority.
To enable FPS to track changes in the inventory of federal buildings that  it protects, GSA, through its Public Buildings Service, provides building  data in electronic files to FPS weekly from GSA’s building property  system. These data include each building number with address; type of  jurisdiction; and square footage and number of personnel to assist FPS to  bill for its services, among other things. FPS personnel then input this  information into its systems electronically. MegaCenters—the four  regional dispatch centers within FPS that are the primary focal points for  incident notification (see figure 1)—use the data to direct calls concerning  building incidents and emergencies to FPS personnel as well as state and  local law enforcement agencies.
As a general practice, MegaCenters make direct radio calls for incident  response to FPS personnel and telephone calls to state and local law  enforcement agencies. FPS instructs tenants to contact the MegaCenter  by calling 1-877-4FPS-411 and, in areas where FPS responders cannot  provide an immediate response; tenants are often directed to also dial  911. (See fig. 2.)
In this report, we assess GSA and FPS’s processes against GAO’s  collaboration key practices and internal control standards. Our previous  work has broadly defined collaboration as any joint activity that is  intended to produce more public value than could be produced when  organizations act alone. We have found that key practices for  collaboration include:  identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources to support  the common outcome and, where necessary, identifying opportunities  to leverage resources; agreeing upon agency roles and responsibilities; and establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to  operate across agency boundaries.
Additionally, agencies can strengthen their commitment to work  collaboratively by articulating their agreements in formal documents, such  as an MOU. We have also reported that organizations may face a range  of barriers when they attempt to collaborate with other organizations. One  such barrier stems from agencies’ concerns about protecting jurisdiction  over missions. In addition, interagency collaboration is often hindered by  incompatible procedures, processes, data, and computer systems. GAO  has identified standards in facility protection that provide a framework for  guiding agencies’ efforts in this area, such as establishing a means of  coordinating and sharing information with other government entities and  the private sector. Finally, standards for controls over information  processing come from GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government. According to these standards, internal control is a  major part of managing an organization and comprises the plans,  methods, and procedures used to meet missions, goals, and objectives.
Internal control standards specific for information systems help ensure the  completeness and accuracy of data.
Some other federal agencies provide their own law enforcement at their  facilities. These include the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Police,  National Park Service (NPS) law enforcement within the Department of  the Interior, and Smithsonian Institution (SI) Police. VA Police provide law  enforcement duties to the 152 VA Medical Centers (VAMC). U.S. Park  Police is a unit of the National Park Service, with jurisdiction in all  National Park Service areas and certain other federal and state lands.  U.S. Park Police provides law enforcement services to designated areas  within the National Park Service (primarily in the District of Columbia,  New York City, and San Francisco, California metropolitan areas).  Additionally, Law Enforcement Park Rangers, belonging to the “Visitor  and Resource Protection Division” within the National Park Service, are  authorized to carry firearms, conduct investigations, make arrests, and  serve warrants pursuant to law and policy. Protection and security  services at Smithsonian Institution facilities are provided by the  Smithsonian Police.
section_title: FPS Uses Various Approaches to Collaborate with State and Local Law Enforcement, but Jurisdictional Data on Federal Facilities Are Incomplete
subsections: section_title: FPS’s Approach Involves a Variety of MOUs, Reliance on Long-standing Relationships, Guidance, and Other Initiatives
paragraphs: FPS uses a variety of methods to collaborate with state and local law  enforcement, ranging from establishing MOUs to document agreement on  roles and responsibilities with some, to relying on long-standing working  relationships with others. FPS also has guidance and various other efforts  under way related to coordination with state and local law enforcement.  More specifically, FPS reported that it had 21 signed MOUs with state  and local law enforcement agencies across the United States as of  September 2011.usage in Alabama; MOUs for arrest authority on properties adjacent to  federal property in California and Florida; and MOUs for mutual aid in the  District of Columbia and Georgia, such as FPS’s reciprocal support  agreement with Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority. MOUs are  mechanisms that can be used to formalize key practices in agency  collaboration such as agreeing on roles and responsibilities, including   For example, there is an MOU for radio frequency  leadership, and to establish compatible policies, procedures, and other  means to operate across agency boundaries.
While FPS has often found MOUs helpful, the general consensus among  FPS officials was that effective coordination did not depend on having  MOUs. FPS prefers a flexible approach of pursuing MOUs only when it  determines they are needed, as opposed to seeking them in all cases.  FPS’s Director stated that FPS has generally not found it necessary to  create written documents, requirements, or MOUs because FPS has  always received good cooperation from state and local law enforcement  agencies when their assistance was needed. For example, in some  jurisdictions such as the suburbs surrounding the District of Columbia,  FPS has no MOUs with state and local law enforcement agencies but has  regular contact and longstanding mutual aid relationships. In addition,  several FPS Regional Directors highlighted the importance of local  response to incidents in and around federal facilities in rural areas  because of the lack of FPS staff at these locations and noted that their  informal relationships have worked successfully because state and local  law enforcement agencies were consistently reliable in their response to  these locations. FPS officials stated that mandating the pursuance of  MOUs with all law enforcement entities would not be in the best interest  of effectiveness and efficiency and would increase the burden on already  task-saturated FPS staff. In addition, it is generally up to state and local  law enforcement agencies as to whether they would be willing to enter  into an MOU with a federal agency.
With regard to long-standing working relationships and regular contact  with state and local law enforcement, FPS Inspectors and Regional  Directors have developed relationships with state and local law  enforcement agencies and collaborate on different levels. Regional  Directors in all 11 FPS regions stated that their offices routinely had direct  contact with state and local law enforcement agencies at multiple types of  security meetings such as the Federal Executive Boards, joint terrorism  task forces, and regional fusion center meetings.state and local law enforcement agencies and FPS at these meetings  establishes mutually reinforcing or joint strategies designed to help align  activities, core processes, and resources to achieve a common outcome.  For example, FPS participates in monthly meetings of the Law  Enforcement Working Group of the Atlanta Downtown Improvement  District. State and local law enforcement chiefs or deputy chiefs from the  surrounding area, officials from 15 local colleges, and officials from other  federal agencies participate. According to an FPS regional official, the  group acts as a “force multiplier” to fight crime within the district, which  includes GSA-controlled facilities. FPS officials also have discussions  with state and local law enforcement agencies as needed during  operational planning associated with special events such as the  Olympics, protests, and parades.
FPS also has guidance for FPS staff and other efforts under way to  collaborate with state and local law enforcement. Regional Directors are  responsible for carrying out FPS policy and guidance, and state that  many of these written policies contain directives for collaboration with  state and local law enforcement. One such directive is FPS Directive  15.1.2.1, Law Enforcement Authority and Powers, which outlines the  scope of law enforcement authority on federal property. Other policies  that reference state and local law enforcement agencies’ coordination  include FPS’s Regional Information Sharing Program, Detention and  Arrest, and Joint Terrorism Task Force Policy, among others. Best  practices and lessons learned are also communicated throughout FPS  regions with weekly regional director conference calls, a regional  director’s council that meets monthly, and yearly Regional Director  conferences.
In addition to guidance, FPS added three new positions in fiscal year  2011 intended to improve communication and standardization across  FPS by coordinating with federal, state, and local law enforcement  officials to reduce crime at, and potential threats to, federal facilities.  These positions are titled Assistant Director for Field Operations (ADFO)  for west, central, and east operations. The ADFO will be a spokesman for  FPS, representing the Director in his or her designated area.
Other initiatives employed by FPS include collaborative operations to  avert or obstruct potential threats inside the facility, such as the presence  of unauthorized persons, or potentially disruptive or dangerous activities,  such as potential terrorist operations and criminal activity in and around  federal buildings. Using a combination of law enforcement agencies is  consistent with facility protection key practices to establish a means of  coordinating and sharing information with other government entities.  These operations begin with planning meetings involving FPS and any  other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies that may be  called upon to assist. The operations combine physical security expertise  and law enforcement authority into an enhanced security team to provide  a visual deterrent at FPS-protected facilities. The combined team then  selects a federal building for which FPS has security oversight and  provides a highly visible presence for a select period of time with patrol  operations, explosive detection dog sweeps, and an enhanced security  posture. As a means to leverage resources, FPS has collaborated with  state and local law enforcement to assist in conducting these operations  by enlisting their support in Chicago, Illinois; New York, New York;  Newark, New Jersey; and the District of Columbia.
section_title: Like FPS, Other Federal Agencies Use a Variety of Methods to Collaborate with State and Local Law Enforcement
paragraphs: Other federal organizations with law enforcement responsibilities similar  to FPS also used a variety of methods to collaborate with state and local  law enforcement. For example, VA has a policy requiring all locations of  VA-controlled property to have formally documented MOUs with state and  local law enforcement agencies to ensure timely backup support for VA   VA headquarters officials stated that MOUs are useful  Police officers.because VA Police typically transport detainees to state and local law  enforcement agencies for arrest and processing, while state and local law  enforcement agencies typically provide first response to leased property  under VA control. However, VA Police reported they cannot provide  mutual aid to state and local law enforcement agencies on non-VA  controlled property because existing law limits the authority of  Department police officers to VA property.
According to U.S. Park Police headquarters officials, the Park Police has  MOUs with federal, state, and local law enforcement including a  longstanding formal relationship with the District of Columbia Metropolitan  Police Department (MPD). Some of the MOUs are for events and are  short-term, such as the last presidential inauguration in the District of  Columbia. The U.S. Park Police also stated they have MOUs that are  formal incident response plans, which outline the roles and  responsibilities of the various entities. In the District of Columbia, the U.S.  Park Police responded to the U.S. Holocaust Museum shooting incident  in 2009 and have provided service to the Kennedy Center for the  Performing Arts for a fee.
section_title: State and Local Law Enforcement Generally Willing to Assist with Protecting Federal Facilities
paragraphs: Our questionnaire of state and local law enforcement agencies and  follow-up discussions showed a general willingness of those that replied  to respond to incidents at federal facilities. For example, 48 of 52  agencies that answered the question replied that they would respond to  calls that dispatch to a federally occupied (owned and/or leased) building,  and 27 of 44 had actually responded to a federally occupied building  since 2007. As for MOUs, 11 of 43 agencies that answered the question  reported having formal MOUs with FPS and 4 of 40 reported having  informal agreements. (See table 1.) Four state and local law enforcement  agencies stated that they would decline to respond to an incident at a  federal building in their jurisdiction. Three of these four law enforcement  agencies were sheriff or highway patrol entities that stated that they are  not the first responders to incidents at the facilities in question and that  there were local police available for response. A fourth questionnaire  responder did not clarify why it answered negatively; however, additional  inquiry with the federal property owner in this law enforcement’s  jurisdiction stated the particular law enforcement agency did coordinate  and respond to calls at the property. Only one state and local law  enforcement agency replied that it was denied access to a federal  building when responding to an incident within its jurisdiction; however, it  declined to clarify the specific instance in which it was denied access. The  only law enforcement agency that answered it had declined to respond to  a call dispatched at a federally occupied (owned and/or leased) building,  later clarified that the answer applied to non-GSA-controlled facilities such  as buildings of Department of Defense and other federal agencies. Table  1 shows the specific questions and responses provided by state and local  law enforcement.
Overall, the variety of efforts FPS has under way reflects a reasonable  approach to collaboration, especially when combined with results we  found from our questionnaire of state and local law enforcement  agencies. The practice of maintaining working relationships and having  regular contact with state and local law enforcement officials establishes  mutually reinforcing or joint strategies designed to help align activities,  core processes, and resources to achieve a common outcome. The  MOUs that FPS has in place are mechanisms consistent with facilitating  key practices in agency collaboration, such as defining and agreeing to  roles and responsibilities. Establishing compatible policies, procedures,  and other means to operate across agency boundaries are key practices  that can help enhance and sustain collaboration. Pursuing MOUs on an  as-needed basis is also consistent with how other federal law  enforcement agencies approach collaboration. Performing operations  such as extra patrol activities using a combination of law enforcement  agencies is consistent with facility protection key practices to establish a  means of coordinating and sharing information with other government  entities.
section_title: Missing Jurisdictional Data Are of Concern, and Data Inconsistencies with GSA Are Being Addressed
paragraphs: Although FPS’s approach to collaboration is reasonable, issues related to  data quality arose during our review. Specifically, we found that FPS  lacked complete data from GSA on the type of jurisdiction (e.g.,  concurrent or exclusive) for about one-third of the buildings FPS protects,  making it difficult to ensure that it is addressing the full scope of issues  related to jurisdictional roles and responsibilities. At the end of our review,  GSA officials informed us that they had made significant progress  addressing this issue. More specifically, when we reviewed the property  list that GSA provided to FPS in December 2011—which is provided on a  weekly basis—about thirty-four percent of the properties lacked recorded  jurisdictions, including blank and pending jurisdiction categories. (See  table 2.)
GSA officials stated that they were aware of the numerous blank data  fields pertaining to jurisdictions and that they were trying to individually  assess these fields building by building. They further stated that it was a  time-consuming process that included reviewing individual property  historical records. GSA officials stated they had made progress and the  jurisdictions that have not been identified were down to 2 percent.  However, these data had not yet been added to GSA’s building property  system or contained in the electronic files GSA sends to FPS weekly.  GSA officials also stated the jurisdictional field on the GSA property list  was not in the top fifty fields that the agency typically monitors because of  the large number of data fields, although the officials recognized the  importance of this field to FPS.
During our review, we found no instances in which state or local law  enforcement exceeded their jurisdictional authority. In some instances,  state and local law enforcement responded to the perimeter of buildings  with exclusive jurisdiction for matters such as traffic accidents and  suspicious packages. FPS officials said that state and local law  enforcement may also be granted access if officers are in pursuit of a  suspect. Furthermore, FPS officials said that inspectors and GSA staff at  the building level generally know the jurisdiction of the individual buildings  for which they are responsible.
Nonetheless, given that facilities of exclusive jurisdiction are unique  because state and local law enforcement agencies generally have no law  enforcement authority on these properties, incomplete data leaves FPS  less equipped to define and agree to respective roles and responsibilities  with regard to state and local law enforcement collaboration. An additional  effect of not having these data is that FPS lacks assurance that, in relying  on state and local law enforcement to respond to incidents at federal  facilities, it is not creating a situation where these entities may be  exercising police authority where they lack such authority as in the case  of exclusive jurisdiction properties. In addition, having incomplete data is  inconsistent with established standards for internal control over data  systems, including those standards that relate to accuracy and  completeness. While only 4 percent of GSA’s inventory was known to be  of exclusive jurisdiction, 34 percent of GSA’s inventory had incomplete  data on the type of jurisdiction in GSA’s building property system.
In our review, we also found inconsistencies between FPS and GSA data  on buildings and their locations—6 of the 11 FPS regions reported that  the GSA list does not match the current property inventory. One FPS  regional official stated that GSA does not keep the property list as current  as FPS needs; changes occur but are not captured by GSA. For example,  the official stated that in his region, agencies sign leases about a dozen  times a year without FPS’s knowledge or timely notice. FPS officials  noted that the overall number could be greater across all FPS regions.  The current MOU between GSA and FPS calls for a pre-lease  assessment of the building by FPS, but these assessments cannot be  completed if FPS is unaware of the new lease. Another FPS regional  official stated that the region uses its own building list, which is updated  by FPS regularly as information becomes available. A third FPS official  stated that the GSA list does not capture changes to buildings with a  security risk level of 1 or 2 as quickly as FPS needs. A fourth regional  official stated that the region relies on a combination of building lists from  GSA, FPS provided lists, and its own regional list. This official stated  these lists often do not reconcile because of changes that are not  updated in a timely manner. In addition, a majority of state and local law  enforcement agencies we sent questions to replied that they did not  identify the jurisdiction of the individual federal buildings in their  geographic areas, while three entities replied that they only identified  some building jurisdictions.
GSA officials recognize that the exchange of building data with FPS is an  issue. GSA stated that only recently did it have the ability to cross- reference and address these differences, and is working with FPS to  correct them. For example, in 2011, GSA and FPS held working groups to  begin to improve the building property list, and established a permanent  GSA liaison in FPS’s headquarters to improve data coordination.  Although this effort is still in progress and data inconsistencies remain,  GSA and FPS are addressing concerns about data inconsistencies.  Further, GSA and FPS are currently negotiating a new MOU that is  expected to be finalized in early 2012. GSA officials told us that the new  MOU will include an agreement on sharing information, such as the  building data, and specifically sharing information at the regional level.  FPS and GSA did not indicate whether the revised MOU would address  the aforementioned issue related to incomplete jurisdictional data.  However, it would seem that addressing this issue in conjunction with  revising the MOU would ensure that data shared were not only  consistent, but more complete as well.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: FPS’s approach to collaborating with state and local law enforcement is  reasonable and consistent with key practices in that the approach uses  mechanisms such as MOUs to document agreements on roles and  responsibilities in some cases, long-standing working relationships,  written guidance to FPS staff, joint operations, and other initiatives to  promote mutual collaboration. Other federal organizations with law  enforcement responsibilities similar to FPS—such as VA, U.S. Park  Police, and Smithsonian—also use a variety of methods for collaboration  with state and local law enforcement. State and local law enforcement  agencies we contacted were generally willing to assist FPS with incidents  at federal facilities. Related to the quality of data exchanged between  FPS and GSA on buildings and their locations, FPS and GSA had taken  action to address data inconsistency issues. However, as of the end of  our review, FPS still lacked complete data from GSA on whether the  jurisdictions of about one-third of the buildings FPS protects are  exclusive, concurrent, or proprietary. Having these data is important  because state and local law enforcement generally have no authority to  enforce state and local law on properties of exclusive jurisdiction. At the  end of our review, GSA informed us that it had made progress with  addressing this issue. GSA and FPS are negotiating a revised MOU that  will include agreement on sharing information such as the building data.  As such, addressing the issue related to incomplete data on jurisdictions,  in conjunction with revising the MOU, would ensure that data were not  only consistent, but more complete as well. Otherwise, FPS would remain  less equipped to define and agree to respective roles and responsibilities  as it proceeds with its efforts to rely on state and local law enforcement  for assistance in responding to incidents at federal facilities.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In conjunction with the revised MOU that is being developed between  GSA and FPS, we recommend the Administrator of GSA ensure that  efforts to identify the jurisdictions of all GSA buildings are completed and  that these data are provided to FPS so that FPS is better equipped to  manage jurisdictional roles and responsibilities at GSA buildings.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to GSA, DHS, DOI, VA, and  Smithsonian Institution for their review and comment. GSA provided  written comments, which are reprinted in appendix II. GSA concurred with  our recommendation that the Administrator of GSA ensure that efforts to  identify the jurisdictions of all GSA buildings are completed, and that  these data are provided to FPS so that FPS is better equipped to manage  jurisdictional roles and responsibilities at GSA buildings. DHS provided a  letter, reprinted in appendix III, describing its efforts to collaborate with  state and local law enforcement. DHS also provided technical comments,  which we incorporated, as appropriate. DOI, VA, and the Smithsonian  Institution provided minor technical comments, via email, which we  incorporated, as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of  Homeland Security, the Director of FPS, the Administrator of GSA, the  Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and Secretary  of the Smithsonian Institution. In addition, the report will be available at no  charge on the GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you, or your staff, have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objective, Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) efforts to collaborate  with state and local law enforcement for assistance in responding to  incidents at federal facilities, we reviewed FPS data on buildings  protected, staffing, procedures, and memorandums of understanding  (MOUs). We also reviewed relevant federal facility building data from the  General Services Administration (GSA) including for example, each  building number with address; type of jurisdiction; and square footage and  number of personnel, among other things. We interviewed FPS officials  throughout the regions, and FPS and GSA officials at their respective  agency’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., regarding the processes and  procedures for exchanging these data. We reviewed the building data for  completeness, but did not verify the accuracy of the information contained  for each building. To ensure we were assessing the exact data that FPS  uses, we requested data samples for fiscal year 2011 from both GSA and  FPS and replicated the jurisdiction category results. We assessed the  extent to which there were missing jurisdiction assignments by reviewing  pending and blank jurisdiction categories. We then assessed GSA and  FPS’s processes for managing these data against GAO’s Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government, Homeland Security: Further  Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal Agencies’ Facility Protection  Efforts and Promote Key Practices, and Results-Oriented Government:  Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among  Federal Agencies.  According to GAO’s standards for internal control in  the federal government, internal control is a major part of managing an  organization and comprises the plans, methods, and procedures used to  meet missions, goals, and objectives. Internal control, which is  synonymous with management control, helps government program  managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public  resources. Control activities—such as reconciliations performed to verify  data completeness; an agency’s data entry design features contribute to  data accuracy; data validation and editing performed to identify erroneous  data; and erroneous data that is captured, reported, investigated, and  promptly corrected—contribute to data accuracy and completeness. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report.
For comparison with FPS’s coordination efforts, we contacted three  federal agencies that provide law enforcement at their facilities—the  Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the National Park Service (NPS)  within the Department of the Interior, and the Smithsonian Institution (SI).  To gain insight into FPS, VA, SI, and NPS coordination with state and  local law enforcement agencies, we emailed a self-administered set of 22  structured questions to the heads of 73 state and local law enforcement  agencies. Our non-random selection of locations included varying  population sizes located in a mixture of metro, urban, and rural areas as  defined by the United States Department of Agriculture using the most  recent Rural-Urban Continuum Codes for jurisdictions that we determined  had FPS, and/or VA, NPS, and SI buildings throughout the United States.  The state and local law enforcement agencies we chose included a mix of  police, sheriff, highway patrol agencies in each of the 11 FPS regions. We  also followed up our email with phone calls to these state and local law  enforcement agencies. Not every respondent answered every question  related to coordination with FPS, VA Police, U.S. Park Police, and SI  police. Additionally, the responses had varying levels of staff within the  state and local law enforcement organization reply for the organization.  Furthermore, the structured questions were related to coordination with  the Federal Protective Service, Veterans Affairs Police, Smithsonian  police, and the U.S. Park Police. Although the results of our questions  cannot be generalized to the universe of jurisdictions that have interaction  with FPS, the results provide key insights on how state and local law  enforcement collaborates with FPS to assist with federal facility  protection. These results illustrate how FPS relies on these organizations  to respond to incidents and collectively, how this multi-faceted approach  enabled us to make conclusions whether FPS’s approach is reasonable.
Further, we interviewed officials at two FPS MegaCenters—the four  regional dispatch centers within FPS that are the primary focal points for  initial incident notification—and toured the Suitland, Md., MegaCenter  facility. We attended an FPS operational exercise in the District of  Columbia. We also interviewed each of the 11 FPS Regional Directors to  determine how their region coordinates with state and local law  enforcement entities for the properties in their jurisdiction. We interviewed  GSA officials at GSA headquarters in the District of Columbia. We  obtained relevant documents pertaining to VA, NPS, and SI collaboration  with state and local law enforcement and interviewed agency officials.  Lastly, we reviewed prior GAO work, including reports on key practices in  interagency collaboration and facility protection.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 to March 2012  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the General Services Administration
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, David Sausville (Assistant  Director), Maren McAvoy, and George Depaoli made key contributions to  this report. Additionally, Colin Fallon, Kathleen Gilhooly, Hannah Laufe,  and Andrew Stavisky aided in this assignment.