Space Acquisitions: Development and Oversight Challenges in Delivering Improved Space Situational Awareness Capabilities
Published: 2011-05-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The United States' growing dependence on space systems makes them vulnerable to a range of threats. DOD has undertaken a variety of initiatives to provide space situational awareness (SSA)--the knowledge and characterization of space objects and the environment on which space operations depend. GAO was asked to (1) review key systems being planned and acquired to provide SSA, and their progress meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals; and (2) determine how much an integrated approach is being used to manage and oversee efforts to develop SSA capabilities. To achieve this, GAO analyzed documentation and interviewed key officials on major SSA development efforts and oversight and management of SSA. This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in February 2011.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has significantly increased its investment and planned investment in SSA acquisition efforts in recent years to address growing SSA capability shortfalls. Most efforts designed to meet these shortfalls have struggled with cost, schedule, and performance challenges and are rooted in systemic problems that most space acquisition programs have encountered over the past decade. Consequently, in the past 5 fiscal years, DOD has not delivered significant new SSA capabilities as originally expected. To its credit, the Air Force recently launched a space-based sensor that is expected to appreciably enhance SSA. However, two critical acquisition efforts that are scheduled to begin development within the next 2 years--Space Fence and the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS)--face development challenges and risks, such as the use of immature technologies and planning to deliver all capabilities in a single, large increment, versus smaller and more manageable increments. It is essential that these acquisitions are placed on a solid footing at the start of development to help ensure their capabilities are delivered to the warfighter as and when promised. GAO has consistently recommended that reliable acquisition business cases be established, such as maturing technologies prior to development start, utilizing evolutionary development, and stabilizing requirements in order to reduce program risks. For efforts that move forward with less mature technologies, assessments of the cost, schedule, and performance implications of utilizing backup technologies, if they exist, could provide the knowledge needed to determine whether the efforts are worth pursuing or the investment trade-offs that may need to be made. DOD plans to begin delivering other new capabilities in the coming 5 years, but it is too early to determine the extent to which these additions will address capability shortfalls. There are significant inherent challenges to executing and overseeing the SSA mission, largely due to the sheer number of governmentwide organizations and assets involved in the mission. Additionally, while the recently issued National Space Policy assigns SSA responsibility to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary does not necessarily have the corresponding authority to execute this responsibility. However, actions, such as development of a national SSA architecture, are being taken that could help facilitate management and oversight governmentwide. The National Space Policy, which recognizes the importance of SSA, directs other positive steps, such as the determination of roles, missions, and responsibilities to manage national security space capabilities and the development of options for new measures for improving SSA capabilities. Furthermore, the recently-issued National Security Space Strategy could help guide the implementation of the new space policy. GAO has recommended since 2003 that such a strategy be issued. Finally, though the commercial sector and the international community are to play a pivotal role in the SSA mission, it is too early to tell whether DOD's efforts to expand and make permanent its Commercial and Foreign Entities SSA data-sharing pilot program will be effective in integrating efforts to develop SSA capabilities.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD assure--in approving the Space Fence and JMS acquisition efforts to initiate product development--that all critical technologies are identified and matured, and that other key risks have been fully assessed. If DOD determines that the programs should move forward with less mature technologies, DOD should assess available backup technologies and additional resources required to meet performance objectives. DOD agreed with the first recommendation and partially agreed with the second. GAO continues to believe DOD should assess required resources earlier than its stated intent.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United States’ growing dependence on space systems for its security  and well-being—such as for missile warning; intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance; communications; scientific research; weather and climate  monitoring; and positioning, navigation, and timing—makes these systems  vulnerable to a range of intentional and unintentional threats. These  threats range from adversary attacks such as antisatellite weapons, signal  jamming, and cyber attacks, to environmental threats such as harsh  temperatures, radiation, and collisions with debris and other man-made or  natural objects, which have been increasing rapidly over the past several  years. While the Department of Defense’s (DOD) space surveillance  network tracked about 4,600 objects in 1980, it currently tracks more than  22,000. It is therefore becoming increasingly important for the U.S.  government to have sufficient space situational awareness (SSA), defined  by the interim report of the Space Posture Review as “the requisite  foundational, current and predictive knowledge and characterization of  space objects and the operational environment upon which space  operations depend.”
DOD has undertaken, over a period of years, a number of ground- and  space-based efforts to provide SSA. Accordingly, you asked us to (1)  review key systems being planned and acquired to provide SSA, with focus  on their progress in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals; and  (2) determine the extent to which an integrated approach is being used to  manage and oversee efforts to develop SSA capabilities.
To review key systems being planned and acquired to provide SSA, we  examined development of acquisition efforts that are expected to deliver  large gains in capability in fiscal years 2010 through 2015, including new  SSA sensor systems, SSA sensor upgrade and life-extension efforts, and  the development of a new space command and control system that is to  integrate data and provide real-time SSA information. In doing so, we  analyzed documentation and interviewed officials on the status and  progress of SSA development efforts in areas such as requirements,  budgets, cost, funding, schedule, contracting, technology maturation,  testing, and personnel. Using criteria we developed through our best  practices work on commercial sector acquisitions, we assessed the levels  of knowledge acquisition efforts had attained at their current development  stages and related risks. For example, we have found that fully maturing  technologies critical to the success of an acquisition program prior to  beginning product development, following an incremental development  path toward meeting user needs, and matching available resources (that is,  technology, time, money, and people) to requirements at program start can  significantly reduce risks to achieving cost, schedule, and performance  goals. To determine whether a program is following this practice, we  reported the readiness of critical technologies (as assessed by DOD), using  technology readiness levels, a metric originally developed by the National  Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and used across space  programs.
To determine the extent to which an integrated approach is being used to  manage and oversee efforts to develop SSA capabilities, we analyzed  documents and interviewed officials from 30 organizations within the SSA  stakeholder community—users and providers of SSA information  represented by DOD, the intelligence community, civil government  agencies, and commercial industry—to examine (1) management and  oversight efforts to develop, acquire, and manage SSA capabilities; and (2)  planning activities for SSA architectures, investments, and requirements.  We also analyzed documentation and interviewed DOD and commercial  industry officials relating to DOD’s implementation of its SSA sharing  mission (formerly the Commercial and Foreign Entities pilot program)  under which SSA information is to be shared among DOD, industry, and  foreign entities for collision avoidance purposes. Our work is based on the  most current information available as of October 1, 2010. In February 2011,  we reported to you on the results of our work in a classified report. This  report is an unclassified version of that report. We excluded all  information that DOD identified as being classified or sensitive in nature  which must be protected from public disclosure. This included certain  specific information relating to SSA mission and challenges.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to December  2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our  objectives, scope, and methodology are provided in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: According to DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence  (ODNI), the space domain is becoming increasingly congested, contested,  and complex. Consequently, space systems are increasingly vulnerable to  a variety of intentional and unintentional threats, such as radio frequency  interference (including jamming); laser dazzling and blinding; kinetic  intercept vehicles; ground system attacks; an increase in the number of  orbiting space objects (including active and inactive satellites, spent  rocket bodies, and other fragments and debris); and space weather  environmental effects. The government’s SSA efforts are designed to  mitigate these threats via a variety of space- and ground-based sensors and  systems that detect, track, and characterize space objects and space- related events and forecast which assets may be at risk. Recent events,  such as the January 2007 Chinese antisatellite weapon test—when China  used a missile to destroy one of its old weather satellites—and the  February 2009 collision between an operational Iridium commercial  communications satellite and a nonfunctioning Russian communications  satellite, have created thousands of additional debris objects and called  attention to the need for better SSA capabilities. SSA is fundamental to  conducting space operations and forms the foundation for accomplishing  space control, which DOD defines as operations to ensure freedom of  action in space for the United States and its allies, and when directed,  denying an adversary freedom of action in space.
subsections: section_title: Organizational SSA Responsibilities and Requirements
paragraphs: Top-level guidance for SSA efforts includes the Administration’s 2010  National Space Policy of the United States of America—a Presidential  Policy Directive that establishes overarching national policy that governs  the conduct of U.S. space activities—and the Department of Defense’s  2006 Space Control Joint Capabilities Document. The National Space  Policy states that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National  Intelligence shall maintain and integrate space surveillance, intelligence,  and other information to develop accurate and timely SSA, as well as to  improve, develop, and demonstrate, in cooperation with relevant  departments and agencies and commercial and foreign entities, the ability  to rapidly detect, warn, characterize, and attribute natural and man-made  disturbances to space systems of U.S. interest.
The National Space Policy assigns the Secretary of Defense the  responsibility, with support from the Director of National Intelligence, for  the development, acquisition, operation, maintenance, and modernization  of SSA capabilities governmentwide. It assigns the Director of National  Intelligence the responsibility for providing robust, timely, and effective  collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information on  foreign space and supporting information system activities and for  integrating all-source intelligence of foreign space capabilities and  intentions with space surveillance information to produce enhanced  intelligence products that support SSA.
The 2006 Space Control Joint Capabilities Document identifies SSA as a  key capability needed to enable freedom of action in space, identifies  capability gaps in SSA capabilities, and contains overarching SSA  requirements for addressing the gaps in the following task areas:    Orbital and network information—detect, track, identify, and catalog  man-made space objects and provide services including overflight  warning, signal/laser deconfliction, and conjunction assessment.
Environmental information—monitor, characterize, predict, and report  on the space-related environment.
Event information—detect, process, and report space events, such as  launches, orbital maneuvers, satellite breakups, space object reentries,  orbital decay, space object separations, dockings, and changes in  baseline status beyond nominal operating parameters; also,  characterize, assess, and resolve anomalies/attacks on all space  systems.
U.S., allied, and coalition space system information—maintain the  status and characteristics of U.S., allied, and coalition space forces and  assets.
Space intelligence information—provide status and characterization of  foreign and adversary space-related assets, strategies, tactics, intent,  activities, and knowledge.
The requirements contained in the Space Control Joint Capabilities  Document form the basis for ongoing and planned DOD SSA acquisition  efforts.
U.S. Strategic Command is responsible for planning and conducting DOD  space operations. The Joint Functional Component Command for Space,  a component of U.S. Strategic Command, coordinates, plans, integrates,  commands, and controls space operations through its Joint Space  Operations Center (JSpOC). A major function of the JSpOC is to maintain  SSA.
section_title: The SSA Mission is Complex and Is Increasing in Difficulty
paragraphs: A multitude of tasks and functions must be performed to meet the broad  definition of SSA. For example, according to the Space Posture Review  interim report, SSA includes, at a minimum, continual awareness of  orbiting objects; real-time search and high-fidelity information; threat  detection, identification, and location; predictive intelligence collection  and analysis of foreign space capability and intent in a geopolitical  context; and a global reporting capability for friendly space systems. The  interim report divides SSA into four major functional capabilities: (1)  detect, track, and identify—the ability to discover, track, and differentiate  among space objects; (2) threat warning and assessment—the ability to  predict and differentiate among potential or actual attacks, space weather  environment effects, and space system anomalies; (3) intelligence  characterization—the ability to determine performance and characteristics  of current and future foreign space and counterspace system capabilities,  as well as foreign adversary intentions; and (4) data integration—the  ability to correlate and integrate multisource data into a single common  operational picture and enable dynamic decision making. Consequently,  the JSpOC relies on numerous sources of data and information to maintain  SSA, including space surveillance sensors; the intelligence community; and  academic, commercial, and foreign collaboration.
A significant aspect of SSA involves tracking many thousands of man- made space objects that typically travel 9 times the speed of a bullet and  reside in a search volume 220,000 times the volume of Earth’s oceans. SSA  also involves knowing where each of these objects came from (who owns  them), where it is and where it is going, its purpose, and its capabilities.  And, if an anomaly occurs, such as satellite communications interference  or loss of satellite functionality, ascertaining the reasons why.
The JSpOC relies on the space surveillance network (SSN) to detect, track,  identify, and catalog space objects. The SSN, primarily operated and  maintained by the Air Force, consists of a worldwide network of 29  ground-based radars and optical sensors, data processing capabilities, and  supporting communication systems. DOD started to build the SSN  subsequent to the former Soviet Union’s launch of its first Sputnik satellite  in 1957. Some of the sensor systems built in the 1960s and 1970s have  undergone modernization and sustainment efforts and are still operational  today. Appendix II discusses the composition of the SSN.
The JSpOC uses SSN data to accomplish the following: maintain the space  object catalog; analyze new space launches; detect new man-made objects  in space, perform conjunction assessments (predict potential collisions  between space objects and inform NASA and other government,  commercial, and foreign entities if objects may interfere with the orbits of  the Space Shuttle, International Space Station, and operational satellite  platforms); and conduct space object atmospheric reentry assessments  (predict when and where a space object will reenter the Earth’s  atmosphere, determine who owns the object, prevent a returning space  object—which to radar looks like a missile—from triggering a false alarm  in missile-attack warning sensors of the United States and other countries,  and predict surface impacts of reentering objects). SSN information is  also used for developing space intelligence, which, in turn, is used to  support SSA operations.
The JSpOC also relies on ground- and space-based sensors that make  space weather observations to detect and forecast solar storms that may  be harmful to space system operations. These sensors are owned,  operated, and developed by DOD, NASA, the National Oceanic and  Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and foreign providers. Examples of  space weather observations include bursts of solar energy called solar  flares, solar winds, geomagnetic activity associated with solar storms,  solar X-ray images and fluctuations, and solar ultraviolet images and  fluctuations. These observations are associated with geomagnetic storms,  electromagnetic radiation, ionospheric scintillation, high-energy particles,  and solar radio bursts that can adversely impact space and ground assets  and operations, terrestrial communications, and transmissions between  Global Positioning System satellites and ground-based receivers.  According to Air Force and NOAA officials, the subject area of space  weather is relatively immature, and is comparable to the maturity of  terrestrial weather research and prediction capabilities that existed 20 to  30 years ago.
SSA mission complexity is also exemplified by the many and varied  organizations that are SSA stakeholders (users and providers of SSA  information). For example, according to Air Force Space Command and  the National Security Space Office (NSSO), 39 organizations across the  military, intelligence, and civil government are involved in efforts to  develop a new SSA architecture (discussed later in this report). This  becomes more complex with the addition of commercial and foreign  organizations. Such a diverse array of stakeholders complicates  architecture and requirements development, acquisition program  oversight, as well as SSA operations.
The SSA mission is also becoming more difficult. For example, as shown  in figure 1, the number of space objects has been increasing over the past  50 years, resulting from increasing use of space as well as events such as  the 2007 Chinese antisatellite test and 2009 Iridium/Cosmos satellite  collision, which, according to NASA, together had increased the number of  cataloged space objects by more than 60 percent.
section_title: DOD Has Made Limited Progress in Delivering Improved Capabilities to Address SSA Shortfalls and Delivery of New Capabilities Expected within the Next 5 Years Faces Challenges
paragraphs: DOD has significantly increased its investment and planned investment in  SSA acquisition efforts in recent years to address growing SSA capability  shortfalls. Most efforts designed to meet these shortfalls have struggled  with cost, schedule, and performance challenges which are rooted in  systemic problems that most space acquisition programs have  encountered over the past decade. Consequently, in the past 5 fiscal years,  DOD has not delivered significant new SSA capabilities as originally  expected. To its credit, the Air Force recently launched a space-based  sensor that is expected to appreciably enhance SSA. In addition, two of  the acquisition efforts that are to provide significant capability increases  are scheduled to begin product development within the next 2 years— Space Fence and the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System  (JMS). However, both face challenges and risks, such as the use of  immature technologies and planning to deliver all capabilities in a single,  large increment, versus smaller and more manageable increments. While  DOD plans to begin delivering other new capabilities in the coming 5  years, it is too early to determine the extent to which these additions will  address capability shortfalls.
subsections: section_title: DOD Is Increasing Its Investment in SSA Acquisition Efforts
paragraphs: DOD has significantly increased its investment and planned investment in  SSA acquisition and sustainment efforts in recent years to address growing  SSA capability shortfalls, and has many separate development efforts—at  least 17—ongoing. DOD plans to spend a total of about $5.3 billion on  SSA projects from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2015, as shown in  figure 2. DOD has invested almost $2 billion from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal  year 2010 in SSA projects, and plans to invest an additional $3.3 billion  from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2015, representing about a 65  percent increase over the preceding 5 years. In the coming 5 years, DOD  expects to spend  about 66 percent of this investment on new sensors to detect, track,  and characterize emerging space threats;  about another 21 percent on a new command and control system that  is to integrate data to provide real-time information for SSA and  command and control of space forces; and  the remainder on continuing to extend the life of existing sensors to  forestall degradation to current capabilities—according to the Air  Force, the primary risks associated with the SSN are related to the age  of the sensor systems—and other SSA-related programs.
The Air Force is, and has been, responsible for the vast majority of DOD’s  SSA acquisition investments (accounting for about 94 percent of the  total). Additional details of DOD’s SSA-related investments are provided  in appendix III.
section_title: Recent Investments Have Not Delivered Significant New SSA Capabilities and Many Ongoing and New Development Efforts Face Challenges
paragraphs: Despite recent investments, existing SSA capabilities continue to fall short  of operational needs and space policy objectives. In the past 5 fiscal years,  while DOD continued its investments in SSA, it has not delivered  significant new SSA capabilities to the warfighter as originally expected.  Capabilities that were delivered served to sustain or modernize existing  systems versus closing gaps. For example, DOD has extended the service  lives of some sensors supporting SSA capabilities and has added  additional processors and servers to the SSA’s command and control  system’s computer, as well as adding analysts and operational personnel.  However, Joint Functional Component Command for Space officials did  not characterize these efforts as delivering significant increases in  capability.
DOD plans to begin delivering major new additions in capability in the  coming 5 years, including the Air Force’s recently launched space-based  sensor that is expected to appreciably enhance SSA. However, it is too  early to determine the extent to which these new capabilities or additions  will address capability shortfalls. As described below, many of these  efforts—those expected to provide the biggest gains in capability—have  struggled or are struggling with cost, schedule, and performance  challenges and face risks to meeting their acquisition goals, potentially  exacerbating SSA capability shortfalls. Two new SSA acquisition efforts  are scheduled to begin product development within the next 2 years— Space Fence and JMS, which are described below, together with five other  key efforts. JMS will be essential to providing and enhancing future space  command and control and SSA capabilities, while Space Fence is to be the  single largest SSA investment. The challenges and risks these programs  face include the potential employment of immature critical technologies,  program office staffing and skill shortages, complex integration tasks, the  integration of data from numerous heterogeneous sources, operations in a  multiple security level environment (information assurance), not utilizing  an incremental development approach, and overloading of DOD’s current  space object tracking system with data from new sensor systems coming  on line over the next 5 years. Table 1 describes, in more detail, the status  of SSA development efforts that are expected to deliver large gains in  capability over the next 5 years and the challenges and risks they face.
section_title: SSA Acquisition Challenges Are Similar to Problems Affecting the Broader Space Portfolio
paragraphs: The cost, schedule, and performance challenges we have identified with  SSA efforts are reflective of systemic acquisition problems affecting the  space portfolio. Our past work has identified a number of causes behind  the cost growth and related problems, but several consistently stand out.  First, DOD often takes a schedule-driven versus a knowledge-driven  approach to the acquisition process. As a result, activities essential to  containing costs, maximizing competition among contractors, and testing  technologies are shortchanged. Second, on a broad scale, DOD starts more  weapon programs than it can afford, creating a competition for funding  that encourages low cost estimates, overly optimistic scheduling,  overpromising, suppressing bad news, and for space programs, forsaking  the opportunity to identify and assess potentially more executable  alternatives. Third, DOD has tended to start its space programs too early,  that is, before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can  be achieved within available resources and time constraints. This  tendency is caused largely by the funding process, since acquisition  programs attract more dollars than efforts concentrating solely on proving  technologies. Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to extend technology  invention into acquisition, programs experience technical problems that  require large amounts of time and money to fix. Moreover, there is no way  to accurately estimate how long it would take to design, develop, and build  a satellite system when critical technologies planned for that system are  still in relatively early stages of discovery and invention. Fourth, programs  have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step,  regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of the technologies  necessary to achieve the full capability. This has stretched technology  challenges beyond current capabilities in some cases and vastly increased  the complexities related to software. Fifth, we have reported that space  programs are particularly affected by the wide disparity of users with  competing interests, including DOD, the intelligence community, other  federal agencies, and in some cases, other countries, U.S. businesses, and  citizens.
In addition, we have reported in the past that shortages of skilled and  experienced space acquisition personnel, and personnel who are  technically proficient to meet security space needs, have magnified the  challenge of developing complex and intricate space systems. These  shortages are the result of a combination of factors including funding  limitations, recruiting challenges, and limited training and education  opportunities. Moreover, problematic implementation of an acquisition  strategy in the 1990s, known as Total System Performance Responsibility,  for space systems resulted in losses of technical expertise (including cost  estimating and systems engineering staff) and weaknesses in contracting  strategies—the effects of which space programs are still dealing with. The  existence of these problems was confirmed by a congressionally directed  independent assessment panel (also known as the Allard Commission),  which cited the reduced availability of technically competent government  personnel as a major factor that has reduced the government’s capability  to acquire space systems and a likely cause of acquisition program  failures.
Our work—which is largely based on best practices in the commercial  sector—has recommended numerous actions that can be taken to address  the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended that DOD  separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an incremental  path toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at  program start, and use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to  make decisions to move to next phases. DOD has generally concurred with  our recommendations and has modified its acquisition guidance to  incorporate them. One exception for space systems is that DOD has not  adopted our recommendation that critical technologies be matured to a  point where they are demonstrated in a realistic (for hardware) or  operational (for software) environment (TRL 7) because it is exceedingly  expensive to test technologies in space. However, it does require that  space systems demonstrate that critical technologies can operate in a  relevant environment (TRL 6). We have also identified practices related  to cost estimating, program manager tenure, quality assurance, technology  transition, and an array of other aspects of acquisition program  management that could benefit space programs. These practices are  highlighted in table 2.
We have found that when DOD chooses to extend technology  development into acquisition, programs generally experience technical  problems that require large amounts of time and money to fix. Moreover,  there is no way to accurately estimate how long it would take to design,  develop, and build a weapon system when critical technologies planned  for that system are still in relatively early stages of discovery and  invention. Most of the major space programs we have studied over the  past decade, for example, have incurred substantial cost increases and  schedule delays because they were approved without demonstrating that  their technologies could work as intended in a relevant or realistic  environment. In fact, at the time DOD made multibillion-dollar  commitments to start certain programs, technologies were sometimes still  in a proof-of-concept or component validation phase (TRL 3 and 4), that is,  components had not yet been built or integrated beyond a laboratory  environment. As a result, significant technology-related rework was  needed in the costlier and more complex phases of the acquisition  process. In addition, most of the programs we studied could not reliably  estimate costs because there were too many unknowns about technology  and requirements. A factor that contributed to the tendency to extend  technology invention into later phases of acquisition is that programs have  historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step,  regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of the technologies  necessary to achieve the full capability, stretching technologies beyond  current capabilities in some cases and vastly increasing the complexities  related to software.
Given the early stages of the Space Fence and JMS acquisition efforts, the  high estimated acquisition costs, and the challenges and risks they face,  opportunities exist to help ensure the acquisition problems that have  affected or are affecting other SSA development efforts are avoided. For  example, utilizing an incremental development approach that would  facilitate, prior to beginning product development, (1) the identification  and assessment of all critical technologies and (2) the inclusion of only  fully mature technologies, would significantly increase the reliability of,  and chances of meeting, program cost, schedule, and performance goals.  Because both the Space Fence and JMS are to be ground-based systems,  technologies developed to a level they can be demonstrated in a realistic  or operational environment (TRL 7) would be considered mature  according to our best practices criteria. One way to mitigate technology  maturity risk is to rely on backup technologies, should newer technologies  not mature in time or otherwise be problematic during product  development. However, the use of backup technologies would likely  present cost, schedule, and performance implications, such as with the  Space Fence effort. Additionally, establishing comprehensive plans to  mitigate other key risks, such as those relating to protecting national  security information, would also help ensure acquisition success. DOD has  already adopted similar practices for its newest major space acquisition— the Global Positioning System IIIA program—and has embraced the  knowledge-based concepts behind our previous recommendations as a  means of preventing large cost overruns and schedule delays.
section_title: Space Situational Awareness Faces Significant Governmentwide Management and Oversight Challenges
paragraphs: There are significant inherent challenges to executing and overseeing the  SSA mission, largely due to the sheer number of organizations and assets  involved in the mission, and the fact that, while the new National Space  Policy assigns SSA responsibility to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretary does not necessarily have the corresponding authority to  execute this responsibility. However, actions are being taken that could  help facilitate management and oversight governmentwide. Additionally,  the recently issued National Space Policy, which recognizes the  importance of SSA, and among other things, directs the determination of  roles, missions, and responsibilities to manage national security space  capabilities and the need to develop specific measures for improving SSA  capabilities, is also a positive step. Lastly, though the commercial sector  and the international community are to play pivotal roles in the SSA  mission, it is too early to tell whether DOD’s efforts to expand and make  permanent its Commercial and Foreign Entities SSA data-sharing pilot  program will be effective in integrating efforts to develop SSA capabilities.  Establishing effective commercial and international relationships will be  another significant challenge given decisions that will be required on how  much and what types of data can and should be shared.
subsections: section_title: Large Number of SSA Stakeholders Complicates Management and Oversight Efforts
paragraphs: Because SSA encompasses a broad range of needed capabilities, it  involves a large number of stakeholders. While DOD and the intelligence  community comprise the vast majority of organizations involved in SSA,  the civil government, commercial sector, and foreign entities also play, or  are expected to play, key roles. For example, key civil government  organizations include:    NASA—which works with officials from the Joint Functional  Component Command for Space to conduct conjunction assessments,  that is, close approach predictions, to avoid collisions between NASA’s  space assets and other known resident space objects.
The Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration—which provides space weather information to the Air  Force as well as NASA and others.
The Department of Energy—which has classified and unclassified  sensors that collect space weather data that can be used for SSA. Also,  its laboratories are currently utilizing and modifying existing computer  modeling and simulation capabilities, and are collaborating with the  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Air Force  Research Laboratory on several risk reduction efforts to develop data  integration capabilities for JMS.
The Department of State—which is responsible for international  matters including SSA, such as orbital debris mitigation and space  surveillance for debris monitoring and awareness.
The Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration  Office of Commercial Space Transportation—which is responsible for  regulating the commercial space transportation industry, including  matters relating to SSA, such as space debris management.
Moreover, commercial and foreign entities are expected to provide SSA  data in the future under an expanded SSA data-sharing program described  later. Figure 3 shows the stakeholders involved in SSA.
section_title: No Governmentwide Authority for SSA, but Actions Are Being Taken to Improve Management and Oversight
paragraphs: At the governmentwide level, while current National Space Policy assigns  SSA responsibility to the Secretary of Defense to develop capabilities,  plans, and options, the Secretary does not necessarily have the  corresponding authority to execute this responsibility. That is, the  Secretary cannot direct resources to the highest priority sensors or  systems if they belong to an agency outside DOD, adjudicate among  competing requirements, or ensure that agencies are setting aside funding  needed for SSA over the long term. This is made even more difficult  because of differing missions among the large range of SSA stakeholders.  However, several actions are being taken that could help address these  differences, and therefore facilitate SSA management and oversight  governmentwide, including the following:  Initial capabilities document. An initial capabilities document  summarizes and justifies the requirements for a materiel or  nonmateriel approach, or an approach that is a combination of both, to  satisfy specific capability gaps. The document is typically required for  a materiel development decision review and is to support a milestone  A decision in DOD’s acquisition process, which determines whether an  acquisition effort may move into the technology development phase.  The NSSO and Air Force Space Command have developed a draft  national SSA Initial Capabilities Document to highlight the capabilities  required to satisfy national-level SSA needs called for in the National  Space Policy. The development of this document has a  governmentwide perspective. Specifically, according to NSSO  documentation, development efforts have included input from DOD  and intelligence community organizations (including ODNI), as well as  civilian government agencies, such as NASA, the National Oceanic and  Atmospheric Agency, the Department of Commerce, the Department  of Energy, the Department of State, and the Department of  Transportation. According to ODNI, the intelligence community plays  a critical role in SSA, especially for analytical support. The draft SSA  Initial Capabilities Document was submitted to U.S. Strategic  Command in August 2010. The U.S. Strategic Command, responsible  for planning and conducting space operations including SSA, is to  review and sponsor this document through the Joint Capabilities  Integration and Development System review process. Due to common  interests between DOD and the intelligence community for SSA, the  document will be processed in accordance with joint DOD and ODNI  guidelines.
National SSA architecture. A national SSA architecture is under  development to highlight the required capabilities to satisfy national- level SSA needs identified in the SSA Initial Capabilities Document. In  April 2008, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and  Information Integration (ASD/NII)—the principal staff assistant for  SSA capabilities responsible for assuring SSA efforts track toward top- level architecture end states—tasked the Air Force and the Executive  Agent for Space to develop an interim SSA architecture to support the  fiscal year 2010 to 2015 program and budget review. Subsequently,  the Joint Requirements Oversight Council requested further action  from the Air Force, which tasked NSSO to serve as the architecture  integrator across DOD and to coordinate with ODNI in the  development of a more broadly focused national SSA architecture.  NSSO and Air Force Space Command cochair the current architecture  development effort initiated in November 2008. As with the  development of the initial capabilities document, the architecture has a  governmentwide perspective. According to NSSO, in light of the new  National Space Policy, one of the biggest challenges in developing the  national SSA architecture is the amount of limited analyses available to  support the broader Presidential direction to have an SSA system that  uses commercial and foreign data. Subsequent iterations of the  national SSA architecture are expected to address commercial and  foreign capabilities. Drafting of the national SSA architecture was  slated for completion in the October/November 2010 time frame, after  which the document was to be approved through the DOD’s and the  intelligence community’s requirements review processes.
National Security Space Strategy. We have recommended since 2003  that space activities (which include SSA) need to include a national  security space strategy tied to overall department-level space goals,  time lines, and performance measures to assess space activities’  progress in achieving national security space goals identified in the  National Space Policy. In January 2011, DOD and ODNI issued the  National Security Space Strategy.
section_title: New National Space Policy Mandates Additional Measures Designed to Strengthen Governmentwide Management and Oversight
paragraphs: In June 2010, the White House issued a new National Space Policy which  emphasizes the need to strengthen stability in the space environment,  including improved information collection and sharing for space object  collision avoidance; protection of critical space systems and supporting  infrastructures, with special attention to the critical interdependence of  space and information systems; and strengthening measures to mitigate  orbital debris. The space policy also emphasizes the need to improve,  develop, and demonstrate, in cooperation with relevant departments and  agencies and commercial and foreign entities, the ability to rapidly detect,  warn, characterize, and attribute natural and man-made disturbances to  space systems of U.S. interests. Furthermore, the space policy identifies  specific implementation actions by key national security space  stakeholders, including directing the following:    The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, in  coordination with the Secretary of State, to develop options, due in 180  days of the issuance date of the policy, to determine roles, missions,  and authorities with respect to the management of national security  space capabilities.
The Secretaries of Defense and Transportation, the Director of  National Intelligence, and the NASA administrator, in coordination  with the Secretary of State and other relevant departments and  agencies, to provide, in 270 days, options for the development,  communication, and implementation of new space collision warning  measures to the National Security Advisor, the Assistant to the  President for Science and Technology, and the Director of the Office of  Science and Technology Policy. These options are to include measures  for improving SSA capabilities; maintaining and improving space  object databases; pursuing common international data standards;  disseminating orbital tracking information; and improving and  disseminating predictions of space object conjunction.
The Secretary of Transportation, in coordination with the Secretaries  of Defense and Commerce, as well as other relevant departments and  agencies, due in 180 days, to identify options, requirements, and  potential implementing structures for providing space traffic  management services, which fuse and coordinate SSA, space  environmental information, air traffic services, radio frequency  spectrum, and orbital debris mitigation policies, to reduce risk and  enhance safe space launch, operations in space, and return from space.
The new National Space Policy increases the number of stakeholders that  must participate in the development of planning documents that, among  other things, identify the roles to manage national security space  capabilities and develop specific measures for improving SSA capabilities.  While identifying roles and having input from more SSA stakeholders are  positive first steps and may result in more inclusive and robust planning  efforts, it is too early to assess the effect of these provisions on managing  and overseeing governmentwide SSA efforts.
section_title: It Is Too Early to Tell Whether DOD’s Efforts to Expand and Make Permanent Its Commercial and Foreign Entities Pilot Program Will Be Effective in Integrating Efforts to Develop SSA Capabilities
paragraphs: The United States is recognized as a key player in SSA. However, the U.S.  government realizes that no single nation has the necessary resources or  geography to precisely track every object in order to support the long-term  sustainability of safe space operations for all space-faring nations.  Therefore, in order to improve its ability to conduct SSA, the U.S.  government has emphasized the need to reach out to the international  community for greater cooperation and information sharing. In 2004, DOD  established, pursuant to congressional authorization, the Commercial and  Foreign Entities pilot program to provide non-U.S. government entities,  state and local governments, and foreign governments and entities, SSA  data to, among other things, avoid damage to satellites in space. Through  the National Defenses Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Congress  made the Commercial and Foreign Entities pilot a permanent program,  commonly known as U.S. Strategic Command’s SSA sharing mission.
U.S. Strategic Command manages and is creating policies and procedures  to execute the mission, which expands data sharing and consists of three  levels of SSA services to commercial entities and international  governments: (1) a basic service consisting of information posted to an  internet Website, (2) advanced services available to entities under a  negotiated agreement, and (3) emergency notifications alerting satellite  operators to hazardous situations. U.S. Strategic Command’s mission is  also to enhance the U.S. government’s SSA capabilities by utilizing SSA  information provided by commercial and foreign entities. The U.S.  Department of State intends to reach out in the near future to all space- faring nations to ensure that the JSpOC has current contact information  for both government and private sector satellite operations centers.  Additionally, U.S. Strategic Command plans to begin reaching out to  international and commercial partners to seek a dialogue and agreement  for information exchange. Key issues remaining to be addressed include  developing mechanisms for:    making SSA data more useable—according to a DOD study of the  Iridium/Cosmos satellite collision, as well as a 2009 European Union  study, the United States does not fully disclose data on satellite orbits  and debris objects (because of the sensitivity of the information),  rendering the data available on the internet Web site insufficiently  accurate for collision avoidance purposes; this includes determining  what data to share, the mechanisms for sharing, and at the same time  protecting sensitive U.S. government and other stakeholders’ SSA  information; and  verifying and validating SSA information provided by commercial and  foreign entities to help ensure the reliability of U.S. SSA data products.
Because the SSA sharing mission is undergoing development, it is too  early to tell whether it will be an effective mechanism for integrating SSA  capability development efforts.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Recent events, such as the Chinese antisatellite test and the Iridium and  Cosmos satellite collision, have highlighted the need for better SSA  capabilities governmentwide. DOD has recognized that its existing SSA  systems fall short of capability needs and has significantly increased its  dollar investments to enhance SSA capabilities. Moreover, the Air Force  successfully launched its SBSS satellite—after several years of delays— which is anticipated to appreciably enhance SSA. However, most other  SSA acquisition efforts that focus on fielding major additions in capability  over the next 5 years have or are facing significant challenges and risks,  such as the use of immature technologies; planning to deliver all  capabilities in a single, large increment, versus smaller and more  manageable increments; technical requirements instability; operations in a  multiple security level environment; and data integration issues. If these  efforts do not progress as planned, risk of continuing or worsening SSA  capability gaps will result. Therefore, while it is too early to determine the  extent to which these new capabilities will address existing shortfalls, it is  essential that new SSA system acquisitions are placed on a solid footing at  the start of development to help ensure capabilities from these systems  are delivered to the warfighter as and when promised. Should DOD decide  to proceed on a path that leaves open important questions, including those  about technologies, then it is important that this footing be based on  thorough analyses of the risks involved—such as with the use of backup  technologies—including cost, schedule, and performance implications.  Such analyses could provide the knowledge needed to determine whether  the acquisition program is worth pursuing or what trade-offs would need  to be made with other investments should additional resources be  required. We have consistently made recommendations for establishing  reliable acquisition business cases, such as maturing technologies prior to  development start, utilizing evolutionary development, and stabilizing  requirements, and DOD has already embraced these for its newest major  space acquisition—the Global Positioning System IIIA program.
A critical aspect in strengthening the SSA mission is ensuring there is  effective coordination and collaboration across the federal government,  especially given the many organizations involved with SSA, along with  their differing missions. While the Secretary of Defense does not have  explicit authority to execute his responsibility to develop capabilities,  plans, and options for SSA, his responsibility has been clarified by the  National Space Policy and there are some actions in place or under  development to facilitate SSA acquisitions, such as a national architecture  and initial capabilities document. Nevertheless, given past difficulties in  coordinating space acquisitions that span DOD and federal agencies,  coordination and collaboration need to be carefully monitored and new  oversight tools, such as the National Security Space Strategy, provide  opportunities to clearly lay out expectations, responsibilities, and  authorities. Because implementation of the National Space Policy is, in  part, intended to address these issues, and given the National Security  Space Strategy has only recently been issued, we are not making  recommendations regarding coordination and collaboration at this time.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: For major space acquisition programs, we have consistently made  recommendations to help ensure acquisition efforts are placed on a solid  footing at program start. For SSA in particular, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to take the following two actions:    Assure—as part of the approval for the Space Fence and JMS  acquisition efforts to initiate product development—that all critical  technologies are identified and matured to a level they can be  demonstrated in a realistic or operational environment, and that other  key program risks have been fully assessed to help ensure cost,  schedule, and performance goals will be met (for JMS in particular,  implementing this recommendation may require dividing the program  into separate increments).
If a determination is made that the effort should move forward into  product development with less mature technologies, then conduct an  assessment of available backup technologies that may lessen  capability and add cost to the programs and the additional time,  money, and effort that may be required to meet performance  objectives.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Defense and ODNI.  Written comments from DOD are included in this report as appendix V.  ODNI did not have any comments.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics assure—as part of the  approval for the Space Fence and JMS acquisition efforts to initiate  product development—that all critical technologies are identified and  matured to a level they can be demonstrated in a realistic or operational  environment, and that other key program risks have been fully assessed to  help ensure cost, schedule, and performance goals will be met. DOD noted  that the requirement to validate required technology maturity levels and  assess other key program risks to ensure cost, schedule, and performance  goals is part of the milestone B—which signifies the start of product  development and the engineering and manufacturing development phase  in DOD’s acquisition process—review, approval, and certification process  required by DOD guidance and statute. While DOD guidance and law  require acquisition efforts to mature technologies to a level commensurate  with TRL 6—demonstration in a relevant environment—our  recommendation is based on our best practices work which has shown  that achieving a TRL 7—demonstration in a realistic or operational  environment—is the level of technology maturity that constitutes low risk  for starting a product development program. We ordinarily regard satellite  technologies that have achieved TRL 6 as fully mature because of the  difficulty and expense of demonstrating maturity in a realistic  environment—space—which is what would be required to reach TRL 7;  however, this does not apply to programs such as Space Fence and JMS  which are ground-based. Additionally, we remain concerned that the JMS  effort does not intend to identify all critical technologies prior to starting  development. Although our best practices work and DOD guidance call for  critical technologies to be identified and matured by development start,  the JMS plans are only to identify and assess critical technologies prior to  and specific for each release. Consequently, as currently planned, the JMS  effort will not have assurance that all needed technologies will be mature  when needed and that cost estimates—based on the development of all  five releases—are reliable as of the start of product development.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that if a determination  is made that the Space Fence or JMS effort should move forward into  product development with less mature technologies, then conduct an  assessment of available backup technologies that may lessen capability  and add cost to the program and the additional time, money, and effort  that may be required to meet performance objectives. DOD noted that an  assessment of required technology readiness and appropriate mitigation  plans is part of the process required for technology readiness decisions for  milestone B, but that trades between cost, schedule, performance, and  technology risks are more appropriately addressed after milestone B— during the integrated system design portion of the engineering and  manufacturing development phase where overall system-level risks are  considered. We continue to believe an assessment of utilizing backup  technologies should occur prior to the start of system development, as the  results of such an assessment could provide knowledge needed to  determine whether the acquisition program is still worth pursuing or what  tradeoffs would need to be made with other investments should additional  resources be required.
DOD also provided technical comments that have been incorporated  where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and other interested parties. The  report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512- 4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are provided in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to (1) review key systems being planned and acquired  to provide space situational awareness (SSA) with focus on their progress  in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals; and (2) determine the  extent to which an integrated approach is being used to oversee and plan  efforts to develop SSA capabilities. Our work is based on the most current  information available as of October 1, 2010.
To review key systems being planned and acquired to provide SSA, we  examined Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition efforts that are  expected to deliver large gains in SSA capabilities during fiscal years 2010  through 2015, including Space Surveillance Network sensor upgrade and  life-extension efforts aimed to avoid gaps in operational capabilities;  development of new sensors, such as the Space Based Space Surveillance,  Space Fence, and Space Surveillance Telescope efforts; and the  development of the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System to  integrate data and provide real-time information for SSA and command  and control of space forces. We analyzed documentation and interviewed  officials on the status and progress of SSA development efforts in areas  such as requirements, budgets, cost, funding, schedule, contracting,  technology maturation, testing, and personnel. We assessed, using criteria  we developed through our best practices work on commercial sector  acquisitions, the levels of knowledge the acquisition efforts had attained at  their current development stages and related risks. For example, we have  found that fully maturing technologies critical to the success of an  acquisition program prior to beginning product development, following an  incremental development path toward meeting user needs, and matching  available resources (that is, technology, time, money, and people) to  requirements at program start can significantly reduce risks to achieving  cost, schedule, and performance goals. In assessing whether programs are  adopting this practice, we reported the readiness of critical technologies  (as assessed by DOD), using technology readiness levels, a metric  originally developed by the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA) and used across space programs. We also analyzed  program-specific cost performance data obtained from various SSA  acquisition program offices for which we did not perform data reliability  assessments. For past and future DOD SSA-related investment amounts,  we used DOD budget request documentation for fiscal years 2006 through  2011. Our analysis included not only efforts traditionally categorized as  SSA, but also selected SSA-related efforts, typically budgeted for and  included under space control and counterspace systems, that are closely  tied to the SSA mission. To assess the reliability of these budget estimates  in determining DOD investments in SSA programs and projects, we  reviewed and assessed Office of Management and Budget documentation  related to the federal budget and DOD’s Financial Management  Regulations relating to preparation of budget reports and concluded that  this documentary review was sufficient to determine that the data were  reliable for purposes of this report.
To determine the extent to which an integrated approach is being used to  manage and oversee efforts to develop SSA capabilities, we analyzed  documents and interviewed officials from 30 organizations within the SSA  stakeholder community—users and providers of SSA information  represented by DOD, the intelligence community, civil government  agencies, and commercial industry—to examine (1) management and  oversight efforts to develop, acquire, and manage SSA capabilities; and (2)  planning activities for SSA architectures, investments, and requirements.  We also analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from DOD and  commercial industry to assess the benefits and challenges relating to  DOD’s implementation of its SSA sharing program (formerly the  Commercial and Foreign Entities program) under which SSA information  is to be shared among DOD, industry, and foreign entities for collision  avoidance purposes.
For both objectives, we analyzed documentation from and interviewed  officials of the following organizations:    Air Force—Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Directorate  of Space Acquisition, Arlington, Virginia; Air Force Space Command,  Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado; Air Force Space and Missile  Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, California; Air Force  850th Electronic Systems Group, Electronic Systems Center, Peterson  Air Force Base, Colorado and Hanscom Air Force Base,  Massachusetts; Air Force Weather Agency, Offutt Air Force Base,  Nebraska.
Other Defense—Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, D.C.; Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Washington, D.C.; Office  of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Washington, D.C.; Office  of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information  Integration, Washington, D.C.; Office of the Director, Cost Assessment  and Program Evaluation, Washington, D.C.; National Security Space  Office, Fairfax, Virginia; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,  Arlington, Virginia; Missile Defense Agency, Arlington, Virginia;  Directorate for Intelligence and Directorate for Force Structure,  Resources, and Assessment, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  Washington, D.C.; Capability and Resource Integration Directorate,  U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska; Joint  Functional Component Command for Space, Vandenberg Air Force  Base, California.
Intelligence Community—Office of the Director of National  Intelligence, Washington, D.C.; National Air and Space Intelligence  Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, Bethesda, Maryland; National Reconnaissance  Office, Chantilly, Virginia; National Security Agency, Fort Meade,  Maryland; Space Protection Program Office, Colorado Springs,  Colorado.
Other—Orbital Debris Program Office, National Aeronautics and  Space Administration, Houston, Texas; Space Weather Prediction  Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Boulder,  Colorado; Aerospace Industries Association, Arlington, Virginia;  Analytical Graphics, Inc., Washington, D.C.; Massachusetts Institute of  Technology Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, Massachusetts; Institute  for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to December  2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Space Surveillance Network Composition and Characteristics
paragraphs: The current space surveillance network includes 29 ground-based  Department of Defense (DOD) and privately and foreign owned radar and  optical sensors at 17 worldwide locations, a communications network, and  primary and alternate operations centers for data processing. Most of the  sensors are mechanical tracking, phased-array, and continuous-wave  radars, but optical telescopes are also used.
The most common radar type is a movable radar antenna with a  mechanical tracker, whereby energy is transmitted into space and  reflected back by a space object to the same radar antenna. A phased- array radar consists of thousands of smaller individual antennas that  produce and steer energy beams to different locations in space. A  continuous-wave radar consists of several transmitters and receivers, each  placed in a different physical location across a horizontal plane. Optical  telescopes possess sensors that are capable of detecting the light reflected  from space objects and tracking and characterizing the objects using this  reflected light.
The support that the sensors provide to the space surveillance network is  categorized as being dedicated, collateral, or contributing. Dedicated  sensors support the space surveillance network as their primary purpose.  Collateral sensors primarily support other missions, such as ballistic  missile warning or launch vehicle range support, but also provide some  space surveillance capabilities. Contributing sensors support the space  surveillance network when requested by the U.S. Strategic Command and  are operated under contract or agreement.
Space surveillance data needs are coordinated by the Joint Functional  Component Command for Space through the Joint Space Operations  Center, located at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, or the alternate  space control center, located at Dahlgren, Virginia. These operations  centers direct the network sensors to collect data on a space object’s  metrics, or orbital position, such as the time that the space object is  observed, its angle (elevation) from the point of observation, its direction  (azimuth), and its distance (range) from the sensor. Information about a  space object’s characteristics, such as size, shape, motion, orientation, and  surface materials, can also be obtained and is used for space object  identification.
Table 3 lists the network sensors by category, with the sensor names and  locations, types, and descriptions. Figure 4 graphically depicts the  locations of these sensors.
section_title: Appendix III: DOD Space Situational Awareness-Related Investments
paragraphs: Fiscal years 2006 through 2009 are actual funding amounts; fiscal years 2010 through 2015 are  budget estimates. Totals may not add due to rounding.
RDT&E refers to Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation; OPAF refers to Other Procurement,  Air Force.
Data not supplied for these projects in fiscal years 2012 through 2015.
section_title: Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels
paragraphs: Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels Lowest level of software technology readiness. A  new software domain is being investigated by the  basic research community. This level extends to the  development of basic use, basic properties of  software architecture, mathematical formulations,  and general algorithms.
Basic research activities, research articles,  peer-reviewed white papers, point papers,  early lab model of basic concept may be  useful for substantiating the TRL.
Once basic principles are observed, practical  applications can be invented. Applications are  speculative, and there may be no proof or detailed  analysis to support the assumptions. Examples are  limited to analytic studies using synthetic data.
Applied research activities, analytic  studies, small code units, and papers  comparing competing technologies.
Active R&D is initiated. The level at which scientific  feasibility is demonstrated through analytical and  laboratory studies. This level extends to the  development of limited functionality environments to  validate critical properties and analytical predictions  using non-integrated software components and  partially representative data.
Basic software components are integrated to  establish that they will work together. They are  relatively primitive with regard to efficiency and  robustness compared with the eventual system.  Architecture development initiated to include  interoperability, reliability, maintainability,  extensibility, scalability, and security issues.  Emulation with current/legacy elements as  appropriate. Prototypes developed to demonstrate  different aspects of eventual system.
Advanced technology development, stand- alone prototype solving a synthetic full- scale problem, or standalone prototype  processing fully representative data sets.
Level at which software technology is ready to start  integration with existing systems. The prototype  implementations conform to target  environment/interfaces. Experiments with realistic  problems. Simulated interfaces to existing systems.  System software architecture established.  Algorithms run on a processor(s) with  characteristics expected in the operational  environment.
System architecture diagram around  technology element with critical  performance requirements defined.  Processor selection analysis,  Simulation/Stimulation (Sim/Stim)  Laboratory buildup plan. Software placed  under configuration management.  Commercial-off-the-shelf/government-off- the-shelf (COTS/GOTS) components in the  system software architecture are identified.
Level at which the engineering feasibility of a  software technology is demonstrated. This level  extends to laboratory prototype implementation on  full-scale realistic problems in which the software  technology is partially integrated with existing  hardware/software systems.
Results from laboratory testing of a  prototype  package that is near the desired  configuration in terms of performance,  including physical, logical, data, and  security interfaces. Comparisons between  tested environment and operational  environment analytically understood.  Analysis and test measurements  quantifying contribution to system-wide  requirements such as throughput,  scalability, and reliability. Analysis of  human-computer (user environment)  begun.
Level at which the program feasibility of a software  technology is demonstrated.
This level extends to operational environment  prototype implementations, where critical technical  risk functionality is available for demonstration and  a test in which the software technology is well  integrated with operational hardware/software  systems. operational environment.
Level at which a software technology is fully  integrated with operational hardware and software  systems. Software development documentation is  complete. All functionality tested in simulated and  operational scenarios.
Published documentation and product  technology refresh build schedule.  Software resource reserve measured and  tracked.
Level at which a software technology is readily  repeatable and reusable. The software based on  the technology is fully integrated with operational  hardware/software systems. All software  documentation verified. Successful operational  experience. Sustaining software engineering  support in place. Actual system.
Production configuration management  reports. Technology integrated into a reuse  “wizard.”
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Art Gallegos (Assistant Director), Kristine Hassinger, Arturo Holguín,  Laura Holliday, Rich Horiuchi, Roxanna Sun, Robert Swierczek, Jay  Tallon, and Peter Zwanzig.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-10-388SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed  to Improve DOD’s Acquisition Environment and Weapon System  Quality. GAO-08-294. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2008.
Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon  System Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes.  GAO-07-388. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology  Transition Processes. GAO-06-883. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2006.
Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers  Needed to Improve Outcomes. GAO-06-110. Washington, D.C.: November  30, 2005.
Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon  Systems’ Total Ownership Costs. GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.: February  11, 2003.
Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early  Improves Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15,  2002.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best  Practices. GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to  Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8,  2001.
Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better  Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington, D.C.: July 31,  2000.
Defense Acquisitions: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better  Weapon System Decisions. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April  26, 2000.
Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can  Improve Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington,  D.C.: July 30, 1999.
Defense Acquisition: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program  Outcomes. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999.
Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires  Changes in DOD’s Environment. GAO/NSIAD-98-56. Washington, D.C.:  February 24, 1998.
subsections: section_title: Space Reports
paragraphs: Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading  Capabilities Persist. GAO-10-636. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2010.
Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to  Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate  Data. GAO-10-558. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010.
Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to Enhance Space Capabilities, but  Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems.  GAO-10-447T. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2010.
Space Acquisitions: Government and Industry Partners Face  Substantial Challenges in Developing New DOD Space Systems.  GAO-09-648T. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009.
Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch  Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges.  GAO-08-1039. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2008.
Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy Needed to  guide Future DOD Space Efforts. GAO-08-431R. Washington, D.C.: March  27, 2008.
Space Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Expand and Sustain Use of Best  Practices. GAO-07-730T. Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2007.
Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to Address  Unrealistic Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems. GAO-07-96.  Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006.
Defense Space Activities: Management Actions Are Needed to Better  Identify, Track, and Train Air Force Personnel. GAO-06-908. Washington,  D.C.: September 21, 2006.
Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems  Acquisitions and Keys to Achieving Them. GAO-06-626T. Washington,  D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Space Acquisitions: Stronger Development Practices and Investment  Planning Needed to Address Continuing Problems. GAO-05-891T.  Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Risks Posed by DOD’s New Space Systems  Acquisition Policy. GAO-04-379R. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems  Acquisition Management Policy. GAO-03-1073. Washington, D.C.:  September 15, 2003.
Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on  Satellite and Related Acquisitions. GAO-03-825R. Washington, D.C.: June  2, 2003.
Defense Space Activities: Organizational Changes Initiated, but Further  Management Actions Needed. GAO-03-379. Washington, D.C.: April 18,  2003.