Defense Infrastructure: Basing Uncertainties Necessitate Reevaluation of U.S. Construction Plans in South Korea
Published: 2003-07-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The U.S.-South Korean Land Partnership Plan (LPP), signed in March 2002, was designed to consolidate U.S. installations, improve combat readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South Korean alliance by addressing some of the causes of periodic tension associated with the U.S. presence in South Korea. The Senate report on military construction appropriations for fiscal year 2003 directed GAO to review the LPP. GAO adjusted its review to also address the effect of ongoing reassessments of U.S. overseas presence upon the LPP and other infrastructure needs. In this report, GAO assessed (1) the scope of the LPP, (2) the implications on the LPP and other construction projects of proposals to change basing in South Korea, and (3) implementation challenges associated with the LPP that could affect future U.S. military construction projects in South Korea.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Although broad in scope, the LPP was not designed to resolve all U.S. military infrastructure issues. Specifically, the plan was intended to resolve 49 of the 89 separate land disputes that were pending in South Korea. Of the land disputes the plan did not address, the most politically significant, complex, and expensive dispute involves the potential relocation of U.S. forces from Yongsan Army Garrison, located in the Seoul metropolitan area. As a result, the LPP, as approved, covered about 37 percent of the $5.6 billion in construction costs planned at U.S. military installations in South Korea over the next 10 years. Ongoing reassessments of U.S. overseas presence and basing requirements could diminish the need for and alter the locations of many construction projects in South Korea, both those associated with the LPP and those unrelated to it. For example, over $1 billion of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving military infrastructure at Yongsan Army Garrison and U.S. installations located north of Seoul--areas where there is uncertainty about future U.S. presence--has recently been put on hold, canceled, or redirected to an installation located south of Seoul. GAO identified some key challenges that could adversely affect the implementation of the LPP and future U.S. military construction projects throughout South Korea. First, the plan relies on various funding sources, including funding realized through land sales from property returned by the United States. The extent to which these sources of funding would be required and available for broader infrastructure changes is not yet clear. Second, a master plan would be needed to guide future military construction to reposition U.S. forces and basing in South Korea.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Military officials from the United States and the Republic of Korea  (hereafter referred to as South Korea) signed an agreement known as the  Land Partnership Plan (LPP) on March 29, 2002. The LPP was described  by the parties to the agreement as a cooperative U.S.-South Korean effort  to consolidate U.S. installations and training areas, improve combat  readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South Korean  alliance by addressing some of the causes of periodic tension and  discontent among South Koreans regarding the U.S. presence in South  Korea. The LPP, as originally approved, promised to reduce the number  of U.S. military troop installations from 41 to 23 and to consolidate many  U.S. facilities north of Seoul (the capital of South Korea), along with other  facilities south of Seoul. Under the plan, financing of new construction to  support consolidations and relocations of U.S. forces in South Korea was  expected to rely on revenue generated from land sales following U.S.  return of selected facilities and training lands to South Korea, on host  nation funding, and on U.S. military construction funding. The LPP was  predicated on continuing to maintain U.S. bases and facilities north of  Seoul (near the demilitarized zone that separates North Korea from South  Korea). Since passage of the LPP by the South Korea National Assembly  on October 30, 2002, there have been various indications that the United  States is re-examining how and where it may want to station its forces  overseas in the future. Prominent among them have been statements by  U.S. officials that the United States is considering a range of options for its  troops in South Korea, including repositioning them away from Seoul and  from areas north of Seoul (near the demilitarized zone).
The Senate report on military construction appropriations for fiscal year  2003 directed us to review the LPP to provide the Congress with a better  understanding of the plan, associated costs, burden-sharing implications,  and other related factors that the plan may not address. In light of  ongoing reassessments of the U.S. presence overseas, which could  affect basing requirements, we adjusted our review to also address the  effect of potential basing changes upon the LPP and the U.S. military’s  infrastructure in South Korea. This report assesses (1) the scope and cost  of the LPP in relation to total infrastructure issues in South Korea, (2) the  implications on the LPP and other construction projects in South Korea  of recent proposals to reposition U.S. forces in South Korea, and (3) the  implementation challenges associated with the LPP that could affect  future U.S. military construction projects in South Korea. Briefings were  provided to various congressional defense committee staffs regarding  our preliminary findings during our review. This report updates that  information and provides our final analysis.
In conducting this review, we met with officials responsible for developing  and managing the LPP and military construction projects throughout  South Korea, and we analyzed projected costs and funding streams. We  visited 16 U.S. military installations and facilities in South Korea that  would be affected by the plan, including sites that will be closed, partially  closed, or expanded. We also visited land transfer sites that remain  unresolved and military construction projects that are not addressed in the  plan, and we met with officials from the Department of Defense and the  Department of State to identify challenges that could also affect future  military construction projects throughout South Korea. In addition, we  interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the Department of  Defense, which provided perspective on the department’s studies  concerning a potential change to the role, size, and basing of U.S. forces in  South Korea. More information on the scope and methodology of our work  is presented in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: U.S. interests in South Korea involve a wide range of security, economic,  and political concerns. The United States has remained committed to  maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula since the 1950 to 1953 Korean  War. Although most of the property that the United States once controlled  has been returned to South Korea, the United States maintains about  37,000 troops in South Korea, which are currently scattered across  41 troop installations and an additional 54 small camps and support sites.
According to U.S. Forces Korea officials, many of the facilities there are  obsolete, poorly maintained, and in disrepair to the extent that the living  and working conditions in South Korea are considered to be the worst in  the Department of Defense (DOD). We observed many of these conditions  during our visits to U.S. facilities and installations in South Korea. While  improvements have been made in recent years, U.S. military personnel still  use, as shown in figure 1, some Korean War-era Quonset huts for housing.
Improving overall facilities used by the United States in South Korea will  require an enormous investment. At the same time, rapid growth and  urbanization in South Korea during the last several decades have created a  greater demand for land and increased encroachments on areas used by  U.S. forces. Consequently, many of the smaller U.S. camps and training  areas that were originally located in isolated areas are now in the middle  of large urban centers, where their presence has caused friction with local  residents; urban locations also limit the ability of U.S. forces to train  effectively. Figure 2 shows the boundaries of Yongsan Army Garrison and  other U.S. installations that have become encircled by the city of Seoul.
Historically, DOD reports difficulties filling its military personnel  assignments in South Korea, which are generally 1-year hardship tours in  which 90 percent of the assigned military personnel are unaccompanied  by their families. A DOD survey conducted in 2001 found that Army and  Air Force personnel considered South Korea as the least desirable  assignment and that many soldiers were avoiding service in South Korea  by various means, including retirement and declining to accept command  assignments. U.S. Forces Korea has wanted to make South Korea an  assignment of choice by improving living and working conditions,  modifying assignment policies to increase accompanied tours to  25 percent by 2010, and reducing the out-of-pocket expenses for personnel  to maintain a second household in South Korea.
section_title: Korea Land Partnership Plan
paragraphs: To address these problems, military officials from the United States and  South Korea signed the Land Partnership Plan on March 29, 2002. The LPP,  as originally approved, was described as a cooperative U.S.-South Korean  effort to consolidate U.S. installations and training areas, improve combat  readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South Korean  alliance. The United States views the plan as a binding agreement under  the Status of Forces Agreement, not as a separate treaty. However,  U.S. Forces Korea officials told us that South Korea views the plan as a  treaty requiring approval by the South Korea National Assembly and that  approval occurred on October 30, 2002.
The three components of the plan are as follows:  Installations—establishes a timeline for the grant of new land, the  construction of new facilities, and the closure of installations. The plan  calls for the number of U.S. military installations to drop from 41 to 23.  To accomplish this, the military will close or partially close some sites,  while enlarging or creating other installations.
Training areas—returns training areas in exchange for guaranteed time on  South Korean ranges and training areas. The plan calls for the  consolidation and protection of remaining U.S. training areas.
Safety easements—acknowledges that South Korean citizens are at risk of  injury or death in the event of an explosion of U.S. weapons, provides a  prioritized list of required safety easements, and establishes a procedure  and timeline for enforcing the easements.
The costs of the LPP must be shared between the United States and  South Korea. U.S. funding is provided from the military construction and  operations and maintenance accounts and from nonappropriated funds.  The South Korean government provides host nation funds and funding  obtained from sales of property returned to South Korea by the United  States. As a general rule, the United States funds the relocation of units  from camps that it wishes to close, and South Korea funds the relocation  of units from camps South Korea has asked to be closed. The execution of  the LPP is shown on figure 3.
The target date for the completion of the LPP was December 31, 2011,  although the timetable and the scale could be adjusted by mutual  agreement. More information on the plan as originally envisioned is  included in appendix II.
subsections: section_title: Infrastructure Funding
paragraphs: U.S. military infrastructure funding in South Korea involves multiple  organizations and sources. It involves 10 organizations from the United  States (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations, Army  and Air Force Exchange Service, Defense Logistics Agency, Department  of Defense Dependents School, Medical Command, and Defense  Commissary Agency), as well as construction funded by South Korea.  These organizations provide funding for military construction using  five different sources of money—U.S. military construction funds,  U.S. operations and maintenance funds, U.S. nonappropriated funds,  South Korea-funded construction, and South Korea combined defense  improvement program funding. Figure 4 shows the sources of funding for  $5.6 billion that, until recently, was planned for infrastructure construction  costs for U.S. installations in South Korea during the 2002 through 2011  time frame.
Most of the approximately $2 billion projected cost of implementing the  plan was expected to be paid for by the government of South Korea, with  much of it financed through land sales from property returned by the  United States. Figure 5 shows all planned funding sources and amounts for  the plan.
More information on funding and sequencing actions associated with the  LPP, as originally approved, is included in appendix II.
A wide array of military operations-related facilities (command and  administrative offices, barracks, and maintenance facilities) and  dependent-related facilities and services (family housing units; schools;  base exchanges; morale, welfare, and recreation facilities; child care  programs; and youth services) have recently been constructed or are  in the process of being constructed in South Korea. Typically, as U.S.  installations overseas are vacated and turned over to host governments,  the status of forces agreements between the United States and host  governments address any residual value remaining, at the time of release,  of construction and improvements that were financed by the United  States. The agreement in South Korea differs from the agreements used in  some other overseas locations where the United States receives residual  value for returned property—such as currently in Germany—in that South  Korea is not obliged to make any compensation to the United States for  any improvements made in facilities and areas or for the buildings and  structures left there.
section_title: Stationing of Troops in South Korea May Be Changing
paragraphs: In recent months, political dynamics in South Korea have been changing  as DOD has been reassessing future overseas basing requirements.  According to U.S. Forces Korea officials, there have always been groups in  South Korea that have criticized the U.S. presence and have claimed that  the U.S. presence hinders reconciliation between North and South Korea.  Demonstrations against American military presence increased sharply  during last year’s South Korean presidential election. South Koreans  were angered in November 2002 by a U.S. military court’s acquittal of  two American soldiers charged in association with a tragic training  accident that claimed the lives of two South Korean schoolgirls in  June 2002. The South Korean government wanted the two American  soldiers who had been operating the vehicle involved in the accident  turned over to South Korean authorities; however, they were tried in a  U.S. military court. As a result, South Koreans demonstrated against  U.S. forces in Korea, carried out isolated violence directed at U.S. soldiers,  and practiced discrimination against Americans (such as businesses  refusing to serve them). Subsequently, other groups demonstrated in  support of the U.S. government. At the same time, the United States and  South Korea were working to strengthen their alliance and to address  issues involving North Korea’s active nuclear weapons program and the  proliferation of its missile programs.
In December 2002, the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Minister of  South Korea agreed to conduct a Future of the Alliance study to assess the  roles, missions, capabilities, force structure, and stationing of U.S. forces,  including having South Korea assume the predominant role in its defense  and increasing both South Korean and U.S. involvement in regional  security cooperation. The results of the Future of the Alliance study  are not expected until later this year. In February 2003, the Secretary  of Defense testified before the Congress that the United States was  considering the relocation of U.S. troops now based within and north of  Seoul, including those near the demilitarized zone. Consideration of such  a move would be in keeping with a broader reassessment of U.S. presence  overseas that is now underway. In April 2003, the Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs and other U.S. officials  met with officials of the South Korean Ministry of National Defense to  discuss redeploying U.S. troops and relocating key military bases in South  Korea. Following these discussions, the U.S. and Korean press reported  that the United States would relocate from Yongsan Army Garrison in  Seoul to an area located south of Seoul. According to the U.S. Deputy  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, both  South Korea and the United States have decided that this is an issue that  cannot wait any longer for resolution. U.S. and South Korean officials  are expected to hold more discussions to finalize the realignment of  U.S. troops by fall 2003.
Moreover, the Secretary of Defense has recently directed acceleration  on work that began during the development of the 2001 Quadrennial  Defense Review, related to the global positioning of U.S. forces and their  supporting infrastructure outside the United States. In March 2003, the  Secretary of Defense requested that the Under Secretary of Defense for  Policy and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop a comprehensive  and integrated presence and basing strategy for the next 10 years. An  Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will build upon multiple  DOD studies, including the Overseas Basing and Requirements Study, the  Overseas Presence Study, and the U.S. Global Posture Study. In addition,  the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will use information  from the combatant commanders to determine the appropriate location  of the infrastructure necessary to execute U.S. defense strategy. The  Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy is not expected to be  completed until the summer of 2003. However, we were recently told by  DOD officials that the United States will likely concentrate its forces in  South Korea in far fewer, though larger, installations than were initially  envisioned under the LPP, and that over time the forces now located  north of Seoul will be relocated south of Seoul.
section_title: Land Partnership Plan as Originally Approved Addressed a Portion of Previously Existing U.S. Military Infrastructure Needs in South Korea
paragraphs: Although the Land Partnership Plan as approved was broad in scope, it  was designed to address only a portion of the U.S. military’s previously  existing infrastructure needs in South Korea, and it left unresolved a  number of significant land disputes. Specifically, the LPP covered about  37 percent of the construction costs planned at U.S. military installations  in South Korea over the next 10 years, encompassing about $2 billion of  the $5.6 billion that the U.S. military and South Korea planned to spend to  improve the U.S. military infrastructure in South Korea from 2002 through  2011. It was intended to resolve 55 percent, or 49, of the 89 separate land  disputes that were pending in South Korea in January 2003, which was  considered a significant step forward. One example of a land dispute that  would be resolved under the LPP involves Camp Hialeah, located on the  southern tip of the Korean peninsula in the port city of Pusan, South  Korea’s second largest city. According to press reports, South Korea  wanted this base returned because of its proximity to the port and the  impediments it posed to urban redevelopment. However, no relocation  agreement could be reached until the LPP included an agreement to begin  relocating Camp Hialeah’s functions to a new site in Noksan, South Korea,  in 2008 and to close Camp Hialeah in 2011. According to press reports  attributed to an official from the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs  and Trade, relocating in-city bases like Camp Hialeah would help lessen  the potential tension between U.S. forces and neighboring communities.
Although the plan was considered a major step forward, it was not  designed to resolve a number of significant land disputes. As far back as  far as 1982, negotiations over some land returns have been deadlocked  and left unresolved. For example, the relocation of Yongsan Army  Garrison remained unresolved because of its projected financial cost to  South Korea. The relocation of the garrison has been and continues to be a  politically sensitive, complex, and expensive issue for U.S. Forces Korea  and the South Korean government. In 1991, the governments of the United  States and South Korea signed an agreement to relocate the garrison by  1996. In 1993, the plan was suspended, largely because of the anticipated  high cost and the lack of alternative locations for the garrison. More than  a decade later, the relocation of Yongsan is an ongoing, contentious  issue. Since the 1990s, U.S. military and South Korean officials have  held discussions on moving the military base out of the city, including  screening various suburb locations. In December 2002, the United States  and South Korea agreed on the need to find a mutually acceptable way to  relocate U.S. forces outside the city of Seoul as a result of the Future of  the Alliance Study.
section_title: Ongoing Studies Are Expected to Alter Previously Planned LPP Construction Projects
paragraphs: DOD has had many construction projects underway in South Korea, both  within and outside of the LPP. However, DOD-sponsored studies now  underway examining future overseas presence requirements are likely to  significantly change the number and locations for U.S. military bases in  South Korea. As noted, we were recently told that the United States will  likely concentrate its forces in far fewer, though larger, installations than  were envisioned under the LPP and that, over time, the forces would be  relocated south of Seoul. Therefore, a number of sites and facilities  retained under the LPP are likely to be affected. Figure 6 shows the  locations of U.S. troop installations in South Korea under the LPP, as  originally approved.
Except as otherwise provided by the LPP, South Korea is not obliged to  compensate the United States for any improvements made in facilities  and areas or for the buildings and structures left behind. This could be  particularly important because of military infrastructure projects planned  or underway in areas from which the United States is considering  relocating its troops, including Seoul’s Yongsan Army Garrison and  U.S. installations located north of Seoul, which, according to a U.S. Forces  Korea official, had recently represented $1.3 billion in ongoing or planned  construction projects. For example, construction projects in Yongsan  included apartment high-rises for unaccompanied soldiers, a hospital,  a sports and recreation complex, a mini-mall, and an overpass between  Yongsan’s main and south posts. We discussed with U.S. Forces Korea  officials the need to reassess construction projects under way or planned  in South Korea and to delay the execution of some projects until better  decision-making information becomes available. Subsequently,  U.S. Forces Korea officials announced that they were reviewing all  projects and that over $1 billion in ongoing and planned construction had  been put on hold. Further, DOD recently submitted an amendment to  the President’s fiscal year 2004 budget to the Congress to cancel about  $5 million of construction projects planned for the garrison and to redirect  $212.8 million of construction planned for the garrison and northern  installations to an installation located south of Seoul.
section_title: Challenges to Completing Land Partnership Plan and Other Planned Construction Projects throughout South Korea
paragraphs: During the initial phase of our review we identified funding and other  management challenges that could adversely affect the implementation  of the Land Partnership Plan. As we considered these issues in light of the  potential for even greater basing changes, we recognized that they could  also affect the associated U.S. military construction projects throughout  South Korea. First, the LPP is dependent on substantial amounts of  funding that South Korea expects to realize through land sales from  property returned by the United States, host-nation-funded construction,  and U.S. military construction funds. While U.S. Forces Korea officials  expect to build on this LPP framework for likely additional basing  changes, the details have not been finalized for the broader changes. As  U.S. Forces Korea revises its plans, competition for limited funding for  other priorities could become an issue. Second, U.S. Forces Korea does  not have a detailed road map to manage current and future facilities  requirements in South Korea.
subsections: section_title: Funding Sources and Competition for Funding Are Challenges
paragraphs: The LPP, as originally approved, was dependent on substantial amounts of  South Korean funding to be realized through land sales, host-nation- funded construction, and U.S. military construction funds. The extent to  which these sources of funding would be required and available for  broader infrastructure changes is not yet clear, particularly for the  relocation of Yongsan Army Garrison. While U.S. officials expect the South  Korean government to fund much of the cost of these additional basing  changes, details have not yet been finalized. The South Korean  government is also expected to remain responsible for providing funding  for the relocation of forces now based at the Yongsan Army Garrison  property, although those costs could be reduced by the fact that a residual  number of U.S. and United Nations personnel are expected to remain at  Yongsan. It should also be noted that the Yongsan Garrison property is  expected to be used for municipal purposes and is not subject to resale to  provide funding to support relocation of U.S. forces. At this point,  insufficient information is available to determine precisely how many  replacement facilities will be required for U.S. troops moving out of  Yongsan Garrison and to anticipate any difficulties that might be  encountered in obtaining the funding. However, if South Korea encounters  problems or delays in acquiring needed lands and providing replacement  facilities, future projects could be delayed. Figure 7 presents the amount  of funding, as of May 2003, that the United States and South Korean  governments expected to pay for the LPP—as originally approved—by  fiscal year. The funding amounts for fiscal year 2004 and beyond are  subject to revision.
The LPP, as originally approved, was dependent on designating up to  50 percent of South Korea’s host nation funding for construction.  Historically, the stability of host nation funding from South Korea has  been subject to some uncertainty because international economic factors  have played a part in determining the level of funding. South Korea host  nation payments are paid in both South Korean won and U.S. dollars;  consequently, a downturn in the South Korean economy or a sharp  fluctuation in the South Korean currency could affect the South Korean  government’s payments. For example, during South Korea’s economic  downturn in 1998, host nation payments were less than expected (the  United States received from South Korea $314.2 million of the $399 million  that had been agreed to).
Designating up to 50 percent of host nation funding for the LPP would also  limit funding for readiness and other needs. Non-LPP readiness-related  infrastructure funding shortages previously identified in readiness reports  at the time of our visit to South Korea in November 2002 were estimated  to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars and represented competing  requirements for limited funding. Such needs included Air Force facilities  at Osan and Kunsan ($338.2 million), Navy facilities at Pohang and  Chinhae ($10.3 million), and Army facilities at Humphreys, Carroll, and  Tango ($25.2 million). Recently, U.S. Forces Korea officials have also  expressed the desire to increase from 10 percent to 25 percent the number  of servicemembers in South Korea who are permitted to be accompanied  by their families. While these expressions have not been finalized, such an  increase could be expected to cause a significant increase in the demand  for housing, schools, and other support services and could result in greater  competition for U.S. and Korean funding. For example, U.S. Forces Korea  officials estimated that the increased demand for housing alone would  cost $900 million in traditional military construction funding and, to  reduce costs, officials were exploring a build-to-lease program using  Korean private-sector funding and host-nation-funded construction,  where possible.
In the past, funding from U.S. military construction accounts, which  represent 13 percent of funding for the LPP as originally approved, has  fluctuated. From 1990 through 1994, U.S. forces in South Korea did not  receive any military construction funds, resulting in a significant backlog  of construction projects.
section_title: Managing Current and Future Facilities Requirements Is Also a Challenge
paragraphs: Implementation of the LPP was expected to involve a closely knit series  of tasks to phase out some facilities and installations while phasing in  new facilities and expanding other facilities and installations. U.S. Forces  Korea was developing an implementation plan for each installation  encompassed by the LPP and, at the time of our visit there, was developing  a detailed, overarching implementation plan capable of integrating and  controlling the multiple, sometimes simultaneous, actions needed to  relocate U.S. forces and support their missions. According to U.S. Forces  Korea officials, such a master plan is needed to accomplish training,  maintain readiness, and control future changes.
During our visits to U.S. installations in South Korea, we found that, in  the absence of a completed master plan for implementation, installation  commanders had varying interpretations of what infrastructure changes  were to occur. U.S. Forces Korea officials told us that this was not  unusual, given that detailed implementation plans were still being  developed. At the same time, these officials emphasized the need for  a detailed plan to guide future projects and to help minimize the costly  changes that can occur when subsequent commanders have a different  vision of the installations’ needs than their predecessors, which could  lead to new interpretations of the LPP and more changes. In light of the  potentially broader repositioning of forces in South Korea, the master plan  under development could be substantially changed; thus, a significantly  revised road map will be needed to manage future facilities requirements  and changes in South Korea.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: As approved, the Land Partnership Plan represented an important step  to reduce the size of the U.S. footprint in South Korea by leveraging the  return of facilities and land to South Korea in order to obtain replacement  facilities in consolidated locations. However, subsequent events suggest  the LPP, as originally outlined, will require significant modification.  Available data indicate that changes in the U.S. basing structure in  South Korea are likely; therefore, a significant portion of the $5.6 billion in  construction projects planned over the next 10 years is being reassessed  based on currently expected basing changes and may need to be further  reassessed when the results of ongoing overseas presence and basing  studies are completed.
The LPP was to require 10 years of intensive management to ensure  implementation progressed as planned. The master plan U.S. Forces Korea  officials are developing to guide its implementation will require significant  revision to accommodate the more comprehensive changes in basing now  anticipated and to identify funding requirements and division of funding  responsibilities between the United States and South Korea.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Commander,  U.S. Forces Korea, to (1) reassess planned construction projects in South  Korea as the results of ongoing studies associated with overseas presence  and basing are finalized and (2) prepare a detailed South Korea-wide  infrastructure master plan for the changing infrastructure for U.S. military  facilities in South Korea, updating it periodically as needed, and  identifying funding requirements and division of funding responsibilities  between the United States and South Korea.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs  provided written comments to a draft of this report. DOD agreed with our  recommendations and pointed out that it is taking actions that address our  recommendations. In commenting on our recommendation to reassess  planned construction projects in South Korea, DOD stated that U.S. Forces  Korea is already reassessing all planned construction in South Korea and  will ensure that all planned construction projects support decisions  regarding global presence and basing strategy. In commenting on our  recommendation for a detailed South Korea-wide infrastructure master  plan, DOD stated that U.S. Forces Korea is already developing master  plans for all enduring installations and, once decisions have been reached  on global presence and basing strategy, they will ensure that all master  plans are adjusted to support these decisions. DOD’s comments are  reprinted in appendix IV. DOD also provided a separate technical  comment, and we revised the report to reflect it.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, and the Director, Office  of Management and Budget. The report is also available at no charge on  GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-5581. Key contributors to this report  were Ron Berteotti, Roger Tomlinson, Nelsie Alcoser, Susan Woodward,  and Ken Patton.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the scope and cost of the plan in relation to total  infrastructure issues in South Korea, we analyzed provisions of the  Land Partnership Plan (LPP), identified the scope and cost of construction  projects outside of the LPP, compared the scope and cost of LPP  construction projects to the scope and cost of all construction projects  in South Korea, and analyzed some of the key unresolved infrastructure  issues not included in the plan, such as the relocation of U.S. troops from  Yongsan Army Garrison. We met with officials from the Joint Chiefs of  Staff (Logistics Directorate and Strategy Division); Under Secretary of  Defense for Policy (Office of Asia-Pacific Affairs); Deputy Under Secretary  of Defense (Installations and Environment); U.S. Pacific Command,  Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Army Pacific, Marine Forces Pacific,  U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Forces Korea, Eighth U.S. Army and 7th Air Force;  U.S. Department of State; U.S. Embassy (South Korea); and South Korea’s  Defense Ministry to document their input to the plan. We visited 16 U.S.  military installations and facilities in South Korea that are affected by the  plan. We selected these installations and facilities because they provided a  cross-section of the activities that are covered by the plan (i.e., some that  will be closed, some that will be scaled back, some that will be expanded,  some where new construction will take place, and some possible new  installation locations). We also visited land transfer sites that remain  unresolved and military construction projects that are not addressed in the  plan to gain an understanding and perspective on the wide range of  infrastructure issues affecting U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.
To determine the implications of potential basing changes on the plan  and other construction projects in South Korea, we obtained the views of  officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Logistics Directorate and Strategy  Division); Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Office of Asia-Pacific  Affairs); and U.S. Forces Korea on the potential impact of changing  defense policies. We conducted a literature review of U.S. and South  Korean publications to collect information on the LPP and possible basing  changes in South Korea. We also attended various congressional hearings,  which discussed funding for U.S. Forces Korea construction projects and  potential basing changes. We used this information to identify the costs  of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving  military infrastructure in areas where there is uncertainty about future  U.S. presence—such as Yongsan Army Garrison and U.S. installations  located north of Seoul. We did not verify the accuracy and completeness  of this information.
To identify implementation challenges associated with the plan that could  affect future U.S. military construction projects in South Korea, we met  with officials from the above organizations and reviewed the Status of  Forces Agreement, an agreement under Article IV of the Mutual Defense  Treaty between South Korea and the United States, and other related  agreements and defense guidance. We discussed challenges that must be  addressed during implementation of the LPP and implementation issues  associated with the plan that could affect future construction projects  throughout South Korea.
We performed our review from September 2002 through May 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Summary of the Land Partnership Plan
paragraphs: The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) provides a comprehensive plan for  more efficient and effective stationing of U.S. Forces in South Korea. The  LPP is intended to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance, improve the  readiness posture of combined forces, reduce the overall amount of land  granted for U.S. Forces Korea use, and enhance public support for both  the South Korean government and U.S. Forces Korea, while positioning  U.S. forces to meet alliance security requirements well into the future.
According to U.S. Forces Korea officials, LPP imperatives are as follows:    The agreement should be based on readiness and security, not the amount  of land involved.
The agreement should be comprehensive, allowing for land issues that  cannot be resolved independently to be resolved as part of a package and  ensuring stationing decisions that fit into a comprehensive vision for the  disposition of U.S. forces.
When new land and facilities are ready for use, U.S. Forces Korea can  release old land and facilities. U.S. Forces Korea needs all existing  facilities and areas and can only return them when replacement facilities  are available or the requirement is met in another manner.
The agreement should be binding under the Status of Forces Agreement.  The LPP is not just an “agreement in principle” but also a commitment to  take action, and it operates within the Status of Forces Agreement—which  means there are no new rules.
The agreement should be self-financing—the costs of the LPP must be  shared between the United States and South Korea. U.S. funding is  provided from the military construction account. The South Korean  government provides host nation funds and funding obtained from sales  of property returned to South Korea by the United States.
As a general rule, the United States funds the relocation of units from  camps the United States wishes to close, and South Korea funds the  relocation of units from camps that South Korea has asked the United  States to close. The execution of the LPP is shown in figure 1.
The LPP has been negotiated under the authority of the Joint Committee  under the Status of Forces Agreement. The Status of Forces Agreement  gives the Joint Committee the authority and responsibility to determine  the facilities and areas required for U.S. use in support of the United  States/South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. The Joint Committee  established the Ad-hoc Subcommittee for LPP to develop and manage  the LPP. The LPP components address installations, training areas, and  safety easements.
Installations: The LPP reduces the number of U.S. installations from  41 to 23 and consolidates U.S. forces onto enduring installations. The LPP  establishes a timeline for the grant of new land, the construction of new  facilities, and the closure of installations. Figure 8 illustrates the sequence  in which new lands are to be granted to the United States and their  relationship to facilities that will be returned to South Korea from calendar  years 2002 through 2011.
Training Areas: The LPP returns U.S. training areas in exchange for  guaranteed time on South Korean ranges and training areas. To ensure  the continued readiness of U.S. Forces Korea, the United States agrees  to return certain granted facilities and areas and to accept the grant of  joint use of certain South Korea military facilities and areas on a limited  time-share basis as determined by the Status of Forces Agreement Joint  Committee. The United States is expected to return approximately  32,186 acres, or 39,396,618 pyong, of granted training areas. Table 1  shows the exclusive use of existing grants retained by U.S. Forces Korea.
Table 2 shows training areas that will be provided on a temporary basis to  U.S. Forces Korea.
Table 3 shows new safety easements to be designated for training areas.
Table 4 shows training areas that will be returned to South Korea under  the LPP.
Table 5 shows training areas where parts of the land will be returned to  South Korea.
Table 6 shows training facilities and areas that the South Korean  government is expected to grant to the U.S. for joint use for the  time specified.
Safety Easements: According to U.S. Forces Korea officials, a safety  easement is a defined distance from an explosive area that personnel and  structures must be kept away from and is directly related to the quantity  and types of explosives and ammunition present. The presence of Korean  citizens in areas requiring explosive safety easements has placed them at  risk of injury or death in the event of an explosion. Tables 7, 8, and 9 show  the various tiers of easements established under the LPP at U.S. military  installations. Upper tier easements are those required at enduring  installations; middle tier easements are required during armistice, but will  not be required after a change in the armistice condition; and lower tier  easements are those required at closing installations. U.S. Forces Korea  shall enforce safety easements inside U.S. installations, while South Korea  will enforce safety easements outside U.S. installations.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense