Army National Guard: Inefficient, Error-Prone Process Results in Travel Reimbursement Problems for Mobilized Soldiers
Published: 2005-03-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony outlines (1) the impact of the recent increased operational tempo on the process used to reimburse Army Guard soldiers for travel expenses and the effect that travel reimbursement problems have had on soldiers and their families; (2) the adequacy of the overall design of controls over the processes, human capital, and automated systems relied on for Army Guard travel reimbursements; (3) whether the Department of Defense's (DOD) current efforts to automate its travel reimbursement process will resolve the problems identified; and (4) other DOD actions to improve the accuracy and timeliness of Army Guard travel reimbursements.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Mobilized Army Guard soldiers have experienced significant problems getting accurate, timely, and consistent reimbursements for out-of-pocket travel expenses. These weaknesses were more glaring in light of the sustained increase in mobilized Guard soldiers following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. To its credit, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) hired over 200 new personnel to address travel voucher processing backlogs and recently upgraded their training. However, Guard soldiers in our case study units reported a number of problems they and their families endured due to delayed or unpaid travel reimbursements, including debts on their personal credit cards, trouble paying their monthly bills, and inability to make child support payments. The soldier bears primary responsibility for travel voucher preparation, including obtaining paper copies of various types of authorizations. DFAS data indicate that it rejected and asked soldiers to resubmit about 18 percent of vouchers during fiscal year 2004--a churning process that added to delays and frustration. Also, existing guidance did not clearly address the sometimes complex travel situations of mobilized Army Guard soldiers, who were often housed off-post due to overcrowding on military installations. Further, DOD continued to be noncompliant with a law that requires payment of late payment interest and fees when soldiers' travel reimbursements are not timely. With respect to human capital, GAO found a lack of oversight and accountability and inadequate training. Automated systems problems, such as nonintegration of key systems involved in authorizing and paying travel expenses and failure to automate key processes, also contributed to the inefficient, error-prone process. DOD has been developing and implementing the Defense Travel System (DTS) to resolve travel-related deficiencies. However, DTS will not address some of the key systems flaws. For example, DTS is currently not able to process mobilized soldier travel authorizations and vouchers and identify and calculate late payment interest and fees.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss controls over travel  reimbursement payments to mobilized Army National Guard (Army  Guard) soldiers. In October 2002, we reported that the Defense Finance  and Accounting Service (DFAS) did not have systems in place to identify  late travel reimbursements and could not identify the soldiers who were  not paid within 30 days of submission of an approved travel voucher and  who should have been paid late payment interest and fees required  pursuant to the Travel and Transportation Reform Act of 1998 (TTRA).  This affected numerous soldiers whose vouchers were paid late. Further,  during our audits of Army Guard and Army Reserve military payroll  controls, soldiers told us about problems with delayed and inaccurate  travel cost reimbursements and meal cost authorizations and entitlements.  Because of the severity of these complaints, this Committee, as well as  other requesters, asked us to examine the effectiveness of the process  used to reimburse Army Guard soldiers for travel expenses and the effect  that travel reimbursement problems have had on soldiers and their  families. Today, I will highlight the results of our review for which our  detailed report is being released at this hearing.
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the operational tempo for  the military services has greatly increased, with corresponding increases  in the basic administrative tasks necessary to keep soldiers paid, fed, and  housed. Over 186,500 Army Guard soldiers were mobilized from  September 14, 2001, through September 30, 2004, to serve in Operations  Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. Army Guard soldiers  called to active service are entitled to be reimbursed for authorized travel  expenses incurred. The Department of Defense (DOD) is to provide a  Guard soldier traveling on official business with transportation, lodging,  and food, or to reimburse the soldier for reasonable and necessary  authorized expenses if the soldier purchases them. In short, the soldier is  to be made whole for authorized out-of-pocket expenses, with timely and  accurate reimbursements for travel expenses.
Within the United States, Army Guard soldiers have guarded the Pentagon,  airports, nuclear power plants, and domestic water supplies as part of the  homeland security effort. Overseas, they continue to perform highly  dangerous peacekeeping missions and force protection operations in Iraq,  Afghanistan, and other countries. When government-provided meals and  housing were not available to some Guard soldiers, they lived off the local  economy—purchased food at restaurants and groceries, and housing at  hotels—and later submitted requests to the Army for reimbursement of  their out-of-pocket expenses.
Because our preliminary assessment determined that the current  authorization, request, review, and approval processes used to pay travel  reimbursements to active service Army Guard soldiers relied extensively  on paper-intensive, nonintegrated systems, and error-prone manual  transaction entry that did not provide an adequate audit trail or a reliable  population of transactions, we could not effectively statistically test  current processes and controls. Instead, we systematically assessed the  effectiveness of the overall design of controls at work in the key areas of  processes, people (human capital), and automated systems through case  studies of 10 selected units of Army Guard soldiers mobilized to active  service in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom, Noble Eagle, and  Enduring Freedom during the period from October 2001 through  November 2003. In addition, we audited a nonrepresentative selection of  individual travel vouchers that were paid 120 days or more from the date  the travel ended and travel vouchers selected from the unit case studies.  We used this approach to provide a more detailed perspective on the  design of controls and the nature of deficiencies in the three phases of the  travel and reimbursement process: (1) authorization; (2) travel voucher  preparation, unit review, and transmission; and (3) computation office  review and payment. Further details on our scope and methodology and  the results of the case studies can be found in our related report.
Today, I will summarize the results of our work with respect to (1) the  impact of the recent increased operational tempo on the effectiveness of  the process used to reimburse Army Guard soldiers for travel expenses  and the effect that travel reimbursement problems have had on soldiers  and their families; (2) the adequacy of the overall design of controls over  the processes, human capital, and automated systems relied on to provide  timely travel cost reimbursements and accurate meal authorizations and  entitlements to mobilized Army Guard soldiers; (3) whether DOD’s  current efforts to automate its travel reimbursement process will resolve  the problems identified; and (4) DOD actions to improve the accuracy and  timeliness of mobilized Army Guard travel reimbursements.
subsections: section_title: Weaknesses in Error-Prone, Manual Travel Reimbursement Process Were Exacerbated by Increased Operational Tempo
paragraphs: The paper-intensive process used by DOD to reimburse Army Guard  soldiers for their travel expenses was not designed to handle the dramatic  increase in travel vouchers since the terrorist attacks of September 11,  2001, and the subsequent military activity. The increased operational  tempo resulted in backlogs in travel voucher processing as DFAS CTO  struggled to keep up with both the increased volume and complexity of  the travel vouchers submitted. For example, the monthly volume of travel  vouchers being submitted to DFAS CTO increased from less than 3,200 in  October 2001 to over 50,000 in July 2003 and remained at levels over  30,000 through September 2004. To its credit, to address the large volume  of vouchers received and the unprocessed backlog, DFAS increased its  staffing by over 200 new personnel and reported an average processing  time of 8 days for its part of the process in September 2004.
subsections: section_title: Increased Operational Tempo Initially Overwhelmed Process
paragraphs: While the inefficient, manual travel and reimbursement process may have  offered some capability to process travel vouchers during periods of low  activity when relatively few Army Guard members were mobilized, the  current increased operational tempo has strained the process beyond its  limits. As shown in figure 1, the monthly travel voucher volume has  remained above 30,000 since the July 2003 peak.
In addition to the rising volume, the increased complexity of the vouchers  received further slowed down the process. As military activity increased  for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Army Guard, Army Reserve, and active  Army soldiers were preparing for duty, not all of the installations to which  Army Guard soldiers were assigned had available government housing. As  a result, the soldiers were housed off-post in commercial hotels or  apartments. This created a number of novel situations that were not  specifically addressed in regulations, as discussed later.
During this time frame, DFAS CTO staffing levels were not keeping pace  with the rising volume of vouchers. However, while DFAS CTO employed  less than 50 personnel in October 2001, this number more than doubled by  February 2003 and was increased further to about 240 in June 2003,  including 83 Army Guard and Army Reserve soldiers, as shown in figure 2.
A DFAS CTO official told us that the office was not properly staffed to  process travel vouchers at the beginning of 2003 when the volume started  to increase. Inadequate staffing and the time necessary to train new staff  created a backlog of travel vouchers at DFAS CTO, ballooning to over  18,000 vouchers in March 2003.
section_title: Impact That Travel Reimbursement Problems Have Had on Army Guard Soldiers and Their Families
paragraphs: The majority of soldiers in our 10 case study units reported problems  related to reimbursements for meal expenses that included late payments,  underpayments, and overpayments resulting in debts to some soldiers in  excess of $10,000. For example, we estimated that about $324,000 was  paid more than a year late to 120 soldiers for meal expenses based on the  proportional meal rate for their locality. One individual responsible for  submitting his unit’s vouchers to DFAS CTO told us that he called the  process “the travel voucher lottery” because “you never knew whether, or  how much, you might get paid.” These issues were caused by weaknesses  in the process used to pay Army Guard travel reimbursements; the human  capital practices in this area, including the lack of adequate training; and  nonintegrated automated systems. Table 1 summarizes the experiences of  Army Guard soldiers in 10 units. Further details on our case studies are  included in our companion report.
During our audit of selected travel vouchers, we identified some that were  paid as much as 16 months after travel ended. Table 2 shows examples of  the extent of delays experienced by soldiers in obtaining payment for  travel expenses.
In another instance, Army Guard soldiers called to federal duty to provide  security at the Denver International Airport in early 2002 experienced  significant delays in getting reimbursed for travel expenditures. The  soldiers were provided lodging but not meals and were not authorized per  diem for meals on their orders. More than a year elapsed during which the  Army Guard Adjutant General with authority over the respective soldiers  and Army National Guard Bureau officials worked to obtain and provide  the proper authorization to reimburse all the soldiers’ travel expenses. In  the interim, Army Guard soldiers experienced financial hardships. For  example, one soldier’s family had to rely on the spouse’s salary to pay  bills, and another’s child support payments were late or less than the  minimum required payments.
section_title: Travel and Reimbursement Process, Human Capital, and Systems Deficiencies
paragraphs: Deficiencies in three key areas—process, human capital, and systems— were at the core of the travel and reimbursement problems we identified.  Policies and guidance, the foundation of the process for authorizing travel  entitlements and reimbursements, were not always known by the  mobilized soldiers nor were they well understood by local base personnel,  and the authorizations were not documented on their mobilization orders  or travel orders. Human capital weaknesses included a lack of leadership  and oversight in addition to inadequate training. Further, the lack of  systems integration and automation along with other systems deficiencies  contributed significantly to the travel reimbursement problems  we identified.
subsections: section_title: Process Deficiencies
paragraphs: The lack of clear procedural guidance contributed to the inaccurate,  delayed, and denied travel reimbursements we identified and created  problems not only for Army Guard soldiers but for numerous other  personnel involved with authorizing travel entitlements. Prior to  September 11, 2001, most travel guidance addressed relatively routine  travel for brief periods and was not always clearly applicable to situations  Army Guard soldiers encountered, particularly when they could not avail  themselves of government-provided meals due to the nature of their duty  assignments. In October 2001, although the Army issued new guidance that  was intended to address travel entitlements unique to Army and Army  Guard soldiers mobilized for the war on terrorism, it was not well- understood. Furthermore, inappropriate policy and guidance on how to  identify and pay soldiers entitled to late payment interest and fees because  of late travel reimbursement meant that DOD continued to be  noncompliant with TTRA. We found a number of cases in which soldiers  should have been paid late payment interest and indications that  thousands more may be entitled to late payment interest.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Clear Guidance on Travel Entitlements, Including Late Payment Interest and Fees
paragraphs: We found that a key factor contributing to delays and denials of Army  Guard reimbursements for out-of-pocket meal expenses was a lack of  clearly defined guidance. We noted that the existing guidance (1) provided  unclear eligibility criteria for reimbursement of out-of-pocket meal  expenses, (2) lacked instructions for including meal entitlements on  mobilization orders, and (3) contained inadequate instructions for  preparing and issuing SNAs.
Two primary sources of guidance used by both Army Guard soldiers and  travel computation office personnel for information on travel entitlements  were (1) the Army’s personnel policy guidance (PPG) for military  personnel mobilized for Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom,  and Noble Eagle; and (2) DOD’s Joint Federal Travel Regulation (JFTR).  We found that both Army Guard soldiers and travel computation  personnel had difficulty using these sources to find the information  necessary about the rules regarding travel-related entitlements.
Table 3 shows the sources of common problems related to meal expense  reimbursements experienced by soldiers in our case studies.
Unclear eligibility criteria. We found that guidance did not adequately  address some significant conditions that entitled a soldier to  reimbursement of authorized meal expenses. For example, although the  JFTR entitled soldiers to reimbursement for meal expenses when  transportation was not reasonably available between government meal  facilities and place of lodging, the term “reasonably available” was not  defined. The PPG directed the maximum use of installation facilities, and  if not feasible, then “multi-passenger vehicles should be used” to transport  soldiers to installation facilities. However, the PPG is silent regarding what  constitutes adequate transportation, particularly when transportation to  government meal facilities is necessary for Army Guard soldiers who  cannot be housed in government facilities. As discussed in our companion  report, we found disagreements between the soldiers and their command  officials about the adequacy of transportation to government meal  facilities and their entitlement to get reimbursed for eating at commercial  facilities closer to their lodgings. Without clear guidance on these issues,  Army decisions will continue to appear arbitrary and unfair to soldiers.
Lack of specific entitlements on orders. Army and Army Guard  policies and procedures do not provide for mobilization orders issued to  Army Guard soldiers to clearly state that these soldiers should not be  required to pay for meals provided to them at government dining facilities.  As a result, we noted instances in which mobilized soldiers arrived at  government mess halls carrying mobilization orders that did not  specifically state that the soldiers could eat free of charge and were  inappropriately required to pay for their meals. Consequently, many Guard  soldiers were unable to obtain reimbursement for their out-of-pocket costs  in a timely manner.
The PPG states, “TCS soldiers who are on government installations with  dining facilities are directed to use mess facilities. These soldiers are not  required to pay for their meals.” In addition, the PPG states, “Basic  Allowance for Subsistence will not be reduced when government mess is  used for soldiers in a contingency operation.” As such, an Army Guard  soldier called to active service is entitled to eat at a government mess hall  without charge and concurrently entitled to receive BAS as part of his  military pay. However, the PPG does not provide guidance addressing the  content of mobilization orders for Army Guard soldiers with respect to  meal entitlements.
In response to questions we posed to officials representing the Mississippi  Adjutant General’s office regarding why mobilization orders did not  include adequate provisions about food entitlements, they explained that  the individual mobilization orders that are prepared by the Adjutant  General’s staff are very basic and include only the travel allowances and  actions that are necessary to get the individual from the home station to  the mobilization station. The Adjutant General office received no guidance  on what should be stated in the orders with respect to soldiers eating free  of charge at government installations or any other conditions that may  entitle Army Guard soldiers to per diem to compensate them for their out- of-pocket meal costs. In addition, our companion report provides  examples where Army officials were not always aware that Army Guard  soldiers called to active duty were entitled to BAS in addition to meal  entitlements while they were serving under mobilization orders or  temporary change of station (TCS) orders.
Confusing, nonstandard SNAs. Lack of standardization and changing  guidance has resulted in SNAs of various form and content, signed by  officials at different levels of authority. Consequently, travel computation  office reviewers were unable to consistently determine the validity of  SNAs. Our work identified travel computation office reviewers who  rejected soldiers’ requests for reimbursements even though they were  supported by valid SNAs.
The most recent PPG guidance authorizes the installation commander to  determine whether to issue an SNA based on each unit’s situation and the  availability of government housing. The guidance states that when  government or government-contracted quarters are not available, soldiers  will be provided certificates or SNAs for both lodging and meals to  authorize per diem. However, the guidance does not specify the form and  content of the SNAs. Consequently, we found that the form of the SNA and  the content of the information on the form varied at the discretion of the  issuing command.
For example, one installation stamped the soldiers’ orders and handwrote  an SNA identification number in a block provided by the stamp. Another  location provided a written memo that stated that the meal component of  per diem was authorized because there were no food facilities at the  government installation. Another provided a single SNA with a roster  attached that listed the names of the soldiers who were authorized per  diem. The variety of SNA formats can cause confusion for the soldier, who  does not know what documentation is needed for reimbursement and  whether the travel computation office will accept it. The travel  computation office personnel can also be confused about the criteria for a  valid SNA.
Our work found instances in which installation commands denied soldiers’  requests for SNAs. In response to our inquiries, we found that commands  do not generally document their rationale for denying SNAs and there is  no requirement for them to do so. This lack of documentation can leave  soldiers even more confused and frustrated when seeking answers as to  why their requests for per diem were denied. GAO’s Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government require the maintenance of related  records and appropriate documentation that provide evidence of  execution of control activities.
section_title: Late Payment Interest and Fees Guidance Thwarts Intent of the Law
paragraphs: Inappropriate policy and guidance, issued by DFAS Indianapolis,  combined with the lack of systems or processes designed to identify  and pay late payment interest and fees, leave DOD in continued  noncompliance with TTRA. As a result, through at least April 2004, DFAS  Indianapolis had made no required payments of late payment interest  and/or late payment fees to soldiers for travel reimbursements paid later  than 30 days after the submission of a proper voucher. For example, of  139 individual vouchers we selected to determine why these took a long  time to process, we identified 75 vouchers that were properly submitted by  Army Guard soldiers that should have received late payment interest  totaling about $1,400.
In addition, DFAS data showed indications that thousands of other  soldiers may be due late payment interest. For example, during the  period October 1, 2001, through November 30, 2003, dates in the DFAS  Operational Data Store showed that about 85,000 vouchers filed by  mobilized Army Guard soldiers were paid more than 60 days after the date  travel ended. If the dates on these vouchers were correct, the soldiers who  submitted proper vouchers within 5 days of the date travel ended would  be entitled to late payment interest if they were not paid within the 30-day  limit.
TTRA and federal travel regulations require the payment of a late  payment fee consisting of (1) late payment interest, generally equivalent to  the Prompt Payment Act Interest Rate; plus (2) a late payment fee  equivalent to the late payment charge that could have been charged by the  government travel card contractor. Late payment interest and fees are to  be paid to soldiers if their reimbursements are not paid within 30 days of  the submission of a proper voucher.
Although DFAS issued guidance related to TTRA in April 2003,  interpretation of the guidance limited the payment of late payment  interest and fees to only the final settlement travel voucher for all travel  under a particular travel order. This practice contributed to continued  noncompliance with the law because it effectively excluded large numbers  of monthly or accrual vouchers from consideration of late payment  interest and fees.
As a result of our work, in May 2004 DFAS clarified that all travel voucher  reimbursements are subject to late payment interest and fees. However,  subsequent to DFAS’s dissemination of its May 2004 clarification guidance,  we found late vouchers for which DFAS did not pay late payment interest  and fees. For example, the final vouchers for 63 soldiers with the Georgia  Army National Guard’s 190th Military Police Company were processed late  in April 2004 without payment of late payment interest or fees, even  though they were covered by DFAS guidance issued in 2003. The payments  were made a total of 81 days after the supervisory signatures, thus making  the payments 51 days over the 30 days allowed for payment. We notified  DFAS officials of the oversight and they subsequently made the interest  payments.
section_title: Human Capital Issues
paragraphs: With respect to human capital, we found weaknesses including (1) a lack  of leadership and oversight and (2) a lack of adequate training provided to  Army Guard soldiers and travel computation office examiners. GAO’s  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that  effective human capital practices are critical to establishing and  maintaining a strong internal control environment. Specifically,  management should take steps to ensure that its organization can  promptly identify problems and respond to changing needs, and that  appropriate human capital practices are in place and operating effectively.  Without an overall leadership structure in place, neither the Army nor the  Army Guard had developed and implemented processwide monitoring and  performance metrics necessary to promptly identify and resolve problems  causing late-paid travel vouchers. We also found that lack of adequate  training for soldiers and newly hired DFAS CTO personnel was a  contributing factor to some travel voucher processing deficiencies.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Leadership and Oversight
paragraphs: No one office or individual was responsible for the end-to-end Army Guard  travel reimbursement process. The lack of overall leadership and  fragmented accountability precluded the development of strong  overarching internal controls, particularly in the area of program  monitoring. Neither the Army nor the Army Guard were systematically  using performance metrics to gain agencywide insight into the nature and  extent of the delays to measure performance and to identify and correct  systemic problems. Our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government require agencies to have internal control procedures that  include top-level reviews by management that compare actual  performance to expected results and analyze significant differences.
As shown in figure 3, internal reports prepared by DFAS CTO show that  missing travel orders was the primary reason why it did not accept  vouchers for payment. DFAS CTO reported that it rejected about 104,000,  or approximately 17 percent, of 609,000 vouchers during the period July  2003 through September 2004, with missing travel authorizations  accounting for over half of the rejected vouchers. While this churning  process appeared to be a primary factor in payment delays and soldier  frustration, DFAS CTO, Army, or Army Guard offices had not performed  additional research to determine the root cause of this and other voucher  deficiencies.
Similarly, our analysis of a selection of individual travel vouchers also  disclosed that some vouchers were returned to soldiers because of missing  documentation or the lack of required signatures. However, neither DOD  management officials nor we could determine the root cause of all  instances of missing information. Some soldiers told us that DFAS CTO  lost documentation that they had submitted. DFAS CTO also experienced  problems with faxed vouchers, which caused vouchers and supporting  documentation not to be printed and processed in some cases. According  to a DFAS CTO official, DFAS was unaware that faxed vouchers were not  printing until a soldier complained that DFAS was not receiving his faxes.  DFAS did not monitor incoming faxes, even though it reported that faxed  travel vouchers account for approximately 60 percent of the total  mobilized Army Guard and Reserve travel vouchers it received. These  problems obstructed the normal handling of a number of those vouchers.  In an effort to resolve this problem, DFAS CTO, in March 2004, ceased  relying on an automatic print function of the fax system software and  began manually printing vouchers.
As shown in figure 4, our audit of a nonrepresentative selection of  139 travel vouchers (69 computed by DFAS CTO and 70 by USPFOs) found  significant delays occurred between the date of the reviewer’s signature  and the date that the travel computation office accepted the voucher.  Some of these delays were caused by the time needed to correct vouchers  that were deficient and resubmit them to DFAS CTO or another USPFO  travel computation office.
We determined that the travel computation office rejected 32 of the  72 travel vouchers delayed for more than 3 days because of missing  documentation or the lack of required signatures and sent them back to  the soldiers for corrections. A lack of documentation or other information  prevented us from determining the reason for delays of more than 3 days  for the remaining travel vouchers.
The Army’s lack of processwide oversight, including monitoring of the  rejection and return of vouchers by DFAS CTO and other travel  computation offices, resulted in undetected delays in reimbursement,  leading to unnecessary frustration with the Army’s travel and  reimbursement process and potential financial difficulty for the  soldier. Further, without establishing and monitoring program metrics,  management had no assurance that it had identified where the  breakdowns were occurring and could not take the appropriate steps to  resolve any identified problems. For example, although the Army relied on  the individual unit reviewer for assurance that travel vouchers were  properly reviewed and transmitted promptly to the travel computation  offices, the Army did not establish and monitor performance metrics to  hold these reviewers accountable for their critical role in the process.
Further, although metrics were available on the average time DFAS CTO  took to pay travel vouchers after receipt, the Army did not have statistical  data on supplemental vouchers that could help provide additional insight  into the extent and cause of processing errors or omissions by voucher  examiners, unit reviewers, or Army Guard soldiers. Several of our case  studies indicate that accuracy may be an important issue. For example,  one method DFAS CTO uses to correct a voucher error or omission is to  process a supplemental voucher. According to DFAS data, DFAS CTO  processed about 251,000 vouchers related to Army Guard soldiers  mobilized during the period October 1, 2001, through November 30, 2003,  of which over 10,600 were supplemental vouchers. However, DFAS CTO  officials could not tell us how many of these were due to errors or  omissions by DFAS examiners or other factors. Our audit of 69  supplemental vouchers for the California 185th case study unit showed  that 41 were due to DFAS CTO errors and the remaining 28 were due to  errors or omissions on the part of the soldiers.
Finally, we noted that although DFAS CTO established a toll-free number  (1-888-332-7366) for questions related to Army Guard and Reserve  contingency travel, DFAS did not have performance metrics to identify  problem areas or gauge the effectiveness of this customer service effort.  For example, DFAS did not systematically record the nature of the calls to  the toll-free number. According to DFAS data, this number, staffed by 30  DFAS employees, received over 15,000 calls in June 2004. By monitoring  the types of calls and the nature of the problems reported, important  information could have been developed to help target areas where training  or improved guidance may be warranted. Further, DFAS had not  established performance metrics for its call takers in terms of the  effectiveness of resolved cases or overall customer service.
section_title: Inadequate Training Results in Late or Inaccurate Reimbursements
paragraphs: Although Army regulations specify the responsibilities of soldiers, they do  not require that soldiers be trained on travel entitlements and their role in  the travel reimbursement process. Some of the Army Guard soldiers that  we spoke with told us that they had received either inadequate or no  training on travel voucher preparation and review. In addition, a DFAS  CTO official told us that the on-the-job-training provided to its new  personnel in early 2003 initially proved to be inadequate. Army Guard  soldiers in our case studies told us that they asked DFAS representatives  or used the Internet in attempts to find, interpret, and apply DFAS  guidance, which by itself proved to be insufficient and required many trial- and-error attempts to properly prepare travel vouchers. As a result, many  soldiers did not receive their travel payments on time.
Army Guard soldiers. Army Guard soldiers in our case studies told us  that they were confused about their responsibilities in the travel voucher  reimbursement process because they had not been sufficiently trained in  travel voucher processes related to mobilization. For example, prior to  September 11, 2001, most travel guidance addressed the criteria for single  trips or sequential trips and was not always clearly applicable to situations  in which Army Guard soldiers could be authorized short intervals of travel  for temporary duty at different locations within their longer term  mobilization. This “overlapping travel” proved to be problematic for Army  Guard soldiers trying to understand their travel voucher filing  requirements and travel computation office examiners responsible for  reviewing travel vouchers.
In addition, we found indications that some soldiers were not aware of  DOD’s requirement to complete a travel voucher within 5 days of the end  of travel or the end of every 30-day period in cases of extended travel.  For example, as shown in figure 5, in our selection of 139 vouchers,  99 (71 percent) of the Army Guard soldiers did not meet the 5-day  requirement. Fifty-two Army Guard soldiers submitted their vouchers  more than 1 year late.
Of the 59 Army Guard soldiers that we could locate and interview, 23 said  that they lacked understanding about procedures, or lacked knowledge or  training about the filing requirements. Eight Army Guard soldiers said that  they procrastinated or forgot to file their travel vouchers on time. The  remaining 28 said that they could not remember anything about the  specific voucher we asked about or did not respond to our inquiries.
DFAS CTO personnel. DFAS CTO also had challenges training its  examiner staff. The increase in mobilizations since September 11, 2001,  and resulting increase in travel voucher submissions put a strain on DFAS  CTO’s ability to make prompt and accurate travel reimbursements to Army  Guard soldiers. As discussed previously, DFAS CTO hired more than 200  staff from October 2001 through July 2003, which brought the total number  of staff to approximately 240. The training of these new employees was  delivered on-the-job. Training time depended on the individual and type of  work. For example, according to a DFAS CTO official, it took from 1 to  3 months for a voucher examiner to reach established standards. The  DFAS CTO official told us that, in some cases, on-the-job training proved  to be inadequate and contributed to travel reimbursement errors during  this period.
Our work indicated that mistakes by DFAS CTO contributed to  reimbursement problems. For example, our California case study  indicated that 33 soldiers were initially underpaid a total of almost  $25,000 for meals, lodging, and incidental expenses when personnel at  DFAS CTO based travel cost calculations on an incorrect duty location  and a corresponding incorrect per diem rate. Although these soldiers  eventually received the amounts they were due, the corrections took  months to resolve.
section_title: System Problems
paragraphs: The lack of integrated and automated systems results in the existing  inefficient, paper-intensive, and error-prone travel reimbursement process.  Specifically, the Army does not have automated systems for some critical  Army Guard travel process functions, such as preparation of travel  vouchers, SNAs, and TCS orders, which precludes the electronic sharing  of data by the various travel computation offices. In addition, system  design flaws impede management’s ability to comply with TTRA,  analyze timeliness of travel reimbursements, and take corrective action  as necessary.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Integrated Systems
paragraphs: The DOD Task Force to Reengineer Travel stated in a January 1995  report that the travel process was inefficient because systems involved  with travel authorizations were not integrated with systems involved with  travel reimbursements. Similarly, as we have reported and testified,  decades-old financial management problems related to the proliferation of  systems, due in part to DOD components receiving and controlling their  own information technology investment funding, result in the current  fragmented, nonstandardized systems.
Lacking either an integrated or effectively interfaced set of travel  authorization, voucher preparation, and reimbursement systems, the Army  Guard must rely on a time-consuming collection of source documents and  error-prone manual entry of data into a travel voucher computation  system, as shown in figure 6. For example, if the system that created the  mobilization order, the Automated Fund Control Order System (AFCOS),  interfaced with the travel voucher computation system, a paper copy of  the mobilization order would not be necessary because it would be  electronically available. In turn, a portion of Army Guard and Army  Reserve vouchers returned by DFAS CTO to soldiers because of these  missing orders—a significant problem as discussed previously—could  have been eliminated.
Further, the lack of an integrated travel system and consequent  “workarounds” increase the risk of errors and create the current  inefficient process. As noted previously, several separate WINIATS  systems at DFAS and the USPFOs can process travel vouchers for  mobilized Army Guard soldiers. These databases operate on separate local  area networks that do not exchange or share data with other travel  computation offices to ensure travel reimbursements have not already  been paid. Instead, as shown in figure 6, multiple WINIATS systems  transmit data to the DFAS Operational Data Store (ODS)—a separate  database that stores disbursement transactions. As a result, when a soldier  submits a voucher, voucher examiners must resort to extraction and  manual review of data from ODS. Next, voucher examiners research and  calculate previous payments—advances or interim payments—made by  other Army WINIATS systems. This information is then manually entered  into WINIATS for it to compute the correct travel reimbursement for the  current claim. In addition to being time consuming, this manual  workaround can also lead to mistakes. For example, a Michigan soldier  was overpaid $1,384 when two travel computation offices paid him for  travel expenses incurred during the same period in August and September  2002. This overpayment was detected by DFAS CTO when the soldier filed  his final voucher in August 2003.
section_title: Lack of Automated Systems
paragraphs: DOD lacks an automated system for preparing travel vouchers, which  hinders the travel reimbursement process. As shown in figure 6, soldiers  manually prepare their paper travel vouchers and attach many paper travel  authorizations and receipts and distribute them via mail, fax, or e-mail to  one of the travel computation offices. The lack of an integrated automated  system increases the risk of missing documents in voucher submissions,  which results in an increased number of vouchers rejected and returned  by DFAS CTO. In addition, the Army currently lacks an automated  centralized system to issue uniquely numbered and standard formatted  SNAs regarding housing and dining facilities for mobilized soldiers. The  lack of automated centralized standard data precludes electronic linking  with any voucher computation system and the reduction of paperwork for  individual soldiers, as they must obtain and accumulate various paper  authorizations to submit with their vouchers.
Further, the Army lacks an automated system for producing TCS orders.  As illustrated at the top of figure 6, the various mobilization stations use a  word processing program to type and print each individual TCS order to  move a soldier to such places as Afghanistan and Iraq. Similar to the  process for SNAs, mobilization stations maintain separate document files  for each TCS order issued. The absence of a standard automated system  used by each of the mobilization stations prevents the Army from  electronically sharing TCS data with other systems, such as a voucher  computation system. Consequently, the process will remain vulnerable to  delays for returned voucher submissions as mobilized Army Guard  soldiers continue to receive paper SNAs and TCS orders. Finally, even if  the Army automates the TCS, SNA, and voucher preparation processes, as  discussed previously, these new automated systems would need to be  either integrated or interfaced with a voucher computation system to  decrease the amount of time from initiation of travel to final settlement of  travel expenses.
section_title: Other System Problems
paragraphs: We found that many Army Guard USPFOs did not populate key data fields  in WINIATS as directed by DFAS Indianapolis. As a result, complete and  accurate information was not available for a variety of management needs.  For example, dates such as the voucher preparation date, supervisor  review date, and the travel computation office receipt date, are key in  providing DOD management with the information necessary to comply  with TTRA, which requires DOD to reimburse soldiers for interest and fees  when travel vouchers are paid late. In addition, these dates are essential in  providing management with performance information that can help DOD  improve its travel reimbursement process. Our analysis of 622,821 Army  Guard travel voucher transactions filed from October 1, 2001, through  November 30, 2003, and processed by DFAS CTO and the USPFOs found  that at least one of these key dates was not recorded in ODS for 453,351,  or approximately 73 percent, of the transactions.
In cases in which the key dates necessary to perform the evaluation were  being captured, incorrect entries were not detected. A WINIATS  representative told us that the system was not designed with certain edit  checks to detect data anomalies such as those caused by erroneous data  entry. We found that 52 of 191 in our nonrepresentative selection of travel  vouchers filed by soldiers had incorrect dates recorded in ODS (e.g., the  date of supervisory review predated the date of travel ended by nearly a  year) and that these data entry errors were not detected. Without system  edit checks to detect data anomalies, the accuracy and reliability of the  data are questionable, and consequently, management cannot carry out its  oversight duties.
section_title: Defense Travel System Deficiencies
paragraphs: Although DOD recognized the need to improve the travel reimbursement  process in the 1990s and has been developing and implementing DTS, this  system is currently not able to process mobilized travel authorizations  (e.g., mobilization orders, TCS orders, and SNAs) and vouchers and,  therefore, does not provide an end-to-end solution for paying mobilized  Army Guard soldiers for travel entitlements. Furthermore, DFAS auditors  have reported additional problems with DTS. Given DOD’s past failed  attempts at developing and implementing systems on time, within budget,  and with the promised capability, and that the effort has already been  under way for about 8 years, it is likely that the department will be relying  on the existing paper-intensive, manual system for the foreseeable future.
At the end of fiscal year 2003, DOD reported investing about $288 million  in DTS. In 2003, Program Management Office-Defense Travel System  (PMO-DTS) estimated an additional $251 million was needed for DTS to be  fully operational at the end of fiscal year 2006, resulting in an estimated  total development and production cost of over 10 years and $539 million.  This cost estimate does not include deploying DTS to the majority of the  Army Guard USPFOs. Although the Army Guard supplies most of the  mobilized soldiers in support of the global war on terrorism, DTS  deployment to the 54 USPFOs is not scheduled to begin until fiscal year  2006. The Army is expected to fund the majority of the costs to field the  program to the USPFOs, where mobilized Army Guard travel begins. The  DTS total life cycle cost estimate, including the military service and  Defense agencies, is $4.39 billion.
subsections: section_title: DTS Is Not an End-to-End Solution for Paying Mobilized Army Guard Soldiers’ Travel Entitlements
paragraphs: While DTS purports to integrate the travel authorization, voucher  preparation, and approval and payment process for temporary duty (TDY)  travel, it does not integrate travel authorizations and reimbursements for  mobilized Army Guard soldiers. DOD officials have stated that currently  DTS cannot process mobilized Army Guard travel reimbursements  involving various consecutive and/or overlapping travel authorizations.  DOD officials acknowledged that DTS would not produce the various  travel authorizations related to mobilization travel, because DOD is  presently designing a pay and personnel system, the Defense Integrated  Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS), which will accomplish this  task. DOD’s current strategy is for DTS to electronically capture the travel  authorization information from DIMHRS, after which a soldier would use  DTS to prepare and submit a travel voucher. This would require that  DIMHRS have the capability to electronically capture the various  authorizations applicable to Army Guard travel, such as mobilization and  temporary change of station orders, and that SNAs are generated from a  standard, automated system that can effectively interface with DTS. DOD  officials do not plan to implement DIMHRS at the Army Guard until March  2006. As a result, the timing and ability of the Army Guard to process  mobilization travel vouchers through DTS appears to hinge on the  successful development and implementation of DIMHRS and its interface  with DTS.
section_title: DTS Does Not Compute Late Payment Interest and Fees
paragraphs: DTS is not being designed to identify and calculate travelers’ late payment  interest and fees in accordance with TTRA. As discussed earlier in this  statement, DOD’s current travel computation system does not  automatically identify and calculate the TTRA late payment interest and  fees. Furthermore, no controls are in place to ensure that the manual  calculation is performed and that the interest and fee amounts are entered  into the system for payment. According to DTS officials, DOD has not  directed that DTS be designed to include such a feature. As a result, as  currently designed, DTS provides no assurance that late payment interest  and fees will be paid to travelers as required pursuant to TTRA.
section_title: Other Auditors Identify Problems with DTS
paragraphs: A DFAS Kansas City Statistical Operations and Review Branch report  identified several significant problems with the current DFAS  implementation. Specifically, for the first quarter of fiscal year 2004, DFAS  reported a 14 percent inaccuracy rate in DTS travel payments of airfare,  lodging, and meals and incidental expenses. This report cited causes  similar to those we identified in the areas of traveler preparation of claims  and official review of claims. In addition to these deficiencies, DFAS noted  errors in DTS calculations for meals and incidental expenses.
Another DFAS Internal Review report, dated June 15, 2004, indicated that  improvements were needed in DTS access controls to prevent or detect  unauthorized access to sensitive files. DFAS Internal Review reported that  because PMO-DTS had not established standard user account review and  maintenance procedures, DTS is vulnerable to unauthorized individuals  gaining access to the system and confidential information, resulting in  potential losses to DOD employees and the government. The report also  noted that DTS was not adequately retaining an audit trail of  administrative and security data, leaving management unable to  investigate suspicious activities or research problem transactions.
section_title: Actions to Improve Accuracy and Timeliness of Mobilized Army Guard Travel Reimbursements
paragraphs: DOD, the Army, the National Guard Bureau, and DFAS reported several  positive actions during the course of our work that, if implemented as  reported, should improve the accuracy and timeliness of travel  reimbursements to Army Guard soldiers. Because these actions were  relatively recent, we could not evaluate their effectiveness.
For example, DFAS officials also told us that they have taken several steps  to reduce the number of vouchers being returned to the soldiers due to  missing signatures and missing mobilization orders. DFAS and the  National Guard Financial Services Center—a field operating agency of the  Chief, National Guard Bureau, that performs selected financial services— entered into a Memorandum of Agreement effective February 2004  whereby DFAS will obtain the assistance of the National Guard to address  problems with certain vouchers that would otherwise be returned to  soldiers. According to DFAS CTO data, since the implementation of the  agreement through the end of fiscal year 2004, 13,523 travel vouchers were  coordinated with the National Guard in this manner rather than initially  being sent back to the soldiers for correction.
In the human capital area, DFAS CTO enhanced its training program for  voucher examiners. For example, DFAS CTO used computer-based  training to provide new personnel an initial overview of WINIATS and  voucher computation procedures. In addition, a DFAS CTO official told us  that a 40-hour course, which was designed specifically to address the types  of vouchers received by DFAS CTO, has been established to train new  employees.
In addition, to help ensure that the Army Guard receives timely and  accurate travel reimbursements, other immediate steps are needed to  mitigate the most serious problems we identified. Accordingly, in our  related report (GAO-05-79), we made 19 short-term recommendations to  the Secretary of Defense to address weaknesses we identified that  included the need for (1) mobilization and related travel orders to clearly  state meal entitlements, (2) standardization of the form and content of  SNAs for contingency operations, and (3) appointment of an ombudsman  with accountability for resolving problems Army Guard soldiers encounter  at any point in the travel authorization and reimbursement process. We  also made 4 recommendations as part of longer term initiatives to reform  travel, pay, and personnel systems, including the need to integrate or  interface automated travel vouchers, SNAs, TCS orders, mobilization  orders, and other relevant systems. In its comments on a draft of our  companion report, DOD agreed with 21 of our 23 recommendations and  outlined its actions to address the deficiencies noted in our report. DOD  partially concurred with 2 recommendations regarding the need for an  automated, centralized system for SNA per diem authorizations and the  need for DTS to include capabilities to identify, calculate, and pay late  payment interest and fees required pursuant to TTRA. Due to the financial  burdens on the affected soldiers documented in our report, we continue to  believe that DOD should implement measures to resolve these matters  both on an interim and long-term basis.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: As Army Guard soldiers heed the call to duty and serve our country in vital  and dangerous missions both at home and abroad, they deserve nothing  less than full, accurate, and timely reimbursements for their out-of-pocket  travel expenses. However, just as we recently reported for Army Guard  and Reserve pay, our soldiers are more often than not forced to contend  with the costly and time-consuming “war on paper” to ensure that they are  properly reimbursed. The process, human capital, and automated systems  problems we identified related to Army Guard travel reimbursement are  additional examples of the broader, long-standing financial management  and business transformation challenges faced by DOD. Similar to our  previously reported findings for numerous other DOD business operations,  the travel reimbursement process has evolved over years into the stove- piped, paper-intensive process that exists today and was ill-prepared to  respond to the current large and sustained mobilizations. Without  systematic oversight of key program metrics, breakdowns in the process  remain unidentified and effective controls cannot be established and  monitored.
Finally, DOD’s long-standing inability to develop and implement systems  solutions on time, within budget, and with the promised capability appears  to be a critical impediment in this area. The problems we identified with  DOD’s longer term automated systems initiatives—DIMHRS and DTS— raise serious questions of whether and when mobilized soldiers’ travel  reimbursement problems will be resolved.
section_title: Contact and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D.  Kutz at (202) 512-9095 or kutzg@gao.gov. Staff making key contributions  to this report include Paul S. Begnaud, Norman M. Burrell, Mary Ellen  Chervenic, Francine M. DelVecchio, Lauren S. Fassler, Dennis B. Fauber,  Wilfred B. Holloway, Patty P. Hsieh, Charles R. Hodge, Jason M. Kelly,  Stephen Lipscomb, Julia C. Matta, Sheila D. Miller, John Ryan, Bennett E.  Severson, Robert A. Sharpe, Patrick S. Tobo, and Jenniffer F. Wilson.
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