Transportation Security: TSA Could Strengthen Monitoring of Allegations of Employee Misconduct
Published: 2013-07-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DHS's TSA employs approximately 56,000 personnel to ensure security at about 450 TSA-regulated airports nationwide. News media have reported allegations of misconduct by TSA employees, including theft. GAO was asked to review TSA's policies and procedures for addressing employee misconduct. This report (1) summarizes data on TSA employee misconduct cases, and (2) examines the extent to which TSA has taken actions to manage and oversee the investigations and adjudications process. Adjudication is the process through which TSA determines whether the evidence is sufficient to propose and sustain a charge of misconduct, and determines the appropriate penalty. GAO reviewed TSA procedures, analyzed TSA misconduct data from fiscal years 2010 through 2012, and analyzed a random, nongeneralizable sample of 50 allegations referred from the DHS OIG to TSA to identify follow up actions.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: According to Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employee misconduct data that GAO analyzed, TSA investigated and adjudicated approximately 9,600 cases of employee misconduct from fiscal years 2010 through 2012. From fiscal years 2010 through 2012, the annual number of TSA misconduct cases increased from 2,691 to 3,408. In that same period, TSA's workforce of Office of Security Operations employees at the airport level grew by about 3,200 employees. Two offense categories accounted for about half of all cases--(1) attendance and leave, which accounted for 32 percent, and (2) screening and security, which accounted for 20 percent. Charges for screening and security related incidents pertain to violating standard operating procedures, including not conducting security or equipment checks, and allowing patrons or baggage to bypass screening. TSA's guidance delineates common employee charges, along with a suggested range of penalties. Forty-seven percent of the cases that GAO analyzed resulted in letters of reprimand, which describe unacceptable conduct that is the basis for a disciplinary action; 31 percent resulted in suspensions of a definite duration; and 17 percent resulted in the employee's removal from TSA. The remaining cases covered a variety of outcomes, including indefinite suspensions.
While TSA has taken steps to help manage the investigations and adjudication process, such as providing training to TSA staff at airports, additional procedures could help TSA better monitor the investigations and adjudications process. For example, TSA does not have a process for conducting reviews of misconduct cases to verify that TSA staff at airports are complying with policies and procedures for adjudicating employee misconduct. Without a review process, it is difficult to determine the extent to which deficiencies, if any, exist in the adjudications process. Further, TSA does not record all misconduct case outcomes, including cases that resulted in corrective action or no penalty, in its Integrated Database (TSA's centralized case management system) because the agency has not issued guidance requiring the recording of all outcomes. Issuing guidance to TSA staff at airports about recording all case outcomes in the database would emphasize management's view of the importance of staff including such information to provide a more complete record of adjudication decisions. Moreover, TSA does not have reconciliation procedures--that is, procedures to follow up on completed misconduct investigations to ensure that the agency has identified cases requiring adjudication. According to a random sample of 50 allegations referred from the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) to TSA in fiscal year 2012, GAO found that 2 were not adjudicated by TSA. As a result of GAO's review, TSA made adjudication decisions on these allegations,1 of which resulted in a 14-day suspension for the employee because of disruptive behavior in the workplace. The results from GAO's sample cannot be generalized to the entire population of over 1,300 allegations referred from DHS OIG to TSA in fiscal year 2012; however, they raise questions as to whether there could be additional instances of allegations referred to TSA in this population that the agency has not adjudicated. A senior TSA official agreed that establishing reconciliation procedures would help TSA identify allegations of misconduct that require adjudication.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends, among other things, that TSA establish a process to conduct reviews of misconduct cases to verify that TSA staff at airports are complying with policies and procedures for adjudicating employee misconduct, develop and issue guidance to the field clarifying the need for TSA officials at airports to record all misconduct case outcomes in the Integrated Database, and develop reconciliation procedures to identify allegations of employee misconduct not previously addressed through adjudication. DHS concurred with the recommendations and TSA is taking actions in response.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), a component of the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), employs approximately 56,000  transportation security officers (TSO) and other TSA personnel to ensure  the security of the traveling public at more than 450 TSA-regulated  airports nationwide. News stories in recent years have highlighted  several high-profile allegations of misconduct by TSA employees,  including TSOs being involved in theft and drug-smuggling activities, as  well as circumventing mandatory screening procedures for passengers  and baggage. For example, in 2011, a TSO at the Orlando International  Airport pleaded guilty to federal charges of embezzlement and theft for  stealing more than 80 laptop computers and other electronic devices,  valued at $80,000, from passenger luggage. TSOs engaging in  misconduct raise security concerns because these employees are  charged with helping to ensure the security of our nation’s aviation  system. The potential impact on aviation security underscores the  importance of controls to help prevent and detect instances of misconduct  within the TSA workforce.
The process of addressing TSA employee misconduct involves various  components within DHS. For example, depending on the facts and  circumstances of a case, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), TSA  Office of Inspection (OOI), or TSA Office of Security Operations (OSO)  may conduct an investigation into allegations of TSA employee  misconduct. OSO generally adjudicates misconduct cases at airports,  which is the process through which TSA determines whether the  evidence is sufficient to propose and sustain a charge of misconduct, and  determines the appropriate penalty. The TSA Office of Professional  Responsibility (OPR), an independent office that TSA established in 2010  to provide greater consistency in misconduct penalty determinations,  adjudicates a more specialized set of cases, such as misconduct  involving senior-level employees and other TSA employees. TSA has  policies and procedures for investigating and adjudicating employee  misconduct and strives to follow the progressive discipline model, which  is the process of taking progressively more severe action, when  appropriate, until the unacceptable conduct is corrected or the employee  is removed from the agency. TSA requires removal for certain TSO  offenses, such as theft and intentional serious security breaches, and  allows removal for the first violation for other offenses, such as sleeping  while assigned to a security activity.
You asked us to review TSA’s procedures for addressing employee  misconduct, including the potential risks associated with conduct issues.  This report (1) summarizes data on TSA employee misconduct cases,  and (2) examines the extent to which TSA has taken actions to manage  and oversee the investigations and adjudications process.
To summarize data on TSA employee misconduct cases, we reviewed  program documentation. For example, we reviewed standard operating  procedures, policy statements, and guidance for staff charged with  investigating and adjudicating allegations of employee misconduct.  Further, we conducted trend analysis on TSA misconduct case data from  fiscal years 2010 through 2012. As part of this work, we assessed data  reliability by testing data for potential gaps and anomalies and  interviewing TSA officials to discuss the mechanisms in place to ensure  data quality. We identified some instances of missing and inaccurate  data, including lack of data about employee pay bands and incorrect job  titles. We also determined that TSA does not consistently track all  employee misconduct cases, which we discuss later in the report. While  we identified such limitations, we found the data sufficiently reliable for  providing general information on the nature and characteristics of  employee misconduct.
To determine the extent to which TSA has taken actions to manage and  oversee the investigations and adjudications process, we reviewed TSA’s  standard operating procedures for addressing employee misconduct  through various types of investigations, including an administrative  inquiry, which is a formal investigation requested by a federal security  director (FSD) or designee, as well as TSA’s procedures for making  adjudication decisions, including providing alleged offenders with certain  due process opportunities. We reviewed TSA’s Table of Offenses and  Penalties, which provides guidance for officials to follow in making  adjudication decisions, such as a list of potential offenses and penalty  ranges. We compared TSA processes for investigations and  adjudications with TSA policies and procedures, as well as with criteria in  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. We used fiscal  year 2012 complaint data from DHS OIG’s Enforcement Data System as  the population from which to randomly select a nongeneralizable sample  of 50 TSA employee misconduct allegations referred from DHS OIG to  OOI. We requested that OOI provide us with the status and outcome of  each of the 50 allegations, including whether TSA had a record of the  allegations and had taken action to investigate and adjudicate each  allegation.
To address both objectives, we interviewed senior officials from TSA. We  also selected a sample of 7 airports from the approximately 450 TSA- regulated airports nationwide and conducted site visits or telephone  interviews with TSA officials responsible for investigating and adjudicating  cases of employee misconduct. Further, we interviewed senior officials  from OOI and DHS OIG field offices with oversight responsibilities for the  airports included in our sample. Specifically, we interviewed criminal  investigators from 4 of the 6 OOI field offices. We also interviewed  criminal investigators from 5 of the 13 DHS OIG investigative field  offices. We selected these airports and OOI and DHS OIG field office  locations based on number and type of past cases of employee  misconduct and geographic dispersion. As we did not select a probability  sample of airports and OOI and DHS OIG field offices to interview, the  results of these interviews are not generalizable to all TSA-regulated  airports nationwide, OOI’s 6 field offices, and DHS OIG’s 13 field offices.  However, the interviews provided us with the perspectives of DHS and  TSA officials responsible for conducting TSA employee misconduct  investigations or adjudications, including their views on potential internal  control weaknesses, lessons learned, and any challenges airports and  field offices have faced in addressing employee misconduct. Appendix I  presents more details about our objectives, scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2012 to July 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on the audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the TSA  Administrator sets the conditions of employment for screener personnel,  including disciplinary measures, as the TSA Administrator determines to  be necessary. To help implement this authority, a TSA management  directive specifies the steps the agency must take in investigating and  adjudicating employee misconduct. Figure 1 below summarizes the  process of investigating and adjudicating employee misconduct.
TSA receives allegations of TSA employee misconduct from a variety of  sources, including air passengers, DHS OIG, and Members of Congress.  For example, air passengers may submit a complaint directly to a TSA  manager at the screening checkpoint or may provide airport staff with a  customer comment card describing the alleged misconduct. The  investigations process involves engaging in fact-finding to the extent  necessary to make an informed decision on the merit of an allegation. For  example, TSA supervisors or managers at airports review evidence, such  as video footage, and obtain a statement from the alleged offender to  determine what happened during the incident and the extent to which the  employee may have been at fault—for example, whether a screener  violated TSA standard operating procedures (SOP), or behaved  unprofessionally or inappropriately toward an air passenger. In some  instances, such as issues of a complex or sensitive nature, including  possible misuse of position or abuse of power, TSA senior management  at airports may appoint an independent employee, known as an inquiry  officer, to conduct an administrative inquiry into allegations of employee  misconduct. Inquiry officers conduct administrative inquiries at the  direction of TSA’s FSDs or their designees, according to specific policies  and procedures. TSA staff at airports are required to elevate misconduct  allegations involving senior-level and law enforcement employees, as well  as issues of a criminal nature, to OOI. Per DHS policy, OOI must  provide the DHS OIG with “right of first refusal” on certain misconduct  cases, such as criminal violations, which allows the DHS OIG to either  open an investigation or send the allegation back to TSA for action. OOI  maintains a Hotline Database to record information on allegations related  to TSA employee misconduct, such as the date of the alleged incident,  source of the allegation, and a description of the alleged misconduct.
subsections: section_title: Adjudications Process
paragraphs: TSA management officials at airports or OPR adjudicate misconduct  cases, depending on the source of the investigation and type of case.  TSA management officials at airports adjudicate the majority of  misconduct cases, such as attendance and leave, security and screening,  and alcohol-related violations. OPR adjudicates (1) all TSA misconduct  cases handled by DHS OIG, (2) all cases involving TSA senior-level and  law enforcement personnel, and (3) any matter that the Assistant  Administrator for OPR determines should be reviewed and adjudicated by  OPR. Depending on the preponderance of the evidence, adjudication  decisions may or may not result in a penalty for the alleged offender.  Cases in which TSA is unable to substantiate that misconduct has in fact  occurred are closed with no action against the employee. If TSA  substantiates the allegation, it employs one of the following three types of  penalties:
Corrective action: This is an administrative or nondisciplinary action,  such as a letter of counseling or a letter of guidance and direction,  that informs an employee about unacceptable performance or conduct  that should be corrected or improved. TSA policy specifies that a letter  of counseling should include a statement informing the employee that  if he or she does not correct the misconduct, more severe disciplinary  or adverse action may be initiated.
Disciplinary action: This includes actions resulting in a letter of  reprimand to a suspension of 14 days or less. A letter of reprimand  describes the unacceptable conduct that is the basis for a disciplinary  action, and represents the least severe form of disciplinary action.  Suspensions in this category involve the placement of an employee in  a nonduty, nonpay status for up to 14 days.
Adverse action: This involves a suspension of more than 14 days,  including an indefinite suspension, an involuntary demotion for  conduct, or a removal. An indefinite suspension is appropriate when  evidence exists to demonstrate misconduct of a serious nature, such  as an employee has been indicted or has been arrested pursuant to a  judge’s warrant for a crime involving potential imprisonment, or an  allegation of misconduct that, if proven, represents a threat to life,  property, safety, or the effective operation of the workplace. A  demotion is a voluntary or involuntary change to a lower pay band or  rate of pay. A removal is involuntary separation from TSA employment  in order to promote the efficiency of the federal service.
TSA may use an expedited process, known as one-step, for certain  allegations of TSO misconduct, such as allegations that may result in  indefinite suspensions or removals involving theft and intentional serious  security breaches, among other things. The one-step process allows TSA  to impose appropriate disciplinary or adverse actions in an expeditious  manner to address specific employee offenses. In the one-step process,  TSA must hold a pre-decisional meeting with the employee to discuss the  allegation, advise the employee of the possible consequences, and  provide the employee with an opportunity to respond to charges prior to  deciding the action. In other cases, a TSA management official issues a  notice of proposed action, including the evidence used to support the  charge, to provide the affected employee with an opportunity to respond  orally and/or in writing, and issues a notice of decision after weighing  input from the affected employee. The affected employee may be  represented by an individual of the employee’s choosing in preparing and  presenting a response. In addition to offering the opportunity to respond  to charges through a pre-decisional meeting or other means, TSA  provides alleged offenders with other due process opportunities, such as  the ability to file a grievance, engage in alternative dispute resolution, and  make an appeal on adverse actions.
TSA uses its Table of Offenses and Penalties as the framework for  corrective, disciplinary, and adverse actions, and this table provides  guidance to management officials for determining appropriate penalties.  Management officials are expected to consider applicable mitigating and  aggravating factors in determining an appropriate penalty. Such factors  can determine whether a penalty should be in the lower or upper end of  penalty ranges. Examples of mitigating factors include self-reporting of  the offense, efforts to remedy wrongdoing, and a long period with no prior  discipline. Examples of aggravating factors include prior warning, failure  to report the offense, and impact on TSA’s reputation.
section_title: Misconduct Oversight and Case Management
paragraphs: TSA Employee Relations (ER) in the Office of Human Capital is  responsible for overseeing administrative inquiries, reviewing disciplinary  actions handled by TSA management at airports, and managing the  Integrated Database. TSA uses the Integrated Database to track specific  elements of misconduct case information. The Integrated Database  contains several modules, including investigative case information from  OOI, and information used by OSO staff at airports and OPR to make  adjudication decisions. The agency uses information from the database  to facilitate monitoring of the investigations and adjudications process,  allow for internal reporting, and enable the agency to respond to data  requests from Congress and other stakeholders.
section_title: TSA Investigated and Adjudicated Approximately 9,600 Misconduct Cases from Fiscal Years 2010 through 2012
paragraphs: According to TSA employee misconduct data that we analyzed, TSA  investigated and adjudicated 9,622 employee misconduct cases from  fiscal years 2010 through 2012. From fiscal years 2010 through 2012,  the annual number of TSA misconduct cases increased from 2,691 to  3,408. In that same period, TSA’s workforce of OSO employees at the  airport/field level grew by about 3,200 employees.
As highlighted in table 1, two offense categories accounted for about half  of all cases—attendance and leave, which accounted for 32 percent of  the cases, and screening and security, which accounted for 20 percent of  the cases.
Attendance and leave cases may involve employees who were absent  without leave for 1 to 5 days or may have violated leave procedures.  Charges for screening- and security-related incidents pertain to violating  SOPs, including failing to conduct security or equipment checks, and  allowing patrons or baggage to bypass screening. For example, at one  airport checkpoint, a TSO was observed on the airport’s closed circuit  television system intermittently running passengers’ property through an  X-ray baggage conveyor belt without stopping the conveyor belt to review  each image, as required by TSA’s SOP. A subsequent investigation and  adjudication resulted in the employee being suspended for 30 days. In  addition, a TSO at another airport left the TSO’s assigned checkpoint to  assist a family member at an airline ticket counter with a carry-on bag.  The TSO assumed control of the bag and instructed the family member to  go through the screening checkpoint without the bag, bypassed required  screening of the bag, and then returned the bag to the family member.  However, a TSA supervisor stopped the TSO in order to screen the bag— which was found to contain numerous prohibited items. A subsequent  investigation and adjudication resulted in the employee being suspended  for 7 days for intentionally allowing property to bypass required screening.
The Table of Offenses and Penalties delineates common employee  charges, along with a suggested range of penalties that includes letters of  counseling, letters of reprimand, suspensions that range from 1 day to an  indefinite period, demotions, and removals. As shown in figure 2, 47  percent of the cases that we analyzed resulted in letters of reprimand,  while 31 percent of the cases resulted in suspensions of a definite  duration. Additionally, in 17 percent of the cases, the employee was  removed by TSA.
section_title: TSA Has Taken Steps to Help Manage the Investigations and Adjudications Process, but Could Develop Additional Procedures to Better Monitor Employee Misconduct Cases
subsections: section_title: TSA Has Taken Steps to Help Manage the Investigations and Adjudications Process
paragraphs: TSA has taken steps to help manage the process of investigating and  adjudicating employee misconduct. First, TSA has established personnel  misconduct policies and procedures, which outline the agency’s  responsibilities for addressing job-related or off-duty behavior that violates  standards described in laws, regulations, rules, and other authoritative  policies and guidance. According to these policies and procedures, TSA  must assess the incident or allegation of employee misconduct, including  but not limited to interviewing the employee who is the subject of the  allegation and witnesses, in determining whether adverse, disciplinary, or  corrective action is appropriate. In making a penalty determination, TSA  must consider factors such as the seriousness and nature of the offense  and the relationship of the offense to the employee’s position and  responsibilities. Second, in 2010, TSA created OPR to provide greater  consistency in misconduct penalty determinations and a more expeditious  and standardized adjudication process because prior to the creation of  OPR, some disciplinary actions experienced delays due to unavailability  of adjudicating officials and extended decision consideration. OPR has 10  case managers that review reports of investigation including reviewing the  facts of each case based on investigative results and determining a  penalty that matches the severity of the offense. In addition, OPR  developed the Table of Offenses and Penalties as a framework to help  TSA officials determine appropriate disciplinary actions involving  misconduct.
Finally, TSA has provided a series of training classes for its staff at  airports to enhance their ability to investigate and adjudicate employee  misconduct. For example, in 2012, ER conducted training for TSA  managers and supervisors at airports on employee misconduct topics,  such as TSA policies and procedures for addressing employee  misconduct, management and employee rights, and use of the Table of  Offenses and Penalties to determine appropriate penalties. ER has also  provided training to staff at the airports on how to conduct administrative  inquiries, including techniques for conducting interviews of witnesses and  alleged offenders, and collecting and documenting evidence to determine  whether misconduct has occurred, among other things.
section_title: Weaknesses in Procedures Impede TSA’s Ability to Monitor Employee Misconduct Cases
paragraphs: TSA has taken steps to help manage the investigations and adjudications  process, but developing and implementing procedures in four areas could  help the agency better monitor misconduct cases: (1) verifying that  misconduct adjudications are compliant with policies and procedures, (2)  recording case information on all adjudication decisions, (3) tracking the  time to complete all phases of the investigations and adjudications  process, and (4) identifying allegations not adjudicated by the agency.
Verifying that misconduct adjudications are compliant with policies  and procedures. TSA does not have a process for reviewing misconduct  cases to verify that TSA staff at airports are complying with policies and  procedures for adjudicating employee misconduct. ER has responsibility  for overseeing misconduct adjudications completed by TSA staff at  airports, including conducting training on the adjudications process for  TSA supervisors, managers, and other staff at airports responsible for  addressing employee misconduct. According to a senior ER official, ER  periodically reviews TSA case files at airports using a document checklist  to ensure that paperwork is included in the file, such as evidence that the  employee has been afforded an opportunity to respond to misconduct  charges. However, the official indicated that ER is not currently  conducting many of these reviews because of resource constraints, and  the official is unsure of the frequency or the results of these reviews.
Consistent with TSA policies and procedures, adjudicating officials need  to collect sufficient evidence to support penalty charges, consider  aggravating and mitigating circumstances when determining a penalty,  and take certain actions, including removal, based on the nature of the  offense. However, TSA does not have a review process to verify that TSA  staff at airports are consistently following these requirements. A review  process might include evaluating misconduct case files on a regular basis  to identify compliance issues with the adjudications process and develop  corrective actions based on the findings. A senior OPR official noted that  some cases have been overturned or the penalties reduced through the  appeals process because staff at airports had not supported the charges  with sufficient evidence or did not properly apply penalty factors. For  example, from January 2011 to June 13, 2013, the OPR Appellate Board,  which reviews appeals made by TSOs on certain adverse actions, either  overturned or reduced the penalty in 125 out of 836 cases (15 percent).  Specifically, of the 125 cases, the OPR Appellate Board overturned the  penalty in 79 cases because the charges had not been proven by  preponderance of the evidence. Additionally, the OPR Appellate Board  reduced the penalty in 34 cases because, among other things, the  adjudicating official did not consider mitigating factors. Further, while TSA  policy requires the removal of employees that have committed an  intentional serious security breach, such as intentionally allowing persons  or property to bypass screening, the agency does not review misconduct  cases to verify that TSA staff at airports are properly adjudicating cases  involving an intentional breach of security. Moreover, our evaluation of  TSA’s fiscal year 2012 data on cases involving sleeping while engaging in  security duties adjudicated by TSA staff at airports indicates that 50  percent of the cases resulted in a lower penalty than the range included in  the Table of Offenses and Penalties.
A senior ER official agreed that TSA would benefit from a review process  to help verify that TSA staff at airports are making adjudication decisions  in conformance with policies and procedures. The official noted that  TSA’s focus has been on other priorities such as development of the  Integrated Database. However, internal control standards state that  internal controls should generally be designed to ensure that ongoing  monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations and that monitoring  is performed continually. Without a review process to verify that TSA  staff at airports are complying with policies and procedures for  adjudicating misconduct, it is difficult for TSA to provide reasonable  assurance that cases have been adjudicated properly and that risk to the  agency is mitigated accordingly. Furthermore, a review process could  allow TSA to gain knowledge regarding areas of noncompliance and  identify the potential causes, such as gaps in training or guidance, so that  it could address such gaps.
Recording case information on all adjudication decisions. TSA does  not record the results of all misconduct cases that have been adjudicated  by TSA airport staff in its Integrated Database, which could help the  agency oversee efforts at the airport level to address employee  misconduct. Specifically, the agency does not record all employee  misconduct case outcomes in the database, including cases that resulted  in a corrective action, which are actions that are administrative or  nondisciplinary in nature, such as a letter of counseling. As discussed  earlier, the Integrated Database is TSA’s centralized case management  system used by staff to track and manage employee misconduct cases.  TSA strives to follow a progressive discipline approach in adjudicating  employee misconduct cases, which means that managers must have  access to information on an employee’s disciplinary track record in a  centralized location.
However, we found that five out of the seven airports included in our  sample do not consistently track corrective actions in the Integrated  Database. A senior ER official stated that ER was unaware that TSA staff  at airports are not consistently recording corrective actions in the  Integrated Database, and there is a strong need for TSA to clarify that  TSA staff at airports should record corrective actions in the database. The  official stated that while TSA has communicated through training that staff  at airports should record corrective actions in the Integrated Database,  there is not a written policy or procedure requiring such tracking. Of the  airports that do not consistently record corrective actions in the Integrated  Database, three use the Airport Information Management (AIM) system to  record corrective actions because there is not a policy or procedure  requiring airports to use the Integrated Database. However, AIM is not  designed to be the central database for information on outcomes resulting  from employee misconduct investigations, and it would be inefficient for  TSA to extract information on corrective actions from this system in  addition to the Integrated Database. For example, this system stores  employee information used for the management of day-to-day activities,  such as work schedules and controlling property, including issuance of  uniforms, among other activities.
Further, TSA’s policy on administrative inquiries states that it is as  important to back findings of no fault, no loss, or no wrongdoing with  documentary evidence as it is to document findings resulting in  disciplinary action. According to the policy, the investigative report must  include sufficient documentation to convince the appointing authority and  others who may review the matter that the evidence is appropriate. While  TSA’s data indicate that OPR and some TSA officials at airports record  cases that resulted in no penalty in the Integrated Database, we found  that all seven airports in our sample do not consistently record case  outcomes that result in no penalty in the database, which are instances in  which TSA investigated an allegation of misconduct, but could not  substantiate the misconduct based on available evidence. These airports  are not recording case outcomes that result in no penalty in the database  because TSA has not provided guidance requiring such tracking.  However, internal control standards state that control activities should be  established to help ensure, among other things, that all documentation  and records are properly managed and maintained, which facilitates  monitoring and resource management. Recording corrective actions and  no-penalty outcomes in the Integrated Database would help provide a  centralized, institutional record on past misconduct, and enable managers  to follow a progressive discipline approach because all case outcomes  would be documented. For example, according to the senior ER official, in  situations where an employee transfers between airports, lack of  information on previous corrective actions taken against the employee  would hamper TSA’s ability to follow progressive discipline at the new  airport. In fiscal year 2012, about 2,100 TSA employees transferred  between airports. Developing and issuing guidance for TSA staff at  airports on the need to record all misconduct case outcomes in the  Integrated Database would emphasize management’s view of the  importance of staff including such information to provide a complete  record of adjudication decisions.
Tracking the time to complete all phases of the investigations and  adjudications process. TSA does not consistently track the cycle time  associated with completing the misconduct investigations and  adjudications process. TSA policies and procedures state that  investigations should generally be completed within 30 days of an  allegation of employee misconduct, and the notice of proposed action to  an alleged offender should generally be issued within 30 days of  completing the investigation. Further, TSA’s administrative inquiry policy  states that administrative inquiries should generally not exceed 15  calendar days. Our review of TSA data from the Integrated Database on  misconduct cases handled by TSA airport staff identified that TSA does  not capture information on the amount of time to complete the  investigations and adjudications process, including the number of days to  complete an investigation and issue a notice of proposed action. While  TSA has established standards for cycle times, according to a senior ER  official, the agency has not required TSA staff at airports to track their  performance against the standards because the amount of time to  complete the investigative and adjudications process can vary based on  the complexity of the case. However, internal control standards state that  agencies need to compare actual performance with planned or expected  results throughout the organization and analyze significant differences.  Tracking cycle times would provide TSA with operational information,  such as the variance in processing time by type of case and geographic  location. For example, according to an OOI senior official, OOI, which  typically investigates cases of a complex nature, tracks the cycle time  associated with its misconduct investigations to allow headquarters to  look across OOI field offices to evaluate patterns, and make resource  management and other decisions. Specifically, the OOI senior official  stated that paying attention to investigative timelines allowed OOI to  identify that theft cases were staying open in the Integrated Database for  an excessive amount of time due to a process issue, which OOI resolved  based on cycle time tracking.
We found that TSA officials at two of the seven airports in our sample  have established a process to track the cycle time for active employee  misconduct cases. For example, TSA staff at one of the airports in our  sample track the following time frames: (1) completion of the  investigation; (2) review of the proposed decision by various  organizational units, such as the Office of Chief Counsel; and (3)  issuance of the decision letter to the offender. Tracking the cycle time for  active employee misconduct cases provides a number of benefits for the  airport, including allowing the airport to identify cases that are delayed,  uncover where the delay is in the process and specific reasons for the  delay, and make adjustments to expedite the cases. Specifically, tracking  cycle times would provide TSA with an opportunity to identify delays  associated with evidence collection. For example, misconduct  investigations must be completed as quickly as possible because  evidence has a finite life span. According to a senior TSA official at an  airport in our sample, TSA officials at airports often have to rely upon  video footage to substantiate whether misconduct has occurred, such as  alleged theft of a passenger’s property. The official stated that it can be  challenging for TSA to obtain video in a timely manner given that a third  party, such as an airport authority, generally controls an airport’s closed  circuit television system, so it is important for TSA to view video footage  prior to a third party taking steps to archive or destroy the content.  Establishing a policy to track cycle times for misconduct cases handled by  airport staff could help TSA ensure that this information is consistently  recorded to identify how long it is taking for misconduct cases to progress  through the investigations and adjudications process. TSA senior officials  agreed that tracking cycle times for investigations and adjudications  completed by airport staff would provide valuable information on the  differences across airports related to case processing, and that instituting  a tracking process would not be cumbersome for the agency.
Identifying allegations not adjudicated by TSA. Our review indicates  that OOI has not established procedures to reconcile completed  misconduct investigations against OSO or OPR adjudication decisions to  identify cases not resolved by OSO or OPR. Specifically, OOI is not  matching its completed investigations against OSO and OPR adjudication  decisions to identify any gaps, following up with OSO and OPR to help  resolve these outstanding cases, and updating the status of the cases in  the Integrated Database. Previously, OOI matched its completed records  of investigation against OSO or OPR adjudication decisions to ensure  that OSO or OPR had received the record and made an adjudication  decision. According to an OOI senior official, the previous Assistant  Administrator for OOI determined that this type of reconciliation process  was too resource intensive and discontinued the process because OOI  had to manually sort through open investigations listed as “pending an  adjudication decision” and then contact OSO or OPR to determine the  status of each case. However, the OOI senior official stated that although  the process was manual in nature, it was beneficial in identifying  allegations that had not been adjudicated by TSA. For example, we  reviewed a random sample of 50 allegations of employee misconduct  referred from DHS OIG to TSA in fiscal year 2012 and found 2 out of 50  allegations that were not adjudicated by TSA. Specifically, OOI  investigated the allegations and referred the cases to OSO staff at the  airport for adjudication; however, at the time of our review, OSO had not  made adjudication decisions on the cases because the investigative  reports were either never received or were missing because of record- keeping issues. As a result of our review, TSA subsequently made  adjudication decisions on these allegations; 1 of the adjudication  decisions resulted in a 14-day suspension for the employee because of  disruptive behavior in the workplace, and the other adjudication decision  resulted in no penalty. The results from GAO’s sample cannot be  generalized to the entire population of referrals from DHS OIG to TSA;  however they raise questions as to whether there could be additional  instances of allegations that TSA had not adjudicated in the population of  over 1,300 allegations of TSA employee misconduct that DHS OIG  referred to TSA for action in fiscal year 2012. A senior TSA OOI official  agreed that since TSA does not have reconciliation procedures, there  may be other allegations the agency is unaware of that TSA OOI has  investigated, but have not been adjudicated by OSO or OPR, and a  reconciliation process would offer benefits to TSA.
TSA has a contract in place to develop reporting capabilities in the  Integrated Database that may allow OOI to match its completed  investigations against adjudication decisions made by OPR and OSO,  thereby helping to maximize TSA’s resources. As of May 2013, the  contractor has modified the database to allow TSA to match OOI’s  completed investigations against OPR’s adjudication decisions, and plans  to develop the same capabilities related to OSO’s adjudication decisions.  However, according to a senior OOI official, OOI is not leveraging the  capability to match OOI’s completed investigations against OPR’s  adjudication decisions because the agency has not identified the staff or  developed protocols for conducting a reconciliation process. Moreover,  the agency does not currently have procedures to reconcile OOI’s  completed investigations against OSO’s adjudication decisions while the  database is under development. Internal control standards advise  agencies to establish monitoring activities, such as reconciliations, to  ensure that management’s directives are carried out and risks are  mitigated. Developing reconciliation procedures could help TSA ensure  that it identifies allegations of employee misconduct not previously  addressed through adjudication.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: TSA has taken actions to help manage the investigations and  adjudications process, but procedural weaknesses have hampered the  agency’s ability to monitor employee misconduct cases. Specifically, TSA  does not have a process to conduct reviews of misconduct cases to verify  that TSA staff at airports responsible for adjudicating employee  misconduct comply with policies and procedures, nor does the agency  record the outcomes of all cases or track the cycle time to complete the  investigations and adjudications process. Consistent with internal  controls, conducting reviews of misconduct cases and consistently  recording all outcomes could provide TSA with reasonable assurance that  cases have been adjudicated properly and there is a complete  institutional record of adjudication decisions. In addition, tracking cycle  times would provide TSA with operational information, including helping  the agency identify how long it is taking for misconduct cases to progress  through the investigations and adjudications process. Moreover,  developing reconciliation procedures could help reduce the risk that TSA  does not address all allegations of employee misconduct not previously  adjudicated.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve TSA’s management and oversight of efforts to address  allegations of employee misconduct, we recommend that the  Administrator of TSA take the following four actions, consistent with  standards for internal control, to establish a process to conduct reviews of misconduct cases to verify  that TSA staff at airports are complying with policies and procedures  for adjudicating employee misconduct, develop and issue guidance to the field clarifying the need for TSA  officials at airports to record all misconduct case outcomes in the  Integrated Database, establish an agency-wide policy to track cycle times in the  investigations and adjudications process, and develop reconciliation procedures to identify allegations of employee  misconduct not previously addressed through adjudication.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS,  in written comments received July 18, 2013, concurred with the  recommendations and identified actions taken, under way, or planned to  implement the recommendations. Written comments are summarized  below, and official DHS comments are reproduced in appendix II. In  addition, DHS provided written technical comments, which we  incorporated, as appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that TSA establish a process to  conduct reviews of misconduct cases to verify that TSA staff at airports  are complying with policies and procedures for adjudicating employee  misconduct, DHS concurred with the recommendation. DHS stated that  TSA is currently taking steps to provide increased auditing of disciplinary  records to help ensure that airport staff are complying with policies and  procedures for adjudicating employee misconduct. TSA expects to  complete these actions by March 31, 2014. These actions, once  implemented, should help address the intent of our recommendation. In  response to our recommendation that TSA develop and issue guidance to  the field clarifying the need for TSA officials at airports to record all  misconduct case outcomes in the Integrated Database, DHS concurred  with the recommendation. DHS stated that TSA plans to develop and  disseminate additional guidance to the field to ensure that all corrective  and disciplinary actions are recorded in the database. TSA expects to  develop and disseminate additional guidance to the field by August 30,  2013. We believe that this is a beneficial step that would address our  recommendation once it is implemented, provided that the guidance also  specifies that cases resulting in no penalty should be recorded in the  database.
In response to our recommendation that TSA establish an agency-wide  policy to track cycle times in the investigations and adjudications process,  DHS concurred with the recommendation, and stated that TSA will  develop a process and mechanism to track airport cycle times for  misconduct cases. TSA expects to develop a process and mechanism by  March 31, 2014. This action, once implemented, would address the intent  of our recommendation. In response to our recommendation that TSA  develop reconciliation procedures to identify allegations of employee  misconduct not previously addressed through adjudication, DHS  concurred with the recommendation. DHS stated that TSA will implement  a reconciliation process to ensure that OOI investigations are adjudicated  by OSO, and noted that OPR currently has a process to communicate  adjudication decisions to OOI. TSA expects to implement a reconciliation  process by March 31, 2014. We believe that these are beneficial steps  that would address our recommendation once implemented, provided that  TSA develops a process to reconcile OOI’s completed investigations  against adjudication decisions made by both OSO and OPR. It is unclear  whether the process TSA plans to develop would involve matching  completed investigations against adjudication decisions made by OPR,  including identifying the staff and developing the protocols for the  process.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the TSA Administrator, appropriate congressional committees,  and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no  charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4379 or at lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report (1) summarizes data on Transportation Security  Administration (TSA) employee misconduct cases, and (2) examines the  extent to which TSA has taken actions to manage and oversee the  investigations and adjudications process.
To summarize data on TSA employee misconduct cases, we reviewed  program documentation, collected data on TSA employee misconduct  cases from fiscal years 2010 through 2012, and interviewed officials from  the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA. In particular, we  reviewed TSA documentation, such as standard operating procedures,  policy statements, and guidance for staff charged with investigating and  adjudicating allegations of employee misconduct. To understand the  magnitude of previous cases of TSA employee misconduct, we obtained  information presented in TSA and Federal Bureau of Investigation press  releases, and interviewed criminal investigators from the TSA Office of  Inspection (OOI) and DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). We also  collected information from TSA on resources, such as staffing numbers,  and protocols for information management. Specifically, we reviewed  information on TSA’s Integrated Database, which comprises misconduct  case data and supporting documentation, such as evidence used to  support a misconduct penalty.
We also conducted an analysis of TSA misconduct case data from the  Integrated Database from fiscal years 2010 through 2012 to identify  trends related to both misconduct offenses and penalties. As part of this  work, we assessed the reliability of data in the Integrated Database by  interviewing TSA officials to discuss the mechanisms in place to ensure  data quality and tested the data for potential gaps and anomalies. We  identified some instances of missing and inaccurate data, including lack  of employee pay band and incorrect job title. For example, we evaluated  TSA’s data to identify instances in which cases involving senior-level  employees may have been adjudicated by OSO rather than OPR, as  specified by policy. As a result of that analysis, we identified data entry  and other issues related to 14 cases. We also determined that TSA does  not consistently track corrective actions and cases adjudicated with no  penalty, which we discuss in the report. While we identified such  limitations, we found the data sufficiently reliable for providing general  information on the nature and characteristics of employee misconduct.
Moreover, we interviewed TSA officials to identify information that the  agency collects about the nature and magnitude of cases of employee  misconduct. We met with senior officials from TSA, including the  Assistant Administrator for the Office of Professional Responsibility  (OPR), the Executive Advisor to the Assistant Administrator for OOI, the  Senior Advisor to the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Security  Operations (OSO), and the Director for Employee Relations (ER). We  also selected a sample of 7 airports from the approximately 450 TSA- regulated airports nationwide and conducted site visits or telephone  interviews with TSA officials responsible for investigating and adjudicating  cases of employee misconduct. We conducted site visits with Hartsfield- Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Miami International Airport,  Southwest Florida International Airport, John F. Kennedy International  Airport, and Newark Liberty International Airport, and conducted  telephone interviews with officials from San Francisco International  Airport and Chicago O’Hare International Airport. Further, we interviewed  senior officials from OOI and DHS OIG field offices with oversight  responsibilities for the airports included in our sample. Specifically, we  interviewed criminal investigators from 4 of the 6 OOI field offices. We  conducted a site visit with OOI’s Atlanta field office, and conducted  telephone interviews with OOI field offices in Detroit, Philadelphia, and  San Francisco. Further, we interviewed DHS OIG criminal investigators  from 5 of the 13 DHS OIG investigative field offices. We conducted site  visits with DHS OIG’s Atlanta and Miami field offices, and conducted  telephone interviews with DHS OIG field offices in Philadelphia, Chicago,  and San Diego. We selected these TSA airport locations, and OOI and  DHS OIG field office locations based on the number and type of past  cases of employee misconduct and geographic dispersion. As we did not  select a probability sample of TSA airport locations, OOI, and DHS OIG  field offices to interview, the results of these interviews cannot be  generalized to all TSA-regulated airports nationwide, OOI’s 6 field offices,  and DHS OIG’s 13 field offices. However, the interviews provided us with  the perspectives of DHS and TSA officials responsible for collecting  information on TSA employee misconduct investigations or adjudications.
To determine the extent to which TSA has taken actions to manage and  oversee the investigations and adjudications process, we analyzed the  processes TSA uses to (1) conduct investigations of allegations of  employee misconduct, and (2) make adjudication decisions, including  determining any relevant penalties. In particular, we analyzed TSA’s  oversight and monitoring processes for investigations and adjudications  handled by TSA staff at airports. As part of our effort to evaluate these  processes, we reviewed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,  pursuant to which TSA implements its human capital management  responsibilities. We also reviewed TSA’s standard operating procedures  for addressing employee misconduct through various types of  investigations, including an administrative inquiry, which is a formal  investigation requested by a federal security director or designee, and  making adjudication decisions, including providing alleged offenders with  certain due process opportunities. We reviewed TSA’s Table of Offenses  and Penalties, which provides guidance for officials to follow in making  adjudication decisions, such as a list of potential offenses and  recommended, mitigated, and aggravated penalty ranges. We compared  TSA processes for investigations and adjudications with TSA policies and  procedures, as well as with internal control standards.
We used complaint data from DHS OIG’s Enforcement Data System as  the population from which to randomly select a nongeneralizable sample  of 50 TSA employee misconduct allegations referred from DHS OIG to  OOI in order to evaluate whether TSA had addressed the allegations.  We focused our analysis on fiscal year 2012 misconduct allegations that  DHS OIG referred to TSA for follow-up action. We requested that OOI  provide us with the status and outcome of each of the 50 allegations,  including whether TSA had a record of the allegations and had taken  action to investigate and adjudicate each one. While not generalizable to  all allegations referred from DHS OIG to OOI, the results of our review  provided insight about TSA’s procedures for ensuring that allegations are  addressed.
In addition, we interviewed senior officials from TSA, including the  Assistant Administrator for OPR, the Executive Advisor to the Assistant  Administrator for OOI, the Senior Advisor to the Assistant Administrator  for OSO, and the Director for ER to determine the extent to which TSA  has developed internal controls for addressing allegations of employee  misconduct. We also interviewed senior officials from our selected airport  locations and corresponding OOI and DHS OIG field offices to obtain their  views on TSA’s efforts to investigate and adjudicate employee  misconduct.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2012 to July 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Stephen M. Lord, (202) 512-4379 or LordS@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Jessica Lucas-Judy (Assistant  Director), Anthony C. Fernandez, Sally Gilley, Eric Hauswirth, Tom  Lombardi, Lara Miklozek, Lerone Reid, and Kelly Rubin made key  contributions to this report.