Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment, and Infrastructure Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and Plans
Published: 2009-02-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The United States is in the process of developing its strategy for operations in Afghanistan, as well as for the drawdown and continued operations of forces in Iraq. As of December 2008, approximately 32,500 U.S. troops were deployed in Afghanistan. Moreover, DOD may add an additional 30,000 troops in Afghanistan. Since 2001, the war in Afghanistan changed from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency effort. As of December 2008, U.S. troops in Iraq numbered approximately 148,500. DOD also had about 162,400 contractors in Iraq as of mid-2008. Today's testimony addresses (1) key observations regarding the development of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) factors that should be considered as the United States refines its strategy for Iraq and plans to draw down forces; and (3) factors that should be considered as the United States develops a strategy for Afghanistan and plans for increasing forces. This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies on Iraq and Afghanistan.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Lessons learned from GAO's past work indicate that U.S. strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan should reflect a governmentwide approach and contain a number of key elements, including clear roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms among government agencies, as well as specific goals, performance measures, and time frames that take into account available resources. Given the heavy commitment of U.S. forces to ongoing operations over the past several years, the availability of forces, equipment, and infrastructure will need to be closely examined in developing plans to reposture military forces. Finally, in light of future demands on the federal budget, attention will be needed to ensure that U.S. plans are developed and executed in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Clearly, strong oversight by the Congress and senior decision makers will be needed to minimize past problems such as contract mismanagement and insufficient attention to overseeing contractors. In refining its strategy and plans for the drawdown of forces in Iraq, senior leaders will need to consider several operational factors. For example, DOD will need to develop plans to efficiently and effectively relocate thousands of personnel and billions of dollars worth of equipment out of Iraq; close hundreds of facilities; and determine the role of contractors. Furthermore, the capacity of facilities in Kuwait and other neighboring countries may limit the speed at which equipment and materiel can be moved out of Iraq. With regard to Afghanistan, DOD will likely face an array of potential challenges related to people, equipment and infrastructure. For example, the availability and training of personnel will be critical considerations as the force is already significantly stressed from ongoing operations and current training capacity has been primarily focused on operations in Iraq. Additionally, the availability of equipment may be limited because the Army and Marine Corps have already deployed much of their equipment to Iraq and much of the prepositioned assets also have been withdrawn to support ongoing operations. Similarly, DOD will need to assess its requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities given its current allocation of these assets to support ongoing operations in Iraq. Further, the ability to transport personnel and equipment into Afghanistan will be challenged by the limited infrastructure and topography of Afghanistan. Moreover, the extent to which contractors will be used to support deployed U.S. forces must be considered as well as how oversight of these contractors will be ensured. Given all of these factors, sound planning based on a well-developed strategy is critical to ensure lessons learned over the years from Iraq are incorporated in Afghanistan and that competing resources are prioritized effectively between both operations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss issues for  consideration as the United States develops its strategy and plans for the  future with regard to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As conditions in  Iraq have improved, the war in Afghanistan has now entered its eighth year  with a deteriorating security situation. As such, the new administration is  in the process of reviewing and revising U.S. strategy. Also, the  Department of Defense (DOD) has begun planning for a reallocation of  forces, which includes beginning to draw down U.S forces in Iraq while  increasing the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. According to DOD,  these plans may include an increase of up to 30,000 troops in Afghanistan.  Since September 11, 2001, Congress has provided about $808 billion to  DOD for the Global War on Terrorism, which includes operations in  Afghanistan and Iraq.
Operation Iraqi Freedom began in March 2003, and since that time the  United States has maintained a sizeable presence in Iraq, rotating forces  into and out of the country in support of ongoing operations. After the U.S.  military surge of five additional brigades peaked in June 2007, those  additional brigades began withdrawing in September 2007. In his April  2008 Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, the Commander, Multi- National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), recommended that the drawdown of brigade  combat teams continue to pre-surge levels and that an assessment then be  performed to examine the conditions on the ground and, over time,  determine when he could make a recommendation for further reductions.  In the meantime, the November 2008 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)  between the United States and the Republic of Iraq that took effect  January 1, 2009, specifies in detail and with specific dates the  requirements for future drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq. As of July  2008, there were approximately 162,400 DOD contractors and, as of  December 1, 2008, approximately 148,500 U.S. troops in Iraq.
Since 2001, the character of the war in Afghanistan has evolved from a  violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a  multifaceted counterinsurgency effort. In the aftermath of the terrorist  attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched Operation  Enduring Freedom (OEF) in order to end the ability of the Taliban regime  to provide safe haven to al Qaeda and to put a stop to al Qaeda’s use of  Afghanistan territory as a base of operations for terrorist activities. After  the fall of the Taliban, the character of the war shifted to a  counterinsurgency effort. As of December 1, 2008, approximately 32,500  U.S. troops were deployed in Afghanistan–19,900 as part of OEF and  12,600 as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force  (ISAF). ISAF operates under United Nations (UN) Security Council  Resolution 1833 and is comprised of about 50,000 military personnel from  41 nations. ISAF forces concentrate on stability and reconstruction  operations, including command of Provincial Reconstruction Teams  (PRTs). ISAF forces do not have a mandate to perform any police training,  but both OEF and ISAF forces train and mentor the Afghan National Army.  OEF is a smaller multinational force that also pursues a more aggressive  counterterrorism role.
Afghanistan is a unique country with characteristics that will continue to  have distinct impacts on military operations there. For example, it is  slightly smaller than Texas but about a third larger than Iraq. Afghanistan  is a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with limited natural resources.  Its population, estimated at over 31 million, is ethnically and linguistically  diverse, with many regions populated by multiple ethnic groups speaking  over 30 languages. The population is largely rural and mostly uneducated.  Afghanistan is one of the world’s poorest countries and ranks near the  bottom of virtually every development indicator category. Afghanistan has  a poorly developed infrastructure with few roads and little household  access to electricity and running water. According to the Central  Intelligence Agency World Factbook, Afghanistan has only 4 airports with  runways over approximately 3,000 meters. By way of comparison, Iraq has  19 airports with runways over approximately 3,000 meters. Additionally,  while Iraq has about 38,000 kilometers of paved roads, Afghanistan has  only about 12,000 kilometers of paved roads.
As you requested, my testimony will focus on the U. S. government’s  efforts to develop a strategy for both Iraq and Afghanistan, and factors  DOD should consider as it develops and implements that strategy.  Specifically, I will address (1) key observations regarding the development  of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, (2) factors that should be  considered as the United States refines its strategy for Iraq and plans to  draw down forces, and (3) factors that should be considered as the United  States develops a strategy for Afghanistan and plans for increasing forces.
My statement is based on our extensive body of work examining Iraq and  Afghanistan issues. A list of selected GAO reports and testimonies is  provided at the end of this testimony. This work was conducted in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Establishing a Comprehensive U.S. Strategy Is an Essential First Step in Planning for Future Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
paragraphs: We have identified several key elements of an effective national strategy  that should be considered by the new administration in developing  national strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan to guide the way forward.
First, our work shows that new strategies for both countries should  reflect a comprehensive governmentwide approach and clearly  delineate U.S. government roles, responsibilities, and coordination  mechanisms.  Not only should the strategy identify the specific U.S.  federal departments, agencies, or offices involved, but also the  responsibilities of the private and international sectors, and specific  processes for coordination and collaboration among the entities. In  particular, our work in Iraq has shown problems in these areas. For  example, in July 2006, we reported that the National Strategy for  Victory in Iraq (NSVI) did not clearly identify the roles and  responsibilities of specific federal agencies for achieving the strategy’s  objectives, or how disputes among them will be resolved. Later, in  March 2008 we noted that U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the Iraqi  government have been hindered by multiple U.S. agencies pursuing  individual efforts without overarching direction. We further noted that  no single agency was in charge of leading U.S. development efforts, and  that the U.S. State Department, DOD, and the U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID) all led separate efforts with little  or no coordination.
As the United States considers increasing its presence in Afghanistan, it  will be even more important that roles and responsibilities of the  various U.S. agencies are clearly identified and their programs and  activities are coordinated. For example, DOD’s Commanders’  Emergency Response Program (CERP) and other funding have been  used to a great extent for building roads. At the same time, USAID has  also invested funds in constructing roads. In July 2008, we reported  that coordination between DOD and USAID on road projects was  problematic because information was not being shared among the  agencies. As DOD expands its CERP program, and other agencies  expand their respective programs, it will be important that their efforts  be coordinated as part of an overall development plan to identify  priorities and maximize resources.
Second, national strategies should include specific goals, objectives,  performance measures, and time frames for achieving the goals.  Regarding Iraq, one major issue that will need to be addressed is to  determine to what extent a drawdown of U. S. forces will be  determined based on the achievement of goals or conditions in light of  the specific time frames for withdrawal included in the November 2008  SOFA between Iraq and the United States that took effect in January  2009. Adopting a withdrawal timetable marks a major change from the  prior U.S. approach of withdrawing forces based on security, political,  economic, and diplomatic conditions in Iraq. The SOFA sets a two- phase timetable—but no conditions—for withdrawing U.S. combat  forces from Iraq by the end of 2011. The President recently called for  the implementation of a responsible drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. A  new U.S. strategy and campaign plan for Iraq will need to clarify how a  responsible withdrawal of U.S. forces will be carried out consistent  with the SOFA timeframe.
Furthermore, as the administration develops strategies for both  countries and plans to adjust force levels, it will need to closely  examine the availability of resources, given the heavy commitment of  U.S. forces to ongoing operations over the past several years. The high  pace of operations, particularly for ground forces personnel, and heavy  wear and tear on equipment have taken a toll on the overall readiness  of the U.S. military. These factors, coupled with the likelihood of  competing demands for certain capabilities to support the drawdown  of forces in one location and increase in forces in another, such as  strategic airlift, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets,  and support forces, will need to be considered in assessing the  feasibility of various strategy options.
Third, in light of future demands on the federal budget, attention will  be needed to ensure that U.S. efforts are executed in a manner that  maximizes the use of available resources and includes mechanisms for  oversight. From this perspective, it will be important that the U.S.  government make a concerted effort to avoid some of the problems  that occurred in Iraq which, in some cases, created numerous  opportunities for waste, fraud and mismanagement, particularly with  respect to the oversight and management of contractors. Another area  warranting attention is in DOD’s approach to developing requirements  for equipment and other critical items to support operations in both  Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, it will be important for DOD to carefully  screen and validate requirements and use cost-effective approaches to  acquiring items. Clearly, strong oversight on the part of the Congress  and senior decision makers within DOD will also be a critical element  to protecting the taxpayers’ interest and resources.
section_title: Operational Factors Should Be Considered in Developing Plans to Draw Down U.S. Forces in Iraq
paragraphs: It is unclear how the timeline in the SOFA and growing operations in  Afghanistan will affect DOD plans for redeploying U.S. forces and  equipment from Iraq. As of September 2008, DOD’s redeployment plans for  Iraq were based on three key assumptions that may no longer be  applicable in light of the SOFA and evolving U.S. strategy. These  assumptions were that    any redeployment will be based on MNF-I and Department of State  assessments of security and other conditions in Iraq; there will be sufficient lead time to refine redeployment plans once an  order with a specific timetable and force posture in Iraq is issued; and the redeployment of forces will be deliberate and gradual, predicated  on a 180-day process for units leaving Iraq and an estimated flow of no  more than 2.5 brigades’ worth of equipment and materiel out of Iraq  primarily through Kuwait each month.
Based on discussions with DOD officials and an analysis of planning  efforts, we found that the effectiveness and efficiency of DOD’s  redeployment efforts from Iraq will depend on the extent to which it  develops plans that address several issues such as the following:    Although the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has designated an  executive agent to coordinate the retrograde of materiel and equipment  from the Iraqi theater of operations, no unified structure exists to  coordinate the teams and units engaged in efforts to manage and  execute the return of materiel and equipment. This results in confusion  and a lack of clarity on the ways those teams should be utilized. Joint  doctrine states that an unambiguous chain of command and clear  responsibilities and authorities are necessary for any such effort. We  have recommended, therefore, that DOD take steps to clarify a unified  or coordinated chain of command over logistical operations to support  this effort. While DOD has taken some actions to clarify certain aspects  of the command and control structure, we believe additional steps are  still needed to improve the efficiency of the retrograde process.
Closing or handing over U.S. installations in Iraq will be time- consuming and costly. As of November 2008, there were 286 U.S.  installations in Iraq that will need to be closed or turned over to the  Iraqi forces during a U.S. redeployment, depending on its scope.  According to U.S. Army officials, experience has shown it takes 1 to 2  months to close the smallest platoon- or company-size installations,  which contain from 16 to 200 combat soldiers or marines. However,  MNF-I has never closed large, complex installations—such as Balad Air  Force Base, which contains about 24,000 inhabitants and has matured  over 5 years—making it difficult to accurately predict the time it will  take to close them. U.S. Army officials estimate it could take longer  than 18 months to close a base of that size.
Maintaining accountability for and managing the disposition of U.S.  government property under the control of contractors may present  challenges to redeploying U.S. forces from Iraq. According to Defense  Contract Management Agency officials, there is at least $3.5 billion  worth of contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq.  From late 2007 through July 2008, planning for the redeployment of  U.S. forces in Iraq did not include a theaterwide plan for contractors.
The pace at which units can be redeployed and equipment and materiel  returned to the United States from Iraq will be governed by the  capacity of facilities in neighboring countries as well as restrictions on  the use of those facilities. According to DOD officials, Kuwait is the  main point of exit for all personnel, equipment, and materiel in Iraq. At  present there are three U.S. bases and five Kuwait facilities that the  United States is using to support operations in Iraq, and the U.S.- Kuwait Defense Cooperation Agreement governs the use of these  facilities. According to DOD officials, any redeployment must take into  consideration the terms of this agreement, particularly given that in  their view, the government of Kuwait desires to limit the size of the  U.S. footprint in Kuwait.
The availability in theater of military-owned and operated heavy  equipment transports and convoy security assets, combined with limits  on the primary supply route, could inhibit the flow of materiel out of  Iraq. According to DOD officials, two types of heavy equipment  transports support U.S. forces in the Iraqi theater of operations:  commercially contracted unarmored transports and armored military  transports with military crews. Any increase in the number of civilian  transports without a corresponding increase in the number of military  transports, they maintain, increases the risk of accidents. However,  DOD officials have reported shortages of military transports in theater.
section_title: Several Operational Concerns Need to Be Considered as DOD Refines Its Strategy and Plans for Afghanistan
paragraphs: Based on our work examining current and past military operations, there  are several operational issues that must be considered as the United States  refines its strategy and plans for using military forces in Afghanistan. We  have identified several issues in the following five key areas that warrant  consideration by DOD planners as they develop strategies and plans for  these operations: availability of forces, training of personnel, availability of  equipment, transportation of equipment and personnel, and management  and oversight of contractors.
subsections: section_title: Availability of Forces
paragraphs: Given the range of likely forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD may  continue to face near-term challenges in providing personnel for  operations in both locations. For the past several years, demands on  DOD’s forces have been extremely high as the department has rotated  personnel in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan. As of December 1, 2008,  more than 180,000 service members were deployed in the two countries.  Demands have been particularly high within certain ranks and  occupational specialties. For example, officers and senior  noncommissioned officers are in high demand due to increased  requirements within deployed headquarters organizations, and  requirements for transition teams to train Iraqi and Afghan forces. These  teams do not exist in any of the services’ force structures, and the demand  for these leaders creates challenges because the leaders are generally  pulled from units or commands, which are then left to perform their  missions while undermanned. The ongoing operations have challenged  DOD’s ability to provide sufficient numbers of forces for certain  specialized capabilities including engineering, civil affairs, transportation,  and military police.
As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have continued, DOD has used a  number of different approaches to meet the ongoing requirements. For  example, it has adjusted the length and frequency of deployments and  reserve component mobilizations; moved personnel between units to  support deployments of units that were short of personnel; and used Navy  and Air Force personnel to fill some CENTCOM requirements that would  otherwise have exceeded the Army’s capability to supply personnel. While  these approaches have helped DOD fill its ongoing requirements, they  have also created a number of challenges. For example, many service  members have experienced deployment and mobilization rates in excess  of DOD’s stated goals. These goals generally call for active component  personnel to be deployed for 1 of every 3 years and reserve component  personnel involuntarily mobilized 1 of 6 years. In addition, the use of Navy  and Air Force personnel has presented challenges in meeting other service  mission requirements.
Faced with these challenges, DOD developed a global force management  process that among other things was designed to prioritize requirements,  identify the most appropriate forces to meet combatant command  requirements, and provide predictability. The portion of the global force  management process that is being used to fill stable, recurring world-wide  requirements provides predictability and the time necessary to consider a  full range of options for meeting the combatant commander requirements.  However, a significant portion of emerging requirements, including many  of the Afghanistan requirements, are being filled under a “request for  forces” process that involves shorter time lines. Within the shorter time  lines, DOD may not have a full range of options available to meet its  requirements. For example, reserve component forces may not be an  option to meet some immediate requirements because reserve forces train  part-time and thus require longer lead times to accomplish the same  amount of training and preparation when compared to full-time active  component forces. If emerging requirements for Afghanistan include many  of the high demand support skills that are resident in the reserve  components, including military police, engineers, and civil affairs units,  DOD is likely to continue to need to use its alternate approaches for filling  requirements—such as moving people between units, or using Navy and  Air Force personnel to fill traditional Army roles—rather than using longer  term options such as growing the force. These near-term challenges could  be exacerbated because many of these support forces may also be needed  to support the drawdown of forces in Iraq.
section_title: Adjustments in Training
paragraphs: To meet mission requirements in CENTCOM, the services, particularly the  ground forces, have focused their unit training on counterinsurgency tasks  rather than full-spectrum operations. For example, since 2004, all combat  training rotations conducted at the Army’s National Training Center have  been mission rehearsal exercises to prepare units for deployments,  primarily to Iraq and Afghanistan.
While DOD has invested heavily in training for particular mission sets  related to requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the majority of that effort  has been directed at preparing for missions in Iraq, which has had about  five times as many U.S. forces as Afghanistan. As the number of forces  decreases in Iraq and increases in Afghanistan, it will take time to adjust  DOD’s training capacity from one type of mission or theater to another.  For example, DOD has designed extensive training areas to mimic Iraqi  urban settings, has incorporated Arabic speakers (the language spoken in  much of Iraq) into training exercises, and focused on weapons and tactics  useful in densely populated areas, such as training for escorting large  armored convoys and using short-barreled weapons in high-density  population areas. In contrast, training in Afghanistan has to take into  consideration the more austere operating environment, myriad mix of  languages and cultures, and lack of major infrastructure, such as paved  roads. In addition, to support ongoing operations, the Army has done an  admirable job of enlisting personnel returning from deployment to train  next-deployers. While DOD has some training infrastructure and combat- tested veterans to support training for the Afghanistan mission, its training  base is not currently configured to support a large increase of forces  deploying to Afghanistan, and adjustments may need to be made to  provide the necessary capacity. Thus, it would be a risk to assume that  units that were preparing for deployments to Iraq could be easily rerouted  for deployments to Afghanistan with no changes in preparation, equipping,  or training.
section_title: Availability of Equipment
paragraphs: Our previous work has shown that as of May 2008, DOD had the equivalent  of 47 brigades’ worth of materiel and equipment in Iraq spread out over  some 311 installations of varying size. The majority of this materiel and  equipment, some 80 percent according to DOD officials, is theater- provided equipment which includes approximately 582,000 pieces of  equipment such as up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled  Vehicles, Mine Resistant Armored Program (MRAP) vehicles, and other  wheeled and tracked vehicles. Although much of this equipment has  remained in Iraq as units rotate in and out, significant amounts will be  brought back to the United States if and when there is a decrease in size of  U.S. forces in Iraq. Upon returning from operations, equipment is reset in  preparation for future operations. The services have also relied on  prepositioned equipment stored at land sites around the world as well as  ships afloat. As we have previously reported, the Army has withdrawn  prepositioned equipment at various stages throughout operations in Iraq  and Afghanistan and removed equipment from its prepositioned ships in  December 2006 to accelerate creation of two additional brigade combat  teams. The Army plans to reconstitute its prepositioned stocks by 2015;  the Marine Corps plans to reconstitute its prepositioned stocks by 2012.
The harsh operating environment and prolonged length of operations have  placed tremendous stress on deployed equipment. At the onset of  operations in Iraq in 2003, the Army and Marine Corps deployed with  equipment that in some cases was already more than 20 years old. The  services continue to operate equipment at a pace well in excess of  peacetime operations. In response to those challenges, the Army and  Marine Corps developed initiatives to retain large amounts of equipment in  theater and provide enhanced maintenance over and above the unit level  to sustain major equipment items such as High Mobility Multipurpose  Wheeled Vehicles and other tracked and wheeled vehicles. In-theater  maintenance consists of field-level maintenance in Iraq and some depot- level repair and upgrade capabilities at Camp Arifjan in Kuwait. There are  also limited maintenance facilities in Afghanistan. The Army and Marine  Corps have developed rotation plans that allow equipment to be sent back  to the United States for depot-level maintenance cycles which essentially  rebuilds equipment and extends its service life.
Equipment availability may pose challenges depending on equipment  requirements for operations in Afghanistan. Army and Marine Corps  officials stated that they are in the process of determining equipment  requirements for Afghanistan; however, final equipment needs will be  based on several factors such as the type of operations, force structure,  and capabilities needed. For example, Army and Marine Corps officials  recently stated that operations in Afghanistan may require lighter body  armor and lighter MRAP vehicles. In addition, geographic and  environmental factors also play a role in determining equipment  requirements for Afghanistan. For example, heavy brigade combat teams,  which include tanks, may not be well suited for the Afghanistan terrain. As  a result, the Army is currently developing a lighter version of the MRAP  vehicle better suited for the difficult terrain of Afghanistan. Also, given the  fact that, since 2006, there have been about 4,800 Army, Marine Corps, and  joint urgent needs requests processed to date for operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan, it is likely that the number of urgent needs requests will  increase in the future as DOD continues to build up its forces in  Afghanistan.
In addition to ground equipment, DOD will need to assess its requirements  for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to  support increased force levels in Afghanistan, given its current allocation  of assets to support ongoing operations in Iraq. Although DOD has  experienced a high level of mission success with ISR, our work has shown  that DOD continues to face challenges in maximizing the use of these  assets, including unmanned aerial systems. ISR assets have proven  especially useful in counter-insurgency operations and counter-terrorism,  enabling the identification of improvised explosive devices and the enemy  forces who planted them. In Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has employed  military ISR collection assets from each of the services, as well as national  ISR collection assets. As a result of operational successes, the demand for  and use of ISR assets continues to grow.
However, military commanders have also experienced numerous  challenges that should be considered as DOD considers its options for  adjusting force levels in Iraq to Afghanistan. During Operation Iraqi  Freedom, difficulties in airborne ISR assets’ abilities to provide strategic,  operational, and tactical users with timely, accurate, and actionable  intelligence were reported. In addition, our previous work has shown that  DOD has faced challenges in optimizing the use of these assets, including  unmanned aerial systems. For example, DOD continues to experience  problems related to interoperability, availability of communications  bandwidths, and airspace integration. Some unmanned aerial systems  components cannot easily exchange and transmit data with ground forces  because they were not designed to interoperable standards. In addition,  stove-piped ISR allocation and tasking systems do not allow consideration  of the capabilities of all available ISR assets in determining how best to  meet the warfighters’ needs. Commanders at the theater level do not have  information on how assets controlled by tactical units are being employed,  and tactical units do not have information on how theater-level assets or  assets controlled by other tactical units are being used. Furthermore, DOD  is still in the process of developing metrics to measure the performance of  these assets. As we have recommended, improving visibility of all available  ISR capabilities and establishing performance metrics would help DOD  identify needs, make decisions about priorities, and optimize the use of  available assets.
The Report of the Joint Defense Science Board Intelligence Science Board  Task Force on Integrating Sensor-Collected Intelligence stated in 2008 that  the number of images and signal intercepts being captured by ISR assets is  beyond the capacity of the current ISR infrastructure so there are backlogs  of data waiting for translators or image interpreters. The Task Force made  recommendations to improve integration of data from different types of  ISR assets and ensure that information is visible and widely available to  users. We are currently assessing DOD’s processes for analyzing, using,  and disseminating intelligence information and expect to report on these  issues this summer.
section_title: Factors Affecting Transportation
paragraphs: Transportation issues should be a key factor in developing a strategy for  Afghanistan and continue to be a challenge for commanders. Changes in  regional staging base options, stresses on the limited military and  commercial air fleets, and underdeveloped infrastructure in landlocked  Afghanistan are only a few of the challenges that could exacerbate already  difficult transportation into and around the country.
As noted by military officials, operations in landlocked Afghanistan  depend on difficult and uncertain overland supply routes from neighboring  countries. This makes airlift very important, but Afghanistan operations do  not have the benefit of a nearby Kuwait-like environment where staging  and reception occur. Kuwait affords the commanders in Iraq both air  facilities and a seaport capable of handling ships. To support air  operations, commanders in Afghanistan depend on access to bases such as  Manas, Kyrgyzstan, which is still a distance from Afghanistan. However,  this access may not continue and any strategy developed for operations in  Afghanistan may have to consider a regional approach. To this end, the  Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, has recently made efforts to  secure other options supporting movement into Afghanistan. Land routes,  such as the Khyber Pass, are also problematic. We have previously  reported the lack of a transloading operation for materiel shipped into  Afghanistan, similar to the one at the port of Kuwait for materiel going to  Iraq, is a limiting factor. Currently, items being shipped by sea to  Afghanistan enter through the port of Karachi, Pakistan, since Afghanistan  is landlocked. Officials told us that establishing a transloading operation in  Pakistan would be difficult.
U.S. strategy will have to consider the degree to which potentially  overlapping operations, the increase in U.S. forces in Afghanistan and  decrease of U.S. forces in Iraq, could stress U.S. strategic transportation  assets, both military and commercial. The U.S. military primarily depends  on commercial aircraft for strategic movement of military personnel (93  percent of DOD personnel during a crisis) and, to a lesser extent, for  movement of equipment in a crisis or contingency. Military-contracted  commercial aircraft currently do not enter either Iraq or Afghanistan, and  military personnel and contractors must transfer to U.S. military aircraft to  reach their final destinations. The Afghanistan situation differs from Iraq  in that military aircraft moving passengers into Afghanistan must travel  greater distances than those arriving in Iraq, and operations tempo and  aircraft utilization will reflect these increased demands. Also, U.S.  commercial aircraft do not deliver critical equipment into Afghanistan, and  essential systems, like MRAPs, arrive via contracted Russian aircraft.
Limited existing facilities currently complicate arrival and onward  movement of forces and equipment and, as we increase force levels, may  have strategy implications for the near future. Ramp space and fuel  availability have been improved since operations began, but infrastructure  is limited and may influence the rate that forces can be received and  moved forward. For example, the way fuel is obtained and distributed can  potentially limit operations. In Afghanistan, Bagram is the hub for fuel  distribution, and distribution within the country is difficult. In November  2008, the United States had over 100 forward deployed locations in  Afghanistan. Most fuel deliveries are made to forward operating bases  using commercial contractors, and we have found through our work that  fuel contractors strike often, delay delivery of fuel, or arrive at  destinations with fuel missing. Security issues include attacks and threats  on fuel convoys, and DOD officials have told us that in June 2008, 44  trucks and 220,000 gallons of fuel were lost in such events. It is unclear  how the increased number of troops will impact these issues.
section_title: Management and Oversight of Contractors
paragraphs: In Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD relies heavily on contractors to not only  provide traditional logistical support—such as base operations support  (e.g. food and housing) and the maintenance of weapons systems—but  also intelligence analysis and interpreters who accompany military patrols.  DOD officials have stated that without a significant increase in its civilian  and military workforce, the department is likely to continue to rely on  contractors in support of future deployments.
Our body of work has identified several long-standing and systemic  problems that continue to hinder DOD’s management and oversight of  contractors at deployed locations, which have led to negative financial and  operational impacts. Although we have made a number of  recommendations aimed at addressing these challenges, DOD has made  limited progress in implementing these recommendations. The key  problems we have identified include the following:    Lack of adequate numbers of contract oversight personnel:  Having the right people with the right skills to oversee contractor  performance is crucial to ensuring the efficient and effective use of  contractors. However, most of the contract oversight personnel we  have met with in conducting work at deployed locations have told us  DOD does not have adequate personnel at those locations. We have  found several cases in Iraq where too few contract oversight personnel  limited DOD’s ability to identify savings, monitor contractor  performance, or resolve contractor performance issues. While these  personnel shortfalls are a DOD-wide problem, the more demanding  contracting environment at deployed locations creates unique  difficulties for contract oversight personnel. Although the Army is  taking steps to increase its acquisition workforce, this will take several  years, and in the interim, the problems posed by personnel shortages in  Iraq and elsewhere are likely to become more significant in Afghanistan  as we increase the number of forces and the contractors who support  them there.
Failure to systemically collect and distribute lessons learned:  DOD has made few efforts to leverage its institutional knowledge and  experiences using contractors to support deployed forces, despite  years of experience using contractors to support deployed forces in the  Balkans, Southwest Asia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. As a result, many of  the management and oversight problems we identified in earlier  operations have recurred in current operations. For example, we found  that a guidebook developed by U.S. Army, Europe on the use of a  logistical support contract in the Balkans was not made available to  military commanders in Iraq until 2006, limiting their ability to build on  efficiencies the Army had previously identified. We have also found a  failure to share best practices and lessons learned between units as one  redeploys and the other deploys to replace it. Given these challenges,  we have concerns that lessons learned from the experience of using  contractors to support forces deployed in Iraq may not be shared with  forces deploying to Afghanistan and many of the contractor-related  issues in Iraq may therefore recur in Afghanistan.
Inadequate training of military commanders and contract  oversight personnel: We have issued multiple reports regarding the  need for better pre-deployment training of military commanders and  contract oversight personnel on the use of contractor support at  deployed locations. Limited or no pre-deployment training on the use  of contractor support can hinder the ability of military commanders to  adequately plan for the use of contractors and cause confusion. Several  commanders of combat units that deployed to Iraq told us that limited  or no pre-deployment training on services contractors would limit their  ability to integrate the need to provide on-base escorts for third  country and host country nationals, convoy security, and other force  protection support to contractors into their planning efforts. As a  result, the commanders were surprised by the substantial portion of  their personnel they had to allocate to fulfill these missions —  personnel they had expected to be available to perform other  functions. Lack of training also hinders the ability of contract oversight  personnel, such as contracting officer’s representatives, to effectively  manage and oversee contractors, creating a variety of problems  including concerns about the quality of services being provided and  difficulties reviewing contractor performance. Although DOD has taken  steps to improve the contractor-related training of military  commanders and contract oversight personnel, it is likely that training- related problems will continue to affect the management and oversight  of contractors in Afghanistan.
Background screening of host nation and third country  contractor personnel: While contractor employees can provide  significant benefits to U.S. forces, they can also pose a security risk to  U.S. troops, particularly when U.S. forces are involved in a military  operation against an insurgency, as they are in Iraq. DOD and  contractors, however, have difficulty conducting background  screenings of host nation and third country national contractor  employees because of a lack of reliable information. Recognizing the  limitations of data, military officials responsible for security at  installations in Iraq and elsewhere told us that they take steps such as  searching contractors and escorting contractors on base to mitigate the  risks contractors, particularly non-U.S. contractors, pose. U.S. forces in  Afghanistan currently work with a number of host nation and third  country contractor employees. The number of these employees will  likely go up as the U.S. presence in Afghanistan increases, further  exacerbating challenges related to background screening.
In addition to these long-standing challenges, the unique aspects of  Afghanistan along with ongoing efforts regarding the drawdown of forces  in Iraq may present additional challenges regarding the use of contractors  to support forces deployed to Afghanistan.
Different language needs: DOD relies on contractors to provide  linguist services in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the U.S. presence increases  in Afghanistan, so too will demand for contractor personnel able to  speak the languages in Afghanistan. The pool of Arabic linguists will  not be useful in supporting this requirement, and the department may  find it difficult to rapidly acquire sufficient numbers of qualified  individuals to support the mission in Afghanistan.
Transportation and security concerns: Operation Iraqi Freedom  required the movement of large numbers of personnel and equipment  over long distances into a hostile environment involving harsh desert  conditions. The collective effort of military, civilian, and contractor  personnel in Iraq since then has been complicated by the country’s lack  of a permissive security environment. Afghanistan presents its own  unique transportation and security concerns that will need to be  factored into how contractors will be able to support the increased  number of U.S. forces and, potentially, bases in Afghanistan.
Drawdown will increase demands on contractors and contract  oversight personnel in Iraq: As noted above, the United States is  planning for the drawdown of its forces in Iraq. However, our previous  work has shown that there is not a one-for-one correlation between the  number of troops withdrawn from a contingency and the number of  contractors withdrawn. For example in 2003, we noted that when troop  levels decreased in the Balkans, contract support increased as  additional contractors were needed to continue the missions previously  done by service members. There may also be an increase in the  overall use of contractors to support the drawdown effort itself. For  example it is likely that DOD will need to increase its equipment reset  capabilities in theater by adding contractors. These increased  requirements will also increase the demands on contract oversight  personnel to manage and oversee these contractors. Contract oversight  personnel will also face increased requirements due to the need to  close out contracts supporting forces in Iraq. As a result, these  individuals may not be available to manage and oversee contractors in  Afghanistan.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: As I have stated today and as we have previously recommended, in  developing a comprehensive strategy for both Iraq and Afghanistan several  basic principles apply; that is, both strategies should include clear and  actionable near- and long-tem goals and objectives, as well as roles,  responsibilities, resources to ensure success, and some means to measure  progress. In addition, as DOD considers the diverse but related operational  factors such as force availability, training, equipment, transportation,  contracting, and related infrastructure and regional issues, these  principles can be applied to both the drawdown in Iraq and the buildup in  Afghanistan. As the United States develops a strategy for Iraq and  Afghanistan, and related plans for adjusting force levels, we believe that  increased awareness of significant challenges may improve their ability to  successfully develop and execute a strategy.
In addition, transparency of these strategies and operational factors will  also assist congressional decision makers with their oversight  responsibilities, especially as Congress considers programmatic issues and  funding requests.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond  to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have at this  time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact   Janet St. Laurent, Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and  Management or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this  testimony include Ann Borseth, Bruce Brown, Carole Coffey, Grace  Coleman, Michael Ferren, Jeremy Hawk, Larry Junek, Hynek Kalkus, Guy  Lofaro, Gregory Marchand, Judith McCloskey, Margaret Morgan, Marcus  Oliver, Sharon L. Pickup, James A. Reynolds, Donna Rogers, Cary Russell,  Matthew Sakrekoff, David Schmitt, Marc Schwartz, William. M. Solis,  Maria Storts, Matthew Tabbert, and Stephen Woods.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve  Management and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter  Needs. GAO-09-175. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2008.
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for  Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq. GAO-08-930. Washington, D.C.:  September 10, 2008.
Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but  Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance  Program Are Needed. GAO-08-689. Washington D.C.: July 8, 2008.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some  Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed. GAO-08-837. Washington D.C.:  June 23, 2008  Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to  Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable  Afghan National Security Forces. GAO-08-661. Washington D.C.: June 18,  2008.
Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the Training  and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands. GAO-08-670.  Washington, D.C.; May 30, 2008.
Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate  Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments, GAO-08-568T.  Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.
Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions Needed  to Rebuild Readiness of U.S. Ground Forces. GAO-08-497T. Washington,  D.C.; February 14, 2008.
Defense Logistics: Army Has Not Fully Planned or Budgeted for the  Reconstitution of Its Afloat Prepositioned Stocks. GAO-08-257R.  Washington, D.C.; February 8, 2008.
Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps Cannot Be Assured That  Equipment Reset Strategies Will Sustain Equipment Availability While  Meeting Ongoing Operational Requirements. GAO-07-814. Washington,  D.C.: September 19, 2007.
Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army’s  Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address Implementation  Challenges. GAO-07-936. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2007.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and Increased  Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities. GAO-07-836. Washington,  D.C.: July 11, 2007  Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for  Congressional Oversight. GAO-07-801SP. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007.
Defense Logistics: Improved Oversight and Increased Coordination  Needed to Ensure Viability of the Army’s Prepositioning Strategy.  GAO-07-144. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2007.
Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Army’s  Implementation of Its Equipment Reset Strategies. GAO-07-439T.  Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2007.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic  Equipment Requirements and Readiness. GAO-07-60. Washington, D.C.:  January 26, 2007.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for  Congressional Oversight. GAO-07-308SP. Washington, D.C.: January 9,  2007.
Defense Transportation: Study Limitations Raise Questions about the  Adequacy and Completeness of the Mobility Capabilities Study and  Report. GAO-06-938. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2006.
Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force  Identification Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements for  High-Demand Support Forces. GAO-06-962. Washington, D.C.: September  5, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help  Achieve U.S. Goals. GAO-06-788. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006  Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on Equipment Reset  Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps. GAO-06-604T.  Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Defense Logistics: Better Management and Oversight of Prepositioning  Programs Needed to Reduce Risk and Improve Future Programs.  GAO-05-427. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Defense Logistics: DOD Has Begun to Improve Supply Distribution  Operations, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain These Efforts.  GAO-05-775. Washington, D.C.: August 11, 2005.
Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical  Items during Current and Future Operations. GAO-05-275. Washington,  D.C.: April 8, 2005.
Military Personnel: A Strategic Approach Is Needed to Address Long- Term Guard and Reserve Force Availability. GAO-05-285T. Washington,  D.C.: February 2, 2005.
Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force  Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues.  GAO-04-1031. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2004.
Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of  Logistics Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom. GAO-04-305R.  Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2003.
Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed  Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD’s Plans. GAO-03-695.  Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003.