Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Achieve Greater Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Published: 2009-07-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: From 2008 through 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest over $16 billion to develop and procure additional unmanned aircraft systems. To more effectively leverage its acquisition resources, DOD recognizes that it must achieve greater commonality among the military services' unmanned aircraft programs. Doing so, however, requires certain trade-offs and complex budget, cost, and schedule interactions. GAO was asked to assess the progress of selected unmanned aircraft acquisition programs, examine the extent to which the services are collaborating and identifying commonality among those programs, and identify key factors impacting the effectiveness their collaboration. GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and performance data for eight unmanned aircraft systems--accounting for over 80 percent of DOD's total planned investment in unmanned aircraft systems from 2008 through 2013--and two payload programs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While proving successful on the battlefield, DOD's unmanned aircraft acquisitions continue to incur cost and schedule growth. The cumulative development costs for the 10 programs GAO reviewed increased by over $3.3 billion (37 percent in 2009 dollars) from initial estimates--with nearly $2.7 billion attributed to the Air Force's Global Hawk program. While 3 of the 10 programs had little or no development cost growth and 1 had a cost reduction, 6 programs experienced significant growth ranging from 60 percent to 264 percent. These outcomes are largely the result of changes in program requirements and system designs. Procurement funding requirements have also increased for most programs, primarily because of increases in the number of aircraft being procured, changes in system requirements, and upgrades and retrofits to equip fielded systems with capabilities that had been deferred. Overall, procurement unit costs increased by 12 percent, with unit cost increases of 25 percent or more for 3 aircraft programs. Finally, several programs have experienced significant delays in achieving initial operating capability, ranging from 1 to nearly 4 years. Several of the tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs GAO reviewed have identified areas of commonality to leverage resources and gain efficiencies. For example, the Marine Corps chose to procure the Army's Shadow system after it determined Shadow could meet its requirements, and was able to avoid the cost of initial system development and quickly deliver capability to the warfighter. Also, the Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance system will use a modified Global Hawk airframe. However, other programs have missed opportunities to achieve commonality and efficiencies. The Army's Sky Warrior--which is a variant of the Air Force's Predator, is being developed by the same contractor, and will provide similar capabilities--was initiated as a separate development program in 2005. Sky Warrior development is now estimated to cost nearly $570 million. DOD officials continue to press for more commonality in the two programs, but the aircraft still have little in common. Although several unmanned aircraft programs have achieved airframe commonality, service-driven acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration are key factors that have inhibited commonality among subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations. For example, the Army chose to develop a new sensor payload for its Sky Warrior, despite the fact that the sensor currently used on the Air Force's Predator is comparable and manufactured by the same contractor. To support their respective requirements, the services also make resource allocation decisions independently. DOD officials have not quantified the potential costs or benefits of pursuing various alternatives, including common systems. To maximize acquisition resources and meet increased demand, Congress and DOD have increasingly pushed for more commonality among unmanned aircraft systems.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: From 2002 through 2008, the number of unmanned aircraft in the  Department of Defense’s (DOD) inventory increased from 167 to more  than 6,000 in an effort to meet growing warfighter demand for these  capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD has noted that meeting this  demand has been difficult because of the highly dynamic nature of  supporting ongoing combat operations while developing new and  emerging capabilities. The department plans to invest more than   $16 billion from 2008 through 2013 to develop and procure additional  unmanned aircraft systems. However, the growing number of national  priorities competing for federal dollars will continue to challenge DOD’s  efforts to meet escalating demands for unmanned systems.
DOD recognizes that to more effectively leverage its acquisition resources,  it must achieve greater commonality and efficiency among the military  services’ various unmanned system acquisition programs. Achieving  commonality, however, can be difficult. We have reported in the past that  programs that involve more than one service require complex budget,  cost, and schedule interactions and are likely to require the services to  make more trade-offs than a single service development would. We have  also found that joint development efforts have often been hampered by an  inability to obtain and sustain commitments and support from the military  services and other stakeholders. However, given your interest in how  DOD is establishing requirements for new intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance capabilities—including unmanned aircraft systems—and  considering opportunities to leverage existing capabilities or achieve  commonality, you asked us to assess DOD’s tactical and theater-level  unmanned aircraft acquisition programs. Specifically, we (1) assessed the  cost, schedule, and performance progress of selected tactical and theater- level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs; (2) examined the extent to  which the military services are collaborating and identifying commonality  among those programs; and (3) identified the key factors influencing the  effectiveness of their collaboration.
To conduct our work, we collected and analyzed cost, schedule, and  performance data for 10 acquisition programs: eight unmanned aircraft  systems—Global Hawk, Reaper, Shadow, Predator, Sky Warrior, Fire  Scout, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), and Unmanned Combat  Aircraft System Demonstration (UCAS-D)—and two payload development  programs—Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP- RTIP) and Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP). Collectively, the  eight aircraft programs account for more than 80 percent of DOD’s total  planned investment in unmanned aircraft systems from fiscal year 2008  through fiscal year 2013. To determine the extent to which the military  services are collaborating and identifying commonality and the factors  affecting that collaboration, we reviewed and analyzed key program  documents and prior GAO work and conducted numerous interviews with  and received briefings from relevant DOD and contractor officials. For  additional details on how we performed our review, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to July 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities  provided by unmanned aircraft systems have proven to be a key asset in  accomplishing combat missions in the Middle East. DOD is planning to  expand unmanned aircraft capabilities to include persistent ground attack,  electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defenses, cargo airlift, and  other missions. Unmanned aircraft systems generally consist of   (1) multiple aircraft, which can be expendable or recoverable and can  carry lethal or nonlethal payloads; (2) a flight control station;   (3) information and retrieval or processing stations; and (4) in some cases,  wheeled land vehicles that carry launch and recovery platforms.  Unmanned aircraft fall into one of three classes: small, tactical, and  theater (see table 1). From 2002 through 2008, the total number of  unmanned aircraft in DOD’s inventory increased from 167 to over 6,000.  Most of the increase has been in small aircraft, with the more complex and  expensive tactical and theater-level aircraft increasing from 127 to 521.
Four major systems—Global Hawk, Predator, Reaper, and Shadow—have  been deployed and used successfully in combat. Given this success,  warfighters have demanded more systems and in many cases enhanced  capabilities. However, we recently reported that some unmanned aircraft  were not designed to meet joint service requirements or interoperability  communications standards and, as a result, cannot easily exchange data,  even within the same military service. Additionally, certain  electromagnetic spectrum frequencies that are required for wireless  communications are congested because a large number of unmanned  aircraft and other weapons or communications systems use them  simultaneously. Furthermore, DOD has been unable to fully optimize the  use of its unmanned aircraft in combat operations because it lacks an  approach to allocating and tasking them that considers the availability of  all assets in determining how best to meet warfighter needs.
To manage the increased demand for unmanned aircraft systems and  encourage collaboration among the military services, the department has  created the Office of Unmanned Warfare, the Unmanned Aircraft Systems  Task Force, and other entities. In addition, DOD has published the  Unmanned Systems Roadmap (Roadmap) that provides a framework for  the future development of unmanned systems and related technologies.  The Roadmap states that there is the potential for an unprecedented level  of collaboration to meet capability needs and reduce acquisition costs by  requiring greater commonality among the military services’ unmanned  systems. We have reported that taking an open systems approach and  designing systems with common subsystems and components can reduce  both production and life cycle costs as well as improve interoperability  among systems. For maximum benefit, commonality should be  incorporated into the design of a system when requirements are being  established. Unmanned aircraft systems can potentially achieve  commonality in design and development, ranging from a complete system  to a subsystem or component, as well as commonality in production  facilities, tooling, and personnel.
section_title: Unmanned Aircraft Acquisitions Have Experienced Cost Growth, Schedule Delays, and Performance Problems
paragraphs: Despite the proven success of unmanned aircraft on the battlefield and the  growing demand for them, these acquisitions continue to incur cost and  schedule growth (see fig. 1). The cumulative development cost for the 10  programs we reviewed increased by over $3 billion, or 37 percent, from  initial estimates. While 3 of the 10 programs had little or no development  cost growth and 1 had a cost reduction, 6 experienced substantial growth  ranging from 60 percent to 264 percent. In large part, this cost growth was  the result of changes in program requirements and system designs after  initiating development. Total procurement funding requirements have  grown in the past because of increased quantities; however, many of the  programs have also experienced growth in procurement unit costs.  Finally, a number of these programs have experienced problems in testing  and in performance that required additional development that contributed  to cost growth and schedule delays (see app. II for more detailed  information about each program).
In most cases, development cost growth was the result of beginning  system development with unclear or poorly defined requirements,  immature technologies, and unstable designs—problems we have  frequently found in other major acquisition programs. The Global Hawk  program is a good example. In 2001, the Air Force began the Global Hawk  program based on knowledge gained from a demonstration program and  planned to incrementally integrate more advanced technologies over time.  However, within a year, the Air Force fundamentally restructured and  accelerated the program to pursue a larger and unproven airframe with  multimission capability relying on immature technologies. The final design  of the new airframe required more substantial changes than expected.  Ultimately, frequent and substantive engineering changes drove  development costs up nearly threefold. While BAMS has reported no cost  growth, the program is just 1 year into its 7-year development, and the  Navy plans to spend over $3 billion in development to modify the  airframe—which is the existing Global Hawk airframe—and integrate  payloads and other key equipment, modify ground stations, and purchase  two developmental and three low rate production aircraft. BAMS program  officials told us that they anticipate that the bulk of the development cost  will result from modifying the size and shape of the existing radar payload  to fit the Global Hawk airframe. Historically, similar weapons  development efforts have had difficulty managing risk. Estimated  development costs for MP-RTIP decreased 23 percent in large part  because of a significant reduction in requirements caused by the  termination of another aircraft program for which the radar was being  developed.
Procurement costs also increased for six of the seven systems that  reported procurement cost data, a large portion of which is due to the  planned procurement of additional aircraft (see table 2). For example, the  Air Force planed to procure an additional 272 Predators, and the Army  planed to procure an additional 84 Sky Warriors. As a result, unit costs for  the Predator and Sky Warrior decreased by 41 percent and 9 percent,  respectively. However, Reaper and Shadow had unit cost growth despite  increased quantities. Reaper’s unit costs increased in part because  requirements for missiles and a digital electronic engine control were  added—which resulted in design changes and increased production costs.  Unit cost increases in the Shadow program were largely the result of  upgrades to the airframe that were needed to accommodate the size,  weight, and power requirements for integrating a congressionally  mandated data link onto the aircraft. The Army is also retrofitting fielded  systems with capabilities that it had initially deferred, such as a heavy fuel  engine. The procurement unit cost for Global Hawk increased the most, in  large part because the Air Force not only increased the program’s  requirements but also reduced the number of aircraft it intended to  purchase.
Four programs have also experienced delays in achieving initial  operational capability by 1 to almost 4 years (see table 3). In some cases,  program delays have been the result of expediting limited capability to the  warfighter. For example, the production decision for the Sky Warrior was  delayed by 2 years, and the Army now expects to deliver initial operational  capability to the warfighter almost 4 years later than originally planned.  Similarly, initial operational testing to prove the larger Global Hawk  airframe works as intended has been delayed by nearly 3 years. Delays for  these two programs and BAMS and Fire Scout average more than 27  months—6 months longer than the average delays we found in our recent  assessment of other major weapons acquisitions. In contrast, the Reaper  program expects to achieve initial operational capability 4 months earlier  than originally planned—in large part because the Air Force expedited  aircraft production to meet wartime demands.
While Global Hawk, Predator, Reaper, and Shadow have been deployed  with notable successes in theater—as well as identified lessons learned— rushing to field these capabilities resulted in a number of performance  shortfalls and in some cases ultimately delayed meeting requirements. For  example, Predator—the oldest program in our sample—directly  transitioned from a successful technology demonstration program into  production, skipping the development process entirely. Because little  emphasis was placed on testing, performance requirements, and  producibility, Predator experienced numerous problems when it was  initially produced and deployed, such as unreliable communications and  poor targeting accuracy.
Given the importance of supporting combat operations, Global Hawk  demonstrators and early production aircraft were also quickly placed into  operational service. Program officials noted that as a result, the availability  of test resources and time for testing were limited, which delayed the  operational assessment of the original aircraft model by 3 years. Similarly,  in February 2009, the Air Force reported that initial operational testing for  the larger more capable Global Hawk aircraft and the program’s  production readiness review had schedule breaches. Air Force officials  cite the high level of concurrency between development, production, and  testing; poor contractor performance; developmental and technical  problems; system failures; and bad weather as key reasons for the most  recent schedule breach. In a recent letter to the Global Hawk contractor,  the Air Force’s Chief Acquisition Executive noted that unless the  program’s problems are resolved quickly, the Air Force may have to  consider deferring authorization of future production lots, terminating  future modernization efforts, and canceling development and production  of the aircraft that are planned to carry the MP-RTIP radar. According to  program officials, they are currently in the process of developing a plan to  address the schedule breaches.
section_title: Efforts to Achieve Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft Programs Have Had Mixed Success
paragraphs: Consistent with DOD’s framework for acquiring unmanned systems,  several of the tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition  programs we reviewed have identified areas of commonality to leverage  resources and gain efficiencies. However, others share little in common  and have missed opportunities to achieve commonality and efficiencies.  Even those programs that have achieved some commonality may have  additional opportunities to leverage resources. Table 4 compares the  levels of commonality for three of our case examples.
subsections: section_title: The Army and Marine Corps Have Achieved Full Commonality in the Shadow Program
paragraphs: In assessing options for replacing an aging tactical unmanned aircraft  system, the Marine Corps determined that the Army’s Shadow system  could meet its requirements for reconnaissance, surveillance, and target  acquisition capabilities without any service-unique modifications. An  official from DOD’s Office of Unmanned Warfare emphasized that the  Marine Corps believed that Shadow represented a “100 percent” solution.  The Marine Corps also found that it could use the Army’s ground control  station to pilot the Shadow aircraft as well as other Marine Corps  unmanned aircraft. A memorandum of agreement was established in July  2007 to articulate how the Marine Corps and the Army would coordinate  to acquire Shadow systems. The agreement details the management  structure, lines of accountability, and funding arrangements between the  two services, and establishes that the Marine Corps will procure systems  directly off the Army contract. While formal decisions to pursue common  systems were made at the service executive level, Army officials told us  that collaboration initiated at the program office level was the primary  driver in achieving commonality.
By forgoing any service-unique modifications in order to achieve a high  level of commonality, the Marine Corps was able to avoid the costs of  developing the Shadow. Those costs were borne by the Army and totaled  over $180 million. The Marine Corps plans to spend almost $9 million from  fiscal years 2009 through 2015 to support development of additional  capabilities for the Shadow, to include a backup takeoff mechanism for  the automatic takeoff and landing system. Additionally, the Marine Corps  and Army are likely to realize some benefits in supporting and maintaining  the systems because the components are interchangeable. According to an  official at the Navy, the Marine Corps has been able to realize savings or  cost avoidance in other areas such as administration, contracting, and  testing, although quantitative data on these savings were not available. The  Army’s Shadow program office agreed that commonality has allowed the  two services to realize economies of scale while meeting each service’s  needs.
Maintaining a high level of commonality in the Shadow program will  require continued commitment from the services and careful management.  Specifically, as the Army and Marine Corps explore ways to add additional  capabilities to Shadow, the services will need to continue to collaborate to  maximize efficiencies. For example, in order to maintain commonality  with the Army, the Marine Corps is spending money to add capabilities  that meet Shadow requirements established by the Army. Likewise, the  Army is interested in adopting capabilities that the Marine Corps  developed for Shadow. Army officials told us that the Marine Corps is  exploring ways to retrofit the Shadow so that it can carry a weapons  payload. They stated that although the Army does not have a requirement  for a weapons payload and has no plans to spend money on its  development, the Army would be interested in acquiring this capability.
section_title: BAMS and Global Hawk Have Achieved Some Commonality, but Greater Efficiencies Are Possible
paragraphs: The Navy BAMS and Air Force Global Hawk programs have achieved  some commonality between their unmanned aircraft systems— specifically, the airframes for the two systems are common. However, the  payload and subsystem requirements differ; and while some BAMS ground  station requirements are common with those of the Global Hawk, the  BAMS contractor noted that the Navy also has some unique requirements.  To meet its requirement for persistent maritime intelligence, surveillance,  and reconnaissance capability, the Navy awarded the development  contract to the Global Hawk contractor, which had proposed a variant of  the Global Hawk airframe. Given the commonality between the two  airframes, the Navy expects to avoid some development costs and gain  efficiencies in production. Since the development contract award, the  Navy and Air Force have worked together to identify commonalities to  gain additional efficiencies where possible. According to a Navy official,  one of the goals of this partnership is for the BAMS program to benefit  from lessons learned by the Global Hawk program and thereby avoid the  types of problems Global Hawk experienced during development.  Officials from the Defense Contract Management Agency emphasized the  importance of using these lessons.
The BAMS payload and subsystem requirements differ from those of  Global Hawk. However, the Navy has identified opportunities to achieve  commonality with other aircraft programs rather than developing a  service-unique solution. For example, the Navy plans to equip BAMS with  the same electro-optical and infrared sensor used on the Air Force’s  Reaper unmanned aircraft. In addition, the Navy plans to equip BAMS with  a maritime search radar based on radars used on the Air Force’s F-16 and  F-22 aircraft. BAMS will also rely on communications equipment that has  been fielded on multiple weapon systems. Furthermore, BAMS will use an  open systems approach in developing its payloads. A BAMS program  official told us that the Navy expects to gain efficiencies in development,  operations, training, and manpower.
Even with these areas of commonality, the Navy anticipates spending  more than $3 billion on development, a substantial portion of which will  be used to modify the airframe and ground stations and to integrate  payloads, including the radar, to meet Navy-specific needs. According to a  program official, the radar technology is mature because it has proven to  be functional on fighter aircraft. However, the radar will require  modifications to both size and shape before it can be integrated onto the  airframe; these modifications are expected to constitute a large portion of  the BAMS development cost. Although OSD certified that all BAMS critical  technologies were mature at the start of development, OSD officials  recently told us that they have some concerns about the radar’s level of  maturity. The Navy also plans to upgrade existing Global Hawk ground  stations, in large part to allow analysts to view and assess information  more quickly. This ground station upgrade will require both hardware and  software development.
Greater efficiencies may also be possible in production. While production  of the first two BAMS aircraft will occur at the same California facility  where Global Hawk is currently produced, the remaining BAMS aircraft  are expected to be produced at another facility in Florida. We believe that  this approach has the potential to create duplication in production by  having two facilities staffed and equipped to conduct essentially the same  work. However, contractor officials point out that while the California  facility has the capacity to accommodate BAMS production, having two  separate facilities would minimize the impact of potential work surges.  They also note that using the California facility for initial BAMS  production will give them time to gain knowledge that could help get the  Florida facility up and running. Yet neither contractor nor Navy officials  provided an analysis to justify using the Florida facility. According to an  official with the BAMS program office, the Navy considers this a  contractor business decision, and according to contractor officials, the  official analysis will not be done for several years. In the meantime, it is  unclear whether the benefits of a second production facility outweigh the  costs—such as additional tooling and personnel.
section_title: The Army and Air Force Have Missed Opportunities to Achieve Commonality and Efficiencies between Sky Warrior and Predator
paragraphs: OSD’s efforts to consolidate and achieve greater commonality between the  Army Sky Warrior and the Air Force Predator have generally not been  successful. In 2001 the Army began defining requirements for a  replacement to the aging Hunter unmanned aircraft system. According to  the Army, the limited number of unmanned aircraft in DOD’s inventory  and its lack of direct control over these assets drove its decision to pursue  the development of Sky Warrior. The aircraft was originally intended to  satisfy the Army’s requirement for wide-area, near real-time  reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition capability. However,  both the Air Force and the Joint Staff responsible for reviewing Sky  Warrior’s requirements and acquisition documentation raised concerns  about duplicating existing capability—specifically, capability provided by  Predator. Nevertheless, the program received approval to forgo an analysis  of alternatives that could have determined if existing capabilities would  meet its requirements. The Army noted that such an analysis was not  needed and not worth the cost and effort. Instead, it conducted a source  selection competition and began the Sky Warrior development program,  citing battlefield commanders’ urgent need for this capability.
In 2005, the Army awarded the Sky Warrior development contract to the  same contractor working with the Air Force to develop and produce  Predators and Reapers. As a variant of Predator, Sky Warrior is now being  assembled in the same facility. In 2006, the Army and Air Force signed a  memorandum of understanding to work together to identify  complementary requirements for the Sky Warrior and Predator programs.  Despite this memorandum, limited progress was made, and in 2007, the  Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the two services to combine their  respective programs into a single acquisition program. The services  subsequently signed a formal memorandum of agreement. However, the  services have maintained separate program offices and funding for their  respective programs and the two aircraft still have little in common. Sky  Warrior is larger, longer, and heavier; has a wider wing span; and has  significantly more payload capacity than Predator.  The Air Force is also  acquiring the Reaper—formerly Predator B—which is even larger and  more capable than both the Sky Warrior and Predator. However, all three  systems have similar missions to seek, target, and attack enemy forces.
Although the ground control station the Army is developing for Sky  Warrior is expected to be used to control other Army unmanned aircraft, it  will not be common with the Predator and Reaper ground control station  used by the Air Force. According to Army officials, however, they are  currently using legacy ground control stations that are essentially the same  as the Air Force’s. The Army officials further noted that the Sky Warrior  systems that the Army plans to deploy this summer will each be deployed  with both an Army-unique ground control station and a legacy ground  control station, to provide backup takeoff and landing capability in case  the automatic takeoff and landing technology on Sky Warrior encounters  problems.
The Army and Air Force are pursuing service-specific payloads and  subsystems for these aircraft. For example, the services are pursuing  separate solutions to meet similar requirements for a signals intelligence  capability. Specifically, the Army is developing a unique signals  intelligence payload for Sky Warrior, while the Air Force is developing the  Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload for Predator, Reaper, and Global  Hawk. Further, the Army is developing its own electro-optical and   infrared sensor for Sky Warrior—and potentially other Army aviation  platforms—and awarded an $11 million sensor development contract to  the same contractor producing the Predator’s electro-optical and infrared  sensor.
section_title: Service-Driven Acquisition Processes and Ineffective Collaboration Have Reduced Opportunities for Commonality
paragraphs: While several of the unmanned aircraft programs we examined have  achieved commonality at the airframe level, factors such as service-driven  acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration have resulted in  service-unique subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations. Despite  DOD’s efforts to emphasize a more joint approach to identifying and  prioritizing warfighting needs and to encourage commonality among the  programs, the services continue to drive requirements and make  independent resource allocation decisions on their respective platforms.  DOD officials have not quantified the potential costs or benefits of  pursuing various alternatives, including systems with commonalities. With  some notable exceptions, the services have been reluctant to collaborate  and efforts to do so have produced mixed results. However, to maximize  acquisition resources and meet increased demand, Congress and DOD  have increasingly pushed for more commonality among unmanned aircraft  systems.
subsections: section_title: Officials Cite the Need for Service-Unique Requirements
paragraphs: In 2003, DOD implemented a new requirements generation system  intended to identify warfighter needs from a joint, departmentwide  perspective—not from an individual service or program perspective. This  process, referred to as the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development  System (JCIDS), provides a framework for reviewing and validating  capability needs. However, as we reported in 2008, requirements  continue to be driven primarily by the individual services with little  involvement from the combatant commands, which are largely  responsible for planning and carrying out military operations. In reviewing  JCIDS documentation related to new capability proposals, we found that  most—nearly 70 percent—were sponsored by the military services with  little involvement from the joint community. By continuing to rely on  capability needs defined primarily by the services individually, DOD may  be losing opportunities to improve joint warfighting capabilities and to  reduce duplication of capabilities. In a separate report issued that same  year, we also noted that DOD did not have key management tools needed  to ensure that its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  investments reflected enterprisewide priorities and strategic goals. We  further noted that DOD lacked assurance that its investments in  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities—including  those in unmanned aircraft—were providing solutions that best minimize  inefficiency and redundancy.
For the unmanned aircraft systems we reviewed, the services established  requirements that were often so specific that they demanded service- unique solutions—thereby precluding opportunities for commonality. Yet  none of the programs were able to provide us quantitative analyses to  justify pursuing their unique solutions or to show why common solutions  would not work.
In some cases, service-unique requirements appear to be necessary. For  example, the Navy requires BAMS for maritime missions, which are  distinct from the land missions of its counterpart, Global Hawk.  Specifically, radar functionality depends on the operational environment— that is, water, a moving surface, compared to land, a relatively static  surface. Distinct radar capabilities are required to create images of  sufficient quality to recognize a target in these unique environments. The  Navy is also modifying the Global Hawk design to accommodate BAMS’s  altitude agility requirements. Unlike Global Hawk, which is designed to fly  continuously at high altitudes, BAMS is intended to fly at low, medium,  and high altitudes during a mission. Consequently, the wings on the  airframe need to be structurally reinforced to handle the loads and wind  gusts associated with frequent changes in altitude. Altitude changes also  make BAMS more susceptible to icing conditions, and therefore require a  de-icing capability for the wing, tail, and engine. Such differences in  requirements have limited commonality in BAMS and Global Hawk beyond  the basic airframe.
While some of the differences between Global Hawk and BAMS  requirements appear to be necessary, an OSD official we spoke with noted  that there is concern that other distinctions in requirements that the  services cited for other systems could lead to duplication and  inefficiencies. For example, an Army official cited the need to develop an  electro-optical and infrared sensor for the Army’s Sky Warrior that had  unique capabilities from the sensor the Air Force uses on the Predator.  The Army noted that it does not need specific sensor capabilities that the  Air Force is pursuing, such as high-definition video, which could require  costly upgrades to existing Army systems. Currently, however, Predator’s  sensor does not use high-definition video and thus could be employed by  the Sky Warrior system. Concerned that the government is paying a  premium to build two separate sensors with essentially the same  capability—the two systems are 80 percent common—OSD directed the  services to evaluate the feasibility of and potential savings associated with  purchasing a common sensor. An Army official, however, pointed out that  the Army had negotiated a unit cost for its version of the sensor that is  nearly $450,000 cheaper than unit cost of the Air Force sensor. Similarly,  Army and Air Force officials cited the need for unique flight control  requirements for Sky Warrior and Predator—“point and click” versus  “stick and rudder”—because the Army uses enlisted operators to fly the  aircraft, whereas the Air Force uses actual trained pilots. These different  approaches require the services to develop and acquire unique ground  control stations as well as other capabilities, such as automatic takeoff  and landing capability, that have not been used before, resulting in  additional cost and schedule risk.
In some cases, the services collaborated to identify common  configuration, performance, and support requirements, but ultimately did  not maximize efficiencies. For example, the Army and Navy have different  data link requirements for their respective variants of Fire Scout, primarily  because of the Army’s requirement for its Fire Scout to operate within the  Future Combat Systems network. However, the Future Combat Systems  has been beset with problems and delays—which may not be resolved  until 2015—and as a result, there are eight manufactured Fire Scouts  sitting in storage that according to the Fire Scout contractor, could be  equipped with the same data link as the Navy Fire Scout and the Army’s  Shadow and Sky Warrior systems. Though the services could not agree on  a common data link, the Army and Navy settled on common Fire Scout  requirements for the air vehicle, engine, radar, navigation, and some core  avionics subsystem requirements. The services also agreed to use one  contract to procure the airframe.
section_title: DOD’s Funding Process Can Hinder Collaboration and Commonality
paragraphs: The majority of needs that the military services identify are validated and  approved without accounting for the necessary resources to achieve  desired capabilities. The funding of proposed programs takes place  through a process called the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and  Execution system, which is not synchronized with JCIDS but is similarly  service-driven. Within the funding system each service has the  responsibility and authority to prioritize its own budget, which allows it to  make independent funding decisions supporting unique requirements.  Therefore, once a service concludes that a unique solution is warranted,  the service has the authority to budget for that unique solution, to the  exclusion of other possible solutions that could achieve greater  commonality and efficiency among the services. While DOD collectively  reviews the individual service budgets, this review does not occur until the  end of the funding process, at which point it is difficult and disruptive to  make changes, such as terminating programs.
For example, OSD has directed the Army and the Air Force to merge their  respective Sky Warrior and Predator programs. However, the services  have concluded that continuing separate programs is warranted to meet  their individual service needs. According to Air Force officials, the Air  Force does not have a requirement for Sky Warrior, and it is not clear if  the system would meet the service’s current operational needs. Therefore,  the Air Force has moved forward with its plan to end Predator  procurement entirely and transition to an all Reaper fleet. DOD officials  noted that the Air Force’s future year budget plans have accordingly  eliminated funding for Predator and increased the Reaper budget. OSD  was concerned about the implications of this plan from a requirements  and acquisition standpoint. Nevertheless, the Air Force will continue to  procure its unique Reaper system and the Army will proceed with the  development and production of its unique Sky Warrior system.
section_title: Efforts to Encourage Collaboration Have Had Limited Effect
paragraphs: Seven of the 10 programs we reviewed have established memorandums of  agreement to foster collaboration and drive the programs toward  commonality. However, these agreements generally lacked rigor and did  not specify areas of commonality to be pursued. Therefore, it is unclear to  what extent these agreements have helped programs leverage resources,  particularly considering that little commonality has been achieved. The  agreements often included caveats that allowed the services to deviate  from the agreement if they determined that service-unique requirements  had to be met. In some cases, the agreement was so explicit about service- unique needs and requirements that there was little incentive to pursue  common solutions. In contrast, the memorandum of agreement between  the Army and the Marine Corps for the Shadow program has specific  statements that highlight their intention to meet both services’  requirements. For example, the memorandum states that the two services  would procure a fully common aircraft off the same contract, assume the  same requirements, and use the same documentation.
At the department level, OSD established the Unmanned Aircraft Systems  Task Force and the Office of Unmanned Warfare primarily to facilitate  collaboration and encourage greater commonality among unmanned  aircraft programs. While the two groups act as advisors and have  implemented OSD’s recommendations regarding areas where further  commonality might be achieved—most prominently, for the Sky Warrior  and Predator programs—key officials from these groups emphasized to us  that they do not have direct decision-making or resource allocation  authority. OSD has repeatedly directed the services to collaborate on  these two programs, and in recent memos has clearly expressed  disapproval with the services’ amount and pace of progress in doing so.  Despite this direction, the services have continued to pursue unique  systems. In response to OSD’s most recent direction to merge their  service-unique signals intelligence payload efforts into a single acquisition  program, the Army and Air Force concluded that continuing their separate  programs was warranted, and recommended that OSD direct an objective,  independent organization—such as a federally funded research and  development center—to conduct a business case analysis to assess the  impact of merging the two programs. Table 5 summarizes OSD’s directions  and the services’ responses over the past few years.
section_title: Congress and DOD Continue to Direct Increased Collaboration and Commonality
paragraphs: In section 144 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2009, Congress directed “he Secretary of Defense, in consultation with  the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  establish a policy and an  acquisition strategy for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  payloads and ground stations for manned and unmanned aerial vehicle  systems. The policy and acquisition strategy shall be applicable  throughout the Department of Defense and shall achieve integrated  research, development, test, and evaluation, and procurement  commonality.” The Act further identifies the objectives that Congress  expects the policy and acquisition strategy to achieve. Those objectives  include, among others, the procurement of common payloads by vehicle  class, achieving commonality of ground system architecture by vehicle  class, common management of vehicle and payload procurements, ground  station interoperability standardization, and common standards for  exchanging data and metadata. Finally, DOD was directed to deliver a  report containing the policy and acquisition strategy to Congress no later  than 120 days after the enactment of the authorization act, which occurred  on October 14, 2008. However, as of May 15, 2009, OSD had not issued the  report. An OSD official within the Office of Unmanned Warfare told us that  the department had requested an extension on the report.
In an acquisition decision memorandum issued on February 11, 2009, the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics  (AT&L) identified the opportunity to adopt a common unmanned aircraft  ground control station architecture that supports future capability  upgrades through an open system and modular design. The memo notes  that adopting a common DOD architecture using a core open architecture  model would provide a forum for competition among companies to  provide new capabilities. It also states that the military services can be  given flexibility to adjust the man-to-machine interfaces for their  respective ground control stations while still maintaining commonality on  the underlying architecture and computing hardware. In addition, the  memo identifies an opportunity to implement common technologies, such  as autonomous takeoff and landing, across the military services. The  military services are directed to work together—and with OSD in one  instance—to assess various aspects of ground control station and  technology commonality, and to report their findings to OSD. As of   May 15, 2009, the services had not yet reported their findings.
Similar to OSD’s approach to ground control stations, the Air Force  Unmanned Aircraft Systems Task Force—which is currently developing a  long-term unmanned aircraft plan—expects future unmanned aircraft to  be developed as open, modular systems to which new capabilities can be  added instead of developing entirely new systems each time a new  capability is needed. It anticipates that this open systems approach will  allow the Air Force to hold competitions for new payloads that can simply  be plugged into the aircraft—or “plug-and-play” payloads. In addition, the  Air Force recognizes the need for more joint unmanned aircraft solutions  and increased teaming among programs and services. A leading task force  official told us that given the limited resources DOD has to work with, it is  imperative that the services explore more joint solutions and work  together and find commonality—which the official noted must begin in the  requirements process. He also noted that DOD should be focused on  providing incremental capabilities to the warfighter and upgrading them  later as the need arises and the technology matures. He pointed out that  for most missions the warfighters do not need an optimal system—a 100  percent solution—they usually only need one or two of the functions the  system can provide.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD is challenged to meet the warfighter’s ever-increasing demand for  unmanned aircraft systems within available resources. Many of DOD’s  tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs have  experienced significant cost growth, schedule delays, and performance  shortfalls. DOD recognizes that to more effectively leverage its acquisition  resources it must achieve greater commonality among the military  services’ various unmanned system programs. While the Army and the  Marine Corps achieved a high level of commonality in the Shadow  program, other programs had less success. In general, the military services  continue to establish unique requirements and prioritize resources without  fully considering opportunities to achieve greater efficiencies. As a result,  commonality has largely been limited to system airframes and in most  cases has not been achieved among payloads, subsystems, or ground  control stations. An objective, independent examination of DOD’s current  unmanned aircraft portfolio and the methods for acquiring future  unmanned aircraft could go a long way to ensuring that DOD gets a better  return on every dollar it invests in unmanned aircraft.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To more effectively leverage resources and increase the efficiency in  unmanned aircraft system acquisition programs, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:    Direct a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the requirements for  current unmanned aircraft programs, develop a strategy for making  systems and subsystems among those programs more common, and  report the findings of this analysis to Congress. At a minimum, this  analysis should quantify the costs and benefits of alternative  approaches, identify specific actions that need to be taken, and  summarize the status of DOD’s various ongoing unmanned aircraft- related studies.
Prior to initiating any new unmanned aircraft program, require the  military services to identify and document in their acquisition plans  and strategies specific areas where commonality can be achieved, take  an open systems approach to product development, conduct a  quantitative analysis that examines the costs and benefits of various  levels of commonality, and establish a collaborative approach and  management framework to periodically assess and effectively manage  commonality.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report DOD partially agreed with  the first recommendation and agreed with all elements of the second.  DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III.
Regarding our first recommendation to conduct a comprehensive analysis  of requirements and opportunities for commonality among current  unmanned aircraft systems, the department agreed that there is significant  cost benefit to leveraging commonality, but noted that the Unmanned  Aircraft Systems Task Force had conducted such analyses. Therefore, the  department did not agree that a separate comprehensive analysis across  all unmanned systems with the specific purpose of identifying  opportunities for commonality was needed. Going forward, we believe  that the department could benefit from a more comprehensive,  quantitative analysis that looks across unmanned aircraft systems and  focuses on subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations as well as  airframes. The analyses DOD has done to date have been done on a case- by-case basis, and have primarily resulted in airframe commonality.
DOD agreed with each element of our second recommendation related to  specific actions that the military services should be required to take before  initiating new unmanned aircraft programs. The department believes that  current requirements and acquisition policies and processes—some of  which were recently revised—satisfy the intent of our recommendation.  To ensure that resources are effectively leveraged to gain efficiencies,  DOD must ensure the consistent and disciplined implementation of these  policies and processes.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the  Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Director of the Office  of Management and Budget. The report also is available at no charge on  the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. A list of key contributors to this report can be found in  appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report examines the Department of Defense’s (DOD) development  and acquisition of unmanned aircraft systems. The primary focus of this  work is to identify practices and policies that lead to successful  collaborative efforts to field unmanned aircraft systems to the warfighter  at the right time and for the right price. Specifically, our objectives were to  (1) assess the cost, schedule, and performance progress of selected  tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs;   (2) examine the extent to which the military services are collaborating and  identifying commonality among those programs; and (3) identify the key  factors influencing the effectiveness of their collaboration.
We selected 10 programs to include in our review: eight unmanned aircraft  programs and two payload development programs. The eight unmanned  aircraft programs included in our review—Global Hawk, Reaper, Shadow,  Predator, Sky Warrior, Fire Scout, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance  (BAMS), and Unmanned Combat Aircraft System (UCAS)—make up more  than 80 percent of DOD’s planned investment in unmanned aircraft  systems from 2008 through 2013. The two payloads—Multi-Platform Radar  Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) and Airborne Signals  Intelligence Payload (ASIP)—are being developed for use on unmanned  aircraft.
To assess the extent to which selected tactical and theater-level unmanned  aircraft systems are meeting their cost, schedule, and performance targets,  we compared current data to baseline cost, schedule, and performance  data for the 10 programs in our review. We collected and reviewed data  from acquisition program baselines, acquisition decision memorandums,  selected acquisition reports, presidential budget documents, and  technology and operational assessments. We worked with knowledgeable  GAO staff to ensure the use of current, accurate data and incorporated  information, where applicable, from our recent assessment of major  weapon programs.
To examine the extent to which the military services are collaborating and  identifying commonality among those programs, we reviewed key  documents such as acquisition decision memorandums and policy  directives, as well as program acquisition strategies and program briefings.  We examined the acquisition approaches of the 10 programs included in  our review to identify any collaborative efforts taken among programs. We  also reviewed relevant DOD and Joint Staff policies and guidance to  identify established criteria for effective collaboration. As part of our  analysis, we compared and contrasted requirements for the systems in our  review in order to assess areas of potential or apparent similarity as  possible opportunities for collaboration. We did not assess the validity of  the military services’ requirements for the selected unmanned aircraft  programs in our review.
To identify and assess which factors influenced the effectiveness of  collaboration among the selected programs in our review, we examined  the roles and responsibilities of DOD and military service acquisition and  requirements organizations in fostering collaboration among programs.  We examined the impact that officials and organizations within the  acquisition and requirements communities have on collaboration. We also  reviewed recent DOD acquisition initiatives, such as portfolio management  and configuration steering boards, as well as service-level plans and  activities related to collaboration and commonality among unmanned  aircraft programs.
In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed  unmanned aircraft systems program officials from Wright-Patterson Air  Force Base, Ohio; Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts; Redstone  Arsenal, Alabama; and Patuxent River, Maryland, and officials from the Air  Force, Army, and Navy acquisition and requirements organizations, the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff offices,  Washington, D.C. Further, we interviewed officials from the UAS Joint  Center of Excellence, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; the Air Force UAS  Task Force, Washington, D.C.; and U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air  Force Base, Florida. We also met with officials from defense contractors  General Atomics in Rancho Bernardo, California, and Northrop Grumman,  in San Diego and Palmdale, California, to obtain information on the  development and production efforts of seven of the eight unmanned  aircraft system programs in our review.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to July 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft Program Ongoing and Future Efforts
paragraphs: This appendix provides additional information about the eight unmanned  aircraft and two payload programs assessed in the body of this report.  Each program summary in this appendix includes an aircraft photo, a brief  description of the system’s mission and program status and our  observations on program execution and outcomes, and where applicable,  the summaries also highlight recent GAO work. To provide additional  insights into the magnitude of recent and expected future investments in  these programs, the summaries include details on DOD’s planned  investment from 2008 through 2013 as contained in the department’s fiscal  year 2009 budget. The budget information in tables 8 through 17 is  expressed in then year dollars, and due to rounding the numbers may not  add exactly. The fiscal year 2008 funding shown in the tables has been  appropriated by Congress. The funding requested in DOD’s fiscal year 2010  budget submission for each program is captured in notes to the tables— DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget did not contain any funding projections  beyond 2010. Tables 6 and 7 detail many key characteristics and compare  the capabilities of the systems discussed in this appendix.
subsections: section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The Global Hawk system is a high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned  aircraft with an integrated sensor suite and ground segment that provides  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The  system is intended to provide high-resolution, high-quality, digital  synthetic aperture radar to include ground moving target indicator, plus  electro-optical and infrared imagery of targets and other critical areas of  interest. A signals intelligence payload and advanced radar are also being  developed.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: Global Hawk is being developed and procured in four configurations.  Block 10 aircraft, designated RQ-4A, are based on an airframe similar to  the original demonstrators and employ imaging intelligence sensors  (synthetic aperture radar, electro-optical, and infrared). The other three  configurations are larger and more capable systems, designated RQ-4B.  Block 20 aircraft employ enhanced imaging intelligence sensors. Block 30  aircraft provide multiple intelligence capabilities—signals intelligence as  well as the enhanced imaging intelligence sensors. Block 40 aircraft will  employ an advanced radar being developed by the Multi-Platform Radar  Technology Insertion Program.
According to the original contract, the contractor was expected to deliver  19 Global Hawk systems by the end of December 2008. However, as of  January 2009, the contractor had only delivered 14 systems, 9 of which  were more than 8 months late. All seven Block 10 aircraft have been  delivered to the Air Force and have supported ongoing military operations.  All six Block 20 aircraft have also been delivered. The Block 20 aircraft are  currently in testing and recently underwent an operational assessment.  DOD’s top acquisition official noted that the assessment provided useful  insight into the performance of the enhanced integrated sensor suite.  Block 20 initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) was expected to  be completed in October 2009. However, the Air Force reported in  February 2009 that operational testing had slipped beyond the acquisition  program baseline threshold date, but did not specify the expected length  of the delay. According to program officials a high level of concurrency in  the program—concurrent development, production, and testing—coupled  with developmental testing delays, unforeseen system failures, and  excessive weather-related flight test cancellations were to blame for the  schedule slip.
The Air Force received the first of a planned purchase of 26 Block 30  aircraft from the contractor in November 2007—10 months later than the  original contract delivery date. The aircraft was subsequently equipped  with an Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP) sensor, and began  developmental flight testing in September 2008. While ASIP developmental  testing on the Global Hawk has gone relatively well, Block 30 IOT&E has  been delayed in concert with Block 20.
According to the contractor, the critical design review for Block 40 has  been completed, and the first Block 40 aircraft is in the final stages of  assembly. Contractor officials also noted that the MP-RTIP sensor will be  integrated onto Global Hawk and begin testing in May 2009. Block 40  operational testing—which was originally expected to begin no later than  November 2010—has been delayed, and no new date has been established.  The Air Force currently plans to purchase a total of 15 Block 40 Global  Hawks.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: Global Hawk concurrently entered development and limited production of  the RQ-4A in March 2001, after completing a successful demonstration  program. One year later, the Air Force chose to pursue the larger, more  capable RQ-4B airframe. Although the two airframes were expected to  have substantial commonality, differences were much more extensive than  anticipated. The final design of the RQ-4B required more substantial  changes than expected to the fuselage, tail, and landing gear. Frequent and  substantive engineering changes during the first year of production  increased development and airframe costs and delayed delivery and  testing schedules. The system unit cost has more than doubled since  development began, and the program has been restructured three times.
Completion of Block 20 operational testing has been delayed more than 3  years from initial estimates. Developmental test results indicate that the  Block 20 aircraft’s enhanced sensors did not achieve the desired level of  clarity. However, DOD’s top acquisition official in an October 2008  acquisition decision memorandum directed the Air Force to go ahead with  the procurement of the Block 20 sensors—noting that the sensor  performance requirement was a subjective measure and current  performance was satisfactory. The Air Force expects to have purchased  more than 60 percent of total Global Hawk quantities before Block 20  testing is complete.
In October 2008, 1 month after beginning Block 30 ASIP testing, the Office  of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) issued an acquisition decision  memorandum stating that the ASIP development appeared to be on track  to meet user requirements and approving the purchase of a limited number  of sensors—pending successful completion of the sensor calibration.  According to ASIP program officials, sensor calibration and developmental  testing are finished. They also noted that they were planning to conduct  dedicated ASIP operational testing on the U-2, which they believe will  further reduce risk in the program before beginning Global Hawk Block 30  operational testing, which has been delayed indefinitely in concert with  Block 20 operational testing.
According to a recent Director of Operational Test and Evaluation  (DOT&E) report, the Air Force’s plan to complete Block 40 development  in 2010 is in jeopardy because development of the advanced MP-RTIP  radar has experienced delays. The report cites a failure to design useful  sensor calibration and poor system software stability as the primary  culprits. In addition, the DOT&E notes that the potential exists for the  contractor to deliver up to 6 of the 15 planned Block 40 systems before  MP-RTIP will be able to deliver any operational capability.
The Air Force’s 2009 budget request contained over $5 billion for Global  Hawk development and procurement. The Global Hawk procurement  budget includes funding to purchase and integrate the ASIP and MP-RTIP  payloads. ASIP and MP-RTIP development are funded separately.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper is a multirole, medium-to-high-altitude, long- endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system capable of flying at faster  speeds and higher altitudes than its smaller predecessor, the MQ-1  Predator. While Predator is primarily a surveillance and reconnaissance  asset, Reaper is designed for armed reconnaissance missions. It is  expected to provide around-the-clock capability to detect, attack, and  destroy mobile, high-value, time-sensitive targets. Reaper will carry  missiles, laser-guided bombs, and the Joint Direct Attack Munition. Reaper  also will support net-centric military operations. Each system consists of  four aircraft, a ground control station, and a satellite communications  suite.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: Because of recent budget increases, the Reaper program may soon be  designated a major defense acquisition program. Based on current  projections, Reaper will achieve initial operational capability in August  2009. Its full-rate production decision was recently postponed over a year,  pending the decision about its acquisition category. It recently completed  initial operational testing, receiving a rating of partially mission capable.  The Air Force has taken delivery of 27 aircraft to date. Total aircraft  quantity requirements have increased from 63 to 118, and may increase  even further since the Air Force plans to increase procurement in its  upcoming budget submission. Reaper’s second increment, comprising the  small diameter bomb and automatic takeoff and landing capability, is  scheduled to begin development in late fiscal year 2010.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: The Reaper program began in January 2002 in the aftermath of the  September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Since inception, Reaper—designated  an urgent operational need—has followed a nontraditional acquisition  path, resulting in concurrent development and production and increased  risk. Shortly after development began, the user required accelerated  aircraft deliveries to achieve an interim combat capability. Two years later,  the user required additional aircraft for an even more robust early fielding  capability. In response to user demands, the Air Force has contracted for  over 30 percent of the total quantity before completing initial operational  testing.
Performance enhancements, such as adding missiles and a digital  electronic engine control, increased the weight of the aircraft, requiring  stronger landing gear, fuselage, and flight control surfaces. In addition to  requirements changes, the aircraft quantity increased 87 percent since the  start of development. The increase—from 63 to 118 aircraft—was due in  part to demands of the war on terror. The quantity may increase even  further because the Air Force plans to curtail future Predator procurement  and buy only Reapers. Despite the significant quantity increase,  procurement unit costs have not decreased; they have increased about 32  percent since development began. This cost growth is due to inefficiencies  associated with the early fielding process and requirements changes.
Although initial operational testing was completed in August 2008, two of  three key capabilities were not fully assessed. Reaper was effective in  destroying targets, but radar problems prevented the test team from  completing an assessment of its ability to detect and identify targets. The  net-centric operations support capability was not assessed at all. Other  areas of concern included operator workload, off-board communications,  and system reliability. Because tests were limited by weather, climate, and  radar reliability and training, additional testing will be required to assess  these capabilities. The Air Force testers gave Reaper a rating of partially  mission capable; DOD’s independent test organization has not yet  completed its assessment of the test results.
Reaper has been funded under the Predator program element since its  inception. In its fiscal year 2008 budget, the Air Force began reporting  Reaper as a separate program element, thereby isolating program costs.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The Shadow 200 unmanned aircraft system provides reconnaissance,  surveillance and target acquisition and force protection at the Army  brigade level. One Shadow system consists of four air vehicles and  associated ground control equipment, including two ground control  stations and an air vehicle launcher.
Shadow is equipped with automatic takeoff and landing capability and  operates at up to 15,000 feet in various weather conditions. The air vehicle  has electro-optical/infrared capabilities. Planned system upgrades include  integration of the Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) and the Army’s  heavy fuel engine. As a brigade-level asset, the Shadow aircraft is intended  to allow for mission payloads to be changed on the aircraft within 30  minutes.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: The Shadow program is an acquisition category II program and grew out  of an advanced concept technology demonstration program. The Shadow  program entered full-rate production in 2002 without the TCDL or the  heavy fuel engine. Program funding after 2002 has been used for Shadow  fleet upgrades, such as integrating the heavy fuel engine. TCDL  development is ongoing; retrofitting is scheduled to begin in 2009.
According to program officials, 252 Shadow aircraft have been fielded to  the Army, with an additional 104 aircraft procured but not yet delivered to  the warfighter. The Army plans to procure a total of 460 aircraft. In  addition, the Marine Corps signed a memorandum of agreement with the  Army in 2007 to acquire 52 Shadow aircraft. The Marine Corps systems are  identical to the Army’s, and are being procured through the existing Army  contract.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: Shadow systems were intended to be fielded as quickly as possible with  “no bells and whistles,” eventually evolving into more capable systems  with the TCDL and heavy fuel engines. According to program officials,  initial research and development funding was designated for the basic  Shadow system, which program officials estimated to cost $198.1 million.  Program officials told us that when Shadow achieved initial operational  capability in 2002—effectively ending development—the Army had only  spent $181.2 million, or 9 percent less than the initial estimate. Officials  stated that development funding since 2002 has been used to upgrade the  basic Shadow system. The cost of these upgrades, officials told us, was  initially estimated at $99.1 million, but the current estimate has risen to  $175.4 million.
According to the program office, total research and development costs for  the Shadow system have increased 80 percent since program start in 1999,  while total procurement costs have increased 267 percent. Program  officials stated that increases in the number of aircraft being procured,  which has nearly tripled from 164 to 460, along with upgrades and retrofits  have contributed to cost growth in the Shadow program.
By following an incremental approach for the Shadow program, the Army  was able to minimize program risk by delivering basic capability to the  warfighter within the initial development cost estimate. To field a more  capable, robust system, the program has continued to pursue development  of additional capabilities that were not available when the system was  initially fielded, such as the TCDL and heavy fuel engine. However, risk  remains as the costs for retrofit and upgrade activities have increased.
The Marine Corps has benefited from the Army’s development of the  Shadow system by avoiding the costs of initial development and  purchasing a mature system. However, as the Army upgrades and retrofits  Shadow, the Marine Corps will also have to fund these efforts if it wants to  maintain the same level of commonality with the Army. Program officials  told us that the Marine Corps is exploring ways to add additional  capabilities to Shadow aircraft to allow it to carry a weapons payload.  Although the Army has no requirement for this capability, the service  would be interested in retrofitting Shadow systems with a weapons  payload if the capability were developed. Consequently, we believe that  the Army and Marine Corps need to carefully manage how they maintain  commonality.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The Extended Range Multi-Purpose unmanned aircraft system (Sky  Warrior) is intended to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, and target  acquisition missions at the Army division level. Additionally, Sky Warrior  is equipped with four missiles. One Sky Warrior system consists of 12 MQ- 1C air vehicles along with associated ground equipment, including five  ground control stations.
Operating at 25,000 feet in a near all-weather environment, Sky Warrior  will be equipped with automatic takeoff and landing capability.  Communications with the Sky Warrior system will be via the TCDL. The  air vehicle will be equipped with electro-optical/infrared and synthetic  aperture radar capabilities, as well as a signals intelligence payload.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics  elevated the Sky Warrior program to an acquisition category I program in a  May 2008 memorandum. This directive supported the OSD decision that  the Army Sky Warrior and Air Force Predator unmanned aircraft system  programs migrate to a single contract for airframe procurement. Currently,  Predator is built on an airframe designated the MQ-1B, but OSD is pushing  the Air Force to transition its Predators to the same airframe the Army is  using for the Sky Warrior, designated the MQ-1C. While the Air Force is  planning to procure 5 MQ-1C airframes—in response to recent OSD  direction—it is in the process of assessing how many additional airframes,  if any, it needs to purchase.
According to program officials, the demand for intelligence, surveillance,  and reconnaissance capabilities to meet current operational needs has  resulted in concurrent development and production of the Sky Warrior  system. The Army has purchased 40 interim Sky Warrior air vehicles, 21 of  which are built on the existing Predator airframes. Although the remaining  19 air vehicles are built on the new MQ-1C airframe they do not provide  full Sky Warrior capability. According to the Army, these interim air  vehicles are intended to provide some capability to the warfighter until the  full Sky Warrior system is fielded. A February 2009 memorandum from  OSD authorizes the Army to procure four production-ready MQ-1C air  vehicles to begin initial testing for the full Sky Warrior system.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: The Sky Warrior program has experienced both cost growth and schedule  delays, which, according to program officials, can be explained by the  need to deliver systems to the warfighter as quickly as possible.  Production quantities have increased from 4 systems at program start to  11 systems; total program costs have increased over 138 percent.  Milestone C—the point at which a system is approved to begin  production—has been delayed by 2 years; therefore, the full Sky Warrior  system will not enter low-rate production until November 2009.  Furthermore, because the systems being fielded early do not possess all of  the intended capabilities of a full system, costs will likely increase as other  capabilities are integrated into the existing systems. Additionally, Sky  Warrior has been designated an acquisition category I program and is  currently undergoing a program rebaseline. This new baseline, once  completed, may incorporate further schedule delays and cost increases.
OSD approved the Sky Warrior program’s acquisition strategy in January  2009, despite the fact that the synthetic aperture radar the Army planned  to use on the system had proven to be unreliable. The radar’s poor  performance forced the Army to select a new radar entirely. However,  according to the program office, given the Army’s acquisition strategy, the  new radar will not be ready until after Sky Warrior finishes initial  operational testing in 2011 and a full-rate production decision has been  made. This approach greatly increases the risk in the program.
During the most recent GAO annual assessment of DOD major weapon  programs, the Sky Warrior program office indicated that all four of the  system’s critical technologies were mature. However, a recent  independent Army test concluded that three of the four technologies are  not yet mature, including the automatic takeoff and landing system and the  TCDL. As of May 2009, Army officials recognized that the automatic  takeoff and landing system was still an immature technology. As a result,  the Army will deploy each of its early Sky Warrior systems this summer  with two ground control stations, an Army One Ground Control Station  and a legacy ground control station—with stick and rudder controls—as a  backup system in case the auto takeoff and land capability fails. Much of  our prior work in DOD weapon systems acquisition and commercial best  practices has shown that conducting technology development concurrent  with product development greatly increases cost, schedule, and  performance risks.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The Air Force’s MQ-1 Predator is a single-engine, propeller-driven,  remotely piloted aircraft designed to operate at medium altitudes for long- endurance missions. The program began in 1994 as an advanced concept  technology demonstration, and the aircraft proved its military utility with a  successful operational deployment in Bosnia. Its original mission was to  provide continuous ISR coverage to the theater commander/joint  warfighter. In 2001, the Air Force added weapons to Predator, thus  expanding its role to include a limited strike capability. Predator provides  full-motion video of the battlefield with high-resolution sensors in near  real time. Each Predator system includes four aircraft, a ground control  station, and a satellite communications suite.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: Future procurement of the Predator is uncertain. After more than a decade  of operational use, it is now considered a legacy program. The Army is  procuring a more modern, capable variant of Predator—Sky Warrior. In  2007, OSD directed the services to merge these two programs, using the  newer Army platform as the baseline configuration. However, because of  differences in service requirements and operations, the Army and Air  Force have made limited progress. For example, the Army needs a tactical  capability that operates with existing Army platforms like the Apache  helicopter. In contrast, the Air Force needs a strategic capability that  satisfies the needs of the joint warfighter. The Air Force has not completed  testing of the newer Sky Warrior aircraft, and in fact is planning to  purchase another variant—Reaper—as a replacement for Predator.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: Because Predator transitioned directly from a technology demonstrator  into production, it did not follow a typical acquisition process. Its  performance and quantity requirements have changed significantly since  inception. For example, Predator was initially designed to provide the  warfighter continuous ISR and targeting information. The user  subsequently required that it carry missiles, giving it a limited strike  capability. In addition, Predator’s quantity requirements have more than  doubled since it began. The Air Force originally planned to procure 12  systems (48 aircraft), but because of the increasing demand for its  capability, the total quantity has been increased to 26 systems.
With the addition of MQ-9 Reaper and the Army’s Sky Warrior, the  contractor’s business base has significantly expanded. This expansion  raised concerns about the contractor’s capacity, particularly given its  history of late aircraft deliveries. Last year, however, the contractor  delivered 10 Predator aircraft ahead of schedule. According to program  officials, these aircraft were completed early to provide time for the  contractor to move its equipment into newly expanded facilities. Despite  these deliveries, the contractor’s more recent aircraft deliveries have once  again been late. Although the Air Force was directed to begin purchasing  the newer MQ-1C aircraft—the Sky Warrior configuration—it plans to buy  Reapers in lieu of Predators. Given the lingering uncertainty about how  many of which configurations will be purchased, program officials are  concerned that future aircraft deliveries will be affected.
Early Predator cost data are limited. Once Predator became an acquisition  program, the Air Force projected an acquisition cost of $910 million (base  year 2009 dollars) for 12 systems. Since that time, the number of  operational systems has more than doubled, the performance and payload  requirements have changed, and the flying hours and attrition rates have  increased. This hampers a direct comparison. The total program cost is  about $3.61 billion (base year 2009 dollars).
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The U.S. Navy Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Air  Vehicle (VTUAV) will provide local commanders real-time imagery and  data to support ISR requirements. A VTUAV system is composed of up to  three air vehicles with associated electro-optical/infrared/laser designator- rangefinder sensors, two ground control stations, one recovery system,  and associated spares and support equipment. The air vehicle launches  and recovers vertically and operates from ships and land. Interoperability  is achieved through use of a common data link and standard  communications.
VTUAV is being designed as a modular, reconfigurable system to support  various operations, including potential surface, antisubmarine, and mine  warfare missions. Future capabilities currently under consideration  include surface search radar, signal intelligence, enhanced data and  communications relay, and integration of weapons.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: The Navy expects the VTUAV to achieve initial operational capability in  late fiscal year 2009. The program began in fiscal year 2000, after market  research and a competitive ship-based vertical takeoff and landing  demonstration were conducted. A competitive contract was awarded to  Northrop Grumman for delivery of system development air vehicles and  the first lot of low-rate initial production (LRIP) systems. During fiscal  year 2002, the program was de-scoped to a technology demonstration  effort, and two LRIP options were not exercised.
In fiscal year 2003, the VTUAV program was restructured to support the  Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), and received increased funding from  Congress in fiscal year 2004 toward that goal. The restructured program  was expected to cost about $2.3 billion, and as a result in August 2006 it  was designated as an acquisition category IC program. The program  received Milestone C approval in May 2007 to procure up to 4 air vehicles  in the first lot of LRIP. The Navy plans to procure a total of 168 air  vehicles, plus 9 developmental LRIP vehicles. VTUAV is currently  undergoing test and evaluation.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: The VTUAV program was restructured in 2004 to support the LCS. At the  time of the restructuring, Congress authorized funding for an upgraded  VTUAV variant, the MQ-8B, which addressed requirement shortfalls— including time on station—of an earlier version, the RQ-8A. In February  2008, after being advised of at least a 2-year delay in the LCS program, the  Navy decided to continue VTUAV development using an alternate ship—a  frigate. Navy officials estimated that the move to the alternate ship would  require $42.6 million of additional funding and result in a 9-month  schedule delay.
VTUAV efforts are funded under cost-type contracts for system  development and firm-fixed price for production. The program uses  common, mature technologies as much as possible. The air vehicles are  based on a commercial manned helicopter that has been in service for  over 20 years. The MQ-8B is undergoing developmental and operational  testing and has landed successfully aboard ship.
The Army, in September 2003, chose VTUAV to meet Future Combat  System (FCS) unmanned aerial requirements. According to contractor  officials, the two services were able to achieve about 97 percent  commonality for the airframe. However, service-specific payloads will  hinder further collaboration.
Furthermore, FCS delays could affect Fire Scout production efficiency.  According to Northrop Grumman officials, they need to produce a  minimum number of airframes per year to break even; they are currently  producing three airframes per year for the Navy to support system  development. If FCS continues to delay the Army portion of the Fire Scout  program (or other potential buyers do not make a purchase), airframe  production will be difficult to sustain.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The XM157 Class IV unmanned aircraft system (UAS) will provide  reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, mine detection, communications  relay, wide area surveillance, chemical detection, and meteorological  survey capabilities for the FCS Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The Class IV  UAS will operate in conjunction with manned aircraft. The air vehicle will  vertically take off and land from unprepared surfaces, and will be  controlled by light tactical vehicles equipped with launch control units and  by command and control manned ground vehicles within the FCS BCT  over the FCS network.
The Class IV UAS is part of the FCS family of systems made up of  integrated, advanced, networked combat and sustainment systems;  unmanned ground and air vehicles; and unattended sensors and munitions.  Complementary programs external to FCS development provide many of  the major Class IV UAS subsystems and payloads, including  communications equipment such as the Warfighter Information Network- Tactical (WIN-T) and the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS).
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: The Army is pursuing a joint acquisition strategy with the Navy. The Army,  in September 2003, chose the Navy Fire Scout for its Class IV UAS.   Program officials indicated that the Navy is the lead service for system  development. The Army purchases common airframes under a separate  line item in the Navy contract, and then provides the airframes to the FCS  lead system integrator as government-furnished equipment. The Army is  leveraging Navy testing to mitigate risk and provide early test data; its own  first developmental flight testing is not scheduled to begin until the second  quarter of fiscal year 2011.
The Army plans to support 15 BCTs, each equipped with 32 Class IV air  vehicles, and will procure 500 air vehicles overall, including 20 for  development and low-rate initial production. The Army has taken delivery  of eight airframes.
The Class IV UAS schedule depends on complementary programs— specifically WIN-T and JTRS—and the overall FCS schedule, which has  slipped. The fiscal year 2011 first flight date represents a 42-month delay  from the Army’s original baseline estimate.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: According to contractor officials, the Army and Navy achieved about 97  percent commonality for the airframe. A Defense Contract Management  Agency official estimated about $125 million in development cost savings  attributable to commonality. Contractor representatives maintain that  operations and maintenance would provide greater opportunity for cost  savings from commonality.
However, the Army’s requirements for FCS-based, mission-specific  subsystems and payloads are hindering further collaboration. According to  both program and contractor officials, the delivered airframes were  intended for testing, but they cannot be tested without WIN-T and JTRS,  which are not currently available. WIN-T will be the data link that allows  control of the Class IV UAS from mobile ground stations, and JTRS will  provide a communication relay capability. Neither program nor contractor  officials seemed confident that these subsystems would be available soon.  Furthermore, DOD’s recent proposal to terminate the FCS ground segment  raises additional uncertainty over the Army’s plans.
While the Navy identified an alternate ship to continue Fire Scout  development when it learned that the projected host platform was  delayed, the Army seems to be holding to FCS standards. Contractor  representatives believe the Army is forgoing providing capability to the  warfighter as a result. They envision the Class IV UAS not being available  to the warfighter until 2015. In their opinion, however, were the Army to  install an existing data link and payload into the aircraft, they would be  useful, for example, in detecting improvised explosive devices in Iraq or  Afghanistan.
Because it is a part of the FCS program, the Class IV UAS is funded  through the FCS reconnaissance platforms budget, which also includes the  Class I UAS. Therefore, we are unable to provide details on the Class IV  UAS budget projections using the fiscal year 2009 budget. However, DOD’s  fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, contains an RDT&E budget  request of $44.005 million in fiscal year 2010 specifically for the Class IV  UAS.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) unmanned aircraft system  will give DOD a unique persistent capability to detect, classify, and identify  targets over a wide area of maritime battlespace. Operating both  independently and cooperatively with other assets, it will provide a more  effective and supportable ISR capability than currently exists. Along with  future systems—the P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft and the EP-X  electronic surveillance aircraft—BAMS will be part of a maritime patrol  and reconnaissance force family of systems integral to the Navy’s  recapitalization of its airborne ISR. The Navy intends to position BAMS  mission crews with maritime patrol and reconnaissance personnel to  closely coordinate missions and use a common support infrastructure. To  meet its objectives, the BAMS program is modifying a version of the Air  Force Global Hawk air vehicle.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: DOD approved the start of system development for BAMS in April 2008,  but the source selection was subject to a bid protest that delayed system  development to August 2008. The program briefed the Joint Requirements  Oversight Council on the source selection results, joint efficiencies being  pursued, and potential future synergies in December 2008 and conducted  the System Requirements Review in January 2009. The LRIP contract  award is planned for fiscal year 2013, and the Navy expects to purchase 70  total aircraft—2 in development, 3 in low-rate production, and 65 in  production.
BAMS is being developed using the Global Hawk airframe; however, the  Navy plans to make upgrades, such as a wing de-icing technology, to  accommodate the maritime operations. It also plans to use different  subsystems, such as sensors and communications equipment. Program  officials explained that the BAMS air vehicle is about 78 percent common  with Global Hawk and uses sensor components or entire subsystems from  other existing platforms. The BAMS program is leveraging lessons learned  from the Global Hawk program to avoid similar cost, testing, and  technology problems, and the two programs have established a  memorandum of agreement.
Northrop Grumman is currently considering whether to assemble BAMS in  two locations: Palmdale, California, where the Global Hawk is being  assembled, and a new facility in St. Augustine, Florida. Though the  Palmdale facility has the capacity to assemble BAMS, contractor officials  told us that the decision will be based on both economic and program risk- level assessments. They were not able to provide quantitative analysis  associated with their pending decision to assemble BAMS in two locations  and told us that the calculations will not be made until the 2011-2012 time  frame.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: In February 2008, before initiating development, DOD and the Navy  concluded that all BAMS technologies were approaching maturity—that is,  they had been demonstrated in a relevant environment. Therefore, the  Navy insists that the BAMS program has no critical technologies. Despite  repeated requests, Navy officials did not provide us with the list of  technologies that were assessed for maturity. Nevertheless, the program  office has identified six subsystems, such as radar software, that could  cause cost, schedule, or performance issues during development. Program  officials indicated that they are monitoring development risks for these  subsystems. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology  and Logistics’ decision allowing the program to begin development also  required that an independent technology readiness assessment be  conducted at the completion of preliminary design review and that the  results be submitted for DOD review.
While there is a benefit to using an existing airframe, the Navy plans to  make changes to Global Hawk that introduce additional risk to the  program. Already the initial operational capability has been delayed from  August 2014 to December 2015, but program officials are planning to  achieve full operational capability by 2019—in time to avoid a capability  gap that otherwise would be created by the retirement of the P-3C Orion  aircraft.
OSD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding  amount of $432.5 million and a fiscal year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $465.8 million for BAMS.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS-D)  program will demonstrate critical technologies for operating a low  observable unmanned aerial system from aircraft carriers. The first  capabilities to be proven are launch and recovery and deck surface  operations. The demonstration will inform a follow-on acquisition decision  at Milestone A or B.
In the 2020-2025 time frame, the Navy plans to change program focus to a  strike-fighter aircraft possibly to replace F/A-18 aircraft in a future Carrier  Air Wings mix with the Joint Strike Fighter. The Navy wants a carrier- based, air-refueled, very long-endurance aircraft capable of operating at  greater distances from the carrier battle group, defeating heavily defended  targets, expanding payload options, and providing continuous maneuvers.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: The Navy conducted a limited source selection between two contractors  that had been involved in prior UCAS-related efforts, and in August 2007  awarded Northrop Grumman a $635.9 million contract to design, develop,  integrate, test, and demonstrate two unmanned combat air systems. The  contract includes cost, technical, and schedule incentives. The first flight  is planned for November 2009 at Edwards Air Force Base, and the first  landing on an aircraft carrier is expected to occur at the end of 2011.
Navy UCAS-D is only a demonstration effort; no acquisition program has  been approved, and no milestone events have been scheduled. However,  the program is trying to mitigate risks through modeling and simulation,  surrogate flight testing, and shore-based testing before conducting sea  trials. Additionally, the demonstration aircraft will use various systems  already in use on other aircraft, such as F-18 landing systems and F-16  engines, according to officials.
The program appears generally to be on schedule and within budget.  According to program officials, the program has the funding needed to  complete the demonstration by fiscal year 2013 as planned, despite a  funding reduction of almost $400 million in the 2009 President’s budget.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: Navy UCAS-D can trace its origin to Defense Advanced Research Projects  Agency (DARPA) unmanned combat air vehicle advanced technology  demonstration programs started in the late 1990s. In 2003, OSD established  a joint Navy and Air Force program, designated the Joint Unmanned  Combat Air System (J-UCAS), to be managed by DARPA. In 2005, the joint  program transitioned from DARPA to the Air Force. However, a late 2005  program decision memorandum recommended terminating the J-UCAS  program and funding separate Navy and Air Force programs. As a result,  the Navy initiated the Navy UCAS-D program in 2006.
Prior to holding a Milestone B decision, the program is leveraging  DARPA’s J-UCAS efforts in conjunction with current risk mitigation  efforts, to evolve required technologies to the level at which DOD  considers technology to be mature. While risk mitigation is a positive step,  and the program seems to be on schedule, significant challenges remain.  For example, development of an airborne data network radio that is  critical to carrier landing and aerial refueling operations has been  suspended indefinitely, according to program officials. While the program  is proceeding with an earlier version of the radio, program officials note  that the future is uncertain. Furthermore, the Defense Contract  Management Agency expressed concern about the UCAS-D program  entering system development; the program may use different technologies  than are currently being demonstrated, likely resulting in significant  additional development costs.
In addition to the $1.4 billion in funding detailed in table 1, we noted fiscal  year 2007 funding of $97.1 million, and program officials identified   $1.3 billion of known funding for either the Navy UCAS-D or DARPA J- UCAS programs before fiscal year 2007—yet acknowledged the amount  may not represent total previous funding. DOD, assuming no future cost  increases, will have spent at least $2.8 billion for two demonstration  aircraft.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The Air Force’s Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP) is a common,  scalable family of sensors designed for medium- and high-altitude aircraft.  ASIP is expected to provide the warfighter with automatic, real-time,  battlefield surveillance, situational awareness, and intelligence  information that may be composed of communications and electronic  signals—commonly referred to as signals intelligence (SIGINT).
Within the ASIP program, the Air Force is developing three different  sensor variants: (1) a baseline variant to be integrated onto the U-2 and  unmanned Global Hawk aircraft; (2) a scaled-down variant, designated the  ASIP 1C, to be integrated onto the unmanned Predator; and (3) a midsized  variant, the ASIP 2C, to be integrated onto Reaper and potentially the  Army’s Sky Warrior, which are also unmanned aircraft. The ASIP program  office is responsible for developing and testing the sensors, while the  individual aircraft program offices will be responsible for sensor  production and integration.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: The ASIP baseline sensor underwent an operational assessment in  February 2008. The results of that assessment indicated that the program  was on track to meet its effectiveness and suitability requirements. The  program completed developmental testing in February 2009 and plans to  begin operational testing using a U-2 aircraft in March 2009. Officials noted  that the Air Force intends to use the operational testing on the U-2 to  assess the baseline sensor’s readiness for initial operational testing on  Global Hawk. Depending on the results of the U-2 tests, the Air Force may  leave the developmental unit on the U-2 for continuing operational use.
Flight testing on Global Hawk began in September 2008, and initial  operational testing is scheduled to begin in late fiscal year 2009. However,  the Global Hawk program officials recently indicated that the program will  not meet its planned starting date for operational testing, and according to  the ASIP Program Manager, it will most likely not begin until early 2010.  The Global Hawk program office plans to purchase a total of 25 ASIP  sensors for its Block 30 aircraft beginning in fiscal year 2009. According to  the program office, those ASIP-equipped aircraft will not be fielded,  however, until 3 years later, because of sensor production and integration.  In October 2008, DOD approved the purchase of 2 sensors and the  program will seek approval for an additional 3 sensors in spring 2009,  depending upon successful completion of developmental testing.
Integration and developmental testing of the ASIP 1C sensor will begin in  summer 2009. According to the program office, the total number of ASIP  1C sensors to be produced is critically linked to the Air Force’s Predator  purchases and has not yet been finalized. Regardless, ASIP program  officials are operating under the assumption that ASIP 1C production will  begin in 2010.
Air Force officials noted that uncertainties about 1C and 2C production  quantities are in large part the result of uncertainties about the number of  Predators and Reapers the Air Force will ultimately purchase. In addition,  officials stated that if the Air Force purchases the Army’s Sky Warrior  airframe to upgrade its Predators, it will have to purchase more 2C sensors  and fewer 1Cs. However, according to DOD officials, the Air Force is  planning to end Predator procurement and pursue an all-Reaper fleet.
ASIP program officials noted that developmental efforts on the 1C sensor  will continue regardless of final production decisions because knowledge  gained from the 1C sensor is an integral part of the 2C sensor’s  development. Because of the modular design of ASIP and the high level of  commonality between the three ASIP variants, the program office plans to  seek approval to bypass a formal 2C development program and enter  directly into production.
Under DOD’s direction, all three ASIP sensor efforts have been combined  under one major defense acquisition program—recently designated  Acquisition Category ID. However, officials stated that the Air Force will  continue to manage the program as though it were three separate  programs.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: According to the program office, the ASIP baseline sensor has experienced  110 percent cost growth from its original estimate, primarily because of  capability enhancements, schedule impacts, and increased hardware  deliveries. Program officials stated that although the baseline sensor’s  development is on schedule, the program is affected by fluctuations within  Global Hawk. Since Global Hawk’s schedule has continued to slip, ASIP  program officials recently sought and received approval to begin ASIP  operational testing on the U-2. The program office noted that the Air Force  had not originally planned to conduct ASIP operational tests, but given the  disconnect between ASIP developmental test completion and the  beginning of Global Hawk initial operational testing, officials believe that  additional operational testing on the U-2 would allow them to gain  knowledge and further reduce risk before beginning Global Hawk testing.
In January 2009, DOD directed the Army and the Air Force to analyze ASIP  and the Army’s Tactical SIGINT Payload in an effort to move to a common  SIGINT sensor. However, in response the services emphasized that after  15 months of collaboration, a joint program does not make sense and  recommended that an independent organization conduct the analysis and  provide further direction.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The Air Force’s Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP- RTIP) is being designed as a modular, scalable, two-dimensional active  electronically scanned array radar. The Global Hawk MP-RTIP variant will  provide persistent imaging on a long-endurance platform, with improved  ground moving target indicator, limited air moving target indicators, and  synthetic aperture radar imaging over current capability.
MP-RTIP was originally intended for multiple platforms, including the E- 10A multisensor command and control aircraft, a large variant of the  Boeing 767 aircraft. However, the E-10A program was canceled in 2007  and all current development efforts are directed to integrating the radar  into the Block 40 configuration of the Air Force Global Hawk unmanned  aerial vehicle. The weight and power restrictions of the Global Hawk  platform require a smaller radar than the variant designed for the E-10A  aircraft.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: In September 2006, flight testing began after installation of a Global Hawk  MP-RTIP development unit on a Proteus, a surrogate test bed aircraft.  Proteus flight testing is planned to be complete in March 2009, which is a  delay from September 2007. According to program officials, radar antenna  calibration issues caused significant delays in maturing software. By June  2009, the MP-RTIP program plans to deliver one MP-RTIP development  unit to the Global Hawk program for developmental testing though  officials told us that delivery could be delayed further if Global Hawk is  not ready to receive the radar at that time. Thereafter, the MP-RTIP  program office will support the Global Hawk program through completion  of initial operational testing, which is planned to start no later than  November 2010. The Air Force currently funds development of the radar  through the MP-RTIP program, while production will be funded through  the Global Hawk program. Furthermore, officials told us that the Air Force  continues to investigate other platforms for the radar.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: According to program officials, the MP-RTIP program office coordinates  with the Global Hawk program office to prepare to integrate the radar on  the Global Hawk Block 40 configuration in June 2009. Officials also told us  that the two offices coordinated the fit tests for the radar in fall 2008, and  continue coordination as they conducted radar system performance-level  verification through March 2009.
Development costs for MP-RTIP have decreased, largely because of the E- 10A program cancellation, according to officials. In total, these costs have  decreased by 23 percent, from $1.7 billion at the program’s December 2003  start to $1.3 billion as of December 2007.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, principal contributors to this  report were Bruce Fairbairn, Assistant Director; Travis Masters; Rae Ann  Sapp; Karen Sloan; Leigh Ann Nally; Raffaele Roffo; Brian Smith; and  Laura Jezewski.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.   GAO-09-326SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2009.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve  Management and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter  Needs. GAO-09-175. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Requirements Determination Process Has  Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities. GAO-08-1060.  Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could  Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes. GAO-08-619.  Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2008.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can Better Assess  and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of Future ISR  Requirements. GAO-08-374. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD’s Intelligence,  Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems. GAO-07-578. Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2007.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary  Observations on DOD’s Approach to Managing Requirements for New  Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development. GAO-07-596T.  Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Better Acquisition Strategy Needed for Successful  Development of the Army’s Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System.   GAO-06-593. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2006.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition  Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges. GAO-06-610T.  Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past  Efforts to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies.   GAO-06-447. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Cost Increase Understated in  Nunn-McCurdy Report. GAO-06-222R. Washington, D.C.: December 15,  2005.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote  Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments. GAO-06-49.  Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition  Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-395T.  Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2005.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk’s Acquisition  Strategy Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks. GAO-05-6. Washington,  D.C.: November 5, 2004.